Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy 1924-1929 0714647586, 9780714647586

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AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN AND TH E

COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

0 0 Westminrter, 0

The Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, M.P. Zke Weekly Westminrter, 19 April 1924. 0 Associated Newspaper.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN AND THE

COMMITMENT TO EUROPE British Foreign Policy, 1924-29

Richard S. Grayson

Routledge Taylor &. Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1997 by Frank Cass Publishers This edition published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X 14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1997 Richard S. Grayson. The right of Richard S. Grayson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Grayson, Richard S. Austen Chamberlain and the commitment to Europe : British foreign policy, 1924-29 1. Great Britain - Foreign relations - 1910-1936 I. Title 327.4’1’009042 ISBN 0 7146 4758 6 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 4319 X (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Grayson, Richard S., 1969Austen Chamberlain and the commitment to Europe : British foreign policy, 1924-29 / Richard S. Grayson, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-7458-6 (cloth). — ISBN 0-7146-4319-X (pbk.) 1. Chamberlain, Austen, Sir, 1863 — 1937. 2. Great Britain—Foreign relations— 1910-1936. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Europe. 4. Europe—Foreign relations—Great Britain. I. Title DA566.9.C43G73 1997 97-10824 327.41—dc21 CIP

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

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Contents Preface

1

Acknowledgements

xiii

List of Abbreviations

xvii

The Journey to the Foreign Office Introduction

1

His Father’s Son

2

Involvement in Foreign Affairs before 1922

4

Returning to the Fold and Ditching Joe

5

To the Foreign Office Conclusion

2

3

ix

8 10

The Diplomatic Machine Introduction

14

Foreign Office Reforms before 1924

14

The Staff and Structure of the Foreign Office

15

Diplomats Abroad

19

Inter-departmental Relations

21

An Empire Foreign Policy?

23

The Cabinet in November 1924

24

Conclusion

27

Calming France: The Security Question, November 1924 to December 1925 Introduction

31

France and the Geneva Protocol

33

The Committee of Imperial Defence: 4 and 16 December 1924

35

Alternatives to the Protocol

37

The Dominions and European Security

41

The Evacuation of the Cologne Zone

42

The Committee of Imperial Defence: 13 and 19 February 1925

43

Austen Chamberlain’s Alternative

44

The Protocol Rejected

47

4

5

6

Chamberlain in Geneva and Paris

50

The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee

57

The Locarno Agreements

63

The Dominions and Locarno

66

Conclusion

66

The League of Nations as the Concert of Europe? Introduction

76

British Policy and the League

77

Chamberlain’s Critics

78

Chamberlain’s Intentions

80

A Limited League

81

A Developing League

82

Germany Joins the Concert

86

The Concert in Action

94

British Interests

105

Conclusion

106

Calming Germany: The Locarno System, 1926-29 Introduction

116

Chamberlain’s Policy

117

Chamberlain as Mediator

120

Italy

122

Revising Germany’s Eastern and Southern Borders

124

Military Questions, Minorities and Reparations

128

Conclusion

135

Disarmament and the USA Introduction

7

146

Chamberlain on Disarmament and the USA

147

The Preparatory Commission

150

The Geneva Naval Conference

153

Chamberlain Looks West

157

Conclusion

164

Appeasing China Introduction

170

Japan and the Singapore Naval Base

173

Initiatives from the Foreign Office

174

Shanghai and Canton: Chamberlain in Control

176

8

Planning the Tariff Conference

178

The Tariff Conference: the Peking Legation in Control

179

The December Memorandum

181

Shanghai: the Cabinet in Control

187

The Nanking Outrage: Chamberlain takes on the Foreign Office

193

Chiang’s Victory

196

Inter-departmental Disputes

198

Conclusion

201

The Middle East and North Africa Introduction

212

The Route to India: Egypt

214

The Route to India: Arabia

220

Maintaining the Mandate for Iraq

224

Western Powers in North Africa and the Middle East: Morocco and Syria

9

231

The Soviet Threat: Persia and Afghanistan

236

Conclusion

241

The Soviet Union and the Border States Introduction

253

Development of a Policy

255

Trade as Policy

259

Hanging On

260

Diplomatic Rupture

263

Plans for War

266

Conclusion

268

Epilogue The Contemporary Verdict

274

The Second Labour Government

276

Chamberlain’s Career to 1937

277

Conclusion

280

Bibliography

286

Index

311

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Preface I am much more of an ‘Européen’ than most of my countrymen, for I have a clearer perception than they of the inextricable way in which our interests are bound up with every possibility of the European situation. Austen Chamberlain to William Tyrrell, 19 Sept. 19271

This book fills a major gap in the study of interwar British foreign policy: it is the first full analysis of the foreign policy of the second Baldwin government, from November 1924 to June 1929. These years have been neglected by historians, which is surprising, for they were eventful in international history. As for significant treaties, we can look to the Locarno agreements of 1925, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; in imperial affairs, there were further moves towards Egyptian independence and the eventful Imperial Conference of 1926. There were also flashpoints aplenty, especially in China, where the civil war led to the despatch of 13,000 British troops to Shanghai in 1927. War with Turkey over Mosul in northern Iraq was also a possibility, perhaps only narrowly avoided. And in the League of Nations, disarmament and the League’s developing authority had high profiles. Some of these areas have their own monograph or article studies; this book considers policy as a whole, filling one of the last major gaps in work on interwar foreign policy. Overall, the aim is to write a history of the 1920s that does not see the decade as only having significance in preceding the 1930s: often, scholars look at the 1920s to ascertain the causes of the problems of the next decade, thus failing either to understand the outlook of policy-makers at the time, or to credit their achievements. The book analyses British foreign policy from 1924-29 by focusing on the foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain. In so doing, it aims to answer three principal questions: what ideas did Chamberlain have on

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europi

foreign policy, how did he formulate his ideas, and how influential was he? These are broken down into a number of sub-questions. Chamberlain’s ideas on policy are crucial, and are tackled by considering general points on how he perceived Britain’s world role: what did he want Britain to do in world affairs, what were Britain’s interests, and how did his conception of British power affect policy? Questions on specific policy areas are then tackled in detail. In western Europe, why did Chamberlain pursue policies that led eventually to the Locarno agreements; how did he maintain the Locarno system, was he ‘pro-French’; and how far did he understand Stresemann’s and Mussolini’s intentions? Looking at the League of Nations, Chamberlain’s views on how far the League should be a factor in British policy are considered, along with the accusation that he undermined the League by establishing a new Concert of Europe. On eastern Europe, how did Chamberlain perceive the Soviet Union, and how did he deal with the threat that it posed? Eastern Europe involves consideration of the role of trade in British policy, for it was put forward by the Foreign Office as a way of bolstering the border states against the Soviets. On non-European matters, China took up much of Chamberlain’s time; Chapter Seven looks at how Chamberlain dealt with crises there, and what this shows about his perception of Britain’s world role. Similar questions are asked in Chapter Eight on the Middle East and North Africa; this also considers Chamberlain’s attitude to British imperial interests. But how far was Chamberlain merely a mouthpiece for the Foreign Office? The study constantly returns to this question, as also to the cognate one of how much influence Chamberlain had in Cabinet upon foreign policy. Their examination is assisted by two introductory chapters which consider Chamberlain’s pre-1924 career, and the state of the diplomatic machine in 1924-29. It will be seen that in both areas Chamberlain’s role varied, depending upon his own self-confidence (or lack of it) in tackling issues, and the strength of interests from other government departments and ministers.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The main sources are government and private papers. However, publications such as Hansard, the League of Nations Journal, and The Times have been used where appropriate. A number of documents

Preface

xi

are duplicated; for example, a letter from Cecil to Chamberlain might appear in two collections of private papers, along with Cabinet or Foreign Office files. Where this is so, I have cited the most accessible source in the following order: 1. Any published source, with Documents on British Foreign Policy having highest priority. 2. CAB 23 and 24 microfilms: various locations, including Public Record Office and Bodleian Library. 3. FO 800 series of Chamberlain’s correspondence on microfilm: Public Record Office and Bodleian Library. 4. FO 371 files: Public Record Office. 5. Chamberlain Papers: University of Birmingham Library. Most of Austen’s letters to his sisters have been published in an edition edited by Robert Self, published since the bulk of this book was written. I have referred to these by their position in the Chamberlain collection, where I originally consulted them, and have added their published reference in the form ‘Self’, followed by the page number. 6. Baldwin Papers: University of Cambridge Library. 7. Cecil Papers: British Library. 8. Other private papers. Quotations follow the convention laid down by the Modern Humanities Research Association; thus, *[...]’ is used where a quotation excludes some words in the original. Where dots are in the original, these are represented without square brackets.

NOTE 1.

Public Record Office [hereafter, PRO], Austen Chamberlain Correspondence, FO 800/261/330-41: AC to Tyrrell, 19 Sept. 1927.

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Acknowledgements

My first thanks must go to my D.Phil. research supervisor, John Dunbabin, of St Edmund Hall. Over three academic years, he exceeded everything that a graduate student can hope for from a supervisor. He suggested many useful avenues for research, painstakingly commented on successive drafts of chapters, and provided stimulating conversation on interwar foreign policy and international relations. Many thanks are also due to John Charmley of the University of East Anglia. His special subject on Churchill first kindled my interest in research on this period, and in a conversation with him on my graduation day, he suggested Austen Chamberlain as a worthwhile topic to research. His continued interest in the topic, and comments on chapters have been invaluable. So, too, has the help of Alastair Parker of The Queen’s College, Oxford, who has advised on many questions of interwar foreign policy, and the challenges of archival research. His comments on early drafts, and my final doctoral thesis, were extremely useful. I am also grateful to Jonathan Wright of Christ Church, Oxford, for advice on Stresemann, and to Steve Fredrickson, now of NASA in Houston, who gave me much helpful and time-consuming advice on the wonders of computers. Since an earlier version of this book was completed as a doctoral thesis, many people have helped me with comments. My thesis examiners, Philip Waller of Merton College, Oxford, and Zara

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

Steiner, of New Hall, Cambridge, tested many of my arguments with a welcome grilling. Following this, I have been assisted by advice from a number of people in Oxford, especially Andrew Thompson (Corpus Christi College), who has been of enormous help in reading parts of this book, and other aspects of my research. Members of the Oxford University seminar on ‘German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ have made helpful comments. Paul Weindling (Wellcome Institute) and Jose Harris (St Catherine’s College) also made useful comments before completion of the thesis. Years before all of this, my interest in history was nurtured by my history teachers at Hemel Hempstead School. Since this is my first book, this is the best place to thank all of them, especially John Ross and James Chappelow, for the interest and time that they took with my work, and for their inspirational teaching. I certainly would not have reached this far without them. Later, at the University of East Anglia, I was similarly inspired by Geoffrey Searle’s course on British history in the 1886-1940 period. Thanks are also due to Roger Thompson, who was my adviser when I was an undergraduate at UEA, and whose assistance with revision essays was a great boost during Finals. During my research, I have bothered many librarians and archivists with queries, and I would like to thank all the staff of the libraries and records offices listed in the bibliography. I would particularly like to mention Dr B. Benedikz, of the University of Birmingham, for interesting conversation on the Chamberlain family. Much appreciation is also due to the Bodleian Library for its great generosity in purchasing microfilms of Austen Chamberlain’s papers held at the Public Record Office, and a complete set of the papers of the Committee of the Imperial Defence in the interwar years. These not only filled a large hole in the library, but saved me much time travelling to archives. My thanks go to the British Academy for providing the means for survival over the three years spent on my doctoral thesis. On a personal note, I would like to thank Jerry Sandford for his amusing and stimulating conversation over many years now on twentiethcentury politics. Most importantly, I would like to thank three people for their love and support: my parents, Jannat and Don Grayson, for their help and encouragement; and to Lucy, my wife, go all my thanks and more for keeping me going in the dark moments that all writers experience, and for making it all so enjoyable.

Acknowledgements

xv COPYRIGHT

I am grateful to the following libraries for permission to quote from private papers: University of Birmingham (Chamberlain Papers and reproduction of Chamberlain photographs); British Library (Cecil and D’Abernon Papers); Syndics of Cambridge University Library (Baldwin Papers); St Antony’s College, Oxford (O’Malley Papers); Dr J. Charmley (Lloyd Papers). Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office, and the Oriental and India Office collections of the British Library, is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The Beaverbrook Papers are in the custody of the House of Lords Record Office and copyright permission has been granted by the Clerk of the Records on behalf of the Beaverbrook Foundation Trustees. Extracts from the Bridgeman Papers are quoted by kind permission of Mrs Stacey and the Trustees of the Bridgeman family archive, and the Shropshire Records and Research Centre. Quotations from the Hankey Papers are made by permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge. I would like to thank Leo Amery for permission to quote from the published versions of his grandfather’s diaries, and the following granted permission to quote from other publications: Cambridge University Press (D. Carlton, ‘Great Britain and the League Council Crisis of 1926’, HistoricalJournal, XI, 1968); British Library of Political and Economic Science (N. MacKenzie, ed., The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Vol. Ill: Pilgrimage, 1912-1947\ 1978); Express Newspapers (K. Young, ed., The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart: Vol. 1\ 1915-1938, 1973); HarperCollins (N. Nicolson, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 1930-39, 1966); Macmillan General Books (A. G. MacDonell, England, Their England, 1933); Macmillan Press Ltd. (S. Marks, The Illusion of Peace, 1976; A. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-35,1936; D. Carlton, MacDonald versus Henderson, 1970); James Nisbet & Co. Ltd. (H. Wickham Steed, The Real Stanley Baldwin, 1930); Princeton University Press (J. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-29 Copyright © 1972 PUP); Royal Institute of International Affairs (F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1952, 1960 edn.); The Historians’ Press (J. Ramsden, ed., Real Old Tory Politics: The Diaries of Sir Robert Sandars, Lord Bayford, 1910-1935, 1984; S. Ball, ed., Parliament and

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

Politics in the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald: The Headlam Diaries, 1923-1935, 1993); Weidenfeld & Nicolson (M. Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement, 1966; R. Rhodes James, ed., Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937, 1969); David Higham Associates (C. Bamett, The Collapse of British Power, 1972). Quotations of Winston S. Churchill are reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown Ltd., London on behalf of the Estate of Sir Winston S. Churchill (© Winston S. Churchill). The frontispiece cartoon is © Associated Newspapers, and I am grateful to Solo Syndications for their help with this.

List of Abbreviations

A RCH IVES

AC CAB 2, 4 and 6 CAB 23 CAB 24 FO 371 FO 800 NC

Austen Chamberlain Papers (University of Birmingham Library) Committee of Imperial Defence Papers (Public Record Office) Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office) Cabinet Memoranda (Public Record Office) Foreign Office Political Files (Public Record Office) Austen Chamberlain Correspondence (Public Record Office) Neville Chamberlain Papers (University of Birmingham Library)

PUBLISHED DO C U M EN TS

DBFP, I and LA, XXV-XXVII and I-VII.

Documents in British Foreign Policy, Series No., Vol. No.

xviii

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe JO U R N A L S

AHR BJIS EHR HJ IHR IRHPS JB S JC H JM H LNOJ PSQ TCBH UBHJ

American Historical Review British Journal of International Studies English Historical Review HistoricalJournal International History Review International Review of History and Political Science Journal of British Studies Journal of Contemporary History Journal of Modern History League of Nations OfficialJournal Political Science Quarterly Twentieth-Century British History University of Birmingham HistoricalJournal

1

The Journey to the Foreign Office [...] my garden will go to ruin & you need not expect to get a letter from me for the next 4 years if I survive so long. Austen Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Nov. 1924, on accepting the Foreign Office} Poor man, he always plays the game and never wins it. Churchill's 1935 verdict on Chamberlain.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

If Austen Chamberlain featured in the popular game Trivial Pursuit’, it would probably be in response to the following questions: who was Neville Chamberlain’s half-brother, also a politician? Or, who is the only leader of the Conservative Party this century never to be prime minister? Views of scholars are only a little more complex. For historians of foreign policy, France, which he said he loved ‘[...] as a man loves a woman [.. .]’,3is believed to have influenced him greatly, an image bolstered by his speaking French (well) in public.4 More often, he is seen primarily as the son of his father, ‘Radical Joe’, a man for whom the ‘best prime minister we never had’ tag can be used - no such case can be made for Austen, who sported the Chamberlain monocle and, after Joe’s stroke, carried the standard for tariff reform. There seemed little distinctive about Austen - one friend commented, ‘If only Austen would wear spectacles and grow a beard.’5Although it is certainly the case that this perception misses almost everything about the private family man, this is what contemporaries saw, and how historians have assessed him since: as a pale imitation of the father.6 Austen’s only difference was to be a ‘Gentleman in Politics’, as the title of Dutton’s biography suggests, which meant he was usually seen as stiff and formal, and was never loved (or hated) like Joe. This also probably prevented him

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

becoming prime minister in 1922, out of loyalty to Lloyd George. ‘Poor man, he always plays the game and never wins it’ quipped Churchill in 1935. This phrase, altered and reattributed to Birkenhead in Beaverbrook’s memoirs, became the enduring epitaph.7 By this time, he was ‘[...] the last of the Great Victorians.’8 He came from a political tradition that was irrelevant by the end of the 1930s - one based upon disinterested public service and reverence for parliamentary forms9 - which was overtaken by mass democracy and class-based politics. This chapter assesses what of Chamberlain’s pre-1924 career is relevant to foreign policy.

HIS FATHER’S SON

Joseph Austen Chamberlain was bom on 16 October 1863. His mother, Harriet, died a few days after.10 His father, Joseph, was soon developing his first political persona - hero of Radical Liberals - a pioneer of municipal services and local government. Later, he became a demon figure for the Liberals, when he worked with the Conservatives after breaking the 1886 government, putting them in for what turned out to be two decades of almost unbroken rule. However, after 1903 it was his campaigning for tariff reform to unite the Empire and provide revenue for social programmes that had the most impact on Austen; and, after Joseph’s stroke in 1906, the son bore his father’s standard. In 1878, Austen went to Rugby, then to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1882. How far his experiences influenced his political views, especially those on foreign policy, is difficult to estimate. But his travels to Europe, and the opinions he formed on France and Germany are important, given later accusations that in 1924-29 he was unduly influenced by French politicians, due to a fondness for things French, and a fear of Germany.11 Much of this stems from his time travelling in France soon after leaving Cambridge in 1885.12 This is all contrasted with his opinions of Germany13 and a passage from a letter he wrote home in 1887, saying, ‘I fear my generation of Germans, and those a litde younger will be far more high-handed and will presume far more on the victories of ’66 and ’70 than those who won them.’ First, one should note that Chamberlain’s fears of Germany were to be justified, both in his generation and after. But, key to an understanding of his views is that, even at this stage, he saw

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

3

the problems France might cause. In the same letter enunciating his fear of Germany, he added that some there were ‘[...] as bad as the French military school 14 One could thus look too far here for signs of pro-French bias. Anything Chamberlain said about French culture was also a standard pose of the intellectual élite in Britain; his father had loved French culture and spoken the language fluently, but looked to Germany as a potential ally. For Austen, a preference certainly existed; but it was far more about holiday destinations15and culture, than suitability as allies. There was also a substantial gap, in experience and development, between the travelling student of 1887 and the man who became Foreign Secretary 37 years later. Then, he not only made contrasts between France and Germany; he also extolled British virtues: at the 1925 League of Nations Assembly, he contrasted the Anglo-Saxon and Latin minds, saying that while the former preferred to deal with specific problems, the latter was prone to generalise - with the result that ‘We have had no revolutionary disturbance for 250 years.516 So, if Chamberlain admired French culture, he also believed Anglo-Saxons were better at politics. Austen had been marked out for a political career by his father; and he joined him in the Commons as a Liberal Unionist in March 1892, representing East Worcestershire until taking over Joe’s seat of West Birmingham in 1914, when he assumed the title ‘Conservative’ for the first time.17 He was appointed Civil Lord of the Admiralty in 1895, where he stayed for five years. After a spell as Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and entering the Cabinet as PostmasterGeneral, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1903 to December 1905, which enabled Balfour to keep close contact with Joseph Chamberlain. From the fall of Balfour’s government until 1915, when he went to the India Office, Chamberlain’s career was dominated by the tariff campaign, the leadership of which he took on after his father’s enforced retirement. In 1911 he also failed to become Unionist Leader, largely because he was considered too conservative for reform-minded Unionists, but too compromising for diehards. He was also probably not seen as a true Conservative - he was not yet using the title, and did not declare against Disestablishment until 1912. Clearly, he had no strong base of support within the party, which was a continuing feature of his career. With the entry of the Unionists into coalition with the Liberals in 1915, Chamberlain became Secretary of State for India, but resigned after two years, accepting responsibility, which was not

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

his, for failures in military campaigns in Mesopotamia.18 In 1918 he returned to the Cabinet without portfolio, becoming Chancellor again in 1919. During this time, like Lloyd George, he urged coalition between Liberals and Unionists - ‘the national & constitutional forces of the country’19- to resist the rise of Labour. When he became Unionist Leader in 1921, he thus advocated supporting Lloyd George with great vigour.20 It was to cost Austen his party’s support and to force his resignation.

IN V O LV EM EN T IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS BEFORE 1922

A clear picture of Chamberlain the party politician can be seen by the end of the First World War: he was deeply opposed to Labour, and tariff reform was the constructive theme of his career. But he had hardly been involved in foreign affairs. At the Admiralty, he tackled no great political questions. During his first spell as Chancellor he voiced opinions on the Russo Japanese war, but only to suggest that if Britain reassured Russia of its intentions, it should not weaken its support for Japan. He wrote to Lansdowne, ‘Let us make new friends if we can, but above all let us keep old ones!’21 Though not necessarily significant in the development of his views on foreign affairs, it is certainly a sign that Chamberlain regarded consistency of action as important. Later, he supported the government at the outbreak of the Great War; and at the India Office he was involved in some strategic issues. But there is no evidence of any distinctive or considered views on foreign policy. After the war, Chamberlain began to talk more about foreign affairs. While Chancellor of the Exchequer, he supported Keynes’s plans for the financial reconstruction of Europe, and accepted the arguments of The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germany would not be able to pay its reparations burden.22 He was even considering foreign affairs when they did not directly relate to his Cabinet portfolio. In June 1920, when Britain’s future relations with France and Belgium were on the agenda, Chamberlain argued strongly that Britain should make a pact with both, in order to show the world (and its own people) the circumstances in which Britain would fight. It had been suggested that tripartite military conversations be held, but nothing more; Chamberlain asked whether, if France and Belgium based their policies on these

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

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discussions, ‘[...] could we, without disgrace and dishonour, refuse to act when and if the occasion for action arose?’ Furthermore, he said, T h e knowledge that such a treaty exists may restrain the aggressor Chamberlain’s course of action was not adopted; in fact, not even limited military talks were held. The Cabinet decided '[...] the proposed military conversations would be premature at the present time.’23 Chamberlain was isolated, more in favour of a clear statement of Britain’s interests in Europe than any of his colleagues. One might also argue that he had a deep commitment to the entente with France. But he did not go as far as, for example, Lord Derby, in this; meanwhile, he would not make Britain’s right to act during the Chanak Crisis conditional on French support, which would ‘[...] reduce this country to a humble appanage of France.’24 He also soon told the French Ambassador that an Anglo-French pact faced considerable difficulties, and did not push the idea despite being asked to by the Ambassador.25 So, by 1920, Chamberlain had thought about the structure of post-war Europe, possibly out of a sense of having views different from those of most of his colleagues. This difference can be simply described: although nobody in the Cabinet thought Britain did not have interests in Europe, Chamberlain was committed to that tradition of opinion which argued for active involvement there.

R ETUR N IN G TO THE FOLD AND D ITC H IN G JOE

But why exactly did Baldwin send Chamberlain to the Foreign Office in November 1924? This question is important, since only two years before, while he was Unionist Leader, the majority of Conservatives in Parliament voted, at the Carlton Club meeting of 19 October 1922, not to stand on a joint platform with Lloyd George at the next general election. This was against Chamberlain’s wishes, and he resigned as Leader and Lord Privy Seal; Bonar Law became Conservative Leader, and the new Prime Minister.26 Chamberlain had been supported by few leading Conservatives. Most notable were Robert Horne, the outgoing Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Laming Worthington-Evans, the Secretary for War. In addition to these, although they were members of the House of Lords and therefore not involved in the voting at the Carlton Club, two big

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

guns supported Chamberlain: Birkenhead, the outgoing Lord Chancellor, and Balfour, who had served as both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary but had most recently been Lord President. In total, Chamberlain was supported by 11 Conservative ministers. He was opposed by 13 junior ministers, and many leading figures, including Bonar Law, Curzon, Baldwin, Joynson-Hicks, Amery and Bridgeman, along with the vast majority of backbenchers.27 Following this, there was no coalescing with Lloyd George, although contacts were maintained.28 But Chamberlain was close to those who had supported him at the Carlton Club, and refused to join forces with any Conservative leader, unless his supporters, principally Horne and Birkenhead, were accepted too. This barred reunion on three occasions in 1923 (May, October and November), despite attempts by Bonar Law and Baldwin. Each time, Birkenhead’s ‘[...] reputation as a drunkard and loose liver 29 was distasteful to most Conservatives, although Chamberlain was also held to have been too hostile to the government in Parliament. O nly Worthington-Evans returned.30 O f most significance to Chamberlain’s later foreign policy is that during these reunion talks he was mentioned by Baldwin as a possible Foreign Secretary, although no reasons were given, and other posts were also talked of. However, there was a freeze in relations between Baldwin and Chamberlain in May 1923 which took months to thaw, after Baldwin suggested that, since he now blocked Chamberlain’s way to the premiership, the latter might wish to retire from politics and accept the Washington Embassy. Chamberlain was angered by this snub;31 perhaps because of it, he became very critical of the government, especially its response to France’s occupation of the Ruhr. As he told Birkenhead: Two criticisms stand out in my mind. The first is that at the outset, while declining to take part in the occupation, they wished the French success. Now, or at some intervening point, they declare the operation which they wished successful to be illegal. Could any combination be more futile and mischievous? Secondly, they are moving without a policy - living, indeed, from hand to mouth and not improbably hastening the catastrophe which it is their object to prevent.32 This was a sign of what he thought was needed in British foreign

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

7

policy, and what he tried to place at its heart as Foreign Secretary: consistency and clarity. As we shall see, the lessons of the Ruhr occupation influenced Chamberlain a great deal. Despite these criticisms, Chamberlain was drawing closer to reunion. Tariffs were the main factor: as he told both his brother and Birkenhead, he would support the government in any move towards tariffs because 4[...] I am bound by every conviction, by my past, and by my name, to give them all the support that I can.’ Even so, Chamberlain’s role in the 1923 general election was limited. He had not been given office, so he took no part in deciding party policy,33 and was returned to Parliament with a majority of 3,957 in West Birmingham (down from 1922’s majority of 5,806).34 With Baldwin’s gamble over tariffs meeting with electoral defeat, the Conservatives were left as the largest party in the Commons, but without a majority; a poorly supported intrigue began in Conservative ranks to replace Baldwin: Chamberlain was involved, but few details survive.35 Ramsay MacDonald formed a government, tacitly supported by Asquith; the sight of a socialist administration was alarming to many Conservatives. Chamberlain reacted by seeking to break the Liberal Party once and for all, to secure for the Conservative Party all anti-Labour support. This was an important factor in restoring him to Conservative ranks.36 After taking soundings, Baldwin took the coalitionists back, a task probably made easier by the fact that this did not mean making Birkenhead a minister.37 When Baldwin made the offer to Chamberlain, Ajusten] looked a little stiff & suspicious but after a moment’s thought frankly said he could do nothing but accept.’ A discussion on policy followed, when Chamberlain asked that the party reaffirm its long-term commitment to tariffs, but state that, since the public was opposed to them at present, they would not be put forward.38 This position was endorsed at a meeting of ex-ministers the following day. Only Amery and Bridgeman opposed the statement.39 When one looks later for the influence of Joseph Chamberlain on his eldest son’s foreign policy, and finds it lacking, one must return to this dropping of tariffs in February 1924. Though deeply committed to tariffs, Chamberlain was a realist; he would continue to argue for them, and most particularly for preferences, when opportunities arose,40 but they had ceased to be prom inent in his politics. Later, when commercial matters demanded his attention, he made no attempt to resist the Free Trade

8

Austen Chamberlain and. the Commitment to Europe

orthodoxy of the Foreign Office.41 Furthermore, for Austen, imperial unity never had the emotional appeal it held for his father. Rather than an ideal in itself, it was an element of tariff reform, and does not appear to have had any existence outside the scheme. With the dropping of tariff reform, he had no clear idea either of how to bring about imperial unity, or that it was a burning issue at all. Faced with the necessities of European diplomacy, the idea was cast aside. In this sense, Amery was far more the heir ofJoseph Chamberlain than was his eldest son. Jo e’s standard had been finally packed away by Austen, now his own man - cautious, conservative, and, above all, European.

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Having returned to the fold, Chamberlain settled past differences with people such as Ronald McNeill/2 But he still doubted Baldwin’s abilities. As he wrote to his sister, Ida, ‘[...] I do not think him competent for his position.’ Meanwhile, in contrast to the efforts of Baldwin, Chamberlain’s own speeches in Parliament had been widely praised, so much so that his brother wrote, ‘I see the Sunday Times which has been hunting S.B. for a long time now appoints A[usten] as leader [...]\43 By October, it was obvious a general election would be called, and Chamberlain’s mind turned to office. In a letter to his wife, he asked her advice: he had thought of becoming Lord President or Lord Privy Seal, but instead, had been offered the Foreign or India offices. Chamberlain was concerned about the workload of the former, but Ivy Chamberlain did not doubt he should aim for it.44 It was clear from all that was said at this time that it was important not to send Curzon back to the Foreign Office, because of the resulting bad effect on France: recent work has revived Curzon’s reputation somewhat, suggesting he laid im portant foundations for the subsequent process of pacifying France and Germany.45 But, it remains undeniable that, in 1924, he was seen as hostile to France.46 It is less clear why Chamberlain should replace him. In part, it must have been that he would require an important post and the Foreign Office was the one most in need of a new minister. In any case, Chamberlain had been increasingly vocal on foreign affairs, particularly in a Commons speech on 14 July, in which he said a

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

9

Conservative government would make ‘[...] the maintenance of the Entente with France the cardinal object of our policy This is sometimes held up as evidence of Chamberlain’s inclination towards a ‘pro-French’ foreign policy. However, he added that unity was needed ‘[...] to prevent fresh causes of difference arising between ourselves and our Allies.’47This was clearly not a case of him arguing for an Anglo-French alliance against Germany or any other threat, which ‘pro-French’ might mean. Rather, as we shall see in Chapter Three, it was a practical recognition of the dangers to Europe’s security of a quarrel between its two strongest powers. If Curzon was someone who would upset France, we should not therefore jump to the conclusion that Chamberlain was someone who would do whatever it said - rather, he would seek not to antagonise it. From the point of view of the portfolio Chamberlain was about to receive, the November 1924 election was important because of the publication of the Zinoviev Letter; coming so soon after the Campbell Case, this led to charges that MacDonald’s government was soft on Communism at home and abroad. The Conservatives were the beneficiaries, as they were able to play the ‘Red Card’; but, as we shall see in Chapter Nine, this had immediate policy consequences for Chamberlain. As for the election’s results, Chamberlain’s majority rose to 7,643, although his only opponent was a Communist.48 Overall, the Conservative Party had 412 seats and an overwhelming majority of 215 over the other parties in the Commons. Chamberlain wrote to Baldwin, ‘I have one clear conviction which you will share - Reaction would be fatal.’ He also asked to see Baldwin before he made his Cabinet.49There was no immediate consultation, although it was clear, early in the process, that Chamberlain was destined for the Foreign Office. News of this leaked to Curzon, who saw it as ‘[...] a terrible slur upon my administration of that office [...]’.Justifying his decision, Baldwin used the standard excuse for passing over Curzon, namely his not being in the House of Commons.50 When Chamberlain did meet Baldwin, the latter ignored his request that Home should be offered a high profile job - Home refused the Ministry of Labour and stayed outside the government. For a short time, there was bitterness between Chamberlain and Baldwin; in any event, on 5 November, Chamberlain was formally offered the post of Foreign Secretary, along with that of Deputy Leader of the House.51 Chamberlain was joined at the Foreign Office by Ronald McNeill, his Parliamentary Under-Secretary. McNeill’s main task was to speak

10

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

for Chamberlain in Parliament on minor issues; later (as Lord Cushendun), while Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, he deputised for Chamberlain during his illness in 1928. There is no record of Chamberlain’s views on the appointment; but a year later, he was happy for McNeill to become Financial Secretary to the Treasury,52 and to be replaced by Godfrey Locker-Lampson, a friend of Chamberlain’s. Aside from these men, three further MPs assisted Chamberlain. Arthur Samuel took responsibility for liaising between Chamberlain and the Department of Overseas Trade, while Roger Lumley became his Parliamentary Private Secretary. Samuel replaced McNeill at the Treasury in 1927, while Lumley went on a tour of the Dominions in 1926, to be replaced by a young MP having his first taste of foreign affairs, Anthony Eden.53 None of these influenced policy other than by relaying Conservative opinion on policy matters, which did not prove significant.

C O N C LU SIO N

On entering the Foreign Office, Chamberlain told his sister, Hilda, ‘[...] my garden will go to ruin & you need not expect to get a letter from me [...].’ He was indeed to work long hours, even at weekends The Times■in 1928, said Chamberlain worked harder than any of his predecessors, attributing this mainly to the work involved in the League of Nations, the demands of an enlarged electorate, and questions overhanging from the war.54 One Conservative backbencher was unenthused about the appointment of both Chamberlains, writing that they *[...] no doubt inspire confidence amongst plain men.555 But the press was generally favourable to Austen’s appointment. The Times welcomed him, saying that he knew Europe (particularly France) well, although he was inexperienced regarding the USA, and that his supposed shortcomings, such as being very formal, might be virtues at the Foreign Office. The Morning Post was sure that he perceived ‘[...] that the key to the settlement of Europe is the security of France.’ Chamberlain was also welcomed by the Daily Chronicle. A day later, from Paris, The Times wrote that Chamberlain would help better Anglo-French relations. From Berlin, The Times' correspondent wrote that Chamberlain would be less erratic than his predecessors, while from Rome came the view that Chamberlain was more likely than any other possible foreign minister to be favourable to Italy.56

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

11

It might be expected that Chamberlain brought to the Foreign Office a belief in uniting the Empire through tariff reform; but, in fact, he had limited his commitment to this in the face of electoral defeat. One might also expect that he would form an ex-coalitionist group within Baldwin's Cabinet, assisted by Birkenhead. This chapter has suggested that remaining true to the ex-coalitionists was very important to him. But later on it transpired that he and Birkenhead did not share identical views on foreign policy. Whatever the future held, Chamberlain had overcome the problems caused by his defeat at the Carlton Club, and become Foreign Secretary only two years later. His return to the fold in February 1924 had been occasioned by electoral defeat for the Conservatives; and one might suggest that his position regarding the threat from Labour had been vindicated. There is no evidence that Conservatives gave him credit for these prophecies. But his comeback was remarkable by any standards. And he would need to marshal all his political skills at the Foreign Office, as the problems in international affairs were great. As we shall see, he was immediately confronted with issues relating to Egypt, the Soviet Union and European security. The views he had already expressed on this last issue, together with the fact that he had very pointedly been chosen as Foreign Secretary instead of Curzon, show exactly what was expected of him, namely, the pacification of France as the first step towards a more secure Europe. NOTES 1. University of Birmingham Library, Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/340: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Nov. 1924 (Robert Self, ed., The Austen

2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his Sisters, Hilda and Ida, 7976-7937 (1995), p. 260 [hereafter, Self]). Churchill to Clementine Churchill, in, Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, Volume V, Companion Part II: The Wilderness Years, 7929-7935 (1981), p. 1363. Austen Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time: Addresses on Europe and the Empire (1928), p. 307. See, for example, Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 7978-7933 (1976), p. 62. Leo Maxse, quoted in David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (1985), pp. 3-4. Self, pp. 6, 19,31. Gilbert (ed.), Churchill, Vol. V, Companion Part II: The Wilderness Years p. 1363. J. R. Clynes, Memoirs, Volume II, 7924-7937 (1938), p. 254. Self, p. 12.

