Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe 9780231878746

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BALKAN UNION

BY THEODORE I. GESHKOFF

NEW Y O R K : M O R N I N G S I D E

HEIGHTS

COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y 19 4 0

PRESS

Copyright

1940

CARNEGIE E N D O W M E N T FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Published 1940 C O L U M B I A UNIVERSITY PRESS, N E W

Foreign Agents: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, House, London, E.C., 4, England, AND Β. Bombay, India; M A R U Z E N C O M P A N Y , Tori-Nichome, Tokyo,

YORK

Humphrey Milford, Amen I. Building, Nicol Road, Ltd., 6 Nihonbashi, Japan

MANUFACTURED IN T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO T H E M E M O R Y of Alexander Stoymenoff Stambulisky—publicist, member of parliament, prime minister of Bulgaria—who lived and died for democracy, peace, and union in the Balkans

FOREWORD

T

H E P A G E of European history with which this volume deals is one so out of keeping with the major trend of that history at the present time as to seem utterly unreal. A t a time when politics of power are dominant in those very nations which for a while led in the great experiment of the League of Nations, the story of the effort to extend and apply the instruments of international peace to the Balkan countries reads almost like a tale from another era. Y e t the fact remains that that era persisted longer in southeastern Europe than the history of the past would have led one to expect. Nowhere else were the conditions of enduring peace more difficult to achieve than in that corner of Europe where the Turkish empire had maintained medieval conditions down to our own day, where peasants living in isolated mountain valleys maintained the blood feud of tribal life, and the memory of ancient wrongs blocked the path of neighborly understanding. With a population backward in education and a geographical position which made them the pawn of imperialist policies on the part of the Great Powers, the Balkan countries emerged on the theater of European history long after western Europe had acquired political maturity. It seems hardly reasonable to expect them to carry on of their own free will that movement toward international peace and cooperation which proved too difficult for even western Europe to build into an effective system. Nevertheless the effort, which this book describes, to achieve these high and unaccustomed ends constitutes a definite phase of the politics of southeastern Europe the traces of which have by no means been obliterated from that part of the world. There is a theory widely held both here and in England as well as on the Continent that small nations constitute a barrier on the pathway to international peace. According to this theory, peace beween nations is achieved b y a process similar to that which suppressed the disorders of feudalism within the state and made national sovereignty synonymous with law and order. The larger the state, therefore, the larger the

viii

FOREWORD

area of peace. Viewed from this angle, the small powers are impediments to a development in which the Great Powers lead by the very nature of their history and situation. At Geneva more than once the representatives of the Great Powers have given voice to this theory when impatient at the refusal of the statesmen of the smaller countries to accept the proposals offered to them. Indeed, one of the causes of the present breakdown of the European state system is the very fact that the governments of the Great Powers did not appreciate what the small powers could offer toward the stabilization of Europe. Actually, in the period since the World War the responsibiliy for the disturbance of the peace has lain more with the Great Powers than with the small ones. Whether because of the movement described in the following pages or for other reasons, the history of southeastern Europe in the postwar years offers a note of encouragement to those who still believe that the self-determination of peoples is a valid as well as a just system of international polity. In this development, the role of the League of Nations is of an importance which should be emphasized in these days of confusion and retrogression. A Greek statesman, Politis, with Benes of Czechoslovakia and their Bulgarian and Jugoslav colleagues, framed some of the League's most important instruments of international pacification. There furnished models for local application in the Balkans in the way described by Dr. Geshkoff. But the old methods are slow to disappear, and the surprising thing is that when the Greek dictator Pangalos tested the vitality of the League by the incipient war with Bulgaria in 1925, it was the structure of peace which prevailed. The prestige of the League was heightened in the Balkans by this incident so that the movement for political association of the Balkan powers was almost as much the expression of their recent history as it was of the ideals of a few advanced leaders. It is a strange paradox that the same Conservative government of Great Britain which rejected the Protocol of Geneva because of its system of guarantees has now been obliged to seek for itself, without the support of the general system of pacification which Geneva had offered, guarantees similar to those that it refused for others. Judged on the face of the record, the movement for the Balkan Union here described was but a local and temporary extension of the essential elements of the system of the League of Nations; and it would seem to have passed away leaving hardly a trace in practical politics. But this conclusion is both misleading and superficial. The movement was but one form of expression of the trend toward better understand-

FOREWORD

ix

ing and more pacific policies on the part of the nations concerned. It was a movement the extent and importance of which are hard to gauge because of the constant interference of the Great Powers. Nevertheless, it is significant that the new Turkey, the creation of Atatürk, one of the greatest statesmen of our day, has to some extent taken the leadership in the effort to build a more solid structure of peace in southeastern Europe and to buttress it by extending the same policies through western Asia to the very frontiers of India. This movement, while more obscure and less effective than that which has been drawing the small powers of northern Europe together, nevertheless resembles it in aim and purpose. Should it succeed in its difficult task, the dream of a Balkan federation would be more than justified. In this volume Dr. Geshkoff has analyzed with meticulous care the records of the meetings held in the various Balkan countries for the purpose of shaping a Balkan union. The narrative follows the official documentation closely and is throughout held strictly to the obligations of objective scholarship. The author, however, brings to the interpretation of the data an intimate knowledge of Balkan politics from the days when he was a close associate of the late Premier Stambulisky in the enlightened attempt to bring about a policy of genuine pacification. The tragedy of Europe and of our time is that nations both great and small have not known how to appreciate at its full value the wisdom of that statesmanship which sees that peace is a function of justice. The study of these texts will bring home once more to the thoughtful reader the unescapable consequences which flow from this great fact. JAMES T .

SHOTWELL

PREFACE

T

H E BALKANS are usually reported to the outside world only in time of terror and trouble; the rest of the time they are scornfully ignored. Kipling epitomized this attitude by exclaiming in The Light That Failed: "Speaking of war, there'll be trouble in the Balkans in the spring." The word "Balkanization," meaning perennial division and strife, was coined as a term of reproach. And, as Arnold Toynbee noted, "certain publicists had been moved to declare that if Eastern Europe could be sunk beneath the sea, the peace of the West would be assured." The present volume describes the very significant movement for the de-Balkanization of the Balkans. It gives an outline of the development and application of the federal idea in the Balkans since antiquity and a broad summary of the results achieved by the annual Balkan Conference during the 1930s for the rapprochement, entente, and union of the Balkan States. It is mainly based on the Documents officiels, published by the Secretariat of the Balkan Conference, with the support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in the periodical Les Balkans (Athens, Greece) as well as in separate volumes. A native Bulgarian, this writer must, first of all, make a confession of faith. He does not believe in Stephen Decatur's dictum: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." He would rather say, like Mazzini in Duties of Man: "Ask yourselves whether you do an action in the sphere of your country, or your family, if what I am doing were done by all and for all, would it advantage or injure Humanity? and if your conscience answers, it would injure Humanity, desist, even if it seems to you that an immediate advantage for your country or your family would ensue from your action." He would exclaim, with Herbert Asquith in A Call to Arms, "For my part, I say that sooner than be a silent witness, which means a willing accomplice to this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history." And he would approve,

xii

PREFACE

with Woodrow Wilson, ' The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot presently be destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence." This volume would have never been written if it were not for the sympathetic interest, suggestion, and support of Professor James T. Shotwell, Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The writer's debt of gratitude to Professor Shotwell as well as to the Carnegie Endowment could not be expressed in words. Thanks are due to other professors at Columbia University who have not spared their time to help the author with valuable criticism and suggestions; to the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment in Paris and to the various national groups of the Balkan Conference for their aid in obtaining some of the Documents officiels; to Dr. Stephen Kyroff, Professor Emeritus of Public Law at the National University of Sofia, Bulgaria, for supplying certain documents ; and to the various editors and publishers who have given permission to quote from their publications. No one but the author is responsible for any errors in these pages. He is fully aware of the inadequacy of his equipment and the resulting imperfections in this volume; but he does not doubt the importance and the timeliness of the subject matter of this work. May it contribute to the strength of the idea of a Balkan union, not as a Utopia but as a fact in the near future! THEODORE I.

Columbia University February 1, 1940

GESHKOFF

CONTENTS by James Τ. Shotwell

FOREWORD

vii

PREFACE

XI

ABBREVIATIONS

XV PART

T H E I. II. III. IV.

BALKANS

IN

3

FEDERALISM AND N A T I O N A L I S M

18

THE

39

BALKAN LEAGUE

A H E C T I C DECADE

T H E

61

THE

O R I G I N OF T H E

VI.

THE

BALKAN

VII.

THE

CONSTITUTION

VIII.

THE

F O U N D A T I O N OF T H E

XI. XII.

OF

BALKAN

T H E

BALKANS

CONFERENCE

77

C O N F E R E N C E AT W O R K OF T H E B A L K A N

PART

X.

II

DE-BALKANIZATION

V.

IX.

R E T R O S P E C T

FEDERALISM A N D I M P E R I A L I S M

PART

T H E

I

R A P P R O C H E M E N T

OF

91 CONFERENCE

BALKAN UNION

109 121

III T H E

BALKAN

STATES

ECONOMIC RAPPROCHEMENT

143

C U L T U R A L COOPERATION

163

POLITICAL R A P P R O C H E M E N T

181

THE

203

BALKAN E N T E N T E

xiv

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

1. Circular-Invitation

235

2. The Statutes of the Balkan Conference

240

3. The Draft Statutes of the Balkan and Social Union

248

Parliamentary

4. The Reply of the Greek National Group to the Questionnaire on the Balkan Union

255

5. The Statutes of the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

261

6. The Statutes of the Maritime Section of the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

268

7. The Statutes of the Balkan Cooperatives Office

271

8. The Draft Convention on a Balkan Labor Office

273

9. The Draft Convention on the Personal Status of Balkan Nationals

277

10. The Draft Entente

Convention

on Regional

Economic 284

11. The Balkan Postal Union Convention

288

12. The Bucharest Draft Balkan Pact

290

13. The Balkan Entente

300

BIBLIOGRAPHY

311

INDEX

327

SKETCH

OF THE

BALKAN

REGION

2

ABBREVIATIONS A JIL—American Journal of International Law Aussenpolittk—Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischenkrise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, Wien, 1930, 9 vols. BD—G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, ed., British Documents on the Origin of the War 1898-1914 BFSP—British and Foreign State Papers BIN—Bulletin of International News BOB—Bulgarian Orange Book (secret documents concerning Bulgaria's participation in the World War), Sofia, 1921, 2 vols. BPP—British Parliamentary Papers or Blue Books BTS—British Treaty Series CAH—Cambridge Ancient History CH—Current History CMH—Cambridge Medieval History CR—Congressional Record CUP—Congris universel de la paix Die grosse Politik—Die grosse Politik der europäischen Cabinette, Berlin, 1922, 48 vols. DNS—Dnevnitsi na Narodnoto Sobranie ("Journals of the National Assembly"), Sofia, 1879— DV—Derzhaven vestnik ("State Journal"), Sofia, 1879— EN—L'Europe nouvelle FPAR—Foreign Policy Association Reports Hertslet—Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, London, 1875-91, 4 vols. IC—International Conciliation Series I CB—Pre Conference balkanique (Athenes, 5-12 octobre 1930), Documents officiels, Athenes, 1931, 435 pp. II CB—IIime Conference balkanique (Istanbul-Ankara, 19-26 octobre 1931), Documents officiels, Premiere partie, Istanbul, 1932, 310 pp. III CB—III*me Conference balkanique (Bucarest, 22-29 octobre 1932), Documents officiels, Bucarest, 1933, 550 pp. IV CB—IV'me Conference balkanique (Salonique, 5-12 novembre

xvi

ABBREVIATIONS

1933), Documents officiels, Athenes, 1934, 550 pp. LB—Les Balkans LN—League of Nations LNBIWIO—League of Nations Bulletin of Information on the Work of International Organizations LNHIO—League of Nations Handbook of International Organizations LNMS—League of Nations Monthly Summary LNOJ—League of Nations Official Journal LNP—League of Nations Publications LNTS—League of Nations Treaty Series MP—Le Mouvement pacifiste NE—Near East (November 1, 1911-June 25, 1925), later Near East and India (July 2, 1925-September 19, 1935), and now Great Britain and the East Νoradounghian—G. Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman, Paris, 1897-1903, 4 vols. NYT—New York Times Obvinitelen akt—Obvinitelen akt protiv bivshite ministri ot kabineta na Dr. V. Radoslavoff prez 1913-18 godini ("Act of Accusation against the Former Ministers of the Cabinet of Dr. V. Radoslavoff during the Years of 1913-18"), Sofia, 1921 PH—Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks, London, 1920 PSQ—Political Science Quarterly RDI—Revue de droit international RDILC—Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee RGDIP—Revue generale de droit international public RHD—Revue d'histoire diplomatique SED—Senate Executive Documents Sb—Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sbornik za narodni umotvoreniya ("Collection of Folklore"), Sofia SI A—Survey of International Affairs SR—Slavonic Review Temperley—H. W. V. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, 1920 USFR—United States Foreign Relations USTS— United States Treaty Series YB—Year Book

Part I T H E B A L K A N S IN RETROSPECT

Chapter I FEDERALISM AND

IMPERIALISM

T

H E R O O T of the problems which confront the Balkan States goes deep down into their history," Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler remarked, "and their situation cannot be understood or interpreted without knowledge of the ethnological, religious, economic and political differences and interests the effect of which is constantly in evidence." 1 In attempting to understand the intricacies of the Balkan problems it is useful to have "an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it." 2 While a discussion of the long and checkered Balkan history would be out of place here, a brief survey of the past attempts at organizing the Balkan peoples into a federal union is indispensable for a clear understanding of the feasibility of a future Balkan federation or confederation. THE

BALKAN

QUESTION

Since the early part of the nineteenth century the name Balkans— a Slavonic or Turkish word meaning mountains—has been given to the most easterly of the three southern prolongations of the European continent, which had previously been known as the Eastern peninsula or Illyrian peninsula. This change in geographical designation was probably made to frustrate Napoleon's ambitions to include the whole peninsula in his creation, the confederation of the Illyrian Provinces. The perennial struggle for domination or control of this peninsula has brought forth a complexity of problems, known at first as the Eastern Question, then as the Near Eastern Question, and at last as the Balkan Question. 1 1

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, YB, 1926, p. 42. Thucydides, History oj the Peloponnesian War, Book i, § 22. 3 J. B. Bury, A History of the Later Roman Empire, I, 261; J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (ed. 1930), p. 21; D. G. Hogarth, The Sear East, p. 7; X. D. Harris, Europe and the East, p. 23. 2

4

F E D E R A L I S M AND

IMPERIALISM

Most of the problems offered by the Balkan Question are chiefly due to three causes. First, the Balkan peninsula is a region of transition between Asia and Europe—between " E a s t " and "West"—with their incompatible political, religious, and social ideals. At the same time it is not separated from the European continental mainland by a high mountain barrier, as the Apennine or Italian peninsula is separated by the Alps and the Iberian peninsula by the Pyrenees. The Danube and its tributary the Sava, and sometimes even the Carpathians, have been considered the northern limits of the Balkan peninsula. This ill-defined region is thus open to invasion from at least two sides, Asiatic and European. Second, various races have from time to time entered the Balkan peninsula as conquerors or settlers, sometimes occupying definite areas but frequently dwelling side by side, with little or no amalgamation, in districts to which none of them could justify exclusive claim. The many mountains and a complicated river system have made it difficult, if not impossible, for a single race among the various settlers to absorb or assimilate all others and thus form a single nation in the region. So long as vigorous conquerors—Philip and Alexander of Macedonia, the Roman and Constantinople emperors, or the Turkish sultans—held these different peoples together in subjection, they would live side by side in comparative tranquillity. But as soon as the imperial power was removed or weakened they would show tendencies toward dynastic, national, or racial animosities which often led them to division and strife, laying waste the whole region. Third, this peninsula has been of great international commercial and economic importance, as controlling the main trade routes between East and West, particularly the Danube and the Straits, thus affecting the interests of distant nations. This importance, so conspicuous in ancient and medieval times, diminished with the discovery of the sea route around Africa to India; but it was revived again in recent times with the reopening of the overland routes to India, the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the various projects of railway communications between Europe and Asia, notably that of the famous or notorious Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. 4 4 Λ. H. Lybyer, "The Influence of the Rise of the Ottoman Turks upon the Routes of Oriental Trade," American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1914, I, 195; C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (London, 1917); J. P. Chamberlain, The Danube, Dept. of State, Confidential Document (1918); J. T. Shot well, "A Short History of the Question of Constantinople and the Straits," 1C, No. 180 (1922) ; Ε. M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway (New York, 1924).

F E D E R A L I S M AND

IMPERIALISM

E A R L Y U N I O N S OF B A L K A N

S

PEOPLES

Two ideas have been contending for mastery over the Balkan peoples ever since antiquity. One is the idea of federalism—a union of tribes, cities, cantons, or nationalities, established on the basis of equality. The other is the idea of imperialism—a union in which one tribe, city, canton, or nationality dominates the others. In the earliest historical times the whole eastern part of the Balkan peninsula, bounded by the Danube, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean, and the Struma River, was known as Thrace, the northern part along the Adriatic as Illyria, the lower basin of the Vardar as Macedonia, and the southernmost part as Greece or Hellas. If Herodotus, the "Father of History," could be credited, 5 the Thracians were "the biggest nation in the world, next to the Indians." But since they were, in the words of the Scriptures, a "house divided against itself," 8 the Thracians were ultimately blotted out of the pages of history. Their kinsmen, the Illyrians and the. Macedonians, had a similar fate. 7 More fortunate than any of the early Balkan peoples were the Greeks or Hellenes, who had since time immemorial organized themselves into religious amphictyonies or "unions of neighbors," the most famous of which was the Delphic Amphictyony. This union of twelve tribes dwelling around the Thermopylae observed certain principles of comity and endeavored to humanize warfare. Its members took the following oath: "We will not destroy an Amphictyonic city, or cut it from running water, in war or peace; if anyone shall do this we will march against him, and destroy his city." The league was governed by a council to which each tribe sent two delegates (hieromnemones) with voting powers and several observers (pylagores) entitled to take part in the debates and to propose measures. As the most important deliberative assembly in ancient Greece, the Amphictyonic Council had great moral authority; but it was in itself an ineffective body, having no power or means to enforce its decisions. Nevertheless, this quasi-federal union has served as a pattern for almost all subsequent actual or contemplated confederations or leagues.8 β

J. T. Shotwell, Introduction to the History of History, p. 152. Matt. 12:25. 7 The History of Herodotus, Book v, 5 3; also Thucydides, Book ii, §§ 95-99. "Herodotus, Book vii, §8 213-14; E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Rome (ed. Bury; New York: Macmillan, 1893), p. 95, cited hereafter as Freeman; C. Phillipson. The International Law and Customs in Ancient Greece and Rome (ed. 1911), II, 5; W. E. Darby, International Tribunals, pp. 1 ff.; Aeschincs, On the Embassy, § 115; The Federalist, No. XVIII. 6

6

FEDERALISM AND

IMPERIALISM

Ancient Greece had gradually developed into separate and independent city-states. Early in the sixth century before Christ, Thales wisely counseled the Greek city-states in Asia Minor to form a sort of federation in order to defend their independence against aggression on the part of the Lydians and Persians. Later, Aristides and Pericles offered plans for the establishment of a Panhellenic confederacy or league, including all the Greek city-states, to ensure and promote peace, commerce, and navigation. But though all Greeks spoke practically the same language, worshiped the same gods, and shared in the same national festivals, their separate city-states had different political constitutions. In the words of Thucydides, the oligarchical Spartans ("Lacedaemonians") were always "apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character of the Athenians." Hence the temporary alliance between Athens and Sparta was dissolved soon after the Persians had been driven back to Asia, and the Greeks again divided into two hostile camps—Sparta against Athens, Dorians against Ionians, oligarchy against democracy. 9 Consequently two regional confederacies came into being, the Peloponnesian League or Lacedaemonian Confederacy with the oligarchical Sparta as the leading city-state or hegemon, and the First Athenian League or Confederacy of Delos with the democratic Athens as the hegemon. Both were based in theory on what the Greeks called isopoliteia: each city-state was obliged to give its citizenship to the citizens of the other members of the union, who might visit it or reside in it; but each city-state was to remain an autonomous and separate entity, and the common affairs of the union were to be managed by a synod or congress consisting of delegates from each city-state. 10 Ancient democracy was as susceptible to the virus of imperialism as oligarchy. For instance, Aristides "the Just" took the customary oath in the name of the democratic Athens, cursing against such of the members of the Confederacy of Delos as should make breaches of their vows; but afterwards he advised the Athenians to throw the perjury upon him and manage the affairs of the union as their convenience and interests required. The allies of Athens unwittingly became "tributaries and slaves," heavily oppressed by Athenian cleruchies and garrisons. The congress (synod) of the union ceased to meet, and, again on the advice of Aristides, the federal treasury was removed from Delos to "Herodotus, Book i, 1 1 7 0 ; Thucydidcs, Book i, § 102; Plutarch's Lives, "Aristides," § 25, "Pericles," § 17; Freeman, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 10 Herodotus, Book i, §§ 106-7; Plutarch's Lives, "Themistocles," i 20. "Cimon," § 11; G. Gilbert, The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, pp. 416-36.

F E D E R A L I S M AND

IMPERIALISM

7

Athens. The Confederacy of Delos was thus transformed into an Athenian empire. 11 Moreover, Athens found herself in an alliance with the "barbarian" monarchies of Macedonia and Thrace; but this North Aegean Confederacy, perhaps the earliest Balkan League, lasted only about three years (431-29 B.C.), mainly because the democratic Athens tried to evade her obligations toward her monarchical allies. Furthermore, the relentless rivalry between Athens and Sparta for the hegemony in Greece resulted in a long Peloponnesian war the upshot of which was the defeat of Athens and the destruction of her empire. 12 In the first quarter of the fourth century, before Christ, Athens recovered from her disastrous defeat and took advantage of the bad impression caused by Sparta's oligarchical imperialism in order to reconstitute the Confederacy of Delos. This union, called the Second Athenian League, was to be governed by a congress consisting of two coordinated branches, one to comprise the Athenian council and assembly, the other to be composed of delegates from all the remaining members of the union. But no regulations were drawn up for the delicate task of assessing the financial and military liabilities of its members and no machinery was provided for removing a deadlock between the two branches of the federal congress. The Second Athenian League was soon transformed from an instrument of security to the Aegean communities into a pirate organization; and, irredeemably bankrupt, its final destruction was only a matter of time. Likewise, the Boeotian League, which was reconstituted on a democratic basis after the unexpected defeat of Sparta by Thebes in 371 B.C., soon became a Theban empire. And the policy of the balance of power divided Greece among the three great city-states, Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. 13 In view of the dismal failure of both democracy and oligarchy to unite the Greek city-states into one confederacy, Plato, in the fifth book of the Republic, spoke of the "philosopher king" and in the Laws, of the "young tyrant." Isocrates was longing, in his Panegyricus, for the commander in chief who would lead a united Greece to the "East" against n Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 44S-53; L. Curtius, The Commonwealth of Nations (1917), pp. 4 1 - 5 0 ; A. E. Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth (1931), p. 179; W. S. Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, p. 11; CAH, V, 33 ff. 12 T h u c y d i d e s , Book i, §§ 67, 73-77, 118-25; Book ii, § 9 5 ; Plutarch's Lives, "Lysander," "Alcibiades," "Nicias"; S. Casson, Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria, p. 183; CAH, V. 33 ff. 13 F. H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy, Cambridge Historical Essay, No. 13: Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 4 3 3 - 4 5 ; Freeman, pp. 120-44; Plutarch's Lives, "Pelopidas"; CAH, VI, 348-75; PSQ, X X V ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 271-96.

8

FEDERALISM

AND

IMPERIALISM

the Persian empire. The prolific mind of Xenophon extolled the virtues of a wise king such as Cyrus of Persia. Thus was the way prepared for Philip II, who ascended the throne of Macedonia in 359 B.C. After ruthlessly exterminating his enemies and rivals he became, in the words of Demosthenes, "in his single person Lord of all things, both open and secret, at once General and Lord Absolute and Treasurer." Philip gradually conquered Thrace, Illyria, and all Greece except Sparta. He then summoned a congress at Corinth and established the Panhellenic League, with himself as strategos-autocrator. But when he was assassinated in 336 B.C. his Balkan empire as well as the League of Corinth immediately disintegrated. 14 Yet his putative son, Alexander the Great, rapidly reconquered Illyria, Thrace, and Greece; he then razed Thebes to the ground in order to inspire terror in the hearts of the liberty-loving Greeks and summoned another congress at Corinth to reconstitute the Panhellenic League, with himself as captain general. Leaving Antipater, his most trusted general, to govern his European dominions and to supervise the League of Corinth, Alexander led his hordes of Macedonians, Illyrians, Thracians, and Greeks into Asia to conquer the Persian empire. The aim of that early totalitarian was to establish a universal empire, with himself as emperor-god. By violating all laws, human and divine, he made "Macedonian" the name of the most hated man in the ancient world. Fortunately he did not live long enough to realize his dreams of transplanting the Asiatics in Europe and the Europeans in Asia; if he had, his empire would have become one in which the Asiatic elements would have outweighed the European, and the Oriental theocratic conceptions and habits would have probably extinguished the nascent liberal ideas of the Occident. The monarchical Confederacy of Corinth, which included all the Greek city-states except Sparta, as well as the vast Macedonian empire, like many an organization hinged entirely upon the personality of one man, fell to pieces as soon as Alexander died at Babylon in 323 B . C . 1 5 After four decades of confused warfare among the ambitious Macedonian generals, another type of union approaching real federation flourished in Greece for a century and a half. Again free Greece was 1 4 Herodotus, Book v, § 22; Demosthenes, Philippica, iii, § 40, De corona, § 233; D. C. Hogarth, Philip and Alexander of Macedon, pp. 159, 179; C.4H, VI, 348 ff.; Plutarch's Lives, "Alexander," 5 9. 1 5 Plutarch's Lives, "Alexander," "Eumcnes," "Pyrrhus," "Dcmetrios"; G. Grote, History of Greece, X I I , 528; CAH, VI, 437 ff.

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

9

divided into two main regional confederations: the Aetolian League, a union of cantons; and the Achaean League, a union of cities. Both were based in theory on sympoliteia: each member of the union still kept its citizenship, but a new community and a new authority of true federal character arose; every man had a double citizenship, one in his own canton or city and the other in the federal community; each canton or city retained its autonomy, while each remitted to the federal authority a large control over common affairs, particularly foreign relations and national defense. It was again the rivalry between these two confederations—a rivalry as relentless as that between Athens and Sparta of old—that ultimately led them, together with the other Balkan peoples, into the laps of the Romans.1® FOUNDATION

OF

NATIONALITIES

By a subtle policy of divide et impera the city-state of Rome, imitating Athens, gradually reduced her allies, the other city-states of the Latin League, to the status of mere subjects or slaves, and then, in the course of about three centuries, conquered the entire civilized world. The Romans at first suppressed all the Greek confederations and strove to weaken every Greek city by isolating it. However, they left the Delphic Amphictyony to survive as a religious association as late as the second century of the Christian era. The emperor Hadrian even fostered the formation of a Panhellenic synedrion with a view to uniting all the Greeks in one cultural association. Thus, unwittingly, the Romans helped to obliterate the separatists influences of the ancient Greek city-states, and consequently the Athenians and the Spartans, the Ionians and the Dorians, the Achaeans and the Aetolians lost their distinctive characteristics and blended into one people, called Romaioi. Greek, moreover, was adopted as the language of the Christian Church, and after Christianity became the established religion of the Roman empire it became of importance equal if not superior to that of the official Latin language. On the division of the Roman empire into two separate states, A.D. 395, the Balkan provinces fell to the lot of the Eastern Roman empire, better known as Byzantium, with Constantinople as its capital. Not long afterwards, the Eastern Roman empire was made in fact, if not in name, a Greek empire, whose tradiin Freeman, pp. 170 ff.; C. Phillipson. op. cit., II, 26-29; M . Dubois. Les Ligues Uolienne et acheenne (Paris, 1885); W. W. Capes, ed., The History of the Achaean League as Contained in the Remains of Polybius (London. 1888) ; H. YVheaton, History oj the Lau< of Nations (ed. 1842), p. 18; The Federalist, Nos. XVI, X V I I I , X L V .

10

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

tions were to mold the characteristics of the various Balkan peoples for more than a thousand years.17 During the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, the Roman provinces were depopulated and devastated by oppressive imperial taxation, by plague, by earthquake, and, above all, by the invasions of the Goths, Huns, and Avars. Then Slav tribes migrated en masse from their old home north of the Carpathians to the Roman provinces of Moesia, Thrace, Illyria, and Macedonia, thus converting them into Slavinias, theoretically vassal of the emperors of Constantinople but practically independent. As Gibbon said, the Slavs "disdained to obey a despot, a prince, or even a magistrate; but their experience was too narrow, their passions too headstrong, to compose a system of equal law or general defense. Some voluntary respect was yielded to age and valour, but each tribe or village existed as a separate republic, and all must be persuaded where none could be compelled." 13 With their superior civilization and culture, the Greeks might have absorbed or assimilated these Slavs, just as they succeeded in converting them to Christianity. Thus a single Greek-speaking nation could have been established in the Balkans. Being farmers, however, the Slavs seem to have been treated by the Greeks as Aristotle had prescribed: "husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same nation, or men of any spirit." 19 The headstrong Slavs were soon dissatisfied with their status of Greek slaves or vassals. In A.D. 678 "seven Slav tribes" dwelling in Lower Moesia revolted from the fiscal oppression of the imperial officials, entered into a "compact" with the Bulgarians ("Volgamen" or "plowmen"), a Slavized Ugro-Finnish people, and thus established a monarchical confederacy by the name of Bulgaria. A year later, Emperor Constantine IV was constrained to recognize the new Balkan state. For centuries afterwards, Byzantium and Bulgaria had to live side by side, now as allies and now as enemies. It was an alliance between Bulgaria and Byzantium that repelled and drove back to Asia the Saracens of Moslemah early in the eighth century. Emperor Jus1 7 Freeman, p. 572; J . L. E. Ortolan, History of Roman Law (ed. 1896), § 181; Th. Mommsen, History of Rome: Provinces, I, 224; G. Finlay, History oj Greece (ed. 1877), I, 44; Plutarch's Lives, "Sulla," § 12; Tacitus, Annals, Book i, §§ 76. 80. J 8 E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (ed. Bury), IV, 346; also Procopius, The Gothic War, Book vii, chap. 19, §5 22-29; Mauritius. Strategikon, Book xi, § 5 (in J . Schaffer, Ariani tactica et Mauricii artis militari libri [Uppsala, 1664], pp. 272-90, and in J . P. Schaffarik, Slavische Vlterthiimer I Leipzig, 1843], II. 665) ; Leo VI, Tactica, Book xviii, 5§ 99-108 (in J . P. Migne, Patrologiae Graeca, CVII, 968-72, and in Bibliotheque historique el militaire f 1840], I I I , 439-566). 1 9 Aristotle, Politics, Book vii, chap. 10, § 13.

