Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During the Confrontation, 1962-66 9789814377706

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The Institute. -of Southeast Asian Studies

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Australia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962-66

by

Hilman Adil

Research Notes and Discussions Series No. 4 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$ 8.00

Publications Review Committee

Professor Kernial

s.

Sandhu (Chairman)

Dr. Corazon M. Siddayao (Co-ordinator) Dr. Huynh Kim Khanh Mrs. P. Lim Pui Huen Mr. M. Rajaretnam Mrs. Christine Tan

Aus~raZia's Policy Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962-66 is ·the fourth in the Researah Notes and Discussions series published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. This series comprises contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific projects.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Hilman Adil and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

*

*

The Institute also publishes books and other papers from time to time in the following series: BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS: specialized studies on topics relating to Southeast Asia. S'OUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS: an annual revie1.v of significant political, economic and social developments in the region, with emphasis on the ASEAN countries. Contents include analyses in depth of topics of regional concern and of specific issues on a country-bycountry basis. FIELD REPORTS: studies embodying the results of, and based exclusively on, the Institute's research programme; OCCASIONA.L PAPERS: professional papers issued periodically on a variety of topics of regional interest. TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: papers and proceedings of Trends seminars held on individual Southeast Asian countries1 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: publications based on proceedings of International Conferences sponsored by the Institute itself or in conjunction with other organizations; CURRENT ISSUES SEMINARS: publications growing out of the Institute's Current Issues series of seminars, the objective of which is to bring together knowledgeable and interested people to discuss topics of current concern and importance to the region. SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: aimed at wider circulation of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are original contributions in English of Southeast Asians or translations of their significant papers and monographs appearing in one of the local or national languages of the

region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publications based on the oral memoirs of persons who have made notable contribution to, or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the developments of Singapore and Malaysia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 20 April 1977

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION I:

PATTERNS OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

3

Determinants of Australian Foreign Policy

3

Australia,s geographic location

3

The British heritage

6

Australia's Foreign Policy after World War II Australia's policy towards Indonesia after World ~.Var II II:

1

8

10

THE SETTING OF AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AGAINST MALAYSIA

15

The Political Setting in Indonesia

15

Background to the Malaysian Proposal and the Main Stages of Indonesia's Confrontation Policy

• 19

The Essentials of the Indonesian and Australian Position: Sources of Both Countries' Interests in the Malay Area

23

The Role of Sir Garfield Barwick as Minister for External Affairs

26

III: AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO INDONESIA'S OPPOSITION TO THE MALAYSIAN PROPOSAL The Pursuance of Australian Foreign Policy Objectives

30

33

The American Government's Views in Early 1963

38

The British Government's Views in Early 1963

42

The Diplomacy of "Alert Appeasement"

43

The failure of the Manila Agreements

45

The domestic political situation in Indonesia

46

The Emergence of a Threatening Indonesian Behaviour Pattern as Perceived by Australia

48

Aust.ralia 1 s position: the government, the opposition and the press

49

The Policy of "Graduated Response" The opposition's attitude On Collision Course

• IV:

53 60 61

The debate in the Security Council

62

Australia's response to the intensification of the conflict

65

American and British positions

67

The emergence of a "Jakarta-Peking axis"

69

CONCLUSION

73

Postscript

76

APPENDIX:

The problem of' Papua New Guinea

76

Regional security arrangements

78

The problem of Portuguese Timor

79

THE I1ANILA AGREEMENTS

83

INTRODUC'I'ION Before and during World War II; Australia's concern with strateg·ic and secur.i t.y matters had been focused on Australia's identity and dependence on a great power. Before lvorld '!Jar II, this meant Australia's dependence on Great Britain. Since the early 1940s, the United States had performed the role of guarantor of Australia's security. The significance of Austrqlia's relations with Indonesia relates to the fact that after World War II a new dimension has been added to Australia's strategic and foreign policy posture. Tlns paper will attempt to describe and analyse Australia's relat1ons with Indonesia from 1962 till 1966, and will pay special attention to the impact of considerations of security in Aust.ralia' s foreign policy towards Indonesia. This period, which covers the beginning of the Confrontation policy aga1nst Malaysia j_n 1962 until the end of that policy, sa~f7 a concerned Australian Government become deeply involved in the conflict" 'I'his period can be described as a period of high tension in the relations between the two countries. Plan of the Study This study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter places Australia's policy in the international context. It describes Australia's approach to international affairs, its objectives; the methods to achieve these ends, and the influence of its historical background on foreign policy issues. Australia 1 s geographical location and its historical background will be emphasized in the discussion since they have created prevailing attitudes in the Australian community, which in turn had a conditioning effec·t on the course of Australian foreign policy. The second chapter provides the setting against which Australia's policy towards Indonesia should be assessed. This involves an analysis of the political setting in Indonesia. This chapter also evaluates the essentials of the Indonesian and Australian position in the dispute. It also pays att.ention to an element which had a profound influence on the conduct of Australia's foreign policy, that is, the different operating styles of the individual person ali ties v.rho were in charge of foreign policy. Thus

2

this part deals specifically with the role of Sir Garfield Barwick in the pol1cy formulation towards Indonesia during the period of confrontation" The third chapter analyses the implementation of Australia's policy towards Indonesia since early 1963. It brings into focus the main issues involving the two countries in the period of political and military Corifrontation after the establishment of the Malaysian Federation, The 1mpact of Australia's 1nvolvement will be set against t.he background of the int.ernal political situation in Indonesia and Australia,r and the international situation. This part also pays attention to the roles of the great powers which were important elements in these developments_, The fourth chapter as a concluding chapter is a comparative analysis of trends in Australian policy towards Indones1a, since the latter's proclamation of independence in 1945. The focus is upon the different objectives of Australian policy which reacted upon the changing pattern of Indonesia's foreign policy. The remainder of this chapter is a prognosis of future developments in Indonesian-Australian relations and a discussion of crucial issues which might have an impact on their future relations, From the outset, it should be made clear that the constraint of lack of time has imposed certain limitations on the study, and therefore the conclusions must be tentativec

I:

PATTERNS OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

An analysis of factors which affect Australia's foreign policy should include an examination of its domestic forces and objectives. At the same time, such an analysis should be placed against the background of an evolving international situation, because of the frequent interaction between domestic issues and international eventso It is for this reason that this chapter will deal with the question of how political forces in Australia tend to respond to international affairs since the establishment of the Federation in 1901. The objective requirements of protecting Australia's interests place certain limits upon Australian statesmen in charge of the formulation of foreign policy. Regardless of their political philosophy or religious outlook, they always have to take into consideration two crucial factors which exercise a conditioning effect upon Australia's general interest.s. These factors are, first, Australia's geographical location and the strategic requirements arising from such a fact, and, secondly, the British heritage. The relative strength of the influences which these two factors exert have varied from period to period. Their influence has changed under the impact of party policies or powerful personalities, but only to a minor extent. As a result, these two factors in practice continuously determined Australia's foreign policy and were also responsible for the constant focus on the protection of Australia's security requirements. Determinants of Australian Foieign Policy Australia's

~eographic

location

On 9 March 1950, P.C. Spender, at that time Australia's Minister for External Affairs, stated that The foreign policy of any countr¥ must have regard primarily and constantly to [sicj its geographic situation •••. [And] our first and constant interest must be the security of our own homeland and the maintenance of peace in the area in which our country is geographically placed.l 1

Current Notes, vol, 21, 9 March 1950, ppo 153 and 172.

4

Aust.ralia is surrounded by two oceans 1 that is 1 the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Viewed in terms of its security int.erests, Australia occupies a strategic posit.ion in the Southeast Asian region. Australia's northwestern and northern coastline forms the closest border adjacent to the Indonesian Archipelago. The western coastline which juts out into the Indian Ocean gives Australia a prominent position in terms of links with Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and the Southeast Asian area.. Australia's eastern coastline is entirely surrounded by the Pacific Ocean which links it with the North and the South American continents. One can also view Australia as an island-continent surrounded on three sides by two oceans, with New Guinea and the adjacent islands forming a roof over Australia's northern coastline, This northern rim constitutes the strategic keystone of Australia's defenceo Instead of being considered as a barrier to Australia, these islands are often viewed as the weak link in its defence. The fear that Australia's security would be threatened if these islands came under the control of a hostile power was evident during the Anglo-Spanish War of 1796 and the AngloAmerican War of 1812" The belief that Australia 1 s existence was determined by who would control the islands led to the enunciation of the view (which has remained a feature of Australia's outlook) that no hostile power should be permitted to become entrenched near Australia" Seen from a strategic point of view, the Australian fears were exaggerated because the most densely populated southeastern region of Australia is located at such a long distance from these islands that the areas in between constituted a barrier to invasion. Exposure on three Sldes to two oceans had created important consequences for Australia's security. First, Australia lies at the end of the world's most important sea-routes across the Indian and Pacific Oceans which carry the bulk of its external trade. The three principal routes until the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 were, first, the route across the Indian Ocean between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal (constituting 41.9% of Australia's trade) and the route to the Arab States in the Middle East (6.1% of Australia's oil imports come from these states) ;2 2

T,B, Miller~ Australia's Press~ 1965), p, 33,

Defence (Melbourne:

Melbourne University

5

secondly, across the Pacific Ocean to the North and South American continents, and finally, through the Pacific and Indian Oceans to Japan and Southeast Asia. If these routes should come under the control of a country or countries hostile to Australia, its existence would certainly be threatened, since Australia lS very much dependent on external trade, Secondly, assuming that a foreign invasion would be launched from either of two sources of attack, that is, from the Asian mainland or from the Indonesian Archipelago across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it would be very difficult to maintain a close watch along Australia's entire coastline of 12,,210 miles encompassing an area of 2,974,581 square miles, However, given the present power balance in the Indi.an and Pacific Oceans such an eventuality is not likely to occur in the near future. The combined naval forces of Australia, Britain, and the United States would easily neutralize any invading threat to Australia. The vast distances over the sea would give an invading enemy great logistical problems. The predominance in naval power of the three Western allies would also guarantee the unin-r::errupted flow of goods along t.he lifelines of Australia: s existence. Given the fact that a foreign invasion launched through the Indian or Pacific Oceans is only a remote possibility, Aust.ralia 1 s military preparedness has traditionally focused on the defence of its northern coastline. This northern rim faces the sou-theastern edge of sout.heastern Asia, that is, the Indonesian Archipelago., Australiais strategic interests in the countries of Southeast Asia varies in direct proportion to the proximity of these countries to it,, 'I'hus Indonesia has the greatest importance to Aus-tralia from the strategic viewpoint In Australian eyes, a hostile Indonesian regime or the occupation of Indonesia by a hostile power would represent a direct threat to Australia 1 s security. o

Apart from the possibility of an attack on Australia through New Guinea, Ihdones1.a' s lmportance to Australia's defence lies in the control of naval and air bases in that country by a potentially hostile power. These bases in enemy hands, from which small-scale operations could be launched, would be likely t.o disrupt Australia's sea communications. Moreover, Australia's eastern as well 'as its sout.heastern seaboard, where the big· cities and

6

industries are located, would be within bombing range. From the establishment of the Federation in 1901 until the outbreak of World War II, Australia felt relatively secure. It was well protected in the north by the Dutch occupation of the Indonesian Archipelago. It had no enemies to fear from the sea, British naval power being in full control of the waters around Australia. Furthermore, a potential Japanese threat was neutralized by the AngloJapanese Naval Treaty. World War II shattered Australia's secure position. But already in the 1920s this position was eroded by the decline of British sea power in Asia, the rise of Japan as a major power, and the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty in l92o.3 Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia during World War II and the direct threat it constituted to Australia convinced many Australians about the correctness of Australia's traditional strategic thinking. The Japanese thrust towards Australia along the "Kokoda trail" in New Guinea exposed Australia for the first time in its history to the threat of a foreign invasion. In the postwar period, new factors added to the problems of Australia's security. Southeast Asia was in a state of turmoiL The withdrawal of the colonial powers left a power vacuum in the area. The emergence of China as a powerful state and as an opponent to the Western powers was confirmed by its intervention in Korea, and its professed intention of assisting "liberation movements" in Southeast Asia. The British heritage The present Australian population is small by Asian standards. Its total of about 13 million is in striking contrast to Indonesia's (about 120 million) or India's

3

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 confirmed Japan's status as a naval power. The Conference agreed to fix the tonnage of aircraft carriers and capitalships of the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy in the ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 (ibid., p. 17)'

7

4 (about 550 million) . Then both racially and culturally, the Australian population can be considered homogeneous (wi t.h the exception of the small aboriginal population) . From the early years of the establishment of the colony until World War II, a major part of the immigrants came from Britain.5 A majority of Australians until World War II still had strong attachments to Britain. To them, Britain remained the 11 Mother Country... During this period the strong identification with Britain was enhanced by a variety of factors. Australia's security was guaranteed by Britain; its external relations were mainly handled by Britain; the British educational system served as a model for the Australian educational system; and, in general, British cultural influence was extremely strong. This close identification with Britain may have been responsible for a feeling of superiority on the part of Australians towards other peoples and races. Such an at·titude has been offered as an explanation for the traditional aloofness to countries and people from the European continent and Asia.6 The early preoccupation with a policy of exclusiveness was translated int.o a trend towards isolationalism. It was intended to protect Australia in time of war against the threat of a foreign invasion, and in time of peace against the disruption of Australia's social and economic structure. The fear of a foreign invasion has been consistent throughout Australia's history. As Werner Levi puts it: In all Australian debates on foreign relations there has always been an undertone of fear which breaks out at the slightest provocation, Fear is the 11 leitmotif 11 of Australian thinking on 4

For

general and statistical information, see Year Book. of the

Commonwealth of Australia, yearly, 5

Between 1830 and 1940. when the. population reached the "7 million mark, 1,211, 663 immigrants came from the United Kingdom, See Gordon Greenwood and Norman D. Harper, eds, , Australia ·in World Affairs_, 1950-1955 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1956), p. 5,

6

Werner Levi, "Australia 1 s Foreign Policy," The For.tnighZy, vol. 162, July-December 1947, New Series, pp. 408-4H,

8

foreign policy and Australians never lack a potential aggressor. At the very early period in the country's history, France and the u.s. were suspected. Russia and Germany were added during the second half of the nineteenth century Later, China, and still later Japan replaced the Western powers. Now Indonesia, India, China and still Japan are feared as potential aggressors.? Such a concern led to the concept of "defence in depth" which meant that the first ring of Australia's defence should be drawn as far as possible from the Australian continent. Based upon this consideration the Australian colonialists urged the British Government, which was responsible for Australia's external relations, to annex most of the unclaimed islands surrounding Australia at the end of the nineteenth century. The British Government, however, did not respond to these pleas. This was one of the important factors which led to the establishment of the Federation in 1901. The policy of exclusiveness was rationalized on the basis of a desire to avoid social and economic conflicts. Economic conflicts already occurred during the 1840s when fierce competitive practices by cheap Chinese labour in the gold fields in Eastern Australia and the ~ueensland sugar fields resulted in an explosive situation. Furthermore, the influx of Asian immigrants could lead to social conflicts which would disrupt the way of life of Australians. It would result, in Professor W.K. Hancock 1 s words, in the "integral decomposition and degradation of their own civilization".8 Australia's Foreign Policy After World War II The events of 1941-42 constituted a watershed in the history of Australia's foreign policy. The fall of Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which exposed Australia for the first time in its history to the possibility of a foreign invasion, demonstrated Britain's inability to guarantee Australia's security. Recognition of this fact compelled Australia to confront the problem of extending

7

Ibid.

8

W.K. Hancock,

Austra~ia

(London:

Ernst Benn, 1930), p. 80.

