Authenticity and Religion in the Pluralistic Age: A Simmelian Study of Christian Evangelicals and New Monastics 1498557422, 9781498557429

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Authenticity and Religion in the Pluralistic Age

Authenticity and Religion in the Pluralistic Age A Simmelian Study of Christian Evangelicals and New Monastics Francesca E. S. Montemaggi

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL Copyright © 2019 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Montemaggi, Francesca, 1977- author. Title: Authenticity and religion in the pluralistic age : a Simmelian study of Christian Evangelicals and new monastics / Francesca Montemaggi. Description: Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019001204 (print) | LCCN 2019008542 (ebook) | ISBN 9781498557436 (electronic) | ISBN 9781498557429 (cloth : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Authenticity (Philosophy) | Religious pluralism. | Philosophical theology. | Simmel, Georg, 1858–1918. Classification: LCC B105.A8 (ebook) | LCC B105.A8 M66 2019 (print) | DDC 210—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019001204 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction: Cultivating Authenticity in the Pluralistic Age

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Authenticity, Modernity, and Religion Crossing Boundaries in the Field The Relational Sociology of Georg Simmel Belief as Experiential and Relational Authenticity, Self-Transcendence, and Relationality Authenticity and Tradition Sacralization: Marking the Boundaries of Authenticity Relational Authenticity The New Monastic Cultivation of Authenticity Authenticity in Pluralistic Times

1 21 35 53 77 97 119 137 157 179

Appendix: The 12 Marks of a New Monasticism

187

Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

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v

Acknowledgments

This book is the fruit of stubbornness. Lacking in funding and an institutional home, I wrote it as my own venture. Outside the reassuring walls of an academic institution, I lacked funding and a scholarly network, yet I was able to take my inquiry into different directions and stray from disciplinary boundaries. Being an independent researcher comes with heavy financial and personal costs, which cannot be sustained for long, but it was worth it. This work has taught me to see the multiple layers of social reality, to hear how people understand and give meaning to their lives, and to make sense of it. This book represents an important step in becoming a sociologist. Thus, I would like to thank those who have opened a window onto social reality. I discovered the beauty of ethnography thanks to Dr. Sara Delamont, who has helped me decode social life and see its layers and dynamics. The main focus of this book is theoretical, yet the ethnographic work and an appreciation of how people make meaning have been crucial in rethinking Simmel and developing concepts that can shed light onto religious life today. Dr. Huw Thomas has been a staunch supporter of my work, notwithstanding the disciplinary divide. Huw has been a friend and an example of integrity and humility in an environment dominated by performance indicators and saturated with inflated egos. I would like to acknowledge my late teacher, Sante Amaduzzi, who taught me self-discipline in my study and passion for knowledge and understanding, and my mother, who has instilled in me love for knowledge. This book is dedicated to all who embark in research without funding, without institutional support, and who are too often alone in pursuit of something that too often seems useless and worthless. There is value in such endeavors.

vii

Introduction Cultivating Authenticity in the Pluralistic Age

Du sollst der werden, der du bist Thou shalt become the person you are —Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1887)

Today, authenticity is often invoked to capture the promise of something “genuine” in a world of carefully edited images and well-crafted sound bites. It is the search for something “original” amidst standardized mass produced goods. It stands for a consistency that does not mutate to meet passing trends and tastes, but that also differs from what is considered mainstream. Being authentic speaks of the search for distinctiveness of the individual in a mass society, where the person is at once called to be herself, while also “wearing different hats.” The person has to develop different “personas” to interact appropriately in each situation. She adapts to the demands for professionalism at work and intimacy in the home; yet, pulled into different directions, the self feels fragmented. The search for authenticity thus becomes the aspiration for some sort of unity of the self, which prevents the person from being reduced to wearing a mask, as Pirandello would have it, to play on the stage of our collective social life. Yet, it is that creative search for one’s moral self and identity that allows the person to keep changing and growing, thus avoiding becoming a rigid mask. It is the continuous process that prevents staleness. Authenticity, as the research in this book shows, is a movement, a becoming aware of social conditioning and pursuing an ethical and spiritual way of life. Authenticity thus lies in the search, rather than in the achievement of a particular way of life. In that search, the moral self is formed and re-formed. ix

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This book develops an original concept of authenticity to better understand the transformation of Christian self-identity in pluralistic times. In the local narratives of Christian evangelicals and new monastics, authenticity is identified with the attempt at living a distinctive moral lifestyle, not superior, but of equal worth to those of non-Christians. Crucially, I understand authenticity as the person’s construction of a moral identity within a tradition of reference, understood as a body of knowledge, practices, and narratives, which connects the individual to a community and the present to the past. Scholarship on authenticity in philosophy, sociology, and in the study of religion, understands authenticity as an expression of modernity, which is too often framed in opposition to tradition. In contrast, I argue that Christians draw on tradition to construct authenticity. For instance, Christians interpret tradition in opposition to the celebration of individual self-authority that is at the core of Western society. Yet, they do not reject modernity and selfautonomy; rather they form their moral self in the tension between individuality and commitment to tradition, which, in their eyes, is what makes Christianity distinctive. The combination of an in-depth interpretation and adaptation of the ideas of Georg Simmel through an engagement with philosophers who have theorized authenticity, together with ethnographic research will appear unorthodox. It is an enterprise that has, I believe, yielded an innovative outlook, but that had to make choices in what to include, how deep and careful an analysis of Simmel was required, and in finding ways to link philosophical thought with empirical reality. A monograph on Simmel’s thought focusing on religion and authenticity would have teased out the intricacies of his thought; it would have engaged more deeply with the phenomenon of modernity and how its dynamics can be seen at play today; and it would have reflected on the changing phenomenon of religion at a time of globalization. An ethnographic monograph would have provided a richer portrait of the case studies; the fieldwork would have included many more interviews; and the analysis would have been broader and included a deeper consideration of local practices. In contrast, this monograph has the ambition of bridging two distinct worlds of academia. Current literature on authenticity is neatly divided between the empirical research, which focuses on how individuals and groups construct their authentic identity, and how producers, advertisers, and consumers construct the authenticity of a product or service, and the theoretical scholarship, which is centered around the individual and the moral dimension of authenticity. The present work bridges the separation between theoretical and empirical works by operationalizing Simmelian thought. I do so by thinking through individuality, authenticity, and relationality with key philosophical ideas and sociological insights. Too often the study of classical theory is confined to a philological analysis or is detached from empirical findings. In this book, I

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bring together Simmel’s work on religion, individuality, and ethics to propose a concept of authenticity that is grounded in a specific tradition. This venture began with a pilot study at the church of Bethlehem, a conservative evangelical church. The choice of the church and the immersion in Simmelian thought was, to an extent, fortuitous and guided wholly by intellectual curiosity. At that time, the choice of the church was motivated by their “vitality” and their action in the public sphere, which led me to investigate and analyze critically the notions of social and spiritual capital (Montemaggi 2011) and theories based on rational choice theory and economics of religion (Montemaggi 2010, 2013a, 2013b). It was Bethlehemites’ focus on commitment rather than belief (Montemaggi 2013b) what led me down the path of developing a theoretical framework that could account for the formation of the moral self. The case study of Bethlehem thus constitutes the main case study and occupies chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8. In successive work, I have tried to expunge Simmel from empirical analysis to suit better the disciplinary structures of academic publishing; yet Simmel gave me the language to understand the Christians I studied. Their local narratives and practices have required an interpretation of concepts that could account for contemporary religious experience. My research participants seemed to echo Simmel in comparing faith to music, talking of authenticity and describing belief as trust in God. The concept of authenticity thus arose from theoretical developments, but also from the local narratives of authenticity. Simmel’s study of religion is part of his complex and wide-ranging sociology, which is underpinned by a shifting philosophical framework and inconsistent terminology. His work does not provide a clear and coherent framework. It is therefore not amenable to simple application; rather it requires careful consideration, interpretation, and adaptation. The theoretical contribution of this book lies in the adaptation and systemization of concepts derived from Simmel’s sociology with a view to providing a notion of authenticity that can capture the meanings of Christians today. Simmel provided sharp insights into the processes of modernity and grappled with the notions of individuality and self-autonomy, which are at the heart of philosophical thought on authenticity. In turn, the empirical research has been crucial in leading to a re-reading of Simmel’s writings and the building of an original framework for the study of religion. Simmel’s work on individuality and ethics has influenced Martin Heidegger, one of the most prominent philosopher of authenticity. Simmel, spoke of a search for “originality” in a society of looser ties characterized by fast change. He thought that people, faced with the speed of social change of the modern era and the incessant creation of new cultural products, sought refuge in a heightened individualism (Simmel [1918] 1968, 19). With Simmel we can view authenticity as a manifestation of the subjectivism of the modern and late modern era. The preoccupation with authenticity reflects the individ-

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ual’s preoccupation with their personal and social identity. At a time of shifts in social status and roles, the person is free and is called to exercise selfautonomy in fashioning and expressing her own identity (Giddens 1991). The search for authenticity, however, does not stop at self-fashioning and self-expression, which some feel might fall prey to narcissism (Taylor 1992). It is a becoming aware of social conditioning and a search for a moral self, even within a context of consumer products and lifestyles (Lewin and Williams 2009, 71). In trying to be authentic one seeks to develop one’s consciousness, grounded in relationships and in dialogue with tradition. Twentieth-century’s philosophy has framed authenticity as an expression of individuality and self-autonomy, yet the authenticity emerging from the narratives of the Christian groups, examined in this book, speaks not only of the individual’s moral self, but also of the construction of a distinctive group identity vis-à-vis, what is felt to be, mainstream society. It has a strong subjective dimension, which often echoes unwittingly the authenticity of proto-existentialist and existentialist philosophers, like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Beauvoir. It also captures the construction of Christian identity as distinctive for being in opposition to the consumer and competitive values of mainstream capitalist society. This is something that is very similar to the identity construction of members of subcultures, which suggests a broadening of the meaning of authenticity. The search for distinction also points to a significant shift in Christian consciousness. Contemporary Christians understand Christianity as a culture that is no longer shared and practiced by the majority; rather it is a distinctive way of life in the sea of diversity of post-Christian liberal democracies. The analysis of authenticity thus provides a glimpse on the transformation of Christianity in the Western world. The appeal to authenticity across society illustrates the modern tension between individuality and the changing social roles and norms of today’s Western society. The authenticity of today, much like that of yesterday, is characterized by the individual’s search for self-autonomy and self-expression vis-à-vis social norms and roles, which are felt as constraining and, often, alienating. The philosophical reflection on authenticity of yesterday (Beauvoir [1943] 2004, [1945] 1948; Heidegger [1927] 1962; Kierkegaard [1843] 1983; Sartre [1943] 1992) and of today (Ferrara 1998; Taylor 1992) has sought to develop the notion of authenticity as an ethical pursuit of the individual, in response to the radical social, economic, and cultural changes, first sparked by industrialized modernity, developed in later stages of modernity throughout the twentieth century, and now in the digital phase of the twenty-first century. It is therefore valuable to go back to a classical analysis of modernity to grasp fully the “aetiology” of the current dynamics. The choice of Georg Simmel, a classical theorist of modernity, as a guide to the

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understanding of authenticity and religion, is thus motivated by the recognition of the continuity of modernity into the present era. Simmel was the “sociologist of modernity” (Frisby 1985), who reflected on how the processes of industrialized modernity shaped individuality. He saw in nineteenth century’s modernity the rise of an individualism of distinction. The concern for an individual “originality” was, for Simmel, a result of the fragmentation of modern society. The increased subjectivism of modernity is born out of the individual’s reaction to mass production and social differentiation. For Simmel the person had an individuality, which was the result of a process of interaction and self-consciousness rather than an essence. He conceived of the individual in relation to others, although the individual was not exhausted by social interactions; rather the person interacts in society through her specific individuality. Simmel’s emphasis on individuality made him attuned to the shifts of modernity, in particular to the challenge of modernity for religion. He foresaw the emergence of a more mystical form of religion through which the individual could express their own religious sentiment. Yet, his relational sociology allows a more nuanced understanding of individuality and of religion. Simmel’s view of religion is often understood in a mystical vein as the individual’s search for meaning in a fragmented modern society. Religion, in its individual dimension, is a mode of consciousness, which offers unity to the self at a time of fragmentation. This reading, while correct, is reductive and leaves unexplored the possibility of religion as a dynamic pathway for achieving self-transcendence of human consciousness. For Simmel, religion did not simply offer solace to alienated modern individuals. Simmel did not view modernity in such gloomy terms. For him, modernity presented great opportunities to express one’s individuality. Individual religiosity, far from being a privatized religiosity, is thus an avenue for self-understanding that stirs the person into transcending social conditioning. In this book, I develop this analysis and build on Simmel’s notion of self-transcendence, as being aware of one’s social conditioning and attempting to go beyond it, so to link religiosity to authenticity. Accordingly, religiosity is a sensitivity to selftranscendence and, as such, offers a path for the search of authenticity. By linking together and reinterpreting Simmel’s insights, I theorize the pursuit of authenticity as a call on the person to be constantly aware of herself and social conditioning and to express self-autonomy (Montemaggi 2017d). I also take Simmel further by adding the role of tradition to the search for authenticity (Montemaggi 2017c). Tradition is an indispensable framework of reference, on which religious actors draw to construct their idea of authenticity. Postmodern thinking has framed tradition as a “grand narrative,” a cultural paradigm through which we understand our world. This is dependent on an understanding of modernity as a fundamental break from a supposed premodern world of tradition. Accordingly, authenticity is an

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outcome of the “detraditionalization” (Giddens 1990) of modernity, a break from premodern society where the individual was subject to traditional values and social order. Such framing fails to recognize similar processes of individualization and urbanization in premodern European societies and assumes tradition to be a static social order. It also precludes any understanding of tradition as a cultural framework that is always being constructed. Authenticity, in the social scientific study of religion, captures the rise in prominence of the individual conscience in shaping religion. In this literature, it is “individuals themselves who are responsible for the “authenticity” of their own spiritual approach” (Hervieu-Léger 2006, 60) in societies where individual autonomy is a principle. Authenticity is understood as a “modern disposition” (Bielo 2011a, 18) of dislocated selves seeking a “religious life or practice that . . . not only must be my choice, but must speak to me; it must make sense in terms of my spiritual development as I understand this” (Charles Taylor 2002, 94). Self-autonomy is decidedly prevalent in today’s religious expression; yet we should not overlook the fact that, though more autonomous than in the past, the person articulates her individuality within a specific social and cultural context and that the emphasis on self-autonomy and the person’s subjectivity are themselves characteristics of the specific cultural context of Western liberalism. The autonomy of the individual is expressed within the religious community and is often key in legitimizing aspects of that religious tradition (Montemaggi 2015). The important shifts of industrialized modernity form a new cultural framework which does not simply supersede tradition; rather tradition is reinterpreted within the modern framework, as shown by the examples of new monasticism in this book and in studies of Italian new monasticism (Palmisano 2015). The authenticity of Christians in this book is also relational. This is perhaps where the authenticity of Christians and that of nineteenthand twentieth-century philosophers differ most. Philosophical ideas of authenticity captured the ideal of self-autonomy and morality, which are grounded in individuality rather than a transcendent God. God was dead, as Nietzsche cried out, and no supreme values were certain. Only by turning inward, could the individual find grounding to be true to themselves and thus be able to inhabit different spheres of life without suffering from alienation. The authenticity of Christians, in contrast, is firmly grounded in relationships (and thus much closer to that of Simone de Beauvoir). Being authentic requires a becoming aware of one’s interdependence and a recognition of the Other. Christians, in this study, consider relationality to be at the heart of Christianity, often in opposition with what is felt to be an individualistic and selfish society (Montemaggi 2017b, 2018c, 2018d). Authenticity thus signifies specificity and distinctiveness, and a moral grounding. This allows a reconfiguration and affirmation of tradition. Accordingly, authenticity is here used as an analytical concept to shed light on how infor-

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mants construct their identity at the individual and communal level. By examining how Christians construct authenticity through the interpretation of tradition and adoption or rejection of wider cultural norms, we can gain a more nuanced understanding of current shifts in Christian consciousness in pluralistic times. The analysis of what informants understand as being an authentic Christian suggests that they accept pluralism, understood as the liberal democratic value, which accords recognition of equal dignity to all individuals and groups (Beckford 2003). Christians acknowledge they live in culturally Christian countries, but understand their Christian identity as distinctive because it is not shared by the wider population. They see themselves as a distinctive group within the wider diversity of multicultural society. Pluralism thus provides recognition and legitimacy to their own specific tradition. Christians’ acceptance of pluralism needs to be inserted in the wider loss of cultural hegemony of Christian culture in today’s Western world. The Christian claim to distinction does not extend to consider Christian authenticity to be necessarily superior to other religious and non-religious moralities; rather they understand Christianity as a particular tradition among others and thus having a legitimate place alongside other faiths and cultures. The acceptance of pluralism among highly committed Christians shows a shift in consciousness. It also provides an insight on a different understanding of religion. The scholarship in the study of religion has for a long time framed religion in the image of Protestantism, as belief in a supernatural entity (propositional belief) and personal conviction (Montemaggi 2018a, 2018b). The Protestant model of propositional belief and an individualistic understanding of the self as the locus of faith became the dominant understanding of all religion, leading to hierarchies of religious traditions and behavior. Such a conception was critiqued by anthropologists, who had studied non-Christian and non-Western societies. More recent studies of new forms of Christian Protestantism are showing a more nuanced understanding of belief, especially among “emerging Christians” (Bielo 2011a, 2011b; Guest 2017; Guest and Taylor 2006; Marti and Ganiel 2014), who “deconstruct” Christianity and seek to elaborate a “contextual theology” for the post-Christian era. This book adds to these studies showing that contemporary Christians, including self-proclaimed evangelicals, distance themselves from propositional belief, privileging experiential and relational belief, and self-transcendence (Montemaggi 2017a). In the local narratives, analyzed in this book, personal conviction and propositional belief are not totally absent, but they are certainly secondary. The book, supported by the development of a Simmelian framework, proposes a theoretical reconceptualization of religiosity as relational and experiential. The notions developed in this book and the empirical analysis make a contribution to debates around belief (Davie 2015; Day 2011; Lindquist and

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Coleman 2008), in proposing different dimensions to belief. The book contributes to the study of continuity and change of Christian religion in proposing the notion of sacralization, which identifies how religious actors legitimize ideas and practices through engagement with tradition. I have put forward a concept of authenticity drawing on philosophical sources that can best capture the narratives and experiences of research participants, thus contributing to the literature on the transformation in contemporary Christian consciousness (Bielo 2011a, 2011b; Guest 2007a, 2007b; Vincett and CollinsMayo 2010). The linking of religiosity with authenticity allows us to go beyond rigid categories of belief and belonging to grapple with the life of faith of contemporary Christians. The theme of authenticity emerged during the fieldwork in Bethlehem, the evangelical church that is the focal point of this study. Church members identify Bethlehem as “conservative” and “mainstream evangelical,” although they share little with their counterparts in the United States (Ault 2004; Balmer 2014; Bielo 2004, 2009a; Elisha 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Kintz 1997). Bethlehem has no specific denomination although the founders, just over thirty years ago, came from a Baptist background. The founders had a vision of a church “in the community and for the community,” as Felix, the founding pastor told me. Bethlehem is not part of charismatic or “emerging Christianity.” It is therefore of significance that committed evangelicals at Bethlehem construct an identity that embraces pluralism. Such embrace is not merely to claim recognition from mainstream society, it is born out of the practice of community and of a relational conception of authenticity. Authenticity as self-transcendence conveys the continuous and incessant becoming aware of social conditioning and seeing oneself and the Other from an ethical perspective. It is a relational authenticity that is expressed in relationships. Bethlehem’s focus on relationality has been translated in efforts to build an inclusive community open to people in the neighborhood, regardless of their background and lifestyle. The overarching ethic at Bethlehem, but also among new monastics, is a relational one, which I call of compassion. Compassion calls on religious actors to be open to and accept the Other refraining from judgment. The ethic of compassion is centered on the person and affects how religious actors interpret long-established moral and doctrinal stances, including in relation to homosexuality and salvation. I distinguish between the person-centered ethic of compassion and the norm-centered ethic of purity, which affirms principles over acceptance of the person. This allows an analysis of boundary making and change. The distinction between the ethic of compassion and the ethic of purity goes beyond the dichotomy of Conservative vs. Liberal (Hunter 1991; Wellman 2008), to shed light on the relationship between ethical approaches and community boundaries. Compassion weakens boundaries, while purity reinforces them. Boundaries emerge from the interplay of the two ethics. This

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framework, together with an understanding of authenticity as a formation of the moral self, makes a contribution to the growing literature in anthropology of morality (Faubion 2011; Laidlaw 2014; Lambek 2015; Lambek et al. 2015; Mahmood 2005; Robbins 2013; Zigon 2007). The people-centered ethic (ethic of compassion) is particularly relevant to the study of new monastics. It was the relational authenticity, expressed through the practice of hospitality that led me to begin my research on new monastic (chapter 9). During the completion of my PhD, I conducted scoping studies of new monastic communities in the United States, Canada, and the UK. These were entirely self-funded, which put constraints on the time I could dedicate to the project. The scoping studies were motivated by new monastic explicit pursuit of a religious and moral way of life that was set out through specific vows and communal covenants, and by their attempt at meeting the Other, which rests on what I term the ethic of compassion. The distinctive way in which new monastic articulate authenticity and compassion led me to pursue the study further. After completing my PhD, I began researching a new monastic community in the UK, which I call The Parish. This was also entirely selffunded. What became apparent from my study of new monasticism was the cultural differences between new monastic communities in the United States and Canada with those in the UK (this is explored in chapter 9). New monastics in North America often seek to be located in inner-city areas to have a transformative impact on deprived neighborhoods. This is done through the practice of hospitality, which is seen as a way to respond at the local level to social inequality, heightened individualism, consumerism, and globalization. The narratives of North American new monastics are more conscious of socioeconomic issues. They are more “political” than British new monastics. This is particularly so for more recent communities. Yet, there is a variety of political views among new monastics. They are far less defined by their politics than by the overarching ethic of compassion. It is the meeting of the Other that is central to new monasticism. This is a characteristic shared by British new monastics. New monastics seek to be inclusive inside the group and of people attending monastic activities of shared meals and contemplative worship, as well as of people at the margin of society. The new monastic practice of hospitality is understood across communities as a way to express the value of inclusiveness. This is grounded on compassion, the recognition of the Other and the attempt at including the Other. The study found that across communities, North American and British, new monastics formulated a “structured” authenticity, based on vows and regular traditional practices. New Monastics understand being a Christian as a way of life, which is practiced through vows. Vows vary from community to community and can include regular individual and communal prayer, a commitment to live sustainably, and giving hospitality, for instance by providing a communal meal for people in the neighborhood. The vows give

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structure to the pursuit of authenticity and accountability of the individual to the group (Montemaggi 2017b). Just like for Bethlehem evangelicals, commitment and effort are required in the pursuit of authenticity. Unlike Bethlehem evangelicals, new monastics appeal explicitly to Christian tradition and seek to reconcile it with inclusiveness. New monasticism is an instance of neo-traditionalism (Spear 2003): the reinterpretation of past practices, narratives, and symbols in the context of the present. New monastics use tradition in explicit ways, through symbols, rituals, and other practices, to sustain personal spiritual growth and renew Christianity. New monastics and Bethlehemites are engaged in the work of authenticity within Christian tradition. By examining how Christians understand and seek to practice authenticity, the book sheds light on the continuities and discontinuities of Christian tradition. PLAN OF THE BOOK The first part of the book deals with the theoretical framework by first analyzing the roots of the idea of authenticity in the individualization process of industrialized modernity, which has had an impact on religion and the scholarly understanding of it. Thus, chapter 1 critiques the construction of religion and belief according to the Protestant Christian model, which has dominated sociology of religion and, yet, no longer accounts for Protestants today. Chapter 2 presents the methodology and methods employed in the study. Chapter 3 outlines the key epistemological notions of Georg Simmel’s sociology that are essential for the understanding of his thought on religion and individuality. This includes a systematization of Simmel’s understanding of the self as social and individual. Chapter 4 analyzes and develops Simmel’s work on both the individual and social dimension of religion. The proposed framework goes beyond the past model of religion as propositional belief and personal conviction to account for religious actors’ narratives of self-surrender and relationality. The theory is illustrated by an examination of the narratives of conversion of research participants. In chapter 5, I consider the most salient philosophical conceptions of authenticity and presents concisely classical and contemporary accounts of authenticity. It also puts forward my formulation of it. Authenticity is a process through which the person forms her own moral self and results from the person’s interpretation of her religious tradition. Authenticity is thus that attempt at going beyond social conditioning and forming a moral self through a reflection over one’s experience and one’s interpretation of tradition. Chapter 6 considers authenticity from a sociological perspective and focuses on how authenticity is constructed and analyzes the construction of authenticity at Bethlehem church. Bethlehemites construct authenticity in terms of obedience and individuality. The tension between individuality and

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obedience to God is the motif that makes Christianity distinctive in the eyes of the informants. It is also the basis for the formation of the Christian self as relational. Chapter 7 sets out the notion of sacralization, as the process through which religious actors give legitimacy to narratives and practices through an engagement with tradition, and explores instances of successful and unsuccessful sacralization. The failure of sacralization of ethical eco-friendly practices shows how authenticity is not exhausted by ethics but requires to be inscribed within tradition. Chapter 8 puts forward a conception of ethics as boundary-making, emerging from an analysis of the empirical data, which has an effect on group boundaries and norms. Building on Simmel’s considerations regarding honor and the work of Mary Douglas ([1966] 1989) on boundaries, I distinguish between the ethic of purity and the ethic of compassion. The former is a norm-centered ethic, which characterizes the tendency of groups to be centered around theological norms and “right” conduct. The latter establishes boundaries by unifying the group around a clear theological identity. In contrast, the ethic of compassion is a people-centered ethic, which emphasizes accepting the person and refraining from judgment. The chapter examines how the focus on creating a welcoming community calls on Christians to refrain from judgment and to accept different lifestyles and backgrounds. This has an effect on many informants’ adherence to established doctrines and ethical stances, including those concerning homosexuality and salvation. Chapter 9 focuses on how the practice of hospitality is understood by New Monastics and its role in the formation of community boundaries and ethics. The final chapter, chapter 10, brings together the themes of the book. The book has reworked and expanded critiques, analyses, and ideas I have put forward in previous work, so no chapter has appeared elsewhere; rather sections from various articles and chapters have. Specifically, part of the discussion of the literature in chapter 1 appeared in the research report “The Changing Face of Faith in Britain: How Should Quakers Respond? Part 1” and “A Quiet Faith: Quakers in Post-Christian Britain” (Montemaggi 2018a, 2018b). Some of the discussion of the Simmelian literature in chapter 3 and my development of Simmel’s philosophy in relation to authenticity in chapter 5 have appeared in the article “Religion as Self-Transcendence. A Simmelian Framework for Authenticity” (Montemaggi 2017d). An initial treatment of the ideas of chapter 4 was presented in “Belief, Trust, and Relationality. A Simmelian Approach for the Study of Faith” (Montemaggi 2017a). Chapter 6 is a substantial development of the ideas expressed in the article “The Authenticity of Christian Evangelicals. Between Individuality and Obedience” (Montemaggi 2017c), while chapter 7 builds on the notion of sacralization put forward in the article “Sacralisation. The Role of Individuals in Legitimising the Sacred” (Montemaggi 2015). Chapter 8 inserts it

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within a Simmelian framework and expands the idea of compassion and purity as ethical approaches, as first appeared in “Compassion and Purity: The Ethics and Boundary-Making of Christian Evangelicals” (Montemaggi 2018c, 2018d). My research on new monastic groups, first treated in the chapter “The Making of the Relational Christian Self of New Monastics in the UK, US, and Canada” (Montemaggi 2017b), is developed in relation to authenticity in chapter 9. The mention of the literature on hospitality in chapter 9 also appeared in the article “Compassion and Hospitality: The Work and Ethos of Catholic Chaplains Supporting Seafarers” (Montemaggi 2018d).

Chapter One

Authenticity, Modernity, and Religion

Nothing is so dangerous as being too modern. One is apt to grow old-fashioned quite suddenly. —Oscar Wilde, An Ideal Husband (1895)

Authenticity is often understood as the expression of the inward turn of modernity. The search for individual self-expression and autonomy became a pressing concern as a result of the social differentiation of industrialized modernity. Authenticity does not stop at an affirmation of self-determination of the individual; it encapsulates an awareness of social roles and norms that define and structure our life and the aspiration to go beyond them, as well as the value placed on our inner reality. Today, the appeal to authenticity in religious narratives is not a mere sign of individualized religion, but a refashioning of Christian consciousness and practices vis-à-vis religious forms that do not respond to contemporary ways of thinking and living, a multiplicity of intersecting identities, and a normative recognition of pluralism. Authenticity for contemporary Christians in a way to reconnect with Christianity, not simply by “bringing it up to date,” but by engaging personally with it and making it meaningful to their lives. Authenticity is part of the wider shift in the far less significant role Christianity plays in the UK. The number of people identifying as Christians has fallen significantly in recent years, while “nones,” those who do not identify with a religion on the census form, have increased, testifying to the loss of relevance churches have for Britons today, in particular for the younger generation. According to the 2011 Census for England and Wales (Stokes 2013; White 2012) people identifying as Christians went from 37 million (71.7 percent) in 2001 to 33 million (59.3 percent) in 2011, notwithstanding an increase of 1.2 million foreign-born Christians. In Scotland Christians were 53.8 percent of the Scottish population in 2011, down by 11 percent 1

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since 2001 when they were 65.2 percent of the population (National Records of Scotland 2013). This contrasts with the increase in the number of people identifying with another religion. The rapid and sharp decrease in self-identifying Christians has been mostly a decrease among people under 60 years of age. Demographically, Christians are older and are more likely to be white than the rest of the population in England and Wales. Twenty-two percent of Christians are 65 and over, compared with 16 percent of the wider population, and 93 percent are white, compared with 86 percent of the wider population. In contrast, “nones” in England and Wales jumped from 14.8 percent of the population (7.7 million) in 2001 to a quarter of the population at 14.1 million. The increase is particularly marked for those aged 20–24 and 40–44 and higher among women (89 percent) than men (78 percent). A similar increase in “nones” was registered in Scotland, where “no religion” went up from 27.8 percent in 2001 to 36.7 percent in 2011. The more recent British Social Attitudes Survey for England and Wales (Harding 2017) found that, in 2016, “nones” represented 53 percent of the population. Among 18- to 24-year-olds, “nones” are 71 percent, compared with 40 percent of respondents aged 65 to 74, and with 27 percent of respondents of over 75 years of age. The census figures give a portrait of steady and inevitable decline of British Christianity. The Christian institutions, narratives, and forms of worship no longer seem as relevant and integral to British society as they have been in the past. The moral and religious self-understanding of British people has changed significantly. This can also be evinced from the narratives of “nones,” which point to feelings of detachment and even hostility toward religion, understood as propositional belief, ritual, and outdated sexual morality (Woodhead 2016). “Nones” are more likely to be former Christians and thus have an understanding of religion as revolving around belief. They are unhappy with religion as it has been constructed by modernity in terms of propositional belief and institutionalized church. Similar complaints are to be found among Christians in this study. The popular discourse constructs religion as a belief system. Although the scholarship in sociology and anthropology of religion has shown that this is a flawed and narrow understanding of religion, for a long time scholars of religion constructed their object of study in the image of Protestantism. Religion, as personal conviction and belief in the supernatural, reflects a Christian Protestant model, which scholars have too often taken as universal. This imposed a narrow model on a variety of cultures and forms of religiosity. It also neglected to see the diversity within Protestantism itself and the changes religion has undergone over thousands of years. This model has been highly successful in constructing other cultural traditions as “religions” (Beyer 1998, 2006; Olupona 2004; Smith 2004; Sweetman 2003) and establishing itself as the dominant understanding of religion in everyday speech. The self-

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understanding of religious actors is very often articulated in relation to and against the idea of religion as (irrational) belief and personal conviction. The present research shows that the contemporary Protestants are ill at ease with such conception of faith to such as extent that they declare Christianity to be “not a religion, but relationships.” It is thus worth exploring how the scholarly literature has understood religion and how this has changed. The overview of the scholarship below does not question the empirical reality of the lay person identifying religion as belief and the increasing detachment and, at times, hostility they feel toward religion; rather it presents a more complex picture of religious change and reveals how the popular conception of religion and belief is used by evangelicals and new monastics to define their identity in opposition to—what they call—“traditional religion.” The review, in examining the construction of religion in the scholarship, reveals the intellectual character of modernity and how this has impacted on Christianity. The Enlightenment’s restructuring of knowledge (Asad 1993), which has led to the dominance of scientific objectivism and materialism, has delegitimized religious knowledge. Christianity has adapted to rationalist modernity largely by becoming a question of private faith and ethics. The sociological scholarship has been an agent of the restructuring of knowledge rather than a neutral observer. The sociological notion of religion for a long time was thus the result of the scholarship’s conception of what constituted legitimate knowledge (i.e., objective science). It also reflected the bias of the prominent Protestant culture whence the scholarship emerged. Grappling with the key notions of modernity is necessary not only to assess how religion has been seen by the scholarship, but also in order to appreciate Simmel, the “sociologist of modernity,” as an alternative voice that is relevant for the study of contemporary religious forms. By reviewing how we have come to understand modernity as “disenchanted,” we can begin to question the assumptions made about religion. The notion of religion as belief in the supernatural (propositional belief) is the reductive and objectified notion of religion that fitted the sociological way of understanding the world filtered through Protestant culture (Montemaggi 2017a, 2018a). The case studies in this book show that the Protestant model of religion as belief in the supernatural, assumed as universal for a long time by the scholarship, does not fit contemporary Protestants. Contemporary Christian forms have been shaped by rationalist modernity’s delegitimization of religious knowledge, which often reduces religion to the irrational, by the loss of significance of religious institutions in the everyday life of people, and by the relativization of claims to “truth,” which is now trapped in inverted commas. The latter erupts with the revolution of the 1960s, which opened the door for a realization that Western societies were less homogeneous than previously imagined. Buttressed by late modern thinking, the relativization of truth ensuing from the “counterculture” is,

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perhaps, a more fundamental challenge to Christianity than positivistic rationalism. This is what leads many Christians to engage with tradition and with our post-1960s society and redefine their identity. MODERNITY AND RELIGION The recurrent features ascribed to modernity by the sociological scholarship have been individualization, differentiation, and rationalization. Individualization identifies the rise in prominence of individual autonomy due to the differentiation of society in separate spheres. This leads to a shift in prevalence from what Tönnies ([1887] 1963) called premodern community (Gemeinschaft) toward a more contractual society (Gesellschaft). For Tönnies, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft coexist, but the latter is the fruit of urban culture. Thus, Gesellschaft is proper of the modern metropolis, subject to a constant process of urbanization and instrumental exchange between people. Tönnies contrasted the natural will (Wesenwille) of Gemeinschaft with the rational will (Kürwille) of Gesellschaft ([1887] 1963, 103). The rationality of contractual relations is instrumental. In Weberian terms, modern society is dominated by instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität), as a result of rationalization. What is “rational” is “objective,” what can explain material reality, how it works, and how it can be manipulated for industrial production and scientific progress. This understanding of modernity is at the of Max Weber’s notion of the “disenchantment” (Entzauberung) of the world, better translated as demystification, which captured how reality was being understood only through the eyes of scientific rationality leaving no room to myth. Weber thought that knowledge of the world was on a linear and progressive path of intellectualization that had been underway for thousands of years. He described intellectualization and rationalization as the processes whereby only modern scientific rationality produces legitimate knowledge. Other forms of knowing, such as artistic and religious, are delegitimized. Weber imputed intellectualization and rationalization to the indirect influence of Protestantism and Puritanism, which shifted the focus from the knowledge of nature, to be found among philosophers, to the study of God’s “works” in the “exact sciences” (Weber [1919a] 1970, 142). Thus, in a now objectified world, religious meaning lost its authority, religion was reduced to the irrational human sentiment fighting against enlightened scientific rationality (Weber [1919a] 1970, 142–43). The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no

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mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization means. (Weber [1919a] 1970, 139)

In the modern rationalist age, reality loses its aura of mystery and becomes knowable and quantifiable in all its forms. Weber thought that modern rationality did not originate from the Enlightenment, but from the progressive loss of the dominance of magic in favor of rationality. This process began in antiquity with the separation between religion and magic. Magic was, for Weber, the direct manipulation of the gods. The magician aimed to bring about a change in reality by forcing the gods to act through certain practices. In contrast, religion established the autonomy and supreme sovereignty of God, who cannot be manipulated, but to whom the believer can only appeal. In this process of disenchantment, Protestant intellectualism was a significant step forward in that it distinguished itself from the more magical, in the eyes of Weber, Catholicism. Like the ancient magician, the Catholic priest controlled the believer’s salvation through transubstantiation, and Catholicism’s “cycle” of sin, confession, forgiveness, and sin prevented individual believers from taking full responsibility for their actions and developing a life conduct (Farris 2013, 66). In contrast, Protestantism did away with the mediating role of the priest and fostered a life conduct in the pursuit of salvation. It is a “rational” life conduct in the sense of purposive rationality. For Weber, “Different religious rationalisations gave rise to different specific economic ethics” (Farris 2013, 72). Weber distinguished between four religious attitudes to suggest an affinity between religious culture and different economic models. Buddhism, for Weber, is characterized by other-worldly mysticism, where the individual shuns the world and focuses on an inner quest; the other-worldly asceticism of Christian monasticism, instead, focuses on the soul; the inner-worldly mysticism of Hinduism is characterized by indifference to the world; while Calvinist inner-worldly asceticism stirs the person to take conscious action in the world to discover their state of grace. Protestant and, in particular, Calvinist methodical action results from “salvation anxiety,” from not knowing whether one is saved or not. Material success is seen as a sign of salvation. This leads the person to be active in the world and seek success to confirm their salvation. Religious ideas, for Weber, shape one’s religious personality. They provide a unitary consciousness to the individual, which directs the action or, indeed, non-action in the world. Weber thought that, not only modern capi-

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talism, but modern culture was founded on the notion of “rational life-conduct” (rationale Lebensführung). This “rational life-conduct” is based upon the “idea of calling” (Berufsidee), which, in turn, was “born out of the spirit of Christian asceticism” (Adair-Toteff 2010, 110). The calling (Beruf), for Weber, was a characteristic of Lutheranism; yet Weber criticized Lutheranism for its traditionalism, saying, “The individual should basically stay in the calling and status which God had first placed him” (Weber [1905] 2011, 103–4). Lutheranism lacks “a planned regulation of one’s own life . . . in contrast to the motivational impulse contained in the mighty teachings of Calvinism” (Weber [1905] 2011, 136–37). Systematic self-discipline, emotional restraint, and methodical action are at the core of the Protestant personality, which has an affinity with the capitalist spirit. “The “world-rejecting” ascetic refuses to enjoy the richness of the world and instead focuses his attention on his divinely assigned task” (Adair-Toteff 2010, 111). There is a tension between the spiritual dimension to which the ascetic aspires and the “corrupt” worldly dimension where the action takes place (Farris 2013, 70). The person needs to act in the world to do God’s will, yet the world is inherently corrupt. It is the routinization of Protestant asceticism that brings about a loss of values. Protestantism fostered and shaped the capitalist ethic, but the capitalist ethic, through routinization, has eroded the validity of religion. As Weber put it, The more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness. (Weber [1915] 1946, 331)

The application to the mundane world of the practices and organization of Protestant asceticism undermined the values and ends it pursued (Symonds and Pudsey 2008, 237). The impersonality of the economy rationalizes relationships economically. The rationalized economy and the rationalized bureaucratic state are characterized by depersonalization that eschews morality (Symonds and Pudsey 2006). Instrumental rationality brings no freedom. Reason is itself “crushed by the forces of its own creation, the materialistic determinism of capitalism” (Mackinnon 2001, 330). The process of intellectualization has been central to the development of culture throughout history; yet Weber contrasts modernity with premodern times in terms of the changed conception of truth. He argues that while the truth of science, in the past, was guided by the search for a deeper transcendental truth, be it “true being” in Plato, “true art and nature” in Leonardo, or “God” in Protestantism, in modern times, the truth of science serves only itself. Truth is lost in the self-justifying logic of modern science. Accordingly, science comes to be seen as “free from presuppositions” (Weber [1919a] 1970, 143), in the sense that it has no ulterior motives; it is “value-free

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because it disregards all values in order to concentrate on the world of pure things and to constitute it as a theoretically closed object-domain” (Vandenberghe 1999a, 61). Yet, the work of science is based on fundamental presuppositions that define, and thus confine, science. The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the world.” Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. (Weber [1919a] 1970, 155)

Values are no longer taken as a given, but are up to the individual. In the individualized, rationalized, and differentiated modern world, the individual is responsible for giving meaning to their experience (Bianco 1997, 9). Bianco (1997, 10) notes that for Weber modernity is a process of gaining consciousness that human beings are the sole founders of values. This recognition undermines the objectivity of values and, indeed, even objective rationality (Richtigkeitrationalität). Weber was concerned about the possible descent into moral relativism. The disenchantment of the world is thus an epistemological concern (Swatos and Christiano 1999), but also a normative one; yet scholars of secularization have often interpreted it as the reason for the demise of religion and of religious authority (see Montemaggi 2018a). For Weber, as mentioned, the Protestant Reformation had played a decisive role in the rationalization of the world bringing about a break from the magic premodern world. Weber betrayed a Protestant bias in his conception of religion, one based on propositional belief. The influence of Weber’s ideas has colored the study of religion. Modernity constituted a break from the past order. Social structures and relationships were overturned and new ones took form. The processes of rationalization, differentiation, and individualization reshaped society. Much of the scholarship, indebted to Max Weber, has conceptualized modernity in opposition to tradition. Accordingly, tradition is understood as a normative order that is upset by the processes of industrialized modernity. For Charles Taylor this premodern order is one of belief and cohesive communities. In his monumental opus A Secular Age (2007), Taylor argues that modernity has brought a move from belief in God to belief in the self. He proposes an understanding of modernity through shifts in culture, rather than “acultural” accounts, by which he means materialistic explanations (Taylor 1995). Taylor claims that, in the West, there has been a movement “from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others” (Taylor 2007, 3). Modernity, for Taylor, is a break from a religious past, a “rejection of cosmic-religious embedding” (2010, 32). Taylor’s

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“God” is clearly the Protestant Christian personal God and “belief” is Protestant belief in the transcendent supernatural. This bias obscures the much more varied and complex reality of premodern society. This view of a religious and cohesive premodern past collapses radically different ages into one in order to construct modernity as unique, disregarding previous instances of rationalization and individualization (Keane 1984, 40; Kennedy 2004, 1046; Weber [1922] 1965, 12), differentiation (Cipolla [1976] 1993, 1969; Stroumsa 2012), a “secular” (laïc) culture among intellectuals (Imbach 1996), and crucially the individual subjectivity emerging in the twelfth century, characterized by inner search for truth and self-knowledge (Cornett 2011; Haskins 1927; Little 2006; Morris 1972; Swanson 1999). As a result, Taylor presents modernity as the time where the individual stands alone, in contractual relationships, bound by rationality rather than traditional ethics. This disregards also how religion has changed forms, function, and status throughout history. The construction of different paradigms for the understanding of humanity vis-à-vis nature and the supernatural has been reflected in very different constructions of religion through the ages. In other words, the terms “god” and “religion” capture different meanings and experiences in Roman antiquity, medieval Europe, early and late modern Europe, and contemporary Europe. The scholarship on religion, reflecting a Protestant bias, has for a long time constructed religion in the image of Protestant Christianity (Day 2011) delegitimizing other religious expressions. It has pitted Protestant against Catholic, where Protestant is personal, intellectual, and ethical, while Catholic is communal, superstitious, and ritualistic. Protestant belief became the yardstick against which religion has been judged. Accordingly, religion has been constructed as a “belief system,” where belief is “propositional,” that is, asserting the belief in the existence of a transcendent, and as the personal conviction of an individual. This has delegitimized not only non-Christian forms of religion, but also everyday Christian practices and narratives. These were often labeled “popular religion,” in contrast with the supposedly coherent system of belief set out by theologians and religious authorities. This, as argued by Hall (1997) and Orsi (2003), reflected a normative bias in favor of a specific form of religion. The model of religion as propositional belief is one that has developed throughout many centuries within Christianity. It has often been taken as universal model regardless of the variety of religious forms and the way they have changed over time. Early definitions of religion, such as that by E. B. Tylor as “belief in Spiritual Beings” (Tylor [1871] 1958, 8), reflect the framework of scientific positivism of early anthropologists, but also their cultural bias. Influenced by the Christian Protestant model of religion, anthropologists and sociologists have for a long time reduced religion to

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belief and belief to “propositional belief,” a statement about a supernatural entity. Anthropologists (Asad 1993; Cantwell Smith 1978; Needham 1972; Ruel 2002), whose fieldwork has been primarily among non-Christian and nonWestern populations, were the first to provide a more comprehensive understanding of religion. Ninian Smart (1968) suggested that religion had many dimensions, such as experiential, narrative, ritual, social, ethical, doctrinal, and material, and could thus not be reduced to belief and ethical behavior. Rodney Needham (1972) critiqued the term “belief” pointing out that it was too wrapped with Christian theological narratives and that its meaning had changed through history. Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1978) emphasized the diversity of religion across faiths and cultures. Anthropologists began to gain awareness of the culture-specificity of the construct of religion that had been employed to describe other traditions thus imposing alien meanings to them. Belief is not merely a Christian notion, which has become abstracted and universalized; it is also a notion that has evolved within Christianity. In his essay “Christians as Believers,” Malcolm Ruel ([1982] 2002) explored the shifts in the concept of belief within Christianity showing how belief changed from the original Greek pistis (trust), to kerygma (proclamation). In antiquity, belief identified trust, as in the Hebrew term emunah and the Greek pistis. Christian belief acquired the element of proclamation (kerygma). Thus, belief implied a proclamation of being a Christian as well as belonging to the Christian community. The boundaries between Christian and nonChristian were developed and solidified by the Church as it grew in social and political power. The defining moment came with the Council of Nicea, in 325CE, in which a set of beliefs were declared official doctrine and thus identified the “true Christian.” The statement of faith marked an identity. In medieval Europe, dissenting voices sought to criticize the organization of the church as well as promote different theological conceptions (D’Onofrio 2003); yet being a Christian was more and more a matter of affirming a set of beliefs. Propositional belief acquired a personal dimension with the Reformation. Martin Luther broke new ground by making personal faith the only way to salvation. For Luther, one needed to be possessed by faith (Ruel 2002, 104), thus emphasizing the need for sincerity, which became a hallmark of Protestant tradition (Robbins 2007). Protestantism cultivated the intellectual, ethical, and individualistic elements of Christianity, which found fertile ground in Enlightenment rationalism. Propositional belief, being a statement regarding something, is a rationalist conceptualization of belief that fits the post-Enlightenment modernist scientific paradigm. The dominance of the scientific rationalistic and utilitarian paradigm, which took hold with industrialized modernity, has been pivotal in restructuring the notion of religion. The materialism of positivistic science came to dominate our perception of reality and to define it only in terms of

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materiality. As mentioned above in reference to Weber’s thesis, the dominance of instrumental rationality meant a delegitimization of other forms of knowledge. Yet the “statement” of propositional belief being about the unproven and unprovable supernatural has confined religion to the “irrational,” that which is outside of scientific knowledge (Ruel [1982] 2002; Tambiah 1990). Liberal Protestantism was quick to embrace the new paradigm and refashion religion in terms of private faith guiding one’s moral life. By assuming a restricted but legitimate role in society, Protestant faith, understood as propositional belief, personal conviction, and ethical behavior, consolidated the boundary separating religion from magic. The latter came to be seen as a flawed attempt at manipulating nature, instead of the performance of a ritual or a philosophical practice (Tambiah 1990). Modern rationalism provided a rationale to religious powers to label and order knowledge hierarchically. At the top was the abstract intellectualism of propositional belief, which claimed “more” rational validity than the ritualism of Catholicism, not to mention the “irrational magic” practiced by non-Western peoples. The distinction between religion and magic has often reflected an understanding of religion in the image of Christian monotheism as the legitimate form of belief and of Protestant Christianity in particular as the yardstick against which other religious and spiritual forms are judged (Magliocco 2012; Olupona 2004; Styers 2004; Tambiah 1990). Magic has thus often been constructed as an attempt at manipulating reality and superstition, rather than as a form of knowing. The Enlightenment’s “restructuring of knowledge” (Asad 1993) has posed belief in opposition to rationality. The dominance of instrumental rationality means that the narratives of practitioners of magic often reflect a complex construction of reality that oscillates between rational materialistic and spiritual (De Martino 1959). Many contemporary spiritual expressions, such as neo-paganism and witchcraft, need to be understood as articulating a conception of knowing in opposition to modernist logical rationality (Luhrmann 1989; Magliocco 2004) and even capitalism (Taussig 1977). For instance, neo-pagans use magic to reconnect with the sacred. They seek “to re-enchant the universe, expand human potential, achieve self-realization and planetary healing” (Magliocco 2015, 637). In contrast, New Agers ground their conception of reality on a non-materialistic notion of science, which envisages unity behind all phenomena, in opposition with what is felt as a reductionist scientific establishment (Magliocco 2015, 637). The scholarship on magic and folklore suggests magic should be understood as “participatory consciousness” (Magliocco 2012), a form of knowing other than materialistic rationality. Magic encompasses practices, such as meditation, channeling, past-life regression, and communication with spirit guides, that stimulate one’s participatory way of thinking, which goes be-

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yond “logical” and “rational.” It is an altered consciousness from which participants gain insights on how to live their lives. Thus, in contrast with instrumental rationality, utilitarian, and capitalist mindsets, alternative spiritualities have given value to the experience of the numinous and altered states of consciousness. This form of knowing is in contrast and in opposition not only with the rational materialism of modern science, but also the rationalism of nineteenth century liberal Protestant Christianity, and closer to contemporary forms of religion, including those of Christian Protestants. The emphasis on the “irrational,” on the “emotions,” and on ritual, found in magic and New Age and contemporary Paganism, has gained legitimacy through the rise of pluralism emerging in the 1960s. The cultural upheaval of the “sixties” represents the second challenge to Christianity. It has challenged social norms, traditional institutions, such as the Church, and has given prominence to self-expression, and alternative forms of knowledge and of truth. THE “SIXTIES” AND THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM Writing in the sixties, Peter Berger (1967), perhaps the most influential secularization theorist, argued that in secularized modernity religion would no longer provide a “sacred canopy,” an overarching narrative legitimizing a religious view of the world. For Berger, religion, as an agent of legitimation, sustained the way in which people thought of their social reality. Following Weber’s demistification theory, he thought Protestant individualism and rationality were responsible for undermining the legitimizing role of religion. According to Berger, secularization “has resulted in a widespread collapse of the plausibility of traditional religious definitions of reality” (Berger 1967, 127). Berger thought that the secularization of culture and society would, in turn, lead to the “secularization of consciousness,” in which individuals understand the world through the framework they found more consonant with their perspective, rather than religious interpretations (Berger 1967, 108). The diversity of worldviews, which Berger called pluralism, undermines traditional religious narratives. This is further compounded by the now voluntary nature of religious allegiance. In an increasingly diverse religious landscape, religious groups must organize to “woo a population of consumers, in competition with other groups having the same purpose” (Berger 1967, 138). The greater individualization of society relegates religious “reality” to the private sphere thus turning it into a subjective concern. Berger later acknowledged that the multiplicity of worldviews does not necessarily impede the coexistence of a religion’s truth with another (Berger 1999).

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However, the rapid change in social values and norms of the sixties began to delegitimize Christian authorities and narratives. In The Death of Christian Britain (2001), Callum Brown argues that it was the culture of the 1960s and, in particular, women’s rejection of conservative religious narratives that led to the demise of Christianity. Brown provides an analysis of popular culture as well as individual accounts of people’s lives showing a profound change in how people constructed their identities. He argues that religiosity in Britain was highly gendered and, therefore, dependent on women’s influence on children and men and on their embodiment of Christian sexual virtue and domesticity. As women become emancipated in the 1960s, they stopped maintaining and reproducing Christian social norms and narratives. Femininity changed and shed its Christian piety. This led to a new way to construct one’s moral identity. The 1960s’ revolution was about how people constructed their lives—their families, their sex lives, their cultural pursuits, and their moral identities of what makes a “good” or “bad” person. (Brown 2001, 8)

In contrast, Hugh McLeod (2007), while still focusing on the 1960s, highlights multiple factors that have led to the “decline of Christendom,” such as changes in family life, student protests, the divergence between law and Christian morality, and affluence. The 1960s cultural and societal shifts have led to the legitimization of individual autonomy thus opening the door for a wider reinterpretation of doctrine in the light of individual experience. This does not necessarily mean that individual autonomy dominates over external authority; rather that we witness a rise of multiple centers of authority (Wood 2007). The increased cultural diversity of Western societies has allowed religious actors to be in contact with a variety of traditions and interpretations, and to rely for information on a wide range of sources. The narrative of Britain as a Christian country gave way to a pluralist, secular, and “post-Christian” Britain. The 1960s opened the door to a diversity of lifestyles, spiritualities, and moral concerns, which undermined Christianity’s cultural hegemony. The cultural revolution of the 1960s, which came to be dubbed the “counterculture,” originated in the youth culture of the post-war boom generation. The “counterculture” challenged the predominance of traditional lifestyles and social norms. It critiqued mainstream culture, seen as white, Western, patriarchal, and, indeed, “heteropatriarchal” (Valdes 1996), with Christianity legitimizing the social order by appealing to a divine and moral order. The “counterculture” was not limited to feminism, peace protests, homosexual rights, and environmentalism, but included campaigns for the homeless, consumers, penal, educational, and architectural reform, to name a few (Marwick 2005, 782, 791).

