Australia’s Pursuit of an Independent Foreign Policy under the Whitlam Labor Government: The Achievements and Limitations of a Middle Power [1 ed.] 9781003380467, 9781032461861, 9781032461878

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AUSTRALIA’S PURSUIT OF AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE WHITLAM LABOR GOVERNMENT

Examining a series of episodes in Australia’s foreign relations under Whitlam, the author pays attention to a broad range of hitherto insufficiently researched domestic and international issues in Australian’s foreign relations of the early 1970s. The election of the Whitlam-led Labor Government in December 1972 ushered in fresh ideas and audacious initiatives in Australia’s foreign policy. Whitlam’s approach was shaped by a vision of taking Australia forward to its “rightful” and “independent” place in the future of the Asia-Pacific region. They range from immigration policy and the abolition of appeals from Australian Courts to the Privy Council to such major international issues as the Anglo-American base in Diego Garcia, French nuclear testing in the Pacific and the Five-Power Agreement with respect to Malaysia and Singapore. He demonstrates how the pursuit of foreign policy independence repeatedly placed the Whitlam Government in a position wedged in between Australia’s traditional allies and the Third World; and how it navigated Australia’s national interests on a series of dilemma situations involving conflicting strategic interests between Australia and its traditional allies, and those between major powers and the non-aligned countries. The analysis presented in this book contributes to not only historical literature on the subject but also the understanding of how a middle power, like Australia, can navigate intensifying great power rivalry. Essential reading for scholars of Australian foreign policy, as well as being an invaluable case study of middle power diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Changwei Chen is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the School of International Studies, Peking University. His research interests include the diplomatic history of China, the United States and Australia. He has authored three books and contributed to numerous publications, including Historical Research, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, History Australia, and The Journal of Australian Studies.

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Australia’s Pursuit of an Independent Foreign Policy under the Whitlam Labor Government The Achievements and Limitations of a Middle Power Changwei Chen

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Changwei Chen The right of Changwei Chen to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-46186-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-46187-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-38046-7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467 Typeset in Galliard by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)

For Qiongyi, Yangyue and Liuyi

Contents

List of acronyms and abbreviations viii Key people ix Acknowledgements xii Author xiv Introduction 1 1 Not a “camp-follower” anymore

35

2 In pursuit of judicial independence

64

3 From “forward defence” to “continental defence”

87

4 The spectre of nuclear testing

115

5 Stuck between two worlds

143

6 The triumph of realism

173

Conclusion 194 Index 204

Acronyms and abbreviations

AHC ANZAM ANZUK ANZUS ASEAN ASPAC AUKUS

Australian High Commission Australia, New Zealand and Malaya (area) Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Security Treaty) Association of Southeast Asian Nations Northeast Asia, the Asian and Pacific Council Trilateral Security Pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory DFA Department of Foreign Affairs (Canberra) EEC European Economic Community FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London) FPDA Five-Power Defence Arrangements FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States HMG Her Majesty’s Government (British Government) IADS Integrated Air Defence System IOPZ Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone JCS United States Joint Chiefs of Staff LCP Liberal-Country Party NAA National Archives of Australia NAUK National Archives of the United Kingdom NLA National Library of Australia SEATO South-East Asia Treaty Organisation UKUSA United Kingdom – United States of America Agreement USDDO US Declassified Documents Online VOA Voice of America WIE Whitlam Institute E-Collection

Key people

Name

Position

Nationality

Aiers, David Pascoe

British diplomat. Counsellor in Singapore from 1965 to 1968; Head of the SW Pacific Department at the FCO from 1968 to 1971; and then Minister at British High Commission in Australia from 1971 to 1975. Australian High Commissioner to Britain, 1973–1974 Premier of New South Wales, 1965–1975 Sri Lankan Prime Minister, 1972–1977

British

Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, 1972–1974 Premier of Queensland, 1968–1987

Australian

Australian Secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1971–1975; Australian High Commissioner to Britain, 1975–1977 British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1974–1976 Leader of the Australian Labor Party, 1960–1967 British Home Secretary, 1972–1974 Australian Member of Parliament, 1963–1977; Minister for Minerals and Energy, 1972–1975 Premier of Western Australia, 1974–1982 British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1970–1974

Australian

Armstrong, John Askin, Robert Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Barnard, Lance Bjelke-Petersen, Johannes Bunting, John

Callaghan, James Calwell, Arthur Carr, Robert Connor, Rex Court, Charles Douglas-Home, Alec

Australian Australian Sri Lankan

Australian

British Australian British Australian Australian British

(Continued)

x  Key people (Continued) Name

Position

Downer, Alexander R. Australian Minister for Immigration, 1958–1963; Australian High Commissioner in Britain, 1963–1972 Dunstan, Don Premier of South Australia, 1967–1968, 1970–1979 Ellicott, Robert Solicitor-General of Australia, 1969–1973 Evatt, Herbert V. Minister for External Affairs and Attorney-General, 1941–1949; Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 1950–1951; Leader of the Opposition, 1951–1960 Fraser, Malcolm Prime Minister of Australia, 1975–1983 Gayler, Noel Commander of US Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 1972–1976 Goronwy-Roberts, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary Goronwy Owen of State, 1974–1975 Gorton, John Minister Assisting the Minister for External Affairs, 1960–1963; Prime Minister of Australia, 1968–1971 Hamer, Rupert Premier of Victoria, 1972–1981 Hasluck, Paul Governor-General of Australia, 1969–1974 Heath, Edward British Prime Minister, 1970–1974 Hunt, John British Secretary to the Cabinet, 1973–1979 James, Morrice British High Commissioner to Australia, 1971–1976 Kirk, Norman Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1972–1974 Kissinger, Henry US National Security Advisor, 1969– 1975; US Secretary of State, 1973–1977 Lee, Kuan Yew Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959–1980 Mao, Zedong Chairman of the Communist Party of China, 1943–1976 McMahon, William Prime Minister of Australia, 1971–1972 Menzies, Robert Attorney-General, 1934–1939; Prime Minister of Australia, 1939–1941; Leader of the Opposition, 1943– 1949; Prime Minister of Australia, 1949–1966; Minister for External Affairs, 1960–1961 Moynihan, Daniel P. US Ambassador to India, 1973–1975

Nationality Australian Australian Australian Australian

Australian American British Australian Australian Australian British British British New Zealander American Singaporean Chinese Australian Australian

American (Continued)

Key people  xi (Continued) Name

Position

Nationality

Murphy, Lionel

Attorney-General of Australia, 1972–1975 President of the United States, 1969–1974 Agent-General for Victoria in London, 1970–1976 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, 1968–1980 British Ambassador to the United States, 1974–1977 Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1970–1976 Premier of Tasmania, 1958–1969, 1972–1975 Australian Ambassador to France, 1969–1973; Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1974–1977 US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1974–1976 Leader of the Opposition of Australia, 1972–1975 Premier of Western Australia, 1971–1974 Leader of the Opposition, 1967–1972; Prime Minister of Australia, 1972–1975 Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1973–1975 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1964–1970, 1974–1976 Premier of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1976

Australian

Nixon, Richard Porter, Murray Rajaratnam, S. Ramsbotham, Peter Razak, Tun Abdul Reece, Eric Renouf, Alan

Sisco, Joseph J. Snedden, Billy Tonkin, John Whitlam, Gough Willesee, Don Wilson, Harold Zhou Enlai

American Australian Singaporean British Malaysian Australian Australian

American Australian Australian Australian Australian British Chinese

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to the Routledge publishing team for their assistance in the publication of this book. My grateful thanks go to Simon Bates who saw promise in the proposal and ushered the project into the publication process, to the three anonymous readers who offered valuable comments and suggestions on the subject, to Khin Thazin who provided professional guide to manuscript preparation, to Chelsea Low Yingqi who meticulously handled the manuscript up to publication. The Routledge publishing team was a pleasure to work with. This book has taken a long time to write. In the preparation of this book, many people have helped me immeasurably. I am particularly grateful to Professor Niu Dayong of Peking University and Professor Stephen Garton of the University of Sydney. Without their encouragement and support, it would not have been possible for me to undertake such a research. I am grateful to Stephen for reading, commenting and advising on the early drafts of the manuscript, and for providing valuable perspectives on historical writing. During the research of this project, I spent many long hours in the reading rooms of libraries and archives. I have to thank the generosity and friendly assistance of librarians at many reading rooms—among them the National Library of Australia, the National Archives of Australia, the Fisher Library of the University of Sydney, the libraries of Australian National University and Australian Prime Minister Centre, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, and Peking University Library. I wish to express my gratitude to the staff from these libraries and archives for their unfailing efforts to track down the material I required. This project was supported by the award of an Australian Prime Ministers Centre (APMC) Fellowship in 2012–2013. I am indebted to the Centre and the School of History at Australian National University (ANU) for hosting my research trip to Canberra. I am grateful to Frank Bongiorno for facilitating my visit to ANU and for information on the archival sources deposited in Canberra. I am grateful to David Jolliffe, Toni Dam of the APMC for their valuable assistance during my time there. I am grateful to John Romeril, a brilliant playwright (who was also an APMC Fellow in Canberra during 2012–2013),

Acknowledgements  xiii for providing valuable perspectives on Australia’s political culture of the 1970s and hosting my visit to Melbourne. From the start, while preparing this book, I have also received generous and enthusiastic encouragement from colleagues, friends and students in the School of International Studies, the Australian Studies Centre, the Yenching Academy at Peking University. David Walker, Greg McCarthy and Pookong Kee—BHP Chairs of Australian Studies at Peking University from 2013– 2022—were all supportive of the project at key stages. I am particularly grateful to Pookong Kee and Kevin Hobgood-Brown for their interest in the project and encouraging me to get the manuscript published. A research grant from the Institute of Area Studies at Peking University also enabled me to bring this project to its final completion. I must in addition make my acknowledgments to George Glanville, Peter Bentley, Rory O’Malley, Karen Walker, and Jatinder Mann, who have kindly read the manuscript, or parts of it and offered constructive suggestions for improvement. While I have been working on this book, I have at the same time had the very fortunate opportunity of teaching some of the best students at Peking University. I wish to express my thanks to some of them, particularly Christ Murphy and Benjamin Griffith for all their help with various aspects of the book. Daniel Huang has provided me with valuable editorial assistance on the manuscript. Finally, and most importantly, I am grateful to my family for their unfailing encouragement and support. Over the past few years, when all our lives have been disrupted by the unprecedented challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, my family has been a truly wonderful source of strength and comfort. To my wife Qiongyi, my son Yangyue, my daughter Liuyi, this book is lovingly dedicated.

Author

Changwei Chen is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the School of International Studies, Peking University. His area of research expertise is the diplomatic history of China, the United States and Australia, with specific focus on the US–Taiwan relationship, America’s alliance system, small and medium-sized powers’ response to great power competition in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to being the solo author of Australia’s Pursuit of an Independent Foreign Policy under the Whitlam Labor Government (2023), he is the lead author of a study of the US–Taiwan relationship during the Cold War (in Chinese, published by Jiuzhou Press, forthcoming), and the co-author of a study of China–US relations during the 1960s (in Chinese, published by Peking University Press, forthcoming). He has contributed to numerous publications, including Historical Research, The Chinese Journal of American Studies, The Journal of International Studies, The Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, History Australia and The Journal of Australian Studies. Professor Chen teaches courses on China’s foreign relations, diplomatic theory and practice, international and global affairs, research methodology. He has lectured and held visiting fellowships at various academic and research institutions in Australia, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Italy, Thailand and the United States.

Introduction

In an age of intensifying great-power rivalry, an independent foreign policy becomes the universal aspiration for most small and middle powers. The term independence has for different powers different meanings attached to it, yet small and middle powers, ranging from the landlock Nepal to the archipelagic Philippines, all claim to conduct an independent foreign policy.1 Australia, a self-proclaimed middle power, is no exception. However, in Australia, the formulation and concept of “an independent foreign policy” is disputable. Since the early 1940s there has been a perennial and probably unresolvable debate over the possibility and feasibility of having “an independent foreign policy.” Does Australia have an independent foreign policy? Should Australia forge an independent foreign policy? How independent can Australia’s foreign policy be? Making sense of this endless national debate requires a close look at the whole of Australia’s history as a sovereign state since 1901. Such a review will show a “transition for Australia from one dependency to another, and then a sort of mutation in that dependency.”2 Nevertheless, in the early 1970s, Australia’s foreign policy deviated from the long-established dependency tradition during the Labor Government under Gough Whitlam. Whitlam stayed in office for a mere 1,071 days (from 5 December 1972 to 11 November 1975). Yet his government left a lasting legacy for carving out a new path in Australia’s foreign policy. Thus, it is not surprising that Australians living in an age of being caught between two great powers would demonstrate a keen interest in revisiting this period, when their government explored the possibilities of an independent foreign policy. In 1972, with Australia bogged down in the Vietnam War as a junior partner of the United States, the public discussion in Australia raised questions about America’s international leadership and Australia’s own foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, Britain’s entry into the Common Market pushed the Australian Government to forge a new relationship with Britain. Should Australia pursue a foreign policy independent of the influence of its “great and powerful friends”? Fifty years later, as Australia faces an intensifying strategic competition between its most important security ally and its largest trading partner, similar questions are once again being asked: Should Australia pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy? Does Australia have the capacity and the political will to chart its own course in the world? DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-1

2 Introduction This book assesses the foreign policy of the Whitlam-led Labor Government, the most controversial government in Australia political history to have answered affirmatively to these questions, and, what’s more, to have put these theories into practice. The election of a Labor Government in December 1972 ushered in fresh ideas and audacious initiatives in Australia’s foreign policy. Whitlam’s approach to foreign and defence policy was shaped by his vision of taking “Australia forward to her rightful, proud, secure and independent place in the future of our region.”3 Whitlam believed in the importance of Australia’s independence in foreign affairs, highlighting this position at his first press conference after the becoming Prime Minister on 5 December 1972. He announced his vision of a more independent Australian stance in international affairs, an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of racism, an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, cooperative and well-regarded nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region, but in the world at large.4 As such, a number of “independent” initiatives in foreign policy soon followed the election of a Labor Government, including the diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the adoption of a strong stand against all forms of racism, an emphasis upon closer links with Japan and the countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and the reassessment of traditional ties with the United Kingdom and the United States, etc. Among these bold and rapid moves, the curious observers must ask: Why was there a problem of independence in Australia’ foreign policy? Why did the Whitlam Government decide to reorient Australia’s foreign policy towards a more independent stance? From a dependent country to a dependent ally Australia became a nation on 1 January 1901, when six separate British self-governing colonies (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia) agreed to form the Commonwealth of Australia. But it is a common fallacy to claim that an independent Australia was born with the Federation of six separate colonies. While the new nation was a sovereign country when it came to its domestic affairs, it remained a self-governing Dominion in the British Empire, with the United Kingdom kept hold of substantial legislative powers and retained control over its relations with the wider world. Before Federation, each of the six British self-governing colonies had its own distinct representation in London, and the vestiges of such an arrangement are still evident today.5 Before 1901, the UK had the power to conduct external affairs on behalf of these six self-governing colonies in Australia. Although the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 established Australia as a nation in 1901, the British Government still retained the power

Introduction  3 to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the Australian Commonwealth.6 It was not until November 1926, when the Imperial Conference issued the Balfour Declaration, that London started relaxing its control over the dominions’ foreign affairs. The Balfour Declaration of 1926 states that the United Kingdom and the Dominions would be autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.7 The principles of equality and common allegiance to the Crown affirmed by the Balfour Declaration called for new laws to be enacted to increase the sovereignty of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire from the United Kingdom. In December 1931, the British Parliament approved the Statute of Westminster, which abolished virtually all of the British Parliament’s authority to legislate for the Dominions, fashioning them into sovereign nations in their own right.8 Yet although the Statute of Westminster 1931 codified the sovereign relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom, its provisions would not come into effect until formal adoption by the Australian Parliament. In fact, Australia refused to apply the provisions of the Statute of Westminster because it believed that doing so would weaken Britain’s obligation to defend Australia should they ever need it.9 It was not until 11 years later, on 9 October 1942, that Australia formally adopted sections 2–6 of the Statute of Westminster 1931.10 With the statute’s passage, Australia gained complete autonomy in the making of its foreign policy, yet it was not until the enactment of the 1986 Australia Act that Australia finally achieved full independence from British parliament and courts.11 Prior to these developments, across a long period stretching from colonial times to the Second World War, the decision-making of Australia’s foreign policy rested in the hands of the British. Consequently, in order to support the United Kingdom both before and after Federation, Australia participated in a long list of overseas wars: the Anglo-Maori Wars (1863), the Sudan War (1885), the Boer War (1899–1902), the Boxer Rebellion (1900–1901), the First World War (1914–18), the War against the Russian Revolution (1918–19), the Second World War (1939–45), and the Malayan Emergency (1950–63).12 Despite nominally becoming a sovereign country in 1901, Australia did not establish its first diplomatic mission outside Britain until 1940 (in Washington). Before that time, the Australian Department of External Affairs, which was not established until 1935, attached an Australian Counsellor to the staff of the British Ambassador in Washington “to provide some direct feedback to Australia.”13 ­Australia’s reluctance to detach itself from the United Kingdom grew out of its reliance on Britain’s military protection and concern over

4 Introduction domestic secessions.14 The Australian Government maintained the unshakeable belief that the British Empire, emerging as a winner from the First World War, would definitively come to Australia’s assistance should an emergency situation arise. Australia still believed its best course of security was to hide under the Empire’s wing. It was the Second World War which jolted Australia into the search for security outside of the British Empire.15 At the start of the Second World War, Prime Minister Robert Menzies gave a radio address on 3 September 1939, announcing that “… in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her, and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.”16 Consequently, Australia deployed most of its forces to assist British forces, fighting in campaigns against the Axis powers across Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa.17 Back at home, Australia was also at war with Japan due to the latter’s alliance with the Axis powers. In February 1941, as the war with Japan was looming large, Australia dispatched the Eighth Division, four RAAF squadrons and eight warships to Singapore and Malaya. However, Australia military strength alone was no match for the advancing Imperial Japanese Army. Britain, meanwhile, had been under threat from Germany since war broke out in 1939 and was scrambling to defend itself. The fleet of aircraft carriers and battleships that had been pledged to the defence of British possessions and dependencies East of Suez was cut down to a single squadron centred around one battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, and one battlecruiser, HMS Repulse.18 Australia was left on its own. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 served as the final straw that led the Australian Government to reappraise its alliance with Britain. Australia came to realise that its alliance with Britain was insufficient to address the current emergency. To confront the threat of Japan, the country needed to move beyond the United Kingdom to enlist the aid of the United States. In a historical New Year’s message at the end of 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin wrote, “Without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”19 Ultimately, the Australian Government decided to prioritise its own national interests above complying with Britain’s inclinations. This shift in foreign policy represented a milestone in the growth of Australia’s nationhood: Australia was forced to wean itself from the sense of security nurtured by a “mother country” and pursue a more independent foreign policy. This action paved the way for the adoption of the Statute of Westminster by the Australian Parliament in 1942, which established Australia’s legislative independence from the United Kingdom.20 Australia was now fully responsible for its own foreign affairs—though it would take another 44 years until the enactment of the Australia Act 1986 before Australia formally severed all legal ties to the United Kingdom with the exception of the monarchy.21 After shifting its alliance from Britain to America then and ratifying the Statute of Westminster, how independent had Australia became? Naturally, many Australians are inclined to view Australia as an independent nation,

Introduction  5 capable of making its own domestic and foreign policies. However, after signing the ANZUS Treaty, Australia became a “dependent ally” of the United States. Whether Australia had achieved political independence from the United States remains a matter of debate. “The habit of dependence died hard,” said Australian scholar Coral Bell. “It has a phoenix-like capacity to regenerate from its own ashes.”22 Indeed, Australia has been paying a very high premium for the insurance policy of maintaining its alliance with the United States. Australia has not only provided territorial base to host key American defence and intelligence facilities (notably at Pine Gap on the outskirts of Alice Springs in the Northern Territory), but also faithfully joined the United States in most of its combat operations since the end of the Second World War, including the Korean War (1950–53), the Vietnam War (1962–72), the Gulf War (1990), the Iraq War (2003–2009), and the Afghanistan War (2002–21).23 Today, in Australia and elsewhere, the question as to whether and when Australia actually became independent is an important one: Unlike many countries in the world, Australia has no clear and widely-recognised “National Independence Day” to celebrate.24 Although Australia achieved constitutional independence from the United Kingdom in 1986, Australia still acknowledges allegiance to a British monarch. To this day, Australia’s historical links with the United Kingdom and its alliance with the United States greatly influence the way that people in other countries see Australia as an independent nation.25 Their perception that Australia is not an entirely independent country has tangible repercussions on Australia's relationships with countries around the world. Gough Whitlam had been considering this problem long before he became the 21st Prime Minister of Australia in ­December 1972. Whitlam advocated a more independent foreign policy Whitlam’s view of international affairs has been consistent since the early stages of his political career. One can read the speeches he made since the early 1960s and find in them a generally reliable guide to the policies he would seek to implement a decade later. Whitlam had long advocated a more independent foreign policy. Beginning in 1960, as the Deputy Leader of the Labor Party, he has been criticising the Liberal-Country Party (LCP) Coalition Government’s foreign policy for lacking independence—a position he continued to hold after becoming the Leader of the Labor Party in 1967. In a keynote speech he delivered for University of Western Australia’s Adult Education Board Summer School on 23 January 1961, Whitlam lambasted the Coalition’s foreign policy for being not “wise” or “successful.” Whitlam attacked the Coalition’s foreign policy for frequently putting Australia at variance with its neighbours.26 For Whitlam, the cause of Australia’s foreign policy failure lay in the Coalition Government’s uncritical support for, and blind adherence to, the policies of the United Kingdom and the United States. He said:

6 Introduction Since the Conservatives took office in Britain and the Republicans in America, our policy has been to follow them when they agreed and to follow the more bellicose and colonial course when they disagreed. We supported the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 although the rest of the world, except New Zealand, opposed it. We have supported the American pretence that the Government in Taiwan is the Government of China although the British and the Afro-Asians have rejected this view for eleven years. We have acquiesced in American policy on the invasion of North Korea and the retention of Quemoy and Matsu although the British and Afro-Asians cautioned against the former and have seriously questioned the latter. In the United Nations we supported until 1958 the British view that apartheid is a South African domestic matter although most of the world repudiated such escapism ever since the subject was first raised.27 For Whitlam, independence in foreign policy meant that a sovereign state could formulate policies and take positions on international issues based primarily on its own national interests instead of those of other countries. In his eyes, the Coalition Government’s foreign policy had been guided by not only the national interests of Australia but also those of its allies and, on many occasions, primarily by the latter. The Coalition’s policy was in line with Robert Menzies’s thinking that it was a completely “realistic and honourable policy” for Australia to enter war with her “great and powerful friends.” Australia’s foreign policy should not be aimed at “noisy demonstration or assertion,” Menzies claimed, and that “a little man waving a big stick is not only faintly absurd, but liable to lose his balance.”28 To a certain extent, Whitlam sympathised with the necessity of relying on external powers for security. As such, he did not seek for absolute independence in foreign policy, in which Australia could freely choose its course of action while completely ignoring how other countries might respond should they become displeased. He understood that the Coalition Government’s foreign policy was a result of history: Australia owed its origin to the federation of six self-governing British colonies, and its alliance with the United Kingdom—and later with the United States—therefore remained a dominant influence in its foreign policy. Consequently, from a foreign policy standpoint, Australians had become “a mirror image of whomever provided their primary security,” as advanced by Professor Randall Jordan Doyle.29 However, Whitlam criticised the Coalition Government for responding passively to the impact of history on Australia’s foreign policy and for neglecting the influences of Australia’s geography, primarily its geographical proximity to the Southeast Asia. For Menzies, it had been completely natural for Australia to rely on the UK during the First World War. It had also been natural for Australia to shift its traditional reliance on military protection from Britain to the United States

Introduction  7 during the Second World War, after Britain failed miserably to protect Australia. Menzies had thought that nothing should be done to impair Australia’s relations with her “great and powerful friends” at any time.30 Taking the opposite view, Whitlam believed it was both anachronistic and dangerous for Australia to continue dancing to the tune of Australia’s traditional allies in the 1960s because the world had changed markedly since the end of the Second World War. He said, “The West no longer controls Asia and Africa and the balance of economic and military power is shifting quite rapidly against the West and the UK in particular.”31 Although Whitlam recognised the necessity of continued reliance on Australia’s traditional allies (at least in political matters), he thought Australians would be committing an injustice to themselves and to their allies if they perpetually rendered uncritical support. For Whitlam, Australia’s history and geography combined to make Australia “the best bridge between the North Atlantic and the Indian Oceans.”32 Therefore, Whitlam castigated the LCP Coalition leaders for failing to serve the best interests of Australia, its allies and its neighbours in the 1950s. Moreover, Whitlam worried that the Coalition Government’s foreign policy would place Australia in danger. He saw the surge in decolonisation in Asia and Africa as posing a serious problem to Australia, which could not take refuge in its remoteness as “the trouble spots are now all around us.”33 In a speech delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Armidale, New South Wales, on 9 July 1963, he painted a formidable picture for Australia’s national security: In Europe war ceased in 1945; in Asia there has been persistent warfare ever since that time. The world keeps a watch on the Mekong rather than the Rhine. The most populous country in the world has recently invaded the most significant democracy in Asia; the agonies of reappraisal have not been limited to India alone. The risks of nuclear war which were once peculiar to Europe and North America are now also with us.34 Whitlam observed that the Coalition Government’s foreign policy had damaged Australia’s reputation and alienated it among other countries in the region. He cited Australia’s voting record at the United Nations (UN) as evidence of the estrangement between Australia and its neighbours. In the 17th session of the General Assembly, there were many resolutions on issues such as West New Guinea, China, Hungary, nuclear tests, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South-West Africa, Angola and the Portuguese Territories.35 On these resolutions Australia voted with Spain and South Africa more often than it voted with Malaya, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.36 For Whitlam, Australia’s isolation from countries with whom they had had traditional economic, social and cultural ties exacerbated the bleakness of Australia’s security situation. He stated:

8 Introduction The captains and kings of Europe have departed from our area. Britain is being drawn closer and closer to Europe. Japan is already a larger market than Britain. Forces very largely outside our control are forcing us into fundamental re-examination of our position as an isolated and European community.37 Australia had no choice but to make “adjustments from the familiar European world to an unfamiliar Afro-Asian world.”38 Whitlam viewed the election of his contemporary John F. Kennedy as the opportunity to change Australia’s foreign policy. Whitlam believed that under President Kennedy, US foreign policy would keep pace with the times and Australia would have the opportunity to be “rescued from some of the blind alleys into which she has gone in the 1950s.”39 Nevertheless, it would not be until eleven years later, when Whitlam himself came into office, that he would finally have the chance of steering Australia away from the familiar European world to the unfamiliar Afro-Asian world. Whitlam’s roadmap towards a more independent foreign policy For Whitlam, to achieve a more independent foreign policy did not mean to forgo its alliances and/or pursue an unaligned policy. Whitlam was fully aware that Australia—as a small, remote, and isolated “middle power”—must, at least “for the time being,” seek security in collective arrangements. “It is not within her province or her means to approach or settle the great issues single-handed.” He had no doubt that the ANZUS Treaty was the most important arrangement to which Australia belonged: Australia’s security was still best guaranteed by its alliance with the United States.40 However, he did not believe that Australia had to remain entirely obedient and subservient to the United States for the sake of receiving America’s military protection. He said in 1976: “We welcome our basic alignment with America but do not believe we must support every American policy around the world.”41 On the contrary, Whitlam saw not only possibilities for Australian Government to act independently within the alliance context but also benefits brought by Australia to itself and its allies through pursuing a more independent foreign policy. He believed that Australia’s allies want Australia to be more independent in its approach to neighbouring countries so that Australia could supplement and interpret its allies’ efforts. Whitlam was of the opinion that Australia’s size and proximity enabled it to do things which its allies could not. He said at the inaugural Evatt Memorial Lecture on 16 September 1966 that since Australia posed threat to no one, it was well placed to translate its “relative military weakness” into political strength in Asia. “We can play a proper role in Asia, not by withdrawal but by involvement. Socialists should bring understanding to the clamour of our neighbours for a better life. We have a particular and unique role to fulfil.”42

Introduction  9 Whitlam saw a contradiction between the influences conditioned Australia’s foreign policy—that between Australian history and geography. By history, Whitlam meant Australia’s past as a colony of Britain until 1901 and its traditional alliance with the United Kingdom and the United States. By geography, Whitlam referred to Australia’s geographical proximity to Asia. He criticised the LCP Coalition Government for allowing Australia’s history to be the primary factor in deciding its foreign policy, while ignoring the calls from other countries of the region. As a result, Australia’s relations with its most significant neighbours, India and Indonesia, remained “the most tenuous and perfunctory” throughout the 1950s.43 Departing from his predecessors, Whitlam believed that it was entirely possible for Australia to, simultaneously, remain an ally of the United States, a friend to the large Asian powers (China, Japan, Indonesia and India), and a major actor in deciding the future of Southeast Asia. He believed that Australia was well placed to bridge the difference between the globe’s two sides—“to interpret the United States to the countries of the region and to interpret those countries to the United States.”44 For him, a Labor Government’s mission was to “bridge the gap between the developed and developing worlds, the communist and non-communist worlds, the Asian and the European worlds.”45 In order to facilitate such a bridge between the two cultures, Whitlam believed it was crucial for Australia to avoid dichotomous thinking about the ongoing Cold War. He said: The world situation is not an uncomplicated struggle between freedom and slavery, between Communism and democracy. Political freedom cannot be equated with the free enterprise systems of the west. We cannot describe South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, Spain and South Vietnam as belonging to the free world. Our ideological opposites are not a monolithic bloc. Many countries within the Communist orbit are pursuing widely different roads; we should encourage the most liberal of them… This ideological contest is only part of the problem. It cannot be isolated from the arms race which is the cause as well as the result of disputes. There is also the sharp gulf between the rich and the poor countries which overshadows all ideological differences. Those who require that the world scene should be interrupted in stark terms of black and white are not only naive but dangerous… The purpose of Australian foreign policy and Australian security are not served by moralistic affirmations of our solidarity with the Western powers and ritualistic denunciations of the Communist powers.46 Three key components formed Whitlam’s strategy for realising an independent foreign policy: asserting Australia’s independence from its traditional allies; reorienting Australia’s relationship with countries of the Third World47; striving for an independent role on the international stage. These three components echoed the three central themes of Labor’s foreign policy approach as enunciated by

10 Introduction Laurie Brereton, the former Labor spokesman on foreign affairs: independence, commitment to engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region and internationalism. Brereton argued that “all three can be traced back to Labor’s formative international experiences in the 1940s under John Curtin, Ben Chifley and Bert Evatt.”48 Even so, Brereton appeared to treat these three themes as parallel, but unrelated, goals. Whitlam, on the other hand, established coherent links among the themes: making Australia a truly independent sovereign state was the end goal; seeking a neutral position between Australia’s allies and Third World countries while playing an independent role on the international stage formed the means. Of the three, asserting independence from Australia’s traditional allies would be the most important step towards accomplishing the overall objective. Asserting independence from Australia’s traditional allies

The Whitlam Government’s dealing with the United States has been well recorded by scholars. James Curran argued that during the Whitlam period the US–Australia alliance faced its greatest-ever crisis. Australia’s relationship with the United States, a relationship that had endured the heights of the Cold War, “veered dangerously off course and seemed headed for destruction.”49 However, this was not necessarily the way that Whitlam himself viewed the US–Australia alliance during the period from December 1972 until November 1975. Although the Whitlam Labor Government generally opposed American military involvement in Vietnam, Whitlam believed there had not been and would not be a fundamental change in Australia’s alliance with America under his government. In January 1973, Whitlam explained that the change of government in Australia would not and could not by that act change the essential foundations of Australia’s foreign policy, its national interests, international obligations as well as alliances and friendships. What had been changed was “the perception and interpretation of those interests, obligations and friendships by the elected government.”50 Unlike Malcolm Fraser, Whitlam’s nemesis, who in later life equated independence in foreign policy as ending Australia’s “strategic dependence” on the United States,51 Whitlam believed that it was possible for the Labor Government to maintain some independence from America’s foreign policy (such as taking a critical attitude towards the United States’ role in the conflict in Vietnam) without shaking the basis of the US–Australia alliance. This thinking was based on his understanding of an inherent problem in Australian–American relations: if Australia, as the junior partner in an alliance between a greater and lesser power, continued to maintain a quiet diplomacy for the sake of achieving a harmonious appearance of partnership, its own special interests would always be overlooked. Whitlam, prompted by his exasperation at being ignored, believed that Australia would not only receive more attention from its ally but also be valued more highly if it shed the role of a quiet and passive partner and became a more noisy and somewhat rebellious one. Thus, during his visit to the United States in July 1973, he reminded an American audience at the National Press Club in Washington that that Australia was not

Introduction  11 a satellite of any country. We are a friend and a partner of the United States particularly in the Pacific; but with independent interests of our own… We are a middle power with substantial resources, with a people of considerable skill and vigour.52 The Whitlam Government’s determination to assert Australian independence from the United States was also reflected in its attitude towards Britain. For Whitlam and, indeed, for many Australian Labor supporters, Britain represented Australia’s past, rather than its future. Since the start of Whitlam’s prime ministership, he called for a realistic assessment of Australia’s links with Britain, stating that “our relationship with Britain is inevitably changing.” The general approach of Whitlam Government’s policy towards Britain was to make Australia’s relations with Britain an integral part of Australia’s “general international relations and not something apart as they have tended to be in the past.”53 Therefore, instead of clinging to past Anglo-Australian connections, Whitlam started his term by introducing a series of changes to sweep away the “relics of colonialism.” The changes he either enacted or proposed included: limiting the powers of the Governor-General, selecting a new national anthem to replace the song it had been sharing with Britain (God Save the Queen), designating the Queen’s Style and Titles as “Queen of Australia,” scrapping the Queen’s approval for diplomatic accreditation, omitting the reference to the Queen from the oath of allegiance for naturalised citizens and abolishing appeals to the Privy Council from Australian courts. In addition, Whitlam himself declined to accept the privy councillorship to which all Australian prime ministers were customarily entitled.54 Whitlam explained his thinking behind these changes: They are solely intended to put our relationship on a more mature and contemporary basis and to reflect the development of a more independent Australian identity in the world. Indeed, what the Australian Government is seeking to achieve in its relations not only with Britain but with a number of other countries—the United States, China, Canada, and our Asian neighbours, for instance—is to give formal recognition to what has already happened, as the necessary foundation for a realistic, more independent, more mature foreign policy.55 Whitlam’s desire to get rid of those politically insignificant —but psychologically potent —symbols of the residual British connexion was driven by his determination to assert Australian independence. For Whitlam, Britain was “a tempting target on which they can score points at small cost to improve their standing elsewhere.”56 For many years, much of Australia’s foreign policy had been essentially derivative, pegged to the attitudes of the country’s great and powerful friends: first Britain, and later the US. Whitlam indicated a clear break with the past through a change in his government’s policy towards Britain; indeed, a new Australian attitude towards Britain would be a sign for Australia’s coming of age. This attitude was exemplified by the switch in the

12 Introduction Australian vote in the United Nations on Rhodesia, and Whitlam’s refusal to agree to Britain’s request that the BBC should be allowed to survey Christmas Island with a view to establishing a broadcast relay station there.57 Adjusting Australia’s relationship with Asia

A second component in Whitlam’s strategy for realising an independent foreign policy was adjusting Australia’s relationship with Asia. Before the election of the Labor Government in 1972, Australia’s outlook on Asia had been conditioned by the Coalition Government’s apprehension over a future revival of Japanese militarism and “the extreme and aggressive posture of Communist China.”58 Whitlam, however, refused to see military strength as the only source of security. He believed that true security flowed not from military strength alone but from the political and economic relationships Australia fostered in its region. Australia would always be vulnerable in purely military terms. “Our coastline is too long, our population too small and our gross national product too limited to make a policy of fortress Australia practical.”59 Whitlam, therefore, thought it was imperative for Australia to engage with Asia on terms other than Cold War security concerns. Only through involving Australia in its region in a deeper and wider way could Australia’s security be guaranteed. Consequently, the Whitlam Government, shortly after coming into office, swung into action to increase diplomatic engagement with Asian nations, establishing diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China on 21 December 1972, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 26 February 1973 and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 31 July 1974. Whitlam initiated a dialogue partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and pledged Australian financial assistance to its development program.60 By recognising China, by supporting Asian peoples in their national aspirations and by developing closer relations with the ASEAN powers, Whitlam hoped to enhance Australia’s national security more than could have been achieved by establishing “a new naval fleet” alone.61 Nevertheless, why should regional countries trust Australia? Australia’s strong identification with American interests had alienated many Asian countries, including some Asian members of the Commonwealth (such as India).62 To win their confidence back, it was paramount for Australia to build its image as an independent country, capable of making its own judgements in international affairs. It was also important for Australia to take note of which issues were most prioritised by these countries. Whitlam understood that there were certain key issues which were exclusively within Australia’s own jurisdiction and which would increasingly determine the attitude of other countries to Australia.63 The primary impediments to deeper engagement with Asia were Australia’s history of racial prejudice and the openly racist White Australia policy in immigration program. Whitlam pointedly observed that the foundation of the Liberals’ foreign policies and attitudes towards Asian countries was grounded in

Introduction  13 their twin fears of foreigners and of communism. And “because these fears in turn focused so sharply on China and the Chinese version of communism, they were rooted in racism.” In fact, he went on, “racism was the common denominator of a whole range of foreign policies of the Menzies era, from Southern Africa to Indo-China.”64 Therefore, Whitlam sought to enhance Australia’s reputation in the region by removing the last vestiges of the White Australia Policy, by ratifying the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and by actively combating racial prejudice within Australia itself. “These measures were intended to dispel the impression of Australia as a society with prejudices and hostilities towards the people of the Asia-Pacific region,” he explained.65 Given the fact that the countries of Asia were diverse and diffuse, it was also necessary for Australia to ensure its own priorities were correct. It was unrealistic for Australia to invest an equal amount of diplomatic and economic resources on each Asian country. It was also not possible for Australia to build its relations with every Asian country to an equally satisfactory level. With some regional neighbours, Australia would “have better relations than with others,” as was the case with European countries.66 It was equally important to have a clear idea about Australia’s different roles towards different countries in Asia. Whitlam cited China and Papua New Guinea as two different examples. Australia’s central task in the case of China is to try to ensure that the opportunities for normal relations between China, the United States, Japan and Australia which were sacrificed at the end of the Korean War and sabotaged after Geneva in 1951 are not again lost when the Vietnam War ends. Australia’s own role in this can be significant but, because of our size compared with the other great powers involved, obviously cannot, be crucial. The exception was PNG. The political arrangements with Papua New Guinea—as distinct from future economic arrangements—are a task which no other country but Australia can perform and for which no other country will share responsibility with Australia … Our conduct in Papua New Guinea is the matter on which, more than anything else, we are being judged by other nations. Yet it is the matter in which, more than any other area of our policy, we have to go it alone.67 Establishing Australia’s image as a country with an independent foreign policy at the international stage

Apart from asserting independence from Australia’s traditional allies and reaching out to Asian countries, the third objective for Whitlam was to establish Australia’s image as a country with an independent foreign policy on the international stage. According to Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High

14 Introduction Court of Australia, Whitlam regarded international law as an essential tool “by which to avoid conflict, resolve disputes, restructure international relations and sometimes pursue domestic policies in order to ensure that Australia could conform with the requirements of international law.”68 About a decade before his election, Whitlam urged the Australian Government to be “be less sluggish and suspicious and more whole-hearted and cordial in promoting international legislation and international agencies.”69 After election, his government initiated an active process of ratifying international treaties. Whitlam paid special attention to Australia’s participation in international governmental organisations. In Whitlam’s mind, Australia’s geographical position and trading pattern were natural advantages, conferring greater gains than most other nations by “the growth of the institutions of world government.” And thanks to Australia’s historic associations and skilled population, “she can contribute more than most nations to the establishment and operation of such institutions.”70 Whitlam was fully aware of the scenario that Australia would need to go through a “steady surrender of sovereignty” in order to be an active member of the international community.71 But he did not think that would cost Australia’s foreign policy independence. On the contrary, active participation in international organisations would help “reforge Australia’s reputation in the international community, as an enlightened, independent and constructive player in world affairs.”72 Whitlam also saw international governmental organisations as a good place to court Third World countries. The Labor Government had already demonstrated its pro-Third World stance at the United Nations. In 1961, the UN General Assembly established a Special Committee devoted exclusively to the issue of decolonisation. The Committee of 24—abbreviated from “the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” also known as the “Special Committee on Decolonization,”—was created with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and making recommendations as to its implementation. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States were all original members of this committee. On 7 February 1967, under a Liberal Country Party Government, Australia withdrew from the Committee. Following Australia’s withdrawal from the Committee of 24, Italy, the UK and the US followed suit. Britain and America expressed disappointment with the Special Committee’s vehemence in denouncing colonialism; they objected to what was termed “constant confrontation,” and called for more amicable and realistic resolutions.73 Less than two months after Whitlam and the Labor Party were elected into Government, Australia rejoined the Committee and became an active member of the Committee. When Australia rejoined the Committee of 24, the other members of the Committee were: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Congo Brazzaville, the People’s Republic of China, Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, USSR, Sweden, Syria, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Tanzania, and

Introduction  15 Yugoslavia.74 Australia’s membership to the Committee of 24 indicated clearly which side the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy leaned towards. The above-mentioned three elements—asserting independence from Australia’s traditional allies, involving Australia deeper and wider in its region, and playing a more active role in international affairs—combined to form Whitlam’s roadmap for an independent foreign policy. The rationale behind Whitlam’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy Whitlam has been widely recognised as a radical reformer.75 Foreign policy constituted a significant part of his reform agenda. Whitlam articulated the basic elements of his position on the multifaceted reform of his government in his political memoir, published ten years after the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1975. Whitlam hoped history would remember him as a reformer whose greatness could not be tarnished even by failures. He was obsessed with the idea of reform and this obsession pervades his many political speeches and the memoirs of his prime ministership. Whitlam informs us that, after becoming Labor leader in 1967, he devoted himself to three principal tasks: “to develop a coherent program of relevant reform; to convince the Labor movement that parliamentary institutions were relevant to themselves and to their country; and to convince a majority of Australians that such reforms were relevant to themselves and their country.” Regarding foreign policy, the Labor Government’s mission was “not only to reverse the policies of two decades, but to change Australian attitudes, deeply entrenched over generations.”76 Although contemporary evaluations of Whitlam’s achievements vary considerably, his commitment to reform remains unquestionable. Paradoxically, Whitlam was fond of reminding people of the daunting task confronting a political reformer in the 1970s. A reformer, according to Whitlam’s reading of Machiavelli’s The Prince, was unfailingly faced with the dilemma of being in desperate need of support, while always lacking it. The man who introduces change into the system, he continued, has for enemies all those who do well out of the old order and has lukewarm supporters in all those who will do well out of the new order. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries who have the laws on their side and partly from the incredulity of mankind who do not put their trust in changes if they do not see them in actual practice. Whitlam therefore could not agree more with Machiavelli’s assertion that “there is nothing more difficult to handle nor more doubtful of success nor more dangerous to conduct than to make oneself the leader in introducing a new order of things.”77 It is worth asking, then, why Whitlam so persistently sought to introduce a new order of things.

16 Introduction The impetus for Whitlam’s reform on foreign policy originated partly from Australia’s domestic politics. George Kennan, the American diplomat and historian and the chief advocate of the strategy of Containment, has argued “every statesman everywhere has to give some heed to domestic opinion in the conduct of his diplomacy.”78 Likewise, Whitlam was fully aware of the close linkage between Australia’s foreign and domestic policies.79 For him, foreign policy was simply an extension of domestic policy. Admittedly, the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy responded to domestic nationalist feeling and external global détente. More importantly, the ALP’s foreign policy also served the purpose of realising the Whitlam Government’s fundamental preoccupation with its own legitimacy to govern. From 1949 to 1972, Australian politics had been dominated by one side of its two-party system, a fact that reverberated paradoxical effects on both sides of parliament: on the conservative side, the longer it was in power the more it took its legitimacy for granted; on the Labor side, there was an earnest desire to counter the perception that Labor would be “forever in opposition.” Whitlam’s aim was to convince the Australian people that there was nothing inevitable about twenty-three years of non-Labor Government.80 Scholars and politicians have observed this “question of legitimacy” hanging over the Whitlam Government—especially with respect to economic management. According to the historian Geoffrey Bolton, there was a widespread feeling [within the Labor party] that it was against the nature of things for Labor to hold office in Canberra, and they must make the most of their opportunity in the three years which were all they could expect. The mirror-image of this belief was held by many Liberal and Country Party supporters, who could not accept the legitimacy of an election which their side lost.81 In A Certain Grandeur, Graham Freudenberg, Whitlam’s biographer and speechwriter, argues that the Opposition never accepted Labor’s legitimacy to govern despite two consecutive election victories. Indeed, the LCP Coalition, instead of admitting defeat, declared a new war on the Labor Government. Other factors also contributed to eroding the Labor Government’s legitimacy, including the deterioration of the economy and the Whitlam Government’s lack of control. The ultimate expression of the growing unease among many in Canberra was the defection of certain Treasury officials who, dissatisfied with Frank Crean’s replacement by Jim Cairns as Treasurer, began clandestine contact with some members of the Opposition. For the next six months, the Opposition was closely informed of the Government’s intentions, particularly its overseas loan-raising activities. It was a clear sign that “some of the officials in the principal department of state were prepared to use their position and their knowledge to damage the elected government—and they did so,” according to Freudenberg.82 Andrew C. Theophanous, an Australian Labor Party member of the House of Representatives from 1980 to 2000 (and

Introduction  17 an independent member from 2000 to 2001), gives a more systematic analysis of the Whitlam Government’s question of legitimacy, or, as Theophanous calls it, its “legitimation crisis.” Citing Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas, he argues that: In modern Western society, it is the state which is held responsible for steering the economy … if the state fails to steer the economy out of crisis and people apprehend that this is so, this often gives rise to a state-political … crisis. This crisis often results in an upsurge of support for the parliamentary opposition (unless that opposition is considered totally illegitimate).83 If the pursuit of legitimacy constituted one of the Whitlam Government’s biggest concerns, why was its claim to governance still in question after the Labor Party won both the 1972 and 1974 elections? Whitlam answered this question in a speech made at the University of Sydney on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Dismissal: Our legitimacy as a Party and a movement must ultimately rest on our claim to reform. Non-issues of the kind that have been recently dominating the headlines are the classic device used by the Australian establishment and forces of reaction against Labor Governments and Labor parliamentarians. It begins as an exercise in the use of a non-issue to divert public attention from the real issues. It depends on the application of the double standard by “the men born to rule” against Labor. And throughout, there is a fundamental objective, to deny the legitimacy, not only of Labor governments, but of the Australian Labor Party itself… One thing is plain. Electoral success does not of itself establish Labor's legitimacy. Our opponents no more accepted the people’s verdict of 1974 than they did that of 1972.84 The “classic device” Whitlam cited referred to the Constitution and the Parliament. One reason these institutions became weapons in the hands of the Opposition to fight the Whitlam Government was the Opposition’s control of the majority in the Senate. Whitlam’s weapons to counter-attack came in the form of his reform agendas and the threat of a double dissolution. In addition to their “classic device,” the Opposition also took advantage of some incidents to seriously damage the Whitlam Government, particularly the widely known Loans Affairs of 1975 and the Morosi Affair. Surprisingly, there is no mention in Whitlam’s political memoir of Tirath Khemlani, the shadowy central figure in the Loans Affair of 1975, nor any reference to Junie Morosi and her relationship with the deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, Dr Jim Cairns. The history of the Whitlam era would not be complete without them, for they were both significant components in the political maelstrom of 1975. Whitlam tended to overlook the fact that these incidents, matters internal to the Party,

18 Introduction contributed to the erosion of Labor’s legitimacy. His focus on his reform agenda and notable silence on these “scandals” showed that, for Whitlam, legitimacy lay principally in the government’s reform program. One key assumption in the legitimation theory is that there is a Rousseau-style “social contract” between the Australian public and the government. The social contract is underwritten by a “general will” which government officials presume to know and identify with their own will. That a government should be capable enough to deliver welfare, educational, and social security services constitutes an important part of the “general will.” That is the main reason why the existing literature on the Whitlam Government’s legitimacy focuses primarily on the government’s economic and social policies. But what about a government’s ability to conduct its foreign affairs? Should a government’s ability to effectively represent Australia in the international arena and safeguard Australia’s national interest be included in the “general will”? The battle for legitimacy between the Labor Government and the Opposition, which lasted all through the three years of the Whitlam Government, took place not only in economic matter but also in foreign affairs. Whitlam himself saw this. When looking back at the Labor Government’s achievements in foreign policy in May 1976, he recalled: “There were any number of critics before 1972 who argued that foreign policy was Labor’s Achilles’ heel. It was the area where Labor was said to be most vulnerable, most suspect, most accident-prone, most dangerous, most misguided.”85 Although Whitlam believed that foreign policy had been the most successful area of Labor Government, his foreign policy had gone through an arduous test no less severe than that in any other field. The close link between Australia’s international affairs and her internal politics through the 1970s has also been thoroughly analysed by scholars. Henry Albinski, professor of political science and Australian and New Zealand studies at Pennsylvania State University, has undertaken extensive research on the interplay between external affairs and domestic politics in Australia through the study of the Vietnam War and conscription. Within these two contexts, Albinski argues that the educational system, the press, the broadcast media and Parliament helped condition public interest in international issues. According to Albinski, the Australian public long demonstrated little interest in foreign affairs for “the Australian political mood is pragmatic rather than ideological, at least on domestic questions, which are considerably more salient and absorbing than foreign affairs.”86 The Vietnam War changed this. Tracing a path through party clashes on Vietnam and conscription, stylistic characteristics of party dialogue, public protest activity and the response of the churches, academics and university students, Albinski observes that Vietnam and conscription had created a climate of public interest in Australia’s external policy and “the issues themselves have been extremely basic and even intimately felt down to the rank and file of the population.” Albinski concludes that Vietnam and conscription created an organised protest movement which heightened the

Introduction  19 Australian public’s level of consciousness for the country’s foreign policy—“an awakening which has permeated both the mass public and the attentive-interested sectors of the public.”87 As the scholar Jenny Hocking contends, before Whitlam assumed the ALP leadership in February1967, Labor’s stance on Vietnam and conscription was marked by uncertainty, indecision and division, which directly caused Labor’s crushing defeat at the November 1966 election.88 In a sense, Whitlam’s amendments to the ALP position on Vietnam, and the subsequent Whitlam reform efforts were a response to this heightened public awareness. Thus, foreign affairs became an important arena for Whitlam to claim legitimacy. Before the election of December 1972, the importance of foreign policy as a way to claim legitimacy was felt by both the ALP and the LCP Coalition. One of Whitlam’s motives for taking the initiative in foreign affairs was to distinguish himself from his predecessors whose foreign policy he regarded as being marked by dependent, racial and militaristic overtones, causing the erosion of international respect for Australia. Even before its election loss, however, the LCP Coalition Government was also undertaking a major reassessment of some of its assumptions on foreign affairs. For instance, on 3 November 1969, US President Richard Nixon announced a new policy of “Vietnamization” whereby the United States would provide South Vietnam with equipment and financial aid but withdraw American troops.89 In response to America’s initiative, the LCP Coalition Government decided to pull out most Australian forces from Southeast Asia, with only a few troops left in Singapore and Malaysia under the Five-Power Defence Arrangements. In other areas, however, the Coalition Government failed to make timely or substantive responses to other important developments on the international stage, particularly in the Soviet–American détente, the Sino-American rapprochement and the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine. Indeed, the Coalition Government’s foreign policy was still dominated by a pervasive fear of Communism. Thus, during his election campaign, Whitlam emphasised that “it is time” for Labor to take the lead in foreign affairs. On 13 November 1972, in the Blacktown Civic Centre, Whitlam asked his audience, “Would you trust your international affairs again to the men who gave you Vietnam?” More than 4,000 people who had gathered in the hall expressed their disapproval.90 Whitlam continued to say: The war of intervention in Vietnam is ending. The great powers are rethinking and remoulding their relationships and their obligations. Australia cannot stand still at such a time. We cannot afford to limp along with men whose attitudes are rooted in the slogans of the 1950s—the slogans of fear and hate. If we made such a mistake, we would make Australia a backwater in our region and a back number in history. The Australian Labor Party—vindicated as we have been on all the great issues of the past—stands ready to take Australia forward to her rightful, proud, secure and independent place in the future of our region.91

20 Introduction Although the Coalition Government was already acting to extricate Australia from the War, Whitlam was effective in painting them as principally responsible for the mess of the War. The implication was that the LCP Coalition, whose policy had been out of touch with reality, had lost its legitimacy to lead the Australian people. Therefore, Whitlam’s aim was to convince Australians that there was nothing inevitable about the twenty-three years of non-Labor Government. From now on they could look to Labor as their natural governing body.92 About this book The core question for this book is how, within this context of battling for legitimacy, Whitlam’s claim to put Australia on a more contemporary and independent footing in foreign affairs operated. This book considers the question of Whitlam Government’s pursuit of foreign policy independence in historical and theoretical perspectives, with attention to a broad range of hitherto insufficiently researched domestic and international issues in Australian’s foreign relations of the early 1970s. Its primary emphasis is on how the pursuit of foreign policy independence repeatedly placed the Whitlam Government in a position wedged in between Australia’s traditional allies and the Third World. Of particular interest is how Whitlam navigated Australia’s national interests through a series of dilemma situations involving conflicting strategic interests both between Australia and its traditional allies, and those between major powers and non-aligned countries. As one of the most controversial political figures in Australia’s history, Whitlam and his government has drawn a lot of academic attention. The existing literature has focused on particular aspects in the political history of the period. Whitlam indicates his own approach and priorities in foreign policy in his political memoir The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, which remains a key primary source for this topic, with 158 (out of 744) pages devoted to international affairs.93 More specialised writing appeared soon after this period. Good examples include Millar’s “From Whitlam to Fraser” and W. J. Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs, 1971–75.94 With more declassified documents trickling into the public domain since the early 2000s, there has also been an increase in journal articles and book chapters about the Whitlam Government.95 Jenny Hocking’s acclaimed two-volume biography of Gough Whitlam takes a political historian’s perspective.96 More recently, James Curran published several important works dealing with the US–Australian relations during the period of the Whitlam Government.97 Michael Easson offers a general discussion of the promise, creativity, problems, and influence of Whitlam’s foreign policy.98 Although existing works have covered different aspects of the politics and foreign affairs of the Whitlam period, broad-ranging and booklength studies providing comprehensive coverage of the Whitlam government’s foreign policy have not appeared. Given the more common habit of placing the United States in the foreground during this era, this book will

Introduction  21 explore the Whitlam Labor Government’s foreign policy through the prism of the United Kingdom. Why Britain? Although the departure from the British Empire constitutes a very important chapter in Australian historiography, the consistency between the Whitlam Government’s policy towards Britain and that of its predecessor has generally not been singled out for detailed examination. It is a widely acknowledged fact that by the time Whitlam came into office, change had been sweeping through Anglo-Australian relations for more than a decade. Historians such as Stuart Ward and David Goldsworthy have drawn attention to the metamorphosis of Anglo-Australian relations in the late 1950s or the first half of the 1960s.99 Recently released governmental files yield evidence that the changes in bilateral relations continued up to the 1970s. Just one year before Whitlam came to power, there was a growing concern in Canberra that Australia’s relations with Britain had lost some of the warmth and closeness that previously characterised them, and abrasiveness became a feature of Australia’s dealings with Britain. In 1971, when William McMahon paid an official visit to London as the Prime Minister of Australia, he had personal experience of the change in bilateral relations. After he returned to Australia, he ordered the Government to undertake a systematic review of Anglo-Australian relations, examining the reasons for the recent drift in the relationship and suggesting remedies for improvement. The prospect of Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the impending transfer of Australia House to the Department of Foreign Affairs reinforced the necessity and urgency of this task. More than one year was spent on this project; not only foreign policy analysts in Canberra but also diplomats posted in many other countries were involved. The result was the Policy Guidance Paper entitled “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives” issued by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs in August 1972.100 This paper was a tangible expression of the Australian Government’s concern and anxiety over the decline of Anglo-Australian relations since the 1960s. It represented the Coalition Government’s reflections on the ongoing relationship between the two countries. Its merits lay primarily in identifying the reasons for the decline of Australia’s special relationship with Britain. First, there was a natural divergence between the countries’ interests given their different geographical locations. With Australia turning to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and Britain turning towards Europe, the paper concluded that it was inevitable for both countries to develop in different directions. Second, the relationship between Australia and Britain was compared to that between a mother and her son: “The son has grown up and become healthy, wealthy and somewhat assertive, and the mother perhaps a little resentful at her diminished responsibility and authority.” Third, the fact that Australia’s application for EEC membership had not been fully considered by successive British Governments still left a scar on the relationship in Australia. Fourth, the Commonwealth link between Australia and Britain was diminishing in

22 Introduction significance. Fifth, the Australian Government needed to take responsibility for neglecting to nurture the relationship.101 In spite of these factors, the authors of the Policy Guidance Paper saw the value of the special historical connections between the two countries and hoped that the uneasiness in the bilateral relations would be only a transitional phenomenon and warmth and closeness would return in due course. In their own words, they yearned for “the pendulum” to swing back.102 Some of these reflections have been endorsed by historians. Andrea Benvenuti has argued that it was primarily due to Britain’s decision to “turn to Europe” that Anglo-Australian relations began to change.103 Moreover, the model of the mother–son relationship for that between Australia and Britain had been used for nearly a century.104 Stuart Ward has emphasised the critical impact of Britain’s first application for entry into the EEC on the decline of Anglo-Australian relations.105 Indian scholar B. Vivekanandan, analysing the British Commonwealth as an institution, has suggested that by the early 1970s the Commonwealth had become a “shrinking circle.”106 Nevertheless, for a policy guidance paper, the ultimate test was Australia’s diplomatic experience. Did it serve as an effective guidance for the McMahon Government to successfully navigate the awkwardness of its policy towards Britain? And did it realise the objective of maintaining “a special, though modified relationship” between Australia and Britain? In the view of some historians, notably Geoffrey Bolton, the five years from 1971 to 1975, more than at any time in the past, saw the erosion of formal and informal links between Australia and Britain.107 Rather than wishing for the pendulum to swing back, the Whitlam Government saw the erosion of the traditional bilateral ties as both inevitable and irreversible. Thus, instead of exhausting all means to repair the relationship, the Whitlam tried to put Australia on a new footing by moving quickly to shake some of the cobwebs out of the foreign policy establishment. Under the banner of reform, the Whitlam Government greatly accelerated the pace of change within Australia’s foreign policy, including shepherding reforms that the conservative governments of the late 1960s and early 1970s were politically unable to make. For this purpose, this book uses the Anglo-Australian relationship to cast more widely into areas such as American and French foreign policy, as well as the emergence of key bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia. It analyses five case studies in relation to Australia’s dealings with Britain and other Commonwealth countries, regarding issues such as immigration policy, constitutional links, defence arrangements, French nuclear testing and the expansion of Diego Garcia as a joint Anglo-American naval base. To facilitate analysis, the diplomatic relations between Australia and Britain during this period can be roughly grouped into two categories according to the nature of the bilateral connections. In the first category, the primary links between Britain and Australia are the products of history. Australia’s long history as a group of British Crown colonies before 1901 and as a Dominion of the British Empire after 1901 left extensive connections between the two

Introduction  23 countries, including shared history, culture, education, institutions (government and law), language, aligned security interests, trade and investment cooperation, and sport. These multifaceted links, with the possible exception of sport, were increasingly in decline after the Second World War due to the disintegration of the British Empire. Post-war immigration from other parts of Europe as well as Australia’s diplomatic coming of age also contributed to the decline, although shared ties of sentiment, history and culture would remain strong. By the time Whitlam came into office, these historical ties, although attenuated, still cast a long shadow over the decision-making of former colonies, particular in Australia. Australia’s policy towards Britain was also closely intertwined with its domestic politics. A major question the Whitlam Labor Government faced was: how should it deal with these “colonial relics”? In this respect, three significant connections have been singled out in this book’s case studies: immigration, law and defence. Moreover, Australia’s relationship with Britain should not be regarded as purely bilateral. It also needs to be seen in conjunction with each side’s mutual relations with other countries and regions. Thus, the second category focuses on the links connecting Australia and Britain that relate to “third-party” countries. In other words, this category covers the issues pertinent to them that are not based on their own domestic needs but on the needs originating from another quarter. Indeed, the fact that Britain was a European country and Australia a country located in the South Pacific, geographically close to Asia, became a primary determinant in each country’s decision-making in relation to the other. In the 1970s, as the British Empire’s old global framework faded into history, Britain and Australia turned towards their own respective regions to form new connections. Increasingly, the two countries faced each other not on purely bilateral terms, but as a member of regional groupings. Just as Britain started to approach Australia as a would-be EEC member, Australia approached Britain as a principal South Pacific country. These positions would sometimes lead them to adopt conflicting positions. Different national interests and geopolitical factors led to divergent policy considerations, and sometimes even friction. What circumstances drove these differences? How did the two Governments attempt to resolve them? And what was the rationale behind the Whitlam Government’s policies, when they did not overlap with British interests? Chapters 4 and 5 discuss Anglo-Australian relations within the context of their own regional considerations, where interactions were governed more by particular “third-party” countries than by imperial links. The Whitlam Government’s response to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and the joint Anglo-American effort to expand military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia are good cases to explore these questions. Whether the Whitlam era was truly a “a shining aberration” in the history of an essentially conservative nation remains one of the most most-debated topics in Australian politics.108 In respect to foreign policy, much of the mythology that surrounds the Whitlam Government emphasises its progressivism, internationalism, and independence. This book, however, sees a great

24 Introduction deal more realism and pragmatism in many of Whitlam’s much-lauded initiatives. Chapter 6 deals with the Whitlam Government’s general approach towards foreign policy. It makes the argument that Whitlam’s foreign policy was always rooted in a realistic recognition of Australia’s strengths and limitations as a “middle power,” in contrast to the more conventional interpretation which foregrounds the perspectives of internationalism and nationalism. Yet realism’s impact on Australia’s policy has also varied. Generally speaking, in the second category, Whitlam’s realistic tendency was more readily seen, while nationalism and idealism are more evident in the first category. In examining these different cases, this book tries to proceed on the assumption that policy towards Britain was both an international and a domestic issue for the Whitlam Labor Government, as perceived by officials responsible for formulating them. In seeking to understand their behaviour, the author has tried to view the problems as the policymakers of the time saw them, not solely as they appear in retrospect. I have not hesitated to express judgements critical of Canberra’s policymakers, but, in doing so, I have tried to keep in mind the constraints, both external and internal, which limited their options. This book is the beneficiary of the significant declassification of documents that has been taking place in both Canberra and London over the past few years; a substantial number of them have not been reviewed before. Therefore, in terms of the use of primary sources, this study of Australia’s policy towards Britain in the 1970s fills a gap in our understanding of the Anglo-Australian political relationship. In the period from the 1950s to the 1960s, Anglo-Australian relations were the least studied and researched relationship undertaken by the Australian Governments. During these two decades, when the Malayan emergency and the Suez crisis still suggested some convergence of British and Australian foreign policy, and when the United Kingdom remained Australia’s major source of trade and investment, little need was felt for a major review of Anglo-Australian relations. It was not until 1972 that the Australian Government produced the first Policy Guidance Paper on its policy towards Britain. Since the 1980s, there has been a trend among Australian diplomatic historians of returning to the history of Anglo-Australian relations, with a particular focus on defining the key events and developments which marked the end of the imperial relationship. Most of these researchers have focused on Anglo-Australian relations from the 1930s to 1960s, while Australia’s policy towards Britain in the 1970s has not been dealt with systematically so far. In a sense, this gap is inevitable. Because of the thirty-year rule, the governmental files on the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy did not become available until after 2005. Before the 1980s, writers on post-war Anglo-Australian relations or Australia’s relations with the Empire could only rely on an extensive memoir literature, some private manuscripts and selective parliamentary papers. Now we have access to the files from both archival depositories in Australia and the United Kingdom. The substantial increase of declassified governmental sources has made it possible to conduct a more comprehensive history of Australia’s diplomatic relations with Britain since the end of the Second World War.

