Augustine, Other Latin Writers 9042918861, 9789042918863

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STUDIA PATRISTICA

". V3

VOL. XLIII

Papers presented at the Fourteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2003 Augustine Other Latin Writers

Edited by F. YOUNG, M. EDWARDS and P. PARVIS with Index Auctorum and Table of Contents of Vols. XXXIX-XLIII

PEETERS LEUVEN - PARIS - DUDLEY. MA

2006

UNIV. OF MICH.

CTACKS

STUDIA PATRISTICA VOL. XLIII

A CEP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

© Peeters Publishers — Louvain — Belgium 2006 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form. D. 2006/0602/141 ISBN-10: 90-429-1886-1 ISBN-13: 9789042918863

Printed in Belgium by Peeters, Leuven

STUDIA PATRISTICA VOL. XLIII

Papers presented at the Fourteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2003

Augustine Other Latin Writers

Edited by F. YOUNG, M. EDWARDS and P. PARVIS with Index Auctorum and Table of Contents of Vols. XXXIX-XLIII

PEETERS LEUVEN - PARIS - DUDLEY, MA

2006

Table of Contents

XVI. AUGUSTINE Bengt Alexanderson, Jorlanda, Sweden Lumiere et ciel dans le De Genesi ad litteram d'Augustin Isabelle Bochet, Paris La figure de Moise dans la Cite de Dieu Gerald Bonner, Durham Predestination and Freewill: Augustine's Letter 2* Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, Bordeaux Le th6atre chez saint Augustin: communaute de signes, communaute d'amour Pamela Bright, Montreal The Spirit in the Sevenfold Pattern of the Spiritual Life in the Thought of St Augustine Montague Brown, Manchester, New Hampshire Augustine on Beauty, Number, and Form Bernard Bruning, Leuven Psaume 45,11 dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin Martin Claes, Utrecht Exercitatio Animi in Augustine's De Trinitate Finbarr G. Clancy S.J., Dublin St Augustine's Commentary on the Emmaus Scene in Luke's Gospel Kevin Corrigan, Atlanta The Soul-Body Relation in and before Augustine Marianne Djuth, Buffalo Ordering Images: The Rhetorical Imagination and Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Polemic after 418 Anthony Dupont, Leuven To Use or Enjoy Humans? Uti and frui in Augustine Michael P. Foley, Notre Dame The Liturgical Structure of St Augustine's Confessions Luigi Gioia, Oxford The Structure of Augustine's Inquisitio in the De Trinitate: A Theo logical Issue Susan Blackburn Griffith, Oxford Medical Imagery in the 'New' Sermons of Augustine

3 9 15

19

25 33 39 45 51 59

81 89 95

101 107

VI

Table of Contents

Carol Harrison, Durham The Assault of Grace in St Augustine's Early Works Jennifer Henery, Milwaukee Jovinian's Proposal: Augustine's Changing Views on Marriage and their Consequences for Virginity John Paul Hoskins, Durham Augustine on Love and Church Unity in 1 John David G. Hunter, Ames, Iowa Between Jovinian and Jerome: Augustine and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 Alexander Y. Hwang, New York Augustine's Interpretations of 1 Tim. 2:4 in the Context of His Developing Views of Grace John Peter Kenney, Colchester, Vermont Transcendentalism in the Confessions Paul R. Kolbet, Boston Formal Continuities Between Augustine's Early Philosophical Teaching and Late Homiletical Practice M. Lamberigts, Leuven Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo on 1 Cor. 15 Robin Lane Fox, Oxford Augustine's Soliloquies and the Historian Christine McCann, Northfield, Vermont 'You know better than I do': The Dynamics of Transformative Knowledge in the Relationship of Augustine of Hippo and Paulinus ofNola J.E. Merdinger, Washington Building God's House: Augustine's Homilies at Episcopal Conse crations, Church Dedications, and Funerals Edward Morgan, Cambridge The Concept of Person in Augustine's De Trinitate John M. Norris, Dallas Augustine's Interpretation of Genesis in the City of God XI-XV Piotr Paciorek, Naples, Florida Christ and Melchizedek both Fatherless and Motherless in the Christology of Augustine of Hippo R.M. Price, London Augustine, Confessions VII: Autobiography or Apologetic? Matthew Robinson, Halifax, Nova Scotia Christ as the Central Metaphysical Principle in St Augustine's Theory of Time: Confessions, Book 11 Ronnie Rombs, St Benedict, Louisiana St Augustine's Inner Self: The Soul as 'Private' and 'Individuated'

113

1 19 125

131

137 143

149 155 173

191

195 201 207

213 221

227 233

Table of Contents

Karin Schlapbach, Zurich / Ithaca Intellectual Vision in Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12 or: Seeing the Hidden Meaning of Images Larissa Carina Seelbach, Hamm-Sieg Augustine on Concubinage and Women's Dignity Joanne Snow-Smith, Seattle Saint Augustine and Hermes Trismegistus Concerning the Worship of Demons: The Condemnation of Free-Standing Statues Tarmo Toom, Arlington, Virginia The Necessity of Semiotics: Augustine on Biblical Interpretation ... Christian Tornau, Jena Does Augustine Accept Pagan Virtue? The Place of Book 5 in the Argument of the City of God Marie-Anne Vannier, Metz La Lettre 147 et la question de la mystique augustinienne Mark Vessey, Vancouver Ghosts in the Machine: Augustine, Derrida, de Man Dorothea Weber, Vienna Some Literary Aspects of the Debate between Julian of Eclanum and Augustine Jonathan Yates, Leuven Selected Remarks on Some of Augustine's Unique Exegesis of the Catholic Epistles in the Pelagian Controversies Frances Young, Birmingham Wisdom in Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana Victor Yudin, Leuven Refuting Porphyry with Plato: Augustine's Reading of the Timaeus 41 A-B

VII

239 245

251 257

263 277 283

289

303 323

329

XVII. OTHER LATIN WRITERS Carole C. Burnett, Baltimore A Westward Slant: Avitus' Latin Translation of Lucian on the Inventio of Stephen's Relics I.J. Davidson, Dunedin Seeking Perfection: Ambrose on Passion Bazyli Degorski, O.S.P.P.E., Rome L'interpretazione pneumatologica delle nozze di Cana secondo san Gaudenzio di Brescia Thomas S. Ferguson, New York Misquoting Plautus: The 'Classical Curriculum' of Fulgentius the Mythographer

339 345

353

359

VIII

Table of Contents

Alberto Ferreiro, Seattle Petrine Primacy and Episcopal Authority in Caesarius of Arles Bernard Green, Oxford Leo the Great and the Heresy of Nestorius Katharina Greschat, Mainz Die Verwendung des Physiologus bei Gregor dem Grofien. Paulus als gezahmtes Einhorn in Moralia in Job XXXI Joseph Grzywaczewski, Paris La lectio divina a la campagne en Gaule au VIe siecle d'apres les Sermons de C6saire d' Arles Theresia Hainthaler, Frankfurt Zur Christologie des Fulgentius von Ruspe in der Frage des Wissens Christi Richard Klein, Erlangen Der Julianexkurs bei Prudentius, apotheosis 449-502: Struktur und Bedeutung Josef Lossl, Cardiff Julian of Aeclanum's 'Prophetic Exegesis' Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe, Cambridge Ambrosiaster's Political Diabology David Maxwell, Notre Dame The Christological Coherence of Cassian's On the Incarnation of the Lord Luciana Mirri, Bologna Elementi teologici nel De Incarnatione di Giovanni Cassiano Sigrid Mratschek, Rostock Die abgebrochene Bischofsliste bei Gregor von Tours — ein vergessenes Zeugnis antipapstlicher Propaganda? Carta Noce, Rome Some Questions about Rufinus' Translation of Origen's Homiliae in Leviticum Willemien Otten, Utrecht Anthropology between Imago Mundi and Imago Dei: The Place of Johannes Scottus Eriugena in the Tradition of Christian Thought .... Philippe Regerat, Chalons La participation du peuple a la liturgie au Vime siecle: le temoignage de la Vita Severini d'Eugippe Helmut Seng, Mainz Felix sine sanguine martyr: Die Norm der Heiligkeit und ihre symbolische Erfullung bei Paulinus von Nola, carmen XIV Roland J. Teske, S.J., Milwaukee The Augustinianism of Prosper of Aquitaine Revisited

367 373

381

387

393

401 409 423

429 435

441

451

459

473

483 491

Table of Contents

Chiara O. Tommasi Moreschini, Pisa Linguistic Coinages in Marius Victorinus' Negative Theology Jean-Marc Vercruysse, Arras La composition rh6torique du Liber regularum de Tyconius John Voelker, Milwaukee An Anomalous Trinitarian Formula in Marius Victorinus' Against Arius Konrad Vossing, Bonn Notes on the Biographies of the Two African Fulgentii Annelie Volgers, Hilversum, The Netherlands Damasus' Request: Why Jerome Needed to (Re-)Answer Ambrosiaster's Questions Susan Weingarten, Oxford Jerome's Geography

IX

505 511

517 523

531 537

Abbreviations AA.SS AAWG.PH AB AC ACL ACO ACW AHDLMA AJAH AJP AKK AKPAW ALMA ALW AnalBoll ANCL ANF ANRW AnSt AnThA APOT AR ARW ASS AThANT Aug AugSt AW AZ BA BAC BASOR BDAG BEHE BETL BGL BHG BHL

see ASS. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen Philologischehistorische Klasse, Gottingen. Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels. Antike und Christentum, ed. F.J. Dolger, Miinster. Antiquite classique, Louvain. Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin. Ancient Christian Writers, ed. J. Quasten and J.C. Plumpe, Westminster (Md.)/London. Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, Paris. American Journal of Ancient History, Cambridge, Mass. American Journal of Philology, Baltimore. Archiv fur katholisches Kirchenrecht, Mainz. Abhandlungen der koniglichen PreuBischen Akademie der Wissen schaften, Berlin. Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), Paris/Brussels. Archiv fur Liturgiewissenschaft, Regensburg. Analecta Bollandiana, Brussels. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh. Ante-Nicene Fathers, Buffalo/New York. Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt, ed H. Temporini et al., Berlin. Anatolian Studies, London. Annee theologique augustinienne, Paris. Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English, ed. R.E. Charles, Oxford. Archivum Romanicum, Florence. Archiv fur Religionswissenschaft, Berlin/Leipzig. Acta Sanctorum, ed. the Bollandists, Brussels. Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Zurich. Augustinianum, Rome. Augustinian Studies, Villanova (USA). Athanasius Werke, ed. H.-G. Opitz et al., Berlin. Archaologische Zeitung, Berlin. Bibliotheque augustinienne, Paris. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, New Haven, Conn. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Chris tian Literature, 3rd edn F.W. Danker, Chicago. Bibliotheque de l'licole des Hautes Etudes, Paris. Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, Louvain. Benedictinisches Geistesleben, St. Ottilien. Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca, Brussels. Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis, Brussels.

XII BHO BHTh BJ BJRULM BKV BKV2 BKV3 BLE BoJ BS BSL BWAT Byz BZ BZNW CAr CBQ CCCM CCG CCL CCSA CH CIL CP(h) CPG CPL CQ CR CSCO

CSEL CSHB CTh CUF CW DAC

Abbreviations

Bibliotheca Hagiographica Orientalis, Brussels. Beitrage zur historischen Theologie, Tiibingen. Bursians Jahresbericht iiber die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Leipzig. Bulletin of the John Ky lands Library, Manchester. Bibliothek der Kirchenvater, ed. F.X. Reithmayr and V. Thalhofer, Kempten. Bibliothek der Kirchenvater, ed. O. Bardenhewer, Th. Schermann, and C. Weyman, Kempten/Munich. Bibliothek der Kirchenvater. Zweite Reihe, ed. O. Bardenhewer, J. Zellinger, and J. Martin, Munich. Bulletin de litterature ecclesiastique, Toulouse. Bonner Jahrbiicher, Bonn. Bibliotheca sacra, London. Bolletino di studi latini, Naples. Beitrage zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, Leipzig/Stuttgart. Byzantion, Brussels. Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Leipzig. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentlische Wissenschaft, Berlin. Cahiers Archeologique, Paris. Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Washington. Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, Tumhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, Turnhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Tumhout/Paris. Corpus Christianorum, Series Apocryphorum, Tumhout/Paris. Church History, Chicago. Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Berlin. Classical Philology, Chicago. Clavis Patrum Graecorum, ed. M. Geerard, vols. I-VI, Turnhout. Clavis Patrum Latinorum (SE 3), ed. E. Dekkers and A. Gaar, Turnhout. Classical Quarterly, London/Oxford. The Classical Review, London/Oxford. Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Louvain. Aeth = Scriptores Aethiopici Ar = Scriptores Arabici Arm = Scriptores Armeniaci Copt = Scriptores Coptici Iber = Scriptores Iberici Syr = Scriptores Syri Subs = Subsidia Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna. Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn. Collectanea Theologica, Lvov. Collection des Universites de France publiee sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Bude, Paris. Catholic World, New York. Dictionary of the Apostolic Church, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh.

Abbreviations DACL DAL DB DBS DCB DHGE Did DOP DOS DR DS DSp DTC EA ECatt ECQ EE EECh EKK EH EO EtByz ETL EWNT ExpT FC FGH FKDG FRL FS FThSt FTS FZThPh GCS GDV GLNT GNO GRBS GWV

XIII

see DAL Dictionnaire d'archeologie chr6tienne et de liturgie, ed. F. Cabrol, H. Leclercq, Paris. Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris. Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplement, Paris. Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines, ed. W. Smith and H. Wace, 4 vols, London. Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclesiastique, ed. A. Baudrillart, Paris. Didaskalia, Lisbon. Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C. Dumbarton Oaks Studies, Cambridge, Mass., subsequently Washington, D.C. Downside Review, Stratton on the Fosse, Bath. H.J. Denzinger and A. Schonmetzer, ed., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Barcelona/Freiburg i.B./Rome. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, ed. M. Viller, S.J., and others, Paris. Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann, Paris. Etudes augustiniennes, Paris. Enciclopedia Cattolica, Rome. Eastern Churches Quarterly, Ramsgate. Estudios eclesiasticos, Madrid. Encyclopedia of the Early Church, ed. A. Di Berardino, Cambridge. Evangelisch-Katholischen Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Neukirchen. Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae, ed. UedingKirch, 6th ed., Barcelona. Echos d'Orient, Paris. Etudes Byzantines, Paris. Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, Louvain. Exegetisches Worterbuch zum NT, ed. H.R. Balz et al., Stuttgart. The Expository Times, Edinburgh. The Fathers of the Church, New York. Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Gottingen. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Gottingen. Festschrift. Freiburger theologische Studien, Freiburg i.B. Frankfurter theologische Studien, Frankfurt a.M. Freiburger Zeitschrift fiir Theologie und Philosophic, Freiburg/Switzer land. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Leipzig/Berlin. Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit, Stuttgart. Grande Lessico del Nuovo Testamento, Genoa. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden. Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, Mass. Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Offenburg.

XIV HbNT HDR HJG HKG HNT HO HSCP HThR HTS HZ ICC ILCV 1LS J(b)AC JBL Jdl JECS JEH JJS JLH JPTh JQR JRS JSJ JSOR JThSt KAV KeTh KJ(b) LCL LNPF L(0)F LSJ LThK MA MAMA Mansi MBTh MCom MGH

Abbreviations Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. Tubingen. Harvard Dissertations in Religion, Missoula. Historisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft, successively Munich, Cologne and Munich/Freiburg i.B. Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Tiibingen. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, Tubingen. Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Theological Studies, Cambridge, Mass. Historische Zeitschrift, Munich/Berlin. The International Critical Commentary of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, Edinburgh. Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres, ed. E. Diehl, Berlin. Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau, Berlin. Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum, Miinster. Journal of Biblical Literature, Philadelphia, Pa., then various places. Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archaologischen Instituts, Berlin. Journal of Early Christian Studies, Baltimore. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, London. Journal of Jewish Studies, London. Jahrbuch fur Liturgik und Hymnologie, Kassel. Jahrbiicher fur protestantische Theologie, Leipzig/Freiburg i.B. Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia. Journal of Roman Studies, London. Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period, Leiden. Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, Chicago. Journal of Theological Studies, Oxford. Kommentar zu den apostolischen Vatern, Gdttingen. Kerk en Theologie, 's Gravenhage. Kirchliches Jahrbuch fur die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Giitersloh. The Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge, Mass. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, Buffalo/New York. Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, Oxford. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, new (9th) edn H.S. Jones, Oxford. Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, Freiburg i.B. Moyen-Age, Brussels. Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, London. J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florence, 1759-1798. Reprint and continuation: Paris/Leipzig, 1901-1927. Munsterische Beitrage zur Theologie, Miinster. Miscelanea Comillas, Comillas/Santander. Monumenta germaniae historica. Hanover/Berlin.

Abbreviations ML MPG MSR MThZ Mus NGWG NH(M)S NovTest NPNF NRSV NRTh NTA NT.S NTS OBO OCA OCP OECS OLA OLP Or OrChr OrSyr PG PGL PL PLRE PLS PO PRE PS PTA PThR PTS PW QLP QuLi RAC RACh RAM RAug RBen RB(ibl) RE

XV

Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, Louvain. See PG. Melanges de science religieuse, Lille. Miinchener theologische Zeitschrift, Munich. Le Museon, Louvain. Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen. Nag Hammadi (and Manichaean) Studies, Leiden. Novum Testamentum, Leiden. See LNPF. New Revised Standard Version. Nouvelle Revue Theologique, Tournai/Louvain/Paris. Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, Miinster. Novum Testamentum Supplements, Leiden. New Testament Studies, Cambridge/Washington. Orbis biblicus et orientalis, Freiburg, Switz. Orientalia Christiana Analecta, Rome. Orientalia Christiana Periodica, Rome. Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, Louvain. Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica, Louvain. Orientalia. Commentarii editi a Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Rome. Oriens Christianus, Leipzig, then Wiesbaden. L'Orient Syrien, Paris. Migne, Patrologia, series graeca. A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. G.L. Lampe, Oxford. Migne, Patrologia, series latina. The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, ed. A.H.M. Jones et al., Cambridge. Migne, Patrologia, series latina. Supplementum ed. A. Hamman. Patrologia Orientalis, Paris. Paulys Realenzyklopadie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft, Stuttgart. Patrologia Syriaca, Paris. Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, Bonn. Princeton Theological Review, Princeton. Patristische Texte und Studien, Berlin. Paulys Realencyclopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart. Questions liturgiques et paroissiales, Louvain. Questions liturgiques, Louvain Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana, Rome. Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, Stuttgart. Revue d'ascetique et de mystique, Paris. Recherches Augustiniennes, Paris. Revue Benedictine, Maredsous. Revue biblique, Paris. Realencyklopadie fur protestantische Theologie und Kirche, founded by J.J. Herzog, 3e ed. A. Hauck, Leipzig.

XVI REA(ug) REB RED REL REG RevSR RevThom RFIC RGG RHE RhMus RHR RHT RMAL ROC RPh RQ RQH RSLR RSPT, RSPh RSR RTAM RthL RTM Sal SBA SBS ScEc SCh, SC SD SE SDHI SH SHA SJMS SM SO SP SPM SQ SQAW SSL StudMed

Abbreviations Revue des eludes Augustiniennes, Paris. Revue des etudes byzantines, Paris. Rerum ecclesiasticarum documenta, Rome. Revue des etudes latines, Paris. Revue des eludes grecques, Paris. Revue des sciences religieuses, Strasbourg. Revue thomiste, Toulouse. Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica, Turin. Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Gunkel-Zscharnack, Tubingen Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique. Lou vain. Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie, Bonn. Revue de l'histoire des religions, Paris. Revue d'Histoire des Textes, Paris. Revue du Moyen-Age Latin, Paris. Revue de l'Orient chr6tien, Paris. Revue de philologie, Paris. Romische Quartalschrift, Freiburg i.B. Revue des questions historiques, Paris. Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa, Florence. Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, Paris. Recherches de science religieuse, Paris. Recherches de theologie ancienne et m6dievale, Louvain. Revue theologique de Louvain, Louvain. Rivista di teologia morale, Bologna. Salesianum, Roma. Schweizerisches Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft, Basel. Stuttgarter Bibelstudien, Stuttgart. Sciences ecclesiastiques, Bruges. Sources chr6tiennes, Paris. Studies and Documents, ed. K. Lake and S. Lake. London/Philadelphia. Sacris Erudiri. Bruges. Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, Roma. Subsidia Hagiographica, Brussels. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, . Speculum. Journal of Mediaeval Studies. Cambridge, Mass. Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordems und seiner Zweige, Munich. Symbolae Osloenses, Oslo. Studia Patristica. Papers presented to the International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford, successively Berlin, Kalamazoo, Louvain. Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia, ed. C. Mohrman and J. Quasten, Utrecht. Sammlung ausgewahlter Quellenschriften zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Tubingen. Schriften und Quellen der Alten Welt, Berlin. Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Louvain. Studi Medievali, Turin.

Abbreviations SVF TDNT TE ThGl ThJ ThLZ ThPh ThQ ThR ThWAT ThWNT ThZ TLG TP TRE TS TThZ TU USQR VC VetChr VT WBC WUNT WZKM YUP ZAC ZAM ZAW ZDPV ZKG ZKTh ZN(T)W ZRG ZThK

XVII

Stoicorum Veteram Fragmenta, ed. J. von Amim, Leipzig. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Mich. Teologia espiritual, Valencia. Theologie und Glaube, Paderborn. Theologische Jahrbiicher, Leipzig. Theologische Literaturzeitung, Leipzig. Theologie und Philosophic, Freiburg i.B. Theologische Quartalschrift, Tubingen. Theologische Rundschau, Tubingen. Theologisches Worterbuch zum Alten Testament, Stuttgart. Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Stuttgart. Theologische Zeitschrift, Basle. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Lancaster, Pa. Theologische Realenzyklopadie, Berlin. Theological Studies, New York and various places; now Washington, D.C. Trierer theologische Zeitschrift, Trier. Texte und Untersuchungen, Leipzig/Berlin. Union Seminary Quarterly Review, New York. Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam. Vetera Christianorum, Bari (Italy). Vetus Testamentum, Leiden. Word Biblical Commentary, Waco. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, Tubingen. Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vienna. Yale University Press, New Haven. Zeitschrift fur Antikes Christentum, Berlin. Zeitschrift fur Aszese und Mystik, Innsbruck, then Wiirzburg. Zeitschrift fur die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, Giessen, then Berlin. Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palastina-Vereins, Leipzig. Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Gotha, then Stuttgart. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, Vienna. Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der alteren Kirche, Giessen, then Berlin. Zeitschrift fur Rechtsgeschichte, Weimar. Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, Tubingen.

XVI. Augustine Bengt Alexanderson Isabelle Bochet Gerald Bonner Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic Pamela Bright Montague Brown Bernard Bruning Martin Claes Finbarr G. Clancy Kevin Corrigan Marianne Djuth Anthony Dupont Michael P. Foley Luigi Gioia Susan Blackburn Griffith Carol Harrison Jennifer Henery John Paul Hoskins David G. Hunter Andrew Hwang John Peter Kenney Paul R. Kolbet

M. Lamberigts Robin Lane Fox Christine McCann J.E. Merdinger Edward Morgan John M. Norris Piotr Paciorek R.M. Price Matthew Robinson Ronnie Rombs Karin Schlapbach Larissa Carina Seelbach Joanne Snow-Smith Tarmo Toom Christian Tornau Marie-Anne Vannier Mark Vessey Dorothea Weber Jonathan Yates Frances Young Victor Yudin

Lumiere et ciel dans le De Genesi ad litteram d'Augustin

Bengt Alexanderson, Jorlanda, Sweden

On sait bien le grand interet qu'Augustin portait a la Genise; il a ecrit trois ouvrages sur ce theme, et il y revient dans les Confessions et dans le De la Cite de Dieu. Je vais chercher a suivre sa maniere de raisonner sur quelques points. Dieu fit le ciel et la terre. Qu'est-ce que le ciel? II y a quatre ou meme cinq possibility. 1. Le ciel est spiritalis creatura, cr6ature spirituelle1 ; la terre est creature corporelle. 2. Le ciel est cr6ature corporelle, en tel cas superior, superieure2; la terre est cr6ature corporelle, infeneure. 3. Le ciel est informis materia spiritalis, matiere spirituelle sans forme3; la terre est matiere corporelle sans forme. Voila l' interpretation a laquelle Augustin arrive dans le De la Genise au sens litteral. 4. Le ciel est creatura spiritalis perfecta et beata semper, cr6ature spiri tuelle parfaite et a jamais heureuse4; la terre n'est pas creature corporelle parfaite, mais matiere encore imparfaite: on sait qu'elle est formee jour apres jour, et il n'y a pas, comme avant, de parallelisme entre ciel et terre. II y a aussi une cinquieme possibilite, mais a mon avis, elle est proche de notre troisieme possibilite; tant ciel que terre seraient sans forme5. Dans le De la Genise au sens litteral il est clair qu'Augustin arrive a la conclusion que la troisieme interpretation est la bonne. Mais qu'est-ce qu'il pense dans les Confessions, quelque 15 ans auparavant? Solignac6 et Pelland7 1 1.1.2. Si non autrement indiqu6es, les citations se r6ferent au De Genesi ad litteram (Gn. litt.). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 1.1.3. 5 1.1.3. Le ciel est informe: il est tenebrae super abyssum. La terre est informis: elle est invisibilis et incomposita. 6 Aim6 Solignac, 'Notes complementaires 2', dans: La Genise au sens littiral, BA 48 (Paris, 1972, r6impression 2000). 7 Gilles Pelland, 'Augustin rencontre le livre de la Genese', dans Pelland et al., 'De Genesi contra Manichaeos', 'De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus' di Agostino d'Ippona, Lectio Augustini 8 (Palermo, 1992), pp. 15-53: p. 46.

4

B. Alexanderson

pensent que la, il adhere a notre quatrieme opinion, a savoir que le ciel est cr6ature parfaite et a jamais heureuse, tandis que la terre est matiere encore imparfaite. II y aurait donc une difference entre les Confessions et le De la Genese au sens litteral. Pepin8, au contraire, croit qu'il embrasse la meme opi nion dans les deux ouvrages, c'est-a-dire que tant ciel que terre sont sans forme. En lisant le douzieme livre des Confessions, on pense absolument que P6pin a tort; il s'appuie sur des passages ou Augustin ne fait que pr6senter des idees diffe>entes, sans s'associer a aucune d'entre elles, et il semble plutot que Dieu crea un ciel spirituel et parfait des le debut, et une terre qui est premierement sans forme et ensuite formee; cette idee serait donc opposee a celle que nous trouvons dans le De la Genese au sens litteral. Mais dans le treizieme livre des Confessions, on trouve que sans doute tant le ciel que la terre sont sans formes des le debut. Je crois qu'on se trompe parce que dans le douzieme livre, Augustin se concentre sur le ciel comme cr6ature parfaite et heureuse, synonyme d'une lumiere spirituelle. II ne s'interesse pas a ce qui existe avant ce ciel parfait, a son 6tat sans forme. Cet 6tat, on ne le trouve que dans le trei zieme livre. Ce n'est pas vers le ciel sans forme, mais vers la terre sans forme qu'Augustin dirige son attention dans le douzieme livre. L'Ecriture ne fait que mentionner le ciel, fecit caelum et terram, et abandonne, pour ainsi dire, le ciel pour decrire immediatement la terre comme invisibilis et incomposita; il faut donc expliquer ce que cela veut dire, et Augustin parle longuement de informitas. Dans le treizieme livre, il arrive aux mots du Createur: Fiat lux, qui ne sont pas mentionnes dans le livre pr6c&lent; dans les Confessions comme dans le De la Genese au sens litteral, e'est avec Fiat lux que la matiere trouve sa forme. On dirait peut-etre qu'Augustin est un peu negligent puisque dans les Confessions, il n'explique pas clairement Involution d'un ciel sans forme a un ciel forme. Mais on pourrait le defendre: en realite, tout se passe a la fois, et meme a deux sens, qui sont tous les deux bien connus. Premierement, tout est fait simul selon YEcclesiastique 18, 1, car certes Dieu qui est tout-puissant peut bien creer tout a la fois; l'Ecriture, au contraire, ne peut pas tout dire en meme temps. Deuxiemement, Involution de ce qui est sans forme a ce qui en a n'est pas une evolution dans le temps, mais une evolution logique qui se fait causaliter. Augustin l'exemplifie dans le De la Genese au sens litteral par le son et les mots9. Nous 6mettons des sons, un bruit, et ce bruit est transform6 en des mots; nous n'6mettons pas premierement le son et le transformons ensuite en mots, mais tout cela se passe a la fois. Donc, le ciel, meme le ciel parfait et heureux, est la immediatement.

8 Jean Pepin, 'Recherches sur le sens et les origines de l'expression caelum caeli dans le livre XII des Confessions de s. Augustin'. Archivum latinitatis medii aevi 23 (1953), 185-274: p. 203-204. ' 1.15.29.

Lumifere et ciel dans le De Genesi ad litteram d'Augustin

5

Une autre difference entre les Confessions et le De la Genese au sens litteral est que, dans les Confessions, Augustin se plait a pr6senter les interpr6tations possibles, et il affirme que toutes, ou presque toutes, peuvent etre vraies et que tant le naif que le subtil, chacun a sa maniere, y trouvent leur 6dification. Le De la Gentse au sens litteral est, elle aussi, une oeuvre aporistique, mais pour ainsi dire plus scientifique; la, il faut arriver a une conclusion marqu6e. Dieu dit: fiat lux10. Comment l'a-t-il dit? Est-ce qu'il l'a dit temporaliter (dans le temps) et mutabiliter (dans le changement), ou l'a-t-il dit verbi aeternitate (dans l'eternit6 du Verbe)? Dieu ne peut pas lui-meme dire quelque chose dans le temps et dans le changement, parce qu'il est immuable (incommutabilis). II faut qu'il parle par quelque chose de cr6e qui serait, ou une cr6a ture spirituelle ou une cr6ature corporelle. Supposons qu'il le fait par une crea ture spirituelle. Cela ne serait pas impossible, car une des possibilites 6tait que Dieu a cr66 une spiritalis creatura. Cette hypothese s'effondre, car en tel cas, la lumiere ne serait pas la prima creatura. Mais pourquoi la lumiere serait-elle la premiere creature? La Genese n'en dit rien. Augustin veut bien qu'elle le soit, et il y arrive en supposant que PEcriture a dit d'abord, d'une maniere g6n6rale, que Dieu a fait le ciel et la terre; ensuite, elle decrit d'une maniere plus detaillee comment cela s'est fait, et alors, le premier pas 6tait de creer la lumiere. Par fiat lux, le temps commence a s'ecouler, et tout ce qui est cree apres est temporel et changeable. Supposons que Dieu a dit fiat lux d'une maniere corporelle. Cela n'est pas impossible, car les creatures formers pouvaient bien etre corporelles, et par une creature corporelle Dieu pouvait bien faire sonner une voix; il l'a fait ensuite, par exemple au bapteme de J6sus-Christ. Mais alors, la lumiere ne serait pas la premiere cr6ature; aussi, Augustin reduit imm6diatement cette idee a l'absurde: Quelle langue Dieu a-t-il parte, qui l'ecoutait? Mais ce qui prononce le message de Dieu n'est pas une creature cr6ee, ni spirituelle, ni corporelle; il se passe in Verbo, selon St. Jean, et 6ternellement". De ce Verbum l'evang61iste dit: In principio erat Verbum, comme Moi'se dans la Genese: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Le probleme 6tait: la lumiere creee, etait-elle spirituelle ou corporelle; si spirituelle, alors la lumiere peut bien etre la prima creatura, cre6e quand Dieu fit ciel et terre. Et elle l'est, car ce ciel est la lumiere, mais comme la terre, il n'est pas encore parfait. Le premier ciel, la premiere lumiere est sans forme, il est informis (voila le mot cle); il est forme par fiat lux, par le Verbe de Dieu. Le cr6ateur appelle cette cr6ature sans forme, et ainsi elle devient formee et parfaite. Augustin poursuit sur ce theme12. Pourquoi n'est-il pas 6crit: in principio dixit Deus fiat caelum et terra, tandis que l'on trouve ensuite maintes fois: 10 1.2.4. 11 1.2.6. 12 1.3.8.

6

B. Alexanderson

dixit Deus? L'explication en est que si l'on trouvait: dixit Deus: fiat caelum et terra, alors tout await ete accompli des le debut, car la parole du createur fait naitre la perfection, mais il est encore trop tot pour cette perfection. La crea ture spirituelle est cr6ee, non pas immediatement mais en deux 6tapes, la crea ture corporelle en plusieurs 6tapes pendant les jours a suivre. On voit l'importance qu'il faut attribuer a chaque mot: rien n'est dit sans cause. Une question a resoudre est la Sagesse. II y a une Sagesse qui est creee avant toute autre chose (prior omnium) selon YEcclesiastique13. Elle ne peut pas etre la Sagesse qui est active dans la cr6ation, dont la Sagesse de Salo mon14 dit: 'elle deploie sa force d'un bout du monde a l'autre et regit tout d'une maniere bienfaisante', et 'tu as tout regle avec nombre, poids et mesure'15. Cette premiere Sagesse est nee (genita), et elle est identique au Fils et au Verbe. L'autre Sagesse, celle qui est creee (creata) est identique a cae lum et a lux, la cr6ature spirituelle. Les anges font aussi partie de cette creature spirituelle, avec les virtutes et les hommes qui entreront dans la vie eternelle16. La position des anges n'est pas tout a fait claire chez Augustin; on ne sait pas s'ils sont identiques a la creature spirituelle, ou s'ils en font partie17, mais il faut qu'ils soient ct66s, et il faut qu'ils se trouvent quelque part. Un autre probleme qui a des rapports 6troits avec la lumiere est celui du soir et du matin : comment peuvent-ils se r6aliser, quand les corps celestes ne sont pas encore creeV8? Cela ne se fera qu'au quatrieme jour. II fait mention d'une ou deux explications sans s'y attarder avant d'en pr6senter une qui a plus de valeur. II part du fait que Dieu cree la lumiere et dit immediatement qu'elle 6tait bonne; la creation spirituelle s'est produite, elle est formee (formata res). Ensuite, Dieu se tourne vers ce qui reste, vers ce qui est corporel et sans forme, vers ce qui repr6sente le soir en comparaison avec ce qui precede. Suivent les choses corporelles, creees l'une apres l'autre; quand une a 6te formee, Dieu se tourne vers ce qui est encore sans forme, vers ce qui est encore le soir. Quand meme, cette explication ne satisfait pas Augustin, et il revient au probleme. La bonne explication est une autre, qu'on ne trouve que dans le quatrieme livre et puis plusieurs fois, comme s'il voulait l'inculquer. L'Lxriture dit: dixit Deus, et ensuite par exemple: fiat firmamentum; voila la connaissance supreme de cette creature spirituelle, de la lumiere; elle arrive a cette connaissance en

13 Eccli. \,4;Gn.litt. 1.17.32. 14 Sap. 8, 1. 15 Sap. 11,21. 16 Par exemple: 2.8.16, in qua natura intelleguntur omnes sancti angeli atque virtutes; 4.24.41, sancti angeli, quibus post resurrectionem coaequabimur. 17 lis semblent Stre identiques au premier jour qui est la creature spirituelle: dies Me societas atque unitas supercaelestium angelorum atque virtutum est (5.4.10). De l'autre cote\ ils ne sem blent pas 6tre identiques a la creature spirituelle, car la nature de celle-ci est aussi parfaite et heureuse que la nature des anges (8.25.47). 18 1.17.33.

Lumiere et ciel dans le De Genesi ad litteram d'Augustin

7

regardant la raison de cette cr6ature nouvelle, par exemple du firmament, dans le Verbum et cela est le jour. Ensuite, on lit: et sic est factum; cela veut dire que la creature spirituelle voit la r6alisation de ce phenomene (firmament, plantes, animaux, etc.); assurement, cette connaissance est d'une dignite inferieure, donc le soir. Puis, on lit: et fecit Deus firmamentum; alors, la creature spirituelle loue le createur pour ce qu'il vient de creer sur terre. Cela est aussi le matin et aussi le commencement d'un nouveau jour de cr6ation. La notion de la Sagesse est aussi etablie dans ce proces. Quand Dieu parte, il parte in Verbo. Cela se passe in coaeterna patri sapientia, dans la Sagesse contemporaine du Pere, cette Sagesse qui est une forme du Fils et du Verbum. Au pas suivant, la creature spirituelle est illuminee. Cela se fait secundum genitam sapientiam, selon cette autre Sagesse qui est creee et cela est le soir19. Nous lisons donc fiat, et sic factum est, et fecit Deus. On dirait que ces trois phrases veulent dire la meme chose, mais il n'en est pas ainsi; ces manieres de s'exprimer veulent dire que la creation est regardee sous des formes differentes pendant un proces ordonne\ ou les indications du temps (j°ur> sou*' matin) trouvent leurs places. Si l'Fxriture s'ecarte de cette maniere de proc6der, il y a une raison a cela. Nous avons deja vu pourquoi il n'est pas ecrit: dixit Deus fiat caelum et terra, a savoir parce que la parole du cr6ateur (dixit) aurait fait naitre la perfection, et il est trop tot pour cela. Pourquoi ne lisons-nous pas: et fecit Deus lucem20? Le premier pas est la: dixit Deus: fiat lux, de meme le deuxieme: et facta est lux. Le troisieme pas fait defaut, parce qu'une creation d'un ph6nomene corporel comme le firmament, les animaux, etc. n'existe pas pour cette lumiere spirituelle. Cette lumiere est illuminee par Dieu, elle voit en elle-mSme, d'une maniere infeneure, sa propre nature, et ainsi s'acheve sa cr6ation. Dans les paroles de Dieu, il est n6cessaire de trouver le vrai sens de chaque mot et de chaque position d'une phrase, de meme d'expliquer chaque devia tion du schema ordinaire. Une cons6quence en est qu'il faut tant combiner que diviser les phenomenes mentionn6s. II y trois lumieres; celle qui est coeternelle au Pere et par qui toutes les choses sont faites21, a savoir cette lumiere qui est le Fils et le Verbe et la Sagesse nee. II y a une lumiere spirituelle, qui est la premiere creature et qui est aussi le ciel mentionne immediatement au debut de la Genise; elle est aussi le caelum caeli du Psalmiste, moins souvent mentionn6 dans le De la Genise au sens litteral que dans les Confessions. II y a finalement la lumiere que nous voyons, cr6ee le quatrieme jour avec le soleil. II y a deux cieux; le sup6rieur, a comprendre comme la creature spirituelle, la lumiere spirituelle, la Sagesse creee, ou les anges ont aussi leur place; il y a 19 La plus claire explication de ces 'trois pas' est peut-etre celle que l'on trouve dans le De civitate Dei 11.29. 20 2.8.16. 21 1.17.32.

8

B. Alexanderson

aussi, totalement ecart6 de ce ciel, le firmament que nous voyons. II y a, pour rendre complete la notion du ciel, un troisieme ciel; les couches d'air, oil volent les oiseaux du ciel. Quant a la position d'une phrase dans le contexte, dle est assurement importante. L'Ecriture dit: vidit Deus lucem, quia bona est, et Dieu le dit immediatement apres la creation de la lumiere, quand le travail du premier jour n'est pas encore accompli; nous ne lisons pas, comme ailleurs, vidit Deus quia bonum est apres tout le travail d'un certain jour. La raison en est que la lumiere est parfaite et bonne, et Dieu le dit, mais Dieu a aussi le meme jour, apres la creation de la lumiere, separ6 la lumiere des tenebres, et les tenebres ne sont pas parfaites: elles representent la matiere non pas encore formee, et par consequent non pas encore bonne22. L'£criture ne peut donc pas conclure le travail du premier jour en disant: vidit Deus quia bonum est. Apres la cr6a tion du soleil et de la lune, on trouve que ces corps c6lestes sont la pour distinguer la lumiere des tenebres, mais maintenant il s'agit de lumiere et des tenebres corporelles. Jour et nuit sont maintenant formes et parfaits dans leurs genres, et par consequent, on trouve apres leur creation: et vidit Deus quod esset bonum. II y a donc deux especes de t6nebres: celles qui representent la matiere sans forme et celles qui sont tout court la nuit. Le De la Gene~se au sens litteral est un ouvrage perspicace et fascinant, oil Augustin infatigablement cherche a tout expliquer. Aucune difficulte ne le fait reculer. L'ouvrage n'est pas facile. Augustin parle souvent des tardiores, les esprits lents, pour lesquels il faut s'exprimer d'une maniere plus simple. Dans le De la Genese au sens litteral, il ne facilite pas trop les choses pour nous autres, nous tardiores.

22 1.17.35.

La figure de Moise dans la Cite de Dieu

Isabelle Bochet, Paris

On sait quelle place tient la figure de Moise dans la Bible, on sait aussi l'importance que lui attachent Philon d'Alexandrie et les Peres1. Augustin lui consacre de longs developpements dans le Contra Faustum ou dans les Quaestiones in Heptateuchum2. On s'dtonne alors de la raret6 des mentions significatives de Moise dans la Cite de Dieu?. L'etonnement s'accroit quand on considere les livres XV a XVIII4: un seul paragraphs du livre XVI suffit a condenser l'histoire de Moise, de Josu6 et des Juges. La figure de Moise intervient en revanche dans le livre X, alors qu'Augustin refute les doctrines paiennes. Les mentions de Moise dans le livre XVIII sont elles aussi significatives. J'examinerai successivement ces references afin de d6terminer le role qu'Augustin confere a la figure de Moise dans son apologie de la religion chretienne.

1. La vie de Moise: un recit laconique (De ciu. Dei XVI.43) La pr6sentation de Moise dans le livre XVI est rapide. Augustin dit seulement que Moise echappe a la mort, qu'il est 'nourri et adopts par la fille de Pharaon', qu'il s'enfuit apres avoir tu6 un £gyptien. II 6numere les plaies d'6gypte, evoque d'une phrase le passage de la mer Rouge, puis le don de la Loi, sans rien dire de son contenu: il insiste seulement sur la fh6ophanie et retient la signification proph&ique de l'evenement, qui prefigure le don de l'Esprit, cinquante jours apres l'immolation du Christ. Augustin ajoute que Moise n'introduisit pas le peuple dans la terre promise, mais que ce fut 'J6sus\ ce qui a valeur figurative.

1 Cf. P.-M. Guillaume, 'Moise', DSp 10 (1980), 1453-71; Moise I'homme de I'Alliance (Toumai, 1955). 2 C. Faust. XXO.69-79 (CSEL 25/1, p. 666-82); Quaest. in Hept. D (CCL 33, p. 70-171). 5 Selon le Cetedoc Library of Christian Latin Texts, 39 sententiae comportent le terme Moys*; certaines sont ties secondaires: Xm.21; XIV.22; XV.14; XVI.4; XVII.1-2; XVII.7; XVm.32; XX.28-29. 4 Pour une 6tude d'ensemble de ce parcours scripturaire, voir I. Bochet, 'Le firmament de I'E.criture' . L'hermineutique augustinienne (Paris, 2004), p. 455-498.

10

I. BOCHET

Dans cette presentation, Augustin a le souci - bien comprehensible dans le contexte de la controverse antipelagienne - de tout attribuer a l'action de Dieu: Moi'se n'est qu'un instrument par lequel 'Dieu accomplit ce qu'il avait promis a Abraham'; ou plutot: par lequel il commence a r6aliser 'la premiere promesse faite a Abraham, celle qui concernait une nation, les Hebreux et la terre de Chanaan, mais pas encore celle qui avait trait a toutes les nations et au monde entier'5. Comment expliquer une pr6sentation aussi sommaire, lorsqu'on sait l'importance de ces ev6nements pour l'histoire du salut? Faire un recit, certes, c'est necessairement privilegier un point de vue. L'ampleur du parcours scripturaire esquiss6 dans les livres XV a XVIII imposait des choix. Mais pourquoi privilegier la Genese, et non l'Exode? Selon A.-M. La Bonnardiere, il faudrait l'expliquer par la r6daction contemporaine des livres II a VII des Quaestiones et Locutiones in Heptateuchum6. Ce rapprochement est interessant, mais 1 'ex plication suffit-elle? La mention rep6tee de la promesse dans le paragraphe 43 du livre XVI met sur la voie d'une explication meilleure. Dans sa pr6sentation de la Genese, Augustin insiste de fait sur le caractere gratuit et universel7 de la promesse faite a Abraham. La s6lection scripturaire des livres XV a XVIII devient alors signifiante, si on considere la visee apolog6tique de la Cite de Dieu : Augus tin entend demontrer que l''histoire sacreV proph6tise 'la voie universelle du salut', comme il l'avait annonce dans le livre X en presentant la religion chretienne comme une r6ponse a la quete de Porphyre8. L'importance donn6e a la Genese se justifie donc doublement: d'une part, on y trouve des recits qui concernent toutes les nations; d'autre part, on y lit des 'promesses', autrement dit, on y decouvre, sous un mode voil6, une annonce de la grace. En revanche, un livre comme l'Exode concerne d'abord le peuple juif et manifeste l'accomplissement de la promesse qui concerne la post6rit6 charnelle d'Abraham. Logiquement, Augustin ne s'y arrete guere, puisqu'il privilegie la seconde promesse, 'qui a trait a toutes les nations et au monde entier' et qui s'accomplit dans Tavenement du Christ dans la chair'9.

5 43.1-2 B A 36, p. 330-3. 6 '"On a dit de toi des choses glorieuses. Cit6 de Dieu!'", en Saint Augustin et la Bible. 6d. La Bonnardiere (Paris, 1986), p. 365. 7 XVI.26.2 (p. 274-7); 16 (p. 244-5); 32.2 (p. 296-7); 37 (p. 310-1 1); 42 (p. 328-9). 8 32.1-3 BA 34, p. 550-9. Sur la uia universalis dans la pens6e de Porphyre (X.32.1 (p. 546-7) = fragm. Smith 302F), voir A. Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague, 1974), p. 136-8. ' XVI.43.2 (BA 36, p. 332-3).

La figure de Moi'se dans la Cite de Dieu

11

2. Les miracles de Moise et la valeur de la Loi (De ciu. Dei X.8 et 13) Augustin mentionne plusieurs fois Moi'se dans le livre X de l'ouvrage, c'esta-dire a la fin de la premiere partie, dans sa r6futation des doctrines pai'ennes. II s'efforce alors de montrer que le culte est a rendre a l' unique vrai Dieu et non a une multitude de dieux10. Pourquoi donne-t-il une place a Moi'se dans ce contexte? Pour confirmer le culte du Dieu unique, il fallait montrer la valeur de l'Ecriture qui le present a l'exclusion de tout autre. Pour manifester la valeur de l'Ecriture, il fallait prouver qu'elle est donn6e par Dieu. Les miracles l'attestent: Augustin 6numere donc des miracles de l'Ancien Testament et, parmi eux, il privilegie les prodiges accomplis par l' interm6diate de Moi'se en raison de leur importance. II 6tait opportun, contre les Platoniciens qui n'h6sitent pas a avoir recours a la magie et a la th6urgie qui lient l'ame aux d6mons, de raconter la confrontation de Moi'se aux mages de Pharaon et de montrer que sa sup6 riorite tient a ce qu'il agit 'au nom du Dieu qui fit le ciel et la terre'". Les dix plaies, la traversed de la Mer Rouge, le don de la manne, des cailles et de l'eau au d6sert, la victoire sur les Amal6cites, le chatiment de Cor6 et de son groupe ou l'episode du serpent d'airain sont autant de miracles oper6s par l'interm6diaire de Moi'se: tous confirment la valeur de la loi qu'6nonce l'Ecriture et qui reserve le sacrifice a Dieu seul12. Dans cette 6num6ration, Augustin ne men tionne Moi'se que dans le cas des plaies d'Egypte, en notant qu'il agissait 'au nom de Dieu qui a fait le ciel et la terre', et dans celui du combat contre les Amal6cites - 'Moi'se priait, les mains 6tendues en forme de croix'. II n'y a ainsi aucune 6quivoque: c'est de Dieu seul qu'il faut attendre les miracles, non d'un homme. La perspective d'Augustin est l6gerement different* apres son expos6 de la Lettre d Anebon. Contre 'ceux qui refusent au Dieu invisible le pouvoir de faire des miracles visibles', Augustin doit montrer que 'le Dieu invisible' peut operer ces miracles et pourquoi il le fait13. II doit aussi justifier les theophanies et lever toute ambiguit6: les manifestations visibles de Dieu ne sont pas Dieu lui-meme qui est 'invisible en sa nature'. La demande de Moi'se qui 'conversait avec Dieu et pourtant lui disait: "Si j'ai trouve grace devant toi, montretoi a moi afin que je te connaisse en te voyant'" montre pr6cis6ment qu'il ne confondait nullement le Dieu invisible avec ses manifestations visibles14. D'autre part, si Dieu a donn6 a voir au peuple des prodiges 'sur la montagne 10 1.1 (BA 34, p. 422-3); 3.1-2 (p. 432-9). " X.8 (p. 452-5); cf. XXII. 10 (BA 37, p. 598-9). Numemus, identifiant Moi'se et Mus&j, souligne a I 'oppose la capacite des mages egyptiens a 'mettre fin aux plus fortes des calamit6s que ce Musee attirait sur l'fegypte' (fr. 9, ed. des Places, p. 51). 12 X.7 (p. 450-1); 9.1 (p. 454-5). 13 X.12(p. 472-3). 14 X.13 (p. 474-5); cf. Quaest. in Heptat. II, qu. 151 (CCL 33, p. 139).

12

I. BOCHET

ou la Loi fut donn6e par l'entremise d'un seul', c'est en utilisant la creature comme instrument et afin de susciter la foi du peuple: ces prodiges manifestent qu'il n'y a aucune commune mesure entre la Loi 'prescrivant le culte du Dieu unique' que Moi'se a recue effectivement de Dieu pour le peuple et les lois donnees aux Lacedemoniens par Lycurgue qui pourtant les disait recues de Jupiter ou d'Apollon. Moi'se est donc presente dans le livre X comme celui qui remet au peuple la Loi prescrivant le culte du Dieu unique et comme un envoye de Dieu superieur aux mages et aux legislateurs pai'ens, car Dieu agit effectivement par lui, alors que le pouvoir des mages est usurpe et les dires de Lycurgue douteux.

3. 'Moise, notre vrai theologien' (De ciu. Dei XVIII.ll et 37) Augustin revient a la figure de Moi'se dans le livre XVIII ou il elablit des synchronismes entre les deux cites et montre la sup6riorite des prophetes hebreux sur les auteurs pai'ens en usant de l'argument d'ant6rioriti15. Le premier developpement consacre a Moi'se dans le livre XVIII le situe dans la chronologie gen6rale des empires pai'ens16. Augustin evoque alors les nombreuses fables qui commencent a se former chez les Grecs, comme pour marquer par avance le contraste avec la connaissance du vrai Dieu par Moise et il oppose la Loi recue de Dieu par le peuple hebreu aux ceremonies sacr6es instituees en l'honneur des faux dieux par les rois de la Grece17. A cette occasion, Augustin rappelle sommairement, pour en fixer la chronologie, les grands 6\6nements de l'histoire du peuple de Dieu H6s a Moi'se: la sortie d'Egypte, le don de la Loi, le sejour au desert. Moi'se est ici pr6sente comme le chef du peuple et comme un prophete qui annonce le Christ. Vers la fin du livre, Moi'se est compare aux philosophes et aux poetes theologiens des Grecs, mais aussi aux sages egyptiens. S'il est facile de montrer son anteriorite par rapport aux auteurs grecs, il n'en est pas de meme en ce qui concerne les Egyptiens, puisque les Actes des apdtres disent que 'Moi'se fut instruit dans toute la sagesse des Egyptiens'18. Augustin poursuit en conse quence son argumentation en montrant I'anteriorite d'Abraham sur les sages de l'Egypte. II developpe une argumentation similaire a propos de l'invention des lettres. 'Aucune nation' ne peut donc 'tirer vanite de sa sagesse comme 15 L'argument est frequent: Theophile d'Antioche, Ad Autolyc. III.20-21 (SC 20, p. 242-7); Clement d'Alexandrie, Strom. I.21.101-107 (SC 30, p. 126-30); Eusebe de ttsaree, Praep. euang. X.4 (SC 369, p. 372-87); 9-14 (p. 412-73). Voir J. Pepin, 'Le "challenge" Homere-Moise aux premiers siecles chr6tiens', RevSR 29 (1955), 105-22.

16 8BA36, p. 500-1. 17 8-12 (p. 500-21). 18 37 (p. 614-15): cf. Ac 7, 22. Celse critique les emprunts de Moise (Origene, C. Cels. I.21-22 (SC 132, p. 128-31)).

La figure de Moi'se dans la Cite de Dieu

13

plus ancienne que celle [des] patriarches et [des] prophetes'19. L'anteriorite de Moi'se n'est donc que relative, mais la comparaison ainsi esquiss6e entre pro phetes hebreux et auteurs pai'ens permet a Augustin d'enoncer autrement la sup6riorite de Moi'se: il le caracterise comme 'notre vrai theologien, qui precha veritablement l' unique vrai Dieu et dont maintenant les ecrits sont les pre miers du canon qui fait autorit6'20. Augustin applique ici a Moi'se le terme theologus qu'il reserve habituellement aux auteurs pai'ens: sans doute pour mieux montrer la superiorite de Moi'se sur les 'poetes theologiens' comme Orphee, Linos ou Musee qui, certes, ont pu en lews poemes 'chanter quelque chose de l'unique vrai Dieu', mais qui ne lui ont pas rendu le culte convenable puisqu'ils 'ont honore avec lui d'autres qui ne sont pas des dieux'21. De facon etonnante. Augustin ne mentionne pas la revelation du buisson ardent, mais il rappelle a deux reprises le nom de Dieu recu alors par lui: dans le livre VIII, ou il y voit l'indice d'une 6ventuelle connaissance de l'Ecriture par Platon22, et dans le livre XII, pour montrer, contre les Manicheens, qu'il ne peut exister une essence 'contraire a Dieu, c'est-a-dire a l'essence supreme et a l'auteur de toutes les essences quelles qu'elles soient'23. La place faite a Moi'se dans la Cite de Dieu r6serve done des surprises. Seule la prise en compte de la perspective apolog6tique d'Augustin eclaire ses choix. Dans son dialogue avec ses interlocuteurs pai'ens, il fait essentiellement de Moi'se 'celui qui a preche veritablement l'unique vrai Dieu' et il l'oppose aux auteurs pai'ens qui pronent le culte polytheiste. II importait alors de mon trer sa sup6riorite: les miracles oper6s par son interm6diate attestent la valeur de la Loi qu'il transmet. On doit donc reconnaitre en Moi'se 'le vrai th6olo gien'. Le souci qu'Augustin a de faire valoir, face aux pai'ens, le culte de l'unique vrai Dieu le conduit meme a accorder une place tres secondaire a la personnalit6 de Moi'se: celle-ci s 'efface pour ainsi dire devant Dieu a qui seul doivent etre attribu6s la lib6ration d'£gypte, le don de la Loi et les nombreux miracles. De facon paradoxale, Moi'se est, dans la Cite de Dieu, presque secondairement celui qui a lib6r6 le peuple hibreu de la servitude et lui a donne la Loi.

19 39 (p. 618-19). 20 37 (p. 614-15). 21 14 (p. 524-7). Sur l'emploi augustinien de theologia, voir G. Madec, Petites etudes augustiniennes (Paris, 1994), p. 261-70. Philon pnSsente Moi'se comme un philosophe et un theologien: Opif. mundi 8 ((Euvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 1, p. 147); Vita Mosis I.29 (CEPh 22, p. 39-40); I.48 (p. 49); 1I.115 (p. 242); Praem. 53 ((EPh 27, p. 68); de meme, Clement d'Alexandrie (Strom. I.22.150 (SC 30, p. 153-4); 24.158 (p. 159); 28.176, 176-178 (p. 173-4)). Porphyre (Ad Gaurum 11.1, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, p. 48) et Eusebe (Praep. euang. VII.7.1 (SC 215, p. 172-3); 9.1 (p. 200-1)) le nomment 'theologien'. 22 1 1 (BA 34, p. 270-3). 23 2 (BA 35, p. 154-5). Cf. Origene, Princ. I.3.6 (SC 252, p. 154-5).

14

I. BOCHET

Dans sa lecture de l'Ancien Testament, Augustin choisit en effet de privitegier, non la promesse destinee aux Juifs, mais celle qui concerne les nations, afin de montrer aux pai'ens, particulierement aux disciples de Porphyre, que 'la voie universelle du salut' est a trouver dans la religion chretienne qu'il faut donc reconnaitre comme 'la vraie religion'.

Predestination and Freewill: Augustine's Letter 2* Gerald Bonner, Durham

The last five years of Augustine's life saw no diminution of his literary activity. The apparent triumph of his campaign against Pelagianism in the years 418 and 419 was followed by a need to continue the conflict: Caelestius continued to lead the diehard element in the Pelagian party, and a very power ful new controversialist had appeared in the person of Julian of Eclanum. Fur thermore, Augustine's unyielding insistence on the need for divine grace for every good action aroused alarm even among his own supporters, who consid ered that his doctrine amounted to a predestinarianism which left man a pup pet, in stark contrast to the defence of freedom of choice in his earlier antiManichaean writings. Pelagius had cited - no doubt in perfect innocence from Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio in his work On Nature; Julian of Eclanum, in the Opus Imperfectum, repeatedly quoted Augustine's definition of sin in De Duabus Animabus, as something from which an individual is free to abstain. As late as 395, in the Exposition on the Epistle to the Romans, Augustine had still left a loophole for human initiative. This was ended by his conversion experience of 396, when the full significance of I Corinthians 4:7 dawned upon him: 'What have you that you did not receive? If, then, you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?' Nevertheless, Augustine continued to maintain that man remained free to choose, even after he had come to insist on the utter necessity of the gift of grace. The issue was raised by the arrival of a copy of Augustine's Letter 194 - written in 418 to the future bishop of Rome Sixtus - at the monastery of Hadrumetum, in Byzacena, about 425, which seemed to some of the commu nity to take away human freedom and reduce men to puppets in the hand of God. In a letter to the monks of Hadrumetum (ep. 214) Augustine explained that his letter to Sixtus had been intended to refute the belief that grace is given as a reward for merit, which led to the sin of pride1. Those unable to understand the relation of freedom of choice and divine grace should believe 1 P.-M. Hombert, Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier in Dieu, principe etfin de la thiologie augustienne de la grace, Collection des Etudes Augustiennes, Sene Antiquite 148 (Paris 1996), rightly emphasizes Augustine's emphasis upon the need for humility in considering the theology of predestination and grace.

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in them both, as revealed truths of scripture, and pray that they should be given understanding, (ep. 214.7). Such an argument may appeal to those individuals prepared to nourish appar ently mutually contradictory beliefs because they are authorized by scripture, but others will feel that faith need not be unreasonable, and look for some rec onciliation of opposites. Such reconciliation preoccupied Augustine between 426 and 429 in his treatises De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (426-7), De Correptione et Gratia (426/7), De Praedestinatione Sanctorum (428/9), and De Dono Perseverantiae (428/9). In addition to these treatises, intended for public read ing, he wrote privately - insofar as any letter in late Roman times would be treated as private - sometime between late 426 and 428 to a certain Firmus, a catechumen who was deferring baptism because he lacked the strength - or so he said - to assume the burden of chastity, which would be imposed by the bap tismal vow. The difficulty of the command to observe chastity must have car ried weight with Augustine, remembering his own difficulties on the eve of his conversion at Milan in 386; but he nevertheless held it necessary to urge Fir mus to make a decision, while at the same time maintaining his own predestinarian theological views. What were these views at the end of Augustine's life? The thought behind them is comprehended in the famous verdict on the treatise Ad Simplicianum in the Retractations (1I.27 [28]): 'In the solution of this question I laboured in defence of the free choice of the human will; but the grace of God conquered.' In the last resort it was God the creator who had the power and the right to dis pose of His creation as He chose; but to this Augustine added certain biblical considerations. He maintained that human free will is not destroyed by grace (gr. et lib. arb. 1.1- 2.2) but held that since the Fall, free will avails only for sin unless it is assisted by divine grace (ibid., 4.7-9.) Furthermore, the guilt incurred by the Fall means that all human beings are justly liable to damnation by Original Sin (dono pers. 9.23) unless they are cleansed by baptism (an. et or. 1.9.10) or by martyrdom (ibid., 11; lib. arb. 3.23.68). However, even after baptism, the need for grace remains absolute. It is not given as a reward for merits; a good life is nothing other than God's grace, and when God crowns human merits, He crowns His own works (gr. et lib. arb. 6.15). In order to observe God's commandments, man's will must be prepared by God (praeparatur voluntas a Deo, Prov. 8:35 LXX) (gr. et lib.arb. 16.32). The elect are not called because they already believe, but that they may believe, and faith is the gift of God (praed. sanct. 20.40). Tragically, the number of the damned greatly exceeds that of the redeemed (cor. et gr. 10.28; cf. civ. XXI. 12). Augustine admits that not all those who receive baptism persevere in the faith until death, even if they have once exhibited the virtues of faith, hope and charity (cor. et grat. 7.17-18). He recognizes the terrible character of his doc trine, but holds that gospel truth may not be sacrificed to pastoral expediency (dono pers. 15.38-16.39).

Predestination and Freewill: Augustine's Letter 2*

17

Given his theology, it could be felt that Augustine might logically have refrained from urging Firmus to take any action, and rather to be content to wait upon the Lord. In practice, pastoral concern, if nothing else, constrained him to urge his correspondent not to defer reception of the sacrament, without which there was no hope of salvation. Since no Christian, as long as he lived, could know for certain whether he was predestinated to election or not (cor. et grat. 13.40): quis enim ex multitudine fidelium, quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, in numero praedestinatorum se esse praesumet?), all had to be treated pastorally as if they were numbered with the elect. Accordingly, Augustine was concerned to urge Firmus to make the decision to receive baptism, which would make him potentially one of the elect, while at the same time reconcil ing this exhortation with his own predestinarian theology. Augustine accepts that Firmus must make an act of will, like the one which he had himself made in the garden at Milan in 386. 'Delay not your conversion to the Lord; put it not off from day to day' (Sir. 5:8). Think of your position rather in this way: not by your own effort, but by His help you may be confident of doing whatever He has commanded for your everlasting salvation. Therefore it is not to yourself, infirm Firmus, but to that powerful One who can do all things, that you should entrust yourself without delay: He can change any life for the better, and make it capable of receiving the grace of regeneration. Do not wait upon the moment when He may will this, as if you would offend Him if you were to will it before He did; for it is only when He is helping and co-operating that you can make the act of the will, whenever that may be. It is assuredly His mercy that prompts you to make the act of your will, but when you make that act, it will certainly be you your self doing so. For if we ourselves do not make any act of the will whenever we do in fact will something, then He does not confer on us anything at all when He enables us to use our wills'2. 1 suggest that this complicated paragraph represents the attempt by Augus tine to harmonize his belief in the absolute divine prevenience in the lives of created beings - praevenit quidem te misericordia eius, ut velis - with a gen uine decision by the creature - sed cum voles, tu utique voles. The clue is in the condition of human free will after the Fall. Sin is not natural; but the choice of the fallen human will is inadequate to avoid sinning unless it is 2 Augustine, Letter 2*.7: 'Ne tardes conuerti ad dominum neque differas de die in diem', sed ita potius ista considera, ut non tuis viribus quod ille praecepit ad tuam sempiternam salutem, sed ipsius adiutorio tefacturum esse confidas et ideo te non tibi, Firmo infirmo, sed eipotenti qui omnia potest ad mutandam in melius uitam et suscipiendam regenerationis gratiam sine dilatione committas; nec expectes quando uelit, quasi offensurus eum si ante tu uelis, cum ipso adiuuante atque operante uelis, quandocumque uolueris. Praeuenit quidem te misericordia euis, ut uelis, sed cum uoles, tu utique uoles. Nam si nos non uolumus, quando uolumus, non ergo nobis aliquid ille confert, cum efficit ut uelimus. Latin text in Augustin, Lettres l*-29*, ed. J. Divjak, BA 46B (Paris, 1987), pp. 72-4, lines 160-73. Translation by John McHugh. My thanks to David Wright for help and comments. There is also an English translation by Robert B. Eno, Saint Augustine, Letters, vol. 6, (l*-29*) (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 23-4.

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helped by the grace of God in Jesus Christ (perf.iust, hom. 2.3). It is only by this help that we can perform any good action; hence it can be said that when God crowns human merit, He crowns His own works (ep. 194.5.19; gr. et lib. arb. 6.15). Divine grace is continually available for those on whom God wills to bestow it, and so is available to the elect to will, when they will: they have the power to make the decision, but the power is the gift of God. Augustine therefore treats Firmus as being potentially one of the elect, and so urges him to enroll for baptism. This, although necessary for salvation, does not auto matically ensure salvation: the post-baptismal life of the individual requires continued grace of God (dono pers. 6. 1 0).This is not given to all the baptized, and it is a mystery how the divine choice is made (ibid. 22.58). Augustine's recommendation that his doctrine should be proclaimed discreetly in church clearly applies to the case of Firmus. The essence, then, of Augustine's message to Firmus is that while God's grace restores the power to act righteously to individuals, some initiative is left to the recipient of grace. One can even see an element of synergism in the decision made under the inspiration of grace: Nam si non volumus, quando volumus, non ergo nobis aliquid ille confert, cum efficit ut velimus - God gives the grace, but man decides to use it. Human freedom is undoubtedly very restricted, but man is not a puppet. Firmus must make up his mind. The paral lel between Firmus' situation and his own at Milan in 386 can hardly have escaped Augustine. Firmus pleaded the difficulty of submitting to the sexual discipline of Christianity already accepted by his baptized wife. Augustine must have recalled how his concubine, discarded at Milan, departed for Africa, vowing that she would henceforth know no man, while he himself found it necessary to procure another bedfellow (conf. 6.15.25), while praying, 'Give me chastity and continence but not yet' (ibid., 8.7.17). Firmus' situation had once been his, and he was aware of the leap of faith necessary to make a deci sion. Practical experience made it clear that God's omnipotence did not obvi ate the human anguish of making a decision.