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The cultural and societal shifts of the sixties have led to the legitimization of individual autonomy, thus opening the door for a wider reinterpretation of doctrine in the light of individual experience. The overarching narrative of individual choice of the sixties, aided by the growth of consumer society (Frank 1997; Heath and Potter 2005), has led to an increase in the freedom to choose to be part of a religious (or spiritual) group, or to adhere to no religion at all. This has been so especially in the more individualistic AngloAmerican culture. To highlight the pre-eminence of choice, Robert Wuthnow (1998) distinguishes between “dwelling spirituality” and “seeking spirituality.” “Dwelling spirituality” is the spirituality expressed in churches and centers around the family, typical of the 1950s; while “seeking spirituality” characterizes the sixties’ search for the spiritual dimension in each individuals’ self-expression. Wuthnow’s dichotomy between dwelling and seeking spirituality is similar to Charles Taylor’s distinction between, what he terms, the “paleo-Durkheimian dispensation,” in which people have a relationship with the sacred through belonging to a church, and the “neo-Durkheimian dispensation,” which entitles people to join their denomination of choice, which is connected “to a broader, more elusive “church,” and, more important, to a political entity with a providential role to play” (Charles Taylor 2002, 93, emphasis in the original). The neo-Durkheimian mode involves an important step toward the individual and the right of choice. One joins a denomination because it seems right to one. And indeed, it now comes to seem that there is no way of being in the “church” except through such a choice. . . . Coercion comes to seem not only wrong, but absurd and thus obscene. (Charles Taylor 2002, 94)

The emphasis on subjectivity emphasized individual distinctiveness and selfexpression transforming all aspects of society deeply (Marwick 2005). This expressivist turn made individual experience and meaning central to religious practice. Accordingly, religious life and practice “not only must be my choice, but must speak to me” (Charles Taylor 2002, 94). The “expressive revolution,” as Bernice Martin (1981) called it, ushered in the “seeking spirituality” (Roof 1993, 1999, 2003). In his book A Generation of Seekers (1993), Roof identifies in the “baby-boomers” a generation with a culture significantly different from that of the pre-boomers. They distrust authorities and seek self-fulfilment, they value experience over intellectual statements of belief and represent a new way in which to engage with religious organizations. [P]ersonal autonomy has a double face, one that reflects the dislocations of institutional religious identities in the contemporary world, and a second that

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The expressive and subjective turn opened the door to alternative expressions of religion and spirituality, such as new Christian forms, the increased legitimacy of non-Christian faiths, alternative spiritual practices, New Age spirituality, and New Religious Movements (NRMs). Much of the scholarship of spirituality has tended to construct spirituality as focused on the free expression of the self and immanence in contrast with religion, constructed in terms of transcendence, often betraying a normative attitude. Eileen Barker (2008, 189–90) distinguishes between religiosity as believing in a transcendent and personal God, and spirituality, which refers to belief in the God within. For Dick Houtman and Stef Aupers (2007), spirituality leaves behind religion’s focus on transcendence to shift toward immanence and the self. Accordingly, the sacred loses its transcendent character and “becomes more and more conceived of as immanent and residing in the deeper layers of the self” (Houtman and Aupers 2007, 315). A student of New Age spirituality, Paul Heelas (1996a, 1996b, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Heelas and Woodhead 2005), has understood spirituality as liberating and the expression of one’s deepest essence. He believes spirituality to be “authentic” while he at times caricatures religion as blind faith and allegiance to an external authority. Heelas characterizes spirituality as revolving around self-authority and self-expression, while religion is articulated by religious authorities through structured forms. Consequently, spirituality captures the liberating quest for inner meaning and truth, while theistic religion is reduced to adherence to “rationalistic, codified, legalistic prescriptions” (Heelas 2008, 127). This very normative and celebratory account of spirituality captures how religion has been constructed as conventional adherence to beliefs, set by religious authorities. This view of religion is that against which Christians today define themselves. Early studies of spirituality have fallen for a romanticization of individual autonomy and expression, neglecting to see relationships of power within spirituality circles, have pitted liberating spirituality against religion, presuming wrongly that religious belief in a transcendent God necessarily negates self-actualization, and have assumed individual self-expression to be ethical in and of itself. Later studies have shown a more balanced perspective and the blurred boundaries between religion and spirituality pointing to a wider shift toward religious forms that privilege spiritual seeking and expression (Ammerman 2013; Bender 2010; Giordan 2004; Palmisano 2009; Pessi 2013; Pessi and Jeldtoft 2012) in their use of space, and in practices and beliefs (Bender 2010; Woodhead 2012). It is to be acknowledged, however, that in popular debates religion is still associated with a belief system and

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organized worship, while spirituality is seen as more abstract and non-theistic (Schlehofer et al. 2008). POST-1960S CHRISTIANS The rise in new forms of religion and spirituality, which often involved much borrowing from Eastern traditions, together with the wider sixties’ culture, had a significant impact on Christianity itself. Thus, the “counterculture” did not solely undermine traditional Christianity; it also spurred change. The baby-boomers of the sixties rejected—what they saw as—authoritarian bourgeois society and embraced the hippie lifestyle as a way to experience Jesus’s teaching more authentically. Christian groups, such as the Jesus People Movement, were at the forefront of the sixties’ “counterculture” happening in the Bay Area in California. The Calvary Chapel Movement and the Vineyard Christian Fellowship, that are now present around the world, also sprang from the “counterculture.” Donald Miller (1997) called Calvary Chapel, Vineyard Christian Fellowship, and Hope Chapel “new paradigm” churches, which he believes have been pivotal in “reinventing” American Protestantism. These “new paradigm” churches have combined contemporary tastes with the “traditional” Christian message. Their buildings are free of religious symbols, dress is casual, and attention is paid to creating a friendly atmosphere (Miller 1997, 13). They also feature a high level of involvement of the laity (Miller 1997, 15–17) and looser structures. Their church culture stresses acceptance (Miller 1997, 68) in an attempt to “meet people where they are at,” as Miller was told by an informant (Miller 1997, 67). They reject—what is felt as—the institutionalization of religion, its formality, hierarchies and intellectualism, to locate religiosity in a personal encounter with God. Their worship is emotional and experiential. Music plays a prominent role, as in the case of Vineyard churches that have spread across the world. The philosophy of “welcoming” has been central to the restructuring of American evangelical churches and the rise of megachurches. The most successful churches were those founded by Bill Hybels in Chicago, Rick Warren in Los Angeles, and Joel Osteen in Houston. The model of the Purpose Driven Church (Warren 1995) responded to the need for “relevance” to contemporary lifestyles. Spiritual seeking was integrated in a religious setting by stressing the emotional support and practical help that a community can provide. This is particularly relevant for the post-boomer generation, who values “expressive communalism” (Flory and Miller 2007, 2008), in which they seek spiritual experience and fulfillment in community. Faith today is emotional and experiential; it is transformative of the whole person.

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Evangelicals have been undergoing a significant process of change in the past two decades. In the UK, Christian alternative worship, such as the “Nine O’Clock Service,” emerged in the 1980s (Guest 2002). This was primarily aimed at young people, but opened the door more widely to experiments in alternative worship in Britain that emphasized experience and hermeneutical deconstruction. The “emerging church movement,” which began in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia (Guest and Taylor 2006), sought to marry experiential worship with “contextual theology,” which reflects critically on past Christian tradition and the contemporary world. The emerging church is conscious of being in a “post-Christendom” environment, where Christianity is no longer culturally hegemonic, but part of the wider pluralistic framework. The emerging church movement in the United States has a much narrower spectrum of innovation (Labanow 2009) and is “defined by a deeply felt disenchantment toward America’s conservative Christian subculture” (Bielo 2011a, 197). It opposes bureaucratic, unwelcoming, and judgmental churches as well as “consumer megachurches churches.” Emerging Christians seek to create inclusive, non-hierarchical communities in which to grow spiritually (Marti and Ganiel 2014). The emerging church movement pursues an “authentic Christianity,” just as did the early megachurches described by Miller (1997), which are now criticized by emerging Christians for their commercial and bureaucratic structures. However, unlike the “new paradigm” churches that later became megachurches, emerging churches are engaged in a process of theological deconstruction and reinterpretation of tradition. THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY Theological deconstruction and reinterpretation are in part a result of the pluralism of contemporary society. The coexistence of multiple, often overlapping identities has given rise to a pluralistic framework, in which diversity is not only accepted, but valued. Thus, pluralism, understood as the acceptance and value of diversity (Beckford 2003, 81), provides a paradigmatic shift in cultural framework for the redefinition of Christianity. Christian belief as exclusive truth has been challenged by the pluralism of liberal society, which places all religions, at least in principle, on an equal footing. Thus, the emphasis is on being open to “unorthodox” opinions and the focus is on formulating authenticity (Bielo 2011a; Guest 2007a, 2007b; Guest and Taylor 2006; Tomlinson 1995; Vincett and Collins-Mayo 2010). Authenticity is not an affirmation of traditional beliefs, but a search to live Christianity in a more experiential way within a pluralistic society. As Christians in the West, faced with the reality of a pluralistic society in which diversity of religion is valued and Christianity is no longer the domi-

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nant and privileged religious culture, have had to reflect on their identities and beliefs, scholars of religion too have had to confront their own biases. Sociologists too had to face up to the construction of religion in the image of Protestant Christianity dominant in the scholarship, in particular, the notion of religion in terms of beliefs, practices, and rituals belonging to an established tradition and legitimized by religious authorities, thus disregarding “informal” beliefs and practices (branded “popular religion”), and the role played by individual actors in legitimizing both formal and informal beliefs and customs (Montemaggi 2015). In the 1990s, some of the scholarship in sociology of religion began to come to terms with the discipline’s Protestant biases and its undue attention to official religious doctrines, and turned its attention to the everyday practices of ordinary people. The approach of “lived religion” (Hall 1997; McGuire 1997, 2008; Orsi 1985) moved away from an understanding of religion limited to its “official” elements, as established by religious authorities, to an appreciation of the narratives and practices of religious people in different settings. This outlook, which is at the basis of the present work, opened the door to a much broader and nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of religion. This has included how people express their religious identity through clothing (Arthur 1999; Furseth 2011), food (Diamond 2002; Koepping 2008), rituals of birth and death (Klassen 2001; Laderman 1995; Prothero 1997), and spontaneous shrines and home altars (Grider 2006; Konieczny 2009). The study of religion as the narratives and practices of religious actors recognizes the agency of individuals (Avishai et al. 2015), including their role in redrawing the boundaries of their tradition (Montemaggi 2015). This shift in approach has also entailed a focus on the practices of religious actors, rather than beliefs (Aune 2015; Neitz 2011), but also embodiment (Løvland and Repstad 2014), and emotions (Riis and Woodhead 2010). This approach allows an appreciation of belief as a multifaceted phenomenon. For instance, Luhrmann (2012) has shown that the emotional and mystical dimension of belief is prominent in the worship of Pentecostal and Charismatic congregations. Evangelicals in Luhrmann’s study believe in God, but are very uncertain about God’s presence and struggle to commune with God. This type of belief is not merely intellectual adherence to a set of propositions; rather it is experiential. This understanding allows us to see that belief consists in training one’s imagination to be able to be open to the divine. Theological doctrine is perhaps even more elusive than belief. Research in the “Bible Belt” of Norway (Repstad 2003, 2008, 2009), has shown that Christian evangelicals are also shifting in their understanding of doctrinal beliefs. Repstad supports the connection between the change toward a more “liberal” Christianity and the encounter of other worldviews. Christian leaders asked to reflect on how they changed their minds cite encounters with people holding different views (Repstad 2008, 20). For instance, the subject

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of hell has become “an unpleasant dogmatic issue in conservative circles” (Repstad 2008, 22). Repstad has documented a shift away from a more sectarian outlook and toward an understanding of Christianity, which stresses experience and community (Repstad 2009, 127). Differences are still expressed, but less dramatically than before. There is more talk now about practicing Christians and active Christians, less about saved people, not to mention about non-saved. (Repstad 2009, 128)

Evangelicals in the United States present a complex picture. Back in 2010, research by Putnam and Campbell (2010) found a similar trend of softening of doctrine pointing to some level of cultural accommodation (Hunter 1985, 1987; McConkey 2001; Shibley 1996). They reported that “83 percent of evangelical Protestant say that those not of their faith could go to heaven” (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 535). When asked whether this included nonChristians the figure went down to 54 percent (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 536). However, continuous evangelical support for U.S. President Donald Trump (Smith 2017; Smith and Martìnez 2016) raises the question of whether the findings would be similar today and whether, perhaps, there is any fragmentation within the evangelical landscape given the rapid demographic shifts (Pew Research Center, May 12, 2015). The topic is beyond the remit of the present book. Suffice it to consider the lack of politicization of religion in the UK, which is reflected in the different narratives of evangelicals and new monastics explored in the following chapters. In Britain, contemporary Christians are no longer defined solely by belief and doctrine. They are responding to the new paradigm of diversity, which has led to Christianity’s loss of cultural monopoly (Guest et al. 2012), and, consequently of its ability to define “truth”; yet it is pluralism that offers them a platform from which to claim legitimacy for Christian identity. The chapter has presented a critique of the conceptualization of religion according to the Protestant model, centered around propositional belief, and modern rationality. Religion was redefined and reshaped, not only as a reflection of Christian Protestantism, but also to fit the construction of legitimate knowledge according to modern science. Legitimate, “respectable” faith consisted in propositional belief, personal conviction, and ethical behavior. This created a cultural hierarchy, whereby religious rituals and emotions came to be seen as an unenlightened and underdeveloped form of religion. The construction of religion and belief according to Protestant canon and scientific materialism created a hierarchy of religious and spiritual forms, from the intellectual and ethical at the top to magical at the bottom. Protestantism fitted the model of knowledge of modern science and legitimized it. The sixties’ revolution, with its critique of established powers and narratives, opened the door to spirituality movements, such as New Age, whose

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adherents were often in opposition to established forms of religion, found to be hegemonic and stifling. One should caution, however, a reading of the 1960s exclusively as a rejection of Christianity in favor of other forms of religion and spirituality, such as Eastern religions and new religious movements. The rigid boundaries of transcendent religion and immanent spirituality reflect an understanding of religion through the model of intellectualist Protestant Christianity. In addition, Christians too participated in the counterculture and sought to reshape Christianity by stressing “spiritual seeking” and experimentation, including communal living. The critique presented here of the scholarly conceptualization of religion is not exclusively an important scholarly issue, but it affects Christians today, as shown by the narratives of Christians in this study, whose religious identity does not conform with the classical idea of religion as propositional belief. The hierarchy of Protestant religion—Catholic ritual—magic impacts on evangelicals today who seek a less intellectualistic religion and are open to practices that share much with spiritual practices of participatory consciousness. This is articulated through the notion of authenticity. In today’s pluralistic culture, which calls for distinctive identities in a sea of diversity, Christians are seeking to be true to the example of Jesus interrogating, interpreting, and even subverting established doctrines and practices. Authenticity emerges as a path of moral development that is at once personal and communal. It is a personal effort at seeing things differently and developing moral practices in one’s everyday life, which involves a critical reflection on church life as well as the society and culture which Christians inhabit. In seeking to transcend themselves, Christians reinvent Christianity for the twenty-first century. It is my belief that this multiform and dynamic religiosity in search of authenticity can be better understood through the lenses of the theorist who most captured the spirit of modernity: Georg Simmel.

Chapter Two

Crossing Boundaries in the Field

You know my method. It is founded upon the observation of trifles. —Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (1892)

The present research is a social scientific endeavor. This is not a simple and straightforward statement. In this book, I bring together anthropology, sociology, social theory, and philosophy. The interdisciplinarity of this work rests on “engaged” borrowing. I borrow and adapt theoretical notions from Simmel and other philosophers. I engage with them but do not propose theory in moral philosophy or theology. I employ philosophical concepts to reveal overlooked aspects of Christian identity today. The development of a concept of authenticity as self-transcendence in dialogue with others and one’s tradition serves to better understand the formation of religious and moral identity. This work is characterized by the social scientific perspective, which belongs to anthropologists and sociologists. I am interested in analyzing narratives and practices, which belong to a specific social context. This is not to say that sociology and anthropology should not be open to a dialogue with theology or have a normative stance; 1 rather that my approach for this specific work is primarily concerned with developing theoretical frameworks through observation of empirical reality to reveal the dynamics of the formation of the moral and religious self. This book seeks to balance theoretical development with empirical analysis. There is much more theory than ethnographies would normally allow. It is my belief that the theoretical framework offers an original and innovative viewpoint from which to understand the contemporary shift in Christian consciousness. The richness and philosophical character of Simmel’s thought has been helpful in gaining a new perspective on religious identity; yet its complexity 21

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called for interpretation and adaptation. In developing new concepts, the ethnographic fieldwork was essential. It provided a microcosm of religious actors living their faith, making sense of what they do, and reflecting on what they believe and how they believe. The role of ethnography, in the present study, was to guide and illustrate theory, rather than to generate it. This chapter thus reflects on the experience of carrying out this study. It begins by considering key issues regarding “knowledge,” which arise from studying religion, namely essentialism, normativity, and reductionism. The second and third sections provide an analysis of ethnography as vicinity and distance and a personal account of self-reflection as an analytical tool. This is followed by an explanation of the methods used in the research. The final section reflects on the research as forming my professional self as a sociologist as well as my personal identity. ESSENTIALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND REDUCTIONISM Every study presents its own peculiar challenges to what constitutes “knowledge.” This study, being concerned with religious and moral identity of the individual, poses questions of essentialism, normativity, and reductionism. In the first instance, the risk of essentialism consists in affirming a set of attributes of religion and religious identity as the nature of religion, and/or in validating as “authentic” local experiences and narratives. It is sometimes tempting to see our preferred form of religion as the one that “truly” goes to the heart of things, that “really gets it.” It is equally tempting to denounce often unethical expressions of religion as “not true” to that religion. The sociological outlook does not allow that (Wuthnow 2004a, 2004b). The approach taken in this study is a constructionist one, which understands the narratives of research participants as an interpretation and construction of Christianity and of Christian identity. The research does not endorse the local understanding of Christianity. Research participants might take an essentialistic view of Christianity and seek to identify “essential” characteristics. Although historical analysis can identify dominant aspects of a tradition, tradition is always the result of reinterpretation (Montemaggi 2015). This becomes evident in the case of new monastics. In addition, the theoretical, or etic, concepts of religion, belief, and authenticity serve the purpose of highlighting different aspects of religious experience and the formation of the moral self. Authenticity is a cultural process. It encapsulates what people believe to be true. It is a process that rests on the actors’ interpretation of their tradition and—what they understand as—truth. The approach is thus interpretive and does not seek to validate the accounts of participants. Theirs is not “true” Christianity, but instances of Christianity.

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In the second instance, the risk of normativity is that of validating the ethics underpinning the practices and beliefs of research participants and constructing a normative dichotomy between “good religion” and “bad religion.” It is the job of theologians and moral philosophers to propose normative theory and normative interpretations of tradition. I believe it is important for social scientists to analyze empirical reality. A normative account of religion would conflate religion with ethics, and thus neglect to appreciate the social and cultural dimension of religion and its transformations throughout time. I sought to understand, not judge, to present narratives and experiences, not embrace them. The concepts proposed (belief/religiosity, authenticity, sacralization, compassion and purity) are therefore analytical and not normative. Distance, the distance of the “professional stranger” (Agar 1980), is a heuristic tool. It is not to dismiss ethical consideration, but to follow Max Weber’s advice of keeping a “clear head,” a “value free” stance (Wertfreiheit) during the research process. Weber was not appealing to ethical neutrality but to be free of bias and ensure “the impartiality of the scientist” (Hennis et al. 1994). Weber considered value judgments necessary in the heuristic phase in order to identify a problem and formulate a hypothesis, however, the analysis of the problem in the research phase needs to be “value-free” (Sztompka 2009, 41). Thus for Weber, “empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do—but rather what he can do—and under certain circumstances—what he wishes to do” (Weber [1904] 1949, 54, emphasis in the original). The approach followed is one that seeks to be “distant” in the observation and analysis. This does not and should not preclude the research from informing normative endeavors. In the third instance, the translation of a theologically-centered world view to sociological knowledge poses the risk of reductionism. This is particularly the case when religion is understood through a functionalist approach. An example is the approach purported by Robert Segal (1999, 2005), who, while acknowledging the array of approaches to the study of religion, distinguishes between “religionists” and “social scientists.” According to Segal, “social scientists” locate the origin of religion in a human need, while “religionists” locate it in God. Origin is here to be understood not simply historically but as originating cause. Social scientific theories deem the origin and function of religion nonreligious. . . . By contrast, theories from religious studies deem the origin and function of religion distinctively religious: the need that religion arises to fulfil is god. (Segal 2005, 51)

Segal’s functionalist interpretation of religion rests on an intellectualist account of religion as a set of beliefs and practices related to the transcendent. It thus fails to acknowledge the deliberate effort of religious actors to under-

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stand their religious tradition in a way that responds to human needs. The point is not that religion is a projection of society and human needs, but a conscious response to them. The effort of Bethlehemites in this study to transform church-doing to be “relevant” is a clear example of their selfawareness of the evolving nature of society and its impact on people’s lives. Segal is rightly frustrated by phenomenological studies of religion that essentialize and authenticate religion (Segal 1999). Indeed, as McGuire noted, “too much sloppy research in sociology and, especially religious studies, has been justified as ‘phenomenological’” (McGuire 2002, 209). Once again distance is required to avoid embracing the viewpoint of one’s research participants; yet the researcher is also required to convey the experience of their research participants. It is important to remain critical of the accounts of participants and to focus on the social dynamics of religious life, rather than the “numinous,” while also gaining an appreciation of the insider’s culture. Empathy with participants or personal experience of the divine might aid in the representation of religious life through plausible descriptions (Davidman 2002; McCarthy Brown 2002; A. Geertz 2002) while focusing on an understanding of the social situation. This does not exclude the study of religious experience (Neitz and Spickard 1990; Spickard 1991) or imply a reductionist interpretation of it. The purpose of sociological knowledge is not to “explain away” religion, but to interpret an aspect of social life. ETHNOGRAPHY AND DISTANCE I sought to find a balance between closeness to and distance from my research participants in blending theory with ethnography. Ethnography immersed me into the life of participants. I got to know them and what they meant by the words they used. Historically, ethnography has been employed by anthropologists to study non-Western cultures unfamiliar to the researcher (Malinowski [1922] 2003; Mead [1928] 2001), but also a particular population in urban contexts (Whyte 1943). By portraying a culture through the understanding of the “native’s point of view” (C. Geertz 1999), ethnography provides a context thus overcoming cultural barriers. It makes the strange familiar and the familiar strange (Delamont et al. 2010). The context of the present study is white middle-class British culture in the case of Bethlehem and The Parish, and white middle-class American and Canadian culture in the smaller new monastics’ case studies. This is not a study of class, race, or national identity, therefore there was less of a need to give a rich description of their culture and how they constructed class, race, and national identity. The focus is also less on the culture of the selected church groups than on the individual religious identity of their members. Yet

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this study is an ethnography not only due to the extended time spent in the field, but because of the intrinsic relationality of individuals. Religious actors believe “with others,” in community; they make sense of religious ideas and practices together. The way Christians in this research were studied was ethnographic. The development of the theoretical framework has curtailed the description of the local environment of each case study; yet the approach adopted in the field was ethnographic. It aimed to gain inside knowledge from an outsider’s perspective. My identity as an Jewish Italian sociologist meant I was a stranger. At first, like Peshkin, I wanted my non-Christian identity to be forgotten so that members at Bethlehem could be themselves (Peshkin 1984, 256), but hiding was of no use because, as Landres rightly points out, the ethnographer is the field (Landres 2002, 105). Nevertheless, I did not “manipulate” my identity to get what I wanted in the field setting (Landres 2002, 106); on the contrary, I used self-reflection on my “outsider” identity to analyze the interaction with research participants and discover social patterns of behavior. It is in the interaction, rather than in an imaginary “neutral observation,” that one can be “distant” and thus identify and comprehend patterns. The interaction sparks a constant negotiation with oneself and others over “understanding.” As Reinharz remarked, The self in the field “is a product of the norms of the social setting and the ways in which the ‘research subjects’ interact with the selves the researcher brings to the field.” (Reinharz 1997, 3, emphasis in the original)

This concept of self-reflection goes beyond “reflexivity” in the strict sense of disclosing and reflecting of one’s positioning to maintain validity (Cresswell and Miller 2000, 127), or of being “sensitive to the interrelationship(s) between herself and the focus of the research” (Delamont 2009, 58); rather it identifies, more specifically, an analytical understanding of others, by looking at oneself, and analytical self-understanding, by seeing through the “eyes” of others. The ethnographic researcher thus plays the roles of stranger and neighbor; “hides and seeks” to grasp a very slippery reality; “moves in” to appreciate the culture under observation, but also “moves out” to reflect from another angle. This movement and reflection enables a better understanding, analytical inference and theoretical formulation. Thus, self-reflection becomes an analytical and explanatory tool to discern how identity is played out in the field by research participants as well as by the ethnographer. It uncovers the unspoken rules of behavior and the assumptions underlying practices and narratives.

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THE “PROFESSIONAL STRANGER” On a Sunday morning of August 2010, in the field of a camping site, I was having breakfast with the participants from the home group. In the middle of mundane chat, Nicholas looked at me and asked, “So, what do you make of us?” Put on the spot, my mind scrambled for an answer that turned out to be a light-hearted, banal and clumsy “You are normal.” It was met with laughter, which got me out of the spotlight. In that moment, I felt very visible. I felt the researcher with white cloak, spectacles, clipboard, and pen observing coolly an animal in its natural habitat. All this time, I’ve been trying to take the “scientific spectacles” off, to leave behind the white cloak of my identity, and keep “clipboard and pen” confined to my mind. After a whole year, I was, at least in Nicholas’s eyes, a researcher studying them. All that “building rapport” and “fitting in” crumbled with just one question. As I walked back to my tent I mumbled, “Malinowski I ain’t.” Yet, I had to come to terms with the fact that one never stops being a researcher no matter how close one gets and that there might always be participants who would think, and rightly so, that one is always on duty even during a camping weekend. My answer did not raise any further questions, except from me. In one sentence, I ended my ethnographic aspirations. If I saw them as “normal,” what was I missing? If they were “normal,” what could I learn from them? The first question worried me the most and it was the starting point to answer the second one. How could I make the familiar strange? How could I see patterns of behavior and meaning-making if the “natives” were the dominant group of the culture of which I was part? The answer was staring at me in the mirror: I was the “exotic exhibit” to observe and talk about, the Italian Jew among Christian evangelicals in Wales, rather than a professional ethnographer looking at “natives.” Nicholas’s question underlined my role of researcher and outsider. I thus considered more carefully how they saw me, how they behaved toward me to identify their own “markers” of identity. During the camping trip I had been looked after by the two couples as if I were a student. Indeed, I was a student, an Italian Jewish student, and also a single female renting a room in a shared house, who found herself among couples who worked and owned a home. The whole “blending in” and establishing rapport went out of the window. Or better, I realized that I was as “inside” as I could be, well immersed, but still with my head outside the water. It is in this liminal state that I could make sense of my fieldwork. I had to observe myself to see what they saw in me and, in turn, how they saw themselves. By focusing on who I was in their eyes, I could see their identity a little more clearly. By reflecting on what made me an “outsider” to the group, I could make visible the social boundary defining the in-group. Amid British Christian married couples, often with children, my self was and is in a liminal state for being a foreigner, Jewish, single and with no fixed

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residence. I realized that I had always lacked a religious community where I could feel at home, where I could participate actively and express my religiosity. Indeed, lacking a community in which to ground my identity of place, language, and relationships, my religiosity had very few certainties. Without a country, a religious community, a family, and a home of my own, I was the Simmelian stranger (Fremde), the one who has a fluid identity that is constantly being challenged and reshaped. The stranger, as described by Simmel, is always “the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going.” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 402). The Simmelian stranger is not just an identity, but an epistemological category (Merton 1972). Thus, the identity of the stranger also sheds light onto the invisible lines of connections between the people making up the group, the culture and unwritten rules of the group. The stranger is not simply outside, but “an element of the group itself. His position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 402). To be a stranger, affirmed Simmel, “is a specific form of interaction” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 402), which endows the stranger of “objectivity,” not in the sense of passivity or detachment, but a participation that is composed of “distance and nearness, indifference and involvement” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 403). Being a stranger is not to be taken as “value-free” (wertfrei) objectivity, but as a complex relation with the research environment and research participants. Being “outside,” the stranger sheds light on the “inside” and how that “inside” is constructed. Being a single Italian student with no fixed residence and community, for instance, marked the construction of community that needs to respond to the aspirations and needs of middle class, relatively young couples with children, who are settled in a specific geographical location. These are generalizations, mental constructs, revealing patterns of socialization, which impact on the construction of religious identity and community. STUDYING BETHLEHEM: THE FIELD AND THE METHODS The present research is a qualitative study of Bethlehem, an evangelical church in Wales, The Parish, a new monastic community in the UK, and shorter studies of new monastic communities across the United States and Canada. The methods employed were unstructured interviews and participant observation. Bethlehem is the main case study of this book and the empirical analysis of Bethlehem is used in chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8. Bethlehem is a “free” evangelical church in a medium size city in Wales, which was established around forty years ago. The fieldwork at Bethlehem lasted three years. The reason for choosing Bethlehem was its vision of being engaged with the

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public sphere. The church seemed to have a clear vision of what kind of church and community it wanted to be. It had a good reputation of being active locally. The vision of the church was to provide a sense of place for the local community by creating a welcoming environment and building relationships. While scouting for the church that I could study, I met with Bethlehem’s then pastor, Felix, to discuss the activities of the church. He later called me asking for my research proposal, which I thought was a little premature, as I had not decided on the church yet. Felix was preparing to leave the church so he wanted to make sure that everything was in place, perhaps not realizing what a departing gift a researcher might be for a church in transition. The vision and organization originated in the founding members of Bethlehem, primarily Nicholas and pastor Felix. When Felix left, the church lost an important reference point, as explored in chapter 4. Yet it retained that yearning to be a place where relationships could be nourished, a place where the person could be in relationship with others and no longer alone. Bethlehem sought to alleviate personal and social loneliness, something that afflicts a rising number of people and has severe effects on health (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Cacioppo et al. 2009; Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010; Yang and Victor 2011). In Bethlehem’s interpretation of Christianity, the pursuit of the Christian life and one’s spiritual development happens in relationships. The focus was thus on creating a welcoming and caring environment where people could develop human relationships and, consequently, develop spiritually. Bethlehem fit the bill: it was an active and vibrant church with a mission to provide relationships in the community. One of the church’s leaflets, in particular, set out in a detailed and structured manner how theological ideas were linked to action. It captured the vision, the internal organization, and the relationship with the outside and wrapped it all in the “sacred canopy” of faith. My supervisor’s initial resistance to the choice of an evangelical Christian church disappeared as soon as he saw the leaflet. It was captivating and intriguing, well laid out and coherent. It was perfect, except none of my research participants had ever seen it. Most Bethlehemites were perhaps not aware of how the activities of the church, the theology, and language used all related to one another; yet many, especially the most active members, employed the same words (gifts, serving, being real, meeting people where they are at, each member is a minister, etc.) and felt strongly that Bethlehem should be a home for the local community and not just a worshiping venue. I began studying Bethlehem church in June 2009 for three months, for my master’s dissertation. This became the pilot for the PhD research (Montemaggi 2013b). Following a meeting with the elders to explain the research and gain their approval, I was introduced to the church on a Sunday morning. Access through Felix allowed me to attend the “home group” Bible study in

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the home of church members. During the pilot study, in the summer of 2009, I attended Sunday services, home group evenings, and most church-run activities, as a participant-observer. I carried out seven unstructured interviews, from which I draw for the doctoral research, with the following: the pastor (Felix), two church members (Dorothea and Will), two elders (Peter and James), and two church employees (Godwin and Lucy). After completing the dissertation for the MSc, I continued the empirical work. This was partly due to my intention to maintain contact while working on the theoretical elements of the study, but also what I felt were the expectations of research participants. Thus, while I was reviewing the literature and gaining deeper familiarity with Simmel’s work, I continued the fieldwork in a “low key,” by primarily attending the home group, where numbers of people present would oscillate between ten and fifteen; churchwide fellowship evenings; and informal social events. This had the effect of limiting my access to other settings. “Gaining access to a research site” as Burgess notices, “is not a one-off event. It is instead a social process that occurs throughout a research project” (Burgess 1991, 52). Consequently, when I attended parent and toddler groups nearly two years later, my presence seemed surprising. I also carried out another round of seven unstructured interviews at different moments. The study as a whole comprised interviews and participant observation of a home study group, of churchwide community events, social events of the home group and of the wider church. Participant observation gave me insight into the culture of Bethlehem. However, it should be recognized that “ethnography is at least as much about conversation as it is about observation” (Forsey 2010, 563) and that the reality the researcher is trying to capture is not always easily observable. My preference for listening rather than observing is partly my own “personal style” of experiencing the field (Forsey 2010). Thus, I adopted an “engaged listening” (Forsey 2010, 567) to uncover how participants constructed their religious identity. As argued by Forsey, The aim of the ethnographer is to listen deeply to and/or to observe as closely as possible the beliefs, the values, the material conditions and structural forces that underwrite the socially patterned behaviours of all human beings and the meanings people attach to these conditions and forces. (Forsey 2010, 567)

All interviews, except Felix’s informal one, were recorded and transcribed while some informal conversations were noted in the field notes, together with notes from participant observation. I chose to limit the interviews to members of the home group because I was more familiar with them, I considered them “knowledgeable” of the local culture (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 66), but also because the confines of the home group selected organically a particular group within the congregation. People in the group have formed strong

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relationships of friendship. This meant that most of the informants represented a very cohesive and, to an extent, homogeneous group. Nevertheless, their opinions on important issues, such as salvation, varied widely. During the interviews, informants were open in sharing personal reflections and anecdotes from their lives while being recorded. However, as the relationship with some key informants developed into friendship, I began to question what I could include as data without breaching confidence. I left out what I considered confidential, notwithstanding the fact that informants had volunteered very personal information about their lives during recorded interviews. I felt that leaving out personal information was necessary to live up to the trust that informants had in me, which made the research possible in the first place. After all, informants did not know how I would use and present the data. Research participants were asked for consent for observation and interviews through the elders and individually. It was made clear that every effort was made to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. It should also be recognized that research findings can be reinterpreted and misconstrued once out in the public domain (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000, 18). Nevertheless, confidentiality and anonymity cannot be guaranteed under all circumstances. Research participants do not always appreciate that their reserve is needed for anonymity to be maintained. This became apparent when I was contacted to present a talk on my research and the person making the invitation named the church of my case study. My most absolute denials were to no avail given that the information came directly from the former pastor. The names of the informants have been changed with the names from the characters of George Eliot’s novels. This was partly due to George Eliot being one of my favorite authors, but also an author showing a strong religious sensibility. Eliot translated Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity ([1841] 1989). Like Simmel, she was influenced deeply by his philosophy. Eliot’s novel Middlemarch ([1871] 2008) is infused with Feuerbach’s concept of religion as consciousness and feeling. For Feuerbach, human beings saw their nature outside of themselves before being able to find it inside of themselves. Dorothea embodies that religious sense, which from evangelicalism turns into mysticism. The use of Eliot’s characters is merely to conceal the identity of my informants and, perhaps, to evoke a sense of religious sentiment in approaching Bethlehem church. Thus, the names should not be taken as a reflection of any aspect of the participants’ personality.

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THE PARISH IN BRITAIN AND NORTH-AMERICAN NEW MONASTICS The findings from my research on authenticity at Bethlehem led me to begin research on new monastics, subject of chapter 9. Three aspects of new monastics’ religiosity linked to my research and offered a way to examine issues more closely: authenticity as the formation and cultivation of a personal moral and religious identity through regular practices; a communal identity based on the people-centered ethic of compassion; and the role of tradition in constructing the group identity and legitimizing practices. The identity of new monastics is largely based on the search of authenticity in one’s daily lives outside of church parameters. New monastics groups are, at least for the time being, something other than “church planting.” Their identity is based on a commitment to a set of vows rather than the aim of setting up a “church.” Some new monastics might be associated with a church, but their religiosity is expressed in the practices agreed with those members of the new monastic community. New monastic are a form of neo-traditionalism. However, unlike conservative neo-traditionalist movements and churches, their identity is shaped by a search for inclusivity. This is why I argue that it rests on the people-centered ethic of compassion (outlined in chapter 8), which is primarily expressed in the practice of hospitality. The data presented here are the findings of a twelve-month study in the Parish, a new monastic community in the UK, and of scoping studies in thirteen other communities in rural areas as well as small, medium and large cities across the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada. I have focused on urban communities to gain a better understanding of new monastic efforts at reconciling their commitment to Christian tradition with inclusivity in diverse contexts. The focus on cities was also partly due to pragmatic issues, including my reliance on public transport to reach each community and the time available. The studies I conducted did not receive any funding, which imposed limits to the scope of the research in terms of the sampling of communities and the time spent in each of them. The studies entailed unstructured interviews and participant observation. Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees. The names have been changed to guarantee anonymity. There are relatively few, if any, new monastic communities in cities. Therefore, to ensure confidentiality I refer to the location of the communities very broadly in terms of regions or country. Chapter 9 explores the cultural differences between British and North American new monastic communities and considers, albeit briefly, the cultural and geographical dimension between the United States and Canada, and within the United States. In particular, the issue of race came out strongly in communities in the United States. This is a significant aspect, especially with regards to urban segregation, that would have required a much longer study

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and adequate funding. There is no doubt that race, class, gender, as well as the differences between urban and rural context, shape narratives, practices, and the setup of religious organizations. An analysis of these aspects is beyond the remit of the present book. It is hoped that future research will explore the theoretical concepts of belief, authenticity, sacralization, and compassion-purity, here proposed, in relation to race, class, gender, and geography. BECOMING A SOCIOLOGIST At the end of the pilot research, I told my supervisor, “They are really caring.” That’s it. That was my “finding”: my research participants aimed to be caring and they were. I wanted to understand why they were caring, so I listened to participants, which I could have done better had I not ditched one theoretical concept after another before finding Simmel. My discovery of Simmel came when I read his essays on religion, following a casual mention from an academic in relation to his essay on the metropolis. In my teenage years, I had read The Stranger (Simmel [1908] 1950) in an anthology, but I had forgotten all about it. Simmel shared much with one of my first literary loves, Luigi Pirandello, a contemporary of Simmel, who left his land of Sicily in 1889 to live in Bonn for two years, where he translated Goethe. It seemed destiny. I thus began my descent into the Simmelian maelstrom without any theoretical anchor that might have kept me from drowning. A draft paper on relationality, right from the abyss of Simmel’s Wechselwirkung, capsized my supervisor’s boat as well, who swam quickly ashore, away from it. My only life-support were a few articles by Simmelian scholar Fréderick Vandenberghe. I once resolved to contact a world-renown expert of Simmel, Professor David Frisby, for advice, but he died a week later. I put off contacting Professor Vandenberghe, just in case. I admit to losing sight of the scope of the research and how to conduct it with “scientific rigor.” I wish I could have interviewed more people; I wish I could have interviewed them for longer; and I wish I could have asked them about compassion. Yet, the best data have come from informants opening up and revealing themselves and their lives as part of a conversation, rather than in response to specific questions. They talked of what faith meant to them, what kind of community they sought to build, and what kind of religion they rejected. I once gave a workshop on community and faith at LimmudFest, a festival-conference of Jewish culture. I asked participants what they did not like of faith communities and what they should be like. I wrote the answers on a board and, then, I presented my findings on Bethlehem church by circling the words on the board. “They are Jews,” someone exclaimed. I might have turned Christian evangel-

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icals into Jews because my eyes and ears saw and heard the human, rather than the numinous, but they sounded “Jewish” in their focus on community rather than saving souls. They are better at being Jewish. At the beginning of my PhD, while dining in the Rabbi’s sukkah, I mentioned I studied a Christian evangelical church. A woman said to me, “I know a good one: Bethlehem church.” I said nothing. She asked, “Why can’t we be like them?” Bethlehem Christians might blush at the compliment, after all during an evening discussing the vision for the church, someone asked, “People, do we like them?” For Bethlehemites and new monastics faith is lived in relationships, in everyday acts of kindness, in feelings of compassion, and in the struggle to overcome the temptation to be selfish, indifferent, and judgmental. I let them speak as much as possible through a perhaps intricate theoretical framework. The theoretical framework helped me to discern the different aspects of the search for authenticity: the continuous work to be like Jesus. It separated the social from the personal, but also the normative. The experience of research has changed my perspective on the world around me. Above all, I have become passionate about finding out what people do, say, and what they mean. Learning the grammar of social life helped me see its richness and variety. The study of the social opens a window on the human. NOTE 1. For a discussion on this, see the symposium “Towards a Critical Anthropology of Religion” in Critical Research on Religion, 2018, 6(1).

Chapter Three

The Relational Sociology of Georg Simmel

Una realtà non ci fu data e non c’è, ma dobbiamo farcela noi, se vogliamo essere: e non sarà mai una per tutti, una per sempre, ma di continuo e infinitamente mutabile. Reality is not something given to us or that exists, rather we must make it, if we want to be: and it will never be the same for all and forever, but in continuous and never-ending movement. —Luigi Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno, Centomila (1926)

Georg Simmel was born on March 1, 1858, in the heart of Berlin, on the corner of Leipzigstraße and Friedrichstraße (Coser 1965, 1). Of Jewish descent, Simmel never really knew his father, Eduard, who had died when he was still young. He was brought up by his mother, Flora Bodstein, and a friend of the family, Julius Friedländer. In 1890, he married Gertrud Kinel (1864–1938), a close friend of Max Weber’s wife, Marianne (Vandenberghe 2001, 8), and a philosopher in her own right, who published under the pseudonym Marie Luise Enckendorf. Their son, Hans (1891–1943), would be sent to the concentration camp of Dachau to later flee to the UK and then the United States. Simmel also had a long-standing relationship with poetess Gertrud Kantorowicz (1876–1945), from whom he had a daughter, Angela. Angela (1907–1944) was born in Bologna and was baptized Angi Bolzano. Simmel did not want to meet his daughter, who was adopted by her mother, Gertrud Kantorowicz, in 1922. In 1933, Angela converted to Judaism and took the name Channah and died in Palestine in 1944 following an accident (Swedberg and Reich 2010, 45–46).

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Simmel enjoyed the vibrancy of Berlin, which, in 1896, hosted the Great Industrial Exposition to affirm its credential of a center for science, technology, and industry. At home, Simmel hosted intellectual evenings with artists, philosophers and scholars, such as Stefan George, Rainer Maria Rilke, Heinrich Rickert, Max and Marianne Weber, Georg Lukács, and Ernst Bloch (Vandenberghe 2001, 10). Simmel’s famous lectures were attended not only by his students but by an enthralled public. Yet, an “outsider” of the academic environment and politics, partly due to anti-semitism (Coser 1965, 3; Frisby 2013, 13), Simmel secured a full professorship only very late in life at the University of Strasbourg. He was one “of the major minds German social science produced around the turn of the century,” yet he remained “atypical, a perturbing and fascinating figure to his more organically rooted contemporaries” (Coser 1965, 1). He wrote more than two hundred articles and numerous substantive works. He trained in philosophy, writing his thesis on Kant, and considered himself a philosopher (Levine 2010, xi). He influenced many philosophers and sociologists, including Martin Buber, Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch, Karl Mannheim, Walter Benjamin, and Martin Heidegger. He died of cancer of the liver on September 28, 1918, just before the end of the war. The reception of Simmel's work has often met resistance. The American Robert Park, a student of Simmel’s, brought his inheritance to the United States, where he developed Simmel's idea of society as interactions, from which the tradition of “symbolic interactionism” ensued. Simmel's sociology was for a long time neglected by American sociology, which privileged Max Weber’s thought (Jaworski 1997). The disregard for Simmel was also partly due to Talcott Parsons’s dismissive views, notwithstanding his own theory drawing so much from Simmel (Levine 2010, xvii). Above all, his philosophy and sociology were stubbornly “Simmelian.” His thought is characterized by dialectical thinking, a tendency to extrapolate general patterns of sociation from characterizations and “micro” instances, such as the “poor,” the “adventurer,” and the “stranger,” and a philosophical perspective on social reality. Simmel has been considered “unsystematic” (Kemple 2007; Scaff 1990, 2005), “impressionistic” (Collins 1994; Frisby 1981; Lukács [1906–07] 2003), and re-read as postmodern (Weinstein and Weinstein 1993). He was unsystematic in his terminology, but not in his philosophical sociology (Weingartner 1962). He never stopped reelaborating his ideas. He continued to develop his ontological and epistemological grounding until his last work, Lebensanschauung, which he considered his philosophical testament. He left a rich and diverse theoretical inheritance that challenged disciplinary boundaries. He wrote that he died without spiritual heirs, but with the consciousness that those who learned from him took forward his thought in their own distinctive way.

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I know that I shall die without spiritual heirs (and this is good). The estate I leave is like cash distributed among many heirs, each of whom puts his share to use in some trade that is compatible with his nature but which can no longer be recognised as coming from that estate. (Simmel, cited in Frisby 2013, 137)

Simmel’s philosophical approach and disregard for disciplinary boundaries do not translate into defined concepts and models to aid empirical analysis. Unlike Weber, Simmel has not been applied widely and his “sociological metaphysics” (Harrington and Kemple 2012) or metaphysical sociology (Lehtonen and Pyyhtinen 2008; Levine 2010; Pyyhtinen 2009, 2018) makes very difficult to elaborate analytical concepts that can illuminate what happens in everyday life. It is thus with a little apprehension that I venture in borrowing from Simmel’s insights, giving my own interpretation of his ideas, and developing theoretical concepts that can be applied to contemporary religious life. The task requires putting aside a philologically accurate and comprehensive analysis of Simmel’s work to be able to build concepts that can elucidate empirical reality. Before doing so, I present, in concise form, the building blocks of his sociology, specifically his understanding of Forms 1 and Contents, and his later Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life). Simmel was unconcerned with clarifying his terminology and employed the same terms in different ways. Mine is necessarily a simplification that serves to set out the terms that I use to develop my own theory. Simmel kept on refining his epistemological framework throughout his life; yet a stable feature was his understanding of reality in movement, first in evolutionary terms, later through a dialectical duality within a Kantian framework (Vandenberghe 1999a), and lastly, with his Lebensphilosophie, as a constant flow that takes temporary form and causes new forms to replace old ones. In Simmel’s “vitalism,” one can see the influence of Nieztsche, Goethe, and Kant. Simmel's first major work, On Social Differentiation ([1890] 1982) shows the influence of Darwin’s and Spencer’s evolutionism and the notion of differentiation, the development from one simple organism to a more complex and differentiated one. Simmel’s understanding of the social in terms of the interactions between the reciprocal individuals and groups was influenced by the Völkerpsychologie of Steinthal and Lazarus, for whom society lay in the interaction of the activities of individuals and the intersection of different social circles (Frisby 1992, 6). It is Kant who, throughout Simmel’s writings, dominates his thinking. Simmel wrote his doctoral thesis on Kant and maintained Kant as a reference point throughout his life, although he also integrated Niezsche and Goethe. Simmel's understanding of reality is first encapsulated within a quasi-Kantian framework of Forms and Contents, which is then reworked, toward the end of his life, in relation to his own conception of Lebensphilosophie. The first section of this chapter thus sets out Simmel’s use of Forms and Con-

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tents, and his relational thinking. Society, for Simmel, is constituted by social relationships. This will be at the core of social interactionism developed by American sociologists. For Simmel, relationality has also a philosophical dimension. It is the synthesis the mind performs of reality. This approach to the understanding of reality pervades Simmel’s oeuvre. This affords the possibility of seeing multiple dimensions, or layers, of any given phenomenon under examination. Simmel’s relationality poses the self as relational and thus constituted through the relationship with the “Thou,” the Other, but also through internal psychological relations. Simmel affirms an individuality specific to the person, but one that is always in “becoming,” resulting from internal and external interactions. This is explored in the second section, which is then followed by an analysis of modern subjectivity. Simmel uses the terms “conflict of culture” and “tragedy of culture” to capture the ineluctable tension between subjectivity and social life. The “objective culture,” as Simmel calls it, of industrialized modernity produces a sense of estrangement in the individual, who seeks refuge in a heightened subjectivity. The final section explores Simmel’s turn to vitalism, which accounts for social change and the modern individual’s wrestle with facticity. Simmel integrates Forms into his Lebensphilosophie. Forms are in opposition to Life (Leben), a constant flux that requires new Forms to be expressed. It is self-transcendence (Selbsttranszendenz) that becomes the key epistemic principle in Simmel’s thought. It is self-transcendence the notion I employ in the next chapter to propose authenticity as a dynamic process rather than essence. FORMS, CONTENTS, AND RELATIONALITY Simmel considered society in terms of interactions. Society has no autonomous substance, it rests on individuals and groups interacting. Interactions have multiple manifestations; yet over time “sociation,” or stable forms, emerges. The Forms of sociation are a crystallization (Verdichtung) of interactions. Forms give a shape to phenomena. We can think of Forms as abstractions that capture social patterns, such as social status, roles, and norms (Tenbruck 1994, 358). They are also abstractions of the mind, not reality per se. It is the mind’s way of making sense of social reality. Simmelian Forms are not universal and constant, but always changing and dependent on the Content they take. In his later thought, when Forms become part of Simmel’s Lebensphilosophie, Forms are understood to be in opposition to Life (Leben). From the never ending flow of Life, Forms crystallize. However, they do not fossilize Life; rather, the process of Life is such that Forms are adapted and surpassed by new Forms.