Introduction  25 It should be pointed out, however, that although these newly released archives make it possible to examine these questions in greater depth, there are limitations to the use of archival material. A level of secretiveness is a common feature for most governments’ decision-making on core foreign policy issues. Moreover, the policymakers in Canberra and London were not insulated from the wider society. They were also exposed to influences from academia, the intelligentsia, the press, party politics, pressure groups, and, most importantly, voters. As the Australian diplomat Richard Woolcott noted: The Department of Foreign Affairs … is, of course, not the sole source of advice to Ministers and to the government on a foreign policy matter. In taking a decision, the government can draw, for example, on attitudes expressed by influential politicians outside the government, academic experts, the press, the representatives of foreign governments. There are also a range of interests and groups which can directly or indirectly influence decisions on foreign policy.109 Although it is a bit extreme to suggest that all the policies introduced by the Whitlam Government after December 1972 were completely new, the tempo with which they were introduced was unprecedented. Never before had so many initiatives been embraced by any Australian Government in such a short span of time. As a result, they presented an image that radical change was taking place, which aroused heated discussions throughout the three years of the Whitlam Government. Debates over Australia’s foreign policy appearing in symposiums, colloquiums and book collections became a familiar phenomenon during these years; the language of “reassessment, rethinking, review” was commonplace. Unlike his predecessors, Whitlam was a keen participant in many of these events, where he actively engaged with the public in foreign policy discussions. For example, in late January 1973, the Australian Institute of Political Science held a conference to discuss Australia’s foreign policy, and Whitlam agreed to deliver the opening speech.110 More than any previous time, the Australian Government under him was responsive to opinions from various domestic groups, and Australian policy towards Britain during the 1970s not only reflected political concerns but also expressed the concerns of the nation. Consequently, our study must move beyond the official archives and also engage with the public culture in which the policymakers of the Whitlam Government operated. As such, relevant evidence from other sources such as memoirs, newspapers, symposia and party documents, is also utilised in investigating the core questions of the thesis. By emphasising the Whitlam Government’s realistic tendency and placing the analysis of decision-making in a number of different contexts, this book will provide a different perspective through which to view Australia’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy during the first half of the 1970s. Nevertheless, as all researchers build on the basis of those who have gone before, this book

26 Introduction benefits a great deal from the many historians of Anglo-Australian relations who have written on this theme. Although a lot of the works in this field focus on periods other than the 1970s, the author found many of them useful for understanding the background of Anglo-Australian relations. I have benefited enormously from the studies of Australia’s ever-shifting relations with its great power “protectors”—the United Kingdom and the United States; from the analyses of the Menzies Government’s policy towards Britain; from detailed descriptions of Australia’s response to the British application for the EEC membership; from the analysis of Britain’s “turn to Europe” and its impacts on Australia; and from the comprehensive review of Australia’s search for a national identity after the Empire.111 This book, through the use of archival material, seeks to cast a greater light on existing historical interpretations on the relationship between Australia and Britain, and the repercussions of this relationship in other parts of the world. This research does not attempt to offer a full account of the relationship between Britain and Australia in the 1970s, but rather the diplomatic and strategic aspects of this relationship. The focus is on the governmental side of relationship. This book will venture into other forms of interaction—between the two peoples, the royal connections and economic issues, such as those caused by the last phase of Britain’s application for the EEC membership—only as far as it is necessary to illuminate the diplomatic and strategic decisions.112 Fifty years after the Whitlam Government election, Australia once again finds herself in a rapidly changing strategic environment. Even as it maintains a close alliance with the United States, Australia has also become economically highly dependent on China, a country increasingly at odds with the West. Thus, Australia’s alliance with the United States has raised increasingly knotty challenges vis-à-vis its close economic ties with China. As such, Australia now faces one of its most complex security and political challenges in its foreign policy. As the intensifying competition between great powers such as China, the United States and Russia poses significant strategic challenges for small and middle powers, Australia finds its room for manoeuvre greatly reduced. This dramatically shifting strategic environment for Australia bears a striking resemblance to a past period that also witnessed a major shift in great power relations—with the final years of the Vietnam War, reduction of United States and United Kingdom involvement in the region, and rapprochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. While this book explores a rather well-known period in the history of Australian foreign policy, it does it from an angle that highlights the importance of that period to present-day politics. The historical analysis presented in this book contains useful lessons for policymakers worldwide and will be critical to Australia’s interests now and in the future. Hopefully, this book contributes not only to historical literature on the subject but also to our overall understanding of how a middle power, like Australia, can and should navigate intensifying great power rivalry.

Introduction  27 Notes 1 “Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Nepal, https://mofa.gov.np/foreign-policy/, accessed 7 January 2023; “The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article II, Section 7,” Official Gazette of the Government of the Philippines, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/ constitutions/1987-constitution/, accessed 7 January 2023. 2 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: Dependent Ally: A Study of Australia’s Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom since the Fall of Singapore (Canberra: Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1984), 1. 3 Whitlam, “It's Time for Leadership,” Australian Labor Party Policy Speech 1972 delivered by Gough Whitlam at Blacktown Civic Centre, 13 November 1972, Whitlam Institute E-collection (WIE), accessed 3 December 2022. 4 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, 5 December 1972, at Parliament House, Canberra, WIE, accessed on 30 May 2020. 5 “Offices of Australian States Governments,” https://uk.embassy.gov.au/lhlh/ FAQsStateGov.html, accessed 7 December 2022. 6 “Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900,” https://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/63-64/12/enacted, accessed 7 December 2022. 7 “Balfour Declaration 1926 (Imperial Conference),” https://www.foundingdocs. gov.au/item-sdid-95.html, accessed 7 December 2022; “Balfour Declaration 1926,” November 1926, https://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/ transcripts/cth11_doc_1926.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022. 8 “Statute of Westminster, 1931,” https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/ pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022. 9 Malcolm Fraser and Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2014), introduction, Kindle. 10 “Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth),” https://www.foundingdocs. gov.au/item-sdid-96.html, accessed 7 December 2022. 11 “Australia Act 1986,” https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A03181, accessed 7 December 2022. 12 “Australia’s overseas wars,” https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/ Australia%27s%20wars.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022. 13 “First Steps,” https://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/firststeps.html, accessed 7 December 2022. 14 David Lee, “States Rights and Australia’s Adoption of the Statute of Westminster, 1931–1942,” History Australia 13, no. 2 (2016): 258–74. 15 “John Curtin’s Legacy: Foreign Policy,” https://john.curtin.edu.au/legacyex/ foreign.html, accessed 7 December 2022. 16 “Menzies Speech: Declaration of War (1939),” https://aso.gov.au/titles/radio/ menzies-speech-declaration-war/availability/, accessed 7 December 2022. 17 “Australians in the Second World War,” https://www.awmlondon.gov.au/ australians-in-wwii, accessed 7 December 2022. 18 “Fall of Singapore,” https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/ fall-of-singapore, accessed 8 December 2022. 19 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead,” 27 December 1941, https://john.curtin.edu.au/ pmportal/text/00468.html, accessed 7 December 2022. 20 “Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth),” https://www.foundingdocs. gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth12_doc_1942.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022. The Statute was made retroactive to 3 September 1939. The date when Australia entered the Second World War, see Randall Jordan Doyle, The Tragedy of Australian Foreign Policy: Voices of Dissent and Visions of Independence in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), 23.

28 Introduction 21“Australia Act 1986,” https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/2, accessed 7 December 2022. 22 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed.), 178. 23 “Australia’s overseas wars,” https://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/ Australia%27s%20wars.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022. 24 Australia is conspicuously missing from the long list of independence days of countries around the world at Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ national_independence_days, accessed 11 December 2022. 25 “In 2021, the tragedy of Australian foreign policy is that it is still shackled to the days British colonialism and servitude, or it is a byproduct of being a client-state of the United States,” see Randall Jordan Doyle, The Tragedy of Australian Foreign Policy: Voices of Dissent and Visions of Independence in the 21st Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), 207. 26 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?” Keynote Speech for University of Western Australia’s Adult Education Board Summer School on 23 January 1961, WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 27 Ibid. 28 Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, The Measure of The Years (London: Cassell, 1970), 44. 29 Randall Jordan Doyle, The Tragedy of Australian Foreign Policy: Voices of Dissent and Visions of Independence in the 21st Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), 5. 30 Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, The Measure of The Years (London: Cassell, 1970), 44. 31 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?” 32 Ibid. 33 Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963,” 14th Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs on 9 July 1963 in Armidale, New South Wales, WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 34 Ibid. 35 “Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 17th session,” https:// research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/17, accessed 22 November 2022. 36 For Australia’s voting record at the UN General Assembly from 1946 to 2018, see “How has my country voted at the UN?,” https://interactive.aljazeera.com/ aje/2019/how-has-my-country-voted-at-unga/index.html, accessed 17 December 2022. 37 Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963.” 38 Ibid. 39 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?” 40 Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963.” 41 Speech by the Hon Gough Whitlam QC, Leader of the Opposition on Mr Fraser’s statement on foreign affairs, 1 June 1976, WIE, accessed 23 November 2022. 42 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge?” Speech Delivered at the Inaugural Evatt Memorial Lecture of the Sydney University Fabian Society on 16 September 1966, WIE, accessed 23 November 2022. 43 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?” 44 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge?” 45 “Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects,” Address by the Hon E.G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., to the Institute of International Affairs (North Queensland), 2 May 1976, WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 46 Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963.”

Introduction  29 47 The Encyclopedia Britannica defines the term “Third World’ as a former political designation originally arose during the Cold War and was used to describe countries that remained non-aligned with either the first world—the capitalist, economically developed states led by the US—or the second world—the communist states led by the Soviet Union. When the term was in vogue, the Third World was broadly comprised of the developing world, the former colonies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the term Third World has decreased in use. This book adopts this terminology because it is more appropriate to the period about which this book is discussing. As the reader will see, the term “Third World countries” appeared quite frequently in the speeches made by politicians of the 1970s. 48 Laurie Brereton, “The Outlook for Australian Foreign Policy: A Labor Perspective,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3 (2001): 343–49. 49 James Curran, “On Whitlam and the US alliance,” published 22 October 2014, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/whitlam-us-alliance, accessed 3 December 2022. 50 “Opening address by the Prime Minister,” in Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, ed. Gordon McCarthy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973), 1. 51 Malcolm Fraser and Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2014). 52 Press Release “Prime Minister’s Address to the National Press Club, Washington” 31 July 1973, WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 53 “Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit – 1 May 1973,” WIE, accessed 2 July 2020. 54 Geoffrey Bolton, “The United Kingdom,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971– 1975, ed. W. J. Hudson (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980), 220. 55 “Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit – 1 May 1973.” 56 “The Australian Labour Party Government (2)”, Despatch by the British High Commissioner at Canberra to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 5 April 1973, FCO 24/1596, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 57 Ibid. 58 Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, The Measure of The Years (London: Cassell, 1970), 50. 59 Whitlam, “Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects.” 60 “Foreign Affairs,” https://www.whitlam.org/whitlam-legacy-foreign-affairs, accessed 3 December 2022. 61 Whitlam, “Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects.” 62 Meg Gurry, “Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949–1964,” Pacific Affairs 65, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93): 510–26. 63 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge?” 64 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975 (Ringwood.: Viking, 1985), 26. 65 “Foreign Affairs,” https://www.whitlam.org/whitlam-legacy-foreign-affairs, accessed 3 December 2022. 66 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge?” Speech Delivered at the Inaugural Evatt Memorial Lecture of the Sydney University Fabian Society on 16 September 1966, WIE, accessed 23 November 2022. 67 Whitlam, “Australia and the World, 5 January 1972,” WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 68 Michael Kirby, “Whitlam as Internationalist: A Centenary Reflection,” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no. 3 (January 2016): 855. 69 Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963.” 70 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?”

30 Introduction 1 Ibid. 7 72 “Foreign Affairs,” Whitlam Institute Website, https://www.whitlam.org/ whitlam-legacy-foreign-affairs, accessed 21 November 2022. 73 James H. Mittelman, “Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 14, no. 1 (March, 1976): 49–50. 74 John McLeay, “Australia's Changing Face in the United Nations,” FCO 45/1630, NAUK. 75 BBC, “Whitlam: ‘a Radical, Reforming Politician’,” 21 October 2014, https:// www.bbc.com/news/av/world-australia-29699661, accessed 4 December 2022; Michael Porter, “Gough Whitlam the Thwarted Globaliser and Market Reformer,” 21 October 2014, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/gough-whitlam-thethwarted-globaliser-and-market-reformer-20141021-11a6d7, accessed 4 December 2022; Bob Carr, “Gough Whitlam Was a Reformer Who Saved the Alp from the Left,” 21 October 2014, https://amp.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/ gough-whitlam-was-a-reformer-who-saved-the-alp-from-the-left/news-story/ 4c988142d575623f2829145818e26b4e, accessed 4 December 2022; Frank Bongiorno, “The Reformer's Way: the Whitlam Era,” The Tocsin, no. 1 (June 2017), 23–4. 76 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 4–5, 25. 77 Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter Six, quoted in Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975; Podium copy of Speech “The Third Whitlam Lecture,” delivered by Gough Whitlam to the Citizens for Democracy and the Fabian Society’ at the Great Hall, Sydney University, 10 November 1985, WIE, accessed 5 June 2010. 78 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 176. 79 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 25. 80 J. D. B. Miller, “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities–II,” International Affairs 50, no. 3 (July 1974): 425–38. 81 Geoffrey Bolton, The Oxford History of Australia. Volume 5, 1942–1988: The Middle Way (Melbourne; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 216. 82 Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam’s Life in Politics (Camberwell: Viking, 2009, Rev. ed.), 306–20. 83 Andrew C. Theophanous, Australian Democracy in Crisis: A Radical Approach to Australian Politics (Melbourne; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 222–4. 84 Whitlam, “Third Whitlam Lecture.” 85 “Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects.” 86 Henry Stephen Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970), 4. 87 Ibid, 208. 88 Jenny Hocking, “‘Disastrous and Deluded War’: Gough Whitlam, Conscription and the Vietnam War,” Agora 44, no. 3 (2009): 29–33. 89 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War of Vietnam – November 3, 1969,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. Vol. 1, 1969 (Washington: US Govt. Print. Office, 1971–1975), 901–9. 90 Whitlam, “It’s Time for Leadership.” 91 Ibid. 92 J. D. B. Miller, “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities-II,” International Affairs 50, no. 3 (July 1974): 425–38. 93 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. 94 T. B. Millar, “From Whitlam to Fraser.” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 854–72; W. J. Hudson, ed., Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975 (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1980).

Introduction  31 95 David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, “Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian Foreign Policy,” Round Table 89, no. 355 (July 2000): 387–406; Gough Whitlam, “Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 3 (2002): 323–36; Anne Pender, “The Mythical Australian: Barry Humphries, Gough Whitlam and ‘New Nationalism’,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 1 (March 2005): 67–78; Jenny Hocking, “‘Disastrous and Deluded War’: Gough Whitlam, Conscription and the Vietnam War,” Agora 44, no. 3 (2009): 29–33; Suzanne D. Rutland, “Whitlam’s Shifts in Foreign Policy 1972–1975: Israel and Soviet Jewry,” Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 26 (2012): 36–69; Michael Kirby, “Whitlam as Internationalist: A Centenary Reflection,” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no. 3 (January 2016): 850–94; Stephen Henningham, “Whitlam and Australia’s Relations with France, 1972–75: Conflict and Cordiality,” History Australia 14, no. 3 (2017): 414–28; Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “With Friends Like These: Australia, the United States, and Southeast Asian Détente,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 27–57; Adam Hughes Henry, “Gough Whitlam and the Politics of Universal Human Rights,” The International Journal of Human Rights 24, no. 6 (2020): 796–827. 96 Jenny Hocking, Gough Whitlam: The Biography. Volume I, A Moment in History (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008); Jenny Hocking, Gough Whitlam: The Biography. Volume II, His Time (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2014); Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam’s Life in Politics (Camberwell: Viking, 2009, Rev. ed.). 97 James Curran, “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American-Australian Relations, 1972–1975.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (April 2014): 377–408; James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015). 98 Michael Easson, “Promise and Influence of Whitlam’s Foreign Policy,” in The Whitlam Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, eds. Scott Prasser and David Clune (Ballarat: Connorcourt Publishing, 2022). Available at: https:// michaeleasson.com/foreign-policy/2022-promise-and-influence-ofwhitlams-foreign-policy/, accessed 2 January 2023. 99 Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001); David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2002). 100 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives, 28 August 1972,” Serial No. PPP 40, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 5, The National Archives of Australia (NAA). 101 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives, 28 August 1972,” Serial No. PPP 40, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 5, NAA. 102 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives, 28 August 1972,” Serial No. PPP 40, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 5, NAA. 103 Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the ‘Turn to Europe’, 1961–1972 (Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press), 2008. 104 Largely due to the fact that Britain founded Australia, it was commonly referred to as the “mother country” by many Anglo-Saxon Australians, particularly before the Second World War. This is a widely acknowledged fact in many historical works. For instance, Ernest Scott, A Short History of Australia (London, New York [etc.]: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1916), 330–40; among the more recent works is Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688–1980 (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

32 Introduction 105 Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001). 106 B. Vivekanandan, The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974 (Bombay: Somaiya, 1983). 107 Geoffrey Bolton, “The United Kingdom,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971– 1975, ed. W. J. Hudson (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 209–30. 108 Geoffrey Bolton, The Oxford History of Australia, Volume 5, 1942–1988: The Middle Way (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990), 244. 109 Richard Woolcott, “The Environment in which Australian Foreign Policy is Formulated,” in Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment, ed. Claire Clark (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973), 58. 110 Gordon McCarthy, ed., Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973); Claire Clark, Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973). During 1972–73, a study group convened by the Victoria Branch of Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) to examine the key issues in Australian foreign policy, the changing external environment and long-term regional or global issues likely to confront Australian policymakers in the 1970s, see: J.A.C. Mackie, ed., Australia in the New World Order: Foreign Policy in the 1970s (West Melbourne: Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976). 111 Carl Bridge, ed., Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991); Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed.); David Goldsworthy, “Menzies, Britain and Commonwealth: The Old Order Changeth,” in Menzies in War and Peace, ed. Frank Cain (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1997); Stuart James Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001); Andrea Benvenuti, “Facing the Inevitable: Britain’s Entry into the European Community and Australia’s Policy, 1970–72,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 2 (June 2007): 251–66; Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the ‘Turn to Europe’, 1961–1972 (Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 2008); James Curran and Ward Stuart, The Unknown Nation: Australia after the Empire (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2010). 112 During the Whitlam period, British EEC membership issue entered into diplomatic arguments at many points. Some research on the impact of Britain’s 1971– 72 application to join the EEC on Australian policy has already became available; see Andrea Benvenuti, “Facing the inevitable: Britain’s entry into the European Community and Australia’s policy, 1970–72,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 2 (June, 2007): 251–66.

References Albinski, Henry. Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970. Bell, Coral. Dependent Ally: A Study of Australia’s Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom since the Fall of Singapore. Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1984. ———. Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Department of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed.

Introduction  33 Benvenuti, Andrea. “Facing the Inevitable: Britain’s Entry into the European Community and Australia’s Policy, 1970–72.” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 2 (June 2007): 251–66. ———. Anglo-Australian Relations and the ‘Turn to Europe’, 1961–1972. Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 2008. Benvenuti, Andrea and David Martin Jones, “With Friends Like These: Australia, the United States, and Southeast Asian Détente.” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 27–57. Bolton, Geoffrey. “The United Kingdom.” In Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, edited by W. J. Hudson, 209–30. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1980. Bolton, Geoffrey. The Oxford History of Australia, Volume 5, 1942–1995: The Middle Way. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990. Bongiorno, Frank. “The Reformer’s Way: The Whitlam Era.” The Tocsin, no. 1 (June 2017): 23–4. Bridge, Carl, ed. Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991. Cain, Frank, ed. Menzies in War and Peace. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1997. Clark, Claire, ed. Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment. North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973. Curran, James. “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American–Australian ­Relations, 1972–1975.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (April 2014): 377–408. ———. Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015. Curran, James and Ward Stuart. The Unknown Nation: Australia after the Empire. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2010. Doyle, Randall Jordan. The Tragedy of Australian Foreign Policy: Voices of Dissent and Visions of Independence in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022. Easson, Michael. “Promise and Influence of Whitlam’s Foreign Policy.” In The Whitlam Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, edited by Scott Prasser and David Clune. Ballarat: Connorcourt Publishing, 2022. Available at: https://­ michaeleasson.com/foreign-policy/2022-promise-and-influence-of-whitlams-­ foreign-policy/, accessed 2 January 2023. Fraser, Malcolm, and Cain Roberts. Dangerous Allies. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2014. Freudenberg, Graham. A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam’s Life in Politics. Camberwell: Viking, 2009, Rev. ed. Goldsworthy, David. Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire. Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2002. Gurry, Meg. “Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949–1964.” Pacific Affairs 65, no. 4 (Winter 1992–1993): 510–26. Henningham, Stephen. “Whitlam and Australia’s Relations with France, 1972–75: Conflict and Cordiality.” History Australia 14, no. 3 (2017): 414–28. Henry, Adam Hughes. “Gough Whitlam and the Politics of Universal Human Rights.” The International Journal of Human Rights 24, no. 6 (2020): 796–827. Hocking, Jenny. “‘Disastrous and Deluded War’: Gough Whitlam, Conscription and the Vietnam War.” Agora 44, no. 3 (2009): 29–33.

34 Introduction ———. Gough Whitlam: The Biography. Volume I, A Moment in History. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008. ———. Gough Whitlam: The Biography. Volume II, His Time. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2014. Hudson, W. J., ed. Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1980. Jones, David Martin and Mike Lawrence Smith. “Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian Foreign Policy.” Round Table 89, no. 355 (July 2000): 387–406. Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Kirby, Michael. “Whitlam as Internationalist: A Centenary Reflection.” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no. 3 (January 2016): 850–94. Mackie, J. A. C., ed. Australia in the New World Order: Foreign Policy in the 1970s. West Melbourne: Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976. McCarthy, Gordon, ed. Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973. Menzies, Robert Gordon Sir. The Measure of The Years. London: Cassell, 1970. Millar, T. B. “From Whitlam to Fraser.” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 854–72. Miller, J. D. B. “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities-II”, International Affairs 50, no. 3 (July 1974): 425–38. Mittelman, James H. “Collective Decolonisation and the U.N. Committee of 24.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 14, no. 1 (March 1976): 41–64. Nixon, Richard. “Address to the Nation on the War of Vietnam – November 3, 1969.” In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, Vol. 1969, 901–9. Washington, DC: US Govt. Print. Office, 1971–1975. Pender, Anne. “The Mythical Australian: Barry Humphries, Gough Whitlam and ‘New Nationalism’.” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 1 (March 2005): 67–78. Rutland, Suzanne D. “Whitlam’s Shifts in Foreign Policy 1972–1975: Israel and Soviet Jewry.” Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 26 (2012): 36–69. Scott, Ernest. A Short History of Australia. London; New York; [etc.]: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1916. Theophanous, Andrew C. Australian Democracy in Crisis: A Radical Approach to Australian Politics. Melbourne; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Vivekanandan, B. The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974. Bombay: Somaiya, 1983. Ward, Stuart. Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal. Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001. White, Richard. Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688–1980. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981. Whitlam, Gough. “Sino-Australian Diplomatic Relations 1972–2002.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 3 (2002): 323–36. ———. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Ringwood: Viking, 1985. Woolcott, Richard. “The Environment in Which Australian Foreign Policy is Formulated.” In Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment, edited by Claire Clark, 53–64. North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973.

1 Not a “camp-follower” anymore

After the electoral defeat of the McMahon Coalition Government, Sir Morrice James, the British High Commissioner in Canberra, reported: “At the end of 1972 a new political tide is carrying Australia in the direction of change. Novel (and sometimes ill-considered) Government decisions promise to be a feature of the year to come. The change of Government after 23 years has created opportunities for us as well as challenges.”1 The election of a Labor Government for the first time in 23 years potentially represented a major shift in the Australian Government’s stance towards Britain. Within a week of winning office in 1972, the Australian Labor Government made a number of foreign policy moves which reversed Australia’s stance on some key issues, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and East Germany. In the United Nations, the Australian representative voted for two resolutions calling for strong action to be taken against Rhodesia, an issue on which Australia had previously abstained in the votes under the McMahon Government in November.2 The Australian delegate also voted for a Sri Lankan resolution on establishing the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) and joined the Ad Hoc Study Group considering its implementation.3 These developments gave the impression that Australian foreign policy was undergoing profound change. But given the fact that by the time Morrice James wrote this report, the ALP had been in power for less than one month and that previously no specific reference to Australia’s relations with Britain appeared in the Labor Party platform, why, then, was Morrice James so sure that Labor would adopt a novel approach towards Britain? To assess whether the Labor Government’s policy really constituted a genuine departure from its predecessor’s practice, it is necessary to compare and contrast the Whitlam Government’s stance on Australian policy towards Britain with that of the McMahon Administration. In the light of comparative analysis, the chapter will highlight their differences with respect to two specific problems that arose in the latter part of 1972—the British request for setting up a transmitter on Christmas Island for the BBC and the Australian response towards new British immigration rules.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-2

36  Not a “camp-follower” anymore The difference between Whitlam and McMahon’s thinking on Australia's relationship with Britain By the time William McMahon came into office in March 1971, the divergence of interests between Australia and Britain had already become widely acknowledged in both countries. During his short prime ministership, McMahon and his team attached great importance to cultivating a good relationship with Britain. Shortly after assuming office, McMahon made it known to British Prime Minister Edward Heath that he hoped to be invited to London in the near future.4 Although the actual visit did not take place until November, it was foreshadowed and planned at an early stage of McMahon’s prime ministership. The reason why McMahon attached much importance to an official visit to London (and to the cultivation of good relations with British Government) had largely to do with his precarious position at home. From the moment he became Prime Minister in March 1971, William McMahon had been preoccupied by the search for political survival, both for himself and for his party. As his administration ran into the election year, the Liberal Party was still beset by internal strife, and morale within the party and the Government remained poor. McMahon’s own personal standing in the country was low.5 Further destabilising the government, by late 1971, his predecessor John Gorton hinted that he had ambitions to lead the Liberal Party again. Gorton’s popularity in the country began to revive, unsettling McMahon.6 McMahon felt the need to gather strength by whatever means available. According to the British High Commissioner, Sir Morrice James, if McMahon could “be seen conferring on terms of friendly intimacy with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Heath in their own capitals,” it “could hardly fail to lend him some of their prestige.”7 The McMahon Government, however, was also confronted by evidence which suggested that Australia was losing ground in the international setting, particularly with regards to its relationship with the United States and Britain. On one hand, the change in American policy on Vietnam and, more significantly, on China, gave the impression that Australia, as America’s close ally, had not been consulted. The McMahon Government desperately needed some gestures to show that Australia’s relationship with America was still as intimate as ever. On the other hand, Britain’s third bid for European Economic Community (EEC) membership had, since 1970, rekindled questions in Australia about its relationship with Britain. According to Andrea Benvenuti, British entry into the EEC “represented a formal departure from the close ties of empire that had characterised Anglo-Australian relations up until the early 1960s.”8 Therefore, the uncertainties in the domestic situation on top of the difficulties being encountered in the international scene, made it necessary for McMahon to take some major initiatives to show that he was in control. In this sense, McMahon’s visits to Washington and London were first and foremost undertaken in the search for credibility and reassurance. Thus, after he received an invitation from President Nixon to visit Washington, McMahon asked the Heath Government to arrange his visit to London as part of

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  37 what McMahon hoped would be seen as a significant engagement with Australia’s key allies.9 McMahon’s overseas tour did produce some positive results. Through those visits, he established a personal working relationship with leaders in both the UK and the US. In London, McMahon impressed the British authorities with his genuine concern for an improvement in Australia’s relations with Britain.10 Indeed, after returning to Australia, McMahon made some significant moves on things that would improve Australia’s relations with Britain. One of the major actions was taken on 25 October 1972, when McMahon announced that the Australian High Commission in London would come under the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1 November. For the previous 60 years, it had been the responsibility of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This decision was interpreted by some press as an anti-British gesture, since, under the new arrangement, Britain would become a “foreign country.”11 Actually, in making this decision, McMahon’s intention was to fix an administrative defect in the decision-making machinery affecting policies towards Britain, ensuring that British relations were in the mainstream Australian foreign policy. Admittedly, there was an advantage in detaching the Australian mission to Britain from those accredited to other countries —having the Prime Minister or a Cabinet Minister in charge of Australia’s relations with Britain conveyed the significance of the post. But the major danger of this arrangement was, as pointed out by policy analysts in Canberra, “that politically appointed High Commissioner may be less responsive to the requirements and directions of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and may tend to blanket senior Foreign Affairs representatives from important contacts.”12 Another danger was that separating Australia’s relations with Britain from the portfolio of the Foreign Minister would dilute the effectiveness of decisions, since only the Foreign Minister was in the position to conduct foreign relations in a fully informed and coordinated way. The assumption implicit in the arrangement of placing Australia House under the supervision of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was that the Anglo-Australian relationship was predominantly a bilateral one. The political management of Australia’s relationship with Britain, however, increasingly involved considerations arising in multilateral international dealings.13 Therefore, transferring the Australian High Commission from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to Foreign Affairs was a measure to consolidate Australia’s relationship with Britain, rather than degrading the relationship. McMahon also made great efforts to ensure the continuation of effective consultation between the British and Australian Governments. On 6 April 1972, McMahon sent a message to Edward Heath, suggesting that a direct telex or telephone link should be established between the British and Australian Prime Ministers.14 This suggestion was much welcomed by the British Government. In particular, as Britain was making final preparations for entering the European Community, the Heath Government wanted to ensure that relations with Australia remained as close as possible.15 Nonetheless, Canberra’s worry about the possible cost of a direct link meant that the decision was

38  Not a “camp-follower” anymore not implemented.16 After the Whitlam Government came to office, neither the British nor the Australian Government sought to re-open the question. McMahon’s third gesture was to instruct policy analysts in Canberra to conduct a systematic study of the history and prospect for improved Anglo-Australian relations. Thus, for the first time, a major review on the principal facts of the Anglo-Australian relationship was undertaken by an Australian Government. The result was the policy paper “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives,” which was approved in August 1972 by the Minster for Foreign Affairs and adopted as the framework for the conduct of Australia’s relationship with Britain.17 The final paper was acclaimed “as an event of some moment.”18 Given the fact that McMahon not only initiated the project but also took part in the discussion of the draft and approved its final form, this policy paper clearly reflected McMahon’s thinking on Anglo-Australian relations.19 The essence of this paper indicated the McMahon Government believed that, “we should endeavour to ensure that our relations with Britain are no less close than those with our other major allies, and to take advantage of the numerous existing ties of friendship.”20 In contrast, Whitlam, after his Labor Party won the election of December 1972, refused to consider an early visit to Britain —despite the fact that he received British High Commissioner, Sir Morrice James, readily and with personal friendliness shortly after the election. Whitlam regarded his predecessor’s official visits to the United States and Britain with disdain. In Whitlam’s view, the Coalition leaders had placed too much weight on these visits to the extent they were treated as a test of legitimacy. Whitlam felt no need “to go a coronation.”21 For Morrice James, the reasons for Whitlam’s initial reluctance, and his preference for visiting countries in the Third World, stemmed from a wish to indicate a clear break with the past when Australian Prime Ministers had made regular pilgrimages to London (and Washington).22 Instead in various ways the new Government sought to differentiate itself from its predecessors through changes to Honours lists and proposed changes in relation to the Privy Council (the subject of the next chapter). During its three-year-long administration, the Whitlam Government did not conduct a single comprehensive study on the history and prospect of Australia’s relationship with Britain, nor was there any evidence that Whitlam and his advisors referred to the Policy Guidance Paper left by the McMahon Government. Nevertheless, Whitlam expressed his government’s general approach to Australia’s relations with Britain in a number of speeches. In May 1973 Whitlam stated that his government’s aim was to make Australia’s relationship with Britain an integral and significant part of Australia’s general international relations and not something apart, as they had tended to be in the past. He declared that: Our relationship with Britain is inevitably changing. The changes we have made or propose to make on such matters as the powers of the Governor-General, appeals to the Privy Council, a new national anthem, the Queen’s Style and Titles and the amendment of the oath of

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  39 allegiance are in no way directed against Britain. They are solely intended to put our relationship on a more mature and contemporary basis and to reflect the development of a more independent Australian identity in the world. Indeed, what the Australian Government is seeking to achieve in its relations not only with Britain but with a number of other countries— the United States, China, Canada, and our Asian neighbours, for instance—is to give formal recognition to what has already happened, as the necessary foundation for a realistic, more independent, more mature foreign policy.23 In summary, the difference between Whitlam and his predecessor’s thinking on Australia’s relationship with Britain boiled down to their different answers to the following questions: First, what kind of country would Britain be for Australia in the future—“just another country” or “a special country”? Although both the Whitlam and McMahon Administrations regarded the divergence of interests between Australia and Britain as inevitable, the McMahon Government displayed more sentimental feelings towards Britain. While Whitlam’s general approach to Britain was to make it “just another country,” the McMahon Government would not reconcile itself to this thinking, although it found it impossible to return to the former special relationship with the United Kingdom.24 Secondly, how should the special connections between Australia and Britain be viewed, as “colonial relics” or “special advantage”? As a corollary to the difference in their general approach towards Britain, the Whitlam Government and the McMahon Government took different views over some of the factors that lay behind Australia’s special relationship with Britain, such as the Anglo-Australian connections in a shared monarch, culture, education, institutions immigration and defence. For the Whitlam Government, some of these “colonial relics” needed to be swept away, while the McMahon Government regarded these links with Britain as a special advantage in cultivating an amicable relation.25 Thirdly, should Australia sustain a closer relationship with Britain? For the Whitlam Government, an overly close relationship with the United Kingdom would impinge upon its diplomatic stance as an independent country, particularly with respect to its strategies towards Third World countries. For the McMahon Government, a close relationship with Britain (and the United States) would be a source of strength, both domestically and internationally. These differences expressed themselves in the different approaches employed by the McMahon Government and the Whitlam Government in dealing with a number of issues that arose in 1972. The British proposal to transfer the BBC relay station to Christmas Island Christmas Island had been a British dependency attached to Singapore. In 1957, it was transferred from Singapore to Australia. In July 1972, the British

40  Not a “camp-follower” anymore High Commission in Canberra passed across to the Australian Government a request that a survey be held on Christmas Island to ascertain its feasibility as a future site for the BBC relay station. The BBC existing relay station located at Tebrau in Malaysia was under threat as the Malaysian Government was insisting that the BBC station leave Tebrau by March 1975. Consequently, the Heath Government started considering Christmas Island as an alternative site for BBC broadcasts. The McMahon Government shared the British concerns. If the BBC could no longer operate its short-wave service into this region, this would represent a major loss of British influence in the region. Australia held extensive discussions on the British proposal to transfer the base to Christmas Island in July. The Departments of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet and Defence all stressed the importance of maintaining a British role and presence in Southeast Asia. In the meantime, the McMahon Administration also noted the possibility of an unfavourable reaction from Malaysia, Indonesia, and, in particular, Singapore. They were also concerned that future Australian interests in Southeast Asia might not necessarily coincide with those of the British. Following British requests blindly would affect Australian independence in the conduct of its own national policies in the Asian and Southeast Asian region. On balance, the McMahon Government decided not to come down against the British proposal but in favour of a compromise arrangement allowing for Australian control and a jointly operated Radio Australia/BBC station. The McMahon Government agreed tentatively that any radio facility on Christmas Island should be controlled by Australia, while facilitating a British radio presence in the region.26 Nevertheless, the solution was placed in doubt following the election of the Labor Government. After coming into office on 5 December, Whitlam immediately expressed his opposition towards the British proposal.27 On 20 December, he told Sir Morrice James that he did not like the idea of hosting propaganda from Britain on Australian territory. His concern was that the British proposal would create a bad precedent in the event of requests from other countries for similar privileges. In other words, it would be hard for him to refuse a similar request from the Voice of America (VOA) if he acquiesced to the British proposal. Whitlam said he had to consider all the possible “catches that might be involved” and, in particular, the possible reaction of other countries if they were offended by material put out by the BBC from facilities on Australian territory.28 Whitlam’s attitude towards the British proposal was in line with Labor’s policy against hosting foreign bases and facilities on Australian soil. As the 1972 ALP policy paper “On Joint Facilities and US Bases and Facilities” stated, “Labor is opposed to the existence of foreign-owned, controlled or operated bases and facilities in Australian territory, especially if such bases involve a derogation from Australian sovereignty.”29 Another major reason for Whitlam to turn down the British proposal was that he wanted to avoid the stigma of acting as a “camp-follower” of more powerful and important countries such as Britain. For Whitlam, “Christmas island afforded an example of

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  41 the insensibility of both Britain and Singapore to Australia’s relations with its neighbours.” He did not want to do something for Britain which Malaysia was no longer willing to do. Furthermore, the Whitlam Government was consciously taking an independent stance with regard to regional affairs. Whitlam clearly did not want British policies which differed from his own, for example, with regard to Southern Africa, to be broadcast from Australian territory. Despite British pressure at the top level, Whitlam refused to endorse Britain’s proposal for a joint feasibility study for a BBC transmitter on Christmas Island. The BBC operation was later transferred to Brunei.30 Britain’s Response to the East African Asians Crisis: Kenyan Exodus & Ugandan Expulsion In late 1972 the Heath Government was preoccupied by two related developments that also had a significant impact on Anglo-Australian relations. The first was the settlement of British passport holders (Ugandan Asians), who were forced to leave Uganda. The second was the impact on Australians of new Immigration Rules passed by the British Parliament, in part as a response to the Ugandan crisis. On both issues, to different degrees, the Australian Government was inextricably involved. The presence of South Asians in Uganda was the direct consequence of the British colonisation of Africa. In the 1890s, about 32,000 coolies, craftsmen, labourers and engineers were brought in from India under indentured labour contracts to work on the construction of the Uganda Railway. When the railway was completed most of the surviving indentured labours returned home, but 6,724 individuals decided to remain in East Africa.31 Later, British colonialism pushed Asians to penetrate further into the interior of Africa. Asian migrants began to establish themselves in the interior, including Uganda.32 These Indians gradually developed a prosperous trade with the Africans, as well as with the Europeans who settled the highlands, and eventually came to play a major role in the modern sector of the Ugandan economy, providing skilled labour, capital, and entrepreneurship, and making corresponding profits.33 Due to historical reasons, a majority of East African Asians held British passports. At the independence of Uganda in 1962, most Asian residents, instead of becoming citizens of Uganda, chose to retain their status as British protected persons (or UK citizens) and continued to hold UK passports.34 East African Asians’ dubious citizenship, combined with the perception of them as immoral economic plunderers, led to resentment among local populations and governments.35 Kenya became the first nation in East Africa to adopt anti-Asian measures, driving Asians out of key positions in the economy. In 1967, the Kenyan Government passed the Kenyan Immigration Act, 1967, requiring all those without Kenyan citizenship to acquire work permits. Consequently, most Asians encountered increasingly tighter restrictions on their social and economic activities—their work permits were no longer renewable; they were restricted to

42  Not a “camp-follower” anymore certain sectors of the economy; they were dismissed from the civil service, etc. Facing a bleak future in Africa, as well as having no right to migrate to the land of their ancestors, Kenyan Asians began to travel to England. In early 1967, a growing influx of Kenyan Asian migrants coming to England at the rate of approximately 1,000 per month.36 The Kenyan Government’s heavy-handed repression intensified the fear and accelerated departure of Kenyan Asians. In the first two months of 1968, another 12,000 Asians voluntarily left Kenya for Britain.37 In response to the “Kenyan Exodus,” the Edward Heath Government hastily enacted a restrictive immigration bill, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968. This Act was the second major step taken by the British Government to control the influx of Commonwealth immigration starting from 1962. Before 1962, the Commonwealth and colonial citizens enjoyed completely unrestricted freedom of entering Britain. The British Nationality Act of 1948 conferred a single legal status of British citizen on all Commonwealth subjects (including Britons and “colonial” British subjects). The British Nationality Act of 1948 enshrined the principle of completely free entry and immigration to the United Kingdom for all “British subjects” or “Commonwealth citizens.”38 In 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan imposed controls on the entry of all Commonwealth citizens, with the exception of UK citizens born in the UK or those holding UK passports issued by the UK Government. The citizens of all Commonwealth states except the UK, and UK citizens who held passports issued by a colonial government, were both subject to those controls. However, according to James S. Read, there was a flaw in the immigration control system introduced by the Macmillan Government. The control system was intended to cover all Commonwealth subjects at all times. After independence of a former dependency, however, UK citizens living there could obtain their passports from the office of the High Commissioner who represented the UK Government itself. Thus, UK citizens in East African states, having been subject to the controls imposed by the UK legislation before independence, escaped from these controls after independence.39 This was the situation which led to the growing exodus from Kenya in 1967, which opened British policy-makers’ eyes to the loopholes in the legal framework of British immigration. Consequently, the UK Government introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, adding an additional condition for free entry into the UK: not only did the UK citizen have to hold a UK passport issued by the UK Government, but also he, or at least one of his parents or grandparents, must have been born, naturalised, registered, or adopted in the UK; otherwise, the immigration controls were applicable to him.40 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 was geared towards keeping diasporic subjects out. However, it provoked a growing influx of East African Asians coming to the UK border, as they worried that the British borders would be permanently closed. The Asian community in Uganda had been placed under great pressure by a string of legislative measures introduced by Milton Obote’s Government

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  43 since 1969.41 By implementing new anti-Asian measures in Uganda, President Milton Obote attempted to use the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 as a tool to undermine British legitimacy.42 The British Government negotiated with the Obote Government but no agreed solution had been reached. However, it would be General Idi Amin, Obote’s successor who executed the plan of expelling the Asians.43 Idi Amin, the commander of the Ugandan Army since 1970, seized power in Uganda by a military coup d’état on 25 January 1971. Six months later, Amin ordered the expulsion of the Asians population domiciled in Uganda, giving them 90 days to leave the country. The Ugandan government accused Ugandan Asians of hoarding wealth and goods to the detriment of indigenous Africans, “sabotaging” the Ugandan economy. Amin bluntly declared that it was Britain’s responsibility of taking care of “British subjects who were of Asian origin” since most of them held passports of the United Kingdom. The situation in Uganda echoed what had happened in Kenya a few years earlier. The Heath Government originally stuck to its electoral pledge, not allowing any further large-scale immigration into Britain. At first, Edward Heath did his utmost to persuade Amin to change his mind via diplomatic channels. But none of the diplomatic measures proved effective. Heath had to declare that the British Government had a “moral duty” to accept the unfortunate expelled Ugandan Asians because “Uganda was still part of the Commonwealth.”44 In an attempt to ease some of the burden, the Heath Government turned to the United Nations and many other nations (including Australia) for a coordinated solution to the Ugandan problem.45 In the first place, Britain turned to India for a solution to the Uganda Asian crisis. The Indian Government, however, tried to shirk its responsibility. After the Kenyan restrictions of 1967 and the enactment of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, India adopted the line that British passport holders in East Africa were the responsibility of Britain, since India did not allow dual citizenship under the Constitution and the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955.46 The frustration in India urged British policy-makers to seek help elsewhere, The Heath Government, facing enormous pressure to resist accepting expelled Ugandan Asians, believed it could turn to other Commonwealth countries for help. Australia, Canada and New Zealand, were obvious candidates because of their close ties with Britain. But both Australia and New Zealand took a pragmatic approach towards the issue, expressing the view that they were interested only in small numbers of professionals and highly skilled labourers in some specific sectors, such as medicine and engineering. In the end, by 1 December 1972, Australia had approved only a total of 477 applications for immigrant visas from Ugandan Asians, New Zealand 27 (with a further 139 applications were under consideration). However, Canada was willing to take more than token numbers, approving a total of 6,300 applications.47 Britain took the greatest share of the emigrants, some 25,000 people.48

44  Not a “camp-follower” anymore The Anglo-Australia interaction over the Ugandan Asian crisis Klaus Neumann, an expert on the history of Australia’s response to refugees at the University of Melbourne, examines Australia’s response to the 1972 expulsion of Asians from Uganda by situating Australia’s contribution to relieving the plight of the Ugandan Asians in the wider context of the international response. Neumann compares the policies of the McMahon and Whitlam Governments, and contrasts them with those of the Howard Government. He concludes that there has been a long tradition of bipartisanship regarding Australia's approach to refugees. The Whitlam Government’s position on Asian Ugandan expellees hardly departed from that advocated by his predecessor— both emphasised the point that Australia’s own national interests should come before other humanitarian considerations.49 The focus of Neumann’s approach is on the expulsion of Ugandan Asians as an international refugee crisis, and the Australian position vis-à-vis British requests receives only brief treatment. In reality, the Anglo-Australia interaction over the Ugandan Asian crisis was closely related to a more direct policy affecting Australia when the Heath Government initiated a significant change in its immigration legislation. In order to control the influx of a large number of Commonwealth immigrants since the 1950s, the Heath Administration passed a new Immigration Act in October 1971.50 A year later, amidst the panic brought on by the Ugandan Asian problem, the Conservative Government proposed two further Immigration Rules to implement this act. The Immigration Act 1971 replaced the previous Acts, including that of 1968, and established an integrated system of laws for all immigrants, whether Commonwealth citizens, UK citizens or aliens. The 1971 Immigration Act and its rules were also designed to facilitate Britain’s future membership of the European Economic Community. One condition for UK membership was to ensure the free movement of British and EEC passport holders between Britain and other EEC countries.51 The most conspicuous feature of the 1971 Immigration Act was its redefinition of those who were entitled to enter the UK free of immigration controls. It adopted a single system for control of entry to Britain by the introduction of the new concept of “patrials” who had the “right of abode” in the UK. Under the new immigration system, the historic division between “alien” and “British subject” was replaced by the categories of “patrial” and “non-patrial.” According to Reginald Maudling, British Home Secretary, three types of people were defined as patrials: first, citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies whose parents or grandparents were born in the UK; secondly, citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who, at any time, have been settled in Britain for five years; thirdly, any Commonwealth citizen who had a father or mother or grandparent born in the United Kingdom. Others outside of this category were defined as non-patrials. Patrials enjoyed the right of abode and the freedom to come and go without being subject to any immigration control, while non-patrials were liable to many restrictions in their entry and stay in UK.52 The concept of “patrials” would have the effect of

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  45 making a distinction between categories of UK citizens and Commonwealth citizens on ethnic or racial criteria. The purpose of the Act and the Rules was therefore to deny thousands of British passport holders of Asian descent in East Africa the unrestricted right of entry to the UK since most of them were unlikely to be British citizens by descent. The main issue of contention about the Act and the Rules, however, was that they offered preference to EEC nationals in entering Britain over nonpatrial Commonwealth citizens who did not have direct family contacts in Britain. Under the relevant Rules almost 200 million European aliens now had the right of unrestricted entry not merely to take but even to seek work in the UK.53 In the British Parliament, some anti-EEC Tories objected to the Immigration Rules on the grounds that “they were in part consequential regulations arising from Britain’s membership of the EEC”. Those speaking for a “white Commonwealth” protested against them because “they (the Rules) discriminate against the kith and kin from Australia, New Zealand and Canada.”54 This opposition was reinforced by a campaign against the proposed Immigration Rules led by Sir Max Aitken, owner of the populist newspaper the Daily Express. Canadian and a staunch advocate of British imperial preference, Aitken was deeply concerned about the large influx of British passport holders from Africa. Consequently, he organised a flurry of critical articles in his newspaper. These articles detailed a series of stories about the hardships that the new immigration law had imposed on both the Australian immigrants and their British relatives. The Daily Express also published letters from readers and editorials demanding that the British Government should finally face up to the question of “British Kinship” and should realise that the “the old Commonwealth is quite simply an extension of the British race overseas.” The newspaper called for Edward Heath to eliminate impediments to Australians entering the United Kingdom, and warned that otherwise he would face the consequence in two forthcoming by-elections.55 This campaign attracted public and parliamentary attention. It highlighted the effect the new Immigration Rules would have on the respective rights of entry into Britain for Commonwealth citizens and EEC nationals. A potent emotional plea was formed from the mixing of genuine sentiment of kinship with the Old Commonwealth, racial preference for the Old Commonwealth, and opposition to Britain’s entry into the Common Market. The issue of alleged discrimination against Commonwealth citizens, in favour of EEC nationals, under the new immigration rules, continued to make press headlines.56 The Daily Express campaign also tried to mobilise emotional attachments forged in successive wars and recognition of wartime assistance from Old Commonwealth countries. Some readers posed the question to the Heath Government: “The sons and daughters of Australia, New Zealand and Malta, have fought for the mother country, Britain, in two wars. Is our overseas European culture now meaningless to Britain’s politicians and Commonwealth an empty word?”57 The campaign even found its echo in Australia.

46  Not a “camp-follower” anymore On 18 November, as reported by John Monks in Sydney, Sir Max Aitken and his Daily Express were front-page news in Australia, and most newspapers carried Sir Max Aitken’s “Defence of the Relationship between Britain and Australia, Canada and New Zealand.” Australians had previously believed that no one in Britain cared: “Now Sir Max has changed all that.” The report also referred to a Labor attack on the Australian Prime Minister for failing to put Australia’s case more strongly in Britain.58 The campaign reached a climax on 22 November 1972, when the Daily Express published a Harris Poll showing significant public support for three things: first, priority in jobs for people from Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries; secondly, free entry into Britain of people from Australia, New Zealand and “other countries colonised by Britain”; and thirdly, for the negotiation of special privileges in the Common Market for “countries like Australia and New Zealand where the inhabitants are of British stock.”59 On the same day, in the British House of Commons, the Heath Government was defeated on a Motion relating to the Immigration Rules for Control on Entry and Control after Entry by 275 to 240 votes. This defeat was brought about by the vote of seven Conservative backbenchers against the Heath Government, the abstention of up to forty more, and the combined opposition of Labour and Liberal members. As a result, the Government was requested to take these rules back, redraft and change the most offensive provisions and bring them back to the House for its further consideration within 40 days.60 The vote was the first time, with one minor wartime exception, that a British Government had been defeated on a matter of importance in post-Second World War British Parliamentary history, and it reflected broad backbench dissatisfaction with the Heath Government’s management of the immigration issue.61 This outcome was hailed by the Daily Express as a triumph for its campaign.62 In the meantime, the Australian High Commission received a considerable number of letters and calls from United Kingdom nationals criticising the Immigration Rules and expressing sympathy with what was assumed to be the Australian position.63 The Australian Coalition Government, however, had been adopting a stance of making no official comments on British immigration policy. When William McMahon visited London in November 1971, the subject of immigration was not raised at all in any of his bilateral talks with British officials.64 But the McMahon Government had to develop a position on the Ugandan Asian crisis in August 1972. In the end their preferred response to the crisis was continued silence and an official position that this had nothing to do with Australia. In spite of Britain’s attempt to persuade the Australian Government to take as many as possible of the Asians displaced from Uganda, the Australian Government was not willing to accede to the British Government’s request. Immigration, particularly coloured immigration, was a highly charged subject in Australia and the Coalition Government felt unable to accede to the British request. In late August 1972, the McMahon cabinet discussed the issue and

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  47 decided that Australia would not depart from its established immigration policy—Australia would accept certain expelled persons from Uganda only if they were qualified for entry under normal immigration policy. British officials were concerned at Australia’s selective policy towards the expelled Ugandan Asians, whereby Australia would end up resettling only the most highly qualified Ugandan Asians and Britain would be left only with “the grocers and barbers.”65 Finally, some 500 Asians were authorised to enter Australia from Uganda.66 In spite of the fact that the publication of the new British Immigration Rules and the outbreak of the Ugandan Asian crisis aroused serious concern among officials in Canberra, the McMahon Government tried to avoid any definitive position on either issue for fear of highlighting Australia’s own continuing restrictive immigration policy. Under pressure with respect to Ugandan Asians, the McMahon Government resorted instinctively to restriction, which indicated the depth of commitment in the Coalition (and presumably they thought the wider community) to “white Australia.” There was a trade that the McMahon Government was not willing to make—any request for preferential treatment in the new British Immigration Rules might put the Government in the position of having to make special efforts to help Britain in the Ugandan Asian crisis. Thus, Canberra was quite unwilling to make a fuss over Britain’s new immigration policy. Some officials within the Australian Government, however, advocated a more compassionate approach towards Britain’s difficulty and requested a similar reciprocity from Britain as well. Australia’s High Commissioner in London, Alexander R. Downer (former Australian Minister for Immigration), argued that Canberra’s refusal to admit Ugandan Asians outside the regular immigration policy would damage Australia’s standing in the world.67 Regarding the entry of Australians into Britain, Downer also requested the British Government to treat Australians in a way “which indicates quite clearly they are members of the Commonwealth and should be treated as such.”68 No matter how hard Australian and British Government officials attempted to downplay the possible impact that the new Immigration Rule would have on Australian immigrants, the Rule represented a fundamental reorientation in Anglo-Australian relations. It was a significant step in an evident evolution of policy towards greater separation between Britain and Australia, especially with the prospect of British entry into the European Common Market. After the new British law was announced, there was an outburst of emotional denouncements of the new Immigration Rules in the Australian press. For some people, limiting of the freedom of Australians to live and work in Britain was a small but unsettling step toward “something of a watershed in Australia’s history.”69 Both The West Australian and The Australian of 2 November took a very strong stand on the issue, suggesting that the Commonwealth would disintegrate more rapidly because of the new laws.70 Consequently, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary, sought to clarify the British Government’s situation on 18 November 1972. He refuted the charges that Britain was not

48  Not a “camp-follower” anymore eager to admit Commonwealth citizens—according to his explanation it was simply not true that they would be reduced to the status of aliens after 1 January 1973. He noted the fact that, between January and August 1972, only 48 Australians and 68 New Zealanders had been refused admission, while 108,880 Australians and 25,704 New Zealanders were allowed in.71 The campaign organised by the Daily Express was instrumental in drawing the British public’s attention to the new Immigration Bill and incited a feeling that the changes introduced by the Heath Government seriously affected the bond between Britain and old Commonwealth countries. In a highly emotional context, the Australian High Commission in London was placed in a dilemma as to whether or not it should make any comment on the situation. But the Commission was very reluctant to have Australian Government attitudes publicised. On 20 November, the Commission rejected a request from Independent Television News to interview Australians about the new British Immigration Rules inside the main reception area of Australia House.72 In fact, W. B. Pritchett, the acting Commissioner, made a great effort to prevent inappropriate information about Australian Government attitudes from being spread. Earlier, however, Sir John Pagan, Agent General for the State of New South Wales in London, commented at a ceremony commemorating Captain Arthur Phillip’s birthday that Britain’s new Immigration Bill would erect a barrier between Englishmen and Australians.73 Pagan’s statement and his interview with The Daily Express greatly annoyed Pritchett, who complained that the NSW Agent General was interfering with affairs falling within the Commonwealth jurisdiction.74 Nevertheless, Pritchett was worried that the continued failure to comment would lead to serious misinterpretation of the Australian position, because he thought “much of the campaign is ill-informed or misleading and is causing unnecessary uncertainty, alarm and hostility among Australians.” Further, he added that “the campaign is placing Australia in a false position in certain aspects, prejudicial to an informed perception or our national attitudes and policies.” He thought it desirable to indicate a position and clarify the Australian Government’s attitude towards the current situation. In the meantime, the Australian High Commission in London had been approached by the press and the general public for official views regarding the new British Immigration Rules, the Australian attitude towards the Daily Express campaign and the forthcoming House of Commons’ debate. Consequently, on 21 November 1972, Pritchett requested Canberra for policy guidance.75 Facing the Daily Express campaign and debate in the British House of Commons, Canberra considered a “low key policy” would best serve Australia’s interests.76 This judgement was based on the fact that, given Australia’s own restrictive immigration policy, it would be best for the Australian Government not to point fingers at the immigration policies of other countries. According to R. E. Armstrong, the policy advisor in the Department of Foreign Affairs, if Australia wished to avoid criticism of its own policy it should refrain from criticising other countries.77

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  49 Furthermore, the McMahon Government was sympathetic to London’s need to control immigration. Canberra accepted the fact that once Britain joined the EEC it was inevitable that Britain would give priority to EEC nationals in entering Britain. Thus, a crusade against the new Immigration Rules in the name of the anti-racial discrimination and anti-EEC membership was inconsistent with Australian policy.78 Finally, the McMahon Administration’s stance was rooted in a realistic judgement of British politics. Although the ties of kith and kin between Britain and Australia (and other Commonwealth countries) had been highlighted as a reason to oppose the passing of the new Immigration Rules, the McMahon Government thought that the campaign had its origins in British internal politics, rather than genuine concern for the interests of Old Commonwealth citizens. Australian Government officials noticed that there had not been an emergence of a strengthened “old Commonwealth” identity arising out of the campaign. As Pritchett reported, “Old Commonwealth is not a significant political force in its own right but rather a vehicle for expression of resentment and anxiety on other scores, and for national feeling.”79 Therefore, the Department of Foreign Affairs thought that the Australian Government should seek to avoid being used by critics such as Sir Max Aitken.80 Even the defeat of the British Immigration Bill did not make any change in Canberra’s views. Despite the fact that some British Tory backbenchers ostensibly displayed concern for Australian attitudes and requirements, William Pritchett’s conclusion that “their position is essentially an expression of their own concerns and desires, pangs about their Europeans, a flood of conscience and emotion about the Commonwealth (Old)” reflected the position adopted in Canberra.81 Immediately after the British Government’s defeat in the House of Commons, the Department of Foreign Affairs instructed Pritchett that: Our preliminary reaction is that adverse vote in Commons strengthens the case for adopting a low key approach. As we see it, existing proposals will now have to be re-examined by [the] British government before consultations with [the] old Commonwealth (foreshadowed by Home) can take place.82 Consequently, on 23 November 1972, the Department of Foreign Affairs sent a cablegram to all foreign posts, instructing officials concerned to reply to enquiries along the following guidelines: first, the Australian Government had made no statement on the proposed new rules, and, while informing itself about them, did not propose to make representations against them; secondly, the Australian Government supported the principle of British entry into the EEC, and appreciated the need for consequential changes in British practice in a number of fields, including the entry of citizens of EEC member countries; thirdly, the Australian Government understood that the great majority of Australian visitors to the UK would not be affected by the proposed new regulations.83

50  Not a “camp-follower” anymore In the meantime, the Australian Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs related the following points to the British High Commissioner in Canberra: first, Australia had no wish to become publicly involved in a British political controversy; secondly, the Australian Government had taken the view that each country had the right to determine its own immigration policies, and therefore did not make representations to the British on the proposed rules; thirdly, the Australia Government recognised the need for changes in British practice as a result of British entry into the EEC, particularly regarding the admission of citizens of EEC member countries; finally, the developments in Britain, including the outcome of the Commons’ debate would be bound to have an effect on the Australian press, which the Government would have to take into account, but it was still too early to assess the effect. The Australian Government decided, therefore, to wait for the British Government to re-examine the situation and formulate new proposals before adopting a definitive position on the question. The British High Commissioner admitted that if the Commonwealth was to be preserved, the British Government could not discriminate against Commonwealth citizens on racial grounds, and that he was not conscious of any public pressure in Australia, as he was not receiving streams of critical letters.84 On the British side, the vote result, although unsettling, did not necessarily mean that the regulations would be abandoned. On 22 November, the British Cabinet met to consider the situation. It pointed to a range of motives that had prompted the seven Conservative backbenchers to vote against the Government and the 53 to abstain. Their attitude—it was interpreted—had been dictated by their opposition to Britain’s entry into EEC; and this had been aggravated by the Daily Express campaign, which alleged that the Heath Government’s immigration policies would discriminate in favour of EEC nationals at the expense of those from the old Commonwealth countries. In the view of the Cabinet, the opposition to the Government within its own ranks was rooted in a growing fear of an endless chain reaction—that other East African countries might shortly follow the example of Uganda by expelling United Kingdom passport holders, who would then exercise their entitlement to settle in this country, and that as a result Britain would be faced with an intolerable repetition of the recent influx of Ugandan UK passport holders.85 In these circumstances, the Government would clearly have to table amended Rules, but in the light of its unsuccessful efforts to prevent backbench defections, the Conservative Party would have to take account of the twin factors of the unpopularity of the government’s EEC policy and the strong feeling over the old Commonwealth immigration issue in amending the substance of the rules. Unless it did so, it might risk a second and more serious defeat on the redrafted rules. Therefore, getting the support of old Commonwealth countries would be critical to the success of the modified immigration rules. The British Government also acknowledged the fact that the proposed Immigration Rules and the public campaign around them had had serious impact on the Anglo-Australian relations. In his annual report to London, the British High Commissioner in Canberra Sir Morrice James stated:

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  51 harm was done here by the extreme and irrational response in the British and Australian media to the Home Office Press release of 24 October about our new immigration rules. The Australians, who are still in the process of developing a real sense of nationhood for themselves, resent the thought (which was quite unfairly put into their minds by the Press and the television) that they are henceforward to be treated in Britain as Australiens. A good many of them are hoping that following the rejection of the Rules by the House of Commons in November, the opportunity will be used in the redrafting process to take some further account of what Australians regard as their special relationship with Britain.86 James, however, thought this damage could be repaired. Consequently, on 24 November 1972, Sir Bernard Braine, a conservative Member of Parliament, telephoned Pritchett seeking his suggestions on how the Rules could be amended and what Australia would like to see in an ideal situation. Pritchett refused to offer any guidance on policy aspects on the grounds that the Australian Government had made no comment at this stage, since the Australian Federal elections were around the corner.87 Pritchett stuck firmly to the “low key policy” instruction from Canberra. Nevertheless, British officials persisted in seeking cooperation from Commonwealth governments to proceed with the new Immigration Bill. On 27 November 1972, British Home Secretary Robert Carr appeared on the Panorama programme on TV, stating that the government would be able to make only limited changes in the Immigration Rules rejected by the House of Commons. However, the British Government would consult at the highest ministerial level with Commonwealth countries to see if they could spotlight difficulties which they thought ought to be removed. He particularly mentioned that the British Government would discuss the whole subject of reciprocity with Commonwealth countries, as there were some 250,000 people in the Commonwealth in the same position as the Uganda Asians, and the “British government should see that this burden does not fall on UK,” so international cooperation should be stepped up.88 In the meantime, some British politicians, such as Robert Adley, were pushing the British Government to do more to persuade Australia and New Zealand Governments to “take more of their fair share of British passport-holding citizens regardless of the colour of their skins.” However, Robert Lindsay, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, found that what he could do was no more than proposing “to consult Commonwealth Governments about immigration matters.”89 For officials in Canberra, Carr’s desire to hold discussions with Australia on immigrant reciprocity was only wishful thinking. Immediately after Carr’s TV speech, Sir Keith Waller, secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, reminded Pritchett that the Heath Government’s proposal for reciprocity in entry control would “pose great difficulties for Australia.”90 And further “Australia’s present thinking is that reciprocity in entry control would not be practicable and that Australia would not wish to discuss rules governing entry

52  Not a “camp-follower” anymore for permanent stay or to take part in any multi-lateral talks about temporary entry.”91 As Robert Carr expected, pressure on the immigration question would continue and probably reach a climax before the Parliamentary recess. He thought discussion with Commonwealth countries would be critical in handling this, as in the House of Commons the Government had been urged to seek the opinions of countries in the old Commonwealth.92 Any commitments made by Australia or other Commonwealth countries would enable him to declare that real and serious consultations had taken place.93 By this time the Whitlam Government had been elected to office in Australia. In many respects, however, the Whitlam Government adopted its predecessor’s policy of maintaining a neutral position regarding the British domestic political controversy. On 20 December 1972, two weeks after Whitlam’s Labor Government came to power, the British High Commissioner Sir Morrice James approached Whitlam for his opinion on the proposed British Immigration Rules. Whitlam said he preferred discussion between officials from the two Governments on the immigration issue should be informal and limited to a lower level—the proposal for mutual consultations at senior ministerial level seemed “too lofty.” In coming to this point of view, Whitlam told Sir Morrice James, he had two things in mind: for one thing, he did not want the Australian Government’s attitude to be used in any Commons debate on the immigration question or for any Australian Government attitude to be used by the Heath Government against the Labour opposition. In other words, he did not want the Australian Government to be dragged into a dispute in the British House of Commons between the Labour and Conservative Parties and within the Conservative Party itself. For another, he did not want any impression to arise that Australia was so akin to Britain that Australia should automatically become involved in solving imperial legacies.94 Although Whitlam understood that the British Government faced a number of problems arising out of the disintegration of its former empire, he insisted that the solution to these problems was essentially a British responsibility—people abroad should not get the impression that Australia had any responsibility for Britain’s colonial aftermath. He sympathised with Britain’s problem arising from its earlier “open door” policy of entry by British citizens from Commonwealth countries. But he stated that the best the British Government could expect from the Australian Government was that it did not comment on such issues. This was a view he had adhered to for over ten years and he had deliberately avoided commenting on Britain’s entry into the EEC and likewise on questions of immigration to Britain. Sir Morrice James expressed the hope that “Australian officials might be able to provide some practical advice in the solution of existing problems,” for the proposed Immigration Rules had had some effect on Anglo-Australian relations and had caused pain and grief to some Australians. Whitlam was, either by sentiment or by inexperience, persuaded to compromise on the position of the British Government. He agreed to some informal discussions between officials but not consultations at senior ministerial levels.95