Le theatre chez saint Augustin: communaute de signes, communaute d'amour.

Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, Bordeaux

Augustin a 6t6 particulierement sensible aux seductions du th6atre, comme il le reconnait dans les Confessions: II raconte avoir particip6 a un concours de poesie theatrale1, et dans un c6lebre passage il analyse, pour la condamner, sa sensibilite pass6e aux malheurs des personnages de th6atre. Mais dfsormais, son regard sur le theatre et plus g6neralement sur les spectacles des jeux publics, est pass6 de 1 'adhesion a la severite2. Pourtant, le theatre demeure une realite culturelle a laquelle il se r6fere dans bien de ses ecrits. II vaut alors comme exemplum: mais de quoi est-il l'exemple, dans quel propos s'inscritil? Je voudrais montrer que dans ces r6ferences, apparemment anecdotiques3, une des fonctions majeures du theatre (comme des jeux du cirque et de l' am phitheatre) est d'illustrer l'idee meme de communaut6, puisqu'il figure le lieu privilegie oii celle-ci se manifeste. La definition d'une telle communaute\ de ce qui la fonde et de ce qu'elle a en partage, ne permet-elle pas aussi de comprendre en creux, a contrario, a quelle communaute Augustin aspire?

I) Le theatre comme communaute de signes Plus que le contenu des spectacles, c'est d'abord la communaut6 institu6e dans et par le th6atre qui int6resse Augustin, et celle-ci repose sur des signes. Le De doctrina christiana relie 6troitement amour et signes: le contenu de la Bible, consid6ree comme un ensemble de signes4, r6side dans le double commandement de la charit65. Et toute communaut6 se d6finit par la facon

1 Conf. IV.2.3. 2 Sur les limites de cette sevente, R.A. Markus, The End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 107-123. 3 Je n'etudierai pas les topoi de la polemique chrenenne contre les spectacles, immoraux et ceuvres des demons. Voir Ciu. Dei I.32 pour la creation des ludi scaenici. 4 Ibid. I.1.1 - 2.2. 5 De doctr. christ. II.7.10 M. Moreau, I. Bochet, BA 1 1/2 (1997).

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A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic

dont dle se r6fere a un systeme de signes que ses membres comprennent6. Or, a cet egard, une place singuliere est faite au theatre. En effet, au livre II, le pre mier exemple choisi pour deTinir les institutions humaines non superstitieuses7, mais superflues pour le chr6tien, sont les signa que font les histrions en dansant. 1ls r6sultent, dit Augustin 'de l'assentiment entre les hommes' (consensio hominum), non de la nature8. Quelle en est la preuve? Aux temps anciens, le 'crieur public' (praeco) devait dire ce que signifiaient les gestes du danseur, et maintenant encore, le spectateur non averti a besoin que quelqu'un lui decode ces gestes et instaure ainsi avec lui une communaute de signes. On note avec quelle insistance Augustin veut rapporter ces pantomimes9 a une pure convention humaine, hors de la nature et des institutions d'origine divine. Dans le De ordine, dix ans auparavant certes, il se contente de qualifier la danse de Yhistrio de 'rationnelle' \rationabilis) car les gestes y sont signes de choses 'pour ceux qui les regardent bien' (bene spectantibus)10; ils r6clament simplement de l'attention, non une v6ritable 'traduction' d'un tiers. Mais le th6atre est-il seulement une communaute de signes? Non, on y partage aussi des sentiments. Quelle valeur ont-ils, et quelle communaute se constitue autour d'eux?

II) Les spectacles, lieux d'une communaute pervertie 1) Une communaute illusoire Dans le fameux texte de Conf. III.2.2-4", Augustin ne se pr6sente pas comme individu composante d'une foule de spectateurs, mais il s'attache a la relation, fort ambigue, qui l'unit aux personnages des repr6sentations tragiques. Cette relation repose sur une forme d'empathie avec les personnages: 6 Voir R.A. Markus, 'Signs, Communication, and Communities in Augustine's De doctrina Christiana' , dans: De Doctrina Christiana. A Classic of Western Culture, ed. D. Arnold, et P. Bright (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 103. 7 Les institutions humaines superstitieuses resultent de 'pactes de signification' avec les demons (De doctr. christ. 1I.20.30). 8 Ibid. 1I.25.38. Le choix du theatre, et le silence sur les autres types de jeux, s'explique selon nous par le role qu'y tiennent les signes. 9 Voir J.-C. Dumont, M.-H. Francois-Garelli, Le Theatre a Rome (Paris: Librairie gen6rale francaise, 1998), p. 195-196. 10 De ordine II. 1 1.34. II faut respecter le code conventionnel des costumes, quelle que soit la beaute des gestes. Cf. De mag. 3.5. 11 Voir dernierement B. Clausi, 'II piacere della sofferenza. Agostino, Aristotele e la catarsi tragica in Conf. Ill, 2', Le Confessioni di Agostino (402-2002): Bilancio e prospettive. XXXI Incontro di Studiosi dell'antichita cristiana, Studia ephemeridis August inianum 85 (Roma: Institurum Patristicum 'Augustinianum', 2003), p. 161-175; et G. Piccaluga, 'L'uomo que aveva amato il teatro. L'Agostino delle Confessiones e il mondo dello spettacolo', ibid., p. 177-189.

Le theatre chez saint Augustin: communaute de signes, communaut6 d'amour

21

il s'attriste et se rejouit avec les amants (III.2.3: tunc in theatris congaudebam amantibus; quasi misericors contristabar). C'est la cependant une fausse mis6ricorde, une maleuola beneuolentia, donc un devoiement de la misericordia chr6tienne, et une perversion de l'amitie: 'Et cela vient du beau courant de l'amitie\ Mais ou va-t-il? Ou coule-t-il?'(/b/d.). En fait, il n'y a pas de r6elle communaute, mais un repli egoi'ste du spectateur, heureux de la souffrance qu'il 6prouve, et pour cette raison aimant les souffirances fictives d'autrui comme autant d' occasions de compatir. 2) La communion dans la cruaute Y a-t-il une communaut6 plus authentique dans d'autres jeux, comme ceux de l'amphith&irre, 'jeux cruels et funestes' (crudeles etfunesti ludi), traditionnel objet de condamnation morale12? On connait l'episode d'Alypius assistant a des combats de gladiateurs (Conf. VI.8.13). Cette fois, la foule des spectateurs est pr6sente, et meme en amont, dans ce groupe d'amis qui l'entraTne au spectacle. Alypius croit pouvoir se proteger en fermant les yeux. Mais la 'clameur immense de la foule tout entiere le frappe violemment' (cum clamor ingens totius populi uehementer eum pulsasset) et le pousse a ouvrir les yeux par curiosite\ dans une suggestio ou se rejoue la chute originelle. C'est aussi la une r6ecriture chr6tienne de la Lettre 7 de S6neque a Lucilius, ou l'auteur avoue sa propre faiblesse (imbecillitas), face a la foule (turba), en particulier celle du spectacle, dont il ressort avec des mores chang6s (Ep. 7.1-2). Meme importance de la foule dans le r6cit des Confessions: Alypius est attir6 par le plaisir cruel des autres, invite a le partager avant meme de le connaitre. Et Augustin decrit ainsi sa transformation: 'II n'etait plus maintenant celui qui ctait venu, mais une unite de cette foule vers laquelle il etait venu, et le compagnon v6ritable (uerus socius) de ceux qui l'avaient ameneV Une societas s'est bien etablie dans 1 'amphitheatre, mais elle est aux antipodes de l' amour de Dieu et du prochain. Elle ne peut etre que condamn6e comme perversion de toute communaute\ Est-ce a dire que les spectacles ne nous apprennent rien sur ce que doit etre une veritable communaute d'amour?

Ill) Le theatre comme symbole d'une communaute d'amour Pour Augustin, une cite est fondee sur un amour commun13. Comment se sert-il du th6atre, fut-ce comme contre exemple, pour deTmir une soctete reposant sur la charite? 12 S6nfeque, Ep. 7.3-5. 13 De Gen. ad litt. XI.15.20; Ciu. Dei XIV.28; et pour la d6finition du peuple, Ciu. Dei XIX.24.

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1) Un amour communicatif Au livre I du De doctrina christiana Augustin 6nonce ainsi une sorte d'imp6ratif categorique de la charit6 envers le prochain: 'Nous devons pourtant vouloir que tous aiment Dieu avec nous' (I.29.30). Pour illustrer cette idee, il d6veloppe I'exemple des 'theatres de perversite' (theatra nequitiae). C'est une perversion, mais une perversion significative, qui a valeur d'analogie. En effet, les spectateurs aiment un histrio comme s'il 6tait le summum bonum: ils aiment a cause de lui (propter eurri) tous ceux qui partagent cet amour, et s'efforcent d'y attirer les autres. 'Voit-il un spectateur froid? II l'excite autant qu'il peut par l'eloge qu'il en fait.' II doit en etre de meme a fortiori14, dit Augustin, pour la societas dilectionis Dei, ou il n'y a pas, comme au th6atre, de haine de l'ennemi15. Le th6atre correspond donc bien a une sorte de socie tas dilectionis, mais c'est une fausse societas, une societas qui divise. II s'agit plus d'un amour communicatif que d'une v6ritable participation a l' amour. Une autre demystification de cette communaut6 d' amour H6e aux spectacles ressort du livre IV des Confessions, ou Augustin analyse son amour pour l'orateur Hierus, dedicaiairc du De pulchro et apto16. II l'aime sur sa r6putation, dans et par la louange des autres. Cette sorte d'amour est infeneure a celle que Dieu assure, 'mais bien differente, et plus s6rieuse' (sed longe aliter et grauiter) comparee a l'amour que recueille un auriga de renom, ou un uenator 'port6 par la faveur populaire' (studiis popularibus dijfamatus). Un tel amour est contradictoire, reconnait Augustin, puisque pour rien au monde il n'aurait voulu etre lou6 et aim6 comme les histrions: 'moi-m6me pourtant, je les louais et les aimais'17. Le prejuge social envers l'histrion, 'notre compagnon de nature' (naturae nostrae socius), r6vele la vanite d'un tel amour affich6, car il n'a pas pour objet ce qui nous fait homme, et ne differe guere de celui qu'inspire un cheval de course (Conf. IV. 14.22). La communaute des jeux repr6sente donc la communaut6 humaine dans sa forme la plus degradee, parce que son principe d'amour est incapable de fon der une communaut6, avec une v6ritable r6ciprocit6; en est absent l' id6al qui fait naitre la concordia. L'enceinte du th6atre, du cirque, de l' amphith6atre devient ainsi le lieu symbolique de repr6sentation et de confrontation de deux systemes de valeurs, ce qu'Augustin appelle deux amours.

14 MSme a fortiori en De catechizandis rudibus 25.49; cf. Sermon Dolbeau 1 1.8 (date de 397). 15 De doctr. christ. I.29.30; Sermon Dolbeau 26.3 (date de 404): cette passion des spectacles est comparee a des sacrifices offerts aux demons. 16 Conf. IV. 14.21-22. 17 Cf. Sermon Dolbeau 26.3.

Le theatre chez saint Augustin: communautl de signes, communautl d 'amour

23

2) Le mime et la volonte commune Cette valeur symbolique ressurgit encore, bien plus tard, a un moment strategique du livre XIII du De Trinitate. Devant la question de savoir comment conjecturer une volonte commune a tous les hommes, Augustin rapporte la 'fac6tieuse plaisanterie' attribute a un mime (mimi facetissima urbanitas): 'il avait promis qu'aux prochains jeux, il dirait en plein th6atre ce que tous avaient dans l'esprit et ce que tous voulaient. Au jour fixe, la foule afflua au theatre, plus dense que jamais, poussee par une grande curiosite.' Le mot du mime est: 'vous voulez acheter a bas prix et vendre cher.' II a pu le conjectu rer, 'que le vice ou que la nature lui suggenit communes affection et aspira tion' (compatiente uel conspirante uitio seu natura). Mais Augustin y voit assurement l'effet d'une communaute de vice, et il refute cette pseudo-v6rite proclam6e par le mime18; jouant le role d'un bouffon, celui-ci a design6 les spectateurs comme une soci6te unie par l'amour de l'argent, done desunie. II s'agit au contraire de retrouver ce qu'est l'aspiration naturelle commune, fondement d'une authentique communaut6. Chaque nouvelle hypothese sur cette volonte commune des hommes est alors fictivement plac6e dans la bouche du mime pour etre 6prouvee19. Ainsi de la parole du poete Ennius, conside>ant l'amour de la louange comme le souhait commun a tous les hommes20. Augustin en denonce la superbia et la r6fute, pour mieux mettre en scene l'affirmation qui rencontrerait une adh6sion unanime: 'Mais si le mime avait dit: "Vous voulez tous etre heureux, vous ne voulez pas etre malheureux", il n'est personne qui n'efit reconnu cela dans sa volonte' (At si dixisset: Omnes beati esse uultis, miseri esse non uultis; dixisset illiquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret uoluntate). On retrouve la l'enseignement de YHortensius (Fg. 59 Ruch), cit6 ensuite (Xffl.4.7). Cependant, devant le dissensus des philosophes sur cette question21, on pourrait croire que vivre heureux n'est autre que vivre 'selon ce qui plait le plus' (secundum delectationem suam). Cette apparence de v6rite, Augustin la formule encore grace a ce que j'appellerais la 'situation th6atrale', affaiblie cette fois par l'absence du discours direct: 'Cela aussi, on pourrait le proclamer devant la foule, au th6atre: tous reconnaitraient la une de leurs volonteY 18 De Trin. XIII.3.6: On peut vouloir proposer le juste prix (cf. la polemique entre Diogene de Babylone et Antipater de Tarse, Ciceron, De officiis III. 12.50 sq.), ou pr6ferer a I'appat du gain une passion plus forte. 19 Pour Seneque en revanche, certaines maximes, dites au theatre, peuvent inciter a I' amour du bien (£p. 108.8). 20 De Trin. XIII.3.6: omnes mortales se laudarier optant. Selon A. Grilli (M. Tulli Ciceronis Hortensius (Milano-Varese: Cisalpino, 1962), p. 40-41), cette citation proviendrait de I'Hortensius (Fg. 77 Grilli). Voir G. Madec, 'L'Hortensius de Ciceron dans les livres XIII-XIV du De Trinitate', REAug, 1969, p. 167-172. 21 Ibid. XIII, 4.7 - 5.8, portant trace de la diuisio de Chrysippe (Ciceron, Lucullus (Academica Priora) 138).

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(XIII.5.8). Mais a cette communaute de stulti, Augustin oppose la parole de sagesse de YHortensius (Fg. 60 Ruch) a laquelle il r6serve ses applaudissements: II n'y a pire malheur que de vouloir ce qui ne convient pas22. Donc, dans ce passage du De Trinitate sont refut6s trois 6nonc6s: la parole du mime, celle du poete, et l'assimilation de la vie heureuse a la simple delectatio; ainsi triomphe, recevant une juste interpretation, la these de YHortensius sur l'universel desir de bonheur, avant de laisser place a celle d'Augustin23. Et c'est en 'situation th6atrale' que tous ces 6nonc6s sont formul6s, alors qu'est en jeu l'objet d'amour commun, c'est-a-dire la source de bonheur qui fonde la communaut6 humaine dans sa nature. Cette mise en scene assume en outre une fonction rh6torique analogue a celle de la prosopop6e.

Conclusion Mais au-dela de cet aspect rh6torique, le theatre sert bien a repr6senter une societ6 humaine, partageant certains signes, un certain amour, et une certaine idee du bonheur, ces trois 6lements 6tant li6s. II s'agit certes d'une commu naut6 pervertie qui, sans etre pour autant rapportee aux demons, s'oppose a la societe chr6tienne, soudee par le souvenir de ses martyrs, et assemblee dans l'eglise. Cependant, tous les jeux, de maniere diverse, sont marques par une forme d'amour, inauthentique il est vrai, car inapte a cr6er une v6ritable com munaute. L'utilisation que fait Augustin de cette repr6sentation du th6atre est done ambigue: a la fois attirante, et repoussoir, elle demeure convoquee pour mieux etre depassee, comme si le th6atre temoignait d'une aspiration qu'il est precis6ment incapable de r6aliser.

22 Ibid. XIII.5.8: 'nee tam miserum est non adipisci quod uelis, quam adipisci uelle quod non oporteat.' Praeclarissime omnino atque uerissime. Cf. Platon, Gorgias, 468e-470c. 23 Ibid. XIII.5.8: 'West donc heureux que celui qui a la fois, a tout ce qu'il veut et ne veut rien de mal.' II n'y a de vie heureuse qu'immortelle (ibid. XIII.8.1 1).

The Spirit in the Sevenfold Pattern of the Spiritual Life in the Thought of St Augustine

Pamela Bright, Montreal

1. A Love for Patterns and Numbers Augustine's love for patterns and numbers, evidenced in the minute attention he pays to the significance of biblical numbers, runs counter to the modern tastes, let alone modern hermeneutics, but it is part and parcel of the culture of the ancient world1 and is at the same time an important witness to a sensitivity toward the symbolic dimension of human existence. In On the Trinity Augus tine notes, I have gathered them (comments on biblical numbers) from the authority of the ecclesiastic tradition received from our fathers, or from the evidence of the divine scriptures, or by a process of reason from the very characteristics of the numbers and comparisons involved2. In the section on numerology in his Handbook ofPatristic Exegesis, Charles Kannengiesser notes the lack of a modern comprehensive study of this special application of typological hermeneutics in the ancient Church: The significance of patristic numerology should not be underestimated. On one side ancient interpreters of the Bible in the church shared with their contemporaries a sense for numerical symbolism which was so vulnerable to extravagant calculations. On the other, they were intent on accounting for all that is written in scripture, and this imposed on these interpreters the necessity of explaining the meaning of the many, and sometimes the mysterious, numbers they had to comment on in the sacred books ...3 In his study of numerology in Augustine's In Johannem, Gerald Bonner notes,

1 Scholars note the revival of widespread interest in numerology in late Antiquity. See Dominic J. O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Peter Gorman, Pythagoras: A Life (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); lamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, translated Gillian Clark (Liverpool: Liverpool UniverityPress, 1989). 2 De Trinitate 4.6.10; George Lawless. 'The Wedding at Cana: Augustine on the Gospel according to John Tractates 8 and 9', Augustinian Studies 28.2 (1997), 35-80, at 59. 3 Charles Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis, The Bible in Ancient Christianity 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 242-8 ('Numerology').

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This numerical interpretation represents Augustine at his most extravagant, and most readers will recoil before an exegetical ingenuity so subtle and fecund, and, withal, as laboured and unconvincing. It would be unrealistic, and even disingenuous, to dismiss it as uncharacteristic - on the contrary it reflects Augustine's taste and that of his age all too faithfully - but there is another, and more appealing side of Augustine's alle gory when he interprets the scripture typologically4. It is all too easy to provide instances of the extravagant and the ingenious in Augustine's treatment of biblical numbers - one has only to consider the delir ium (to our taste) of the commentary on the 153 fish5 in the Eighty-three Ques tions. However, there is a numerical pattern that is consistently integrated into the development of the broader theological frame of Augustine's thought. This is the richly diverse, decades-long meditation on the sevenfold patterning of the Christian spiritual life. In broad terms, the spiritual life implies stages of growth and deepening lev els of spiritual awareness6; in specifically Christian terms, the spiritual life is linked with questions of pneumatology - the role of the Holy Spirit in the transformation of the self in its ascent/return to God, the origin of its being. In his meditations on this ascent/return to God (the essence of his under standing of the spiritual life), Augustine presents a series of literary tapes tries, richly embroidered with biblical, cultural, and philosophical allusions to the significance of the number seven. He draws on popular wisdom: the seven ages of the human lifespan - infancy, childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, old age, and death. He synthesizes the four cardinal virtues7 and the three theological virtues into another pattern of sevens, but the guiding intu ition of these meditations is the mystical significance of the biblical 'sevens'. These mediations of the biblical 'sevens' centre on the role of the Holy Spirit with the book of Isaiah and the Book of Revelation as the sources of his reflection on the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit8. In his commentary on Psalm 150, Augustine notes that the Holy Spirit is specifically spoken of by the number seven

4 Gerald Bonner, 'Augustine as Biblical Scholar', in The Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 1, From the Beginninggs to Jerome, ed. P.R. Ackroyd and C.F. Evans (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1970), 541-63, at 560. 5 See Question 57 of the Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, tr. David L. Mosher, FC 70 (Wash ington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 99-103. 6 Karl Rahncr provides us with an insightful (and critical) essay on the tradition of the stages of the spiritual life in 'Reflections on the Problem of the Gradual Ascent to Christian Perfection', in Theological Investigations vol. 3, The Theology of the Spiritual Life, tr. Karl-H. and Boniface Kniger (London: Darton, Longman & Todd. 1967), 3-23. 7 See Question 61 of the Eighty-Three Diverse Questions. 8 Question 61.4, commenting on the seven loaves of the multiplication of the loaves and fishes (Mt 15:32-38): '... the feeding therefore refers to the grace of the Church which is nour ished through the well-known seven-fold work of the Holy Spirit' (120).

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whether in Isaiah or in the Apocalypse, where the seven spirits of God are most directly mentioned on account of the one and the same Holy Spirit (Rev. 1:20). And this sevenfold operation is mentioned in Isaiah (11:2). Hence the Holy Spirit is spoken of under the number seven9. In the Genesis account of the seven days of creation, Augustine again turns to the role of the Holy Spirit with special attention to day one and day six10. Here Augustine draws upon generations of commentary on the significance of the 'days' of creation in the baptismal discourse of the early church. One of the most significant developments of this theme is to be found in Book XIII of the Confessions, to be discussed later.

2. The Seven Steps of the Spiritual Life Augustine's imagery of growth in the spiritual life as a series of seven mys tical steps is preserved in a segment quoted in the Commentary on the Apoca lypse of Primasius". Numbered 171 A among Augustine's Letters, the episto lary fragment is addressed to a certain Maximus. Augustine links the seven virtues (three cardinal, four theological), the beatitudes, and the seven gifts of the Spirit to form a series of seven steps. The first step is fear of the Lord - the beginning of wisdom - with the seventh step as that peace and tranquility which the world cannot give. The entry under 'virtue' in Augustine Through the Ages draws attention to letter 171 A: These seven virtues together with the commandments of God and the Beatitudes of the New Testament constitute a seven-stage plan for Christian living in which the virtues play the decisive role...12 There is another variant of the seven-step pattem in Book II of De doctrina christiana. Here, specifically in terms of the seven gifts of the Spirit, Augus tine links growth in understanding and love for the scriptures with growth in the spiritual life.

9 Enarr. in Ps. 150.1, tr. A. Cleveland Coxe [et al.], NPNF, first series, vol. 8 (1888), 681, slightly adapted. 10 Reply to Faustus, the Manichaean 12.8: 'On the sixth day, in Genesis, man is formed after the image of God; in the sixth period of the world there is the clear discovery of our trasformation in the renewing of our mind, according to the image of Him who created us, as the apostle says (1 Col 3:10)', tr. R. Stothert, NPNF, first series, vol. 4 (1887), 185-6. 11 ... has septem quin etiam gradus: introduction to frag, of Augustine, Letter to Maximus (PG33.751). 12 George J. Lavere, 'virtue', in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 871-4, at 872.

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Step 1 Step 2

Fear of the Lord - to think on the judgements of God Subdued by piety, one believes in and submits to the authority of scripture Knowledge of the scriptures - to seek nothing in scripture but the love of God Fortitude and resolution - with unremitting prayer to seek to extri cate oneself from every fatal joy in transient things The counsel of compassion - to cleanse one's soul from the filth that has been contracted, and to exercise love of neighbour Purification of the heart (understanding) - the 'eye' of the heart which can see God (through a glass darkly, that is, walking by faith and not by light) 'Such a son ascends to wisdom which is the seventh step which he enjoys in peace and tranquility. From the beginning then, till we reach wisdom itself, our way is by the steps now described'13.

Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6

Step 7

These seven steps in De Doctrina Christiana illumine aspects of Augustine's allegory of the seven days of creation in Book XIII of the Confessions, to be treated briefly in the final section of this paper. Another significant elaboration of the biblical 'sevens' in relation to the development of the spiritual life is to be found in question 58 14 of the 83 Ques tions. Here, in the early to mid nineties of the fourth century, while he was exercising his priestly ministry, Augustine provides a succinct linkage of the seven phases of human life with the seven 'ages' of salvation history, the 'ages' being a favoured motif in his preaching and cathechetics15. Phase Phase Phase Phase Phase Phase Phase

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Infancy Childhood Adolescence Youth Maturity Old Age Death

Adam to Noah Noah to Abraham Abraham to David David to the Babylonian exile Babylonian Exile to Christ Advent of the Church General Resurrection Six mystical 'thousands', with the Church as the sixth 'thousand', is a familiar topic in the apocalyptic literature of the early Church (Cyprian, Commodianus, Tyconius16), but Augustine's elaborations on this theme are specifically linked 13 De doctrina christiana 2.7.9-11. tr. J.F. Shaw. NPNF, first series, vol. 2 (1887), 537-8. 14 'For there are also six ages or periods in the life of the individual man: infancy, boyhood, adulescence, youth, maturity and old age ... In this sixth age the outer man (who is called the "old man" is corrupted by old age, as it were, and the inner man is renewed from day to day (Col 3:9-10; 2 Cor 4: 16)' (Question 58; tr. Masher, 105). See also Question 44; 53; 64. 15 De catechizandis rudibus 17.27; 22.39. 16 Cyprian, Ad Fortunatum, praef. 2; Commodianus, Instructions and Carmen adversus ludaeos et gentes (both works refer to the 6000 years of salvation history); Tyconius, The Book of Rules, Rule 5.

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to his theological understanding of salvation history in line with the fourfold pattern of the Epistle to the Romans: Ages 1 and 2 (Adam to Abraham) 'before the law'; Ages three and four (Abraham to Christ) - "under the law"; age six - 'under grace', and the fourth period - without end, the peace of the great Sabbath.

3. The Inner Dynamics of the Ascent to God At this point it is tempting to suggest the publication of a lucrative 'how to' book, The Spiritual Life in Seven Stages. However, the masterpieces of his early episcopacy indicate that Augustine had something more fundamental in mind than a rigid mapping out of specific stages of the spiritual life17. His attention is on the inner dynamics of the ascent to God. This can be observed in the last four books of the Confessions. In Book X the God-seeking self is drawn ever inward/upward through the storerooms of mem ory in lucid awareness of the vulnerability of the human condition. At this ver tiginous prospect of ascent/descent Augustine turns to the opening chapter of Genesis, there to face critical issues of the human condition, enmeshed in time (Book IX) and subject to change (Book XII). It is specifically in Book XIII that Augustine highlights the role of the Holy Spirit within the context of one of his most significant meditations on the sevenfold patteming of the spiritual life: his allegorical interpretation of the six days of creation and the Great Sabbath. At first sight, the allegorical interpretation of chapter 1 of Genesis shares a number of characteristics with the hexameron commentaries of the early Church, espe cially in their characteristic focus on the baptismal themes of enlightenment and re-formation in the image and likeness of God. However Augustine's commen tary on the seven days of creation tends to be a more comprehensive survey of the Christian life. He pays special attention to the initial conversion and to bap tism, but also addresses specific issues concerning the deepening of the spiritual life though the 'works of mercy', the 'higher delights' of contemplation, and the deepening of spiritual discernment in the spiritual life. Day One (XIII. 13-15: Gen. 1:1-5). The 'children of light' are urged on their pilgrimage toward a conformation and renewal (Rom. 12:2), trusting in the 'pledge' of what is to come - the Spirit to live in our hearts (2 Cor. 1 :22) Day Two (XIII. 16-19: Gen. 1:6-9). The fixing of the firmament is allego rized as scripture stretched above - 'no other words are so destructive of pride'. Day Three (XIII.20-21: Gen. 1:9-13). The land separated from the seas is furnished with a spring (Ps 143:6). The resulting 'fruits' are the works of mercy, and the seeds of mutual compassion.

17 Rahner, 'Gradual Ascent to Christian Perfection', 8.

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Day Four (XIII.22-25: Gen. 1:14-19). After the works of mercy of day three, the 'higher lights of contemplation' appear. It is significant that Augus tine continues to insist on the on-going process of conversion (repentance, works of mercy, keeping the commandments) and the very dynamics of the conversion process mean that there is a maturing in the spiritual life - we pass from milk to a mature diet (according to the Pauline image). 'Let there be light in the heavens' - for those growing in spiritual maturity. Day Five (XIII.26-28: Gen. 1:20-23). Augustine draws attention to 'moving creatures' - birds flying in the sky and oceans full of life (but not the life-soul of Gen. 2:7). The on-going work of mission and conversion is perfected in the ministries of the sacraments. Once again we see the emphasis on the maturing of the spiritual life. Day Six (XIII.29-47: Gen. 1:24-31). The commentary on day six is the longest and most complex in Augustine's Genesis commentary in the Con fessions. The 'earth' of the pilgrim Church is fed by the FISH18 - the living Christ. Augustine warns against three concupiscences, returning to the theme he developed in the second half of Book X, and again, as in day one, the insistance is on non-conformity to the world - but towards transformation and the renewal of the mind (Rev. 12:2). The renewal of the image and like ness (Gen. 1:26) focuses on the need for discernment of spiritual gifts, for discernment in scriptural interpretation, and for discernment of morals and works of mercy in the Church (the gift is to carry out the works of mercy; the fruit is to have the right intention). The blessings of multiplication are alle gorized as the multiplication of the spiritual. Finally, in citing 1 Cor. 2:12, Augustine reminds his readers that 'we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God' and concludes with a reference to Rom. 5:5, 'the love of God shed abroad in our hearts by the Spirit which is given to us'. The Seventh Day crowns the spiritual pilgrimage with the rest of the great Sabbath.

Conclusion One would rightly expect Augustine's meditations on the sevenfold pat tern of the spiritual life to be marked by his own pastoral experience and his acute awareness of the vicissitudes of his own life. Though the seven steps

18 See also Question 61.4 of the Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, referring to Mt 15:32-38, the multiplication of loaves and fishes: '... rather there were a few fish, i.e. those who first believed in the Lord Jesus Christ and were anointed in his name and were sent to preach the Gospels and to withstand the stormy sea of this world so that they might serve as ambassadors as the apostle Paul says (2 Cor 5:20), for that one great fish, i.e. for Christ' (121).

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are logically developed, there is neither inflexibility nor inexorability in their elaboration. It is important to note that his reflection is, at base, biblical. The biblical 'sevens' are mystical, with the shimmering of light and shade that is proper to biblical exegesis. The proper ambiguity of scripture is well devel oped in Augustine in Books XII and XIII of the Confessions, and is reflected in his elaboration of the seven steps of the spiritual life. This ascent is not effected by the feet of the body, but by the affections of the heart19. The psalmist lifted up by his faith, thither he rises in affection, with longing hopes . . . This very longing causes the soul to purge off the filth of sin20. The sevenfold pattern of the spiritual life is one of the significant sources for understanding Augustine's remarkably rich theology of the Holy Spirit. In Ps. 126:4, Augustine comments, Bound in the frost of our sins, we are frozen. But the south wind is a warm wind . . . The south wind the Spirit has blown ... as ice in fair weather, our sins are melted. Let us run to our country, as the torrents in the south ...21. His focus is not on a delineation of the phases of the maturing of the spiri tual life, but on the inner dynamic of the transformation and renewal in spe cific references to the Holy Spirit. It is not a 'gnosis' spirituality - his focus is not on the knowledge and techniques of the ascent - but a graced spirituality: We are all running, we are all toiling, we are all building now; and before us others have run, toiled, and built: but 'except the Lord build, their labour is but lost'22. As his commentary on Psalm 123 phrases it, God has made 'ascending steps in the heart' : Where then are the ladders? For we see so great a distance between earth and heaven, there is such a great space between them. Do we deceive ourselves because we sing the Song of Steps, that is, the Song of Ascent? We ascend to heaven if we think of God who has put ascending steps in the heart23.

19 Enarr. in Ps. 123.1 (NPNF 598-9). 20 Enarr. in Ps. 122.4 (NPNF 597, adapted). 21 Enarr. in Ps. 125.10 (NPNF 605, slightly adapted). 22 Enarr. in Ps. 126.2 (NPNF 606). 23 Translation Mary T. Clark, 'Psalm 122: God is True Wealth', in Augustine of Hippo: Selected Writings, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 250.

Augustine on Beauty, Number, and Form Montague Brown, Manchester, New Hampshire

In the thought of Augustine, beauty, number and form are closely related. In fact, they are sometimes identified. But if beauty is form and form is number1 , it might seem that we have a highly abstract idea of beauty and a notion of form that feeds right into the modern penchant for reducing reality to quantity. However, Augustine's understanding of number, because of its close associa tion with form and beauty, supports a far richer view of reality than the mod ern mathematical model. This presentation has two major sections. In the first, we look at how Augustine identifies beauty, number, and form and consider how beauty, understood in these terms, informs temporal and spatial things. In the second, we see how Augustine applies these categories analogically to all levels of reality.

Let us begin with and examination of number in Augustine's thought and how he associates it with form and beauty. Augustine is strongly influenced by Plato and the Neoplatonists. For many modems, as for the atomists against whom Plato argues, number is a useful tool to order our experience of a world devoid of substantial forms. For Plato and Augustine, on the other hand, num ber is the intrinsic intelligibility of things. 'For I do not observe the body and members of any living thing in which I do not find that measures, and num bers, and order pertain to the unity of harmony'2. Besides Augustine's Platonic heritage, he also has a scriptural basis for con sidering number to be at the heart of reality.

1 The equation of beauty and number is made explicitely in Contra Faustum (hereafter CF) 20.7. 2 Non enim animalis alicujus corpus et membra considero, ubi rum mensuras et numeros et ordinem inveniam ad unitatem concordiae pertinere. De Genesi contra Manichaeos (hereafter DGnM) 1.16.26 (PL 34, 185). (All translations are my own.) See also De docthna Christiana (hereafter DDC) 2.38.56, De vera religione (hereafter DVR) 40.74-75, and De libero arbitrio (hereafter DLA) 2. 16.42. In Book 6 of De musica (hereafter DM), Augustine finds numbers in the body, the soul, and the universe.

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And among us, we read that it is said to God, 'You have ordered all things in measure, number, and weight' [Wisd. 1 1 :21], and the prophet says, 'who brings forth the world by number' [Isa. 42:26], and in the Gospel our Saviour says 'all the hairs of your head are numbered' [Matt. 10:30]3. Number is spoken of as God's knowledge of and very presence to created things: he has created according to number; he orders the universe according to number; and his providence extends to every single detail. This idea of number is far from David Hume's idea of mathematics as a human invention to order arbitrarily a chaotic and ultimately meaningless world of matter in motion. Number is not merely enumeration and measurement, but also (and more importantly) proportion, harmony, integrity, and order. These are the same characteristics that make things beautiful; they are to be found in all things, from the simplest fly to the order of the universe and even to history as ordered by divine providence. The one constant is that beauty is ordered unity; it is the harmonious integration of constituent parts4. When Augustine gives a systematic articulation of the beauty of material things in De libero arbitrio, he does so expressly in terms of number. 'Look now at the beauty of bodily forms: numbers are held in place; look at the beauty of bodily motion: numbers move around in time'5. Symmetry and pro portion characterize both spatial and temporal things. Not only do we appreciate beauty in nature, but we can also create beauty in the fine arts. Augustine's paradigm for understanding created beauty in music6. Music is a particularly good paradigm for understanding the beauties of creation because change and time are essential to it. The temporal and fleet ing elements (notes in a song, syllables in a poem) are constitutive of the very integrity of the beauty of the whole. Even the spaces of silence (nothingness in relation to sound) are integral to such beauty of form. The beauty is found less in any one part of a musical composition (or a poem or a speech) than in the whole.

5 Et apud nos Deo legitur: Omnia in mensura et numero et nondere disposuiti; de quo et propheta dicit: Qui profert numerose saeculum, et Saluator in euangelio: Capilli, inquit, uestri omnes numerati sunt. De civitate Dei (hereafter DCD) 12.19 (CCL 48, 375); see also De Trinitate (hereafter DT) 3.16. 4 Although there are many formulations of the elements of aesthetic appreciation in the writ ings of Augustine, these elements seem to be reducible to three: unity, order, and brightness. On unity, see Epistola 18 (Augustinus Coelestino) 2 (PL 33, 85), DVR 30.55, and DVR 18.36. On order or proportion, see De Trinitate 9.6 (CCL 50, 302-3); DCD 11.22, 11.27, 12.4, and 22.20; DVR 30.55; and De diversis quaestionibus (hereafter DD83) 78. On brightness, see DVR 29.54, DCD 11.23, and DT 8.2. 5 ... inspice iam pulchritudinem formati corporis: numeri tenentur in loco: inspice pulchritudinem mobilitatis in corpore: numeri uersantur in tempore ... DLA 2.16.42 (CCL 29, 266); see also DVR 40.75, DD83 78, and the later work DT 4.4. 6 See DM 2.1.

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35

Beauty in the visual arts is spatial. Although the Cartesian idea of mathe matical extension necessarily brings with it part outside of part and hence a disintegration of unity7, spatial beauty is found in the proportion and harmo nization of these spatially fragmented elements. Thus, the very elements which destroy unity on one level (numerical unity) are constitutive of that unity on another (formal or aesthetic unity).

II Given this paradigm of beauty in nature and art, let us consider how Augus tine applies it to the various levels of reality. Two principles order the analog ical hierarchy. First of all, Augustine says that, if something is made up of parts, the whole is always more beautiful than any part8. Secondly, whatever apparent defects we judge to be in something are ultimately part of the beauty of the whole9. Augustine holds that all things are beautiful, from the very first level of cre ated reality where form is introduced into formless matter. 'For nothing is ordered which is not beautiful'10. As every material thing is composite, its beauty is more in its integral wholeness than in a part, an its beauty extends to the very core of a thing's being. The very materiality - that which is not form - remains unknown to us, but this is taken up in the whole of each thing and in the order of material things within the universe. The interrelation of things in the larger whole of the material universe is the most beautiful of merely material things. 'These creatures received that mea sure of being by the will of the Creator in order that, by some passing away and others succeeding, they might complete, through this lowest kind of tem poral beauty, the harmony of the world in all its parts'". And although the order of material things may not look beautiful to us, that is because we are aware of only a small part of the whole. "The beauty of this order does not delight us because, through the condition of our mortality, we are not able to perceive the universe as a whole in which the particulars which offend us come together fittingly and harmoniously'12 7 See Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Second and Sixth Meditations. 8 'Every beauty which is constituted by parts is much more praiseworthy in the whole than in any part' (Omnis enim pulchritudo quae partibus constat, multo est laudabilior in toto quam in parte...) DGnM 1.21.32 (PL 34. 188). 9 See DVR 40.76. 10 ... nihil enim est ordinatum, quod non sit pulchrum. DVR 41.77 (PL 34, 156). 11 ... cum istae creaturae eum modum nutu Creatoris accepterint, ut cedendo ac succedendo peragant infimam pulchritudinem temporum in genere suo istius mundi partibus congruentem. DCD 12.4 (CCL 48, 358). 12 Cuius ordines decus nos propterea non delectat, quoniam parti eius pro condicione nostrae mortalitis inexti uniuersum, cui particulae, quae nos qffendunt, satis apte decenterque conueniunt, sentire non possumus. DCD 12.4 (CCL 48, 358). See also DGnM 1.16.26.

36

M. Brown

Although inanimate things are truly beautiful, the beauty of a living thing is greater than that of the entire inanimate material universe. Since order and inner harmony make for beauty, the living thing, which orders the matter of its body into a living, integral whole, is more ordered and hence more beautiful than the inanimate universe. Matter, however, is less than any kind of life, since it is through life that however small an amount of matter remains in its form, whether it be the life by which any particular living thing is governed, or that by which all the natural things of the world are gov erned13. Augustine writes at length about the beauty of a fly14 and even the beauty of a worm15. The highest example of the beauty of a living thing is the marvellous order of the human body16. But it is not just the body's external appearance that is beautiful: function as well as form adds to the beauty. Even the parts that seem ugly to us are, as silence is to sound in music and black is to colour in paint ing, part of the beauty of the whole. As the beauty of the inanimate universe is greater than the beautiful things in that universe, so the universe of living and non-living things is more beau tiful than any living thing. Although some things seem bad to us, they are ordered in the beauty of the whole. 'So great are the force and power of integrity and unity that there are many good things which only please when they come together and make a universe. The universe takes its name from unity'17. Still more beautiful than the universe of animate and inanimate things are the human acts of judgement and free choice, for they order reality in a still higher way. As the living thing is more beautifully ordered than non-living things, so the judgement or choice that orders non-living and living things is more beautiful than the entire material universe18. Beyond this, the whole of human judgement, choice, and action is more beautiful than any part, and what appear to be defects are integral to the beauty

13 Corpus autem minus est quam vita quaelibet; quoniam quantulumcumque manet in specie, per vitam manet, sive qua unumquodque animal, sive qua universa mundi natura administrate. DVR 11.22 (PL 34, 132). 14 DGnM 1.16.26. 15 DVR 41.77. 16 See DCD 22.24. 17 Tanta est vis et potentia integritatis et unitatis, ut etiam quae multa sunt bona tunc placeant, cum in universum aliquid conveniunt atque concurrunt. Universum autem ab unitate nomen accepit. DGnM 1.21.32 (PL 34, 188-89). 18 Augustine says that the order of peace for the rational soul consists in 'that harmonious agreement of conduct and conviction' (ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio). DCD 19.14 (CCL 48, 681).

Augustine on Beauty, Number, and Form

37

of the whole. The application of our first principle is quite straightforward: if beauty is more in the harmonious whole than in any part, and if human judge ments and choices are the most beautiful created things, then the greatest of beauties is the integrated unity of a well-ordered people. The order may be human or divine, and although the divine is certainly more perfect, Augustine holds that there is real beauty in a well-ruled temporal society19. However, a well-ordered people cannot be understood in the same way as a well-ordered individual judgement or choice, for a people exists over time and consists of many judgements and choices. Like all temporal realities, from the worm, to the song, to the order of the universe, the order of human judge ments, choices, and acts - in a word, history - can only be fully appreciated as a whole20. Such appreciation and ordering of the whole of history obviously cannot be done by any human being. The integration of all peoples and times into a harmonious whole must therefore be done by a higher power - God. How history is providentially ordered escapes us, but we know that to appre ciate fully its beauty and meaning, one must view it as a whole. Our second principle - that apparent defects are necessary for the intelligi bility and beauty of the whole - is harder for us to apply to history and provi dence. For moral evil is not just lack of virtue, as silence is the lack of sound, and darkness the lack of light: it is not simply deficiency of will, but rather perversity of will21. For an act to be morally evil, the agent must know that it is bad and freely choose it. It is impossible on moral grounds to say that the morally evil act, which is essentially a matter of intention and not conse quences, adds to the beauty of human history. Natural reason cannot integrate moral evil into a pattern of overall good. Thus, at its highest level, the hierarchy of beauty enters the realm of faith faith that somehow the evils human beings do are ultimately ordered by God into a salvation history of transcendent harmony and beauty. So out of our sin, which our nature committed in the first sinful man, humankind is made the great glory and ornament of the world, and is governed so fittingly by the care of divine providence that the art of ineffable healing turns the foulness itself of our sins into an unknown beauty all its own22.

19 See DVR 26.48. 20 See DVR HA^i. 21 See Confessions 7.16 and DCD 12.6. 22 ha de peccato nostro, quod in homine peccatore ipsa natura nostra commisit, et genus humanum factum est magnum decus ornamentumque terrarum, et tam decenter divinae providentiae procuratione administratur, ut ars ineffabilis medicinae ipsam vitiorum foeditatem in nescio quam sui generis pulchritudinem vertat. DCR 28.51 (PL 34, 145).

38

M. Brown III

Always for Augustine, beauty and form are to be found in the relation of intrinsic parts and the order of extrinsic relations. Ultimately, the ordering is of God, who is the first principle of all truth, beauty, and goodness. Holding God to be the ultimate explanation and the ultimate beauty, far from closing down insight into the beauty and reality of things, invites us to expand our horizons to appreciate the most complete and perfectly ordered whole possible, a task that must always be renewed as the history of the material universe and of human judgements, choices, and actions unfolds. This movement is antithetical to the modern tendency to reduce things to their constituent parts, and these parts to still more elemental parts, until all things are explained by a few elemental forces of nature. On this view, history is really only the random collection of human choices; human choices are only the arbitrary impulses of life responding to environment; life is really only chemical reactions, and so on. Augustine's aesthetics can provide us with the basis for an appreciation and an understanding of reality that moves in quite the other direction: things are more beautiful and more real the more they are integrated and harmonized within a whole. Thus, the elements are more real and have a greater unity than the particles, the material things than the elements, the living things than the material things, rational living beings more than the merely living beings, and the whole history of the universe and humankind than any part of that history. To recover Augustine's theory of beauty and its association with form is to recover an appreciation of reality in all its rich complexity of order and harmony.

Psaume 45,11 dans l'oeuvre d'Augustin

Bernard Bruning, Leuven

Le texte complet du verset 45,11 se lit comme suit dans le sermon d'Au gustin sur ce psaume: (a) Vacate, et uidete quoniam ego sum Deus (Dominus): (b) exaltabor in gentibus, et exaltabor in terra1. A part le sermon sur le psaume 45, c'est toujours la premiere partie du ver set qui apparait dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin2. La version de la Vetus Latina et de la Vulgate lit 'voir' (uidere) au lieu de 'savoir' en h6breu (jada') et met tout de suite l'accent sur la contemplation. II y a pourtant des cas ou 'voir' est remplace par 'savoir'3. Augustin cite d'ailleurs presque toujours ce uacate dans le contexte de Yotium et du negotium4. Pourtant, il est frappant que ce verset ne figure pas dans la literature sur la vision de Dieu chez Augustin5. Mais il est aussi remarquable que le verset n'est pas mentionn6 non plus dans les grands textes augustiniens sur la vision ou la contemplation de Dieu. Est-ce que le uidere de notre verset n'a rien a voir avec le uidere des textes augustiniens sur la vision de Dieu6?

1 En. Ps. 45.14 (PL 36, 524). En fait, Dominus est plus frequemment cit6 dans ce verset que Deus. Le texte du verset apparait dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin selon la chronologie suivante: De uera relig. 65; Conf. 9.4 (paraphrase); Ep. 55.22; Sermo 8.6, 103.3, 362.31; En. Ps. 134.26 (par.), 45.14 et 15 (par.); De Gen. ad litt. 1.20.40 (par.); En. Ps. 70.1.18; De cons. Euang. 1.18 (par.); lo. eu. tr. 57.3 (par.); Sermo 104.7; De ciu. Dei 22.30. 2 Dans la Septan te on trouve aussi I'imp6ratif scholasate: 'prends du temps libre', pour uacate. Le teste du verset est comme suit: 'et sache que Moi je suis le Dieu'. Le texte hebteux donne apeu pres lememe sens: harpou (raphah), 'lache... et sache que Moi je suis le Seigneur'. 3 Scire, agnoscere, cognoscere. Le scire est une fois connecte avec fez. 20,12: Et sabbata mea dedi eis in signum inter me et inter eos, ut scirent quia ego Dominus, qui sanctifico eos. Notons que ce verset est un hapax dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin. 4 Voir mon article: 'Otium and Negotium within the One Church, Epistula 48', Augustiniana 51 (2001) 105-149. 5 Erich Naab, Augustinus. Uber Schau und Gegenwart des unsichtbaren Gottes (Stuttgart, 1998); Basil Studer, Zur Theophanie-Exegese Augustins, Studia Anselmiana 59 (Roma, 1971); Id., Gratia Christi - Gratia Dei bei Augustinus von Hippo, Christozentrismus oder Theozentrismus?, Studia Ephemeridis 'Augustinianum' 40 (Roma, 1993); Margareth Ruth Miles, 'Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's De trinitate and Confes sions', Journal of Religion 63 (1983) 125-42; Frederick Van Fleteren e.a., Mystic and Mystagogue, Collectanea Augustiniana (New York, 1994); Ephrem Hendrikx, Augustins Verhdltnis zur Mystik (Wurzburg, 1936). 6 Voir E. Naab, o.c.

40

B. Brunino

Dans ce verset Augustin reconnait la tension pernianente dont il est devenu le porte-parole depuis sa conversion. II s'agit d'une tension entre le labeur dont il faut se distancier (uacare). l'action du negotium, et la contemplation du repos (otium, quies). Le poids de son m6tier comme rheteur l'avait epuise\ non a cause de la quantite du travail mais a defaut d'ambitions (cupiditas), cellesci, autrefois, le rendant capable de supporter une pression 6norme (ferre graue negotium). II se sentait l'esclave de sa cupidite et voulait etre libre (liber) tandis que ses 6leves, les enfants des libres (liberi), ne voulaient pas la libert6 de leur maitre7. Une fois la decision prise, le converti essaie de saisir son destin comme un religieux qui se retire de ses activites professionnelles pour mener une vie contemplative. Son choix de Yotium veut maintenant etre stimul6 par un autre poids beaucoup plus 16ger, celui du Christ. La charite qui est un iugum leue se dciache des pressions du lieu et du temps, c'est-a-dire du monde sensible qui depuis la chute est devenu le domaine elu de la cupiditc. Le lieu offre ce que nous aimons tandis que le temps nous vole ce que nous aimons et les phantasmes qui restent nous guident comme un tourbillon8. En fait, Augus tin est maintenant pousse par un autre amour qui lui promet la vraie liberte de l' otium9. II ne s'agira nullement d'une vie paresseuse, car la contemplation est une vie d'etude et de priere. Cette vie est videe des activites mondaines et s'en libere en faveur de la reflexion. Augustin compare ce uacare avec le dormire du ('antique des Cantiques: 'Je dors mais mon cceur veille' (Cantique des Cantiques 5,2), ou il considere le sommeil comme une mort a cet amour du monde pour que la veille de l'etude d'un autre monde soit favoriseV0. L'6tude des Ecritures a son tour doit etre Iiber6e (uacare) d'une lecture facile afin d'atteindre la couche profonde des textes et d'entrevoir (uidere) ainsi combien est douce la nourriture que Dieu nous procure le sabbat". Comme la uacatio ne sert pas a mener une vie paresseuse, le repos du sab bat doit etre entendu comme une quies spiritualis qui imite le repos de Dieu apres les six jours de la cr6ation. Ce repos divin annonce alors le repos dont nous jouirons un jour en Dieu. Le sabbat est observ6 dans notre cceur et non pas comme chez les Juifs dans les membres corporels. La condition d'un tel 7 Conf. 9.4. 8 De uera relig. 35.65: 'agite otium', inquit. 'et agnoscetis, quia ego sum dominus': non otium desidiae, sed otium cogitationis. ut a locis ac temporibus uacetis. Remarquez que uacate est rcmplace par agite otium. ' Voir son commentaire sur le psaume 4 dans les Conf. 9.4.8-1 1 ; En. Ps. 4. 10 lo. Eu. Tr. 57.3: uitam quietam in studiis dulcibus et salubribus agunt ... 'ego dormio, et cor meum uigilat'. uaco, et uideo quoniam tu es Dominus. . . Cf. En. Ps. 4.9: 'In pace, in id ipsum obdormiam, et somnum capiam. ' Recte enim speratur a talibus omnimoda mentis abalienatio a mortalibis rebus et miseriarum saeculi hujus obliuio. . . Cf. Conf. 9.4. 1 1 : Et tu es id ipsum ualde, qui non mutaris, et in te requies obliuiscens laborum omnium... 1 ' De Gen. ad litt. 1 .20.40: quos dulciter haurire deberent uix patienter adtingunt. . . non enim uacant uidere, quam suavis est Dominus, nee in sabbato esuriunt. . .

Psaume 45,1 1 dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin

41

repos pour l'homme est qu'il s'y pr6pare par les bonnes ceuvres. Cela consiste d'abord a renoncer aux mauvaises ceuvres qui decoulent de notre peche originel, l'orgueil et l'avarice, qui, d'ailleurs, sont les racines de l'amour de ce monde. Ne cherche pas la querelle mais l'humilitl, ne te vante pas de ton pouvoir, alors tu verras que tu n'es pas le Dieu qui cree et recree, vide-toi de toimeme12. La uacatio signifie donc aussi l'abandon, la lib6ration du mal. Les bonnes ceuvres au contraire nous introduisent dans une uacatio, qui est la paix et la serenite d'une bonne conscience13. II n'y a pas de bonne conscience aussi longtemps que l'homme s'imagine pouvoir recouvrer sa propre sante, agir de soi-meme et par soi-meme, se vanter du merite de son propre travail. Dans ce cas il est negotiator qui ne reconnait pas qu'il doit se reposer tandis que Dieu oeuvre en lui14, ou autrement dit: pendant que nous travaillons, c'est Dieu qui travaille en nous15. II y a donc un repos remarquable qui, pourtant, n'est pas paresseux et qui prouve que l'ceuvre a 6t6 bien faite. Nos ceuvres pour etre bonnes ne peuvent avoir d'autre but que le repos du septieme jour16. Ce jour est le seul dans la Genese qui a et6 sanctifi6 parce que toute la cr6ation a alors atteint sa perfection en Dieu17. II est eVident pour Augustin que Dieu ne se repose pas de 1 'effort de la crea tion de ces six jours, car il continue tous les jours a soutenir et a dinger ce qu'il a cree. Dieu se repose et opere jusqu'a maintenant18. Quand il est dit que Dieu se repose de ses ceuvres, cela implique qu'il ne creera plus de nouvelles cr6a tures, mais sans pour autant cesser de conserver et de gouvemer ce qu'il a fait19.

12 En. Ps. 45.14: 'Vacate'. Ad quam rem? 'Et uidete quoniam ego sum Deus'. Hoc est: non uos, sed ego sum Deus: ego creaui, ego recreo... Hoc non uidet tumultus contentiosus animi humani; cut tumultui contentioso dicitur: 'uacate', id est, reprimite animos uestros a contradictionibus. . . Si autem uacaueritis in uobis, et a me petieritis omnia, qui primo de uobis praesumebatis. 45.15: Vacatur in tranquillitate cordis, ut cognoscatur auctor Deus omnium munerum suorum. Cf. Ep. 55.22. 13 En. Ps. 91.2: ... in corde est sabbatum nostrum... in uacatione et tranquillitate et serenitate conscientiae suae. . . 14 En. Ps. 70.1.18: ... superbi, pollicentes salidem hominibus, cum domini sit salus ... Quid est: 'Uacate et uidete quoniam ego sum Dominus', nisi, ut sciatis quia Deus est qui operatur in uobis...? Haec requies contra negotiatores praedicatur, haec requies contra eos qui oderunt i itimn praedicatur, agendo et iactando se de operibus suis, ut non requiescant in Deo. . . 15 Id. 19: Numquid non operabimur bonum? Operabimur, sed ipse in nobis operante... 16 Ep. 55.20: ... omnia quae bene operamur, non habeant intentionem nisi in futuram requiem sempiternam. 17 Id. 19: nee requiescere poterimus post omnia opera nostra, quae in hac uita gerimus, nisi eius dono ad aeternitatem sanctificati atque perfecti. . . 18 Sermo 128.1: ... Deus simul et requiescit et agit; omnis enim qui sine labore agit, et in ipso opere requiescit. Si me interroges utrum Deus vacet, nineremiis si uacaret? ... et requiem habet, et usque nunc operatur. 19 De Gen. ad litt. 4.12: ... Quapropter sic accipimus Deum requieuisse ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, ut iam nouam naturam ulterius mil|am conderet, non ut ea, quae condiderat, continere et gubernare cessaret.

42

B. Bruning

La perfection de Dieu apparait dans ce septieme jour, ou il se repose de ce dont il n'avait pas besoin ou dont il n'etait redevable a personne. II ne se repose pas dans ses creatures mais de ses cr6atures en lui-meme20. De notre cot6 on peut dire que Dieu se repose dans notre repos en tant que nous nous reposons dans sa perfection a Lui21. Mais aussi longtemps que nous vivons encore sur terre nous menons une double vie, figur6e par Marie et Marthe qui representent la vie contemplative oii nous nous reposons en Dieu et la vie active oii nous agissons pour Lui. Meme si le Christ repond a Marthe que Marie a choisi la meilleure part, cette double vie ne doit pas etre concue comme une opposition entre le mal et le bien, comme si le travail de Marthe 6tait mauvais22. Marthe et Marie qui incarnent la tension entre les deux vies, representent la double vie de l'Eglise qui se trouve a la fois ici-bas sur terre et la-haut dans le ciel. Pour souligner que la vie active est meme indispensable pour arriver a la uacatio de la contempla tion, Augustin dit qu'on ne peut passer au repos sans avoir travers6 le travail, sans avoir prech6 la parole divine aux membres les plus faibles du Christ total, sans avoir nourri les affam6s et vetu les nus du Corps du Christ23. Quoique la vie de Marthe soit indispensable, la vie de Marie est meilleure car les multiples ceuvres de mis6ricorde prendront fin un jour, il y aura une uacatio aussi dans ce domaine24. En attendant le travail multiple de Marthe doit etre dirige par l'Un: il n'existe aucun peuple ni aucune communaut6 sans l'unite qui les ins pire et les fonde25. Grace a cette double vie chaque membre de l'Eglise peut participer des ici-bas a la contemplation a condition qu'il se mette a distance: 'uacate et uidete: quid? quoniam ego sum dominus. Magna visio,felix contemplatio'26. Se mettre a distance, c'est ce que fait la continence: s'abstenir de l'amour de ce monde pour s'orienter vers l'amour de Dieu. Seulement apres le jeflne de cette vie terrestre nous serons libres (uacabit) pour la vraie jouissance

20 De Gen. ad litt. 4.15: ... nullo opere suo sic delectatus, quasi faciendi eius eguerit... ipse autem nulli, quod ex ipso est, debeat. . . ne illis uel faciendis uelfactis auctum eius gaudium uideretur, sed eum, quo ab ipsis in seipso requieuit. II serait interessant d'analyser la transcendance de la perfection divine a partir des notions de 'egere' et de 'debere' qui sont absolument absents en Dieu. 21 Conf. 13.50-53. 22 Sermo 104.3, 103.3, 5 23 Id. 104.3. 24 Id. 104.7: ... iransibunt ista: toleranda sunt, amanda... adsit modestia, adsit misericordia... Cf. Sermo 362.28. 25 Sermo 103.4: Da unum, et populus est: tolle unum et turba est... Ad hoc unum non nos perducit, nisi multi habeamus cor unum (Act. 4,3). Id. 104.3: Quia tu circa multa, ilia circa unum. Praeponitur unum multis: non enim a multis unum, sed multa ab uno. . . Transit labor multitudinis, et remanet caritas unitatis. 26 En. Ps. 103.4. Ici nous vivons encore en esperance, en recevant la benediction de Sion; mais la a J6rusalem ou Dieu habite nous serons libres pour Le voir dans sa paix eternelle: uacabimus ad uidendum deum in pace aeterna (En. Ps. 134.26).

Psaume 45,1 1 dans l'ceuvre d'Augustin

43

de Dieu27. Mais pour cette vision de Dieu, le cceur humain doit etre purifie\ parce que seuls ceux qui sont libels de toute impurete dans leur cceur verront Dieu28. Mais il n'est pas probable que cette vision soit possible dans la vie terrestre a cause de l'invisibilite et de l'ineffabilit6 de Dieu29. Dans le paradis la vie des saints sera comme celle des anges: il n'y aura pas besoin de faire une pause apres avoir fait un effort douloureux et il n'y aura pas de repugnance non plus a cause de l'unique nourriture qui est Dieu, car cette nourriture provoque une satietas insatiabilisM. C'est comme si nous sommes invit6s a nous mettre a table et a manger: soyez libres et voyez! Alors nous serons libres et nous verrons Dieu comme il est31. Dans la perfection du sabbat eternel nous serons libres 6ternellement, nous verrons et nous saurons, nous aimerons et nous louerons32. Le commentaire d'Augustin sur psaume 45,11 montre bien sa methode de travail ex6g6tique: le sens n'est jamais univoque parce la lecture r6vele une source de plusieurs significations. II s'agit plutot d'une pluralite de sens qui est l'arriere-plan de chaque signification.

27 Sermo 125.9: Omnes scripturae nihil te aliud docent, nisi continentiam ab amore saeculi, in amor tuus currat in Deum. . . lam tunc non nobis uacabit nisi laudare deum. 28 Cons. Eu. 1.8: ista quo peruenitur, ilia qua laboratur, ut cor mundetur ad uidendum deum, ista qua uacatur et uidetur deus. Cf. Ep. 147.28; 147.37 et 148.6. II serait interessant d'analyser les textes ou Augustin propose le precepte de l'amour du prochain comme la purification de 1'ail qui se prepare a voir Dieu lui-meme: De spir. et litt. 64; De disc. Christ. 5; lo. eu. Tr. 17.8 17.14; En. />*. 118.13.4; Sermo 179.7. 29 De Gen. ad litt. 12.28, 12.34: ... ipsam dei substantiam verbumque deum, per quod facta sunt omnia, per caritatem spiritus sancti ineffabiliter ualeat uidere et audire. . . Cf. E. Naab, o.c., 27ss., 37ss.; M.M Miles, o.c, 130ss.; B. Snider, Zur Theophanie. 53ss.; F. Van Fleteren, o.c, 113ss., 287ss. 30 Sermo 125.11 362.29; Conf. 2.18. 31 Sermo 362.31: Quasi enim diceretur, recumbite et manducate: ita dictum est, 'uacate et uidete'. Vacabimus ergo et uidebimus Deum sicuti est... Se mettre a table est une faible traduc tion de recumbere parce dans l'Antiquit6 on se couche sur un divan pour le repas. On se repose pendant le repas. La jouissance divine est comme un repos parfait. 32 De ciu. Dei 22.30: Ibi uacabimus et uidebimus, uidebimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. Dans ce texte on rencontre une citation litterale du psaume 45,1 1 et quatre paraphrases.

Exercitatio Animi in Augustine's De Trinitate Martin Claes, Utrecht

Obviously De Trinitate is not the most popular book from Augustine's oeuvre, although it is and was frequently quoted in handbooks on systematic the ology from the Middle Ages until modern times. Especially Augustine's 'psy chological' analogy of the Trinity became well known in numerous textbooks. But was this scheme of the image of the Trinity in the human soul the essence of Augustine's De Trinitate? Were Augustine's literary qualities so poor that he needed fifteen books, with all their detours, to explain to his readers that the human soul was created after the image of the divine Trinity? It seems this schematic vision of Augustine's De Trinitate underrates not only Augustine's literary genius, but also the influence of the literary tradition in which we should situate De Trinitate. In De Trinitate Augustine seems to give us a report of his personal quest to the divine Trinity, as he guides the reader through the detours of scripture and of the self. This makes De Trinitate for us difficult to read, used as we are to systematic treatises, to books with a clear design, without doublings and detours. It was H. Marrou in his book Saint Augustine et la fin de la culture Antique1 who introduced one of the key notions for understanding De Trinitate, but who at the same time fell into a form of anachronistic judgement, which he cor rected in his 'Retractatio'. Marrou in his book asked for attention to be given to the notion of exercitatio animi: the process in which the human soul is given exercise before it is able and strong enough to comprehend and to be in contact with truth, the good, with God. Marrou noticed the importance of this notion of exercitatio animi, especially in the earlier works of Augustine. But he failed to notice that the literary form Augustine chose to write in had exactly the purpose of the exercitatio of the reader's soul. This was exactly the purpose of all these detours, repetitions, and longer deviations. In the book Marrou therefore concluded that Augustine was not a talented writer and that his works were poorly composed2. He withdrew this conclusion later in his 'Retractatio'3. 1 Marrou, H.I., Saint Augustin.et la Fin de la Culture Antique, 4th edn (Paris, 1958). 2 Marrou, pp. 307-25. 3 See also the commentary of J. Brachtendorf on Marrou. According to Brachtendorf, Mar rou 's main argument for the interpretation of De Trinitate as an exercitatio mentis is the poor style of composition. According to Brachtendorf, Marrou withdrew this argument in his 'Retractatio',

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M. Claes

An important contribution to the understanding of antique philosophical works, and therefore also many early Christian works, was made by Pierre Hadot in his book Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique. This book was later reedited and translated as Philosophy as a way of Life4. In this book Hadot points to the pedagogical character of many works of ancient philosophy. He makes it clear that they have many characteristics of the oral character of the antique philosophical education. These works were never meant as systematic treatises on a certain subject, but were often conceived as books that were written in a style reflecting the oral character of the education. The authors take the readers by the hand as if they were physically present in their philo sophical colloquia, leading them through philosophical problems as a spiritual guide. Hadot places these ancient philosophical works in the genre of spiritual exercises, involving a working on the self and a tradition the self-knowledge. In this way, ancient philosophy is strongly connected with notions of exercise and training. Augustine in De Trinitate also uses medical metaphors to express the human condition of weakness and as an analogy for the process of growth of the human soul. It is in relation to this exercitatio animi that I want to examine some pas sages from Augustine's De Trinitate in this paper. It often happens that scholars concentrate on the second part of De Trinitate. But although the second part of De Trinitate - from a pragmatic point of view - is perhaps indeed the most interesting part for many scholars, we should ask ourselves what the function and place of the first part was. In the first book Augustine invites the reader - us - to go along with him as a guide. He will lead us to purify our minds and along ways that are fitted to our weak condition: Accordingly, dear reader, whenever you are as certain about something as I am go for ward with me; whenever you stick equally fast seek with me, whenever you notice that you have gone wrong, come back to me; or that I have call me back to you. In this way let us set out along Charity Street together, making for him of whom it is said: 'Seek his face always.' This covenant, both prudent and pious, I would wish to enter into in the sight of the Lord our God with all who read what I write, and with respect to all my writings, especially such as these where we are seeking the unity of the three, of and there is therefore no relevant argument left to interpret the entire De Trinitate as an exerci tatio mentis. Brachtendorf considers a part of De Trinitate books XI-XIII), as an exercitatio. Brachtendorf' s conclusion here seems to have a somewhat artificial result: although Marrou's argument of poor composition of De Trinitate was withdrawn, there still remain many places in De Trinitate were Augustine himself writes about training of the mind. It is not very convincing to suppose that Augustine only in these books, XI-XIII, wrote with the idea of exercitatio in his mind, especially when we recall the importance of this notion in other works. See J. Brachten dorf, Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflektion und Erkenntnis Gottes in De Trinitate (Hamburg, 2000). pp. 4-7. 4 Hadot, P., Exercises spirituels et philosophic antique (Paris, 1987); tr. M. Chase, as Philos ophy as a Way of Life (Oxford, 1995).

