Asian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States The Growing Foreign Population and Their Lives [1 ed.] 9789004393363, 9789004395404

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Asian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States

The Intimate and the Public in Asian and Global Perspectives Managing Editor Ochiai Emiko (Kyoto University) Editorial Board Danièle Bélanger (Laval University) Fran Bennett (University of Oxford) Mary Brinton (Harvard University) Melanita Budianta (University of Indonesia) Chang Kyung-Sup (Seoul National University) Harald Fuess (University of Heidelberg) Barbara Hobson (University of Stockholm) Shirlena Huang (National University of Singapore) Ito Kimio (Kyoto University) Barbara Molony (Santa Clara University) Oshikawa Fumiko (Kyoto University) Rajni Palriwala (University of Delhi) Ito Peng (University of Toronto) Carolyn Sobritchea (University of the Philippines) Tseng Yen-Fen (National Taiwan University) Patricia Uberoi (Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi) Thanes Wongyannava (Thammasat University)

volume 10

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ipap

Asian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States The Growing Foreign Population and Their Lives Edited by

Masako Ishii Naomi Hosoda Masaki Matsuo Koji Horinuki

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: Migrant workers by the Dubai Creek (Deira, Dubai, March 4, 2013). Photo by Naomi Hosoda. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2213-0608 ISBN 978-90-04-39336-3 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-39540-4 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgements  vii Notes on Editors  X Introduction: Socioeconomic Spaces and Migrants’ Lives in the Arab Gulf States  1 Masaki Matsuo, Naomi Hosoda, Koji Horinuki and Masako Ishii

Part 1 Migration Policy and the Relationship between Nationals and Migrant Workers 1 International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States: Trends, Institutions, and Relations  23 Koji Horinuki 2 Political Economy of the Labor Market in the Arab Gulf States  53 Masaki Matsuo Excursus 1: What Are the Arab Gulf States?  73 Masaki Matsuo and Koji Horinuki Excursus 2: Economic Development in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha  77 Sadashi Fukuda 3 Gender and “Tradition”: Power Negotiation between Employers and Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia  83 Namie Tsujigami 4 In/Dependence of the Local and Dependence of the Foreign: The UAE Family, Domestic Service, and a Precarious Future  103 Rima Sabban 5 Enhancing Resilience: The Roles of Pre-departure Programs for the Migrant Domestic Workers toward Arab Gulf States  125 Akiko Watanabe

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Contents

Part 2 Lives, Community, and Networks among Asian Migrant Workers 6 Formal and Informal Protection for Domestic Workers: A Case of Filipinas  145 Masako Ishii 7 Survival Strategies and Migrant Communities in the Arab Gulf States: A Case of Filipino Workers in the UAE  172 Naomi Hosoda 8 Does Religious Conversion Transcend the Boundaries of Multiple Hierarchies? Filipino Migrant Workers Embracing Islam in the UAE and Qatar  194 Akiko Watanabe 9 Transnational Community Networks of Goan Migrant Workers  218 Kyoko Matsukawa Excursus 3: Recruitment of Bangladeshi Migrants in the Arab Gulf States: A Typology of Work Visas  236 Md Mizanur Rahman Excursus 4: An Indian Expatriate’s Perspective about the UAE  243 N. Janardhan Excursus 5: Education, Career, and the Future of Middle-Class Asian Children  250 Kyoko Matsukawa and Naomi Hosoda Index  261

Acknowledgements This book is the translated and updated version of Wangan Arab Shokoku no Imin Roudousya: Tagaikokujin Kokka no Shutsugen to Seikatsu Jittai (Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States: Growing Foreign Population and Their Lives) which was published in 2014 from Akashi Shoten in Tokyo, Japan. Before we express our thanks to all of the people who shared their experiences and provided us with valuable advices and comments, we would like to mention our research background briefly. We started our first joint field research on Filipino migrants in Dubai in 2008. At that time, the Gulf cities were still economically booming, and migrants had been attracted from all over the world, although there were many negative and critical reports on their treatments there. Even after the Dubai debt crisis in 2009 and the Arab Spring in 2011, most migrant communities have survived against the backdrop of rapid political, social and economic changes taking place in the Arab Gulf states. Today, the Arab Gulf states are considered as one of the main destinations of international migrant workers in the world. In the last decade, many scholars including us have been drawn into the region to investigate the society which ­consists of nationals (local citizens) and massive numbers of migrants. The dynamics of the migration phenomena and the multiplicity of the society cannot be understood from a single perspective, and thus, we organized a research team composed of both the scholars on Asian sending countries and on Arab Gulf host states and conducted joint field studies. In this way, the book adopts multi-dimensional and multidisciplinary approach: mix quantitative and qualitative approach and tries to provide new perspectives on the segregated socioeconomic spaces of the Arab Gulf states; from analysis of the policies and institutions which generate the segregated spaces to the ethnographic accounts on Asian migrant workers. We would like to express our gratitude to Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), for granting us different funds through ten years; “Filipino Diasporas in an Open City in the Gulf States” from 2008 to 2010 (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20401007), “Ethnic Relations of Expatriate Workers: A Gulf Model” from 2011–2013 (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP23401014), and “NeoPlural Society: Research on Ethnic Group Relations with a Focus on Expatriate Workers in the Arab Gulf States” (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP26257004) from 2015–2017. Without generous research grants, we could not have conducted comprehensive and long-term field studies in the Arab Gulf states and Asian sending countries.

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Throughout seminars and workshops, we have presented our preliminary findings and received valuable comments and advices. We would like to pay special thanks to Dr. Patricio N. Abinales (University of Hawaii), Dr. ­Steven Wright (Hamad bin Khalifa University), Professor Habibul ­Khondker (­Zayed University), Professor S. Irudaya Rajan (Centre for Development S­ tudies), Dr. Keiko Hirano (Hokkaido University of Education), Dr. Yoshiaki Takemura (National Museum of Ethnology), Dr. Shin Yasuda (Takasaki City University of Economics), Dr. Hirotake Ishiguro (IDE-JETRO), Dr. Yuka Ishii (University of Shizuoka), Professor Hidemitsu Kuroki (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies), Dr. Yoko Hayami (Kyoto University), Dr. Aiko Nishikida (Keio University), Dr. Sachi Takahata (University of Shizuoka) and numerous others. We also had some chances to present our research outcomes at the international conferences, and we are very much encouraged by the constructive discussions from audiences. We are also grateful for the assistance of Ms. Favita Dias (Goa University) at the time of our field research in Goa, India. We would like to show our gratitude to Mrs. Bienvenida C. Lacsaman and Mr. Rodolfo A. Lacsamana for helping us in our research in the Philippines as well as to Ms. Sherma Sappari for her kind guidance in Qatar. We are thankful for King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies for facilitating our fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and for the NGOs such as the Migrante International for providing us critical views on the migration issues. As for the editing process of this book, we would like to thank anonymous reviewers for reading our manuscripts thoroughly and providing us critical but constructive comments. Our gratitude also goes to Ms. Kathryn Wright for her dedicated copy-editing work and Ms. Wendy Logeman, the Brill’s editor, for leading us to the publication. Many thanks also to Professor Emiko Ochiai (Kyoto University) and Dr. Wako Asato (Kyoto University) for kindly let us join the series of The Intimate and the Public in Asian and Global Perspectives of the Brill. We would also like to thank Akashi Shoten for kindly giving us a permission for publishing of this translated and updated version. Also, without the supports by our project office staffs at Kyoto University, Kagawa University, and Rikkyo University, we could not have managed our research project smoothly. Lastly but not the least, it should be noted that we met a lot of people with various backgrounds in both sending and receiving countries during our tenyears of research projects: not only migrants who stayed and worked at the Arab Gulf states, but also employers, recruitment agents, politicians, government officials, academics, journalists, school teachers and students, NGO staff, as well as the family members who are waiting for their beloved ones to come

Acknowledgements

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home, whose names we cannot mention individually due to the limited space and to protect their privacy. Without such encounters through our field studies, this book could not have been published. The editors

Notes on Editors Masako Ishii Ph.D. (2000), is Professor at the College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, Japan. Her main research interest is Area Studies on Muslim society in the Philippines focusing on gender, migration and peace process. Her publications include: Possibilities and Limitation of Protection for Filipina Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States, in Naomi Hosoda, ed. Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States: Growing Foreign Population and Their Lives, 122–146 (in ­Japanese, Akashi Shoten, 2014); Muslim Filipino Women Working in the ­Middle East: Changing Norm and Migrant Women, in Hiroshi Kato, ed. Sexuality and Cultures in Islam, 185–210 (in Japanese, Tokyo University Press, 2005). Naomi Hosoda Ph.D. (2007), is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University, Japan. Her main research interest is in anthropological studies of Filipino migration with a focus on cultural normality, family transformation, transnational community, education and citizenship. She published several articles on Filipino migrants’ identity and community formation in Arab Gulf states such as: 2008: ‘Open City’ and a New Wave of Filipino ­Migration to the Middle East, in E. Tagliacozzo et al. ed. Asia Inside Out: C ­ hanging Times, 281–303 (Harvard University Press, 2015); and edited Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States: Growing Foreign Population and Their Lives (in Japanese, Akashi Shoten, 2014). Masaki Matsuo Ph.D. (2003), is Associate Professor at the School of International Studies, Utsunomiya ­University, Japan. He has studied the political economy of the Middle East, focusing on the relation between the re-distribution of oil wealth and the authoritarian regimes. His publications include: Authoritarianism and Labor Market: Preference of Labor Policies in the Arab Gulf Countries, IDE Discussion Paper, No. 514: 1–26 (2015); Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States: Preliminary Analysis of Recent Labor Market, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 4 (1&2): 35–40 (2011). Koji Horinuki Ph.D. (2011), is a Senior Researcher at JIME Center, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). His main research interests are contemporary Gulf politics, security, and social affairs. His works in English include: Japan in the Gulf:

Notes on Editors

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Between ­Intra-Bureaucratic Politics and Inter-Asian Rivalry, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Yukiko Miyagi, ed., The Emerging Middle East-East Asia Nexus, 85–93 (coauthor with Namie Tsujigami, Routledge, 2015); Controversies over Labour Naturalisation Policy and Its Dilemmas: 40 Years of Emiratisation in the United Arab Emirates, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 4(1&2): 41–61 (2011).

Introduction

Socioeconomic Spaces and Migrants’ Lives in the Arab Gulf States Masaki Matsuo, Naomi Hosoda, Koji Horinuki and Masako Ishii 1

The Importance of Migrant Research Focusing on the Arab Gulf States

This book focuses on nationals and migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states (namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates or uae) and examines how they construct new relationships with others in the segregated socioeconomic spaces of the region.

Iraq Jordan

Iran

Kuwait

Kuwait City

Kish Island Dhahran

Bahrain Madinah

Riyadh

Manama Qatar Doha

Dubai Abu Dhabi

uae Jeddah

Makkah

Saudi Arabia

Muscat

Oman

Yemen

Figure 0.1 Arab Gulf states Source: , edited by KOJI HORINUKI © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_002

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The Arab Gulf states accept a large number of migrants from various countries as temporary contracted workers. However, few policies have been implemented to integrate these workers into society. Therefore, except in cases of intermarriage with a man who is a national (see Watanabe, Chapter 8 in this book), foreigners are not allowed to have permanent residency or citizenship. The sponsors of many of the migrant workers are their employers (the kafala system). This means that migrant workers are always subordinate to their sponsors/employers who have the ability to cancel contracts and force them to return home. Therefore, their position is always precarious. The wages of a migrant worker are set in accordance with the economic standards (for example, the wage levels) of their home country, rather than their individual skills and experience. Therefore, it is difficult for individuals of different nationalities to unite, even if they are engaged in the same job. In addition, migrant workers’ social activities are restricted and there is generally no freedom of assembly. Because of the policies and institutions of the Arab Gulf states, as stated above, the society is segregated hierarchically and vertically according to nationality, ethnicity, gender, and class. For this reason, migrant workers appear not to associate with the people around them—especially those of different nationalities—and tend to either live on their own or be connected to a relatively small number of familiar people. There are few occasions and locations for nationals and migrant workers, as well as migrant workers of different attributes, to interact outside the workplace. It is as though the nationals and migrant workers coexist in the same place but are segregated into very small groups. As this hierarchical segregated society is considered to be the cause of ­human rights violations, previous literature has described the lack of social integration as negative. Yet, political disorder arising from the acceptance of a large number of migrant workers is scarce, and the economies of these countries are generally doing well. Why are these countries able to continue to receive large, diverse groups of foreign nationals as human resources? How do the nationals accept and perceive the foreign labor policy and the substantial number of migrants working in their countries? On the other hand, how do migrant workers protect themselves, reconstruct lives where they can maintain their self-esteem, and survive this segregation? What is it like for migrants to live in a country with many other nationalities with whom they essentially never intermingle? This book tries to answer these questions regarding the segregated socioeconomic space in the Arab Gulf states by carefully paying attention to both positive and negative aspects. On the basis of empirical studies, this book shows that the negative views on the lack of social integration do not always

Socioeconomic Spaces & Migrants’ Lives in THE Arab Gulf States

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hold. Instead of assuming that segregation is a disadvantage for migrant workers, it emphasizes multiple aspects and presents various voices. In this way, the book tries to unfold the region’s segregated socioeconomic space and new forms of networking and connectedness to understand how the various peoples coexist: a situation that often entails conflict and discrepancies between expectations and reality. Research on migrants in the Arab Gulf states is not new. As the number of temporary international migrants has increased since the latter half of the 1970s, the pioneers of research in this field have emerged since then. Farrag (1975), Halliday (1977), Birks and Sinclair (1979, 1980), and Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair (1988) are such pioneers. They collected statistical information and figured out some characteristics of the migrant issues in the Arab world: the labor shortage caused by the oil boom and the numerical superiority of Indian migrants. This research direction has been maintained, and rich literature about the labor market and demographic issues has been produced to date (Looney 1994; Al-Qudsi 1998; Kapiszewski 2001, 2003, 2006; Baldwin-Edwards 2011; Hertog ed. 2012; Winckler 2017). On the other hand, it was not until the 1990s that scholars started paying attention to the asymmetrical relationship between citizens and migrants. Owen (1992) was one of the first scholars who highlighted the demographical imbalance (numerical superiority of migrants over citizens), ethnic composition of migrants (predominance of non-Arab migrants), and asymmetrical power relationship between citizens and migrants in the context of the migrant society of the Arab Gulf states. With the influx of low-skilled migrant workers to the Arab Gulf states since the 1980s, the issues of human rights violations and lack of protection of ­migrants have come to the fore. Much of the literature began to criticize the kafala (sponsor) system because it puts migrant workers into a vulnerable position relative to nationals, causing the problems of oppression and exploitation (Jureidini 2003; International Organization for Migration 2004; Human Rights Watch 2010a; Middle East Institute 2010). In this way, the negative aspects of migration policies and institutions have been debated by both scholars and human rights organizations.1 Although such criticisms and views are important to address the atrocities against vulnerable migrants, they do not holistically illustrate the lives of migrants in the Arab Gulf states. For example, most nationals and migrants do not perceive kafala as a hotbed of human rights violations; nationals consider it as a measure to protect themselves in an environment that is besieged by culturally different foreign populations, and some migrants hardly 1 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International intensively produced reports.

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meet with their kafeel (sponsor) during their stay in the Arab Gulf states so they cannot even draw a simple image of the mechanism that works to make them subordinate to the citizens. An understanding of the lives of migrants in the Arab Gulf states began to be unfolded with the work of Anh Nga Longva. She lived in Kuwait from 1984 to 1987 and started systematic field research between 1987 and 1989. One of her works, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (1997), is a pioneering ethnographical study about social relations between the nationals and migrants. Longva referred to J.S. Furnivall’s concept of the plural society to unfold how the lifeworlds of migrants evolve where the nationals and various migrant groups coexist without any formal integration policy (Furnivall [1939] 2010). By focusing on the experiences of migrants, she illustrates subjective integration among migrants, in spite of their structural marginality and exclusion in Kuwait. It was not long after Dresch (2005) indicated the need for ethnographical research to understand the politics, society, and economy of this region that many ethnographical studies were produced. One of the comprehensive ethnographical works that introduced a new framework after Longva was that of Gardner (2010). Referring to Galtung (1969), Gardner applied the concept of “structural violence” to describe the asymmetrical power relationship between citizens and migrants. Some literature assumes that customs or traditions such as slavery, which was abolished in the Gulf relatively recently in the middle of the twentieth century, are the reason for unprotected migrant conditions, implicitly or explicitly. However, as Gardner noted, this allows the views of orientalists to spread. Instead, he depicts the enslaved condition of migrant workers as the result of a combination of globalization, the international movement of workers, and the power of nation states that confer themselves with the authority of border control, which is the source of vulnerability for migrants. He does not stigmatize the Gulf societies as a setting of exploitation; rather, he considers them as a node of various wills and powers and writes about how migrants survive and establish their lives there. The Arab Gulf states receive migrants of various nationalities. However, studies have tended to focus on a single ethnicity or nationality and have dealt only with low-paid workers. Hence, the object of study needed to be extended beyond a single national group and the lower occupational stratum to obtain a complete picture of the migrant society of the Arab Gulf states. Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar in 2012, was one such study. This was a collection of papers that dealt with various migrant groups by using different approaches such as space, labor, social networks, and

Socioeconomic Spaces & Migrants’ Lives in THE Arab Gulf States

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institutions, based on rich information acquired through fieldwork. In this study, migrant workers were not mere victims of exploitation; rather, they were described as independent actors who negotiated with arbitral powers and found a way to survive in the segregated society. Furthermore, Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar Al Shehabi, and Adam Hanieh in 2014, surveyed migration policies and laws and explained how the governments controlled the rights of migrants. This book offered rich information about the lives of migrants in the Arab Gulf states and described how the governments tried to manage their economies and societies, which depended on temporary foreign workers. The workers’ temporary nature wove a unique social fabric in the Arab Gulf states. The above scholars not only criticized the human rights violations against migrant workers, but also tried to grasp the issues experienced by the actors engaged in this unique phenomenon, so as to shed light on the subjectivities of the migrants, nationals, and governments. Other studies have pointed out that class is also a criterion for division (Ali 2010; Gardner 2010; Bristol-Rhys 2012). For example, in Abu Dhabi, uae, social spaces that one may enter are determined based on class. Furthermore, the terms used among migrant workers also reflect their full awareness of the class differences between themselves and nationals. For example, middle-class migrants from South Asia call themselves and are called by other South Asians “expats” or “expatriates,” whereas the term “laborers” is used to refer to those from the low-income class (Bristol-Rhys 2012:70). It is important to note that the actors who shape the fabric of international temporary migration in the Arab Gulf states do not exist independently; rather, they are interconnected. It is true that the segregation of migrants from nationals is ubiquitous in this region and is even officially institutionalized by systems like the kafala (sponsor) system discussed later. However, this does not mean that migrants do not construct social relations in this society. By investigating new forms of networking and connectedness in the Arab Gulf states, this book presents new discussion on the following aspects: (1) Migration policy and institutions that form segregated socioeconomic spaces in the Arab Gulf states (Chapters 1, 2 & 5); (2) relationships between employers (madams) and employees (female migrant domestic workers) (Chapters 3 & 4); (3) new forms of connectedness among nationals and migrant workers of different nationalities (Chapters 6, 7 & 8); and (4) transnational networks between the Arab Gulf states and labor-sending countries (Chapter 9). The book is supplemented by five excursuses. Excursus 1 and 2 introduce basic concepts, ideas, and trends related to the Arab Gulf states so that those not familiar with

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Figure 0.2 Conceptual chart: Relationships between nationals and migrants in the Arab Gulf states and this book’s chapters

these issues can easily understand the context. Excursus 3, 4 and 5 introduce topics which each chapter cannot cover to provide a more comprehensive picture on Asian migrants in the region. Figure 0.2, which is based on both the descriptions found in previous re�search and our own research, illustrates the relationships between people of differing nationalities living in the Arab Gulf states. The large triangle represents the overall country population, reflecting class hierarchy and population size. At the top is the elite class, and below is the low-income class; those on top are small in number, whereas those below are high in number. In terms of the relationships between each part of the triangle, nationals and migrants (foreign nationals) are divided and nationals are in an advantageous position compared to migrants. The migrants are divided into nationality A, nationality B, nationality C, etc. Generally, Western and Arab people are in a high position, and Asian and African people are in a low position. Furthermore, there are also differences within groups of people of the same nationality. First, there are class differences. Within a group of people from the same nation, such as India, there can be a wide range of classes spanning from the elite to the low-income class (Nationality C). On the other hand, there are few members of the elite classes from other nations, such as the Philippines (Nationality A). It appears that people from the same nationality split into subgroups based on their classes. Aspects such as area of origin, language, ­ethnicity,

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and religion can serve as criteria by which migrants divide into subgroups. Furthermore, when analyzing the lives of migrants, one cannot ignore the existence of transnational networks. Through the ties of the aforementioned ­subgroups, the vast majority of migrants living in Arab Gulf states are connected with their own and other countries through transnational networks. The authors of this book are area studies scholars, who have studied either the Arab Gulf states or Asian countries for many years. Migration studies require multisite research, but it is difficult for one scholar to be a specialist in several areas. However, by conducting a collaborative work with scholars specializing in both labor-sending and receiving countries, we can engage in both theoretical and ethnographical work, and we can thus look into both macrostructures and micro-phenomena. The various perspectives offered in this book and the mixed quantitative and qualitative approaches are the product of collaborative multidisciplinary research. We conducted on-the-ground participatory observations and interviews and also gathered statistical information. Although the data collection periods differed depending on the author, the work was primarily conducted between 2008 and 2017. This book is written to be useful not only for students concerned with migration to the Arab Gulf states but also for a wider audience of governments, practitioners, policy makers, decision makers, non-governmental organization (NGO) activists, etc. As three authors of the book are specialists in Philippine studies (Ishii, Hosoda, and Watanabe), the empirical studies could not cover migrants of other nationalities in the Arab Gulf states in depth. However, each chapter starts with an introduction to the basic background, as well as related previous studies, so that the reader can learn not only about the case study but also the general topics that each chapter tries to unfold. As such, this book can also be utilized as a handbook for those starting to learn about the topic. 2

Overview of Part 1

Part 1 of this book introduces the circumstances, institutions, and socioeconomic structures that emerged as the Arab Gulf states received large numbers of migrant workers. It then focuses on the relationships between employers and employees, nationals and migrants, and madams and female migrant domestic workers.2 Through these analyses, Part 1 makes it clear that, although 2 The domestic workers category in the Arab Gulf states includes not only those who engage in household chores, such as cleaning and washing, but also drivers, gardeners, and cooks. In this way, “domestic workers” includes both men and women, and the tasks are allocated

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migrant workers are absorbed as a labor force and have become an integral part of the Arab Gulf states, divisions between nationals and migrant workers, as well as between migrant workers themselves, are maintained. Let us first consider the background that led migrant workers to flow into the Arab Gulf states in massive numbers. The Arab Gulf states are extraordinarily resource-rich countries, and the percentage of their revenues that come from the export of resources such as oil and natural gas is high (generally over 50 percent). After the 1973 oil boom, economic development based on oil wealth went into full swing. These countries, called “rentier states,” do not rely on domestic taxes but rather on exogenous income from fossil fuel exports (see Matsuo and Horinuki, Excursus 1). However, the Arabian Peninsula originally had a small population, and it was impossible for it to provide the large amount of labor necessary for economic development. Therefore, these countries came to rely on migrants from Europe, the United States, neighboring Arab countries, and Asia to build their workforce. Figure 0.3 shows the changes in foreign national populations and gdps in the Arab Gulf states. It can be seen that from 1975 onward—since the oil boom—the foreign national populations increased rapidly. With the uae and Oman’s development going into full swing in the 1980s and Qatar’s following in the 2000s, the migrant populations increased even more. In the mid-1980s, the price of crude oil dropped because of an oil glut, which also influenced government budgets and economic growth in the Arab Gulf states. Additionally, as a result of the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the following Gulf War, the foreign national populations decreased, especially in Kuwait. However, this much influence on the Arab Gulf states overall, and their foreign national populations continued to increase up to the present. The first half of Part 1 (Chapters 1 & 2, Excursus 1 & 2) places the situation of the Arab Gulf states’ migrant workers within worldwide trends and analyzes related policies and institutions. It describes how the governments have managed the flow of migrants and handled problems arising from having a large number of foreign nationals. In Chapter 1, Koji Horinuki contextualizes the changes in migrant worker reception in the Arab Gulf states that have previously been treated as exceptional in the worldwide movement trends of international labor. In Chapter 2, by focusing on the differences between nationals and migrants in the labor participation of the host country, Masaki Matsuo categorizes the Arab Gulf states into two groups and presents a model that a­ ccording to gender norms in the region. This book mainly deals with female migrant domestic workers.

9

Socioeconomic Spaces & Migrants’ Lives in THE Arab Gulf States Million 16

Billions usd 900 Bahrain 800

Kuwait

14

Oman 12

700

Qatar

10 8

Saudi Arabia

600

United Arab Emirates gdp Total

500 400

6

300

4

200

2 0

100 1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

0

Figure 0.3 Changes in the foreign national populations and gross domestic products of Arab Gulf states Note: GDP as the real value based on the value of US dollars in 2005. Source: Compiled by Masaki Matuso based on data from the United Nations [2013] and World Bank[2018]

explains how these states converged into these two groups and why ineffective migrant policies were adopted. In Excursus 1, Matsuo and Horinuki explain the context that led the Arab Gulf states to have more foreign nationals than nationals—a rarity in the world—as well as the forms of governance in these countries. In Excursus 2, Sadashi Fukuda focuses on the uae and Qatar, which have very high percentages of migrant workers even for Arab Gulf states. He discusses the connections between the global development strategies that have attracted ­international attention in recent years and the migrant receiving policies. The second half of Part 1 (Chapters 3 & 4) focuses on the relationships between migrant domestic workers and their employers. There are various ­contexts in which nationals and migrants come into contact in the Arab Gulf states, for example, as bosses and subordinates in the workplace, or as ­providers and receivers of services at retail establishments. Within these various c­ ontacts, the relationship between domestic workers and their employers is a contact between the top and bottom positions in the hierarchical national/migrant

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worker relationship (see Figure 0.2), and these relationships are formed ­during intimate labor that unfolds in a gendered realm of reproduction. The relationship between domestic workers and their employers is important in the discussion of intimacy within segregation. Female migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states engage in a variety of jobs. A high percentage seem to be in domestic work, but it is difficult to accurately determine their number and situation.3 Until the 1970s, many domestic workers were from India, with which the Arab Gulf states have a history of movement of people. However, from the 1980s onward, migrant numbers increased and their nationalities diversified to include Filipinas, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, and, in recent years, Indonesians and Ethiopians, among others. Their wages are low, at approximately 100 to 250 us dollars per month (Esim and Smith, eds. 2004; Ishii 2011; Sabban 2012).4 Furthermore, as a result of their long work hours, hard labor, and restriction of movement and communication, their working conditions have even been criticized as “modern-day slavery.” Many developing countries have, in the process of modernization and industrialization, implemented social policies to divid their female nationals into “productive workers” and “reproductive workers” and mobilized each group for economic development (Murakami 2002). However, in the Arab Gulf states did not have to mobilize their female nationals as productive workers because the governments provided all households with financial support generated from the oil wealth. In fact, this income raised the living standard of ordinary people and made it possible for them to hire migrant domestic workers. Women in the Arab Gulf states became manager-housewives who ran the domestic reproductive sphere with the use of domestic workers. In Chapter 3, by taking the perspective of Saudi Arabian employers, Namie Tsujigami describes their experiences of bewilderment in receiving domestic workers in their private spaces and engaging them in intimate work. She ­thereby depicts the complex and nuanced nature of the relationship between employers and domestic workers. Rima Sabban then points out in Chapter 4 3 According to the International Labour Organization (ilo), their number is 784,500 in Saudi Arabia (507,900 female and 276,600 male, as of 2009), 246,100 in Kuwait (151,100 female and 95,000 male, as of 2005), 236,500 in the uae (146,100 female and 90,400 male, as of 2008), 94,600 in Oman (69,300 female and 25,300 male, as of 2009), 80,300 in Qatar (48,100 f­ emale and 32,200 male, as of 2009) and 76,500 in Bahrain (48,500 female and 28,000 male) (International Labour Organization 2013: 128–129). On the other hand, according to data gathered by Human Rights Watch, an international n ­ on-governmemtal organization, their number is 1,500,000 in Saudi Arabia, 660,000 in Kuwait (Human Rights Watch 2010b) and 87,400 in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch 2012: 19). As shown in the above figures, there are large differences in the figures on domestic workers. 4 Some Filipinas are paid 400 us dollars a month. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration started policy reforms on the deployment of domestic helpers and set their minimum wage at 400 us dollars on 16 December, 2006.

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that the uae has had to confront the negative social influence created by the over-reliance on domestic workers. The country has reached the point where young people are unable to do household chores. Akiko Watanabe then follows in Chapter 5 with a discussion of pre-departure programs comparing those of the five migrant sending countries of domestic workers bound for the Arab Gulf states. The programs differ among the countries in accordance with the nature of civil society, level of importance to the government, capacity of the administration, budget, human resources, and social context. Although these programs are regarded as progressive efforts for the protection of migrant workers to build resilience, Watanabe highlights the resilience instilled may have side effects. For example, having excessive competence at surviving abroad may also result in a longer period of working abroad away from one’s family, leaving institutional, structural, and conventional challenges intact. 3

Overview of Part 2

Part 2 focuses on the lives of Asian workers and consists of four chapters and three excursus with special focus on the migrants’ survival strategies, including the networks/communities they have formed. This part also examines the relationships between migrant workers of different nationalities and those between people of the same nationality but different class, religion, ethnicity, and so on. Although people from countries all over the world come to work in the Arab Gulf states, Part 2 takes a look into the cases of Filipinos, Indians, and Bangladeshis, in particular. Over half of the migrant workers residing in the Arab Gulf states are from Asian countries. According to the World Bank’s 2010 statistics (see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1), Indians make up 32 percent of migrant workers in these countries, the highest proportion overall. Following them are Pakistanis, Egyptians, ­Yemenis, Filipinos, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Sudanese, Iranians, and Indonesians. In other words, six of the top ten sending countries are in Asia. The highest number of South Asians are from India, and the highest number of Southeast Asians are from the Philippines. A pronounced increase in Asian migrant workers began to be seen after the 1973 oil boom (Rajan 2004: 91). Whereas in 1970 Asian migrant workers numbered 120,000, this increased to 370,000 in 1975, 2,000,000 in 1980, and 3,200,000 in 1985—approximately 26 times the number 15 years earlier (Abella 1989: 113).5

5 There are several explanations for the de-Arabization of migrant workers. Please refer to Kapiszewski (2006) and Matsuo (2012) for details.

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When discussing the rapid increase in Asian workers in the Arab Gulf states, we must not forget the role of private employment agencies and governments. Whereas Arab migrants generally move on the basis of personal connections and proceed to bring over their families after securing a job, many Asian migrants find a job through an employment agency in their home country. Therefore, even people without personal connections can secure a job by paying a broker’s fee. Furthermore, from the 1970s onward, some Asian countries’ governments promoted overseas employment as a measure to alleviate unemployment and support economic development, thereby encouraging people to find work in the Arab Gulf states (Owen 1985: 9–10; Asis 2004: 22). In addition, the different historical circumstances surrounding South Asians and Southeast Asians going to these countries also influence employment patterns and occupational differences (Vora 2013: Chapter 3). For many Asian workers, going to the Arab Gulf states has a different ring to it than going to Western countries where migrants have chances to become permanent residents. Most migrant workers move to the Arab Gulf states on the basis of a fixed-term contract that lasts for around two years. They regard their move as temporary and primarily for employment purposes. They do not expect to obtain citizenship after moving, to assimilate into the local society, or to reside in the country permanently, as might be the case in many Western countries. These differences in immigration policies and individual migrants’ expectations increase the fluidity of the Arab Gulf states’ labor markets. However, it must be noted that there are some migrant workers, especially professionals and skilled workers, who repeatedly renew their contracts and stay for the mid- to long-term. The discussion in Part 2 centers on the connections among Asian workers residing in the Arab Gulf states, which take forms such as local, transnational, and translocal networks and communities. It is well-known that, even if the receiving country adopts anti-settlement policies, some migrant workers who were supposed to stay temporarily become semi-settled (Massey et al. 1987: 3–6; Iyotani 2001: 236–237). Additionally, with today’s pronounced developments in communications technology and methods of transportation, one cannot discuss migrants’ lives while ignoring the existence of transnational networks (Gardner 2010; Osella and Osella 2012; Vora 2013; Kathiravelu 2016). Based on ethnographic research conducted by each author, the chapters in Part 2 analyze the interactions (beyond personal and familial) of people from India and the Philippines. They reveal the dynamics of how the perceived differences or distance may create occasions for forming new connections and

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how similarities may become instances to feel divisions among migrants during their sojourn. In Chapter 6, Masako Ishii focuses on the formal and informal protection activities for migrant domestic workers, taking Filipinas as an example. She particularly pays attention to the informal safety nets woven for Filipina domestic workers and how the migrants resort to them as survival strategies. In Chapter 7, Naomi Hosoda focuses on the connections between different subgroups with the same nationality. She introduces the many survival strategies of Filipinos and brings to light how, among them, layered mutual aid networks, in the form of street communities, associations, religious communities, and so on, are constructed and sometimes even transcend class differences. Akiko Watanabe follows in Chapter 8 with an analysis of the perspective of Filipinos in the uae and Qatar who have converted from Christianity to Islam and considers the changes in their social relationships after conversion. Some converts come to feel more sharply the nationality-based divisions, in addition to those based on religion, which makes clear the multilayered nature of the divisions prevalent in the Arab Gulf states. On the other hand, in Chapter 9, Kyoko Matsukawa focuses on the migrants’ transnational networks that extend to their home countries. By focusing on individuals from Goa, India, who are living long-term in Dubai, uae, Matsukawa demonstrates how they make a living while heightening their awareness of themselves as “Goan Christians” through a transnational network that closely connects Goa and Dubai. These four chapters present the reorganization of relationships among Asian workers in the Arab Gulf states, with attention to the differences and connections. The three excursus in Part 2 examine this aspect further. Excursus 3 by Md. Mizanur Rahman introduces various types of work visas Bangladeshi workers make use of in order to obtain work opportunities, and provides an interpretation of their differences. Rahman describes how the recruitment/ employment system of Bangladeshi workers is intertwined with the connections of various actors residing in both the Arab Gulf states and Bangladesh. In Excursus 4, N. Janardhan depicts Asian upper-middle-class and elite individuals who are economically well off and stable. Janardhan argues that many of them interact with people from other countries on a daily basis, suggesting that differences according to nationalities may be felt less among the uppermiddle and elite classes. Matsukawa and Hosoda, in Excursus 5, investigate the lives and future prospects of the second-generation Indians and Filipinos who grow up in the Arab Gulf states by focusing on their educational and career paths. Although they hold the passports of their parents (i.e., India or the

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­ hilippines), they are more accustomed to the lifestyles of the Gulf cities, with P clean and orderly environments and modern urban infrastructure, than those of the hometowns of their parents. Nonetheless, they maintain ambiguous feelings toward the Arab Gulf states because of the vulnerability resulting from their legal status as temporary residents. 4

Arab Gulf-Style Migration: What Can We Learn?

Let us now consider the implications of an Arab Gulf-style migrant society for international migrant research overall. First, as Longva (1997) pointed out, the politics of exclusion and nonintegration policies segregates the nationals from the migrants, as well as the migrants of different nationalities. Because of the migrants’ temporary status, their sense of belonging to the Arab Gulf states is not nurtured and they ­continue to base their lives and cultures in their homelands. Therefore, while people of diverse nationalities pass each other daily on the street, they do not normally become involved in each other’s lives or cultures. There is a sense of distance in their contact, which is limited to necessary communication such as simple greetings or conversations on the job or inside shops. On the other hand, because of this exclusion and segregation, they live without any pressure to integrate and assimilate into their host societies. It should be emphasized that the middle and elite classes often express a positive opinion about the lack of pressure to assimilate in the Arab Gulf states. The Filipina nurse appearing in Hosoda’s Chapter 7, the Indian (Goan) journalist described in Matsukawa’s Chapter 9, and the upper-middle-class individuals found in Janardhan’s Excursus 5 see merit in the fact that, unlike the situation in Western countries, they can maintain their home country’s cultural forms and/or a cosmopolitan lifestyle while not interacting with the host society more than necessary. Second, while part of the merit of non-integration also applies to the lowskilled migrants, they are not granted some privileges offered to the middle and elite classes, such as visas to invite family members. Besides, the hierarchical nature of the segregated socioeconomic space renders the lower-skilled migrants susceptible to exploitation and human rights violations. One cannot evaluate Arab Gulf-style migration without listening to the voices of the ­voiceless who have suffered from human rights violations. They tend to accept power asymmetry between themselves and their employers and opt for submissiveness as a strategy, rather than translating the feeling of inequality into

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a feeling of injustice (c.f. Longva 1997: 181). Furthermore, there are few media�tors to report injustices committed against vulnerable migrants because social activism is restricted (see Ishii, Chapter 6). While the sending countries, which rely on remittance by their migrant workers, are in a weak position r­ elative to the receiving countries, the latter may gradually change their receiving policies under pressure from an international regime (see Horinuki, ­Chapter 1). Third, because migration policies give rise to segregation in the Arab Gulf states, the invisible and informal networks and communities that exist among migrant workers provide important support and protection. Although many migrants are able to obtain economic benefits, they still seem to have few opportunities to find joy in life, intimacy, self-worth, and a sense of belonging in the long run. In other words, the migrants find it difficult to feel ­psychologically or spiritually fulfilled. Therefore, they try to find a place to belong by placing themselves in local and transnational networks. However, from the outside, it is difficult to realize that these communities exist. For example, people are usually unaware of the changes in social relationships of Filipino converts to Islam, to which Watanabe (Chapter 8) draws our attention. In addition, the safety nets mentioned by Ishii (Chapter 6) and Hosoda (Chapter 7)—the former an informal one that helps fleeing domestic workers and the latter for ­Filipinos trying to find work after entering the uae on a visit visa—are not known to outsiders; yet they exist in practice and play an important role in survival. This is because, under authoritarian monarchies (see Excursus 1), migrant workers construct the connections that they need while remaining aware of the watchful eye of the government authorities and very carefully checking the forms of connections that are permitted. Fourth, it is important to consider the variety and dynamics of perceptions among local citizens regarding the increased presence of migrant workers in these countries, in connection with their social position, gender, generation, and so on. As Matsuo writes in Chapter 2 and Fukuda illustrates in Excursus 2, the Arab Gulf states have each decided upon policies for accepting migrants, seeing it as part of economic development and the preservation of the political regime. On the other hand, according to Tsujigami’s Chapter 3 and Sabban’s Chapter 4, the acceptance of large numbers of migrant domestic worker has given rise to, for example, unease about the meaning of family, because the existence of migrant domestic workers has transformed the “traditional” roles of family members within the household in the host society. The Arab Gulf states have adopted foreign labor policies for the efficient advancement of economic development and political regime preservation. ­Paying attention to how their foreign labor policies change depending on these

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countries’ relations with the international community will serve as a useful reference, particularly for other countries with similar systems. 5

Terms and Statistical Data

The terms and statistical data used in the book are as follows. We use the term “Arab Gulf states” in referring to the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc), namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the uae. These countries, together with Iran and Iraq, are also called the Gulf states; however, because we focus on the six oil-rich countries with monarchical political regimes located on the Arabian Peninsula, we settled on the term Arab Gulf states. In referring to people who migrate to work in the Arab Gulf states, we use the term “migrant workers.” However, terms such as “migrant workers” and “immigrants” are sometimes avoided by the Arab Gulf states’ governments in the context of labor and migrant policies because these words evoke an image of permanent residence or naturalization, statuses that are considerably restricted. At the same time, “foreigners,” “foreign workers,” and “expatriates” are also used, depending on the context of each chapter. Even though different terms are used in this book, the meaning is the same. With regard to statistical data, ministries and national statistical bureaus in the Arab Gulf states provide better data now than 10 years ago because the availability of statistical data and transparency are key factors to attract foreign investment. However, questions remain as to the accuracy of their data on migrant workers. First, there still is a gap between the data produced by the Arab Gulf states and international organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for ­Migration (IOM) and the World Bank. This indicates that one should be wary in referring to statistical data and should carefully consider whether it reflects reality. Second, the Arab Gulf states do not present statistical data on migrant workers by nationality. This is because the change in demographic balance caused by the influx of migrants is a sensitive political and security issue. On the other hand, the statistical data from the World Bank such as “Global Bilateral Migration Database” (World Bank Group and Ç. Özden, C. Parsons, M. Schiff and T.L. Walmsley 2011) do indicate migrant workers’ nationalities; however, they are not perfectly accurate. In addition, Qatar provides population data by sex but do not differentiate the data by nationals and foreigners. Since the 2016 Census, the uae also stopped to provide population data by nationals.

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These two countries seem to be the most ­demographically imbalanced countries between nationals and expatriates, in that the nationals make up less than 10 percent of the total population. In this book, we utilize the official statistics produced by the governmental agencies of each country to refer to the populations of its nationals and migrants. However, when we conduct comparisons with other countries, such as in Chapter 1, we use the data produced by international organizations. Furthermore, the official data from both sending and receiving countries are occasionally mentioned or used to create figures. Therefore, readers may find some ­statistical incoherence, even within the same chapter. Bibliography Abella, Manolo I. 1989. “Pre-Migration Costs of Contract Laborers.” Asian Migrant 2 (4): 113–121. Ali, Syed. 2010. Dubai: Gilded Cage. New Haven: Yale University Press. Al-Qudsi, Sulayman. 1998. Labour Markets and Policy in the GCC: Micro Diagnostics and Macro Profiles. Abu Dhabi: ecssr. Asis, Maruja M.B. 2004. “Not Here for Good?: International Migration Realities and Prospects in Asia.” The Japanese Journal of Population 2 (1): 18–28. Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. 2011. Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends. Research Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics. Birks, John S. and Clive A. Sinclair. 1980. Arab Manpower: The Crisis of Development. London: Croom Helm. Birks, John S. and Clive A. Sinclair. 1979. “International Labour Migration in the Arab Middle East.” Third World Quarterly 1 (2): 87–99. Birks, John S., Ian J. Seccombe, and Clive A. Sinclair. 1988. “Labour Migration in the Arab Gulf States: Patterns, Trends and Prospects.” International Migration 26 (3): 267–286. Bristol-Rhys, Jane. 2012. “Socio-spatial Boundaries in Abu Dhabi.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 59–84. New York: Columbia University Press. Dresch, Paul. 2005. “Introduction: Societies, Identities and Global Issues.” In Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by Paul Dresch and James P. Piscatori, 1–33. London: i.b.Tauris. Esim, Simel and Monica Smith, eds. 2004. Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

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Farrag, Abdel Magid. 1975. “Migration between Arab Countries.” ILO: Manpower and Employment in Arab Countries: Some Critical Issues, 84–109. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Furnivall, John Sydenham [1939] 2010. Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3): 167–191. Halliday, Fred. 1977 “Migration and the Labour Force in the Oil Producing States of the Middle East.” Development and Change, 8: 263–291. Hertog, Steffen, ed. 2012. National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC. Berlin: Gerlach Press. Human Rights Watch. 2010a. Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2010b. Slow Reform: Protection of Migrant Domestic Workers in Asia and the Middle East. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2012. For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda. New York: Human Rights Watch. International Labour Organization. 2013. Domestic Workers across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection. Geneva: International Labour Organization (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--­ dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_173363.pdf, Accessed 16 June, 2014). Ishii, Masako. 2011. “Hukugō Kakusa wo Idō Suru: Wangan Sanyu-koku de Kaji Rōdōsha toshite Hataraku Firipin no Musurimu Josei” [Moving through Multiple Layers of Complex Disparities: Muslim Filipina Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States]. In Sekai de Mottomo Mazushiku Aru toiu Koto [Being the Poorest in the World], edited by Peace Studies Association of Japan, 25–46. Tokyo: Waseda University Press. Iyotani, Toshio. 2001. Gurōbarizeshon to Imin [Migration in an Age of Globalization]. Tokyo: Yushindo. In Japanese. Jureidini, Ray. 2003. Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East. Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper 2. Geneva: unrisd. Kamrava, Mehran and Zahra Babar, eds. 2012. Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Reading: Ithaca Press. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2003. “The Changing Status of Arab Migration Workers in the GCC.” Journal of Social Affairs, no. 20: 33–60. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2006. “Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development

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in the Arab Region, Population Division Department of Economic and ­Social Affairs United Nations Secretariat Beirut, 15–17 May 2006. Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2016. Migrant Dubai: Low Wage Workers and the Construction of a Global City. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Khalaf, Abdulhadi, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, eds. 2014. Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf. London: Pluto Press. Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder: Westview Press. Looney, Robert E. 1994. Manpower Policies and Development in the Persian Gulf Region. London: Praeger Publishers. Massey, Douglas, Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González. 1987. Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico. Berkley: University of California Press. Matsuo, Masaki. 2012. “Wangan Shokoku ni okeru Imin Rōdōsha” [Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States]. In Chūtō Seijigaku: Chiiki Kenkyū to Hikaku Seijigaku no Kakyō wo Mezashite [Analyzing the Middle East: Bridging Comparative Politics and Area Studies], edited by Keiko Sakai, 201–213. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Middle East Institute. 2010. Migration and the Gulf. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. Murakami, Kaoru. 2002. “Kōhatsu Kogyōkoku ni okeru Josei Rōdō to Shakai Seisaku: Mondai no Shozai to Kadai” [Women’s Labor and Social Policies in Developing Countries: Problem Statement and Issues]. In Kōhatsu Kogyōkoku ni okeru Josei Rōdō to Shakai Seisaku [Women’s Labor and Social Policies in Developing Countries], edited by Kaoru Murakami, 3–19. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. Osella, Caroline and Filippo Osella. 2012. “Migration, Networks and Connectedness across the Indian Ocean.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 105–136. New York: Columbia University Press. Owen, Roger. 1992. Migrant Workers in the Gulf. London: Minority Rights Group. Rajan, S. Irudaya. 2004. “New Trends of Labour Emigration from India to Gulf Countries and Impact on the Kerala Economy.” In International Labor Migration from South Asia, edited by Hisaya Oda, 89–116. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan. Sabban, Rima. 2012. Maids Crossing: Domestic Workers in the UAE. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing. United Nations. 2013. World Population Policies 2011. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs / Population Division, ST/ESA/SER.A/327, New York: United Nations. Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. Durham: Duke University Press.