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  53 Three days later (22 December 1972), Whitlam agreed to a British Government proposal that talks at the official level be held in Australia early in the New Year before the revised Immigration Rules were tabled in Parliament (a British delegation would also be visiting Wellington for the same purpose). Before the British Parliament rose for the Christmas recess, the Home Secretary intended making a statement assuring members that Australian and New Zealand interests were being safeguarded and he would refer to the planned talks, which Australia had agreed might best be described as “confidential and exploratory.”96 In spite of this, the indication that there would be informal discussions with Australia, New Zealand and Canada on immigration matters helped the British Government to face a further spate of comment on kith and kin complaints and criticisms both in public and in Parliament. Although Australian authorities kept refraining from offering any comment, directly or indirectly, on British immigration procedures, during its revision of the Immigration Rules, British Government authorities were able to refer to the fact that “confidential and exploratory talks at the official level” have taken place and the Australian Government had not raised any objection. This position was confirmed by the Australian Government.97 On 25 January 1973, the Home Secretary Robert Carr announced in the British Parliament the publication of revised Immigration Rules. These new Rules contained some significant changes. The former rules were divided into procedures for control on entry and control after entry, each set covering both Commonwealth citizens and foreign nationals, but with a clear privileging of EEC citizens. Under the first iteration of the rules EEC citizens and Commonwealth citizens were grouped together, although governed by different frameworks and principles. In the revised rules, however, the two major categories became Commonwealth citizens, and the EEC and other foreign nations. The Government hoped to reduce the risks of being defeated by presenting the rules for EEC nationals and for Commonwealth citizens in separate sets, with a view to separate votes in the House.98 In addition, the rules regarding Commonwealth citizens made more generous provisions for the entry of Commonwealth citizens than did the previous ones rejected by Parliament. It contained a number of amendments designed to meet criticisms of the original rules, including: that, first, Commonwealth citizens with a grandparent born in the United Kingdom would be able to obtain entry clearances enabling them to stay and work in Britain for as long as they chose; second, that if they married a United Kingdom-born national, they would also acquire a right of residence; an third, that the new rules would also extend the maximum “working holiday” from three to five years.99 The revised new Immigration Rules were approved by the Parliament on February 1973.100 With the publication of the revised Immigration Rules on 25 January 1973, the heat surrounding the British immigration issue dissipated in both Britain and Australia. The revised Immigration Rules and the concessions which the British Government had made were received reasonably well in the Australian press. For his part, Whitlam had made it plain to British officials that he did

54  Not a “camp-follower” anymore not propose to make any comment on them since he regarded them as entirely a matter for Her Majesty’s Government in the UK (despite the fact that the newly appointed Australian High Commissioner to London, John Armstrong, had privately condemned British immigration policies as treating Australians like aliens).101 Nonetheless, Whitlam used the issue of Britain’s new immigration law to move forward on his own domestic agenda. In doing so his government moved beyond the passive acquiescence, although private disquiet of the former Coalition Government. For Whitlam, it was now desirable and necessary for Australia to look more closely at its own immigration policies. For a long time, British subjects of European race and Irish citizens had been exempted from the necessity to obtain visas for entry into Australia, whereas non-European Commonwealth citizens from the same countries were required to obtain visas. Furthermore, the established policy also offered British subjects of European race and Irish citizens considerable advantages in entering Australia as migrants. According to Charles Price: They received better assisted passages conditions; they had special hostel arrangements for initial settlement; they could move in and out of Australia on visits with little difficulty. Moreover, like all British subjects, they received preferential treatment when seeking to enter Australia armed, merchant marine or civil services, and could vote in elections without becoming Australia citizens.102 This legacy, in the view of Whitlam, was an anachronism. The Whitlam Government hoped to eliminate from its immigration policies any suggestion of preference on the basis of nationality or race. Given that the British Government had just updated its immigration legislation, the Whitlam Government saw an opportunity for similar significant reform in immigration, through which Australia would not only get rid of the stigma of “White Australia” but also assert its national independence and sovereignty. Whitlam possessed the conviction that Australia’s future lay inevitably in Asia—Australians were being driven rapidly to making adjustments from the familiar European world to an unfamiliar Afro-Asian world by the reality of Australia’s geography—an argument he made repeatedly in the 1960s.103 Accepting the imperative of having to engage with Asia, his government turned its back on the “White Australia” policy. The Labor Government applied a colour-blind approach in all migrant categories. “The criteria against which would-be migrants were judged became much more open. Preference for British or European settlers was abolished, and assisted passages became available to all on an equal basis.”104 Thus, in August 1974 the Whitlam Government declared that Commonwealth citizens of European descent and Irish citizens coming to Australia for any period, whether for a visit or settlement, would be required to obtain visas just as for non-European people and European aliens.105 The objective was to establish a set of uniform criteria and procedures for migrant entry to Australia

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  55 which would apply throughout the world in accordance with its policy of non-discrimination. Therefore, the preferential system previously accorded to Commonwealth citizens of European stock, which was inconsistent with the principles of non-discrimination, would be removed.106 In addition, there was the added incentive of worsening unemployment in Australia. A decline in assisted immigration from the United Kingdom to Australia would relieve some economic pressure. Instead, the Whitlam Government put more emphasis on basing the assisted immigration programs on humanitarian principles, applied equally to people from every part of the world. These new policies meant that “Britons would be treated no different from anyone else and would never regain their formal importance in numbers or status.”107 Whitlam wrote to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 16 July 1974, informing him of the intention of the Australian Government to introduce a new visa system which would apply to the UK citizens. Afterwards, advertisements about these changes appeared in United Kingdom newspapers.108 In contrast to the fact that the British Immigration Rules caused many irritations amongst individual Australians visiting Britain, there was very little public reaction in Britain to the Australian system of visas introduced on 1 January 1975. Regarding the Whitlam Government’s new immigration policy, the Wilson Government took a similar view to that of successive Australian Governments—it was inappropriate to comment publicly on the policies of other nations. Since the British Government found it necessary to introduce controls over entry, so they fully understood the background which led to the Whitlam Government’s action. Therefore, London took the view that “the Australian Government are perfectly entitled to introduce whatever legislation they need in this or any other connection and it is not for us to comment in any detail,” for they understood that in practice obtaining a visa to entry Australia was unlikely to be more than an administrative chore.109 Indeed, it turned out that the impact made by the new British immigration legislation and the Whitlam Government’s new immigration policy on the flow of people between two countries was negligible. By the mid-1970s, there were at least 300,000 Australians flying across the world to visit Britain. According to Sir Morrice James, in 1976 there were some 100,000 Australians in Britain, a high proportion of whom were young people. Morrice James saw this number as an indication that Britain filled a special need in the lives of Australian people. Although far fewer Britons made similar pilgrimages to Australia, the country remained a popular destination for a large number of British migrants. By the mid-1970s, more than a million Australian residents had been born in Britain. It was from this flow of people and from older generations of Australians that that seedbed for popular sentimental attachment to Britain was sustained. But sentiment could cut both ways, “because it would be both morally indefensible, and politically costly, for any British Government to seem to turn its back on those who still value and preserve their ties.”110 Moreover, by the time the revised Immigration Rules came into operation, Britain had been accepted as a member of the European Economic

56  Not a “camp-follower” anymore Community. In its content and its timing, the new British immigration legislation was closely associated with Britain’s move towards Europe. These new policies abolished one of the last vestiges of the old Empire—where Commonwealth subjects and citizens had a special entitlement with respect to immigration to Britain. The world was no longer grouped by those from the British Empire who had rights and privileges in the United Kingdom and those foreigners who did not.111 In this sense, the British Government broke the obligation to keep and maintain Britain’s traditional links with Australia and other ex-colonial territories. In reforming its own laws Britain formally accepted its changed role, from the leader of the British Empire to a member of the EEC. The controversy around the new immigration laws indicated that in Britain the concern to maintain political and economic links with ex-colonial territories and therefore to grant privileged treatment to nationals of those countries was outweighed by the British Government’s intention to embrace a new European future. The Australian Government demonstrated a pragmatic attitude towards these British developments. Although the new Immigration Rules would influence the freedom of entry and settlement in Britain for some Australians, the Government was reluctant to protest against such a change. But Australian politicians recognised that there was little to gain and much to lose by overt opposition. Both the McMahon and Whitlam Governments made it quite clear that the Australian Government recognised the inevitability of Britain’s efforts to enter the EEC and believed British immigration policy was a matter of domestic politics which should be left to its own Government to handle. The McMahon Administration’s response was also motivated by its concern for possible criticism of Australia’s own restrictive immigration policy and sought to avoid highlighting immigration issues in its foreign policies. Therefore, facing the campaign against the new Immigration Rules, Canberra steered a neutral course against— at times—strong public opinion. In terms of its response to the British immigration issue, the Whitlam Government largely adhered to a stance initiated by the previous Coalition Government. What distinguished the Whitlam Government’s response from that of its predecessors was the fact that Whitlam, exhibiting considerable acumen and opportunism, used the outcry as the ground for muchneeded reform in Australia. By changing Australia’s restrictive immigration policies, the Whitlam Government not only eliminated the stigma of racialism but also asserted that Australia could no longer be seen as a dependent nation anxiously hanging on to the Old Commonwealth relationship. Only an independent nation would treat British citizens like any other foreign national. Notes 1 Morrice James, “Australia: Annual Review for 1972,” FCO 24/1586, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 2 See A/RES/2652(XXV), 3 December 1970, Australia, Non-Voting; A/ RES/2769(XXVI), 22 November 1971, Australia, Abstentions; S/RES/326(1973), 2 February 1973, Australia, Yes; S/RES/327(1973), 2 February 1973, Australia,

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  57 Yes, sources from the “Voting Data” of United Nations Digital Library, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org, accessed 17 January 2022. 3 A/RES/2832(XXVI), 16 December 1971, Australia, Abstentions; A/ RES/2992(XXVII), 15 December 1972, Australia, Yes; A/RES/3080(XXVIII), 6 December 1973, Australia, Yes; sources from the “Voting Data” of United Nations Digital Library, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org, accessed 17 January 2022. 4 It was through the British Conservative politician Sir Max Aitken that McMahon passed the message to Heath, see P. J. S. Moon to Ian McCluney, 3 May 1971, PREM 15/744, NAUK. 5 Colin A. Hughes, Mr. Prime Minister: Australian Prime Ministers, 1901–1972 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1976), 196. 6 In August 1971, McMahon sacked Gorton as a Liberal politician which led to the plummeting of the approval rating of the Prime Minister; see Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam's Life in Politics (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977), 215–23. 7 Morrice James, “Mr. McMahon in Britain,” 8 December 1971, PREM 15/744, NAUK. 8 Andrea Benvenuti, “Facing the Inevitable: Britain’s Entry into the European Community and Australia’s Policy, 1970–72,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 2 (June 2007): 252. 9 Morrice James, “Mr. McMahon in Britain,” 8 December 1971, PREM 15/744, NAUK. 10 Ibid. 11 This interpretation is partly attributed to the fact that the change was announced only 24 hours after the retirement of Sir Alexander Downer as the High Commissioner and the publication by the British Government of the New Immigration Rule which would take effect after British entry into the EEC. In that particular context, it was very easy for people to interpret the McMahon Government’s decision regarding Australian House as a major symbolic response to Britain’s stance, see Stewart Harris, “Britain is now foreign affairs for Australia,” The Times, 26 October 1972. 12 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives, 1 December 1971,” Serial No. CP/12, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 4, The National Archives of Australia (NAA). 13 W. B. Pritchett’s comments on Comments on the Policy Planning Paper CP 12/71 of 1 December 1971, Memo No. 32, 12 January 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 4, NAA. 14 William McMahon to Edward Heath, 6 April 1972, PREM 15/1306, NAUK. 15 Edward Heath to Robert Armstrong and Peter Moon, 21 November 1971, PREM 15/1306, NAUK. 16 Patrick Gratton to Lord Bridge, 5 March 1973, PREM 15/1306, NAUK. 17 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives,” 28 August 1972, Policy Guidance Paper Serial No. PPP 40, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 18 W. B. Pritchett’s comments on the Policy Planning Paper CP 12/71, 12 January 1972, Memo No. 32, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 4, NAA. 19 Memorandum from J. R. Holdich, 17 December 1971, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 4, NAA. 20 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives,” 28 August 1972, Policy Guidance Paper Serial No. PPP 40, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 21 Interview with Michael Willesee by the Prime Minister, Mr. E. G. Whitlam, Canberra, 4 June 1973, FCO 24/1588, NAUK. 22 Morrice James, “The Australian Labour Party Government (2),” 5 April 1973, FCO 24/1596, NAUK.

58  Not a “camp-follower” anymore 3 “Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit, 1 May 1973,” WIE, accessed 12 February 2011. 2 24 “Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives,” 1 December 1971, Serial No. CP/12, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 4, NAA. 25 Ibid. 26 Christmas Island: BBC Relay Station, 6 October 1972, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 5, NAA. 27 Record of Conversation between Sir Keith Waller and Sir Morrice James on 5 December 1972, File No. 67/1/3, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 28 Record of Conversation between Sir Morrice James and Gough Whitlam on 20 December 1972, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 29 Quoted in Michael Easson, “Promise and Influence of Whitlam’s Foreign Policy,” in The Whitlam Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, eds. Scott Prasser and David Clune (Ballarat: Connorcourt Publishing, 2022). Available at: https://michaeleasson.com/foreign-policy/2022-promise-and-influence-ofwhitlams-foreign-policy/, accessed 2 January 2023. 30 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972–1975, 122–23. 31 Stephanie Jones, “Merchant-kings and Everymen: Narratives of the South Asian Diaspora of East Africa,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no.1 (2007): 30, footnote 11. 32 Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, “Black Attitudes to The Brown and White Colonizers of East Africa,” in Michael Twaddle, ed. Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (The Athlone Press, 1975), 90–91. 33 Vali Jamal, “Asians in Uganda, 1880–1972: Inequality and Expulsion,” The Economic History Review 29, no. 4 (November 1976), 602. 34 Michael Twaddle, ed. Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (The Athlone Press, 1975), 194. 35 Sara Cosemans, “The Politics of Dispersal: East African, British, and Indian Roles in the Creation of a Global Ugandan Asian Diaspora (1967–1974),” Proceeding paper following the Fifth Annual Symposium of the Consortium for Asian and African Studies [CAAS] at Columbia University, 3–4 October 2014, 59–64. 36 Randall Hansen, “The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968,” The Historical Journal 42, no. 3 (September 1999): 810, 817. 37 Sara Cosemans, “The Politics of Dispersal: East African, British, and Indian Roles in the Creation of a Global Ugandan Asian Diaspora (1967–1974),” Proceeding paper following the Fifth Annual Symposium of the Consortium for Asian and African Studies [CAAS] at Columbia University, 3–4 October 2014, 59–64. 38 Randall Hansen, “The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act,” Twentieth Century British History 10, no. 1 (1999): 67–95. 39 James S. Read, “Some Legal Aspects of The Expulsion,” in Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians ed. Michael Twaddle (The Athlone Press, 1975), 195–6. 40 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, available at: https://www.legislation.gov. uk/ukpga/1968/9/pdfs/ukpga_19680009_en.pdf, accessed 23 January 2022; James S. Read, “Some Legal Aspects of The Expulsion,” in Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians ed. Michael Twaddle (The Athlone Press, 1975), 195–6. 41 James S. Read, “Some Legal Aspects of The Expulsion,” in Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians ed. Michael Twaddle (The Athlone Press, 1975), 199–200. 42 Sara Cosemans, “The Politics of Dispersal: East African, British, and Indian Roles in the Creation of a Global Ugandan Asian Diaspora (1967–1974),” Proceeding paper following the Fifth Annual Symposium of the Consortium for Asian and African Studies [CAAS] at Columbia University, 3–4 October 2014, 59–64.

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  59 43 James S. Read, “Some Legal Aspects of The Expulsion,” in Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians ed. Michael Twaddle (The Athlone Press, 1975), 199–200. 44 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), 457. 45 Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 197–201. 46 Michael Twaddle, ed. Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (London: The Athlone Press, 1975), 13. 47 Hansard, Volume 848: debated on Monday 11 December 1972, available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1972-12-11/debates/886ab2b1599b-470f-9297-a5ede394a66f/UgandanAsians(CommonwealthSettlement), accessed 24 January 2022. 48 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), 457. 49 Klaus Neumann, “‘Our Own Interests Must Come First’: Australia’s Response to the Expulsion of Asians From Uganda,” History Australia 3, no. 1 (June 2006): 10.1–10.17. 50 For full text of the 1971 Immigration Act, see Ian A. MacDonald, The New Immigration Law (London, Butterworths, 1972). 51 House of Commons Debate, 22 November 1972, Vol.846, cc.1343–459, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 11 April 2010. 52 Peter Evans, “EEC Nationals Will Be Free to Enter Britain to Work without Permits from January,” The Times, 25 October 1972; House of Commons Debate, 8 March 1971, Vol.813, cc.42–173, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems. com/, accessed 5 April 2010; For the detailed explanation and the complete text of Immigration Bill of 1971, also see Ian A. MacDonald, The New Immigration Law (London, Butterworths, 1972). 53 James S. Read, “Some Legal Aspects of The Expulsion,” in Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians ed. Michael Twaddle (London: The Athlone Press, 1975), 198. 54 Philip Norton, “Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons: A Case Study. The Immigration Rules 1972,” Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXIX (1976), 404–20. 55 Cablegram from the Australian High Commission (AHC) in London to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 20 November 1972, No.18757, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 56 David Wood, “Concessions urged for Australia, Canada,” The Times, 21 November 1972. 57 Letters to the Editor, by David Renton, David Stephen, Mabel Strickland, D. I. Matheson, The Times, 22 November 1972. 58 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 20 November 1972, No.18757, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 59 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 22 November 1972, No.18859, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 60 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 23 November 1972, No.18922, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA; House of Commons Debate, 22 November 1972, Vol.846, cc.1343–459, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems. com/, accessed 13 April 2010. 61 Norton, “Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons,” 404–20. 62 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 23 November 1972, No.18935, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 63 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 22 November 1972, No.18859, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 64 “Mr. McMahon in London,” The Times, 8 November 1971; also, according to Edward Heath, he had bilateral talks with McMahon on 9th November, 1971,

60  Not a “camp-follower” anymore “the subject of immigration was not raised at any of these bilateral talks”, see: House of Commons Debate, 7 December 1972, Vol.847, c.502W, Hansard 1803– 2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 13 April 2010. 65 Neumann, “‘Our Own Interests Must Come First’,” 10.1–10.17. 66 Morrice James, “Australia: Annual Review for 1972,” FCO 24/1586, NAUK. 67 Neumann, “‘Our own interests must come first’,” 10.1–10.17. 68 Stewart Harris, “Britain is now foreign affairs for Australia,” The Times, 26 October 1972. 69 12 November 1972, the ABC program Monday Conference organised a discussion on Anglo-Australia Relations, attended by the Rt. Hon. Sir Morrice James, British High Commissioner to Australia, and Robert Moore, ABC, and Dr T. B. Millar, Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and Professional Fellow in International Relations at the ANU, and Dominic Nagle, features writer on The Australian. They thought, among other things, British entry the Common Market would “In the long run it’s likely to have a big influence on how the British and the Australians think of each other.” See “Monday Conference – 65,” ABC Broadcast on 13 November 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 70 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in London, 20 November 1972, No.14771, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 71 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 20 November 1972, No.18755, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 72 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 20 November 1972, No.18759, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 73 “UK migration bill ‘barrier to Australians’,” Sydney Moring Herald, 12 October 1971, newspaper cutting from A1838/2, 67/1/3/6 PART 1, NAA. 74 Memorandum from W. B. Pritchett to the Secretary of the DFA, 20 November 1972, No.1242, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 75 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 21 November 1972, No.18843, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 76 The “Low Key Approach” was suggested by Foreign Affairs advisors, including Keith Waller, and was strongly recommended by Sir John Bunting to the Prime Minister; see John Bunting to the Prime Minister, 22 November 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 77 R. E. Armstrong to Sir Keith Waller, 22 November 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 78 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 21 November 1972, No.18843, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 79 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 21 November 1972, No.18843, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 80 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in London, 23 November 1972, No.14956, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 81 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 23 November 1972, No.18921, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 82 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in London, 23 November 1972, No.15026, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 83 Savingram from the DFA to All Foreign Affairs Post, 23 November 1972, AP 202, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 84 Milne to Hutchens, 27 November 1972, PRIMIN AA20778, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA; Record of Conversation between Morrice James and Keith Waller, 24 November 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 85 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/50/54, CM (72) 53, 23 November 1972, NAUK. 86 “Australia: Annual Review for 1972,” 31 December 1972, FCO 24/1586, NAUK. 87 Cablegram from Pritchett to the DFA, 26 November 1972, No. 19079, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA.

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  61 88 Cablegram from the AHC in London to DFA, 28 November 1972, No. 19207, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 89 Hansard, Volume 848: debated on Monday 11 December 1972, available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1972-12-11/debates/886ab2b1599b-470f-9297-a5ede394a66f/UgandanAsians(CommonwealthSettlement), accessed 24 January 2022. 90 Waller to Pritchett, 28 November 1972, No. 15205, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 91 Message from Mr. McGuiness, 28 November 1972, A1838/2, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 92 House of Commons Debate, 7 December 1972, Vol.847, c.502W; House of Commons Debate, 19 December 1972, Vol.848, cc.1115–17, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 13 April 2010. 93 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 13 December 1972, I.130572, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 94 Record of Conversation between Morrice James and Gough Whitlam on 20 December 1972, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 95 Ibid. 96 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in London, 22 December 1972, 0.116042, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 97 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in London, 24 January 1973, 0.8279, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 98 Cabinet Memorandum: Immigration Rules. CAB 129/167/6, CP (73) 6, 19 January 1973, NAUK. 99 House of Lords Debate, 25 January 1973, Vol.338, cc.267–78, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 13 April 2010; British Press Reaction to the Relations with Australia, undated, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA; Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 26 January 1973, I.10306, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 100 House of Lords Debate, 21 February 1973, Vol.851, cc.577–646; House of Lords Debate, 27 February 1973, Vol.339, cc.537–91, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard. millbanksystems.com/, accessed 13 April 2010. 101 “A brief note on Anglo-Australian relations and a personality note,” 6 February 1973, PREM 15/1305, NAUK. 102 Charles Price, “Immigration,” in Australians & British: Social and Political Connections, ed. J.D.B. Miller (North Ryde, NSW: Methuen Australia, 1987), 33–4. 103 Whitlam, “What should Australia’s Foreign Policy be?,” Keynote Speech for University of Western Australia’s Adult Education Board Summer School on 23 January 1961, Whitlam Institute E-collection (WIE), accessed 21 November 2022; Whitlam, “Australia’s Foreign Policy 1963,” 14th Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs on 9 July 1963 in Armidale, New South Wales, WIE, accessed 21 November 2022. 104 Neville K. Meaney, “The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945–1990,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995): 182–3. 105 Prime Minister Press Statement No. 292, 1 August 1974, FCO 24/1941, NAUK. 106 “Immigration Policies—Extract from Briefing Prepared for Sir M. Malliser’s visit to Australia,” 15–18 October 1975, FCO 24/2084, NAUK. 107 Charles Price, “Immigration,” 33. 108 “Australian Immigration Policy, Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office,” 11 December 1974, FCO 24/1912, NAUK. 109 I. A. Carpenter to News Department, 25 July 1974, FCO 24/1941, NAUK.

62  Not a “camp-follower” anymore 110 Morrice James, “Britain and Australia: Reciprocal Needs,” 30 April 1976, FCO 24/2203, NAUK. 111 Ian R. G. Spencer, British Immigration Policy since 1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain (New York: Routledge, 1997), 144.

Bibliography Anonymous. “Mr. McMahon in London.” The Times, 8 November 1971. Benvenuti, Andrea. “Facing the Inevitable: Britain’s Entry into the European Community and Australia’s Policy, 1970–72.” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 2 (June 2007): 251–66. Cosemans, Sara. “The Politics of Dispersal: East African, British, and Indian Roles in the Creation of a Global Ugandan Asian Diaspora (1967–1974).” Proceeding Paper Following the Fifth Annual Symposium of the Consortium for Asian and African Studies [CAAS] at Columbia University, 3–4 October 2014: 59–64. Easson, Michael. “Promise and Influence of Whitlam’s Foreign Policy.” In The Whitlam Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, edited by Scott Prasser and David Clune. Ballarat: Connorcourt Publishing, 2022. Available at: https:// michaeleasson.com/foreign-policy/2022-promise-and-influence-of-whitlamsforeign-policy/, accessed 2 January 2023. Evans, Peter. “EEC Nationals Will Be Free to Enter Britain to Work without Permits from January.” The Times, 25 October 1972. Freudenberg, Graham. A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam’s Life in Politics. South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977. Hansen, Randall. “The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968.” The Historical Journal 42, no. 3 (September 1999a): 809–34. ———. “The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act.” Twentieth Century British History 10, no. 1 (1999b): 67–95. ———. Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Harris, Stewart. “Britain Is Now Foreign Affairs for Australia.” The Times, 26 October 1972. Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998. Hughes, Colin A. Mr. Prime Minister: Australian Prime Ministers, 1901–1972. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1976. Jamal, Vali. “Asians in Uganda, 1880–1972: Inequality and Expulsion.” The Economic History Review 29, no. 4 (November 1976): 602–16. Jones, Stephanie. “Merchant-Kings and Everymen: Narratives of the South Asian Diaspora of East Africa.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 1 (2007): 16–33. MacDonald, Ian A. The New Immigration Law. London: Butterworths, 1972. Meaney, Neville K. “The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945–1990.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995): 171–89. Miller, J. D. B., ed. Australians & British: Social and Political Connections. North Ryde: Methuen Australia, 1987. Neumann, Klaus. “‘Our Own Interests Must Come First’: Australia’s Response to the Expulsion of Asians from Uganda.” History Australia 3, no. 1 (June 2006): 10.1–10.17.

Not a “camp-follower” anymore  63 Norton, Philip. “Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons: A Case Study. The Immigration Rules 1972.” Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXIX (1976): 404–20. Ocaya-Lakidi, Dent. “Black Attitudes to The Brown and White Colonizers of East Africa.” In Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians, edited by Michael Twaddle, 81–97. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975. Read, James S. “Some Legal Aspects of the Expulsion.” In Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians, edited by Michael Twaddle, 193–209. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975. Renton, David, Renton, David, Stephen, David, Strickland, Mabel, and Matheson, D. I. “Letters to the Editor.” The Times, 22 November 1972. Spencer, Ian R. G. British Immigration Policy Since 1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain. New York: Routledge, 1997. Twaddle, Michael, ed. Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975. Whitlam, Gough. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Ringwood: Viking, 1985. Wood, David. “Concessions urged for Australia, Canada.” The Times, 21 November 1972.

2 In pursuit of judicial independence

Whitlam intended to place Australia’s relationship with the UK on “a more mature and contemporary basis and to reflect the development of a more independent Australian identity in the world,” as mentioned in the previous chapter.1 He regarded the obsessions of Australian conservatives with the British connection and “their exploitation of the perquisites and privileges associated with it” as the primary force retarding the growth of a realistic, more independent, more mature foreign policy.2 Thus, he came to office with an ambitious policy agenda of removing the last vestiges of colonial ties between Australia and Britain. He started by searching for a new Australian national anthem. In 1972 God Save the Queen was Australia’s national anthem, although during the election campaign Whitlam announced his intention to officially proclaim a new one. In 1973, a competition was organised by the Australia Council for the Arts to find an anthem that could represent Australia with “distinction,” through a contest dubbed the Australian National Anthem Quest. This was held in two stages, first lyrics and second music, each having a AU$5,000 prize for the winning entry. Although the quality of most of the entries was far from impressive, the quantity was amazing—the first stage for lyrics attracted more than 1,400 entries; the second stage 1,200 entries. As none of the new entries were deemed sufficiently worthy, the Council also considered the old standards Advance Australia Fair, Waltzing Matilda and Song of Australia.3 Finally, based on the result of a poll conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Advance Australia Fair was chosen and enshrined as the national song, to be used on all occasions except those of a specifically regal nature. The active response to the Australian National Anthem Quest, in Whitlam’s view, reflected a strong desire among the Australian people for a national anthem of their own, “an anthem that truly reflects the character and traditions of our people.”4 The quest for a new national anthem was just one aspect of a wider campaign by Whitlam to sweep away important symbols of Australia’s continuing colonial connection to Britain. British immigration reforms were a clear indication that UK interests now rested on closer ties to Europe. For Whitlam, Australian interests had to be similarly freed from the past, abandoning the DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-3

In pursuit of judicial independence  65 symbolism of colonialism and asserting symbols of national independency and autonomy. This went beyond the anthem. The Whitlam Government also amended the focus of Royal address. The Australian Royal Style and Titles Act 1953 had adopted the formula “Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.” During Whitlam’s visit to London in the Easter of 1973, he proposed a new formula to the Queen: “Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.” She would thus be officially designated as “Queen of Australia.” According to Whitlam, this change brought the Monarchy more in line with reality, for “she (Elizabeth II) has always been Queen of Australia; now she bears the title, I am proud of it. It is an entirely contemporary and appropriate title. It takes account of popular feeling. It makes the monarchy a closer and more relevant institution for Australians.”5 Closely related to the Queen’s Royal Style and Title in Australia was the matter of diplomatic accreditation. It had been the practice in the appointment of Australian Ambassadors to other countries, and also in the appointment of High Commissioners to countries not within the Queen’s realms (republican countries within the Commonwealth), for the Australian Government to make proposals to the Governor-General and to then ask the Governor-General to seek the Queen’s approval. It was thus also applied to the accreditation of Heads of Mission to Australia. Namely, the government concerned put forward the name of its proposed Ambassador and sought agreement before proceeding to formal accreditation. Agreement was forthcoming only after the approval of the Queen on a recommendation made through the Governor-General. The Whitlam Government proposed to omit the procedure of seeking the Queen’s endorsement for any diplomatic appointments—all these matters became ones for approval by the Governor-General on the Queen’s behalf. The Queen, of course, would be informed by the Governor-General of the appointments of Australian Heads of Mission overseas and of the recognition of Ambassadors or other diplomatic representatives appointed to represent the interests of foreign states in Australia. The major practical reason for such a change was the increase in the number of accreditations since 1950s, which made a new, and more simple procedure in accreditation questions a necessity.6 The most controversial of the Whitlam Government’s efforts to project, both practically and symbolically, a sense of national independence was its proposal to revoke the London-based Privy Council’s ability to hear appeals on the decisions of Australian courts. On 31 May 1973, the Whitlam Government introduced a set of two Bills—the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Bill and the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill—into the Federal Parliament. The first Bill was eventually passed by the Australian Federal Parliament and became known in law as the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975. However, Whitlam’s ambitious effort to abolish all appeals from Australian courts other than from the High Court to the Privy Council fell flat.

66  In pursuit of judicial independence The issue is central to the understanding of the Whitlam Government, and so it has attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention in Australia.7 There has been considerable literature engaging in explaining the rationale behind the Whitlam Government’s policy initiative. Geoffrey Bolton notes that such constitutional reform proposals were part of the larger effort by Whitlam to overhaul Australia’s stance towards Britain.8 Deborah Gare also argues that the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council was significant for the development of Australia’s national sovereignty, concluding that Australia did not achieve its independence until the passing of the Australia Acts in 1986. Thus, the Whitlam Government’s attempt to cut Australia’s judicial ties with Britain was an important milestone towards the achievement of this eventual outcome.9 Some scholars have regarded the Whitlam Government’s efforts of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council as evidence of Whitlam’s “opportunistic federalism.”10 For others, they are an indication of Whitlam’s “aspirational nationalism” or “new nationalism.”11 James Curran and Stuart Ward point this out, as well as Whitlam’s determination to rid Australia of its residual constitutional “anachronism” was essentially “designed to construct a new idea of nationality based on Australian, rather than British, citizenship.”12 Admittedly, Whitlam’s endeavour can be regarded as one of the attempts made by the 1960s and 1970s generation to invent national traditions for Australia. His failure to modernise Australia’s constitutional and legal relationship with the UK is just one of failures of his generation “to come up with any credible alternatives to empire and Britishness.”13 These perspectives are helpful in increasing our understanding of the overall context within which the Whitlam Government’s reform took place. However, as to the case itself, some questions are still worth asking: Why did the Whitlam Government fail to achieve its goal of abolishing all appeals to the Privy Council before 1975? Since this issue took place in the context of constitutional conflict between the Australian Commonwealth Government and the State Governments, as well as against the background of a gradual change in AngloAustralian relations, how did the British Government and Australian State Governments react to the Whitlam Government’s initiatives?14 Instead of affixing a general label on the Whitlam Government’s policy rationale, this chapter focuses on tracing the historical development of the Whitlam Government’s Privy Council proposal, scrutinising the reasons leading to its limited success. A thorny issue left over by Australia’s colonial past Final appeals from Australian courts to the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rested on a long historical tradition. Prior to 1900 the Australian States were colonies with no constitutional relationship with one another. The Commonwealth of Australia was formed by agreement of the six colonies. However, the constitutional position of the States as colonies remained unchanged after federation. Although the Statute of Westminster 1931 established a status of legislative equality between the self-governing dominions of the British Empire (including Australia) and the UK, it did not clarify the

In pursuit of judicial independence  67 ability of the UK Parliament to legislate with regard to individual states of Australia. Thus, the quasi-colonial status of the States was preserved from 1931 until the passing of the Australia Act 1986.15 With the growth of Australian republican sympathies, however, the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council increasingly became a controversial issue in Australian political culture. As early as the late nineteenth century, there were moves to abolish such appeals, particularly during the Australian Constitutional Convention debates in the 1890s. These debates were often cited to support the Whitlam Government’s position. Rex Connor, the Labour politician, argued that Section 74 of the Australian Constitution which empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws to prevent appeals to the council was actually a result of the compromise between delegates at the Convention.16 Nonetheless, no serious moves were made to abolish or restrict appeals until 1968, when the enactment of the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 ended all appeals to the Privy Council in matters involving federal legislation. Labor’s opposition to Privy Council appeals has had a long history, first adopted as a party policy in 1908, but Labor’s desire to restrict appeals had always floundered as a result of their lack of control of the Senate. Despite party policy, the Privy Council appeal provisions did prove politically useful under certain circumstances. Indeed, during the controversy around the Bank Nationalisation case of 1948, the Chifley Labor Government tried to use the right to appeal to the Privy Council in order to strike down a High Court decision which declared the Labor Government’s legislation invalid.17 Gough Whitlam, however, was an active abolitionist from an early stage of his political career—he claimed himself to be “the first member of Parliament to advocate it in Parliament.”18 In 1957, he publicly proclaimed that actions should be taken to carry out the Labor Party’s objective of “investing the High Court with final jurisdiction in all questions and matters.”19 For Whitlam, appeals from Australian courts to the Privy Council were not consistent with Australian nationhood. “What other independent country,” he asked in 1965, “would allow decisions of its courts to be taken on appeals by the Government of that other country, to a court giving judgment by way of advice to the Head of State of that other country?”20 The Liberal/Country Party Coalition’s policy on this issue ranged from a stubborn insistence on keeping the appeals to the Privy Council to trying to make the High Court the final court of appeal for Australia. During the extended prime ministership of Sir Robert Menzies, the Coalition Government resisted any reform. For Menzies, the existence of the appeal to the Privy Council did not impinge on Australia’s status as an independent country and it was imprudent and unnecessary to alter the existing state of affairs.21 After Menzies retired in 1966, the Coalition shifted its position. Nigel Bowen, who was appointed Attorney-General of Australia in the Second Holt Ministry in December 1966, introduced the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act of 1968. This Act closed off all appeals to the Privy Council from the High Courts and all State Courts in constitutional matters.22 By introducing this

68  In pursuit of judicial independence Act, Bowen’s objective was to further enhance the standing and prestige of the High Court of Australia.23 Given the fact that appeals from the High Court and the State courts in matters of a wholly State character were still allowed, the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act of 1968 was, however, very restricted in scope and operation. After Whitlam assumed the leadership of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), he believed that it was the Labor Party’s mission to complete the “logical, further and final step in the process of making the High Court of Australia Australia’s final appeal court” to enhance the image and cement the reality of Australia as an independent nation.24 Consequently, at both the 1969 and 1972 elections, Whitlam proclaimed that a Labor Government would abolish appeals to the Privy Council.25 When an ALP victory became a real prospect in early December 1972, Whitlam could hardly wait for the eventual victory to lift the curtain on constitutional reform. In his last public campaign meeting at Anzac House in Sydney, Whitlam, instead of giving the public a few rousing words on the coming victory, started lecturing them on Commonwealth–State relations and the necessity of constitutional reform.26 To dust off the cobwebs in a rush After coming into office, the Labor Government wasted no time in initiating its reform agenda. On 8 December 1972, three days after the Whitlam–Barnard “Duumvirate” Ministry was sworn in, Whitlam suggested to British Prime Minister Edward Heath that he would make arrangements to enable the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to sit in Australia and to be composed exclusively of Australian Judges. This proposal was not met with enthusiasm.27 In January 1973, Whitlam sent Senator Lionel Murphy, the Attorney General of the new Labor Government, to London to confirm with Heath the Australian Government’s intention to end the rights of the Privy Council appeal.28 Murphy’s visit, however, was regarded by British officials as “a false start.” Whilst making his case, Murphy not only failed to specify in detail the changes he wished to make, but also gave the impression that the Australian Government was seeking the cooperation of British Ministers to strengthen the Australian Commonwealth Government at the expense of State Governments. What is more, during the presentation of his position, Murphy demonstrated an intransigence which antagonised many of the London officials.29 Consequently, Heath called Whitlam insisting that he take personal control of this aspect of the Anglo-Australian relationship.30 British policy had been to avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of other Commonwealth countries, especially in legal matters. Britain had taken special care to ensure it had no residual legislative powers in local law in Commonwealth countries which had gained their independence in recent years—no matter how tenuous these powers might be. In the case of Australian independence, however, the situation was different. Like New Zealand and Canada, Australian independence took additional effect from the Statute of

In pursuit of judicial independence  69 Westminster in 1931, when less care had been taken to clear up legal odds and ends. In this sense, Australia was only the latest in a line of countries no longer wanting final legal judgements to be made in London. Rather, the proposed legal changes were seen in Britain as a political gesture to symbolise to Australians their full independence, and to suggest that a new, vigorous, rational and patriotic regime had taken over and it was ready to “dust off the cobwebs.”31 The British Government was reluctant to commit itself to any legislative changes before the Australian Government’s wishes were more concretely outlined. Its main concern was the possibility of getting involved in a dispute between the Australian Federal Government and some of its States. Therefore, Heath called Whitlam on 24 January, explaining that the British Government had no wish to insist on maintaining the relics of the past, but it could not ignore its existing constitutional obligations.32 Since Australia was a sovereign country, the constitutional arrangements relating to Australia were primarily an Australian matter. To the extent that any change, such as the abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy Council, might involve the British Government in introducing necessary legislation, the British Government would be willing to cooperate in accordance with appropriate constitutional procedures.33 Heath emphasised that “the question of the procedures to be followed is of the greatest importance,” and the British Government “must be careful the method we adopt is not open to challenge on constitutional or legal grounds.”34 The Heath Government understood that the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council remained a controversial issue in Australia. Just as Whitlam faced opposition in Australia, the Heath government faced difficulties at Westminster. In the British Parliament, concerns were raised about the interests of Australian Federal States. Members of the British House of Lords, such as Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, were sympathetic towards the right of continuing the appeal to the Privy Council. He suggested that if there was a constitutional struggle between the States and Federal Government in Australia, then the Australian States would have no outside body to appeal to.35 Arguments of constitutional propriety made it very difficult for the Heath Government introduce any legislation into the British Parliament in the absence of consensus in Australia. Indeed, by early 1973, some state governments had begun vigorous fight against the federal government manoeuvres. One tactic State governments adopted was to directly approach the British Government and the Queen. In late February, representatives of Australian States asked the British Attorney-General to transmit a petition to the Queen requesting that the seabed question referred to the Privy Council.36 Although British legal advisers accepted that the Australian Federal States had a right to petition the Queen, the British Attorney-General advised them to make the petition through the Australian Government, since the Queen would be constitutionally obliged to seek the advice of Her Ministers once the petition reached her.37 Whitlam admitted that the States were entitled to make representation to the British Government over such matters as the seabed because,

70  In pursuit of judicial independence constitutionally speaking, they were still British colonies. Still, Whitlam firmly believed that the States did not have the power to prevent him from abolishing appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and he thought it inappropriate for Australian State Governments to communicate with the British Government on this question.38 On 12 April 1973 Whitlam wrote to Heath, stating that Australia’s position as a nation requires that communications affecting Australia should take place only between the United Kingdom Government and, at the Australian end, the Australian Government at Canberra … it should be the position in regard to all matters, including matters in which the individual Australian States may be interested.39 During the Easter week of 1973, Whitlam paid his first official visit to London as Australian Prime Minister. The subject of appeals to the Privy Council was at the top of his agenda for this visit. Heath took the view that the question of whether appeals should be brought to the Privy Council from the courts of a Commonwealth country was essentially a question for the Commonwealth country concerned and the Australian Government should use the mechanism inherent in their constitution to settle this problem independently. Whitlam, however, insisted that the Australian Government was constitutionally entitled to ask the British Government to agree to his proposal of introducing legislation for the purpose of abolishing appeals from Australian courts to the Privy Council.40 The direct outcome of the discussions in London was Whitlam’s determination to introduce a Bill as soon as possible, as well as to request the British Government to abolish the remaining appeals to the Privy Council which could still arise from Australian Courts. This decision was announced in the Australian House of Representatives on 1 May 1973.41 A domestic-policy issue or a foreign-policy issues? The Whitlam Government took the initiative to approach London over the issue of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council without consulting the state governments. Whitlam assumed that issues of a “diplomatic” nature did not require prior consultation of the federal government with the state governments, despite the fact that rights to appeal to the Privy Council were still valued by them as a guard against any encroachment of Federal powers.42 Whitlam’s proposed legislation comprised a package of two separate Bills—a Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill and a Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Bill—designated for the abolition of appeals from the State Courts and the High Court, respectively. Responses to the announcement of these Bills, particularly the former, caught Whitlam off-guard. State governments immediately began planning a counter-move against the Australian federal government. On 7 May 1973, Sir Murray Porter, the Agent-General for Victoria in London, notified the British Government that the state of Victoria

In pursuit of judicial independence  71 was opposed to the Commonwealth proposal of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council, and the Victorian government was prepared to fight back “if that interest was endangered.”43 The British Government adopted a very cautious approach in dealing with the Australian states. Sir Murray Porter had in fact sought to call on the foreign secretary, but was instead received by the parliamentary under-secretary, indicating British concerns at their involvement in Australian domestic politics. The British agreed to the meeting simply because the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was, in principle, the official communication channel between the Australian States and the Queen.44 The unilateral action of the Commonwealth government in approaching the British Government without any prior consultation with state governments was heavily criticised. State authorities pointed out that they were entitled to “above board consultation” rather than a “backdoor approach to London” and the “sudden introduction of offshore legislation.”45 The fact that three state Labor governments—South Australia (SA), Western Australia (WA) and Tasmania—played leading roles in challenging a federal Labor government, highlighted the panic which Whitlam’s tactics aroused.46 Nonetheless, Whitlam offered no compromise. He stuck to the necessity of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council by calling it “the most ample, dilatory, extravagant form of appeals in the world,” adding that “it was an insult to Australian judges.”47 C. W. Harders, Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, suggested that the Federal Government should contact the British Government as soon as possible, because he was confident that London would be favourably disposed to Canberra’s position. In February, when Tasmania was proposing an approach to the Privy Council regarding the seabed legislation, John Armstrong, the Australian High Commissioner in London, simultaneously held discussions with Eric Norris, the deputy under-secretary of the FCO. Norris stated that the British position on this matter was that Tasmania should submit a petition to the Queen through the Australian Government. If Tasmania petitioned Her Majesty directly, the Queen would only be constitutionally obliged to seek the advice of her Ministers and their advice would be to not refer the matter to the Privy Council without the prior agreement of the Australian Government.48 Harders regarded this gesture as a sound basis for an approach by the Australian Government in the present circumstances.49 Whitlam was not convinced. He feared that the Queen, on receiving a petition, might invoke the Privy Council as the appropriate place to resolve the matter. He wanted to ensure that the British Government would advise to firstly refer the matter to the Australian Government. On 24 May Whitlam wrote to Heath, telling him that if the States proceeded with their petition to the Queen, he would ask the Governor-General of Australia to request that the Queen not refer the matter to the Judicial Committee.50 In an attempt to dissuade them from petitioning the Queen, Whitlam also informed all the state Premiers of the federal government’s position and his exchange of views with Edward Heath and the British Government.51

72  In pursuit of judicial independence In the meantime, the actions of the state governments drove home the urgency of coming up with relevant legislation. No time was wasted in drafting, revising, and getting a clearance from the British Parliament for the proposed Bills.52 On 31 May, two Bills—the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill and the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Bill—were introduced to the federal Parliament. The former constituted Whitlam’s ambitious effort to abolish all appeals from Australian courts other than from the High Court to the Privy Council. This Bill, among other things, requested and consented to the enactment of complementary British legislation under the terms of the Statute of Westminster. The latter restarted the process, began by the Australian Parliament in 1968, of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court, which did not call for any action from the UK Government or the British Parliament.53 State governments, however, were equally determined. As Whitlam presented the Bills in Parliament House, the Solicitors-General of Tasmania and Queensland lodged their petitions to the Queen with the Clerk of the Office of the Privy Council. Their purpose was to persuade the British Government not to alter the constitutional structure of Australian Federation without consultation and agreement from the States.54 Australian constitutional tussle in London The gathering in London of the Premiers and representatives of the six Australian States indicated the seriousness of the “constitutional battle” looming between the States and the Commonwealth government. British historian Robert Jackson warned that the struggle could have an impact on Australia’s existence as a federation. Because of the special constitutional links between the two countries, Britain had an investment in the satisfactory resolution of this question.55 However, Australia’s “constitutional battle” created a diplomatic dilemma for the British Government as it had to walk a tightrope between these two competing powers. London was of the view that the British Government should continue to play the role of neutral mediator, attempting to bridge the gap between the different parties in the dispute.56 The guiding principle that Edward Heath adopted was not to intervene in Australian domestic disputes; such matters should instead be settled in Australia. Therefore, he told Whitlam that the British Government had not expressly agreed to the terms of the Bills tabled in Parliament in Canberra, and would avoid any public comment on them. Heath also informed Whitlam that he would meet with the visiting state premiers and attorney-generals as a matter of courtesy, but the British Government was not prepared to enter into independent discussions with the states on a government-to-government basis.57 The unprecedented meeting of Australian state premiers, attorney-generals and solicitor-generals made London the main stage for the Australian constitutional tussle, the dramatic effect of which was greatly reinforced by the arrival of the federal solicitor-general, Robert Ellicott.58 To avoid embarrassing

In pursuit of judicial independence  73 British authorities with an unnecessary public spat with state representatives, Ellicott’s discussions with British officials were conducted with little fanfare and limited access to the press. On 11 and 14 June, the Australian representatives had two meetings with their British counterparts. The crux of their differences remained: to which ministries—UK, Australian, or Australian States—should the Sovereign look to for “advice”? 59 The lobbying efforts of the States’ representatives were vigorous but ineffective. They were received by senior British ministers and legal advisers, and even offered an informal talk with Edward Heath. The British authorities, however, did not respond positively to two specific issues: Firstly, the British authorities did not approve the States’ petitions seeking an advisory opinion from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the territorial limits of the states in relation to offshore areas. Secondly, the British were uneasy about the request that Whitehall should refrain from enacting the necessary legislation without consultation on matters which primarily concerned the states. The only successful outcome for the States in these discussions was Sir Douglas-Home’s agreement “to give careful consideration” to these issues.60 The Australian Commonwealth Government’s dilemma At the request of several states, the proposed abolition of appeals to the Privy Council and general methods of constitutional change were included in the agenda for the 1973 Premiers’ Conference in Canberra.61 As a result, Whitlam eventually accommodated to the importance of seeking consultation with the states and suggested that all seven Australian Parliaments join the federal government in requesting and consenting to the enactment of UK legislation. In the meantime, if all the Premiers agreed that appeals should be abolished, he would not proceed with the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill 1973 beyond the stage of its second reading in the House of Representatives.62 On 23 July 1973, Whitlam repeated this proposal to the Premiers, confirming his willingness to withhold action in respect of the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill 1973 until the following year. By doing so, he hoped that the States would have enough time to introduce legislation that would support the federal government’s request for the enactment of legislation at Westminster.63 This proposal was discussed at the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General on 2 and 3 July 1973 in Perth. The state attorney-generals, however, did not make any concrete commitment to Whitlam’s request; the attorney-generals for New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria pressed to proceed immediately with a proposal for a “Statute of Westminster for the States,” as a precondition for consideration of the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.64 Replies were received from all Premiers, except Robert Askin, the Premier of NSW. WA and Tasmania supported the government’s view that the High Court should be the final court of appeal from State Supreme Courts. These two states were prepared to cooperate in the course proposed by the Prime Minister; still,

74  In pursuit of judicial independence they preferred an approval involving enactment of a Statute of Westminster to the Australian states, which would enable state parliaments to act on their own initiative to abolish appeals from State court to the Privy Council. Eric Reece, the Tasmanian Premier, added that his government wished to preserve the right to seek an advisory opinion from the Privy Council until such time as the High Court was invested with advisory jurisdiction, a broadly similar approach to the view of SA.65 Victoria indicated that it would only support proposals for the improvement and amendment of the Constitution rather than a complete change in the law.66 On 12 September 1973, the Queensland Premier replied that his government’s attitude “was made patently clear” by the passing of the Appeals and Special Reference Bill on 2 August 1973, which provided for appeals directly from the Supreme Court of Queensland to the Privy Council and for the referral of questions to the Privy Council for advisory opinions.67 The Queensland Parliament’s introduction of its own Bill formulated a common solution in response to the question of the rights of States to appeal to the Privy Council. A further development occurred in Canberra on 31 August when, during a meeting of ministers responsible for censorship matters, Whitlam told M. G. Everett, the attorney-general of Tasmania, that the Australian Government could not proceed with the proposal for a Statute of Westminster for the states, unless the states agreed to the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. Everett then suggested that the two matters—the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council and the enactment of a Statute of Westminster for the states—could best be reconciled together. There was a twofold intention behind Everett’s suggestion—both to ensure, from the Australian Government’s viewpoint, that all states were committed to the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council and also to secure the enactment of a Statute of Westminster to make his proposal palatable to all six States.68 At this point, the Commonwealth Government faced a dilemma. Should it try to proceed with the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill or should it engage in further discussion with the states regarding the feasibility of Everett’s suggestion? C. W. Harders, the Secretary of the Federal Attorney-General’s Department, suggested that the government could seek to make an alteration to the Constitution to empower parliament to abolish appeals to the Privy Council across all matters. Meanwhile, measures might be taken to provide the High Court with an advisory jurisdiction.69 No action was taken, however, either to discuss Everett’s proposal with the states or to pursue the proposed constitutional changes. Strictly speaking, the round of discussion with the states initiated by Whitlam’s letter of 23 July was not yet concluded because a reply from the Premier of NSW had not arrived. It never arrived. In late October, C. W. Harders told R. J. Ellicott, “There is no present indication as to what action will be taken with Privy Council Bill.”70 Another crucial issue that remained outstanding was the British Government’s decision on the Tasmania and Queensland seabed petitions. Later, Heath informed Whitlam that British legal advisors and academic experts had reached the conclusion that the two petitions should not be referred to the

In pursuit of judicial independence  75 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The British ministers would advise the Queen of this conclusion. Heath went on to say that the British Government fully accepted that, in the particular circumstances of the petitions, the Australian Government also had a right to tender advice concurrently to Her Majesty if it wished to do so. Edward Heath’s formal advice was planned to be submitted to the Queen by 21 January 1974.71 Who controls the formal conduit for advice to the Queen? Edward Heath’s letter was a boost for the Whitlam Government. It established the federal government’s legitimacy as a formal conduit for advice to the Queen. However, Heath’s message also noted that while advice to the Queen would not be given without prior consultation with the Australian Government, this advice would be furnished by Her Majesty’s British ministers. This did not appease Whitlam. For Whitlam, the Queen should be guided by “Her Majesty’s Australian Ministries.” Thus, he faced a dilemma: Since the British advice would be proposed to the Queen by 21 January, should his government instead decide to break with convention and offer a second set of recommendations alongside the British ministry’s own advice?72 On 17 January 1974, Whitlam wrote to Heath, emphasising that the Queen should be guided by the advice of the Australian ministers, which would be conveyed to the Queen through the Australian Governor-General.73 On the same day, Whitlam requested the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, to convey the advice of his government to the Queen and that, on receipt of her decision, the Australian Government would then convey it to the Premiers of the two States.74 This message was delivered to the Queen by Paul Hasluck on 21 January. Two days later, Hasluck was informed that Her Majesty had accepted the advice. Accordingly, Hasluck then wrote to the governors of Queensland and Tasmania on 30 January, reiterating the Australian Government’s advice given to the Queen of Australia and Her Majesty’s decision not to refer the State petitions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.75 The Queen personally repeated this advice when she opened the Australian Parliament in Canberra on 28 February. The governors of these states were also separately informed by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, that their petitions would not be referred to the Judicial Committee. Douglas-Home said that Her Majesty had sought the advice of her British ministers and had accepted their recommendation to that effect.76 Subsequently, on 8 February, Stanley Burbury, Governor of Tasmania, wrote to Sir Alec Douglas-Home seeking his clarification on the apparent inconsistency between Hasluck’s and Sir Alec’s letters to him— why had the Queen accepted the same advice from both Her British and Australian ministers? Douglas-Home’s explanation was that the Queen’s decision was based on the advice of her British ministers, but “the Australian Commonwealth government also claimed the right to tender advice on this matter.” The fact that “they submitted to Her Majesty in her capacity as Queen of

76  In pursuit of judicial independence Australia is a matter for them.”77 Later, at the Tasmanian Premier’s request, the Governor, writing to Paul Hasluck, stated that “the statement in your despatch that Her Majesty had accepted the advice of her Australian ministers proceeded from some misunderstanding of the constitutional position” and suggested that “Your Excellency may be advised that some amendment to the terms to your despatch should be made.”78 Hasluck thought that the Queen’s willingness to accept advice from both British and Australian ministers had the potential to give rise to procedural questions, even though in this particular case the two sets of advice led to the same outcome. Hasluck was also deeply disturbed by the fact that a Secretary of State in the British Government was still corresponding directly with an Australian state government on matters “being solely the concern of Australian governments.” In a letter to Whitlam of 26 March 1974, he said that “it was out of keeping with recent developments.”79 Whitlam also regarded the channel of communication between state governments and the FCO to be unsatisfactory. He insisted that the Australian Government should be the only source of the Queen’s advice, anything communicated at Vice Regal level should also be communicated to the Governor-General. Furthermore, the FCO should discontinue their direct communication with Australian state governments. He indicated that the proposal for the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council should be made in the context of relations between the Commonwealth and the states in the Queen’s Australian realm, therefore making it of little relevance to the Queen’s British ministers.80 These views were directly at odds with the British position, which had been expressed in an earlier message from Morrice James to Sir John Bunting, stating that “the power created by Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 is a power vested in Her Majesty in right of the United Kingdom and not in Her Majesty in some other capacity.” The British Government took the view that the Queen should act on the advice of Her British ministers in exercising the power to refer regarding questions to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. The British Government conceded, however, that Australian ministers had the right to provide their advice to the Queen when questions involved “the limits inter se of the constitutional power of the Commonwealth and the States.”81 The Whitlam Government had hoped that this concession would ensure that the Australian High Court could exercise exclusive jurisdiction in relation to abovementioned issues. Yet, the view taken by the British Government had the potential to give rise to the question of whether Australian ministers should have an exclusive right to advise the Queen in regard to matters concerning Australia. The Judicial Committee Acts, however, made provisions for the establishment of what was, in effect, a British facility and namely a Judicial Tribunal located in the UK. At this point, the Australian Government concluded that it was a real possibility that the Queen could receive conflicting advice from both the British and Australian Ministers. For Whitlam, this provided an

In pursuit of judicial independence  77 important argument in favour of abolishing the advisory jurisdiction of the Privy Council in regard to Australian matters.82 The two Australian Bills lapsed when parliament was prorogued on 14 February 1974.83 As the consensus of all states to introduce support and consent legislation had not been realised, these Bills were intended to be reintroduced. However, with the forthcoming British election in March, it was seen as logical to postpone any such action. The Australian elections, to be held in May that year also made it somewhat impractical to proceed. When Labour came across Labor… Harold Wilson succeeded Edward Heath as British Prime Minister in March 1974. Whitlam was re-elected in May and immediately asked the Governor-General Paul Hasluck to confirm with Tasmanian officials that there had been no misunderstanding of the constitutional position on the part of the Australian Government. The Queen made her decision on the advice of Her British ministers, but the Australian ministers’ advice was also accepted by the Queen and the Australian Government’s right to tender advice to the Queen was also fully recognised by the British Government.84 Consequently, on 18 June Paul Hasluck informed the Governor of Tasmania that no amendment was necessary to the terms of his despatch of 30 January.85 In the meantime, Whitlam was ready to submit the proposal abolishing appeals to the Privy Council under Wilson’s new Labor Government. Whitlam wrote to Wilson on 6 June 1974, citing the Tasmanian government’s request for clarification as a strong reason to dissuade the British Government from providing advice to the Queen on matters of concern only to Australia. He wanted to ensure that the Australian federal government was the Queen’s only advisory source on Australian issues. He further argued that the current system of “double-advising” from both the British and Australian ministers to the Queen on Australian matters had given rise to various “procedural” problems which were unnecessary and overly bureaucratic. Whitlam also urged British authorities to produce an agreed text which would be included in the schedule of the Australian Bill at the earliest possible date in order to reintroduce the two Australian Bills on the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.86 The Wilson government took a tougher position than the previous Heath government on the constitutional tussle which was unfolding. To Whitlam’s dismay, Wilson’s response to his request was discouraging. Not only did Wilson reiterate his predecessor’s unwillingness to be involved in Australian constitutional disputes, but he also made it clear that the British would not commit to the introduction of the Schedules Bill to Parliament, at least until the legislation had firstly been enacted and successfully litigated in Australia. Furthermore, Wilson thought it inappropriate to arrange for communications from the States to be forwarded through the Governor-General, instead of British ministers. In his view, the British Government could not establish a general

78  In pursuit of judicial independence principle as proposed by Whitlam before some understanding was reached between the Australian federal and state governments.87 As a result, Wilson stated that his government would wait for the legislation to be enacted in Australia, as well as the finalising of the legal proceedings which might emerge as a consequence before indicating London’s attitudes towards tabling the legislation proposal at Westminster.88 C. W. Harders, the Secretary of the Federal Attorney-General’s Department, interpreted Wilson’s message as a direct challenge to the Australian Government’s proposed “dual approach”—to enact the relevant legislation in Australia and Britain concurrently. Harders admitted that the unilateral abolition on the Australian side had always involved the risk of failure.89 Whitlam was disappointed by Wilson’s letter of 1 August 1974. When Queensland again endeavoured to obtain an advisory opinion from the Privy Council concerning the proposal that Her Majesty should be known as Queen of the UK, of Australia, of Queensland and each of the other Australian States, Whitlam wrote to Wilson indicating his government’s opposition to the Queensland government’s action. In addition, the Whitlam Government sought to challenge the Queensland government in the Australian High Court. And Whitlam then advised the Queen to not accede to Queensland’s request.90 Later, Whitlam wrote to Wilson, suggesting that further discussion ought to be held, firstly between the respective officials of the two governments and then between the two Prime Ministers, as a way to move the matter forward.91 Wilson agreed with Whitlam’s suggestion, but chose not to comment on Queensland’s action.92 By joint initiative, two preliminary discussions were scheduled at an official level for 10 October and 5 November. Nonetheless, nothing new emerged from these discussions. The British officials made it clear that they had no new proposals to table,93 and no satisfactory resolution arose.94 Further discussions, regarding the abolition of appeals and references to the Privy Council and related matters, were arranged between the legal advisers for both governments in London on 18–19 November 1974.95 No breakthrough was achieved. Regarding the issue of the channels of communication between the Australian States and Her Majesty, the British officials still held the view that until the Australian states themselves sought to alter their constitutional position in relation to the UK, the channels of communication should remain as they presently existed. Responsibility for advising the Queen on matters concerning the States, therefore, remained with British ministers.96 Whitlam met with Wilson in London in late December 1974. Their meeting concluded without any public statement from either Prime Minister. However, rumours circulated that Whitlam had not only tried to end the right of appeals to the Privy Council of Australian states but was also attempting to restrict the power of the State Agents-General in London.97 This created unease amongst the state premiers. At the initiative of the Premier of WA, Sir Charles Court, the state governments decided to launch a new joint campaign to counter “­Whitlam’s manoeuvre.” Sir Charles Court and Johannes Bjelke-Petersen

In pursuit of judicial independence  79 arrived in London on 23 January 1975 as the representatives of the Australian Premiers. They hoped to hold discussions with Harold Wilson or his senior ministers to get the Australian states’ voice heard.98 The two Premiers’ week-long stay in London was filled with high-profile activities which were closely reported and widely criticised. The fact that the Australian Prime Minister and State Premiers were quarrelling with one another in respect to the mother country “which has long relinquished the responsibilities of constitutional parenthood” was seen in British official circles as unseemly and demeaning.99 Bjelke-Petersen was derided as “a man who has never accepted the fact that the sun has set on the British Empire.”100 Whitlam was infuriated that his position had been mis-stated and distorted by the State Premiers, declaring that “it is amazing how these super patriots … feel free to denigrate and downgrade Australia abroad, to foul the nest.”101 Bjelke-Petersen told British and Australian journalists that Whitlam wanted to sever every link between Australia and Britain and make Australia a republic with himself as the president adding, for good effect, the groundless allegation that Whitlam was going to abolish the position of Agent-General.102 The WA and Queensland Premiers, however, were satisfied with the outcome of their lobbying efforts in London. On 28 January 1975, they were received by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. A public statement released after their discussion indicated that the British Government considered constitutional disputes in Australia as “essentially matters for resolution by Australians in Australia.”103 Bjelke-Petersen thought that this was all the assurance they required. The Premiers thus returned to Australia with confidence that “the British government will not do anything contrary to the wishes of the States.”104 This joint public statement was approved by Wilson, who thought it was an appropriate time to clearly state his government’s position on Australian constitutional disputes. On 26 January 1975, he wrote to Whitlam rejecting Whitlam’s suggestion of founding an Australian “panel” of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which would sit in Australia and hear all appeals originating in Australia. He thought the proposed solution would begin a bad precedent for other Commonwealth members who had a similar relationship with the Judicial Committee. Wilson reaffirmed the British Government’s position that it would not commit to the introduction of the Bill until after the legal proceedings in Australia had concluded. He stated that British Government officials would continue to maintain the convention of receiving visiting Australian Premiers and listening to their opinions but would not engage in substantial discussion. Finally, Wilson reiterated his government’s opinion that they had no wish to be embroiled in the internal or domestic affairs of Australia.105 Under these circumstances, there was only one course of action open to the Australian Government: To proceed with the introduction of the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Bill and the Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill. On 11 February 1975, these Bills were re-introduced into the Federal

80  In pursuit of judicial independence Parliament. However, this time all the State governments were informed in advance. Both Bills were passed by the House of Representatives on 18 February 1975. The first was then passed by the Senate on 25 February 1975, and received the Queen’s Assent in 30 April 1975. It became known in law as the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975. Routes of appeal from the Australian High Court to the Privy Council were now closed for good. However, the second Bill was rejected by the Senate on 26 February 1975.106 Three months later (27 May 1975), it was reintroduced and was finally passed by the House unopposed on 18 August 1975. On 21 August 1975, however, it was rejected by the Senate.107 Whitlam intended to revise and re-introduce the Bill at some future stage, but his government was dismissed in November 1975 before that was ever possible.108 These constitutional issues, for nearly three years a major irritant in Australia’s relationship with Britain, lay dormant during the years of the Fraser Coalition Government. It was not until a decade after the Whitlam Government’s dismissal that appeals from Australian courts to the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were finally terminated (with the promulgation of The Australia Act of 1986). The Whitlam Government’s attempt to abolish appeals to the Privy Council from Australian Courts was a significant chapter in paving the way for Australia’s final judicial independence. It was also the point where Australia’s internal politics became inseparably intertwined with its British connection. By attempting to abolish appeals to the Privy Council from Australian courts, the Whitlam Government was trying to untie a historical knot left over from Australia’s colonial past and, as such, support from both the British Government and Australian States were essential for its success. The Labor government, however, lacked both. The Australian States constituted the strongest defenders of the “old order” and posed the biggest hurdle to reform. Liberal and Country Party State governments refused to relinquish the right of appeal to the Privy Council. State Premiers, particularly Sir Robert Askin and Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, invoked the doctrine of state sovereignty against the doctrine of national mandate. As Graham Freudenberg has noted, “two factors which contributed so much to the destruction of John Gorton— conservative unease about change and the hostility of State Premiers—set in against the Whitlam Government from the very beginning.”109 To thwart Whitlam’s effort, Bjelke-Petersen even went to great lengths to portray “the Whitlam government as the harbinger of a godless socialist dictatorship.”110 Whitlam’s obliviousness to the need for a political strategy that engaged the States also contributed to his failure. He put himself and his government in a disadvantageous position by not consulting with the State Premiers before proposing plans to the British for the first time. As Paul Hasluck said, the major contrast between the Whitlam Government and its predecessors and successor was not simply in “what was done but rather in the way it was done.”111 Whitlam paid a heavy price for his impatience and heavy-handedness. He turned the Premier of Queensland into a fierce critic who eventually played a pivotal role in the ALP’s downfall.112

In pursuit of judicial independence  81 Furthermore, Whitlam failed to win over the British authorities to his cause. His approach towards Britain was not well received by people like Morrice James, the UK High Commissioner to Australia, who regarded Whitlam as someone “suffered from tunnel-vision in his thinking about Anglo-Australian links,” because Whitlam “could not see past the minutiae of an (admittedly in some ways anachronistic) constitutional relationship.”113 In James’ eyes, Whitlam was a maverick leader suffered from a “presentational itch” and the desire to be seen as a “dramatic innovator.”114 Unsurprisingly, the British Government, from the very beginning, adopted a sensible stance of seeking to extricate itself from domestic Australian disputes. Although the British would have gladly relinquished its remaining constitutional powers in Australia, it only agreed to do so under proper procedures. In fact, the British Government had little space for manoeuvre. On the one hand, both Edward Heath’s Conservative government and Harold Wilson’s Labour government were reluctant to tip the balance in favour of the Australian Federal government, because any action taken by the British government without a consensus among the various Australian parties concerned would lay the UK open to the charge, both in Britain and in Australia, of having connived at circumventing the Australian Commonwealth Constitution by strengthening Canberra at the expense of the States.115 On the other hand, both Heath and Wilson Governments were equally unwilling to sacrifice the Anglo-Australian relationship for the benefit of any State government. The issue of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council was just one aspect of Australia’s federal–state relations, though relevant to Britain to a certain extent, the final solution ultimately rested upon compromise and consensus within Australia. Acknowledgement This chapter is derived in part from an article published in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (2021) copyright ©Taylor & Francis, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com; DOI:10.1080/03086534.2020.1 783114, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.­ tandfonline.com. Notes 1 “Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit, 1 May 1973,” Whitlam Institute E-Collection (WIE), accessed 12 February 2011. 2 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972–1975 (Melbourne: Viking, 1985), 130–31. 3 For a history of Australian National Anthem, see http://www.itsanhonour.gov. au/symbols/anthem.cfm#history, accessed on 5 July 2010. 4 “Speech by the Gough Whitlam QC, at the unveiling of the Eureka Flag, Ballarat Fine Art Gallery, Ballarat,” 3 December 1973, WIE, accessed 5 July 2010.

