Authoritarian Gravity Centers: A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion 2020020681, 2020020682, 9780367442842, 9781003008804, 9781000072372, 9781000072402, 9781000072433

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“What accounts for the recent spread of autocracy in the world? This important book develops a systematic conceptualization of the ‘attraction’ exerted by powerful authoritarian regimes and demonstrates its analytical usefulness through well-chosen and thoroughly researched case studies. An interesting guide to understanding democracy’s current predicament!” Kurt Weyland, Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Austin “Based on painstaking research in different regions of the world, this thought-provoking set of studies provides new explanations for the regional clustering of autocracies.” Marlies Glasius, Professor of International Relations, University of Amsterdam

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Authoritarian Gravity Centers

Autocracies not only resist the global spread of democracy but are sources of autocratic influence and pressure. This book presents a conceptual model to understand, assess, and explain the promotion and diffusion of authoritarian elements. Employing a cross-regional approach, leading experts empirically test the concept of authoritarian gravity centers (AGCs), defined as “regimes that constitute a force of attraction and contagion for countries in geopolitical proximity.” With an analysis extending across Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Asia, these AGCs are shown to be effective as active promoters (push) or as neutral sources of attraction (pull). The authors contend that the influence of exogenous factors, along with international and regional contexts for the transformation of regime types, is vital to understanding and analyzing the transmission of autocratic institutional settings, ideas, norms, procedures, and practices, thus explaining the regional clustering of autocracies. It is the regional context in which external actors can influence authoritarian processes most effectively. Authoritarian Gravity Centers is a vibrant and comprehensive contribution to the growing field of autocratization, which will be of great interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of comparative area studies, illiberalism, international politics, and studies of democracy. Marianne Kneuer is Professor for Political Science, Director of the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Hildesheim, Germany, and current President of International Political Science Association (IPSA). Her research interests include studying comparative regime studies, quality of democracy, and democratization, especially the international dimension of democratization and of autocratization. Thomas Demmelhuber is Professor of Middle East Politics and Society at the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany. Demmelhuber’s research focuses on state, power, and politics in the Middle East from a comparative perspective, including that of international actors such as the European Union.

Conceptualising Comparative Politics: Polities, Peoples, and Markets Edited by Anthony Spanakos (Montclair State University) and Francisco Panizza (London School of Economics)

Conceptualising Comparative Politics seeks to bring a distinctive approach to comparative politics by rediscovering the discipline’s rich conceptual tradition and interdisciplinary foundations. It aims to fill out the conceptual framework on which the rest of the subfield draws but to which books only sporadically contribute, and to complement theoretical and conceptual analyses by applying it to deeply explored case studies. The series publishes books that make serious inquiry into fundamental concepts in comparative politics (crisis, legitimacy, credibility, representation, institutions, civil society, reconciliation) through theoretically engaging and empirically deep analysis. 7 Trust and Terror Social Capital and the Use of Terrorism as a Tool of Resistance Ammar Shamaileh 8 Manipulating Political Decentralisation Africa’s Inclusive Autocrats Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas 9 Shaping Citizenship A Political Concept in Theory, Debate and Practice Edited by Claudia Wiesner, Anna Björk, Hanna-Mari Kivistö and Katja Mäkinen 10 The End of Communist Rule in Albania Political Change and The Role of The Student Movement Edited by Shinasi A. Rama 11 Authoritarian Gravity Centers A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion Edited by Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com

Authoritarian Gravity Centers A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion Edited by Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber

First published 2021 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Taylor & Francis The right of Marianne Kneuer & Thomas Demmelhuber to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kneuer, Marianne, editor. | Demmelhuber, Thomas, 1980– editor. Title: Authoritarian gravity centers : a cross-regional study of authoritarian promotion and diffusion / Edited by Thomas Demmelhuber, Marianne Kneuer. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Conceptualising comparative politics; Volume 11 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2020020681 (print) | LCCN 2020020682 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367442842 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003008804 (ebook) | ISBN 9781000072372 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781000072402 (mobi) | ISBN 9781000072433 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Authoritarianism. | Democracy. Classification: LCC JC480 .A98 2020 (print) | LCC JC480 (ebook) | DDC 320.53—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020020681 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020020682 ISBN: 978-0-367-44284-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00880-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of Illustrations Preface

ix xi

PART I

Concept 1 Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors – A Challenge for Comparative Research

1 3

M A R I A N N E K N EU E R A N D T HOM A S DE M M E L H U BE R

2 Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers: Sources and Addressees, Mechanisms and Motives of Authoritarian Pressure and Attraction

26

M A R I A N N E K N EU E R A N D T HOM A S DE M M E L H U BE R

PART II

Empirical Studies on Authoritarian Gravity Centers: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan 3 Kingdom of Gravity: Autocratic Promotion and Diffusion in Saudi Arabia

53 55

T OBI A S Z U M BR ÄGE L

4 Democratic Erosion and Autocratization in Latin America: The Role of Venezuela as an Authoritarian Gravity Center

89

M A R I A N N E K N EU E R

5 Kazakhstan: A Possible Future Authoritarian Gravity Center? A DE L E DE L S OR DI A N D A L E X A N DE R L I BM A N

138

viii Contents PART III

The International Dimension of Authoritarianism Revisited

173

6 Russia’s Effects on a Consolidated Democracy: The Erosion of Democracy in Hungary and the Putin Model

175

T HOM A S A M BRO SIO

7 Iran and Its Neighbors: Military Assistance as Support for Authoritarianism

203

R AC H E L VA N DE R H I L L

8 Networking with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Party-to-Party Relations in Asia

225

J U L I A BA DE R A N D C H R I S T I N E H AC K E N E S C H

9 Spreading Cyber-Autocracy? The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Diffusion of Norms of “Internet Sovereignty”

249

SE BA S T I A N H A R N I S C H

PART IV

Authoritarian Gravity Centers in Cross-Regional Comparison

275

10 Authoritarian Gravity Centers in Cross-Regional Comparison: Future Studies and the International Dimension of Authoritarianism

277

T HOM A S DE M M E L H U BE R , M A R I A N N E K N EU E R , A N D  T OBI A S Z U M BR ÄGE L

Notes on Contributors Index

291 295

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 8.1 8.2 8.3

Modes of External Influence: The Concept Tree Analytical Model Autocratization in the GCC – Scores on the Democracy Status (Bertelsmann Transformation Index) Gradation of Saudi Influence Toward its GCC Fellows The Development of the Democratic Status According to the BTI (2003–2016) Meetings of the CCP-ID with Party and Non-Party Representatives in Asia, 2002–2017 Heatmap of the CCP-ID’s Activities in Asia by Country, 2002–2017 CCP-ID Contact with Government and Opposition Parties for Different Political Regime Types, 2002–2017

40 43 56 57 92 230 230 231

Tables 2.1 4.1 4.2 6.1 9.1

Sub-Mechanisms: Methods, Instruments, and Coercion Steps in the Constitutional Reform Process in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia Empirical Results of Autocracy Promotion and Diffusion in Latin America Comparing the Russia Model to Fidesz’s Strategy of Democratic Erosion SCO Evolution of Membership, Observer, and Dialogue Partner Status

41 107 126 194 251

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Preface

This book is the result of a five-year journey. During the course of our research, the phenomenon and the pressure of autocratization spread and increased, as did the scholarly debate in this field. At the same time, the international world order evolved to become more fluid and multipolar. This dynamic will encourage political leaders in democracies and autocracies alike to rely ever more on regional networks and alliances as long-standing multilateral agreements are crumbling. The normative inspiration of autocratic protagonists’ vis-à-vis neighboring countries thus calls for scholarly explanation. In the same vein, the deepening influence of autocracies on democratic regimes, challenging the established political norms and procedures of Western democracies, must be examined. In this edited volume, we not only attempt to explain regional clustering of autocracies, but also aim to identify the puzzles and gaps in literature for future “avenues of research.” This research project was funded by a grant from the German Research Foundation (DFG) from 2015 until 2018. We are grateful for this support that made it possible to conduct comprehensive fieldwork in the various world regions and to present our research at international conferences and workshops. It was a fortunate circumstance that the first ideas for and the realization of our research project coincided with the establishment of the international research network “International Diffusion and Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes” (IDCAR) by the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg. This network provided numerous occasions to exchange ideas and receive input on our progressing research. We want to thank all involved colleagues from GIGA – foremost André Bank, Bert Hoffmann, Mariana Llanos, Patrick Köllner, Thomas Richter – and all colleagues from the IDCAR network. Special thanks go to our research associates in the project, Raphael Peresson and Tobias Zumbrägel, for their work and relentless support. We are further grateful to Natalia Afanasyeva, who worked in the project as a PhD fellow. Going into the field can only be successful with colleagues and institutions on the ground. We owe much gratitude to the King Faysal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIC) in Riyadh, the Gulf Studies Centre at Qatar University, and the Center for

xii Preface Gulf Studies at the American University in Kuwait for hosting us during the fieldwork. Thanks also go to numerous colleagues in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua: We thank Friedrich Welsch (Venezuela), Flacso Ecuador, and especially Simón Pachano and Manuel Alcántara (Salamanca) for always being open to discussing the project. The meetings with the colleagues from the LASA Section on Ecuador were always inspiring. Moreover, we thank our colleagues from East European studies and Central Asian studies who were valuable partners for discussing our Kazakhstan case. Our two home institutions, the Stiftung Universität Hildesheim and the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität ErlangenNürnberg, provided us with great support, which made it possible for us to finish this research project at two different institutional locations. The main pillar of this study are over 150 interviews we conducted in the three regions. This study would not have been possible without the willingness of our interviewees across the globe – deepest thanks go to them. The final stage of preparing the manuscript is always a journey with many pitfalls. With the tremendous support of Katharina Nicolai (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg), it turned out to be an easy trip. We thank Katharina for her work. Last but not least, we are very grateful to our publisher Routledge. Many thanks go to our senior editor Natalja Mortensen and to the series’ editors Tony Spinakos and Francesco Panizza for the excellent cooperation and for accepting us in the renowned Routledge Series “Conceptualizing Comparative Politics.” Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Hildesheim/Erlangen, November 2019

Part I

Concept

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1

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors – A Challenge for Comparative Research Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber

Introduction Autocratization has moved to the center of political attention and scholarly debate in recent years. Beyond cases such as Russia, Venezuela, or Thailand, we have witnessed the erosion of democracy in EU member states like Hungary and Poland. Thirty years after the Cold War ended and the momentum of a new wave of democratization receded, we are confronted with an entirely different situation. While the euphoria over democratization of the 1990s had a strong impact on scholarly research and generated an enormous corpus of literature on democratization, the ebbing of the Third Wave of Democratization started to raise doubts about its sustainability (Diamond 1996). The resilience of pre-Cold War autocratic regimes, and especially the regression of young democracies that had been established after 1989, directed scholarly attention toward studying autocracies and phenomena like democratic backsliding (Erdmann/Kneuer 2011; Bermeo 2016; Waldner/Lust 2015), de-consolidation (Foa/Mounk 2016), or the dying of democracies (Levitsky/Ziblatt 2018; Runciman 2018). The different labels for what appears to be a “development away from democracy” boldly indicate that this new thread of research is still at its beginning. Much research, theory-building, and conceptualization remain to be done. At the center stands a vibrant search for a common denominator in terms of terminology: For some time, scholars have struggled when using “autocratization” as a simple opposite of democratization. Much disagreement on how to interpret the trend of autocratization still exists. Some speak of a decline and crisis of democracy,1 while others question the assumption of a democratic rollback (Merkel 2010; Levitsky/Way 2015) or warn about alarmist tones and state that the current widespread pessimism presents an overly dramatic storyline (Carothers 2009; Skaaning/Jiménez 2017). Indeed, the account of the global state of democracy shows a mixed balance: On the one hand, there is empirical evidence of a wave of autocratization. On the other hand, the number of electoral and liberal democracies in the world is still close to the highest recorded number. This may lead to the conclusion that the normative power of democracy remains

4  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber high (Meckova et al. 2017; Lührmann/Lindberg 2019; Mainwaring/Bizzarro 2019). A closer look reveals that the dynamics of regression refer in particular to defective democracies that are backsliding to electoral autocracies or electoral autocracies backsliding to closed autocratic regimes (Cassani/Tomini 2019: 46). Those regimes at an intermediate position between fully consolidated democracies and fully consolidated autocracies – Carothers’ seminal “gray zone” (Carothers 2002: 9) – appear to be exceedingly vulnerable to autocratization. These accounts provide important findings about the scope and direction of autocratization, but cannot answer the critical question of the causes and mechanisms of an obvious autocratic dynamic, which is antagonizing the liberal-democratic script. Confronted with the evidence of autocratization on a global scale, there is a need of conceptual work as well as of empirical studies. A significant part of the literature has focused on suggesting typologies to capture autocratic subtypes, such as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky/Way 2010), or conceptualized the additional variant of hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002; Morlino 2009). Another important thread addresses the causes for stability and durability of autocratic regimes, mostly examining the domestic dimension and internal mechanisms (e.g. Brownlee 2007; Ghandi/Przeworski 2007; Ghandi 2008; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012). In this newly emerged field of research, the international dimension of autocratic resilience and autocratization was neglected for quite some time. A mere decade ago, individual scholars, some of whom were active in research on the international dimension of democratization, turned their attention to possible external influences on processes of autocratization (Bader et al. 2010; Burnell 2010; Jackson 2010; Burnell 2011a; Vanderhill 2012). But in these early works on the international dimension of authoritarianism, the regional environment was greatly underestimated. Beyond the temporal clustering of autocratization (Lührmann/Lindberg 2019), there is empirical evidence of spatial clustering (i.e. autocratic clustering in geographical proximity). The empirical picture of the postCold War autocracies shows three different threads: 1

2

Autocratic resilience in reformed or non-reformed post-socialist regimes that remained in place after 1989 (China and Vietnam as representatives of illiberal capitalist autocracies; North Korea, Cambodia, and Laos as examples of non-reformed socialist regimes) and persisting theocratic republics or autocratic monarchies (e.g. Arab peninsula and Iran), unsuccessful consolidation of countries that initiated democratization in the 1990s but got stuck in a hybrid status and then experienced backsliding toward an authoritarian status quo ante (Russia and numerous countries of the former Soviet Union), and

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  5 3

democratic erosion of consolidated regimes with an incremental process of hybridization and autocratization (like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras).

This spatial clustering raises questions about possible origins, drivers, or interacting influences between these countries. In order to explain this autocratic clustering, we presume that neither hybridization nor autocratization takes place in an insulated way as a purely domestic development, but that there are external influences and interactions between the external and domestic level, shaping the domestic actors’ preferences and their policy choices. Thus, the main research interest of this book is to uncover the possible external push and pull factors that contribute to a converging trend of democratic regression and/or to an autocratization, but also facilitate the consolidation of existing autocracies. This includes the means by which autocratic protagonists thwart liberalization and dynamics of democratic transition, even in revolutionary moments like the early days of the Arab uprisings in the Middle East in 2011. There is much circumstantial evidence regarding interactive dynamics between neighboring countries in a regional or subregional setting, with significant impact on democratic regression and autocratic resilience. So far, this has not been researched in a systematic way. The process of autocratization remains barely theorized. This implies a lack of conceptual work. Although this is not the subject of this book – we will not discuss autocratization itself – we give a working definition so that the notion is operable for our research. In this vein, we understand autocratization as an overarching concept, meaning the process of change from the regime-type democracy to the regime-type autocracy. This change comprehends the “rapid death” (like breakdown) as well as the “slow death” (erosion or the loss of democratic quality).2 While the first form of autocratization has become marginal after the end of the Cold War, more relevance has to be given to processes of incremental erosion of democracies and unfinished democratization processes stuck in a hybrid state, which can also be a trajectory toward autocratic rule. Apart from the reality that a systematic conceptualization of autocratization does not yet exist, we witness a high level of uncertainty regarding why and under which circumstances and external factors autocracies increase regime strength or stability (Jackson 2010: 103), or influence autocratization. Moreover, it became obvious over the last decades that foreign policy has gained relevance as an additional instrument of authoritarian power consolidation. This is especially true for Russia and China (McFaul 2010; Bader 2014). In the Russian case, the assertive foreign policy under Putin – culminating in the military invasions of Georgia in 2008 and the Crimea annexation in 2014 – is closely linked to domestic regime transformation, flanked by the ideational dimension of national-patriotic mobilization. Putin’s millennium manifesto from

6  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber 1999 is already indicative as it sets the fundament for the “strong state” approach as well as for the idea of the Russian renewal as a great global power. This mission for a “new Russia” reflects the interdependent relation between the installation of an alternative model of rule and the re-emergence as a regional or even global power (Mankoff 2009). It is important to note that this foreign policy assertiveness goes beyond military occupation and territorial control (McFaul/Spector 2010). It comprehends measures such as (a) preventing democratic liberalization in the neighboring countries, (b) influencing elections, (c) exporting alternative election monitoring rules, and (d) installing regional cooperation schemes for strengthening ties with government actors as well as non-governmental actors (McFaul/Spector 2010; Tolstrup 2015). Moreover, Russia is not only supporting undemocratic governments in the geopolitical proximity, but is also trying to destabilize democratic countries (see the case of the Baltic states). In the Chinese case, the foreign policy assertiveness increased after Xi Jinping ascended to presidency. The “Chinese Dream” – similar to the mission “New Russia”– aims at “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” At the same time it pursues a much more proactive foreign policy in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) through new instruments such as the Silk Road Initiative (One Road, One Belt), which does not limit itself to a regional sphere, but reaches out to Europe (Noesselt 2019). Against the background of the multipolar and more fluid post-Cold War world order, authoritarian states are seeking cooperation and legitimation, which facilitate the maintenance and survival of their regimes. Fueled by the global financial and debt crisis of Western democracies that led to a broader debate on the crisis of democratic capitalism (Streeck 2013), self-assertive and economically successful authoritarian leaders began to antagonize the democratic model and democratic values, and nurtured an attractive ideological alternative (Carothers 2009). Gradated forms of resistance to the global spread of democracy exist: 1

2

3

A defensive form of growing reluctance toward the global euphoria for the democratic script and a resistance of autocratic regimes against democracy promotion activities in their countries (see the scholarly debate in the first half of the 2000s, e.g. Carothers 2006; Gershman/Allen 2006), open opposition to Western democracy promotion, the “counterpromotion” (Burnell 2011a: 7), “anti-democracy promotion” (Whitehead 2014), or prevention of democracy (von Soest 2015) which partially overlaps with open antagonization of democracy by offering alternative models in an affirmative way and exporting authoritarian norms, ideas, and practices to countries in the geopolitical proximity (Kneuer/Demmelhuber 2016: 775–776).

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  7 We may conclude that democratic pessimism (Carothers 2009) as well as pressure for autocratization goes hand in hand on a global level. Do the growing attitude of democratic pessimism and the growing affirmative attitude of autocratic rulers correlate? Certainly, to some extent, authoritarian-minded rulers reacted to the previously prevailing democracy promotion agenda (Whitehead 2014: 23). They did so because they perceived that the “picture of democracy in retreat” (Carothers 2009: 3) created an opportunity structure for selling their own “brand of politics” (Burnell 2010: 9). In this sense, the increasingly loud debate on the crisis of representative democracy and democratic pessimism, and the increasingly open confrontation of liberal democratic procedures and the branding of “alternative models,” seem to be two sides of the same medal. Assessing the impact of autocratic pressure is a moving target. Whitehead’s argument against autocracy promotion as mirror image of democracy promotion, that is, that “the overall international system is still fairly rule-based and dominated by liberalizing norms” (Whitehead 2014: 24), is weighty and still valid (especially for the second part). But we cannot ignore that the rule-based international system has been questioned and damaged in the past years (e.g. through the ignorance of multilateral governance by the Trump administration). Dynamics of pressure for autocratization, however, remain vague. More conceptual work, more empirical analysis, and more comparative work need to be done. This book makes a conceptual contribution on how to better understand, assess, and explain possible mechanisms of autocratic pressure and clustering and to empirically test this concept in a comparative, inter-regional way. We set out to detect explanations for the empirical evidence of autocratic pressure and the interaction between sources and addressees of this pressure. This encompasses (a) the identification of sources that disseminate autocratic elements, namely, ideas, institutions, processes, models, and techniques, (b) the conceptualization of the mechanisms with which these authoritarian sources gain influence, and (c) the tracing of their possible motives or intentions. In a nutshell, it is the attempt to understand the what, how, and why of autocratic influence. The contributions of this book come from different fields of research. They offer insights for the explanations of autocratic resilience as well as for democratic erosion. All contributions relate to the debate on the international dimension of autocracy, especially the one on autocracy promotion, and expand the knowledge on external influences that hollow out existing democratic institutions and processes, the installation of autocratic leaders, or the consolidation of existing of autocratic regimes. The underlying concept and analytical framework we suggest is the notion of “authoritarian gravity centers” (AGCs) that represent regional protagonists with the willingness and ability to influence their regional neighborhood. We define an AGC as a regime that constitutes a direct lever or an

8  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber indirect force of attraction for countries in its (geopolitical) proximity. This concept, which will be elaborated in detail in Chapter 2, builds on various theoretical arguments with conceptual and methodological implications that will be presented in the next section. Thereafter, we will discuss in more detail the external factors in autocratization processes and present our understanding of autocracy promotion and autocracy diffusion. Finally, we close this introductory chapter with remarks on the design of the cross-regional comparison and the structure of the book.