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World Bank. 2018. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/, Accessed: ­August 20, 2018. World Bank Group and Ç. Özden, C. Parsons, M. Schiff and T.L. Walmsley 2011. “Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960–2000.” World Bank Economic Review 25(1): 12–56. Statistical data used in this document is available at https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-bilateralmigration# (Accessed 13 August 2019). Winckler, Onn. 2017. Arab Political Demography: Population Growth, Labor Migration and Natalist Policies. Revised and expanded third edition. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Part 1 Migration Policy and the Relationship between Nationals and Migrant Workers

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Chapter 1

International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States: Trends, Institutions, and Relations Koji Horinuki 1 Introduction According to the World Bank statistics, 11.7% of total world migrants—or 29 million—were living in the Arab Gulf states in 2013, which were well known for their oil wealth and monarchial regimes (World Bank 2016). Massive numbers of migrants have moved to the Arab Gulf states since the 1970s as cheap laborers and skilled expatriates, and they have contributed to state building, modernization, and economic development. In addition, the numbers of migrants have still been increasing, even though the Arab Gulf states have faced economic depression because of low oil prices since 2014. Obviously, the Arab Gulf states could not achieve today’s economic prosperity without migrants. However, the Arab Gulf states were not the main stream or a topic of great interest for international migration studies for a long time. Recently, much new research has published, both in Gulf studies and international migrant studies. For example, a classic text book on international migration, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World by Castles and Miller, recently gave more focus to cases in the Arab Gulf states in its fourth (2009) and fifth (2014) editions than in previous editions. Therefore, it can be said that the migration phenomenon that we observe in the Arab Gulf states are not exceptional cases any more, even in international migration studies, but that we should argue them as a global migration trend. In this chapter, I analyze the basic information, data, and policies/institutions concerning migrants in the Arab Gulf states, which will be used for discussion throughout this book. The aim of this chapter is to relate the migrant situations of the Arab Gulf states to the global context, in order to position it within our understanding of international labor migration. It is i­ mportant to emphasize that a review of the policy and institutional framework for migrants is always required to understand the whole picture of the migrant situation in the receiving country. However, at the same time, it must be r­ ealized that the realities of the migrant condition are occasionally different from policy and institutional design. In addition, migrant policy and related i­nstitutions can be

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_003

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changed to respond to issues, international pressures and negotiations, and environmental changes, such as financial and economic issues with low oil prices; thus, I will report recent migrant and policy trends. First, I show the current data for migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states to position them within international migration trends. Second, I review the basic institutions in these countries for receiving laborers. Third, I discuss the international regime governing migrant workers and how the Arab Gulf states are engaged with it. 2

The Trend of International Labor Mobility and the Arab Gulf States

In this section, I will clarify the migrant situation in the Arab Gulf states based on statistical data, namely demographics, international labor trends, and international remittances. The Arab Gulf states entered an era of state building and modernization in the 1970s, and the number of migrants present there has grown dramatically since the oil boom in 1973; this growth still continues today. Studies on Labor and Migrant Policy in the Arab Gulf States—Review Before the discussion, I will briefly review recent major works on migrants in the Arab Gulf states with a focus on related policies to those already reviewed in the Introduction. In the 2000s, the migrant situation in the Arab Gulf states attracted global and academic attention, not only because of its demographic uniqueness but also its migrant-unfriendly conditions. Since then, the number of related academic works and policy reports has increased. Migrant policies have been changed in line with migrant trends in the region, labor market conditions, and external factors such as sending countries’ demands for protection of labor and international advocacy by non-­ governmental organizations (ngos). For migrant trend and policy side dis­ cussions about the Arab Gulf states, there are many good references, from ­historical and political to economic perspectives (Ahmad 2012; Chalcraft 2012; Dito 2015; Gardner 2012; Hussain 2016; Kamrava and Babar 2012; Khalaf 2015; Naufal and Genc 2012; Oommen 2016; AlShehabi 2015; Winckler 2009). Since the majority of labor positions in the Arab Gulf states are occupied by migrants, it can be said that migrant policy is always related with labor policy. Winckler summarized the history and transition of the labor migration system and policy from the view point of “the dual labor market,” which clearly 2.1

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s­ eparates the markets for nationals with high salaries and migrants with low salaries (Winckler 2009). Historical changes in policies show us that, although the Arab Gulf states have attempted to reduce over-reliance on migrant laborers to deal with local unemployment issues, the low cost and work experience of migrants have been a major obstacle for them. Migrant issues, such as poor labor conditions, violation of human rights, domestic workers, and the kafala (sponsorship) system, are the main areas of attention and criticism for the Arab Gulf states as migrant-receiving countries. Human rights organizations and international organizations have published many accusations, white papers, and policy recommendations to demand reform from the Arab Gulf states (Amnesty International 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Human Rights Watch 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012; ituc 2014). The kafala system is a main structural cause of migrant labor issues in the Arab Gulf states because migrants cannot obtain work permits and residence visas without a sponsor (or employer), which leads to an asymmetric power relationship between the sponsor as employer and the migrant as employee (Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants 2014; Dito 2015; Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2011). However, policies and institutions for migrant labor are not always static: even the infamous kafala system has gradually reformed in some countries, and we should not understand it as a static system. Migrant and labor policy reform have been brought about by international debate and patient negotiation held in international forums such as the International Labor Organization (ilo), International Organization for Migration (iom), and Global Forum on Migration Development (Martin 2012; Hanieh 2015). The Arab Gulf states have participated in international discussions on migration and labor to protect their international reputation and rights against international pressures. 2.2 Migrants in the Arab Gulf States First, I will look at migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states in terms of their demographic composition and its characteristics (Table 1.1).1 When we examine the populations in 2016–17, Saudi Arabia had the biggest overall population, with over 30 million people, including 12.2 million migrants. According to the World Bank statistics, the size of the migrant population in Saudi Arabia was followed by those in the United Arab Emirates (uae), Kuwait, and Oman. The total population of expatriates in the Arab Gulf states reached 25.4 million 1 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, we use statistical data from the Arab Gulf states’ statistical authorities for national and expatriate populations and data from international organizations for use in international comparisons. Thus, the figures shown in this article will contain certain differences.

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Table 1.1  Nationals and migrant populations in the Arab Gulf states Official statistics Nationals

Bahrain (2017) 677,506 Kuwait (2017) 1,270,201 Oman (2017) 2,540,254 Qatar (2017) n.a. Saudi Arabia (2017) 20,427,357 uae (2016) n.a. Total

World Bank statistics

Migrants

Total

Ratio of migrants

International Population, migrant stock, total (2016) total (2015)

823,610 2,812,503 2,102,267 n.a. 12,185,284 n.a.

1,501,116 4,082,704 4,642,521 2,641,669 32,612,641 9,121,167 54,551,448

54.9% 68.9% 45.3% n.a. 37.4% n.a.

704,137 2,866,136 1,844,978 1,687,640 10,185,945 8,095,126 25,383,962

1,425,170 4,052,580 4,424,760 2,569,800 32,275,690 9,269,610 54,017,610

Source: Central Authority for Statistics, Saudi Arabia (2017), Central Statistics Bureau, Kuwait (2017), Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, UAE (2016), Information and eGovernment Authority, Bahrain (2017), Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar (2018), National Center for Statistics and Information, Oman (2017), World Bank Group (2015, 2016).

in 2015, and most of them were labor migrants. The percentage of migrants in the total population is unusual, however; 87.3 percent of the total population in the uae was made up of these migrants, a percentage followed by those of Kuwait and Qatar. The nationals, or so-called locals, are a “minority” relative to the migrant community in terms of the demographic composition of the state, a situation that is unique in the world (Horinuki 2010: 20–22). We have already seen the changes in the migrant population, in Figure 0.2 in the Introduction, with the number of migrants rising rapidly in the 1970s. The figure shows the demographic trends driven by an unceasing inflow of expatriates, even during the oil glut after the mid-1980s and the global financial crisis beginning in 2008. This increasing trend will continue as a result of mega-­ development projects in the Arab Gulf states, such as those for the Dubai Expo in 2020 and the fifa 2022 World Cup in Qatar.2 2 According to data from the Qatar Ministry of Development and Statistics, Qatar’s population increased by 1,699,435 in 2010 and reached 2,641,669 at the end of December 2017 (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2018). This increase was not solely a result of natural population growth of native Qatari people but rather a rapid increase in migrant workers for infrastructure and construction projects related to the fifa 2022 World Cup. The population of Oman has also increased since 2010, reaching 4,642,521 at the end of December 2017 and

International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States

27

Although the statistics do not recognize it, there are many illegal residents and undocumented people in the Arab Gulf states. Most of the illegal residents originally entered and worked legally; however, they may move or stay after the expiration of their legal status and continue to work. The local media often ­reports crackdowns on these illegal residents by the labor and security authorities. Every country has launched amnesty programs for these illegals, to give them the chance to return without any charges or to legalize their status within the country. In the case of the uae, the authorities announced an amnesty ­period from December 2012 to February 2013, and more than 60,000 illegals applied (Salama 2013). Amnesties may sometimes affect labor markets, by increasing temporal labor shortages and labor costs (L’Agence France-Presse 2013). The gender balance within these demographic compositions is also unique. Many migrants who work in the construction and other labor-intensive sectors are male and single or living without their family—they are called “bachelor workers” in the local context. Thus, the percentage of the male population has risen to 60–70 percent in some countries. As we will discuss later, family reunification is restricted based on salary, so most of these “bachelors” cannot bring their families. This gender imbalance in the host society is recognized as a security issue in family neighborhoods and could cause political and social friction.3 Table 1.2 shows the numbers of the migrant populations based on nationality.4 Seven of the sending countries in the top ten are Asian countries. Migrants coming from the traditional sending countries for the Arab Gulf states, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Egypt, are still the most common. In addition, new sending countries, such as Nepal and Myanmar, has recently become popular among the Arab Gulf states as for construction worker, taxi driver, and security guard. It is difficult to say that any trend in the sending country is based on the preference of the receiving country and of employers to particular nationalities. For example, Filipinos are preferred for domestic workers because they are thought to have skills in that area and have a good public image. consisting of 2,540,254 Omani and 2,102,267 migrants. Similar to that in Qatar, the increase in Oman’s population was mostly due to migrant workers (National Center for Statistics & ­Information 2017). 3 Many low-wage and bachelor migrant workers often share rooms and villas with their friends and colleagues to reduce their expenses. Thus, the male population has increased in some urban areas, leading families and female residents to consider them as menace parts of the city. In 2008, the Dubai Municipality announced a “one villa, one family” campaign that prohibited illegal sharing and moved bachelor workers to suburban labor camps to reduce their dominance in urban areas. 4 Please note that we use statistical data from the World Bank that may not accurately reflect the true composition of the migrant population. (Please also see the section on “Terms and Statistical Data” in the introductory chapter.).

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Table 1.2  Migrants in the Arab Gulf states (by nationality, 2013) Receiving countries

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

uae

Total

2,268,200 1,346,984 1,000,000 309,300 320,684 700,000 60,926 201,451 200,000 150,000 154,968 0 52,503 141,490 7,377 412,400 24,948 44,268 12,256 33,856 112,371 7,553,982

6,451,317 3,386,365 3,164,927 2,347,643 2,005,403 1,773,932 1,220,860 1,112,350 1,097,857 851,146 759,408 600,000 581,406 535,021 511,437 488,819 198,681 169,948 169,002 89,467 395,435 27,910,424

Sending countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

India 262,855 730,558 644,704 545,000 2,000,000 Pakistan 87,892 244,281 117,208 90,000 1,500,000 Bangladesh 100,444 279,169 148,314 137,000 1,500,000 Egypt, Arab Rep. 65,607 489,023 41,365 143,960 1,298,388 Indonesia 29,553 82,139 35,027 38,000 1,500,000 Philippines 43,971 153,292 21,669 185,000 670,000 Syrian Arab Republic 5,614 142,000 0 12,320 1,000,000 Yemen, Rep. 18,564 51,598 0 40,737 800,000 Nepal 722 56,135 0 341,000 500,000 Sri Lanka 9,804 27,251 14,091 100,000 550,000 Sudan 14,281 39,693 8,466 42,000 500,000 Myanmar 0 0 0 0 600,000 West Bank and Gaza 4,838 13,448 0 10,617 500,000 Jordan 13,040 36,242 10,249 34,000 300,000 Afghanistan 680 1,889 0 1,491 500,000 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 46,419 0 30,000 0 Lebanon 2,298 6,390 0 5,045 160,000 Turkey 4,079 11,339 0 8,952 101,310 Ethiopia 1,129 3,139 0 2,478 150,000 United Kingdom 3,119 8,672 5,613 6,846 31,361 Others 10,360 28,782 9,141 22,722 212,059 Total 678,850 2,451,459 1,055,847 1,797,168 14,373,118 Source: World Bank Group (2015a)

In this case, workers are obviously hired based on preference for nationality, but people will otherwise generally be hired based on their career, experience, skill, and wage level.5 Table 1.3 shows the number of employees in the uae in 5 Saudi Arabia announced a ban on the employment of domestic workers from the Philippines in 2011 when there was a disagreement between them over labor conditions. Saudi Arabia changed supplier from the Philippines to Ethiopia. However, the demand for and evaluation of Filipino domestic workers were still high in the domestic labor market; thus, the Saudi authority had little choice but to resume receiving them (see Ishii, Chapter 6).

International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States

29

2008 by economic activity group and nationality. The total labor population in the uae was 3 million in 2008, and of that, 1 million workers were in the construction sector. According to the nationality groups, 2.5 million workers were from Asian countries and 0.9 million of them worked in the construction sector. Therefore, it can be said that the uae, and the other Arab Gulf states, could not have achieved economic success without enormous numbers of cheap migrant laborers. 2.3 Trends in the International Labor Market in the Arab Gulf States In this section, I will discuss the expatriate situation in the Arab Gulf states and its characteristics with reference to the international labor market. Table 1.4 shows the global rankings of migrant stocks in 2015.6 The biggest migrant-receiving country is the United States, which received 46 million people or 19.2 percent of global migrants, followed by Germany (12 million or 4.9 percent), Russia (11.6 million or 4.8 percent), and Saudi Arabia (10.2 million or 4.2 percent). Among the other Arab Gulf states, the uae is sixth and Kuwait is twentieth in the rankings. This means that the Arab Gulf states have become a major global labor market. Figure 1.1 shows total migration stocks and net migration flows in the world and in the main receiving regions. The migration stocks indicate that global trends in migration have continued to increase since the 1990s, as well as those in Europe, North America, and the Arab Gulf states. The flows show the dynamics of migration, in that Europe (with 33.2 percent) and North America have been major receiving regions, whereas the Arab Gulf states have now reached 10.4 percent. Looking at the flows by country, the United States had a net inflow of 4.69 million migrants in 2010 (19.2%); this was followed by 1.92 million in Spain (7.9 percent) and 1.07 million in Canada (4.4 percent). Among the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, with 1.04 million migrants (4.3 percent), is the top destination, and it was followed by 600,000 in Qatar (2.5 percent), and 450,000 in the uae (1.9 percent). Therefore, the stocks and flows of migrant movements also demonstrate that the Arab Gulf states have become a global destination for international labor migration.

6 The definition of “migrant” in UN statistical documents refers to people who are foreign born. If data are not available, we refer to migrants as those who have not obtained citizenship in their receiving country.

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Table 1.3  Employees by economic activity group and nationality in 2008

Nationality group uae Economic activity group Agriculture, Hunting, 10 and Forestry Mining and Quarrying 3,956 Manufacturing 2,805 Electricity, Gas, and Water 1,576 Supply Construction 3,219 Wholesale and Retail 6,035 Trade, Repair of Vehicles, Motorcycles, and Personal and Household Goods Hotel and Restaurants 668 Transport, Storage, and 12,066 Communications Financial Intermediation 10,856 Real Estate, Renting, and 4,234 Business Activities Public Administration, 70,171 Defence, and Compulsory Social Security Education 453 Health and Social Work 215 Other Community, Social, 758 and Personal Service Activities Total 117,022

gcc Other Arab Asian African countries countries countries ­countries (Non Arab) (Non Arab)

9

771

5,138

209

123 748 78

7,758 30,392 2,240

44,377 364,057 8,178

325 740 13

149 188

65,194 67,082

925,565 435,490

3,220 3,284

109 625

26,040 20,749

126,374 244,434

3,474 2,642

317 443

12,141 33,428

34,827 174,579

276 1,822

3,019

40,623

52,532

406

146 40 57

17,723 4,842 8,808

29,491 18,812 43,938

456 238 266

6,051

337,791

2,507,792

17,371

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (uae) (2010)

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International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States

European North Central South Oceanic countries American American American countries countries and Caribbean countries countries

Not stated

Total

4

0

0

0

0

0

6,141

1,887 2,010 119

367 385 56

22 64 0

60 14 1

45 140 13

139 532 2

59,059 401,887 12,276

4,834 6,015

428 1,391

341 67

10 52

377 922

25 860

1,003,362 521,386

2,659 3,703

511 628

16 86

54 37

210 373

6 71

160,121 285,414

1,551 6,061

679 1,012

34 3

12 158

339 596

34 29

61,066 222,365

1,483

439

3

66

222

927

169,891

1,091 541 335

670 168 62

12 3 0

18 12 13

214 30 38

23 16 48

50,297 24,917 54,323

32,293

6,796

651

507

3,519

2,712

3,032,505

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Table 1.4  Global ranking of migrant stocks (2015, thousands)

Ranking

Country

Number of migrants (thousands)

Migrant ratio in the host country (%)

Migrant ratio in the world (%)

1 2 3

United States Germany Russian Federation Saudi Arabia United Kingdom uae Canada France Australia Spain

46,627 12,006 11,643

14.5% 14.7% 8.1%

19.2% 4.9% 4.8%

10,186 8,543

32.3% 13.1%

4.2% 3.5%

8,095 7,836 7,784 6,764 5,853

88.4% 21.9% 11.7% 28.4% 12.6%

3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 2.8% 2.4%

Kuwait Oman Qatar Bahrain Total of Arab Gulf States

2,866 1,845 1,688 704 25,384

72.8% 43.9% 68.0% 51.3% 48.2%

1.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.3% 10.4%

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 … 20 32 33 59

Source: World Bank Group (2015b)

2.4 International Remittances from the Arab Gulf States The size of international remittances from the Arab Gulf states also highlights the situation of migrants there. Figure 1.2 shows the changing remittance trend in the Arab Gulf states, with an increasing trend from 1975 to 1985 and then another increase in the quantity of total remittances in the late 1980s. The amount was stable for 10 years from the mid-1990s; however, the remittances have increased rapidly since 2007 because of a huge influx of expatriate workers as the “second oil boom” in the Arab Gulf states took off. Abother contributing factor is that the total sums remitted have been captured more precisely because an unofficial regional remittance system, the so-called hawala, was put under strict money-laundering regulations imposed after the September 11 attacks. The size of remittances from the Arab Gulf states has continued to increase, despite the global economic crisis triggered by the Lehman Brothers

33

International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States Total Migration Stocks (1990–2015)

(Thousands) 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0

1990

1995 Europe

(Thousands)

2000

North America

2005

2010

Arab Gulf States

2015

World Total

Total Migration Flows (1995–2010)

30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

1995 (1990–1995)

2000 (1995–2000)

2005 (2000–2005)

Europe

North America

Arab Gulf States

2010 (2005–2010) World Total

Figure 1.1 Total migration stocks (above) and flows (below) in the world Source: United Nations (2011), World Bank (2015b)

bankruptcy in 2008 and the consequent Dubai debt crisis in 2009. The figures do not include statistics from Qatar and the uae, and thus, the figures must be substantially too low if we consider the expatriate population in both ­countries. The remittances of the Arab Gulf states comprise approximately 20 percent of the global volume.

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Horinuki

(Million US$) 60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

0

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Figure 1.2 International remittances from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia Source: World Bank Group (2014)

Table 1.5 shows the data for remittances from the Arab Gulf states to major labor-sending countries and the Arab Gulf ratio for the total amount of remittance inflows. The largest country in terms of receiving remittances from the Arab Gulf is India, and these remittances represent 55.6 percent of the total global remittances to India. The remittance size is roughly proportional to the size of the expatriate population in the Arab Gulf states. The remittance ratio for the Arab Gulf states in terms of the total money received depends on each country’s situation. The most-dependent country on Gulf remittances is Yemen, which receives 90 percent of the total amount of received remittances; this is followed by Egypt and Nepal. High dependency on the Arab Gulf states tends to affect the development of international and regional affairs: for example, many Yemenis and Palestinians were deported from the Arab Gulf states in 1990 and 1991 because both governments supported Saddam Hussain of Iraq, who had invaded Kuwait. Remittances from the Arab Gulf states thus decreased sharply, and both Yemen and Palestine suffered economic damage (Ulrichsen 2016: 176). As described above, it seems that the situation of the Arab Gulf states with regards to international labor migration is no longer exceptional from the

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Table 1.5  Remittances from the Arab Gulf states to major migrant-sending countries in 2017

India Egypt Pakistan Philippines Bangladesh Nepal Indonesia Sri Lanka Jordan Yemen Lebanon Syria The West Bank and Gaza Iran Thailand

Remittances from Total received the Arab Gulf states remittances (million US$) (million US$)

Gulf ratio

38,378 14,512 13,698 10,350 7,271 4,893 4,615 3,638 3,175 3,016 2,044 598 451

68,968 19,983 19,665 32,808 13,469 6,947 8,997 7,190 4,418 3,351 7,955 1,623 2,034

55.6% 72.6% 69.7% 31.5% 54.0% 70.4% 51.3% 50.6% 71.9% 90.0% 25.7% 36.9% 22.2%

443 274

1,379 6,729

32.1% 4.1%

Source: World Bank Group (2018)

viewpoints of demographics, trends, and remittances. The Arab Gulf states have become a new center of global human mobility, and this has had a substantial influence on the societies and economies of the sending countries. However, the huge influx of expatriates into the Arab Gulf states has produced such a demographic imbalance that the nationals of these states have become a minority in the uae, Qatar, and Kuwait. This demographic imbalance is one of the characteristics of the Arab Gulf states’ migrant situation. 3

Migrant Policies and Institutions in the Arab Gulf States

In the previous section, we examined the migrant situation of the Arab Gulf states with regard to international labor migration based on statistical data. In this section, I review the receiving conditions and institutions in the Arab Gulf

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Horinuki

states. For comparison, I have generalized a common receiving policy and institutions for the Arab Gulf states, although there are differences among them. However, we can also find many similarities in the basic system of managing migrants, such as entry, exit, temporary and fixed-term employment, a sponsorship system, and a social integration policy. In addition, the Executive Bureau of the Arab Gulf Councils of Ministers of Labor and Social Affairs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) has discussed migrant issues in terms of their common policy targets and coordinated relevant policies.7 3.1 Temporary and Fixed-Term Contracts First, we examine what migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states are called. The terms “immigrant”(muhajir in Arabic), “migrant worker” (‘amil muhajir), and “guest worker” are not general terms in the context of the Arab Gulf states, where these people are typically just called “foreigners” (ajnabi), “expatriates” (wafid, mughtarib), or “foreign workers” (‘amil ajnabi) (Horinuki 2009: 70). The differences among these terms indicate that the governments of the Arab Gulf states tend to avoid the term “migrant,” because it gives an impression of settlement and permanent residence, whereas they accept foreigners only as “temporary contract workers.”8 Foreigners are able to stay and work within their two- to three-year contract term, based on the sponsorship (kafala) system that will be discussed later. If they are refused a renewal of their contract by their employers, they must either seek a new employer or return to their home country.9 Therefore, it can be inferred that the governments of the Arab Gulf states attempt to strictly prevent the settlement of foreigners,10 and the 7 8

9 10

For example, the Arab Gulf states have worked to establish common laws to protect d­ omestic workers from instances of abuse (Kerr 2014). In 2008, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, involving both labor-sending and -receiving countries including the Arab Gulf states, defined the aim of the conference as discussing issues on “temporary contract labor.” When Human Rights Watch described migrants as “migrant workers” in its report on the uae’s foreign labor issues, the uae government refuted this because “workers hosted by the uae and other gcc countries cannot be considered ­migrant workers, as they work on a temporary basis and according to fixed-term employment contracts.” As such, these governments do not use this expression to refer to populations with long-term settlements (Human Rights Watch 2006: 70; Horinuki 2009: 88). For example, Article 38 of the uae’s labor law defines in its contract terms that “the employment contract may be for a limited or unlimited term. A limited term contract shall not exceed four years.” Not surprisingly, the settlement of migrants, family reunification, social integration, and naturalization can lead to cost increases for receiving countries. Nationals may oppose the naturalization and political and social integration of migrants because it reduces the rent allocation to nationals per capita.

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Arab Gulf states have discussed a five-year cap on foreigners’ residencies (­Toumi 2008). In 2017, the Qatar government announced that they had ­approved a law for allowing expatriates who have performed outstanding service to Qatar to obtain permanent residency, but this is still a rare case (Reuters 2017). However, there are long-term foreign residents, or de facto permanent residents based on the renewal of their contracts, who bring their families from their home countries. For example, some research shows that the average length of stay of migrants from Kerala, India, in the Arab Gulf states is 107 months (about 9 years) (Czaika and Varela 2012: 16), and the average length of stay for migrant workers in the uae is also about 9 years (Grant 2008). Although someone could stay longer than average, they must nevertheless return to their home country if their contract ends and they fail to find a new job and sponsor. Family reunification in the host country is restricted by income level.11 For instance, in Kuwait, those who want to bring their families need a monthly income of KD 250 (860 US dollars) to receive a family visa. In the uae, they need a monthly income of more than aed 3,000 (816 US dollars) plus accommodation or aed 4,000 to sponsor their families. In reality, however, a monthly income of 800 US dollars is not enough to support their families in the host state because rents and prices are too high. 3.2 Sponsorship System When we look at the recruitment process, migrant workers must, in principle, find an employer before they enter the Arab Gulf states. An employer must act as their sponsor, or kafeel in Arabic, in order for them to obtain a work permit and a residence visa; this system is called the kafala (sponsorship) system (Dito 2015). Today, the labor markets in the Arab Gulf states are “offshored,” in that employers offer jobs through an employment agency in the receiving country and the agency seeks employees through its network of sending countries (Matsuo 2013b: 176). In many cases, migrant workers also used visit visas or

11

As Toshio Iyotani points out, migration studies have tacitly assumed the historical perception of “transition from movement of people to settlement,” and he criticizes the assumption that the concepts of migrants and settlement are conflicting ideas related to the normalcy of settlement and deviation of migrants (Iyotani 2007: 6). Today, although many migrants enjoy family reunification and obtain citizenship for settlement or permanent residence in their receiving country (based on the spread of international human rights norms and international treaties on migrant protection), there are a number of countries that have retained temporary and fixed-term policies for migrants.

38

Horinuki

tourist visas to enter and look for a job in an informal way; once they were ­employed, they legalized their status.12 Migrant workers can change jobs and are transferred to another sponsor if they finish their contract and obtain a socalled No Objection Certificate from their employers. A householder can be a sponsor for their family members and for domestic workers under his or her sponsorship. In this way, the Arab Gulf states use a combination of a sponsorship system and temporary contracts to avoid the settlement of migrants and achieve a highly fluid labor market. However, the sponsorship system is often criticized as the root of all labor issues in the Arab Gulf states. Migrant workers cannot enter the country and work without a sponsor and are forced to leave if their employer cancels the sponsorship. Thus, the system establishes a one-sided relationship between employers and migrant workers that raises many labor issues, such as difficult working conditions, unpaid wages, and human rights abuses (Horinuki 2009: 76). Today, international human rights pressures are pushing the Arab Gulf states to reform and abolish the sponsorship system. Since 2012, Qatar faced international human rights pressure and was criticized for the sponsorship system when labor issues emerged about the experiences of construction workers in charge of construction projects for the fifa 2022 World Cup. After that, labor reforms has gradually progressed and Qatar’s diplomatic crisis with neighboring countries in 2017 spurred its reform. In 2018, the Qatar government announced the abolishment of kafala and several labor reform plans. (Human Rights Watch 2018). 3.3 Strict Control of Entrance, Departure, and Residency Migrant workers are under control both directly and indirectly from the receiving countries. Direct control is exerted at the state level via the issuance of entrance and residence permits by the Ministry of Interior and work permits by the Ministry of Labor, whereas indirect control is exercised through the sponsorship system, as previously discussed. Today, the control of migrant workers is exercised not only to maintain control of permissions and information but also for the control of physical and biological information. The passport information of migrant workers is registered when they enter a country. Their biological information, such as fingerprints and iris patterns, are also scanned and registered. It is impossible to change this biological information, although the passport itself can be renewed or forged. These migrant workers are thus liable to be traced permanently. If they are deported for overstaying, illegal work, or crime, they will be refused entry to the country again. 12

However, visa system and its operation in the Arab Gulf states has often been changed by time and country. For Bangladeshi workers’ cases, please see Rahman, Excurses 3.

International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States

39

This information and the blacklist have recently been shared between the ministries of the interior for the Arab Gulf states. After migrant workers enter a country, they have to undergo medical checks for hiv and hepatitis, and (for women) a pregnancy test, in order to obtain a work permit, and they will be forced to leave if they are disqualified by these tests.13 When they leave the host country, migrant workers need to obtain an “exit permit” or “exit visa” from their employers. Migrant workers are monitored and controlled for security reasons because they constitute an enormous mass of people and a numerical majority in their host societies. Security authorities thus watch closely to minimize the risks of crimes and riots by migrant workers.14 Nationals sometimes see migrant workers as a threat, which may affect social stability and the development of their own culture; this has led to attempts to legitimize policing and the sponsorship system (Matsuo 2012: 209–211). There are many articles in local newspapers reporting the achievements of crackdowns on illegal migration; at the same time, migrants take precautions against such crackdowns and share information though sms and mobile communications. However, it can be said that controlling the human flow and migration is more or less impossible, because we see hundreds of thousands of people rush to the authorities when the Arab Gulf states announce an amnesty. 3.4 Absence of Social Integration Policy In Western countries, migrants are expected to be integrated into the host society, because social integration is one of the tools used to control them and to prevent social destabilization. Therefore, on one level or another, migrants are required to adapt and assimilate to the local language, culture, and customs. However, the Arab Gulf states do not expect migrant workers to integrate into their host society. As we discussed above, migrant workers in the Arab

13

14

Some countries such as Oman and Bahrain require pre-entry medical test for visa appliers in their home country. They should take medical tests at medical agencies authorized by the Gulf Approved Medical Centers Association (Chatterji 2017; Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2018; Royal Oman Police n.d.). There are many reports and discourses on criminal cases involving migrant laborers, such as theft, violence, alcohol consumption, prostitution, and so on. In fact, 12,807 cases (59.4 percent) of Dubai’s total 21,550 criminal cases in 2011 were committed by migrants from Asian countries (Dubai Statistics Center 2011, 162). This number is much higher than the number of crimes committed by uae nationals (2,696 cases or 12.5 percent); however, according to the author’s estimation, the criminal rate among uae nationals for every 100 residents is 1.15 cases, which is higher than that among Asian migrants (1.13 cases). Therefore, it can be said that there is no big difference in crime rates between nationals and expatriates.

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Gulf states are received on the condition of a temporary and fixed-term contract, and they are subject to control under the sponsorship system. The Arab Gulf states therefore consider that social integration programs for migrants are not necessarily a priority in migrant policy. Likewise, migrant workers themselves recognize that they can only stay for a limited time and are not allowed to be naturalized, so they do not need to learn the local culture or Arabic, the official language. In addition, the benefits for migrants from learning the local language are much lower than the costs. Therefore, migrant workers have little incentive to integrate into their host society or to claim political and social rights. In this situation, active interaction between nationals and expatriates has not been observed, although there are personal interactions between them and it can be said that a state of “pseudo-coexistence” has been formed in such situations. However, governments and nationals recently changed their attitude on migrant workers’ roles in the Arab Gulf states, and they have attempted to hail migrants as members of the state on formal occasions such as May Day and the national day. For example, Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan, the then Minister of Culture, Youth, and Community Development in the uae, pointed out that the uae success story included expatriate contributions in his keynote address to the Harvard Arab World Conference in 2014 (Masudi 2014). Domestic issues such as unemployment for nationals in the Arab Gulf states have not triggered an anti-immigrant movement or serious confrontations, such as hate crimes, as yet. This is because the labor-market competition between nationals and migrants is generally still not very serious (see Matsuo, Chapter 2). However, there are many complaints among nationals that the decent number of migrants and the demographic imbalance problem should be discussed as political issues, so that serious confrontations can be avoided in the future if the social and economic situation changes. 4

International Efforts Regarding Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States

In this section, I will discuss how the international efforts, policies, and diplomatic strategies of sending countries affect the Arab Gulf states’ migrant policies and their labor markets. As we have already seen in the previous section, the number of migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states is enormous, so it is very natural for them to be highlighted by the international spotlight. Labor conflicts and issues in the Arab Gulf states have been of international concern; however, the Arab Gulf states have failed to take sufficient measures to

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resolve them, and there are many questions regarding the effectiveness of the measures that have been implemented. However, some Arab Gulf states have attempted to improve migrant conditions and protect laborers since the mid2000s, and the situation has been improving gradually. It can be pointed out that the improving situation is not only due to international pressure but also to the Arab Gulf states’ participation in international bodies and dialog between the sending and receiving countries. In the following sections, we will argue these issues through four levels: international institutions, economic treaties, bilateral relations, and non-state actors. 4.1 International Institutions The human rights, status, and protections for migrants and migrant labor have been discussed in the international community. International bodies, such as the iom and ilo, have worked for an institutional design for smooth labor movement and labor protections that spread international norms for protecting migrants. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar attend the iom with observer status, and every Arab Gulf State participates in the ilo and voices their unified view as the gcc. In addition, the Arab Gulf states attend the United ­Nations Human Rights Council, and they have received recommendations on human rights issues, including the migrant labor problem. As of 2018, every Arab Gulf State except Oman has experience as a member of the council. However, the Arab Gulf states have taken a negative stance toward ratifying international treaties for the protection of migrant workers. In the 2000s, the Arab Gulf states faced international criticisms about child labor and human trafficking, namely, that children were kidnapped and forced to work as jockeys in camel racing. After these criticisms, they ratified an international treaty against human trafficking (Janardhan 2011: 127–128). Otherwise, the Arab Gulf states have not ratified major international treaties and conventions for protecting migrant labor and refugees, such as the 1949 ilo Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (United Nations 2011: 329). Thus, it can be said that migrant protection based on existing frameworks, such as international norms and human rights regimes, has not had much of an effect. 4.2 Economic Treaties International economic regimes that the Arab Gulf states have joined have affected migrant workers’ treatment. The Arab Gulf states have joined in negotiations for the World Trade Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Free Trade Agreement (fta) as part of their economic activity in the international community; however, Western countries have urged the Arab Gulf states to introduce labor protections. For example, the United

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States demanded that the Arab Gulf states improve the rights of migrants during the fta negotiation, such as by allowing permanent resident status, an equalization of employment opportunities and treatment for both nationals and migrants, thereby granting a right to education and healthcare, and freedom of association for trade unions (Janardhan 2011: 104). In fact, the US Trade Representative requested a consultation with the Government of Bahrain with regards to protection for workers’ rights in May 2013 (Palmer 2013). Nothing is known about what happened after that; however, it can be said that the conclusion of economic treaties provides a springboard for labor market reforms in the Arab Gulf states. 4.3 Bilateral Relations In recent years, diplomatic pressure and bargaining from sending countries has led receiving countries to change migrant protections and statuses.15 When a labor issue arises in a receiving country, civil groups and ngos campaign about the issue and put pressure not only on the receiving country but also on the government of the sending country to exert diplomatic pressure. The ­government cannot ignore protests from their nationals because international remittances contribute substantially to the national economy and the government will face strong criticism if they neglect the issue, which could potentially lead to a domestic political problem. Therefore, the sending countries have little choice but to make a diplomatic issue of it, and they thus attempt to negotiate through diplomatic channels. The most prominent examples of this dynamic are the governments of the Philippines and India. These two governments have successfully reached bilateral agreements and memorandum of understandings with the Arab Gulf states since the 2000s, in order to protect their nationals’ rights and status there. They have successfully introduced a minimum wage for the protection of their nationals, and they may refuse to issue permits to send workers to receiving countries unless decent contracts are concluded. For example, major sending countries of domestic workers, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, banned the sending of their nationals as domestic workers to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states in 2010 because many cases of the abuse of domestic workers were revealed to the public. At the time, these instances

15

According to a person in charge of protecting Indonesian citizens in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, bilateral negotiation is more effective in resolving migrant issues than international dialogue (Interview with the author on 9 August 2012).

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International Labor Migration and the Arab Gulf States Table 1.6  Bilateral agreements and MoUs between Arab Gulf states and major migrantsending countries

Country

Bilateral agreements

MoU

Afghanistan Agreements with n.a. Etisalat uae for Graduate Trainee Induction Program (2010); agreement with Iran for cooperation on social affairs (2010), technical labor dispatch protocol with Qatar. Bangladesh Kuwait (2000/2008), Qatar (1988/2008), Malaysia South Korea (2007) (2003/2006), uae (2007), Oman (2008), Libya (2008) China Mauritius (2005) and United Kingdom (2005), Malaysia (2003) Republic of Korea (2007) India Qatar (2007) uae (2006), Kuwait (2007), Oman (2008), Malaysia (2009), Bahrain (2009)

Indonesia

n.a.

In process uae, Kuwait, Iran

Joradan, Bahrain, and Italy n.a.

Yemen, Libya, Poland, Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia Jordan (2001, renewed 2009), Syria, Australia (2005), Japan Lebanon, (2008), Republic of Korea Libya, Brunei (2010), United Arab Emirates Darussalam (2007, renewed 2010), (draft Malaysia (2006 domestic submitted workers), (2010 private to the sector), Japan (2008), Qatar Government (2008, renewed 2011 for the of Brunei formal sector, 2010 for the Darussalam), health sector) and between Australia, and ieto (Indonesia Economic Japan and Trade Office in Taipei, Taiwan Province of China) and teto (Taipei Economic and Trade Office in Jakarta) (2004, renewed 2011)

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Table 1.6  Bilateral agreements and MoUs between Arab Gulf states and major migrantsending countries (cont.)

Country

Bilateral agreements

MoU

In process

Nepal

n.a.

Lebanon and Malaysia

Pakistan

Qatar (1978, 2008)

Philippines

n.a.

Sri Lanka

Japan (jitco—2003), Qatar (2005), uae (2007), South Korea (2007), and Bahrain (2008) uae (2006) and South Korea (2008) Libya (1979, 2006), Jordan (1981, 2010) Korea (2004, 2005, 2006, 2009), Lao pdr (2005), Spain (2006), Saskatchewan (2006), Bahrain (2007), uae (2007), Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba (2008), New Zealand (2008), and Japan (2009) n.a.

uae (2007); Qatar (2008); Libya (2008); Jordan (2006); Bahrain (2008); South Korea (2004,2010) n.a. uae (2007), Republic of Korea (2009), Japan (imm 2010), Japan (jitco— Record of discussion 1994, updated 2010) Russia (1992 BA Republic of Korea (2004, updated in 2008); Lao mou updated in 2008), pdr (1994 BA last Oman (2007), Bulgaria updated in 2009); Qatar (2008), Slovakia (2008), uae (2008); Kazakhstan (2009), and Saskatchewan (2009) (2006)

Thailand

Vietnam

Source: iom (2011)

Italy and Bahrain n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Japan (1992 updated in 2010) and Saudi Arabia (2006)

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of abuse became diplomatic issues between Saudi Arabia and the sending ­countries and brought about the recall of the ambassador. Saudi Arabia sought alternative suppliers of domestic workers from Ethiopia and other countries when they faced bans on the recruitment of domestic workers from their traditional suppliers. However, the new sending countries could not meet d­ emand or provide a similar quality of domestic workers, and many Saudi employers complained. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia was forced to sit at the negotiating table with the sending countries. In recent years, political leaders of major sending countries publicly started to raise labor and migrant related issues with host countries to seek a fundamental resolution. In this regard, Philippines and India has become tough ­negotiators for the Arab Gulf states because leaders have to secure more protection for their nationals to gain political support from them. There is an interesting case that the Indian’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed ­Indian labors in Doha during his official visit to Qatar in 2016. He said “I am aware of the issues you are facing. I will talk about it when I meet the authorities.” After that, Prime Minister Modi discussed labor issues with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hama Al Thani (Bhalla 2016). This trend shows that the Arab Gulf states as labor host countries cannot avoid the negotiation for migrant issues any more. 4.4 Non-state Actors It is important to note that human rights issues and the attention paid to them by non-state actors, such as the media and human rights organizations, have forced the Arab Gulf states to proactively participate in international institutions. Human rights pressures from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, in addition to international media reports such as bbc, have focused on issues of concern regarding labor conflicts in the Arab Gulf states, which are obviously human rights concerns for Western countries (Horinuki 2009). As previously described, ngos in sending countries are also the important non-state actors that can put pressure on related bodies (see Ishii, Chapter 6). In the mid-2000s, for example, migrant workers’ issues in the Arab Gulf states became a focus for international media reports. A large labor riot at the construction site of the “Burj Dubai,” now renamed as the Burj Khalifa, was reported worldwide in 2006, and it shed light on the actual condition of migrant labors in the UAE. Since migrant issues may hurt the international reputation and image of the Arab Gulf states, therefore, receiving countries try to improve labor conditions to avoid such as negative media reports. A similar pattern was seen in the debate over the issue of migrant ­labor for the fifa World Cup that

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will be held in Qatar in 2022. The International Trade Union Confederation (ituc), as well as other media such as the British newspaper The Guardian, accused Qatar of being a country of “modern day slavery,” which was a huge pressure for them. Because the country has suffered from international criticism, the Qatar government and labor authority has immediately reformed the migrant and labor policies to protect migrant workers in cooperation with international organizations, law firms, and ngos. As can be seen from the above discussions, the conditions for migrants in the Arab Gulf states have been improved by international institutions, economic treaties, bilateral relations, and reform pressures from non-state actors. In addition to the above, the Arab Gulf states have indicated their intentions to actively participate in building international institutions. In 2005, the Arab Gulf states participated in the “Colombo Process” as observers; this was an international forum of major Asian sending countries for the discussion of migrant issues. This meant that both sending and receiving countries sat at the same table to share and discuss issues. In 2008, the “Abu Dhabi Dialogue,” which discussed migrant labor issues of both sending and receiving countries, was established, and the event had been held four times by 2017. Many agendas relating to the protection of migrant labor and the introduction of a proper employment process have been discussed. Receiving countries participate in these international forums not only to protect their international reputation in terms of migrant issues but also to reduce recruitment and labor conflict costs through the promotion of standardization in recruitment, training, employment, work, and return processes. 5 Conclusion In this chapter, I have analyzed migrant labor mobility in the Arab Gulf states in relation to international trends to relativize its case and demonstrate that it is not exceptional in the global migration trend. The number of migrant workers has continued to grow, along with state building, modernization, and economic development. Today, the Arab Gulf states are a major international ­labor market that has received more than 25 million migrants. The Arab Gulf states have become a global region where people, goods, capital, and information meet, and they hold a great significance for sending countries, both politically and economically. In addition, the influx of massive migrant shapes unique demographic structure of the host countries that migrant has consisted of majority of population against nationals in the uae, Qatar, and Kuwait.

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As we have already seen, tight labor controls under a temporary contract and sponsorship system and inactive social integration for migrant ­populations are the characteristics of the Arab Gulf states as migrant-receiving countries. It is true that there are still many criticisms on migrant issues in the Arab Gulf states such as human rights abuse and labor conditions, however, these issues have gradually been resolved through migrant policy reform, international dialogue, and bilateral negotiations between sending and receiving countries. The recent trend in the Arab Gulf states shows the region’s proactive participation in forming new institutions for migrant labor, in addition to its participation in existing international institutions. Thus, it is also important to highlight that the Arab Gulf states as migrants receiving countries are developed by international migration streams. Bibliography Ahmed, Attiya. 2012. “Beyond Labor: Foreign Residents in the Persian Gulf.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 21–40. London: Hurst and Co. Al-Noaimi, Ali Rashid and Irena Omelaniuk, eds. 2013. Labor Mobility: An Enabler for Sustainable Development. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. AlShehabi, Omar. 2015. “Histories of Migration to the Gulf.” In Transit States: Labour, Migration & Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 3–38. London: Pluto Press. Amnesty International. 2013. The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar’s Construction Sector ahead of the World Cup. London: Amnesty International Publications. Amnesty International. 2014a. My Sleep is my Break: Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers in Qatar. London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International. 2014b. No Extra Time: How Qatar is still Failing on Workers’ Rights ahead of the World Cup. London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International. 2015. Promising Little, Delivering Less: Qatar and Migrant Labour Abuse ahead of the 2022 Football World Cup. London: Amnesty International. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants. 2014. The Kafala: Research on the Impact and Relation of the Sponsorship System to Migrant Labor Bondage in GCC Countries. Hong Kong: Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants. Bhalla, Nita. 2016. “Qatar reassures India after Modi raises abuse of migrant workers.” Reuters, 7 June 2016. Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller. 2009. The Age of Migration; International Population Movements in the Modern World, 4th edition. New York: Guilford Press.