12

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

10. For Chamberlain’s early life and family: Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, Volumes I and II, (1939 and 1940); Dutton, Austen Chamberlain. 11. For example, India Office Library, Halifax Papers, Mss. Eur. C. 152/17, no. 85b: Josiah Wedgwood to Irwin, 24 Aug. 1926. Cambridge University Library, Baldwin Papers 219, Daily Express cartoon, 16 June 1926. 12. Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years (1935), pp. 13-28. 13. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain p. 17. Petrie, Chamberlain Vol. /, p. 28. 14. Chamberlain, Down the Years p. 44. 15. Motoring holidays were favourite. 16. Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time p. 76. 17. F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918,\ 1974), pp. 75,421. 18. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, p. 91. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. /, pp. 318-19; Vol. //, Ch. 2. 19. AC 24/3/47: AC to John Gretton, 20 July 1921. 20. Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924 (1971), pp. 144-5. Neville Chamberlain, too, though at first enjoying good relations with Birmingham unions, became vehemently opposed to Labour in 1924-29. David Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, Vol. 7(1984), p. 519. 21. AC 17/1/73: AC to Lansdowne, 29 Oct. 1905. 22. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. II pp. 144-45. Robert Skidelsky,/oArc Maynard Keynes, Volume I: Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920 (1983), pp. 368-70. 23. PRO, CID Papers, CAB 4/7, 246-B: AC note, 28 June 1920. PRO, Cabinet Conclusions, CAB 23/21, CC 38(20): 30June 1920. 24. AC 24/4/51: Wroxall to AC, 31 May 1922. AC 33/2/30: AC to A. Boscawen, 5 Oct. 1922. 25. AC 24/3/91 and 92: AC and Comte de St. Aulaire correspondence, 9 and 13 Dec. 1921. 26. Michael Kinnear, The Fall of Lloyd George: the Political Crisis of 1922 (1973). Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (1979). 27. AC 33/2/92 and 93: Votes at Carlton Club, 19 Oct. 1922. Neville Chamberlain was not at the meeting: he was returning from Canada, and joined Bonar Law’s government when Austen accepted that staying out would ruin Neville’s career. NC 18/1/370: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 31 Oct. 1922. 28. Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment: Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922-1929 (1975), p. 100. 29. University of Birmingham Library, Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/416: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 17 Nov. 1923. 30. AC 5/1/250: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 18 Nov. 1922 Self, pp. 200-2. AC 35/2/10: AC to Cllr. Talbot (W. Birmingham), 26 May 1923. John Vincent (ed.), The Crawford Papers: The Journals of David Lindsay, twenty-seventh Earl of Crawford and tenth Earl of Balcarres, 1871-1940, during the years 1892 to 1940 (1984), p. 484: 26 May 1923. NC 18/1/396: N. Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 May 1923. NC 2/21: Diary, 9 Dec. 1923. J. Ramsden (ed.), Real Old Tory Politics: The Dianes of Sir Robert Sandars, Lord Bayford, 1910-1935 (1984), p. 210: 16 Nov. 1923. 31. AC 35/2/1 lb: AC memorandum of a conversation with Baldwin, 26 May 1923. AC 35/3/16, 17 and 21c: Paddy Hannon and AC correspondence, 31 Oct. 1923; Birkenhead memorandum of meeting with Baldwin, 13 Nov. 1923. NC 2/21: Diary, 1 June 1923. 32. AC 35/2/25: AC to Birkenhead, 17 Aug. 1923.

TheJourney to the Foreign Office

13

33. AC 35/3/8 and 3: AC to Birkenhead, 16 Oct. 1923; AC to Baldwin, 14 Nov. 1923. 34. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. I I pp. 208, 238. 35. Philip Williamson (ed.), The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935 (1988), p. 170: Dec. 1923. 36. AC 5/1/302 and 304: AC to Ida and Hilda Chamberlain, 12 and 24 Jan. 1924 (Self, pp. 246-8). NC 2/21: Diary, 21 Jan. 1924. 37. NC 18/1/423: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 Jan. 1924. Baldwin 159 ff. 258-61: Salisbury to Baldwin, 26 Jan. 1924. Cecil Papers, B.L., Add. MS 51080 ff. 113-16: Cecil to Baldwin, 1 Feb. 1924. 38. NC 2/21: Diary, 6 Feb. 1924. NC 18/1/425: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Feb. 1924. AC 35/4/5: AC memorandum of conversation with Baldwin, 5 Feb. 1924, written on 7 Feb. 1924. 39. NC 2/21: Diary, 7 Feb. 1924. John Barnes and David Nicolson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I: 1896-1929 (1980), p. 367: 7 Feb. 1924. 40. In May 1924, Chamberlain argued against removing the new Import Duties of the Finance Act (1915), while in June, he argued for imperial preference on duties which had been imposed by Snowden on dried fruits. Hansard, 5th Series, 173, cols. 1287-1295; 174, cols. 2237-2266. 41. See below pp. 259-60. 42. NC 18/1/426: N. Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Feb. 1924. The nature /%+ 4-1-ip n l i T P r P T i r P Q

IQ l l T l P l P i i r

43. AC 5/1/307: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 9 Feb. 1924 (Self, p. 249). NC 18/1/436: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 May 1924. 44. AC 6/1/563: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 10 Oct. 1924. AC 6/2/336: Ivy Chamberlain to AC, 13 Oct. 1924. 45. G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24 (1995), p. 201. 46. AC 24/6/34: Lord Lee to AC, 30 Oct. 1924. 47. Hansard, 5th Series, 176, cols. 109-10. 48. Petrie, Chamberlain, Volume //p . 242. 49. AC 35/5/3: AC to Baldwin, 31 Oct. 1924. 50. Baldwin 42, ff. 192-6, 216-7 and 238: Baldwin’s Cabinet list, dated 31 Oct. 1924, shows AC at FO; Curzon to Baldwin, 31 Oct. 1924; Baldwin to Curzon, 5 Nov. 1924. 51. AC 6/1/592: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 5 Nov. 1924. AC 6/1/593: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 5 Nov. 1924. AC 35/5/4: AC to Baldwin, 6 Nov. 1924. NC 2/21: Diary, 20 Nov. 1924. 52. Baldwin 160, f. 26: Churchill to Baldwin, 1 Nov. 1925. 53. A. R. Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1938 (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 7-14. 54. AC 5/1/340: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Nov. 1924 (Self, p. 260). Ephraim Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926 {1994), p. 158. The Times, 28 Nov. 1928, p. 17. 55. Stuart Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the Age on Baldwin and MacDonald: The Headlam Diaries, 1923-1935 {1993), p. 48: 7 Nov. 1924. 56. The Times, 7 Nov. 1924, p. 13. AC 35/5/10, 15 and 9: Morning Post, 1 Nov. 1924; Daily Chronicle, 7 Nov. 1924; The Times, 8 Nov. 1924.

2

The Diplomatic Machine I get very amusing accounts of Cabinet proceedings. It appears that Churchill and Amery do not always agree. Amery is at odds with the new group. Neville Chamberlain is not always on amicable terms with his brother. Baldwin sits silent, except when he announces the next speaker in the Cabinet debates. Beaverbrook on the new Cabinet, 28 Nov. 1924}

IN T R O D U C T IO N

In tackling the challenges facing him at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain was assisted by a complex diplomatic machine. If its influence is to be properly assessed, it is necessary to understand the way it worked. This chapter covers the structure of the Foreign Office, the role of ambassadors/ministers, and the foreign policy experience of Chamberlain’s Cabinet colleagues. The main question asked is who advised Chamberlain on foreign policy?

FOREIGN OFFICE REFORMS BEFORE 1924

The structure of the Foreign Office of 1924 was the result of reforms aimed at improving efficiency. In 1905, the Registry system had been introduced,2 and clerks gained positions of influence as advisers rather than only being administrators.3 Further changes were made after the First World War after criticism (most notably by the Union of Democratic Control) that the Foreign Office failed to reflect the ‘democratic’ nature of society, and had, through ‘secret diplomacy’, been partly responsible for the outbreak of war.4The hopes of radical critics were not realised, but important changes were made.5 First, wartime departments were dismantled, with work now shared

The Diplomatic Machine

15

between six departments: Eastern, Western, Central, Northern, American and Far Eastern. Second, the number of senior staff changed; by 1922, after some experimentation, there was one permanent under-secretary, three assistant under-secretaries, and eight assistant secretaries (who were also department heads).6 Third, the Foreign Office and diplomatic service were amalgamated to improve efficiency and standards through interchanging staff.7 Fourth, a new system for registering documents received was introduced, which, after some initial problems, improved efficiency, providing policy-makers with more information than ever before.8 And, finally, not through conscious change by the Foreign Office but more as a reflection of broader social change, the social and educational backgrounds of staff altered between 1919-29, with at least six recruits coming from state grammar schools, and a decrease in the number of Old Etonians, who, having represented 67 per cent of entrants in 1909-14, were only 24 per cent in 1929.9

THE STAFF AND STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The reforms did little to create a ‘new’ diplomacy.10 But there is no doubt the Foreign Office inherited by Chamberlain in November 1924 was more efficient than before the war. Chamberlain’s main point of contact with the system was via the four senior staff members.11 In 1924, the most senior, the Permanent U nder­ secretary, was Eyre Crowe. He joined the Foreign Office in 1885 as a Clerk, and became a Senior Clerk, his first post with real influence, in 1906. From 1912 to 1920, he was an assistant under-secretary, after which he was promoted to the most senior staff position in the Foreign Office. Crowe is best remembered for the Crowe Memorandum of 1907, identifying Germany as Britain’s major rival.12 However, some work has revised the view of him as an anti-German figure;13 and, as we shall see later, he was willing to negotiate with Germany. Of the three assistant under-secretaries, William Tyrrell was the most senior. He entered the Foreign Office in 1889, spending time in Rome in 1904. He became a Senior Clerk in 1907, making his name when he was Grey’s Private Secretary as an able despatch/ memorandum writer, and was promoted to assistant under-secretary in 1918. The other assistant under-secretaries were Victor Wellesley and Hubert Montgomery. Wellesley, promoted to his current post as

Dept.

Far Eastern

American Dept.

Assistant UnderSecretary of State (Later Deputy USS)

Legal Advisers

Library

News Dept.

Registry

Chief Clerk

!

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State

Passport

Finance Officer

Treaty Dept.

Central League/Western Department Department

Legal Adviser

!

Permanent Under-Secretary of State

Secretary^ of State

THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN NOVEMBER 1924

FIGURE 2.1

Northern Dept.

Egyptian Dept.

Eastern Dept.

Assistant Under­ secretary of State

Private Secretary

I

Private Secretary

The Diplomatic Machine

17

recently as February 1924, entered the Foreign Office in 1899, but like Tyrrell worked at the British Embassy in Rome for a year in 1905-6. Montgomery, meanwhile, was Chief Clerk - head of the administrative departments, with no role in political decisions, and little contact with Chamberlain. Over the next five years, although Montgomery remained in his post, there were changes in the other three most senior staff positions. The first reorganisation was necessitated by Crowe’s death in April 1925. With Tyrrell replacing him, Wellesley became the most senior assistant under-secretary, with the new title of Deputy Under-Secretary. Don Gregory, with a diplomatic background, became the new assistant under-secretary. Then, in July 1928, Tyrrell became Ambassador to Paris, and was replaced by Ronald Lindsay, who had worked in the Foreign Office and for the Egyptian Government, but had most recently been Ambassador to Turkey (1924-26) and Germany (1926-28). According to Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, Lindsay had ‘[...] been very much in Austen Chamberlain’s good graces’ since the negotiation of the Mosul treaty with Turkey in 1926, and the appointment was unsurprising.14 In the same year, Lancelot Oliphant, who also had a diplomatic and Foreign Office background, replaced Gregory, who was found to have been speculating in foreign currency.15 The Foreign Office’s policy-making sections were the seven political departments, each dealing with a specific geographical area, though the Western Department also covered the League of Nations and general matters. These departments reported to the Foreign Secretary via under-secretaries.16 In departments, reports from abroad were interpreted by clerks, and policy options were formulated through minutes and memoranda. Differences of opinion between clerks were dealt with by a minute from the department head, covering the pros and cons of each view. Information was then relayed to the Foreign Secretary via the Permanent Under-Secretary, his Deputy, and two assistants. The Foreign Secretary could take a variety of actions: endorse the views received, decide between conflicting views, ask for further information, or offer his own suggestions. As we shall see, Chamberlain did all at different times. Of the seven political departments, the Egyptian had been created in 1924,17but the others were as set up in 1919: American and African, Central, Eastern, Far Eastern, Northern, and Western/ General/League of Nations. Each political department was headed

18

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

by a counsellor, the position immediately below assistant under­ secretary. Only the Egyptian Department retained the same head throughout 1924-29, although some heads exchanged with each other. Table 2.1 indicates the heads of departments on 9 November 1924, the date they left, where they went to, and who replaced them. T A B L E 2.1 PO LIT IC A L D E P A R T M E N T H E A D S, 1 9 2 4 -2 9

Nov. 1924

1925

19261

1927

American and African: Robert Vansittart1**

1928

1929

Robert Craigie

Central: Miles Lampson^

Orme Sargent

Eastern: Lancelot Oliphant20

Lord Monteagle21

Egyptian: John Murray Far Eastern: George Mounsey

Sydney Waterlow22 Northern: Don Gregory2^

George Mounsey24

Western, General and League of Nations: Gerald Villiers27

Charles Palairet2^

Gerald Villiers2**

Horace Seymour

Ronald Campbell

The 14 heads of departments shared many characteristics. In 1924, all were aged between 39 and 46. Of the 12 whose school education can be traced, eight went to Eton, two to Harrow, one to Radley, and one to Haileybury. With the exception of Murray, who had served the Egyptian Government, and was appointed and retained on the basis of that expertise, all had served time with the Diplomatic Service28 - the longest being Campbell for 18 years, and the shortest, Oliphant, for six years. Murray apart, ten worked in the Foreign Office before attachment to the Diplomatic Service, the exceptions

19

The Diplomatic Machine

being Waterlow, Mounsey and Palairet, while ten were at the Foreign Office by 1924.29 Chamberlain thus inherited a political staff which was to receive few new members during his term of office. Aside from the seven political departments, there were seven administrative ones,30 and a Department of Overseas Trade, run jointly with the Board of Trade. The most important for policy was the News Department, headed first by Percy Koppel, and then by Arthur Willert. Koppel had been a barrister, and held civil service posts before entering the Foreign Office in 1918; Willert was a journalist for The Times before moving to the Ministry of Information during the war and the Foreign Office in 1921. These two men contributed to a general expansion of the Foreign Office’s relations with the press at home and abroad that had begun during the war.31 It can be seen, then, that many of those heading the political departments had similar backgrounds, both in terms of education and experience. However, in 1924-29 clear differences of opinion emerged among them. When this took place, the under-secretaries recommended different courses of action to Chamberlain.

DIPLOM ATS ABROAD

There was much more to the diplomatic machine than the Foreign Office, mainly the embassies, consulates and legations abroad.32 At the end of 1924, there were nine embassies: the most important were those in the capitals of the Great Powers - France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USA. There were also embassies in Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Portugal, while the legation in Argentina received embassy status in 1927. Other countries which might have had embassy status were the Soviet Union and Turkey. The former only had a chargé d’affaires, while Turkey had an HM representative, upgraded to ambassador in 1925. There was clearly some political motivation intended in not giving these two countries ambassadors. Representation in the five most important capitals is shown in table 2 .2 . Each embassy acted not only as the contact point between London and foreign capitals; they spent much time entertaining, and coordinated the activities of local offices.33 This was a substantial operation: in both France and the USA, there were 56 consulates throughout the country; in Italy there were 37; while there were 13

20

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

in both Germany and Japan. Aside from the offices mentioned above, affairs were also managed through nearly 40 legations (headed by an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary), seven consuls, five consul-generals, two high commissioners, one vice-consul, and one chargé d’affaires. We can see from table 2.2, that ambassadors were a select band there were certainly fewer of them than heads of Foreign Office departments. In 1924, at the age of 67, D’Abernon was 20 years older than his successor, Lindsay, but all except these two and Crewe were born between 1863 and 1870. O f the nine men, D’Abemon, Eliot and Howard had not served any time at the Foreign Office; but all except D’Abernon and Crewe had substantial experience in the diplomatic service before becoming ambassadors. These two both had Liberal political backgrounds; and if one considers Tyrrell’s Foreign Office background, one could conclude that the French and German embassies were a little separate from the rest. Certainly, they had the closest contact with Chamberlain, although it is fair to say that he often bypassed them by dealing with Briand and Stresemann direct, or occasionally via the French and German embassies in London. T A B L E 2 .2 A M BA SSA D O R S TO THE GREAT POW ERS, 1924-29

Nov. 1924

1925

1926

1927

1928

1929

France Sir William Tyrrell35

Marquess of Crewe34 Germany Viscount DAbem on36

Sir Ronald Lindsay37

Sir Horace Rumbold3®

Italy Sir Ronald Grahame3^ Japan Sir Charles Eliot40

Sir John Tilley41

USA Sir Esme Howard42

As with British ambassadors abroad, there were few changes made by the other Great Powers. Turkish and Soviet representation

21

The Diplomatic Machine

mirrored (as was customary) that of Britain in those countries. Thus, the Soviets sent a chargé d’affaires, Christian Rakovski, until the breach of May 1927, while the Turks sent a minister until 1925, when Ahmed Ferit Bey became ambassador. However, the foreign representatives were much less important to policy than British diplomats abroad. Chamberlain met them frequently at the Foreign Office: he saw an ambassador every two to three days on average, and saw the French, German and Italian ambassadors every one to three weeks. But he made no attempts to become personally close to any of them, even with de Fleuriau and Sthamer, who both served in London throughout the whole period. His main contact with foreign countries was either directly with their leaders, or via British diplomats there. T A B L E 2.3 A M BA SS A D O R S FROM THE GREAT PO W ERS, 1 924-29

Nov. 1924

1925

1926

1927

1928

1929

France A. de Fleuriau4^ Germany Friedrich Sthamer44 Italy Antonio Bordenaro4^

Marquis of Torretta45 Japan Hayashi Gonsuke47

Matsui Keishiro4^

Matsudaira Tsuneo4^

USA Frank B. Kellogg50

Alanson B. Houghton51

IN T E R D E P A R T M E N T A L R E L A T IO N S

As we shall see later, in a number of policy areas the Colonial Office was the department with which the Foreign Office had most contact. This was followed, although by no means closely, by the service departments, the India Office and the Board of Trade. Of course, the highest profile matters concerning more than one department were often resolved in Cabinet by ministers; but many areas were dealt

22

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

with by civil servants, either by exchanging letters and minutes, or through interdepartm ental meetings, sometimes described as conferences. The latter were most important when treaties were negotiated. Some matters may have been discussed informally at social gatherings, or over the (gradually developing) telephone. However, there is no apparent evidence of close friendships between senior Foreign Office staff and officials in other departments; equally, there were no controversies which rivalled in intensity the rows of the 1930s.52 Treasury influence is worth covering separately, for it is more complicated. Clearly, some influence was exerted via Churchill in Cabinet. The Treasury also had an input into policy via interdepartmental conferences, in the same way as the other departments mentioned above. But there was also an element of Treasury control of administration. This had been seen in the 1919 amalgamation of the diplomatic service with the Foreign Office; and in 1924 the Treasury seems to have tried to control appointments within the Foreign Office and at embassies.53This was partly because the head of the Treasury, Warren Fisher, was also head of the whole civil service. One way in which the Treasury’s influence manifested itself was in the enquiry into the ‘Francs Case’ of 1928. This resulted from allegations, made in the law courts in the case of Ironmonger and Company v. Dyne, that in 1923-26, Don Gregory, Owen O ’Malley and H. F. B. Maxse of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department had speculated in French francs;54 it was potentially embarrassing because the French believed speculators were responsible for some of their currency problems, and it implied an inappropriate use of official information. The investigations were carried out by a Board of Enquiry consisting of Fisher and two other Treasury officials. They found no use of official information, but they revealed that Miles Lampson and Gerald Villiers had speculated in currency, although not in conjunction with Gregory.55 Some believed the investigations might have found that even more people had been involved.56 Rather oddly, Nevile Henderson said, ‘The Gregory affair was a shocking bad business. The only gram of consolation which I find in it, is the check which it will cause, especially with W[illiam] T[yrrell]’s departure, [to the Paris embassy] to the Catholic element in the Department.’57 Perhaps there were some religious divides in the Foreign Office, although it is difficult to find any evidence of differing Catholic and Protestant foreign policies.

The Diplomatic Machine

23

The course of action recommended by the Board, endorsed by Chamberlain and Baldwin, was that Gregory should be dismissed, Maxse should lose five years’ seniority, while O ’Malley should be permitted to resign. Subsequently, O ’Malley did so, although he was reinstated with the provision that he should be unemployed for a year and lose five years’ seniority. Villiers and Lampson were not punished: Hankey believed the latter ‘[...] had rather a narrow squeak over the “francs” case, and would probably have been done in but for the admiration in which he is held by the Government.’ The effect of this on the Foreign Office is difficult to assess; O ’Malley bore no grudges, believing Fisher to have been generous and professional in rethinking his earlier decision, although in his memoirs he revealed a fairly low opinion of Chamberlain’s intelligence. However, when the report of the Board, as endorsed by Chamberlain and Baldwin, included a set of rules for future conduct, at least one diplomat, Percy Loraine, was angry that they were based upon the Treasury Rules and Minutes. He told Chamberlain he would only be bound by the rules of the Foreign Office, a statement which was not rejected by the latter.58

A N E M PIR E F O R E IG N P O L IC Y ?

Following the end of the First World War, the Dominions became increasingly assertive in foreign affairs.59 Thus, in 1924, the position of the Empire in the making of foreign policy was in a state of flux, and it remained so until at least the Statute of Westminster in 1931, a period covered by some excellent studies.60 The Dominions had signed the 1919 peace treaties, and entered the League of Nations individually, although this was merely symbolic, for British representatives continued to sign themselves as representing the UK ‘and the British Dominions beyond the Seas’.61 At the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Dominions had gained the right to ratify treaties individually, thus raising the question of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. Chamberlain was clear early on that it was ‘[...]imperative [...] to preserve in word and act the diplomatic unity of the British Em pire’.62 However, in 1926 there was a further Imperial Conference; Chamberlain presented a set-piece speech reviewing foreign affairs.63 But he was also on the fringes of negotiations resulting in the Balfour Report, in which the Dominions were

24

Austen Chamberlain and, the Commitment to Europe

declared to be ‘[...] autonomous communities within the British Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs 64 Then, in 1927, a system of Dominion consultation on foreign affairs was established, instigated by Amery, but implemented with Chamberlain’s support, and involving high commissioners and imperial secretaries.65 By 1929 South Africa and Canada were appointing separate representatives in some foreign capitals, which Chamberlain did not see as incompatible with imperial unity.66 This raises the questions of how far the Dominions influenced Chamberlain’s foreign policy, and how far he felt they should? To both points, the answer is very little: it will be seen later that Chamberlain wanted to prevent the Dominions from restricting his freedom of action - Locarno meant Britain giving a commitment to Europe that the Dominion governments could not give; meanwhile, in emergencies, such as Egypt and China, he did not have time for consultation. Furthermore, Chamberlain believed Britain would not find itself fighting a war without the help of the Dominions, for ‘[...]almost every declaration of war by us would be the result of a Covenant [of the League] obligation - an obligation shared by every Dominion & India because they have also signed the Covenant.’ He was happy for Britain to go alone on many foreign policy issues, with the proviso that he would provide as much information for the Dominions as they required. This was, in fact, rarely a great deal, although he added, in 1928, that if Canada wished to publish information, ‘[...] we must in future be as cautious & uninformative in what we say to him [MacKenzie King] as he habitually is in what he says to us.’67 Thus, the Dominions were not an important part of the diplomatic machine, and nor did they wish to be. This rather blasé attitude about imperial unity on Austen’s part was, nevertheless, in marked contrast to Joseph Chamberlain and, later, Leo Amery.

THE CABINET IN NOVEM BER 1924

Many of the most important foreign policy debates took place in Cabinet, and foreign affairs accounted for much Cabinet time.68 Here, in terms of experience in the House of Commons, Chamberlain was the most senior member, having served longer than any of his

The Diplomatic Machine

25

colleagues who were still in the Commons, although Churchill had a longer ministerial career. In a wide range of newspaper cartoons at the time, Chamberlain and Churchill were portrayed as the two leading figures in the government after Baldwin.69 But he may well have been viewed with suspicion by some colleagues, and he did not represent any large section of the Conservative Party. Any strength he had came from his personal reputation and his office. Nevertheless, he had been thought important enough by Baldwin to be brought into the Cabinet in a senior position. As we shall see later, Baldwin, in accordance with his general style, gave Chamberlain a free hand. The extent of Cabinet influence on policy varied according to the issue but when necessary, and sometimes with Baldwin’s support, Chamberlain was able to fight off strong attempts at interference by colleagues such as Churchill. On entering the Foreign Office, Chamberlain told Baldwin he was alarmed about Churchill’s appointment to the Treasury.70He told his sister Hilda of his views on other colleagues. He saw Health (his brother), India (Birkenhead), and Agriculture (Edward Wood), ‘[...] as exceptionally well filled’. He thought the other main selections were good or adequate, includingJoynson-Hicks at the Home Office, but was unhappy about Arthur Steel-Maitland going to the Ministry of Labour. Chamberlain felt he was neither a good administrator nor boss, adding, ‘The odds are that either S.B. will out S.M. or S.M. will out us all before long.’71 Chamberlain said nothing to his sisters, though, about the appointment of Robert Cecil as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. That he should have had views on it is suggested by the Foreign Office concern that Cecil would have too much influence on foreign policy if he was given a position in the Cabinet.72 Cecil had been Assistant Foreign Secretary for part of the war, and was regarded as one of the founders of the League of Nations. During Bonar Law’s government, he had played a prominent part in League affairs; this had caused problems with Curzon, who accused Cecil of trying to become ‘[...] a kind of Ministerial Secretary of State who is entitled to take the initiative on all matters that do not merely now but may in the future touch the sphere of the League.’73 It has been suggested, by Philip Noel-Baker, that Cecil was only in the Cabinet because Baldwin was lobbied forcefully by Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League.74 Meanwhile, on accepting office, Cecil told Baldwin he would only remain in the Cabinet, if ‘[...] by

26

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

doing so I can be of service to the Government in dealing with questions affecting the League [...]’. Chamberlain certainly raised no objection to Baldwin over the appointment; and Cecil had in fact been told by Baldwin *[...] that he was unable to press Austen to let me [Cecil] do the League work at Geneva until he knew more about his own office.5 Chamberlain did, however, tell Baldwin of his department’s concerns, writing, ‘It is essential to restore unity in the control & representation of foreign affairs.’ Baldwin’s response to this is unclear. But when Cecil requested, later in the month, to be sent all the papers relating to the League which Chamberlain received, Chamberlain refused, saying it would be improper for Cecil to have more information than the rest of the Cabinet.75 The foreign policy experience of the rest of the Cabinet was limited. Curzon, of course, had been Foreign Secretary; the Lord Privy Seal, Salisbury, had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1903. Eustace Percy had worked in the Diplomatic Service before entering Parliament, and had written a book on Britain’s relationship with the League.76 However, his portfolio, education, gave him little direct reason for involvement in foreign affairs. Meanwhile, although his book on the League took the familiar Conservative position on the limitations of the League, his advocacy in it of the potential of Christianity as a unifying world force was off the beaten track of policy options, and unlikely to be influential. Nobody else had experience or obvious views on foreign policy, although some had related interests. Churchill had been at the Admiralty and Colonial Office before the war and, with Amery, had gained wartime experience in military matters, both in the Cabinet and on the frontline, while Joynson-Hicks, Worthington-Evans, Cunliffe-Lister and Steel-Maitland all had experience in matters relating to overseas trade. All this hints at the possibility that many of Chamberlain’s Cabinet colleagues may have had views on foreign policy, but little experience of the precise nature of the diplomacy involved in such matters. Apart from Curzon, only Balfour, who had been both Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, and was to replace Curzon in April 1925, could claim extensive experience.

27

The Diplomatic Machine T A B L E 2 .4 B A L D W I N ’S S E C O N D C A B I N E T 77

Prime Minister: Lord Chancellor: Lord President: Lord Privy Seal: Chancellor of the Exchequer: Home Secretary: Foreign Secretary: Colonial Secretary: Secretary for War: Secretary for India: Secretary for Air: Secretary for Scotland: First Lord of the Admiralty: Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster: President of the Board of Trade: Minister of Agriculture: President of the Board of Education: First Commissioner of Works: Minister of Labour: Minister of Health: Attorney General:

Stanley Baldwin Viscount Cave; Viscount Hailsham (D. Hogg) from March 1928 Marquis Curzon; Balfour from April 1925 Marquis of Salisbury Winston Churchill William Joynson-Hicks Austen Chamberlain Leo Amery (also became Dominions secretary, June 1925) Laming Worthington-Evans Earl of Birkenhead; Viscount Peel from October 1928 Samuel Hoare John Gilmour William Bridgeman Viscount Cecil; Lord Cushendun from October 1927 Philip Cunliffe-Lister (formerly Lloyd-Greame) Edward Wood; Walter Guinness from November 1925 Lord Eustace Percy Viscount Peel; Marquis of Londonderry from October 1928 Arthur Steel-Maitland Neville Chamberlain Douglas Hogg; successor from March 1928 not in Cabinet

C O N C L U S IO N

On becoming Foreign Secretary, Chamberlain had an extensive team behind him. But despite the similarities of age and background that many diplomats shared, the advice he received from them was often very divergent. This suggests that it is not possible to find any common major influences on his advisers. Chamberlain was now entrusted with the task of using this ‘machine’ effectively. Or would the machine use him? Meanwhile, as Beaverbrook noted, ‘Neville Chamberlain is not always on amicable terms with his brother.’78 Austen Chamberlain was soon to have more problems in the Cabinet than a frosty brother.

NOTES 1. House of Lords Record Office, Hist. Coll. 184, Beaverbrook Papers (BBK), C/283: Beaverbrook to Rothermere, 28 Nov. 1924. 2. This dealt with receiving communications and circulating them to the relevant

28

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe part of the Foreign Office accompanied by a summary of the contents of each document. Zara Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office, 1898-1905’, VI, 1 (1963), pp. 59-90. M. Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War (1971). Zara Steiner and M. L. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office reforms, 1919-1921’, Iff, XVII, 1 (1974), pp. 131-56. Christina Larner, ‘The Amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office’, JCH\ VII, 1 and 2 (1972), pp. 107-26. Valerie Cromwell, ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’, in Zara Steiner (ed.), The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (1982). Maisel, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy pp. 1-59. PRO, The Records of the Foreign Office', 1782-1939 (1969). Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, (1955). John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee, The Foreign Office (1933). Steiner and Dockrill, ‘FO Reforms’, HJ XVII (1974), pp. 134-7. Larner, ‘Amalgamation of the DS with the FO\JC H , 7 (1972), pp. 107-26. Steiner and Dockrill, ‘FO Reforms’, HJ, XVII (1974), pp. 146-9. Tilley and Gaselee, FO, p. 315. Examples of the number of documents registered at the Foreign Office are as follows: 1853 - 35,104; 1906 - 43,208; 1916 - 264,537; 1926 - 145,169. Steiner and Dockrill, ‘FO Reforms’, HJ,\ XVII (1974), pp. 144-5. Ibid., p. 151. Biographical details of staff are found in, G. E. P. Hertslet (ed.), The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book (1925 et seq.). G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 7/7(1928), pp. 397-420. Richard A. Cosgrove, ‘The Career of Sir Eyre Crowe: A Reassessment’, Albion: Proceedings of the Conference on British Studies at its Regional and National Meetings, IV, 4 (1972), pp. 193-205. His biographer (and daughter) have argued that he was concerned about the German threat to the balance of power, rather than being especially anti-German. Sibyl Crowe and Edward Corp, Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925 (1993), p. xvii. Churchill College, Cambridge, Hankey Papers 3/35: Hankey to Robin Hankey, 19 Feb. 1928. Cmd. 3037 (1928): Report of Board of Enquiry appointed by Prime Minister to investigate certain Statements affecting Civil Servants. See also, Hankey 3/35: Hankey to Robin Hankey, 6 Feb. 1928. See below pp. 22-3. The permanent under-secretary had equal status to the assistant under-secretaries beneath him in this matter. They did not report via him, rather they had responsibility for one or two departments, as did their chief. The exact division of responsibilities changed throughout 1924-29, depending on personal expertise. Cromwell, ‘FCO’, in, Steiner (ed.), Times Survey of Foreign Ministries p. 560. Became Private Secretary to Baldwin, 2 Feb. 1928. Became Minister at Peking, 22 Oct. 1926. Promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary, 28 Feb. 1928. Formerly Thomas Spring-Rice. Became Minister at Bangkok, 20 May 1926. Promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary, 1 May 1925. Moved to Far Eastern Department, 20 May 1926. Transferred to Rome, 1 Dec. 1928. Resigned 9 April 1929.

The Diplomatic Machine

29

27. Moved to Northern Department, 1 Dec. 1928. 28. Although the amalgamation of the FO with the Diplomatic Service did not take place until after the Great War, those serving in each before then could opt to spend some time with the other. 29. Sargent returned in 1925, Seymour in 1927, and Campbell in 1928. 30. News, Treaty, Passport Office, Chief Clerk’s, Communications, Consular and Library. 31. Tilley and Gaselee, FO, p. 285. 32. Definitions of these were laid down by the Congress of Vienna (1815). Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin, The British Foreign Service: A Discussion of the Development and Function of the British Foreign Service (1970), p. 8. 33. For a useful account of the life of a diplomat, see, Martin Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941 (1973), pp. 303-24. 34. A Liberal Cabinet minister in 1905-16, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Secretary of State for India, Lord Privy Seal, and Lord President of the Council. Retired from the diplomatic service after leaving Paris. 35. Moved to Paris from the FO, where he was Permanent Under-Secretary, on 30 July 1928. 36. Liberal MP for Exeter in 1899-1906 as Sir Edgar Vincent. He had been at Berlin since 29 June 1920, having not previously held a diplomatic appointment. 37. Went to Berlin from Turkey on 12 Oct. 1926. Left Berlin to take over from Tyrrell at the FO. 38. Moved from Madrid on 1 Aug. 1928. 39. Went to Rome from the Hague on 25 Nov. 1921. 40. Moved to Tokyo on 1 Jan. 1920 from being High Commissioner and ConsulGeneral-Siberia. 41. Moved from being Ambassador to Brazil on 1 Feb. 1926. 42. Moved from being Ambassador to Spain on 2 Feb. 1924. 43. Appointed on 19 Dec. 1924. For the first six weeks of Chamberlain’s term of office, the French Ambassador was the Comte de Saint Aulaire - in place since 9 Feb. 1921. 44. Since 14 Oct. 1920. 45. Since 22 Nov. 1922. 46. Took over on 6 May 1927. 47. Since 13 Oct. 1920. 48. Took over on 30 Nov. 1925. 49. Took over on 20 Feb. 1929. 50. Since 14Jan. 1924. 51. Took over on 27 April 1925. 52. Eunan O ’Halpin, Head of the Civil Service: A Study of Sir Warren Fisher (1989), pp. 249-58. 53. Treasury control was asserted more in the 1930s. Geoffrey Kingdon Fry, Statesmen in Disguise: The Changing Role of the Administrative Class of the British Home Civil Service, 1853-1966 (1969), pp. 52-3. 54. Gregory had also speculated in Belgian, Norwegian and Italian currencies. 55. Cmd. 3037 (1928): Report of Board of Enquiry appointed by Prime Minister to investigate certain Statements affecting Civil Servants. 56. Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Rumbold dep. 35/174: Rumbold to [Louisa Rumbold?], 12 Feb. 1928. 57. MS. Rumbold dep. 35/233: Henderson to Rumbold, 4 March 1928. 58. Owen O ’Malley, The Phantom Caravan (1954), pp. 138-52. Ann Bridge (Lady O ’Malley), Permission to Resign: Goings-on in the Corridors of Power (1971), p. 133.

30

59.

60.