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

11

tinian II conferred upon the Bulgarian king Terbel the title of caesar (Slavized as czar or tsar). In 864 Christianity became the established religion in Bulgaria. But the Slav provinces of the Byzantine empire always gravitated toward their kinsmen in Bulgaria, which caused many a war between Bulgaria and Byzantium. While the Bulgarians appeared as champions of federalism against Byzantine imperialism, the Bulgarian czars or tsars aspired not only to the establishment of a GrecoSlav confederacy by uniting Bulgaria and Byzantium but also to mounting the imperial throne of Constantinople. Especially was Simeon the Great (893-927) imbued with this idea; he arrogated to himself the title "Tsar and Autocrat of all the Bulgarians and Greeks." 20 Yet the Greeks were unwilling to recognize as equals, let alone as superiors, their former vassals. The instinct of self-preservation prompted the Byzantine emperors to ally themselves with the pagan Magyars and Patzinaks against Christian Bulgaria. In 963 Bulgaria, greatly reduced by external aggression and plunged into internal dissensions, was split into two separate states. Eastern Bulgaria was overrun by Svyatoslav, the pagan prince of Kiev, as Byzantine ally; Svyatoslav tried to establish a Russian empire in the Balkans. Emperor John Tzimisces allied himself with the Bulgarians and succeeded in driving the Russians north of the Danube. In 971 the emperor dethroned his ally, Tsar Boris II, and annexed Eastern Bulgaria to Byzantium. Western Bulgaria, after a short span of glory, was finally subjugated in 1018 by Emperor Basil II, "the Bulgarian-Slayer." 21 The unification of the Balkan peoples under the imperial government of Constantinople was not destined to be lasting. The fiscal oppression of the imperial officials kept the Slav provinces of the Byzantine empire in constant turmoil, while the Bogomilian "heretics" preserved the national or racial spirit of independence among the subjugated Slavs. In 1040 the Serbs, who had hitherto been Bulgarian subjects at one time and Byzantine vassals at another, rose in rebellion and shook off the Byzantine yoke. In 1186 the Bulgarians too revolted 20 D. Micheff, "Memoire," II CB, p. 65; J. B. Bury, A History of the Eastern Roman Empire (1912), p. 360; S. Runciman, A History of the First Bulgarian Empire, p. 337; F. Dvornik, Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome (1926), p. 184; Photius, Epistolae, Book viii, § 628 (Migne, Patrologiae Graeca, Vol. CHI) ; Response Nicolai Papae I ad consulta Bulgarorum anno 866 (Migne, Patrologiae Latinae, Vol. C X I X ) . 21 Finlay, op. cit., II, 376-81; F. A. Wright, trans., The Works of Liutprand of Cremona (London, 1930), p. 254; E. F. Henderson, Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages, p. 451; A. Rambaud, History of Russia, I, 72; N. P. Blagoeff, Bessedata na prezvyter Kozma protiv bogomiliti (Sofia, 1923); Tsar Samuelovata derzhava (Sofia, 1925); G. A. Illinsky, Gramoti bolgarskih tsarey (Moscow, 1911).

12

FEDERALISM AND

IMPERIALISM

from the Byzantine empire and established the Second Bulgarian empire, which for a while almost stifled the nascent Serbian nationality. In 1204 the pseudo-Crusaders captured Constantinople and established the ephemeral Latin empire. The remains of the Byzantine empire were partitioned between Nicaea, Trebizond, and Epirus. The Second Bulgarian empire, allied now with the Latins against the Greeks and now with the Greeks against the Latins, conquered Epirus and regained for a short time the glory of the First Bulgarian empire. But the crafty Bulgarian monarch, John Assen I I (1218-41), who resumed the title 'Tsar and Autocrat of All Bulgarians and Greeks," died without having gratified his ambition of capturing Constantinople and mounting the imperial throne. Thereafter his empire was torn to pieces by the feudal lords. In 1261 Michael Palaeologus, emperor of Nicaea, had little difficulty in expelling the Latins from Constantinople and restoring the Byzantine empire, whose vitality had already been dissipated. 22 Neither the Bulgarians nor the Greeks were, however, again to achieve supremacy in the Balkans. The Slavs dwelling in the western part of the Balkans comprised three main groups: Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Together with the Bulgarians, the Serbs, as Bulgarian subjects, accepted Christianity from Constantinople, whereas the Croats and Slovenes fell under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome and the political domination of the Venetians and Magyars—a historical fact which was to prove fatal for the unity of the southern Slavs. Moreover, the Serbs themselves were divided into three states: Bosnia, Rashka, and Zeta. Bosnia, after a brief independence, fell under the political domination of the Magyars. Rashka and Zeta united as Serbia under the Nemanitch dynasty. After the battle of Kyustendil in July, 1330, Bulgaria was made a vassal of Serbia. Brilliant was the reign of Stephen Dushan the Strong (1331-55), who, like his Bulgarian predecessors, dreamed of capturing Constantinople and of establishing a triune confederacy of the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks, with himself as emperor. Inasmuch as neither the Patriarch of Constantinople nor the Pope of Rome would give him a royal crown, he summoned a special Church council at Skoplje, his new capital, at which Simeon, the Bulgarian Patriarch of Tirnovo, and Nicholas, the autocephalous Archbishop of Okhrida, anointed the Serbian Archbishop Joanice as Patriarch; and then the new Serbian Patriarch, assisted by 22 Finlay, op. cit., I l l , 128; Anna Comnena, The Alexiad (trans, by E. A. S. Dawes, London, 1928), p. 412; Gibbon, op. cit., VI, 376; M. G. Popruzhenko, Synodik Tsariya Borüa (Sofia, 1928).

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

13

the two Bulgarian prelates, crowned Stephen Dushan as "Tsar and Autocrat of the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks." Thereupon the Patriarch of Constantinople gave himself the vain satisfaction of anathematizing and excommunicating the Serbian people for the uncanonical procedure of their king and primate. 23 THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

Like the Persians who had been repelled by the united Greeks in the fifth century before Christ or the Saracens who had been routed by the Greco-Bulgarian alliance early in the eighth century of our era, the Ottoman Turks could have been defeated and driven back to Asia by a Greco-Slav confederacy. Yet the Greeks despised the Slavs, their former vassals; they preferred to ally themselves with the Ottoman Turks, a people among whom were included a large number of Moslemized Greeks. In fact, the Turks came to Europe for the first time in 1345 as allies of the Greeks against the Serbs. In 13 54 the Turks, no longer allies but enemies of the Greeks, occupied Gallipoli and Rodosto without a declaration of war. In December, 1355, Tsar Stephen Dushan suddenly died at the early age of forty-six, his vast Serbian empire immediately fell to pieces, and the Turkish conquest of southeastern Europe proceeded apace. In the course of about one century all the Balkan peoples were reduced at first to the status of vassals and then to that of rayah ("serfs") of the Turkish sultans. As a Turkish author said: "The net gain from the Ottoman Empire's career of successful warfare, which lasted nearly three centuries, was some 2,000,000 square miles of territory containing a mixed population of 50,000,000 speaking twenty different languages." 24 Under the strict precepts of the Koran, the fundamental law of the Ottoman empire, the "infidel" should embrace Islam, pay tribute, or suffer death. In general, the Ottoman Turks, unlike the Seljuk Turks or the Saracens, applied the second alternative. The conquered Christian peoples were reduced to serfdom, and only the Christian nobility was offered Islam or death. By submitting voluntarily to Turkish overlordship Moldavia and Wallachia alone contrived to preserve their native 53 B. Prokitch, "Postanak jedne slovenske tsarevine u Makcdoniju u X veku," Glas (Serbian Royal Academy, Belgrade, 1908), XXVI, 306; S. Stanojevitch, lstoriya srpskago naroda, p. 135; A. Stead, Servia by the Servians, p. 10; Chedo Mijatovitch, Servia and the Servians, p. 3. 24 Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War, p. 12; also Gibbon, op. eil., VI, 499; S. Stanojevitch, op. cit., p. 142.

14

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

nobility and a measure of internal autonomy. The European dominions of the Ottoman empire were given the name of Rumelia, and the Christian peoples were classified as Rum-milleti ("Ruman peoples"). Everyone who was not a Moslem, unless he was an Armenian or a Jew, was officially considered a Greek. Muhammed II, on capturing Constantinople and mounting the throne of the Byzantine emperor in 1453, conferred upon the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople the authority of administering the civil as well as the ecclesiastical affairs of the EasternOrthodox Christians in accordance with their own Greco-Roman law, inasmuch as the Turkish law, as based upon the Koran, did not purport to be applicable to non-Moslems. The Ottoman empire was, in effect, organized as a sort of Turko-Greek dyarchy or "a federation of theocracies under the scepter of the Sultan." 25 Yet when Sultan Selim (1512-20) conquered Syria, Egypt, and Arabia, with the Mohammedan holy cities of Mecca and Medina, thus assuming the office of caliph or spiritual head of all the Moslems, the Ottoman policy reverted to the religious fanaticism of the early caliphs. Henceforth, twice in the Ottoman history (under Sultan Selim in 1517 and Sultan Ibrahim in 1646) the Divan considered the advisability, permissibility, or expediency, according to the precepts of the Koran, of forced Islamizing or exterminating the entire Christian population of the Ottoman empire. But since the Koran forbids the forcible conversion of adults who believe in the revelations of Moses and Jesus —the "kitabis" or "people of the book"—the mufti (the Moslem high priest) refused to issue the necessary fetva (decree) sanctioning such drastic measures; and thus the massacre of millions of Christians was avoided on both occasions, while the Catholic Christians gave no quarter to their dissenting or heretical coreligionists in western Europe. 28 The Pax Ottomana was, however, destined to go the way of its predecessors, the Pax Romana and the Pax Hellenica. In the first half of the seventeenth century the idea of a universal unitary empire was shelved and the idea of a universal confederation took hold of the minds of Europeans. But the Ottoman sultan, being a Moslem, might not join the Christian sovereigns in a universal confederation or league of nations. His empire "remained outside of the Christian international law; he forced his entrance as an intruder and ran the risk of being expelled 25 Selected Writings of Viscount ottoman, Pt. I, chap, ii, pp. 2 ff.; lenique, p. 392; A. Emin, op. cit., nople, p. 31. 20 Finlay, op. cit., V, 29; Nasim

Strangford, I, 224; also G. Young, Corps de droit K. Paparrhigopoulos, Histoire de la civilisation help. 19; C. D. Cobham, The Patriarchs of ConstantiSousa, The Capitulatory

Regime of Turkey,

pp. 36 ff.

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

15

27

by force." It is true that the plan of the French thinker Cruce for a "Universal Union" was so broad as to give the Turkish sultan the second rank among the Christian sovereigns "on account of the ancient Eastern Empire, of which Constantinople was the capital." 28 But this exceptional indulgence toward the Turkish sultan was probably due to the fact that since 1535 France had acquired, through the grants, treaties, and usages known as capitulations, the right to protect all "Franks" or Latin Christians as well as extensive commercial privileges and immunities for her own citizens in the East. This situation committed her to the policy of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire.29 But the Great Design of Henry IV of France contemplated the establishment of a "confederation" of Christian Europe which was to be divided into six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four republics, with a council modeled after that of the ancient Amphictyony of Delphi. The main object of this association was to expel the Turks from Europe and to deprive the House of Austria of its hegemony in the Holy Roman empire as well as of all its European possessions except Spain. The prevailing three religions in Europe—the Roman Catholic, the Protestant, and the Reformed—were to be preserved and strengthened, while the Eastern Orthodox Christians were to be treated as "idolators" or "schismatics" and placed in the same class as the Turks. Should the grand duke of Muscovy or czar of Russia, who is believed to be the ancient khan of Scythia, refuse to enter into the association after it is proposed to him, he ought to be treated like the Sultan of Turkey, deprived of his possessions in Europe, and confined to Asia only, where he might, as long as he pleased, and without any interruption . . . continue the wars . . . against the Turks and the Persians. . . .30 After Cardinal Alberoni advanced his "Plan of Reducing the Turkish Empire under the Domination of Christian Powers," many an ingenious diplomatist amused himself by devising schemes for the settlement of the so-called "Eastern Question" by the partition of the Ottoman em27 C. Seignobos, A Political History of Europe since 1814 (New York: H. Holt, 1899), II, 618; also T. A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, I, IIS; N. Sousa, op. cit., p. 162; W. W. White, The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 30 ff. 28 T. W. Balch, trans., The New Cyneas of Enteric Cruce (Philadelphia, 1909), p. 36. 29 N. Sousa, op. cit., p. 53. 30 Sully, Grand Design of Henry IV, Grotius Society Publications, No. 2 (1921), pp. 31-33; see also C. Pfister, "Les 'Economies royales' de Sully et le grand dessein de Henri IV," Revue historique, LVI (1894), 316-17.

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

16 31

pire. But none of these schemes took any account of the primordial rights of the submerged Christian nationalities within that empire, because, as already observed, they were despised by western Europe as "schismatics" who might share the fate of the Turks. It was generally taken for granted that the inheritance of the Ottoman empire would ultimately devolve upon one or more of the Great Powers. Austria and Venice, which bore the brunt of the struggle against the Turks throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, naturally aspired to the European territories of the Ottoman empire. But Russia, though she had come into direct contact with the Turks as late as 1633 and the Great Design of Henry IV had contemplated confining her possessions to Asia, claimed to have better title to the same territories. Russia had inherited the Byzantine traditions and assumed the title borne by the medieval Bulgarian and Serbian monarchs. The Russian tsars had considered themselves legitimate protectors of the Eastern Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman empire. Because of these conflicting claims, Europe was haunted by the nightmare of a general European war ever after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) reduced the Turkish dominions in Europe to the Balkan peninsula.32 If it were not for the interposition of Austria, the Russo-Turkish war (1768-74) might have resulted in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the resuscitation of the Byzantine or Greek empire. As it was, the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), which was acclaimed by liberal minds throughout Europe as a Christian Magna Carta, gave the Ottoman empire a death blow and greatly diminished French prestige in the East. Under the terms of this "perfect and perpetual peace," Russia agreed to restore to the Ottoman sultan most of those of his territories which she had recently occupied—Bulgaria on the right bank of the Danube, Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Aegean Islands. The Ottoman sultan, on his part, undertook "to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches," to "allow the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations," and "to take such representations into consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friendly Power." Moreover, the islands of the Archipelago and the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were restored to the Ottoman sultan under specific condi31 Cardinal Alberoni, Scheme for Reducing the Turkish Empire (London, 1736); also in AJIL, VII (1913), 82-107; see also T. G. Djuvara, Cent Projets de partage de la Turquie (Paris, 1914). 32 Noradounghian, I, 182; Finlay, op. ät., II, 344.

F E D E R A L I S M AND I M P E R I A L I S M

17

tions, such as toleration of Christianity, respect for the Christian clergy, moderate taxation, and good treatment of the population. To start them on the road to self-government as nuclei for the contemplated new Byzantine or Greek empire, each of these provinces was to have a (Greek) Christian charge d'affaires accredited to the Ottoman government, and these functionaries, "notwithstanding their comparative want of importance," were to "be considered as persons enjoying an international position." Furthermore, the French and English capitulations were to be considered as "inserted word for word" in this treaty. It was provided, too, that "the prisoners of war and slaves in the two Empires" as well as "all Christians fallen into slavery" should be "set at liberty without ransom or redemption money." 33 Austria helped herself by occupying and annexing the Ottoman province of Bukovina. Great Britain had hitherto welcomed the remarkable progress of Russia—politically as a counterpoise to the preeminence of France and commercially as an exporter of raw materials and importer of English manufactured goods. But Great Britain was alarmed by the aggressive policy of Catherine II (1762-96), and most of the British statesmen, beginning with the younger Pitt, adopted the view that British as well as French interests in the East would be jeopardized by the access of Russia to Constantinople and the Straits or by the resuscitation of the Byzantine (Greek) empire. And so the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire became an important article of British as well as French foreign policy. Thus was engendered an enmity between Great Britain and Russia as bitter as that between France and Russia, causing great discomfiture to the Christian peoples in the Ottoman empire.34 33 Noradounghian, I, 319-34; Τ. E. Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey from 1774 to 1853, pp. 36-56; S. P. Duggan, The Eastern Question, p. 45; "History of the Eastern Question," PH, No. 15, pp. 67 ff. 34 Ward and Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 109; Marriott, op. cit., pp. 159 If.; A. Sorel, The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 78 ff.

Chapter II FEDERALISM AND

NATIONALISM

AS T H E eighteenth century drew to a close, the Ottoman empire x i f o u n d itself in a process of internal disintegration. Not unlike many of his Byzantine predecessors, the Ottoman sultan was left with the undisputed possession of only Constantinople and its immediate environs. Throughout the length and breadth of his vast empire the dercbeys had rendered themselves virtually independent; the Montenegrins had practically separated themselves from the empire; the Suliotes in Epirus had also cut their loose ties with Constantinople; Ali Pasha of Yanina had made himself the head of an independent Albania; PasvanOglu of Vidin styled himself prince of Bulgaria, dreaming of resuscitating the medieval Bulgarian empire with Constantinople itself as his capital; and, the worst of all, the celebrated army corps of Janissaries had been transformed into an unruly crowd of praetorian guards, changing the sultans and their ministers as fancy moved them. RHIGAS'S

PLAN

In the meantime, the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, although it gave the Ottoman empire a much-needed respite from external aggression, enhanced the discontent of its component peoples. Inspired by the ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality, Rhigas Pheraios, alias Constantine of Velestinlis, was the founder of a secret revolutionary society out of which the Philike Hetaireia ("Association of Friends") subsequently developed. In his poems, written in the popular Greek vernacular, Rhigas urged the "Bulgarians and Albanians and Serbs and Greeks," as well as all the other peoples in the Ottoman empire, both Christians and Mohammedans, to rise and throw off the yoke of the despotic sultan. Rhigas did not hesitate to appeal to PasvanOglu of Vidin, self-styled prince of Bulgaria, to lead the peoples of the Ottoman empire to freedom. He drew up a constitution or "New Po-

F E D E R A L I S M AND N A T I O N A L I S M

19

litical Statute for the Inhabitants of Rumelia, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean Islands and Moldavia-Wallachia," which contemplated the establishment of a confederation under the name of the "Greek Republic." To make Greek the official language in such a Balkan confederation would not have been difficult inasmuch as Greek was then spoken by all the Eastern Orthodox Christians; the Rumanian, Yugoslav (Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Bulgarian), and Albanian vernaculars were not yet developed into literary languages. But after the capture and execution of Rhigas at Belgrade in 1798, the federal idea found no other zealous protagonist among the Balkan leaders. His countrymen not only abandoned the federal ideal but also discarded the name "Greeks" or "Romaioi" and adopted the classical designation "Hellenes." The protagonists of modern Hellenism did not desire to extricate the Greek nationality from the Ottoman empire as much as to make it the ruling element in the empire itself by ejecting the Moslem Turks from their privileged position and reducing all the other Eastern Orthodox Christians to the status of Greek subjects or serfs. Southeastern Europe was ruled by the Turks, but its religion, education, and commerce were in the hands of Greeks, who considered themselves a superior class of Christians forming a counterpart to the Turks. Under the Ottoman dual system of government, the Greek clergymen, with some rare exceptions, abused their power of office more than the Turkish political and military officials. On the other hand, the administration of the autonomous vassal principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by Phanariote Greeks for over a century is said to have been little else than organized brigandage.1 Of course, the non-Greek Eastern Orthodox Christians were unwilling to exchange Turkish serfdom for Greek slavery such as might have resulted from the establishment of a Balkan confederation under the name of "Greek Republic." 2 1 "They [the Phanariote kospodari or princes] acquired the throne by gold, and they could keep it by gold. All depended upon how much they were able to squeeze out of the country. The princes soon became past masters in the art of spoliation. They put taxes upon chimneys, and the starving peasants pulled their cottages down and went to live in mountain caves; they taxed the animals, and the peasants preferred to kill the few beasts they possessed." D. Mitrany, "Rumania," in The Balkans (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1915), p. 264. 2 For a French version of the Draft Constitution of Rhigas, see La Revolution fran(aise (193S), No. 2, pp. 158-82; also A. Dascalakis, Les CEnvres de Rhigas Velestinlis (Paris, 1937), pp. 74-125; Rhigas Velestinlis: la revolution franfaise et les prtludes de l'independance hellenique (Paris, 1937), pp. 95 ff.; Michev and Petkov, La Federation balkanique, pp. 6ff.; Edmonds, Rhigas Pheraios (London, 1890).

20

FEDERALISM

THE

AND

PRINCIPLE

OF

NATIONALISM

NATIONALITY

E a r l y in the nineteenth century Russia ostensibly discarded Catherine's idea of resuscitating the Byzantine or Greek empire, thus curtailing the imperial aspirations of modern Hellenism. As Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon I of France failed to agree on a plan for the partition of the Ottoman empire, Russia began to contemplate the design of liberating her Christian proteges from the yoke of the Turkish sultan and organizing them into a confederation of small states under her auspices. For this reason the neglected Slav vernaculars in the Balkans, the Serbian and the Bulgarian, soon became, under Russian auspices, literary languages. Meanwhile, under the influence of the ideas disseminated by the French Revolution, a new spirit of nationalism—each nationality aspiring to have its own political state—had been awakened among the Balkan peoples, who had hitherto fought for faith, merely as Christians against Moslems. T h i s spirit was stimulated by the creation of a sort of federation of the Ionian islets ( 1 8 0 2 ) under the joint protection of T u r k e y and Russia and by the establishment of the confederation of Illyrian Provinces under Napoleon's auspices ( 1 8 0 9 - 1 4 ) . T h e Serbs had already taken advantage of the anarchy prevailing throughout the Ottoman empire to revolt and throw off the sultan's yoke in 1804. B y the treaties of Bucharest ( 1 8 1 2 ) , Ackerman ( 1 8 2 6 ) , and Adrianople ( 1 8 2 9 ) , concluded between Russia and Turkey, the stipulations of the previous T r e a t y of Kutchuk Kainardji ( 1 7 7 4 ) were confirmed and Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia were constituted autonomous principalities under both the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan and the protection of the Russian tsar. 3 T h e principle of nationality was brought to the forefront of European diplomacy by Alexander Hypsilanti, who unsuccessfully unfurled the flag of Balkan freedom in the spring of 1821 in Moldavia, while the Balkan rebellion in Morea, which became known as the Greek Revolution ( 1 8 2 1 - 2 9 ) , afforded France and Great Britain, as well as Russia, an opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire " n o less by sentiment of Humanity, than by interest for the tranquillity 3 Noradounghian, II, 86, 116, 166; Hertslet, I, 747; II, 813; also Memoirs o) Prince Adam Czartoryski, I I , 55; A. Vandal, Napolion et Alexandre Ier, I, 283 ff.; M. PivecStcle, La Vie economique des provinces illyriennes 1809-1SI3, pp. 10 ff.; F. Zwitter, "Illyrisme et sentiment yougoslave," Le Monde slave (1933), IV, 39-71; V. 161-85; VI, 358-75.

F E D E R A L I S M AND NATIONALISM

21

4

of Europe." By the Portocol of London (March 22, 1829) a part of Greece was constituted a Christian principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan; but by another Protocol of London (February 3, 1830) Greece was recognized as "an independent state" under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Thus, because of the jealousy and suspicion between France and Great Britain on the one hand and Russia on the other, a small and weak Greek kingdom came into being, instead of the Balkan Confederation that Hypsilanti and his Hetairists had at first contemplated. 5 INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

THE

OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

Anxious to enjoy the protection of international law and to avoid further European intervention, the Turks made belated efforts at reforming their empire. But these reforms aroused Moslem fanaticism and the hatred of all vested interests under the existing regime; they were branded as unconstitutional or contrary to the Koran. In 1807 the Janissaries obtained a fetva of the mufti, invaded the royal palace, and deposed the reformer sultan Selim III. After his assassination and that of Mustapha IV by the Janissaries, Mahmud II ascended the throne and issued an imperial edict solemnly cursing and denouncing all the unconstitutional or "infidel innovations" of his immediate predecessors. In fact, Mahmud II, who had been carefully schooled in the necessity for reforms, bided his time. In 1826, after creating a loyal army corps, he managed to obtain the necessary fetva of the mufti for the introduction of a program of reforms, as not being contrary to the Koran, then ruthlessly exterminated the unruly Janissaries, both in the capital and in the provinces, suppressed the feudal nobility of deri-beys, and took from the provincial governors the power of life and death. And Sultan Abdul Medjid issued in 1839 a remarkable imperial edict, known as the Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane, which professed to guarantee "equality and perfect security for life, honor and fortune" to all the Ottoman subjects of whatever race or religion.® 4

Hertslet, I, 770. "Greece, as Aberdeen long afterwards confessed, owed her escape from vassalage to complete independence solely to the impression created by the Treaty of Adrianople. Wellington, then Prime Minister, believed that the end of Turkey was at hand; it was, therefore, useless to place Greece beneath a suzerain too feeble to defend her; on the other hand, believing that Greece would be Russopbil (as Beaconsfield equally erroneously believed Bulgaria in 1878), he was anxious that she should not be too large." "Greece," PH, No. 18, p. 28. See also Τ. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 4 ff. β Hertslet, II, 1003 ; A. Emin, op. cit., p. 24. 5

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NATIONALISM

Denounced by the reactionary Moslems as unconstitutional or blasphemous violations of the Koran, all these reforms remained "in toto or in part a dead letter." 7 The lot of the Eastern Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire became steadily worse. In November, 1853, Russia declared war upon the Ottoman empire "for the defense of the Orthodox faith in the East which is equally professed by the Russian people." 8 But, jealous and suspicious of Russian influence and design in the East, Austria, France, and Great Britain entered into an alliance (December 2, 1854) to which Sardinia (the future I t a l y ) also adhered (January 26, 1855) for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman empire; and they demanded that Russia relinquish the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji and especially her "pretensions to take under an official protectorate the Christian subjects of the Sultan of Oriental ritual." 9 B y the Treaty of Paris (1856), which terminated the so-called Crimean War, Russia was constrained to renounce her treaty rights to a protectorate either over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman sultan or over the tributary vassal principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia, whose autonomy was now placed under the collective guarantee of the concert of Europe. The signatories undertook, also, " t o respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire" which was "admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe." 10 On his part, Sultan Abdul Medjid issued another imperial edict, known as the Hatti-Humayun (February 18, 1856), confirming the guarantee of "equality before the law" to all his subjects without regard to race or religion. 11 RUMANIA:

UNION

OF M O L D A V I A

AND

WALLACHIA

In the above-mentioned treaty, provisions were made for blocking Russia's supposed roadway to Constantinople; moreover, some of its signatories did their utmost to alienate the Eastern Orthodox Christians from their erstwhile official protector. For instance, the Moldavians and Wallachians had shared the Slav liturgical language with the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Russians ever since the ninth century; they were also under Greek influence during the eighteenth century. Yet toward the middle of the nineteenth century, under French influence, their "sleeping Latin spirit" was roused; they proudly recalled being the descendants of ''Turkey in Europe," PIT, No. 16, p. 34; also Cambridge Modern History, Hertslet, II. 1177-78. 9 Ibid., pp. 1221-24; cf. Hearnshaw, European Coalitions, Alliances, and since 1792 ( P H , No. 152), p. 28. 10 Hertslet, 1 1 Ibid., II, 1250. ρ 1243. 7

X I , 2TS.

8

Ententes

FEDERALISM AND

NATIONALISM

23

Roman colonists and legionnaires; they adopted the Latin alphabet, made a mixed Latin-Slav vernacular their literary language, and assumed, or rather perpetuated, the name Rumanians (from Romaioi or Rum-milleti) ,12 The enjoyment of a common constitution (the Reglement organtque, 1829, framed by Count Kisseleff, their provisional Russian governor), as well as the formation of a customs union (1845), had already paved the way for the amalgamation or unification of Moldavia and Wallachia. In September, 1857, the representative assemblies of these principalities expressed a practically unanimous wish for a union under a foreign prince. But the European concert, under the terms of the above-mentioned Treaty of Paris, worked out a scheme for a peculiar sort of union under a general commission made up of eight members from each of the two principalities. In 1859, however, both Moldavia and Wallachia elected Colonel Couza, a Moldavian, to be their joint hospodar, thus effecting a personal union. After various attempts to frustrate the will of the people of both principalities for union, the European concert finally recognized Prince Couza as "Hospodar of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia." Prince Couza, then, hastened to issue a proclamation (December 20, 1861), saying in p a r t : "Rumanians: the Union is an accomplished fact! The Rumanian nationality is formed. . . . Long live Rumania." 13 Moreover, inspired by the example of the Rumanians, a plan called the Coalitune Sacra ("Sacred Coalition") was hatched at Bucharest, envisaging the union of the Bulgarians with the Rumanians; another plan contemplated a union of the Bulgarians with the Serbs; and a third plan provided for a dual monarchy of Turko-Bulgaria, patterned after Austria-Hungary. But the emancipation of Bulgaria from the political yoke of the Ottoman sultan was a condition precedent to the realization of any of these tentative schemes of unification. 11 KOSSUTH'S

PLAN

Kossuth of Hungary, seconded by Couza of Rumania and Michael Obrenovitch of Serbia, offered an elaborate plan for the establishment 12 D. Mitrany, "Rumania," The Balkans, pp. 367-68; Cambridge Modern History, V, 635-47. 13 BFSP, X X X V I I , 586; Cambridge Modern History, XI, 283; Hertslet, II, 1499. 14 D. T. Strashimiroff, Istoriya na Aprilskoto vozstanie (Plovdiv, 1907), I, 7ff.; S. Radeff, "The Serbo-Bulgarian Agreement of 1867 for a Yugoslav Confederation," Pages from Bulgaria's Life, pp. 21-31; S. Panaretoff, Near Eastern Affairs and Conditions, pp. 199 ff.