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Simmel not only used Forms within very different epistemological frameworks, he was also inconsistent in his use of the term Form, which he interpreted as a principle of structuration of the social; as a synthetic principle, and the “a posteriori crystallisation of energies or interactions in the cultural objects and social institutions,” such as the sphere of values, science, art or religion (Vandenberghe 2002, 54–55). Accordingly, in the first instance, the Forms of “sociation” (of being in social relations) identify empirical regularities into a pattern of sociation. Specific examples are status, role, and norm (Tenbruk 1994, 358). In this sense, Forms are crystallizations of social interaction. In the second meaning, Forms “synthesize” the knowledge of the observer of social reality. Forms order how the observer understands reality. Simmel, like Kant, conceived knowledge of reality as partial and the result of a synthesis by the mind of the observer. He wrote, “Human thought always and everywhere synthesizes the given into units that serve as subject matters of the sciences” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 5). The result of the subject’s synthesis is a Form that is an abstraction, “from a given complex of phenomena, of a number of heterogeneous objects of cognition” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 7). The synthetic view is a repeated sifting and ordering (Simmel [1907] 2004, 108–10) of reality on the basis of the mind’s constructs. However, the process of synthesis does not happen according to stable a priori Forms; it is relational. Of course this form of interpreting meaning also connects with the motives of the persons who are acting, but it subjects their analysis to the a priori demands of thought, through which the transmitted events are first formed into a historical context. (Lichtblau 1991, 49, emphasis in the original)

Forms are also autonomous worlds, “languages into which the world or aspects of it may be translated. These languages may be conceived as general schemata that constitute conditions for the intelligibility of the world as a whole or specific aspects of it” (Oakes 1980, 10). Accordingly, each Form “has its own definitive modes and its own characteristic language. Each form produces a representation of the world that is unique to the form itself” (Oakes 1980, 11). Form as an autonomous world (Simmel [1918] 2010, 55) is the sense in which Simmel employs the term in relation to religion. Accordingly, the Form of religion (die Religion) is an objectification of a religious propensity: religiosity (die Religiosität). Religion, as a Form, changes throughout time. Forms, as mentioned, are mutable. This results from the constant social interactions constituting society. Society is not a “real entity” from which social relations and interactions derive, but the sum of these (Simmel [1890] 1982, 19). Thus, a sociological object is “unified” in as much as its parts are in reciprocal dynamic relation (Simmel [1890] 1982, 17). In other words,

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social reality is interactions. Accordingly, “one should properly speak, not of society, but of sociation (Vergesellschaftung). Society merely is the name for a number of individuals, connected by interaction. It is because of their interaction that they are a unit” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 10). Society is not a substance (Substanz), but an event (Geschehen) (Simmel [1908] 1950, 11). Simmel's relationality is more than an understanding of society as interactions, but a regulative principle of reality. Simmel develops Kant’s notion of Wechsel (exchange) and turns Wechselwirkung 2 (relationality/reciprocity) into the principle underpinning social relations. Everything is in interaction. Simmel’s relativity, or relationality, is a the overarching principle in Simmel’s sociology (Pyyhtinen 2018). Such interaction means the relationship between actions, thoughts, motives etc., is one of “relativity.” We cannot understand reality but in reference to its dynamic relations. Simmel, however, was not relativistic; rather he borrowed from Einstein's idea of relativity to convey the inter-relationality of reality, as he referred to in a letter to his friend Heinrich Rickert. My kind of relativism constitutes a perfectly positive metaphysical worldview and it is as much scepticism as is relativism in physics as it is represented by Einstein and Laue. Obviously I have not made clear what I mean when I say that truth is relative. Relativity of truth does not mean to me that truth and untruth are co-relational; but rather, I mean that truth is a relation of contents. Neither of the contents is true in itself, just as no physical object is heavy by itself but only in a reciprocal relation (Wechselverhältnis) with another. (Simmel, cited in Kaern 1990, 78–79)

Simmel, with the principle of relativity, rejects the “dogma” of “a single truth that needs no proof” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 104), in favor of the “interrelationship” of knowledge of the world, according to which “from every point we can attain by demonstration every other point;” such “reciprocity of proofs is the basic form of knowledge” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 104). Cognition is thus a free-floating process, whose elements determine their position reciprocally, in the same way as masses of matter do by means of weight. Truth is then a relative concept like weight. (Simmel [1907] 2004, 104)

Simmel does not undermine the validity of knowledge nor does he think that its validity is relative to a specific frame of reference, such as that of culture or language (Pyyhtinen 2008b, 72). On the contrary, Simmel’s relativity is the underlying principle of truth, value and objectivity as “a new concept of solidity” (Simmel, cited in Pyyhtinen 2008b, 72), a positive doctrine of knowledge resting on reciprocal conditioning (Vandenberghe 2002, 41). Truth means the relationship between representations, which may be realized as an infinite construction, since, even if our knowledge is based upon truths

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that are no longer relative, we can never know whether we have reached the really final stage, or whether we are again on the road to a more general and profound conception. (Simmel [1907] 2004, 114–15)

Truth is dependent on our representations, how we understand reality. Simmel adopts a pragmatic outlook to distinguish between valid and invalid representations. Actions “based on ‘false’ representations tend to injure us” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 104–5), while call truth “those representations that, active within us as real forces or motions, incite us to useful behaviour” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 105). More importantly, for Simmel, objectivity rests once again on relationality/relativity: on the mutual relationship between representations. The “ideal of objective truth . . . finds its supplement and therewith its legitimation through the other” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 112). Relativity means everything is interrelated and from this interrelation truth emerges. Relativity does weaken the idea of truth. [Relativity] is the positive fulfilment and validation of the concept of truth. Truth is valid, not in spite of its relativity but precisely on account of it. (Simmel [1907] 2004, 116)

Reality is interrelated and in movement. This relativity is relationality, not relativism. It describes how everything is interconnected with everything else. Simmel’s relationality also concerns the self that is always in relation to the Other. This is understood in a sociological and philosophical sense. Sociologically, the individual is part of society and embedded in social relations, although is also unique and, as such, never exhausted by society. Philosophically, the self is constituted through internal relationships and understands itself through the Other. For Simmel, the “I” is always in relation to the “Thou.” THE “I AND THOU” AND THE RELATIONAL SELF Simmel saw individuals as “sociated.” They are conscious of being part of social relations, and act with that consciousness (Simmel 1910a, 377). The self is not independent, separate, and bounded, but is in relationship with others and shaped by those relationships. The self is social in the sense that it emerges from and is constituted by social interactions, although not exhausted by them. One’s identity is not reduced to one’s social roles. Simmel’s individual is relational, but maintains individuality. Simmel’s emphasis is on how individuals understand themselves and others, rather than structural processes of sociation. The relationality of Simmelian actors is first and foremost epistemic. For instance, the person is conscious of associating and of being a member of a community looks at other members as members of

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their group (Simmel 1910a, 380). Collective structures thus shape our understanding of each other (Simmel [1908] 2007). Social interactions create multiple typifications of the person that are expressed at any given point and through which people understand each other. The individual does not simply act in a social role; rather his personal character is stylized in social interaction (Simmel [1908] 1950, 48). Individuals understand themselves and others through the “typifications,” or images, they hold of others, but also on the basis of the image they have of themselves in relation to others. We thus form a picture of ourselves and of others that captures the salient social information and allows exchange. As Lichtblau explained it, We always see the other only in the mirror of our own generalisations and typifications, and we gain our self image conversely only through a “generalized other.” (Lichtblau 1991, 48)

Simmel is influenced by Dilthey’s ([1900] 1972) idea Verstehen (understanding), derived from Hegel’s epistemic intersubjectivity. Knowledge, for Hegel, entails consciousness of oneself as knower, which rests on the recognition of others as self-conscious subjects. Individual self-consciousness exists on the basis of mutual recognition (Anerkennung). Self-consciousness is not a closed self. This should not be taken ethically, but merely ontologically in terms of shared characteristics of human consciousness (Cobben 2017). This relationality of the self is a fundamental idea that will influence the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has today been taken forward in contemporary works (Honneth 1995; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011; Pippin 2008; Williams 1997). In Dilthey, Verstehen should not be misunderstood as empathic understanding of another’s point of view, but a process of reconstruction of our own as well as of others’ reality. For Dilthey, I experience my own individuality “only through a comparison of myself with other people; at that point alone I become aware of what distinguishes me from others” (Dilthey [1900] 1972, 231). We have no knowledge, argues Dilthey, of the inner reality of others; therefore we need to reconstruct the person to make sense of what we grasp. Dilthey’s notion of Verstehen is taken up by Simmel through the notion of the “Thou” as understanding. “Thou” as a category originates from experiencing “the other person or the Thou as a unified entity” (Simmel [1918] 1980, 106). For Simmel, Thou is the other person, but also the process of understanding (Simmel [1918] 1980, 107). Understanding depends on alterity. Therefore, we understand others through ourselves and by reconstructing the person through typifications, by creating images of others through which we relate and interact. The process is always ongoing and proceeds through

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subsequent and constant “changes and reshapings” (Simmel 1910a, 381), which prevent a complete characterization of the individual. The individual does not become a static character, a mask imposed by social generalizations. On the contrary, Simmel’s dynamic process of “changes and reshapings” allows generalizations to be remodeled. It is this constant remodeling that prevents social interaction producing rigid characterizations of individuals. Individuals are shaped by social interactions, but never exhausted by them. For Simmel, the individual has a distinctive character, a personal side; it is that which is not “turned toward the group” (Simmel 1910a, 381). Social generalizations ascribe specific characteristics to the individual without ever capturing the actual self of the individual, but always painting a picture that forms a personality through which the individual engages in social relations. [T]he generalization is always at the same time more or less than the individuality. That is, the individual is rated as in some particulars different from his actual self by the gloss imposed upon him when he is classified in a type, when he is compared with an imagined completeness of his own peculiarity, when he is credited with the characteristics of the social generality to which he belongs. (Simmel 1910a, 381)

The social setting does not shape and absorb the individual completely. It is through this individuality that the individual can come to be part of the group. Without one’s own personal side, one could not interact with others. [A]n extra-social being, his temperament and the deposit of his experiences, his interests and the worth of his personality, . . . gives the individual still, in every instance, for everyone with whom he is in contact, a definite shading, and interpenetrates his social picture with extra-social imponderabilities. (Simmel 1910a, 382)

The Simmelian self is thus not merely the characterization of the individual arising from social interaction and through which individuals interact with each other, but also the image we have of our own “self” which is never concretized fully. The specificity of “one’s own individuality” grants individuals an “image” of themselves. Thus, individuality refers to our personality, our character, in the same sense in which we recognize our actions as being “in character” or “out of character,” expressing that unity underpinning our “fragments.” It is one’s consciousness or, in Simmel’s words, “personality” that bestows a sense of coherent unity to the person. Human beings are made of physical and psychological elements held together by consciousness, which gives an image of unity. Consciousness, this unified image of the self, does not nullify the relationality of the self. The self is the outcome of

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constant inner as well as outer interactions. One’s relationships with the outside world and the inner workings of the mind thus shape one’s psyche. The representations of memory are an example of how the mind gives a sense of a unified self; one, however, that is perpetually altered by the dynamic relationship between past and present. Thus, the past shapes us in the present as much as the present shapes the image we have of ourselves in the past. [W]e can conceive of the continuous flux of our inner life only by means of the symbol that the contents of life, crystallized in our abstraction as “ideas,” modify each other, so that by and large man’s present is the result of his past. As memory transforms the past into the present, however, the past that is alive within us is also influenced by the elements that have since been added or are currently being formed. (Simmel [1911] 1997, 49) 3

This perpetual process prevents the realization of the “personality,” as Simmel puts it, “in the absolute sense” (Simmel [1911] 1997, 51). 4 One is never complete, but Simmel does not simply mean that one’s “personality” is fragmented; rather that the personality consists in a continuous interaction. The personality is “a mutual penetration, a functional adaptation and transfer, an interrelationship of parts, a fusion within the sphere of all possible contents.” (Simmel [1911] 1997, 51). 5 The self that emerges from Simmel’s reflections is one that is relational, not just in a social sense, but with itself. We have come full circle, so to speak. Society consists of social relations, all reality results from the mind’s relational process of understanding, the self is shaped by social interactions, but it is also the result of epistemic interactions. Simmel talks of the I and Thou, the relationship between the self and the Other. We, as human beings, are in relation with the Other, and understand ourselves through the Other. [W]e experience the other person, the Thou, both as the most alien and impenetrable creature imaginable, and also as the most intimate and familiar. On the one hand, the ensouled Thou is our only peer or counterpart [Pair] in the universe. It is the only being with whom we can come to a mutual understanding and feel as “one.” . . . On the other hand, the Thou also has an incomparable autonomy and sovereignty. It resists any decomposition or analysis [Auflösung] into the subjective representation of the ego. It has that absoluteness of reality which the ego ascribes to itself. (Simmel [1918] 1980, 106–7)

Simmel does not put forward a relational ethics, something Martin Buber ([1923] 1970) and Emmanuel Lévinas ([1961] 1980) will do; he is more interested in the ontological rather than normative aspect of alterity. In particular, he eschews a unity of the I and Thou. I and Thou should not be dissolved in an all encompassing Oneness, but maintain their separate identities (Simmel [1907] 1991, 111). The relational approach, hallmark of Sim-

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mel’s thinking, keeps the I and Thou in dynamic relationship. Individuality is thus not lost in relationships; rather it is affirmed through them, just as relativity is, for Simmel, a positive principle. Simmel’s relational thinking colors his understanding of the modern fragmented self grappling with a restructuring of social relations in the industrial age. He thus speaks of a “conflict of culture” or “tragedy of culture” not to lament alienation of the modern individual, but as a result of his dialectical mode of thinking (Levine 1991, 109). Indeed, we could say that the conflict is constitutive of modern subjectivity. SUBJECTIVITY AND THE “TRAGEDY OF CULTURE” Simmel discerns a shift in the cultural understanding of individuality throughout history. He viewed the Italian Renaissance as the origin of modern subjectivity. The Renaissance signaled a loosening of the ties of the medieval community, “a time when individuals believed in no limits to the possibilities of presenting themselves to others with character, distinction and independence” (Simmel [1917] 2007, 66). The individuality of the Renaissance is heightened with industrialized modernity, when everything is experienced in terms of one’s subjective life. [T]he essence of modernity as such is psychologism, the experiencing and interpretation of the world in terms of the reactions of our inner life and indeed as an inner world, the dissolution of fixed contents in the fluid element of the soul, from which all that is substantive is filtered and whose forms are merely forms of motion. (Simmel, cited in Frisby 1985, 49)

Simmel thought that the radical changes of industrialization and of modern urbanization led to an intensified subjectivity. The impersonality and anonymity of the city, where traditional bonds were looser, allowed more freedom to the individual. Simmel was struck by the constant visual stimuli the individual would receive in the city giving rise to a blasé attitude (Blasiertheit) typical of the metropolis (Simmel [1908] 1950). For Simmel, what overwhelms the person is the seemingly endless production of cultural artefacts and objects—what we may call consumer culture. The individual reacts to mass production and social differentiation by seeking refuge in a heightened subjectivism. In his essay on the “tragedy of culture” (Simmel [1918] 1968), Simmel argued that the person is overwhelmed by the seemingly endless production of cultural artefacts and objects. He distinguished between “objective culture” and “subjective culture.” “Objective culture” is the culture that is independent of the individual and arises from the plurality of cultural artefacts produced in modern society. “Subjective culture” refers instead to the ab-

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sorption of the cultural products by individuals, a process through which the individual develops culturally and morally. This “tragedy of culture,” which Simmel also calls “conflict,” lies in the inability of the person to absorb the ever increasing objective culture. The real cultural malaise of modern man is the result of this discrepancy between the objective substance of culture, both concrete and abstract, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the subjective culture of individuals who feel this objective culture to be something alien, which does violence to them and with which they cannot keep pace. (Simmel [1909] 1976, 251)

This cultural gap is a result of the division of labor of the modern economy, which creates “objectified cultural forms . . . at a rate which exceeds the capacity of human subjects to absorb them” (Levine 1991, 107). Simmel acknowledged that human consciousness had to be preoccupied with means in order for human beings to progress, to have the strength or interest to perform the immediate task without being crippled by the realization of its ultimate insignificance (Simmel [1907] 2004, 231). In other words, human beings cannot simply contemplate the ultimate concerns of life (Simmel [1907] 2004, 232), but need to function within society; yet the frustration of “the purposes of life” leaves people “enslaved . . . in the interest of technics” (Simmel [1907] 2004, 232). This mismatch between social pressures and individuality drives the individual to a heightened subjectivism, the search for originality, or we might say authenticity. Simmel wrote that [o]riginality reassures us that life is pure, that it has not diluted itself by absorbing extrinsic, objectified, rigid forms into its flows. This is perhaps a subliminal motive, not explicit but powerful, which underlies modern individualism. (Simmel [1918] 1968, 19)

Simmel’s use of the term “conflict” of culture reflects his dialectical way of conceptualizing phenomena (Levine 1991, 109), not a judgment; while the reference to “tragedy” exposes the contrasting forces inherent to a phenomenon. Therefore, the tragedy of culture is not alienation, but a process that is inherent to modernity. It is the inherent opposition of forces. The tragic, for Simmel, is intrinsic to a phenomenon (Giacomoni 2015, 871; Simmel [1910] 2003, 39). In modern life, there is an inescapable tension between the “restless life of the creative soul” and its own fixed cultural product, “which arrests and indeed rigidifies this liveliness” (Simmel [1918] 1968, 31). Simmel, however, does not lament a loss of purity brought about by industrialization; rather, for Simmel, culture is always a synthesis of one’s subjective development with an objective value (Simmel [1918] 1968, 37). For Simmel, mass production and social differentiation lead inevitably to the search for a heightened individuality. Simply put, the person’s aspiration

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of expressing her own individuality is frustrated by her need to be a productive member of society. However, to fulfill her vocation, a person needs to fit into an objective society, which, in turn, may stifle the person’s individuality. This tension is also a tension between spiritual aspirations and everyday reality. [The individual has a] sense of being surrounded by an innumerable number of cultural elements which are neither meaningless to him nor, in the final analysis, meaningful. In their mass they depress him, since he is not capable of assimilating them all, nor can he simply reject them, since after all they do belong potentially within the sphere of his cultural development. (Simmel [1918] 1968, 44)

The tragedy of culture is symptomatic of the search for unity and distinctiveness of the nineteenth century. The individual of the nineteenth century is fragmented and in search of a sense of unity, something that is true and constant. Simmel understood the process of modern individualization as unfolding in two phases: a “quantitative individualism” and in the eighteenthcentury, and a “qualitative individualism” in the nineteenth century. Quantitative individualism is “the individualism of singleness [Einzelheit]” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 81). It identifies the universal ideal of freedom and equality of the individual reflecting the Enlightenment’s values of the eighteenth century. At its core was the Kantian conception of the individual as an end in itself and basic unit of a universal humanity. Nineteenth-century qualitative individualism is “the individualism of uniqueness [Einzigkeit]” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 81). This is not limited to a turn inward; rather it captures the search for originality, which will inform later notions of authenticity. Simmel’s qualitative individualism derives from his philosophical engagement with Goethe, Schleiermacher, and Nietzsche (Podoksik 2015, 126). Accordingly, the value of the individual did not lie solely on being human, but on being distinctive. What mattered was that the individual “was this specific, irreplaceable, given individual” (Simmel [1908] 1950, 78). In his early book Social Differentiation ([1890] 1982), qualitative individualism is not present. Simmel stressed the commonality of humankind. The tension between society, its roles and norms, and individuality was there solved through an ethical attachment to society (Podoksik 2015, 416). In contrast, society, in Simmel’s later works, is but one mode of “redemption,” because human beings are more than just members of society (Podoksik 2015, 425). In his final work Lebensanschauung (Simmel [1918] 2010), Simmel articulates a philosophy of Life (Lebensphilosophie) in an attempt to reconcile quantitative and qualitative individualism, the universal and the particular.

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SIMMEL’S LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE Toward the end of his life, Simmel reconceptualized his neo-Kantian framework of Forms through a formulation of Lebensphilosophie ([1918] 2010). Leben (Life), here, is modeled partly on Heraclitus’s continuous flow. The incessant flow of Life takes up Forms, which become obsolete and are superseded by new Forms. Simmel retains the notion of Forms and integrates it within his own conception of vitalism. In doing so, Simmel integrates Kant and Goethe. As argued by Levine (2012, 2), contrary to the traditional systematization of Simmel’s thought according to different periods: a Darwinian period, a Kantian period and a final Bergsonian stage of Lebensphilosophie, Kant and Goethe remain his principal interlocutors throughout his life. Accordingly, Simmel reworks his understanding of Forms as essential part of the Life process. Forms are in opposition to Life, but are also essential to its process. From the never ending flow of Life, Forms crystallize. The constant flow of Life is experienced and can only be experienced through Forms. Forms do not fossilize Life; rather, the process of Life is such that Forms are adapted and surpassed by new Forms. Simmel identifies two dimensions of Life: “more-Life” (Mehr-Leben), which is the fundamental dynamic movement of all life forms (human and animal), and “more-than-Life” (Mehr-als-Leben), which transcends the Life process to crystallize into Forms (Simmel [1918] 2010, 13–17). Mehr-Leben refers to “the drive toward reproduction, common to all organic species” (Levine 2012, 37), while Mehr-als-Leben is the creation of Forms that become autonomous, which include cultural forms and social structures. Forms give Life a shape. As Donald Levine argues, they reengage vital processes reshaping them and thus need to be understood as integral part of the Life process (Levine 2012, 37). They are necessary for Life to concretize. When a Form is no longer an adequate vehicle for Life, there is a crisis that can lead to changes to that Form or create new Forms (Levine 2012, 36). So, for instance, when a particular Form of religion becomes obsolete, a new Form emerges. Life and Forms are in dynamic relation. In The View of Life ([1918] 2010), as noted by Levine, [Simmel] reversed his position dramatically. Instead of viewing the ongoing life process as threatened by the hypertrophy of objectified cultural forms, he found the ascendance of the idea of Life and the explosion of vital energies so relentless that cultural forms could no longer exert the kind of constraint that they had throughout history. (Levine 2010, xxii)

The totality of Life can never be constrained in a Form. The absolute is never reached. The Life process implies a constant overcoming. Simmel’s burning concern for unity gives way to a dynamic process of becoming and overcom-

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ing. The quest for the absolute can be realized only through partial and individual content (Simmel [1910] 1996, 24). Simmel’s philosophical principle is thus not unity, but self-transcendence (Selbsttranszendenz). In Hauptprobleme der Philosophie ([1910] 1996), Simmel stated that human beings, “as knowing beings,” can transcend themselves by virtue of their capacity for interpretation and awareness of the limits of knowledge (Simmel [1918] 1971, 357–58). Human beings recognize the partiality of human knowledge. Knowing that “this one-sidedness” is a necessity of cognition places human beings above it (Simmel [1918] 1971, 358). Life is “this-side” of the boundary (Grenze), but it is also on the “other-side.” So it is this human awareness that is self-transcendent. This “self-transcending consciousness” poses the self between the relative and the absolute (Simmel [1918] 1971, 364). It is by being aware of the relative and absolute, the particular and the universal, that human beings can transcend themselves. Transcendence, therefore, is immanent (Simmel [1918] 2010, 17). It is not located in a supernatural realm; rather it characterizes the human condition. [Human beings] do not simply stand within these boundaries, but by virtue of our awareness of them have passed beyond them . . . That we are cognizant of our knowing and our not-knowing . . . this is the real infinity of vital movement on the level of intellect. (Simmel [1918] 1971, 358)

By philosophizing, one overcomes the finitude of one’s consciousness. Philosophy offers a possibility of self-transcendence, as do art and religion. As Fitzi explains, Human beings are to be seen as “beings of the limit,” because their attitude to the world is determined by the fact that, in every dimension of experience, they find themselves constantly moving between two opposing limits . . . the existence of limits is fundamental for their continued existence; the individual limits, however, are steadily overcome in a process that does not abolish its principle but each time establishes a new limit. (Fitzi 2012, 189)

Transcendence is immanent (Simmel [1918] 2010, 17). It is not located in a supernatural realm; rather it characterizes the human condition. Vandenberghe gives a metaphysical reading of Simmel’s transcendence, which reflects Kant’s move from the transcendent to the transcendental (universal). Kant’s transcendental enacts a shift from the transcendent God to universal consciousness. For Vandenberghe, Simmel’s transcendence is immanent because it is the unity to which one’s subjective consciousness aspires. Vandenberghe notes that Simmel “continuously hints that there is something beyond reality, something that transcends mere life, encompassing all of its moments and giving it its unity” (Vandenberghe 2010, 7). This “authenticity,” for Vandenberghe, is attained through the cosmic “Thou,” which encompasses

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the self and the other, as well as the “absolute Thou.” It is through “Thou” that “the subject can thus realize its unique identity and attain authenticity” (Vandenberghe 2010, 21). In a similar vein, Podoksik suggests that Simmelian individuality needs to be reconciled with universality or, as he puts it, totality. For Podoksik, individuality and totality are reconciled through a “radicalization” of qualitative individualism (Podoksik 2010, 139). I differ, at least in part, in my interpretation of Simmel’s thought from Vandenberghe and Podoksik. I believe Simmel’s approach wants to retain a dialectical tension. Simmel might long for unity and transcendence, but he ultimately rejects both. I believe Simmel never relinquishes the movement of becoming. Life is self-transcendent, in becoming. I am therefore closer to the interpretation given by Darmon and Frade (2012), who give prominence to the notion of Erlebnis (lived experience) as a sense of the whole, but whose horizon is in constant movement. Simmel’s third realm is similarly a realm of pure movement, in which the selftranscendence of life is so continuous that form is constantly on the brink of being dissolved into flux. (Darmon and Frade 2012, 206)

Simmel contrasts Kant’s Absolute, which is a pure idea that cannot be seen or known, with Goethe’s Erlebnis, “immediate sentiment of the essence of nature” (Simmel [1906] 2008, 24). It is Goethe’s notion of unity of being expressed in the multiplicity of forms that fascinates Simmel. The Absolute, or transcendent, or divine, is in nature as much as in the human soul. Darmon and Frade (2012) have argued that the merging into the One is always ahead, as well as behind, and life a perpetual imbalance so as to preserve this overall encompassing equilibrium. (Darmon and Frade 2012, 206)

I would go further and argue that more than “equilibrium” what is central to Simmel’s conception of the relationship between absolute and particular is the “conflict,” the tension that cannot be resolved. In Simmel’s writings we might perceive at times a longing for an all-encompassing Oneness. Yet Simmel does not seek a reconciliation of the particular with the universal. He writes, “We only perceive ‘unity’ as the interaction and dynamic interweaving, coherence and balancing of multiplicity” (Simmel [1908] 1976, 247). Simmel sought a constant movement of self-transcendence, a becoming which captures opposing forces. Like Michelangelo’s non-finito (unfinished), Simmel wants to retain the tension and perpetual overcoming of Form. In Michelangelo, ein Kapitel zur Metaphysik der Kultur, Simmel wrote that the artist attained perfection and redemption of life in life itself, in molding the absolute in finite form ([1910] 2003, 64). The overcoming of the dualism of body and mind, accomplished by Michelangelo in his statues, is

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not a placid perfection, but retains the conflict of opposites. The Form is never “finished”; it is temporary, fleeting, while Life is always moving and never Oneness. In stressing the “unfinished” movement and rejecting Oneness, I do not do so out of any deeper knowledge of Simmel. On the contrary, I am sincerely indebted to Simmelian scholars for aiding me in my reading of Simmel; rather I do so partly out of my own sensitivity, but also to bring Simmel closer to the experience of contemporary Christians. Their authenticity is a constant overcoming, a moving closer to an ideal, but always failing to reach it. Any personal moral growth rests on movement, on inner and outside conflict; for instance one’s conflict with one’s fears and with social conventions and expectations. My engagement with Simmel is motivated by a belief that his insights can illuminate today’s dynamics of religious life. That, however, requires interpretation and adaptation rather than philologically accurate exposition. CONCLUSION The notions in Simmel’s thought explored in this chapter help us appreciate Simmel’s dialectical and relational way of thinking. He pioneered a relational concept of the self that will become staple in sociological thinking. Simmel’s individual is embedded in relationships, shaped through relationships, but not exhausted by them. The individual has a specific individuality that is expressed in relationships. Simmel’s relationality does not stop at social relations, it is epistemic. In the first instance, the person relates to others through typifications. In the second instance, Simmel understands the other, the Thou, as the fundamental relationship through which we understand ourselves. The person’s subjectivity is thus always in movement because in relationship with the Other and also with oneself. Simmel’s sociology does not subsume individuality to the group, nor does it concentrate on individuality at the expense of the group. It is a composite sociology that dares tackle the fundamental philosophical questions. Equally, his philosophy retains a deep understanding of the social and captures the human quest for knowledge in a world that is being constructed and reconstructed continuously. Simmel’s Lebensphilosophie provides a framework for the understanding of social change. Leben (Life) is experienced through Forms. The fundamental “energies” of Life take a shape, they take a Form: for example, the vital force of religious “yearning” (Simmel [1911] 1997, 9) 6 generates religious Forms. However, when a Form is no longer an adequate vehicle for Life’s pulses, there is a crisis that can lead to changes to that Form or create new Forms. Forms cannot constrain Life, which enacts a never-ending process of self-transcendence. Within this framework, human beings are self-transcen-

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dent beings by virtue of being aware of “this one-sidedness,” of being part of a wider reality. Humans are “this side,” but have a glimpse of totality, the “other side.” Human beings are self-transcendent by being cognizant. They are not simply conscious of being sociated but of sensing that which is beyond the limit, beyond social and human life. It is this self-transcendence that I employ in my interpretation and adaptation of Simmel’s thinking on religion, as explored in the next chapter. By interpreting the religious sensitivity as a propensity to self-transcendence, I bridge religious life with the notion of authenticity. NOTES 1. The use of the capital “F” for Forms, “C” for Contents, and “L” for Life (Leben) is to distinguish the epistemological concepts of Forms, Contents and Life from all other meanings of these words. 2. Wechselwirkung is composed of Wechsel (exchange) and Wirkung (effect). It was used by Kant in relation to Newton’s “movement of the planets” and implies a force of attraction and repulsion between the planets (Papilloud 2000, 104). 3. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel; Edited and translated by Horst Jürgen Helle in collaboration with Ludwig Nieder; Foreword by Phillip E. Hammond. 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. 4. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel. 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. 5. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel. 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. 6. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel. 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.

Chapter Four

Belief as Experiential and Relational

“That is beautiful mysticism, it is a—” “Please not to call it by any name,” said Dorothea, putting out her hands entreatingly. “You will say it is Persian, or something geographical. It is my life. I have found it out and cannot part with it.” —George Eliot, Middlemarch (1871)

A DYNAMIC UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGION Max Weber famously described his friend, Georg Simmel, as “musical” in matters of religion (Hammond 1997, vii). A marked sensitivity to the more mystical dimension of religion transpires from Simmel’s writings. For Simmel, the religious sentiment, religiosity (die Religiosität), was a human need, which was more present in some individuals and less or non-existent in others. Religion (die Religion) was the objectification of this religious propensity. Simmel thought that religiosity in the modern age could no longer find adequate expression in traditional religious forms, which were now challenged by a culture dominated by the objectivist outlook of modern science. The modern era made the doctrines of religion a remnant of the past. Modern science defined the limits of rationality according to what was “provable” within a framework of positivist science. As a result, the traditional forms of religion had become less binding in modern culture. The challenge of modernity to religion was existential. In the modern era, when legitimate knowledge is only scientific knowledge, religion in terms of propositional belief, that is, belief that God exists, is no longer valid because no material proof can be sustained. Simmel stated that science defines as “believable reality only that which is scientifically probable” (Simmel [1909] 1997, 4). 1 Therefore, “the object of transcendent faith per se is characterized 53

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as illusory” (Simmel [1911a] 1997, 9). Modernity sweeps away the “object” of faith, intended as a set of claims regarding transcendence. The traditional forms of religion are thus empty shells that cannot express the religious sentiment. Thus, the end of transcendence of traditional religion has left the “yearning” of the religious person unfulfilled, “as if cut off from the path to its own life.” (Simmel [1911a] 1997, 9). A new form of religion is required, one that enabled the religiosity of the individual to be expressed (Simmel [1918] 1997, 20). The subjectivity of modernity breathes new life to the mystical elements of religion. It is through subjectivity that, for Simmel, religion can survive modernity. This should not be taken as receding into the private sphere (Luckmann 1967), but a turning inward. Simmel did not lament the “disenchantment” of the world as Weber did. He favored subjective religion. He was interested in understanding religion as a reflection of human consciousness (Simmel [1902] 1997, 121). His notion of religiosity, as a person’s sensibility and a state of mind, reflects his concern for the subjective dimension of the modern age. Indeed, Simmel’s idea of religion is often understood as subjective religion (Flanagan 1996, 2007, 2008; Heelas 2007, 2008; Lamine 2008, 2010; Strhan 2013, 2015; Varga 2007; Watier 1996). Yet, Simmel’s sense of the social is reflected in his understanding of religion as relational. Just as much as the individual is in relationships and not a bounded separate entity, religion embodies a social sentiment (pietas). Simmel’s ontological relationality also means that religious relationality stands for the linking together of the disparate elements of life into the religious mind-set. This chapter proposes a neo-Simmelian framework for the understanding of belief today as experiential and relational. This is articulated through three concepts: religiosity as a way of experiencing the world, or a mode of consciousness; belief as “belief in” (trust); and the sense of self-surrender of religiosity. Religiosity as a mode of consciousness refers to the linking together of disparate aspects of reality. It provides a mental schema that orders life. It gives epistemological unity to how religious actors perceive the world, but also a metaphysical unity to overcome the experience of fragmentation of modern life. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I go beyond the idea of unity as oneness to have a dynamic understanding of religiosity. This is explored in the next chapter where I link religiosity to self-transcendence (Selbsttranszendenz). In this chapter, I concentrate on belief as trust and selfsurrender and the relationality of religion in terms of how religion relates the person to others. The empirical data in this chapter thus illustrate the experiential side of religion, how belief is sustained and sometimes begins in relationships with others, and how personal relationships are modeled around the relationship between the believer and God.

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RELIGIOSITY AND RELIGION Simmel understood religion within the framework of Form and Content, where Forms are a shell that can contain and shape different empirical Contents. Forms “synthesize” knowledge giving rise to autonomous worlds (Simmel [1918] 2010, 55). The Form of religion (Religion) gives expression to the religious sentiment, or religiosity (Religiosität). Simmel was not consistent in his terminology and did not develop a systematic framework for the understanding of religion. As a result, one can glimpse different strands of thought, some of which do not sit harmoniously with others. Simmel’s notion of religiosity could be read phenomenologically. Accordingly, the religious sentiment is an a priori essence and the origin of the social process of religion. Cipriani draws a parallel between Religiosität and Geselligkeit (sociability). Geselligkeit is “the natural tendency people have to be together, to form a community, even if conflicts are present” (Cipriani 2000, 87). From Geselligkeit derives the cultural product of society, just as religion is the cultural product of the religious sentiment. However, the religious sentiment is not a human drive shared by all; rather, for Simmel, it is present in some and much less, possibly not at all, in others. This allows an understanding of being religious as reflecting a way of feeling and being rather than adhering to a set of beliefs and/or belonging to a religious tradition. Simmel’s religious sentiment identifies a religious personality. The religious sentiment gives rise to religion. Simmel identifies the sentiment underlying religion as that of pietas (Simmel [1912] 1997, 161), which in ancient Rome was a sense of devotion to parental authority, and one’s own country. Pietas gains autonomy from the social realm (Simmel [1912] 1997, 158). In other words, it is no longer confined to the original secular devotion of Roman religion, but becomes identified with religion. It becomes detached from that specific context and comes to express a feeling of dependency toward a higher principle. Pietas is the feeling of being “bound to some general, higher principle” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 156) to which one surrenders. [T]he individual feels bound to some general, higher principle from which he originates and to which he ultimately returns, to which he dedicates himself but from which he also expects elevation and redemption, from which he is distinct and to which he is yet identical. (Simmel [1912] 1997, 156)

Pietas is not only directed vertically to a higher principle, but also horizontally as the basis for social trust. The feeling of pietas is projected onto one’s group creating a bond.

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Simmel suggests that religion is the result of the objectivization of pietas and the crystallization of social relationships and, in particular, of relationships of trust (Simmel [1898] 1955, 374; [1902] 1997, 125–26; [1912] 1997, 157–58). Following Lactantius’s etymology of religio from religare 2 (bind together), Simmel suggests religion is relational because it provides unity by connecting the person to others. He stated that, “it is relations between people that find their substantial and ideal expression in the idea of the divine” (Simmel [1898] 1955, 374). According to Laermans (2006), we can distinguish between two social types of religiosity: belief in the sense of social trust, and the experience of social unity, which expresses a feeling of dependency toward a higher principle. This, however, should not be lead one to reduce religiosity to social relationships or God to social unity (Laermans 2006, 486). I suggest that the relationality of religion, for Simmel, is not limited to social relationships; rather it has an epistemic dimension. Religiosity is thus a mode of consciousness. RELIGIOSITY AS A FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS Simmel’s key notion of religiosity as an attitude implies that it engenders a particular way of experiencing the world. Religiosity is thus not a mere preference, but a way of being, which shapes how a person experiences and lives life. Simmelian religiosity is an innate disposition, a sensitivity, which is decoupled from a belief in the supernatural as well as from religious practice. The religious sensitivity colors how the person experiences life. Religiosity is “the fundamental quality of being of the religious soul” (Simmel [1911a] 1997, 10). Simmel likened it to an artist’s sensitivity to the aesthetic aspects of life. Just as an artistic sensibility does not make one an artist, the religious sensibility is not always expressed in religious behavior. The religious person is religious in her “very being” (Simmel [1911a] 1997, 10). Simmel identified as characteristics of religiosity “the feelings of dependence and hopefulness, humility and yearning, indifference to mortality and the constraints of life.” (Simmel [1911a] 1997, 10). He did not delve into the relationship between the feelings he associated with religiosity and the state of mind of religiosity. Religiosity as a mode of consciousness gives a schema, a frame, to the world around. Religion “is not a set of claims but a certain state of being,” and thus, “it can no more be disproved by science than can any other state of being” (Simmel [1909] 1997, 6).

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What makes a person religious is the particular way in which he reacts to life in all its aspects, how he perceives a certain kind of unity in all the theoretical and practical details of life . . . Religiousness thus can be seen in this light: as a form according to which the human soul experiences life and comprehends its existence. (Simmel [1909] 1997, 5)

Religiosity is a form of consciousness, a mind-set, because of its epistemic relationality, which lies in the mind’s linking up of reality in an effort to understand the world around (Papilloud 2000). Religion, by interrelating all aspects of reality, is a schema that orders life. Simmel emphasized how the religious person perceives an overarching unity. Religion brings about psychological unity through its “totalizing” quality (Totalisierungsvermögen). The unio mystica, union with the transcendent, is re-read by Simmel as psychological unity of the fragmented modern psyche. The essence of mysticism is that we should perceive behind the given multiplicity of phenomena that unity of being which is never a given fact, and which therefore we can grasp directly only within ourselves as this unity. . . . This unifying of the fragments and contradictions of our view of the world by attributing to them one common, all-embracing source may be the earlier achievement of religion, historically speaking, but it is perhaps only of secondary importance. Of more fundamental significance, especially as far as modern man is concerned, is what religion makes of the contradictions of spiritual life. Just as this theistic or pantheistic mysticism reconciles the fragmentary nature of the world’s elements by unifying them in God, so religious behavior brings peace to the opposing and incompatible forces at work within the soul, resolving the contradictions they create. (Simmel [1904] 1997, 36)

The multiplicity and contrasting aspects of life are unified within the religious consciousness, resolving the contradictions of modern life. Simmel’s conception of unity lends itself to be read as a form of pantheism, which is interrelational. Accordingly, the principle of interaction Wechselwirkung relates all parts to a single whole. Simmel’s language of soul, salvation, and God lends itself to a quasi-theological reading of Oneness. In this vein, Vandenberghe (2010) proposes a careful account of Simmel, which stresses his fascination with Protestantism and his pantheistic sociology within a Kantian framework. He argues that Simmel, in a Kantian move, shifted from the transcendent to the transcendental. The “noumenon” is something experienced by consciousness and therefore no longer transcendent, but immanent. The “immanent transcendent” is constituted by the person’s consciousness. Vandenberghe emphasizes religion as binding together. Accordingly, Simmel’s subjective religion is a yearning for wholeness. Simmel’s references to “soul” are to be understood as “psyche” as Simmel’s study of religion is a study of the human psyche. Simmel’s unity is concerned with the person’s consciousness. The unity of religion is a “unity

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of interaction” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 201), where God is the abstraction of the interaction of existence. Like in the Greek “correspondence theory of truth,” this unity of existence, the “totality of the universe itself” (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 51), corresponds to the totality of the self. [T]he concept of God is the ultimate realization of personality . . . the wholeness and unity of His being is not subject to the fragmentariness and incompleteness of temporal incoherence. (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 51)

The modern self, for Simmel, is made of fragments; its unity comes from consciousness. Consciousness bestows wholeness to the person. Human beings are made of physical and psychological elements held together by consciousness, which gives an image of unity. These elements are constantly moving. The person’s psyche is shaped by the social interactions outside; yet the person’s consciousness, in resolving the conflict of fragmentation, provides a unified self. The concept of God, as an absolute “personality,” corresponds to a united self. God is the abstraction of our longing for unity. Just as our own imperfect unity is borne mysteriously by the idea of the self, the true unity of universal being is crystallized in an ultimate self, the absolute personality. (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 52)

Following this interpretation, religion, in its promise of unity, counterbalances the fragmentation of modern individual identity. It provides a sense of unity to the person. Crucially, in the concept of the salvation of the soul, unity stands for the ideal of one’s own self, which anticipates the notion of authenticity that will dominate twentieth-century philosophy. By salvation of the soul we mean . . . the unity of a state that we can feel although we have not attained it, or, perhaps better, a state that is as real to us when we long for it as it would be when fulfilled within us. . . . The self’s pure form, what it ought to be, is an ideal reality that pervades the imperfect reality of existence. . . . The inner core need only be freed from that which masks and restrains it. (Simmel [1903] 1997, 30–31)

The soul’s unity, once again, involves interaction. Everything, Simmel states, is “in incessant motion” (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 54). This is because there is always a distinction within reality. There is a separation between the absolute and the world, just as much as within the self. The self is not subsumed within its contents, its thoughts, feelings, and decisions; it is “distinct from each item of content”; the self “judges every such object, accepts or rejects it, is master of it or not.” (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 55, emphasis in the original). The mind thinks itself. Self-consciousness requires self-reflection, “life fragments itself in order to rediscover itself” (Simmel [1911b] 1997, 58). Self-

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consciousness happens in this interaction. Equally, the unity of religion is a “unity of interaction” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 201), where God is the abstraction of the interaction of existence. Unity emerges from interactions, and, crucially, the process never ends. Religion . . . at every moment it is unity and unity yet to be; it resolves the contradictions it finds outside itself as well as those which arise constantly between itself and the totality of the rest of life. This is clearly an endless process. (Simmel [1904] 1997, 43)

Religion’s unity is never accomplished. Therefore, religion’s relationality is not just “linking up,” but “moving to.” Simmel’s view of religion is often understood in a mystical vein as the individual’s search for meaning in fragmented modern society. Accordingly, religion, as a form of consciousness, offers unity to the self at a time of fragmentation. In contrast, I seek to give a “dynamic” interpretation and adaptation of Simmel’s thought in relation to religion. I go beyond the idea that religion offers solace to alienated modern individuals. For Simmel, modernity was no mere fragmentation, but an opportunity to express one’s individuality. In the next chapter, I thus explore the possibility of religion as a dynamic pathway for human consciousness by interpreting religiosity as a sensitivity to self-transcendence. At this juncture, I want to build on Simmel’s insights on belief and self-surrender to propose a framework that can illumine the experience of faith of contemporary Christians. THE SELF-SURRENDER OF BELIEF Simmel distinguishes between belief that (propositional belief) and belief in (trust). “Believing in” God does not simply equate to holding something to be true; rather “it implies a certain spiritual relationship to Him, an emotional dedication, an orientation of life toward Him” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 166). By analogy, our belief in others does not mean that we believe in their existence; but that we assume a spiritual attitude in regard to them. Simmel explains that religious belief can be expressed in theoretical form, but that it is not “the content of a mental image;” rather it is “an emotional fusion with Him experienced as a real event” (Simmel [1902] 1997, 130, emphasis in the original). In other words, the believer trusts God and experiences an encounter with the divine, from which arises a relationship with God. This relationship colors one’s existence. This conception of belief bridges the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence, shedding light onto the experience of believers and also religious ideas that seek to capture a sense of immanent transcendent, such as the Christian idea of the incarnation of God. Simmelian belief is relational

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and emotional. The religious person, for Simmel, experiences feelings of surrender and humility. The aspect of pietas that interested Simmel and which he considered a characteristic of religion was the following: [U]nselfish surrender and fervent desire, of humility and exaltation, of sensory concreteness and spiritual abstraction; and all this occurs not only in alternating moods, but in a persistent unity. (Simmel [1912] 1997, 161)

Belief, for Simmel, expresses awe. It is experiential. This resonates with some of the narratives of self-surrender of my informants. The sense of surrender emphasizes the experiential character of belief, in contrast with propositional belief and allows a more nuanced understanding of belief, one that is more in tune with contemporary religious experience. The experiential aspect of faith affirms a consciousness that is other than logical rationality and is closer to participatory consciousness found in contemporary witchcraft (Magliocco 2004, 2012). Going against modern rationalism and individualism, and Protestantism’s own nineteenth-century’s intellectual and individualistic faith, evangelicals at Bethlehem articulate their relational belief in opposition to outside society, which is perceived as materialistic, rationalist, and individualistic. My informants are not opposed to science and they, at times, are confronted with doubts as to the validity of Christianity. They, too, share an understanding of rationality reflecting positivist science; yet they are attuned to the emotional and immaterial aspects of religion. They thus compare religion to music, which cannot be analyzed under a microscope, but can only be felt. The notions of awe leading to self-surrender, belief as trust, and the relationality of belief are thus not abstract ideas removed from reality, but dominant elements in the narratives of contemporary Christians. My informants have put aside the theological concern with doctrinal belief. Their religiosity is one of self-surrender to a higher authority, which is trusted not on the basis of rational logical arguments, but on the basis of a personal experience of God. THE RELATIONAL BELIEF OF BETHLEHEM CHURCH Bethlehem, the main case study in this book, was set up around forty years ago in an area of rapid housing development that lacked a community “hub,” as Nicholas, one of the elders, explained. It is a “free church,” an independent evangelical church, whose founders had Baptist affinities. Today, Christians at Bethlehem consider themselves a relatively “conservative” mainstream evangelical church with no specific denomination. They call themselves conservative and in many ways they are. For instance, there are no women elders, the official theology is conservative although, as we will see,

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many do not subscribe to it, and there is no experimentation in terms of worship. Nonetheless, they are a million miles away from the conservative British evangelicals studied by Anna Strhan (2015) and those in American megachurches examined by Omri Elisha (2011). In the beginning, the church consisted of an informal group meeting in different venues to worship God. As the group grew and became more settled in the local area, they decided to buy land and build the church. The people who set up Bethlehem have often had an experience of church as judgmental, divisive, and old-fashioned. The “founding fathers” of Bethlehem, Nicholas, one of the founding elders, and Felix, the first pastor, wanted to communicate Christianity to the “unchurched,” people who do not normally go to church. Bethlehem members often describe the church, at times with a tinge of disappointment, as a “proper church” with “no raising of hands” or people being “knocked off by the Holy Spirit.” They are not charismatics (Coleman 2000; Coleman and Hackett 2015), nor are they “emerging Christians” deconstructing Christianity and elaborating a contextual theology for the post-Christian era (Bergmann 2003; Bielo 2011a; Marti and Ganiel 2014). They are also not “metropolitan.” They are a small-sized church in a medium-sized city in Wales. Today, Bethlehem is a small church of two hundred congregants (members and associates). It is located in a demographically fairly homogeneous white British middle class area, although there are some members of different national origins as well as some belonging to ethnic minorities. The church attaches great importance to social engagement in the local community in the form of providing groups for local people around their needs, such as parent and toddler groups, youth groups, and a group for elderly people. The identity of the church is rooted in the importance of forming “caring” relationships with others. Bethlehemites’ aspiration is that of providing an emotional and physical place for people in the community rather than convert them. What follows is a narrative portrait of the church that seeks to capture the image the “founding fathers” of the church had and its atmosphere and culture today. This is followed by an analysis of Bethlehemites’ narratives, which includes long quotations. The length of the quotations serves to convey the context and the perspective of the interviewee. I have emphasized the sentences that are most significant to the analysis. Beginnings In the mid-1970s, Nicholas, a fifteen-year-old boy, found God. He told his family and they laughed and said, “Don’t worry, it’ll pass.” It didn’t. Nicholas went on to set up Bethlehem church. He wanted to communicate the truth he had discovered. So with his friend, Felix, he decided that it was time for something different, something that would not put people off, but would ring

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true. They were fed up with being preached hell, fire and brimstone, and halfhearted singing of two-hundred-year-old hymns from dusty books on hard pews. They wanted to bring Christianity to the people. They began in the backroom of the Ship & Pilot, a pub just three hundred yards from where the church now stands, on a small mound facing the sea. The sixties had come and gone, but they had left a distinctive yearning for something authentic, something exciting, something true. The worship meetings moved from the pub to a school. The list of people willing to try something different and bored stiff of church Sunday mornings grew steadily. It was time to build a home, a spiritual home, for the thirsty and the needy, for Christians searching for authentic Christianity and for the crowd outside seeking a soul in a world of strangers. Nicholas and Felix had a vision. They wanted a church that was not a club and a faith that was not just for the sake of believing. They wanted a place of comfort, where people could feel welcome. They wanted a building that would make that possible. It had to build bridges and include people. The building had to be open to the community to show a face of Christianity that didn’t scare people off, that didn’t judge or ask for money. But the “founding fathers” also wanted something real that pierced through the hearts of people, that answered the big questions, the questions of pain and suffering, loneliness and emptiness. How do you do that? People don’t want to go anywhere near a church. They think it’s just self-righteous loonies looking down at you. They don’t need salvation and they are quite happy with sin, thank you very much. No use in talking about sin, sanctification, and salvation if nobody understands what you mean. Nicholas looks toward the window and goes back a few decades, then says, [W]hen we started to meet in homes, back in the eighties, that was just to meet together, study the bible together and pray together, in a small group. Bit by bit, we grew. There wasn’t a strong focus on evangelism, on sharing faith other than in your personal life, until we had a public facility to hold meetings. . . . As I was doing these things, we started to realize that we could invite people to these kind of events. I thought “how are we gonna do this? How are we gonna present the information in a way that makes sense to people?” And it dawned on me “why do we do church the way we do church?” . . . So we started to look at that, we played with different types of styles. We did something called blue-prints for about a year or so, once a month. We had a whole hour and a half with videos, music, and a short message. . . . The message was the same, but it was the way in which we were trying to communicate. Some nonChristians came along, I don’t think anybody came to faith, . . . but probably kept them on their journey, a little while. . . . And that was in our mind when we opened this place and so we first started, probably the first 10 years or so, we said that our primary objective in running a church service on Sunday morning is for people who don’t go to church.

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That was the vision: tell the story to those who don’t know it. BETHLEHEM AND THE TRADITIONAL CHURCH From the section above, we can begin to delineate a strong motif in the narratives of informants: Bethlehem is constructed in opposition to what informants often referred to as the “traditional” church: a hierarchical, bureaucratic, formal, and unfriendly institution. Bethlehem seeks to be a “spiritual home,” as the leaflets and many members call it, a welcoming and caring community, in contrast with the “holy huddle,” as Nicholas and Felix described it, an inward-looking club of like-minded people. The dichotomy between the “traditional church,” unfriendly and “legalistic,” and the “spiritual home,” where the person is accepted, constitutes the overarching narrative constructing the communal identity of Bethlehem. For Felix it was important that the church service would be relevant to people’s lives. So they come along on Sundays, this isn’t frightening; but the other thing is, is that it’s serving society . . . a community that is committed to serve society and not be just a holy huddle inside a church building. . . . The word church has now become useless because we’ve ruined the word church, I mean it’s a building now, it means stained glass, it’s got an altar, funny talk there, that’s not a church, the church is part of the Kingdom of God, it’s people, it’s relationships, it’s a powerful spiritual thing, you know, but we threw that, so I use, the term kingdom . . . helps break out of the word church, but community is a similar word to me, you know. Community is church in the community and moving out in the community.

The church is a community, the community of Christians who are open to the other. It seeks to be inclusive, not a “holy huddle.” The church leaders sought to create an informal and friendly atmosphere. As a result, the dress is informal, the songs are contemporary, and the text of the passages read or of the hymns sung during the service is projected on a screen using power-point software. The sermons, mostly delivered by the elders and the pastor, are in everyday language and shun theological jargon. The original vision is still alive today in Nicholas’s mind and present in the narratives of the church leaders and members. It is an understanding of faith that needs to be communicated in everyday language and away from religious symbols, which are seen as off-putting, as Nicholas explains below. As it is a long quotation, I have emphasized some remarks, which are particularly relevant to the discussion and to the broader contents of the book. What is this vision thing? We need to be clear about this, about what we are about. . . . I know people want to worship, there’s nothing wrong with that, but small groups are perfect for worship. Let’s face it, you actually can have too

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Chapter 4 many prayer meetings, too many worship meetings, too many bible studies, because you become internally focused and all you try to do is your thing in here, in your little holy huddle, whereas Christ never did that and I’m sure his church should never do that. . . . One thing that has become increasingly clear and challenging to me in this whole thing is this, if you’re trying to boil down what Christianity is. . . . This one phrase keeps coming back to me, Jesus says “follow me.” What does that mean? Where? How are you gonna lead me? Where are we going together? And if you see how Jesus did his life, in the years of his public ministry, it wasn’t just doing the way we do church. He didn’t stand at the front of the synagogue and just preached. He did a bit of that as well, but that was probably minority at this time actually. But if we model Christianity in the way Jesus did his life, we wouldn’t hold church services as often as we do. He was out there, in amongst these people’s lives, sometimes he would speak spiritually to people, sometimes he wouldn’t mention anything spiritual. Sometimes he healed people, sometimes he wouldn’t, he would just speak spiritual things to them. So there’s a whole spectrum of engagement with people, . . . like Willow Creek church in the States. I loved the way in which they understood the value of multimedia engagement with people. . . . We’ve run some comedy nights events, just to show it’s not just about church and preaching Christianity. It’s also about doing good and engaging and having fun actually. It’s good to laugh.

Felix and Nicholas paint a picture of the vision for Bethlehem they sought and still want in stark contrast with the “traditional church.” The “traditional church” is a “holy huddle,” as it is often described, an inward-looking club of like-minded people focused on worship; an exclusive and unfriendly community, an old-fashioned institution where theological language dominates church services. Seeking to challenge the image of the church, as an ancient building resounding with traditional hymns played by an organ, Nicholas and Felix experimented with innovative forms of church-doing by having services with a contemporary feel, groups and activities that met local needs, and, above all, to create a welcoming community where everybody would feel accepted. Thus, the vision of Bethlehem is to communicate Christianity to all, especially to those who have an image of Christianity as outdated and exclusive. The picture of Bethlehem that emerges is one that is consistent with the innovation in church-doing described by Miller (1997), showing the crosspollination between British and American evangelical traditions (Hatcher 2017). Bethlehem sought to attract the “unchurched.” The attempt at refashioning “church-doing” for contemporary times led the founders to carry the message of “modern, relevant, and inclusive” onto the building itself. Bethlehem does not “look like” a church: there are no Christian symbols, such as crosses or paintings. It was designed and built as a community center, often mistaken for a non-religious community center, and is generally called “the Center” by the local community and church members. The design was an

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exercise in translating the “Christian message” into practice. The aim of the building was to build bridges and create a friendly home open to all, seven days a week. Camden, a lawyer in his thirties, is a former Catholic, who was struck by the non-church appearance of Bethlehem. When we sat down and I walked into the main hall and went “are you sure this is a church, Winifred?” There’s no priest, there’s no altar, there’s no gold or decoration, this just looks like a community hall and it was and it is and that’s the idea. It’s reaching out to the community.