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Castles, Stephen, Hein de Hass, and Mark J. Miller. 2014. The Age of Migration; International Population Movements in the Modern World, 5th edition. New York: Guilford Press. Central Authority for Statistics (Saudi Arabia). 2017. “Population by Single Age, Nationality (Saudi/Non-Saudi) and Gender in 2017.” Accessed 15 August 2018. https://www .stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/estm_pop_ar2017.xlsx. Central Statistics Bureau (Kuwait). 2017. “Population estimates in Kuwait by Age, ­Nationality and Sex at 1/12017” Accessed 15 August 2018. https://www.csb.gov.kw/ Pages/Statistics_en?ID=67&ParentCatID=%201. Chalcraft, Jhon. 2012. “Migration Politics in the Arabian Peninsula.” In The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics, and the Global Order, edited by David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen, 66–85. London: Routledge. Chatterji, Anir. 2017. “Corporate Immigration 2017: GCC Overview.” pwc Middle East. Accessed 15 August 2018. https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/media-centre/articles/cor porate-immigration-gcc.html. Czaika, Mathias and María Villares Varela. 2012. “Labour Market Activity, Occupational Change and Length of Stay in the Gulf.” imi Working Papers Series, no. 56. Dito, Mohammed. 2015. “Kafala: Foundations on Migrant Exclusion in GCC Labour Markets.” In Transit States: Labour, Migration & Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 79–100. London: Pluto Press. Dubai Statistics Center. 2011. “Perpetrators of Crimes by Nationality and Gender— Emirate of Dubai (2009–2011).” Accessed 15 August 2018. https://www.dsc.gov.ae/ Report/DSC_SYB_2011_07%20_%2020.xls.pdf. Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (uae). 2016. “UAE Population 2016.” Accessed 24 February 2018. http://fcsa.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/Statistics/UAE-Popula tion-2016.aspx. Gardner, Andrew. 2012. “Why Do They Keep Coming? Labor Migrants in the Gulf States.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 41–58. London: Hurst and Co. General Directorate of Statistics (Bahrain). 2017. Bahrain in Figures 2016. Accessed August 15, 2018. http://www.data.gov.bh/ar/ResourceCenter/DownloadFile?id=2712. Grant, Michele. 2008. “Would You Retire in Dubai?” Gulf News, 19 June 2008. Gulf Times. 2014. “Reforms Fail to Impress Amnesty, ITUC.” Gulf Times, 15 May 2014. Hanieh, Adam. 2015. “Migrant Rights in the Gulf: Charting the Way Forward.” In Transit States: Labour, Migration & Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 223–232. London: Pluto Press. Horinuki, Koji. 2009. “Wangan Arab Sanyukoku ni okeru Gaikokujin-Roudousha-­ Mondai to Kokunai-Seiji no Henyō” [Foreign Labor Issues and Transformation of Domestic Politics in the Arab Gulf States: A Case Study on the United Arab E ­ mirates]

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(in Japanese). In Kokusai-Idō no Hikaku-Seijigaku [Comparative Politics of International Labor Mobility], edited by Japan Association for Comparative Politics, 69–91. Kyoto: Minerva Shobō. Horinuki, Koji. 2010. “The Dynamics of Human Flow, Control, and Problems in the United Arab Emirates: The Relationship between Labour-Sending and Receiving Countries in 2000s.” Paper presented at the 2010 Gulf Conference, Exeter, UK , 30 June-3 July, 2010. Human Rights Watch. 2006. Building Towers, Cheating Workers Exploitation of Mi­grant Construction Workers in the United Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2008. Exported and Exposed: Abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2009. The Island of Happiness: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2010. Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2012. For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Qatar: Year of Crisis Spurred Rights Reforms,” Human Rights Watch. Accessed 15 August, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/ qatar-year-crisis-spurred-rights-reforms. Hussain, Zakir. 2016. “GCC’s Immigration Policy in the post-1990s: Contextualising South Asian Migration.” In South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development, edited by Prakash C. Jain and Ginu Zacharia Oomen, 93–120. London: Routledge. Information and eGovernment Authority (Bahrain). 2017. “Population by Nationality & Sex, 2007–2017,” Accessed 14 August 2018. http://www.data.gov.bh/en/Resource Center/DownloadFile?id=2577. International Organization for Migration. 2011. GFMD 2011 Thematic Meeting: Lowering Migration Costs in Collaboration with, and Developing a Model Bilateral Framework with Receiving Countries. Accessed 15 August 2018. https://www.gfmd.org/files/doc uments/gfmd_swiss11_dhaka_background-paper2.pdf. International Trade Union Confederation (ituc). 2014. Facilitating Exploitation: A Review of Labour Laws for Migrant Domestic Workers in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. Brussels: ituc. Iyotani, Toshio. 2007. “Houhou to shite no Imin: Idō kara Basho wo Toraeru” [Migration as a Means: Considering Migration from Place] (in Japanese). In Idō kara Basho wo Tou: Gendai Imin Kenkyū no Kadai [Motion in Place / Place in Motion], edited by Toshio Iyotani, 3–23. Tokyo: Yushindo.

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Janardhan, N. 2011. Boom amid Gloom: The Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf. New York: Ithaca Press. Jureidini, Ray. 2016. Ways Forward in Recruitment of Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in the Asia-Arab States Corridor. International Labor Organization (ilo) White Paper. Kamrava, Mehran and Zahra Babar, eds. 2012. Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. London: Hurst and Co. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Reading: Ithaca Press. Kerr, Simeon. 2014. “Gulf States to Reform Contracts of Domestic Workers,” Financial Times, 27 November 2014. Khalaf, Abdulhadi. 2015. “The Politics of Migration.” In Transit States: Labour, Migration & Citizenship in the Gulf, edited by Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 39–56. London: Pluto Press. Khan, Azfar and Hélène Harroff-Tavel. 2011. “Reforming the Kafala: Challenges and Opportunities in Moving Forward.” Asia and Pacific Migration Journal 20: 293–313. Labour Market Regulatory Authority (Bahrain). 2018. “Medical Examination,” Labour Market Regulatory Authority. Accessed 15 August 2018. http://lmra.bh/portal/en/ page/show/203. L’Agence France-Presse, Labour Costs Soar in Saudi Arabia after Migrant Exodus, Khaleej Times, 9 November 2013. Martin, Susan F. 2012. “Protecting Migrants’ Rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 217– 231. London: Hurst and Co. Masudi, Faisal. 2014. “Expats Part of UAE Success: Minister.” Gulf News, 27 March 2014. Matsuo, Masaki. 2012. “Wangan Syokoku ni okeru Imin Rōdōsha” [Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States] (in Japanese). In Chūtō Sējigaku: Chīkikenkyū to Hikaku Sējigaku no Kakyō wo Mezashite [Analyzing the Middle East: Bridging Comparative Politics and Area Studies], edited by Keiko Sakai, 201–213. Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Matsuo, Masaki. 2013a. “Wangan Arab Shokoku niokeru Esunokrashī: Rōdōshijō ni okeru Imin to Kokumin” [Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf Countries: Migrant Workers and Citizens in the Labor Market] (in Japanese). Hakusan Jinruigaku [Hakusan Review of Anthropology] 16: 9–27. Matsuo, Masaki. 2013b. “Wangan Arab Shokoku ni okeru Kokumin to Imin: Kokuseki ni Motoduku Bungyō Taisei to Kenishugi Taisei” [Nationals and Migrants in the Arab Gulf States: Authoritarian Regimes based on the National Division of Labor] (in Japanese). In Chūtō Chiiki Chitsujo no Yukue: “Arab no Haru” to Chūtōshokoku no Taigai Sēsaku [Futures of Regularity in the Middle East: “Arab Spring” and Foreign ­Policies in the Middle Eastern Countries], edited by Ichiki Tsuchiya, 169–194. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization.

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Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar). 2015. “Monthly figures on total population in Qatar.” http://www.mdps.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/stat istics_en/monthly_preliminary_figures_on_population_en, Accessed 10 September 2015. Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar) 2018. Qatar Monthly Statistics December 2017. National Bureau of Statistics (United Arab Emirates). 2010. “Census 2005.” National Bureau of Statistics. Accessed 15 August 2018. http://fcsa.gov.ae/_layouts/download .aspx?SourceUrl=%2Fen-us%2FLists%2FD_StatisticsSubject%2FAttachments%2F 488%2FEnglish.rar. National Center for Statistics and Information (Oman). 2015. Monthly Statistical Bulletin October 2015. National Center for Statistics and Information (Oman). 2017. Monthly Statistical Bulletin December 2017. Naufal, George and Ismail Genc. 2012. Expats and Labor Force: The Story of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Oommen, Ginu Zacharia. 2016. “South Asian Migration to the GCC Countries: Emerging Trends and Challenges.” In South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development, edited by Prakash C. Jain and Ginu Zacharia Oommen, 17–45. London: Routledge. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2008. International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2008. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. Palmer, Doug. 2013. “U.S. Requests Talks with Bahrain over 2011 Labor Crackdown.” Reuters, 7 May 2013. Reuters. 2017.“Qatar approves law allowing some foreigners permanent residency.” Reuters, 3 August 2017. Royal Oman Police. n.d. “Visa Types Information: Employment Visa,” Royal Oman ­Police. Accessed 15 August 2018. http://www.rop.gov.om/old/english/dg_pr_visas _employment.asp. Salama, Samir. 2013. “Crackdown on Illegal Residents Stepped Up.” Gulf News, February 6. Toumi, Habib. 2008. “GCC Summit to Discuss Limiting Expatriates’ Stay.” Gulf News, 14 December 2008. Toumi, Habib. 2012. “Saudi Work Visas for Filipinos to Resume.” Gulf News, 26 September 2012. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. 2016. The Gulf States in International Political Economy. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. United Nations. 2011. World Population Policies 2011. New York: United Nations.

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United Nations. 2017. International Migration Report 2017. New York: United Nations. Winckler, Onn. 2009. “Labor and Liberalization: The Decline of the GCC Rentier System.” In Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf, edited by Joshua Teitelbaum. London: Hurst and Co. World Bank Group. 2010. “Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010.” Accessed 15 August 2018. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334 934-1110315015165/T1.Estimates_of_Migrant_Stocks_2010.xls. World Bank Group. 2014. “Migrant Remittance Outflows (US$ million)”. World Bank Group. 2015a. “Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2013.” Accessed 15 August 2018. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/10/3888144 5543162029/bilateral-migration-matrix-2013-0.xlsx. World Bank Group. 2015b. “International Migrant Stock, Total.” Accessed 24 February 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL. World Bank Group. 2016. “Population, Total.” Accessed 24 February 2018. https://data .worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL. World Bank Group. 2016. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, Third Edition. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank Group. 2018. “Bilateral Remittance Estimates for 2017 Using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes (millions of US$) (April 2018 Version).” Accessed 15 August 2018. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/705611533 661084197/bilateralremittancematrix2017-Apr2018.xlsx.

Chapter 2

Political Economy of the Labor Market in the Arab Gulf States Masaki Matsuo 1 Introduction The labor market in the Arab Gulf states is famous for its demographic imbalance between national and migrant workers, unemployment, division of labor, and low working conditions of the migrant workers. However, the reason why the Arab Gulf states maintain the political stability in spite of these problems is obscure. For example, it is generally believed that the availability of migrant workers explains the unemployment rates of national workers. The rise in the unemployment rate may provoke criticism of the government. When this criticism becomes harsh, the government may fall from power and a new government would be established. In the Arab Gulf states, which are ruled by authoritarian monarchies, a change of government means a fall of the regime; hence, migrant workers and unemployment in this region have been recognized as a “time bomb” (Kapiszewski 2006: 8). But this bomb has never exploded in the several decades since the states have started to receive vast numbers of migrants. It is time to reconsider whether migrants are really threats against these regimes. Rather, the governments of the Arab Gulf states may have invented a system that converts migrants from a threat into a support for the regime. This chapter will explain the function of migrant workers in the labor market and its characteristics, along with the political economy that is peculiar to the Arab Gulf states, whose budgetary base is oil exportation, rather than domestic economy, and whose rulers try to maintain the authoritarian regimes In the following part of this chapter, the system that creates political stability based on huge migrant population will be explained. At first,views toward labor market filled with migrant workers and a theory explains authoritarian regimes in the Arab Gulf states are referred. Second, the existence of national division of labor is confirmed and the Arab Gulf states are categorized into “highly divided” and “less divided” countries according to the degree of division of labor between nationals and migrants. Because in “less divided countries” competitions around jobs between nationals and migrant is more likely to occur, the next part of this chapter will focus on one of “less divided countries”, Saudi Arabia, and analyze in which occupational categories the competitions will occur, by © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_004

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finding occupational preference of national workers by scrutinizing statistical data of its labor market. Finally, the process that a policy implemented to protect national workers against migrants causes the inefficiency of the labor market is explained. 2 Views toward Labor Market and Political Stability in the Arab Gulf States According to the review of preceding studies by Seccombe (1984), research into the labor market in the Arab world started in the late 1970s. At that time, there was no perception of “the Arab Gulf states” as a group; rather, issues in the Arab Gulf states were treated as a part of the Arab world. Researchers concerns lay with the context of Arab politics. For example, Birks and Sinclair, who produced various research outcomes about the labor market in the Middle East, categorized the Arab countries into capital-rich states and capital-poor states and focused on migrant issues that reflected the economic gap between the two groups (Birks and Sinclair 1980). At that period, when the Camp David accord in 1978 was followed by the peace between Egypt and Israel, the concept of Arab unity was in doubt. The oil boom in the early 1970s and the economic growth of Arab oil producers were once evaluated as a possibility for general Arab economic development based on complementarity between the Arab states; however, after the 1980s, oil was regarded as “a divisive force in the Arab world” (Birks and Sinclair 1980: 364). It is worth mentioning that the important basic natures of the labor market in the Arab Gulf states, such as the segmentation of the labor market between nationals and migrants, and the absorption of national workers in the public sector, were already being noted at this time. However, the reasons why rulers tended to implement such segmentation were ascribed to culture and tradition, rather than the structure of the labor market and its politics. The traditional relationship of sheikh to tribesman has not, in essence, been altered by the advent of oil. The traditional duties of the sheikhly leader have been assumed by the government, whose modern responsibilities remain the provision of social services and employment. This ­attitude means that conditions of employment for nationals are par­ ticularly favourable, wages being paid to nationals as a right almost ­irrespective of productivity. Many nationals therefore regard their job in the Ministry as a sinecure, which requires only infrequent personal attendance. birks and sinclair 1980: 348

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If, in an authoritarian country, there are citizens who are dissatisfied with their deteriorating working conditions caused through the competition with cheap migrant workers, the policy of receiving migrants without restriction may result in an increased threat against the regime. This is the fundamental question for countries that receive a large number of migrants. But the relation between migrant and regime stability was not posed. In 1987, Beblawi and Luciani published a famous piece of literature, The Rentier States, which explains the reason why authoritarian regimes have been prevalent in the Middle East. The theory, that the rulers buy the support of citizens toward the regime in exchange for the allocation of rent revenue, explains the resiliency of the oil monarchies in the Middle East (Beblawi and Luciani 1987). The “rentier state” refers to a political entity for which the economic and budgetary bases lie with the rent revenue. The oil revenue has an exogenous nature when it is generated mostly by export; hence, the government of an oilexporting country relies on the exogenous revenue, rather than taxes from the domestic economy. Furthermore, the majority of workers do not have a relationship to the oil industry because the workforce that takes part in the oil industry is very small, owing to its capital incentive nature. Therefore, when such exogenous oil wealth flows in to the country, it looks like unearned income for the economy. The term “rentier states” is derived from the similarity of the unearned income of land owners (rentier) to the exogenous oil revenue. When rulers allocate the oil revenue to the citizens, the citizens enjoy unearned income because it has not been collected as a tax imposed on their work; rather, it comes from abroad. Even when an authoritarian government rules, the citizens support it. The rentier state theory explains the resiliency of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab Gulf states; however, it deals only with relations between rulers and citizens. Migrant issues were not addressed. There has been a tendency in studies that deal with the authoritarian stability of the Arab Gulf states to exclude migrants from the scope of the study. When the share of migrants in the entire population is considered, this tendency is quite strange because political stability is discussed without reference to more than half of the residents. On the other hand, there are various studies about the labor market in the Arab Gulf states. These studies have pointed out the inefficiency of labor market and inability of governments to control immigration in the Arab Gulf states that caused the high unemployment rates, demographical imbalance, division of labor, and subordinated migrant workers’ conditions. However, it is rare to see an explanation for the robustness of authoritarian regimes with taking migrant population into consideration. Longva (2005) was the first to explain that the political effect of the migrants strengthens the authoritarian nature of the Arab Gulf states. By applying the

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concept of Mazrui (1975), she described the regimes of Kuwait as ethnocracies, which create political and economic disparity between citizens and migrants and uses this disparity to maintain authoritarian rule. Kuwaitis have a perception that they are besieged by migrants so they have to protect themselves by establishing a system like kafala, which enables citizens to subordinate migrants. The migrants perceived as a threat ensure the solidarity of the Kuwaitis, who are in reality divided between members of Al Sabah, the royal family, and ordinary citizens. Longva’s study is innovative because it treats migrants not just as victims but as a unit that supports the authoritarian regimes. From her discussion, a supposition can be deduced: if there is unemployment and/or an inefficient labor market system, it is not a result of the incompetence of rulers in the Arab Gulf states; rather, these are minor by-products of a system which enables authoritarian regimes survive. While cheap migrant workers would become a threat of unemployment and political unrest, at the same time, they would become a support for authoritarianism in the Arab Gulf states through the national division of labor. 3

Division of Labor in the Public Sector

Owing to large oil revenues, the Arab Gulf states have a tendency to absorb national workers into the public sector. This creates a national division of labor, which allocates public sector jobs to national workers and private sector jobs to migrants. This seems to be a favorable policy for the rulers of the Arab Gulf states. It removes the competition between nationals and migrants, so it decreases the possible discontent arising among national workers. At the same time, it is a kind of rent allocation policy, because the wage for workers in the public sector is a part of the public expenditure, so it has the effect of buying off the support of citizens toward the regime. Figure 2.1 compares the division of labor by nationality between the public and private sectors in Arab Gulf states. In all of thoese countries, migrants are concentrated in the private sectors and do not work in the public sectors. In contrast, the situation for national workers falls into two groups. Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (uae) can be characterized as “highly divided countries,” in which more than 80 percent of the national workers are concentrated in the public sectors. On the other hand, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are “less divided countries,” because one-half or more of the national workers are working in the private sectors. A country’s economic base is the key to firmly sustaining its division of labor by nationality, and it varies between “highly divided” and “less divided countries.”

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Bahrain 2010 Nationals Migrants

Kuwait 2011 Nationals Migrants

Oman 2010

Nationals Migrants

Qatar 2011 Nationals Migrants

Saudi Arabia 2010 Nationals Migrants

uae 2008

Nationals Migrants

0%

10%

20%

public sector

30%

40%

mixed sector

50%

60%

70%

private sector

80%

90% 100%

others

Figure 2.1 National division of labor in the Arab Gulf countries Sources: Compiled by the author based on data in the Central Informatics Organization (Bahrain) (n.d.), Central Statistical Bureau (Kuwait) (2013), Ministry of National Economy (Oman) (2011), Statistics Authority (Qatar) (2011), Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2012), and National Bureau of Statistics (UAE) (2008).

Figure 2.2 illustrates the historical changes in expenditure of central governments in “less divided countries” (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) and “highly divided countries” (Kuwait and Qatar). In Figure 2.2, bars in blue and light yellow show the expenditure of the governments: the light yellow represents the wage expenditure and the blue represents the remainder, labeled “other.” The orange bars indicate either a surplus or a deficit, and the lines chart the proportions of wage expenditures to total expenditures for each year. The values of the bars are indicated by the left scales and those of the lines by the right scales. It appears that the proportions of wage expenditures have, with some variation, grown over time in the “less divided countries.” After 2000, wage expenditure reached about 45% in Saudi Arabia and 40% in Bahrain. These countries have only small surpluses which indicate that these countries can not afford to extend wage expenditure. Due to a surge in the oil price, in 2005, the surplus of Saudi Arabia increased; in 2010, its budget extended to nearly 1.7 times that of 2005. Therefore, the proportion of wage expenditure fell sharply to 36 percent in 2010, which was almost the same value as that two decades ago; however, the budget for 2014 recorded a

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(usd millions) 180,000

Saudi Arabia 1985–2010

50 40

130,000

30

80,000

20

30,000

10

–20,000

1989

1985

1995

2000

2005

2010

Bahrain 1975–2010

(usd millions) 6,000

0 60 50

4,000

40 30

2,000

20

0

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

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2010

10 0

–2,000 Kuwait 1974–2010

(usd millions) 60,000

40

40,000

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1974

1980

1985

1990

1995

1999

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2010

10 0

–20,000 (usd millions) 40,000

Qatar 1980–2010

50

30,000

40

20,000

30

10,000

20

0 –10,000

1980 wage expense

1985

1990 other expenses

1995

2000 surplus/deficit

2005

2010

10 0

share of wage expense

Figure 2.2 Change of wage expenses, surplus/deficit, and share of wage expenses Note: The figures are in 2010 US dollars for consistency. Calculations are based on the consumer price index and official exchange rates available from the World Bank (2018). Sources: Calculated by the author based on data from the International Monetary Fund, Central Department of Statistics (Saudi Arabia), Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Qatar Central Bank, and Qatar Monetary Agency.

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deficit of 65.53 billion Saudi Riyal (about 17.24 billion US dollars) because of a sudden drop in the oil price, and this will probably raise the proportion of wage expense again (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 2015). To increase its proportion of national workers in the public sector to Kuwait’s level, which absorbs around 85% of national workforce in its public sector (see Fig.2.1), the Saudi government, which absorbs only 55% of national workers in its public sector, would have to increase its wage expense by 1.5 times which is impossible because of its budget size. In Saudi Arabia, which has a relatively large proportion of national workers, and in Bahrain, which produces a relatively small amount of oil, the ability to create public sector jobs cannot keep pace with the proportional growth of national workers. On the other hand, in the “highly divided countries,” the proportional wage expenditures have remained low and, since 2000, have declined. By relying on their huge surpluses, these countries have expanded their budgets; this has enabled them to continue absorbing national workers into the public sector. Strong national divisions of labor are evident only in Kuwait, Qatar and the uae. The “highly divided countries” have successfully diffused the time bomb. 4

Occupational Preference of National Workers

When “less divided countries” cannot maintain a policy to absorb national workers in the public sector, some national workers must take part in the private sector. There is competition between citizens and migrants in the private sector, and migrants have price competitiveness. The generous welfare system in the Arab Gulf states raises the expected wage of national workers. These conditions create an incentive for national workers who cannot have public sector jobs to choose unemployment benefit, rather than working in the private sector. This will be a budgetary burden. However, there are some occupations in the private sector that attract national workers. If the government can create the jobs preferred by national workers, it can decrease the unemployment budgetary burden. However, the government of Saudi Arabia, one of the “less divided countries”, implemented completely opposite policy. It created unpreferred jobs for national workers, nevertheless, the regime survived at the midst of the storm of “Arab Spring”. Table 2.1 shows the numbers and proportions of employees in each occupational category, separately for nationals and migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, in 2011when the Arab Spring occurred. Column 1 presents the numbers of employees in each occupational category, column 2 and 3 present the percentages of nationals and migrant workers in the grand total and in each occupational category, and column 4 reports the bias of Saudi employees between the overall figure

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Table 2.1  Numbers and percentages of Saudi Arabian national and migrant employees in occupational categories in 2011

Occupational Number of Bias Percentage category employees in industries Percentage of Percentage in overall occupational category Agriculture Saudi 8,527 0.48 Migrant 703,587 10.03 Total 712,114 8.11 Oil and mining Saudi 64,968 3.68 Migrant 20,177 0.29 Total 85,145 0.97 Production Saudi 104,567 5.93 Migrant 699,616 9.97 Total 804,183 9.16 Power, gas, and water (utilities) Saudi 13,694 0.78 Migrant 11,026 0.16 Total 24,720 0.28 Construction Saudi 252,001 14.29 Migrant 3,258,139 46.44 Total 3,510,140 39.98 Retail Saudi 193,675 10.98 Migrant 1,307,292 18.63 Total 1,500,967 17.10 Transportation, communication Saudi 20,713 1.17 Migrant 209,952 2.99 Total 230,665 2.63 Finance, insurance, and real estate Saudi 56,824 3.22 Migrant 88,377 1.26 Total 145,201 1.65

1.20 98.80

0.06

76.30 23.70

3.80 　

13.00 87.00

0.65 　

55.40 44.60

2.76 　

7.18 92.82

0.36 　

12.90 87.10

0.64 　

8.98 91.02

0.45 　

39.13 60.87

1.95 　

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Occupational Number of Bias Percentage category employees in industries Percentage of Percentage in overall occupational category Community service Saudi 129,507 Migrant 638,854 Total 768,361 Public sector Saudi 919,108 Migrant 79,030 Total 998,138 All occupational categories Saudi 1,763,584 Migrant 7,016,050 Grand total 8,779,634

7.34 9.11 8.75

16.85 83.15

52.12 1.13 11.37

92.08 7.92

100.00 100.00

20.09 79.91

0.84 　

4.58 　

1.00 　 　

Source: Compiled by the author based on data in Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2019)

and that for each occupational category. The percentage of Saudi employees in the grand total (20.09 percent) indicates the “crude” percentage: if all Saudi workers have equal job preference toward all occupational categories and employers in each of the occupational categories have the same incentives to hire Saudis and migrants, the percentage of national workers in each occupational category should be the same value as this “crude” percentage. However, there are large differences between the values. The bias figures evaluate these differences. The bias is calculated by dividing a figure for the national workers’ percentage in a given occupational category by the percentage of Saudi workers in the grand total (20.09 percent). When the percentage of Saudi employees in a given occupational category would equal that of the grand total, the bias value for that occupational category would be 1.0. In other words, when the value of the bias is not 1.0 in a given occupational category, employers in that occupational categories and/or Saudi workers who consider taking part in that occupation have some preference. In Table 2.1, for example, in the occupational category of agriculture, the bias is 0.06 (1.20/20.09), which means that the percentage of Saudi national

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Table 2.2  Preferences of employers and Saudi employees and the related bias values

Saudi employees’ preferences

Employers’ Prefer Saudi preferences workers Do not prefer Saudi workers

Prefer the occupation

Do not prefer the occupation

above 1.0 (Saudis are hired) less than 1.0 (migrants are hired)

less than 1.0 (migrants are hired) less than 1.0 (migrants are hired)

Source: Compiled by the author

workers in that occupational category is almost one-seventeenth of the crude percentage. The bias in oil and mining is 3.80 (76.30/20.09), which indicates that the percentage of Saudi employees is almost four times larger in this category than the crude percentage. We may consider that these figures indicate the job preferences of Saudi workers, who want to take work for the oil companies, not in the agricultural sector. In occupational categories with a bias greater than 1.0, national employees are more concentrated than their overall representation. It is supposed that Saudi workers prefer these occupational categories, and at the same time, the employers prefer Saudis to migrants. Logically, if Saudi workers were unwillingly confined to a certain occupational category the bias would still exceed 1.0. However, up to now, this supposition is hardly supported because there are a huge amount of migrant workers who do not limit their occupations to particular categories and employers can hire them instead of Saudi workers who do not want to take part in the occupation. This means that all occupational categories with bias above 1.0 are preferred by Saudi workers. In occupational categories with a bias less than 1.0, national workers are relatively less represented. The reason is probably, firstly, that Saudis do not want those jobs and migrants take them. At the same time, secondly, even when national workers prefer those occupations, the employers of those occupational categories might prefer migrant workers because they are cheaper laborers. Thus, the value of the bias will be less than 1.0 when the preferences of the national workers and the employers of a given occupational category differ, when the national workers prefer other occupations or the employers do not want to hire them. From this analysis, we can obtain a rough image of the national workers’ occupational preferences in the private sector in Saudi Arabia (Table 2.2).

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Table 2.3  Average wages of Saudi and migrant employees in the private sector in 2011

Occupational categories

Average wage Saudis (a)

Migrants (b)

Difference (times) (a) / (b)

Agriculture Oil and mining Production Power, gas, and water (utilities) Construction Retail Communication and transportation Finance, insurance, and real estate Community service Total

3721.24 16070.47 5692.09 9500.68

564.36 3891.16 1040.17 2887.24

6.59 4.13 5.47 3.29

3192.52 3601.24 3798.73

855.08 1020.08 854.95

3.73 3.53 4.44

8581.29

2910.84

2.95

5003.88 5249.40

1231.37 948.26

4.06 5.54

Note: Values of wages are in Saudi Riyal Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Wizāra al-‘Amal (al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabīya al-Su‘ūdīya) (2011)

Wage differences are also key to understanding employment preferences. All of the occupational categories in Table 2.1 have large wage differences (between 2.95 and 6.59 times) between national and migrant workers (Table 2.3). If the wage differences are considered, employers in all of the occupational categories should avoid hiring Saudi workers if they want to increase profits, but that is not the reality. The bias exceeds 1.0 in oil and mining (3.15); in power, gas, and water (utilities) (2.76); in finance, insurance, and real estate (1.95); and in the public sector (4.58). The question then is why the bias of occupational categories other than the public sector (which is institutionally manipulated to exclude migrants) would exceed 1.0. The answer can be found in the fact that these occupational categories offer wages high enough to attract Saudi workers and that they have features similar to the public sector, especially the categories of “oil and mining” and “power, gas, and water”; this means they are less influenced than other occupational categories in the private sector by the cost–benefit considerations that favor cheaper migrant labor. With regard to the finance, insurance, and real estate category, Forstenlechner and Mellahi’s (2011) analysis is useful for understanding this difference.

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They examined the reactions of enterprises to the uae policy to nationalize its labor force and found that the financial sector perceived more pressure from their customers to obey this policy. In the finance sector, customers often interact with employees face-to-face. It is obvious in the uae who is and who is not a migrant by a person’s physical appearance. The extent of the nationalization of labor in the finance sector would be easy to observe, and that sector willingly tried to comply with the policy. The uae’s case can be applied to the Saudi case. 5

Creating Incentive for Unpreferred Occupations

Through the labor market analysis, it is clear that Saudi workers have a preference for four occupations (oil and mining; power, gas and water; financial, insurance, and real estate; and the public sector). However, not all of these occupational categories can be brought to bear on Saudi workers’ competition against migrants. As confirmed above, the Saudi government cannot extend the public sector because of budgetary constraints. The growth in the other occupational categories has scant influence because their proportional representations to the total number of employees are small. For example, the finance, insurance, and real estate occupational category represents 1.65 percent, oil and mining represents only 0.97 percent, and power, gas, and water represents just 0.28 percent (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, the proportions of Saudi employees in these occupational categories are already so high that little room remains in which these occupations can absorb more Saudi workers. On the other hand, the proportions of employees in the categories of construction, retail, and production relative to the total number of employees are larger (39.98 percent, 17.10 percent, and 9.16 percent, respectively). Moreover, the proportions of Saudi employees in these categories are smaller (7.18 percent, 12.90 percent, and 13.00 percent, respectively). In short, these three occupational categories have the potential to solve the unemployment problem. However, the bias values for these occupational categories are less than 1.0 (0.36, 0.64 and 0.65 respectively), which suggests that these occupations are shunned by Saudi workers. Moreover, the wages of these three categories are, at least, about 1.5-times lower than the wages of the occupational categories with bias values above 1.0 (production in comparison with finance, insurance, and real estate) and, at most, about 5.0-times lower (construction in comparison with oil and mining) (Table 2.3). Again, given that the wage gaps between nationals and migrant employees in these three occupational categories are almost 3.53 times in favor of Saudi workers in retail, 3.73 times in construction, and 5.47 times in production, it is reasonable that employers avoid hiring Saudi workers.

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In summary, the reason that the bias values in the construction, retail, and production occupational categories are less than 1.0 must be a combination of the low preference of Saudi workers for these jobs and the low preference of those employers for hiring Saudi workers. The occupational categories that Saudi workers prefer cannot absorb them, and the occupational categories that are expected to grow tend to prefer migrant workers. This implies that the growth of the Saudi economy will not contribute to create jobs that Saudi workers prefer and, hence, cannot solve the unemployment problem. When there is no prospect of increasing the jobs that Saudi workers prefer, how can the government create incentives for them to work? There are two options: (1) the government pays compensation for national workers who suffer from low wages, or (2) it introduces a quota system to make enterprises hire Saudi workers. The first option seems to be more difficult to implement because paying compensation makes the budgetary burden similar to that caused by creating public sector jobs. As the reason why the national workers have to participate in the private sector is the budgetary constraints, the government cannot introduce compensation policies except for limited period such as current unemployment benefit scheme which pays the benefit up to twelve months. The second option, on the other hand, is preferable for the government, because it can shift the cost of hiring national workers onto private enterprises. Niṭāqāt, which has been implemented in Saudi Arabia in 2011, is typical of this second option. Niṭāqāt is a kind of quota system. The word Niṭāqāt is the plural of niṭāq, which means “range” in Arabic. All private companies are required to hire a certain amount of Saudi workers, corresponding to the size of the company and the industry. According to the degree of achievement of requirements for hiring an imposed share of Saudi workers, companies are categorized into four Niṭāqāt, from top to bottom: platinum, green, yellow, and red. Penalties can be imposed on companies categorized as yellow and red, such as the suspension of issuing and/or renewal of visas for migrant workers. The Niṭāqāt was introduced for the purpose of encouraging employers to hire Saudis in the private sector (Ramady 2013; Sadi 2013). But this creates a curious phenomenon: ghost employment. 6

Ghost Employment: Another Kind of Rent

Let us imagine a scenario in a country with a large number of migrant workers willing to work for low pay where a certain quota to hire national workers is imposed upon a construction company. If the company cannot meet the quota, a certain penalty will be imposed. In this scenario, the national workers’

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Table 2.4  Change in computed annual growth rates of Saudi and migrant workers in the private sector before and after Niṭāqāt

Occupational category

Agriculture

Oil and mining

Production

Power, gas, and water (utilities) Construction and building Retail

Transportation and communication Finance, insurance, and real estate Community service

Total Private Sector workforce

Type of employee

Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total Saudis Migrants Total

Computed annual growth rates (%) 2005–2008

2011–2013

6.0 10.4 10.3 1.9 4.5 2.8 11.5 1.4 2.7 –0.3 –0.6 –0.4 10.1 8.9 9.0 12.3 –1.2 0.5 4.6 5.4 5.3 12.7 5.0 7.4 11.0 1.2 2.7 6.7 15.3 14.2

41.7 –5.1 –4.4 3.6 5.9 4.2 29.9 2.9 6.8 57.4 5.3 36.7 38.4 13.5 15.4 35.5 9.9 13.6 79.1 13.3 20.6 15.9 12.7 13.9 20.4 0.6 4.2 31.8 8.8 11.5

Difference (percentage points)

35.8 –15.5 –14.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 18.4 1.5 4.1 57.7 5.9 37.1 28.2 4.6 6.5 23.2 11.2 13.1 74.4 7.8 15.4 3.2 7.7 6.5 9.4 –0.6 1.5 25.0 –6.5 –2.6

Source: Computed by the author BASED ON data from the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (2019)

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preferences for working in construction are low, but the company must hire national workers in order to avoid the penalty. Under such conditions, the company may approach national workers with the proposal that it will pay them minimum wages without requiring them to work. It is cheaper for the company to hire them at minimum wage than to pay the penalty, because it can shift the cost of hiring the national workers onto migrants by lowering their wages. Such an offer is attractive for national workers because they can receive, without working, a certain amount of money that is more than the unemployment benefit provided by the government. Thus, a quota system for national workers with a regulation minimum wage only for national workers would generate ghost employees. Table 2.4 shows the difference in the computed annual growth rates (cagr) of employment in the private sector before (2005–2008) and after (2011–2013) Niṭāqāt was introduced. To guard against aberrant economic fluctuation, the period of the world financial crisis (2009–2010) is excluded. The overall (combined Saudi and migrant employment) changes after Niṭāqāt in the total private sector workforce is modest and negative (the difference is –2.6 percentage points, as shown on the final line). However, when the differences between the Saudi and migrant employees are compared, the changes are clear. In the total private sector workforce, the Saudi workforce’s cagr is 6.7 percent in the before-Niṭāqāt period and that of migrants is 15.3 percent. But in the afterNiṭāqāt period, the cagr of the Saudi workforce jumped to 31.8 percent and that of migrants declined sharply to 8.8 percent. This seems to be an effect of Niṭāqāt for two reasons. First, there was no other policy than Niṭāqāt implemented to reform the labor market in Saudi Arabia during this period. Second, the positive change can be found only in the Saudi workforce. If the same change could be found in the migrant workforce, it would deny the effect of Niṭāqāt. The occupational category that changed the most is transportation and communication (the difference is 74.4 percentage points for the Saudi workforce), followed by the power, gas, and water (utilities) (57.7) and agriculture (35.8) categories. But these categories are out of our scope because of the small proportions of total employees in the labor market. The occupational categories that can absorb the most Saudi workers are the construction, retail, and production categories. These categories have relatively large proportions in the total work force (42.9, 17.76, and 8.41 percent, respectively, as shown in Table 2.1) and the cagrs in these three categories marked significant changes (28.2, 23.2, and 18.4 percentage points, respectively). When the number of national employees increases under the quota system with a minimum wage, some of that growth must include ghost employees. The ghost employment can be seen in the upper right cell of Table 2.2 (employ-

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ers try to hire Saudi workers, but Saudi workers shun working in those occupations). Even in occupations with bias values larger than 1.0, ghost employment can be generated; however, the majority of Saudi employees in those occupations prefer them and strive to retain their jobs. Therefore, the extent of ghost employment in occupational categories with a bias larger than 1.0 should be small. On the other hand, when a quota system is introduced to occupations with bias values less than 1.0, ghost employment will be generated easily. In short, the growth in the proportion of Saudi employees in the construction, retail and production categories can be explained by ghost employment. The salary of ghost employees is a “rent.” Here, the term rent is not a metaphor like that used in the rentier state theory. In economics, “rent” refers to a profit that exceeds the cost to produce the product. It is hard to distinguish rent from normal profit under the complete competitive market; however, we can find it relatively easily when an intervention creates rent. For example, the profit that is generated by a patent to protect innovative ideas is a rent. This rent sometimes contributes to economic growth. If the government protects innovative ideas by introducing patents, the rent generated by the patents compensates for the cost of innovation; therefore, it promotes the investment of enterprises for the innovation. On the other hand, if a lobby for a certain kind of agricultural products pressures to introduce a tariff on the products, although such a tariff will protect the producers, the consumers will have to pay more to the products. Niṭāqāt was introduced to create job opportunities for Saudi workers. The wages paid to Saudi workers who could have their jobs owing to Niṭāqāt are rent, because if Niṭāqāt had not been implemented, the wages would not have been paid. Here, the Saudi workers are rent seekers, and the migrant workers are used as a resource to generate a rent. Even if the oil rent decreases, the Arab Gulf states can generate this other kind of rent to allocate to citizens. However, Niṭāqāt is not simply a good opportunity for Saudi workers to gain rent income. Instead, it deprives them of the opportunity to acquire required skills through on-the-job training. The possible influences of Niṭāqāt are ironic because, whereas Saudi national employment increases, the real productivity decreases. The nationalization of the labor force merely generated recipients of rents allocated from enterprises in the private sector. 7

Distorted Labor Market: The Cost of Authoritarianism

Why did the Saudi government implement a policy that cause inefficiency of its labor market? In its fifth five-year plan (1990–1995), the Saudi government had already admitted the failure of Saudization, which was first announced in

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the fourth five-year plan (1985–1990), by explaining that the private sector’s reliance on cheap migrant labor accelerated the wage depression and created a buyer’s market. This means that the Saudi government has not solved this problem for nearly 30 years. However, it may be indiscreet to suppose that the governments of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states are incompetent in creating productive national workers who have enough ability to replace migrant workers. In reality, they simply do not intend to do so. Unlike the rulers of pre-modern states, who possessed the wealth of their domains as their personal assets, the governments of modern states must rely on taxation to cover administrative expenses because they generally do not have adequate assets for this purpose. To increase tax revenue, governments must increase the economic productivity of the nation and, therefore, attempt to increase their quantities of skilled workers. In contrast, a country with a rich natural resource, which is sometimes owned by the state as a national asset, is released from the burden of collecting taxes. The Arab Gulf states had (and some of them still have) sufficient assets to virtually exclude taxation from budgetary considerations; instead, they rely on oil revenues. 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1990

1995 Bahrain

2000

2005 Oman

Kuwait

United Arab Emirates

2010

oecd

2015

Saudi Arabia

World

Figure 2.3 Tax on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue) of selected countries (1990–2017) Note: Discontinuities are caused by missing values of original data. The data for Qatar is omitted because its data is limited and not adequate to indicate on the figure. Values for World and OECD are represented in average. Sources: Compiled by the author based on data from the World Bank (2019)

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Information about the revenue sources of the governments of the Arab Gulf states is only partly disclosed; however, it is not impossible to detect the degree of their tax reliance. Figure 2.3 shows the percentages of tax to total revenues for the Arab Gulf states except Qatar, because of the data availability, global and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) averages. The global and oecd averages are between 30 percent and 35 percent, whereas those for the Arab Gulf states are strikingly smaller (5 percent or less). With the asset of oil wealth, the Arab Gulf states can secure enough revenue to support their governments without imposing taxes upon individuals or enterprises. Even if the oil revenues become too small to sustain this policy, the authoritarian governments of the Arab Gulf states cannot implement taxation readily because it brings with it accountability regarding the reasons for and uses of the taxes that are collected. This situation would open the door to democracy, which the governments of the Arab Gulf states always try to avoid. Countries that depend on taxation have another solution to the labor market problems that are caused by cheap migrant workers: redistribution. According to Borjas (1995), the government of a country receiving migrant workers has the option to solve problems such as job shortages or wage depressions that are caused by migration. If enterprises can decrease the cost of workers by employing cheap workers, that is, migrants, they can generate more profits. Therefore, they will pay more corporate taxes than before. This, in turn, increases government revenues. The government, receiving more corporate tax revenue, can afford to pay benefits to the unemployed or low-paid citizens, in addition to expenditure for skill training programs for national workers who try to acquire competitiveness against the migrants. These countries do not need quota systems and can avoid ghost employment. The Arab Gulf states, however, cannot adopt this type of approach because the tax revenue is not adequate to compensate the national workers’ loss caused by cheap migrant workers. Expansion of their taxation targets would increase governmental revenue and allow the quota systems to be discarded, which would then eliminate ghost employment; however, it is required for governments to obtain the consent of enterprises for this policy. This means that the governments would have to make concessions to the enterprises, and this will harm the monopoly of political power by elites. Instead, the Saudi government created a system to secure an economic foundation by forcing private companies to pay wages to Saudis. This looks like the introduction of a tax on private enterprises; however, it is not taxation because the cost of paying wages to Saudi workers can be shifted onto the migrant workers by lowering their wages to compensate. The reliance on the oil revenue explains well why the Saudi government does not implement policies to improve the productivity of national workers.

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8 Conclusion “Highly divided countries” can continue to receive migrants and making them work in the private sector without creating competition between their national and migrant workers. On the other hand, “less divided countries” experience competition between their national and migrant workers and must intervene and manipulate the labor market by introducing quota systems to solve unemployment problems. The oil gushing from the earth enriches the Arab Gulf states and inevitably attracts migrants seeking work, which results in labor market problems. The division of labor by nationality and the quota system was introduced not merely to protect their national workers; these are survival tactics of the authoritarian regimes. Such tactics are linked to rentier state systems that avoid taxation and, hence, use migrant workers to generate a new kind of rent to allocate to the national workers. This creates ghost employment, which is harmful to the national economy. The unemployment, division of labor, quota system, and ghost employment are not irrational policies or the incompetence of rulers. Instead, these are the result of rational survival strategies of authoritarian rulers in migrant-abundant societies. Bibliography Beblawi, H. and G. Luciani. 1987. The Rentier States. London: Croom Helm. Birks, J.S. and C.A. Sinclair. 1980. Arab Manpower: The Crisis of Development, London: Croom Helm. Borjas, G.J. 1995. “The Economic Benefits from Immigration.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, (no. 2) (Spring): 2–22. Central Informatics Organization (Bahrain). n.d. “Census 2010.” Bahrain Open Data Portal, http://www.data.gov.bh/, Accessed: August 17, 2018. Central Statistical Bureau (Kuwait). 2013. Annual Statistical Abstract 2012, edition 49. State of Kuwait: Central Statistical Bureau. Forstenlechner, I. and K. Mellahi. 2011. “Gaining legitimacy through Hiring Local Workforce at a Premium: The Case of MNEs in the United Arab Emirates.” Journal of World Business 46: 455–461. General Authority for Statistics (Saudi Arabia) n.d. al-Kitāb al-Iḥṣāī al-Sanawī 11, General Authority for Statistics, https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/46, Accessed: 17 August 2018. International Monetary Fund. 2013. Saudi Arabia, 2013 Article iv Consultation (imf Country Report No.13/229). Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2006. “Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and

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­ evelopment in the Arab Region, Population Division Department of Economic D and Social Affairs United Nations Secretariat Beirut, 15–17 May 2006. Longva, Anh Nga. 2005. “Neither Autocracy nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political System in Kuwait.” In Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by Paul Dresch and James P. Piscatori, 114–135. London: I.B.Tauris. Mazrui, A. 1975. Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy. Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing. Ministry of National Economy (Oman). 2011. Statistical Yearbook 2011, Issue 40. Oman: Ministry of National Economy. National Bureau of Statistics (United Arab Emirates). 2008. “Labour Force 2008.” National Bureau of Statistics, http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae, Accessed: January 30, 2016. Ramady, Mohamed. 2013. “Gulf Unemployment and Government Policies: Prospects for the Saudi Labour Quota or Nitaqat System.” International Journal of Economics and Business Research 5 (4): 476–499. Sadi, Muhammad Asad. 2013. “The Implementation Process of Nationalization of Workforce in Saudi Arabian Private Sector: A Review of ‘Nitaqat Scheme,’” American Journal of Business and Management, 2 (1): 37–45. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 2012. Forty-Eighth Annual Report. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Saudi Arabian Monetary Autority. 2019. Annual Statistics 2018, Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/Pages/YearlyStatistics .aspx, Accessed: 13 August 2019. Seccombe, I.J., with C.H. Bleaney and B. Al-Najjar. 1984. International Migration for Employment in the Middle East: An Introductory Bibliography. Durham: Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham University. Statistical Authority (Qatar). 2011. Annual Statistical Abstract 2011. Doha, State of Qatar: Statistical Authority. United Nations. 2011. World Population Policies 2011. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 2013. World Population Policies 2013, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, ST/ESA/SER.A/327. New York: United Nations. Wizāra al-‘Amal (al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabīya al-Su‘ūdīya). 2011. Al-Kitāb al-Iḥṣā’ī al-Sanawī 1432/1433h, Riyadh: Wikāla al-Wizāra li-l-Takhṭīṭ wa al-Taṭwīr wa al-Ma‘lūmāt, alIdāra al-‘Āmma li-l-Iḥṣā’āt al-‘Ummālīya. World Bank 2019. Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of revenue), World Development Indicators, World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ GC.TAX.YPKG.RV.ZS, Accessed: 13 August 2019.