61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe O ’Halpin, Head of Civil Service pp. 160-67. Hankey 3/35: Hankey to Robin Hankey, 4 March 1928. Gordon Waterfield, Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle Bt., 1880-1961 (1973), pp. 143-5. See, for example, Lorna Lloyd, ‘“Equality means freedom to differ”: Canada, Britain and the World Court in the 1920s’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7, 2 (July 1996), pp. 314-44. R. F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939 (1981). Max Beloff, Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-42 (1989). Norman Hillmer, ‘The Foreign Office, the Dominions and the Diplomatic Unity of the Empire, 1925-29’, in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power, Volume One, 1906-1939 (1981), pp. 64-77. Robert MacGregor Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status (1937), pp. 33-4. Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time p. 2. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 Series IA, Volume II (1968), Appendix: AC statement to Imperial Conference, 20 Oct. 1926. Cmd. 2768 (1926): Imperial Conference, 1926, Summary of Proceedings, p. 14. Holland, Commonwealth Alliance pp. 83-4. PRO, Foreign Office Papers, Series 627, Volume 3, U 267/4/750: AC minute, 7 May 1929. PRO, Foreign Office Papers, Series 372, Volume 2198, T 13684/5885/384: AC minute, 22 Oct. 1926. FO 372/2443, T 5217/53/384: AC minute, 30 April 1928. An approximate count shows that 408 (22 per cent) of 1,850 Cabinet papers covered foreign affairs. In 1924-26, this figure was 179 of 1,050 (17 per cent); in 1927-29, 229 of 800 (29 per cent). The latter higher figure is particularly due to disarmament papers going to Cabinet, as report items. Not all foreign affairs papers were generated by the FO or Chamberlain - about one-quarter came from ministers commenting on FO papers, or, more often, from the India and Colonial offices. The actual time spent discussing these is difficult to ascertain, since minutes seldom reveal the length of meetings. Occasionally, there were long discussions, but in general, foreign affairs probably took up less Cabinet time than their share of papers indicates. Baldwin 217: Miscellaneous newspaper cuttings. Baldwin 42, ff.248-249: AC to Baldwin, 6 Nov. 1924. AC 5/1/340: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Nov. 1924 (Self, p. 260). Baldwin 42, ff. 270-271: AC to Baldwin, 9 Nov. 1924. Add. MS 51080 ff. 14-15: Curzon to Cecil, 18 June 1923. E. T. Williams and Helen M. Palmer (eds.), Dictionary of National Biography, 1951-1960 {1971), p. 200. Add. MS 51080 ff. 120 and 118-9: Cecil to Baldwin, 10 Nov. 1924; Cecil memorandum of conversation with Baldwin, 10 Nov. 1924. Baldwin 42, ff. 270-271: AC to Baldwin, 9 Nov. 1924. Add. MS 51078 ff. 24-25: AC to Cecil, 21 Nov. 1924. Eustace Percy, The Responsibilities of the League (1919). From A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 653-4. BBK C/283: Beaverbrook to Rothermere, 28 Nov. 1924.

Calming France: The Security Question, November 1924 to December 1925 I believe that Great Britain has it in her power at this moment to bring peace to Europe. To achieve this end two things are indispensable: 1. that we should remove or allay French fears. 2. that we should bring Germany back into the concert of Europe. Both are equally vital. Neither by itself will suffice & the first is needed to allow the second. Austen Chamberlain minute, 19 March 1925. IN T R O D U C T IO N

O n arrival at the Foreign Office, Cham berlain was almost immediately faced with the issue of European security, and the Locarno Agreements of 1925, more than any other foreign policy issue, are closely associated with him. It was assumed by makers of British foreign policy in the 1920s that Britain had no important national interests in eastern Europe and that, especially, it had no strategic interest in the troubled Polish-German border.2 However, the extent to which Britain had interests in western Europe was more controversial; consequently, historians of the Locarno Agreements see the extent to which the treaties committed Britain to Europe as the main question on British policy. The present chapter focuses on this issue, which is particularly relevant regarding Chamberlain personally since his policies were centred upon Europe. Britain’s Locarno commitment seemed great - a guarantee to defend Germany’s frontiers with France and Belgium. But, as Michael Howard argues, the Locarno era, as he describes 1919-31, saw no British military preparations for fulfilling the Locarno pledges.3 Similarly, Anne Orde and Jon Jacobson see the agreements as limiting British involvement,4 while Correlli Barnett is bitingly critical, describing Locarno as ‘[...] a bogus commitment, a fraudulent IO U that was given only because the English Government

32

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

never thought for a moment that they would ever have to make it good.’5 Meanwhile, Kissinger criticises Britain for not strengthening its ties with France, which would have bolstered the balance of power against Germany; instead, Britain pursued a half-hearted form of collective security.6 Only Frank Magee and Erik Goldstein have argued that Locarno represented a real commitment to Europe, and Goldstein adds that Chamberlain had no interest in eastern Europe.7 By looking at Locarno again, specifically at Chamberlain’s motivation, this chapter argues that while Britain’s commitment was only a political and diplomatic one, it was substantial: crucial to this is that Chamberlain planned a long-term policy to avoid war. Locarno was the first stage in a two-part policy, of calming France, and then Germany. Chamberlain’s personal motivation is often portrayed as proFrench. Beaverbrook said he was *[...] keener on the side of France than the present French premier or his predecessor [...]’.8 Sally Marks sees a ‘[...] Francophile Chamberlain determined to allay French fears by an Anglo-Belgian-French security system’.9Jacobson, Orde and Ephraim Maisel take similar positions,10 and, admittedly, Chamberlain’s contemporary reputation, as someone who valued good Anglo-French relations above all else, helps their case11; after all, he said of France in 1927, ‘I love her as a man loves a woman [...]’, and, earlier, ‘[...] I am the most pro-French member of the Government [...]’.12 In his defence, comparing France with Germany, there were good reasons for this: the Germans continuously made provocative suggestions for the sake of bargaining, even in Locarno’s friendly atmosphere. And, after all, it was not France which invaded Belgium in 1914. ‘Pro-French’ is thus a justifiable label in this context, but it was an understandable position for a British statesman. However, this chapter argues that, whatever Chamberlain’s basically francophile nature, he was much more flexible than previously thought; his chosen policy was dictated by factors other than his love of French culture as seen in Chapter One. Many interpretations of the 1920s see British policy-makers as having a choice between either a League-based policy or one based on a series of limited regional agreements.13But, in fact, the extent of Britain’s European commitment was the real issue. Chamberlain was crucial to Locarno because he wanted Britain to play a role in Europe,14 and believed it was powerful enough to be influential. In Cabinet discussions on security, he thus secured agreement to some

33

Calming France

kind of pact, against the wishes of colleagues such as Churchill and Amery. Here, the division was not one of pro- and anti-French ministers, or of the League as opposed to regional agreements; rather it was one of pro- and anti-European Conservatives. It was Chamberlain’s policy of involvement in Europe which won the day, through combining the strength of his office, prime ministerial and military support, and the force of his case. We shall also see that he originated and controlled much European policy in the Foreign Office. There, those with the greatest influence, Crowe and Lampson, were influential because their views coincided with Chamberlain’s interpretation of what was necessary.

FRANCE A N D THE G EN EV A PR O TO C O L

European security was an issue partly because of the Geneva Protocol, which sought to tackle global security problems. The League Assembly, in September 1924, thereby provided for compulsory arbitration of disputes and the rigid imposition of economic sanctions upon aggressors.15However, the Zinoviev Letter overtook the Labour government and, after Conservative victory in the November general election, it was left to Baldwin’s government to decide Britain’s position towards the Protocol. For the Foreign Office and Chamberlain, the question of French security would lie at the heart of deliberations about it. Five days into office, Chamberlain circulated to the Cabinet a paper, from the Foreign Office’s Central Department, on the urgency of French security - something the Foreign Office had also stressed under MacDonald.16It described the current situation of France relative to British foreign policy in Europe. There were, it said, three problems. The first, reparations, had been dealt with by the Dawes Plan. Inter-Allied debt and the question of security both still remained.17 Chamberlain got around the debt problem by ignoring it. Churchill urged Chamberlain, *[...] to take this debt reclamation policy upon your shoulders as one of the leading objectives of British foreign policy 18 But Chamberlain did not raise the issue on his first trip to Paris as Foreign Secretary, telling Churchill, ‘I refrained from discussing inter-allied debts with anyone while abroad, permitting myself to observe in a phrase which I hope you will pardon me for using, that we had an English proverb which indicated that it

34

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

was unnecessary to bark oneself when one kept a dog [...].’19 Churchill may have accepted this as a version of nice-man/nastyman interrogation. However, Chamberlain did not want the Treasury to press the issue at all. In January 1925, after a conference at which Churchill made some compromises,20 Chamberlain wrote to Lord Crewe, Britain’s Ambassador in Paris, i[...] I had far sooner that he sacrificed some hundreds of thousands and smoothed our political path than that he collected a little more money at the expense of our good relations with America and the Allies.’21 There is little to suggest that the settlement did upset relations between Britain and any of the countries involved, so Chamberlain need not have been so concerned. However, the debt question remained influential on public opinion (or was at least perceived as such by some politicians), with Joynson-Hicks writing to Baldwin in March 1925, ‘England has the uncomfortable feeling that while she is being taxed to the hilt to pay the debts of France, France is doing nothing of the kind herself.’22 Chamberlain may not have been able to influence Churchill and the Treasury, but he did not allow them to interfere with foreign policy. The security problem was more enduring, for it made France potentially dangerous. The Foreign Office said the Protocol attempted to solve this, but that if the Protocol was rejected, or was ratified but still felt inadequate, French fears would remain. The Paris Embassy feared that a government of the Right, led perhaps by Poincare, would seek security through sheer military superiority, thus damaging stability. Meanwhile, under a government of the Left (the current position), France might seek rapprochement with Germany through ‘[...] commercial agreements which, by a species of Franco-German industrial combine, may prove highly injurious to British interests’.23 This was probably not a major concern to the Foreign Office, whose disregard of economic issues was striking throughout the 1924-29 period: even the Franco-German steel cartel and commercial agreement went through the Foreign Office with little comment, and a lack of attention from senior figures.24 Furthermore, Britain wanted French cooperation in action it might have to take in China;25 and Chamberlain hoped to influence French policy towards Morocco.26 Bearing in mind the state of Anglo-French relations, any agreement would be difficult. Since 1919, many proposals had floundered, highlighting discord; and, following the Ruhr occupation

35

Calming France

in 1923 by French and Belgian troops, British public opinion looked unfavourably upon France,27while the Foreign Office came to believe that the French wished to control the Rhineland permanently.28 A symbolic low point was reached at the Gare du Nord early in 1923. After an argumentative meeting, the French Prime Minister, Poincare, waved goodbye to his British counterpart, Bonar Law. Smiling at Poincare through a closed window, Bonar Law said, A nd you can go to hell.’29 So, when Baldwin’s second government entered office, relations with France were strained. Apart from the problems noted above, the circumstances of the general election threatened to divide the two governments. Charles Mendl, the Foreign Office News Department’s representative in Paris, warned Tyrrell that Herriot had hoped for a Labour victory, and based his policy on that outcome.30 Chamberlain was aware of this;31 and distrust also prevailed in fields of diplomacy further afield, with the supposedly anti-British attitudes of Mougin, a French representative at Ankara.32 But it was clear to the Foreign Office that the Protocol overcommitted Britain, and was unlikely to be more effective than the Covenant in preventing war, since not all countries would be willing to join a conflict involving powerful nations determined to settle their problems by force.33 Chamberlain was of the same opinion, but was more concerned about the Protocol’s inadequacy regarding French security34- a conversation with Herriot *[...] left me with the strong impression that even if the protocol were signed, the question of a mutual pact would still arise.’35 For the moment, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) met to discuss the Protocol in December 1924. A sub-committee then deliberated on amending it, with further CID meetings in February 1925, before a Cabinet decision.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE: 4 AND 16 DECEM BER 1924

The first CID meeting took place on 4 December 1924.36 Chamberlain was in Rome at the League Council, gaining time for Britain’s consideration of the Protocol.37 Members of the Cabinet who did attend were Baldwin (as President), Curzon (in the Chair),38 Churchill, Amery, Worthington-Evans, Lloyd-Greame,39 Balfour, Bridgeman, Hoare and Cecil. They were joined by the service chiefs

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and officials from the Treasury, Foreign Office and Colonial Office, though only Cabinet ministers spoke. Curzon, the Chairman, was neither known for sympathy to France nor likely to support a pact.40 He was also rumoured to be bitter that Chamberlain was Foreign Secretary and not he.41 But, in fact, Curzon did nothing on the CID to frustrate Chamberlain. He contributed little to discussions, except through questions to Chamberlain as to how genuine he felt French fears to be;42 as Chairman he ensured the Committee discussed all options, and he was a fair summator of points made. This was possibly influenced by his realising that decisions regarding the Protocol and any alternative would be taken at Cabinet level. There, he proved more obstructive to the policy of Chamberlain and the Foreign Office.43 At the meeting, it became clear the Protocol was opposed by the Foreign Office, the armed services, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary. It was felt that a Permanent Court, as arbiter of disputes, might be biased, that Parliament would be reluctant to accept its decisions, and that the mechanism for settling disputes would clash with the machinery of the Washington agreements.44 It was feared there would be restrictions on troop deployment in, for example, Egypt, that sanctions would damage trade and cause problems with the US, and that reparations crises would develop after any conflict.45There were also general criticisms that signatories would lose sovereignty, and that the Protocol would damage imperial unity. But, Curzon added, *[...] it is out of the question that we should reject it and do nothing more. We shall still have to consider the case of France, with whom the whole question of security is for the time being involved in the Protocol For ministers, this was the key point: in their discussions on replacing the Protocol, they addressed only French security. Therein lay their fundamental objection to the Protocol. It addressed world security, but the limit of concern among British policy-makers was France’s eastern border and how that affected British interests. But how should the Protocol be rejected? Balfour wanted to say only that such a proposal was useless until the US joined the League; Amery and Hoare wanted to produce a positive plan in its place, although Amery proposed removing parts of the Covenant to which the US and the Dominions objected. Churchill favoured a scheme of demilitarised zones, first between France and Germany with (unspecified) guarantors, then for the German-Polish border. Cecil

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looked at the Protocol from his unique viewpoint of whether it would assist disarmament. He also hoped leading members of other parties would be consulted, to ensure policy enjoyed cross-party support,46a measure which Chamberlain had already suggested, but which was not pursued.47 Twelve days later, Chamberlain, having returned from Rome, put his views to the CID. Birkenhead was another new face, although Churchill and Balfour were absent.48 Chamberlain said he favoured a tripartite security pact between Britain, France and Belgium, even if Britain signed the Protocol. While in Geneva, he had decided there were so many reservations from countries like Sweden and Italy that the Protocol could never be satisfactory. He had also concluded that most people regarded a guarantee of the Franco-German border as the best hope for general European security, and that this would be far more effective than the Protocol. He emphasised that ‘The dominant feature in the outlook of Europe to-day is, I think, fear.’ But, with a security pact, ‘[...] the policy of France will become reasonable 49 He also argued, ‘[...] if it were decided to enter into a pact with France and Belgium to guarantee their security, it might be possible at a later date to induce Germany into a similar pact, but that the French would never agree to the inclusion of such an arrangem ent in the ^original docum ent.’ This shows that Chamberlain wanted an Anglo-French pact because he believed it was practical politics, not simply because of a personal preference. Thus, at two CID meetings, wide differences of opinion emerged. There was unity on rejecting the Protocol, but markedly different suggestions were made regarding alternatives, with only Chamberlain favouring a clear commitment to Europe. The question of alternatives now dominated. A subcommittee considered how the Protocol might be amended, while Chamberlain initiated Foreign Office discussions on alternatives.

A L T E R N A T IV E S TO T H E P R O T O C O L

With the Protocol about to die an early, although perhaps inevitable, death, an alternative way of securing France was necessary. Some discussion took place at a CID subcommittee, consisting of civil servants and chaired by Hankey. They suggested minor amendments to the Protocol, and said that if it were rejected, French security could

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only be dealt with by ‘[...] some kind of Anglo-French pact of guarantee’. However, this was envisaged as covering only the North Sea and Channel Ports. Germany could not be included since this would probably involve France requesting a guarantee of the German-Polish border.50 But it was in the Foreign Office that the main debate took place; on 4 January, Chamberlain asked for suggestions. His own mind was open: [...] I am frankly at a loss. Can we propose an Anglo-FrancoBelgian Pact of Guarantee to be followed by a Quadruple Pact embracing Germany? Or ought we to propose a unilateral declaration of British interests and of what we should regard as a casus belli? Or again is there some third course?51 But something had to be done. The Times noted in November that a makeshift policy was no longer excusable.52 Whether Chamberlain was influenced by press opinion is difficult to say, but he was anxious about the policy of drift the government seemed to be pursuing with regard to European security; and the Foreign Office debate should be seen in this context. He wanted to ditch ‘[...] a “hand to mouth policy’” as soon as possible.53 The Foreign Office’s deliberations took two forms. First, a conference took place between Chamberlain, Ronald McNeill, Eyre Crowe, the Central Department, the legal and historical advisers, and members of relevant departments such as the Northern and Western. Unfortunately, such conferences were unminuted; but the conclusions were recorded by Harold Nicolson in a paper of 23 January, which became the Foreign Office report, recommending a pact with France. Nicolson himself was unsure about the conclusions he had noted in his paper, believing there was little Britain could do to remove French fears of Germany, 80 per cent of which resulted from geography and population. Nicolson said the alternative to a pact was c[...] to have no objective Foreign Policy at all, which, to my mind, and in present conditions, would not be a wholly bad conclusion.’ But nobody else endorsed these views.54 The conference also raised the idea of the Concert of Europe, which became a hallmark of Chamberlain’s policy (as we shall see later regarding the League of Nations). The idea came from the Foreign Office’s historical adviser, J. W. Headlam-Morley. Chamberlain noted,

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[...] I was much struck with one observation made by Mr. Headlam-Morley at our conference [...]: - that the first thought of Castlereagh after 1815 was to restore the Concert of Europe, & that the more ambitious peacemakers of Versailles, when they framed the Covenant,55 still left a gap which only a new Concert of Europe can fill.56

This became the theme of Chamberlain’s attempts to bring Germany into the League, and gave a clear illustration of the need to calm France so that Germany could obtain equality in Europe. The second method of debate in the Foreign Office was through minutes written by Chamberlain and his staff, responding to information received from the Paris and Berlin embassies. These confirmed the view, put forward at the conference, that a pact including Germany at an early stage was unacceptable to France, and would wreck chances of an agreement.57 It was in this that the Foreign Office staff was most influential, with Crowe and Lampson confirming the impression Chamberlain had gained from discussions with the French Ambassador. Chamberlain thus had a clear reason for continuing to argue for a pact with France first. However, such influence was only possible because Chamberlain had already raised the idea of a pact; earlier, with Ramsay MacDonald, the Foreign Office had not pursued such an alliance, partly because MacDonald had a general prejudice against pacts, feeling they led to counter­ pacts, and partly because officials were unsure as to whether a pact would be acceptable politically.58 As the Foreign Office considered the alternatives, a proposal arrived from Berlin - sent first to Britain, and later to France. On 20 January, four days into his chancellorship, Hans Luther (and his foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann) made a proposal similar to the 1922 Cuno Plan. Partly inspired by D’Abemon,59 the offer was imprecise, but suggested arbitration treaties and guaranteeing the Rhineland’s existing territorial status.60 The Central Department made varied comments: J. C. Stemdale Bennett saw a pact including Germany as better than one directed against it, but he felt this was impractical since Germany had not sufficiently disarmed for France to reach agreement with it. Lampson shared the belief that such a pact was not yet realistic, but for different reasons - Britain and France needed to make a pact between themselves before Germany could be brought in. Crowe endorsed this, adding, ‘Nevertheless, the

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whole idea is a move in a good direction and ought not to be discouraged’.61 These views were not new to Chamberlain, but they may have confirmed what he heard from the French: barriers to initial German involvement in an agreement were substantial. However, only nine days after the offer was made, Stresemann withdrew it, fearing France might see it as an attempt to shirk Versailles’ disarmament clauses.62 W hat seemed impractical to Britain and France, now seemed difficult for Germany, too. But Germany persisted and made another offer, this time to France on 9 February, along the same lines as that made to Britain. The French did not object in principle, but wanted to discuss any pact with Britain first, before talking to Germany.63 Cham berlain was encouraged, telling Crewe that the German offer was ‘[...] the most hopeful sign that I have yet seen.’ He also said, though, that the League of Nations Union and the Opposition were set against any regional pact.64 But, most importantly, he added that whereas in 1919 public opinion would not have allowed Britain to sign a pact with Germany, this would be more acceptable now; indeed ‘[...] in the circumstances of today a guarantee of the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium by Great Britain would be rendered a much more practical policy if Germany was associated with it.’ He added that it would be a great mistake for Germany to withdraw the offer, or for France not to consider it fully.65 So this German offer suggested hope for the future. At the moment, however, it was vague and tentative. It had been withdrawn once, and could be again. Chamberlain therefore continued to argue for the seemingly more achievable goal of an Anglo-French pact. Opinions on the pact varied inside and outside the Foreign Office. As an apologist for Germany, Britain’s Ambassador to Berlin, Lord D’Abernon, feared ‘[...] a continuation of the war grouping and mentality 56 pointing out that France was militarily superior to Germany and that there was no need for a pact to secure France.67 Although there was little doubt of the accuracy of D’Abernon’s claims about French military superiority, only Balfour made this part of his opposition to a pact. The service chiefs saw a strategic advantage in a pact with France, with the caveat that the navy and RAF were concerned that it might provoke Germany. Only the RAF added that the value of a pact might be increased if it included Germany.68 Nor did D’Abernon find support in the Foreign Office. Even before the German offer, Ronald McNeill wrote vigorously

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against any agreement including Germany, saying, ‘She always has dishonoured her signature when it suited her, and there is not the slightest reason to believe she will do otherwise in the future.569 As for Chamberlain, it is important to note his long-term view of making Europe secure. In a conversation with de Fleuriau, the French Ambassador in London, he said, c[...] our object must surely be to make it possible for a new generation to grow up who would not share the passions engendered by the war, who would have become accustomed to the new situation, and would accept it rather than face the dangers of a new appeal to force.570Writing to the King, he said, T am working not for today or tomorrow but for some date like 1960 or 1970 [...]5.71 This was the theme of his policy, and it is a reason why no military plans for fulfilling the eventual guarantee were made. The scheme depended on a long period of diplomatic involvement in Europe, and required no military component. Hankey spoke to Chamberlain of the commitments involved under a pact, saying ‘Some day the cheque might be presented, and we should have to honour it.5 Chamberlain responded that he hoped to secure peace in Europe, and that ‘He did not wish to wreck his policy on the technicalities of military considerations.572 He had earlier told Hankey that he did not wish to know on which countries the Chiefs of Staff based their war plans, so that if ever asked by a foreign representative, he could deny that he knew of any British plans for war against that country73 - a classic example of Chamberlain5s famed integrity. It is also clear that he felt Britain was strong enough for the aura of its might to have a decisive influence on the balance of power on the continent, simply through diplomatic commitment.74

THE DOMINIONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

While the CID rejected the Protocol, so did the Dominions, fearing the impact of the Permanent Court upon their own immigration rules.75 Such an argument provided British leaders opposed to the Protocol with a further reason for rejecting it. But the question of whether the Dominions would take part in an alternative remained, for they were asserting their independence;76 and throughout the discussions on security, the government considered this. It was partly important because the main newspaper challenge to the government stemmed from arguments about the diplomatic unity of the Empire.

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Beaverbrook’s Daily Express believed that the policy threatened imperial unity, and argued that if Chamberlain persisted with his present course, it might be necessary to stand ‘Imperialist’ candidates at by-elections.77Chamberlain’s attitude to Dominion involvement in foreign policy was that, I am anxious, eager rather, to meet as fully as possible the Dominion demand for (a) information (b) consultation. But in a crisis the British Empire must not be paralysed because nowhere in that Empire has anyone the right to speak or act on its behalf [...].78

A series of Foreign Office minutes suggest considerable British desire for the Dominions to sign a pact.79 But after the 19 February CID meeting, where Amery urged Dominion consultation and Chamberlain urged the rapid formulation of policy, it seems to have been assumed they would not be included, and there was no major discussion at Cabinet level on whether they should be. Rather, the Dominions were informed in March that Britain would pursue a quadrilateral pact. It was clear, however, from the instructions given to Chamberlain by the Cabinet, that foreign powers should understand that he did not speak for the Dominions.80 One must therefore accept Robert Holland’s argument that here we can see British concerns not to have European policy restricted by the Dominions.81

THE EVACUATION OF THE COLOGNE ZONE82

While security discussions took place, Chamberlain pressed France over the evacuation of the Cologne zone. Under Versailles, Allied troops were to withdraw in 1925, provided Germany complied with its disarmament obligations. However, when it became clear Germany had not complied fully,83 Chamberlain feared that the French response might weaken British support for an agreement to secure France, and that France might make evacuation conditional on security. This is the key to Chamberlain’s treatment of Cologne; he relegated it below the main concern - security. The Foreign Office position was put forward in a briefing for

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Chamberlain on 7 November: if Germany failed to comply only in minor matters, keeping Allied troops in the area £[...] would cast doubt on the good faith of the Allies and would undo a great deal of the good that has been done by the application of the Dawes Plan.’ Chamberlain accepted this, warning Crewe that failure to evacuate could end chances of a security agreement.84 In the event, a compromise was reached. Chamberlain resisted linking security to evacuation, but at the price of agreeing to a slower process of deliberation about Cologne. It was in some ways a victory for Herriot, who had effectively put evacuation on hold.85 However, Britain still had influence over the French occupation and it was to be discussed separately from security. French intransigence over Cologne would now be less likely to harm security negotiations. As we shall see, the issue was not resolved until the end of 1925, when security agreements had been made.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE: 13 AND 19 FEBRUARY 1925

The CID met on 13 February to discuss alternatives to the Protocol.86 Baldwin was at neither this meeting nor the one on 19 February, although all other ministers who took part in previous discussions attended. Overall, Chamberlain continued to advocate an AngloFrench pact in order to make France adopt a more generous attitude towards Germany. He set great store by Stresemann’s talk of it being possible to make arbitration treaties for Germany’s eastern frontiers.87 But he faced opposition. Balfour argued that any pact would ‘[...] only irritate the world Birkenhead was for a quadrilateral agreement on the Belgian frontier with Germany, plus one on the Franco-German border if possible; this last commitment was lukewarm, for he later became one of those whom Amery described as ‘the anti-pactites’.88Amery did not favour a guarantee of the Franco-German border - only one of the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, which, he believed, could be justified to the Empire. While against a strong commitment to France, Churchill urged that Britain guarantee the Franco-German border once the two had come to terms - there should be no British involvement before. He said that his views had changed since 1922, when he had supported an Anglo-French pact. Curzon closed the meeting by

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highlighting the need not to alienate public opinion or to unite Liberals and Labour by agreeing to a Franco-British bilateral pact. At the final CID meeting, on 19 February,89 new views were expressed by Hoare and Trenchard, the Chief of Air Staff, on the danger of cementing European divisions through a pact. They argued that if time was left to take its course, trade would pacify Europe. Worthington-Evans opposed this, emerging as Chamberlain’s only strong supporter. But he, like Chamberlain, believed that Germany should be excluded for the moment, since it would be difficult for Britain to say it trusted a country it currently occupied. There was hesitation over Amery’s concern about consulting with the Dominions. But Chamberlain’s stress on the need for action carried the day, and Amery’s point was never seriously addressed. Significantly, Chamberlain’s position on the type of pact to pursue was not fully defined. Taking a different track from the 13 February meeting, he showed he still had an open mind, saying, ‘We have no interest in the German frontier. We have a direct British interest in guaranteeing the French frontier. I want a little guidance on that [...]’.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN’S ALTERNATIVE

Following this final CID meeting, Nicolson reported on the Foreign Office deliberations which had been set in motion on 4 January. Nicolson’s paper90 defined the threat to security as Germany wanting to revise Versailles, and perhaps attacking France if Britain was neutral. Meanwhile, if France felt insecure, it might provoke a German attack. This was dangerous to Britain, who wanted no single power to dominate the Channel or North Sea ports. Britain, therefore, needed to make an agreement with France and Belgium to create ‘[...] a nucleus of certainty [...]’, into which Germany could later be drawn. The paper concluded, ‘[...] until we can quieten France, no concert of Europe is possible, and we can only quieten France if we are in a position to speak to her with the authority of an Ally [...] The first hope of stability in Europe lies in a new entente between the British Empire and France.’ But, while Chamberlain and the Foreign Office clearly felt an Anglo-French pact, with Germany included later, was most likely to succeed in calming France, Chamberlain did not consistently argue this at the CID meetings. On analysing his views, we can see that what was most

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important to Chamberlain was securing France one way or another. An Anglo-French pact was only a means to this end. The main thread of this argument leads to the conclusion that what Chamberlain took to the Cabinet on 2 March, when the final decision on the Protocol would be made, was only a preference for an Anglo-French pact, but a firm commitment to securing France and a commitment to some type of pact. Chamberlain’s aims are best summarised in a minute written in mid-March 1925: I believe that Great Britain has it in her power at this moment to bring peace to Europe. To achieve this end two things are indispensable: 1. that we should remove or allay French fears. 2. that we should bring Germany back into the concert of Europe. Both are equally vital. Neither by itself will suffice & the first is needed to allow the second.

Admittedly, Chamberlain also noted, ‘My sympathies are French’. One should not make too much of this, though: he recognised French exaggerations and reprimanded McNeill for saying that Britain should in no circumstances break with France over implementing Versailles. Chamberlain told him, *[...] do not let you and me because of our strong French sympathies, tie ourselves to the defence of all the vagaries of French policy or allow our reason to be quenched in her fears.’91 In this respect, he was less pro-French than McNeill. Central to Chamberlain’s thoughts was the need to calm France. But how did he seek to do this and why did his methods change? A useful source for Chamberlain’s views is a letter he wrote to D’Abernon in 1930, the contents of which he repeated to his sisters, responding to the publication of D’Abernon’s diaries.92 Its date means it must be treated with care, and it is vague on the evolution of the German offer to France. However, since it shows that Chamberlain was not initially in favour of the action that led to Locarno, which means denying paternity of a triumph, this writer is inclined to value it as a useful portrait of Chamberlain’s mind in

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early 1925. Recalling the security negotiations of 1924-25, Chamberlain noted that, at first, he was working for an Anglo-French pact ‘[...] which I hoped eventually (but, I must admit, only eventually) to turn into a reciprocal agreement with Germany.’ This is what was in his mind at the 16 December CID meeting. By 13 February, the German offer had been made to France, and a pact involving Germany seemed to be a more realistic option than previously. He was considering including Germany in the pact at an early stage, as we can see from his words to Crewe on 14 February, ‘[...] a guarantee of the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium by Great Britain would be rendered a much more practical policy if Germany was associated with it.’93 However, at the third CID meeting he mentioned both an Anglo-French pact and a quadrilateral pact; at the final CID discussion of the matter, he expressed doubts about German involvement. First, Chamberlain’s views on a pact must be seen in the context of the CID discussions. Here, the issue was whether to reject the Protocol; and when he initially talked of pacts, he was addressing the question ‘Protocol or pact?’, rather than ‘What type of pact?’ One must also note Chamberlain’s statement, to D’Abernon in 1930, that if he had not pushed for an Anglo-French pact, ‘I am quite certain that I should never have got the assent of the Cabinet to the mutual pact.’94 This is confirmed by a minute written in mid-March 1925, in which Chamberlain said, ‘Unless I were known to be pro-French I could never get them to move on the lines of Cabinet policy & I could not afford to say or do as much to help Germany.’95 There may well have been, then, a tactical element in Chamberlain’s advocacy of a pact with France - asking for much more than was needed, in the hope that what was required would be given. Chamberlain’s initial preference for an Anglo-French pact can be seen in the reasons given at the final CID meeting - that it was difficult for any British government to consider including Germany. Meanwhile, it is important to bear in mind the vagueness of the German proposal, which offered various alternatives along the lines of the 1922 Cuno plan.96 Furthermore, advice from D’Abernon suggested that the political situation in Germany was extremely unstable; this can only have reinforced Chamberlain’s own concern ‘[_] that I can have no assurance that any Government will do what it knows to be right and wise because of internal weakness.’97 Only after Nicolson’s paper was written did the German offer begin to take

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a definite shape.98 Even so, Chamberlain had welcomed the earlier German offer, because it seemed a way of offering France security evidence that he was not set upon an Anglo-French pact as the only way of doing this. Chamberlain also had some fears about Germany’s Rapallo policy; however, these were not great, and, in general, throughout the 1920s Britain did not believe that Germany was likely to throw in its lot with the Soviet Union, seeing the two countries’ aims as incompatible in the long term.99 In January, commenting on D ’A bemon’s paper on German military strength, he minuted, ‘I do not understand Lord D’Abernon’s reason for thinking union between the Imperialist military leaders in Germany & the Communists of Russia “unthinkable”. After all, who started the Russian revolutionaries on their task, why not again[?]’ However, this never became a serious concern, and Chamberlain was more likely simply to use Rapallo as a diplomatic tool, noting that the Belgian Ambassador, Moncheur, was struck by his statement that before Russia again emerged as a great power, it was important to ‘[...] link Germany with the system of the west.’100 In October, H. A. Gwynne (of the Morning Posij reminded Chamberlain that in the summer the Foreign Secretary had told him that, ‘England and Russia were fighting for the soul of Germany.’101 Nevertheless, the Soviet threat did not make France more likely to accept a pact with Germany. This remained the case until March when Germany stated it could pledge not to change its border with Poland by force.102

THE PROTOCOL REJECTED

When the Cabinet met on 2 March, aside from Nicolson’s paper, it saw papers from the CID ,103 the General Staff, Churchill and Hoare. Joynson-Hicks did not attend but wrote to Baldwin opposing a pact.104The CID papers included a note from Curzon, saying that the CID believed the Protocol could not be accepted and that the Cabinet needed to decide how best to reject it. He added that a pact including Britain, France, Germany and Belgium would be the best way of ensuring French security, but that there were practical problems in including Germany. The General Staff’s view was similar to that of the Foreign Office: ‘The true strategic frontier of Great Britain is the Rhine [...]’ and ‘[...]

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“French Security” spells “British Security” [...]’. Churchill, however, took a different line, refusing ‘[...] to accept as an axiom that our fate is involved in that of France.’ Britain should make no commitment until ‘[...] France has made a real peace with Germany [...]’. His was the lone voice, or at least, the lone pen, questioning Britain’s interest in French security. The real difference of opinion in the Cabinet was whether Britain should join a pact and, if so, when Germany should be included. Chamberlain and the Foreign Office favoured an Anglo-French pact, but, as we saw earlier, Balfour saw any pact as likely to upset European stability; Hoare agreed - the greatest threat to security lay not in German aggression [...] but from the division of Europe into two great camps, the camp of the victors and the camp of the vanquished [...].’105 The Cabinet opted to reject the Protocol, stressing that it was better *[...] to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements to meet special needs.’106 A pact with France and/or Belgium was rejected. But a pact including Germany and, possibly, Italy ‘[...] stands on a different footing and might become a great assurance to the peace of Europe [...]’.107 The minutes, and Amery’s diary, show that the pact policy was framed to satisfy Chamberlain, with the implication that this was not seen as necessary by every member of the Cabinet. Amery said, ‘[...] Austen talked the Cabinet round to agree to some kind of promise of a pact to be more or less given to Herriot [...]’.108 This suggests Chamberlain was more concerned to secure at least some kind of pact, rather than necessarily one with France and Belgium alone. On the surface, the outcome seemed a defeat for Chamberlain. However, his support for an agreement with France alone had been a practical position rather than one of principle. As he told D ’Abernon in 1930, T remember saying that it was not my policy but that it was a policy which I believed could be worked [...], but would not go abroad without a policy.’109Furthermore, he had told his sister, Ida, only the day before the Cabinet meeting, T have npw got my policy clear & definite in my own mind 110 If this was the case, one might expect him to have been rather disappointed by having it rejected. But there is no evidence of this, because the policy adopted did not, in fact, differ fundamentally from the one he preferred. Although it involved taking a more difficult path, it had the same aims. But had Chamberlain alone won this concession? On 1 March, he had written to Ida Chamberlain, ‘[...] I am banking on the Prime

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Minister to weigh in with authority at the critical moment [...]’.111 And Baldwin certainly told Crowe he would support Chamberlain.112 Although Baldwin asked Chamberlain to speak first at the meeting,113 whether he did any more than this is difficult to say, since the minutes include no further reference to his role. This in itself suggests it was not great. However, we can be sure that two days later, with Baldwin away attending to his ill mother, the position was modified. At the meeting on 4 March, ‘Poor Austen had an awful bucketing [...]’114 as the Cabinet rethought its position, due to the anxieties of Curzon and Balfour about Britain overcommitting itself.115 The new Cabinet resolution stated that the earlier commitment to Germany went beyond what public opinion would tolerate. The revised view was that Britain should not turn down the German offer as this might drive Germany towards the USSR, and that it should work towards a successful agreement including Germany if Stresemann’s offer was treated seriously by the rest of Europe.116 According to Amery, besides himself and Hoare who had opposed a pact two days before, the Anglo-French pact policy was scuppered by Curzon, Churchill and Birkenhead.117 Ominously, Hankey said that Amery supported the 4 March position of the Cabinet ‘[...] only because he is certain the French won’t take it - a bad reason.’118 However, Amery’s 4 March diary entry was, like that for 2 March, written on 25 March, and his memory seems to have been faulty. If one looks at the resolution of the first meeting, a pact with France was clearly rejected then. The task of the 4 March meeting was, therefore, not to reject that post, but to dilute the commitment to a quadrilateral pact. The change from 2 to 4 March was not actually as great as Amery suggests, and Neville Chamberlain could still write to his sisters that his brother ‘[...] was rewarded by getting a fairly free hand 119 Chamberlain’s own reaction to the Cabinet meetings was recorded in a letter to his wife. He wrote, ‘Briefly I may say that I cannot do what I wanted to do [...] But I am authorised to try something else, much more difficult in my immediate sphere but I hope not impossible, & certainly more likely to meet with general approval at home.’120 To explain this, one must return to the argument that the course chosen by the Cabinet was simply another way of achieving the ends Chamberlain had hoped to arrive at by a pact with France which would later bring in Germany. Chamberlain stood by the view that such an agreement would be difficult; but he adopted the policy as his own and sought to carry it through.