82  In pursuit of judicial independence 5 “Speech by the Prime Minister of Australia at Mansion House, London,” 19 December 1974, Record No. 000002869, WIE, accessed on 8 September 2010. It seems odd for someone with strong Republican feelings to “refurbish the old institution to bring it in line with the reality.” In reality, Whitlam did not become an open republican until after the Dismissal of 11 November 1975, which radically changed his views on monarchy as an Australian institution. 6 To illustrate this point, Whitlam stated in this speech that “in 1953 for instance, Australia had 28 Ambassadors and High Commissioners abroad and there were 29 Ambassadors and High Commissioners accredited here. In 1972 the corresponding figures were 74 Australian Ambassadors and High Commissioners abroad 55 Heads of Mission here, see “Speech in the House of Representatives ‘The Queen and the Privy Council’ on 1 May 1973,” Record No. 000000550, WIE, accessed on 2 July 2010. 7 Whitlam records at length in his memoirs the extended saga of his government’s attempt to abolish appeals to the Privy Council, mainly to defend his government’s policy legacy, see Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 130–52. 8 Geoffrey Bolton, “The United Kingdom,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971– 75, ed. W. J. Hudson (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 209–30. 9 Deborah Gare, “Dating Australia’s Independence: National Sovereignty and the 1986 Australia Acts,” Australian Historical Studies 29, no. 113 (1999): 251–66. 10 O’Brien argues that the Whitlam Government’s attempt to abolish appeals from Australian courts to the Privy Council arose primarily from the ALP’s long-standing ambition to transform the federation into a unitary state where all power was centralised in the Federal government, see O’Brien, Constitutional Conflict in Australia (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980); Paul Henderson regards this as a typical example of conflict between state governments and the Commonwealth Government, see Paul Henderson, Parliament and Politics in Australia: Political Institutions and Foreign Relations (Richmond: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1988). 11 See Anne Twomey, “Aspirational Nationalism or Opportunistic Federalism,” Quadrant 51, no. 10 (2007): 38–43, and James Curran, “The ‘new line in the Strand’: John Armstrong and the ‘new nationalism’,” in The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in The United Kingdom, 1910–2010, eds. Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee (Barton: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), 164–81. 12 James Curran and Stuart Ward, The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire (Carlton: Melbourne University, 2010), 138. 13 Ibid., 87. 14 Twomey shows that the Whitlam Government, in its attempts to terminate the Privy Council’s rights to hear appeals from Australian courts, operated under a complete misapprehension of the perceptions and realities in Britain. She argues that contrary to Whitlam and his political advisors’ understanding, the British Government was not merely a channel of communication for the views and advice of Australian governments to the Queen concerning state constitutional and political questions, see Ann Twomey, The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors (Annandale: The Federation Press, 2006), 104–45. 15 Constitutional Issues, Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 12 December 1974, FCO 24/1912, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 16 House of Representatives Debate, 23 September 1965, pp. 1197–210, Hansard cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, The National Archives of Australia (NAA). 17 Dr. H. V. Evatt, Attorney-General of the Labor Government was a driving force behind the Government’s resorts to the Privy Council, see Goldring, The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution, 4–5.

In pursuit of judicial independence  83 18 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 603. 19 Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution (Camberwell: Widescope, 1977), 15–45. 20 House of Representatives Debate, 23 September 1965, 1197–210, Hansard cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 21 Ibid. 22 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 603. 23 Whitlam reports his trip to London, undated, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 8, NAA. 24 Whitlam’s speech in the House of Representatives on 1 May 1973, Record No. 000000550, WIE, accessed 8 March 2011. 25 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 603. 26 Graham Freudenberg, A Figure of Speech: A Political Memoir (Milton: John Wiley & Sons Australia, 2005), 135–6. 27 Constitutional Issues, Brief by FCO, 12 December 1974, FCO 24/1912, NAUK. 28 Heath to Whitlam, 29 January 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 29 Morrice, “The Australian Labour Party Government (2),” 5 April 1973, FCO 24/1596, NAUK. 30 Heath to Whitlam, 29 January 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA; The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 603. 31 Tendler, “Australia to cut its last legal and judicial ties with Britain,” The Times, 15 January 1973; Berlins, “Privy Council appeal function in question,” The Times, 19 January 1973. 32 Bridge to Acland, 24 January 1973, FCO 24/1643, NAUK. 33 Abbott to Lewin, 16 February 1973, FCO 24/1644, NAUK. 34 Heath to Whitlam, 29 January 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 35 House of Lords Debate, 9 May 1973, vol.342, cc.437–503, Hansard 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 22 April 2009. 36 In 1970, the Commonwealth Liberal Government introduced the Territorial Sea and Continent Shelf Bill 1970 into the Commonwealth Parliament, intending to legislate concerning offshore minerals outside the traditional three-mile limit off the States. The State vigorously objected to the Bill. Concerned that the Commonwealth might enact the legislation, the Tasmanian Liberal Government sought to initiate a petition to the Queen seeking an advisory opinion from the Privy Council on whether the States held sovereignty over the seabed. For an introduction of the evolution of seabed question and that of the Seas and Submerged Bills, see Twomey, The Chameleon Crown, 115–29 and Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 255–62. 37 Cablegram from the Australian High Commission (AHC) in London to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 19 February 1973, I.19347, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 38 Prime Minister’s Press Conference, 16 January 1973, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 39 Whitlam to Heath, 12 April 1973, No. 037128, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 40 “Record of Prime Minister’s Discussion with the Lord Chancellor,” 24 April 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 41 Speech in the House of Representatives “The Queen and the Privy Council” on 1 May 1973, Record No. 000000550, WIE, accessed 5 July 2010. 42 Bolton argues that Whitlam was unaware of the possible consequences of his act, see Bolton, “The United Kingdom”, 221. 43 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 14 May 1973, I.53239, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 8, NAA. 44 Record of Conversation between D. P. Aiers and Australian Foreign Secretary in Canberra on 9 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA; Cole-Adams, “Victoria Planning Appeals Fight,” The Age, 9 May 1973.

84  In pursuit of judicial independence 45 “Why Imperil Federation?” The Herald, 14 May 1973; Kimpton’s Letter to the Editor, 15 May 1973, newspaper cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 46 Colebatch, “Holding Attacks Off-shore ‘Grab’,” The Age, 14 May 1973. 47 Jost, “An Insult to Our Judges,” The Age, 16 May 1973. 48 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 19 February 1973, I.19347, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 49 Harders to Bunting, 17 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 50 Whitlam to Heath, 24 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 1, NAA. 51 Whitlam to all State Premiers, 24 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 52 Before the Bills were introduced, Whitlam kept pushing the British sides for an early clearance, although the latter felt unconfident that it would be possible within this time frame, see Note for file by P. H. Bailey, 30 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA; Note for File by P. H. Bailey, 31 May 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 53 For High Commissioner from Bailey, 31 May 1973, 0.55984, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. In 1968, Senator Sam Cohen moved to extend the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 to prevent appeals from the High Court in matters of a wholly state characters, but his motion was defeated by the combined efforts of the members of Liberal Party, Country Party and DLP, see Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972–1975, 603. 54 Cablegram from the AHC London to the DFA, 31 May 1973, I.61190, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA. 55 Jackson’s Letters to the Editor, The Times, 24 May 1973. 56 “Australian Dilemma,” Daily Telegraph, 29 May 1973; “London Is the Wrong Arena,” The Times, 30 May 1973. 57 Heath to Whitlam, 6 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA. 58 Harders to Brazil, 4 June 1973, 0.057075, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA. 59 Record of Discussion held at the FCO, London, on 11 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 60 Draft of Telegram, 12 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA; Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, 13 June 1973, I.66156, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 61 Letters from Whitlam to State Premiers, 20 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA. 62 Record of Premier’s Meeting, 29 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA; Appeals to the Privy Council, by Parliamentary Branch, 13 August 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 63 Whitlam to Askin, 23 July 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 2, NAA. 64 Cablegram from the DFA to the AHC in Ottawa, 3 August 1973, 0.80299, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 65 Reece to Whitlam, 16 August 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA; Tonkin to Whitlam, 13 August 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA; Tonkin to Whitlam, 25 June 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 3, NAA. Dunstan to Whitlam, 20 August 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 66 Hamer to Whitlam, 16 August 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 67 Bjelke-Petersen to Whitlam, 12 September 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 68 Harders to Bunting, 4 October 1973, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 69 Ibid; Appeals to the Privy Council, Brief Notes for the Prime Minister, 1 February 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 70 Harders to Ellicott, 23 October 1973, 0.110947, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 71 Heath to Whitlam, 7 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA.

In pursuit of judicial independence  85 72 “Seabed Petitions – Privy Council, Matters for Consideration”, undated, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 73 Whitlam to Heath, 17 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 74 Whitlam to Hasluck, 17 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 75 Hasluck to Burbury, 30 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA; Hasluck to Hannah, 30 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 76 Douglas-Home to Burbury, 23 January 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 77 Douglas-Home to Stanley, 19 February 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 78 Burbury to Hasluck, 21 March 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 79 Hasluck to Whitlam, 26 March 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 80 Communication from Prime Minister, 21 March 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 81 James to Bunting, 19 February 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 82 Message from the United Kingdom Prime Minister, undated, A432, 1973/3262 PART 4, NAA. 83 Harders to Bunting, 25 October 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 84 Whitlam to Hasluck, 6 June 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 85 Hasluck to Burbury, 18 June 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 86 Whitlam to Wilson, 6 June 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 87 Wilson to Whitlam, 1 August 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 88 Draft Parliamentary Briefing Notes, Bunting to Menzies, 10 September 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 89 Harders to the Attorney-General, 11 July 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 5, NAA. 90 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 608–9. 91 Whitlam to Wilson, 24 September 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 92 Wilson to Whitlam, 14 October 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 93 Bunting to Harders, 17 October 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 94 Note of discussion with Aiers and Hay, 17 October 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA; Harders to the Secretary, 7 November 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 95 From Canberra to London, 20 October 1974, 0.CH131439, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 96 Report of discussions with UK Officials on 18 and 19 November 1974, A432, 1973/3262 PART 6, NAA. 97 Lunn, “Premier Plan UK Trip to Counter PM,” The Australian, 1 January 1975; Heinrichs, “States to fight for UK links: PM’s London trip worries Premiers,” The Age, 4 January 1975. 98 Premier of SA to the Secretary of the FCO, 22 January 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA. 99 “Place for family row is home,” The Age, 9 January 1975. 100 Murphy, “Joh’s medieval meander,” newspaper cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA. 101 “Position on Privy Council Appeals Mis-stated: PM,” undated, newspaper cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA; To Don Emerton from Prime Minister’s Office, 6 February 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA. 102 “Whitlam ‘Wants to make Australia a republic’,” newspaper cutting from A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA. 103 Text of Press Statement, 28 January 1975, 28 January 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA. 104 “Bjelke Reassures Lewis on Appeal to Privy Council,” The Australian, 1 February 1975. 105 Wilson to Whitlam, 26 January 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA.

86  In pursuit of judicial independence 106 Lindell to Emerton, 26 February 1975, 73/3262, A432, 1973/3262 PART 7, NAA; A notification of the Queen’s approval of the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975, 14 May 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 9, NAA. 107 G. Kelly to the Secretary, 22 August 1975, A432, 1973/3262 PART 9, NAA. 108 Ibid. 109 Freudenberg, A Figure of Speech, 255. 110 Mark McKenna, The Captive Republic: A History of Republicanism in Australia, 1788–1996 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 227–8. 111 Paul Hasluck, Light That Time Has Made (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1995), 161–4. 112 Henderson, Parliament and Politics in Australia, 7–8. 113 “Britain and Australia: Reciprocal Needs,” Valedictory Despatch by Sir Morrice James, 30 April 1976, FCO 24/2203, NAUK. 114 From Canberra 2102302 to FCO Tel No 1808 of 21 December 1972, FCO 24/1610, NAUK. 115 Constitutional Issues, Brief by FCO, 12 December 1974, FCO 24/1912, NAUK.

Bibliography Ashton, S. R., Carl Bridge, and Stuart Ward, eds. Australia and the United Kingdom, 1960–1975. Barton: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010. Bolton, Geoffrey. “The United Kingdom.” In Australia in World Affairs, 1971–75, edited by W. J. Hudson. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. Curran, James. “The ‘New Line in the Strand’: John Armstrong and the ‘New Nationalism’.” In The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in The United Kingdom, 1910–2010, edited by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee, 164–81. Barton: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010. Curran, James and Stuart Ward. The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire. Carlton: Melbourne University, 2010. Freudenberg, Graham. A Figure of Speech: A Political Memoir. Milton: John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Gare, Deborah. “Dating Australia’s Independence: National Sovereignty and the 1986 Australia Acts.” Australian Historical Studies 29, no. 113 (1999): 251–66. Goldring, John. The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution. Hobart: University of Tasmania Law School, 1996. Hasluck, Paul. Light That Time Has Made. Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1995. Henderson, Paul. Parliament and Politics in Australia: Political Institutions and Foreign Relations. Richmond: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1988. McKenna, Mark. The Captive Republic: A History of Republicanism in Australia, 1788– 1996. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. O’Brien, Patrick. Constitutional Conflict in Australia. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980. Twomey, Anne. “Aspirational Nationalism or Opportunistic Federalism.” Quadrant 51, no. 10 (2007): 38–43. ———. The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and Her Australian Governors. Annandale: The Federation Press, 2006. United Kingdom. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 342, 1803– 2005. 9 May 1973. Whitlam, Gough. On Australia’s Constitution. Camberwell, Victoria: Widescope, 1977. ———. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Melbourne: Viking, 1985.

3 From “forward defence” to “continental defence”

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was established in 1971 as a post-colonial transitional arrangement to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia after the British withdraw from east of Suez. Under this framework, ANZUK, a tripartite force formed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, was created and stationed in Singapore and Malaysia. During Whitlam’s 1972 election campaign, he announced the plan of ending Australia’s military contribution to Singapore and Malaysia. He promised that “the battalion and battery there will not be replaced when they complete their tour of duty” because he was of the conviction that the “Five-Power Arrangements do not require an Australian garrison in Singapore.”1 After the ALP won the election of 1972, Whitlam dutifully carried out this campaign promise by deciding to withdraw Australia’s military contribution to Malaysia and Singapore which led to the disbandment of ANZUK. Australia’s participation in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore was the last combined military operation between Australian and the United Kingdom, starting from that in the Sudan in 1885, followed by the Boer War of 1899, the Boxer uprising of 1900, and the First and Second World Wars. After the Second World War, Britain had decided that one way of supporting world power was to encourage key Dominion partners to take a more prominent, if not leading part in partnering defence planning in their regions, in order to commit their resources and make them a main support base for their respective areas in the case of major or world war. In Southeast Asia, Britain revitalised the Australia–New Zealand–Malaya Agreement (ANZAM) arrangement to strengthen the defence of Malaya in response to a change in its defence doctrine to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, as well as the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact. In order to block Britain’s pressure for admission to ANZUS and prepared the future diminution of British power in Southeast Asia, Australia accepted the British proposal for the revitalisation of ANZAM and reaffirmed its role as a Commonwealth alliance partner of the British in the form of participation in a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya.2

DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-4

88  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” From an Australian viewpoint, accepting such a role post-1945 was based partly on a reading of the fall of Singapore/attack on Darwin that forward defence in Asia was advisable, and that following British failures it should take a more active part in strategic and regional planning, and ultimately accepting a domino reading for Asia.3 By 1961, however, Whitlam had adopted the view that the history that had been conditioning Australia’s national security policy was no longer relevant because the world had changed markedly since 1945. He regarded the changed voting patterns in the UN as clear evidences of the change in the regional balance of power. In his view, “the West no longer controls Asia and Africa and the balance of economic and military power is shifting quite rapidly against the West and the UK in particular.”4 He criticised Australian Government’s policy of blindly following Britain and America “when they agreed and to follow the more bellicose and colonial course when they disagreed,” because such a policy put Australia “so often and so greatly at variance” with its neighbours. Whitlam, therefore, advocated that Australia should stop rendering Western allies “uncritical support” and steer a change of its foreign policy “from the familiar European world to the unfamiliar Afro-Asian world.”5 To pull Australian military contribution to Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Malaysia) was among Whitlam’s suggested adaptations to new circumstances. In this sense, the end of ANZUK was the tail end of both a British policy— as Britain reorientated to merely assisting local forces—and an Australian one, as presumably Australia post-Vietnam moved away from the “forward defence” policy towards the “continental defence” policy. Historians have various opinions on the Whitlam government’s military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. The debate centres mainly on these questions: Does the Labor Government’s policy towards military deployment in Malaysia and Singapore represented a sharp departure from those by the Liberal/National (Country) Party Coalition Government? Was it a slight disengagement with Asia, or just a switch to emphasising politics and cooperation and downplaying military aspects of Asian policy? A debate among historians Although Whitlam was widely credited for bringing a new vision and skill in dealing with various Northeast Asian countries, views on his Southeast Asian policies remain divided. Indeed, his envisioning of a new and truly regional grouping, including Australia but not the US, was rebuffed by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and came to no avail. Additionally, his effort to develop bilateral relations with Indonesia floundered over East Timor. Based on the Whitlam government’s policies towards Southeast Asia that two researchers, Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, challenged the view that Whitlam was “the adroit and skilful” architect of Australia’s engagement with the Asian region. They argue that the most notable Southeast Asian policy during Whitlam’s term, the 1973 withdrawal of Australian forces from Malaysia and

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  89 Singapore, was an act of disengagement rather than one of engagement. For Benvenuti and Jones, this policy delivered a serious blow to Australian engagement with Asia by irritating Australia’s allies and complicating Australia’s relations with its immediate neighbours.6 This is only one of the many aspects in the historiography of Australian foreign relations during the Cold War that researchers such as Benvenuti et al. find unsatisfactory. In particular, they do not accept the “conventional understandings” of Australian foreign policy which views the decisive break in external relations as having only occurred only after 1972 with the arrival of Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister. The core of this conventional wisdom is that Whitlam, out of a more mature understanding of Australia as part of a wider Asia region, began to sever Australia’s outdated imperial linkages to Britain, thereby setting Australia on an independent course in world affairs. Between 1949 and 1972, Australia was seen as docile and subservient to its great power protectors (the United States and the United Kingdom), a policy stance which was propelled by a conservative yet reactionary domestic monoculture that simultaneously alienated its Asian neighbours. By contrast, Benvenuti et al. contend that the conventional wisdom associated with the beginnings of Australia’s “modern” era does not concur with historical fact.7 Bevenuti et al. argue that some “left-Labor” scholars, including Bruce Grant, Gareth Evans, Meg Gurry, and Frank Bongiorno, helped to establish this skewed understanding, having blindly followed the “Evatt tradition and Keating tradition” which itself offers disparaging views of Menzies’ regional policies and helped in creating and propagating the myth of Labor’s linkages within Asia.8 By arguing that the Whitlam Government’s policy towards Asia was not so original and creative as it was perceived and, on the other hand, that the Menzies Governments’ handling of Asian affairs was not as clumsy and myopic as it is usually viewed, Bevenuti et al. assume that there is a discontinuity in Australia’s foreign policy from Menzies to Whitlam. The major difference between Bevenuti et al. and the “Left-Labor scholars,” which they criticise, is that they regard the transition from Menzies to Whitlam as a step backwards rather than a progressive evolution, as proclaimed by the latter group. Bevenuti et al. single out the Whitlam government’s decision to withdraw Australia’s military contribution as major evidence of the Labor government’s mishandling of Australian relations with Southeast Asia. Bevenuti and Jones are not the first authors questioning the thesis that Whitlam Government’s approach to foreign affairs represent a watershed in Australia’s foreign policy. Although the multitude of new policies announced by the Labor Government after December 1972 displayed a sense of change in Australia’s foreign affairs, some contemporary commentators started to appraise to what extent the Whitlam Government’s diplomatic practice had departed from the established thinking of previous administrations. How far was it really new? Were the changes wrought by the Whitlam Government significant enough to amount to a genuine reform? Hedley Bull, an influential Australian political scientist and a conservative observer of Australian foreign

90  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” policy, was among those asking these questions in the early 1970s. He analysed the Whitlam Government’s perception of Australia’s role in the world and leaned towards the view that Whitlam’s policy had not departed far from the established thinking of the previous administration. In Bull’s view, although it was an obvious fact that the Whitlam Government had introduced many new initiatives into Australia’s foreign policy, it had also inherited its predecessor’s perception of Australia’s basic interests and obligations in foreign policy. The changes that the Whitlam Government made were simply the means and modalities for upholding these basic interests and obligations. Moreover, some changes the Whitlam Government ushered in had already commenced in the late 1960s; the Whitlam Government’s contribution was to accelerate and accentuate these changes. For instance, the decision to withdraw from Vietnam was actually made by the Gorton and McMahon LCP Coalition Governments, which fashioned the doctrine that Australia would not face serious military threat in the coming decade. These governments began to reduce military commitments overseas. The role played by the Whitlam Government was to facilitate adjustments in Australian’s foreign policy to suit the new circumstances of the 1970s.9 Regarding Australia’s relations with Asia, Bull argued that some changes that are associated with the Whitlam Government were in fact originated in the late 1960s by Liberal-Country Party Governments. It was the Gorton government that began the trend towards greater independence of the United States and Britain in foreign policy; it was the Gorton and MacMahon governments that withdrew Australian combat forces from Vietnam. It was Liberal-Country Party governments that began the reform of Australian immigration policy so as, after 1966, to admit substantial numbers of Asian immigrants.10 For Bull, the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy was merely an adjustment to changing circumstances, which its predecessors had been slow to make. In contrast, T. B. Millar thought that the Labor Government’s foreign policy was deeply marked by the personal style of Gough Whitlam, and that he had significantly changed the direction and approach of Australian foreign policy. In Millar’s view, Whitlam came to power at a time devoid of new thinking in foreign affairs. His influence on Australia’s foreign policy was unprecedented. For about eleven months, Whitlam was his own foreign minister and he was in effect the foreign minister de facto for the remainder of his administration (Don Willesee was appointed Minster for Foreign Affairs on 30 November 1973). Although Millar also conceded that some aspects of Labor’s policy could be traced to earlier governments, particularly the Gorton Administration, and especially with respect to its view on Vietnam. However, he emphasised that, fundamentally, Labor’s view of the world was very different from that of its predecessor, which had barely started to adjust to the contemporary situation after twenty years of anti-communist wars in Asia.11

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  91 A middle road was offered by J. D. B. Miller and J. A. C. Mackie, who argued that there was both continuity and change in Australian foreign policy in spite of the sense of a new start which the Whitlam Government inspired. Miller categorised Whitlam’s foreign policies into different groups in terms of their relation to the past: on some aspects, there was a clean break with the past; on other aspects, however, he insists, there was no discernible difference between the Labor Government and the former LCP Coalition Government. For Miller, there was continuity between Whitlam’s Labor Government and the Liberal-Country Party Coalition in their policies towards Japan, Indonesia and Southeast Asia. In some respects, such as Australia’s policy towards Papua New Guinea, the Labor Government accelerated changes already evident before 1972. But there was a clear departure from old practices with respect to China, South Africa and the United States.12 Mackie also divided the major foreign-policy initiatives taken by the Whitlam Government into three categories: the first category included measures which had irrevocably reversed the policies of the previous government; the second category embraced new initiatives which had significance as pointers to the future; the third category was related to Australia’s racial policies and international standing on racial issues, which Mackie regarded as necessarily distinct from the more substantive foreign policy changes.13 For Miller and Mackie, Whitlam was a cautious and pragmatic reformer, pushing ahead where feasible and sensible, but retaining a strong commitment to tradition in international relations. In their view, Whitlam pushed Australian foreign policy to evolve into a more independent stance, but evolution was not revolution. Against such a historiographic context, by arguing that the Whitlam Government’s policy towards Asia is not so original and creative as it is perceived and, on the other hand, the Menzies governments’ handling of Asian affairs is not as clumsy and myopic as it is usually viewed, Bevenuti et al. are assuming that there is a discontinuity in Australia’s foreign policy from Menzies to Whitlam. The major difference between them and the “left-Labor scholars” they criticise is they regard the transition from Menzies to Whitlam as a retrograde devolution rather than a progressive evolution or revolution as proclaimed by the latter group. They single out the Whitlam government’s decision to withdraw Australian military contribution as major evidence of the Labor government’s mishandling of Australia’s relations with Southeast Asia. This chapter, however, argues that we need to add a caveat to the contention that the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 marked a turning point in Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia. Those who have argued that the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 marked a turning point in Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia have overlooked some key continuities. This chapter argues that they have also failed to take account of a significant motivating force behind these continuities: in some aspects of Australia’s policy towards Southeast Asia, a pragmatic calculation in relation to Australia’s regional defence engagement replaced a sense of responsibility to the Commonwealth as the new form of continuity between the Coalition and

92  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” the Labor governments. This chapter will support this argument with a case study focused on the Whitlam Government’s decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian military deployments from Malaysia and Singapore. Although this decision appeared to constitute a radical departure from previous Australian Governments’ strategic thinking towards Malaysia and Singapore, a careful scrutiny of John Gorton’s stance on Australian participation in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, and the thinking behind the Labor decision to withdraw from the region reveals a bipartisan trend of shifting from “forward defence” to “continental defence.” Through a comprehensive examination of the process surrounding the Whitlam Government’s decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore and the response from regional countries, this chapter will show that Whitlam greatly benefited from the seeds planted by his Liberal-National Coalition predecessors in having a relatively resistance-free withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.14 Therefore, in terms of strategic thinking towards Malaysia and Singapore, Gorton’s signing of the FPDA and Whitlam’s withdrawal from the ANZUK Force demonstrates more continuities than points of difference in what are traditionally seen as the Labor and the Coalition foreign policy traditions, respectively. The defence arrangement of Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal The FPDA owes its origins to the British Labour Government’s decision to withdraw its military presence from East of Suez. From the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s, the defence of Malaysia and Singapore had been guaranteed by the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA). Under this agreement, Britain, as the principal guarantor of the security of the area, provided the bulk of military support in the region, with Australia and New Zealand contributing some comparatively smaller forces.15 From the 1960s, however, the considerable drain on British resources caused by its overseas deployment finally led the British Labour Government to reduce the country’s defence spending.16 In November 1967, the British were forced to devalue the Pound due to mounting economic problems. This led to deep cuts to its government budget, and it became increasingly clear that the British Government could no longer uphold its military commitment in the Far East.17 On 16 January 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson told Parliament that Britain would withdraw all its military forces from the Malaysia/Singapore area by the end of 1971 (instead of by the mid-1970s as previously announced), and that the UK intended to revise its defence agreement with Malaysia, under which British, Australian and New Zealand forces were stationed in the area. The British also announced that they would provide aid to mitigate the economic effects of their withdrawal; would be willing to help Malaysia and Singapore establish an air defence system to cover both countries and train personnel to operate it; and would be ready to join in a meeting with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand to consider the post-withdrawal situation.18

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  93 The Conservative Government, which returned to office in June 1970, decided to retain some military presence in the region. But the economic challenge of sustaining large-scale overseas deployments also beset the Heath Government, which was elected on a platform promising reduced taxation and public expenditure. Economic constraints meant that it was unrealistic for the Conservative Government to commit additional resources overseas.19 Consequently, the Heath Government came up with “an exciting new concept aiming at a greater degree of cooperation between the Commonwealth countries.” Britain would make a contribution to a “five power force” involving Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia.20 The Conservative Government moved quickly to announce the concept of the FPDA as a replacement for the AMDA. From late July to early August, Lord Carrington, the new British Secretary of State for Defence, visited Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in order to seek a revision of arrangements East of Suez. His objective was to reduce Britain’s burden in the defence of the Malaysia and Singapore region through relegating Britain from its previous position as a dominant partner in Southeast Asia to that of one among five equal partners.21 In particular, Lord Carrington expected that Australian and New Zealand military forces would shift from assisting Britain to shouldering equal responsibility for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore.22 Carrington’s Far East visit paved the way for the establishment of the FPDA. The FPDA framework consisted of six bilateral agreements signed on 1 December 1971. Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom each signed separate agreements with Malaysia and with Singapore, whereby they would maintain forces in Malaysia and Singapore as well as providing training, technical, operational, material and other related assistance to the military forces of Malaysia and Singapore. A communiqué on the formation of the FPDA was issued on 16 April 1971, which came into effect on 1 November 1971 after the cessation of the AMDA. It stated that the five powers (Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore) would continue to cooperate in the field of defence and consult in the event of external aggression or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singapore.23 Based on this agreement, the Australian, New Zealand and British forces in Malaysia and Singapore were integrated into a single tripartite force known as the ANZUK (or ANZUK force) for general logistical and administrative purposes.24 It was also during this time that the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) of FPDA was set up as the only permanent component of FPDA. Australia assumed a major role in both the ANZUK and the IADS: the total strength of ANZUK was about 9,000, to which Australia contributed 4,000 land and naval forces in Singapore and two squadrons of Mirage supersonic fighter aircraft at Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia, whilst the IADS was under the command of an Australian Air Vice-Marshal.25 Unlike AMDA, under the new arrangements, no external power played the dominant role in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. As K. U. Menon noted: “Whereas the AMDA institutionalised the dependence on external

94  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” protection, alliance roles were reversed in the FPDA, with primary defence responsibilities after 1971 residing in Malaysia and Singapore rather than their external Commonwealth allies.”26 In addition, there was no commitment by the three ANZUK nations to help defend Malaysia or Singapore in the event of an external attack. Instead, immediate consultations would be held between the parties to decide on measures to be taken, jointly or separately, in the event of external aggression. Furthermore, the FPDA partners’ military cooperation was recorded relatively informally—instead of taking the form of a series of military treaties, the FPDA was only operational following the issuance of a communiqué by the Defence Ministers of the five countries. There was nothing in this communiqué that specified essential details such as the reasons why the ANZUK army, navy and air force elements were based in the region or how long they would be stationed there.27 In fact, the ANZUK was not an inherent component of the FPDA. This joint organisation owed its birth to the administrative convenience and budgetary economy rather than any specific regulations of the FPDA. It was also an outcome of individual agreements between the three constituent members, plus Malaysia and Singapore separately. Although the ANZUK influenced the content of consultations among FPDA members its overall existence and operation ultimately depended on the individual policies of the members. Consequently, ANZUK was essentially a transitional and ad hoc arrangement, “lasting as long as there was agreed need.”28 Apparently, the FPDA was at best a partial replacement of the AMDA. The vague terms defining the FPDA framework rendered it a toothless tiger. As a post-colonial transitional arrangement, the FPDA’s most important mission was to serve as a stabilising factor for Malaysia and Singapore while they built up their own defence capabilities. However, Malaysia and Singapore, the two major beneficiaries of the arrangements, viewed the FPDA differently. Singapore valued the economic side-benefits and the deterrent effect against potential unrest in the region.29 Malaysia meanwhile preferred the sophisticated air defence cover and regarded the FPDA as a framework for practical defence cooperation rather than as a deterrent. For the British, the FPDA was an ideal way of reaching the goal of maintaining a useful military presence in the Far East at a low cost. The Gorton Government’s stance on the FPDA The Australian Government was the principal reason behind the form that the five-power defence cooperation eventually took. Immediately after Wilson’s announcement of January 1968, Australia began preliminary thinking and consulting on how they would adjust to the British decision. In February, Australian Foreign Minister Paul Hasluck toured Southeast Asian capitals for exploratory discussions. He found a strong desire on the part of both Singapore and Malaysia for a continued Australian military presence after 1971, and acceptance of this on the part of Indonesia. At the same time, he noted

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  95 considerable mutual distrust between Malaysia and Singapore, along with ignorance of what was involved in maintaining modern forces. Following Hasluck’s trip, the Australian Government announced that although it could not fill the gap left by the British, it would take part in the five-power conference and would “be prepared to discuss the size and role of an Australian contribution to combined defence arrangements which embrace a joint Singapore–Malaysia defence effort.”30 However, the Gorton Government was reluctant to play a larger role without involving external powers such as Britain and/or the United States. Australia looked to the ANZUS Council meeting in Wellington on 5 April 1968 for consultations with the US, and for indications of the degree of US willingness to stand behind any forces which they might maintain in the peninsula after 1971. Hasluck had previously queried the US on the applicability of ANZUS to such forces.31 The American Government replied that although they recognised questions concerning the application of the Treaty might arise, they had no intention of expanding their commitments or responsibilities as a result of the British decision to withdraw.32 Subsequently, there had been strong indications that Gorton was backing away from the Australian Government’s previously announced, tentative decision to station forces in Singapore/Malaysia after 1971. Gorton instructed Defence Minister Allen Fairhall to tell Parliament that Australia’s future participation in Singapore/ Malaysia defence depended upon the cooperation of all five Commonwealth powers—including Britain.33 Gorton had also indicated a belief that, in view of the allegedly uncertain direction of future US policy, it would be unwise for Australia to maintain troops in the peninsula without a specific US guarantee of some kind.34 Gorton’s position on Australia’s future role in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore was also influenced by what he saw as an emerging US isolationism. On 31 March 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson, under the huge pressure of the rising Anti-Vietnam War movement in the US, announced that he was partially halting the US bombing of Vietnam, and that he had decided not to seek his party’s nomination for president.35 Since this speech, Gorton had come to fear a resurgence of isolationism in the US under the next administration, and he believed that Australia might accordingly have to reassess its own basic defence strategy. Gorton feared, as commentators suggested, that US troops would be withdrawn from Southeast Asia by 1971 and that, in such circumstances, Australians would conspicuously be the only “Caucasian” troops present in the region.36 According to Winthrop Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the US Department of State, on 9 May Gorton told Liberal Parliamentarians in closed meetings that his government could not define long-term defence policy until he had conferred with President Johnson later that month. He said he was aware that some MPs were uneasy about a possible change in US policy in Southeast Asia and resulting effects on the US–Australia alliance. It was foolish, he said, to proceed with fundamental defence planning until such imponderables were

96  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” resolved, and he was therefore putting off Australia’s new three-year defence plan for one year. Looking ahead, he predicted a possible need to abandon the “Menzies concept of forward defence” in favour of “an Israeli-type defence scheme.” On the same day, he told a reporter that he was convinced there would be a major US retrenchment in Asia after the US presidential election in November 1968, regardless of who won it, and that this would amount to a return to “pre-World War II isolationism.”37 Therefore, Gorton was unwilling to commit Australian forces to Malaysia/ Singapore defence without greater assurance of support from either or both the UK and US. During the five-power conference, Gorton went to great lengths to avoid accepting any concrete commitments. In his view, any formal commitments that put Australia in the position of bilateral support of both Malaysia and Singapore might arouse suspicion in other regional governments. Furthermore, Australia wanted to avoid encouraging immoderate policies based on the expectation that external military support would always be available whenever they found themselves in dispute or friction with their neighbours. Finally, Australia sought to avoid any formal or legal restrictions on its option to withdraw its forces should it became obvious that they were at risk of military threats.38 Gorton hoped his administration could take an even-handed approach towards geopolitical rivalries in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, he wanted to reassure the Malaysians and Singaporeans of Australia’s regional commitment to their fundamental security interests particularly vis-à-vis potential clashes with regional neighbours such as the Philippines and Indonesia. On the other hand, Australia had to disarm any Indonesian and Filipino resentment of their presence.39 This balance lay at the heart of Australian policy and, consequently, calculated ambiguity had been a feature of Gorton’s approach towards geopolitics in Southeast Asia. He expressed unequivocal interest and demonstrated strong will and capability in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, whilst also eschewing any defined bilateral commitments to both countries. For him, a degree of uncertainty about the Australian position afforded an important diplomatic instrument and enlarged the opportunities for spreading influence. The Gorton Government’s non-committal attitudes were instrumental in the form that the ambiguous FPDA framework eventually took—consultative by nature, loose in structure, and vague in details. The Australian Government viewed the FPDA as a low-risk venture. Since involvement in the internal security operations of Malaysia and Singapore was rigorously excluded and military commitment in the event of external threat was specifically limited to consultation only, the risks of involving Australia in any unnecessary and risky security situation were deemed to be extremely low. Even in the likely scenario that the Five Power Defence Arrangements accidentally involve Australia in an intra-regional dispute, it was still possible for Australia to extricate its forces.40 In the meantime, the FPDA owned all the symbolic value that the Australian Government needed. The Coalition Government regarded the FPDA as a gesture of support for Malaysia and Singapore in the aftermath of a series of

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  97 radical changes in Southeast Asia: Sukarno’s “confrontation,” Britain’s planned military withdrawal from East of Suez by the early 1970s, and a history of tension between Malaysia and Singapore. In addition, the FPDA was designed to help enhance the defence of Malaysia and Singapore whilst their own defence capabilities developed. It was a credible expression of Australian interest in Southeast Asian regional security and orderly development, as well as a long-term means of securing political status and influence in the region. The stability of the political situation in Malaysia and Singapore and the prevention of significant penetration of the region by external powers were seen as essential for Australian national security.41 Should Australia station military forces in Malaysia and Singapore? The calculated ambiguity was instrumental in creating space for the Gorton administration to manoeuvre, but the imprecision of the FPDA’s objectives became loopholes open to criticism. After the signing of the FPDA, the maintenance of military forces in Malaysia and Singapore was called into question by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) led by Gough Whitlam. Whitlam felt that, after Australia’s experience in South Vietnam, popular sentiment was strongly opposed to having troops (which Whitlam saw as “garrisons”) stationed in other countries. Their presence could be counter-productive. The ANZUK force could easily be undermined by a shift in local attitude towards the stationing of large troops of foreign troops within the country. Moreover, Whitlam pointed out that the over-reliance of Singapore and Malaysia on the role of Australian “garrisons” could detrimentally impact on the development of their own national defence forces. He pledged that Australia would withdraw its forces from Malaysia and Singapore once a Labor Government returned to office.42 The stationing of military forces in Malaysia and Singapore became an issue of heated debate during the 1972 Australian federal election. With the withdrawal of the task force from Vietnam, a convergence of views against the deployment of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore was emerging, especially during the six months leading up to the December election.43 Following Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972, the ALP argued that Southeast Asia would not be an area of confrontation among the great powers in the foreseeable future.44 Moreover, since the early 1970s, as a part of attempts by Southeast Asian countries to limit great powers’ military involvement in the region, there had been a trend towards a policy of neutralisation in Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia, as the prime mover in this movement, suggested a joint great power guarantee of Southeast Asia’s neutrality.45 Lance Barnard, Labor’s Deputy Leader and Shadow Defence Minister, believed that “neutralization can and should be made into a credible concept for Southeast Asia.”46 The FPDA and the concept of neutralisation of Southeast Asia were thought to be at odds with each other. Barnard also stated in May 1972 that, due to Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) imminent independence, the principal focus of

98  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” Australia’s foreign policy interest was shifting from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia to PNG and the Pacific. Australia should therefore reconsider its policy towards Southeast Asia, particularly the issue of the FPDA.47 The tendency towards bipartisanship As a result, the military forces stationed in Malaysia and Singapore seemed to have become a major issue dividing Labor and the Coalition. Labor’s policy in favour of withdrawal of Australian troops from Malaysia and Singapore was largely influenced by the change of Labor’s attitude to Vietnam, brought about by pressure from the Anti-Vietnam War Movement and changing public opinion.48 However, differences in their overall approaches towards Southeast Asia should not be exaggerated. That Labor was able to draw a distinction between Australia’s commitments to consultation among powers within the FPDA and the stationing of Australian military forces in Malaysia and Singapore was due to the inherently loose framework that the FPDA eventually took—an outcome attributed to John Gorton. In reality, as a consequence of the dramatic developments in global and regional relationships, there had been a growing tendency towards bipartisanship in domestic Australian attitudes towards Southeast Asia by the late 1960s. This tendency was reflected in some of the policy decisions taken by John Gorton. Observers discerned a conspicuous isolationist trend in Gorton’s early foreign and defence policy statements and public announcements. For example, on 8 May 1968 he asserted that the “forward defence” concept—the maintenance of an Australian military presence in Southeast Asia—should be re-examined because it was no longer relevant. Gorton suggested that only American guarantees of assistance could encourage Australia to continue its defence responsibilities in the Singapore–Malaysian region after the British withdrawal.49 The rationale for the “forward defence” policy was initially weakened by the Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation (1963–1966) and then by the withdrawal of the British garrisons from East of Suez in the 1960s. Consequently, the 1967 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy recognised that Australia’s “participation in a forward defence strategy would become more difficult.”50 The policy was ultimately undermined by the US defeat in Vietnam and Nixon’s Guam Doctrine which required America’s allies in the region to take responsibility for their own defence against future regional confrontations.51 The US isolationism that Gorton had been worried about seemed to be coming true. Moreover, Gorton also identified a global trend that the essentially bipolar organisation of power was giving way to a more complicated strategic situation “in which China, Japan and Western Europe have greater importance, and lesser states too are enabled to assert their independence and strengthen their economic and military capabilities.” This, together with, what he saw as Australia’s Southeast Asian neighbours’ seeking wider and more flexible relationships, made Gorton pursue greater flexibility in Australia’s foreign and

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  99 defence policies.52 Under Gorton’s auspices, the 1971 Strategic Basis Paper indicated that Australian Government should constantly examine whether the purposes of the Australian military presence in Malaysia/Singapore “are still being served.” The paper recognised that “new circumstances or risks, including further moves towards non-alignment or a serious deterioration in relations between Malaysia/Singapore which could call for the termination of the forward deployment of Australian forces.”53 That is why Gorton took an equivocal position on the FPDA—he was attracted to notions of an end to “forward defence” and the development of ‘continental defence’ as the basis of Australian strategic planning.54 Likewise, Whitlam emphasised that strategy based on “containment, forward defence, and ideological confrontation” was no longer relevant and had become counter-productive. Australia, he stated in a speech to Parliament on 24 May 1973, should move towards “ideological co-existence and strategic interdependence between great and small powers alike.” But in assessing longterm trends and seeking continuities amid change, national interests prevailed over partisan politics.55 In short, Whitlam did not regard Southeast Asia as a frontier where Australia should fight nameless Asian enemies.56 Whitlam’s objection to the deployment of military forces in Malaysia and Singapore was based on his belief that Southeast Asia lay outside the sphere of Australia’s core interests. If Australia continued to station military forces in Southeast Asia, then it would carry the danger of overextending its military commitments. For Whitlam, Australia’s most fundamental commitment firstly lay in its own security, secondly in securing a stable and friendly Papua New Guinea, thirdly in achieving a close and cooperative relationship with Indonesia, and lastly in securing peace and prosperity in Australia’s immediate region.57 Therefore, to recall Australian military forces stationed in Malaysia and Singapore was a major move towards adjusting Australia’s overseas commitment in line with its overall policy framework, since these forces added little to Australia’s safety and, potentially, could even damage Australia’s reputation. Aside from the bipartisan perception of the realities of external change, Whitlam’s decision to withdraw Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore was also influenced by the Labor Left. Some members of the Labor Left saw the stationing of forces in Malaysia and Singapore as manifestations of the forward defence policy, which, in their view, “was totally discredited by the Vietnam experience.”58 To a certain extent, the ALP’s determination to withdraw military forces from Southeast Asia was a response to the intense pressure from the Labor Left to bring Australian military forces home as soon as possible towards the end of the Vietnam War. The dreadful lessons of Vietnam were still fresh within Australian political culture. Why take the risk of becoming entangled in another Asian war? This attitude led to the ALP’s decision to reduce the military emphasis in Australian foreign policy. When Whitlam met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in July 1971, Whitlam promised to Zhou that the ALP “have this general proposition that foreign troops should be withdrawn from other countries.”59

100  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” The decision to withdraw Since December 1972, the sentiments regarding Australia’s commitment to the terms of the FDPA had become entwined with Whitlam’s highly personalised style of foreign policymaking and implementation. After assuming office, he nominated himself to hold the Foreign Affairs' portfolio and continued serving as Foreign Minister for the first twelve months his government was in office.60 He sought to develop the image of Australia playing a new and more independent role in the international community and in particular to distance Australia from its “great and powerful friends” in international relations. Within days, even hours, of coming to power, Whitlam put this ethos into practice. The predominant theme was a determination to represent Australia as an “outward looking” country. Equally important, the new administration endeavoured to become more closely identified with the Third World, particularly countries located in Asia and the South Pacific. As a result, the Whitlam Government took a different stance on some major policies to that of the UK and the US. For instance, at the UN, Australia voted for non-aligned resolutions on Rhodesia and South Africa, contrary to the vote of the UK on these matters. It was in this context that the Labor Government started active consideration of measures to withdraw Australian forces stationed in Southeast Asia. In January 1973, the Whitlam Government announced that the Australian battalion and battery in Singapore would not be replaced when their tour of duty expired at the end of that year. Whitlam’s remarks conveyed the impression that most troops, other than the battalion and battery, would remain in Singapore with the heavily Australianised support element of ANZUK remaining similarly unaffected.61 The Labor Left, however, urged the Whitlam Government to adopt a more radical policy which called for the battalion and battery located in Singapore to be withdrawn immediately. They also urged the recall of all supporting forces, including the monitoring unit and Australia’s logistical contribution to ANZUK.62 Given the strength of left-wing support in the ALP, the Labor Government had to go beyond its original gesture. Whitlam, partly as a response to these pressures from within the Party, chose to publicly divulge the identity and function of a top-secret Australian signals monitoring unit stationed within the ANZUK framework in Singapore. The disclosure caused acute embarrassment for Singaporean authorities and exposed ANZUK to unnecessary regional attention. It tended to suggest that ANZUK had a strategic function far beyond its actual limited capabilities. Taking advantage of the situation, the Whitlam Government moved to make a timely announcement that the signalmen would depart alongside the infantry and gunners.63 The preparation for the withdrawal of Australian military forces began immediately after the full ministry was established.64 The Australian Defence Department’s target was to limit the total number of servicemen stationed in Singapore to 600 by the end of February 1974. To achieve this, the withdrawal of the battalion and battery would have to begin in October or

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  101 November 1973, and the monitoring station should begin thinning out in November 1973. By April 1975, all logistical support to the UK and New Zealand forces in Singapore would be terminated. If the military withdrawal proceeded as planned, then this would also signal the end of the ANZUK force (though the FPDA would continue).65 Nevertheless, the Whitlam Government’s withdrawal of Australian ground forces from Singapore did not signal the end of Australia’s military presence in the area as the air units remained at the RAAF base in Butterworth.66 Consequently, less than three months after the Labor Government came into office the commitment to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia had become a firm policy decision. This is only one of a large number of symbolic changes that Whitlam and his associates introduced after a short period of time in government. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that observers like British High Commissioner to Australia Morrice James concluded that a serious break was occurring in Australia’s foreign relations.67 But the detailed analysis of actual policies, processes and proposals, in fact, suggest that Whitlam was far less radical than he appeared in practice. The regional response In early April, Lance Barnard scheduled a number of visits entailing discussions with the other Five-Power partners. The intention was for the Australian Defence Minister to explain Australian planning and note its reception in order to then report back to the Foreign Affairs and Defence (FAD) Committee of the cabinet. In response to the Whitlam Government’s decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Wellington found it impossible to persuade Canberra to “backpedal on the ANZUK rundown.” Although the New Zealand Labour Government planned to retain their forces in Singapore beyond April 1975, they did not want the ANZUK issue to become a problem for bilateral relations with Australia. The New Zealand Minister of Defence, A. J. Faulkner, was eager to make sure that Australia did not misunderstand New Zealand’s decision to remain in Singapore, “since both countries had similar strategic interests in Southeast Asia.”68 In contrast, the Malaysians were somewhat indifferent to Australian intentions in regard to the FPDA. This nonchalance was partly rooted in their distrust of their Commonwealth partners. It is easy for Malaysian leaders to recall the fact that “negotiations to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with a new defence arrangement were fraught with pussyfooting on the part of British, Australian and New Zealand leaders.”69 In actual fact, Malaysia never perceived the FPDA as being at the core of their defence. According to the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) no. 31 entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Malaysia/Singapore” by the United States Department of State, Malaysia was not entirely confident about the FPDA because “Gorton’s limitation of his commitment to West Malaysia (‘Malaya’) confirmed Malaysian fears that

102  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” the new arrangement was not so ironclad as the British commitment.”70 Indeed, in 1969, following race riots in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, neither Australia nor Britain reacted in support of its Commonwealth partner, despite Malaysia’s request for both arms and equipment.71 It was therefore natural for the Malaysians to question the relevance of the FPDA to Malaysia’s national defence. After the Five-Power defence talks in Canberra in June 1969, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated that Malaysia should continue to expand its armed forces precisely due to the British withdrawal and the overall inadequacy of other members in the FPDA.72 As a result, the Malaysian Government (led by the new Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak) did not show much concern about Whitlam Government’s plan to pull Australian troops out of Malaysia and Singapore. The Whitlam Government’s proposal, moreover, did not have a significant effect on Malaysian defence. Malaysia’s main interest was in the future of the Mirage Squadrons at its Butterworth Base, regarding which Australia assured it would retain an open mind. Furthermore, the Whitlam Government’s declared support for the neutralisation objective was also welcomed by the Malaysian Government. Zaiton Ibrahim bin Ahmad, the Secretary-General of the Malaysian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, believed that the maintenance of the FPDA until neutralisation was not dependent on the presence of military forces.73 By contrast, the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s take on the FPDA had been consistently pragmatic. From the very beginning, he expressed the hope that Australia and New Zealand forces would increase after the British military withdrew. He therefore resented the fact that John Gorton was reluctant to committing to a bigger and more active role without the British and/or the Americans.74 As a result, Lee tabled some discriminatory treatment towards Australia and New Zealand concerning rent and training facilities during the ANZUK negotiations. The issue was resolved only after the Australian Government agreed to Singapore’s request for their troops to have access to training facilities in Australia.75 Throughout the negotiation process, Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues maintained a robustly realistic attitude towards the FPDA. Some researchers pointed out that the Singaporean leaders never saw the continued presence of foreign forces as anything other than providing “breathing space,” as well as being a valuable source of support and technical aid.76 The Singapore Defence Minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee, dismissed the whole arrangement as “a toothless paper tiger.”77 Regarding the Whitlam Government’s ANZUK decision, Lee certainly wanted the troops to stay—the dedicated pragmatist was concerned about the economic effects that withdrawal would have on his country’s economy. Foreign military forces stationed in Singapore had been a steady source of income for Singaporeans after the Second World War. Its impact had lessened with the phased reduction in British military expenditure by the latter part of 1971, but was soon counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in spending by ANZUK.78 Accordingly, the full effect of a withdrawal on Singapore’s economy soon became an issue of significant concern.

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  103 After the Australian Government announced the phased withdrawal of Australian forces in Singapore and Malaysia, Lee came out in criticism and complained to the US State Department on 5 April 1973.79 However, Washington had long recognised Malaysia and Singapore as countries in which the US had “important but limited interests and no commitments.” Malaysian/Singapore’s geographic location was important in strategic, economic and communications terms, but much more so to America’s Asian allies than to the US. The NSSM on US policy towards Malaysia/Singapore predicted the possible scenario in which Australia and New Zealand may reverse their decisions of playing a post-1971 role in Malaysia/Singapore defence. Should that happened, the Memoranda concluded, it would not serve the US interest “in having ANZ take on greater responsibility in the area.”80 Lee’s appeal to the US failed to gain traction. It was the last roll of the dice. Thus, when Lance Barnard put the proposal to the Singaporeans and sought their reactions in early May 1973, Singapore’s leaders seemed to have resigned to the inevitable. Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam did not even mention Five-Power or ANZUK Forces and Acting Minister for Defence, Lim Kim San, indicated by a shrug of the shoulders his acceptance of the Australian position.81 N. F. Parkinson, the Australian High Commissioner in Singapore, believed that the reason why Singaporeans eventually acceded to the Australian proposal was that these “hard-headed realists” would not want extensive links between Australia and Singapore to be jeopardised by “short term considerations.”82 Singapore’s stance is evidenced by the fact that when Whitlam visited Singapore in February 1974 the issue of Australia’s military withdrawal from Singapore was not raised at all in his discussion with Lee Kuan Yew.83 To pull Australia back The Australian proposals were most unwelcome in London. The British Conservative Government feared that the Australian decision would expose it to domestic criticism. The British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore had been a result of the Conservative Government’s reversal of the preceding Labour Government’s decision to withdraw all military forces from East of Suez. Before becoming Prime Minister, Edward Heath had vehemently opposed Wilson’s “East of Suez” policy and was committed to maintaining a presence in Asia to protect vital British overseas interests.84 As such, Australia’s proposed withdrawal of military forces from Singapore carried the implication that Heath had made an ill-considered decision. Therefore, the British Government preferred the FPDA to run on undisturbed, at least until sometime after the upcoming British elections in 1975. British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home’s anxiety about the premature public disclosure of Australian intentions was indicative of this political sensitivity.85 However, the Heath Government understood that the new Australian proposal represented the decisions taken by Whitlam to placate the ALP left wing and it was therefore unlikely to be altered.86 If they failed to shift Whitlam on the substance of the Australian decision, the British Government’s objective

104  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” was to influence him about the way in which the new decision would be announced and implemented. In particular, the Heath Government hoped to persuade Whitlam “not to make any premature or dramatic announcements of Australian intentions which would have the effect of damaging the confidence of its local partners in the Five Power Arrangements.”87 In response to the British concerns, the Whitlam Government emphasised that they differentiated between its commitment to the FPDA and the stationing of forces under the ANZUK arrangements. Their position was to honour the FPDA in full, but the stationing of military forces was not essential to such a pledge. They also considered that the FPDA was fundamentally conceived as a transitional measure in circumstances which were substantially different from those in 1973. Many of its original objectives had already been achieved and that other objectives, particularly in the political and diplomatic spheres, were best pursued by other means. Moreover, there was no rush into a premature withdrawal. The Australians would instead provide logistical support to the British and New Zealanders for two more years. In total, the planned withdrawal would stretch over four years from the date of the Government’s election.88 On 4 July 1973, Barnard announced the detailed plan of phased withdrawal of Australian military forces from Singapore. By early 1974 Australia withdrew most of the battalion and of the military logistical elements. The two Australian squadrons of Mirage fighters remained at Butterworth air force base, near Penang, with a detachment at Tengah in Singapore.89 Since the ANZUK force was established by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom as a means of commanding and administering their forces stationed in Singapore and Malaysia under the FPDA, the Australian Government’s decision to withdraw made it impossible for this tripartite force to continue. Therefore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom decided to disband the ANZUK force, replacing it with separate national forces with separate headquarters, each serving the interests of their respective country.90 But this was not to last. Shortly after the Australian military withdrawal, the British Government was forced to terminate its contribution to ANZUK. Consequently, the ANZUK force formally disbanded on 1 January 1975. Its demise came not as a result of failure nor underlying fault but rather because of the changing strategic and diplomatic relations in the region as well as the fundamental policy changes in Australia and the UK.91 With the rapidly changing political climate after the end of the Vietnam War, the return of all Australian troops to Australia was in keeping with the movement towards regional self-reliance and cooperation. The horrific lessons of Vietnam also made overseas military deployment a sensitive issue in domestic Australian politics. There indeed existed a strong argument that Australian commitment to ANZUK contributed to the overall stability in the Malaysia and Singapore region; however, this commitment was more of a gesture of concern rather than a fighting force. Moreover, the FPDA framework survived the ANZUK disbandment as well as the successive military withdrawals due to the distinction between having an external military presence and continuing the FPDA.

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  105 Admittedly, Gorton and Whitlam differed greatly in their most intriguing and innovative thinking in foreign affairs. For instance, Gorton harboured a fierce ambition for Australia to have a nuclear bomb, while Whitlam formally ended Australia’s atomic aspirations by signing onto the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1973.92 However, we should not view everything Whitlam did in foreign policy as revolutionary. At least, there is indeed some continuity on the issue of Australian forces being stationed in Malaysia and Singapore at a time of chaotic transitions in Australia’s regional alliance politics. The Whitlam Government’s military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore took place against the backdrop of its effort to build an image of Australia as an independent country, capable of making its own judgement in international affairs. Nevertheless, this shift in the Whitlam Government’s approach to Malaysia and Singapore should not be overexaggerated as this decision was as much a result of the Australia’s bipartisan movement from “forward defence” to “continental defence” as a result of Whitlam’s response to the intense pressure from the Labor Left to bring Australian military forces home as soon as possible towards the end of the Vietnam War. That the Whitlam Government could make a distinction between Australia’s military deployment in Southeast Asia and its commitment to the FPDA was largely attributed to the calculated design of John Gorton. ANZUK had no formal standing in the FPDA framework and it was never meant to be permanent. Neither did the architecture of the FPDA intend to change the status quo into a framework for regional security. Additionally, and largely due to their experiences with John Gorton’s realistic and pragmatic approach towards Australia’s military commitments to Malaysia and Singapore, leaders of these two countries developed a high level of distrust of Australian politicians (on both the Liberal and Labor sides) and a certain indifference towards policy changes in Australia. Therefore, Whitlam could complete the military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore with relatively little resistance from Australia’s FPDA partners whilst generating minimal disturbance in the region. Although Whitlam’s decision to withdraw Australian military deployment from the ANZUK Force appears to be a reversal of Gorton’s policy of engaging Southeast Asia through the FPDA framework, both governments’ approach towards Australia’s defence relationship with its Commonwealth partners in Southeast Asia was underpinned by a common, careful cost–benefit analysis of Australia’s regional defence interests. On this issue, the divide between Whitlam and his Coalition predecessors was actually not that deep. It is therefore inappropriate to cite the Whitlam Government’s decision to withdraw Australian military forces from Malaysia and Singapore as an act of disengagement with Southeast Asia. The so-called “sharp break” between the Gorton and Whitlam governments, as posited by both the “orthodox” and “revisionist” approaches of historiography, is neither sharp nor break. In terms of Australian participation in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, the transition from Gorton to Whitlam is evolution not revolution.

106  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” Acknowledgement This chapter is derived in part from an article published in History Australia (2022) copyright © 2022 Australian Historical Association, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com; DOI: 10.1080/14490854.2022.2050464, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com on behalf of Australian Historical Association. Notes 1 “It’s Time for Leadership,” delivered by Gough Whitlam at Blacktown Civic Centre on 13 November 1972, Whitlam Institute E-Collection (WIE), accessed 13 March 2022. 2 Hiroyuki Umetsu, “The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK Proposal to Revitalise ANZAM and the increased Australian Defence Commitment to Malaya,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004): 509–25. 3 T. B. Millar, “Anglo-Australian Partnership in Defence of the Malaysian Area,” in Australia and Britain: Studies in A Changing Relationship, eds. A. F. Madden and W. H. Morris-Jones (Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1980), 68–85; Allan Patience, Australian Foreign Policy in Asia: Middle Power or Awkward Partner? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 72–3. 4 Whitlam, Keynote Speech “What Should Australia’s Foreign Policy Be?” for University of Western Australia’s Adult Education Board Summer School on 23 January 1961, WIE, accessed 25 March 2010. 5 ibid. 6 Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “Engaging Southeast Asia? Labor’s Regional Mythology and Australia’s Military Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, 1972–1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 32–62. 7 David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, “Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian Foreign Policy,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 89, no. 355 (2000): 387–406. 8 Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 57–78. 9 Hedley Bull, “The Whitlam Government’s Perceptions of our roles in the World,” in Advance Australia, Where? ed. B.D. Beddie (Melbourne: Oxford University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975), 29–51. 10 Hedley Bull, “Australia and Asia: Security Perspectives,” India International Centre Quarterly 4, no. 2 (April 1977): 146. 11 T. B. Millar, “From Whitlam to Fraser,” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 854–72. 12 J. D. B. Miller, “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities-I,” International Affairs 50, no. 2 (April 1974): 229–41. 13 J.A.C. Mackie, ed. Australia in the New World Order: Foreign Policy in the 1970s (West Melbourne: Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976), 21–5. 14 This subject has attracted some scholarly attention over the years. Chin Kin Wah has looked into the process through which the AMDA was transformed into the loose FPDA, see Kin Wah Chin, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA:

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  107 Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974); Damon Bristow and Carlyle Thayer trace the evolution of the FPDA from its establishment in 1971 to the present day, detailing the development of the FPDA’s major pillars such as the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), the architecture of the political–military dialogue platform, and the exercise programme. Nonetheless, they hold contrasting views regarding the significance of the FPDA for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore: Bristow argues that the FPDA is just “a hangover from a bygone era,” while Thayer believes that the FPDA has become “the quiet achiever.” Both of them, however, overlook the ANZUK force, see Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Security Organization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–20; Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges 3, no. 1 (February 2007): 79–96; Andrea Benvenuti examines the British Government’s rationale for negotiating the FPDA and its decision to maintain a small defence force in Southeast Asia, see Andrea Benvenuti, “The Heath Government and British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of Empire (1970–71),” 20th Century British History 20, no. 1 (2009): 53–74. 15 For the size of Australian military presence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1967, see Andrea Benvenuti, “The British Military Withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Its Impact on Australia’s Cold War Strategic Interests,” Cold War History 5, no. 2 (May 2005): 202. 16 Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia 1941–1968 (London: Curzon Press, 2001), 285. 17 Malcolm H. Murfett, Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 328. 18 House of Commons debates, 16 January 1968 vol.756 cc.1577–620, Hansard 1803–2005: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/index.html, accessed 29 July 2020; Background paper in preparation for Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's 5/27–5/28/68 visit to the US, 22 May 1968. US Declassified Documents Online (USDDO), CK2349547766. There is a wealth of literature on the British withdrawal from East of Suez. For factors influencing the British Government’s decision, see Toni Schönenberger, “The British Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia: Influence of the Labour Party on the Decision,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, no. 2 (September 1981): 113–25; for the debate whether the withdrawal is economically inevitable or a political choice, see Edward Longinotti, “Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice,” Contemporary British History 29, no. 3 (November 2015): 318–40. For Australia’s response to the withdrawal, see Derek McDougall, “Australia and the British Military Withdrawal from East of Suez,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997): 183–94. For key primary records about the Anglo-Australian defence relations from May 1960 to September 1973, see S. R. Ashton, Carl Bridge and Stuart Ward, eds. Australia and the United Kingdom, 1960–1975 (Barton: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). 19 Notes of a meeting of 3 August 1970, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 14, The National Archives of Australia (NAA). 20 Cablegram from London, A1838/346, TS696/1/9 PART 6, NAA; For a summary of the continuing British military presence under the framework of FPDA, see Doc. 106, UKNA: FCO 24/646, Minute, Carrington to Heath, London, 6 August 1970, in Ashton et al., Australia and the United Kingdom, 310–3. 21 Cabinet Minute, Ad Hoc Committee, Canberra, 31 July 1970, Decision No. 575 (Ad Hoc), A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 14, NAA.