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Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For nowhere else is a mistake more dangerous, or the search more laborious, or discovery more advantageous'5. In this first book Augustine defines the purpose of his mission: to seek the unity of the Trinity. But it is not a mission for himself alone. He explicitly wants to undertake this mission together with his reader. He exhorts his reader directly to stay close to him. Augustine uses the already familiar metaphors about scrip ture and its pedagogy of humility, fitted to the weak condition of children. In the opening of book III Augustine directs his speech again to the reader, the person he is guiding. This time he refers to his function as a bishop. He points to his task to protect his diocese against persons teaching errors - a pas toral task. It seems he is now reinterpreting his task as a guide - (perhaps a philosophical guide) as that of a pastoral guide, the bishop as a shepherd who is protecting and guiding his flock. In the fourth book Augustine uses a medical metaphor where Christ is com pared with a medicine halfway between man and God, a mediator: Christ can cure men because he is halfway between God and man, God adapting himself to the sick and weak condition of men. Incarnation therefore became an essen tial element of the process of therapy, and also of pedagogy. Augustine's concern in the following books, V-VII, is how to speak about the Trinity, and therefore their content seems to be rather logical and linguis tic, but they lack the systematic style we would expect. Augustine's arguments are embellished with all kinds of detours. In book VIII again, Augustine, like a spiritual guide, speaks to his reader and exhorts him not to remain searching in earthly things for truth. In books IX-XI Augustine and his reader discover images of the Trinity in the human soul. An image is found in the act of seeing - the seeing of the object, the actual sight, and the conscious intention of seeing (XI.2) - and, fur ther, in the attention of the mind, the mind's eye, and the image stored in the memory (XI.6-7). But Augustine warns his reader several times that these trinities are not the image of God because they grew out of the senses and not from God (XI.8). At the end of book XIII Augustine directs his attention again to the reader, his pupil and reminds his reader of the goal of this journey in the human soul. He makes clear he started his journey in the lower regions, in the outer man, to exercise the mind of the reader. Now Augustine seems to conclude that they still only found trinities of the outer man, not of the inner man, where they hope to find the image of the Triune God in men. We had thought it best, you may remember, as we were climbing up, so to say, step by step, to search within the inner man for an appropriate trinity in each of these spheres,

5 De Trinitate I.5, tr. E. Hill, The Trinity, The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century, I.5. (New York, 1991).

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just as we had previously searched within the outer man, in order by training the mind at these lower levels to come in our own small measure to a sight of that trinity which God is, at least in a puzzle and in a mirror, if of course we can manage even this much . . . But, when he does this, we said, he is certainly not acting according to a trinity of the inner man but rather one of the outer man, because all that he remembers and looks at when he wishes and as he wishes is something belonging to the sense of the body which we call hearing, nor by such thinking is he dealing with anything but the images of bodily things, namely of sounds'6. After he has found, together with his reader, the image of trinity, Augustine in the closing book, XV, stresses the differences between the image of trinity in the human soul and the divine Trinity itself. Augustine reflects, now that he has arrived together with his reader at the end of his quest, In pursuance of our plan to train the reader, in the things that have been made, for get ting to know him by whom they were made, we came eventually to his image. This is man insofar as he excels other animals, that is in his reason or understanding and in whatever else can be said about the rational or intellectual soul that may belong to what is called mind or consciousness'7. This element of exercise 'in the lower things' is also mentioned in XV. 10. It seems therefore that Augustine considered the quest for the image of the Trinity in the outer man and later in the inner man as an exercitatio mentis to fit the soul of his student, the reader, to make contact with the Triune God. But now, almost at the end of his book, he wants to make clear that the image of the Trinity is not the Trinity itself. He summarizes the path he and his reader have gone together - the path from the outer trinities in the creation to the inner trinity in the human soul. But despite the similarities, the dissimilarities are greater. This dissimilarity and inadequacy of the image of the trinity over against the divine Trinity is strongly related to the difference between creation and creator, with the weak condition of the creation. Augustine warns the reader, using different metaphors, not to confuse the image and the Trinity itself. He compares the image with a mirror. Faith can cleanse our hearts so that one day we can see face to face and without a mirror. The philosophers are accused of trying to reach this visio without the cleansing function of faith. They only train themselves in subtle discussions and therefore condemn them selves8. It is not easy to make some concluding remarks concerning therapy and edu cation in De Trinitate. Both themes are present in De Trinitate, but in a differ ent way from the works we spoke about earlier. With Pierre Hadot as an exam ple, and having Marrou's remarks about the exercitatio animi in mind, I think we should see De Trinitate as a project of cooperation between Augustine and 6 De Trinitate XIIi.26 tr. Hill. 7 De Trinitate XV .1 tr. Hill. 8 De Trinitate XV.44.

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his reader9. Augustine more than once shifts his focus to his reader and guides him as a good shepherd to knowledge of the self. I am inclined to think that Augustine with De Trinitate also wrote in the philosophical tradition of spiri tual exercise found, as Hadot made clear, in many ancient philosophical writ ings. This common quest gives the book its own dynamics, which are of course not the dynamics of the sort of systematic treatise on Trinity that were pro duced centuries later. This could be an explanation for the long detours Augus tine makes in the text. The detours have their own place and function in Augus tine's educational and pedagogic project with his reader. They could have the function of the training of the reader's soul, to make him ready for the difficult quest for the image of the Trinity in his own soul, which is at the same time a quest for knowledge of the self. What they have found is an image, a mirror, a sign, but not the res itself. In other words, it is the human image of trinity, not God himself.

9 B. Studer states the complete De Trinitate was conceived as an exercitatio mentis. See B. Studer, 'Oikonomia und Theologia in Augustins De Trinitate'. in J. Brachtendorf, Gott und sein Bild. Augustins De Trinitate im Spiegel gegenwdrtiger Forschung (Paderborn, 2000), pp. 39-52.

St Augustine's Commentary on the Emmaus Scene in Luke's Gospel Finbarr G. Clancy S.J., Dublin

Luke's Emmaus narrative (Lk. 24: 13-35) was customarily read on either the Tuesday or Monday of Easter week in the Church of North Africa in Augus tine's day1. Five of Augustine's Easter week sermons give succinct commen taries on the Emmaus scene2. Additional brief comments on Luke's text occur in twenty-five other works3. While it is difficult to date all of these texts accu rately, most fall within the period AD 400-420. I propose to give a synthetic overview of Augustine's commentary on Lk. 24:13-35. I shall follow the details of Luke's narrative, focusing sequentially on five points: the description of the two disciples; the portrait of Christ as third traveller; the scripture lesson; the fractio panis; and Augustine's teach ing on the officium hospitalitatis.

Despairing and Disillusioned Disciples Augustine regularly describes how the outward appearance of the two disci ples matched their inner spiritual state: 'Their very words reveal where their hearts were; their voices witness to what is going on in the spirit' (Sermo 236.2). Their eyes saw Christ as a mere travelling companion, but failed to recognise him as risen Lord. Augustine notes that their eyes reflected their inner state of

1 On Augustine's Iectionary, see G.G. Willis, St Augustine's Lectionary, Alcuin Club Collec tions 44 (London: SPCK, 1962); S. Poque, 'Les lectures liturgiques de l'octave pascale a Hippone d'apres les Trails de saint Augustin sur la Premiere EpTtre de s. Jean', RBen 74 (1964), 217-41; S. Poque, Augustin d'Hippone: Sermons pour la P&que, SC 116 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1966), 85-1 15; W. Harmless, Augustine and the Catechumenate, (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995), 324-30. For Augustine's references to the usual order of reading the resurrection narratives, see Sermo 232. 1 ; 234. 1 ; 235. 1 ; 239. 1 . 2 Sermo 232; 234; 235; 236; 236A. The authenticity of certain sections of Sermo 236A (sec tions 5-8, and possibly also 4) is doubted. 3 Sermo 47.10; 89.4, 7; 1 1 1.2; 239.2; 352.4; Enarr. in Ps. 34, sermo 2.4; 63.17; 68, sermo 1.8; 73.5; 96.2; 113, sermo 1.11; 147.17-18; In lo. ev. tr. 9.3-6; 25.3; 103.3; In Ep. lo. tr. 2.12; De consen. Evang. 3.25.70-86; Quaest. Evang. 2.51.1-2; Quaest. in Hept. 1.43; 7.49; De div. quaest. 83 61.3; Loc. in Hept. 1.9; Ep. 149.3.31; De nupt. et concup. 1.5.6; C. mendac. 13.28.

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mind. They had wandered far from the Lord, and their hearts were dead4. The doleful pair were locked in conversation about the iniquity of the Jews and Christ's death: 'grieving for him as dead, not knowing that he had risen again'. They are portrayed as 'despairing, grieving, mourning, no longer hoping any thing', 'sad, sorrowing, groaning, and sighing'. They proceed to open up 'the depths of their despair' to their unrecognised companion5. The twin ailment besetting the pair was their lack of faith and hope. As Augustine evocatively put it, 'The leading rams had the disease which the lambs shudder at'6. He regularly contrasts their state of mind with that of the good thief crucified alongside Jesus (cf. Lk. 23:39-42). 'When they wavered, he believed. Where the robber found hope, the disciples lost it.' The disciples had fallen from hope, yet it is their unrecognised companion who will pick up the pair who could not imitate the faith of the good thief7. In a sermon on repentance, Augustine sees Moses' doubt, exemplified in his striking the rock twice with his staff (cf. Num. 20:10-11), as foreshadowing later doubters. Peter remonstrated with Jesus following his prophecy of the passion (cf. Mt. 16:22), and Augustine typifies the two disciples on the Emmaus road as exhibiting a similar doubt. Each feared the wood - that is, the cross - coming in contact with the rock - that is, Christ (Sermo 352.4). Such doubt eclipsed their sense of hope in Christ. Ipse cum eis erat, et spes illius in Mis non erat (Enarr. in Ps. 96.2). Cleopas and companion are described as seeing Christ, but not truly recognising him (Sermo 235.2). Reference is commonly made to their eyes being held from recognising him (cf. Lk. 24:16), but this is variously inter preted. Augustine denies that their eyes were physically closed or suffered from natural blindness8. He states that 'their eyes were held from recognis ing him, because their hearts needed more thorough instruction' (Sermo 232.3). Elsewhere it is Christ himself who is the agent preventing their eyes from recognising him: 'He kept their eyes from recognising him, not to remove himself from believers, but to put them off while they were still doubters'9. In his De consensu Evangelistarum Augustine discusses how the disciples' eyes were held from recognising Christ until the breaking of the bread. Their state of ignorance concerning the truth is the first explanation given. This is coupled with an ecclesial emphasis, perhaps conditioned by anti-Donatist con cerns. Full knowledge of Christ is only obtained when one is a member of his

4 See Enarr. in Ps. 68, sermo 1.8; Sermo 235.2. 5 Sermo 232.3; Enarr. in Ps. 34, sermo 2.4; 63.17; Sermo 352.4. 6 Sermo 236.2. 7 On the contrast between the pair and the good thief, see Sermo 232.5-6; 111.2; 234.2; 236A.4; Enarr, in Ps. 68, sermo 1.8; In lo. ev. tr. 9.4; 109.4. 8 Loc. in Hept. 1.9; De nupt. et concup. 1.5.6.; De. Consen. Evang. 3.25.72; Sermo 239.2. ' Sermo 352.4; see also Enarr. in Ps. 147.17.

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body, the Church. An additional explanation suggests that the impediment to recognition may have been introduced by Satan. Such an impediment is only removed when one becomes a participant in the body of the Church10.

The Third Traveller - The Risen Christ Augustine often refers to the unrecognised Lord as a viator tertius accom panying the dejected pair". A commonly interwoven theme is that of Christ as the Way. This metaphor is cleverly used to capture the plight of the disciples who simultaneously see but fail to recognise, who hope and lack hope, who follow yet wander. Thus, Augustine states, Jesus appeared. He was seen with their eyes and was not recognised. The Master was walking with them along the way. He himself was the Way, and they were not walk ing along the way; he found, you see, that they had wandered off the way12. As the disciples express their surprise at this stranger's ignorance concerning what had taken place, they simultaneously unveil their own ignorance and lack of faith and hope. Augustine perceptively notes what ensued between the three travellers: 'They went over all that had happened to Jesus. And straight away they proceed to open up all the depth of their despair, and albeit unwittingly they show the doctor their wounds'13. Augustine invariably reacts strongly to the disciples' reference to Jesus as 'a prophet powerful in deeds and words' (Lk. 24:19). Adopting a high Christological stance, Augustine in general disliked the designation of Jesus as 'prophet', preferring the title dominus prophetarum14. To designate Christ as a prophet was tantamount to 'giving your judge the title of herald' {Sermo 232.3). Augustine notes that at Caesarea Philippi it was the ordinary populace who referred to Christ as 'one of the prophets', while Peter acknowledged Jesus as the Son of God. Prophecy without reference to Christ displays the tastelessness (insipientia) of water. By contrast, understanding Christ in the prophetic books is like par taking of wine, which not only has taste, but even inebriates. Jesus brands the two disciples as insensati, tardi corde ad credendum (Lk. 24:25). It is only when they taste the inebriating power of prophecy fulfilled in Christ that their hearts burn within them (cf. Lk. 24:32)15. 10 De consen. Evang. 3.25.72. The ecclesial emphasis recurs in Enarr. in Ps. 34, sermo 2.4; 68, sermo 1.8. 11 Sermo 89.4; 111.2; 232.3; 236.2; 352.4. 12 Sermo 235.2. See also Sermo 111.2; 236.2. 13 Sermo 352.4. 14 On Christ as Lord of the prophets, see Sermo 232.3; 234.2; 236.2; In lo. ev. rr.24.7. See also M.F. Berrouard, Oeuvres de St. Augustin: Homilies sur I't.vangile de saint Jean, 1-XVI, BA71 (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes. 1993), 949-50, and Homilies sur I'Evangile de saint Jean, XVII-XXXII, BA 72 (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1988), 777-80. 15 In lo. ev. tr. 9.3-5.

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The notion of Christ as teacher features prominently in Sermo 234. Christ is depicted as teaching the robber from the cross: 'The cross was a classroom; that is where the Master taught the robber, the tree he was hanging on became the chair he was teaching from' {Sermo 234.2). This is contrasted with the two dis ciples, who manifest their disappointed hopes concerning Christ as redeemer. Augustine castigates them for forgetting what Christ had earlier taught them: They were disciples, they had heard him, they had lived with him, they had known him as their teacher, they had been instructed by him, and they could not even imitate and share the faith of the robber hanging on the cross. (Sermo 232.5)

The Scriptures Explained In commenting on the third traveller explaining the scriptures to Cleopas and companion, Augustine focuses on Christ's soteriological role, the neces sity of the passion as a prelude to the resurrection, and his purification of the disciples' notion of the kingdom. As viator tertius Christ rescues them from their wandering, restores their hope, and gives new life to their hearts. The catechesis on scripture acts as a prelude to his full disclosure in the fractio panis. Augustine explains that Christ expounded the scriptures to the pair to enable them to recognise him in the point at which they had forsaken him, his crucifix ion. 'He opened the scriptures to them, so that they would realise that if he had not died, he would not be the Christ' (Sermo 236.2). In Sermo 232.4 he states, 'The Son of God had come precisely in order to die; if he had not come in order to die, what would have enabled us to live?' A little later in the same sermon we meet the concise formula, Accepit Me mortem de nostro, ut daret nobis vitam de suo (Sermo 232.5). It is faith in the risen Christ which must be the distinguish ing mark of the Christian, compared to Jews or pagans (Sermo 234.3). Commenting on Jn. 6: 15, Augustine cautions against untimely haste in wish ing to establish the kingdom. Replying to Cleopas' words (cf. Lk. 24:21), Augustine notes that he was not immune from this temptation to anticipate the kingdom - sed quid festinatis? (In lo. ev. tr. 25.3). He explains that the kingdom is presently being gathered together, being prepared, being purchased by Christ's blood. Before being made manifest, the kingdom must first be gathered. Com menting on the twelve baskets of scraps left over after the multiplication of the loaves, Augustine links them with the twelve disciples being nourished by what the Jews had left and abandoned. He states that the Lord, as if breaking and opening up what was hard and encased in the Law, filled the disciples in the post-Resurrection period, by explaining the Old Testament to them. He mentions the two disciples on the road to Emmaus by way of example here16. 16 See De div. quaest. 83 61.3. Similarly in Quaest. in Hept. 7.49, Jephthah's name (cf. Jud. 1 1 :29-31), interpreted as 'opening', is linked with Christ's opening up of the scriptures to the disciples.

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In his commentary on Psalm 113, Augustine links v. 8, which speaks of God transforming rock and flint into springs of water, with Christ's explanation of the scriptures to Cleopas and companion. He speaks of Christ melting himself and his apparent hardness, in order to become a fountain of living water gush ing up to eternal life (cf. Jn. 4:14). 'That rock, that hardness, was turned into pools of water, that stone into fountains of water, when on his resurrection he expounded to them, commencing with Moses and all the prophets, how Christ ought to suffer thus'17. Augustine speaks movingly of Christ's action in the disciples' regard in the course of his commentary on Psalm 34. While not referring explicitly to the explanation of the scriptures, he speaks of the fruit of that activity. 'In great fasting had the Lord remained had he not refreshed them that he might feed on them. For he refreshed them, he comforted them, he confirmed them, and into his own body converted them' (Enarr. in Ps. 34, sermo 2.4). Augustine describes the impact of Christ's explanation of the scriptures on the disciples. 'They listened, they were filled with joy, they breathed again, and as they declared themselves, they were on fire [cf. Lk. 24,32], and still they did not recognise the presence of the light' (Sermo 236.2). They were advancing from seeing Christ to recognising him as the risen Lord, but they had not yet made that final step towards the desired goal.

Consoletur tefractio partis The breaking of the bread, the opening of the disciples' eyes, and their recognition of Christ as risen Lord are closely linked in Augustine's commen taries18. The events associated with the fractio panis are clearly interpreted eucharistically. We note in all of the commentaries a certain reserve when speaking explicitly about the Eucharist. The disciplina arcani was clearly still being observed. Luke's specific language concerning Christ taking, blessing, and breaking the bread is regularly employed, especially the last two terms19. Augustine notes that Christ wished himself to be recognised in the fractio panis20. Having referred to Cleopas and his companion coming to recognition of Christ at the breaking of bread, Augustine reminds his congregation that they cannot say that they do not know Christ. We both know him and have him with us when we believe. He compares the two disciples, who had Christ with them

17 Enarr. in Ps. 1 13, sermo 1.11. See also Enarr. in Ps. 63.17, where Christ, as one not yet fully recognised, explains the scriptures ut laetius agnoscatur. 18 See Sermo 89.4,7; 232.7; 234.2; 235.3; 236.3; 236A.2; 239.2; Enarr. in Ps. 63.17; 147.17; De consen. Evang. 3.25.72. 19 E.g., Sermo 89.4; 234.2; 235A.2; 239.2; De consen. Evang. 3.25.72. 20 Sermo 234.2; 235.3; Enarr. in Ps. 147.17.

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at their meal together, with the faithful, who have Christ within spiritually. 'It is a greater thing to have Christ in your heart than in your house, since it is more inwardly attached to us' (Sermo 232.7). In panis fractione cognoscitur; quia ibi percipitur, ubi vita aeterna percipitur (Sermo 239.2). Augustine states that it was for our sake that Christ wished to be recog nised in the breaking of bread. We were not to see him physically, as Cleopas and companion did, but we would eat his flesh in the Eucharist. Encouraging his flock to take their membership of the Church seriously, Augustine eloquently states, consoletur te fractio panis. He continues, 'The Lord's absence is not an absence. Have faith and the one you cannot see is with you' (Sermo 235.3). This notion of faith is emphasised in two other aspects also. Firstly, com menting on Lk. 24:28b - se ire longius dominus finxit - Augustine interprets the Lord's pretence here as being figurative rather than fallacious. As regards the Lord's bodily presence he was assumed to be departing. Christ, however, is to be detained by faith, detained for the breaking of bread21. Augustine lays down a challenge to the catechumens in his congregation: 'Those who put off knowing about the sacrament will find Christ "going on further" from them. Conversely, those who detain Christ by faith and invite him to enjoy their hos pitality, they will find themselves invited to heaven' (Sermo 89.7). Secondly, perhaps stimulated by Luke's reference to the Lord 'vanishing from their sight' (Lk. 24:31b), but also referring to the period after the Ascen sion, Augustine speaks of Christ's withdrawal serving the purpose of building up faith. 'He withdrew from them in the body, since he was held by them in faith. That indeed is why the Lord absented himself in the body from the whole Church, and ascended into heaven, ut fides aedificetur1 (Sermo 235.4).

Officium hospitalitatis The hospitality that Cleopas and companion exhibited to the third traveller, inviting him to stay with them as evening fell, became the privileged context in which their eyes were opened to recognise the risen Lord at the fractio panis. This becomes a paradigm for Augustine, leading him to reflect on the officium hospitalitatis22. In extending hospitality to the stranger, Christ, too, can be recognised in our midst. His Emmaus commentaries often have an eth ical dimension woven into their fabric, supported by an ecclesiology of the Body of Christ.

21 See Sermo 89.7; Quaest. Evang. 2.51.2. Augustine also comments on Lk. 24:28b in C. mendac. 13.28. 22 On the hospitality of Cleopas and his companion, see Sermo 89.4,7; 232.7; 235.3; 236.3; 236A.2; 239.2; Quaest. Evang. 2.51.2.

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In Sermo 234 Augustine reminds his flock that Christians must be distin guished not only by faith, but also by works and love. The performance of works 'on fire with charity', or accompanied by fervency of spirit, must be their goal. Imitating Cleopas and companion, who experienced 'their hearts burning within them' (Lk. 24:32), the Christian must seek to be on fire with the ardour of charity (igne charitatis). 'Set yourselves alight with the fire of charity: get yourselves white hot with the praise of God and the excellence of your morals' {Sermo 234.3). For Cleopas and companion, their hospitality became the prelude to the full recognition of Christ. Augustine states clearly that Christ can be found as much in the stranger as in the fractio panis. 'Con strain the stranger if you want to recognise the Saviour' (Sermo 235.3). And again in another sermon: Discite hospites suscipere, ubi agnoscitur Christus (Sermo 236.3). Augustine's comments on the officium hospitalitatis are often coupled with reference to the details of the last judgement scene (Mt. 25:31-46), where Christ identifies himself with the suffering members of his body, whose needs are tended to by others23. In exhibiting hospitality to any Christian one is simultaneously welcoming Christ: 'So when a Christian takes in a Christian, members are serving members; and the head rejoices and reckons as given to himself whatever has been lavished on a member of his.' Augustine continues here by saying, So here let Christ be fed when he is hungry, be given a drink when he is thirsty, clothed when he is naked, taken in when he is a stranger, visited when he is sick. Such are the needs of the journey; that is how we have to live in this wandering exile, in which Christ is in want. He is in want in his people, he is replete in himself. (Sermo 236.3) In book 2 of his Questions on the Gospels Augustine reflects on Lk. 24:28b, symbolically interpreting the reference to Christ making as if to go on further by linking it with his Ascension. By his Ascension, however, the Lord did not intend to be absent from us. He is still to be found among his members as they serve each other in the officium hospitalitatis. Augustine supports his point here by citing texts from the last judgement (Mt. 25 : 38, 40) and from Paul (Gal. 6:6; Rom. 2:13, 12:13) concerning apostolically active faith and having a special care for hospitality24. The theme of hospitality is also asso ciated with our heavenly goal. Augustine observes that our Lord chose to be a guest on earth, a stranger in the world that he had made: 'He prepared to be a guest that you might have the blessing of giving him welcome.' While Christ is welcomed as a guest, he himself is preparing a home in heaven for us (Sermo 239.2).

23 See Sermo 235.4; 236.3; Quaest. Evang. 2.51.2. 24 Quaest. Evang. 2.51.2.

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We can summarise Augustine's commentary on the Emmaus scene in terms of faith, hope, and charity. Unrecognised at first, the risen Lord accompanied the dejected pair of disciples and mingled with their conversation. Through the explanation of the scriptures, focusing on the necessity of the passion, if Christ was to be Saviour, the veils of doubt are lifted from the disciples' minds and the embers of faith and hope are rekindled. It was not until the fractio panis that the risen Lord wished to be fully disclosed to the pair, bringing them inner consolation and incorporating them into his own body. The same Lord is accessible to faith by all who receive him in the Eucharist. Through being on fire with the spirit of charity and exercising the officium hospitalitatis, the members of Christ can glimpse the presence of Christ among the least of his members, whose needs they seek to serve.

The Soul-Body Relation in and before Augustine

Kevin Corrigan, Atlanta

1. This paper is a small, introductory, and tentative part of a much larger project. My original goal was to compare Gregory of Nyssa and the later Augustine on the nature of the human being, but it became impossible to get there. Augustine's work is just too large, for one thing; and, for another, I got the impression from some commentators that the early Augustine, at least, did n't have much idea about anything; he believed uncritically, or instance, that we were really an immaterial soul; and that this soul did not or should not have anything to do with body: he didn't approve of desert impassibility, but still for him the body functions 'like a stick' in my hand; or again alternatively, he rejects any activity of body on soul1. If we add to this, his little Greek; his access only to a few Platonc Dialogues, perhaps the Phaedo and Phaedrus, in part through Porphyry and Marius Victorinus (as well as Ambrose, of course); his, in part, derivative knowledge of the Greek tradition from Cicero (Tusculan Disputations; Hortensius) and Varro2, then Augustine sometimes looks to some of his commentators somewhat philosophically unsophisticated. My thesis is the reverse of this impression. I shall argue here, first, that Augustine is more sophisticated on the soul-body relation from the beginning than some of his commentators appear tho think; and second, that his notion of attentiolintentio and his later view of the soul-body relation, particularly vis-a-vis the resurrection body, confirms his multidimensional, Christian and Platonic approach, as well as his radically critical view of Platonism itself3. 1 See, for example, Vernon J. Bourke. 'The Body-Soul Relation in the Early Augustine', in Collectanea Augustiniana, ed. J.C. Schnaubelt and F. Van Fleteren (New York, 1990), pp. 435-50 (p. 438 especially). 2 Cf. G.J.P. O'Daly, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind (London, 1987), pp. 7-11. 3 This paper is a broader development of some of the themes in K. Corrigan, 'Love of God, love of self, and love of neighbour: Augustine's critical dialogue with Platonism', AugSt 34 (2003), pp. 97-106. As a measure of 'sophistication' in this paper, I shall take the view of Plotinus as a pre-eminent example, first, because this is also a measure, at least in part, adopted by Augustine himself (in his early works especially), and, second, because Plotinus' view, in the words of one eminent critic, succeeds, significantly, in putting 'an end to the conflict between [Platonic] dualism and [Aristotelian] entelechism' (J. Igal. 'Aristoteles y la evolucion de la antropologia de Plotio', Pensiamento 35 (179), pp. 35-46). This is not to suggest that other mea sures, particularity Christian ones, might not also be appropriate, but rather to adopt one measure of sophistication that was evidently helpful for Augustine himself.

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2. Some preliminary remarks4: the soul-body relation prior to Augustine tends to get treated in generally monochromatic ways (1) as if it were a sim ple question of an obvious opposition between immaterialism, on the one hand, and materialism, or perhaps incarnationalism, on the other (that is, roughly between so-called Platonism, on the one hand, and Stoicism or devel oped Christianity on the other; or (2) as if there were simple current defini tions of man according to Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Christianity which one can just parade as being useful for understanding the 'problems' an open-ended thinker like Augustine faced in his own time5; or (3) as if the socalled Platonic definitions of man as immaterial soul or soul using a body and the Aristotelian definition of man as soul-body composite and of soul as the form of a natural organic body potentially having life were not themselves either (a) genuinely open to interpretation or (b) already transformed in the thought of later thinkers like St Paul, Origen, or Plotinus6; or (4) as if the Neoplatonic treatments like those of Plotinus or Porphyry, for instance, were so obviously insufficient that we could be excused for wondering just what Augustine could have seen in them in the first place. In other words, if I may generalize, many of the treatments of this question in and before Augustine want to establish either a clear doxographic line of pre-Augustinian thinking7 or to determine Augustine's territory over against any other foreign claimants much more than they appear to want to look at a movement of ideas which was capable of electrifying people of many different persuasions. Christian and otherwise (and to the improvement of each). I recognize the need for 4 In so many of the accounts of the soul-body relation before and in relation to Augustine we seem to have little sense of the complexity of the question not just in Augustine's own time, but even in Plato's dialogues themselves or again in Aristotle's works, not to mention the develop ing complexity of treatment from the Stoics to St Paul, Clement, Origin, the Cappadocians, and. of course, so-called Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic thought (i.e., 'Platonic' and 'Neoplatonic' are somewhat procrustean terms we have given to rather diverse forms of thought that do not necessarily lend themselves to modem categories). For a sense of this question in relation to Augustine and earlier thought see R.J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. pp. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); idem, The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works (New York, 1994); J.M. Rist, Augustine: Christian Thought Baptized (Cambridge, 1994): idem, Man, Soul, and Body: Essas in Ancient Thought from Plato to Dionysius, Collected Stud ies Series CS 549 (Aldershot, 1996); R.A. Markus, 'Marius Victorinus and Augustine', in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cam bridge, 1967), pp. 327-419; The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (Cambridge, 2001); see also J.J. O'Meara, Studies in Augustine and Eriugena, ed. T. Halton (Washington, 1992), and in relation tot Origen, M.J. Edwards' provocative Origen against Plato (Aldershot, 2002). 5 See, for example, Bourke (note 1 above). 6 See generally J. Pepin, Idees grecques sur I'homme et sur Dieu (Paris, 1971); De la philosophie ancienne a la thMogie patristique. Collected Studies Series CS 233 (London, 1986); K. Corrigan, Plotinus' Theory of Matter - Evl and the Question of Substance: Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Leuven, 1996). 7 As in the case of Augustine and Porphyry, for instance, with W. Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle, 1933).

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ownership, even denominationalism, but not at the expense of much larger, apparently living and shareable forms of thought. 3. First, a brief look at Platonism and Aristotelianism generally in relation to fourth-century thought as well as to some problems of interpretation in the texts themselves. 3.1. There is not one single form of Platonism more or less generally characterizable as simply opposed to Aristotle or Peripatetic thought or even Sto icism, Middle Platonism, and so on, any more than the apparent viewpoint of one or part of one Platonic dialogue can be said to identify the whole of Plato's thought. The Phaedo, for example, may appear to exemplify a single, unitary view of a spiritual soul and a negative view of body, but this is not true of the whole dialogue (for example, the soul is also capable of 'becoming corporealized' and the final myth has a positive view of body in some sense or other after death8 and it is equally not true of the Phaedo's sister dialogues the Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus. In other words, in 'Plato', the soulbody relation is inherently complex and multidimensional, a psycho-somatic landscape in which the psyche retains or should retain her organizing leader ship, but also a landscape in which the body, rooted in soul, finds its meaning also rooted beyond soul, namely, in intelligible reality9. Something like this more complex soul-body relation is Augustine's view from the outset of his writing life, despite the lack early on perhaps of a fully emphasized theory of the resurrection body. In fact, we find a range of soul-body relations in Augus tine, comprising at least six different dimensional views: (1) soul-body in the person of Christ, and by analogy with the purely human relation10; (2) Adam before the Fall - with a spiritual body (the earlier Augustine)"; (3) Adam before the Fall - with an animal body (the later Augustine)12; (4) a variety of ways of living composite existence, not only throughout the human/animal or plant realm, but also in terms of a range in human exis tence from virtually total body-dependence to identification with the free dom of the contemplative soul13; 8 See Phaedo, 107 ff. 9 This view, implicit at least in the argument of Republic 2-9 that the body must be ordered for the sake of the soul and in relation to the good beyond both, may be said to be more fully worked out in relation to the 'making' of soul in the Timaeus (34b ff.) and the placing of body 'in' soul, rather than soul 'in' body. 10 See for example Letter 137.1 1; in lohannis evangelium tractatus 19.15; also O'Daly (note 2 above), pp. 57-8, for the difference between Christological and Trinitarian contexts. " See O'Connell, 1968 (note 4 above), pp. 152-66 generaly. 12 Cf. De genesi ad litteram 6.19,30; Letter 143.6; and ist, 1994 (note 4 above), p. 1 14. 13 This is a complex question that would require independent treatment. See generally, how ever, Rist, 1994 (note 4 above), 95 ff., for the complexity; O'Daly (note 2 above), 15 ff., for grades of soul etc.

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(5) a fall or descent of humanity (neither good nor evil qua descent or both good and evil from different viewpoints - as is perhaps suggested in the four hypotheses of the soul's origin in De Libero Arbitrio 3.56-9 - or the inclusion of all individual human beings in Adam in the Fall14; (6) the post-resurrection spiritual body15. But before looking at one small detail of this (from the De immortalitate animae as a relatively early example), let me briefly take up the question of Aristotelianism. 3.2. Even in Aristotle, despite Nuyen's view of the evolution of Aristotle's psychology16, the so-called Platonic view of soul as an immaterial form occurs together with the instrumentalist view of soul using body and the supposedly later formulation of soul as the form or entelechy of a natural, organic body potentially having life. Whether or not these three views represent different strata of Aristotle's own development, Aristotle can still call psyche twice in Metaphysics 7 'primary ousia'11 in his quest to determine in what sense form aporotate, he admits18 - may be said to be substance (and not just quality, for instance); and the question naturally arises, if the Unmoved Mover is said to be the primary ti en einai (in Metaphysics 12), in what sense Nous in the universe as a whole is to be related to all the unmoved movers or intellects (in Meta physics 12.8) or the unmoved movers as souls in nature (Physics 8)19 and how, in turn, Nous is to be related to that in the soul of the human composite which may be said to be, at least analogously perhaps, a 'primary substance'. I am not trying to cloud the question unnecessarily; only to point out that the problem that was most puzzling for Aristotle - who seems to have been rather like Augustine, an open-ended thinker rather than a simple doxologist or compiler of opinions - remained puzzling for the greatest open-ended thinkers who fol lowed him, even if this makes the job of distinghuishing Platonic and Aris

14 The four hypotheses - of which even in the Retractationes Augustine said that he did not know which was right at the time of writing both the De Libero Arbitrio and the Retractationes - appear to be a) a version of traducianism ('one soul is made . . . from which the souls of all who are born are drawn (trahuntur)', b) a version of creationism ('they are made singly in everyone at birth') c) a positive descent or embodiment of pre-existent souls ('souls already in existence in some secret place of God's are dispatched to animate and govern the bodies of individuals as these are bom'), d) voluntary embodiment of pre-existent souls ('souls created elsewhere ... come of their own accord to inhabit bodies'). On this see O'Daly (note 2 above, 16 ff., and O'Connell, 1994 (note 4 above). 15 See M. Miles, Augustine on the Body (Missoula, Montana, 1979), pp. 99-125; Rist, 1994 (note 4 above), p. 99, n. 27, for references. 16 F. Nuyens, L 'ivolution de la psychologie d'Aristote (Louvain, 1973). 17 Cf. Metaphysics 7, 1035 b pp. 14-22; 1043 a pp. 35-6. 18 Cf. Metaphysics 7, 1029 a 33. " Re ti in einai see Metaphysics \2, 1074 a pp. 35-6, and K. Corrigan, 1996 (note 6 above), p. 325, note 59; Physics 8, chapter 6, p. 258 b.

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totelian (or Stoic or Christian) elements in later thinking with some clarity extremely difficult or even impossible. One word in Clement of Alexandria or Evagrius, for instance, may contain hidden worlds of intertextual reference20. Evagrius' appropriation of Gregory of Nazianzus' appropriation of pseudoAristotle's appropriaton (in the Vices and Virtues) of the apparently Platonic tri partite soul in a broader context is a very good case in point21 ! 4. Before looking directly at the fourth century and Augustine, let me now be more precise by telling a slightly different story of the history of thought. 4.1. O'Connell has argued of the early Augustine (especially in reltion to the Contra Academicos and Soliloquies), that Augustine's underlying notion is one that makes the T essentially soul. The compos ite of soul and body becomes accordingly an uneasy amalgam, its semi-accidental unity being explained by a 'fall' of soul into body... This, Augustine claims, is the truth enveloped in the definition 'ancient philosophers' have given of man22. We might make two comments: first, the notion of 'returning entirely to oneself in Acad. II.5, for instance, does not necessarily only imply a fall, but also the conditions of creation itself as a procession requiring an existentially constant conversion or return to oneself in God. Second, Augustine nowhere says the soul is man simply. True, he does say that we are minds or souls, but the situation in more complex, I suggest, since Augustine's so-called Platonic identification of man primarily with the soul does not preclude a positive view of body or a unified incarnate view either of man or of the soul-body relation. The case is rather the opposite. A positive incarnate view of man, for Platonism in its many forms, is impossible without the proper development of soul in the first place. In fact, the need for soul-separability at the level of self-consciousness presupposes already a soul-body union, but one as yet con fused, unconscious both of itself and of its multidimensional organizing abil ity. Soul has to 'wake up' from simple identification with the body before any deeper substantial union is even possible23, for the whole nature of soul is oth erwise not being realized; she is merely 'vegging' out, enjoying the sights, sounds, or mushrooms, but in a severely constricted material space with no doors or windows. 'Waking up' in this sense is, of course, Platonic-Plotinion - 'waking up... into myself; but it is also the experience Aristotle designates

20 E.g., gnostikelgnosis!gnostikos. 21 Cf. Evagrius, Praktikos 89, attributed by Evagrius to Gregory Nazianzen, 'our wise teacher' (cf. Gnostikos 146; KG VI.51), but indebted, in fact, to (the pseudo-) Aristotle's On Virtues and Vices 1249 a-b. 22 O'Connell (see note 4 abov), p. 185. 23 See, for example, Plato. Republic 7, 523 a ff.

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as dependent on reflexive thought in the Metaphysics 12.724. The whole of the Confessions is a meditation on this theme on a much broader scale still, and it is also why Augustine's preoccupation with rejecting the view that soul is a body (in De Imm. An and later) is not just a rehash of Plotinus, but a crucial question. In fact, the tension between the physical fact of the union and yet the need for soul to control the body is shown for Augustine by the occur rence of pain as an expression of the soul's difficulty in controlling the body in Gn. Lin 3.16.25. Augustine uses the word compagem, double-structure, a reflection of the Phaedrus' use of yoke imagery or perhaps of sympegesthai to describe the relation of soul and body - 'bound together'25: For even the pain itself in any living being is a great and wonderful power of soul which vitally holds together that double-structure by an ineffable mixture (ineffabili permixtione) and brings it to a unity of its own measure, since it does not allow it to be corrupted and dissolved with indifference but, so to speak, with indignation. (Gn.Litt. 3.16.25) Three features of this passage are noteworthy: (1) the union is real -apermixtio; (2) the union is causal; the power of soul continet et redigit in quamdam unitatem sui moduli; and (3) the union is one in which the proper causal-con trolling force is experienced as a tension. In other words, this is not a question of simple-minded soul agency upon a body-object, but a dynamic relation con ceived causally by which the body is transformed. There is already, then, a much more complex view here of the soul-body relation than might at first seem likely. We shall take this up below. 4.2. Soul-separability/soul as controller or organizer is, therefore, also a function of the rejection of body as the tomb of soul's consciousness or of the need for contempt of sensibilia, for instance. We find both views side by side in the Morals of the Catholic Church and they are complementary: '... all sen sible things are to be despised - while, however, they are to be used as this life requires' (Morals 20). Let us leave aside for the moment the uti-frui ques tion26. My point here is more limited. Augustine clearly understands that the integral union of soul-body in the classic Socratic sense (Republic 9) is the ordering of the body for the sake of the soul and of the divine27, or this is pre cisely the force of his commendation of the anchoritic and cenobitic lives sev eral chapters further on: 'They work with their hands in such occupations as may feed their bodies without distracting their minds from God' (Morals 31). In other words far from it being the case necessarily that the negative view of body, characteristic apparently of Platonism, is just Augustine being unaware 24 25 26 27

Metaphysics 12, 1072 b. Plato, Phraedus 246 c. See on this question and for references K. Corrigan, 2003 (note 3 above). Plato, Republic 591 b-e.

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of the unfortunae consequences of his Platonic mindset, a deeper sense of soulbody unity is the obverse side, in effect, of a negative view: unity and separa bility go together, for otherwise soul lives as more or less body dependent, body-focused, body-identified. Positive and negative aspects are therefore complementary. Nor, as we shall see, does this make of the soul a homunculus or a ghost-in-the-machine reality28. 4.3. Another way of looking at this would be to see soul-instrumentatlity in a broader organic way. From Paul and from Plato, Augustine adopts the notion of the 'outer' and 'inner' man (Civ. Dei 13.24). From Plato's Alcibiades I, he adopts the notion of man as 'soul using body': 'man then, as it seems to me, is a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body' (Morals 1.27.52). But the context makes clear that 'use' comes with a double reverence and responsibil ity: 'Therefore, he who loves his neighbour does good partly to his body and partly to his soul'. From Varro and Cicero or also perhaps Plotinus we get a sense in Augustine of the range of the question 'What is man?' ... Is the body only, or the soul only? For although the things are two, soul and body, and although neither without the other could be called man (for the body would not be man without the soul, nor again would the soul be man if there were not a body ani mated by it), still it is possible mat one of these may be held to be man... What then do we call man? Is he soul and body as in a double harness, or like a centaur? Or do we mean the body only as being used by the soul which makes it, as the word lamp denotes not the light and the case together, but only the case, yet it is on account of the light that it is so called? Or do we mean only the mind, and that on account of the body which it rides, as horseman means not the man and the horse, but the man only, and that as employed in riding the horse? The dispute is not easy to settle...29'. Both here (Morals 4) and later (Civ. Dei), Augustine accepts Varro's defini tion of man as the composite of the body and soul (even if he rejects Varro's view of the highest good given by the philosophical tradition): Not the whole man, but the better part of man, is the soul; nor is the whole man the body, but it is the lower part of man; but when each is joined to the other, that is called man. (Civ. Di 13.24) At the same time, the soul is 'a certain substance sharing in reason, fitted for rule of the body' (Quant. An. 22) and therefore possessing a natural tendency for body. Nonetheless, the 'soul with a body does not make two persons, but one man' (lo. Ev. Tr. 19.15), and, influenced at least in part by both Christological and Trinitarian contexts, for Augustine man as composite is persona'30. 28 According to the famous depiction by Gilbert Ryle of Descartes in The Concept of Mind, 3rd ed. (Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 13-25. 29 Translation, R. Stothert, in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 1 , ed. Whitney R. Oastes (New York, 1948). 30 On this general notion see H.R. Drobner, Person-Exegese and Christologie bei Augustinus: zur Herkunft der Formel Una Persona (Leiden, 1986). G.J.P. O'Daly (see note 2 above), pp. 42-58;

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In the person... there is a mixture of soul and body... in the unity of the person the soul uses the body, that man may be. (Ep. 137.11) If we draw all of this together, and this is by no means the whole picture, the instrumentalist 'soul using body' view has to be seen in a much broader view of the soul-body relation in which (a) the 'whole soul' (very definitely Socrates' phase in the Republic)31 is pierced and transformed by a vision much larger than itself and (b) the body is properly directed in this vision, no longer as an objec tified focus of living, but as included in soul's larger, reflexive but transcen dent-focused subjectivity. In other words, the body is no longer an object, but a part of reflexive subjectivity. This, I suggest, is one of the roots of Augustine's powerful notions of attentio, intentio. Instrumentality involves a new form of integral self-awareness. But more on this below. As to (a) above, Augustine's insistence that the chief good of the soul cannot be the soul itself is profoundly Platonic (and surely profoundly true?). If not, Pausanias' view of the soul-body relation in the Symposium would be Socrates' view, and the unconscious justi fication on the highest moral and academic grounds of one's own preferences would be all there is32. In other words, if the account of soul's subjectivity can not be a hermetically sealed world of its own preference, if the soul has to be pierced by a potentially communicable world of divine reality, and if the body has to be included in this orientation, any instrumentalist conjunction - synamphoteron has to be seen substantially, that is, as a substantial union and realiza tion of the wholeness of soul and the right ordering of body. And this is pre cisely how Augustine sees it. Take De Musica 6.13, for instance: For it befits the soul both to be ruled by what is above her and to rule what is below her. Above her alone is God, below her alone the body, if you look to the whole and total soul (si ad omnem et totam animam intendas). Just as therefore she cannot be total without God, so she cannot excel without her slave. Proper, substantial, holistic instrumentality brings out the excellence, the best functioning or virtutes (cf. excellere) of the soul, but by means of the body. This goes far beyond Socrates, returning into the cave to free his fellow prisoners (and to get killed) in Republic 7, but it catches exactly - but in a Christian context - the broader meaning of the integration of the virtues in the articulated, organic life of the human being in Republic 4-9 (as well as in the Phaedo and elsewhere)33. Yet, at the same time, it is surely a new view of Mary. T. Clark 'De Trinitate' in The Cambridge Campanion to Augustine (see note 4 abve). p. 96 and note 30. See also P. Henry, Saint Augustine on Personality, Saint Augustine Lecture Series, Saint Augustine and the Augustinian Tradition, 1959 (Villanova 1960), and Mary T. Clark, Augustinian Personalism, Saint Augustine Lecture Series, Saint Augustine and the Augus tinian Tradition, 1969 (Villanova, 1969). 31 See, for example, Republic 591 b; cf. 442 b. 32 Symposium 180 c - 185 c. 33 Cf. Republic 428 a - 444 a; Phaedo 69 a-d.

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body with the kind of emphasis we find in Gregory of Nyssa34. If this is early Augustine, we certainly find this integral, substantial instrumentality in the late Augustine fitted into the larger picture of divine providence35: Moreover, even in the body, though it dies like that of the beasts, and is in many ways weaker than theirs, what goodness of God, what providence of the great Cre ator is apparent ! The organs of sense and the rest of the members, are they not so placed, the appearance, and form, and stature of the body as a whole, is it not so fashioned, as to indicate that it was made for the service of a reasonable soul? Man has not been created stooping towards the earth, like the irrational animals, but his bodily form, erect and looking heavenwards, admonishes him to mind the things that are above. Then the marvellous nimbleness which has been given to the tongue and the hands, fitting them to speak and write, and execute so many duties, and practise so many arts, does it not prove the excellence of the soul for which such an assistant was provided? (Civ. Dei 22.24) The more scriptural Augustine's tone the more this resonates with Plato's Timaeus or Plotinus' Ennead VI.7.8-1336. The harmony or coaptatio31 of the body means, Augustine goes on to argue, that no part has been created for util ity which does not also contribute to its beauty. In other words, a sublime cre ative final causality runs through every part of such an 'instrument'. This is a theme in Aristotle as well as in St Paul, Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, but it brings us to a further crucial question of how a soul-body mixtura, permixtio in which such creative instrumentality is vested can be conceived causally without ghost-in-the... machine overtones. Augustine, of course, didn't have the benefit of Gilbert Ryle's 'Descartes' Dream' to inform him of the startling fact that at Oxford or Cambridge, the University is 'nothing but' the amalgam of colleges! 4.4. Let me begin by answering this question with a series of suggestions which relate to various works of Augustine since the question is too big to tackle all at once. 4.4.1. It is sometimes observed that Augustine rejected hylomorphism and that it was a pity he was not better acquainted with Aristotle, for such acquain tance might have led him in the more incamational direction of Aquinas' thinking38. The corollary of these views is, as we have seen above, that the

34 See K. Corrigan, 'The problem of personal and human identity in Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa', SP XXXVD (2001), pp. 51-68. 35 This theme bears comparison with the treatment of providence in Plotinus not only in Enneads VI.4-5 and III.2-3, but also in the early chapters 1-13, of VI.7. 36 As too with St Paul's notion of the mystical body and also Gregory of Nyssa's treatment of bodily development in De Hominis Opiflcio (especially chapters 8 and 30). 37 See Ennead M.3.4 for Plotinus' version of coaptatio, namely, the logos synapton. 38 See V. Bourke (note 1 above); 443 ff.

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early Augustine possesses a relatively unsophisticated view of the soul-body relation. Again, I think, this is simply a misunderstanding of Augustine's approach even in the early works. I shall take the De immortalitate animae as an example, despite Augustine's own severe verdict about this work in the Retractationes I.5.1 : 'The reasoning is involved and too briefly expressed, and its resultant obscurity was such that my attention wearied as I read it: I could hardly understand it myself. I think this is a fair assessment, but the overall work still reveals a potentially sophisticated view of the soul-body relation, precisely because, among other things, it implicitly recognizes already Plotinus' critical transformation of Aristotelian thought into his own approach to the soul-body relation. By this I mean the following: first, Augustine situates his own thought in a post-Aristotelian context (not so much in the context of Ennead IV.7 - which O'Connell sees as key to the work)39, but rather in the context of post-Aristotelian category thinking. In this light, chapter 10, which argues against the view that mind can be the organization or temperatio of body, is not at all a rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism, but much rather a rejection either of Stoic materialism or, more likely still, the sort of harmonia theory proposed by Simmias in the Phaedo or, again possibly, of one typical Peripatetic view, such as that of Boethus of Sidon, which held the soul to be the form of the body in a thoroughly materialistic fashion40. Augustine instead adopts the more inclusive view of Alexander of Aphrodisias and also of Plotinus (derived of course from Aristotle's Categories)41, according to which the soul-body relation is not a relation of quality or quantity to matter, for this would not allow the attention of the soul or mind to be self-dpendent. I say a more inclusive view because the body's organization is thereby included in the form of the rational soul42. In Letter 137, for instance, both temperatio and 39 See O'Connell, 1968 (note 4 above), and on the vexed question of what exactly Augustine read of Plotinus, O'Connell (ibid.), pp. 1-14. O'Connell's confidence that Augustine may have read Enneads I.6; I.8; V.l; V.2; III.2-3; V.3; VI.6; VI.9; IV.7; 1I.7; IV.3-5; IV.8; VI.4-5; and even A.H. Armstrong's view ('Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and St. Augustine', Augustinus Magister, Congris international augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre, 1954, 3 vols (Paris, 1954), 1, pp. 329-34), 1I.4 and VI.7, may seem excessive, especially against the back ground of Theiler's extreme view that Porphyry, not Plotinus, is always in question (note 7 above) or the much more balanced skepticism of O'Meara (note 4 above); yet it is hard to imag ine that such an important treatise as VI.7 did not in some form come to Augustine's attention. On this see further below. 40 Cf. K. Corrigan, 1996 (note 6 above), pp. 304-6 and note 17: also P. Merlan, in A.H. Arm strong (ed.), 1967 (note 4 above), pp. 107-16. See more generally on post-Aristotelian category thinking, C. Evangeliou, Aristotle 's Categories and Porphyry (Leiden, 1988); S. Strange, 'Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categries\ in ANRW 36, 2 (1987). pp. 955-74. 41 Categories 2, 1 a 20 ff.; cf. Ennead I.8.14, lines 31-3 Henry-Schwyzer and IV.3.20-2, with Alexander, De Anima 13-15; Quaestiones 1.8; 2.7; 2.26 (Bruns); K. Corrigan, 1996 (note 6 above), pp. 318-19. 42 For Plotinus see Ennead VI.7.5. 22-33, and K. Corrigan, 1996 (note 6 above), 372 ff. For Augustine, see how both temperatio and siiblimatio are included in the unified soul-body relation

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sublimatio are included in the soul-body union (in Christ). The soul then is not in body as in a subject-substratum: ... in no way can shape or colour, or the organization of the body itself, which is a cer tain mixture of four natures in which the same body consists, turn from the thing in which they are inseparably as in a subject. (De Imm. An. 10) So, if the soul-body relation is a mixture, it is not a mixture of soul in body as in a subject, that is soul and body as a mere aggregate of elements. Instead, the definition or mixture will have to be something different from its elements, and this difference Augustine goes on to express as a causal relation in chap ter 15, that is, as soul giving form to body or as body subsisting through the soul which gives it form, and finally, in chapter 16, in terms of the integral soul as an active function of the whole being and its articulation: The whole soul, therefore, is present simultanously in each part, and simultaneously senses in each. Yet the soul is not wholly present in the way in which whiteness or any other quality of this sort is wholly present in each part of a body. Now, it is true that the above statement bears comparison with Enneads IV.34, VI.4-5, and so on, but in fact, in far too condensed and obscure a form, as Augustine later admits, it expresses almost precisely the 'special kind of mix ture or union of soul with body' which has been thought not to have been given a precise formulation in Plotinus (beyond 'presence' and 'light')43. This, in fact, occurs in Plotinus' argument of Ennead I.1.1-7. What is man, Plotinus asks. The qualified body is not all we mean by 'living creature', nor do we mean soul and body, as a constituent definition or aggregate of elements. Instead, a living creature is a migma in a different sense, that is, 'something different' from its elements, a difference which has to be expressed as a causal interaction, and not just as if we are talking of two objects or things (cf. II.7.3; VII.7.1-5). and the definition has to take account of the whole range of the experience of the human living creature, that is, in terms of physical, psycho physical, and psychological modes of speaking (cf. I.1.5-6). Characteristically in a single sentence in I.1.7 lines 1-6, Plotinus argues that the human being is the compound subject which perceives things directly but by virtue of the soul (which is the cause of a thing's being human or being anything else); and this organization or presence in the body is expressed, not in terms of a quality being 'in' matter, for soul is not 'in' the body in that way (if soul is substan tially present to the body), but as a causally creative organic presence which

in Christ, Letter 137.9: Nunc vero ita inter Deum et homines mediator apparuit, ut in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam. et solita sublimaret insolitis, et insolita solitis temperaret. 43 Cf. J.M. Rist, 'Pseudo-Ammonius and the Soul/Body Problem in some Platonic Texts of Late Antiquity', American Journal of Philology 109 (1988), pp. 402-15, espec. pp. 402-3; and on light and warmth in Plotinus see H.J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology, His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul (The Hague, 1971), pp. 18-19.

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does not lose her power as soul by being the organizing form of the body. Plotinus expresses this as follows: Let it be the compound then which perceives, and the soul by her presence does not give herself in this qualified way either to the compound or to the other element in the com pound, but makes, out of the body qualified in this way and a kind of light which is given from herself, the nature of the living creature, something different, to which per ceiving and all the other affections of the living creature are said to belong. (I.1.7, 1-6)44 I suggest that something like this, mutatis mutandis and however imperfectly expressed in both, is precisely Augustine's view in De Immortalite Animae and that it is anything but unsophisticated. The substantial union of soul-body requires that one lives and thinks that union in terms of a total presence of soul to body which simultaneously allows for soul-body instrumentality, unconfused union of soul and body (as in Letter 137: 'In the unity of the person the body used the soul so that the human being can exist... in that person, then, there is a mixture of soul and body, etc...45, but a mixture in the sense of an image which soul gives to body and a causal relation between the two which produces not the addition of 1 + 1, but 'something different'46 whether or not unconfused union comes from a pagan or a Christian Ammonius, from Plotinus or Porphyry. And whether or not it refers only to the union of incorporeal substances (that is substance tout court) or to the union of incorporeal and cor poreal substances, in this understanding man is a substantial union and not an accidntal one47. 'Presence' and 'light', of course, are still players in the Plotinian definition48, but this is not the end of the matter since there is another sig nificant definition of 'man' in VI.7.1-5, which there may also be good reason to believe Augustine read, thoroughly assimilated, and transformed into the very different world of his own thinking. But, for the moment, let me note two things: first, for both Plotinus and Augustine, 'we' really peform our own actions, but by the power of our souls. We are therefore concrete, unified beings by virtue of the soul as the organiz ing principle of the whole somatic, psycho-somatic, and psychological range of our beings. Second, the soul is both immanent and yet transcendent. One of Plotinus' criticisms of Aristotle (in IV.7.8 (5)) is that if soul is the inseparable form or 'entelechy' of body, then one is compelled to introduce another entelechy or substantial form, namely, intellect, in order to account for soul. Therefore, precisely to avoid such a plurality offorms, Plotinus concludes, it is better to suppose that the soul is not an inseparable form, but an immortal 44 This conclusion answers the migma possibility from the list proposed for analysis in I.I.I, 1-5. 45 lo. Ev. tr. 19.15; cf. Utter 137.11-16. 46 This phrase, from Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17, and Plotinus, I. 1.1, is not to be found in Augustine, but the notion is there nonetheless. 47 See J.M. Rist, 1988 (note 43 above). 48 See Blumenthal (note 43 above).

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substance in its own right. So, for Plotinus, the range of soul and intellect in a single human being does not make for a quantitative plurality of substantial forms; it rather denotes directly what substance is. Compare Vernon Bourke: Augustine does not seem to have known very much about the Aristotelian explanation of the soul as the substantial form of the human being. This explanation enables Thomas Aquinas and most Scholastic thinkers to avoid a two-substance composition of man, which makes it hard to maintain the unity of the human person49. Presumably, it is because of this sort of appearance of the question that Augustine tends to avoid trichotomizing 'man'50 and that when he does intro duce a trichotomous division, he makes clear that they are really two: So there are three things by which man is constituted, spirit, soul, and body (spiritus, anima, et corpus): these in turn are said to be two, for the soul is often identified with the spirit. Indeed, the rational part, which beasts lack, is named spirit. Spirit is our prin cipal part, then comes the vital part by which we are joined to the body, and this is called soul. Finally, comes our last part, the body itself which is visible. (De fide et symbolo 10.23) 4.5. This brings me to another crucial problem in Augustine's view of the soul-body relation, the key term intentio (or attentio in the De Musica 6 and other works). Why is intentio crucial? Because it expresses in a rather differ ent way the soul-body mixtura, permixtio. Intentio can mean 'tension', 'exten sion', as well as 'attention', 'awareness', 'mental concentration'51. Its possible Stoic roots (that is the tension (tonos) of soul in which the soul's cohesion and its intellectual powers are included), perhaps modified by the Platonic notion of omnipresence, may be visible when Augustine describes the soul in Letter 166.4 as 'spread through the entire body it animates, not through any local extension, but by a kind of vital tension; for it is simultaneously entirely pre sent throughout all its parts'52, but the connection between tension, extension, and intention as mental concentration is clear, for instance, in the following pasage from Gn. Litt. 8.21.42: ... the soul is not a corporeal nature and does not fill the body spatially, as water fills a skin or a sponge, but is mixed with the body which it has to vivify in some extraor dinary way by its own incorporeal will (nutu), by which it also issues commands to the body through some kind of intentio and not through bulk... that very tendency of its will (nutus ipse voluntatis) is not moved locally. As O'Daly puts it, 'The pesence of soul to the body signified by intentio is that of an unmoved substance, if movement is understood to be local. Inextended

49 50 51 52

V. Bourke (note 1 above), p. 443. Cf. G.J.P. O'Daly (note 2 above), pp. 58-62. See O'Daly (note 2 above), 43 ff., pp. 84-7 (which pages I take as my starting-point here). O'Daly (note 2 above), p. 45.

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physically, soul moves, and is moved temporally'53. As I see it, intentio is con nected with activity rather than passivity, with Augustine's whole theory of active perception which, despite appearances to the contrary, allows for active perception, psycho-somatic interaction, and so forth (just as Plotinus' equally misunderstood theory allows for psychological and psycho-somatic expres sions). Intentio is also connected with the will, intention, or activity of the sub ject, and this is important since we may obviously be curious about what in the compound it is that actually does the willing, seeing, imagining, and so on, and this is primarily for Augustine the rational soul or mens. 'Let the rational soul concentrate attention (intendat) on this; not by the senses of the body let it consider, but by the mind and reason itself, Augustine says in Letter 13754. Although we are certainly here in the general environment of Plotinus and Prophyry, no term either Plotinus or Porphyry commonly uses fits Augustine's usage exactly, although various cognate terms have been proposed: for exam ple, pareinaiIparousia, koinoneinIkoinonia, dedesthai, skesis, rhope, diathesis, dynamis, energeia, even ektasis55. I want here to propose two or three alterna tives, since I think Augustine's attentiolintetio is of complex, not simple her itage, and I propose them not in any sense as Quellenforschung, but rather because I think Augustine's language resonates deeply and interconnectedly with these alternatives. 4.5.1. My first suggestion comes from anchoritic, desert spirituality of the fourth century and from Antony/Anthanasius, in particular, because the char acter of attention Augustine seems to have in mind is, in some respects, almost exactly proseche, that is, a kind of mindful attention to God, soul, or even the body that the monk should always strive for, or alternatively avoid. This usage is related to the gospel exhortation to constant vigilatio and also to the cognate need evigilare, to wake up the mind in its body-slumber (cf. Letter 137)56. 53 O'Daly, ibid. 54 Letter 137.5: Intendat haec anima rationaiis, et sensus corporis non sensibus corporis, sed ipsa mente atque ratione considered 55 See, for example, O'Daly (note 2 above), p. 44 and n. 1 10; Heinrich Dorrie, Porphyrios' 'Symmikta Zetemata'. Ihre Stellung in System und Geschichte des Neuplatonismus nebst einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten (Munich, 1959), pp. 87-93; p. 95; p. 98f.; H.-R. Schwyzer, Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Piotins (Opladen, 1983), pp. 79-81; H.J. Blumenthal (note 43 above), pp. 16-19; A. Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague, 1974). pp. 1-19. 56 Here there is no room to determine the vexed question how far the Life of Antony reflects the actual Antony himself or the political/ecclesiastical agenda of Athanasius or simply the desert experience of an Athanasius who spent almost as much time in desert exile as he did in Alexandria. Nor is there space to determine the equally vexed question of the difference between the Antony of the Life and the Antony of the Letters as well as that of the Sayings. Generally, however, on these issues see Athanasius of Alexandria. The Life of Antony. The Coptic Life, the Greek Life, tr. Tim Vivian and Apostolos N. Athanassakis (Kalamazoo, 1999), and Samuel Rubenson, The Letters of St. Antony. Monasticism and the Making of a Saint (Minneapolis, 1995). The text I have used here is Athanase d'Alexandrie. Vie D'Antoine, ed. G.J.M. Bartelink, SC 400 (Paris, 1994).