Saddleback and Willow Creek were what Miller (1997) called “new paradigm” churches, which criticized the bureaucratic structures of churches and sought to implement a more participatory model with a high-level involvement of the laity and an emphasis on emotional and experiential worship. In contrast with Bethlehem, which has remained a small church of around two hundred congregants, the “new paradigm” churches became “megachurches” and have come to rely on professional staff and focus on participation in church programs. The leader of Willow Creek, Billy Hybels, has lately admitted that the focus on church programs has not helped spiritual growth of congregants (Christianity Today 2007). In addition, although they sought to be a church where people felt accepted (Miller 1997, 68), they employed the language of “purpose-drivenness,” but remained strict on theology. The identity of Bethlehem church is not exhausted by attempts at being “modern” and “relevant” to attract people who would not normally go to church; rather it is grounded in relationships. Bethlehem has a “community feel” to it. The building is a community center and most of its congregants live nearby. Members often describe it as a “spiritual home,” where everybody is welcome and where people care for one another, providing a comforting physical and emotional place. When I first started the field work, Caleb, a longtime member of Bethlehem who led the weekly daytime Bible study at the church, told me that the church café was there to provide a sense of community. Once a man had told Caleb that he would go around the aisles of the local supermarket just to feel among people and that, once Bethlehem café opened, he had found a place where he could chat with people. During an evening study group, Nicholas told the group that there were many people in the local area feeling lonely and Bethlehem could provide a place for community. When we did a survey in the local community, 20 years ago, one of the biggest issue[s] was loneliness. One of the reasons why people come into the center is that they want to feel part of something.

Bethlehem’s aspiration of being a “spiritual home” is that of creating a community, where people feel accepted. Acceptance is what attracted to Bethle-

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hem many of the now active members of the church. Dorothea contrasted the genuine acceptance received at Bethlehem with the atmosphere felt in a church where she used to go. In her old church, she was once asked whether she would go to the Bible study, to which she replied that she was going out on a pub crawl. She horrified her listeners. She told me that, on the night of the pub crawl, she gave “her testimony” of why she had become a Christian twice. She commented: “That was more useful than if I had been in the Bible study.” In contrast, people at Bethlehem accepted her for who she is, as she put it: “When I came to Bethlehem, I was accepted for exactly who I am.” Dorothea was accepted at Bethlehem and not judged according to norms of propriety, unlike at her previous church. In choosing Bethlehem, my informants also cited the role of the laity in running church activities, or “ministries,” open to the local community. This is another characteristic that distinguishes Bethlehem from the “traditional church.” Informants sought a church where they could live out their Christianity through ministries, such as the group for parents and toddlers and the soup run for homeless people. In the words of my informants, being a Christian means being like Jesus every day, not just going to church one day a week. This reflects the Protestant tenet of the priesthood of all believers, which is interpreted not only as an opposition to the mediating role of a priest between the believer and God, as in Catholicism, but the need to “be like Jesus” in one’s daily life. As Dorothea put it, At Bethlehem, they realized that a church can’t run on an evangelist on his own, it’s not all about one person, everyone should take a role and no one should be taking a back seat. It’s not the minister that is the church, it’s the people who comprise it.

Celia and Arthur, now a professional couple in their fifties, decided to go to Bethlehem after a friend’s recommendation. Celia told me that what made them decide to leave their previous church for Bethlehem was Bethlehem’s commitment to the local community and the opportunity for them to serve. We were really, we were immediately embraced and welcomed . . . it did very soon feel like the right place for us to be. . . . to be like Jesus, become more like Jesus in the community, the idea of really serving and having opportunities to serve. . . . It is no good to just come along and sit there on a chair . . . and then go home. That’s not, that’s not really what is all about. . . . God has something for everybody to do, whatever that is, it might be to be at the front, it might be stacking the chairs. Everybody has a part to play.

The vision was strong and, years after Felix had departed, it was still with people, but something had gone awry. A disagreement on the direction the church was taking regarding the need to build an extension led Felix to leave

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the church. He felt no longer supported. This happened before the research began, so the extract below is a narrative reconstruction based on accounts from church members. It is kept short for reasons of confidentiality and anonymity. The reason it is mentioned at all is the effect Felix’s departure had on church members. Bethlehem lost direction and purpose and, even today, nearly ten years later, it is still without a pastor. INTERIM It was meant to be an informal discussion on the vision, which was felt needed rekindling. There had been talk of expanding. It came to nothing though. Some people wanted to work with the Council to provide services for the local community. The proposal for the extension was put to the church and voted down. They had to find money, a lot of money, and that didn’t happen. It left a bitter taste in the mouth of Felix, who had tried so hard. If he could only have persuaded more people. They liked him a lot, but, you know people, they get tired of pursuing something so badly and, when it falls through, they just want to crawl back and lick their wounds. So they did and Felix left. After Felix had gone, a new batch of elders was elected. They had enough to cut their teeth on with emerging competition to the café and nursery from a string of new shops nearby and an expanded school, the loss of the pastor and the stepping down of Nicholas, who were both the backbone of the church. Things started off fine. They hired Walter, as interim pastor, who had the same vision as Felix and Nicholas. He set out to learn about the local area. He wanted to gear the church to respond to the local needs and review Bethlehem’s activities. Walter still lived in another town, further inland, and would travel nearly every day to Bethlehem to reorganize the church. He was clear that he would stay only for a couple of years or so and that the elders had to be in charge. A year after Walter retired, Bethlehem found a new pastor, but it was not for long. He was firm in his opposition to women elders and it caused disquiet. Some stopped caring and left, some complained that the elders dragged their feet, others wanted change and asked for a church discussion. The elders themselves were not united on the subject and some stepped down. It finally came to a discussion, but many kept to their entrenched positions and nothing changed. No women elders and no pastor.

Felix left as I began my study. His departure left a vacuum and many felt disoriented. Some people felt that had there been more open discussion, Felix’s departure could have been avoided. Still today Bethlehem suffers from a lack of leadership and inability to deal with internal divisions and differences. Individuals are welcomed and valued, but finding common ground when opinions differ is hard. The discussion on women elders was a positive step, but the matter has been a bone of contention for many years now. Bethlehem is still in turmoil; yet the strong narrative of community and

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relationships still dominates Bethlehemites’ image of the church. Bethlehemite Christianity is deeply relational. CHRISTIANITY AS RELATIONSHIPS The narrative of the “church in the community” envisions Bethlehem as a physical and emotional place where people can feel accepted for who they are and come into contact with one another. This is not limited to the activities taking place in the church; it is how Christianity is interpreted. This is echoed by the words of Godwin, manager of the church community center, who began a study session by saying: “We don’t do religion; religion causes problems. We are about relationships.” It is in relationships that the Christian faith, for Bethlehemites, is to be lived. These are “caring” relationships, as informants and the church literature state. Caring relationships are contrasted with “religion,” just like the “real church” is contrasted with the “traditional church.” Christian authenticity is constructed by Bethlehemites through dialectical narratives. Religion, understood as adherence to doctrine, is rejected in favor of “faith,” or “being a Christian,” as Camden explains. I don’t think religion is good . . . religion is adhering to a bunch of principles and a way of living what you think it will make you good with God, whereas faith, Christian faith and the Christian experience of life, is about not you, but about Jesus, about God coming down in the form of man and meeting you rather than you having to do something to attain to his standards.

The quote above is reminiscent of the rejection of “good works” as a way to attain salvation, which is at the core of Protestant theology, but Camden, in this quote and in the rest of the interview talked of faith as a relationship (Montemaggi 2017b). Accordingly, the relationship between Jesus and the believer is the model human beings are meant to replicate in their relationships. As Peter, in his forties and one of the Elders of the church, explains, As a society, we’re often struggling with relationships, we’re not particularly good some times at building up relationships, so that’s the way we’re working: building up relationships.

Being a Christian does not equate to espousing a statement of faith. Informants shunned any explicit affirmation of doctrine. This is not to say that propositional belief is completely absent; rather that it is secondary to their experience. Bethlehem has a statement of faith, which is read out aloud in front of the congregation by those who decide to become members of the church. The statement of faith is the emblem of propositional belief; yet it was never mentioned by informants as part of their conversion experience at

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any point during the fieldwork. The only mention was in the form of regret, expressed by one of my informants, that people had to stand in front of the congregation and seemingly make a pledge, which seemed embarrassing. There is a variety of views and interpretations at Bethlehem, yet my selected informants are all very committed Christians who are active in the church community. They are not “one-day-a-week Christians,” nor are they unsure about their religious identity; yet they shy away from espousing any rigid religious statement in favor of a more intimate and difficult to define experience. It is the self-transcending experience of belief. BELIEF AS EXPERIENTIAL AND RELATIONAL Belief is experiential and relational. It captures the self-transcendence of the person. Following Simmel, we could say that belief is not about the transcendence of God, but it is believing that is self-transcendent. The conversion narratives of Nicholas and Lucy, in the extracts below, illustrate the elements of Simmelian “belief in” and the sense of self-surrender that lead to conversion. In the first extract, Nicholas shows that belief is “belief in,” trust, and that goes against what is considered “rational” in our society. The religious actor needs to take a leap of faith into the unknown and trusts that there might be other realities beyond materiality. This is evident in the case of Nicholas, who began to frequent the youth club of a church with his friends in his teenage years. The church had a café and they thought they could “have a good laugh at those Christians.” He did not grow up in a Christian family and thought that Christians were “a bit like flat earth society people.” So, at first, he was surprised by the “rational thinking” of that group of Christians. There was actual rational thinking. People there who understood my questions and surprised me by having answers, so from a number of conversations . . . I guess it was a sort of challenge, you know, you say you don’t believe in God, but maybe he is there, why don’t you try him? . . . trust him. It’s about trusting. Pray and just see what happens. If he is there may be he’ll do something. And I prayed, I started to trust that may be he is there, and I just felt different. . . . and the more I looked into what they were saying and claiming, and what the bible was saying, the more it made sense to me. . . . I made that step of faith and say “God, if you’re there, I want all this” . . . and something happened. I felt, literally felt quite high. . . . Today, 40 years on, how do I describe that? I don’t know. At that time, it was a something that happened there, the spirit of God, is one way of looking at it, emotions is another one. Something happened, and probably a mixture of the two, that made me feel . . . I just felt different. . . . I mentioned to my family that I’d become a Christian. They just laughed and said “don’t worry, it’ll pass.”

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Nicholas expected Christianity to be irrational and was challenged by the approach of the evangelists. It was not so much an intellectual and theological debate, but a matter of experiencing God. He was told to “trust,” not to believe specific truths. He did. He made a “step of faith” and “felt different.” In the full interview, Nicholas does not mention being persuaded by ideas or subscribing to a particular theological tradition, but trusting that maybe God is there. Simmel explains that religious belief can be expressed in theoretical form, but that it is not “the content of a mental image,” rather it is “an emotional fusion with Him experienced as a real event” (Simmel [1902] 1997, 130, emphasis in the original). Belief is experience rather than assent. This perspective enables us to understand why Nicholas prayed although he had no belief. Simmel explained, [T]here is prayer to obtain faith—completely senseless behaviour from the standpoint of common rationality because one evidently can address the prayer only to one in whom one already believes. . . . But that one acts in this way proves that one prays to obtain something else, an actual inner reality, a transformation of the way we are that finds in the holding of something to be true only a point of conscious support or an external reflection. (Simmel [1902] 1997, 130–31)

Nicholas felt that something had happened, he “felt quite high.” It was a deeply emotional and personal experience that gave a new direction to his life. It was not, however, “once and for all.” Nicholas, at the time of the interview, had been going through a period of questioning his faith radically. He had doubted God’s existence and realized how much “the life of faith is a journey.” He struggled with faith, but found that [l]iving the Christian life is . . . a million times better than anything else . . . So, even if I couldn’t intellectually understand it, something in there is hugely attractive. . . . There’s something about this I don’t wanna lose and so I step back in faith and I hold on and, suddenly, I discover he (God) is still there and I can experience him.

As Simmel argued, the holding of something to be true is merely something that sustains the person at the conscious level; rather than the essence of belief. Belief is not an intellectual endeavor. Nicholas claims that he does not understand it intellectually, but he experiences God. Belief, here, is the experience of God as a real event, rather than the coming to accept a theological statement. This is something shared by all informants. Over and over again, informants talked of trusting and experiencing God. Narrating her conversion, Lucy recounts that it went against her rational self and that it transformed her. Lucy’s story of conversion illustrates the self-surrender of the believer, characteristic of Simmel’s religiosity (Religiosität).

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Lucy comes from what she described as a “non-Christian” family, who “only went to church for weddings and funerals and christenings.” She was not interested in religion. She began attending Bethlehem church for its parent-and-toddler group. After two years, a few people mentioned to her the “Alpha course,” an introductory course on Christianity. She told me that she was not looking for faith but went because she is “not very good at saying no.” After a few weeks, she noticed a change in her. Although she “fought against it” and wondered whether she was being “brainwashed,” she allowed the change to happen. I think within about two to three weeks, I knew that something really major was happening in me, which I didn’t understand at all and I guess, at the beginning, I really fought against it. I thought: “no, I didn’t come for this. This isn’t, I’m not, I’m not a Christian, this isn’t how I think” and I thought: “am I being brainwashed? Am I actually being just coerced into believing in this?” . . . In a period of about three weeks, I really moved from not really caring whether God existed to actually thinking: “yes, he’s real and he’s there and he’s trying to talk to me.” It’s kind of strange because it was a very quick journey. I was not aware myself that I had changed, but my husband said: “you’re so different.” Cos I’ve always been a very volatile, up and down, up and down, up and down, and shout and swear, always really shout. In the car, really terrible, you know, beeping the horn and being aggressive. And it just left me. It just went. I stopped swearing. I just calmed down. I felt happier. . . . My family noticed, my friends noticed and they were saying: “what’s happened to you? You’re really, you’re really content.” Even my daughter, who was six at that time, said: “mum, you’re much nicer than you used to be.” And that was really shocking. . . . I can’t even explain it. Something in my . . . it was like something deep in my heart that changed and I felt that all the anger, all the lack of patience, all the frustration had just been replaced by a sense of calm that everything was ok and I wasn’t a bad mother. . . . As time went on, . . . I borrowed a Bible and I remember sitting for about three days and every time I opened it what I read really hit me, it was for me, it was about me. . . . I got to the point when I thought, d’you know, this is a real problem, because I’m not even challenging this, I’m just accepting this like a child, I’m not, I’m not even thinking about this as an adult. The next verse I read was from Luke where he says that “we’re expected to believe as children, not to question, but to believe as children.” To me that confirmed that it came from God, that this wasn’t from within me, this was from outside of me. And that gave me a great peace.

People at Bethlehem have sometimes remarked that Lucy’s change was very significant. Over ten years on, Lucy is still a Christian and an active member of the church. Notwithstanding difficult times, her transformation was not short-lived. She has been an active member of Bethlehem for nearly twenty years. Her account stresses belief as going against rationality. The dominance of scientific thinking constructing religion as non-rational is evident in

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Lucy’s comments and her doubts about Christianity, just as much as in Nicholas’s view of Christians before his conversion. Like Nicholas, she had always thought that Christians were “loonies”; yet she made a “leap of faith.” In trusting, she let go. Simmel, in describing religiosity as a sense of surrender and dependence on God, captured well Lucy’s experience of relinquishing of control. Yet Nicholas’ and Lucy’s experience, much as that of many at Bethlehem, does not stop at being a subjective and emotional experience. Belief, in the Simmelian sense I propose, is grounded in relationships. Lucy’s experience of people at the church allowed her to trust that religion might be different from what she thought previously. Her conversion, like that of Nicholas, happened through relationships. Relationships are the way informants experience and also interpret God and, consequently, how they see themselves. THE RELATIONAL SELF OF RELIGIOSITY I propose to adopt Simmel’s notion of religiosity as relational to highlight the role of relationships in the believer’s life and the ensuing construction of the self as relational. Personal conviction is still important to evangelicals; yet it seems to constitute only the starting point for a relationship with God. The substance of being a Christian, according to my informants, is living in relationship with others and seeing oneself intimately interconnected to others. This emphasis derives from an interpretation of Jesus as concerned with the well-being of the person and not solely the salvation of the soul. This is illustrated by Godwin’s comments below. Godwin, at the time of the interview, played a leading role in evangelism as manager of the community center of the church. The whole thing is evangelism, we endeavor to get to the message of it at some point. Jesus, when he walked the earth, he went out and he, he healed people, he didn’t always necessarily saved them for want of a better phrase. Sometimes just healed people because that’s what they needed and then he carried on. So, that’s the model: give people what they need, be willing to share what you believe, but literally it is about giving them what they need.

Relationships provide a context for belief. As the narratives of conversions of Nicholas and Lucy show, being in relationships with others was crucial for them to become Christians. This was also the case for those, like Camden, who had been brought up Catholic. In his interview, Camden told me that it was through his wife that he decided to go to Bethlehem. In joining Bethlehem he came to have a personal relationship with Jesus. Bethlehem’s stress on relationships was also a factor for Celia and her husband Arthur in joining the church and moving into the neighborhood, as mentioned previously.

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Celia recounted that they were “immediately embraced and welcomed.” As they became part of the church, they formed relationships inside the small group of study. Celia told me of a time when she was ill and members of the home group brought food for her and her family for a week to the amazement of their neighbors. Similarly, during the fieldwork I recorded that the home group organized a food rota to help out Elinor after the birth of her first child. After a fire that destroyed the interior of Lucy’s house, people from the church hosted Lucy and her family and continued to provide food and support for weeks. We ate somewhere different every night. People fed us, people took my washing, people bought books for the children. It was just incredible. There was a sort of sense that, you know, you’re family. Coming around you when you most needed them. And then what was really nice was when we moved to the rented house, there was a little flurry of activity and people brought bits and pieces and things to make it home. And then people kind of left us alone to settle down, which I really appreciated.

Being a Christian is constructed by informants as “a lifestyle of having relationships,” as Walter put it. Talking about prayer, Arthur said that they needed to put aside what they thought they needed and ask instead to “be accepting of one another, forgiving one another, building relationships.” For my informants, it is in relationships that God is manifest. As Simmel noted, “[I]t is relations between people that find their substantial and ideal expression in the idea of the divine” (Simmel [1898] 1997, 118). Yet, Bethlehem is far from the perfect oasis of caring relationships that it seeks to be, as members at times lament. Relationships are often circumscribed within the church and, often, within smaller groups. Members of the church have voiced selfcriticism about their failure at caring for people in the community and, at times, for those who have some association with the church. Bethlehemites’ self-criticism further endorses the centrality of relationships to the identity of the church. The interpretation of being a Christian in terms of relationships, however, is not the simple extension of social life onto the religious sphere, but an ethical imperative, which often causes discomfort. Relationships are also not seen as easy and require commitment. Informants often talked about their struggle with forming relationships and being open, as shown by Camden’s remarks below. We were invited to home group straight away. . . . I found the home group a bizarre concept and very strange praying in front of people. That was a big challenge for me to get over and say my first prayer in front of Winifred as well. I thought it was very weird to start with, I must admit. I found the relationships very strange. I found the whole concept of meeting as a group, I found that quite strange, . . . suddenly, it was like a switch going . . . “actually this is really, really good. This is the right way of doing it.” If you like, it’s

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The difficulty of relationships is partly understood by informants as a consequence of the individualistic and materialistic structure of life in Western society. Informants construct the identity of the church in opposition to the world outside. Being a Christian assumes connotations of challenging the dominant culture, in the words of my informants, being a Christian is being “countercultural,” which they understand as running contrary to the values of individualism and materialism of mainstream society. Bethlehem seeks to be the refuge that goes against selfish and empty consumerism, a place of relationships in an individualistic competitive, and lonely world. In opposition to a society, seen as dominated by individual autonomy, Christians at Bethlehem counter with a conception of human beings as “interdependent,” as they put it. This understanding of the self as “interdependent” can be read as contrary to traditional Protestant individualism. However, in good Protestant tradition, evangelicals in this case study, construct being a Christian in the form of a “protest” against mainstream individualistic society. Simmel noted that Protestantism had relied on being a “protest” against something for its identity and continuity (Simmel [1904] 1997, 681). This protest is evident in the narratives of evangelicals, which are often dependent on a contrast between the “real church” and the “traditional church,” being a “one-day-a-week Christian” and being a “follower,” being “world-friendly church” and being “countercultural.” My informants contrast Bethlehem’s style of Christianity with the world outside and with a church that is not “real,” because it is too detached from people’s lives or too comforting. It is on this basis that they affirm a relational self and an interpretation of Christianity and of belief as relational. They construct their identity in opposition to selfish and competitive secular society and also to the “traditional church” to embody a vision of Christianity that seeks to be more accessible to all, but also truer to the message of Jesus. The vision of Bethlehem, to be a welcoming and inclusive church for all, is grounded on relationships. It is a vision of authenticity for the person developed through human relationships, which reflect the relationship between the believer and God. Thus, Bethlehem does not simply strive to be “modern” and “relevant” to adapt to the times; it does not simply provide comfort to church and community members; rather it aspires to be the place where people can seek to be authentic, as human beings and Christians, by forming human relationships. In sum, evangelicals at Bethlehem have reconstructed belief as relational and experiential, moving away from doctrinal statements to focus on a personal relationship with Jesus and people around them. They have also

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grounded their construction of Christian identity on a relational conception of the self. This is a long way away from the nineteenth and early twentieth century’s Protestant belief as a propositional statement and an individual’s personal faith. Belief, for my informants, is firmly located and expressed in relationships. CONCLUSION Modern subjectivity had a radical impact on religion. Simmel feels religion needs to adapt to modern subjectivism and emphasize the inner experience. Much of writing on religion reflects an interest for a mystical form of religion that would allow individual self-expression. Simmel’s notion of religiosity as a sensitivity taps into the emotional aspect of religion. It offers the opportunity to view religiosity not as an attribute of someone who has faith; rather it is a disposition of the person, a way of seeing and experiencing life. At first glance, Simmel seems concerned with the religious sentiment; yet his approach is always more philosophical than phenomenological. In understanding religiosity as a mode of consciousness, Simmel focuses on religion’s capacity for providing unity to the mind. This chapter has proposed three notions building on Simmel’s insights: religiosity as a mode of consciousness; belief as experiential; and belief as relational. The advantage of understanding religion as a mode of consciousness lies in the capacity to encapsulate an overarching perspective rather than essentializing particularities such as religious belief or belonging to a religious community. Accordingly, religiosity is more than the “sum of its parts,” be they beliefs, rituals, or emotions. Religiosity is an all-encompassing mode of consciousness. Religion, as a Form, structures the experience a person has of reality. It is relational in the sense of connecting disparate elements of reality and thus making sense of it. Religion is like a schema, or a frame, that orders life. In viewing religiosity in its dimension of Form, we free it from the constraints of constructs such as the propositional concept of belief, as an adherence to dogmas, or belief in the existence of supernatural entities. A person is a “religious person” and not someone “with a religion.” Simmel’s notion of the self-surrender of belief has here been developed to highlight the experiential aspect of religiosity. Belief is not propositional because it is a personal experience. For Simmel, the sensitivity of religiosity was more present in some than others. He did not equate it with religious behavior or adherence to religious doctrine. On the contrary, religiosity is characterized by the emotion of awe. It is a sense of dependence on something higher and self-surrender. Religiosity is experiential. This is prominent in the experiences of my informants, especially when recounting their con-

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version to Christianity. This allows us to go beyond the propositional notion of belief that has dominated understandings of religion to this day. My interpretation of Simmel’s reflections on belief suggest a notion of belief as trust, based on the experience of believers, which is grounded in a relational conception of the self. Belief is thus relational and experiential. It is not simply confidence in God, but also experience of God. Simmel’s “belief in” identifies a relationship with God based on the experience of God as a real event. The transcendent is present in the person’s belief because belief is a self-transcendent process. This perspective has the value of going beyond the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence. Believing, as experiencing the transcendent, makes the transcendent immanent. The immanence of transcendence is, however, not the result of a learning process of communicating with God (Lurhmann 2012), but of the experience of relationships in the church community and in the neighborhood. Belief is at once a personal experience based on a person’s sensitivity and is relational, connecting the person to others. Bethlehemites’ belief is grounded in relationships. They are not seeking seeking unity of a fragmented self, as for instance Strhan’s (2015) metropolitan evangelicals. The self of Bethlehemites is relational, interconnected with others, and expressed in relationships. Relationships is how they understand their identity as Christians and as human beings. NOTES 1. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel, edited and translated by Horst Jürgen Helle in collaboration with Ludwig Nieder, foreword by Phillip E. Hammond. 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. 2. In Divinarum Institutionum (IV, xxviii), Lactantius argues that religion derives from religare (connecting) against Cicero’s interpretation of religion as relegere (to treat carefully), as written in De Natura Deorum (II, xxviii). http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/02m/ 0240-0320,_Lactantius,_Divinarum_Institutionum_Liber_IV,_MLT.pdf.

Chapter Five

Authenticity, Self-Transcendence, and Relationality

This ascent of life beyond itself is not a something added to it, but is its genuine, immediate essence. —Georg Simmel, The View of Life ([1918] 2010)

THEORIZING AUTHENTICITY This chapter proposes a concept of authenticity as self-transcendence. Authenticity is not an essence but a becoming aware of our situatedness and taking moral responsibility for our lives. This understanding of authenticity derives from my engagement with Simmel’s philosophy, in particular his notion of “individual law,” and philosophical accounts of authenticity in proto-existentialist, existentialist, and contemporary philosophy. I also propose to understand religiosity as a path to authenticity. Therefore, I begin the chapter by building on the Simmelian notion of religiosity as a sensitivity, which I interpret as a sensitivity to self-transcendence. I thus link religiosity to authenticity. This is to explore the self-transcendent dimension of religious experience. The mode of consciousness of religion, by inserting the individual into a wider universal perspective, can make the individual aware of facticity and thus be a catalyst for authenticity. Linking religiosity to authenticity also provides a cultural framework on which religious actors draw in articulating authenticity. My concept of authenticity is not solely reliant on Simmel. Authenticity, as an autonomous concept, derives from proto-existentialist and existentialist philosophy. Any theorization of authenticity cannot disregard this body of work. I therefore examine briefly the key features of authenticity as elaborat77

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ed by proto-existentialist Søren Kierkegaard ([1843] 1983), existentialist philosophers Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1962), Jean Paul Sartre ([1943] 1992), and Simone de Beauvoir ([1943] 2004, [1943] 1948), before considering contemporary conceptions from Charles Taylor (1992a) Massimo Ferrara (1998), and Lee and Silver (2012). In these endeavors, philosophers tease out the modern dilemma of individual conscience, existence, social situatedness, and moral responsibility. They have established the language of authenticity and have reflected on what are still fundamental questions regarding individuality, social conditioning, and ethics. It is beyond the remit of this book to provide a full account of such illustrious sources, and yet it is also not possible to treat authenticity without mentioning their terms. This is not solely due to their significance in debates on authenticity, but also a degree of indebtedness to Simmel, especially in the case of Heidegger, who was influenced by Simmel’s philosophy (Gadamer [1960] 2004), and through Heidegger, Beauvoir. Much scholarship on authenticity, however, constructs it in opposition to tradition. I thus include a consideration of Alasdair MacIntyre ([1981] 2007) to affirm the importance of tradition as a cultural framework on which individuals draw to elaborate their understanding of authenticity. The philosophical thread on authenticity requires me to separate the theoretical framework from the empirical analysis, which follows in the next chapter. RELIGIOSITY AS SELF-TRANSCENDENCE Simmel stated that religiosity is a sensitivity. This sensitivity is characterized by a propensity toward belief. In the last chapter, I proposed to understand belief in experiential terms rather than as a statement on the existence of God. This rested on Simmel’s notion of belief as “a form of existence,” “a subjective process” (Simmel [1902] 1997, 130). 1 Moving beyond the phenomenological conception of religiosity as a sentiment, I suggest it is a process, specifically a metaphysical process. Simmel was concerned with the “intellectual level” of experience. I read Simmel’s affinity for mystical religiosity as akin to a philosophical search for knowledge. That is why religiosity is an attribute that is present in some people more than in others. The religious “soul,” to use Simmel’s words, like that of the artist and of the philosopher is attuned to self-transcendence. The artist, the philosopher, and the religious person seek an awareness of the human condition. The frame of mind of religiosity is one oriented towards self-transcendence. Religiosity is not transcendence separate from immanence, as it might have been in Christian theological tradition, but the constant process of going beyond facticity, the “becoming” rather than being. In Ethik und Probleme der modernem Kultur ([1913] 2004), Simmel reflected on the post-Enlight-

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enment framing of the religious question as a question regarding its empirical reality. Accordingly, either the supernatural is real or faith is but a subjective fantasy ([1913] 2004, 44). Simmel opposed to this view a “third” option: faith itself may be something metaphysical. The transcendent lies in “the process of faith” ([1913] 2004, 44, emphasis in the original). It is being religious that is transcendent, metaphysical and objective ([1913] 2004, 45). I thus suggests that religiosity is being sensitive to the metaphysical dimension of life. Simmel’s “immanent transcendence” is an attempt at grappling with the universal and the particular, with Life, in the ontological sense, which takes a Form and then surpasses it. The constant movement of Life means that old Forms become obsolete and are discarded for new ones. Religion, Simmel argues, is more itself when it discards the old Form. Religion taking a Form becomes entrapped in social reality, although it retains its self-transcendent character. The shedding of old Forms and the taking up of new ones purifies religion, not in the sense of religion becoming more perfect or better, but more itself, “a more purely religious form” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 210). As McCole (2005, 15) explains, for Simmel, the rationalism of the modern age and the enlightened criticism of religion purify the subjective religious attitude of religion’s contents, such as dogmas. Religion is purer when more subjective, when it allows the expression of the person’s religious sentiment. Simmel takes the individualism of Christianity as a paradigm for the modern search for authenticity. Religion cannot be reduced to a specific content, such as propositional belief, but is lived in every moment. As he wrote, If subjective religiosity were to be realized in an absolutely pure form . . . it would be in the process of life itself, in the way the religious person lives each hour of his life. (Simmel [1914] 1997, 79)

Simmel tells us that religiosity is a “life process” (Simmel [1912] 1997, 209, emphasis in the original), which is required to go out of itself to acquire a Form. The taking of a Form is an objectification that is external to religion, yet it retains its otherness. Simmel writes that, [religion] suffers from the inability to shake off this otherness . . . because religiosity remains fused with forms of the earthly, rationalist, social-empirical material through which objective religion came into being, while still enduring the presence of random particles of its matter. (Simmel [1912] 1997, 209, emphasis in the original)

I argue that this ought to be interpreted as religion being more “metaphysical,” rather than transcendent, for it rests on the religious person’s metaphysical sensitivity. Religiosity is thus a sensitivity to self-transcendence: the sense of being “this side” and the attempt at going beyond it. Self-transcen-

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dence is the mind’s ability to go beyond facticity. The person’s realization that the world is but “one side” allows one to transcend it by virtue of this very recognition. It is the philosophical-metaphysical endeavor that is at stake here. The individual’s “battle” against facticity can be found in Simmel’s essay “On the Salvation of the Soul” of 1903. Simmel interprets the Christian idea of salvation as imposing a duty on the person to make the most of her own talent ([1903] 1997, 34). It is this individualism and “battle of self-assertion against one’s self in order to achieve salvation” that is most akin to the search for authenticity. For Simmel, every person has an ideal of themselves in tension with objective reality. He wrote that, “the self’s pure form, what it ought to be, is an ideal reality that pervades the imperfect reality of existence” (Simmel [1903] 1997, 30). The path toward that ideal comes through the discarding of facticity. “Everything outside the soul that has power over it must first be discarded” (Simmel [1903] 1997, 31). It is the transcendence of social forms that grants the person freedom. [We are free] when our individual thoughts and decisions, our actions and our suffering alike, are an expression of our real self, undiverted by forces that do not form part of us. (Simmel [1903] 1997, 32)

The religious person is engaged in a constant effort to transcend facticity. In this struggle lies “authenticity.” Thus, authenticity is not merely the realization of what is distinctive of the person, the individual uniqueness, rather it captures the person’s self-transcendence. Such transcendence is never realized fully, because both facticity and transcendence are constitutive of existence. The self cannot go beyond its embodied and social reality, but it can become aware of social reality and of itself. Authenticity is therefore always a process and never something attained. It is this awareness, the being between limits, that stirs the person to seek to transcend facticity. Authenticity is the process of gaining consciousness of one’s individuality as distinct from one’s social self, that is, one’s social roles and social typification, and the constant movement to redefine oneself vis-à-vis social reality. The authentic self thus emerges from this dynamic relation between self-transcendence and facticity. Authenticity consists in transcending facticity, gaining a consciousness of being in relation to the world, but not enmeshed in it. Yet, authenticity, for Simmel (and for later philosophers of authenticity), was not limited to consciousness. It was not solely a philosophical acknowledgement of social conditioning. It called for the pursuit of an ethical self-autonomy and selfrealization, which Simmel sought to conceptualize with his “individual law” (das individuelle Gesetz), an ethic that accounted for the individual’s personality and conscience. Simmelian scholars have often interpreted the individu-

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al law as a notion of authenticity, understood as the pursuit of an ethical way of life. The next section examines Simmel’s individual law to highlight the ethical dimension of authenticity, which is then explored further in existentialist and contemporary philosophical accounts of authenticity. AUTHENTICITY IN SIMMEL’S “INDIVIDUAL LAW” In the “individual law,” Simmel attempted to ground ethical duty in individuality. The universal moral law needs to be in accordance with the individuality of the person. It is Simmel’s attempt at reconciling modern individualization with universal ethics. In discussing Simmel’s “tragedy of culture,” in chapter 3, it was mentioned that the increasingly differentiated and structured social life of modernity overwhelms the individual. The modern individual is unable to absorb the profound social changes of industrialized modernity; yet this does not lead to alienation proper, but to an intensification of subjectivity. The pursuit of the individual’s distinctive individuality is both a result of the modern value of individual autonomy and the reaction to a rapidly changing society, which is felt as fragmented. This process of individualization, together with the process of rationalization, which restructured knowledge according to the modern scientific paradigm (Asad 1993; Tambiah 1990), not only had an impact on religion, but also on ethics. The rise to prominence of individual particularity called for a life and ethics that were meaningful to the individual. Kantian morality primed the individual as moral legislator. Duty was a response to one’s conscience and discernible through reasoning. Kant’s “trascendental Ego” collapses “all individual selves into an abstract universal Self” (Golomb 1995, 4). The search for authenticity reflects the fundamental shift in legitimation that emerges from the individualization process of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Self-autonomy and self-expression become intrinsic to modern life. Religion as well as morality can no longer dispense with individual choice, and, most importantly, their value rests on the individual giving meaning to moral norms and religious beliefs and practices. Post-Enlightenment ethics requires personal engagement and transformation. The “individual law” (individuelle Gesetz) is Simmel’s attempt at theorizing duty on the basis of a person’s individuality. Accordingly, the person’s sense of duty to act ethically comes from their very being. In his attempt to reconcile the universal moral law with individual subjectivity, Simmel conceived of individuality as the door for universalistic value. Here there is a strong echo of the metaphysics of Friedrich Scheleimacher, for whom the absolute was expressed through the individual. The absolute, dwelling in the individual, was the source for the individual’s moral task. Simmel, trying to reconcile Kantian duty with qualitative individualism, does not want ethics to

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be subjective, but believes that the “ought” has authority over the individual only if it “speaks” personally to the individual (Silver et al. 2007, 272). Morality, for Simmel, does not originate in Kant’s universal reason, but it is apprehended in the inner uniqueness or solitude in which it is experienced, then morality itself originates from the point where the person is alone with himself, and to which he finds his way back from the “broad way of sin”—whose breadth signifies not merely its alluring ease, but also its accessibility for all. (Simmel [1918] 2010, 115)

The “individual law” is Simmel’s attempt at making the “ought” (das Sollen) dependent on the individual: one expresses oneself in the act. Simmel moves away from the general and abstract law of Kant’s categorical imperative, according to which single acts are judged as ethical or unethical on the basis of their accordance with general moral principles imposed by human reason. The person, for Simmel, is not simply obligated by a general abstract law, like Kant’s categorical imperative, but by a command felt by and emerging from the individual. The ethical command is not what is customary in a society, which merely reflects facticity, nor is it an impersonal universalism, but an “ought” (das Sollen) that is deeply felt by the person. Ethical conduct requires the whole person; it is not exhausted by the action; rather it is an expression of the self. [L]aw can stem from the life unity of the individual unfolding as obligation— or more precisely, the law must be the instantaneous arrangement of it. (Simmel [1918] 2010, 124)

In Ethik und Probleme der modernem Kultur, Simmel affirms that the “ought” is life itself and that is where true autonomy comes into being (Simmel [1913] 2004, 35). This is because human beings act as a whole, not first as reason and then sensibility (Simmel [1913] 2004, 34). As Silver and his colleagues have remarked, it follows that, the relevant ethical question is not how norms do or do not match reality, but how a norm is living and charged with emotional energy rather than dead or dull. This means that a genuine law, Simmel argues, must require me to give my whole self, including my being and my feelings; such laws must speak to each individual as the individual he is. (Silver et al. 2007, 272)

Life becomes the realization of the “ought,” in the sense of the expression of what we, as individuals, are meant to be. The “lawfulness” of the “ought” needs to reach deep into the heart of the individual, without it being relativized. Simmel’s objectivity of the “ought” rests on the Nietzschean notion of the “eternal recurrence” of existence (Simmel [1907] 1991, 176). Recurrence

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instills in the person the obligation of living every instant as we would if we were living eternally. Simmel, explaining Nietzsche, stated, We are responsible for our conduct in a new way, or at least we understand our responsibility differently, if we know that no moment of our life is ever over once and for all, but that we and humanity must experience it innumerable times just as we shape it now. . . . [This is based on the] persistence of the ego, which finds a new meaning and new consequences in the first instance in light of the reappearance of the same contents a second time. (Simmel [1907] 1991, 171–74)

As explained by Levine, [L]ife is a single process that encompasses the constituents acts, acts that cannot be judged as moral in isolation. The whole of life enters into each discrete action of the individual, such that there is a universality of the individual, not of the act or moral principle. We cannot, however, deny the objectivity of this individualized morality. Such denial causes humans to slip into pure amoral individualism. Rather we must recognize that the “individual law,” the universality of the individual, has a certain objectivity or “materiality” to it. This conception, Simmel argues in a final added passage, means that the whole life is responsible for every act, and every act for the whole life. (Levine 2010, xx)

The person is called to realize the “ought.” The “ought,” is not subjective, but objective, whether it is recognized as such or not by the individual (Simmel [1896] 2008, 37). As Levine puts it, Duty still constitutes the formal structure of morality, as with Kant, but for Simmel now it consists of duties to pursuing the ever-emerging ideal of one’s authentic self. (Levine 2012, 38)

The “ought” is not separate from the process of Life; rather it rests on becoming aware of social conditioning and of one’s duty. The “ethical life” is thus conceived by Simmel “as the perfection of the individual” (Lee and Silver 2012, 131). As remarked by Joas, [T]he meaning of the moral law can lie only in addressing the whole person and demanding of him precisely those acts which are inherent in him as impulsions of the Ought (Sollensimpulse) in a particular situation. (Joas 2000, 82)

Life, as it ought to be, needs to be traced at the individual level; yet the “ought” is not determined solely by the individual (Ferrara 1998, 65–66). Indeed, Ferrara stresses that Simmelian authenticity is no mere self-realization.

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Chapter 5 At the same time Simmel wishes to distinguish his ethics of the individual law from what he understands as a “hedonistic ethics of self-realization.” Happiness—not even happiness understood as the fulfillment or realization of one’s personality—is not as such the ultimate end presupposed by the individual law. (Ferrara 1998, 68)

Simmel wanted to avoid relativistic subjectivism. The ought was not dependent on the individual; rather the “ought” needed to speak to the individual while at the same time be in accordance with an objective moral law. However, Simmel’s authenticity presumes Nietzschean “nobility.” It is not an enterprise for the faint-hearted, but for a selected few. As such, it lacks generality. This need not be seen as moral elitism that precludes the masses from moral self-realization. It can be understood as different degrees of moral “sensitivity,” just as much as religious sensitivity is, for Simmel, more present in some than in others. Yet, as Vandenberghe noted, Simmel’s philosophy of life lacks a philosophy of the good life thus leaving his notion of individual law open to abuse (Vandenberghe 2000). The appeal of the individual law, in relation to authenticity, lies in its tension with facticity. The “ought” is in opposition to facticity (Ferrara 1998, 65). The authenticity of the “individual law” rests on the individual’s selftranscendence. The self moves toward an ideal while remaining embedded in social relations. Authenticity is once again in the tension between the pull toward the ideal and objective reality, between the awareness of social conditioning and the person’s embeddedness in society, between transcendence and facticity. In the pursuit of an ideal self one battles oneself, one’s “ego,” to realize a self that is not tainted by facticity. The “soul’s salvation” to which Simmel refers should thus be read as the individual’s search for authenticity. The next section presents key notions in the conceptualization of authenticity in existentialist and contemporary philosophy, which establish self-transcendence, in the sense of becoming aware of facticity, as central to the concept. THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF AUTHENTICITY The search for “authenticity” is the hallmark of proto-existentialist and existentialist philosophy. It is evident in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard, for whom the individual has to embrace an inward journey of self-discovery and pursue with passion moral self-realization. Kierkegaard’s authenticity is a Christian ethical pursuit, which is why it is the understanding of authenticity that is the closest to the narratives of my informers. As explained by Golomb (1992), Kierkegaard thought that “Christian faith had been reduced to the comfortable code of shallow bourgeois ethics” (Golomb 1992, 67), and that what was required was not the external righteous behavior of abiding by a set

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of rules, but an inner transformation. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, authenticity could not be enunciated propositionally, as a rational argument, but had to be felt and embodied. Authenticity revolved around subjective faith. Faith, for Kierkegaard, “is the highest passion in a human being” (Kierkegaard [1843] 1983, 122). As Golomb writes, [A]uthenticity consists in acts of willing passionately and sincerely to become a genuinely authentic individual, despite one’s awareness that becoming authentic requires a perpetual movement without definite results. (Golomb 2013, 2)

When Kierkegaard ([1846] 2009, 171) proclaims that “subjectivity is truth,” he identifies the individual as central in the coming to know truth and that truth needs to be taken up by the person. For Kierkegaard, the truth is the Christian faith; yet the individual is free to choose whether to follow God (Rae 2010, 85). Kierkegaard’s “knight of faith” is embedded in the social world, but one has a choice on how to lead one’s life and is responsible for one’s actions. Authenticity consists in a perpetual movement of going beyond social mores and rests on choosing the life of faith. It is an affirmation of one’s freedom, although this freedom consists in obeying God. The act of resignation does not require faith, for what I gain is my eternal consciousness. This is a purely philosophical movement that I venture to make when it is demanded and can discipline myself to make, because every time some finitude will take power over me, I starve myself into submission until I make the movement, for my eternal consciousness is my love for God, and for me that is the highest of all. The act of resignation does not require faith, but to get the least little bit more than my eternal consciousness requires faith, for this is the paradox. (Kierkegaard [1843] 1983, 48)

This paradox of authenticity, which lies in the tension between freedom and obedience to God, is something that can be evinced from the narratives of Christians in my research. In the Christian narrative of being countercultural, we find echo of the need to go beyond and against social mores to be faithful to God. Authenticity is the search for something “true” that unmasks the falsity of social structures, roles, and norms. It is in opposition to an alienating society. The crucial aspect of authenticity in philosophical reasoning, but also reflected in Christian narratives, is the going beyond one’s perspective, one’s social conditioning, one’s habit of mind. There lies freedom. The link between transcendence of facticity and freedom can be found in Martin Heidegger’s idea of authenticity. The father of existentialism, Heidegger, gave the most influential philosophical conceptualization of authenticity. For Heidegger ([1927] 1962), the self is a relation between what one is at a given moment and what one can be.

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Authenticity is a constant search to be one’s own to overcome the arbitrary nature of one’s social existence, which he calls “thrownness” (Geworfenheit). One is “thrown” into the world and constrained by one’s social status and ties. Heidegger sought to avoid an ethical conceptualization of authenticity. He stated that authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of being of Dasein (being there), being in the world, and one is not superior to the other. However, it is hard not to perceive a normative tone. For Heidegger, being inauthentic identifies the “falling” (Verfallen) of Dasein; it means being part of the world and being fascinated by it (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 220). In other words, inauthenticity is a way of life that is not detached or in opposition to social norms, roles, or expectations. Falling is “tempting and tranquillizing,” but is also alienating (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 222), removing the person from the possibility of authenticity. In contrast, authenticity denotes self-awareness. This is particularly so when one reflects on one’s mortality, something that Heidegger takes from Simmel (Pyyhtinen 2012). Like Simmel, Heidegger understands death as a boundary (Grenze). Death is immanent in life in the sense that death is life’s Other. Death is not only the end of life; rather it “affects and sets the tone for every moment and content of our life” (Pyyhtinen 2012, 87). For Heidegger, the authentic individual does not merely perish (Verenden) but dies (Sterben) “properly.” Death needs to be “owned” by the individual. Although Heidegger claimed repeatedly that authenticity is not a normative category, as Daigle (2011) explains, authenticity is quite clearly an “ought.” Dasein may let itself be trapped in inauthentic modes but must aim toward authenticity as a mode of its own being. The ontological yields an ethical demand, that of authenticity. (Daigle 2011, 3)

Heidegger is conscious of the fact that there is no stable core self to which to be “true,” there is a “becoming,” which is forged through social relations and often in tension with our social self. In other words, the individual is not separate from the world, but engaged in it, shaped by it, and in conflict with it. Authenticity requires the person to go beyond facticity and choose one’s potentiality and be resolute (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 263). Therefore, authenticity is no mere self-expression, but the formation of a responsible self, accountable for their actions. Heidegger invents the term Eigentlichkeit for authenticity to mean “real own.” Authenticity is thus going beyond one’s every day social existence (facticity/thrownness) that requires one to be conscious of one’s social persona and yet choose oneself and “take hold” of oneself (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 197). In Heidegger’s account, self-determination is a core trait of authenticity; yet, such self-determination is based on the consciousness of the individual being social as well as for themselves, pour soi, in the words of Jean Paul

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Sartre. Sartre’s contribution was to question the very possibility of being authentic, in the sense of being our “true self.” We are in “bad faith” (selfdeception) when we think we can be our true self because there is no core self (Sartre [1943] 1992). We cannot go beyond our “situatedness” tout court; indeed authenticity requires becoming aware of one’s situated being. Recognizing our social existence (facticity) means transcending it. Authenticity is the radical freedom of being conscious of social existence and of motivating oneself to be. This is a process that never ends. Daigle explains thus: Authenticity will be gained through assuming one’s free situated and historical being. However, this gain will have to be perpetually regained as one persists in one’s free project. If that does not happen, one will relapse in inauthenticity. (Daigle 2011, 5)

Sartrean self-awareness, unlike in Heidegger, does not come from being conscious of one’s death; rather from the realization that one wants to be God/Totality and cannot be. As remarked by Daigle (2011, 6), “[a]uthenticity requires that one embraces oneself as a being for whom the desire to be God is a feature of one’s being.” The desire for totality is thus a characteristic of being human, for Sartre; yet this “project” is only authentic if it is pursued as an expression of freedom. Freedom is a higher value (Zheng 2002, 133), because that implies taking responsibility for oneself. Therefore, inauthenticity is believing to have a fixed essence and try to coincide with oneself, while authenticity is taking responsibility and acknowledging one’s normative commitments. Webber (2014) explains thus, Authenticity is rather the recognition of the particular person that you are. This has two dimensions. One is recognition of what it is to be a person, which is to be a normative being whose identity is conferred by their commitments. The other is recognition of the particular commitments that one has, as these are manifested in the way the world seems in experience. (Webber 2014, 140)

In Sartre we encounter relationality, although it is understood in negative terms. For Sartre, we objectify the Other and the Other objectifies us. In contrast, Simone de Beauvoir puts forward an ethical and relational authenticity. Following Heidegger, Beauvoir believes that the person has the duty to unveil Being. The person is “thrown” into the world and is authentic in recognizing their situatedness. Authenticity, for Beauvoir, is an unveiling and not a coinciding with oneself as a fixed identity, but “a flux, a transcending movement, a being that is not but that exists” (Daigle 2011, 11). Authenticity is also not pure transcendence, but, to borrow Simmelian language, immanent transcendence. As Daigle clarifies,

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Chapter 5 As an embodied consciousness, the individual may transcend only as immanent. It is a transcendence in immanence, and not a transcendence of one’s immanence. (Daigle 2011, 11)

The authentic self is free, but is not confined to their own subjectivity because of the Other. Beauvoir writes, “The other’s freedom alone is capable of necessitating my being. My essential need is therefore to be faced with free men” (Beauvoir [1943] 2004, 129). Following Hegel, the self is relational, but, for Beauvoir, the relationship is more than cognitive, it is ethical. “Man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men” (Beauvoir [1943] 1948, 73). There cannot be any objectifying of the Other or by the Other, but a mutual recognition as free human beings. It is through generosity that we move closer to the Other, recognize their freedom, and, in doing so, give value to the freedom of all (Daigle and Landry 2013, 123). The authenticity emerging from the philosophical notions explored above is one of becoming (or existence), not essence. It identifies the becoming aware of one’s social situatedness, social conditioning, and the aspiration of transcending it. It poses freedom and responsibility as fundamental. It captures the tension between being part of society and being shaped by it, and responding to the modern imperative of being free individuals responsible for their actions. In Beauvoir, the freedom of authenticity is relational. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Beauvoir were key in developing the language of authenticity in our culture. They identified the “dilemma” of authenticity and some of its traits, such as intentionality (Kierkegaard), “facticity,” or “thrownness” as the constraints imposed by social existence on individuality (Heidegger), self-creation (Sartre), and our relationality (Beauvoir). Contemporary conceptualizations of authenticity seek to integrate relationality, although the emphasis is perhaps more on the self than on the mutual recognition of relationality. RELATIONAL AUTHENTICITY One of the most influential conceptualization of authenticity in recent times has been that of Charles Taylor (1992a). This rests on the idea that the shared ethical framework of premodern times has been undermined by the “inward turn” of the Reformation (Taylor 1989). Taylor’s view of a shift from a religious premodernity to secular modernity has been critiqued briefly in chapter 1. Taylor believes that modern individual subjectivity has led to secularization and the loss of a shared ethical frameworks. The “turn inward,” for Taylor, is not simply an affirmation of individual autonomy, but “a fragmentation of experience which calls our ordinary notions of identity into question” (Taylor 1989, 462). Thus, the “condition of modernity” not

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only encapsulates the fragmentation of morality, but, paradoxically, of individuality. The subject turns inward and the “I” becomes a fragmented “self” in search of authenticity. The search for authenticity is, for Taylor, a form of self-absorption originating in the three “malaises” of modernity: “the fading of moral horizons,” “instrumental reason,” and “loss of freedom” (Taylor 1992a, 10). The extreme individualism of the modern age, not tempered by a “higher purpose” (Taylor 1992a, 4), leads to an obsession with self-fulfillment. Following Tocqueville, Taylor sees the democratic equality of modern times leading the individual to “self-absorption” (Taylor 1992a, 4). Individuals are “enclosed in their own hearts” (Tocqueville quoted in Taylor 1992a, 9) and unable to participate in society. This leaves a moral vacuum and a search for impossible fulfillment. Taylor seeks to recuperate the ethical dimension. Thus, he argues that the modern individualistic idea of self-fulfillment is a valid idea that needs to be rescued from extreme subjectivism. Self-fulfillment is not vain egoism or relativistic self-referentiality. There is a moral ideal behind self-fulfillment which is “that of being true to oneself” (Taylor 1992a, 15). This fulfillment is to be found in something “which has significance independent of us or our desires” (Taylor 1992a, 82). Taylor goes decidedly beyond the self, appealing to something “bigger than ourselves,” to find meaning. Authenticity, for Taylor, is the foundation for a modern individual identity that results from one’s moral stance. Thus, identity “is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stance” (Taylor 1989, 27). Taylor’s “moral horizon” is based on “hypergoods,” “goods which not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor 1989, 63). This is explained clearly by Varga (2012), who subscribes to Taylor’s notion of authenticity thus: Wholeheartedness means that betraying your commitment would also mean betraying yourself (centrally), and it involves being committed to both the actual project and to entertaining the committment itself (continuity). . . . This persepective acknowledges that our wholehearted engagements have a grip on us as on persons embedded in horizons of significance that are partly constituted by qualitative distinctions of worth. While we constitute ourselves through our choices of commitments, these commitments are linked to ideas of the good that qualitative distinctions of worth are based on. (Varga 2012, 160, emphasis in the original)

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Taylor is a communitarian (Taylor 1992b), for whom the hypergoods that inform the construction of the moral self derive from the communities we inhabit. However, it is not clear whether, as some impute to Taylor (Sidorkin, et al. 1997, 83), the “ethics of authenticity” ultimately rests on the individual’s inner feelings rather than a relationship, or whether the ethics of authenticity is derived from and in line with the values of community. One’s moral horizon, for Taylor, is based not on a solipsistic and self-enclosed self, but a “dialogical” self. Relationality is essential to one’s identity and self-knowledge. He writes, [I]n the culture of authenticity, relationships are seen as the key loci of selfdiscovery and self-confirmation. Love relationships are . . . the crucibles of inwardly generated identity. (Taylor 1992a, 49)

Relationality in Taylor affirms the value of ethical mutual recognition (Taylor 1992b, 26), which is not solely about recognition of free individuals, as in Beauvoir, but also of one’s specificity, stressing the aspect of belonging to a community, as well as recognition in the private sphere in the context of loving relationships. Taylor’s hypergoods derive from one’s community and thus reproduce a culture. Taylor recognizes that there are different views of what constitutes the “good” which one needs to confront, but does not seem to consider the internal diversity and conflict within a community and tradition, and ignores how relations of power shape the person (McNay 2008). Further, Taylor does not set out criteria on which basis “hypergoods” should be debated and decided upon, while giving the impression that rational argument will suffice in bringing agreement. More importantly, there is no acknowledgement that someone’s “hypergoods” might not be so “good” for others, when not downright damaging. Alessandro Ferrara (1998) criticized Taylor’s notion of authenticity for being essentialistic and formulated his own conception by grounding it on Kant’s reflective judgment, Aristotelic phronesis, Weber’s notion of ethical responsibility (Weber [1919b] 1970), and, to a lesser extent, Simmel’s individual law. Kant’s reflective judgment refers to those judgments that are not a generalized universal norm to be applied to given particulars, but judgments arising from given particulars. Specifically, the judgment on taste, from which Ferrara draws his notion of validity, is a subjective judgment that makes a universalistic claim of validity by expecting recognition from others. In other words, when we appreciate an object and call it beautiful, we expect others to share our judgment. Reflective judgment is, therefore, intersubjective. Similarly, Aristotle’s phronesis identifies the ability to choose ethically independent of general laws. The conclusions made by phronesis cannot be proven, only “shown.” Thus, one’s choices are shown to others as a model that needs the recognition of others.