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of a Danubian confederation comprising Hungary and the Danubian principalities of Rumania and Serbia, to which Transylvania, Croatia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria might subsequently adhere. Each of the component members of the union was to enjoy complete internal autonomy; the federal parliament was to sit in turn in the capitals of the members of the union; and French was to be the official language of the confederation. But this plan as well as many other early plans for a confederation of the peoples in southeastern Europe failed of realization mainly because the policy of the Great Powers was to keep those peoples divided and weak in the interest of the so-called "balance of power." 15 A

BALKAN

ALLIANCE

In January, 1868, an attempt was made to form a Balkan alliance for the practical solution of the "Eastern Question." In fact, a secret treaty of alliance was concluded between Serbia and Rumania, to which Greece and Montenegro were to adhere later. It provided, in part, as follows: Article VI. The two signatories bind themselves to act in concert when circumstances require their co-operation in emancipating the Christian populations of Eastern Europe. Article VII. The islands forming the Delta of the Danube and the eastern part of Bulgaria lying between Rustchuk and Varna, on the one side, and the Black Sea, on the other, shall be annexed and joined forever to Rumania. Article VIII. Old Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, except that part of the latter country allotted to Rumania, shall be annexed forever to Serbia. This agreement for the partition of Bulgaria between Serbia and Rumania clearly indicated that the recently emancipated Christian nationalities in the Balkans were animated by imperialism and not by federalism. Greece, too, claimed her share of Bulgaria up to the Haemus ("Stara Planina"). Soon, however, the Greeks, the Rumanians, and the 15 L. Kossuth, Souvenirs et icrits de mon exil (Paris. 1880), pp. 254 ff.; Oscar Jäszi, "Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon," Foreign Affairs, XII (1933), 86-97; T. Lengyel, "The Hungarian Exiles and the Danubian Confederation," The Hungarian Quarterly, V (1939). 450-61; I. GaraSanin, "Nachertane 1844," Delo, XXXVIII (Belgrade, 1905), 321-36; E. Lengyel, The Danube, pp. 461 ff.; S. Pribichevich, World without End, pp. 387 ff.

F E D E R A L I S M AND N A T I O N A L I S M

25

Serbs were bitterly disappointed at the aspirations of the Bulgarians to liberty and independence for themselves.1® BULGARIA'S

SCHISM

For centuries before the end of the Greek war of independence (1821-29) the Greeks and the Bulgarians lived in comparative harmony as one people (both being Romaioi) under the ecclesiastical and civil administration of the ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and the political authority of the Turkish sultan. Greek was the language of churches and schools in Bulgaria. Many a Bulgarian was a devoted follower of Rhigas Pheraios and lost his life for the establishment of a Balkan confederation under the name of "Greek Republic." Many a Bulgarian took part in the war for the independence of Greece. Almost all the educated Bulgarians were most ardent protagonists of Hellenism. As a result of this policy of self-effacement, however, Phanariote Greeks took charge of practically all churches and schools in Bulgaria, forming a privileged order similar to the Athenian cleruchies of old. But after the proclamation of Greek independence the Turkish officials were no longer willing to favor the Greeks as a sort of Christian aristocracy in the Ottoman empire; no longer was the authority of the Greek bishop over the conscience, liberty, and property of his flock enforced without appeal by the sword of the Turkish pasha. As a corollary of their political autonomy or independence, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece acquired autocephalous churches, independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Bulgaria, too, aspired to similar ecclesiastical (and civil) autonomy while still merely a province of the Ottoman empire. It was certainly hard for the Bulgarians, situated as Bulgaria is at the very gates of Constantinople, to revolt against the political authority of the Ottoman sultan; it was safer for them to start a peaceful revolution against the ecclesiastical and civil administration of the Greek Patriarch. The Bulgarians took full advantage of the promulgation of the Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane (1839), the HattiHumayun (1856) and the Law of the Yrilayets (1867), which conceded to them the rights to elect their own municipal councils and mayors and judges, to assemble peaceably, and to address petitions to the authori1,1 E. Engelhardt, "La Confederation balkanique," RHD, V (1892), 29-55; V. Popovic, "Serbia and Greece," The Iftw Europe (March 15, 1917), pp. 265-76; SNU, X V I - X V I I (1900), 3-58; N. Iorga, Histoire des Etats balkaniques (1914), p. 332.

26

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NATIONALISM

ties. The councils of all the Bulgarian towns and villages petitioned the Greek Patriarch to appoint native bishops, priests, and teachers. But as these legitimate and modest demands were scornfully ignored as being designed to introduce "philetism" in the Church of Christ, which had been monopolized by the Greeks, the Bulgarians turned to the Turkish sultan and petitioned him to restore the old autocephalous Bulgarian Church. On the other hand, the Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical controversy was aggravated by outside interference. While Orthodox Russia was trying hard to reconcile the Bulgarians and the Greeks, Catholic France and (curiously enough) Protestant England were urging the Bulgarians to abandon the Eastern Orthodox Christianity and join the Roman Catholic Church. For this purpose the Ottoman sultan was induced to issue a firman (1861) constituting a "Unionate Bulgarian Church," with its bishop and primate ordained by the Pope of Rome. But this attempt (one of a series begun in the ninth century) at making Bulgaria a Roman Catholic bulwark in the East was bound to fail, for what the Bulgarians demanded was not a change of theocratic masters but ecclesiastical and civil autonomy (the right to choose their own bishops, priests, teachers, and judges), which neither the Patriarch of Constantinople nor the Pope of Rome was willing to concede to them. 17 After the revolt of Crete (1867), in which many Bulgarians took part, the Ottoman government brought pressure to bear upon the Greek Patriarch to satisfy the Bulgarians, lest they follow the example of the Cretans. But the Greek Patriarch protested that it was not canonical for the Bulgarians to have an autocephalous church as long as they did not have an independent or autonomous state. The Ottoman government perceived that such a spurious interpretation of the canon law was calculated to incite the Bulgarians to revolt against the political authorities. If it had been canonical for the Bulgarians to have an autocephalous archbishopric at Okhrida under the Byzantine empire (1018-1186) as well as under the Ottoman empire (1396-1767), why should not they now have ecclesiastical and civil autonomy under the political administration of the Ottoman sultan? Hence the sultan issued another firman (March 11, 1870), constituting the Bulgarian Exarchate. Its jurisdiction included the districts of Rustchuk, Silistria, ' " H a j e k , Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschajt, p. 199; C. Bojan, Les Bulgares et le patriarche oecumenique (Paris, 1905) ; De Barenton, La France catholique en orient et les missionaires capucins durant les trois derniers siecles (1902) ; O'Conner, "Capuchin Mission in Bulgaria and Reunion with Rome," American Catholic Quarterly Review, X L I I I (1918), 205-27; A. Ilieff, Spomeni, p. 42.

FEDERALISM

AND

NATIONALISM

27

Shumen, Tirnovo, Sofia, Vrattsa, Lovech, Vidin, Nish, Pirot, Kyustendil, Samokov, Veles, Varna (without the cities of Varna and Constantsa), Sliven (without Messembria and Anchialo), Sozopol and Philippopolis (without the cities of the same name and a few other localities). It was provided, also, that any other district or locality in the Ottoman empire might decide to join the Bulgarian Exarchate by the vote of the whole or at least two-thirds of its voting population. In September, 1872, the Bulgarian Exarchate was anathematized as schismatic by a special assembly of eastern bishops and autocephalous patriarchs, the Patriarch of Jerusalem dissenting.18 Thus were the Greeks and the Bulgarians made separate and hostile nationalities in the Balkans. Not content with ecclesiastical and civil autonomy, however, the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee at Bucharest issued a programmatic declaration (December, 1870), defining its aims as being (1) "the liberation of Bulgaria by a moral and armed revolution" and (2) the formation of "a federation of independent nationalities," consisting of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Greece (provided the Greeks renounced their "Panhellenic aims and historical claims"). This document stressed the points that the Bulgarians proffered "no claims of historical rights"; that the population should be allowed to decide for themselves by plebiscite as to which nationality of the federation they belonged; and that the Bulgarians, while coveting no territory of any other nationality, would by no means give up any part of their own territory. The aspirations of Greece, Rumania, and Serbia to divide Bulgaria among themselves were thus brought to nought.10 T H E CONGRESS OF

BERLIN

In 1876, while the European concert was tackling the thorny problems arising from the revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called "April Rebellion" broke out in Bulgaria. The Turks swooped down on the rebellious Bulgarian provinces, suppressed the uprising with ruthless cruelty, and massacred thousands of innocent men, women, and 1R Kcssyakoff, Prinos kum diplomaticheskata isloriya na Bulgaria, I, 304; Soradoungkian, III, 293; J . Baker, Turkey, pp. 435-38; R. von Mach, The Bulgarian Exarchate, pp. 12-18; A. M. Hyde, A Diplomatic History of Bulgaria 1870-1886, pp. 22-34; Troubetzkoi, "La Politique Russe en Orient," RHD, X X I (1907), 175 ff.; Appleton's Encyclopaedia, X (1870), 2SS-S7; XI (1871), 272; XII (1872), 270; C. D. Cobham, The Patriarchs of Constantinople, p. 33. 19 Strashimiroff, op. cit., I, 127-28; Z. Stoyanoff, Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent (London, 1913).

28

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children. Throughout the world the news of the "Bulgarian atrocities" caused horror and indignation against the Turks. In Great Britain, for instance, Gladstone demanded "the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria." 20 It became necessary for the European concert to intervene on the grounds of humanity. A conference of ambassadors assembled at Constantinople (December 22, 1876) to consider various projects for administrative reforms in the nature of local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and a guarantee of similar nature against maladministration in Bulgaria. The conference rejected a draft organic statute prepared by Eugene Schuyler, American consul general at Constantinople, and Prince Tsereteleff, Russian consul general at Philippopolis, for the creation of a single autonomous province, Bulgaria, in the Ottoman empire, including the districts which had been placed under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In accordance with the policy of divide et impera, however, the conference adopted an organic statute for the establishment of two autonomous Bulgarian provinces (vilayets): the Eastern Vilayet, with Tirnovo as its capital; and the Western Vilayet, with Sofia as its capital. A similar organic statute was framed for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the meantime (December 23, 1876) the sultan granted a constitution and rejected the decisions of the conference of ambassadors to introduce reforms only into Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, as being contrary to international law. The result was another declaration of war by Russia against Turkey (April 24, 1877). The Turks were driven back to the very walls of Constantinople, but the intervention of the concert of Europe again saved the Ottoman empire in Europe from extinction.21 Under the terms of the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878—a date hallowed by the Bulgarians as their Independence Day), the Ottoman sultan agreed to recognize the vassal principalities of Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia as independent states and Bulgaria as constituting "an autonomous and tributary principality, with a Christian Government and national militia," its boundaries being determined on the basis of the "principle of nationality." The sultan undertook "to apply scrupulously in the Island of Crete the Organic 20 Gladstone, The Bulgarian Horrors (London, 1876), p. 62; see also J. MacGahan, Turkish Atrocities in Bulgaria (London, 1878); W. G. Wirthwein, Britain and the Balkan Crisis, 1875-1878; British Academy, Proceedings, 1931, pp. 105-46; "Schuyler's Report on the Bulgarian Atrocities," SED, No. 24, 44th Congress, 2d Sess., II; CR, V (1878), Pt. I, p. 647; Pt. II, p. 987; Moore, Digest of International Law, IV, 573. 21 B P P , Turkey No. 2 (1878), pp. 4 2 ^ 8 , 163-66; USFR (1877), p. 552; Hertslet, IV, 2598; Suppl. AJIL, II (1908), 368.

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29

Law of 1868, taking into account the previously expressed wishes of the native population." An analogous law adapted to local requirements was to be introduced into Epirus, Thessaly, and the other parts of Turkey in Europe for which a special constitution was not provided in this treaty. The organic statute adopted by the conference of ambassadors at Constantinople for Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be introduced immediately, with any modifications which might be agreed upon in common between the governments of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman empire.22 "The Treaty of San Stefano," an English historian said, "was the wisest measure ever proposed for the pacification of the Balkan peninsula." 23 But previous secret understandings between Austria and Russia as well as between Austria and Great Britain had excluded the establishment of "a great compact Slavic or other State" in the Balkans.24 The new principality of Bulgaria extending from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to Okhrida Lake was considered by the concert of Europe "a strong Slav State" which might become a "too powerful Dependency of Russia." 25 So the Congress of Berlin was opened on June 13, 1878, to revise the Treaty of San Stefano and to partition Bulgaria. By the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878) northern Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan, "with a Christian Government and national militia"; southern Bulgaria, named "Eastern Rumelia," was to remain an autonomous province of the Ottoman empire, with a Christian governor general; the Aegean Thrace and Macedonia were given back to Turkey; certain western districts were ceded to Serbia, while northern Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in exchange for the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, while the independence of Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia was confirmed under the condition that they, as well as the "autonomous" Bulgaria, should maintain religious liberty for their minorities and observe the Turkish commercial treaties and capitulations so long as they were not modified or abolished by the consent 22

Hertslet, IV, 26S8, 2672; Suppl. AJIL, II (1908), 387. 0 . Browning, A History of the World, 1815-1910 ( N e w York: F u n k ) , p. 742. 24 F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, II, 194, 203; Revue de Paris, IV (July-August, 1915), 609. 25 Hertslet, IV, 2703; Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching, p. 90; "The Congress of Berlin," PH, No. 167; H . F. Munro, The Berlin Congress (Washington, D.C., 1919). 23

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of the Powers concerned. And, finally, Great Britain helped herself by taking the island of Cyprus. 26 Gladstone seems to have been quite right in exclaiming that the Congress of Berlin "took the side opposed to that of freedom." 27 As a matter of fact, the Berlin "Settlement of the Affairs of the E a s t " was to keep the Balkans in confusion and ferment for the next thirty years. In an age of economic development elsewhere, the new "independent" and "autonomous" Christian Balkan states were reduced to the necessity of concentrating all their attention on liberating their national economy from the shackles of the antiquated Turkish commercial treaties and capitulations; they were, moreover, so absorbed in the struggle to acquire consciousness of national individuality that none of their energies could be spared for other than military activity; their egotistic and exaggerated "national ideals" or scrambles to grab the remainder of the Turkish provinces in Europe made them unable to perceive the value of good-will, cooperation, and solidarity. In short, they became intensely jealous of one another, and each of them developed a spirit of chauvinism which gradually made all understanding appear impossible. TOWARD

PARTIAL

UNIONS

If the idea of an all-inclusive Balkan union was shelved for a while after the Congress of Berlin, the tendency toward partial unions of Balkan countries persisted and gained strength. The reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was soon to become an accomplished fact. Under the above-mentioned Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria was to frame her own "organic law" and to elect her own prince, 28 while Eastern Rumelia was to have an "organic statute" drawn up by a European commission, and a Christian governor general appointed for a five-year term by the Turkish sultan with the advice and consent of the signatory Powers. 23 These stipulations were apparently designed to prevent the 28 Hertslet, IV, 2759; Suppl. AJIL, II, 401; Oakes and Mowat, op. cit., p. 332; P. Fauchille, Traiti de droit international public, I (3^me partie, 1926), 180-91. 27 Parliamentary Debates, CCXLII (3d Series, 1878), 679. 28 The constituent national assembly of Tirnovo, April 28, 1879, adopted and promulgated a very liberal or "semi-republican" constitution, and not an organic law, of 169 articles, drawn largely from the Greek constitution of 1864 ( B F S P , LVI, 572), the Rumanian constitution of 1866 (ibid., LVII, 263), and, especially, the Serbian constitution of 1869 (ibid., LXI, 1070), all of which were heavily indebted to the Belgian constitution of 1831 (ibid., XVIII, 1052); an English translation of the Bulgarian constitution is given in Hertslet, IV, 2672 (a summary); BPP, Turkey No. 8, 1878-79 (Cmd. 2357); H. F. Wright, The Constitutions of the States at War 1914-1918, pp. 87-104. - e A European commission at Plovdiv (Philippopolis) adopted on April 26, 1879, an "organic statute" for Eastern Rumelia, containing 495 articles and 142 annexes. See

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM

31

union of the two countries by the framing of identical constitutions and the election of one prince, as Moldavia and Wallachia had done before. And yet three of the signatories of that treaty—Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia—entered into a secret agreement (June 18, 1881) not to oppose "the eventual reunion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia." 30 In October, 1884, these two countries concluded a treaty for the establishment of a customs union; and in September, 1885, Eastern Rumelia sent her Christian governor general back to Constantinople and proclaimed her reunion with Bulgaria. Now since Russia opposed this "illegal" reunion, Great Britain made an abrupt about-face and supported it. The concert of Europe recognized only the personal union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers signed a protocol (April 5, 1886) which read: "The Governor-Generalship of Eastern Rumelia shall be intrusted to the Prince of Bulgaria in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty of Berlin." 31 Nevertheless, the organic statute of Eastern Rumelia had been suppressed forever and the complete amalgamation of the two countries became an accomplished fact. 32 Meanwhile, an attempt was made, too, at a union of Bulgaria and Serbia into one state named Yugoslavia. As early as 1880 the governments of Bulgaria and Serbia entered into negotiations for the establishment of a customs union, but Austria-Hungary promptly interposed her strong objections and the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations fell through. As a Serbian author stated, "had the customs union been concluded the war between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1885 would not have occurred." 33 That Serbo-Bulgarian war, in which Serbia was ignominiously defeated, had been started by the Serbian king Milan Obrenovitch, at the instance of Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of breaking up the union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. In his declaration of war upon Bulgaria, that king alleged as reasons for his action, inter alia, "unjustifiable customs regulations" which Bulgaria had introduced against Serbia and which had "put a stop to all commercial intercourse between the two countries." 34 In July, 1905, a treaty for the establishment of a customs union beHertslet, IV, 2680; BFSP, LXX, 759; BPP, Turkey No. 6, 1879 (Cmd. 2328); Oblastni Sbornik na zakoni na Istochna Rumelia, 1880-85; S. S. Bobcheff, Istochna Rumelia (Sofia, 1924). 30 Pribram, op. cit., I, 43-45. 31 Hertslet, IV, 3138; BPP, Turkey No. 2, 1886, pp. 35-36. 32 Ibid., p. 223. 33 T. Diourdievitch, "Le Mouvement balkanique," I CB, p. 64. 34 Hertslet, IV, 3141; Die grosse Politik, V, 12

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32

tween Bulgaria and Serbia was signed at Belgrade. But Austria-Hungary, which had previously concluded with both Bulgaria and Serbia commercial treaties recognizing their right to enter into a customs union,35 now set to work to destroy it, claiming that it might damage her commercial interests. Bulgaria was technically a vassal of the Ottoman sultan; but in fact she was practically an independent state, possessing two ports on the Black Sea for her exports and imports. She could thus afford to defy both Austria-Hungary and Turkey. So in December, 1905, the Bulgarian Sobranie ratified the Serbo-Bulgarian Customs Union Treaty by a unanimous vote.30 Serbia, however, though technically an independent state, had completely fallen under the sway of her great neighbor, her commerce being almost exclusively with Austria-Hungary. Furious at Serbia's refusal to withhold the ratification of the customs union treaty with Bulgaria, Austria closed her frontier (January, 1906) to Serbian cattle and pigs. A veritable economic war, known as the "Pig War," ensued between Austria and Serbia; it was brought to a close only after Serbia had complied with all the wishes of Austria. And the Serbo-Bulgarian customs union thus again fell through. 37 "Governments judge the motives of other Governments by their own, and they are not likely to believe in the disinterestedness which they are aware they do not possess themselves." 38 Austria revealed the motives of her own policy of Drang nach Osten ("Drive to the East"), earnestly pursued ever since her expulsion from Italy (1859), when she saw in the Serbo-Bulgarian customs union a deep-laid plot of Russia to swallow both Serbia and Bulgaria at one gulp in the near future. This policy of Austria was succinctly summarized as follows: 35

BFSP, L X X X I V , 1024; L X X X V I I , 371. In a note to the Bulgarian government dated January 5, 1906, the Ottoman government, apparently at the instance of Austria, protested that Bulgaria, being a vassal state, had no right to conclude treaties with foreign states without the consent of her suzerain, the Ottoman sultan. But the Bulgarian government replied on January 14, 1906, that Bulgaria had previously concluded treaties with Austria and other foreign states without having to obtain the consent of the Ottoman sultan, who had no right to interfere with the affairs of Bulgaria inasmuch as the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) did not expressly restrict Bulgaria's "full freedom of action in concluding such treaties with foreign States as would seem advantageous to her economic or political interests." L'Universite de Sofia, Faculte de Droit, Annuaire, X - X I (1913-15), 250-61. 37 K. D. Spisarevsky, Serbsko-Bulgarskiya mitnicheski soyuz (Sofia, 1906). 38 G. L. Dickinson, International Anarchy (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1926), p. 237. 39

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM

33

The evil influence of the great Bismarck has long outlasted him in Vienna. His programme for Austria demanded that she should absorb the Balkan States, especially Serbia, in order that, when the future should give Germany control over the Dual Kingdom, the way would be made easy for a German advance to the sea. Austria was to be the unfortunate cat to pick the chestnuts out of the fire for Germany. That was Bismarck's idea, and though he is dead, his idea seems yet to dominate the Austrian government. . . . It is poetic justice that Austria's action will bring upon her its own punishment.39 So the Drang nach Osten was to merge with Pan-Germanism for the establishment, under German hegemony, of an economically self-sufficient empire extending from Scandinavia to the Near East and encompassing as its main constituents Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. For the success of this policy it was necessary to annihilate all attempts at the combination of the Balkan states under other than the auspices and domination of Berlin or Vienna.40 Owing to the opposition of Austria and Russia, Regent Stambuloff failed, soon after the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg in 1886, to effect a personal union between Bulgaria and Rumania or between Bulgaria and Turkey through the election of either the king of Rumania or the sultan of Turkey as prince of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the annals of the nineteenth century were enriched by a series of plans or proposals, some realistic and some visionary, for the establishment of a union of the Balkan states. A series of projects, emanating from Berlin, Budapest, or Vienna, contemplated the establishment of a loose Balkan confederation or Greco-Slavo-Turkish entente under the hegemony of Austria for the purpose of blocking Russia's advance to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. But it was a Russian idea that the Christian Balkan states which had obtained their independence largely through Russian help should form, together with Turkey, a confederation or entente in order to counteract Austria's aggressive policy of Drang nach Osten. Another project offered by "Un Latin" envisaged a confederation of all the Balkan states, including Turkey, under the hegemony or presidency of Italy. Only the proposals made by the "League for Balkan Confederation" of Paris or the "Balkan Commit39 A. Stead, "The Serbo-Bulgarian Convention and Its Results," Fortnightly Review, L X X I X (1906), 539-42. 40 F. Naumann, Mitteleuropa, p. 322; S. Grümbach, German Annexationist Aims, p. 118; R. G. Usher, Pan-Germanism, p. 209; G. T . Danaillow, Les Effets de la guerre en Bulgarie, p. 451; M. S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, p. 20.

34

FEDERALISM

AND

NATIONALISM

t e e " of London seem to have had in view an independent Balkan confederation—to say nothing further of the numerous schemes of Balkan and outside political writers. 41

THE

MACEDONIAN

QUESTION

T h e worst product of the Congress of Berlin seems to have been the so-called "Macedonian Question." Included in Bulgaria by the T r e a t y of San Stefano and given back to the Ottoman sultan by the T r e a t y of Berlin, Macedonia was an object of ardent desire not only to Bulgaria but also to Greece, to Serbia, to Albania (herself still a Turkish provi n c e ) , and even to Rumania, though Rumania had no common frontier with Macedonia. Of course there could be no enduring Balkan union before the disposal of that apple of discord. 42 Bulgaria was in favor of either Macedonia's retrocession to herself or else the creation of an autonomous Macedonia under the protection of the concert of Europe. But Serbia, Rumania, and Greece opposed not only Macedonia's retrocession to Bulgaria but also an autonomous Macedonia, for, with the m a j o r i t y of her population already under the ecclesiastical administration of the Bulgarian exarchate of Constantinople, she might, like Eastern Rumelia, ultimately reunite with Bulgaria. T h e y all favored an " e q u i t a b l e " partition of Macedonia for the sake of the balance of power in the Balkans—a solution vigorously opposed by Bulgaria. 4 1 A . Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs (1893); Türr, Solution pacifique de la question d'Orient (1877); Danilewski, La Russie et l'Europe (1889); Un Latin, Vne Conjediration orientate (1905) ; Μ . R . Ivanovitch, " T h e Future of the Balkans," Fortnightly Review, X C I (1909), 1040-58; Vesnitch, " L e Prince Michel Obrenovitch et ses idees sur la Confederation balkanique," Annales internationales d'histoire, Congres de la Haye (1898), pp. 227-44; Pinon, "Une Confederation balkanique est-elle possib l e ? " Revue des deux mondes, L V I I (1910), 799-829; Caleb, " N o t e sur la Confederation balkanique," Bulletin mensuel, Societe de legislation comparee, X X I X , Nos. 4-5 (1910), 278-91; Peritch, "Essai sur la Confederation balkanique." Le Correspondant, C C L I (1913), 417; P . L . [Argyriades], " L e federalisme et la question d'Orient," Revue socialiste, X X I I (1895), 202-13; N . Iorga, "Premiers essais de federation dans le SudEst europeen," L'Europe du Sud-Est (August, 1933), pp. 71 ff.; The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, I I I , 272-76. 42 Pro Macedonia (Indianapolis, 1927), p. 1; J. T . Markovitch, Macedonia and the Macedonians, p. 31, 44-45; G. T . Georgevitch, Macedonia, p. 68; H. L . Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 195; L . Villari, The Balkan Question, p. 171; M . Konitza, "Albanian Question," 1C, N o . 138 (1919); J. D. Bourchier, " A Balkan Confederation," Fortnightly Review, L V I (1891), 372; Jonescu, " T h e Unrest in the Balkans," Monthly Review, X I (1903), 69; Drakoules, "Greece, the Balkans, and the Federal Principle," Asiatic Review, V I (1915), 113; Schopoff, " T h e Balkan States and the Federal Principle," Asiatic Review, V I I (1915), 6; BPP, Turkey N o . 3, 1903.

F E D E R A L I S M AND N A T I O N A L I S M

35

Another solution was provided for in Article X X I I I of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) whereby the Ottoman sultan undertook to introduce into his European provinces laws similar to the organic law of Crete (1868), elaborated and adapted to the local requirements of each province by special commissions in which the native population was to be largely represented. But no such laws were ever enacted. On the contrary, the despotic sultan Abdul Hamid II suspended the constitution of 1878 and promulgated, with the approval of the signatories of that treaty, a reactionary "Law for the European Provinces" (August 23, 1880) under which the Christian population of these provinces was subjected to unbearable exactions, extortions, and persecution at the hands of the Turkish officials, with the avowed purpose of Moslemizing these provinces.43 As the hope of promised reforms faded away and the conditions of the Christians in Macedonia became steadily worse, the so-called "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization" (IMRO) came into being in 1893, with the slogans: Macedonia for the Macedonians; no annexation to Bulgaria, much less to Greece, Serbia, or any other state; no partition but simply an autonomous Macedonia, under the protection of the concert of Europe, which might become a separate member of a prospective Balkan confederation. In other words, the IMRO of 1893 aimed at the resuscitation of the Macedonian state extinguished by the Romans in 147 B.C. At Sofia, under the very auspices of Prince Ferdinand, a rival or auxiliary "Supreme Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Committee" (SMAC) was set up in 1895. Its adherents, all professional patriots in the service of Bulgaria's prince, enjoyed immunity from the Bulgarian laws and were generally called "irresponsible factors." The SMAC's adherents were also called the "Annexationists" as distinguished from the "Autonomists" of the IMRO. The program of the SMAC, identical with that of the Bulgarian government, was either Macedonia's annexation to Bulgaria or the creation of an autonomous Macedonia. This equivocal program of "either way" ("i täka i väka") characterized the whole activity of that committee, which was little else than that of gangsters and racketeers. If some implacable Bulgarian politician dared to oppose Prince Ferdinand's policy, he was cowed to silence or killed as a "traitor" by some "irresponsible factors." In this manner Prince Ferdinand managed to get rid of his own benefactor, ex-Premier Stephen 43 For the organic law of Crete, see BFSP, LVIII, 137-64; the Law for the European Provinces, B P P , Turkey N o . 16, 1880 (Cmd. 2704); see also Westlake, "The Balkan Question and International Law," Nineteenth Century and After, L X (1906), 889.