108  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” 22 “Record of conversation between Carrington and Gorton on 31 July 1970,” A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 14, NAA; Notes of a meeting of 3 August 1970, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 14, NAA. 23 For the origin of the FPDA, see Cheng Guan Ang, “Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971,” War & Society 30, no. 3 (2011): 207–25; Storey et al., The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011), 1–23. This collection of articles rarely touches on the ANZUK which has not been dealt with in a book-length research. An introduction of the ANZUK can be found in the following articles in addition to the previously cited works by Benvenuti and Jones etc.: Kin Wah Chin, “Rearranging Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Process of Continuing Adjustments in 1973,” Southeast Asian Affairs (1974): 15–26; Kin Wah Chin, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” The Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991): 193–203. 24 “For Prime Minister’s Visit to Malaysia/Singapore: Five Power Defence Arrangements,” A1838/346, 696/1/9 PART 19, NAA. 25 “A summary of major defence alliances,” A1838/346, 696/1/9 PART 20, NAA. 26 K. U. Menon, “A Six-Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 3 (December 1988): 306–27. 27 “Notes of a meeting of 3 August 1970,” A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 14, NAA. 28 George G. Thomson, “Stability and Security in the Region after ANZUK,” Southeast Asian Affairs (1975): 151–9. 29 It proved that the military withdrawal had economic and security repercussions on Singapore, see C. M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore 1819–1988 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), 293–9. According to a survey by the Financial Times in November 1972, the departure of the British forces meant the liquidation of an “Industry” then representing 20 percent of Singapore’s gross national product, see “Financial Times praises S’pore success,” The Straits Times, 21 November 1972, 1. Retrieved from http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/strait stimes19721121-1.1.1, accessed 25 July 2017. 30 Background paper in preparation for Australian Prime Minister John Gorton’s 5/27–5/28/68 visit to the US, 22 May 1968. USDDO, CK2349547766. 31 Memorandum by Australian Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck, White House, 9 October 1967. USDDO, CK2349509334. 32 Ibid.; Summary of NSC paper on the United Kingdom, n.d. USDDO, CK2349278538. 33 Speech by Allen Fairhall, in the House of Representatives, 2 May 1968, Historic Hansard: https://historichansard.net/, accessed 30 July 2020. 34 Ian Fitchett, “Gorton to ask US its policy,” Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1968, newspaper cutting from A1838/36, 696/1/9 PART 1, NAA; Background paper in preparation for Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's 5/27–5/28/68 visit to the US, 22 May 1968. USDDO, CK2349547766. 35 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), entry 170, 469–76. 36 Telegram from Cronk to Rusk, 13 May 1968, Subject: Talking points in preparation for Australian Prime Minister John Gorton's meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson, USDDO, CK2349519948. 37 Ian Fitchett, “Gorton to ask U.S. its policy,” Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1968, newspaper cutting from A1838/36, 696/1/9 PART 1, NAA; Winthrop Brown to Dean Rusk, 23 May 1968. USDDO, CK2349547769. 38 “Defence – Five Power Conference June 1969 – Decision 1085,” A5868/2, 622, NAA. 39 ibid.

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  109 40 Daniel Wei Boon Chua, “America’s Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967–1971,” The International History Review 39, no. 4 (2017): 627. 41 Lance Barnard’s Submission for Cabinet, 26 March 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 23, NAA. 42 Harris, “Gorton Attack on Defence Policy of Opposition,” The Times, 5 November 1970; BBC Interview, 3 November 1971, A1838/346, TS696/1/9 PART 18, NAA. 43 In August 1972, Prime Minister William McMahon declared that Australian troops would be out of Vietnam by Christmas. The actual withdrawal began in October, with a few elements of the team remaining until late 1972 and embassy guards until 1973. For detailed discussions, see Peter Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 307–17; and Paul Ham, Vietnam: the Australian War (Pymble: HarperCollins, 2010), 551–2. 44 Cablegram from DFA to various posts, O.21974, 13 March 1972, A1838/346, TS696/1/9 PART 18, NAA. 45 John Ingleson, “Southeast Asia,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, ed. W. J. Hudson (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 302. 46 Cablegram from DFA to various posts, O.28070, 30 March 1972, A1838/346, TS696/1/9 PART 18, NAA. 47 Cablegram from DFA to Australian High Commission (AHC) in New Delhi, 1 June 1972, O.48055, A1838, 696/1/26/1 PART 1, NAA; “Visit of Mr. Barnard: ALP Policy,” A1838/346, 696/1/9 PART 19, NAA. 48 For how the ALP responded to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement, see Malcolm Saunders, “The ALP's Response to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement: 1965–73,” Labour History, no. 44 (May 1983): 75–91; see also Ashley Lavelle, “Labor and Vietnam: A Reappraisal,” Labour History, no. 90 (May 2006): 119–36. 49 Justus M. Van der Kroef, “The Gorton Manner: Australia, Southeast Asia, and the US,” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 3 (Autumn 1969): 316. 50 “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1967,” A1838, TS677/3 PART 10, NAA. 51 T. B. Millar, “Trends in Australian Defence Policy,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2, no. 1, Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia (March 1971): 49–55; Graeme Cheeseman, “From Forward Defence to Self-reliance: Changes and Continuities in Australian Defence Policy 1965–90,” Australian Journal of Political Science 26, no. 3 (1991): 430–1. 52 Doc. 108, NAA: A5882, CO1191, Minute, Gorton to Cabinet, Canberra, 19 May 1971, in Ashton et al., Australia and the United Kingdom, 315–18. 53 “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, p. 58,” in A5882, CO1191, NAA. 54 Jeffery Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 252. 55 Thomson, “Stability and Security,” 155. 56 News Release “Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School, 27 January 1973,” WIE, accessed 25 March 2010. For the decline of the forward defence, see Cheeseman, “From Forward defence to self-reliance,” 429–45. 57 “Australia and the World, 5 January 1972,” WIE, accessed 24 March 2010. 58 Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War (Sydney: NewSouth, 2014), 253. 59 “Transcript of discussions between Whitlam and Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1971,” in For the Record: Gough Whitlam’s Mission to China, 1971, A series of Occasional Papers published by the Whitlam Institute, no. 3 (July 2013), 20. 60 Wicks, “Australia’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” 121–9. 61 “Mr. Whitlam’s visit to London, April 1973,” 16 April 1973, FCO 24/1555, NAUK.

110  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” 2 Stanhope, “Another fickle ally disappoints Singapore,” The Times, 16 January 1974. 6 63 Ward, “Full blame to Whitlam,” The Australian, newspaper cutting from A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 26, NAA; More detailed description of what Whitlam chose to “divulge” was made in Henry Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor: Content, Process and the National Debate (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 401–3. Also in Chin, “Rearranging Five Power Defence Arrangements,” 22–3. 64 “Prime Minister’s Press Conference, 5 December 1972,” WIE, accessed 24 March 2010. 65 For Acting Secretary, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 23, NAA. 66 Cablegram from Australian High Commission in Wellington to DFA, 14 December 1972, I.130740, A1838/346, 696/1/9 PART 20, NAA. 67 “Australia: Annual Review for 1972,” FCO 24/1586, NAUK. 68 Cablegram from the AHC in Wellington to the DFA, I.56208, 21 May 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 69 Chua, “America’s Role,” 627. 70 National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) no. 31 entitled: “US Policy Toward Malaysia/Singapore”, USDDO, CK2349547665. 71 Menon, “A Six-Power Defence Arrangement,” 317. 72 Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysian Defence Policy: A Study in Parliamentary Attitudes, 1963–1973 (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University Malaya, 1980), 38. 73 Cablegram from the AHC in Singapore to the DFA, 11 December 1972, I.129018, A1838/346, 696/1/9 PART 20, NAA; Record of Meeting, Ministry of Defence, Kuala Lumpur, 7 May 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 74 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First. The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Times Editions, 2000), 429. 75 Ang, “Road to the FPDA,” 215–21. 76 Murfett, Between Two Ocean, 405. 77 Ang Cheng Guan, “On the Establishment of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),” in The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty, 31–2. 78 Rowley, “Population Explosion—Threat to Republic’s Place in the Sun,” The Times, 2 May 1973. 79 Cablegram from Australian Embassy in Washington to the DFA, I.40633, 11 April 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 80 National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) no. 31 entitled: “U.S. Policy Toward Malaysia/Singapore,” USDDO, CK2349547665. 81 “Record of Conversation, 5 May 1973,” A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 82 Cablegram from the AHC in Singapore to the DFA, I.49727, 7 May 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 83 Cablegram from Australian High Commission in Singapore to the Department of Foreign Affairs, I.19344, 8 February 1974, A1838, 3024/10/11/5 PART 2, NAA. 84 B. Vivekanandan, The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974 (Bombay: Somaiya, 1983), 144. 85 Cablegram from the AHC in London to the DFA, I.35315, 29 March 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 23, NAA. 86 Hickman to James, 21 June 1973, FWA10/5, FCO 24/1639, NAUK. 87 “Mr. Whitlam’s visit to London, April 1973,” 16 April 1973, FCO 24/1555, NAUK. 88 Barnard to the Cabinet, 29 June 1973, A5931/1, CL285, NAA. 89 Barnard to the Cabinet, 26 March 1973, A5931/1, CL285, NAA. 90 Cablegram from the AHC in Kuala Lumpur to the DFA, I.129429, 9 November 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 25, NAA. 91 Thomson, “Stability and Security,” 151–9.

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  111 92 For a brief survey on the history of Australia’s nuclear ambitions, see Jim Walsh, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions,” The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (1997): 1–20.

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112  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” Chua, Daniel Wei Boon. “America’s Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967–1971.” The International History Review 39, no. 4 (2017): 615–37. Dennis, Peter, and Jeffrey Grey. Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950–66. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996. Edwards, Peter. A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965–1975. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997. ———. Australia and the Vietnam War. Sydney: NewSouth, 2014. Fitchett, Ian. “Gorton to ask US its policy.” Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1968. Grey, Jeffery. A Military History of Australia. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Guan, Ang Cheng “On the Establishment of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).” In The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty, edited by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh, 24–35. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011. Hack, Karl. Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia 1941–1968. London: Curzon Press, 2001. Ham, Paul. Vietnam: The Australian War. Pymble: HarperCollins, 2010. Harris, Stewart. “Gorton Attack on Defence Policy of Opposition.” The Times, 5 November 1970. Hawkins, David. The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: From AMDA to ANZUK. London: United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1972. Ingleson, John. “Southeast Asia.” In Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, edited by W. J. Hudson, 283–305. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1980. Jeshurun, Chandran. Malaysian Defence Policy: A Study in Parliamentary Attitudes, 1963–1973. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University Malaya, 1980. Jones, David Martin, and Mike Lawrence Smith. “Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian Foreign Policy.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 89, no. 355 (2000): 387–406. Kuhn, Rick. “Laborism and Foreign Policy: The Case of the Vietnam War.” In From Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Foreign Policy, edited by David Lee and Christopher Waters, 77–98. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997. Lavelle, Ashley. “Labor and Vietnam: A Reappraisal.” Labour History, no. 90 (May 2006): 119–36. Lee, David, and Christopher Waters, eds. Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997. Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First. The Singapore Story: 1965–2000. Singapore: Times Editions, 2000. Longinotti, Edward. “Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice.” Contemporary British History 29, no. 3 (November 2015): 318–40. Mackie, J. A. C., ed. Australia in the New World Order: Foreign Policy in the 1970s. West Melbourne: Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976. Madden, A. F., and W. H. Morris-Jones, eds. Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980. McDougall, Derek. “Australia and the British Military Withdrawal from East of Suez.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2, (1997): 183–94.

From “forward Defence” to “continental defence”  113 Menon, K. U. “A Six-Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 3 (December 1988): 306–27. Millar, T. B. “Anglo-Australian Partnership in Defence of the Malaysian Area.” In Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship, edited by A. F. Madden and W. H. Morris-Jones, 68–85. Sydney: Sydney University Press in association with Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1980. ———. “From Whitlam to Fraser.” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 854–72. ———. “Trends in Australian Defence Policy.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (March 1971), Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia: 49–55. Miller, J. D. B. “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities–I.” International Affairs 50, no. 2 (April 1974): 229–41. Milne, R. S. “Malaysia and Singapore in 1974.” Asian Survey 15, no. 2 (February 1975): 166–73. Murfett, Malcolm H., Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004. Patience, Allan. Australian Foreign Policy in Asia: Middle Power or Awkward Partner? Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Rowley, Anthony. “Population Explosion—Threat to Republic’s Place in the Sun.” The Times, 2 May 1973. Saravanamuttu, Johan. “Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defence Arrangements.” In The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty, edited by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh, 38–50. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011. Saunders, Malcolm. “The ALP’s Response to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement: 1965– 73.” Labour History no. 44 (May 1983): 75–91. Schönenberger, Toni. “The British Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia: Influence of the Labour Party on the Decision.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, no. 2 (September 1981): 113–25. Stanhope, Henry. “Another Fickle Ally Disappoints Singapore.” The Times, 16 January 1974. Storey, Ian, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh, eds. The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011. Thayer, Carlyle A. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever.” Security Challenges 3, no. 1 (February 2007): 79–96. Thomson, George G. “Stability and Security in the Region after ANZUK.” Southeast Asian Affairs (1975): 151–9. Till, Geoffrey. “A Little Ray of Sunshine: Britain, and the Origins of the FPDA—A Retrospective on Objectives, Problems and Solutions.” In The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty, edited by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers, and Daljit Singh, 1–23. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2011. Turnbull, C. M. A History of Singapore 1819–1988. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989. Umetsu, Hiroyuki. “The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK Proposal to Revitalise ANZAM and the Increased Australian Defence Commitment to Malaya.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004): 509–25. United States. President (1963–1969: Johnson). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and

114  From “forward Defence” to “continental defence” Statements of the President, November 22, 1963 to January 20, 1953 to January 20, 1969, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: US Govt. Print. Office, 1965–1970. Van der Kroef, Justus M. “The Gorton Manner: Australia, Southeast Asia, and the U.S.” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 3 (Autumn 1969): 311–33. Vivekanandan, B. The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974. Bombay: Somaiya, 1983. Walsh, Jim. “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions.” The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (1997): 1–20. Whitlam Institute. For the Record: Gough Whitlam’s Mission to China, 1971, Vol 3. A series of Occasional Papers published by the Whitlam Institute, July 2013. Whitlam, Gough. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Ringwood: Penguin: 1985. Wicks, Peter. “Australia’s Relations with Southeast Asia Since 1972.” Southeast Asian Affairs (1976): 121–9.

4 The spectre of nuclear testing

France undertook 193 nuclear tests from 1966 to 1996 at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls in French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean, causing large-scale protests across the globe. South Pacific nations, in particular, organised an extensive campaign against French nuclear testing in the region. Protests by Australia and other South Pacific countries reached a climax in 1973, when Australia and New Zealand launched an action in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to stop France conducting atmospheric tests at Mururoa. A number of key questions in this diplomatic incident have attracted scholarly attention over the years. The role of the media, the colonial and post-colonial context, cultural perceptions and domestic politics in both France and Australia have been analysed.1 The legal aspects of the events, especially the course and implication of the two Nuclear Test Cases (the separate Australia and New Zealand cases against France) before the ICJ, have also aroused considerable research interests.2 From the perspective of international relations, however, the existing literature ignores one key aspect of the saga. In the global context of disarmament of the 1970s, the South Pacific protest against France quickly spread to other parts of the world. Not only were many international organisations used for expressing opinions, making requests and seeking support, but the repercussions of the anti-nuclear campaign in the South Pacific also extended to domestic politics in other countries. Britain, in particular, was dragged into the conflict because of its status as a major signatory to the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty of 1963 and its close connections with both France and Australasia. While Britain increasingly saw its primary role as an effective player in Europe, Australia and New Zealand sought London’s support for their protests against French nuclear testing. Thus, Britain was unavoidably caught between its emerging alliance with France and its commitment to the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, this side of the story has not been adequately analysed.3 This chapter, therefore, focuses on the interactions between the Australian and British Governments over the French nuclear testings in the early 1970s, examining the considerations behind the Australian Government’s approach to Britain and Britain’s response to this overture. It presents DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-5

116  The spectre of nuclear testing a case study demonstrating the manner in which Australia’s Pacific interests and Britain’s European interests inevitably led to different policy thinking. French nuclear tests in Polynesia The French Government’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was deeply rooted in the humiliating defeat which French had suffered in the hands of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. More importantly, according to Martine Piquet, it was “the even greater humiliation of being treated as a second-class partner” by Britain and the United States that made the French more determined to possess their own atomic bombs.4 Obviously, during the Anglo-American wartime deliberations for a post-Second World War global order, France, as a defeated nation, had not been given sufficient opportunities to have its voice heard. The French Government concluded that the development of France’s own nuclear deterrent was the only way for France to achieve political and military independence. The defeat of France and its allies in the 1956 Suez crisis was another heavy blow, which reinforced France’s decision to “go nuclear.” In April 1958, French Prime Minister Felix Gaillard signed the order for a nuclear bomb to be built. Two years later, in February 1960, the French Government conducted the first successful nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara, which was followed by a series of other atmospheric tests and underground explosions, all in Algeria.5 However, Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962. Under the terms of the Evian Accords, which ended French colonial rule in Algeria, France was allowed to use military bases in Algeria for a further five years, but it was agreed that Paris would have to find alternative testing sites within a short period of time. Accordingly, President Charles de Gaulle decided to move nuclear facilities to two uninhabited atolls in French Polynesia (Mururoa and Fangataufa). Mururoa, which forms part of the Tuamotu Archipelago, is a coral ringed atoll located about 1,250 kilometres southeast of Tahiti. Fangataufa is located 42 kilometres south of Mururoa and is the southernmost atoll of the Tuamotu. Over a period of eight years (1966–1974), forty-four atmospheric nuclear tests were performed: thirty-nine in Mururoa and five in Fangataufa. This continued until 1975, when underground testing began.6 These explosions caused deep anxiety in South Pacific countries, especially regarding the potential harmful effects these experiments could have on the environment and human health. A deep-seated fear that nuclear fallout would wreak havoc on wildlife in the “last unpolluted frontier” on earth galvanised opposition throughout the region. Public rumours associating an increase in cases of leukaemia and birth deformity with nuclear tests spread, affecting the populations of small island countries as well as those of New Zealand and Australia. People were outraged with what they thought of as “outdated colonialism” and, in the global context of disarmament since the 1960s, the French Government’s refusal to sign the treaty banning all atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests made it a ready target for international denunciation.7

The spectre of nuclear testing  117 Public concern led to large-scale protests against French nuclear tests in mid-1972, notably in Australia and New Zealand.8 In both of these countries, the groundswell of public anger over the nuclear tests and French arrogance was remarkable for both its diversity and its intensity. In some cities, protesters attacked both French diplomatic missions and business offices. Some Australian scientists bitterly criticised the “selfish and cynical” French position.9 Further, the Australian Council of Churches delivered a message to the French Ambassador demanding a halt in French nuclear tests in the Pacific.10 New Zealand yachts sailed to the French nuclear testing grounds to protest.11 High school children in Victoria refused to learn French because of the nuclear tests.12 The Australian press mounted fierce attacks against the tests and there was a strong response from trade unions. Some opinion-formers even favoured a boycott of French trading activities.13 Given the size of the South Pacific economies, their boycott of French products could make only a tiny dent in the French economy. Thus, the nature of the Australian Government’s response to the continuation of nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific remained a matter of real concern to the Australian people. The LCP Coalition Government expressed official disquiet through its Embassy in Paris and the French Ambassador in Canberra, and also refused to allow French aircraft and vessels connected with the Pacific tests to land in or pass through Australian territories. Early in 1972 Prime Minister William McMahon sent a personal letter of concern to the French President Georges Pompidou.14 The French ignored these overtures. They were determined to proceed with the nuclear tests in defiance of these the protests.15 The McMahon Government, therefore, actively sought to marshal world opinion to pressure the French Government. On 20 June, Australia, together with New Zealand and Peru, sent a joint message to the Chairman of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, protesting against the French nuclear weapons tests.16 Later that month, foreign ministers from New Zealand and Australia tried to get their counterparts of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which France was an inactive member, to condemn the French tests at their meeting in Canberra. However, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, told them that SEATO was not an “appropriate” forum for the request.17 Another avenue for the Australian Government to express its displeasure was the United Nations (UN). Under the auspices of the UN, a scientific committee on atomic radiation conducted research on the effect that French nuclear tests were having on the environment of the Southern Hemisphere. The committee’s significant finding in late September was that there had been an obvious increase in radioactive-iodine levels in milk in the Southern Hemisphere since France’s 1970 and 1971 tests, high doses of which were known to cause thyroid tumours. The Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand seized upon this, meeting representatives of other countries in the Southern Pacific to spur action at the UN General Assembly. They promoted a resolution expressing concern over the weapons tests, calling for a prohibition on all further nuclear testing.18

118  The spectre of nuclear testing Whitlam’s protest against the French nuclear tests As the French Government indicated no intention of halting the tests, Gough Whitlam, then Leader of the Opposition, called for more radical measures. He highlighted French nuclear testing in the election campaign and severely criticised the McMahon Government for failing to take a strong line against it.19 He claimed that only a Labor Government could prevent the “colossal impudence of the French deliberately polluting our doorstep through radiation.”20 After the election the Labor Administration formally demanded that the French Government cease conducting further tests. Whitlam proclaimed at a press conference on 9 January 1973 that, if the French authorities resumed the tests in the Pacific, his government would consider suspending diplomatic relations with France and seek an injunction against the nuclear tests in the ICJ at The Hague as “possible contingencies.”21 After diplomatic contacts failed to produce satisfactory results for both sides, on 9 May 1973 the governments of Australia and New Zealand lodged an application against France at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, on the grounds that the radioactive fallout from the French tests at Moruroa had polluted their national territories.22 France countered by claiming that the ICJ was not an organisation qualified to judge defence matters. However, the court ruled that radioactive pollution across international boundaries was more a health matter than a defence matter. Accordingly, the ICJ issued an interim injunction ordering France to suspend all nuclear testing. When it became apparent that the French Government would turn a blind eye to this injunction, Norman Kirk, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, took the audacious decision of sending a warship to Moruroa with a cabinet minister and a group of journalists on board. This was an effective way of winning international sympathy for the endeavours of the South Pacific countries.23 Behind Whitlam’s high-profile protest against the French nuclear tests lay his desire to reap political capital by taking advantage of the widespread popular opposition to French nuclear tests. In reality, however, like its predecessor, the Whitlam Government was faced with a basic difficulty. Where would the protests against nuclear testing stop? It would prove difficult for Australia to confine its objections to nuclear testing in the atmosphere alone. This was already an apparent weak point in Australia’s stance against France. Several months before Whitlam came to power, French President Georges Pompidou had rejected McMahon’s request to cancel the French nuclear tests in the Pacific, on the grounds that the Australian protest against French nuclear tests in Pacific was “hypocrisy,” since Australia had not made the slightest protest against American and British nuclear tests in the Pacific (despite the fact that they were more numerous and more powerful), and Australian authorities had even agreed to let some of these tests take place on territory under their sovereignty (i.e. the British nuclear tests in South Australia).24 Moreover, Whitlam and his government found themselves confronted by a sharp dilemma—would they extend their protests against the French nuclear

The spectre of nuclear testing  119 tests to encompassing Chinese atmospheric testing? From Australia’s perspective, one obvious difference between French atmospheric tests and those conducted by China was the comparative distance of the testing venues from Australian territory: The French were conducting nuclear tests on what the Australians believed to be their “doorstep,” whereas the Chinese tests were conducted in Lop Nor in the desert of western China, thousands of miles away from the South Pacific. Yet this did not stand up to close scrutiny—“Mururoa is located some seven thousand kilometres from the nearest Australian coast, while the Chinese testing grounds are roughly one thousand kilometres closer to Australia than Mururoa.”25 Even New Zealand is 3,000 kilometres west of Moruroa.26 However, in Australians and New Zealanders’ “imagined geography,” the South Pacific islands are regarded as their backyard. The Pacific Ocean, as Ramesh Thakur puts it, “has created a sense of community in the same way in which the continental landmass has created the idea of Europe.”27 Whitlam pointed out in a press conference in March 1973 that Australia would not make an issue of the Chinese nuclear tests since the “Chinese tests… did not discernibly affect Australia while those of France did.”28 Accordingly, in the minds of people living in the South Pacific, the potential effects on the South Pacific environment of fallout from the Chinese nuclear tests were too small to be worthwhile making a fuss of it. In contrast, it was all too easy to construct a nightmare image of the havoc that the French nuclear tests would wreak on the South Pacific. Public criticism of the French nuclear tests, although concentrated on the supposed environmental dangers from radioactive fallout, was also undoubtedly motivated by broader opposition to nuclear weapons. Moreover, there were powerful factions in the ALP that objected to all kinds of nuclear weapons programs, a movement that had been active within the Party since the 1950s. Former ALP leader Dr H. V. Evatt suggested in 1954 that an Australian Labor Government would initiate a special meeting of the General Assembly of the UN to take immediate positive action to control the hydrogen bomb.29 Whitlam himself emphasised on several occasions that the “Labor Party condemns nuclear weapons tests, especially those carried out in the atmosphere.”30 From the very start, however, the Labor Government’s policies on French nuclear tests displayed an inherent inconsistency. On the one hand, Australia’s protests against French nuclear tests had been “loud and strident.” On the other hand, Australia’s protests against the Chinese atmospheric tests had been “so hushed as to be almost inaudible.”31 The Whitlam Government did make a few formal protests to the Chinese Government about Chinese nuclear weapon tests on a number of occasions since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in December 1972. On 10 April 1973, the Whitlam Government made a formal protest to the Chinese Government expressing Australia’s strong opposition to the conduct of nuclear weapon tests and reaffirmed the Australian Government’s view that atmospheric nuclear weapons testing was contrary to international law. During his visit to China in May 1973, the Minister for Secondary Industry Jim Cairns

120  The spectre of nuclear testing re-stated the Australian position to Premier Chou En-lai.32 Following the Chinese nuclear test on 27 June 1973, Sir Laurence McIntyre, the Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, presented a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim, expressing Australia’s concerns over the actions of the Governments of France and China in detonating nuclear devices in the atmosphere in the South Pacific and northwestern China, respectively.33 Soon afterwards, formal notes of protest were delivered both to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing and to the Chinese Embassy in Australia.34 Furthermore, Whitlam re-stated the Australian position of opposing Chinese nuclear weapon tests during his meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong on 2 November 1973.35 However, the Whitlam Government’s protests against Chinese nuclear tests only amounted to a gesture for the purpose of maintaining a façade of indiscrimination with every kind of nuclear test. In reality, these gestures were accompanied by Australian diplomats’ careful communications to Chinese officials of the reasons why the Australian Governments had to take these steps. Since the Chinese Government were informed of Australia’s protest beforehand, they chose to treat it as “a slightly unpleasant chore.”36 From an appreciation of Australia’s position, the Chinese Government intentionally arranged for a mid-level official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to handle this issue, deliberately keeping relations at a higher level free of such abrasion. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao was quite blunt in telling Whitlam during their meeting of 2 November 1973 that he believed Australia’s protests were only a necessary “routine,” China did not mind Australia’s protests and would not like them to impede development of the Sino-Australian bilateral relations.37 Why, then, had the Whitlam Government’s protests against the French atmospheric nuclear tests been fiercer than those against the Chinese tests? Australian scholar Hedley Bull has pointed out that the principal reason for the difference was that a political campaign against France on the issue suited the general line of the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy, while a comparable campaign against China would run counter to the main drift of Australian diplomacy.38 A campaign against Chinese nuclear tests was potentially risky given the fact that the establishment of Sino-Australian ties was one of Whitlam’s proudest achievements.39 Richard Broinowski went even further by suggesting that Whitlam’s half-heartedness in protesting against the French nuclear testing was only part of his ambiguous and opportunistic stance on nuclear-related issues. Whitlam also made compromises on supporting the proposals for establishing nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific and the embargo against the visits of nuclear armed or powered ships to Australian ports, in order to accommodate the strategic interests of the United States. At some particular point of time, he was even eager to make profits out of mining and selling Australia’s rich uranium resources.40 In addition to these considerations, one widely ignored reason for the Whitlam Government’s protest against the French nuclear tests was an awareness that Australia had a potential leadership to take in the South Pacific, and

The spectre of nuclear testing  121 thus an obligation to be the vanguard in the public campaign against France. This was where Whitlam differed from the previous McMahon Government. In June 1972, Whitlam pointed out that the French were forced to cease their tests in the Sahara only because African opinion mobilised against them. Australia, the largest and the most significant nation in the South Pacific, should play a principal role in the mobilisation of world opinion by South Pacific countries. He criticised the McMahon Government’s inactivity against the French. It was a great shame that Australia abstained from voting on the New Zealand-sponsored resolution against the tests at the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in mid-1972. It was the only South Pacific nation to do so. For Whitlam, the McMahon Government had shown the world that Australia was not “dinkum in its protest against the French nuclear tests in the Pacific.”41 His government was determined to rectify this neglect. The Heath Government sought to avoid embroiling themselves in the dispute When Australia, New Zealand and other South Pacific countries started looking for international support for the campaign, they expected the British Government to take a strong line against the French. This was a natural consequence of the close Commonwealth relations between Britain and Australasia, and Britain’s major role in the negotiation of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, given Britain’s responsibilities as an administering power in respect of a number of its Pacific territories, and Britain’s traditional function as an “agent” between Australasia and European countries before the Second World War, they felt that it was reasonable to expect Britain to adopt a supportive role for their campaign.42 To put things in a broader perspective, there might also be a strong historical underpinning for Britain and Australasia to form a united front against France. Australian anti-French sentiment, as Martine Piquet argues, “have been somewhat atavistic,” representing an “imported version of ‘standard British prejudices’ and of the age-old enmity between the English and the French, dating to the time of Agincourt or even earlier.”43 Domestically, Britain’s Heath Government also faced strongly felt and widespread public opinion against French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Partly this reflected ties with friends and relatives in Australia and New Zealand. But there was also a more general opposition to nuclear weapons. Sympathy with the efforts of South Pacific countries and anger over the French Government’s arrogance also gained ground in Britain. On 28 June 1972, four British professors wrote a joint letter to the editor of The Times, protesting against the French Government’s decision of continuing above-ground nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and urging the British Government to do its utmost to persuade the French Government to desist from its programme and to observe the provisions of the Test Ban Treaty.44 Repercussions of the international consumer boycott against French goods extended to Britain, with organisations such as the British unions and the national Trades Union

122  The spectre of nuclear testing Council launching large-scale boycotts against French produce.45 In the meantime, other countries joined the South Pacific chorus denouncing France. The United States, which had opposed the French nuclear tests since mid-1965, was quick to express support for the measures initiated by South Pacific countries.46 On 29 June 1972, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers joined his counterparts from Australia (Nigel Bowen) and New Zealand (Sir Keith Holyoake) in denouncing French nuclear weapon tests in the Pacific, although, previously, the Nixon Administration had avoided criticism in an effort to improve French–American relations in the post-de Gaulle period.47 Diplomatically, the British Government did not respond favourably to these protests. On the contrary, it adopted an obviously pro-France stance clearly at odds with the stance taken by the Australian and New Zealand Governments. In September 1972, when South Pacific countries submitted to the United Nations a research report on the effect that French nuclear tests had had on the environment of the Southern Hemisphere, Britain expressed serious reservations about the research results. Britain regarded the resolution, with its specific reference to the South Pacific, as discriminatory and expressed considerable sympathy with French objections. More controversially, British authorities had monitored the tests in British Pitcairn Island and came to the conclusion that “there was no detectable hazard” in the French nuclear tests. As a result, in early November, the British Government instructed the British delegation to the UN to support the approach adopted by Belgian and other Western European countries seeking an amendment to the Australian/New Zealand resolution to “eliminate its discriminatory character.”48 The Australian Government was deeply disturbed that Britain was playing a role in undermining the Australian initiative. On 9 November 1972, the Australian Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen sent an urgent message to Alec Douglas-Home urging the British Government to avoid making any gesture weakening the resolution sponsored by South Pacific nations. He stated it would not be understood by the Australian public if Britain, with its long and continuing record of interest and achievement in our part of the world, were not to share fully the concern of Australia and New Zealand about nuclear weapons testings in the atmosphere and the threat to the Pacific environment which it entails.49 He did not receive any helpful reply from the British Government.50 In the meantime, within British political circles there was much sympathy and interest in the attitudes of the Pacific countries, especially that of New Zealand and Australia. In particular, the British Labour Party, who were Her Majesty’s official opposition at the time, pressed the Conservative Government to commit itself to a position regarding French nuclear tests in South Pacific.51 But the Heath Administration was adamant in its stance. There were several reasons behind Heath and Douglas-Home’s steadfast refusal to condemn the French tests or to offer support to Australia and New

The spectre of nuclear testing  123 Zealand. Firstly, the British Government was anxious to avoid being drawn into the dispute between the French on one hand and the Australians and New Zealanders on the other. Earlier, some reports circulating within the French Government implied that the British Government was the instigator of the campaign in Australia. This was definitely not the case, but the Heath Government was determined to ensure that it did everything it could to minimise French suspicions.52 When Heath was asked in the House of Commons whether he was aware that Australia would “take France to the International Court to try to prevent the explosion of a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific,” and whether he would “say categorically that he supports Australia in this move, or is he still playing the role of Pompidou’s Poodle,” he replied that “it is for the jurists in the International Court to decide and not for other governments to interfere.”53 In early 1973, when British Defence Secretary Lord Carrington was about to take a tour of the Far East, policy advisors drove home to him the importance that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand should not gain the impression that the British Government could be pushed into taking a more assertive line against the French.54 Secondly, since the early 1960s British Governments had been carefully cultivating cordial Anglo-French rapport, for the opinion of France was vital to its chances of entry into the European Economy Community (EEC). The British Government did not want to make French nuclear testing issue a sticking point in bilateral relations by joining the international chorus of condemnation.55 The Heath Government was still in the final stages of negotiation for EEC membership, and French cooperation was necessary to obtain a revision of the EEC’s agricultural prices policy—an important element in the negotiation over British entry. Edward Heath promised French President Georges Pompidou that Britain was ready to “give priority to [Europe] over other interests in the world”.56 The loss in Commonwealth friendship would be compensated for by the economic benefits of the EEC. Thirdly, the Heath Government had taken the line that, having completed nuclear tests itself, Britain was in no position to criticise the French.57 Actually, with regard to this point, the Heath Government hoped to gain Australian and New Zealand Government understanding about the difficulty that Britain was facing. As policy advisors suggested to Lord Carrington, it might be useful for him to intimate, in “private” conversations with Australian and New Zealander Ministers, that the British Government was obliged to take account of the interests of its “European neighbours and allies” as well as those of its “Commonwealth friends.”58 Furthermore, British policy was shaped by the conviction that it was unrealistic to stop the French from developing nuclear weapons technology. The Heath Government believed, on one hand, that it remained a fundamental Gaullist thesis that without nuclear weapons, a nation such as France “is incomplete and cannot be truly independent”. France’s decision to acquire a nuclear capability reflected its determination to occupy a “normal place” in the world and to assure itself the supreme freedom of decision.59 On the other hand, the

124  The spectre of nuclear testing British Government concluded that since France’s nuclear programme had been undertaken at very high cost and to a certain degree had achieved most of the objectives, it was highly unlikely that the French would abandon it.60 Finally, based on the results of British monitoring of the last series of tests in Pitcairn Island and elsewhere, British scientists decided that the French nuclear tests were “harmless.” The Heath Government believed, in fact, that the French had taken effective measures to limit the radioactivity of the tests.61 Although the British Government was torn between sharing Australia’s view that nuclear tests in the atmosphere should cease and showing a sympathetic understanding of France’s pursuit of great-power status as a nuclear power, London opted for a position that allowed it to adopt a passive attitude towards France’s nuclear tests. No official protest had ever been made since the French had first announced its nuclear testing plan in the mid-1960s. In January 1973, when the French Government informed British “in strict confidence” that there would be a series of low-yield nuclear tests at Mururoa in the next twelve months, British leaders thought that “it is most important that this fact is not disclosed to the Australians.”62 Furthermore, in February 1973, at the height of the South Pacific protest, the British Minister of State Julian Amery told the French Ambassador to the United Kingdom that the British Government sympathised with France’s wish to be a nuclear power and understood France’s present difficulties. Amery stated clearly that his government would try to avoid any criticism of France.63 There was a hope in Britain that the French Government would eventually see its way to signing the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and renounce all nuclear testing in the atmosphere—without British interference.64 Thus Britain adopted a “no comment” stance in public, while reassuring France of its support behind the scenes. Paradoxically, Britain’s lack of a clear public policy intensified the yearning of South Pacific countries for Britain to support their efforts to curb French ambition in the South Pacific. On 19 April 1973, seven South Pacific nations—Australia, New Zealand, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands—met in the annual South Pacific Forum. They agreed to lobby the two major powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which had territorial possessions in the South Pacific, to join them in the crusade against France.65 Whitlam, who represented the Australian Government at the meeting, was widely regarded as the principal spokesman for South Pacific countries. It was expected that, during his forthcoming visit to Britain in April 1973, he would seek Britain’s support for the united South Pacific campaign against nuclear tests in Pacific.66 Nevertheless, Whitlam did not seem to hold any high hopes for persuading Britain to add pressure to the French Government. This was largely due to his realistic estimation of the British policy rationale, which was exacerbated by a lack of confidence in the Conservative Government of Edward Heath.67 Whitlam’s meeting with the British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home took place on 24 April 1973, but the French nuclear tests issue was not at the top of his agenda. Indeed, in the 135-minute-long conversation with Douglas-Home, only a couple of minutes were devoted to the matter. Whitlam told

The spectre of nuclear testing  125 Douglas-Home that the tests had become the most emotional issue in Australian politics, claiming that both of the major Australian parties were unanimous in their objection to French actions. He described what had happened at the recent South Pacific Forum and said that those South Pacific countries with close connections to Britain all objected strongly to French nuclear testing and would wish the British Government to convey their views to the French Government. Douglas-Home’s response was equivocal. He promised to study the objections of the Australian and other South Pacific Commonwealth countries and to pass their opinion on to the French Government. But he reiterated the British Government’s reluctance to get involved in the issue.68 This was the only exchange to take place on the issue during Whitlam’s first official visit to Britain. After the meeting, he was asked by the Press whether he thought the British response towards his appeal for support was “disappointing.” His diplomatic answer could not mask the real differences between two Governments. However, Whitlam refused to disparage the stance of the British Government, indicating that Douglas-Home’s reply was “courteous and helpful” and remarking that he had confidence that Britain would put forward to Paris the views of the Commonwealth countries.69 Was Whitlam really satisfied with Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s promise? Why, one British MP asked, did the British Government not join the South Pacific countries in pressing the French Government, since they also opposed nuclear testing in the atmosphere? Why didn’t Whitlam press Douglas-Home harder in seeking support from the British Government on this issue, given that he told journalists in London that the “South Seas felt more strongly” about the French nuclear tests than any other issue?70 Behind his strong rhetoric lay Whitlam’s pragmatism and realism. He did not want to push the Heath Government too hard on an item peripheral to his agenda at the expense of his other priorities, notably the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.71 Moreover, Whitlam understood that in the current context of Britain’s European agenda, criticising French nuclear tests would certainly have posed some difficulty to the British Government. Douglas-Home kept reiterating in British Cabinet meetings that it was enough for the British Government to maintain in public that the French Government was well aware of Britain’s opposition of atmospheric nuclear tests, and that “no useful purpose would be served by any more formal protest, particularly in view of the Prime Minister’s forthcoming visit to Paris.”72 Douglas-Home said he would refrain from any further public comment on French nuclear tests and hoped that his colleagues would agree to do the same.73 Whitlam’s attitude towards the British position could also be explained by the fact that he harboured the view that, by making strident noises over the French nuclear tests, the Australian Government was assuming regional dominance for South Pacific countries in the campaign. This was in his mind as important as bringing the campaign to fruition—especially if the two could not be achieved simultaneously. Before election Whitlam had stated in his famous “It’s time for leadership” speech of 13 November 1972 that Australia

126  The spectre of nuclear testing “should be the natural leaders of the South Pacific.” Denouncing the French nuclear tests was a tangible enough expression of the Australian Labor Government’s leadership in South Pacific affairs.74 He felt that Britain’s attitude towards the South Pacific anti-nuclear movement did not affect Australia’s leading role in the anti-nuclear movement generally. It was on this point that the Whitlam Government differentiated itself from the New Zealand Government. There was widespread popular support in New Zealand for opposing French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and the New Zealand Government’s dismay at Britain’s reluctance to offer help was more genuine. Even the British Government noticed this difference. In December 1972, not long after the Whitlam Labor Government came to power, the British Foreign Secretary found that although the ALP was “less helpful than their predecessors” in many respects, it was less hostile and radical than the New Zealand Labor Government with regard to the French nuclear tests issue.75 Indeed, the Whitlam Government was muted in its criticism of the British government’s stance over French nuclear tests, especially in public, as was evident in Whitlam’s official visit to London. This was in contrast to the position held by New Zealand. In early April 1973, Hugh Watt, the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, after meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath in London, openly declared that he was disappointed he had been unable to gain the British Government’s support in the fight against the French tests. He criticised the British Government for its lack of “political morality” since the Conservatives had prioritised Anglo-French trade relations over Britain’s political ties with New Zealand. Consequently, some New Zealand newspapers even forecast that British–New Zealand relations would enter a stormy phase.76 Again, in July 1973, when the Heath Government refused to share information with the New Zealand Government regarding the precise timing of an upcoming French test, New Zealand made no effort to conceal its frustration with the Heath Government’s stance.77 In contrast, the Australian Labor Government was reluctant to take a radical stance against French nuclear tests, unless it served Australia’s other tactical purposes. When the New Zealand Labor Government found that the French Government could not be lightly brushed aside through regular channels, Prime Minister Norman Kirk decided to send a gunboat into the nuclear test zone with a Cabinet Minister aboard as a way of capturing public attention in the Northern Hemisphere.78 Nevertheless, the Australian Government offered little support to this plan. In early May 1973, Australian Deputy Prime Minister Lance Barnard visited Wellington to consult about Australia’s withdrawal from Singapore. For New Zealanders, Barnard’s visit was an important opportunity to impress upon him the need for Australian supply and logistical support for their proposal of sending a warship into the nuclear test zone. Initially, Barnard showed no enthusiasm for this plan. But after it was pointed out how Australia’s absence on this venture would be perceived by the world, particularly those countries of the South Pacific, and that it would also arouse public opinion at home, he was quickly on the phone to Canberra and won Whitlam’s consent to

The spectre of nuclear testing  127 give New Zealand an assurance that supply would be provided. Nevertheless, Barnard stressed on a number of occasions that Australia considered that this particular form of protest should only be undertaken as a last resort.79 The Whitlam Government’s reluctance to take radical actions against France was also evidenced by its attitudes towards the anti-French movement in Australia. On the union front, a group of thirty-five Federal Trades Unions met in Melbourne on 10 May and unanimously passed a recommendation to the ACTU Federal Executive to impose indefinite bans on all forms of transport and communication between France and Australia as well as on the handling and purchase of all French goods. In a similar move, the Australian Postal Workers Union refused to handle most communications with France.80 However, the Federal Government did not entirely endorse these proposals. Whitlam said during a press conference that he did not encourage the industrial action proposed by Australian trade unions. He was reported to have approached Bob Hawke, the ACTU President, to request that at least “telephone communications with France be maintained.”81 The campaign against French nuclear tests continued to gain momentum. From early May, protests against the French Government spread from the South Pacific to Europe. Even in France, a group of anti-nuclear activists held demonstrations on 7 May in various cities against their Government’s testing in the Pacific.82 In late June, the International Court of Justice, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, required France to suspend her nuclear tests in the South Pacific pending a judgement on their legality in international law.83 But the French Government refused to abide by the ICJ’s injunction.84 Other countries began to join the international protest, notably Japan, Canada and Sweden. Whitlam attempted to claim the rhetorical high ground, arguing that France had betrayed its traditional respect for the law by ignoring requests by the International Court of Justice to halt the tests. The Australian Council of Trade Unions announced that it would keep its boycott of French goods as long as the tests continued.85 The growing public opposition to France placed the British Government under renewed pressure to make a formal protest. The Heath Government was again criticised by the Labour Party for failing to support the South Pacific protests. Labour claimed that there was “deep resentment throughout Australia and New Zealand at the gutless attitude of Her Majesty’s Government.”86 However, the Heath Government indicated that ther would be no change in its policy.87 “A convenient pretext to invoke” While the Australian and British Governments were searching for their best courses of action, they had no idea that the United States had been secretly offering assistance to the French nuclear program since the late 1960s. According to William Burr, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive of the George Washington University, when France began its first French nuclear test in 1960, key US government officials did not want to assist France because the

128  The spectre of nuclear testing US–France relationship turned sour due to a dispute between Washington and Paris over the organisation of the Western alliance system. Senior US officials’ reluctance to see France to go nuclear was also caused by American’s concern that a French nuclear capability could evoke an arms race in Western Europe or even cause a nuclear war. However, by the end of the 1960s, high-level US decision-makers changed their minds. After Richard Nixon assumed the presidency, he made the improvement of the French–US relations one of his foreign policy priorities. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, worried that the European Community might pose a potential threat to US interests. He wanted to play a balance of power game in Europe by providing some strategic aid to France so that he could manipulate the situation to US advantage. Given the uneasiness in the British–French relations within the EEC, Kissinger believed he could break European unity by playing the one partner off against the other. Therefore, aiding the French would help them foster the confidence that they might be able to overtake the British in nuclear capability.88 The assistance that the US provided to France included not only military aid and technical exchanges as disclosed by Burr, but also help in silencing some of the nations protesting against French nuclear tests. When Pompidou brought this headache to the attention to his American counterpart during a French– US summit meeting at Reykjavik on 31 May 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had no hesitance in throwing their support behind the French Government. The following excerpt of conversation provides a glimpse of the secret discussion between the Nixon Administration and the Pompidou Government – President Pompidou: … Also, we pursue our nuclear tests in the Pacific, although a number of small countries tell us that the U.K. and U.S. push them to protest. I tell them it is a convenient pretext to invoke. Dr. Kissinger: On this issue the President has instructed me not to bring any such appeals to him, to instruct our bureaucracy not to discuss your tests with any government, and forbid the AEC from announcing your tests, to avoid giving anyone any pretext to embarrass you. If you know of any U.S. official involved in this protest we would like to know. President Nixon: I am for a stronger French and U.K. nuclear force and I am for your tests. As you know, I talked with Heath about Poseidon and I will be glad to talk with you about anything you may care to raise. President Pompidou: Thank you for this clarification. I knew this already but we can't keep Latin American countries from saying the U.S. puts them up to this, or Australia, New Zealand or Fiji from saying it is the U.K. Dr. Kissinger: The Australians are changing. Whitlam wants to come talk to the President.89

The spectre of nuclear testing  129 Shortly before the summit between Nixon and Pompidou at Reykjavik, Peter Wilenski, Whitlam’s private secretary, made a special visit to Washington in the same month to prepare Whitlam’s forthcoming visit to the US. When Gough Whitlam met Richard Nixon in the Oval Office on 30 July 1973, he reassured Nixon that “Australia’s effectiveness in its relations with Asia depends upon good relations with the US.”90 This is another background against which the Whitlam Government’s protest against French nuclear test unfolded. In August 1973, the French nuclear tests became a contentious topic in the Commonwealth Leaders’ Meeting held in Ottawa. Australia and New Zealand, both represented by their outspoken Prime Ministers, lobbied for a joint declaration deploring the atmospheric tests that France was conducting in the South Pacific. The principal opposition to such a move came from the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who still did not want to prejudice Britain’s newly won place in the EEC. Almost no progress was achieved in resolving the differences between Britain, Australia and New Zealand over the question. The statement finally took the form of a reconfirmation of the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was signed by all nuclear powers except France and China. Obviously, the British Government was saved from the awkward situation of having to denounce its new ally in the EEC, while the concerns of Australia and New Zealand were largely ignored.91 Four months later, the British Government demonstrated more clearly that it valued “Anglo-French solidarity” more than its traditional Commonwealth links. On 5 December 1973, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific, calling upon France and all other countries to discontinue any further nuclear atmospheric testing in the South Pacific area. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 99 against 4. The Australian delegate was surprised to find that the British delegate not only backed France by voting against the resolution, but also made the “prejudicial comment” that “so far as our (British) Territories are concerned there is no evidence that the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the area have had any harmful effects on the people of those territories.” The Australian team was so stunned by the British delegate’s most “unhelpful intervention” that they even asked whether their British counterparts were under “instruction” to take such an initiative, although the answer to the question was obvious.92 The British UN delegate’s statements were directly at odds with the conclusion reached by Australian scientists. In May 1973, the Australian Academy of Science and the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee concluded that the nuclear tests had caused radioactive fallout and contaminated the Australian environment.93 In Canberra, the British UN delegate’s statements were seen as neither necessary nor justified. The fact that the British Government was siding with the French to the detriment of Australian interests caused considerable consternation in the Australian capital. Edward Heath was defeated by Harold Wilson in the election of March 1974. The return of a Labour Government in Britain rekindled optimism

130  The spectre of nuclear testing regarding possible British cooperation in the protest against French nuclear tests. Immediately after Wilson assumed office, Canberra approached the new British administration to convey the Australian Government’s request for its support of Australian opposition to the nuclear tests. Whitlam hoped that the new British Government would make some helpful statements before the next hearing of Australia’s case in The Hague in late May, such as stating that the British Government shared international concern about the health and environmental hazards of atmospheric nuclear tests. If that proved too difficult, at least the Labour Government could ensure that there was no repetition of “unhelpful interventions.”94 Harold Wilson replied to the Australian request in an indirect way. On 27 March 1974, in the House of Commons, he expressed his government’s stance of opposing atmospheric tests by all countries, a gesture which seemed to augur something new.95 But what happened next convinced Canberra that the new Labour Government would inherit the Heath Government’s pro-France stance. The British Government had started monitoring French nuclear tests in 1966 at Pitcairn Island in the South Pacific with the object of safeguarding the health of the islanders.96 But the report had never been formally released, although it was quoted selectively on occasion by relevant authorities (such as the British UN delegate). In early 1974, the Heath Government decided to publicly release its monitoring report, partly as a way to curb the emerging public criticism. The election loss intervened but the Wilson Government decided to push ahead on this project. On 30 April 1974, the FCO informed the Australian Government that the British Government would release the report on the results of monitoring of “fallout in British Dependent Territories from French Atmospheric Tests in the Pacific from 1966 to 1973.” This report, which was prepared against the background of public and Parliamentary questions about British policy on French nuclear tests, concluded that “the French atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific in the period 1966 to 1973 did not and do not constitute a danger to the inhabitants of Pitcairn Island or the other UK Pacific Dependent Territories.”97 There was another reason behind Britain’s desire to publish this report: according to J. A. Thomson, Assistant Under Secretary at the FCO, the report was also required by certain Latin American countries, particularly Peru, who would not provide facilities for British aircraft monitoring the tests unless they made the report available.98 Despite the fact that the FCO kept reassuring Canberra that the release of the British report would not harm Australian proceedings against the French before the International Court, Australian Government officials were deeply concerned that the publication of the report would have a detrimental impact on the Australian case. Britain’s conclusion that the last series of French tests did not constitute a danger to the people in the British Pacific Territories was especially disturbing, because this was clearly at odds with the results of the tests undertaken by Australian scientists. Australian experts interpreted the British report as one explicitly prepared to provide assurance to the inhabitants

The spectre of nuclear testing  131 of the United Kingdom’s Pacific dependent territories.99 For Canberra, there could have been no more inappropriate time for this report to be published, because India’s nuclear tests were in progress and the Australian Government observed that it might not be long before both South Africa and Israel also developed nuclear capability.100 In this context, the British report would not only justify French nuclear testing in South Pacific, but also, in all probability, be used by other prospective nations as a justification for conducting their own nuclear tests, resulting in further erosion of the South Pacific anti-nuclear campaign. In view of the sensitivity of the British report in its present form, Whitlam decided to intervene. He wrote to Wilson on 29 May 1974, requesting the British Government maintain “an impartial attitude” on the question of the French nuclear tests. In particular, he entreated the British Government to delay the publication of the paper until after the ICJ “rules on the jurisdiction and admissibility phases of the Australian case.”101 Wilson, however, turned down Whitlam’s request. He informed Whitlam on 24 June that the British authorities would make the report of the British Radiation Committee available to the public in mid-July.102 However, the British Government did so in a low-key manner by delivering copies to the libraries of both Houses of Parliament without publicity.103 Accordingly, Whitlam at least saved some face. Paradoxically, Anglo-Australian interaction over the French nuclear tests ended with another series of nuclear tests, not from France but from Britain. The British authorities conducted an underground nuclear weapons test at the American test range in Nevada in late June 1974, after an interval of nine years since the previous British test. Interestingly, Harold Wilson Government’s resumption of underground nuclear tests was marked by unusual secretiveness— there had been a total lack of advance announcement. The British Government was forced to lift the curtain only through accidental press disclosure. The British media fuelled significant public anger over the fact that politicians had tried to keep them in dark.104 The British Government, however, had reasons of its own for carrying out another nuclear test—occasional tests were essential if Britain wanted to retain her independent nuclear capability and extend the life of its missile system.105 Furthermore, underground testing did not break any international agreement as this did not pollute the atmosphere, and posed no threat to health. From Australia’s perspective, however, the British Government could not have found a worse time to conduct these tests. Canberra declared that it occurred “at a time when other recent developments have justifiably increased apprehension in the international community about the nuclear-arms race.”106 The fact of the British test, and the way in which it was conducted, explained why the British Government had always been reluctant to deplore the French nuclear program. Even when forced to make some noise about French nuclear tests, the British had been cautious in limiting their tone, and carefully directing criticism toward tests in the atmosphere as opposed to those underground.

132  The spectre of nuclear testing Yet, nuclear tests of any sort, and any act which implied a readiness to maintain nuclear weapons, touched a nerve in the Australian Government, especially at this time, when the International Court of Justice at The Hague was hearing arguments from Australia and New Zealand against the continuance of French atmospheric nuclear tests. But the court action was never brought to a conclusion. The French Government, after two further atmospheric tests, claimed, in October 1974, that it would move its tests underground from 1975 onward. Consequently, in December 1974, the ICJ dismissed Australia and New Zealand’s suit to force France to stop the tests, since the claim of Australia and New Zealand “no longer had any object.”107 Whether the change was brought about by a breakthrough in French nuclear technology, which made it unnecessary to continue atmospheric testing, or forced by the pressure from Australia and New Zealand, was a moot point. Subsequently, the campaigns against French nuclear testing subsided. However, French nuclear tests would continue for another twenty years. Between 1975 and 1996, a series of 152 underground tests was detonated at the two test sites.108 In the 1980s international campaigns against the tests were revived by environmentalist groups such as Greenpeace, which led to terrorist action by the French State (in the Rainbow Warrior Affair).109 The strained relations between Australia and France came to an end in early January 1975, when Whitlam arrived in Paris for an official visit. He reopened talks with the French Government on reviving economic exchanges, following the Australian boycott of French goods during the atmospheric tests.110 But the South Pacific Countries’ pursuit for a nuclear-free region continued. In July 1975, the South Pacific Forum issued a communiqué supporting the concept of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the South Pacific and agreeing to seek wider endorsement of the idea through the adoption of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. This proposal was initiated by the New Zealand Labor Government and endorsed by the Whitlam Government. Once again, however, Britain did not see eye to eye with Australia and New Zealand on this issue. The British Government took the view that a maritime zone free of nuclear weapons was not feasible since it was impossible for states to impose restrictions on the freedom of navigation on the high seas without contravening international maritime laws. More importantly, it would restrict Britain’s freedom of manoeuvre in the South Pacific.111 Not until ten years later, when this proposal was formalised by the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Rarotonga) signed by most South Pacific nations, did Britain endorse this part of its content.112 A saga that has no ending The saga of Anglo-Australian interaction over French nuclear tests in the 1970s can be seen within three contexts. Firstly, it was shaped by the special relations between Britain and Australia—the very fact that Australia, New Zealand and Britain belonged to the Commonwealth, and that their histories were

The spectre of nuclear testing  133 inextricably intertwined in Empire and colonisation, created a psychological yearning for Britain’s support, when Australia and other South Pacific countries felt both their environment and their health were threatened by another European country. Secondly, it took place in the global context of disarmament which pervaded the 1970s. The mobilisation of international opinion became a major strategy of countries in the South Pacific to bring pressure against France and demonstrate to Britain, one of the leading nuclear countries and original signatories of the Test Ban Treaty, that it was expected to take special responsibility to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, the Anglo-Australian interaction took place in each country’s “own region.” Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez and its application for entry into the EEC lifted the curtain on its “turning to Europe.”113 It also reinforced Australia’s self-awareness as a country in the South Pacific region. On the French nuclear testing issue, the British reluctance to criticise the French Government and the importance Whitlam attached to his leadership of a protest movement in the South Pacific indicated the reality that both countries’ strategic objectives were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than lingering Empire links. The South Pacific nations’ fight for a nuclear-free zone climaxed on 6 August 1985 when the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature (it came into force on 11 December 1986). The geographic scope of the treaty is vast, extending from the West coast of Australia to the boundary of the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone in the east, and from the equator to 60 degrees south, where it meets the boundary of the zone established by the Antarctic Treaty. As a result of the South Pacific’s first-hand experience with nuclear weapons testing, this treaty was hailed as a notable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as it prevents the placement of nuclear weapons within the South Pacific by member states. The Rarotonga Treaty also reinforces, at the regional level, the legally binding commitments that its States Parties have made under the near universal Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) not to manufacture, possess, acquire or have control over nuclear weapons.114 In 1996, France ratified Protocol 1 to the Treaty of Rarotonga, shortly after its announcement that it was stopping its nuclear test programme.115 However, this is not the end of the story. In 2005, for the first time, a French court granted financial compensation to an ex-soldier who developed a disease linked to his participation in the French nuclear tests undertaken in Algeria. The same year, Oscar Manutahi Temaru, the President of French Polynesia, created a Council to assess the impacts of nuclear testing in French Polynesia from 1966 to 1996.116 In March 2009, the French government, reluctantly yielding to decades of pressure by people sickened by radiation, announced to compensate victims of nuclear tests in Algeria and the South Pacific. Nevertheless, dispute remains between the French Government and victims’ groups as to who is eligible for compensation. The French Government intended to grant compensation only to a limited number of people who suffered health

134  The spectre of nuclear testing problems associated with the tests, while people who were on site for all the tests France carried out during those decades are pushing to expand the eligibility for compensation.117 Given the nature of the dispute, a solution to this dispute will eventually be found with the passage of time. However, the spectre of nuclear terror is still haunting Australia. On 15 September 2021, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom announced a new security partnership (AUKUS). Under this pact, the US and the UK will assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. Although it is not clearly stated, the primary priority of AUKUS is to counter China. Following the ratification, France accused its allies of stabbing it in the back when Australia opted for nuclear-powered submarines to be built with US and British technology instead of a multi-billion-dollar French submarine program. Although the AUKUS security alliance is carefully designed to avoid infringement of the Treaty of Rarotonga, Pacific Island nations expressed concerns about nuclear submarines and conflict in their backyard. To a certain extent, the AUKUS security partnership had opened a deep divergence between Australia and other members of the South Pacific community, which is still deeply committed to keeping the South Pacific nuclear-free. French atmospheric nuclear testing in French Polynesia during the early 1970s remains one of the most commonly hated events in the South Pacific for decades. It was the desire for a nuclear-free Pacific and resentment at French “arrogance” in the Pacific that have instilled into the heart of Australian public a strong anti-nuclear sentiment. By a stroke of the irony of history, however, less than fifty years later, Australia would cancel a deal with the French to build diesel-electric submarines in favour of a contract with the US and the UK for a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. Acknowledgement This chapter is derived in part from an article published in Australian Journal of Politics and History (2013) copyright © 2013 The Author, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajph.12011. Notes 1 For the rationale behind France’s nuclear tests in South Pacific, see Stephen Henningham, France and the South Pacific: a Contemporary History (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992); For the analysis of roles of the media, the colonial context, the cultural perceptions and domestic politics in both France and Australia, see: French Worlds, Pacific Worlds: French Nuclear Testing in Australia’s Backyard, ed. Stephen Alomes and Michael Provis (Port Melbourne: Institute for the Study of French Australian Relations, 1998); and Paul de Deckker, “The Perception of France in the Pacific Islands,” in France, Oceania and Australia: Past and Present, ed. Robert Aldrich (Sydney: Dept. of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1991), 172–89. 2 Thomas M. Franck, “Word Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases,” The American Journal of International Law 69, no. 3 (July 1975):

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612–20; Dana D. Fischer, “Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice: Four Recent Cases,” International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 251– 77; Iain Scobbie, “Discontinuance in the International Court: The Enigma of the Nuclear Tests Cases,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41, no. 4 (October 1992): 808–40; Judith Hippler Bello, Peter H. F. Bekker, “Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case,” The American Journal of International Law 90, no. 2 (April 1996): 280–6. 3 Australia’s response to French nuclear tests is raised by James Curran in his introductory article on John Armstrong, Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1973 to 1974. Nonetheless, Curran’s focus is on how Armstrong, as the Whitlam Government’s representative in London, dealt with the special diplomatic situation under the circumstances of the Australian Government’s “new nationalism” in the early 1970s, see James Curran, “The ‘new line in the Strand’: John Armstrong and the ‘new nationalism’,” in The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910–2010, ed. Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno and David Lee (Barton: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), 164–81. 4 Martine Piquet, Cold War in Warm Waters: Reflections on Australian and French Mutual Misunderstandings in the Pacific, The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) Working Papers Series, no.1 (2000), The University of Melbourne, 21. 5 Robert Aldrich, France and the South Pacific since 1940 (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993), 303. 6 Laurence Cordonnery, “The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific,” in The Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks, ed. David D Caron and Harry N. Scheiber (BRILL, 2010), 69–70. 7 Paul de Deckker, “The Perception of France in the Pacific Islands,” 172. 8 Patrick Brogan, “French defy protests and set time for atom tests,” The Times, 20 June 1972. 9 Stewart Harris, “Protesters attack diplomat's home,” The Times, 3 June 1972. 10 “Halting French A-Tests,” New York Times, 17 July 1972. 11 “New Zealand yachts going to test zone,” The Times, 11 July 1972. 12 Henry Stanhope, “British scientists stationed to monitor French tests and ensure safety of Pitcairn islanders,” The Times, 23 June 1972. 13 “French planes banned in nuclear protest,” The Times, 2 June 1972. 14 “Background Paper: Australia’s Relations with France,” 30 January 1973, FCO 24/1562, NAUK. 15 Patrick Brogan, “French defy protests and set time for atom tests,” The Times, 20 June 1972. 16 Cabinet Minute, Canberra, 20 June 1972, Decision No. 1034, A5909, 1034, The National Archives of Australia (NAA); “France Goes Ahead with Atom Tests,” The Times, 22 June 1972. 17 “Rogers in Protest on French A-Tests at Atoll in Pacific,” New York Times, 30 June 1972. 18 Kathleen Teltsch, “U.N. Study Cites A-Test Effects,” New York Times, 29 September 1972. 19 Statement by E. G. Whitlam, Canberra, 13 June 1972, M170, 72/80, NAA. 20 Whitlam’s message to The Radical, 11 July 1972, M170, 72/101, NAA. 21 “Australia and New Zealand Set Moves Against French A-Tests,” New York Times, 24 January 973.