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Intentio is, of course, important in the normal working of sense-perception and imagination, but it also plays a role in the pathology of these activities for Augustine, as in hallucinations and demonic visitations. Augustine can ask, for instance, about spiritual visions by superhuman powers, 'Does some thing occur in the body, so that the soul's intentio, so to speak, is relaxed...?' (Gn. Litt. 12.13.37)57. These and similar questions are of equal, if not greater, importance for Evagrius and for those before him. But first, in order to estab lish a proper context for this comparison, I shall briefly provide a little back ground. One of the classic expressions of post-Platonic/post-Aristotelian thought on the soul-body relation (already, in my view, in a thoroughly Christian context, probably deriving in some significant measure from St Paul), and one funda mentally compatible with that of Augustine, despite obvious differences, is that of Origen and Evagrius, particularly the tripartite soul psychology gov emed by a more or less impassible nous5*. Impassibility or purity of heart is suceptible of extreme expression and Augustine rightly rejects the Zeno of Citium variety (as exemplified in extreme forms of anchoritic/cenobitic behav iour, though not, I think, those of Antony or Evagrius) when he writes, There is a danger lest, in using the words of the learned, we harden the souls of the unleaned by leading them away from compassion instead of softening them with the desire of a charitable disposition. (Morals 27) For Evagrius, nous (that is the nous of soul) by being separate from all things and from even material-based forms and images (even in prayer) is closest to the world, not furthest removed from it and its real meanings (its logoi). In other words, separation entails self-dependent closeness to the world and our neighbour, not distance or aloofness: 'The monk is one who is separated from all and who is in harmony with all' (Thoughts 124)59. 57 Cf. O'Daly (note 2 above), pp. 111-27. 58 See also A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys (Oxford, 1981); B. McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism. Origins to the Fifth Century (New York, 1991). 59 This classical expression already assimilates Platonic, Aristotelian, and other elements namely ( 1 ) the Platonic views (a) that there is more than one soul-body relation; (b) that the orga nizing function of the logistikon in the tripartite soul or in the nous which guides the logistikon and the rest of the soul is directly to be correlated to its separability, impassibility, or purity of heart; and (c) the more complex view from Plato, Aristotle, St Paul, Origen, Evagrius, and the Cappadocian Fathers that the soul-body relation on its own is a recipe for demonic narcissism or, in other words, that the soul needs a multi-perspectival viewpoint beyond itself if the difficult business of truth is to have any hope of success; and (2) the Aristotelian views, on the other hand, (a) that the immediacy of all joy, life, thought, and feeling is given in the fullest exemplary fashion only in the 'sweetest' life of the divine nous, a self-reflexivity of knowing and feeling; and (b) that the proper way to awaken a complete return in human beings (who can know them selves either not all or with considerable difficulty) is only through the laborious route of (i) selfcontrol in relation to oneself and one's community (praktike), (ii) scientific, contemplative knowledge of the world, and (iii) a transformative approach to the divine life (theologiki). In

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This is very much akin to Augustine's view both of God, primarily, and of the anchoritic and cenobitic monk in Morals of the Catholic Church: some people, he observes, think that anchoritics have abandoned human things, 'not taking account how much they may benefit us by prayer... and by example, whose bodies we are not permitted to see' (Morals 31). But we find a defini tive statement in Letter 137 (from the year 412), where Augustine writes about the closeness of Christ in the Incarnation (which does away, in his view, with the need to approach God by demonic intercession), Human beings might know that the God to whom they made their way as if positioned far off through interposed powers is so very near (tam primum) that he counted it wor thy to take on man (hominem) and to be united with that in some way so that the whole human being (totus homo) is coadapted to him just as the body is joined to the soul. (Letter 137.22; PL 33, 521). In other words, in Christ even the human soul-body relation is seen at its most unified. This background helps to set the scene for understanding the special importance of Antony's notion of proseche, both for Augustine and the subse quent Hesychast tradition60. One centre of the life of Antony is watchfulness (agrupnia), attention to oneself, and the subsequent activation of one's proper intention or purpose in life (proairesis, prothesis). According to Athanasius, the young Antony 'paid attention' to the scripture readings, and we meet him outside his house prosechon heauto - like Socrates in the Symposium, only more obviously mindful synagon heautou ten dianoian (2.1), and this attentiveness also characterizes the whole ascetic life: 'each monk wishing to give attention to his life, prac tises askesis' (3.2), especially since the Devil wants to cut him off from his right proairesis, deliberate intention (5.3: orthe proairesis)61. So the monk must focus attention upon the noeron or nous of his psyche, with intensity (syntonos), practising askesis to lift up the declining soul (19.5: ten psuchen klinousari) and in this holding, attentive attitude to nature, moral excellence exists (20.5 : tes psuches to noeron kata phusin echouses he arete sunistatai).

such a context, paying attention to one's habits, activities, logismoi, and general psychology becomes a matter of life and death, for in community, according to Evagrius, the slanderer attacks us through the foibles of our fellow monks, but in the anchoric life he wrestles with us 'naked'. The question, therefore, how the incorporeal and the corporeal are related in practical psychology becomes pressing, and in one rather remarkable passage Evagrius represents nousbody instrumentality in terms of the attention of the subject; see Thoughts 25 (text: Evagre le Pontique: Sur les pensees. ed. P. GeTiin, C. Guillaumont, and A. Guillaumont, SC 438 (Paris, 1998) for this striking example (roughly contemporary with the early Augustine). 60 See A. Louth (note 58 above); W. Johnston, Mystical Theology. The Science of Love (New York, 1995), chapter 5 on Eastern Christianity, 54 ff. 61 For Aristotelian usage of this term see H.H. Joachim, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1953), and for Plotinian usage see J.H. Sleeman and G. Pollet, Lexicon Plotinianum (Leiden and Leuven, 1980).

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according to scripture (Prov. 4: 23, cited in 21.2: pase phulake teresomen heauton ten kardian). This brings us to the centre of Athanasius' notion of attentio as including proairesis and activity, surely a direct, if unnoticed parallel for the develop ment of Augustine's usage. Lack of power, lack of active, direct agency, and lack of intention characterize demonic action: demons cannot make or enact anything, strictly speaking, since they have no proairesis (deliberate intention) for this: Dia to meden dunasthai poiein, dia touto ouden poiousin e monon apeilousin. Ei gar edunanto, ouk emellon, all' euthus energoun to kakon, etoimen echontes eis touto ten proairesin (Life of Antony 28.6). If they had the power, they would not delay, but would immediately enact the evil, having a ready proairesis for it. Demons are stochastai, not really prognostai - like really hard behaviourists, rather than diagnosticians - and so, Athanasius/Antony suggests, we shouldn't pay them any attention. Instead, the purified soul becomes dioratike through its own activating attention and 'sees farther and broader than demons'. I suggest that this transition from prosechein to power activation, to proairesis as the prothesis (purpose) of the ascetic life is one important way of framing the resonances in Augustine's attentiolintentio. Antony is the model of such attentiveness in action: 'live daily dying, prosechontes heautois' (91.3). With Evagrius we shall see this developed in a way that is perhaps even more cognate to that of Augustine since such attentiveness is directly concerned witth the way an immaterial soul is to be related to the schema or, in this case, self-image of the body62 but the essence of the notion is already there in the Life of Antony. We do not know what Latin translation of the Life Augustine read, but Confessions 8.6 confirms the effect that reading the Life had upon Ponticianus, and Ponticianus' experience was the immediate precursor of Augustine's own conver sion from complete dividedness to the kind of deepened or enlarged field of the experience of self and world that Augustine charts in the subsequent books of the Confessions. What I am suggesting, then, is that the term proseche and cognates, both here and in the later Hesychast tradition (proseche-proseuche), have a nat ural tendency in desert spirituality already to include the metaphysical and psychological depth required for an epexegesis of the soul-body relation and for the movement from attention, in many different modes, to intention in the sense of mental concentration. In particular, we are with Athanasius' Antony and later with Evagrius very close to the idea that in integral action

62 See Evagrius, Thoughts 25, lines 18 ff.; schema typically means not only 'monastic habit', but also 'mode of being' (as in the Letter to Melania) or, as here, 'shape', 'figure', or 'image' of one's own body.

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as opposed to objective image-dependence there is required the attentive broader focus of a genuinely intending subject to make up for the (puzzling) partial blindness of our self-images, or the lack of intention and active agency as such in object-dependent or demonically induced motions63. 4.5.2. A second suggestion, which also seems to me reasonably well founded. When Augustine asks in De Musica 6.9 whether the soul is subject to bodily agency and how the soul perceives, he gives two major answers to these questions, answers which have puzzled generations of his readers. First, on the question of the soul-body relation itself he has the following to say : For I do not believe that this body is animated by the soul, except through the intention of the agent (nisi intentione facientis). Nor do I consider that it (sc. soul) is in any way acted upon by it (sc. body), but that it (sc. the soul) is active (facere) from and in the body, as if the latter were by divine providence subject to its diminion64. Body-soul animation, therefore, has to be understood in terms of the activating soul as expressed in the active agency of composite existence. But how does this relate to perception? Augustine answers as follows: And to be brief, it seems to me that when the soul senses in body, it does not suffer anything from the body, but rather the soul acts more attentively in the passive changes (passionibus) of the body, and these actions (actiones), easy or difficult depending upon whether they are agreeable or disagreeable, do not escape the attention of the soul (non eam latere); this is the whole explanation of sensing65. Bourke draws a slightly skewed conclusion from the above, highly precise passage. According to him, Augustine's theory is just one step better than Descartes: Unlike Cartesian occasionalism in which there is no real communication between mind and body, Augustine's theory includes a one-way interaction from mind to body, but rejects all activity from body on soul. Such an explanation certainly suggests that Augustine thought of himself as primarily a soul substance which is associated in its earthly existence with a different kind of nature, the body which the soul may use and regulate66. But Augustine does not deny psycho-physical interaction at all. What he denies is that perception is a question of bodily agency, that is, of body as an active subject. Activity or agency, for Augustine, is a function of the power of the agent and this is not the soul simply, but that which in the compound exis tence which is man is primarily responsible for active agency.

63 That is, kinesis as opposed to an energeia, as further suggested by the term ateles in Thoughts 25, i.e., something incomplete (a term derived from Aristotle). 64 Translation by O'Daly (note 2 above), p. 44. 65 Translation by Bourke (note 1 above), p. 438 (adapted). 66 Bourke (note 1 above), p. 439.

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This theory of perception, as O'Daly has rightly argued, is very close to that of Plotinus, But I don't have time to show this clearly here67. My point is more limited: there is only one work in the whole of the Enneads which deals simul taneously with the animation of the body, the definition of man, and the ques tion of the nature of sensation in terms of the problematic intention of the cre ator, and this is Ennead VI.7.1-7 (closely followed by another masterpiece, VI.8, 'On the free will and the will of the One' - if Augustine read these two works, they would have made the deepest impression on his theory of will and intention). In fact, VI.7 is the classic work about intention: how the creator could have intended, deliberated, planned 'what is intended' (to mellon) to come about, when planning or deliberating are clearly human means of expla nation expressing deficiency of perfect or complete activity. Creative thought, such as that of God or Nous, cannot be a planning operation, for it must be spontaneously and non-deliberatively all-powerful (and yet if the subsquent work (VI.8) is any guide, it must somehow be willed even as pure thought or as beyond pure thought)68. But, for Plotinus in VI.7, intention or what we mean by agency only becomes crucial at the level of the definition of man, where what was non-deliberatively about to be or 'intended' (according to the will of the One - in terms of the subsequent work, VI.8) actually comes to be in the deliberatively active agency of the compound human being. Where then does intention occur? Only, properly speaking, in the causally active relation of the embodied rational soul. Who or what then is man? Plotinus actually formulates two versions of the position that is often attrib uted both to him and Augustine - and rejects them both. Either 'soul will pro vide the rational life', he says, 'and the human being will be an act of soul and not substance or the soul will be the human being' (VI.7.4, lines 34-6). Now, on the first horn of the dilemma, 'soul' will be the form and 'man' the matter, but on these terms man will not be substance, that is, a proper subject in his or her own right, but a material puppet manipulated by soul. And on the second horn of the dilemma, if we were to accept this horn, we should simply have to identify the human being with soul. Plotinus rejects both horns of this dilemma, the first as a matter of course because in the Enneads Plotinus always insists that T am the agent of my own actions 'with' or 'against' prov idence, cosmic influences, and so on; and the second because man is clearly not 'soul', since the term 'soul' has an extension far beyond the species 'human being'. Human beings are only a part, and not the most important part (cf. I.1, line 8) of the world's organic nature. So we cannot define 'this human being' without all human beings, as though human beings were the only, dom inant species. There is no human being without all beings! At the same time, 67 On this see K. Corrigan, Reading Plotinus: a practical introduction to Neoplatonism (West Lafayette, Ind., 2005), chapter 2. 68 On Ennead VI.7 generally see P. Hadot, Plotin. Traiti 38. VI, 7 (Paris, 1988).

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the human being can be defined, Plotinus concludes (and here we come to the crucial comparison with Augustine's De Musica 6.9 and the view there expressed that the body cannot be animated otherwise than by the intention of the agent). The human being can be defined, Plotinus concludes, not as an assemblage of contingent parts nor as a form in matter (a tode en tode), but as an active compound understood in terms of a causal relation between its elements69. What prevents man from being a compound, soul in a logos of a definite kind [that is, a qualified, organic body], the logos being an activity, so to speak, of a definite kind [that is, the body understood as an active from, not just a potency] and the activity not hav ing the power to exist without the acting subject (aneu tou energountos). (VII.7.5, 1 ff.) In other words, just as in Augustine's sine intentione facientis, so too in Plotinus' aeu tou energountos, agency or the active subject in the compound is provided by the soul in this causal relation. Intention as such in the human experience of planning, deliberating, effcting, and sensing (in the following argument of VI.7.5-7) is a causal activiy of the soul in the compound which, however, does not make man into soul simply or into some homunculus version of an agent. Later in Ennead 1.1.13, for instance, Plotinus asks is it 'we' or 'the soul' that has conducted the investigation. It is definitely 'we', he replies, 'but by the soul'. But what does 'by the soul' mean? 'By having soul?' he asks. No, we investigate in so far as we are soul, Plotinus replies (13, 1-3). To be man by virtue of soul is a question of being, not having. This is not the view that many scholars have attributed to Plotinus, but it is precisely the view of Augustine; and the above phrase aneu tou energountos in its context is a close, if not the closest parallel, in my view, to Augustine's sine intentione facientis in its context70. Augustine, in fact, has understood Plotinus more deeply than generations of subsequent schol ars, has grasped the total novelty of this thought, and has so thoroughly assimi lated that thought into his own creative and original way of thinking that the real ity and novelty of his view have erased the traces of their origins in the process, precisely because Augustine has other things and a much bigger picture in mind. Had I more space, I should again like to make the case that, quite apart from Plotinus (or Porphyry), desert spirituality played a role here too. 69 On the language of this section see K. Corrigan, 1996 (note 6 above), pp. 374-82. 70 In other words, Augustine starts from a major insight in Plotinus which helps to open the door for his own creative genius. Did Augustine read Plotinus' ultimate description of to energoun as 'like a face' which is 'not one bulk', but fully articulated as intellect is and which, Plot inus says, can be imagined either as a pamprosopon ti chrema lampoon zosi prospopois or as 'all the pure souls running to identity... But having all that belongs to themselves (panta ta houton)' or 'the entire nous seated upon their summits so that the place is illuminated by intellectual light'? And even so, Plotinus adds, to look at the propdson in this way is 'as one sees another from outside'; instead 'one must become that, and make oneself the vision' (VI.7. 14-15). Here, one might argue, is the closest transition from prosdpon to persona in the Augustinian sense, if not in the modern sense of personality (O'Daly (see note 2 above), p. 58), then certainly in the cognate sense of active subject or agent.

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Finally, a small note on the resurrection body in the changing, indeed rev olutionary emphases of Augustine's later thought. When Augustine argues in De Civ. Dei 10 and 13 against Platonism and Porphyry's omne corpus fugiendum, he may have a significant different emphasis from his early works and he is certainly in process of a radical deconstruction of Platonism, but he is also well aware, in my view, (a) that it is the corruptible body that is still to be left behind, though not every body (and not even the corruptible body, perhaps, to the degree it is made and sustained by God)71; (b) that both views, the separability and the resurrection views, can in a strange deconstructive way be held together, if in tension; and finally (c) that the resurrection of the body should perhaps be the logical conclusion of Platon ism itself, on the grounds of the Timaeus, Phaedo, and other works. If there are divine celestial, terrestrial, and intracosmic bodies in the Timaeus and Phaedrus, and blessed compounds, soul and body, in the concluding myth of the Phaedo12, as well as bodies (and matter) in the intelligible world in Enneads IV.3.18, VI.2.21, and VI. 7.4-7, then one may reasonably ask, not only of the soul, but also of the body (as in Andrew Marvell's Definition of Love) where its extended nature be 'fixed'. Augustine is surely not entirely wrong to point out that the Christian view of the resurrected body is in a sense a deeper way of looking at the ultimate implications of Platonism itself than many, if not any, of the Platonists were capable of imagining. If both soul and body are really reflective of the creative will of God, then a human being cannot be whole unless they are united. For Augustine, this deeper union in which we most truly are (like the promise of the resurrection itself) is only granted through the person of Christ. Yet, as he also says in De Civ. Dei 10.29 '... we know from the testimony of our own nature that a human being is whole and complete only when the body is united with a soul'. If Aquinas developed Aristotle (and a lot of Platonism besides) in order to articulate this insight73, Augustine intimates in his late work that 71 Cf. De Civ. Dei 13.17: Non ergo ad beatitudinem consequendam omnia fugienda sunt cor pora, sed corruptibilia molesta. gravia moribunda, non qualia fecit primis hominibus bonitas Dei, sed qualia esse compulit poena peccat. 13.4: Omnes enimfuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille uniis. . . Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed iam erat natura seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccatum vitiata et vinculo mortis obstricta iusteque damnata non alterius condicionis homo ex homine nascaretur. 72 Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc vitam pie iusteque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati in ipsorum deorum, qui sua corpora numquam deserunt, recipiantur sinum. . . 75 On this see K. Corrigan, 'The Irreconcileable Opposition between the Platonic and Aris totelian Conceptions of the Soul in some Ancient and Medieval Thinkers', Laval thiologique et philosophique 43, 3 (1985), pp. 391-401. I should like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding of a research project of which this paper is a small part.

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such a view of the soul-body relation is the logical, if apparently paradoxi cal conclusion of Platonism. The substantial union of soul and body, I sug gest, which even the Platonists had professed and conspicuously developed, becomes for Augustine, in the person of Christ, a wholly new outlook upon the world, and for everyone.

Ordering Images: The Rhetorical Imagination and Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Polemic after 418

Marianne Djuth, Buffalo

But since eating and learning have some similarity to each other, on account of the fas tidiousness of many, even that food, without which life is impossible, must be sea soned1.

As a rhetorician, Augustine was well aware of the indispensable role that the imagination oftentimes plays in bringing human beings to an understand ing of the truth. To some, what initially seems hopelessly obscure on account of intellectual abstractness readily becomes accessible when ornamented by images that entice the mind into accepting the truth. How else to explain the popularity of Augustine's Confessions throughout his lifetime in comparison to the uncertainty of his effort to quell the concerns of the monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles at the end of his life through a series of polemical trea tises ! 2 And yet, careful attention to these works reveals the mark of a master rhetorician skilfully crafting his response to Valentinus and the monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles by sketching his argument against the back ground of a chorus of images drawn from scripture. Many of these images would have been familiar to his readers from the Confessions, for in that work these images took centre stage while the explicit references to predestination that crowd his works after 418 remain subtly in the background. Augustine's reversal of the order of images in these works reflects the importance that he attributes to these rhetorical embellishments even in the midst of polemical disputations aimed at defending the doctrine of divine pre destination. Augustine informs his readers that he intends to write something suitable to their purposes, but warns them of the difficulty inherent in his task, given his desire to reconcile the conflicting demands of grace and human free dom3. Accordingly, he not only arranges these treatises in such a way that he assigns a role to these images, albeit a secondary one, but he also refers his

1 De doctrina christiana IV. 1 1.26 (CCL 32, 134-5): Sed quoniam inter se habent, nonnullam similitudinem uescentes atque discentes, propter fastidia plurimorum, etiam ipsa, sine quibus uiui non potest, alimenta condienda sunt. 2 De dono perseverantiae 20.53 (BA 24, 730). 3 Epistula 215.2 (BA 24, 62); De praedestinatione sanctorum I.2 (BA 24, 466-8).

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readers to the Confessions for a more palatable account of the insights found in his polemical treatises4. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to defend the pivotal role that Augustine's images play in works such as the Confessions and his anti-Pela gian writings after 418. A comparison of two dominant images in these texts indicates the care Augustine takes to address the concerns raised in Hadrumentum and Marseilles. In his letters to Valentinus, Augustine uses the image of walking to frame the contents of the treatises that follow. The image of a hand reinforces a pattern of relation between these works that emerges on the basis of the comparison of the content of the images and Augustine's deploy ment of them. Far from being mere rhetorical ornaments, these images shed light on Augustine's strategy to advance his opponents' understanding of the truth, as well as on his deliberate arrangement of them as an aid to under standing. Augustine directs his initial response to the crisis at Hadrumentum to Valentinus, the abbot of the monastery5. To resolve the problem, Augustine adopts the same strategy that he employs in the Confessions. He situates his remarks in the context of the theme of faith seeking understanding and associ ates this dynamic with the image of walking6. In the Confessions, Augustine's treatment of this image is far more complex than it is in his response to the monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles. This complexity is due to the wider audience that Augustine intends the Confessions to reach. Instead of confining his remarks to a monastic community, Augustine extends them to pagans and Christians who inhabit the world around him. The image of walking, therefore, has multiple levels of meaning in the Con fessions. In the context of Augustine's conversion to Christianity, its primary meaning is intimately connected to the parable of the prodigal son7. The image of walking fulfils a twofold purpose in this regard. On the one hand, it repre sents the pilgrimage of the Christian community in this life towards the king dom of God, or the virtuous Christian's striving to persevere in seeking wis dom in light of his faith in God. On the other hand, it conveys the sense of bewilderment that occurs when the errant individual wanders away from the straight and narrow path that Augustine associates with God's way, and chooses instead the broad ways of the world that wind towards Babylon8. Beneath this biblical layer of meaning lie two additional levels of meaning, both pagan in inspiration. Utilizing the technique of mnemonic replacement, Augustine subsumes the pagan meanings attributed to the journey motif in 4 De dono perseverantiae 20.52-53 (BA 24, 728-32). 5 Epistulae 214 and 215 (BA 24, 52-72). 6 Confessions I.1.1; XIII. 38.53 (S. Aureli Augustini, Confessionum libriXlII, ed. M. Skutella (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1934. rev. edn 1981), 1-2; 370-1); Epistula 215 (BA 24, 60-72). 7 Confessions I.18.28-29 (Skutella, 21-2); IV.16.28-31 (Skutella, 73-6). 8 Confessions VI.5.8 (Skutella, 106); VII.21.27 (Skutella, 151).

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Plotinus' Ennead I.6.8 and Virgil's Aeneid under the Christian meaning of walking associated with the parable of the prodigal son9. In Ennead I.6.8 Plot inus concludes his description of the soul's ascent to God with the reminder that this ascent depends upon the soul's moral conditioning. Thus, the soul's journey to God has as little to do with a literal or geographical journey on foot to distant places, as it does with travel to foreign countries by wagons or ships. Rather, it is the soul's likeness to God that is paramount in its turning towards divine goodness10. The same can be said of the Christian ascent to God, for it, too, is essentially moral in nature. In the case of Ennead I.6.8 Augustine sim ply incorporates its meaning into his understanding of the parable of the prodi gal son". The story of Aeneas' wanderings and the founding of Rome functions in a similar manner. For here, too, Augustine interprets its meaning in the Confes sions in the light of Christianity and allows it to resonate with scripture as an underlying motif for the soul's disaffection with, and renewed interest in, the heavenly kingdom of God that transcends all earthly kingdoms12. But in this instance, the model for the soul's return to God originates in poetry instead of philosophy. In the end, however, both meanings converge in the story of the prodigal son because Augustine transforms the contents of both works in the light of scripture. As in the Confessions, Augustine's letters to Valentinus link the image of walking with the dynamic of faith seeking understanding, but now Augustine maps the Christian meaning of this image onto the notion of the middle path on which all good Christians must walk. While the exact significance of this notion remains unclear, two interpretations are of interest - Augustine's con ception of the upright way (recta via) and the eastern notion of the royal way (via regia)13. In his response to Valentinus, Augustine's preoccupation with the notion of the middle path has strategic importance. Augustine's strategy is partially discernible in light of the figurative mean ing that eastern authors attribute to the notion of the royal way. To intellectu als like Philo and Clement of Alexandria, the royal way reflects the moral and religious concerns associated with the contemplative life. Concisely put, it rep resents the path of moderation that enables the soul to ascend to the heavenly

9 See M. Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 46-59. 10 Ennead I.6.8 (ed. P. Henry and H.R. Schwyzer, Enneads, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, Press, 1982), 102-3. 11 Confessions I.18.28 (Skutella, 21-2); X.34.52 (Skutella, 248). 12 Confessions I.13.20-22 (Skutella, 15-17). See R.J. O'Connell, Soundings in St. Augustine's Imagination (New York: Fordham, 1994); J.J. O'Meara, 'Virgil and Augustine: The Aeneid in the Confessions', Maynooth Review 13 (1988), 30-43. 13 See M. Djuth. 'Royal Way', in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 735-7.

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kingdom. By avoiding excess on either side, the virtuous soul is able to recon cile opposing extremes and thereby to progress towards its ultimate goal, namely, contemplative union with God. Augustine uses the notion of the upright way in a similar manner in his works14. Despite this agreement, when eastern authors apply this meaning to the rela tion between grace and human freedom, or when Augustine's critics favour his early over his late works, their understanding of this relation conflicts with Augustine's during the Pelagian controversy. To someone like John Cassian, for example, walking along the royal way implies that God and human beings have a reciprocal role to play in salvation, one that initially allows for the will's unaided movement towards God15. Augustine's objective in writing to Valentinus, then, is to replace this mis taken notion of the relation between grace and human freedom with the one he defends after 397 16. Consequently, Augustine advises the monks of Hadrumentum (and later on the Masillians as well) that in order to advance in the understanding of the mystery of salvation, they must persevere in their faith17. That faith proclaims that both grace and human freedom are indispensable to salvation18. On this basis, he encourages the monks of Hadrumentum to adhere to the middle path, that is, to maintain their faith in the Christian religion, as he articulates it according to Paul's epistles, and to advance along with him in their understanding of it. For this is what faith seeking understanding means. Hence, the monks should incline neither to the right nor to the left, for if they were to do so, they would inevitably deny one of the two extremes - either grace or human freedom. And such a denial would be contrary to the Christian faith in that scripture confirms the existence of both19. Furthermore, given the division at this time in the monastery at Hadrumen tum, the ambiguity of the middle path requires the mnemonic replacement of Augustine's early conception of grace and human freedom with the one he affirms after 397. By juxtaposing the Pauline interpretation of the middle path with the image of walking, Augustine applies his criticism of his opponents' view of grace and human freedom to himself. Since his conception of the upright way before 397 resembles the eastern notion of the royal way, the road to unanimity requires a reaffirmation of his own change of heart20.

14 See n. 13. 15 Collatio XIII.7-18 (Jean Cassien, Conferences V1I1-XV1II, tr. E. Pichery, vol. 2, SC 54 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958), 155-81. 16 De dono perseverantiae 20.52 (BA 24, 728-30). 17 De gratia et libero arbitrio 1.1 (BA 24, 92); De praedestinatione sanctorum 1.2 (BA 24, 466-8). 18 De gratia et libero arbitrio (BA 24, 90-206). 19 Epistula 215.6-8 (BA 24, 66-72). 20 See M. Djuth, 'Vera philosophia and Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues', Augustinus (forthcoming).

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Finally, if Augustine's letters to Valentinus set the tone for the treatises that follow, it is clear that the message he conveys through the use of the image of walking in those treatises is remarkably consistent with the one found in the Confessions. What differs after 418 is the explicit identification of the path on which human beings walk with predestination21. But the emphasis on walking as a voluntary act, adhering to the straight and narrow path of salvation, and being intellectually confounded at the hidden way of God is common to both periods22. A similar pattern of relation between the Confessions and Augustine's antiPelagian treatises after 418 surfaces in the case of Augustine's use of the image of a hand. Of the images found in the treatises, the image of a hand occupies a central position despite the subordination of images in general to the overriding concern with polemics. Given the argumentative nature of these treatises, Augustine regards them as disputations and relies heavily on repre sentative passages from scripture to defend his views. As a result, the images that appear in these texts have their basis primar ily in scripture rather than in a narrative of self-examination, as is the case in the Confessions. Perhaps the most striking example that can be used to illustrate this difference in approach is the change that occurs in Augus tine's outlook on the will. In the Confessions Augustine traces the will's certitude to his own intellectual intuition of its existence23. In the De gratia et libero arbitrio the confirmation of the will's existence depends upon divine revelation24. Augustine's use of the image of a hand in the Confessions - it appears in virtually every book - parallels the centrality of the image of walking to his endeavors there. In Books I-IX Augustine frequently represents the hand of God as reaching down into the abyss of the human soul to rescue it from its ignorance and misery. In these passages, not only does the intervention of the divine hand in his life exemplify divine power, but it also signifies the ultimate source of mercy and judgement that Augustine discovers within when he turns his attention to himself25. Because the drama of salvation occurs within the soul, the image of the divine hand functions as a magnet for many of the insights that Augustine develops at greater length in his polemical treatises after 418. Thus, Augustine insists in the Confessions that it is impossible to resist the divine hand if God desires to remove the will's hard-heartedness. Moreover, since no one can predict when

21 De praedestinatione sanctorum 10.19 (BA 24, 522). 22 Confessions V.7.13 (Skutella, 86); De gratia et libero arbitrio 8.20 (BA 24, 132-4); De correptione et gratia 9.22-24 (BA 24, 316-24); De dono perseverantiae 1 1.25 (BA 24, 652-4). 23 Confessions VII.3 (Skutella, 127-9). 24 De gratia et libero arbitrio 2.2 (BA 24, 92). 25 Confessions HI. 11.19 (Skutella, 51); IX. 1.1 (Skutella, 180).

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God will open or close his hand, human beings are completely dependent upon divine providence to repair the soul's inner ruin26. A similar ambiguity characterizes the working of the human hand. This hand exhibits both good and evil qualities because it is capable of turning away from God and placing its confidence in its own strength, or turning towards him and recognizing its complete dependence on him27. Here, too, Augustine conceives the will's dilemma in the same way that he does in his anti-Pelagian writings after 418. But as with the divine hand, Augustine's dis cussion of it contains no explicit reference to divine predestination. The contrast between the use of the image of the divine hand in passages before and after his conversion reveals the manner in which Augustine delib erately orders images in relation to the text's content. His use of this image in Confessions IX reflects the change that occurs in him as a result of his con version. From IX.4 onwards, he employs the image of Christ seated at God's right hand to convey not only the acceptance of his complete dependence on God, but also his realization that Christ mediates God's goodness to him through his right hand28. The same deliberate ordering of images shapes Augustine's response to the monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles. The instances of the image of the divine hand found in the De gratia et libero arbitrio, without exception, repro duce the scenario that exemplifies Augustine's defence of human freedom in the De libero arbitrio. That scenario depicts the divine hand stretching itself towards struggling humanity, so that the human hand can clasp God's hand29. Augustine deploys the same image in the De gratia et libero arbitrio, but now he rewrites the meaning that he maps onto this image, so that it conforms to the change that occurs in his thinking in 39730. In effect, Augustine rehabil itates this image in concert with the image of walking in order to ensure that both images conform to the content of his polemic against the dissident monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles. As in the case of walking, he explicitly iden tifies the divine hand with divine predestination31. If Augustine subordinates images to polemics in his anti-Pelagian writings after 418, the Confessions paint a completely different picture. Except for a few scattered references to Adam's fall from goodness, vessels of honour and dishonour, and the sorrow that Adam's sons and daughters must now endure,

26 Confessions V.l.l (Skutella, 76-7); VI.5.7 (Skutella, 105); VII.21.27 (Skutella, 151). See R.J. O'Connell, Images of Conversion in St. Augustine's 'Confessions' (New York: Fordham, 1996), 168-70 and Soundings, 1 10-2. 27 Confessions II.7.15 (Skutella, 34-5); VI.8.13-9.15 (Skutella, 111-14); X.4.5 (Skutella, 212). 28 Confessions IX.4.9 (Skutella, 187). 29 De libero arbitrio 1I.20.54 (CCL 29. 273). 30 De gratia et libero arbitrio 2.3 (BA 24, 96). 31 De praedestinatione sanctorum 16.33 (BA 24, 564).

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Augustine rarely has anything to say about the doctrine of divine predestina tion32. He mentions it explicitly on two occasions - in Confessions V.9 and XIII.3433. In neither case does he elaborate the significance of this doctrine, as he does after 418. And yet, despite the muted presence of this doctrine in the Confessions, Augustine devotes considerable attention to the work of God's mercy and judgement in the soul. Perhaps, then, Augustine is correct in his assessment of the situation. It was Pelagius and his followers who forced him to write more on predestination than was necessary. For surely the Confessions conveys the central tenets of that doctrine at the same time as it succeeds in delighting the imagination34. In the De doctrina christiana Augustine recognizes that the imagination has an important role to play in the contemplation of truth. Not only do images facilitate the understanding of truth, but they also make the discovery of diffi cult and complex things more satisfying and easy to retain35. Even the apostle Paul was cognizant of the fact that wisdom accompanied by eloquence makes the truth accessible to many who would otherwise turn away from it36. Given Augustine's awareness of the importance of the imagination, it is striking that he subordinates images to polemics in his anti-Pelagian works after 418. The monks of Hadrumentum and Marseilles, after all, were not as highly educated as some of Augustine's other opponents were. Consequently, the monks were more likely to experience difficulty following Augustine's reasoning. Augustine no doubt sensed this difficulty and sought to remedy it by reminding them of the Confessions, since this work had delighted many in the past and had moved them towards the acceptance of the truth. By appealing to the Confessions, Augustine was able to provide a more bal anced account than his polemical treatises permit. Furthermore, Augustine's suggestion to read the Confessions alongside his polemical works would have enabled the monks to read scripture in the light of the model of conversion proposed in the Confessions. Besides providing the paradigm of his own life as an example to be followed, Augustine is solicitous to demonstrate the role that reason and the imagination play in the process of faith seeking understanding. His reflections on memory, time, and Genesis display an awareness of the need for both in the search for understanding. It is hardly surprising, then, that Augustine would have utilized his rhetori cal skills in quelling the disturbances in Hadrumentum and Marseilles. The

32 Confessions I.9.14 (Skutella, 11); I.16, 25 (Skutella, 19); VIII.9.21 (Skutella, 171); XII.26.36 (Skutella, 321); XIII.14.15 (Skutella, 339-40); XIII.20.27 (Skutella, 349). 33 Confessions V.9.17 (Skutella, 90); XIII.34.49 (Skutella, 369). M De dono perseverantiae 20.53 (BA 24, 730-2). 35 De doctrina christiana II.6.8 (CCL 32, 36); IV. 12.27 (CCL 32, 135). 36 De doctrina christiana IV.7.1 1 (CCL 32, 123).

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remarkable coherence of the images found in the Confessions and his antiPelagian treatises after 418 are not only conducive to the acceptance of the truth, but they also reveal the work of a master rhetorician. If it is true, as Augustine claims in the De doctrina christiana, that truth is the food of the soul, his works surely attest to the fact that the meal he serves his critics is well seasoned.

To Use or Enjoy Humans? Uti and frui in Augustine Anthony Dupont, Leuven

In this communication I would like to give a summarised report of my research results regarding the meaning of the Latin verbs uti and frui in the thinking and writing of Augustine of Hippo. De doctrina christiana I and De diversis quaestionibus 83, quaestio 30 may be regarded as the basis of Augus tine's thinking about uti and frui since they are his only treatises that are entirely devoted to that subject. That is why I will use them to evaluate the lit erature concerning Augustine's uti and frui. The discussion in the recent literature about Augustine's uti and frui was initially placed in the broader context of the study of Augustine's concept of love in general. Karl Holl, Anders Nygren, Gunnar Hultgren, Kurt Flash, and Josef Bretchken accuse Augustine of defending an egoistic, instrumentalist, erotic, hedonistic, and non-Christian kind of love. Love for Augustine is, in their interpretation, an egocentric longing for one's own and individual beatitudo. For that purpose humans seemed to be allowed to use their fellow man. In the studies of William Riordan O'Connor, John Burnaby, Ragnar Holte, Luc Verheijen, Tarsicius Johannes Van Bavel, and Raimond Canning I have found three fundamental insights that refute these accusations. First, Augustine makes a difference between libido or cupiditas and caritas. LibidoIcupiditas is indeed selfish and instrumentalist in an abusive and exploitative sense. But in Augustine's perspective, libido/cupiditas only refers to bad forms of love. Augustine calls good love caritas, and the love for God and for the neighbour precisely are caritas. This good love is certainly not meant to be self-profiting in an amoral sense. Second, the charge of egoism cannot stand, simply because Augustine frequently stresses the importance of community. Third, in the love for God I love already my neighbour. As Raymond Canning emphasises, love for the neighbour and for God are deeply united and intrinsically connected. Love for the neighbour is much more than only an instrumental preparation for the love of God. Love for the neighbour is so important that one can find God in it. The question that Augustine tries to answer in De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 30, is Utrum omnia in utilitatem hominis creata sint? What if humans are subject and temporal goods object? The meaning of uti homine is by conse quence not the specific topic of the 30th question. Nevertheless, arguments

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against the accusations of egoism and instrumentalism can be found there. In quaestio 30 Augustine stipulates that the object adfruendum is invisible, intel ligible, and spiritual, or in other words, it is God. All that is bodily and visible is to be used (uti). This implies that humans are ad utendum. Augustine, how ever, immediately adds that humans are not to be used ad eminentiam, but ad societatem1. Humans are to be used, but not in the same manner as other earthly instruments are to be used. Humans are equals and should try to build up community. Augustine is here far removed from a self-centred, selfish ethics. Besides, Augustine has a great respect for all living creatures: bodies should be used for noble goals - patience, moderation, truth, justice, and health2. Furthermore, Augustine reacts explicitly against egocentric attempts to achieve fruitio. Those who are too much oriented to their own goals are guilty of superbia3. Claiming that, for Augustine, only God may be loved means neglecting Augustine's thought of ordinata dilectio. This is one of the crucial points in De diversis quaestionibus 83, quaestio 304. Love is essentially a matter of order. There is an order in the different modes of love and in the objects of love. This implies that, besides God, other objects may be loved. Not only love for the neighbour, but even the correct use of temporal goods is already love because it respects the order of the creation, because it obeys the Creator. Augustine's insight that the use of humans is completely different from the use of the rest of the creation takes also a central place in De doctrina chris tiana I. Such an uti of humans is connected with love. Uti of humans by humans is not just 'using': always it is a form of love, it is diligere5, it is an officium misericordiae6. Uti and frui, especially in De doctrina christiana I, became an exclusive subject of interest in a more recent stage of literature about Augustine. Augus tine tries to solve in that book the problem what humans have to do with fel low humans. Oliver O'Donovan in particular complains that Augustine is inconsistent and incoherent in addressing that complicated question. Accord ing to O'Donovan, Augustine placed humans first under uti. Later on in the 1 De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.30 (CCL 44A, p. 39, 40-44). 2 De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 46-52). 5 De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 45-46). 4 De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.30 (CCL 44A, p. 38, 10-15, 28-29). 5 De doctrina christiana I.xxiii.22 (44). For text edition, numbering of chapters, paragraphs, and alineas, I rely on the CSEL edition of William MacAllen Green. Augustine himself distin guished only four books in De doctrina christiana. Succeeding text editions refined the classifi cation. The edition of Green is the end of that evolution. In citing the Latin texts, it makes no sense to mention page numbers, because the alinea-classification is much more detailed. Guilemus M. Green (ed., introd.), De Doctrina Christiana, CSEL 80, Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera sect. VI, pars VI (Vindobonae: Hoelder/Pichler/Tempski, 1963). 6 Augustine formulates explicitly and at length (from alinea 61 to 72) that using humans stands for mercifully taking care of them, like the Good Samaritan, for officium misericordiae.

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book, Augustine began to realise that he was thinking in an unchristian fash ion. That is why he corrected himself by placing humans in the category ad fruendum. Since Augustine changed his thoughts - according to O'Donovan he is to be called inconsistent. Luc Verheijen reacts against the charge of inconsistency7. Verheijen refers to the structure of De doctrina christiana I in order to argue that Augustine is reasoning very consistently. De doctrina christiana I is built around the magna quaestio*, what to do with the neighbour, uti, frui, or both. Since that magna quaestio consists of three parts, there should be three answers, in De doctrina christiana I. The first part of the question is whether humans can be the object offrui. Augustine answers, no, not here on earth. The second part of the ques tion is whether humans can be the object of uti. The answer is, yes, here on earth. Third, are humans object offrui and uti? The answer to this question is the central point of Augustine's exposition. It is a nuanced answer, completely in accordance with the two previous answers: yes, humans are the object of uti during this life on earth, and yes, even so humans are object offrui, but in the next and eternal life. I agree with Luc Verheijen that the structure of De doctrina christiana I proves that Augustine is not writing in an inconsistent way. Augustine, indeed, clearly makes a distinction between three sorts of realities: those that are only ad utendum, those that are only adfruendum, and the category that fruuntur et utuntur9. The latter is the category for humans. By making of humans a third category, Augustine already shows from the beginning that humans are not an object of only frui or of only uti. Second, only the fact that the magna quaes tio consists of three options - uti, frui or uti and frui our neighbours - also demonstrates that, according to Augustine, when humans are the objects, uti and frui do not exclude each other. Furthermore, Augustine explicitly states that there is no major difference between uti and frui when applied to humans. The third definition of uti and frui in De doctrina christiana I, which only applies to humans, states that both uti and frui are a form of diligere. In other words, they lie very close to one another. When humans are the objects, frui is very close to uti of humans, that is, uti cum dilectione10. The fundamental structure of De doctrina christiana I is actually quite sim ple. Augustine starts with three premises in the preparatory part of De doctrina christiana I": 7 L. Verheijen 'Le premier livre du De doctrina christiana d'Augustin - Un iraite de "telicologie" biblique', in J. den Boeft and J. van Oort (eds), Augustiniana Traiectana, Etudes Augustiniennes (Paris, 1987), pp. 169-87. 8 De doctrina christiana I.xxii, 20 (40): Itaque magna quaestio est, utrumfrui se homines debeant an uti an utrumque. ' De doctrina christiana I.iii.3 (7). 10 De doctrina christiana I.xxxiii.37 (79). 11 De doctrina christiana I.xxii.20 (39).

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(1) subject: humans + object: creature = uti; (2) subject: humans + object: God -frui\ (3) humans are created and have something divine. After introducing these three basic premises, Augustine subsequently asks, what happens when humans are object and subject? The answer, uti and frui, results logically out of the three premises. De doctrina christiana I is not only consistent structurally, but also as regards its content. From the very beginning of De doctrina christiana I, Augustine makes us understand that there is something divine in humans, as gifted with reason and created imaginem et similitudinem Dei12. Augustine's expression frui homine in Deo has to be understood with this clue at its base13. Humans may enjoy humans in the Lord, because humans are in the Lord, because the Lord himself is present in humans. This is an invitation, but also a restriction. Only in as far as the Lord is present in humans, humans are enjoyable. This is emphasised and illustrated by Augustine in the words of Paul to Philemon: ha frater, inquit, ego te fruar in Domino14. Augustine shows that Paul does not want to enjoy Philemon the human, but the divine in Philemon. That is why enjoying humans by humans requires the addition 'in the Lord'. Our neighbour as a human being is after all not our source of hap piness. Augustine furthermore cannot demand obedience to the two precepts of the double love-commandment15, which is the core of De doctrina chris tiana I, if he does not see something divine in humans. If humans have to ori ent all their love entirely and completely to God, then love for the neighbour 12 Something similar is already suggested in paragraphs 25 and 26, in which Augustine writes about creation and incarnation: God is present in the creation and the Word of God lives in humans. The idea of something divine in humans can also be found in Augustine in different con texts. Augustine does not go as far as Manichaeism and Priscillianism. According to their anthro pology, the human soul makes up a divine element in man. Augustine conceives of the human soul, although incorporeal and eternal, as created and as such not divine in se. Nevertheless, the human soul is the closest being to God, because created imaginem et similitudinem Dei. This is why the human soul is capax Dei (De Trinitate XIV.iv.6; XIV.viii.ll). God is (and has to be) present in our love for our fellow men (In lohannis evangelium. XVII.8; Sermo 336.2). Christ identifies himself with mankind out of love for humans (De civitate Dei XVII. 18). That is why we touch God already in our love for humans (In lohannis evangelium LXV.2; Sermo 265.8.9). Love for humans is love for God. This thought is implied in Augustine's concept of Totus Christus. God transcends humans. Nevertheless, we do not have to look for him outside humans; he is in humans: interior intimo meo et superior summo meo (Confessiones III.vi.l 1). God can be dis covered, step-by-step, through an internal search of human reason (Confessiones VII.xvii.23). 13 De doctrina christiana I.xxxiii.37 (79). 14 De doctrina christiana I.xxxiii.37 (79): Cum autem homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris. Illo enim frueris quo efficeris beatus. et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias. I iitle ad Philomonem Paulus: "Ita frater, inquit, ego te fruar in Domino" . [Phil. 20] Quod si non addidisset, in Domino et te fruar tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset, spem beatitudinis suae. Quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti. 15 De doctrina christiana I.xxii.21 (42-43).

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is only understandable if and only if there is something of that God present in the neighbour. A reading with attention for the subtle game of definitions in De doctrina christiana I reveals a fully considered and well-prepared schema with different, but concordant answers. Consequently, the two cardinal points of my 'rehabilitation' of Augustine are 1) an analysis of the structure of the different definitions in De doctrina christiana I and 2) a new approach to that book, namely, starting from the insight that Augustine perceives something divine in humans. These two points have sufficiently shown that it is wrong to accuse Augustine of a self ish and hedonistic instrumentalism and of being an incoherent writer and thinker. As a more conceptual conclusion of my research I had to ask the following question: our fellow men - do we have to treat them as means or as ends? According to Augustine, our fellow men are not our final end, but only a means to that end. At the same time, the fellow men carry in them that final end and are (a sign of) that end. Augustine's answer is not formulated so univocally, but that is its value. Augustine realises that the question itself, just as the status of (fellow) men, is too complex to be answered without nuances. Augustine stresses the unique status of humans: creature, but creature par excellence, because created to the image of his Creator. That exceptional sta tus makes it clear that there are many levels in the question of the correct rela tionship between humans. The merit of Augustine lies in his paying attention to the complexity of this matter. He understands that it is not easy to formulate the relations between humans since those relations have many aspects. He does not want to lose sight of that plenitude. He does so by making a differ ence between uti and frui, worked out in a schema of several definitions.

The Liturgical Structure of St Augustine's Confessions

Michael P. Foley, Notre Dame

Because our time is limited and because I would very much like to hear your thoughts later on, I shall proceed directly to my thesis: not only does the Confessions contain several significant references to sacrament and liturgy, but because it is constituted, at least to a certain degree, by a liturgical and sacra mental progression, it may be said to be structured iiturgically'. Books One through Nine, the narration of Augustine's past, are dominated by the theme of baptism. First, both the opening and concluding books of this narration include substantial passages on baptism, framing the story of Augus tine's past life with a salient baptismal motif. Book Nine describes Augustine's baptism after a long and tortuous journey to the font, as well as the baptism of four others, even though not all of them take place within Book Nine's chrono logical parameters. In Book One, on the other hand, Augustine provides a brief but powerful excursus on the theological significance of baptism (something he does not explicitly do in Book Nine) as part of his discussion on why his bap tism was delayed when he was a boy (1.11). In this discussion Augustine includes a curious detail, that he was 'signed with the Lord's cross and sealed with his salt' the moment he came forth from his mother's womb (1.1 1.17). In fourth-century North Africa, this was what formally marked one's entrance into the catechumenate1. Contrary, then, to the common perception that Augustine's conversion was from paganism to Christianity, the drama of Books One through Nine hinges on the question of whether or how Augustine the catechu men will embrace the sacrament that he was sealed from birth to receive2. Second, the importance of baptism in these sections may be indirectly sur mised from Augustine's description of sin in terms of death and hell. Examples of both images abound. Augustine states that the life into which we are born after the Fall is a 'dying life or a living death' (1.6.7), while in reading of Dido's death Augustine was becoming dead to God (1.13.20). Augustine's lust drowned him 'in a whirlpool of crimes' (2.2.2), leading his mother to see that Postscript: An expanded version of this presentation may be found in the Spring 2005 issue of Antiphon and in a forthcoming book by the author tentatively titled. Right Reading: The Mystagogical Unity of St. Augustine's Confessions. 1 De catechizandis rudibus 26.50. 2 There are also several other significant allusions to the catechumenate and its distinctive ceremonies in Books One through Nine, which time unfortunately prevents us from examining.

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he was [spiritually] dead (3.1 1.19). And so on3. Similarly, Augustine adorns the narration of his sinful behaviour with frightening demonic and Tartarean images. In adolescence Augustine burned to take his fill of hell (2.1.1), while he 'sullied the lucidity [of friendship] with the hell of disordered desire' (3.2.2). Faustus was a 'great snare of the devil' (5.3.3), while the pernicious influence of the Manichaeans would lead Augustine to exclaim, 'Alas! Alas! By what steps was I led into the very depths of hell' (3.6.1 1)4. The baptismal relevance of these bleak metaphors is that they denote the mortal sin - or as Augustine calls them, 'the horrible and deadly sins' (9.2.4)5 - of which only the laver of regeneration will eventually wash him clean. Not coincidental!) , these images are completely absent from Augustine's narration of his present sins (Book Ten) and are found only in those passages describing his pre-baptismal life. A third indication of the link between baptism and Books One through Nine is Book Eight, which narrates the final stage of Augustine's conversion in terms redolent of the only part of the Eucharistic liturgy that catechumens were permitted to attend, the so-called 'Liturgy of the Word', which culmi nates with the reading of the Gospel. Book Eight is in itself an extension of the Gospel story, for in it Augustine responds to the reading of an Epistle after responding to a story about two agents responding to a story about a man named Antony who responded to the Gospel6. But Book Eight is not just an extension of the Gospel story; it is an extension of the Gospel story as pro claimed by the Church in its sacred liturgy. One of the key components in Augustine's right response to hearing the child's voice in the garden, it should be recalled, is remembering St Antony's response to hearing the Gospel read during Mass and imitating it accordingly (8.12.29). The 'Liturgy of the Word' motif in Book Eight may also be adduced from two other references to the liturgical proclamation of the scriptures, references that are found nowhere else in the Confessions. The first occurs while Augus tine is explaining the psychological impact of the 'lost and found' stories of the stray sheep, the misplaced drachma, and the prodigal son (8.3.6). Signifi cantly, all of these are Gospel parables described here in terms of hearing rather than reading, but it is the last example that is especially telling: And the joy during the solemnity of your house brings tears when [the passage] about your younger son is read in your house, for he was dead and was brought back to life, he was lost and was found.

3 Cf. 5.7.13, 5.9.16, 6.1.1. 6.6.9, 6.1 1.20, 7.21.27, 8.5.12, 8.7.18, 8.11.25. 4 Cf. 3.3.6, 5.9.16, 6.3.5, 7.21.27, 8.4.9, 8.5.10, 9.13.34. 5 Horrendi et funerei. Augustine does not use the term 'mortal sin' but elsewhere labels this level of transgression against God 'damnable' (damnabilis) (Contra mendacium 8.19; De civitate Dei 1.9) or 'lethal' (lethalis) (Contra lulianum 2.10.33). 6 Cf. Donovan Johnson, 'Story and Design in Book Eight of the Confessions', Biography 14/1 (Winter 1991), 39-60.

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This is hardly the first time that the parable of the prodigal son is used in the Confessions, but what makes the allusion here noteworthy is its contextualization within the celebration of a Eucharistic sollemnitas, specifically, as the Gospel reading of the day. Augustine even mentions twice in the same sentence that the recitation of the parable takes places in God's house (domus tua) to remove any ambiguity from the description. Second, while pillorying the Manichees' simplistic account of a will split between good and evil, Augustine demonstrates the inadequacy of this dualism by showing how the will may be torn by several good options. The example he offers is the enjoyment of either an epistle from the Apostle, a Psalm, or a Gospel (8.10.24). These three options, significantly, are the three scriptural readings that comprise the Mass of the Catechumens; in one breath, Augustine has summarized the main contents of the Liturgy of the Word in his day7. It is as if the 'liturgy' of Book Eight prepares Augustine for his full initiation in Book Nine, an initiation that included not only baptism and chrismation, but first Holy Communion. This may explain the appearance at the end of Book Nine of the Confessions ' first explicit theological exploration of the Eucharist as the sacrifice that blots out the handwriting written against us (9.13.36). Book Nine, with its climactic baptisms and concluding Eucharistic reflec tions, thus sets the stage for a new sacramental focal point in Book Ten, which is in many ways the book on the Eucharist. This may be seen from the first four and last four chapters. In chapters one through four Augustine discusses his motives in confessing his present life and the audience for whom it is intended. Unlike Books One through Nine, which are written for whoever picks up the work (2.2.3), Book Ten is only for Augustine's 'brethren' - that is, fellow full-fledged Christians - not for 'outsiders or the children of strangers' (10.4.5). (Notice that this exclusion of the unbaptized from Book Ten is akin to the dismissal of the catechumens from the Eucharistic liturgy.) Augustine not only then goes on to describe his brethren in liturgical terms (their hearts are thuribles, their prayers are like incense rising to God, and so forth), but he says that he is making his confession for them, for those who will come after them, and, astonishingly, for those who have gone before (10.4.6). How can one write a book for the dead? The statement, I contend, cannot be construed literally but should be seen as an echo or foreshadowing of the Eucharistic offering Augustine the priest and bishop is now capable of making on behalf of both the living and the dead8. That Eucharistic foreshadowing finds its literary completion in the last four chapters (10.40-43) of Book Ten. Augustine has just finished examining his conscience vis-a-vis the threefold concupiscence mentioned in 1 John 2:16 7 Cf. G.G. Willis, St. Augustine's Lectionary (London: S.P.C.K., 1962), 5, 21. 8 Commenting on Augustine's persona in Book Ten, J.J. O'Donnell remarks that Augustine 'will not tell us what it is like to participate in the eucharist; he appears before us as he appears at the altar' (Augustine Confessions, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 3, 245).

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and he is worried, for despite having been bom again in water and the spirit years ago, he still sees a discrepancy between what he is and what he should be. Augustine thus asks anxiously by what sacraments he is to be reconciled to God (10.42.67). His answer is Christ, the mediator who helps us bridge the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought' of our life, but more specifically, it is Christ as the High Priest interceding (interpellare) for us. Augustine describes Christ's mediation thus: 'for our sake he was to [God] both victor and victim, and victor because victim; for our sake he was to [God] both priest and sacri fice and priest because sacrifice' (10.43.69). Augustine then goes on to end Book Ten with what can only be called a communion rite: 'I meditate on the price of my redemption, I eat it and drink it and I give it to others to eat and drink ...' (10.43.70). By juxtaposing his troubled conscience with the media tion of Christ in the Eucharist, Augustine is indicating that this sacrament is the 'medicine', as he calls it (10.43.68, 69), for the peccata venialia commit ted after baptism9. And if the Eucharist is the 'answer' to the second half of Book Ten, with its attention to venial vices, it is also the analogue to the first half, with its explo ration of memory. The Eucharist is, after all, the memorial of Christ's passion, death, and resurrection, the fulfilment of the command to do this in memory of him. Book Ten even includes a telling reference to the ancillary agent of this living memory, the presbyter. Augustine alludes to his own priestly ordination only once in the Confessions when he recalls how God granted him chastity even before he became a 'dispenser of [the Lord's] sacrament' ( 1 0.30.4 1)10. This sacerdotal allusion is appropriate not only by virtue of the Eucharistic theme of Book Ten, but in light of Augustine's exploration of memory, which moves from a process of finding to one of being found (cf. 10.40.65). Such an inversion parallels Augustine's own theology of ordained ministry, in which it is not the seemingly active presbyter but Christ's priestly humanity that is the true agent of the sacrament11. Finally, Books Eleven through Thirteen concem Augustine's episcopal orders, for they are centred on unlocking the mysteries of the scriptures, and that is the unique responsibility of the bishop. (As Possidius relates, while any priest could offer the Eucharistic sacrifice, it was the custom in the African

9 As mentioned above, there are no 'mortal sins' described in Book Ten: in fact, the lethal and infernal imagery of sin in Books One through Nine is replaced in Book Ten with a different set of metaphors, that of gravity and burden, to denote the venial transgressions Augustine com mits after his baptism. 10 Dispensator sacramenti tui. While the expression need not refer to the priesthood per se (the bishop in fifth-century North Africa being the Eucharistic presider par excellence), the con text here links it to the presbyterate, for it is Augustine's sacerdotal ordination that permanently marks him for the celibate life. Cf. the acts of the Council of Carthage, 390 A.D. and Stefan Heid, Celibacy in the Early Church (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 205-6. 11 Cf. Jo. ev. tr. 80.3; Contra litteras Petiliani 1.5.6, 7.8.

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churches for only the bishop to preach on the readings12.) The last three books of the Confessions are a thorough fulfilment of this obligation, first by their exploration of the sacred text's literal polysemy (11.1.1 - 13.11.12), then by their explication of the hexameron's figurative meaning (13.12.13 - 13.38.53). Not coincidentally, Augustine refers to his episcopal orders only once in the Confessions, in Book Eleven, when he mentions his role of dispensing the Lord's sacrament and preaching his word (1 1.2.2). By tracing the sacramental structure of the Confessions I am not proposing that this exercise exposes the overall unity of the work, but I would like to sug gest that it reveals one of the work's several ordering principles, or to put it in Augustine's terms, one of the threads he has used to weave the tapestry of his confessio (10.8.14). This thread is significant for at least three reasons. First, it highlights the ecclesiastical, sacramental dimension of conversion. Augustine does not portray conversion in an isolationist manner, but sees it as intrinsically related to the visible Church. The concept that proved so pivotal in the conversion of Marius Victorinus - intra parietes ecclesiae (8.2.4; cf. 3.3.5) - also proves crucial to Augustine's theology of conversion. Second, it intimates a link between sacramental participation and a right reading of the sacramenta, or sacred signs, of the created order. For Augus tine, the increased ability to read the handwriting of reality well is at least par tially contingent upon one's reception of the ecclesiastical sacraments. Third, it illuminates the nature of Augustine's confessio, which is told in written form to serve as a mystagogical aid to the reader, initiating us into the same lifelong sacramental conversion of reading, choosing, and loving well (13.15.18), so that we all may join Augustine, the bishop-as-mystagogue, in saying, 'Great thou art, O Lord, and greatly to be praised' (11.1.1).

12 Vita S. Augustini 5.2.

The Structure of Augustine's Inquisitio in the De Trinitate: A Theological Issue1 Luigi Gioia, Oxford

The starting point of Augustine's inquisitio in the De Trinitate is often located in a formal concept of the Trinity, the result of creedal statements, at least a step removed from scripture. Then, Augustine's aim is interpreted as an attempt to find an 'analogue' or an 'illustration' of the Trinity, or to fill a too abstract approach to the Trinitarian mystery. We can gather these criticisms under the same label and refer to them as the 'analogical line of interpretation' of Augustine's Trinitarian theology. Parallel to this 'analogical line', another cluster of attempts to devise an encompassing criterion to explain Augustine's approach to the mystery of the Trinity could be labelled 'anagogical line of interpretation'. According to it, Augustine leads his reader along a 'soteriology of ascent', more or less depen dent on Plotinian philosophy, characterized by commentators as 'an attempt at a direct "ascent" from the consideration of that which is created to the con templation -the Plotininan noesis- of the Creator' or again as 'an extended exercise of the mind in the "non corporeal" mode of thinking with which the Trinity will ultimately be grasped'2. Whether Augustine's method in the De Trinitate is described in analogical or anagogical terms or as a combination of both, these accounts have in com mon the following features: - they struggle to explain the unity of the De Trinitate and are either based on one particular section of it or simply assume that the treatise is not unified; - attempts at interpretation almost exclusively concentrate on the books 814, most of the time taking for granted that there is a radical turn in the argument at the end of book 8; - it is assumed that Augustine is interested in the justification of formal Trinitarian concepts and these are deduced in their turn from the triads of mind which are supposed to illustrate them. In particular, this applies to

1 The argument of this communication is developed in the forthcoming book: Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 2 Cf. John Cavadini, 'The Structure and Intention of Augustine's De Trinitate', AugSt 23 (1992), 106.

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L. Gioia his understanding of consubstantiality and explains the persistent modalist suspicion of his Trinitarian theology. Indeed, if all that Augustine had to say on consubstantiality had to be worked out from his so-called 'psy chological triads', this suspicion would probably be justified.

My argument in this paper is that the main problem of a great deal of secondary literature concerning the De Trinitate is a failure to grasp the uncompromising theological framework of Augustine's approach to the mystery of the Trinity. For him, the Trinity is object of knowledge to the same extent and in the same way as it is object of love, and it is considered not as a problem to solve, but as that which we are called to enjoy, frui. To prove these claims we must start by setting the epistemological issue - that is, 'How do we know the Trinity?' - in Augustine's own terms, carefully following the way in which it is unfolded in the dense and complex eighth book, the real hinge around which the whole of the De Trinitate turns. The possibility of grasping Augustine's argument and purpose in this treatise wholly depends on the correct under standing of this book.

The Eighth book of the De Trinitate In the first seven books of the De Trinitate, while pursuing various threads of enquiry and already preparing the ground for the move he intended to undertake in the second half of the treatise, Augustine had given his argument a predominantly polemical thrust. His targets there were generic 'Arian' views on the Trinity, and he deemed he had to rebut them through partially adopting the style of argument of his opponents, that is, through linguistic and logical considerations. The hinges of this polemical section had been the unity, equal ity, and simplicity of the Trinity, the way attributes have to be predicated of God, and the issue of consubstantiality. After a short summary of these findings at the beginning of the eighth book, a clearly programmatic sentence announces the change of perspective which he is about to embark upon: Dicta sunt haec, et si saepius uersando repetantur, familiarius quidem innotescunt; sed et modus aliquis adhibendus est deoque supplicandum deuotissima pietate ut intellectum aperiat et studium contentionis absumat quo possit mente cerni essentia ueritatis sine ulla mole, sine alia mutabilitate3.

3 8.1: 'All this has been said, and if it has been repeated rather often in various ways, this only means that we become all the more familiar with it. But we must put some limits to repeti tion, and beseech God as devoutly and earnestly as we can to open our understandings and tem per our fondness for controversy, so that our minds may be able to perceive the essence or being of truth without any mass, without any changeableness.'

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This implies that the formal Trinitarian criteria painstakingly elaborated and criticized throughout the previous seven books had not dealt yet with knowl edge of God properly speaking, but came rather under the heading of contentio, of 'controversy'. As a matter of fact, through the first seven books of the De Trinitate, a fun damental question has been left unanswered: how is God an object of knowl edge for us? We shall see, however, that this way of summarizing Augustine's intention at this point is inadequate, since it entails that we can ask such a question before we actually start knowing God. The reality is that the epistemological issue needs to be completely reshaped when he who is known is not an object similar to any other object, but is the very root of our ability and pos sibility to know. This is the task Augustine sets for himself in the eighth book. Because of the limits imposed by the length of this paper, we cannot follow the detail of Augustine's development of knowledge of objects of faith in gen eral, and we must go straight to the point in which he deals with knowledge of the Trinity. As he reaches this point, however, the way in which he sets the question is not 'How do we know the Trinity?'. On the contrary, the question is, Quomodo igitur eam trinitatem quam non nouimus credendo diligimus?4. The issue of knowledge of God is not dealt with as the condition upon which the possibility of relation with God would rest. The relation with God is a real ity already. Augustine's starting point is the fact that we actually discover our selves in the act of loving God the Trinity through faith, even if we do not actually see him. The eighth book unfolds a carefully constructed and progressively marked emphasis on the radical difference of 'cWecf/o-for-the-God-whom-we-do-notsee-through-believing-in-him' from any other form of knowledge, the climax of which is reached in the following statements: An uero diligimus non quod omnis trinitas sed quod trinitas deus ? Hoc ergo diligimus in trinitate. quod deus est. Sed deum nullum alium uidimus aut nouimus quia unus est deus. ille solus quem nondum uidimus et credendo diligimus5. No surprise if we cannot find any similitudo or comparatio or notitiae to explain why we love the Trinity. In fact, what we love in the Trinity is that he is God, and we do not see or know any other god, because unus est Deus. Unus means here absolutely unique, unparalleled. As a result, Augustine can resolutely focus the issue on these terms: Quapropter non est praecipue uidendum in hac quaestione quae de trinitate nobis est et de cognoscendo deo nisi

4 8.8: 'How is it, then, that we love by believing the Trinity we do not know?' 5 8.8 'Perhaps, then, what we love is not what any trinity is, but the Trinity that is God. So what we love in the Trinity is that he is God. But we have never seen or known another God, because God is one; he alone is God whom we love by believing, even though we have not yet seen him.'

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quid sit uera dilectio. immo uero quid sit dilectio6. Dilectio is of course here to be understood in its full theological sense. In order to define what the nature of true dilectio is, Augustine resorts to another example, that of dilectio of the Apostle Paul. We must skip the detail of this argument as well and simply notice the point Augustine wants to make through it: we do not know nor have ever seen the Apostle Paul, and all we know about him is that which is said about him in scripture and which we believe. If we discover that we love him, it is because we believe that he is an animus iustus. Both these elements, to be animus and to be iustus, are not known to us through notitiae or regulae, whether speciales or generalles. On the contrary, we love animus and iustitia because we recognize them or become aware of the fact that somehow they are in us. The conclusion drawn from this example can be summed up as follows: - love comes first, triggered in us by belief in what we hear about the apos tle we do not see; - if we look into the nature of this love, we discover that its object is a forma already present in us; - this forma is known in ipsa veritate; - this forma entails love because it is something which not only wants to be known, but also wants to 'form' and 'transform' (this is why it is aforma) us and does so through love. All this, however, amounts to saying that we somehow love and know the Apostle Paul in God and through God. In fact, God himself is (i) the veritas and the lux in which we see the forma of iustitia; (ii) he is the very dilectio which enables us to adhere to the forma of iusti tia and to be 'formed' (informare) by it so as to become iusti in our turn7. Augustine's reader is now prepared to be introduced into the core of the issue, love and knowledge of God the Trinity himself, which, on the basis of the example of the love for the apostle, can be reformulated as follows. - We discover ourselves in the act of diligere the Trinity we do not see but in whom we believe. - In the case of the apostle, what we loved was the forma of iustitia we knew in ipsa veritate. In the case of God the Trinity, this point undergoes two fundamental changes: (i) what we love in the Trinity is that he is God; (ii) this God is not a forma we could know in nos or apud nos in ipsa veritate, because he himself is the veritas and the lux in which we see every forma.