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Outside the Cabinet, The Times published a series of articles arguing for a pact. Although there is no evidence of collusion between the newspaper and Chamberlain or the Foreign Office, it may have had inside information of some kind, for its comments addressed arguments made in Cabinet: on 2 March, it merely argued that a commitment was necessary, but on 4 March, when the C abinet’s partial endorsem ent of the German offer looked threatened, The Times argued strongly for the German proposals.121 Chamberlain himself was vague in public. In the House of Commons, he said little about the German offer or the Protocol. He emphasised the fear prevailing in Europe - always his trump card in persuading sceptics that Britain should make some kind of continental commitment.122The main talking-point of the debate was not one of foreign affairs at all. Rather, it concerned a walk-out from the chamber by all Labour members (including MacDonald), following the expulsion by the Deputy Speaker of a Labour member who suggested that Chamberlain’s slowness in announcing the German offer was akin to the events surrounding the Zinoviev letter. Writing to the King about the incident, Baldwin said it was symptomatic of Labour’s general dislike of Chamberlain, whose respect for tradition and expression of this in his manner of dress ‘[...] are not qualities which endear themselves to the more modem products of democracy’. Baldwin added that the incident took ‘[...] all interest out of the debate on foreign affairs.’123 So, Chamberlain said all he could to the Commons. Some probably suspected him of having committed Britain already, for, on 11 March, Charles Trevelyan, the Labour MP and former President of the Board of Education, moved a motion urging that all treaties should be put to Parliament before ratification124 - the result of Labour believing the methods of secret diplomacy were once more in use.125 However, Chamberlain took only a tentative security proposal to the League Council meeting where he would reject the Protocol. After that, on Cabinet instructions, he had to wait and see.

CHAMBERLAIN IN GENEVA AND PARIS

Before this meeting in Geneva, Chamberlain met the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Edouard Herriot, on 6 March in Paris, telling him of his regret at rejecting a pact with France, but

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adding that Luther’s proposal offered hope. Herriot feared the scheme was designed by Luther to secure early evacuation of the Rhineland. Chamberlain countered by saying Stresemann had made it clear his offer had no connection with this. The next day, both men went over similar ground, plus Herriot’s desire for Britain, France and Belgium to solve differences between themselves before negotiating with Germany. Chamberlain reported Herriot had said that, ‘He could say things to me as an ally that he could not say in the presence of the Germans.’ Chamberlain accepted this as long as it did not take the form of a tripartite agreement. Herriot then voiced sentiments that caused Chamberlain concern: France could stay in Cologne indefinitely, since Germany seemed unlikely ever to meet fully the terms of Versailles.126 As a result of these conversations, Chamberlain faced problems at home from those opposed to a continental commitment. This arose from a letter of 8 March, in which Chamberlain asked Crowe to ascertain the views of the Cabinet on the evacuation of Cologne:127 [...] I thought it well to put plainly to Monsieur Herriot the dangers of the breach over Cologne, and to beg him to think of the security which is given to France by the continued presence of our troops along with the French and Belgian armies of occupation, and of all that would be implied by our complete withdrawal. Can you get me, through the Prime Minister, any indication of the views of the Cabinet on this subject?128

However, Crowe failed to relay Chamberlain’s views accurately to the Cabinet, possibly because he had his own opinions on the matter. The Cabinet thus believed that Chamberlain wanted to offer a pact with France; ministers opposing a pact used the occasion either to push their views, or simply to vent their anger over being asked to reconsider a proposal they had rejected. Since Chamberlain had been authorised to make a provisional offer of British involvement in a pact, it seemed to him that the Cabinet was asking him to renege on a commitment already given. He threatened to resign; only when Baldwin supported Chamberlain, did he continue with negotiations. Before evidence is offered for these conclusions, it is necessary to note other writers’ views, as the episode has been often misinterpreted. Many assume Chamberlain was seeking to make a firmer commitment to a pact, and have not demonstrated that Crowe was at fault in

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seeking to commit Britain to a pact with France. One such commentator is Douglas Johnson. Although he does not say exactly what Chamberlain hoped to do, Johnson wrote, ‘In these circumstances he [Chamberlain] felt justified in wondering whether the Cabinet would not authorise him to go further in his approaches to Herriot.’ As his source, Johnson cites Chamberlain’s 8 March letter to Crowe which, as we have seen, asked only for advice on Cologne, and not a pact.129 The most detailed account is by Middlemas and Barnes. It is from this, and Johnson’s article, thatjacobson takes his evidence.130 Middlemas and Barnes claim that Chamberlain, ‘[...] cabled to Baldwin for guidance, asking to be allowed at least to say that Britain agreed to join a West European security pact, adding that it was necessary to be firm with France about the evacuation.’131 First, it should be said that there is no evidence in the papers of the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, Chamberlain and Baldwin, of a cable to Baldwin, while Middlemas and Barnes, uncharacteristically, do not provide a reference for it. In 1930, Chamberlain wrote briefly that he ‘[...] telephoned from Geneva to the Prime Minister [...]’,132 but this was probably his message to Crowe for Baldwin:133 had it been a direct conversation between Baldwin and Chamberlain, it is likely that Chamberlain would have given more priority to it in his recollections. It seems, then, that Chamberlain’s only message for Baldwin was via Crowe.134 Petrie, meanwhile, maintains Chamberlain wrote to Crowe because ‘[...] he wanted to be sure that he had his colleagues behind him.’135 Dutton suggests, ‘[...] Chamberlain had sought authority from Baldwin to state that Britain would definitely agree to a pact based on the German plan.’136 These views are easily explained: Petrie had not seen the relevant Foreign Office documents in 1940, since they were still hidden from public scrutiny; Dutton seems to have attributed to Chamberlain views expressed by Crowe, for there is nothing in his sources which backs up such an interpretation. Erik Goldstein takes a similar position to previous writers - Chamberlain asking for permission to make a stronger commitment to France; Sibyl Eyre Crowe, meanwhile, uses the episode as part of an article attributing Locarno to the role played by Crowe in the discussions of 1924-25.137 So what did happen? Chamberlain asked Crowe to establish how far Herriot should be pressed on Cologne, but made no reference to further committing Britain to a pact. Evidence of what happened

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after this letter was received by Crowe, on 11 March, is contained in a letter from Crowe to Chamberlain of 12 March,138 and it is clear Crowe misled Baldwin and the Cabinet. Crowe wrote that he had spoken to Baldwin on receiving Chamberlain’s letter, and raised the problem of Cologne. Baldwin had said he believed Chamberlain’s instructions on the pact were too rigid, and asked for Crowe’s opinions on what should be done. Crowe wrote that he had told the Prime Minister he felt Chamberlain had only sought advice on the question of Cologne in the hope that a firm stance would be rejected. This is quite feasible since Chamberlain had always taken this position, but had not been given firm instructions by the Cabinet. However, Crowe also told Baldwin that, in his opinion, a statement should be made that Britain was ‘[...] ready to contemplate the method of separate pacts [...]’ as long as Germany was in some way involved. This was not at all what Chamberlain asked Crowe to say; Crowe, admittedly at Baldwin’s prompting, had ventured his own opinions, which had nothing to do with Chamberlain’s request about Cologne. Although Chamberlain had mentioned (in his letter of 8 March to Crowe) the effect that the rejection of an Anglo-French alliance had had on Herriot, he was not asking the Cabinet to reconsider or approve anything he had done. Rather he was asking for views on Cologne, a matter that had not been discussed in detail by the Cabinet. Baldwin appears to have been interested in Crowe’s view, but said the Cabinet must discuss it, and that he could not call a meeting in the next few days. However, Baldwin did call a meeting of ministers for the same day. As with the Crowe-Baldwin conversation, evidence relating to this meeting comes from Crowe’s letter to Chamberlain of 12 March. At the meeting, Crowe relayed Chamberlain’s request for guidance about Cologne. He went on to add his own view ‘[...] that the issue involved was a much wider and graver one In the discussion that followed, the whole idea of cooperating with France was attacked, particularly by Churchill, Birkenhead and Amery, who probably felt that their instructions to Chamberlain were clear. Baldwin said nothing. Only Cecil was in favour of a pact. Significantly, though, Crowe did not attend the whole meeting, being asked by Baldwin to leave so that the ministers could discuss the matter alone. Crowe himself suggested to Chamberlain, ‘Perhaps I may still hope that Mr. Baldwin may have wished merely to reserve his support of you for the moment when he

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spoke to them alone.’ Bridgeman’s diary noted of the meeting that it *[...] decided to continue the policy of refusing any pact with France to join her against a German attack, unless a quadrilateral arrangement could also be made to include Germany.’139 Nothing was done about Chamberlain’s original request about the evacuation of Cologne. Following his receipt of Crowe’s account, Chamberlain sent Crowe a message for Baldwin, saying his position was *[...] wholly false and absolutely untenable adding that he would resign on his return to Britain.140 It seemed to him that, having told the French that Britain supported a pact including Germany, he was being undermined. However flexible Chamberlain was on the details of a pact, and it is argued here that he was very flexible, if he had gone back on his word to Herriot, he would never again be regarded as controlling foreign policy. Baldwin replied on 12 March that those at the meeting felt Chamberlain had ‘[...] represented firmly and clearly our decision Cologne required further consideration, but it was ‘[...] impossible to say more than you have said on the pact question.’141Crowe, meanwhile, had relayed Chamberlain’s resignation threat to Baldwin,142 and was told to tell Chamberlain that he had Baldwin’s full confidence. Baldwin said Chamberlain should not take the informal meeting as a Cabinet view; they would discuss the matter on his return.143 Chamberlain’s impression of Crowe’s account, is recorded in a letter to his wife. Writing so as to prevent, he hoped, an unauthorised reader of the letter from making sense of it, he said, ‘[...J the friend who owes most to me [Birkenhead] appears to be working hard against me & that his friend [Churchill] takes the same line, whilst the sphinx [Baldwin] sits silent, gives me no word of support or confidence & says only that we must have a serious talk when I get back!’144 He added on 23 March, ‘What exactly was the truth of it all I don’t know [...]’. Four years later, in 1929, he wrote of this episode that Crowe had not misrepresented the feelings of ministers, *[...] & that it was only my insistence that I would resign if not supported that even then carried the day.’145 But, in 1933, he said, ‘[...] when I got home I found that everything was going smoothly and I never got any explanation of this episode [...]’.146 Petrie’s view gives prominence to Chamberlain’s resignation threat,147 while Stambrook maintains that it won the day for the pact policy.148 But this is a case of an historian making much ado about very little. The most

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significant fact is not that Chamberlain’s strength defeated other ministers, but that Crowe stirred up a hornets’ nest by suggesting that a pact with France was needed. This would certainly have angered the opponents of such a policy, Churchill, Amery and Birkenhead, who had already defeated it in Cabinet. One might be tempted to suggest they used the episode in an attempt to undermine the idea of any pact. But this has to remain an open question; there is no evidence they did plan this, while it is highly unlikely there would be any evidence of it if they had. The conclusion has to be that Baldwin was able to pacify the malcontents enough for the matter to pass by. Orde and Magee give good accounts of the episode and do not make the same mistakes as other writers.149 However, neither consider the possibility that it was something of an irrelevant sideshow in which Chamberlain’s position was never really threatened. In this view, Baldwin emerges as a skilled Cabinet manager with an essential role to play. Crowe is the villain: responding to Baldwin’s doubt about the rigidity of Chamberlain’s instructions, he raised the issue of a pact with France, and overstepped the bounds of his instructions from Chamberlain. Chamberlain’s talk with Baldwin on his return was ‘[...] quite satisfactory [...]’;150 and there was a Cabinet meeting at which the quadrilateral pact was discussed and endorsed for a statement to the House of Commons.151 As events unfolded at home, Chamberlain went to Geneva, rejecting the Protocol without incident.152 Returning home via Paris, he met Herriot again, and they had a further general discussion on security. At this point, there were three French criteria for agreement. First, security could not be conditional on early evacuation of the Rhineland. Second, France could not renege on its arrangements with Poland. Third, Germany must enter the League of Nations. Britain, meanwhile, could not accept any extension of its commitments as envisaged by the Protocol, nor could it enter a pact ‘[...] specifically directed against Germany.’ With regard to the Franco-German frontier, Germany should renounce all desire for change; on its eastern frontier, Germany was understood to reserve its rights to change it under Article 19 of the League’s Covenant on joining the League, although it was understood throughout the negotiations that Germany would renounce war as a means of border revision.153 This embodied the policy the Foreign Office now believed would ensure French security. It also provided for the ‘special arrangements to meet special needs’ that were felt to be more

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effective than the Protocol, on, for example, the border between Poland and Germany. Britain, of course, would take no part in these special arrangements. This was partly the result of a desire not to be over-committed, but also because it was felt that discussion of the issue would wreck chances of agreement between France and Germany. In addition, it reflected Chamberlain’s view of how problems between Germany and Poland might eventually be overcome. He believed it was ‘[...] a problem which time and good will alone will solve [...]’.154 It was best, therefore, to leave it alone. With such common ground between France and Britain, Cham berlain accepted on 16 March the idea of inter-allied consultation.155It should be noted, though, that Chamberlain and the Foreign Office later ensured that the inter-allied agreement was not so rigid as to give the impression of dictating another treaty to Germany.156 The French had now accepted the British position. D’Abernon attributed this to Chamberlain’s own work, writing in his diary on 22 June, ‘Paris feels that if Chamberlain adheres, no other course is open; Paris must therefore follow suit.’157 With a clearly defined policy in his hands, Chamberlain returned from Geneva to defend the quadrilateral pact in the House on 24 March. He faced strong attacks from Arthur Henderson on the Protocol’s rejection, while MacDonald believed it had been rejected outright too early. Lloyd George said the important issue was arbitration; what was needed now was a treaty better able to provide it than the Protocol. The main thrust of Chamberlain’s argument was that Britain must be involved in Europe if security was to be achieved. In a rare piece of rhetoric, reminiscent of his father, he ended his main speech saying, The British Empire, detached from Europe by its Dominions, linked to Europe by these islands, can do what no other nation on the face of the earth can do, and from east and west alike there comes to me the cry that, after all, it is in the hands of the British Empire, and if they will that there shall be no war there will be no war.158

Clearly, Chamberlain saw Britain as powerful enough to play a full diplomatic role in Europe. The debate was marked by a further rarity - the incursion of Baldwin into foreign affairs, presumably to lend prime ministerial

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gravitas to Britain’s position. However, it probably added little to Chamberlain’s case, for he did not face strong opposition in the House. Significantly, but only for the moment, there were no criticisms from Conservatives. C. W. Bellairs, Conservative MP for Maidstone, did call for disarmament to accompany a pact, but this was more an aside than a direct criticism. More important was an event outside the chamber of the Commons, when the German Ambassador, who had listened to Chamberlain’s speech, told Chamberlain that he had gone too far in saying that Germany would renounce the use of war to alter its eastern frontiers. Chamberlain held firm on this, however, and after consultation with Berlin, Sthamer was obliged to concede the point.159Chamberlain’s attention now turned to detailed negotiations.

THE TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE

An event of significance took place in France on 17 April, when Herriot’s government fell. Paul Painleve became prime minister and Aristide Briand took over at the Quai d’Orsay. Chamberlain was pleased: ‘M. Briand is a man of supple & ingenious mind, capable of admitting disagreeable truths & forming broad & liberal views.’160He later wrote that, ‘Briand has almost taken my breath away with his liberality [...] The German attitude had been just the contrary, niggling, provocative, crooked.’161 Three points need to be made about this. First, Chamberlain did not always view ‘the Germans’ as a single entity. Neville Chamberlain recorded his view as: ‘Luther Ajusten] found sympathetic. [...] Stresemann on the other hand has not a sympathetic personality. But A. expressed great admiration for his courage Later, in 1930, Chamberlain wrote of Stresemann’s ‘[...] amazing skill.’162 Second, Chamberlain’s view of Germany came partly from D’Abernon, and, as Stephanie Salzmann has pointed out, D’Abernon’s reports from Germany did not fully reflect the activities of right-wing groups; so, at this time, Chamberlain might not have fully appreciated Stresemann’s domestic difficulties.163 This certainly changed by 1926, when Chamberlain was pursuing a policy of calming Germany;164but, for the moment, it is important to note that any criticisms of German politicians made by Chamberlain, were not necessarily the result of anti-German prejudice on Chamberlain’s part. Thirdly, Chamberlain did not see other Frenchmen as favourably

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as Briand. He had no illusions about Caillaux, writing to Churchill on 5 June, ‘Caillaux is really more crooked than ever and a great mischief maker.’165 Later, writing in December from the League of Nations Council meeting, he said, ‘I do not find [Paul-] Boncour easy to work with.’166 So, if Chamberlain was pro-Briand, he was far from enamoured with other French politicians, an attitude he shared with others in Britain.167 Thus, Chamberlain’s views on Briand and the Germans might just as well have been a contrast of Briand and Herriot. Why exactly, though, was Chamberlain so attached to Briand? Why would he later say of Briand, ‘No other French Minister could do as much as he can do [...]’.168 The answer is, in part, that Chamberlain found Briand was a man with whom he could do business because both were pragmatic. Furthermore, both believed that a British commitment to Europe was vital to European security. However, most importantly, both realised that there must be a policy towards Germany which was more conciliatory than that adopted by, for example, Poincare.169 In Chamberlain’s eyes, Briand was the only French politician who could deliver this because of his position in the political spectrum. Chamberlain later developed this idea when he wrote to D’Abemon in February 1926: It cannot be expected that any other Frenchman would have both the strength and the wish to go so far. Some would have neither. Any movement towards the Right must make the policy of conciliation more difficult, but any movement towards the Left might have the same result, for the further Left the basis of the Government, the greater suspicion there will be of any concessions made by it, the less power it would have to take such decisions as Briand vaguely meditates, and the more likely we should be to find ourselves face to face with a Foreign Minister like Herriot, who had plenty of good­ will, but who feared the responsibility of a decision.170

Chamberlain was not the only person to take this view; D’Abernon had already reported Stresemann’s views on Briand before Briand took office: apparently, Stresemann had told friends that it would be easier to reach an agreement with Briand or Loucheur because they would not be opposed by the Right as Herriot was. In saying this, Stresemann saw Briand’s position in France as similar to his own in Germany.171

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It might be argued that Chamberlain also believed that Briand was the only person in France who could make concessions with regard to France’s eastern alliances, so as to make sure that Britain did not have to be involved with any kind of eastern guarantee. Certainly, he wrote of Briand and the east, ‘Here again the attitude of M. Briand, given the necessary conditions of French policy, is all that we could expect or desire.’172But what he meant was that Briand was willing to come to some agreement with Germany over existing treaties.173There was never any question of French politicans expecting Britain to guarantee the east, and given the fact that all French Cabinets prized British cooperation above all else, moving away from an eastern outlook was almost inevitable.174Meanwhile, Briand did not actually believe that guarantees from France to Poland and Czechoslovakia were weakened by Locarno, even though this was the long-term result.175 Later, it became more and more clear that what really impressed Chamberlain was Briand’s willingness to come to terms with Germany.176This ‘liberality’ towards a former enemy, so lacking in many French politicians, was what Briand brought to international politics. It was to be so important in future years. Between April and October 1925 negotiations took place, first between Britain and France, and then including Germany. Throughout this time, Chamberlain was a conciliator, urging the Germans to behave generously towards the French, while Briand coaxed French public opinion.177 He told Crewe, ‘You will see how in Berlin as in Paris I am trying to play the part of the “honest broker”, perhaps even a little more honestly than the author [Bismarck] of that famous phrase.’178 Belgium was also watching what happened between France and Britain. But it would clearly participate in a settlement. In fact, the anxiety of the Belgian foreign minister caused Chamberlain to minute: ‘What a pity it is that European statesmen in general are not gardeners. If only they would realise that it is inexpedient to dig plants up every day in order to see if they are properly planted. I should have hoped better things from a Minister of Foreign Affairs who is also Minister of Agriculture!’179 Chamberlain himself was a keen gardener.180 From April, the Cabinet discussed an Anglo-French response to the German proposals, mainly through a committee of interested parties: Chamberlain, Baldwin, Cecil, Balfour, Hoare, Amery and Churchill. The attendance of these latter two might have led to further attempts to sabotage a pact, but, instead, they played a

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constructive part in discussions. The principles upon which Britain was prepared to make a pact had already been laid down. By April 1925, the stage of airing fundamental disagreements had passed. The fears of Amery and Churchill were also, perhaps, eased by Chamberlain’s continual assertion to France that Britain could commit itself to an agreement relating only to the Rhineland area, not the German-Polish frontier.181 However, the most significant and time-consuming problem was France’s desire for Britain to sign an arbitration agreement, rather than simply providing territorial guarantees. This was flagged by the Foreign Office as unacceptable: it involved differences that might occur throughout the world rather than just Europe, and would apply to, for example, Egypt, a country where Britain reserved its right to act alone.182 Contrary to Amery’s opinion that Chamberlain was unaware of the issue’s importance,183 he devoted much time to arguing Britain’s case with the Quai d’Orsay. Chamberlain made no attempt to follow France; Briand accepted Britain’s position; and, on 8 June, Britain approved France’s welcoming response to the German proposal.184 Less time-consuming, but potentially more publicly damaging, was the question of when Britain might have to fight. Both the Cabinet and the C ID 185 knew that public opinion focused on this following the publication of a White Paper on the proposed pact.186 The opinion of Cecil Hurst, the Foreign Office’s legal adviser, was that in most cases, Britain’s liabilities were clear; but the situation was ambiguous where a conflict arose from a German attack on Poland, which France sought to frustrate by entering the Rhineland. However, Britain already had responsibilities as a member of the League. If Germany attacked Poland, it was likely Britain would be involved under Article 16 of the Covenant, which provided for action against aggressors. Hurst said that if France attacked Germany in such an event, Britain would not be bound to assist France, but it would be extremely difficult for Germany to claim the pact’s protection as the initial aggressor. Hurst’s final conclusion, however, was not a legal one: on the grounds that Britain was interested in preserving France’s eastern border, the details of the dispute might not matter if France were attacked; if the Rhine frontier was so important to Britain, it should be defended whatever the precise circumstances.187 This, of course, would mean that in a security pact relating to the Franco-German border, Britain would acquire an unwritten, informal, yet very real interest in ensuring that France and

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Germany did not fight over Poland. Nobody openly admitted this at the time, and Chamberlain never confronted the issue directly: one can only assume that it was believed that pacifying western Europe would create a more general atmosphere of stability which no country would be willing to undermine. There is certainly evidence to support this in the way in which the Locarno agreements were received, and the way in which ‘Locarno diplomacy’ was subsequently conducted.188 Furthermore, Germany’s commitment to arbitration treaties regarding eastern border revision would also make such a conflict less likely. Some of these criticisms were voiced in the Daily Chronicle, the Daily Herald and the Daily Express, the latter writing, ‘It is a War Pact involving the lives of our sons and even our grandsons, and putting them in imminent peril of death [...]’. Others supported a pact. The Times emphasised Britain’s strong interest in Europe; but it was also pleased that Britain’s commitment was limited to fighting after the failure or rejection of arbitration, and that there was no involvement in Germany’s eastern border. The Daily Telegraph wrote on 19 June that Chamberlain had limited British involvement, and praised him for doing so. The same day, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News were noncommittal on the pact, although the latter criticised Chamberlain for not getting France to agree to measures of disarmament.189 In a Commons debate on 24 June, Chamberlain countered concerns about over-commitment by emphasising Britain’s existing responsibilities under the League’s Covenant. He came in for a rougher time than previously; MacDonald continued to defend the Protocol and Lloyd George feared over-commitment. Many Labour MPs disagreed with pacts, as opposed to security provided by the League. There was also Conservative opposition: Ellis AshmeadBartlett (North Hammersmith) was a lone voice, but must have spoken for many of his colleagues when he said Britain should stay on Europe’s sidelines until the balance of power was threatened.190It was against arguments of this nature that Chamberlain’s emphasis on the fear existing in Europe was used successfully, and he soon wrote to his sister, Ida, ‘[...] I have won the battle here 191 After this debate, so that Britain’s guarantee should not be frustrated by a complicated consultation process, Chamberlain tried to ensure action could be taken against an obvious aggressor without waiting for the League’s permission. His aim here, as he told the

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Cabinet, was to see that, while Britain was not required to fight without the League’s say so, it was allowed to fight without delay in certain circumstances. This was essential in order to calm France, by avoiding the possibility of the German army reaching Paris while the League deliberated in Geneva. But it meant ignoring the opinions of Hurst, Lampson and Bennett at the Foreign Office, and taking a line only endorsed by Chamberlain and Tyrrell (who had taken over as Permanent Under-Secretary on Crowe’s death). At a meeting on 22 July with these four,192 Chamberlain insisted that both this, and the maintenance of a demilitarised Rhineland, were vital to French security. The draft treaty agreed between Chamberlain and Briand on 12 August included both provisos. Even so, Britain was to be the arbiter of the use of its armed forces, and France could not force it to fight without recourse to the League.193 Meanwhile, in July, there had been a terse Cabinet debate on disarmament. Cecil was the only member of the Cabinet who seriously believed disarmament to be practical at this time, and he tried to place the issue on the agenda.194 He was rebuffed by, among others, Chamberlain, who wrote, ‘There can be no reduction without security.’195 As we shall see later, disarmament was very much a long-term issue for Chamberlain.196 While inter-allied discussions took place, Chamberlain talked to Germany. Stresemann attempted to secure colonial concessions,197 which Chamberlain resisted, in part because he ‘[...] thought that the mass of Germans were indifferent to colonies [...]’.198 But he also opposed concessions because he felt Germany had a bad record of relations with indigenous populations in colonies, and because it had in the past used its colonial status to justify possessing a strong navy.199More problematic was Germany’s raising of war guilt and the evacuation of Cologne, which particularly antagonised Chamberlain, since it had been accepted from the first that these questions would not be discussed along with security. And, in July, agreement was threatened by Berlin’s provocative reply to the French response to its original proposal. This included general references to treaty revision and raised questions relating to the occupation of Cologne. Chamberlain was prompted to write angrily to D’Abernon, ‘Thinking only of the party position in Germany they published an election manifesto and addressed it to the French government.’ If the German government was indeed posturing for the benefit of German public opinion, it was helped by French agreement to complete evacuation of the Ruhr

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in early August;200 then, the Germans ceased to be disruptive. Nevertheless, having calmed France, Chamberlain was later to try to calm Germany by assisting with treaty revision.201 After Britain and France had agreed their draft treaty, it was possible for a meeting of jurists at the Foreign Office to be arranged for early September.202 The Italian government, which had been watching closely, indicated its wish to participate. This was initially rejected by France on the grounds that Italy was not committed to signing a pact; but when it became clear Mussolini wished to be a guarantor should a pact result, the Italians were allowed to attend.203 Cham berlain was not involved with the jurists, and their recommendations were dealt with by him and his opposite numbers at Locarno. At the end of September, Germany was invited to attend a conference at Locarno to discuss a final agreement.204 Chamberlain went ‘[...] in a spirit of sober hopefulness.’ He felt that the Polish question would be the most difficult one, although he would do no more than ‘[...] show an interest in the success of the eastern negotiations [...]’.205

THE LOCARNO AGREEMENTS

The conference made a positive start with agreements on Franco-German and Belgian-German arbitration, and on provision for arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland/Czechoslovakia. However, Article 6 of the proposed treaty, a French guarantee of Germany’s eastern agreements, proved another matter. Luther said this could not be accepted ‘[...] by any representatives of Germany.’ Chamberlain pointed out that France could not renege upon existing agreements, but Luther would not accept this; both he and Chamberlain feared for the conference’s future.206 Next day, though, Briand met Luther informally, and believed agreement might be possible, as the Germans seemed to be less bothered now about the guarantee of Poland than about Article 16 of the League’s Covenant. This provided for involvement of member states in coercive action by the League. Germany held that since it was disarmed to a low level, it should not be boilnd to participate in the same way as other members.207 Meanwhile, Chamberlain asked the British delegation at Locarno to draft alternatives to Article 6, so that options for compromise could be placed on the table.208

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The solution felt to be most hopeful by Lampson, who coordinated the delegation’s discussion, was not used. It is, however, interesting, because it was the only time during any of the security negotiations, that anyone on the British side envisaged a role for the League. This involved Germany and Poland making an arbitration agreement, to include referral to the League’s Council. In this case, French troops would be put at the League’s disposal, to be used in the event of aggression by either side.209 For the Foreign Office, a powerful League was acceptable as long as it did not bind Britain. However, French and German lawyers made headway on Article 6 - by expanding Article 2, which allowed for circumstances in which signatories would not be prevented from fighting each other, but did not create the same problems for Stresemann and Luther as specific reference to a French guarantee of eastern arbitration treaties.210 According to Stresemann, full acceptance by Germany of the League’s Article 16 was now the major problem.211 On this point, Britain and France maintained that Germany must be bound by the same requirements as other League members. Cham berlain emphasised the importance of the League to British public opinion. A day later, there seems to have been no desperation on Chamberlain’s part, as he wrote optimistically of the German attitude. Meanwhile, Lampson wrote, ‘[...] Even those ravening wolves, the reporters, have apparently succumbed to the atmosphere of general contentment [...].’ In this atmosphere, a solution was found: a declaration was to be made that each League member had to help enforce Article 16 ‘[...] dans un mesure qui soit compatible avec sa situation militaire et qui tienne compte de sa position geographique.’212 All that remained to be covered were the eastern arbitration treaties, which Chamberlain told Tyrrell were ‘[...] dealt with by means of informal conversation amongst those concerned’. Chamberlain’s role in this is unclear, but Hurst certainly took part, since Chamberlain told Tyrrell, T believe that Hurst spoke the decisive word in the German-Polish negotiations [...]’. Rather mysteriously, he added, ‘[...] you know, I think, the instructions which I gave him [...]’.213 There is no apparent record of what these were. A last minute attempt by Germany to extract concessions from Chamberlain and Briand over Cologne and disarmament failed. Both maintained that these must be treated separately from security, although they eased Stresemann’s position by agreeing to a process

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to bring about evacuation - this involved Germany complying with its obligations, and meant no compromise.214 The episode probably never threatened the chances of agreement. Certainly, Luther was not diverted by a telegram from a prominent German Nationalist, telling him to do no more than bring proposals back to Germany. Luther responded, Tell him to “Kiss my a—” [in English] I mean to sign’.215 The Locarno Agreements were approved by the conference on 15 October,216 with signing planned for London in December, after formal approval by the respective parliaments.217 Britain was now pledged to fight France or Germany if either attacked the other, or crossed into the Rhineland; Germany had agreed to join the League, accepted its border with France, and agreed to arbitrate on revision of its eastern frontiers. In Parliament, Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald welcomed Locarno, albeit voicing concerns, the former over Dominion consultation, and the latter over the response of the Soviet Union.218 There was some suggestion by cartoonists, that the ‘Locarno Spirit’ might be now applied to domestic issues,219 and even the Daily Mail\ generally critical of the government, supported Locarno.220 One Conservative backbencher, Cuthbert Headlam, grudgingly praised Chamberlain for succeeding where ‘[...] clever men might have failed [...]’ - Chamberlain’s supposed limitations of correctness and straight dealing had proved vital.221 Meanwhile, The Times was enthusiastic, attributing Locarno to Cham berlain’s generous personality.222 His role in Locarno was recognised by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize.223 And, despite the views of his brother, who preferred to stay away from honours as Radical Joe would have wished,224 he was made a Knight of the Garter. Now, after Locarno’s failure, and a further world war, it is easy to overlook the hope with which it was greeted. Three examples illustrate this: writing on 16 December, Balfour told Chamberlain, ‘The Great War ended in November 1918. The Great Peace did not begin till Oct. 1925 [...].’225 In France, although there was some scepticism among politicians, the general public greeted it with great enthusiasm, and the Chamber of Deputies endorsed Locarno by 413 to 71 votes (with 60 abstentions): France was already more calm about its security.226 Later in December, a large thanksgiving service was held at the Cathedral of St John the Divine in New York.227 High praise indeed.

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe THE DOMINIONS AND LOCARNO

How did the Empire respond to Locarno? In June 1925, Mackenzie King said that Canada was not party to the proposed pact.228 Bruce, the Australian Prime Minister, also made it clear his country could not sign, and Smuts did the same for South Africa in July. Mackenzie King’s statement does not seem to have caused a stir in the Cabinet. In July, a CID discussion on the Dominions’ position towards the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee passed without controversy, and resulted in a decision to allow the Dominions to opt-in if they wished, reflecting Chamberlain’s view that the Dominions should not restrict Britain’s freedom of action.229 This was approved without comment by the Cabinet.230 It was only in November that the Cabinet formulated a line to be used in response to parliamentary questions: Britain had hoped to have a conference before the Protocol was rejected, but this had not proved possible. The Cabinet also said it would prefer individual Dominions not to discuss Locarno until broad questions of imperial defence and foreign policy were discussed at an Imperial Conference, thus preserving a measure of Imperial unity.231 In New Zealand, however, there was a feeling that European security was far more important than imperial bureaucracy in preserving world peace, and that the whole Empire should share Britain’s European burden.232 It was therefore willing to sign quickly; but, despite its eagerness to do so, it was persuaded to accept the British view that such a move should only be made after the next Imperial Conference.233 As time wore on, it became clear that no Dominion government, other than that of New Zealand, wished to sign.

CONCLUSION

Chamberlain soon wrote that his main achievement was that Germany now knew ‘[...] that her security lies in our friendship with France not in dividing France & us.’234 He felt it was his own policy that had led to the success of Locarno; and he was right. He and Worthington-Evans were the only members of the Cabinet who had consistently argued for a British commitment to European security. His early support for an Anglo-French pact, was much less important to him than is thought,235 and he was able to adapt his position

67

Calming France

towards Germany since he advocated an Anglo-French agreement as a strategy, rather than a principle. He can thus be labelled, in the same way as his brother, an appeaser. However, whereas Neville Chamberlain appeased Germany, Austen made the minimum concessions necessary to France, in order to stop it wrecking a more general policy of conciliation aimed at restoring Germany to the Concert of Europe. But what next? Clearly, Germany had to fulfil its pledge to enter the League, and Chamberlain was adamant in Parliament on 18 November that *[...] we regard Locarno, not as the end of the work of appeasement and reconciliation, but as its beginning.’236There was the possibility that he might be carried away by Locarno’s good reception; Cecil wrote to Salisbury, ‘I hope Locarno will not give Austen [a] swelled head.’237 But, in fact, Chamberlain kept his feet on the ground and was far from optimistic, writing to Ida Chamberlain on 31 October 1925, ‘[...] I am frightened by [...] the thought of the reaction & disappointments that are bound to come.’238 Only time would tell whether or not France had been calmed. It was now time to calm Germany, and turn attention to the League.