Excursus 1

What Are the Arab Gulf States? Masaki Matsuo and Koji Horinuki 1

Formation of the Arab Gulf States

Today, the Arab Gulf states are well known for their economic prosperity based on income from oil and gas production. Historically, however, because this area is largely desert, it had a very small population and no major industry ex­ cept for pearling and the transit trade. The transit trade flourished because the area lies on the sea route between Europe, the Middle East, and India. This strategic location attracted imperial powers, including Portugal in the six­ teenth century and the British Empire after the end of eighteenth century. Brit­ ain ruled part of the region, both directly and indirectly, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, which was formed in 1932 without foreign interference. In 1960, Kuwait became independent of British rule. In 1968, the British announced their withdrawal from lands east of the Suez Canal, and the other sheikhdoms moved toward independence: first Oman in 1970, and then Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (uae) in 1971. Most citizens of the Arab Gulf states are ethnically Arabs. There are also some people of Iranian, Pakistani, or African origin as a result of active eco­ nomic and cultural exchanges through trade and the annual religious pil­ grimage (hajj). Islam is the official religion; Sunnis are in the majority, although there are many Shiites in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of ­Saudi Arabia. In Oman, Ibadi Muslims comprise two-thirds of the population. Saudi Arabia has importance for Muslims because it has two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, which Muslims visit from around the world for the hajj as one of their religious duties. Therefore, Saudi Arabia identifies herself as “the Guard­ ian of the Two Holy Mosques.” 2

Discovery of Oil and State Building

More than 50 percent of the known oil reserves lie in this region, and thus, the Arab Gulf states are the major supplier of energy to the world. A commercial oil field was first found in Bahrain in 1932, and that was followed by discoveries in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Full-scale production began after World War ii,

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when industrial societies formed around the world and needed oil to propel their economies. The Gulf region was integrated into global oil production– consumption relations, and this attracted a massive influx of international la­ bor. Saudi Arabia imported educated Egyptians as professionals and skilled workers; cheap labor came from Yemen and other nearby Arab countries. In contrast, the small Gulf emirates, because they were under British protectorate and influence, introduced labor from British-ruled India; this shaped their on­ going practice of receiving migrant workers mainly from India. The discovery and production of oil defined the politics, societies, and econ­ omies of the Arab Gulf states. Before oil, rulers of the region relied on tax rev­ enues from merchants; however, the contracts with Western oil companies gradually replaced that source of wealth. In particular, the oil boom of 1973, coinciding with the October War,1 had a decisive effect on the Arab Gulf states: the Arab oil-producing countries embargoed oil exports to pro-Israel coun­ tries, which caused the international oil price to rocket up and brought in mas­ sive revenues. In addition, state building and modernization in the Arab Gulf states overlapped with the oil boom, sharply increasing labor needs and the demand for migrant workers from Arab and Asian countries. 3

Political System and Allocation of Oil Revenue

The enormous oil revenue has helped to stabilize regimes in the Arab Gulf states, which are all monarchies (including the uae, where the president is one of seven emirs). These are all authoritative monarchies. The emir, sultan, or king in an Arab Gulf states has the prime sovereign authority. His relatives share power by staffing ministerial posts, and thereby, they keep others outside the ruling circle. There are parliaments in the Arab Gulf states, but their au­ thority is weak because the monarch’s approval is required to pass any bills; in addition, the right to choose the prime minister is granted not to the parlia­ ment, but to the monarch. Rights of political participation are restricted, along with freedom of association and speech. Despite this authoritarianism, life in the Arab Gulf states does not bear out the popular belief that authoritarian regimes are harsh on their citizens and often resort to violence. The ruling elites enjoy popular support because they 1 This was a war between Arab states and Israel that broke out on 6 October, 1973. Arab Mem­ bers of the Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries and Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries imposed an oil embargo against countries that these oil pro­ ducers considered allies of Israel. As result, the international oil price soared and the oil revenue of the Arab Gulf states increased.

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What are the Arab Gulf States?

share the wealth: citizens can receive free education, free basic medical ser­ vices, and free residential land allocations or houses without paying any taxes. Their living expenses are eased by heavy government subsidies for food, water, and electricity. Furthermore, a high percentage of citizens are employed in the public sector because the wages are high and the fringe benefits are generous (see Matsuo, Chapter 2). This is a counterbalance to the restriction of political rights: citizens feel like participants in the government because they can exer­ cise some political power as public administrators. Migrants, on the contrary, work in the private sector and support economies, and they are largely ruled by the citizens. The Arab Gulf states, as “rentier” states, financially rely on non-tax revenue that is mainly generated by oil exportation and allocate it to their citizens. The oil has brought economic prosperity and, at the same time, a reinforcement of Table E1.1  Statistical information about the Arab Gulf states in 2018

Sovereign and title

Bahrain King: Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Kuwait Emir: Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al Sabah Oman Sultan: Qaboos bin Said Al Said Qatar Emir: Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani Saudi Arabia King: Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud uae President: Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Surface area (km2)

Population (in millions)

Gross domestic product per capita (current us$)

770

1.569

24,051

17,820

4.137

34,240

309,500

4.829

16,419

11,610

2.782

69,027

2,149,690

33.700

23,219

83,600

9.630

43,005

Source: Compiled by Koji Horinuki based on data from World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worlddevelopment-indicators (Accessed on 10 August 2019).

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authoritarian rule. In other words, the unique juxtaposition of economic pros­ perity and authoritarian regimes has been shaped by oil exportation. The sys­ tem has flourished for some 70 years, but it lately seems to be reaching a turning point. For example, the oil reserves in Bahrain are almost exhausted and the oil industry there relies heavily on a supply from Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia it­ self, rapid population increase has reduced each citizen’s share of the pie. On the other hand, in countries like Qatar where population is still small, the share has increased. The economic disparities within the Arab Gulf states are in­ creasingly affecting the circumstances for migrant workers and the labor markets. In summary, it is oil that has largely shaped the unique path of economic and political development of the Arab Gulf states, including their system of governance and the population imbalances between citizens and migrants. Reference United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2014. World Statistics Pocketbook, 2014 edition. New York: United Nations.

Excursus 2

Economic Development in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha Sadashi Fukuda 1

Oil Revenue and Development

The rising number of migrant workers is most pronounced in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha. The migrant populations of these three cities are increasing at a pace that far exceeds that of the Arab Gulf states overall. This is because of the remarkable economic development of these cities. Two primary factors lie in the background of the economic development in these three cities in the United Arab Emirates (uae) and Qatar. First, the increase in their revenue from oil was brought about by the rise in the price of crude oil. This increased revenue led to economic development. The oil revenue in this region has been increasing rapidly since around 2004 because of the rise in the price of crude oil. From a comparison of the figures for 1998, when income from oil exports was the lowest in two decades, and 2012, when it was highest in history, it can be seen that the income from oil exports in the Arab Gulf states overall has increased more than tenfold (see Figure ­Excursus  2.1). The governments received most of this income as oil revenue to the states. In correlation to the great amount of revenue from oil that has flowed into these city-states—particularly Abu Dhabi and Doha (with gas revenue in the case of the latter)—development projects have been actively carried out, causing these cities to develop at a dizzying pace. 2

Dubai’s Development

The second factor to consider is that the cities’ development strategies have exerted a considerable influence on their development and contributed to the increases in migrant workers. It is particularly important to take into account Dubai’s development. The government of the Dubai Emirate has pushed forward with an active development strategy, developing while taking in funds and people from abroad. This has produced constant results, brought about

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In hundreds of millions of us dollars 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

0

1995

1,000

Year Figure E2.1

Arab Gulf states’ income from oil exports Source: Author’s calculations based on price and export data.

the development and expansion of the economy and the city, and led to migrant workers arriving in large numbers. Although Dubai originally produced a considerable amount of crude oil, this began to dry up in the mid-2000s, which caused the amount produced to fall rapidly. Currently, Dubai can no longer be called an oil-producing state (emirate). It was Dubai’s unique development strategy that played a large role in its great development, although Dubai continues to develop now by attracting oil money from surrounding oil-producing countries. Dubai is one of the seven emirates that comprise the uae. It holds a degree of political and economic autonomy within the federation and has developed itself by formulating its own development strategy. This strategy was adopted as a result of its sense of rivalry toward Abu Dhabi, the emirate in which the country’s capital was placed when it became independent in 1971. Furthermore, partially because of the small amount of Dubai’s crude oil deposits and the expectation that they would run out in the near future, Dubai has actively pushed ahead since independence with a strategy that aims for economic development without relying upon oil. The emirate began developing the Jebel Ali area in 1975 and moved forward with economic development centered on

Economic Development in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha

79

the Jebel Ali Free Zone, based on industrialization and trade promotion. It also cultivated the aluminum refining industry and oil-related industries. However, these measures failed to yield the desired result in the industrialization drive. Dubai’s development began to advance in the latter half of the 1990s, when the emirate began aiming to cultivate diverse fields, such as tourism, finance, real estate, IT, and media. As these fields advanced, Dubai took the form it has today. With regard to the financial sector in Dubai, a stock market, namely the Dubai Financial Market, was launched in 2000, the Dubai International Financial Center was established in 2004 as a financial free zone, and the Dubai International Financial Exchange was formed in 2005. With the development of systems and facilities related to finance, the financial sector—mainly stocks and securities—came to play a large role in the economy. Furthermore, a large real estate investment boom occurred after restrictions on real estate ownership by foreign nationals were relaxed. Although nationals of other Arab Gulf Cooperation Council states can own real estate in Dubai, the emirate opened the way in 2001 to allow a kind of real estate ownership for foreign nationals, in the form of a long-term, 99-year lease. In 2006, Dubai passed a law to legitimize property ownership by foreign nationals. As a result, large-scale real estate development occurred to provide villas and flats for ­foreigners. Construction and real estate development were actively carried out—for example, an artificial resort island in the shape of a palm tree was built—and many investments were made in the city. The tourism industry also developed. Multiple upscale hotels, such as the Burj Al Arab, were built along the coast and attracted tourists from neighboring countries and Europe. Additionally, Dubai International Airport became one of the world’s hub airports, to which Dubai’s airline “Emirates” brings customers from around the world. Moreover, Dubai has been hosting golf tournaments, horse racing, and other international sports competitions, as well as the Dubai Air Show, in which airplane makers from all over the world participate. The highest building in the world was opened in 2010 (the Burj Khalifa; 828 meters tall). Dubai’s colorful set of attractions, including various events, has drawn a great deal of world attention. This development strategy by Dubai has succeeded and brought in people and investment from surrounding oil-producing states, as well as other parts of the world such as India, Iran, Europe, and the United States. For example, ­according to the Dubai government’s data, Indians bought the greatest portion of luxury apartments and commercial space in the Burj Khalifa—mainly for ­investment—followed by Iranians, in the first half of 2012. In these six months,

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the properties acquired by Iranians in the Burj Khalifa were worth 1.3 billion us dollars, a higher value than that for properties owned by uae nationals. Because the population of nationals in Dubai is very low (approximately 200,000 nationals in 2012, accounting for only 10% of the total population), a diverse set of foreign nationals were brought to handle projects in the advancing real estate development and financial industries, as well as the IT and ­media industries. Furthermore, the commerce and service industries (such as hotels and restaurants) also expanded amidst this economic development, and the number of migrant workers in these industries greatly increased. In the uae, the oil fields belong to each emirate, not to the federal government. There are oil fields in the Dubai Emirate, and crude oil production initially increased during its early development. At the end of the 1970s, Dubai produced 360,000 barrels per day (b/d), which supported the emirate’s subsequent economic development. However, the fields started to go dry, and production decreased to 230,000 b/d in 2001 and rapidly to 65,000 b/d in 2007. Dubai’s crude oil production has now fallen to the extent that one is hesitant to call it an oil-producing state (emirate). The emirate has pushed ahead with its own development plan, succeeding in switching to an economic structure that does not rely on oil and continuing to develop in spite of its crude oil drying up. However, Dubai’s prosperity strongly relies on oil money from the surrounding oil-producing states, and thus, from a broader perspective, one could say that it still relies upon oil. The Dubai ruling family has led the development of its economy, sometimes even referred to as “Dubai, Inc.” Although the so-called “Dubai Crisis” occurred in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, the state has recovered from the damage caused by this, and the ruling family is trying to push ahead with a new development plan. 3

Development of Abu Dhabi and Doha

Abu Dhabi is an oil-producing emirate. Abu Dhabi has produced a massive amount of crude oil, for example, 934,200 b/d in 1971 and 1,403,700 b/d in 1975. Since independence in 1971, it has utilized its revenue from oil for economic development. Up until the middle of the 1980s, Abu Dhabi was the most modern city in the Gulf, unlike Dubai, which was still a small city in those days. The population of Abu Dhabi was only 22,023 in 1968. It increased to 212,000 in 1975, then to 454,000 in 1980, and 670,000 in 1985. The economic development of the emirate brought a number of migrant workers to the city.

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81

In the latter half of the 1990s, there was an intensified sense of rivalry from Abu Dhabi toward Dubai, which had become prosperous in those days. Abu Dhabi attempted to diversify its economy in the same manner as Dubai. In 1999, a development plan for the Saadiyat Island free zone was announced that included the establishment of a stock exchange, commodities exchange (such as oil), and offshore banking center. However, this plan did not proceed smoothly, and the free zone was not created. Instead, new projects on the island have been undertaken by the Abu Dhabi government and have included the construction of cultural and educational facilities, such as New York University Abu Dhabi and the Louvre Abu Dhabi. Moreover, a project referred to as “Masdar City,” which includes solar power generation, is also being established. In this way, the Abu Dhabi Emirate has been trying to promote diverse economic development. However, the results are not as great as those in Dubai. Even today, the economy’s axis is income from oil; the massive amount of oil revenue that flows into the emirate drives its economy. When the development policy is considered, unlike Dubai, Abu Dhabi has retained the characteristics of a strong oil-producing state. It is outstripped by Dubai in terms of diversification and internationalization of the economy. Qatar has also developed its land and economy based on a specific development strategy. The policy to preserve the country’s security has played an important role in its formulation. The emirate is small, in terms of both land size and population. It is surrounded by strong countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 1992, a small-scale military conflict occurred on its border with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Qatar has sought to ensure its security by increasing its international presence and recognition. It has hosted many big international conferences and sports competitions, such as the Asian Games, and important meetings of the World Trade Organization, such as the Doha Round. Furthermore, it will host the 2022 fifa World Cup. Qatar is also home to a United States Air Force base in order to ensure its security. Qatar is a major producer of natural gas and also produces crude oil. With its abundant income from these resources, it has actively developed its economy and has constructed infrastructure and facilities for conferences and sports. This can be seen in its preparations of the 2022 fifa World Cup. The construction brought a number of migrant workers into the country. Qatar has developed its international relationships while receiving human resources from around the world. Qatar attaches particular importance to its relationships with the United States and European countries in order to ensure

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its own security. For example, in the Doha suburbs, Qatar built an “Education City,” which hosts branch campuses of multiple European and American universities, such as the United States’ Georgetown University. By strengthening its relations with such universities, Qatar is cultivating an education industry while taking in the human resources from other countries. Qatar’s economy is, like that of Abu Dhabi, one of an oil-producing state. However, partially because of its security considerations, its development measures are more global in nature than those of Abu Dhabi. Qatar’s infrastructure development has attracted significant attention to the situation of migrant workers, such as the world’s concerns and criticism over the miserable situation of foreign construction workers in Doha. The outlooks of development in three city-states might appear to be the same from the outside. However, in reality, the development strategies differ depending on the state and city.

Chapter 3

Gender and “Tradition”: Power Negotiation between Employers and Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia Namie Tsujigami 1 Introduction Globalization is mainly explained as increased interaction and integration among people, governments, and companies driven by international trade, open economies, and information technologies. The new international division of labor (nidl), a shift in manufacturing labor from developed countries to developing countries, is understood as an inevitable result of such processes. Although globalization is often minimally understood as a phenomenon that only occurs in productive spheres, one of the achievements of scholars of gender and migration studies, as represented by Rhacel Parreñas, has been to clarify the fact that nidl is taking place not only in public/productive spheres but also in private/reproductive spheres (Parreñas 2005). Faster and cheaper transportation has enabled not only white-colored businessmen to travel abroad; those who are categorized as low-skilled workers can also work abroad as migrant workers. The Arab Gulf states, which grew rapidly as oil-rich economies, were not an exception: these oil-producing countries have attracted not only male workers but also female workers since the oil boom era in the 1970s. This resulted in the feminization of migration in the Arab Gulf states. With the enhancement in the general living standard, more and more households began to hire foreign domestic helpers, which stimulated interest in “global householding,” a phenomenon wherein the household as a unit transcends nationstate borders (See Chapter 0). Female domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states have drawn attention, mainly from the human rights point of view, because of maltreatment, abuse, and violence towards them. This is particularly problematic as they are working within the private (and, thus, intimate and mostly non-visible) sphere. Asian migrant women working in the Arab Gulf states are a case in point: they are increasingly exposed to human rights violations, such as abuse, confinement at home, and extremely low wages (See Ishii, Chapter 6).

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Recent studies in this genre have emphasized, through empirical data, the agency within inequalities that domestic workers exercise but they have been less concerned about the employers, apart from a few works (Gamburd 2000, Sabban 2012). These studies contributed to this field of research by not depicting the domestic workers merely as victims of the global economy, but by trying to understand the agencies they exercise at various levels. Based on such studies, this chapter focuses on the employers, in an attempt to analyze the agencies and strategies that the employers as well as domestic workers exercise. This study thus looks at the Saudi women who are in charge of directly managing domestic workers in their daily lives. By doing so, this chapter explores not only the agencies and strategies of the domestic workers but also those of their female employers. The study will also illuminate the female employers’ cautiousness, or even fear, regarding having “the other” within their intimate sphere, as well as the rarity of the emotional attachments that are assumed to develop for those who sustain long-term employment. Through an investigation of the relationships between domestic workers and their employers, this chapter also attempts to examine the characteristics of globalized house holding in Saudi society. Households in Saudi Arabia, as a result of accepting foreign domestic workers without letting female nationals enter into the labor market have been able to maintain or even intensify “traditional” activities (forging and strengthening ties among extended families through intensive visitations) and religious ceremonies (extravagantly celebrating religious festivities). This forms a clear contrast to other migrant-receiving countries where traditional and religious activities have generally been reduced as a result of the emergence of forms of capitalism. 2

Globalization and Its Effect on Domestic Spheres

As has been extensively discussed by Michel Foucault and others, the modern world, which was brought about by the industrial revolution and the civil revolution, transformed the family into the center for reproduction and for the care of laborers (Foucault 1980). As a result, biological reproduction, childcare, and education became the main concerns of households. Family, although relegated to specific roles, began to be closely interlinked with production and national economies through the reproduction of the next generation of laborers and caring for existing laborers. However, the globalization of production triggered the emergence of the nidl toward the latter half of the twentieth century. Industrial restructuring and the concomitant restructuring of labor required cheap labor forces, and female labor was considered to be the most suitable cost-wise.

Gender and “Tradition”

85

An increasing number of women, as a result of the emergence of the market economy, began to take on the double burden of paid work outside and unpaid work inside the home, a situation that led to the importation of foreign domestic workers who could help with domestic chores. This state of affairs brought about what Mike Douglas has called “global householding,” a phenomenon wherein the household as a unit transcends nation-state borders (Douglas 2006). Douglas’s definition of global householding includes various factors in the globalization of households, such as the rising level of international marriage, adoption of foreign children, sending children abroad for education, hiring foreign household helpers, and the movement of retired couples from higher- to lower-income countries. He contends that the feminization of migration, wherein more and more women are involved in transnational migration, took place not as a result of factory work but as a result of women being imported for domestic help and for the care of children and the elderly. The families of labor-sending countries form “mother-away transnational families” as a result of the fact that mothers leave their children behind in their own country for their eldest daughters and female kin to take care of (Parreñas 2005). This trend has naturally led to a global link of care, or the “global care chain,” to use a term coined by Arlie Hochschild to refer to “a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring” (Hochschild 2000: 131). Hochschild points out that the most common form of the chain is (1) an older daughter from a poor family cares for her siblings while (2) her mother works as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating nanny who, in turn, (3) cares for the child of a family in a rich country. Nicola Yeates elaborates Hochschild’s idea and argues that the global care chain is driven by women with dependent children in rich countries, who enter paid employment and find themselves unable to fulfill the “domestic duties” of childcare and house cleaning without working a “second shift” (Yeates 2009: 40). In conjunction with the global care chain, domestic duties that had previously been provided by women in “core” or developed countries began to be provided by women from “peripheral” countries who have migrated to the “core” countries to undertake this labor (Yeates 2009: 19). The process has entailed the nidl in the reproductive sphere in many developed countries. However, it has taken a different form in the Arab Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, to that in other regions. On the Arabian Peninsula, the importation of foreign workers is often regarded as a modification of the slavery system (Jureidini 2005). It is true that the Arab Gulf states have frequently been criticized for being inhumane and ruthless in terms of the treatment of migrant workers, which has created a critical international problem from time to time. Nonetheless, the influx of people to the Gulf after the discovery of oil should be understood separately from the tradition of the slavery system, in which some rich

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merchants possessed slaves on the Arabian Peninsula until the middle of the twentieth century. This is because, firstly, it is no longer a tradition for a small number of the population who can afford to possess servants; instead, it has expanded to a broader section of society. Secondly, the remarkable phenomenon of transnational migration to the Arab Gulf states is no longer in the hands of the pull-side of the migration only (the rise in demand for the labor force); rather, the migrants themselves are either forced or attracted to move to the region of their own will (Silvey 2006, Watanabe 2010). In this sense, migration is certainly paced with and connected to globalization. The histories of the Arabian Peninsula indicate that some wealthy merchants once possessed slaves at home who would clean and cook for the master. According to Al-Baadi’s valuable work, the possession of slaves was limited to a small cadre of wealthy merchants who could afford to own them. Women from other social strata did their own domestic chores themselves, or local women from poor families cleaned the neighbors’ houses and washed clothes to help their own households financially (Al-Baadi 1982). State formation in 1932 and the subsequent influx of vast wealth as a result of the discovery of the oil fields enabled the kingdom to enhance modernization. Of course, the direct recipient of the oil wealth was and remains to be the government; however, people in general indirectly benefited from the government’s job creation and public investment policies. As a result, the standard of living was raised as a whole, and even ordinary households could afford to employ domestic laborers. Hiring domestic workers in the Arab Gulf societies became a phenomenon of the rentier economy (see Matsuo and Horinuki, Excursus 1). The Arab Gulf states have witnessed a steady increase in the workforce for more than half a century. Andrzej Kapiszewski correctly pointed out the increased need for Southeast Asians in the Gulf labor market. With the influx of vast amounts of oil wealth into the Arab Gulf states, the composition of the foreign population has changed with time. Whereas the Arab Gulf states welcomed neighboring Arab workers at the dawn of the oil era, the preference of nationality has shifted to Asian workers for economic, political, and social reasons (Kapiszewski 2006). This de-Arabization of the labor market has had a great impact on the reproductive sphere of labor in Arab Gulf societies because the new preference for Asian workers facilitated the migration of Asian female laborers to the Gulf as well (see Ishii, Chapter 6). Despite the brisk demand for laborers in the Gulf during the oil boom, local women were not considered as potential for the workforce, particularly in Saudi Arabia. It demonstrates a clear-cut contrast to the women in the Arabian Peninsula, be they nomadic or fishery, used to be

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involved in productive spheres before the discovery of oil. However, they were gradually relegated to the private sphere as a result of urbanization and economic development (Al-Baadi 1982). The exclusion of women from the labor market is also proved by the fact that Saudi labor law, until the article was abolished in 2005, had stipulated that women-only workspace must be provided. This apparently discouraged private companies from hiring women as their employees. In addition, the predominant norm has been that women should fulfill their “natural” roles as mothers and wives, as I have discussed elsewhere (Tsujigami 2011a). Until the 1990s, prominent Saudi religious scholars (ulama) issued numerous fatwa, or legal opinions, to encourage conventional gendered roles: men are responsible for maintenance, whereas women are in charge of childrearing and domestic chores. Under such value system and with increased household budgets as a result of oil wealth, people began to employ domestic workers from abroad, while local women remained at home. This custom made a critical difference in the process of “global householding” compared with that in other European and Asian regions where domestic workers became necessary because of women’s participation in the labor market. 3

Relationship between Domestic Workers and Their Employers

In this way, employing a domestic helper became more and more common among the middle class households and the above, which has created numerous visible and invisible frictions between the employer and the domestic workers. This study tries to explore power relationship among them based on my fieldwork research conducted several times in Saudi Arabia between 2007 and 2017. The informants consisted of 26 Saudi women, a Saudi man and a woman from Dubai, ranging in age from teens to women in their sixties (­Table 3.1). I focused on interviewing women because they were the main ones who managed the domestic workers at home. The research was conducted mainly in Riyadh, with complementary data gathered from other regions, such as Dhahran (a city located in the Eastern Province) and Wadi Fatima (a small town located in the western part of Saudi Arabia). Most of the employers experienced difficulties in employing domestic workers. Only four out of 28 answered that they maintain a good relationship with them and that they had employed the same worker for more than 10 years. (These cases were observed among the women-headed households of Employers No. 11, 12, 13, and 14.) Some employers enjoy the domestic workers’ experiences and skills, and they leave all the domestic chores to the experienced

Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh Dhahran Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 Riyadh 14 Riyadh 15 Riyadh

Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh

1 2 3

40s 40s 40s

40s 40s 40s 40s 40s 30s 40s 30s 60s

30s 10s 40s

F F F

F F F F F F F F F

F F F

Employed Employed n.d. Employed Employed Employed n.d. Employed Unemployed Employed Employed Employed

Employed Student Employed

Surveyed Age Gender Job status city cohort

Single Single Married

Married Married Married Married Married Married Widowed Divorced Widowed

Married Single Divorced

Marrital status

1 1 4

4 4 n.d. 4 3 3 2 1 1

9 7 6

1 1 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1

IN IN n.d.

IN IN n.d. IN PH PH IN PH IN

IN PH SL

No. of No. of Nationality family domestic of domestic members helpers helpers

Table 3.1  List of informants and the number and nationality of their domestic workers

1 1 1

2 1 1 1 1 1 n.d. 1 n.d.

2 n.d. 1

2 2 3

3 2 2 2 2 2 n.d. 2 n.d.

3 n.d. 2

Three children come and go to ex-­husband’s house.

No. of Total no. of Notes drivers domestic workers

88 TSUJIGAMI

M

50s

40s 40s 40s

30s 40s 30s

23 Riyadh 24 Dubai 25 Riyadh

26 Riyadh 27 Riyadh 28 Riyadh

F F F

F F F

F

40s

21 Wadi Fatima 22 Riyadh

F F F F F

40s 20s 20s 10s 50s

Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh Riyadh

16 17 18 19 20

Employed Employed Employed

Self Employed n.d. Employed Self Employed

Employed Employed Student Student Self Employed Employed

Surveyed Age Gender Job status city cohort

n.d. Married Single

Married Married Married

Divorced

Divorced

Married Single Single Single Married

Marrital status

n.d. 8 3

7 6 6

3

4

8 7 6 6 5

n.d. 0 0

4 4 5

2

1

2 2 2 2 3

n.d. None None

n.d. PH PH,IN

PH

n.d.

IN, Africa IN PH PH IN, Syria

No. of No. of Nationality family domestic of domestic members helpers helpers

n.d. 0 1

n.d. 1 2

1

n.d.

n.d. n.d. 1 1 1

n.d. 0 1

n.d. 5 7

3

n.d.

n.d. n.d. 3 3 4

Four helpers are assistants of the employer.

All helpers work part time. The helper works as a day helper.

No. of Total no. of Notes drivers domestic workers

Gender and “Tradition”

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helper (Employers No. 7, 9, 11,12, 13, and 14). Others mentioned problems, but no one answered that she had resorted to violence to solve the problem. (Employers No. 2, 19, 25, and 26 emphasized the problems caused by the domestic workers.) Instead, when they talked about cases of violence, they talked about it as someone else’s problem. Contrary to resorting to violence, many of them emphasized that they took good care of the domestic workers because the domestic workers were mainly in charge of caring for babies and the elderly, the most vulnerable members of their family. They did have concerns about possible violence against these members of the family. In fact, some from the younger cohort of informants revealed that the domestic worker had slapped them when they were small. Others complained that they had their clothes cut out of envy and that their money had been stolen (Employers No. 2, 8, and 19). Employer No. 8 told the author that she had fired the helper after seeing the helper slapping her son. Of all the difficulties between domestic workers and their employers, the most feared is the runaway maid (Employers No. 3 and 10 told their experiences of helpers running away). In this situation, domestic workers literally run away, all of a sudden, from the employer’s house. Some domestic workers are reported to have suffered from domestic violence, sexual harassment, and/ or non-payment of their wages, but others leave simply because they have found a better job. Employers who have employed a domestic worker through the referral of a recruitment agency will end up losing the placement fee if the employee runs away after the three-month testing period, which means that an employer has to pay the placement fee again to find a new helper. Running away also costs the domestic workers, because they have to give up their visas and/or passports, which are basically in the hands of the employers. In the interviews, employers told me that they keep the maid’s passport to prevent her running away. As a natural consequence, such domestic workers turn into ­illegal migrants once they run away. According to employers, some domestic workers, however, do not care about losing their documents because their initial documents are already fake; their passports and medical certificates are often falsified, which creates distrust in the employer (Employers No. 3, 10, and 25). The informants said that they often doubt the domestic worker’s age because she tended to lie about it, representing herself as some years older so that the employer would think she was a reasonable age to be employed. A reasonable age in Saudi Arabia means over mid-twenties, so that the maid knows what to do as a domestic helper. For the female employers, it is also important to make sure that the domestic worker is not sexually attractive and does not cause trouble at home. An informant once accepted such a girl with falsified documents who, she said, “didn’t know anything about what she was expected to do. She didn’t

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know how to cook or clean and wasn’t able to do so even when she was taught. Obviously, she was only a teenager” (Employer No.3). The girl soon became homesick, at which point the difficulties became even more acute. One day in the month of Ramadan, when extended family members gather and everyone stayed up late and the domestic workers were extraordinarily busy, she attempted to commit suicide in the bathroom. She did not die because the employer family noticed the incident and called an ambulance. In recalling that day, the employer said that she did not want such a helper “because we didn’t want to be involved in such a serious case.” According to the employers, deceit cases by domestic helpers often take place with or without document falsification. Another informant felt deceived by her former Filipino helper (Employer No. 25). This informant’s helper was very attentive and hard working at the beginning. The informant noticed one day that the helper had a sore arm and was having a difficulty in carrying a big pan. The employer could have “returned” her to the recruitment agency because she was still in the testing period and could have been replaced by someone else. But the employer decided to keep her instead and took her to the hospital. The domestic worker was hospitalized for a minor surgery, for which the employer covered the cost. The employer also gave her a week-long holiday at the employer’s home when she was discharged. During that week, other maids took care of her. When she recovered, however, the helper insisted that she needed to go back to the Philippines. She cried all day to convince the employer. To complicate matters, this happened just after the trial period was over. The employer had to “give up” the employee without any compensation or any reimbursement of the medical costs. The employer told me that she did it as a pious Muslim who offers assistance to those who are in need of it. She could not neglect her helper’s malady nor could the helper be returned to the agency, but she felt betrayed by the domestic worker. Different habits and mindsets in terms of the domestic work sometimes cause problems between the employer and domestic worker. Many domestic workers, especially those who are new to the job, are not familiar with the latest home appliances, nor are they familiar with a large, gorgeous house that the employer wishes to keep perfectly clean to welcome guests at any time. Some informants complained that the domestic worker destroyed their home appliances so that they say they refrain from purchasing home appliances with the latest technology.1 Differences in language may also be an obstacle in making employees understand what they are expected to do. Employers who started to employ 1 Wide gaps in lifestyles between domestic helpers and employers were also demonstrated through my fieldwork in Manila in 2011 (Tsujigami 2011).

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d­ omestic workers from “new countries” increasingly face such problems. This occurred because Saudi Arabia was suspended from accepting domestic workers from certain countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, as a result of bilateral tensions that developed after cases of murder, abuse, and other problems between domestic workers and their employers’ families.2 Employers had to employ domestic workers from countries that did not have experience in sending their human resources. One informant who started employing two Vietnamese women complained about the difficulty of communicating with them, not only because they did not speak either English or Arabic but also because the social and economic gap made it difficult for the domestic workers to understand what the employer wanted them to do (Employer No. 25). That informant told me how surprised she was when they arrived for the first time. They did not know how to use the bathroom and shower, so the employer had to go inside the shower room, put shampoo on their hair, and teach them how to wash by body language. The story manifests that the workers are accepted as “the intimate other” from the beginning: the employer wanted the workers to be washed properly as they share the private space with the employer’s family, however, they are completely considered to be “the other” in a sense that the workers did not share the idea of how to take shower, which is likely to be very important for the employer. Black magic, or sihr, is one of the most feared troubles that domestic workers may cause. None of the informants had experienced black magic themselves, but they said that they had heard a lot about it. They spoke about cases of employers who lost money in a hypnotic state, of a wife being affected by a disease, of a husband who lost affection for his wife, and of seeing a stranger at home at midnight. The fact that even highly educated employers believe in this magic reflects the penetrating belief in black magic in the society. (For example, Employer No. 4, a PhD holder and is working as the female head of a government institution, emphasized her fear of black magic.) Knowing their employers’ fear of being cursed with black magic, some domestic workers tactically dare to inform their employers that they know black magic, whether they really do or not. By doing so, domestic workers believe that they will not be treated badly by the employer. Black magic make employers afraid of the domestic workers because they may resort to counter-measures in cases of 2 Indonesia suspended sending domestic workers to 21 countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, in May 2015 when two Indonesian domestic workers were executed in Saudi Arabia for murder (Whiteman, 2015). The Saudi government reacted by enforcing a ban on newly arriving domestic workers. It took almost a year for the two countries to reach an agreement and for the recruitment of Indonesian workers to restart. The new agreement ensures that working contracts are provided that stipulate the duties and responsibilities of the worker and employer.

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maltreatment. Through such negotiations, domestic helpers attempt to expand their power and space within the household. This eventually illuminates the importance of communication skills. Such negotiations with the employers can dictate the domestic helpers’ status in the home, and whether they will be totally controlling the household affairs or will be degraded as a laborer who will undertake menial, hard, and dirty work. More distrust comes from the different sexual norms of the employer and her domestic worker. Employers tend to regard domestic workers as sexually active and think that they will seek sex partner(s) whenever possible. One of the informants found that her domestic worker ran a little prostitution business of her own in the employer’s absence; that is, she would invite men to the house when the employer’s family was out. Another employer, who believed that domestic workers were always trying to find someone for a sexual relationship, said that the domestic worker had distributed her mobile number when she had a chance to go out without her employer, although it should also be noted that domestic workers are very rarely given opportunities to go out. In many cases, employers lock the door when they leave the domestic worker if there is a suspicion that she might practice prostitution. Locking the door also prevents the domestic worker from running away suddenly. In addition, the informants also fear that their husbands will be targeted as sex partners, so they try not to let the domestic worker communicate with their husbands very frequently. What is interesting is the female employers’ viewpoint in that they consider only the domestic helpers to be sexually active; this does not apply to their husbands. Such understandings and discourses are widely shared among women; a woman tends to worry about her husband being snatched, rather than her husband snatching the domestic helper. However, like the film of a wife who caught her husband cheating with the domestic helper with a hidden camera, which is widely known by the hashtag #SaudiWomanCatchesHusbandCheating, husbands’ sexual interests toward domestic helpers cannot be overlooked.3 In trying to avoid these and other troubles, the employers said that they tended to provide more than they were obliged to. For example, employers buy daily commodities for the domestic workers in addition that they give gifts and tips on the occasion of festivals and returning home. They tip their helpers, especially during Eid Al-Fitr, the festivals that mark the end of Ramadan, the holy month of the Islamic calendar. This is known to be the busiest season for domestic workers. Some employers give a bunch of gifts at the end of c­ ontracts. 3 It should also be noted that it was not the husband but the wife who filmed him that faced imprisonment for defaming her husband, in accordance with the law on information technology crime.

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A businesswoman who hires as many as five domestic helpers (four of them are hired as pro forma domestic workers, yet they are working on her business in reality) takes her maids out for shopping before they return home. She buys gifts not only for the maids themselves but also for the maids’ family back home, including clothes for the maids and their families, inexpensive gold products, mobile phones, and/or laptop computers. She once bought the latest iPhone for the leader of the maids. She told me that she did it out of generosity and as her responsibility as a good Muslim. However, she looks at the workers’ changes cynically; she told me that most of her maids and drivers arrived at her place very thin, but they quickly gained weight. This is because, for them, everything is free whenever they are with her. She even complained about their lack of cost consciousness, by saying “they consume a lot of food, shampoo, water, and electricity as if all are free of charge” (Employer No. 25). Some employers support their workers for a long period of time. One employer helped an Indonesian maid who lost her house and husband while she was working in Saudi Arabia. Her husband sold the house and left her in order to marry another woman. The worker was at a loss because the house had been built with the money she had sent home to her husband every month. After this incident, the employer advised her not to send all her money to her family but to save it up herself. When she had saved a certain amount of money, the employer lent her the rest of the money to purchase some land in Indonesia (Employer No. 5). Domestic workers often seek both emotional and physical support from their employers, and employers feel a responsibility to respond to it. On one weekend when I was staying with a Saudi family, I immediately realized that it was not an ordinary morning. Both the wife and her husband looked busy (unlike normal weekend mornings that are basically peaceful and quiet because everyone is sleeping), and one of their maids was crying. She was claiming that her mother in the Philippines was seriously sick and she needed to remit money as soon as possible. Otherwise, she said, her mother wouldn’t be able to see the doctor. She never stopped crying, as if her mother had died. The employer and her husband were willing to provide an advanced payment of two months of her salary. Madam (the female employer) tried hard to comfort her emotionally, whereas “Sir” (the husband) was busy preparing for the money to be transferred at the beginning of the following week. Myself, I was suspicious about the story, as a family member’s sickness is an easy reason to bargain not only for an advanced payment of salary but also for the employer’s lenience. It was particularly dubious to me because it happened on a weekend morning when husband, who was rarely at home, was definitely at home. Although I gave my personal opinion to the madam, she was not interested in such reckless

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advice and hurriedly contacted a strange Saudi family where the maid’s aunt was working. Later in the afternoon, they transferred the maid to this family’s house for a couple of days so that she would feel better. The results of this research show that the majority of employers are not completely happy with their domestic workers because of one or more of the problems discussed above. Other problems arise because the helpers’ work takes place in the private sphere; they are often the caretakers of the most vulnerable members of the family, such as babies and the elderly. Thus, employers feel that they must compromise on trivial matters and respond to the demands of the domestic workers. One employer, who offered me a place to stay during my visit, indeed compromised by being robbed of her money and valuable items almost regularly. Although she noticed that one of her previous maids was stealing her money and jewelry from time to time, she was not able to ask if that maid was to blame. She could not do so because, other than the theft, all of her work was perfect. That domestic worker knew what her madam wanted, always kept her eyes on other maids, and took a good care of the children while the employer was absent (although she was not so much expected to do so, as all of the children were almost grown up). Practically, she was the irreplaceable manager of the household. The employer especially appreciated her information about the other maids. One night, the maid secretly visited the madam’s bedroom and told her that one of her colleagues was planning to run away. The madam hurried to the other maid’s room and found her packing the few items that belonged to her. The employer had to ask what she was doing late at night. Thanks to the information that the irreplaceable maid provided, the employer was able to prevent the other maid running away. The employer immediately talked with the escaping maid and decided to send her to one of her relatives to solve the problem.4 After this event, the employer enhanced her trust in the maid and never asked about the robberies, although she always suspected her of the thefts. As an alternative, the employer provided the author (I was staying at her place then) with a safe because she was not able to overtly question her. After this maid left the home, the employer told me that the stealing never happened again. However, the employer is still longing for the maid to come back. The hiring of live-in domestic helpers is indeed accepting aliens into a very intimate space. Gamburd reflects correctly on migrant domestic workers when she depicts them as “marginal insider, intimate outsider” (Gumbard 2000: 102). It also becomes difficult to avoid the domestic workers’ frustration and jealousy 4 Although this should not happen under contracts, employers sometimes swap or give domestic helpers to relatives without transferring sponsorship.

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that arises out of the differences in living standards between the domestic workers and their employers. From the accounts of the employers, this is why they become extravagant; their support is sometimes extended to the domestic helper’s family; it is needless to add that they give gifts and tips, in addition to providing basic commodities. 4

Consumption of Care and the Reproduction of “Tradition”

In Saudi Arabia, households have begun participating in the global economy without employing a lot of local women in the labor market until very recently. The use of domestic workers is considered as a luxury item that frees women from the burden of household chores and caring for their family members; hence, I use the phrase “consumption of care,” which means that such women consume, sometimes unnecessary, care with their extra money. Nonetheless, my research has revealed that employers suffer considerably from problems caused by domestic workers, and many of them bear the burden of living expenses for their helpers. Here, the question arises: why, if domestic help is merely a luxury item, do people continue to employ them at considerable cost to themselves? Multiple informants answered that they needed domestic workers for their lifestyle. By “lifestyle,” they meant their large families and the large number of guests that they entertain at home, particularly on the occasions of the two Eids: Eid Al-Fitr after the month of Ramadan and Eid Al-Adha, the festival after the month of pilgrimage. One employer added that the sandy climate in Riyadh requires the house to be cleaned twice a day. In the meantime, it should also be noted that the employers do not want to leave everything to the domestic workers. Some employers emphasize that they do some of the domestic tasks themselves, whereas others argue that the domestic workers cannot do anything without the employers’ instructions. I also came across with several conversations among Saudi women that praise a life without a domestic helper. On one hand, they admire a life independent from the workers. On the other hand, those who employ helpers give excuses of having a large family and/or a large house. Such a cliché, therefore, often ends up indirectly exhibiting the economic power of those who can afford to domestic helpers. In such a way, I would argue that the domestic helpers turn out to be the objects of conspicuous consumption. Also, mental and emotional aspects cannot be overlooked. Some employers need domestic workers as their indispensible companion. A widowed woman who maintains good relationship with her helper (No. 12) needs the helper not only as her maid, but also as a companion. As a widowed who lives alone in a villa, she treats the Indonesian maid as her family member by calling her

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“­sister.” However, employers rarely show lenience at their domestic workers. I have often witnessed informants’ discomfort in discussing on domestic workers during the interview, as if topics of domestic workers do not serve academic interests. Such attitudes imply employers’ potential racism over the maids who often come from humble class in an underdeveloped country. A sense of superiority over the “the inferior” can also be a good reason to employ domestic worker(s). These reasons and excuses given should be examined in detail. According to the Human Development Report, the fertility rate in Saudi Arabia was 7.3 from 1970 to 1975, but it decreased to 3.8 between 2000 and 2005. Thus, the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime has steadily decreased during the past three decades, although the number remains high in comparison to the world average. Urbanization has contributed to increasing the percentage of nuclear families. Nonetheless, solidarity among extended families remains relatively high: people prefer to live very close to their extended families. Some families build several houses on a large plot of land in cities after they migrate from the suburbs so that they can support one another on a daily basis. In many European and Asian countries, urbanization, women’s participation in the labor force, the nuclearization of families, and the declining birth rate have taken place almost simultaneously. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s global householding did not involve female nationals’ massive entry in to the labor market. The birth rate has surely slowed but women have been kept busy by events in the private sphere. According to Saudi anthropologist Soraya Altorki, married women extend their social world through social visits beyond the limits of their household (Altorki 1986). The ties among women were called Wafa’, and these relationships were only allowed to married women, whereas single girls were exposed only among close friends and kinswomen. Women in the cities nowadays enjoy a higher level of mobility than in the 1980s when Altorki’s work was published because of the spread of vehicles and expatriate chauffeurs hired by each household. However, I would argue that the women’s network forged through social visits remains important in this modernization process, given the persistent divides based on class, gender, and race in the Arab Gulf states. John Willoughby employed the notion of “segmented feminization,” in which the feminization of education and labor is taking place among the daughters of the elite families (Willoughby 2008). Willoughby points out that the gender and class based evolution is being witnessed in Saudi Arabia: the evolution denotes, the more women is educated, the more they are likely to work in the paid labor force in professional jobs. As a result, women from elite families tend to achieve higher education, which leads them to good jobs.

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I would dare to argue that kinship solidarity and family bonds can also be stretched to the segmentation of women’s lives; women’s education, marriage, employment, and other daily activities are largely interconnected with their kinship networks. Thus, how much support, information, and care they can reciprocally give and receive from their kin and family has a considerable impact on their lives, as will their ability to construct and strengthen women’s kinship networks work against the constraints peculiar to women. Therefore, Saudi women tend to maintain or even intensify their “tradition” with the help of strong, extended family ties, which is in contrast to other cases where “traditional” events have been reduced or have even vanished as a result of the ­emergence of a labor-intensive society. Just as the informants indicated, the two Eids are important because of the number of guests in the home. Of the two Eids, the Eid Al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan is particularly important for Muslims, and the demand for domestic workers suddenly increases prior to the season as they prepare to celebrate the holiday with lavish ceremonies with their extended family and relatives.5 In other words, the “traditional” and religious ceremonies and festivities cannot be maintained without the help of foreign domestic workers. Also, we should not overlook the gender norm constructed out of such lifestyles. Saudi men and women tend to take the gender roles as given. They would think of hiring domestic helpers to do the domestic work rather than to let men to do it. Their sense of masculinity/femininity has been created and strengthened in such a way by outsourcing the human resources. In addition, in a society where men and women have separate gatherings, foreign domestic helpers are needed to bridge male world and female world as foreigners are often considered to be exception of their gender norms. For example, they prefer to let the domestic helpers to receive shopped items from the driver, than to receive them by themselves. 5

Un/Changing Lifestyle in Saudi Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia has witnessed global householding without women’s massive participation in the labor force, change is coming because an increasing number of women are seeking job opportunities as a result of the raised level of education and continual inflation over the last decade (Tsujigami 2016). The cia (Central Intelligence Agency) estimates that the female unemployment rate for those between the ages of 15 and 24 exceeds 40 per cent 5 It is said that the number of runaway maids increases in this season because the demand for maids and their salary expectations rise in this season (Al-Seghayer 2012).