Conceptualizing Comparative Research on Autocratization: Theoretical, Conceptual, and Methodological Implications The newly emerging research field on the international dimension of autocracy and autocratization connects comparative politics and international relations (IR). Debates in comparative politics first addressed the international implications of external actors (like national or international organizations) in democracy promotion. However, soon after, domino effect during the implosion of the socialist bloc or actions of national governments like the withdrawal of the Brezhnev Doctrine by Gorbachev brought IR into the arena of scholarly debate. Beyond doubt, studies on comparative democratization benefited a lot from the widening domestic perspective including international factors,3 just as IR benefited from opening the black box of democratizing countries and acknowledging the specificity in processes of transition and consolidation.4 This underlines that the study of autocracy and autocratization is located in this intersection and therefore benefits a lot from a multidisciplinary perspective. To what extent can knowledge from democracy and democratization studies travel and be transported to the development of concepts for analyzing autocracy and autocratization? From a theoretical perspective, there is no reason why scholars should not be inspired by similar theoretical features – such as agency, structure, and institutions – in order to develop and identify causal factors in an autocracy and in processes of autocratization. Against the background that the extensive work on democratization produced some robust findings (Bunce 2000), it makes sense to scrutinize if and to what extent findings on causal factors – like the role of economic development, elites, masses, institutions – are also relevant for autocratization and where established knowledge on democratization processes might or might not be transferable for autocracies and processes of autocratization. The same applies to the international dimension. Intuitively, international factors like external actors, structural conditions, international environment, or zeitgeist that have been analyzed in the democratization literature can be attributed the same explanatory power for autocratization. Thus, national and international actors have been confirmed to be relevant for the dissemination of democratic norms, rules, and practices. In the same manner, studies assigned

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  9 relevance to a democracy-friendly environment or other structural factors like linkages. There is no theoretical barrier that opposes the inclusion of such factors into a concept on the international dimension of autocracy. In a next step, we must empirically test which actors, structures, and institutions are relevant in autocratization processes and if there are commonalities with democratization or not. Such studies are still lacking. Until we have such a systematic account, theory-based assumptions and their empirical testing should not be conflated with inductive assumptions. Another level of conceptualization pertains to external mechanisms. Can mechanisms that were essential in democratization studies be used for the study of autocratization? The main mechanisms that democratization studies identified and confirmed are promotion (as active, direct, and intentional measure taken by an actor) and diffusion (an indirect, passive, and neutral way of dissemination). Although Burnell enumerates several intuitive differences between democracy and autocracy promotion (Burnell 2011a: 246–252), he also points out that the growing number of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes by itself tells us nothing about cross-border influence, so the precise nature and extent of the international connections – the mechanics of cause and effect – must be examined closely before jumping into conclusions. (…) This means that the true significance of the interactions cannot be appraised, so long they remain poorly understood. (Burnell 2011a: 252) We will focus on the question of what can be subsumed under external factors in autocratization in a later section (see below). Indeed, much empirical work has to be done in order to get a better understanding of these interactions. For example, as long as we do not have systematic analysis of various forms of autocratic conditionality, it is difficult to state that there is little evidence of its existence (Tansey 2016: 30). Moreover, the rich literature on democratic promotion informs on a variety of possible forms of which one is conditionality, although there are others like incentives (Ethier 2003) or functional cooperation (Freyburg et al. 2015). However, even if promotion is reduced to conditionality, there is no reason why this mechanism should be excluded from an empirical examination. Conceiving the core scheme of conditionality as leverage – a stick-and-carrot-method of giving rewards or sanctioning for expected and defined steps (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Jünemann/Knodt 2007) – it is not farfetched to assume that such leverage also exists in the external actions of, for example, China and Russia. Another question is if autocratic conditionality can have different characteristics than democratic conditionality, for example, the lack of explicit criteria (Tansey 2016: 30), or how

10  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber effective autocracy promotion can be. Some autocratic leaders may rely more on informal leverage packages, while others communicate them more openly. There is a need for more in-depth studies of possible commonalities and differences in order to get reliable indications of which mechanisms do or do not apply in autocratization. The first theoretical added value of this book therefore builds on the two main mechanisms of interaction between external actors and democratizing countries: active promotion and diffusion effects. In the 1990s, research on these two main sets of explanatory factors produced a legion of conceptual and empirical work, most of which tested either active promotion or diffusion as independent variable. The question, however, is: Can regime change processes – be it toward democracy or toward autocracy – be clearly and exclusively attributed to one mechanism? We argue that both play a role, and it is thus relevant to understand in which ratio. Does one mechanism dominate, and if it does, for what reason? So far, scholars produced work on autocratic diffusion (Ambrosio 2010; Bank 2017; de la Torre 2017; Weyland 2007, 2019) as well as several approaches of theoretical conceptualization on promotion of autocracy (Burnell 2010; Burnell/ Schlumberger 2012; Vanderhill 2013; Whitehead 2014; Tansey 2016). To our knowledge, hardly any conceptual approach combined the two possible mechanisms in an analytic model so that the occurrence and the possible interaction of both can be tested in the same cases. The second added value of this book refers to the regional context. In order to unscramble international influence of autocratic regimes, we attribute more relevance to regional than to international processes. We hold that the regional context is more relevant for autocratic dissemination – be it by diffusion or by promotion – than international influences. This assumption resonates with findings from democratization studies (Schmitter 1996; Bunce 1998; Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2005; Pevehouse 2005) as well as from IR (Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch/Ward 2006). Interestingly, both subdisciplines agree that diffusion is more relevant in regional contexts. Schmitter states that the argument for diffusion is more persuasive in regional contexts (Schmitter 1996: 39), while Gleditsch and Ward indicate that “(…) international processes that influence democratization are not particularly likely to be found at a global level (…). The global level is an aggregate that masks large regional differences and variation” (Gleditsch/Ward 2006: 916). At the same time, scholars find that the “most effective context within which external actors can influence democratic processes at the national level is increasingly regional” (Schmitter 1996: 47). Hence, for both promotion and diffusion, it is true that the regional context constitutes a strong factor, stronger than the international context. We transfer this finding to processes of autocratization, since the background conditions that make such processes predominately regional are the same: the increasing multipolarity and regionalization of economic blocs, formation of regionally based NGOs,

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  11 parties, movements, and so forth as well as regional networks based on cultural and geographic linkages. The assumption on the relevance of regions has conceptual and methodological implications. The dominant attention in comparative politics toward national contexts goes along with a continuing neglect for regional processes. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán point to the deficit in comparative politics of considering regions as units of analysis and postulate to pay more attention to regional effects. They argue that studies that fail to consider regional influences overstate the importance of domestic factors (Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2005: 2). While capturing such regional dynamics, the authors make an important point: They confirm that generalizations by large-n studies are important but at the same bounded by historical and geographic contexts (Mainwaring/PérezLiñán 2005: 17–18, 33). Accordingly, we find an intermediate position between large-scale studies and single-case studies meaningful in view of international dissemination processes (like democratization or autocratization) presumably being more powerful within regions. We concur that social sciences neglected intermediate research strategies in the comparative studies of political regimes and that there is a need for region-wide studies that are sensitive to intra-regional differences. This book therefore fills a significant gap in the conceptualization of autocratization by also focusing on intra-regional dynamics. At the same time, the concept of the AGC adds to the understanding of regional dynamics that cannot be captured by the concept of regional hegemons. Five shortcomings of the regional hegemon concept stand out. First, they are blind with respect to regime types and certain actor’s aspirations to influence the regime type in its geopolitical proximity. Second, they focus on material power and motives leaving aside nonmaterial and constructivist aspects like regional identity formation. Third, they neglect dynamic processes of region-building efforts. Fourth, the various different accounts on regional power/hegemons lack analytical value since the conceptual (over)stretching ultimately leads to a one-size-fitsall approach. Fifth, and finally, one of the two AGCs analyzed in this book – Venezuela – cannot be regarded as a regional hegemon or even a regional power, whereas Saudi Arabia is not the only decisive player in the Middle East (Kneuer et al. 2019: 453). Literature on the new regionalism (see e.g. Riggirozzi/Tussie 2012) indicates that other actors – not necessarily regional hegemons – and other factors – not exclusively power-seeking interests – might be at play. The third added value of this book roots in the focus on intra-regional dynamics, but goes one step further. Beyond capturing and explaining the intra-regional dynamics, we aim at extending the analysis beyond one region in order to get a broader picture of possible patterns across different regions. Are there similar modes of autocratization in different regions? Are there similar sources for this pressure? And to what extent are

12  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber the assumed mechanisms of autocratic diffusion and autocratic promotion similar or different in various regions? Do the interactions between autocratic actors display similar patterns in different regions? The existing literature in comparative politics focusing on regions as analytical units not only refers to the intra-regional, but also to interor cross-regional comparison. While large-n studies are able to show global developments and features in autocratization, they fall short in explaining regional dynamics or cross-regional patterns. If comparative politics lacks the attention to intra-regional dynamics, it also holds true for inter-regional patterns. Discussing the problem of regional effects in democratization and how it has been tackled in democracy studies, Bunce points to two solutions: One suggestion is to engage in more crossregional studies, and the other is to shift the focus from a most similar cases design to a most different cases design (Bunce 2000: 726). These are exactly the two methodological steps this book builds on: We present a cross-regional perspective and address different paths of autocratic resilience and autocratization. Conducting research on cross-regional5 patterns of autocratic pressure and autocratic clustering requires both a sound theoretical approach and a consistent operationalization. For this purpose, we rely on comparative area studies (CAS), an approach that resonates the concerns that neither ideographic approach nor nomothetic approach is prone to capture regional dynamics in a systematic analytical way. CAS specifically addresses this dilemma between ideographic efforts and analytical techniques offering a “middle-ground” (Locke/Thelen 1995; Ahram et al. 2018). It relies on contextualized comparisons that bridge area-specific debates and the interest for explaining trans-regional – that is global – phenomena (Ahram et al. 2018: 4). Although CAS is not a new approach, it provides the methodological tools for the increased interest of social science scholars in phenomena that emerged after the end of the Cold War. The multipolarity of global politics and the interconnectedness of political processes are only two aspects that stimulate this search for broader – thus inter-regional – in-depth analysis. Given the quality of CAS to uncover mechanisms and processes in specific historical, sociocultural, and geographic settings, it is a highly suitable approach for the comparative analysis of autocratization. It enables us to both trace the complex interaction in a determined region and to facilitate the comparison of possible similar mechanisms in other regions (Ahram et al. 2018: 10). The significant contribution to comparative inter-regional work is that regional contextual attributes are recognized, while, at the same time, explanations and causal linkages that transcend these regional contexts are included. Considering regions as central units for comparative work carries the dilemma that the regional specifics do not allow for generalizations (Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2005: 32), an inter-regional comparison may mitigate this limitation. In-depth analyses of several regions

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  13 will not produce general findings, but they can provide a broader understanding if dynamics of democratization or autocratization are similar in different regions. Findings will depend on which differences are found and how they can be explained. This inter-regional comparison complements the aggregated perspective of large-n studies, which are instructive regarding general trends, but fail to capture dynamics that occur below the radar of generalization. The inter-regional CAS approach has implications for our theoretical ambitions as well as for the research design of this book. Even if we do not pretend to achieve generalized insights, we are aware that obtaining middle-range knowledge is also ambitious when addressing a phenomenon like autocratization. The conceptualization we propose in the next chapter has to be understood as a middle-range approach to explain regional dynamics of autocratization. From a methodological point of view, we are convinced that in order to reinvigorate CAS as a research design for comparative work, two requisites are essential: On the one hand, area specialists are needed for the kind of in-depth analysis that is required. On the other hand, the criticism of a too narrow scope of area studies can be only overcome by a comprehensive and sound conceptual framework.

Conceptualizing External Mechanisms: Discussing Autocracy Promotion and Diffusion Democratization studies identified promotion and diffusion as the most relevant forms of democracy-invoking mechanisms, although other mechanisms such as learning or cooperation prove influential as well (see e.g. Bank 2017). However, as not to overstretch our research design, the project will be limited to the already ambitious goal of analyzing two mechanisms. Why did we choose these two mechanisms? We are interested in examining if promotion and/or diffusion play a role for the stabilization of autocracies or autocratization and how they possibly complement each other. Both concepts – promotion and diffusion – focus on agency and intention and are thus actor-centered. We also incorporate structural factors like linkage or economic asymmetries that are constitutive in a regional environment. In our approach, structural factors are understood as intermediate variables that influence both promotion and diffusion. Furthermore, diffusion processes necessitate a high density of communication flows, which can only exist in a structurally similar or equivalent environment (e.g. cultural factors and/or common historical legacies). One considerable factor in this regard is language as a facilitator of building “epistemic communities” (Yom 2014). Wejnert emphasizes the relevance of communication modes, the impact of media, and communication channels (Wejnert 2014: 36). She ascribes a high influence to the network connectedness of members of different countries on the decision to adopt

14  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber new political ideology (Wejnert 2014: 45). Such networks function better if their members do not encounter language barriers. For our cases in Latin America, the Middle East (Gulf region), and Central Asia, it is striking that three case settings are structurally very similar. These networks constitute a critical element in diffusion processes, as it is here where new ideas are spread, discussed, and find followers. These networks play out on different levels – head of state meetings, state officials’ meetings, the party officials’ level, or through partisan networks. The networks can develop by accident (produced by events, protocol, etc.), or they can be deliberately established in order to create a platform for exchange and coordination. Bunce and Wolchik make a further important distinction: They speak of demonstration effects if a country provides an appealing example to actors in other states. The “example” is persuasive if the conditions of the sending and receiving state are similar and central constituencies/actors notably benefit from the change. Accordingly, this kind of diffusion based on demonstration is rather informal (Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 287). In contrast, emulation takes place in a more purposive and planned manner, since diffusion results from collaboration between local and external actors. The existence of such networks is therefore indispensable. In these networks, actors confer with one another about goals and strategies, and innovators peddle their ideas outside the state (Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 287). We follow this distinction in our concept (see Chapter 2). The core of any diffusion process is the decision of an actor to adopt a specific element. Thus, we are looking at governments and their decision to adopt certain elements (be they institutional, ideological, procedural, and/or administrative). This perspective incorporates all domestic actors who are relevant for government decisions (e.g. the military). At the same time, we are interested in the underlying motives for intending to adopt or transfer authoritarian elements. Findings on motives and overall intentions will cast light on the central question if the transfer of a certain element is done in order to bolster a certain ideological direction (e.g. anti-liberal, anti-democratic) and to deliberately adopt this authoritarian element with the intention to establish or consolidate an authoritarian regime. While there is a substantial number of studies on autocracy diffusion (Ambrosio 2010; de la Torre 2017; Weyland 2017), there still exist methodological problems, as most works lack comprehensive reflections and rigor on issues such as case selection, causal mechanisms, and also on the role of alternative explanations (Ambrosio/Tolstrup 2019). How do we overcome this “herculean task” (Ambrosio/Tolstrup 2019)? The studies in this book are qualitative studies, which exclude quantitative methods for measuring diffusion. There are accordingly two main approaches to define diffusion (Holzinger et al. 2007: 15): A broader notion of diffusion encompasses practically all international determinants

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  15 of national policy change, like imposition or conditionality, international harmonization, international competition, as well as learning, imitation, or persuasion. The problem of this broad definition of diffusion is that it loses its analytic sharpness and utility. Therefore, we follow the narrow definition, which encompasses all transfers of ideas, institutions, and policies that are characterized as a voluntary transfer in contrast to obliged or imposed transfer (Knill 2005: 766–767). The mechanisms can consequently be delimited as, for example, imitation, learning, persuasion, contagion, socialization. Studies on diffusion also underline the relevance of spatial effects, though scholars state that geographic proximity alone does not automatically have a significant effect on diffusion (Abbott/DeViney 1992: 245–274; Brinks/Coppedge 2006). Obviously, more factors encouraging diffusion exist. The literature identifies three central ones: (1) Structural similarity (O’Loughlin et al. 1998) or structural equivalence (Wejnert 2014) plays a role as an important intermediary variable that determines the conditions of role modeling, emulation, and imitation in the context of diffusion. As Bunce and Wolchik state, the more similar sending and receiving countries are the more likely innovation will travel (Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 287). Structural similarity or equivalence is defined through comparable economic and social status that stimulates a country’s perception of concordance with the other countries (“awareness of the sameness”). Cultural factors (language, tradition, religion, self-identity, values, and norms), a common historical background, or the similarity of political behavior in the context of regime change play a role as well (O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Wejnert 2014: 52). (2) New ideas or innovations are adopted if they are perceived as being attractive, successful, and transferable (Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 286f.; O’Loughlin et al. 1998: 7f.). The receiver must believe that adopting a change will be beneficial, compatible, and suitable to his own conditions, as well as easy to transport. If a country is looking to change, it may hope to transfer innovation. The idea must have thus been successful in the other country and must fit into the framework or strategy of the emulating state. (3) An important facilitating factor for both mechanisms of external influence – autocracy promotion and autocracy diffusion – is the presence of networks. Collaborative networks constitute the channels of communication (horizontal and vertical) which enhance the spread of ideas and institutional or policy innovations (Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 286f.; Wejnert 2014: 38–44). Highly centralized, stratified networks can make use of pressure on their members to achieve conformity. At the same time, networks make diffusion processes more likely. In order to trace diffusion, we examine (a) the similarity/equivalence (degree of adoption) of the states and the sequences of adoptions, (b) the motives of the involved actors, and (c) the networks therein. Regarding the mechanism of promotion, we face the problem that in democracy promotion, the mechanism depends on the actor’s motives.

16  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Accordingly, it is necessary to clearly delineate external influences based on economic or security interest6 and purely norm or ideologically orientated influences. Governments may promote democracy due to a variety of motives: Believing in the normative validity of a system stands diametrically opposed to more self-interested motives such as facilitating the interaction with foreign governments by adhering to common values (Light 2001: 75). Literature on democracy promotion and its central actors, including the USA or EU, indicates that promotion and security agendas are strongly interwoven (Ikenberry 2000; Jünemann/Knodt 2007; Magen et al. 2009; Leininger/Ziaja 2014). Democracy promotion in Eastern Europe after 1989 was thus driven by a normative impulse to support democracy, but also based on the strategic consideration of avoiding an instable environment at the geographic borders of the European Community. When the EU offered accession to the countries of Eastern Europe, prospective economic gains by integrating post-socialist markets played a role in the considerations. On the other hand, democracy promotion and security interests can be conflicting. In most cases, the latter outweighs the former (Smith 1994; Carothers 1999, 2004). The lesson we draw from research on democracy is that identifying what is and what is not promotion remains a tricky endeavor. The same applies to autocracy promotion. One central problem is the intention behind promotion measures. Burnell states that (a) democracy promoters have a goal of global transformation toward democracy, which (b) they do not hide and (c) they display “recognizable liberal and democratic credentials.” In contrast, autocracies do not declare such global ambitions and disguise their autocratic aims by employing the “language of democracy” (Burnell 2011: 247–249). Similarly, Whitehead emphasizes that global aspirations do not exist and that there is no unifying objective (Whitehead 2014: 24). This confirms the middle-range scope we presume to develop. Putin and Chávez did not cease to insist on the multipolar structure of world politics, while at the same time they proclaimed their countries to be one of those regional poles. The foundation of regional organization like ALBA or the Eurasian Union, as well as the consolidation of existing organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCC; see Harnisch in this volume), testify that AGCs strive to build platforms to proactively coordinate authoritarian best-practice models. These bolster other autocracies abroad, encourage authoritarian learning, and streamline certain ideological narratives (Burnell 2010; Kneuer et al. 2019; Obydenkova/Libman 2019). The “language of democracy” practice is not new. Twentieth-century autocracies widely used the term “democratic” for their totalitarian or authoritarian systems. However, when autocratic leaders stick to the label of democracy with attributes (e.g. sovereign democracy, participative democracy), they do not shy away from openly declaring their anti-liberal

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  17 vision and their disdain for the “ill” democratic procedures. Victor Orban, for example, explicitly sells the notion of an “illiberal democracy” as an achievement of his policies. A central issue in the evolving literature on the international dimension of autocracy discusses the criteria regarding the intention behind autocracy promotion. Tansey’s most far-reaching and systematic attempt at conceptualizing intention distinguishes between different motivations of autocratic sponsorship: democracy prevention or democracy resistance that strives to protect incumbent autocrats from democratization, or relying on instrumental considerations about policy alignment. Only one type, namely, shoring up and supporting autocratic elites abroad, coupled with an ideological commitment to authoritarianism as a force of regime, would be subsumed under autocracy promotion (Tansey 2016: 38). Tansey argues that autocracy promotion can be a mix of motivations but that ideological motives – that is the commitment to a particular, non-democratic regime – must be a major driver of the policy in question. We suggest a more differentiated conceptualization, which depends on the regime types that an autocracy promoter finds in its geopolitical proximity. If the autocracy promoter – in our understanding the AGC – targets an already autocratic country, the intention is the consolidation of existing autocratic rule. If the AGC targets a hybrid regime, the intention is strengthening autocratic elements. If an AGC targets a democratic or deficiently democratic country, the intention is the empowerment of those forces in the country that are like-minded in their aspiration for an autocratic model. As we include these different settings in our analysis (AGCs in an autocratic environment, AGCs with hybrid or defective democratic regimes in their neighborhood), we can test these different intentions. Another pivotal aspect is the normative or symbolic attraction of an autocracy promoter based on – as Weyland argues – the degree of its ideological appeal. This too may shape the relation with other (authoritarian) regimes (Weyland 2017). Again, we expand this line of thinking. Democracy studies point to different modes of promotion, ranging from more coercive ones like control or intervention to “softer” ones like persuasion. There are moreover two factors which influence the relation between promoter and target state: the normative attraction of the promoter and the structure of resonance on the domestic level in the target state (see e.g. Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Jünemann/Knodt 2007). When we transfer these findings to autocracy promotion, we argue that the sub-mechanisms of autocracy promotion (from coercion to subtle leverage) depend on the attraction of the promoter and his regime model and on the resonance structure in the target state. One aspect in the debate on autocracy promotion stands out. It is of utmost importance to delineate clearly between active and intentional measures taken by an external actor toward a target state (promotion) from the passive and unintended attractiveness of an external actor

18  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber constituting a role model for emulation (diffusion). We follow a strict definition of diffusion, which excludes active measures by an external actor in order to better trace the source of autocratic influence and its actions.