136  The spectre of nuclear testing 22 Submission No. 295, Cabinet Minute, 6 May 1973, Decision No. 598, A1838, 1558/1/44 PART 40, NAA; “World Court Asked to Ban French A-Tests in Pacific,” New York Times, 10 May 1973. 23 Bengt Danielsson, “Under a Cloud of Secrecy: The French Nuclear Tests in the Southeastern Pacific,” Ambio, 13, no. 5/6 (1984), The South Pacific: 338–9. 24 “Australian Prime Minister told by President Pompidou that nuclear tests cannot be called off,” The Times, 27 June 1972. 25 Martine Piquet, Cold War in Warm Waters: Reflections on Australian and French Mutual Misunderstandings in the Pacific, The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) Working Papers Series, no.1 (2000), The University of Melbourne. 26 Trevor Findlay, “Explaining Australasian Angst: Australia, New Zealand and French Nuclear Testing,” Security Dialogue, 6, no.4 (1995): 374. 27 Ramesh Thakur, “The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific,” Nuclear Politics 51, no. 3 (Summer, 1996): 468. 28 Canberra to London, 14 March 1973, FCO 24/1563, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 29 “Labour will take initiative on hydrogen bomb,” speech by Dr. Evatt, 3 April 1954, A1838/392, 1558/1/44 PART 40, NAA. 30 Whitlam’s message to The Radical, 11 July 1972, M170, 72/101, NAA. 31 Hedley Bull, “The Whitlam Government’s Perceptions of our roles in the World,” in Advance Australia, where? ed. B.D. Beddie (Melbourne: Oxford University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975), 29–51. 32 PM Transcripts, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test, 18 June 1974,” available at: https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-3303, accessed 6 February 2022. 33 PM Transcripts, “Nuclear Testing: Australian Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 26 July 1973,” available at: https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov. au/release/transcript-3303, accessed 6 February 2022. 34 Outward Cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs to Australian Embassy, Peking, 2 July 1973, O.67672, in NAA: A1838, 3107/38 PART 13; Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Peking to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 1973, I.73635, in NAA: A1838, 3107/38 PART 13. 35 PM Transcripts, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test, 18 June 1974,” available at: https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-3303, accessed 6 February 2022. 36 Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Peking to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 1973, I.73635, in NAA: A1838, 3107/38 PART 13. 37 CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, ed. Chronology of Mao Zedong: 1949–1976, Volume 4 (Beijing: Zhanggong Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013), 502; “Cablegram from the Australian Embassy Peking, ‘Prime Minister's Call on Chairman Mao’,” 3 November 1973, in NAA: A1838, 3107/38 PART 14. This cablegram is also available at the Wilson Center Digital Archives: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175870, accessed 6 February 2022. 38 Hedley Bull, “The Whitlam Government’s Perceptions,” 29–51. 39 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 60. 40 Richard Broinowski, Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia's Nuclear Ambitions (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2003), 103–26. 41 Statement by E. G. Whitlam, 13 June 1972, M170, 72/80, NAA. 42 Australia and New Zealand did not create their own ministries of Foreign Affairs until the Second World War – all diplomatic functions were conducted by

The spectre of nuclear testing  137







deputies in London, cited in note 16 of Paul de Deckker, “The Perception of France in the Pacific Islands,” 172. 43 Martine Piquet, Cold War in Warm Waters: Reflections on Australian and French Mutual Misunderstandings in the Pacific, The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) Working Papers Series, No.1 (2000), The University of Melbourne. 44 “French nuclear test,” Letters to the Editor by Andrew Martin, et al, The Times, 28 June 1972. 45 Flora Lewis, “France, Reportedly Urged by China, Going Ahead With A-Test,” New York Times, 3 July 1973. 46 United States. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963– 1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1997), 180. 47 “Rogers in Protest on French A-Tests at Atoll in Pacific,” New York Times, 30 June 1972; “Halting French A-Tests,” New York Times, 17 July 1972. 48 Cablegram from the Australian High Commission (AHC) in London to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 7 November 1972, I.115865, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA; Brief Files for the Secretary of State’s Tour, FCO 24/1563, NAUK. 49 DFA to AHC in London, 9 November 1972, O.101032, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 50 AHC in London to DFA, 13 November 1972, I.118020, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 6, NAA. 51 House of Commons Debate, 19 December 1972, vol.848, cc.1115–7, Hansard 1803– 2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/, accessed 15 October 2009. 52 “Australian Prime Minister told by President Pompidou that nuclear tests cannot be called off,” The Times, 27 June 1972. 53 AHC in London to DFA, 20 December 1972, I.133276, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 54 Brief Files for the Secretary of State’s Tour, FCO 24/1563, NAUK. 55 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/41, NAUK. 56 George Clark, “Heath–Whitlam talks today about links,” The Times, 24 April 1973. 57 ibid. 58 Brief Files for the Secretary of State’s Tour, FCO 24/1563, NAUK. 59 La Force De Frappe, FCO 24/1562, NAUK. 60 Record of Conversation between Lord Carrington and Members of the Cabinet, 2 February 1973, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 61 ibid. 62 Meeting with Australian Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, Mr L Barnard, 18 June 1993, Visit of Lance Barnard, Australian Minister for Defence, to UK, 17–18 January 1973, Part A, FCO 24/1638, NAUK. 63 London to Paris, Telegram No. 165, 19 February 1973, FCO 24/1562, NAUK. 64 Henry Stanhope, “British scientists stationed to monitor French tests and ensure safety of Pitcairn islanders,” The Times, 23 June 1972. 65 “Pacific Nations Protest Slated French A-Tests,” New York Times, 19 April 1973. 66 George Clark, “Heath–Whitlam talks today about links,” The Times, 24 April 1973. 67 Whitlam later made a comparison between Edward Heath’s Conservative Governments and the succeeding Harold Wilson’s Labor Government on 12 March 1974, when he said in a press conference that in connection with the French nuclear tests issue, the new Government would be “more positive the previous British Government,” see DFA to Various Posts, 12 March 1974, O.30761, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 11, NAA.

138  The spectre of nuclear testing 68 Whitlam’s Talks with Douglas-Home, 24 April, 1973, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 8, NAA; Record of Discussion between Whitlam and Douglas-Home, Lord Carrington and Others, 24 April 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA; “Mr Whitlam talks about east of Suez,” The Times, 25 April 1973. 69 A. M. Rendel, “Mr Whitlam seeks court changes,” The Times, 26 April 1973. 70 “British opposition to atom tests known to French,” The Times, 3 May 1973. 71 Transcript of Prime Minister’s Press Conference in London on 25 April 1973, WIE, accessed 2 July 2010. 72 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/52/3; Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/52/12, NAUK. 73 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/54/19, NAUK. 74 Whitlam, “It’s Time for Leadership – Australian Labor Party Policy Speech 1972, 13 November 1972,” WIE, accessed 2 July 2010. 75 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/50/57, NAUK. 76 From Wellington to London, 9 April 1973, FCO 24/1563, NAUK; “France explains why it must go ahead with Pacific tests,” The Times, 3 May 1973. 77 Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/52/14, NAUK. 78 Statement by the New Zealand Prime Minister N. E. Kirk, 17 April 1973, FCO 24/1564, NAUK. 79 Annabelle J. Rankin to Keith Waller, File: 1/1/2, 2 May 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA; Trans Tasman, 3 May 1973, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 24, NAA. 80 “Australian Mail Union Joins Protest on French A-Tests,” New York Times, 17 May 1973. 81 W. Peters to C. M. James, 11 May 1973, FCO 24/1564, NAUK. 82 Richard Wigg, “Demonstrations in France against nuclear tests,” The Times, 7 May 1973; “35 Australian Unions Vote A Wide Boycott of France,” New York Times, 11 May 1973. 83 “World Court Asks Paris to Halt Tests,” New York Times, 23 June 1973. 84 “The Weakness of the World Court,” The Times, 31 May 1973. 85 “French A-test Bring Protests by Five Nations,” New York Times, 23 July 1973. 86 AHC in London to DFA, 30 January 1973, I.11285, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 7, NAA. 87 British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home said in a Cabinet meeting on 28 June 1973 that “it should suffice, however, to maintain our public contention that they were already well aware of our views,” see Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 128/52/12, NAUK. 88 William Burr, “U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969– 1975: From ‘Fourth Country’ to Strategic Partner,” available at: https://www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-french-nuclearprogram-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic, accessed 18 January 2022. 89 Summary of a meeting between President Richard M. Nixon and French President Georges Pompidou at Reykjavik, Iceland, 31 May 1973. US Declassified Documents Online (USDDO), CK2349546772. 90 James Curran, “How Whitlam rattled the ANZUS alliance,” 2 August 2012, available at: https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/august/1348618 116/james-curran/dear-mr-president#mtr, accessed 19 January 2022. 91 Louis Heren, “Unity at Ottawa on test ban,” The Times, 4 August 1973; William Borders, “Commonwealth's Leaders Meet in Crisis-Free Mood”, New York Times, 3 August 1973; William Borders, “Commonwealth Asks Nuclear Test Halt,” New York Times, 4 August 1973. 92 Australian UN Mission in New York to DFA, 5 December 1973, I.141448, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 10, NAA.

The spectre of nuclear testing  139 93 “France explains why it must go ahead with Pacific tests,” The Times, 3 May 1973. 94 DFA to AHC in London, 22 March 1974, O.35526, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 11, NAA. 95 DFA to AHC in London, 28 March 1974, O.38019, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 11, NAA. 96 Cabinet Memorandum: General de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy over the Next Two Years. CAB 129/124, NAUK. 97 AHC in London to DFA, 30 April 1974, I.58907, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 11, NAA. 98 Record of Conversation between J. A. Thomson and G. N. Upton on 17 May 1974, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 99 Whitlam to Wilson, 29 May 1974, O.CH64268, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 100 Record of Conversation with Morrice James, D. F. Aiers and B. S. Martyn, on 27 May 1974, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 101 Letter from Whitlam to Harold Wilson, 29 May 1974, O.CH64268, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 102 Wilson’s letter to Whitlam of 24 June 1974 has not been found, but according to a cablegram sent from London to Canberra, Britain’s decision was conveyed to Australian Government vie such a letter, see Cablegram from London to Canberra, 16 July 1974, O.LH12910, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 103 Record of Conversation between G. W. Hewitt and. B. Cooper on 16 July 1974, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 104 “Labour's Nuclear Dilemma,” The Times, 26 June 1974. 105 Henry Stanhope, “Report of bomb tests plan by Britain,” The Times, 22 June 1974. 106 Statement issued by the Prime Minister, 25 June 1974, O.CH76033, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 107 International Court of Justice, “Nuclear Test Cases: Australia v. France, New Zealand v. France, Judgments of the Court,” International Lawyer 9, no. 3 (1974): 563–74. 108 “Moruroa Files”: https://www.interprt.org/project/moruroa-files/, accessed 7 January 2022. 109 “Who Sank the Rainbow Warrior?,” New York Times, 29 August 1985. 110 Flora Lewis, “Australian Chief's Paris Visit Ends Rift Over Nuclear Tests,” New York Times, 7 January 1975. 111 “South Pacific nuclear weapons free zone,” FCO 24/2072, NAUK; “New Zealand proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone,” FCO 24/2072, NAUK. 112 Britain ratified Protocol II (negative security assurances) and Protocol III (ban on nuclear testing in the nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Treaty of Rarotonga, see http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz, accessed 17 April 2011. 113 For Anglo-Australian Relations before 1972 and Britain’s returning to Europe, see Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the “Turn to Europe,” 1961–1972 (Woodbridge, UK; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 2008). 114 Treaty of Rarotonga, https://www.un.org/nwfz/content/treaty-rarotonga, accessed 11 January 2022. 115 “France: Ratification of Protocol 1 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,” https://treaties.unoda.org/a/rarotonga_p1/france/RAT/pifs, accessed 7 January 2022. 116 Laurence Cordonnery, “The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing in The Pacific,” in David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, The Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, BRILL, 2010), 69–71.

140  The spectre of nuclear testing 117 The Associate Press, “France offers compensation to victims sickened by nuclear tests,” 25 March 2009, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/france-offers-compen sation-to-victims-sickened-by-nuclear-testsY.797730, accessed 13 January 2022.

Bibliography Aldrich, Robert. France and the South Pacific Since 1940. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. Alomes, Stephen, and Michael Provis, eds. French Worlds, Pacific Worlds: French Nuclear Testing in Australia’s Backyard. Port Melbourne: Institute for the Study of French Australian Relations, 1998. Anonymous. “35 Australian Unions Vote a Wide Boycott of France.” New York Times, 11 May 1973a. ———. “Australia and New Zealand Set Moves Against French A-Tests.” New York Times, 24 January 1973b. ———. “Australian Mail Union Joins Protest on French A-Tests.” New York Times, 17 May 1973c. ———. “British Opposition to Atom Tests Known to French.” The Times, 3 May 1973d. ———. “France Explains Why It Must Go Ahead with Pacific Tests.” The Times, 3 May 1973e. ———. “France Goes Ahead with Atom Tests.” The Times, 22 June 1972a. ———. “French A-Test Bring Protests by Five Nations.” New York Times, 23 July 1973f. ———. “French Planes Banned in Nuclear Protest.” The Times, 2 June 1972b. ———. “Halting French A-Tests.” New York Times, 17 July 1972c. ———. “Halting French A-Tests.” New York Times, 17 July 1972d. ———. “Mr Whitlam Talks about East of Suez.” The Times, 25 April 1973g. ———. “New Zealand Yachts Going to Test Zone.” The Times, 11 July 1972e. ———. “Pacific Nations Protest Slated French A-Tests.” New York Times, 19 April 1973h. ———. “Rogers in Protest on French A-Tests at Atoll in Pacific.” New York Times, 30 June 1972f. ———. “The Weakness of the World Court.” The Times, 31 May 1973i. ———. “Who Sank the Rainbow Warrior?” New York Times, 29 August 1985. ———. “World Court Asked to Ban French A-Tests in Pacific.” New York Times, 10 May 1973j. ———. “World Court Asks Paris to Halt Tests.” New York Times, 23 June 1973k. Bello, Judith Hippler, and Peter H. F. Bekker, “Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case.” The American Journal of International Law 90, no. 2 (April 1996): 280–6. Benvenuti, Andrea. Anglo-Australian Relations and the ‘Turn to Europe’, 1961–1972. Woodbridge; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 2008. Borders, William. “Commonwealth Asks Nuclear Test Halt.” New York Times, 4 August 1973a. ———. “Commonwealth’s Leaders Meet in Crisis-Free Mood.” New York Times, 3 August 1973b.

The spectre of nuclear testing  141 Brogan, Patrick. “French Defy Protests and Set Time for Atom Tests.” The Times, 20 June 1972. Broinowski, Richard. Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions. Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2003. Bull, Hedley. “The Whitlam Government’s Perceptions of Our Roles in the World.” In Advance Australia, Where?, edited by B. D. Beddie, 29–51. Melbourne: Oxford University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975. Burr, William. “US Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969–1975: From ‘Fourth Country’ to Strategic Partner.” Available at: https://www.wilson center.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-french-nuclear-program-19691975-fourth-country-to-strategic, accessed 18 January 2022. CCP Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, ed. Chronology of Mao Zedong: 1949–1976, Vol. 4. Beijing: Zhanggong Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013. Clark, George. “Heath–Whitlam Talks Today about Links.” The Times, 24 April 1973. Cordonnery, Laurence. “The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific.” In The Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks, edited by David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, 69–78. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014. Curran, James. “The ‘New Line in the Strand’: John Armstrong and the ‘New Nationalism’.” In The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910–2010, edited by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee, 164–81. Barton: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010. Danielsson, Bengt. “Under a Cloud of Secrecy: The French Nuclear Tests in the Southeastern Pacific”, Ambio 13, no. 5/6, The South Pacific (1984): 336–41. de Deckker, Paul. “The Perception of France in the Pacific Islands.” In France, Oceania and Australia: Past and Present, edited by Robert Aldrich, 172–89. Sydney: Department of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1991. Findlay, Trevor. “Explaining Australasian Angst: Australia, New Zealand and French Nuclear Testing.” Security Dialogue 6, no.4 (1995): 373–81. Fischer, Dana D. “Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice: Four Recent Cases.” International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 251–77. Franck, Thomas M. “Word Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases.” The American Journal of International Law 69, no. 3 (July 1975): 612–20. Groser, John. “Labour’s Nuclear Dilemma.” The Times, 26 June 1974. Hargrove, Charles. “Australian Prime Minister Told by President Pompidou That Nuclear Tests Cannot Be Called Off.” The Times, 27 June 1972. Harris, Stewart. “Protesters Attack Diplomat’s Home.” The Times, 3 June 1972. Henningham, Stephen. France and the South Pacific: A Contemporary History. North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992. Heren, Louis. “Unity at Ottawa on Test Ban.” The Times, 4 August 1973. International Court of Justice. “Nuclear Test Cases: Australia v. France, New Zealand v. France, Judgments of the Court.” International Lawyer 9, no. 3 (1974): 563–74. Lewis, Flora. “Australian Chief's Paris Visit Ends Rift Over Nuclear Tests.” New York Times, 7 January 1975. ———. “France, Reportedly Urged by China, Going Ahead with A-Test.” New York Times, 3 July 1973.

142  The spectre of nuclear testing Martin, Andrew, Martin, Andrew, Neild, Robert, Peierls, Rudolf, and Wright, Michael “French Nuclear Test.” The Times, 28 June 1972. Piquet, Martine. “Cold War in Warm Waters: Reflections on Australian and French Mutual Misunderstandings in the Pacific.” The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) Working Papers Series, No.1 (2000), The University of Melbourne. Rendel, A. M. “Mr Whitlam Seeks Court Changes.” The Times, 26 April 1973. Scobbie, Iain. “Discontinuance in the International Court: The Enigma of the Nuclear Tests Cases.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41, no. 4 (October 1992): 808–40. Stanhope, Henry. “British Scientists Stationed to Monitor French Tests and Ensure Safety of Pitcairn Islanders.” The Times, 23 June 1972. ———. “Report of Bomb Tests Plan by Britain.” The Times, 22 June 1974. Teltsch, Kathleen. “U.N. Study Cites A-Test Effects.” New York Times, 29 September 1972. Thakur, Ramesh. “The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific.” Nuclear Politics 51, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 466–86. United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963–1968, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament. Washington, DC: US Govt. Print. Off., 1997. Whitlam, Gough. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Ringwood: Viking, 1985. Wigg, Richard. “Demonstrations in France Against Nuclear Tests.” The Times, 7 May 1973.

5 Stuck between two worlds

The decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s saw increasing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. During this time, Diego Garcia, a tiny coral island of the Chagos Archipelago in the centre of the Indian Ocean, was chosen by the United States Government to be the base for American naval power in the Indian Ocean with a view to curbing the Soviet presence there. It was under British authority at the time. The Anglo-American effort of constructing military facilities on Diego Garcia, however, was opposed by many littoral countries (such as Sri Lanka and India), which protested the perceived growth of military competition in the Indian Ocean between two superpowers and proposed to transform the Indian Ocean into a “Zone of Peace.” Although Australia was an important Indian Ocean littoral country and a major ally to both the United States and the United Kingdom, its policy towards the international controversy around the Indian Ocean has received little scholarly scrutiny.1 In the meantime, Hedley Bull has argued that “participation in the American system is a basic premise of foreign policy for both Britain and Australia, defining the two countries’ approaches to national security and their political posture in the world.”2 In this vein, other scholars, such as Gordon Greenwood and Coral Bell, have examined the “triangular relationship” between Australia and its two dominant allies—the United Kingdom and the United States.3 This chapter analyses a key aspect of this triangular relationship between Australia, Britain and the United States in the 1970s, focusing on Australia’s response to the joint Anglo-American effort to expand military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia. It examines the Whitlam Government’s diplomatic manoeuvres towards great power rivalries in the Indian Ocean and its support of the concept of building the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ).4 By showing how the Labor Government walked a tightrope between opposition to Anglo-American militarisation of Diego Garcia and maintenance of alliances, especially of the security relationship with the Americans, it will provide a new perspective on understanding the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-6

144  Stuck between two worlds The origin of the US military bases in Diego Garcia Diego Garcia is the largest of seven islands and atolls that form the Chagos archipelago and is situated in the south-east of the archipelago. With an area of about 27 sq. km., Diego Garcia makes up more than 50 per cent of the archipelago’s total land area. The island was originally discovered by Portuguese explorers in the early 1500s. Since its discovery it had remained untouched by the hand of man until it was rediscovered by Spanish explorer Diego García de Moguer in 1532. It fell into the hands of French in 1793 and remained a French colony until the Napoleonic Wars. As a result of British victory, France ceded the islands to Britain in 1814 according to the Treaties of Paris. From 1826, the islands of the Chagos Archipelago were listed by Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole (Governor of Mauritius, 1823–1828) as dependencies of Mauritius. In 1903 the British merged the Chagos Archipelago with Mauritius, then British colony about 1,900 kilometres to the south-west. Between 1903 and 1965, the United Kingdom governed the Chagos Archipelago as a dependency of the colony of Mauritius.5 In 1959 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conducted a study to identify small strategically located islands of potential significance to United States military strategy. Diego Garcia was listed as one of the six islands in the Indian Ocean which would be ideal for future base sites, as it has the perfect location as a military base.6 Located in the centre of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia is approximately 970 nautical miles south of India, 925 nautical miles southwest of Sri Lanka, 2,200 nautical miles southeast of the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 1,600 nautical miles from the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, and 2,400 nautical miles from Bangkok. The coastline of Diego Garcia forms a natural harbour, making it ideal to station a naval base there. More significantly, the atoll abuts all major shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. As Admiral John S. McCain Jr., Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command (CINCPAC), noted, “As Malta is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean—equidistant from all points.”7 The island itself consists of a wishbone-shaped coral atoll, 14 miles long and 4 miles wide, which surrounds “one of the finest natural harbors in the world.”8 In the early 1960s, when the British Government started to talk about a possible withdrawal from “East of Suez,” there was concern in Washington that this withdrawal would create a power vacuum potentially inimical to US interests.9 This led to a greater awareness of the need for Indian Ocean bases. In April 1963, the US Department of State began secret exploratory negotiations with the British Government about the possible use of certain small islands in the Indian Ocean.10 Several months later, in August 1963, the US Department of State decided that Diego Garcia was the most suitable location for a joint Anglo-American military station.11 Diego Garcia’s position is strategically vital for the US and UK. Should London lose access to Aden or Singapore, Diego Garcia would allow them to project their military strength northwest into the Middle East and South Asia, east into Asia, or west into

Stuck between two worlds  145 Africa. During the Anglo-American discussions, it was agreed that the UK would be responsible for acquiring land, resettling the population and compensating them, while the US would be responsible for construction and maintenance costs. Once developed, the facilities would be available for joint use by the two countries.12 Consequently, in 1965, the British split off the entire Chagos Archipelago (includes Diego Garcia) from Mauritius and the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, and Des Roches from the Seychelles, and constituted them into what was known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). On 30 December 1966, the British and American Governments signed a bilateral agreement which made the islands of the BIOT available to both Governments for defence purposes, initially for a period of 50 years. After the initial period this Agreement shall continue in force for a further period of twenty years. These arrangements paved the way for the construction of military facilities in the Indian Ocean.13 After much delay, the UK and US Governments agreed in December 1970 to establish strategic communications facilities on the island of Diego Garcia.14 A further Agreement in 1972 authorised the construction of a “limited naval communications facility.”15 By 1973 both a naval communication station and the airfield runway were completed. The need to expand Diego Garcia became obvious even before the communication facilities were complete. In January 1974, the US Department of State decided to consolidate the US Navy’s tactical communications and expand logistical support facilities at Diego Garcia, in order to make it a useful and effective support facility for US and British forces in the Indian Ocean. The major rationale for such a decision, according to James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defence of the Nixon Government, was America’s need to respond to changing circumstances, particularly after the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal, and Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean. Schlesinger thought it was imperative for the US to maintain a strong presence in the Indian Ocean area to act as a deterrent to the Soviets. He claimed that: This balance will, among other things, signal to the Soviets our intention to continue to play a role in the area, to stand by our friends, and to deter any threats to the shipping routes over which so much of the industrialised world’s oil flows.16 Nevertheless, US plans for the expansion of Diego Garcia were contested both domestically and internationally. In the post-Vietnam War context, American public opinion was deeply suspicious of any new military initiative. Division was deepening within the US Congress regarding the Government’s plan for Diego Garcia. Some members were convinced that American expansion would contribute to a superpower naval rivalry in a faraway ocean, thus “America was starting down the same path that led to the Vietnam quagmire.”17 Critics within the administration, such as Daniel P. Moynihan, the US Ambassador to

146  Stuck between two worlds India, complained that Diego Garcia would be largely a costly symbol, since Moscow would be unlikely to risk a major confrontation by attacking Western shipping in the Indian Ocean. He queried the Nixon Government: Was it really necessary to have a substantial naval presence in order to keep the sea lanes open? Did America really believe the Soviets intended to use their vessels to threaten Indian Ocean countries? Would the United States have sufficient means to react to a threat without a more regular and systematic presence in the Indian Ocean?18 Moreover, international diplomacy around the Diego Garcia base was also developing. Moynihan reported, on 26 April 1974, that India (and other Indian Ocean littoral countries) believed that a substantial US military presence in the region was not in their interests, since it would provoke a military rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. These countries continued to campaign for the recognition of the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone, a proposal which was supported by US allies such as Australia and New Zealand.19 But key policy-makers in the American Government, notably Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, thought Indian Ocean deployment was crucial for US foreign policy.20 It was unwise, in their view, to postpone the decision to develop a modest naval logistical support facility in Diego Garcia.21 Despite international pressure for both superpowers to restrain their presence in the Indian Ocean, and a US Congressional request for arms limitation negotiation, Kissinger believed that America should not suspend the Diego Garcia plan in order to seek negotiation with the Soviets. On the contrary, an expanded military base in Diego Garcia would provide the US with a better negotiating position in its approach to the Soviets.22 After much political lobbying by the White House, the US congress finally approved the funding for the expansion of Diego Garcia on 7 November 1975 (on the condition that the funds could not be used prior to 1 July 1976).23 The role of the British Government The British Government also played a pivotal role in Diego Garcia’s growth from a tiny island into an important military base in the Indian Ocean. It not only controlled the ownership of Diego Garcia as part of the British Indian Ocean Territory, but was also directly involved in the planning of the project, the acquisition of the land and the deportation of the dwellers. In every sense, the birth of Diego Garcia as a military base could be seen as the outcome of a joint Anglo-American effort.24 In entering into cooperation with the United States in the establishment of a military base in the Indian Ocean, the British Government had its own strategic objectives. Given that cost had been a major obstacle for the British ever since the BIOT was established, the proposed financial contribution by the American Government cleared this issue out of the way, as Washington stated unequivocally that it would bear most of the cost while the base was for joint use. Moreover, despite the withdrawal from east of Suez policy, the British Government still attached great importance to the area

Stuck between two worlds  147 of the Indian Ocean. Britain recognised that secure trade routes and British lines of communication in the Far East remained a major issue of national security. If a base could be built on Diego Garcia, it would be of strategic value for the realisation of both goals.25 The British Government, however, suffered a setback when trying to negotiate Commonwealth endorsement for its Indian Ocean strategy. In January 1971, at the initiative of the British Government, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore reached a decision to establish a Commonwealth Study Group to investigate the factors affecting the security of the maritime trade routes in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as a large number of Commonwealth countries deemed that those factors were of vital importance to their interests.26 The British Government hoped that the result of the Study Group would build the basis for greater Commonwealth defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean.27 But this effort got nowhere. Several countries decided to pull out of the study group, fearing it would be seen as a rubber stamp for Diego Garcia.28 The Heath Government also tried to set up a viable security arrangement for the Indian Ocean involving the littoral states, with India playing a key role as a founding member. To Britain’s disappointment, the Indian Government expressed no interest in supporting the proposal.29 Thus, in the absence of a broader Commonwealth strategy, Britain was even more inclined to accept and actually encourage the US plan to develop facilities at Diego Garcia—a proposal which had the potential effect of making Western influence in the Indian Ocean more tangible. This served British purposes. For Britain, the Diego Garcia expansion was not entirely free from negative effects. The Diego Garcia proposal occasioned critical comment from some of the littoral states, among which India was the most outspoken. And other Commonwealth countries, such as Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Australia, Malaysia, Tanzania and New Zealand, joined in this criticism. Those nations strongly supported the proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone to keep the Indian Ocean region free from the great power rivalry. This idea originated from Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike in the early 1960s. After the British announced plans to withdraw their forces east of Suez, and the Soviet Union started making initial deployments in the Indian Ocean, this proposal gained considerable support from other Afro-Asian countries. It had been on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) agenda since 1971, when a UN resolution was passed proclaiming the area for all time to be a zone of peace. This resolution urged the great powers to halt their military escalation and remove their bases and nuclear weapons from the area.30 Afterwards, two more resolutions were passed to reinforce this policy and in December 1972 a UN Ad Hoc Committee was set up to study ways of implementing it.31 Thus, the British Government faced a dilemma as allowing the Diego Garcia base meant incurring a measure of criticism from India and some other countries while refusing it meant denying a request “for which there was strategic justification and to which the Americans attached importance.”32

148  Stuck between two worlds Nevertheless, given the potential benefits of Diego Garcia, the Heath Government was more inclined to ignore these tensions and back the US proposal. London thought that it would be “fully justified” in doing so. Accordingly, the Heath Government consistently abstained on Indian Ocean Peace Zone Resolutions in the UN on the grounds that the proposal was ill-defined and could prejudice its legitimate interests, such as protecting Britain’s dependencies and safeguarding the use of major trade routes.33 After Edward Heath was defeated by Harold Wilson at the election of March 1974, the new Labour Government expressed reservations about the Diego Garcia proposal. Shortly after coming into power, Wilson said in Parliament that the proposal for a “Zone of Peace” in the Indian Ocean was very much in the mind of his government. He told the questioner in Parliament he would discuss the idea with Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. Since the American proposal would be subject to the new Government’s approval, Wilson’s remarks immediately aroused international speculation as to whether the new Labour Government would reject US plans to extend its military facilities on Diego Garcia.34 On 31 October 1974, it was argued, during the British Cabinet meeting, that the views of the Indian Government and the Governments of other countries in the area should be taken into account before a final decision was reached on the future of Diego Garcia.35 The British Cabinet struck an uneasy compromise. On the one hand, it would accept, in principle, the proposal of building the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. On the other hand, the Wilson Government believed that achieving progress towards arms limitations in the Indian Ocean would be “unrealistic” without the participation of the US and Soviet Governments.36 Finally, the Cabinet concluded that it was in the overall strategic interests of Britain to support the development of Diego Garcia. Thus, despite the tensions this would create in the Commonwealth for the Government, the Wilson Government moved to endorse the US proposal. The evolution of the Australian Government’s position Australia, as a major Indian Ocean littoral country and an important ally to both the US and UK, played an important role in the international diplomacy surrounding Diego Garcia. The McMahon Government had been a strong supporter of the Anglo-American proposal. On one hand, Australia held a direct stake in the construction of military facilities on Diego Garcia. According to the design of US Navy, a strategic communications facility on Diego Garcia would serve the purpose of linking two US Naval Communication Stations, Asmara and Northwest Cape, Australia, thereby closing the gap in reliable communications coverage existed in the central Indian Ocean-Bay of Bengal area.37 As a UKUSA member, Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate would benefit directly from the establishment and maintaining of those facilities.38 On the other hand, the McMahon Government perceived the plans for establishing military facilities at Diego Garcia as evidence that the US Government valued

Stuck between two worlds  149 highly the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and was taking concrete steps to prevent it from being dominated by the Soviet Union. This was a welcome sign for the McMahon Administration because, in their view, the US presence would help to maintain the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean and safeguard Australia’s trade route through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the McMahon Government supported the US decision to develop Diego Garcia.39 Accordingly, at the UNGA of 16 December 1971, Australia, along with the US and UK, choose to abstain from a resolution favouring the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.40 Furthermore, the McMahon Administration even allowed the United States and Britain to use the Cocos Island airstrip, which Australia maintained as a “staging point,” in transporting materials for the construction of the joint American-British base on Diego Garcia.41 After the election of the Labor Government, however, Whitlam initiated a sharp turn in his government’s policy towards the expansion of Diego Garcia. Shortly after coming to office, Whitlam instructed Australian UN delegation to vote “yes” on a resolution favouring the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to study the implications of this proposal.42 When the US Government announced that it would seek US$29 million to improve military facilities on Diego Garcia on 5 February 1974, the Whitlam Administration immediately declared its opposition to the idea.43 On 8 February 1974, Australian Foreign Minister Donald Willesee stated that the building up of facilities by any great power in the Indian Ocean, or the introduction of additional naval forces, did not contribute to Australia’s longterm objective that the Indian Ocean should be free from great power rivalry. The Australian Government considered that the most effective way of moving towards the long-term objectives of maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean would be for both great powers to agree to exercise mutual restraint.44 On the same day, during a press conference in Singapore, Whitlam reiterated Australia’s opposition to the great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and its commitment to the building of the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. He said: Australia is a member of and has given its firm support to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean zone of peace and has endorsed the ASEAN proposal for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the ASEAN region. Both these proposals look to a situation where great power rivalry will be eliminated from an area of importance to Australia … it is clear that the building up of facilities by any Great Power in the Indian Ocean or the introduction of additional naval forces does not contribute to the achievement of the long-term objective which the Australian Government and the Governments of other countries in the region have set for themselves.45 The Whitlam Government’s stance towards the Anglo-American proposal for Diego Garcia expansion boiled down to two related issues. On one hand, the Australian Government opposed superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean and

150  Stuck between two worlds deplored any action that could lead to the escalation of such rivalries. On the other hand, the Government supported the long-term objective of building the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. Therefore, the Whitlam Administration urged both great powers to maintain mutual restraint and move towards a reduction of their presence.46 The Federal Opposition strongly criticised the policy shift introduced by the Whitlam Government in relation to Diego Garcia. Nonetheless, for both the Whitlam Government and its critics, one fact remained undisputed: the Soviet Union had successfully established a strong military presence and influence in the Northwest Indian Ocean area.47 The LCP Coalition and the ALP, however, split over the nature of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and whether it was necessary to contain its expansion in the region.48 Billy Snedden, leader of the Australian Federal Opposition, held the view that the increase of Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean represented a potential threat to Australia’s national security and immediate measures should be taken to check the growth of the Soviet naval presence.49 Whitlam, on the other hand, believed that the focus of Soviet attention had always been present in the northwest of the Indian Ocean, in the area around Somalia and Aden. It was absurd to base Australia’s defence efforts on developments at such a distance from it. In his view, the presence of Soviet shipping in the Indian Ocean was inevitable, as “the Indian Ocean is the shortest warm weather route linking the eastern and western sections of the Soviet Union. Geography alone ensures that the Soviet navy will remain in the Indian Ocean as long as the Soviet Union remains a maritime power.”50 Thus, Whitlam thought it was not necessary to be alarmed by the build-up of Soviet forces. As a corollary to this difference, the LCP Coalition and the ALP held contrasting views regarding the Anglo-American proposal to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia. The Federal Opposition argued that Australia should support the decision of Britain and the United States to develop further the naval installation at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as it was an effective means to curb the growth of Soviet naval forces and therefore served Australia’s national interest. This rationale was in line with the explanation given by the United States, which stated that the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia would bring potential benefits to the US and its allies. The US Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger argued, on 4 February 1974, that regular visits of US navy vessels into the Indian Ocean had been disrupted by the Vietnam War. It was in the interests of both the United States and its allies to re-establish them, particularly because of the growing Soviet naval presence.51 Whitlam, however, did not agree that the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia was such an urgent task. On the contrary, he believed that building up Diego Garcia would have the effect of increasingly straining relations with the Soviet Union, which, after all, was one of Australia’s major trading partners. The escalation of tensions between the superpowers was, furthermore, causing concern amongst most countries in the region, from India and Sri Lanka, to Malaysia.52

Stuck between two worlds  151 Why did the Whitlam Government protest against the proposal for the expansion of Diego Garcia? The US Diego Garcia proposal, however, was viewed sympathetically by a number of Australian newspapers. The base was regarded as a legitimate US response to a re-opened Suez Canal, which would give rise to an increase in Russian ships in the Indian Ocean. According to The Australian, although most Australians did not like the scenario of American and Russian fleets chasing each other up and down the western littoral, it was thought to be better than “having only Russian ships.”53 Furthermore, there was a prevailing view in the media and the bureaucracy that the American Alliance based on ANZUS was still critical to Australian foreign policy. For some commentators, the Whitlam Government’s “pro-Soviet policy” would put the US–Australia alliance in jeopardy.54 This was an unnecessarily alarmist interpretation of Whitlam’s policy stance. On the contrary, he never doubted the soundness of treating ANZUS as Australia’s ultimate insurance policy. Since coming into power, Whitlam publicly declared on many occasions that it was the only defence arrangement with continuing validity for Australia. In a speech made on 14 March, he distinguished ANZUS from Australia’s other agreements, saying: “There is only one arrangement to which we are a party which would seem to have continuing validity. That’s ANZUS… The other arrangements … SEATO, ASPAC and the Five-Power Arrangements are anachronistic or objectionable in part, or transitory.”55 Given this, why was the Whitlam Government so adamant in publicly denouncing the Anglo-American proposal for the expansion of Diego Garcia? Were there additional reasons, apart from avoiding “strained trade relations with the Soviet Union” and “causing concern among countries of the Indian Ocean regions”? The evidence suggests that the Whitlam Administration’s protest against the proposal for the expansion of Diego Garcia was motivated by several other factors. Firstly, Whitlam had been trying to build a more independent Australian stance in international affairs, particularly by keeping a measured distance from the policies of its “old and powerful friends”—a euphemism generally means Britain (the old friend) and the United States (the powerful friend). On the issue of Diego Garcia, the Whitlam Government hoped to avoid the image of being an obsequious supporter of US policies in order to distinguish itself from its predecessors. In this regard, the administration did not even hesitate to let one major side of the great power rivalry – the Soviet Union—know of Australia’s concern. On 2 April 1974, Australian Foreign Secretary Alan Renouf explained to senior Soviet foreign official V. P. Suslov that the present Australian Government was trying to pursue a more independent foreign policy. He felt that the previous Government had been too much aligned with the United States. The present Government was seeking to redress the balance.56 This was a radical break in the tradition of Australian foreign policy. Ironically, the second reason underpinning the Australian Government’s protest about Diego Garcia, as outlined by the Australian Minister for Defence

152  Stuck between two worlds Lance Barnard, was frustration over the lack of US consultation. Barnard told officials from the US Embassy on 1 March 1974 that if the US Government had told Australia earlier of its intentions and in more detail, Australia’s reaction to the announcement might have been different.57 This claim about inadequate briefing was, to a certain extent, true. As late as 26 February, the US Government’s briefing on Diego Garcia remained sketchy. The Australian Government was able to get a vague idea about the American proposal through a chance conversation between Australian diplomatic representatives in New Zealand and Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Noel Gayler. During the ANZUS meeting in Wellington, the latter accidently mentioned that the United States was developing a “minimum operating base” at Diego Garcia⁠—“something the United States could hang its hat on if the need arose”.58 The fact that the United States did not brief Australian authorities early enough was not well received. Australia viewed itself as one of the most important US allies and yet it had been ignored. This was a frustration that had been felt many times by successive Australian Governments since the signing of the ANZUS treaty in 1951—over West New Guinea, Confrontation, the American accommodation with China and the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Under the Whitlam Government, the feeling against this discourtesy by America was particularly strong, for it suggested that Australia was very much the junior partner of the Australian– American alliance. Worse, for some radical elements from the ALP’s left wing, it suggested that Australia was just a puppet of the United States. They had long been demanding a stronger and more independent Australian stance within the alliance.59 Indeed, Whitlam’s gesture on Diego Garcia was in part determined by the need to pacify the party’s radicals and to avoid a split between the left and right wings of the party. In contrast to the Nixon Administration’s apparent arrogance towards Australia, the British Government was much more cautious in avoiding any complaint from Australia. It carefully informed the Whitlam Government of the secret agreements it had reached with the US. On the same day that the Joint Agreement was publicly announced (on 5 February 1974), the British Government instructed its High Commission in Canberra to brief Australian authorities on the Diego Garcia developments. They highlighted the following points—the decision to extend the facilities at Diego Garcia was a joint Anglo-American decision and Britain saw the extension of facilities at Diego Garcia very much in the context of Western security generally. It was not merely a response to the recent Yom Kippur War, although the prospect of the opening of the Suez Canal was a factor.60 Britain stressed the overall geographical importance of the base in the context of the Cold War. Finally, the Whitlam Government’s main reason for expressing opposition to the Anglo-American proposal was based on the fact that the proposed expansion of the military facilities in Diego Garcia had been the subject of wide protest both within and outside the United States. Some Indian Ocean littoral countries (India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in particular) had denounced the

Stuck between two worlds  153 plan about Diego Garcia, advocating an Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Whitlam was sympathetic to their aspirations. Whitlam also sensed that the American proposal would alienate important elements of American domestic opinion. After the Dismissal, he said: No government around the Indian Ocean basin—with the sole exception of the Fraser Government—will give overt support to American bases in this region. For Australia to give such support does nothing to help our relations with our neighbours and little in the long run to improve our standing with the United States. Congress is by no means happy with the American buildup in the Indian Ocean. We should learn from the fact that Congress was disillusioned with the Vietnam War long before successive American Administrations felt any misgivings about the slaughter and destruction. We will not enhance our credibility or our popularity with Congress by inveigling the Americans into a military involvement they do not want and may live to regret.61 Obviously, on this issue, the United States and Britain, and Indian Ocean littoral countries like India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, represented two opposing poles. It was impossible for the Whitlam Government, as a member of the UN Ad Hoc Committee, to publicly support the proposal on Diego Garcia while endorsing the concept of building the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. Nonetheless, it had never been Whitlam’s policy to unduly alienate such important allies as the US and the UK. As a result, the Whitlam Government tried to navigate a middle way between these poles—it supported the IOPZ but did not commit itself to any concrete steps and opposed the Diego Garcia expansion but not to the extent of endangering Australia’s alliance with the United States and Britain. Whitlam’s goal was to support the policy of “neutralising” the Indian Ocean without blatantly opposing any attempt, by previously trusted allies, to curtail the growth of Soviet military and naval power. In other words, the Whitlam Government endeavoured to establish the image of a Third World supporter without sacrificing its relationship with the United States. But how could this strategy work? Policy advisors in Canberra recommended three courses of action: Australia’s position should be low-key; in expressing opposition to the Anglo-American proposal, Australia should avoid appearing to oppose steps to prevent the area being dominated by the Soviet Union alone; and it should advocate a realistic, flexible, step-by-step approach in the UN Ad Hoc Committee. Due regard should be given to the security interests of regional states, the major powers, and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean.62 As a gesture of Australia’s support for US military operations in the Indian Ocean, Lance Barnard even informed US Secretary for Defence James Schlesinger in January 1974 that Australia’s Cockburn Sound base, once the construction work was completed, would be available for US naval vessels to visit.63

154  Stuck between two worlds The tacit understanding among Washington, London and Canberra The nuances of the Australian approach in this policy area were conveyed to US authorities on many occasions. On 14 March 1974, Whitlam had a conversation with US Ambassador to Australia Marshall Green. Whitlam was blunt, telling Green that he did not like the expansion on Diego Garcia, but acknowledged that “strictly it was not Australia’s affair” and he could understand what the United States was doing, concluding that “the USA clearly could not let things go by default in the Indian Ocean.” Australia’s difficulty lay in its inability to acknowledge publicly its acceptance of US priorities regarding Diego Garcia, while supporting the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal at the same time. Diplomatically, he hoped to forge a compromise, suggesting to the USA that the best thing would be a limitation agreed to by the USA and USSR.64 On 28 March, Sir Patrick Shaw, Australian Ambassador to the United States, assured Joseph J. Sisco, American Under Secretary of State for political affairs, that Australia would not disparage America’s objective of maintaining a balance in the Indian Ocean, and requested America not to include Australia in the list of countries that “had not kept the picture in perspective.”65 On 30 August, Barnard told his American counterpart that he could understand and accept the US position. He did not see the plans for Diego Garcia as involving a major base or large-scale naval escalation in the Indian Ocean. He would find it difficult to state this position publicly, however, given the stance that the Prime Minister had taken and the Labor Government’s vocal support for the concept of a Zone of Peace.66 In both London and Washington, there was a tacit understanding of Australia’s strategy. In late 1973, the British Government was told by officials from the Australian Defence Department that they regarded talk of a “zone of peace” as quite illusory and, although they had to participate in the United Nations exercise, they were careful not to allow their participation to cause difficulties for their friends in the United Kingdom and United States. Australian officials said that they did not wish to see an increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area and welcomed British activities there and joint exercises with British forces.67 The US Department of State also understood that Australia would not be an impediment to US proposals regarding Diego Garcia. In mid-1974, a US interagency working group conducted research on its Indian Ocean strategy. In this report, the US intelligence analysts distinguished between Australia’s public stance and its private attitude⁠—although Prime Minister Gough Whitlam personally criticised the US proposal, the Australian Government had privately assured America that the Diego Garcia issue could be handled to the “basic satisfaction” of the American Government.68 Daniel P. Moynihan, US Ambassador to India, clearly pointed out that the Whitlam Government’s diplomacy had something to do with its calculations of benefit and cost. It was striving to improve its position in the Third World, but it was facing great

Stuck between two worlds  155 pressures from the Labor Party’s left wing, so it would be politically disastrous if they publicly endorsed the US proposal. Nevertheless, the United States could still work with them because “they privately are sympathetic to our actions.”69 This perspective was in line with the judgements made by some British officials. On 26 April 1974, during a discussion with Henry Kissinger, Sir John Hunt, British Secretary to the Cabinet, and other officials, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States, suggested Australia’s vociferous protest against the proposal would “calm down quickly.”70 Sure enough, by October 1974, both the US Ambassador Marshall Green and the UK High Commissioner Morrice James came to the conclusion that although Whitlam disagreed with the British and American Governments over the Diego Garcia issue, he “seemed content no longer to be a front-runner in respect of these matters.”71 It was clear that the emphasis of the Whitlam Administration’s strategy was an attempt to identify more closely with the security aims and outlook of Australia’s Asian neighbours without unduly straining Australia’s relationship with America and Britain. The Whitlam Government still adhered to ANZUS and the American Alliance. But its desire for non-alignment, and its alleged support of the American Alliance, seemed to be, in the words of Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs Andrew Peacock, “trying to ride two horses galloping in different directions at the same time.”72 Whitlam was able to manipulate the situation to Australia’s advantage partly due to one fatal defect in the idea of IOPZ. Although it was clear that advocates of the IOPZ sought to secure permanent withdrawal from the Indian Ocean region of armed forces by all non-littoral states, they had yet to define the area and the precise obligations of parties to any eventual agreement. Some key concepts essential for a clear definition of this idea were missing: What did it mean by “peace”? Did it include the idea of protesting against nuclear proliferation? What did it mean by “zone”? Did it cover just the sea or the littoral states as well? If the plan for Diego Garcia should be scrapped under this design, what would happen to other bases involved? Should the two superpowers be excluded from these regional arrangements? Even the resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly in 1971 and afterwards had no specific definitions or concrete initiatives.73 The idea was simply too ill-defined to be converted into a concrete proposal. The discussions within the UN Ad Hoc Committee increasingly degenerated into meaningless prattle. In the process of consultation, at least five different concepts had been produced, none of which was universally accepted by all Committee members.74 And there was little likelihood of an early agreement between strong regional powers like India and weak states such as Sri Lanka and between the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states. After December 1974, with the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee being enlarged to include new UN members such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia, the hope of reaching a consensus became even more remote.75 The Whitlam Government took this to mean that supporting the general concept of IOPZ in

156  Stuck between two worlds line with UN Resolutions was the only thing it could do. The ambiguity and impracticality of the concept made it impossible for Australia to treat it as a “long-term objective.” Thus, fortunately in terms of Whitlam’s policy priorities, Australia did not have to do anything concrete arising out of its support for the concept of a zone of peace, other than denouncing great power rivalries and military build-up in the region. Thus, Australia could also urge both great powers to move towards a reduction of their presence without appearing to oppose steps to avoid the area being left to sole or predominantly Soviet influence.76 Australia urged the US and the Soviet to reach a mutual restraint agreement Nonetheless, in addition to public statements and the private assurances, the Whitlam Government took a practical step to promote the objective of making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. On 22 and 23 March, the Australian missions in Moscow and Washington approached their respective hosts, expressing the view that the most effective way of moving towards a long-term internationally acceptable political settlement for the Indian Ocean would be for them to agree to exercise mutual restraint.77 In his United Nations speech of 30 September 1974, Whitlam said eloquently that: We continue to urge upon the superpowers the need for them both to maintain the utmost mutual restraint in their relations between themselves—and towards us. … We are entitled to insist upon restraint in their deployment of forces overseas, in areas such as the Indian Ocean. Australia is strongly opposed to the Indian Ocean becoming a ground for competition, much less confrontation between the great powers.78 However, a question remained to be answered: in making the decision to approach the authorities of two superpower governments, did the Whitlam Administration really believe that they could influence their respective policies? Even smaller countries like Burma were deeply sceptical of the extent to which Australia’s course of action could shape US policies, particularly on issues relating to strategic military disposition.79 Furthermore, as with the idea of building the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone, the concept of “mutual restraint” by two superpowers was too ambiguous to be feasible. Whitlam did not elaborate, in his UN speech, on the form which he thought a US/USSR agreement on mutual restraint might take. J. A. Thomson, leader of the British team in the Anglo-American talks, asked the following questions: What did the term “mutual restraint” mean? Did the Australian Government envisage any limitation on numbers, or types of warships, or warship days being imposed in the Indian Ocean? How did the Australian Government define warships? Would submarines be included in any regime of mutual restraint? How would restraint be policed?80

Stuck between two worlds  157 The Whitlam Government did not provide any well-defined answers to these questions. Whitlam clearly did not think it realistic to expect the superpowers to withdraw entirely from the Indian Ocean. When answering a Parliamentary Question on 22 October, he said: We recognise that it may be difficult for the USA and USSR to consider questions relating to the deployment of their forces in the Indian Ocean area in isolation from deployments and capabilities in other areas and from general issues of mutual balance and restraint. We would rather expect discussion of the Indian Ocean to form part of the continuing bilateral exchanges on arms control between the two Powers. We shall continue to urge them to pay particular attention to the Indian Ocean in these discussions and to keep the littoral states informed of progress.81 Thus, the Australian objective in approaching the superpowers could at best be interpreted as an effort to encourage dialogue between them. It was certainly a gesture to appease internal critics within the ALP. Indeed, the Labor Government was far from vigorous in urging either superpower to take concrete steps to realise arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.82 This call for discussions and restraint, however, carried great symbolic weight in Australia, and countries in the Indian Ocean region, although Washington was hardly going to pay much heed to this call. The Americans said that they regarded the Australian suggestion of mutual restraint as a “possible” subject for study but made it clear that they did not wish to be rushed into taking a stance.83 In reality, the dominant view in Washington was that the United States would be in a better position to negotiate with the Soviet Union if the Diego Garcia plans had been completed. When Australia chose to act, Kissinger was arriving in Moscow. Nonetheless, limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean “had not come up” in Soviet–American discussion.84 And given the global context, Australia’s action had little chance of success. What, then, was the significance of the Whitlam Government taking such a step? Alan Renouf, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, explained that the Australian initiative in directing the superpowers to a mutual restraint agreement was not for the purpose of stopping the US from going ahead with Diego Garcia, an objective which he thought was impossible to achieve unless backed by Britain.85 The Australian Government did not approach the British Government for a joint request to the US authorities, thereby forsaking any possibility of achieving an effective means of pressuring the United States. Admittedly, during his conversation with British High Commissioner Morrice James in May 1975, Whitlam did request that the British Government not give the Americans the additional facilities they sought on Diego Garcia, on the grounds that the countries bordering the Indian Ocean strongly opposed the plan. But he never took a stronger position to press the British Government.86

158  Stuck between two worlds On occasions such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in the same month in Jamaica, Whitlam expressed views on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. But he did not seize the chance to press British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to endorse this idea. Although the final communiqué of this meeting urged that all nations should “work towards the implementation of the resolutions of the UN declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace,” Harold Wilson emphasised during the confidential discussion of the communiqué that this wording would not change the UK’s attitude towards the UN resolution on the Indian Ocean.87 On his way back from Jamaica, Whitlam stopped in Washington to meet US President Gerald Ford. He told Ford that “we all will not be happy” about the expansion of Diego Garcia. But he admitted that “everyone is cosy about this”—just could not say it publicly.88 Moreover, Australia abandoned one possibly powerful alternative—a combined approach with India—because of the suspicion that this would arouse in the United States and other littoral countries.89 India’s leaning towards the USSR made this a risky strategy for Australia. Nor did the Whitlam Government ever test any joint gesture with another key Commonwealth country directly concerned by the Diego Garcia issue. Mauritius, from which Diego Garcia was detached, still declared the island part of its national territory in its Constitution.90 Nevertheless, the Ramgoolam Government of Mauritius had been riding the fence on the issue of Soviet–American rivalry in the Indian Ocean—it acquiesced in the Anglo-American efforts to turn Diego Garcia into a military base and allowed Russian ships to use its port facilities.91 Australia has had formal diplomatic relations with Mauritius since September 1970. Given the fact the latter attached great importance to its trade, immigration and civil aviation relations to Australia, Canberra would have been in a good position to influence over the policies of Mauritius in regard to their attitudes towards Diego Garcia. However, nothing happened.92 Within the UN Ad Hoc Committee, Australia lacked genuine interest in forging a common regional view, as it feared that any such position, if backed by concrete policy proposals, would hurt Australia’s relations with the United States.93 Obviously, the Whitlam Government was keen to demonstrate to the Indian Ocean littoral countries its strong support for the concept of IOPZ—the audience that the Whitlam Government had in mind were countries around the Indian Ocean rather than the two superpowers. Immediately after approaching Moscow and Washington, the Whitlam Administration informed India and other members of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace of the diplomatic move that Australia had taken.94 By this means, the Labor Government hoped to indicate that it had an independent stance, independent of Britain and the United States in particular. Thus, it sought to demonstrate that Australia saw its interests as aligned to those of its regional neighbours. Australia was in the region and would look to regional governments not necessarily to London and Washington for guidance. The dilemma for Whitlam was that independence might compromise its vital security ties to the UK and the US. It was a difficult tightrope to walk.

Stuck between two worlds  159 Fraser swung Australia’s posture back to the conservative position Ironically, the Whitlam Government’s argument against Diego Garcia was adopted by the Wilson Administration in support of the proposal. On 4 December 1974, Roy Mason, the British Secretary of State for Defence, announced that because of the effect of its decision to reduce forces in the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet naval presence there, the British Government had agreed to the request from the United States Government for a modest expansion of the facilities of Diego Garcia. In making this announcement, Mason highlighted that the British Government saw much merit in Whitlam’s proposal that the US and the Soviet Union should embark on talks with a view to an agreement on mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean. He made reference to Whitlam’s answer to a Parliamentary question on 22 November 1974 and said it was not practical to consider the Indian Ocean in isolation. The British Government had to base its decision on Diego Garcia on global considerations such as those Whitlam mentioned, but he did not regard this decision as incompatible with his objectives. As indicated in the statement, the British Government would be pursuing the question of arms limitation in the Indian Ocean with the Americans. This would, of course, include Whitlam’s proposal, which the British Government had already told the United States Government they favoured.95 The Whitlam Government saw this as the success of its policy—at least it was a strong argument to refute the criticism that its policy led to failure.96 After Malcolm Fraser became Prime Minister, he swung Australia’s posture swiftly back to the longstanding conservative position. Among significant changes he introduced was forthright endorsement of American moves to expand the defence facility on Diego Garcia. Fraser dismissed the theory of a neutral Indian Ocean as fantasy. He thought that Whitlam’s aspiration to establish a neutral zone in the Indian Ocean was not likely to be achieved. It was unrealistic to support the idea of a neutral Indian ocean as long as Russia was building up her naval presence there.97 Australia should seek a balance of superpower naval forces and extension of the US naval facilities at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean as an effective strategy to check Soviet’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean.98 In addition, the Liberal-Country Party Coalition took the view that its support for Diego Garcia was consistent with allowing three American bases on Australian soil.99 At the same time, the movement for building a peace zone finally proved to be fruitless. On September 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone adopted a final report to be submitted to the UNGA. Notably, this draft resolution, based largely on a Sri Lankan working paper, made no mention of Diego Garcia. According to the Australian mission which participated in Committee meetings, these low-key results reflected views of more conservative members of the committee, including Australia, Iran, and India. Although these countries might have different agendas in the Indian Ocean region, they all opposed “precipitate action” on the conference proposal or even establishment of a time-frame for preparatory work.100

160  Stuck between two worlds On 11 February 1976, Gough Whitlam, then the Leader of the Opposition, attacked the Fraser Government’s policy, stating “The ASEAN proposals for a Nuclear Free Zone in the Indian Ocean and a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in the ASEAN region were major initiatives which my Government strongly supported.” He went on to stress that our relations with our neighbours were more important than our relations with distant powers and that the regional powers had a responsibility to prevent an arms race in the Indian Ocean. The Fraser Government’s policy not only weakens the excellent relations developed over the last three years with the ASEAN members, but also stimulates an escalation in Indian Ocean armaments.101 Whitlam proudly claimed that during his prime ministership he had carved out “a very special role for Australia as an honest broker between the Third World and the industrialised West based on the respect we engendered on both sides.”102 The Whitlam Government’s navigating challenges posed by the Diego Garcia dilemma is typical of equidistant diplomacy. Diplomacy is, in essence, “the principal means by which states communicate with each other, enabling them to have regular and complex relations.”103 Equidistant diplomacy is “a specific form of diplomatic signalling that aims to generate the image of political neutrality,” according Ang Guan Teo and Kei Koga, who have studied the mechanism of equidistant diplomacy based on Singapore’s diplomatic behaviour vis-à-vis the United States and China from the 1990s. For Teo and Koga, equidistant diplomacy is perception management—an independent diplomatic tactic which strived to create a neutral image through diplomatic tools. Equidistant diplomacy involves, at least, three sides: State A, which conducts equidistant diplomacy, and two target states, B and C, which are in strategic competition with each other. Assuming that both targets are valuable partners whose relationships directly affect the national security of State A, State A will have a political desire to ensure its stable relationship with States B and C.104 Whitlam was placed in a serious foreign policy dilemma of choosing between Australia’s traditional allies and the Third World countries around the issue of Diego Garcia. On one hand, Whitlam sought to keep the balance between great power rivalries in the Indian Ocean and on the other it hoped to endorse the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace for the purpose of cultivating good relations with its neighbouring countries. Whitlam resorted to equidistant diplomacy—through making Australia to be perceived as a neutral country—as a way out of such a dilemma. Overall, Whitlam’s policy towards the international diplomacy around Diego Garcia—distancing itself from Anglo-American policy, cultivating closer

Stuck between two worlds  161 contact with other countries, making independent judgements on international issues—had served its purpose. Although the interests of the Third World countries and those of Western Powers were at odds in the case of Diego Garcia, the Whitlam Government was able to demonstrate a pro-Third World public stance against great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean without abandoning Australia’s traditional goal of sustaining its alliance with the United States and Britain. There was no open diplomatic clash between Australia and its major allies, even though Australia adopted a different attitude towards the build-up of Diego Garcia compared to Britain and the United States. So while the Whitlam Government clearly saw Australia’s interests as still tied to the triangular relationship, it did manage to negotiate an independent stance on the issue of Diego Garcia, suggesting to other nations in the Indian Ocean region that Australia had an independent policy and an emerging alliance with regional allies. The Whitlam Government’s diplomatic experiences around Diego Garcia constituted an important part in the shaping of a unique Australian foreign policy, one free from attachment to British and American considerations, although mindful of the need to factor in the interests of the UK and the US into Australia’s calculations of its own best interests. A knot to be untied For the United States, the decision to build a military based in Diego Garcia during the Cold War proved to be an act of incredible farsightedness. With the enlargement of the facilities on the island, its strategic importance has been greatly strengthened. A third bilateral Agreement between the US and UK in 1976 permitted the development, maintenance and operation of a US Navy support facility. When finished in 1986, the facilities at the US base on Diego Garcia included a large aircraft runway and berthing facilities for vessels.105 Nowadays, it houses an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 service personnel as well as bomber aircraft, ordnance, and a sophisticated radar, space tracking, and communications facility. Diego Garcia has become a military base of the utmost importance, clearing the way for the US to project its power into the Indian Ocean, Middle East and Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, Diego Garcia proves its strategic value as a vital launching point for a series of US military actions in the Middle East—including the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), the Afghanistan War (2001–2021) and the Iraq War (2003–2011).106 It is also a refuelling station for US Air Force jets that patrol the South China Sea and is designated an emergency landing spot for space missions by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of the US.107 With the passage of time, Diego Garcia became America’s most controversial base in the Indian Ocean. The agitation over Diego Garcia did not subside with the completion of the construction of the military base. Since the 1970s, the Chagossians have been calling for the UK Government to take belated

162  Stuck between two worlds responsibility for its human rights violations occurred during the creation of the BIOT. Britain’s sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and America’s legitimacy in using Diego Garcia as a military base are being challenged. Between 1968 and 1973, the UK deported around 1,500 indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago from their native land. Many were removed to Mauritius and the Seychelles, where they encountered abysmal poverty and serious discrimination.108 In 1972, the British Government offered the indigenous people of Diego Garcia Island a compensation of £650,000 through the government of Mauritius, but it was not distributed until 1977. In April 1973, the Chagossians started taking legal action to claim compensation and the right of abode in the Chagos. Various petitions and lawsuits have been ongoing from that time onwards.109 Furthermore, in 2010, the UK announced the creation of a protected marine area in and around the Chagos Archipelago. This decision has been condemned by Mauritius, which claimed the ownership of the Chagos Islands. On 20 December 2010, the Government of Mauritius initiated proceedings against the UK Government under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge the legality of the marine protected area. On 18 March 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration unanimously held that the establishment of the marine protected area (MPA) was illegal under the UNCLOS, as Mauritius had legally binding rights to fish in the waters surrounding the Chagos Archipelago, to an eventual return of the Chagos Archipelago, and to the preservation of any minerals or oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago prior to its return.110 The Permanent Court of Arbitration adjudicated that by establishing this protected area the UK has failed to comply with its obligations to return the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, when it is no longer needed for defence purpose.111 The Chagossians have also brought a number of legal actions in the UK courts, the European Court on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee challenging their expulsion, accusing the British authority of multiple violations of human rights and requiring the elimination of racial discrimination. Pressured by this number of judicial proceedings, the UK changed its ordnances regarding resettlement but without any real effect.112 In one of its later decisions, the UK decided against resettlement due to security, defence interests, but also the harsh reality that this process would result in exorbitant cost.113 On several occasions, the UNGA condemned the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago and stated that it was done contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and Resolution 1514 (XV).114 On 23 June 2017, the UNGA voted in favour of referring the territorial dispute between Mauritius and the UK to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in order to clarify the legal status of the Chagos Islands archipelago. The motion was approved by a majority vote with 94 voting for and 15 against, with 65 abstentions. Multiple European and other allies of the UK did not support it

Stuck between two worlds  163 in that vote, with Germany, France, Canada abstaining, while most former colonial nations voted in favour of sending the case to the ICJ.115 In February 2019, the ICJ ruled that “The United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring an end to its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, thereby enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonisation of its territory in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination.”116 In response to the ruling, the UK Government claimed that the advisory opinion made by the ICJ “is not a legally binding judgment.”117 On 22 May 2019, the UNGA affirmed the decision of the ICJ and demanded that the UK withdraw its colonial administration from the Islands and work with Mauritius to facilitate the resettlement of Mauritian nationals in the archipelago. The resolution won the support of 116 countries, while 56 abstained and only Australia, Hungary, Israel and the Maldives joined Britain and the US in voting against it.118 More recently, the Diego Garcia base is gaining increased strategic significance as the US and UK governments seek to increase their engagement in the Indo-Pacific through initiatives such as the new AUKUS security pact. Given the strategic utility in Diego Garcia for these two allies, the US and UK are more likely to endure considerable “reputational costs” and international backlash for retention of the atoll than ceding the sovereignty of Diego Garcia to Mauritia.119 That is why the US government issued a written statement on 1 March 2018 saying that neither the US nor the UK have any plans to discontinue use of the military base on Diego Garcia.120 For decades, Australian Governments since that of Malcom Fraser have given unquestioning support for Britain’s position on sovereignty, and thus to the legitimacy of the US base on Diego Garcia. Australia’s AUKUS partnership reinforced the thinking in Canberra that the US military presence in the Indian Ocean, supported by the Diego Garcia military base, is vitally important.121 However, it is increasingly accepted as a mainstream opinion among the UN community that the detachment of the Chagos from Mauritius and the forced expulsion of Chagossians from their motherlands mean that the US and UK Governments is in blatant breach of international rules, norms, and values. The task that Gough Whitlam encountered about half a century ago— to balance Australia’s roles as “an ally and associate of the most powerful and affluent countries in the world” and “neighbour of the most turbulent and deprived”—remains relevant.122 As a middle power, Australia is still required to maintain a balance between fulfilling its alliance obligations and retaining the image as a good global citizen. Acknowledgement This chapter is derived in part from an article published in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (2013) copyright © Taylor & Francis, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com; DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2013.868219, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com.