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(Central Intelligence Agency 2016). The Saudi government is rapidly implementing various projects in developing human resources and creating employment opportunities. In addition, the late King Abdullah appointed as many as 30 female members to the consultative council in early 2013, comprising 20 per cent of the seats. These newly appointed women are in discussions about how to solve the problems pertaining to the growing participation of women in the labor market. Women’s labor participation will be further developed owing to the rising level of education and inflation. The female members of the consultative council are demanding that kindergartens and nurseries be established to help working mothers. The underlying reason for this is the numerous troubles and abuses that occur because children are left alone with the domestic workers. Nevertheless, it is not clear if the demand for domestic workers will decline in the future, considering the lifestyles and values of Saudi women and men. Although newly married couples tend to live without a maid, the Saudi population, of which 60 per cent is under the age of thirty, is familiarized with a life assisted by domestic helpers. Many of the middle class Saudi youth had their own nanny as they grew up. Children, particularly boys, are raised without learning how to clean, wash clothes, or cook for themselves. As a result, individuals have clear-cut gender roles based on their biological sex. In such a society, it is unlikely that men take the initiative of his household chores and child rearing. The global care chain has profoundly penetrated into the society and cannot be easily dragged away. Saudi society is currently suffering from the government’s fiscal predicaments since the decline of international oil prices in 2014. The government, led by a new leadership since 2015 after the death of King Abdullah, is trying to break the dependence on oil revenues by diversifying the economy, attracting foreign investments, and extracting revenues from its people through taxation and reduced subsidies on gasoline and other items. Such government measurements directly hit the people. However, a change in the lifestyles and values that depend on domestic helpers on a daily basis may require a further paradigm shift among the people, including how they depart from the consumption of care that they have enjoyed. 6 Conclusion In many countries, the global care chain was formed as the result of women’s labor participation. Hochschild and Yeates both contended that the global care chain was driven by working women who were unable to fulfill the “domestic duties” of childcare and house cleaning without working a “second shift.” This

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theory, however, has proven not to be applicable in Saudi Arabia, where people have hired domestic workers even though the women remained at home. Thanks to oil revenues, Saudi households can hire domestic workers with their increasing budgets, and the ability to do so frees women from domestic work. However, as this study has revealed, many employers suffer from the fears and troubles that they face as a result of employing “marginal insiders” and “intimate outsiders” in their homes. Nevertheless, the employers indicated that they needed domestic workers to support their big families and to help with performing religious and “traditional” ceremonies properly. Thus, I would argue that this reproduction of “tradition” is related to economic development, the relatively high fertility rate, urbanization, and women’s slowness to participate in the labor force. Although Saudi Arabia has witnessed a declining birth rate over the past few decades, the pace of decline has not been as fast as that in other countries in Europe and Asia. Having many children is considered a blessing, mainly by the older generation. Urbanization has also progressed, but solidarity among extended families has not vanished, which partly helped women to hold their autonomy among female networks. “Tradition” has been revitalized, or the people have invented a “tradition” that celebrates religious ceremonies superbly with the assistance from domestic workers. Foreigners are hired to support this “authenticity” as a result. Recent trends, however, may shift this nexus, as socio-economic changes require women to participate in the labor market as women’s labor participation is part of the project to nationalize the labor force. The recent Niṭāqāt (see Matsuo, Chapter 2) program enforces the hiring of a certain percentage of nationals if companies wish to continue employing foreign workers. The dilemma of this program, however, is that the Niṭāqāt program is funded from the raised price of Iqama, which is the residency permit for migrant workers. This means that labor force nationalization is itself based on the resources generated by migrants. Thus, the current dependence on migrants is operative in both the production sphere (labor market) and the reproduction sphere (household), two interlinking spheres on the verge of change. To put it differently, the dependence on foreign labor is institutionalized, in both the production and reproduction spheres. Contrary to the widespread images of abusive employers in the Arab Gulf societies, this study has discovered power negotiations not only by the domestic workers, but also by the employers. My fieldwork articulates various kinds of measurements taken by employers in order to avoid problems and troubles due to hiring domestic helpers. By making compromises and providing special treatments, employers are also negotiating boundaries in order to share the time and space with “marginal insider and intimate outsider.” To put it the other way around, power relationship between employers and domestic helpers is not always rigid, and there is a room for negotiation for both parties.

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Saudi version of modern family has been constructed by sharing the intimate space with outsiders (domestic helpers), which resulted in further discouraging men to participate in the domestic chores. However, in the post rentier economy due to decreased oil revenue, their value system and gender roles may change, which will affect the way of sharing space with domestic helpers. Bibliography Al-Baadi, Hamad Muhammad. 1982. “Social Change, Education, and the Roles of Women in Arabia.” Unpublished PhD diss., Stanford University. Al-Seghayer, Khalid. 2012. “The Dilemma of Runaway Maids.” Saudi Gazette, 23 October 2012. (http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/19790/The-dilemma-of-runaway-maids, Accessed 23 October 2012). Altorki, Soraya. 1986. Women in Saudi Arabia. New York: Columbia University Press. Central Intelligence Agency. 2016. World Factbook. cia. (https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html, Accessed 20 August 2018). Douglas, Mike. 2006. “Global Householding in Pacific Asia.” International Development Planning Review, 28 (4): 421–446. Foucault, Michel. 1980. The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books. Gumbard, Michele. 2000. The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids. New York: Cornell University Press. Hochschild, Arlie. 2000. “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value.” In On the Edge: Globalization and the New Millennium, edited by Tony Giddens and Will Hutton, 130–146. London: Sage Publishers. Human Rights Watch. 2008. As If I Am Not Human (http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 2008/07/07/if-i-am-not-human, Accessed 20 August 2018). Human Rights Watch. 2010. Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System (http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re ports/kuwait1010webwcover.pdf, Accessed 12 August 2018). Jureidini, Ray. 2005. “Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East.” Racism and Public Policy 2005: 48–71. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2006. Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, Paper presented at UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut: May 2006. Parreñas, Rhacel. 2005. “The Gender Paradox in the Transnational Families of Filipino Migrant Women.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 14 (3): 243–268. Sabban, Rima. 2012. Maids Crossing: Domestic Workers in the UAE. Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambart Academic Publishing. Silvey, Rachel. 2004. “Transnational Domestication: State Power and Indonesian Migrant Women in Saudi Arabia.” Political Geography 23 (2004): 245–264.

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Silvey, Rachel. 2006. “Consuming the Transnational Family: Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia.” Global Networks 6 (1): 24–40. Tsujigami, Namie. 2016. “Higher Education and Changing Aspirations of Women in Saudi Arabia,” In Dale Eickelman and Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf eds., Higher Education Investment in the Arab States of the Gulf: Strategies for Excellence and Diversity. Berlin: Gerlach Press. 42–54. Tsujigami, Namie. 2011. “Chūtō Dekasegi Firipinjin Meido no Kokyō wo mite Wakattakoto” [Living conditions of the Filipino migrant domestic workers back in the Phillipines], Asahi Chūtō Magazin [Asahi Middle East Magazine], 10 October 2011. In Japanese. Watanabe, Akiko. 2010. “‘Open City’ niokeru Firipin-Muslim: Arab Shucyō Renpō no Jirei” [Filipino-Muslim in an ‘Open City’: Case of the United Arab Emirates]. Hakusan Review of Anthropology 13 (2010): 117–123. In Japanese. Whiteman, Hilary. 2015. “Indonesia Ban Won’t Work in Mideast, Migrant Groups Say.” CNN (6 May, 2015) (https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/06/asia/indonesia-migrantworker-ban/index.html, Accessed 12 August 2018). Willoughby, John. 2008. “Segmented Feminization and the Decline of Neopatriarchy in GCC Countries of the Persian Gulf.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 28 (1): 184–199. Yeates, Nicola. 2009. Globalizing Care Economies and Migrant Workers: Explorations in Global Care Chains. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4

In/Dependence of the Local and Dependence of the Foreign: The Uae Family, Domestic Service, and a Precarious Future Rima Sabban 1 Introduction As a young nation-state in a globalized world, the United Arab Emirates (uae) has quickly achieved massive socioeconomic growth and advancement in the last half century, an unmatched and remarkable feat in terms of both speed and trajectory. The uae, a federation of seven Emirates, comprising Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um-al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and al-Fujairah, has transformed from a minor area on the edge of the historical record to becoming an emerging, influential state actor that is recognized globally (Abdulla 2006). Similarly to the neighboring Arab Gulf states, the uae was also built on the fortuitous bounty of fossil fuels and became officially established to unify the governing seven local emirates only nine years after its first oil ­export. As the country’s most inviolable and vital resource, oil helped to accelerate the uae economy, society, and labor markets, thus enabling the government to directly support local families’ employment and social welfare. To put this into context, the dramatic change in socioeconomic circumstance has given the uae a modern Cinderella-esque arc to its historical trajectory; it has swiftly moved from total poverty and subsistence living (El Mallakh 1981) to levels of affluence that place residents (locals and non-locals) in a league with the inhabitants of some of the world’s richest countries (Al Fahim 2006). Prior to the era of oil discovery, the uae, a country characterized by arid desert and a hot, humid climate, was sparsely populated, and the local inhabitants suffered from a lack of even the most basic amenities. In fact, the Emirates was a forgotten nation-state in the realm of history and was thus often mentioned only in passing in the various literatures. There was also very little ­interest—or indeed incentive—to live in the uae because of the lack of economic opportunities, which, at times, forced many local inhabitants to migrate to neighboring locales or, in some cases, other Arab countries. Even the British Empire only tolerated the coastal region that eventually became the uae for its strategic location as a bastion of the Straits of Hormuz, rubberstamping the

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area as a British Protectorate1 to lay claim to the territory and guarantee that rivals could not encroach on other important colonies on either side of the Gulf. The British Empire’s domination in the area, however, changed upon the discovery of oil, which suddenly thrust the small coastal state into the global economy. The contemporary socioeconomic shift is and has been reverberating amongst the local population ever since, as they grapple to navigate the complexities of a modern existence, while remaining firmly attached to their highly esteemed traditions. As globalization has increasingly intensified the socioeconomic structures and opportunities in the uae, mainstream uae society has deeply maintained its tribal family structures, which largely function as the central unit of society (Heard Bey 2004; Al Sharekh 2007). In fact, the uae family is not only the fundamental building block that forms society and its prevailing social structure, but it also constitutes the very basis of survival of the culture. The extended family unit also reinforces and expands the functioning and existence of society; it influences all facets of the economy and local politics within a given community. Without these strong cultural and family ties embedded in the families within the complex social structure, the harshness of the existence in the uae—especially during the pre-oil discovery period—could not have been structurally sustained. It is also important to acknowledge that, although the basic notion of “family” in the Emirati context remains central to the very core of the nation’s fundamental architecture, the nature of the “family” in the uae has gone through a series of major changes on a variety of levels (­Al-Tarrah 2007) with the advent of wealth and modernity. These specific tangible shifts are largely rooted in multiple and complex social, economic, and political factors that converged to trigger dramatic transformations among local families in the uae. One of the least anticipated—but most influential—factors in the rapid societal changes in the uae is the massive influx of migrant domestic workers—mostly coming from the Asian countries (for example, the ­Philippines, India, and Indonesia)—into Emirati households (Sabban 2012a). The ­arrival of migrant domestic workers not only accelerated the shift from 1 The British authorities did not employ the same brutal tactics in the region as they had in other, more unfortunate nearby colonies; they avoided exerting themselves by refraining from building schools or other facilities (Al Faris 2000) and generally engaging as little as possible with the natives. The Governor’s representatives appeared to view the local people as little more than underdeveloped savages and the area as unbearable to live in. Their representatives would spend their time in the more friendly climates of neighboring Oman or Bahrain, particularly in the summer when the temperature could rise to above 50 degrees celsius (Zahlan 1978; Kazim 2000; Heard-Bey 2004).

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traditional subsistence living in the uae but also influenced local Emirati households to adopt to more modern conveniences in a global context. In other words, the global migrant emergence and integration of migrant domestic workers into uae households has profoundly reconfigured the contemporary formation of household structures, cultures, and practices in contemporary Emirati society. This chapter analyzes both the roles and the impacts of the inclusion of migrant domestic workers into the average Emirati household on the culture, structure, and practices of families in uae society. The societal shifts can be identified both in tangible and intangible forms. This chapter also examines the historical evolution and increasing alteration of the family unit’s spatial structure with the physical move from the more extended family configuration (that is, grandparents, wife (or wives), children, grandchildren, sons- and daughters-in-law, uncles, and aunties) to a more modern nuclear system (that is, where young married couples leave the extended unit to form their own, smaller families in separate accommodation). This chapter argues that the socioeconomic shift is not only the product of modernity and globalization but also specifically exists in tandem with an almost existential social transformation that changed the family unit structure, as members of this small society have been increasingly forced to adjust to the demands of a modernized world. Given the private nature of uae society and the difficulty that many social scientists have in accessing the inner sanctum of the Emirati family, I employ both published secondary sources on the topic and my own prior field work data—including both published and unpublished interviews with uae family members and domestic workers—collected over the past few decades. To further contextualize the evolution of local families’ dependency on domestic workers, I further utilize my own personal life experience within an Emirati family in Dubai to effectively provide more nuance to the framing and evolution of the family unit’s structural and emotional transformation in the context of the rapid emergence of the migrant domestic workforce, both in the uae and beyond. 2

The Early Years: Historical Foundations

Prior to the state formation of the uae in 1971, this small corner of the Arabian Peninsula, which consisted of a number of overlapping territories that varied geographically from winding coast to expansive dunes and sprawling mountains, was modestly inhabited by a mixture of Arab tribes, some of whom were

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nomadic Bedouin. Others historically remained settled throughout the year, such as Indian traders and their Persian merchant counterparts from the south of Iran. As Table 4.1 indicates, in the early 1900s, the local population was estimated at no more than 80,000 individuals (Heard-Bey 2001), and the population gradually increased with the passage of time until the oil discovery period, when the local population exponentially exploded as a result of the high international migration of various migrant workers, including domestic workers, into the country (Sabban 2012a). Furthermore, the local inhabitants heavily relied on the few meagre resources, and considerable ingenuity, to survive the hostile climate in the uae. As Heard-Bey acknowledges, They [local populations] had developed the means to make all aspects of their seemingly inhospitable environment work for them. Management of these economic resources was harmonized with an age-old social structure producing unique socio-economic responses to the rigors of life in the eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. heard-bey 2001

Table 4.1  Population growth and composition in the uae since 1900

Year 1900 1958 1968 1975 1977 1978 1979 1992* 1995 2000* 2005 2010** 2018***

Total 80,000 86,000 180,000 557,000 862,000 950,000 1,015,000 2,012,000 2,411,041 2,623,000 4,106,427 8,264,070 9,560,748

Nationals (%)

Ex-patriots (%)

Not available Not available 114,000 (63) 201,000 (36) 215,000 (25) 222,000 (23) 228,000 (22) 580,000 (29) 587,330 (24) 762,000 (29) 825,495 (20) 947,997 (11.5) 956,075 (10)

Not available Not available 66,000 (37) 356,000 (64) 647,000 (75) 787,000 (77) 787,000 (78) 1,433,000 (71) 1,823,711 (76) 1,861,000 (71) 3,280,932 (80) 7,316,073 (88.5) 8,604,673 (90)

Sources: uae General Information Authority 1994; Faris 1994; * uae Official estimation; **uae National Bureau of Statistics (nbs); *** UN World Population Review

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The above-mentioned “rigors” principally included an absence of basic infrastructures, including roads, schools, hospitals, skilled professionals (that is, doctors, nurses, and engineers), and domestic workers, who were historically considered to be a rare luxury (Heard-Bey 2001). Formal education in the uae was also neither readily available nor fully accessible to the entire local population (Al Faris 2000), excluding some of the traditional Qur’anic schools and the very few primary schools that were established in the mid-twentieth century (Al Faris 2000; Soffan 1980). As a result, the illiteracy rate exceeded 90 percent prior to the formation of the uae (El Mallakh 1981). Moreover, until the 1950s and 1960s, many of the local inhabitants lived in a variety of simple dwellings from goat hair tents and houses made of palm fronds (locally known as ‘arishah) or, in some cases, modest constructions made of coral stone with “an upper floor and even an ornate wind tower for comfort during the hot summer months” (Heard-Bey 2001). Thus, the early historical formation period in the uae was clearly marked by socioeconomic underdevelopment, and the dependency on foreign migrant workers—specifically migrant domestic work—­ appears to have been little or almost absent among early local families within mainstream uae society. In addition to the economically underdeveloped nature of the uae society, the local tribal system also played a pivotal role in shaping the local community for centuries, as well as strengthening the very essence and “structure of their society.” On an individual level, “tribal ‘belonging’ is far more reassuring than the comforts of ‘home’ and the sense of security, which is paramount for people whose social structures are associated with the land they live on” (Heard-Bey 2001). In this particular social system, the family unit was considered to be a fundamental social building block for sustaining all facets of life in mainstream uae society, ranging from the economy to the political community. The overarching family system also provided an embedded structure to maintain the tribal connections and reinforced the complex social roles that eventually shaped the formation of household structures among local families. In addition, extended family members lived either in the same household as their kin or in close proximity to each other (Sabban 2012a). In fact, local families would help each other in their daily tasks, such as caring for family and children, in times of difficulty or during significant events, including giving birth2 or falling sick. Additionally, uae households and families were more directly integrated into the local domestic economy. For example, in the pearl diving era (a vital and high risk means of living before the decline of natural 2 Family, friends, and neighbors would support the mother until she regained her strength and was able to return to normal activities. Variations of this practice are still evident among Emirati families today.

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pearls worldwide3), men would leave their families for more than three months for employment and would migrate outside of their local communities in order to make the most of the pearling season. During these absences, women were mainly in charge not only the domestic sphere but also of the subsistence economy, making clothing and food, and building houses that were made of palm leaves and/or tents made of processed animal skins or hand-woven fabrics (Al Sayegh 2001; Heard-Bey 2004). The existence of gender-specific roles coded within local uae society was not only deeply structured and embedded but also played an integral role in sustaining both the local culture and household structures. However, during this time, women carried much of the burden of domestic duties, ranging from the arts of weaving fishing nets and dyeing the palm leaves used extensively both inside and outside of the domestic arena to caring for animals, along with the more typically associated tasks, such as child rearing and food storage and preparation (Al Sayegh 2001; Heard-Bey 2004). In this social system, women, in particular, played a critical role in the overall survival of the local family because “the need to alternate between various economic activities placed great responsibilities on the women during the long periods of time that men were obliged to be away from home” and, therefore, a woman’s “contribution earned her a high status in society, and a husband’s reputation and honor rested on the conduct of his wife and daughters” (Heard-Bey 2004). These gender-specific social roles not only configured and defined the local domestic norms, practices, and values among uae households but also eventually reaffirmed the critical value of domestic work duties in building the local family, society, and nation. Furthermore, the gender segregation roles embedded in local households helped to reinforce the early notion and importance of domestic work activities within uae society. In fact, although hired domestic help or, in some cases, slavery played a role within the local culture, it was often the exclusive reserve of affluent merchant families; therefore, domestic work had little or no impact at all on local households. To an extent, the concept of domestic help from non-family members was not a ubiquitous feature of daily life; yet it has recently been observed across every social class, nationality, and family structure across the country. As the country has moved from an aggregate of loosely connected Emirate states to the unified uae state, this particular concept has

3 Cultured pearls emerged during the 1930s and effectively destroyed the pearling industry that had sustained the local populace and much of the economy for centuries, leaving behind a vacuum that would not be filled until the discovery of oil; this development left the already tenuous subsistence living in disarray.

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eventually transformed the collective understanding that has long lived with the uae national women.4 3

The Early Years: The Causes of Domestic Transformation

With the discovery of oil, the uae began to reform its territorial emirate borders and transform into the vibrant cosmopolitan federation that now exists. With the rapid modernization process, combined with the massive influx of economic wealth and investments in the country’s infrastructure, the uae economy and society quickly transformed. This transformation process initially began with the sudden population growth, as new employment opportunities and the ensuing manpower shortage for building the required modern infrastructure helped to create a demand for all types of foreign workers, including domestic workers. More specifically, this particular era shifted the uae from a subsistence-based economy to one that relied almost exclusively on oil production to thrive, both at the regional and global levels. The following paragraphs highlight how oil wealth helped restructure and transform the nature of uae society: 3.1 Economically With the advent of oil, the Emirates began to “break regional—even ­international—records in urban development and fast economic growth” (Sabban 2012a). As the uae embraced the tangible benefits of globalization, the uae’s economic rankings also increased, to attain one of the highest per capita gross domestic products in the world and the second highest ranking in the region after Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Economy 2016). From an economic 4 During of the author’s fieldwork in the summer of 1993, she interviewed 34 Emirati women who employed domestic workers. Of these, 33 highly praised the value of domestic work because the institution provided an element of social value and afforded the women the opportunity to engage in society. Interestingly, none of the informants—even two decades after the establishment of the federation—felt there was a contradiction between defining their roles in the domestic sphere as the core of their social status and then transferring said related domestic tasks to other, non-Emirati women. This response provides a curious contrast to the long-standing conceptualization and feminist critique of domestic work as a devalued commodity in the market system on which the modern economy is based. “Domestic work has long been the site of contestation since the advent of industrialization, modernization, and women’s participation in the work sphere. Domestic work engenders gender tension, class exploitation, and racial manipulation. It has historically been the terrain of domestic violence of different shapes and levels” (Sabban 2014a). For more information, see: Enloe 1990; Jayakody at al. 2008; Mitchel 1974; Oakley 1974; Scott 1986; Smith 1973.

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standpoint, the dramatic economic shift of the uae, to an extent, has led to the marginalization of Emirati families, moving them away from the national economy and their former central role in the mobilization of labor. Traditional means of employment such as “subsistence agriculture, nomadic animal husbandry, the extracting of pearls and the trade in pearls, fishing, and seafaring” (Shihab 2001) became obsolete or were transferred to imported foreign migrant workers, as the economy diversified and Emiratis began to take on less manual forms of labor. In particular, local uae nationals began to take on positions that conformed to more westernized concepts of employment, with typical five-day workweeks, eight-hour workdays, and regular salaries. This ­economic transition and prosperity has eventually created a division: A two-tier labour market has emerged in the uae. At the top is the indigenous labour force, which constitutes about 10 per cent of the total work force. Below this is an unlimited supply of foreign labour. The uae has reaped benefits from foreign skilled and unskilled workers, who initiated its economic development in the early 1970s and subsequently have come to sustain it. shihab 2001

In order to increase national employment in the labor force, women were encouraged and incentivized to participate in the evolving domestic economy, as newer industries were established. The pro-nationalization policies of the uae government have not only increased female labor force participation but also integrated them into the modernized workforce in ever increasing capacities, thereby creating a further need for change in the organization of the domestic sphere. In other words, the uae government’s economic strategy not only enabled local uae populations to obtain formalized employment status but also increased women’s labor market participation, which, to a large extent, drove the labor demand for the domestic work sector to address the growing ­domestic care deficit within local households. 3.2 Socially Although women were still the main responsible figures in the households and families, many factors played important roles in encouraging the importation of domestic workers from abroad, which, in the mid-1980s, became a well-­ established government immigration system. The Hareem5 system of h ­ ierarchy, 5 In this context, Hareem (literally, women) refers to the matriarchal system that functioned as the support network among Emirati women, which was, and remains, a major social

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which had provided support for the young and old within the family for generations by dividing domestic duties among all members of the household,6 was beginning to change. Despite the major changes that engulfed the society, uae women continued to perform the main domestic responsibilities, although domestic workers started becoming more visible in some families as they began to accumulate more wealth and participate in the labor market. In particular, the prevailing structure of the extended family played a role in both necessitating and sustaining the move into larger, more modernized homes in organized neighborhoods. However, even as local families started moving out of the existing extended family structure, they continued to support and rely on one another—particularly in times of need or during special occasions—in order to maintain the local culture, customs, and traditional practices within local uae society. As new wealth had brought on more responsibilities, families eventually adapted to a more modernized life style by slowly integrating domestic work services to effectively create more efficient household systems (Sabban 2012a; 2014). As daily life in the Emirates became more modern, urbanized, and globalized, the internal structure of local families’ households started shifting toward a more nuclear form, and the move to larger modern residences ensured that the employment of domestic workers would inevitably become an imperative option to survive in the contemporary period. In addition, the (in)dependence7 period in the 1980s could be potentially viewed as the first period of actual “modernization” for the family in the uae and its subsequent metamorphosis from the strictly extended to broadly nuclear (El Haddad 2003; Crabtree 2007; Sabban 2012a). Although the new nuclear families still held strong cultural connections with their extended families by living in close proximity and providing them with multiple forms of domestic help and support, the actual physical and domestic work support lessened or, in some cases, even disappeared in most local households (El Haddad 2003; Sabban 2012a, 2012b). In fact, migrant domestic workers started playing their new household roles and eased the transition of daily life into that of modernity and material wellbeing for entire local families. For newlywed couples or the nuclear family, this new social order provided them with a greater amount o­ rganizational force. This should not be confused with the Harem, that is, the wives and concubines of rulers in the imagined and lived Arab and Islamic world. 6 The senior matriarch was responsible for the kitchen and other major household decisions; the younger members were provided with lesser tasks to achieve the smooth running of the household. 7 It is independence for the newly rising nuclear family from the previous structure of the extended family, whereas it is a new form of dependence on domestic workers, which will mark a major transformation in the society.

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of independence and autonomy from the large extended family than had been previously possible, while allowing them to accumulate ample time and space to participate in the labor market, attend social gatherings, initiate entrepreneurial activities, and other related leisure activities. This independence from the local and traditional structure turned out to be a new form of dependence on foreign domestics. The adoption of migrant domestic help enabled families to remain connected with their social relations (that is, extended family, friends, etc.), because they had more time to visit, exchange food, and enjoy quality time with their extended family; they could easily employ domestic workers to do the household work that would have traditionally consumed much of a woman’s day (Sabban 2014a, 2014b). Because of the growing dependence on and importance of domestic workers in local uae households, women were inevitably criticized, particularly in both the English and Arabic media,8 as the shift to heavy dependence on domestic service became more publicly widespread. These criticisms of women relying on domestic staff to seemingly carry all previous domestic responsibilities and child care9 arose in both public and private discourse because many perceived such dependency as a form of cultural abandonment of the traditional and cultural women’s roles in local uae society (Khalaf 1987; Khalifa 1986). In other words, the growing dependence on migrant domestic workers was not only viewed as a direct threat—either actual or perceived—to the established cultural domestic norms but also as a negative factor in sustaining women’s cultural identity as domestic carriers and protectors (as mothers) of the local culture and nation. 3.3 Politically The influx of economic investment has also enabled the state’s “revenues to finance huge programs for governmental spending, maintain a huge number of governmental employees, and support the prices of energy, water and other services for their citizens” (Ministry of Economy 2016), while simultaneously providing “the government with the opportunity to undertake ambitious economic development programs” (Faris 1994). The transformative economic shift 8 In a previous study with Moors et al., I have analyzed the differences in the discourses and media portrayals of the heavy reliance on domestic workers. Curiously, in the English media, the issue often focused on domestic workers’ rights (or lack thereof) and their positions as victims, whereas the Arabic media focused on the negative impact of domestics on the family unit (Moors et al. 2009: 167). Women were singled out in such reports, both directly and indirectly, and burdened with the portrayal of being lacking and inadequate in their household roles and responsibilities. 9 One of the other main concerns was the impact of domestic workers on the language of children and other types of cultural erosion that might arise from leaving children in the care of nannies (uae mowsa 1990).

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has also empowered the state to increase its political capacity and reaffirm its domestic sovereign power to govern the local populations. Although such measures were established to improve the quality of living for all inhabitants, nationals were generously provided with certain exclusive benefits (Abu Baker 1995). For example, education in public schools was free for nationals and certain non-national government employees. Public schools initially provided free food, clothing, books, and even allowances for children to encourage all parents to send their children to school. Nationals were awarded fellowships to study abroad to further improve the country’s human capital supply, in line with the strategy to establish a knowledge-based economy. Non-Arabic speaking expatriates were given land and allowances to establish their own schools and other community facilities (Davidson 2005). Health care was also guaranteed for all, as the “the uae government’s health policies aim at providing a range of facilities and at implementing programmes aimed at advancing the level of service and health education throughout the uae” (Shihab 2001). Another major consequence of the state’s policies also provided Emiratis with land and building allowances—in the form of interest-free mortgages or loans—to construct their homes, especially among the newly educated populations.10 The state’s generous support encouraged the small society to grow and provided young small nuclear families, especially the newlyweds, with more power and autonomy than the earlier, much stricter patriarchal extended family (Sabban 2012a). Therefore, the uae state’s accumulation of wealth did not only subtly play a role in transforming local families’ collective wealth but also consequently helped to accelerate the reconfiguration of local households’ structure, lifestyle practices, and cultural dependence on migrant domestic work in the contemporary period. 3.4 Demographically The greatest change of all for the newly formed uae occurred as the population dramatically increased in size and changed in composition as a result of the major structural transformations that followed the economic boom and 10

Most houses that are built are villas that vary in style and size according to the individual family’s financial capacities; they often feature a garden surrounding the villa with high walls and greenery for privacy. Of course, not all nationals are able to own villas due to their circumstances. Lower income families live in smaller houses with a small yard, in neighborhoods where houses were built by the government and provided to underprivileged nationals, among them widowed or divorced mothers unsupported by their husbands (Sabban 2012a). Non-nationals often reside in designated neighborhoods and/or working compounds that are owned by the companies that employ them. Construction workers and lower income workers also live in their own clusters known as “labor camps” (Khalaf 2006; Gardner 2011).

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rapid urbanization in the country. Prior to the uae’s formation, the whole population did not—as was established earlier (see Table 4.1)—exceed more than a hundred thousand people. These numbers began to grow suddenly in 1973 with the advent of oil and the establishment of the state, almost doubling to one hundred and eighty thousand (El Mallakh 1981). Furthermore, the population of the Emirates11 during those early years still consisted mainly of inhabitants local to the region, who formed some 63 percent of the populace whereas expatriates formed the remaining 37 percent (Sabban 2012a). This demographic trend reversed completely within the following decade; between 1958 and 2000, the total population in the uae quickly increased from 86,000 to 2,623,000, whereby expatriate populations accounted for 71% of the total uae population. The local population, however, only represented 29% and has ever since been largely outnumbered by the expatriate population, even in the contemporary period. An independent think-tank organization, the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (glmm) Population Program estimated that, in 2016, the expatriate population largely dominated the overall uae population, representing 91% of the total population, whereas the local population has increasingly become a minority. Given the decreasing fertility rate in the uae, the share of the local population against the total uae population is projected to decrease in the long run. This new demographic trend certainly created an exponential market demand for domestic workers, and importing/recruiting agencies bloomed as newspapers carried advertisements daily. The employment of domestic workers as cooks, maids, and drivers was easy, cheap, and accessible (Sabban 2012a, 2012b). The cyclical nature of this upsurge ensured that the population would continue to increase and the need for domestic workers would remain firmly in place. As a result, almost all families—both national and non-national—employed domestic help in some capacity, depending on their level of income, ease, and accessibility (Sabban 2012a, 2012b). Initially, given the historical ties and the long-term relationship between India and the coastal region of the Gulf and the uae, most migrant domestic workers employed in the Emirates were from the South Asian region. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, male Indian domestic workers were the most ubiquitous domestic help in many local uae households (Moors et al. 2009). However, while some families would continue to employ male domestic workers from India, the market started changing very quickly, and soon ­domestic workers arrived from Indonesia,12 Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. These three nationalities were treated with some hierarchy that dictated the 11 12

Based on estimates from the 1960s. Those from Indonesia were particularly encouraged because of the country’s Muslim status (see Silvey 2006, 2007).

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roles13 that they would occupy and the salaries that were expected (Ghubash 1986; Khalifa 1986; Khalaf et al. 1987; Sabban 2012b). Domestic service—which is currently considered a common and essential feature of daily life—also encouraged the state to begin to ease the relevant domestic market regulations and, thereby, facilitate the importation of domestic workers, in order to ease the living of all inhabitants, particularly national families (Kapiszewski 1999; Shah 2009). The rate of dependency on domestic workers among nationals in particular reached 2.2 domestic workers per family by the mid-1990s (uae mowsa 1990; Sabban 2012a, 2012b), and recently 3.5 (2014) or maybe more now. Thus, the growing dependence on migrant domestic work was not only a product of a state-led policy initiative but was also influenced by global social, economic, and political factors that triggered the influx of migrant domestic workers and their integration into local uae households. 4

The United Arab Emirates Today

In the contemporary uae period, the accumulation and distribution of oil wealth has certainly played a critical role for positioning the uae at the center of the world economy in terms of modernity and wealth (Sabban 2013; Hannieh 2011). It has also particularly functioned as a powerful force responsible for the shaping of the modern uae family and society that exists today and, most importantly, the ensuing demand for migrant domestic work. The aspiration and determination of the country and its inhabitants to embrace global modernity in this era of globalization thus cannot be underestimated. Dubai, in particular, is the most obvious embodiment of such ambitions because the city has embraced the task of molding itself into a global brand14 and initiating world-record megastructure projects, such as Palm Island. The global branding strategy of Dubai has ricocheted through the country and the wider region (Abdulla 2006; Krane 2009; Barret 2010) and has further shaped the uae family and society, in a way, by embodying domestic service as part of a modernized

13

14

For example, household cooks—an institution in their own right in many large households—were often Indian, or in some cases Iranian, because of the expectations of their kitchen knowledge and local palates, whereas domestic workers from the Philippines were employed as household servants and nannies. Interestingly, domestic workers from the Philippines were also a sign of status for uae families and women (Sabban, 2012b) because they were considered to be more modern and, therefore, more capable of helping the family in its shift to modernity. With projects like the tallest hotel (The Burj Khalifa) and the biggest mall in the region (The Dubai Mall).

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attempt to symbolize and signal wealth and adaptation in a global context (Sabban 2012b, 2014a). Although there are no official government data published on domestic worker populations in the uae, recent estimates suggest that the current number of domestic workers has risen to approximately 800,000 (excluding those unregistered “illegal” or “unaccounted for” workers who remain in the country).15 The heavy reliance on domestic workers is now de-rigueur among most local uae families and, in the case of the many women, who opt to work and establish a presence in the public sphere, migrant domestic work is deemed to be a necessary tool to create a smooth, well-functioning family unit. Basically, local households in the uae cannot function without support staff. The number of domestics per family has risen considerably to 3.5 per family, and domestic work has become much more professionalized with clearer roles for cleaning, cooking, child-care, elderly-care, driving, and gardening, among other duties (Sabban 2014a, 2014b). In a recent survey of 400 local families in the uae, I found that 95% of families acknowledged their inability to survive without any form of migrant domestic help within their households (Sabban 2014a). Of course, not all Emirati families have migrant domestic workers, either through choice or by limitation of means. Less than 2 percent of families are still striving to survive without domestic workers; however, these families are the exception to the general rule and are largely difficult to access for research purposes (Sabban 2014a). Additionally, not all migrant domestic workers in the uae are employed by Emirati families; in fact, statistically speaking, a larger proportion of domestic workers are to be found in non-national households (Sabban 2012b). Many of the diverse expatriate families that now reside in the uae hire domestic workers from their own community.16 5

The Cost of Change: Consequences for Emirati Society

In mainstream Emirati society, the local populations have found themselves in a paradoxical situation where, on the one hand, “…the basic structure of their tribal society has remained intact, even though for some families their changed 15 16

Multiple amnesties have been issued by the uae government in attempts to resolve such issues over the decades, and no publicly available government data estimates are available (Fargues et al. 2015). The Indian community of the middle and upper middle class will hire Indian domestics, and the Filipino population will hire domestics from the Philippines. In the case of European expats, families will hire from a diverse range of backgrounds, whereas expatriate Arabs (Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, etc.) hire from all other available nationalities in the market, such as Filipino, Indonesian, Ethiopian, Bangladeshi, etc.

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economic circumstances have dramatically revolutionized many aspects of their lives. For others, access to modern housing, education and healthcare have made a great difference, but the basic pattern of their lives has not yet changed” (Heard-Bey 2001). On the other hand, the combination of the transformation of the economy, the many functional developments that society has witnessed, the demographic imbalance due to migration, and government policies have facilitated transformations that have contributed to the change and reconfiguration of domestic life in the uae. The conflicting position that was brought forth by modernity and globalization has, ultimately, also resulted in a number of costs and consequences that have inevitably placed the traditional Emirati family in the uae in the midst of a number of serious dilemmas in several respects: – Increased Domestic Work Dependence: Perhaps the most obvious and often decried outcome of the rise in migrant domestic service has been the greater dependence on domestic workers in contemporary uae households. Emirati women, given the central role they are often deemed to play in the transference of tradition and identity to future generations, are subject to much of the burden of domestic responsibility for the real and perceived impact of domestic service. Young Emirati women are today reaping the fruits of increased government attention and appointments in positions as ministers and ambassadors17 and in senior government posts. The more achievement women gain in public life, the higher their dependency on domestic help is in private. An entire generation of Emiratis has, in fact, been raised without the domestic skills that were once transferred through practice and observation of daily activities. The extended family structure that once allowed for domestic work to be shared amongst family members no longer directly serves as the main source of support or cultural/traditional

17

Certain behavior, such as travelling alone or working in mixed environments, was formerly considered unseemly for respectable Emirati women. In this area, there has also been a change in attitude among the wider local populace, particularly in recent years as the success of uae women, particularly the younger generations, has become a huge source of pride for many families. The change has, however, been much more gradual as a friend of the author’s who works in the diplomatic corps explained. The woman stated that, in choosing a career in public service that would require extensive travel and relocation, she took steps that were met with disapproval by her family, particularly her father. However, with perseverance, success, and the support of government initiatives for women to play a greater role in the public sphere, the woman observed that her father, who had initially rejected her first appointment in the diplomatic field, was now her biggest supporter and openly expressed his fatherly pride in seeing his daughter achieving such success. Needless to say, professional women today, married or single, have domestic workers who support them at home in order to continue in their public roles.

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knowledge transfer in the specific area of household chores and duties among uae households. – Culture Clash and National Identity: Emiratis are now grappling with the tension that constantly arises between tradition, heritage, and globalization. Everything from the native Arabic language to local food and traditional dress, such as the abaya (a long thin black gown to cover the inner clothes) and sheila (a thin black head scarf) for women or the kandora (a long white dress) and ghatra (a white head cover with a black circle to keep it from moving) for men, is being observed much more loosely by the younger ­generations and is being negotiated as the society adapts and reinterprets ­global influences. Tension over national identity and personal behavior is creating significant generation gaps (Khalaf 2005) as Emirati families adapt to changes. The serious issue of identity is becoming more apparent in ­society as a result (Sabban 2013, 2014a). In particular, an increasing concern among Emirati and other Gulf-based families centers on the influence of migrant domestic workers on local children’s values, identity, and behaviors (Roumani 2005). – Substantial Demographic Imbalance:18 The uae annually attracts millions of visitors and foreign workers, who substantially reinforce the demographic imbalance dilemma in the country. The inhabitants have recently reached an astonishing 10 million individuals according to Amin Al Amiri, Assistant Undersecretary, Public Health Policy and License Sector, Ministry of Health (see Cornwell 2015), a startling population boom in so short a period. ­However, the massive influx of foreign migrant workers has created a dramatic demographic imbalance that has turned Emiratis into a minority. This has caused alarm among some members of the community, who fear that society and tradition is being irreparably lost through the increase in globalization. These signs are worrying to those nationals who are open in spirit to the world but who are, through circumstance, surrounded by non-nationals in every capacity (Abdulla 2006; Sabban 2013; Malit et al. 2018) and who now 18

In the mid-1990s, the government began taking measures to regulate expat workers because the numbers were rising rapidly. One new regulation that affected domestic workers was to exclude the low-skilled earners from bringing any of their family members along (Sabban 2012b). This law also meant that, even in cases where the employer might allow them to do so, domestic workers were legally prohibited from forming their families in the country, which thus created a “conditionality” based form of integration within mainstream uae society (Malit et al. 2018). The introduction of a new government quota on the import of domestic workers by both nationals and non-nationals, along with a mandatory security deposit that was required for each domestic worker employed and that would be returned on termination, was also implemented in an attempt to steady the demographic imbalance (Sabban 2012b).

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have to face the sociocultural impacts that such exchanges have played on the development of the social fabric in mainstream uae society. – Human Rights: Domestic work in the uae has been subject to a fair amount of scrutiny from a human rights standpoint as issues related to labor abuse, exploitation, and neglect have increasingly become more apparent in an economy where foreign migrant labor is the very means by which the transformation of uae cities (mostly Dubai and Abu Dhabi) into global forces has been possible. As such, domestic work regulations have increased in the uae to protect both the family and domestic workers from unethical and illegal practices committed by agencies. As a result, local families have also felt under pressure to address these issues too, and they are constantly being subjected to criticism by international labor and rights groups, both in social media and in public life. Laws and regulations are continually evolving to ensure that labor and human rights violations and exploitations are eradicated; however, the process is one that requires a considerable amount of organization and regulation, which puts the country under increased pressure in terms of the protection of labor rights and treatment of domestic workers (Fernandez and De Regt 2014, see also Ishii, Chapter 6). Recently, for example, the uae Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (uae mohre) passed a new domestic law that guarantees labor rights (that is, living conditions, working conditions, salary, etc.) and increases workers’ access to dispute resolution mechanisms in an attempt to bolster their access to legal justice in the uae. The uae mohre’s Domestic Work Department has also created at least 30 Tadbeer offices—a centralized recruitment, placement, and domestic work training agency—across the country in order to systematically regulate the recruitment of migrant domestic work both here and abroad. Therefore, the labor and human rights issues embedded in the context of migrant domestic work narratives have not only triggered and impacted on the “branding consciousness” of the uae but have also constructively influenced local families to rethink the complex issues of labor and human rights, as well as their domestic legal responsibilities and rights to protect their image and avoid major repercussions for the country’s global standing. 6 Conclusion The uae has certainly achieved unparalleled socioeconomic growth and development in recent decades, while simultaneously continuing to exhibit strong determination to set its sights firmly on the future, as codified under the uae 2030 vision plan. In the age of mass globalization, however, as the uae

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continues to engage with modernity and globalizing forces, local uae families and society are dramatically evolving, posing more complex and critical threats to their local culture, national identity, and security. One critical consequence of globalization on the uae family is the inevitable and, to a large extent, longterm dependence on migrant domestic work. Although the fertility rate is ­declining in the uae, the heavy dependency on migrant domestic workers continues to grow. Although some families view domestic work as an inevitable tool to embrace modernity and globalization and as a signaling factor to convey wealth and social status, other uae families view it as an imperative domestic support that is needed to create an efficient local household structure. As local uae families’ dependency on migrant domestic work increases, the consequences and costs on local uae families and society also deepen in the long run. Many of these sociocultural challenges are rooted in the rapid social transformation after the discovery of oil, which has created a unique environment where the presence of domestic help is one of the most contentious and apparent outcomes of this dramatic economic transformation. More importantly, it is noteworthy that migrant domestic service has deeply impacted on the fundamental nature, structure, and culture of the Emirati family, which is deemed to be the very core of this exceptionally private and traditional culture. The evolution of the family unit in the Emirates as a result of the reliance on domestic help has also resulted in a unique set of complex labor and human rights issues and challenges that are a constant part of the discourse in the public and private spheres in the mainstream uae community. The causes and consequences of these challenges, and the concerns themselves, are not only complex and unpredictable, but as the current situation stands, it is not clear if there is a “one size fits all” solution to the sociocultural conflicts that subtly impact on the local household cultures, structures, and practices. The speed of the complex social, economic, and cultural change and the constant imposition of migration as a development strategy reflects not only the uniqueness of the uae families’ dilemma but also the achievements of the uae’s brilliant ability to move from living in the shadow of history to becoming a young, successful nation-state globally. The cost, however, of such economic transformation on local uae families’ structure, culture, and traditions has many ­complex and multiple repercussions that may come with an “invisible” tomorrow in the long run. Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Ms. Maimoona Al Behandy for her help in the final research and editing of this chapter, and also thank Mr. Froilan Malit, for

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the extra editing and thorough suggestions for material and relevant resources. Their help has made a great addition to the final form of this chapter. Bibliography Abdulla, Abdul Khaleq. 1984. Political Dependency: The Case of the United Arab Emirates. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Georgetown University. Abdulla, Abdul Khaleq. 2006. “Dubai: An Arab City Going Global.” Journal of Social ­Affairs 23 (92): 53–85. Abu Baker, Albadr. 1995. Political Economy of State Formation: The United Arab Emirates in Comparative Perspective. Unpublished PhD. Dissertation. University of Michigan. Al-Fahim, Mohammed. 2006. From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi. London: The London Center of Arab Studies. Al Faris, Mohammed Faris. 2000. Al Awdaa Al Iqtisadiya Fi Imarate al Sahil Al Emarate Al Yom 1862–1965 UAE. Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Abu Dhabi, uae. In Arabic. Al Sayegh, Fatima. 2001. “Women and Economic Changes in the Arab Gulf: The Case of the United Arab Emirates.” Digest of Middle East Studies 10 (2): 17–39. Al Sharekh, Alanoud. 2007. The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernity. London: Saqi Books. Al-Tarrah Ali. 2007. “Family in the Kinship State.” In The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernities, edited by Al Sharekh, 119–124. London: Saqi Books. Barret, Raymond. 2010. Dubai Dreams: Inside the Kingdom of Bling. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. Cornwell, Alexander. 2015. “UAE Population Edging Closer to 10 Million.” Gulf News, 1 October 2015. Accessed 31 October 2015. http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/ uae-population-edging-closer-to-10m1.1579486. Crabtree, Sara Ashencaen. 2007. “Culture, Gender and the Influence of Social Change amongst Emirati Families in the United Arab Emirates.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 38 (4): 575–592. Davidson, Christopher. 2005. The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. El Haddad, Yahya. 2003. “Major Trends Affecting Families in the Gulf Countries.” Paper presented at the Conference of the College of Arts and Science, Bahrain University. 17 May 2003. Manama, Bahrain. El Mallakh, Ragaei. 1981. The Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates. London: Croom Helm. Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. London: Pandora Press.

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Sabban, Rima. 2013. Al HadathaWalTataworWaTa’thirihoma Fi Al A’datWalTakalid Fi Al Mojtama’t Al Khalijya. Center for Research and Strategic Studies uae. Abu Dhabi, uae. In Arabic. Sabban, Rima. 2014a. “UAE Family Under Global Transformation.” Report Presented to the National Research Foundation as part of a fellowship grant, uae. Sabban, Rima. 2014b. “Domestic Workers Between Two Paradigms: Dependency and Self Sufficiency: An Examination of the Opposing Models of Japan and the UAE.” Journal of Kagawa University International Office 5: 59–86. Saif A. Ramahi. 1973. Economics and Political Evolution in the Arab Gulf States. New York: Carlton Press. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press. Shah, Nasra. 2009. “The Management of Irregular migration and Its Consequence for Development: Gulf Cooperation Council.” ilo Working Paper. http://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_ 105105.pdf. Shihab, Mohamed. 2001. “Economic Development in the UAE.” In United Arab Emirates: a new perspective, edited by Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer, 249–259. London: Trident Press. Silvey, Rachel. 2006. “Consuming the transnational family: Indonesian migrant domestic workers to Saudi Arabia.” Global Networks (6)1: 23–40. Silvey, Rachel. 2007. “Mobilizing Piety: Gendered Morality and Indonesia-Saudi Transnational Migration.” Journal of Mobilities (2)2: 219–229. Smith, Joan and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1992. Creating and Transforming Household: The Constraints of the World Economy. Cambridge: University Press of Cambridge. Soffan, Usra. 1980. The Women of the United Arab Emirates. London: Croom Helm. Trask, B.S. 2010. Globalization and Families: Accelerated Systemic Social Change. Springer. London, United Kingdom. uae Government Portal. “Population and demographic mix.” Accessed 14 February 2018. https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/social-affairs/preserving -the-emirati-national-identity/population-and-demographic-mix. uae Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (mowsa). 1990. Impact of Nannies on the UAE Family. Dubai, uae. In Arabic. uae Government. 2018. “UAE Vision 2030.” Accessed on 14 February 2018. https://www .government.ae/en/about-the-uae/uae-future. uae General Information Authority (gia). 1994. “Population Growth and Composition in the uae since 1900.” Accessed on 14 February 2008. http://www.gia.gov.ly/ar. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. 1978. The origins of the United Arab Emirates: a political and social history of the Trucial States. Palgrave Mcmillan: London, United Kingdom.