9

its external relations beyond the Commonwealth context. It also meant the extension of Australian politics to foreign and defence problems. In anticipation of these developments, Labour Prime Minister J. Curtin, whose Administration came to power on 3 October 1941, made his famous appeal to the United States on 27 December 1941 The Australian Government ... regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the Unit.ed Kingdom" We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces .. ,. But we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are, therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and shall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of the battle swings against the enemyo9 After World War II, the intrusion of ideological issues, part.icularly with regard to communism, was responsible for the broadening of the content of Australian politics.. Until World War II, communism was mainly identified with industrial strikes and agitation" The non-Labour Parties from the beginning opposed communism almost entirely on the basis of this identification. The Australian Labour Party (ALP) also largely accepted this limited view of communism. Its Catholic members clearly opposed communism, but the main opposition came from the leaders of the Australian Workers Union (AWU) , the Australian Council of Trade Unions tACTU) , and trade councils and unions who objected to communist challenges to their authorityo After the war, however, with communist upris~ngs in various parts of the world and the rise of Catholic influence in the ALP's industrial groups, attitudes towards communism began to shift. By the time of the Korean War

9

Quoted in Alan Watt, The Evo~ution of Australian Foreign Poliay, 19381965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 55,

•

10

and the attempt to outlaw the Communist Party in the early 1950s, domestic communism had become linked in political controversy with its overseas manifestations. Thus communism in China, Vletnam and Malaya was seen as an external threat greater than that of communism in the trade unions, Australia's policy towards Indonesia after World War II During the struggle of independence - at least in the initial stage - neither the Australian Government's policy nor public opinion was strongly committed to the cause of Indonesian independence, Indeed, the Labour Government's support: for the. Indonesian Republic was not given immediately, and when it was finally given it was qualified, because the government still considered some Dutch tutelage over the Indonesian people necessary. Australia's policy towards Indonesia in the early years after World War II exposed the dilemma in which the Australian Government found itself. On the one hand, there was sympathy for the Indonesian struggle for independence and a genuine desire to maintain good relations with the Indonesian Republic" On the other hand, however, the possibility of a Dutch withdrawal from the Indonesian Archipelago increased Australia's sense of insecurity" The crucial question i:rtvol ved was whether the Indonesian people would use their independence favourably or unfavour:ably to Australia's interest.s. Another important question was whether they would be able to resist the communist threat. These two questions were the focal point of Australia 1 S policy towards Indonesia since the latter's proclamation of lndependence. The Labour and Liberal Parties provided different answers to these two questions, From the outset. they both agreed on the objective that Australia should be on good terms with the power that would remain in control of Indonesia. Between l945 and 1949, they differed in their assessment whether this should be the Indonesian Republic or the Netherlands. The a.nswers of the Labour Party (which was in power during this perlod)to these two questions were determined by ideological motives and to a larger extent by its assessment of the future power balance in Southeast Asia. Ideologically, the Labour leaders were opposed to colonialism

•

11

and they: therefore, showed considerable sympathy for the Indonesian independence struggle. Their long-term assessment of the Indonesian political situation was that the forces of nationalism would eventually emerge as the dominant element in control of the country. Consequently, there was no point for Australia to be in favour of prolonging colonial rule in Indonesia as the Dutch sooner or later would have to leave the country. Therefore, such a policy would unnecessarily antagonize the Indonesian people with whom Australians after all had to live. Another argument was that a policy of sustaining Dutch rule against the forces of nationalism would only undermine the latter's potential resistance to communism. Prime Minister J.B. Chifley, in particular, firmly believed that the nationalistic nature of the Indonesian movement for independence was resilient enough to preven·t any communist encroachment. There were,however, also Labour leaders like Dr. H.V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, who took a more pragmatic view of the Indonesian Republic. In principle, he agreed that the Indonesian people had the right to govern themselves but only if they were ready for it. His statement at the U.N. Conference in San Francisco on 10 May 1945,10 and his position on the Linggajati Agreementll indicated this line of thinking. Before the Dutch launched their first military action in July 1947, it was Evatt's hope that a compromise settlement between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands could be obtained. It would give self-government to the Indonesian people and at the same time would enable them to draw upon the expertise of Dutch administrators and advisers. Thus between the lines of Evatt's sympathy declarations for the Indonesian Republic, one could also detect his apprehension about Australia's security position if control of the Archipelago would suddenly and completely pass from the Dutch to the Indonesians. Evatt's initial objective, therefore, was to secure co-operation with the remaining Western powers in Southeast Asia instead of advocating their withdrawal from the area.

10

See India Quarterly, vol. 2, January 1966, p. 9.

11

H,A, Wolfsohn, "Australia's Foreign Policy and the Indonesian Dispute,"

Australian Papers: Irrrpl.iaations for Australia on Reaent DeveZ.opments in the Far East: 11th Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, India, 3-15 October 1950, p. 11,

12

Apart from the security consideration, there was also the legal aspect of the Indonesian problem. The Dutch were still recognized de Jure as the sovereign rulers and were, therefore, considered the legitimate power in control of ·the Archipelago. Evatt's legal background must have had some influence on his judgement. But at the same time, he must also have realized that a purely legalistic answer to the question of who was the power in control could not be adequatef and that the political aspect of the Indonesian problem would have a bearing on future Australian-Indonesian relations. Any decision made by the Australian Government, irrespective of the grounds, would be subjected to a political interpretation by the Indonesian people. The Lingga.jati Agreement provided Australia a way out of the dilemma which was raised by the security and legalistic aspects of the Indonesian problem. After the abrogation of the Agreement and the launching of the first military action, Australians support for the Indonesian. Republic was unqualified. This policy was pursued forthrightly and forcefully during the debates in the Security Council and through the Australian member in the Good Offices Committee (GOC). Both instances showed the limitation of Australia's influence, but within these limits, the Labour Government used its influence to the fullest possible extent in support of the Indonesian Republic. Thus despite the failure of the Security Council to react to Dutch policies to the extent the Labour Government wanted it to, the Australian objective to bring the Security Council increasingly into the dispute was achieved. Similarly, in the GOC, despite the increasing difficulties he met, the Australian member consistently worked hard to preserve the existence of the Indonesian Republic. Given these limits, it was the maximum which the Labour Government could achieve, and to that extent its policy was successful. This policy formed the basis for friendly relations with Indonesia and a.t. the same time it gave Australia a favourable image among Asian states. As far as the Liberal leaders were concerned, they were on the whole more inclined to favour the prolongation of Dutch rule in Indonesia" In terms of a. guarantee of Australian security, they thought that such a policy would be more prudent than one which aimed at friendly relations with the Indonesian Republic, especially if that would have resulted in the removal of the Dutch. They feared that, with independence in combination with political instability and inexperience, the Indonesians would be unable to wi t.hstand the onslaught of communlst aggression" Such a

13

view could be inferred from the fact that after World War II, the content of Australia's foreign policy was broadened by the int.rusion of ideological issues, particularly with regard to the threat of communlsm., Furthermore, there was also the dru1ger that a policy of supporting the ouster of the Dutch might accelerate the withdrawal of other European colonial powers from the Southeast Asian region. They further contended that a narrow interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter on noninterference in internal affairs might in the future give a pretext for some U.N. members to bring the White Aust.ralia Policy before ~he United Nations as a colonial issue. On 27 December 1949f the Menzies Government formally recognized Indonesia's independence and expressed its desire to have friendly relations with it. A legitimate question to raise was what was meant by 11 friendly relations .. and what price Australia should pay for it. Two interrelated issues which formed an obstacle to friendly relat.i.ons were the communist problem and the /"Vest Irian dispute, as the·following paragraphs show. 'l'he Liberal Government advocated primarily military measures to restrict the spread of communism" Indonesia, on the ot.her handr mistrusted the purpose of these measures as i t saw t.hem as efforts to sustain colonialism in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it had its doubts about their efficacy" Its interpretation of the aims and methods of communlsm was quite different from that of Australia. To Australiar the threat of communism was directed from Moscow and Peking and should be opposed by military strength. Indonesia, especially during the Hatta and Natsir Cabinets ln the early l950s 1 believed that communist expansion was made possible by economic poverty and social discontent in less developed societies. This difference in interpretation impeded the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries. If friendship with Indonesia required that Australia also adopt a policy of noncommitment which would have meant a renunciation of collective security arrangements, then the Liberal Government was not wi.lllng to pay this price. It firmly believed t.hat Australia r s interests could only be protect.ed through collective security measures, and it was determined to cont:inue this pol icy even at the risk of provoking Indonesia's displeasure,

14

The West Irian dispute was the other outstanding issue which proved to be an obstacle to friendly relations between Australia and Indonesia. After 1950, the fear of having a common border with an Asian power in New Guinea was the fundamental cause of Australia's opposition to the Indonesian claim. Although the responsibility for opposing the Indonesian claim after 1950 lay with the LiberalCountry Party coalition, the Labour Party, and especially Dr. Evatt, had indirectly also expressed its opposition before 1950. The West Irian issue was an issue on which the Australian people unanimously backed their g-overnment. The traditional view about West Irian's "vital importance" to Australia's security inhibited any desire to come to an agreement with Indonesia on the issue. Particularly in the context of the security aspect, there was always a point beyond which no Australian Government was prepared to go. One other factor added to Australia 1 s inflexible position on the West Irian dispute. The extreme eagerness of the Liberal Government to remain in power imposed a rigidity on Australia's policy towards West Irian. The government did not want to run the risk of going against public opinion, and it did not try to convince the Australian people of the need for new and different policies until a fo~ae majeu~e was accomplished by American intervention.

II:

THE SETTING OF AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AGAINST MALAYSIA

The Political Setting in_Indonesia In order to assess Australia's policy towards Indonesia's Confrontation policy against Malaysia, it is necessary to examine aspects of Canberra's policy in the period from the inception of Guided Democracy in 1957 till the end of the West Irian conflict in 1962. Although Canberra paid some attention to some events in Singapore and Malaysia, it was most concerned with the political situation in Indonesia after Guided Democracy, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion, and the campaign to regain West Irian, The inception of a political system called Guided Democracy, the rise of Pres1dent S~karno to a dominant position, the unopposed growing streng,th of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and other extreme left-wing organizations, and a foreign policy which was regarded as supporting Russlan and Chinese policies, were all features reflecting political developments in Indonesia since 1957. Canberra perceived these developments as detrimental to its security interests. In Canberra's view, the situation in Indonesia was further aggravated by the abolition of political parties and Parliamentary Government which was seen as further pushing Indonesia in a political direction that favoured communist and anti-Western policies. In 1957, therefore, the Australian Government came to the conclusion that conditions were created in Indonesia which would frustrate efforts to contain communist expansion in Southeast Asiae Another frustrating development in Canberra's view was the steady military build-up in Indonesia as a result of the flow of arms from the communis·t bloc which constituted a potential threat to Australia's security. On 6 April 1958, agreements were concluded for the purchase of arms totalling US$60 million 12 12

The military equipment from the East European countries included MIG jet-fighters and Ilyushin bombers~ J.'he New Yo:t>k Times, 7, 9 and 10 April 1958.

16

from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In terms of checking the drift towards communism in Indonesia, no acceptable constellation of forces could be found which would not be adverse to the West especially after the Indonesian Government was able to crush the. PERMESTA (Perjuangan Semesta) rebellion in 1958 and gradually reestablished its control in Sumatra and, later on, in Sula.wesi. The crucial factor which entirely destroyed any opti.mism over the outcome of the rebellion that Canberra might have entertained was that the effect of the rebellion was not producing a climate favourable to developments Canberra would like to see. The rebellion did not produce anticommunist pressure on President Sukarno but was in fact producing the opposite effect. Before the rebellion, Australian policies were directed towards the search for alternatives which would prevent Indonesia from becoming a communist stateo This was 6 however, one dimension of the search for a satisfactory solution for the protection of Australia's security interests. The conflict over West Irian was the other dimension. The dllemma confronting the Australian Government was 1 therefore, more complicated. To Canberra, there remained two alternatives which appeared potentially capable of checking the drift towards communism" These were the rebel movements outs1de Java, and the Army. The Army had established its political importance since the 17 October Affair in 1953.13 Many of the influential high officers, especially from the General Staff, were considered anticommunist. But the Army's

13

Thi& affair referred to the episode when t:he Army Chief of Staff, General A.H, Nasution, supported by a group of high officers (mainly fr'om the crack Siliwangi Division) P tried to gain the Army's control over the Government,, Their main objective was to reduce the status of Parliament and curtail the political parties' power, In such a political se-cting, President Sukarno would be given strong e.xecutive powers albeit in a formal sense and, therefore, subject to the Army's control, Sukarnc with the support of some regional commanders successfully resisted these demands, which subsequently led to '1asution's dismissaL See HcT. Kahin, ed,, Major Governments in As-z-a (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p, 561,

17

rank-and-file and some commanders in the field were an unknown quantity in political terms. Moreover, the 17 October Affair clearly showed that the Army was far from homogeneous. The fact t.hat there were several factions in it was progressively manifested in terms of support for or opposition to Sukarno, attitudes towards the PKI, and personal rivalries. Moreover, to Canberra the Army was less attractive as an alternative, because the attitude of an Army-controlled Government towards West Irian was not likely to differ much from Sukarno's. Therefore, the threat to Australia's security interests would still remain. The aftermath of the PRRI rebelllon gave President Sukarno the opportunity to consolidate his political power and to establish the institutions of Guided Democracy. As long as thls process of consolidation was still going on, there was little scope for undertaking a vigorous Confrontation policy. In June 1959, however, it was announced that Indonesia was no longer interested in diplomatic means for solving the West Irian conflict. Instead, it would concentrate "on a contest of power" with the Dutch.l4 Between June 1959 and August 1960, Indonesia's foreign policy with regard to West Irian went through two stages. The initial strategy was to place the dispute in its regional set.t.ing, that is, to treat it as a problem of colonialism. In the second stage, a new dimension was added which was world-wide. Although priority was still given to the regional dimension, which meant that all vestiges of colonialism should be removed from the Southeast Asian area, President Sukarno increasingly became fascinated by the role the Afro-Asian world should play in international politics. He discarded the concept of nonalignment which he believed could not cope with the problems the developing nations were facing.l5 He, therefore, favoured a militant

'1'1~mr3s~

14

The New York

31 July 1959,

15

Indications that Indonesia abandoned a policy of nonalignment were already apparent when it refrained from criticizing China for the invasion of Tibet in March 1959, It also refused to condemn Russia's resumption of nuclear testing in 1961. See

18

confrontation between the progressive forces of the world and the forces of imperialism and colonialism. Thus the concept of the newly emerging forces came into being, in which Indonesia aspired to play one of the leading roles. But the implementation of a militant Confrontation policy, both in its regional and global setting, required a modern military capability. It was with this objective in mind that Indonesia's foreign policy, from the summer of 19 60 on, focused on the ways and means to acqui:r·e a modern military establishment. In the pursuit of this objective, Indonesia increasingly drifted towards the communist bloc. After General Nasution's mission in October 1960 to acquire military arms from the United States had been rebuffed by the Eisenhower Administration, the Indonesian Government turned to the Soviet Union. Nasution visited Moscow in early 1960, where an agreement was concluded involving the purchase of heavy arms materials, estimated to be worth between US$800 million and US$1 billion.l6 As a result of Indonesia's acquisition of a modern military capability, there was understandably much concern among the Western powers, including Australia, that Indonesia would now solve the conflict by military force. Canberra also expressed great concern about these developments because the new phase in Indonesia's foreign policy indicated the beginning of its animosity against Australia. Both President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio were on record stating that Indonesia considered Australia as the main stumbling block towards a solution of the West Irian conflict.

Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy, 19601965," in Indonesia, val. 2, October 1966 (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University), pp. 34-38. 16

David P. Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian ReZations: An Overview 19551965 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-4641-PR, July 1965), pp, 34-38,

19

Background to the Malaysian Proposal and the Main Stages of Indonesia's Confrontation Policy The strategic aspect of the Malaysian conflict was the cornerstone of Australia's foreign policy during the period of confrontation. It resulted in a determined opposition to Indonesia's assertions. Canberra believed ·that the establishment of Malaysia was an important aspect of the strategy of 11 defence in dep·th 11 • There was much concern in Canberra at any indication which would upset a stabilized power configuration in Southeast Asia. One destabilizing element in Canberra's view was communist penetration and infiltration, and in particular if directed from Pekingn It wasr therefore, imperative to establish a zone of stability between Australia and China. Such a zone of stability insulated from destabilizing elements should be guaranteed by British and American power. In this zone., Malaya and Singapore were to play a vital role, In fact, before World War II these two States were already in a key position in Australia's defence strategy. This strategy retained its validity after the war, as indicated by the stationing in Malaya of P.ustralia' s most. significant military establishment abroad. Australia's forces in the area were part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve which was stationed in Malaya under the AngloMalaya Defence Treaty of 1957" At that time Tunku Abdul Rahman for the first time announced his Malaysian proposal, there was no indication whe·ther the provisions of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty would still apply after the establishment of the Federation. It is against this background that one should assess Canberra's cautious attitude. The Australian Government's concern was focused on the possibility that, after the creation of Malaysia, some restrictions might be placed on the deployment of the Commonwealth forces stationed in the a:ceao Consequently, there was little official response in Australia towards the Tunku's merger proposal since Canberra did not want to commit itself before information on specific arrangements about the deployment of Commonwealth forces became availableo Nevertheless, negotiations between the British and Malayan Governments were followed closely. The declaration after the Tunku's meetings with the British Government in London in Novembe:r 1961 removed any uncertainty about the status of the Commonwealth forces

20

which would remain unaffected after the creation of Malaysia. The Australian Government's reaction came out strongly in favour of the Malaysian proposal. On 25 November 1961, Prime Minister Menzies stated: \~e

have throughout indicated our belief that the concept was a very good one, and we hope it. will include all the countries originally indicated by the Tunku. We know that the question of the use of Singapore base is a very important one and we have emphasized this.

Having been in close touch we welcome the agreement now made. We hope that the Malaysia proposal will reach full achievement as soon as possible. As in the case of the Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 ""'we will give consideration to Australia's association with the new agreement in appropriate form.l7 The British and Malayan Governments reached an agreement in London on 1 August 1962 which decided that "the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31 August 1963."18 In December 1962, a revolt broke out in Brunei which was soon crushed by British troop reinforcements. The rebellion received strong· support from the Indonesian Government. Canberraf on the other hand, condemned the rebellion. Sir Garfield Barwick, the Minister for External Affairs,stated: The revolt is an attempt to overthrow the constitutional government of a terri t.ory enjoying internal self-government •..• There has been no popular support for the uprising within Brunei.l9

17

Current Notes, November 1961, p, 14.

18

Malaysia: SeZeat Doauments on International Affairs, no, 1, 1963 (Canberra: Department of External Aftairs), pp, 104-105.

19

Ibid .