The Design of the Inter-Regional Analysis – Structure of the Book Our main arguments are that (1) processes of autocratic dissemination (be it promotion or diffusion) more effectively take place in regional contexts and (2) certain regional players act as protagonists because they actively strive to influence their geopolitical proximity (autocracy promotion) or they present a role model for other countries in the proximity (autocracy diffusion). The explanatory concept and analytical framework we suggest introduces AGCs, those regional protagonists with the willingness and ability to influence their regional neighborhood. In a nutshell, an authoritarian gravity center is a regime that constitutes a direct lever or an indirect attraction force for countries in its (geopolitical) proximity (see Chapter 2). The conceptual point of departure is the idea that a country can act as a protagonist who actively strives to influence its geopolitical proximity and/or that a regional protagonist can be a role model for regional neighbors (Kneuer/Demmelhuber 2016; Kneuer et al. 2019). This concept has been developed in a research project between 2015 and 2018. Over this time period, we tested our concept for three regions from an inter-regional comparative perspective. The samples were chosen according to the three described patterns: one case of an environment of resilient autocracies with Saudi Arabia as AGC; one case of autocratization with Venezuela as AGC, being the early prototype of democratic erosion; and, finally, one case of unconsolidated democracies, namely, Kazakhstan as a former Soviet Republic and a regional player in a regional cluster of autocracies. The case of Kazakhstan was included as a control case to examine whether this country would display the quality of an AGC. Kazakhstan embodies some basic elements of a subregional protagonist (resources, territory, and subregional leadership aspirations), but is at the same time enfolded between two other AGCs (China and Russia). These cases constitute the first part of the book. We garnered comprehensive primary data during fieldwork. In total, we conducted 164 interviews: 57 interviews in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh), Qatar (Doha), Bahrain (Manama), and Kuwait (Kuwait City); 69 interviews in Venezuela (Caracas, Isla Margarita), Bolivia (La Paz), Ecuador (Quito), Nicaragua (Managua), Germany (Berlin), and Spain (Valencia); and 38 interviews in Kazakhstan (Almaty and Astana) and Kirgizstan (Bishkek).7 Although this inter-regional comparison relies on a broad basis – to our knowledge, such a broad analysis on international dynamics of autocratization has not been conducted so far – more AGCs exist beyond our sample (e.g. China, Russia, Iran). Therefore, we invited leading scholars

Autocratization and its Pull and Push Factors  19 on the international dimension of authoritarianism for an International Conference in July 2018, in order to deal with those cases that could not be tackled in our research project. These contributions can be found in the second part of the book. In the chapter on Russia’s foreign policy, Ambrosio argues that Russia serves as an AGC for the former Soviet Union, reinforcing autocratic tendencies of weak democracies or fully authoritarian regimes. The focus lies on how autocratic protagonists may have an impact on the democratic erosion of consolidated democracies. Ambrosio shows how Russia’s authoritarian gravitation attraction is felt outside the immediate region, even within the European Union. This is most evident in post-2010 Hungary under the right-wing populist political party Fidesz. Fidesz implemented an illiberal strategy similar to the one previously adopted in Russia, with negative effects on Hungary’s democratic credentials. This chapter outlines how the Putin model found a home in Hungary through an institutionalist examination of four areas (the judiciary, the media, the electoral system, and civil society) in which Fidesz’s illiberal strategy was similar to that previously adopted in Russia. A contribution by Vanderhill on Iranian foreign policy follows. The example of Iran illustrates the basic feature of the AGC concept, that is, that competing autocratic protagonists may strive for regional hegemony (e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran). Vanderhill argues that Iran’s motives for supporting authoritarianism in Syria and Iraq are similar to preventing democratization because democratization in either country is a strategic threat to Iran’s national security and regime survival. Questions about regime type in Syria and Iraq are inherently connected to geopolitical strategic interests and concerns about regime survival. Two further contributions focus on Asia, and in particular on the role of China as a newly emerging AGC. Bader and Hackenesch discuss China’s ambition to shape the regional and global order and to share lessons of its own experiences with one-party rule. One of the key actors tasked with implementing this shift in Chinese foreign policy is the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP-ID). The CCP-ID maintains the kind of collaborative network that is hypothesized to be a channel of policy diffusion and learning. Offering a first exploration of this under-researched aspect of China’s foreign policy, both authors systematically compare the activities of the CCP-ID in five of China’s close neighbors to better understand the patterns of interaction and, more importantly, the topics and content of engagement. Party-to-party relations are used for promoting China’s foreign policy interests as well as diffusing authoritarian practices. In the last chapter, Harnisch investigates the relative influence of autocratic great power competition and the political conflict stemming from the expansionist nature and functional limits of autocratic rule, which spreads through the prominent regional organization, the Shanghai

20  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Cooperation Organization (SCO). The robust findings of the article suggest that some forms of autocratic rule export, such as diffusion and learning, are more likely when autonomy concerns vis-à-vis great powers or rivaling legitimacy considerations toward autocratic neighboring states are absent. In turn, autocratic great power involvement in regional organizations, while limiting consensual norm diffusion, may breed global autocratic norm entrepreneurship. This chapter also sheds additional light on our control case Kazakhstan and points at future avenues of research. Finally, new directions of research are an important focus of the concluding chapter, which summarizes the findings of the book and outlines a tentative to-do-list for future studies.

Notes 1 See especially the Freedom House reports in the last decade: Freedom House 2017, 2018, 2019. 2 We follow the early attempt of differentiation of democratic regression which captures “rapid death” as sudden breakdown due to e.g. coup d’état or civil war and “slow death” as “incremental decay” (Erdmann/Kneuer 2011: 12). 3 The literature on the international dimension of democratization is very broad, see e.g. Whitehead (1986, 1996), Pevehouse (2002), Magen/Morlino (2009), McFaul (2010). 4 See e.g. Schimmelfennig (2003), Freyburg et al. (2015) Cowles et al. (2001). 5 Following the differentiation of cross-regional comparison which addresses analytical units across different regions and inter-regional comparison which identifies regional patterns and compares them with each other (Basedau 2007), we situate our approach as inter-regional comparison. 6 More recent issues are climate change or energy security (see e.g. Burnell 2012). 7 The interviews were conducted by Natalia Afanasyeva, Rafael Peresson, Tobias Zumbrägel, and Marianne Kneuer.

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2

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers Sources and Addressees, Mechanisms and Motives of Authoritarian Pressure and Attraction1 Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber

Introduction Since the early 2000s, a growing resistance to the global spread of democracy has been observed in various world regions. Researchers concurrently observed that there are “older,” resilient, autocratic regimes, which remained untouched by democratic contagion (e.g. in the Middle East). At the same time, a new phenomenon of hybridization and autocratization, often as a regressive process of hybrid regimes, emerged. Although the literature shows that there has not been a significant decrease of democratic and increase of autocratic regimes until today (Merkel, 2010a, 2010b; Møller and Skaaning, 2013), a closer look reveals three dynamics. The first describes changes within the regime types: from a consolidated democracy to a deficient one, or from a moderate to a hard autocracy. The second dynamic refers to democratic regression or backsliding (Erdmann and Kneuer, 2011; Lust and Waldner, 2015; Bermeo, 2016). Although democratic breakdown has been a marginal phenomenon since the end of the Cold War, the “slow death” of democracies (Erdmann and Kneuer, 2011) can lead to hybridization and, in some cases, even to autocratization. The third dynamic points out how autocratic regimes have begun to become more secure, self-confident, and assertive (Carothers, 2009; McFaul and Spector, 2010). Thus, even if democracy indices show that in absolute numbers autocracies are not outpacing democracies, the international behavior of autocratic governments changed. Autocratic elites not only increasingly resist the democratic and liberal script, but – as McFaul and Spector describe for the Russian case – champion a non-Western form of government and develop strategies to export this model to the near abroad (McFaul and Spector, 2010, 117). This pattern of new autocratic “governance language” encompasses the domestic dimension (implementing an autocratic and illiberal governance model) as well as externally materializing pressure for autocratic and illiberal alternatives. Obviously, there is a close interaction between the autocratic logic of action regarding the domestic and the international dimensions.

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  27 Literature has only recently begun to close gaps regarding the questions of how, why, and when autocratic regimes try to use foreign policy as an additional source of upholding regime survival and generating legitimacy. We frame our work within this international dimension of authoritarianism and try to make a conceptual contribution to better capture and explain possible mechanisms of autocratization by distinguishing between sources and addressees, mechanisms and motives of authoritarian pressure and attraction. In order to analyse and explain authoritarian clustering, we presume that autocratization does not take place in an isolated way as a purely domestic development, but that interaction between clustered countries is taking place and accounting for (a) the resilience against democratization and (b) the democratic backlash toward hybrid or autocratic regimes. We follow an actor-centered approach, arguing that autocratic actors’ preferences play a role, not only for the own policy choices but also for those of their geopolitical proximity. Thus, we hold that political elites have incentives to export or to adopt certain illiberal and autocratic ideas and institutional and procedural elements. The puzzle is: What are these incentives or motives? What is actually exported or transferred and adopted? And which mechanisms are in place? In sum, we ask for the “How,” “Why,” and “What.” In order to explain the “How,” we rely on the theoretical concepts and findings of democratization studies, more concretely the research on the international dimension of democratization. This research field produced two main threads of theorizing: promotion as mechanism of active and intentional export, and diffusion as the passive spread of ideas, institutions, processes, policies, and/or policy elements.2 Recent studies on the international dimension of autocracy mostly refer to one of these theoretical strings. However, the literature on European democratization cases tells us that mechanisms of active promotion (conditionality or other forms of leverage) and diffusion (emulation, demonstration effects etc.) most likely take place at the same time. On the one hand, a democracy promoter may be interested to export democratic ideas and the democratic governance model; on the other hand, elites in surrounding countries may be interested to transfer and adopt democratic elements. But only few studies included both mechanisms, like Vachudova (2005, 4), who – referring to the EU and accession candidates – speaks of active and passive leverage, defining active leverage as deliberate policies directed toward target states, and passive leverage as the attraction that an actor has for domestic politics of another state. An added value for the still young field of research on autocratization is therefore to base our approach on both theoretical threads and to integrate them into a conceptual model and thus achieve two goals: first, to trace both mechanisms in order to explain possible autocratic clustering, and second, to evaluate which mechanism possibly prevails over the other.

28  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber A further finding we extract from the literature on the international dimension of democratization pertains to the regional context. Both theoretical threads – promotion and diffusion – have concurring lines of explanation for the dissemination of ideas and elements, but come to the same conclusion of emphasizing the relevance of the regional context. This regional context has experienced an increase in relevance. Unlike during the Cold War – when leaders chose a specific patron who guaranteed, for example, necessary security or trade relations – the regional environment is now crucial. At the same time, relevant autocratic actors advocate for a multipolar world which means that they intentionally denounce the Western-dominated world order; this refers especially to Russia, China, but also to Iran and Venezuela, countries that are crafting foreign policies that link a renewed impetus for influence in line with their autocratic and illiberal mindset. Our premise is that the regional context is relevant for the observed phenomenon of autocratic clustering holding true for promotion as well as diffusion of autocracy. According to our concept, promotion of autocracy meets especially favourable conditions in regional contexts. We assume that autocratic actors as promoters may have an eminent interest in creating or preserving a like-minded environment with the consequence that a government aims to influence its proximity. We make two important differentiations that go beyond the so far existing literature: We differentiate between the “sender” and the “target.” Disaggregating the target side means that an autocratic promoter acts in order to (a) prevent democratic tendencies like uprisings or liberalization (democratic prevention), (b) to bolster like-minded elites – not yet in office – in order to secure an autocratic ally for the future (autocratic empowerment),3 or (c) to consolidate an already existing autocratic regime and its autocratic incumbent in the proximity (autocratic consolidation). In our understanding, the mechanism of autocracy promotion entails an autocratic actor who actively and intentionally exerts influence on a country, which can be a deficient democracy, a hybrid regime, or an already existing autocracy.4 This differentiation on the side of the target states goes beyond suggestions that only focus on autocratic countries sponsoring autocratic regimes (e.g. Tansey, 2016a,b). Evidence shows that autocratic governments do not limit themselves to support other autocracies but also try to influence “grey zone regimes” that are not fully consolidated democracies nor autocracies. Thus, Russia does not only sponsor governments like Belarus or Kazakhstan, but also strives to influence regimes like Ukraine (see e.g. the support for Viktor Yanukovych in the context of the elections for president in 2010) in order to draw them on its side. Moreover, also on a theoretical basis, there is no reason to limit the promotion of autocratic ideas and elements to regimes that are already autocratic. The differentiation on the sender side offers a typology of sub-mechanisms that break down the far too

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  29 complex notion of “promotion” in three degrees of active influence that differ in the intensity of intervention: control, hard leverage, and subtle leverage. Diffusion, by definition, is based on a different notion: Autocratic governments constitute attractive role models for their proximity so that neighbors will emulate and transfer elements if they are interested in preventing democratic uprisings and rather prefer to consolidate an illiberal governance model. The literature on democratic diffusion emphasizes some relevant factors like structural similarity (O’Loughlin et al., 1998) or structural equivalence (Wejnert, 2014). As Bunce and Wolchik state, the more similar sending and receiving countries are, the more likely innovation will travel (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 287). Collaborative networks constituting channels of communication (horizontal and vertical) may also enhance the spread of ideas and institutional or policy innovations (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 286f.; Wejnert, 2014, 38–44). We assume that structural similarity, communication, and networks as determinant factors for emulation and imitation are more relevant in regional contexts, especially when there is a certain homogenous background of history, culture, and language facilitating networking. Consequently, countries in the region look for role models or are more susceptible to role models, which offer successful and attractive approaches, solutions, and practices that address similar problems or goals. Finally, the reshaping of the world order paved the way to a different approach of autocratic elites. In sharp contrast to the antagonistic ideological struggle between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War, new regional autocratic protagonists have emerged who seek to regain more global influence (Russia, China), which is accompanied by the strengthening of regional powers. In other cases, autocratic leaders strive to build regional power structures in order to augment their voice at the global level (Venezuela under Chávez). These autocracies no longer solely rely on traditional military means and rather seek like-minded regimes to collaborate with (von Soest, 2015, 623–638). Their new approach includes a more subtle and comprehensive strategy: They label their own regime as a “new” or “alternative” form of non-Western democracy and export and/or offer this “own language of government” to nations within their geopolitical proximity. At the same time, an assertive foreign policy is developed seeking legitimacy and equality in global affairs (like the Astana talks of autocrats from Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey, and Russia in view of the Syrian conflict have vividly shown since 2016). This new phenomenon may increase the attractiveness of authoritarian models as sources of contagion or transfer for countries in geopolitical proximity. This assertive foreign policy strategy is reflected in the instrumentalization of multilateral structures and the search for regional cooperation by exploiting institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Muhr, 2010; Riggirozzi

30  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber and Tussie, 2012; Libman and Obydenkova, 2018). In other cases, new structures are created such as ALBA-TCP5 in Latin America – strongly promoted by former Venezuelan President Chávez – or the Eurasian Economic Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as founding members, plus Armenia and Kyrgyzstan as recent members) that was initiated and strongly promoted by Russia. Hence, regional organizations also serve as transmission belts and learning rooms for autocrats (Kneuer et al., 2019, 451–470). Assuming that both mechanisms – promotion and diffusion of autocratic elements – are more efficient in regional contexts, there is still a lack of understanding regarding possible origins, drivers, and the concrete interactions between the countries in an autocratic cluster that can explain and analytically capture this pattern. Autocratic regimes with a deliberate will of influencing their environment may emerge, but likewise countries in the proximity may be interested and susceptible to new ideas, institutional settings, and practices that adhere to an autocratic and illiberal mindset. Both theoretical assumptions are based on the notion that there is a country that serves as an active push factor (promotion) or as a pull factor (diffusion) for other surrounding countries. Be it as active promoter or as passive diffusor – both theories trace back to a purported protagonist. This is the point of departure in our mid-range concept identifying the phenomenon of what we call authoritarian gravity centers (AGCs) on a regional level. According to our actor-centered approach, we argue that AGCs are autocratic countries actively exporting sets of autocratic ideas, rules, or policy instruments in order to keep their regional environment aloof from a more liberal political setting. Alternatively, AGCs are autocracies serving as role models (especially if they are successful) for the countries in their geopolitical proximity, making emulation, learning processes, or policy transfers more likely. According to our approach, AGCs induce both the promotion and diffusion of autocracy at the regional level. Thus, AGCs constitute the explanatory factor for autocratic clustering. Motives, mechanisms, and the concrete elements that are exported or transferred must be examined further. The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize the process of autocratization and modes of influence that lead to the active or passive dissemination of autocratic elements, in order to continue with our findings for the selected world regions, that is, AGCs (see the chapters on Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia). We start by taking stock of the current state of research, and then we present the concept of AGCs and introduce an actor-centered explanatory factor that sheds light on this diffuse phenomenon of regional relevance for regime development and survival. In the next step, we generate and present an analytical tool that is able to trace both types of dissemination of autocratic elements: active promotion of autocracy by an AGC, and autocratic diffusion.

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  31 Following this conceptual reading, the AGC is both a push factor (promotion) and pull factor (diffusion). The model differentiates between relevant arenas of interaction, that is, where the export or diffusion of autocratic elements takes place and presents hypotheses for the motives of the AGC or the adopters. The consideration of promotion and diffusion enables us to concretely identify the “exporter” or the “line of emulation” of autocratic elements – be it norms and ideas, institutional elements, policy approaches, or autocratic practices. Looking at the target states of an AGC may also reveal mechanisms of the transfer of autocratic elements from the target states’ perspective.

The International Dimension of Autocratization When studying processes of regime change, scholars underestimated the international environment as a significant source of influence. Until the second half of the 1990s, literature addressing regime change had been dominated by a domestic perspective. It took until the late 1990s for research to sufficiently acknowledge the international dimension of democratization. Two global political events were major triggers: the breakdown of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although considerable steps have been taken in exploring the international dimension of democratization, uncertainty persists, particularly concerning the impact of external influence and the interplay of domestic and external actors. Up to now, instead of focusing on horizontal outcomes at supranational levels, theories of international relations have not been able to get past the domestic-international divide (Erdmann and Kneuer, 2009, 324f.; Magen and Morlino, 2009; McFaul, 2010). Even after two decades of research, scholars agree that democratization is complicated and rarely monocausal. These gaps in knowledge reflect some sort of “scholarly uncertainty” about how democracy promotion works. Yet, there is a broad consensus about the following modes of external influence, as reiterated by numerous scholars: Whitehead found three main modes of influence, namely, contagion, control and consent, and convergence (Whitehead, 1996). Schmitter added conditionality as a fourth mode (Schmitter, 1996). As a slight variation, Morlino and Magen focus on control, conditionality, socialization, and examples including demonstration effects (Morlino and Magen, 2009, 26–52). According to Schmitter, “none of these categories are mutually exclusive; all may contribute to improving our understanding” (Schmitter, 1996, 31). Looking at more than 20 years of research, three main threads can be analytically distinguished within this field: (1) the dominant mainstream of actor-centered approaches (referring to conditionality, control, consent, and socialization), (2) concepts of diffusion, understood as a neutral transmission of democratic ideas, institutions, policies, or behavior

32  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber like contagion or demonstration effects. A third, more recent approach refers (3) to the structural explanation based on linkages (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Research on the authoritarian counterpart is rather new and has emerged as a field of interest since the early 2000s. Meanwhile, we may differentiate in three camps of scholarly debate: (1) works on autocratic promotion (e.g. Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010, 1–15; Tansey, 2016a, 2016b), (2) studies on autocratic cooperation and collaboration (Mattes and Rodríguez, 2014, 527–538; Odinius and Kuntz, 2015, 639–654; von Soest, 2015, 623–638; Tansey et al., 2016, 1221–1254), and (3) works on autocratic diffusion (Ambrosio, 2010, 375–392; Bank and Weyland, 2018), with authoritarian learning being a subcategory (Bank and Edel, 2015; Ambrosio and Hall, 2017, 143–161). The process of “autocratization” is theorized in earlier accounts (Jackson, 2010, 101–118) in order to tackle some level of uncertainty regarding why and under which external factors autocracies increase in regime strength, durability, or stability (Tansey, 2016). Many works claim that authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule is on the rise and that the increasing international influence of both is a real possibility (Burnell, 2010, 272). The literature offers the same theoretical explanations as for democratization: diffusion and promotion. Regarding promotion of autocracy, there remains some terminological and conceptual ambiguity, for example, between antidemocratic promotion or democracy prevention on the one side, and autocracy promotion on the other. Burnell (2011a, 253–256) distinguishes an inclusive approach that embraces all forms of external initiatives and an exclusive, that is, more narrow approach focusing on the behavior of actors and their intentions. Based on this, he suggests a sort of “wish-list” of features of autocracy promotion (ibid., 254). However, some researchers such as Way and Whitehead argue that promotion of autocracy as a concept may be overstated because what really drives the foreign policy of an authoritarian regime is the wish to prevent and/ or contain democratic influence in its neighborhood (Way, 2015, 45–58; Whitehead, 2014, 1–24; Tansey, 2016). Tansey, who has so far delivered the most comprehensive conceptual framework of autocracy promotion, stresses the difference between democracy resistance (as an interestdriven motivation) on the one hand, and autocracy promotion on the other hand (as based on an ideological commitment to authoritarianism as a regime type (Tansey, 2016, 37f.)). A clear conceptualization of the phenomenon of autocracy promotion with a detailed differentiation of its sub-mechanisms is still lacking. At the same time, we may discern that scholars point to the empirical evidence of some sort of promotion of autocracy (Burnell, 2011; Vanderhill, 2013). Such processes can be observed in Asia, where Russia and China are regarded as prototypes (Melnykovska et al., 2012, 75–89), and in other world regions (see e.g. Bader et al., 2010, 81–100). According to Vanderhill,

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  33 at least in the early years of the 2000s, China might be considered a special case as “there are no signs that China is actively seeking to influence regime type.” She further states, “China’s international engagement has been economic in nature. Chinese support may help a nondemocratic government to avoid international pressure to democratize, but there is no conclusive evidence that the Chinese government seeks to develop authoritarian regimes” (Vanderhill, 2013, 6; see also: Bader, 2015a, 23–33; 2015b, 655–672). From the perspective of 2019, China has been steadily developing to a concrete case and source of autocratic practices, ideas, and norms. Initiatives such as the “One Belt, One Road Initiative” are examples in which the growing density of ties nurtures patterns of influence and attraction (Kneuer, 2017, 181–211). In other world regions, we witnessed such cases even earlier, including Latin America, especially Cuba (Hoffmann, 2011) and Venezuela (Corrales and Penfold, 2011), the Middle East, where attention concentrates on Saudi Arabia and Iran (Burnell, 2011a, 246; 2011d, 274), and the regional sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union, with Russia as a dominant actor (McFaul and Spector, 2010; Tolstrup, 2015, 673–690; Libman and Obydenkova, 2018, 151–165). Bader et al. argued in 2010 that autocracies have already gained attractiveness as role models (Bader et al., 2010, 84). In line with this argument, they raise the question whether an autocratic regime should be expected to promote its regime type in other countries. They hold that autocracy promotion can be assumed to be an instrument used to generate stability in the immediate neighborhood (ibid., 82). These findings correlate with results from recent inner-regime analysis, which determined that autocracies can be as stable as democracies (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010, 8). Research on authoritarian external action focuses on domestic and sporadically on regional cases, with studies on the interaction between, that is, the interplay of, domestic and external dimensions only increasing in the last few years, such as Heike Holbig’s work in advancing David Beetham’s model of measuring national legitimacy by adding the international dimension (see also: Hoffmann, 2011). On the basis of a two-level game, she assumes that the legitimacy produced by autocratic regimes on the international level can be translated into increased legitimacy on the national level (Holbig, 2010, 38–43). Kneuer extended this model by adding variants that extend from the internal to the external dimension. She holds that foreign policy goals are formulated for internal legitimation (Kneuer, 2013, 205–236). Likewise, autocracies are able to generate legitimacy by making use of both external and internal strategies: Severe problems in generating legitimacy “at home” can be externalized in the same way as rulers can announce strategic external objectives in order to solve legitimacy deficits in the national realm (del Sordi and Dalmasso, 2018, 95–116). Regarding diffusion of autocracy, Ambrosio (2010) distinguishes two broad mechanisms of diffusion: appropriateness holds when domestic

34  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber actors adopt external authoritarian norms for reasons of legitimacy, that is, because they consider them appropriate. Effectiveness, in turn, comes into play when actors face domestic problems and look abroad for policy solutions, ultimately in order to strengthen power at home. The research gaps in the field of autocracy studies, however, continue to be substantial, and the focus on authoritarianism beyond its domestic setting and its interaction with the international and regional scenery remain porous. Likewise, mixed approaches, focusing, for example, on promotion and diffusion remain rare.