164  Stuck between two worlds Notes 1 Existing literature on Diego Garcia tells stories mainly from the perspective the United States, covering aspects such as America’s policy in the Indian Ocean and the collaboration between the US and UK Governments, see for instance, Monoranjan Bezboruah, US Strategy in the Indian Ocean (New York: Praeger, 1977); Gary Sick: “The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions,” in The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Praeger, 1983), 49–80; Peter H. Sand, United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial Base (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). The human rights and sovereignty aspects of the creation of a new colony, BIOT, and the expulsion of its inhabitants to make way for a US base also receive some scholarly attention, see David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the US Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); “Diego Garcia: The Other Guantánamo,” 4 April 2008. http://www.antiwar.com/orig/vine.php?articleid=12628, accessed 29 September 2009; and Vytautas B. Bandjunis, Diego Garcia: Creation of the Indian Ocean Base (San Jose, CA: Writers’ Showcase, 2001). Although there is some limited work focussing on the international diplomacy around Diego Garcia, the role of Australia has not been adequately explained, let alone an archival-based work on Whitlam Government’s policy towards the Diego Garcia militarisation, see, for example, K. S. Jawatkar, Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy (London: Sangam, 1982). 2 Hedley Bull, “Britain and Australia in Foreign Policy,” in Australians & British: Social and Political Connections, ed. J.D.B. Miller (North Ryde: Methuen Australia, 1987),110. 3 Gordon Greenwood, “Australia’s Triangular Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 4 (July 1957): 689–704; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed). 4 Although the Whitlam Government took a prominent role in human rights and decolonisation in the UN, the human rights, humanitarian and moral issues arising out of the expulsion of inhabitants from Chagos did not become a challenge for the Labor Government. The deportation of the local inhabitants, which was completed in May 1973, had been going on a semi-secret way. The US Navy had been insisting that the islands were “uninhabitable” and the population on them was “negligible.” It was not until September 1975 that David Ottaway, a reporter of Washington Post, broke the story, see David Vine, Island of Shame, 102–25. 5 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago (n. 1) paras. 27–8; Gabor Papp, “Highlighting the Significance of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean Region,” Published by Foreign Affairs Bulletin by IDSA on December 7, 2020, http://idsa.hu/2020/12/07/highlighting-the-significance-of-diego-garciain-the-indian-ocean-region/, accessed 12 December 2021; “Indian Ocean Naval Base Diego Garcia – Launchpad To Attack Iran,” 7 January 2020, https://great gameindia.com/indian-ocean-naval-base-diego-garcia-launchpad-to-attackiran/, accessed 13 December 2021. 6 K. S. Jawatkar, Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy, 31; David Vine: “Diego Garcia: The Other Guantánamo.” 7 Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocea, 14 March 1974, Hearings before the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, 91. 8 Andrew S. Erickson, Walter Dc. Ladwig III, and Justin D. Mikolay, “Diego Garcia and the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy,” Asian Security 6, no. 3 (2010): 221.

Stuck between two worlds  165 9 Rubinstein, eds., The Great Game, 50–6. 10 In April 1963, the US Government approached the British authority, who responded affirmatively to the American proposal for exploratory discussion in July, see FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XIX, 565, 623–4. 11 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XIX, 653–4, footnote 1; for how the US “Strategic Island Concept” and its correlation with Diego Garcia, see David Vine, Island of Shame, 56–71. Later, when the United Kingdom Government found the cost of detaching Diego Garcia from Mauritius much more than expected, the United States agreed in June 1965 to contribute one-half of the British costs of detaching certain islands in the Indian Ocean from their present administering authorities, see FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 97. 12 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 87–8. 13 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 105–7. 14 Aide Memoire, A1209, 1963/6829 PART 1, The National Archives of Australia (NAA). 15 “The use of Diego Garcia for rendition, 19 June 2014,” https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmfaff/377/37704.htm, accessed 16 December 2021. 16 Attachment to Doc. 66, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 17 “The Meaning of Diego Garcia,” Wall Street Journal, 4 August 1975, 8. 18 Doc. 72, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 19 Ibid. 20 Doc. 78, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 21 Doc. 80, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 22 Doc. 86, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 23 Doc. 90, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 24 During a conversation with Gough Whitlam in January 1975, Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, accused the British Government of practically “giving” the Island of Diego Garcia to the United States, see John Armstrong to Harold Wilson, 20 January 1975, PREM 16/301, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 25 House of Commons Debate, 9 March 1966, vol.725, c.2362; House of Commons Debate, 14 March 1967, vol.743, c.314; House of Lords Debate, 24 February 1971, vol.315, cc.1062–157, Hansard 1803–2005. 26 London to Canberra, I. 33041, 26 March 1971, A1209/80, 1963/6829 PART 3, NAA. 27 Aide-Memoire by British High Commission in Canberra, 22 February 1971, A1209/80, 1963/6829 PART 3, NAA. 28 Parliamentary Questions No. 1166, A1209/80, 1963/6829 PART 3, NAA. 29 B. Vivekanandan, The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974 (Bombay: Somaiya, 1983), 147. 30 Resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, http://www.un.org/Depts/ dhl/resguide/r26.htm, accessed 19 January 2013. 31 The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of the following States: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, see Resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972; 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r26.htm, accessed 19 January 2013. 32 Cabinet Conclusion, CAB 128/55/17, CC (74) 42, 31 October 1974, NAUK. 33 “US expansion of Diego Garcia and Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,” FCO 24/2072, NAUK. 34 “Support for US base,” The Canberra Times, newspaper cutting from A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA.

166  Stuck between two worlds 35 Cabinet Conclusion, CAB 128/55/17, 31 October 1974, NAUK. 36 Cabinet Conclusion, CAB 128/55/22, CC (74) 47, 20 November 1974, NAUK; Cabinet Memorandum, CAB 129/181/21, C (75) 21, NAUK. 37 FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East, 1969–72, 127, 129. 38 For general background of UKUSA, see Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries: The United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Boston; Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 159, 194, 202–6. For technical analysis of Diego Garcia’s functions and capabilities, see Lenny Siege, “Diego Garcia,” Pacific Research, vol. VII (March/April 1977), 1–12. 39 See a joint study report by the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs in December 1971, “The Significance of the Indian Ocean to Australia,” December 1971, A1209/80, 1963/6829 PART 3, NAA. 40 For the voting record of Resolution A/RES/2832(XXVI) of 16 December 1971, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/Doc.s/voting.asp, accessed 19 January 2013. 41 Robert Trumbull, “2 Island Dependencies Seeking More Home Rule After Australia Moves to Effect Administrative Changes,” New York Times, 14 September 1972. 42 For the voting record of Resolution A/RES/2992(XXVII) of 15 December 1972, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp, accessed 19 January 2013. 43 “The Expansion of Military Facilities at Diego Garcia,” 19 February 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 44 Senate Question, Question no. 11, 21 March 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 45 Whitlam’s speech in Singapore Press Club, 8 February 1974, Whitlam Institute E-Collection (WIE), accessed 16 September 2009. 46 “Possible Parliamentary Question: Diego Garcia,” 14 March 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 47 This conclusion was supported by an intelligence report by the Australian Defence Department, see “The Expansion of Military Facilities at Diego Garcia,” by Director of Joint Intelligent Organisation, 19 February 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 48 “Australian/Indian Official Talks: Indian Ocean,” A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 49 Newspaper cutting from A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA and A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 50 Whitlam’s speech on Fraser’s statement on foreign affairs, 1 June 1976, WIE, accessed 16 September 2009. 51 “Diego Garcia – Brief Outline,” A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA; Washington to Canberra, 4 February 1974, I.16961, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 52 “Motion of No Confidence in Government over Foreign Policy,” 12 October 1976, WIE, accessed 16 September 2019. 53 “New trial of strength looms east of Suez,” The Australian, 24 January 1974. 54 Newspaper cutting from A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA; The Age, 4 April 1974. 55 “The Australian Labour Party Government (2),” 5 April 1973, FCO 24/1596, NAUK. 56 Record of conversation with V. P. Suslov and V. N. Smirnov on 2 April 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 57 Record of Conversation between W. C. Harrop and F. J. Blakeney on 1 March 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 58 Cablegram from the Australian High Commission (AHC) in Wellington to the DFA, 26 February 1974, I.28237, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA.

Stuck between two worlds  167 59 Two examples are Jim Cairns’ reported statement that Australia should recognise the Provisional Revolutionary Government in North Vietnam in December 1973 and Senator Brown’s attack on US Ambassador Marshall Green as “the top US hatchet man” in Australia “to protect American financial interests and maintenance of its military installations in this country” in June 1974. Both Cairns and Brown belonged to the radical left wing of the ALP and both of them were highly popular in the 1974 election, see G. W. Hewitt to A. R. Clark, 17 December 1973, FCO 24/1904, NAUK; G. W. Hewitt to A. R. Clark, 28 June 1974, FCO 24/1904, NAUK; In addition to the Diego Garcia issue, the Whitlam Government also faced considerable pressures from the ALP left wing regarding US facilities in Australia, see P. G. de Courcy Ireland to B. L. Barder, 3 October 1974, FCO 24/1926, NAUK. 60 Record of Conversation between Thomas F. Conlon, B. Barder and F. J. Blakeney, P. Fraser on 5 February 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 61 Whitlam’s speech on Australian Foreign Policy, 2 May 1976, WIE, accessed 20 September 2019. 62 Brief for Prime Minister on Indian Ocean, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA; Brief for Admiral Gayler’s Visit, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 63 Lance Barnard to Whitlam, 18 February 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 64 Record of Conversation between E. G. Whitlam and Admiral N. Gaylor, Marshall Green, M. Abramowitz, on 14 March 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 65 Cablegram from Australian Embassy in Washington to the DFA, 28 March 1974, I.44856, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 66 “Diego Garcia – Australian Policy Guidelines,” A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 5A, NAA. 67 “Australian Defence Policy,” FCO 24/1637, NAUK. 68 Doc. 77, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 69 Doc. 73, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 70 Doc. 71, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3. 71 Conversation between Morrice James and Marshall Green on 11 October 1974, FCO 24/1904, NAUK. 72 Newspaper cutting from A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 5A, NAA. 73 See Resolutions 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972; 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, http://www.un.org/Depts/ dhl/resguide/r26.htm, accessed 19 January 2013. 74 “Australian/Indian Official Talks: Indian Ocean,” A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 2, NAA. 75 Resolution 3259 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ resguide/r26.htm, accessed 19 January 2013. 76 ibid. For a brief evaluation of the IOPZ proposals, see Philip Towle, “The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: Blind Alley or Zone of Peace?,” 207–21. 77 “Possible Parliamentary Questions,” 1 April 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 78 “Australian Mission to the United Nations,” Address by the Prime Minister delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, New York on Monday 30 September 1974, WIE, accessed 13 December 2022. 79 C. G. Woodard to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 29 March 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 80 Record of Conversation between J. A. Thomson and G. N. Upton, on 17 May 1974, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 12, NAA. 81 Historical Hansard, House of Representatives, 22 October 1974, 29th Parliament, 1st Session, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1974/19741022_ reps_29_hor91/#subdebate-52-14, accessed 13 December 2022.

168  Stuck between two worlds 82 During a conversation between William Morrison (who succeeded Lance Barnard as the Minister for Defence) and British Secretary of Defence Roy Mason in August 1975, Morrison said he had explained the Australian Government’s views to the US Government and gained the impression that Americans might discuss the possibility of arms limitation in due course and the same might be true of the Russians. In other words, the Australian Government should do nothing but wait for that to happen; see Record of a discussion between the Defence Secretary and W. L. Morrison, the Australian Minister for Defence, 9 August 1975, FCO 24/2072, NAUK. 83 “US expansion of Diego Garcia and Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,” FCO 24/2072, NAUK. 84 Washington to Canberra, 3 April 1974, I. 47593, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 85 From Alan Renouf, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 86 Record of conversation between Gough Whitlam and Morrice James, 22 May 1974, FCO 24/1904, NAUK. 87 “US expansion of Diego Garcia and Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,” FCO 24/2072, NAUK. 88 Summary of a meeting between US President Gerald Ford and Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, 7 May 1975, reproduced in US Declassified Documents Online (USDDO), CK3100515532. 89 Record of Conversation between Per Anger, and Australian Foreign Secretary, on 3 April 1974, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA; Draft Telegram: Addressed New Delhi, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA; “Diego Garcia: Soviet Indian Ocean Deployments/Capabilities,” A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 90 See Article 111 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius: http://www. gov.mu/portal/sites/HRC/downloads/the%20constitution.pdf, accessed 29 January 2013. For a discussion on Mauritian sovereignty over the archipelago, see Chellapermal, “The Problem of Mauritius Sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago,” in The Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, Western Australia, 1984, Section D, International Relations, organised through the collaboration of Murdoch University, University of Western Australia [and] Western Australian Institute of Technology, Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia, 1984. 91 See a report submitted by H. W. Bullock, who visited Mauritius in April 1970—“Visit to Mauritius”, undated, A1838, 146/10/6 Part 1, NAA; and “Possible Parliamentary Question—Mauritius,” A1838, 146/10/1 Part 1, NAA. 92 For an explanation of the potential influence that Australia might have over the policies of Mauritius, see Bullock’s report. 93 New York to Canberra, 23 April 1974, I.44977, A1838, 67/1/3 PART 11, NAA. 94 Canberra to Cairo, 28 March 1974, O.037716, A1838, 697/8/1/1 PART 3, NAA. 95 Canberra to Singapore, 4 December 1974, O.CH145954, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 27, NAA. 96 Canberra to Singapore, 4 December 1974, O.CH145755, A1838/369, 696/1/9 PART 27, NAA. 97 “Mr Fraser on Mr Whitlam's Hard Mattress,” The Times, 19 February 1976. For an analysis of Indian Ocean issues under the Fraser Government, see Albinski, “Australia and the Indian Ocean,” in The Indian Ocean in Focus: International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, Western Australia, 1979, Proceedings Section IV, International Politics, organised through the collaboration of Murdoch University, University of Western Australia [and] Western Australian Institute of Technology, 1–20. Nedlands: University of Western Australia, 1979.

Stuck between two worlds  169 98 Malcolm Fraser and Margaret Simons, Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs. (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2010), chap. 9, Kindle. 99 Harry Gordon, “Australia's Foreign Policy Readjustments,” New York Times, 21 December 1975. 100 Doc. 99, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Chapter 3; This draft resolution was formally approved by the UNGA in December 1976, see Resolution A/RES/31/88 of 14 December 1976, http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r26.htm, accessed 20 January 2013. 101 Press Release “Foreign Policy” 11 February 1976, WIE, accessed 3 February 2023. 102 Ibid. 103 G. R. Berridge, Alan James, Sir Brian Barder, eds. A Dictionary of Diplomacy (New York, N Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 2nd ed.), 70. 104 Ang Guan Teo and Kei Koga, “Conceptualizing Equidistant Diplomacy in International Relations: The Case of Singapore,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no. 3 (2021): 378–9, 385. 105 “The use of Diego Garcia for rendition, 19 June 2014,” https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmfaff/377/37704.htm, accessed 16 December 2021. 106 Gabor Papp, “Highlighting the Significance of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean Region,” http://idsa.hu/2020/12/07/highlighting-the-significance-of-diegogarcia-in-the-indian-ocean-region/, accessed 16 December 2021; Lauren Coontz, “Diego Garcia: A Small Island with Big Military Value, 29 September 2021,” https://coffeeordie.com/diego-garcia-military-island/, accessed 16 December 2021; Tom Porter, “See inside Diego Garcia, a secretive US Navy base on British land at the center of a bitter tug-of-war in the Indian Ocean,” 2 September 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/photos-diego-garcia-air-base-indianocean-2019-8, accessed 16 December 2021. 107 “Indian Ocean Naval Base Diego Garcia – Launchpad To Attack Iran,” 7 January 2020, https://greatgameindia.com/indian-ocean-naval-base-diego-garcialaunchpad-to-attack-iran/, accessed 16 December 2021. 108 Peter Harris, “Decolonising the special relationship: Diego Garcia, the Chagossians, and Anglo-American relations,” Review of International Studies 39 (2013): 712; “Chagos Islands dispute: Mauritius calls US and UK ‘hypocrites’, 19 October 2020,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54598084, accessed 15 December 2021; “Why Diego Garcia Is America's Most Controversial Military Base?” 1 February 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ayTi_M_a7mM, accessed 14 December 2021. 109 “Expulsion of the Chagossians,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expulsion_of_ the_Chagossians#cite_note-8, accessed 15 December 2021. 110 “In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration Before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Between the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Award,” 18 March 2015, available at: https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf, accessed 14 January 2022. 111 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, para. 50. 112 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, paras. 113–131. 113 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, para. 129. 114 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago paras. 38–39, 45, 47, 49–50. 115 United Nations General Assembly, “A/71/PV.88,” https://documents-dds-ny. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/180/72/PDF/N1718072.pdf ?OpenEle ment, accessed 5 December 2021.

170  Stuck between two worlds 116 “Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,” https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169, accessed 5 December 2021. 117 “British Indian Ocean Territory,” Statement made by Sir Alan Duncan on 30 April 2019, Statement UIN HCWS1528, https://questions-statements. parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2019-04-30/HCWS1528, accessed 15 December 2021. 118 “General Assembly Welcomes International Court of Justice Opinion on Chagos Archipelago, Adopts Text Calling for Mauritius’ Complete Decolonization, 22 May 2019,” https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm, accessed 5 December 2021. 119 Samuel Matthews Bashfield, “Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago? Strategic implications for Diego Garcia from a UK–US perspective,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 16, no. 2 (2020): 166–81. 120 “Request by the United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the ‘Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965’ – Written Statement of the United States of America,” March 1, 2018, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/169/16920180301-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf, accessed 14 January 2022. 121 David Brewster, “Australia’s stance on Diego Garcia dispute is increasingly untenable,” Published 11 Dec 2019 13:00, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/australias-stance-diego-garcia-dispute-increasingly-untenable, accessed on 12 December 2021. 122 Booklet “Australia: Base or Bridge”—Evatt Memorial Lecture 1966 by E.G. Whitlam, 16 September 1966, WIE, accessed 13 March 2022.

Bibliography Albinski, Henry S. “Australia and the Indian Ocean.” In The Indian Ocean in Focus: International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, Western Australia, 1979, Proceedings Section IV, International Politics, organised through the collaboration of Murdoch University, University of Western Australia [and] Western Australian Institute of Technology, 1–20. Nedlands: University of Western Australia, 1979. ———. “Australia, New Zealand and Indian Ocean Security.” In The Indian Ocean; Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, edited by William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood, 356–77. Durham: Duke University Press, 1985. Bandjunis, Vytautas B. Diego Garcia: Creation of the Indian Ocean Base. San Jose, CA: Writers’ Showcase, 2001. Barclay, Glen. Friends in High Places: Australian–American Diplomatic Relations Since 1945. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985. Bashfield, Samuel Matthews. “Mauritian Sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago? Strategic Implications for Diego Garcia from a UK–US Perspective.” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 16, no. 2 (2020): 166–181. Bell, Coral. Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Department of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed. Berridge, G. R., Alan James, Sir Brian Barder, eds. A Dictionary of Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 2nd ed. Bezboruah, Monoranjan. US Strategy in the Indian Ocean. New York: Praeger, 1977. Braun, Dieter. The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Peace Zone? Translated from the German by Carol Geldart and Kathleen Llanwarne, London: C. Hurst, 1983.

Stuck between two worlds  171 Bull, Hedley. “Britain and Australia in Foreign Policy.” In Australians & British: Social and Political Connections, edited by J. D. B. Miller, 103–27. North Ryde: Methuen Australia, 1987. Chellapermal, A. “The Problem of Mauritius Sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and the Militarisation of the Indian Ocean.” In The Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies, Perth, Western Australia, 1984, Section D, International Relations, organised through the collaboration of Murdoch University, University of Western Australia [and] Western Australian Institute of Technology, Nedlands: University of Western Australia, 1984. Fraser, Malcolm and Margaret Simons. Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2010. Greenwood, Gordon. “Australia’s Triangular Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 4 (July 1957): 689–704. Harris, Peter. “Decolonising the Special Relationship: Diego Garcia, the Chagossians, and Anglo-American Relations.” Review of International Studies 39 (2013): 707–27. Jawatkar, K. S. Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy. London: Sangam, 1982. Kay, D. “The United Nations and Decolonization.” In The United Nations: Past, Present and Future, edited by James Barros, 143–70. New York: Free Press, 1972. Kumar, Kamal. Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing, 2000. Richelson, Jeffrey T., and Desmond Ball. The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries: The United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Boston; Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Sand, Peter H. United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial Base. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Sick, Gary. “The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions.” In The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 49–80. New York: Praeger, 1983. Siege, Lenny. “Diego Garcia.” Pacific Research VII (March/April 1977): 1–12. Teo, Ang Guan and Kei Koga. “Conceptualizing Equidistant Diplomacy in International Relations: The Case of Singapore.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no. 3 (2021): 375–409. Towle, Philip. “The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: Blind Alley or Zone of Peace?” In The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, edited by Larry W. Bowman and Ian Clark, 207–21. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. United Kingdom. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 725, 743; House of Lords Debate, Vol. 315. Available at: http://hansard.millbank systems.com/, accessed 11 April 2010. United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963, Vol. XIX, South Asia. Washington, DC: GPO, 1996. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, Near East Region; Arab Peninsula. Washington, DC: GPO, 2000. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970. Washington, DC: GPO, 2008. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976. Washington, DC: GPO, 2007.

172  Stuck between two worlds Vine, David. “Diego Garcia: The Other Guantánamo,” 4 April 2008. Available at: http://www.antiwar.com/orig/vine.php?articleid=12628, accessed 29 September 2009. ———. Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Vivekanandan, B. The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in British Foreign Policy, 1945–1974. Bombay: Somaiya, 1983.

6 The triumph of realism

The Whitlam Government is largely remembered in history as a radical government that remade Australia’s foreign policy within a short span of time. Within a week of his election as Prime Minister in 1972, Gough Whitlam steered his Labor Government through a number of major foreign policy moves. These changes reversed Australia’s stance on several key issues, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and East Germany. In the United Nations (UN), the Australian representative voted for two resolutions calling for strong action against Rhodesia, on which the McMahon Government had previously abstained during voting.1 The Australian delegate also voted for a Sri Lankan resolution on establishing the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and joined the Ad Hoc Study Group considering its implementation.2 For the first time in the country’s history, Australia voted with Third World countries in the UN against its traditional allies—Britain and the United States. There is no doubt that these developments gave the impression that Australian foreign policy was undergoing a profound change. However, Whitlam's dealings with Suharto—as well as his involvement in the events which led to Indonesia’s forced annexation of East Timor—remains a paradoxical contrast to the other reformist policies of his government. Consequently, the assessments of Whitlam’s style and the evaluations of his foreign policy achievements have varied as widely as the values and preferences of his judges. Debate on Whitlam’s foreign policy legacy centres around the nature of the ideologies animating his management of Australia’s foreign affairs. Observers have emphasised different facets of Whitlam’s foreign policy since the 1970s. In December 1972, the New York Times reporter Robert Trumbull described him as a leader bringing “a fresh breeze of nationalism” sweeping across “this normally placid country.”3 But for Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, Whitlam is primarily an internationalist eager to embrace an ethos of international engagement.4 For historian James Curran, Whitlam’s worldview is a combination of “hard-headed realism” with “liberal internationalism.”5 The debate climaxed in a post-mortem of Whitlam’s political legacy triggered by his death in October 2014. From this lively discourse through DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-7

174  The triumph of realism the decades, it appears that perceptions of his legacy are becoming more divided even as historical facts about the Whitlam Government are becoming clearer.6 To a certain extent, scholars’ efforts to pin down the nature of Whitlam’s foreign policy is akin to the group of blind men attempting to conceptualise an elephant—with various “-ism’s” representing the different conclusions each blind man draws after they have touched just one part of the whole. The three ideologies most widely cited by scholars as the basis of Whitlam’s foreign policy are nationalism, internationalism and realism. Yet Whitlam had demonstrably adopted a multifaceted approach to conducting Australia’s foreign affairs. Labelling him with one particular type of “-ism” runs the risk of reducing a dynamic and complicated figure into an oversimplified picture. Even so, if a certain amount of truth can be identified in each of these three ideologies, which among them constitutes the most dominant factor in determining Whitlam’s foreign policy behaviour? This book leans towards a “realist” explanation of the Whitlam Labor government’s foreign policy. Although facets of Whitlam’s foreign policy approach suggested internationalism and nationalism, the bulk of his foreign policies prove to adhere most closely to traditional realist theory. “New nationalism” and “new internationalism” Questions about the guiding principles used by the Whitlam Government to manage Australia’s foreign affairs are not just born of hindsight. Indeed, they were uppermost in the minds of some prominent contemporaries. T. B. Millar was among those who analysed Whitlam’s impact on foreign policy in the 1970s. For Millar, the distinctive character of his government’s package of foreign and economic policies is “a heightened sense both of nationalism and of internationalism”—and the “inevitable tension between the two.”7 These two terms—nationalism and internationalism—sound vague at the outset, yet they have become the two most trodden paths as other scholars search for the philosophy defining the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy approach. Internationalism

There is a critical dimension to the internationalism in Whitlam’s foreign policy. Profound changes in the global geopolitical context both before and after his election prompted a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives. This was most true in Whitlam’s attitude towards China. J. D. B. Miller and Coral Bell highlight Whitlam’s ice-breaking trip to China when he was the Opposition Leader in July 1971. Severely attacked by the McMahon Government at the time, Whitlam bucked the prevailing assumption that Australia must always take the same side as the United States. Whitlam’s China visit, however, was soon followed by the news that Henry Kissinger, the White House’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, had already been to Beijing, and that the

The triumph of realism  175 American President himself, Richard Nixon, would visit China before May 1972. The scorn McMahon and his ministers heaped on Whitlam backfired because they could not apply these same words to Nixon. The huge political risk Whitlam took by going to China transformed into substantial political capital.8 Another major argument supporting Whitlam’s internationalism refers to the changes taking place in the international scene, and the response of the great powers (the USA, the UK and the Soviet Union) to these changes. These reactions had a considerable impact on how Australian foreign policymakers viewed their country’s place in the world. As Neville Meaney observes, they catalysed a bipartisan realisation that Australia was “entering a new era.” Riding this new environment, the Whitlam Government’s enthusiasm for reform was a creative, imaginative and “excessive” response to the “opportunities which the new international situation offered.”9 Whitlam’s reform-minded foreign policy was heavily influenced by Nixon’s policy of détente, which had ushered in an era of relaxed tensions between the USA and the two leading communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. Through the lens of détente, Whitlam perceived the world as a more stable and less dangerous place than his predecessors. He believed he was not subject to the same rigid constraints of security. Instead, Meaney argues, Whitlam was able to rethink and define Australia’s position in the world, to experiment with notions of regional cooperation and order which would minimise the intervention of the super-powers and to engage in a many-sided diplomacy across a much wider sphere than any Liberal leader had thought proper or appropriate for an Australian government.10 One outcome of this approach was that the new Labor Government discarded the Cold War ideological blinkers which had restricted previous governments. In July 1973, Whitlam told an American audience that Australia’s regional engagement strategy was ready “for an ideological holiday.”11 In addition, the Whitlam years witnessed Australia’s growing engagement with international treaties and the nation’s increasing acquaintance with international laws. Michael Kirby observed Whitlam’s inheritance as an inheritance from his father, H. F. E. Whitlam, a pioneer of international human rights law in Australia who had a great influence on his son’s outlook on international affairs.12 Nationalism

Nationalism is another important lens to understand the Whitlam Government’s policy motivations. Neville Meaney suggests that after the idea of “British-ness” collapsed as a defining pillar of the Australian national identity in the 1970s, nationalism as a radical national myth emerged to fill the void. The movement turned out to be short-lived, as “the new Australian symbols of nationhood have not attracted fervour comparable to that invested in their

176  The triumph of realism British predecessors.”13 And yet, despite its ephemerality, this brief nationalist enthusiasm proved capable enough to bring Whitlam into power. As Geoffrey Bolton observed, the Whitlam Government was “a shining aberration” in the history of Australian nationalism.14 Not all scholars buy into Whitlam as a deviation from the orthodoxy of Australian nationalism. For Stephen Alomes, the Whitlam Government belongs to a period of Australian history characterised by both reform and reaction. He argues the Whitlam Government took advantage of openings offered by the decline of Britain and the retreat of America from Vietnam to cast himself as a symbol of change.15 In foreign policy, this radical image presented by Whitlam contrasted greatly with a more conservative and traditional reality. Alomes contends that the character of Australian nationalism was influenced by rising international forces and contemporary contexts. In particular, the development of Australian nationalism in the late twentieth century was closely tied to internationalism. The interplay between the two became the motivation for the Whitlam Government’s reforms in social and economic policy.16 Thus, Alomes returns to the significance of both internationalism and nationalism in understanding Australian foreign policy during the late twentieth century. Given his primary focus on covering a century of change, Alomes gives only sketchy treatment to the ambivalence of the Whitlam reform experiment. In this regard, James Curran contributed a more comprehensive analysis of Whitlam’s nationalism by examining how Australian Prime Ministers after the Second World War attempted to shape the national identity in their speeches. According to Curran, Whitlam had a continuing faith in the necessity of shaping Australia’s identity, but carried a cautious attitude towards adopting the more aggressive elements of nationalism. Whitlam tried to steer Australia away from the White Australia Policy under the auspices of a “new nationalism” defined by inclusion rather than exclusion.17 Curran further explores this theme in The Unknown Nation (2010), where he and co-author Stuart Ward argue that the sudden rupture of Australia’s imperial ties to Britain in the 1960s and 1970s reduced the country to the status of an “unknown nation.” The familiar British ideas, habits and symbols that Australians grew accustomed to had become obsolete, forcing the nation's politicians, policymakers and intellectuals to confront the task of remodelling a new national image for Australia. Whitlam, through his rhetorical and foreign policy practices, became “the embodiment of some form of national political and intellectual renewal, throwing off the remnants of the imperial legacy and fulfilling Australia's own national destiny.”18 Idealism

Both the internationalism and nationalism dimensions of foreign policy fall under a broader approach to the study of international relations—commonly termed idealism. As noted by the British political scientist and historian

The triumph of realism  177 E. H. Carr, both internationalism and nationalism are special expressions of a doctrine known as the harmony of interests, which declared that “in pursuing his own interests, the individual pursues that of the community, and in promoting the interests of the community he promotes his own”; while nations, “by developing their own nationalism, promoted the cause of internationalism.”19 According to Hedley Bull, the belief at the core of idealism was that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of “the international mind”, the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teaching, it was in fact being transformed.20 The responsibility of idealists, then, was to assist the “march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way.”21 In the internationalism approach, the roles played by international laws and international organisations are underscored in the analysis of Whitlam’s conception of policy formation. In addition, Whitlam’s preference for idealist principles could also be seen in his denunciation of the South African Government’s racial policies and his passion for building a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Among the scholars arguing forcefully for Whitlam to be viewed as an idealist is Rawdon Dalrymple. He points to the period from the late 1940s to 1983, when Australian foreign policy was split starkly along partisan lines. Differences between the conservative Coalition and the Labor side corresponded roughly to the differences between “realism” and “idealism” in international relations theory. Australian conservatives understood international relations as a matter of interests and power. Australia had only a small population and little direct power, and therefore it needed to attach itself to “great and powerful friends.” This diplomatic approach accords generally with the “classical” realism enunciated by E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and others.22 Meanwhile, key figures in the Labor Party believed that Australia’s foreign policy should be rooted in moral and legal idealism, the ethos of the UN and the aspirations of countries that emerged after the Second World War. The debates between Menzies and Evatt over foreign policy in the late 1940s, as well as the disagreement between Menzies and Arthur Calwell over Australian policy on Vietnam, split along these lines. According to Dalrymple, when Whitlam won the election in 1972, his divergence from Fraser’s approach to foreign policy further fuelled the gap between idealist and realist approaches to international relations. Whitlam’s idealism could be seen in his opposition to the United States’ engagement in Vietnam, his insistence on Australian independence in the world, his attachment to the UN’s approach of finding a peaceful resolution to conflict, and his commitment to global détente.23

178  The triumph of realism Analysing the dynamics from a different angle, David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith contrast the “successful foreign policy” of the Liberal-National governments with what they describe as a quarter-century of “illthought-out and ultimately unsuccessful” foreign policymaking between 1972 and 1996. Jones and Smith designate the Whitlam Government as the inaugurator of a revisionist foreign policy characterised by “insensitivity and naivety.” By contrast, they argue that Menzies and his successors, realists who believed in balance of power politics, had operated a coherent and largely successful foreign policy. For Jones and Smith, the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy was a reaction against the realistic approach espoused by Menzies and his successors.24 In this sense, the “Whitlamite revisionism,” as coined by Jones and Smith, is actually a synonym for the “idealism” used by Dalrymple. Realism as an underpinning of Whitlam’s foreign policy Whitlam, for his part, viewed himself as “idealistic, yet realistic.”25 James Curran believed that during the Cold War, Whitlam’s worldview was first and foremost expressed in terms of a progressive realism. “It was ‘progressive’,” Curran explained, because “it rejected the strategies of containment, forward defence and ideological confrontation, and repudiated the view that power was the decisive factor in international relations.” 26 However, the progressive realism of Whitlam foreign policy thinking was more realistic than progressive. Whitlam had spent a long time formulating his views during the opposition’s protracted period in power, when he was not burdened by the practicalities and difficult decision-making of holding office. His principled realism manifested in political speeches delivered during his extended sojourn in the political wilderness prior to the ALP winning office on 2 December 1972. It is evident from those speeches that Whitlam’s foreign policy is first and foremost based on a realistic understanding of Australia’s status as a middle power. He said in 1963: Australia is a remote country and a middle power. It is not within her province or her means to approach or settle the great issues single-handed. She should offer and try to take her share of world responsibilities. For the time being she cannot forgo alliances. Many Australians believe that Australia could and should pursue an unaligned policy. Many other Australians have advocated preventive wars. It would be surprising if there were no isolationists and interventionist on our political parties—because the absence of them would indicate an unwholesome conformity—but it is significant that their views have not prevailed within their parties.27 These words echo the views of other well-known realist commentators such as Walter Lippmann, who warned that government should not allow its commitments to exceed its capabilities.28

The triumph of realism  179 What, then, were reasonable foreign policy objectives for Australia to pursue? When Whitlam was sworn in as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in December 1972, he announced that his intent was to steer the commonwealth towards a more independent Australian stance in international affairs, an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of racialism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, cooperative and well-regarded nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large.29 Whitlam’s preoccupation with international esteem grew out of his rejection of the tendency by some conservative politicians to treat Australia as an “insignificant” satellite of the United States. Whitlam understood that it was unrealistic and unwise for a middle power like Australia to pursue dominant military power as an overarching goal in its foreign affairs, yet that concession did not mean that Australia should concede to having its voice ignored on the international stage. Whitlam once vehemently denounced Nigel Bowen, Foreign Minister of the McMahon Government, for labelling Australia a “small and relatively insignificant” country.30 Whitlam said: Far from being an insignificant country, Australia, in Labor’s eyes, had genuine power and genuine influence—power based on our resources and interests, power to influence events in our own region and beyond. In no way was Australia ever insignificant… We recognised that Australia had strengths as well as limitations. We were a major power in our own region, a middle power in the world. Our location, our national resources, our history and our level of political, social and economic development gave us a unique opportunity to understand the issues dividing the world. We had the capacity to act independently, although it had been sadly neglected. We had the capacity to earn the respect of all countries in the world, although it had been grievously jeopardised.31 To fully realise Australia’s potential strength and compensate for its limitations, Whitlam early on developed a realist view of differentiating between issues close to home and those relating to distant geographies. He opted for preaching internationalism on the world stage as a principle, but practised realism at home when it mattered. The best example of this approach to conducting Australia’s regional affairs is in his policy towards Indonesia. While it was widely known that Suharto and Indonesia's military initiated the massacre of Indonesian communists and leftists in the aftermath of their 1965 coup attempt, Whitlam nevertheless welcomed Suharto’s New Order, citing the significant savings in defence expenditure compared with having a communist nation as a neighbour.32 Prior to his election in 1972 prior, he spoke glowingly of Suharto’s virtues and achievements in “consolidating” matters in Indonesia.33 Whitlam, of course, was fully aware that Suharto had achieved this in part

180  The triumph of realism by superintending the massacre of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Indonesian: Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and imprisoning his opponents without trial. Throughout Whitlam’s years in power, this discrepancy between his internationalistic rhetorical gesture on the world stage and his more practical, politically-driven actions in Australia’s home region would become a recurring feature of his government’s foreign policy. Whitlam’s involvement and support for international organisations

The Whitlam Government’s commitment to supporting UN treaties and resolutions and its desire to build stronger ties with Third World countries were not solely motivated by idealist considerations, as some scholars have claimed. On the contrary, they reflected Whitlam’s genuine perceptions about what was in Australia’s national interest. Drawing lessons from America’s experience in Vietnam, he formulated a view that a nation’s foreign policy should always tread a balance between its commitments and power. In February 1972, he elaborated what he saw as Australia’s major foreign policy commitments. The most fundamental commitment was to the nation’s own security. Other major commitments included managing a secure, stable and friendly Papua New Guinea; achieving a close and cooperative relationship with Indonesia—Australia’s largest and nearest neighbour; maintaining peace and prosperity in the region; and finally safeguarding Australia’s global reputation.34 Crucially, Whitlam did not mention promoting the values espoused by international organisations such as the United Nations as within Australia’s core interests. His respect for the UN and his inclination towards fostering connections with Third World countries sprang more from his interpretations of Australia’s national interests and limited resources than any “international complex.” T. B. Millar noted that they reflected Whitlam’s view that Australia was at most only a “middle power” on the world stage, with an economy that was heavily reliant on exports. Furthermore, Australia had limited political and military influence, a modest amount of aid to offer, and far less international clout than its leaders often assumed.35 As a result, Whitlam’s Labor Government adopted an archetypal “middle power” strategy that sought to obviate the lack of decisive military power through active involvement and support for international institutions and regimes.36 To recognise the reality of international politics head-on

Whitlam’s realism also shines through in the fact that his policies on many key issues were rarely subject to ideological constraints. Nowhere was this tendency more apparent than in his attitude towards China. In the 1950s, as the Australian Government followed America’s containment policy towards Communist China, Whitlam became the first Member of Parliament to urge recognition of the Chinese Communist Government in Beijing. In August 1954, he stated in Parliament that the Australian Government’s policy of not recognising the Chinese Communist Government was “unrealistic” and “menacing”

The triumph of realism  181 because he believed the Nationalist Government installed in Taiwan had no chance of ever again becoming the government of China “unless it is enabled to do so as a result of a third world war.” Therefore, he insisted, the Australian Government “should have recognised the Communist Government in China, in view of the fact that all our neighbours, including the colonial powers, Great Britain and the Netherlands, have recognised it.”37 At the time, the dominant US view was deeply rooted in Cold War ideology, viewing the Communist regime in Beijing as only a fleeting chapter in Chinese history and asserting that the Nationalist Government, with the support of Western countries, would eventually return to the mainland. Whitlam discarded this theory as an unrealistic myth. Similarly, decades later in August 1974, his sudden decision to accord de jure recognition to the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union—at a time when most nations granted de facto— came out of his recognition that the situation’s realities—i.e., the Soviet Union’s control over the States—was unalterable.38 To cast principles aside should the necessity arise

As leader of the Labor Party and later a Labor-led government, Whitlam often needed to formulate policy in reaction to events and circumstances, not simply based on his idealist philosophies. Therefore, it is appropriate and necessary to determine the nature of Whitlam’s foreign policy on the basis of his experience and, more importantly, his actions. Sometimes Whitlam had to sacrifice principles for pragmatism, or adapt idealist principles to actual situations. For instance, James Curran observes that Whitlam did not embrace “new nationalism” as an all-pervasive political philosophy. Instead, his attitude towards “new nationalism” varied according to the context. His shifts from proactively adopting and affirming the “new nationalism” in Australia to hardly even acknowledging the term abroad reflected his adaptations to a changing audience and the intent of his speeches. On a deeper level, it was because he had an “acute sensitivity to nationalism’s danger,” Curran writes, and “his broader commitment to Australia as a model of international best practice meant it was simply inappropriate and unnecessary to be on the world stage extolling a loud-mouthed, stridently nationalist line.”39 This raises the question of whether “new nationalism” was the overarching ideology driving both Whitlam’s domestic and external policies. In other words: how could an ideology be capacious enough to be promoted at home yet downplayed abroad? In fact, Whitlam regarded “new nationalism” as a means to an end rather than an end itself. For him, internationalism and new nationalism were both important, and each was to be deployed in varying ways depending on the context. There was clearly some political opportunism in Whitlam’s changes of position, and he treated his principles as expendable should the necessity arise. This illustrates both his realistic and pragmatic sides, and perhaps explains his sympathies with Machiavelli, whom Whitlam ranked as “the wisest of Italian statesmen.”40

182  The triumph of realism The pursuit of an independent stance in both the Australian-American and Anglo-Australian alliances

The Machiavellian tactics that Whitlam employed in international diplomacy were also apparent in his dealings with Australia’s traditional allies. In the early 1970s, Whitlam thought that the changes in American foreign policy⁠—the Nixon Doctrine, US–Soviet détente, the Sino-US rapprochement—had presented opportunities for Australia to pursue a more independent stance in its diplomacy. Consequently, the Whitlam Government adopted a critical attitude towards the United States’ role in the conflict in Vietnam and the shape of a new Asia. The most notable example of this occurred in December 1972 as several senior ministers in Whitlam’s government openly criticised Nixon’s decision to launch the “Christmas bombings” in North Vietnam. Among researchers, opinions are split on Whitlam’s handling of Australian’s relationship with the United States. Some scholars are strongly critical of Whitlam’s record in managing the US–Australian relationship. Coral Bell identifies a notable deterioration of the USA–Australia relationship during the Whitlam years.41 James Curran pushes this argument further, claiming that due to Whitlam’s clumsy handling of the US–Australian alliance, “the harmony of aims and interests that characterized the alliance during the Cold War had come to an abrupt and acrimonious end.”42 Curran suggests that Whitlam was to blame for harming a USA–Australia relationship “that had endured the heights of the Cold War” until it had veered “dangerously off course and seemed headed for destruction.”43 Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones share Curran’s view that Whitlam’s US polices represented a failure, but they did not believe that Whitlam’s handling of Australia’s alliance with the United States was driven by the rise of “a new-found nationalism” in the wake of the UK and US withdrawals from Southeast Asia. For Benvenuti and Jones, Whitlam’s foreign policy resulted from “a somewhat idiosyncratic and moralistic reading of the Cold War in the era of détente that reflected his need to ‘appease’ the ALP’s radical Left.” They argue that Whitlam’s quest to dramatically depart from the past led him to convey the wrong message to the United States and its traditional regional allies: that Western power was no longer necessary to maintain peace and stability in the region (Southeast Asia). The real source of tension between Australia and the United States during Whitlam’s time, the two scholars believe, was the Nixon Administration’s frustration over “the Australian government’s radically different assessment of political developments in contemporary Asia and the role that the Western alliance should (or could) play there after Washington’s détente with the Soviet Union and its opening to China.”44 Although Whitlam’s approach towards the United States stood out as an aberration when compared with the Australian Government’s stance both before and after him, it was nevertheless rooted in a realistic understanding of an inherent problem in Australian–US relations: Australia, as the junior partner in an alliance between a greater and a lesser power, often had its special interests

The triumph of realism  183 overlooked when it maintained “a quiet diplomacy” for the sake of the “superficial appearance of partnership.”45 As noted by the American political scientist Robert O. Keohane, “American policymakers are too busy to think up grievances for states that cannot manufacture their own.” Almost all US allies played the role of a “loyal ally” to some extent, “but if the loyal ally appears entirely satisfied,” Keohane contends, “it will be ignored.”46 Not being ignored was undoubtedly one of Whitlam’s objectives. Consequently, Australia under his leadership aimed at becoming, to borrow a metaphor from Keohane, one of the “badges, mice and pigeons” within international politics to lead the elephant of the United States. James Curran acknowledges that “Whitlam succeeded in making the Americans more aware of the needs and interests of its junior partner” and “instituted a greater sense of self-reliance within the alliance.” But he is sceptical about how much Whitlam’s efforts “filtered through the American political system.”47 At the same time, others, like Neville Meaney, hold Whitlam’s approach towards the American alliance in more positive regard. Meaney argues that Whitlam’s assertion of independence from the United States implied “a new maturity” for Australia’s conduct of foreign affairs. For Meaney, Whitlam, by taking a forthright stand, succeed in “focusing American attention on Australia and in causing the Americans to take into account Australia’s own foreign policy.”48 To a certain extent, Whitlam’s approach towards the United States centred around leveraging ANZUS, which, according to T. B. Millar, conferred to Australia the right to consult with the United States government and its strategists at a much higher level and in more favourable circumstances than she would otherwise have, and (limited though it still may be) a greater opportunity to influence American foreign policy than she could otherwise expect.49 The Labor Government’s determination to assert Australian independence from the United States also reflected in its attitude towards Britain. For Whitlam and many Australian Labor supporters, Britain represented the country’s past, not its future, and the essence of their position was to account for the new realities of the present. In May 1973, after his first official visit to the United Kingdom, Whitlam called for a realistic assessment of Australia’s links with Britain, stating that “our relationship with Britain is inevitably changing.” His policy was to “make our relations with Britain an integral and important part of our general international relations and not something apart as they have tended to be in the past.”50 Instead of clinging to the special Anglo-Australian connections, Whitlam started his term by introducing a series of changes to sweep away the “relics of colonialism.” These included limiting the powers of the Governor-General, selecting a new national anthem to replace the song it had previously shared with Britain, designating the Queen’s Style and Titles as “Queen of Australia,”

184  The triumph of realism scrapping the Queen’s approval for diplomatic accreditation, omitting the reference to the Queen from the oath of allegiance for naturalised citizens and abolishing appeals to the Privy Council from Australian courts. Furthermore, Whitlam himself declined to accept the privy councillorship to which all Australian prime ministers were customarily entitled.51 He offered an explanation for these changes: They are solely intended to put our relationship on a more mature and contemporary basis and to reflect the development of a more independent Australian identity in the world. Indeed, what the Australian Government is seeking to achieve in its relations not only with Britain but with a number of other countries—the United States, China, Canada, and our Asian neighbours, for instance—is to give formal recognition to what has already happened, as the necessary foundation for a realistic, more independent, more mature foreign policy.52 Whitlam’s desire to get rid of these politically insignificant—yet psychologically potent—symbols of the residual British connexion was entwined with his determination to assert Australian independence, evidencing the idealist impetus behind his approach. Yet there was also plenty of realism driving him, as Whitlam viewed Britain as “a tempting target on which they can score points at small cost to improve their standing elsewhere.”53 For many years, much of Australia’s foreign policy had been essentially derivative, tied to the attitudes of the country’s great and powerful friends, foremost Britain and subsequently the USA. When Whitlam entered the leadership, he indicated a clear break from this past through the change in his government’s policy towards Britain—a new Australian attitude towards Britain signalled Australia’s coming of age. This shift found other expressions in Whitlam’s foreign policy decisions, as Australia switches its vote in the UN on Rhodesia, and denied the BBC’s request to survey Christmas Island and potentially establishing a broadcast relay station there.54 At the same time, despite the Whitlam Government’s efforts to build an image of Australia as an independent country, capable of making its own judgements in international affairs, the shift in Australia’s approach under the Whitlam Government should not be exaggerated. Since the end of the Second World War, the essence of Australia’s foreign policy had rested on the necessity of cultivating strategic relationships with its “old and powerful allies” —the United Kingdom and the United States—a fact that remained unchanged until the 1970s. Britain’s withdrawal from the east of Suez forced Australia to move its security emphasis to its alliance with the United States, but the requirement of sustaining its traditional link with the United Kingdom remained unquestioned. Therefore, Whitlam must not be understood only by his internationalist and nationalist ideals, but also as a realist through his government’s policy towards Britain. Additionally, given the established historical connections between Australia and Britain, sentiments involving the navigation of

The triumph of realism  185 Anglo-Australian bilateral relations add special significance to the study of the Whitlam Government’s realism in this area. A marked display realism observed during one of Australia’s most unlikely time periods raises important considerations for an overall assessment of the Labor foreign policy in the early 1970s. The triumph of realism over the abstract principle of self-determination

Whitlam’s realistic approach to international affairs can be most clearly observed in his involvement in the decolonisation of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and East Timor. Before coming into office, he regarded the China question and the New Guinea question as two similar issues—both were crucial to Australia's future role in Asia and, in both cases, he believed “Australia’s delay in squarely facing the reality has merely added to our difficulties.”55 In the 1960s, out of “sympathy for colonial independence movements in Asia and Africa,”56 Whitlam advocated for granting independence to PNG as early as possible because he believed that was the only way to curb the dangerous growth of separatism within PNG. But even here, Whitlam’s policy was more focused on Australia’s interests than PNG’s, and he condemned the Coalition Government for carrying “gradualism to the point of imperceptibility.” At his behest, the Coalition government announced in October 1972 that PNG would become self-governing by 1 December 1973.57 PNG gained full independence two years later. Yet when the country continued to experience high levels of ethnic conflict and other post-independence problems in the period following, the Whitlam Government opened itself to criticism for not putting enough effort into preparing PNG’s independence.58 An even more striking example of Whitlam’s realist approach to international affairs can be seen in Australia’s policy towards East Timor. Political tensions in East Timor intensified in the aftermath of the Portuguese revolution of 25 April 1974. In May, following the impending decolonisation of Portugal’s African territories, three influential political associations emerged in East Timor: the Timorese Democratic Union, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), and the Popular Democratic Association of Timor. Indonesia feared that an independent East Timor under a “radical” FRETILIN leadership might become “the Cuba of the South Seas.” Officials in the Whitlam Government generally regarded these fears as unfounded, but they understood that Indonesia’s concerns were deeply held and fundamental to its security policy.59 For Whitlam, Indonesia represented the key to Australia’s future acceptance in the region; he had declared in January 1972 that achieving a close and cooperative relationship with Australia’s largest and most proximate neighbour must remain one of Australia’s top foreign policy priorities.60 When it became clear that Indonesia’s intent was to integrate Timor, Whitlam turned to Richard Woolcott, his ambassador to Indonesia. Woolcott advised Canberra to “disengage ourselves as much as possible” from East Timor and avoid being seen as “the only, or the main, country in the region obstructing what Indonesia and its other neighbours would see as

186  The triumph of realism Indonesia's legitimate national interest.” 61 Ultimately Whitlam’s approach to East Timor went further than that as he issued direct signals to President Suharto around Australia’s “understanding” towards Indonesia's objective of integrating Portuguese Timor.62 In December 1975, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor under the pretext of anti-colonialism and overthrew the FRETILIN-led government. This sparked a violent quarter-century occupation which resulted in thousands of deaths by repression or starvation. On 5 January 1976, a month after the invasion, Richard Woolcott stated in a cable to Canberra: The Government is confronted by a choice between a moral stance, based on condemnation of Indonesia for the invasion of East Timor and on the assertion of the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to the right of self-determination, on the one hand, and a pragmatic and realistic acceptance of the longer-term inevitabilities of the situation on the other hand. It is a choice between what might be described as Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism. The former is more proper and principled but the longer-term national interest may well be served by the latter. We do not think we can have it both ways.63 In fact, the Whitlam Government had already opted for the Kissingerian realism in its approach to the Timor issue in April 1975, when Whitlam indicated to Suharto that his government’s “actions in regard to Portuguese Timor would always be guided by the principle that good relations with Indonesia were of paramount importance to Australia.”64 Since 1975, a great number of scholars have written about Whitlam’s role in the forced integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Though opinions remain divided over the extent to which Whitlam’s decisions were influenced by some of his key advisors, the general consensus is that Australia’s policy towards East Timor was undoubtedly “Whitlam policy.”65 According to James Cotton and others, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Don Willesee, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Alan Renouf and Secretary of the Department of Defence Bill Pritchett resolutely opposed Whitlam and Woolcott’s approach to East Timor. Despite their advocacy for a “moral” line and their support for self-determination, it was Whitlam and Woolcott’s realist perspective that eventually won out.66 Much of the existing literature is critical of Gough Whitlam’s stand on East Timor. Scholars like Michael Salla view Whitlam as the orchestrator behind Australia’s foreign policy, which implemented a policy of acquiescence, if not outright encouragement, with regard to Indonesia’s integration campaign of East Timor.67 James Cotton articulated three fundamental flaws in Whitlam’s approach to East Timor: (1) it underestimated FRETILIN’s survival capacity and its ability to resist the Indonesian invasion; (2) it failed to envision the long-term adverse effects of the Timor annexation on Australia’s relations with

The triumph of realism  187 Indonesia; and (3) it failed to recognise the substantial damage caused by the annexation to the reputation of Indonesia as a regional player and a leader in the non-aligned world.68 A minority of researchers have expressed a more sympathetic reading of Whitlam’s policy in East Timor. Nicholas Klar suggests that much of the criticism levelled towards Whitlam's response to the East Timor crisis comes with the benefit of hindsight. Writing in 1993, he expressed that to more fairly evaluate Whitlam’s stand on the issue, one “must try to do so from the stand point of 1975 not 1993. At that point his response becomes understandable, although not totally justifiable.”69 Angus L. Porter argues that although history has proven that Whitlam underestimated East Timor’s capacity to survival as an independent state, this alone does not discredit his decision-making in the moment. Porter states, “Considering the context of the era and the evidence available at the time, the assessment that East Timor was unlikely to be a viable independent state was, however distasteful today, reasonable.” Furthermore, Whitlam’s decisions may not have been able to sway the eventual outcome anyway. American support for Indonesia was staunch, and, as Porter concludes, “there was no window of opportunity for the Australians to alter the East Timor situation.”70 In the end, Whitlam’s stance on the East Timor issue came out of his concern for Australia’s security and his pursuit for Asian engagement. At the developing situation’s critical juncture, he was forced to make a choice between standing by self-determination or pursuing engagement with Indonesia. While Whitlam was happy to promote self-determination in the case of PNG, he went to great lengths to avoid the perception that he advocated the same principle in East Timor. He understood that espousing self-determination in East Timor might quickly corner him into siding with the territory’s pro-independence forces, which may have drawn Australia into opposing Indonesia’s assertion of its “legitimate” national interest in East Timor. Whitlam had no qualms about sacrificing the principle of self-determination when it pitted against his government’s interests. In any final analysis, Whitlam stands as a polarising and divisive figure. He was not as virtuous as his supporters touted, nor was he as incompetent as his detractors denounced. He was, through his words and deeds, a pragmatic realist. His foreign policy was always rooted in a realistic recognition of Australia’s strengths and limitations as a “middle power.” On the world stage, Whitlam’s support for international organisations such as the UN and his sympathies for Third World countries were never as absolute and unconditional as he presented them to be. They were more indicative of his interpretation of Australia’s national interests, rather than any international complex. Whitlam had a penchant for promoting himself as a liberal statesman with a role to play in global affairs. He was always pleased to press some point of liberal internationalism, whether at the UN and elsewhere, when it had no direct impact on Australia. His decisions on South Africa and Rhodesia were public displays of these principles, just as his demands of the

188  The triumph of realism French at the UN to decolonise New Caledonia was a showy exercise in tilting at windmills. All of these issues were far from Australia’s geography. When hard decisions arose related to Australia’s region, Whitlam was quick to discard liberal principles. Suharto’s New Order engaged in atrocious abuses of human rights, and still Whitlam turned a blind eye to its victims so as to not jeopardise his relationship with Suharto. He demonstrated a similar inconsistency in his regard to the norm of self-determination. When speaking to a global audience about Portugal’s impoverished colony Guinea Bissau, he had passionately advocated for self-determination, and yet on the matter of another Portuguese colony, East Timor, Whitlam recalibrated his position and withheld the same opportunity on the grounds that it was too impoverished to be self-sustaining.71 This inconsistency is not an accidental oversight; it is an essential part of Whitlam’s realism: he promoted certain ideals when the issue either did not matter to Australia or Australia was irrelevant to the outcome, and ignored them when it did matter or risked jeopardising Australia’s security. In short, he endorsed liberalism in abstract rhetoric and realism in concrete reality. This did not necessarily mean that his realism produced an admirable foreign policy. For some, Whitlam’s foreign policy achievements are at best lacklustre. For instance, his grand plan to engage Asia was never wholeheartedly embraced by regional leaders who saw Australia as too open and democratic, with too great an emphasis on human rights—views which they did not share. This raises the question of how adept Whitlam was at reading different cultures. The lasting takeaway should be that, on the matter of understanding the Whitlam Government’s foreign policy record, realism must serve as a touchstone, if not the most enlightening one. Acknowledgement This chapter is derived in part from an article published in Journal of Australian Studies (2022) copyright © 2022 International Australian Studies Association, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com; DOI: 10.1080/ 14443058.2022.2107692, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com on behalf of International Australian Studies Association. Notes 1 “Question of Southern Rhodesia: resolution,” A/RES/34/192, the UN Digital Library, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/635800?ln=en, accessed 5 May 2020. 2 “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: resolution,” A/RES/2992(XXVII), the UN Digital Library, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/652628?ln=en, accessed 5 May 2020. 3 Robert Trumbull, “A Fresh Nationalism Is Sweeping Australia,” New York Times, 31 December 1972.

The triumph of realism  189 4 Michael Kirby, “Whitlam As Internationalist: A Centenary Reflection,” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no. 3 (2016): 850–94. 5 James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon At War (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2015), 8. 6 For a summary of the assessment of Whitlam political legacy in general and scholarly interpretation of his foreign policy achievements in particular, see Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “With Friends Like These: Australia, the United States, and Southeast Asian Détente,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (2019): 27–9. 7 T. B. Millar, “From Whitlam to Fraser,” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (1977): 854–72. 8 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993): 116; J. D. B. Miller, “Australian foreign policy: constraints and opportunities – I,” International Affairs 50, no. 2 (1974): 233. 9 Neville Meaney, “The United States,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, ed. W. J. Hudson (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 163–208. 10 Meaney, “The United States,” 181. 11 Press Release “Prime Minister's Address to the National Press Club, Washington,” 31 July 1973, Whitlam Institute E-Collection (WIE), accessed 17 April 2020. 12 Kirby, “Whitlam As Internationalis,” 852–3. 13 Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian identity: the problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography,” Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (2001): 89. 14 Geoffrey Bolton, “The United Kingdom,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1971– 1975, 220. 15 Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880–1988 (North Ryde: Angus & Robertson, 1988). 16 Ibid., 171–93. 17 James Curran, The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2004), 58–65, 77–101. 18 James Curran and Stuart Ward, The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2010), 59. 19 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946), 41–6, 85–8. 20 Hedley Bull, “The theory of international politics, 1919–1969,” in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969, ed. Brian Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 33–4. 21 Ibid. 22 Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939; Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1978); George Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 23 Rawdon Dalrymple, “Looking for theory in Australian foreign policy,” 28 April 2003, Australian Review of Public Affairs, http://www.australianreview.net/ digest/2003/04/dalrymple.html, accessed 15 April 2020. 24 David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, Reinventing Realism: Australia’s Foreign and Defence Policy at the Millennium (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000). 25 Gough Whitlam, “Australia’s foreign policy: new directions, new definitions,” 30 November 1973, WIE, accessed 17 April 2020. Benvenuti and Jones argue that Menzies’ pragmatic regional policy represents a prudential realism, which helped to establish “the third and most effective tradition in Australian foreign policy thinking.” See Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (2011): 71–4.

190  The triumph of realism 6 Curran, Unholy Fury, 116. 2 27 The 14th Roy Milne Memorial Lecture by Gough Whitlam, Armidale, 9 July 1963, WIE, accessed 17 April 2020. 28 Samuel P. Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann Gap,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987): 453–77. 29 Prime Minister’s Press Conference, 5 December 1972, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 30 Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects, 2 May 1976, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 31 ibid. 32 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge – Evatt Memorial Lecture, 16 September 1966,” WIE, accessed 1 November 2020. 33 Speech delivered by Gough Whitlam Leader of the Opposition at a Luncheon in Honour of President Suharto on 11 February 1972, WIE, accessed 1 November 2020. 34 Australia and the World, 5 January 1972, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 35 T. B. Millar, “From Whitlam to Fraser,” 860. 36 Gary Smith, Dave Cox and Scott Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), 98. 37 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government (Ringwood: Viking, 1985), 53–4. 38 Keith Suter, “Australia’s New Policy on Recognising Governments,” The Australian Quarterly 61, no. 1 (1989): 67–8. 39 Curran, The Power of Speech, 97. 40 Third Whitlam Lecture – 10 November 1985, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 41 Bell, Dependent Ally, 104–131. 42 James Curran, “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American–Australian Relations, 1972–1975,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (2014): 377. 43 James Curran, “On Whitlam and the US alliance,” 22 October 2014, The Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/whitlam-and-us-alliance, accessed 12 April 2020. See also Curran’s Unholy Fury; and his “Dear Mr. President: What Did Gough Whitlam Say to Upset the President,” The Monthly (Melbourne), August 2012: 41–5. 44 Benvenuti and Jones, “With Friends Like These,” 32, 55–6. 45 Meaney, “The United States,” 205–6. 46 Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (1971): 168. 47 Curran, Unholy Fury, 300. 48 Meaney, “The United States,” 205–6. 49 Thomas B. Millar, “Australia and the American Alliance,” Pacific Affairs 37, no. 2 (1964): 150–1. 50 Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit – 1 May 1973, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 51 Bolton, “The United Kingdom”, 220. 52 Prime Minister’s Overseas Visit – 1 May 1973. 53 Morrice James, “The Australian Labour Party Government (2),” 5 April 1973, FCO 24/1596, The National Archive of the United Kingdom (NAUK). 54 Ibid. 55 Whitlam’s Speech “Papua-New Guinea: The Dangers of Separatism,” Monash University, Melbourne on 29 July 1971, WIE, accessed 14 April 2020. 56 Curran, Unholy Fury, 76. 57 Donald Denoon, A Trial Separation: Australia and the Decolonisation of Papua New Guinea (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2012), 78–80. 58 Sean Dorney, “Australia’s ignorance about Papua New Guinea is a loss for both nations,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/20/ australias-ignorance-about-papua-new-guinea-is-a-loss-for-both-nations, accessed 12 April 2020.

The triumph of realism  191 59 Wendy Way, ed., Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976 (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 294, 707. 60 Australia and the World, 5 January 1972, WIE, accessed 5 April 2020. 61 “Letter from Woolcott to Whitlam, Canberra, 12 April 1975,” in Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976, 242. 62 “Record of Conversation between Whitlam and Soeharto, Townsville, 4 April 1975,” in Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976, 244–8. 63 Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976, 657. 64 “Record of Conversation between Whitlam and Soeharto, Townsville, 4 April 1975,” in Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974– 1976, 246. 65 Nancy Viviani, “Australians and the East Timor Issue,” Australian Outlook 30:2 (1976): 201; Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism & Colonialism (St. Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1978), 251–2. Australian Ambassador to Indonesia Richard Woolcott was widely believed to play a dominant role in Australian policy-making. However, Woolcott defended himself by saying that Whitlam as strong-minded prime minister were not easily influenced by any of his subordinates, see Richard Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings (Pymble, NSW: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 140. 66 James Cotton, “‘Part of the Indonesian world’: Lessons in East Timor policy-making, 1974–76,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001): 119–31; Graeme Dobell, “To argue with a prime minister,” 10 February 2014, https://www. aspistrategist.org.au/to-argue-with-a-prime-minister/, accessed 1 November 2020. 67 Michael E. Salla, “Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995): 207–22. 68 James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 35. 69 Nicholas Klar, 1993, “An evaluation of Gough Whitlam's response to Indonesian claims to East Timor,” The Klar Books Site, http://klarbooks.com/academic/ timor.html, accessed 12 July 2020. 70 Angus L. Porter, Windows of Opportunity: East Timor and Australian Strategic Decision Making (1975–1999) (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, 2016), 31–5. 71 Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976, 241–2.