6 8.10. 'Thus in this question we are occupied with about the Trinity and about knowing God, the only thing we really have to see is what true love is; well in fact, simply what love is.' 7 8.13

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- Finally, the role of dilectio also fundamentally changes because, in the knowledge of God the Trinity, dilectio is not simply that through which we adhere to what is known, but is the very thing known. In the end, Augustine can say that in hac quaestione quae de trinitate nobis est et de cognoscendo deo nisi quid sit uera dilectio, immo uero quid sit dilectio*, precisely because (i) God is dilectio and (ii) that which we diligimus when we believe in the Trinity is dilectio itself. We are thus prepared to answer the question which underlies the whole book, How is it that we discover ourselves able/enabled to love God the Trin ity we do not see? What do we know that triggers this love? Augustine's answer is that love for God and for the neighbour has no other reason than love itself, nor other trigger than love itself, since God is dilectio. Nobody is authorized to say that he does not know God: Diligat fratrem et diligat eandem dilectionem; magis enim nouit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligir9. In the example of the apostle, love for him was based on the forma of iustitia present in us. On the contrary, in the case of love for God and for the neighbour, what is present in us is not only the forma of dilectio to which we then have to adhere through dilectio. Augustine states, Ecce iam potest notiorem deum habere quam fratrem, plane notiorem quia praesentiorem, notiorem quia interiorem, notiorem quia certiorem10. God who is dilectio is known at the highest possible degree because he is the most interior thing, he is the most present thing, he is the most certain thing by being the ground of any other certainty. God the dilectio is both the forma we know - so to speak - and that through which this forma transforms and infor mai us: Amplectere dilectionem deum et dilectione amplectere deumu. Augustine is aware of the difficulty to grasp this point and restates it in all possible ways so as to make it crystal clear. He anticipates a possible objection: At enim caritatem uideo, et quantum possum eam mente conspicio, et credo scripturae dicenti: Quoniam deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate in deo manet. Sed cum eam uideo non in ea uideo trinitatem12. As an answer to it, in the most explicit way he states: Immo uero uides trinitatem si caritatem aides13.

* 8.10. 'Thus in this question we are occupied with about the Trinity and about knowing God, the only thing we really have to see is what true love is; well in fact, simply what love is.' 9 8.12. 'Let him love his brother and love that love; after all, he knows the love he loves with better that the brother he loves.' 10 8.12. 'There now, he can already have God better known to him than his brother, certainly better known because more present, better known because more inward to him, better known because more sure.' 11 8.12. 'Embrace love which is God and embrace God through love.' 12 8.12. 'Yes I can see charity, and to the best of my ability to grasp it with my mind, and I believe the scripture when it says that God is charity and whoever abides in charity abides in God. But when I see it, I do not see any Trinity in it.' 13 8.12. 'Oh, but you do see the Trinity if you see charity.'

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In the case of God the Trinity, therefore, the epistemological issue is refor mulated in an absolutely unique way. Since God is dilectio, the distinction between the object of our love and the act though which we love it does not apply any more. What we love in the Trinity is that he is God, that is, that he is dilectio. And since dilectio either is ex Deo or is not dilectio at all, then we are no more in the condition of those who have to love something they do not yet possess on the basis of a belief which they deem true for whatever reason. On the contrary, we are in the situation of those who already know, already see, already love out of God's dilectio, i.e. propter Deum. And this is possible because the very act which enables us to love and therefore know God is the result of the economic enactment of the act through which God loves and knows himself, that is, of the mystery of the Trinity.

Books 9-15 As a result, if our analysis of the eighth book of the De Trinitate is correct, we are not in the presence of a first analogical or anagogical attempt to climb up to the mystery of the Trinity, but rather of the setting forth of a proper the ological, that is, Trinitarian epistemology. Therefore, as he embarks upon the section going from the ninth to the fifteenth book, the question which Augus tine is pursuing is not, 'do we have any analogy for the mystery of the Trin ity,' but rather, 'how is it that we discover ourselves able, enabled to love and know God?' The answer to this question is unfolded in the doctrine of the image of God. The doctrine is elaborated through an anagogical process going from the exte rior to the interior, from the material to the spiritual, from the sensible to the intelligible. However, through this process, Augustine is not looking for an image of God, but for the image of God. And the image of God is not so much that which in us is like God, but that through which we are totally dependent on God and eventually enabled to enjoy (frui) God through knowledge and love or, better, through sapientia and dilectio. It is that through which, right from the moment of our creation, we were called to be in a relation of knowl edge and love with God and it is that which needs to be restored for this rela tion to be re-established. Very importantly, the restoration of this relation does not merely consist in the communication of some pieces of knowledge con cerning God or in the infusion of power to enable us to go back to God, but is the result of an enactment of Trinitarian life.

Medical Imagery in the 'New' Sermons of Augustine

Susan Blackburn Griffith, Oxford

Patristic preachers and writers, especially but not exclusively the North Africans, appear very fond of medical metaphor. This sort of imagery can be readily located in Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory Nazianzen, among others1. Their rhetorical education would have encouraged this sort of literary embellishment, which scripture, in particular the Gospel narratives of healing, would have reinforced. In the works of Augustine, however, the overwhelming frequency of med ical allusions stands out2. A rudimentary search on forms of medicus, medicamentum, medicina, and their cognates reveals nearly 1300 instances through out his corpus, not including the newly discovered sermons3. An intriguing pattern in Augustine's sermons is the interweaving of the themes of illness and medicine with sin, humility, and rhetoric: Christ the Word heals with a word; Christ's humility heals our pride; preaching of the word can bring healing. 1 E.g., Tertullian, Scorpiace; Cyprian, De lapsis 13-15, Ep. 29.3, 30.3, 30.5, 50.4, 51.16, 54.13, 56.1; Jerome, Tract, in psalm. LXXXIIII.8, Comm. in Ecclesiasten VII.20.21, Tract, in Marci Euangelium I.13-31; Ambrose, Exameron VI.8.50, Explanatio psalmi 37.56, Expl. ps. 40.14, De paradiso 7.35. Certain patristic authors demonstrate familiarity with medical philoso phies and practices, as well as with miraculous cures, e.g. Gregory Nazianzen, who had some medical training, Jerome (Adv. louinianum n.6, Dialogi contra Pelagianos III. 11, Vita S. Hilarionis 14, Comm. in Amos II.5.3), and Augustine himself. The author discusses the image of the Physician in Gregory Nazianzen's orations in another communication given at this conference. 2 A few scholars have made forays into Augustine's use of this topos, in particular P.C.J. Eijkenboom in his dissertation, 'Het Christus-Medicusmotief in de Preken van Sint Augustinus' (R.K. Universiteit, 1960). See also Rudolph Arbesmann, 'Christ the Medicus Humilis in St. Augustine', in Augustinus Magister, Congres International Augustinien, Paris, 21-24 Septem ber 1954, 3 vols (Paris, 1954), II, 623-9, and "The Concept of "Christus Medicus" in St. Augus tine', Traditio 10 (1954), 1-28; Paul Victor Beddoe, 'Augustine's Use of Medical Imagery in His Polemical Theology' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 1998); Thomas F. Martin, 'Paul the Patient: Christus Medicus and the "Stimulus Carnis" (2 Cor. 12:7): A Consideration of Augustine's Medicinal Christology', Augustinian Studies 32. 2 (2001), 219-56; William Harm less, 'Christ the Pediatrician: Infant Baptism and Christological Imagery in the Pelagian Contro versy', Augustinian Studies 28. 2 (1997), 7-34. 3 The sermons discovered in the closing years of the twentieth century tucked away in florilegia in various European libraries (notably in Mainz) have yet to make it onto the various data bases such as Patrologia Latina or Cetedoc. Most of the new and nearly new texts have been compiled in Vingt-Six Sermons au Peuple d'Afrique, ed. Franfois Dolbeau, Collection des (amies Augustiniennes, Serie Antiquite 147 (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes, 1996).

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The complexity of Augustine's treatment of these topoi as an interwoven whole - particularly his connection of healing with the rhetoric of Christ marks a significant development in the use of medical imagery in the patristic period. It echoes the interdependence of philosophy, medicine, ethics, and rhetoric in Hellenistic philosophy4. The philosopher as physician of souls, the importance of good rhetoric for a doctor - these were ideas expressed in some of the writings absorbed by Augustine as a young student. Augustine takes a metaphor familiar in both pagan and Christian contexts and transforms it into a ready piece of imagery upon which he improvises elaborate rhetorical riffs. His primary usage occurs in exhortations to humility, to follow the example of Christ the medicus humilis. Do these patterns continue in the new sermons? Christ the Physician does indeed appear in the Dolbeau collection as a cure for the evil of pride5, as one who exalts the humble6. He is the doctor who, more than your local purveyor of healthcare, understands your ailment. The man who diagnoses (legit) your illness for you from Hippocrates is not more to be relied on by you than the one who demonstrates to you from the divine scripture how you are internally ill. So listen to the scripture saying, 'The beginning of every sin is pride'7. The doctor not only brings the medicine, but becomes the medicine, offering himself, and specifically his humility, as the antidote: 'Christ's humility is the remedy (medicamentum) for your pride'8. And so the congregation is told to 'listen to the doctor as he hangs on the cross'9. Here can be seen a continua tion of the connection of healing with pride and its cure, the humility of Christ. Intriguingly, in another of the new sermons, Augustine makes much of the use by doctors of contrary cures, an influential medical theory of the time known as allopathy, which in turn was based on the theory of the four basic bodily humours. Thus the bishop refers to prescriptions of cold compresses for a fever, dry treatment for a moist condition, and other opposing treatments10. Such allopathic therapy fits nicely with the rhetorical device of opposing terms, a frequent trope in Augustine, and particularly with his theme of the necessity of Christ's counterbalancing humility to effect a cure for pride: 'So if we see

4 For more on their interrelation in Hellenistic philosophy, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer sity Press, 1994). 5 Sermo 159B.11, 13, 15. 6 Sermo 198.32. 7 Sermo 360B.17. Latin texts for the 'new' sermons are from Dolbeau. English translations, except where noted, are from The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle. Sermons, vol. III/11, Newly Discovered Sermons, tr. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997). The scriptural allusion is Sirach 10: 13. 8 Sermo 360B.17. Cf. 374.23. 9 Sermo 360B.18. 10 Sermo 341.4.

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the art of medicine curing a patient by the application of contraries, it's not sur prising if we who were sick with human pride are cured by the humility of God'". Unfortunately, that which makes the patient sick also makes him reject the medicine offered, since nothing offends pride like humility. The Incarnation and the Passion are portrayed as particularly offensive: 'What sort of God am I going to have?' asks the patient rhetorically, 'One who was bom, suffered, was smeared with spittle, crowned with thorns, hung up on a cross?'12 Augustine's patient is too sick to go to the doctor, so the doctor lowers himself to come to him; the patient, however, 'sneers' as the humble doctor offers him the remedyfilled cup13. The bishop diagnoses the ironic problem: the very disease that needs curing, pride, causes the patient to reject the cure as well as the Curer14. The word here for cup (poculum) could clearly allude to the cup of the Eucharist, since patristic Latin usage, while favouring calix, does occasionally opt for poculum. Patristic references to eucharistic elements as medicine for the soul are relatively common15. Echoes of a passage from Tertullian's Scorpiace might be heard, wherein a reluctant patient rejects a poison's antidote16. Augustine's use of the topos goes beyond the connection with humility, and the 'new' sermons offer further evidence of this expansion. Christ the 'true physician' is not merely humble, but also patient, compassionate, and non-vin dictive17. Augustine continues with allopathic rhetoric: sneerers are met with kindness, frenzied patients with calm, murderers with self-sacrifice; the doctor whom they should keep alive they instead kill, yet the one whom they kill rises from the dead and in so doing heals them18. In Sermon 374, in the context of the themes of revelation and illumination associated with the Feast of the Epiphany, the bishop goes into a lengthy dia logue with a purported enquirer to illustrate the essential nature of faith in order for one's blindness of spirit to be healed. Augustine creates an imagina tive dialogue. The doctor encounters a patient who is either blind since birth or has forgotten he could ever see. He offers to rid the patient of this ancient blindness by an operation. He promises that there is something he can point out and show, if the patient will suffer himself to be cured. As for him, of course, how will he ever be cured if he doesn't believe the doctor before he is actually able to see?19 " Ibid. 12 Sermo 360B. 17. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 E.g., Ignatius' famous description in Ephesians 20.2 of the Eucharist as the 'medicine of immortality'. 16 Tertulllian, Scorpiace V.8. 17 Sermo 360B.18. 18 Ibid. 19 Sermo 374.8.

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The patient argues with the doctor, because he wants to see first, before the operation, and refuses to believe the doctor until he can see. The theme drawn out by Augustine relates to faith: one needs to trust the doctor. Faith precedes sight. His parable also subtly undermines the arrogance of human reason and perception unaided and untransformed by the Spirit of God. The interconnection between healing and rhetoric appears again in another of the Dolbeau sermons. In a sermon on Luke 13, Augustine describes Jesus' miracles, such as the healing of the woman bent double, as God's works and God's words: they are 'not only mighty works,... but are also, so to say, visi ble words' - verum etiam quasi verba esse visibilia20. He extends the metaphor to compare someone who rejoices in the miracle, but fails to understand the significance of the story of healing that he has just heard to an illiterate person who marvels at the calligraphy of a scribe without grasping the meaning of the words. Augustine does not dismiss the importance of praising God for his works; but his theology of signs compels him to look for another layer. Augustine's rhetoric functions in a similar way: his vocabulary of healing is quasi verba visibilia. Just as the healing miracles of Christ had multiple levels of meaning, so the rhetoric of healing in Augustine operates on many levels. Both serve as signs, pointing to a deeper reality. The most significant of the new sermons for the topic of medical imagery is Sermon 20B, in which Augustine returns to the pulpit after a lengthy absence due to illness21. With the added drama of someone who has been through a physical trial, indeed who comments that he needs to be brief because his scar from the surgery is not completely healed22, Augustine takes the opportunity to preach on the struggle of the Christian, the nature of suffering, by commenting on Psalm 60, which had just been sung: 'Give us help from affliction, and vain is the salvation of man' (Ps. 60:1 1). It is perfectly acceptable to ask for physical health; indeed it is a gift from God. But if given a choice between physical health and spiritual improvement, the Christian should opt for the latter. The doctor may indeed know what is for our betterment in a way that we cannot fully understand. He may give us a medicine that we do not wish to take, whereas our servant would give us 'with a snap of our fingers' what would bring us pleasure or temporary comfort, but not be helpful for us in our illness. A main reason to argue for a late date for the sermon is its reference to the martyrs and its heightened awareness of heaven. Here, in Augustine's thinking, health becomes eschatological, defined as standing in victory before God along with the martyrs. The wounds of the martyrs, their wasting away in chains, is compared by 20 Sermo 1 10A. 1 . Cf. Sermo 11.1 : quasi verba, si dici potest, visibilia et aliquid significantia. 21 There is some conjecture as to the specific nature of the illness, but perhaps the most likely explanation, offered by Hill, is that Augustine has had a recurrence later in his episcopacy of 'piles' requiring yet another surgery. See in Augustine, Newly Discovered Sermons, p. 35, n. 1. 22 Sermo 20B.11.

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the bishop to those who suffer physical distress. The medical imagery in this sermon has little to do with the more typical Augustinian connection with humility and much to do with common sense and prudence: this Physi cian knows what he is doing. Sermon 20B emphasizes faith, calling the believer to trust in the midst of horrendous (or even mild) suffering. And finally, it reminds the believer of the triumph of the victorious martyrs and the hope to be found in sharing in their victory and the victory of their Heavenly Physician. In conclusion, Augustine's medical imagery, in the 'new' sermons as else where, serves not only to illustrate his thought, but in a significant way informs it. The therapeutic analogy provides a flexible tool, which likewise helps to shape the hand that wields it. Playing with an analogy and exploring all its possible tangents - often to ludicrous extremes - was a common game with rhetoricians influenced by the Second Sophistic. Augustine's exploration of medical metaphor occasionally has playful elements, but always marshalled for a much more serious purpose. As a bishop he became very aware of the suffering experienced by his flock - their frequent physical trials as well as the suffering engendered by original sin and chronic disobedience. Augustine desires to aid them in their struggle by informing their understanding. While starting in a relatively homely metaphor, the implications of Augustine's use of the therapeutic analogy, particularly that of Christus medicus humilis, extend into the major branches of theology. Firstly, and most significantly, this metaphor encapsulates Augustine's Christology. Christ is the humble doctor. He does not stay in his lofty position, treating only those who are wealthy and well, but comes to heal the poor and sick. Christ is patient, both in the sense of suffering on behalf of those who suffer and in the sense of forbearing with them in their weakness and slowness to come to repentance. Love summarizes all of the doctor's activity. Secondly, it draws a vivid portrait of Augustine's theological anthropology. Sin-sick humanity has been wounded by the Fall, blinded by lack of faith and tumescent with pride. Such a patient can do nothing to effect his cure, except to cooperate with the doctor. Thirdly, an understanding of Augustine's soteriology, located at the inter section of his anthropology and his Christology, benefits from attention to the medical analogy in his sermons. Sin-sick humanity cannot heal itself; only Christus medicus can. The illustration depends heavily on the themes of the Incarnation and the Passion. Both are integral to Augustine's model of salva tion. Only by taking on infirm human flesh in the Incarnation could Christ heal our infirmity. As the incarnate Christ, he touched the sick and healed them, and the Gospel narratives of healing provide significant material for Augus tine's preaching. Only by becoming the medicine on the cross could the doc tor effect the necessary healing. The patient's conversion is his healing: 'We cannot be converted,' he declares in one of the new sermons, 'except insofar

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as we are healed... What does Convert us mean? "Heal us.'"23 Furthering the incamational model, Augustine's usage of vivid and highly memorable med ical imagery puts flesh, if you will, on the Gospel. Furthermore, the soteriology presented in the medical analogy is flexible enough to be at once sacramental and relational. A frequent location for med icinal language occurs toward the end of the sermon, as Augustine segues into the Eucharist. The bread is the medicamentum, but it is also the medicus. The doctor-patient relationship portrayed is one of necessary intimacy. This doctor knows everything about his patient and rather than treating symptoms, as was the more common medical practice of the time, he diagnoses the underlying problem and applies the required remedy - himself. Finally, Augustine's use of medical metaphor touches on eschatology. The healing which believers experience in conversion and in sacrament is but a start. 'He has cured us, and he goes on curing us,' the bishop preaches24. The bread offered as medicine is the heavenly bread, coming down to heal25. Ulti mately, however, Augustine reminds us, complete healing will be experienced only in the presence of God, when 'we shall see what true health is'26.

23 24 25 26

Sermo Sermo Sermo Sermo

130A.7. 299A.5. 130A.12. 20B.9.

The Assault of Grace in St Augustine's Early Works Carol Harrison, Durham

We are accustomed to speaking of the outward operation of God's grace in his creation, in providence, scripture, the Incarnation, preaching, and teaching, and it is generally held that this is the only way in which one can properly speak of the operation of divine grace in Augustine's early works up to 396. On the other hand, we speak of the inward operation of grace in Augustine's thought, in relation to God's illumination of the mind by his Word, and most especially, his infusion of the will with his Holy Spirit, so that fallen humankind, who would otherwise be incapable of knowing or doing the good, might be enabled to love and to act upon it. This idea of 'operative' or 'infused' grace, together with a doctrine of universal fallenness and predesti nation, is usually identified as first occurring explicitly in Augustine's Letter to Simplicianus of 396, and as then being characteristic of Augustine's mature thought, being fully worked out in the context of the Pelagian Controversy. I would like to question this consensus, however, to argue for a continuity in Augustine's theological reflection which avoids any dramatic changes, rev olutions, or conversions in his thought apart from the one in 386. There are indeed many texts and arguments which do suggest that the characteristic fea tures of a doctrine of 'operative' or 'infused' grace are part of Augustine's thinking from the very beginning, but it is not those which I wish to rehearse today. Rather, in this paper, I would like, as it were, to suggest a context in which these early texts on inward grace might best be read, and to dig the foundations on which the arguments might be constructed. Firstly, we need to ask whether it makes sense to speak of outward and inward grace as if the two were separable entities and operations. It is quite clear in Augustine's work that all is of grace, since God is the creator who gives existence and form to what was nothing, who sustains it, and when it deforms itself by turning away from him, converts and reforms it towards him self. There is no dividing line: God is the Creator of soul and body; the life of the mind and the flesh; the One to whom external things witness and point, who is ultimately found as the inward life and source of the soul. This is what Augustine calls God's providence in the second book of On Free Will, where he writes, 'If all existing things would cease to be if form were taken from them, the unchangeable form by which all mutable things exist and fulfil their functions ... is to them a providence. If it were not, they would not be'

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(2.17.45) This is what he terms 'natural providence' in The Literal Commen tary on Genesis*, by which he understands God's hidden, as it were inward presence to his world, which he creates, orders, and sustains in its natural processes. Alongside natural providence, however, Augustine places 'volun tary providence', which signifies the way in which God works through the will of rational creatures, outside or beyond natural processes, most especially to maintain order despite their disruptive and destructive sinful actions. Thus, for example, he punishes the evil and rewards the just; orders history; sends prophets and teachers; becomes Incarnate; inspires scripture; bestows the sacraments of the Church. Most importantly, he operates within the will of fallen humanity, who are blind to the truth and incapable of acting upon it, to inspire love and delight in the good. This distinction between natural provi dence and voluntary providence seems to me to be a much more satisfactory way of talking about the operation of grace than the inward/outward distinc tion. God's work is never less than both, but voluntary providence becomes much more important when he responds to the sin or Fall of his creation, and must work through the will of rational creatures to restore order and unity to his creation. Given that Augustine maintained a doctrine of the Fall from the very beginning, and frequently suggests in these early texts that without divine aid man is incapable of knowing, willing, or doing the good, this is the context in which we must read those texts in the early works which clearly suggest what is described by scholars as a doctrine of inward, operative or infused grace. They are a part of God's providential operation within his rational cre ation. This is also the context in which we must read those early texts which speak of God operating upon man's will, bringing about our willing within us, or of the inward inspiration of the Holy Spirit moving fallen man to love and to do the good. This is the case because, even though Augustine does not actually use the later terminology of natural and voluntary providence, what they represent for him is one of the main themes of the early works: how the Creator, former, and orderer of creation reforms and redeems his fallen creation through his providential action upon the wills of his rational creation. I would like to take one example of this type of action of 'voluntary' providence in the early works because I think it demonstrates how the artificial and misleading distinction between the inward and outward operation of grace is cut through and elided right from the very beginning. I am not going to take the obvious texts which speak specifically about the inward inspiration of the Holy Spirit as inspiring love and delight, but rather those in which Augustine describes the providen tial action of God as literally assaulting man, laying hold upon him and attack ing him, disciplining, commanding, causing pain and suffering, disregarding and overriding his will, purging and cleansing him like a consuming fire, 1 Gn.litt. 8.9.17-18.

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because I think these perhaps give us a better insight into the way in which Augustine believes that divine grace does indeed operate upon the will, to infuse man's will and to 'bring about our willing within us'2. There is little room for talk of cooperation or synergy between God and humankind in these texts; rather God overcomes and conquers his wayward creation, dramatically battering them into submission, so that they might ultimately attain freedom. What are these texts? In his first extant work, Against the Academics (1.3), Augustine describes the harsh bufferings he endured from the secret work of providence in order to rouse the divine element in him and bring him to con version, and in a more extended description of his journey to conversion in his second work, On the Happy Life, using the metaphor of a sea journey, he observes, 'How few would perceive where to strive or where to return, unless, at some time, a tempest, against our will and way ... should thrust us all unaware, off our faulty course' ( 1 . 1 ). In On Music he observes how the love of temporal things is taken by storm by the sweetness of eternal things (6.16). The sea, storms, and tempests are among Augustine's favourite images to describe Christian life in a fallen world, and, as here, the dramatic and force ful way in which he is rescued from them. Man is moved by force, woken up by adversity, carried by elemental forces, against his will, to abandon his sin ful habits. The very nature of reality seems to be part of this dramatic working of divine providence; its temporality and mutability admonish man to look for immutable and eternal truth3. Meanwhile God orders creation to man's benefit by filling it with stumbling blocks which stop people in their accustomed ways, to exercise and test them, and make them aware of the divine purpose4. These stumbling blocks often take the form of punishments5, tribulations and temptations6, afflictions of body and soul7, suffering and illnesses8, scourges of mind and flesh9: 'whom the Lord loves he chastens, and scourges every son whom he receives'10. The chosen are the 'ductile trumpets' of the Psalms, hammered out and beaten until they are the perfect shape to sound God's praise". One of Augustine's favourite images, from the early works onwards, to express these ideas is of God as the divine Physician12 caring for sinful man 2 diu.qu.83 68.5-6. 3 u.rel. 40.75. I en.Ps. 94.8 (393-4); 9.20. 5 diu.qu.83 82.3. 6 ibid.; en.Ps. 54.9; 63.1; serm.dom. 2.9.34. 7 u.rel. 30-31; en Ps. 9.1. 8 diu.qu.83 82.3. 9 en.Ps. 97.8 (393-4). 10 en.Ps. 37.23 (395). 11 en.Ps. 97.8. 12 A traditional image, much used by Augustine's predecessors, both classical and Christian.

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with remedies appropriate to his illness, changing prescriptions as his condi tion improves or deteriorates, ignoring the agonised cries of the suffering patient in order to administer the correct treatment, regardless of the pain or discomfort it might cause. He is a doctor prepared to override the will of his patient and subject him to intense pain, always with his best interests and health at heart13. The eternal question of why the righteous suffer is answered in this context, where suffering is seen as medicinal and therapeutic and there fore to one's ultimate advantage. As Augustine puts it in 83 Diverse Ques tions, 'through punishments used to touch and bring pain to the unhealthy part in which the sickness resides, they are admonished in mercy to become whole through the grace of God by turning to the healing remedy' (82.3). The work of providence thus becomes the 'art of God's ineffable healing'14; it is the 'temporal medicine' by which the soul is treated and healed15. We might also mention the assault of words, or rhetoric, which Augustine maintains in On Order - and will continue to maintain throughout his life, in theory and in practice - is necessary in order to stop unwise men following their own feelings and habits16. So what are we to make of this activity of divine grace? It is dramatic, vio lent, painful, unpredictable, often counter to man's will, and yet it works for his salvation. Man does not seem to have much part to play, however, and there is little sense of his cooperating or working with these manifestations of divine grace. Rather, he is laid hold of, subjected, overcome, and reformed by them. They are more than simply admonitions, in the sense of exhortations, urgings on, or calls, whether external or internal, to which man must respond - though of course this is part of the work of divine grace in the early works - rather they represent divine grace subjecting man in order to liberate him, consuming him in order to cleanse and purify him, assaulting him to knock him into shape, as it were. Man must suffer the work of divine grace in order to be healed - what Augustine rather interestingly describes in On the Greatness of the Soul thus: To me there is no work more laborious, no activity more like inactivity, than this ren ovation of spirit, for the soul has not the strength to begin or complete it, except with the help of him to whom it turns itself. Hence it comes about that man's reformation must be sought from the mercy of him whose goodness and power are the cause of man's formation. (28.55)

13 For example, sol. 12; 25-26; u.rel. 34; en.Ps. 21.ii.4; s.2.3. 14 u.rel.S\. 15 u.rel. 45. It is clear from u.rel. that Augustine not only has the individual in mind, but also the Christian community, the class of the devout, who will also be saved by the working of divine providence, as against the class of the impious, who will not be saved. This is obviously a first sounding of a theme fully orchestrated in ciu. 16 ord. 2.13.38; doct.chr. book 4.

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'No activity more like inactivity' - man must suffer the onslaughts of divine grace or voluntary providence, in order to be liberated and reformed: he must allow the goodness and power of divine grace to work upon his soul. I think this provides a context and foundation upon which to begin to read those many texts in the early works which speak of the inward, 'infused' oper ation of the Holy Spirit, the 'gift' or love of God, upon man's soul, possessing it and bringing about his willing within him - this will be the subject of a future paper. Meanwhile, it should bring to mind the assault of grace famously described in Confessions 10.27: You called and cried out loud and shattered my deafness. You were radiant and resplendent, you put to flight my blindness. You were fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now pant after you. I tasted you, and I feel but hunger and thirst for you. You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace which is yours. This is a God who will not let go until his will is done, and is the ground for Augustine's doctrine of grace from the very beginning.

Jovinian's Proposal: Augustine's Changing Views on Marriage and their Consequences for Virginity

Jennifer Henery, Milwaukee

In recent decades Peter Brown, Elizabeth Clark, and David Hunter have thoroughly examined Augustine's developing thoughts on marriage and their relationship to his changing exegesis of the Genesis narrative1. As this has been the primary focus of scholars, I would like instead to investigate the con sequences that Augustine's changing exegesis of the Genesis creation narra tive had on his defence of virginity and on his ascetical imagery. I will indi cate that the transformation in Augustine's ascetical imagery about gender and the body results from his changing exegesis of the creation narrative, specifi cally Genesis 1:28, which shifted the argument for virginity from one tradi tionally rooted in an angelic paradise to one anticipating only the angelic world of the eschaton. Throughout Augustine's writings holiness is expressed in transformational imagery. Indicating that in her holiness Monica went beyond natural gender designation, Augustine says of his mother that "we forgot her sex at this point" when she shows manliness in mind2. In an early sermon celebrating the birthdays of Perpetua and Felicity, Augustine comments that in their inner selves they were neither male nor female and, surpassing their female bodies, were manly in mind and deed3. 1 Peter Brown, The Body and Society. Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Chris tianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 387-427. Elizabeth Clark, '"Adam's Only Companion": Augustine and the Early Christian Debate on Marriage'. RAug 21 (1986) 139-62. 'Heresy, Asceticism, Adam, and Eve: Interpretations of Genesis 1-3 in Later Latin Fathers', in E. Clark, Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith: Essays on Late Ancient Christianity, Studies in Women and Religion 20 (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 366-8. David Hunter, 'Resistance to the Virginal Ideal in Late Fourth Century Rome: The Case of Jovinian', TS 48 (1987) 45-64. 2 DBV2A0. 3 Sermo 280.1. Cf. DeOrd 2.11.31-32. Augustine here is following a well-established tradi tion of maleification. Cf. Philo, Quaestiones et solutions in Exodum 1.8. Porphyry, Ad Marcellam 33, ed. W. Potscher (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969), 36. "The Life of Macrina", in Saint Gregory ofNyssa Ascetical Works, tr. V.W. Callahan, FC 58 (Washington. DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1967), 163, 169, 170. "Acts of Paul and Thecla" and "Acts of Thomas", in New Testament Apocrypha, ed. Wilhelm Schneelelcher, 2 vols (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1991-92), 34, 243, 245, 387. "Martyrdom of Saints Perpetua and Felicitas", in Acts of the Chris tian Martyrs ed. Herbert Musurillo, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 106-31.

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In part we understand the perfect life and the transcendence of fallen nature as manly existence or going beyond one's nature. In addition, the transcending of nature is also indicated by the ability of the true ascetic to transcend the lim its of human nature as such and live a life which is angelic. In Sermon 299, preached on the feast of the Scillitan martyrs, Augustine notes that as human beings we are in the middle between angels and beasts. With the angels we share reason, intelligence, and wisdom; with the beasts, flesh, weakness, neediness, and mortality. He then admonishes us to fix our gaze upon the lasting angelic things and to spurn those beastly things which pass away. Thus, pre figuring life in the resurrection, virginal life was described as angelic as it resembled the incorporeal and genderless life of the angels similiar to that life in paradise4. Although by the early fifth century Augustine drops his imagery of becom ing manly, he never turns away from his notion of virginity as reflecting an angelic existence and anticipating the resurrected life. In contrast to his earlier imagery of becoming male, and virginity representing a return to the angelic state of paradise and prefiguring a non-gendered, non-corporeal existence in heaven, Augustine begins to speak about a fleshly, gendered existence in the resurrection. Where Augustine would previously speak of an incorporeal res urrection, he now says that in the resurrection there will be gendered bodies,5 and the body in the resurrection will be fleshly6. The reference to angelic life, therefore, is no longer about the incorporality of the resurrected body nor about the lack of gender, but rather solely about the practice of virginity7. The explanation of this changing imagery lies in Augustine's changing exe gesis of the Genesis narrative. In On Genesis Against the Manichees (GenMan.), his earliest full exegesis of Genesis, written in 388, Augustine alludes to two stages in man's creation. In the first stage, man was created in God's image, which Augustine is eager to point out "was neither male nor female". In order then to explain the remainder of the verse, "male and female he created them", Augustine follows the exegetical tradition preceding him and argues that male refers to the ruling principle of reason, whereas female is to be under stood as the obeying principle, the body, or even as the passions of the soul. Thus, there is no notion of physical male and female, and the command of 1 : 28 4 Sermo 299.2. Cf. Sermo 280. 5 CD 22.24. 6 fine*. 23.91. 7 DBC 8.8. Cf. Sermo 277, where Augustine concludes that, like the bodies of the angels at Mamre, the martyr's 'spiritual body' will be flesh. The issues of becoming angelic and brides of Christ has also been addressed in recent literature. In an article titled, 'Asceticsm and Anthropol ogy: Enkrateia and 'Double Creation' in Early Christianity', Giulia Sfameni Gasparro demon strated that in the tradition of enkrateia, Luke 20:27-40 and the notion of taking neither husband nor wife, but rather being like the angels in the resurrection developed into the idea that there was a relationship between gender, marriage, and death (in Asceticism, ed. Vincent Wimbush and Richard Valantasis Oxford: (Oxford University Press, 1995), 127-46).

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to "be fruitful and multiply" is not to be understood as carnal generation, but as the chaste union of 'male' and 'female' that would fill the earth with spiri tual offspring of intelligible and immortal joys. Augustine does refer to the cre ation of gendered human beings in the second stage of creation but repeats that woman is made as an illustration which communicates that the soul rules over the body, and manly reason holds subject to itself its animal part, as was indi cated in Genesis 1 which speaks about a single reality. Here, Augustine says, "we can also come to see in one human what we can see more clearly in two humans, that is, in the male and female". Augustine's description of forgetting what sex Monica was and noting that Perpetua and Felicity were neither male nor female in their inner selves indicates their holiness as a reflection of the originally created state which does not include sexual distinction. It seems odd that imagery of maleness would reflect an originally created state where there is no gender. The explanation, though, which Augustine employs to explain the division of male and female in Genesis 1 :27, says that according to reason we are made in the image of God. Reason is characterized as male. Thus, as holy women progress and reflect this single pre-fallen state, they too are described as manly. Similarly, the notion of being angelic hearkens back to this allegorical inter pretation of the Genesis narrative. In his figurative exegesis of Genesis 1, Augustine presents us with an immortal, spiritual body-soul composite who is created in the image and likeness of God according to reason. The account of Genesis 2 presents a man who was either created as a body-soul composite or as a material body which was enlivened by the infusion of the soul created in Genesis 1 :27. Whatever the origin of this material body-soul composite, man became spiritual when placed in paradise, thus paradise is recorded as a spiri tual place resembling that of Genesis 1 where there is no procreation. He also connects this protological state with the eschatological state that is promised in the resurrected life by referring to Luke 20, the Lord's condemnation of the state of carnal generation in which we live after the fall. He argues that Gene sis 1:28 should be understood spiritually, as Adam and Eve were not children of this world before they sinned8. Like Jerome and Ambrose, Augustine teaches that fleshly fecundity came about only after the fall. Like most of his predecessors, Augustine understands the protological state to be an angelic existence that is reflective of the angelic and immaterial life of the resurrec tion. Thus, the theological import of Augustine's early Genesis exegesis was clear: virginity would return the Christian to the condition of paradise before the fall and anticipate the angelic state which would be assumed in the resur rected life, for in both states there is neither marriage nor procreation. 8 GenMan. 19.31. In 390, in DVR 46.88 Augustine repeats this interpretation, saying 'We would not have any such temporal relationships which arise by being bom or dying, if our nature remained in the precepts and image of God and was not dismissed to this corruption'.

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This allegorical understanding of Genesis 1 :28 was maintained through the end of the fourth century in the closing chapters of the Confessions. Within months of writing the closing chapters of Confessions, Augustine would enter the Jovinian debate and begin to distance himself from this traditionally accepted exegesis of the Genesis narrative. Jovinian's position attacked this traditional exegesis and its defence of asceticism as Manichaean. In order to defend marriage, Jovinian suggests the command of Genesis 1:28, to "be fruitful and multiply", implies that Adam and Eve were sexually differentiated beings in the garden who could have had sex without sin. In order to steer a narrow course between Jovinian and the ascetic position represented by Jerome and his earlier exegesis Augustine adopts Jovinian's exegesis, but pre sents a new defence of virginity9. He begins this new argument in the opening of On the Good of Marriage, where he declines to discuss Genesis 1 :28, which he had previously adopted in his defense of virginity and which Jovinian was currently employing in his defence of marriage. He then articulates an apology for virginity which did not include the Genesis narrative, making it clear that virginity is only anticipatory of the eschatological state10. In On Holy Virginity, Augustine argues that vir ginal integrity belongs with the angels, and that in corruptible flesh, virginity is a foretaste of eternal incorruptibility". Such virgins display the life of angels to all and live a heavenly way of life on earth12. Early in the fifth century, after writing On the Good of Marriage and its companion On Holy Virginity, Augustine returns to the exegesis of the Gene sis narrative in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (GenLitt.). There Augustine progressively moves to the literal interpretation of Genesis 1 :28 that he would maintain13 and radically changes his earlier understanding and thus changes the ascetic imagery attached to it. By book 9, he presents Adam and Eve as sexually differentiated mortal beings in paradise who would have sexually reproduced in Eden even if they remained sinless. It is also at this point that he cites Matthew 22:30, "for in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage". The passage is often cited by his predecessors to indicate the incompatibility of sexual reproduction with the protological as well as the eschatological states. Augustine, though, uses this scripture to indi cate that the resurrected life will not resemble the protological state but rather the final glory of man which he would have achieved had he not sinned in par adise. By book 1 1 , Augustine thoroughly rejects his previous exegesis of the 9 It is now a commonplace judgement in scholarship that the change in Augustine's exegesis of Genesis 1 :28 between GenMan. and GenLitt. must be understood in the context of the Jovin ian debate raging in the 390s. Cf. note 1 . 10 DBC 2.2. 11 DSV 13.12. 12 DSV 53, 54. 13 DNC 2.31.53; CM. 3.7.15, 25, 27; CD 14.23,26.

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Genesis narrative and the understanding of virginity that it supported. He labels as ridiculous the earlier view that Adam and Eve were not yet ready for sex in the garden and lacked permission to unite14. When he turns to the exegesis of Genesis 1:28 and the command to "be fruitful and multiply", Augustine says Adam and Eve were created in the form of the human body familiar to us, as the command could only be realized by carnal intercourse which implies mortality. In maintaining that paradise was a literal place, Augustine argues against the position presented in GenMan. which suggested that man was created animal and was made spiritual when placed in paradise. This also forces him to explain how man, being made ani mal, would not necessarily be mortal. Here Augustine suggests that Adam's animal body would have changed to a spiritual body in eternal life after a holy and obedient life in paradise. In the eternal life with spiritual bodies there would be no need of sexual reproduction. Ascetic imagery of transcending gender and recapturing the angelic life of paradise cannot be derived from this understanding of the Genesis narrative. Augustine's view of the resurrected life as a gendered, fleshly existence is derived directly from his new exegesis of creation which includes gender and procreation. Even with the state of paradise including gender and procreation, Augustine is able to keep the imagery of the virginal life being angelic as he explains that in eternal life there will be no need of procreation. Augustine's early exegesis of the Genesis narrative offered an understand ing of virginity which promised the return to paradise: to the perfect life as lived before the fall as well as that manifested in the angelic eschaton. In antic ipation of that return, and indeed to hasten its coming, believers would act out in their bodies the spiritual truth of their faith. The way in which Augustine describes this perfect life and those who were achieving it also reflected protological and eschatological states: holy women were protologically manly and eschatologically angelic. In Augustine's early works on Genesis, virginity and ascetic imagery are connected to angelic protological and eschatological states. In his later works, virginity is connected to the angelic eschatological state since the protological state is no longer understood as relevant, just as the protological state is no longer understood as angelic. So as Augustine changes his exege sis of the Genesis narrative, so too does he change his imagery of virginity and the ascetical life. Augustine's new understanding of virginity promised the resurrected state in which spiritual bodies, like the angels, would have no 14 GenLitt. 11.14. Cf. Ret.\. \2.\2 and 1.13.8, rejecting GenMan. and DVR, respectively. In DeTrin. 12.5-22 Augustine seems to return to this spiritual exegesis of the Genesis narrative. The reason Augustine returns to this exegesis here is to explain Paul's explanation of man being made in the image of God and woman being the glory of man. He is arguing against the notion that family represents the Trinity and arguing for the notion that according to reason man and woman are made in the image of God.

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need for procreation. However, this spiritual body remained fleshly and included gender. Therefore, the imagery of leaving one's body and going beyond nature or becoming manly no longer applied to Augustine's under standing of virginity.

Augustine on Love and Church Unity in 1 John John Paul Hoskins, Durham

When the ten sermons In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos were published, Augustine added a short prologue. 'In that epistle', he comments '... more than anything else, love is commended. [John] has spoken much, and nearly all is about love'1. The assertion of 1 John is that 'God is love' (1 Jn 4:8, 16): the letter was addressed to a community threatened by christological heresies (1 Jn 2:22, 4.2) and a breakdown of mutual love (1 Jn 2: 19, 3: 10)2. Preaching at Easter tide in 4073, Augustine saw parallels with his own context, in which the Catholic Church in Africa was confronted with the continued vigour of the Donatist schism4. Augustine refers directly to the Donatists5 in the third tractatus, when he is discussing what it means to call someone an 'antichrist'. Spiritual growth is urgent: we know that it is 'the last hour' because of the presence of antichrists6, who are by definition opposed to Christ and his body7. They have left the body, and have sinfully attempted to establish a pure church of the

1 ep. lo. tr. prologus: in ipsa epistola . . . maxime caritas commendatur. locutus est multa, et prope omnia de caritate. All translations in this paper are my own. 2 On the origins and context of the letter, see R.E. Brown, The Community of the Beloved Dis ciple (New York, 1979); The Epistles ofJohn (Garden City, NY, 1982); C.C. Black, 'The Johannine Epistles and the Question of Early Catholicism', NovTest 28 (1986), 131-8. 3 A.-M. La Bonnardiere, Recherches de chronologie augustinienne (Paris, 1965), 21-56. Paul Agaesse suggests the later date of Easter 415: see his Commentaire de la premiere ipitre de s. Jean, SC 75 (Paris, 1961), 7-12. The earlier date makes more sense of the obviously anti-Donatist tenor of the sermons. See also S. Poque, 'Les lectures liturgiques de I'octave pascale a Hippone d'apres les traites de s. Augustin sur la premiere epitre de s. Jean', RBen 74 (1964), 217-41; A. Zwinggi, 'Die Perikopenordnungen der Osterwoche in Hippo und die Chronologie der Predigten des hi. Augustinus', Augustiniana 20 (1970), 5-34. 4 On the origins and history of the Donatist schism, see G.G. Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London, 1950); W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church (Oxford, 1952); P. Brown, 'Religious Dissent in the Later Roman Empire: The Case of North Africa', History 46 ( 1961), 83-101, reprinted in Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London, 1977). 5 The Donatists are referred to explicitly four times, at ep. lo. tr. 1.13, 2.3.1, 2.4, and 3.7.2; examples of implicit references are found at 1.8.2, 1.12.3, 6.2.1, 6.10.2, 10.8.1, and 10.10.1. 6 ep. lo. tr. 3.3. 7 ep. lo. tr. 3.4.2.

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elect. 'See, they went out from us and became Donatists! '8 Augustine's oppo nents confess faith in Christ, and there are no obvious doctrinal differences between the two communities. However, Augustine argues, although the schis matics confess Christ with their words, they deny him with their actions9. This makes them worse than heretics, none of whom deny that Jesus is the Christ10. The Donatists resist the Word of God, who is Christ; and so they can be described as antichrists": they dissolve the Church which is Christ's body12, and love the world rather than God13. Put that bluntly, so far the argument appears rather unsophisticated. But John 'has spoken much, and nearly all is about love'. In the first tractatus, Augustine explains that the 'fullness of joy' is 'in fellowship itself, in love itself, in unity itself14. To have fellowship with God we must be forgiven; we must confess our sins; and before we can confess we must have love, for 'love covers a mul titude of sins' (1 Pet 4:8)'15. The way is being paved for a theological master stroke. We know God, John says, if we keep his commandments. What com mandments, Augustine asks rhetorically? '"A new commandment I give to you," [Jesus] says, "that you love one another'" (Jn 13:34)16, and this theme is developed more fully in the rest of the homilies. At the end of the fourth sermon, Augustine posed an apparent problem. John says that we are in error if we claim not to have sin (1 Jn 1:8), but he also says that those bom of God do not sin (1 Jn 3:9)17. In the following homily, Augus tine reconciles these texts: although we are all prone to sin, there is one partic ular sin which is impossible for those who are truly bom of God, 'such that if anyone commits it, they reinforce the others, but if they do not commit it, they unbind the others'18. The only specific sin which has such paramount impor tance is if we break the commandment to love. Augustine therefore describes such a transgression as 'both a serious sin and also the root of all sins'19. The distinctive features of Augustine's theology of love are well known20, but what is particularly of interest is his emphasis on the necessity of love for 8 ep. lo. tr. 3.7.2: ecce exierunt a nobis, etfacti sunt Donatistae. 9 ep. lo. tr. 3.8.2. 10 ep. lo. tr. 3.7.1. 11 ep. lo. tr. 3.9. 12 ep. Io. tr. 6.14. 13 ep. Io. tr. 7.4. 14 ep. lo. tr. 1.3: plenum gaudium dicit in ipsa societate, in ipsa caritate, in ipsa unitate. 15 ep.Io.tr. 1.6.1: caritas cooperit multitudinem peccatorum. 16 ep. lo. tr. 1.9.1 : mandatum, inquit, nouum do uobis, ut uos inuicem diligatis. 17 ep.lo. tr. 4.12. 18 ep. lo. tr. 5.2.3: et tale peccatum est illud, ut si quisquam illud admiserit, confirmet cetera: si quis autem hoc non admiserit. soluat cetera. 19 Ibid.: et graue peccatum est, et radix omnium peccatorum. 20 See J. Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study in the Religion of St. Augustine (London, 1938); A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. P.S. Watson (New York, 1953); K. Rahner, 'Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God', Theological Investigations 6, tr. K.-H. Kruger

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one another. Those who love their brothers live in the light, neither relinquish ing nor thereby causing scandal to either Christ or his Church21. They bear everything in love for the sake of unity22, even loving enemies so that they might become brothers23. Ultimately, our hope is that we might be able to say about the whole world, 'Now they are with you, now they too are joined to you in catholic unity'24. It follows that divisions in the Church are scandalous. Since sins are forgiven in Christ's name alone, not the names of Peter, Paul, Augus tine, or Donatus, our unity is rooted in the love of Christ whose name we bear25. Those who leave the unity of the Church are antichrists, as we have seen, abandoning their catholic and apostolic inheritance26. Disunity is caused by those who do not love one another27, who do not have 'the love of peace and unity, the love of the Church spread throughout the world'28. Schismatics and heretics lack this mutual love, for they divide the Church. The pars Donati are a local sect, cut off from fellowship with the worldwide Catholic Church: even if their words profess faith in Christ, their actions tear apart Christ's body through their lack of love29. In short, they hate love, and they hate God who is love30. Catholic Christians, however, have been anointed with what Augustine describes as 'that love', the Holy Spirit31, through whom Christ teaches us32, and who himself intercedes for us: 'love itself groans, love itself prays: against it, he who gave it cannot close his ears'33. Five times in these homilies, Augustine quotes one of his favourite texts: 'The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us' (Rom S^)34. The commandment of God is to love one another, so that we live in God, and God the Holy Spirit lives in us. 'Surely it is obvious that the Holy Spirit effects

and B. Kruger (London, 1969); O. O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-love in St. Augustine (London, 1980); Y. Congar, 'Aimer Dieu et les hommes par l'amour dont Dieu aime?'. Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 28 (1982), 86-99; R. Canning, The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine (Heverlee-Leuven, 1993). 21 ep. lo. tr. 1.12.1. 22 ep. lo. tr. 1.12.3. 23 ep.Io.tr. 8.10.1. 24 ep. lo. tr. 10.7.3: iam tecum est, iam in unitate etiam catholica tibi coniunctus est. 25 ep. Io. tr. 2.4. 26 ep. lo. tr. 3.7.2. 27 ep.Io. tr. 6.2.1. 28 ep. Io. tr. 6.10.2: dilectio pacis et unitatis, dilectio ecclesiae toto terrarum orbe diffusae. 29 ep.Io.tr. 6.13.2. 30 ep.lo.tr. 7.11.3. 31 ep. lo. tr. 3.12.2: caritas ilia. 32 ep. lo. tr. 3.13.2. 33 ep. lo. tr. 6.8.2: caritas ipsa gemit, caritas ipsa orat: contra hanc aures claudere non nouit qui illam dedit. 34 Ibid.: caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.

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this in human beings, that there might be love and charity in them? ... If you have found that you have love, you have the Spirit of God'35. When the Spirit was given at Pentecost, he was manifested in the gift of tongues36; but he is now displayed in the love which gives unity to the Church37. If we love one another, we have the Spirit of God38, but if we cut ourselves off from the Church, we do not possess the Holy Spirit39. Whoever has the Spirit knows that 'love is from God' and that 'God is love' (1 Jn 4:7, 8)40. In De Trinitate Augustine comes to the conclusion that the Holy Spirit is the person of the Trinity who can most appropriately be described as love, since he is eternally the common gift and unity of the Father and the Son41. So if God can in a general sense be described as love, in a more particular sense the Holy Spirit himself is love42. In this way, love can both be from God and be God43. We have not seen God, but God lives in us through the gift of the Spirit who fills our hearts with love44. Consequently, we 'bear one another in love, trying to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace' (Eph 4:2-3)45, which is of course another of Augustine's favourite proof-texts. 'Love: a sweet word, but a sweeter act'46. If love dwells within us, we can not but have love, which explains one of Augustine's more notorious sound bites: 'love and do what you will'47. We grow in love by loving one another: You can say to me, 'I have not seen God'; but surely you cannot say to me, 'I have not seen a human being'? Love your brother, for if you love the brother whom you do see, you will at once also see God, because you will see love itself, and God lives within48. This is remarkably similar to a passage in book 8 of De Trinitate: Let nobody say, 'I do not know what to love.' Let them love their brother, and they will love the same love; for they know the love with which they love more than the

35 ep. lo. tr. 6.9: nonne manifestum est quia hoc agit spiritus sanctus in homine, ut sit in illo dilectio et caritas? ...si enim inueneris te habere caritatem, habes spiritum dei. 36 ep. lo. tr. 6.10.1. 37 ep. Io. tr. 6.10.2. 58 Ibid. 39 ep.Io.tr. 6.11.2. 40 ep. Io. tr. 7.4: dilectio ex deo est ... deus dilectio est. 41 trin. 6.5.7. 42 ep. lo. tr. 7.6. 43 Cf. trin. 15. 17.27- 15.19.37. 44 ep.Io.tr. 8.12. 45 ep. Io. tr. 1.12.3: sufferentes inuicem in dilectione, studentes seruare unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis. 46 ep. lo. tr. 8.1 : dilectio dulce uerbum. sed dulcius factum. 47 ep. lo. tr. 7.8: dilige, et quod uisfac. The second part of the phrase is conditional on the first. 48 ep. lo. tr. 5.7.2: potes mihi dicere: non uidi deum: numquid potes mihi dicere: non uidi hominem? dilige fratrem. si enimfratrem quem uides dilexeris. simul uidebis et deum; quia uidebis ipsam caritatem, et intus inhabitat deus.

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brother whom they love. So now they know God more than they know their brother, clearly more known because more present, more known because more within, more known because more certain . . . Indeed, if you see love you truly see a trinity49. If we love one another, we love love itself, and so we love God50. Failure to love one another shows that we lack the love of God who commanded us to love51. But because God is love, it is through love itself that we love: we are caught up in the trinitarian dynamics of love loving love. Whoever loves the children of God, loves the Son of God; and whoever loves the Son of God, loves the Father. Nobody can love the Father unless they love the Son, and whoever loves the Son also loves the children of God52. If all we knew about God was that he is love, we should seek nothing else53. For without love, we are nothing (1 Cor 13:2, 3)M; but Augustine hears God calling to us: 'love itself makes me present to you'55. The life of the Church is analogous to that of the Trinity: just as the Holy Spirit unites the Father and the Son in a mutual bond of love, so the Church is also made a unity through the love of the Spirit. Augustine offers us all a timely warning: if we pursue purity at the expense of love, we do not have the Holy Spirit, and in that case we cease to be the Church, the body of Christ.

49 trin. 8.8.12: nemo dicat: non noui quod diligam. diligat fratrem et diligat eandem dilectionem; magis enim nouit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligit. ecce iam potest notiorem deum habere quam fratrem, plane notiorem quia praesentiorem, notiorem quia interiorem. notiorem quia certiorem . . . immo uero uides trinitatem si caritatem uides. 50 ep.lo.tr. 9.\0. 51 ep.lo.tr.9MA. 52 ep. lo. tr. 10.3.1: qui diligit filios dei, filium dei diligit; et qui diligit filium dei, patrem diligit; nec potest quisquam diligere patrem, nisi diligat filium; et qui diligit filium, diligit et fil ios dei. 53 ep. lo. tr. 7.4; and note that Augustine quotes from Ps. 105:4, 'always seek the face of the Lord' (quaerite faciem eius semper), at three decisive moments in De Trinitate, at trin. 1.3.5, 9.1.1, and 15.2.2. 54 ep.Io.tr. 5.6.2, 6.2.1,8.9.2. 55 ep. lo. tr. 10.4: ipse amor praesentem me facit.

Between Jovinian and Jerome: Augustine and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7

David G. Hunter, Ames, Iowa

In the spring of 393 the monk Jovinian was condemned for heresy at a synod in Rome and, slightly later, in Milan. Jovinian's primary offence was to teach that married Christians and celibate Christians were equal in merit and would receive an equal reward in heaven. While several prominent Chris tians joined the opposition to Jovinian, among them bishops Ambrose and Siricius, by far the most vocal critic of Jovinian was St Jerome. From his monastery in Bethlehem Jerome issued a virulent treatise, Adversus Jovinianum, which earned the dubious distinction of being censured even by his closest friends1. The negative reception of Jerome's treatise indicates that responses to Jovinian were not univocal. While some participants in the Jovinianist contro versy were unrestrained champions of asceticism, others were not. Such is the case with Augustine. About ten years after Jovinian's condemnation, Augus tine wrote two treatises, De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate2. Although Augustine himself stated in his Retractationes of 427 that these two texts were written against 'the heresy of Jovinian', numerous scholars have noted that Augustine's response was equally concerned to refute the excesses of Jerome's Adversus Jovinianum. As Robert Markus has put it, 'Augustine's rehabilitation of the married state is a thinly veiled answer to Jerome's deni gration (vituperatio) of it: his covert work Against Jerome'3. 1 The most recent discussion of the chronology is that of Yves-Marie Duval, L 'affaire Jovinien. D 'une crise de la societe romaine d une crise de la pensie chritienne d la fin du TV* et au dibut du V siecle (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 2003), pp. 1 1-21. 2 I have adopted here the chronology of Pierre-Marie Hombert, who dates the treatises to 403: Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne (Paris: Institut d' Etudes Augustiniennes, 2000), pp. 105-8 (De bono coniugali), and 109-36 (De sancta virginitate). For my argu ments in support of this chronology, see 'Augustine, Sermon 354A: Its Place in His Thought on Marriage and Sexuality', Augustinian Studies 33 (2002), 39-60. 3 The End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 45. Cf. Emile Schmitt, Le marriage chritien dans I'oeuvre de saint Augustin: Une thiologie baptismale de la vie conjugale (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1983), p. 68: 'II s'agissait a la fois de refuter l'erreur de Jovinien, de defender la doctrine catholique de toute contami nation manichcennc. et, par le fait meme, de rectifier indirectement la position de Jerdme, auquel, sans le nommer, il fait manifestement allusion'.

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While I fully agree with Markus's observation, my aim here is to suggest that Augustine's desire to rehabilitate the married state was not the only issue on the agenda in his treatises on marriage and virginity. It is well known that Augustine and Jerome had previously engaged in debate, beginning in the year 395, over Jerome's interpretation of Galatians 2, the famous account of the conflict between Paul and Peter at Antioch. In this article I will demonstrate that this earlier controversy between Jerome and Augustine continued into their discussion of marriage and celibacy. This is most evident when we exam ine the disparate uses to which Jerome and Augustine put the text of 1 Corinthians 7. Jerome and Augustine differed not only in their respective views of marriage, but also on the more fundamental question of whether a biblical writer might lie. Both issues surface in Augustine's refutation of Jerome in his treatises on marriage and celibacy. There is no doubt that Jerome and Augustine offered quite different read ings of Paul's account of marriage in 1 Corinthians 7, and that Augustine's discussion was a calculated rejoinder to Jerome's interpretation. For example, when speaking of 1 Corinthians 7:1 ('It is good for a man not to touch a woman'), Jerome had commented, If it is good not to touch a woman, it is bad to touch one; for the only opposite of good ness is badness. Now if it is bad and the evil is pardoned, the reason for the concession is to prevent worse evil. But surely something that is permitted only because there may be something worse has only a slight degree of goodness . . . What is naturally good is not compared with evil nor is it overshadowed because something else is preferred4. This statement is typical of Jerome's interpretation of Paul in Adversus Jovinianum. Although Jerome could call marriage a 'good' and 'a gift of God' (on one occasion each), he preferred to portray marriage simply as the lesser of two evils, rather than a genuine good in its own right5. Particularly telling are Jerome's observations on 1 Corinthians 7:28 and 7:38. Commenting on the former ('But if you marry, you do not sin'), Jerome argued that there is a difference between not sinning and actually doing well. "The person who marries does not sin', Jerome argued, 'but he does not do well'6. And when Paul added in 1 Corinthians 7:38, 'He who marries his virgin does well', Jerome noted, he immediately went on to say, 'and he who does not marry does better', thus negating his previous affirmation. By following the

4 Adversus Jovinianum I.7 (PL 23, 229). It has long been recognized that Jerome's discussion of 1 Cor 7: 1 is dependent on Tertullian's Montanist treatise De monogamia. See now the discus sion in Duval, L'affaire Jovinien, pp. 1 16-18. 5 Jerome repeated this point throughout his treatise. Commenting on 1 Corinthians 7:9 ('It is better to marry than to burn'), he observed, 'I am suspicious of the goodness of that thing which is compelled to be a lesser evil by the greatness of another evil. What I want is not a smaller evil, but a thing that is absolutely good in itself (Adversus Jovinianum I.9 (PL 23, 233)). 6 Adversus Jovinianum I.13 (PL 23, 242).

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clause 'he who marries his virgin does well' with the clause 'he who does not marry does better', Jerome concluded, 'the apostle diminishes that good and obscures it by comparison with what is better'7. Augustine's approach to the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 was strikingly different from Jerome's. Throughout his two treatises, Augustine emphasized that marriage was something truly good, and not merely the lesser of two evils. For example, in De bono coniugali Augustine wrote, We do not call marriage a 'good' in this sense, that in comparison with fornication it is a good; in that case there would be two evils, one of which is worse . . . No, marriage and fomication are not two evils, the second of which is worse; but marriage and con tinence are two goods, the second of which is better8. Similarly, in De sancta virginitate Augustine insisted that it was wrong for vir gins to regard marriage as an evil like adultery. Citing both 1 Corinthians 7:28 ('If you marry, you do not sin') and 1 Corinthians 7:38 ('He who marries his virgin does well'), Augustine argued that it was the very goodness of marriage that made virginity something greater. 'The glory of the greater good is greater not because marriage is shunned as a sin, but because the good of marriage is transcended'9. The contrast between Jerome and Augustine on this point is clear: for Jerome, marriage was the lesser of two evils; for Augustine, it was the lesser of two goods. But in this passage from De sancta virginitate, Augustine pro ceeded to offer a further reason for taking the apostle Paul at his word when he spoke of the good of marriage. The passage is worth quoting at length, because it touches on the primary issue that had divided Augustine from Jerome ever since 395, namely the question of the veracity of the apostle Paul: Since people are being urged to aspire to such a splendid gift, not because of a merely human opinion, but on the authority of divine scripture, we must act in a careful and thorough manner, so that no one will think that the divine scripture contains lies. Those who would persuade sacred virgins to maintain that way of life by condemning mar riage are really discouraging them rather than encouraging them. For how can they be sure that the text, 'and he who does not marry does better', is true, if they think that what was written immediately before it, 'He who marries his virgin does well', is not true? But if they believe the scripture without question when it speaks of the good of marriage, they will find security in that absolutely trustworthy authority of the heav enly speech, and will hurry on with enthusiasm and confidence to what it says about their own superior good10. This passage contains very strong evidence that Augustine was responding directly to Jerome's interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 as the latter presented it 7 Adversus Jovinianum I.13 (PL 23, 243). 8 De bono coniugali VIII.8 (CSEL 41, 198). 9 De sancta virginitate XXI.21 (CSEL 41, 254-5). 10 De sancta virginitate XXI.21 (CSEL 41, 255).

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in Adversus Jovinianum. Augustine has taken Jerome's argument about 1 Corinthians 7:38 and precisely reversed it. Whereas Jerome had argued that the second half of verse 38 ('and he who does not marry does better') essen tially negated the first half ('He who marries his virgin does well'), Augustine insisted that Paul's assertion in the first half must be true in order for his asser tion in the second half to be true. Augustine's concern with the trustworthiness of the apostle's teaching points back to his earlier conflict with Jerome over the interpretation of Galatians 2, an issue that was still on the table when Augustine composed his trea tises on marriage and virginity around 403. Augustine had approached Jerome by letter in 395 with criticisms of his biblical translations and commentaries, and they continued an acrimonious correspondence on the matter off and on for the next ten years. Augustine especially objected to Jerome's interpretation of Galatians 2: 1 1-14, the story of Paul's rebuke of Peter at Antioch. Because Jerome could not fathom that the two most important leaders of the early Christian church could be in conflict, he had attempted to circumvent the apparent meaning of Galatians and argued that the story of the conflict at Anti och was, in fact, an elaborate subterfuge perpetrated by Paul. As Jerome put it in his Commentary on the Letter to the Galatians, 'Paul employed the same strategy of pretence that Peter had, when he "resisted Peter to his face and spoke before them all". He was not rebuking Peter, so much as correcting those on whose behalf Peter had conducted his pretence'". In several letters to Jerome, written between 395 and 405, Augustine repeatedly objected to Jerome's view that either of the apostles might have lied12. Already in his very first letter to Jerome, Augustine had noted the dangerous implications of Jerome's approach to Galatians for an interpretation of Paul's teaching on mar riage in 1 Corinthians 7. As Augustine stated in Letter 28 from 395, If the apostle Paul was lying when he rebuked Peter . . . what will we respond when wicked people arise who forbid marriage, as Paul himself predicted that they would? What will we do when they say that the whole passage, where the apostle spoke about strengthening the right of marital unions, is a falsehood, which Paul fabricated, not because he really believed it, but in order to placate those men who would have raised a disturbance because of the love of their wives13?

11 Comm. in ep. ad Galatas (PL 26, 342). On the conflict between Jerome and Augustine over Galatians, see R. Hennings, Der Briefwechsel zwischen Augustinus und Hieronymus und ihr Streit um den Kanon des alien Testament und die Auslegung von Gal. 2. 11-14 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 121-30. 12 See ep. 28.iii.3 (CSEL 34/1, 108). In Augustine's view, once the possibility of falsehood was admitted in the scriptures, 'not one bit of those books will remain'. If the biblical authors were capable of lying, Augustine argued, whenever a person found the testimony of scripture to be difficult to understand or to follow, he would have recourse to 'this most destructive principle of interpretation (eadem perniciosissima regula)'. 11 Ep. 28.iii.4 (CSEL 34/1, 108-9).

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The danger of Jerome's approach, Augustine argued in 395, is that someone who wished to reject Paul's teaching on the permissibility of marriage could simply claim that Paul did not really mean what he said when he approved of marriage. We find an even more revealing statement of this view among the new ser mons of Augustine edited by Fran?ois Dolbeau. Sermon 162C on Galatians 2 explicitly links the interpretation of verses 28 and 38 of 1 Corinthians 7 to the interpretation of the conflict between Peter and Paul at Antioch. Once again Augustine argued that allowing the possibility of deliberate deception in scrip ture could lead to erroneous teachings on marriage: What are we to do, when I say to someone, 'It is good to marry, but it is better not to marry, as the apostle Paul wrote' [cf. 1 Cor 7:28, 38]? What if someone who con demns marriage [damnator nuptiarum] then replies to me, 'Paul most certainly did condemn marriage; but he was only pretending when he wrote this, since the truth itself could not be borne by the weak. It is because continence can only be undertaken with great hardship that he said, "It is good to marry". In fact, he knew that it is bad to marry'14? This sermon, as Pierre-Marie Hombert has recently argued, was probably writ ten a year or two after De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate15. It indi cates that the issue of how to read Paul's teaching on marriage in 1 Corinthi ans 7 and the issue of whether an apostle was capable of deliberate deception were closely linked in Augustine's mind, both before and after the composi tion of his treatises on marriage and virginity. Augustine's comment in the Dolbeau sermon raises the intriguing possibil ity that Jerome might have been the damnator nuptiarum whose approach to Galatians 2 led to an erroneous reading of 1 Corinthians 7. Indeed, in Letter 82 to Jerome written around the same time as Sermon 162C (that is, in 405), Augustine suggested that Jerome's approach to Pauline interpretation was potentially more dangerous than that of the Manichees. Whereas the Manichees claimed that the text of Paul's epistles had suffered scribal corrup tion, Augustine observed, Jerome presented the more pernicious view that Paul had actually intended to deceive: The Manichees maintain that many parts of the divine scriptures are false, because they cannot twist them to a different meaning, but their detestable error is refuted by the perfect clarity of scriptural expression. And yet even they do not attribute falsehood to the apostolic writers, but to some supposed corrupters of the text . . . Does your holy Prudence not understand what an avenue we open to their malice if we say, not that

14 Ser. 162C.14 (= Dolbeau 10; Mainz 27): text in F. Dolbeau, Augustin d'Hippone: Vingtsix sermons au people d'Afrique, Collection des Etudes Augustiniennes, Serie Antiquitc 147A (Paris: Institut d' Etudes augustiniennes, 1996), pp. 45-56, quotation at 54-5. 15 Although Dolbeau suggested a date of 397 for Sermon 162C, Hombert has recently argued for the year 405; see his Nouvelles recherches, pp. 347-54.