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Ferrara proceeds to formulate authenticity as an expression of the core of the actor’s personality. He draws from Weber’s sense of responsibility espoused in Politics as Vocation ([1919] 1991). Weber’s sense of responsibility, for Ferrara, “shares all the characteristics of authentic conduct,” for it “combines considerations of expediency and value with a deep emotional resonance which stems from the link that this kind of action manifests with the identity of the actor” (Ferrara 1998, 6, emphasis in the original). Accordingly, authenticity thus implies faithfulness to one’s character, or congruence with one’s personal identity. Ferrara, here, takes from Georg Simmel’s “individual law,” which is based on a conception of identity not as fixed but in constant motion. Thus, one’s morality cannot be judged on the basis of single actions, but on the basis of the totality of individual life. Ferrara interprets the “individual law” as “a principle of authenticity” (Ferrara 1998, 65), where authenticity is not just the self-realization of “one’s needs and inclinations but also of the rest of the determinations of one’s identity, including normative contents” (Ferrara 1998, 68). It is not a pursuit of personal well-being, but it includes the living out of duty. This means that even “the choice to renounce one’s ‘self-realization,’ if made and executed with reflective awareness is a choice for self-realization” (Ferrara 1998, 68). Ferrara’s ethical authenticity is mostly concerned with personal development and assumes specific human characteristics as universally good. He identifies qualities such as “coherence,” “maturity,” “depth,” and “vitality” that suppose a high level of personal commitment and self-consciousness. This is in line with Simmel’s position, which followed Nietzsche’s idea of nobility, in understanding the “individual law” as pertaining to the “virtuosos” of ethics. Authenticity is not a conception of ethics that can be generalized to all, but an individual path, which, in contemporary conceptions, is relational. The self, for Taylor and Ferrara, is in relationships. For Taylor, recognition is a “vital human need” (Taylor 1992b, 26). Who we are emerges from a relational reality. He takes the example of language and argues that “people do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own” but “through interaction with others who matter to us” (Taylor 1992b, 32). Relationships shape us, but, for Taylor, are also necessary for self-fulfilment. One’s identity depends on one’s dialogue with others. For Ferrara self-realization presupposes recognition. Therefore, authenticity is intersubjective; yet, like Taylor, Ferrara does not tackle the fact that there exist “entirely different, often incompatible, modes of self-actualization” (Honneth 2004, 13). An intersubjective interpretation of Simmelian authenticity comes from Lee and Silver for whom our actions ought to embody our ideal or, indeed, authentic individuality. The “ethical life” is thus conceived by Simmel “as the perfection of the individual” (Lee and Silver 2012, 131). Lee and Silver explain that

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Chapter 5 [E]ach individual may have her own categorical “ought” toward which her life aspires but what that ultimate “ought” consists in can only be a product of vigorous self-reflection on the part of this individual in conversation with others. (Lee and Silver 2012, 134)

Intersubjectivity does not constitute objective morality. Indeed, it does not even ensure shared moral values. Thus, Lee and Silver seek to reconcile the “objective value” of the individual ideal with the individual’s relationality. They write, Though ethics may manifest as rights and duties between individuals, the form of ethical life is not at all limited to its social facet. A’s realization of his fullest potential through a social relationship may contribute to B’s ethical fulfilment. (Lee and Silver 2012, 139)

An individual’s self-realization “may” contribute to another’s self-realization or, indeed, it may not. It may, as it is often the case, be of obstacle to another or, even, harm another. The individual might feel the duty, but they might not. If ethics has no imperative, can it really motivate to act justly? In Lee and Silver, there is an unspoken assumption of the “good life,” which needs to be understood and lived out by people. It is perhaps inevitable that an individual’s ethical self-realization necessitates a person’s awareness of duty and the pursuit of a life that reflects that. The conceptions of authenticity above make the critical contribution of recognizing human relationality and mutual recognition among individuals. It is odd, however, that relational conceptions of authenticity should lack an analysis of relational ethics and, in particular, of any mention of Buber, Lévinas, or even Beauvoir. The relational authenticity of contemporary debates too often presuppose some sort of harmonious consensus on ethics emerging from the dialogue among different actors and groups. This fails to account for the complex relationship between the self and the Other, which often includes conflict. The notion of authenticity has suffered from being identified with a personal ethical endeavor in opposition to tradition and thus culture. Contemporary conceptions have emphasized relationality in terms of recognition of the Other and neglected the importance of the person’s social situatedness. Authenticity is self-transcendence, but as Beauvoir noted, that does not mean that we go beyond our situatedness; rather we become aware of it, give it meaning, and shape it. Authenticity has too often suffered from being a formulation without a cultural context. Authenticity, with its emphasis on the individual and the individual’s transcendence of facticity, poses an opposition between freedom and culture. However, as Alaisdair MacIntyre ([1981] 2007), asserted, the conception of the “good” is embedded in tradition, for “man without culture is a myth” ([1981] 2007, 161). Thus, the social and cultural context is essential to a

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person’s conception of the good. The problem lies in appreciating internal difference and also hegemony within any given culture. This is something that is essential for the understanding of diametrically opposed interpretations of religious tradition and ethics, as shown in chapter 8. MacIntyre’s appreciation of culture is a little rose-tinted and fails to account for internal strife and relations of power. It is worth surveying briefly as I believe divergence in interpreting the “good” and the “ought” are at the basis of religious change and religious conflict. In his seminal work, After Virtue ([1981] 2007), MacIntyre lamented the “failure” of Kant’s project of morality, based on rationality. Modern society is affected by “emotivism,” which “is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling” ([1981] 2007, 11–12, emphasis in the original). As such, agreement in moral judgment cannot be secured by any rational method ([1981] 2007, 12). The condition of modernity is thus ethical fragmentation where we are no longer “governed by impersonal standards justified by a shared conception of the human good” (MacIntyre 2007, ix). Alas, MacIntyre’s suggestion of a past free from ethical conflicts or where moral agreement was determined on the basis of rational argument, rather than might or persuasion, strikes one as fanciful. MacIntyre criticized the supposedly neutral and universalistic stance of liberal individualism. He attacked the universalistic claims’ of liberalism for failing to acknowledge that liberalism is itself a tradition; yet he has refused to view liberalism as a complex and multifaceted tradition favoring, in its stead, a narrow conception of the “liberal project” that claims neutrality. In popular debates, one cannot help to find those who conceive of liberalism as neutral, but this is not so for liberal philosophers like Michael Walzer (1997) and even John Rawls, who reflected on the criticism to his book A Theory of Justice (1972) and recognized that modern democratic societies are characterized by a plurality of beliefs (“comprehensive doctrines”) that can often be irreconcilable and that require agreement between citizens on principles of justice. This enables coexistence without prejudice to diversity (Rawls 1993). MacIntyre seems to assume that different communities will come to a similar understanding of the good, or one that is not antagonistic to that of others, if they only practiced the virtues from within their tradition. He revived Aristotle’s account of virtues, whose practice develops the person morally, which has been deeply influential in anthropology of morality. Yet, it is unclear whence this presumed harmonious consensus over the good is supposed to arise. The rush to attack liberalism has led communitarian philosophers to overlook the ethical legacy and shared language of liberalism, for instance in relation to human rights, thus relativizing all conceptions of the good (Insole 2004). Above all, communitarianism has fallen for a romanticized picture of community. Communities are locus of power as much as of

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love. Communities are structured according to relationships of power, often imposing homogeneity and hierarchies, and marginalizing or excluding dissenters. The liberal-communitarian debate is significant in highlighting the complexity of the relationship between the individual and the community. Community is where meaning-making happens. In community, religious actors acquire the shared language to understand and speak of their own personal experience. This applies to religious meaning-making. In the previous chapter, I have argued that belief is experiential and relational. It is experiential because it captures the sense of surrender to something that is beyond human finitude. It is relational in the sense of resting on the relationship between the believer and the divine and between the believer and others. The relationship of love between Christ and the believer needs to be replicated. Relationships are also the context for developing faith. It is in relationships where faith is expressed and cultivated. It is in relationships where authenticity is formulated. The next chapter explores how authenticity is “constructed” through the narratives and practices of Christian evangelicals at Bethlehem church. CONCLUSION The chapter began by building on Simmel’s notions of religiosity and of selftranscendence to link religion to authenticity. Religiosity is thus a sensitivity to self-transcendence: the sense of being “this side” and the attempt at going beyond it. By interpreting self-transcendence as becoming aware of facticity and attempting to go beyond it, religion becomes an avenue for self-understanding that stirs the person into transcending social conditioning, or “facticity.” The religious life steers the person toward self-transcendence by emphasizing the spiritual dimension over and above the material and social dimension. I have argued that this does not solely pertain to the realm of philosophical enquiry. Art, music, and religion elicit in us a thirst for totality and are therefore avenues for self-transcendence. This is not solely for the artist, the musician, or the religious virtuoso, but also for those who have an artistic, musical, and religious sensitivity. Authenticity, for Simmel, was not limited to consciousness. It was not solely a philosophical acknowledgement of social conditioning. It called for the pursuit of an ethical self-autonomy and self-realization. In the “individual law,” Simmel attempted to ground ethical duty in individuality. He sought to reconcile the universal with the particular. The moral law needs to be in accordance with the individuality of the person. The echo of Simmel’s ideas of self-transcendence, relational individuality, and his attempt at reconciling the “ought” with the “self” can be found in existentialist philosophy. It is existentialist philosophy that has conceptualized authenticity more fully. I

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have presented an account, albeit a brief one, of proto-existentialist, existentialist, and contemporary philosophy on authenticity to thread together a way of thinking on individuality and ethics. Philosophers have conceptualized authenticity as a movement, not an essence. In Kierkegaard, authenticity is a perpetual movement of going beyond social mores and choosing the life of faith. It is an act of freedom. For Heidegger too, authenticity implies a “becoming.” There is no true core self; rather we become and in this becoming, “owning” oneself lies freedom. Sartre’s authenticity is the radical freedom of being conscious of one’s social existence and choosing to be. Beauvoir’s relational authenticity requires becoming aware of facticity, although one’s situatedness is never transcended and serves one’s understanding. Authenticity is self-transcendence, not transcendence, or, to borrow Simmelian language, immanent transcendence. It is a recognition of facticity, an awareness of oneself and one’s social reality, which calls for responsibility in one’s own life. Contemporary philosophers of authenticity have developed the dimension of relationality without accounting adequately for its complexity and the tensions and conflict inherent in relating to the Other. Beauvoir’s authenticity is perhaps the first and stronger instance of responsibility toward the Other. Relationality is inherent in Beauvoir’s conception. There is no freedom of the individual without the freedom of the Other. Sadly contemporary philosophers of authenticity, notwithstanding their avowals of intersubjectivity, have neglected to even consider Beauvoir’s philosophy, perhaps believing it to be nothing more than a feminist critique of society. NOTE 1. Essays on Religion, Georg Simmel; Edited and translated by Horst Jürgen Helle in collaboration with Ludwig Nieder; Foreword by Phillip E. Hammond. © 1997 by Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.

Chapter Six

Authenticity and Tradition

Every individual concerned to justify his existence feels that his existence involves an undefined need to transcend himself, to engage in freely chosen projects. —Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949)

CONSTRUCTING AUTHENTICITY This chapter integrates tradition into the concept of authenticity. It does so by building on the sociological understanding of authenticity as a social construct. Social constructivism, especially in its postmodern variant, has at times fallen prey of relativism. The social constructedness of our everyday reality, values, and aspirations does not make them illusory, but the result of a process, one in which we all have a stake. Understanding authenticity as a social construct emphasizes that an individual’s moral endeavor happens within a society and culture, that the interpretation of authenticity varies from community to community and from person to person. This is not in such stark contrast with philosophical accounts as it might first appear. Heidegger and Beauvoir reflected on the person’s situatedness; for Beauvoir, in particular, self-transcendence did not mean relinquishing one’s situatedness, but becoming aware of it and embracing it by recognizing the Other. The chapter begins by outlining authenticity in the sociological literature, it then presents my own concept of authenticity in relation to tradition. The second part of the chapter illustrates authenticity through an analysis of the narratives of Christians at Bethlehem church.

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CONSTRUCTED AUTHENTICITY In sociological thinking, actors construct a notion of authenticity through narratives and practices. Studies of cultural and consumer production, such as the music industry, advertising, tourism, and food products, emphasize the “authenticity work” (Peterson 2005) done by different actors in staking claims, producing an image of a product, and communicating it. This is not limited to producers, marketing, and advertising agents; rather it is a process in which several actors are engaged, including consumers, music fans, and industry experts. Actors are not alone in their construction of authenticity. A Punk, a straight-edge, a goth, for instance, draw on specific repertoires with regards to clothing, hair styles, and music choices characterizing their respective “scene,” and participate with others in making that “scene,” producing, and reproducing that culture. The production and reproduction of authenticity creates an identity, provides personal meaning, and gives value to objects and practices (Lindholm 2008). This process is not exhausted by the following of a trend. In constructing an identity, actors interrogate it and identify what they value. The empirical research suggests that authenticity is felt and understood by informants as an ethical pursuit; its traits are often emotional intensity (Holden and Schrock 2009), anti-conformism (Lewin and Williams 2009), and individual self-expression (Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1995). Authenticity is often identified with self-autonomy and motivation (Vannini and Burgess 2009; Weigert 2009), and fulfilling one’s moral commitments (Erickson 1994, 1995). The understanding of authenticity of members of subcultures resonates with that of religious actors in many respects. Members of youth subcultures construct boundaries to define their identity by stressing how they differ from mainstream culture (Williams and Copes 2005). For instance, for punk members, “rejection” of mainstream society is essential to be truly accountable to their perceived self rather than external pressures. Punks’ opposition to mainstream culture is an attempt at “undoing societal influence in order to lead meaningful lives” (Lewin and Williams 2009, 71). The search for authenticity reflects the tension between one’s perceived self and outside society, much as it was theorized by Heidegger and Sartre. As Lewin and Williams explain, [S]triving to understand one’s genuine self and demanding accountability to it brought meaning and understanding into the lives of the punks we studied. The goal of self-actualization ultimately manifested in the development of a selfconcept that subjectively existed outside of social influence. (Lewin and Williams 2009, 79)

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The subculture is the community and way of life that allows the person to express her individuality. Thus, some subculture members see the belonging to the subculture as the realization of their true self as they have always been. For instance, some “straightedge” subculture members claim to have always been “straightedge,” even before they knew about the subculture (Williams 2003; Wood 2003). The claim to authenticity constructs the boundary of a subculture identity. The choice of clothes, language, and how to act with others are used as markers of subcultural identity on which the claim to authenticity is made. This sometimes includes dismissing others as not authentic for adhering in perfunctory manner to the subculture style (Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1995). [One has] to simultaneously follow the rules and yet appear to be above the rules. Authenticity to oneself is perceived as being above conformity to the mainstream culture, but also above conformity to one’s subculture that challenges the mainstream subculture. (Brekhus 2008, 1068)

This points to individuals identifying with a group identity, but also forming their own self as distinctive (Williams 2007). The construction of authenticity among subculturalists identifies the individual’s formation of the self as unique, the pursuit of a meaningful life consisting in the ability to express oneself in spite of societal pressures, and the belonging to a distinctive social identity. This sense of self associated with authenticity is, for Vannini and Burgess (2009), motivational. In their research they found that “[b]y being one’s own woman or man against all pressures to conform, some professors reveal their willpower, their intentionality, their spur to self-fulfilling action.” (Vannini and Burgess 2009, 109). Authenticity is not, however, to be equated with self-autonomy; it is motivational, but it rests on a personal identity that is unique and not simply performing a social and cultural identity. Thus, as Franzese puts it, authenticity is “an individual’s subjective sense that their behavior, appearance, self reflects their sense of core being” which is “composed of their values, beliefs, feelings, identities, self-meanings, etc.” (Franzese 2009, 87). The appeals to authenticity within contemporary Christianity reflect a transformation in religious consciousness vis-à-vis contemporary pluralistic society. Bielo (2011a, 2011b, 2012) has shed a light on American “emerging evangelicals” who seek to fashion an identity that is in opposition to the mainstream. Bielo’s evangelicals react against the dominant American evangelical culture, its commodification of faith, as represented by megachurches, and its political alignment with the Republican Party. Bielo’s evangelicals are dissatisfied with the American religious landscape and society; they want “something more real, more genuine, more meaningful, more relevant, more honest, more biblical—something more” (Bielo 2011a, 31). Spe-

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cifically, he identified the processes of “deconversion” and “deterritorialization.” Following Barbour (Barbour 1994), Bielo uses the term deconversion to stress emerging evangelicals’ attempt at distancing themselves from the evangelical subculture. Barbour writes that deconversion epitomizes the modern search for authenticity in its “flight from authority, from inherited paradigms of thought, and from various forms of pressure to conform” (Barbour 1994, 210). For Bielo, emerging evangelicals’ deconversion is a cultural critique of evangelicalism. They define themselves on the basis of what they are not. The second element of emerging evangelicals’ identity is that of deterritorialization, a term borrowed by Appadurai (1996). Emerging evangelicals lament the loss of sense of place, exemplified by suburbia and outof-town megachurches, and seek to foster a sense of place through churchplanting and establishing grassroots churches in the communities they seek to transform. Christians in this study, as the next section shows, echoed a dissatisfaction with mainstream churches and with capitalist consumer society. Like Bielo’s emerging evangelicals, Bethlehem’s evangelicals want something “more real,” but the surrounding culture is a predominantly a secular one (Pew Research Center 2018), in which Christianity is declining rapidly and has never had a link to political power. While the proportion of disaffiliation in America is growing (Pew Research Center 2015, 4), the religious discourse and religious ties to political power still dominate American culture (Corrigan and Hudson 2018; Forbes and Mahan 2017; Smidt et al. 2009). Indeed, it has been argued that a dislike for the Christian Right is influencing the rise in “nones” in the United States (Djupe et al. 2018; Hout and Fisher 2002, 2014). In contrast, Christians in Britain often feel they live in a postChristian society so much that even the former archbishop of the Church of England, Rowan Williams, labeled Britain post-Christian (Sparrow 2014). As a result, Christians often feel social marginality in being Christian, this is especially so for young people (Guest et al. 2013, 10). Evangelicals at Bethlehem construct their identity in opposition to capitalist consumer society and to what they call the traditional church, which generally refers to the Church of England. Unlike conservative evangelicalism in the United States, the traditional church Bethlehemites reject is a quaint relic from the past. Bethlehemites construct their authenticity by distancing themselves from an irrelevant and “boring” church, and a church culture that does not stimulate a deep awareness of being a Christian. Therefore, Bethlehemites reject what they see as the conformity of mainstream church culture, the following of rituals and statements of belief that are not deeply felt. In that they embody the sincerity hallmark of Protestantism (Keane 2002; Robbins 2001), but also they spurn the repetition of established tropes. They do not appeal to a homogeneous “pure” community with clearly

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defined boundaries, as it is often the case when authenticity is used to validate an ethnic or national identity (Lindholm 2008). Their authenticity is therefore always a becoming: the constant search for awareness of what it means to be a Christian through engagement with tradition. It is thus that they articulate Christian identity as distinctive for being the expression of a specific tradition. AUTHENTICITY AND TRADITION I conceive authenticity as the movement of self-transcendence of the person, the becoming aware of facticity, understood as social reality. I am not concerned, here, on whether this movement of self-transcendence always rests on an “ought,” or whether one could theorize an “ethically neutral” authenticity, as I speculated in my thesis (Montemaggi 2013a). This book is concerned with the construction of authenticity of contemporary Christians, which for my informants is primarily an ethical endeavor. Christian authenticity is about being true to Christian values and thus rests on Christian tradition. Therefore authenticity is not solely ethical, as it is the case in the philosophical concepts of authenticity analyzed in the previous chapter; rather it also identifies a particular religious identity. It thus rests on tradition. Tradition is not a “grand narrative” identifying a timeless order, but a cultural framework of reference. Authenticity has been considered the child of modernity, born out of the opposition to tradition, understood as the premodern order. This is partly to do with the postmodern criticism of modernity. At times, normative interpretations of modernity as detraditionalization sound as some sort of “fall” from the garden of Eden of Gemeinschaft. Apart from being unnecessarily gloomy, they end up disregarding the importance of tradition. The interpretation of tradition is fundamental to the acceptance of any change. Innovations become part of the “canon” through references to tradition, be it symbols, ideas, or rituals. This is why I want to rescue tradition from the dustbin of postmodern critiques of grand narratives and interpret it as a cultural framework. Tradition is a body of knowledge, practices, and narratives, with which the person engages to craft her own religious identity. It connects the individual to a community and the present to the past. It includes symbols, rituals, beliefs, moral principles, and theologies, as interpreted by the actors. It is not a static paradigm to which individuals and groups subscribe; rather individuals and groups engage actively with it through interpretation. The narratives and practices making up tradition are always changing, for tradition is always being reinterpreted. There is no essential and static core to tradition. What is

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traditional is the outcome of an interpretation. As Handler and Linnekin point out, [T]raditional is not an objective property of phenomena but an assigned meaning . . . tradition is not a bounded entity made up of bounded constituent parts, but a process of interpretation, attributing meaning in the present though making reference to the past. (Handler and Linnekin 1984, 286–87)

Tradition, for the purposes of this book, is limited to the actors’ interpretation of Christian history, beliefs, symbols, and practices, and thus does not include historical or scholarly understandings of it. It is recognized that authoritative theologies and texts as well as leaders have influence on lay actors (Montemaggi 2015); however, the focus is exclusively on the informants’ interpretation and practice of Christianity. Therefore, there is no assumption that the informants’ understanding of tradition is necessarily historically accurate or theologically informed. They might be incomplete, inaccurate, and selective, but informants cannot be “wrong.” The focus is on their interpretation and practice of Christianity and how this shapes their identity. The selfunderstanding of the individual as a Christian is dependent on the person interpreting tradition for their everyday life. Equally, the person’s everyday life guides her interpretation of tradition. In practicing and interpreting tradition, tradition is constructed by informants to be meaningful to their lives today. Tradition provides the language, the ideas, and practices with which religious actors can conceive authenticity. Moral ideas and practices are part of religious authenticity, yet authenticity is not limited to the pursuit of an ethical lifestyle. It includes a search for “truth,” for understanding, for awareness, which is, in Simmelian terms, self-transcendence. It requires the consciousness of being a Christian. It is a prise de conscience of being human, understood as going beyond social conditioning (facticity) and acting in accordance with God’s will. Authenticity is an attempt at overcoming facticity in a search for truth that is never reached. This entails becoming aware of facticity and is expressed in the person’s intentional pursuit of moral development and of a relationship with God. It is not a static essence to which one aspires, but a constant search and effort, which forms the moral self. Authenticity requires interpretation and practice within the framework of tradition. Consequently, religious actors need to “work out” what they consider the essential elements of their tradition, in this case, what it means to be a Christian. Authenticity is a mind-set but one that rests on self-transcendence. It is a search to have a perspective that challenges social conditioning and that spurs one to live up to one’s values. Authenticity is at once interpretation and conscious practice. Christians interpret their social context and their religious

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tradition and such interpretation guides practice. Being a Christian is thus a practice, rather than a belief system. It involves acquiring a Christian perspective by interpreting Christian tradition and committing to follow Jesus in one’s daily life. Christians seeking authenticity are engaged in the process of interpreting and constructing religious tradition. Authenticity is articulated in dialogue with tradition. In the case of Bethlehem, Christian tradition is interpreted through dialectical narratives that construct Christianity as “countercultural” for espousing an ethical ideal that is anti-materialistic and antiindividualistic. AUTHENTICITY AT BETHLEHEM CHURCH Christian evangelicals at Bethlehem church, like mainstream evangelicals in the UK and North America, identify Christianity as being “countercultural.” The term “countercultural” has only a tenuous link to the 1960s counterculture. It is not part of a critique of power, authority, and of hegemonic cultural frameworks. It is employed to emphasize the distinctiveness of Christianity vis-à-vis mainstream materialistic culture. Evangelical narratives rest on an opposition between the ideal of the Christian life, as caring and compassionate, and wider society, as individualistic, materialistic, and competitive. Evangelicals seek to be “in the world but not of it”; they seek to live according to the ideal of being like Christ, rather than according to the customs of their society. In their critique of society, Bethlehemites include the “traditional church,” because it is deemed exclusive and “worldly.” These narratives echo much of Protestant thinking as an opposition to established rituals and organizations. The imperative of Kierkegaard to become a Christian rather than a be a Christian would resonate with Bethlehemites. Many Bethlehemites consider cultural Christians, those born and brought up in a Christian culture, not real Christians. One needs to take upon oneself to become a Christian, which involves transformation and commitment in one’s daily life. The becoming aware of facticity for Bethlehemites means a transformed way of thinking, as demonstrated by a change in one’s priorities, as Dorothea says, and leading to a life of “service.” Therefore, authenticity is not simply living in accordance with religious and ethical rules, but a constant effort at discerning God and loving others. Authenticity is a constant striving. It is a search, which precludes simple answers and, as we will see, defined boundaries. In contrast with subculturalists, Bethlehemites are less concerned with affirming group boundaries and identifying specific behaviors and symbols as identity markers. Authenticity is thus more about constructing an ethical ideal than identifying boundaries. Indeed, the ethic of authenticity of Bethlehemites consists in an attitude of compassion (Montemaggi 2017c, 2018c),

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which, in some cases, challenges group boundaries, as examined in the next chapter. The narrative of authenticity of Bethlehemites provides a religious ethical framework within which believers articulate their religious and ethical practices. Authenticity is thus not an essence to be pursued, but a process of becoming conscious of one’s being in the world and practicing Christian ethics. Authenticity is not just a search for replicating what is seen as the model of early Christianity, nor is it an attempt to modernize tradition; rather, the search for authenticity requires the person to reflect and interpret their tradition, and to commit sincerely to a Christian way of life. This often rests on constructing Christianity in contrast with wider society’s values, thus marking the distinctiveness of Christianity. In the next section I analyze the narrative of obedience as a way in which informants construct authenticity in opposition to outside society. This is followed by a section exploring how obedience and the relationship with Christian tradition forms and validates the self. Authenticity entails relinquishing control over one’s life; yet this has the paradoxical effect of intensifying one’s individuality. Through self-surrender, Lucy embraces the Christian framework, gains a new consciousness and is free. In the final section, Arthur’s experience of Africa suggest that authenticity requires a “death and rebirth” to truly appreciate one’s relationship with God. It is a metaphysical death that gives one consciousness of transcendence. THE MIND-SET OF AUTHENTICITY: OBEDIENCE Christian evangelicals at Bethlehem construct Christianity in opposition to the culture of consumerism and individual financial success. This critical stance toward individualism and the importance of money in our society is what makes Christianity distinctive or, as often put by informants, “countercultural.” Obedience to God emerges as a fundamental Christian trait that stands in stark contrast, not only with the money-driven society, but also with the value of individual self-authority that is at the core of Western society. The extract below is based on the field notes taken during a home group discussion and it is therefore not verbatim. The topic of the discussion was “stewardship,” understood as the ways in which members could commit to the activities of the church. Arthur: We tend to think that we own what we have . . . the culture around us tells us so. Materialism is a fundamental part of our society, we are part of society so it affects us. . . . The challenge of the Bible is how we deal with our possessions and money. . . . We are stewards; we are not owners of anything. The culture we live in is one that says to us “that is mine.”

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Nicholas: It’s countercultural Arthur: The Bible says that God gives it all. I want you to manage your money wisely to serve others and for kingdom’s purposes. God says, “I’m keeping tabs; I’m watching what you do.” The effect of culture on us is huge. How we guard money is a reflection of the way we are. God is looking to challenge our perspective. Nicholas: God wants to lead us, learn the right way. Arthur: How much of God’s money am I keeping for myself? It’s upside down. . . . We are either countercultural or not at all. You’re either in it or you’re out of it. If we do things begrudgingly . . . it’s not the attitude God wants. It challenges to our core. The extract above suggests that the mind-set Christians should aim to have is one of humility based on the belief that one’s possessions, abilities and fortune are granted by God and, therefore, need to be used to serve God. This is contrasted with capitalist culture, where people feel that what they have is the fruit of their labor, that they own it, and have control over it. The contrast with Western capitalist values is underscored by the reference to the theological concept of Kingdom, as the realization of human nature and society according to God’s design. The reference to the Kingdom shows that ethical living is understood within the framework of Christian tradition and, in particular, of evangelical tradition. Most participants would relate to the term Kingdom and use it regularly, although the interpretation of its meaning might vary depending on the context in which it is used. In this example, the Kingdom is in opposition to capitalist society, where one’s worth depends on one’s property and capital, which is thought to be the result of one’s work and therefore can be used according to one’s wishes. It is also in opposition to consumer society that promotes self-gratification and consumption, rather than an ethical lifestyle. This is contrasted with the Christian framework according to which one’s wealth needs to be employed according to God’s will. Christians are “countercultural” for they recognize God’s sovereignty over them. From this follows the need to be obedient and be guided by God, rather than by one’s self-interest or, even, one’s conscience. In the extract below, also from a home study group, obedience is identified with Christian distinctiveness. Christians are called to be different and walk in the path of God. Authenticity is, here, difference from the wider world and moral striving. Selina: Why is an attitude of obedience crucial to fulfill this role (of leader)? . . . He’s asking us to be different.

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Arthur: If we choose to be obedient, is like walking in the right direction, if we choose not to be obedient, we fall a little bit and go backward. Selina: People have this expectation of you (as Christians). People, family, they say to you, “you’re a Christian, you can’t say that.” It’s constantly thrown at you. . . . I’m a work in progress! Obedience is constructed as a distinctive trait of Christian tradition, which is contrasted with Western culture of self-authority and self-expression. Obedience is not supine adherence to set rules, which are not present at Bethlehem; rather it is instrumental to the formation of the virtuous self, for it is based on engagement with tradition and self-reflection. The authentic Christian chooses God. Evangelicals do not simply belong to a church; rather they need to make a commitment to God. By choosing God, Christians establish a personal relationship with God, which, in turn, calls on them to “answer” to God. Bethlehemites respond by seeking to “be like Jesus,” to live differently, the way Jesus would live. This relationship and this response create a religious perspective from which Christians view the world. The initial choice thus becomes a commitment to “live differently” and be in accordance with “God’s will” by following what they see as the “upside down” logic of faith. Obedience originates in an autonomous choice, which creates a bond with God and establishes God’s overarching authority. Obedience is thus characterized by an intentional state of mind (similar to Kierkegaard’s purity of heart) of following God, who is accessible only through tradition. It is useful, at this point, to draw a parallel with the “obedient will” of medieval monastic discipline (Asad 1993; Foucault [1975] 1995, 1988). The disciplinary practices of medieval monks were part of the formation of moral dispositions, with the disposition of obedience being the most important one. The object was “the development of the Christian virtue of willing obedience, a process that . . . re-organised the basis on which choices were to be made” (Asad 1993, 167). Similarly, Christians at Bethlehem pursue a moral path by willing to be obedient. Authenticity involves intentionality; yet it is not exhausted by the individual’s will. Unlike existentialist accounts of authenticity, Christian authenticity requires the reining in of self-determination by recognizing that one’s conscience is not the ultimate authority. The person needs to be accountable to God. This aspect, which contrasts with the ubiquity of individual autonomy in Western culture is felt by informants as a distinctive aspect of Christianity. Obedience, however, is not an end in itself; rather it is instrumental in sustaining Christians in their pursuit of an ethical life. It enables one to break away from a self-centered mind-set and to perceive one’s everyday life from a Christian ethical perspective. As remarked by Nicholas, one needs to follow “the right way” and make use of what one is granted in this life accord-

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ing to the ethical ideals of the “Kingdom of God,” rather than what is valued by culture. If “outside culture” is dominated by self-interest and one’s conscience is not sufficient to guide the person’s moral development, how do Christians know the will of God? Christians at Bethlehem seek answers by reflecting on their daily lives and relating them to tradition, and by seeking understanding through practice. However, without clear-cut rules and moral prohibitions, the attempt to understand God’s priorities fills my informants with an immense sense of inadequacy and doubt. During the “women’s prayer group,” Selina commented that prayer is about “handing it over to God rather than clinging onto the problem.” Prayer is asking God to manifest God’s will. This requires trust in God and, therefore, acceptance of God’s will, even when it seems to be against one’s own perceived interests or what is considered “rational” in the general culture one inhabits. As she put it, When we ask for revelation from God, we need to be prepared to deal with what comes from it.

This was echoed by the words of Will during a home study group: Make yourself open to the answer you don’t want.

Informants often remarked how difficult it is to understand what God “says” and that they “get it wrong.” The religious frame of mind calls on the person to maintain the “awareness” of God in seeking to understand the will of God. In the battle against pursuing their own self-interest, being aware of their emotional needs, and basing their decisions solely on intellectual reflection, Christians seek guidance from an engagement with tradition by reading the Bible, discussing texts and practices in groups, and reflecting on their involvement in church activities. Thus, Christian authenticity is constructed as a moral pursuit, which is sustained by a dialogue with tradition. This formation of a virtuous self, according to Christian tradition, is dependent on a change in perspective. Once again, it is obedience that sustains the formation and development of the self, as we can see in the following section. THE FREEDOM OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE Obedience can take the form of relinquishing control, the Simmelian selfsurrender, as explored in the conversion narratives of chapter 4 . Self-surrender is not limited to the experience of the numinous, rather it is the first step in the continuous search for authenticity. Here, I wish to explore how the experience of self-surrender leads to a change in perspective, a transformation of the self through an awareness of a wider reality. By being obedient,

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the person inscribes herself within an understanding of existence that goes beyond materiality. In the first extract below, Dorothea recounts how she became a Christian, how her priorities changed as a result, and how this caused conflict with her family. The quote is long, so I have emphasized significant passages. My parents sort of thought that to be a Christian you just have to be brought up in a Christian country, cos in a lot of faiths that seems to, sometimes it’s the case. It seems to be that it’s not a conscious decision, but it’s like you’re brought up with it. My parents always thought they were Christians just because they thought themselves to be good people and didn’t understand the difference between actually being a good person and being a Christian. You could be a Christian and not necessarily be the best person in the world, that you’ve chosen to try to follow Jesus. I became a Christian when I was 13 or 14, but it wasn’t by my parents. In fact, it caused quite a bit of friction in the family and when they realized that it’s not, it’s sort of, it’s different to just being a good person, that it impacts your life and some of the things that happened after becoming a Christian are just the way I prioritize things differently did cause quite a lot of friction in my family. . . . When I was about 14 I really felt that God wanted me to go into Christian ministry, at a later date when I grew up, and my parents thought that that was an absolutely crazy idea and they became very antagonistic towards the church and sent me to a very traditional church that they wouldn’t sort of it would calm me down a bit. I wasn’t, I was never not calm, but they just didn’t like the way that suddenly God became my priority and they always thought me, their ethic is to look out for number one and suddenly seen that changed, they thought, they’d feel the worst for me. They thought that I would be throwing my life away by following something like that. Also when I was 16 I really thought that God wanted me to go to Africa to work . . . They couldn’t quite understand how my priorities were suddenly changed, why I want to do something like work every hour I could during my A-levels to get enough money to go and live somewhere pretty horrible and it was difficult.

Dorothea draws the opposition between being a Christian and the ethic of wider society, which is here represented by her parents. Her parents are “culturally Christian,” they are not “real Christians.” In Dorothea’s narrative, the way Christianity is understood in outside society is that being a Christian means being a good person and going to church. The opposition with her parents is quite stark. Dorothea emphasizes that the “conscious decision” of becoming a Christian means living Christianity in one’s daily life. Her priorities have changed because they are no longer the result of social conditioning; rather they obey a different logic. The pursuit of authenticity leads to a change in terms of one’s priorities. Following the Christian path means one’s career, one’s health and well-being, one’s self-fulfilment are not the priorities—rather being compassionate is. This does not stop Christians at Bethle-

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hem wanting a career, health, and self-fulfilment, but it inscribes them within a wider moral picture. My informants perceive the tension between being a Christian and being in the world. Indeed, their construction of Christianity rests on this tension. It is not a fuga mundi, but an effort at inhabiting the world with a consciousness of not belonging to it. That is why, at times, they see their lack of success and difficulties in life as part of God’s design. Bethlehemites are not fatalists and, as mentioned, they are middle class. They have social aspirations, although exploring this topic is beyond the remit of this book. In Dorothea’s explanation below, being a Christian is acting out of love for God. It is ethical action, but the “source” of ethics is the love for God and imitatio Dei, a constant attempt at being like God. This translates into seeing others as God sees them and loving them. Becoming a Christian means gaining a new consciousness of oneself, but also of others. I think to be a Christian is to learn to be, to try your best to learn to be like Jesus in the world, to be his hands and feet as much as you can, but that doesn’t mean that you’re going to be perfect, it doesn’t mean that you’re not gonna make mistakes, but it means accepting, acknowledging that you make mistakes . . . what it means to be a Christian is almost want to be like Jesus out of love for what he’s done for us . . . it comes a stage when you just want to do it, the more you learn about what God has done for me, I think that I, I just want to do what I can for him. . . . I think the motives for doing good things change, because you don’t suddenly pretend to love people and pretend to do good because that makes you feel better in some sort of way. For some reason it becomes about actually loving people and try to see people the way God sees them . . . it becomes stepping out of your comfort zone.

Dorothea’s reflections on being a Christian paint a marked opposition between Christianity and society. That is why “it becomes stepping out of your comfort zone.” Christianity is distinctive. It has different priorities, which are ethical; yet Christianity is not just an ethical system. It rests on gaining a new consciousness, which transforms the person (makes one see the way God sees), and affects one’s priorities. The second extract below, from an interview with Lucy, points to an affirmation of her individuality by becoming a Christian. The ethic of Christianity allows Lucy to be herself; yet Lucy’s self-surrender to God also enables her to go beyond the constraints of the self, the need to be in control, and to gain a broader perspective. That makes Lucy free. The extract below shows Lucy’s experience of Christianity, as a way to be true to her individual self, rather than a mystical experience. Lucy worked as a nurse for many years and has always had a desire to help others. Christianity provided her with validation. I think that my personality is a huge thing because, like I said, even as a child I liked to do things for other people. I’ve always had: “she’s very caring, she

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Chapter 6 wants to help people.” And I did and maybe that was part of the change in me when I became a Christian that it was all kind of validated. It actually, you can live your life . . . with that personality, with that desire to help others without being weird. You know, it kind of gave it an expression, I suppose, in a way and . . . maybe that’s why it happened so quickly. I mean I thought about it so much that maybe because that was me and my personality and then it fitted, it all came together, it felt right, it felt . . . I’ve always wanted to kind of be able to help others and now I understand maybe why; maybe that was always in me for a reason. . . . the way life and the world is constructed is not easy to really express that without people thinking: “mhm, strange” or that . . . you’re kind of doing for ulterior motives. And I think for me it was kind of “yeah, this is fine, this is what the Christian life is all about” . . . you’re not just out for yourself, but you’re almost going to the other side and give yourself . . . in small ways for someone else, without expecting anything back.

Lucy contrasts the caring ethic of Christianity with the competitive environment outside, where caring acts can be mistaken for the pursuit of selfinterest. Authentic Christian life frees the person to go beyond the logic of competition and wealth accumulation. Christianity allows the expression of love and compassion, which, for Lucy, is the living out not only of faith, but of her own “personality.” By being a Christian, Lucy can thus be “true to herself.” In the next extract, Lucy touches on the “radical freedom,” to borrow a term from Sartre, derived from self-surrender. I’ve always wanted children. I loved being with my children, but there was always a part of me thinking: “is this it? Is it gonna be like this for 10 years?” It’s just give, give, give. And no matter how wonderful your children are, it’s giving and giving and giving. It’s never enough and that was perhaps the root to a lot of my frustration. And that was the biggest change in me. I thought: “even being a mother to these children is an act of service. It’s something I should do gladly . . . they are not actually my children. These are individual people that happened to have been born to me and my husband, but they are not my possessions, they are not my burden.” My whole perception changed, even on what being a mother was. I was just the one who had been tasked, or trusted, to help them grow up.

Lucy’s “recognition” that her children are not her “possessions” and that she is “tasked” to bring them up inserts her and her task of child-rearing within the religious perspective. Lucy realizes that she is not a “bad mother,” she is “ok,” for she goes beyond understanding her life as confined to the “here and now,” confined to its situatedness. Her role of mother is part of God’s design. Her life is transformed by going beyond the finite perspective of this world or, in Simmelian terms, “this side.” Self-transcendence, however, is not otherworldly; rather it “elevates” concrete reality, in this case child-rearing. The movement of self-transcendence, which inserts Lucy in a dimension that is beyond concrete reality, not only frees Lucy from feeling inadequate and

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burdened by her daily tasks, but also gives value to those tasks. Lucy’s changed perspective, however, is not simply a form of personal development or self-fulfilment. She gives up control and recognizes that she does not “own” her life and that her children are not her possessions. Lucy’s selftranscendence happens through self-surrender. These narratives tap into the sense of awe for “something bigger,” the recognition of human finitude, of being “this side” while reaching out for something beyond it. As Arthur states in the extract below, there is something “eternal,” bigger than he is and bigger than his daily concerns. Selftranscendence is akin to “death and rebirth.” This reflection widens Arthur’s horizon and inserts him and his life within the religious framework of “God’s design.” Arthur’s surrender of the self has the effect of intensifying his individuality. Authenticity is freedom. This sense of freedom is not so unlike Heidegger’s ownership of the self and Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s freedom achieved by transcending facticity. Here too, informants relinquish their social persona and transcend it. The freedom derived from Christian authenticity lies in being subject to God rather than society, being part of God’s design and flourish in accordance with it. Freedom thus lies in expressing one’s ethical potential. This is very similar to Simmel’s individual law. Arthur’s quote below is long, therefore I have emphasized what I considered the most significant sentences. I also think God takes a lot of delight in seeing the potential in us, in everyone of us, I believe, occasionally being released. That, to me, is incredibly authentic and incredibly privileged position. I think all that I’ve got is God given. . . . But there’s nothing more fulfilling in my view than seeing people . . . you love and care for or grow in a relationship with, you see them flowering in their potential . . . God sees us all like that, like little children, you know, when we start to release, sorry, to fulfil the potential that he’s put within us . . . he enjoys seeing us becoming more and more the type of person that he intends us to be. . . . It’s not like some self-help philosophy or whatever. To me, it’s more genuine than that, it’s more linked to something which is supernatural, eternal, and, yet, it’s real now, in the here and now. I’ll never forget the sermon by this old minister. He said unless you wanna enter the kingdom of heaven you need to be like the seed and the seed needs to die to re-grow. And there’s a wonderful picture there of death and then out of that death comes new life. I thought this, this is just me. I don’t think I’m bad, but if I want to really know God, to have this relationship with him, rather than just knowledge, I need to die to myself and I’ll be reborn. And I think God’s spirit then touched me for the first time. And it’s been a process ever since. Some days I really struggle, sometimes it’s not so much of a struggle. I think I grow more and more aware all the time.”

The self-surrender is expressed by Arthur as a metaphorical death and rebirth. The attitude of obedience leads to a relinquishing of self-autonomy and

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self-control. No longer burdened by the sovereignty of social conditioning, but rather submitting to God, the person is “free” to realize her potentiality. This might be likened to mystical experiences, such as those of Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart, where the self is “annulled” in God (Flood 2004, 196–200). However, here there is no mystical sublimation of the self. The self does not cease to exist in God, nor is there an abdication of one’s will; rather the individual gains “self-control” by relinquishing the sense of control over their life. This form of authenticity resembles the existentialist ownership of oneself, which comes from transcending facticity. It is the reflection on death that stirs one to live “properly.” It is not, however, strictly speaking, a reflection on physical mortality, but on “immanent transcendence.” The transcendent Christian God is immanent and requires taking stock. By becoming aware of God, Christians die and are reborn with a self-transcendent consciousness. Unlike in existentialist philosophy, my informants’ authenticity is anchored in the framework of Christian tradition. Accordingly, the individuality of Christian authenticity is dependent on the person acting in accordance with God’s will. In the eyes of my informants, this recognition of God’s sovereignty and its eternal dimension make Christian authenticity distinctive. Christian authenticity, unlike “self-help philosophies,” as Arthur remarked, is distinctive because it does not exalt self-autonomy, but rests on the formation of an obedient will. Arthur characterizes the search for authenticity as “present continuous” emphasizing its ongoing effort. The person needs to go beyond the self continuously. Within Bethlehem’s theological framework, authenticity reflects the theological notion of sanctification. Accordingly, the believer goes through a process of transformation when they come to have a relationship with Jesus. Sanctification is a process whereby the Holy Spirit grants believers the “fruits of the spirit,” as Nicholas explained in his interview, such as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, humility, and self-control. These characteristics “grow” in the person who “submits” to God. Faced with inherent human brokenness, the Christian believer submits to Jesus to receive forgiveness and salvation. The self-surrender of the believer is fundamental to self-transformation. This theological narrative of the “fruits of the spirit,” which identifies the religious ethical values of love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, humility, and self-control, suggests that authenticity is not limited to the mystical experience of self-surrender. It is not an annulment of the self; rather it entails a change in consciousness. Christians, through obedience, overcome social conditioning; they surrender the self and grasp “the other side.” Through obedience, they experience “true” freedom, which consists in the ethical flourishing of the person, in accordance with religious tradition.

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Authenticity is never attained fully. It is a continuous striving. Selina, in the first extract at the beginning of the chapter, conveyed this humorously saying “I’m a work in progress!” It is a continuous effort because people are seen as morally flawed, because any moral development is gradual and never complete, and because it also requires an active engagement with tradition to reflect on what constitutes God’s will in one’s daily life. Authenticity is thus about the transcendence of facticity in terms of one’s consciousness and the pursuit of a moral ideal. The most striking example of this comes from informants’ experience of volunteering in Africa, as analyzed in the next section. AFRICA AND AUTHENTICITY Africa has a special place in the hearts of my informants. Several of them have spent prolonged periods of time (from one month to a year) in missions in Africa engaging in very practical and, often, heavy labor to aid African villages. Although it is acknowledged that there is need for charity in many other places, including the UK, Africa is invested with religious significance. The extracts below offer a glimpse of various aspects of authenticity. They all come from Arthur’s interview, where he recounts the first time he went to Africa with the organization Samaritans’ First. He was met by a young woman working for the organization, who explained the challenge they faced and stressed the frustration that might arise from a “Western” attitude of “fixing things” when faced with the inability to solve problems. She said: “probably, most of what you’re used to doing it in terms of your society is fixing things.” . . . That’s what you’re paid to do, that’s what I’m paid to do in work. . . . She said: “You’re gonna see things you’ve never seen ever before. Some of those things are quite disturbing, actually they are all pretty disturbing in the great scheme of things.” She said: “I suspect most of you are going to revert back to yourself, your normal type, you’re gonna fix this.” She said: “you will not be able to fix this, what you see, cos the scale of the challenge is so vast that it might just knock you completely. It can shake your faith, it could, could psychologically really cause a bit of discomfort.” Then she opened the Bible and she told the story about Jesus and the 5000 people, they didn’t have any food. . . . You’ve got five loaves of bread, two fishes, loads of people. The automatic reaction is “ok, we can’t do any of that.” It’s a waste of time, but they brought them to Jesus and, how it happened I don’t know I don’t even really wanna go down the road of trying to explain it, but the principle here is he took something that seemed a total waste of time and multiplied it to such an extent that there were baskets and baskets, leftovers. And the principle was sometimes all we can do is bring to, bring to God our limited offering that’s pathetic and stupid, seemingly hopeless as that might be and he has, because he’s so different, he’s God, on a different plane to our thinking, to our mentality, he was able to do all sorts of things. That was

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Chapter 6 unbelievable for me. That was major shaping of my mind-set really, my heart, attitude and also my understanding of the greatness of God. Also probably my own, man generally, willingness to trust him, because we could do an awful lot more by trusting and by giving what we do have. . . . But my contribution, what God’s called me to do, I think he’s called me to make a contribution in whatever way that is, bring my little bag of seemingly inconsequential offerings that I lay before the king of kings and the lord of all creation. And I don’t actually know what he’s gonna do with it.

In the quotation above, Africa represents a “wholly other” dimension which elicits a different perspective. The Western mentality of being in control, as exemplified by the idea of “fixing it,” is painted as futile before utter deprivation. To be able to work face to face with extreme poverty, one is required to relinquish control and accept that one’s action is but a drop in the ocean. The motif of self-surrender and the dialectics between the life of faith and Western society are reiterated. Arthur presents this as a turning point in his knowledge of God. He felt in awe of God, as he came to terms with his own finitude. It is a moment of personal spiritual growth, when Arthur understands that all he can do is to bring his “inconsequential offerings” without knowing what will come of them. Thus, faith is, here, trust in God; rather than belief that God exists or that God intervenes to help the needy. It is accessed through self-surrender and leads to a new perspective, the transcendence of self authority and of social conditioning (the Western mentality of “fixing it”). The transcendence of the self is within the religious framework. As Arthur puts it, authenticity happens when “men and women being made in God’s image . . . reflect something of God’s characteristics.” To be molded and shaped for good, I know these things Francesca are very subjective, but I think the changes in my character from what would be, if I wasn’t a Christian, to what is work in progress, now are just massive. I’m so glad that even if it must be frustrating to God at times cos I don’t, I’m not changing as quickly as . . . It’s not change, I’m not being refined as, maybe, as speedily as he would like. But I just know they’re good, they’re good and I feel fulfilled. . . . I just know there’s a load of impurity left within me that God is constantly blasting with a big . . . kind of hot flame in order to . . . He’s looking to create in all of us something that’s precious. It’s not free from pain, it’s not free from stress and whatever, but it’s precious nonetheless. I know someone would argue that’s a contradiction, but to me that’s part of life. This progress going through.

Authenticity is, here, presented as living out one’s relationship with God by fulfilling one’s spiritual and moral potential. The relationship with the divine sets in motion the process of moral development, which is a work in progress of being “refined” rather than changed. The use of the word “refine” refers to a verse in the Bible (Malachi 3, 2 1 ). From a theological point of view, the

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“refinement” is the effect of “sanctification” born out of the relationship with God. The context of Africa brings to light the inner process of authenticity, which is not merely acting in accordance to ethical principles but becoming aware of the spiritual dimension of one’s life. Africa is the “Other,” the opposite of comfortable life in the UK. It is bare and raw. Stripped of Western materialism, it is the place of faith, where “things” and “society” do not obstruct the relationship between believers and God. It provides a source of intense religious experience. Serving in Africa is not merely an act of charity, but a way to “find oneself.” Africa has a transformative power. However, the inner transformation of the believer is not for one’s personal sake, but to acknowledge the sovereignty of God and to be in a relationship with God. Africa offers the opportunity to “surrender” to God. The overwhelming poverty of African villagers, but also their faith have a shattering impact on the consciences of those who have been there. It is a powerful experience of humility that transforms the person. The human struggle for survival is a reminder of the insignificance of humanity. Human beings have no real control over their own destiny. Yet, once again, it is in acknowledging one’s powerlessness that one’s individual autonomy is intensified. It is intensified by one’s awareness of the truth of God. The symbolical value of Africa in the Christian imagination provides a cultural framework within which authenticity is articulated. Africa represents the experience of authenticity par excellence. Africa allows an intense form of self-transcendence, for it is physically and metaphorically the “other side.” In Christian imagination, Africa is truer because it lacks the artificiality of Western life. Once again, the anti-materialist motif resurfaces. Western materialism, selfish individualism, and comfort are lived as a challenge to being authentic. This is understood by participants as a weakness on their part. Africa strips away the mundane from their consciousness and allows them to transcend facticity. Self-transcendence is not an end in itself, however, but the step of faith that frees the person from social conditioning to pursue ethical living, in accordance with their religious tradition. Being a Christian calls for an awareness of the spiritual dimension of life. Christian authenticity is self-transcendent. It is gaining a new consciousness, but one that is grounded in tradition. The role of religious tradition is fundamental to the process. Tradition should not be understood as adherence to norms and practices; rather it results from an active interpretation and legitimization on the part of believers, as explored in the next chapter. Tradition is the framework through which actors can make sense of self-transcendence. It is what enables the religious person to have a relationship with the divine.