21

Soon after the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, the Indonesian Government proclaimed its opposition to the Malaysian proposal. The trend for a vigorous Confrontation policy gradually emerged. On 9 December 1962, President Sukarno promised to encourage the spread of rebellion to British Borneo. Foreign Minister Subandrio, in a speech to the Mahakarta Regiment in Yogyakarta on 20 January 1963, had this to say Now the President has decided that henceforth we shall pursue a policy of confrontation against. Malaysia. This does not mean that we are going to war. This is not necessary. However, one thing is certain, that we will no longer take a passive attitude towards all accusations, agitations and the hostile attitude of Malaya. For this, of course, Malaya has to bear all the consequences.20 Initially, there was no opposition raised by any of the Southeast Asian countries to Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposed plan for the Federation. Even the Indonesian Government at thi.s initial stage did not oppose the Malaysian proposal.. Before the U.N" General Assembly meeting on 20 November 1961, Foreign Minister Subandrio stated: •.. when Malaya told us of its intention to join wi t.h the three British Crown Coloni.es of Sarawak, Brunei, and British Borneo, we told them that we had no objections, and that we wished them success with their merger, so that every one might live in peace and freedome21 The shift in Indonesia's policy towards t.he Malaysian proposal introduced the first stage in its policy of confrontati.on (December 1962-September 1963) , which had a limited objective, that is, to prevent the creation of Malaysia. This, the Indonesian leadership felt, should be achieved by first, encouraging further uprisings from within the Federation, as for example the Brunei revolt; secondly, initiating a propaganda offensive, coupled with

20

The Strat-&s Times, 26

21

Quoted in Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in In~ernational. DipZomacy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), p, 67.

January 1963.

22

covert military aid to 11 freedom fighters" of the territories in North Borneo: and thirdly, developing a diplomatic strategy to delay the creation of Malaysia. The diplomatic method remained the main instrument until mid-1963, through which the limited objective could be achieved. The deployment of diplomacy in this first stage resulted in the Manila Agreements. Because of misinterpretations, but above all mistrust of each ot.her' s intentions, these Agreements proved abortive. After the failure of the Manila Agreements to solve the conflict, events in September 1963 led to the second stage in Indonesia's Confrontation policy. Thus Malaysia was accused of the breach of the Manila Agreements, which was followed by Indonesia's refusal to recognize the new Federation when it was formed. Subsequent burning and looting of the British and Malayan Embassies in Jakarta was followed by the cutting of all commercial ties between Indonesia and Malaya. The second stage in Indonesia's Confrontation policy (September 196 3-·June 196 4) still relied heavily on the diplomatic instrument - by making efforts to rediscover a basis for the return to the Manila Agreements. However, conferences held in Bangkok (February-March 1964) and in Tokyo (June 1964) were all abortive. During this stage, Indonesia's relations with the Western countries received a further setback as a result of a major shift in the power configuration in Indonesia, which was reflected by the ascendancy of the radical left-wing elements at the expense of the moderates in the government. The political survival of the latter group depended on the success of the u.s.sponsor:ed economic stabilization programme which was initiated in 1963. The success of this programme in turn depended on the effective utilization of resources in Indonesia. The Confrontation policy, however, made this virtually impossible. Indonesian-American relations further deteriorated as a result of the discontinuation of U.S. aid. The American Government apparently had given up any hope that it could employ economic aid effectively as a lever to restrain Indonesia's policy of confrontation. The hardening of this policy of confrontation became visible with the proclamation of Dwikora, the mobilization of "volunt.eers" in May 1964 to fight Malaysia and in June 1964 after the failure of the Tokyo negotiations. These events introduced the third stage in Indonesia's Confrontation policy (Ju.ly 1964-December 1964) , which saw

23

an escalation of the military conflict when Indonesian forces made two attempted landings on the Malay Peninsula. However, a British threat in September 1964 to launch counter-strikes against naval and airforce bases in Indonesia had a restraining effect on further military escalation of the conflicto Again Indonesia relied heavily on diplomatic efforts by putting pressure on Malaysia to negotiate a return to the Manila Agreements in retur:n for its participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algiers in 1965. The fourth and final stage of Indonesia's policy of confrontation (January 1965-0ctober 1965) started with Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965. Although it indicated a further hardening of the Indonesian position, there .,was no evidence of an escalation of military conflict. Instead, Indonesia put the emphasis on a Peking-oriented foreign policy within the framework of a dialectic process of struggle between the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Forces. The further drift towards Peking, the cutting of economic aid from t.he West in conjunction with an accelerated price inflation, the increased influence of the PKI which alarmed the anticommunist forces, precipitated a crisis situation in Indonesia which finally erupted in the abortive coup of 30 September 1965. Events after this marked the beginning of Indonesia's abandonment of its Confrontation policy. The Essentials of the Indonesian and Australian Position: Sources of both Countries' Interests in the Malay Area Until the formal establishment of the Malaysian Federation in September 1963, the Indonesian position in its Confrontation policy against Malaysia revolved around four main categories of argument:22

22

a.

On ideological grounds: Malaysia was a neocolonialist creation of Britain and imposed upon the people against their will.

b.

On security grounds: Malaysia was a threat to Indonesia's security and to the peace in Southeast Asia.

J.A,C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, 'l'he Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-

1966 (Kuala Lumpur:

Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 8-9.

24

c.

On historical grounds: Imperialist and neocolonialist powers were a threat ·to the existence of the developing countries and should be opposed at all cost. Since these powers' influence in Southeast Asia would eventually be eliminated from the area, Malaysia could never be a viable State.

do

On legal grounds: Malays1a was created, despite the violation of the Manila Agreements.

Indonesia argued that Malaysia was merely a device to maintain British power in the Southeast Asian area. It was a British neocolonialist scheme to protect its strategic and economic interests with the co-operation of the feudal rulers in Malaya and Chinese businessmen who had a vested interest in the perp:tuation of the established order created by the colonial rulers, Furthermore, the creation of Malaysia with Singapore remaining as a British base under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was a potential threat to Indonesia's security. The experience of foreign intervention during the PRRI rebellion in 1958-59 which used Malaya as a base were still vividly recalled in Jakarta. The Malaysian scheme, therefore, was believed to aim at the encirclement and subjugation of Indonesia. Historically, the Indonesian Government argued that the creation of Malaysia was an anachronism, since it could only survive by continued British aid. This was seen as an attempt to "stem the tide of history" by preventing the Southeast Asian people from deciding their own destiny in their own way. Placed in the context of a global conflict between the "Old Established Forces" and the "New Emerging Forces 11 , Malaysia was doomed to failure. America's problems in the Vietnam War was an indicat.ion of the ultimate defeat of the 11 0ld Established Forces". Britain's initiative in the creation of Malaysia was considered outside interference which could only lead to wars and conflicts in the area. At any rate, Indonesia argued, it was not up to Britain to decide what constitutes peace or stability in Southeast Asia. It is the people in the area who should be given a chance to sort out any problems in their own way. In short, 11 Asian problems should be solved by Asians in the Asian way."

25

In a legal sense, the Indonesian Government's refusal to accept the U.N. Mission's report and to grant immediate recognition to Malaysia on 16 September 1963 was based on the contention that the Manila Agreements had been violated. This contention was the main argument used during the negotiations in Bangkok and Tokyo. In Jakarta's view, the Manila Agreements were violated because, long before the U.N. Mission had completed its enquiry, the date of formation of the Malaysian Federation on 16 September was announced in London on 29 August 1963. 23 The Australian position which opposed the Indonesian arguments was basically the same as Br1tain's, although with rather different nuances reflecting their more sensitive relationship with Indonesia. a.

The Australian Government rejected the Indonesian argument that Malaysia was a neocolonialist creation. In fact, it provided a framework which would allow the process of decolonization in a peaceful way. By incorporating Malaya, Singapore, the two British colonies Sabah and Sarawak, and the British protectorate Brunei into a viable state, the new Federation would significantly contribute to stability in the area by its capacity to resist the encroachment of communism in the area. 24 As for the Indonesian contention that the Malaysian proposal was against the wishes of the people, Canberra argued that a British-Malayan Commission of enquiry under Lord Cobbold was able to ascertain the opinion of the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo which turned out to be in favour of the proposal. A similar result was obtained during a referendum held in Singapore. A U.N., Commission of enqu1ry also confirmed that the Malaysian proposal was not being forced upon the people against their wishes.

23

For the basic elements in Australia's policy, see Peter Boyce, "Canberra's Malaysia's Policy," Australian Ou&Zook, voL 17, no. 2, August 1963, pp. 149-161.

24

See the statement of Menzies en 17 November 1961 November 1.961, p. 14,

~n

Cu1•rent Notes,

26

b.

The Indonesian contention that Malaysia constituted a threat to Indonesia and to the peace in Southeast Asia was unacceptable and unconvincing to the Australian Government. Rather than consider Malaysia as a threat to the peace in the area 1 Canberra believed that the British presence after Malaysia's formation was essential to the stability of the region. British forces in the area were committed to defend Malaysia under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement and were not there to threaten any State in Southeast Asia.

c.

The ant.ii.mperialist and antineocolonialist justification of Indonesia's Confrontation policy presented a most serious threat to Southeast Asia because its objectives were more or less identical to those of Peking< It was, ·therefore, quite possible that the Indonesian Government was in fact serving Communist China's purposes ln Southeast Asia. Such a possibility became more credible after Subandrio's statement on the co-ordination of both countries' policies towards Malaysia, after his meeting with China's Fo~eign Minister, Chen Yi, in August 1965.25

The Role of Sir Garfield Barwick as Minister for External Affairs The Australian Government's policy on the Indonesian Confrontation policy towards Malaysia was to some extent, at least in its initial stagef influenced by Sir Garfield Barwick 1 who vJas the Liberal Party's Minister for External Affairs from December 1961 till early 1964. Although Prime Minister Menziescs influence on the general conduct of Australia 1 s foreign policy was still strong, nevertheless Barwick left his mark on Australia 1 s policy during the period of confrontation.26

25

Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1965,

26

Professor G. Greenwood asserts that Australia's foreign policy is made by relatively few powerful political personalities, See G. Greenwood and N, Harper, AustraUa in Wo1old Affairs, 1956-1960 (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1963), p, 4,

27

In reviewing the period of Barwick's tenure, one cannot fail to be struck by his preoccupation with Southeast Asian affairs which in his view should be the most significant aspect of Australia's foreign relations, and, therefore ••. it is not only natural, but of greater utility to the cause of the free world, that we undertake and plan to make our main military and economic aid effort in the South and Southeast Asian region and that we therefore exert our maximum diplomatic effort.27 From the outset, he firmly believed that relations between states cannot be determined by power politics. On 25 January 1964, he stated No country today .•. ,however powerful and however much it would like to be ruthless in pursuit of its own national purposes, can pursue them regardless of the views of others •••• 2 8

No doubt, Barwick's legal training had deeply influenced his approach to international politics which considered power to be treated with suspicion. In addition, his view on international affairs was greatly affected by his attachment to diplomatic methods guided by accepted norms of international conduct to attain foreign policy objectives. These two elements were responsible for Barwick's interest in helping to bring about a negotiated and peaceful settlement in international disputes. For example, he was instrumental in diplomatic attempts to bring Indonesia and Malaysia together during Confrontation. These attempts were carried out in Manila in March 1963, when Barwick had a series of talks with Dr. Subandrio. On Australia's policy towards Indonesia, Barwick realized that due to the low level of interaction between

27

Sir Garfield Barwick, "Australia's Foreign Policy," mimeographed, speech delivered on 25 January 1964 at the 30th Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science held in Canberra, P• 8.

28

Ibid,, p, 1.

28

the two countries, the structural framework which could regulate their relations effectively was virtually nonexistent. The absence of such a structural framework which could easily lead to misjudgement of each other's intentions resulting in open conflict made the tasks of diplomacy extremely difficult. Soon after he became Minister for External Affairs in December 1962, Barwick vigorously set out to undertake such a task. His role during the height of the West Irian crisis, which came close to a shooting war, was an example of it. Such diplomatic activities would involve extensive efforts to comprehend views and claims which were not necessarily in agreement with Australia's policy. This required a reassessment of images of other people.'s aims and intentions, acquired over a prolonged period of time. Barwick warned in this context that, since Australians were relatively new to international life, their tendency was not only to be conservative in relation to change, but also to display a mistrust of it. He said: Countries with a different history, different background and national philosophy to our own, particularly where we are ignorant of that history, background and philosophy, often appear alarming and even sinister to our people.29 Barwick chided those people who took President Sukarno's policy statements seriously: .•• we are apt to give to the slightest reported word of any of their leaders, a significance we would not dream of giving to life language of our own political leaders. One never assumes that their leaders do not mean what they say although much is said for domestic consumption unmindful or careless of what other audiences may infer.30 Due to Ba~ick's unceasing diplomatic efforts during the period of confrontation in explaining Australia's position to the Indonesian Government, the framework of

30

Ibid., pp. 2-3.

29

Australian-Indonesian relations became more structured. This meant that issues became more specific, indicating that boundaries of action were further delineat.ed. Interests became more distinct as each country purposely defined its areas of concern. On the Australian Government's side, it was made clear to Jakarta that there were limits to Indonesian demands. Thus while "Australia's policy towards Indonesia will continue to be one of seeking to promote sound, friendly relations without sacrificing Australia's interests o • o Indonesia cannot expect that Australia can do other than condemn breaches of accepted international obligations and of accepted norms of international conduct."31 In response, Jakarta made great efforts to restrain any adverse steps which could harm Australian-Indonesian relations. Thus, at the time when the British and Malaysian Embassies in Jakarta were burned and looted, the Australian Embassy was spared. Also little reference was made by Indonesian officials to any intention to invade the Australian territories in New Guinea. Furthermore, Australia was never put in the same category as Britain which was branded as a 11 neocolonialist 11 power.

31

Ibid,

III:

AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO INDONESIA'S OPPOSITION TO THE MALAYSIAN PROPOSAL

The Australian Government's initial response to Indonesia's declaration of Confrontation against the Malaysian proposal was to play down the heat generated by i t and to minimize its impact on public opinion. The reason for its caution was that Canberra was determined to avoid a conflict with Indonesia at this juncture. Thus, in nearly every declaration opposing Indonesia's policy during the first part of 1963, official Australian spokesmen avoided any unfriendly references"· to Jakarta and also made appeals urging Jakarta not to impair the nominally good relations between the two countries. Against this consideration which confronted the Australian Government was Australia's commitment to support Malaysia because of both cduntries• membership in the British Commonwealth and the implications of Malaysia's stability and prosperity for Australia as part of the strategy of "defence in depth".32 The significance of these two potentially conflicting objectives reflects Australia's ambivalent reaction to Indonesia's Confrontation policy, which more or less continued until the demise of the Sukarno Government in 1966. Reflecting this basic dilemma which confronted Canberra, Barwick stated: " ..• we have a special ·relationship with Malaya ••• as a Commonwealth country We also have a particular interest in the friendship of Indonesia."33 At the end of 1962, however, the Australian Government's freedom to manoeuvre was circumscribed by the hardening of public opinion and anti-Indonesian sentiments in the daily press. As one writer puts it: Unfortunately for the Indonesian image in Australia, Jakarta embarked on.her "confrontation" with Malaya at the very 32

Paul Hasluck, Minister of Defence, on 25 September 1963, CPD (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates), H.R. (House of Representatives), 25 September 1963, p. 1378.

33

Current Notes, March 1963, p. 31.

31

time when wide segments of official and public opinion in this country was somewhat sceptical of Soekarno's bona fides in West Irian and somewhat ashamed at Australia's ready accommodation of Soekarno's policy there.34 The editorial opinions, which appeared in the daily press, ranged from caution and restraint to outright opposition to Indonesia's policies. Representative of the latter opinion which was shared by many Australians was the Sydney Morning He.ra~d, probably the most vigorous anti-Indonesian newspaper in Australia. It argued for political and, if necessary, military resistance to Indonesian "expansions" and accused the Australian Government of a policy of appeasement.35 The Melbourne Age, on the other hand, urged for caution and restraint, and, in an attempt to understand the Indonesian position, agreed with the policy towards West Irian, that is, to accept the inevitability of Indonesian control over West Irian. 36 As far as the Federal Parliament was concerned, little interest was displayed during the first part of 1963. One reason for this was that when the Brunei rebellion broke out in December 1962, Parliament was in recess and did not reconvene until 26 March 1963. Another probable reason was that those members who took an interest in the development of the area did not oppose the general objectives of the government's foreign policy. The hardening of public opinion was revealed in a public opinion survey conducted in April 1963. It indicated a tendency among many Aus.tralians to favour Malaya. Asked if Australia should fight to defend Malaya or the North Borneo Territories if they were attacked by Indonesia, 55% was in favour of militarily opposing Indonesia, whereas only 22% wished to reject it.37

34

Boyce, "Canberra's Malaysian Policy," op.cit., p. 149.

35

Quoted in ibid,, p. 150.

36

Quoted in ibid.

37

AustraLian PubLic Opinion Po Us, nos. 1676-1687, May-June 1963.

32

As a result of these sentiments, a growing interest in defence and foreign policy issues among Australians emerged. Both the Liberal Party and the ALP tried to turn it to their electoral advantage. There were already signs of a change in the ALP's attitude towards the Malaysian issue. On 12 March 1963, the Leader of the Opposition Labor Party, A.A. Calwell, stat.ed that the ALP would oppose any Australian conuni tment to defend Malaya or a Malaysian Federation.38 This position was adopted during a Special Labor Party Conference on defence and foreign affairs on 18 March 1963 in Canberra" A Resolution was tabled to that effect, urging that Australian forces stationed in Malaya should not be conunitted without "a clear and public treaty which accords with the principle of this declaration, and which gives Australia an effective voice in the arrangements."39 A division in the ALP on the issue became evident after an amendment to the Resolution was put to a vote. This amendment urged for a return to the policy established in 1955, which called for a withdrawal of Australian forces from Malaya. However, the amended Resolution was defeated by a tied vote {19-18) .. The Resolution, without. t.he amendment, was similarly defeated. 'rhe Conference, however, made clear from the outset that it supported the Malaysian proposal and opposed Indonesia's policy of confrontation. The ALP Leadership (A. Calwell and his Deputy, realized the need to adjust Labor policies to a changing external environment. To that effect, in the face of a pending election in 1963, a more pragmatic foreign policy platform should be formulated which would have an appeal not only to a majority of the ALP's rankand-file but also to non-Labor voters. At the ALP Conference in Perth in late 1963, a new Labor platform on foreign policy - which supported an Australian troops commitment in Malaysia on the condition that such a commitment should be clearly and formally defined - was unanimously approved. Go Whitlam)

Mo1~ing

HeraZd, 12 March 1963.