Authoritarian Gravity Centres (AGCs): The Concept In order to conceptualize interactive patterns between autocratic regimes, we draw on works in the field of democratization as well as concepts and findings about external influence. The central premise of our study is attributed to the basic knowledge of the Third Wave of democratization, namely, that the “most effective context within which external actors can influence democratic processes at the national level is increasingly regional” (Schmitter, 1996, 47). We transfer this finding to the international dimension of autocracies: It is in the regional context that external actors can most effectively influence authoritarian processes. Therefore, in order to unscramble international learning and the cooperation processes of autocratic regimes, we attribute more relevance to regional than to international processes. We believe that autocracy promotion is induced and implemented by AGCs that are interested in constructing such a “regional regime identity” and regional power on the one hand, and in striving to gain more international weight against what they perceive as a Western democratic domination on the other. Yet this does not imply that we fully neglect the international dimension. First, we assume that the regional dimension is most relevant for the promotion of autocracy, and, second, that the approach of using an assertive regional foreign policy and the formation of a sort of “regional regime identity” has international repercussions. The relevance of the regional level has been equally emphasized by diffusion theory. Empirical studies regarding the diffusion of democracy prove the salience of the regional context in regime changes (e.g. Brinks and Coppedge, 2006, 463–489; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006, 911– 933; Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, 30–58; Bank and Weyland, 2018). Thus, Brinks and Coppedge state that, “countries tend to change their regimes to match the average degree of democracy or non-democracy found among their contiguous neighbors” (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006, 464). This means that there is a tendency for neighboring countries to converge toward the shared regime level in the neighborhood. The pressure to converge is greater if the regime difference is significant. Interestingly, the authors assume that in such regional contexts, what matters most is that “some influential actors champion regime convergence” (ibid., 467).

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  35 Instead of all neighbors being alike and influencing each other equally, some countries have more influence than others. We adopt the assumption of Brinks and Coppedge. Yet, according to our concept, asymmetric influence within a regional group can be attributed to AGCs, but indicators such as GDP, territorial expansion, and population size do not seem to be sufficient to grasp the pull factors created by AGCs. Based on the results of democratization and regime studies that have addressed the relevance of the regional context, this study argues that (1) processes of intentional dissemination and diffusion of autocratic elements more effectively take place in regional contexts, and (2) AGCs can be attributed with both the active promotion of autocracy and the inducement of diffusion effects. AGCs and Regional Hegemons The phenomenon of AGCs must be considered against the background of a multipolar and more fluid world order in which democracies are antagonized by self-asserting and economically and socially “successful” authoritarian countries. We perceive AGCs as a phenomenon different in their objectives, patterns of behavior, and actions. Therefore, our concept of AGCs does not rely on the concept of regional hegemons (e.g. Myers, 1991; Prys, 2010, 479–504). Our understanding of AGCs draws on the scientific definition of gravity (gravitation) as a phenomenon by which two or more bodies or particles attract each other with a force proportional to their masses.6 For the purpose of our research, we define an AGC as an autocratic regime that constitutes a force of attraction for countries in geopolitical proximity. AGCs can unintentionally project and produce diffusion effects or actively strive to export autocratic governance in terms of institutional settings, procedures, norms, or practices because the “regional basis for interdependence stems from a close relationship between geographic distance and opportunity for interaction” (Gleditsch, 2002, 5). Beyond the bilateral linkage, AGCs can either seek multilateral regional cooperation or make use of existing linkages and interaction schemes that may generate spillover effects on countries in geopolitical proximity. Therefore, according to our understanding, AGCs not only manage their strategies and activities on a bilateral level, they also try to use regional institutions or organizations for legitimation and for an authoritarian claim that may transcend the regional level. AGCs share a similar mode of governance or oscillate within a limited spectrum in terms of regime type. They aim at establishing regional cooperation schemes (or make use of already existing patterns) in order to garner external regime legitimacy and regime support and to improve the region’s standing and clout internationally. These schemes may be informal or institutionalized. They include norms, ideas, structures, processes, or best-practice models in specific policy fields (e.g. the security apparatus).

36  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber An AGC thus constitutes a push-and-pull factor in the regional environment: as a country that has the kind of leverage to promote autocratic elements or a country that is an attractive model for countries in geopolitical proximity as it provides policy solutions that are perceived as suitable. Studies on diffusion consensually underline the relevance of spatial effects, though scholars also state that geographic proximity alone does not automatically have a significant effect on diffusion (Abbott and deViney, 1992, 245–274; Brinks and Coppedge, 2006, 463–489; Bank and Weyland, 2018). There are obviously more factors encouraging diffusion such as structural similarity (O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 545–574) or structural equivalence (Wejnert, 2014). These can play a role as important intermediary variables that determine the conditions of role modeling, emulation, and imitation in the context of diffusion, or that enhance the susceptibility of a target country for the external promotion of autocratic elements. As Bunce and Wolchik state, the more similar sending and receiving countries are, the more likely innovation will travel (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, 287). This similarity does not necessarily imply a joint border between AGC and target states. Such structural similarity or equivalence is based on comparable economic and social status, which stimulates a country’s perception of concordance with the other countries (“awareness of the sameness”). Similarity is also based on cultural factors (language, tradition, religion, self-identity, values, and norms), a common historical background, or similar political behavior in the context of regime change (Wejnert, 2014, 52). Another important facilitating factor for both means of external influence – promotion and diffusion of autocracy – is the presence of networks. Collaborative networks constitute the channels of communication (horizontal and vertical), which enhance the spread of ideas and institutional or policy innovations (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, 30–58; Wejnert, 2014, 38–44). Highly centralized, stratified networks can make use of pressure on their members to achieve conformity. In turn, networks and frequent interaction are necessary for AGCs if they want to gain access to the target country and relevant groups therein. At the same time, networks make diffusion processes more likely. Finally, the adoption of new ideas, institutional and policy innovations, or practices depends on the perception of being attractive, successful, and transferable (O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 7). To sum up, the concept of AGCs combines specific facilitating conditions for the export or diffusion of autocracy that, on the one side, encompasses geographical proximity, but, on the other side, goes beyond simple contiguity: structural similarity or equivalence of the center and the adopting country, networks and intense interaction therein, and a basic (common) perception of the suitability and success of the new ideas and innovations. In contrast to the presence of regional hegemons, which is in no way novel, AGCs may emerge independently from such hegemons against the background of an increasingly fragmented world structure

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  37 that is further shaped by renewed competition between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. While regional hegemons presumably have a significant influence vis-à-vis their regional environment due to their economic or military power, AGCs are not identical in their objectives, spheres, or modes of influence, although they do utilize political, economic, strategic, territorial, and cultural asymmetry. Last but not least, the concept of regional hegemons is blind to regime types; they can be either democratic or autocratic, while AGCs are autocracies by definition. In Latin America, the regional hegemons are Mexico and Brazil. Both countries were democracies in consolidation and have been witnessing a regression toward a defective democracy (based on BTI data7). However, there is an additional country that fits into the concept of AGCs: Venezuela under Chávez elaborated its own ideational system, the bolivarismo, which served as a central source for internal legitimization at the expense of democratic consolidation. At the same time, bolivarismo aimed at offering a point of linkage to nearby countries as part of Chávez’ construction of a regional identity. This ideational dimension went along with massive economic incentives (e.g. oil shipping below market price) and antagonistic behavior toward the USA, with whom Venezuela tried to claim a more powerful stance in Latin America and greater international weight as the voice of anti-US discourse. On the other hand, in rare cases, it is possible for a regional power to simultaneously be a hegemon and an AGC. Russia, for example, not only strives to garner influence in the whole region, but also intervenes when liberalization or democratic upheavals are taking effect despite heavy autocracy promotion – as seen in Ukraine or Belarus (Yakouchyk, 2016, 195–224). Under Putin, Russia has been increasingly active in influencing its neighborhood. Russia uses instruments to inhibit activities of democracy promotion, while the government also deliberately promotes its own autocratic elements, for example, under the umbrella of the Eurasian Economic Union. It is quite evident that the regional hegemons on the one side, and the AGCs on the other, are not usually identical and do not always share the same objectives and strategies or have the same scope of regional or international influence. It might be that an AGC is a regional first-order power with strong leverage, predominantly based on economic or military power and its international position; Russia and China are such examples. At the same time, we do not disregard the influence regional hegemons have on the strategic consideration of AGCs. Along these lines, we suggest that certain criteria need to be fulfilled to be in place in order to be classified as an AGC (Kneuer et al., 2019, 454f.): 1 2

The potential AGC has been a (moderate) autocracy (BTI8 score below 5) for a period of at least five years. There is a strong will on behalf of the AGC to be the dominant player vis-à-vis its geopolitical proximity. This is mirrored by the capacities

38  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber

3

(immaterial and material capacities) deriving from geographic size, economic power, resource wealth, military power, or by taking a protagonist position in nurturing ideological discourses. A high degree of linkage, understood as density of ties and crossborder flows, exists between an AGC and its target states (TSs).

In turn, TSs are characterized by: 1 2 3

A power asymmetry between the AGC and the respective TSs (a point that can be also found in concepts of regional powers/hegemony). The potential TSs have been either defective democracies (BTI under 8) or autocracies (BTI score below 5). The TS can be member of the respective RO, where the AGC constitutes the protagonist country.

Before introducing the modes of authoritarian influence we ascribe to the respective AGC, the main argument is that other concepts (e.g. regional hegemons) are not able to capture the dynamics and logics of autocratization, and AGCs differ in two important aspects: the motives and the mechanisms of influence. Therefore, the empirical puzzle is centered on the question: Which strategies and forms do AGCs use in their promotion of autocracy? Do they exchange authoritarian practices and learning processes, and if so, why and in which way and direction and with what success? Do autocratic regimes exploit regional cooperation structures for the promotion of autocracy, and if so, in which way and to what intensity (in-depth results also in: Kneuer et al., 2019, 451–470)? Are AGCs attractive models that third countries decide to emulate? Do diffusion processes take place, and if so, in which way and to what intensity? Motives of AGCs We follow two main hypothetical threads to explain the motives of an AGC for exerting direct influence on its proximity: Our first hypothesis is based on a rationalist argument that AGCs seek to stabilize their own regime and the contiguous environment. The conditions for authoritarian survival have changed dramatically in the post-Cold War period. In contrast to the Cold War era, autocratic regimes today lack the ideological patron that guarantees economic support and military protection. This multipolar order implies a different logic behind seeking and gaining partners. Likewise, autocratic rulers are confronted with a sort of cooperation imperative in order to achieve regional or even international weight as well as to fulfill central tasks like economic performance and security, which are important for their survival and legitimation. According to the stability argument, autocratic leaders are interested in preempting liberalization. Turmoil due to democratic upheavals that could

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  39 lead to unstable conditions in nearby countries can also pose a threat to a state’s own regime. The autocratic leader wants to be surrounded by like-minded regimes, as stability in their own country and in the proximity is perceived as being interwoven. On this basis, regional cooperation is more probable and can lead to an even closer interdependence, with advantages in economy or trade. Therefore, stability and convergence of regime type foster such cooperation and engender stability at home (see also: Odinius and Kuntz, 2015, 639–654). The second hypothesis is based on a constructivist argument. Several studies underline the relevance of legitimation for autocratic regimes (e.g. Gerschewski, 2013, 13–38; Kneuer, 2013, 205–236), yet the internal conditions for survival in the post-Cold War authoritarian states are different. This is also due to the international discourse on democratization: Legitimacy has become a key issue for the autocratic regimes of the twenty-first century. To a higher degree, they are forced to transmit legitimacy messages, and thus are more dependent on legitimation strategies and popular support. Subtypes like competitive authoritarianism imply, for example, democratic façade elements like elections or multiparty systems (Levitsky and Way, 2010). In order to dissociate its own regime from democratic patterns and values, the AGC nurtures a regional regime identity discourse that promotes regional regime patterns and superiority vis-à-vis democratic alternatives (including elements of “othering,” national/regional branding, and national/regional identity building). Legitimation can be achieved externally (e.g. via international recognition) and can be used for stabilizing the regime on the domestic level. Likewise, formulating foreign policy aims, for example, regional cooperation or an anti-Western discourse, that find popular support at home can generate internal legitimation (Kneuer, 2013, 213). Moreover, AGCs need to find partners in order to strengthen their voice internationally. An assertive regional foreign policy can thus be driven by the search for some sort of “regional regime identity” that can counter the global script of liberal democracy. Modes of Authoritarian Influence The main research threads concerning the international dimension of democratization serve as a central conceptual basis for international learning and the cooperation processes of autocracies. There are, however, two caveats. The first refers to those modes of influence that are shaped by EU mechanisms and are thus not transferable (like accession and conditionality). These pathways must be reformulated. The second deficit is that the concrete connection between the external actor/factor and the domestic actor, that is, the mechanisms of interaction, is not sufficiently described. Therefore, we find it necessary to concretize possible mechanisms that capture not only the external action, but also the motives,

40  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber calculations, reactions, and behavior of the domestic actors (“opening the black box”). In turn, we modify some of the modes of influence set out above. Consent or convergence as well as conditionality constitutes patterns that mainly refer to modes of influence shaped by the EU (see e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2018, 17–27). These specific EU-orientated modes of influence can be excluded from our concept regarding autocracies. However, the underlying fundamental mechanism of conditionality is the leverage exerted by a powerful actor within a relationship of asymmetric interdependence, which enables the externalization of pressure. This leverage mechanism is supposed to be equally present in other contexts, such as in AGCs. They can exert leverage over third countries for various reasons (e.g. economic dependence or power to protect). According to Vachudova, leverage can be active, that is, deliberate engagement directly influencing a third country (Vachudova, 2005, 143), or passive, that is, the attraction or magnetism of an actor “by virtue of its existence and its usual conduct” (ibid., 65). Passive leverage represents a neutral mechanism and therefore is identical with setting an example or demonstration effect. While we are inspired by Vachudova in having a more fine-grained reading and understanding of leverage, we argue that leverage is, by definition, active and goes together with intended and active actorness. By conceptualizing these modes of influence, we can identify two main patterns of external influence. One pattern is intentional, as the AGC has clear objectives and is actively involved in implementing them (independent of its success). The other pattern is unintentional, as the AGC is not actively involved. In this case, it is the domestic actor in the target state who decides on transferring elements from the AGC. Thus, we differentiate, firstly, intentional, actor-driven modes of external influence like control, hard leverage, and subtle leverage, and, secondly, neutral transmission modes of external influence like diffusion encompassing emulation and demonstration effect. Both methods of influence are understood as departing from the AGC and inducing reactions on the domestic level of the target state, thus leading to interaction and reciprocity. Based on this conceptual framing, we provide a more differentiated model: AGC

Promotion

Control

Hard Leverage

Diffusion

Subtle Leverage

Demonstration Effect

Figure 2.1 Modes of External Influence: The Concept Tree. Source: Own compilation.

Emulation

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  41 Control represents the maximum level of influence based on (military) coercion. It can appear as an imposition of a certain regime type, mainly by military intervention or defeat. Military occupation following defeat opens up the possibility of installing political structures or procedures that can guarantee mid-range influence on the character of the regime. While the influence is still purposive and planned, hard leverage differs from control in the method (offer), the instrument (material incentive), and the degree of influence (less intensive, although coercive). We define subtle leverage as a sub-mechanism that can rely on instruments like strategic calculations or on normative suasion, and thus counts on a non-coercive and voluntary influence. While the first implies that actors calculate the consequences of compliance, engage in bargaining and rhetorical action, and the outcome is mostly adaption, normative suasion is based on reflection about appropriateness, arguing, and consensus orientation, and the outcome is rather expected to be the internalization of new norms and rules. Overall, while the forms of influence can take military, economic, financial, ideational, and other ways, the different sub-mechanisms can be divided along their method, their instruments, and their degree of coerciveness/force of coercive. In this sense, control is the strongest coercive form, hard leverage takes a middle position, and the vague path of subtle leverage to exert influence employs the least intense coercive measures. Diffusion is a characteristically unintentional process “in which new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or repertoires of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites” (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, 34). Studies on diffusion consensually underline the relevance of spatial effects, though scholars also state that geographic proximity alone does not automatically have a significant effect on diffusion (Abbot and deViney, 1992, 245–274; Brinks and Coppedge, 2006). Obviously, there are more factors encouraging diffusion. Three main factors are discernable in the literature: Structural similarity (O’Loughlin et al., 1998) or structural equivalence (Wejnert, 2014) plays a role as an important intermediary variable that determines the conditions of role-modeling, emulation, and imitation in the context of diffusion, or that enhances the susceptibility of a country to the promotion of autocratic elements. As Bunce and Table 2.1 Sub-Mechanisms: Methods, Instruments, and Coercion Method

Instruments

Degree of coercion

Control

Military, coercive

Intervention, defeat

Comprehensive

Hard leverage

Carrot-and-stick offer

Material incentive

Pressure without direct coercion

Subtle leverage

Strategic calculation, Rhetoric, oral normative suasion support/disapproval

Source: Own compilation.

Non-coercive, voluntary

42  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Wolchik state, the more similar the sending and the receiving countries are, the more likely that innovation will travel (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 287). Such structural similarity or equivalence is based on a comparable economic and social status that stimulates a country’s perception of concordance with the other countries (“awareness of the sameness”) as well as on cultural factors (language, tradition, religion, self-identity, values, and norms), a common historical background, or the similarity of political behavior in the context of regime change (O’Loughlin et al., 1998; Wejnert, 2014, 52). A second catalyst for the adoption of new ideas or innovation is the perceived attractiveness, success, and transferability of the engendering factors (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 286f.; O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 7f.). The receiver must consider the adoption of a change as beneficial, as compatible and suitable to the own underlying conditions, and as easy to transport. If a country is looking for a change, then it may consider adopting an innovation. Thus, the idea must work both reliably and successfully in the other country, and it must fit into the country’s own framework or strategy. A final important facilitating factor for both means of external influence – autocracy promotion and autocracy diffusion – is the presence of networks. Collaborative networks constitute the channels of communication (horizontal and vertical) which enhance the spread of ideas and institutional or policy innovations (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 286f.; Wejnert, 2014, 38–44). Highly centralized, stratified networks can make use of pressure on their members to achieve conformity. Thus, networks and frequent interaction are indispensable for AGCs if they want to gain access to the target state and relevant groups therein. At the same time, networks make diffusion processes more likely. Based on the basic findings of literature on diffusion of democracy, we will look at (a) the similarity and equivalence, (b) the motives of adoption, (c) and the networks within target states (focus on political elites and associated groups). However, the limitation that diffusion processes are difficult to pin down and to distinguish from global trends remains (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006, 464). But how do adopters react? The rationalist argument for a contiguous country to voluntarily adopt autocratic elements found in the AGC draws on (a) the compliance with coercive measures, including incentives that may satisfy economic or security interests (in the case of autocracy promotion) and (b) the expectation of finding a solution to a problem or the improvement of institutional settings or policies, as they proved successful in the AGC and/or appear to fit into the plans of the government (e.g. in the transfer of diffused elements). The constructivist argument assumes that the adopter perceives a gain in internal legitimation (justifying the transfer of certain elements with the success in the AGC, material benefits, etc.) or a gain in external legitimation (increase of regional weight through the cooperation with the AGC, benefit from cooperation, etc.).

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  43

Figure 2.2 Analytical Model.

Our analytical model serves as a basis for examining possible modes of influence of AGCs. The added value of this model is that it encompasses both unintentional, neutral transmission as diffusion or transfer and intentional, actor-driven influence. The recent literature on autocracy promotion predominantly examines diffusion effects or is based on elite approaches (see: Bank and Weyland, 2018). However, we find that both types of influence can be significant for the dissemination of autocratic ideational, institutional, behavioral, policy-orientated sets and that both must be considered to gain a complete picture. Structural Variables and the Arenas of Interaction Following our premise, the access of external actors and the ability to form coalitions (Risse-Kappen, 1995, 25) are easier for autocratic regimes that exercise an assertive promotion policy, for instance, its own ideas, practices, and norms in a regional context, as the historical, cultural, and economic linkage is presumably greater. In Levitsky and Way’s concept, this structural context of linkage constitutes a central dimension in understanding the effectiveness and the variation of international (democratization) pressure. This means, linkage encompasses the density of ties and cross-border flows among particular countries and multilateral institutions, whereas, according to our argument, the cross-border-flows would occur among AGCs and target states. Linkage comprehends economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, social, informational, and civil-society ties (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 43–44). Consequently, we conceive structural factors like linkage and structure of resonance of the third country as intervening variables that may condition the learning and cooperation processes of autocratic regimes in a regional context (as either facilitating or restricting factors). The independent variables are the direct, actor-driven influences and the neutral transmissions on behalf of the AGCs.

44  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Based on this conceptual model for empirical examination, we may tackle a broad list of questions. What elements are imposed, diffused, and transferred, in which way and to what degree of intensity and effectiveness? What mechanisms of learning and cooperation processes between the AGC and the target states are induced and implemented? In order to capture the possible elements of intentional actor-driven or unintentional transmission modes, we identify four arenas of action. They are primarily based on the policy transfer framework by Dolowitz, though we conflate ideologies and attitudes/cultural values to the ideational arena, policies, and programs to the policy arena (Dolowitz, 2000, 10). Additionally, we include one further arena, administrative techniques, which we place below the formal institutional level and consider as informal procedures. 1

2

The institutional arena comprehends all measures that aim at modifying the existing political structures or the constitutional level. This may concern (a) abolishing institutions that support democratic processes and the division of power, often in the judiciary (Supreme Court), or independent agencies or entities (e.g. ombudsman or anticorruption councils). Such measures may relate to horizontal as well as vertical power division (abolishing decentralized or federal elements); (b) altering electoral systems or respective elements therein (e.g. introducing plebiscitarian elements in order to circumvent parliament); (c) introducing new institutional rules that secure the autocratic regime, for example, the expansion of presidential competence (like decrees) or the modification of provisions regulating the president’s reelection; and, finally (d) constitutional alterations that reduce political rights and civil liberties in the country. Measures at the institutional level of autocratic regimes mainly aim at prolonging the incumbency and at reducing influence from opposition parties and veto players (jurisdiction, administration, etc.). The policy arena can refer to policy goals, policy content, or policy instruments that correspond to the autocratic regime’s visions and support its approach of antagonizing the “democratic” community. This especially includes the economic field. Policy performance has become increasingly salient for autocratic regimes in order to generate legitimacy vis-à-vis the democratic and market-oriented community. Generally, AGCs are countries that represent a model of economic success and can thus “offer” something to countries in their geopolitical proximity. Energy resources have become an essential issue in this context, encompassing economic models like the nationalization of energy resources (nationalization) or selective distribution of resources or trade barriers. A further important policy field for autocratic regimes is security policy, that is, domestic security. Here, “models” of repression or certain modes of patronizing relevant groups in society can be exported if they show the expected

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  45

3

4

results. Furthermore, media policy has gained importance in order to repress oppositional opinion formation and alternative communication platforms like social media. Controlling, circumventing, or instrumentalizing digital media has become a point of special attention for autocratic regimes. The ideational arena is of importance for autocratic regimes, especially for the legitimation of their regime (see Kneuer, 2017, 118–211). In turn, ideologies, ideas, values, and certain attitudes are instrumentalized to gain the acceptance and support of the population, and of relevant elite factions like the military or the business elite, which are essential for the survival of the regime. Autocratic regimes are interested in creating transnational networks in order to disseminate ideas. The transport of ideas, arguments, or ideational frames aims at synchronizing perceptions in the neighborhood and at providing a common ground for a regional or subregional identity. Autocratic leaders consider the construction of strong ideational bonds as a means of generating the legitimacy they are usually lacking, but remains simultaneously vital. We further add the arena of administrative techniques, which encompasses measures that occur below the formal institutional level. Moreover, they refer to informal or barely institutionalized legal modes of interaction and instruments that can be considered as informal procedures. They are implemented in the executive administration (local, regional, or state administration) and may include surveillance techniques, electoral fraud, withdrawal of TV/ radio licenses, or the revocation of leasing contracts of private media companies. Such measures constitute a more subtle control and repression approach, which is internationally less visible than, for example, human rights violations. These four arenas of interaction apply to AGCs as well as to TSs.