FEDERALISM AND

36

NATIONALISM

Stambuloff, who had secured his election to the Bulgarian throne by a packed grand national assembly in 1887 ; and afterwards that Machiavellian German prince easily fastened his despotic "personal regime" upon Bulgaria. 44 In September, 1901, Americans were filled with horror by the kidnaping of Miss Stone, an American missionary in Macedonia, and then a bloody feud between the two rival revolutionary Macedonian organizations began. The kidnaping of the American missionary was, in fact, done in a cavalier fashion by the I M R O with a view to obtaining money and publicity for the "sacred cause" of Macedonia's autonomy. But the rival SMAC at Sofia, apparently not without the sanction of its royal patron, sent an armed band into Macedonia to recapture or kill Miss Stone, so that the Autonomists should not obtain ransom money and thus become independent in their activities. But the Autonomists succeeded in routing and driving the Annexationists back to Bulgaria, the Ottoman bank paid to the I M R O coffer a ransom of 14,000 Turkish pounds in gold ($70,000), and Miss Stone was safely released. The ransom money served to purchase arms and dynamite; and the so-called "Saint Elliah's Rebellion" broke out in Macedonia in 1903. These outrages of the Macedonian committees naturally alienated outside sympathy, while the Ottoman sultan obtained an opportunity to let loose his troops, regular and irregular, upon the hapless peasants in Macedonia; the inhabitants of more than a hundred towns and villages were either massacred or rendered homeless and destitute. Then the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, realizing their responsibility for the Macedonian troubles, commissioned Austria and Russia to initiate immediately a scheme of reforms known as the "Miirzteg Programme." But since these reforms did not solve the essential difficulties, Macedonia sank deeper and deeper into the slough of anarchy. Moreover, jealous of what they considered a triumphal march of Bulgarian bishops and komitadjis ("committee-men") throughout Macedonia, the Greek and Serbian governments formed their own "Macedonian Committees" for propaganda in Macedonia; and the rival armed bands of komitadjis made life intolerable for the remainder of the Macedonian population. 45 When in 1907, after more than a century of bitter hostility, Great Britain and Russia succeeded in ironing out their differences and thus making the Triple Entente (France, Great Britain, and Russia) complete as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Ger44

A. G. H. Beaman, Stephen Stambuloff, pp. 234 ff. USFR (1902), pp. 997 ff.; Ε. M. Stone, "Among the Brigands," Everybody's zine, VI (1902), 45 ff.; BD, V, 49-75. 45

Maga-

FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM

37

many, and Italy), the Macedonian Question again came to the forefront in European diplomacy. In June, 1908, an agreement was reached between Great Britain and Russia at Reval (now Tallinn, capital of Estonia) for the pacification of Macedonia through a more radical scheme of reforms. Yet in July, 1908, the "Committee of Union and Progress," better known as the "Young Turks," hastened to effect a bloodless revolution in Constantinople, restoring the constitution of 1876 and thus rendering the "Reval Programme" superfluous. There was no necessity for reforms for Christians because there was hurriet ("liberty") for everybody in the Ottoman empire. Exaggerated hopes were raised that at last the theocratic Ottoman empire had reformed itself and that one of the obstacles to a union with its Christian neighbors had been removed overnight. The Organosis, a committee of Christian and Moslem members of the Turkish parliament, was set up in Constantinople to work for the establishment of a confederation or entente of all the Balkan states. 46 But the transformation of the despotic and theocratic Ottoman empire into a modern constitutional monarchy was pregnant with serious dangers for Austria's Drang nach Osten policy as well as for the actual independence and integrity of Bulgaria. Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, were in theory still Ottoman provinces, while Bulgaria was technically an Ottoman vassal principality, united to the autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia: the vassal Bulgarian prince was in theory simply appointed by the sultan with the advice and consent of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin as governor general of Eastern Rumelia. The rejuvenated Ottoman Sublime Porte ("Government") was bent on reasserting its sovereign treaty rights over those former Ottoman dominions. In August, 1908, the Austrian emperor and the Bulgarian prince agreed secretly that Bulgaria should declare her formal independence of the Ottoman empire in contravention of the Treaty of Berlin, thus paving the way for Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. On October S, 1908, on his return from Austria, Prince Ferdinand summoned his cabinet of ministers at the medieval capital Tirnovo, in the old Church of Forty Martyrs, to countersign a manifesto proclaiming the united northern Bulgaria and southern Bulgaria an independent tsardom and giving him the medieval title of "Tsar of the Bulgarians." The government of the Young Turks contented itself with a paper 46 "L'Entente balkanique et l'organosis de Constantinople 1908-1912," LB, I, No. 6 (1931), 1-6.

38

F E D E R A L I S M AND NATIONALISM

protest, while the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin made no move against Bulgaria. On October 7, 1908, Emperor Francis Joseph considered it safe enough to give the Treaty of Berlin another blow by announcing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to AustriaHungary, although the population of these provinces was Serbian. In April, 1909, all the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin recognized all the accomplished facts except the decision of the assembly of Crete (October 12, 1908) to unite the island with Greece." 47 E. J. Dillon, "The Near Eastern Crisis," Contemporary Review, XCIV (1908), 51332; W. Steed, Through Thirty Years, I, 292; Aussenpolitik, I, 97.

Chapter III T H E BALKAN

LEAGUE

H

ARASSED by the bad turn of events abroad and pressed by the reactionary Moslems at home, the Young T u r k s soon forgot all about constitutional liberties and inaugurated a relentless policy of Moslemizing the Ottoman provinces in Europe. Such a policy could not have failed to bring about a rapprochement of the Christian peoples in the Balkans. The Greek Ecumenical Patriarch and the Bulgarian "Schismatic" Exarch at Constantinople exchanged amenities for the first time since 1870 and entered into a tacit agreement on a concerted action in defense of their flocks. The Christian peoples and the komitadjis of these provinces, following the example of their spiritual chiefs, began to fraternize. Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian students exchanged visits to their capitals. Economic committees were formed at Athens, Belgrade, and Sofia for the purpose of preparing the preliminaries of a customs union. It began to look as if an alliance or entente of the Christian Balkan states was about to become a reality. A

MIRACLE

For over thirty years the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin had shirked their responsibility for the introduction of reforms into the Christian provinces of the Ottoman empire; but in 1912 "a miracle took place." Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, for a while subordinating their quarrels to the menace of a common enemy, formed the so-called "Balkan League." Then the six Great Powers were at length awakened from their lethargy. Again choosing Austria and Russia as their mandatories, they delivered (October 8, 1912) a threatening note to the allied Balkan states, declaring: 1. That the Powers energetically disapprove of all measures calculated to bring about a breach of the peace. 2. That, by virtue of Article X X I I I of the Treaty of Berlin, they will

40

T H E BALKAN

LEAGUE

undertake, in the interest of the populations, the realization of reforms in the administration of Turkey in Europe, it being understood that these reforms will not in any way diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or impair the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; this declaration, however, reserves to the Powers the liberty to proceed to the collective and subsequent study of the reforms. 3. That if war nevertheless breaks out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the close of the conflict, any modification of the territorial status quo in Turkey in Europe. In their identical replies, the allied Balkan states declared rather defiantly that after so many promises of reforms had been given and broken by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan "it would be cruel not to endeavor to obtain, in favor of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, reforms of a more radical and definite nature, which would really ameliorate their miserable condition if applied sincerely and in their integrity." Simultaneously the allied Balkan states delivered an ultimatum to the Ottoman government, demanding immediate and radical reforms in "Turkey in Europe," including ethnic autonomy of the various nationalities. As an answer, the Ottoman government declared war against the four Balkan states (October 18, 1912). And then, within the short span of a month, the Balkan League unexpectedly demolished the Ottoman empire in Europe; four small states with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeated an empire having 25,000,000 inhabitants and possessing an army trained and equipped by German military instructors. The alleged Turkish misrule during the previous five centuries seems to have been finally avenged. Each of the four allies did its part in the incredible and dazzling epic, although, as generally admitted, the brunt of the fighting fell upon the Bulgarians. Now the previous talk of reforms was forgotten. The obnoxious Treaty of Berlin (1878) was torn into shreds. Even the six Great Powers, though alarmed or surprised at the success of the Balkan League, vied with one another in eating their words and in declaring that the territorial status quo had vanished forever. By the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) the Ottoman sultan ceded to the allied Balkan states the Island of Crete and "all the territories of his Empire on the continent of Europe west of a line drawn from Enos on the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea, with exception of Albania," and such matters as "arranging the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania" or "passing upon the title to all the Ottoman Islands in the Aegean Sea (except the

T H E BALKAN

LEAGUE

41

Island of Crete) and to the Peninsula of Mount Athos" were to be submitted to the six Great Powers for final decision. 1 After this brilliant achievement, however, the Balkan League ignobly collapsed because of its inherent organic defects. Sometimes erroneously called "Balkan Federation," its covenant was based upon a secret treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia (March 13, 1912), which was to expire at the end of 1920; a secret treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and Greece (May 29, 1912) for three years; and a vague secret understanding between Bulgaria and Montenegro. So the Balkan League ("Bulgaria and her allies") was somewhat analogous to the Delian League ("Athens and her allies") or the Peloponnesian League ("Sparta and her allies"). But each of these two ancient confederacies was a permanent alliance with a common organ, congress or synod, whereas the Balkan League was a temporary alliance without a common legislative or advisory organ. The Balkan League bore rather an instructive analogy to the ancient temporary alliance between Athens and Sparta. Its ancient counterpart was dissolved soon after the Persians had been driven back to Asia; the Balkan League collapsed soon after the Turks had been expelled from Europe. Whether its originator was Gueshoff of Bulgaria, Venizelos of Greece. Milovanovitch of Serbia, or Bourchier of the London Times, the Balkan League came into being under ignominious circumstances. It was brought about by Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who received for his services a secret "loan" of 3,000,000 gold francs from the coffer of Tsar Nicholas of Russia. 2 Regarded by Russia as a mere appendage of the Triple Entente, the Balkan League acted as an independent grouping of small states, in many instances contrary to the expressed wishes of Russia and her great allies. On the other hand, while there was no previous agreement between Bulgaria and Greece as to the division of the "liberated" Turkish territories, the Secret Annex to the Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia defined in detail their respective territorial claims as follows: All territorial additions which may be secured by common action, as provided in articles one and two of the treaty and article one of this secret 1 Suppl. AJ1L, VIII (1914), 12-13; Oakes and Mowat, The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 361-62; Β. E. Schmitt, "The Balkan Revolution," Bulletin, Western Reserve University, XVII (1914), 13-56; The Peace Movement, II (1913),

22 ff. 2 Sbornik sekretnikh dokumentov ("Collection of Secret Documents"), No. 4 (Petrograd, December, 1917), pp. 168-76; M. Paleologue, .1« Ambassador's Memoirs, II, 25-27; D.\S, IV (1929), 2681.

THE BALKAN

42

LEAGUE

appendix thereto, shall be under the common dominion (condominium) of the allied States. The division thereof shall be made without delay within the maximum period of three months after the reestablishment of peace and upon the following bases: Serbia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to the territories to the east of the Rhodopes and the Struma River; Bulgaria recognizes the right of Serbia to those situated to the north of Shar-Planina. As regards the territories situated between the Shar Planina, the Rhodopes, the Aegean Sea and Okhrida Lake [Macedonia] if the two parties reach the conclusion that it is impossible because of the common interests of the Bulgarian and the Serbian nations, or for other reasons of domestic or foreign affairs, to organize the territories as a separate autonomous province, they shall be disposed of according to the following provisions: Serbia agrees not to lay any claim to the territory situated beyond the line traced upon the map, starting from the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier at Mt. Golem (to the north of Kriva Palanka) and following a generally southwestern direction to Okhrida Lake. . . . Bulgaria agrees to accept this frontier if His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, who shall be asked to be the final arbitrator of this question, decides in favor of this line. It is understood that the contracting parties agree to accept as final the frontier which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, within the above indicated limits, may find to correspond the closest to the rights and interests of the two parties. Paying only lip service to the principle of autonomy, Serbia and Bulgaria thus agreed on Macedonia's partition, with the lion's share going to Bulgaria. Moreover, Article 4 of this instrument provided: Every difference which shall arise concerning the interpretation and execution of any of the provisions of the treaty, of this secret appendix, and of the military convention, shall be submitted to Russia for final decision, as soon as one of the two parties shall have declared that it believes it impossible to reach an agreement by direct negotiations. A

GERMAN

AGENT

IN

THE

BALKANS

It was easy to see that Serbia signed this secret treaty, solemnly giving up her aspirations to almost the whole of Macedonia, with mental reservations. Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who engineered the whole thing for a price, was by no means singularly blind when he affixed his sign manual to this document. Apparently he had his own mental reservations ; he designed to transform the Balkan League into a Balkan or

T H E BALKAN

LEAGUE

43

Eastern empire and reduce Bulgaria's allies to the status of vassals. The Balkan League was therefore born with the seeds of its own doom. 3 While the Bulgarian army was demolishing the main Turkish forces in Thrace and Tsar Ferdinand was preparing himself to outstrip the glory of his medieval predecessors Simeon and John Assen I I by entering Constantinople and proclaiming himself "Emperor of the East" despite a stern warning by Russia, the Greeks and the Serbs occupied most of Macedonia and promptly expelled its Bulgarian bishops, priests, and teachers. Serbia was not slow to demand the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance on the ground of rebus sic stantibus ("changed conditions"), claiming that it had been rendered obsolete by the proclamation of an independent Albania (November 28, 1912). There was, of course, no evidence that the negotiators of that treaty had been so rash as to contemplate the partition of Albania or the allotment of Albanian territory to either Bulgaria or Serbia. On the contrary, its provisions concerning the division of Macedonia between Bulgaria and Serbia stopped abruptly at Okhrida Lake, the eastern border of Albania. Bulgaria would not accept the Serbian demand for the revision of the treaty of alliance; she held out for the whole treaty and nothing but the treaty. Greece, too, had a dispute with Bulgaria over the possession of Salonika and its hinterland. Premier Gueshoff, who had prudently advised the submission of all disputes between Bulgaria and her allies to Russian arbitration, was constrained to resign as soon as the Treaty of London was signed by the allied Balkan states and Turkey. Tsar Ferdinand and his new premier Daneff were intent on arriving at a settlement of the disputes with Greece and Serbia over Macedonia by force of arms. On June 1, 1913, Greece and Serbia entered into an alliance against Bulgaria. Rumania, too, joined Greece and Serbia against Bulgaria, notwithstanding the Protocol of St. Petersburg (May 9, 1913) for the voluntary cession of the Bulgarian district of Silistria to Rumania as a compensation for the Rumanian neutrality during the war against the Turks. On June 8, 1913, the Russian tsar interposed to prevent a "crime s / ) , X I , Part I, 530: X , Part I, 313, 316; R. Rankin, The Inner History of the Balkan War (London, 1914), pp. 469-70; Α. Η. E. Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs (London, 1917), p. 211; A. H. Fried, "A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War," IC, No. 74 (January, 1914), pp. 3-14; Sbornik diplomaticheskih dokumentov kassavushtihssya sobitti na Balkanskom Poluostrovove (St. Petersburg, 1914); Myatorich, The Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist, p. 239.

T H E BALKAN

44

LEAGUE

inal struggle" between the allies by offering his services as arbitrator. He appealed especially to the kings of Bulgaria and Serbia not to "dim the glory they had earned in common" by a fratricidal war but, as their treaty of alliance provided, to submit their dispute to him for final decision. Serbia grudgingly accepted Russia's offer; but on June 22, 1913, a crown council in Bulgaria decided to accept it under the condition that the arbitral award should be rendered within seven days. Offended by the "insolence" of the Bulgarian tsar, the Russian autocrat refused to act promptly as arbitrator and took a fishing vacation on the Baltic Sea. Exactly seven days later (June 29, 1913) Tsar Ferdinand, with the knowledge of his pliant premier Daneff, gave the Bulgarian army an order to attack and eject the Greeks and the Serbs from the soil of Macedonia. On the next day Premier Daneff instructed the Bulgarian ministers accredited to the governments of Russia, France, and Great Britain: "Declare that Bulgaria will be stampeded by no threats. . . . Make it well understood that, when the question involves the fate of Macedonia, Bulgaria is ready to make any sacrifices." As even a Balkan shepherd could have foreseen, within a few weeks Bulgaria was crushed by a combination of Greece, Serbia, and Rumania, while the Turks took advantage of this fratricidal struggle to reoccupy eastern Thrace despite the Peace Treaty of London. On July 14, 1913, Premier Daneff confided Bulgaria's fate to the hands of Russia. Owing to Russian interposition at the last moment, Bulgaria was not completely wiped out for the criminal folly of her German king, though the peace terms imposed upon her by the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) were very harsh. Bulgaria was constrained to cede her rich province of Dobrudja to Rumania; she lost also the greater part of Macedonia, which she would certainly have acquired under Russian arbitration; and she had to content herself with the barren district of Petrich and a narrow strip of the Aegean Sea coast between Maritsa and Mesta. By the Treaty of Constantinople (September 29, 1913) Bulgaria also lost eastern Thrace to Turkey. 4 4

For the Balkan League treaties, see A Diplomatist [G. Young], Nationalism and War in the Near East, p. 387; W. M. Sloan, The Balkans (1920), p. 383; E. Gueshoff, The Balkan League, p. 112 ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States (Sofia, 1919), p. 157; Suppl. AJIL, VIII (1914); BD, IX, ii, 1011; Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Le Traiti de la paix de Bucarest du 28 juillet (10 aoüt), 1913; ibid., Documents diplomatiques, septembre 1912-aoüt 1913 (Bucarest, 1913); Doklad na parlamentarnata izpttatelna komissiya (Sofia, 1918) ; PH, No. 152, p. 37; S. Tonjoroff, "Bulgaria and the Treaty of Bucharest," North American Review, CXCVIII (1913), 630.

THE

BALKAN

LEAGUE

45

The chief, if not the sole, villain of this ignoble piece was Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, all the naive arguments of a school of history holding that the people have more influence than the king to the contrary notwithstanding. That German prince himself admitted that he "had personally smashed the Balkan League and thereby done Austria the greatest service." 5 This "service," was certainly not performed gratis. Article 239 of the Bulgarian Military Penal Law provides: "A military commander who willfully begins military operations against an allied or neutral State shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not less than fifteen years." But his "criminal folly" in giving orders to the Bulgarian army to attack Bulgaria's allies might not be legally punished because Article 8 of the Bulgarian Constitution provides: "The person of the Tsar is sacred and inviolable." To paraphrase the Bible (I Samuel 12: 19), the Bulgarians had added unto all their sins to elect that German prince as their ruler. Yet when early in 1914 they were ready to send him with all his retinue back to Germany, the Russian foreign minister Sazonoff not only advised them to keep him on the throne but also urged Serbia, in the event of his abdication and the proclamation of a republic, to intervene in the internal affairs of Bulgaria in order "to uphold the monarchical principle and restore order." By the grace of Russia, therefore, Ferdinand was to stay on the Bulgarian throne five years longer, to carry out his "mission in the East" and to contribute a great deal to the destruction of monarchism in Russia. It should be noted in passing that the Second Balkan War brought about one good result—the emancipation of the Rumanian peasantry from serfdom." THE

WORLD

WAS

With the disruption of the Balkan League a serious obstacle to Austria's Drang nach Osten was removed; but the loose alliance of Greece, Serbia, and Rumania still remained to block the access of Austria to the Aegean Sea. Moreover, the aggrandizement of Serbia greatly en5 J . M. Baernreither, Fragments of a Political Diary (Macmillan, London, 1930), p. 253; see also Foreign Affairs, VI (1928), 654. 6 "Rumania's part in the second Balkan War proved a mere excursion across the Danube, with only part of her forces, but that short expedition had an unexpected effect on her soldiers. . . . They saw that in Bulgaria, only a short distance from their own places, there was a country' which knew not what large property and masterful landlords were; in which every peasant had his holding, and the villages were better built and fields better tilled than their own. After the return from Bulgaria the late Ionel Bratianu recognized . . . the need for a land reform." D. Mitrany, The Land and Peasant in Rumania, p. 91.

46

T H E BALKAN L E A G U E

hanced the discontent of about 7,000,000 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Austria-Hungary. The government of Vienna considered it necessary to crush Serbia, the pivot of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans, for a twofold reason: (1) to remove a formidable stumbling block to the Drang nach Osten and (2) to ensure the domination of the Herrenvolk (11,000,000 Germans and 10,000,000 Magyars) over 26,000,000 Slavs and 4,000,000 Rumanians and Italians in Austria-Hungary. Instead of re-forming the Dual Monarchy on federal and democratic bases as a triune monarchy of Austria-Hungary-Slavia or a Danubian confederation, in accordance with the signs of the new times, the Habsburgs contemplated the idea of preventing by all means the formation of a Balkan confederation and of subjugating the Balkan peoples. Some might say that the Balkan peoples should have submitted to slavery instead of resisting the policy of the Herrenvolk and thus provoking the World War. Yet Baron d'Estournelle de Constant was right in saying, "War rather than slavery." 7 On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the reputed Slavophile heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, together with his morganatic Slavic wife, was assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital. The assassin, though an Austrian subject, was a Serb. The Herrenvolk hated the unfortunate archduke for his alleged designs to reorganize the empire as a triune monarchy; yet they seized the opportunity afforded by his assassination to annihilate Serbia. On July 23, 1914, Austria-Hungary addressed to Serbia the famous ultimatum; at the same time the Austrian foreign minister Count von Berchtold instructed the Austrian minister at Sofia that— the Macedonian Committees in Bulgaria should at once begin intensive activity—which the Bulgarian Government might naturally and categorically condemn and disavow—with the main purpose of concentrically destroying the means of communications (bridges, railroads, and telegraphs), thus cutting off Serbia from Salonika on the south and from Bulgaria on the east. As soon as our mobilization is declared you are authorized to find ways and means for the promotion of such activity, proceeding carefully and secretly and using money.8 Assured that Bulgaria, with her German king and Macedonian committees, would be her ally, Austria-Hungary declared war upon Serbia (July 28, 1914). Within a few days Germany, Austria's ally, declared 7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 4 (1914), p. 1. 8 Aussenpolitik, VIII, 609; Kautsky, The Outbreak of the World War (1924), pp. 68-· 69; E. Ludwig, July '14 (1929), pp. 54 £f.

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47

war upon Serbia's ally, Russia, and upon Russia's ally, France. Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium, and Great Britain declared war upon Germany. Thus was the first World War begun. Bulgaria declared her neutrality (July 31, 1914)—a course which was followed by Turkey as well as by Greece and Rumania. Turkey was, however, dragged into the war on the side of the Triple Alliance in November, 1914. On the outbreak of the war Italy declared her neutrality on the ground that her allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany, entered into an offensive war whereas the Triple Alliance was a defensive instrument. Later Italy denounced the Triple Alliance, threw in her lot with the Triple Entente, and in May, 191S, declared war upon Austria-Hungary. If by that time Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania had joined the Quadruple Entente, the Germanic Powers might have been defeated and the war brought to a close before the end of 1915. In such a case there would have been no opportunity for the United States of America to intervene in the war at all. Bulgaria was, however, unwilling to fight side by side with Serbia and Greece, her erstwhile "alliesrobbers," as a popular Bulgarian song of the "by jingo" variety called them. Disillusioned and wearied by the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarian people desired to stay neutral, though they sympathized with the cause of the Quadruple Entente. But the Bulgarian government was openly in sympathy and secretly in alliance with the Germanic Powers. Soon after the outbreak of the World War Premier Venizelos of Greece launched a proposal to revive the Balkan League, now to include Rumania. To bring Bulgaria back into the league, large territories claimed as her own would have to be returned by Greece, Serbia, and Rumania, and since none of these three states was prepared to make such territorial sacrifices, the proposal fell to the ground. The proverbial Balkan mentality—the inability to give and take—rendered futile all efforts exerted by the Quadruple Entente to revive the Balkan League.9 9 Sir Edward Grey (later Lord Grey), who as Great Britain's secretary for foreign affairs did bis utmost to revive the Balkan League, said: ". . . if Bulgaria were unreconciled and attacked her, Serbia would lose not only the glorious future prospects, but everything that she now had. It was all in vain. The Serbian Minister closed one conversation with me by saying that they would rather all die than let Bulgaria have Monastir. A preference for death put an end to all argument, and I became respectfully silent. . . . Even with all the stern realities of the war about him, it remains true that many people would rather have fine words and false hope than the truth which is unacceptable." Twenty-five Years 1892-1916 (New York: F. A. Stokes, 1925), II, 203. See also J. Danilov, "Les Tentatives de constitution d'un bloc balkanique en 1914-1915," Le Monde slave, No. 5 (1928), pp. 201-29; No. 6, pp. 352-78.

48

T H E BALKAN L E A G U E BULGARIA

SOLD

OUT

Russia and her allies were mistaken in their assumption that since the immense majority of the Bulgarian people were in sympathy with their cause Bulgaria could not be brought into the war on the side of Germany. Equally mistaken were the clever diplomatists who thought that, realizing her strategic importance, Bulgaria stood on the international auction block, ready to join the highest bidder. According to the secret diplomatic document published in the Bulgarian Orange Book, Bulgaria had been an active ally of the Central Powers since 1913; she had already been sold out in camera by Tsar Ferdinand to Germany (as revealed in the German Reichstag on March 19, 1931) for a personal commission of 25,000,000 gold marks ($5,250,000), an annual pension of 60,000 gold marks for life, and various other pecuniary gifts. On September 6, 1915, the deal was formally closed by the conclusion of three secret accords: a treaty of friendship and alliance between Germany and Bulgaria, which was to expire by the end of 1920; an agreement between Germany and Bulgaria for the partition and obliteration of Serbia; and a military convention signed by AustriaHungary, Germany, and Bulgaria. A few days later the Turko-Bulgarian convention for the voluntary retrocession of Karagach by Turkey to Bulgaria rounded out the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) versus the Quadruple Entente (France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy). 10 Serbia contemplated saving herself by declaring a preventive war on Bulgaria, but her allies wisely vetoed such a rash action, for it would have merely transformed Tsar Ferdinand from a villain into a hero. Only a revolution or the dethronement of Ferdinand could have prevented Bulgaria from entering the war on the side of Germany. The leaders of the Bulgarian opposition parties—Stambulisky, Malinoff, Gueshoff, Daneff, and Tsanoff—went to the royal palace (September 17, 1915) and told Ferdinand that they would oppose his pro-German policy by all legal means. The dauntless Alexander Stambulisky, leader of the largest opposition party, even threatened him with a revolution and with losing his throne and his head if he persisted with his proAmbassador Morgenthau's Story, p. 262; Ferdinand of Bulgaria; the Amazing Career of a Shoddy Czar, by the author of the "Real Kaiser," p. 10; Berliner Tageblatt, October 9, 1918, pp. 1 - 2 ; H. R. Madol, Ferdinand von Bulgarien (1931), pp. 212 ff.; BOB, I, 1080; Obvinitelen akt (Sofia, 1921), pp. 25 ff.; "Re Ex-Tsar Ferdinand's Funds," The Law Times, C X X I I I (1920), 661-70; "Ferdinand of Bulgaria," Living Age, CCCXLI (1931), 238-39; BOB, I, 1 ff.; Stenographische Berichte, Band 445, pp. 1733-34.