38

Sydney

39

Quoted in Henry Albinski, Aus"traZian PoZic'ies and Att'i.tudes toward Ch'ina (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 205.

33

The Pursuance of Australia's Foreign Policy Objectives The beginning of Confrontation posed some crucial questions for the Australian Government. All of them had a bearing on the problem if Australia and Indonesia became involved in a military conflict" Firstly, the American policy of "noninvolved cordiality .. towards the Malaysian con:Elic·t increasingly worried Canberra, since it also might ent.ail a difference in both countries' interpretation of America's commitments under ANZUS, the pact between Australia, New Zealand and United States. It meant that the United States would consider Malaysia beyond ANZUS's scope of operation. This possibility was reinforced by America 1 s involvement in the Vietnam War, which made the U.,S, more reluctant to get involved in another area of conflict" According to Canberra, if the UoS. would consider the Malaysian dispute outside the scope of ANZUS, then Australia would be in the same position as during the West Irian crisis. Such a situation, in conjunction with Indonesia us increased military strength and Russian and Chinese support for Indonesia, would merely encourage Indonesia to undertake a policy of aggression. If t.his should happen, the whole Southeast Asian area would be transformed into an arena of conflict. Canberra, therefore, believed that American adherence to its commitments under ANZUS which should also apply to the Malaysian conflict, would be an effective deterrent to any Indonesian encroachment in the area. The first priority in Australia's policy wasi therefore, to make sure that the American position would be different from the one adopted towards the conflict over West Irian. Secondly 1 it was also important. to know about the extent of Britain's commitment to defend Malaysia. Thirdly, the steady military build-up in Indonesia constituted a potential threat to Australia:s security, since it could also be turned against Australia. The Australian Government decided to counteract this trend by trying to induce Jakarta to solve the conflict by negotiations instead of the deployment of military force. Fourthly, as a result of Indonesia's Confrontation policy; the political climate in Australia gradually focused on defence and foreign policy issues which most probably would decide .the next election" It came into sharper focus because of the general public's discontent

34

with the government's defence policies, which left Australia unprepared in the face of a conflict situation. The possibility now emerged that the Liberal-Country Party Government would be defeated in the next election. The government's objective, therefore, was to convince the electorate of the government's determination to build up i t.s armed forces. In early 1963, the Australian Government took steps to attain these objectives. It involved diplomatic discussions with Australia's principal allies and both parties to the dispute. In early March 1963, Canberra discussed the Malaysian proposal and the possible repercussions after the Federation was created, with General Sir Richard Hull, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Selkirk, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, and T.K. Critchley, Australia's High Commissioner to Malaya. The purpose of the two British officials' visit was apparently to find out whether Australia was prepared to honour its commitments under the Anglo-Malaya Defence Treaty of 1957 after Malaysia's inception" 40 However 1 Canberra did not want to commit itself at this stage. First, there was no assurance how long Britain intended to contribute to the defence of Malaysia after its establishment. This would involve the problem that, in case Australia made commitments to defend Malaysia, it would be left carrying an increased burden of responsibility after a British withdrawal. Secondly, through its communication with Washington, Canberra was already informed about the American policy of noncommitment on the Malaysian issue. Thirdly, the Australian Government needed some freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre to bring the parties to the dispute together and negotiate a peaceful settlement. On 5 March 1963, a Cabinet meeting was held to discuss for the first time the Malaysian issue. Barwick issued a statement afterwards, which did not contain a significant departure from previous official statements on the conflict. He stated that "apart from its interest in the prosperity

40

The Age,

4

March 1963,

35

and well-being of Malaya and its friendship for a close Commonwealth neighbour, [Australia] has a direct concern in the stability of the area". As such, the Malaysian proposal should be supported as "a major act of orderly decolonization". But still, Malaya was "primarily the concern of Britain". 41 However, Barwick's statement together with the subsequent announcement that "one half of the Navy's combat strength would be assigned to the Commonwealth Far Eastern Strategic Reserve",42 was interpreted in Australia and Malaya as a departure from the government's previous posture, specifically in terms of an official commitment to defend Malaysia after its inception. The Sydney Morning Herald stated in an editorial that "the Australian Government now, it seems, abandoned ••. the policy of appeasement of Indonesia ..•• "43 The Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman stated on 19 March that Australia had promised to support Malaya, if an armed conflict would occur as a result of Indonesia's Confrontation policy.44 Probably this statement which embarrassed the Australian Government was an effort on the part of the Tunku to put pressure on Canberra to come out in the open and to follow Britain with public assurances of extended military aid for Malaysia. The Australian Government, however, refused to accommodate the Tunku and declined to announce any commitments. Prime Minister Menzies made clear on 12 March that Australia's policy on the matter would not go beyond Barwick's 5 March statement.45 The Leader of the Opposition, A.A. Calwell, reacted to the alleged change in Australia's policy by stating

41

Current Notes, March 1963, p. 36.

42

Boyce, "Canberra's Malaysian Policy," op.cit., p. 154.

43

Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March 1963.

44

Ibid., 12 March 1963.

45

Ibid., The Tunku's statement was subsequently withdrawn and the Tunku apologized to the Australian Government stating that he was misquoted, Straits Budget, 20 March 1963.

36

that the Labor.Party would oppose any Australian commitment to defend the Malaysian Federation. After Menzies's clarifying statement, however, he was satisfied that such a commitment had not been given.46 The Australian Government's position was restated by Barwick upon his arrival from Manila on 15 March to the effect that Australia had no formal obligation to give armed support to Malaysia in the event of an Indonesian attack. He emphasized that under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty of 1957, Australia was only indirectly committed to defend Malaya. Furthermore, these commitments, which were given through the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, did not automatically cover Malaysia after its inception.47 However, this statement was less than satisfactory to some Australian newspapers, since it did not clarify Australia's position and its commitments on the Malaysian issue. There was a concern that Australia had to face the same situation as during the West Irian crisis. The West Australian stated on 19 March 1963 in an editorial that .•. there is a danger as well as doubt in Canberra's failure .to define the Australian position in its entirety ••.. We are entitled to know the precise extent of the commitment to Malaya, which Sir Garfield described as indirect and carrying no formal .obligation to give armed support to Malaysia if it is attacked. This is woolly talk such as befogged Australia's attitude to West New Guinea. The dilemma facing the Australian Government, and which was clearly perceived by Barwick, was not fully appreciated by his critics. As one newspaper in an editorial puts it: Australia needs friendship with both Indonesia and Malaya, but if Indonesia forces a crisis we cannot sit on the fence. After the New Guinea affair, Canberra's obsession with the idea that we must never do anything to offend

46

Ibid., 12 March 1963,

47

Ibid"' 16 March 1963.

37

the Sukarno regime at any price would result in our being contemptuously disregarded not only by Jakarta but also by our American ally. 48 Barwick, in fact, could not come out with a firm declaration of Australian support for Malaysia without offending Jakarta's sensitivities. At this stage, Barwick was not prepared to abandon the Australian Government's desire to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia. He also might have felt that provoking Indonesia's hostility at this stage could not be reconciled with the role of mediator to which he was aspiring. For this reason, Barwick strongly endorsed a Summit meeting between the parties to the dispute: I thought the idea of this conference should be supported. It could very well make a great contribution towards removing misunderstandings and misconceptions .o. and it could ease the tensions.49 He felt relatively optimistic that such a Summit meeting could solve the dispute without resort to force. He, therefore, felt that Australia should not commit itself on the issue, before the outcome of such a meeting became known. Furthermore, on the basis of his talks with Subandrio, he believed that the Indonesian Government would accept the proposed Federation, if it was consulted and informed on the Malaysian plan. Barwick found it for this reason necessary to convince the Malaysian Government of the need to provide Jakarta with an explanation along these lines.SO These Australian diplomatic efforts were seen as an exercise of Australia's power in the region on the basis of a policy which carried all the rights and responsibilities of a nation 1 s recognized interests". 5 1 11

48

The West Australian, 5 March 1963.

49

Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1963.

50

Bruce Grant, The Age, 16 March 1963.

51

Ibid.

38

It was in such a context that Barwick, in a series of statements,tried to clarify Australia's posture on the Malaysian issue, which to his critics seemed ambivalent. On 15 March 1963, Barwick stated: " .•. there is reason to think that Malaysia could come into existence with at least much less opposition and perhaps an absence of it """we can say that Australia's part has been useful in this connection ... But on the crucial question where Australia would stand if Indonesia.should attempt to intervene with force in North Borneo against a project Australia had supported, Barwick refused to state whether Australia was obliged to assist since this was a hypothetical question. 52 On 26 March 1963, Barwick stated before the Parliament that Australia had no formal alliance with Malaya. Nevertheless, Australia regarded Malaysia's security of 11 direct significance" to its own security.53 On 27 March 1963, Barwick's subsequent statement before Parliament was more revealing. He stated the nature of Australia's commitments under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement which was stipulated in an exchange of letters between the two governments in 1959. Australia admitted in it that Malaysia was vital to its security. However, at this juncture, Barwick could not state whether Australia's commitments would be the same after Malaysia's creation, since the matter 11 has not yet been discussed with the Malayan Government ... 54 It was clear that Barwick was not prepared to make a formal commitment, while the situation remained fluid and where a negotiated settlement could be obtained. The American Government's Views in Early 1963 In mid-February 1963, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sir Arthur Tange, held discussions in

HeraZd~l6

52

Sydney Morning

53

0~D~

54

Ibid., val. 38, 27 March 1963, p. 130.

March 1963.

H.R., val. 38, 26 March 1963, p. 4,

39

Washington with high officials of the American Government, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman, and the Director of the State Department's office of Southwest Pacific Affairs David Bell. The purpose of Tange's visit was probably to sound out the American views and also to propose American diplomatic intervention by persuading Jakarta to accept the Malaysian proposal.55 But most likely, his primary mission was to find out about America's interpretation of its commitments under ANZUS. However, President Kennedy's assurances, stated in a press conference on 14 February 1963, to support the Malaysian proposal and similar assurances given to Senator J. Gorton, the Australian Minister for the Navy, while on a visit to Washington,56 proved less than satisfactory to Canberra. The American Government was apparently determined not to get involved in any conflict in Asia South of Vietnam, and would not give its support to its allies at this juncture if the creation of Malaysia would lead to armed conflict with Indonesia. The American Government's assessment of the Malaysian conflict was greatly influenced by the political situation in Indonesia. It thought that the acquisition of Russian arms in conjunction with President Sukarno's repudiation of a policy of nonalignment and Moscow and Peking's support of this policy gave an increasingly leftward thrust to Indonesia's foreign policy. Washington was anxious to slow t.he drift towards either Moscow or Peking by strengthening the noncommunist elements, especially the Army leadership, and thus to make sure that in the event of Sukarno's death or elimination, the PKI would not be permitted to seize power. In addition, the u.s. was firmly committed to the defence of South Vietnam, which was regarded as the line of containment where a stand should be made to contain communism in Southeast Asia. Therefore, no conflict could be permitted behind that line of containment which could be a distraction from the primary objective of establishing a defence-line upon which the U.S. could fall back to block the Southward expansion of communism. 55

The Age, 14 February 1963.,

56

Ibid., 20 February 1963,

40

Here we must compare Australia's strategic interests with those of the U.S. It would be reasonable to assume that both countries' interests would not permit the military destruction by Indonesia ·of the proposed i1alaysian Federation. But these strategic interests could not be of the same order of priority. To Canberra, it was of vital importance that Indonesia's military strength should not. reach the stage when it could become an acute threat to Australia, especially since both countries were sharing a common border after the dissolvement of the West Irian conflict. The American Government, on the other hand, in early 1963 considered the Indonesian Confrontation policy with less alarm than Canberra. First of all, America's vital interests were not involved. Secondly, Washington was predominantly concerned about the escalating aspect of the Vietnam War. Thirdly, Washington still hoped to use its economic aid to Indonesia as a lever to restrain the Indonesian Government. And finally, the American Government felt that the situation could settle down after a cooling-off period. In its foreign policy recommendation to the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations on 24 February 1963, a Senate subcommittee, headed by Senator Mike Mansfield, followed the same line of reasoning: The general principle of strict noninvolvement ••• would appear to apply to the emerging Malaysian Federation . •• . it would seem to be desirable continue to maintain the position of noninvolved cordiality.

to

··" there can be no justification for the kind of one-sided aid involvement which has appeared elsewhere, ..• [any complications] would appear to involve in the first instance the Commonwealth nations.57 This American view was made clear to Malaya's Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak on his visit to Washington 57

Vietnam and Asia: Report of Senator Mansfield, Boggs, PeZZ and Smith to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, February 1963, p. 17.

41

in April 1963, to the effect that the U.S. was only prepared to give "moral support" to Malaya.58 From the outset, however, the creation of Malaysia was considered as a contribution to the stability in Southeast Asia. But it was Britain's responsibility to protect the interests of the new Federation. As was mentioned before, the U.S" was not prepared at this stage to antagonize Indonesia because this would only play into the hands of the PKI, the Soviet Union and China Furthermore, it was also at this stage that Washington saw some prospects that the Indonesian Government would commit itself to undertake an economic rehabili ta.tion scheme and would move away from its Confrontation policy. c,

The official American position of "noninvolved cordiality" was interpreted in Australia as a policy to limit ·the U.So burden in Southeast Asia and a reminder that: America's allies should play a greater role in the area. 59 The London Economist, however, was more blunt in its assessment: "No Indonesian regime short of a blatantly Communist one would earn active American hostility, no mat.ter what harm it did to national Australian interests". 60 One writer had no illusions about America's interpretation of its commitments under the ANZUS Treaty: " ••. the Americans have reinforced the limited quality of the alliance by their policy towards •.• Malaysia ••• the U.S. will not enter into the argument over the Borneo territories, if she can avoid doing so" .61 However, the official American position received no support from the press in the U.S. The American press in general took a dim view of Indonesia's intentions and

58

Michael Leifer, "Anglo-American Differences over Malaysia," The World Today, vol. 20, 1964, p, 158.

59

The Wesr; Australian, 14 February 1963.

60

The Economist, 12 Jam1ary 1963,

61

Coral Bell, "Australia and the American Alliance," The World Today, June 1963s pp. 305-306.

42

mostly supported the Malaysian proposal. The New York Times stated in an editorial on 6 February 1963: 11 the Sukarno Government, having achieved big power military st.atus through Russian arms aid ••• is now as irresponsible as it is ambitious ..•• The best hope for stability in the area lies in the Bri tish-Malaysian plan. 11 The British Government's Views in Early 1963 The British and Australian foreign policy objectives were more or less identical. Since Tunku Abdul Rahman had made his declaration. on the formation of Malaysia in May 1961, the British Government consistently gave its unequivocal support to the Plano Some months later, the Australian Government followed suit when Menzies stated Canberra's policy towards the Malaysian proposal.62 However, both Australia and Britain acknowledged Indonesia's potential capacity to resist communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. Both countries also recognized that this threat primarily came from China, or was at least inspired by China in the case of internal communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. But their scale of priorities was different. Consequently, there was some disagreement between them regarding matters of more immediate concern in the Southeast Asia area. The Malaysian issue exposed their conflict of interest. Britain's posture on the Malaysian conflict had been unequivocal and sustained in its military implications. Britain was prepared from the very beginning to extend its commitments under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 to the Malaysian Federation. On the other hand, the Australian Government gave its unqualified pledge of military aid to Malaysia only on 25 September 1963.63 Still, despite this commitment, it was only in 1964 that active military support was given. Moreover, the first

62

Menzies's speech, 25 November 1961, Current Notes, November 1961, p, 14.

63

As stated by Menzies Ln Parliament, CPD, H,R,, vo1. 40, 1963, p, 13339,

43

Australian military units were not sent to Borneo until February 1965.64 Nevertheless, both the Australian and British Governments saw the Malaysian proposal as a step towards decolonization in the area which would at the same time ensure a considerable degree of stability. The Australian Government's posture on the Malaysian issue was more or less influenced by the American policy of "non-involved cordiality", which meant that American support in the event of armed conflict with Indonesia was far from certain. Therefore, Canberra was not prepared to commit. it.self militarily before the U.S. would give some indication of actively opposing Indonesia's Confrontation policy. The traumatic experience at the time of the West Irian crisis was still remembered, when Australia's policy suffered a setback because of lack of American support. The DiElomacy of "Alert

Appeasemen~

The Australian Government became increasingly concerned about the bitterness developing between Indonesia and the Philippines on the one side, and Malaya on the other. As was mentioned earlier, the Australian Government took a dim view of Indonesia's intentions, But given the urgency of the situation and the fact that no other alternative except. armed conflict was available, Canberra perforce had to work through diplomatic channels to attain Australia's foreign policy objectives. In March 1963, Min1ster for External Affairs Barwick went to Manila as head of the Australian delegation to the ECAFE Conference, where he had a series of talks with Foreign Minister Subandrio. The purpose was to offer Australia's assistance to settle the Malaysian dispute peacefully and to emphasize Australia's interest in participating in such regional deliberations. In addition, it. was also intended to remove Indonesia's apprehension

64

Alan Watt, The Evolu&ion of Australian Foreign Poliays 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p, 266.