Chapter 5

Enhancing Resilience: The Roles of Pre-departure Programs for the Migrant Domestic Workers toward Arab Gulf States Akiko Watanabe 1 Introduction This chapter investigates the roles of pre-departure programs run in Asian labor-sending countries for migrant domestic workers bound for the Arab Gulf states, explore the probability of these programs in enhancing resilience among the workers, and analyze their potential positive and negative consequences. It particularly focuses on the Philippines, Indonesia, and four other labor-sending countries of domestic workers. For the past 30 years, the Arab Gulf states have been employing female migrant domestic workers from Asian and African countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Ethiopia, and more recently from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Madagascar (Fernandez 2014). The official number of female migrant domestic workers in the six Arab Gulf states amounts to 1.1 million; however, the figure provided by the International Trade Union Confederation (ituc) scored 2.1 million, as it added in undocumented domestic workers (Fernandez 2014, ituc 2017). Owing to the nature of domestic work in the Arab Gulf states, such as living in the employer’s house with little competency in their language, being segregated from one’s fellow countrypersons, and not being subject to the labor laws of the receiving countries,1 this large population of migrant domestic workers has been vulnerable to exploitation and poor working conditions. Although they have been sending remittances and contributing to the gross domestic products of their countries of origin, the workers have been suffering physical, psychological, sexual, material, discriminatory, and other abuses, which have led to abscondences, deaths, pregnancies, disabilities, disorders, imprisonments, unwilling repatriations before termination of their labor contracts, and others. In these circumstances, international communities have 1 For the uae, the Council of Ministers assigned the Human Resources and Emiratization Ministry to oversee the recruitment and employment of domestic workers beginning in 2017 (Human Rights Watch 2016). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_009

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been demanding the implementation of regulations and labor laws for migrant domestic workers in these countries, in accordance with the International Labor Organization (ilo) Domestic Workers Convention of 2011 (No. 189). Saudi Arabia passed Resolution 310, or the Household Regulation on Service Workers and Similar Categories, in 2013, and Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (uae) developed draft of Standard Unified Contracts for migrant domestic workers;2 yet, the protection measures taken by these migrant-­receiving governments have been time consuming. While waiting on law enforcement, the labor-sending countries have been putting different pre-departure programs into place to safeguard these workers by equipping them with information, skills, and attitudes, rather than just treating them as cash-cows. “Pre-departure program,” in this chapter, is used as a common term for skills training and awareness programs provided by governmental agencies, civil groups, and private institutions for those who are planning to work abroad as contract workers (Watanabe 2014). The pre-departure period for migrant workers varies according to studies, but could be classified into of three stages: (1) pre-migration, when the decision to migrate is thought about and taken; (2) recruitment and contract signing; and (3) pre-leaving, when preparations are made for the journey and move (Siddiqui, Rashid, and Zeitlyn 2008). This chapter focuses mainly on stages (2) and (3). As pre-departure programs for migrant domestic workers have been conducted in the different labor-sending countries, critiques have often been heard from academia and beyond. These include gaps between modules and reality (International Organization for Migration (iom) 2005), commercialization of the programs and financial exploitation of the workers within the system (Baggio and Taguinod 2004), educational façades to empower workers belonging to vulnerable sectors (Guevarra 2006), functional problems with the pre-departure programs serving as justification for the government (Guevarra 2009), and dodging of the government’s responsibility by manufacturing “wellinformed” migrant workers (Rodriguez 2010). Yet, if adequately done with a comprehensive approach, these programs may be interpreted as a way to start confronting the dominant discourses under which female migrant domestic workers are placed. This chapter will focus on the notion of resilience for vulnerable migrants. Resilience, which originally meant tolerance to stress in physics and psychology, was redefined by Bourbeau (2015: 25) as “the capacity to positively adapt to 2 Saudi Arabia passed a resolution that guarantees domestic workers nine hours of rest daily, one day off a week, and one month of paid vacation after two years (see Fernandez 2014 and Ishii, Chapter 6, for details).

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profound adversities in a way that is substantially better than expected” in migration studies. In disaster prevention studies, it means the strength and pliancy to accept and survive new conditions and recover from “calamities” (Kawakita 2016: 7), which include the deprivation of safety, a stable job, legal protection of the body, unity of family, human dignity, and one’s homeland. The degree of damage is naturally different for each individual, and often marginalized people are prone to greater damage. It is debatable whether the migration of domestic workers to other countries is a “calamity,” since international migration may be a forced or voluntary act for the betterment of individuals and their families. Still, considering the similarities in the deprivation phenomena stated above, some migration studies has utilized resilience as key term to for migrants to acquire and survive the global structures where they could not rely on familial safety nets likewise in their homelands, but become competent and strong enough to get through the individualism and neoliberalism in the transnational field (e.g.-Rashid and Gregory 2014, Bourbeau 2015, Busza et al. 2017, Seki 2018). Thus, this chapter looks into how migrants are able to build the strength and capabilities to survive the terms of their migration contracts. According to Kawakita and Nishi (2016), a compilation of articles in the area studies field responding to disasters, resilience is developed in three major dimensions: the powers and functions of communities, the possibility of international solidarity for the sake of survival, and sharing and inheriting personal experiences of recovery with society. Thus, resilience does not come out of nothing, but is gained through modifying the experiences of predecessors and renewing community customs (Furuta 2016). Moreover, Kusakabe (2016) pointed out that, by focusing on assistance for disaster victims, both structural measures (facilities) and non-structural measures (education and training) support work on enhancing resilience, but as there are no common measures in the process of improving disaster prevention capabilities, he stressed the necessity of developing a mechanism to disseminate consciousness of disaster prevention, and this should be compatible with local settings. Furuta and Kusakabe’s arguments apply to the situations of both the sending and receiving countries of migrant workers. As discussed later, migrant workers, especially female domestic workers, had been prone to different aspects of harassment, and were thus taught their rights as contract workers. With this, the resilience of these migrant may be exercised within the sociopolitical conditions of the receiving countries. Thus, whereas in Hong Kong, ­following the political traditions of the masses in the Philippines, Filipino domestic helpers exercised their strength through solidarity and collectively took action to assert their rights, and were later joined by Indonesian domestic

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workers (Constable 2011), it is not possible to do so in the Arab Gulf states, where collective political activities are banned not only for migrant workers but for nationals as well. There are some factors that affect the expression of their resilience based on the sociopolitical setting. In any migration case, female migrants may encounter many challenges and negative impacts, and it is important to focus on how they can withstand the adversity and demonstrate resilience (Rashid and Gregory 2014). Their ­relationships with spouses/family members who stay behind, financial management, and physical security are key to ensuring that they survive their ­migration. This is supported by Nagasawa (2016), who examined the plight of Palestinian refugees and emphasized the importance of strong familial ties in recovering from hardship. Reaffirmations and transformations of the relevant values and benefits need to be made (Bourbeau 2015), and pre-departure programs may provide occasions for this. Hence, this chapter investigates the backgrounds and contents of pre-­ departure programs practiced in different countries for female migrant domestic workers bound for the Arab Gulf states. In doing so, this chapter seeks to explore the probabilities of the workers’ enhancing their resilience by analyzing both potential positive and negative transformative consequences brought about by the upheaval of migration. The data and arguments used in this chapter are based mainly on qualitative and quantitative research in the Philippines, Indonesia, and the uae from 2009 to 2012. I conducted the following researches: key informant interviews with individuals working for the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (poea), the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (owwa), and recruiting agencies in August 2009; observation of the Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (pdos) and interviews with pdos-providing non-governmental organizations (ngos) in September 2010; interviews with the labor attaché at the Philippine Overseas Labor Office (polo), expats, and several runaway Filipinas in a shelter in the uae from February to March 2011; and interviews with some officers of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration and the National Authority for the Protection and Placement of Indonesian Migrant Workers, as well as participatory observation of pre-departure programs at a recruiting agency in a suburb of Jakarta, Indonesia. 2

Evolution of Pre-departure Programs and Best Practices of the iom

As early as 1980s labor-sending countries initiated implementing pre-­departure programs for prospective workers with the assistance of the ilo. The ilo

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hosted numerous projects and seminars on management of labor migration, among which was the “Asian and Pacific Project for Labor Administration (arpla) Inter-country Seminar for Training Labor Administration Officials in Overseas Employment Administration” held in the Philippines in 1986. During this seminar, officials from labor-sending countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand—together with personnel from Hong Kong, a labor-receiving country—discussed the problems in managing labor migration. They achieved a consensus on the emphasis of the pre-departure programs in managing overseas labor forces (ilo 1987). Up to present, pre-departure programs have been introduced and adapted differently in every labor-sending country, and no penalties are imposed on governments that do not provide these programs. Thus, to protect migrants and to ensure their security in their destination countries, the iom has been playing a role since its establishment in 1989.3 It has been coordinating with different governmental and civil societies to “advance the understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants” (iom n.d.). In recent years, the Migrant Training and Integration Unit, within the Division of Labour and Human Development, has been working with the government of Canada and has developed a “best practice” pre-departure program (iom n.d.) not only for refugees and migrants bound for Canada but for other labor migrants bound for countries that do not belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These “best practices” include the following: 1. Develop curricula and support activities with destination country. 2. Link pre-departure and post-arrival activities, recognize the transitional continuum. 3. Make use of cross-cultural or bi-cultural trainers. 4. Maximize training accessibility. 5. Consider the timing of pre-departure orientation. 6. Develop training that is participatory and learner-centric. 7. Address not only factual content, but skills and attitudes as well. 8. Help migrants teach each other. 9. Proceed from the known to the unknown. 10. Train in the migrants’ native languages. 11. Address psychosocial issues in pre-departure training. 3 Though this institutional body was created as early as 1951 its name has frequently changed. The predecessor of the iom was the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (icm) between 1980 and 1989.

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12. Create a risk-free, non-threatening learning environment. 13. Develop pre-departure training that is holistic and addresses the family unit. 14. Promote gender equality in migrant training. 15. Recognize the inherent strengths and resources of migrants. 16. Reaffirm the dignity and positive contributions of every migrant. With this program design and approach, the iom recognizes that it can contribute to effective and well-conceived pre-departure migrant training. It regards training as a chance to develop migrants’ self-esteem and self-governance and to reduce their levels of anxiety. Therefore, this best practice provides “the participants with opportunities to interact with the ideas and information in ways that make a difference in how they approach their migration experience,” and thereby “trainers are encouraged to draw on the extensive experience, strengths and resiliency which migrants bring with them when designing, conducting and evaluating training programs” (iom n.d.). 3

Comparison of Pre-departure Programs among Five Major Sending Countries of Migrant Domestic Workers

Although developing resilience is an important aspect of pre-departure programs, what training is actually practiced in the different countries that send female migrant domestic workers to the Arab Gulf states? Here, I have selected five major sending countries—the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, and Ethiopia—and I will briefly explore their practices. The Philippine government is making it mandatory for prospective migrant domestic workers to attend pre-departure programs as a condition of working abroad to learn about the culture and laws of their destination countries. In addition to three-week skills training at the government-run Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (tesda) or tesda-accredited agencies, they must go through the Comprehensive Pre-Departure Education Program. Introduced in 2009, this is a four-day program, during which accredited ngos and recruiting agencies for migrant domestic workers provide an eight-hour seminar on the first day and the owwa provides the Language and Culture Familiarization Program for the other three days. In this familiarization program, the first two days are spent learning vocabulary related to household chores and the last day is reserved for stress management and cultural exposure. These programs are divided according to the destination of the labor contracts; thus, country- or region-specific booklets are provided to the prospective migrant workers.

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Domestic work abroad requires spouse and family participation. Sri Lanka is also a long-time labor sending country, especially of female migrant domestic workers to the Arab Gulf states. Its pre-departure program is managed by both private recruitment agencies and the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment, which was established in 1985. In addition to 18 days of literacy skills training, they provide 13-day mandatory pre-departure orientation training for female migrant domestic workers bound for the Arab Gulf states; this became mandatory in 1996. For the first 12 days, skills education in household management, language, and general learning takes place. What is distinctive about the pre-departure program in Sri Lanka is that on the 13th day, there is a spouseand family-involved orientation intended to share the realities of female domestic work abroad and to think together about how to maintain the household and cope with family separation. The iom provided financial aid for training and module development in the making of this program (Ali 2005). In 2006, Indonesia, too, made it mandatory for female migrant domestic workers to attend pre-departure programs (called the Pre-departure Briefing of Indonesian Migrant Workers Abroad). The programs are run either by private recruitment agencies who are members of the Indonesian Labor Providers Organization (if the prospective worker is outside of Jakarta and other large cities) or by the National Authority for the Protection and Placement of Indonesian Migrant Workers, whose responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration in 2009 (Asis and Agunias 2012). The Indonesian program is mostly dedicated to skills training (two weeks to one year) in household work, such as languages, cooking, housekeeping, and using household electronic appliances. When the training ends, a 20-hour briefing is conducted. During the briefing, the situation and culture of the destination country, risks of overseas labor, language skills, and rights and duties of Indonesian migrant workers are taught (iom 2010). In India, the government has just started to provide skills training in housekeeping and awareness of work safety through the India International Skill Centres set up under the Ministry of External Affairs (mea). Yet, it was only in 2017 that the government began implementing its pre-departure orientation (pdo). The pdo manual was designed by the India Centre for Migration, the research think tank of the mea, in collaboration with the iom. The program has 12 modules covering the basic tenets of international migration, including the costs and benefits of migration, the impact of women’s international labor migration, and how prospective migrants can prepare for the journey abroad, among other subjects. Entry formalities, labor laws in the Arab Gulf states, sociocultural and religious aspects, and language are all covered. Jointly hosted with UN Women, the “Migration of Women Domestic Workers from India:

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Building Capacities for Safe Mobility” project took place in major migration pockets of the Andhra Pradesh and Telengana states in 2014. Although 120 master trainers of the pdo went through the training, the length, methods, and actual practices of the program are not known. Among the major causes of disputes between Ethiopian domestic workers and their employers in the Arab Gulf states are the lack of basic housekeeping and communications skills on the part of the former (Sisay 2015). Thus, the Ethiopian government passed a law on mandatory pre-departure training for migrant domestic workers in 2015. Under this law, all Ethiopians travelling to the Arab Gulf states will be required to take months of free vocational training by the government, mainly in housekeeping and caregiving. Still, as illicit recruitments and human trafficking are prominent, UN Women and the ilo have initiated a program called Community Conversations, in coordination with the district Labour and Social Affairs Office, aimed at preventing “irregular migration” and providing information to make the community aware of the risks. Men and women of different age groups, returnee migrant workers, families of migrant workers and prospective migrants, religious leaders, and community influencers are all engaged in the conversation (UN Women 2016). In this regard, returnee migrant domestic workers have been willing to share their challenging and even traumatic experiences so as to boost resilience among the next wave of migrants (Busza, Teferra, Omer, and Zimmerman 2017). The enhancement of pre-departure programs varies between countries, reflecting the gender relations and sociopolitical contexts of those countries. This may be caused by factors such as a vocal civil society, the government’s level of importance, the capacity of the administration, budgets, human resources, and the collective social fabric, among other reasons. If a society is male dominated, the plight of female migrant domestic workers tends to receive marginal attention from policy-makers, which has led to ongoing vulnerability to various forms of abuse and exploitation. 4

Building Resilience through the Philippines’ Pre-departure Programs

With more than three decades of practice, the nature of pre-departure programs in the Philippines has shifted from preventive to proactive. The following is a typical scene from a Language and Culture Familiarization Program, observed in 2011, aimed at migrant domestic workers bound for the Arab Gulf states. In a hall of about 250 seated prospective female domestic workers, predominantly Christians and a few Muslims wearing hijabs (scarves to cover their

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hair), a middle-aged female lecturer was strolling around the hall asking the participants what to do if a case of sexual harassment was about to take place at the house of their employer. More than 10 raised their hands, and the lecturer called on them to answer. One said, “I would say no to him. If you show him uncertainty, he will do it again.” Another responded, “I would try not to be in front of males in the house, or escape from being in such a situation. And if ordered to do something, like make coffee for him, I would not bring it directly.” A female in a hijab commented, “I would say haram to him, as it means forbidden for us Muslims. It’s better to say it in their language.” The lecturer replied, “All of you are right. You must keep focused and say no by not inflaming that person or by following their culture. Otherwise, you may be more despised and in big trouble. You may also tell your employer if you happen to encounter such an occasion. Then, the next topic is how you will manage loneliness during your contract…” This picture was in contrast to what I observed in 2012 at a pre-departure briefing by a private recruiting agency in West Java, Indonesia. The number of participants was almost half of that in the Philippines, but the atmosphere of the class was different. Whereas more vocal and active conversations took place in the Philippines, the Indonesian class was relatively quiet and it seemed that the participants were not allowed to express their opinions. Moreover, whereas the program of the former was keener to avoid human rights violations and tried to rectify injustice, participants in the latter were told to endure the same circumstances. How did these differences develop? As stated earlier, the Philippine government is making it compulsory to attend the pdos as a condition of working abroad to learn about the culture and laws of the destination countries. Originally, the pdos started through initiatives of church-based organizations and groups of former overseas workers to disseminate information on the legal and social conditions in the Arab Gulf states. It was taken over by the poea, established in 1982 (Scalabrini Migraton Center 1992). During the next decade, there was a growing demand for domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states, and an increase in the number of cases of human rights violations and abuses was seen. This required more scrupulous care to be taken with domestic workers, and, thereafter, pdos for migrant domestic workers were handled by ngos and recruiting agencies (henceforth, “pdos providers”) accredited by the government office. Following two major incidents with domestic workers Flor Contemplacion in Singapore and Sarah Balabagan in the uae that spurred nationwide debates in the early to mid-1990s (May 1997, Guevarra 2006 and Ishii, Chapter 6), legislation was revised at various times, turning into today’s Comprehensive Pre-departure Education Program. The program enables to acquire three prerequisite certificates: the Certificate of Competency issued

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by the tesda, the Certificate of pdos Attendance issued by the pdos providers, and the Certificate of Attendance at the Culture Familiarization and Language Training for Household Service Workers.4 Thus, the features of the pre-departure program have changed not only preventatively but also extensively and proactively. As of December 2017, 45 organizations were accredited by the owwa to provide pdos (owwa 2017). These pdos providers stress that their primary goal was for applicants to complete their two-year contract and return home safely. Therefore, the key issues for them are teaching workers how to minimize possible friction while working abroad and how to protect themselves. Consequently, different additional programs are run by each pdos provider. Some show videos with narratives about how domestic migrant workers were abused physically and sexually, and others show videos about how to defend oneself in case of a sexual attack by using aikido-like martial arts. Some include group improvisation to share participants’ reasons for working abroad with family members (the topic of the observed program was “how to teach your children the value of money and not make them spoiled”), lest they consider doing the same. Aside from these psychosocial approaches, the programs also cover financial literacy. With the i­ nvolvement of a former state-owned bank, a remittance bank, and a telecommunications company, participants are advised to open their own bank accounts. They are told not to send all of their earnings home: instead, more “wise” ways of using the money are promoted, such as savings and investment. In the program I observed, this was fortified by a former migrant worker sharing her traumatic experience of having been betrayed by her countryperson, whom she had relied on to bring her cash back home to save costly remittance fee. In the pdos, the lecturers also ensure that workers do not easily abscond and become tago-na-tago (meaning to keep oneself hidden), because this would not only tarnish the reputation of the recruiting agency and the Philippine government, but would also put the worker at risk. Some workers have previously been mentally unprepared for working abroad and have subsequently run away from their employers and returned home before the end of their contracts simply because they missed their family. Others found better working conditions (for example, a higher salary or more generous employer) and left without any regard for their current employer, so they ended up being “wanted” by local law enforcement. To avoid such occurrences, risk management has been introduced, whereby some time is allocated for pdos participants to learn of the “pains and gains” they might experience overseas. It would 4 The Philippine government uses the term “household service workers” to refer to domestic workers.

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be particularly troublesome for the pdos providers and recruiting agencies if domestic workers backed out at the last minute, returned home early, or worse, ran away while working abroad. Thus, various programs have been provided to ensure that workers spend two trouble-free years in their employers’ homes. One of the aforementioned pdos providers ran skills training sessions for Muslim women from the Southern Philippines in addition to the pdos program, because most of them had far different lifestyles to those in the Arab Gulf states, with smaller houses, fewer (if any) electronic appliances, and a different frame of mind. The pdos providers taught these Muslim women basic housework before they underwent the tesda training, to reduce the gap between the employers’ expectations and what their domestic workers could actually do. Thereby, they tried to reduce instances of employers beating workers that do not meet their expectations, withholding salaries, and replacing workers within the three-month trial period. Added to this, participants in the Culture Familiarization and Language Training for the Arab Gulf states learned language skills (Arabic script; numerals; vocabulary; sentence construction; personal/interrogative pronouns; greetings; expressions of thanks and apology; expressions of time/day/week/ month/year; terms for parts of the house, home appliances, kitchen utensils, household chores, foods [vegetables, meat, fruits, fish] and condiments, cooking and cleaning items, beverages and drinks, measurements and colors, parts of the body, family members and relatives, and common illnesses; caring for the sick and children; and phone conversations, as well as how to make emergency calls) and cultural information (geography, Islam in the Middle East, Arab cuisine, culture/values/traditions, holidays and ways of celebration, general culture inside the home, dress codes, standards of social behavior, respect for the elderly, and dining manners). Classes were taught by well-trained lecturers with college degrees who had experiences of working in the Arab Gulf states, mainly by using practical active-learning methods. On the last day, the aforementioned class on stress management (including discussions such as how to maintain trust with spouses who stay behind in the Philippines and workshops in which participants declare what their goal will be on returning home) were carried out. In this pre-departure program package for migrant domestic workers, as Busza, Teferra, Omer, and Zimmerman (2017: 8) depicted, there were four domains of “lessons learned” by the participants: (1) knowledge, (2) skills, (3) interpersonal characteristics, and (4) access to resources. For knowledge, the prospective domestic workers learned the dos and don’ts, their rights and obligations as migrant laborers (such as not just absconding as an easy way out but rather finding an adequate way to solve problems), and their rights, such as

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they should hold their own passports and mobile phones to ensure their safety during the contract. For skills, they learned things such as how to operate electronic appliances and do appropriate household chores, how to prevent sexual harassment, and in so doing, the ability to communicate with their employer to assert their will. With regard to their family members back home, they learned how to deal with loneliness, how to manage their earnings with a longterm view, and how to be patient sometimes. For interpersonal characteristics, they learned that preparedness, a firm intention to work, and keeping their self-confidence are crucial to working abroad as domestic workers (as the lecturer frequently repeated, “you must be focused”). For access to resources, they learned where to call or who to approach in cases of emergency and that, to do so, they would have to keep their mobile phone and passport in their own hands. As a whole, these topics aimed to ensure migrant domestic workers’ safety and well-being, maintain their self-esteem as laborers and human beings, and develop resilience among female domestic migrant workers. 5 Conclusion The aims of this chapter were to investigate the roles of pre-departure programs in the Philippines, Indonesia, and four other labor sending countries of migrant domestic workers to the Arab Gulf states, to explore the probability of their enhancing resilience among the workers, and to analyze both potential positive and negative transformative consequences especially in the Philippines. The basic struggles and challenges that one may face, especially if one wants to work as a vulnerable domestic worker abroad, must be considered as a part of labor migration. In order to be equipped to deal with this adversity, various prerequisites have been institutionally established for the “protection” and “safety” of workers. Above all, pre-departure programs, which have been developed over time, have become almost the norm in labor-sending countries, with the help of international organizations. Reflecting the gender relations and sociopolitical contexts of the countries, the balance of four dimensions (knowledge, skills, interpersonal characteristics, and access to resources) differ in accordance with the nature of civil society, government’s level of importance, capacity of the administration, budgets, human resources, and social context. Thus, the resilience instilled through these programs differs in each country that sends domestic workers overseas. However, we should not overlook the other perspectives on resilience. The operation of pre-departure programs to develop resilience is not always

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evaluated as a righteous thing. As Nishi (2016) points out, what seemed to be the best prescription for overcoming deprivation in the short run may do harm in the long run. This is obvious from the fact that it is not always good to “be submissive to employers” or “sacrifice for the sake of family.” Having excessive competence at surviving abroad may also result in a longer period of working abroad away from one’s family. Moreover, providing the structural and nonstructural measures for domestic workers may lead to governments passing on their responsibility to protect migrant workers and becoming like labor brokers, which Guevarra (2009) and Rodriguez (2010) criticized. Indeed, migrant domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states are still prone to human rights violations by employers and their families and to contract defaults by local recruiting agencies. A labor attaché of polo–owwa in Abu Dhabi whom we interviewed expressed that there were also problems arose from unequal power relationship as practiced by the employers, and he stressed the need to provide seminars for employers before they hire domestic workers. He also said, “If you are forced to work all day and night for seven days, or are not allowed to leave the house once in two years, you would be worn out both physically and mentally. Thus, we should, as representatives of our government and people here, ensure our contract workers are treated properly.” Meanwhile, the assistant labor attaché argued that local recruiting agencies should have more power to conduct post-arrival orientation seminars and regularly check whether the working conditions for domestic workers are satisfactory and that polo–owwa should not permit new employment contracts to be signed until these agencies have resolved contract violations and complaints from the workers. However, if polo–owwa’s stance is excessive, the local recruiting agencies could stop hiring Filipino workers and recruit labor from more permissive countries. Even though domestic workers are provided with pre-departure programs, this alone cannot develop resilience among them. Proper protection of workers by the authorities of their home countries and the implementation of regulations and labor laws for migrant domestic workers in the receiving countries (in accordance with ilo convention 189) are crucial for these migrants to have decent lives and working conditions during their contracts. In this sense, there is still room to change the unequal power relations between nations. Pre-departure programs equip domestic workers with various means to overcome difficulties or handle problems with employers and their families, recruiting agencies in both the labor-sending and receiving countries, and their own families. With the help of returnee migrants, practical advice or tips gained from their own real-life experiences are provided. Thereby, a certain

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level of resilience is developed through pre-departure programs, as harassment is more serious for those who entered the country on a visit visa without attending a pre-departure program and those who have run away, as revealed by the abovementioned labor attaché. But then, some participants make light of these programs, regarding them as a necessity but not taking note of the contents, thinking that the problems will never happen to them. In fact, comments such as “not really worthwhile” and “boring” are often heard from the participants. For them, resilience is something not to be forcibly taught in a classroom, but rather to be learned from experience and made good use of through their own skills. Bibliography Ali, Masud. A.K. 2005. “Pre-Departure Orientation Programme: Study of Good Practices in Asia, a Comparative Study of Bangladesh, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.” Accessed 21 December 2017. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources /Pre-DepartureOrientation Study-Bd.pdf. Asis, Maruja M.B. and Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias. 2012 “Strengthening Pre-Departure Orientation Programmes in Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines. Issues in Brief, 5.” International Organization for Migration. Accessed 15 December 2017. https://www .migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PredepartureOrientation.pdf. Baggio, Fabio and Michelle Taguinod. 2004. “Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars: A Positive Joint Venture between GOs and NGOs in the Philippines.” Workshop H50. Fostering cooperation among ngos, academe and governments. Regional ­experiences. Accessed 15 December 2017. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN TECA/Resources/PDOSpaper.pdf. Bourbeau, Philippe. 2015. “Migration, Resilience, and Security: Responses to New Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Migrants.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(12): 1958–1977. Accessed 21 December 2017. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/ bitstream/handle/1810/251248/Bourbeau%202015%20Journal%20of%20Ethnic% 20and%20Migration%20Studies.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Busza, Joanna, Sehin Teferra, Serawit Omer, and Cathy Zimmerman. 2017. “Learning from returnee Ethiopian migrant domestic workers: a qualitative assessment to reduce the risk of human trafficking.” Global Health 13: 71. Accessed 21 December 2017. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5594517/. Constable, Nicole. 2011. “Telling tales of migrant workers in Hong Kong: Transformations of faith, life scripts, and activism.” Diasporic journeys, ritual, and normativity among Asian migrant women, edited by Pnina Werbner and Mark Johnson. 107–125. Oxford: Routledge.

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Kawakita, Atsuko. 2016. “Hajimeni [Introduction].” In Rekishi to shiteno Resilience [Resilience as History], edited by Atsuko Kawakita and Yoshimi Nishi, 1–13. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. In Japanese. Kawakita, Atsuko and Yoshimi Nishi. 2016. Rekishi to shiteno Resilience [Re­silience as History]. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. In Japanese. Kusakabe, Naonori. 2016. Zeijaku na tochi ni ikiru: Bangradeshu no saikuron bousai to inochi no bouda [Living in a vulnerable land: Disaster Prevention against cyclone and border of lives in Bangladesh]. In Rekishi to shiteno Resilience [Re­silience as History], edited by Atsuko Kawakita and Yoshimi Nishi, 221–258. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. In Japanese. May, R.J. 1997. “The Domestic in Foreign Policy: The Flor Contemplacion Case and Philippine-Singapore Relations.” Pilipinas 29: 63–75. Nagasawa, Yoji. 2016. “Nakba wo ikiru [Living Nakba].”In Rekishi to shiteno Resilience [Resilience as History], edited by Atsuko Kawakita and Yoshimi Nishi, 177–219. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. In Japanese. Nishi, Yoshimi. 2016. “Owarini [Conclusion].” In Rekishi to shiteno Resilience [Resilience as History], edited by Atsuko Kawakita and Yoshimi Nishi, 343–356. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. In Japanese. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. 2017. “Updated list of Supplemental PDOS Providers as of Dec. 1, 2017.” Accessed 23 December 2017. http://www.owwa.gov.ph/ sites/default/files/files/updated%20list%20of%20Supplemental%20PDOS% 20Providers%20as%20of%20Dec_%201%2C%202017.pdf. Rashid, R. and D. Gregory. 2014. “‘Not Giving Up on Life’: A Holistic Exploration of Resilience among a Sample of Immigrant Canadian Women.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 46(1): 197–214. Rodriguez, Robyn Magalit. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. Minnesota: Minnesota University Press. Scalabrini Migration Center. 1992. Pre-Employment and Pre-Departure Services for Filipino Migrant Workers, Prepared by the Scalabrini Migration Center, Inc. on behalf of the La Trobe University Regional Social Development Centre and International Social Service Migrant Worker Project for the International Labor Organization, Quezon City, Philippines. Seki, Koki. 2018. [Shakaiteki na mono no jinruigaku: Firipin no globaru-ka to kaihatsu ni miru tsunagari no shosō] An Anthropology of the “Social”: Globalization, development, and connectedness in the Philippines. Tokyo: Akashi shoten. In Japanese. Siddiqui, Tasneem, Rozana Rashid, and Benjamin Zeitlyn. 2008. Information Campaigns on Safe Migration and Pre-Departure Training. drc Research Reports. Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty. Accessed 21 December 2017. http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/research_reports/Infor mation_Campaigns_and_Pre_Departure_Training.pdf.

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Sisay, Andualem. 2015. “Ethiopia seeks to protect migrant workers from abuse in Middle East.” The East African. 8 June 2015. Accesssed 21 December 2017. http://www .theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Ethiopia-seeks-to-protect-migrant-workers-abuse-in -Middle-East/2558-2744338-hqdny0z/index.html. UN Women. 2016. “Community conversations in Ethiopia prevents exploitative migration.” 14 September 2016. Accessed 26 December 2017 http://www.unwomen.org/ en/news/stories/2016/9/community-conversations-in-ethiopia-prevents-exploi tative-migration. Watanabe, Akiko. 2014. “The Question of Well-informedness in the Pre-Departure Programs to the Overseas Filipino Workers bound for the ‘Middle East’: A Case of the United Arab Emirates.” Bunkyo University International Studies Review, 24 (2): 25–45. In Japanese.

Part 2 Lives, Community, and Networks among Asian Migrant Workers

∵

Chapter 6

Formal and Informal Protection for Domestic Workers: A Case of Filipinas Masako Ishii 1

Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States

According to the International Labour Organization (ilo) report titled “Global Estimates on Migrant Workers” (2015), there were an estimated 11.5 million migrant domestic workers of working age (15 years old and over) in the world in 2013.1 Of these 11.5 million migrant domestic workers, 3.151 million (27.4 percent) were located in the Arab states. In 2013, the Arab states hired 19.0 percent of around 8.5 million female domestic workers and 50.8 percent of around 3 million male migrant domestic workers. Although the Arab states includes those states other than the Arab Gulf states in the Arab League States, the figures above show that the region is one of the major destinations of migrant domestic workers and has become a forerunner of global marketization of the reproductive sphere. Because protection measures of both sending and receiving countries are not substantial, ­female migrant domestic workers in the region are exposed to the dangers of discrimination, abuse, violence, and human rights infringements over ­ ­dimensions of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexuality (Parreñas 2001; Ito et al. 2008: 119). This chapter, by taking the case of Filipino female domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states as an example, describes how they resort to help to cope with the risks they face as vulnerable workers. It particularly focuses on the informal safety nets woven among the migrants. Both the Philippines and the receiving countries have been improving their protection measures, but these countries depend on migrant domestic workers to sustain their economies and society. Therefore, the official protection measures of the Philippine authorities are devised so as to make the migrants themselves more capable and resilient to various risks. In addition, one of the 1 C189—Domestic Workers Convention, 2011, defines the term domestic work as “work performed in or for a household or households” and the term domestic worker as “any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship.”

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characteristics of the Arab Gulf states is that the organization of social movements or activism, such as that by non-governmental organizations (ngos), is restricted to take place. Left to face risks by themselves in an alien land, migrants tend to resort to informal safety nets woven among the Filipino community and low-waged migrants across nationalities. The rapid influx of migrant domestic workers into the region since the 1973 oil boom has drawn the attention of both scholars and practitioners. Firstly, let us review how the studies on domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states have evolved and where this chapter stands among them. 2

Relevant Previous Studies of Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States

The oil boom has brought about a fundamental socio-economic change to the households in the Arab Gulf states. Their household economy has become largely sustained by government subsidies to the extent that even ordinary households can afford to hire domestic workers. The Arab Gulf states used to receive migrant domestic workers from South Asia, with which they have had a long historical flow of people. Since the 1980s, with the phenomenon of feminization of migration, they have begun accepting domestic workers from Southeast Asia and, more recently, from Africa. The influx of Asian domestic workers led to a wave of research on the general situation and policy issues of female domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states (Shah et al. 1989; Shah and Al-Qudsi 1991; Shah 1994). The Arab Gulf states formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) in 1981, and they have implemented similar policies governing the acceptance of foreign workers. The ilo has produced reports regarding the general migration trends and problems of domestic workers, including those in the Arab Gulf states.2 The Arab Gulf states are categorized as part of the region of the “Arab states,” and, therefore, the reports do not focus exclusively on them. For example, the ilo ­published a report entitled Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers (Esim and Smith, eds) in 2004, which focused on the cases of Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the uae. All four cases were based on both quantitative and qualitative research and provided important basic information about the four countries.

2 The ilo website features labour migration in Arab states: http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm.

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With the influx of female migrant domestic workers in the region, human rights violations and abuse against domestic workers occur rampantly in these countries, which has drawn the attention of both practitioners and researchers. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have produced numerous reports, and they engage in advocacy against harsh labor conditions in ­favor of the workers’ protection under labor laws. They have been engaged in dialogues with the governments of the Arab Gulf states and have pressurized each government to improve protection measures for the vulnerable migrants (see Horinuki, Chapter 1). The attention to human rights violations was followed by the publication of a number of empirical works. In 2011, the Asia and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (3–4) published a special issue on migrant workers in the gcc states and assessed their migration trends, patterns, and policies, as well as examining how the migrants’ lives evolved empirically. Sabban’s work on female domestic workers in the uae was one of the first books written by an author living and teaching in a receiving state and provided a holistic picture, as well as detailed data about domestic workers in the uae (Sabban 2012). The focus on migrant domestic workers has developed into research investigating the socio-economic structure of the region in order to understand the frequent occurrence of abuse and the lives of the migrant workers. One of the first and most insightful ethnographies explaining the migrants’ situation within the socio-political structure of the Arab Gulf states is that of Longva (1997). She describes how a hierarchical pluralistic society has been formed in Kuwait with the influx of migrants and how this impinges on the lives of both nationals and migrants. Her work does not necessarily focus on migrant domestic workers, but it provides many insights for considering the gendered ­relationship between female employers and domestic workers w ­ ithin the segregation and exclusion produced in the hierarchical pluralistic society. In comparison with other developing countries, the economic development of the Arab Gulf states has been achieved through the distribution of oil wealth, and it has not occurred in a way that necessitated their women to become the part of productive labor force. The need for domestic workers in the region has not been caused by social progress of women creating a lack of reproductive labor in the home. Their residences have become physically larger with rapid modernization and high birth rates. It is because the space of reproduction in households grew so rapidly that domestic workers were imported to maintain them. Instead of participating in the productive labor market, females in such countries were positioned as the cornerstones of the “family,” which reproduces the population, culture, and tradition (Longva 1997; Sabban 2012; Tsujigami, Chapter 3).

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Mahdavi (2011, 2012, 2014) explores the reasons for human rights violations against vulnerable migrants in the uae. She investigates the roles of the state and inter-state relations, as well as the recruitment agencies, in the sending and receiving countries. These agencies render migrant workers as deportable, expendable, and vulnerable, leading to human trafficking-like structures for the migrant workers (Mahdavi 2011). She also highlights the problem of trafficking discourse, which heavily problematizes the issue of sex workers and places less emphasis on state policy, which does not provide protection for vulnerable migrant workers and allows them to be driven into abusive informal sectors (Mahdavi 2012). Mahdavi applies the concept of “perverse integration” to analyze the migrants’ decision-making in seeking out more desirable employment in “the informal economy of sex work” as a result of the lack of official protection (Mahdavi 2012: 101). Her work is important for examining the limitations of official policy from the perspectives of vulnerable migrant workers who face various risks. The experiences of abuse have also been examined in ethnographic works focusing on migrant workers of specific nationalities. Gamburd studies Buddhist Sinhalese women from Sri Lanka who worked as domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states (Gamburd 1999, 2004). She examines the repeated narration of “horror stories” based on experiences with Arab employers. Gamburd argues that the sharing of such “horror stories” produced a stereotyped image of Arab employers that compelled domestic workers to refrain from resisting their employers, while at the same time, it also produced a nascent class consciousness among the domestic workers. Gamburd also analyzes activism movements to support migrant workers including domestic workers from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. In comparison with Sri Lanka, the Philippines has more ­potential for ngo activism as a result of the diversity of the destination countries, the abundance of domestic workers working abroad, and the high educational standards (Gamburd 2010). Her work is important for understanding how the accumulated bad experiences of the domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states will transform their agency, as well as their original society. Scholars also pay attention to the mechanisms domestic workers use to cope with risk. In particular, this chapter reviews studies featuring migrants’ agency and their new forms of connectedness. Ethnographic research has focused on the agency of domestic workers and challenged the representation of migrant domestic workers as passive victims of abuse and exploitation; Migrant Domestic Workers in the Middle East: The Home and the World (Fernandez and Regt, eds. 2014) is one such work. It describes how new forms of “encounters, of belonging, spiritual connection,

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friendship, conviviality, and sociality” for migrant domestic workers evolve in multiple spaces in the Arab Gulf states. Though it is not the case of the Arab Gulf states, Pande (2012) highlights the domestic workers in Lebanon who utilized their special exclusion to form a what she calls “meso-level of r­ esistances— strategic acts that cannot be classified as either private and individual or as organized collective action.” With regard to the Filipino migrants in the uae and Qatar, the existence of associations and networks, as well as religious organizations, has been highlighted (see Hosoda, Chapter 7; Hosoda and Watanabe 2014). In the case of Saudi Arabia, there are middle-class Filipinos, recruiting agencies, and Saudi nationals who are open to hiring runaway domestic workers (Johnson 2010, 2011). By facing risks in the neo-liberal forms of migration policy, migrant workers in the lowest social stratum develop new informal networks and forms of connectedness to secure protection and care. Migrant Dubai: Low Wage Workers and the Construction of a Global City by Kathiravelu (2016) does not focus exclusively on domestic workers, but the author highlights the importance of informal care as a strategy of the often-marginalized workers in Dubai. This chapter investigates how Filipina domestic workers resort to various protection activities, both formal and informal, when they face critical problems. It particularly focuses on informal safety nets woven among migrants. Formal protection measures exist, but they do not always provide the necessary and appropriate help for the migrants. Instead, as the above literature mentions, migrants develop new informal networks and activities to secure protection and care. This chapter introduces the narrative of a Muslim Filipina who survived by resorting to various safety nets to understand how these networks function. As her narrative unfolds, it is clear that her survival depended on a very precarious chain of safety nets. Therefore, her narrative is interpreted both as a survival strategy and as an indication of the precariousness of the informal safety nets. There are some distressed domestic workers who incur fatal wounds and do not survive. On the other hand, some domestic workers gain survival strategies by accumulating both individual and shared experiences. They utilize informal safety nets not only in search of help but also to look for better ­employment opportunities. In other words, they intentionally integrate into the informal economy to find better jobs. However, for these distressed domestic workers, there is no guarantee that the help they seek will always be provided in the informal safety nets; some survive, while some do not.

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This chapter is based on field research and a survey of Muslim Filipina overseas workers conducted in the Sarangani region (this refers to Sarangani Province and General Santos City), Mindanao Island, for short periods from 2001 to 2004 and from 2008 to 2009 (Ishii 2011). From 4 to 17 February 2009, I visited the uae and interviewed 26 Muslim Filipina domestic workers and members of an ngo (hereafter called pngo, a pseudonym; Ishii 2011). I visited the other five Arab Gulf states between 2012 and 2017 for a few days and interviewed the Philippine Overseas Labor Office–Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (polo– owwa) staff, persons of groups that are member organizations of the pngo, and some Filipino workers. Although my focus has been on Muslim Filipina domestic workers, the phenomena that I will unfold in this chapter do not differ according to religious affiliation. However, Muslim Filipinas used to be hired with the labor conditions of around 200 US dollars per month, with no day off and endured longer hours of work than their Christian counterparts, who are often hired by relatively rich expatriates and paid approximately 400 US dollars per month with a weekly day off. The focus on the Muslim Filipina domestic workers tends to reflect the reality for vulnerable low-wage migrant domestic workers in general regardless of religious affiliation. The following section of this chapter examines the formal measures that exist for the protection of domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states. The third section contrasts this with the informal protection practices of ngos and the migrant workers themselves. The fourth section introduces specific examples of domestic workers who actually sought help in order to examine how their choices of support and protection were made. The final section explores the possibilities of and limitations to activities for the protection of domestic workers. The existence of informal support activities among migrants merits attention to understand the pluralistic nature of the Arab Gulf stats where there is limited social interaction between the nationals and migrants and how the migrants use their space exclusion for resistance (Pande 2012) as well as for for gaining better employment opportunities. 3

Formal Actions for the Protection of Domestic Workers

3.1 Official Measures in the Arab Gulf States As domestic work is carried out in the private space of the home, it falls outside the jurisdiction of labor law. As such, it is very difficult for government authorities in charge of employment disputes to intervene if problems arise. However, with pressure from the international organizations, the governments of the

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Arab Gulf states have tried to improve the protection measures for migrant domestic workers (see Horinuki, Chapter 1). According to Human Rights Watch, Bahrain’s labor law covered domestic workers in 2012 (Human Rights Watch 2012, 5–6).3 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and in 2017, Qatar and the uae have issued specific legislation for domestic workers (Human Rights Watch 2018) Bahrain, Kuwait, and the uae have their own standard employment contracts for domestic workers in place (Human Rights Watch 2010a; Human Rights Watch 2010b; ilo 2016: 5–7). A standard employment contract is an employment contract between the recruitment company, the employer, and the employed party (the domestic worker). It specifies common standards for employment terms such as rest and paid annual and sick leave, the right of the workers to keep their own passport, etc. Additionally, countries including Kuwait, Bahrain, and the uae operate shelters for women who have been mistreated (Human Rights Watch 2010a; Human Rights Watch 2012: 7). The Arab Gulf states supported the adoption of the Domestic Workers Convention of 2011 (No. 189) in 2011, but as of 2016, none of them have ratified it (ilo 2016: 6). Similarly, the governments of sending countries also try to improve employment conditions for domestic workers through participation in international frameworks and bilateral negotiations with receiving countries. On this front, the Philippines is a pioneer among the countries that send workers to the Arab Gulf states. For example, the Philippines was the first sending country to sign an agreement with Saudi Arabia regarding the employment of domestic workers. At first, in response to the Philippine government’s desire for a minimum monthly wage of 400 US dollars for domestic workers, Saudi Arabia stopped recruiting domestic workers from the Philippines in July 2011 (gma News 2011). However, the negotiations of the Philippines bore fruit. In October 2012, Saudi Arabia created a standard employment contract for Filipino domestic workers that included conditions such as a minimum monthly wage of 400 US dollars, break periods, days off, paid leave, the prohibition of the retention of passports and work permission documents by employers, the right to free communication, and the right to humane treatment. Furthermore, in May 2013, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines signed the Agreement on Domestic Worker Recruitment with the objective of protecting the rights of both domestic workers and their employers.4 3 In July 2012, Bahrain amended its labor law, extended some provisions to domestic workers, and introduced new protections, including annual vacation and severance pay. However, Human Rights Watch criticizes the reform because the law fails to set maximum daily and weekly work hours, weekly days off, or overtime pay (Human Rights Watch 2012, 5–6). 4 The agreement laid down the areas of cooperation between the two countries including (1) a mutually acceptable recruitment and deployment system; (2) recruitment of domestic

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In October of the same year, the Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia passed Resolution 310, or the Household Regulation on Service Workers and Similar Categories, which established the rights and obligations of employers and domestic workers. For domestic workers, this resolution guaranteed nine hours of break per day, prohibition of “renting out,” that is, the renting of domestic workers to households other than the contracted household, a weekly rest day, one month of leave after two years of service, paid sick leave of not more than thirty days, etc. It also outlined the obligations of the domestic workers, such as to render the work agreed upon, to do their best in the performance of the work, to take care of the employers’ property, to not refuse work or leave the service without legitimate reason, to respect the Islamic religion, and to ­observe the Saudi regulations applied in Saudi Arabia, etc (see Department of Labor and Employment 2013b).5 However, questions have been raised as to how substantial such official measures are in reality. International human rights groups point out that government-run shelters offer relatively little protection (Human Rights Watch 2010b: 10) and that migrants have yet to develop trust to seek help from the authorities (Mahdavi 2012). Similarly, a standard employment contract does not incorporate all of the rules that are stipulated in labor laws, such as hours of labor, overtime, workers’ compensation, health and safety, and allowances for sick days, etc (Human Rights Watch 2010a: 39; 2010b: 12–13). In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Resolution 310, which establishes nine hours of break time per day, can be seen as permission to make domestic workers labor for 15 hours every day (Human Rights Watch 2013). ­ orkers through recruitment offices that practice ethical recruitment and are licensed by w their respective governments; (3) prohibition against charging or deducting from the salary of the domestic worker any cost attendant to recruitment and deployment or imposing any kind of unauthorized salary deductions, etc. The agreement also established specific responsibilities of the Saudi Arabian government, which include (1) the authenticity of the employment contract; (2) the opening of a bank account in the name of the domestic worker; and (3) the ­facilitation of exit visas for repatriation upon contract completion or during emergency situations, etc. For the Philippine government, the specific responsibilities include (1) ensuring that workers are qualified and medically fit with no derogatory record and (2) verification of all employment contracts submitted by Saudi recruitment offices. Both sides ­reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the Standard Employment Contract (Department of Labor and Employment 2013a). 5 On the other hand, the uae Ministry of Interior introduced a new standard contract for domestic workers in June 2014 that led to the suspension of the Philippines’ role in verifying and attesting contracts. The Philippine Government opposed this action and stopped sending new hire domestic workers.