Tracing Promotion and Diffusion We define promotion of autocracy as direct and/or indirect intentional influence from an AGC toward a TS. The influence encompasses the dissemination of certain elements that aim at authoritarian clustering, that is, democracy prevention, autocratic empowerment, and consolidation of an already existing autocratic regime. Additionally, we see promotion as a gradual and dynamic process that can vary in type, degree, and duration of influence. The following variables for operationalization follow Tansey (2016), who, in turn, was inspired by the monography “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect” (Pattison, 2010). The variables of the new factors (d) and (e) have been established in an inductive manner. We contend that promotion encompasses (a) the presence of a form of agency since “there must be a promoter acting with

46  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber intent” (Tansey, 2016, 147); (b) intentionality in a sense that triggers an “advancement of autocratic rule” (ibid.); (c) an underlying reason that can have various roots, that is, ideological or strategic, altruistic or self-interested, cost-benefit considerations, but they are detached from the overall purpose (= intention) (Tansey, 2016, 149). It is especially the last point that distinguishes our approach from Tansey, who argues that it is the principal ideological motivation that defines the promotion of autocracy. Instead, we stress that it can be both a rational and ideological motivation that explains promotion of autocracy. Furthermore, the first three criteria of agency, intention, and motives have been adapted by authors, who are either concerned with autocracy diffusion (Ambrosio, 2010, 375–392) or argue only in favor of democracy prevention (Whitehead, 2014, 1–24; von Soest, 2015, 623–638; Way, 2015). In other words, there must be further distinctive aspects that define promotion of autocracy. Hence, we suggest that (d) the type and the degree of direct influence play a crucial role. In our understanding, promotion does not solely encompasses intended, agency-driven measures. It may also include intended passive/indirect forms of influence, which is disregarded by Tansey, who argues rather bluntly: “If there is no intention, there is no promotion” (Tansey, 2016, 145). Lastly, we also consider the (e) duration of influence as important. The longer the duration of a certain influence, the more probable that it is more about promoting a specific language of government, that is, a regional regime identity that transcends an ad hoc attempt of resisting democratization. Regarding diffusion, we followed a more narrow definition. We comprehend diffusion to be all transfer of ideas, institutions, and policies characterized as voluntary transfer in contrast to obliged or imposed transfer (Knill, 2005, 766–767). Based on this definition, diffusion is conceived as a distinctive causal factor with distinct coercive forms such as imposition or conditionality. Hence, in order to operationalize diffusion, we are looking for temporal sequences of adoption/change, depending on the opportunity (e.g. taking over power), the pressure of finding solutions for a certain problem that in a similar form exists in the AGC (e.g. media coverage by oppositional groups), and the attractiveness/success of the role model AGC. What degree of diffusion is taking place? We differentiate between emulation and demonstration effects, following Bunce and Wolchik (2006). Regarding demonstration effects, a country provides an appealing example to actors in other states; the example is persuasive if there are significant constituencies/actors that gain from the change, and when the prerequisite conditions in the sending and receiving state are similar. Diffusion based on demonstration is rather informal (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 287). Emulation, in contrast, takes place in a more purposive and planned manner, and here diffusion constitutes the result of collaboration between local and external actors. Therefore, networks are a key factor. In these networks, actors confer with innovators about goals

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  47 and strategies. Innovators peddle their ideas outside the state. Close attention is given to the changes, conditions, and strategies that lead to their successful adoption (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 287).

Conclusion The purpose of this chapter is to present the conceptual framework that helps us capture, explain, and understand possible mechanisms of autocracy promotion in the next chapters. In view of the empirical background, our study aims at providing added value to the under-researched area of the international dimension of autocracies, and, particularly, at offering insight to the “what, why and how” of concrete mechanisms of autocratic dissemination. Based on the central premise of our study, which we attribute to our basic knowledge of Third Wave of democratization and the regional framing of democratization processes, we transferred these findings to the international dimension of autocracies and stated the following: It is primarily the regional context in which external actors can most effectively influence autocratic processes. We argued that other concepts (such as the concept of regional hegemons) are not able to capture the dynamics and logics of autocratization. Moreover, AGCs differ in their objectives and underlying mechanisms of influence. The latter is induced and implemented by modes of autocratic influence as active export by the AGCs on the one hand, and as passive and unintentional diffusion on the other. However, we argued that structural factors like linkage or oil abundance are to be seen as intervening variables that may condition learning and cooperation processes within an AGC. This analytical model then served as a basis for examining possible modes of influence practiced by AGCs. In order to capture the transferred elements, we identified four arenas of interaction: the institutional, policy, and ideational arenas, plus the administrative techniques arena, in which the active export and/or diffusion of autocratic elements takes place. Based on the summary of our actor-centered and particularly elitedriven concept of AGCs, what kind of explanatory power and added value can be expected from the following empirical analysis? First, our empirical findings in all three world regions under study show which mode of influence used by the AGC (active intentional export or unintentional diffusion) is more effective in reality. Second, we present concrete results about which strategies AGCs eventually use when following patterns of autocratic export and dissemination. Our differentiated model enables us to break down the very general impression of autocracy promotion in a more precise way, which, in turn, allows us to reflect critically on these strategies. Furthermore, our findings will also indicate which arenas of autocracy promotion are more or less frequently used. Third, the empirical testing of our model reveals the extent to which intermediate regimes in geopolitical proximity are prone to using AGCs as a

48  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber source of transfer and emulation. Finally, we will present conclusions on how far regional cooperation structures, used for the establishment of complementary networks, are being exploited for the export and dissemination of autocratic elements. The empirical testing of our concept over next chapters helps us understand the clustering and persistence of autocratic regimes in a regional context.

Notes 1 2

3

4 5 6 7 8

This chapter is a revised version of our concept (based on the insights gained during the three years of our project), first published in Democratization (2016), vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 775–796 (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016). The literature for both threads is comprehensive; just to name some referential works of democracy promotion: Whitehead (1986, 1996), Pridham (1991), Carothers (1999, 2004), Burnell (2000), Cox et al. (2000), Youngs (2001), Grabbe (2006); and for diffusion: Elkins and Simmons (2005), Brinks and Coppedge (2006), Gleditsch and Ward (2006), Bunce and Wolchik (2011), Wejnert (2014). This aspect goes back to Raphael Peresson taking up Tansey’s notion but bringing it in a different context, namely that an incumbent autocratic actor might be interested to support a like-minded person for getting into office in a neighboring country with the aim of having an autocratic ally for the future. Actorness and intention are two characteristics of promotion we also transfer from the literature on democracy promotion. Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos; Alliance for the People of Our America. This also recurs to an often-used resort in social sciences on the gravity model in order to grasp spatial interactions and processes (see e.g. Sen and Smith, 1995). Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), see: www.bti-project.org/en/ home/. Ibid.

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50  Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber Dolowitz, David P. “Policy Transfer: A New Framework of Policy Analysis.” In Policy Transfer and British Social Policy: Learning from the USA?, edited by David P. Dolowitz, Rob Hulme, Mike Nellis, and Fiona O’Neill, 9–37. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2000. Elkins, Zachary, and Beth Simmons. “On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework.” ANNALS 598, no. 1 (2005): 33–51. Erdmann, Gero, and Marianne Kneuer. “Externe Faktoren der Demokratisierung: Forschungsperspektiven und Entwicklungspotenzial.” In Externe Faktoren der Demokratisierung, edited by Gero Erdmann, and Marianne Kneuer, 319–338. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. Erdmann, Gero, and Marianne Kneuer. Regression of Democracy. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2011. Gerschewski, Johannes. “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes.” Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–38. Gleditsch, Kristian S. All International Politics Is Local. The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.” International Organization 60, no. 4 (2006): 911–933. Hoffmann, Bert. “The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Legitimation: The Impact of Regime Evolution.” GIGA Working Papers 182 (2011), Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Holbig, Heike. “Die Finanzkrise in China: Auswirkungen auf die Legitimität der Parteiherrschaft.” Der Bürger im Staat 60, no. 1 (2010): 38–43. Jackson, Nicole J. “The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia’s Influence on Central Asian Regimes.” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 101–118. Kneuer, Marianne. “Auf der Suche nach Legitimität. Außenpolitik als Legitimationsstrategie autoritärer Systeme.” In Autokratien im Vergleich, edited by Patrick Köllner, and Steffen Kailitz. PVS-Sonderheft 47, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013: 205–236. Kneuer, Marianne. “Legitimation beyond Ideology: Authoritarian Regimes and the Construction of Missions.” Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 11, no. 2 (2017): 181–211. Kneuer, Marianne, and Thomas Demmelhuber. “Gravity Centres of Authoritarian Rule: A Conceptual Approach.” Democratization 23, no. 5 (2016): 775–796. Kneuer, Marianne, Demmelhuber, Thomas, Peresson, Raphael, and Tobias Zumbrägel. “Playing the Regional Card: Why and How Authoritarian Gravity Centres Exploit Regional Organisations.” Third World Quarterly 40, no. 3 (2019): 451–470. Knill, Christoph: “Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors.” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005): 764–774. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Libman, Alexander, and Anastassia V. Obydenkova. “Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism”, Journal of Democracy 4 (2018): 151–165. Lust, Ellen, and David Waldner. “Unwelcome Change: Understanding, Evaluating, and Extending Theories of Democratic Backsliding”, USAID, 2015. Retrieved from https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAD635.pdf

Conceptualizing Authoritarian Gravity Centers  51 Magen, Amichai, and Leonardo Morlino. “Hybrid Regime, the Rule of Law, and External Influences on Domestic Change.” In International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring democracy?, edited by Amichai Magen, and Leonardo Morlino, 1–25. New York: Routledge, 2009. Mattes, Michaela, and Mariana Rodríguez. “Autocracies and International Cooperation.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2014): 527–538. McFaul, Michael. Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. McFaul, Michael, and Regine A. Spector. “External Sources and Consequences of Russia’s “Sovereign Democracy”.” In New Challenges to Democratization, edited by Peter Burnell, and Richard Youngs, 116–133: Tylor & Francis Group; Routledge, 2010. Melnykovska, Inna, Hedwig Plamper, and Rainer Schweickert. “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?” Asia Europe Journal 10, no. 1 (2012): 75–89. Merkel, Wolfgang. “Are Dictatorships Returning? Revisiting the Democratic Rollback Hypothesis.” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 1 (2010a): 17–31. Merkel, Wolfgang. Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung. Wiesbaden: VS, 2010b. Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Eric Skaaning. “The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers.” Journal of Democracy 4 (2013): 97–109. Morlino, Leonardo, and Amichai Magen. “Methods of Influence, Layers of Impact, Cycles of Change: A Framework for Analysis.” In International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring democracy?, edited by Amichai Magen, and Leonardo Morlino, 26–52. New York: Routledge, 2009. Muhr, Thomas. “Counter‐Hegemonic Regionalism and Higher Education for All: Venezuela and the ALBA”, Globalisation, Societies and Education 8, no. 1 (2010): 39–57. Myers, David J., ed. Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991. Odinius, Daniel, and Philipp Kuntz. “The Limits of Authoritarian Solidarity. The Gulf Monarchies and Preserving Authoritarian Rule during the Arab Spring.” European Journal of Political Research 54, no. 4 (2015): 639–654. O’Loughlin, J., M.D. Ward, C.L. Lofdahl, J.S. Cohen, D.S. Brown, D. Reilly, K.S. Gleditsch, and M. Shin. “The Diffusion of Democracy 1946–1994”, Annals of the Association American Geographers 88, no. 4 (1998): 545–574. Pattison, James. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protext: Who Should Intervene? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pridham, Geoffrey. “The Politics of the European Community, Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition.” In Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, edited by Geoffrey Pridham, 212–246. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. Prys, Miriam. “Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood.” International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010), 479–504. Riggirozzi, Pía, and Diana Tussie. The Rise of Post-hegemonic Regionalism. The Case of Latin America. Heidelberg: Springer Dordrecht, 2012. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction.” In Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, edited by Thomas Risse-Kappen, 3–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

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Part II

Empirical Studies on Authoritarian Gravity Centers Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

3

Kingdom of Gravity Autocratic Promotion and Diffusion in Saudi Arabia Tobias Zumbrägel

Approaching the Arabian Peninsula via the Concept of AGC In the wake of the wave of mass protests that ousted many governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), scholarship shifted its focus to the Arabian Peninsula, where the absolutist monarchies seemingly remained stable (Yom, 2018). Manifold publications emerged that discussed why monarchies survived, while republics were toppled.1 As a result, scholars referred to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (majlis al-taʿāwun li-duwal al-khalīj al-ʿarabiyya) as the “new” center of power in the Arab world. While the increasing number of studies and analysis greatly contribute to the scholarly debate, they bear some shortcomings. These works often consider the GCC states as one monolithic bloc2 and frequently fail to take the broader historical context prior of 2011 into account (Interview 9 February 2017). Furthermore, scholars barely explained the recent tendency of strengthening autocratization among the GCC monarchies in a systematic way. Lastly, the majority of studies lack empirical evidences since fieldwork is (still) difficult to conduct in these “closed autocracies.” This article intends to fill these gaps. Using the concept of the Authoritarian Gravity Centre (AGC), this study provides a different perspective as it argues that a protagonist country (in this case Saudi Arabia) can dramatically shape regional dynamics. The approach attempts to explain the hierarchization, (mutual) interrelation, and autocratization processes within the Arabian Peninsula. It additionally takes into account the broader historical context by investigating the period from 2001 to 2015. The selected time period predominantly reflects the rule of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.3 Concurrent influential domestic, regional, and global events include the second oil boom (2002–2008), 9/11, the war in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), as well as the so-called “Arab Spring” (2011). Most importantly, the study builds on extensive fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, as outlined in the preceding chapter. The Arabian Peninsula is characterized by an autocratic clustering. There is a tendency of strengthening autocratization over recent years, as indices such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) reveal.

56  Tobias Zumbrägel All monarchies are considered autocratic, ranging between a hard-line (1–4 BTI score) and moderate (4–6 BTI score), with Saudi Arabia having the worst score (BTI, 2017). The Arabian Peninsula hosts an “autocratic bastion,” with Saudi Arabia as its “nucleus.” There further is a clear power asymmetry between Saudi Arabia as the AGC and the five other GCC members that represent the target states (TSs) (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 12 February 2017b). This becomes most apparent in political, military, demographical, geographical, and ideational terms. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia views itself as the undisputed leading power of the GCC and openly claims this role (Interview 21 November 2016a). Saudi Arabia is frequently described as the “backbone of the GCC,” which exerts considerable influence over its surrounding states (Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 26 February 2017b; Interview 28 October 2017). All smaller GCC states are suspicious of a Saudi hegemony and seek to maintain their own sovereignty and autonomy (Interview 23 October 2017).4 From time to time, some Gulf States attempted to escape the Saudi sphere of influence, “but their overall place within the Saudi orbit is not questioned” (Gause, 2014, p. 193; Interview 15 November 2016; Interview 30 October 2017). Within the investigation period from 2001 to 2015, a gradation of fellowship among the smaller monarchies became manifest. It prompts a categorization into three classes: Bahrain is arguably the most dependent on Saudi Arabia (soft case), Oman and Qatar are the least dependent (hard cases), while the UAE and Kuwait fall between these two poles (middle cases) (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 21 November 2016b). 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Bahrain

Qatar

UAE

Oman

2016

Figure 3.1 Autocratization in the GCC – Scores on the Democracy Status (Bertelsmann Transformation Index). Source: Own compilation based on the BTI data sets 2006–2016.

Kingdom of Gravity  57 Least dependent on Saudi Arabia

Qatar Oman

Very dependent on Saudi Arabia

Kuwait UAE

Bahrain

Figure 3.2 Gradation of Saudi Influence Toward its GCC Fellows. Source: Own compilation.

Citing the words of an interview partner: “Saudi Arabia is aware about the degree of the others’ fellowship. For instance, in the case of Bahrain they expect 100% cooperation, for Qatar maybe 25–50%, Oman, again, is different” (Interview 30 October 2017). An interviewee based in Bahrain summarized the geopolitical role of his home country as follows: “Saudi Arabia is our fate if we want it or not” (Interview 5 November 2017). Another Bahraini scholar indicated that “Bahrain cannot survive without Saudi Arabia” (Interview 8 November 2017). Regarding other GCC fellows, one interview partner made statements by describing Qatar as “a headache in the eyes of Saudi Arabia” and referring to Oman as “black sheep” that “is in another orbit” and “not a full-fledged GCC member” (Interview 12 November 2016; Interview 15 November 2016; Interview 25 October 2017b). Occasionally, Oman is declared a hybrid “linchtier” monarchy (Lucas et al., 2014, p. 161). Also, a senior Omani official blatantly stressed: “We are not a Gulf state” (cited in: Partrick, 2016, p. 78). This hierarchization inspects also a high level of competition among the second-tier Gulf States (Davidson, 2015, p. 122; Interview 15 February 2017; Interview 26 February 2017a; Interview 8 March 2017). According to a Saudi political scientist: “No country within the GCC disputes the fact that Saudi Arabia is number one, but there is a lot of talk and struggle, who is number two” (Interview 30 November 2016). In summary, I argue that this briefly sketched interrelation reflects the Saudi’s ability of exerting influence or attracting others to follow its path. Besides Saudi Arabia as the AGC, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar represent the TS of each category, where extensive fieldwork was conducted. Conversely, Oman and the UAE function as control cases. It is further assumed that membership within the regional organization (RO) of the GCC defines the sample: It has one of the highest autocratic records among regional organizations (Yom, 2018, p. 68) and serves as a transmission belt and learning room of Saudi influence (Kneuer et al., 2018). Its establishment in 1981 was considered a “golden opportunity for Saudi Arabia to put its umbrella over the other states” (Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 5 November 2017b). Limiting the analysis to the GCC has some advantages with regards to research feasibility. Saudi

58  Tobias Zumbrägel Arabia’s gravitational force doubtlessly goes beyond the GCC region and reaches Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, or Libya (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 4 March 2017; Interview 24 October 2017b; Interview 7 November 2017). Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s invitation to the socalled linchpin monarchies Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC, supports the argumentation of a broader scale of influence on behalf of the AGC. Yet, such a broad investigation is not the subject of this research interest. Instead, the aim is to uncover for what reasons and in what way Saudi Arabia shapes the geographical and system proximity. The analysis follows the conceptual framework of the AGC, which was introduced in Chapter 2 of this volume. The first section elucidates the how by assaying the sub-mechanisms of promotion and diffusion across the different arenas. Noteworthy, not all arenas exhibit both mechanisms. For instance, I observed a lack of Saudi dissemination of institutional practices and norms, which is why this arena has been omitted. Indeed, it appears that Kuwait is the frontrunner and role model when it comes to institution building (Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 4 December 2016a; Interview 13 February 2017). Additionally, I consider the ideational arena (i.e. nonmaterial means) as a complementing effect of promotion and diffusion instead of a distinctive arena (Interview 26 November 2016). As will be seen, it is mostly used as a steering effect for the dissemination of autocratic practices that are linked to other fields, particularly the policy arena. The second section discusses the why of both the AGC and the TS. Besides identifying the underlying motives of the AGC’s efforts, the section further sheds light on the reactions of the neighboring countries. Lastly, a concluding section comprises five key findings.