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German policy. Immediately after the audience Tsar Ferdinand went to the council of ministers and "bitterly complained against the conduct of Stambulisky who had made such a scene as the Tsar had never before seen in his life." That proud German prince told Premier Radoslavoff that he (Ferdinand) was "no longer the Tsar of Bulgaria, so deeply and cruelly had he considered himself insulted and outraged by Stambulisky." 11 Unfortunately Ferdinand did not abdicate at that time but about three years later. Of the 245 members of the Bulgarian Sobranie, 119 composed the Opposition which condemned the policy of Premier Radoslavoff and demanded the immediate convocation of an extraordinary session of the assembly. Of the 126 members of the Government majority, 17 adherents of Dr. Genadieff also opposed Bulgaria's alliance with Germany. Hence Tsar Ferdinand issued a decree proroguing the regular session of the Sobranie (October IS) for two months. With Stambulisky courtmartialed and condemned to imprisonment for life, with many of his adherents imprisoned or shot in order to inspire terror in the hearts of the people, and with the leaders of the other opposition parties cowed or silenced by Macedonian komitadjis, Tsar Ferdinand decreed general mobilization and "armed neutrality" (September 22, 1915); and then (October 14, 1915) he declared a "defensive war" on Serbia (he had given orders to the Bulgarian army to invade her territory two days earlier). Although Serbia's allies—Russia, France, Great Britain, and Italy—declared war on Bulgaria, within about a month Serbia had ceased to exist; her king, her cabinet, her parliament, and the remnants of her heroic army were transported to the Greek island of Corfu; the Serbian inhabitants east of the Morava River (allotted to Bulgaria by the secret agreement with Germany) willy-nilly changed the suffix of their names from "-itch" to "-off" and thus became for all intents and purposes "pure Bulgarians." In August, 1916, Rumania took the side of the Quadruple Entente and declared war on Austria-Hungary; but within about two months she also was crushed by the Central Powers. In June, 1917, Greece too joined the Quadruple Entente; but, being divided against herself, she was not of much help to her allies. The collapse of Russia in 1917 gave the German Herrenvolk some impetus to dream of the conquest of the world; but the intervention of the United States of America on the side of the Quadruple Entente in April, 1917, rendered the defeat of the 11 Obvinitelen akt, p. 478; A. Stambulisky, Dvyete mi sreshti s tsar Ferdinand (Sofia, 1918) ; A. L. Kennedy, The Old Diplomacy and New (1922), p. 255; M. Dunan, L'£te bulgare, pp. 286 ff.

so

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Central Powers inevitable. President Wilson's Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918) helped immensely to break the morale of the Central Powers, in spite of the ridicule heaped upon Wilson's suggestions by the Central European controlled press. 12 BULGARIA

AND THE

UNITED

STATES

On cutting off its relations with Germany, the government of the United States expressed an earnest desire that "relations between it and Bulgaria should continue friendly as heretofore." Bulgaria intended "also on her part to preserve the relations of perfect friendship." In his address delivered at a joint session of the two houses of Congress (December 4, 1917) recommending war with Austria-Hungary, President Wilson declared: We must meet force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others. According to the military convention concluded between Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany (September 6, 1915), the United States of America became their "common enemy" on declaring war against Germany. Under the provisions of the American "Trading with the Enemy Act" (October 6, 1917) Bulgaria was branded as an "ally of an enemy nation." As Secretary Lansing believed, Bulgaria was "disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent of making a separate peace with the allies." This was why the diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria were not cut off and why President Wilson wisely ignored the clamor in Congress to declare war against Bulgaria. Yet Premier Radoslavoff, on his part, was intent on declaring war against the United States, provided Germany conceded the whole of Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Since the Treaty of Bucharest between the Central Powers and Rumania (May 7, 1918) retroceded to Bulgaria only the southern Dobrudja which had been ceded to Rumania under the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) Premier Radoslavoff re12 Temperley, I, 448-58; D. Kraptcheff, Izminat The New Europe, XIII (November 20, 1919), 191.

put 1906-1936

(Sofia, 1937), p. 83;

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fused for the first time to comply with the wishes of Germany, and thus Bulgaria preserved her peace with the United States.13 ARMISTICE

After well-nigh three years of warfare on the side of her hereditary enemies against her former friends and protectors, Bulgaria found herself face to face with certain defeat or obliteration. Bulgaria's collapse was apparently expected and even desired by Germany as an alibi for her own capitulation, for early in 1918 she withdrew almost all her troops from the Salonika front and ceased supplying Bulgaria with munitions. Her treaties with Germany thus made scraps of paper, Bulgaria was free legally and morally to make a separate peace with the Entente Powers. But Tsar Ferdinand was determined to remain "a faithful ally of the Central Powers" to the bitter end; yet he saw the writing on the wall and sent a very pessimistic message to General Zhekoff, his commander in chief (June 11, 1918). Tsar Ferdinand said: I am sorry to note that the morale of the Army is very bad and that the minds of the soldiers have been poisoned by criminal agitations. What I have considered impossible is a wretched and dangerous fact. The Army is permeated through and through by political and partisan passions. Hence I cannot now, as before, rely upon the Army. The disastrous consequences of this ugly situation will perhaps soon put an end to my mission in the East. Ten days later that foxy German prince managed to open a safety valve by dismissing the pro-German premier Radoslavoff and appointing to the premiership the pro-Russian Malinoff, who had distinguished himself at the New Year celebration (1909) by greeting his "August Master" with the servile pronouncement: "By you and for you, always and everywhere." 11 It became as clear as daylight that Bulgaria and her allies would be defeated as a result of the entry of the United States of America into the World War. Inarticulate as they might have been, the Bulgarian soldiers, well-nigh 800,000 strong, were determined to quit fighting by 13 Baker and Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrou Wilson, Vol. I: War and Peace (New York: Harper, 1927), pp. 135-36; Suppl. AJ1L, XII (1918), 27; VSFR, 1917, Vol. I, Suppl. I, pp. 116, 138; Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1921), p. 193; Text of the Rumanian Peace (Dept. of State, Conf. Doc ), 1918, p. 52 ; CR, Vol. LVI (1917), Pt. I. pp. 50-53, 64, 86; and Pt. VI, pp. 5472-78; \'YT, December 9, 1917; BOB, I, 680 ff. 14 Doklad, Parlamentarnata izpitatelna komissiya za anketirane upravlenieto na bivshiya kabinet Malinoff-Kosturkoff (Sofia, 1923), pp. iv, 2 7 ) ; see also Noykoff, Zashio ne pobedikhme, p. 80; VSFR, Suppl. I, Vol. I (1918), pp. 262-64, 292-93; BOB, II, 905 ff.

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September IS, 1918, when, according to some "criminal agitations," the secret alliance of Bulgaria with Germany would expire—only Tsar Ferdinand and a few of his underlings knew at that time that it was to expire as late as December 31, 1920. But General Franchet d'Esperey, the commander in chief of the Allied army on the Salonika front—although duly apprised that the Bulgarian army would hoist the flag of truce on September IS, 1918, if in the meantime the Bulgarian government had not made peace—ordered a general attack upon the Bulgarian positions two days earlier. The Bulgarian front wavered and within two weeks collapsed. Pardoned and summoned to the royal palace, Alexander Stambulisky advised Tsar Ferdinand to ask for armistice and peace immediately as the sole alternative to complete disaster; and a Bulgarian delegation, accompanied by the American charge d'affaires Murphy, hurriedly departed for Salonika. Tsar Ferdinand was intent on repudiating the armistice and prolonging the war by a slow retreat of the remnants of the Bulgarian army as far back as the Dobrudja, and to frustrate this royal folly Stambulisky organized the retreating Bulgarian troops at the town of Radomir, about thirty miles from Sofia. On September 27, 1918, Bulgaria was proclaimed a republic. Two days later (September 29, 1918) Bulgaria signed the Salonika Armistice which, in the words of Ludendorff, "sealed the fate of the Quadruple Alliance." On the same day Hindenburg, the commander in chief of the German army, informed the kaiser that Germany had lost the war. Within about a month the war was brought to an end, 15 as if to justify the pronouncement of a Pan-German apostle: "The war comes from the E a s t ; the war is waged for the East; and the war will be decided in the East." l(i PEACE

As soon as Tsar Ferdinand abdicated and fled to Germany (October 3, 1918) his son Boris ascended the Bulgarian throne and the Radomir republic collapsed. At the Paris Peace Conference, Clemenceau is said to have asked: "Is Bulgaria a kingdom or a republic?" Perhaps the distinguished Frenchman wished to make a gibe at President Wilson's in15 "Armistice Agreements," SED (1919) No. 147; Sup pi. AJIL, X I I I (1919) ; USFR, Suppl. I, Vol. I (1918), 321-27, 334; BOB, II, 1085; Ludendorff's Own Story, II, 326; Hindenburg, Out of My Life, p. 402 ; Nowak, The Collapse of the Central Powers, p. 193; Villari, The Macedonian Campaign, p. 12; M. Larcher, La Grande Guerre dans let Balkans (Paris, 1929). 16 Ernst Jackh, in Deutsche Politik, December 22, 1916, quoted in The Sew Europe, II (February8, 1917), 123.

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correct statement that Tsar Ferdinand "abdicated in favor of his son Boris, who likewise abdicated within a month and Bulgaria was proclaimed a republic." 17 Though the victorious Allies were chiefly responsible for the failure of the republican movement in Bulgaria, 18 an English historian asserted that "had Bulgaria been declared a republic immediately after her collapse, better terms might have been offered her, for public opinion in Britain and America would have surmised that the Bulgarians had definitely renounced the misguided policy of their rulers and resolved to make a fresh start." 19 Yet the Paris Peace Conference laid down the principle that "the Austrian Republic should be regarded as responsible for the policy and acts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy during the course of the war." 20 Following the same logic, one might hold Abel responsible for the misdeed of Cain, Joseph for his brothers, Jesus for Judas Iscariot, George Washington for Benedict Arnold. The peacemakers at Paris seem to have been determined to apply the principle of Brennus, vae victis, without regard to republics or monarchies, innocent or guilty. As Harold Nicolson said: For the Bulgarians I cherished feelings of contempt. Their traditions, their history, their actual obligations, should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. . . . Inspired by the most material motives of acquisition they had joined with Germany, and by so doing lengthened the war by two whole years. . . . They had joined our enemies for purely selfish purposes; their expectations had proved erroneous; and they were now endeavoring to cast upon King Ferdinand the blame for what had in fact been a movement of national egoism. I did not feel that Bulgaria deserved more mercy than she would herself have been prepared in similar circumstances to accord. 21 17 L. Buxton, The Black Sheep oj the Balkans, p. 28; W. Wilson, The Statt (ed. 1919), p. SI7; USFR, Suppl. I, Vol. I (1918), pp. 476-80. 18 Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy said in the House of Commons on April 19, 1920: "We prevented the setting up of a republic in Bulgaria by British troops after the Armistice with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people wished to have a republic, but that was contrary to British policy or to French policy, or some other policy, and British bayonets were used to prop up that discredited, detested dynasty of Ferdinand of Coburg, King of Bulgaria, and his people were not permitted to get rid of him. There was a glorious opportunity of getting rid of one of these offshoots of the German Royal House who was misgoverning and oppressing one of the small peoples of Europe. But that did not suit the foreign policy of the Allies." Pari. Debates, House of Commons, CXXVIII (1920), 166. 19 J. Buchan, "Rumania and Bulgaria," The Nations of To-day (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), pp. 34-35. -"SED, No. 121 (1919), p. 22. 21 Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1934). pp. 34-35.

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In spite of this indictment against a whole nation, Bulgaria had a good claim to just terms of peace because by her speedy capitulation she did shorten the war by one or two years. 22 Moreover, in the eleventh of his famous Fourteen Points President Wilson had solemnly announced that "the relations of the several Balkan States to one another" should be "determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into." Furthermore, the Report made early in January, 1918, by the American Inquiry to President Wilson regarding "War Aims and Peace Terms," interpreted and supplemented this point as follows: No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest [1913]. . . . The ultimate relationship of the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous and inventive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The meddling and intriguing of Great Powers must be stopped, and the efforts to attain national unity by massacre must be abandoned. It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw frontiers for the Balkan States. Certain broad considerations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief: (1) that the area annexed by Rumania in Dobrudja is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should be returned; (2) that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of London; (3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the Gulf of Orfano, and should leave the mouth of Struma River in Bulgarian territory; (4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through Saloniki; (5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be determined without further inquiry. . . ,23 22 In March, 1918, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt exclaimed: "Let us prepare for a three years' war and begin n o w to make ready an army of five million men." N Y T , March 29, 1918. On June 19, 1918, General Pershing wrote to Colonel House: "It w a s general opinion in military circles that it would require at least another year of fighting to defeat Germany. In fact, some felt that the final campaign could not come before 1920." C. Seymour, ed., Intimate Papers ο) Colonel House, III, 452. President Wilson, on signing the N e w M a n P o w e r Bill in August, 1918, said: "This starts the machinery which will assuredly array an army of 4,000,000 Americans against the Hun next Summer." Outlook, September 11, 1918; U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. X L . Pt. II, p. 1840. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement ( N e w York: Doubleday, 1922), III, 3 6 - 3 7 ; C. Seymour, ed., Intimate Papers of Colonel House, III, 334; R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, p. 195.

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55

Had such a just and lasting settlement been accomplished in the Balkans, these states might have soon entered into "a customs and postal union" and a "federation," as advocated by the Memorandum on War Aims adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference at London (February 23, 1918). Bulgaria had already chosen for her premier Alexander Stambulisky, whose National Peasant Party's program (paragraph 28) read as follows: "To maintain friendly relations with all other small and great nations and to work for a close rapprochement of Bulgaria with all small neighboring States on a federal basis." 21 VAE

VICTIS

25

Like the Thebans of old, the Bulgarian delegates at the Paris Peace Conference argued that, since the "Bulgarian nation did not approve of the alliance with Germany and that alliance was forced on it," Bulgaria should not be held responsible for the wrongs committed by her while under the despotism of her former German king.2® Nevertheless the Paris Peace Conference bluntly refuted the Bulgarian argument by declaring: The Allied and Associated Powers . . . cannot lose sight of the fact that, in ranging herself beside the Central Powers and in remaining until the moment at which their defeat seemed achieved, Bulgaria has broken the chief link between Russia and her Allies, opened to Germany the road to the East and thus rendered inevitable the prolongation of the war. She is then responsible for the terrible evils resulted from this.27 Bulgaria was dubbed the "Prussia of the Balkans." She was to be taught "a stern lesson as to the penalties inevitable upon aggression." 28 21 USFR, Suppl. I Vol. I (1918), p. 160; also J. Tadjer, Kova Bulgaria (Sofia, 1922), p. 40. :5 In the fifth century B.C., at the Plataean Conference, the Thebans said: "Our city at that juncture had neither an oligarchical constitution in which all the nobles enjoy equal rights nor a democracy, but that which is most opposed to law and good government and nearest to tyranny—the rule of a close cabal. These, hoping to strengthen their individual power by the success of the Mede, kept down by force the people, and brought him into the town. The city as a whole was not its own mistress when it so acted, and ought not to be reproached for the errors that it committed while deprived of its own constitution." Thucydides, Book iii, §62 (Everyman ed., p. 212). 26 Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (October 24, 1919), p. iv; also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States (Sofia, 1919). =7 Temperley, IV, 414. 28 Ibid., V, 40; R. Laffan, The Guardians of the Gates, p. 209; J. D. Bourchier, "Vae Victis," Contemporary Review, No. 649 (January, 1920), pp. 25-33.

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The Bulgarian delegation received on September 19, 1919, a very harsh draft treaty of peace; and November 27, 1919—Bulgaria's Decoration Day—was the date of its signing; thus, by accident or design, Bulgaria's humiliation is commemorated. The Treaty of Neuilly, though its preamble spoke of "a firm, just and durable peace," was frankly admitted to be a vindictive peace.2® Bulgaria as well as Turkey had to pay the price of her alliance with the defeated Germanic Powers. Her neighbors, victorious after suffering from military occupation, urged upon, and obtained from, the Paris Peace Conference an unjust and unwise territorial settlement. Again fulfilling one of the laws of historical psychology, a people took advantage of the difficult situation of another people in order to exercise against that other all rights to which it believed itself entitled. The real motives of the Paris Peace Conference in setting aside the American program for a just settlement in the Balkans will become known only after the publication of its full records.30 Rumania achieved her national unification by annexing the provinces of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania and half of the Banat. The Yugoslavs, too, accomplished their national ideal by uniting all their lands, together with Montenegro, into the triune Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later named Yugoslavia. Both Rumania and Yugoslavia could have afforded to give back the Bulgarian lands which they had seized after the Second Balkan War (1913). Such a generous and just settlement would have made Bulgaria their friend and ally; and it would have served as a guarantee of their new acquisitions. Thus Premier Stambulisky fervently pleaded with the Rumanian and Yugoslav delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. 29

Viscount Bryce said in the House of Lords, April 23, 1920: "I think it is a misfortune that so many provisions have been introduced into these Treaties which obviously comc from passion rather than from wisdom, and which are likely, therefore, to bear very unfortunate fruits in the future. The noble Viscount [Lord Milner] . . . complained of Bulgaria for joining in the war. He said, quite justly, that if a nation chooses to leave its fortunes in the hands of unscrupulous or unwise guides; if, like . . . Bulgaria, it falls under the control of Ferdinand and the group of satellites which surrounded him—then that country must suffer for being in the hands of bad rulers." Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, X X X I X (1920), 990; also J. D. Bourchier, The Bulgarian Peace Treaty, pp. 13-14. 30 The U.S. Department of State has announced that the full records of the Paris Peace Conference will be published in its series of ''Foreign Relations." So far only private and fragmentary accounts of the proceedings of this important peace conference have been published. See, for instance. H. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1920), 6 vols.; D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (New York, 1924), 21 vols.; A. de Lapradelle, La Documentation internationale: la paix de Versailles (Paris), 9 vols.

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Yugoslavia, however, chose to annex more Bulgarian territory, ostensibly for strategic considerations. Rumania, too, retained the southern Dobrudja, which had been left to Bulgaria by the Salonika armistice. Premier Stambulisky declared at the Paris Peace Conference that if Rumania would give back the southern Dobrudja, Bulgaria would give up all claims over the northern Dobrudja, which had been annexed to Rumania in 1878 as a compensation for her loss of Bessarabia to Russia, in spite of the fact that Rumania had reacquired Bessarabia at the close of the World War. But Bulgaria's offer was rejected by Rumania. 31 Moreover, instead of trying to reconcile her new Bulgarian subjects, Rumania proceeded to the creation of a very troublesome Dobrudja irredenta by the promulgation of a special "law" (originally enacted on April 1, 1914) for the organization of southern Dobrudja— demanding all landowners to prove their titles, and then surrender to the State one-third of the land to which they had thus established a claim, or to pay its value in cash. It will be seen that the measure was modelled on the arrangement made in Rumania when the serfs were emancipated, when two-thirds of the estate was reserved for the peasants, while one-third became the property of the landlord. In this case the Rumanian State considered itself as having acquired the title of ownership formerly enjoyed by the Ottoman, later by the Bulgarian, State; though Bulgaria had confirmed before the annexation the title of the holder. . . . The measure had a purely nationalistic purpose. 32 Curiously enough, the authors of that measure reverted to the Ottoman law, completely ignoring the fact that the southern Dobrudja had for thirty-five years (1878-1913) been under Bulgarian legislation and jurisprudence (statutes and court decisions), which had swept away all traces of feudal tenure, such as the Turkish mirie, and had recognized only one kind of property, that of absolute and unqualified freehold. Of course, Rumania might in international law change this system and adopt a new one, provided she gave such a measure no retroactive force. As regards the past, the Bulgarian, not the previous Ottoman, law ought to have held precedence. The legislative act of April, 1914, promulgated contrary both to 31 J. T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference ( N e w York· Macmillan, 1937), pp. 145 ff.; G. Markoff, Bulgaria's Historic Rights to Dobrudja (Berne, 1919) ; A. Ischirkoff, Les Bulgares en Dobroudja (Berne, 1919) ; N . Iorga, La Dobroudja roumaine (1919). ;, - D . Mitrany, The Land and the Peasant in Rumania, pp. 179-80; T. Tocheff, Propriete fonciere rurale dans la Dobroudja du sud (Sofia, 1928) ; I. Kolaroff. La Loi roumaine pour la nouvelle Dobroudja (Sofia, 1929) ; "Bulgaria's Minority in Rumania," Λ'£, X X X I X ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 125.

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international law and to the existing Rumanian constitution of 1866 (Article 19 of which provided that no one might be dispossessed except for the purpose of public utility and after just and previous compensation), widened and deepened the cleavage between Bulgaria and Rumania. And, knowing Rumania's aspirations to annex the whole of northern Bulgaria if the old scheme for the partition of Bulgaria between its neighbors were applied, every Bulgarian has ever since the enactment of that "law" viewed Rumania more or less with apprehension and misgiving. No enduring friendship or rapprochement between these two neighboring states would be possible under such conditions. 33 Greece, in pursuance of her design to resuscitate the Byzantine empire, aspired to both western Thrace (Bulgarian) and eastern Thrace (Turkish). Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly provided: Bulgaria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers [The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan] all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which belonged to the Bulgarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside of the new frontiers of Bulgaria as described in Article 27 (3), Part II [Frontiers of Bulgaria], have not been at present assigned to any State. Bulgaria undertakes to accept the settlement made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea. The conditions of this guarantee will be fixed at a later date. The Supreme Council at Paris then authorized the Allied commander in chief of the Eastern forces, General Franchet d'Esperey, to set up in this Thracian province an inter-Allied administration. The province was occupied by French troops and an Italian company. The provincial administration was carried on by Bulgarian officials and largely on the basis of Bulgarian laws, under the supervision of French military officers. This highly interesting and very successful experiment in international government was terminated by a treaty signed at Sevres (August 10, 1920) which read in part as follows: ""Rumania and Her New Territories," Contemporary Review, CVI (1914), 20; J. Caleb, "Le Conflit roumano-bulgare et le droit des gens," RDILC, XLV (1913), 333-50, 445-70; A. de Lapradelle, "La Legislation relative k la propriete fonciere dans la Dobroudja et de droit international," RDI, V (1930), 160-274; H. F. Wright, The Constitutions of the Stales at War, 1914-1918, pp. 517-36; T. P. Theodoroff, Pravoto na nedvizhimata sobstvenost ν Bulgaria (Sofia, 1920).

T H E BALKAN L E A G U E

59

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers [The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan] hereby transfer to Greece, who accepts the said transfer, all rights and title which they hold, under Article 48 of the treaty of Peace with Bulgaria signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on the 27th of November, 1919, over the territories of Thrace which belonged to the Bulgarian Monarchy and are dealt with in the said article. Not only did Bulgaria protest against the transfer of her former province to Greece, but she has ever since contended that, inasmuch as one of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" (The United States of America) did not sign or ratify the Treaty of Sevres, the transfer of all rights and title over western Thrace to Greece was legally imperfect, and, therefore, Bulgaria has had not only a right of servitude ("economic outlets" on the shore of the Aegean Sea) but also the rights and title over the territory. This Bulgarian contention, however, seems to have been set aside by the Senate of the United States of America, which, though refusing to ratify the peace treaties and in spite of the opposition of Senator Borah, passed Resolution No. 276 (January 21, 1920) to the e f f e c t that those parts of Thrace which have been surrendered by Bulgaria and Turkey to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and which, according to the showing made by Greece, are ethnographically and historically Greek and strategically important to Greece, should be awarded by the Peace Conference to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece, Greece being charged with the duty of granting to Bulgaria arrangements for the accommodation of Bulgarian commerce at an Aegean port of a similar character to the accommodations granted Serbia at Salonika.34 It should be noted that at least on this point the Paris Peace Conference was in a complete agreement with the American Senate. By the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) Turkey in Europe ceased to exist, except for Constantinople and a strip of territory for its defense. Greece was to have eastern Thrace as well as western Thrace up to the Chatalja line. The Straits and the contiguous areas were to be demilitarized and were to be controlled by an international commission. Greece was to have the Aegean Islands, also, with the ex34 CR, Vol. 59, Pt. II (1920), pp. 1366, 1649, 1814-15; S. Radeff, "Economic Frontiers in Thrace," Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XII (July, 1926). 282-86; "An Experiment in International Government: the Inter-Allied Regime in Thrace," in D. Mitrany, The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe, pp. 254-63; Peace Treaties, SED, No. 7 (1921), p. 65; Suppl. AJIL, XVI (1922), 126-32.

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ception of Rhodes, which was to be retained by Italy as long as Great Britain retained Cyprus. The Dodecanese Islands were assigned to Italy, but the latter had already agreed to cede them to Greece. Smyrna and its hinterland in Asia Minor were to be under Greek administration for five years, at the end of which their future was to be decided by a plebiscite. The Ottoman sultan renounced all his rights over Armenia, Arabia, Kurdistan, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco." In short, the Treaty of Sevres dissolved the Ottoman empire. The Turks, however, were the first to challenge boldly the Paris peacemakers and to undo some of their painstaking work. 35

The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, II, 787.

Chapter IV A HECTIC

DECADE

I

T MAY frankly be admitted that if they had been victorious the Central Powers would have dictated peace terms just as bad as those imposed upon them by the victorious Entente Powers. In order to make their treaties durable, however, the justice of the peacemakers at Paris (1919-20) should have exceeded the justice of the peacemakers at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest (1918), for, as the Scriptures (Matt. S :20) say, "That except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." STAMBULISKY'S

PLANS

In spite of all the bitter disappointments and formidable obstacles created by the peace settlement, Premier Stambulisky of Bulgaria continued to work for the reconciliation and rapprochement of the Balkan states. Like the Croatian Stephen Raditch, Stambulisky was imbued with the idea of an integral federal union of the Southern Slavs—the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Bulgarians. Hence in 1922 he offered a plan for the establishment of a customs union between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Fearing that a combination between the Croats, Slovenes, and Bulgarians might deprive them of supremacy in an integral Yugoslav federation, however, the Serbs spurned the Stambulisky proposal. Premier Stambulisky went on with the work for the rapprochement of the Balkan states. For instance, he wrote: Now the Balkan peoples have a great desire for peace and understanding. The wars have brought them new iniquities, but at the same time conditions have been created for a new order. Democracy has grown and continues to grow in all Balkan countries. This is a guarantee of their bright future. I firmly believe that the whole civilized world will support the efforts of these peoples to establish an enduring peace among themselves.

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What should be done for the establishment of an enduring peace in the Balkans? Very little: first, self-determination of the inhabitants in the contested territories; second, full respect for the rights of minorities; and, third, convenient and secure outlet to open sea for each Balkan people. If these three problems are solved, an enduring and fruitful peace will be ensured in the Balkans, the Balkan peoples will make a rapid cultural progress, and thus the way will be paved for the ultimate establishment of a real federal union of the Balkan States.1 THE

LITTLE

ENTENTE

Yugoslavia and Rumania claimed, however, that they were no longer "Balkan" but "Central European" states, though their aggrandizement at the expense of Austria-Hungary had practically extended the Balkan frontiers. At the Portorose Conference, the "Succession States" (Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) tried without much success to reach agreements on economic collaboration. The plan to form a Danubian confederation was regarded with disfavor as an attempt to restore the old empire of Austria-Hungary, which had so severely repressed its subject nationalities in the past. 2 Three of the "Succession States" (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) set up a loose system of cooperation called the Little Entente. The basis of this combination was a series of bilateral agreements between these three states, in the form of defensive alliances. The foreign ministers of the three states formed the council of the Little Entente, which held periodic meetings to discuss matters of common interest with a view to formulating a joint policy. Fear that Hungary and Bulgaria would attempt to subvert the territorial situation created by the Paris peace treaties was the real force behind the formation of 1 Zemledelsko znami (Sofia), July 7, 1921; see also E. Grossman, Methods o) Economic Rapprochement (Geneva, 1926), p. 21; G. Arvanitakis, "Une Confederation balkanique," La Tribune de Geneve, No. 234 (1919), cited in II CB, p. 68; C. Stephanove, "Drifting toward a Yugoslav Federation," CH, XV (1922), 930-37; F. Horner, "Balkan Unrest a Menace to World Peace," CH, X X I I (192S), 248-52 ; "Bulgaria's Future; an Interview with Premier Stambulisky," Living Age, CCCVI (1920), 274-76; T. Vladimiroff, "Bulgaria's Novel Method of Reconstruction," CH, X I I I (1920), 217-22; C. D. Hazen, Europe since 181S, II (1924), 919 ff. 2 J . T. Shotwell, "Portorose Conference," 1C, No. 176 (1922); No. 322 (1936), pp. 43576; C. J . C. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. 49; A. Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 216; F. Gribble, "The Passing of a Legend," The Nineteenth Century," L X X X I I (1917), 870; A Czech Socialist, "The Question of a Danubian Confederation," The New Europe, XIV (January 15, 1920), 15-17; Otto Bauer, "A Danubian Customs Union," The New Europe, X (January 30, 1919), 66-68; S. Muenz, "The Real Face behind Hungary's Janus-Mask," CH, X I X (1923), 441-52; Oscar Jaszi, "Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," Foreign Agairs, II (1923), 270-81.

A

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the Little Entente. The fatal defect of the Little Entente was that it did not envisage or provide for the defense of the existing territorial situation against an unprovoked attack on the part of a Great Power.3 REVISION

OF

THE

TREATY

OF

SEVRES

Turkey, unlike Bulgaria, defied the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference. Indeed, amazing is the story of how Mustapha Kemal Pasha, army inspector for the Eastern Provinces, left Constantinople in May, 1919, and set out to transform the backward Ottoman monarchy into a progressive republic; how he took advantage of the death of King Alexander (poisoned by a monkey's bite in the royal palace at Athens) to smash Greek imperialism in Asia Minor and to help to convert the Greek monarchy into a republic; how he managed to tear the Treaty of Sevres into shreds and to compel the proud Paris peacemakers to meet in November, 1922, at Lausanne to negotiate, not to dictate, a new peace treaty. 4 At the Lausanne Conference, Premier Stambulisky stated Bulgaria's case. He said in part: You are aware, gentlemen, that before the cessation of hostilities in the Near East, and before the Mudania decisions, Bulgaria had expressed the desire to see Eastern and Western Thrace constituted as an autonomous region, placed under the control of the League of Nations or of the Great Powers, to whom Bulgaria and Turkey ceded this same region by the Treaties of Neuilly and Sevres respectively. . . . We think indeed that such a solution of the question would have been the best and fairest, since it would have assured liberty of existence to all the elements which make up the population of Thrace (Turks, Bulgars, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews), not one of which forms by itself a really important majority. The autonomy of Thrace would moreover have contributed largely toward consolidating peace in the Balkans and ensuring the freedom of the Straits 3 Convention of August IS, 1920, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, to maintain "the situation created by the Treaty concluded at Trianon on June 4, 1920," against "an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary"; Convention of April 23, 1921, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, for the same purpose (LNTS, VI, 209-19); Convention of June 7,1921, Rumania and Yugoslavia, to maintain "the situation created by the Treaty concluded at Trianon on June 4, 1920, . . . and by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, concluded on November 27, 1919," against "an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary or of Bulgaria or of both these Powers" (ibid., X I I I , 231-35); Treaty of Alliance, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, August 31, 1922 (ibid., LIV, 257-61). By protocols concluded on May 21, 1929, all these agreements were prolonged for indefinite periods, unless denounced (ibid., XCIV, 53; XCVI, 311). 4 A. Emin, Turkey in the World War, pp. 271 ff.; also Ε. M. Earle. "The New Constitution of Turkey," PSQ, X L (1925), 73 ff.