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CONCLUSION The chapter showed that the authenticity emerging from the narratives of informants shares important traits with the authenticity of proto-existentialist and existentialist philosophy. Christians construct authenticity in terms of self-transcendence of facticity, by being in opposition to social norms and pressures. Informants consider Christian authenticity as distinctive for being the expression of a specific tradition. Christian authenticity, in contrast with philosophical accounts of it that emphasize self-authority and is anchored in tradition, in the interpretation and practice of what are considered to be Christian traits. It is tradition what gives Christian authenticity its distinctiveness and shapes its communal identity. In the eyes of my informants, being authentic Christians is distinctive, because authenticity requires Christians to challenge the dominant culture by being obedient, rather than independent; by caring for others, rather than by making money; and by living their everyday lives within the framework of tradition, rather than by autonomous spiritual lifestyles. It is a path that is not always a source of joy, and that might entail sacrifice. The contrast with the outside is a source of identity, but also of inevitable tension between being and acting in accordance with God’s will and one’s human needs. Christian authenticity is a moral pursuit that requires obedience, the acceptance of God’s will. Obedience runs counter to Western society’s celebration of self-authority, and is thus considered distinctive. At the individual level, obedience is instrumental to the formation of the authentic self. The person reflects on their experience, on their Christian practices to discern the “right way” of being. This process enables the person to go beyond their personal desires and act in accordance with God’s will. Christian authenticity is not, however, supine adherence to set rules and morals or following leaders with no reservations. It is the recognition of the “sovereignty of God,” seen as something “bigger” than the person and “bigger” than society with its materialistic and competitive logic. It engenders the “authentic mind-set” that is necessary for the action to be an expression of the authentic self, rather than a general sense of duty. The construction of authenticity from the narratives of informants is that of a state of mind, which leads to acting intentionally as a Christian. The individual wills obedience. Being a Christian requires the person to commit and submit to God in order to release her human potential. Authenticity is not merely the pursuit of moral actions; rather actions are the result of a transformed consciousness. The authentic self is formed in the process of challenging one’s mind-set, one’s desires and needs. Authenticity requires selfdirection; yet self-direction comes from obedience. Authenticity therefore requires a continuous self-scrutiny and effort at interpreting God’s will and at

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directing one’s actions accordingly. Self-transcendence reasserts the self, which gains validation by being inscribed in the framework of tradition. NOTE 1. “But who may abide the day of his coming? And who shall stand when he appeareth? For he is like a refiner’s fire, and like fullers’ soap.”

Chapter Seven

Sacralization Marking the Boundaries of Authenticity

For I believe that ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created. —Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger ([1966] 1989, 4)

RESCUING TRADITION FROM MODERNITY Authenticity necessitates a cultural framework. It requires boundaries. These are always changing, but the work of “tidying experience,” as Douglas phrased it, of “separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions” (Douglas [1966] 1984, 4), establishes traditional narratives, practices, and symbols that provide a shared identity, but also legitimacy, as I argue in this chapter. Authenticity as self-transcendence implies a going beyond boundaries, yet it rests on an engagement with boundaries (both social and religious), a becoming aware of them and reinterpreting it. This is why my conception of authenticity in dialogue with tradition is closer to Beauvoir than to Sartre or Heidegger. Becoming aware of one’s embeddedness is central to authenticity. We can only become aware of our facticity through the philosophical and ethical means of our culture. The striving for going beyond social norms, roles, and relationships reflects our culture and draws on cultural values and ideas to articulate authenticity. MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism was mentioned because it applies to the way modernity has often been understood, as a break from tradition. The idea of “detraditionalization” 119

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(Giddens 1991), the diminishing authority of tradition in the reflexive modern era, can lend itself to the construction of tradition as a static order that is no longer significant in modern and late-modern societies and an interpretation of tradition in terms of conservative ethics and ideas. In contrast, I understand tradition as a cultural framework on which actors draw to make meaning, reflect on their everyday life, and legitimize values and practices. Contemporary religiosity is an expression of commitment (Montemaggi 2013), and not merely the result of an autonomous choice of the individual. Commitment is not an intellectual adherence to a set of principles, but an emotional attachment that is expressed through meaning-making, narratives, and practices relating actors to one another and to tradition. Religious actors identify with tradition but also interpret it and thus make it meaningful to their lives. Religious tradition is thus constantly being reinterpreted and constructed not only by religious authorities, but also by individuals and groups. In doing so, they grant legitimacy to religious tradition and establish its boundaries. This chapter outlines the concept of sacralization (Montemaggi 2015) to further the understanding of the construction and legitimization of religious tradition. Sacralization is the process whereby individual religious actors bestow spiritual value to ideas and practices and recognize them as legitimate part of tradition. The sacred derives from this process and is that which religious actors consider of value and distinctive of their religious tradition. The sacred, therefore, is always constructed in reference to a specific religious culture. Religious actors vary in what they consider sacred, but they employ shared narratives in sacralizing practices. The sacred is, therefore, not an essential property of a religious object, idea, or practice; rather it is derived from religious actors’ reference to tradition. Sacralization identifies the process of giving spiritual value to everyday practices, which then become part of tradition. The next section presents a review of current uses of the term sacralization that are relevant to the discussion. It then outlines the definition of sacralization as I employ it here to identify the construction and legitimization of tradition by individuals. This is followed by an analysis of the sacralized practice of “serving,” which is central to the interpretation of Christianity at Bethlehem, and the failed sacralization of eco-friendly practices, which shows how the lack of consensus on shared narratives resulted in sustainable lifestyle being considered ethical but not Christian. The section on “serving” reveals how Christians at Bethlehem distinguish between “secular caring” and Christian “serving” by inserting the latter within a spiritual dimension. The interviewees are clear that they do not consider “serving” to be more ethical than caring or Christians better than non-Christians; rather the difference between caring and serving is the spiritual mindset of the actor. There lies authenticity. Christians seeking authenticity

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transcend facticity to inscribe their own selves within a spiritual perspective, which calls for action that reflects it. The relationship with Jesus requires the becoming aware of the spiritual dimension and consequent action to “be like Jesus.” THE TERM “SACRALIZATION” Sacralization is a sufficiently vague term to be employed across disciplines and identify different phenomena. Broadly speaking, sacralization is the recognition of something as sacred. The way sacralization has been used in psychology of religion, in the study of popular culture “fans,” and in Emilio Gentile’s (1990, 2000) study of fascism and politics help us determine shared traits on which to build a framework for the understanding of the role of individual religious actors in valuing and legitimizing religious tradition. As mentioned, I use the term sacralization to identify the attribution of value that shapes a shared identity by codifying common values, customs, beliefs, myths and rituals. Codification is a feature of the notion of the sacralization of politics put forward by historian Emilio Gentile, who has examined politics as religion (2001, 2004), especially in reference to totalitarian political movements (Gentile 1990, 2000). Sacralization, for Gentile, refers to politics acquiring a “religious dimension” (2000, 22). Gentile’s understanding of religion is a system of beliefs and myths that define values and ethics. The sacralization of politics takes place “when politics is conceived, lived and represented through myths, rituals and symbols that demand faith in the sacralized secular entity, dedication among the community of believers” (2000, 21). In this framework, sacralization identifies the process whereby political beliefs and movements assume the characteristics of religion by making political ideas, symbols, and myths, such as the nation, sacred. The sacred is, for Gentile, that which is of ultimate value, what gives meaning and purpose to life. Accordingly, the sacralization of the nation, as in the case of Italian Fascism, is the recognition of the nation as being of ultimate value. This something akin to theologian Paul Tillich’s ([1951]1973) notion of the holy, which has influenced key texts in psychology of religion (Emmons and Crumpler 1999; Pargament 1997; Park 2005; Silberman 2005). Gentile understands the sacred in universalistic and essentialist terms, rather than seeing it as constructed. This leaves little room for an appreciation of changes of values depending on the social context. Further, his notion of sacralization rests on religion being understood as a coherent system of beliefs, myths, rituals, and symbols, which, as shown in chapter 1, fails to account for how all religious traditions are constructed, their internal diversity, and how they change over time. Gentile highlights how the Fascist

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movement was able to sacralize a particular view of the nation but leaves unexplored the role of ordinary Italians in accepting Fascist beliefs, myths, and rituals and the extent of the penetration of Fascist ideology. Sacralization, as I intend it, is about the construction of the sacred and how individuals engage with tradition in constructing the sacred in their everyday lives. In the sociological study of “fandom,” sacralization is belonging to a community on the basis of shared values. Jindra (1994, 2005) argues that Star Trek “fandom” can be considered a religious phenomenon due to the sacralization of shared elements of culture, the formation of distinctive communities, the development of a canon, and the presence of official authorities. For Jindra, sacralization entails [D]eep-seated American beliefs about the nature of humankind, the world and its future, and encourages the practices that parallel religious processes of codifying, forming a community and developing institutions to guide its practices. (Jindra 1994, 50)

It is perhaps more appropriate to talk of fiction-based religion as a vehicle to share religious and ethical values (Crome 2014) or a need for self-identity and community (McCloud 2003) rather than a contemporary form of religious sentiment (Cusak 2013; Davidsen 2013). What is of interest is the aspect of codification. Like Gentile, Jindra points to the presence of a “canon” identifying what is officially part of the “Star Trek universe.” Star Trek thus becomes a “body of knowledge that is continually being added to and revised” (Jindra 1994, 46). In other words, the Star Trek universe is a tradition made of shared narratives and symbols. Jindra’s sociological outlook makes him more attuned to how Star Trek fans receive, interpret, and contribute to the Star Trek universe. However, he does not consider how single practices or ideas become part of the canon and thus gain legitimacy, whether some fans have more influence than others, and what criteria are employed to accept or reject innovation. The sacred outside of traditional religion is to be found in Rothenbuhler’s (2005) interpretation of celebrity culture as part of modern society’s religion of the individual. Following Durkheim, Rothenbuhler argues that in this “new, modern religion, the individual is sacred” (Rothenbuhler 2005, 92). The celebrity phenomenon is thus a form of worship sustained by the media and consumer culture. Accordingly, “the media system of consumer culture and celebrity has grown as a church of the cult of the individual” (Rothenbuhler 2005, 92). The religion of celebrity culture lacks organizational structures and authorities, although Rothenbuhler stresses the preeminent role of the media in promoting the cult of the individual. The media are the agents sacralizing prominent individuals. The focus is here on the wider consumer culture, rather than on how individual fans relate to celebrities in their daily

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lives; however it presents an interesting example of canonization of personality. Hans Mol’s (1976) classical study of religious identity proposed an understanding of religion as the sacralization of individual and collective identity. Individuals and groups have a need for identity, understood as “a stable niche in a predictable environment” (Mol 1976, 55) to counter the process of differentiation of modernity. Mol’s sacralization rests on the projection of a feeling of awe onto one’s identity, which has the effect of consolidating it. Mol’s notion of sacralization emphasizes the attribution of sacred value to identity. His functionalist approach presumes religion to be beneficial to individuals, groups and society by providing cohesion. However, this view neglects the diversity of religious expressions, especially disruptive or violent religion (Smith 1996). It also rests on a universalistic and essentialist idea of the sacred, which inspires awe and is an essential core of human experience. I, however, retain the aspect of projection of the sacred as something that is part of my notion of sacralization. The above historical and sociological studies approach sacralization in terms of collective cultures. In contrast, the notion of sacralization in psychology of religion is concerned almost exclusively with the individual. Psychologists conceive of religion as an all-encompassing meaning system (Paloutzian 2005; Park 2005; Silberman 2005), which orients the religious person. Religion provides a framework according to which one organizes values. Emmons and Crumpler (1999) distinguish between “sacralization” as “a process of imbuing external objects with sacred qualities,” and “sanctification” as “an inner process of transformation” (Emmons and Crumpler 1999, 18). Sanctification corresponds to “a process by which personas are made pure or holy. Sanctification thus refers to moral purity or moral goodness (literally, ‘saint-like’)” (Emmons and Crumpler 1999, 18–19). This notion of sanctification, however, reflects the Protestant idea of sanctification by the Holy Spirit, according to which the Holy Spirit begins a process of perfecting the believer once the believer has accepted God in their life. There are fundamental problems with this conception. In the first instance, it applies the lens of a particular religious tradition while making a universal claim on individual experience. In the second instance, it conflates the sensation of being cleansed with moral purity disregarding the processes of construction of purity and any relationship between morality and group boundaries (Douglas [1966] 1989). Consequently, in the third instance, it assumes that there is such a state or quality of moral purity, disregarding the complexity and contested nature of ethics. Sacralization, for Pargament (1997), entails attributing sacred value to daily actions. Within this framework, religion “has to do with building, changing, and holding on to the things people care about in ways that are tied to the sacred” (1997, 32). In line with Gentile’s notion of sacralization,

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Pargament’s notion identifies the process of ascribing sacred value to everyday activities, such as teaching or giving food to the homeless. In turn, these become “ministering,” when performed as service to God, and are understood differently from the same activities performed as a secular task (Pargament 1997, 211). This notion of sacralization, understood as attribution of value to practices, objects, and ideas, is helpful in understanding the impact of values on decision making. For instance, bargaining based on economic incentives during conflict resolution negotiations, or affecting symbolical state policies, such as the Iranian nuclear program, has been shown to backfire when it disregards sacred meaning (Dehghani et al. 2009; Fiske and Tetlock 1997). This notion of sacralization does not explain the process of attribution of value and how actors do not necessarily attribute ultimate value to all or most of their actions and ideas. Actors often understand norms and practices as carrying different degrees of sacredness and consider some specific practices and norms of particular value to them, while recognizing that they might be of no consequence to others. For instance, as shown by the data examined in this chapter, some religious actors integrate environmental concerns in their religious living, while others do not. The overview of the above studies aimed to show that sacralization is not the mere presence of religion; rather the varied use of the term points to a specific dynamic of attributing value to things, be they ideas, symbols, narratives, or objects. The next section builds on Simmel’s notion of belief in to conceptualize sacralization in terms of value attribution and identification that draw on tradition and, in turn, legitimize tradition. SACRALIZATION OF TRADITION Sacralization is a process whereby religious actors attribute value to ideas and practices making them legitimate part of tradition (Montemaggi 2015). Accordingly, the “sacred” is constructed through the religious actors’ interpretation of tradition in the light of their everyday experience. The focus is thus on the role of individuals in constructing and legitimizing tradition rather than official hierarchical bodies, such as the Catholic Church establishing tradition through Church Concilia. The process of sacralization has the effect of constructing and altering the boundaries of tradition. It includes and excludes practices. The emerging boundaries point to what is acceptable and what is not, what pertains to a specific religion and what is extraneous to it. The sacred is thus what results from the attribution of value; the process of attribution of value is ongoing as tradition is always being interpreted. There is no static sacred as there is no static tradition but an ongoing process of making tradition. As explained in the previous chapter, tradition is

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a cultural framework of reference that is interpreted and thus constructed by actors. Some individuals and groups carry more influence and authority than others; yet all have a role in constituting what they understand to be their religion, but can do so successfully only through engagement with shared narratives and within the context of a community. Sacralization reveals what is seen as acceptable and what is not by a specific group, what is deemed to pertain to a specific religion and what is deemed extraneous to it. The sacred is thus what results from the attribution of value. This concept allows us to appreciate that religious tradition is not passed on from generation to generation with no alteration, nor is it simply the result of the interpretation and practices by religious authorities; rather individuals are active participants in its construction and legitimization. I ground sacralization in the Simmelian notion of belief in as the projection of human feelings onto a “higher principle.” In chapter 5, a Simmelian notion of belief was presented to account for the experiential aspect of faith. Here belief in gives legitimacy to one’s group and tradition. I link belief in with the projection of human sentiments onto others, one’s country, and “the gods,” put forward by Simmel in his work on the persistence of groups (Simmel 1898a, 1898b, 1898c). Accordingly, I argue that the feeling of pietas, dependency on a “higher principle,” is projected onto the divine, the group and the tradition through which one experiences the relationship with the divine aiding the person’s identification with the group. It is the consciousness of a relationship with something higher, such as the divine, which forms the group (Vandenberghe 2001, 42). Individualities are thus transcended in the spiritual bond human beings form in the social unity of the group. Out of individuals existing side by side, that is, apart from each other, a social unity is formed. The inevitable separation which space places between men is nevertheless overcome by the spiritual bond between them, so that there arises an appearance of unified interexistence. (Simmel 1898a, 667)

The group assumes significance superior to that of the individual. It becomes “immortal.” Simmel refers to groups that, while changing in membership and forms, maintain continuity in time. He surveys disparate forms of association such as medieval municipal corporations, kingship, and the Catholic clergy. The group goes beyond the life of the individual. Continuity is maintained because change happens slowly and gradually. The new generation does not simply substitute the old generation causing an abrupt shift, but it is inserted into the life of the existing generation so that “the group seems as much like a unified self as an organic body in spite of the change of its atoms” (Simmel 1898a, 669). This “unified self” is central to the Christian tenet of the church as body of Christ. Every Christian is, thus, an essential atom in the body of

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the church stretching infinitely beyond itself. The sense of continuity, we could say of tradition, gives identity and legitimacy to the group and its practices. The religion’s and the group’s structures impact on sacralization. The case studies in this book refer to groups that are independent of outside authorities and where individual and group interpretation is thus essential to the legitimization of practices. This “canonization” from below happens within a social context that is much more fluid than a hierarchical church, like the Church of England and even more so the Catholic Church which has a legal framework in Canon Law. Therefore, individual actors interpret and legitimize practices alongside or against the local leadership. Any change in practices requires to be inserted within tradition in order to be legitimized. For instance, long-standing practices, such as male-only elders, might come to be rejected as no longer valuable and/or relevant by individuals, but in order for the community to adopt any change, this needs to be legitimized within the framework of tradition. The process of sacralization is necessarily circular, for what constitutes tradition changes depending on what elements actors at any given point consider “essential” or significant of their religion and how these elements are articulated. Sacralization identifies how actors identify specific ideas and practices that are central to their religious life. Authenticity, as becoming aware of facticity and of being liminal beings, is pursued in dialogue with tradition. For instance, the ethical principles and conduct followed as a result of self-transcendence derive from the person’s engagement with tradition. Sacralization uncovers this engagement with tradition, how ideas and practices are understood and valued. For instance, the example of eco-friendly living in the next section shows how actors relate to established theology, how they diverge, and what practices they consider integral part of their religion. BETHLEHEM’S SERVING Christian authenticity is not exhausted by moral action, it is action in the service of God, which translates into love of others (agape). As explored in chapter five, being a Christian does not equate with being good, rather it is about being in caring relationships with others. The self-transcendence of Christian authenticity is not merely an intellectual becoming aware of social conditioning, nor is it merely emotional experience, but a new consciousness that leads one to loving others. It is a relational authenticity, closer to that of Beauvoir than that of Heidegger or Sartre. Being a Christian means striving to have an attitude of compassion toward others. This is grounded in a relational understanding of being human. Human beings, for Bethlehemites, are

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interdependent. Thus, church members seek to care for one another and for the people with whom they come into contact. Bethlehem’s relational ethics is very much unlike the “antihumanism” Elisha (2008b) found among evangelicals in a Tennessee megachurch, for whom their radical intersubjectivity leads them to interpret God’s authority as absolute, and to hold an authoritarian viewpoint. In contrast, Bethlehemites interpret Christianity by giving primacy to being “caring.” In the previous chapter, Lucy made several references to “caring” for others in explaining how she interpreted being a Christian. “Caring” takes many forms. During the fieldwork, I came across many instances in which members of the church organized rotas to provide food and other help needed by people who were in a situation of need. For instance, members of the home group I followed organized help for couples who had just had a baby. As I referred to in chapter 4, Celia told me of a time when she was ill and members of the home group brought food for her and her family for a week to the amazement of their neighbors. In chapter 4 I mentioned Lucy’s experience of being cared for after a fire that devastated her house. I report here a fuller account to emphaize the attribution of spiritual value to caring as evidence of sacralization. We ate somewhere different every night. People fed us, people took my washing, people bought books for the children. It was just incredible. There was a sort of sense that, you know, you’re family. Coming around you when you most needed them. And then what was really nice was when we moved to the rented house, there was a little flurry of activity and people brought bits and pieces and things to make it home. And then people kind of left us alone to settle down, which I really appreciated. . . . the genuineness of our family here, of how people truly care and show that they care, cos it’s one thing, isn’t it? to say: “Gosh, I’m so sorry to hear what’s happened,” but actually to turn up on your doorstep, to phone you up and say: “come and eat with us.” To me, it’s really putting it into action. And we’ve received so much of that, it’s been incredible. So, yeah, that’s been . . . spiritually a very significant event in our lives. I think as a family as well . . . for the children as well. It’s been a real lesson for them in, you know, in caring and how we should care for one another.

The help Lucy and her family received had a spiritual dimension. It was the conscious practice of being a Christian. It is not “caring” out of friendliness or ethical duty, but “serving.” Serving identifies one’s actions that are “sacralized” and thus within the Christian framework. As mentioned, sacralization is the process whereby individual religious actors bestow value to ideas and practices and recognize them as legitimate part of tradition. Ethical living that is “sacralized” becomes “serving.” This does not mean that serving is somehow superior to non-religious caring; rather serving is moral action within religious tradition. It is ultimately dependent on God rather than one’s

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conscience and has a religious value. Serving is action that is in accordance with God’s design. Much like the narratives of obedience, serving stresses the sovereignty of God over and above the individual’s moral conscience and moral agency. This is expressed by Dorothea’s comments, which first identify the rationale of serving in God. Serving is no mere altruistic behavior, it is being an instrument of God’s action in the world. That, sometimes, includes lacking an awareness of one’s role in God’s design. What is serving? I think it’s preferring someone else’s needs to your own and not necessarily thinking of yourself as better than people, always thinking that you’re, always thinking about others as better than yourself, and I don’t think that we’ve got that sort of “summed up,” I don’t think Christians do it by any sense . . . I see it as doing it for God when I do it for someone else. Although it’s motivated by love for that person I do see it . . . by seeing it as doing it for God, it doesn’t matter how they react to it, it takes that, it takes that away, because quite often if I do something nice for my parents, because I don’t have a good relationship with them, it can, it can sometimes get a really hurtful response, but I find that . . . that sort of knowledge that serving is about, is about God, about Jesus, I can live, it can take away the hurt because I’m doing it for something that is even higher again than the relationship with my parents. . . . I guess on practical basis, it changes my priorities with what I do with my time in a way, it changes my life also because it makes everything more positive . . . I know that there’s a higher good why I’m here. I know there’s also a reason why I’m in a certain place, it makes me make the most of things. I don’t think it’s just a consolation to myself. I really think that that’s the case and if I, I only have to ask God one day to reveal to me why I’m here and he will. He always, he never fails to do that. For example, I came here, I wasn’t liking it doing my Ph.D. very much. I thought that what’s God had led me into because that’s, I prayed very hard that he would open and close doors accordingly as to what Ph.D. I should do and I got here and I just “this isn’t like it, this isn’t what, what I wanted to do at all” and then he brings along a friend who wasn’t, who wasn’t my friend at all at that time, who has, had ME for seven years and was trying to get back into the workplace and just gave me so many opportunities to serve my friend, to help him . . . you don’t realize what impact you can have just by being there for someone and although I didn’t know that I was necessarily serving, it’s sort of been shown to me later that, that was important in his life and he said to me, even just the other week . . . even if you made no use to your career, he said, in my life it has really benefited and I just sort of thought “. . . God can really use someone who is just so, so insignificant in the grand scheme of things, has so little life experience. . . . I think serving changes my life in that, in that everything, everything I do can be seen as doing it for God and I can see the best in situations and I can know that God can get me through it.”

Serving is altruistic action, but it is not for one’s own gratification or to respond to a moral imperative; it is in accordance with God’s will. Serving might include something one does not want to do and thus requires obedi-

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ence. Serving contributes to building the Kingdom of God. The term Kingdom of God emphasizes God’s sovereignty over and above human constructions. The believer is called to be an instrument of God’s action. As such, one’s actions, but also one’s existence, are endowed with sacred significance. This “sacralization” of one’s actions and one’s existence enables Dorothea to “see the best in situations” and know that God will get her through it. Below, Godwin, who used to manage the church’s community center, explains how he understands serving. I think . . . I’m the center manager here and under a normal business model . . . I would have people under me who would do the rolling their sleeves up . . . , but that’s not the model that we hold up to here. . . . If I walk into the kitchen and the kitchen staff are busy, I roll my sleeves up and worked the dishwasher . . . the vast majority of my time, if you were to analyse what I do, the vast majority of my time is not actually manager-related roles. . . . I think it’s about putting yourself in somebody else’s shoes, it’s about what it takes for me to make sure the team operates well, that we work well together. It can be throwing bodies at tasks, but it can also mean, I’ve gotta do some stuff that I probably I don’t wanna do: take the rubbish out, do the dishwasher, you know. Serving is about making everybody else’s burden lighter, making their work easier. . . . that’s what Christianity is all about. . . . We need to be the best employer, we need to be the best managers, the best facilitators. We don’t need to be the people who are pushing others to work beyond their limits. . . . Personally I believe that . . . when we’re doing what God wants us to do, then the business operates well. So we made decision for some people, in the last financial year, for some people we would give meals away.

Godwin articulates serving in stark contrast with the practices of profitmaking businesses. The work in the church café is serving, for it embodies the idea of caring for one another that participants consider distinctive of Christianity. The rationale of caring is paramount and alters the operations of the café by opting out from the normal charging of customers making it serving. The work of the kitchen café is sacralized, given sacred value. Further, Godwin’s description of serving includes sympathy (“putting yourself in somebody else’s shoes”), obedience (“I’ve gotta do some stuff that I probably I don’t wanna do”), and altruistic action (“making everybody else’s burden lighter”). The attitude inherent in serving is also stressed by Lucy, below. Service is conscious altruistic action in accordance with God’s will, rather than one’s own conscience. It thus requires obedience (“an act of devotion”). The whole serving thing to me is . . . a kind of an attitude really: what you do, you do to please God. And sometimes the things you do to please God are not necessarily the things you would have wanted to do or chosen to do, but you know that it’s the right thing and . . . there’s a kind of a real joy in that. . . . I

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Chapter 7 really do not wanna do this or you had to do it at the expense of something that you would rather do, but there’s a kind of a sense deep within that “yeah, this is the right thing to do, this is what God wanted me to do.” So I think, yes, serving is definitely, it’s like an act of devotion, without sounding too holy, that is, it’s something I want to please God. God’s done so much in my life that I want to use my life to, to do good things in his name. I don’t want people to say “oh Lucy is such a good person.” I want to say “God’s amazing, look what he’s enabled her to do, look how he uses her.” Whereas sometimes giving is . . . we do for our own gratification. Perhaps we need that in a certain way, to be built up, but I think the service is really about where I stand before God and where he’s kind of pushing me and nudging me to do.

Lucy contrasts serving with “giving.” Accordingly, serving is doing things to please God, to act as a Christian. The activity that constitutes serving might be the same as that of giving; yet by inscribing the activity within the theological framework of serving, it assumes sacred value. Lucy identifies the motivation for “giving” in one’s own gratification. Personal gratification is acceptable and it is not judged unethical. The real distinction with serving is, instead, the element of struggle, which reflects religious actors’ recognition of God’s sovereignty over their life and choices. Giving is seen as wholly dependent on one’s will, while serving is a call from God. The element of struggle reinforces the idea that serving is the expression of one’s accountability to God; rather than the expression of an altruistic personality. Authenticity presupposes intentionality: the path of authenticity requires the believer to choose and commit to follow Jesus. The self-transcendence of authenticity changes one’s perspective. The religious mind-set, described by informants as countercultural, is in opposition to mainstream social mores. Therefore, serving is not a response to social pressures, but the result of one’s transformed consciousness. Serving, to be serving and not just moral action, needs to be carried out with religious consciousness. Dorothea mentioned an instance of serving without having an awareness of it, however her intention was to present one’s existence as part of God’s plan rather than discount the believer’s agency and consciousness. She recounted doing things for her parents notwithstanding having a difficult relationship with them. She could do so because that action was to serve God rather than her parents. Spiritually, serving contributes to building the Kingdom of God, and through serving, one becomes aware of the spiritual significance of one’s actions. Serving is at the same time in opposition to the materialism and selfcenteredness of outside society, and an exercise in obedience. It requires obedience because serving is not limited to the acts of kindness a person feels drawn to do; rather it is often what the person does not want to do, but understands it as the will of God. However, serving is authentic only when it is intentional. The individual needs to embrace it. Serving is willing selflessness. It challenges Christians to go beyond their own needs and desires, and

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to put others first, not for one’s self-realization, but to serve others and God. It embodies obedience to God and compassion for other people. This fundamental relationality is what is felt to be the core of Christianity. It is a relationality with human beings, rather than nature, as explored below. ETHICAL BUT NOT CHRISTIAN I have argued that the sacred is not an essential property of a religious object, idea or practice; rather it is derived from religious actors’ reference to tradition. The sacred is also not to be conflated with that which is ethical, as the example below shows. Ethics is part of religious belief and practice, but it is not inherent in them. The process of sacralization thus does not make something ethical; rather it legitimizes practices and ideas with reference to tradition and making them part of tradition. The process is inherently circular for tradition is always being reinterpreted in relation to changed social circumstances. The data presented in the next extract show that some participants see environmental ethics as “good” and yet outside of what they consider to be sacred. The process of sacralization defines what is inside and what is outside of religious tradition. However, what falls outside of one’s interpretation of tradition is not necessarily judged as unethical. Indeed, ideas and practices that are outside a specific religious tradition can be seen as morally valuable; they are simply not part of the specific identity of the group. Further, some ideas and practices might be sacralized by some individuals but not by the group as a whole. In the extract below, taken from the field notes, participants discuss a video from a Christian DVD series titled “Living Distinctively.” This particular video featured an environmentalist Christian woman named Ruth, who is shown as an example of living distinctively as a Christian. Tertius: the stress is on buying local, but this has a huge impact on the third world which relies on us buying non-locally. Camden: (reading from the DVD booklet) How does our attitude to the environment reflect theology? Rosamond: I’ve never thought about it. It’s stressful enough when you’re going shopping to look at where it comes from. Nicholas: I’m not convinced by her (Ruth) view of theology. Will: it would have been helpful if they had quoted scripture. (Winifred reads some verses from Bible)

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Camden: it’s about stewardship. We can’t be wasteful, we can’t be careless. It’s ultimately about being ethical to our fellow-man. Arthur: for our society is as cheap as you can. Harriet: . . . and people can’t afford it as it is now. Nicholas: food prices are going to go up with the economy of India and China growing. We might not be able to care about the environment if feeding the family becomes difficult. I think the bigger issue is resource management . . . energy. Harriet: it’s got to be an individual’s decision. As a society we cannot possibly do it, because there’s such a difference between those who can afford it and those who can’t. Arthur: there is huge inequality in the world. I wonder what he (God) thinks about that. Celia: what she’s (Ruth) saying is that that it comes from our heart, to reflect how we understand God. Harriet: I agree with you. Different things touch you. I prefer giving to the poor than spending hours checking where things come from. Camden: what are the more important commitments? (Winifred reads from the booklet a statement on the environment being part of being a Christian) . . . If Jesus were around today, would he go around the supermarket looking at where things come from? I’m not convinced that the answer is yes. Winifred: (Camden’s wife) Yes, he (Jesus) would. Tertius: This is all very well but we’re making a mess of everything else. What about people who have nothing in Africa? As former elder, Nicholas’s opinion carries influence on the group, especially in matters of theology. In the extract above, he questions the theological framework of the environmentalist in the video. Although the video was accompanied by a booklet that contained biblical verses, it lacked explicit mention of theological terms or Biblical passages, as pointed out by Will. Will’s mention of the need to ground practices in scripture shows that for a lifestyle to be sacralized, it cannot simply be recognized as valuable; rather it needs to be inserted within tradition. Winifred, who is very supportive of

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recognizing eco-friendly lifestyles as part of Christian tradition, reads from the Bible to provide that grounding. Camden, in turn, employs the theological term “stewardship” to add support to the argument of seeing eco-friendly lifestyles as Christian practices. The participants refer to theological language and to the Bible in search of religious grounding of environmental ethics. They all agree with the ethics, just not with its sacredness within Christian tradition. Although there are attempts at inserting environmental concerns among Christian practices, the group is not persuaded. Even Camden shows that he is not fully convinced. He asks what Jesus would do, to which his wife Winifred answers promptly that Jesus would care about the environment. Being in favor of environmental ethics, she reads from the Bible twice to steer the others to make the connection between the shared religious framework and human care for the environment. She attempts to sacralize environmental ethics, although seemingly with no success. Later conversations with participants suggested a much wider support for seeing eco-friendly practices as part of Christian life, nevertheless the discussion that evening showed that the group agreed that respect for the environment was important and ethical, and that everybody should adopt a more sustainable lifestyle without however endorsing environmental practices as part of Christian life. The eco-friendly lifestyle was thus not sacralized. I suggest that there are three main reasons for the failed sacralization. In the first instance, the discussion showed participants were not certain of what constituted sustainability. The group lacked clear guidelines and criteria upon which to judge the best policy. Arthur highlighted how “for our society everything needs to be as cheap as you can,” arguing environmental concerns clash with consumerism with no apparent solution. The price of an environmentally friendly lifestyle seemed to confine issues of sustainability to the personal choice of a few, rather than the many. In the second instance, the discussion lacked a robust theological grounding of environmentalism. Although the environment is becoming increasingly part of evangelical concerns (Pally 2011; Smith and Johnson 2010), at Bethlehem, the group did not have access to environmental theologies and sufficient time to reflect on them. Serving is primarily conceived as giving to other human beings. The “poor” are seen much more as a priority, especially if in poorer countries, as the comments by Harriet and Tertius show. Thus, ideas, norms and practices relating to environmental concerns have so far failed to be discussed and sacralized by Bethlehem members and are therefore not part of the local canon. The focus on the environment, while not wholly absent, is not central in Bethlehem’s Christian repertoire. The lack of the theological underpinning and sufficient guidelines on which to insert norms and practices within the sacred realm prevented the group from sacralizing environmental concerns and practices. In this particular example, the divergence in interpretation did

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not cause a rift in the group. This is partly because environmental concerns can be accommodated in the lives of individuals without impacting on the rest of the group or on the organization of the church. Winifred’s persistence at legitimizing environmental concerns provides a strong example of individual sacralization despite the absence of communal agreement and a connection to the relevant theological literature. This example reveals that what and how one sacralizes depends on one’s interpretation of tradition as much as on one’s adoption of wider social values. Winifred shows that environmental ethics in wider society have impressed on her urgent concerns, while Nicholas is more concerned with the lack of theological grounding and thus does not see eco-friendly practices as distinctive of Christian life although he recognizes their social importance. The acceptance of wider social values is also present in the recognition by some of the appropriateness of women elders. Some in the church have sacralized women as elders. Based on their interpretation of the Bible, as they have reported to me, they have come to the opinion that women should be eligible to be elders; yet this has not been accepted formally and is in contrast with the stance of the last pastor Bethlehem had. One of my research participants, Dorothea, explained that for her and her husband, Will, as well as others in the church, the recognition of women as elders in the church follows an engagement with Scripture. She interprets Scripture in the light of her everyday experience as a twenty-firstcentury woman. Dorothea told me that she was part of a group that voiced strong objections to the current situation at Bethlehem. During a conversation, she said that she lives in a society where her daughter can aspire to become a doctor, scientist, or lawyer, and that is why she does not want her daughter to see inequality in church. This sends the wrong message that women cannot lead the church because of their gender. The contrast with the outside is here to challenge church practices. Unlike the first instance of sacralization, where serving is pitted against a harsh and competitive environment, here the value of equality of outside society, albeit a very imperfect one, calls into questions the practices of the church. At the time of writing, the church had discussed the subject of women as preachers and elders without coming to a conclusion. As things stand, women are not allowed to be elders at Bethlehem. How Bethlehem handles this issue will determine its next chapter and shape its future identity. The lack of sacralization of the eco-friendly lifestyle holds a lesson for the possibility of recognizing women as elders. It shows that for environmental practices to become part of the “canon,” and be legitimized as Christian practices, they need to be related explicitly to tradition. The important difference is that, while the former can be accommodated as part of an individual lifestyle, the latter goes right at the heart of the church organization and identity. Sacralization is thus the result of the dynamic relationship between the religious actors’ personal

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background, their community, and the relevant theological and cultural traditions. The concept of sacralization allows us to see the discursive practices of religious groups (Bielo 2004, 2008, 2009b) and how these construct tradition and legitimize action. The instance of failed sacralization suggests that the structure and composition of the group impacts on what is sacralized and how. In addition, sacralization happens within the religious group’s hierarchies and structures. Group leaders, who may have either formal or informal authority, are influential in shaping the local narratives, interpreting texts authoritatively, and legitimizing customs. Consequently, they have more sway in granting legitimacy to practices and beliefs, but also in allowing, promoting, or prohibiting change. CONCLUSION The process of sacralization, outlined in this chapter, sheds a light onto the way individual religious actors contribute to the construction of the sacred by engaging with their tradition, which includes interpreting and innovating elements of tradition. Sacralization is the process whereby individuals inscribe themselves and their actions within the spiritual dimension. Accordingly, everyday acts, such as cooking, teaching, and child-rearing, become “serving” or “ministering.” They have a spiritual dimension. Religious actors inscribe their lives within the spiritual dimension by engaging with tradition through narratives. This engagement and identification with tradition legitimizes it. Religious actors adopt religious tradition as an all-encompassing meaning system, but they also contribute to shaping it. The interpretation of tradition is fundamental to the acceptance of any change. Innovations become part of the “canon” through references to tradition, be it symbols, ideas, or rituals. The first instance of sacralization was “serving,” which identifies actions for the benefit of others. Bethlehemites distinguish it from altruism by inscribing it within the spiritual dimension. “Serving,” for Bethlehemites, is at the core of Christianity, which is understood as relational. In contrast, not all research participants consider environmentally friendly lifestyles as Christian. The lack of theological language during the discussion made the sacralization of eco-sustainability unsuccessful. This process shows what is “in” or “out” of tradition, and that it can vary from person to person, and it changes through communal interpretation. What is sacralized, be it an idea, practice, object or place, identifies the boundaries of authenticity, which is inscribed within one’s tradition.

Chapter Eight

Relational Authenticity

The whole idea of compassion is based on a keen awareness of the interdependence of all these living beings, which are all part of one another, and all involved in one another. —Thomas Merton (cited in Fox 1978, 292)

Compassion, as Thomas Merton writes, identifies the awareness of human interdependence. It is the term I employ to identify Bethlehemites’ relational authenticity, their understanding of human beings and the ensuing ethical approach they employ in their life. Compassion is thus not just a moral emotion but the recognition of human nature as relational. For Bethlehemites, this recognition is a moral statement and imperative. Bethlehemites are called to exercise compassion toward others because Christianity is lived in relationships. Evangelicals worldwide are fond of using the now commonplace phrase “Christianity is not a religion, but a relationship,” to mean that Christianity is not about following rules set by a hierarchical institution but a relationship with Jesus. One of the earlier proponents of the slogan was none other than the American preacher Billy Graham (1971). The phrase has seeped into the evangelical Christian culture that has sought to construct itself as countercultural. Bethlehemites’ narratives, as seen in chapter 4, construct religion in negative terms as adherence to rule, ritual, and belief in opposition to the Christian way of being. For Bethlehemites, just as much as American evangelicals, Christianity is a relationship with Jesus. However, they do not say that “Christianity is a relationship,” rather that “Christianity is relationships.” This might seem a very minor and unimportant difference in phrasing the same notion, yet it reveals a focus on relationships with others that colors their interpretation of the Christian way of life. In chapter 3, former pastor Felix explained his vision for a church in community and for the community. Bethlehem is a “community church” 137

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before being an evangelical church. Bethlehemites understand Christian authenticity in terms of relationships with others. Acceptance of the other is thus more important than converting the Other to Christianity. The emphasis on relationships is translated into a relational ethics, which seeks to avoid judgmentalism and accept and welcome the Other. This is grounded in a relational view of the self. The person is interdependent, and the overarching ethic is one of love for the Other, or agape. Agape is an integral notion of Christian ethics. Appeals to agape are thus to be found across Christian denominations; yet the interpretation of agape and its boundaries may vary even significantly. The attitude of compassion, understood as acceptance and openness to the Other, observed at Bethlehem, impacts on the boundary-making of the group. This has led me to develop a distinction between two ethical attitudes, one of “purity” and one of “compassion” (Montemaggi 2017a, 2018c). The ethic of compassion is person-centered and consists in the recognition and acceptance of the person while eschewing judgment of the person. This is in contrast with the ethic of purity, which is norm-centered and privileges the adherence to norms and boundaries. Purity and compassion do not refer to ethical content, but to an orientation that guides the actor. They are not meant to be taken normatively, but as a way to uncover boundary-making and religious change. Purity affirms boundaries, while compassion weakens them. The distinction between a person-centered ethical approach and a normcentered one goes beyond the dichotomy of Conservative vs. Liberal (Hunter 1991; Wellman 2008), which reflects a cultural and political polarization proper of the United States. Many “liberals” are as likely to apply an ethic of purity reaffirming liberal norms just as much as “conservatives.” Equally, “conservatives” can apply an ethic of compassion challenging the dominance of norms. This is not to say that this happens in a cultural void. Conservative churches might be more concerned with preserving boundaries and upholding norms. Crucially, although one ethic might be dominant in a given community, the two approaches of purity and compassion are co-present. The boundaries of a community thus result from the interplay of the two ethics. This chapter begins by highlighting the theoretical notions on which I build to propose my framework of purity and compassion. I have drawn on Simmel’s analysis of Schopenhauer ([1907] 1991), his posthumous work on love (1984), and his reflections on honor (1898a), as well as Mary Douglas’s ([1966] 1989) work on purity, and the “care and justice” debate, which helped to identify two ethical orientations that were found to be relevant empirically (Edgell 1997, 1999; Wedam 1997). These references do not only represent the building block of my theoretical framework, they also find echo in the narratives of compassion and recognition of the Other of my informants, which are explored in the second part of the chapter. The analysis of the data suggests that the compassionate attitude, which seeks to be open to

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and accept the Other, puts in question established religious norms, such as on salvation and homosexuality, issues that have the potential for redrawing group boundaries. BUILDING A RELATIONAL ETHICS WITH AND WITHOUT SIMMEL In his book Schopenhauer and Nietzsche ([1907] 1991), Simmel contrasts Nietzsche’s pity with Schopenhauer’s compassion. For Schopenhauer, compassion means transcending individual division by sympathizing with another. The “individual subject identifies itself with all of the others” (Simmel [1907] 1991, 106). In contrast, Nietzsche interprets Mitleid as pity, which can involve manipulation by the pitied of the pitier (Cartwright 1984, 85–86), but also helping others may increase the feeling of superiority the pitier feels toward the pitied (Cartwright 1984, 88). For Schopenhauer, “compassion for the suffering of sentient beings was the basis for actions having moral worth” (Cartwright 1984, 92). According to Simmel, Schopenhauer’s view is based on the discovery of the subject that individuation is but an illusion concealing that someone else’s suffering is ultimately one’s own (Simmel [1907] 1991, 110). Thus, compassion is based on the recognition of the unity of all being. Morality, for Schopenhauer, is only the alleviation of suffering (Guyer 2012, 405). Compassion alleviates suffering thus bestowing moral worth to action. Compassion is “the fundamental incentive of all genuine, i.e., disinterested, justice and lovingkindness” (Schopenhauer [1839] 1995, 187) for it is based on the identification of the subject with another. I nevertheless feel it with him, feel it as my own, and not within me, but in another person. . . . But this presupposes that to a certain extent I have identified myself with the other man, and in consequence the barrier between the ego and the non–ego is for the moment abolished; only then do the other man’s affairs, his need, distress, and suffering, directly become my own. (Schopenhauer [1839] 1995, 165–66, emphasis in the original)

Simmel grounds his ethics in the individual law, which is not developed in conjunction with his thoughts on love and compassion. However, he recognizes the relational dimension of ethics. He is uneasy with the implication of Schopenhauer’s grounding of compassion in the lack of individuation. Contrary to his student, Martin Buber ([1923] 1970), who will later interpret the I and Thou as a unity and ground for ethics, Simmel resists this lack of differentiation. This is because, for Simmel, the “absolute unity of essence dissolves not only an independent ‘thou,’ but also the ‘I’” (Simmel [1907]

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1991, 111). In Simmel, the distinction between “I and Thou” is affirmed rather than dissolved. [T]he zenith of morality is reached when relations among human beings evince simultaneously full duality and full unity: a moral occurrence is just one in which duality is not permitted to disappear in the quest for unity. (Simmel [1907] 1991, 116)

This is reiterated in his fragment On Love (1984). The existential will of the I flows to the Thou with complete intimacy. It does not need a bridge, which separates just as it connects. Nevertheless, the dynamic at stake here is different from the metaphysical unity of all being as such, from which Schopenhauer, for example, derives charity and sacrifice. This is precisely the miracle of love. It does not nullify the being-for-itself of either the I or the Thou. (Simmel 1984, 155)

Simmel’s reflections on “universal philanthropy” and Christian love help us understand love in its “ideal,” in the sense of abstract, dimension. They also trace the move from love directed to a person to love as a state of being of the subject. In the first instance, universal philanthropy is “concerned with the person as an abstraction” (Simmel 1984, 182). Universal philanthropy has the abstract character of eighteenth-century universalism. It rests on “the elimination of the individual differences of its objects” to the extent of becoming “unconditional” (Simmel 1984, 185). It is a general emotion based on shared humanity and, therefore, not one directed to anyone in particular. Simmel contrasts this with Christian love, which, for him, “embraces the total person” (Simmel 1984, 185, emphasis in the original). Although the sinner is also an object of universal philanthropy, this is really in spite of the fact that he is a sinner, and only because ultimately, he is a human being as well. Christian love, on the other hand, embraces the sinner—and precisely as a sinner—if not with a greater love than is bestowed upon the normal person, then at least without that “in spite of.” (Simmel 1984, 185–86)

In his ethical framework of the “individual law,” Simmel retains Kantian objectivity while stressing the importance of individuality. He did not elaborate a relational ethics, something Buber will do by developing the ethical dimension of Simmel’s “I and Thou.” This will be taken up further by Emmanuel Lévinas ([1961] 1980), who proposed a conception of ethics that sees the self as inherently relational. Influenced by Heidegger, but also troubled by Heidegger’s embrace of Nazism, Lévinas responded to Heidegger’s disregard for ethics by conceiving a relational self that is prior to “being.” The self is relational and responds to a “call” from the Other. The “ought” in relation-

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al ethics is grounded in relationships rather than universal principles. The I responds to the call of the Other. Today, relational ethics is widely used to refer to ethics grounded in a self that is in relation with others and attentive to others (Metz and Miller 2016), and it primarily derives from the “care and justice” debate sparked by Carol Gilligan’s (1982) critique of Kohlberg’s (1973, 1981) six stages of moral development, in psychology. This debate played out the tension between relational ethics, such as those of Buber and Lévinas, and the abstract principle of Kant’s categorical imperative. The debate began with Gilligan’s criticism of Kohlberg’s (1973, 1981) six stages of moral development, where the highest stage identifies a conception of the good with universal justice. For Gilligan, Kohlberg had adopted male experience and reasoning as universally normative disregarding women’s ethical reasoning (Gilligan 1982, 6). She argued that women see a moral dilemma as “a narrative of relationships that extends over time” (Gilligan 1982, 28), rather than a calculation that severs connections from relationships. Therefore, they would not score highly in Kohlberg’s scale. In contrast with Kohlberg’s “ethic of justice,” she proposed an “ethic of care” to account for a worldview that privileges relationships. This framework was employed by Wedam (1997) and Edgell (1997, 1999) in sociology of religion. Wedam (1997) examined how two Christian groups used different ethics in discussing abortion. Both groups considered abortion immoral. Both groups agreed on the same ethical principle and interpretation of it; yet, one group privileged care for the persons involved, while the other attributed more weight to judgment. Wedam argued that one group applied an ethic of justice, implying “adjudication based on the principle of the right to life” (1997, 165); while the other group “applied an ethic of care in which the principle of nonviolence determined adjudication” (1997, 165). Wedam was concerned about conflict and the resolution of disagreements. The two groups are engaged in “adjudication.” The appeal to care, or compassion, was to prevent conflict. It is therefore pragmatic logic and does not necessarily impact on the moral and theological stances of religious actors. Research by Edgell (1997) also drew the attention to the different “moral logics” present in congregational conflicts. She distinguished between compassion and authority. Accordingly, “the logic of compassion or caring, a relational logic that keeps conflict, in most cases, from escalating into ‘winner takes all’ contests. This logic emphasizes dialogue and compromise.” In contrast, “the logic of religious authority, implementing the guidelines agreed upon in advance as originating from an authoritative text or person.” (Edgell 1997, 140). For Edgell, authorities justify choices on the basis of the authority of a text or person. Like Wedam, Edgell is concerned about conflict

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management within the group; yet these studies highlight the presence of different moral imperatives within the same congregation. In the light of Wedam’s and Edgell’s research as well as my own, I began to distinguish between an ethical approach centered on the person and one centered on norms. The discourse and practices at Bethlehem church are dominated by a relational ethical approach, which privileges compassion over judgment. This is partly motivated by the negative experience research participants have had of church as judgmental. As a result, I have drawn on Simmel’s notion of “embracing of the total person” to construct a concept of compassion as the emotional participation in another’s suffering, but also the recognition of the Other’s human dignity. Compassion is an encounter with another that enables the actor to see the other as fully human and deserving of value. Thus, the other person is seen in her humanity rather than in the image we create through social categories (rich, poor, foreign, homeless, etc.). The concept of compassion I put forward is descriptive and analytical. It is descriptive in capturing the meaning-making of Christians and analytical in highlighting a relational ethical orientation and how that impacts on community boundaries and the interpretations of norms. What I want to stress is not the normative aspect of compassion, present in the narratives of my informants, but the “compassionate attitude” and its effect on boundaries. Compassion accounts for the aspirations and efforts of my informants, but not for the rationale behind “strict” churches. Therefore, taking from Simmel’s considerations on honor and Douglas’s concept of purity, I also develope a notion of purity as an ethical approach that privileges norms, which provide unity to the group. For Simmel, honor is a particular aspect of morality, which is not necessarily recognized as “good” by the wider society. Honor, in fact, encapsulates the distinctive character of the group and forms the boundaries of conduct, but also of group membership. Thus, honor among thieves coalesces the class (Stand) of that particular social group. Honor is, for Simmel, “one of the most thorough means of maintaining the existence and specific significance of the group” (Simmel 1898a, 683). Honor appeals to specific ideas surrounding the essence of the group and the distinctive conduct, which form the boundaries of the group. [T]hrough the appeal to honor, society secures from its members the kind of conduct conducive to its own preservation, particularly within the spheres of conduct intermediate between the purview of the criminal code, on the one hand, and the field of purely personal morality, on the other. . . . While civic law employs physical force as its sanction, while personal morality has no other recourse than the approval or disapproval of conscience, the laws of honor are guarded by penalties which have neither the pure externality of the former nor the pure subjectivity of the latter. (Simmel 1898a, 680–81)

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Honor regulates what is outside of the dominium of the law. Honor is actualized through the group’s condemnation and legitimization setting the boundaries of behavior and group identity. By the demands upon its members contained in the group standard of honor the group preserves its unified character and its distinctness from the other groups within the same inclusive association. (Simmel 1898a, 681)

Honor taps into the need for unity of a group. Douglas’s ([1966] 1989) notion of purity highlights the boundary work done to construct and preserve unity. In her analysis of the purity laws of Leviticus, Douglas noted how the impure is what is “out of place.” The organization of the community requires practices to eliminate disorder through social categories and hierarchies. Purity is the sense and need for unity (Lugones 1994). It requires a work of separation between what is part of the community and what is not. Purity establishes order through boundaries. I thus interpret purity as a metaphor for order, which provides unity. Purity and compassion, as I understand them, are two ends of a spectrum of people’s ethical approach. Purity stands for an ethical attitude based on norms, while compassion refers to an ethical attitude based on relationships. The “compassionate” frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the “pure” frame of mind reinforces them. For instance, a community where the normcentered ethic of purity is prevalent might be strict on the criteria for membership, while one, like Bethlehem church in this study, where the personcentered ethic of compassion prevails, would be more flexible in accommodating people within the congregation. A strong sense of purity would also lead to judgmentalism, while a strong sense of compassion would lead to forgiveness with no regard for justice. Therefore, compassion is not superior to purity. Extreme forgiveness can deny justice and allow harmful behavior within a community. The two ethics coexist. The boundaries of a community emerge from their interplay. Compassion or purity might be more dominant in any given community, yet there is a dynamic between the two. Compassion and purity identify an approach, not an ethical content. Compassion does not equate with acceptance of a behavior or belief. It is an open attitude to the person, which is delimited by one’s religious and ethical beliefs. Accordingly, compassion is not limitless; rather purity (the upholding of religious and ethical norms) restrains it. Equally, any community needs to balance upholding norms with being accepting of its own members thus maintaining a sustainable community, and of people in the locality, thus enabling peaceful coexistence. Only extremists would pursue purity with no accommodation or consideration for others.