Saudi Arabia’s Gravitational Force: Uncovering Mechanisms of Promotion and Diffusion The Kingdom Seizes Control over the Arabian Peninsula While the 1990s are generally perceived as a “lost decade” of Saudi foreign policy, one can detect growing regional aspirations from the 2000 onwards (Interview 30 November 2016). Saudi Arabia impeded the construction of a natural gas pipeline between Qatar and Kuwait in 2003 (Dorsey, 2013; Interview 21 November 2016b; Interview 23 October 2017), and two years later, it blocked Qatari plans of building an exporting gas pipeline to Bahrain and Oman (Krane & Wright, 2014, p. 11). Additionally, Riyadh objected to the construction of a causeway linking Qatar and the UAE in 2004 (Interview 21 February 2017; Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 53). In 2010, the first instance of Saudi Arabia closing a border to a neighboring country, namely, the UAE, occurred (Interview 16 February 2017; Interview 20 February 2017). This sanction mechanism was again applied in 2011 to Bahrain and 2013/2014 to Qatar. Especially the blockade

Kingdom of Gravity  59 against Qatar, which was reinstalled in 2017, rested on a strategic calculus to put (economic) pressure on the Qatari ruling family Al Thani (Interview 16 February 2017; Interview 26 February 2017c; Interview 28 February 2017). Along these lines, one interviewee reported: We see here in Qatar that miles after miles there are trucks waiting to cross the border and it has been stated that there is a problem with the visa machine and then (…) all of a sudden is working again. (Interview 15 February 2017) These delivery interruptions affected Qatar considerably, because blocked import goods included construction material (e.g. cement) for the infrastructure megaprojects for the FIFA World Cup 2022 (Interview 2 March 2017b). The most tangible sign of control within the policy arena, however, was the GCC military intervention in Bahrain. It was considered an exception to the usually applied “quiet diplomacy” of the Saudi policy behavior (Gause, 2011, p. 19). In March 2011, approximately 1,200 members of the Saudi Arabia’s National Guard (joined by 600 Emirati police forces on the following day) entered the kingdom of Bahrain to control and secure strategic buildings and locations in the capital Manama. Although the official narrative purported that it was a response to Bahraini crown prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa’s request for external help, several sources on the ground attested to a Saudi-led operation (Interview 12 February 2017a; Interview 30 October 2017). An interviewee with close ties to the Bahraini ruling elite described the proceeding of the deployment: The Saudi foreign minister called his Bahraini counterpart that they will invade immediately. When the Bahraini foreign minister wanted to ask for permission from his king, his Saudi counterpart replied: It is not necessary, we do not need permission; we are already on our way. (Interview 5 November 2017a) On an ideational level, the military intervention was supported by a large-scale media offensive accusing Iran to “have a finger on Bahrain” (Interview 28 October 2017; Savyon et al., 2011). Since the 1980s, the GCC monarchies, and especially Saudi Arabia, promoted an anti-Iranian discourse. The rhetorical dispute calmed during the 1990s, but revived in the early 2000s. It correlated with the watershed of the Iraq War in 2003 and growing cross-sectarian tensions in its aftermath. Indeed, even the vocabulary reflected these anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian sentiments: While many referred to the Shia as non-Arabs or Iranians (ajam), since 2003, the terminology of rejectionists (rafidha) gained prominence (Haddad, 2013, p. 11). In official settings, Riyadh’s rhetoric remained modest. For instance, in October 2005, King Abdullah commented, “Iran is a friendly country (…) and we hope that Iran will not become an obstacle to peace

60  Tobias Zumbrägel and security in Iraq” (cited in: Stenslie, 2012, p. 87). Similar statements were made by the then foreign minister (Stenslie, 2012, p. 87). On the sidelines, however, the tension was palpable: As leaked confidential material reveals, King Abdullah urged the Americans to “cut off the head of the snake” (cited in: Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 120). Other GCC officials agreed to this, demanding tougher actions and stronger measures (including military means) against the regime in Teheran (Davidson, 2015, pp. 169–174). The uprising in Bahrain in 2011 provided a scenario to showcase alleged Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula. Along with the arena of administrative techniques and the controlled access to information and sources, one can notice how several GCC media outlets, and particularly Saudi media coverage, promulgated this narrative (Guzansky, 2015, p. 56). They presented the demonstrations in Bahrain as an Iranian plot to seize control over the Arabian Peninsula. Simultaneously, they accused the Shia populations as being Iran’s closest allies. One of the often-repeated allegations referred to Iran creating chaos, sectarian division, and civil strife in the region (al-farqat wa-lfitnat al-tāʾifiyya) (Savyon et al., 2011). At the same time, Saudi officials and media used the alleged external threat for a “rally-round-the-flag effect.” They reiterated the loyalty of the Saudi population to their country. The following statement made by Emir Khaled bin Talal indicates this: We – the [Saudi] leaders and the [Saudi] people – will not accept any intervention whatsoever in the affairs of the Saudi kingdom. As [Saudi Foreign Minister] Saud Al-Faisal said: If anyone tries to dip even a finger into the affairs of the kingdom, his fingers will be chopped off… The Saudi people in its entirety is united behind its ruler, and we will remain united on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna… (cited in: Savyon et al., 2011) The military intervention, as the clearest example of control, exposes how Saudi Arabia utilized the sectarian and anti-Iranian framing to securitize the situation and to strengthen unity among its citizens and the GCC members (Interview 2 March 2017a; Interview 20 October 2017). Furthermore, externalizing the domestic-triggered unrest provided Riyadh with a (legitimate) cover to call for a collective GCC military response and thus lower the reputational costs. The Power of Incentives and Autocratic Promotion through Hard Leverage Saudi Arabia is also keen to empower its GCC fellows by applying mechanism of conditionality and more material-induced leverage through incentives. Especially Saudi’s abundance of hydrocarbon resources is often politically and strategically used (Interview 4 December 2016a; Interview

Kingdom of Gravity  61 30 October 2017). There are numerous joint oilfield operations between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. Usually the state-owned mega enterprise Saudi ARAMCO operates them. Due to their smaller territories with much fewer oilfields, GCC countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait are in greater need of these fuel sources and their revenues. Saudi Arabia frequently instrumentalizes its own advantageous position. For instance, Bahrain holds a 50 percent share stake in the joint offshore oilfield of Abu Safah that is run by Saudi ARAMCO (Interview 31 October 2017). In 1987, the oil resources from this field began to deplete, and Bahrain became dependent on Saudi oil. Since then, the Saudi rulers have been providing the resource-poor Bahrain with 147,000 barrels of oil per day. This equals around 77 percent of Bahrain’s total output (Davidson, 2015, p. 113). These incentives can also be reversed into means of pressure (Interview 8 November 2017). In 2004, the Saudi government confined the oil subsidies after Bahrain signed a bilateral trade agreement with the USA (Interview 21 November 2016b; Interview 31 October 2017; Partrick, 2011, p. 13). From 2011 onwards, the oil subsidies helped the Bahraini royal family to stay in power. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have several joint ventures of major oilfields along their borders. In 2015, the Saudi government decided to shut down the oil production of two joint Saudi-Kuwaiti oilfields, namely, the onshore al-Wafra field and the offshore al-Khafji field. For Kuwait, a country that unlike its big Saudi neighbor is highly dependent on both oilfields, the decision posed a serious threat to its economy (Interview 22 October 2017; Interview 30 October 2017). Altogether, these examples show how Saudi Arabia makes use of the oil weapon for not only empowering surrounding autocrats but also putting pressure on them to strive for regional convergence. Money is another means of Saudi hard leverage (Rieger, 2014). The kingdom is known to be the biggest donor within the Muslim world (Guzansky, 2015, p. 16). While this tool is apparently more effective beyond the wealthy GCC region, in 2011, Saudi Arabia persuaded Kuwait and the UAE to launch a fund for Oman and Bahrain (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 110; Davidson, 2015, pp. 208–209; Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 5 March 2017; Yom, 2018, p. 75). In 2015, a report noted that the Saudi kingdom allocated 10.7 billion riyals ($2.8 billion) to Bahrain and 9.4 billion riyals ($2.5 billion) to Oman between January 2011 and April 2014 (n/a, 2015). Oman and Bahrain are not members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and lack the resource wealth of their GCC fellows. As a consequence, they are in greater need of financial assistance (Interview 21 November 2016b). Both experienced protests during the Arab uprisings in 2011, although Oman did not nearly face a similar level of large-scale demonstrations (Gause, 2011, p. 18). The ruling elites of Oman and Bahrain used the influx of money to mollify the popular discontent by allocating welfare gains and promoting developmental projects.

62  Tobias Zumbrägel Especially the GCC responses to the turmoil in early 2011 are a good example of this rentier mentality. They allocated huge amounts of their state budgets to satisfy their populations. Saudi Arabia is known to long have meticulously honed this practice of appeasement.5 Already in February 2011, King Abdullah announced subsidies for Saudi citizens and large investments in the social sectors worth some $37 billion (Davidson, 2015, pp. 213–214; Laessing, 2011). The other wealthy states followed this strategy of public spending including Kuwait in June 2011 and the UAE in September 2011 (Davidson, 2015, pp. 217–224; Interview 26 February 2017a). As described earlier, they also assisted poorer states like Oman and Bahrain to apply the same “tried and tested strategy of buying social peace through co-optation” (Rieger, 2014, p. 2). In this vein, one interviewee noted: Allocation of wealth is “within Gulf monarchies’ DNA” that sets apart Middle Eastern dynastic monarchies from all other Middle Eastern regimes (Interview 13 February 2017). That said, it is important that these welfare gains are distributed in agreement with the other GCC states. Otherwise, citizens from other Gulf monarchies would demand the same treatment as “their brothers” (Interview 20 February 2017). Shifting to the ideational arena of hard leverage, the observations made on the ground infer that there is not much religious promotion of the Saudi conservative state-official version of Islam (Wahhabism) within the Gulf region (Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 22 October 2017). Put simply, Saudi religious sponsorship is much more effective outside the Gulf (Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 20 February 2017; Interview 2 March 2017b). But it would be misleading to assume that religion plays no role at all. As one interview partner put it: “Saudi Arabia spreads conservatism as a form of social control by manipulating religion” (Interview 22 October 2017). Furthermore, it has already been suggested that an anti-Shiite discourse prevails. Beyond that, the ideational-level application of hard leverage centers on branding the GCC monarchical rule as a best practice model. Accordingly, an interview partner pinpointed: “Monarchism is a model of success and a model of exclusion” (Interview 30 November 2016). Another interview partner added that “time has shown that monarchies are the best model” (Interview 4 December 2016a). Particularly, narratives of a welfare state and paternalistic authority with the emir, king, or sultan serving as “father of the nation,” deliver an important legitimation source for the regime (Interview 26 November 2016; Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 22 February 2017). These monetary gifts or grants (minḥa) constitute the generosity of the leaders (often stated as makrama malakiyya). In 2011, the monarchs started a “concerted effort” to persuade the domestic and international audiences that Gulf monarchies are “inherently different” from the Middle Eastern authoritarian republics (Davidson, 2015, p. 204). Similar to the mechanism of control, the arena of administrative techniques depicts the political influence over the editorial independence: Traditional and social media channels circulated this message

Kingdom of Gravity  63 and stressed that Arab monarchies are legitimate, because they are “more flexible in accepting public demands, and more connected and closer to them” (Alhomayed, 2011). Another source added: “Unlike republican regimes, the institutions of Arab monarchies provide a fertile ground for the concept of power-sharing” (Al Kabalan, 2011). Several elements can be recapitulated here: The (collective) provision of financial gifts constitutes an important source of eudemonic and personal legitimation. Saudi Arabia puts much effort into maintaining this policy-behavior of rentierism inside and outside the kingdom. Additionally, this allocation character has a great ideational power that serves the monarchical idea (Davidson, 2015, pp. 49–54; Interview 22 February 2017). Two narratives are linked to this: On the one hand, it is about portraying the monarchical rule as role model of economic and welfare development with a benevolent leader at top. On the other hand, it is about antagonizing the republics to highlight this superiority. Behind the Scenes: The Power of Subtle Leverage The kingdom of Saudi Arabia significantly influences other GCC fellows via rhetoric and nonmaterial means. However, for the most part, these GCC power dynamics are happening within the black box and are hard to grasp empirically (Interview 14 November 2016). Acts of (diplomatic) “withdrawal of affections” mirror this symbolic power most vividly. For instance, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador twice from Doha in 2007 and 2014 (Interview 22 February 2017; Interview 26 February 2017c; Interview 28 February 2017). Moreover, the Saudi king was absent from the GCC summit in the Bahraini capital in 2004 and in Doha in 2014 (Nonnemann, 2006, p. 347). Both events were interpreted as a clear signal of displeasure toward the hosting country (Interview 9 February 2017). Apart from this diplomatic disengagement, evidence from the ground on subtle leverage can be found in Kuwait. This is an interesting case because “its liberal behavior made the neighbors nervous” (Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 23 October 2017b). Kuwait has a “dynastical enterprise” as main authority, resembling all other GCC states, but it also has a “parliament” (majlis al-umma) with considerable influence on the decision-making processes (Interview 28 October 2017). Furthermore, there exists a culture of political bargaining and a comparatively high degree of interest articulation and aggregation (Interview 24 October 2017b). Particularly, more autocratic Saudi Arabia has recently targeted to narrow down this public freedom and (limited) pluralism in the neighboring monarchy, as several sources on the ground confirmed (Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 22 October 2017). According to one interviewee: There are more laws on restrictions in Kuwait. More repression against civil activities and there are hundreds of cases. It seems

64  Tobias Zumbrägel that Kuwait started this process, because there was also a threat from Saudi Arabia in the form of “look when you cannot handle it, we will”. (Interview 25 October 2017a) Beyond these rhetorical threats, another more advanced non-material tactic on behalf of Saudi Arabia is to use the country’s legal framework to silence dissidents. There is evidence of an increasing number of cases, where Saudi Arabia utilized court proceeding against citizens in Kuwait. In order to do so, the Saudi embassy in Kuwait would issue a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kuwait, accusing a suspect of, for instance, insulting the Saudi king. The foreign ministry, in turn, would instruct the Ministry of Interior to initiate a court process. The benefit of silencing dissidents by this method is to bypass the Kuwaiti parliament (Interview 24 October 2017a; Interview 25 October 2017a). These incidents support the perception of a trend toward increasing restrictiveness. Even verbal defamation of monarchism outside of Saudi Arabia crosses a red line for the Saudi royals. Besides, Kuwait’s ratification of the GCC security pact, described in the next chapter, appears to have some implications for this process of silencing dissents through a third party (Interview 24 October 2017). The two so far discussed meta-narratives of the ideational arena include (1) monarchism as a best-performing role model and (2) antagonizing Iran and the Shiite populations. Interestingly, they are consistent with patterns of administrative techniques. In the following, the focus concentrates on the two identity-building attributes: inclusion and exclusion (Partrick, 2012). Inclusion encompasses the promotion of cultural content and common heritage (turath). Rephrased, it describes what medieval scholar Ibn Khaldun has labeled group or tribal solidarity (asabiyya) (Partrick, 2012) and underlines the collective tribal heritage that is also written in the Saudi basic law. For instance, the Bahraini ruling family Al Khalifa stems from the same geographical origin of Najd like the Saudi family, which further explains the strong bond between both countries (Interview 20 February 2017; Interview 26 February 2017d). The rhetorical accentuation of same origin and collective cultural heritage also elucidates why Saudi Arabia is able to exert subtle leverage on Kuwait. Salafists, but also the tribal ethnic groups, feel ideationally affiliated to Saudi Arabia (Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 16 October 2017b; Interview 20 October 2017; Interview 22 October 2017; Interview 23 October 2017a; Interview 23 October 2017b). There are individuals in the Kuwaiti parliament that are supportive of Saudi Arabia (Interview 23 October 2017a). Furthermore, several thousand Kuwaitis are living in Saudi exile (Interview 17 October 2017; Interview 19 October 2017b). Some interviewees claim that Riyadh facilitates the dual citizenship and that many people are crossing the border in order to vote in

Kingdom of Gravity  65 favor of prioritizing Saudi interests in the Kuwaiti elections (Interview 20 February 2017; Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 19 October 2017b; Interview 23 October 2017a).6 According to a political scientist based in Kuwait: “the tribes are Saudi suburbs” (Interview 23 October 2017a). Patterns of exclusion are most obvious in anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite rhetoric. Othering may also happen on an intra-Sunni level, by publicly discrediting Qatar or organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In August 2013, the Saudi government forced the Kuwaiti cleric Tareq al-Suwaidin, who is based in Saudi Arabia, to resign from the religious channel al-Resalah, after he expressed sympathy toward the MB. When by the end of December 2013 the Egyptian government declared the MB to be a terrorist organization, Saudi Arabia outlawed the organization in March 2014 (Interview 7 November 2017). The government in Riyadh, moreover, exerted subtle pressure to convert the GCC states to the anti-MB front, in order to contain this “democratic Islamist populism” (Gause 2015). Consequently, the UAE and Bahrain outlawed the organization in 2014 (Interview 22 October 2017; Ryan, 2014).7 “Propaganda war” and techniques of shaming and blaming are other nonmaterial forms of influence, as demonstrated by the ongoing dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In 2006, the quasi-governmentcontrolled daily newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that the Qatari emir paid a secret visit to Israel. As most of the GCC states maintain hidden diplomatic relations to Israel, publishing the event was for the clear purpose of embarrassing the royal family in Doha (Guzansky, 2015, p. 69). In turn, the emir’s wife rejected such an allegation and openly proclaimed that al-Sharq al-Awsat is “controlled by Saudi intelligence paymasters who used the newspaper as a mouthpiece for a propaganda campaign against Qatar and its leadership” (Dorsey, 2013). Such media campaigns were also carried out regarding the dominance of television networks. In this vein, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in several pan-Arab satellite networks such as the Dubai-based MBC and the Bahrain-based Orbit Satellite Network (now called OSN) (Alqudsi-ghabra et al., 2011, p. 54). The best-known media battle is between al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya (Mattar, 2015). While the former was established to help the Qatari Al Thani dynasty in branding its distinctive foreign policy, Riyadh intended to limit the political influence of the state television network in Doha on all sides. In 2001, the then crown prince Abdullah claimed that the Qatari broadcaster is “a disgrace to the GCC countries, of defaming the members of the Saudi royal family, of threatening the stability of the Arab world and of encouraging terrorism” (Krane & Wright, 2014, p. 11). In 2013, the Saudi foreign minister defamed the little peninsula publicly on Twitter, stating: “A TV station with 300,000 inhabitants is not a state” (Trenwith, 2013; Interview 15 February 2017). Between 2002 and 2004, Saudi Arabia prohibited al-Jazeera to broadcast the annual

66  Tobias Zumbrägel pilgrimage, and in 2003, it launched its own satellite channel. Managed by a member of the Al Saud family, al-Arabiya “was explicitly created to compete with Al-Jazeera” (Sakr, 2006, p. 144). Sakr continues: Thus, Al-Jazeera, for example, regularly covered political struggles in the GCC (…), often interviewing dissidents from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In response, Al-Arabiya’s management is understood to have encouraged its staff to give airtime to dissidents in Qatar. (Sakr, 2006, p. 149) Lacking legitimizing channels of political participation, controlling media outlets became important for the autocratic rule of Gulf monarchies to influence the public sphere (Sakr, 2007, p. 8). The media has been strategically used to spread specific norms (e.g. Egyptian preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi on al-Jazeera and Amr Khaled on Saudi-owned broadcasts such as ART and Iqra) or garner support for pushing forward certain foreign policy agendas (e.g. the case of Palestinian elections in 2005; coverage of the “Arab Spring” in 2011) (Hofheinz, 2007, p. 75; Maiola & Ward, 2007; Mattar, 2015). Another digital tactic of subtle leverage is applied by the so-called “king’s men.” They include popular Saudi “politicians, scholars, and journalists, who, directly or indirectly, serve as mouthpieces for the royal house” (Guzansky, 2015, p. 115). In contrast to the Saudi officials, they can formulate a much harsher rhetoric of dissatisfaction over certain topics or events. They spread their opinions through their social media channels, where they can reach a broad audience of millions of followers. For instance, in 2012, when the MB ruled in Egypt, these individuals “warned against the danger and encouraged the Egyptian army to stage a coup” (Guzansky, 2015, p. 115). Considering how the Saudi government took action to support the military coup in Egypt in the following year, it indicates that the “king’s men” act fully in line with the Al Saud. Additionally, the general manager of al-Arabiya, Abd al-Rahman Al-Rashed, criticized Qatar’s behavior during the so-called Arab Spring (Dorsey, 2013). He did the same to put pressure on Kuwait, as one interviewee told me: “Al-Rashed is ‘a good friend of Kuwait, but he wrote four articles against Kuwait, which was clear that he was pressured to do so. Bots [fabricated accounts] have circulated this in the social media’” (Interview 19 October 2017b). Furthermore, “king’s men” may also include religious Saudi scholars. One prominent case is Muhammad al-Arefe, who supported the royal family and frequently slanders Iran and the Shia population on Twitter. In this vein, he fuels cross-sectarian tensions (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 106).8 Traditional media outlets like al-Arabiya also use their social platforms to spread a pro-Saudi narrative (Transfeld & Werenfels, 2016, p. 55).

Kingdom of Gravity  67 Emulation: It Is Always Better Together Effects of emulation take place most obviously within the organizational structures of the GCC, where certain key actors collaborate on a regular basis (Interview 14 November 2016; Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 31 October 2017). Beyond the annual GCC summit and extraordinary meetings, the foreign ministers of all GCC states meet every three months. Every ministry also has a GCC working group that is in continual exchange with the central organization (Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 28 October 2017). Notwithstanding, the different ministries and their working groups play only a minor role. Most of the decision-making happens among the head of states via personal and informal channels of communication (Interview 12 February 2017b; Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 4 March 2017; Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 51). Saudi Arabia functions as passive promoter of many developments, especially in the broader sector of security. Yet, the Saudi kingdom does not act altruistically: Several interview partners claimed that Saudi Arabia considers the GCC “rather as a political tool than a political entity for further integration on different issues” and makes use of it “to formalize Saudi Arabia as rightful hegemonic power” (Interview 15 February 2017). Also, the GCC secretary is headquartered in Riyadh, and hence at the heart of the Al Saud’s sphere of influence (Guzansky, 2015, pp. 21–22; Interview 4 December 2016b; Interview 13 February 2017). During the 2000s, especially in the field of countering terrorism as one aspect of the policy arena, Saudi Arabia has had great success on a regional level and served as an inspirational source that other GCC states frequently sought to emulate. Particularly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, combating terrorism became a top priority for Saudi Arabia (Interview 28 October 2017). In the face of growing global Islamic terror, the GCC states signed a Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Radicalism (2002), a GCC Counter-Terrorism Agreement (2004), and developed a Permanent Anti-Terrorism Committee (2006) (GCC Secretariat-General, 2014; Hürsoy, 2018, p. 31). In 2015, the ministers of interior of the six GCC states also established a unified terror “blacklist’ (Ulrichsen, 2018). In many cases, it was Riyadh that gave the impetus for these collective actions since “terrorism was always connected to stability in Saudi Arabia” (Interview 2 March 2017a). Since 2011, one can detect a Saudi willingness of stronger confederation and securitization (Interview 30 October 2017). This growth in influence on a regional scale became most apparent in King Abdullah’s claim “from cooperation to unity” (cited in: Guzansky, 2015, p. 26). While Bahrain stressed its full support to the plan, the other members remained silent and feared for their independence. Only Oman publicly stressed that it will not be part of a Gulf union (Guzansky, 2015, pp. 36, 92; Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 23 February 2017). Meanwhile, King Abdullah postponed plans and pushed forward several multilateral pacts such

68  Tobias Zumbrägel as the already mentioned “Riyadh Agreement” (2013) and its “Riyadh Supplementary Agreement” in late 2014 (Interview 13 February 2017). Regarding a stronger security integration, Saudi Arabia pushed forward the establishment of a GCC Interpol in 2015 and plans of a joint naval force (Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 23 February 2017; Interview 2 March 2017b). It also attempted to restructure the military capacity of the monarchies, but in the face of large-scale protests in 2011 and in the light of a GCC military intervention in Bahrain, these plans were reconsidered. Eventually, in 2013, the GCC leaders announced the “formation of the 40,000-strong ‘Al-Jazeerah Shield Joint Forces’ (…), which is the first unified land command under the ‘Command of Al-Jazeerah Shield Forces’” (Hürsoy, 2018, p. 37; Interview 23 February 2017). Since Saudi Arabia provided the lion’s share of military personnel, it can be perceived as a “semi-permanent garrison dressed up in GCC colours” (Partrick, 2011, p.  15; Interview 16 February 2017; Interview 30 October 2017). In other words, it provides Saudi Arabia with a tool to control the Arabian Peninsula military under the formal umbrella of the GCC. The ratification of the Saudi-proposed GCC internal security agreement (ittifāqiyyat al-ʾamniyya al-khalīji) in 2013 was probably the clearest sign of autocratic assertion. Already in 1975, it proposed a collective security scheme for the Gulf region (at this time with Iraq and Iran), but there was no consensus (Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 51). After the creation of the GCC with its six members, Riyadh renounced renewed plans in the 1980s and 1990s, but without achieving consensus (Interview 28 October 2017). Ultimately, in 2013, its plan came into force, when all GCC members – except Kuwait – acknowledged the proposal’s terms and ratified the agreement (Interview 20 February 2017; Yom, 2018). The pact’s content has never been published. Individual passages speak of “integration and cooperation and mandates GCC states’ support of each other in case of security unrest and disasters” (al-Sayed, 2013). Another chapter allows the border-crossing of security forces into other GCC members’ territory, leading to a “transnationalization of repression” (Yom, 2018, p. 75). Other sources claim that it is an instrument to control, monitor, and punish regime critics, and therefore comprises articles that include sharp restrictions of public rights, such as freedom of press, in order to foster autocratic rule in these countries (Cooley, 2016, p. 57). These proposals that allow for interference into state sovereignty and were clearly incompatible with the political culture in Kuwait, triggered much resistance from the parliament and the civil society (Interview 28 October 2017). According to one interviewee: “Kuwait was reluctant because you share very sensitive national security topics with the other and also [it was seen as] inconsistent with its constitution” (Interview 26 February 2017c; Interview 16 October 2017a; 23 October 2017a; Yom, 2018). Yet, there is no evidence of Saudi Arabia exerting pressure on the other GCC members to sign the pact (Interview 28 October 2017).