44

about Malaysia's threat to its security. 65 This visit was the first of a number of-diplomatic initiatives in an attempt to secure a negotiated settlement and to avoid a direct clash with Indonesia. Earlier in February 1963, the Australian High Commissioner to Malaya, T.K. Critchley, had also been to Jakarta to sound out the Indonesian int.entions and "to try to lessen friction between Indonesia and Malaya" over Malaysia and the Brunei revolt.66 The discussion he had with Subandrio instilled in Barwick a sense of optimism about the prospects for a settlement. The various political and regional issues which confronted Australia and Indonesia and which had a bearing on the Malaysian conflict were in Barwick's judgement "susceptible to diplomatic handling and solution". He was inclined to think that there was a good chance of "the heat" going out of the situation, since Indonesia and the Philippines were prepared to hold a tripartite meeting with Malayao67 The result of the preliminary talks between the parties to the dispute was the adoption of a formula for exploratory talks" At this stage, neither party was prepared to change its previous attitude towards the other. But at least they agreed to accept President Macapagal's proposal to have further talks on a summit level.

65

It is not likely that the substance of these discussions will ever be revealed, since no transcripts of the talks were made at that time. The only person present besides Barwick and Subandrio, was K.C.O, Shann, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta; see Bruce Grant, Indonesia, Melbourne: 1964, pp. 163164. The British Government apparently was not very pleased with Barwick's mediating efforts, J,A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 129.

66

Straits Times, 28 February 1963,

67

The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1963.

Critchley had discussions with President Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders with \vhom he had established cordial relations when he was the Australian member of the U.N. Committee of Good Offices during the struggle for independence.

45

These preliminary talks, however, exposed the basic difficulty of encouraging the parties to solve their disagreements by negotiation.6B The crucial question involved was which problems should be discussed. The Malaysian Government, for example, was not prepared to give in to Indonesian demands that the Malaysian proposal and the preconditions for the termination of Confrontation should be put on the agenda of a Summit meeting, The Malaysian position was that the purpose for further talks was to explain the reasons for the Malaysian proposal and would exclude any negotiation pertaining to the timing or terms on which Malaysia would be formed. The Indonesian Government, on the other hand, argued that a face-saving device should be formulated which would give President Sukarno some tactical excuse to explain why the abandonment of Confrontation would not be contradictory to the doctrine of the New Emerging Forces. The crucial dilemma facing the Malaysia and Australian Government, however, was to find out the real objectives of Sukarno were in initiating his policy of confrontation. The pivotal question was whether Sukarno had any intention to solve by negotiation any outstanding issue between Indonesia and Malaya. The answer to this question would decide whether results could still be obtained by negotiations. Eventually, a basis for further discussion was found in Macapagal's proposal for a loose confederation between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. Such a framework would at least minimize Indonesia's apprehension about Malaysia 1 s threat to its security. Agreement was also reached on the date for a Summit meeting on 5 April 1963. The failure of the Manila Agreements On 31 July 1963, the Manila Agreement was signed by the parties to the dispute.69 The Agreement was perceived 68

Mackie, op.cit., pp, 129-130,

69

Boyce, op,cit., pp, 70-72; see also Mackie, op.cit,, pp. 148-179 for an account of the deliberations leading to the Agreement.

46

by the Australian Government as a starting point of a gradual development towards easing tension in the Southeast Asian area. It contained four main points: first, agreement that "the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation"; second, support for initial steps towards the "Macapagal .plan"; third, Malaysia's admission that the Philippine's claim to Borneo would not be prejudiced by its incorporation in Malaya; and fourth, affirmation of adherence to the self-determination principle in relation to the formation of Malaysia. All parties to the dispute made concessions to the Malaysian proposal. The Malayan Government agreed on a U.N. fact-finding mission to ascertain public opinion in the Borneo territories. The Indonesian and Philippine Governments agreed to accept Malaysia if the mission's findings were in favour of the creation of Malaysia. However, it soon became apparent that the interpretations given by the parties to the dispute were conflicting. The Agreement was based on one weak element, that is, it called for co-operation based on mutual trust, which did not exist between the parties. Eventually, the report of the U.N. fact-finding mission was rejected by Indonesia and the Philippines because of breaches of the Manila Agreement concerning the rights of both countries' observers to witness the negotiations. They also objected to the Malayan Government's decision to proclaim Malaysia before the findings of the U.N. mission were known. The domestic political situation in Indonesia The relations between Indonesia and Malaysia broke down after the formation of the Malaysian Federation in mid-September 1963. The collapse of direct talks between the two parties had increased the dangers in a situation which was already grave. Conditions in Indonesia provided a basis for discontent which could only benefit the PKI. The inflationary tendencies in 1961-62 were generated by excessive government spending on the West Irian campaign and overambitious projects in the Eight Year Overall Development Plan. The result was rising prices, which had been spiralling at a rate of roughly 100% per annum

47

70 since early 1962. To counteract this trend which could only benefit the PKI, noncommunist and moderate elements, in the government, led by First Minister Djuanda were determined to launch an economic stabilization scheme which could solve these economic problems. The main issue around which the struggle for power seemed to hinge at the beginning of 1963 was tied up with the international implications of .the economic stabilization scheme. Such a scheme could only be financed by substantial foreign aid from the International Monetary Fund and a u.s. backed consortium of Western countries. Its political implications would certainly move in a direction adverse to the PKI's interests, However, after the Brunei revolt which made the Malaysian issue a prominent feature in Indonesian politics, the domest.ic political situation in Indonesia entered a decisive stage. It became increasingly clear that undertaking an economic stabilizat.ion scheme would not be compatible with a policy of confrontation. Thus the crisis situation which emerged in mid-September 1963 made an end to the policy of economic stabilization, It is in this context ·that the Australian Government • s response to the events in mid-September should be assessed. To Canberra., the more President Sukarno's policies of confrontation went unchecked, t.he more the PKI could strengthen itself at the expense of the noncornnunist moderate elements and eventually capture the leadership in Indonesiao In 1963, events in Indonesia during Confrontation were heading precisely in such a direction. The negotiations between the Indonesian and Malayan leaders were marked by a stiffening attitude of Indonesia and increased opposition of the PKI to these negotiations. The PKI also denounced the Manila Agreements and Maphilindo, because of the fear that its anti-Chinese implications would be more prominent than its anticolonialist aspects.71 To the PKI, American support of Maphilindo together with Indonesia's close association with Malaysia and the Philippines - two nations already committed to the West - was also unacceptable.

70

Mackie, op,cit •• pp, 136-137,

71

Ibid,, po 169,

48

The failure of the Manila Agreements and the subsequent escalation of confrontation resulted in a shift in the power struggle in Indonesia with the PKI as the major beneficiary. The Emergence of a Threatening Indonesian Behaviour Pattern as Perceived by Australia The failure of the Manila Agreements meant also the failure of Indonesia's diplomatic strategy to attain one of its most important objectives, that is, to prevent the creation of Malaysia. It also introduced a phase in Australian-Indonesian relations, in which Australia perceived Indonesia's actions as a threat to its security interests" The establishment of Malaysia unequivocally committed Indonesia to a collision course with Malaysia and its allies. It eliminated the other alternative, that is, "pin-prick" operations along the border with Sarawak, or encouraging Malaya to give up its close associat~on with Britain in the framework of Maphilindo. As Mackie stated: A point of no return was passed, not only in relations between [Indonesia and Malaysia] but also in the domestic politics of Indonesia, when the Western-oriented course which had been followed earlier in the year now had to be reversed and a drift towards the left set in which continued throughout the next two years.72 On the day that the Federation of Malaysia was proclaimed on 16 September 1963, the Embassies of Britain and Malaya in Jakarta were attacked. The next day, diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia were severed. On 21 September the Indonesian Government decided upon the severance of all commercial and financial relations with Malaysia, including Singapore. The Australian Government's initial response to these developments was stated by Deputy Prime Minister J. McEwen on 19 September when he expressed his government's "profound concern". He further stated: "The House and

72

Ibid., p. 179.

49

the Australian people can take it that the Australian Government regards the situation very seriously".73 The day beforer the Secretary of the Department for External Affairs, Sir Arthur Tange, told the Indonesian Charge d'Affairs, S. Bahroemsjah, that the Australian Government expected "normal protection" to be provided for all Australian residents and property in Indonesia.74 On 25 September Prime Minister Menzies officially stated that Australia's commitment under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to Malay·sia and thus made the Australian. commitment explicit. 75 Menzies also pledged Aust,ralia • s unequivocal support for Malaysia against invasion or subversive activity. Australia's position: the government, and_the E.re~s

~ the.-~El:~osi tion

The Aust.ralian Government • s freedom to manoeuvre was evidently c!rcumscribed by the hardening of public opinion"76 In Parliament and in the daily press 1 the debate between t.he government and its c:ci tics focused on the question whether Australia's firm positi.on towards Indonesia was not long overdueo Demands were rising that Australia should cease all its foreign aid to that country, including the Colombo Plan" The Liberal backbencher Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes questioned the government why it did not take a stronger stand immediately. 77 But on the whole, the major Australian newspapers supported the Menzies statement; The Sydney Morning Herald, in an editorial, described the statement as "unambiguous and unequivocal " .. a. necessary act of policy which should be welcomed by every t.houghtful Australian ... to leave t.he Indonesian leadership in doubt about our determination to defend Malaysia would be the worst disservice we c

73

The Sydney Morning He:ra'ld3 L.O September 1963,

74.

Canberra '1'1.-mes, 2.0 September 1963.

75

CPD, H,R,, 25 September 1963, p, 1365,

76

The Times (London), 29

77

The Nat.ion, 20 St::pternber 1963,

Sep~ember

1963,

50

78 could do to them 11 • The Age, in the editorial, stated t.hat 11 at least all doubts and ambiguities about Australia's defence commitments to Malaysia have been cleared away". 79 The paper said with regret: "It may be a long time before Australians can again look north with anything like genuine friendship".80 The Canberra Times, on the other hand, accused the Australian Government of deliberately playing down the gravity of events in Indonesia: "Australia should have been the first to stand with Britain in making its prot.est". The paper called for a complete review of relations with Indonesian, including the question of aid, and concluded: "We certainly have passed the point at which appeasement will produce any result".Bl This criticism was apparently directed against Sir Garfield Barwick and some officials in the Department of External Affairs. Within the Department, there appeare~ to exist a division of opinion. Those who were in favour of maintaining the lines of communication open with Indonesia reportedly included Barwick. He was instrumental in facilitating an atmosphere of open dialogue between the two countries. He, therefore, thought that Australia would not. necessarily break off diplomatic relations with Indonesia, even if Britain .did. He stated: "The important thing is to keep your bridges up, not break them down 11 • 82 Barwick's assessment of Australia's commitment to defend Malaysia was also expressed in cautious terms. He stated that Australia was "likely" to stand with Britain, if the security of Malaysia was violated.83 Th6 Sydney Morning Herald, however, accused Barwick of deliberately introducing an .element of uncertainty in Australia's position: 78

The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 1963

79

Th~

80

Quoted in The Times (London), 29 September 1963.

81

Ibid.

82

The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 September 1963; The Age, 21 September 1963,

83

The Sydney Morning Heruld, ibid.

Age, 26 September 1963.

51

"Likely" is not a word that lights the landscape with conviction. Those Australians who remember well the negativeness and evasions of Barwick '.s commentaries .during .the West New Guinea crisis will much prefer Mr. McEwen's way of putting.the needs .of this new and potentially perilous situation.84 From some reports we can infer that Prime Minister Menzies did not entirely agree with Barwick's approach. The Sydney Sunday Mirror on 21 July 1963 reported that Barwick was "dismayed at Sir Robert's heavy-handed criticism of Indonesia". This was with reference to Menzies's statement on .14 July in which .he criticized President Sukarno for renewing his Confrontation policy. He also stated that Indonesia's insistence to have plebiscites in Malaysia contrasted sharply with the Indonesian Government's reluctance to grant the right of self-determination to the people of West Irian.85 Menzies also apparently made clear in the Cabinet meeting on 25 September that there should be no weakness or suggestion of appeasement in Australia. The Cabinet was also told that Australia had reached the point at which its attitude must be clear-cut.B6 The Labor Opposition strongly criticized the government's methods and approach. While it fully agreed with the government's support of Malaysia, it regarded the arrangement with Malaysia as "completely unsatisfactory" and called for a "clear, open, and defined treaty to be negotiated to.cover Australia's future relations with Malaysia and to regularize the conditions under which Australian troops would remain in Malaysia". The ALP leadership admitted, however, that its policy on the Malaysian issue had changed. It was no longer opposed to the presence of Australian troops in the Malaysian area, but their 1'continued presence [there] shall be covered by a treaty." 87 84

Ibid,, 21 September 1963.

85

The Age, 15 July 1963.

86

Alan Reid in The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1963.

87

A. Calwell, CPD, H.R., 25 September 1963, p, 1365.

This brought a complaint from Foreign Minister Subandrio, who regarded Menzies's statement as a threat to Indonesia. The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 1963,

52

The Menzies statement apparently had no perceptible restrainl.ng.effect.on the Indonesian .Government. It is doubtful that this statement in.itself could.have produced much effect, since Jakarta probably did not much ca1e about Australia's unilateral warning.. Furthermore, Jakarta maintained.that Asian problems should be solved by Asians themselves. Australia as a predominantly European country should be excluded from any regional role in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia. However, the .power which loomed large in Indonesia's foreign policy was the u.s. By the end of 1963, the prospects regarding American policies towards Indonesia were discouraging. It became increasingly evident to Jakarta, as a result of Washington's latest moves, that the U.S. had.decided to adopt a different approach which was more opposed to Indonesia's Confrontation policy and would have an effect on its foreign aid to Indonesia. After the dissolution of the West Irian problem and before the events in September 1963, the Kennedy Administration took a sympathetic line towards Indonesia. It was prepared to support a substantial U.S. backed aid programme in the framework of Indonesia's Eight Year Development Plan. This economic stabilization scheme, which was to bring a spiralling inflation under control, was developed by a survey mission led by Professor D.D. Humphrey with the aid of experts from the IMF. However, the implementation of an economic stabilization policy was threatened by Sukarno's initiation of Confrontation against Malaysia. The influential Clay Report on the u.s. foreign aid programme, which was published in 1963, mentioned Indonesia as a country to which we cannot see how external assistance can be granted .•. unless it puts its internal house in order, provides fair treatment to foreign creditors and enterprises, and refrains from international adventures •••. 88 On 22 September 1963, the U.S. Foreign Aid Administrator, David Bell, warned the Indonesian Government that the burning of the British Embassy would affect the U.S.

88

Quoted in Mackie, op,cit., p, 136.

53

aid programme to Indonesia. 89 At the end of September 1963, both the IMF standing credits and further U.S. aid were withheld. The u.s. shift in policy was further facilitated by the .change of Administration in Washington after President Kennedy's assassination on 10 November 1963. It became increasingly clear that the Johnson Administration would be more amenable to a "hard-line" policy than its predecessor. In a stern personal note to Sukarno in January 1964, President Lyndon Johnson expressed the U.S.deeg concern over the escalation of border clashes in Borneo.9 The PolicJ:: of "Graduated Response" In October 1963, Barwick met American officials in Washington to discuss the new phase in Indonesia's policy of confrontation, and to find out whether Washington was prepared to give up its policy of "noninvolved cordiality". President Kennedy's policy towards Indonesia came under severe criticism by Congress and the major newspapers. Even opinion in the State Department was divided.91 It must have been evident to Barwick, especially after the st.ern economic measures, that Washington had serious doubts about the Indonesian Government's intentions. After his return from Washington, Barwick issued a warning to Indonesia stating that friendly relations between the two countries could not be .achieved until Indonesia ceased its policy of confrontation: While there is a threat to destroy a Commonwealth nation, relations must be under a cloud ••.• The u.s. joins with Australia in this opinion and believes the present " confrontation" should be abandoned in the best interests of Indonesia as well as other countries.92

89

The Times (London), 29 September 1963.

90

Daily

91

The West AustraUan., 5 October 1963.

92

Canberra Times., 21 October 1963"

Telegraph~

1 January 1964.

54

However, Washington still maintained that the Malaysian issue was primarily Britain's and the Commonwealth's responsibility.93 It, therefore, welcomed Menzies's offer to defend Malaysia together with Britain if requested by Malaysia. With this in mind, the Australian Government could not help but be aware of existing reservations in u.s. policy. It recognized the futility of adopting a rigid opposition towards Indonesia in the absence of American support as Australia's experience during the ~vest Irian crisis showed. One of the few newspapers in Australia which expressed a similar view was The Age. Its editorial warned against a policy to accommodate Britain, but which would aggravate Australia's relations with its closest neighbour: ... any attempt to aggravate the reasonable feelings of uneasiness and resentment ... would be shortsighted. Whatever the administration of Indonesia, it remains a great country and the It also fifth most populous in the world •••. remains Australia's closest neighbour. Unlike Britain, we can never wash our hands of Indonesia; we have to live with it, for better or for worse. The Australian Government was warned not to adopt a 11 hardline 11 policy and to cease all its forelgn aid, as the British Government reportedly suggested.94 ~Vi th the economic stabilization scheme abandoned and with the American aid and IMF stabilizing loans suspended, it was clear that Indonesia was in no position to launch and sustain an all-out war against Malaysia.

Barwick might have reasoned along these lines when, even after the events in mid-September 1963, he still adopted a cautious approach towards Indonesia. He also might have maintained the view that there were still several options open to Jakarta, before it put itself on a collision course with Britain and Malaysia. Therefore, while these options still remain, it would be inexcusable to push a policy of firm support for Malaysia to the point

93

The Sydney Morning HeraZd, 21 October 1963.