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and the efficacy of the Bulgarian outlet to the sea; above all, as far as Europe is concerned, it would in no way have affected the integrity of the peace treaties. However, the Allied Powers have already consented to the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, as regards Europe, by giving back Eastern Thrace to Turkey. We have no sentiment of animosity toward the Turkish people; on the contrary, we rejoice at their success. The Turkish people is worthy of our admiration and of that of the world. It deserves to be rewarded and guaranteed. The Bulgarian people, although seriously affected by the Treaty of Peace, has chosen another method, namely, an attitude of complete loyalty, in the firm conviction that the attitude (of which all Europe has witnessed the satisfactory result) would be appreciated at the right moment. In my opinion that moment has now come; I think it is ncccssary to make every effort to avoid anything which might make nations think that they cannot obtain the indispensable satisfaction of a legitimate desire without first having bathed in their own blood. H e added that in justice the retrocession of eastern Thrace to Turkey should have been followed by the retrocession of western Thrace to Bulgaria; but, since this might seem "a terrible blow to the Treaty of Neuilly" and the Bulgarians wanted "to remain loyal to the end," they asked only that western Thrace should be given back the autonomous administration instituted under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, before the transfer of this province to Greece by the defunct Treaty of Sevres. Venizelos, the head of the Greek delegation, answered in a long speech. In 1912 he had tried to create a Balkan Confederation [he said] and had done everything possible and spared no concession to achieve this end. He had consented in particular, to the Bulgars' obtaining a large portion in Eastern Thrace, Western Thrace, Eastern Macedonia, and even half of Central Macedonia. He had gone so far as to concede that the Bulgars should establish themselves up to 16 kilometers north of Salonika. He had thus abandoned to Bulgaria 1,000,000 Greeks. He had only asked in exchange from Bulgaria some concessions in Western Macedonia for the benefit of the three other allies, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. But Bulgaria did not accept his offer and that was why the Second Balkan War broke out. Again, although Bulgaria had possessed Western Thrace for several years, she had never thought of creating a port at Dedeagatch [ Alexandroupolis]. She was then constantly claiming Kavalla. During the Great War he had proposed to the then King of Greece to cede Kavalla to Bulgaria in order

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to induce the latter to come to the side of the Allies. Bulgaria did not accept this; she sided with the Central Powers of her own free choice. He was surprised that the Bulgarian delegate should now declare that Bulgaria could not utilize the port of Dedeagatch if it were under foreign rule. . . . Bulgaria's demand seemed all the more strange since she would agree to Dedeagatch belonging not to Greece, but to some other State, for instance, to an autonomous State of Western Thrace, and recognized that in the latter case she could utilize the port. . . . Greece, after her defeat by Turkey, had . . . to . . . abandon Eastern Thrace in order to terminate hostilities. . . . But it was really too much that a third Power, which had not taken part in the last struggle, should consider Greece as beaten by it and demand cession of part of her territory. In his rebuttal Premier Stambulisky emphatically stated that "Bulgaria and Greece had respectively changed roles," that the arguments of Venizelos reminded him of the language of Bulgaria's former rulers who had led their own country into two national disasters, and that the Bulgarians and the Greeks should learn something from their past mistakes. He appealed once more to the Lausanne Conference to settle the question of western Thrace on the basis of justice and not in accordance with the old principle that injustice might be repaired only by a victorious war. 6 Inasmuch as the Bulgarian demand for autonomy of western Thrace was backed by Yugoslavia alone at the Lausanne Conference, Greece and Turkey managed to iron out their hitherto irreconcilable differences and to enter into an informal understanding to keep the Southern Slavs, the Serbs as well as the Bulgarians, at a distance from the shores of the Aegean Sea. "Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of war which" had "existed in the East since 1914," the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) decided to revise the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920), sanctioning the results brought about by the victorious sword of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Thus, by rewarding the warlike policy of Mustapha Kemal Pasha of Turkey while scornfully ignoring the pacific policy of Premier Stambulisky of Bulgaria, the Lausanne Conference gave an example of that headstrong statesmanship which in the course of a decade would have disastrous consequences for the peace of Europe.® 5 Lausanne Conference on the Near Eastern Affairs, Records of Proceedings, XXVI, (1923, Cmd. 1914), 30-33. 6 The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, II, 9S7; BTS, No. 16 (1923) ; H. Nicolson, Curzon: the Last Phase, 1919-1925, pp. 323-24; A. Ischirkoff, La Bulgarie et la mer Egee (Berne,

66

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DECADE OF

NATIONS

In the last of his famous Fourteen Points President Wilson declared : "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." Unfortunately, while the best thought of the best men was concentrated upon the problem of how to make impossible for the future a recurrence of the ghastly catastrophe, how to evolve order out of chaos, how to rebuild upon the ruins of a shattered civilization a more stable edifice, ignorant or willful men did their utmost to frustrate the application of the Wilsonian principles. Hence the feeble League of Nations ("Societe des Nations") came into being in 1919; its Covenant was adopted as Part I of each of the Paris Peace Treaties. And it was made all the more weak by the refusal of the United States of America to ratify the Covenant. 7 Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) were admitted as original members of the League of Nations. Bulgaria ratified the Covenant (Part I of the Treaty of Neuilly) "without reserve," and on December 16, 1920, the First Assembly granted Bulgaria's application for admission as a member of the League of Nations. Although they made no objection to the admission of Albania and Austria, Politis of Greece, Ionescu of Rumania, and Spalaykovitch of Yugoslavia vehemently opposed the admission of Bulgaria, stating that they entertained "doubts as to her willingness to abide by her international undertakings" and thus increasing the suspicion that they had some secret design upon her political independence and territorial integrity. This opposition was overruled by the Assembly, thanks to such men as Branting of Sweden, Nansen of Norway, and Lord Robert Cecil of Great Britain. 8 KoMITADJIS

AND

MINORITIES

At the Genoa Economic Conference (1922), Premier Stambulisky submitted a memorandum, which was forwarded to the Council of 1919); C. Stephanove, The Question of Thrace (Berne, 1919); Ε. Venizelos, the Peace Congress, American Hellenic Society Publications, No. 7; CH, 339-41; X I V (1921), 171-72, 3S2. 7 See Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant; also Shotwell, On the Rim pp. 2 £f.; H . C. Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (1925). 8 Records of the First Assembly (1920), pp. 581-82, 597-605; Minutes Committee (1920), II, 168-93; E. Zlatoustova, Obshtestvoto na naroditi

Greece before X I I (1920), of the

Abyss,

of the Fifth (Sofia, 1928).

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67

the League of Nations, setting forth Bulgaria's grievances and proposing satisfactory solutions. This document says, in part: In consequence of the Treaties of Peace, 2,000,000 Bulgarians have been left outside of the boundaries of the Bulgarian State. Of these, 500,000 are refugees in Bulgaria, and many of them have taken to brigandage. Prevented from living in a lawful manner with their kinsmen, they form themselves into small groups, which pass continuously from one side of the frontier to the other. This frequently gives rise to disputes with the neighboring States. . . . In the opinion of the Bulgarian Government, the real cause of the existence of these bands is the exceptional regime under which the Bulgarians left outside the frontiers of Bulgaria are at present living. Their schools, their institutions and their churches have been closed; their teachers and all the Bulgarian priests have been driven away. Restrictions are placed on the freedom of conscience and on the right to hold meetings, and they are forbidden to speak their native language, etc. To remedy this state of affairs the Bulgarian Government proposes: (1) That the Balkan States should declare amnesty allowing these refugees to return to their homes; (2) That their abandoned property should be restored; (3) That the clauses in the Treaty of Peace which safeguard the rights of minorities should be enforced as soon as possible.9 In June, 1922, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, to justify the maltreatment of their Bulgarian minorities, made a collective representation to Bulgaria that should the incursion of armed bands of komitadjis into their frontier districts continue, serious consequences might ensue. Seeing her political independence and territorial integrity thus endangered by her three neighbors, Bulgaria requested the Council of the League of Nations to intervene on the ground of Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant, either by sending an international commission of enquiry or by any other means which it might deem best to adopt for ascertaining the truth about the alleged activity of komitadjis and fixing the responsibility therefor. At the nineteenth session of the Council of the League in July, 1922, the representatives of Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia disclaimed the minatory or hostile character of their representations to Bulgaria and objected to the intervention of the Council of the League on the ground that the Bulgarian government was engaged in direct negotiations for the settlement of the controversy over the komitadjis. The Council was of the opinion that any possibility of acts of violence in 8 LNOJ, No. 8 (II), (August, 1922), pp. 8 0 6 , 1 9 2 1 ; cf. also D. Alastos, The Balkans and Europe, pp. 188 ff.

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contravention of the Covenant of the League of Nations was for the time being excluded, but requested the governments to keep it informed of the results of the negotiations and received the formal assurances of the governments concerned that should these negotiations result in a situation likely to endanger the peace of the Balkans, they would again refer the question to the Council. 1 0 A

CHANCE

MISSED

Indeed, the 1920s were very auspicious for the establishment of a B a l k a n union. Gone were the empires of Austria, Germany, and Russia, with their vicious policy of setting one B a l k a n people against another. Bolshevist Russia, Fascist Italy, and Republican Germany were either very busy with their own internal troubles or too weak to interfere effectively in Balkan politics. T h e League of Nations was growing into a powerful instrument for facilitating peaceful settlements. And observing that the Balkans might again become " a confused welter of fear and unrest, always on the edge of violence," an English publicist urged t h a t — Great Britain should set an example. Let her break away from that hateful policy of setting one Balkan State against another which produced the last war. Let her steadily pursue the policy . . . of urging upon all these Balkan States the aim and end of sinking their miserable differences and forgetting their bitter memories. Let her become a crusader on the side of the Balkan Union. For in union is their safety. 1 1 Unfortunately, on Saturday, J u n e 9, 1923, a midnight military coup d'etat occurred at Sofia. Premier Stambulisky, then the lonely crusader on the side of the Balkan Union, was overthrown ; he and more than twenty thousand of his followers were imprisoned and killed, without the formality of a trial, on the pretext of their " a t t e m p t to escape." T h e new dictatorial Bulgarian government, composed mainly of military officers, in the words of a close observer "practically ceded the Petritch D i s t r i c t , " the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, to the komitadjis.1Bulgarian internal as well as external politics again reverted to the law LNOJ, August, 1922, pp. 764-65, 795, 803^*. H. Spender, "Through the Balkans," Contemporary Review, C X X V I (1924), 37. 1 2 According to a Macedonian author, the new rulers of Bulgaria "thought that it was a good idea that someone should continue, by force if necessary, to dispute the right of the Greeks and the Serbs over Macedonia. Little did they suspect how dangerous this was, and what internal and external complications it would creatc for the Bulgarian State." S. Christowe, Heroes and Assassins (New York: McBride, 1935), pp. 132-65. See also H. Barbusse, Les Bourreaux (Paris, 1926) ; D. Alastos, op. cit , pp. 34 ff. 10

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of the jungle and thus thwarted the impending rapprochement Balkan states.

69 of the

SECURITY

President Wilson seems to have wisely contemplated universal, as against regional, security. In his address delivered in New York City (September 27, 1918) he said that "there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations." Yet Article 21 of the Covenant provides : "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." All the Balkan states except Turkey signed the famous Protocol of Geneva, adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations (October 2, 1924) for the triple object of collective or universal arbitration, disarmament, and security. 13 But a change of government soon took place in Great Britain, and the new Conservative government hastened to repudiate this remarkable instrument which had been framed and adopted under the auspices of the previous Labour government and to propose "to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements to meet special needs." 14 Thus the idea of regional, as against universal or world-wide, security prevailed. "Instead of the Protocol of Geneva came the Treaties of Locarno." 1 5 Moreover, the Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations in 1926 recorded its conviction that the general principles of conciliation, arbitration, and security embodied in the Locarno treaties of 1925 might well be included in the fundamental rules which should govern the foreign policy of every civilized nation. It recommended to the members of the League of Nations that they put these principles into practice and requested 13 Shotwcll, "A Practical Plan for Disarmament," IC, No. 201 (1924), "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes," ibid., No. 205 (1924), and "Plans and Protocols to End War," ibid., No. 208 (1925) ; also LN, Fifth Assembly, Resolutions and Recommendations, pp. 21-27; LNMS, October, 1924; LS, The Reduction of Armamcnl and the Organization of Peace (June, 1928), pp. 16 ff. 14 The British former prime minister McDonald said: "This new Government seems to have proceeded on the assumption that it could undo even-thing done by its predecessors. I know it is hard for the governors selected by heaven to regard people like us as belonging to 'the community.' We are not noble game, we are only vermin who are to be killed with any weapon. In fighting Labour there are no belts below which blows may not be aimed. From this mentality of extermination, foreign politics has not been exempted, and this adds to the insecurity of pacts." IC, No. 212 (1925), pp. 225-63. 15 Shot well, On the Rim of the Abyss, p. 20; LXTS, LIV, 290-365: LNMS, Suppl., December, 1925; IC, No. 216 (1926).

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the Council to offer, if necessary, the League's good offices to other groups of states for the purpose of the conclusion of similar regional agreements. 16 As there was perhaps no other group of states more in need of regional agreements concerning conciliation, arbitration, and security than the Balkan states, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sent Dr. James T. Shotwell, director of its Division of Economics and History, to investigate and report on conditions in the Balkans, to stimulate, if possible, the conclusion of such a regional understanding as a preliminary step to some form of Balkan union, and, particularly, to find out "some method of indicating to the Balkan States the Endowment's sympathetic interest in their problems as a whole without differentiating in favor of any one individually." 17 It was in the course of this journey that Dr. Shotwell first outlined a definition of aggression. In an address delivered at a public meeting held under the auspices of the Institut social in Bucharest in October, 192S, and attended by the Rumanian intellectual elite, including the members of the Rumanian cabinet of ministers, Dr. Shotwell said: "The aggressor is that country that goes to war while refusing arbitration . . . the country that refuses to submit its case to a tribunal, refuses to avail itself of the pertinent means which in time of peace it had agreed upon as well fitted to set such differences right." 18 Dr. David Mitrany, who accompanied Dr. Shotwell, summarized his own observations of the possibilities of a regional Balkan pact in a remarkable paper which formed a part of the report to the Carnegie Endowment. Dr. Mitrany's conclusion was rather discouraging. He said: " I t is to be practical, not pessimistic, to admit that a federation is not an issue for the near future." 10 The Balkan states were not yet ready to make concessions to one another, as the signatories of the Locarno treaties did, and without concessions no Balkan understanding would be possible. Moreover, since the Greek national assembly rejected (February 3, 1925) the 10

LNOJ, Spec. Suppl. No. 43 (1926), p. 16. Carnegie Endowment for International Peacc, YB, 1926, p. 42; 1932, p. 101; 1933, p. 10S; 1936, pp. 103-4. 1β Shotwell, "A Turning Point in History," IC, No. 229 (1927), pp. 149-61. ι» Mitrany, "The Possibilities of a Balkan Locarno," IC, No. 229 (1927), pp. 162-74; Μ. Η. H. Macartney, "Toward a Balkan Bloc," Fortnightly Review, C X X I X (1928), 311-28; H. F. Armstrong, The New Balkans, pp. 174 ff.; K. S. Chandan, Les Nouvtaux Balkans . . . , pp. 174 ff.; "Balkan Locarno and the Macedonian Question," Pro Macedonia, No. 2. 17

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so-called "Little Protocol" on the protection of minorities which was concluded between Bulgaria and Greece under the auspices of the Council of the League of Nations (September 29, 1924),20 the relations between these two neighboring countries were strained to the breaking point. In October, 1925, a frontier incident at Demir-Kapu resulted in a grave armed conflict between Greece and Bulgaria. Fortunately, the Council of the League of Nations, acting on the appeal of Bulgaria, promptly intervened and succeeded in putting immediately to an end this "Little Balkan War" which might have otherwise developed into a general conflagration. As Dr. Shotwell observed: Had the two nations actually gone on with the struggle, their neighbors would inevitably have been drawn in; the flames in Southeastern Europe could hardly have been arrested, the Great Powers could hardly have escaped as well. At least this much can be said, that the murder of Sarajevo seemingly held no greater potentiality of war in 1914 than the events which promised a general Balkan conflagration in 1925. Instead—the League of Nations applied the definition of aggression.21 The Council also imposed sanctions upon the aggressor (Greece) to pay the victim (Bulgaria) the sum of 30,000,000 leva ($210,000) damages for the invasion of her territory." Peace was thus preserved in the Balkans, but the time was not yet ripe for the conclusion of a regional Balkan pact. While all the Balkan states, including Turkey, adhered to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris (August 27, 1928) for the renunciation of war "as an instrument of national policy," none of them ratified its supplement, the Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (September 26, 1928).23 The Little Entente states—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—concluded at Belgrade (May 21, 1929), a regional tripartite "General Act of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement." 2< 20

LNTS, X X I X , 117, 123. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pad of Paris (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929), pp. 211-12. 22 LNOJ (192S), pp. 1696-1709; LN, Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents on the Frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, Report (C. 727. M. 270. 1925. V I I ) . 23 Dept. of State, Washington, D.C., Treaty for Renunciation of War (1933) ; LNTS, XCIV, 57; X C I I I , 343-63; LN, Ninth Assembly, Resolutions and Recommendations (1928), pp. 20-S9; Shotwell, War as an Instrument . . . , pp. 41 ff.; "The Pact of Paris," IC, No. 243 (1928); Philip C. Jessup, "The United States and Treaties for the Avoidance of War," IC, No. 239 (1928). 24 LNTS, XCVI, 311-31. 21

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I t became clearer and clearer, after the Greco-Italian incident and the temporary occupation of Corfu by Italy in 1923, that, although it served a useful purpose as an instrument for preserving the peace in regions such as the Balkans, the League of Nations could not effectively guarantee the political independence or territorial integrity of its smaller and weaker members as against the wanton aggression on the part of certain great and predatory Powers. The League is a composite association which must take into account the wishes and interests of all its members; its business is to discover and explore such common ground as exists; it has no power to impose a collective will, but only opportunities to elicit general consent; in short, it provides, not a form of government, but a method of co-operation; for while, on the one hand, it may not abandon the idea of progress in every sphere for which it is created, it has to take account of the prevailing tendencies of the Governments of which it is composed.25 This "composite association" suffered from two organic defects: the necessity "to elicit general consent"; and the want of "power to impose a collective will." The Delphic Amphictyony in ancient Greece, the prototype of the League of Nations, suffered from only one organic defect, the want of power to impose a collective will, which made it an ineffective body throughout its whole life. It is no wonder, then, that the League of Nations, with its two organic defects, has likewise been an ineffective instrument. Just as the Delphic Amphictyony was at first enfeebled by blunders on the part of ancient Greek democracy and later rendered useless by wanton aggression on the part of predatory Macedonian and Roman imperial despots, so the League of Nations has been made weaker and weaker by the folly of contemporary European democracy and may be destroyed by the aggression of Communist, Fascist, and Nazi dictators. Yet, as surely as day follows night, mankind will sooner or later get tired of goose-stepping and heil-crying, and then, perhaps after another horrible world conflagration, will certainly return to the noble ideals of peaceful cooperation of nations offered at Delphi and at Geneva. In the meantime, to preserve their independence and territorial integrity, the small states, like those in the Balkans, ought to rely mainly upon their own strength and solidarity. Their safety is in their union. 25

LN, Secretariat, Information Section, Economic p. 8; 1C, N o . 199 (1924), 158-63.

and Financial

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While the Council of the League of Nations shied away from offering its good offices to the Balkan states for the purpose of achieving a regional Balkan understanding, as recommended by the Seventh Assembly of the League, Coudenhove-Kalergi's scheme for a PanEuropean union 2 0 as well as Aristide Briand's plan for a European federal union 2 7 helped to awaken the Balkan peoples from their lethargy, and then a very important and significant movement was launched toward the ultimate formation of a Balkan confederation. 2 6 The idea of a Pan European union, analogous to the Pan American Union, excluding the British Empire and the Soviet Union, was expounded by R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi of Vienna, Austria, in the autumn of 1923. Pan-Europa (Wien, 1923); Pan Europe (New York, 1926); XXIIle CUP, pp. 61-76, 79-84, 90). 2 7 Aristide Briand, foreign minister of France, offered on September 5, 1929, before the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations, "with slight misgiving," his plan for a European federal union. LNOJ, Spec. Suppl. No. 84 (1930), pp. 37 ff.; Documents Relating to the Organization of a System of European Federal Union, LNP, VII. Political. 1930. VII. 4 ; also in 1C, Spec. Bulletin (June, 1930), and No. 265 (1930).

Part II THE DΕ-BALKANIZATION THE BALKANS

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Chapter V T H E O R I G I N OF T H E B A L K A N CONFERENCE

I

N T H E spring of 1929 Alexander Papanastassiou, formerly premier of Greece, suggested to the Committee for Centenary Celebration of Greek Independence the calling of a Balkan interparliamentary conference at Athens, during the festivities, for the purpose of devising some kind of organization, official or private, which might foster the reconciliation, solidarity, and understanding of the distraught Balkan peoples. Yet this committee, imbued as it might have been with the tnegali idea, did not even take into consideration the suggestion whose author was thus left to lament the early and violent death of Alexander Stambulisky of Bulgaria and Stephen Raditch of Croatia, two other dreamers of a Balkan union.1 THE

BIRTH

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It became necessary to bring the same suggestion, in one form or another, to the attention of one of the several private international peace agencies or organizations. Kaphandaris, another outstanding statesman of modern Greece, suggested that the Council of the International Parliamentary Conference of Commerce held at Berlin (September, 1929) take the initiative in the organization of regional interparliamentary conferences to prepare the ground for the conclusion of the regional understandings recommended by the League of Nations. Although the Greek suggestion was promptly seconded by all the delegates of the other Balkan states, the delegations of certain Great Powers, notably Germany and Italy, vigorously objected to the inauguration of regional interparliamentary conferences—ostensibly fearing that the aspirations or interests of their own countries might be 1

A. Papanastassiou,

Vers I'Union balkanique,

p. 11.

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injured by the conclusion of a regional Balkan entente. So the Council of the International Parliamentary Conference of Commerce, too, rejected the Greek suggestion.2 In the meantime, the same suggestion was brought to the attention of the Thirteenth Plenary Congress of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies, held at Madrid (May 20-24, 1929), which took enough interest in the proposal to name a Comiti d'entente for southeastern Europe. But no further action seems to have been taken by this international organization either. 3 The Greek suggestion was at long last taken up by the International Peace Bureau ("Bureau international de la paix"). 4 Incorporated in Switzerland (1891), the aim of this bureau as set forth in its statutes was to further the development of international law, to study the problems of arbitration and neutrality, to investigate the origin of conflicts between the various nations, to suggest equitable and practical solutions of such conflicts, and to collect material relating to peace and war with the object of establishing a center of propaganda for the ideals of justice, liberty, and mutual respect, which form the bases of permanent peace between nations. 5 Besides the publication of an Annuaire and a fortnightly Le Mouvement pacifiste, as well as a study of special subjects, the International Peace Bureau has been responsible for the organization of an annual or periodic Universal Peace Congress ("Congres universel de la paix") for the purpose of discussing and pointing out the solutions of problems and current issues affecting international peace.® A number of these congresses gave special attention to Balkan problems.7 For instance, 2 For the constitution and purpose of the International Parliamentary Conference of Commerce, see LNH10 (1938), p. 339; Conference parlementaire internationale du commerce, Compte-rendu (1914). 3 International Federation of the League of Nations Societies, Bulletin (1929), V, SS. 4 The usefulness of the International Peace Bureau was recognized by the grant of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1910; and, before the outbreak of the World War in 1914, it was subsidized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and later by the governments of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Czechoslovakia. LNHIO (1938), p. 28; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Books, 1911-16. 5 For the statutes of the International Peace Bureau, see MP, No. 4 (1913), pp. 202-5; The Peace Movement (1913), II, 203-6. 6 For the reglement of the Universal Peace Congresses, see Troisieme Congris universel de la paix, Bulletin officiel, pp. 40-41; Report of the Fifth Universal Peace Congress (Chicago), p. 250; XXXe CUP, pp. 16-20. 7 For the first series of International Peace Congresses, the first of which was held in London in 1843, see Beales, The History of Peace, pp. 66-95; and for a second series of thirty Universal Peace Congresses, beginning with that held in Paris in 1889, see their Bulletins, Documents, Proceedings, or Reports, and, especially, XHIth Universal Peace

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the Sixth Universal Peace Congress, held at Antwerp in 1894, discussed and approved the formation of a "League for Balkan Confederation," with its seat at Paris, for the purpose of "uniting the several peoples in the East." 8 And the Twenty-third Universal Peace Congress, held at Berlin (1924), gave special instructions to the International Peace Bureau to watch closely the trend of events in the' Balkans and to see to it that the governments of the Balkan states carry out their international obligations to preserve peace.9 The turning point in the history of the de-Balkanization of the Balkans was the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress, held at Athens (October 6-10, 1929), which was attended by one hundred and four delegates from many countries, including the United States of America and all the Balkan states except Albania.10 Its agenda included such items as modifications called for in the sphere of legislation and international relations by the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations, immediate and compulsory armistice, federation of states and current events. Venizelos, premier of Greece, was named honorary president of the congress; Papanastassiou, former premier of Greece, president; and the heads of all other delegations, vice presidents. Messages of felicitation were received from the foreign ministers of France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—Briand, Benes, and Zaleski—as well as from the German Reichskanzler Müller and the Bulgarian semidictatorial premier Liaptcheff who gave special assurances of his own attachment to "the fine work of peace propaganda" carried on by the International Peace Bureau. In his opening address as president of the congress, Papanastassiou emphasized the point that Greece was animated by "no feeling of revenge" but solely by "love of peace and liberty." After stressing the task of the congress to consider ways and means for the "practical organization of peace" and praising the initiative of Aristide Briand for the creation of a "European Federal Union," he added that there was "another problem awaiting solution which would warm the hearts of the peoples in the Near East: a union of the Balkan states." 11 The Greek delegation submitted to the congress a remarkable memorandum which envisaged the creation of an "Institute of Balkan Entente," with its permanent seat at Athens. This institute was to be Congress, Official Report (Boston, 1904), pp. 7 ff.; Peace Year Books; and Advocate Peace, later World Affairs, which has given an account of each of these congresses. 9 " Vle CUP, p. 167. XXIlIe CUP, p. 107. lfl 11 XXVW CUP, pp. 271-74. Ibid., pp. 144-47.

oj

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divided into six sections: educational, ecclesiastical, press, propaganda, political, and women's activity. The aim of this institute was to bring together educators, clergymen, journalists, writers, parliamentarians, politicians, and businessmen of the various Balkan countries at regional conferences or congresses in order to propagate the cause of cooperation, solidarity, and understanding of the Balkan states. The various sections were to exert all efforts to obtain for this work the collaboration of the several agricultural, labor, commercial, industrial, cultural, and professional organizations or societies in all the Balkan countries. In short, the object of this institute was to bring about an eventual Balkan entente.12 In closing the second plenary meeting of the congress, President Papanastassiou announced that: the Committee on Federation of States had spontaneously named a SubCommittee, composed of delegates of the Balkan countries and non-Balkan delegates who had taken interest in Balkan affairs, to investigate the question of whether federal principles could be applied to the relations of the several Balkan States and whether it could be possible to bring about immediately a Balkan Entente as a substantial guarantee for peace in Europe. The congress greeted with "vifs applaudissements" the news that the Balkan subcommittee had already held several meetings, presided over by Senator La Fontaine of Belgium, and that a very important resolution had been drawn up, to be submitted for approval to one of the next plenary meetings of the congress.13 At the fourth plenary meeting of the congress (October 9, 1929), presided over by Senator La Fontaine, President Papanastassiou, acting as rapporteur of the Balkan subcommittee, observed that, although the topic of rapprochement of the Balkan states was not on the agenda of the congress, it was closely related to, or rather was part of, its third item, the federation of states; and that, inasmuch as the Greek delegation had submitted an important memorandum, the third committee, with the approval of the plenary meeting of the congress, had named a subcommittee to investigate and report on the matter. While the proposal to establish an Institute of Balkan Entente had been readily approved by all the Balkan delegates on the subcommittee, he proceeded, they hopelessly disagreed on the location of its permanent seat. Hence 1 L ' P . Papadopoulos, " P o u r la Fondation d'un institut d'entente b a l k a n i q u e , " pp. 1 1 2 - 1 9 . 13 Ibid., pp. 1 6 9 - 7 5 .

ibid.,

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81

the draft resolution attached to the Greek memorandum had been set aside and another had been drawn up instead. The new draft resolution provided that a special Balkan conference should be held annually for the purpose of laying the foundations of a union of the Balkan states, that the International Peace Bureau should take the initiative in summoning the First Balkan Conference, and that the League of Nations should be requested to set up an institute of Balkan intellectual cooperation. Rapporteur Papanastassiou concluded his remarks by saying that this resolution was merely "a declaration of principles, a gesture, a beginning of action." 14 In the debates that followed, all the delegations expressed enthusiastic approval of the draft resolution. Papadopoulos, author of the Greek memorandum, rose to dissipate any misgivings as to the motives of the Greek delegation in naming Athens the permanent seat of the contemplated Institute of Balkan Entente. He pointed out that to establish a permanent organization would be essential and that the location of its seat would be of no importance; he added that a Balkan conference could be assembled annually only for a few days and that there should be a permanent bureau or secretariat to prepare the agenda of each annual conference and to look after the application of its resolutions and recommendations. Stephen Kyroff of Bulgaria said, in p a r t : All outsiders who have taken the pains to study the political, economic, and social conditions under which we live in the Balkans have constantly given us the same advice: "Be united." It should be admitted that were these conditions viewed from a higher plane, ignoring the local interests which are not as important as we have thought, it could be seen that a Balkan entente might settle most of the questions that have so far divided us. And, finally, the resolution calling for the organization of an annual Balkan conference to pave the way for a Balkan union was adopted by acclamation. 15 At the closing meeting of the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress, held at Delphi, the seat of the ancient Amphictyonic Council, the directing committee of the International Peace Bureau decided to undertake a peace excursion to the other Balkan countries. The members of the committee were received and entertained lavishly as Istanbul, 14 T h e text of this resolution is included in the Circular-Invitation; see Appendix 1 (p. 235). 13 XXVlIe CUP, pp. 189-93, 220-21; LNBIWIO, II, No. 5 (1930), 224-27.