Kingdom of Gravity  69 It has been already mentioned that the ideational framing of the GCC as a “monarchical club” (nādin lil-malakiyya) is a major tool to bolster a regional regime identity of khalīji as well (Derichs & Demmelhuber, 2014, p. 189; Yom, 2018, p. 74). The Saudi military ventures in Yemen 2009 and Bahrain 2011, which were (at least symbolically) supported by the smaller GCC countries post facto through, for example, joint statements, are good examples of this practice (Partrick, 2011, p. 28). The same can be said for the Saudi-led initiative to withdrawal its ambassador from Doha and its partial success in convincing other GCC members to do the same (Interview 24 November 2016; Ryan, 2014).9 Bahrain and the UAE joined Riyadh after trilateral talks in order “to teach Tamim [the Qatari emir] a lesson” (Interview 15 February 2017). Subsequently, Doha was very ambitious to return to the “monarchical club.” In fact, they are all part of the “GCC family,” with various bonds linking the royal families, second-tier elites, but also ordinary citizens and specific groups and organizations (Interview 16 February 2017). Multiple ideational foundations and references to various cultural factors, common history, and policy behavior strengthen such a common notion of familiarity. All elements can be framed under a distinctive khalīji identity that oscillates with the national regime identities (Interview 23 November 2016; Partrick, 2012). On a GCC level, such an emphasis on sameness is applied more frequently than substantive policy implementation, because of the fear of “constraining the ‘sacrosanct’ principle of sovereignty” (Partrick, 2011, p. 35; Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 51).10 Beyond this, a khalīji identity is further amplified by applying a simplistic friend-foe dichotomy or the already mentioned concept of othering, which will be described more profoundly in the following section. Demonstration Effects: Mimicry at Place In addition to examples of multilateral collaboration, there is some evidence that Saudi Arabia served as an inspirational source, which other GCC countries aimed to copy. In September 2004, the Bahraini government arrested several human rights activists after Saudi Arabia undertook the same action six months earlier (Sakr, 2006, pp. 147–148). Since 2011, several GCC states introduced anti-terror laws on a national scale (Interview 26 February 2017c). These laws of combating terrorism often go hand in hand with a restriction of freedom and of expression and a crackdown on regime dissidents or criticism. In early 2014, Saudi Arabia issued the law for the crimes of terrorism and its financing. The antiterror law includes a very broad definition of terrorism, in which political expressions, group petitions, or gatherings, as well as the creation and establishment of organizations and associations can be interpreted as “terrorist crimes” (n/a, 2014c). Increasingly, human rights activists are arrested under this new law due to accusations such as “inciting public

70  Tobias Zumbrägel opinion” and “undermining the regime and officials” (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, pp. 79–80). Half a year later, the UAE published amendments to its own anti-terror law. This modification of an already existing law was perceived as the “toughest in 40 years” (Salama, 2014). By the end of the same year, Bahrain introduced similar amendments to its national anti-terror law. These amendments closely resembled the Saudi modifications. Concretely, Bahrain adapted the practice of extending the pre-trial detention without charge, as the Saudi law had stipulated earlier. Although Kuwait hesitated to implement a new anti-terror law, the Saudi law found supporters: A Kuwaiti MP demanded a “Saudi-style anti-terror law” for his country and justified it by stating that “Saudi Arabia has initiated a revolution against this deviant thinking while we in Kuwait suffer from it” (n/a, 2014b). All newly introduced anti-terror laws or their amendments include harsh restrictions on terrorist crimes that may also be used to confine activity in the public space and curtail oppositional movements. Moreover, they contain but vague definitions of terrorism itself. Bahrain, for example, adopted the same definition as the Saudi law, describing terrorist acts as “disrupting public order,” while the UAE employed the similar phrase of “antagonizing the state” (Government of Bahrain, 2014; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2014; United Arab Emirates, 2014). These forms of stronger censorship that enable the punishment of insults of GCC leaders make the institutions and head of states sacrosanct. It serves the idea of what an interviewee dubbed “monarchism as a symbolism” (Interview 24 November 2016). Meanwhile, there are hundreds of cases, in which individuals with no clear affiliation to terrorism have been detained. According to Yom, who relies on unpublished data material: “Between January 2012 and August 2015, there were over 150 such cases in the Gulf (compared to virtually none prior to the Arab Spring)” (Yom, 2018, p. 75). Many of those individuals were arrested for publicly criticizing or insulting a certain GCC head of state, a country, or the security forces on social media (Interview 12 February 2017b; Interview 30 October 2017; Interview 8 November 2017). Some of them were detained on behalf of Saudi Arabia. This highlights the usage of further autocratic practices, such as the exploitation of the legal setting and the implementation of the GCC internal security pact. The recent anti-terror laws reveal the interplay of legal and technological development and constraints of the digital sphere, which refer both to the arena of administrative techniques and the (constructed) ideational narrative of anti-Shiism. In this sense, Saudi Arabia released a Press and Publication Law by royal decree in 2000; Bahrain (2002) and Kuwait (2006) followed suit. These laws include sections that explicitly punish insults of religious and political leaders (Alqudsi-ghabra et al., 2011; Duffy, 2014, p. 16; Sakr, 2007, p. 12). In the wake of mass protests and the growing role of social media, the GCC states restricted electronic

Kingdom of Gravity  71 communication through legal frameworks such as media laws and “cybercrime” laws (Duffy, 2014, p. 9). Saudi Arabia was the first that published a new media law in April 2011, with more restrictions on media coverage as well as advanced regulations for Internet censorship (Davidson, 2015, p. 152; Duffy, 2014; Interview 24 November 2016).11 In the aftermath, both Oman (late 2011) and the UAE (2012) updated their cybercrimes laws, which fostered the self-censorship and limited freedom of expression in the digital sphere (Duffy, 2014, p. 9). Further demonstration effects are observable in developments regarding technological control of the Internet, which shape administrative techniques. According to Hofheinz: “It was not until 1999, when the Saudi authorities felt sure they had the technology to control Internet use, that they opened it to public access, several years later than most other Arab states” (Hofheinz, 2007, p. 57). In order to do so, it used the US software SmartFilter for blocking and filtering online content. In 2002, the UAE adopted this technology for the same purposes (Hofheinz, 2007, p. 58). Other findings have mixed results. While some interviewees claimed that Saudi Arabia is a pioneer in filtering and monitoring the social media sphere, others consider the UAE or Qatar at the forefront (Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 26 February 2017; Interview 8 March 2017; Interview 8 November 2017). Complementary to multilateral collaboration, individual state-to-state transfer in which Saudi Arabia set an example for its neighbors exists as well. Another example of a demonstration effect is the dissemination of bots or fabricated social media accounts, which is also relevant for the ideational arena. Some early analyses identified several thousands of suspicious Twitter accounts, created to spread anti-Shiite sectarian and pro-Saudi propaganda between in 2013 and 2014 (Jones, 2016). Given the sheer number of Twitter and Facebook users in Saudi Arabia, pro-Saudi discourses dominate the digital sphere as cases such as the discussion of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and anti-Shia hate Twitter posts illustratively reveal (Jones, 2017; Transfeld & Werenfels, 2016, p. 50). Jones as well as several of my interview partners claims that (especially) Kuwait has taken over the Saudi-propagated anti-Shia and antiIran discourses (Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 23 October 2017b). This further evidences a demonstration effect, since “Saudi Arabia initiated the Iranoia” across the GCC sphere (Interview 12 February 2017a; Interview 2 March 2017b). In this vein, the Kuwaiti government sentenced several Iranians to death and expelled Iranian diplomats after uncovering an alleged Iranian spy network in April 2011. A Kuwaiti interviewee noted: “There is a broad perception that the ‘Iran Element’ is here” (Interview 19 October 2017a). Moreover, the Bahraini Al Khalifa government justified the bloody and violent crackdown on protesters by claiming that it was fueled by Teheran. In a newspaper interview, the Bahraini king claimed in 2012 that “there is no doubt that some in Iran

72  Tobias Zumbrägel have an unhealthy focus on Bahrain, as some of the broadcast coverage shows” (Smoltczyk & Mekhennet, 2012). The UAE applied similar rhetoric to defend its military intervention in Yemen. Here, the UAE foreign minister stated: “The UAE stands firmly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in opposition to any Iranian attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states” (Al-Harthi, 2015). Even in Qatar, one can notice accelerating anti-Iranian sentiments (Interview 15 February 2017).

The Temptation of Authoritarianism: Explaining the Motives of the AGC and TS Motives of the AGC to Exert Influence The assumption behind the AGC concept presumes both rationalist and constructivist hypotheses (see Chapter 2). Saudi Arabia’s motives derive from the rational self-serving interest of regime survival combined with geopolitical concerns, such as stabilizing the surrounding environment and empowering autocratic allies (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 4 December 2016a; Interview 16 February 2017; Interview 22 October 2017; Niblock, 2006, p. 4). Moreover, Saudi Arabia promotes an autocratic model that “violates the fundamental principles of liberal democracy” (Kneuer et al., 2018, p. 2). The AGC fosters a regional regime identity (hawiyya khalīji) that trumps the formation of national identities (al-jinsīyāt al-dawlīya) leading to an autocratic consolidation. According to one interviewee: “Saudi Arabia is a reactionary regime that negatively influences the other regimes” (Interview 22 February 2017). While religion does not play a pivotal role, strategies of religious inclusion and exclusion have been applied frequently and effectively (Interview 19 October 2017a). Hereby, Saudi Arabia enhances not only a kind of Sunni supremacy, but reinforces this identity by promoting a friend-foe mindset (e.g. anti-Iran, anti-Shia, anti-MB). In a nutshell, Riyadh uses its superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors to apply carrot-and-sticks tactics that aim to create a Saudi-style environment. The following sections intend to reflect on these points in depth by looking at several specific cases. Uncovering the Promotion Side Particularly the military deployment to Bahrain in spring 2011 shows that the Saudi domestic survival is intrinsically linked to the regional environment. The intervention certainly aimed to stabilize a close ally, but, as many others have stressed, it first and foremost served Saudi Arabia’s interests (Interview 23 November 2016). According to a Gulf expert: “If the opposition in Bahrain wins, then Saudi loses (…) In this regional context, the decision to move troops into Bahrain is not to help the monarchy of Bahrain, but to help Saudi Arabia itself” (cited in: Rieger 2014, 7).

Kingdom of Gravity  73 Riyadh certainly feared a cascading effect to its own Shia population that is based in the oil-rich Eastern province demanding the same reforms, which would, ultimately, mark the starting point of a liberalization process (Odinius & Kuntz, 2015). Additionally, the Al Saud could not allow the downfall of one of its closest allies with which it also shares the strongest economic ties (Nuruzzaman, 2013). One interviewee suggested that the deployment was a convenient test run to assess the Saudi military strength after it upgraded its forces significantly in the last years (Interview 2 March 2017a). In addition to these rational calculations, the military operation highlights several legitimation messages and the construction of a Saudi meta-narrative in order to foster a regional regime identity. Accordingly, the deployment of troops under the GCC umbrella was justified by an (alleged) request on behalf of the Bahraini government and formally legalized (Interview 24 November 2016). One interview partner specified: “The intervention in Bahrain was on the base of the mutual defense agreement and necessary since it is suicide to do something like that on your own” (Interview 23 November 2016). The externalization and the construction of an Iranian threat were intended to generate popular support and to avoid any allegations of a onesided Saudi aggression from the international audience (Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 30  November 2016; Interview 9 February 2017). The willingness to sustain the idea of monarchism was another major trajectory (Interview 31 October 2017). As one interviewee put it: “Monarchical survival was certainly the main reason for sending the PSI [Peninsula Shield Force] to Bahrain. Generally, monarchism is the best solution (also for Yemen), because you see how all republicans fall behind” (Interview 28 October 2017; Interview 31 October 2017). Similar claims have been published by Saudi officials. For instance, one source stressed in the Washington Post that “We’re not going in [to Bahrain] to shoot people, we’re going in to keep a system in place” ( Ignatius, 2011). Achieving compliance from Kuwait and Qatar was not as easily accessible as in Bahrain, and it was based on a more fine-grained approach (Interview, 15 February 2017). Saudi efforts to exert hard and subtle leverage over both countries were guided by a rational calculus to encounter any liberalization attempts as well as an ideational underpinning of fostering Saudi-style region-building processes. Kuwait with its “quasi-democratic political culture,” and Qatar with its national identity of a “globalization without Arabization,” challenge the Saudi vision of building a collective regional identity (Yom, 2018). For instance, Riyadh wanted to force Qatar to shut down the satellite network al-Jazeera, because it creates disunity in the GCC (Ryan, 2014). At the same time, the demands to give up support for Iran and the MB can be interpreted in the light of security threats, but also legitimizing strategies of referring to a (religious)

74  Tobias Zumbrägel otherness. On the one hand, the MB and its various constituencies inside and outside the Gulf states represent a political and religious challenge for the Saudi statecraft and regional hegemonial claims (Interview 7 November 2017). On the other hand, they pose an ideational threat to Saudi Arabia by offering a more bottom-up and reform-oriented alternative populist approach to the conservative, dynastic, and absolute rule of the Al Saud (Gause, 2015; Odinius & Kuntz, 2015). Both the hard and subtle leverage against Kuwait was seemingly grounded in preempting bottom-up mobilization. But it also ideationally kept the Kuwaiti regime closer, and therefore more autocratic. Saudi Arabia used its natural resource endowment as a political weapon (Interview 30 October 2017; Interview 5 November 2017a). The official Saudi account named environmental issues as the reason for stopping the oil production from the joint oilfields, but others interpreted it as “clear signals (…) against policy in Kuwait” (Interview 25 October 2017b). According to them, it targeted Kuwaiti liberal politics and was intended to put more constraints on the political landscape. Some suggested that the Saudi move intended to put pressure on some MPs in the parliament to ratify the GCC internal security pact (Interview 25 October 2017b). Furthermore, the exploitation of the country’s legal setting is a refined way of narrowing the freedom of speech and hindering the formation of critical voices. Uncovering the Diffusion Side Examples of the diffusion mechanisms indicate that Saudi Arabia has managed to portray itself as the “big brother’ that looks after the GCC family (Interview 23 November 2016). Such a “sub-regional paternalism” (Young, 2011, p. 14) reprints the image of a “security guard,” which goes back to the 1980s, where Saudi Arabia publicly committed to protect the smaller GCC states for the first time. The then Saudi foreign minister declared: “The security of every state in the Arab Gulf is the security of Saudi Arabia” (cited in: Guzansky, 2015, p. 20). These pledges initially remained rhetorical. Especially the Gulf War of 1990 revealed the inability of the Saudi to provide security to other GCC members. In the 2000s, however, Saudi Arabia started to make considerable efforts in building up a profound security sector, especially in the field of combating terrorism. This Saudi-promoted securitization accelerated in the wake of the Arab protests of 2011 (Interview 9 February 2017). Saudi Arabia became known as the architect of a security community (Interview 4 December 2016b). The kingdom reinforced this image of the guarantor for stability and security by constructing threats. As one interview partner put it: “Saudi Arabia is the key player in emphasizing security threats” (Interview 4 March 2017). It justified foreign policy behavior in this context.

Kingdom of Gravity  75 For instance, the Saudi decision to recall its diplomatic mission from Doha in 2014 was framed as the need “to protect their security and stability,” although it was a highly symbolic move of showing displeasure about Qatar’s distinctive policy that opposed a collective khalīji norm (n/a, 2014a). These patterns of securitization (often accompanied by sectarian tensions) depict an important narrative that attracted GCC fellows, as will be elaborated in the next chapter. It boosted Saudi Arabia’s regional aspirations of creating an environment of like-minded regimes and disseminate its autocratic concept of rulership. It appears that Saudi Arabia favors the role of passive provider of disseminating authoritarian elements. According to several sources, much more norms and practices are diffused than promoted by Saudi Arabia. The kingdom tends to avoid imposition of its own autocratic governance. Instead, it has “strategic patience of waiting for things to be implemented” (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 21 November 2016b; Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 3 December 2016). Several interviewees state that the kingdom respects the sovereignty of each GCC state and avoids intentional promotion efforts within the Gulf because of mentality and morality (Interview 21 November 2016b; Interview 9 February 2017; Interview 12 February 2017a; Interview 26 February 2017d; Interview 24 October 2017a). Another interviewee confirmed this by highlighting that “persuading the others with words and emphasizing the common sense” is much more legitimate and appropriate (Interview 30 November 2016). Additionally, the Saudi kingdom favours the regional forum of the GCC to indirectly exert influence and attract other members (Interview 17 October 2017; Interview 19 October 2017b). When you consider the GCC a Saudi learning room rather than a transmission belt, it resembles Cooley’s observation: Regional organizations are setting up legal frameworks under “legitimate global scripts or norms” of security or counterterrorism to foster and institutionalize autocratic practices (Cooley, 2016, p. 57). Attraction and Reaction: The Target States and Autocratic Diffusion Scholarship already emphasized that individual state interests deserve special attention. They often act as intermediate variables (Darwich, 2017). The smaller GCC states are afraid “of being swamped by Saudi Arabia” (Interview 2 March 2017b). Such fear of losing state sovereignty and independence is a result of historical experience with Saudi expansionist behavior over 200 years (Interview 20 February 2017; Interview 28 February 2017). Furthermore, as some interviewees stressed: The other GCC states “do not value Saudi Arabia in terms of social, educational, political and cultural aspects” (Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 24 November 2017). Yet, the question remains: Why is Saudi

76  Tobias Zumbrägel Arabia able to influence and attract the other countries at all? Particularly when it comes to diffusion, it is puzzling why the TSs voluntarily adopt autocratic elements from a hard-line assertive autocracy like Saudi Arabia? Again, a division along rational and constructivist arguments appears fruitful. On the one hand, there is a rational calculus to seek exchange and cooperation with a stronger ally in order to stabilize the own rule. One interviewee described it on point: “Either you can get under the Saudi umbrella or you get isolated like Oman” (Interview 16 February 2017). Target states may also look to the AGC as a copy-worthy model for own state improvement. On the other hand, the acknowledgment of a sameness is based on a shared sense of belonging that fosters collaboration (Gause, 2015). An investigation of the aforementioned cases reveals this dualism and the TS’s constant dilemma of choosing between their own state interests and the demands of Saudi Arabia (Interview 22 October 2017). Reactions to Saudi Promotion Efforts The case of Bahrain, again, is striking. Giving the observation made in the preceding section (Section “The Kingdom Seizes Control over the Arabian Peninsula”) about the military intervention, the country had no choice but to comply to the Saudi coercive measures. The Al Khalifa apparently intended to start a reform process and enter into dialogue with the opposition movements. This crossed a red line for Saudi Arabia and resulted in military deployment. Two weeks prior to the intervention, a Saudi expert with close ties to the Interior Ministry told BBC News on 15 February 2011 that “the Bahrainis [had been] on notice that if they did not deal with the demonstrations, the Saudis would do it for them” (cited in: Rieger, 2014, p. 6). In a same manner, a voice from Manama claimed: “Our society may be ready, our government may be ready …. But our neighbors are not ready. And if our neighbors are not ready and they don’t like the deal you worked out, they can make it fail” (cited in: Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 113). In combination with the financial “Saudi infusion” (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 111), compliance satisfied economic interests, but came with high transaction costs. Accepting Saudi terms led to a loss of sovereignty and greater dependence on the big neighbor, while the unresolved situation of the Shia population remains a latent crisis. Since this turning point, many experts on the ground label the tiny kingdom as a “part of Saudi Arabia,” a “Saudi colony,” or a “Saudi principality” (Interview 21 November 2016b; Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 2 March 2017b). Possibly, the turmoil in Bahrain created a unifying moment that resulted in a stronger collaboration amongst the other GCC monarchies and general GCC cohesion (Interview 22 October 2017; Odinius &

Kingdom of Gravity  77 Kuntz, 2015). Such a situation is typical, as one interview partner pinpointed: “GCC membership is stronger in the face of immanent threats” (Interview 13 February 2017). Hence, all GCC head of states stressed in a final communiqué of an emergency meeting in February 2011, that “any harm of the security of any of its members is detrimental to all members alike, triggering decisive and firm unhesitant response” (n/a, 2011). In contrast, other events were rather characterized by a low degree of cohesion and fueled by individual state interests. For instance, the UAE’s decision to follow the Saudi example of withdrawing their ambassador from Doha and outlawing the MB in 2014 was driven by self-interests like domestic security concerns (animosity with the MB) and regional aspirations (e.g. to contain the power of its biggest GCC competitor) (Darwich, 2017). Qatar’s response was muted, but the diplomatic quarrel made an impact on emir Tamim, who ascended the throne in 2013. It is well documented that he reconciled with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. According to one interviewee: Qatar tried to stick to its principles of sovereignty and independence, but soon the young emir, facing the greatest tenure, and its inner circle realized that this a great and very costly undertaking because people were chattering about this and there were even rumours in the media coverage, so all of a sudden, we find that the emir is twice in Riyadh for making good relations. (Interview 15 February 2017) During the GCC Summit 2014 in Doha, in the absence of King Abdullah, the young emir Tamim welcomed the Saudi crown princes with all honors and emphasized his willingness to reach an understanding (Interview 12 February 2017b). The supposedly shortest summit in history ended with a final declaration, in which the Qatari leader reemphasized his respect to the Saudi King and assured cooperation. Emir Tamim further conceded to signing the Riyadh Agreements, forcing members of the MB to leave the country, confirming full support for key allies like Egypt and accepting “joint action in the Gulf” (Khatib, 2014, p. 5). He was also the first head of state who ratified the Saudi-inspired GCC internal security pact (Yom, 2018, p. 77). Kuwait faced a similar catch-22 situation of balancing its political legitimacy and pleasing Saudi Arabia. The ruling family of the al-Sabah ­ faced security concerns caused by the Arab uprisings and growing terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia increased its pressure on the Kuwaiti government to change its path of political openness and pluralism. The country’s comparatively liberal politics had emerged as the dominant constitutive norm of national identity. A change “would erode this ‘Kuwaiti-ness,’ and with it the regime’s self-conception” (Interview

78  Tobias Zumbrägel 28 October 2017; Yom, 2018, p. 69). The then pendant ratification of the GCC internal security pact illustrates this dilemma. While several interviewees told me that the government signed the security agreement, the parliament resisted to approve this (Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 19 October 2017b; Interview 20 October 2017; Interview 23 October 2017a; Interview 24 October 2017b; Interview 25 October 2017b). One interviewee, who attended the session, confirmed that “the pact literally died in the Foreign Affairs Committee at Kuwait’s parliament” (Interview 24 October 2017a). It seems that the Kuwaiti rulers rejected the pact to maintain domestic legitimation and credibility. But the Kuwaiti government implemented other legal frameworks such as a new media law and cybercrime regulations in order to please the Saudis (Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 16 October 2017b; Interview 19 October 2017b; Interview 22 October 2017; Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 9 February 2017; Interview 12 February 2017a). In the words of an interviewee: All GCC members had an interest to implement the security pact, because it is about their survival. If Kuwait would have been not able to agree due to the constitution, they would have found other ways to collaborate secretly or so. (Interview 13 February 2017) Increasing reports of arrests for charges like offending the emir or other GCC head of states as well as rigid entry requirements support the line of argumentation of an autocratic resurgence in the comparatively liberal Kuwait. Several examples of detained Kuwaiti citizens and activists, including the religious scholar Hakim al-Mutairi, the opposition activist Tariq al-Mutairi, and the Mohammed al-Ajmi, support this assumption (Interview 26 November 2016; Interview 12 February 2017b; Interview 16 October 2017a; Interview 16 October 2017b; Interview 23 October 2017b; Interview 25 October 2017a; Interview 5 November 2017a; Okruhlik, 2016, p. 30). One interviewee emphasized that this autocratization goes along with a stronger discrimination against Shiites, which has not happened before (Interview 23 October 2017b). Particularly the initiated reconciliation processes by individual GCC members reflect the gravitational force of Saudi Arabia (Interview 21 November 2016a; Interview 4 March 2017; Interview 8 March 2017; Interview 25 October 2017b; Interview 28 October 2017). For instance, when Saudi Arabia showed displeasure over Bahrain in 2004, the latter initiated an appeasement strategy in order to please the big neighbor (Interview 31 October 2017). There are no signs that Bahrain tried to risk resentment again thereafter. The same is true for a hard case like Qatar. In both cases 2007 and 2014, where Saudi Arabia applied a mixture of control, hard and subtle leverage, the Qatari government tried to resolve the dispute.