N O TE S 1. FO 371/10756, C 3539/3539/18: AC minute, 19 March 1925. 2. For the short-term manifestation of this, see Stephanie C. Salzmann, “‘The Overestimation of a Treaty”. British Realpolitik and the Myth of the Rapallo Treaty, 1922-34’ (Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1994), pp. 66-70. For the long­ term tradition, see Paul’W. Schroeder, ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, HJ\ 19, 1 (1976), pp. 223-43. 3. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: the dilemma o f British defence policy in the era o f the two world wars (1972), pp. 74-95. 4. Anne Orde, Great Britain and International Security, 1 9 2 0 -1 9 2 6 (1978), pp. 209-10. Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (1972), p. 379 5. Correlli Barnett, The Collapse o f British Power (1974), p. 332. 6. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994), pp. 264-5, 273. 7. Frank Magee, “‘Limited Liability”? Britain and the Treaty of Locarno’, TCBH\ 6, 1 (1995), pp. 1-22. Erik Goldstein, ‘The evolution of British diplomatic strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925’, in Michael L. Dockrill and B. J. C. McKercher (eds), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1951 (1996), pp. 115-35. 8. BBK C/51: Beaverbrook to Borden, 29 April 1925. 9. Marks, Illusion o f Peace p. 62. 10. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy pp. 12-13, 16-17. Orde, Britain and International Security pp. 71-8; Maisel, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy p. 158. See, also,

68

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe Dutton, Chamberlain pp. 238-41; Douglas Johnson, ‘Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements’, UBHJ\ VIII (1962), pp. 62-81; David Carlton, ‘Great Britain and the League Council Crisis of 1926’, HJ\ XI (1968), pp. 355, 363; P. G. Edwards, ‘AngloTtalian Relations, 1924-1929’, (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1971), p. 260. In ‘Britain and the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, 1925-26’,JCH, 4, 2 (1969), p. 164, John P. Fox notes that Chamberlain’s attitude to the IAMCC is an exception to this perception. He does not, however, look further into the implications of this. Maurice Alfred Gerothwohl (ed.), An Ambassador o f Peace: Lord D ’A bernon’s Diary, Volume III, The Years o f Recovery, January 1 9 2 4 -October 1926 (1930), pp. 21-6. See, also, Baldwin 219, Daily Express, 16 June 1926. In a cartoon, Chamberlain was depicted as a member of a fashion parade: ‘A two peace model from Geneva. Designed entirely on French lines. (Maison Briand).’ Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time p. 307. FO 800/257/352-5: AC to Crewe, 20 Feb. 1925. Philip Towle, ‘British Security and Disarmament Policy in Europe in the 1920s’, in, R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke, and M. Howard (eds), The Quest for Stability: Problems o f West European Security, 1 9 1 8 -1 9 5 7 (1993), pp. 127-53. Dutton, Chamberlain pp. 239-40, says that Chamberlain differed from colleagues on this, but does not develop the point. Cmd. 2273: League of Nations Fifth Assembly - Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments. League o f Nations Journal o f Fifth Assembly, 29 (3 Oct. 1924), pp. 352-3. Cmd. 2289: League of Nations Fifth Assembly, Report of British Delegates relating to Protocol for Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. For a contemporary defence of the Protocol, see P. J. Noel Baker, The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement o f International Disputes (1925). Maisel, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy pp. 135-7. PRO, Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/168, CP 481(24): FO memorandum, ‘France and the Geneva Protocol’, 9 Nov. 1924. FO 800/256/279: Churchill to AC, 1 Dec. 1924. FO 800/256/380: AC to Churchill, 15 Dec. 1924. Martin Gilbert, Prophet o f Truth: Winston S. Churchill, 1922-1939 (1976), pp. 79-82. AC 52/180: AC to Crewe, 15 Jan. 1925. Baldwin 115, ff. 57-9: Joynson-Hicks to Baldwin, 2 March 1925. CAB 24/168, CP 481(24): FO memorandum, 9 Nov. 1924. For the steel cartel, see, FO 371/11329, C 11342/9063/18: M. H. Huxley memorandum, 20 Oct. 1926. For the commercial agreement, see, FO 371/ 11260 and 11261, File C 40/18. AC 50/2: AC to Crewe, 14 Nov. 1924. See below pp. 176-7. PRO, Foreign Office Papers, Series 371, Volume 10584, W 10911/783/28: AC minute, 18 Dec. 1924. See below pp. 231-6. J. C. Cairns, ‘A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France, 1919-1940’, AHR> 79 (1974), pp. 710-43. Stephen A. Schuker, The End o f French Predominance in Europe (1976), pp. 251-4. Quoted in, Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Memoirs o f a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, 1 9 10-1937 {1969), p. 143. PRO, William Tyrrell Correspondence, FO 800/220/238-245: Charles Mendl to Tyrrell, 6 Nov. 1924. FO 800/256/16-18: Crewe to AC, 9 Nov. 1924. AC 52/180: AC to Crewe, 15 Jan. 1925.

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69

33. FO 371/10571, W 9974/134/98: Crowe memorandum, 17 Nov. 1924. CAB 4/12, 540-B: FO memorandum by Campbell, 20 Nov. 1924. 34. FO 800/256/106-108: AC to Cecil, 19 Nov. 1925. 35. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1918-1939, First Series, Vol. XXVI (1985), no. 608: Memorandum of conversation between AC and Herriot, 5 Dec. 1924. 36. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): 190th CID, 4 Dec. 1924. 37. League o f Nations OfficialJournal, 6, 2 (Feb. 1925), pp. 124-6. 38. Although, as President, Baldwin was formally chair, he told the committee that he did not plan to attend every meeting. By asking Curzon to summate at points throughout the meeting, he was effectively giving him the role, and the minutes list Curzon as chairman. 39. Lloyd-Greame’s name changed to Cunliffe-Lister towards the end of 1925 when his wife inherited the Swinton estate in Yorkshire. See, J. A. Cross, Lord Swinton (1982), p. v. 40. AC 6/1/563: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 10 Oct. 1924. 41. AC 6/1/613: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 27 March 1925. Hankey 1/7, Diary: 22 March 1925. 42. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): 195th CID, 13 Feb. 1925. 43. AC 39/2/35: AC to D’Abernon, 11 Sept. 1930. NC 18/1/475: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 7 March 1925. Amery Diaries p. 399: 4 March 1925. 44. See below pp. 147 and 172. 45. CAB 4/12, 536 and 537-B: Board of Trade and Treasury memoranda, 24 and 26 Nov. 1926. 46. He suggested this in a letter to Hankey, who replied that Baldwin was considering the matter and that others had raised it. Add. MS 51088 ff. 22-23: Cecil and Hankey correspondence, 1 Dec. 1924. 47. House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, G/7/1/3: H. A. L. Fisher to Lloyd George, 20 March 1925. 48. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): 192nd CID, 16 Dec. 1924. 49. Churchill and The Times were also aware of the climate in France. CAB 23/49, CC 2(25): 15 Jan. 1925. The Times, 3 Feb. 1925, p. 13. 50. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): Report of Geneva Protocol Sub-Committee, 13 and 19 Feb. 1925. 51. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, Vol. XXVII, (1986), no. 180: AC minute, 4 Jan. 1925. 52. The Times, 3 Nov. 1924, p. 15. 53. CAB 23/49, CC 1(25): 5 Jan. 1925. 54. FO 371/11065, W 2035/9/98: Nicolson memorandum and minute, 26 Jan. 1925; AC minute, undated. 55. Of the League of Nations. 56. FO 371/11064, W 1252/9/98: AC minute, 21 Feb. 1925. 57. For example, FO 371/10727, C 1143/459/18: Lampson and Crowe minutes, 27 Jan. 1925. FO 371/10728, C 3097/459/18: Lampson minute, 4 March 1925. 58. Maisel, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy p. 137. Schuker, End o f French Predominance pp. 251-54. 59. F. G. Stambrook, u‘Das Kind”: Lord D’Abemon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact’, Central European History, 1 (1968), p. 253. NC 2/21: Diary, 22 Oct. 1925. D’Abernon Papers, B. L., Add. MS 48936 ff. 204-205: D’Abernon to Lady D’Abemon, 2 Dec. 1925. Salzmann, ‘British Realpolitik and Rapallo’, p. 70.

70 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 189: D’Abernon to AC, 20 Jan. 1925. FO 371/10726, C 980/459/18: Crowe minute, 22 Jan. 1925. DBFP i I, XXVII, no. 194: D ’Abemon to AC, 29 Jan. 1925. DBFP ; I, XXVII, nos. 197 and 198: D’Abemon to AC, 10 Feb. 1925; Crewe to AC, 12 Feb. 1925. In this note, he made his famous comment on the Polish Corridor, ‘[...] for which no British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier DBFP i I, XXVII, no. 200: AC to Crewe, 16 Feb. 1925. Add. MS 48927A ff. 161-62: D’Abernon to Grahame, 8 March 1925. DBFP ; I, XXVII, no. 181: D’Abernon to AC, 7Jan. 1925. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 185: FO memorandum, 15 Jan. 1925. This statement was rejected by the FO historical adviser, who cited Bismarck as an honourable German statesman. See, DBFP\ I, XXVII, no. 186, n. 2: Headlam-Morley notes, 16 Jan. 1925. DBFP ; I, XXVII, no. 188: AC to Crewe, 20 Jan. 1925. AC 52/378: AC to the King, 9 Feb. 1925. Quoted in Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man o f Secrets, volume II, 1919-1931 (1972), p. 396. PRO, CID Minutes, CAB 2/4, 187th CID: 28 July 1924; Hankey note of conversations with Chamberlain and Curzon, 20 Nov. 1924. There was no review of Britain’s military obligations in the light of its Locarno commitments. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (1980), p. 76. Cmd. 2458: Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Correspondence relating to the Dominions. I. C. McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale: The N aval Defence o f New Zealand, 1914-1942 (Wellington, 1981), pp. 146-53. See above pp. 23-4. FO 371/10727, C 2081/459/18. FO 371/10565, W 10990/4972/50: AC minute, 20 Dec. 1924. See also, Baldwin 93, ff. 153-5: AC to Baldwin, 20 Dec. 1924. FO 371/11065, W 2035/9/98: Campbell minutes, 28 and 29 Jan. 1925; Lampson minute, 29 Jan. 1925. CAB 23/49, CC 12(25): 2 March 1925. CAB 24/172, CP 134(25): Baldwin to Dominions, 4 March 1925. Holland, Commonwealth Alliance (1981), p. 47. See also, R. F. Holland, ‘The Commonwealth in the British Official Mind: a Study in Anglo-Dominion Relations, 1925-1937’, (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1977). David G. Williamson, The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers (1991), covers the occupation. See also, Fox, ‘Britain and IAMCC’, JCH, 4, 2 (1969), pp. 143-64. DBFP, I, XXVI, no. 727: AC to Crewe, 30 Dec. 1924. DBFP, I, XXVI, nos. 588 and 577: FO memorandum, .7 Nov. 1924; AC to Crewe, 2 Feb. 1925. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy pp. 51-2. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): 195th CID, 13 Feb. 1925. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 189 and 190: D’Abemon to AC, 20 and 23 Jan. 1925. Amery Diaries p. 399: 4 March 1925. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25): 196th CID, 19 Feb. 1925. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 205: Nicolson memorandum, 20 Feb. 1925. FO 371/10756, C 3539/3539/18: AC minute, 19 March 1925.

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71

92. AC 39/2/25: AC to D’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. This letter was followed by another, in which Chamberlain expanded upon his response to the initial German offer, Add. MS 48926B, f. 248: AC to D ’Abemon, 1 Oct. 1930. See also, AC 5/1/517: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 11 Oct. 1930 (Self, p. 356). 93. DBFP ; I, XXVII, nos. 197 and 200: D’Abemon to AC, 10 Feb. 1925; AC to Crewe, 16 Feb. 1925. 94. AC 39/2/35: AC to D’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. 95. FO 371/10756, C 3539/3539/18: AC minute, 19 March 1925. 96. DBFP ; I, XXVII, no. 189: D’Abemon to AC, 20 Jan. 1925. 97. FO 800/257/255-6 and 61-2: D’Abemon to AC 7 Feb. 1925; AC to D ’Abemon, 9Jan. 1925. 98. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 207: Crewe to AC, 22 Feb. 1925. 99. Salzmann, ‘British Realpolitik and Rapallo’, abstract. 100. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 181 n.5 and 212: AC minute, 14 Jan. 1925; AC to Grahame, 26 Feb. 1925. 101. FO 800/258/566-567: Gwynne to AC, 8 Oct. 1925. 102. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 216: D’Abernon to AC, 1 March 1925. 103. CAB 24/172, CP 105(25). 104. Baldwin 115, ff. 57-9: Joynson-Hicks to Baldwin, 2 March 1925. 105. CAB 24/172, CP 116, 118 and 121(25): General Staff Paper, 26 Feb. 1925; Churchill memorandum, 24 Feb. 1925; Hoare memorandum, 27 Feb. 1925. 106. CAB 24/172, CP 136(25): Draft communication to Drummond, undated. 107. CAB 23/49, CC 12(25): 2 March 1925. 108. Amery Diaries p. 399: 2 March 1925. 109. AC 39/2/35: AC to D’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. 110. AC 5/1/347: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 1 March 1925 (Self, p. 274). 111. AC 5/1/347: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 1 March 1925 (Self, p. 247). 112. AC 52/240: Crowe to AC, 12 March 1925. 113. AC 39/2/35: AC to D’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. 114. NC 18/1/475: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 7 March 1925. 115. AC 39/2/35: AC to D’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. NC 18/1/475: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain 7 March 1925. Amery Diaries p. 399: 4 March 1925. The Chamberlains note a change of heart by Curzon and Balfour; Amery only refers to Curzon. 116. CAB 23/49, CC 14(25): 4 March 1925. 117. Amery Diaries^. 399: 4 March 1925. 118. Quoted in, Roskill, Hankey, Vol. //p . 396. 119. NC 18/1/475: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 7 March 1925. 120. AC 6/1/602: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 10 March 1925. 121. The Times, 2 March 1925, p. 15; 4 March 1925, p. 15. 122. Hansard, 5th Series, 181, col. 707. 123. Baldwin 60, ff. 175-83: Baldwin to the King, 6 March 1925. 124. Hansard, 5th Series, 181, cols. 1430-74: 11 March 1925. McNeill said that if all treaties were laid before Parliament, valuable time would be spent on items such as the recent arrangement with Switzerland for the exchange of hotel waiters. 125. M. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1925 (1926), pp. 29-30. Labour fears arose from Chamberlain’s statement that the government did not consider itself bound by its predecessor’s pledge to lay all treaties before Parliament. See, Hansard, 5th Series, 181, col. 565: 15 Dec. 1924. 126. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 224 and 225: AC to Crowe, 7 March 1925. 127. Rather than approach ministers direct while abroad, a foreign secretary did so via the FO.

72 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134.

135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 227: AC to Crowe, 8 March 1925. Johnson, ‘Chamberlain and Locarno ‘, UBHJ\ p. 74. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy p. 20. K. Middlemas andj. Barnes, Stanley Baldwin (1969), p. 352. Add. MSS 48926B f. 242: AC to D ’Abemon, 11 Sept. 1930. AC 52/241: AC to Crowe, undated. In a letter of 15 March to his wife, Chamberlain mentioned a ‘wire’ to Baldwin. However, the subject was his resignation; and he says in the letter that the wire was a ‘message’, which surely refers to the threat sent via Crowe. This interpretation is backed up by Chamberlain’s later recollection, albeit in 1933, that he replied to Crowe’s first letter with a message for Baldwin via Crowe. See, AC 6/1/603: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 15 March 1925 and AC 35/1/23: AC to Selby, 25 Jan. 1933. The only apparent evidence of a cable to Baldwin at this time appears in Foreign Office Papers. This related to the circulation of Nicolson’s pact memorandum to the Dominions and a summary is at FO 371/10728, C 3298/459/18: it is undated but appears between documents dated 7 March, the second of which was not received until 9 March. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. 7/p. 263. Dutton, Chamberlain p. 244. Goldstein, ‘British diplomatic strategy’, in Dockrill and McKercher (eds), p. 132. Sibyl Eyre Crowe, ‘Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno Pact’, EHR, 87 (1972), pp. 49-74. AC 52/240: Crowe to AC, 12 March 1925. Bridgeman Diaries p. 182. AC 52/241: AC to Crowe, undated. AC 52/80: Baldwin to AC, 12 March 1925. Baldwin 115, ff. 63-65: Crowe to Baldwin, 14 March 1925. AC 52/244: Crowe to AC, 15 March 1925. AC 6/1/603: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 15 March 1925. AC 6/1/606 and 740: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 23 March 1925 and 16 Feb. 1929. AC 35/1/23: AC to Selby, 25 Jan. 1933. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. //p . 264. F. G. Stambrook, ‘The Foreign Secretary and Foreign Policy: the Experiences of Austen Chamberlain in 1925 and 1927’, IRHPS ' VI (1969), pp. 109-27. Orde, Britain and International Security pp. 93-7. Magee, ‘Britain and the Treaty of Locarno’, TCBH (1995), pp. 14-15. AC 6/1/605: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 19 March 1925. CAB 23/49, CC 17(25): 20 March 1925. LNOJ, 6, 4 (April 1925), pp. 446-50. Cmd. 2368: Statement Respecting Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Geneva, 12 March, 1925. DBFP ; I, XXVII, nos. 225, 251, 255: AC to Crowe, 7 March 1925; AC memorandum, 16 March 1925; AC to D’Abernon, 16 March 1925. FO 371/10729, C 3975/459/18: AC minute, 26 March 1925. See also, DBFP\ I, XXVII, no. 255: AC to D’Abernon, 18 March 1925. DBFP ; I, XXVII, no. 251: AC memorandum, 16 March 1925. FO 371/10737, C 9994/459/18: FO minutes, 29 July 1925. DAbernon’s Diary, Vol. I l l p. 170. Hansard, 5th Series, 182, cols. 307, 347, 337-8 and 322. Petrie, Chamberlain, Vol. I I pp. 270-1.

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160. FO 371/10730, C 5414/459/18: AC minute, 22 April 1925. 161. FO 800/258/556-557: AC to D’Abemon, 30 Sept. 1925. 162. NC 2/21: Diary, 22 Oct. 1925. AC 5/1/515: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Sept. 1930 (Self, p. 354). 163. Salzmann, ‘British Realpolitik and Rapallo’, pp. 72-3. 164. See below, Chapter Five. 165. AC 52/158: AC to Churchill, 5 June 1925. 166. AC 6/1/627: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 10 Dec. 1925. 167. Caims, ‘Nation of Shopkeepers’, AHR, 79 (1974), pp. 726-7. 168. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series IA, Vol. I (1966), no. 236: AC to D’Abernon, 2 Feb. 1926. 169. Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 5 : FrenchCzechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (1961), p. 379. 170. DBFP, IA, I, n. 236: AC to D’Abernon, 2 Feb. 1926. 171. FO 800/257/222-4: D’Abernon to AC, 31 Jan. 1925. 172. DBFP,i I, XXVII, no. 509: AC memorandum, 2 Oct. 1925. 173. That is, French agreements with Germany’s eastern neighbours. 174. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies p. 388. Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight o f the French Eastern Alliance, 1926-36: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the remilitarization o f the Rhineland (1988), p. 157. 175. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies p. 368. Wandycz, Twilight o f the French Eastern Alliance p. 25. 176. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series IA, Vol. V (1973), no. 292: AC to Tyrrell, 18 Dec. 1928. 177. DBFP\ I, XXVII, nos. 283 and 313: AC to D’Abemon, 2 April and 7 May

1925. 178. FO 800/257/483: AC to Crewe, 2 April 1925. 179. FO 371/10732, C 7066/459/18: AC minute, 28 May 1925. 180. Chamberlain, Down the Years pp. 6, 292-306. Brent Elliott, ‘A Political Family’, The Garden: The Journal o f the Royal Horticultural Society, 117, 1 (Jan. 1992), pp. 37-9. 181. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 321, 343 and 349: AC memorandum, 14 May 1925; Notes of Cabinet Committee, 26 May 1925; AC to Crewe, 28 May 1925. 182. FO 371/10731, C 6493/459/18: Sterndale Bennett minute, 14 May 1925. 183. Amery Diaries p. 412: 26 May 1925. 184. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 343 and 365: Minutes of Cabinet Committee, 26 May 1925; AC to D’Abernon, 9 June 1925. 185. CAB 24/174, CP 322(25): 201st CID, 1July 1925. 186. Cmd. 2435: Proposals for Pact of Security, made by German Government, 9 Feb. 1925. 187. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 385: Hurst memorandum, 18 June 1925. 188. See below, Chapters Four and Five. 189. FO 371/10734, C 8447, 8263 and 8258/459/18: The Times, 18June 1925, p. 17. 190. Hansard, 5th Series, 185, cols. 1652-68, 1570, 1584-96 and 1614. 191. AC 5/1/347: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 1 March 1925 (Self, p. 274). 192. FO 371/10736, C 9784/459/18: Minutes of FO Meeting, 22 July 1925. 193. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 438, 439 and 440: Meeting between reps, of GB and France, 11 Aug. 1925; AC to D’Abernon, 11 Aug. 1925; Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, 12 Aug. 1925. 194. Dick Richardson, The Evolution o f British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (1989), p. 27.

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195. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 414: AC memorandum, 16 July 1925. 196. See below, Ch. 6. 197. Andrew J. Crozier, The Colonial Question in Stresemann’s Locarno Policy’, International History Review, IV, 1 (Feb. 1982), pp. 37-54, demonstrates this was important to Stresemann. Chamberlain responded that if Germany joined the League, it could apply for mandates in the same way as all other members. In fact, none was available, and none was likely to be. 198. FO 800/256/278: AC to F. D. Lugard (Mandates Commission), 1 Dec. 1924. 199. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 336: AC to D’Abemon, 21 May 1925. 200. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 429, 431 and 433: AC and D’Abemon correspondence, 28 and 30 July and 6 Aug. 1925. 201. See below, Ch. 5. 202. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 466: Hurst Report on Meeting ofJurists, 1-4 Sept. 1925. 203. FO 371/10739, C 11158/459/18 and C 11220/459/18: FO minutes, 28 and 29 Aug. 1925. P. G. Edwards, ‘Britain, Mussolini and the “Locamo-Geneva System’”, JCH, 10 (1980), pp. 1-16. Sally Marks, ‘Mussolini and Locamo: Fascist Foreign Policy in Microcosm’, JCH, 14 (1979), pp. 423-39. 204. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 493: AC to D’Abemon, 26 Sept. 1925. 205. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 509: AC memorandum, 2 Oct. 1925. 206. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 516 and 518: AC to Tyrrell, 5 Oct. 1925; AC notes, 6 Oct. 1925. 207. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 519: AC to Tyrrell, 7 Oct. 1925. 208. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 520: Lampson memorandum, 7 Oct. 1925. 209. Ibid. 210. DBFP, I, XXVII no. 522 and Appendix, no. 7: AC to Tyrrell, 8 Oct. 1925; Notes of conversation of British Delegation at Locamo. 211. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 522: AC to Tyrrell, 8 Oct. 1925. See also, Eric Sutton (ed.), Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries , Letters, and Papers, Volume II (1937), pp. 172-8. 212. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 523, 528, 529 and 532 n. 2: AC to Tyrrell, 8 Oct. 1925; AC notes, 9 Oct. 1925; Lampson to Tyrrell, 9 Oct. 1925; AC to Tyrrell, 12 Oct. 1925. 213. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 532: AC to Tyrrell, 12 Oct. 1925. AC 4/1/1265: AC to Mary Chamberlain, 18 Oct. 1925, enclosing copy of letter to Tyrrell of same date. 214. DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 547 and Appendix, no. 14: AC to Tyrrell, 16 Oct. 1925; Meeting between Heads of British, French and German Delegations at Locamo, 15 Oct. 1925. The Cologne zone was eventually evacuated soon after, in Jan. 1926. 215. NC 2/21: Diary, 22 Oct. 1925. This was NC’s note of a conversation with Austen. 216. Cmd. 2525: Final Protocol of Locamo Conference, 1925. 217. DBFP, I, XXVII, nos. 534 and 543: AC to Tyrrell, 13 and 15 Oct. 1925. 218. Hansard, 5th Series, 188, cols. 454-7 and 437-42. 219. See, for example, Baldwin 218: Western Mail, 5 Dec. 1925. 220. Baldwin 56, ff. 39-64. This is a summary, probably by Conservative Central Office, of the newspaper’s editorial attitude to the government from May 1925 to Sept. 1927. 221. Headlam Diaries p. 71: 19 Oct. 1925. (Self, p. 21). 222. The Times, 17 Oct. 1925, p. 13. 223. The 1925-26 prizes were shared by Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann, and Charles Dawes.

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224. NC 18/1/511: N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1925. 225. AC 37/24: Balfour to AC, 16 Oct. 1925. 226. Georges Suarez, Briand , sa vie, son œuvre, avec son journal, VI: L'artisan de la paix, 1923-32 (Paris, 1952), p. 134. Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France’s B id for Power in Europe, 1 9 1 4 -1 9 4 0 (1995), pp. 121-2. Wandycz, Twilight o f the French Eastern Alliance p. 27. 227. AC 37/64: Order of Service. 228. CAB 23/50, CC 28(25): 10 June 1925. 229. CAB 24/174, CP 322(25): 201st CID, 1July 1925. See above p. 42. 230. CAB 23/50, CC 33(25): 3 July 1925. 231. CAB 23/51, CC 53(25): 18 Nov. 1925. 232. McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale ip. 163. 233. FO 371/10748, C 16390 and 16540/459/18: Gov. Gen. NZ to Amery, 10 and 23 Dec. 1925. 234. AC 5/1/367: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 31 Oct. 1925 (Self, pp. 281-3). 235. Indeed, Locarno has been seen as a defeat for France as it ended chances of an Anglo-French pact. See, George A. Grün, ‘Locarno: Idea and Reality’, International Affairs, 31 (1955), p. 484. 236. Hansard, 5th Series, 188, col. 420. 237. Add. MS 51085 ff. 69-70: Cecil to Salisbury, 8 Nov. 1925. 238. AC 5/1/367: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 31 O ct 1925 (Self, p. 282).

4

The League of Nations as the Concert of Europe? [...] that the first thought of Castlereagh after 1815 was to restore the Concert of Europe, & that the more ambitious peacemakers of Versailles, when they framed the Covenant, still left a gap which only a new Concert of Europe can fill. Austen Chamberlain minute, 21 Feb. 1925J

INTRODUCTION

At the height of the 1926 League Council crisis, Chamberlain described his task as like *[...] dancing among eggs.’2 This might be said of the rest of his League work, for he was much criticised in a mission he saw as pushing Britain’s ‘[...] preference for the real and the practical and the cold douche of common sense [...]’.3 This chapter considers Chamberlain’s League policies, placing them in the context of his foreign policy as a whole. It shows that he was, committed to developing the League, with the important proviso that he resisted strongly attempts to involve it in British concerns. For him the League became a way of solving those problems of the world in which Britain did not have a direct interest and which could not be settled directly between the nations concerned. Chamberlain sought to do this through a revived Concert of Europe - the system which had tackled some important nineteenth-century European problems, while leaving others alone. However, he did not believe the Great Powers should control everything, with the Council or Assembly merely rubber-stamping their decisions. Nor was this what happened; rather, the Powers lent their weight to the League so that it would be in a stronger position to make decisions. In many cases, when they might have been interested in doing so, they did not interfere at all. Where their intervention was most marked, it was

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usually at the last minute, when, without extra pressure from the Powers, the League could not enforce its wishes. Meanwhile, there was no attempt to establish spheres of influence, as might have been expected, which calls into question work which portrays the Concert as undermining the League.

BRITISH POLICY AND THE LEAGUE

What was the context in which Chamberlain worked? He inherited, at least on paper, a strong British commitment to the League, although the Foreign Office had rarely thought through the implications of this.4A general briefing written for him in April 1926 by Don Gregory of the Foreign Office, placed the League Covenant first in a list of British commitments, ahead of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. But, as Gregory pointed out, Britain’s strong commitment to the League could not be tested without British consent, for the Council would decide any action, and Britain had a veto on it under Article Five of the Covenant.5 Meanwhile, resolutions passed at Geneva in 1921 meant each nation could decide for itself how far it participated in League action.6 Furthermore, the Foreign Office had seen the League, from its inception, as a conference system, rather than an international parliament.7 Significantly, throughout 1924-29, whenever any League member tried to define more closely the type of action members were obliged to take, British representatives resisted without either serious debate or questions in the Foreign Office or Cabinet. Only Cecil was an exception to this, and then not a persistent one. So, any comment on Chamberlain’s commitment to the League must be qualified by pointing out established limits on Britain’s involvement, and concerns shared by all his Cabinet colleagues. Crucially, early in Chamberlain’s term of office, this resulted in the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, which was replaced, at least in British eyes, by the Locarno Agreements. But it was not just Conservatives who opposed the Protocol, for Ramsay MacDonald, one of its authors, faced difficulties in making it attractive to his Labour Cabinet.8 There thus appears to have been a consensus between parties about limiting the League’s ability to bind Britain.

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The League’s failure to provide ‘collective security’ is usually ascribed to unrealistic expectations about its ability to deal with major problems,9 but comments on Chamberlain in particular are also generally unfavourable. His contemporaries certainly made criticisms: the League of Nations Union, a predominantly Liberal organisation which aimed to promote the League,10took the line that Chamberlain saw the League as ‘a second-class institution’, a position endorsed by Cecil.11 However, the reverse was also true. In 1929, Bridgeman, another Cabinet colleague, believed Chamberlain ‘[...] was almost entirely absorbed with League of Nations and European affairs connected with it [...]’, adding that at the 1929 general election he detected dislike of Chamberlain’s policies among Conservatives: T think they thought he was too much at Geneva, and too bent on peace propaganda to have time to study British interests all over the world.’12The implication was that Chamberlain devoted more time to the League than many Conservatives could stomach. Amery perceived this to be affecting policy: when, in 1929, he attempted to declare the Persian Gulf an area of special British interest, he recorded Chamberlain’s response as *[...] reading aloud all the various clauses of the Covenant 13 the implication being that Chamberlain gave the League too high a priority. So, there was contemporary division over Chamberlain and the League. As for the historians, Zimmem, in 1936, believed that through the commitment of Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann, the League experienced a golden age - it ‘[...] began at last to fulfil the principal regular function designed for it [...]. It became a centre for a standing Conference between the powers 14 But since the archives opened, only Beck has seen Chamberlain as a League-builder. However, his thesis argued that Chamberlain was above all else committed to developing the League: Locarno aimed at so doing, while matters that did not come before the League were kept away so as not to damage it, rather than because it could not cope with the issues.15 This overlooks Chamberlain’s concerns for French security which drove his involvement in Locarno, and his concern for keeping the lid on potential flashpoints; it is argued here that Beck’s thesis overestimates Chamberlain’s League-building. The specific criticisms historians make of Chamberlain fall into three categories. The first is that he generally lacked commitment to

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the League: T h e League to him was a part of the diplomatic system, to be used or not according as convenience might dictate.516 Secondly, he is said to have undermined it through private meetings with Briand and Stresemann. Jacobson says, ‘[...] these “Geneva tea-parties55, as they were derisively called, became far more important than the meetings of the League which occasioned them.5 Walters also takes this line, writing that because of the tea-parties, ‘[...] the actual agenda of the Council was made up of questions of third-rate importance. [...] of the greatest questions it heard nothing.5 A particular instance he cites is that of the Locarnites ensuring the Council did not consider the row between Italy and Yugoslavia, over the latter5s alleged preparations for war against Albania in March 1927.17 Finally, Chamberlain5s involvement in the Council crisis of 1926 has been seen as raising false hopes among nations aspiring to permanent Council seats, thus damaging the League5s public image, and making Spain and Brazil leave the League. Carlton blames Chamberlain5s ‘[...] pro-French outlook and his even more obsessive attachment to the candidature of Spain [...]5.18 There are general weaknesses in the cases of some of the critics. At no point do any consider how Chamberlain felt the League could be developed. Equally, they do not criticise him for adopting double-standards towards it, depending on whether the issue involved was one in which Britain had a direct interest. This point will be further developed later. Meanwhile, we should note that Walters worked for the League secretariat throughout the interwar period, and was Deputy Secretary-General in 1939-40; he wrote from a Geneva viewpoint. And Carlton5s work exhibits one failing of some historical writing on the 1920s: it begins from a viewpoint that what is important about this decade in foreign policy is that it led to the next decade, and therefore, the Second World War. The failures of the League and Locarno are thus stressed at the expense of understanding how they were built. Also, like Walters, Carlton assumes that Chamberlain failed because he did not sign up to one version or another of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance or the Geneva Protocol.19 As we saw in the last chapter, there were many reasons why British policy-makers did not adopt this Cecilian concept of security. This chapter will consider, then, not what should have been done, but why particular attitudes to the League developed.

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Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe CHAMBERLAIN’S INTENTIONS

As for Chamberlain’s intentions, initially he seemed most interested in using the League as a new Concert of Europe. After a conference of the Foreign Office’s Central Department in February 1925, Chamberlain was struck by the view of the Office’s historical adviser, J. W. Headlam-Morley, [...] that the first thought of Castlereagh after 1815 was to restore the Concert of Europe, & that the more ambitious peacemakers of Versailles, when they framed the Covenant, still left a gap which only a new Concert of Europe can fill. For this reason amongst others [...] I should rejoice to see Germany join the League & take her seat at the Council.20

In November 1926, on his installation as Rector of the University of Glasgow, Chamberlain developed this: he spoke of the special position of the Great Powers in the League, and was adamant that nothing could be achieved if the Great Powers were divided into two camps.21 In effect, he was arguing that Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan should take on the leadership of the League, while at the same time recognising the necessity of involving other nations. This is also clear from a minute written two months before, in which Cham berlain declined German proposals to pre-arrange the Assembly’s agenda on the grounds that, ‘[...] the League is an assembly of equals. There may be some who are first among their equals [...] but we, Great Powers within the League [...] know that if we do not recognise the equality of all powers, the Assembly will not recognise the primacy of the Great Powers.’22 There was also much gradualism in Chamberlain’s views. In 1927, he wrote that he wanted the League to ‘[...] develop slowly and naturally, to avoid radical changes and ambitious attempts to recast its constitution, to pray that it may not have to face a great crisis until it is much more firmly established [...]’.23 Significantly, Chamberlain was opposed to American entry, showing he had clearly thought about what would strengthen the League, and what would not. He wrote, ‘[...] I am by no means persuaded that, in the present stage of their constitutional development, the accession of the United States to the League would be of advantage to the latter.’ This was because the Senate would insist on examining every piece of League business

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in which American representatives were involved. It would tie American Council members so much that their presence at Geneva would throw the League into confusion.24 All this suggests that Chamberlain saw limits on the League, and saw the Great Powers as most important within it. But it also shows Chamberlain believed it could be developed and wanted to do so. His view of the League, then, may be summarised as ‘hopeful pessimism’ but certainly not as ‘hostile’.

A LIMITED LEAGUE

Chamberlain initially had no plan for involving the League extensively in policy. But he also saw Britain’s League policy as something to be controlled. This meant avoiding, as we saw earlier,25 attempts at interference by Cecil, who wanted special responsibility for League matters. Meanwhile, Chamberlain asserted control by ensuring that British representatives at League meetings adhered to government policy and that they were nominated by him.26 In the past, some representatives had no link with the government at all.27 He continued to keep a watchful eye on Cecil, successfully preventing him being Britain’s representative in the League’s work regarding opium. As he wrote to Cecil’s brother, [...] I must make it clear that there is only one foreign policy and only one authorised exponent of it before I can afford to send Bob to Geneva. Both in Paris and Rome I get hints, quite polite but unmistakable, that in recent years we seemed to have spoken with two voices - one at Geneva, another in the Foreign Office - and our reputation for good faith has suffered in consequence.28

This has been portrayed by McKercher as an attempt by Chamberlain to place League policy at the heart of British foreign policy. Although this is certainly true, McKercher is confused over Chamberlain’s motives. He portrays Chamberlain as someone who from the first saw the League as fundamental to British foreign policy, doing battle with Cecil, who saw it as somehow separate.29 In fact, although Chamberlain did not wish to have Cecil advancing views at Geneva different from those of the Foreign Office, the evidence suggests that, at least in 1924, Chamberlain had no schemes to use

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the League extensively. Rather, he simply wanted to assert control over foreign policy to secure ‘[...] unity in the control & representation of foreign affairs.530The merits of such a foreign policy are clear, and, given the lessons of 1919-24, it seemed vital to Chamberlain. Though Chamberlain would later come to understand exactly how the League could work, and that it could be used extensively, the Cecil episode related to foreign policy in general, rather than only to the League.