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Bucharest, and Belgrade. But Sofia gave them such a dazzling reception that jealousy and suspicion were engendered at the other Balkan capitals. For instance, the peace advocates had an audience with King Boris and an interview with his premier Liaptcheff; they were given banquets by the Cabinet of Ministers, the Holy Synod, the Academy of Sciences, the Association of Journalists, and other distinguished groups. They delivered peace speeches at a mass meeting held in the very hall of the Military Club. Their ideas of solving the differences between states, and especially between the Balkan states, by pacific means—conciliation, arbitration, and judicial procedure—were applauded not only by the Bulgarian intellectual elite but also by the very militarists who had previously persecuted, tortured, and killed in cold blood without the formality of a trial many Bulgarians accused of being "defeatists" or "traitors." Indeed, to judge from these external manifestations of good will, everything augured well for an early and complete de-Balkanization of the Balkans.16 PRELIMINARIES

In pursuance of the Balkan resolution of the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress, the directing committee of the International Peace Bureau held a meeting in Paris (January 18-19, 1930) to elaborate tentative rules for the organization of the Balkan Conference. These rules were embodied in a circular invitation addressed to the foreign ministers of the six Balkan states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. This document suggested that the first assembly of the Balkan Conference be convened on October 5, 1930, at Athens, Greece, because of historical sentiments and because the very idea had originated there—although the Balkan subcommittee of the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress had tacitly agreed that the first assembly of the Balkan Conference should be convened at Istanbul (Constantinople). 17 It was also suggested that the Balkan Conference would be an "unofficial" assemblage without powers to commit the governments of the Balkan states in any way; but these governments were to be represented thereat by "observers" with consultative voice. Each delegation was to comprise thirty members and to have an equal number of votes. The agenda might include such items as permanent statutes of the Balkan 10

MP, Nos. X - X I (1909), pp. 123-124; Le Messager d'Atkenes, X X X I , 139-44. 17 Michev and Petkov, La Fideration balkanique, pp. 3 ff.

October 23, 1929: CH,

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83

Conference, general principles of the incipient Balkan Union as well as proper measures for the advancement of the immediate economic, cultural, political, and social cooperation of the Balkan peoples.18 A similar circular letter was likewise addressed by the International Peace Bureau to the academies of science, municipalities, peace societies, and newspapers in all the Balkan countries, soliciting their collaboration for the organization of the Balkan Conference.19 On June 9, 1930, the idea was extensively and favorably discussed in the Greek chamber of deputies, which decided to instruct its president to communicate to the presidents of the legislative assemblies of the other Balkan countries that the Greek parliament would welcome with genuine pleasure the meeting of the first assembly of the Balkan Conference at Athens. This move, the first of its kind in the Balkans, made favorable impression in the capitals of the other Balkan countries. The mayor of Athens, on his part, sent a circular letter to his colleagues of the other Balkan capitals, requesting their support for the contemplated Balkan Conference.20 At the Twenty-sixth Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, held in London (July, 1930), Senator La Fontaine of Belgium availed himself of the opportunity to call a special meeting of the parliamentary delegates of the Balkan countries to consider the preliminaries of the impending Balkan Conference. 21 It was then realized that, since parliamentarism in the Balkans was in a precarious stage and the parliament in Yugoslavia had been actually suspended, the annual Balkan Conference could not have a purely interparliamentary character, as at first contemplated. It became necessary to return to the ideas embodied in the above-mentioned Greek memorandum on the Balkan Entente, namely, that the delegates of each Balkan country should be selected from among the educators, clergymen, journalists, writers, politicians, businessmen, and parliamentarians. 22 In the meantime a general organizing committee was set up at 18

19 See Appendix 1, p. 235. La Bulgorie, August 12, 1930. / CB, pp. 22-31. 21 Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 13; La Bulgarie, July 30, 1929. 22 By virtue of a royal decree of J a n u a r y 6, 1929, the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of J u n e 28, 1921, was suspended (CH, 1922, pp. 83247; McBain and Rogers, The New Constitutions of Europe, pp. 343-78); by another royal decree (October 3, 1929), the name of this state was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as originally intended by the Declaration of Corfu of July 20, 1917; and on September 3, 1931, King Alexander granted a new semidictatorial constitution. Μ. I. Pupin, "Yugoslavia," IC, J a n u a r y , 1919; Andrew, Twelve Leading Constitutions, pp. 373-84; Dareste, Les Constitutions modernes (4th ed.), III, 346-67; Markovic, "The Yugoslav Constitutional Problem," SR, XVI (1938), 356-69. 20

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Athens. It elaborated the suggestions of the Circular-Invitation of the International Peace Bureau and published a provisional reglement of twenty-six articles (August 29, 1930). The first article of this document stated that the aim of the First Balkan Conference was to contribute to the cordial relations and collaboration of the Balkan peoples in all their relations so as to bring about the ultimate union of the Balkan states. The second article fixed the agenda, which included such items as general principles of the Balkan Union, organization of the Balkan Conference, and proper measures for the advancement of the political, intellectual, and economic rapprochement of the Balkan peoples. The other twenty-four articles laid down the rules of procedure and provided for the composition of a plenary assembly, a council, a bureau of the assembly, and six standing committees, very much like those of the League of Nations.-* Soon after the publication of this provisional statute, the governmentcontrolled Bulgarian press began to clamor that the question of minorities be included in the agenda or else no Bulgarian delegation would attend the First Balkan Conference and at the same time to complain that Bulgaria's neighbors were maltreating the Bulgarian minorities in their territories in defiance of the Paris peace treaties. To make matters worse, certain Greek newspapers indulged in abusive comments on Bulgaria's attitude in regard to the issue of minorities. Bulgarian newspapers paid in kind, quoting, in variations, the proverbial expression which Virgil (Aeneid, Book II, verse VII) had put in the mouth of the hapless Laocoön: " I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts." And the Bulgarian delegation announced that it would be useless to attend the meeting of the First Balkan Conference with such an atmosphere prevailing in Athens and that the Balkan Union would be a sham if it were not based upon the previous and just settlement of the question of minorities. 24 By a long message wired from Athens to Sofia, the general organizing committee requested the Bulgarian delegation to attach no importance to the writings of "irresponsible journalists," adding that the question of minorities would be discussed "in principle" and that the Balkan Conference would have to foster the collaboration of the Balkan peoples primarily in their cultural and economic rather than political relations. The message gave the warning that the absence of the Bulgarian delega23 The Reglement provtsoire is given ill I CB, pp. 3 2 - 3 8 ; LB, No. 2 (1930), I, 3 - 6 ; La Bulgarie, October 14, 1930. 24 La Bulgarie, September 4, 11, 12, 27, 1930; Mir, September 23, 1930 ; Zariya, September 28, 1930; Nezavissimosl, September 26, 1930; Narod, September 3C, 1930.

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tion from the conference would throw the real motives of Bulgaria into suspicion. Senator La Fontaine of Belgium, president of the International Peace Bureau, sent from Geneva to Sofia a similar message. Then the semidictatorial Bulgarian government of Premier Liaptcheff realized that such an irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Bulgarian delegation would expose Bulgaria before the bar of world public opinion, which a small state like Bulgaria could not afford to flout. So, at the last moment, the Bulgarian delegation was instructed, or rather permitted, to depart for Athens. 23 THE

FIRST

BALKAN

CONFERENCE

On October 4, 1930, the first session of the council, composed of eighteen delegates—the head and two other members of each of the six delegations—was opened in the hall of the Greek senate by Alexander Papanastassiou, who, as head of the Greek delegation, was ex officio president of the council. It was unanimously decided that, although the provisional statute provided that each delegation was to have thirty votes and that a delegate was entitled to a maximum of three votes in the plenary assembly, the Yugoslav delegation, which was composed of only seven members, was nevertheless entitled to thirty votes, in accordance with the principle of equality to be developed and fostered by the Balkan Conference. 26 The harmony at the meeting was soon disturbed, and the alignment of the "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" states—Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia versus Albania and Bulgaria—became clearly discernible. The delegates of both groups of states recognized the necessity and utility of a close cooperation and solidarity; but they disagreed on the scope of the agenda and the method of approach to achieve these objects. The Circular-Invitation of the International Peace Bureau suggested that the program of the conference "should have no other limits than those laid down by its own concern for the common welfare." President Papanastassiou gave the warning that thorny questions which might cause friction would better be deferred for a while until after a more favorable atmosphere was created in the Balkans and, especially, that the question of minorities should be discussed only "in principle." Hassan Husni Bey, head of the Turkish delegation, pointed out that the agenda of the First Balkan Conference was rather too long and that some of its topics could be dropped without serious damage to its com25 26

I CB, p. 11; Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 62; La Btdgarie, October 2. 1930. For a list of the members of the council, see I CB, p. 221.

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pleteness. President Papanastassiou explained that the items of the agenda were already assigned to the six standing committees which were to report their conclusions to the plenary assembly. Konitza, head of the Albanian delegation, was of the opinion that thorny questions should be taken up in the first place, so as to remove any misunderstanding among the Balkan peoples, which might impede their collaboration and solidarity. He was seconded by Professor Kyroff, head of the Bulgarian delegation, who expressed his disappointment at the failure of the general organizing committee to include the question of minorities in the agenda but added in a conciliatory manner that the thorny aspect of this question could and would be avoided in the deliberations of the conference. Professor Yonnitch, head of the Yugoslav delegation, expressed the opinion that there were two main obstacles to overcome: first, public opinion was too skeptical and was bent on ridiculing or opposing every noble effort; and, second, the various delegations were too eager to take up and solve all controversial questions at once. He considered that, since the "Balkan Union could be based solely on moral principles," efforts should be exerted first of all toward the transformation of Balkan mentality or the creation of an atmosphere of benevolence and understanding among the Balkan peoples. Senator La Fontaine, observer for the International Peace Bureau, advised the council that economic questions should take precedence over political questions and that thorny items should for a while be discarded from the agenda or at least be discussed in a general way with great caution. Yanko Sakazoff, head of the small but very active Bulgarian Socialist Party and formerly Bulgarian minister of labor, stated that the Bulgarian "peasants, workers, and intellectuals," whom he claimed to represent at the conference, ardently desired to bring about a Balkan federation and that for this reason efforts should be exerted to remove all obstacles to the accomplishment of this object. He thought that the greatest of all obstacles in this respect was the question of minorities, which, he conceded, should be considered with moderation. A unanimous agreement was finally reached that the question of minorities should be discussed only "in principle" and that no question of treaty revision should be discussed or even raised at the meetings of the council, the plenary assembly, or the committees of the conference. With the designation of Papadopoulos, secretary of the Greek delegation, as secretary general of the First Balkan Conference, and the nomination

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of the chairmen of the six committees, the council closed its first session in an optimistic mood. 27 On Sunday (October 5, 1930) the solemn opening of the plenary assembly of the First Balkan Conference took place in the hall of the Greek chamber of deputies, in the presence of ninety-four delegates, twenty-five secretaries and experts, and eighteen observers. 28 Premier Venizelos and many other Greek dignitaries were also present. The Balkan flag, with six golden stars and six stripes symbolizing the incipient Balkan Union, was conspicuous in the beflagged Greek parliamentary hall. A chorus, accompanied by the Athens municipal band, sang the " H y m n of Peace" and the "Balkan Hymn." 29 In concluding his address of welcome, ex officio President Papanastassiou remarked: We have usually been regarded as a source of misunderstandings and conflicts. But now, for the first time in our history, we all have assembled of our free will, firmly determined, in spite of all obstacles, to cement a solid and durable understanding among ourselves. We shall prove today . . . that the Balkan peoples are and will in the future be masters of their own destinies and that we shall work so as to develop in this corner of Europe a new and bright civilization which will illuminate the world. Premier Venizelos delivered a short address, thanking the delegates and giving them the following cogent advice: Certainly no one fails to appreciate the difficulties of bringing about such a Union [of the Balkan states]; we all recognize that it can be accomplished only by stages. But if you begin to work out solutions of questions on which agreement is easier to arrive at, you are going to create an atmosphere in which the successive settlement of more difficult questions, on which differences of opinion are at present more serious, will become possible. But it was Senator La Fontaine who gave the delegates the most useful advice. He said, in p a r t : Disunited, you were the object of misadventures; united, you will be masters of your own destinies. . . . It will be necessary to unify your methods of legislation, to spread technical knowledge in the country, to develop means of circulation, to suppress customs formalities and perhaps 27

For the Minutes of the Council, see I CB, pp. 221-24. For a list of the delegates, see LB, No. 2 (1930), I, 2-3; Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 63. For the Balkan flag, the "Balkan Hymn," and the "Hymn of Peace," upon which the Bulgarian semiofficial French organ, La Bulgarie (September 24. 1930) had poured ridicule and scom, see Appendices of I CB; Le Messager d'Athenes, October S, 1930. 29

29

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CONFERENCE

to arrive at a single customs system, to remove all vexatious passport and visa measures, in short, to inaugurate a policy of rapprochement, of intense and daily cooperation in all fields of material and intellectual activity. . . . You are going to discuss all these things, but I do not think that you should discuss too long; words should be followed by action without delay. In their responding addresses, the heads of the other delegations expressed their ideas about the work of the conference. Konitza of Albania insisted upon the necessity of inducing their governments to solve promptly and equitably all pending questions between the Balkan states and particularly the question of minorities. Professor Kyroff of Bulgaria complained that "for the last ten years Bulgaria had loyally fulfilled her obligations arising from the harsh Treaty of Neuilly" and alleged that had the other Balkan states observed other clauses of the same treaty the situation in the Balkans would have been far better. Stefan Ciceo Pop of Rumania expressed the opinion that "a Balkan union could not be realized without the application in good faith of the treaties which are the basis of the international status quo in Europe" or "without the protection of racial and religious minorities as provided for by treaties." Hassan Husni Bey of Turkey made some enthusiastic remarks about the impending Balkan Union, pointing out the marvelous reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. Professor Yonnitch of Yugoslavia hailed the "Pan-Balkan Union which would mark a new era" in southeastern Europe, adding that the Balkan Conference might follow the example of "the ancient Amphictyonies which had assembled at Delphi to consider the problems of the Greek cities in a friendly manner." Walters, observer for the League of Nations, congratulated the conference in behalf of the League's secretariat. Papanastassiou was elected president of the First Balkan Conference by acclamation; the prime ministers of the six Balkan states and the president of the International Peace Bureau were named honorary presidents. And the opening plenary meeting was closed in order to give the delegates an opportunity to attend the first Balkan Games in the Athenian Stadium. 30 On October 6-9, 1930, the six standing committees took up the various items on the agenda. The political committee alone met with considerable difficulties in dealing with the vexatious question of minorities. The bureau comprising the heads of the six delegations had to meet more than once in order to smooth out those difficulties and to reconcile 30

I CB, p p . 225-41; also Inter-Parliamentary

Bulletin,

N o . 6 (1930), X ,

224-28.

O R I G I N OF T H E B A L K A N C O N F E R E N C E

89

31

the divergent views. The plenary meetings held on October 10-11, 1930, approved the conclusions of the committees 32 and adopted a series of resolutions on the feasibility of a Balkan union, on the unification of Balkan law as well as on political, intellectual, and economic collaboration, and on communications and the social policy of the Balkan states, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 33 On the next Sunday (October 12, 1930) the First Balkan Conference held its closing plenary meeting at Delphi, making itself a sort of Amphictyonic Council. After adopting the permanent Statutes of the Conference 34 and accepting the invitation of the Turkish delegation to convene the Second Balkan Conference at Istanbul, President Papanastassiou read the following message: On the occasion of the closing meeting of the First Balkan Conference at this sacred seat of the ancient Amphictyony, we, the members of the Conference, take the opportunity to address a cordial greeting to all the Balkan peoples, to their governments and to their press. We declare that our direct contact and our collaboration in the course of the work of the Conference have shown that we are brothers and that we can by mutual understanding and pacific means solve our controversies which have divided us. We have spoken to each other sincerely. Everyone has said what has been in his mind, and that has made us respect and like one another all the more. We believe that it is through our union that we might succeed in improving our conditions. We have given our hands and have promised to help one another. Animated by this spirit, we have proposed peaceful solutions of many questions. We entreat all the Balkan peoples—the Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Rumanians, Turks, and Yugoslavs—to follow our example. It is up to us to make ourselves really independent, to ameliorate our conditions and even to help other peoples in extricating themselves from the difficulties that have overwhelmed them. Nothing can stop us from following the new road that we have traced. The Balkan Union—this is the new ideal of all the Balkan peoples. During the farewell addresses of the delegations and as the First Balkan Conference was closed, enthusiasm ran high in all the delegations—even 31

For the Minutes of the Committees, see I CB, pp. 242 ff. For the Records of the Plenary Assembly, see I CB, pp. 303 ff. 33 For the resolutions and recommendations of the First Balkan Conference, see I CB, pp. 364-82 ; LB, N o . 2 ( 1 9 3 0 ) , I, 7 - 1 7 ; Le Messager d'Athenes, October 5-13, 1930; EN, XIII, N o . 667 (1930), 1705-10. :! 1 See Appendix 2, p. 240. 32

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CONFERENCE

the Albanian and the Bulgarian, who had come to the conference in a spirit of skepticism. Indeed, it did appear as if a new era of good will and understanding was inaugurated in the Balkans, so long known as the "cockpit of nations." 35 It should be noted, however, that this movement toward a Balkan union was derided not only by the extreme Rightists but also by the extreme Leftists. The Moscow Communist International, which had aimed at setting up a "Union of Balkan Soviet Socialist Republics," organized demonstrations throughout Europe and denounced the "imperialist Balkan Conference" as a veiled "capitalist conspiracy" against the Soviet Union. But about four years later, as will be observed in another chapter, Soviet Russia was to make an abrupt about-face and approve of the objects of the quadruple Balkan Entente. 36 35 LNBIWIO, III, No. 1 (1931), 8; BIN, VII (1930), 3-9, 1003-1009; S/.4 (1930), pp. 145-56; Papanastassiou, op. cit., pp. 55-91; Sikelianos, "La I« rc Conference balkanique sous les auspices de l'idee delphique," LB, I, No. 3 (1930), 8-13 ; Loiseau, "La Confirence d'Athenes et l'Union balkanique," Le Monde slave (December, 1930), pp. 321-36; Häberlin, "La Premiere Conference balkanique," Revue internationale de la Croix rouge, LX1II, No. 341 (1931), 7-22; Miller, "The First Balkan Conference," Contemporary Review, CXXXVIII (1930), S62-69. 36 Pravda (Moscow), October 8, 1930, p. 2\ La Federation balkanique, VII (Wien, November, 1930), 10-14.

Chapter VI T H E BALKAN C O N F E R E N C E AT WORK

N

ATIONAL groups were to be the nuclei of the Balkan Conference.

In compliance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Statutes, the delegates of each of the six countries who had attended the First Balkan Conference at Athens constituted a national group whose duty was to keep in close contact with its own government as well as with the diplomatic representatives of the other Balkan states in its own country. Thanks to this ingenious provision, no longer was propaganda in favor of the Balkan Union or contact with a diplomat of another Balkan state considered ''treason" against one's own country! 1 THE

GROWTH

OF T H E

BALKAN

IDEA

At its third session, held in the hall of the Chamber of Commerce at Salonika (January 30 to February 1, 1931) - under the presidency of Papanastassiou, the council of the Balkan Conference thanked the Carnegie Endowment for the generous donation of $10,000 which would enable the secretariat of the Balkan Conference to meet the expenses of its publications. President Papanastassiou reported that he was keeping in touch with the advisory committee comprising the Greek minister of foreign affairs and the diplomatic representatives of the other Balkan states in Greece. The head of each delegation reported on the work of his own national group. But only the Greek delegation could report having formally submitted the resolutions and recommendations of the First Balkan Conference to the Greek chamber of deputies.3 The council next adopted "an official statement for the press," noting "with satisFor the organization of the national groups, see LB, I, No. 4 (1931), 27-28. The Second Session of the Council of the Balkan Conference was held at Delphi, October 12, 1930, immediately after the closing of the First Balkan Conference, but no record seems to have been kept. Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 64. * LB, I, No. 4 (1930), 28 ft. 1

2

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faction that the ideal of a Balkan Union has rapidly gained ground among the Balkan peoples." It was decided to set up an ad hoc committee of twelve members, two from each national group, to prepare a report on the feasibility of a Balkan pact. Two other ad hoc committees also were set up, one to prepare a draft convention on the status of Balkan nationals and the other to investigate the problems of Oriental tobacco. The last week of April each year was designated "Balkan Week," to be devoted by the national groups to excursions, meetings and solemn ceremonies for the propagation of the ideal of the Balkan Union. According to Article 15 of the Statutes, the presidency of the council passed from the head of the Greek national group to the head of the Turkish national group, inasmuch as the next general assembly, or the Second Balkan Conference, was scheduled to meet at Istanbul, Turkey. The council further adopted a draft questionnaire on the Balkan Union and authorized Hassan Husni Bey of Turkey to request the Turkish foreign minister to take the initiative in summoning the first annual meeting of the foreign ministers of the Balkan States, as recommended by the First Balkan Conference. As soon as the agenda for the next conference came up for consideration, a storm broke out at the session. Professor Kyroff of Bulgaria made a motion that the question of minorities be expressly inscribed on the agenda. This motion, seconded by Konitza of Albania, was vigorously opposed by all the other delegations. At length the Bulgarian and Albanian delegations were constrained to agree to a compromise: the question of minorities, though not expressly mentioned in the agenda, was to be considered as implied in the item of the agenda concerning the preparation of a draft Balkan pact. The session of the council was closed in a friendly atmosphere. 4 The enemies of Balkan reconciliation, especially those in Bulgaria, seized the opportunity afforded them by an innocuous mistake on the part of the secretariat of the Balkan Conference to attack the whole movement. In the first resolution of the First Balkan Conference a phrase had been included on the motion of the Bulgarian delegation, namely, that the Balkan Union should by no means "tend to stifle the existing ethnic entities" ("ne pas tendre ä etouffer les entites 6thniques existantes"); but this phrase was omitted from the text of the resolutions as published by the secretariat of the Balkan Conference. Al* "La 3e Session du conseil de la Conference balkaniquc ä Salonique, proces-vcrbaux," LB, I, No. S (1931), 24-36.

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93 5

though this omission was later corrected and explained, Bulgarian extreme nationalists availed themselves of the opportunity to accuse Professor Kyroff, head of the Bulgarian national group, of having "betrayed his own country." β Moreover, as the council failed to inscribe the question of minorities in the agenda of the Second Balkan Conference, Professor Kyroff was constrained to resign, and the presidency of the Bulgarian national group was taken by Yanko Sakazoff, "a very patriotic Socialist." 7 Balkan Week was observed in the various Balkan countries in April, May, and June, 1931. Representatives of the chambers of commerce and industry as well as of the banking institutions of all Balkan countries met at Athens and laid the foundations of the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; at Istanbul a congress of tourist offices set up a Balkan Tourist Federation; at Sofia an agricultural meeting adopted a series of recommendations on agricultural problems and organized an excursion to the famous Rose Valley; at Belgrade a meeting of women's delegates took place; and a gathering of representatives of municipalities was held at Tirana. 8 Fortunately, the semidictatorial Bulgarian government, headed by the Macedonian komitadji Andrew Liaptcheff, was overthrown by the general election which took place on June 21, 1931 (the fourth Bulgarian cabinet to be so overthrown by the ballot of the people within fifty years). A moderate coalition cabinet of ministers was formed and supported by a parliament the backbone of which was the National Peasant Party of the late Premier Stambulisky. The tremendous success of a series of Balkan Games held for the first time at Sofia (October, 1931), in spite of the protest and boycott of the Macedonian and other "patriotic" organizations, indicated clearly that the professional patriots in Sofia could hardly make any trouble without the connivance of the Bulgarian government. 9 Such progress in the de-Balkanization of the Balkans could not but be gratifying to every friend of peace and prosperity in the Balkans. The Twenty-eighth Universal Peace Congress, held at Brussels (July, 5 Resolutions de la I're Conference balkanique (Athenes, 5-12 octobre 1930), p. 1; LB, I, No. 2 (1930), 7; "Un Correction," LB, I, No. 4 (1931), 27; I CB, p. 364; Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 239. u P. M. Matthieff, "Stephen Kyroff, The World Unity, IV (1929), 292. 7 Papanastassiou, "Les Ecueils," LB, I, No. 8 (1931), 4-5; Demokraticheski sgovor (Sofia), March 31, 1931. »"La Semaine balkanique," LB, I, No. 8 (1931), 37^tl; LB, I, No. 9 (1931), 48-51; LB, I, Nos. 10-11 (1931), 32. "LB, II, No. 24 (1932), 658; NE, X L (1931), 465.

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1931), passed a resolution noting "with greatest satisfaction the success obtained by the Balkan Conference" and "congratulating the National Groups of the six participating States on the spirit of understanding which animated them and on the success of their efforts to a rapproachement of their peoples." 10 The Committee of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace promised further material and moral support to the Balkan Conference. 11 Of course, the work for the de-Balkanization of the Balkans could not always go smoothly. There was again a snag—an alleged "printed error" which caused some friction between the Turkish and the Bulgarian national groups and thus marred the remarkable progress of reconciliation of the Balkan peoples. The rapporteur of the agricultural meeting at Sofia had indulged in some careless remarks about the Turkish misrule in Bulgaria more than half a century back. The Turkish national group protested to the secretariat of the Balkan Conference for having printed these remarks in its official organ, Les Balkans. This incident was closed after the apology of the Bulgarian national group.1THE

SECOND

BALKAN

CONFERENCE

Because of the absence of Rushtii Bey, Turkish foreign minister, from his country, the Second Balkan Conference was postponed from the eleventh to the nineteenth of October, 1931. One day earlier the council met to modify the agenda and to name the chairmen of the committees. The opening meeting of the Second Balkan Conference took place at Istanbul under the presidency of Hassan Husni Bey, symbolically enough in the splendid royal palace Dolma Bachtche, where the despotic sultans of former times had resided and presided over the vast domains of the Ottoman empire. Well-nigh two hundred delegates, experts, secretaries, and observers attended the meeting.13 In greeting the conference, Ismet Pasha, premier of the Turkish republic, said that the presence of so many delegates testified to the sincerity of the protagonists of the Balkan Union, which should rest upon the firm basis of equality of all the Balkan states. Hassan Husni Bey, head of the Turkish delegation and ex officio president of the council, said that, inasmuch as the Balkan Conference was a permanent organization, there should be no discouragement with the slow progress of its work in any one year. Konitza of Albania, in his responding address, Ό XXVIII' CUP, p. 203; LNBIWIO, III, No. 4 (1931), 165-66. 11 12 LB, I, No. 9 (1931), 48. Ibid., p. 49, and No. 12, pp. 21-22. 13 For a list of the delegates, see II CB, pp. 7-17.

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95

dwelt on the method of approach to be followed by the Balkan Conference. He said, in p a r t : It has often been stated that easy questions should be settled first. I am not of this opinion. When we want to build a house, we do not begin with the doors and windows, but with the foundations. The foundations of the house that we have been trying to build in common are the equitable settlements of the question of minorities. But now Yanko Sakazoff of Bulgaria did not even mention the question of minorities; he showed remarkable moderation by confining himself to explaining the difficulties which the Bulgarian national group had encountered during the previous twelve months in the effort to persuade public opinion that it would be in the interest of Bulgaria to take part in the work of the Balkan Conference. Papanastassiou reported that the Greek national group was carrying on very active propaganda in favor of the Balkan Union. Stefan Ciceo Pop of Rumania emphasized the necessity for reconciliation in the Balkans, while Professor Yonnitch again reiterated the Yugoslav thesis that the Balkan Conference should lay aside controversial political questions and should give primary consideration to cultural and economic questions. A greater number of experts and specialists was now attached to each delegation than had been the case with the First Balkan Conference ; and more diligence was shown by the several delegations in preparing and submitting reports or memoranda on the items included in the agenda. Rushtii Bey, Turkish foreign minister, the ministers of the other Balkan states in Turkey, Cummings of the League of Nations secretariat, Quide and von Gerlach of the International Peace Bureau, and Earle B. Babcock of the Carnegie Endowment were present as observers. 14 Immediately after the closing of the first plenary meeting of the conference, the six standing and the two ad hoc committees met at Yildiz Palace for a detailed examination of the items on the agenda, and their work continued for five days (October 20-25, 1931). In the Political Committee, the Bulgarian delegates showed unaccustomed moderation and restraint while the Albanian and Yugoslav delegates exchanged some recriminations. But the work of the ad hoc Committee on the Balkan Pact reached a deadlock, for, although accepting the Greek D r a f t Balkan Pact in principle, the Albanian and Bulgarian delegations moved that its discussion and adoption be adjourned until 14

For the agenda of the Second Balkan Conference, see II CB, pp. 25-26; for the addresses at the opening meeting, LB, II, Nos. 13-14 (1931), 72-83.