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Aside from the formal protection measures implemented by the governmental authorities, the socio-political structures of the Arab Gulf states make it difficult for their nationals to form a consensus in favor of protecting migrant domestic workers. In the Arab Gulf states, the influx of domestic workers has neither improved the status of female nationals as citizens in the public sphere nor has it strengthened their political rights (see Tsujigami, Chapter 3). Longva’s survey of Kuwait shows that the asymmetrical power of female nationals vis-à-vis migrants helps them to ignore the existence of gaps among themselves, as well as with men in their country (Longva 1997: 213–220). It is the existence of migrants that connects nationals who otherwise have limited commonality to form a nation. Longva points out that, as Kuwaitis are a minority in their own country, they feel threatened by migrant workers, who vastly outnumber them. This results in the e­ mergence of a logic of the exclusion of and dominance over the migrant workers (Longva 1997: 43–75). In this context, female nationals create clear boundaries between themselves and migrants. They show little desire to improve the rights and welfare of domestic workers, and the organization of social movements and activisms that might shape these feelings is officially restricted. Accordingly, advocacy movements to improve the welfare and rights for domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states tend to be driven by attention from the international community or through bilateral negotiations, not through domestic support for vulnerable domestic workers. 3.2 Protection/Promotion Dilemma of the Sending Country Government The Philippines is one of the major labor-sending countries and their destinations extend to over 170 countries worldwide. The “oil shock” and its resultant price hike has polarized the developing countries into oil-producing countries, such as the Arab Gulf states, and non-oil-producing countries, such as the Philippines. The “oil shock” exacerbated the Philippines’ existing balance of payments problems and produced massive unemployment. To cope with the situation, the Philippine government enacted the Labor Code in 1974 to promote overseas employment and established the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (poea) under the Department of Labor and Employment (dole) in 1982. Since then, the top destination country for the Overseas Filipino Workers (ofws) has been Saudi Arabia, and the five other Arab Gulf states have been almost constantly included in the top 10 destination countries. The majority of Filipino female migrant workers are domestic workers (Tables 6.1 and 6.2).

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Table 6.1  Number of new hires of deployed land-based overseas Filipino workers by top ten occupational categories and sex in 2010 (number of people)

All occupational categories All categories: Total 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Household service workers Charworkers, cleaners, and related workers Nurses, professional Caregivers and caretakers Waiters, bartenders, and related workers Wiremen and electrical workers Plumber and pipe fitters Welders and flame-cutters Housekeeping and related service workers Bricklayers, stonemasons, and tile setters

Male

Female

Both sexes

154,677

185,602

340,279

1,703 2,612

94,880 9,521

96,583 12,133

1,828 543 4,393

10,254 8,750 4,396

12,082 9,293 8,789

8,576 8,391 5,037 701

30 16 22 4,098

8,606 8,407 5,059 4,799

4,478

29

4,507

Source: Table 12. Number of Deployed Landbased Overseas Filipino Workers by Top Ten Occupational Categories and Sex, New hires: 2010. Poea. Accessed 16 June 2014. http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010_Stats.pdf

The Philippines was one of the first Southeast Asian countries to institutionalize the sending of their workers abroad, and their welfare and protection measures are considered to be the most advanced; they are therefore regarded as a model for other labor-sending countries for the Arab Gulf states. Remittances from migrant workers are the largest source of foreign capital for the Philippines and are, thus, indispensable for the national economy. Because of this, the Philippine state is caught in a dilemma of protecting ofws at the same time as promoting them. The situation necessitates the Philippine state to promote their ofws by adopting a policy of sending more skilled and professional workers. Due to the marketing of its national as skilled and empowered OFWs, scholars refer to the Philippines as a “labor-brokering state” (Rodriguez 2010). As ngos, recruiters, agencies, and vocational schools have also joined the state in this effort, Seki refers to it as a “labor-brokering regime” (Seki 2017: 207). By providing training programs and pre-departure orientation seminars, as described in the

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Formal and Informal Protection for Domestic Workers Table 6.2  Number of new hires of deployed household service workers by top ten destinations (number of people)

Destination

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

All destinations: Total

62,818

82,467

91,412

47,877

50,081

71,557

96,583

16,424 17,018 5,816 7,699 2,436 1,305 666 645 1,108 285

17,514 19,707 9,113 9,227 4,998 2,429 763 1,419 982 68

19,532 19,097 11,844 11,898 6,524 3,162 1,343 2,068 1,178 573

22,127 18,286 4,806 8,092 3,149 6,403 2,581 3,079 1,912 4,682 1,568 1,244 413 558 719 944 1,763 1,218 4,951 2,839

24,998 14,087 10,558 6,954 6,376 1,405 1,095 1,098 1,409 1,793

28,602 21,554 13,184 11,582 9,937 2,848 1,714 1,564 1,549 1,223

1. Hong Kong 2. Kuwait 3. uae 4. Saudi Arabia 5. Qatar 6. Singapore 7. Bahrain 8. Oman 9. Cyprus 10. Italy

Source: Table 13. Number of Deployed Household Service Workers by Top Ten Destination, New hires: 2004–2010. Poea. Accessed 16 June 2014. http:// www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010_Stats.pdf

­Chapter  5,6 ofws are trained to become more competitive and marketable. At the same time, they assume and manage the risks of working abroad. They are encouraged to act as exemplary representatives of the country, abide by the law, work diligently, and return home at the end of their period of employment. Rodriguez (2010) also focuses on the way the Philippines as a state attempts to instill a sense of national identity in migrant workers to secure their remittances. The Philippine state tries to imbue migrant workers with a collective identity as “new national heroes” who defend their beloved country and families with their remittances. Rodriguez conceptualizes this relationship that the nation weaves between itself and migrant workers as “migrant citizenship” (Rodriguez 2010: 142–143). ofws are important citizens for the Philippine state.

6 All applicants for overseas domestic work are also obliged to undergo a country-specific ­language and culture training sponsored by the owwa, as well as skills assessment by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (tesda). See poea (2006) and Watanabe, Chapter 5.

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Despite this, the promotion of a sense of “migrant citizenship” creates a political climate in which anti-government sentiment can occur when the state fails to fulfill the duty to protect them. In the Philippines, in tandem with the trend towards the “feminization of migration,” human rights violations inflicted upon overseas domestic workers and “entertainers” in Japan have become publicized. In the mid-1990s, two high-profile incidents involving the human rights of female migrant workers threw the Philippines government into ­crisis.7 This created a political dynamic in which the issue of protection for overseas Filipino workers directly affects political legitimacy, and domestic ­workers, who are most likely to experience human rights violations, are the Philippine government’s Achilles’ heel. The Philippine government is under strong pressure to perform its mandate to protect the ofws. 4

Informal Activities for the Protection of Domestic Workers

Both sending and receiving states have implemented protection measures, but they do not extend enough support to distressed workers yet. As a result, migrants have woven informal safety nets to cope with their risks. In this section, I will introduce the informal safety nets that Filipina domestic workers can resort to for help: (1) the safety net woven among the loosely formed Filipino community and (2) the safety net woven among the low-wage migrant workers across various nationalities.

7 In the mid-1990s, two incidents regarding domestic workers shook the political stability of the Philippine government. In 1995, a Filipina domestic worker, Flor Comtemplacion, was subjected to capital punishment because of a dubious accusation in Singapore. Many Filipinos believed that Contemplacion was innocent. The case provoked mass outrage, and the Philippine government was criticized for its failure to save her life. A hand grenade was thrown at the office of Singapore Airlines in Manila, and both governments needed to summon their ambassadors. Eventually, the Ramos administration had to replace its Foreign Minister to calm down the situation. After the incident, the Philippine government stopped sending female domestic workers to Singapore. In 1994, a 15-year-old girl, Sarah Balabagan stabbed her 67-year-old employer to death when she was about to be sexually abused in the uae. She said in her court statement that she was about to be raped and that she murdered him in an act of self-defense. However, the court found her guilty of murder and sentenced her to death. National and international movements to save Sarah developed immediately. As a result, her sentence was reduced to one-year imprisonment, 100 lashes, and payment of 41,000 US dollars of blood money. Further negotiation by President Ramos reduced her imprisonment to three months.

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Informal Safety Net Woven among the Loosely Formed Filipino Community Although domestic workers are the largest group of Filipino migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states, Filipinos are also employed in a wide variety of other occupations. While the largest employment category in the Arab Gulf states is domestic work, less than one third of the total employment of OFWs comprises domestic work in these countries, with the exception of Kuwait and Oman (Table 6.3). By contrast, in the other main destination countries for Filipino workers, the largest employment category consisted of over 50 percent of the total for each country excluding the United States. In the Arab Gulf states, the experience of being marginalized in labor markets segregated by nationality promotes the formation of a loose Filipino workers’ identity and community. “Loosely” formed Filipino community means it lacks “any real means of ensuring the accountability of their members” (Kathiravelu 2016: 185). The formation of this loose identity and community sometimes function as a safety net of mutual aid, in which compatriots may help each other without knowing one another. For example, streets in the uae frequented by large numbers of Filipinos are spaces where Filipinos can expect help from each other (see Hosoda, Chapter 7). Johnson (2011) documents the situation in Saudi Arabia, where middleclass Filipinos working in professional jobs protect fleeing Filipino domestic workers in their own homes. Even among middle-class Filipinos in the uae, there are volunteer activities that focus on domestic workers who have fled to the shelter attached to the Philippine Embassy. Hosoda focuses on how Filipino associations in the uae passionately provide support to compatriots who need immediate assistance such as domestic workers. It is precisely because they have had the experience of being discriminated against in a labor market segregated by nationality that they are able to find meaning in helping compatriots who are in worse situations than they are (see Hosoda, Chapter 7). Although citizen action is restricted in the Arab Gulf states, it is often the case that activities by private organizations are permitted to some extent. In this context, the case of pngo, an ngo that works for the improvement of rights for Filipino workers, merits attention. pngo is a global alliance of Filipino migrant organizations with member organizations in countries across the globe. The Flor Contemplacion incident of 1995 (see Note 7) was the impetus for the establishment of pngo, which was officially founded in 1996. I have visited its member organizations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the uae to discuss its activities. 4.1

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Table 6.3  Numbers of overseas Filipino workers by country and proportion: New hires in 2006 and 2010 Year

2006

2010

Country

No. of ofws Percentage (persons) in first occupation group (%)

No. of ofws Percentage (persons) in first occupation group (%)

Arab Gulf States Bahrain 5,151 Kuwait 26,322 Oman 3,130 Qatar 27,814 UAE 38,523 Saudi Arabia 89,783 Asia Hong Kong Singapore Japan

America Canada United States Europe Italy UK

26 72 65 23 31 13

5,307 27,110 2,801 36,795 46,779 119,275

32 79 55 27

19,598

97

28,794

98

4,398 7,083

71 87

6,447 1,287

44 75

3,024

61

2,954

42

3,122

13

1,080

16

621

92

1,303

60

1,880

57

517

49

First ­occupation group

Female ­domestic helpers and related ­household workers

28

9

Female ­domestic helpers and related ­household workers Female “­entertainers” (composers, musicians and singers, ­choreographers and dancers) Female ­caregivers and caretakers Female teachers (2006); female ­physiotherapists and ­occupational therapists (2010) Female ­domestic helpers and related household workers Caregivers and caretakers (2006); female nurses professional (2010)

Source: “ofw Deployment per Country and Skill: From Jan 01, 2006 To Dec 31, 2006.” Poea. Quoted in Johnson (2010: 6); owf Deployment per Country and Skill: New Hires Full Year 2010 (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration) http://www.poea.gov.ph/ofwstat/percountryperskill/2010.pdf Accessed on 10 August 2018

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The activities that pngo member organizations in the Arab Gulf states carry out through their loose networks consist of support for Filipino workers in trouble—for example, those who have fled from their employers, those who overstayed their visas and are unable to return home, and those in custody in internment cells or on death row. Because conducting public ­activities as an ngo is difficult, PNGO does not have any premises resembling an office, and the main and active members make use of communication such as mobile phones to keep in contact during the formation of their networks. As an example, let us examine the actions of pngo and their member organization in Saudi Arabia when the Saudi Arabian authorities started a crackdown on illegal migrants in March 2013. As news of the crackdown spread throughout the Filipino community in Saudi Arabia, two hundred Filipinos fearful of being detained gathered at the Philippine Embassy in the capital of Riyadh; several thousand formed a “tent city” at the Consulate General, located in the second largest city of Jeddah. Unrest and confusion spread. This unrest was not limited to the Filipino community but spread among illegal migrants of a range of nationalities. In response to this chaos, King Abdullah ordered a halt to the crackdown on 3 April and issued a declaration of amnesty whereby illegal migrants were given 90 days either to acquire legal status for themselves or to leave the country without punishment (Agence France-Presse 2013). As information regarding the crackdown began to filter through to its member organization, the PNGO began posting warnings such as “Filipinos going to the atm and money transfer service shops should take care” on Facebook and other sites. When people started to gather at the tent city, they began to petition the embassy and consulate for swift return home. Meanwhile, in Manila, pngo led protests at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. pngo strongly ­criticized the Philippine government’s handling of the situation. They claimed that the workers encamped in the canteen of the embassy in Riyadh were not supplied with electricity or food and that because the government had not promptly initiated repatriation, Filipino workers, including 100 children, were suffering in intense heat and poor conditions (Fiel 2013). They then petitioned the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate with the Saudi government for an extension to the amnesty, which expired on 3 July. Their i­nternational alliance group supported their petition. Although it is unclear whether this had an effect or not, Saudi Arabia extended the amnesty to 3 ­November 2013. In this way, pngo member organizations provide direct support to workers in trouble in the Arab Gulf states. At the same time, they are able to demand that the Philippine government be held accountable for the problems and to criticize inadequate responses. Their deeds and actions are covered in the major newspapers not only in the Philippines but also in major English language

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newspapers in the Arab Gulf states, such as the Arab News in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf News in the uae.8 4.2 Ad-hoc Support Activities among Low-Wage Migrants In the Arab Gulf states, the wage rates of migrant workers are based not on educational standards or skills but on nationality. The main nationalities of domestic workers include Indian, Sri Lankan, Filipino, Indonesian, and Ethiopian (see Sabban, Chapter 4), and the wage of Filipina domestic workers is higher than that of other nationalities. On 16 December 2006, the poea created a policy reform package with regards to Filipino domestic workers. The monthly wage of 200 US dollars for the majority of the domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states was viewed as problematic, so a new minimum monthly wage of 400 US dollars was set for domestic workers. The Philippine government has been vigorously negotiating with the labor-receiving countries to observe this minimum wage. However, even if domestic workers sign contracts for a monthly wage of 400 US dollars before leaving their country, it is often the case that they are employed for less than the contracted rate after arriving in their host country. A uae national operating a recruitment company in Abu Dhabi commented as follows in a conversation with the author on 4 March, 2012: “Even if the actual rate of pay is low, these women say that they want to work in the uae rather than return to their home country. As there is demand and supply, linking the two is not a bad thing. I regard my work as just another way of helping people.” A characteristic of the Arab Gulf states is the fact that foreigners are not an invisible minority, but they exist in great numbers. The socio-space in the Arab Gulf states is segregated by class and nationality (Bristol-Rhys 2012). Whereas there are residential places exclusively for natives and high-skilled workers, there are also streets, districts, and shopping mall dominated by middle-class and low-wage migrant workers.

8 pngo member organizations rarely carry out actions directly aimed at local authorities within the Arab Gulf states. The reason for this is that the individuals acting with pngo member organizations in the Arab Gulf states are migrant workers themselves. To engage in such activities would entail the risk of losing their jobs and being deported. Therefore, action is necessarily reduced to negotiations with local authorities via the Philippine government. Their activities in the Arab Gulf states are directed toward the local Philippine Embassy and Consulates or toward the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the poea, and the owwa in the Philippines. Furthermore, substantive collective action with workers of other nationalities in the Arab Gulf states has yet to be organized.

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In the uae, they are clearly recognizable as domestic workers when they are out pushing prams, handling supermarket trolleys as they accompany their employers on outings, and taking out the trash. Sabban notes that, as domestic workers in the uae are visible to each other, they form a sense of c­ ollective identity (Sabban 2012: 169–171). At the same time, because of the visibility of lower class migrant workers in the public space, they form a loose class identity that facilitates as ad hoc reciprocal assistance when one is in crisis, as in the following case of a migrant worker I will call Jema (a pseudonym) shows. It is often the case that a network of mutual aid that transcends nationality is at work, emerging from a shared class-based identity among lower class migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states. It is also common for domestic workers whose movements are restricted to make various requests of drivers working in the same households (because they are allowed to leave the premises) or taxi drivers. It is said that this enables pngo to obtain information in Qatar from taxi drivers regarding domestic workers that may be subject to abuse. 5

Domestic Workers Resorting to Formal and Informal Protection

Thus far, I have described the formal and informal support activities for Filipina domestic workers. I will now introduce the case of a Filipina domestic worker who actually resorted to a combination of formal and informal support activities. 5.1 The Case of Jema In June 2008, Jema left for Saudi Arabia from the Philippines.9 It was her second journey to the Arab Gulf states as a domestic worker. She is a Muslim ­Filipina, born in Sultan sa Barongis Municipality, Maguindanao Province, ­Mindanao Island. She withdrew from high school in her second year, as it was financially difficult to continue her studies. Jema lost her father when Camp Abubakar, a military base of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, was attacked in 2000 during the Estrada administration. Her father was a civilian, and they were living inside the compound of the camp. After the family lost their father, they needed to evacuate from the place, leaving behind their livestock and crops. Jema was introduced to a recruiter in Cotabato city by her aunt in her neighborhood. Her aunt told Jema that she needed only pocket money to go abroad. 9

Interview with Jema by the author (22 March 2014, General Santos City, the Philippines).

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The recruiter prepared all her processing documents, including her passport, and arranged a ship going to Manila. The recruiter used her cousin’s certificates to issue the passport. Therefore, her passport bore her cousin’s name and her listed age was 34, although she was only 21 years old at that time. She was told to pay the amount of seven months’ salary to the recruiter from her salary to be paid. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Jema worked in the house of a family of seven. She had three children to take care of, and she did all of the household chores, such as cleaning, cooking, washing, etc. She was the only domestic worker in the house. According to Jema, the work itself was fine, but her male employer was “manyak (obsessed).” Sometimes, he asked Jema to give him a massage in his room. Jema was very afraid of him and did not agree; she locked the door of her room and ignored his request. One day, the employer’s family went to Mecca, and Jema was left alone in the house, where all the doors had been locked. She jumped out of a window on the third floor to run away. “As if I lost my mind,” she said. She knew she could get killed by jumping from the third floor, but otherwise, she thought she might be molested by her male employer. She injured her left leg severely and walked with a severe limp for three years afterward. Then, a taxi passed by. Jema stopped the taxi and got in. When she jumped out of the window, she was neither wearing sandals nor an abaya.10 She left everything, including her passport. At the sight of her, the taxi driver asked, “Why are you like this?” But he understood that she had run away from her employer: Taxi driver Jema Taxi driver Jema

“Do you have any relatives or friends?” “No.” “Where do you want to go?” “I don’t know. Please take me to shopping mall.”

She knew that there were many Filipinos at shopping malls. The taxi driver took her to the shopping mall and even gave her 100 riyal (27 US dollars). He was an old man from Sri Lanka. Jema did not want to go to the Philippine Consulate to seek help, because she knew what kind of attitude the staff of the consulate might take toward her and that they might not take good care of her and instead might insult her. At the shopping mall, she found a bench and sat down absent-mindedly. Then, a Filipina woman found her. She was letting her employers’ child play at 10

A long loose-fitting black robe used to cover female bodies in public.

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163

the playground of the shopping mall. She pitied Jema and spoke to her. Jema had not eaten anything since 10 a.m. It was already 6 p.m. at that time. Filipina Jema Filipina Jema

“Why are you like this?” “I ran away.” “Where are you going?” “I don’t know.”

This Filipina then phoned one of her friends, a beautician who had been taking care of another runaway Filipina in her room. Jema went to this Filipina’s room and stayed. She was a woman from the Polomolok Municipality, South Cotabato Province on Mindanao Island. Jema did not remember her exact name, but she was an Ilocana (a woman whose family originally came from Ilocos region in the Philippines), and Jema and the other runaway Filipina called her “Mommy.” Jema could not go to the hospital. “Mommy” knew how to massage, so she gave Jema’s leg a massage for four months. “Mommy” was a balikIslam (a convert to Islam) when Jema met her. Jema could not walk for almost a year. She gradually got well and worked for “Mommy’s” customers, such as the British, Egyptians, or Arabs, as a domestic worker, and she sometimes earned 1,000 to 1,200 riyals (270 to 324 US dollars) per month. Thursday was her day off, and she went to buy clothes and food. “Mommy” provided food for Jema, but Jema also bought some food when she had money. While she was staying at “Mommy’s” place, she met her future husband. He came to Saudi Arabia in 1998 and became a balik-Islam in 1999. They got married in the house, witnessed by a Filipino ustaj (a religious teacher) who was a friend of “Mommy.” Her husband was working for a company, and his initial salary was 900 riyals. However, one day, his company turned into a situation that the company had to return all of the workers soon. Jema said to her husband, “What would happen to me if you go back? My leg is still not fine. You should not go home.” His passport had already received an “exit” stamp, but he left the company, became tago ng tago (tnt, translated literally as “hide and hide,” meaning to keep oneself hiding carefully), and found another job. After they got married, they left “Mommy’s” house. Jema got pregnant. Until she got pregnant, she did part-time jobs at hotels. She delivered a baby in 2010 with the help of a Muslim Filipino midwife. They knew about her through acquaintances of her husband. In April 2013, a crackdown on undocumented workers had been announced in Saudi Arabia. They heard the news that the police could enter houses and

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check the status of migrant workers. Fearing that they might be jailed, Jema, her husband, and their baby boy voluntarily went to the “tent city” in front of the Philippine Consulate. At the “tent city,” their co-workers, friends, and relatives gave them food, medicine, and so on. The situation in the tent city was critical. At one point, Jema’s baby had a high fever, and she thought she would lose him. The nurses at the tent city took care of him. According to Jema, the consulate staff did not help them at all. At one point, the consulate staff let them enter the compound because they wanted to take their names. As they were not given any help, they got very angry with the consul. But the staff at the consulate said, “We do not care about you.” People at the tent city felt that they had been insulted, and they could not make any complaints. They could not work and just went around inside the tent city. If they left, they might be caught by the authorities. Finally, on 10 November 2013, the consulate prepared ten buses to bring them to “the deportation house.” Women, children, the pregnant, and the elderly were prioritized to get on the buses. Jema got on the bus, but her husband remained in the tent city. On 16 or 17 December 2013, Jema, together with 200 Filipinos, mostly Muslims, got on an airplane and arrived in Manila at 10 a.m. At the airport, they were given an envelope. Jema thought something like a “check” was inside, but she only found a piece of paper saying “Welcom back (maligayang pagdating).” Everybody, including Jema, got angry. Before the departure, the vice-consul had promised them that they would be assisted in Manila on their ­arrival, for example, with accommodation in Manila, and also given transportation back home to Mindanao and a new job position in the Middle East. He advised them to go to owwa. At the airport, owwa personnel asked them to wait. They waited until 3 p.m., but eventually owwa said that they were not obliged to extend any such help to them. The workers related what the vice-consul said to them before departure and asked why the OWWA personnel were contradicting that statement. The owwa personnel became silent. They prepared a red carpet for them to walk on at the airport, but did not give them even a bottle of water. On arrival, they were interviewed group by group, and made to fill out many forms. The Vice President and Adviser on Overseas Filipino Worker Concerns, Jejomar Binay, and his staff then ­welcomed them at the airport. But the Philippine government did not give them any help. Jema stayed at the house of her mother-in-law in Manila and returned to Mindanao. Back home in Mindanao, she was helped by a branch office of the pngo to claim assistance and benefits from the owwa.

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Jema’s story illustrates how vulnerable domestic workers find various types of help in an alien place. Driven by a necessity to earn money after the death of her father, without knowing much about her rights or what p ­ rocedures to take, she went through the exploitative recruiter she was introduced to by her aunt. Lacking knowledge about how to protect herself from the risk of sexual exploitation and driven by fear, she jumped from the third floor of the employer’s house. Having risked her life, Jema did not expect that she would receive official assistance from either the host government or Philippine authorities. Instead, she sought assistance on the street and at the shopping mall. On the street, a taxi driver extended ad hoc assistance to Jema without expecting anything in return. At the shopping mall, she met a Filipina, and because they were both Filipinos, Jema was introduced to “Mommy,” who took care of runaway maids like Jema and was probably, at the same time, earning income by arranging jobs for them. She established her own intimate space by getting married and having a child, but the couple were aware that their stay was an illegal act in Saudi Arabia. Hearing the news of the crackdown, they ran to the Philippine Consulate to seek help. However, they could secure little official help, and instead, the Filipino community, perhaps including the pngo, extended help to the distressed ofws in the tent city. In the case of Jema, she felt that she was not supported by the staff of Philippine Consulate in Jeddah. But, to be fair, there are also stories of people receiving significant assistance from Philippine embassies and consulates in the Arab Gulf states. In other words, neither formal nor informal protection ensure that cries for help will always be answered, but they both exist as safety nets that migrants can use to seek support and assistance. 6

Protection/Promotion: The Other Function of the Safety Nets

The existence of safety nets makes it possible not just for domestic workers who are actually being abused to escape, as outlined above, but also for them to run away in the hope of securing better employment ­conditions (Johnson 2011). One Saudi female, who worked as a professional, mentioned to the author that: “The ‘runaway maid’ problem is also a big ­problem for the rights of the people of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabians are also being victimized.”11 There are four children in her family, who range in age from teenagers to university 11

Conversation with the woman by the author (12 March 2013, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).

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graduates. In the past, they had employed a Filipino driver, but he disappeared after just one month. They had also employed a Filipina domestic worker, but she ran away after several months. It had cost them 15,000 riyals (4,050 US dollars in 2013 terms) to employ her, but the money was never recovered. When they employed an Ethiopian domestic worker, they paid 10,000 riyals (2,700 US dollars in 2013 terms), but she also fled after six months. At the end of their tether, they hired another Ethiopian, even though they were aware that she was a “runaway maid” herself. With a large house, children, and a job, the wife felt that a domestic worker was simply essential. Her husband was against the idea because the domestic worker had no residence permit (iqama), but in the end, he really had no say in the matter. The informal safety nets and recruitment companies that connect employer demand with “runaway maids” also make it possible for domestic workers to leave their employers in search of better conditions. The number of runaway maids increases during the month of Ramadan (when Muslims observe fasting from dawn until sunset) when there is high demand on domestic workers. This is partly because they are made to work longer hours with extra duties, but also because they can expect to be hired with better labor conditions (see Ali i 2008; Arab News 2014). It is also possible to say that the informal safety nets create an environment where abused domestic workers are able to manage their problems without going to the shelter attached to the Philippine Embassy or Consulates. Fleeing to the shelter managed by the Philippine government can, if the government cannot provide timely support, result in being stuck there with no employment or income for more than half a year. It could be said that what makes this runaway action possible are the amnesties for illegal migrants that are regularly declared in the Arab Gulf states. ­During the Ramadan month or after cases such as the Saudi Arabian crackdown example discussed above, the Arab Gulf states sometimes establish amnesty periods where illegal migrants are permitted to return home without paying fines or to legalize their status within the country. As the chance of being able to return home as the result of an amnesty exists, the risks associated with working as an illegal migrant are lessened. Among the huge crowd of workers assembled in Riyadh or in the tent city at Jeddah, there must have been many who lived in daily fear of discovery as they worked and waited in anticipation of the declaration of an amnesty.12 12

On March 17, 2013, I met a Muslim Filipina in the Kheitan district in Kuwait who had been waiting for an amnesty to be declared so that she could go back. She worked for a Kuwaiti home of 20 people including the children of the first and second wives. She was the only domestic worker and worked from 5 a.m. until 1 a.m. in the morning. She went to the

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7 Conclusion This chapter has explored means of protection for domestic workers by examining the official measures by the governments of sending and receiving countries, as well as the informal safety nets woven among migrants. As Kathiravelu points out, the development of the unstructured informal safety nets is the “reactionary strategies” (Kathiravelu 2016: 183) to contend with the lack of sufficient formal protection measures and the logic of inclusion and exclusion produced in the segregated societies of the Arab Gulf states. “The mechanisms of generating informal adjustment thus come about because formal rules do not sustain desirable levels of civility, sociability and an ethic of ‘care’.” (Kathiravelu 2016: 184). This chapter has highlighted the safety nets available for Filipina domestic workers. Both safety nets woven among the Filipinos and those among the lowwage workers across nationalities are unstructured and spontaneous (see Kathiravelu 2016: 185). The former is woven based on social capital, such as nationality and language. However, it cannot become organized collective action as this is prohibited by the authority and entails the risk of deportation. The latter is more ad hoc: most of the time it is only one-time encounters and is not sustained afterwards. Therefore, there is no guarantee that a distressed domestic worker can always avail herself of help, and there is a limitation to the amount of assistance provided. The safety nets are precariously woven, and there are many whose needs are not met. For example, according to owwa, 196 Filipino workers died in Kuwait since 2016 to February 2018, 155 were due to medical reasons, 14 were due to accidents, 22 were due to suicide, and five were due to unknown causes (gma News 2018).13 As some deaths caused by abuse are sometimes disguised as “medical reasons,” it is assumed that some of those who lost their lives could not resort to both formal and informal protection measures (Barcia 2017).14

13 14

agency and to the Philippine Embassy because her employer tried to make her work in another home. But her employer did not respond to her complaints. With the consent of the employers, she left the house, found a job advertisement posted by an American company in the newspaper, and applied. She was accepted even though she did not have an “iqama” or a residence permit. She then changed her job to work for an internet telephone company. She mentioned that she did not want to go to the polo-owwa as she thought it was like a prison. People there had nothing to do but wait for a very long time. She rather preferred to work and save money while waiting for an amnesty to be declared. It was report that around 262,000 Filipinos work in Kuwait, nearly 60 percent of them as domestic helpers in 2018, according to the Department of Labor and Employment (Nawal 2018). In this article, it is reported that Ana Fe Velasco-Bania was made to work for two households in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in violation of her contract from 2015 for two years. A few

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Additionally, the morals and humanity that connect the low-wage migrants across nationalities merit attention. Particular focus should be given to how migrants reconfigured the segregated public space in the Arab Gulf states. Migrants who have stayed in Arab Gulf states for an extended period of time or have repeatedly come back learn about the existence of safety nets. Once they understand how to manage their risks by utilizing those safety nets, they can look for better jobs. What this chapter has also pointed out is that their choice to find employment in the informal economy is not always made reluctantly but may also be chosen by the active agency of a domestic worker who can manage risks by resorting to various safety nets in the Arab Gulf states. Bibliography Agence France-Presse. 2013. “Saudi Workers Scramble Before Amnesty Deadline.” The National. 2 July 2013. Ali i, Samah. 2008. “Runaway Maids are in High demand during Ramadan.” Arab News. 31 August 2008. http://www.arabnews.com/node/315545 Accessed on 10 August, 2018. Arab News. 2014. “Number of Runaway Maids Mounts as Ramadan Approaches.” Arab News. 3 June 2014. http://www.arabnews.com/node/581191 Accessed on 10 August 2018. Barcia, Rhaydz B. 2017. “Bicolana OFW Dies After Serving ‘Two Masters’ in Saudi Arabia.” Rappler. 18 November 2017. https://www.rappler.com/nation/188753-bicolanaofw-dies-riyadh Accessed on 10 August 2018. Bristol-Rhys, Jane. 2012. “Socio-Spatial Boundaries in Abu Dhabi.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 59–84. New York: Columbia University Press. Department of Labor and Employment. 2013a. “Statement of Secretary Rosalinda Dimapilis on the Signing of the Agreement on Domestic Worker Recruitment in ­Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Department of Labor and Employment. https://www .dole.gov.ph/ro_polo_updates/view/462 Accessed on 15 February 2018. Department of Labor and Employment. 2013b. “A First Between Saudi Arabia and a Country of Origin.” In Historic Agreement Between PH and KSA Sealed Stronger Protection for the Filipino HSW, 27 December 2013. http://www.dole.gov.ph/ ­ ro_polo_updates/view/631. Accessed 6 June 2014.

months before the end of her contract, her mother received a report that her daughter had died. A hospital in Saudi Arabia reported the she had died of a stroke but her family found bruises on her body and doubted the report.

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Esim, Simel and Monica Smith, eds. 2004. Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers. Regional Office for Arab States, International Labour Organization. Fiel, Cheryll D. 2013. “Thousands of Distressed OFWs Await Gov’t Action in Tent Cities in Riyadh, Jeddah.” Davao Today. 28 May 2013. Fernandez, Bina and Marina de Regt, eds. 2014. Migrant Domestic Workers in the Middle East: The Home and the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gamburd, Michele Ruth. 1999. “Class Identity and the International Division of Labor: Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaid.” Anthropology of Work Review, 19 (3): 3–8. Gamburd, Michele Ruth. 2004. “Money that Burns Like Oil: A Sri Lankan Cultural Logic of Morality.” Ethnology 43 (2): 167–183. Gamburd, Michele Ruth. 2010. “Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and Challenges.” In Migrant Workers in Asia: Distance Divides, Intimate Connections, edited by Nicole Constable, 66–86. London: Routledge. gma News. 2011. “Saudi Arabia bans domestic workers from the Philippines.” gma News. 30 June 2011. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/pinoyabroad/224839/ saudi-arabia-bans-domestic-workers-from-the-philippines/story/ Accessed on 10 August, 2018. gma News. 2018. “196 Pinoys Died in Kuwait Since 2016: OWWA Data.” GMA News. 21 February 2018. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/pinoyabroad/news/644227/196pinoys-died-in-kuwait-since-2016-owwa-data/story/ Accessed on 10 August 2018. Hosoda, Naomi and Akiko Watanabe. 2014. “Creating a ‘New Home’ Away from Home: Religious Conversions of Filipina Domestic Workers in Dubai and Doha.” In Migrant Domestic Workers in the Middle East, edited by Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 117–139. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Human Rights Watch, 2010a. Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System, New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2010b. Slow Reform: Protection of Migrant Domestic Workers in Asia and the Middle East, New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2012. For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda, New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. 2013. “Proposed Domestic Workers Contract Falls Short: Gulf Countries Should Improve Laws, Ratify Treaty.” 17 November 2013. https://www.hrw .org/news/2013/11/16/proposed-domestic-workers-contract-falls-short Accessed on 15 February 2018. Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Respect the Rights of Domestic Workers that Oman ­Depends on.” 18 January 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/respect-rightsdomestic-workers-oman-depends Accessed on 15 February 2018. International Labour Organization. 2015. “Global Estimates on Migrant Workers.” http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_436343/ lang--en/index.htm. Accessed on 15 February 2018.

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Ishii, Masako. 2011. “Fukugō-Kakusa wo Idō suru: Wangan-Sanyukoku de Kaji-Rōdōsha toshite Hataraku Firipin no Musurimu Josē” [“Moving through Multiple Layers of Complex Disparities: Muslim Filipina Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States”]. In Sekai de Mottomo Mazushiku aru to iukoto [Being the Poorest in the World], edited by The Peace Studies Association of Japan, 25–46. Tokyo: Waseda University Press. In Japanese. Ito, Ruri, Chiho Ogaya, Brenda Tenegra, and Nanako Inaba. 2008. “Ikanishite ‘Kea Jōzu na Firipin-jin’ ha Tsukurareruka?: Care Giver to Saiseisan Roudou no ‘Kokusai Shouhin-ka’” [“How ‘Good Caring Filipinos’ are Created? Care-Givers and the ‘International Commodification’ of Reproductive Labors”]. In Kokusai Idou to : Saiseisan Ryouiki no Global-ka [International Migration and “Gendered Chain”: Globalization of Reproductive Spheres], edited by Ruri Ito and Mariko Adachi, 117–143. Tokyo: Sakuhinnsya. In Japanese. Johnson, Mark. 2010. “Diasporic Dreams, Middle Class Moralities and Migrant Domestic Workers among Muslim Filipinos in Saudi Arabia.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 1 (3–4): 1–22. Johnson, Mark. 2011. “Freelancing in the Kingdom: Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers Crafting Agency in Saudi Arabia.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (3–4): 459–478. Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2016. Migrant Dubai: Low Wage Workers and the Construction of a Global City. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Mahdavi, Pardis. 2011. “But We Can Always Get More! Deportability, The State and gendered Migration in the United Arab Emirates.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (3–4): 413–431. Mahdavi, Pardis. 2012. “Informality and Its Discontents: Mapping Migrant Worker ­Trajectories into Dubai’s Informal Economy.” In Migrant labor in the Persian Gulf, ­edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 85–103. New York: Columbia University Press. Mahdavi, Pardis. 2014. “Immobilized Migrancy: Inflexible Citizenship and Flexible Practices among Migrants in the Gulf.” In Migrant Domestic Workers in the Middle East: The Home and the World, edited by Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 7–93. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nawal, Allan. 2018. “Duterte: OFW Ban to Kuwait Permanent.” Inquirer.net. 30 April, 2018. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/166363/duterte-ofw-ban-kuwait-permanent Accessed on 10 August 2018. Pande, Amrita. 2012. “From ‘Balcony Talk’ and ‘Practical Prayers’ to Illegal Collectives: Migrant Domestic Workers and Meso-Level Resistances in Lebanon.” Gender and Society 26(3) (June 2012): 382–405.

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Parreñas, Rhacel S. 2001. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (poea). 2006a. “Policy Reforms on Deployment of Domestic Helpers.” Accessed 16 June 2014. http://www.poea.gov.ph/ hsw/hsw.html. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (poea). 2010. “Overseas Employment Statistics 2010.” http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010_Stats.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2014. Rodriguez, Robyn Magalit. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. Sabban, Rima. 2012. Maids Crossing: Domestic Workers in the UAE. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. Seki, Koki. 2017. “Shakaiteki na Mono” no Jinruigaku: Filipin no Globalka to Kaihatsu ni miru Tsunagari no Shosou [An Anthropology of the “Social”: Globalization, Development, and Connectedness in the Philippines]. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. In Japanese. Shah, Narsa M. 1994. “Arab Labour Migration: A Review of Trends and Issues.” International Migration 32 (1): 3–28. Shah, Nasra M., Sulayman S. Al-Qudsi, and Makhdoom A. Shah. 1989. “The Changing Characteristics of Migrant Workers in Kuwait.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 21: 31–55. Shah, Nasra M. and Sulayman S. Al-Qudsi. 1991. “Asian Women Workers in Kuwait.” International Migration Review 25 (3): 464–486.

Chapter 7

Survival Strategies and Migrant Communities in the Arab Gulf States: A Case of Filipino Workers in the uae Naomi Hosoda 1 Introduction This chapter examines the survival strategies, networks, and diasporic communities of Filipino workers in the uae. There has been an increasing interest in research on the everyday lives of Asian migrants in the Arab Gulf states. Anthropologists and sociologists have demonstrated how, despite the social structure resulting from limited and ­circumscribed interactions across nationalities and class in these countries (Owen 1985; Longva 1997; Gardner 2010; Mednicoff 2012; see Introduction of this volume), Asian migrant workers cope with such structural constraints and form various forms of solidarity among themselves. Gardner (2010) looked into the voluntary associations of middle-class Indians residing in Bahrain and argued that such ethnic groups are the only permanent organizations among the extremely mobile expatriate population and are the only place where Indians can seek “Indian-ness” during their sojourn. Venier (2016) discussed various factors that give rise to the socio-spatial mobility and migratory strategies of semi-permanent highly skilled/professional Keralite workers who live with family members in the uae. The work of Vora (2013) investigated the sense of belonging and citizenship among middle-class Indians living in Dubai, who make the city state their strategic home not only for economic reasons but also because of various other factors. Not only middle-class associations but also working-class relationships have been explored. Osella and Osella (2012) dealt with the importance of informal, temporary, friend-based networks among working-class Keralites when these workers are looking for job opportunities or need special assistance. Kathiravelu (2016) focused on how the lowest class migrants in Dubai survive with localized forms of care outside the state framework. Although these detailed ethnographic works have demonstrated multifaceted networks and practices that contribute to the mutual wellbeing of Asian migrants, they have primarily paid attention to Indian (and/or other South

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Asian) workers. The situations of Asians from outside South Asia remain largely unexplored, although these workers also comprise a considerable portion of the migrant population in the Arab Gulf states.1 To take the case of the Philippines, although the Arab Gulf states has been a major destination for Filipino migrants seeking employment since the 1970s, the bulk of the literature on this outmigration has overlooked Filipino workers’ living situations in the region, except for human rights violations and different forms of abuse arising from recruitment and employment practices (Arcinas, Bautista, and David 1986; Margold 2002; Mendoza 2010) and the magnitude and types of undocumented workers (Battistella and Asis 2017). Gonzalez (2012), who illustrated the existence of lively Filipino communities in Dubai and Fujairah, together with other major destinations for Filipino migrants, such as San Francisco, London, and Singapore, is one of the few researchers who paid attention to the camaraderie spirit among middle-class Filipinos living with family members in the Arab Gulf states. After conducting field research that focused on the life experiences and conditions of Filipino migrant workers in the uae, I came across numerous forms of subjective practices among these workers based on the spirit of mutual and/or communal assistance (Hosoda 2013, 2015, 2016). This chapter reveals the everyday practices and types of networks and communities that offset the legally and socially constrained environments among Filipinos working in the uae, in a holistic manner. I begin with a general discussion of the Filipino population in the uae and follow this with a case of one Filipina who migrated to Dubai in 2008. I continue with background information on how the undocumented flow of migrants from the Philippines to the uae has increased, by referring to the macro-economic conditions, the uae’s migrant labor management policy, the “visit visa” business, and other structural factors. I then delineate the survival strategies acquired by Filipino migrants and examine the networks that transfer local knowledge and serve as an informal safety net for these people. Next, I relate cases of Filipino communities in which some members acquire a sense of belonging, despite the precarious situation, and I analyze how new bonds can be formed across nationality and class lines. Finally, I comment on Filipino ways of forming communities, in comparison with cases of South Asian communities in the Arab Gulf states.

1 Johnson (2010) and Nagy (2008) focused on cases of Filipinos in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, respectively. They dealt with the issue of the identity of the informants, but they examined a specific group of Filipino people. This chapter, by contrast, looks into different types of Filipino communities and also how they are related to one another.

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The main field data presented in this chapter were collected through semistructured interviews of 82 Filipino workers (48 women and 34 men) and participatory observation that took place mostly in Dubai and Abu Dhabi over eight months between 2009 and 2014.2 To gain general information on issues related to migrants, I also interviewed Philippine Embassy officials, Catholic priests, and other religious leaders, university professors and researchers, and journalists in the uae. In addition, I visited the Philippines for two months between 2009 and 2014 and interviewed recruitment agents, Philippine government officials, international organization and non-governmental organization (ngo) officials, journalists, movie directors, and university students who wished to go abroad in the future. 2

Filipinos in the uae

The World Bank data that show the Filipino population in the uae as 120,000 in 2010 (see Table 1.2, Chapter 1) are an underestimation. According to the Philippine government, the estimated number of Filipinos residing in the uae was 822,480 in 2013 (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2018), which makes the uae the third most popular destination for Filipinos overseas, after the United States and Saudi Arabia. According to the Philippine Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Filipinos constitute the third-largest foreign population in the uae, after Indians and Pakistanis. In addition, other data show that more females than males from the Philippines were working in the uae as of 2010 (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2018). Filipinos in the uae are employed in more than 200 different professional categories. This high degree of professional diversity, which is the second highest in all overseas destinations of Filipino workers after those in Saudi Arabia, is a distinctive feature of Filipinos in the uae. By sectors (in 2010), the service and sales sector employed 35 percent of the total number of new Filipino 2 The information I collected in the interviews includes educational level and professional background, family composition, migration or recruitment process, visa status, duration of stay, monthly salary and benefits, living conditions, number of accompanying family members, amounts remitted to the Philippines, religious and recreational activities, and family and friends in the uae. Because the study is qualitative, interviewees were selected chiefly by the snowball sampling method; however, a minority of them were people I met on the street (for details, see the section about the “street community”). The languages I used were “Taglish” (a combination of Tagalog and English), Waray (a regional language of the Philippines, spoken mainly on Samar Island, where I have been doing ethnographic research since 2000), and English, depending on the class and the region of origin of the interviewees.