A DEVELOPING LEAGUE

There was, however, one sign of a change in Chamberlain’s general view of the League after his first direct encounter with it. At the December 1924 Council, held in Rome, he did little, since Britain’s policy on the Geneva Protocol was still being formulated. But he did tell the Council, ‘[...] I shall go back to England with an even greater respect for the League, for I have now personally seen it at work [_]’.31 One Conservative backbencher wrote later of the need, because of public opinion, to ‘[...] be polite about the League and try and believe that it really can do what its supporters urge [...]’;32 and Chamberlain’s words may well have been only public posturing. But they certainly fit in with the view that Chamberlain became more supportive of the League, the more he saw it in action. This was, admittedly, not enough to make him support the Geneva Protocol. But he was soon to tell Esme Howard, ‘[...] the League is serving a most useful purpose. I believe that if it be wisely guided, and if too much is not expected of it, or attempted by it, in its early years, it will steadily grow in strength and influence [...].’33 This is a striking example of Chamberlain the cautious conservative - a marked contrast to his father. In 1925, though, Chamberlain’s perception of the League developed further. He became impressed by the work of some of the Council’s committees, and began to feature regularly at a range of meetings. One should note that most of the work Chamberlain took on relating to committees was done by his staff; what he gave to the committees was the prestige of his presence.34 At the Minorities Committee, for example, he had a particularly good attendance record: during his term of office, he attended 24 meetings, whereas Briand and Stresemann attended only five and one respectively.35

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However, this was limited to Council committees - his participation in Assembly ones was only nominal, with other members of the British delegation attending in his place.36 Such work was something that the League, and probably only the League, could take the lead in, although Chamberlain did see limits. In August 1926, for example, he opposed the establishment of a League convention on animal welfare, favouring regulation by individual states. Cecil endorsed this attitude, but persuaded Chamberlain to allow the Assembly to look into the matter, so that Britain would not appear obstructive.37 Chamberlain’s opposition to the social and welfare activities of the League was also seen in his arguments against its involvement in children’s issues such as sex education: this, he claimed, was an issue for national governments only - if the League was involved, it would obscure the League’s real purpose.38 More importantly, Cham berlain was involved in the Greco-Bulgarian dispute. This was a frontier incident in which Greek troops entered Bulgaria on 22 October 1925, shelling the town of Petrich, after a Greek border guard had been shot by a Bulgarian counterpart three days before. In the resulting League enquiry, Chamberlain was the Council’s rapporteur on the subject, eventually becoming convinced that the whole position of the League as a deterrent to war was at stake. With regard to Chamberlain, the most important question is how far he felt the League might be able to provide a solution? Certainly, in an earlier dispute between Greece and Serbia, over the Salonica-Ghevgeli Railway, Chamberlain hoped Britain could avoid the issue, but refer it to the League if it became an acute problem.39 As regards Greco-Bulgarian problems, one possibility is that he was initially sceptical: Barros has shown how the initial instincts of both Chamberlain and Briand were to seek a solution through coordinated pressure by the French and British representatives in Sofia and Athens; Barros also argues Briand came round earlier than Chamberlain to the idea of referring the matter to the League,40 although there was little discussion of the question since Bulgaria raised the matter at Geneva only hours after the Greek invasion began.41 However, Barros fails to consider that it might have been because Chamberlain hoped the incident would not prove serious that he was unsure whether it should come before the League.42 Although Chamberlain did not say so, bringing the matter before the League would raise the profile of Greek-Bulgarian differences, and perhaps cause them to become more entrenched.

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Despite this, though, it is difficult to say for sure how far Chamberlain would have resisted a reference to the League. Due to Bulgaria’s rapid appeal, the matter was out of his hands. At the special council meeting assembled on 26 October, Chamberlain was asked to be the rapporteur; and after a series of meetings covering five days, the Greeks and Bulgarians accepted provisions for the withdrawal of Greek troops and for an enquiry.43 Although Chamberlain had not doubted Greece would comply, he believed that if it did not, the ‘[...] whole position of [the] Council and [the] effectiveness of [the] covenant as [a] means of preventing war will be at stake [...]’. The Cabinet therefore accepted his proposal that Britain should, if necessary, take naval action against Greece - though not unilateral action, since then France and Italy would ‘[...] make capital out of it further to oust us from trade with Greece.’44 But Greece accepted the League proposal, and Chamberlain hailed the affair as a great stride in ‘[...] building up the jurisprudence of the League of Nations.’45 It also marked a great stride for Chamberlain towards viewing the League as a body that could prevent some disputes escalating to war.46 Finally, 1925 also affected Chamberlain’s view of the League because it was the year of Locarno. The negotiations regarding European security took place outside the League. But, as a result of the agreements made, Germany was to become a member with a permanent seat on the Council: and, as we saw at the start of the chapter, during the security discussions in the Foreign Office, Chamberlain became convinced of the need for a new Concert of Europe. Furthermore, the Council now had a position as arbiter of disputes under the Locarno Agreements. The League had, therefore, become a body with a new strength and a new duty: it could call upon the diplomatic resources of the three great nations of western Europe,47 while it also had to act as an arbiter between them. For the rest of Chamberlain’s term of office, his attention was therefore much more focused on the League and how it might be made an effective arbiter. This concern was at the root of his actions during the Council crisis of 1926, a crisis which reveals him as someone who had become deeply committed to the League’s development. While Chamberlain’s views evolved, Britain’s main League concern throughout 1925 and the early part of 1926 was the dispute with Turkey over Mosul in northern Iraq.48This affected Chamberlain’s views on Council membership, and saw a further development of his

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belief in the League’s value as an authority in disputes. The matter was before the League because, after failing to reach agreement with Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain had (in accordance with one of these provisions) referred the matter to the Council. One might see Chamberlain’s willingness to see the League settle the dispute as undermining the view that he would not allow it to be involved in British interests. However, apart from the fact that Britain had already agreed to refer it to the League, Chamberlain believed, ‘Mosul really matters very little to us - we can exist & flourish without Irak [...]’.49 This was a clear example of him being less interested than colleagues such as Amery in eastern questions. Furthermore, if he did not wish to invite the League into Egypt or the Sudan,50 it was already involved in Iraq. He was pragmatic enough to recognise ‘[...] a change has come over international relations with the advent of the League & we could not if we would carry off a situation by the high hand.’51 As a tactic during the dispute, the Foreign Office was concerned to ‘[...] preserve the character of the issue as one between the League and Turkey.’52Through making much of Britain’s willingness to abide by the League’s decision, British delegates successfully ensured this was achieved. Amery was Britain’s principal negotiator in the dispute, with Chamberlain ‘[...] reserving myself for lobbying if that be necessary.’53 This principally involved talking to members of the Mosul Commission, particularly the Spanish Ambassador to Paris, Quiñones de León. But, although Chamberlain’s involvement in the dispute was limited, it did affect his views on the League. First, it contributed to the process of building the League’s jurisdiction: had the League failed to settle the dispute, it would have damaged much that had been achieved during the Greco-Bulgarian dispute. As Chamberlain minuted, Britain could stand the loss of Iraq, ‘[...] but can the League stand such a failure for itself?’54 Second, the dispute bore on the question of which Powers should gain permanent seats on the Council, which (as a consequence of Locarno) was soon to come before the League. During the discussions on Mosul, Britain’s case had been supported, on the League’s three-man Mosul Committee, by Quiñones de León, and Chamberlain began to feel that Britain owed a permanent seat to Spain. He wrote to Crewe on Quiñones, ‘We owe too much to his friendly attitude on the Mosul dispute for me not to feel obliged to yield [...]’.55 Thus, when the issue arose, Chamberlain viewed Spain favourably. Meanwhile,

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Chamberlain felt it was desirable for powers involved in a dispute to have the same status (i.e., both either to be members or not) on the Council to ensure fairness: although, under Article Four of the Covenant, any nation could sit as a Council member when a matter concerning it was being discussed, Chamberlain felt this was not a sufficient guarantee of equal treatment. He had feared the Council might find for Turkey’s view of the Mosul dispute, so as not to be accused of bias in favour of one of its own. He said, ‘[...] that independent members of the Council felt themselves the gêne of this inequality and were less ready to decide in our favour because they felt suspect of partiality to the power which was their colleague [...].’56 He came to feel that it was, therefore, in everyone’s interest for Poland and Germany to be represented equally on the Council.

GERMANY JOINS THE CONCERT

The Council question arose out of Locarno, where Germany had agreed to join the League with a permanent seat on the Council. Chamberlain’s role has been strongly criticised by Carlton as undermining the League.57 But, as we shall see, throughout the discussions on Council membership, Chamberlain’s main concern was to make the Council effective in dealing with problems that might threaten European security: bringing in Germany, and possibly others, was a means to this end. Chamberlain saw Germany’s rapid entry as a test of its loyalty to Locarno, and the next step in building the Concert of Europe. Furthermore, he favoured speed because, Tt is impossible to say how long the men who met at Locarno will continue to direct the foreign policy of their respective countries.’ Now was the best time for progress.58 Chamberlain’s anxiety shows how unstable he felt the situation to be, particularly in the light of Briand’s insecure position. But the main problem with German entry was that other long-standing claims to permanent Council seats also came to the fore, specifically those of Spain and Brazil, who already had temporary seats, and Poland.59 Chamberlain had already agreed to support Spain, appreciating its claim to a special position as a representative of Hispanic cultures, and since he felt indebted to it for help over Mosul. He may also have seen Spain as a ‘good’ League member, with a proven record on the Council. As early as

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November 1925, his view had been put to the Cabinet which had agreed to support Spain. However, the Cabinet expressed doubts about permanent seats for Poland and Brazil, giving Chamberlain ‘[...] a free hand to make the best arrangement he could Chamberlain’s own view was that, ‘I have always been pro-Spain on this question but bothered by the number of other claims.’ He felt particularly that, though a special case could be made for Spain, permanent membership should be kept to great powers only, and was thus doubtful about Poland and Brazil.60 Regarding these claims to Council membership, Chamberlain was unwilling to make any firm stand, believing, ‘“Wait & see” is not always folly or weakness; sometimes it is better to hold your cards up than throw them on the table. [...] We offend no one irretrievably, we keep all possibilities open & the result may be anything - even the best possible solution!’61 So, Britain would make no firm commitments. But this was a little disingenuous: perhaps because of Briand, who supported Poland, Chamberlain saw merits in Poland’s claim. This view was shared by Drummond, who, like Chamberlain, had at first opposed.62 Chamberlain’s views could be interpreted as following France; and he was certainly accused by Ramsay MacDonald of doing so.63 In fact, Chamberlain, as we saw earlier,64 was prepared to disagree with France, and it is much more likely that he was persuaded by the arguments themselves. However, he certainly believed Briand to be vital to the whole situation; if he was not pro-French, he was pro-Briand, and may well have been trying to help Briand’s domestic position.65 Poland based its claim on having disputes with Germany, meaning that both should have equal status on the Council. Chamberlain’s own experience of the Mosul dispute led him to endorse this, while he accepted that, with Poland on the Council, France would no longer have to speak for Poland against Germany, which would reduce Franco-German tension. There was another factor: if it opposed France on Poland’s claim, Britain might be isolated, and the chances of expanding eastward the work of Locarno would be severely damaged. As the debate developed, it was this point that Chamberlain emphasised the most: for example, when he told Cecil that if he went to Geneva and opposed Poland, he would ‘[...] antagonise the whole Polish nation and [...] make it certainly more difficult and very probably impossible to draw any further results from Locarno in that part of the world.’66Thus we see how the

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League was steadily increasing in its importance in Chamberlain’s world view, and how it was tied to the system that had been established at Locarno. But Poland’s claim was opposed by some in the Foreign Office. Lampson believed Poland should not be admitted since it was not a great power. He added that a larger Council would increase the amount of intrigue in Geneva, and this could only be bad for the League. But Lampson later argued that giving Poland a non-permanent seat might be an acceptable compromise; and, significantly, the most senior member of staff, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Tyrrell, favoured Poland’s claim, believing it would free France from having to voice Polish concerns at Council meetings, and thus allowing it to take on a mediatory role.67 Tyrrell’s position would probably have been enough to dissuade Chamberlain from listening to the doubts from lower down in his department. However, German entry remained Chamberlain’s main concern. First, Germany made it clear that it could not enter the Council at the same time as Poland as this would be against the spirit of Locarno. Germany’s attitude to Spain was initially unclear, but became equally hostile. Second, other Council members, Sweden and Belgium, stated that they wanted Germany to be the only new addition to the Council. This, then, put an end to Chamberlain’s use of the argument that Britain’s opposition to Poland would be an isolated one. However, as he still had some faith in the arguments made for Poland’s claim, he suggested a compromise, with the Poles asking only for a temporary place on the Council, rather than a permanent one.68 The fact that he did so, albeit without success, shows he did not blindly follow France. Chamberlain continued to argue, though, that an increase in Council numbers would help to make the League more effective - at present a dispute arising out of Locarno might have to be decided on by only four of the ten Council members, since six might be involved in the dispute. He told Drummond, ‘It is a pity really from this point of view that there are not more Powers like Spain which, if not to be classed absolutely as a great Power, yet stands out from the ruck of little Powers to whom in such a crisis no one would pay any attention.’69 Thus he went to the Cabinet inclined to support both Poland and Spain so long as this did not prevent German entry. But he was still trying to arrange a compromise, while being constantly advised by the British Embassy in Warsaw of the dangers to Locarno in opposing Poland.70

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On 17 February, the Cabinet held its first detailed discussion.71 Besides a memorandum from Chamberlain urging support for Poland, it saw a paper from Cecil, saying that Spain had a case, but opposing Poland since it was not a great power and had been an irresponsible League member. Cecil urged that only Germany should be taken in at the present time. If this was impractical, Spain could be accepted as a permanent member now, along with the guarantee that one of Brazil, Argentina and Chile should always be on the Council. In any event, he said, Poland should be pacified by Britain and France agreeing to support its application as a temporary member. No final decision was taken; on 24 February, the Cabinet was told that the Dominions wanted only Germany added to the Council at present, and the next week’s meeting was set as the time for a decision.72 By then both Spain and Brazil made it clear they might withdraw from the League if their applications were not accepted, with Brazil also threatening to oppose German entry.73 Meanwhile, Churchill, who was not at the 3 March Cabinet, had written to Baldwin, ‘I am sure the only straightforward course is to bring Germany into the League before any change is made in its composition.’74 The Cabinet’s final decision was that Chamberlain and Cecil, Britain’s two Council representatives, should make the best deal possible, based upon three principles. First, nothing must delay German entry. Second, only Great Powers should be permanent Council members, though Spain might be in a special position. Third, Brazil and Poland should not be permanent members, but Poland should become a temporary one as soon as possible. This was against the position Chamberlain had initially taken, although his efforts to persuade Poland to go for a temporary place suggest that a permanent seat for the Poles was not his greatest concern. With this position decided, Chamberlain went to Geneva ‘[...] to play as difficult a hand as ever fell to a man’s lot.’75 While the Cabinet had debated Council membership, so too had British public opinion. How far Chamberlain was affected by this is of great importance. Potentially significant for Chamberlain was that The Times, a stalwart supporter of his European security policy, argued strongly that only Germany should be admitted to the Council for the time being, and that all other claims should be postponed. It took the line put forward by the former foreign secretary, Viscount Grey, that the most important task was for Germany to be brought in, and nothing should obstruct this. Though

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not wishing to tie Chamberlain’s hands in advance, it said that allowing Poland to enter the Council appeared to be a snub to Germany, just as it was entering the League. Meanwhile, in Parliament, both Ramsay MacDonald and Lloyd George raised the spectre of secret diplomacy, alleging that Chamberlain had already made commitments on membership, and demanding that the public be told what they were. Chamberlain responded that he was trying to use the League as Castlereagh had used the Concert of Europe, to build peace after war; German entry was thus the next step from Locarno, and he pleaded for latitude in discussions.76 However, although the League of Nations Union saw the episode as a triumph for public opinion,77 Chamberlain was not influenced at all by the opposition to Poland; he had been conscious, during the Locarno negotiations, that public opinion might set limits to British actions, but he did not regard these as germane to Council membership. Certainly, he emphasised that German entry was the priority, but this was already his main concern before public opinion was voiced in newspapers and in Parliament. This accords with Steiner’s opinion on the effects of public opinion on Salisbury, Lansdowne and Grey: daily decision-making could be done in the face of opposition, while only decisions related to declaring war, making peace, or accepting obligations, needed the acquiescence of public opinion.78 Instead of bowing to public pressure, Chamberlain simply tried to maintain ‘Our proper role [...] of peacemaker and conciliator & I am working my hardest to keep enough liberty to play that part [...].579 But, even if he did not change his policy, he was aware of the damage that hostile public opinion could do to it, writing of the League of Nations Union, Tf anything could frustrate my efforts (not wholly without success) to increase the authority & strength of the League, it would be the consistent wrong-headedness of the secretariat of the League of Nations Union.’80In an attempt to win the arguments, Chamberlain therefore met Gilbert Murray and other Union representatives.81 Meanwhile, he was also soon to face opposition from Conservative MPs who wanted only Germany added to the Council at the present time, and believed they represented the bulk of Conservative opinion.82 Cham berlain also ignored potential problems with the Dominions, although these did not in fact develop. Demonstrating how far the Empire had ceased to be a factor in his politics, Chamberlain had to be reminded of the Dominions by Amery.

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Initially, they were against any enlargement of the Council other than the addition of Germany. However, the Colonial Secretary persuaded them of the dangers of tying Chamberlain’s hands in any way before the Council meeting; and the meetings of the Empire delegation that took place during the Council were briefings rather than consultations.83 Once in Geneva, two points stand out about Chamberlain’s actions. First, he wanted the matter solved between himself, Briand and Stresemann, through ‘[...] friendly personal discussion [...] before the subject is formally discussed at Council 84 - an example of the ‘tea-parties’ that have led to criticism of Chamberlain, but also of how he hoped to make the League effective as a new Concert of Europe, in which disagreements were raised privately rather than publicly. Second, when Germany insisted it should be admitted alone, Chamberlain, in line with Cabinet policy, told Poland that Britain could support it only for a temporary seat, making it clear that Germany was his priority. He even went so far as to tell the Germans that if Germany threatened to withdraw its application because of the claims of others, he would vote against all except Germany, with the proviso that a public declaration would have to be made about why he could no longer support Spain. This, however, was unacceptable to Stresemann and Luther.85 A solution for the Polish problem emerged when Sweden offered to resign its seat so that Poland could take its place. But Spain and Brazil remained awkward, with Brazil threatening a veto of Germany’s application.86 Despite various meetings between the Locarnites, Germany still insisted it must be the only nation to enter the Council at the present time. With the Locarnites reaching deadlock, and Brazil looking likely to use its veto, the matter was referred to a formal session of the Council. Chamberlain and Briand agreed that a session of the Assembly would soon be necessary at which public statements would have to be made. Chamberlain feared the consequences of what was becoming ‘[...] a misfortune for the League, a disaster for Germany and a grave peril to the policy of reconciliation for which I have so earnestly striven.’87 At the last minute, a possible solution emerged. Given his instructions from the Cabinet, Chamberlain felt it would be acceptable to all countries except Britain. As the first step, Germany would enter the Council alone. Sweden and Czechoslovakia would then resign, putting their seats at the disposal of the Council, when

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Poland and Norway would probably be elected in their place. Later, in September, the Council would recommend the creation of permanent seats for Spain and Brazil. It was this final suggestion that Chamberlain’s orders would oblige him to reject. At the Foreign Secretary’s request, a Conference of Ministers was rapidly assembled. Their decision, later approved by the Cabinet, was that they would prefer the creation of no extra permanent seats, but would support Chamberlain if he felt it necessary. Clearly, despite his earlier defeat, Chamberlain had a very strong position in the Cabinet and his arguments were accepted as the right ones. However, this too proved unacceptable to Germany, and it was decided to refer the whole matter to the September meeting of the Assembly.88 Meanwhile, Chamberlain made it clear to Spain that he no longer felt obliged to support its claim for a seat. In the negotiations to come, he said Britain must start with a clean slate. Chamberlain’s defence of his actions was that his main task at Geneva was to prevent a split between Germany and the other Locarnites; this he had achieved.89 However, as a result of the failure to secure Germany’s entry to the League, there was much criticism of Chamberlain in Britain; although, significantly, The Times accepted the argument that Locarno was still safe.90 Cecil privately attacked Chamberlain’s League policy: The Covenant relies on public opinion as the chief force at the back of the League, and it is on this conception that the League is based. [...] In this controversy public opinion has been ignored. All the earlier negotiations were conducted in secret meetings of ‘Locarnites’ and in meetings of some or all of the members of the Council.

Cecil considered resigning, telling Baldwin that Chamberlain had acted out a ‘[...] typical example of the old diplomacy [...].’ He asked Baldwin to take a greater part in foreign affairs; but the Prime Minister did not wish to ‘[...] imitate the proceedings of Lloyd George in interfering too much.’91 This shows a marked change with regard to prime ministerial influence on foreign policy. Even bearing in mind that this was as much to do with Baldwin’s style as his own, Chamberlain was more in control of foreign policy than any holder of his office since Grey, except, of course, his immediate predecessor who had also been Prime Minister. In the event, Cecil decided to

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remain in the Cabinet, impressed by Baldwin’s request that he should be on the League Commission which would discuss further the membership of the Council.92 However, at least one backbencher was nonplussed by the affair, writing, ‘The importance of the whole thing seems to me exaggerated. There is no sign that the peace of Europe is in any way endangered.’93 The Conservative Party rallied round Chamberlain in a Commons debate on 23 March,94 which, as the usually reserved Annual Register said, was remarkable for the way in which Conservatives forgot their past criticisms and supported Chamberlain.95 It was eventually a British proposal which proved to be the way out. Chamberlain took no part in the negotiations on the League’s ‘Committee on the Composition of the Council’. This work was carried out by Cecil, whose proposal was the one that formed the substance of the settlement. It involved the creation of a mixture of permanent and semi-permanent seats.96 Significantly, the Foreign Office saw some problems in this scheme, but Chamberlain backed Cecil.97 However, Chamberlain was much involved in making sure nothing got in the way of German entry to the League. He believed ‘[...] nothing ought to prevent the election of Germany at the first possible moment.’98 This was at the heart of his policy on Europe at this time: he saw it as vital for the continuation of the rapprochement that had begun at Locarno. Therefore, he was adamant that disagreements over future inspection of Germany’s military capabilities (which had broken out with the Germans while negotiating the end of the rule of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control) should not slow down its admission to the League. They did not, in fact, do so; indeed, the League was later utilised in settling outstanding disagreements, a clear sign that its authority was increasing.99 Perhaps significantly, Chamberlain’s commitment to German entry became particularly vigorous when Germany signed a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union. This, he felt, might well be due to Germany’s failure to enter the League in March; and there was much internal British speculation as to its meaning.100In order to ensure Germany entered, Chamberlain lobbied Spain, Brazil and Poland through his regular meetings with their ambassadors in London, in an attempt to secure their acceptance of Cecil’s proposal. This, as Chamberlain told the Spanish Ambassador, ‘[...] had been framed with the express purpose of giving [...] to Spain in particular, the substance since we could not give her the form of her demand.’101

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Progress was made, and, in June, the German Ambassador said his country supported an increase in the number of elected seats. Poland was also satisfied. But Spain and Brazil were not, eventually resigning from the League.102 By September, it was clear that Germany would enter, albeit with the loss of Brazil and Spain, and Chamberlain was not fearful of the outcome. Germany was duly accepted as a member of the League and elected to a permanent seat on the Council.103 Chamberlain wrote, A breeze from Locarno blew through the stuffy hall of the Assembly this morning and I recovered some of the thoughts and emotions of those happy days.’104 A fundamental part of Cham berlain’s Locarno policy had been implemented: Germany’s return to the family of nations. At the December 1926 Council, he could reflect ‘[...] I have served the League well if less noisily than some others & have made it a bigger force than it was when I took my seat on the Council.’105 Robert Sandars, who had felt that peace was not threatened by the crisis,106 was probably correct. However, although Spain and Brazil had been lost,107 Germany was now a member of the League.

THE CONCERT IN ACTION

So, in September 1926, with Germany in the League, the Concert was established. But what did this mean? As we shall see, Chamberlain saw the Concert as a way of making the League work; in no way did it replace the League. Because of this, it is argued here that the importance of the so-called Geneva ‘tea-parties’ has, in the context of the League, been overestimated by Jacobson and Walters. We shall also see, though, how Chamberlain’s commitment to the League was limited when British interests were involved. As for the details of the ‘tea-parties’, that the meetings were held in Geneva, and often took place at tea-time is not in question, but much else is. The first of the tea-parties happened while German membership of the League was being discussed in March 1926.108 Although important discussions therefore took place outside the Council itself, it is clear that far from aiming to undermine the Council, the meeting aimed at gaining German entry, thus strengthening the League. The representatives of the Locarnites and Poland were given a greater say during these discussions, but this is because it was they who had most at stake. When we look at the rest

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of the meetings, it is clear that many issues, which could have been discussed if the Locarnites were seeking to manage business themselves, were not, in fact, raised. These include prominent items such as matters relating to Danzig (March, June, September and December 1927), the Memel Convention (June 1927), minorities in Greece and Albania (June 1928), and the system to be used for electing non-perm anent Council members (December 1926). Participants at the tea-parties also never discussed a request from Chamberlain,109 supported by the League’s Secretary-General, Eric Drummond,110 to reduce the number of Council sessions from five (September counted for two meetings) to four per year,111 so that foreign ministers could attend regularly. It was originally proposed in March 1927, and finally agreed in November 1929, after Chamberlain had left office.112 Throughout, no discussions were held privately. So what was discussed at the tea-parties? After German entry to the League, the first took place in December 1926, attended by Chamberlain, Briand, Stresemann, and the representatives of Belgium, Italy and Japan.113 The inclusion of Italy and Belgium was because of their role as Locarnites; and although it could be argued that Japan was there as a Great Power, it also had a role in the implementation of Versailles, a subject which was to be discussed. These December 1926 meetings reveal that the participants were not usurping the Council’s authority or arranging League business among themselves. In fact, they discussed only military control in Germany. This was an issue concerning only those at the tea-party, and it is difficult to imagine how it could have been solved more easily in high profile discussion at the Council table. Following this, it is clear Chamberlain perceived the meetings as a way of fostering good relations and understanding between the leaders of the Locarno Powers. For example, he spoke of how a meeting of himself, Briand, Stresemann and Mussolini might stop the latter feeling as isolated as he was said to feel from European affairs.114 But this did not undermine the League; rather, it was part of an attempt to bring Mussolini more into it, perhaps to avoid a repeat of the Corfu occupation in 1923. Chamberlain seemed to be succeeding when Mussolini sent a senior adviser to work for the League’s secretariat, and pledged to pursue a ‘League policy’.115 The March 1927 Council also sheds light on the nature of the tea-parties. Here, the Council was more effective and had a wider remit as a result of German and Polish membership. Meanwhile, we

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can see that, because of Locarnite concern about the perception of private meetings, business was not solved through tea-party meetings. The two points at issue were the Saar railway defence force, and the German minority schools in Upper Silesia. The former was the more important, since it involved a direct conflict of wishes between France and Germany. Unlike the question of military control in Germany, the League already had a role in the dispute: under the Treaty of Versailles, inter-allied troops occupied the Saar Basin, and decisions regarding them were made by the League, acting on advice from the Saar Governing Commission. However, this body had been able to agree neither on the number of troops in the force, nor on whether they were to be located inside the Saar or just outside. In August 1926, the British and French governments reached agreement on the establishment of a force to guard the Saar railways after troops had withdrawn, with Britain insisting that it should number no more than 500 men.116 But when the Saar Governing Commission subsequently recommended a force of 800 men, the agreement collapsed.117 All involved wanted the matter to be solved at the forthcoming Council meeting, and there was an obvious opportunity for meetings of Chamberlain, Stresemann and Briand. But, Chamberlain noted afterwards, [...] there was, I think, a tacit agreement among us that it would be inexpedient on this occasion to repeat the Conferences of three, four or five members in my room which had played so large a part on previous occasions, and accordingly, though Briand visited me and I him, and both of us paid visits to and received visits from Stresemann, we never met a trois.118

Each foreign minister made the other aware of his views,119 but tea-parties did not take place in any form other than meetings of two foreign ministers. So the matter went to a public session of the Council. There a compromise was reached, aided, as Chamberlain pointed out, by the fact that when the pressures on each side were clear in public, it was easier for Stresemann and Briand to agree, and also because Briand and Chamberlain were keen that Britain and France should not disagree in public over the question of numbers.120 The solution thus reached was a halfway house between German and French desiderata. The French got a force based in the Saar, but the Germans (and Britain) got their way on numbers.121 The prestige of

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GENEVA IS SO EMBRACING. [Referring to the recent successful session of the Council of the League of Nations, The Times remarks: “A sense of humour has made a welcome appearance at the meetings, and the witty repartees of M. B r ia n d and Dr. S t r e s e m a n n during Saturday’s discussion on the Saar created a general good temper.”]

Punch, 23 March 1927. © Punch Ltd.

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Two Faces of Chamberlain with Stresemann and Briand

Above: Drawing colleagues into his confidence. Below: Emphasising his point (Chamberlain is wearing a monocle; Stresemann is to Chamberlain’s left; Briand is to Stresemann’s left).

Reproduced from the Chamberlain Papers (Chamberlain Miscellanea 9/46/1-2) by permission of the University of Birmingham.

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the League was raised and The Times wrote that the League was developing into a valuable centre for settling international affairs.122 Meanwhile, Germany and Poland compromised on a matter regarding German minority schools in Upper Silesia, from which, it transpired, children had been wrongly excluded by the Polish Government.123 This, too, was done outside the tea-party system. Soon after this meeting a controversy arose between Italy and Yugoslavia, which Walters cites as a clear example of the Locarnites preventing the Council from discussing matters which might embarrass them.124 In this instance, Italy had accused Yugoslavia of preparing for war against Albania, and had made representations to the Locarnites without indicating what they should do. Germany had suggested, tentatively, that the Council might consider the matter, but Mussolini was set firm against any such idea.125 Chamberlain had long taken the view that, ‘[...] it is essential that we should keep Italy, a growing power, in sympathy with our policy & in cooperation with us. This may be vital in the future either to maintain peace in Europe or to restrain or guide Italy outside Europe.’126As part of this general appeasement, Chamberlain believed it was important not to make Mussolini hostile to the League.127On this particular occasion he also believed the League could inflame the situation by ‘[...] still further exciting public opinion and giving rise to a fresh crop of rumours.’ Meanwhile, Briand took the view that there was no clear way in which the League could intervene. Both were probably right, and Stresemann agreed.128 After a flurry of communications between ambassadors and foreign ministers, it was decided that there should be no reference to the League. Walters’ argument is that the Council could have considered the Italian accusations, but that, to save Mussolini’s face, the Locarnites rallied around and prevented this from taking place. However, it is unclear how the League could have helped; and the episode is more significant as an example of Chamberlain’s belief that a referral to the League could in some cases worsen a situation by entrenching the positions of those in dispute. In the event, Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to discuss the matter and the situation was calmed.129 The League might only have got in the way, and might not have made any capital for itself. At the June 1927 Council, there were two ‘tea-parties’. Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand, Vandervelde, Scialoja and Ishii met,130 after Stresemann asked for a meeting to discuss the effects of Britain’s recent diplomatic breach with the Soviets. This was the

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principal item of discussion, and one that could not have come before the League without raising the stakes. However, they also considered a further Yugoslav-Albanian dispute, which had arisen out of the Albanian arrest of a Yugoslav, Vuko Juraskovitch, on charges of espionage. Yugoslavia sent a strong note of protest, and diplomatic relations were broken off on 4 June.131It was agreed at the meeting that while France could try to influence Yugoslavia, Italy could do the same in Albania; Stresemann later said he would instruct the German ministers in both countries to act with their French and Italian colleagues.132 All this was aimed at calming matters which were not yet serious enough for the Council, rather than undermining the League. As Briand was later to say in public, ‘I consider it desirable to deal outside the League of Nations with such international differences as can be settled by the normal processes of diplomacy before they constitute any real danger to peace.’133 This approach was successful, as Juraskovitch was released in July, and diplomatic relations were resumed in August.134 Soviet threats to Poland were also discussed at this tea-party, and Stresemann promised to make representations to Moscow. Once again, though, this was a matter that could not easily be brought before the Council. Stresemann then raised three questions of interest to Germany: its fortresses along the French frontier, which he said had been destroyed; the possible abolition of the Conference of Ambassadors; and German representation on the subject of the Mandates Commission. The next day, a full discussion took place.135 Here, a method of verifying the forts’ destruction was agreed. Meanwhile, although the former allies said they believed the Conference of Ambassadors was still useful, it was agreed to look into its abolition;136 and a method of raising the Mandates Commission at Council was settled - the secretariat would be informally asked to raise it,137and it could be discussed in September. This item, the Mandates Commission, was the only League matter dealt with.138 Finally, Stresemann raised the question of the number of troops occupying the Rhineland: after pressure from Chamberlain, Briand agreed to investigate. It is clear, then, that at this June 1927 session, with the exception of the Mandates Commission, no League matters were discussed by the Locarnites. They addressed only points at issue between themselves, or others, such as Britain’s breach with the Soviet Union, which could not be dealt with by the League. Meanwhile, Chamberlain had a number of

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interviews with representatives of non-Locarno countries, on a wide range of issues: he was not ignoring the lesser powers.139 As 1927 continued, Chamberlain was involved in a further League matter: the Hungarian-Romanian dispute. This arose out of Hungary’s grievances about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, under the scheme of agrarian reform being enforced there. It claimed that Hungarians were being treated more harshly than Romanians and asked the League to arbitrate under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. The desirability of the matter coming to the League does not appear to have been discussed in the Foreign Office: there was little that Britain could do to stop it, even if it wanted to. At the League Council meeting in March 1927, Chamberlain was appointed as rapporteur on the question. On a Committee of three, he was assisted by the representatives of Japan and Chile. The Committee met in London at the end of May, when evidence was taken from Hungarian and Romanian representatives. But little progress was made, and further consideration by the Council was adjourned until its September meeting, in order to allow more time for consultation in the countries concerned.140 In September, the recommendation made by Chamberlain’s Committee was the seemingly equitable solution of reference to a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (as established under the Treaty of Trianon), with the proviso that its members should accept the principle that Romanians and Hungarians should receive equal treatment in the enforcement of agrarian reform. Details were unacceptable to Hungary, though, and the compromise failed. The situation continued unresolved into 1928, when a further solution was blocked by Romania. It was apparent by this stage that no compromise would be acceptable; but, equally, there was little the League could do to enforce any decision, as it was clearly not a matter for sanctions. As far as Chamberlain and the League were concerned, then, the Council decided, in June 1928, that the matter should be left to the countries concerned.141 By the end of Chamberlain’s term of office, a settlement had still not been made.142 The League had failed in this matter; but Chamberlain had at least tried to make it work, and failure was certainly not due to the Locarnites trying to usurp the authority of the Council by prearrangements among themselves. The Locarnites did have a role in the dispute - as they agreed that if Hungary refused to accept the Council’s report, they would insist it be sent back to Budapest for further consideration, followed by a

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Council discussion in December.143 Once again, all the Powers were doing was trying to strengthen the League. In general, that September, both Briand and Chamberlain were anxious to avoid any private meetings because of criticisms made at the Assembly by the Norwegian and Dutch delegations, the former of which had spoken of rumours about the existence of a ‘Supreme Council’. These criticisms also represented disappointment at the failure of the July 1927 Geneva naval conference, and Chamberlain was forced to defend Britain’s record in the League and on disarmament. He hoped the Assembly would learn from its failure ‘[...] that it is not always by hurrying that the greatest or even the quickest results are achieved [...]’ Cecil referred to his speech as a ‘pompous lecture’.144 But if public pressure dictated against tea-parties, at Stresemann’s request an ‘accidental’ meeting of the three together with Scialoja was arranged after lunch one day; but they discussed only troops in the Rhine, and Stresemann was told France had done all it could for the moment, having made reductions after the last Council. That no more organised Locarno meetings were held is perhaps due to the fact that Chamberlain and Briand knew Stresemann wanted to discuss troop numbers further, which they did not.145 Nevertheless, if they did not all meet together, they did discuss in pairs two pieces of League business. One was an investigation protocol on the private manufacture of munitions, in which the Locarnites simply decided to agree with a motion passed by the Assembly.146 The other had a higher profile: following problems with the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, Poland was anxious for the Assembly to adopt a motion against the use of war as a method of settling disputes.147 It proposed a resolution that: 1. All recourse to war for the settlement of international differences is and remains forbidden; 2. Differences of whatever nature they may be arising between states can only be settled by peaceful means [...].