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96

after a satisfactory solution of the question of minorities. Such acrimonious debates followed between the Albanian and Bulgarian delegates on one side and the rest of the delegates on the other that no stenographic record of the meeting was kept. The council of the conference was called into extraordinary session to find a way out of the impasse, and the question of a draft Balkan pact was again referred to another ad hoc committee to make further investigation and to report its conclusion to the next annual Balkan Conference. 15 The second plenary meeting of the conference was held in Yildiz Palace, Istanbul, on October 25, but the closing plenary meeting was held in the hall of the Kamutay (National Assembly) in Ankara, the new capital of Turkey. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, president of the Turkish republic, delivered a remarkable address. Greeting "the eminent delegates" who were laying "the foundations of the union of the Balkan peoples," the head of the Turkish nation expressed his belief that, since "collaboration in the economic life as well as in the domain of culture and civilization is to be the basis of the Balkan Union, there can be no doubt that such an enterprise will be regarded favorably by all the civilized world." 16 With the president of the Turkish republic as a spectator, the closing plenary meeting of the Second Balkan Conference adopted a series of resolutions and recommendations, as well as a number of miscellaneous decisions, which will be discussed later. President Hassan Husni Bey closed the conference with a farewell message. The council held another extraordinary session for the purpose of accepting the invitation of the Rumanian delegation to convene the Third Balkan Conference at Bucharest, the general assembly having referred the matter to the council for decision. Although this conference had failed to achieve its main objective, the adoption of a draft Balkan pact, Yanko Sakazoff of Bulgaria exclaimed: "We are very much satisfied with the results of the Second Balkan Conference." 17 In general, the work of the annual Balkan Conference 15

For the minutes of the committees, see LB, II, Nos. 13-14 (1931). 90 ff. By a law enacted early in 1934 and effective January 1, 1935, the existing Turkish titles of nobility, such as Pasha, Bey, Eßendi, Aga, were abolished. The law provided, also, that every Turkish citizen should select and register a family name with the government. The Kamutay conferred on Mustapha Kemal Pasha the surname of Atatiirk ("Father of all Turks"), Premier Ismet Pasha assumed the name of Inönü and the foreign minister Tewfic Rushtii Bey that of Arras. "Dix Annees de republique en Turquie," LB, IV (1933), 889-922; "L'Evolution politique et sociale de la Turquie kemaliste," LB, VII (1935), 185-203. 17 For the plenary meetings and the resolutions of the Second Balkan Conference, see LB, II, Nos. 13-14 (1931), 94-142; for the address of President Mustapha Kemal Pasha, see ibid., pp. 1-2. 16

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97

was considered satisfactory even outside of the Balkans. The Twentyninth Universal Peace Congress, held at Vienna (1932), passed a resolution noting— with great and growing satisfaction the excellent results attained so far by the Balkan Conference. It congratulates the delegations of the six countries on the concessions mutually agreed upon and on the efforts made in the various circles in order to facilitate the work of closer intercourse which has been undertaken. It appreciates the friendly attitude adopted by the governments toward the Conference. The Congress further requests the International Peace Bureau to address letters to Mr. Papanastassiou, the President of the First Balkan Conference, and to Rushtii Bey, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, congratulating them on the results achieved.18

PARTIAL

BALKAN

BLOCS

So far the ticklish issue of national minorities had been successfully brushed aside by the annual Balkan Conference. The conference at Athens merely recommended the "loyal execution of all obligations arising from the existing treaties, including those concerning minorities." 10 But the conference at Istanbul advised "the establishment of direct relations between the National Groups of the parties concerned, in order to reach agreements on matters likely to endanger the good relations between them and to ensure scrupulous respect tor all obligations arising out of treaties now in force, including those dealing with the protection of minorities." 20 While the first recommendation could be construed as a tacit admission of failure on the part of the Balkan Conference to deal with the issue of minorities, the second might be taken as opening the door for the formation of several partial Balkan blocs instead of a single Balkan union. But only two of the national groups, the Albanian and the Bulgarian, succeeded in "the establishment of direct relations" and reaching a vague agreement on the issue of minorities, of which more will be said later. The other national groups refused, on the ground that the issue of minorities was outside the competence of the organs of the is xxixe CUP, p. 156. See also LNB1WIO, IV, No. 1 (1932), 12; Trifonoff, "The Second Balkan Conference," The Bulgarian British Review (Sofia), November, 1931, pp. 4 - 6 ; L'Esprit international, VI (1932), 209-30; Le Journal d'Orienl, October 20-29, 1931; SIA (1931), pp. 324-40; Resolutions et voeux de la deuxieme conference balkanique (Istanbul, 1931). 191 CB, p. 365. 20 LB, II, Nos. 13-14 (1931), 134.

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BALKAN C O N F E R E N C E AT WORK

Balkan Conference, to enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of arriving at similar agreements. 21 It was, then, under most inauspicious circumstances that the council held its fifth session at Istanbul (January 28 to February 1, 1932). In every Balkan country there was severe economic depression as well as political convulsion. Owing to a fresh outbreak of frontier incidents, the official relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were strained to the breaking point. The Rumanian members of the council, unable to attend the session, authorized Manescu, Rumanian commercial attache in Turkey, to represent them. 22 Nevertheless, the council went on with its work. It decided to hold the Third Balkan Conference at Bucharest in spite of the political convulsion in Rumania after the restoration of Carol II. It approved the tentative Draft Balkan Pact, with an additional chapter on minorities. It fixed the agenda of the Third Balkan Conference and arranged the program for the impending Balkan Week. Although Papanastassiou read a statement for the press, describing the work of the council and asserting that in all its meetings ; 'a spirit of cordiality and perfect harmony prevailed," this session of the council might have been the last ever heard of the Balkan Conference if it had not been for the skill of Papanastassiou and the conciliatory attitude of Hassan Husni Bey, who were able to find the proper formula to avert a rupture. 23 As the contemplated bipartite agreements on the question of minorities had failed to materialize, the Albanian and Bulgarian national groups refused to observe Balkan Week in the spring of 1932, while the Rumanian national group, plunged into a bitter election campaign, could not spare time for Balkan Week.24 At Athens a medical conference set up the Balkan Medical Union.25 At Istanbul an economic meeting inaugurated the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 26 At Belgrade a juridical meeting, attended only by Greek, Turkish, and Yugoslav delegates, named the Permanent Balkan Commission of Jurists to prepare the ground for the meeting of a general conference for the unification of Balkan laws.27 21

LB, II, Nos. 17-18 (1932), 327-28; LB, III, Nos. 4-5 (1932), 457-58. LB, II, Nos. 15-16 (1932), 231-47; La Bulgarie, February 22, 1932; NE, (1932), 119, 139. 23 For the Minutes of the Council, see LB, II, Nos. 17-18 (1932), 320-27. 24 Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 126; NE, XLI (1932), 461, 932. 25 LB, II, No. 23 (1932), 569; III CB, 17, 276-78. 26 LB, II, No. 23 (1932), 564-69. 27 III CB, pp. 17-19; LB, II, No. 22 (1932), 546-*9. 22

XLI,

BALKAN C O N F E R E N C E AT W O R K

99

Three other conferences or meetings were held—not as part of, but closely connected with, Balkan Week. At Bucharest a semiofficial tripartite conference (Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) of agricultural cooperatives examined the possibilities of alleviating the economic depression.28 At Istanbul an official conference of the three Orientaltobacco producing countries—Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey—was held as recommended by the Second Balkan Conference to deal with the problems of Oriental tobacco.20 A semiofficial conference of Balkan universities was held at Sofia, but Turkey refused to send delegates, and Albania had no university.30 And thus it seemed in 1932 as if several partial Balkan blocs would come into being. THE

THIRD

BALKAN

CONFERENCE

Meanwhile the semidictatorial Rumanian government of Professor Iorga was replaced by the National Peasant Party and the Rumanian national group intensified the preparations for the meeting of the Third Balkan Conference. However, it was announced at Sofia that the Bulgarian national group had approved the tentative Draft Balkan Pact with a reservation to the effect that the bipartite agreements on the question of minorities should have been concluded before the meeting of the Third Balkan Conference, and since this condition was not fulfilled, the Bulgarian national group proposed the postponement of the Third Balkan Conference until after the conclusion of the contemplated agreements on minorities.31 This dilatory attitude was condemned by Bulgaria's best friends abroad, while the other national groups rejected the Bulgarian motion, holding that the Statutes provided for the meeting of the Balkan Conference every October and that the Second Balkan Conference had not specified the period during which the contemplated bipartite minorities' agreements were to be concluded.32 Thereupon the Bulgarian national group announced its decision to abstain from participation in the work of the Third Balkan Conference. After having received positive assurances that the bipartite negotiations would take place after the meeting of the Third Balkan Conference, however, it agreed to send a small delegation which was conspicuous by the absence of the president of the Bulgarian national group and by the inclusion of open enemies of 28

29 Ibid., p. 539. Ibid., pp. 539-46. Ibid., pp. 549-52; La Bulgarie, June 28-July 5, 1932. 31 LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 64; NE, XLI (1932), 479. 32 Ibid., p. 597; Papanastassiou, op. cit., p. 127. 30

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B A L K A N C O N F E R E N C E AT W O R K

the ideal of a Balkan union, such as General Lazaroff, Bulgaria's Ludendorff. 33 Stefan Ciceo Pop, ex officio president of the council, sent a formal invitation to the other delegations (October 14, 1932), expressing gratification that the Bulgarian national group had rescinded its previous decision to abstain from the work of the conference and anticipating "the re-union of the delegates from the other five countries of the peninsula with a firm desire for friendship and understanding." 34 As soon as the council opened its sixth session, in the hall of the Rumanian senate (October 21, 1932), the head of the small Bulgarian delegation made a formal protest that the other national groups had rejected the Bulgarian proposal for the adjournment of the Third Balkan Conference; he gave warning that the conference could not proceed to other business without first solving the issue of minorities. 10 In order to appease the Bulgarian delegation, the council affirmed the necessity of carrying out the recommendation of the Second Balkan Conference concerning bilateral agreements on the issue of minorities. After naming the chairmen of the various committees, the council closed its session with rather gloomy forebodings. 30 The Third Balkan Conference was solemnly opened in the hall of the Rumanian chamber of deputies (October 22, 1932). Telegrams of homage were sent to the heads of the six Balkan states. The Rumanian foreign minister Titulescu addressed the delegates in part as follows: By your work you have greatly facilitated the policy of your governments. . . . Your work will not remain fruitless. . . . I should like to say that, while in the past the Balkans have been considered a source of international friction, today, thanks to your efforts, there is in the Balkans a new movement aiming at establishing peace on solid bases: helping one another without injuring anyone else. The question of minorities seems to have dominated the minds at the conference. Stefan Ciceo Pop, head of the Rumanian delegation, said, in p a r t : Respect for the rights of minorities is as much a question of solemn obligation as a question of wise public policy. To secure the internal tranquillity 33

LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 6; Le Messager d'Athents, October 15, 1932. LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 71-72. 30 This Bulgarian delegation comprised only six members, instead of at least ten as required by the Statutes: T. Triphonoff, General Lazaroff, B. P. Petkoff, I. Sakazoff, B. Diakoff, and V. Daneff. Ill CB, p. 5; see also Ghenov, La Bitlgarie e! les Conferences balkaniques (Sofia, 1931). 3e For the Minutes of the Council, see LB III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 72-78; 111 CB, p. 339. 34

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and good name of the State abroad, it is necessary to make the minorities content and satisfied. I am of the opinion that there should be a general guarantee for the minorities to exercise all their natural and contractual rights within the limits of the sovereignty of the States. After paying a deserved tribute to "Mentor Papanastassiou," Konitza of Albania stated emphatically that the settlement of the problem of minorities "remained a condition sine qua non to the Balkan Union" and that "the Balkan Union without guarantee for the rights of minorities, if possible at all, would have an ephemeral life, not having been established on moral principles." Triphonoff, on his part, declared that the Bulgarian delegation will be glad to see, before the meeting of the Fourth Balkan Conference, the establishment of close contacts between the several National Groups in order to open the way for the legal and moral protection of minorities and for the removal of all obstacles likely to hinder rapprochement in the Balkans. Papanastassiou said that the Greek national group had formally submitted the resolutions and recommendations of the Second Balkan Conference to the Greek chamber of deputies and that the leaders of all political parties in Greece had pledged support for the establishment of a Balkan union. Hassan Husni Bey of Turkey emphasized the immediate necessity of such a union. He asserted that if the Balkan peoples were to wait for the establishment of a union until after the removal of all the political and economic obstacles, they would involve themselves all the more in a vicious circle. He concluded that the shortest way to solve all the problems was to establish the Balkan Union. Yovanovitch of Yugoslavia warned the delegates that the conference might collapse if it took up questions too difficult to deal with. "Unfortunate were the attempts in the past at the solution of political questions," he asserted. "As soon as it is realized that rapprochement should begin along economic, social, and cultural lines, the solution of the other problems will become easier." 37 Barandon, observer for the League of Nations secretariat, noted that the Third Balkan Conference was faced by a very extensive agenda. 38 Stefan Ciceo Pop, head of the Rumanian delegation, was elected president of the Third Balkan Conference by acclamation instead of by secret ballot as Article 7(2) of the Statutes provided. VladescoRacoassa, secretary of the Rumanian delegation, became ex officio secretary-general of the conference. 3 " 3" For the opening meeting, see LB, III, Nos. 1 - 2 ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 79-98; III CB, pp. 303-24. 3 " For the agenda, see LB, III, Nos. 1-2 ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 77-78; III CB, pp. 1-2. 33 For a list of delegates, experts, secretaries, and observers, see III CB, pp. 5-11.

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As each of the six standing committees met to examine its respective items of the agenda, Triphonoff, head of the Bulgarian delegation, left the chairmanship of the Communications Committee and went to the meeting of the Political Committee in order to introduce a motion that the consideration of the Draft Balkan Pact be adjourned until the meeting of the Fourth Balkan Conference; he expressed the hope that the contemplated bipartite understandings on the question of minorities would have been concluded in the interval. All other delegations, including now the Albanian, rejected the Bulgarian motion as baseless. Thereupon Triphonoff declared that "the Bulgarian delegates found themselves constrained to withdraw from the Third Balkan Conference as delegates and to remain therein as mere observers to follow its debates," and the meeting of that committee was immediately adjourned. 40 The entreaties of the other delegations were useless. The Bulgarian delegation had just received telephone instructions from Sofia (presumably from the head of the Bulgarian national group but in reality from the ministry of foreign affairs) to withdraw from the Third Balkan Conference immediately after the rejection of its motion to adjourn the discussion of the Draft Balkan Pact. An extraordinary session of the council decided that, in spite of the withdrawal of the Bulgarian delegation, the Draft Balkan Pact might be discussed and adopted by the conference. With the Bulgarian delegation in absentia, the six standing and two ad hoc committees finished their work quietly and reported their conclusions to the plenary meetings.41 A series of resolutions and recommendations was adopted by the conference; the Yugoslav delegation voted the Draft Balkan Pact with reservations concerning its minorities provisions.42 The Bulgarian delegation could have done just as well as the Yugoslav delegation, signing or voting the Draft Balkan Pact with reservations. Such a course would have been wiser than a theatrical withdrawal from the conference. At the closing plenary meeting, the heads of the five delegations lauded the adoption of the Draft Balkan Pact and expressed deep regret that the Bulgarian delegation had chosen to withdraw from the conference. Konitza of Albania emphatically condemned the attitude of the Bulgarian delegation.43 (This indicated the end of whatever Albanian-Bulgarian understanding had existed.) He said, in part: 40

41 LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 100-101. Ibid., pp. 101-S8. For the resolutions and recommendations, which will be analyzed later, see ibid., pp. 172-96; III CB, pp. 347-72. 43 N. J. Padelford incorrectly states that the Albanian delegation, too, withdrew from the conference. Peace in the Balkans, p. SO. 42

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Let our Bulgarian friends who do not doubt my sincerity allow me to tell them that their attitude is unwise. Bulgaria is not so small as to depend entirely upon the consideration and protection of the family of nations; yet she is not so strong as to rely solely upon her own strength. . . . We are certainly depressed to see the Bulgarians refusing to take part in the work for our common security. But we do not despair of the future. We are sure that, after returning home and reflecting for a while about what has taken place, they will come to the conclusion that they have lost the battle. And there is no doubt that our capricious friends will come back some day; and they may be sure that we shall receive them with open arms. In his farewell message President Pop recapitulated the work of the Third Balkan Conference and expressed the hope that the Bulgarian national group would renew its participation in the work of the regional organization in the Balkans. 44 At an extraordinary meeting of the council, it was decided to accept the invitation of the Yugoslav delegation to convene the next conference at Belgrade. The council held another meeting (October 27, 1932) to hear once more the objections of the Bulgarian delegation to the Draft Balkan Pact. The Bulgarian delegation was finally persuaded to make a lukewarm declaration that it would do everything possible to secure Bulgaria's adherence to the Draft Balkan Pact. 45 THE

FOURTH

BALKAN

CONFERENCE

Chastised and sobered by the severe criticism of its unwise attitude, the Bulgarian national group soon returned to the fold of the Balkan Conference. 48 All six national groups were represented and a new spirit of cooperation was manifest at the eighth regular session of the council held at Bucharest (March 17-20, 1933). President Stefan Ciceo Pop said that a Balkan union was no longer considered a Utopian idea, that the annual Balkan Conference had come into being in order to accomplish positive results, that the circumstances required the most intensive propaganda in favor of the ideal of a Balkan union, that the Balkan Conference was making the Balkan peoples deeply conscious of the fact 44

For the closing meeting, see LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 159-70; III CB, pp. 325-38. LB, III, Nos. 1-2 (1932), 170-71; III CB, p. 340; LNBIWIO, V, No. 1 (1933), 17-20; C. Galitzi, "The Third Balkan Conference in Bucharest," World. Affairs Proceedings, X (1933), 40-49; L'Indipendence roumaine, October 21-28, 1932: Journal de la IIIe Conference balkanique (Bucharest, 1932). 46 Yanko Sakazoff, the head of the Bulgarian national group, had undertaken during the previous winter an unofficial visit to the capitals of certain Great Powers; and after his return to Sofia he told the Bulgarian press that everywhere, and especially in Paris, he had been advised by Bulgaria's best friends to work for Balkan rapprochement. LB, IV (1933), 665. 45

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that their security could rest only on their economic and political solidarity, and that the six Balkan peoples could not give up the work for mutual understanding without compromising themselves and without endangering their collective security. He concluded: "By the establishment of the Balkan Union which has been the object of our movement, we shall serve well our countries and humanity, so eager for peace and progress." The council voted a resolution urging the "cooperation of the governments, statesmen, newspaper men, and all other enlightened minds" for the realization of the ideal of a Balkan union. The Rumanian and Yugoslav representatives made a joint declaration designed to dispel the apprehension that the new Little Entente Pact of Organization (February 16, 1933) would put any obstacles in the way of the annual Balkan Conference. There was no difficulty in drawing up the agenda of the Fourth Balkan Conference. Since Professor Yonnitch of Yugoslavia announced that it would be impossible to hold the Fourth Balkan Conference at Belgrade, the head of the Greek national group readily accepted responsibility for summoning that Conference at Salonika. The council expressed the hope that the national groups would urge their governments to accept and apply the resolutions and recommendations of the previous assemblies of the conference and, especially, to ratify the D r a f t Balkan Pact. In order to pave the way for the application of the Postal Convention, which had already been ratified by Greece and Turkey, as well as of the D r a f t Balkan Pact and other draft conventions adopted by the previous assemblies, the council decided that these might come into force as soon as adopted and ratified by at least two Balkan states. This decision again tended toward the establishment of partial Balkan blocs instead of a single Balkan union. 47 A series of three bilateral meetings took place immediately after the closing of the council. The first, held at Bucharest by the Bulgarian and Yugoslav delegations, seems to have really laid the foundations for a remarkable rapprochement between their hitherto hostile countries. The two other bilateral meetings—the Bulgarian-Greek and the Bulgarian-Turkish—took place at Sofia (March 21, 1933) and two "protocols" were signed, the three national groups pledging themselves to work for close cooperation of their countries in the application of the resolutions and recommendations of the annual assemblies of the Balkan Conference. 48 47 48

For the Minutes of the Council, see III CB, pp. 340-344; LB, III (1933), 545-55. LB, III, Nos. 6-7 (1933), 550-55.

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During the spring and summer of 1933, Balkan Week was devoted to business meetings of subcommittees of the Balkan Conference. At Athens the meeting of the Maritime Communications Subcommittee elaborated draft statutes of the Maritime Section of the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 49 At Istanbul the Administrative Council of the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, together with a special semiofficial preparatory committee, elaborated a draft convention on a regional Balkan economic entente. 50 At Sofia another communications subcommittee adopted a series of resolutions advising the governments of the Balkan states to undertake an extensive program for the construction of highways, railways, and bridges in the Balkans.51 At Sofia an official bilateral Bulgarian-Rumanian railways conference dealt with the questions of building a bridge over the Danube and improving the railway junctions between the two countries.52 At Istanbul an official Bulgarian-Greek-Turkish economic conference set up definitely the Oriental Tobacco Office.53 At Belgrade the Balkan Medical Union, at its first congress, adopted a series of recommendations on hygiene in general and rural medical help in particular. 54 In September, 1933, the Greek national group formally submitted the resolutions and recommendations of the Third Balkan Conference to the Greek Chamber of Deputies. Again the Greek national representatives obtained the opportunity to discuss ways and means for the close cooperation of the Balkan states. And again the legislative assemblies of the Balkan states exchanged telegraphic messages of felicitation and good will.55 On the request of several of the national groups, the meeting of the Fourth Balkan Conference was postponed from September IS to November 5, 1933. The reasons for the delay were several: conflict with the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations and the InterParliamentary Conference as well as a desire to give the governments more time for the pending negotiations on the ratification of the Draft Balkan Pact. 58 At the regular session of the council, held at Salonika (November 4, 1933), the Yugoslav delegation again took exception to the placing of the question of minorities on the agenda of the conference. The head of the Bulgarian delegation insisted once more on the importance of the question of minorities and stated that the Bulgarian national group 49 51 54

50 Ibid., IV, Nos. 8-9, pp. 112-15. Ibid., pp. 121-22, 299-302. 52 Ibid., p. 116. Ibid., p. 122. « I b i d . , p. 667. 5S 50 Ibid., p. 592. Ibid., pp. 652-65. Ibid., p. 668.

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had agreed to take part in the future work of the Balkan Conference only "on the condition that all questions which might hinder the rapprochement of the Balkan peoples should be discussed." Then the head of the Yugoslav delegation declared that he did not insist on the elimination of the question of minorities from the agenda; he simply wanted to draw attention to the futility of trying to solve in a hurry questions which were not yet ripe. It was decided that the Legal and Organization Committee, and not the Political Committee, should be instructed to study the question of the unification of consular conventions; that the question of the establishment of a Balkan chamber of agriculture should be studied by the Economic Committee and referred to the Fifth Balkan Conference; and that no more Balkan institutions should be created until after those already established had begun to function normally. A motion of the Bulgarian delegation to include in the agenda the question of the erection of monuments to soldiers and officers killed during the Balkan Wars and the World War provoked some heated discussion. Hassan Husni Bey said that the proposal was of no practical utility and that his government would not permit the erection of such monuments in Turkey. "Let us think of the future," he said, "and let us not pose thorny questions of the past." But the Bulgarian delegate Petkoff insisted that the proposal involved a question of the application of a stipulation of an existing treaty, and, on the motion of Papanastassiou, the question was referred to the Fifth Balkan Conference to be studied by the Committee on Intellectual Relations and Moral Disarmament. 57 On November 5, 1933, the Fourth Balkan Conference was solemnly opened in the aula of the University of Salonika. In his opening address, after thanking the six Balkan governments, the League of Nations Secretariat, the International Labor Office, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Peace Bureau, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for their moral and material support of the Balkan Conference, Papanastassiou reminded the delegates that, being assembled in the University of Salonika, a temple of science bearing the name of Aristotle, they should conduct their deliberations in the most scientific manner; and that they should never lose sight of the ultimate object of the movement: a union of the Balkan states. In conclusion he said that, though the task was very difficult, "the faith which may move mountains" would inspire them to overcome all difficulties. Foreign Minister Maximos greeted the delegates as "servants of a 57

For the Minutes of the Council, see IV CB, pp. 4 1 1 - 1 3 ; LB, IV ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 992-95.

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great and lofty cause," assuring them that the Greek government wished the conference "the most splendid success." Natchi of Albania, referring to the Greco-Turkish Pact of Cordial Friendship (September 14, 1933), decried the tendency toward the formation of partial Balkan blocs and expressed the hope that all the delegates were aiming at the formation of a single Balkan union. Sakazoff expressed his belief that the annual Balkan Conference was advancing an "idealistic policy," while the Balkan governments were pursuing a "realistic policy." He asserted, further, that the governments had lately taken some steps toward making the policy of the Balkan Conference their own. Raducano of Rumania advised the delegates to throw a veil over the sorry past and to fraternize in the future. Hassan Husni Bey of Turkey expressed his conviction that the future belonged to a "union of nations emancipated from secular and antiquated prejudices." Yovanovitch of Yugoslavia reiterated his thesis of economic rather than political rapprochement of the Balkan states: The Yugoslav Group is imbued with this idea and is entirely devoted to the study of social, cultural and economic questions. . . . Our Group has always been attached to the investigation of questions relating to the economic collaboration of the Balkan peoples and more especially those concerning the economic accord which may finally lead us to a Customs Union.88 Presided over again by Papanastassiou, the Fourth Belkan Conference proceeded to deal with its rather extensive agenda. 59 Again there were difficulties in the Political Committee, which held three meetings to examine the application of the resolutions so far adopted by the previous meetings of the Balkan Conference, particularly those calling for annual meetings of the six Balkan foreign ministers and the ratification of the Draft Balkan Pact. The head of the Bulgarian delegation proposed bilateral meetings of the foreign ministers and reiterated the Bulgarian reservations concerning a Balkan pact. It became necessary to suspend the meeting of the Political Committee in order to call an extraordinary session of the council. The Bulgarian proposal to set up a special committee to revise the D r a f t Balkan Pact was rejected by the council. It was decided that the Fourth Balkan Conference might recommend the ratification of the D r a f t Balkan Pact by the governments of the Balkan states and that the Bulgarian delegation might sign or vote this recommendation with reservations. 00 58 5,1 60

For the opening meeting, see IV CB, pp. 413-34. For the agenda, see IV CB, pp. 413-14. The Minutes of the Committees are in IV CB, pp. 435-62.

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WORK

All the committees repeated their conclusions to the plenary meetings, 61 and a series of resolutions and recommendations was finally adopted by the Fourth Balkan Conference. 82 In his valedictory address, President Papanastassiou rejoiced at the presence of such a great number of high public officials as delegates and experts as well as of a considerable number of parliamentarians, inasmuch as his ambition was that the Balkan Conference would "little by little become a true Balkan Parliament." The head of the Bulgarian delegation did not miss the opportunity to express regret that the Balkan Conference had not as yet been able to deal effectively with political questions. He expressed, also, the hope that by the meeting of the Fifth Balkan Conference the pending political questions would have become ripe for settlement and thus the ground would be cleared for the erection of " a federation, a Balkan union." President Papanastassiou announced that the council had again selected Belgrade, Yugoslavia, as the seat of the Fifth Balkan Conference and then read his farewell message, appealing for moral and material support in the efforts to establish " a complete union of the six Balkan states." fl3 For the records of the plenary meetings, see IV CB, pp. 463-512. IV CB, pp. 515-33; LB, IV (1933), 1087-1104. 63 IV CB, pp. 499-512 ; Papanastassiou, op. cit., pp. 175 ff.; T. Dourdievitch, Tchetvrta balkansku konjerentsiju (Beograd, 1935); A. Girard, "La IVC Conference balkanique," Affaires elrangeres, I I I (1933), 612-21. 01 02

Chapter VII T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N OF T H E BALKAN C O N F E R E N C E

I

T IS a truism that without proper organization neither concord nor unity of action can be evolved. The success of a voluntary association like the Balkan Conference—an instrument for regional understanding—depends as much on the good faith and zeal of its sponsors as on the perfection of its constitution. But the sponsors of the Balkan Conference, whose good faith and zeal are beyond question, seem to have had no clear-cut idea of its constitution. It was obviously contemplated at the beginning that the annual Balkan assemblage should have an organization analogous to that of the International Parliamentary Conference of Commerce or to that of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.1 PROVISIONAL

ORGANIZATION

As has been observed, however, the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress sidetracked the modest Greek proposal for the creation of an institute of Balkan entente and embarked on an ambitious plan for an annual Balkan conference to trace the ground for the establishment of a "Union of the Balkan States." It gave instructions to the International Peace Bureau "to take the initiative in convening the First Balkan Conference, in collaboration with the international parliamentary organizations, and, if possible, under the auspices of the League of Nations." In nature and structure the regional Balkan Conference was to be similar to a series of international conferences held under the auspices of the League of Nations—such as, for instance, the International Financial Conference of Brussels (1920), the International Conference 1 Conference parlementaire internationale du commerce, Berlin, 2 3 - 2 6 septembre 1929, Quatrieme assemblee pleniere, Compte-rendu, X X I X , 3 6 3 - 7 2 ; Union inter-parlementaire, X X e Conference, 2 8 - 3 0 aoiit 1922, Compte-rendu, pp. 4 4 9 - 5 4 ; Inter-Parliamentary Union, Statutes and Regulations (Geneva, 1931).

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on Customs Formalities of Geneva (1923), or the International Economic Conference of Geneva (1927)—the delegates of which were "appointed by the Governments not as Government representatives but chosen for their personal qualifications" and the participating "States were naturally free to observe or not" their resolutions and recommendations.2 On the other hand, the International Peace Bureau might have envisaged the annual Balkan Conference with an organization similar to that of its annual or periodic Universal Peace Congress.3 It was Papanastassiou who first outlined the constitution of the annual Balkan Conference as the annual General Assembly of the "Institute of Balkan Cooperation" ("Institut de cooperation balkanique"). 4 But no trace of this contemplated institute could be found in the Circular-Invitation of the International Peace Bureau of Geneva or in the provisional Reglement of the General Organizing Committee of Athens.5 The idea of a permanent "Institute of Balkan Cooperation" or "Institute of Balkan Entente" was apparently set aside in an effort to do away with the apprehension that such a regional organization might fall under Greek domination.6 PERMANENT

STATUTES

As the records show, the Balkan Conference was begun quite tentatively. The framers of its constitution or statutes had not attributed due importance to the problems of organization. At the First Balkan Conference (1930), for instance, the Yugoslav delegation alone submitted a memorandum dealing briefly with the organization of the "Balkan Movement." This document envisaged the formation of a "benevolent association" in each Balkan country, having a free hand to work as it might see fit for the close collaboration of the Balkan peoples. These "Associations for Balkan Cooperation" were to proceed, with the aid of donations and subventions of the states concerned, to the establishment of the "Institute of Balkan Cooperation." Although each national association might determine its own relations with the regional institute, a general understanding between the various national associations might be reached on this point. Besides, there was to be a "Union" of these national associations as well as a "Central Bureau of the Union," which was to maintain the spirit of collaboration 2 LNP, The League of Nations: Survey 1920-1926, p. 55; The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League oj Nations (1935), p. 135. 3 4 ///