94

The Age, 22 October 1963.

55

where the Australian Government vJOuld lose all flexibility, and where the lines of communication between the two countries would be disrupted" As The Age put it: As Malaysia's sponsor, Brita1n is now cast in It may the role of the colonialist intrudero be useful for Australia to maintain contact with Indonesia in the hope that economic pressures will sooner or later change President Sukarno's mind. While we can never be a mediator, we may at least provide a channel of communicationo95 The significance of such an approach reflects the Australian Government's ambivalent reaction to the Malaysian conflict, since its policies vacillat.ed on essentially contradictory objectives. The Australian Government wanted to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia, but the implementation of such a policy proved to be contrary to its conception of Aust.ralia' s security Thus, on the one hand, there was the stable interests, element in Australia's foreign pol1cy, namely to avoid irretrievable damage to its relations with Indonesia. But on the other hand, increasing responsibilities with regard to its defence commitments demanded a different approach. However, it became increasingly more difficult for Barwick to keep these two contradictory objectives in balance. An answer to t.he pivotal question which would decide Australia's relations with Indonesia was whether Sukarno seriously wanted a face-saving formula with which he could abandon Confrontation, or whether he was looking for more concret.e objectives, like the elimination of foreign bases in Southeast Asia and all vestiges of neocolonialism as part of the doctrine 11 New Emerging Forces versus Old Established Forces"o96

The hardening of public opinion and the presence of hard-line 11 elements in the Cabinet, in conjunction with the increasingly threatening behaviour pattern of Indonesia 1 s Confrontat.ion policy made Barwick's even-handed 11

20 December i963,

95

Ibid.~

96

Mackie, op,ciL, pp, 159-1.60,

56

approach difficult to sustain. The result was the introduction of a new element in Australia's policy towards Indonesia, which called for a gradual military involvement in the Malaysian conflict. This policy of limited escalation or "graduated response" as Barwick termed it continued until the end of confrontation. It meant, after Menzies's statement on 25 September and, after an escalation of fighting, increased military aid to Malaysia" Thus Australia provided, upon Malaysia's request, ammunition and other supplies to British and Malaysian forces fighting in Borneo. In addition, training facilities in Australia were made available to Malaysian personnel.97 The firm economic measures taken by the U.S. had apparently produced a restraining effect on Indonesia's policy of confrontation. The Indonesian Government at this juncture seemed more amenable to resume the talks between the Heads of State of the Maphilindo nations as suggested by the Philippines, Japan and Thailand. These leaders had an interest in avertinh a serious conflict in the Southeast Asian area.98 After a meeting with u.s. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Foreign Minister Subandrio stated that Indonesia would welcome a mediation effort by Japan, and that Indonesia was in favour of a peaceful solution. Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, was only prepared to have further talks if certain conditions could be met by Indonesia. The stalemate more or less persisted until the mediation efforts by Robert Kennedy, who acted as the personal representative of President Lyndon Johnson. Kennedy's objective was, as he termed it, "to take this controversy out of the jungle ..• and put it around the conference table."99 · Kennedy's mediation efforts resulted in Sukarno's agreement to have a ceasefire, a move welcomed by the 97

This brought a complaint by Subandrio which was conveyed to the Australian Ambassador LC . O. Shann (The Nation, 25 February 1964).

98

The New York

99

Keesing's ContemporaYy

Times~

20, 22, 26, 27 September 1963. Archives~

vol, 14,

1963-1964~

p. 20181.

57

Tunku. The three parties to the dispute agreed to meet in Bangkok in February 1964 to decide on arrangements for the implementation of a ceasefire. The Bangkok Conference, however, proved abortive. A second Bangkok Conference on 4 and 5 March, and a Conference of Heads of States in Tokyo in June 1964, could not solve the deadlock either. The Indonesian Government throughout these conferences insisted on political concessions from Malaysia in return for a withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the Borneo territories. The Indonesian objective was a return to the status quo ante before Malaysia's creation in September 1963, which meant that the Manila Agreements should be the basis for further negotiations. The Malaysian Government, however, maintained that the Manila Agreements had been fully implemented"lOO Meanwhile, an armed escalation of the conflict continued as Indonesian guerrillas stepped up their operations in Borneo. The response of the Australian Government to this development was made by Barwick in Parliament in March 1964.101 It was the strongest criticism that he had stated until now: "The time has surely arrived for Indonesia to pause in its present course and to review the position in which it has placed itself". On the question of withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Borneo, he said: " ... we await Indonesia's decision whether or not to withdraw the infiltrated troops ••• and to meet around the conference table to discuss [and to] resolve Indonesia's relationship with Malaysia". He then warned Indonesia: " ••• Indonesia cannot expect that Australia can do other than condemn breaches of accepted international obligations and of accepted norms of international conduct". Barwick made two points which put the Indonesian case in the wrong: first, Indonesia's Confrontation policy was a breach of the U.N. Charter which requires members not to threaten or use force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any other member state; and second, Indonesia's Confrontation policy also contravenes the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of

100

Mackie, op.cit., p. 227.

101

The Straits Times, 12 March 1964.

58

other countries which was accepted by the Afro-Asian Conference of 1955 in Bandung.l02 Barwick, while attending a SEATO Conference in Manila on 18 April 1964, also stated that Australia would give further military aid to Malaysia.l03 He warned Indonesia that both Australia and the u.s. were prepared to take part in defending Malaysia, if any widespread fighting occurred, thus implying that the u.s. in such a situation would extend its commitments under ANZUS. This understanding could not have been made public without Washington's approval. On the other hand, however, despite Barwick's assertion, the relationship of ANZUS to the Malaysia conflict remained uncertain since Washington neither denied nor confirmed whether such a relat.ionship in fact existed. On .22 April 1964, a State Department spokesman declined to comment on the question whether the u.s. would be obliged to intervene under the ANZUS Treat~ if Australian troops were attacked in Malaysia.lO~ Foreign Minister Subandrio took immediate issue with Barwick, stating that Australia was threatening Indonesia with war and trying to involve the u.s. in the conflict. He warned Australia to be prepared to take full responsibility if the conflict could not be confined locallyol05 In a Parliamentary debate on 21 April 1964, the Leader of the Opposition, A.A. Calwell, criticized the government on the question of American commitments under ANZUs,l06 He asserted that the government's understanding of the u.s. role and commitment under that Treaty as related to Malaysia was ambiguous: " .•• the American Government just does not see the Malaysian dispute as coming under ANZUS".l07 In his reply the next day, Prime

102

1'he Age, 12 March 1964.

103

Ibid., 20 April 1964.

104

The Indonesian

105

The

106

CPD, H.R,, 21 April 1964, pp, 1274-1275; The Age, 22 April 1964.

107

Ibid,

Nation~

He~atd~

24 April 1964.

20 April 1964,

59

Minister Menzies stated that "it is veri wrong to be dogmatic about what the u.s. would do". 08 On 20 May, a member of the Opposition Party, Dr. Jim Cairns, again raised the question in Parliament.l09 The government's reply was evasive as before. It is difficult to establish whether Barwick had misjudged the American position on the problem. It is possible that there was some disagreement. on this point between Barwick and Menzies as one writer claimed.llO It is significant, however, that soon afterwards Barwick resigned to become Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. He was replaced by Paul Hasluck, reputedly to be more hard-headed in his approach towards Indonesia. It could be interpreted as a shift towards a significant Australian military involvement, since the policy of "graduated response" .Barwick had initiated failed to produce a deterrent effect on Indonesia's Confrontation policy. However, the policy of "graduated response" had at least achieved the preservation of formal diplomatic relations, despite the deteriorating relations between the two countries. It was part of the policy of "graduated response" which Barwick tried to explain: "I have maintained diplomatic conversations with the Indonesians and have pointed out progressively where all this might end up."lll He added: " •.• if this thing grows I am sure Australian involvement will increase. I have tried to make that very plain to Indonesia, diplomatically, in the hope that it will deter them from what is a very dangerous course 11 • In the framework of this policy, Barwick consistently tried to understand Indonesia's point of view in an effort to avoid a disrupture in relations. He stated: "Australia's policy towards Indonesia will continue

108

The DaiLy Telegraph, 21 May 1964.

109

Ibid.

110

Hanno Weisbrod, "Australia Security Relations with the United States, 1957-1963," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1969, The Australian National University.

111

See P. King, op.cit.

60

to be one of seeking to promote sound, friendly relations without sacrifice of Australia's interests".ll2 The opposition's attitude While the official attitude of the government on the Malaysian conflict vacillated on contradictory objectives, the Opposition's attitude was also not very clear. Yet while the ALP supported the creation of Malaysia on security considerations, ideological principles precluded the formation of a bipartisan policy. The ALP did not want a close identification of Australia's interests with those of Britain. The principal issue involved was focused on the desirability of a Treaty, which should clearly stipulate Australia's commitment to defend Malaysia. In fact, the problem was how to define Australia's relationship with Britain and how to protect Australia's interests in the first place. This concern was expressed by the Deputy Opposition Leader, G. Whitlam, on 3 April 1964. He stated that as long as Australian troops remained subordinated to British forces in Malaysia, Australia's motives would be misunderstood: "It is certainly not our responsibility to protect British rubber and tin interests, and the Indonesian charge of neocolonialism would tend to remain while only white Anglo-Saxon powers supported Malaysia" .113 This concern was reiterated by Calwell in Parliament on 21 April: "Nothing could be more dangerous to Australia's position in Asia, nothing could better substantiate Indonesia's suspicions about our attitudes, than that we should base the legality of our actions on a British agreement" 0114 However, the exchange of letters between Canberra and Kuala Lumpur instead of a Treaty, upon which most probably the latter insisted, was due to the Malaysian Government's reluctance to offend Afro-Asian sensitivities towards military alliance with Western powers, especially

112

CPD, H.R., 11 March 1964, p. 8,

113

King, cp,cit,, p. 286.

114

The Age, 22 April 1964.

61

at a time when Malaysia had embarked on a diplomatic offensive in Asian and African countries to gain their support against Indonesia's Confrontation policy. At any rate, the exchange of letters left no doubt about the Australian Government's jurisdiction over the deployment of Australian troops.ll5 First, the Australian Government reserved its right to be consulted on issues affecting Australian troops in Malaysia. These forces could ~ot be used without the governmentcs consent. Secondly, there would be no automatic Australian involvement in Malaysia's disputes with other powerso Thirdly, the Australian Government would examine each situation as it develops and would decide whether Australian forces should be used. The exchange of letters also took into account Malaysia's anxiety to preserve its image as a nonaligned country and which would also meet the Opposition's criticism" Under the previous arrangement, the deployment of Australian troops for SEATO purposes had already embarrassed the Malayan Government. The new AngloMalaysian Defence Agreement contained a clause which permitted the British base in Singapore to be used "for Commonwealth defence and preservation of peace in Southeast Asia", as well as for Malaysia's defence. This provided a loop-hole for t.he Australian Government to use its forces based in Singapore for SEATO purposes. On Collision Course The major shift in the power configuration in Indonesia. since September, 1963, followed by the failure of the Tokyo Suwmit Meeting in June 1964, preciptated an intensification of Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" campaign a

On 17 August 1964, 40 well-armed Indonesian guerrillas landed near Pontian, about 30 miles north of the Straits of Johoreo This was the first substantial incursion into the Malay Peninsula, which however proved abortive. More serious was t.he incursion a few weeks later.

115

Ibid"' 23 April 1964,

62

On the night of 1-2 September air-droppings, involving about 100 para-commandos,were launched at Labis. These droppings coupled with the outbreak of race riots in Singapore on the same day, provided a serious threat to the Malaysian Government. On 6 September, a state of emergency was put into full operation throughout Malaysia.ll 6 The Australian Government's response to these developments was expressed through T.K. Critchley, the Australian High Commissioner in Malaysia, who on the same day stated that any Malaysian request for Australian troops would be "met speedily" .117 The Indonesian reaction came one week later when Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that a state of emergency for some parts of Indonesia would soon be proclaimed by President Sukarno.ll8 The Malaysian Government soon decided to refer the Indonesian incursions into Malaysia to the U.N. Security Council. The debate in the Security council After its failure to obtain any satisfaction from discussion with Indonesia and after para-commandos and naval landings on the Malay Peninsula were initiated by Indonesian forces, Malaysia took the dispute before the U.N. Security Council and shifted to the level of international diplomacy to counter Indonesia's Confrontation policy.ll9 The Malaysian Government's decision was supported by Canberra. At ·the Security Council's meeting on 9 September, the Malaysian representative Ismael bin Dato Abdul Rahman, under Article 39 brought to the attention of the Council that hostilities initiated by Indonesia were "blatant and inexcusable aggression •o•• An act which is in itself a breach of the peace and involves a threat to international peace and security in the area" .120 116

Canberra Times, 7 September 1964,

117

Ibid.

118

The Age, 14 September 1964,

119

Earlier in the year, moves were taken to obtain the backing of world opinion against Indonesia's Confrontation policy. Lee Kuan Yew visited some African countries, while Tunku Abdul Rahman made a series of visits to major world capitals.

120

'I'he Sydney Morning HeraLd, 9 September 1964.

63

The Malaysian move was motivated by the following considerations: (.a )

even though a Resolution condemning and taking punitive measures against Indonesia under Article 41 was unlikely to be obtained due to a Russian veto, the evidence of Indonesia's aggression would be exposed before a world forum;

(b)

to obtain a Resolution expressing support for Malaysia's territorial integrity which could provide a basis for further appeal to the U.N. if Indonesia's attacks continued;

(c)

a discussion of the dispute in the Security Council would have a temporary rest.raining effect on further Indonesian aggression; and

(d)

to explore the extent of Afro-Asian support of Malaysia.

The proceedings in the Security Council revealed that a draft Resolution which could get the support of AfroAsian and Latin American members, should also be acceptable to Indonesia. Thus a strongly-worded Resolution condemning Indonesia would face a certain defeat. Faced with such a situation, the Council members supporting Malaysia had to formulate a draft Resolution which would be acceptable to a majority of members except for the Communist representatives. This would sufficiently expose Indonesia's isolatlon within the Afro-Asian and Latin-American blocs, and its dependency on the Communist bloc. 121 A draft Resolution sponsored by Norway did not go so far as to condemn Indonesia. It tried to meet AfroAsian objections by refraining from naming Indonesia, by mentioning the incidents counter-charged by Indonesia, and by taking into account the "Asian solutions by Asians" argument in its reference to the Conciliation Commission proposed during the Tokyo Summit meeting. The Resolution did not propose direct U.N. intervention, although it required that an Conciliation Commission established would keep the Security Council informed. 121

Full text in Boyce, "Malaysia and Singapore Diplomacy," op.cit., Document 6, p. 103.

~n

International

64

The Malaysia delegation considered the Resolution as a minimum response to the Indonesian incursions. It also realized the need for preserving an Asian image by not depending exclusively on Western support. It was, therefore, essential to pass a Resolution which would satisfy the Afro-Asian and Latin-American members. The Norwegian Resolution in its view had met this requirement. The Indonesian delegation opposed the Norwegian draft Resolution on the following grounds:l22 (a)

The Resolution made a distinction between incidents in the region generally, which it regrets (paragraph 1), and the particular incident raised by Malaysia, which it deplores. Indonesia had claimed that the dropping of paratroops on 1-2 September was merely one incident on the surface of a deeper conflict. On the other hand, Indonesia listed British and Malaysian incursions in Indonesian territory and argued that it was merely defending itself.l23

(b)

The call to both parties to respect "the territorial integrity and political independence of each other" (paragraph 4) was more obviously applicable to Indonesia than to Malaysia. The burden of Malaysia's case was that its territory had been violated. In addition, Indonesia had refused to recognize Malaysia until now.

(c)

The Resolution contained a key word in paragraph 5, namely "thereupon". The talks suggested in paragraph 5, in other words, were contingent on Indonesia calling off its "crush Malaysia" campaign, or at least to refrain from threats and use of force, and the other requirements of paragraph 4. The formulation of the Resolution, therefore, suited the Malaysian contention that it could not hold talks under duress; in particular, that it would not talk while Indonesia refused to withdraw its troops from Malaysian territory.

122

The Age, 17 September 1964.

123

See speech by Deputy Foreign Minister Sudjarwo on 9 September 1964, U.N. S'eaurity CounaiZ OffiaiaZ Records, 1144th Meeting, 9 September 1964, Document S/PV 1144.

65

The debate on the Malaysian conflict ended when the Norwegian Resolution was put to a vote. It was passed by a vote of 9 to 2, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The assessment of the line-up in the Security Council by members supporting Malaysia's case was more or less substantiated by the voting on the Resolution. Malaysia was particularly satisfied that Indonesia was unable to Despite the ideological affinities get Afro-Asian support. these countries had with Indonesia, it was difficult for them to condone Indonesia's overt incursions in Malaysia's territory. Indonesia, on the other hand, viewed the proceedings in the Security Council as another manifestation of Old Established Forces' policies frustrating New Emergency Forces' legitimate causes. It merely increased Sukarno's dissatisfaction with the U.N. as a creation of the Old Established Forces. The election of Malaysia as a member of the Security Council in 1965 gave him the excuse to withdraw Indonesia's membership from the U.N. and to initiate efforts in creating a rival institution which would serve the interests of the Afro-Asian world. Australia's response to the intensification of the conflict As was mentioned earlier, the Australian Government's response towards the new Indonesian incursions was made through Critchley's offer to heed immediately any Malaysian request for Australian aid. On 16 October 1964, the new Minister for External Affairs, Hasluck, warned Indonesia that, "her continued confrontation of Malaysia makes [Australia's] task of living in peace with [her], temporarily impossible".l24 On 30 October, Menzies declared before Parliament that for the first time Australian troops were in combat with Indonesian forces, when fifty to sixty raiders landed by sea on the Malaysian coast, south of Malacca. Menzies used the occasion to reiterate Australia's support for Malaysia against "unprovoked On 10 November Menzies officially made the attacks" .125

124

The Age, 17 October 1964.