Chamberlain was told by the Foreign Office’s legal adviser that the resolution might commit Britain to universal compulsory arbitration, so he told the that Poles he did not wish to revive the controversies of the Geneva Protocol. However, he added that he would support a

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proposal if it was important to Poland, but the details would have to be agreed by him with France and Germany. Chamberlain told Briand and Stresemann of his fears, and Briand proposed a meeting of the British, French, German and Polish delegations. When this took place, the Polish legal advisers came up with a redraft which was still unacceptable to Britain, and representations were made to Poland. The government in Warsaw backed down; the wording of the motion passed read: (1) That all wars of aggression are, and shall always be, prohibited; (2) That every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes, of every description, which may arise between States.148

This was a clear case of the Locarnites arranging business. But how important was it? The motion was of the type held in high esteem by the Assembly; however, even if the original wording had been accepted, the League would have lacked any way of enforcing it. It is perhaps of more importance to note that Chamberlain took commitments made by Britain seriously, and recognised the League’s limits. He would not allow it to attempt something of which it was incapable. Furthermore, he would not tie Britain to compulsory arbitration, which had been a part of the Geneva Protocol so firmly rejected in March 1925. In December 1927, Chamberlain discussed possible GermanPolish agreements with Stresemann.149 But the main item of business at this Council was the Polish-Lithuanian dispute - an episode that stands out as the only important example of the Locarnites bypassing the Council. In theory, a state of war existed between Poland and Lithuania, as a result of a long-standing refusal by Lithuania to recognise their shared border. However, the immediate issue between the two in 1927 was the treatment of minorities - each country had accused the other of mistreating its minority, and both had appealed to the League. After an initial public meeting on 7 December, at which each side put its case,150 the matter was dealt with through two secret Council sessions, at which only the main representatives of the Council members were present. This was, Stresemann noted, *[...] in pursuance of an arrangement first discussed and agreed upon by the representatives of the five Great Powers 151 After a report by the Dutch rapporteur, Belaerts van

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Blokland, and a proposal by Briand to send neutral military observers to the frontier, the two countries agreed to accept that they were at peace; agreement was soon reached on the outstanding matters, and a show of unity put on at a public Council session on 10 December.152 However, the Polish prime minister had been militant throughout, and, as Chamberlain noted, ‘One cannot be too thankful that this sitting was held in secret. Marshal Pilsudski’s attitude would have produced the worst impression at a public sitting [...]’.153 Overall, Briand and Stresemann had persuaded the Soviets to put pressure on Lithuania outside the League, and the three Locarnites had been able to give moderating advice to Poland. Chamberlain said, ‘The result was success for the Council, which with every such triumph grows in confidence and authority [...]’.154 It was also the only important example of the Concert taking oyer the League. Equally, it saved the League from an embarrassing failure to deal with a problem. Even then, it should be remembered that the Locarnites had only arranged for secret sessions of Council to be held - these had then taken place, and the Locarnites held no more meetings between themselves on the matter. For March 1928, there is no evidence of meetings between all three main Locarnites; Stresemann and Briand did discuss Franco-German relations, and Chamberlain met Briand to discuss disarmament155- but this led eventually to a compromise on conflicting French and British aims,156 and can be seen as something which aimed to smooth the passage for the League’s disarmament work. In June 1928, when Briand and Stresemann were unable to attend the Council because of illness and elections respectively, Chamberlain made a point of attending so as not to offend other states and to ‘[_] prevent action being taken which should be inconvenient to us all.’157He appears to have discussed League business with von Schubert, representing Germany, although no record survives,158 and disarmament with Paul-Boncour;159but there were otherwise no important discussions. In September, Chamberlain was ill himself, along with Stresemann. Cushendun attended the Council for Britain, and met representatives of the Locamo Powers and Japan, but they discussed no League matters. This was repeated when Chamberlain attended the Council in December, by which time Briand and Stresemann were both now able to attend.160 In March 1929, after his last Council, Chamberlain told his ambassadors in Berlin and Paris that nothing of consequence had passed between himself, Briand and Stresemann,161 and there is no contrary evidence.

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B R IT IS H IN T E R E S T S

If the revived Concert did not damage the League, and in fact did much to help it, there was one key area in which Chamberlain would go no further than his colleagues, namely, allowing the League to interfere in British interests. Indeed, one of his first tasks in office was to rebuff Cecil’s attempt to involve the League in an area of traditional British concern: Egypt. Cecil wanted to report to the League Council, justifying Britain’s actions following the murder of the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, Lee Stack.162The rest of the Cabinet, and the Foreign Office regarded this as a domestic question.163 Later, at the end of 1925, when Egypt threatened to go to the League over a territorial dispute with Italy,164 Chamberlain minuted tersely, Tt is not in our interests to allow Egyptian affairs to be brought before the League. We must resist this if possible.’ A similar attitude was expressed towards the Sudan when Ramsay MacDonald suggested that it might become a League mandate. Chamberlain was adamant Britain should not ‘[...] invite interference in any form.’165 Clearly, there was a limit on the government’s view of the League’s role. Where British interests in Egypt were concerned, nobody in the Cabinet, other than Cecil, was prepared even to make reports and so tacitly admit the League’s competence. This was all justified, as during the Geneva Protocol discussions, by reference to the uniqueness of Britain’s Empire. This never changed. Only Cecil was to suggest that Britain should accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.166 In 1927, although a report was made, a similar position was taken on China, when Britain dispatched 13,000 troops to defend the international settlement at Shanghai against a nationalist advance.167 With Egypt, it was Cecil who wanted the League involved. But over China, even he was opposed to League involvement. He endorsed the Foreign Office view that, although it would be a good public relations exercise, it would anger the Kuomintang, and that anyway there was little the League could do since there was no clear issue between Britain and the nationalists. Typically, Chamberlain thought of the politics of the Council, minuting, ‘[...] I cannot help thinking that it would be singularly embarrassed by such a reference.’168 However, Cecil did endorse the Foreign Office proposal for making a statement to the League on British policy in China, explaining that it was aimed solely at protecting existing British interests, not at

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expanding them or interfering in an internal dispute. Chamberlain supported this suggestion happily, and a letter was duly sent to Drummond. This included a statement that Britain could see no way in which it could appeal to the League under the Covenant at present,169but any suggestion on how to do so would be welcomed.170 Meanwhile, Cecil told Gilbert Murray, Britain was trying to secure French, Japanese and American help in China; but if troops were sent under League control, France and Japan would see it as an attempt to get around their refusal to fight. Cecil also feared the League might become unpopular in China if it interfered there.171 Significantly, the League of Nations Union backed the government line.172 Chamberlain clearly had one set of rules for involving the League in British disputes, and another for disputes involving other countries. He was happy for the League to rule on the Greco-Bulgarian dispute and, later, the quarrel between Hungary and Romania. In both of these cases, the British interest was not so much in the specific settlement reached as that it should be acceptable to the parties involved. But in Egypt and China, the case was different - the League became subject to British concerns, and, as with the Kellogg-Briand pact,173would be subject, in effect, to a British Monroe Doctrine.

C O N C L U S IO N

In 1930, A. G. MacDonell’s amusing account of a League Assembly, in England, Their England, represented the Foreign Office as avoiding League commitments whenever possible. When the hero of the story, Donald Cameron, accompanying the British Representative on the Committee for the Abolition of Social Abuses, asked the FO, A nd what about brothels? What do we say about them?’ he was told, A t the last six Assemblies we’ve simply said that we don’t know what they are. All you have to do is say it again.’ Eventually, he was told, ‘Broadly speaking, you are fairly safe to take as a generalization, that so far as Organized Vice is concerned, we might, as an Empire, be reasonably described as being more or less against it.’174 This reluctance to be tied down was to be found both in respect of many complicated Assembly matters, and where real British interests were concerned. But on the key issue of maintaining peace, Chamberlain ensured Britain took a full role in the League.

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This was done through the Concert, initiated by Chamberlain’s Locarno policy, which secured acceptance of Germany’s western frontiers by its leaders, and allowed it to take an active part in the League. Chamberlain believed ‘[...] our interests are bound up with every possibility of the European situation’.175 Thus, he sought to make the League influential in Europe, with Britain playing a leading role. Through the Concert, he strengthened the League; and, it has been argued here, he did not undermine the Council as many have suggested. Ultimately, too, the League existed for maintaining peace. Anybody who took the same account of the views of Haiti, for example, as they did of those of the great European powers, did the League no favours at all. The Concert left many important items solely to the Council, notably controversial questions relating to the management of the Polish corridor port of Danzig. Though it arranged a secret Council session to deal with the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, this was an isolated example. More often, as during the controversies between Hungary and Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia, or Italy and Yugoslavia, the Concert underpinned the Council, or calmed the situation before matters were strained enough for League intervention. The real criticism of Chamberlain, if one is seeking to say that he was not committed to the League, is that he fiercely guarded all areas of direct British interest. Outside this, he tried to make the League work. Believing adventures such as the Geneva Protocol would harm the League, Chamberlain worked to make it a success; in his view, the Powers should lend their weight to the League to place it in a stronger position to make decisions. In many cases, when they might have been interested in doing so, they did not interfere at all. When their intervention was most marked, this was usually at the last minute when it seemed that, without extra pressure from the Powers, the League could not enforce its wishes. This locates Chamberlain outside the main trend of Conservative thought on Europe - he was more committed than any of his party colleagues. But, most importantly, this questions interpretations that show the Concert as undermining the League. Accordingly, it is difficult to blame the League’s weaknesses in the 1930s on Chamberlain’s construction of a new Concert of Europe. When he left office, the League had a clear role in the security of the world. But League enthusiasts saw security as only one part of its task; the other important mission was disarmament. In this, Chamberlain was much less interested.176

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1. 2. 3. 4.

FO 371/11064, W 1252/9/98: AC minute, 21 Feb. 1925. AC 6/1/636: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 3 Feb. 1926. AC 54/31: AC to Baldwin, 16 Sept. 1927. For the lack of analysis of the League’s role after the Corfu crisis, see, Peter J. Yearwood,4“Consistently with Honour”; Great Britain, the League of Nations and the Corfu Crisis of 1923’, JCH, 21 (1986), pp. 559-79. 5. Under Article Five of the Covenant, all Council and Assembly matters required unanimity, unless specifically named as exceptions. 6. DBFP\ IA, I, Appendix: Gregory memorandum, 10 April 1926. 7. Peter Yearwood, “‘On the safe and right lines”: The Lloyd George Government and the Origins of the League of Nations, 1916-1918’, HJ\ 32, 1 (1989), pp. 131-55. George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation o f the League o f Nations: Strategy, Politics and International Organization, 1914-1919

(1979), p. 100. 8. See above p. 33. David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (1977), pp. 354-6. 9. J. P. Dunbabin, ‘The League of Nations’ Place in the International System’, History, 78, 254 (1993), pp. 421-2. Zara Steiner, ‘The League of Nations and the Quest for Security’, in Ahmann et al. (eds), Quest for Stability pp. 35-70. 10. The Union claimed a substantial membership: 414,545 in Nov. 1924, rising to 724,561 in Nov. 1928, and continuing. See, Headway, VI, 12 (Dec. 1924), p. 240, and X, 12, (Dec. 1928), supplement p. i. However, these numbers were all those who had joined at one time or another, minus deaths and resignations. They do not reveal the number of fully paid-up members. 11. Headway , IX, 8 (Aug. 1927), p. 144. Add. MS 51080 ff. 170-71: Cecil memorandum of conversation with Baldwin, 30 March 1926. 12. Bridgeman Diaries pp. 224, 228. 13. Amery Diaries p. 582: 21 Jan. 1929. 14. Alfred Zimmem, The League o f Nations and the Rule o f Law, 1918-1935 (1936), p. 352-9. 15. P. J. Beck, ‘Britain and the Peace-Keeping Role of the League of Nations, 1924-29’, (London Ph.D. thesis, 1971), pp. 96-114, 409. His subsequent article, however, ‘From the Geneva Protocol to the Greco-Bulgarian dispute: the development of the Baldwin government’s policy towards the peacekeeping role of the League of Nations, 1924-1925’, BJIS\ 6, 1 (1980), pp. 52-68, follows the more traditional interpretation of Chamberlain. 16. F. P. Walters, A History o f the League o f Nations (1952, 1960 edn.), pp. 339-40. See also, P. J. Beck, ‘Geneva Protocol’, BJIS, 6, 1 (1980), p. 68. Peter J. Yearwood, ‘The Foreign Office and the Guarantee of Peace through the League of Nations, 1916-1925’, (Sussex Ph.D. thesis, 1980), pp. 158-9. 17. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy pp. 69-70. Jon Jacobson, ‘The Conduct of Locamo Diplomacy’, Review o f Politics, 34 (1972), pp. 67-81. The latter concentrates on the Thoiry meeting of 17 Sept. 1926 between Stresemann and Briand. As an example of Locarno diplomacy, this is flawed since Chamberlain was not present. Walters, History o f the League pp. 341-3. 18. Carlton, ‘Council Crisis of 1926’, HJ, XI, 2 (1968), pp. 363-4. 19. Walters, History o f the League pp. 284-5. Carlton, ‘Council Crisis’, HJ, XI, 2 (1968), p. 1. 20. FO 371/11064, W 1252/9/98: AC minute, 21 Feb. 1925. 21. Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time p. 163. 22. FO 371/11898, W 8109/223/98: AC minute, 26 Aug. 1926. This responded to

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23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

109

a member of the German Embassy in London’s attempt to arrange the procedure of the Assembly between Britain and Germany. No attempts were made again. AC 54/408: AC to F.S. Oliver, 17 Jan. 1927. FO 800/260/131-133: AC to Howard, 25 Jan. 1927. See above pp. 25-6. CAB 24/169, CP 517(24): AC memorandum, 26 Nov. 1924. CAB 23/49, CC 65(24): 3 Dec. 1924. Chamberlain believed these had sometimes made commitments which pledged the government more than it wished. An example was Helena Swanwick, who represented Britain on an Assembly committee on opium, refugees, and slavery in 1924. She was a pacifist in the Great War, and the first president of the Women’s International League; in 1924, she became editor of the Union of Democratic Control’s Foreign Affairs. Other non-government representatives had included, for example, Prof. Winslow of the League of Red Cross Societies. At the first Assembly of Chamberlain’s term of office, Britain was represented by Chamberlain, the FO legal adviser, the ambassador to Belgium, and three junior ministers. In 1926, 1927 and 1928, a similar pattern was repeated. Mrs Swanwick was, however, to return in 1929 when Labour was once again in power. FO 800/257/13-14: AC to Salisbury, 2 Jan. 1925. Later, in 1926, Chamberlain continued to prevent the development of a dual voice, when it was suggested by staff that because of his workload, Cecil might replace Chamberlain on the League’s Minorities Committee. Chamberlain minuted that while he would surrender Britain’s position on some committees to other countries, he was unwilling, if Britain was on a controversial committee, to let another person represent the government. See, FO 371/11901, W 11191/854/98: Cadogan and AC minutes, 11 and 12 Feb. 1926. B. J. C. McKercher, ‘Austen Chamberlain’s control of British foreign policy, 1924-1929’, IHR, VI, 4 (1984), pp. 570-91. Baldwin 42, ff. 270-1: AC to Baldwin, 9 Nov. 1924. LNOJ 6, 2 (Feb. 1925), p. 146. Headlam Diaries p. 59: 19 April 1925. AC 52/498: AC to Howard, 4 June 1925. See, for example, FO 371/10576, W 10463/9859/98: Cadogan and AC minutes, 27 Nov. 1924, on Chamberlain’s role as rapporteur on the Committee on Traffic in Women and Children. Richard Veatch, ‘Minorities and the League of Nations’, in The League o f Nations in retrospect: Proceedings o f the Symposium organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute o f International Studies (New York, 1983),

pp. 378-9. 36. At the 1925, 1926 and 1927 assemblies, Chamberlain was represented on the slavery committee by Hurst (1925), Cecil (1926), and Lord Onslow and Sir Edward Hilton Young (both 1927). See, for example, League o f Nations Journal o f Eighth Assembly, Geneva, 1927 p. 20. 37. FO 371/11905, W 7065/7065/98: AC and Cecil minutes, 8, 11 and 12 Aug. 1926. 38. Carol Miller, ‘The Social Section and Advisory Committee on Social Questions of the League of Nations’, in Paul Weindling (ed.), International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918-1939 (1995), p. 163. 39. CAB 24/173, CP 276(25): FO memorandum, 22 May 1925; AC minute, 26 May 1925.

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40. James Barros, The League o f Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925 (1970), pp. 28, 33-4. See also, FO 371/10672, C 13428 and 13528/13309/7: Crewe to AC, 23 Oct. 1925; Gregory and AC minutes, 23 Oct. 1925. 41. FO 371/10672, C 13387/13309/7: Ralph Stevenson (Sofia) to AC 22 Oct. 1925. 42. FO 371/10672, C 13380/13309/7: AC to A. Grant Duff (Stockholm), 22 Oct. 1925. 43. FO 371/10672, C 13674, 13675, 13758, 13845 and 13972/13309/7: Minutes of meetings of 36th session of Council, 26-30 Oct. 1925. LNOJ\ 6, 11, Part II (Nov. 1925), pp. 1700, 1711-15. 44. FO 371/10672, C 13705/13309/7: AC to Baldwin, 27 Oct. 1925; Howard-Smith minute, 28 Oct. 1925. CAB 23/51, CC 51(25): 28 Oct. 1925. 45. LNOJ, 6, 11, Part II (Nov. 1925), p. 1715. 46. The dispute was resolved at the Council meeting in Dec., when Greece accepted a Commission of Enquiry recommendation to pay Bulgaria reparations of nearly £80,000. Provision was also made for better discipline among frontier guards, and the establishment of a conciliation commission. See, FO 371/10673, C 15558/13309/7: Report of Commission of Enquiry into Incidents on Frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, 28 Nov. 1925. 47. The same could not be said of material resources. As we saw in Chapter Three, Germany only agreed to join the League on condition that Locarno was accompanied by a declaration that nations had to contribute to action under Article 16 only in so far as their geographical position allowed. In effect, this was a let out for Germany from having to provide military assistance in a war against Russia. 48. See below pp. 224-30. 49. FO 371/10826, E 6772/32/65: AC minute, 5 Nov. 1925. 50. See below p. 105. 51. FO 371/10840, E 6930/18/34: AC minute, 12 Nov. 1925. This minute was in the context of Persian affairs, but it accords with his general view of the Mosul dispute. 52. AC 52/770: Tyrrell to AC, 19 Oct. 1925. 53. AC 5/1/364: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 Sept. 1925. Amery’s experience of the affair led him to write that it did not reduce his doubts about the League’s ability to solve disputes. See, L. S. Amery, My Political Life: Volume Two, War and Peace, 1914-1929 (1953), p. 331. 54. FO 371/10826, E 6772/32/65: AC minute, 5 Nov. 1925. 55. AC 52/228: AC to Crewe, 22 Oct. 1925. 56. DBFP\ IA, I, no. 233: AC memorandum, ‘Poland and the Council’, 1 Feb. 1926. 57. Carlton, ‘Council Crisis of 1926’, HJ, XI, 2 (1968), pp. 363 and 364. 58. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 231, 232 and 236: AC to D’Abernon, 1 and 2 Feb. 1926. 59. AC 52/331: Drummond to AC, 27 June 1925. In 1926, China also made a claim. See, AC 50/169: AC to Macleay, 19 Feb. 1926. 60. CAB 23/51, CC 52(25): 11 Nov. 1925. AC 52/332: AC to Drummond, 30 June 1925. Carlton, ‘Council Crisis’, HJ, XI (1968), pp. 357-8, describes Chamberlain as being obsessed with Spain. The fact that he had made this early commitment, and that he was keen never to go back on his word, suggests that his later position was not so obsessive as might appear. 61. FO 371/11262, C 1820/71/18: AC minute, 15 Feb. 1926. 62. FO 800/259/55-58: Drummond to AC, 3 Feb. 1926.

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63. AC 53/355: Notes of a private meeting addressed by Ramsay MacDonald to members of his party, April 1926. The explanation of how Chamberlain got these notes are vague: accompanying the notes, a letter to Chamberlain from somebody whose name is unclear (F. Hancock?), says a friend at the German FO had given the notes to him, after attending the meeting on an invitation extended to somebody else (un-named). Cecil also believed Chamberlain had followed France in this matter. See, Halifax Papers, Mss. Eur. C. 152/17, no. 58: Cecil to Irwin, 22 June 1926. 64. See above p. 51. 65. See above pp. 57-8. 66. DBFP\ IA, I, nos. 233 and 257: AC memorandum, 1 Feb. 1926; AC to Cecil, 9 Feb. 1926. 67. FO 800/259/95: Lampson to Tyrrell, 8 Feb. 1926. Alexander Cadogan held similar views: FO 800/259/96: Cadogan to Tyrrell, 8 Feb. 1926. FO 371/ 11262, C 1820/71/18: Lampson minute, 13 Feb. 1926. FO 800/259/97-9: Tyrrell minute, 6 Feb. 1926. 68. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 275, 276, 279, 255, 252, 263: AC and D’Abemon correspondence, 15-17 Feb. 1926; AC to Grant Duff, 9 Feb. 1926; AC to Max Muller, 8 Feb. 1926; AC to Crewe, 10 Feb. 1926. 69. FO 800/259/133-136: AC to Drummond, 16 Feb. 1926. 70. DBFP, IA, I, no. 285: Max Muller to AC, 19 Feb. 1926. 71. Interestingly, Chamberlain wrote to his wife on 4 Feb., ‘We had a satisfactory meeting of the Cabinet yesterday on the Council question.’ See, AC 6/1/636: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 3 Feb. 1926 with P.S. dated 4 Feb. 1926. However, the minutes of the Cabinet that day do not record the matter was discussed. See, CAB 23/52, CC 3(26): 3 Feb. 1926. 72. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 233 and 253: AC memorandum, 1 Feb. 1926; Cecil memorandum, 8 Feb. 1926. CAB 23/52, CC 5 and 7(26): 17 and 24 Feb. 1926. 73. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 302 and 306: AC to Ramsay, and Rumbold, 26 and 28 Feb. 1926. 74. Baldwin 115, ff. 135-6: Churchill to Baldwin, 28 Feb. 1926. 75. CAB 23/52, CC 9(26): 3 March 1926. AC 5/1/375: AC to Ida Chamberlain, 5 March 1926 (Self, p. 287). 76. The Times, 27 Feb. 1926, p. 13. Hansard, 5th Series, 192, cols. 1655-66: 4 March 1926. 77. Donald S. Birn, The League o f Nations Union, 1 9 1 8-1945 (1981), p. 64. 78. Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 4 (1969), pp. 199-200. 79. AC 6/1/636: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 3 Feb. 1926. 80. FO 800/259/74: AC minute, 4 Feb. 1926. It is possible that Chamberlain reserved special scorn for the secretariat, for, as with many organisations, the senior activists were the most committed, and thus most opposed to him. 81. FO 800/259/73-74: Selby note of conversation with Spicer of League of Nations Union. AC 24/8/42: Gilbert Murray to AC, 10 Feb. 1926. 82. AC 24/8/36: R. Boothby, G. Butler, Lord Hartington, H. Macmillan, J. de V. Loder, and H. Spender-Clay to The Times, 25 Feb. 1926. AC 24/8/39 and 40: L. R. Lumley and AC correspondence, 25 and 26 Feb. 1926. 83. AC 53/13: Amery to AC, 2 March 1926. DBFP, IA, I, no. 332: AC to Tyrrell, 10 March 1926. 84. DBFP, IA, I, no. 287: AC to D ’Abemon, 21 Feb. 1926. See also, ibid., no. 321: AC to Crewe, 4 March 1926. FO 371/11263, C 2144/71/18: AC minute, 20 Feb. 1926.

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85. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 327 and 330-2: AC to Tyrrell, 7, 9 and 10 March 1926. 86. Under the Covenant, this required only a majority in the Assembly, but unanimity in Council. 87. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 333, 334, 337, 341, 344, 346: AC to Tyrrell, 10-14 March 1926. 88. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 349, 351, 359: AC and Tyrrell correspondence, 15 and 16 March 1926. CAB 23/52, CC 11(26): 17 March 1926. Amery Diaries p. 446: 15 March 1926. 89. Baldwin 115, ff. 142-51: AC to Baldwin, 18 March 1926. 90. The Times, 18 March 1926, p. 17. 91. Add. MS 51078 ff. 118-19: Cecil to AC, 16 March 1926. Add. MS 51080 ff. 170-71: Cecil memorandum of conversation with Baldwin, 30 March 1926. 92. Add. MS 51080 ff. 172-73: Cecil to Baldwin, 31 March 1926. 93. Ramsden (ed.), Sandars Diaries p. 225: 24 March 1926. 94. Hansard, 5th Series, 193, cols. 1057-75: 23 March 1926. 95. M. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1926 (1927), p. 22. 96. DBFP, IA, I, nos. 518, 525, 527: Cecil to AC, 12, 16 and 17 May 1926. DBFP, IA, II, nos. 6 and 46: Cecil to AC, 20 May 1926; Cecil memorandum, 4June 1926. 97. FO 371/11894, W 3361/223/89: Campbell memorandum and minute, 19 April 1926. 98. DBFP, IA, II, no. 137: AC to de Fleuriau, 9 Aug. 1926. See, also, ibid., no. 472: AC to HM representatives in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Montevideo, Caracas, Lima, Guatemala, Havana and Panama, 28 April 1926. 99. DBFP, IA, II, nos. 120, 172, 173, 174, 175, 182, 355: AC to Crewe, 1 Aug. 1926; D ’Abemon to AC, 24 Aug. 1926; AC to Crewe and D’Abernon, 27 Aug. 1926; Notes of a meeting AC’s room, Geneva, 12 Dec. 1926. 100. DBFP, IA, I, no. 492: AC to HM representatives in Prague, Paris, Brussels, Rome and Warsaw, 3 May 1926. See below p. 126. 101. AC 50/227a: AC to Rumbold, 12 Aug. 1926. 102. AC 50/208: AC to D’Abemon, 3 June 1926. AC 6/1/672: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 1 Sept. 1926. LNOJ, 1 ,1 (July 1926), pp. 1003-7; LNOJ, 1, 11 (Nov. 1926), p. 1528. 103. AC 6/1/678 and 679: AC to Ivy Chamberlain, 8 Sept. 1926. League o f Nations Journal o f Seventh Assembly, Geneva, 1926 no. 4, 9 Sept. 1926, pp. 32-6. 104. DBFP, IA, II, no. 203: AC to Tyrrell, 10 Sept. 1926. 105. AC 5/1/403: AC to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 Dec. 1926 (Self, pp. 297-8). 106. See above p. 93. 107. After much behind-the-scenes negotiating by Chamberlain and France, Spain withdrew its resignation in July 1928, and was elected to the Council at the Assembly in Sept., with a declaration of re-eligibility. See, FO 800/262/47-8 and 56-8: Drummond and AC correspondence, 14 and 18 Jan. 1928. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 Series IA, Vol. IV (1971), no. 160: Briand and AC to Quiñones de León, 9 March 1928. FO 800/263/8-9 and 16-18: AC to French Ambassador, 13 July 1928; AC to Quiñones de León, 20 July 1928; League o f NationsJournal o f Ninth Assembly, Geneva, 1928 p. 98. 108. DBFP, IA, I, no. 327: AC to Tyrrell, 7 March 1926. 109. This idea does not seem to have been discussed in the FO. It was possibly Chamberlain’s own. 110. FO 800/260/324 and 347: Drummond to AC, 19 and 28 March 1927. 111. The Council met in March, June, Sept. and Dec., with its work either side of the Assembly in Sept., counting as two sessions.

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112. LNOJ 8, 4 (April 1927), p. 420; 8, 10 (Oct. 1927), p. 1379; 9, 2 (Feb. 1928), pp. 141-4; 9, 4 (April 1928), pp. 387, 404; 9, 10 (Oct. 1928), pp. 1658-63; 10, 1 (Jan. 1929), p. 10; 10, 11 (Nov. 1929), p. 1465. Sessions were to be held in Jan., May, and twice in Sept. 113. DBFP\ IA, II, nos. 333, 345, 352, 353, 354: AC notes of meetings, 6-12 Dec. 1926. 114. FO 800/260/57-58: AC to Crewe, 7 Jan. 1927. 115. FO 800/260/149-52: Drummond memorandum, 26 Jan. 1927. DBFP\ IA, IV, no. 5: AC to Tyrrell, 12 Sept. 1927. 116. DBFP\ IA, II, no. 267: J. M. Troutbeck memorandum, 25 Oct. 1926. 117. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 7919-1939 Series IA, Volume III (1970), no. 35: AC to de Fleuriau, 3 March 1927. 118. DBFP\ IA, III, no. 46: AC to Lindsay, 15 March 1927. 119. Eric Sutton (ed.), Gustav Stresemann: His Dianes, Letters and Papers, Vol. I l l (1940), pp. 125-8. 120. DBFP\ IA, III, no. 46: AC to Lindsay, 15 March 1927. The two men worried that this might weaken Briand at home, thus lessening Chamberlain’s influence on France. 121. LNOJ, 8, 4 (April 1927), pp. 405-16, 593-600. 122. The Times, 16 March 1927, p. 17. 123. The Polish Government was anxious about the large number of children who spoke both Polish and German, but whose parents wished to send them to German schools. LNOJ, 8, 4 (April 1927), pp. 400-403, 474-80. 124. Walters, History o f the League pp. 342-3. 125. Stresemann Diaries, Vol. I l l pp. 134-8. DBFP, IA, III, nos. 49 and 60: AC to Graham and Crewe to AC, 19 and 22 March 1927. 126. DBFP, IA, II, no. 243: AC minute, 7 Oct. 1926. See also, Peter Edwards, The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings’, HJ, XIV, I (1971), pp. 153-4. 127. See, for example, CAB 23/52, CC 3 (26): 3 Feb. 1926. 128. DBFP, IA, III, nos. 61, 66 and 83: AC to Graham, 22 March 1927; Crewe to AC, 23 March 1927; Lindsay to AC, 26 March 1927. 129. DBFP, IA, III, nos. 64 and 65: Graham and Kennard (Belgrade) to AC, 23 March 1927. 130. DBFP, IA, III, no. 240: Selby note of meeting, 14 June 1927. Stresemann Diaries, Vol. ///pp . 161-5. 131. M. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1927 (1928), pp. 191, 200. 132. FO 800/261/55-64: AC to Tyrrell, 17 June 1927. 133. The Times, 10 Aug. 1927, p. 10. 134. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1927, p. 191. 135. DBFP, IA, III, no. 241: Selby note of conversation, 15 June 1927. Stresemann Diaries, Vol. I l l pp. 165-71. 136. Although the Conference had been used during the Corfu incident, it did not seriously rival the League in Chamberlain’s time, and it fell into disuse. Walters, History o f the League p. 300. 137. Chamberlain did this himself by immediately telephoning Drummond. 138. Drummond duly raised the question, and Ludwig Kastl, a former member of the German Colonial Service, was appointed in September. See, LNOJ, 8, 7 (July 1927), p. 790; 8, 10 (Oct. 1927), pp. 1120-21, 1132. 139. FO 800/261/55-64: AC to Tyrrell, 17 June 1927. Chamberlain met the representatives of Lithuania, Yugoslavia and Greece. 140. LNOJ, 8, 4 (April 1927), p. 372; 8, 7 (July 1927), p. 790.

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141. 142. 143. 144.

LNOJ, 8, 10 (Oct. 1927), pp. 1382-3 and 1407-14; 9, 7 (July 1927), pp. 933-7. M. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1929 (1930), p. 222.

FO 800/261/330-341: AC to Tyrrell, 19 Sept. 1927. League o f NationsJournal o f the Eighth Assembly nos. 3 and 5 (7 and 9 Sept. 1927), pp. 27-9 and 46. Chamberlain, Peace in Our Time pip. 177-8. Add. MS 51084

ff. 51-56: Cecil to Irwin, 29 Sept. 1927. 145. DBFP\ IA, IV, no. 8: AC note of conversation with Briand, and then with Briand, Stresemann and Scialoja, 14 Sept. 1927. 146. Stresemann Diaries, Vol. ///pp . 220-34. LNOJ\ 8, 10 (Oct. 1927), pp. 1447-8. 147. DBFP\ IA, III, no. 327: Cadogan memorandum of conversation with M. Sokal, 2 Sept. 1927. 148. DBFP\ IA, III, no. 328: AC memorandum of conversation with M. Sokal, 4 Sept. 1927. DBFP, IA, IV, nos. 201-4: AC to Tyrrell, 6 Sept. 1927; AC memorandum, 7 Sept. 1927; AC and Max Muller correspondence, 8 and 12 Sept. 1927. League Journal o f Eighth Assembly p. 305. 149. DBFP, IA, IV, no. 91: AC note of conversation with Stresemann, 12 Dec. 1927. 150. Epstein (ed.), Annual Register, 1927 pp. 174-6. LNOJ, 9, 2 (Feb. 1928), pp. 144-56. 151. There are no British minutes of these as there are for tea-parties, since Chamberlain was the only British delegate present. Rather, he wrote a letter to Tyrrell as a record of events. See, FO 800/261/659-72: AC to Tyrrell, 12 Dec. 1927. Stresemann’s brief note is in Stresemann Diaries, Vol. I l l pp. 257-8. 152. LNOJ, 9, 2 (Feb. 1928), pp. 176-8. 153. FO 800/261/659-72: AC to Tyrrell, 12 Dec. 1927. 154. FO 800/261/704-10: AC to Lampson, 20 Dec. 1927. 155. Stresemann Diaries, Vol. I l l p. 365. DBFP, IA, IV, no. 304: Memorandum by British Delegation in Geneva, 10 March 1928. 156. See below pp. 161-62. 157. FO 800/262/390-391: AC to Crewe, 9 May 1928. 158. DBFP, IA, V, no. 55: AC record of conversation with von Schubert, 9 June 1928. 159. DBFP, IA, V, no. 376: AC memorandum of conversation with Paul-Boncour, 8 June 1928. 160. DBFP, IA, V, nos. 151, 156 and 287: Record of meetings in Cushendun’s room, 11 Sept. 1928; AC memorandum of conversations with Briand and Stresemann, 10 and 13 Dec. 1928. 161. W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 Series IA, Volume VI (1975), no. 100: AC to Tyrrell and Rumbold, 11 March 1929. 162. See below p. 214. 163. Add MSS 51110, ff. 132-7: Drummond and Cecil correspondence, 26-28 Nov. 1924. Add MSS 51080, ff. 123-4: Cecil to Baldwin, 29 Nov. 1924. CAB 24/169, CP 521(24): Cecil memorandum, 29 Nov. 1924. CAB 23/49, CC 64(24): 26 Nov. 1924. FO 371/10073, E 10517/10240/16: AC to Crewe, 27 Nov. 1924. FO 371/10046, E 10811/368/16: Hurst, ‘Memorandum on the Locus Standi of the League to Intervene in the Dispute between His Majesty’s Government and Egypt’, 2 Dec. 1924. 164. See below pp. 216-17. 165. FO 371/10886, J 3491/28/16: AC minute, 1 Dec. 1925. FO 371/10793/368/ 16: Ramsay MacDonald speech, 28 Nov. 1924; Murray, Tyrrell and AC minutes, 1 Dec. 1924.

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166. Baldwin 115, ff. 72-4: Cecil to Baldwin, 16 March 1925. 167. See below p. 189. 168. FO 371/12443, F 115/115/10: V. Cavendish-Bentinck minute, 5 Jan. 1927; Mounsey, Wellesley and AC minutes, 25 Jan. 1927; Cecil minute, 26 Jan. 1927. 169. There was no sign that the Peking government might appeal. When the Nationalists took over at Peking, they continued to be represented at the Assembly by the previous Chinese representative. Disputes with Britain were limited to a well-mannered one over the scope of a League investigation into opium smoking. See, League Journal o f Ninth Assembly pp. 353-7. 170. CAB 23/54, CC 4 and 8(27): 26Jan. and 7 Feb. 1927. CAB 24/184, CP 41(27): AC and Cecil to Drummond, 3 Eeb. 1927. FO 371/12443, F 1203/115/10: AC to Drummond, 8 Feb. 1927. 171. Bodleian Library, Oxford, Gilbert Murray MS. 200, 39-40: Cecil to G. Murray, 21 Feb. 1927. 172. FO 371/12444, F 1337/122/10: League of Nations Union to AC, 9 Feb. 1927. 173. See below pp. 159-60. 174. A. G. MacDonell, England, Their England (1933), p. 159. 175. FO 800/261/330-341: AC to Tyrrell, 19 Sept. 1927. 176. See Chapter 6: Disarmament and the USA.