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THE ETHIC OF AUTHENTICITY: COMPASSION The ethic of compassion rests on an interpretation of Christian agape as loving the person and refraining from being “judgmental.” Being judgmental differs from making a moral judgment in that it is a criticism of the person devoid of any “fellow-feeling” (Archer 2017; Dean 2012; Fullinwider 2005; Craig Taylor 2002, 2012). It implies a very partial and rigid judgment on a person. In contrast, the notion of compassion emerging from the local narratives of evangelicals is the acceptance of the other, based on valuing human relationships. It is accompanied by a feeling of empathy, understood as putting oneself in another person’s shoes, and of sympathy for the pain of another; yet it is more than an emotion. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. Christians intend to be accepting of others and to refrain from being judgmental; they also feel compassion, understood as the recognition of the humanity of other persons. Bethlehem’s relational ethics rests on an understanding of human beings as interdependent and an interpretation of Christianity in terms of agape. In the last chapter, I mentioned that Bethlehemites understand serving as the fundamental expression of Christianity and that serving is not exhausted by altruistic actions; rather it is characterized by a compassionate attitude, an attitude oriented toward the Other. Compassion here should not be confused with pity; it is a feeling of empathy and recognition of the dignity and humanity of the other person. Compassion leads to accepting the other regardless of background or lifestyle without judgment. Informants construct Christianity as a value system grounded in compassion. They do not think that compassion is exclusive to Christianity or practiced systematically by Christians, but that it is a fundamental trait to which they should aspire. From the narratives of informants, compassion emerges as the attempt at transcending social barriers to love others. In the following quote, Felix, recounts his effort of reviving the soup run for the homeless. There were too few volunteers so he stepped in because he thought that “caring for poor people” was central to being a Christian. They just couldn’t run it anymore, you know, we were literally gonna say “well, the people aren’t here, we won’t do it anymore,” but it was, this was a slightly different case where, as a pastor, I thought: “as a church, we should be involved with caring for poor people and we’re not doing much in that area and here is one of the few bits we’re doing, so let’s try and keep that alive.” So, I went down myself. I shared it with the church, suddenly there were 14 people who came forward and said: “look, we really wanna help.” So it’s a fantastic, thriving ministry now, but it, it almost died, I mean.

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A church whose “mission” is to care for others needed to be involved in providing a soup run for homeless people. One evening, during the soup run, Dorothea and other members of Bethlehem told me that they thought relationships were important in giving people a chance and being part of society. It is difficult, however, to form relationships on the street, which is why several volunteers mention a not-for-profit center that churches use to provide hot food to homeless people. There people can sit and talk. The boundary of homelessness and poverty makes difficult to form relationships; yet over time homeless people have become more open to church volunteers and seek an encounter, albeit a brief one, rather than receiving food and leaving. Some ask for a hug, some just like a chat. Those Bethlehemites involved in the soup run attempt to overcome the socioeconomic boundary between them and homeless people. It is limited in time and place, and the giving by the church to the receiving homeless person does nothing to tackle effectively the very real socioeconomic hierarchy; yet it lacks the ambiguity of more conservative churches (Elisha 2008a, 2008b, 2011) and the moralism of Victorian memory. Bethlehemites’ interpretation of Christianity is centered around relationships. This is implemented in the church activities, which provide services for the local community, but for Bethlehemites thesez are a way to provide the opportunity for human relationships. Celia runs the group of parents and toddlers, which in most respects is like many of its secular equivalent groups. There are no explicit references to God or Christianity with the exception of Christmas songs and a special event for Easter. Celia’s running of the group of parents and toddlers is serving because it is within the framework of Christian tradition and therefore different from similar secular activities. Its significance, for Celia, is in being a place for parents to experience God’s love. The group is of value to the families; yet what makes it sacred is the fact that such an activity enables volunteers to be a vehicle of God’s love. (referring to the parent and toddler “ministry”) How is it a ministry? . . . I love the little ones, I do, don’t get me wrong, I love them very much and, but it’s not my sole reason in doing it, . . . but my heart is for the families in the community, . . . it’s such a time in life when you can feel very isolated, . . . my heart is that they might come to know God, they might come to know of the savior that loves them and, . . . they might experience God’s love for them, as well as meeting them on a human level . . . providing somewhere where they can come and feel comfortable and at ease and get to know some other people.

The authentic Christian aims to see others as God sees them and for others to “see something of Jesus in us,” as put by Celia; so that “they might experience God’s love for them.” Relationships are not ends in themselves, but a way in which Christians try to follow the example of Jesus by loving others. From this emerges the attitude of compassion that constitutes the overarching

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ethic at Bethlehem. The attitude of compassion reflects the attempt of Christians to be like Jesus and, accordingly, see others like Jesus sees them, as expressed by Camden below. When you see that in the unsavoury in society no one wants to speak to, when you see them as a child of God, it’s heartbreaking for you as an individual. . . . When you meet someone for the first time, in a few seconds you call these assumptions about them without knowing anything about them. The way they walk, the way they talk, whether they have eye contact with you, what you know about them in their job, anything like that. God doesn’t see like that. It’s really, really compelling when you try to see someone through God’s eyes, if you do manage to do that. . . . it’s just nuts.

Compassion means seeing “the whole person,” going beyond social conditioning that creates boundaries in terms of economic and social status, gender, race, disability, sexual orientation, and prevents a human encounter based on a shared humanity. This has an impact on religious boundaries. Godwin, in the quotation below, identifies the core of Christianity in caring for those in need, making evangelism secondary. It is this attitude that leads some to reinterpret the doctrine of salvation in a more inclusive manner. For me Christianity is about reaching out to people, it’s about feeding the hungry, it’s about clothing the poor, it’s about whatever it means to make life better for people, whatever it means. Ultimately, it would be great then if those people buy into Christianity, but if they don’t, I believe, that we’ve given a little bit of Jesus Christ to them. We made their lives better. That’s how I live my Christian life. . . . God has created us to have a physical body, emotions, psychology, the spiritual and I don’t see that God actually separates any of that. I think he’s interested in the whole person. . . . you wanna give the message, but the reality is, what their needs are in that moment in time are much more crucial. . . . You’ve got somebody and try and share what you believe in, but they are on their knees with hunger, it’s not gonna do any, it’s not gonna do any good. The whole thing is evangelism, but we endeavor to get to the message of it at some point. Jesus, when he walked the earth, he went out and he, he healed people, he didn’t always necessarily saved them for want of a better phrase. Sometimes just healed people because that’s what they needed and then he carried on. So, that’s the model: give people what they need, be willing to share what you believe, but literally it is about giving them what they need.

The following quotation is from Selina, who was a very conservative member of Bethlehem and left for another church. Her frustration with Bethlehem, however, lay not so much on the lack of more theologically conservative preaching or even evangelism, indeed she called “exasperating” the elders’ evangelism strategy, when she thought Bethlehem needed to be more spiritually focused, “closer to God.” Selina’s complaint is about the lack of

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real compassion for people with serious needs, like additions and debt. For Selina, Bethlehem is not focused on serving others. It’s excellent in having contact with the community in terms of bringing people into tots ‘n’ toys (parent and toddler ministry), and you’ve got an opportunity to speak to the ladies as they come in etcetera, but the problem is that . . . lots of people have issues . . . and we’re not able to face the messy stuff of life, then, you know, we’re not gonna be able to help people . . . people say “oh, it’s great now that the coffee shop is there, bla bla bla.” It’s just a coffee shop at the minute and the idea is, is that I would love for people to be able to come into that, into the community center for, you know, people who have rings of addictions, people who have money problems and for us to be able to pray for them and also be able to give them practical advice . . . even people within our church that have those issues but they don’t get spoken about. . . . The Bible is all agape love, loving people unconditionally and it’s, it’s, it is a struggle on a human level.

Selina’s complaint is that Bethlehem is too complacent and “middle class.” It provides a comfortable environment for people in the area and activities for parents and children but fails to live up to the challenge of really caring for others, regardless of their dire situation. She told me of a woman who had suffered abuse. She came to Bethlehem through the church’s café, became a Christian but was not cared for sufficiently. She was fostered from a young child as she went through terrible abuse . . . she’s come to our church, she came to the coffee shop and she said “oh, I love this, this is safe.” Through her experiences she became a Christian and she’s a lovely lady, but, because of the, you know, the sexual abuse, domestic abuse and all that that she had as a child, she’s got lots of issues, ehm, and as a church we weren’t equipped to deal with them. . . . She was sent to us as a test because we want to go out and we want for people, for the community to come in. Well, if we think we’re gonna get all these middle classy people coming in with no problems whatsoever, then, you know, we’re not facing reality because people are gonna come in with all kinds of stuff.

For Selina evangelism is about loving people and that entails going beyond social barriers and transcending differences. The ethic of compassion, as an orientation towards the Other, allows us to go beyond the labels “liberal” and “conservative.” Selina is “conservative,” but her faith has little in common with Elisha’s (2008a, 2008b, 2011) conservatives, for example, for whom the “vertical” authority of God is reflected in an “antihumanistic” attitude. Her faith is supported by conservative preaching, but it is oriented toward the Other and does not differ from the narratives of other members at Bethlehem. The problem for Selina is that Bethlehem does not live up to the aspiration of compassion, something that other members have also voiced. The next sec-

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tion focuses on the effect of the ethic of compassion in blurring theological and moral boundaries. PURITY AND COMPASSION: SALVATION Purity is the sense and need for unity (Lugones 1994). The ethic of purity, in my theoretical framework, is a norm-centered ethical approach. It privileges adherence to principles over personal relationships. The organization of any community requires norms and practices that eliminate “disorder” through social categories and hierarchies. It requires a work of separation between what is part of the community and what is not. Purity establishes order through boundaries, compassion destabilizes order by questioning boundaries. Purity and compassion coexist. At Bethlehem, the ethic of compassion is more prominent; yet there are boundaries and rules, which reflect the ethic of purity. In seeking to be a “hub” for the community and welcoming of others, boundaries at Bethlehem often become blurred, as in the case of membership. The label “members” is for those who have accepted and read out the “statement of faith” in front of the congregation; yet non-members can participate in the same way as members, with the exception of forming part of the leadership. At Bethlehem, there are no set dues. During the fieldwork, the elders appealed to congregants to contribute to the church on a “Stewardship Sunday,” during which the elders informed the congregation that only 17 percent of members supported the church financially. Therefore, the church depends financially on a minority of people. At the time of the research, Bethlehem had 140 members and 80 associates. Associates can participate in all church activities. This has included a Muslim woman volunteering in one of the groups. The significant number and role of associates suggest that lack of adherence to the “statement of faith” is not an obstacle to belonging to the church. Doctrine is secondary to being involved in the church community. One of the key traits of evangelical Christianity has always been the doctrine of salvation through belief in the sacrifice of Jesus on the cross (Bebbington 1989). Bethlehem’s statement of faith is unequivocal. It affirms salvation by “faith alone” (sola fide). It reads, The Lord Jesus Christ is fully God and fully human. . . . He died on a cross in our place, bearing God’s punishment for our sin, redeeming us by His blood. . . . Salvation cannot be earned or deserved: it is the free gift of God. He made it available through the death of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Salvation cannot be “earned.” It is not the result of good works, but of grace, the unconditional love of God. During a home study group, participants

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reiterated this principle while also remarking that they were troubled by it, as shown in the following comments. Celia leads the discussion with the aid of a booklet. She asks “What happens to Christians after death? Why does Paul mentions this?” This is so that they won’t be full of sorrow, as if with no hope for “another life.” She asks whether non Christians have more sorrow. . . . During the discussion, a few participants note that “a lot of people, who might not be faithful, still think they’ll go to heaven.” “What does the Bible say it happens? God says that unbelievers are banished from His presence.” . . . There seems to be general agreement that without faith in God, one goes to hell and that hell is the separation from God, rather than a place of “fire and brimstone.” Being good is not sufficient. It is through the atonement of Jesus that one is saved. Camden thinks that there might be salvation for people who believe in their heart regardless of whether they believe in Christ or not. He says: “There must be something else. I cannot reconcile this (the idea of hell) with God as good.”

Even conservative Selina, in her interview, in explaining why she is a Christian and believes in Jesus, opens up the possibility of others experiencing God through nature rather than specifically through the Christian (Protestant) tradition. Talking to Selina one had the impression of a tension between theological ideas of salvation and being open to different paths to God. I do not know how Selina is thinking now and whether her new church has shaped her thinking differently. At the time of the research, she had never stressed the absolute need for people to become Christians. I love the Christian faith, cos there’s so much wisdom in it. Would I listen to anything else? No, because, you know, because it just, it will not ring true to me and things’ve got to ring true, you know. And I just think that if I, if I believe that, in order to be happy in life you, what am I gonna follow? What am I gonna believe in? Well, I’m hedging my bets that I’m believing in God and Jesus and that’s the right thing and if I’m wrong “how am I gonna lose?” I’m not gonna lose, am I? [laughs] And I just think, “yeah, why doesn’t everybody else come to that conclusion? It’s just so obvious, isn’t it?” Oh dear, . . . I guess it isn’t. But then, you know, but then, why don’t they see it? There’s a blindness, isn’t it? and I think that’s the thing, people’ve got to ask for God to take away that blindness. . . . but then, somebody will say to me “well, this God of yours,” you know, “somebody in the rainforest and what have you, never came across the Bible, never came across anybody, then, then, how does he get an opportunity?” But then, I guess, God is in everything, God is in nature, would that present the question to him that there is a God, isn’t it? I mean, there’s lots of questions I have no answers to.

The tension between theology and acceptance of others is present in the narratives of Bethlehemites. Some are very open theologically and consider all those who believe in God, however understood, saved. More complex is

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Camden’s view. In his interview, he recognized truth outside of Christianity, but affirmed Christianity’s privileged, albeit not exclusive, way to the truth. I see God at work in Christians and non-Christians alike and one of my great friends in my work at the moment, who isn’t a Christian. . . . He says a lot of things which I regard as true and someone who doesn’t accept that he is religious in any way or Christian in any way saying things that have a truth means that in this world there is truth and we are all part of that truth. God will work in individuals to teach you truth and to show you more truth, but it’s not something which is just for Christians cos it’s not meant to. . . . So it’s always the process of God working in us. The more you hang on to him, the more you trust him, the more you spend time with him, the more he’s gonna change you, . . . that’s the road we are all on and that’s the road we should be on and even people who at heart are unconcerned, are not Christian, haven’t dedicated their life to Christ are still on that path, they just don’t know it yet.

Camden’s perspective moves away from the established evangelical understanding of salvation as faith in Jesus and opens up to the possibility of emphasizing salvation as a more meaningful (authentic) life due to the believer’s relationship with Jesus. This view is expressed by Felix. I once asked him whether he thought that non-Christians could enter heaven. He replied, “It depends on what you mean by heaven.” He did not believe that nonChristians were damned, but that there was a difference. He said, “I believe in Jesus’s ‘I am the way, nobody comes to the Father (God as the father), except through me.’” Nevertheless, he sees religion as people’s “attempt to get hold of God, Christianity is part of it, but there’s also revelation.” The real difference, for Felix, is that “(Christian) faith is ‘sanctification,’ it needs to transform, renewing your mind and make you think the way God thinks.” Belief in Jesus is, here, having a relationship with Jesus, which is evidenced by self-transformation and is expressed in love for others. Salvation thus becomes a life of faith rather than salvation of the soul after death. Camden and Felix are not liberal or “emerging” Christians. They do not engage in “contextual theology” (Bergmann 2003), responsive to the sociocultural and ecological context of the contemporary world; rather, in their reinterpretation of salvation, they are guided by the ethic of compassion, which blurs boundaries by seeking inclusivity. A further example comes from Walter, who replaced Felix as pastor at Bethlehem for a couple of years. As Walter wanted to retire, the church leadership sought a permanent pastor. Walter was involved in the recruitment process. He told me that, at the recruitment interview, he asked the candidate how he would deal with homosexuals, single people, and people going through divorce. I asked how he would have answered. We need to embrace people as fellow human beings regardless of the circumstances. In many churches, they reject the person, which means not receiving

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one another, not even within the church. You can’t reject the person because of the circumstances they are in. That’s what happens very often in faith communities. I have lovely times with people, who sometimes would come and cry on my shoulder. It’s being a human being, for goodness’ sake, you know? And showing myself vulnerable as well. I think that our evangelism is to get to the core of people, I have no right to tell you what to do, no right at all, but if I care about you, you might trust me enough to ask my opinion on things or to ask me how could this work for me? That’s where I feel the church must be. Traditionally, the dogma of churches gets in the way “I believe this so you must be wrong.” As a result, they can’t see the person of another faith as a person. We are made in the image of God, this means we are equal. We need to identify with one another’s humanity. This is core to Jewish tradition: how do you deal with the stranger?

In the quotation above, Walter does not take a position on homosexuality, non-belief, or on people belonging to other faiths; rather he states that what matters is welcoming the other and establishing a relationship. Walter’s answer identifies a principle that guides action. The ethic of compassion is an approach, rather than ethical content. The attitude of acceptance of the person does not necessarily mean an acceptance of a different lifestyle and morality; rather it is an effort in refraining from judgmentalism and being open to the person. This attitude leads to members holding different views in theological and ethical matters, and blurred boundaries between members and associates. Thus, the boundary of inclusion in the church does not rest on “doctrinal belief,” but much more on who can preach and be an elder. The quote below by Godwin draws such boundary in relation to salvation. There are certain things that are unmovable in my theology and that would be shared by the wider church leadership that is we believe that Jesus is the only way to God the father. Other religions won’t believe that. . . . What we wouldn’t allow is for somebody to come through, believing that some other pathway to God is acceptable. We wouldn’t allow that person to teach that from the front of the church because it contradicts our standing, our beliefs. But we wouldn’t make that person feel that they couldn’t be part of, they’re somehow lesser because of it.

Preaching and eldership are the instances where the ethic of purity is active and, consequently, Bethlehem’s boundaries are being defined. In recent years, the boundary of male-only eldership has been called into question making this issue of purity of primary importance for some members. There have been instances of women preaching at Bethlehem in the past, but so far they have not been allowed to become elders. The current elders have agreed to have a discussion on this matter and have facilitated it, although this has not come to a final vote on reversing the current policy of male eldership. In

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private conversations, some have also raised the possibility of including homosexual preachers and elders. During the fieldwork, participants were happy to discuss potentially thorny issues, such as homosexuality and women elders, individually during recorded interviews. However, there was a conspicuous absence of discussion in small groups and church general meetings. This is, however, not limited to controversial issues. Several informants told me that people are hesitant to discuss matters affecting them, like divorce, stress, and workrelated problems. It is thus difficult for congregants to know other people’s opinions on a given topic. As things stand, a group of members wants to see the full inclusion of women in the church. This asserts the ethic of compassion because it seeks inclusivity and questions long-standing norms. In contrast, the leadership privileges the long-standing norms of male eldership thus asserting the ethic of purity. BLURRING BOUNDARIES: HOMOSEXUALITY The Evangelical Alliance conducted a survey of British evangelicals and found that 80 percent of evangelicals did not think homosexual couples should be able to have civil partnerships blessed in churches and that 73 percent considered homosexual actions always wrong (Evangelical Alliance 2011, 9). Evangelicals tend to be stricter than other Christian denominations on sexual morality, as well as in theology. Research has shown that evangelicals show increasingly an ambivalent attitude to homosexuality. Moon (2004) highlights how evangelical ethics is guided by personal relations; however that does not lead to acceptance of behavior that is considered morally wrong, such as homosexuality. Evangelicals often reject homosexuality morally, yet they seek to welcome the person. Arguably, this “structured ambivalence” (Bulanda 2001) between behavior and belief is motivated by the changing ethics of wider society, which conflict with traditional Christian sexual morality (Andersson et al. 2011; Bean 2014; Bean and Martinez 2014; Moon 2004, 2009; Strhan 2015). In contrast, Bethlehemites seem to hold a range of views on homosexuality, from opposition to full support. Bethlehem consists predominantly of families with parents in their thirties, forties, and fifties. The church is structured around the family with a nursery, groups for parents and children, and for young people. The family shapes the social identity of most members and has a strong normative character. Homosexuality was rarely mentioned during my fieldwork. Whenever the matter was touched upon, it was accompanied by an explicit rejection of any form of discrimination against homosexuals. Some members support civil same-sex marriage, but not religious ones, while others, like Dorothea, who told me that she would like to see homosexuals fully included in the

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church, as members, preachers, and elders. Some would like the matter to be discussed at a general meeting of the church to allow different perspectives to be raised. Godwin is not a liberal Christian. He believes that homosexuality is not in accordance with the Bible; yet, in his interview, he told me that a rigid stance is not helpful. He explained that some Christians would condemn homosexuality and others would accept it. He told me that this diversity of views needs to be accepted as it was important to “not freeze people out because of their views,” and to “relate to everyone.” I asked him whether it would be acceptable for an open, committed homosexual couple to ask to join the church. He replied, slightly blushing, that “that never happened.” Although he clearly thought that homosexuality conflicted with the teachings of the Bible, he was reluctant to condemn it and stressed the importance of being open to others. The reality is that the Old Testament says that that’s not the way God has planned it. God has planned it to be man and a woman. . . . There has to be a place here, there has to be a welcome here that God would give. . . . We are not here to condemn. We are here to lead people to Jesus Christ, we are here to lead people into a relationship with God. Can you be a committed Christian and a homosexual? That’s a minefield. . . . I actually want to be on record as someone who says “look, Jesus is there for everyone.”

Bethlehemites often say they are countercultural, in the sense of resisting mainstream culture. However, they are concerned that they might be seen as moralistic by outsiders. On one occasion, Winifred talked of a misunderstanding with her colleagues at work, who she believed assumed that she held homophobic views. She was quite emotional and concerned that her colleagues thought she was judgmental toward homosexuals. In later discussions, Winifred and her husband Camden made clear that they were in favor of same-sex marriage. Thus, although there is a strong countercultural narrative among Bethlehemites, their identity is less defined by resistance to liberal ethics than by the affirmation of the ethic of compassion. This is not exhausted by an approach of “condemning the sin, not the sinner”; rather it extends to questioning one’s stance and beliefs. External culture poses theological and moral questions for Bethlehemites. It is the ethic of compassion, the dominant ethical approach of Bethlehemites, that leads them to question their own stances rather than simply object to mainstream liberal ethics. Acceptance of the Other prompts self-scrutiny and blurred boundaries. Bethlehem is not only an example of ambivalence, but of openness to change. The ethic of compassion, understood as an ethical approach rather than ethical content, reveals a disposition to reflect on one’s own stance in meeting the Other. The compassionate attitude gives primacy to the “truth” of human relationships over doctrinal “truths.” It is grounded in

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the recognition of the fundamental dignity of the person and is cultivated in relationships. THE “COMPASSIONATE” INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN TRADITION Bethlehemites consider relationships to be at the core of the Christian faith. They interpret Christianity as “relationships” rather than as a religion, as Godwin phrased it. This is common among evangelicals, yet, at Bethlehem, the significance of relationships guides people’s approach to others. Informants talk of “seeing others as God sees them.” Human relationships mirror the relationship between the believer and Jesus. Christianity is thus not something to be believed, but something to be experienced in relationships. The emphasis on relationships involves seeing “the whole person,” their physical and emotional needs, rather than people as recipients of evangelism, as expressed by Selina. Somebody asked what was evangelism and the definition I give is that it’s just being Jesus to people. Ehm, and that’s the reason why we do it, is to show love to people, isn’t it? And it’s to be genuine, because Christianity is not being inward-looking and just thinking of yourself . . . it’s about loving people.

Celia told me that one day she was walking down the street when she saw one of the mothers from the parent and toddler group. She felt compassion for that mother and remembered a verse where Jesus feels compassion for people. She felt the same compassion and told me that God made her able to feel that compassion. Compassion is an intentional attitude of openness to the Other and of recognition of the Other’s human dignity, which has an emotional dimension. Research participants believe that they are endowed with a feeling and attitude of compassion by God. Their experience of God makes them more open to loving others. Compassion is an attitude that requires a suspension of judgment and a connection with the person that is not dependent on one’s personal relationship. Celia’s compassion is a sign of a connection with people who are acquaintances. Dorothea’s compassion allows her to love those she “does not like.” Compassion is an encounter with another that is deemed a central feature of the Christian faith. It has legitimacy because it is inscribed within Christian tradition. Compassion is thus not the mere acceptance of liberal values; rather, by tapping into the Christian notion of agape, compassion allows contemporary ethical questions to be brought in dialogue with Christian tradition. While the ethic of purity affirms boundaries appealing to ethical and theological norms, the ethic of compassion blurs boundaries appealing to agape, love for the Other. The ethic of purity and the ethic of compas-

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sion are currently at play in Bethlehemites’ debate over the possibility of having women elders. The interplay between purity and compassion can thus reveal how religious actors engage with tradition and contemporary ethical questions and how they affect religious change. CONCLUSION The chapter began with serving, which is understood by informants as “the essence of Christianity.” Serving is not a mere act of devotion to God, as prayer might be; rather it requires a recipient. It is within a relational framework. Being an authentic Christian, for my informants, means feeling compassion for others and “serving” them. Such feeling of compassion is willed. Christians elicit the feeling of compassion to be “like Jesus.” Although only some informants have used the term compassion, the term was chosen to convey a complex of feelings, including empathy, understood as putting oneself in another person’s shoes, and of sympathy for the pain of another; yet it is more than an emotion. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention of being accepting of others and refraining from judgmentalism with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. The authentic Christian self is called to feel compassion for others by accepting them for who they are and refraining from moral judgment. Bethlehemites seek to build an inclusive and welcoming community, open to those who have had a negative experience of church or no experience. Many church members recount churches where they did not feel welcome or accepted fully for who they were. Acceptance of the Other is thus a driving force at Bethlehem, which is constitutive of the identity of the church. Bethlehemites, in seeking inclusivity, avoid adherence to rigid norms. Thus, a significant number of congregants are associates rather than members, but they are not barred from being involved actively in the church. This does not mean that Bethlehemites are liberal; rather the ethic of compassion leads them to be accepting of the person. Compassion is not the adoption of liberal morality and theology, but an ethical approach of acceptance that has the effect of challenging some exclusive theological and ethical norms, such as salvation and homosexuality, and, in turn, of weakening group boundaries. The ethic of compassion is evident in the attempt by Bethlehem’s evangelicals to be welcoming and inclusive. This is central to their religious identity and guides their interactions with others. The analysis of the data shows that the pre-eminence of compassion at Bethlehem opens the door to less strict interpretations of theological and moral stances and, for some, a rejection of them. For instance, the doctrine of salvation (sola fide) is interpreted in terms of faith in Jesus as being transformative of one’s life rather than eternal salvation of the soul.

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Bethlehemites are not only “ambivalent,” they privilege acceptance of the person over and above adherence to norms. The ethic of compassion is an attitude of openness that leads congregants to reflect on their own beliefs and stances. It is, at once, an intentional frame of mind and an emotion, which draws on the actor’s cultural and religious tradition. The actor’s emotions, as in the case of Celia and Camden, are molded by their religious tradition. Their feeling of compassion is inscribed within Christian tradition. Evangelicals, in this case study, ascribe normative value to relationships because they see it as the essence of Christianity. The ethic of compassion is thus reproduced by the local narratives and practices at Bethlehem. Compassion is centered on the person. It is a relational authenticity. It is expressed and fostered in relationships. These relationships are not limited to the in-group of the church, but extend to all those who use the community facilities of the church and those with whom Bethlehemites come into contact. Compassion is dominant at Bethlehem, but the boundaries of the church emerge from the interplay between compassion and purity. Purity is not absent from Bethlehem. As explained by Godwin, non-Christian teaching and teaching that rejects exclusive salvation would not be allowed. Bethlehem, being situated in a demographically homogeneous area, is detached from the experience of diversity, in terms of faith, class, and lifestyles. However, I have found the same person-centered ethical approach among new monastics, as examined in the next chapter, and Catholic chaplains of the Apostleship of the Sea, the ministry of the Catholic Church supporting seafarers (Montemaggi 2018d).

Chapter Nine

The New Monastic Cultivation of Authenticity

Hospitality means primarily the creation of free space where the stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an enemy. Hospitality is not to change people, but to offer them space where change can take place. It is not to bring men and women over to our side, but to offer freedom not disturbed by dividing lines. —Henri Nouwen (1975, 71)

Hospitality is the practice of compassion, as defined in the preceding chapter. As captured by Nouwen, hospitality is the creation of space where the Other, the stranger, can become a friend. It rests on compassion, the acceptance of and openness to the Other. Hospitality can take many forms. Bethlehemites give hospitality through their involvement with soup-runs for homeless people; some, like Dorothea, like having an “open house” at Christmas for people who would otherwise be alone. However, new monastics have made hospitality, which is often the literal provision of food and shelter, central to their interpretation of authentic Christianity. The “paradoxical” nature of hospitality (Derrida 2000) offers a window on how Christians negotiate their identity with the Other. New monastics create their own spaces deliberately for the Other and through practices. As a result, new monastic authenticity differs from that of Bethlehemites. It still involves self-transcendence, but it is much more “structured.” The preceding chapters have delineated the authenticity of Bethlehemites as consisting in self-transcendence, which calls for commitment to be compassionate toward others. Christian authenticity entails going beyond social conditioning by becoming aware of the spiritual dimension of one’s life and the need to act in accordance with the will of God. This requires engagement 157

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with tradition, which is interpreted through the lens of one’s individual experience and one’s community. The path of authenticity calls for living out what is understood to be the core of Christianity, which, for Bethlehemites is “serving” the Other. Bethlehemites’ Christianity thus calls for an attitude of recognition of the Other, which I have termed “ethic of compassion.” The attitude of compassion leads Bethlehemites to meet and welcome the Other without judgment. It is a concrete engagement with the Other that has the potential for questioning one’s beliefs and moral stances, as shown in the previous chapter. Bethlehemites’ authenticity is thus not exhausted by selftranscendence; rather it is relational and requires an encounter with the Other. My interest in new monasticism was motivated by their focus on the cultivation authenticity through practices. It is a “structured” authenticity. The vows set out ways in which to become aware of one’s spiritual dimension and pursue a Christian path. Monasticism, for members of new monastic communities, captures the vision of an ongoing spiritual commitment and development, which forms a Christian self. This consists in a spiritual training, often referred to as novitiate, discipleship, or, even, apprenticeship, that happens through practices. The life of new monasticism is therefore “consecrated” in as far as it is aimed at the spiritual growth of a Christian self. This is pursued through regular practices, such as prayer, tithing, and giving hospitality. The practices within the context of a close-knit community enable the person to learn from their experience and reflection upon it, on how to be a Christian. New monastics, like Bethlehemites, move away from propositional belief to an experiential and relational belief. The commitment is thus more formal but also more specific. New monastics do not commit to a “statement of faith,” but to specific actions and to a specific community. They are distinctive in recovering tradition explicitly to inform their way of life. In the fluid reality of shifting contemporary Christian consciousness, new monastics’ focus on practices allows the person to explore their spirituality-religiosity without the need to engage in deep theological discussion. This is a marked deviation from the intellectualist character of Protestantism and from Christian denominationalism. New monasticism is sometimes seen as part of the change in consciousness of Christian evangelicals (Bielo 2011a; Markofski 2015; Marti and Ganiel 2014). It shares some features with the inclusive and questioning religiosity of the Emerging Church Movement (Bielo 2011a; Guest 2007b; Labanow 2009; Marti and Ganiel 2014; Packard 2012). Like the Emerging Church Movement, new monastics seek to build inclusive communities and reject firm doctrinal stances. For Markofski (2015), new monasticism is a shift in evangelical religiosity with a strong emphasis on progressive politics. There are indeed many former evangelicals among new monastics, especially

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in the United States, and many have read the “staple literature” of the Emerging Movement authors, such as McLaren (2004), Sine (1981), Tomlinson (1995), and Bell (2011). However, not all new monastic communities are characterized by progressive politics or even inclusive culture, as shown, Killian (2017), who studied a conservative intentional community and a more liberal one. The focus on political culture (Markofski 2015) and on strictness or flexibility (Killian 2017) reflects more the American religious experience. New Monasticism in Europe has a very different cultural and religious framework and is not defined by being in opposition to a dominant religious culture, let alone a political one. The approach also disregards the presence of Catholic new monasticism and the strong influence of Catholic thinkers, such as Thomas Merton, Jean Vanier, Henri Nouwen, and Joan Chittister, on new monasticism in North America and Europe. New monasticism seems to be a trend for a selected few, for those seeking a small community providing intimacy and support, reminiscent of Wuthnow’s (1994) support groups. Indeed the term “new monastic” might have already lost significance, as members often do not seem to be attached to the term and communities so far lack a cohesive and self-referential body of literature, shared events, and organizational capacity to form a movement. The autonomy and grassroots nature of new monastic communities mean that they are, at least for now, islands in a sea of new expressions of Christianity. However, new monastics are not concerned with theological deconstruction or the renewal of institutional forms. Indeed, I have often encountered a reluctance to engage in theological debate. I believe that the focus on practices is what makes it adaptable. Its appeal is at once wider and narrower. It is wider because it refrains from theological debate and allows people who seek to explore their spirituality to be part of the community. It is narrower because it requires regular commitment and an engagement with tradition. New monastic focus on “structured” practice within a neo-traditionalist framework sets it apart from other “emerging” expressions. The orthopraxis is to develop a Christian authentic self. The Christian self of new monastics is relational; thus the personal spiritual development happens within the context of interdependent relationships. The new monastics I studied, in particular, seek to become more compassionate toward others and are guided in their spiritual work by the value of inclusivity. This is why the practice of hospitality is perhaps the most significant practice, for it sheds a light on to the challenges of meeting the Other and being accepting of different ideas and lifestyles. In this chapter I present an overview of the similarities and differences across new monastic communities in the UK, United States, and Canada, which I visited. This is a necessarily cursive outlook due to the time and financial limits of the fieldwork. New monastics present an interesting case

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of authenticity due to the explicit traditional references used (e.g., vows). They are an example of a formulation of authenticity in dialogue with tradition. The many communities I have visited were also characterized by the ethic of compassion, aimed at creating an inclusive environment. The next section begins with a brief history of new monasticism and how it relates to similar movements in North America and Europe. It then explores the cultural differences I have found across communities and their specificity resulting from their cultural context. This is followed by an analysis of the authenticity of new monastics, which arises from practices. The chapter concludes with a closer look at the practice hospitality, which embodies the ethic of compassion. Through hospitality, new monastics open themselves to the Other and are challenged by the Other. Through hospitality, new monastics live their relationality of authenticity. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF NEW MONASTICISM New monasticism today is associated with the experiments by former theology students Shane Claiborne (2006) and Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove (2005, 2008), in creating close-knit communities in deprived areas to be alongside the poor and form relationships of trust with people in the neighborhood. This latest wave has a much longer history, one which begins with Bonhoeffer’s letter to his brother Karl-Friedrich in 1935. Bonhoeffer wrote that the restoration of the church will surely form a new type of monasticism which has in common with the old only the uncompromising attitude of life lived according to the Sermon on the Mount in the following of Christ. (Bonhoeffer 1995, 424)

He set up the secret seminary of Finkenwalde, where students would not only study theology, but also build the school. The Gestapo closed the seminary in 1937 (Samson 2010). A year later, in Britain, amidst the hopelessness and poverty of the Depression, George MacLeod founded the Iona community. 1 Like Finkenwalde, Iona was an experimental community with no common purse or vows. MacLeod’s initial project saw unemployed craftsmen and trainee clergy work together to rebuild the medieval abbey in Iona. In 1933, across the Atlantic, Dorothy Day set up the Catholic Worker Movement 2 to provide hospitality, food, and clothing to volunteers and those in need. Thus, a key characteristic of new monasticism has been, since its beginnings, the rejection of the “cloistered life” as separate from society and the call to be among those most in need in society. The new wave of new monasticism in North America originates in theologian Jonathan Wilson’s response to Catholic philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s ([1981] 2007, 263) call for a new St. Benedict. In After Virtue, MacIn-

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tyre condemned liberal modernity for the fragmentation of moral discourse. In highly diverse liberal societies, new forms of community are needed to sustain moral life. At the end of After Virtue, MacIntyre hoped for a new St. Benedict to revitalize ethical discussion and practice the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. (MacIntyre [1981] 2007, 263)

Wilson (1998) took up MacIntyre’s challenge by advocating “Christian communities that may produce a new St. Benedict.” Agreeing with MacIntyre, Wilson argues that we live in a fragmented rather than pluralistic world, where there is “no vision of the way things ought to be” (Wilson 1998, 24). The new monastic life is, for Wilson, a disciplined life to rediscover the telos, living the life “in the purpose for which God creates us” (Wilson 2005, 57). It is new monastic communities that can help heal the world’s fragmentation by giving a sense of purpose through spiritual disciplines and theological reflection (Wilson 1998, 70–76). But it was The Irresistible Revolution by Shane Claiborne (2006) and Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove’s (2005) example of Rutba House that put new monasticism in the spotlight. In 1995, while still a theology student, Claiborne became involved in a student protest against the removal of homeless people in the “Love Park” in Philadelphia. He later volunteered in Mother Theresa’s mission in Calcutta, experienced mega-churches and being born again “many times”; then he chose to set up the Simple Way community in a deprived neighborhood in north Philadelphia. Claiborne’s friendship with Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove, soon to become Jonathan Wilson’s son-in-law, developed the Simple Way into a new monastic community, while Wilson-Hartgrove set up his own community Rutba House in Durham, North Carolina. The Simple Way, which I visited in 2012, has changed significantly from its original set up. It has become more structured and organized with volunteers from around the world. New monasticism is the subject of theological discussion (Downey 2011; Cray, Mobsby, and Kennedy 2010; Talbot 2011) and has been influential in the formation of many communities as well as in establishing connections with Christian intentional and alternative communities already established. Anglo-American new monasticism taps into a common religious culture and religious literature, aided by a shared language. The books of Claiborne and Wilson-Hartgrove reached quickly British shores. Claiborne even collaborated to the UK publication by Cray, Mobsby, and Kennedy (2010) New Monasticism as a Fresh Expression of Church, linking experiences in the United States with the experiments in “doing church” within the Anglican

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tradition. New monastic leaders share their vision and advise new communities across the Anglo-American world. What is perhaps unexpected and more significant is the similarity between the Anglo-American communities I surveyed and Italian Catholic new monastics (Palmisano 2013, 2015), which reflects wider social changes, such as gender norms and democratization. For instance, Palmisano writes that Comunità di Bose is a mixed gender community and that “the rule” in Italian new monastic communities is a composite of spiritual principles guiding everyday life, which is decided and altered by the community (Palmisano 2013, 357–58). This is something shared with communities in the UK, the United States, and Canada. Italian new monastic communities, like their Anglo-American counterparts, also consist mostly of lay members (Palmisano 2013, 354), including married couples (Palmisano 2013, 350, 360), which was also a feature of early monasticism (Hughes 2005). New monastic reinterpretation of traditional practices includes, at times, an element of bricolage, which needs to be understood as syncretism (Altglas 2014) integrating elements from other faiths by connecting them with Christian tradition. This can be seen in Italian communities, as well as AngloAmerican ones. It includes the use of literature from other faiths and practices such as meditation (Palmisano 2009). Anglo-American new monastics, unlike those in Italy, do not use the appellative of “monk” and “nun,” although in some theological literature we begin to see reference to it (Talbot 2011). There are ordained ministers (Protestant Pastors and Anglican Priests) who are members and often leaders of the community. However, there are no members who belong to a traditional monastic order nor does “the rule” of new monastic communities include a vow of chastity. Anglo-American new monastic communities generally have no connections with a monastery, except for the Iona and Northumbria communities in the UK. The British communities emphasize worship and liturgy, however, they lack the same “assiduous prayer” of Italian communities (Palmisano 2013, 361). Italian new monastic reinterpretation of fuga mundi, the otherworldly character of old monasticism, is “a conscious reconstruction of a separate world based on a radical reflection on the various aspects of the society being left behind” (Palmisano 2013, 361). In Anglo-American communities, this “state of mind” is however aimed at building inclusive communities and having a transformative impact on deprived neighborhoods. This is particularly so in American and Canadian urban communities, which are often located in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES There are important differences across new monastic communities. These often reflect difference in national culture, but also differences across regions and localities, and from group to group. In the UK, new monastics are often disenchanted with the superficial relationships encountered in mainstream churches, and seek to form a community based on commitment to a way of life through the structure of vows. In North America, the value of community takes on the tone of opposition to individualism, neoliberalism, and gentrification. This is particularly strong in the United States, where the state is weaker and the culture more individualistic. Thus a strong theme among new monastics in the United States is the attempt at creating an intentional community. An intentional community is a community of people who “live together to enhance their shared values or for some other mutually agreed upon purpose” (Sargeant 1994, 14; Sargisson and Sargeant 2004, 5). The appeal of intentional communities lies in the mutual support, informal welfare, and sense of place. This is also part of a reaction to the urban sprawl, including large churches being located in the suburbs making people dependent on their car, and population mobility, which, albeit diminishing (Molloy et al. 2014), is higher in the United States than across Europe. The appeal of intentional communities lies in the support and deep relationality of living in close proximity. Proximity is however the biggest challenge for most communities, due to the lack of affordable housing, co-housing estates, and institutional financial support. Lacking the physical and financial resources of traditional monasteries, new monastics cannot always live in proximity, leading the expansion of community to new “cells” in other locations. Proximity is at times mediated through presence in a community center or even a church, which grants the space necessary for communal activities. Proximity speaks of the search for a close-knit community. New monasticism thus attracts those who seek to be part of a neighborhood as well as of a community grounded in close relationships and interdependence. New monastics in the United States and Canada are particularly critical of consumerism, individualism, and inequality. In the United States, this extends to a critique of evangelical churches and non-denominational megachurches, such as Willow Creek and Saddleback, which are sometimes seen as part of consumer culture. As mentioned, the appeal of monasticism lies in the search for an “authentic” religiosity that is constructed in opposition to the wider mainstream culture of individualism, capitalism, and consumerism. Thus the simplicity of monasticism and its commitment to the neighborhood are contrasted with the “consumer church” in the suburbs. This can be found in the 12 Marks of New Monasticism, the joint publication of new monastic thinkers edited by Rutba House. 3 One of the marks is “geographical proxim-

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ity to community members who share a common rule of life” (Rutba House 2005, xii). The new monastic community is grounded in geographical stability, in contrast with the high level mobility of American society. William, during a group discussion, said, When I think of most vivid example of commitment, I think about my parents, not just the fact that they’ve been married for 32 years. They’ve lived in the same house for over 20 years and every Friday had Bible study for 20 or so years with the same people. That’s been a big example of commitment. As I got older, I’ve also seen how they’ve passed opportunities for their career. My dad turned down jobs at more prestigious universities for the sake of our stability, our wellbeing. For me it has been a real practical and realistic understanding of commitment and making promises.

The fuga mundi of new monasticism is not an escape, but a critique of society and of the church that seems to adhere to social structures and norms rather than question them. Accordingly, mega-churches are often referred to as “consumer churches,” which encourage a consumer approach to faith rather than a committed one. The size and suburban location of the mega-church are felt as encouraging relationships between people with a similar outlook, experience, and background. People choose to drive to the church in the same way they go to a shopping mall and are part of a club of like-minded people. The mega-church is sometimes felt as alienating for being “super-professional, like a Broadway show.” The stage, the lights, the carefully rehearsed music, the scripted service make for a professional church service that feels distant. Services are a show where show-business techniques are employed to move the audience. This feels artificial. George likes when “things are not quite right, when it feels like home.” That is where real relationships happen, are born out of “disappointment, delight, apologies, and vulnerability.” Many found their experience of large churches “fake” and superficial. However, there is also a recognition that people need different types of communities. As pointed out by Richard, a Catholic new monastic in the United States, there is an “issue of fragmentation and isolation in society that no one knows what to do about. . . . Willow Creek and Saddleback try to address that. . . . There are lots of different people, there needs to be different expressions of church.” New monastics acknowledge that people find their spiritual growth in different environments. Their own spiritual growth and distinctive Christian self is formed in opposition to consumer culture and religious forms that second such culture. Monastic practices thus stand as a critique of the focus on theological doctrine of conservative churches, especially evangelical churches. This is felt across communities in all three countries. However, the opposition to dogmatic evangelical religiosity is more acute in in the United States, home to more “recovering evangelicals,” as they describe themselves

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jokingly. They are opposed to the conservative evangelical cultural and political dominance of American society. They have often experienced hurt and isolation in church communities, where they felt discomfort at the expectation of living a successful middle-class life and of belonging to the evangelical world with no contact with outside society. Richard told me of how important it was, in the evangelical world, to use the same lingo, listen to the same Christian music, and read the same books. These experiences push new monastics to be open to people from different religious and social backgrounds and develop a self which is grounded in relationships. Evangelical churches and mega-churches are at times condemned as selfsatisfied communities of middle-class people, often sectarian and dogmatic, who are detached from the rest of society. This is partly due to the close relationship between economic and religious conservatism in the United States that is much weaker in Canada and the UK where state welfare is generally seen positively (Clements and Spencer 2014; Hoover et al. 2002). The emphasis on socioeconomic inequality is thus a feature of many American new monastic communities. This is reflected in the “marks” of new monasticism of Rutba House. The first two are, (1) Relocation to the abandoned places of Empire. (2) Sharing economic resources with fellow community members and the needy among us. (Rutba House 2005, xii)

The first is often interpreted as a call to inhabit deprived neighborhoods to experience the inequality, which results from “Empire,” the American capitalist economy, and be a hopeful and critical presence. There is a trace of romanticism in this. As George mentions, “it seemed something more adventurous about trying and going into the belly of the beast;” yet it does not stop at a romantic vision of social justice. The aim is to “be a part of living a hopeful pattern of life in the middle of a very hopeless pattern of life.” Thus, the call to share one’s possessions in the community, in the second “mark,” is a form of tithing that acknowledges social disadvantage, but also critiques consumerism and the excessive value put on individual independence, and instead it affirms the intrinsic interdependence of human beings. New monastic communities on the East Coast and in the Mid-West, in particular, are also sensitive to the issue of race. Wilson-Hartgrove, who lives in Durham, North Carolina, includes in his marks of monasticism the commitment to reconciliation across racial lines. The fourth “mark” states, (4) Lament for racial divisions within the church and our communities combined with the active pursuit of a just reconciliation. (Rutba House 2005, xii)

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Traveling across states and cities to be with new monastics, I experienced the segregated nature of many places, including Washington D.C., New York, and Chicago. I have been the only white on the bus or on the street on many occasions with people turning to look at me or staring at me. This made palpable the geography of race. In D.C., the white new monastic community chose to be located in a predominantly black neighborhood in an attempt at bridging the segregation of the city. In a neighborhood where people would turn around to look at me, a white woman walking alone, the white presence of new monastics sought to be a symbol of reconciliation that did not go unnoticed. Racial segregation is far less prevalent in the North-West and on the West Coast, where the urban deprived neighborhoods where new monastics live are more mixed racially and culturally. However, new monastics tend to be overwhelmingly white and middle class. They do not represent the communities where they are present; rather they are “missional” in those communities, ministering to them, although they seek to “act with” people in the neighborhood. Communities in the North-West and West Coast are immersed in a reality of secularism, religious pluralism, and rapidly changing cities due to the growth of the high-tech economy, especially in Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco. Communities on the East Coast and in the Mid-West are often articulating their identity vis-à-vis the church they left behind and the church they critique, while for communities in the North-West and on the West Coast, being a Christian among non-Christians posed an identity question. For the former, inclusivity seems to be concerned more with socioeconomic inequality, while for the latter communities, inclusivity is also an openness to different identities. It is the realization that Christianity is not the default option. This leads to a reflection on what it means to be a Christian and how to articulate it. As Richard explained, Most of the people that we live around don’t even believe in the existence of God and they hate Christians, so preaching at anybody isn’t going to make any difference. We need to earn the right to even say anything by showing the goodness of how we live our lives. . . . So it was learning to not see ourselves from places of privilege anymore and go, maybe, more a place of humility.

The reality of multiculturalism, religious diversity, and secularism is something Canadian new monastic communities also face. Canada, like the UK, saw a fall in people identifying as Christians and a rise in the religiously unaffiliated (Bowen 2005). Criticism of conservative evangelicalism is also present in Canadian communities, however they are at ease with maintaining a connection with, or even belonging to a church. The structures of the church allow projects that benefit the local area. This is something that Canadian communities share with UK ones. Church facilities, venues, and, at

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times, financial assistance can support new monastic groups and make them viable. Canadian communities, like American ones, were located in disadvantaged neighborhoods thus making a concern for inequality an important mark of their new monastic identity. Living in deprived neighborhoods allows new monastics to build relationships with local people and experience and gain a concrete understanding of the reality of inequality. The call to relocate “to the abandoned places of Empire,” in the words of the 12 Marks of New Monasticism, is thus a distinctive feature of urban North American new monasticism. British new monastic communities, in contrast, are rarely located in disadvantaged neighborhoods. As mentioned previously, the Iona community was established in the 1930s and sought to bring together clergy and workers at the time of the depression. It stands out as particularly attuned to progressive politics. There are examples of intentional communities in deprived areas, however transforming inequality is not a central feature of British new monasticism. There may be many reasons for it, including a more traditionally strong welfare state in comparison with North America. British new monasticism is characterized by a return to liturgy, which taps into the Celtic tradition. This is exemplified by the publication of a Celtic prayer book by the Northumbria community, which is used by other communities. The Parish, as well as another community in a large city, are more recent and are partly the result of experimentation with new forms of church. However, in line with new monastic neo-traditionalism, The Parish has adopted Northumbria’s prayer book and often uses Celtic symbols. A Celtic cross is always present at the Sunday gatherings at The Parish and it is on the community’s logo. Neo-traditionalism, however, is not a withdrawal to a past religiosity, but the recovering of a wisdom that is seen relevant to today’s challenges. In one of the British communities’ documents, an explicit link is made between early Celtic monks and contemporary monasticism. In many ways the spiritual landscape of 21st century Britain looks similar to fourth century Britain – there are many and diverse religions and most indigenous people know nothing of the claims of Christianity. The efforts of established church are failing to alter this and many groups are advocating a return to Columba’s monastic approach.

New monastics draw on monastic tradition to respond to diversity in what is seen as a post-Christian context. Therefore, there is an attempt at creating a space and time for the wider community where religion is not just discussed but also experienced. This includes discussion groups open to those who do not identify as Christians. Discussions are rarely theological. For instance, the antipathy for theological discussion at The Parish is born out of the value

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ascribed to experience over intellectual debate. Their aim is to build relationships of trust and friendship in which to cultivate authenticity, as explored below. CULTIVATING AUTHENTICITY New monastics are lay Christians, who can be single, married, or in relationships, living together as a community or in close proximity where possible. They belong to grass-roots communities, which are largely autonomous. The communities decide democratically on the “rule” to adopt, while “dispersed communities,” such as those belonging to Iona, follow the established rule. Therefore, the internal organization, narratives, and practices vary greatly across communities. Members join by taking vows, which establish practices, such as prayer or service in the community, and reflect a core of Christian values with which the group identifies. There are three common aspects that I have identified across the new monastic communities I have visited: a move from orthodoxy (propositional belief) to orthopraxis; authenticity through personal “discipleship” (“structured” authenticity); and a relational self that is oriented toward the Other. In the first instance, new monasticism identifies the formation of the Christian “self” through the structure of daily practices thus moving from a concern with belief and belonging toward a Christian identity that is grounded in practice. Accordingly, being a Christian is a way of life that is articulated through regular practices, rather than defined by a set of beliefs. There is often a rejection of rigid statements of belief. New monastics, like the emerging movement, are disenchanted with church and dogma. They sometimes criticize churches for lacking spirituality by being too formal or for aiming at entertainment, especially in the case of megachurches. They do not want to label themselves and define their beliefs nor do they not want to be defined. Unlike the emerging movement though, theological discussion is often shunned or minimal. What defines them are the practices arising from the vows, through which they develop as Christians. New monastics are committed to Christian tradition, but focus on practices rather than theology. In particular, clear doctrinal stances are associated with judgmental attitudes and exclusivity. The resistance to doctrinal stances and denominational identity impacts on group belonging. For instance, in some groups, those who sought to affirm clear doctrinal stances could not be accommodated and decided to leave. The move away from propositional belief testifies the new consciousness of Christians within contemporary pluralistic societies. New monastic neotraditionalism is thus not a mere adoption of older practices and lifestyles, but an instance of religious change legitimized through practices grounded in

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tradition. When I interview Ian Mosbsy, former leader of the new monastic community Moot, in London, he explained, What New Monasticism tries to get back to is the idea of ortho-practices as a starting place in the practice of faith, rather than just right thinking. . . . For me, it’s a sense of how important is your daily life. . . . What we try to offer here the way into Christianity where prayer and meditation are as important as spiritual reading. It’s about enabling people to experience God. It’s less about facts about God, which I think discipleship in modernity was all about, facts about God rather than encountering God. What we’re trying to do now is actually trying to enable people to experience God through prayer in the belief that God is drawing everybody to God. So submission and catching up with what God is already doing rather than trying to enable people to have facts about God. It’s a totally different theology.

The move away from propositional belief echoes the narratives of relational and experiential belief of members of Bethlehem church. Like Pentecostalism, the focus is on experience; yet new monastic worship is more intimate and the “experience” is an everyday training of the mind. Discipleship is thus at the core of new monastic religiosity, as Ian Mosbsy told me, The traditional model of church is when you come to us and you take the set method and you either join with us or go somewhere else, while here we’re trying to say that everybody has a unique relationship with God and it’s gonna work differently with every individual. . . . you’re in your own unique journey with God and we’re gonna try and support you to go deeper with God. . . . Discipleship is about the rest of life, learning and growing into a more deep understanding of the faith. . . . The whole point about this is that people are going to struggle with this as a way of life.