125

Ibid., 31 October 1964.

66

first step to meet an escalation of the Malaysian conflict by introducing peace-time selective compulsory services and increased defence expenditure.l26 He told Parliament that there was "a real risk of war" with Indonesia and implied the possibility of retaliatory attacks on Indonesian bases by British-Malaysian forces: " ... if Indonesian attacks continued, Malaysia may find it intolerable to confine defensive measures to the guarding of her shores and jungles" .12 7 Menzlesrs statement on the law defence programme was well received by the general public which was indicated by the election results in the Senate elections at the end of the year. These results could also be interpreted as a trend t.owards favouring a firmer military stand on Indonesia's Confrontation. On the other hand, a public opinion poll conducted in December 1964 indicated a slight trend towards continuing to extend financial aid to Indonesia. In favour of continuing aid: 47%; against continuing aid: 40; undecided: 13%.128 The Australian on 12 November in its editorial warned against sentiments favouring a rupture in relat.ions between the t.wo countries. It called for conciliation Wlth Indonesia on the basis of reaZ-poZi~ik: "The reality of geopolitics is that Indonesia is a far more vi tal buffer against Communist China than Malaysia. is". The inference can be drawn that it was China which was Australia's main concern. As Hasluck put it: "Indonesia is just a sideshow. Red China, not Indonesia, is the biggest trouble-maker in Asia".l29 126

The Sydney Morning Herald. ll November 1964.

127

The Sydney Morning

128

The

Herald~

129

The

Aus&ralian~

The introduction of selective compulsory service would affect persons twenty years of age. Call-up was to be for a total period of two years full-time duty, with at least twelve months effective service in a unit, and would start in mid-1965, The increase in defence expenditure was expected to raise government's spending from an actual £A 260.5 million in 19651966, £A 42L 7 million in 1966-1967, and £A 429.1 million in 1967-1968. Herald~

11 November 1964.

10 December 1964. 19 November 1964.

67

American and British positions After the Indonesian incursions into the Malay Peninsula, Washington was in the stage of making a reassessment of its Malaysian policy in the context of Indonesia's rapprochement with Peking. Washington shared the Australian Government's concern about a Chinese threat in the area, which remained the main focus in both countries' foreign politics until the end of Confrontation.l30 There was also the fear that the uncompromising character of Indonesia's Confrontation policy would put the moderate elements in the Indonesian Government in political isolation, thereby encouraging a seizure of power by the Peking-oriented PKio Based on these considerations, the U.S. was now more inclined to take a more firm position towards Indonesia.l31 The shift in American policy in effect meant a preparedness to support Malaysia in more concrete terms. This was already indicated after Tunku Abdul Rahman's talks with President Johnson in July 1964, in which the U.S. Bgreed to extend special training facilities for Malaysia's armed forces and credit facilities for the purchase of military aircraft. During the debates in the Security Council in September 1964, the American delegate Adlai Stevenson, warned Indonesia that the "outer limits of restraint" had been reached in its Confrontation against Malaysia.l32 However, American support for Malaysia did not mean outright opposition to Indonesia. Washington still favoured a flexible posture in its relations with Jakarta by keeping available options open. This was indicated by the government's action to block a

130

Albinski~

op,cit.

131

To Washington it was also significant that during the nonaligned conference in Cairo, Sukarno on several occasions took issue with the moderate stand of Egypt, India and Yugoslavia. He called for militant action against colonialism, thereby reflecting Peking's rather than Moscow's line. Bruce Grant, The Age, 13 October 1964.

132

The Sydney Morning HeraZd, 12 September 1964.

68

Congressional amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill which would have cut all American aid to Indonesia. Britain 1 s response to the intensification of the conflict was the dispatch of five hundred troops by air from West Germany and a Naval Force in the Mediterranean, consisting of two destroyers and two fighters. Another Naval force at that time in the Indian Ocean and bound for Australia from Singapore was ordered to return. It included one aircraft carrier and two destroyers. With the dispatch of these reinforcements, two potential conflict situations emerged, involving the Naval unit in the Indian Ocean and an Airforce squadron including four Vulcan bombers which recently reinforced British forces in the area.l33 The shortest way for the Naval unit to reach Singapore was through the Sunda Strait which Indonesia claimed as territorial water. The Indonesian Navy, however, declared the Sunda Strait off-limits to foreign vessels because of naval manoeuvres in the area. A conflict was averted by the British decision to divert the Na.val force through the Lombok Strait. Speculation also arose over the deployment of the Vulcan bombers against Indonesian naval and air bases in retailiation of increased incursions in the Malayan Peninsulae Reportedly, Britain was on the verge of launching such an attack but had to abandon it in the absence of Australian and New Zealand support. The matter was raised in the Australian Parliament by T. Uren, a Labor member, in a question to the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck.l34 The Minister, however, declined to give a direct answer and after being pressed by Calwell, the Opposition Leader, Hasluck stated that it was not in the interests of Australia and its allies to disclose publicly the substance of consultations between Australia and Britain. It is difficult to ascertain in the absence of more reliable information about the extent of British

133

Mackie, "Konfrontasi," op"cit., p, 262.

134

CanberY'a Times, 1 October 1964,

69

determination to launch a deterrent attack on Indonesian bases. It is clear, however, that if there was a serious British intention in.this direction, they could not have fully grasped the serious implications it might have. Above all, it would undermine Malaysia's case in the Security Council and in the Afro-Asian world. It would also be seized upon by the PKI and the militant proponents of Confrontation as a pretext to isolate the moderate elements in Indonesia. In addition, it would undermine the position of the Armed Forces' leadership which would enable the PKI to seize power in Indonesia. The emergence of a "Jakarta-Peking Axis" The Indonesian Government's reaction to Menzies's statement on selective compulsory service and increased defence expenditure was expressed by Subandrio who warned Menzies about China's recent acquired nuclear capacity.l35 The Indonesian Herald, considered to be the mouthpiece of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in an editorial mentioned the possibility of an extension of conflict to other parts of Asia.l36 The growing rapprochement between Jakarta and Peking, during 1964-65, was paralleled by a left-ward thrust in Indonesian domestic politics. The unopposed growing strength of the PKI was facilitated by the political isolation of most of Indonesia's prominent anticommunists by the middle of 1965, who also took a dim view of the Confrontation policy. In addition, the growing tension in dcmestic politics in anticipation of a power struggle after Sukarno's death, precipitated a crisis over the Bandan Pedukung Sukarnoisms (Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism, BPS), an overt anticommunist organization.l37 The adoption of a pro-Peking line might have been facilitated by the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device in September 1964. Another factor was the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, mainly as a result over Indonesia's unfavourable position to the Soviet

135

The Age, 13 November 1964.

136

The Indonesian Herald, 15 November 1964o

137

See Mackie, "Konfrontasi," op.cit., pp, 279-285,

70

Union's right to attend the Second Afro-Asian Conference which Peking also opposed. In addition, the sizeable reduction of U.S. economic aid since September 1963 had also much to do with it. The drift towards Peking was increased by Sukarno's decision to withdraw from the U.N. which Peking welcomed as a chance for the anticolonialist members to establish a rival organization. The trend towards a Peking-oriented foreign policy was presumably laid during Sukarno's discussions with Chou En-lal. and Chen Yi in Shanghai, soon after the explosion of China's atomic bomb, and after Chen Yi's visit to Jakarta in November 1964 when apparently the concept of a "Jakarta-Peking Axis" was conceived. In January 1965, Foreign Minister Subandrio headed a 44member delegation to Peking to work out the detailed implications of the concept. The implications of the new trend were soon manifested in an increasingly anti-American posture in Indonesia's foreign policy in conjunction with Peking's support of Indonesia.'s Confrontation policy. Canberra viewed these developments with great concern, because the new phase in Indonesia's foreign policy indicated Peking's increasing influence over Indonesia. It also would mean an intensification in Indonesia's confrontation, especially after its withdrawal from the U.N. which made it no longer subject to whatever restraining.influence organized world opinion would exercise on its Confrontation policy. The deterioration in Indonesian-Australian relations in 1965 was indicated by Sukarno's threat of political rebellion in "Oceania", which some considered as a threat to Australia. He stated: To our East ... in "Oceania", the people must be given their chance to become masters in their own homes and manage their own affairs ••. do not be shocked if a time comes when the Pacific Ocean explodes, rebels, and the peoples then set up their own independent countries.l38 138

T, B, Miller, "Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, January-June 1965," The Australian Journal of Po Zitias and History (AJPH) , vol, 11, no. 3, p. 270.

71

The second indication was the strong inference in the President's same speech that Indonesia would not hold the agreed plebiscite in West Irianel39 The third indication, and the one which appeared to have caused most reaction in Australia, was the recommendation of the People's Provincial Consultative Assembly (MPRS) that "firmer measures" must be taken against "all interests of the imperialists, British, American, Australian and New Zealand" as a reprisal against their support of Malaysia. However, despite these fierce pronouncements, they did not foreshadow a rupture in relations between the two countries. They certainly marked a harder and more aggressive Indonesian line. On the other hand, one could argue that given the increased anti-American campaign, an increased anti-Australian posture was predictable in view of its overt support of Malaysiao But both were not of t.he same intens:lty, since attacks against Australia were rather relatively mild. Indonesia's increased anti-American .posture had much more to do with American involvement in the Vietnam War than with American support of Malaysia. First of all, direct American aid to Malaysia was comparatively small. Secondly President Johnson's special envoy, Elsworth Bunker, was apparently able to convince Sukarno about the U,So desire not to be directly involved in the Malaysian conflict. The reason for the shift in Indonesia's posture towards the u.s. must therefore be sought in a wider context, that is, in Indonesia's rapprochement with Peking with its global implicationso The relatively mild verbal attacks on Australia, who was in fact more directly and substantially involved in Malaysia's defence, could be interpreted as a part of a developing trend in Indonesian-Australian relations reflecting a desire of both countries at least to keep their lines of communication open. This trend continued until the end of Indonesia's Confrontation policy in 1966.

139

Subandrio was already on record stating that "the plebiscite does not exist," The Australian, 9 April 1965.

IV:

CONCLUSION

There are at least two elements which have continued to characterize the course of Australia's policy towards Indonesia. One element is the dilemma to reconcile on the one hand a desire to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia, and on the other hand a commitment to protect Australia's security interests. Another consistent element is the crucial role of the u.s. which on many occasions proved decisive in determining Australia's policy towards Indonesia,, Australia's policy towards Indonesia, in the early years after World War II, for the first time exposed the dilemma of reconciling good relations with its most immediate northern neighbour and the need to protect it from any threat to its security" Maintaining good relations with Indonesia was motivated by ideological factors which were crucial in determining Australia's support for the Indonesian Republic. On the other hand, there was also Evatt's view on regional security in close collaboration with colonial powers in Asia which had influenced Australia's policy before the Dutch launched their first military action in 1947. It was only after the two Dutch military actions in 1947 and 1948 that Australia's policy became more favourably disposed towards the Indonesian Republic. After the general elections in late 1949, which brought defeat to the Labor Party, a Liberal-Country Party coalition-government came to power. After the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia, the new Australian Government formally recognized the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949. It was in this period that an element of animosity emerged in the relations between the two countries" The ~vest Irian issue was primarily responsible for it. However, Canberra still strived to create a favourable political climate between the two countries. It was, therefore, significant that Austral~a's aid to Indonesia through the Colombo Plan was nevQr disrupted. At the same time, however, Australia's support for the Dutch in the conflict over West Irian still continued. This policy of ambivalence suffered a serious setback when Australia was faced with a fait accompli and reluctantly had to accept the New York Agreement of 1962 which made an end to the West Irian conflict.

73

The West Irian issue was important in the development of Indonesian-Australian relations because it was the first attempt by both countries to make their interests explicit. Indonesia made clear from the outset that there would be no compromise on the West Irian dispute. Australia, on the ot.her hand, based its opposition to the Indonesian claim on the "vi tal importance" of West. Irian to Australia's security interests. Throughout this period of tension in which a local war could only be narrowly averted, however, bot.h governments on many occasions expressed their desire to maintain friendly relations" The same process more or less developed during Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. The conflict over Malaysia proved also to be a serious obstacle between the two countries. Indonesia's policy was based on the contention that Malaysia's was a neocolonialist scheme devised by the British and as such a threat to stability in Southeast Asia. Australia's opposition to Indonesia's Confrontation policy was based on its association with Malaysia in the British Commonwealth and Malaysia's being an in·tegral part of Australia's own defence perimeter. The Australian Government took a firm stand in September 1963, after the Indonesian Government refused to accept the verdict of the U.N.'s fact-finding mission and after the British and Malaysian Embassies in Jakarta were attacked. Increasing combat activity between Indonesian and British-Malaysian forces in Borneo during 1964 placed a great strain on Canberra, which found itself more deeply committed to Malaysia's defence. Domestically, the Australian Government faced increasing pressure from the Opposition Labor Party, the press and public opinion over its alleged accommodating attitude towards Indonesia. On the external level, Australia's concern was focused on Indonesia's drift towards China and the possibility of a seizure of power by the PKI in Indonesia. However, there were some constraints which prevented Australia from being more hostile to Indonesia" Above all, Canberra still wanted to maintain its good relations with Jakarta and to avoid a direct clash between their military forceso This became more urgent after the U.S. made clear its preference to consider Indonesia rather than Malaysia as a consolidating element of noncommunist influence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, ~vashington had not reached the conclusion that Indonesia's Confrontation policy would be pressed to the point which would force America's military

74

involvement in the dispute" For this reason, Australia's reluctance to commit itself to a more vigorous policy opposing Indonesia was in the final analysis due to lack of American support •vhich Australia had tried to enlist from the very beginning. Sir Arthur Tange's mission to Washington in February 1963 should be interpreted as an initial effort to seek American intervention in the dispute.l40 However, Washington's reluctance to get involved in the dispute by refraining to clarify its commitment under Articles 4 and 5 of the ANZUS Treaty (that is, each party recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area on the armed forces of another party affected its own peace and security and would act against the common danger) was understandable. Indonesia's Confrontation policy could develop into a threat to international peace and security which would ultimately involve the deployment of American forces. The U.S., therefore, was more inclined to adopt a policy geared towards easing tension between the parties t.o the dispute. This assessment was reflected in the report of a 11 Congressional study-mission to Southeast Asia: Any armed conflict in the area .•. could escalate into a major war, one ultimately involving American forces. United States' efforts should be directed toward easing the 'confrontation' that now exists between the countries in this area 11 .141 Washington's refusal to clarify its commitment to Australian forces in Malaysia under the ANZUS Treaty clearly had the objective of avoiding a situation where Australia could dispatch its forces to any area of conflict in the Pacific area and invoke American support when they are attacked Since t.he U.S. performs the role of Australia 1 s security guarantor, according to l"lashington Australia had to adjust its foreign policy objective as much as possible to those of the U.S. At the same time, the two countries' scale of priorities in pursuing these objectives could not be similar since the U.S. had wider interests than those of Australia's security. These two o

140

Peter Boyce, "Canberra's Malaysian Policy," op,cito, pp. 152, 157.

141

u.s, House of Representatives, Report of SpeaiaZ Study Mission to Southeast Asia, October 1963, pp, 19, 2L

75

elements of conflict which had a profound impact on Australia's policy were put in sharper focus during the period of confrontation. The u.s. Government could not be persuaded to accept Canberra's argument that. the Malaysia situation had deteriorated to a point where the ANZUS Treaty could be invoked. First, Malaysia's defence in its view was a Commonwealth responsibility. To Washington it would seem that the substantial British forces and the AustralianNew Zealand contingents in the area could adequately cope with the situation there. As one writer puts it: It was evident that the United States did not relish its allies using ANZUS as an indirect means of applying American pressures in an area where other allied powers were well in control and form which the United States preferred to remain aloof.l42 Secondly, Washington was reluctant to oppose Indonesia militarily since this could not be reconciled with the objective of preventing another area of conflict in Southeast Asia besides Vietnam. Therefore, Sir Garfield Barwick's warning to the Indonesian Government in April 1964 that large-scale aggiession against Malaysia would involve not only Australian but also, eventually,.American troops, was less appreciated in Washington. The only assurance Washington was prepared to give was President Johnson's offer to provide equipment and military training for Malaysian troops in July 1964.143 The Australian Government was far from satisfied with this American assurance. Given both the fact that Canberra placed very little reliance on Indonesian official statements reflecting a desire to ease the tension in the area and the fact that there were no specific American sanctions in case of an overall Indonesian attack, Canberra's concern was understandable. On the other hand, Canberra could not officially take issue with its most powerful ally. It was a situation similar to the one Australia found itself during

142

Trevor R, Reese, Australia, New ZeaZ.a:nd and the United States (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 224.

143

The New York Times, 24 July 1964,

76

the West Irian crisis in 1962, when the Australian Government under American pressure had to accept the New York Agreement. Postscript With source of relations demise of

the removal of the Malaysian conflict as a friction between Indonesia and Australia, their improved considerably, especially after the the Sukarno regime in 1966.