Bibliography Alomes, Stephen. A Nation at Last?: The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880–1988. North Ryde: Angus & Robertson, 1988. Bell, Coral. Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Department of International Relations, RSPacS, ANU, 1993, 3rd ed. Benvenuti, Andrea, and David Martin Jones. “Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia.” Journal of Cold War Studies, 13, no. 4 (2011): 57–78. Benvenuti, Andrea. “With Friends Like These: Australia, the United States, and Southeast Asian Détente.” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 27–57. Bull, Hedley. “The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969.” In The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969, edited by Brian Porter, 33–55. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

192  The triumph of realism Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1946, 2nd ed. Cotton, James. “‘Part of the Indonesian World’: Lessons in East Timor Policy-Making, 1974–76.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001): 119–131. ———. East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge Curzon, 2004. Curran, James. “Dear Mr. President: What Did Gough Whitlam Say to Upset the President.” The Monthly (Melbourne) (August 2012): 41–45. ———. “On Whitlam and the US Alliance.” The Lowy Institute, 22 October 2014a. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/whitlam-and-us-alliance, accessed 12 April 2020. ———. “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American–Australian Relations, 1972–1975.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (April 2014b): 377–408. ———. The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2004. ———. Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015. Curran, James and Ward Stuart. The Unknown Nation: Australia after the Empire. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2010. Dalrymple, Rawdon. “Looking for Theory in Australian Foreign Policy.” Australian Review of Public Affairs, 28 April 2003. Available at: http://www.australianreview. net/digest/2003/04/dalrymple.html, accessed 15 April 2020. Denoon, Donald. A Trial Separation: Australia and the Decolonisation of Papua New Guinea. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2012. Dobell, Graeme. “To Argue with a Prime Minister.” 10 February 2014. Available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/to-argue-with-a-prime-minister/, accessed 1 November 2020. Dorney, Sean. “Australia’s Ignorance about Papua New Guinea is a Loss for Both Nations.” The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ feb/20/australias-ignorance-about-papua-new-guinea-is-a-loss-for-both-nations, accessed 12 April 2020. Geoffrey, Bolton, “The United Kingdom.” In Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, edited by W. J. Hudson, 209–230. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. Huntington, Samuel P. “Coping with the Lippmann Gap.” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987): 453–77. Jolliffe, Jill. East Timor: Nationalism & Colonialism. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978. Jones, David Martin, and Mike Lawrence Smith. Reinventing Realism: Australia’s Foreign and Defence Policy at the Millennium. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Keohane, Robert O. “The Big Influence of Small Allies.” Foreign Policy no. 2 (1971): 168–182. Kirby, Michael. “Whitlam as Internationalist: A Centenary Reflection.” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no. 3 (January 2016): 850–94. Klar, Nicholas. “An Evaluation of Gough Whitlam’s Response to Indonesian Claims to East Timor,” The Klar Books Site. Available at: http://klarbooks.com/academic/ timor.html, accessed 12 July 2020.

The triumph of realism  193 Meaney, Neville. “Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography.” Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (April 2001): 76–90. ———. “The United States.” In Australia in World Affairs, 1971–1975, edited by W. J. Hudson, 163–208. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. Millar, T. B. “Australia and the American Alliance.” Pacific Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1964): 148–60. ———. “From Whitlam to Fraser.” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 854–72. Miller, J. D. B. “Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities–I”, International Affairs 50, no. 2 (April 1974): 229–41. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, c1978, 5th ed., Rev. Porter, Angus L. Windows of Opportunity: East Timor and Australian Strategic Decision Making (1975–1999). Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, 2016. Salla, Michael E. “Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995): 207–222. Smith, Gary, Dave Cox, and Scott Burchill. Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996. Suter, Keith. “Australia’s New Policy on Recognising Governments.” The Australian Quarterly 61, no. 1 (1989): 59–71. Trumbull, Robert. “A Fresh Nationalism Is Sweeping Australia.” New York Times, 31 December 1972. Viviani, Nancy. “Australians and the East Timor Issue.” Australian Outlook 30, no. 3 (1976): 241–61. Reprinted in East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate, edited and with an introduction by James Cotton, 81–107. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1999. Way, Wendy, ed. Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000. Whitlam, Gough. The Whitlam Government 1972–1975. Ringwood: Viking, 1985. Woolcott, Richard. The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings. Pymble: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003.

Conclusion

Gough Whitlam sought to develop a new and more independent role for Australia in the international community and, in particular, to demonstrate that Australia’s attitudes and policies were no longer determined by London and Washington. Within days, even hours, of coming to power, Whitlam put this ethos into practice. Among the Labor Government’s first decisions were recognition of China, East Germany and North Vietnam. The predominant theme was a determination to represent Australia as “outward looking.” Equally important, the new Labor Government endeavoured to become more closely identified with the Third World, particularly countries in Asia and the South Pacific. In its effort to improve relations with Asian countries, the Whitlam Government had shown some sympathy with Third World positions on such issues as decolonisation, South Africa, and the need for a new world economic order. At the UN, Australia voted for non-aligned resolutions on Rhodesia and South Africa, contrary to the vote of the UK and the US on these matters. For the purpose of establishing an independent image for Australia, the Whitlam Government attempted to distance Australia from its traditional allies in international relations. As a result, it took a different stance on some major policies to that of the United Kingdom, such as its acquiescence in the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and collaboration with the United States in seeking the expansion of the Diego Garcia military base. These views, and the influence of the Labor Party’s left wing, had also led to some questioning of the close defence cooperation between the US and Australia, including joint facilities on Australian soil and operating rights for US Navy ships.1 The most contentious issue between the US and Australia in the early 1970s was Indochina. Australians withdrew their forces from Vietnam in 1971, and the Labor Government got off to an inauspicious start in its relations with the US when three ministers (Jim Cairns, Clyde Cameron, and Thomas Uren) condemned the US bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972.2 Whitlam and others in his government had long regarded a Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia as inevitable. Whitlam maintained that the primary problem in Indochina had been great power intervention, not North Vietnamese expansionism. Whitlam and his Party felt that their long-standing opposition to DOI: 10.4324/9781003380467-8

Conclusion  195 US policies there, and also to Australia's own military involvement in South Vietnam, had been vindicated by the outcome of the Vietnam War. Whitlam wanted to establish relations early with the new Communist governments there, and to launch economic assistance programs in these states. He established relations with North Vietnam in February 1973.3 His government recognised the Royal Government of the National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) in Cambodia as soon as Phnom Penh fell,4 and the February 1975 Labor Party Conference resolved to establish a diplomatic relationship with the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG).5 Had the Whitlam Government pursued closer ties with the Third World at the expense of its traditional allies? Despite these efforts to build an image of Australia as an independent country capable of making its own judgements in international affairs, the shift in Australia’s approach to foreign policy under the Whitlam Labor Government should not be exaggerated. Unlike some small and middle power leaders during the Cold War, who gained influence from shifting (or indicating their intention to shift) allegiance from one great power to another, Whitlam had no such option.6 Since the end of the Second World War, the essence of Australia’s foreign policy had rested on the necessity of cultivating strategic relationships with its “old and powerful allies”—and this remained unchanged until the 1970s. British withdrawal from East of Suez forced Australia to move its security emphasis to its alliance with the United States, but the requirement of sustaining the traditional links with the United Kingdom was still not in question. Although Whitlam was not an Anglophile like Sir Robert Menzies, he still saw the need to maintain vital links with Britain. Like his predecessors, Whitlam wished to continue Australia’s close and friendly relationship with the United Kingdom—irrespective of the “surface blemishes” which had developed in the bilateral relationship after he came to office. In his opinion, the disagreements had been much exaggerated by the media in both countries, and the British Government had also taken a far too serious view of them.7 Likewise, Whitlam had no doubt that alliance with the US should remain a key pillar of Australia’s foreign policy. He was also well aware of the importance to Australia of good relations with the United States. Australia’s bilateral relations with the United States, which declined after the Labor Party took power in December 1972, had improved significantly following Nixon’s replacement by Gerald Ford. After Whitlam’s call on US President Gerald Ford in October 1974, he took a public position at the Labor Party Conference in February 1975 which eased American concerns about the future of the important joint US–Australian defence installations and facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.8 To soften the Labor Government’s suspicions about the existence of US military installations in Australia, US Ambassador Marshall Green promised in a speech to involve Australia more in running the joint installations and facilities.9 By May 1975, key officials of the Ford Administration believed that American relations with the Whitlam Government were now “more stable and mature.”10

196 Conclusion Given the fact that Whitlam and his associates introduced a large number of symbolic changes over a short time, it is hardly surprising that the media and the public concluded that a serious break was occurring in Anglo-Australian relations. The reform of immigration policy, the selection of a new anthem, the negotiation of the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, the announcement of military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, were all initiatives undertaken within months (some even within days) after Labor came into office. So it was to be expected that Whitlam was seen in certain quarters as a dangerous radical undermining the tradition of close cooperation and collaboration with the UK in foreign policy. But detailed analysis of actual policies, processes and proposals suggests that in practice Whitlam was far less radical than he appeared. Paradoxically, shaping an independent image for Australia was not only a matter of keeping a distance from the United Kingdom. On the contrary, realising these objectives on some important issues, such as sweeping away the anachronism of Privy Council appeals, entailed seeking cooperation from the British Government. In the early 1970s, in the context of post-colonial independence and economic growth particularly in Asia, there were occasions when Australia’s traditional allies and the newly emerging Asian and African nations represented two poles on key questions. When Australia was closest to its great and powerful allies, it was often furthest away from its neighbouring Third World countries. If Australia cultivated a clear policy preference for one side it might be seen to drift away from the other. From time to time, Whitlam was confronted very directly with this dilemma. Even under these circumstances, no sharp break with Britain and the US occurred and Australian Governments sought to ensure that this never eventuated. When he was required to make choices between cultivating a new relationship with Asian and South Pacific countries, and sustaining its traditional relationship with the UK and the US, he sat uncomfortably on the fence, trying to appease both sides. Whitlam expected Britain and the United States to understand and tolerate Australia’s occasional “rebellion,” in order to recognise Australia’s independent credentials. In his view, an ally had a responsibility not only to come to the defence of its own legitimate interests but was also entitled to criticise what it might perceive as weaknesses in its partner’s position. Nevertheless, when Whitlam found it necessary to criticise the UK and the US, he did that very cautiously. More often than not, Whitlam managed to keep a careful balance between supporting Third World countries and criticising old allies. Australia’s desire to play a greater and more independent role in regional alliances was generally achieved without imperilling old loyalties. The guiding tactic here was strident rhetoric but sober policy. For instance, Whitlam proclaimed Australia’s belief in a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, while doing nothing to prevent the Anglo-American efforts to expand military facilities on Diego Garcia. The Whitlam Government also declared strong support for a “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality” in Southeast Asia, without actually committing Australia to be part of the zone. They led a campaign against

Conclusion  197 the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, but did little to rebuke the US and Britain’s obvious pro-French stance. It was clear that although the Whitlam Government intended to seek closer relations with Asian and South Pacific countries, it was not prepared to pay the price of losing its traditional connections with the UK and the US. As one examines Whitlam’s record of handling Australia’s relations with its traditional allies and the Third World countries, what emerges is his realistic comprehension of Australia’s position in world politics⁠. Australia, at the end of the day, was only a middle power with limited political and military strength. A plain fact in international relations is that small and middle powers are not endowed with the freedom of doing what they wish to do because they are not only economically, militarily relatively weaker than other states but also very often strategically dependent on more powerful states. Whitlam was realistic enough to take this to heart. Furthermore, Australia, although geographically located in the South Pacific and close to Asia, was not, and would never be, a Third World country. As such, playing the role of effective broker between the West, and Asia and the South Pacific, was the best way to gain prestige and respect from both Australia’s Western allies and the Third World countries. Whitlam’s approach towards the Third World countries smacked of Machiavelli’s precepts: while it is not always possible/necessary for a prince to have good qualities such as honesty and reliability, it is indeed possible/necessary to appear to have them.11 The implications were straightforward. The viability of Australia’s foreign policy depended as much on perceptions of Australia as an independent country as on what that independence actually was. For Whitlam, Australia’s strength lay in its good reputation among Third World countries— Australia was “a threat to no one.” 12 In other words, Australia’s image, prestige, and credibility on the international stage could be a strong source of power. That is why, Whitlam, before coming into office, was concerned that the LCP Coalition Government’s foreign policies had produced a “damaging and dangerous” reputation for Australia. He worried that, Australia, as a European nation on the fringe of the most populous and deprived coloured nations in the world, had been seen as a country which had “an aboriginal population with the highest infant mortality rate on earth;” which had “eagerly supported the most unpopular war in modern times on the ground;” which failed to “oppose the sale of arms to South Africa;” which had an immigration policy that was “based on colour;” and which run “one of the world's last colonies.”13 In Whitlam’s eyes, the combination of such policies leaned heavily on Australia's credibility. To win the trust of Third World countries, it was imperative to signal and shape Australia’s image of as a reliable nation to those countries. He deemed that it was his government’s duty to seek to clean those elements which were standing in the way of improving Australia’s image in the eyes of Asian countries. In this sense, Whitlam’s approach to foreign policy is consistent with a diplomatic tactic identified by some International Relations (IR) scholars as “equidistant diplomacy”⁠—an independent diplomatic tactic aimed at signalling a neutral image through three main tools: paralleling, downplaying, and

198 Conclusion broadcasting.14 But how far did Whitlam succeed in balancing his desire for changes with a realistic pursuit of Australia’s interests? How far did he succeed in managing expectations from both its traditional allies and new friends from the Third World? How far did he succeed in realising the goal of associating gesture and substance without paying the penalty? As always, Whitlam was not hesitant in waxing lyrical about his government’s achievements in foreign affairs. In particular, he claimed that his government had carved out “a very special role for Australia as an honest broker between the Third World and the industrialised West” and engendered respect on both sides.15 In retrospect, Whitlam ranked foreign policy as the most successful area of his prime ministership. This was largely due to the fact that substantial initiatives of the Labor Government in foreign policy were not reversed by the subsequent Fraser Government. In Whitlam’s view, the basic thrust of our foreign policy has never been challenged. On fundamental questions the Labor Party has been proved right. The very area where we were expected to encounter most difficulty proved to be the area of greatest success.16 Whitlam attributed his success in foreign policy to freedom from the obstructions of a partly hostile Parliament and from the constraints imposed by the Federal Constitution on his capacity to manoeuvre in domestic affairs⁠—foreign policy was conducted largely by ministerial and administrative decision and it rarely depended on legislation. Therefore, the Whitlam Government had been able to conduct foreign affairs unencumbered by interference from political foes. For Whitlam, While it was possible for a hostile Senate to obstruct our domestic policies it was not possible for them to obstruct our foreign policies… The vast array of entrenched pressure groups and vested interests and the enormous machinery of obstruction at their disposal—anti-Labor States, recalcitrant Premiers, Constitutional restraints, antagonistic business interests, litigation in the Courts, the Senate itself—none could hinder, except in marginal ways, our foreign policy.17 Thus, for Whitlam, the authenticity of his contribution to social and political progress, after years of Coalition passivity and dependence on powerful allies, was unsullied by compromise with respect to foreign policy. Not only was Whitlam’s foreign policy relatively free from Opposition obstruction, but his government’s diplomatic decision-making was characterised by the development of policy by a small coterie, rather than the party as a whole. Although his policy responded to the wider political culture, he consulted with only a small circle of his closest advisors when it came to actual decision-making. On some occasions, senior officials like the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Sir John Bunting, and the Secretary of the

Conclusion  199 Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, were left out of Whitlam’s policy meetings. Instead, Whitlam took much of his advice from his private Secretary, Dr Peter Wilenski, and Richard Woolcott, a comparatively junior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs, who was a personal friend of Wilenski.18 Thus, Whitlam also sought to escape the inherent conservatism of the foreign policy mandarins in Canberra. Consequently, foreign policy became Whitlam’s personal stamping ground, deeply marked by his flamboyant style and a reforming zeal underpinned by a new elite of younger advisors. Despite—or because of—this, there was sustained criticism within Australia of the effectiveness of Whitlam’s policy towards the UK and the US. Most of this opposition came from the States, which saw Whitlam as a dangerous Federalist undermining State rights and autonomy. This was also a driving force for the Coalition in seeking to obstruct Labor primarily through their power in the Senate. For instance, the Labor Government was prevented by the Senate from abolishing the right of appeal to the Privy Council by State Supreme Courts, despite the initiative of the Holt Government in 1967 in abolishing appeals from the High Court. Whitlam’s efforts to cut Australia’s ties with the United Kingdom were also frustrated by the States, evident in their attempts to undermine Whitlam’s proposal to abolish imperial honours. The States, relying on their continuing status as British colonies, asked the British Government to recommend honours to the Queen of Britain, though the Whitlam Government was able to introduce an Australian honours system which the Fraser Government saw fit to preserve.19 In addition, there was a conservative element in Australian public opinion, which made radical change hard to accept. For instance, there was no general approval in Australia for Whitlam’s policy of wooing the Third World at the cost of losing cordiality with “old and powerful” friends. Many Australians still harboured a sentimental affection for the United Kingdom and the United States and valued the relationship. They feared change. Indeed, a price was certainly paid. Australia’s new friends in the Third World remained somewhat suspicious of Australia as a rich, largely white Western country having little in common with them. Because most Asian leaders had not been very enthusiastic to his approaches, Whitlam had to shelve his more grandiose and ill-defined schemes for a new international structure in Asia. Tensions within interpersonal relationships emerged between Nixon and Whitlam due to the latter’s vocal opposition to the Vietnam War. Whitlam’s uninformed comments about America’s Christmas bombing had made him a particular object of Nixon’s wrath,20 who described Whitlam’s attitude as an “absolute outrage” and a “cheap little manoeuvre.”21 Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s chief National Security Advisor, even called Whitlam a “bastard.”22 Australia’s relationship with Britain, which was important in psychological and historical terms to hundreds of thousands of Australians, appeared negative and backward-looking when looked at from the perspective of the emerging post-colonial nations in Asia and the South Pacific. For the British Government, some proposals of the Whitlam Government did create challenges. In the perspective of some British officials, Whitlam seemed to be

200 Conclusion motivated by “presentation itch”—he had put the desire to demonstrate Australia’s immunity from British or American influence firmly ahead of other considerations, on occasion even to the extent of making this a paramount consideration in reaching policy decisions.23 Whitlam’s desire to sweep away the last vestiges of Empire meant that the Labor Government, in the view of British diplomats, suffered from “tunnel vision” with respect to Anglo-Australian relations. These constitutional preoccupations prevented Whitlam from grasping “how fully and fruitfully Britain and Australia could work together in today’s world as separate, sovereign nations.”24 Consequently, British Prime Minister Edward Heath became particularly scathing in his comments about Whitlam, whom Heath regarded as an arrogant and ignorant leftist.25 There was a wider field on which both governments could benefit through the exchange of information and ideas, particularly in relation to the developing Commonwealth countries. But Whitlam’s obsession with the “minutiae” of an admittedly somewhat anachronistic constitutional relationship meant the potential benefits of the relationship failed to materialise.26 This preoccupation, along with Labor seeking favour from Third World Countries, also led to some personal tension between Whitlam and Edward Heath, who disparaged Whitlam as simply “wet.” Whitlam’s insistence on removing the remaining colonial links with Britain overshadowed his discussion with British Governments, while London would have preferred to enlarge the area of mutual understanding.27 In reality, on these constitutional issues, both Heath’s Conservative Government and the subsequent Wilson Labour Government found that they had little freedom of manoeuvre since neither had any wish to get involved in Australia’s “internal” politics. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Empire, both Britain and Australia were alive to the fact that they had to put the bilateral relationship on a new footing, one which acknowledged that the ties of Empire were loosening and the requirements of engaging more actively with their immediate region—Europe and Asia and the South Pacific, respectively—were to become the impetus of future foreign policy. The British Government, in the meantime, admitted the impact that the Whitlam Government had made on Australia’s foreign policy. In May 1974, about eighteen months after the Australian Labor Party came to power, the British High Commissioner in Canberra, Sir Morrice James, cited favourably an eminent Australian diplomat: It could almost be said that the essential criticism of Australian foreign policy is that Australia has no foreign policy of its own. We accepted American public estimates and attitudes on virtually all the great issues of the last two decades. Sir Morrice James, nevertheless, pointed out that “no one could write in similar terms of Whitlam’s foreign policy.”28 He simply drove home the fact that Whitlam’s idealistic, yet realistic approach to foreign affairs had finally set Australia on a different path from that trodden by previous LCP Coalition Governments.

Conclusion  201 Whitlam’s term came to an abrupt end on 11 November 1975, when his government was dismissed by the Governor-General. Australia’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy has lingered on and been reasserted from time to time ever since. In an increasingly polarised and contested world, when the push and pull of foreign policy is intensified, more and more small and middle powers are attempting to find a feasible balance between security and development, between history and geography, between rhetoric and reality. In this regard, Whitlam’s Labor Government had performed an imperishable work; it had shown us the limits to how far a middle power like Australia could have reached in its pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Notes 1 “Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll to President Gerald Ford,” 1 May 1975, US Declassified Documents Online (USDDO), CK2349506590. 2 Malcolm Saunders, “The ALP’s Response to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement: 1965–73,” Labour History, no. 44 (May 1983): 89–90. 3 Robert Trumbull, “Australia Establishes Ties with Hanoi,” New York Times, 27 February 1973, 6. 4 Keith D. Suter, “The Australian Government's Policy of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations,” The Australian Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 1975): 67–79. 5 David Lee, “The career diplomats: Sir Patrick Shaw, Alan Renouf and Sir Nicholas Parkinson, 1974–82,” in David Lowe, David Lee, Carl Bridge, eds., Australia Goes to Washington: 75 Years of Australian Representation in the United States, 1940– 2015 (ANU Press, 2016), 165. 6 During the Cold War, the most notable examples of small and middle power leaders gain their strength through manoeuvring the superpowers were leaders of the “Non-Aligned” Movement, e.g., Tito in Yugoslavia, Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, see John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand strategies in the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12–14. 7 Morrice James, “Relations between the British and Australian Governments,” 10 January 1974, FCO 24/1908, NAUK. 8 Special report on the Australian Labor Party Federal Conference, Terrigal, NSW, February 3–7 1975, (Canberra: International Public Relations Pty Ltd, 1975). 9 “Changes made by the Labor party government in Australia’s Foreign Policy (Whitlam, Hawke, and Keating periods),” https://medium.com/@bittergourdie/ changes-made-by-the-labor-party-government-in-australias-foreign-policywhitlam-hawke-and-c70f99869a68, accessed 6 April 2022. 10 “Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll to President Gerald Ford,” 1 May 1975, USDDO, CK2349506590. 11 Whitlam thought Machiavelli as “the wisest of Italian statesmen,” see Whitlam, “Third Whitlam Lecture – 10 November 1985,” WIE, accessed 30 December 2022. For Machiavelli’s explanation of qualities such as honesty and reliability, see Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated and with an introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c1998, 2nd ed), 68–70. 12 Whitlam, “Australia – Base or Bridge?” Speech Delivered at the Inaugural Evatt Memorial Lecture of the Sydney University Fabian Society on 16 September 1966, WIE, accessed 23 November 2022. 13 Statement by the Leader of the Australian Labor Party, Mr EG Whitlam QC MP, Port Moresby, Sunday 17 January 1971, WIE, accessed 30 December 2022.

202 Conclusion 14 There are at least two different ways of conceptualising “equidistant diplomacy.” Some researchers equal “equidistant diplomacy” with avoiding taking sides in a conflictual/competitive situation between two great powers, see Jun Moriguchi, “India’s Foreign Policy as Seen from a Geopolitical Perspective – ‘Equidistant Diplomacy’ Strategy in a Multipolar Era,” Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Monthly Report, October 2022, https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/ report/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2022/12/12/2210c_moriguchi_e.pdf, accessed 5 February 2023; Hiro Katsumata, “ASEAN’s Diplomatic Tasks During the Pandemic,” East Asia 39 (2022): 117–126. Some other scholars interpret “equidistant diplomacy” merely as a “perception management” tactic, see Ang Guan Teo and Kei Koga, “Conceptualizing Equidistant Diplomacy in International Relations: The Case of Singapore,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no. 3 (2021): 375–409. Obviously, Whitlam’s approach to foreign policy is closer to the latter conceptualising of this term. 15 Leader of Opposition, Press Statement No. 13, Foreign Policy, 11 February 1976, WIE, accessed 29 December 2010. 16 Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects, 2 May 1976, WIE, accessed 17 September 2010. 17 Ibid. 18 According to a “private” conversation between an Australian diplomat (whose name remained classified) and British diplomat M. Reith on 6 August 1973, Sir John Bunting and Sir Keith Waller were very concerned about Whitlam’s behaviour and the aberration he brought to Anglo-Australian relations. They both were being kept out of Whitlam’s policy meetings, and it was Dr Wilenski and Mr. Woolcott who generally occupied the advisers’ chairs in the executive sessions, see “British/ Australian Relations – contents from a private conversation,” 16 August 1973, FCO 24/1610, NAUK. 19 Australian Foreign Policy – Past Achievements: Future Prospects, 2 May 1976, WIE, accessed 17 September 2010. 20 “Text of a letter to President Richard M. Nixon from Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam,” 20 December 1972, USDDO, CK2349670006. 21 Eryk Bagshaw, “Whitlam v Nixon: the cables that reveal Australia’s relations with US at breaking point,” 21 October 2014, Sydney Morning Herald, https://www. smh.com.au/national/whitlam-v-nixon-the-cables-that-reveal-australias-relationswith-us-at-breaking-point-20141021-119ajj.html, accessed 5 April 2022. For an in-depth discussion on Nixon’s personal grudges against Whitlam, see James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015). 22 Curran, Unholy Fury, 267. 23 Brief by Morrice James for Mr. Whitlam’s discussion in London: 19–20 December 1974, 2 December 1974 – Part 1: Political, PREM 16/300, NAUK. 24 Morrice James to James Callaghan, a report regarding the Foreign and Defence Policies of Mr. Whitlam’s Government, 28 May 1974, FCO 24/1926, NAUK. 25 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), 497; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), chap. 5, Kindle. 26 Morrice James, “Britain and Australia: Reciprocal Needs,” 30 April 1976, FCO 24/2203, NAUK. 27 Heath’s own explanation is “if there were nasty things, he just didn’t want to know about them!,” see Extract from Record of Discussion between Prime Minister and President Nixon, 1 February 1973, FCO 24/1599, NAUK. 28 Morrice James to James Callaghan, “a report regarding the Foreign and Defence Policies of Mr. Whitlam’s Government,” 28 May 1974, FCO 24/1926, NAUK.

Conclusion  203 Bibliography Anonymous. Special Report on the Australian Labor Party Federal Conference, Terrigal, NSW, February 3–7, 1975. Prepared by International Public Relations Pty Ltd. Canberra: International Public Relations Pty Ltd, 1975. Bagshaw, Eryk. “Whitlam v Nixon: The Cables that Reveal Australia’s Relations with US at Breaking Point.” Sydney Morning Herald 21 October 2014. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/national/whitlam-v-nixon-the-cables-that-reveal-australiasrelations-with-us-at-breaking-point-20141021-119ajj.html, accessed 5 April 2022. Curran, James. Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War. Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015. Gaddis, John Lewis. “Grand strategies in the Cold War.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 1–21. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998. Katsumata, Hiro. “ASEAN’s Diplomatic Tasks during the Pandemic.” East Asia 39 (2022): 117–126. Kissinger, Henry A. Years of Upheaval. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982. Lee, David. “The Career diplomats: Sir Patrick Shaw, Alan Renouf and Sir Nicholas Parkinson, 1974–82.” In Australia Goes to Washington: 75 Years of Australian Representation in the United States, 1940–2015, edited by David Lowe, David Lee, and Carl Bridge, eds., 161–182. Acton: ANU Press, 2016. Saunders, Malcolm. “The ALP’s Response to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement: 1965– 73.” Labour History, no. 44 (May 1983): 75–91. Suter, Keith D. “The Australian Government’s Policy of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations.” The Australian Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 1975): 67–79. Teo, Ang Guan, and Kei Koga. “Conceptualizing Equidistant Diplomacy in International Relations: The Case of Singapore.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no. 3 (2021): 375–409. Trumbull, Robert. “Australia Establishes Ties with Hanoi.” New York Times, 27 February 1973.

Index

Pages followed by “n” refer to notes. aboriginal population 197 Adley, Robert 51 Aitken, Max 45–46 Albinski, Henry 18–19 Algeria, Evian Accords 116 Alomes, Stephen 176 American-­Australian alliance: China and Vietnam issues 36; junior partner diplomacy/overlooked national interests 10; McMahon Coalition Government 36; military support 5, 8, 10, 26, 195; Whitlam’s independent stance 182–183 American military bases in Australia 5, 195 Amery, Julian 124 Amin, Idi 43 Anglo-­Australian relations: contrasting the McMahon/Whitlam Governments 36–39; decline since 1960s 21; end of imperial relationship 24; erosion in 1971–75 period 22; Heath’s legislation changes impact 50–51; literature (historians) 26; mature basis 184; Menzies 195; military support 3–4, 6; mother-­son relationship 21, 22, 31n104; natural divergence/geographical locations 9, 21, 23; “relics of colonialism” 11, 23, 39, 183–184, 199–200; “special advantage” 39; trade and investment 24; Whitlam’s independent stance 183–185; Whitlam’s “presentation itch” 200 “Anglo-­Australian Relations: Prospect and Initiatives” (Policy Guidance Paper) 21–22, 38

Anglo-­Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) 92, 94 Antarctic Treaty 133 ANZUK: Australian signals monitoring station 100–101; Butterworth Air Base (Malaysia) 93, 101; disbandment 87, 88, 92, 104, 105; end of 100– 101; and FPDA 94; Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) 93; New Zealand Labour Government 101; stationing AU forces 104 ANZUS Treaty 5, 8, 87; AU consultation with US 183; Council meeting (5 April 1968) 95; Diego Garcia 151, 152, 155; different from other agreements (Whitlam) 151; US briefing to AU 152, 167n59 Appeals and Special Reference Bill (Queensland 1973) 74 Armstrong, John 54, 71 Armstrong, R. E 48 Asia: and Australia’s historical racial prejudice 12–13; Australia’s relationship 12–13, 90, 182; diplomatic engagement (Whitlam Government) 12; immigration policy changes (Whitlam) 54; McMahon Government 9, 90; Menzies Government 91; military vulnerability to Australia 12; persistent warfare (Whitlam speech 1963) 7; political strength of Australia 8–9; US frustration with AU assessment 182 Askin, Robert 74, 80 “aspirational nationalism” 66 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 12, 160

Index  205 Atomic Weapons Safety Committee, French nuclear testing 124 AUKUS: Australian public’s anti-­nuclear sentiment 134; Diego Garcia 163; nuclear-­powered submarines 133 Australia: aboriginal population 197; American military bases/operations with 5, 195; anti-­nuclear sentiment 134; application for EEC membership 21; balancing role between Third World/allies 163; Balfour Declaration (1926) 3; Britain’s military protection 3–4, 6; Commonwealth of Australia 2, 67; Dominion of the British Empire 2–3, 22–23; economic deterioration (Whitlam Government) 16–17, 54; economical high-­dependency on China (today) 26; French goods boycott 121–122, 127, 132; “great and powerful friends” (“old and powerful allies”) 2, 6, 7, 10–12, 26, 89, 100, 143, 151, 184, 195–196, 199; as middle power 1, 8, 11, 24, 178, 179, 180, 197, 201; military alliance with US 5, 8, 10, 26, 195; military support for UK in overseas wars 3; regional engagement strategy 175; security from external powers 6; sentimental feelings towards UK/US 199; “social contract” public/ government 18; “triangular relationship” (AU/UK/US) 143, 151, 161, 199–200; uranium resources 120; see also immigration Australia Act (1986) 3, 4, 67 Australia House, transfer to Department of Foreign Affairs 21, 37 Australia-­New Zealand-­Malaya Agreements (ANZAM) 87 Australian Academy of Science, French nuclear testing 124 Australian Ambassadors (to other countries), political appointments 65, 82n6 Australian conservatives, obsession with British connection 64 Australian Department of External Affairs 3 Australian Federal States: and British monarchy 71, 76, 78; petition to Queen 69–70, 72, 75; Privy Council appeals 67, 69, 71, 72, 81; Statute of Westminster (1931) 73, 74

Australian High Court 76 Australian in World Affairs, 1971–75 (Hudson) 20 Australian Labor Party (ALP): dismissal from government 201; electoral success 2, 17; foreign policy and moral/legal idealism 177; “forever in opposition” perception 16; “On Joint Facilities and US Bases and Facilities” (policy paper) 40; Labor Left influence 99, 100, 105, 182, 194; legitimacy to govern (own preoccupation) 16; Loans Affairs (1975) 17–18; “question of legitimacy” 16–18; stance on Vietnam before Whitlam leadership 19 Australian Parliament: Senate (Opposition’s control) 17, 198, 199; Statute of Westminster (1931) 3, 4, 27n20 Australian Postal Workers Union 127 Balfour Declaration (1926) 3 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo 147 Barnard, Lance: Diego Garcia 152; diplomatic communication (acceptance of US priorities) 154; Five-­Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 101, 103, 104, 126; Indian Ocean/US naval vessels 153; Southeast Asia 97–98 Bell, Coral 5, 143, 174, 182 Benvenuti, Andrea 22, 36, 91; and Jones, David Martin 88–89, 182 Bjelke-­Petersen, Johannes 79, 80 Bolton, Geoffrey 16, 22 Bongiorno, Frank 89 Bowen, Nigel 68, 122, 179 Braine, Bernard 51 Brereton, Laurie 10 Britain: allegiance with France (EEC membership) 123, 125, 126, 129, 130; Australian immigration 47; Common Market entry 22, 32n112, 36, 50, 52, 123, 129, 130; East of Suez military arrangements 92, 93, 103, 144, 146, 184, 195; economic deterioration (Heath Government) 93, 103; exploring Whitlam’s foreign policy 21; Heath Government immigration legislation changes 44–46, 53; immigration rules due to EEC membership 44–46, 49, 50, 53,

206 Index 56; as “just another or special country” 39; McMahon/Whitlam Governments (contrasting) 36–39; military commitment in Far East (end) 92–94; non-­interference position on domestic affairs in AU 68–69, 72, 79, 81, 200; nuclear weapons test Nevada (June 1974) 131; “ patrial” (immigration concept) 44–45; treated as “foreign country” 37, 57n11; “turn to Europe” 22, 26, 37, 44, 55–56, 133, 200; Whitlam attitude towards 11–12 British Empire: decline after Second World War 23; unshakeable belief 4 British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), Diego Garcia 145, 146, 162 British Labour Party (in opposition), French nuclear testing 122, 127, 138n87 British monarchy: allegiance 4, 5; and Australian Federal States 71, 76, 78; Australian Royal Style and Titles Act (1953) 65, 82n5; diplomatic accreditation approval (AU) 37, 65, 82n6, 184; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 71, 76; and Governor-­General 65, 183; Judicial Committee Act (1833) 76–77; Ministers’ “double-­advising” on Australian matters 77; petition to Queen (Australian Federal States) 69–70, 72, 75; “Queen of Australia” 65, 76; Queen’s Style and Titles 11, 38, 65, 78, 82n5, 183; seabed question 69–70, 71–72, 75, 83n36; seek advice from Her Ministers (UK or AU) 70, 73, 75–77 British Nationality Act (1948): Commonwealth subjects 42; later problems with 52; Macmillan’s flawed changes 42 British passport holders: Asian descent 45; fear of rush to UK from East African countries 50 British Pitcairn Island monitoring, French nuclear testing 122, 124, 129, 130, 131 Broinowski, Richard 120 Brown, Winthrop 95 Bull, Hedley 89–90, 120, 143, 177 Bunting, John 76, 198–199 Burbury, Stanley 75

Burr, William 127, 128 Butterworth Air Base (Malaysia) 93, 101, 102, 104 Cairns, Jim 16, 17; visit to China (May 1973) 119–120 Calwell, Arthur 177 Cambodia, Royal Government of the National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) 195 Carr, E. H. 177 Carr, Robert 51, 52, 53 Carrington, Peter (Lord Carrington) 93, 123 Certain Grandeur, A (Freudenberg) 15, 16, 17 Chagos Archipelago: Diego Garcia 144, 145, 164n5; International Court of Justice (ICJ) action 162–163; right of peoples to self-­determination 163; UK protected marine area 162 Chifley, Ben 10 China: and AUKUS 133; Cold War ideology 181; fear of Communism in Australia 12, 13, 19; Kissinger/Nixon visits 174–175; Nixon’s approach 182; normal relations with (AU) 13; nuclear weapons testing 119–120; Whitlam visit (July 1971) 174 Christmas Island transmitter plan 12, 39–41, 184 Clifford, Lewis (Lord Clifford of Chudleigh) 69 Cold War: ideological contest 9; ideology (China) 181; shifting allegiances 195, 201n6; Whitlam’s idiosyncratic/moralistic reading 182 Commonwealth: Asian members 12; British Nationality Act (1948) 42; diminishing link Australia and Britain 21–22; “shrinking circle” 22 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting: arms limitations in Indian Ocean 158; French nuclear testing 129 Commonwealth Immigration Act (1968) 42 Commonwealth of Australia 2, 67 Commonwealth of Australia Act (1900) 2–3 Constitution of Australia 17; Australian Constitutional Convention debates (1890s) 67; federal control of domestic not international affairs 198;

Index  207 matters to be resolved by Australians (not UK) 79; Privy Council appeals 74, 81 Containment strategy 16 Cotton, James 186 Court, Charles 79 Crean, Frank 16 Curran, James 10, 20, 66, 173, 176, 178, 181, 182 Curtin, John 10; New Year’s message (1941) 4 Dalrymple, Rawdon 177, 178 De Gaulle, Charles 116 defence policy 87–110; American guarantees of assistance 98; AU “garrisons” in other countries 97; Australian signals monitoring station 100–101; Australia’s role in the world (Whitlam perception) 90; bipartisanship 98–99; changing circumstances (world) 90; combined military operation AU/ UK 87; “continental defence” 105; end to “uncritical support” to Western allies 87; “forward defence” (Menzies) 96, 98–99, 105; Gorton’s approach 98–99, 105; “great and powerful friends” 2, 6, 7, 10–12, 26, 89; Indonesian-­Malaysian confrontation (1963–66) 98; “Israeli-­ type defence scheme” 96; Labor Left influence 99, 100, 105, 182, 194; Malaysia and Singapore British withdrawal 92–97, 98; McMahon Coalition Government 92, 106n14; Menzies’ regional policies 89; neutralisation objectives 102; nuclear weapons 105; overseas deployments (past) 104; Singapore and Malaysia ending AU contribution 87, 88–89, 92, 99–105, 106n14; Southeast Asia 91–92, 96, 97; Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy (1967) 98, 99; uncertain direction of US policy (1971) 95–96; “U.S. Policy Toward Malaysia/Singapore” (memoranda) 101–102, 103; Vietnam War 97, 104, 109n43; Whitlam on “forward defence” 99; Whitlam’s approach 105; see also Five-­Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) Diego Garcia 143–170, 164n1, 194, 196; American naval power in Indian Ocean 143; Anglo-­American naval

base 22, 144, 146, 161, 163, 165n24; ANZUS Treaty 151, 152, 155; AUKUS 163; British briefing to AU 152; British contribution 146, 165n24; British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) 145, 146, 162; British interest in project 146–147; British support continued (Heath to Wilson) 148; Chagos Archipelago 144, 145, 162, 164n5; Chagossians call for US recognition of human right violations 161–162; Chagossians legal actions against UK 162; Cold War context 152, 161; critical littoral states 147, 152–153, 158; as deterrent to Soviets 145, 146, 149, 154, 157; diplomatic communication (acceptance of US priorities) 154– 155; Federal Opposition critical of Whitlam policy shift 150; Fraser Coalition Government 159–161, 168n97; Frazer endorsement to expand 159; Heath Government’s role 146–148; Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 35, 146, 147, 148, 149–150, 154, 155–156, 164n4; India’s leaning towards USSR 158; international backlash for UK/ US 163; Labor Left influence 155; Mauritius dependency 144, 158; McMahon Government 148–149, 150; natural harbour 144; need to expand 145, 150, 152, 159; “neutralising” the Indian Ocean (Whitlam) 153, 156–158, 159; secret negotiations US with UK 144–145, 152; Soviet knowledge of AU’s concerns 151; Soviet military presence in Northwest Indian Ocean area 150, 166n47; strategic communication facilities 145; superpower “mutual restraint” 156–157, 159; superpower naval rivalry 145, 149–150; tacit understanding (US/UK/AU) 154–156; “triangular relationship” (AU/UK/US) 143, 151, 161; UKUSA membership 148, 166n38; US briefing to AU 152, 167n59; US jet refuelling (operations in South China Sea) 161; Whitlam Government protests against 149– 156; Whitlam (in Opposition)

208 Index attacking Fraser’s policy 160; Whitlam relations with AU neighbouring countries 160–161; Wilson Government 159 diplomacy, definition 160 diplomatic mission: Asia 12; Democratic Republic of Korea 12, 195; Democratic Republic of Vietnam 12, 195; East Germany 35, 173; People’s Republic of China 2, 12, 35, 173, 180–181; Royal Government of the National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) 195 Douglas-­Home, Alec: Five-­Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 103; French nuclear testing 117, 122, 124–125, 137n67; immigration rules due to EEC membership 47–48; Privy Council appeals 73, 75; Whitlam meeting French nuclear testing 124–125, 137n67 Downer, Alexander R. 47 Doyle, Randall Jordan 6 Easson, Michael 20 East Timor: annexation (American support) 187; annexation by Indonesia 173, 185–186; FRETILIN-­led government 185, 186; massacre of communists/leftists (Indonesia) 179–180; and self-­ determination “moral line” 186, 187, 188; Whitlam’s role in annexation 186–187, 188, 191n65 Ellicott, Robert 73, 74 equidistant diplomacy: definition 160, 197–198, 202n14; perception management 160 Evans, Gareth 89 Evatt, H. V. (Bert) 10, 119; foreign policy debates with Menzies 177 Everett, M. G. 74 Fairhall, Allen 95 Faulkner, A. J. 101 Federal Trades Unions 127 First World War, AU reliance on UK 6 Five-­Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 19, 87; after ANZUK disbandment 104; ambiguous framework 96; and AMDA 94; British preference for undisturbed continuation 103; Canberra defence

talks (June 1969) 102; economic side-­benefits to Singapore 94, 102, 108n29; end of “forward defence” (Menzies) 99; as gesture of support for Malaysia and Singapore 96–97; Gorton Government’s stance 94–97, 102; Lee Kuan Yew’s (Singapore PM) views on 102–103; objectives 97, 104; origins 92, 93–94, 107n18, 108n23; regional response to AU troop withdrawal 101–103; “toothless paper tiger” 102; Whitlam’s commitment to 104, 105; Whitlam’s views on 97 Ford, Gerald: Diego Garcia 158, 195; Whitlam’s visit (1974) 195 Foreign Affairs and Defence (FAD) Committee 101 “forward defence” (Menzies) 96, 98–99, 105 France: assistance from US on nuclear program 127–128; decision to develop nuclear weapons 116; relations with US under Nixon 128 Fraser Government: Diego Garcia 159–161, 168n97; foreign policies of Whitlam kept 198; honours system (Whitlam) 199; judicial independence 80 Fraser, Malcolm 10 French nuclear testing 23, 115–140, 194; Algeria 116; American/British tests (lack of protest from AU) 118; anti-­French sentiment (AU) 117, 121, 127; atmospheric tests 116, 132; Britain’s alliance with France/ Commonwealth commitment 115, 125, 129, 130, 131, 135n3, 197; British/Australian diplomacy 124–125, 133; British/French diplomatic communication 124, 131; British Government change (Heath/ Wilson) 129–130; British Labour Party 122, 127, 129–130, 138n87; British pro-­France stance 122, 123, 125, 126; British tests (no position to criticise France) 123, 131; Chinese atmospheric testing 119–120; Committee of Disarmament in Geneva 117; Commonwealth leaders’ Meeting (Aug. 1973) 129; compensation from French state 133–134; French goods boycott

Index  209 121–122, 127, 132; French “outdates colonialism” 116–117, 134; French Polynesia impact assessment 133; Heath Government position 121– 127, 136n42; International Court of Justice (ICJ) action 115, 127, 130, 132; leukaemia and birth deformity rumours 116; McMahon Coalition Government 117, 118, 121; monitoring British Pitcairn Island 122, 124, 129, 130, 131; monitoring by Australian scientists 129, 130–131; Mururoa 118, 119, 124; New Zealand gunboat sent to test zone 126–127; nuclear weapons (general opposition) 119; political capital for Whitlam 118, 120, 125; Polynesia 116–117; “Pompidou’s Poodle” (Britain) 123; Pompidou’s rejection of requests to stop 118; protests against (international) 115, 127; protests against (Whitlam) 118–121, 127; Reykjavik summit FR/US (31 May 1973) 128–129; Sahara (cease due to African opinion) 121; South Pacific Forum 124, 125; South Pacific nations campaign against 115, 117; South Pacific nuclear-­free zone proposals 120; Stockholm Conference on the Environment (1972) 121; The Times (British professors letter) 121; underground testing 132; United Nations (UN) 117, 120, 122, 129; unrealistic to stop France 123–124; US denouncement 122; US secret assistance 127–128, 197; Whitlam/ Douglas-­Home meeting (24 April 1973) 124–125; Whitlam letter to Wilson (29 May 1974) 131, 139n102; Whitlam’s protest 118– 121; Wilson Government 129–130, 131 Freudenberg, Graham 16, 80 “From Whitlam to Fraser” (Millar) 20 Gaillard, Felix 116 Gayler, Noel 152 Goh Keng Swee 102 Goldsworthy, David 21 Gorton Government: Five-­Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 94–97, 102; isolationism 98; Southeast Asia policy 98

Gorton, John 36, 80, 92, 98–99, 102 Governor-­General: and British monarchy 65; powers 183 Grant, Bruce 89 Green, Marshall 154, 155, 195 Greenpeace, French state terrorist action 132 Greenwood, Gordon 143 Guinea Bissau 187 Gurry, Meg 89 Habermas, Jürgen 17 Harders, C. W. 71, 74, 78 Hasluck, Paul 75, 76, 77, 80–81, 94–95 Hawke, Bob 127 Heath, Edward: Britain as “Pompidou’s Poodle” 123; economic deterioration 93, 103; McMahon visit (1971) 36–37; Privy Council policy 68–69; scathing comments on Whitlam 200; Whitlam’s Third World countries approach (tension) 200, 202n27 Heath Government: backbench defections 50; Diego Garcia 146– 147; East of Suez military arrangements 93, 103, 184, 195; French nuclear testing 121–127, 136n42; Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 148; Indian Ocean security arrangement 147; re-­election and Whitlam’s Southeast Asia policy 103–104 High Commissioners, political appointments 37, 65, 82n6, 184 Hocking, Jenny 19, 20 Holt Government 199 Honours lists 38, 199 Hudson, W. J. 20 Hunt, John 155 idealism, Whitlam Government 176–178 immigration: AU’s low-­key approach to UK immigration changes 49–50, 51, 52, 53–54, 56; Australian press view of Heath’s legislation changes 47, 60n69; Australians into Britain 47; Australia’s problem with reciprocity 51–52; Britain’s “turn to Europe” 55–56; British Immigration Bill 46, 49, 50; Commonwealth countries and reciprocity with UK 51–52; Commonwealth subjects’ special entitlement 56; EEC nationals/

210 Index Commonwealth citizens (UK) 45–46, 49, 50, 53, 56; flow of people after policy changes (UK/AU) 55; Heath’s legislation changes impact 50–51; White Australia policy of immigration 12–13, 46, 48, 54, 176, 197; Whitlam’s domestic changes 54–55, 56, 176 Immigration Act (UK 1971) 44 independent foreign policy: Britain as prism for exploring Whitlam’s policy 21; engagement with public in discussions 25; image (establishing) 13–15, 194; independent stance to UK and US 182–185; key Whitlam components 9–10; own national interests 6; and traditional allies 10–12; universal aspiration 1; “Whitlamite revisionism” 178; Whitlam’s rationale 15–20; Whitlam’s roadmap 8–15 India, Ugandan Asian crisis 43 Indian Citizenship Act (1955) 43 Indian Ocean: arms limitations 157, 158, 159, 168n82; ASEAN proposals 160; “neutralising” (Whitlam) 153, 156–158, 159; Soviet-­American discussion 157; Soviet military presence in Northwest Indian Ocean 150, 166n47; superpower “mutual restraint” 156–157, 159; superpower naval rivalry 145, 149–150 Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 143, 164n4, 196; area definition/ obligations of parties (ambiguity) 155, 156; Diego Garcia 146, 147, 154; Heath Government 148; United Nations (UN) 147, 149–150, 153, 155–156, 158, 159; Whitlam Government 154, 173, 177; Wilson Government 148 Indonesia: annexation of East Timor 173, 185–186, 187; East Timor annexation (American support) 187; massacre of communists/leftists (East Timor) 179–180; Suharto 173, 179–180, 187; Whitlam’s policy towards 179–180; Whitlam’s role in annexation of East Timor 186–187, 188, 191n65 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 13

International Court of Justice (ICJ) action: Chagos Archipelago (detachment by UK) 162–163; French nuclear testing 115, 127, 130, 132 international law, avoiding conflict 14 international organisations, Whitlam’s involvement/support 14, 180, 187 Jackson, Robert 72 James, Morrice: Christmas Island transmitter plan 40–41; creation of Australian foreign policy 200; Diego Garcia 155, 157; Heath’s immigration policy changes 36, 50–51, 52, 55; Privy Council appeals 76; Third World countries Whitlam’s preoccupation 38; Whitlam election/ immediate policy changes 35, 101; Whitlam’s “tunnel vision” 81 Johnson, Lyndon B. 95 Jones, David Martin: and Benvenuti, Andrea 88–89, 182; and Smith, Mike Lawrence 178 Judicial Committee Act (1833), British monarchy 76–77 judicial independence 64–86; Appeals and Special Reference Bill (Queensland 1973) 74; engagement with Australian Federal States 74; Fraser Government 80; Ministers’ “double-­advising” on Australian matters 77; “opportunistic nationalism” 66, 82n10; Premiers’ visit to London (Jan. 1975) 79; see also Privy Council Kennan, George F. 16, 177 Kennedy, John F., foreign policy 8 “Kenyan Exodus”: British response 41–42; Commonwealth Immigration Act (1968) 42; Kenyan Asians arrival in England 42 Kenyan Immigration Act (1967) 41–42 Keohane, Robert O. 183 Khemlani, Tirath 17 Kirby, Michael 13–14, 175 Kirk, Norman 118, 126 Kissinger, Henry: Diego Garcia 146, 155, 157; French-­US relations 128; tensions with Whitlam 199; visits to Beijing 174–175 Klar, Nicholas 187

Index  211 Koga, Kei, and Teo, Ang Guan 160 Korean War 13 League of Nations 177 Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) 88, 102–103 Liberal Party, internal strife 36 Lim Kim San 103 Lindsay, Robert 51 Lippmann, Walter 178 Loans Affairs (1975) 17–18 Lowry Cole, Galbraith 144 Machiavellian politics 15, 181–182, 197, 201n11 Mackie, J. A. C. 91 Macmillan, Harold 42 Malayan emergency 24 Malaysia: Butterworth Air Base 93, 101, 102, 104; indifferent to withdrawal of AU troops 101; neutralisation objectives 102; race riots (1969) 102; stationing AU forces in 97–105; withdrawal of Australian forces 88–89, 92, 99–101, 104, 105 Mao Zedong 120 Mason, Roy 159 Maudling, Reginald 44 Mauritius: Chagos Archipelago UK protected marine area 162; Diego Garcia 144, 158; diplomatic relations with AU 144 McCain, John S. Jr. 144 McIntyre, Laurence 120 McMahon Government: “Anglo-­ Australian Relations: Prospect and Initiatives” (Policy Guidance Paper) 38; Asia policies/relationship 12, 90; defeat and legitimacy attacks on ALP 16, 35; Diego Garcia 148–149; fear of Communism 19; foreign policy criticism by Whitlam 5, 6, 7, 9; Privy Council appeals 67–68; reassessment of foreign policies before defeat 19; relations with Asia 9; Singapore and Malaysia ending military contribution 92, 106n14; Ugandan Asian crisis 46, 49, 56; Vietnam War 19–20, 90 McMahon, William: French nuclear testing 117, 118, 121; invitation to visit Nixon 36; sentimental feelings towards UK 39; suggested direct phone link to UK 37; visit to London (1971) 21, 36–37, 46

Meaney, Neville 175, 183 Menon, K. U. 93–94 Menzies Government, policy towards Britain 26 Menzies, Robert: Anglo-­Australian relations 195; and Australia’s historical racial prejudice 13; foreign policy debates with Evatt 177; “forward defence” 96, 98–99, 105; “great and powerful friends” 6; Privy Council appeals 67–68; regional policies 89; Second World War speech 4; Vietnam War 177 Millar, T. B. 20, 90, 174, 180, 183 Miller, J. D. B. 91, 174 Monks, John 46 Morgenthau, Hans 177 Morosi Affair 17 Morosi, Junie 17 Moynihan, Daniel P 145–146, 154–155 Murphy, Lionel 68 national anthem 11, 64–65, 183; Advance Australia Fair 64; Australian National Anthem Quest 64 “National Independence Day” 5, 28n24 nationalism: idea of “British-­ness” 175; Whitlam Government 175–176; Whitlam’s opportunism 176 Neumann, Klaus 44 “new internationalism” 174–178 “new nationalism”: and context 181; idealism 176–178; and internationalism 174–175; Privy Council policy 66 Nixon, Richard 19; apparent arrogance toward AU 152; Guam Doctrine 98; improved French-­US relations 128; invitation to McMahon to visit 36; Sino-­US rapprochement 182; tensions with Whitlam 199; US-­ Soviet détente 182; visit to Beijing 97, 175 Non-­proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty 133 Norris, Eric 71 nuclear weapons: and Chinese atmospheric testing 119–120; defence policy 105; underground testing 131, 132; unrealistic to stop France developing 123–124; see also French nuclear testing

212 Index Obote, Milton 42–43 “On Joint Facilities and US Bases and Facilities” (ALP policy paper) 40 “opportunistic nationalism,” Privy Council policy 66, 82n10 Pagan, John 48 Papua New Guinea (PNG) 13, 99, 180; criticism of Whitlam’s efforts on independence 185; imminent independence 97–98 Parkinson, N. F. 103 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 121, 124, 129, 133 Peacock, Andrew 155 People’s Republic of China, diplomatic recognition 2 Piquet, Martine 121 Pompidou, Georges 118; Reykjavik summit with US (31 May 1973) 128–129 Porter, Angus L. 187 Porter, Murray 71 Premiers’ Conference (Canberra 1973) 73 Price, Charles 54 Prince, The (Machiavelli) 15 Pritchett, W. B. 48, 49, 51, 186 Privy Council 38, 79; abolishing appeals 11, 65–66, 184, 196, 199; ALP opposition to appeals (1908) 67; Australian constitutional tussle in London 72–73; and Australian Federal States 67, 69, 71, 72, 81; Bank Nationalisation case (1948) 67; Britain’s constitutional obligations 69; British Judicial Committee 66; British Labour Gov. 77–81; British legislation to change role 77–78, 79; British position of non-­interference of domestic affairs in AU 68–69, 72, 79, 81; domestic/foreign-­policy issue 70–72; exchange of views Whitlam/ Heath 71–72; exchange of views Whitlam/Wilson 77–81; failure of abolishing all appeals 66, 82n14; as “insult to Australian judges” 71; “investing High Court with final jurisdiction” 67, 68, 74; Judicial Committee arrangement for sitting in AU 68, 79; jurisdiction on AU matters abolition argument 77; McMahon Government 67–68;

“opportunistic nationalism” 66, 82n10; Premiers’ visit to London (Jan. 1975) 79; rational of Whitlam Government’s policy 66; seabed question 69–70, 71–72, 75, 83n36; State governments 80, 199; thorny issue from colonial past 66–68; Whitlam did not consult Federal States 70–71, 80–81 Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill 66, 70–71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 84n52 Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act (1975) 66, 80 Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Bill 65–66, 70–71, 72, 80, 84n52 Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act (1968) 67, 68, 72, 84n53 racism: Australia’s historical racial prejudice 12–13; strong stand against 2 Rajaratnam, S. 103 Ramsbotham, Peter 155 Read, James S. 42 realism (Whitlam Government) 24, 25, 173–191; cast principles aside if necessary 181, 186, 187, 188; international politics (head-­on approach) 180–181; “new nationalism” and “new internationalism” 174–178, 181; progressive realism 178; self-­ determination (abstract principle) 185–188; underpinning Whitlam’s foreign policy 178–188, 189n25; Wilsonian idealism/Kissingerian realism 186 Reece, Eric 74 Renouf, Alan 151, 157 Roberts, Goronwy (Lord Goronwy-­ Roberts) 79 Rogers, William P. 122 Salla, Michael 186 Schlesinger, James 145, 150, 153 seabed question, British monarchy 69–70, 71–72, 75, 83n36 Second World War: British Empire decline after 23; Curtin’s New Year’s message (1941) 4; economic/military balance after 7; enlisting the help of US 4; fall of Singapore 4; Menzies

Index  213 speech 4; post-­war immigration 23; reliance shift UK to US 6–7; search for security outside British Empire 4; war with Japan 4 self-­determination: Chagos Archipelago 163; East Timor 186, 187, 188; realism (Whitlam Government) 185–188 Senate (Opposition’s control) 17, 198, 199 Shaw, Patrick 154 Singapore: and FPDA 102–103; FPDA economic side-­benefits 94, 102, 108n29; New Zealand’s decision to remain 101; Second World War 4; stationing Australian forces in 97–105; withdrawal of Australian forces 88–89, 92, 99–101, 104, 105 Sisco, Joseph J. 154 Smith, Mike Lawrence, and Jones, David Martin 178 Snedden, Billy 150 South Africa: racial policies 177; sale of arms to 197; Whitlam’s non-­aligned approach 100, 187, 194 South Pacific, leadership opportunity for AU 120–121, 125 South Pacific Forum: French nuclear testing 124, 125; nuclear free zone 120, 132, 134; Whitlam’s attendance 124 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 132, 133, 134 Southeast Asia: defence policy towards (AU) 91–92, 97; domestic AU attitudes towards 98; geopolitical rivalries 96; Gorton’s approach 96, 98; Nixon’s visit to Beijing 97; US troop withdraw by (1971) 95 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), French nuclear testing 117 Soviet Union: Baltic States 181; Diego Garcia as deterrent 145, 146, 149, 154, 157; Nixon’s approach 182 Standing Committee of Attorney-­ General, Privy Council policy 73 State Agents-­General, power in London 79 Statute of Westminster (1931): and Australian Federal States 67, 69; Australian Parliament 3, 4, 27n20; enactment to Australian Federal States 73, 74; Privy Council appeals acts 72

Stockholm Conference on the Environment (1972), French nuclear testing 121 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy (1967) 98, 99 Suez crisis 24 Suharto 173, 179–180, 187 Suslov, V. P. 151 Temaru, Oscar Manutahi 133 Teo, Ang Guan, and Koga, Kei 160 Thakur, Ramesh 119 Theophanous, Andrew C. 16–17 Third World countries: AU as honest broker under Whitlam 160, 163, 198; AU role today 163; definition 29n47; Machiavellian politics 197–198; strategies towards 39; tensions Heath/Whitlam 200, 202n27; Whitlam’s attempts to support (image of) 153, 154–155, 180, 187, 194, 196–197, 199, 202n27; Whitlam’s visiting preference 38 Thomson, J. A. 130, 156 Treaty of Rarotonga 132, 133, 134 Treaty on the non-­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 105, 115 Trumbull, Robert 173 Tunku Abdul Rahman 102 Uganda: British colonisation 41; Idi Amin 43; independence 41; Obote Government 42–43 Uganda Railway, Asian workers 41 Ugandan Asian crisis 41–56; Anglo-­ Australian interactions 44–56; AU’s low-­key approach to UK immigration changes 49–50, 51, 52, 53–54; Australia visa numbers 43, 47, 51; Australia’s own restrictive immigration policy 46, 48; Britain taking most emigrants 43; British response 41–43; campaign against immigration legislation changes in UK 45–46, 48; Canada visa numbers 43; Heath’s immigration election pledge 43; immigration legislation changes (Heath Government) 44, 51; immigration rules EEC nationals/ Commonwealth citizens 45–46, 49, 50, 53, 56; as international refugee crisis 44; McMahon Government 46, 49, 56; New Zealand share 51; “

214 Index patrial” (UK immigration concept) 44–45; softening of UK approach 50; Whitlam Government 44, 52–56 UKUSA membership, Diego Garcia 148, 166n38 United Kingdom (UK) see Britain United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 162 United Nations (UN) 11; Ad Hoc Committee (Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone) 147, 149–150, 153, 155, 158, 159, 165n31, 173; Australia’s voting record 7, 12; Chagos Archipelago (detachment by UK) 162–163; Chagos Archipelago UK protected marine area 162; Committee of (24) 14–15; French nuclear testing 117, 122, 129; General Assembly 17th session 7; Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 35, 155–156; New Caledonia point to French by Whitlam 187; nuclear weapons control 119, 120; pro-­Third World stance (decolonisation) 14–15; Rhodesia vote 12, 35, 100, 173, 184, 187, 194; South Africa non-­aligned resolution vote 100, 187, 194 United States: East Timor annexation by Indonesia 187; French nuclear testing 122, 127–128; frustration over Whitlam’s assessment of Asia 182; isolationism 95, 96, 98; military alliance with Australia 5, 8, 10, 26, 195; Second World War support to Australia 4, 6–7; “U.S. Policy Toward Malaysia/Singapore” (memoranda) 101–102, 103; Whitlam’s relationship record (split opinions) 182–183 Unknown Nation, The (Curran and Ward) 176 Vietnam War: ALP attitude towards 98, 109n48; ALP stance before Whitlam leadership 19; Anti-­Vietnam War Movement 98; Australia’s experience 97, 104; “Christmas bombings” 182, 194, 199; conscription 18–19; debate Menzies and Calwell 177; final years/ end 13, 26, 194–195; McMahon Government 19–20, 36, 90; Nixon “Vietnamization”/withdraw of troops 19; obligations to US 1; opposition US involvement (Whitlam) 10; US

defeat 98; Whitlam speech on 19; Whitlam’s opposition to 177, 180, 182, 199; withdrawal of Australian forces 97, 99, 105, 109n43 Vivekanandan, B. 22 Waller, Keith 51, 199, 202n18 Ward, Stuart 21, 22, 66, 176 Watt, Hugh 126 Weber, Max 17 White Australia policy of immigration 12–13, 46, 48, 54, 176, 197 Whitlam, Gough: ALP leader 15, 68; appreciation of Machiavelli 15, 181–182, 197, 201n11; British diplomates “tunnel vision” view of 200; Chinese nuclear tests 119; desire to be seen as “dramatic innovator” 81; Diego Garcia 153, 158, 160–161, 195; early visit to UK ruled out 38; foreign minister de facto 90; French nuclear testing 118–121, 124–125, 127, 132; as “hard-­headed realist” 173; idealism 176–178; involvement/ support for international organisations 180; literature on 20; meeting Gerald Ford 158, 195; meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (July 1971) 99; meeting with Wilson (Dec. 1974) 78–79; “neutralising” the Indian Ocean 153; opportunism 176; political legacy 173–174, 189n6; political memoir 15, 16, 17, 20; political risk of relationship with China 174–175, 180–181; preoccupation with international esteem 179; Privy Council appeals abolitionist 67; racial reformer 15; tensions with Nixon 199; Third World visiting preference 38; Vietnam War 177, 180; visit to China (July 1971) 174–175; visit to France (Jan. 1975) 132; visit to London (Dec. 1974) 78–79; visit to London (Easter 1973) 70, 183; visit to US (July 1973) 10–11, 129 Whitlam Government: Christmas Island transmitter plan 40–41; Diego Garcia 149–156; dismissal 201; economic deterioration 16–17, 54; election Campaign/French nuclear testing 118; Federal States criticism 199; foreign policy legacy 173–174, 189n6;

Index  215 freedom from Opposition obstruction on foreign policy 198; idealism 176–178; immediate policy changes 35, 101; immigration policy changes 54–55, 56; Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 154, 177; internationalism 174–175; Labor Left influence 155; Loans Affairs (1975) 17–18; mythology surrounding 23–24; nationalism 175–176; “new nationalism” and “new internationalism” 174–178, 181; opportunism 176; overseas loan-­raising activities 16; policy advisors 198–199, 202n18; political risk of relationship with China 180–181; “question of legitimacy” 16–18; realism 24, 25; “social contract” public/government 18; symbolic changes (early) 196; Treasury officials defection 16; Ugandan Asian crisis 44, 52–56 Whitlam Government 1972–1975, The (Whitlam) 20 Whitlam, H. F. E. (father) 175 Whitlam speeches: Australian Institute of International Affairs (9 July 1963) 7; Australian Institute of Political Science (January 1973) 25; Blacktown Civic Centre (13 Nov. 1972) 19; Evatt Memorial Lecture (16 September 1966) 8; internationalism 179; National Press

Club (Washington July 1973) 10–11; “neutralising” the Indian Ocean (Whitlam) 156; progressive realism 178; relationship with UK (May 1973) 38–39; traditional economic/ social/cultural ties 7–8; United Nations (30 Sep. 1974) 156; University of Sydney (tenth anniversary of the Dismissal) 17; University of Western Australia (23 Jan. 1961) 5–6; Vietnam War 19 “Whitlamite revisionism” 178 Wilenski, Peter 129, 199 Willese, Donald 149, 186 Wilson Government: Diego Garcia 159; French nuclear testing 129–130, 131; Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) 148 Wilson, Harold: East of Suez military arrangements 103; French nuclear testing 129–130; Indian Ocean (AU policy) 158; meeting with Whitlam (Dec.1974) 78–79; military commitment in Far East (end) 92; Privy Council appeals 77–81 Woolcott, Richard 25, 185–186, 199 Yom Kippur War 152 Zaiton Ibrahim bin Ahmad 102 Zhou Enlai (Chinese Premier), meeting with Whitlam (July 1971) 99, 120