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the apostolic writings were falsified by others, but that the apostles themselves wrote falsehood16? Augustine's Letter 82 of 405 shows that he remained deeply troubled by Jerome's willingness to attribute falsehood and dissimulation to the apostles. As I have argued here, such concerns informed Augustine's discussion of marriage and 1 Corinthians 7 in his writings against Jovinian17.

16 Ep. 82.6 (CSEL 34/2, 356). Tr. by W. Parsons, St. Augustine: Letters, FC 12 (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1951). p. 394 (partially altered). 17 Jerome explicitly defended falsehood in Adversus Jovinianum I.34 (PL 23, 268-70), where he suggested that Paul's prescription that the bishop should be a 'man of one wife' was merely a concession for new converts and not a true expression of the apostle's preferences regarding the clergy. Later in his apologetic letter to Pammachius, written in response to the negative reception of the Adversus Jovinianum at Rome, Jerome suggested that his own words should not be taken at face value and that dissimulation was an acceptable method of argumentation in the biblical writers, including Paul; see ep. 49.13 (CSEL 54, 370).

Augustine's Interpretations of 1 Tim. 2:4 in the Context of His Developing Views of Grace

Alexander Y. Hwang, New York

1 Tim. 2:4 states that God 'desires that all be saved and come to the knowl edge of the truth'1. This paper will detail the various ways Augustine inter preted this passage in the context of his developing views of grace. Augustine first interpreted 2:4 in Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans2, written in 394. There Augustine insisted on the freedom of the will and the prior place of human faith in the economy of salvation. In this initial study of Romans, Augustine first referred to the passage in the course of explaining the meaning of Romans 13:5, 'And so you must be subject not only because of anger but also for the sake of conscience.' Augustine asserted that Paul instructed the Christian to submit to temporal authorities out of love for God3. Augustine explained that this was because 'God desires that all be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth,' and Paul had these same temporal authorities in mind in Rom. 13:54. Therefore, Christians are not to hate or deceive the rulers, whom God desires to save. Thus, Augustine understood 'all' in 2:4 within the context of 2:1-3. What Paul meant by 'all' were 'kings and all who are in high positions'. The quality of God's desire was not specified, but it does not appear to be absolute, which was consistent with his belief at that time in the priority of human faith in the process of salvation5.

' All biblical quotes are from the New Revised Standard Version. Although some translations of Augustine's works use 'wills' instead of 'desires' when quoting 2:4, 'desires' will be used in this paper. The Vulgate's vult can be translated as either 'wills' or 'desires'. 2 Expositio quaerundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos [critical text and facing trans lation in] Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, tr. Paula Fredriksen Landes, in Augustine on Romans, Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations 23 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982). 3 Ibid., 74. 4 Ibid. 5 Augustine returned to the issue of election and foreknowledge in Romans 9 in Responses to Simplicianus a few years later. No longer is election based on foreknowledge of future belief, which he held only a few years earlier, but election is now based solely on God's mercy. A Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus (CCL 44).

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Augustine returned to the passage in 397/3996. In a work directed against Faustus the Manichaean, Augustine, primarily concerned with defending the Old Testament against Manichaean attacks, interpreted 2:4 as an 'echo of Jere miah'7. Just as Jeremiah called the captives to pray for the Babylonians, who were their authorities, Paul calls the Christians to pray for people who are their authorities. Augustine was not concerned with interpreting the passage in terms of salvation, but focused on the peaceful and quiet life Christians are to seek from their rulers (1 Tim. 2:2), again within the context of the pericope. Augustine's interpretation of 2:4 thus far was faithful to the context of the passage. The emphasis was on prayer, especially for the rulers, and the pas sage was not viewed as a general statement concerning grace per se. Augus tine's interpretation of 2:4, however, began to undergo a significant change when he was confronted with Pelagianism and then semi-Pelagianism, which presented 2:4 in isolation, out of the context of the passage and as a general statement about grace. In The Spirit and the Letter, written in 4 1 2, Augustine refuted the Pelagian claim that the gift of belief is given to all, which the Pelagians based on 2:48. Augustine asserted that the passage did not mean that the gift of belief is given to all; rather, 'desires' meant 'provides opportunity" for salvation. It was up to the individual to choose or not to choose to take advantage of this opportunity through the freedom of choice9. God 'desires', that is 'provides the opportunity', for 'all' to be saved. Thus, instead of correcting the error of removing the passage out of the context of prayer, Augustine refuted the Pelagian interpretation of the passage within the context of the discussion on grace. Augustine next dealt with the passage in a letter replying to Paulinus in 4141°. The passage was interpreted within the context of 1 Tim 2:1, 'First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgiving be made for everyone.' Augustine believed that Paul wants Christians to make 'supplications, prayers, and intercessions, and thanksgiving' for 'all classes of people', including persecutors of the Church". '[God] desires' still meant 'provides opportunity for' salvation. However, 'all' now meant 'every class or kind of persons'. Augustine further specified 'persons' in his first and only usage of 2:4 in a sermon, preached in 417 on the 'Feast Day of Laurence the Martyr'12. Augus tine's point in this sermon was to encourage the congregation to follow in the 6 Contra Faustum Manichaeum (PL 42: 249-797). 7 Ibid., 12.36 (PL 42: 272-73). 8 De spiritu et littera liber unus 33.57 (CSEL 60: 215-16). 9 Ibid., 33.58 (CSEL 60: 216). 10 Ep. 149 (CSEL 44: 348-80). 11 Ep. 149.17 (CSEL 44: 363-64). 12 Sermo 304.2 (PL 39: 1395-96).

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footsteps of Christ. Although Laurence is praised as a holy martyr who fol lowed Christ, Augustine reassured his congregation that they can follow Christ without having to die like a martyr. Augustine quoted 2:4 as proof, interpret ing the passage to mean that salvation was available to all kinds of Christians - 'martyrs', 'virgins', 'married people', 'widows', or any other kind of Chris tian13. 'Christ suffered for "all" such people'14. God, then, desires the salva tion of every class or kind of Christian person. In Answer to Julian, written in 421, Augustine refuted Julian of Eclanum's interpretation of 2:415. Julian used the passage in support of his assertion that the reason why people are not saved is due to their own fault in not asking, seeking, or knocking at the door of salvation that would be opened if they were, in fact, to ask, seek, and knock16. According to Julian's interpretation of 2:4, God provides the opportunity for salvation, which was Augustine's inter pretation only a few years earlier. Augustine, now, refuted this interpretation with the example of infants who, although they cannot ask, knock, or seek, nonetheless enter the doors of salva tion, if they are baptized17. In the course of explaining why some and not all are saved, Augustine interpreted 2:4 as stating what causes the salvation of people. People are saved because God desires it to happen; thus God's desire to save is only true for those whom God will save. 'AH' means only those whom God saves. As for those who are not saved, they 'have themselves to blame for it'18. Augustine had asserted that '[God] desires', meant God provides opportu nity, but now and in all future treatments of 2:4, '[God] desires' meant God would necessarily and only save those whom God wants to save. Moreover, as those who are saved became more defined in Augustine's thought, the mean ing of 'all' corresponded to these changes. Shortly after the work against Julian, Augustine wrote the Enchiridion in 422, interpreting the passage in two places19. Augustine argued that, although God's desire to save 'all' seems to be thwarted by the desire of those who choose not be saved, thus making God's desire less than omnipotent, the example of infants who have no power in choosing or not choosing to be saved refuted this claim20. Augustine did not directly define 'all', but assumed that since God's desire is omnipotent, 'all' can only refer to those whom God desires to save, a desire which cannot be thwarted by human willing. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Ibid. Ibid. Contra lulianum (PL 44: 641-874). Ibid., 4.8.42 (PL 44: 759). Ibid. Ibid., 4.8.43 (PL 44: 760). Enchiridion (CCL 46: 49-1 14). Ibid., 97 (CCL 46: 100).

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The second interpretation in the work is Augustine's fullest treatment of 2:4. Augustine first established the assertion that God's desire is omni potent and then attempted to understand this passage within that assump tion. Since what God desires necessarily occurs and what God does not desire does not occur, it follows that if God desires the salvation of anyone, it will necessarily happen. The readers are instructed to pray to God to desire our salvation, since God's desiring our salvation is the only way we can obtain it21. People are not only to pray for their own salvation but also to offer up prayers for the salvation of 'all', the human race in all its varieties of rank and circumstances - kings, subjects; noble, plebeian, high, low, learned, and unlearned; the sound in body, the feeble, the clever, the dull, the foolish, the rich, the poor . . . and whatever else there is that makes a dis tinction among men22. Augustine interpreted 2:4 as belonging to Paul's instructions for prayers to be made for the salvation of all kinds of people. Augustine next justified his understanding of the term 'all' by quoting the passage from Luke 1 1 :42, 'For you tithe mint and rue and herbs of all kinds.' Augustine believed that Jesus used the term 'all kinds' to mean only those herbs used by the Pharisees. Since the Pharisees could not tithe with every possible kind of herb in the world, the term 'all kinds' was a figure of speech and could only mean all kinds of herbs that were available to the Pharisees. The term 'all' therefore is not an exhaustive term; it is a figure of speech not to be taken literally. Therefore, 'all' in 2:4 should be understood in the same way as it is used in Luke 1 1 :42. Augustine returned the passage to the context of prayer, but because of his evolved view of grace, he was confronted with the challenge of reconciling the role of human prayer and the priority and exclusive role of God's desire in sal vation. The exact role these prayers have in the economy of salvation is not clearly spelled out, but they apparently have some role in it: 'God, then, in His great condescension has judged it good to grant to the prayers of the humble the salvation of the exalted'23. Also, during this time, Augustine wrote a letter to Vitalis where the sover eignty of God's desire is clearly spelled out in his interpretation of 2:424. God desires the salvation of those God saves, and God desires that others not be saved25. People are not saved, 'not because they do not will it [salvation], but 21 Ibid., 103(CCL46: 104). 22 Ibid. (CCL 46: 105; trans. J.F. Shaw in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 1 [Grand Rapids: Baker, repr. 1992], 103). Compare the 'kinds' mentioned in Sermon 304; cf. n. 13 above. 23 Ibid. 24 Ep. 217 (CSEL 57: 403-425). 25 Ep. 217.19 (CSEL 57: 417-18).

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because God does not'26. What is meant by 2:4 is God only wants to and will save those whom God wants to and will save. God's desire is sovereign and human wills have no role in being either saved or damned. Here Augustine did not situate the passage within the context of prayer. Augustine interpreted the passage in Rebuke and Grace around 426/427 where, again, he dismissed the notion that 2:4 points to a thwarting of the will of God by insisting on the irresistible quality of God's desire27. Augustine employed the same designation for 'all', which he again justified with Luke 1 1:42, as he did in the Enchiridion. Here, however, Augustine removed 2:4 from the context of prayer and, for the first time, explicitly identified 'all' as the predestined, which consisted of 'every kind of human being'28. The insistence on God's sovereign desire continued in The Predestination of the Saints, written in 428 or 429, which contains Augustine's final inter pretation of 2:429. In the course of answering the question of why God does not teach everyone, and thus save him or her, Augustine referred to 2:4 as an example of the power of God's desire in the process of salvation. The pas sage is to be interpreted as a proof for the power of God's desire, which saves 'all' the predestined. And the desire to save is understood as irre sistible: 'if he [God] had desired ... they undoubtedly would have come ... Heaven forbid, then, that anyone does not come who has heard the Father and has learned'30. A little later Augustine explored the issue of why prayers are offered up to God to desire the salvation of those unwilling to be saved31. Augustine answered that these prayers are appropriate since it is only by God's will that anyone should be saved, but, unlike a few years earlier when there was some positive role for prayer in salvation, Augustine subtly suggested that prayers themselves do not anticipate the grace of God32. Augustine had earlier understood 1 Tim 2:4 within the context of 1 Tim 2:1-3. Accordingly, 'desires' was understood as meaning 'gives opportunity', and 'all' as meaning 'rulers'. This interpretation began to change as Augus tine attempted to interpret the passage in isolation and in the context of a gen eral theory of grace, which was in response to how the Pelagians and semiPelagians understood the passage. 'Desires' remained the same, but 'all' was

26 Ibid. 27 Augustine concluded by stating, 'One should, therefore, have no doubt that human wills cannot resist the will of God.' (De correptione et gratia 14.45 [CSEL 92: 273; trans. Roland Teske in Answer to the Pelagians IV, Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21" Cen tury = WSA 1/26 [New York, New York City Press, 1999], 139]). 28 Ibid., 14.44 (CSEL 92: 272). 29 De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44: 959-92). 30 Ibid., 8.14 (PL 44: 971; trans. Roland teske in Answer to the Pelagians IV, 161). " Ibid., 8.15 (PL 44: 972). 32 Ibid.

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applied to general humanity. Then the radical shift occurred, brought about by the open and heated conflict with the Pelagians. 'Desires' took on absolute and efficacious qualities, and the meaning of 'all' was reduced to the predes tined. 1 Tim. 2:4 should be understood, then, as meaning that God saves only the predestined. All others, apparently, do not even have a prayer.

Transcendentalism in the Confessions

John Peter Kenney, Colchester, Vermont

The Confessions is built on the armature of an evolving yet consistent the ology. This can create difficulties for Augustine's contemporary readers, caught as we are between the fixity of our own theological expectations and the subtle malleability of his ideas. One such quandary is how to understand Augustine's transcendentalism, that is, his commitment to a level of intelligi ble reality that transcends the spatial and temporal cosmos and is known by the inner self through contemplation. Indeed, Augustine's depiction of contempla tion in the Confessions has troubled some modern readers in one important respect: it makes no reference to union with God. In his recent study, Bernard McGinn has quite plausibly suggested that Augustine seems to have avoided the language of mystical union intentionally. He says, It is difficult not to think that this deliberate avoidance of the language of union in someone who knew Plotinus so well was a conscious choice and an implied criticism of the limitations of non-Christian mystical effort1. My purpose in this short essay is to reflect in a preliminary way on the issue that McGinn's observation raises, namely, the nature and scope of human tran scendence in the Confessions. To that end I shall begin with Plotinus' treat ment of the matter and then turn to several texts from the Confessions. It bears mention at the outset that postmodern theology has been highly critical of tra ditional accounts of transcendence, so it is important that we take a close look at what these classical theists really maintained. Union with the One is not a straightforward matter in the Enneads. In the first half of the twentieth century, Plotinus was read as teaching a form of monism, such that the soul could be ultimately absorbed back into the One. That position still has its defenders. But the predominant reading of the Enneads today is theistic; that is, the soul is united through contemplation with a reality substantially distinct from itself2. That reality is its source, the infinite One. Yet we must be careful in interpreting the details of this posi tion. If we misunderstand the theism of Plotinus, even fractionally, it is easy 1 Bernard McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. / , The Foundations of Mysticism (New York, 1991), p. 231. 2 See my review of the issue in 'Mysticism and Contemplation in the Enneads', American Philosophical Quarterly LXXI.3 (1997), 315-37.

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to underestimate the creativity and significance of Augustine's Christian theology. The structure of Plotinus' pagan monotheism might be summarized as fol lows: the One is 'a long life stretched out'3. As the ontological source of all reality, the One is present to everything that exists. Moreover, the One is infi nite, and is distinct from all finite beings. The first consequent of the One is the eternal world of perfect being, the collective realm of Nous or intellect. It contemplates the One eternally. Finally, souls are the next consequent of the One. Although incarnated into matter, they too have a continuous contempla tive connection to Nous, even if their misplaced enthusiasm for material exis tence can make them unconscious of their deeper ontological roots. Several points bear special notice. Nous is the linchpin of Plotinus' tran scendentalism. The mediating role of Nous in the metaphysical hierarchy helps to explain, within the confines of monotheism, how the first principle is in pro ductive contact with all its myriad consequents. And Nous is the true home of every finite reality. As a result, human souls are always present to their higher, undescended, eternal selves. Because this noetic self is always in contempla tive contact with the One, we are - beneath every moment of our earthly con sciousness - in union with the One. This is what 'union' in Plotinus actually means - the recognition of our deep connection with the Good. Notice that there is nothing really dramatic about contemplation for Plotinus. It strips away the veil of materially induced forgetfulness, but it changes nothing. No new ontological condition is catalysed, nothing significant happens except for the soul's enlightenment. Transcendence is the native condition of soul. More over, Plotinus understands the hypostases to maintain an underlying interrela tionship which the higher self recovers through philosophy. There is never any break in this pattern of contemplative association, even if we often lose track of it in our embodied state. Back now to Augustine. When he abandoned Manichaean dualism, Augus tine faced the classical issues of monotheism just as Plotinus had. Part of that conversion from materialistic dualism was also his acceptance of transcen dental metaphysics. But Augustine developed his theism and his transcenden talism in ways very different from Plotinus, and this helps to explain why union language was inappropriate for his new orthodox Christian theology. Perhaps the passages in the Confessions that best exhibit Augustine's distinc tive transcendentalism are those which relate to the caelum caeli, the heaven of heaven in Book 12. Augustine read the caelum of Gen. 1 : 1 in reference to the caelum caeli of Ps. 148:4. The first creation is the heaven of heaven, in contrast to the visible and material world. On this exegetical opening Augus tine constructed an account of a foundational level of created but immaterial reality. 3 Ennead V.2.2.

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One critical passage is found at 12.9.9 (I will use the Chadwick translation and O'Donnell's text): That is why the Spirit, the teacher of your servant [Moses], in relating that in the begin ning you made heaven and earth, says nothing about time and is silent about days. No doubt the 'heaven of heaven' which you made in the beginning is a kind of creation in the realm of the intellect. Without being coetemal with you, O Trinity, it nevertheless participates in Your eternity. From the sweet happiness of contemplating you, it finds power to check its mutability. Without any lapse to which its createdness makes it liable, by cleaving to you it escapes all the revolving vicissitudes of the temporal process4. We can discern several key claims. 1 . The caelum caeli exists within the level of intellectual existence, outside space, time, and materiality. 2. It is a primordial form of creation. 3. As such it is not within the uncreated Godhead, nor eternal along with the Trinity. 4. It exists by participation in the eternity of the Trinity. 5. This participation takes the form of continuous contemplation. 6. This continuous contemplation prevents the mutability, to which it is liable as a created being, from taking hold. We should notice that Augustine attributes to this hypostasis the capacity for contemplation and the capacity for decision making. The conditions of its exis tence could be worse, if it chose the vicissitudes of temporality. I want now to concentrate on another revealing passage, one of the 'domini cal voice' texts that take on a special emphasis and authority. At 12.11.12, Augustine recounts his recognition of the nature of the heaven of heaven. Again you said to me, in a loud voice to my inner ear, that not even that created realm, the 'heaven of heaven', is coetemal with you. Its delight is exclusively in you. In an unfailing purity it satiates its thirst in you. It never at any point betrays its mutability. You are always present to it, and it concentrates all its affection on you. It has no future to expect. It suffers no variation and experiences no distending in the succes siveness of time. O blessed creature, if there be such: happy in cleaving to your felic ity, happy to have you as eternal inhabitant and its source of light! I do not find any better name for the Lord's 'heaven of heaven' [Ps. 113:16] than your House. There your delight is contemplated without any failure or wandering away to something else. 4 James J. O'Donnell, Augustine: Confessions (Oxford, 1992), vol. 1. Henry Chadwick, Saint Augustine, Confessions (Oxford, 1991). Ideoque spiritus, doctor famuli tui, cum te commemorat fecisse in principio caelum et terram, tacet de temporibus, silet de diebus. nimirum enim caelum caeli, quod in principio fecisti, creatura est aliqua intellectualis. quamquam nequaquam tibi, trinitati, coaeterna, particeps tamen aeternitatis tuae, valde mutabilitatem suam prae dulcedine felicissimae contemplationis tuae cohibet et sine ullo lapsu ex quo facta est inhaerendo tibi excedit omnem volubilem vicissitudinem temporum (Conf. 12.9.9).

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The pure heart enjoys absolute concord and unity in the unshakeable peace of holy spirits, the citizens of your city in the heavens above the visible heavens5. Created and contingent beings have the capacity to move away from God, towards less reality. But the heaven of heaven is coeternal with God because, though created, it has not chosen distance, and so is not distended into temporal ity. Moreover, the heaven of heaven is described by the use of a related notion, the House of God, the heavenly city. There is a collective act of volition by the holy spirits that dwell within the caelum caeli, and this secures its adherence to God. At 12.13.16 Augustine further indicates that the pilgrim soul's grasp of the heaven of heaven comes about through meditation upon scripture. He also defines the contemplative state associated with the heaven of heaven in refer ence to Gen. 1 : My provisional interpretation of that is that 'heaven' means the 'heaven of heaven', the intellectual, non-physical heaven where the intelligence's knowing is a matter of simul taneity - not in part, not in an enigma, not through a mirror, but complete, in total open ness, 'face to face' [I Cor. 13:12]. This knowing is not of one thing at one moment and of another thing at another moment, but is concurrent without any temporal successiveness6. In this sequence of passages, Augustine asserts a direct knowledge of the transcendent realm - the caelum caeli. Augustine sketches out a scripturally grounded knowledge of the caelum caeli, the first, intelligible creation. And the caelum caeli is described as an unfallen creature, a collective realm of spir its who have not exercised the option of sin and embraced mutability. Signifi cantly, he concludes his discussion of the caelum caeli, the heavenly Jerusalem and the homeland of the soul, with a reference to the first fruits of the spirit from Romans 8:23 at 12.16.23. I shall not tum away until in that peace of this dearest mother, where are the first fruits of my spirit and the source of my certainties, you gather all that I am from my dis persed and distorted state to reshape and strengthen me for ever, 'my God my mercy'7. 5 Item dixisti mihi voce forti in aurem interiorem, quod nec ilia creatura tibi coaeterna est cuius voluptas tu solus es, teque perseverantissima castitate hauriens mutabilitatem suam nusquam et numquam exerit, et te sibi semper praesente, ad quem toto affectu se tenet, non habens futurum quod expectet nec in praeteritum traiciens quod meminerit, nulla vice variatur nee in tempora ulla distenditur. o beata. si qua ista est. inhaerendo beatitudini tuae. beata sempiterno inhabitatore te atque inlustratore suo! nec invenio quid libentius appellandum existimem 'caelum caeli domino ' quam domum tuam contemplantem delectationem tuam sine ullo defectu egrediendi in aliud, mentem puram concordissime unam stabilimento pacis sanctorum spirituum, civium eivitatis tuae in caelestibus super ista caelestia (Conf. 12.1 1.12). 6 sic interim sentio propter illud caelum caeli, caelum intellectuale, ubi est intellectus nosse simul, non ex parte, non in aenigmate, non per speculum, sed ex toto, in manifestatione, facie ad faciem; non modo hoc, modo illud, sed quod dictum est nosse simul sine ulla vicissitudine temporum ... (Conf. 12.13.16). 7 et non avertar donee in eius pacem, matris carissimae, ubi sunt primitiae spiritus mei. unde ista mihi certa sunt, conligas totum quod sum a dispersione et deformitate hac et conformes atque confirmes in aeternum, deus meus, misericordia mea (Conf. 12.16.23).

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This scriptural reference recurs from the vision of Ostia, and this passage is, in some respects, a gloss on it. Augustine believes that he has had certain knowledge that the true place of the human self is there in the transcendent realm of the caelum caeli. But, unlike Plotinus, that intelligible locus of the human self is not so secure that the soul always remains rooted there in the transcendent world. Rather, the contemplative soul can only identify in antici pation its station within the caelum caeli; it does not currently exist at this level of existence - even fractionally. This discussion of the caelum caeli clarifies why union with God is not part of Augustine's account in the Confessions. In Plotinus, union with the One was within the nature of the soul, when fully restored to its intelligible station within the eternal realm of Nous. Not so for the Augustinian soul, whose dis covery of its place within the caelum caeli is a twofold recognition of its dis tance from God. First, it achieves through contemplation only a momentary recognition of its potential home within the 'house of God', the heavenly Jerusalem. It does not actually possess that intelligible status as part of its cur rent nature. Moreover, that transcendent caelum caeli is itself a created entity, distinct from the Trinity and subject to possible declension into time. Contem plation of the transcendent exposes, therefore, a radically different metaphysi cal architecture in Augustine, one in which the soul's capacities are much diminished, its nature deeply contingent and prone to moral loss, its prospects limited. Were it not for the power of Christ, the soul's prospects would be dim. Augustine's Christian account of transcendence exhibits, therefore, the lin eaments of a distinctive monotheism. Its central logic is based upon the dis tinction between the creator and the created, while the distinction between the transcendent and the corporeal is depreciated in significance. His account of the caelum caeli exposes this. While bearing the hallmarks of classical Pla tonic transcendence, the caelum caeli is nonetheless created and subordinate to the uncreated Trinity. Thus Platonic transcendentalism has been fundamentally recast in the Confessions, and its central theological tenets revised. In its place we find an orthodox Christian transcendentalism, and with it an entirely differ ent estimate of the soul's capacity. It is in this light that the notion of union with the One can be understood as being deliberately avoided by Augustine, given the fundamentals of his Christianity. A final point regarding Platonism. This brief consideration of transcenden talism in the Confessions exhibits why any characterization of Augustine as a Platonist, even a Christian Platonist, misdirects our understanding of his theol ogy. It is a self-inflected hermeneutical wound, which, alas, still festers among some scholars and Christian theologians8. But Augustine is not a Platonist in his theology, even if he does indeed develop the metaphysics that undergird 8 A recent example is Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, tr. Michael Charet (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2002), pp. 251-2.

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his account of the transcendent world out of the libri Platonicorum. It is I think - best to represent Augustine as a Christian thinker who faced the com mon issues with which all theists must grapple. He adapted a wide range of ideas from a variety of sources - especially Platonism - in his efforts to under stand the experience of God revealed in Christ. But the result is a new and unique theology. It is in this light, as an exercise in Christian self-definition, that the transcendentalism of the Confessions is best understood.

Formal Continuities Between Augustine's Early Philosophical Teaching and Late Homiletical Practice

Paul R. Kolbet, Boston

Much of Augustine's last thirty-nine years were spent preaching. Nearly one thousand of his homilies have been preserved1. This amounts to more than a third of his surviving literary corpus2. Attention given to early Christian homilies such as those of Augustine, nevertheless, continues to lag behind that given to other early Christian literature such as the apologetic, doctrinal, or political works. J.J. O'Donnell has recently referred to Augustine's sermons as 'long known but under-studied masses of texts'3. There are any number of reasons for the neglect of sermons, including the problem of finding reliable, authentic texts; the difficulty of dating them, since they nearly always lack internal references that can be connected to verifiable facts outside of them4; the exegetical quality they have, whose logic continues to be somewhat elusive5; and finally, their nature as oral performances which we never witnessed. Only the notes made by those who originally heard them survive. Consequently, we are in a position not unlike that of palaeontologists examining the bones of some ancient creature, who attempt to imagine what it actually looked like. As if all these things were not enough, may I suggest that the main problem is the following? We lack an adequate theory that explains the homily as a dis crete task with its own explicit criteria for effectiveness - a theory that explains the structural characteristics of the homilies including their digres sive, repetitive, and exegetical features. This lack of theory has consequences. When passages from the sermons appear in scholarly publications (which hap pily they do), they tend not to be looked at on their own terms, but are used in 1 Counting the 205 Enarrationes in Psalmos, In lohannis euangelium tractatus CXX1V, Tractatus decem in epistolam lohannis ad Parthos, 544 Sermones ad Populum, and the new sermons. 2 James J. O'Donnell, Confessions, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 2, 350. 3 He includes Augustine's letters in this assessment as well ('Augustine: His Time and Lives', in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)) p. 23. 4 For these difficulties, see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, 2nd ed (Berke ley: University of California, 2000), 441-7; Hubertus Drobner, 'The Chronology of St. Augus tine's Sermones ad populum', Augustinian Studies 31:2 (2000), 211-18. 5 Note how Peter Brown likens such scriptural exegesis to Freudian analysis of dreams (far from an exact science); Augustine, pp. 249-50, 258.

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service of some other project, such as pithy illustrations of whatever doctrinal topic is at hand or as evidence of a historical occurrence. Furthermore, at least some students respond to Augustine's sermons by thinking that the venerable bishop writes poorly. After all, he seems to have trouble making his point clearly and concisely while staying on topic. I believe the impression comes from not being able to discern the peculiar art that the sermons themselves are brilliant instances of. Moreover, thinking of sermons as means of popularizing for the masses beliefs articulated more precisely in the treatises does not get us very far in accounting for the characteristic features of the homilies. A more sophisticated theory is discernible in Augustine's own writings. From the moment we first meet the young man at Cassiciacum, he was partic ularly interested in a certain kind of speech. It was the speech he initially encountered in Cicero's Hortensius, speech that he famously wrote changed his affections, altered his prayers, emptied him of every vain hope, and aroused in him an ardour of heart for the immortality of wisdom6. Although Augustine abandoned his secular career as an orator and came to look upon his former self as a mere 'seller of words' that was paid 'in the markets of rhetoric' to tell lies and teach others to lie persuasively, he kept and refined the very skills that brought him from provincial North Africa to the proximate edges of imperial power in Milan7. In this way, he benefited from centuries of reflection by Hel lenistic philosophers on the capacity of speech to influence human souls. He used these skills at Cassiciacum no longer to supply students who aspired to worldly glory with what weapons they needed to attain it, but to lead their souls to what he, at the time, called the harbour of philosophy8. Augustine already had an operative theory at this time that guided his teach ing. It is this theory that he continued to revise in his early life and eventual ministry. It provides continuity between his early philosophical teaching and late homiletical practice. Of course, there are many subtle discontinuities in Augustine's life as he matured, but amid these changes there is a persistence of form that is important to discern9. At Cassiciacum, Augustine was quite reticent in confronting students too directly about the diseases infecting their souls. He worried that harshness would only create emotional resistance in them. Every ancient reader of Homer knew that Achilles could not hear the truth about his anger even when confronted about it by the most eloquent Phoenix10. Augustine approached his

6 Conf. 3.4.7-8. 7 Conf. 9.2.2. 8 Philosophiae portum (Beata u. 1.1 (CCL 29, 65.1)); philosophiae tutissimus iucundissimusque portus (Acad. 2.1.1 (CCL 29, 18.22-23)). 9 See, among others, Robert A. Markus, Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine's Spiritual Career (Philadelphia: Villanova University Press, 1989). 10 //. 9.430-605.

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students, therefore, indirectly through conversations whose outcome he claimed not to know in advance". Whatever was the subject of enquiry for a given day came to be approached indirectly in discussions filled with digressions which only eventually circled back around to their primary topic. Students needed to come to perceive the truth themselves. When Licentius began to retreat from a contention he had been advocating, Augustine admonished him, 'You still should not abandon your position on that account, especially since we have engaged in this discussion of ours to train you and incite you to cultivate your mind'12. Augustine describes engaging his young men in conversation 'where philosophy itself freely played along with us, so to speak'13. Indeed, even when Augustine sought to renew his students' interest in dogmatic rather than scepti cal philosophy, he thought this best accomplished through play rather than indoctrination. In this way, he chose to manoeuvre carefully around his student' complex motives and sensitive souls. Augustine portrays himself at Cassiciacum as catering meals 'not only for our bodies, but also for our souls'14. He invited his students to come dine with him, and eat the meal prepared specifically for them15. He enticed them with dishes served in small amounts, apportioned to their appetites, 'made and seasoned, as it were, with scholastic honey'16. Augustine solicited his students' involvement in the conversation as if they were helping him serve a feast prepared for God. At one point, Navigius responds to his teacher's offer of 'sweets', saying. Such things will surely cure me, for the dish which you have set before us, concocted and spiced in some way or other is ... sharp in its sweetness and does not bloat my stomach. Therefore, even though my palate has sampled only a little, I swallow it all gladly insofar as I am able17. Adapting his discourse in this way to his students' taste and enriching it so that it was sweet to the palate placed Augustine's practice at Cassiciacum uncomfortably close to that of his former school of rhetoric in Milan. At one point, Augustine asks his students why he continued to use 'copious and ornate language ... as if I were still engaged in that school from which I am glad that I have in some measure escaped?'18 Even if the psychological dis tance travelled exceeded the physical distance between Milan and Cassici acum, he realized that truth needed to be adorned with charms to win the atten tion of human hearts and not awaken resistance. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Beata u. 3.17. Acad. 2.7.17 (CCL 29, 27.27-9). Acad. 2.9.22 (CCL 29, 30.15-6). Beam u. 2.9 (CCL 29, 70.74-7). Beam u. 2.10 (CCL 29, 71.108-10). Beam u. 2.13 (CCL 29, 72.174-5). Beam u. 2.14 (CCL 29, 73.197-202). Ord. 1.9.27 (CCL 29, 102.5-7).

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He explained, Because ... the unwise generally follow their own senses and habits rather than the most genuine truth ... it was necessary that they not only be taught to the extent of their ability, but also frequently and strongly aroused in their emotions. To the portion of itself which accomplished this ... wisdom gave the name rhetoric19. For the vast majority of people, the soul's health was best restored not through passing the truth on directly, but through a gradual training of the soul, that is, a daily therapy. At Cassiciacum, Augustine invited his students into not unfamiliar philo sophical controversies and traditional texts like Virgil, whom they read daily. Teacher and student quoted in turn verses of Terance or Cicero's Hortensius. In seeking to turn the souls of his students to ever brighter things, it was as if texts were convenient objects to be used in exercises because they did not shine in their own light but could be seen by the light that gave them meaning. As he strove to improve their thinking about such things by philosophical argument, he did so implying that such an exercise leads to Christianity. At this time Augustine worried little about what resources were available for the cure of soul in specifically Christian practices and texts. He knew of Christian scripture and liturgical acts from an early age, but their potential would not be fully appreciated by him as long as he was attending to his career or possessed the leisure to pursue philosophy in a traditional manner20. Of course, all this changed because - despite his best efforts to avoid it - he was forcibly ordained. The safe harbour of philosophy would be breached and replaced with unending pastoral tasks. Rather than causing him to reject his earlier reflections on the role of speech in the cure of soul, he responded to this crisis by bringing this learning to an arena it was never intended to serve. As he would preach, the bishop provided instructions to his hearers about how best to participate in the homily. He describes his preaching in words similar to those used in the Cassiciacum dialogues. True to his earlier principles, Augustine endeavoured in his sermons to express the truth in a way that would be persuasive; that is, to see the content enacted in the lives of hearers. He continued to recognize that persuasion was exceedingly difficult because it involved a change in the habitual way of life of the hearer rather than mere assent. Much of the challenge of preaching then became employing a form that inculcated the content of the homily, that is, a form that educates the mind and trains the soul. He admonishes his hearers never to be content with belief in his human words or anyone else's for that matter. They should rather press on toward direct apprehension of the truths themselves to which the words refer.

19 Ord. 2.13.38 (CCL 29, 128.12-19). 20 On the traditional features of the Cassiciacum period, see Dennis E. Trout, 'Augustine at Cassiciacum: Otium Honestum and the Social Dimensions of Conversion', VC 42 (1988), 132-46.

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He told them flatly, 'Do not think that anyone learns anything from a person'. Reliance upon external words yields only 'useless sounds'21. His own voice even as a bishop - was at best one that could offer superficial 'aids and sug gestions', a kind of external prompting that was nothing more than empty sound22. His hearers should employ this external aid to acquire the skills nec essary to perceive the truth themselves. If they were to profit from his homi lies, they could not be content with passively appreciating his words, no mat ter how eloquent. They needed actively to press beyond them to apprehend wisdom themselves. Rather than arguing directly from propositions or doctrines, Augustine typ ically invited his hearers to join him in a shared enquiry into the meaning of scripture which would ideally facilitate their growth in self-knowledge and personal transformation. The overwhelming majority of his homilies take the form of an enquiry into the meaning of particular biblical texts. He would say, 'I am prompted by the Lord to tackle together with you this text that has been read and find out what it really means'23. Augustine exhorted those who came to hear him not just to listen, but to search with him: 'Join in the work with me'; 'Help me knock at the door'; 'I am your fellow worker'; 'Let both of us, therefore, seek. Let both knock'24. He often advised the faithful that they needed to engage in this spiritual exercise daily if they expected it to be sufficiently formative. They were to receive the word of God as 'daily food on this earth'25. The Christian needs most of all 'a regular discipline of listening to the word of God'26. Such prac tices functioned as much to remind or retrain the soul as to bring it new infor mation. He said, These readings that are read to you, this is not the first time they have been read to you, is it? Are they not repeated every day? Well, just as readings of God's word have to be repeated everyday to prevent the vices of the world and thorns from taking root in your hearts and choking the seed which has been sown there, so too the preaching of God's word has to be repeated to you always'27. Through this ongoing engagement, hearers of the bishop were to internalize the language of scripture and be so formed by it that they would, in his words, 'hear with catholic ears and perceive with catholic minds'28.

21 Ep. lo. tr. 3.13.2; 'I am not requiring you just to believe what I am about to say; do not accept anything I say unless you find it in yourself (S. 52.18). 22 Ep. lo. tr. 3.13.2 (SC 75, 210); continuing an early theme: see Mag. 1 1.36-38. 23 S. 36.1 (CCL 41, 434.7-9). 24 S. 52.3, 8.17, 49.2; lo. eu. tr. 18.6.2. 25 S. 56.10 (PL 38, 381). 26 S.5.1 (CCL 41, 50.1-2). 27 S. 5.1 (CCL 41, 50.17-23). M lo. eu. tr. 100.4.1 (CCL 36, 590.2).

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To sum up, it would be a mistake to so overemphasize the material discon tinuity between Augustine's earliest writings and his mature sermons that one is unable to appreciate the continuity of form. Knowing this form makes it possible to track the movement of the sermons and determine their structure. His digressions and repetitions often make sense when one pauses and asks of the passage, how does this lead the soul? In doing this, the sermons in their structure, style, and content appear to be a distinct project in its own right with its own intellectual challenges and philosophical and theological tasks.

Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo on 1 Cor. 15 M. Lamberigts, Leuven

1. Introduction Over the course of the last few decades, much research has been done on the Pelagian controversy in general and on the major figures of the controversy, Pelagius, Julian of Aeclanum, and Augustine, in particular1. One major result of these studies is that one can no longer speak of the Pelagian movement as a coherent crusade, just as one can no longer think that the term 'Pelagian' refers to any self-consciously coherent group. Another important result is that the efforts to present the insights and concerns of the Pelagians in a historical-crit ical and, thus, a (hopefully) fairer and more balanced way has frequendy resulted in both a rehabilitation of (at least) Pelagius, and an increasingly crit ical attitude towards Augustine. Of course, this is not to imply that a critical attitude toward Augustine is limited to the positions he adopted in his 'antiPelagian' period. Critics can readily be found for many aspects of Augustine's views2. The question of whether or not these increasingly critical attitudes toward Augustine are justified is not the aim of this paper. Rather, I would pre fer to concentrate on the battle which Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo waged over the 'true' interpretation of 1 Cor. 15. Notably, this Pauline text was not of great interest to Pelagius, just as contemporary treatments of the debate between Julian and Augustine frequently fail to give it its due3. In

1 Surveys can be found in, e.g., C. Garcia-Sanchez, Pelagius and Christian Initiation: A Study in Historical Theology (Washington, 1978), pp. 9-103; F.G. Nuvolone, 'Pelage et Pelagianisme. I. Les ecrivains', in DSp 12,2 (1986), 2889-923; O. Wermelinger, Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius, in C. Mayer and K.H. Chelius (eds), Internationales Symposion iiber den Stand der Augustinus-Forschung vom 12. bis 16. April 1987 im Schloss Rauischhokhausen der Justus-Liebig-Universitdt Giessen, Cassiciacum, 39/1 (Wiirzburg, 1989), 189-217; G. Bonner, 'Pelagius/Pelagianischer Streit', in TRE 26 (1996), 176-85; M. Lamberigts, 'Pelage: la rehabilitation d'un her6tique', in J. Pirotte and E. Louchez (eds), Deux mille ans d'histoire de I'Eglise. Bilan et perspectives historiographiques (RHE 95/3 (2000), 97-111; M. Lamberigts, 'Recent Research into Pelagianism with Particular Emphasis on the Role of Julian of Aeclanum', Augustiniana 52 (2002), 175-98. 2 See R. Dodaro and G. Lawless (eds), Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner (London and New York, 2000). 3 See, e.g., S.M. De Simone, // problema del peccato originale e Giuliano d'Eclano (Posillipo-Napoli, 1949), who does not discuss this text.

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spite of this oversight, it remains true that 1 Cor. 15 was discussed at length by both Julian and Augustine, with especial attention being paid to verses 21-22: Quoniam enim per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum: sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur*. In what follows, I will demonstrate how significantly the combatants' theolog ical presuppositions influenced their 'exegesis' of this text5. Before doing this, however, a few preliminary remarks are in order. Although it may seem obvious, the fact that our text is discussed in the con text of a controversy cannot be overlooked6. Both antagonists were convinced that their position was as correct as that of the other was wrong. Both also claimed that their positions were firmly grounded in the scriptures. We should also note well that both Julian and Augustine were perfectly sincere in making both of these claims7. Both of these men were well trained in rhetoric and, as the debate heated up, both increasingly took full advantage of this education8. This means that Julian regularly ridiculed the positions of his opponent by asking penetrating ques tions and by attempting to employ the technique of reductio ad absurdum. Throughout the controversy, Julian repeatedly accused Augustine of being a Manichaean9. The Manichees naturally claimed that Paul supported their posi tions10, and, for this precise reason, Julian will discuss Paul's view at length (in our case as found in 1 Cor. 15)": he was thoroughly convinced that Paul,

4 A systematic analysis of this text is missing in the study of J. Lossl. Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre unc| ihrer Oberlieferung, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 60 (Leiden. 2001). 5 Julian's commentary in his work Ad Florum is extensively if not completely quoted by Augustine in his Opus imperfectum contra Julianum VI.31ff. (PL 45, 1583ff). 6 On the 'requirements' of such controversies, see I. Opelt, Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur von Tertullian bis Augustin, Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften. N.F., Reihe 2, 63 (Heidelberg, 1980). 7 In my opinion, it is not fair to accuse only Julian of arrogance. Either one accepts that both antagonists respected the rules of a polemical exchange or one has to accuse both Julian and Augustine of arrogance. With regard to Julian's supposed arrogance, see Lossl, Julian von Aeclanum, p. 148, n. 6. 8 Cf., e.g., N. Cipriani, 'Aspetti letterari dell'Ad Florum di Giuliano d'Eclano', Augustinianum 15 (1975), 125-67; Lossl, Julian von Aeclanum, pp. 107ff.; D. Weber, 'For What is so Monstrous as What the Punic Fellow Says? Reflections on the Literary Background of Julian's Polemical on Augustine's Homeland', in P.-Y. Fux, J.-M. Roessli, and O. Wermelinger, Augustinus Afer. Saint Augustin: africanite et universalite. Actes du colloque international AlgerAnnaba (1-7 avril 2001), Paradosis, 45/1 (Fribourg, 2003), pp. 75-82; M. Lamberigts, 'The Ital ian Julian of Aeclanum about the African Augustine of Hippo', in Augustinus Afer. pp. 83-93. ' Cf. M. Lamberigts, 'Was Augustine a Manichaean? The Assessment of Julian of Aeclanum'. in J. van Oort, O. Wermelinger, and G. Wurst (eds), Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West. Proceedings of the Fribourg-Utrecht International Symposium of the 1AMS, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 49 (Leiden, 2001), pp. 113-36. 10 See, e.g., Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1583). 11 Paul is called magister egregius (Ad Florum VI. 33 (PL 45, 1586)) and magister gentium (Ad Florum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586)).

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when taken at face value, provided more than enough material to destroy the pretensions of the Manichaeans. According to Julian, Paul would never have accepted the Manichaean ideas about a natural sin, nor would he have toler ated for even five minutes their rejection of the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh12. Augustine, for his part, regularly accused Julian of verbosity13. He never hesitated to label Julian as, for example improbissime, loquacissime , contumeliosissime , calumniosissime14. One is even surprised to read that, accord ing to the Bishop of Hippo, 1 Cor. 15:21-22 has nothing to do with the ques tion at stake, especially since modern research has shown that Augustine, as he placed his own stamp on the doctrine of original sin in the years prior to the Pelagian Controversy, employed 1 Cor. 15:21-22 as an argument in favour of his own position15. He accused Julian of obscuring what in fact was clear and evident16. He called him an enemy of grace17. He felt that Julian's heresy (haeresis vestra)ls must be condemned, just as surely as that of the Manichaeans19, whose cause, at least in Augustine's view, was furthered by Julian20. Such bilateral vehemence makes it clear that one will be disap pointed if one expects either fair discussion or significant respect to mark the words of these combatants.

12 See Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45, 1590). 13 So, e.g., Opus imperfection VI.31 (PL 45, 1584); VI.32 (PL 45. 1586). In a sense, Augus tine had a point: in order to answer Augustine's De nuptiis et concupiscentia I, Julian needed four books (Ad Turbantium). For his reply of Augustine's De nuptiis et concupiscentia II, he needed eight books (Ad Florum). On the other hand, one must also admit that Augustine's answer to Julian, at least with regard to 1 Cor. 15, was not exactly direct or to the point. On other occa sions, Augustine accused Julian of presenting idle and vain conclusions, another rhetorical topos; cf. Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1590); VI.41 (PL 45, 1605). 14 Opus imperfectum VI.33 (PL 45, 1587). 15 S. Lyonnet, 'Rom. V,12 chez saint Augustin. Note sur l'elaboration de la doctrine augustinienne du peche original', in L'homme devant Dieu. Melanges offerts au pere Henri de Lubac, vol. I, Exegese et patristique, Theologie 56 (Lyon, 1963), pp. 327-39, has made clear that 1 Cor. 15:22 played a more important role in the development of his doctrine of original sin than did Rom. 5:12. 16 Cf. Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1585). 17 In Augustine's view, because Julian trivialized their physical death, he was also an enemy of the saints; so Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1585). 18 Cf. Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1590). 19 Opus imperfectum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586). 20 Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593). According to Augustine, Julian helped the Manichaeans in so far as he denied that the struggle between flesh and spirit (cf. Gal. 5:17) was a result of Adam's sin. Therefore, the Manichaeans, in order to find an answer to the ques tion unde malum, had to invent another evil nature, co-eternal with God. On the validity of Augustine's argument, see A. Trape, 'Un celebre testo di Sant'Agostino sull' "Ignoranza e la difficolta" (Retract. 1,9,6) e I' "Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum'", in Augustinus Magister, Congres international augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre, 1954, II (Paris, 1954), pp. 795-803.

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2. Julian's Exegesis of 1 Cor.15. The starting point of Julian's argument is 1 Cor. 15:22: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. In De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1I.46, Augustine quoted this text as a proof that the physical death of human beings was a consequence of Adam's sin21. Julian, on the other hand, categorically rejected the idea that because of Adam's fall, we all have to die physically22. Indeed, Julian made a clear distinction between the realm of the physical creation and that of the moral life23. In the first realm, all that we are by nature is a gift of God, the Good Creator. This Good Creator created a good nature and endowed it with a free will. By creating us this way, he enabled us to do naturally all that we are required to do. Consequently, what one wills to do belongs totally and completely to one's personal capacities and responsibility24. One's personal responsibility would be compromised if one were to be punished solely for the sins of another, such as Adam25. In other words, for Julian, the idea of an original sin would contradict not only God's goodness and, by extension, the goodness of creation, but it would also anni hilate human beings' ability to act morally26 and, by a similar extension, throw into question the justice of God. How could it be otherwise if God is thought to be punishing one person for the sins of someone else? From a more modem perspective, it is one of Julian's greatest merits that he attempts to develop his argument by placing verses 21-22 into the broader context of 1 Cor. 15:12-57. According to Julian, the Adam of 1 Cor. 15:22 21 CSEL 42, p. 300. In 1I.45-47 (CSEL 42, pp. 298-303), Augustine commented upon Rom. 5: 12 and its broader context, vv. 13-19. Julian would reply to this commentary in his Ad Florum II. On the discussion as such, see Oeuvres de saint Augustin. Premieres polimiques contre Julian, (BA, 23, ed. F.-J. Thonnard et al. (Paris, 1974), pp. 740-3. In 1I.46, Augustine only quoted 1 Cor. 15:22, but did not offer a detailed analysis, a fact criticized by Julian: Hoc testi monium usurpasti tu, cum quo nobis causa est: sed quid eo confici putares, quia tu tacuisti (Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1583)). 22 On the differences between Julian and Augustine with regard to Adam's nature, see M. Lamberigts, 'Julien d'Eclane et Augustin d'Hippone: deux conceptions d'Adam', in B. Bruning, M. Lamberigts and J. van Houtem (eds), Collectanea Augustiniana. Melanges TJ. van Bavel, BETL 92 (Leuven, 1990), pp. 373-410. For a short but not always balanced presentation of Julian's exegesis of 1 Cor. 15, see J. Lossl, Intellectus Gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo, (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 38 (Leiden, 1997), pp. 381-3, esp. note 371. 23 On the sources and the reception of this idea, see F. Refoule, 'Julien d'Eclane. Theologien et philosophe', RSR 52 (1964) 42-84; 233-247; cf. also the reply of F.-J. Thonnard, 'L'aristotelisme de Julien d'Eclane et saint Augustin', REA 1 1 (1965), 296-304. 24 Cf. M. Lamberigts, 'Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator', Augustiniana 38 (1988). 5-24. 25 See A.E. McGrath. 'Divine Justice and Divine Equity in the Controversy between Augus tine and Julian of Eclanum', DR 101 (1983) 312-319. 26 Cf. P.L. Barclift, 'In Controversy with Saint Augustine: Julian of Eclanum on the Nature of Sin', RTAM 58 (1991), 5-20.

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simply means man27. The easiest interpretation of omnes might well be that physical death was intrinsic to the nature of all living beings and that, there fore, all living beings must die28. Those human beings who all die according to their nature, will all be raised from death through Christ's power29. Through the power of the one who instituted both fecundity and mortality, all will be raised from death in order to receive what they deserve30. Julian clearly believed that creation and resurrection both belong to the power of Christ, cre ator et excitator31. In Julian's view, Paul also held the view that death non supplicialis est, sed naturalis32. Julian found support for the idea that Adam had been created mortal in the words of 1 Cor. 15:45: Factus est homo primus Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Accord ing to Julian, the gift of immortality is a gift of the life-giving Spirit. The liv ing soul (anima vivens) is possessed by our mortal nature: Christ, through the Spirit, offers this immortality to all the saints. Adam is living (vivens), but not immortal33. 1 Cor. 15:21 teaches us that, in naturally born human beings, death demonstrated itself, but that, in Christ, it was resurrection that did so. Both death and resurrection derive from God, their originator34. For Julian, the order of nature and the order of the will must be clearly distinguished: if human beings die because of their will, then death cannot be related to nature. If, on the other hand, human beings die because of their nature, their will (and, hence, their moral activities) cannot be in any way responsible for their death35. However, if one insists that Paul had been thinking of Adam's sin and Christ's salvation, one should interpret 1 Cor. 15:22 as follows: many die by imitating Adam, just as many are saved by imitating Christ36. If In Adam omnes moriuntur is taken as referring to sin, then it is merely a reference to the miserable and guilt-ridden death which comes as a consequence of a human being's individual sinful behaviour. It is obvious, Julian continued, that, in that case, death could have no real relation to Christ, to the saints, or to infants, since the latter, as infants, are unable to do anything morally good or morally 27 Ad Florum VI.31, (PL 45, 1583-4): cum Adam nomen hominis sit; Adam sermo Hebraeus nihil aliud indicat quam hominem; nomine Adae naturam humanitatis. In my opinion Julian neglected too easily the Pauline antithesis Adam-Christ (cf. esp. Rom. 5:12-21). 28 Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584). 29 Secundum hominis qui moriuntur naturam, per virtutem Christi a mortuis excitantur (Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1583)). 30 Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1583-4), with a reference to 2 Cor. 5:10. 31 Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584). 32 Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45, 1591). 33 Ad Florum VI.39 (PL 45, 1598). 34 Utrumque institutum per Deum est (Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45, 1592)). 35 Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45, 1592). 36 Ad Florum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584). Note that this statement is quite consistent with the 'clas sic' Pelagian doctrine that sin and death, as well as righteousness and (eternal) life, are the results of following the example of others.

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bad. Commenting on 1 Cor. 15:51 - Omnes quidem resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur - Julian (rightly) suggested that the first 'all' referred to the resurrection of all human beings, while the second part of the verse referred only to the beati, that is, those who merit God's love, not his wrath37. To this group belong not only the saints, but also innocent children, who are obviously unable to choose between good and evil. Created by God, they pos sess a good nature and, through baptism, are made better through a process of adoption and renewal38. In other words, baptism also guarantees them eternal life. Obviously, Julian could not accept any concept of natural sin that would either distinguish the human Christ from other human beings or that would, because of its universality, attribute to Christ any form of a vitiated nature. In short, Julian could not accept that Paul could be taken in any sense which might give support to Manichaean formulations39. Julian is equally indignant with regard to the antithesis Adam-Christ and the consequences it might hold for other interpretations of the omnes. Indeed, Julian catalogued and carefully examined the other possible meanings of the word omnes as it is given in 1 Cor. 15.2240. The omnes of 1 Cor. 15:22b (in Christo omnes vivificabuntur), if related to 'in Christ', has nothing to do with unbelievers, for, in that case, there could be no punishment for the unright eous41. If the omnes was related to the death of the body (in Adam omnes moriuntur), this death should in no way be taken as referring to guilt, quando in eodem Adam et Christus mortuus invenitur: Christ could only be raised, if he truly had died42. Julian stressed that Christ, as a human being, did not raise himself. Such texts as Phil. 2:8-9 and Acts 2:22-24,32 clearly show that it was God who raised the human Jesus. Julian did not deny that Christ as Word was involved in the process of resurrection (note his reference here to John 10: 18), but, obviously, this only belonged to his divine nature: Cum ergo sit Filii una persona, tamen distinctione legitima aliud applicatur carni, aliud deitati43. For Julian, it was evident that the overcoming of sin, which he consistently defined as only freely committed, bad moral acts, will be uniquely realized through the power of faith44. 17 Immutatio ergo in gloriam illis tantum debetur, qui non iram Dei, sed amorem merentur (Ad Florum VI.40 (PL 45, 1600)). 38 Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45. 1592). 39 Abest tantum ab ista suspicione traducis Manichaeae , quantum Christus a peccato, qui et iniquitatem non habuit, et minus de hominis natura nihil habuit (Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45. 1592)). 40 In fairness to Julian and to all would-be exegetes, one must admit that Paul himself was not very careful in his use of the word 'all'. 41 In his commentary on 1 Cor. 15:42-43, Julian stated that Paul was dealing with the resur rection of the saints; cf. Ad Florum VI. 39 (PL 45, 1598). One must admit that Paul himself did not pay much attention to the fate of non-believers. 42 Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45. 1592). 43 Ad Florum VI.36 (PL 45, 1591). 44 Ad Florum VI.41 (PL 45, 1600).

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Such interpretations are the logical consequence of Julian's basic belief that condemnation and salvation are closely related to one's moral behaviour, not to one's created and/or inherited nature as such. After their resurrection, human beings will be rewarded or punished for what they did during their life time45. Julian thought that the broader context of 1 Cor. 15 laid the primary emphasis upon the (mostly) still future, eternal life of those who were, or would be, saved. Commenting on 1 Cor. 15:24-28, Julian noted that when God will be all in all, the saints, with Christ as their head, will obey God with a per fect love, while, simultaneously, any and all desires for sin will be forever extinguished46. Always consistent with his own framework, Julian related the number of the saints to God's foreknowledge: God foreknows whom he will save, since he perfectly foreknows which human beings will be obedient and which will not. On this point, Augustine seems to have agreed with Julian: in connection with this idea, he noted that Julian did not discuss anything quod ad causam quae inter nos agitur pertineat41. Before accusing Julian of arrogance or of exaggerating human beings' moral capacities, one must also take into account the fact that Julian stressed that, in his human nature, Christ possessed the same substance as all other human beings48. According to Julian, this single fact clearly demonstrates one of the most important differences between the Manichaean and traducian posi tions on the one hand, and that of Paul and his true followers on the other. The Manichees distinguished between our nature and the nature of Christ49. Julian never accepted that Christ's virgin birth in any way distinguished his human nature, since, had that happened, our hope for salvation and resurrection would be in vain. Simply put, if Christ's nature was essentially different from ours,

45 AdFlorum VI.31 (PL 45, 1583-4, with a reference to 2 Cor. 5:10). 46 Totum corpus dignum regno coelorum, quod sub Christo capite construitur, divinae voluntati perfecta qffectione cohaerebit, ut exstincta omni cupiditate culparum Deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat (Ad Florum VI.37 (PL 45, 1595)). 47 Opus imperfectum VI.37 (PL 45, 1595). A similar reaction followed after Julian's com mentary on 1 Cor. 15:28-32; cf. Opus imperfectum VI.38 (PL 45, 1597): Et his nihil prorsus quod ad rem pertineat, quae in nostra disceptione versatur ... non sunt contra fidem ... 48 Ad Florum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586). 49 Certe hanc vim in disputando Apostolus non haberet, si secundum Manichaeos et eorum discipulos Traducianos, carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distingueret (Ad Florum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586)). Augustine reacted to this by pointing out that according to the Manichees Christ did not possess any flesh: Opus imperfectum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586). Although this reply is correct, I do not think that it fully takes into account Julian's concern that Christ can only be a model for humanity in so far as he, as a human being, was gifted with the same nature as all other human beings; cf. M. Lamberigts, 'Was Augustine a Manichaean?' pp. 130-2. J. Riviere, 'Heterodoxie des Pelagiens en fait de R6demtion?', RHE 41 (1946), 5-43, at pp. 15-16, has con vincingly shown that Julian in no way questioned the objective value of Christ's suffering and death. In other words, Julian never denied any of the salvific acts that faith attributes to Christ as the Redeemer.

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we could no longer imitate Christ's example50. Julian supported his argument with biblical texts such as 1 Pet. 2:2 1SI. According to his reading of Paul, Paul himself recognized that it was absolutely essential for Christ to possess a nature identical with ours in order to guarantee the possibility of our resurrec tion (1 Cor. 15:12-1 3)52. Here we have yet another example of how Julian was firmly convinced that his position was in line with scripture. It goes without saying that, for Julian, just as for Paul, Christ is the 'firstfruits' of those who have fallen asleep (cf. 15:20). He not only quoted 1 Cor. 15,23-24 with approval, but added to it other scriptural texts such as Col. 1:18, 1 Thes. 4:17, and Mt. 25:46 in order to further substantiate Paul's claim. It is important to see that, for Julian, the doctrine of original sin endangered Christ's mediatorial position: either he was a human being exactly like us (that is, con ceived in sin), or he was born without any such defect. If the first obtained, he could no longer be our redeemer since he himself would have been sub peccato; if the second were true, he could no longer guarantee our resurrection, since he would not have been a being exactly like us53. While one is more than justified in asking whether such reasoning is fair to Augustine's position, one cannot deny that the idea of a congenitally depraved and vitiated nature causes problems both for human beings' moral responsibility and for the central role Christ must play as our ethical pattern and example54. In my view, it must have been Julian's particular understanding of the gospel/Rule of Faith that com pelled him to react against the idea of original (that is, natural or inborn) sin. Faithful to his distinction between universal created nature and individual moral behaviour, Julian interpreted the terrestris and caelestis of 1 Cor. 15:4647 as follows: 'earthly' refers to vices, 'heavenly' to virtues. He buttressed this position by quoting Rom. 6:19. When Paul claimed that flesh and blood could not possess the Kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), he clearly intended to indicate human beings' evil moral behaviour, not flesh and blood as created substances per se55.

50 Ad Florum VI. 34 (PL 45, 1587). Julian considered v. 20 as the 'completion' of vv. 12-13: cf. M. Alfeche, 'The Use of Some Verses in 1 Cor. 15 in Augustine's Theology of Resurrection', Augustiniana 37 (1987), 122-86, at p. 146. 51 Et Christus passus est pro vobis vobis relinquens exempIum, ut sequamini vestigia eius; reference to this text is made in Ad Florum VI.34 (PL 45, 1587). See also Ad Florum IV.85 (PL 45, 1386). In the latter passage, Julian stressed that Christ's sinlessness was due to the excel lence of his moral behaviour, not to his possessing a nature that was superior to ours; IV.85ff. (PL 45, 1586ff.). 52 Cf. Julian's argumentation in Ad Florum VI.34 (PL 45,1587-8). 53 Ad Florum VI.35 (PL 45, 1589). 54 In spite of Augustine's rhetoric, it remains true that Julian was not blind to human moral weakness, just as he consistently confessed his belief in the need for redemption and grace; cf. M. Lamberigts, 'Julian of Aeclanum on Grace. Some Considerations', in SP XXVII (1993), 342-9. 55 Ad Florum VI.40 (PL 45, 1599).

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It is very interesting to see how Julian's own theological preconceptions about nature, free will, justice, and our ability to imitate both Adam and Christ are liberally interwoven throughout his commentary. He can be shown to have read his own ideas into the text of Paul as he tried to show that Paul, when 'correctly' exegeted, left no room for anything approaching a ManichaeanAugustinian position. It is also striking to see that, generally speaking, Julian concentrated on 1 Cor. 15 as such. When he referred to other scriptures either inside or outside the Pauline corpus, it was deliberate: all the texts referred to are intended as corroboration of his argument. At the same time, his exegetical method betrays his inability to prevent his own theological presuppositions from influencing his reading and understanding of Paul. It would be both an interesting and an important exercise to see if these features also mark his nonpolemical, exegetical works.

3. Augustine's Reply: 1 Cor. 15 as a Support of the Doctrine of Original Sin and Grace In replying to Julian, Augustine repeatedly claimed that 1 Cor. 15:22 referred to the death of all human beings: Paul was dealing with the death of all human beings, both the good and the evil56. Augustine distinguished between two kinds of death, physical and eternal57. Physical death is a by product of Adam's sin58. It follows from this that physical death could have been avoided if Adam had not sinned. By maintaining access to the tree of life and by obeying God's commandment(s), Adam could have lived on in his original state until he reached the state of the non posse mori59. Reality, however, dictated that death proceeded as an unavoidable consequence of Adam's exile from paradise and, more particularly, of his separation from the tree of life60. What is worse, physical death was transferred to all human beings : it became an intrinsic feature of both the human condition and their contamination by Adam's sin61. Simply put, physical death is a 56 Prorsus de morte corporis dictum est, ista scilicet qua necesse est moriantur boni et mali. . . (Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584)). 57 Augustine's view of death has been the subject of many studies; see, e.g., J.-M. Girard, La mort chez saint Augustin. Grandes lignes de Involution de sa pensie, telle qu'elle apparait dans ses traits, Paradosis 34 (Fribourg, 1992). 58 Augustine links 1 Cor. 15:21-22 immediately to Rom. 5: 12ff.; see, e.g., Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1585). 59 Opus imperfectum VI.39 (PL 45, 1598). 60 Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584); for the link between physical evil and death and the exile from paradise, see also VI.36 (PL 45, 1594). For Augustine, it was unacceptable that current physical and mental evils (e.g., ignorance, weakness, corruption) could have also been present in paradise; cf. Opus imperfectum VI.39 (PL 45, 1598). 61 Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1585).

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punishment62; it usually possesses only negative connotations, although it can become somewhat positive in the case of the death of saints63. Eternal death, on the other hand, will come at the eschaton and only as a result of Christ's judgement64. Augustine explicitly linked 1 Cor. 15:21 to 1 Cor. 15:22: the two men of v. 21 receive names in v. 22. They are Adam and Christ65. Augustine also made much of the different tenses used in v. 22, moriuntur and vivificabuntur. In other words, here Paul was not speaking about the second death of those who will be tortured, body and soul, in eternal hellfire. Augustine's conclusion is clear: people die because they have been justly punished; they will be made alive because they have been gratuitously rewarded66. In other words, the death of v. 21 refers to every one's physical death67. That this death is both unnatural and problematic is confirmed by 1 Cor. 15:26, Novissima autem inimica destruetur mors. The death indicated by Paul is physical death; the second death is labelled as eternal precisely because it will be the eternal state of all those who are condemned to the eternal fire. Death, therefore, can only refer to physical death. This death is called the enemy and, thus, cannot be part of our cre ated nature: it is nothing more and nothing less than a punishment68. At this point, it is important to see that, in Julian's argumentation, suffering and death were irrelevant. For Augustine, however, both of these are seen and, what is worse, both are experienced, as deficiencies. Augustine could not accept that mortality was, from the very beginning, part of our nature, just as he could not accept that Adam would have had to die, even if he had never sinned. It was in this context that he accused Julian of introducing both death and all the various forms of physical evil into paradise69. As one might expect, Augustine rejected the accusation of Manichaeism. He did not hold the Manichaean position that attributed sin to a foreign nature, nor

62 Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45. 1585); VI.36 (PL 45, 1593). 63 Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45. 1593). See also M. Alfeche, 'The Basis of Hope in the Resurrection of the Body according to Augustine', Augustiniana 36 (1986), 240-96. at p. 288. 64 Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1584). 65 Et ipsi homines duo propriis etiam nominibus exprimuntur, ut de quibus hoc dictum sit... (Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593)). 66 Nunc enim moriuntur ex poena, tunc vivificabuntur ex praemio. (Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593)). 67 Although, in a broader sense, Augustine will accept this, one might also think here of the second death, namely the death of those who will not be saved by Christ: Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593). 68 Porro inimica quomodo esset, si naturalis ita esset. ut poenalis non essetl (Opus imper fectum VI.37 (PL 45, 1596)). 69 Non enim mortem solam . . . sed etiam omnes morbos, et omnia genera malorum. quae homines non valendo ferre moriuntur, quantum ad te attinet, in locum tantae felicitatis et quietis immittis: quod errore quanto facias video, sed quafronte nescio (Opus imperfectum VI.31 (PL 45, 1585-6)).