It introduced a new period since 1966 in which both countries were again compelled to respond to specific issues affecting their common interests. This new period differed from the previous one as relations between the two countries are placed in a different power configuration in Asia. This power configuration was affected by a number of factors, that is the diminished role of British; the suspension of Sino-Indonesian relations; the increased economic role of Japan; the increased significance of ASEAN; and the importance attached to regional cooperation by Indonesia and Australia. And finally, after the Vietnam War in early 1975, America's withdrawal from the Asian mainland which had the most profound impact on the power configuration in Asia. These factors will have significant implications for the future power configuration in Southeast Asia, and will also affect the course of Indonesian-Australian relations in the near future. Three specific issues which are also issues of shared interest, contain the seed for conflict. These are the political future of Papua New Guinea, the problem of regional security arrangements and the problem of Portuguese Timor. The problem of Papua New Guinea Potential cause of friction between Australia and Indonesia on this problem are the interrelated questions of defining the boundary separating West Irian and Papua New Guinea, the problem of refugees using the territory of refuge as a base for subversive activities and the aspirations of Papua nationalism to establish a new Papuan state by integrating West Irian and Papua New Guinea.

77

These problems which contain the ingredients of a conflict situation were created by the process of uneven development of both territories. Even before the recent independence of Papua New Guinea, the Australian Government had launched a crash programme with the objective of rapidly developing the territory's natural resources as well as its human resources. Especially on the latter aspect, Canberra's efforts were focused on the creation of an expanding elite. The existence of such an elite, together with the acquired status of an independent state and improved economic conditions, will put the leaders of Papua New Guinea in a position enabling them to exert political influence over West Irian's population. In such a situation, movements of an irredentist nature in West Irian could be encouraged to demand the separation of West Irian from the rest of the Indonesian Republic. Such a develcpment would create a conflict situation between Indonesia and Australia which might cause the break-up of their present cordial relationship. Indonesia would never tolerate centrifugal forces to operate in any part of its territory since this could destroy the unitary character of the republic. Therefore, external encouragement for such a development would force Jakarta to strike at the source of its ire, for example in the West Irian case, the launching of a military invasion of Papua New Guinea. Australia, on the other hand, has already made clear from the outset that it is committed to the defence of Papua New Guinea. The basis for Australia's concern about future developments in Papua New Guinea is focused on considerations of security. Australia cannot permit a significant change in the control over Papua New Guinea as this would threaten the Australian continent. As one writer puts it, "Any hostile air or naval base there . . . could have major rep~rcussions on the strategic security of much of the eastern Australian coastline, as well as parts of the Australian continent."l44 With Indonesia clearly in mind, he thought that Indonesia might acquire the territory by either force or through the 11 act of free choice" as applied 11 to West Irian: Australia could therefore hardly tolerate occupation or absorption of that territory by any major and

144

H.G. Gelber, The Australian-Amer-ican AZ.Z.ianae: (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968)» p. 14,

Costs and &.nefits

78

potential hostile power, This might well apply even to absorption by the free choice of its inhabitants, though it is an obvious primary Australian interest to avoid having Papua-New Guinea faced with such a choice at all." T,B. Millar in plain te:r:ms mentioned Indonesia as the potential hostile power, when he stated: "It cannot be assumed that all future Indonesian Governments will be a.s friendly to Australia as the present one" In the unfortunate event of an expansionist, adventurous Indonesia with hostile intentions towards Australia, we would find it much more difficult to restrain aggressive actions launched by sea or air from New Guinea if the whole of the island were in Indonesian hands than if portions of it were in Australian hands or under the control of a friendly indlgenous Government."l45 Reslonal securitx arrangements The problem of regional arrangements will remain a major aspect.in Indonesian-Australian relations. After the rise to power of tpe Suharto Government in 1966, the Indonesian and Australian views of the problem of regional security have found themselves in much closer agreement than during the previous decade. Both countries view Southeast Asia as the area of their immediate security interest o In an effort. to anticipate power shifts in Sout.heast Asia, both have started to explore the idea of regional co-operation as a means to ensure their security. Indonesia, however, has retained its disapproval of military alliances. This was reiterated by President Suharto during his visit. t..o Australia in 1972" He stressed the necessity to let Asian states decide their own future, and said that they should not let. themselves be used as pawns ln the conflict between the Great Powers. This statement, in fact, declared Indonesia's adherence to the traditional principle of nonalignment and its refusal to be manoeuvred into military alliances. It also stressed the need for regional co-operatlon bet.ween Southeast Asian states. Foreign Minister Adam Malik is on record stating that he was not worried about. facing the security situation in Asia because it could be preserved through co-operation

145

T.B . Millar, Australian Foreign PoZiay (Sydney: Robertson, 1968), Po 343c

Angus and

79

146 among Asian countries themselves. On another occasion, he warned the Southeast Asian states that, unless they remain united in view of forthcoming changes in the regional power balance, they would lost control of the situation.l47 The focus of Indonesia's security concern is clearly directed on threats coming from outside the region. Australia's apprehension about its security, on the other hand, is focused on threats coming from within the region, and especially from Indonesia. Whether this concern is well-founded or simply exaggerated is less important than the fact that such an attitude does exist and might have an impact on future Indonesian-Australian relations. The Eroblem of Portugu,ese Timor The possibility that international conflicts could emerge from within the Southeast Asian region itself is well exemplified by the recent events in Portuguese Timor.l 48 In the context of Indonesian-Australian relations, the problem constitutes the most immediate issue between the two countries which potentially could have serious repercussions for their future relations. Fully aware of this, both countries have shown a guarded approach to the problem that could lead to serious misunderstandings. Both countries' attention on Portuguese Timor, reflecting their concern about the security aspect, started from the time the Spinola Government in Portugal proclaimed its intention to grant self-government to Portugal's overseas

146

An~ara

147

Indonesian Army Staff College (SESKOAD), OffiaiaZ Magazine, Bandung, 17 April 1969,

148

This section is not intended to be exhaustive. Its primary purpose is to make some observations on recent events viewed within the framework of Indonesian-Australian relations and their implications for their future relations, At the time of writing, violent clashes between opposing factions were still going on without any certainty about the outcome, A solution to the problem becomes more difficult because of the fluidity of politics in Portugal,

(Indonesian News Agency), 16 January 1969.

80

colonies. From the outset, Australia made clear that it would support the right of self-determination for the people of Portuguese Timor and the principles stated in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1541 governing changes of status of nonselfgoverning territories. The Indonesian Government similarly had stated through Foreign Minister Adam Malik its adherence to the principle of self-determination for the people of Portuguese Timor. At the same time, however, semiofficial sources in Jakarta maintained that Indonesia would oppose the establishment of a left-wing regime there, since this could be a source of subversive activities against the Indonesian part of Timor and neighbouring islands. With regard to Australia's commitment to support the principle of self-determination in Portuguese Timor as viewed in the light of a possible Indonesian encroachment of the territory, it is understandable that Canberra has stated its apprehension of becoming involved in such an intraregional dispute, which is of less vital concern to Australia's own security. As Mackie puts it: II oc• [Australia]' s strategic interests are no more than marginally involved in the outcome •.• whether it be independence or incorporatlon in Indonesia".l49 He thought that incorporation int:o Indonesia would be the most satisfactory solution as far as Australia is concerned. First of all, it would preclude any involvement by external powers. It would also avoid the delicate situation in which Australia would be manoeuvred in the event of appeals from the people of Portuguese Timor to take their side in a conflict with Indonesiao Despite the fact that what matters to Australia is the way the problem is resolved rather than the final outcome, Australia is in no position to honour any pledge of support in the event of a military solution by Indonesia. However, Indonesia already made clear that no military invasion of Portuguese Timor is contemplated. It would seem that, excluding unforeseeable events in Portugal and Timor leading to actions which Indonesia considers provocative, Jakarta would not be easily tempted to invade Portuguese Timor in view of the grave risks involved. Above all, it would tarnish Indonesia's image abroad. Especially, Indonesia's relations with Australia and with the other

149

J"A"C. Mackie, "Foreign Policy Options for Australia. The external Dimensions: Regional Problems and Policy Decisions," paper delivered at The Australian Institute of International Conferences, Melbourne, 9-11 May 1975, p. 17,

81

ASEAN members would be put under great strain. Indeed, if these relations were to seriously deteriorate, the prospects for stability in the wider Southeast Asian area would become quite bleak. This would have far-reaching consequences for Indonesia's second development programme, REPELITA II. In view of these brief observations, it would be prudent for Australia as well as Indonesia to put primary emphasis on finding a mutually satisfactory diplomatic solution to the problem of Portuguese Timor.

APPENDIX:

(A)

THE MANILA AGREEMENTS

The Manila Accord

Reports and recommendations of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines to the respective Heads of Government. 1. The Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines, prompted by their keen and common desire to have a general exchange of views on current problems concerning stability, security, economic development and social progress of the three countries and of the region and upon the initiative of President Diosdado Macapagal, agreed that a Conference of Ministers of the three countries be held in Manila on 7th June, 1963, for the purpose of achieving common understanding and the close fraternal cooperation among themselves. Accordingly, Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Dr. Subandrio, Deputy First Minister/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, and Hon" Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President of the Philippines and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, met in Manila from 7th to 11th June, 1963. 2. The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in keeping with ·the spirit of friendship prevailing in the various meetings held between President Soekarno of the Republic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra of the Federation of Malaya, and President Diosdado Macapagal. This Ministerial Conference was a manifestation of the determination of the nations in this region to achieve closer cooperation in their endeavour to chart their common future. 3. The Ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance o£ the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form of manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region, in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. 4.

In the same spirit of common and constructive

84

endeavour, they exchanged views on the proposed Confederation of Nations of Malay origin, the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to North Borneo and related problems. The Maaapagat Plan

5. Recognising that it is in the common interest of their countries to maintain fraternal relations and to strengthen cooperation among their peoples who are bound together by ties of race and culture, the three M~nisters agreed to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and for their neighbours. 6. In this context, the three Ministers supported President Macapagal's plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. This calls for the establishment of the necessary common organs. 7. The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations. The details of such machinery will be further defined. This machinery will enable the three Governments to hold regular consultations at all levels to deal with matters of mutual· interest and concern consistent with the nat.ional, regional and international responsibilities or obligations of each country without prejudice to its sovereignty and independence. The Ministers agreed that their countries will endeavour to achieve close understanding and cooperation in dealing with common problems relating to security, stability, economic, social and cultural deve lopmen·t. 8. In order to accelerate the process of growth towards the ultimate establishment of President Macapagal's planv the Ministers agreed that each country shall set up its own national secretariat. Pending the establishment of a central secretariat for the consultative machinery, the national secretaries should co-ordinate and co-operate with each other in the fulfilment of their tasks. 9. The Hinisters further agreed to recommend that Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meet at least

85

once a year for the purpose of consultations on matters of import.ance and common concern o

Malaysia and North Borneo 10. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries adherence to principle of self-determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo Territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representatives, 11. The Federation of Malaya expressed appreciation for this attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines and undertook to consult the British Government and the Governments of the Borneo Territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representat.ive to take the necessary steps in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of those Territories. 12o The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippines claim to North Borneo. The Ministers took note of the Philippine claim and the right of the Philippines to continue to pursue it in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes. They agreed that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. Moreover, in the context of their close association, the three countries agreed to exert their best endeavours to bring the claim to a just and expeditious solution by peaceful means of the Parties' own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration.

13. In particular, considering the close historical ~1es between the peoples of the Philippines and North Borneo as well as their geographical propinquity, the Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the Government of the latter and the Government of the Philippines should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their region to ensure the security and stability of the area.

86

14. 'I'he Ministers agreed to reconunend that a meeting of their respective Heads of Government be held in Manila not later than the end of July 19630 15. The Ministers expressed satisfaction over the atmosphere of brotherliness and cordiality which pervaded their meeting and considered it as a confirmation of their close fraternal ties and as a happy augury for the success of future consultations among their leaders. 16" The Ministers agreed to place on record their profound appreciation of and gratitude for the statesmanlike efforts of President Macapagal whose courage, vision and inspiration not only facilitated the holding of this historic meeting but also contributed towards the achievement for the first time of a unity of purpose and a sense of common dedication among the peoples of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. (B)

The Manila Declaration

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, assembled in a Summit Conference in Manila from July 30th to August 4th 1963, following the meeting of their Foreign Ministers held in Manila from June 7th to 11th, 1963. Conscious - of the historic significance of their coming together for the first time as leaders of sovereign states that have emerged after long struggles from colonial status to independence, Desiring - to achieve better understanding and closer cooperation in their endeavour to chart their common future, Inspired - also by the spirit of Asian-African solidarity forged in the Bandung Conference of 1955. Convinced - that their countries, which are bound together by close historical ties of race and culture, share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability anq security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities and to ensure the peaceful development of their respective countries and their region in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples, and

87

De~ermined - to intensify the joint and individual efforts to their countries to secure lasting peace, progress and prosperity for themselves and their neighbours in a world dedicated to freedom and justice.

Do hereby declare First - that they reaffirm their adherence to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people as enunicated in the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Declaration, Second - that they are determined, in the common interest of their countries, to maintain fraternal relations, to strengthen cooperation among their peoples in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote economic progress and social well-being in the region, and to put an end to the exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another" Third - that the three nations shall combine their efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all forms and manifestations and for the eradication of the vestiges thereof in the region in particular and the world in general. Fourth - the the three nations, as new emerging forces in the region, shall cooperate in building a new and better world based on national freedom, social justice and lasting peace, and Fifth - that in the context of the joint endeavours of the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by hodling frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo.

fe)

The Manila Joint Statement

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines, and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya met at a Summit Conference in Manila from July 30th to August 5th, 1963. 1. Moved by a sincere design to solve their common problems in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding, they

88

considered, approved and accepted the report and recommendations of the Foreign Ministers of the three countr~es adopted in Manila on June 11th, 1963 (hereafter to be known as the Manila Accord) . 2. In order to provide guiding principles for the implementation of the Manila Accord the Heads of Government have issued a Declaration known as the Manila Declaration, embodying the common aspirations and objectives of the peoples and Governmen·ts of the three countries. 3" As a result of the consultations amongst the three Heads of Government, in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Manila Declaration, they have resolved various current problems of common concern. 4. Pursuant to paragraph 10 and 11 of the Manila Accord, the United Nations Secretary-General or his representative should ascertain prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) , Principle 9 of the Annex, by a fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary-General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements embodied in Principle 9, ·taking into consideration: (I)

The recent elections in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak, but. nevertheless, further examining, verifying and satisfying himself as to whether (a) Malaysia was a major issue, if not the main issue, (b) Electoral registers were properly compiled, (c) Elections were free and there was no coercion, and (d) Votes were properly polled and properly counted, and

(II)

The wishes of those who, being qualified to vote, would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had it not been for their detention for political activities, imprisonment for their political offences or absence from Sabah (North Borneo) or Sarawak.

89

5" The Secretary-General will be requested to send working teams to carry out the task set out in paragraph 4. 6u The Federation of Malaya having undertaken to consult the British under Paragraph 11 of the Manila Accord on behalf of the three Heads of Government, further undertake to request them to cooperate with the SecretaryGeneral and to extend to him the necessary facilities so as to enable him t,o carry out his t:asks as set out in paragraph 4.

7., In the interests of the countries concerned, the t.hree Heads of Government deem it desirable to send observers to witness the carrying out of the task to be undertaken by the working teams, and the Federation of Malaya will use its best endeavours to obtain the cooperation of the British Government and the Governments of Sabah (North Boreno) and Sarawak in furtherance of this purpose. 8, In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord, the three Heads of Government decided to request the British Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute between the British Government and the Philippine Government concerning Sabah (North Borneo) by means of negotiations, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlements, or other peaceful means of the Parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 'I'he three Heads of Government take cognizance of the position regarding the Philippine claim to Sabah (North Borneo) 1 after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as provided under paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord that is, that the inclusion of Sabah (North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia, does not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder. 9. Pursuant to paragraph 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Manila Accord and the fifth principle of the Manila Declaration, that is, that initial steps should be taken towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels, to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo, it is agreed that each country shall set up a National Secretariat for Maphilindo affairs and as a first step the respective national secretaries will consult together with a view to coordinating and cooperating with each other in the study en the setting up of the necessary machinery for Maphilindo. 10.

The three Heads of Government emphasised that the

90

responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the Government and the peoples of the countries concerned, and that the three Governments undertake to have close consultations (Mushawarah) among themselves on these matters o

11, The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign powers temporary in nature - should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countri·es. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. 12. President Soekarno and Prime Minister Abdul Rahman express their deep appreciation for the initiative taken by President Macapagal in calling the Summit Conference which, in addition to resolving their differences concerning the proposed Federation of Malaysia, resulted in paving the way for the establishment of Haphilindo. The three Heads of Government conclude this Conference, which has greatly strengthened the fraternal ties which bind their three countries and extended the scope of their cooperation and understanding with renewed confidence that their Governments and peoples will together make a significant contribution to the attainment of just and enduring peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Research Notes and Discussions Series 1

M. Mainguy, Economic Problems Related to Oil and Gas Exploration, 1976. 39pp. S$6.00

2

R. William Liddle, Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia, 1977. 2lpp. S$4.00

3

Raja Segaram Arumugam, State and Oil in Burma, 1977. 36pp. S$5.00

4

Hilman Adil, Australia's Poliay Towards Indonesia During Confrontation, 1962-66, 1977. 90pp. S$8.00

THE AUTHOR Dr. Hilman Adil is currently a member of the Research Staff of LEKNASLIPI (National Institute of Economic and Social Research), Jakarta. He obtained his doctorate in Political Science from the University of Leyden in 1973. Between January and July 1975 he was Fellow in Australian/Southeast Asian Relations in ISEAS. He is the author of Australia's Relations with Indonesia, 1945-1962 (Almelo: Lulof, 1973).

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