Kingdom of Gravity  79 Reactions to Saudi Diffusion Efforts Saudi Arabia’s attraction of other GCC members is most efficient in security matters (Interview 5 March 2017; Interview 7 November 2017; Interview 16 October 2017b; Interview 19 October 2017a; Interview 20 October 2017; Interview 25 October 2017b; Interview 28 October 2017). Surrounded by a belligerent power triad of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, the smaller GCC countries are highly vulnerable to territorial losses and external influence, which they experienced through several (military) external shocks over time (Yom, 2018, p. 73). Particularly the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein remained a trauma, and not only for Kuwait (Interview 13 February 2017; Interview 17 October 2017; Interview 20 October 2017; Interview 23 October 2017b; Interview 28 October 2017). As one interviewee pinpointed: Saudi Arabia is “the only country that can secure their security and stability” (Interview 24 November 2016). The feeling of insecurity has grown in the last years. It is accompanied by increasing threat perception regarding (religious/sectarian) identity marker. This development was stipulated during the 2000s by a growing number of terrorist attacks and increasingly aggressive Iranian rhetoric and behavior under President Ahmadinejad. Since 2011, the growing feeling of insecurity was mainly linked to the regional upheavals. The GCC monarchs feared to be overthrown like their republican counterparts (Interview 12 February 2017a; Interview 15 February 2017; Interview 22 October 2017; Interview 24 October 2017a; Interview 25 October 2017a; Interview 28 October 2017). In light of the regional turmoil, maintaining security appears to be the ultimate source of legitimacy (Interview 2 March 2017b; Interview 5 November 2017b). Adopting the strategy of othering is an appropriate tool to divert from domestic challenges and failures. A last reason is the huge amount of GCC nationals working in the governmental sector, and especially in the security-related sector. Hence, the expansion of the security role goes along with socioeconomic motives since the GCC states suffer from high rates of unemployment and increasing demographic growth (Interview 26 November 2016; Interview 9 February 2017; Interview 2 March 2017b). One interview partner summarized this general development while also clarifying the interplay of various motives: One can say that it is about (over)emphasizing an external threat, because this makes the need for change at home less likely. The greater the threat, the more you can emphasize what a good job you are doing in protecting your citizens (…) and this is something, where all GCC states are interested in. (Interview 20 February 2017) As Sections “Emulation: It Is Always Better Together” and “Demonstration Effects: Mimicry at Place” illustrate, Saudi Arabia most clearly

80  Tobias Zumbrägel functions as an imitation-worthy role model in the field of counterterrorism. Scholarship illuminated how autocratic rulers increasingly justify repressive tactics under the banner of “global war on terror’ and in the name of maintaining “security” and “order” (Edel & Josua, 2018). Another interview partner agreed that “people are highly acquiescent in accepting anti-terror laws as long as it does not affect their daily life” (Interview 22 October 2017). Diffusion of these measures can be clearly detected in the geographic proximity of the GCC. The close ties in the Gulf are built on a “love-hate relationship” (Interview 13 February 2017), where members balance between compliance, appeasement, and attraction, while continuously maintaining state sovereignty, autonomy, and regime resilience as self-serving interests.

Conclusion Several findings may be deduced from this article: (1) Saudi Arabia is an AGC that influences and attracts its neighborhood; (2) this behavior has significantly changed over time; (3) there is a great variation of executing mechanisms; (4) the motives are based on rational calculus but also on the basis of an ideational logic; (5) there is a gradation of Saudi gravitational power and even reciprocal pathways of diffusion. These points will be elaborated more profoundly in the following. First, by applying the conceptual framework of AGCs, I have shown that Saudi Arabia constitutes the protagonist country within the Arabian Peninsula and it has a strong gravitational force that shapes its environment, in which its members act (more or less) in unison. Being the most autocratic state, one also sees that this influence correlates with an authoritarian clustering in the region. The manifold empirical examples underline that not only the AGC but also the TSs have taken action toward autocratization (Interview 8 November 2017). In brief, intentionally and unintentionally disseminated Saudi elements, norms, and practices led to curtailing the political freedom, academic freedom, freedom of press, and human rights issues in the TSs, a development that mostly occurred within the last years (Interview 9 February 2017; Interview 12 February 2017b; Interview 16 February 2017). Second, Figure 3.1 underlines a stronger autocratization attempt in the post-2011 period. Before, Saudi Arabia was reluctant to “play[ing] the big brother role” (cited in: Partrick, 2011, p. 21). From the early 2000s onward, Saudi Arabia engaged more in bilateral actions based on its own state interests, like preventing its own status as the Arabian Peninsula’s hegemon (Dorsey, 2013; Guzansky, 2015, p. 69). Such a behavior perfectly fits to how Gause has generally described the politics in the Arabian Peninsula, which “is guided by a simple operating principle: deny any other power a position of substantial influence” (Gause, 2014, p. 192). At the same time, shaped by events such as the Iraq War 2003, Saudi Arabia was keener to play the sectarian card (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 98).

Kingdom of Gravity  81 In the face of rapidly spreading uprisings in the region that constituted a serious threat to regime survival, Riyadh assumed a more assertive foreign policy (Interview 15 February 2017). Since then, the kingdom disengaged from the previous role of a “regional coordinator” (Kamrava, 2012, p. 98). Three dominant elements can be identified on the basis of such a policy shift and stronger claim for regional leadership: (A) Saudi Arabia’s more assertive and active policy was grounded on and formalized through a closer coordination and collective adoption within the GCC itself. (B) Such a regional integration was accompanied by constructing ideational patterns of inclusion and exclusion. (C) The content of this policy centered on security and stability, which again brought about a stronger autocratic character. This stands in stark contrast to the more liberal period in the 2000s (Interview 20 February 2017; Interview 2 March 2017a). Considering the overall time investigation, several milestones can be identified that explain a policy shift: (A) from 2001 onward: revitalizing regional aspirations; (B) from 2003 onwards: Saudi-led securitization and sectarianization; (C) from 2011 onward: confederation and autocratization. Third, although a more proactive foreign policy enforced since 2011, applying techniques of control and hard leverage is rather the exception, and are mainly applied in the face of a direct existential threat. One can say that Saudi Arabia prefers a wait-and-see strategy combined with a subtle influence behind the scenes instead of forcefully imposing policies (Interview 12 November 2016; Interview 23 November 2016; Interview 16 October 2017a). The majority of intentional promotion is performed through informal rhetorical persuasion and threatening that is much more effective within the Gulf (Interview 24 November 2016; Interview 30 November 2016; Interview 8 March 2017). Even if Riyadh made impositions like economic sanctions, it conceals them (e.g. problems with visa machine or violating environmental regulations). Furthermore, patterns of promotion and diffusion are taking place at the same time (Interview 2 March 2017a). They are interconnected and often difficult to divide clearly. Examples include the sequencing of public spending to mollify protests in 2011 (hard leverage and emulation), as well as the withdrawal of ambassadors from Doha in 2007 and 2014 (subtle leverage and emulation). Fourth, the prime incentive for Saudi Arabia to act as an AGC is the calculus of domestic regime survival, which is based on the understanding that the regional context plays a major role in sustaining regime durability. As Gause stressed: “The al-Saud believe they can handle their own domestic situation; it is the region they worry about” (Gause, 2011, p. 18). Being surrounded by stable and similar regimes may offer advantages when fulfilling core tasks such as economic welfare and security that constitute the backbone for regime legitimation. Thus, the AGC strives for regional collaboration and the construction of a regional regime identity. In doing so, ideational patterns of legitimizing and identity-based

82  Tobias Zumbrägel motives such as emphasizing the own Sunni monarchical identity became important (e.g. invitation of Morocco and Jordan to the GCC). At the same time, socially constructed means of exclusion like anti-Iran and anti-Shia policies were applied. Here, one can notice that rational and constructivist logics are clearly interconnected. Fifth, and lastly, there is a gradation of GCC fellowship and, hence, Saudi ability to influence its neighbors. The proposed threefold classification of hard, middle, and soft cases seems a valid approach to depict the complex dynamics in the Gulf region. It should not be assumed that Saudi Arabia solely influences its neighborhood. There is some evidence of reverse effects on diffusion. For instance, Saudi Arabia adopted e-government processes from Bahrain, which is known to be the frontrunner in this field. Riyadh was also inspired by the UAE cybercrime law of 2006. These examples underline the complex interplay within the Arabian Peninsula, where different actors with different agendas and substantial capacities (e.g. through abundance of natural resources) balance their own state interests with regional challenges, demands, and needs. But it does not challenge the pivotal role of Saudi Arabia. As several interview partners assured: “nothing within the GCC can happen without Saudi Arabia” (Interview 4 March 2017).

Notes 1 This debate is also known as the “monarchy-republican gab’ (Lucas et al., 2014). 2 A more nuanced perspective only gained attention in light of the ongoing Gulf crisis since summer 2017 (Yom, 2018, pp. 68–69). 3 Prior to his accession to the throne (2005–2015), he exerted considerable influence on the political decision-making process in his role as a crown prince after late King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. 4 When speaking of hegemons, one should be aware of the ongoing discussion on whether Saudi Arabia can, in fact, be considered a regional power or a regional hegemon, in view of other proximate nations, such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, who are decisive power in the region as well (Interview 26 February 2017b). 5 In his famous book, Toby C. Jones explains how the Ikhwan and tribes have been co-opted through food and land in the early years of Saudi state building, Jones (2010, p. 9). 6 Often, these people are Kuwaiti nationals, whose tribes and families had been settled in Kuwait or in the area, which has been conquered by Saudi Arabia later on (Interview 23 October 2017a). 7 Other accounts, however, speak only of UAE following the Saudi lead (Darwich, 2017). 8 Yet, he became too critical in the eyes of the Saudi authorities and was detained in 2014. 9 They returned their ambassadors in November 2014 (only a month before the GCC summit) after Qatar agreed to the Riyadh Agreement. 10 Examples include GCC summits and the accompanied media coverage of unity, celebration of each GCC member’s national holiday, low border controls for GCC nationals, or the Gulf football tournament (kaʾs al-khalīj).

Kingdom of Gravity  83

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Kingdom of Gravity  87 Yom, S. (2018). Regimes, Identities, and Regional Order. Kuwait, Qatar, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 67–94. Young, K. E. (2011). The Emerging Interventionists of the GCC. Retrieved from London: https://issuu.com/lsemec/docs/karenyoungpaper/16 Interviews Interview 12 November 2016, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 14 November 2016, with a diplomat in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 15 November 2016, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 21 November 2016a, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 21 November 2016b, with a businessperson in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 23 November 2016, with a political scientist and advisor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 24 November 2016, with a political scientist and advisor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 26 November 2016, with a human rights activist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 30 November 2016, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 3 December 2016, with a political scientist and advisor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 4 December 2016a, with a politician in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 4 December 2016b, with a political advisor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 9 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 12 February 2017a, with political advisor in Doha, Qatar. Interview 12 February 2017b, with political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 13 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 15 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 16 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 20 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 21 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 22 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 23 February 2017, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 26 February 2017a, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 26 February 2017b, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 26 February 2017c, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 26 February 2017d, with a political scientist in Doha, Qatar. Interview 28 February 2017, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 2 March 2017a, with a political advisor to the royal family in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 2 March 2017b, with a political scientist in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 4 March 2017, with a political advisor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 5 March 2017, with a member of the Saudi royal family in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 8 March 2017, with a former diplomat in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Interview 16 October 2017a, with a political scientist and advisor in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 16 October 2017b, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 17 October 2017, with a diplomat in Kuwait City, Kuwait.

88  Tobias Zumbrägel Interview 19 October 2017a, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 19 October 2017b, with a journalist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 20 October 2017, with a former military officer in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 22 October 2017, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 23 October 2017a, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 23 October 2017b, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 24 October 2017a, with a political scientist and advisor in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 24 October 2017b, with a politician in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 25 October 2017a, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 25 October 2017b, with a political scientist in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 28 October 2017, with a politician in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Interview 30 October 2017, with a political scientist and advisor in Manama, Bahrain. Interview 31 October 2017, with a political advisor in Manama, Bahrain. Interview 5 November 2017a, with a politician and human rights activist in Manama, Bahrain. Interview 5 November 2017b, with a political scientist in Manama, Bahrain. Interview 7 November 2017, with the director of a government controlled non-governmental organization (GONGO). Interview 8 November 2017, with an economist in Manama, Bahrain.

4

Democratic Erosion and Autocratization in Latin America The Role of Venezuela as an Authoritarian Gravity Center1 Marianne Kneuer

Introduction Like other world regions, Latin America experienced a regression of democracy since the 2000s. This is partially reflected in a decrease of democratic quality and partially characterized as hybridization, which, in some cases, even led to authoritarian regimes. More than that, Latin America provides a striking case for regional authoritarian clustering. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán qualify the group of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua (adding also Honduras) as cases of democratic erosion on the basis of various indicators (Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2015: 116–118, 123). This empirical finding resonates with most of the other regime measurements like Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Indice de desarrollo democrático de América Latina (IDD), which reflect similar patterns and trends in regard to the deterioration of democracy over time. Thus, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Honduras, and Guatemala form the group of countries with the lowest democracy level (Morlino 2016: 127–134). This pattern of democratic regression and hybridization displays spatial clustering (in terms of geographical proximity) as well as temporal clustering (starting in the same time period of the 2000s), raising questions about possible origins, drivers, or interacting dynamics between these countries that can explain and analytically capture this pattern. Literature widely subsumes the focused group here as “pink tide” or “radical left,” signalizing common traits in the political transformation toward a different kind of democracy (participatory democracy), in the economic policy, and also the societal approach like more inclusion of minorities, ethnic groups, and so forth. The convergence of the political project of change as well as its duration encompassing the time period from 1998 to 2017 when the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa did not run for the presidential elections any more (hoping that his dauphin Lenín Moreno would follow his path) indeed justifies such inscription. Although an array of literature has been produced on the pink tide, few

90  Marianne Kneuer studies are interested in the explanation of the convergence or clustering. Most studies present country cases (see e.g. Chávez 2008; Weyland/ Madrid/Hunter 2010; Levistky/Roberts 2011; Ellner 2014). Some scholars set out to explain the convergence; Weyland points to demonstration and contagion effects (2013), and de la Torre (2017) suggests diffusion (learning and emulation) as general mechanism. What still is lacking is a systematic account of how this clustering can be explained and which mechanisms are responsible for it including not only diffusion but also promotion of autocracy. Moreover, studies predominantly concentrate on domestic developments and causes, while studies are rare (to nonexistent) when it comes to considering possible external influences. Given the knowledge from democratization studies in the context of the Third Wave (see in detail: Introduction), it is not far-fetched to hold that the process of democratic erosion does not take place in an isolated fashion as a purely domestic evolution, but that there exist external influences and external-domestic interactions that shape the domestic actors’ preferences and their policy choices. The concept of authoritarian gravity centers (AGC) offers an approach to identify a source of authoritarian pressure and/or the source of dissemination of authoritarian elements. This chapter thus not only contributes to the general debate on the pink tide and the democratic erosion in this region but also adds a new account (a) on external influences of democratic erosion and autocratization and (b) on the research on what makes democratic, defective democratic, or hybrid regimes susceptible for an authoritarian path. The analysis corroborates that Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) is an AGC. The favoring conditions for this role as AGC were twofold. On one side, Chávez was as much interested in creating a politically and ideologically like-minded regional environment (at the same time serving as a hegemonic counterpart to the USA and the Western liberal democracies in general) as countries in his proximity like Bolivia under Evo Morales, Ecuador under Rafael Correa, and Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega were interested in transferring ideas and policy elements from the Chávez system. On the other side, two relevant contextual factors exist. Firstly, the United States’ reduced interest in the region since 9/11 produced a context in which political outsiders and alternative political models could rise in and find significant room to maneuver with regard to foreign and regional policies. Secondly, the high international prices of raw materials (oil) and the resulting revenues served as a permissive cause for Venezuela’s “petrodiplomacy” (Clem/Maingot 2011) and its “regional social policy”’ (Muhr 2011a: 220, see also Muhr 2011b) via ALBA. This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis of how Venezuela’s influence materialized in terms of different mechanisms (promotion versus diffusion) and sub-mechanisms (control, hard, and subtle leverage versus emulation and demonstration effect – see Introduction).

Democratic Erosion and Autocratization  91 The empirical analysis of these mechanisms covers four arenas (institutional, ideational, policies, administrative techniques). At the same time, this chapter illuminates the motives of Chávez as well as of the leaders in the target states. Methodologically, this study relies on qualitative work, that is, data collection mainly by interviews. In total, 70 interviews were conducted in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Germany, and Spain.2 Additionally, and to get a more fine-grained picture of the interaction in the ideational arena, a discourse analysis was completed. For that, 27 (relevant) speeches of the presidents of the four countries under research were selected and analyzed.3 Beyond that, other official documents as well as secondary sources have been evaluated.

Venezuela as Protagonist of Democratic Erosion in the Region – Defining the Sample The group of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua shares the common trait of democratic erosion during the 2000s. On the basis of the criteria outlined in the introductory chapter of this volume, Venezuela is identified as the region’s AGC. Different democracy indices (e.g. Polity IV, Freedom House, BTI) all share as a common denominator its declining democratic character. One landmark is reflected in the report year 2006 when Polity IV as well as BTI stopped classifying Venezuela as a democracy and instead characterized it as open anocracy (Polity IV) or moderate autocracy (BTI). Freedom House, as an index that has been widely criticized as too highly aggregated (see Coppedge et al. 2011, 2016), is not able to reproduce the deterioration of democratic quality in the same fine-grained way, but equally reflects the incremental downgrading at the critical junctures in 2005 (starting the way toward the socialism of the twenty-first century) and 2009 (the amendment of the constitution lifting the term limits for presidential election). Despite the controversial positions in regard to the chavismo that shapes the scholarly literature, there is a minimum consensus that the government of Chávez has to be divided into several phases, which, at the same time, display different levels of democratic quality (Hawkins 2010; Corrales/Penfold 2015; López Maya 2016; Hidalgo/Corrales 2017). Within the evolution toward a hybrid regime between 1999 and 2009 (Corrales/Penfold 2015: 14–48), most analysts agree that after the “political honeymoon” (Corrales/ Penfold 2015: 15), the coup d’état of 2002 catalyzes a next sequence, consolidating control over justice, the electoral bodies, and the media. Another critical juncture is the Revocatory Referendum of 2004 that impels Chávez – although emerging triumphant out of this challenge – to leave behind the model of the participatory and protagonist democracy as alternative democratic model and move toward the socialism of the twenty-first century (López Maya 2016: 107–129). When the referendum for constitutional

92  Marianne Kneuer reform, that was meant to install the new socialist and anti-liberal model, failed in 2007, Chávez two years later finally enforced an amendment including the most relevant element for securing his grip to power: the lifting of the term limits. This last phase of the Chávez’s government (2009–2013) implies a further democratic deterioration toward autocratic rule comprehending recentralization, vertical concentration of power and control, and the increase of suppression of pluralism and the participatory element. In sum, Venezuela is a role model for the incremental erosion of democratic structures and processes (Kneuer 2018) and the sequencing from democracy toward hybridization, or a hybrid regime in transition (Hidalgo/ Corrales 2013), and finally to autocratization. The country fulfills the first criterion we defined for an AGC, namely, the status as autocracy for at least five years (see Kneuer/Demmelhuber in this volume). According to our second criterion, an AGC has to have the willingness and the capacity to be the protagonist authoritarian player vis-à-vis its geopolitical proximity. Indeed, ever since the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution, the Chávez government not only tried to transform the political, economic, and societal landscape of Venezuela, but also that of the whole region (Corrales/Penfold 2015; de la Torre 2017). Therefore, it established missionary and outward-oriented policies aiming at a Latin American integration scheme oriented against the United States and, in turn, striving for a “multipolar world” (GBRV 2008: 7). Within this new world order, the Venezuelan government defined its own role as a “global energy power” (GBRV 2008: 7), and later as a social, economic, and political power in the region (GBRV 2013: 13). 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 2003

2006

Venezuela

2008 Bolivia

2010 Ecuador

2012

2014 Nicaragua

Figure 4.1 The Development of the Democratic Status According to the BTI (2003–2016). Source: BTI 2003–2014; 10–8: consolidated democracy;