The second element of new monasticism is the striving for authentic religiosity. This has two interrelated aspects: an acceptance of human frailty and need for deeper relationships, and the regular “training” of consecrated life. Stephen, a former Baptist minister who set up The Parish, expressed it thus: Trying to create a community of people in authentic relationship and who are honest and real with each other and honest and real with God. . . . The way that church seems almost manufactured and you have to be, you have to become something that might not honestly reflect who you are or where you are at in your life, but you’re actually expected to become something, a Christian. My experience of church and church life is, there is a very kind of marked gap between people as they are, people’s lives and people’s lives when they come to church. . . . I need to keep this part locked away, because nobody can know that I struggle with this or I don’t wanna trouble people with this, or people will judge me. The reality is, my experience again, that people do get judged if you’re open, if you do things that are not acceptable or if you struggle with something. You do get judged. I think a lot of people’s experi-

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The experience of judgmentalism makes an appearance once again in the narratives of the members of The Parish. Louisa told me of a church where the pastor and his wife were supporting only people they liked and that “they were wishing away the people they didn’t like.” She grew increasingly frustrated, especially due to a rigid understanding of doctrine at the church and decided to leave. She told me that churches “should not be like that.” Asked what a church needs to be like, she replied Church needs to be a place where people are free to be themselves and are free to make mistakes, not where people are held up as perfect, because none of us are perfect. It needs to be a place of forgiveness really, struggling through life together rather than judging and condemning other people because they happen to see differently from the way we see.

Louisa’s complaint is about the conformity expected by people in many churches in order to be accepted. What I don’t like of many churches . . . you have to do something in a certain way to be part of our in-club. You’ve got to behave like we do, do exactly as we do, dress like we do, talk like we do.

The search for a “more relational and more real” community, as Stephen put it, one where people can be “more honest and more real to each other and to God” is present in all communities surveyed. It is born out of a frustration with the church as an event on a Sunday, and the yearning for meaningful relationships that sustains one’s spiritual growth. As Esther put it, “you want to share your life story, plunge in and be vulnerable.” Community is where the disciplined self can grow. The Parish has three vows: hospitality, journeying, and blessing. “Hospitality,” as explored in the next sections, encapsulates the value of inclusivity of the community that is expressed in a non-judgmental attitude and caring relationships. “Journeying” identifies the personal and spiritual growth of each member, akin to metanoia, while “blessing” refers to the practical engagement with people at the margins in the local community. One day, Stephen told me how he used to practice martial arts and valued the discipline and meaning attached to it. It was more than play or keeping fit. It required commitment and it trained the mind as well as the body. At times, the training for some grows out of what the community has set as practices. For instance, Jane mentioned that she became involved with The Parish

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because of its spiritual practice of meditation. She has always done meditation and found that the meditation of The Parish was not so dissimilar from it. Indeed, she said “this has the words “God” and “Jesus” in it which meditation hasn't got, but it's the same.” She said that she has now grown into it and realized that the meaningfulness of the other aspects, such as “blessing” (social action) and “hosting” (hospitality). During a discussion on being an “apprentice,” Emma, Stephen, and Tom discussed the disciplined practice of the apprenticeship in the following terms: apprenticeship is more than learning from a manual; it is taught by a living teacher, Jesus. Jesus is the mentor and the “traineeship” requires dedication to the master. It involves risk, like putting up shelves. The first time one does it, they’ll be wobbly, then it becomes easier. This means that there must be a permission to fail. Apprenticeship entails watching and doing, Seeking answers for and in ourselves, work it out, and encourage others. It is like the archer who practices until the bow becomes part of the archer. It is also non-negotiable. It requires discipline and repetition; yet the journey of the apprentice begins with choice, the choice to follow love. The appeal of spiritual training that gives a structure and purpose to one’s everyday life and that develops values through practice is something that can be found in Westernized forms of martial arts (Brown et al. 2009; Kohn 2003, 2008; Monahan 2007), as captured by Stephen. Jane’s reference to the commonality between meditation at The Parish and the secular meditation she has always done points to the value of a humanistic ethic that is perhaps more at ease with an increasingly secular and pluralistic society. It testifies a need to develop ethical values through practice and contemplation rather than adherence to values and beliefs already set. The spiritual development of new monastics requires a community that has a high level of intimacy and accountability. The third element of new monasticism is its relationality, which is articulated in the attempt at building communities that are inclusive internally but also oriented toward the Other externally through the practice of hospitality. This relational authenticity is analyzed in the next section. RELATIONAL AUTHENTICITY The relational authenticity of new monastics has two aspects: internal inclusivity and external engagement, which often takes the form of hospitality. The disciplined authenticity that is based on metanoia and an acceptance of human frailty requires intimacy. Intimacy is however hard and can only happen over time. All the communities surveyed were relatively small, with at the most around thirty members. Lawrence, from a Western new monastic community in the United States, told me that in small communities, personalities matter and conflict is not always managed well. Clashes over the format

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or the number of meetings, lack of clarity over the direction the group is pursuing, or the priorities for the group are not infrequent. At The Parish, the few people who left wanted a much clearer theological and religious identity, but also felt they had not found the close relationships they were looking for. The group has further developed weekly meetings where those who have made a formal commitment to the community share their spiritual journey. These meetings are open only to those who have taken up the consecrated life. This is a feature common across communities. These smaller groups support the person in their spiritual development as well as cement stronger bonds within the group. The vows thus function as a means to establish the internal boundaries of the community by identifying a core group of people who commit to one another to follow the “rule.” The accountability to one another imposed by the vows constitutes the fundamental dynamic of the community. Accountability is valued greatly by members for being pivotal in their spiritual growth. The new monastic community is held together by reciprocal accountability. This, however, is not in the form of reproach, but through listening and encouragement. Seeking to be democratic, non-hierarchical, and non-judgmental communities, new monastics seek to avoid conflict, although they are not always successful at doing so. New monastic relational authenticity is not limited to forming close-knit communities supportive of their members; rather it entails engaging with society. In contrast with withdrawn communities, such as the Amish and Plymouth Brethren, new monastics stress the importance of inclusivity of those in the local area. The importance of building inclusive communities was at the heart of all communities’ endeavor, although there was a marked difference between UK communities and North American ones. Communities in North America, in particular, see hospitality as a way to respond to current socioeconomic and cultural processes of change, including heightened individualism, consumerism, and globalization. They view their efforts at building inclusive communities and engaging with disadvantaged people as an attempt to counteract economic and social isolation in rapidly growing cities. In contrast, communities in the UK tend to stress more contemplative worship and hospitality, aimed at caring for the person, and detached from political and economic narratives. The inclusivity of The Parish involves an openness to “spiritual seeking.” The Sunday gathering but also the small groups’ meetings reject theological discussion and focus on contemplation and reflection on one’s experience. This makes the group open to “spiritual seekers,” although the liturgy is clearly Christian with references to the “triune God” and Jesus Christ. In their contemplative reflection, The Parish employs koans, traditional Japanese short statements on which the person meditates. The koans used are at times Japanese but are often verses from the Gospels or statements from Christian Saints and theologians. Following the meditation, people are asked

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to share their insights based on their emotions and experiences while refraining from an analysis of the statement. The focus is on compassionate relationships, which, as Stephen states below, should be the face of Christianity to others. It’s important how relate to one another and it’s important how we relate to outsiders. . . . When an outsider comes in randomly what would make an impact is not what we say, what we say we believe, but how we treat each other. If someone can see us treat each other with stupid amounts of forgiveness and reconciliation, wanting that above all else, and people willing to sacrifice anything, including pride, anything in order to achieve reconciliation, that I think is the countercultural way of life that would make an impact on people. So I really think it is about how we treat each other. We’re all incredibly different people, how do we respond to one another, how do we respond to the frustrations that we have with one another. That’s the thing.

When it came to decide on how to engage in social action, the consensus in the meeting was to encourage people to pursue social justice individually to avoid creating divisions inside the group along political lines. Interestingly, the possible political divisions were not among those who had taken the vows, but between those who had and those who attended the community meetings, but had not taken the vows. Inclusivity, in this case, trumped the group’s engagement with social action and thus shaped the group’s relationship with the local community, which is firmly focused on “acts of care,” such as the Sunday’s shared meal, rather than social justice. 4 There is a tension between acts of care and acts of social justice. For instance, in a community in the American North-West, some members were keen on setting up community gardens to care for people in the neighborhood, while others wanted to carry out a social justice campaign against trafficking and in support of sex workers. Nevertheless, the overarching and uniting principle is that of building relationships with people at the margins and be transformative of the local neighborhoods, city, and wider society. As one of my informants put it, they seek to become a “local micro-culture of reconciliation . . . based on healthy and compassionate communication.” New monastics are concerned with consumption and consumerism, substance misuse, housing shortages, inequality, and crime. Most groups tend to be more left-leaning economically and often socially. Yet their engagement aims at bringing about transformation through close encounter rather than organized campaigning, as explored in the section on hospitality. HOSPITALITY Hospitality refers to the practices that establish a relationship with another or consolidate a relationship. This is achieved by the host’s provision of materi-

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al or symbolical goods and services to the guest (Selwyn 2000). As such, it is social exchange, transforming strangers into familiar and friends, often by acknowledging a shared moral framework. From an ethical perspective, hospitality is a practice that presumes openness to the other, which does not require reciprocity (Nouwen 1975). Thus, it has been seen at times as paradoxical in trying to balance control over one’s identity and resources with opening oneself and one’s community to others (Derrida 2000). However, hospitality can also reaffirm the unequal status between host and guest and thus function as a form of social control. Hosts and guests give each other honor, in the form of exchanges of gifts and respecting etiquette, thus implying responsibilities on the host as well as on the guest (O’Gorman 2007a, 2007b; Selwyn 2015; Telfer 2000). Hospitality is recognized as an important means of facilitating everyday social relations and bonds of trust between people from different social backgrounds (Marsden 2012). Hospitality is increasingly being seen as a concrete instance of encountering the Other and negotiating boundaries in the theological, philosophical, and political scholarship (Bretherton 2006; Fiala 2017; Innerarity 2008; Moyaert 2011; Pohl 1999). For instance, for political philosopher Innerarity (2008), being guests or hosts reveals the interconnected nature of being human, from which arises a moral imperative of caring for one another overcoming the natural disposition for self-protection. Christian theologian Luke Bretherton (2006) sees hospitality as an occasion where it is possible to affirm one’s identity and tradition and form a relationship with another. Hospitality is the practice where the ethic of compassion gets tested the most. It embodies compassion’s reaching out to the Other. It transforms strangers into friends (Selwyn 2000) and can be an occasion where it is possible to affirm one’s identity and tradition and form a relationship with another (Bretherton 2006). Yet, it is also the occasion where expectations and responsibilities come to the fore (O’Gorman 2007a, 2007b; Selwyn 2015), and, above all, where identities get questioned. Openness implies a questioning of one’s preconceived ideas and habits. Compassion presumes equal dignity, yet the host has always the possibility of denying or limiting hospitality (Montemaggi 2018d). Taking as inspiration old monastic practices of the monastery as a safe haven, new monastic communities seek to “welcome the stranger” in their midst. This is often in the form of a shared meal to people from the local community and visitors. “Potluck” meals are common in many religious and non-religious communities; yet the shared meal of new monastic communities takes on the value of inclusivity. It is an expression of the ethic of compassion. It is about openness to and acceptance of the Other. The meal is a regular occurrence and is open to all. It is the first point of entry to the community. Hospitality extends to hosting visitors, as it happened to me on several occasions, and hosting people in need. Richard, from the East Coast

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of the United States, recounted how he and his wife gave hospitality to someone with a substance addiction and found it hard and unsustainable in the longer term. The willingness to help and care for a vulnerable person clashed with the complex needs of addiction, mental health, and homelessness. Hospitality is linked to “service” within the Christian terminology, like soup runs for homeless people and more traditional forms of charity. However, the character of new monastic hospitality today is the idea of being on an equal footing with the guest. It is not “charity to,” but an encounter. Its centrality for new monastics lies in the recognition of interdependence of human nature and the transformative effect of one’s encounter with the other. I believe this is captured by how John, a Catholic new monastic in the American North-East, explained Jesus’s miracle of the fish and bread loaves. He told me that “nowhere in the Bible it says that Jesus multiplied them, he only blessed them so people shared what they had. That’s much more of a miracle.” The sharing of resources, of food, of space is a means of meeting each other and bringing down barriers of class, education, and status. Hospitality and community are therefore intertwined. Hospitality is the most tangible instance of an inclusive community, where the Other is respected. It is the practice that most develops a relational Christian self. The acceptance and welcoming of the Other extends to engaging with people at the margin of society in social action. In contrast with conventional Christian approaches to charity, some new monastic communities, especially in Canada, seek to act alongside disadvantaged people, rather than for them. This has included sharing the responsibility for the organization and running of specific activities and events with homeless people. This marks a paradigmatic shift from giving “charity to” people in need toward “action with” people in need. The effort at engaging on an equal footing with disadvantaged people sometimes poses challenges to the group. For instance, in one community a group of homeless people, who had made excessive use of alcohol, congregated by the community center and set a dustbin on fire. Members of the new monastic community had to step in and restrict the unsupervised use of the community space to guarantee safety. Ultimately, some boundaries needed to be drawn to prevent physical or emotional damage. The practice of hospitality is paradoxical, as Pitt-Rivers ([1977] 2012) and Derrida (2000) remind us. The host-guest relationship is not free from ambivalence. Rules emerge to regulate the exchange, to strengthen or weaken established social positions, especially so when the guest cannot reciprocate and thus inhabits a position of social inferiority despite the host’s efforts at inclusion. I believe hospitality plays such a central role in new monastic identity because it prompts the transformation of the host. It is a form of metanoia. As Harold once said, “We seek to become a certain kind of person,” some-

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thing I have heard from many new monastics. It is through practice, rather than theological discussion and learning, that new monastics grow into their faith and gain a deeper understanding of what being a Christian entails. Hospitality, as a practice, is perhaps the most transformative because it is an encounter with the Other, who might be very challenging to one’s identity, lifestyle, and values. The encounter with another is one of recognition and acceptance of the person before and, sometimes, despite their identity. Hospitality is the way to encounter others and form “authentic relationships,” as Stephen described them. It is the practice that shuns judgment and labeling. As Richard commented, [I]t’s easy to be dogmatic about an issue but it’s difficult to be dogmatic about a person you know. If we know our poor neighbors, our lesbian neighbors, our gay neighbors, then suddenly it’s people, it’s not issues and you don’t say the same things anymore.

The attitude of acceptance of compassion calls on the person to question her own identity, beliefs, and ideas about the world. It shapes the self. It is transformative. This attitude of acceptance of others seeks to bring down the boundaries of the community by inviting in people from different walks of life. In turn, in the encounter with the Other, the authentic self is formed. CONCLUSION This chapter has presented a picture of the common threads shared by new monastic communities in the Anglo-American world and the differences due to their cultural and geographical location. New monastics are part of a shift in Protestant consciousness from a concern over “right” belief to a spiritually enriching lifestyle that is inclusive of difference. New monastics stand out for their focus on practices grounded in tradition. New monastic neo-traditionalism is not an escape from contemporary life, but an opposition to the dominant values of capitalist consumer society, such as individualism, materialism, and profit seeking. The retrieval of traditional wisdom strengthens new monastics in their effort at growing as Christians. The vows they take express their commitment to living a life according to Christian principles, but they also imply mutual accountability and support. The vows presuppose the intimacy of close relationships; yet new monastics seek to be open to the Other. The ethic of compassion underpins the new monastic endeavor and brings challenges and opportunities to the way in which groups engage with the wider community in the area. Hospitality is thus the privileged practice through which new monastics try to live out compassion. It is the expression of a relational self. In opposition to the individualism and materialism of contemporary society, the Christian rela-

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tional self affirms the interdependence of human beings and the need for acceptance of diversity. The authenticity of new monastics is articulated through practices and compassionate relationships. It is practices that stimulate self-transcendence, and it is through compassionate relationships, especially in the form of hospitality, that the authentic Christian self expresses and tests its relationality. NOTES 1. http://iona.org.uk/about-us/history/. 2. http://www.catholicworker.org/forest-history.html. 3. See appendix. 4. The commitment to social justice has so far not concretized partly because The Parish is in transition. The group intends to set up a community café linked to social justice projects.

Chapter Ten

Authenticity in Pluralistic Times

“Margaret ! I am going to leave Helstone.” “Leave Helstone, papa ! But why ?” . . . “Because I must no longer be a minister in the Church of England.” . . . “You could not understand it all, if I told you—my anxiety, for years past, to know whether I had any right to hold my having—my efforts to quench my smouldering doubts by the authority of the Church. Oh! Margaret, how I love the holy Church from which I am to be shut out!” —Elizabeth Gaskell, North and South (1854)

In Elizabeth Gaskell’s novel North and South, the protagonist, Margaret Hale, is forced to leave her home and her beloved village of Helstone, following the decision of her father, a local pastor, to “turn Dissenter” and leave the Church of England. At that time, leaving the Church would have meant being an outcast; yet Mr. Hale could not bring himself to agree with everything written in the Book of Common Prayer and took the course of action commanded by his conscience. Mr. Hale’s crisis of faith feels both outdated and contemporary. It represents the primacy of intellectual coherence and adherence of the individual in religious matters, which is quintessentially Protestant; yet, Hale’s anguish over “being true” to his conscience is very much in accordance with our contemporary paradigm. His crisis of faith shares much with the narratives of Christians in this book, who seek an “authentic” way of life, understood as a becoming aware of social trappings, including those of the “traditional church,” and the pursuit of an ethical way of life. What today is understood as religion in popular debates comes from the meeting of the Christian, and particularly a Protestant, model of religion with modern rationalism, the result of centuries of religious transformation, as Ruel ([1982] 2002) has taught us, and one that has been applied to all relig179

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ions, organizing customs, beliefs, and rituals into the category “religion” (Beyer 1998). The “shaping” of religion was by no means a smooth affair. The rationalization of Christian belief was met with fierce opposition, like that of the “Oxford Movement,” which posed a fundamental challenge to the Church of England by wanting to reaffirm the liturgical, pastoral, and missionary role of the church (Knight 1995). Yet, the Protestant trait of sincerity (Haeri 2017; Keane 2002; Robbins 2001, 2012) and the centrality of belief are now essential part of how the popular imagination thinks of religion. In public intellectual debates, secularists identify religion with theological statements (Mair 2012) and seek to apply a rationalist and materialistic logic to religious belief, thus ignoring rituals and emotions. This intellectualist understanding of religion no longer reflects the experience and self-understanding of Christians, including conservative Protestants today. This is thus not limited to liberal or romantic wings. The narratives of “conservative” Christians evangelicals and of new monastics in this book suggest a dissatisfaction with established religious practice and rigid belief, and the search for a way to express their faith that is felt as authentic. Through authenticity, contemporary Christians form their moral self, grounded in relationships, and in dialogue with tradition. Sociologists were part of the wider “restructuring of knowledge” of modernity and thus helped construct the idea of religion in terms of propositional belief, belonging to and attendance at religious establishments, and adherence to a set of moral norms. In seeking to establish sociology as a science, fitting with the instrumental rationality of industrialized modernity, sociologists have looked at religion through materialistic lenses and thus reduced religious forms to a set of claims and behaviors. The dominance of instrumental rationality shaped society and the study of society. Religion soon came to be understood in an intellectualist manner, which conformed with the scientific mentality. Thus reduced, religion could no longer claim its knowledge as legitimate and was decreed moribund. Ironically, creationists applied the same objectivist logic to their reading of the Bible, seeking to establish it as objective truth, in the 1981 trial on creationism McLean v. Arkansas (McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 1982). Liberal theologian Langdon Gilkey, the main witness for the plaintiff, explained in his book Creationism on Trial (Gilkey 1985) that those making the case for creationism had all a scientific background, often with doctoral degrees from reputable universities and holding appointments in prestigious institutions. Instead of appealing on the authority of the Bible, they advanced the notion of creationism as a scientific theory and thus interpreted Biblical stories in a reductive and objectivist fashion. In contrast, the plaintiffs, standing against creationist science, were all representatives of religious organizations seeking to rescue religion from objectivism.

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The McLean case captures brilliantly the pervasiveness of instrumental rationality in the modern world. In that sense, Weber was right about the “disenchantment of the world” and right to complain about it. What was taken as “progress” entailed the loss of meaning. Nevertheless, his disenchantment has not been taken as a warning, but as a prediction of the demise of religion. Simmel himself thought that religion, understood as propositional claims regarding the supernatural, could not survive modernity and that only mysticism could weather the modernist storm. What it would have made of today’s reality is hard to tell. Religion is still going strong, even in postindustrialized Europe, albeit in some countries more than others (de Hart et al. 2013). Time will tell what kind of religious forms will be predominant and where. The choice of going back to the past, by drawing on Simmel, to understand the present is thus motivated not by his predictive ability, but by his sensitivity to the religious sentiment. His ability to see belief, religion, and religiosity as detached from the organization of religion, and his nuanced interpretation of the processes of modernity, especially so individualization, support an understanding of religion as a mind-set and a way of life that shapes one’s consciousness. I am not suggesting that this type of religiosity will be prevalent, only that it is consonant with what I have found in this study and in recent literature. Today, the way people relate to religion and understand themselves as religious, atheists, or non-religious is changing. The rise of non-religion seems to me not a rejection of religion but rather a rejection of the nineteenth-century Protestant model of religion, which no longer fits the bill. The research on non-religion and atheism (Baker and Smith 2009a, 2009b; Cragun et al. 2012; Field 2014; Hassell and Bushfield 2014; Lee 2012, 2014; Lim et al. 2010; Madge and Hemming 2017; Mason et al. 2007; Ribberink et al. 2013; Smith and Denton 2005; Tomlins and Beaman 2015; WilkinsLaflamme 2015) suggests that many, though not all, “nones” simply do not “believe in God” or do not “belong” to a church. They do not subscribe to propositional belief. The narratives of “nones,” and often those of atheists, too, seem to echo those of Christians, especially “emerging Christians.” This book has been an attempt at rethinking religion and belief for contemporary pluralistic societies. The book began by outlining the intellectualist assumptions and Christian biases in the understanding of religion and belief, how scholars of religion have changed their conceptualization of religion, and how societal transformations, like the 1960s revolution, have changed how people relate to religion and religious authorities. Contemporary Christians inhabit the post-1960s society and are shaping a Christianity that responds to the challenge of pluralism, individualism, and consumerism. It is a Christianity that gives prominence to relationships, emotional experience, and the development of a moral self. For contemporary Christians, the self has a relational nature and flour-

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ishes in relationships. Belief is relational, but also experiential. The experiential element of belief, at times, takes the form of a deeply transformative experience of self-surrender. This strengthens individuality by inscribing the person within transcendence. Religious authenticity is the search for transcendence. It’s a repeated self-transcendence that forms the moral self. The book has sought to engage sufficiently deeply with the metaphysical sociology of Georg Simmel to elaborate theoretical concepts that can illuminate contemporary religious forms. It has also explored the narratives and practices of contemporary Christians who are seeking and molding a Christianity fit for the twenty-first century. In bridging the world of theory with the world of empirical analysis, I have borrowed, adapted, and changed concepts. I had to be selective with the academic debates and knowledge on Simmel and on contemporary religion and leave out much that I would have liked to include. A better Simmelian might have perhaps devised a theoretical framework that was more faithful to Simmel’s thought. On balance, I sought to be more faithful to the experience of my research participants because I believe that theory needs to be an instrument for the understanding society. The theoretical framework proposed is the result of a dialogue and, at times, a conflict between my study of Simmel and my observation of Christians today. The aim of the book was not only to describe analytically contemporary Christians, but to develop theoretical concepts that can provide a new perspective on religiosity. Accordingly, I have put forward four key theoretical concepts: belief as experiential and relational; authenticity as selftranscendence grounded in tradition; sacralization as the process whereby individuals and groups construct the content and boundaries of their religious tradition; and the ethic of compassion as the person-centered approach that orients the person toward the Other and, in doing so, weakens boundaries. Compassion is openness to and acceptance of the Other, which, for participants, is fundamental to Christianity. The concept of belief that I sought to impress on the reader is not one restricted to subjective religiosity and experience; rather it is deeply relational. Scholars interpreting Simmel, with the exception of Laermans (2006), have often emphasized subjective religiosity (Lamine 2008, 2010; Strhan 2013, 2015; Varga 2007; Watier 1996), which is certainly prominent in Simmel’s thinking on religion; yet this neglects his underlying relationality. I have thus borrowed from Simmel’s writings on religion and belief to propose a concept of belief as experiential and relational. Developing the notion of belief in and, specifically, of pietas, I have proposed to understand belief as the experience of self-surrender and a relational sentiment that is expressed and performed in relationships. The experience of self-surrender has the paradoxical effect of intensifying one’s individuality.

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The “true self” emerges in relinquishing control and rationalistic logical knowledge. This experience echoes the “participatory consciousness” found in the scholarship on witchcraft, New Age, and Paganism. The experiential character of belief of Christians in this study, however, is not part of a ritual, like in many alternative religious forms; neither has it the performativity and bodily expression of Pentecostals and Charismatic Christianity. The selfsurrender of belief is a personal and private experience. Further, belief in is not exhausted by the feelings of self-surrender and humility; it identifies a relationship of trust. This allows a conceptualization of belief as relational. Simmel’s interpretation of religion as “binding together,” in the sense of relating all things, and his relational sociology provide the framework for thinking of religious belief as a person’s mode of relating to human and nonhumans, but also as a mode of consciousness. The relationality of religion, for Simmel, does not stop at relationships. It is epistemic; it relates all things together. Accordingly, religion creates a mind-set, a way of experiencing the world that is coherent. Simmel does not talk of a normative viewpoint; rather he speaks of a “sensitivity.” That is the subjective dimension of religion, religiosity (Die Religiosität), a sensitivity that is present in some people more than in others, a spiritual yearning, which can no longer be expressed through traditional religious forms in the modern era. I have adapted the notion of religiosity to mean a sensitivity to selftranscendence, as an awareness of the limits of human cognition and an attempt at going beyond social conditioning. This should not be read in exclusionary terms. Self-transcendence is not limited to the religious mindset; rather it can be experienced through philosophy, music, the arts, and maybe even social science. The notion of self-transcendence, for Simmel, identifies the awareness of the “other side.” Self-transcendence is fundamental to Simmel’s epistemic (and metaphysical) approach. Relationality is thus characterized by constant movement and is never subsumed into unity. This affords a dynamism that a more Parmenidean unity would prevent and, consequently, a conception of people’s consciousness as fluid and in becoming. Authenticity is not an essence, but a becoming, an indefatigable effort at becoming aware of facticity. Proto-existentialist and existentialist philosophy has helped order my concept of authenticity in a way that sole reliance on Simmel, or even those who have influenced him, like Nietzsche, Kant, and Goethe, would have not made possible. This has required perhaps too much philosophy for the taste of empirical social scientists and too brutal a treatment of major philosophers for the taste of philosophers and social theorists. Yet, I believe it works. The narratives of Christians in this study resemble the existentialist view of authenticity, in particular, the relational authenticity of Simone de Beauvoir, but for one important element: tradition.

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The Christian life is a becoming. It is becoming aware of social trappings and an overcoming of them to live in accordance with God’s will, which is interrogated through a dialogue with tradition. Christian authenticity is freedom and obedience. It is an aspiration, always disappointed, but never abandoned. Authenticity is a personal journey that forms the ethical self, but that rests on religious actors drawing on their tradition and making sense of it in their everyday life and in community. The aspiration of authenticity is one of transcending social conditioning, but it is tradition that provides a framework of reference to orient the religious actor embarking in the work of authenticity. Authenticity “elevates” and tradition “grounds” the person. Tradition gives an ethical framework and mind-set that supports the religious actor; yet tradition is not static but always being reconstructed. The concept of sacralization identifies how religious actors interpret and attribute value to their religious tradition. Religious actors interpret tradition and, in doing so, construct it. In turn, by appealing to tradition, they legitimize specific narratives and practices. As shown in chapter 8, the sacred is not solely what is ethical, but what is considered part of tradition. In the case of Bethlehem church, volunteering in Africa is considered part of the Christian way of life, while eco-friendly concerns are deemed ethical but not specifically Christian. The fact that there was a disagreement over the status of eco-friendly practices, points to the mutable nature of tradition. Religious actors participate in the formation of tradition by sacralizing narratives and practices. Through sacralization, they adapt tradition to insert their everyday lives and concerns within the story of their religious tradition and thus reconcile continuity and change. Tradition grounds the “flight” of authenticity. Authenticity has too often been portrayed as an individual pursuit of self-fashioning and self-autonomy in opposition to tradition. In contrast, the authenticity of Christians in this book is relational and in dialogue with tradition. This is particularly evident in the case of new monastics, who employ explicitly traditional ideas and practices to respond to contemporary ethical questions. Theirs is a “structured” authenticity that is sustained by “discipleship” and regular activities through vows made communally. Thus, far from being merely an instance of religious subjective experience, Christians’ construction of authenticity weaves together individual aspiration and group identity through the individual’s self-reflection and interpretation of Christian tradition. In their appeals to authenticity, evangelicals and new monastics are engaged in the formation of a moral self. Authenticity is a commitment to a distinctive moral path, which is often in opposition to social conventions and norms. This reflects wider social trends of dissatisfaction with consumerism and rapidly changing life patterns; yet it also emerges as an affirmation of Christian tradition and identity in an increasingly secular and pluralistic society. Christian consciousness, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is

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coming to terms with the loss of the cultural and religious hegemony of Christianity. Post-Christendom contributes to a change in Christian belief and self-understanding. The intellectual belief that became a hallmark of nineteenth-century Protestantism gives way to one that is more experiential and relational. Their appeal to authenticity is, at once, a moral endeavor and an affirmation of their religious tradition as a distinctive moral lifestyle, not superior, but of equal worth to those of non-Christians. In post-Christian societies, pluralism offers Christians the platform to claim a place for Christianity in a highly diverse society and, in turn, Christian tradition provides a framework of reference for interpreting the outside world. Christians in this book have a relationship with the “outside” that is twofold: of opposition and criticism toward contemporary profit-making and selfish culture, but also of openness toward people. The two are not opposed. On the contrary, the criticism of competitive selfish culture underscores the value of the human. In seeking to provide a “safe haven” from society, Bethlehemites and new monastics want to affirm the dignity of human emotional needs. Human needs are seen as so vital that they trump any requirement of religious commitment. People are met “where they are at,” no questions asked. There is no pressure put on people. There is no evangelism. Or better, evangelism is by example. Christians seek to embody the example of Christ and draw people to Christ by loving others. However, this attitude of openness to the Other challenges established religious and moral ideas and affects a change. Christian compassion, as a value, calls on Christians to be open to and accepting of the Other. It invites self-reflection through a committed encounter with the Other. Compassion is about overcoming social and cultural barriers. It is about seeing the human in the Other. Compassion is the recognition of a shared humanity. It is not a charitable attitude toward the less fortunate or to non-Christians. This is particularly evident in the new monastic practice of hospitality, which is meant to host the Other as an equal. This poses the crucial question of how to relate to those at the margins of society in a way that is not paternalistic. Conscious of the weight of the unequal socioeconomic status between hospitable Christians and people in deprived neighborhoods, new monastics work on ways to “act with” disadvantaged people rather than give charity to them. The compassionate encounter may be just momentary, yet the attitude of compassion alters their practices and how Christians interpret their tradition. In order to better understand how compassion affects change, I have proposed to distinguish between the ethic of compassion and the ethic of purity. The former is a people-centered approach that consists in refraining from judgment and in accepting the Other, while the latter is norm-centered and consists in upholding religious principles. The boundaries of a religious group emerge from the interplay of the two ethics. No religious group has

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solely one ethic, although one ethic will figure more prominently than the other. The case studies in this book show that the ethic of compassion is prevalent in these communities and that it challenges many informants’ adherence to established doctrines and ethical stances, including those concerning homosexuality and salvation. It was shown how even conservative evangelicals identify with the compassionate orientation toward the Other and are reluctant to espouse black-and-white theological statements. The distinction between ethic of compassion and ethic of purity offers a way to understand how people negotiate boundaries, reflect on their religious tradition, and develop their moral identity. The focus on the person rather than norms of the ethic of compassion prompts religious actors to reinterpret the legitimacy of norms and/or how to interpret norms. This framework thus is a useful approach in moving away from an understanding of religious groups as liberal or conservative and an undue focus on belief as a yardstick for the level of faith, commitment, and adherence to traditional religious norms. Further research can help identify the conditions that favor one ethic over the other and how religious actors employ different ethical approaches in dealing with change. Compassion allows more fluidity and thus the possibility of adapting to social change. However, religious actors interpret tradition and act within a web of social relationships, internal and external to the religious group. Accordingly, relationships of power shape how the ethic of compassion and the ethic of purity are employed and on what issues. At a time of intense polarization in Western societies, the adversarial framing of ethical debates leads too often to an incommensurable divide between progressive and conservative positions. This fails to capture the internal logic and motivations of religious groups, and thus perpetuates antagonism rather than dialogue. By developing the framework of compassion and purity, I attempted a more nuanced portrayal of religious identity and practices. However, I am under no illusion that this could possibly shift the focus onto possible paths of mutual understanding and cooperation. The emotivism of the age seems to harden hearts and close minds.

Appendix The 12 Marks of a New Monasticism

From School(s) for Conversion: 12 Marks of a New Monasticism (Rutba House 2005, xii). 1. Relocation to the abandoned places of Empire. 2. Sharing economic resources with fellow community members and the needy among us. 3. Hospitality to the stranger. 4. Lament for racial divisions within the church and our communities combined with the active pursuit of a just reconciliation. 5. Humble submission to Christ’s body, the church. 6. Intentional formation in the way of Christ and the rule of the community along the lines of the old novitiate. 7. Nurturing common life among members of intentional community. 8. Support for celibate singles alongside monogamous married couples and their children. 9. Geographical proximity to community members who share a common rule of life. 10. Care for the plot of God’s earth given to us along with support of our local economies. 11. Peacemaking in the midst of violence and conflict resolution within communities along the lines of Matthew 18. 12. Commitment to a disciplined contemplative life.

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Index

Africa, 104, 108, 113, 113–115, 132, 184 alienation, xii, xiii, xiv, 40, 44, 45–47, 59, 81, 85, 164 America/USA, 18, 27, 31, 99, 100, 103, 158, 159, 160, 161–162, 163–167, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176 anthropology (of religion), 8–9, 21, 24, 93 Asad, Talal, 3, 9, 10 asceticism, 5, 6 attribution of value, 98, 110, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 184 authenticity, ix, x, xi–xii, xiii–xiv, xvii, xviii, 1, 14, 15–16, 18–19, 21, 22, 31, 33, 38, 46, 47, 49, 51, 58, 62, 68, 74, 77–84, 94, 97–116, 119, 120, 126, 130, 135, 137, 144, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183–184; relational authenticity, xiv, xvi, 80, 87–94, 95, 126, 137–156, 157–158, 159, 160–162, 163–164, 167–168, 169–170, 171–173, 175–176, 182, 183, 184. See also selftranscendence autonomy, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 4, 11, 12, 13–14, 74, 80, 81, 82, 88, 94, 98, 99, 104, 106, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 120, 159, 171, 184 Barker, Eileen, 14 Beauvoir, Simone de, xii, xiv, 77, 78, 87–88, 90, 92, 95, 97, 111, 119, 126, 183

Beckford, James, xv, 16 belief, xi, xiv, xv, xviii, xix, 2–3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18–19, 21, 22, 23, 53–76, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 111, 121, 131, 143, 153, 154, 156, 157, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186; belief as irrational, 2, 10, 107, 108; belief in/ belief that, 54, 59, 60, 69, 71, 76, 114, 124, 125, 149, 150, 182, 183; experiential/mode of consciousness, xv, 9, 15–16, 17, 18, 54, 56–60, 65, 68–71, 74, 75–76, 77, 78, 79, 94, 111, 125, 158, 167, 169, 181, 182–183, 184; personal conviction, 2, 9, 10, 18, 72, 74; pietas (belief as trust), xi, xix, 9, 55–56, 59, 60, 125; propositional belief, xv, 2–3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 68, 70, 74, 75, 79, 114, 158, 168, 169, 176, 180, 181, 184, 186; relational, xv, 54, 55–56, 57, 59, 60, 63–66, 68–71, 72–74, 76, 94, 158, 167, 169, 181, 182–183, 184; self-surrender, 59–60, 69, 70, 71, 75, 104, 107, 109, 110–111, 112, 114, 115, 181, 182, 183 Berger, Peter, 11 Bethlehem (church), xi, xvi, 23, 24, 25, 27–30, 32, 33, 60–76, 94, 97, 100, 102, 103–116, 120, 126–135, 137–138, 142, 143, 144–156, 157, 159, 169, 184, 185 Bielo, James, xiv

209

210

Index

boundaries, xvi, xix, 17, 18, 98, 99, 100, 103, 119, 120, 123, 124, 135, 137–138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 172, 174, 175–176, 182, 184, 185–186 Buber, Martin, 44, 92, 139 Canada, 27, 31, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 172, 175, 176 Cantwell-Smith, 9 capitalism, xii, 5, 6, 10, 100, 104, 105, 110, 129, 163, 165, 172, 176, 185 Catholicism/Catholic, 5, 10, 19, 72, 124, 125, 126, 159, 160, 162, 164, 175 change (religious change), xii, xv, 1, 3, 8, 15, 16, 135, 138, 154, 157, 168, 179, 184, 185–186 city/urban, xvii, 4, 24, 27, 31, 32, 45, 61, 76, 162, 163, 166–167, 172, 173 class, 24, 27, 31, 61, 109, 147, 156, 164–165, 166–167, 175 commitment, 68, 89, 91, 103, 106, 108, 120, 143, 157–158, 159, 163, 168, 170, 171, 172, 176, 185, 186, 187 community, xvi, xix, 17, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 45, 61, 62, 63, 64–66, 67–68, 75, 90, 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 101, 116, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 134, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 155, 156, 157–158, 159, 160–161, 162, 163, 164–166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171–172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 184, 185, 187 compassion, xvi–xvii, xix, 23, 31, 33, 103, 108, 109, 110, 126, 130, 137–138, 139–140, 142, 143–144, 145–146, 147–148, 150–151, 152, 153–154, 155–156, 157, 159, 172, 173, 174, 175–176, 182, 185–186. See also purity conflict of culture/tragedy of culture, 38, 44–47, 81 conscience, 105, 106, 107, 127, 129, 179 consciousness, 1, 3, 6, 7, 11–13, 16, 30, 41, 42, 43–44, 46, 48–49, 54, 56–59, 60, 80, 85, 91, 95, 99, 100, 102, 103–104, 107–109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 125, 126, 127, 129–130, 157, 176, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185; participatory consciousness, 10, 19, 60, 179, 180, 181, 184–186. See also self

conservative/liberal, 16, 17, 18, 31, 60, 93–94, 100, 119, 138, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166, 180, 185–186 consumer society/consumerism, xii, 13, 16, 45, 98, 99, 104, 105, 122, 163, 164, 165, 172, 173, 176, 181, 184 contextual theology, 16, 61, 150, 159 continuity, xii, xv, 1, 125, 184 countercultural, xii, 3, 12, 15, 18, 74, 85, 102, 103, 104, 105, 130, 153, 173 Davie, Grace, xv detraditionalization, xiii, 101, 119 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 42 discipline/training, 170–171, 184, 187 disenchantment/Entzauberung, 3, 4, 5, 11, 54, 181 distinctiveness, ix, xii, xviii, 13, 47, 90, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, 116, 120, 134, 158, 164, 166, 184 doctrine, xix, 9, 12, 13, 17–19, 60, 68, 79, 137, 146, 148, 150–151, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 164, 168, 169, 170, 185. See also purity Douglas, Mary, xix, 119, 123, 138, 143. See also purity duty/ought, 91, 92, 94, 101, 116, 140. See also ethics/morality emerging Christians, xv, 16, 61, 99–100, 103, 150, 158, 159, 168, 181 emotions, 11, 15, 17, 18, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 90, 91, 93, 98, 99, 107, 126, 137, 144, 146, 153, 154, 155, 156, 172, 175, 180, 181, 185, 186 Enlightenment, 3, 5, 9, 10. See also modernity environmentalism/eco-friendly/ sustainability, xix, 12, 120, 124, 126, 131–134, 135, 184, 187 ethics/morality, ix, xii, xix, 2, 3, 8, 10, 14, 18, 21, 23, 44, 47, 51, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81–84, 85, 86, 87, 88–91, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103–107, 108–109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123, 126–130, 131–135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 157, 160–161, 173; relational ethics, xvi, 127, 135, 137,

Index 139–156. See also compassion; duty/ ought; purity; values ethnography, x, 21, 24–26 evangelicals/evangelicalism, x, xi, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, 3, 15–16, 17–18, 19, 32, 60, 72, 74, 94, 99–100, 104, 105, 106, 127, 133, 137, 144, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158, 163, 164–165, 166, 180, 184, 185; evangelism, 62, 72, 100, 146, 151, 154, 185 existentialism, xii, 77, 84–88, 94, 106, 112, 116, 183. See also authenticity; Beauvoir, Simone de; Heidegger, Martin; Kierkegaard, Søren; Sartre, Jean Paul facticity/social conditioning, ix, xiii, 1, 38, 48, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 94–95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 126, 146, 157, 179, 183–184, 185 Ferrara, Alessandro, xii, 77, 83, 84, 90–91 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 30 fragmentation of the self, xiii, 54, 57, 58, 59, 88, 93 freedom, 45, 47, 80, 85, 86–87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 104, 107–116, 157, 184 gender, 2, 12, 31, 60, 67, 107, 134, 141, 146, 151, 152, 154, 161, 162 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 37, 47, 48, 50, 183 Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm, 42, 88 Heidegger, Martin, xi–xii, 77, 78, 85–86, 87, 88, 95, 97, 98, 111, 119, 126, 140 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, xiv homosexuality, xix, 12, 138, 150, 151–153, 155, 176, 185 hospitality, xvii, xix, 31, 157, 158, 159, 160, 170, 171, 172, 173–176, 185, 187 identity, 1, 3, 9, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 31, 61, 65, 68, 74, 76, 88, 89, 90, 91, 98–101, 102, 103, 108, 116, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 131, 134, 153, 155, 157, 166, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 184, 186

211

inclusivity/inclusion, xvii, 31, 62, 63, 74, 150–152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 162, 166, 168, 169–170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176. See also compassion; Other; purity individualism, xi, xiv, 11, 13, 60, 74, 79, 83, 89, 93, 102, 103, 163, 165, 172, 176, 181, 184; qualitative/quantitative, 47, 49, 81 individuality, x, xi–xii, xiii, xiv, xviii, 1, 4, 7, 38, 41, 42–45, 46–47, 49, 51, 59, 78, 80, 81–82, 88, 91, 94, 99, 104, 109, 111, 112, 140, 181, 182; individual, xiv, 8, 13–14, 16, 17, 38, 41, 42–45, 46–47, 49, 51, 53, 59, 77, 78, 80, 81–85, 86, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 106, 109, 110, 111, 115, 120, 121, 122–123, 124–126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 140, 157, 179, 182, 184 individualization, xiii, 4, 7, 8, 11–14, 81, 181 intentionality, 99, 102, 106, 107, 116, 130, 144, 154, 155, 156 interpretation, 100–102, 104, 105, 107, 115, 116, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 131, 133–134, 135, 137, 162, 165, 184, 185, 186 judgment/judgmental, xix, 61, 62, 65, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 168, 169–170, 172, 175, 185. See also purity Kant, Immanuel, 37, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 81, 82, 83, 90, 93, 140, 141, 183 Kierkegaard, Søren, xii, 77, 84–85, 88, 95, 103 knowledge, x, 3, 4, 8, 9–10, 11, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 39, 40–41, 42, 46, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 78, 81, 101, 111, 114, 128, 180, 182, 183 Leben/Lebensphilosophie/philosophy of life. See Simmel, Georg Lee, Monica, and Daniel Silver, 91–92 legitimization/legitimation, 11–13, 16, 17, 18, 23, 31, 41, 81, 115, 119–120, 121, 122, 124–125, 126, 127, 131, 134–135, 143, 154, 168, 180, 184, 186. See also sacralization

212

Index

Lévinas, Emmanuel, 44, 92, 140 Levine, Donald, 36, 37, 44, 46, 48, 83 love, 90, 93, 94, 103, 109–110, 112, 126–127, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 171, 185 MacIntyre, Alaisdair, 78, 92–93, 119, 160–161 magic, 5, 7, 10, 18, 19; neo-Paganism/ witchcraft, 10, 11, 60 Magliocco, Sabina, 10 modernity, x, xi, xii–xiii, xiv, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 19, 45–47, 53–54, 57, 58, 59, 79, 81, 88–89, 93, 101, 119, 122, 123, 160, 169, 179, 180, 181, 183 mysticism, xiii, 5, 53–54, 59, 75, 78, 109, 111, 112, 181 Needham, Rodney, 9 neo-traditionalism, xvii, 31, 159, 162, 167, 169, 176, 184. See also new monasticism New Age, 14, 18 new monasticism, xiv, xvii, 3, 22, 31, 33, 157–176, 180, 184–185, 187. See also neo-traditionalism; The Parish Nietzsche, Friedrich, xiv, 37, 47, 82, 83, 84, 91, 139, 183 1960s/sixties, 11–15, 18, 62 non-religion, 1–2, 100, 151, 166, 167, 181. See also secularism; theories of secularization; unchurched obedience, xviii, 85, 104–107, 108, 111–112, 116, 127, 128, 129–130, 184 objectivity, 3, 4, 27, 38, 39, 41, 82, 83, 84; objective culture, 45–47; objectivism, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 53 originality, xi, xiii, 46, 47. See also authenticity; individuality Other, xiv, xvii, 38, 41–42, 43–44, 49, 51, 63, 85, 87, 95, 97, 109, 114, 139, 140, 145–146, 147, 148, 149–151, 154, 155, 159, 171, 173, 174, 176, 182, 185; acceptance of, xvi, 137, 138, 144, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 174, 175–176, 182; recognition of, xiv, xvii, 42, 88, 90, 91, 92, 137, 138, 142, 144, 154, 157, 175

personality, 43, 44, 55, 58 pluralism, xiv–xv, 1, 3, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18–19, 90, 93, 99, 150, 151, 161, 164, 166, 167, 168, 171, 181, 184 post-Christian, 12, 61, 100, 166, 167, 184. See also non-religion; secularism; theories of secularization; unchurched postmodernism, xiii, 3, 101 private/privatized faith, 3, 11, 54 Protestantism, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18–19, 57, 60, 66, 68, 74, 82, 100, 123, 149, 158, 176, 179–180, 181, 184 purity, 23, 46, 100, 123, 138, 142, 143, 148, 150–153, 154, 156, 169, 185–186. See also boundaries; compassion; judgment/judgmental race/ethnicity, 2, 12, 24, 31, 61, 100, 146, 165–166, 187 rationality/rationalization, 3, 4–5, 6–7, 9–10, 11, 18–19, 60, 69–70, 71, 79, 81, 93, 179–180; instrumental rationality/ Zweckrationalität, 4, 180–181, 183; irrational, 3, 9, 10, 11 relationality/intersubjectivity, xi, xiv, xvi, 21, 24, 54, 57–59, 60, 90, 91–92, 95; relational self, xiii, xviii, xix, 24, 38, 41–44, 58, 72–74, 76, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94, 126, 137, 140, 141, 144, 159, 164, 165, 168, 175, 176, 180, 181. See also compassion; Other relationship (with God/sacred), 13, 59, 68, 72, 94, 102, 104, 106, 111–113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 125, 130, 137, 150, 153, 154, 169, 170 relationships (human), xi, xiv, xvi, xviii, xix, 2, 26, 27–28, 29, 30, 33, 38, 51, 54, 56, 59, 61, 62–64, 65–66, 68–71, 72–74, 76, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 104, 106, 114, 115, 119, 126–128, 130, 134, 135, 137, 140, 141, 143, 144–147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163–164, 166, 167, 168, 169–170, 171, 172–176, 181, 182–183, 185, 186; modernity’s effect on, 4, 6, 7, 8 religion, xii, xiii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11–19, 22–23, 30, 31, 32, 39, 49, 51,

Index 53–76, 94; Form/Content, 37–39, 48, 50, 51, 55, 75, 79; religiosity/ Religiosität, xiii, xv, 2, 39, 51, 53–55, 56–59, 70, 72, 75, 77, 78–84, 94, 120, 122, 158, 163, 164, 167, 169, 181, 182–183 responsibility/accountability, 85–86, 87, 88, 90–91, 95, 106, 111, 112, 130, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176 Ruel, Malcolm, 9 sacralization, xiv, xv, xix, 23, 120–126, 127–135, 182, 184; sacred in, xix, 10, 11, 13, 14, 28, 120, 121, 122–123, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 145, 184. See also boundaries; purity salvation, xix, 29, 57, 58, 62, 72, 79, 84, 112, 138, 146, 148–151, 155, 156, 185 Sartre, Jean Paul, xii, 77, 86–87, 88, 95, 98, 110, 111, 119, 126 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 47, 81 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 138, 139, 140 science, 6, 10, 18, 53, 56, 57, 60, 71, 79, 81, 180 secularism, 1–2, 3, 4, 53, 55, 74, 100, 120, 121, 123, 145, 166, 171, 180, 184. See also non-religion; theories of secularization; unchurched self, ix, x, 7, 13–14, 21, 22, 42–44, 57–58, 79–84, 85, 86–87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 98–99, 104, 106, 109, 111, 112, 116, 176, 184. See also consciousness; relationality/intersubjectivity self-expression, 13–14, 15, 81, 98, 99, 106, 116, 184 self-realization, 10, 83–84, 89, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 108, 109, 110–111, 112, 114, 116 self-transcendence, 1, 19, 21, 38, 48–50, 51, 54, 59, 69, 76, 77, 78–88, 92, 94, 95, 97, 101, 102, 104, 107–113, 114–115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 126, 130, 157, 176, 181, 182, 183–184 serving/ministering, 63, 66, 103, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 123, 126–130, 133, 134, 135, 144–145, 146, 147, 155, 157, 166, 170, 175. See also sacralization Smart, Ninian, 9

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Simmel, Georg, x–xi, xii, xiii, 3, 21, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35–51, 53–60, 69, 70, 71–72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78–79, 80–84, 85, 90–91, 94, 95, 102, 107, 110, 111, 124, 125, 138–140, 142, 181, 182–183; I and Thou, 38, 41–44, 49, 51, 94; individual law, 77, 80–84, 90–91, 94, 111, 139, 140; Leben/ Lebensphilosophie/philosophy of life, 37, 38, 47–51, 79, 84; Wechselwirkung/ relationality, x, xiii, 32, 37–41, 51, 52n2, 54, 57–59, 60, 75, 87, 88, 182–183. See also relational self; relationships (human) sociology (of religion), x, xi, xviii, 2–3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 14–15, 16–18, 21, 23–24, 141 spirituality, 14, 15, 18, 61–62, 63, 114, 116, 120, 125, 127, 130, 135, 146, 157–158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 168, 169, 170–171, 172, 176 subcultures, xii, 16, 98, 99, 100, 103 subjectivity/subjectivism, xi, xiii, xiv, 11, 13, 14, 38, 44–47, 49, 51, 54, 71, 75, 78–79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99, 142, 182, 183, 184 Tambiah, Stanley, 9–10 Taylor, Charles, xii, xiv, 7, 13, 77, 88–90, 91 The Parish, xvii, 24, 27, 31, 32, 169–171, 172–173. See also new monastics; neotraditionalism theories of secularization, 7, 8, 11–12, 88. See also non-religion; secularism; unchurched Tönnies, Ferdinand, 4 tradition, x, xiii–xiv, 3, 7, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 74, 78, 90, 92–93, 97, 100–102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119–120, 121, 122, 123, 124–126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 135, 145, 149, 150, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 180, 182, 183–184, 186; traditional church, 53, 63–64, 66, 74, 100, 103, 179. See also neo-traditionalism transcendence/immanence, 14, 18, 23, 48, 49, 50, 53, 57, 59, 78, 79, 85, 87, 88, 95, 104, 112

214 trust, 107, 113, 114, 160, 183 truth/true, 3, 6, 11, 14, 16, 18, 22, 40–41, 61, 62, 70, 74, 85, 86–87, 99, 101, 102, 110, 115, 149–150, 153, 179, 183 Tylor, E. B., 8 unchurched, 61–65, 68. See also nonreligion; secularism, theories of secularization unity, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50–51, 54, 56, 57–59, 60, 75, 76, 139, 140, 142, 143, 183

Index values, 7, 101, 102, 104, 119, 121–122, 123–124, 134, 144, 145, 154, 156, 163, 168, 171, 176, 185. See also ethics vows, xvii, 31, 158, 159, 160, 162, 168, 172, 173, 176, 184, 187. See also new monasticism Weber, Max, 4–6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 23, 53, 54, 90, 91, 181; disenchantment/ Entzauberung, 3, 4, 5; instrumental rationality/Zweckrationalität, 4 Wechselwirkung/relationality. See Simmel, Georg worship, 62, 63–64 Wuthnow, Robert, 13

About the Author

Francesca E. S. Montemaggi, PhD, is a researcher in the field of sociology and anthropology of morality and religion. She has conducted research across Christian communities on authenticity and moral identity. She has lectured in anthropology of religion and sociology at Cardiff University and conducted research at St. Mary’s University, London, and at the Woodbrooke Centre for Quaker Studies.

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