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did he deny the resurrection of the flesh70. Moreover, he stressed that the way in which Julian presented the Manichaeans' christology was incorrect. The Manichaeans, Augustine pointed out, did not distinguish between Christ's flesh and our flesh. Rather, they simply denied that Christ had ever had any flesh71. In a word, Julian needlessly confused Augustine's views with those of the Manichaeans72. Of course, Augustine admitted that both the Manichaeans and the Catholics regarded carnal concupiscence as evil; however, he also pointed out that the reasons for doing so were substantially different73. Augustine frankly admitted that he made a distinction between Christ's flesh and ours, not in the sense that Christ's flesh was not real flesh, but in the sense that Christ came in similitudine carnis peccati (Rom. 8:3). Paul's statement could only be valid and meaningful if and in so far as Christ (and only Christ) did not possess our caro peccati14. In other words, while all naturally conceived human beings are born with sinful flesh, Christ is the unique exception75. Augustine insisted that Christ became man (caro vera) precisely in order to heal our caro peccati and to take away our guilt76. Christ is the only mediator between God and man (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5). He is the only one who died a (person ally) guiltless death. He did this in order to remove the guilt and punishment that was ours77. Because he possessed these views, Augustine was scandalized by Julian's claim that Christ necessarily had the same flesh as all other human beings78. The Bishop of Hippo emphasized that Christ was not only man, but also God. He was born from the Holy Spirit and a Virgin79. And it was pre cisely for this reason that Christ was not born as a result of carnal concupis cence. This feature of his conception guaranteed that he did not possess a caro

70 Numquid nos, sicut Mi, aut peccatum tribuimus alienae naturae, aut carnis resurrectionem negamus? (Opus imperfectum VI: 36 (PL 45, 1592)). 71 Manichaei non sunt, qui carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguunt; sed qui nullam carnem Christum habuisse contendunt (Opus imperfectum VI. 33 (PL 45. 1586)). 72 Opus imperfectum VI.33 (PL 45, 1586-7). 73 Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1607-8). On Augustine's very nuanced view of concupis cence, see M. Lamberigts, 'A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality', in DODARO and LAWLESS (eds), Augustine and his Critics, pp. 176-97 (with further litera ture). 74 Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1589). In Augustine's argumentation, Rom. 8:3 consis tently serves as a cornerstone. 75 Sic ergo nee istam differentiam denegantes, quafatemur solam carnem Christi, non ut aliorwn fuisse carnem peccati, sed carnis peccati similitudinem (Opus imperfectum VI. 34 (PL 45, 1 588)). See also Alfeche, 'The Use of Some Verses in 1 Cor. 15 in Augustine's Theology of Resurrectione', p. 146. 76 Quapropter etsi malum est in carne peccati, non est tamen in Christo, qui venit in carne vera . . . carnem sanare peccati. Non ergo Me creditur reus, sed ab Mo noster solvitur reatus et originalis (Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1589-90)). 77 Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1590). 78 Opus imperfectum VI.33 (PL 45, 1587). 79 Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1588); VI.41 (PL 45, 1608).

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peccati*0. He had the power both to lay his life down and to take it up again (Jn. 10:18). In Augustine's opinion, 1 Cor. 15:16, Nam si mortui non resur gent, in-que Christus resurrexit must be understood as follows: we believe that Christ, who became man, has been raised from the dead; therefore, all other human beings who experience physical death will also be raised81. On the other hand, Augustine also believed that Christ's body was terrestrial and mortal. He rejected the idea that Christ, who fully intended to (almost) per fectly identify with mortal human beings, should somehow be unlike them after his resurrection82. With regard to 1 Cor. 15:56b: Virtus vero peccati lex, Julian suggested that Augustine had in mind the commandment given to Adam in paradise. Augus tine denied that he ever had interpreted the text in this way. For him, this verse should be read in close connection with Rom. 7:7-8. As long as one did not know the law, one could not commit a transgression (praevaricatio) against it. In Augustine's mind, no evil desire had existed before Adam's grande peccatum. All evil desire was the direct consequence of Adam's sin. Not only had it vitiated our nature by being transmitted to us, but it had also provided the means for the inheritance of original sin83. Every human being is bom with this sinful desire and must be set free of its resultant guilt through rebirth in Christ. This desire compels all to sin if they do not, or cannot, resist it. Through the commandment 'You shall not desire'84, this inborn concupiscence becomes even stronger (concupiscence in its fullness, omnis concupiscentia). Fallen humans long even more ardently for that which the law explicitly for bids. To do this is to commit a praevaricatio. For those who are not helped by God's grace through Christ, the law no longer corrects the sinners, but becomes, and is rightly labelled, 'the power of sin (virtus peccati)'*5. This is, according to Augustine, the correct interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:56b. In fact,

80 Opus imperfectum VI.35 (PL 45, 1590). 81 Quia Christus ideo resurrexit, ut resurrectionis mortuorum aedificaret fidem, in carne resurrecturos homines ostendens, sicut ipse homo /actus resurrexit in carne. . . . Resurrexit autem Christus; resurgent igitur mortui (Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1588)). 82 Absit ut Christus eis se disparem faciat resurgendo, quibus se voluit aequare moriendo (Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1588)). 83 Haec igitur concupiscentia, utique mala, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. nondum erat ante primi hominis illud grande peccatum; sed esse tunc coepit, naturamque humanam tanquam in traduce vitiavit, unde trahit originale peccatum (Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1605)). 84 Augustine read this text, Ex. 20: 17 (with its parallel of Dt. 5:21), in close connection with Rom. 7:7-8: Nesciebam concupiscentiam, nisi lex diceret, Non concupisces. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam (cf. Opus imper fectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1605)). 85 Unde lex, apud eos quos non adjuvat gratia Dei per Agnum Dei qui tollit peccatum mundi, non correctio peccantis, sed virtus potius est dicta peccati (Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1605-06)).

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this interpretation is typical of Augustine's exegesis in that he attempts to understand a particular verse by placing it within the broader context of the Pauline corpus and, by extension, to read it in light of his own presuppositions as to what constituted the Christian faith86. Although his presuppositions included a severe view of original sin, one should not forget that Augustine never limited himself to discussing Adam's sin and its consequences. He repeat edly introduced grace into the equation since, in his reckoning, it is the only means for overcoming our evil concupiscence. In a word, because it comes through grace, the victory over concupiscence is uniquely a gift of God87. Augustine was convinced that his own position represented the recta et catholica fides8*; in order to support his position, Augustine referred to Hilary of Poitiers. As given by Augustine, the text used here is a compilation of De Trinitate 10.24-25 and In Matthaeum 10.23-2489. He shows that Hilary clearly related the caro peccati directly and explicitly to Adam's sin, just as he also stressed that it was for that reason that Christ had possessed flesh, but had not known or possessed sinful flesh. Read this way, Hilary offered Augustine solid support for his claim that he was in line with the Church's tradition90. It was from a similar motivation that Augustine referred to Ambrose and John Chrysostom. The Bishop of Milan clearly regarded the struggle between flesh

86 Cf. (Euvres de saint Augustin. Premieres polemiques contre Julian, (BA, 23. (Paris, 1974), p. 796, where Thonnard rightly states 'II est vrai qu' Augustin aborde souvent un passage de la Bible moins pour en decouvrir le sens que pour y trouver la confirmation d'une doctrine qu'il a acquise par la meditation assidue de l'ensemble des £cntures et specialement des lettres de saint Paul ...' 81 Augustine's text runs as follows: Gratias Deo qui dedit nobis victoriam. However, he was also aware of other readings: Vel sicut alii codices habent. quod et graeci habent, 'qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum (Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1606)). 88 Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1607). 89 Ergo cum missus est in similitudine carnis peccati, non sicut carnem habuit, ita habuit et peccatum; sed quia ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parente deducta, in simil itudine peccati carnis est missus, existente in eo, non peccato sed peccati carnis similitudine. This text was quoted twice; see Contra lulianum I.9 (PL 44, 645); Opus imperfectum VI.33, (PL 45, 1587). A summary is found in Contra lulianum I.32, (PL 44, 662). With regard to Augus tine's knowledge of Hilary, J. Doignon, 'Testimonia d'Hilaire de Poitiers dans le Contra lulianum d'Augustin', RBen 91 (1981), 7-19, is of the opinion that Augustine only knew Hilary through a florilegium. With respect to this particular example, Doignon might be right since here Augustine is rather vague in his reference to Hilary. For other Hilarian texts quoted by Augus tine, however, I am less convinced, since Augustine is normally very accurate. Indeed, he usually gives the precise title of Hilary's work from which he borrows; see, e.g., Contra lulianum I.10 (PL 44, 645-6); 1I.26 (PL 44, 691); 1I.27 (PL 44, 692); 1I.28 (PL 44, 692); 1I.29 (PL 44, 693). Moreover, these texts, in so far as they have been preserved, closely correspond to the text pre sented by Augustine. For a concise state of the question, see A. Bastiaensen, 'Augustin et ses pnSdecesseurs latins chr6tiens', in J. den Boeft and J. van Oort (eds), Augustiniana Traiectina, Etudes Augustiniennes (Paris, 1987), pp. 25-57, esp. 40-2. 90 Cf. also Opus imperfectum VI. 35 (PL 45, 1590), where the faith of the Church is again introduced.

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and spirit (cf., again, Gal. 5: 17) as the direct result of Adam's fall91, just as the Bishop of Constantinople had overtly stated that it was because of Adam's sin that humanity had been condemned en masse92. Augustine did not agree with Julian's idea that Christ needed the exact same nature as other human beings if he was to be a model for all. For Augustine, the human will can only be good if it has been prepared by the Lord (Prov. 8:35)93. One cannot forget, however, that Augustine immediately added to this claim the statement, Nemo ergo imitatur nisi velit94. It obviously follows from this that human beings' moral behaviour can only be labelled 'good' when they act 'faithfully' and live sub gratia (Dei). In this context, Augustine went on to stress the importance of prayer95. Whenever her priests pray, the Church prays not only for all the faithful in order that they should persevere, but also for all the unbelievers in order that they should come to faith96. Augustine was genuinely convinced that the stress on this necessary gift of grace did not elim inate free will. This context makes it understandable how, for him, the resur rection is simultaneously a gift and a reward97. It is a gift because no human being possesses the power to raise him or herself. It is a reward for those who, under grace, lived a life according to God's will. Obviously, in so far as it had to do with the latter, it also pertains to an individual's moral life. It is also interesting to see that while Julian considered the idea of punish ment for the sin of another (that is, Adam) unjust, Augustine consistently argued from another angle. Taking as his starting point the self-evident reality of evil and physical death, he concluded that both must be consequences of a just punishment as meted out by a just God. Moreover, if they were punish ments that all shared in, guilt must also exist within all human beings (at least before baptism)98.

91 Reference to Ambrose's Expositio in Lucam VII. 12.53; cf. Opus imperfectum VI.37 (PL 45, 1596); VI.41 (PL 45, 1608). 92 Reference to John's Letter to Olympias, in Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1606). 93 Quoted in Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1588); VI.41 (PL 45, 1606); on the importance of this text for Augustine's doctrine of grace, see A. Sage, 'Praeparatur voluntas a Domino', REA 10(1964) 1-20. 94 Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1588). Augustine added that an identical nature is not a prerequisite for imitation and gave as example the case of the angels. 95 References were made to Mt. 6:10 (a text quoted by Julian himself in Ad Florum II.52), Mt. 5:48, and Lev. 1 1 :44); cf. Opus imperfectum VI.34 (PL 45, 1589). 96 Unde sancta Ecclesia per ora supplicantium sacerdotum non solum pro fidelibus, ut in eo quod credunt, perseverante pietate non deficiat, verum etiam pro infidelibus orat, ut credant (Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1608)). 97 Cf. Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593, 1595). 98 Omnis autem poena hominis quid est, nisi poena imaginis Dei? Quae si infertur injuste. profecto a quo infertur injustus est. Quis porro dubitet quod injuste inferatur poena imagini Dei. nisi hoc culpa meruerit? (Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1594)); cf. also VI.37 (PL 45, 15%).

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With regard to the terrestrial and celestial image (cf. 1 Cor. 15:49), Augus tine first stressed that it is possible - even if only through the virtues of faith and hope - for us to bear the celestial image while still in this life. Only after the transformation of our animal body into a spiritual body will we bear it as a permanent reality99. Unlike Julian, for whom these two images referred directly to vices and virtues, he related the terrestrial to Adam and the celestial to Christ. According to Augustine, the first, earthly man is Adam (1 Cor. 15:47), per quem mors; the second, heavenly man is Christ, per quem resurrectio mortuorum. He supported this position by referring (again) to 1 Cor. 15:21-22. He then concluded that because all are born under punishment, all need rebirth in Christ100. In other words, Augustine did not believe that Paul's shift from Adam to Christ was merely a shift from a discussion of vices to a discussion of virtues101. He did not think that Julian could substantiate his point by quoting Rom. 6:19: in that text, Paul was clearly dealing with good and evil behaviour, while here he was just as clearly dealing with death and resurrection102. Death had to do with Adam's sin, resurrection with Christ, with primitiae ('first-fruits'), and with the promise of our resurrection103. In line with his belief that our animal flesh was vitiated because of Adam's sin, he interpreted caro et sanguis Regnum Dei possidere non possunt (1 Cor. 15:50) in the sense that this flesh and blood, in so far as it had been corrupted, could not possess the kingdom of God: it must be thoroughly transformed in order to do so104. Employing more than a little literary licence, Augustine fired a series of questions at Julian, trying to show that his position regarding the second death was a ridiculous by-product of his unwillingness to accept the obviously empirically based concept of original sin105. It is also at this juncture that we find Augustine unfairly claiming that Julian's opposition to this crucial doctrine was the equivalent of withholding Christ's easily obtained salvation from infants and children106. In Augustine's exegesis of 1 Cor. 15, the major themes of his theological framework were freely and consistently provided a place: original sin, the fate 99 Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1601). 100 Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1601). 101 Non itaque duas conversationes, malam scilicet et bonam, vult hoc loco intelligi: sed resurrectionem carnis itaper Christum futuram, sicut per Adam mortem carnis asseritfactam (Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1601)). 102 Ibi enim de mails et bonis moribus loquebatur; hic autem de resurrectione corporis et morte corporis loquitur (Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1602)). 103 Opus imperfectum VI.36 (PL 45, 1593); Alfeche, 'The Basis of Hope in the Resurrection of the Body', pp. 286-287. 1{M Quamvis et aliter hoc possit intelligi, ut isto loco, nomine carnis et sanguinis corruptio significata sit, quam nunc in carne videmus et sanguine; quae utique corruptio regnum Dei non possidebit, quia corruptible hoc induetur incorruptione (Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1602)). 105 Opus imperfectum VI.40 (PL 45, 1603-4). 106 Opus imperfectum VI.41 (PL 45, 1606).

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of non-believers and unbaptised infants, concupiscence, free will, the nature of Christ as unique mediator and saviour of humanity, our need of grace, the Catholic tradition, and the necessity of prayer, among others. His having par ticipated in the Pelagian controversies did not radically change this: it just gave him the opportunity to see that they were honed to an even finer edge.

4. Conclusion It is not unfair to conclude that the primary consideration of both Julian and Augustine was to prove that Paul was in line with their own positions. At this stage of the controversy, both had fixed their positions, and both were reading Paul through their own particular theological lenses. With regard to the methodological approach of the two, one of the main dif ferences between Julian and Augustine seems to be that while Julian more strictly followed the text as it was given, Augustine was quicker to quote other scriptural passages in order to help substantiate his position. In this regard, it is interesting to see that while Julian in no way took into account the Genesisstory, Augustine was of the opinion that it was impossible to correctly under stand Paul if one neglected the Genesis story. And, given the prominent role the Adam-Christ typology played in Paul's theology, this is not an unreason able assumption. A positive element in Julian's exegesis is the stress he placed on the resur rection as a gift given by Christ to believers. Another interesting point is the stress he placed on Christ's sinlessness, an idea which was not always evident among the anti-Pelagians107. Julian sharply saw the problem Augustine's ideas about concupiscentia carnis caused for Christ's nature. Is it not contradictory to speak of Christ as a real human being, but at the same time stress that he is very different in comparison to other human beings? If Christ is a 'superman', how can he also be the guarantee for other human beings' resurrection? On the other hand, one of the weakest points in Julian's exegesis - and here he was no longer in line with either the Western or (at least part of) the East ern traditions - is his denial of a connection between the fall of Adam and physical death. Exegetes agree that, for Paul, death proceeds from Adam because the whole of humanity is contained in him108. In fact, according to

107 Here recall that Jerome, in his controversy with Pelagius, even claimed thai Jesus had not been sinless; (cf. Dialogi contra Pelagianos III. 2 CCL 80. p. 99). See, in this regard. O. Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der romischen Bischofe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432, Papste und Papsttum 7 (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 54. 108 See, e.g., H. Conzelmann, / Corinthians. A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, tr. James W. Leitch, ed. George W. Macrae, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 268-9.

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Paul, Adam is the cause of death for human beings109. Therefore, Julian could not rightly claim that Paul thought of death as belonging to one's nature. Indeed, in chapter 15, death is so often mentioned in a negative way (cf. verses 26, 42, 54-55), that one has the feeling that Julian's thought suffered from his rigid distinction between nature and will. In fact, Rom. 5:12-19 directly contradicts Julian. Julian simply underestimated and neglected the Adam-Christ typology. Moreover, the idea of imitation, important though it be, did not sufficiently do justice to Paul's positions. Paul's main interest was the resurrection of Christ, an event which was, for him, a sign that the end of the age was breaking into history and that, because of Christ's resurrection, the resurrection of others must necessarily follow"0. The Christ, presented by Paul in 1 Cor. 15, is not simply the moral example that Julian took him to be. A minor critical remark about Julian's theological positions can also be made with regard to created nature: if it is the direct result of the activity of a good creator, why does it require amelioration and renewal? Indeed, why is baptism necessary? Regardless of the problems that result from Julian's ideas about amelioration and renewal, it remains true that, in Julian's view, baptism guaranteed all human beings, including children, the possibility of eternal life with God. Anyway, Augustine was unfair when stating that Julian was against the baptism of children. How about Augustine? He correctly related physical death to Adam's sin. He was also right to invoke the Genesis story as the broader framework for Paul's Adam-Christ typology. As has Hays stated, Paul's allusion to the Gen esis story showed that he expected his readers to know and to accept that story"1. For his part, Augustine made this connection explicit for his audience. One might even suggest that Augustine consciously presented himself more as a dogmatic theologian than Julian did: he tried to defend his own position by reflection on and use of a broader scriptural basis. He clearly had the stronger position when he insisted that death was a punishment because of Adam's sin (cf. Rom. 5: 16,18). He also had the better arguments when he appealed to the Christian tradition with regard to the link between Adam's sin and the current state of human beings. Finally, and also very Pauline, was Augustine's stress on Christ as mediator, as saviour, and as giver of grace. Augustine proved himself a man of the Church when he related the spiritual life and prayer of the Church to the question of conversion: if everything indeed depends upon our free will, why should we pray for the salvation of non-believers or the perseverance of our fellow-believers? At the same time, it

109 Conzelmann, / Corinthians, p. 268; R.F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina Series 7 (Collegeville, Minnesota, 1999), p. 548; R.B. Hays, First Corinthians, Interpretation, A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, 1997), p. 263. 110 Hays, First Corinthians, p. 263. 1>1 Ibid.

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is fascinating to see that, in the last chapter of his last work, Augustine repeated yet again that nobody will believe against his own will and that the gift of eternal life is connected with our moral life on earth. One also cannot deny that Augustine hat hit upon another crucial point Christ's birth from the Spirit and a Virgin. Here, Julian seemed to neglect (or not fully take into account) the scriptural evidence, or, as married man, was not so sympathetic to the preference of the new generation of unmarried bish ops for an asexual, ascetic lifestyle. In sum, it is evident that Augustine was far more genuinely Pauline in his reflections than Julian: Christ and only Christ is Saviour, giver of grace, guar antee of our resurrection, mediator between God and men, and the beginning of our new and everlasting life. Further, at least with regard to Adam and his sin, he was better supported by the tradition. On the other hand, this does not mean that one can derive from 1 Cor. 15:21-22 the idea that we all are guilty because of our being in Adam. To quote Conzelmann, 'The notion provides no concrete statement whatever concerning human existence'"2. Further, Augus tine did not take into account that Paul wrote to Christian adults: clearly Paul, at least in this chapter, was thinking of the fate of neither non-believers nor unbaptized babies when he wrote to the Christian Corinthians.

112 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, p. 269.

Augustine's Soliloquies and the Historian Robin Lane Fox, Oxford

For every hundred modern studies of Augustine's Confessions, there is probably only one of his Soliloquies. But the Soliloquies are his first personal work, written in late 386, very soon after his decision to abandon wordly ambition, spes saeculi, and to adopt the celibate life. With so much ahead of them, modern biographers have to hurry on: there is one page only on the Soliloquies from Peter Brown and three from Serge Lancel1. But the Solilo quies still interested England's King Alfred in the 890s, who translated and adapted them in his old age2. In a free mediaeval adaptation, pseudo-So/Z/oquies then circulated. They are important for Petrarch's engagement with Augustine, including his own dialogue with him, the Secretum3. For historians, the Soliloquies are the first original thing which Augustine is known to have done in his life. So brilliant is the Confessions' description of his earlier progress that we can easily forget that others had lived more quietly through each of its various stages. But even the word 'soliloquies' is Augus tine's own coinage: when, how, and why did he compose them? In autumn 386, students in Milan returned from their summer long vacation to find that their professor of rhetoric, Augustine, had resigned, abandoned them, and disappeared. If we attend carefully to his own hints of the timing, we can see that Augustine had delayed what the Confessions describe as his lenis subtractio until the end of the vacation4. Only then, in late September perhaps, did he leave Milan for the foothills of the Alps and the villa which his

1 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London, 1967), 119; S. Lancel, Saint Augustin (Paris, 1999), 159-62; editions include W. Hormann, in CSEL 89 (1986); Harold Fuchs, with H. Miiller (Zurich, 1954); and P. de Labriolle, Dialogues Philosophiques II, Dieu et I 'ame, BA 5 (Paris, 1948); a thorough study by Catherine Lefort is in progress. 2 H.L. Hargrove, King Alfred's Old English Version of Augustine's Soliloquies (New York, 1904); T.A. Camicelli, King Alfred's Version ofAugustine's Soliloquies (Harvard, 1969); Asser, Life of Alfred, 76, is apposite: 'day and night Alfred lamented and sighed constantly to God and to his close friends that Almighty God had made him without Divine Wisdom and the liberal arts': a 'natural' for Cassiciacum? 3 Denis Marianelli, tr. and comm., Saint Augustin et L'Anonyme Medieval, Soliloques (Paris, 1999), relevant to H. Baron, Petrarch's Secretum: Its Making and Its Meaning (Camb, Mass;, 1988), and Carol E. Quillan, Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine, and the Language of Humanism (Ann Arbor, 1998). 4 Aug., Conf. 9.2.1.

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literary friend, Verecundus, was lending to him. He was still intending to teach, but the programme was now to be based on philosophy, the 'love of wisdom', not rhetoric5. The pupils, too, had changed. With him went friends and family, what Peter Brown described as 'an ill-assorted company for a life of philosophical otium: a pious old woman (his mother), two uneducated cousins and two private pupils, aged about 16'6. We should add his young son and, for a while, his brother and, on and off, his sober, solid friend Alypius. Augustine's Alpine reading party is the first known example of a genre which still continues here in Oxford. Verecundus' villa is the setting in which the Soliloquies were written, but first the group had been busy with their own philosophy discussions. They are unusually well known to us. Secretaries, trained in shorthand, had taken the raw discussions down, and Augustine then went over the transcripts and tidied them into his first three Dialogues7. In the finished text, the varying role of the secretaries is mentioned from time to time: did thay really exist? Cicero, Augustine's admired predecessor, had remarked that a fictional setting was the mos dialogorum, but the secretaries in Augustine's text are not a literary topos8. Unlike Cicero, Augustine was teach ing a group. Transcripts would allow his pupils to go through the arguments again and see what went right and wrong. But they also allowed the proceed ings to be sent to important persons elsewhere, an important aspect of the Soliloquies too. Augustine's rich patron, Romanianus, would be able to read in exact detail of the progress of his son, Augustine's pupil. Only a few months before, Romanianus had been expecting to pay for the philosophical commune in which he, Augustine, and others were planning to live, even before the deci sion to 'go celibate'9. No doubt Romanianus was now paying, or supplying, the secretaries. But Augustine could also send exact records of his activities to other 'superior persons' whom he had recently met in Milan. They had not been a coherent study group, or a 'Milan circle', who were meeting under the guidance of Ambrose or one of his priests. They had probably been encoun tered individually among the local amici maiores on whom Augustine later recalls his attendance10. They, too, had philosophical interests, and now they 5 G. Catapano, // Concetto di Filosofia nei Primi Scritti di Agostino: Analisi dei Passi Metafilosofwi dal Contra Academicos al De Vera Religione (Rome, 2001), is excellent on this theme. 6 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 1 19, with, however, Lancel, Sain; Augustin, 148 and 683-4, on Trygetius as an ex-soldier and also Alypius. With the 'reading party' at Verecundus' villa, com pare the reading parties of young Oxonians still held in the French Alpine chalet bought by Fran cis 'Sligger' Urquhart (a committed Catholic) in 1892 for this very purpose. 7 Aug., C. Acad. 1.1.4; B.V. 2.15, 3.18; De Ord. 1.10, 29; G. Madec, 'L'Historicite des Dia logues de Cassiciacum', REA 32 (1986), 207-31. 8 Cic, Ad Fam. 9.8.1; I do not accept the vigorous arguments of J.J. O'Meara, 'The His toricity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine, VC 5 (1951), 150-78. ' Aug., Conf. 6.14.24. 10 Aug., Conf. 6.11.18-9; against the idea of a 'Milan circle', G. Madec, 'Le Milieu Milanais. Philosophe et Christianisme', BLE 88 (1987), 194-205.

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could read the very words of the latest recruit to their subject of study. One of them, Manlius Theodorus, had already written dialogues too". This audience is also important for the Soliloquies. When Augustine left for the villa, he had never studied philosophy with a trained teacher or given lessons on the subject. He was known publicly for rhetoric, not 'wisdom'. Thanks to the secretaries, however, the days from about 10 November to about 25 November 386 are the best known in the entire history of ancient philoso phy12. Polished up, the transcripts would prove Augustine's new role, show a wider public what he was doing, and establish to the 'superior persons' that intellectually he was now 'one of them'. Verecundus' villa is also the setting for his earliest letters, some of which were sent to these important contacts back in Milan. The most enchanting are those to his intelligent friend Nebridius, scrutator acerrimus13. Letter 3 shows that Nebridius had written to Augustine, calling him beatus after reading texts which Augustus had sent to him. Surely Nebridius had just read the Beata Vita? No, answers Augustine, I am only quasi beatus but if Nebridius could read my Soliloquies, then he would really call me beatus and 'rejoice much more abundantly'14. Plainly, Augustine regards the Soliloquies with real plea sure. They are his claim to be beatus, in the sense of being 'happy' in a philo sophical use of his time. They have already been composed, or at least the two of the three projected books which are all that he finished. Why did he write dialogues between himself and Ratio, or Reason?15 We do not know how much, if any, of the reading party remained in the villa: was he now alone (or perhaps only with Monica)? In Letter 3, he describes himself pondering Nebridius' letter alone on his bed, Augustinus cum Augustino. It is quite usual to ponder a letter alone, but it is much less so to write whole books of philosophical dialogue with oneself. In Greek anecdotes, philosophers like Antisthenes the Cynic or Pyrrho the Sceptic were said to have studied philos ophy because it enabled them to talk to themselves16. But they were rather odd

11 Claudian, Panegyr. Man. Theod. 85-86. 12 G.J.P. O'Daly, 'Cassiciacum', in Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. Cornelius Mayer, I (Basel, 198694), 771-82, for the problem of exact dates. 13 Aug., Conf. 6.10.17 and 8.6.13 (amicus dulcissimus et mitissimus): on the letters, G. Folliet, 'Epistulae ad Nebridium', in G. Reale et al. (eds.), L'Opera Letteraria di Agostino tra Cassici acum et Milano (Palermo, 1987), 191-215; F. Navarro Coma, 'La Correspondencia de Augustin durante su estancia en Casiciaco. Una reconstruccion', Augustinus 45 (2000), 191-215, thinks Epist. 4 may be written from Africa (p. 208 nn. 170-8), but I prefer J. Doignon, 'Le "Progres" Philosophique d'Augustin dans L'Otium de Cassiciacum d'Apres La Lettre 4', in Fructus Centesimus: Milanges Offerts d GM. Bartelink (Dordrecht, 1989), 141-51 14 Aug., Epist. 3. 15 Aug., Epist. 3, and esp. De Ord. 48-50 for another, contemporary sort of 'inner dialogue' with Reason. 16 Diog. Laert. 6.6 and 9.64, with P. Hadot, Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie Antique, EA, 2e ed. (Paris, 1987), 44-5 (pupils of Socrates were credited with dialogues with their own self).

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(hence the stories), and even if Augustine somehow knew about them, they were not his models. Nor was his revered Cicero. After the death of his dear daughter Tullia, Cicero had indeed composed a 'Self-Consolation' (Lactantius still knew it)17. But it was not a book of philosophical argument, and in his philosophical works Cicero was never a soliloquizer. Marcus Aurelius' Meditations might seem a more promising precedent. In their earliest manuscripts they are entitled 'To Himself: whether Augustine knew them or not, had Marcus anticipated him? In fact, Marcus' book is more useful as a contrast. It was a personal spiritual diary, composed over a long period, without a title or structure and without the aim of circulation beyond Marcus himself18. Augustine, however, gave the Soliloquies their title and wrote the two books as a unity. Tellingly, the first book does not end with the first day of discussions: it has a further section, to convey (we will see) the right tone. Above all, Augustine stated explicitly that he was writing for the fortunate 'few', and in Book 2 he pays compliments to two absentees whose own works on questions of the soul (he hopes) will be such a help to him. As Courcelle rightly saw, neither is bishop Ambrose19. One is the poetic Zenobius, who was away in the Alps, the other is Manlius Theodorus. Augustine's subject, the soul, was theirs too. His compliments were meant for these beneficiaries, who would surely receive copies of the arguments of their fellow 'soul-searcher'. By his writings, Augustine says, one of them (Manlius Theodorus) 'has taught us how to live'. Claudian's later panegyric on Theodorus actually praises his writings on 'what is the rule of the good, what is the path of the honourable'20. The Soliloquies, then, are unprecedented: the way to account for them is to consider Augustine's unusual circumstances. In Book 2 he justifies the book's new form and name because it evades a great obstacle in philosophical dia logues: participants are often 'ashamed' to be beaten in an argument21. Ques tion and answer is the best method for finding the truth, but 'it almost always happens' that a 'disorderly clamour of stubbornness' destroys the subject at issue and 'feelings are lacerated'. Augustine stresses the 'shame' here, some thing to which he is typically sensitive. Not long before, he had witnessed just such 'clamour' and 'laceration' in his wounded young pupils during their men tal tussles22. So now he would argue only with himself, ensuring that he would not lose and feel hurt. 17 Lact, Div. Inst. 1.18.20 and 5.18.10; Cic, Ad Fam. 12.4.5; E.D. Rawson, Cicero: A Por trait, rev. edn. (Bristol, 1983), 225-7. 18 P.A. Brunt, 'Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations', JRS 64 (1974), 1-20; P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, tr. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). 19 Solil. 2.14.26; P. Courcelle. Recherches sur Les Confessions de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1968), 204-10, with Aug., De Quant. Animae 33.70; G. Madec, Saint Ambroise et La Philoso phic (Paris, 1974), 252ff. 20 Claudian, Panegyr. Man. Theod. 95-6. 21 Solil. 2.7.14, compare Licentius' reactions in Aug., BV 2.15 and De Ord. 1.10.29. 22 Aug., De Ord. 1.10.28-29.

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There was also, surely, a further advantage. In the recent Dialogues, Augus tine had had to go slowly with his novices, the boys. Now, he could show him self engaging with really hard questions about the soul (a topic of interest to his admired correspondents) and even about God. He was arguing with himself at full stretch. The work showed what this new recruit to philosophy teaching could really do. Nobody outside his own close friends had previously known that he was any good at it. The Soliloquies allowed him to show his progress. His word for them is sermocinationes (the Latin word for dialogues including Plato's)23. In Latin, philosophy always took the dialogue form. These 'mono logue dialogues' are Augustine's master-class, conducted with himself. They are also the text in which he first 'goes solo', without secretaries or transcripts to help what he writes. At the very beginning he describes how Reason asked how he would preserve whatever he had discovered in his pri vate thinking about the themes on his mind. Reason urged him to write it down, and specifically not to dictate it, as such things required total solitude24. Augustine fears he is too weak to write (he has had prolonged chestpains; he has just lost his voice; he has had raging toothache), but first, he prays to God in a long prayer (which he must also have written, and probably rewritten). The 'brief conclusion', which Reason wants to be written down, is, then, his wish to 'know God and the Soul'25. What follows is also surely aiming at more such 'brief conclusions'. Eleven years later, Augustine would be writing his Confessions, and here the contents would be even more intimate. Presumably, his Reason would still give the same advice on their method of composition. In Confessions Book 10, Augustine does say that he is addressing God 'silently' and sine strepitu. The Confessions, then, are not a 'priere biblique', dictated to secretaries in the room26. Nor was the opening prayer of the Solilo quies: Augustine wrote it, and did not dictate it. So much for their context, title, and method of composition: what about their tone, their sources, and their religious content? To us, 'soliloquies' are generally uncertain things, wondering what to do or what to think, from Homer's Hector outside the walls of Troy (Homer's heroes are keen solilo quists) to the famous lines in Shakespeare's Hamlet and beyond. In Ambrose Thomas' French opera, Hamlet, the great soliloquy begins, 'Etre ou ne pas etre: o misere! ' Up in Verecundus' villa, Augustine has certainly had his 'mis eries', the chestpains, the awful recent toothache, the continuing stress from his recent 'conversion'27. From the villa, he would write an account of his pre vious errores and send it down to the busy Ambrose in Milan, while wanting 23 Solil. 2.7.14; Apul., Apol. 26; Rhet. Ad Herenn. 4.55; Quint, Instit. 9.2.31. 24 Solil. 1.1.1. 25 Conf. 9.2.4. and 9.4.12; Solil. 1.1 and 1.2.7 (breviter ea conlige). 26 Conf. 10.2 (tacet strepitu, clamat qffectu); I disagree with G. Madec, 'Les Confessions comme Priere Biblique', is his Lectures Augustiniennes (Paris, 2001), 11-20. 27 Conf. 9.3.4, 9.5.12; Solil. 1.12.21.

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the bishop to baptize him. Plainly his past sins were going round in his mind, the sort of rigmarole which he had first tipped out on Simplicianus in Milan, too28. He was also frequently in tears. 'You have wept a lot,' Reason tells him on the second day, and as Reason probes his weaknesses again, Augustine begs him not to torture him as he cannot bear to weep now29. Reason tells him not to, and to pull himself together. On the first day, Augustine had admitted that the absence of his friends and his poor health were causes of a 'certain sickness' in his mind. The cultural context of tears in late antiquity is not ours, but there are clearly some very sensitive points in Augustine's emotions. Peter Brown described the Soliloquies as an exercise in 'sombre' examina tion and 'intimate self-searching'30. Indeed, there are free gifts for historians at this level. On the first day. Reason asks explicitly, 'Are we healthy?' Augus tine admits that sometimes an unexpected thought may pain him with unex pected sharpness, but at present three things only are likely to upset him: 'loss of those whom I love' (a typical fear for sociable Augustine), fear of pain, fear of death. It is not a very sombre list, and any of us might give it nowadays. Reason then asks about his 'desire for riches'. No, Augustine says, I ceased from desiring them almost fourteen years ago, thanks to 'one book of Cicero's'. Plainly, he means the Hortensius, and he has already fixed on this point, long before the Confessions dwell on it. The renunciation is not total, though; he will use riches moderately, or 'most prudently and cautiously' (per haps as the Hortensius advised)31. As for honours, the desire for them had been only recently lost, with the abandonment of spes saeculi. What, then, about a wife, a 'beautiful, chaste, accommodating, educated wife, or one who would easily be educated by you? What about one who brought not a big rich dowry for you, but enough so that she would not be a burden to your free time?'32 Augustine rejects this ideal female (a real Late Roman charmer) and remarks that although philosophers might marry only for the sake of having children33, he has decided not to sleep with a woman at all because the risks of being undermined by it are too great. He has renounced it, he says, 'for the freedom 28 Conf. 8.2.3. and 9.2.1 (circuitus erroris mei). 29 Solil. 1.14.26; 2.1.1; De Ord. 1.29; compare De Ord. 1.8.22, 1.10.30, and C.Acad. 2.7.18. 30 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 118. 31 Solil. 1.9.16, 1.10.17 (riches); the Hortensius was first diagnosed here by H. Diels. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie I (1888), 479; sapientissime atque cautissime also echo the Hort.; for its views on riches, compare Aug., BV 3.22, 4.37, and J. Doignon, ed., Dialogues philosophiques, De Beata Vita - La Vie Heureuse, BA 4/1 (Paris, 1986), 146-7. 32 Solil. 1.10.17 (pulchra, pudica, morigera. litterata): contrast the older Roman Republican triad (generosa, bene morata. pulchra), discussed by S. Treggiari, Roman Marriage (Oxford, 1991), 86-9 and 198-9: litterata did not feature then. For the 'temptations' in Solil. 1.9-10, com pare G. Lawless, 'Honores, Coniugium, Lucra... A Greco-Roman Rhetorical Topos and Augus tine's asceticism', AugSt 33 (2002), 183-200. 33 Ultimately, he is thinking here of Stoics: SVF I. 270 (Zeno); SVF II. 727 (Chrysippus); Cic, De Fin. 3.68.

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of my soul'. No Christian justification and no gospel text are cited in support: the reasoning is conventional and philosophic34. Sex he recalls now (he says) with 'horror and disdain': he has resolved to abandon it altogether, unlike his possessions, which he will use, still, in moderation. Reason then digs deeper. Augustine wants to pursue wisdom with his friends; suppose this aim needed 'ample property'? Would he not then desire riches? Suppose the friends could only be persuaded to pursue wisdom if Augustine himself had public honours and they had them too, through his own honoured status? Would he not then desire honours? And suppose the 'ample patrimony' of a wife was the only way in which to provide for all his friends when living together? Suppose she herself was in favour of that aim? Suppose the honours needed to persuade the friends could only be gained by her own noble family?35 Here, Reason draws a persuasive picture of patronage at work in the late Roman system of appointments. Revealingly, Augustine simply replies, 'When would I dare to hope for all that?' Back in Milan, his mother Monica had recently helped to find him a child bride, but evidently she had not been really well-born or especially rich36. In Confessions Book 6, Augustine described himself as musing on the possibility of a governorship after this impending marriage, or maybe more, but (despite the recent conclusions of Claude Lepelley) evidently it would not have been a very grand governorship and the hopes of anything higher were very remote37. On the second day of Soliloquies Reason returns to the topic of the wife. 'How sordid, how foul, how execrable, how horrid' a woman's embrace seemed to you on the previous day: the string of four emphatic words is reveal ing, because Augustine had previously written nothing quite so strong38. But while awake during the night he had thought again of the 'charms and bitter sweetness' of a woman's embrace and it 'titillated' him. It was no uncontrolled sexual dream: Augustine was still awake39. In reply, Augustine begins to weep, but before we diagnose an imminent breakdown, we must remember how high his aims have been set: the renunciation of honours, and above all, the renun ciation of a woman's gentle touch. The tears, in fact, disappear, and at once, Augustine is arguing again about 'progress', with high expectations. In the opening prayer Peter Brown pointed to a 'distinctive' attitude in Augustine,

34 Note, however F.B. A. Asiedu, 'Following the Example of a Woman: Augustine's Conver sion to Christianity in 386', VC 57 (2003), 276-306. 35 Solil. 1.11.18: note si generis nobilitate tarda polleat. 36 Aug., conf. 6.13 (instabatur... instabatur tamen). 37 C. Lepelley, Aspects de L'Afrique Romaine: Les Cuis, la Vie Rurale, le Christianisme (Ban, 2000), 328-44, esp. 339 and n. 40, whose translation of Conf. 6.1 1.19 ('probablement') I do not accept. 38 Solil. 1.14.25 (quam sordidus, quam foedus, quam exsecrabilis, quam horribilis); at 1.11.17, it was only ccum horrore atque aspernatione talia recordor. 39 Solil. 1.14.25 (vigilantes).

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'a sharp note of unrelieved anxiety about himself and a dependence on God'40. But this anxiety is the classic 'anxiety' of a resolute ascetic, a Christian overachiever with high aims, which is not (in my view) Augustine's personal pecu liarity. In the prayer, as also in the aim to 'know God and the soul', the full 'optimisme Augustinien' is in evidence41. God does not create evil; the Universitas is 'perfect', even with its 'sinister parts'. Augustine feels he is living in the best of all worlds with a God, a creator, who will care for him. His aim (promised by Reason) is to know God and to see him: 'self-examination', to such an end, is not really sombre, and the tone is not one of a man 'on the brink', trying to keep up his spirits while underneath he has been pushed too far42. Here, the contrast with Marcus' Meditations is again helpful. Marcus really is prone to self-reproach and a recurring pessimism about his own relation to what he accepts as true about the universe. 'Sombre self-examination' fits much of his spiritual diary43. The Soliloquies, by contrast, have a markedly dif ferent structure. The first book does not end with the natural division, at the end of the first day's discussion. Nor does it end with Augustine's tears and plea to God to 'do what he pleases' with an Augustine committed to his care. Instead, it ends explicitly with a 'little bit of reasoning' (a ratiuncula) which gives real hope and proof of Augustine's progress. Reason is somehow 'lit up' to proffer an apparent proof that truth is immortal and 'no things are true except those which are immortal'44. The argument, in fact, is fallacious, but it is placed so as to close the book with clear evidence of progress and the hope of more to come. The very structure of Soliloquies I is 'optimistic'. As Marrou brilliantly observed, the Soliloquies (like the first Dialogues) are mental exercises, exercitationes animi, whose circuitous route towards truth is set out so as to tone up and exercise its readers too45. They are not examples of 'spiritual exercises', in the sense of exercises in ethical self-improvement, like the texts of Marcus or Epictetus46. They are preliminary workouts, or pre ludes, to 'spiritual exercise' in another sense, a real ascent of the soul, or part of it, towards its Creator, God. Knowledge of the soul (Augustine has explained) is the topic for 'learners'. However, the aims of the Soliloquies do not simply vanish when the optimism of wisdom's new 'lover' recedes and his 'sombre' self-examination deepens. Even the more searching self-scrutiny in 40 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 123. 41 G. Madec, Dialogues Philosophiques III, BA 6, 3rd edn. (Paris, 1976) 575-8, for this. 42 Philip Cary, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self (Oxford, 2000), 81: 'there is great uncertainty in this young man, but there are also high hopes'. 43 Brunt, 'Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations', 18: 'Reason told Marcus the world was good beyond improvement, yet it constantly appeared to him evil beyond remedy'. 44 Solil. 1.15.27-8 (nescio quisfulgor invitat et tangit). 45 H.I. Marrou, S. Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique (Paris, 1958), 299-315. esp. 305-6. 314. 46 P. Hadot, Exercices Spirituels et Philosophie dans la Pensee Antique, for this type of

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Confessions Book 10 (now nourished by the Psalms and the Book of Job) is the preface to an exemplary 'ascent' of the soul towards God47; it is exactly the sequel which had been hoped for in the Soliloquies, eleven years or so ear lier. Then, in De Trinitate, this focus shifts to knowing God (the Soliloquies' second stage): but as Marrou also saw so well, the aim of 'ascent' to him is still in evidence48. The Soliloquies are not a sombre bit of self-scrutiny, after Augustine's 'conversion' and before his baptism, which, in the rest of his spir itual life, led nowhere. Nor are they detached from his intellectual past: their roots go right back into his years as a student in Carthage. If we did not have Confessions 3-8 and if we only had the Soliloquies, a Marrou, a Madec, or a Chadwick would have some how reconstructed Augustine's formation, the 'mental furniture' in his room as a student since about 373. The two dead ends, astrology and Manichaeism, are missing, but Cicero's Hortensius is there (the 'one book of Cicero's') and there is even a hint of Aristotle's Categories49. Old Varro's writings on the 'disci plines' have returned to prominence too. There are also the philosophical prob lems which arise from scepticism (Augustine's reading from 383-6) and dialec tic. There is so much here which continues to be refined and discussed in modem philosophies of knowledge50. There is the first allusion to 'Cogito' as grounds for knowledge; long before Bishop Berkeley, there is awareness of the possibility that objects in the world might not exist when there is nobody pre sent to perceive them51. There are the problems of truth and perception posed by an oar, apparently bent in water. This particular problem, what the late Bemard Williams called 'the apparendy bent stick situation', is known to derive from sceptical Cicero52. So, no doubt, would others if we had more idea of the first published version of his Academica, including the CatulusS3. 47 G. Madec, 'Ascensio, Ascensus', in his Pitites Etudes Augustiniennes (Paris, 1994), 13749, esp. 144; on different grounds, C. Harrison, 'Augustine's Cassiacum Confessions', Augst 31 (2000), 219-24, suggests at p. 222, 'I am forced to conclude that Augustine had the Soliloquies, and especially Book 1, before him while he was composing Confessions Book 10': I would not go so far as she does. 48 Marrou, S. Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique, p. 52 (pp. 16-27). 49 Solil. 1.10.17 (unus Ciceronis liber); 2.12.22, with Aristot. Categ. 1.12-18 and 24; 2.20.34-35, with D. Doucet, 'Augustin Confessions 4.16.28-9, Soliloquies 2.20.34-5 et les Commentaires des Categories', Riv. di Filosofia Neoscolastica 93 (2001), 372-92; Solil. 2.24.3, with Aristot., Categ. 2.1 and P. Hadot, Review of H. Dome, Porphyrios' 'Symmikta Zetemata', Jour nal of Hellenic Studies 81 (1961), 195-6. 50 Solil. 2.1.1; E. Bermon.Le Cogitodans la Pensee de S.Augustinn (Paris, 2001); M.-A. Vannier, 'Les Anticipations du 'Cogito' chez S. Augustin', Revista Agustiniana 38 (1997), 665-79. 51 Solil. 2.5.7. 52 Solil. 2.6.10; Contra Acad. 3.26; G.J.P. O'Daiy, Augustine 's Philosophy of Mind (London, 1987), 92-5; T. Fuhrer, Augustin Contra Academicos Bucher 2 und 3 (Berlin, 1997), 353; Cic. Acad. 2.54-57 and 84-86; Bernard Williams, Descartes (London, 1978), 52. 53 For the various versions, see now M. Griffin, 'The composition of the 'Academica': motives and versions', in Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero 's 'Academic books'. Proceed ings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum (Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995), ed. Brad Inwood and Joan Mansfield (Leiden, 1997), 1-35.

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I should like to point to one such argument, in Book 2. The question is whether fictions are true or false. The first discussion of it goes off our modem track: when an actor plays Daedalus, he is both falsus (a 'pretend' Daedalus) and verus (a real tragic actor)54. When Augustine discusses verus, he slides too easily between our 'true', 'correct', and 'genuine', and when he discusses falsus he combines our 'fake', 'fictional', and 'deceptive', as well as 'false'55. When he adds that if small boys repeat the words 'Daedalus flew', there is both verum (that which they repeat is being repeated) and falsum (Daedalus' flight); his verum here is still nearer to our 'correct' than to 'true'. He never considers our simple modem definition of 'false', that it is 'that whose negation is true'. We also seem far from the problems of sense and reference which have been devel oped for modem philosophers by Frege, Russell, and Strawson: is a statement about a non-existent subject, 'Daedalus' or the 'King of France', false or is it neither true nor false? However, Reason and Augustine then return to the question. They are still trying to define 'false' in terms of 'being like something which it is not'. Augustine considers the sentence 'Medea flew on snakes with linked wings'; he implies that it is false, and yet it does not 'imitate something'56. Correct, says Reason, but something which does not exist cannot even be said to be false. His reasoning is different, but there is a hint, here, of Strawson's position, that with statements which refer to fictional or non-existent subjects, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Well, says Augustine, suppose I say, 'Huge winged snakes, joined to a yoke' (he is quoting a line of poetry): in this case am I also not saying anything falsum? No, says Reason, you are: what you say, the sen tence, is falsum because it resembles the sentence which you would say if it was true (by contrast, it would never be true that Medea flew; it might, I suppose, be true that winged snakes were joined to a yoke). You must distinguish, and Augustine duly does, between the 'sentences' in which we say something, and the 'thing' to which sentences refer57. They do not discuss the question of 'sense' and 'reference' in our modem way, but they do grasp a preliminary dis tinction between a proposition and its reference. Again, we must remember that Augustine has never had a philosophy teacher or studied philosophy in a uni versity. I find his talent impressive, and I hope Manlius Theodorus was impressed too.

54 Solil. 2.10.18 (surely from Cicero, hence 'Roscius'). 55 Giovanna Ceresola, Fantasia e lllusione in S. Agostino: dai Soliloquia al De Mendacio (Genoa, 2001), 37-64, is excellent on these terms and also on Solil. 2.20.34-51; D. Doucet, 'Le Vente, le Vrai et la Forme du Corps'. RSPT 77 (1993), 547-66, esp. on Solil. 2.18.32. 56 Solil. 2.15.29, with P.F. Strawson, 'On Referring', Mind 59 (1950), 320-44, and 'Identify ing reference and truth-values', Theoria (Lund) 30 (1964), 96-1 18. 57 Solil. 2.15.29, note iam intellego multum interesse inter ilia quae dicimus et ilia de quibus dicimus iiliquid.

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This sort of logical arguing is neither 'sombre' nor 'self-searching' and I doubt if it is sustainable by someone on the verge of mental collapse. What, though, of the impact of the Platonist books whose encounter with Augustine, only a few months earlier, is immortalized in Confessions Book 7? There are Platonist echoes, to our ears, in the opening prayer, and the very idea of begin ning a difficult enquiry with a prayer has a Platonizing analogy (though obvi ously Christian too)58. There is the stress on turning inwards, on the hope for ascent to God59, on the 'proofs' of the immortality of the soul (Plato, Meno 86B is fundamental here), and on the complex argument of the relation between knowing God and mathematical concepts, including space (such arguments are also traceable in Plotinus 4.7.8 and in Porphyry)60. There is the trio 'being, living, understanding' (exactly as in Plotinus61) and also, at the start of the sec ond day, there is Reason's arguing that Augustine must 'flee from things which are connected with the senses' (with hindsight, Augustine himself thought that here he had come too close to a view held by Porphyry)62. Plotinus 4.7, 'On the Immortality of the Soul', had surely caught his attention, as had the Platonist use of metaphors of the 'light' and the 'sun'. If we look sideways to his letters at this phase of his life, we find many more of the questions which were per plexing him and stretching him. Why is the world as big as it is? Could it be bigger, and so forth? His reflections on the difference between finite and infi nite numbers and their divisibility is also based on Neoplatonism (beginning from Plotinus 4.7.6 and going on to Porphyry, Sententiae 37)63. Without the Neoplatonists, neither the Soliloquies nor the letters to and from Nebridius would have been written64. Augustine acknowledges his predecessors, Plato and Plotinus, and tells us that Manlius Theodorus was 'most studious' in Plotinus too65. Nebridius 58 For Platonists' preliminary prayers, Plot. 5.8.9, with M. Atkinson, Plotinus. Enneads V l: On the Three Principal Hypostases (Oxford, 1983) and Plot. 4.9.4, 'more a convention of style'; later, Marinus, V. Prodi 22. For the prayer's content, J. Doignon, 'La Priere Liminaire des Soliloquia dans la Ligne Philosophique des Dialogues de Cassiacum', in J. den Boeft and J. van Oort (eds.), Augustiniana Traiectina (Paris, 1987), 85-104; for Aug.'s prayer, note De Lib. Arb. 1.16.35. 59 Solil. 2.6.9 and 2.19.33 (revertere in te); 1.15.30 (te ad se sublevare). 60 Solil. 1.4-5.9-11. 61 Solil. 2.1.1; P. Hadot, 'Etre, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin', in Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Fondation Hardt V (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1960), esp. 107-9; Plot. 1.6.7; orig inally, Plato, Sophist 248E. 62 Solil. 1.14.24; Retract. 1.4.1. 63 P. Hadot, 'Numerus Intelligibilis Infinite Crescit: Aug. Epist. 3.2', in Miscellanea Andre Combes, 2 vols (Rome, 1967-68), 181-91, with Porphyry, Sent. 37. 64 The view at C. Acad. 3.42 that Aristotle and Plato 'agreed' is traced, to my mind rightly, to Porphyry and his (lost) Condordance by R. Walzer, 'Porphyry and the Arabic Tradition', in Porphyre: Entretiens Fondation Hardt XII (Geneva, 1966), 275-99), esp. 286ff. Surely Aug. found it in Porphyry first? 65 Solil. 1.4.9 and B.V. 1.4.

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praises Augustine's writings for having the savour of Plato and Plotinus (and Christ)66. Nobody mentions Porphyry, but as H. Dorrie, then J. Pepin have brilliantly argued, Augustine was also familiar with Porphyry's (lost) Miscel laneous Enquiries. Their argument has been challenged recently by H. Drecoll, partly on the grounds that the proposed echoes of Porphyry are not cer tainly echoes of him, rather than of other earlier Platonists, but I do not think he has actually changed the argument as to what Augustine himself had read67. Porphyry was surely very important for the sketch which survives for us of On the Immortality of the SouP8. Du Roy even argued that a probable echo of On Immortality occurs in the later phases of the Soliloquies7 opening prayer and thus that those bits of the prayer were added as a second addition, when On Immortality had been sketched out69. The correct answer is that like On Immortality, this bit of the Soliloquies echoes Porphyry's Miscellaneous Enquiries too. They had been read, then, by the end of 386. They are a rather unlikely text for a library in the villa of Verecundus, a literary man. If so, Augustine acquired them in Milan, and had been reading them in the wake of the first encounter with bits of Plotinus in Latin. As Nello Cipriani has reminded us for 386/7 and Martine Dulacy for 387/9, we should not underes timate the continuing range of Augustine's own reading at this period70. He was, after all, at leisure, as never before. These readings may also help with a change of emphasis between these first Dialogues (and the Soliloquies) and Confessions Book 7. In the latter, Augus tine famously describes two 'ascents' towards God, the second of which was not, it seems, 'une vaine tentation', but a real contact, however brief, with God71. But the Soliloquies, which he writes only months later, gives not the slightest hint that he himself had only recently managed to make contact with God. Instead, he emphasizes how the eye of the would-be visionary's soul needs to be cleansed, by reading the disciplines (he himself had read old Varro's book on them back in Carthage), by ethical restraint, and (not least) by sexual abstinence (yet when he brushed with God he was still having active sex with a concubine)72. Why has he interposed this hard programme of men 66 Epist. 6. 67 H. Dorrie, Porphyrios' 'Symmeikta Zetemata': Ihre Stellung im System und Geschichte des Neoplatonismus, Zetemata 20 (Munich, 1959): J. Pepin, 'Une Nouvelle Source de Saint Augustin, Le Ziitrma de Porphyre sur l'union de 1'ame et du corps'. Revue des Etudes Anciennes 66 (1964), 53-107; V.H. Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Tubingen, 1999). 68 G. Madec, 'Le Spiritualisme Augustinien', in Petites Etudes Augustiniennes, 105-19. 69 O. du Roy, VIntelligence de la Foi en la Trinite Selon Saint Augustin (Paris, 1966), 196-206. 70 N. Cipriani, 'Le Fonte Cristiane della Doctrina Trinitaria nei Primi Dialoghi di S. Agostino', Aug. 34 (1994), 253-313; M. Dulaey, 'L'Apprentissage de l'Ex6gese Biblique par Augustin dans les Annees 386-9', REA 48 (2002), 267-95. 71 Conf. 7.10 (nondum me esse qui viderem), but then at 7.17 nondum me esse qui cohaererem. 72 Solil. 1.6.13, 1.9-10.16-17, 1.13.23.

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tal and moral preliminaries? Perhaps his reading of Neoplatonists, and espe cially Porphyry, had encouraged him. Mme Hadot was wrong to claim that the Neoplatonists were the first to link the study of the 'liberal arts' to a mystical ascent of the soul (Varro had preceded them), but she was not wrong to claim that neoplatonists endorsed the connection. Had Augustine found it, in autumn 386, in his readings of Porphyry?73 If so, it gave him a much-needed pro gramme for his imminent future. He could still be a teacher, but now he could teach the basic liberal arts (on which he then writes separate texts) as part of a religious and mystical training. By giving up spes saeculi, Augustine was potentially without a social context. Temperamentally, he was completely unsuited to life as a solitary, the sort of life which he had heard about as St Antony's. He did not want yet to be in a monastery, but (as he read in Por phyry) he could usefully teach the basic disciplines to a study group as a preparation for an ascent to God74. In Alfaric's view, if Augustine had written only the Soliloquies, we would regard him as a 'convinced Neoplatonist' with only a 'tincture, at most of Christianity'75. Alfaric would not incline us to expect no less than ten allusions to Christian scripture in the opening chapters76. Nonetheless, there is not a word about redemption or the Cross, the Incarnation, or even Christ. These silences may be a matter of genre (as Alypius pointed out to him at the time)77, and in these early works, I would also point to two further uses of language which have a long history to them. Augustine writes that Reason urged him 'not to want to be, as it were, your own man, in your own power, but instead, to confess yourself to be the slave of the "mildest and most merciful Lord'"78. The ideal of being 'one's own man' is precisely the ideal which Quentin Skin ner has recently identified as essential to a 'neo-Roman' classical moment in subsequent political thought: by contrast, the ideal of being a 'slave' of God is emphatically Pauline and Christian, not Neoplatonist. As for 'mercy', Augus tine had also been praising the Incarnation as popularis dementia, two words which have a fascinating earlier resonance for historians79. For in the writ ings of his admired Cicero, they were key words in the public image of Julius Caesar80. Again, they have no resonance at all for a Neoplatonist.

75 P. Hadot, Arts Liberaux et Philosophie dans la Pensee Antique (Paris, 1984), with G. Madec, Petites Etudes Augustiniennes, 1 14-15. 74 G. Madec, 'Condiscipuli sumus', in Dialogues Philosophiques III, BA 6, 545-8. 75 P. Alfaric, L'EvoIution Intellectuelle de S. Augustin I (Paris, 1918), 527. 76 Esp. Solil. 1.3.3; S.A. Cooper, 'Scripture at Cassiciacum: 1 Corinthians 13.13 in the Soliloquis', AugSt 27/2 (1996), 21-46; there are no such allusions in Solil. Book 2. 77 Conf. 9.4.7. 78 Solil. 1.15.30. 79 Aug., C. Acad. 3.19.42. 80 Cicero, Ep. Ad M. Brut. 1.2A; ad Att. 10.4; S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1972), 241-3; B.M. Levick, 'Mercy and Moderation on the Coinage of Tiberius', in B.M. Levick (ed.),

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Actually, Reason had already posed precisely the question which underlies Alfaric's rather sharp polarity. If what Plato and Plotinus said about God is true. Reason asks, is it enough for you to know God as they used to know him? Augustine replies that 'if they said true things, it does not necessarily follow that they knew them (scisse ea)'81. In what sense, then, were they igno rant? With the hindsight of Confessions Book 7, we would assume that he meant that they were proud, that they lacked humility and were ignorant of the Incarnation or the gift of the scriptures or of Christ as a mediator82. But in the Soliloquies, eleven years earlier, his point (I think) is something else. Plato and Plotinus did not scire in the sense of knowing a logically demonstrated truth. They had not proved what they said truly by the certainties of dialectic. The claim seems so odd to us because we think of dialectic as almost the invention of Plato and we read Plotinus as if he is proceeding by logical argument. But in this context, the young Augustine (I suggest) did not. He and Reason will establish these 'truths' by cast-iron dialectic, the 'discipline of disciplines' (had passages in the Hortensius supported his high estimate of dialectic?)83. In that sense he will 'know', just as in Contra Academicos he had ended by 'knowing', through argument, that extreme scepticism is logically mistaken. Of course our modern philosophers, O'Daly and Kirwan most recently, have shown the false steps in Augustine's key arguments which follow84, but for him, these arguments were setting out 'knowledge', as Plotinus had not. We should also allow for Augustine's developing 'history of philosophy'85. In due course, he could accept that there had been one wisdom, bits of which had reached Plato from Egypt. What the later Academy had then kept as a pri vate doctrine had been taught to one and all by Christ. Plotinus and others had presented what they still knew of it, but (like Plato himself) they did not know it all. They had also continued to pollute it with idolatry. Seen in this light, there was no sharp polarity between the truths in Plato and the truths of Chris tianity: the former derived, ultimately, from the same source86. When Reason begins by exercising Augustine's mind with comparisons between mathemati cal knowledge and the knowledge of God, he is immediately using what he The Ancient Historian and His Materials, Essays in Honour of C.E. Stevens on His Seventieth Birthday (Farnborough. 1975), 123-37. 81 Solil. 1.4.9. 82 Conf. 7.21.27 and G. Madec, 'Si Plato Viveret', in Neoplatonisme: Melanges Offerts a Jean Trouillard (Fontenay aux Roses, 1981), 231-47. 83 Aug., De Ord. 2.13.2-11; C. Acad. 3.13.6-7; at C. Acad. 3.17.37 Plato is indeed said to have used dialectic as a base; J. Pepin, S. Augustin et La Dialectique (Villanova, 1976), 196-210. In the Hortensius, Hort, had spoken against dialectic, it seems. 84 G.J.P. O'Daly. 'Anima, error, and falsum in some early writings of St Augustine', in his Platonism Pagan and Christin: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine. Collected Studies CS 719 (Ashgate, 2001), chap, vii; C.A. Kirwan. Augustine (London, 1989). 85 See esp. I. Bochet, 'Le Statut de l'Histoire de la Philosophic Selon la Lettre 1 18 d' Augustin a Dioscure', REA 44 (1998), 49-76. 86 Still best is R. Holte, Beatitude et Sagesse (Paris, 1962).

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would consider as shared, universally valid 'wisdom'. When Reason goes on to emphasize the need for 'faith, hope, and charity' in order to have a vision of God, he is arguably continuing on the same track87. To us, this trio is Christ ian and Pauline: its use here is certainly significant. But unlike Paul, Augus tine attaches it to seeing God, not to Christian ethics. Here, we have a fasci nating analogy in Porphyry's letter to Marcella, where four 'elements', 'faith, truth, love, and hope' are specified as necessary in an ascent to God88. Of course Augustine did not know the letter, nor the appropriate parallels which we can find for this bit in our surviving Neoplatonist texts, but he may well have known another such citation in some passage of Porphyry now lost to us. The sequence of the 'elements' is different in our bit of Porphyry ('hope' fol lows after 'love'), but nonetheless the apparent analogy may have inclined Augustine to develop this theme at the start of his Soliloquies. For it too was 'wisdom', proclaimed by Christians but partially known to Platonists as well. It is to the vision of God, after all, that his Reason connects it, as Porphyry had done in the one passage surviving for us. Augustine was not yet baptized, but given this view of 'wisdom', it is mis leading to find only a 'tincture' of Christianity in the philosophy of this text. It is even more misleading, I think, to project his later Christian thinking back onto it. Du Roy, especially, has claimed to find the presence of the Christian Trinity in the elements of the thinking soul as singled out by Augustine89. But the De Trinitate must not be allowed to cast a long shadow backwards. When Augustine remarks that he is unsure whether Reason speaks to him from inside or outside, he is not dissembling: he is genuinely unsure90. Reason is not the Holy Spirit, here; how ever would Augustine have written a dialogue part for it if it was?91 The 'first draft' of Soliloquies Book 3, our surviving On the Immortality of the Soul, holds no such view. Here, Reason exists insepa rably with the soul and is its aspectus animi, its capacity for 'seeing' closely: the definitions here are intellectual, not Trinitarian. Reason is aspectus animi, by which we notice, rather than simply 'see'92. Intellect is understanding, in which are 'completed' the subject who understands and the object which is understood.