5

Calming Germany: The Locarno System, 1926-29 For reasons of sound policy we desire to get rid of the control even though the Germans have not done what they agreed to do. Austen Chamberlain on the Inter-Allied Military Commission o f Control, 18 Nov. 1926}

INTRODUCTION

The Locarno system collapsed in 1936 when Hitler’s troops entered the Rhineland. But in 1929 everything seemed in order; and it is argued here that the system worked until it was overtaken by economic depression and the rise of Nazism. This chapter examines relations between Britain, France and Germany following Locarno, and considers Italy’s place in Chamberlain’s diplomacy; the main issue is Chamberlain’s understanding of Stresemann’s revisionism, and how he dealt with it. Some aspects of this have already been considered in Chapter Four; for, after Germany joined the League of Nations, the focus of relations between the countries, over matters such as Saar railway troops, shifted to the League. However, the most important Franco-German issues remained outside the League’s remit, principally troops occupying the Rhineland, and reparations. Criticisms of the Locarno system come from Jacobson and Marks. Although Jacobson does not dismiss the stabilisation of the 1920s as years of illusion, a pause between 1919 and the mid-1930s,2 both writers argue that friendly relations between foreign ministers masked important differences. Marks sees ‘[...] a fearful France flanked by the unhappy east Europeans, trying to hide their humiliation and panic, and a resentful, revisionist Germany demanding ever more alterations in the power balance [...]’; Jacobson argues that

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‘[...] fundamental rivalries and antagonisms persisted through the Locarno era.’3 Furthermore, Chamberlain is specifically criticised. During the Locarno negotiations, he claimed to be an ‘honest broker’;4 afterwards, Jacobson believes, this was not true of his European policy. He views Chamberlain as basically closer to France than Germany, and not understanding German sensibilities as well as those of the French.5 An example of this was the French President’s May 1927 visit to Britain, when Chamberlain spoke to the press of the ‘Entente Cordiale’ rather than the ‘Spirit of Locarno’, causing some German anxiety. Jacobson takes this, and simultaneous discussions held between Britain and France, as indicating an ‘entente policy’.6 Is this what developed as part of Chamberlain’s policy of calming France, which was seen in Chapter Three to be central to his concept of European security? And did it undermine Locarno, making Cham berlain overlook German concerns? Fundamentally, are Jacobson and Marks right to see Locarno as failing to tackle Europe’s problems? Meanwhile, is Gilbert right when he says Locarno was Chamberlain’s ‘[...] last essay in appeasement [...]’, that is, he constructed a system which he failed to maintain?7

C H A M B E R L A IN ’S P O L IC Y

Much of Chamberlain’s policy depended upon close relations between himself, Briand and Stresemann; this was helpful regarding the League, and he hoped it could be in Europe. To this end, he continuously worried about the health of both colleagues.8 His close relationship with Briand has already been discussed in Chapter Three, but it is also important to note that he came to feel great respect for Stresemann. He wrote to D ’Abernon in September 1930, ‘When I got to know Stresemann I came to feel for him as you feel for him. You rightly banked on his courage and insight [...]’. A month later, he added, ‘What a tragedy it is for us all that he should have died so young.’9 His policy was also based on the assumption, after German entry to the League, that the presence of Allied troops in the Rhineland was an ‘anomaly’, which contradicted the sentiments of Locamo, and gave Britain no real strategic advantages.10 But his policy further assumed that Stresemann’s intentions regarding treaty revision were limited in the short-term. Stresemann

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made it clear, for example, that Germany wished to revise the Polish Corridor, but he also said this was not presently ‘practical politics’.11 His ultimate intentions are controversial: as Jonathan Wright has pointed out, Stresemann said different things to different groups, as he tried to justify his policies. The common ground between rhetoric and belief has thus been difficult to establish.12However, in 1924-29, Stresemann certainly felt that ‘[...] evacuation was the great question for Germany.’13 And there is a powerful case for the view that Stresemann saw extensive areas of compatible self-interests between the European powers, which ruled out aggressive revisionism.14 As for the possibility of border revision, Briand went as far as to discuss specific revisions with Stresemann; Chamberlain only ever said Britain could have no part in revising the Polish border, but that if Germany and Poland could agree a settlement, which Stresemann felt might be possible, Britain would welcome it.15 On neither point did Chamberlain have major doubts about Stresemann; he did not believe Germany would fight Poland over border revision, and in removing troops from the Rhineland, Chamberlain helped Stresemann - as Locarno calmed France, this would calm Germany. But what of German rearmament? Ultimately, of course, Stresemann wished Germany to become a Great Power again, which included military parity with France, and he has been shown to have known about, and endorsed, rearmament.16 It has also been argued that revisionism could only ever lead to war, and that the Weimar Republic could only be a staging-post on the road towards the strong state that revisionism ultimately required.17 Meanwhile, it has transpired that a scheme for matching French armaments in a decade had been formulated in 1928.18 However, even for Stresemann this was a long-term issue; and nobody in the Foreign Office believed the rearmament then taking place threatened peace. The Foreign Office certainly kept an eye on the activities of German ‘patriotic associations’;19but it was unconcerned when, in December 1926, the Manchester Guardian revealed details of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Reichswehr on armaments manufacture. M. H. Huxley was able to note, ‘There seems to be nothing of immediate significance in all this [...]’ - largely because as the newspaper itself admitted, the German government pledged to take action to stop the activities.20 In any case, British enquiries early in 1927 did not reveal any large-scale cooperation.21 Salzmann argues that, after 1927, there was a further factor that

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made the British less likely to regard rearmament as a problem: with the Anglo-Soviet diplomatic breach, Britain had no presence in the country where most of the cooperation was taking place, and thus received scant information.22 There is some truth in this view, although it probably overestimates the extent to which there was cooperation. What is certain, though, is that from 1928, the Foreign Office position, which Chamberlain endorsed, was ‘[...] to shut one eye to such subterfuges in view of the fact that far more [...] danger to peace would be created by an endeavour to stem such leakage than is constituted by the actual dribble itself.’ This stemmed partly from the fact that some even doubted Stresemann knew what was going on,23 which was nonsense, for it was exposed in the Reichstag in December 1926.24 Second, how exactly could Stresemann be tackled on the question without firm evidence? When, in 1928, there were rumours of Spain importing German submarine parts, Chamberlain was said to be, ‘[...] in general reluctant to take the lead [...] in accusing Germany of breaches of her Treaty obligations on the strength of paragraphs published at random in foreign newspapers.’25 Third, nobody in the Foreign Office wanted to encourage the French to protest, as this might hamper European reconciliation. As Orme Sargent noted, ‘Our whole policy recently has been to make it clear to the French that we are opposed to a policy of useless pinpricks.’26 Most importantly, though, there was no clear evidence that Stresemann intended anything more in the short term; there was no need for Chamberlain to tackle it immediately. The advice from the Berlin Embassy, only a few days before Chamberlain left office, was that the best hope for peace was not keeping armaments low - this had already been done for as long as could be realistically hoped under Versailles; rather, it was that democratic forces in Germany would remain in power, for they were against an aggressive war.27 Stresemann represented these democratic elements in German politics. Through depending on Stresemann’s intentions being limited, Chamberlain implicitly placed considerable trust in Stresemann. He was not alone in this: Briand, for example, never made any claim that Stresemann could not be trusted. This was understandable, for Stresemann had a high stake in following the path of gradual revisionism: his own political reputation depended on the Locamo policy. Having said this, there were risks attached to Chamberlain’s strategy, and he did not accept Stresemann’s position completely

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without question. But he had to trust him, for, as he told Mussolini: ‘Only the future would show whether Germany would really accept her present position or whether she would again resort to arms and stake everything on the hazards of a new war.’28 As for Mussolini, although Chamberlain has been accused of being too close to him, Edwards has contradicted this view. Chamberlain certainly believed that fascism was good for unruly Italians; he also believed, as we shall see, that Mussolini needed watching.29 Chamberlain’s understanding of Stresemann’s aims meant that he would try as hard as he could to secure troop reductions, and, eventually, complete withdrawal from the Rhineland. This was his ultimate aim in this period; anything more was so far in the future that he did not need to consider it. For now, France was a sufficient constraint to make even this difficult. As he tried to secure Germany’s legitimate requests, he was to be stubbornly opposed by France, which had already received a substantial gesture in Britain’s Locarno commitment to its security. With this in place, the task was now to calm Germany through mediation between it and France. France now had to make concessions towards Germany: Chamberlain’s influence was to be crucial on every occasion that they did this.30

C H A M B E R L A IN AS M E D IA T O R

Chamberlain believed that what Germany required first was the reduction of occupying troop numbers in the Rhineland. Cologne was evacuated at the end ofJanuary 1926; Coblenz and Mainz were now on the agenda, and (unspecific) reductions in the Rhineland as a whole had been promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in November 1925.31 In this, Chamberlain successfully persuaded Briand, at an early stage, that French generals’ demands for no reductions were unrealistic; as early as January 1926, Briand agreed that further reductions were necessary.32 However, Chamberlain had a balancing trick to perform: French public opinion required German League entry before conceding troop withdrawals; and, although Chamberlain continued to lobby Briand, he was hampered by German pronouncements about troop reductions, which did not help ‘[...] steady progress in the path of concession and conciliation [...].33 In this atmosphere, France and Germany failed to agree; matters came to a head when the German Ambassador, Sthamer,

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formally requested a reduction in July 1926.34 Finding his earlier policy of gentle persuasion had failed to shift Briand, Chamberlain pushed Germany’s case, dressing up his request as an Anglo-French front. He told Briand, ‘Working together France and England can do almost anything. If we are once separated, the whole edifice is endangered.’ Cham berlain added that he regarded German complaints about the number of troops in the Rhineland as justified, that movement needed to be made on troops remaining in the Saar, and that he recognised the German point of view on the question of having a permanent League representative resident in Germany for inspecting military facilities.35 In all of this, Chamberlain was anxious that nothing should prevent German entry to the League at the earliest opportunity,36 and was also concerned that Briand did not want to move regarding the Saar.37 Owing to Chamberlain’s continued pressure, the French made reductions, although admittedly these were far from satisfactory to Britain and Germany. The French removed 6,000 troops; but this still left total levels (approximately 75,000)38 higher than a year before, because British and Belgian troops from the Cologne zone were now stationed in Coblenz and Mainz. These were believed by the War Office to be at minimum levels, a view contested by the French and which Chamberlain did not share - he tried to persuade the War Office to reduce numbers by 50 per cent, but they refused. The fact that the argument was not pursued was probably because he took the view of his advisers that the French case was not entirely justified.39 Overall, though, it can be seen that if Chamberlain had not wanted to push Briand in the first instance, he would oppose him if necessary. He was in no way wedded to France or Briand. Rather, he adopted whatever tactic he felt would be most successful in moving the situation along. He was thus as good a friend as Germany could have hoped for, and his role in the Locarno system was that of mediator. But mediators were not always needed. It looked as if future troop reductions might be settled as part of a more general settlement, when Briand met Stresemann at Thoiry in September 1926, without Chamberlain.40 They discussed issues outstanding between France and Germany, particularly evacuation of the Rhineland and payment of reparations - essentially Franco-German issues, not requiring Chamberlain’s presence, although he knew the meeting was to take place, and approved of it.41 The discussions went well,

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and both Briand and Stresemann left believing a general settlement might be possible.42 Chamberlain had no involvement in Thoiry, and nothing in the British archives contradicts standard accounts of what happened there, although he was fully briefed by both Stresemann and Briand, and the Paris Embassy received information about discussions.43 But, in British government circles, he responded to Thoiry by preparing the way for a potential row about how Britain should behave if large troop reductions were involved - preparation which was necessary since the Treasury feared losing the support costs received from Germany in respect of troops stationed in the Rhineland and opposed withdrawals. He also prepared to join discussions with France and Germany as soon as they had a rough scheme, so that Britain would not face having to reject plans approved by both.44 However, Chamberlain’s main task was to argue with the Treasury over the scheme to finance Thoiry by commercialising German debts through the sale of railway bonds. This proved too ambitious, largely owing to the opposition of American markets, which did not see it as viable. But there was also opposition in Britain, where the Treasury not only believed that the scheme was likely to prove impractical, but feared that the British government might lose money from it. Chamberlain also believed the scheme would be impractical, and would fail on its own,45 but he urged, ‘[...] that we must not press our own interests too far; that we must not have the appearance of destroying for selfish reasons so promising a development in Franco-German relations; & that we must show a desire to help & not to hinder the rapprochement.’ If Britain was to reject the scheme, he wanted to be able to suggest a positive alternative.46 After Orme Sargent met the Treasury’s Otto Niemeyer twice, this was agreed by the Treasury, although no specific plan was established.47In the event, many in France and Germany came to see problems with the sale of railway bonds,48 and American money never materialised, so Chamberlain did not have to address the issue more closely. For the moment, he had defeated the Treasury; had the issue appeared again, he might not have been so successful. As for Thoiry, this attempt at direct Franco-German conciliation had failed, and for the rest of the 1920s British mediation played a central role.

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While Briand and Stresemann met at Thoiry, Chamberlain saw Mussolini at Livorno - the fourth meeting between the two49 - to discuss general foreign affairs. The meeting caused contemporary controversy. Some suggested Chamberlain was fooled by Mussolini, and that he approved Italian expansion in Albania; the general impression was not helped by Ivy Chamberlain’s wearing of a Fascist badge, in response to Mussolini’s gift of a basket of orchids.50 But Chamberlain’s aims were clear. A few months after their Livorno meeting, he wrote, with considerable foresight, A part from accidents, including those of temper, [...] Mussolini needs ten years of peace before he undertakes any adventure. In five years I should begin to watch him closely - which is not to say that I keep my eyes shut now [_].’51 For the moment, his policy was based on the view of Italy that, [...] what she wants before all things now is to be treated as a great power on a footing of equality with France, Germany & ourselves. [...] Fine manners (if not fine words) will butter more parsnips in Italy than anywhere else; & it is essential that we should keep Italy, a growing power, in sympathy with our policy & in cooperation with us. This may be vital in the future either to maintain peace in Europe or to restrain or guide Italy outside Europe.52

Nothing Chamberlain said at Livorno contradicted this: he offered restraining advice to Mussolini, and continued to do so.53 The effects of this in one important area, the Red Sea, are covered elsewhere;54 but there was a European dimension to Chamberlain’s flattery of Mussolini. In western Europe, he hoped France and Italy would not row, and encouraged good relations between them whenever possible, for example over Tangier.55 Meanwhile, in the Balkans, Italian diplomacy had a role to play in ensuring stability, owing to its links with Albania. In the main, Britain had no clear Balkan interests, and the Foreign Office was unable to make up its mind, for example, on the effects of a projected Yugoslav-Bulgar alliance.56 No firm opinion was needed, for there was no question of an active policy; Britain could adopt a stance *[...] of masterly inactivity.’57 However, it was to everyone’s advantage to prevent local disputes becoming international ones.

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W hen problems occurred in Albania in December 1924, over alleged Yugoslav support for a coup, Chamberlain was in Rome at the League Council. The Foreign Office acted, refusing Albanian attempts to refer the matter to the League, believing this might bring France and Italy into conflict. Britain therefore acted alone to put pressure on all sides to avoid provocative acts.58 Matters settled when Ahmed Zogu’s59 coup replaced Fan Noli in Albania. It is impossible to say whether Chamberlain would have acted differently had he been in London, although there is no evidence that he disapproved of what was done. But, following Locarno, there was a change in Balkan policy. In the long term, there was talk in the Foreign Office of a Balkan Locamo. Such local security arrangements were periodically mentioned to countries in the area, as when Chamberlain asked Benes to consider an agreement involving Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary. When these ideas were rejected, Chamberlain noted, ‘We will give any help that we can, but salvation comes from within. There can be no real peace but by consent. If the Great Powers impose peace, peace remains an outer garment which can be thrown off at any moment.’60 The Foreign Office continued to believe that a Locarno system could be applied to central and eastern Europe,61 but nothing materialised. Chamberlain’s belief in a Concert of Europe’s potential has been discussed in Chapter Four. In the absence of a Balkan Locamo, attention focused upon cooperation with France and Italy. In June 1925, Chamberlain told Briand and Mussolini that their three countries must cooperate to keep the Balkans stable. This was influenced partly by the Foreign Office view that, Anglo-French agreement will not [...] be sufficient so long as Italian diplomacy works in an opposite direction.’62 In part, this meant restraining Italian ambitions, as Chamberlain tried to do in meetings with Mussolini; it was helped by the fact that the Foreign Office did not regard Italy as being an immediate danger.63 It also meant keeping a watchful eye on Italy; for example, over the Italo-Albanian Pact of Tirana of December 1926, under which Italy agreed ‘[...] to maintain the political, legal, and territorial status quo of Albania.’64 This suggested that Italy had established a protectorate over Albania. Overall, though, the new policy meant using French and Italian contacts in the Balkans to counsel caution. The high point of this diplomacy came with the Yugoslav-Albanian dispute of mid-1927, which saw both France and Italy pressure their contacts in the two

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countries to calm matters.65 Keeping Italy tame was Chamberlain’s contribution to policy in this area. Whether Chamberlain watched Italy closely enough, though, is a complex question. It is clear that Chamberlain felt Mussolini intended to expand, and so would need to be watched closely from about 1931. So, why was Chamberlain not more concerned about the Pact of Tirana? Initially Chamberlain said, ‘We must watch & wait.’ But he was quick to say of Mussolini, ‘[...] the more one learns, the stronger the evidence grows that his “intentions were honourable”.’ Chamberlain seems to have been more concerned about Yugoslavia upsetting the situation.66 In part, this might reflect a general British view, held at least since the 1915 Treaty of London, that Italy should ‘influence’ Albania if it so wished. But why was the Foreign Office unconcerned about Italy’s clandestine arming of Hungary, revealed in the Szent-Gotthard incident of January 1928 when Italian guns had been smuggled into Hungary?67 One answer might be that these episodes only appear important with hindsight - to international observers at the time, they would not have seemed to be precursors of something bigger - only from about 1930 did Mussolini begin to assert a more vigorous nationalism and confidence in foreign policy.68 Certainly, neither The Times nor the Royal Institute of International Affairs were concerned about Tirana, other than, in the former’s case, from fear that Yugoslavia should make a needless fuss. Szent-Gotthard passed by similarly.69 Furthermore, although there is no apparent evidence, Tirana might have been seen as an aspect of European stabilisation. More importantly, Mussolini was certainly to be kept friendly in the context of relations with France and Germany. However, given Chamberlain’s prediction of expansion, the lack of more careful observation can be seen as neglectfiil.

R E V IS IN G G E R M A N Y ’S E A S T E R N A N D S O U T H E R N B O R D E R S

In the early stages of the negotiations that led to Locarno, Chamberlain had set forth his views on German-Polish relations. He believed that it was vital for Germany to renounce any intention of changing borders by violence; at Locarno, agreement on this was reached. Chamberlain then felt that further moves could only be made with time:

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[...] if she [Germany] comes into the League and plays her part there in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, I myself believe that within a reasonable number of years she will find herself in a position where her economic and commercial support is so necessary and her political friendship so desirable to Poland that, without having recourse to the League machinery, she will be able to make a friendly arrangement on her own account directly with the Poles.70

This was a clear endorsement of the view that at some point, revision was necessary, and inevitable. But might this not encourage Germany to behave aggressively? That Chamberlain did not regard Germany as likely to revise its eastern and southern borders by force can be seen when both became potential issues .from 1926, when the Soviet spectre appeared as a factor in relations with Germany. In April 1926, Germany agreed the Treaty of Berlin with Russia; this amounted to little more than a neutrality declaration,71 but begged the question of secret deals over Poland. Though potentially worrying, the agreement made little impact. Unlike Rapallo, the British government was kept informed by Stresemann as negotiations progressed, while the Germans said the agreement was ‘[...] the complement and completion of Locarno.’72 Moreover, as Chamberlain admitted to Crewe, Britain could do nothing about it even if it wished to. One adviser suggested that questions could be put to Germany, but Gregory pointed out, Any nagging at him [Stresemann] now might easily have the opposite effect to what we want.’ As Chamberlain said, ‘Either the German Govt, are acting in good faith, as I believe; or they are not.’ A questionnaire would not reveal this, and pressure on Berlin to prevent signature might have strengthened the German Nationalists.73 Even when details of the treaty proved less clear than Britain was led to believe, Britain was powerless to act. Chamberlain adopted a position ‘[...] of reserve. If Germany really acts in good faith, no great harm will have been done; it all turns on how she interprets the treaty, and that time alone will show.’ His main aim at the time was to get Germany into the League.74 Cham berlain also saw little danger in German-Polish disagreements, seeing them as outside British interests, and unlikely to be immediately threatening. At Locarno, he had tried to keep the border issue off the agenda;75he was also the author of the infamous, often misquoted phrase, that the Polish Corridor was something ‘[...]

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for which no British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier 76 which was a clear statement of his assessment of British interests. In April 1926, he did see potential in the Russo-German agreement for moving Locarno’s work eastward, since it came at the same time as a Polish-Romanian treaty, a situation which might have led Germany and Poland to look to each other for a settlement. He noted, /[...] Berlin seems almost as frightened of Warsaw as Warsaw is of Berlin & is as much perturbed by the Polish-Roumanian treaty as Warsaw is by the Russo-German one.’77 This was perhaps understandable, since Poland was militarily stronger than Germany. Because of all this, he felt a Polish-German treaty in which outstanding grievances might be settled, was becoming more likely.78 But he was singularly unconcerned about tariffs, which were the subject of a Polish-German ‘war’. Chamberlain did believe that Germany was unreasonable on some points;79 but, perhaps because some in the Foreign Office saw it as in Britain’s interest for Germany to be able to alter Polish tariffs, nothing was done.80 Otherwise, he thought only about the frontier: in December 1927, he urged Stresemann to settle the border with Poland peacefully, believing that this would finally bring peace in Europe.81 But he had no great involvement with German-Polish relations, only again having to address the issue with regard to the possibility of Britain raising its legation in Warsaw to embassy status. When Germany refused to do the same, Chamberlain decided not to do so.82 It is clear that Chamberlain was unwilling to press Germany over Poland, believing Franco-German relations to be the most important acts of diplomacy. In his eyes, Britain had no interests in Poland: even on the frontier question, Chamberlain took the view that it would be good if it could be settled, without believing it was a major threat to Britain if it was not. Presumably, he would not have regarded a German-Polish war with indifference; rather, he does not seem to have viewed it as more dangerous than one on Germany’s western frontier. This was surprising given Polish-German tension at the time; the Germans were much more likely to fight the Poles than the French. That Chamberlain was so uninterested could be a criticism, but it also places him firmly in the British tradition of viewing eastern Europe as having limited British interest - a tradition with a long history before the 1920s. O n the question of Anschluss, though, Cham berlain was determined to discourage Stresemann from endorsing growing

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popular pressure for it. In May 1925, some in the Foreign Office believed Britain should take no position - Anschluss might ultimately be the only way to maintain an economically stable Austria. But Chamberlain was, [...] definitely opposed to Anschluss & shall say so anywhere & every time that the subject is raised. There can be no security without stability. All this talk of rewriting treaties within 6 years of their signature is dangerous & foolish.[...] Every additional bit of experience which I gain strengthens in me the conviction that our only chance of peace is to let everyone know that we are opposed to any revision of the treaty settlement... [for a generation after which?]83 [Square brackets in text of original minute.]

These last words are crucial: in the long term, in accordance with the time-scale of Chamberlain’s Locarno pacification, changes might be made. Chamberlain’s mood seems to have softened briefly as Locarno approached, when he was ‘[...] not prepared to speak dogmatically about the Anschluss'u But, by July 1926, he was again sure of 4[...] the great danger to peace, the certain flaring up again of old suspicions & controversies, if the Anschluss question is raised in this generation.’85 In fact, the issue was not raised in meetings between Chamberlain and Stresemann, except when the latter denied that he had intentions in that direction;86 Chamberlain doubted whether this was the case for all the German government,87 nor was it in fact Stresemann’s long-term position,88but Britain never took any public stance in the 1920s. It is clear, then, that Chamberlain understood Stresemann’s intentions on border revision to be limited, and believed they could be held off in the short to mid-term, after which they might not be dangerous.

M IL IT A R Y Q U E S T IO N S , M IN O R IT IE S A N D R E P A R A T IO N S

More immediate were military questions and reparations. At Versailles an Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control had been established, which was due to withdraw when Germany fulfilled its disarmament obligations. As early as 1921, Britain tried to secure withdrawal of the Commission as soon as possible, believing

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Germany was nearly fully disarmed; in 1924 Ramsay MacDonald secured agreement on the specific details of how this would take place. All that remained for Chamberlain was verification of disarmament, and agreement on a method of inspection to replace the commission. This has been covered by Fox, who demonstrates how Chamberlain was equidistant between Germany and France in the negotiations,89 although Fox has not followed this through and shown it as representative of Cham berlain’s whole policy mediating between France and Germany in an attempt to remedy the latter’s grievances, having already calmed France at Locarno. Despite evidence from the commission of German failure to disarm fully, Chamberlain believed, Tor reasons of sound policy we desire to get rid of the control even though the Germans have not done what they agreed to do.’90 This ‘sound policy’ of furthering Stresemann’s short-term aims on military questions, he pursued at the League Council meeting in December 1926, where private meetings were held, and disagreements over Allied control were discussed between Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann. Chamberlain’s position throughout was to reduce French demands to a minimum to make them acceptable to Germany, with the provision that outstanding matters should be settled through the League.91 There were a number of meetings on fine points; eventually, League inspections not involving permanent residence, combined with a continuation of the Conference of Ambassadors on fortifications, were acceptable to all concerned.92 Chamberlain had successfully persuaded France to yield. With Allied control ended, the dominant issues became inspection of destroyed forts along the Franco-German border, further troop reductions, and War Office concern to restrict German imports of machines for making war material. The first was perceived by Chamberlain to be important to French public opinion - something it was still necessary to calm in order to help Stresemann’s aims - and he felt that Germany was being needlessly obstructive. To the new British Ambassador in Berlin, Ronald Lindsay, Chamberlain wrote, ‘[...] the growing irritation of the French public seems to me not without justification. If, indeed, the average Frenchman asks himself what practical benefits have hitherto accrued to France since the Locarno treaties were initialled fifteen months ago, he must be hard put to it to find the answer.’ And he later wrote of ‘[...] the fatal inability of the Germans to appreciate

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the psychology of other nations or ever to foresee the results of their action.593 There were also problems because Germany was violating some clauses of Versailles, by, for example, sending naval advisers to Turkey,94 and cooperating with the Soviets over training. This was widely known: it had been exposed in the Reichstag; but the British position was that violations were difficult to prove, and trying to do so would threaten good relations with Germany.95 Carsten speculates also that fuss was avoided so as to give the French no excuse to dig in their heels.96 Meanwhile, Chamberlain was trying to secure French support for the War Office concern to limit German abilities to keep stocks of half-wrought goods and machinery for making war material. Despite ignoring minor treaty infringements, the War Office saw this as greatly enhancing Germany’s capacity to produce large quantities of weapons at short notice. The War Office had conceded to Chamberlain that arbitration might have to resolve the issue, but he still needed the French to support his position. France did not move immediately, and Chamberlain was forced to complain, ‘[...] we expect from them a far fuller measure of support over the question of war material than they have hitherto afforded us.’ Support was forthcoming, and satisfaction was obtained at the end of January.97 Chamberlain had thus temporarily suspended his role as ‘honest broker’, at this point focusing on securing French support for British concerns. In March 1927, France and Germany agreed (bilaterally, since it was entirely a Franco-German issue), on a solution to the controversy over troops in the Saar,98 but this still left questions regarding inspections. Chamberlain was anxious to avoid an appeal to the League, believing this would hamper good relations;99 but by March he was pushing matters forward, telling Stresemann that he believed him to be justified about troops. Until August, his main task was to force an unwilling France to withdraw more troops.100 When the issue was formally raised at the end of March, Chamberlain, in this tense period, again acted as an honest broker. This partly involved indicating to Germany that it was unhelpful to portray reductions as a step towards complete evacuation. It also involved satisfying the French over inspection of the destruction of the eastern forts through firm pressure on Germany, and, with this done, making it clear to France, largely via Crewe, that reductions would have to be made. On 27 July, Briand agreed.101

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Chamberlain now had to deal with details of the withdrawals. The Foreign Office studied the issue and, in July 1927, Orme Sargent recommended that overall troop numbers be reduced from the existing level of approximately 70,000, to 56,000. In this reduction of 14,000, the French should reduce their numbers by 11,000, and Britain and Belgium by 1,500 each. This would leave around 45,000 French troops in the Rhineland, with Britain and Belgium having 6,000 and 5,000 respectively. Chamberlain endorsed this recommendation.102 Some in the Foreign Office believed that Briand, who was ill, had temporarily lost control of French policy: as Tyrrell noted, ‘As far as we know he has buried himself in the country looking after his pigs, and the Poincare policy, as it were, holds the field.’103 This view seemed to be confirmed when the French would not agree to removing more than 10,000 troops - including 1,500 each from Britain and Belgium. The Foreign Office immediately pointed out that this was out of all proportion to troop numbers in the Rhineland. Orme Sargent advised consulting Stresemann, but Chamberlain realised he would not accept such a figure.104 Instead, Chamberlain decided to press the matter on Briand, who seemed to have returned to Paris in better health.105There was also a problem with the Treasury over withdrawals, for reasons stated earlier. Chamberlain told them to suggest an alternative way of recouping lost revenue.106However, Chamberlain’s position was first and foremost that ‘I cannot support France in breaking her word & ours [...]’.107 A barely modified proposal arrived from Paris, to which Chamberlain reacted with ‘[...] profound disappointment.’ He warned Briand that ‘[...] the close and intimate cooperation of France & England, is being endangered by a policy which I must frankly say shows little consideration for English views [...]’.108 Briand agreed to try to persuade the French Cabinet of the need for a higher proportion of French withdrawals in the figure of 10,000, which he successfully did, along the lines of a proposal from Chamberlain, approved by the British Cabinet.109 But even this was not enough for Chamberlain. He now urged Briand to consider complete evacuation of the Rhineland as soon as possible, although he believed neither Briand nor Stresemann had any clear views on how to proceed.110 The problem was that Germany wanted to move rapidly. However, France desired a final reparations settlement, to replace the temporary Dawes Plan; and this could not be achieved until after the November 1928 US presidential elections, since America would have to participate.111

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Matters came to a head in May 1928, when Parker Gilbert, of the Reparations Commission, suggested Germany’s liabilities be fixed as soon as possible. Meanwhile, German elections, in which nationalists fared poorly, enabled Chamberlain to tell Briand that Britain and France needed to show ‘[...] that to a peaceful Germany we accord willingly and promptly what a Germany pledged to a policy of revenge would never have wrung from us [...]’. In the meantime, Germany was told not to raise the subject of evacuation unless it had something to offer France;112 Chamberlain believed Germany needed to be reminded of the virtues of ‘[...] goodwill & a modicum of sweet reasonableness [...]’.113 But Chamberlain’s own involvement was curtailed by illness from August to November 1928 - a combination of dyspepsia, pneumonia and neuritis. Cushendun was placed in temporary charge at the Foreign Office, a move which Baldwin indicated might be permanent if Chamberlain did not recover.114 So, it was Cushendun who attended the League Council at Geneva, where evacuation and reparations were raised in ‘tea-party-style’ meetings.115 Britain made no formal proposals - it was clear on reparations that Britain would lose money in any revision, so ‘[...] we are not going to be 1st in the field with such a scheme, wh: will inevitably it is to be feared, prove to be more to our financial disadvantage than to anyone else’s [if it is] to be generally acceptable to everybody else!’116 Cushendun made it clear to Germany that both issues must be discussed together. The Germans agreed, and a committee of experts was established.117 Britain only required that policy should rest on the Balfour Note118 and American involvement.119 Once again, British policy had successfully moved affairs forward in a way that furthered Stresemann’s aims, yet calmed French opinion. In discussions that followed, the Foreign Office, and Chamberlain on his return from illness in November, had little involvement. The Treasury led negotiations, with Churchill taking Parliamentary questions.120 There were informal conversations between Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann at Lugano in December,121 and Chamberlain took particular care to point out to France the demands of British public opinion. Whether this was Chamberlain’s motivation for pursuing evacuation of the Rhineland is difficult to say; he was certainly able to use it as a reason, citing not just Liberal and Labour pressure, but also ‘[...] a very large section of the best conservative opinion [...]’.122

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Chamberlain’s position was that ‘I will do all I can to help Stresemann because I believe that evacuation is now in the interest of us all [...]’, but he was also clear that France would need a reparations settlement.123 Internally, he had little more to do than persuade the Treasury of the French preference for the committee of experts to be independent rather than government appointees, which Churchill accepted.124 One further French concern was over the Commission of Verification and Conciliation that would operate post-evacuation. Here he aimed at ‘[...] giving the French the minimum that they need to satisfy their public opinion that evacuation is safe and asking nothing of the Germans either in form or substance which they could not accept with perfect equanimity and without any serious inconvenience.’125 Full discussion was postponed because of Stresemann’s problems with the Reichstag.126 Having returned from illness, Chamberlain also faced the issue of minorities. This was an issue with much potential for grabbing centre stage, and disrupting progress towards evacuation and a reparations settlement. That it did not, was as much due to Stresemann as anybody else, although as with his policy in general, there is considerable debate on his precise intentions. Stresemann’s outburst at Zaleski, the Polish representative on the League Council in December 1928, suggested that Germany might be seeking to launch a political offensive on the question, seeking to revise the way in which minorities were treated by the League. Zaleski had suggested that minorities in Poland were acting in a treacherous manner towards the country they found themselves in, and expressed anger that Germans in Poland were continuously petitioning the League with complaints. Stresemann was outraged, arguing that they were simply loyal to their former country, and that in March he intended to raise the whole minority issue.127 Chamberlain, typically, was alarmed by Stresemann’s language.128 Yet the minority issue did not emerge as a major controversy, because Stresemann did not press the point. One view is that he was posing as a protector of minorities in order to secure support at home, from those who desired a more aggressively revisionist policy in the east.129 Having secured such support, he was able to behave in a much more conciliatory fashion; for example, at the March 1929 Council, when he publicly accepted Chamberlain’s view that minorities must show loyalty to their country of residence.130 As for Chamberlain, it is clear that even if he was alarmed by Stresemann’s

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language, and even if the two did not discuss the issue privately, he did give his German colleague tacit support. This is seen in his response to Briand’s attempts to get Stresemann to drop all plans for an enquiry: Chamberlain responded that he doubted the wisdom of using any influence he might have on Stresemann over ‘[...] an object of so little consequence it was best ‘[...] to reserve ourselves for matters of real importance, such as the questions arising out of reparations and the military occupation.’131 As with other eastern matters, it was not a priority for Chamberlain. Since Stresemann did not press the minority matter, who can say that Chamberlain was wrong? The treatment given to the minorities issue thus sums up the state of Anglo-German relations in late 1928 and early 1929: Chamberlain allowing Stresemann to make the gestures he needed to make for the sake of his public opinion, and not letting anything distract attention from the main issues of reparations and evacuation in the west. So what of reparations? As for the committee of experts (by now known as the Young Committee after its chairman), Chamberlain had little influence. Although the German delegation gave much information to Stresemann, this never reached Chamberlain, and it seems clear from Stresemann’s papers that he never held meetings on the question with British leaders before the Hague conference.132 The Young Committee’s first meeting was held on 11 February, and initially Britain received scant details from the independent experts. After pressuring the Treasury to ask Josiah Stamp, the British expert, to send information, the Foreign Office was able to observe events more closely. Even then some information was only received via the American press, prompting J. V. Perowne to minute that ‘[...] the proceedings of the Experts are shrouded in secrecy from H.M.G. [...]’.133 The information that did reach Chamberlain did not please him: T am horrified that the [...] Spa percentages134should have been varied. [...] If we are to pay such a price in money it should be only on condition of achieving our political ends i.e. evacuation.’135 When the first concrete proposals arrived from the experts, they involved a considerable reduction of Britain’s share of reparations: the plan proposed annual payments of