87 Solil. 1.6.12. 88 Pophyry, Ep. ad Marcell. 24, with K. Alt, 'Glaube, Wahrheit, Liebe, Hoffhung bei Porphyrios', in E. Grasser (ed.), Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche, Festschrift fur Ulrich Wickert (Berlin, 1997), 25-44. 89 O. du Roy, L'lntelligence de la Foi, 143. 90 Solil. 1.1.1; for the range of admonitio, G. Madec, Augustinus-Lexikon I, 95-9. 91 The prayer at Solil. 1 . 1 .2-4 has a tripartite structure in the eyes of most editors (G. Watson, Soliloquies and Immortality of the Soul (Warminster, 1990), 23-7), and G. Madec, Le Dieu d'Augustin (Paris, 2000), 71, sees it as 'certainement trinitaire'; myself, I do not see this structure in it, even implicitly. 92 De Imm. Anim. 6.10; R. Ferris, 'Mens, Ratio, Intellectus en Los Dialogos Primeros de Augustin', Augustinus 43 (1998), 45-78, is very helpful.

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What, though, about the idea of 'illumination'? The Soliloquies do use this metaphor and have much to say about 'God's light', but are they early evi dence for Augustine's 'theology of illumination' even before his baptism? Explicitly, God is said to 'illuminate' the truths attained by the disciplines or 'liberal arts'93. In Book Two, at a perplexing and 'obscure' stage of the argu ment, Augustine does also pray to God to 'hold out your light for me'94. Above all, at the end of Book 1 , Augustine begs Reason to give him a hint, at least, of the progress they are making. Reason says that Augustine's 'doctor' is humouring him: 'for some inexplicable gleam (fulgor) of light is inviting me and prompting me as to where l shall lead you'95. This passage may sug gest the more detailed doctrine of an 'inner master' who is illuminating the individual's soul, as we will soon find it in the De Magistro96. Nonetheless, I do not believe that anything so precise is intended here, nearly three years ear lier. In the Soliloquies, the soul is straining to be able to see the 'light' of God, and that light illuminates the truths which will help it to cleanse itself. The entire dialogue is conducted with a sense of God's providential guidance: 'how do you know what God is wanting?', Reason asks, when Augustine queries the course of one phase in the argument. A 'gleam' may lead on Rea son when Reason is about to give an outline of logical reasoning97. But the operation of the 'gleam', its relation to Reason and its place in the individual soul are not matters, as yet. which Augustine has elaborated98. One reason for their absence is the absence, as yet, of any interest in the Christian text which underlies their later formulation - Ephesians 3.16-18, in its Latin version, on the 'inner man'99. Like Augustine's life at this time in the villa, the discussion with Reason is guided by divine providence. Hence the prayer for help and the appeals, even, to God's absolute power and mercy: 'let Him do what He pleases ... now, I commit myself entirely to His mercy and care ...M0° But the main thrust of the discussion is logical and dialectical, even if it is conducted under God's

n Solil. 1.6.12. 94 Solil. 2.6.9. 95 Solil. 1.15.27. 96 Aug., De Mag. 14.46. 97 Solil. 1.15.27. 98 Note esp. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, tr. L. Lynch (London, 1961), 66-1 1 1, esp. 77-9: 'God does not take the place of our intellect when we think the truth. His illumination is needed only to make our intellects capable of thinking the Truth, and then by virtue of a natural order of things expressly established by him'. This summary fits the provi dential, orderly Universe of the 386 Dialogues very well. 99 Perhaps 'illumination' first struck Aug. in Platonist texts and John 1; then, in Eph. 3.16-18, on which see De Vera Religione, and G. Madec, 'Conversion, Interiorite\ Inicntionalitc'. in Petites Etudes Augustiniennes, 151-3. 100 Solil. 1.1.5: iube. quaeso, quidquid vis...

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general guidance. Augustine, the 'lover' of wisdom, shows himself the lover of argument, rationally conducted101. In his letter at this time to Nebridius, he refers to himself as 'playing sweetly' (blandior) with Reason as if with a 'one and only' girlfriend. Much of his language for his 'love' of wisdom is conventional, but in one who has just given up sex for ever, its strength is surely self-revealing. Like Wisdom, Reason has a feminine charm, 'my one and only'; Wisdom has 'breasts' and Augustine would like to embrace her naked, with no intervening cover102. The language of desire is transposed here onto the celibate's new (feminine) object. In his free adaptation, the elderly King Alfred even went on to remind us that when seeking to embrace a naked form, we should not wear gloves. But for Augustine, of course, this newly-found love is quite different from his former love of a 'one and only'. Wisdom, its newfound object, is freely accessible to all those who love her, and those who love her, Augustine loves too. In On Free Choice (c.390), he develops the image of Wisdom entertaining her lovers one after another, without provoking jealousy103. Let us, then, seek her concorditer, with that 'concord' which will emerge again in Augustine's later monastic rule104. For, there is not, for Augustine, a choice between 'Christian ity' and 'philosophy'. The preliminary mental exercises in the Soliloquies will persist, a stage further on, in the De Trinitate of his maturity105. What he seeks is as many people as possible who will 'desire Wisdom with me, gape for her, hold her with me, and enjoy her with me'. Tanto mihi amiciores futuri quanto erit nobis amata communior: the more my loved one is shared, the more will be my friends106. Augustine could not have said the same about the bride whom he might have gone on to marry. But is there any more fitting epigraph for what an International Conference of Patristic Studies is hoping to be about?

101 On his hopes of 'progress' (proficere), Solil. 1.9.16-10.17; 1.11.19; 1.14.26 with H. Dome, 'Die Lehre von der Seele', in Porphyre: Entretiens Fondation Hardt XII, 167-87, at 185: 'Nach Porphyrios befindet man sich in standiger "prokopen"'. 102 Aug., Epist. 3.2: tamquam unicae blandiri soleo; R.J. O'Connell, 'The Visage of Pilosophy at Cassiciacum', AugSt 25 (1994), 65-71; C. Acad. 1.4 (breasts); .3.2 (bosom). 103 Aug., De Lib. Arb. 2.13.35. 104 Aug., Regula 1.8. 105 H.I. Marrou, S. Augustin et La Fin de la Culture Antique, 316-27. 106 Solil. 1.13.22, with G. Madec, Petites Etudes Augustiniennes, 216-231, with 216 n. 8.

'You know better than I do' : The Dynamics of Transformative Knowledge in the Relationship of Augustine of Hippo and Paulinus of Nola Christine McCann, Northfield, Vermont

Scholars have usually characterized the relationship between Paulinus and Augustine as friendship. This it undoubtedly was, and friendship is certainly what Augustine wanted their relationship to be. However, although Paulinus accepted Augustine's offer of friendship, it seems that he wanted something more or at least something different. This paper will argue that Paulinus ini tially sought out Augustine not as a friend, but as a 'Christian sage', whose knowledge of the bible and Christian doctrine could transform Paulinus into the mature Christian he wanted to become. Reading Paulinus' first letter to Augustine with Martin Jaffee's definitions of transformative knowledge and the discipleship community in mind1, it appears that Paulinus had an impulse to create or become part of a discipleship community bound together by letters with Augustine as the master of the group. In 395, Paulinus wrote his first letter to Augustine2. He opened the letter with the statement that he wrote out of the confidence that Christ's charity had already bound the two men together. He went on to say that he had read 'five books'3 of Augustine's, noting that he received the books as a gift from the Bishop Alypius, who was, of course, Augustine's good friend. Paulinus further praised the books and Augustine as their author. He asked Augustine to send him any more books he had written 'against other enemies of the Catholic faith'. Paulinus next announced that he was ready to engage in the study of divine wisdom and appealed to Augustine for guidance. Paulinus then closed the letter with blessings on the Catholics in the churches and monasteries of Africa and a few small requests. Finally, he offered the gift of a loaf of bread. 1 Martin S. Jaffee, 'A Rabbinic Ontology of the Written and Spoken Word: On Discipleship, Transformative Knowledge, and the Living Texts of Oral Torah', Journal of the American Acad emy of Religion 65 : 3 ( 1 997), 525-49. 2 Paulinus, Ep. 4, in CSEL 29, ed. G. Hartel (Vienna, 1894), 18-24; Augustine, Ep. 25, in CSEL 34.2, ed. A. Goldbacher (Vienna, 1898), 506-13. 1 These books are believed to be De vera religione, De Genesi contra Manichaeos libri II, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, and De moribus manichaeorum. See Dennis E. Trout, Paulinus of Nola: Life, Letters, and Poems (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), p. 203, n. 36, for a summary.

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Now that I have outlined Paulinus' first letter to Augustine, I will summa rize Martin Jaffee's definitions of discipleship community and transformative knowledge. This comes from his article 'A Rabbinic Ontology of the Written and Spoken Word: On Discipleship, Transformative Knowledge, and the Liv ing Texts of Oral Torah', published in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion in 1997. In this article, Jaffee suggests what he calls a 'rough def inition' of the discipleship community, a phenomenon common to many reli gions4. According to Jaffee, discipleship is a hierarchical relationship, involving at least two people (master or sage and disciple), but often more. These relation ships are in certain respects modelled after those found in the school and the family5. (I personally have used the term 'spiritual mentoring' to refer to this type of relationship6.) Jaffee says, 'We have discipleship ... when affective relationships culturally appropriate to elder kin and children are transferred to the educational setting of the school, ordering the relations of people who are not kin'7. The master in the discipleship relationship, then, is both a parent and a teacher, and yet more than both, for she or he offers not just 'formative knowledge' but 'transformative knowledge'. Transformative knowledge does more than simply train the student. In fact, transformative knowledge, which is learned by observing, memorizing, and mimicking the master's words and deeds, helps the student to be re-formed in the image of the master. Thus, 'emulation' or imitation of the master is an important part of this process8. This transformative knowledge, according to Jaffee, is always 'conceptual ized as a kind of text', even 'texts' that are only transmitted orally. The mas ter is master because she can make the meanings of the texts clear, while dis ciples are those who seek this knowledge (and are willing to play by the rules necessary to attain it). (Any co-disciples are helping and competing with each other.) Jaffee summarizes the discipleship community as 'a setting for the transmission of transformative knowledge in which emulation of the imparter of knowledge is both a primary goal of knowledge and proof of its posses sion'9. Jaffee goes on in his article to discuss how these general definitions took on particular forms in the Rabbinic Judaism from the third century on. What I propose instead is to examine how Paulinus' letter indicates that he was seek ing in some way to create a Christian, epistolary form of a discipleship com munity, with Augustine as the master or sage. 4 Jaffee, pp. 529-32. 5 Jaffee, pp. 529-30. 6 See. for example, my PhD dissertation, 'Spiritual Mentoring in Late Antique and Early Medieval Europe', (University of California, Santa Barbara, 1998). 7 Jaffee, p. 530. 8 Jaffee, p. 531. 9 Jaffee, p. 531.

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Jaffee characterizes discipleship first as a hierarchical relationship, mod elled in part after relationships found in the family and school. In his letter, Paulinus describes himself as an 'infant', (infans), a 'small one' (parvulus), someone who needs 'training/nurturing' (edocere) in the spiritual life, and he calls Augustine his 'father' (pater). Paulinus minimizes the fact that he and Augustine are both priests, saying that although they both share the same 'office', Augustine is the greater in 'merit'10, and again, 'If you consider our common office, you are a brother, but if you consider your maturity of mind and experience, you are my father ...'". Paulinus seeks in this letter to cast Augustine in an authoritarian role that we know Augustine would not want to take. The fact that Paulinus refers to himself as a child and Augustine as his father matches the familial aspect of Jaffee's definition of discipleship, and the affective component rings in Paulinus' confession of his admiration and love for Augustine: 'how well I know you, with how much amazement I admire you, with how much love I embrace you ...' Lastly, Paulinus' requests for more books and instruction fit the 'educational' portion of Jaffee's definition. The second part of Jaffee's definition of discipleship is transformative knowledge, knowledge possessed by the master that can make the disciple into a new person. Remember that this knowledge is always thought of as a text. In his first letter to Augustine, Paulinus places great emphasis on the importance of Augustine's books or texts - he praises those he has already read, calling them 'physicians and wet-nurses for my soul'12. Augustine's books contain, he writes, 'food ... that produces the substance of everlasting life'13. He asks for more books, telling Augustine that 'daily I enjoy the conversation of your books and feed on the breath of your spirit . . . ' 14. He also refers to Augustine as a source of light, whose words dispel the darkness of the heretics15. In con trast, Paulinus comments that he himself has been up to this point 'foolish and mute before God', writing 'useless' works.16 According to Jaffee, learning the texts that the master knows and imitating the master is part of the process of transformation. Paulinus indicates his desire to emulate and to be formed in Augustine's image when he writes, 'Guide this small one creeping uncertainly and teach me to follow your steps

10 Ep. 4.4: ut te praestante mentis officio sociatus aequarer. 11 Ep. 4.3: Si officium commune consideras.frater es, si maturitatem ingenii tui et sensuum, pater mihi es. 12 Ep. 4.1 : ut animae meae medicas et altrices in quinque libris interim teneo. 13 Ep. 4.1: cibum ... qui operatur vitae aeternae, substantiam per fidem nostram. 14 Ep. 4.2: cotidie conloquio litterarum tuarumfruor et oris tui spiritu vescor. 15 Ep. 4.2: Licet haereticorum caligines discutis et lucem veritatis a confusione tenebrarum splendore clarifici sermonis enubilas. 16 Ep. 4.1: Sapientiam mundi miser hucusque miratus sum et per inutiles litteras reprobatamque prudentiam deo stultus et mutusfui.

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. . . Since in reference to the Word of God and my spiritual age I am a suckling infant, nurture me with your words . . . warm and strengthen me in holy read ing and spiritual studies'17. Paulinus even asserts that God has made him a priest (although he is unworthy) so that 'I may become like you'18. All of this indicates that for Paulinus, Augustine is the sage who possesses the transfor mative knowledge of Christian doctrine that he seeks. I will briefly touch on a few other points in the letter that indicate that Pauli nus had an impulse to join a discipleship community, one perhaps linked together by letters. Paulinus points to Alypius's efforts to have Paulinus love Augustine, thus creating bonds between the three men. In closing the letter, he greets Augustine's household and 'all the companions and imitators in the Lord of your Holiness'19, referring to the discipleship community he seems to have believed already surrounded Augustine. In addition, Dennis Trout has shown that Paulinus was in the midst of a large and widepread 'network of friends and correspondents'20, while Catherine Conybeare has argued convinc ingly that, for Paulinus, letters were a 'sacramental activity' and that a letter was itself 'a spiritual offering and a basis for general meditation and reflec tion'21. We also know that Paulinus had already been in contact with Jerome, who had offered him an impressive plan for a Christian biblical study pro gramme22. Given all of this, it seems that Paulinus had a predisposition for becoming part of an epistolary discipleship community and that he hoped Augustine was the sage who could guide that community. Of course, we know that Augustine did not agree to this, and he eagerly insisted to Paulinus that they were brothers, equals, and friends. In fact, years later, he wrote to Paulinus, '[Perhaps] you know better than I do', referring to a question about the bodily resurrection23. Paulinus's hope of a discipleship community headed by Augustine as sage never did come to fruition, but it remains a tantalizing shadow amidst the myriad visions of Christian commu nity proposed in the late fourth century.

17 Ep. 4.3: Rege ergo parvulum incerta reptantem et tuis gressibus ingredi doce. Nolo enim me corporalis ortus magis quam spiritalis exortus aetate consideres ... ut infantem adhuc verbo dei et spiritali aetate lactantem educa verbis tuis uberibus fidei, sapientiae, caritatis inhiantem . . . Fove igitur et corrobora me in sacris litteris et spiritalibus studiis tempore. 18 Ep. 4.4: Ut te praestante meritis officio sociatus aequarer. 19 Ep. 4.5: Totam domum et omnem comitem et aemulatorem in domino sanctitatis tuae plurimo fraternitatis unanimae salutamus affectu. 20 Trout, pp. 200-9. 21 Catherine Conybeare, Paulinus Noster: Self and Symbols in the Letters of Paulinus ofNola (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 54-5. 22 Jerome, Ep. 53 in CSEL 55, ed. I. Hilberg (Vienna, 1996). 23 Augustine, Ep. 95.6: nisi quod me consulere voluisti, quod aut mecum nescis aut mecum scis aut magis quam ego forsitan scis.

Building God's House: Augustine's Homilies at Episcopal Consecrations, Church Dedications, and Funerals J.E. Merdinger, Washington

We know from Possidius that Augustine preached almost daily, up until the final weeks of his life. He delivered most of his sermons at Hippo and at Carthage, but Possidius tells us that Augustine was often asked to preach else where1. In this paper, I would like to suggest that Augustine spent considerable time journeying to church dedications, episcopal consecrations, and funerals of colleagues, where he would often serve as the keynote homilist. I believe that such wide-ranging visitations afforded the bishop of Hippo yet another oppor tunity to help reform the African Church. In previous work, I have emphasized the prodigious efforts made by Augus tine and Aurelius, the bishop of Carthage, to revitalize the Catholic Church in Africa through annual councils and canonical legislation2. To reach not only clergy but laity as well, the two reformers also emphasized homilies. As early as 397, Augustine spoke of the duty of bishops to dispense the Word (and sacraments), a theme that he would sound repeatedly throughout his life3. His ecclesiology demanded of him unceasing pastoral effort to save souls. Augustine's long ministerial career was bracketed at the beginning and at the end by an episcopal consecration and a church dedication. Perler has noted that to our knowledge the first trip Augustine took after becoming co-adjutor bishop of Hippo was to Cirta, up in the hills of Numidia, to attend an epis copal consecration. A former pupil from Augustine's monastery - probably Profuturus - was to assume the bishopric of the provincial capital4. One of the final letters ever written by Augustine finds him declining an invitation to attend a church dedication because of his old age, frail health, and the frigid winter weather. He probably wrote Letter 269 in the winter of 429-4305. To 1 Possidius, Vita Aug. 9. 2 J.E. Merdinger, Rome and the African Church in the Time of Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Ch. 6. See also F.L. Cross, 'History and Fiction in the African Canons', JThSt n.s. 12 (1961), 227^7. 3 Augustine, Confessions 11.1-2. 4 Othmar Perler, Les voyages de Saint Augustin (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1969), 205-10. 5 Ep. 269. Dating in W. Parsons, Saint Augustine, Letters, vol. 5, FC 32 (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1956).

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examine the evidence in more detail, I will cull from Possidius' Life of Augus tine, and from the handful of extant sermons that Augustine delivered at con secrations, dedications, and episcopal funerals. Time and again in his biography of the saint, Possidius emphasizes Augustine's tireless preaching. Even at the close of his account, Possidius reveals, 'Right up to his last illness he had preached God's word in the Church unceasingly, rigorously, and powerfully, with sound mind and judge ment'6. Verbraken has estimated that in thirty-nine years of ministry Augus tine delivered over 8,000 sermons. Only a fraction have been preserved (about 900 altogether), with the majority having been given at Hippo or, by invitation of Aurelius, at Carthage7. Nonetheless, here and there we can catch tantalizing glimpses of other venues where Augustine preached. In Letter 44, Augustine mentions that he abruptly had to cease debating with a Donatist bishop because he (Augustine) had to go to an episcopal consecra tion. 'But because the necessity of ordaining a bishop was already tearing us away from them, we could not stay with him a longer time'8. Episcopal consecrations were of special concern to Augustine. Without question the Catholic Church in Africa needed to recruit good men into the ministry. Canons drafted at Aurelius and Augustine's councils testify to abuses perpetrated by bishops and priests who were ill educated or derelict in their duties9. Procedurally, consecrations in North Africa could be fraught with contention. With the provincial primate, the local clergy, and the con gregation all having a voice in the process, problems invariably arose. Early on, Augustine himself learned from bitter experience how divisive the process, could be. The primate of his province, Megalius, initially blocked Augustine's nomination to the episcopate because of his Manichaean past and certain unsavoury rumours about him. An unedifying and embarrassing episode at such a critical juncture must have left a profound impression on Augustine. The scars are evident in Letter 38, which he wrote just three weeks after Megalius' burial in early 39710. Almost no sermons delivered by Augustine at episcopal consecrations have been preserved. Just one is extant - Sermon 340A. Internal evidence suggests that Augustine preached it at the consecration of Antony of Fussala sometime

6 Possidius, Vita Aug. 31.4. Tr. F.R. Hoare, The Western Fathers (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), 242. 7 Pierre-Patrick Verbraken, 'Saint Augustine's Sermons: Why and How to Read Them Today', Augustinian Heritage 33 (1987), 106. 8 Ep. 44.13 (CSEL 34,2,120). Tr. Roland Teske. Utters IIII, The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st century (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2001), 180. ' Hippo Breviary, Canons 1, 4, 15, 16, 20, 21, in C. Munier, ed., Concilia Africae A. 345-525. CCL 149: 33-4, 38-9. Also see Jean Anatole Sabw Kanyang, Episcopus et plebs: L'iveque et la communaute ecclisiale dans les conciles africains (345-525) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000). 10 Dating for Ep. 38 in Perler, Les voyages, 214.

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around 412 AD". Sermon 340A has been mined extensively by scholars, so a few brief remarks will suffice here. Augustine is very candid in it about the traits a bishop ought to possess. Nor does he shy away from admitting that bad bishops exist. To him they are like scarecrows, bishops in name only12. Mostly, however, Augustine gives advice, making sure to address each con stituency in the audience - the local clergy, visiting bishops, the congregation, and the bishop-elect himself. Augustine's emphasis throughout is on building up the Church and the hard task that lies ahead for the bishop-elect. A handful of other sermons that lend insight into Augustine's understanding of nominations and episcopal consecrations deserve mention here. These are Sermon 339, preached on an anniversary of his own consecration, and Sermon 213, where Augustine nominates Heraclius as his successor at Hippo and hopes to avoid the mistakes recently made by his long-time friend Severus of Milevis13. Augustine's homilies at church dedications must now be examined. Again, only a few are extant: Sermons 336, 337, and 338. For all three, the prove nance is unknown and the dates are not certain14. What is striking initially about these sermons is the physicality of Augustine's description of the newly built church. We can almost smell the pine-scented timbers and run our hands along the freshly quarried rocks. In Sermon 337, Augustine notes, As long as stones are being hewn from the mountains and logs from the forests, while they are being shaped and chiseled and fitted together, there is a lot of hard work and worry. But when the dedication of the completed building is celebrated, there is rejoicing15. Yet, Augustine unhesitatingly moves beyond the physical to encourage spiri tual renewal and upbuilding that should take place within every member of the congregation. What was going on here when these walls were rising, is going on here and now when believers in Christ are being gathered together . . . but when the people are catechized, baptized, formed, it's as though they are being chipped and chiseled, straightened out, planed by the hands of carpenters and masons16. 11 Though Augustine could not foresee it, Antony became one of the most rapacious and destructive bishops ever in the African Church. There is dispute about the daring and provenance of this letter. See Perler, Les voyages, 303-4. Useful bibliography in Hubertus Drobner, Augustinus von Hippo: Sermones ad Populum (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 12 Sermo 340A.6 = Morin Guelf. 32 (PL 2,642). 13 For difficulties concerning the date of Sermon 339, see Edmund Hill, tr., Sermons 1III9, The Works of Saint Augustine (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 1994), 289. Severus neglected to consult his congregation when he and his clergy chose his successor in 426. A storm of protest ensued. 14 Hill believes that Sermon 336 is a late work, possibly dating to 420 or 425. Sermon 337 may be an early piece because of Augustine's emphasis on light. Sermon 338 may have been written around 412, very soon after the Colloquy of 41 1. See E. Hill, tr., Sermons IIII9, 270, 274, 278. 15 Sermo 337.2 (PL 38,1476). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons 1II19, 272. 16 Sermo 336.1 (PL 38,1471-2). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons 1II19, 266.

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Using 1 Cor 3:10-11, Augustine sees Christ as the foundation of the Church, with the whole 'cemented together' and properly fitted together by charity. An edifice will not collapse, he assures his listeners, if these essential elements are in place17. Moving seamlessly between physical reality and spiritual imagery, Augus tine reminds the congregation that they are God's house - Domus Dei. At the beginning of Sermon 336.1, he makes this clear: 'So while this is the house of our prayers, we ourselves are the House of God. If we ourselves are God's house, we are being built up in this age, in order to be dedicated at the end of the age'18. Joyous as a church dedication is after the hard labour of construc tion, what truly counts for Augustine is the congregation itself within those new walls. The people who come to worship there are 'living stones, fashioned by faith, made solidly firm by hope, cemented together by charity.' The imagery of living stones he mines from 1 Peter 2:5: 'And like living stones be built up together into the temple of God'19. The imagery of 'living stones' probably became a favourite of the bishop of Hippo when he preached at other church dedications. It certainly would have been readily appreciated and understood by hard-working country folk who thronged the churches and chapels of Numidia. At the end of his life, when Vandals wreaked havoc in North Africa, Augustine unhesitatingly employed that imagery in a letter to Honoratus, a bishop anxiously seeking advice whether clergy should stay and minister to their flocks or flee before the onslaught. We should be more afraid of 'living stones' being extinguished when we have aban doned them than of the stone and wood of earthly buildings being set on fire under our eyes. We should be more afraid of the members of Christ's body being destroyed, starved of the food of the spirit, than of the members of our own body being tortured, gripped in the clutch of the enemy20. One final example of a dedicatory sermon will suffice here to illuminate an underlying theme that needs to be addressed. Interest in martyrs' relics surged in North Africa during the early fifth century, and, in particular, the cult of St Stephen became immensely popular21. In late June or early July 425, when Augustine was seventy years old, he was invited to preach at the dedication of a new shrine to St Stephen in the vicinity of Hippo. Sermon 94 is the address 17 Sermo 337.1 (PL 38,1476). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons 1III9, 271. 18 Sermo 336.1 (PL 38,1471). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons II119, 266. For Augustine's different usages of the term Domus Dei, see E. Lamirande, 'Domus Dei', Augustinus-Lexicon, ed. Cor nelius Mayer, vol. 2, fasc. 3-4 (1999). 19 Sermo 337.1 and 337.4 (PL 38,1476 and 1477). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons 1III9, 271, 273. 20 Possidius cites this letter in its entirety in the penultimate chapter of his biography of Augustine. See Possidius, Vita Aug. 30.7, tr. F.R. Hoare, The Western Fathers. 237. 21 Augustine, de civitate Dei 22.8; see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, new edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 416-8.

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he delivered there. Six to seven minutes in length, it was unusually short by Augustine's standards. No doubt the weather was beastly hot, but meteorolog ical conditions alone did not prompt him to curtail his remarks. Instead, it is clear from the start that he was tired, feeling every bit his seventy years, and chagrined that his fellow bishops who had come for the festivities were not being helpful at all. The gospel reading for that day (the parable of the sloth ful servant who is condemned for burying the talent given to him rather than investing it) further emboldened him. Sermon 94 commences with this salvo: My lords, brethren and fellow bishops have indeed been good enough to visit us and cheer us with their presence, but goodness knows why they refuse to help poor, weary me. The reason I have said this to your graces while they are listening is in order that your hearing it may somehow appeal to them on my behalf to preach a sermon or two themselves when I ask them to. Let them invest what they have received, let them be good enough to work, rather than make excuses. Tired out though I am, and scarcely able to speak, accept ungrudgingly a few words from me ...n Augustine is candid here; he needs help in building God's church. Too often, scholars simply assume that the African bishops enjoyed great collegiality; they cite Zmire's well-known article as sufficient evidence23. However, colle giality required effort and good will and was not easy to achieve in an epis copate so large and so widely dispersed. In fact, torpor and indifference posed a significant problem as Munier has noted in his studies on the African councils24. Finally, Augustine's sermons at colleagues' funerals must be mentioned. Only one such sermon survives, though I expect to find allusions to his partic ipation in such rites as my research continues. Sermon 396 is a short, heartfelt address to a grieving congregation. Augustine never mentions the deceased bishop's name, but Perler has argued persuasively that it was Florentius, bishop of Hippo Diarrytus and close friend of Augustine25. It suffices to say that Augustine, too, admits being overwhelmed with grief, but nonetheless seeks to console the congregation. In the winter of 429, Augustine received an invitation from a priest named Nobilius, inviting him to attend the dedication of a new church. Augustine's reply (Letter 269) is one of the last missives he ever wrote. It is short but disarmingly charming. With rhetorical grace and polish learnt more than half a century earlier, Augustine regrets that he cannot come. Winter and old age have finally got the better of him. He cannot face the prospect of travel. 22 Sermo 94.1 (PL 38, 580). Tr. E. Hill, Sermons 1II13, 478. 23 P. /.mire. 'Recherches sur la collegialite episcopale dans l'Eglise d'Afrique,' RAug 7 (1971), 3-72. 24 C. Munier, Vie conciliaire (London: Variorum, 1987). 25 Perler, Les voyages, 352-4. Criteria for dating Augustine's sermons on death in Eric Rebillard, 'Interaction Between the Preacher and His Audience: The Case-Study of Augustine's Preaching on Death', SP XXXI (1997), 86-96.

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Augustine's vision for a rejuvenated Catholic Church in Africa permeated all aspects of his ministry from a very early date. For him the Church is founded on Christ: Christ is the head; the Church is his body, encompassing all the faithful (Christus Totus, Caput et Corpus). It was not enough for Augustine to write tomes against Manichaeans, Donatists, Pelagians, Arians. It was not enough for him to attend provincial and plenary councils, helping draft canons and oftentimes working behind the scenes. It was not enough for him to preach at Hippo and Carthage. In journeys and sermons now lost to us, in chapels and basilicas great and small, Augustine also built up God's house at church dedications, consecrations, and colleagues' funerals.

The Concept of Person in Augustine's De Trinitate

Edward Morgan, Jesus College, Cambridge

In what follows I will refer to the Latin term persona as a starting point for a broader discussion of human identity in the De Trinitate, and will move from it to suggest a framework within which I view Augustine configuring a general account of human identity in the work1. The chief metaphor in this framework will be that of conversation, and I will here attempt to provide the grounds upon which the metaphor of conversation between God and the human person is a profitable mode of understanding the theological exploration that Augus tine undertakes in the De Trinitate. Augustine encounters a problem with the word persona in his exploration of its use as a term for speaking about the individual members of the Trinity in Book 7 of the De Trinitate. Here he concludes that the only reason to use this word in referring to the members of the Trinity is in order to have 'any one word' (unum aliquod vocabulum) with which to avoid lapsing into silence when asked what it means to say that God is a trinity2. His answer reflects an apophaticism concerning the possibility of philosophically grounding the word persona any further than its simple status as a word. This discussion occupies the latter part of his thought in Book V. However, it is an apophaticism that has its kataphatic counterpart in an earlier part of his discussion, especially in Books 1-4. Here he proposes that the economic Trinity's manifestation enables us to glimpse the nature of the Trinity's eternal relationships in and of them selves. He states it succinctly:

1 Substantial exploration of the christological significance of the Latin term persona, with respect both to the De Trinitate and to Augustine's broader corpus, has already been done by H. Drobner. See his Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus. Zur Herkunft der Formel Una Persona (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986). 2 Augustine, De Trinitate (henceforth DT) 7.1 1 ; cf. DT 7.9. All English translations of this text are my own, unless otherwise noted. In the case of other translations apart from my own, I use the translation by E. Hill, The Trinity, The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21a century, Part I, vol. 5 (New York: New City Press, 1991). I have found this version of the text very helpful in preparing my own translations. The Latin version of Augustine's text, on which the translations are based, is the Corpus Christianorum edition, Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Trinitate Libri XV, CCL L-LA (Tumholt: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1968). My reference system is to the book and the chapter of the Latin text, the latter as indicated by Arabic numerals in this edition. 3 DT 7.7-11.

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[J]ust as being born means for the Son his being from the Father, so his being sent means his being known to be from him. And just as for the Holy Spirit his being the gift of God means his proceeding from the Father, so his being sent means his being known to proceed from him4. The operation of the Trinity in time, most specifically the sending of the Son and the Spirit, provides the foundation for understanding the Trinity's eternal and immanent relations. As Augustine observes in the same context, the Father is sent by no one and hence must be the source of all divinity (totius divinitatis vel si melius dicitur deitatis principium pater est)5. The importance of these observations is that, quite unlike the apophaticism Augustine encounters in his attempt to engage the meaning of the term persona with respect to the mem bers of the Trinity, the manifestation of the Trinity in creation establishes the possibility of human speaking and thinking about God. All of this may seem like so much theological commonplace. Scriptural testi mony and its exegesis, on which basis Augustine expounds these descriptions of the trinitarian God, is of course the foundation of doctrinal and dogmatic theology. However, when placed alongside some remarks Augustine himself makes con cerning the specifics of the economic Trinity, most especially the economic Trin ity's activity in the incarnation, the significance of Augustine's kataphatic trinitarianism becomes slightly clearer. Describing the relationship between human thought and its formation into speech, a process which involves the passage from an inner word of thought to one which can be heard by the senses, Augustine draws a direct analogy between this process and the incarnation. He says, The word which sounds outside is a sign of the word which lights up inside, which inner word primarily deserves the name of 'word'. For the word that is uttered by the mouth of flesh is the sound of a word, and it is also called word because of the one which assumes it in order to be manifested outwardly. Thus in a certain fashion our inner word becomes a bodily sound (vox quodam modo corporis fit) by assuming that in which it is manifested to human senses, just as the Word of God became flesh by assuming that in which it too could be manifested to human senses6. In Augustine's understanding of language, speech is an analogue of the incar nation. On his reading of it here the incarnation is God's speech-act7. 1 will put 4 DT 4.29: Hill's translation. 5 DT 4.28-29. DT 4.28 is the precise statement of the Father's distinction from the Son and the Spirit, in so far as the Father has no one to proceed from - Sed pater cum ex tempore a quoquam cognoscitur, non dicitur missus; non enim habet de quo sit aut ex quo procedat. DT 4.29, the source of the quotation cited in the text, is the summary of this position. 6 DT, 15.20. 7 The philosophical vocabulary of 'speech-acts' obviously owes its origin to J.L. Austin (How To Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)) and was substantially developed by J. R. Searle (Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1969)). My own use of the term does not owe specific allegiance to this school. However, it is clear that Austin's and Searle's exploration of the notion that speech is in a sig nificant sense performative has good correlation with the account of the incarnation Augustine is providing here. It could be an interesting further study to pursue this relation.

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this remark alongside another that Augustine makes concerning the relation ship between language, thought, and the transcendence of God, and then make some clarifiying connections between Augustine's vision of the incarnation, the economic Trinity, and human language. Augustine states, [T]he total transcendence of the godhead quite surpasses the capacity of ordinary speech. God can be thought about more truly than God can be talked about, and God is more truly than God can be thought about8. Language sits on the bottom of a three-rung scale of truth. The scale moves up from language to thought and then finally to God, who transcends both lan guage and thought. Now, given the apparently lowly status of language in this description by Augustine, one might well ask what my concern with it is and why I am focusing on it in his thought. The answer is of course provided by the remark previously cited, where Augustine makes the explicit analogy between human speech and the incarnation. For Augustine, human speech-acts stand in anal ogy to the way the incarnation took place. Speech is for Augustine the mani festation of previously hidden thoughts to the external and perceptible world, 'to human senses' (sensibus hominumf. The incarnation is thereby the speech of God, and according to Augustine's explanation of the role of the economic Trinity in revealing the Trinity's eternal relations, the content of God's speech in the incarnation is to communicate both that God is a trinity and to provide preliminary insight into the meaning of this term. As Augustine stated above, the incarnation enables us to see that the Son is sent from the Father, on which basis Augustine speaks of the Son as bom from the Father etemally10. The Spirit, similarly, is said by the incarnate Christ to be sent by the Father, on which basis Augustine determines that the Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father". Thus in so far as the incarnation is God's speech, and we as human people can respond to God at least through our reflection on God's speech, then so does the incarnation invite the human person into a conversa tion with God that is explicitly trinitarian. We noted above that Augustine sees human language at the bottom of a three-rung scale of truth that moves up through thought and then to God. So might it be said the human person moves closer to God, who is truth, through reflection on God's trinitarian speech in the incarnation and the trinitarian vocabulary it provides12. Such a vocabulary, while certainly specialised and having its origin in the particular ity of divine speech, must also interact with the words of ordinary speech. 8 DT 7.7. 9 DT 15.20. 10 DT 4.29. " DT 4.29. Cf. Jn 15.26. Augustine claims also that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. How ever, I am not setting out here to discuss this controversial claim. 12 Augustine identifies God with truth at, e.g., DT 8.3: Ecce vide si potes, o anima ... deus veritas est.

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Thus it is in dialogue with ordinary human language and ordinary human speaking that, through trinitarian conversation with God, we are able to ascend to God, who in transcendence is also the truth which all created things reflect, including human language13. If the thought of God as speaker in the incarnation provides the foundation for the idea that trinitarian conversation is a constructive way of understanding the relationship between divine and human being in the De Trinitate, then in what will this conversation consist? To whom will the human person speak, and what will be the details of this interaction? What I would like to do for the remainder of this paper is to outline briefly what I understand to be Augus tine's vision of the central role of the Spirit in this conversational interaction between God and humanity. In a more detailed exposition of the way to understand the particular char acter of the eternal relations of the Trinity, Augustine determines that the proper name of the Spirit is 'love' (dilectio, caritas)14. He does this in view of the statement in the First Epistle of John that 'God is love and whoever abides in love abides in God'15. This is brought into dialogue with the Pauline remark that 'the love of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us'16. Augustine concludes that the Spirit must simul taneously be love and gift, since we are able to love God in the Spirit, who is gift to us17. His discussion here reflects very much his concern with the pri macy of the economic Trinity in understanding the eternal nature of God. The Spirit is love, and as he states it elsewhere the Spirit is the love between Father and Son18. But we know that the Spirit is love primarily because of the Spirit's gift to us of the love of God which is poured out into our hearts. Therefore the Spirit's interaction with time, or more specifically with time-bound creatures such as we are, provides the necessary insight into the Spirit's existence in 13 For the idea that God is the goodness of all created things, see DT 8.4-5. Speech which 'delightfully informs and appropriately moves one listening to it' is one of various goods listed as reflecting God's goodness at DT 8.4: [BJona locutio suaviter docens et congruenter movens audientem. 14 Dilectio and caritas are equivalents in the De Trinitate in so far as Augustine uses them interchangeably when discussing especially 1 John, which describes God as love. See, for exam ple, his discussion at DT 15.31, where Augustine uses caritas and dilectio interchangeably with respect to precisely the same biblical quotation (1 Jn 4.7-8). By the time he returns to the dis cussion at DT 15.37, exactly the same sense of the word 'love' is used with respect to caritas that has predominantly been the focus of dilectio at DT 15.31. The Corpus Christianorum notes to Augustine's text demonstrate the extent to which these terms are equivalents with reference to the same biblical passage, and seem to suggest that Augustine may have had differing versions of the same text available to him. 15 1 Jn 4.16. See DT 6.7; 7.6; 15.31; 15.37. Augustine makes the identification of the sub stance of God with love (caritas) at DT 6.7. 16 Rom. 5.5. DT 15.31. 17 DT 15.31. 18 DT5.12.

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eternity. If, as I suggested above, a correct way of interpreting this meeting between eternity and time is the trinitarian conversation it invokes between God and humanity, Augustine's remarks on the Spirit begin to frame this con versational relationship as one centred in love. God is love, and through the Spirit we converse with the love which is God. It is a conversation of love that also involves other people, as he explains elsewhere in identifying God with the love by which we ought to love other people. He says: Let no one say, 'I don't know what to love.' Let him love his brother, and love that same love; after all, he knows the love he loves with better than he knows the brother he loves.... Embrace love which is God, and embrace God with love (Amplectere dilectionem dewn et dilectione amplectere deum)19. As the love with which we love others, God is closer to us than those we love. And given his explicit identification of love (dilectio, caritas) with the Spirit, it is reasonable to assume that he understands the Spirit as the person of the Trinity who inspires such acts of love. Augustine in fact makes this connection in his later discussion: So it is God the Holy Spirit proceeding from God who fires us to the love of God and neighbour when he has been given to us (cum datus fuerit homini accendit eum in dilectionem dei et proximi), and the Holy Spirit himself is love (ipse dilectio est)20. Hence in the example above, concerning love of one's brother, there is a con versation taking place between the human person and God concerning the social world in which the human person lives. We realise God's intimate presence through loving others, and we discover God's presence in love once we under take this activity. This conversation has its parallel in Augustine's description of his inspiration by Paul's ministry as it is described in 2 Corinthians. Augustine notes that Paul's account stirs up in him a 'burning charity' (vita credita. . . flagrantiorem excitat caritatem)21. However, he also explains that it is not so much Paul who inspires him as God, whom he perceives through Paul's ministry: [T]hat God's ministers should live like Paul we do not believe on hearing it from someone else, we observe it within ourselves (intus apud nos), or rather above our selves in truth itself (supra nos in ipsa veritate) . . . . [UJnless above all we loved this form which we perceive always enduring, never changing, we would not love Paul just because we hold on faith that his life when lived in the flesh was adapted to and har monious with this form22. Encounter with God in God's intimate immanence and simultaneous transcen dence is primary to any recognition of God's action in other people, for instance 19 20 21 22

DT 8.12. DT 15.31. DT 8.13. The Pauline text to which Augustine refers here is 2 Cor. 6.2-10. DT8.13.

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in the life of the apostle Paul. However, this recognition is prompted by love, burning charity, that as noted above Augustine identifies with the Spirit who is love itself. Thus conversation with God, whether it takes place in scriptural or social contexts and with respect either to our neighbour or to the ministry of someone like Paul, has the Spirit of God, who is caritas or dilectio, at its centre. What has been found in this exploration? Firstly, that Augustine's account of the nature of personhood in the Trinity depends upon an engagement with the Trinity as the Trinity has operated in time. The central moment of this activity is the incarnation. Secondly, in so far as Augustine deploys an analogy between human speech and God's action in the incarnation, then so can the incarnation be seen as God's speech to the human person. The incarnation in fact reads as the commencement of an explicitly trinitarian conversation between God and humanity, whereby through the incarnation humanity recog nises as Trinity the God who addresses it. Reflection on this conversation leads the human person closer to God, who is truth. Finally, the Spirit inspires this conversation. In so far as the Spirit is the love through which we love both God and our neighbour, and through which we respond to an example such as the apostle Paul with burning charity, then so also does the Spirit inspire our lives to transformed, loving participation in human reality. In virtue of the Spirit human reality becomes for us, to borrow Hopkins's phrase, 'immortal diamond'23, to which we respond in deepening participatory relationship to God. But if trinitarian conversation is a framework within which Augustine enables us to understand human relationship to God, then so also does Augus tine allow eschatology to have the final word on the outcome of this frame work as a description of human personhood. Augustine says that eschatologically we will see God 'face to face' (facie adfaciem)24. In such direct vision there will not be an end to conversation with God, as much as there will be its final transformation. The conversation there, as he states, will be transformed into a perpetual hymn of praise: So when we attain to you, o God, there will be an end to these many things that we say and do not attain. And you will remain one, yet all in all, and without end we shall say one thing praising you in unison, even ourselves being made one in you25.

23 Gerard Manley Hopkins, 'That Nature Is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection', in Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. R. Bridges, 3rd edn, ed. W. H. Gardner (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 1 1 1-12. 24 DT 1.16. Cf. ICor. 13.12. 25 DT 15.51.

Augustine's Interpretation of Genesis in the City of God XI-XV John M. Norris, Dallas

Though Augustine spent more ink on the exegesis of the book of Genesis than on any other book of the bible, and though a major portion of the City of God, Books XI-XVI, could be considered an extended commentary on Gene sis, few scholars have focused upon the importance of Genesis for Augustine's theory of the two cities. Yet Augustine himself clearly considers that the inten tion of the sacred author of Genesis is to describe the history of the City of God and the City of Man1. Typically, origins for Augustine's theory of the two cities are posited in the vestiges of Manichaeism, in Tyconian Donatism, in Neoplatonic dualism, in the spiritual biblical interpretation of Origen and Ambrose, or if in the scriptures, in the Book of Revelation, or in the Psalms. These sources are then seen as the standards by which Augustine reads and interprets (some would say misinterprets) Genesis. However, Vernon Bourke does concede that 'The Scriptural origin of this treatment of the two cities may even be traced back to Genesis'2. Nevertheless, Augustine's interpretation of Genesis is generally regarded as eisegetically handicapped. He is purported to read into the text a theory of the two cities that he has already inherited or developed theologically elsewhere. What I propose here is that Augustine's theory of the two cities is also dependent upon his reading and reflection upon Genesis and that Genesis should be considered as a serious source for his understanding of the two cities. I would also assert coincidentally that Augus tine's reading of Genesis is an insightful exegesis of the text and not merely an imposed reading. When we see Augustine reading Genesis here, he does so in a synthetic way, looking at the work within a broad scope, regarding seriously the intentions of the author. Finally, I would propose that such a position strengthens a view which is found more and more in Augustinian scholarship 1 De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, Libri XI-XXII, CCL 48 (Brepols: Tumhout, 1955), XV.8, (p. 463): Propositum quippe scriptoris illiusfuit, per quem sanctus Spiritus id agebat, per successiones certarum generationum ex uno homing propagatarum peruenire ad Abra ham ac deinde ex eius semine ad populum Dei. 'Naturally, the purpose of the writer, through whom the Holy Spirit was working for that purpose, was to arrive at Abraham by the successions of particular generations propagated from one man, and from his seed to the people of God . . . ' 2 'The City of God and History', in The City of God: a Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Dorothy F. Donelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 293-4.

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- to wit, that if we are to understand Augustine's theology, we must focus more closely on his interpretation of the scriptures as his primary source. Here I cite Frederick van Fleteren, who wrote, 'The canons of Augustine's thought stem principally, though of course not exclusively, from Scripture; and the standards by which he exegizes Scripture come, by and large, from Scripture itself...'3 Augustine begins the second half of the City of God declaring, 'The city of God of which we are speaking is witnessed to by the Scriptures'4. The follow ing material illustrates his conviction that the bible is the primary source for his historical vision. Soon Augustine begins his task: I shall speak, as much as I am able, about the beginning, the extension, and the fated ends of the two cities, namely the earthly and the heavenly, which in this age mean while are confused, as we said, and mutually intermixed ...5 This task is fulfilled primarily by his exposition of Genesis from its beginnings to the covenant with Abraham, where he finds just such an exposition of the origin of humankind and human society. I will begin my examination of Augustine's interpretation with some com mentary upon similarities between Augustine's presentation and understanding of the two cities and the literary character of Genesis. Though perhaps too obvi ous to be mentioned, the first and clearest similarity is the common narratological framework of both works. Both present the creation of humanity and the development of human society as the basis for the revelation of God's plan of salvation, whether for Israel or for the Church. This joining of creation myth and the legends of human origins as a prologue to the description of the salva tion history of the people of God is profoundly formative for the Christian tra dition, and especially for Augustine. The portrayal of God's action in creation and history and of humanity's nature and their response to God throughout the beginnings of human civilization offers a basic catechesis in the faith. As schol ars have noted before, there is a great resemblance in material, if not in length, between Augustine's De catechizandis rudibus and the second half of the City of God6. When Augustine wishes to present the basics of the Christian faith, he does so through a retelling of the Genesis material. Augustine does so for two main reasons. The Jewish tradition and the Christian tradition stemming from it had become inseparable from this narrative prototype. And the subject matter in itself and in its interpretative heritage offered a brilliant platform from which to 3 'Miscellaneous Observations', in Donelly, 416. 4 Civ. Dei XI. 1: Ciuitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea scriptura testis est (321). 5 Civ. Dei XI. 1: de duarum ciuitatum, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodam modo diximus inuicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum ualuero, disputare ... (321-2). 6 Johannes van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's City of God and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 38, 188-92.

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begin either a simple or a most complex discussion of the Christian faith. Hence it is no wonder that when Augustine seeks a format for this most majestic of his works, he relies once again upon the narrative framework of Genesis, just as he did to conclude his Confessions. Whereas in the Confessions, Genesis serves as an interpretative model for the individual life, here it functions as a model for communal human life. This is a catechetical framework he inherits, and one that he finds especially significant and useful given his apologetics against the Manichees, who reject this vision of God, humanity, and the world. For it is not only the narrative framework which Augustine returns to again and again. The basic theological content and the fundamental theological questions that are asked by the book of Genesis continue to draw the full power of Augustine's intellect to bear upon them. Augustine's contemplation and development of this content, and his speculation brought up by Genesis encompass a significant percentage of the latter half of the City of God. When we examine the basics of Augustine's understanding of the two cities, we see that he has adapted much of what we find when we read Gen esis. Genesis itself uses a historical presentation of the origins of human society in order to show, first, the great design God has for humankind, how and why human society has gone astray, and how by God's plan in Abraham, humanity can be called by God to fulfil that original plan, to be blessed, to be fruitful, numerous, and prosperous, through faith and obedience to the covenant. In Genesis, this narrative takes the situation and questions of the contemporary Israelite society and places them within a mythological con text in order to clarify and sharpen the issues. The covenant law is symbol ized by the command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. The motivation for disobedience is contemplated through the mechanism of the story of the serpent, Eve, and Adam. The effects of covenantal disobedience are portrayed through God's punishments and the expulsion from the garden. Just like Psalm 1, Genesis is clearly trying to delineate two ways of life, in order to encourage one and discourage the other. By the time we get to Gen esis 1 1 and 1 2, we find the author deliberately contrasting two different com munities, which nevertheless seem to have similar goals or human desires. The people of Babel build a city to seek a name for themselves, desiring not to be scattered over the face of the earth, but they do so by themselves and achieve the exactly the result they feared. In deliberate contrast, God calls Abram to be the father of a people, and promises to make a name for him, but God does so on his own terms, emphasizing obedience and human dependence upon God for the fulfilment of his promises. Here we see the author(s) of Genesis deliberately interpreting the current Israelite history, their separation and division from pagan nations like Babylon, in terms of an ancient and prototypical difference between ways of life and civilization. Augustine as well takes the historical situation of the sack of Rome and the

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accompanying theological dilemmas and examines them through the metanarrative of the two cities, a narrative he borrows directly from Genesis. Much of what has been stated here in this description of Genesis can be found as keystones to Augustine's vision of the two cities. One element we find strongly in common between Genesis and Augustine's portrayal of the two human groups is the understanding of the origins of human sinfulness. Augustine's theory of sinfulness as a perversion of a proper hierarchy of loves is certainly well known. Yet the text of Genesis emphasizes again and again this problem of human reversal of hierarchies. Eve listens to the snake and Adam listens to Eve, and all three do not attend to God, when the opposite order should be preserved. And in punishment God once again establishes the proper order by force. The serpent is subject to the woman, who is subjected to the man, who is then subject to God. Augustine comments, For if the will had remained stable in love of the superior and immutable good, by which it is purified in order to see and enkindled in order to love, then it would not have been turned away toward its own pleasure. The will would not from this have been so darkened and numbed that the woman would believe what the serpent said to be true, nor would he have put his wife above the will of God ...7 This emphasis upon human independence as a slight and affront to God is repeated again in both the tale of the Nephilim and especially that of the tower of Babel. Augustine can be said to encapsulate the position of Genesis when he writes, 'However by desiring more, one is made less; when one chooses to be sufficient unto oneself, one abandons Him who is truly sufficient for one'8. Though some find that Augustine's portrayal of human inability for good ness is a radical departure from the Christian tradition before him, and certainly from Genesis9, a closer comparison of the two texts shows that both strongly emphasize the capacity for wickedness among human beings. After a brief period in Eden, Genesis focuses much more upon the failures of humanity, the disobedience and expulsion of Eve and Adam, the murderous character of Cain,

7 Civ. Dei XIV. 13: quoniam si uoluntas in amore superioris immutabilis boni, a quo inlustrabatur ut uideret et accendebatur ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum auerteretur et ex hoc tenebresceret et frigesceret, ut uel ilia crederet uerum dixisse serpentem, uel ille Dei mandato uxoris praeponeret uoluntatem (434). 8 Civ. Dei XIV. 1 3: Plus autem appetendo minus est, qui, dum sibi sufficere deligit, ab illo. qui ei uere sufficit, deficit (435). 9 Elaine Pagels writes, 'The work from Augustine's later years, radically breaking with many of his predecessors, effectively transformed the teaching of the Christian faith. Instead of the freedom of the will and humanity's original royal dignity, Augustine emphasizes the bondage of the will by depicting humanity as sick, suffering, and helpless, irreparably damaged by the Fall. For that "original sin," Augustine insists, involved nothing else than Adam's prideful attempt to establish his own autonomous self-government. Astonishingly, Augustine's radical views pre vailed, eclipsing for future generations of Western Christians the consensus of the first three cen turies of Christian tradition' ('The Politics of Paradise', in Donelly, 373-4.

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the horrendous example of Lamech, the situation with the Nephilim, the uni versal wickedness of humanity during the time of the flood, and even after the beginning of the Noadic covenant, the error of Ham and the wilfulness of the people of Babel. As a commentary on the general character of human exis tence, the decision in Genesis to make Cain the opening lead in the history of humanity outside the garden illustrates its stark vision of human nature and human community. Though Genesis does not develop a systematic explanation for the origin of human wickedness as Augustine does, nevertheless Augus tine's perspective on the likelihood of human sinfulness does not fall far from the tree (pardon the pun). Yet like Genesis, Augustine holds that there is hope, and the story of human wickedness should inspire great hope for those who belong to the community called by God. In Genesis he finds both cities described, because thus it was proper to portray these two cities, one going from murder to mur der (for Lamech reveals to his two wives that he has committed homicide), the other by him who hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God10. In conclusion, in this brief excursus I have tried to offer a couple of impor tant points where one can see that Augustine's theology of the two cities is clearly in harmony with the theology of Genesis, and thus perhaps dependent upon it. Though Augustine's thought in this area is also dependent upon other areas of both the Old and New Testaments, as well as the Jewish and Christ ian traditions which he inherits. Genesis should also be regarded as a prime element in his sources for the City of God and the City of Man. This depen dence is evident not only in the amount of time that Augustine spends in com menting upon Genesis in the second half of the City of God, but also in his perception of the division in human communities from the beginning of human history, with the major error of human sinfulness lying in a dependence upon self rather than a reliance upon God, and in the rather pessimistic vision he has of the possibility of human goodness apart from the direct intervention of God. Such a conclusion also leads us to see that Augustine's exegesis of Genesis is not as outrageous as some have supposed. True, there are times when Augus tine forces this system of the two cities upon the text, for example when he considers Abel's lack of a foundation of a city to be a sign of the pilgrim-like character of the City of God, and not a mere by-product of his early and unfor tunate death". Yet despite these occasional irregularities, Augustine's com mentary on Genesis is a faithful, insightful, and foundational reading.

10 Civ. Dei XV.21: quia sic oportebat istas duas proponere ciuitates, unam per homicidam usque ad homicidam (nam et Lamech duabus uxoribus suis se perpetrasse homicidium confitetur), alteram per eum, qui sperauit inuocare nomen Domini Dei (486). 11 Civ. Dei XV. 1 (454).

Christ and Melchizedek both Fatherless and Motherless in the Christology of Augustine of Hippo

Piotr Paciorek, Naples, Florida

The question of the origin of the Son of God played an important role in the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries largely because the origin of the existence of a person determined his status. This paper will investigate the notion of 'two births', that is, two generations, relating to the divinity and humanity of Christ, and will use a dialectical method to expound upon this notion so as to reach greater theological comprehension. Augustine of Hippo actively defended the Catholic position in the midst of these contro versies. He developed the concept of the two births of Christ concerning his divinity and humanity, especially his eternal pre-existence and his existence in historical time. Augustine's Christology is rooted in the teaching of Johannine literature. Christ's eternal pre-existence ('the Word was with God') and his existence in historical time accordingly to the Logos-sarx Christology ('the Word became flesh') inaugurated the concept of the 'two generations of Christ'. A fundamental point of Augustine's Christology is the statement that Christ was born from God. This includes the pre-existent Christ as God from all eternity as well as the incarnation of the Word of God in time, bora of the Virgin Mary. The exegetical key to an understanding of Augustine's idea of someone 'born both without a father and without a mother' is the biblical concept of Melchizedek1. This image is present in biblical statements and in patristic the ology, and this personage was known in the Jewish, Gnostic, and Christian tra ditions2. The divine generation of the Only-begotten Son of God in Augustine's writings is exemplified by the symbolic character of Melchizedek, especially in Augustine's expression that the Son of God was born 'without a Mother and without a human father'. The Son of God has, therefore, a resemblance to 1 See Martin McNamara, 'Melchizedek: Gen 14, 17-20 in the Targums, in Rabbinic and Early Christian Literature', Biblica 81 (2000), 1-31; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, 'Melchizedek in the MT, LXX, and the NT', Biblica 81 (2000) 63-9; Florentine, Garcia Martinez, 'Las tradiciones sobre Melquisedec en los manuscritos de Qumran', Biblica 81 (2000) 70-80; Deborah W. Rooke, 'Jesus as Royal Priest: Reflections on the Interpretation of the Melchizedek Tradition in Heb 7', Biblica 81 (2000)81-94. 2 See C. Gianotto, 'Le personnage de Melkisedeq dans les documents gnostiques en langue copte', SP XVII. 1 (1982), 209-13.

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Melchizedek. In fact, they have common characteristics, being of both human and divine origin. Some early Christian groups, especially in Egypt, identified Melchizedek with the Son of God, Jesus Christ3. Evidently, one common ele ment they share is a priesthood4 ('the Anointed One') that originates from God. Understanding the biblical character of Melchizedek also helps deepen our understanding of the theology of Mary in Augustine's work. This study endeav ours to highlight the importance of precise theological language for human comprehension. The example of Melchizedek in Augustine's biblico-patristic Christology is particularly relevant, because it contains three issues, namely, the biblical definition of Melchizedek, his relationship to Christ, and Augustine's definition of Christ. The biblical definition of Melchizedek highlights one of the main characteristics for patristic Christology, especially for the Christology of Augustine. It is necessary to note that the biblical context of Augustine's Christology provides one of the most important aspects of his definitions. In his writings, Augustine evoked several expressions concerning the theme of Melchizedek. For instance, he notes the messianic and eschatological aspect of Melchizedek, king ('King of Salem') and priest ('Priest of the Most High God'), as a prefiguration of the Son of God5. Also in Psalm 110:4, the Mes siah is styled 'a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek'. Mystery and ambiguity enshroud the example of Melchizedek. It is quite possible that Augustine used the figure of Melchizedek to explain the two generations of Christ as well as the relationship between the human and divine in Christ. In Augustine's statements concerning Christ we find descriptive resem blances that resonate to the biblical description of Melchizedek. Christ is sim ilar to Melchizedek since both, in a certain sense, are fatherless, motherless, and without genealogy. Their beginning and end is neither comprehended nor comprehensible. In fact, the biblical presentation of Melchizedek's character istics is rather enigmatic. The identification of Melchizedek as a theophany, or an appearance of the pre-incarnate Christ in the Old Testament6, can be under stood as based on Hebrews 7:3: 'He is without father or mother or genealogy, and has neither beginning of days nor end of life, thus made to resemble the Son of God, he remains a priest forever.' This statement indicates that Melchizedek had a priestly office by special divine appointment, and was thus a prototype of the priesthood of Jesus Christ. The fact that Melchizedek was 3 See the Introduction, 'Melchizedek and Nag Hammadi Codex IX: Melchizedek' , in The Coptic Gnostic Library. A Complete Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices, vol. V, introduction and notes by Birger A. Pearson (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 19-40, 42-85. 4 Ambrosius Mediolanensis, De fide III.89 (CSEL 78, 140): 'Ergo ilium Melchisedech in Christi typo sacerdotem dei accepimus.' 5 Gerald Bonner, 'The Doctrine of Sacrifice: Augustine and the Latin Patristic Tradition', in Bonner, Church and Faith in the Patristic Tradition (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1996), II. See Augustinus, Enarratio in Psalmum 109.17 (CCL 40, 1616-17). 6 Gn 14:18-20; Ps 110:4; Heb 5:6-11; Heb 6:20-7:28.

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one 'resembling the Son of God' (Heb 7:3) suggests that he was only the prefiguration of the Son of God. In Augustine's De doctrina christiana, we find the following quote from Cyprian of Carthage: Melchisedech typum Christi portaret ('Melchizedek holds the image of Christ')7. However, the key ques tion concerning this expression is to what extent does Augustine regard Melchizedek as an image of Christ? Why did this biblical person prefigure Christ and indirectly encrypt his enigmatic origin? An important idea closely connected with the birth of the Son is the question of the eternity of the Son. However, the fact of his birth presupposes the Father, and the name Father presupposes his birth. This can be understood by analysing the August inian antithetical description of sine matre, sine patre and sine initio*. All three suggest the eternal birth or generation of the Only-begotten Son. Hence, the Son is generated ab aeterno since non-exis tence at a given time is contrary to eternity of existence. Augustine maintains that the Son is 'true God from true God'. The words 'begotten not made' refer to the peculiarity of his divine origin, or his beginning from eternity, not to his human beginning in time. Yet the notion of the two generations of Christ is nonetheless implied. He was born from eternity, receiving birth from the eter nity of the Father, and he was born from the Virgin Mary. The Son was engen dered of the Father from all eternity, before all time (filius aniens de patre in aeternum ab aeterno genitus, aequalis gignenti9), meaning that from eternity he is with the Father. Since the beginning of the Arian controversy, questions about the generation of the Son became one of the main topics in Christian thought. The Arians ascribed to Christ a beginning in time and an origin out of nothing. According to the Bishop of Hippo, Christ was begotten, and his birth is peculiar to the Father. Yet the first ecumenical Council of Nicaea taught that the Son is 'one in being (substance) with the Father', a phrase that was intro duced precisely to counter the Arians and maintain the eternal equality of the Son. Generation is the eternal and changeless activity in the Godhead by which the Father produces the Son without division of essence and by which the Son is identified as an individual subsistence. The generation of the Son can be described as an eternal and perpetual relation in the Godhead. In many places, Augustine emphatically uses the formula sine matre, especially in Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium10 and in his Sermonesn. When he spoke of 7 See Cyprianus Carthaginensis, Epistula 63.2-4 (CSEL 3, 702); Augustinus, De doctrina christiana IV.21, 45 (CCL 32, 152); IV.126 (CSEL 80, 154); Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram X.19.34(PL34. 423). 8 Augustinus, Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium 104.3 (CCL 36, 603); 1 15.4 (CCL 36, 645). 9 Augustinus, Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium 46.3 (CCL 36, 399). 10 Augustinus, Tractatus in Iohannis Euangelium 8.8 (CCL 36, 86-7); 12.8 (CCL 36, 125); 14.2 (CCL 36, 125); 26.10 (CCL 36, 264); 33.2 (CCL 36, 307). 11 Augustinus, Sermo 44.3. 6 (PL 38, 260); 140.2 (PL 38, 773); 184.2.3 (PL 38, 997); 187.1.1 (PL 38, 1001); 189.4.4 (PL 38, 1006); 190.2.2 (PL 38, 1007-8); 194.1.1 (PL 38, 1015); 195.1 (PL 38, 1017); 214.6 (PL 38, 1068); 305.4 (PL 38, 1399).

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the duae (ambae) nativitates of Christ, the one divine and the other human, he uses the antithetical expression sine matre and sine patre. Yet the Bishop of Hippo also used the formulation that Christ was born ex patre and ex matre or ex virgine. In his interpretation, Augustine presents two kinds of formulations. First, he argues that the birth of Christ is from God the Father without a mother. The second birth is from the womb of Mary without a father. This is a major point in the Augustinian definition of Christ, which combined rhetorical art with a biblical definition of Melchizedek. 'The birth of Christ from the Father was without a mother; the birth of Christ from his mother was without a father (a Patre sine matre, et a matre sine patre); each birth was wonderful. The first was eternal, the second took place in time'12. The implication is that from the Father the birth was divine, while from the Mother the birth was human. 'There are two births of our Lord Jesus Christ, the one divine, the other human; both marvellous; the first without a woman as mother, the second without a man as father'13. Using this chiasmus, Augustine tried to express the mystery of the eternal birth (before all time) of the Son from the Father and the birth of Christ from Mary in time. Thus, the biblical definition of Melchizedek is only a point of departure for Augus tine's Christology. Augustine invites us to question how and against whom he used the biblical concept of Melchizedek in his polemical controversies. In order to analyse these questions, we first need to find a similar expression in the writings of Augustine's contemporaries. Then we need to confront directly the erroneous positions of heretical thinkers who denied either the divinity or the humanity of Christ. We will pursue both a diachronic and a synchronic method in order to understand how Augustine's view of Melchizedek relates to the figure of Christ, whose birth before time is beyond human comprehension. Among ecclesiastical writers, Tertullian is probably the first before Augus tinian times who highlighted that Christ cannot have a human father, because if anyone accepts the human father he denies the Fatherhood of God14. In his work On the Flesh of Christ, Tertullian declares that Christ before the human birth has a father without human mother, and for his human birth he has a human mother without human father15. The Christian poet Lac tan ti us argued that the first birth of Christ - a spiritual birth - was without a mother, but from God the Father (In prima enim nativitate spiritali dndxo)p fuit, quia sine offi cio matris a solo Deo Patre generatus est). The second birth of Christ - a human birth - was without a human father, but from a human mother (In 12 Augustinus, Sermo 189.4.4 (PL 38, 1006); tr. Edmund Hill, in The Works of Saint Augus tine, A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle, III.6 (New York: New City Press, 1992), 35. 13 Augustinus, Sermo 196.1.1 (PL 38, 1019); WSA III.6. 60. 14 Tertullianus, Aduersus Marcionem IV. 10.6-7 (CCL 1, 563). 15 Tertullianus, De came Christi 18.2 (CCL 2, 905; SCh 216. 282-5).

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