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workers in the country, followed by domestic household service (30 percent), production and transportation (20 percent), and professional, technical, and clerical services (15 percent). However, the number of Filipinos in administrative and managerial positions has remained less than 1 percent since at least 2000 (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2018). The above-mentioned lack of a so-called Filipino “elite” class distinguishes the Filipino population in the uae from other South Asian populations that began migrating before the oil boom to seek employment of different types, ranging from merchants to laborers (Gardner 2010; Vora 2013). The majority of Filipinos only began arriving in the uae in the 1970s, after the uae actively began using commercial recruitment agencies to seek contract workers from Asian countries (Owen 1985). Therefore, socially speaking, middle-class Filipinos in the uae are placed at the “top” of the entire Filipino population in the country, because of which they seem to have more space and are more expected to take leading roles within the uae’s Filipino community, than their counterparts from South Asia. On the basis of a discourse analysis of the sub-categories of Filipino residents in the uae, the population can broadly be subdivided into the following categories: (1) professionals, (2) semi-skilled workers, and (3) domestic workers (Hosoda 2013). Professionals, including also high-end technical and clerical workers, occupy the highest socioeconomic strata of these three groups; most are university graduates, and some have professional licenses in fields such as engineering, nursing, and teaching. They receive salaries that range between 5,000 and 20,000 dirhams per month (between 1,360 and 5,440 us dollars). Because uae law permits migrant workers with a monthly salary of over 4,000 dirhams (1,090 us dollars) to sponsor their family members, many of these workers bring their families to the uae and stay for longer periods. Semi-skilled workers such as restaurant employees, hotel room staff, retail clerks, travel agents, office workers, and security guards, mostly live in ­dormitory-style sleeping quarters known as “bed spaces.” Their monthly salaries range from 1,000 to 4,000 dirhams (270 to 1,090 us dollars). In principle, these workers have one day off each week, but many opt to either work at their respective workplaces even on their day off or take on part-time contract work elsewhere on their day off, as a means of supplementing their income. In general, they do not earn enough to sponsor their family members and, thus, live by themselves. Alternatively, their family members may come to the uae as workers as well. Domestic workers are distinguished from the other two groups primarily by their social and legal status as “servants,” rather than formal workers. Their educational backgrounds vary, but the average domestic worker is a high

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school graduate. Their monthly salaries vary from 500 to 3,000 dirhams (140 to 840 us dollars), and their working hours are unspecified. Although some have one day off per week, others have no days off. If they are employed by families living in suburban or rural residential areas, their spatial mobility is highly limited because they have to rely on the private cars of their employer, even on their days off. Their working and living conditions vary, depending on the attitude of their employers, but regardless, they cannot take their employers to the labor court because labor codes do not apply to domestic workers. Furthermore, working in a private house makes them highly vulnerable to various forms of violence and abuse (see Ishii, Chapter 6). According to a Philippine Embassy record, there were two government-run shelters in 2010, one located in Abu Dhabi and one in Dubai, each of which housed approximately 100 Filipino citizens, almost all of whom were domestic workers who had escaped from their employers’ homes. I broadly consider the professional workers as middle class and the semiskilled and domestic workers as working class. Among the three groups, semi-skilled workers are said to be the largest in terms of numbers. Below, I illustrate a semi-skilled worker’s experience in Dubai. 3

Grace’s Journey to Dubai

Grace (a pseudonym) was born in a fishing village on Cebu Island in the central Philippines in 1980. In 2008, she came to Dubai alone, leaving her husband and eight-year-old daughter in her home village. She met her husband when she was a freshman in college and, soon after, gave birth to their daughter. Both Grace and her husband left college before graduating. Her husband then worked as a passenger-carrying motorized tricycle3 driver in Cebu, but he stopped the job when he became addicted to drugs. While Grace was working part-time at a canteen owned by her in-laws to make ends meet, her cousinin-law, who learned about Grace’s husband’s drug addiction, invited her to work in Dubai. Her in-laws borrowed 40,000 pesos (900 us dollars) from their relatives for her airfare and other expenses, and she flew to Dubai after obtaining a “visit visa” (see below) to enter the uae. Upon arriving in Dubai, Grace met her cousin-in-law, who was renting a bed in an apartment room. The cousin-in-law told Grace to rent her own bed space 3 Motorized tricycles are a popular means of public transportation in the Philippines. After a sidecar has been attached to a motorbike, the motorized tricycle can carry around five to eight passengers at a time.

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right away. She recalls, “I thought my cousin-in-law would let me sleep at least on her bed (as a gesture for welcoming a relative), because it was my first day after arrival. But she only lent me bed sheets, which made me feel so lonely.” Following the cousin-in-law’s advice, Grace immediately rented her own bed space at 750 dirhams per month (200 us dollars) in another building nearby. Because the bed-space rent and other living costs were a heavy financial burden to her, she desperately looked for a job by directly contacting shop owners or asking other Filipinos on the streets if they knew about job openings. The first shop she worked in was a clothing store managed by an Iranian. Because of her long working hours (from 10 a.m. until 12 midnight), Grace quit after three days as a result of severe leg pain. She said, “I came Dubai on a visit visa so [I] cannot complain [about] any working conditions. [If I don’t like the job] I just quit and look for the next.” She worked in three other stores, but each only lasted a few days, because she felt afraid of non-payment of salary, offensive attitudes, or sexual harassment by the employer. After two months had passed, her visit visa expired. Unable to return to the Philippines without any earnings, Grace decided to make an exit to Kish Island in Iran, by borrowing money from her cousin-in-law. The uae government has changed the ways of renewing or changing one’s visa status from time to time, but as of 2010, uae law allowed foreigners with visit visas to stay for up to 60 days following expiration. After the 60 days, however, foreigners needed to leave and remain out of the country for 30 days before re-entering the uae. Therefore, some foreigners who wanted to re-enter the uae stayed in neighboring visa-free places for 30 days before applying for new visit visas. Kish Island used to be a popular place for such foreigners to stay during their waiting period and, as such, had large-scale hotels to host these foreigners. The hotels on the island housed people of various nationalities who were waiting for new visas. To save money, they mostly stayed inside the hotel compounds and ate inexpensive food such as instant noodles to survive during their stay. According to Grace, “I heard of cases of stranded foreigners there. Because, even after waiting for 30 days, these foreigners were unable to obtain new visas which were promised to them before coming to Kish Island and [they had] run out of all the cash; they had no choice but become beggars. I even heard rumors that some people had committed suicide. So, I prayed hard every day that I will get a visa.” Grace got her visa after 30 days and went back to the uae. Upon returning to Dubai, she resumed job hunting and, in the following year, began working as clerk at a grocery shop run by an Indian. She also switched her visa status from a visit visa to an employment visa immediately after the shop manager promised to process an employment visa for her. With an employment visa, foreigners can work for two years. Grace stated, “At the

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beginning, my Indian boss got angry at me because he didn’t like my answering, saying only ‘Yes, Sir.’ But since I changed my attitude not to be too shy and began to have more conversation with him, I am on good terms with him. My salary has also gone up a little.” However, with 1,700 dirhams (460 us dollars) as a monthly salary, she could barely send 500 dirhams (140 us dollars) home each month. Thus, she took a part-time job each Friday, which was her day off, for a Filipino woman who ran a catering business of Filipino homemade dishes. This part-time job, the availability of which she learned from a Filipino she met on the street, allowed her to earn an extra 100 dirhams (30 us dollars) per day. To avoid spending money on eating out in this expensive city, she brought a lunch box stuffed with rice and sausage to the shop every day. In Grace’s view, “Life in Dubai is easy, because I just have to take care of myself and my workplace,” unlike her life in Cebu, where she was taking care of her family and relatives. Yet, she could not avoid feeling lonely because she “just work[s] 12 hours every day without people to talk to.” After two years in Dubai, a Filipina whom she met on a bus invited her to a gathering of a Christian “born-again” group (see the later section of this chapter), and since then she attended the gathering on any Fridays when she had no work to do for her catering job. She said that she had never read the Bible seriously in the Philippines, despite being born Catholic. Reading the Bible in Dubai, she considered, made her realize for the first time that the Bible contained many useful teachings. She wanted to keep attending the Bible study group in order “to avoid evil things in the city where I cannot avoid feeling lonely.” Furthermore, she regarded the Bible study meetings as opportunities for stress relief by socializing with fellow Filipinos outside of the workplace. In 2013, Grace moved to a new bed space where she shared a room with other born-again group members. 4

The Dubai Boom and the Visit Visa Business

Grace’s experience elucidates many of the social conditions for hundreds or thousands of semi-skilled Filipino workers in the uae. As shown in Figure 7.1, the estimated Filipino population in the uae rose from 124,000 in 2000 to 636,000 in 2010. Although the number of Filipinos seeking employment in the uae has been on the rise since the 1970s, the increase from 2005 to 2010 was the sharpest. By category of visa status, the number of documented Filipino workers with employment visas grew 1.7 times in the five-year period, whereas of the number of other Filipinos entering the c­ ountry rose 4.8 times in the same period. According to news reports and interlocutors, most of those who came to the uae without employment visas were Filipino

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1,000,000 900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 7.1 Estimated Filipino population residing in the uae, 2001–2013 (by the author, based on data from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2018)

“visitors,” who were allowed to enter the country for a few months but not allowed to work. The use of visit visas was a popular way for Filipinos to gain entry to the uae, as Grace did, especially up until 2008, when the visa rules were changed (Hosoda 2015). Prior to that time, the uae government did not require official proof of family relationships (kinship) from visa applicants and their respective sponsors. Therefore, even a self-claimed “relative” of a foreign visitor could easily serve as the official sponsor of that visitor, though often for a fee. Visit visas, then, were convenient for some employers and employees, because employers could hire workers without having to go through governmental “red tape,” often at lower costs. Workers, on the other hand, could find employment through their own volition, rather than having to depend on a recruitment agency in the Philippines and without any concrete knowledge about the workplace or employer. In addition, visit visas offered flexibility. If either party found a problem with the other, they could cease the employment relationship immediately. Workers could begin to search for other opportunities, and employers could begin to search for new employees. This rapid growth of Filipino “visitors” from the mid-2000s was a response to the fast-rising labor demand in the uae. Among the seven emirates of the uae, Dubai in particular has attracted world attention because of its plethora of innovative, large-scale construction projects and sporting events. In fact, the uae’s gross domestic product growth rate in real terms between 2004 and 2008—when Dubai began to attract the world’s attention—remained as high as 6 to 10 percent (International Monetary Fund 2009). The economic boom

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encouraged individuals from diverse regions of the world, including those from the Philippines, to seek employment opportunities there. By 2008, the uae’s foreign population reached 5.9 million, or 87 percent of the total population of the country. As stated earlier, Filipinos are now one of the three major nationalities in the uae, and they are especially prominent in the service industry. Simultaneously, among Filipinos living in the Philippines, Dubai became increasingly differentiated from other Middle Eastern cities. At present, it has a distinction that is accompanied by a particular set of images, summarized by the term “open city,” which spread widely throughout Philippine society during the 2000s. No record exists of when the use of the expression “open city,” in this context, was popularized; however, we can presume that, by the 1990s, a few major international destination cities were referred to as “open cities.” For example, my interlocutors cited Hong Kong as another typical “open city.” A similar expression, “open country,” has a slightly different connotation, because “open country” typically refers to English-speaking immigrant destination countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. One reason why Dubai is often referred to as an “open city” is because migrants have been able to enter the city easily on visit visas, especially before 2008. In addition, from the mid-2000s, Filipino television programs showed Dubai as a glamorous tourist spot and a location where a large Filipino community thrived. Furthermore, the blockbuster Filipino movie entitled Dubai, which was released in 2005, set the image of Dubai as a dream location for those seeking greener pastures. In the movie, popular Filipino actors and actresses acted as semi-skilled workers; yet these semi-skilled workers live in spacious apartment houses and enjoy a middle-class lifestyle. My interlocutors stated that this portrayal of Dubai life, which was quite different from the ­reality for most semi-skilled workers in their view, had changed perceptions of migration to a Middle Eastern city among Filipinos in the Philippines. My interlocutors stated that, following the movie’s release, an unprecedented number of Filipinos migrated to Dubai. 5

Reconstructing Lives

Upon landing in their destination country, migrant workers learn new sets of skills to reconstruct their lives. Visit visa holders, who normally have no or few contacts and no formal employer initially, encounter a variety of challenges, in addition to adjusting themselves to a new culture and environment. One of the first things with which visit visa holders must struggle is finding a place to stay. Especially up until 2008, Dubai was one of the most expensive

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cities in the world with regard to cost of living (Hosoda 2015; Venier 2016). This phenomenon left most migrant workers with few opportunities for housing and led them to staying in apartment rooms packed with eight or more roommates, each occupying only a bed space (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Kathiravelu 2016). Although it is considered a tradition in the Philippines for Filipinos to let their relatives from far distances stay in their house until the newly arrived relatives find a source of income and can afford to pay their own livingspace rent, the skyrocketing housing prices in Dubai led to many situations (such as with Grace and her cousin-in-law) where these Filipinos are unable to accommodate newly arriving visitors’ needs. To survive in the city and manage their budgets, migrant workers are also required to learn where to buy groceries and use Internet communications at low prices, how to use public transportation, and how to apply for jobs in Dubai. It is also crucial to be always attentive to uae rules and regulations, which are often subject to changes, and to avoid violation of them, because such violations can result in heavy fines or deportation. Many Filipinos are afraid of going back home without a certain amount of economic gains, not only because some have debt awaiting them there but also because it is a highly shameful experience to be called “losers” in their homeland (Hosoda 2015: 292). The “visa run” is a key aspect of life in Dubai. It was also casually referred to as a “tax” in Dubai among interlocutors. Although the uae used to be a wellknown tax-free country among Filipinos until value-added tax was introduced in January 2018, Filipinos who resided on visit visas interpreted the fees were systematically imposed when they exited the country to attempt visa renewals as a form of tax. A number of travel agencies in Dubai offer visa renewal (or change) package tours to visa-free towns bordering the uae; these packages include airplane/bus tickets, overnight hotel accommodation, and visa processing fees. As the case of Grace demonstrates, semi-skilled workers often resort to changing jobs as a way of surviving poor working environments and maximizing their chances of larger paychecks; alternatively, they take on multiple jobs as another method of enhancing their income (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999). The adjustment of their interpersonal attitudes toward bosses, coworkers, and customers from various cultural backgrounds is another technique that they must learn from the experiences of others. Aside from looking for jobs by entering the country and/or renewing visit visas, there are other ways to search for better opportunities in the uae. One of these is to acquire a so-called “free visa,” which means that a Filipino pays a certain amount of money to a local citizen and works in a company or runs their own small business, for example, as an unlicensed taxi driver or part-time cleaner at professional workers’ houses. Grace’s employer who runs a catering

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business producing Filipino dishes is an example of a “free visa” holder (see also Rahman, Excursus 3). 6

Kababayan Street Community

Newly arrived migrants learn the local knowledge to survive and re-establish themselves in the uae mainly through two channels: through personal networks and within broader communities. The former includes people who the migrant workers already know, such as family, neighbors, and friends prior to their departure from the Philippines, and new friends that they have made since arriving in the uae. Aside from such personal networks, there is also what I call “the kababayan street community,” upon which Filipino migrant workers can rely for voluntary, on-the-spot assistance, such as asking for directions and ways to solve particular issues. Kababayan is a Filipino word referring to compatriots, the singular form of which is kabayan, composed of the prefix ka, denoting “fellow,” and bayan, meaning “town” or “country” (Hosoda 2013: 19). By calling the attention of a person by saying “kabayan,” migrants can expect certain sets of behaviors, with a sense of mutual respect and compassion for one another, even though they have not met each other before. The concentration of Filipino workers in certain public areas and the practice of mutual assistance among kababayan are not unique to Dubai and Abu Dhabi (and, to a certain extent, other Arab Gulf cities); instead, they are a common feature of large international cities with a considerable Filipino population. What makes the kababayan street community distinct in the Arab Gulf cities is that it ­encompasses Filipinos of various professions, including both semi-skilled and professional people. Semi-skilled workers make up the core of the kababayan street community, because of their large numbers, impermanence, diversity, and economic ­insecurity (Hosoda 2013). Despite their occupational diversity, semi-skilled workers share a common lifestyle and ethos. As explained earlier, they live in extremely congested apartment rooms filled with beds and housing several family members, relatives, or close friends, and they try to make the most of their luck by learning how best to survive in their new and changing environment. Because uae cities that try to cater to the needs of international tourists and investors also provide Filipino dwellers with various public spaces for them to stroll, the kababayan street community has flourished. As such, the community is elastic in nature, with its membership based on behavioral

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modes, although actual encounters may lead to more intimate and lasting relationships. Despite their higher salary and the privilege of sponsoring family members, professionals sometimes also mingle with the kababayan street community, because they are still bound by the same legal restrictions of being noncitizens and temporary workers. Regardless of what class they belong to, as long as they are migrant workers in the uae, they cannot be certain about their occupational and civil security. Thus, as long as members express compassion and share certain modes of behavior, these common grounds have established the kababayan street community as the basic safety net covering all Filipinos. On the other hand, the presence of professionals is much less felt in this type of street community than that of the semi-skilled workers because of their different life styles. Professionals tend to have their own cars or ride in taxis often, rather than relying on public transportation, and they spend most of their free time with their family at home or with association members in respective meeting places, as shown in the next section. Furthermore, it must be noted that some Filipinos in uae cities refrain from communicating with unknown kabayan. They point out the existence of those who just take advantage of the benevolence of their compatriots and the feeling of fear of immediate deportation when mingling with any strangers, including Filipinos. This type of ethnic community involves an informal economy that has developed in uae cities. The case of Grace shows that she acquired a part-time job through a Filipino friend whom she got to know in Dubai. The woman ­running the catering business producing Filipino dishes informally hires parttimers like Grace on Fridays because of the increased demand for catering at weekends. Likewise, a good number of undocumented Filipinos who escape from abusive employers and/or “overstay” also survive in the uae by finding informal employment by contacting Filipinos on the street. Many of them opt to stay in the uae instead of going to the Philippine Embassy or Consulate to be repatriated, because they believe they have not earned enough money to go back to the Philippines, as stated earlier. 7

Filipino Communities and the Transformation of Social Relations

It is assumed that the formation of organizations is difficult in countries like the uae where migrant workers’ stays are temporary and their turnover rate remains high. Moreover, the uae restricts associational activities, both among its own citizens and foreigners; therefore, labor unions, ngos, and other large

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social gatherings are not officially permitted, and religious activities other than those of Islam are restricted (Watanabe and Hosoda 2015). As a result, in comparison with Western destination countries, where a considerable number of Filipinos have migrated and their communal activities have received notable scholarly attention, Filipino communities in the uae are less known to the general public and, therefore, have been less investigated. Nevertheless, a considerable number of Filipinos experience a prolonged stay in the uae, despite their temporary status. A good number of them find membership in one or more Filipino communities where they can socialize on a more stable basis than in the street community. It is generally known that, in the Arab Gulf states, Asian migrants show a greater tendency to organize themselves into associations and other types of groups to protect themselves from accidents and crises, as well as to escape from stress and loneliness (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Gardner 2010; Venier 2016). Members of each community typically maintain close relationships within the group and, at times, extend voluntary help even to non-members, although most groups carefully refrain from being visible in public spaces. Below, I describe two examples of Filipino community groups—one religious community and one professional association—focusing on the activities, membership, and social relationships among the members. 7.1 Religious Communities For Catholic Filipino workers, community building tends to center on the church and church activities. One of the most important activities for large numbers of Filipinos is participation in Mass, which is conducted regularly in the Tagalog language by Filipino priests in Catholic churches in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. One Filipino priest in Dubai noted that a Tagalog Mass would draw about 3,000 participants (Watanabe and Hosoda 2015). One notable religious phenomenon is the increasing involvement of Filipino workers in Christian born-again movements. Here, the term “born-again” is consistent with typical usage of this term among Filipinos, and refers to nonCatholic Christians belonging to Pentecostal or charismatic movements. ­Although there are no formal data as to how many and what kinds of ­Filipino-related born-again Christian groups are active in the uae, based on information that I heard from interlocutors who have participated in bornagain Christian activities, some groups originated in the Philippines and ­others were formed by Filipinos (together with other nationalities) in the uae or other Arab Gulf states (Hosoda 2013).4 4 Although there are also born-again groups originally from other countries, the majority of Filipinos participate in groups related to their homeland.

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According to the data of three born-again groups that I visited in Dubai, they carry out both religious and recreational activities in places such as the seminar rooms of Dubai’s Protestant church compound, members’ houses, or the function/conference rooms of hotels (Watanabe and Hosoda 2015). The former activities include worship services, in which the majority of members participate once or twice a week, and other activities such as Bible studies that are carried out by volunteer members. The latter activities include birthday or various anniversary parties for members and sports tournaments, often organized by sub-groups divided by age and gender. Activity expenses are covered by members’ contributions, and details of the planned activities are posted on each group’s website or Facebook account. A good number of Roman Catholics convert to born-again Christianity after coming to the Arab Gulf states. One of reasons why they are attracted to bornagain groups is that the experience of leaving the Philippines has made them rethink their spiritual dimension by questioning their relationship with “Jesus” or “the Holy Bible” for the first time, because the Roman Catholic practices used to be just part of their everyday lives back home (Hosoda and Watanabe 2014). Some members consider that joining born-again groups can save them from slipping into the “evil” ways that surround Filipinos in uae cities, where migrant workers can become trapped in credit loan debt or fall into illicit ­relationships with new partners (Hosoda 2013). Another reason for joining born-again groups is that they want a “family” during their sojourn, ­because born-again Christian groups tend to be relatively small, numbering between 30 and 100 members who attend meetings and events regularly. Bornagain group members, during my interviews, frequently described the organization as being “like a family” (parang isang pamilya) (Watanabe and Hosoda 2015). These groups’ members include professionals, semi-skilled workers, and domestic workers.5 Based on interviews conducted with key group members, the ratio of men to women is about equal; in addition, the semi-skilled workers and domestic workers commented that classism is less felt within their group and that, sometimes, these groups have members from other countries (Watanabe and Hosoda 2015). It is worth noting that semi-skilled workers, who tend to stay in bed spaces, may group together to rent one room in an apartment building. Figure 7.2 shows people living in Grace’s apartment house, by sex and religious affiliation. It is interesting that two rooms are exclusively shared by born-again 5 Although the category of domestic workers includes both live-in workers and part-time workers, there are very few participants of the former type, because they have very few days off work and are often unable to participate in activities.

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Room 1 (4 singles) Female: Born-again A Female: Born-again A Female: Born-again B Female: Born-again C

Toilet

Bathroom

Kitchen Room 2 (1 couple) Female: Born-again A Male: Born-again A

Room 3 (5 singles, 1 couple) Female: Roman Catholic Female: Roman Catholic Female: Roman Catholic Female: Roman Catholic Female: Roman Catholic Male: Roman Catholic Male: Roman Catholic

Living room

Room 4 (2 singles) Female: El Shaddai Female: El Shaddai

Entrance

Figure 7.2 Residents, by sex and religious affiliation, of an apartment house rented out as bed spaces (illustrated by the author, based on field data collected in Dubai in March 2013) Note: “Born-again A,” “Born-again B,” and “Born-again C” refer to three different born-again groups.

Christians, one room by Roman Catholics, and the last one by Roman ­Catholics who belong to the El Shaddai group, a popular and charismatic Filipino Catholic movement. Although most people in the apartment house were not conscious of the division of the rooms by their religious affiliation, some believed that it was easier for them to live with people of the same religious groups in the confined bed-space room to minimize personal friction, because of the similarity in moral beliefs and close feelings between those who go to the same church.

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Although my research into the longevity of Filipino members’ sense of belonging to born-again Christian groups is not yet complete, judging from the reported views of Filipinos about their religious identities upon returning to the Philippines, I assume that some remain born-again Christians for a long time, regardless of where they live (Hosoda and Watanabe 2014). Others are likely to be uncertain about their religious futures, partly because of their precarious employment status. This latter group considered church members as their closest friends and almost like family; yet they conceded that belonging to a born-again Christian community might be temporary, lasting only for the term of their sojourn. 7.2 Filipino Associations Voluntary associations are another center of community activity among Filipinos residing in the uae. As of September 2014, there were 51 Filipino associations registered at the Philippine Embassy and 65 registered at the Philippine Consulate in Dubai and the Northern Emirates.6 According to some leaders of these associations, countless associations also exist that are unregistered at either the Embassy or Consulate. As of 2014, there were also two umbrella organizations—one in Abu Dhabi and the other in Dubai. The Philippine government fostered the formation of these umbrella organizations under its auspices with the cooperation of Filipino community leaders. The umbrella organizations were composed of ­representatives from all registered associations and held regular meetings and large-scale annual celebrations, such as that of Philippine Independence Day (Hosoda 2016). Because there was no centralized information dissemination system that could reach all Filipino residents in the uae, these umbrella ­organizations helped to spread authorized information from the Philippine government and the uae government, to call for consolidated support for victimized compatriots, and to monitor the safety situation for Filipino workers. The chief aims of forming groups vary widely, from regional or religious identities to those that reflect professionals’ lifestyles and social relationships, including (1) those formed by common recreational activities, such as basketball, chess, music, driving, and dance; (2) groups of workers employed in a common profession or trade, such as engineers, nurses, computer programmers, architects, and safety professionals; (3) fraternity/sorority groups and university alumni; and (4) groups that offer social support and address members’ concerns (Hosoda 2016). Members of these associations include both 6 These numbers are based on lists of associations prepared by the Philippine Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the Philippine Consulate in Dubai, respectively.

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males and females, who are mostly long-time residents—albeit contract ­workers—with families. Our questionnaire surveys on association members’ career paths and lifestyles revealed that the average association member had lived in the uae for about five years with his or her family, had joined one or two associations, and aside from time spent at home, had spent most of their two-day weekends, and perhaps even some weekday evenings, with these associations.7 Not many semi-skilled and domestic workers participated in ­associations because of their limited free time and budget. Regardless of each group’s chief aim, most associations engaged in various activities, which ranged from holiday celebrations and sports leagues to dances or simply “hanging out” after gatherings. Although the aims of the associations differ, from offering recreational activities to forming career organizations, a striking feature of Filipino associations in the uae is that many are actively involved with charity and volunteer work, which includes both direct and indirect assistance for distressed Filipinos (Hosoda 2016). Some association members engage in volunteer work with a high degree of commitment; for example, there are Filipino professionals who are constantly contacted by compatriots seeking their advice or assistance. They spend most of their free time on weekends with Filipinos in need, and the transportation costs involved in their travels are paid for with their own money. In some associations, members organize search-and-rescue missions for compatriots who need immediate assistance for their safety. My interviews with these association members revealed some aspects of the Filipino professionals’ lives in Abu Dhabi and Dubai that drive them to commit themselves to the betterment of their compatriots in the uae. Most Filipino professionals first migrate to the uae as a temporary move, but after an ­adjustment period, some see the advantages of being in the uae and change their attitude toward staying in the Arab Gulf State. Despite this desire to stay, however, discriminatory working conditions and loneliness in this com­ partmentalized society continue to affect them (Hosoda 2016). In addition, at one point or another, they lose their sense of satisfaction in mere economic gains, which are the major reason for coming to the Arab Gulf region for most

7 My research project colleagues (Masako Ishii and Akiko Watanabe) and I conducted a questionnaire survey of 12 members of the Filipino Nurse Association in the Emirates in Abu Dhabi in March 2011, which was followed by another survey of 15 members of a Filipino choir group in Abu Dhabi called “the Circle of Hands” in February 2012. The characteristics mentioned here represent our findings from these two surveys.

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­ igrants. Thus, after several years of prolonged stay, many Filipino professionm als may begin searching for identification within a wider society.8 The presence of Filipino communities in overly globalized uae cities facilitates a feeling of belonging to a wider society and adds new meaning to the lives of migrant workers living there by allowing them to find and form relationships with fellow Filipinos. Unlike some other Arab Gulf cities, such as Riyadh, where almost all organized social and cultural activities are banned, especially for women, Dubai and Abu Dhabi are becoming increasingly tolerant of the social activities of foreign residents, provided they do not cause social disruption, which leaves social space for foreigners to organize themselves, to an extent. This uae social context could work to consolidate the attention of professionals toward fellow nationals in need of assistance. 8 Conclusion This chapter has described the various forms of survival strategies, networks, and diaspora communities among Filipino workers in relation to the uae’s foreign labor policy and social conditions. It has also discussed the transformation of social relationships within such networks and communities. Migrant workers in the uae are placed in legal, economic, and social systems in which it is difficult to form organized networks and communities that might transcend nationality and class lines. For fear of immediate deportation or hefty fines, migrant workers regulate their own behavior and obey the rules set by the authorities. Under such circumstances, different forms of survival strategies have emerged to reduce the risks and improve their working and living conditions, and these strategies are passed on by migrants’ personal networks upon a­ rrival. uae cities also have a kababayan street community, from which Filipinos can expect instant help from compatriots by calling even unknown Filipinos kabayan. Because of its elusive nature, this street community is undetectable by the authorities or even non-Filipino people, and it successfully transfers local 8 On the other hand, it must be noted that the rivalry among members of Filipino associations can often become a source of internal conflict and drive some people away from voluntary activities. I was told by some middle-class Filipinos that they opt out from such Filipino associations and prefer to be on their own, largely because they are afraid (or have already got tired) of the “crab mentality” within such groups. “Crab mentality” is a Filipino expression meaning the internal rivalry whereby members keep pulling others down to progress themselves, as crabs do when climbing.

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knowledge regarding survival in the country. In this manner, the street ­community functions as a safety net for Filipinos who come to the uae without strong existing support and who need to survive in precarious employment and legal situations. In addition to the kababayan street community, there are also more organized Filipino community groups that Filipinos living in the uae for long periods, despite their temporary status, often participate in. Members of these groups can expect more organized and long-lasting ties than those in the street community. The intimacy among members of these community groups generally seems to be felt more strongly in the uae than among similar Filipino groups in Western countries, partly because there are no other formal social groups in which they can take part as a result of the restrictions imposed on the freedom of assembly and association in public spaces in the Emirates, which do not occur in Western countries (Hosoda 2013). In religious communities, one can experience family-like ties among the members, even across class and nationality lines. Voluntary associations often exert great efforts to extend assistance to compatriots in desperate need of help, with the aim of recapturing a sense of self-worth and recognition from a wider society. By looking into the subjective practices of Filipino workers in the uae, we can witness numerous networks and communities that have developed to overcome the insecure and isolating environment, even though these networks and communities can be quite invisible to outsiders. In comparison with those of other major Asian nationalities, I have found that the Filipino communities in various forms tend to be more centralized than the communities of Indians and Pakistanis in the uae (see, for example, Osella and Osella 2012; Vora 2013; Kathiravelu 2016). As the Philippines is also a multi-ethnolinguistic nation, like India and Pakistan, this characteristic may derive from the historical background of Filipino migration to the Arab Gulf states. Unlike Indian and Pakistani migrants, there are no elite Filipino individuals with relatively strong socioeconomic foundations and connections in the country. Furthermore, because the out-migration of Filipino workers was initiated primarily as a major state project of the Philippine government (Rodriguez 2010; Guevarra 2010; see Ishii, Chapter 6), Filipino migrants go through a unified and centralized labor-sending system, which also includes some protective measures in times of abusive and emergency situations (­although there are some Filipinos who go to the uae on visit visas like Grace) (see Watanabe, Chapter 5). It is equally important to note the spirit of solidarity among Filipinos, which connects Philippine government officials and Filipino workers in various jobs.

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A considerable part of the government’s protective measures for victimized compatriots could not be achieved without the support of Filipino people who are willing to act for unknown others, both through individual action on the spot and through group activities. As a result, we can witness semi-autonomy of Filipino communities in uae cities, despite the large population volume. Bibliography Arcinas, Fe R., Maria Cynthia Banzon Bautista, and Randolf S. David. 1986. The Odyssey of the Filipino Migrant Workers to the Gulf Region. Quezon City, Philippines: Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines. Battistella, Graziano and Maruja M.B. Asis. 2017. “Stemming Irregular Migration at the Source: The Philippine Experience.” In Skilful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme, edited by Philippe Fargues and Nasra M. Shah, 315–335. Cambridge, UK: Gulf Research Centre Cambridge. Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2018. “Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos as of Dec. 2010.” Accessed 17 February 2018. http://www.cfo.gov.ph/. Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Guevarra, Anna Romina. 2010. Marketing Dreams, Manufacturing Heroes: The ­Transnational Labor Brokering of Filipino Workers. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Gonzalez iii, Joaquin Jay. 2012. Diaspora Diplomacy: Philippine Migration and its Soft Power Influences. Minneapolis: Mill City Press. Hosoda, Naomi. 2016. “Middle Class Filipinos and the Formation of Diasporic National Communities in the United Arab Emirates.” In International Migration in Southeast Asia: Continuities and Discontinuities, edited by Kwen Fee Lian, Mizanur Rahman, and Yabit Bin Alas, 39–56. Singapore: Springer. Hosoda, Naomi. 2015. “2008: ‘Open City’ and a New Wave of Filipino Migration to the Middle East.” In Asia Inside Out: Changing Times, edited by Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen F. Siu, and Peter C. Perdue, 281–303. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hosoda, Naomi. 2013. “Kababayan Solidarity? Filipino Communities and Class Relations in United Arab Emirates Cities.” Journal of Arabian Studies 3(1): 18–35. Hosoda, Naomi and Akiko Watanabe. 2014. “Creating a ‘New Home’ Away from Home: Religious Conversions of Filipina Domestic Workers in Dubai and Doha.” In ­Migrant

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Domestic Workers in the Middle East, edited by Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 117–139. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. International Monetary Fund (imf). 2009. “IMF Country Report No.9/124.” Accessed 1 June 2010: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cro9120.pdf. Johnson, Mark. 2010. “Diasporic Dreams, Middle Class Moralities and Migrant Domestic Workers among Muslim Filipinos in Saudi Arabia.” The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 11(3–4): 428–448. Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2016. Migrant Dubai: Low Wage Workers and the Construction of a Global City. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Khalaf, Sulayman and Saad Alkobaisi. 1999. “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping and Patterns of Accommodation in the Oil-Rich Gulf Societies: Evidence from the UAE.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26(2): 271–298. Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Margold, Jane A. 2002. “Narratives of Masculinity and Transnational Migration: Filipino Workers in the Middle East.” In Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World?, edited by Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., 209–236. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Migration Research Network and Philippine Social Science Council. Mednicoff, David. 2012. “The Legal Regulation of Migrant Workers, Politics, and Identity in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 187–215. London: Hurst & Co. Mendoza, Dovelyn Rannveig. 2010. “Migration’s Middlemen: Regulating Recruitment Agencies in the Philippines–United Arab Emirates Corridor. Migration Policy ­Institute Report (June 2010).” Accessed 17 February 2018: https://www.migration policy.org/research/migrations-middlemen-regulating-recruitment-agencies-philippinesunited-arab-emirates. Nagy, Sharon. 2008. “The Search of Miss Philippines Bahrain: Possibilities for Representation in Expatriate Communities.” City and Society 20(1): 79–104. Osella, Caroline and Filippo Osella. 2012. “Migration, Networks, and Connectedness across the Indian Ocean.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 105–136. London: Hurst & Co. Owen, Roger. 1985. Migrant Workers in the Gulf. London: Minority Rights Group. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. 2018. “OFW Deployment Statistics (2010).” Accessed 17 February 2018: http://www.poea.gov.ph/ofwstat/ofwstat.html. Rodriguez, Robyn. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Venier, Philippe. 2016. “Spatial Mobility and the Migratory Strategies of Kerala Immigrants in the UAE.” In South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development, edited by Prakash C. Jain and Ginu Zacharia Oommen, 141–156. London: Routledge.

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Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. Durham, US: Duke University Press. Watanabe, Akiko and Naomi Hosoda. 2015. “Transforming Intimate Spheres and Incorporating New Power Relationships: Religious Conversions of Filipino Workers in the United Arab Emirates.” In Southeast Asian Migration: People on the Move in Search of Work, Refuge and Belonging, edited by Khatharya Um and Sofia Gaspar, 92–113. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Chapter 8

Does Religious Conversion Transcend the Boundaries of Multiple Hierarchies? Filipino Migrant Workers Embracing Islam in the uae and Qatar Akiko Watanabe 1 Introduction In a society where people are segmented and hierarchically divided by nat­ ionality, class, religion, and other factors, how does conversion to the major­ ity faith open up relations between migrants and the dominant groups, cause schisms with fellow migrants of the former faith, and above all, transcend the boundaries of multiple strata? This chapter elucidates the ways in which new ties are forged and which relationships are alienated or developed by focusing on migrant workers’ conversions to Islam in the Arab Gulf states, namely the uae and Qatar.1 It particularly highlights on former Christian migrant workers from the Philippines. By doing so, the chapter notes how the multi-hierarchic situations in Arab Gulf society impinge on the formation and reformation of relationships. It is widely known that religion plays an important role for immigrants in adjusting to the host society and overcoming their foreignness and isolation (Werbner and Johnson 2011). Religion provides an entry point for fuller partici­ pation in the majority of host societies (Bonifacio and Angeles 2010), a public space for the migrant community, encounters with fellow believers of different backgrounds, and a safety net among members. Moreover, it allows an expres­ sion of ethnic consciousness, provides a sense of belonging, and is a basis for building and affirming one’s identity, among other factors (Beckford 2015; Saunders, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Snyder 2016). As almost half (48.5 per cent) of migrant workers are concentrated in two broad subregions, Northern Amer­ ica and Northern, Southern and Western Europe (International Labour Migra­ tion 2017), in many cases, host societies are either predominantly Christian or 1 Some parts of this chapter coincide with the work of Watanabe and Hosoda (2015).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_012

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culturally familiar for the migrant workers from the Philippines. Whereas in the case of the Arab Gulf states, we can assume that these countries are Muslim-­prevailing societies, because a large fraction of the population, includ­ ing nationals and migrant workers together, are Muslim.2 In countries where they have received migrant workers and provided them with citizenship, the major population influx has become one of the key fac­ tors for destabilizing the receptiveness of societies because it leads to national identities being threatened socially and economically. Yet in the Arab Gulf states, there have been various restrictions and social environments that have led to multi-layered divisions, according to nationality, religion and social class, that stratified the ­migrant workers (Kapiszewski 2001, Bristol-Rhys 2012), in which Longva (1997) claimed “the stratified coexistence of ethnic groups”(1997:4). On the basis of nationality (country of origin), the nationals are positioned at the top, followed by Westerners, non-national Arabs, Asians, and Africans. On the basis of religion, Muslims are situated at higher stratum than the non-Muslims. On the basis of social class, the society is divided into the upper class, middle class, and lower class, including domestic workers; these divisions have hindered migrant workers from having chances to interact with each other. In addition to these bases, I am proposing that there is cultural basis (Western and ­non-Western)—which by and large lead to the existence of multiple strata in Arab Gulf societies. Against this background, I had presumed that becoming a Muslim would be a catalyst for a migrant worker to gain entry into the majority society in the uae and Qatar, where Arab Muslims predominate. Indeed, although nationals take up less than 10 percent of the total population, being Muslim is still one of the significant identities of the Arab Gulf states, and Islam is considered, both politically and socially, to be the most respected religion in these countries. Owing to these circumstances, the Christian Filipinos living in this society are located at the lower part of the religious hierarchy, because non-Muslims are placed at the lower levels. Therefore, conversion from Christianity to Islam might be indicative of an attempt to reach a higher social level, from the mi­ nority to the majority. By doing so, one would be taken in as a member of the “community of I­ slam.” However, as I will illustrate later in this chapter, it be­ came evident that these converts to Islam could not overcome the various bar­ riers that segment the society in the uae and Qatar. By embracing Islam, ­Filipino migrant workers are faced with new adversities based on differences 2 Those migrant workers come from South and West Asian countries, such as India (there are non-Muslim Indians as well), Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran, among others (World Bank 2010).

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of nationality and class that were once deemed to have been transgressed along with the religious boundary. By carefully relativizing the experiences of Filipino converts to Islam, I will demonstrate in this chapter the complexities of the multi-hierarchic situation in the Arab Gulf societies, where the nationality hierarchy that places the na­ tionals above the rest, the cultural hierarchy that elevates the West with re­ spect to scholarship, science, and technology, and the religious hierarchy all exist separately but are interrelated (Figure 8.1). Here, “Filipinos” are given im­ portant posts, although Dumia ingenuously called them as “low-cost Ameri­ cans” (Dumia 2009: 59), since they are hardworking, cleanly, fluent in English, and accustomed to the culture of the West. This means that, among the differ­ ent migrant workers from Asia, many of the “Filipinos,” especially professional and skilled workers (and perhaps including a few domestic workers as well), are considered as “Western.” However, the term “Filipinos,” in the mindset of Arab nationals, represents only Christian Filipinos and does not include Mus­ lim Filipinos. When these Christian Filipinos embraced Islam, they were cate­ gorized as “non-Western” and were thus disconnected from people who were nearly regarded as “of the West.”3 Thus, the chapter tries to examine whether and how a migrant worker embracing the majority religion could be a catalyst for them to transcend these assumed categories. Nationality

Social Class

Higher Nationals/ Westerners

Upper class

Arabs from Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) countries

Middle class

Religion Muslim

(Converts)

Culture Western Non-Western

Non-Muslim Arabs from non-gcc countries Low-income class Lower (includes Domestic Asians Africans Workers) Figure 8.1 Conceptual diagram of the multi-hierarchic situation in the arab gulf societies from the viewpoint of new filipino Muslims Note: Regarding the hierarchy of nationality, the Westerners may be situated above the nationals. Source: By the author based on fieldwork. 3 One ethnic Muslim interlocutor even explained to me that when she told her interviewer during a job interview that she was Muslim, he became obviously discouraged by her words.

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The chapter constitutes five sections. In the first section, I will give an over­ view of migrant workers’ religious conversions in the Arab Gulf states. In the second section, the religious environments in the uae and Qatar will be intro­ duced. In the next section, I will discuss the phenomenon of Filipinos’ convert­ ing to Islam. In the following section, the focus will be on Islamic Centers, places that are crucial for Muslim converts. Finally, through case studies, the relationships of new Muslims with other Filipinos, other migrant workers, and nationals of the Arab Gulf states will be analyzed. I note here that, in collecting data for this chapter, I conducted five months of ethnographic research be­ tween 2009 and 2015 in the uae and Qatar, mainly through participatory obser­ vations and in-depth interviews with 28 Filipinos (5 males and 23 females). Among them, 23 (5 males and 18 females) were converts to Islam. I have been conducting fieldwork in Metro Manila and Muslim-majority areas in Mindan­ ao Island in the Philippines. I spoke Tagalog and English during the research. Aside from the uae and Qatar, I visited Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for comparisons. 2

Overview of Religious Conversion in the Arab Gulf States

Religious conversion has been perceived as a way for migrants to enter a host society. Lacar, a sociologist, claimed that religious conversion is a process to bring in the doctrines, beliefs, rituals, and practices of a new religious group (Lacar 2001: 39). Rambo (1993), a scholar of religious studies, claimed that reli­ gious conversions are deeply related to one’s social, economic, and political marginalization. Indeed, there are many cases of people who, considered even in their homeland as political and social minorities, have decided to convert to the majority religion in order to pull themselves away from their marginalized structures and situations (see, for example, Aoyama 2006).4 In recent years, newspapers and magazines in the Arab Gulf states have fre­ quently posted articles about migrant workers’ conversion to Islam (Shaaban 2011; Nazzal 2013; The National 2015; Abdullah 2017). According to Islamic ­Affairs and Charitable Activities Department under the Dubai government, there has been an increase in the number of converts in Dubai since around 2008.5 In response to this new phenomenon, several research papers and books have been published (Ahmad 2011; Angeles 2011; Mahdavi 2013). ­Although 4 There are adverse cases, such as people situated at the very bottom of the Hindu society in India converting to Buddhism (Enoki 2010). In this case, disengagement from the majority religion helped this ethnic group to upgrade their social status. 5 Report of the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department (Dajani 2010).

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both male and female migrant workers have embraced Islam (Shaaban 2011; Abdullah 2017), these studies have put a special focus on female domestic workers and intermarriages. Female domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states come not only from Mus­ lim countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh but also from non-Muslim countries, including Sri Lanka, India, the Philippines, Nepal, and Ethiopia. Some of these non-Muslim women have converted to Islam in the course of working for Arab families. With respect to the rationales for their conversions, there are two different views presented by scholars. One explanation is that, because they are most vulnerable and working in isolated environments, they are converting so as to get themselves out of such situations (Angeles 2011). The other explanation is that they are converting as a result of their f­ amiliarization with Islam in the course of intimate contact with their employers’ families (Ahmad 2011). There is no way to exclude either of these opportunistic and ac­ customing explanations as the rationales for their conversions, because there is a multiplicity of religious and social situations that domestic workers experi­ ence and the perceptions of workers may differ according to their life stages. Thus, these studies provide various ways to understand domestic workers’ con­ versions to Islam, especially the process of conversion and the internal aspects, such as reinterpretations of their lives. As for intermarriages, according to the Philippine Embassy of Abu Dhabi, there were 464 people who submitted their marriage registration to the em­ bassy in 2010; among these, 84 people (18 percent) acquired a certificate of ­legal capacity to contract a marriage, which is usually used to marry non-­ Filipinos. This figure was not limited to those marrying Muslims, but many of the Filipinas were marrying foreigners and more than a few were marring Mus­ lim nationals and migrant workers while working in the Arab Gulf states.6 Marriage to Muslims requires adaptations in various phases of life, and for most Filipinas, they face different ways of life and frames of mind that they have never previously experienced. Although not an academic, Hajar, a Filipi­ na married to a Qatari, has written an autobiography of her life and depicted her Qatari’s family’s attitude toward intermarriage; and her story is an analysis of social relations as limited to the boundary of family and in-laws (Hajar 2011).

6 With regard to the timing of the conversion, some converted individually and met their spouse afterwards, whereas others embraced Islam after their marriage. For cases outside of the Arab Gulf states, there is a study of Filipino female migrant workers in Hong Kong who converted to Islam to keep or strengthen their relationships with Pakistani husbands or boy­ friends (Hawwa 2000).

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Pingol (2011) has dealt with Filipinas who married Muslims in Saudi Arabia and has argued their views and the issues of conjugal relationships against the background of polygamy. In adding to these studies of domestic workers and intermarriages, this study seeks to investigate whether conversion to Islam by migrant workers impinges on the formation and reformation of these relation­ ships and transcends the boundaries of multiple hierarchies in the Arab Gulf states. 3

Religious Environments in the uae and Qatar

In the uae and Qatar, Islam is set as the national religion in the respective constitutions. There are mosques, or worship facilities, for Muslims every few blocks. When the time comes for them to pray, the azan (the call to prayer in Islam) runs through neighboring communities through amplifiers attached to the minarets of the mosques. In shopping centers, there are prayer rooms for Muslims, and there are places for them to do ablution next to lavatory rooms.7 Fridays are holidays, and congregation prayers are performed at mid-noon at every mosque. Friday is supposed to be reserved specifically for the observa­ tion of Islam and family. During Ramadan, the ninth month of the Islamic cal­ endar, which is designated for fasting, restaurants are banned from operating during the day, and other stores are opened for shorter periods. As such, there are structures set up in the Arab Gulf states that allow Muslims to have no dif­ ficulty in practicing Islam.8 There are tacit approvals to the practice of other religions in the uae and Qatar, but only Islam is permitted to be publicly demonstrated and propagat­ ed. Thus, active da’wa (Islamic education activities) are performed by ustaz and other famous imams (religious leaders) in markets, parks, shopping malls, companies, and even in prisons (see Dajani 2010); they conduct activities like debates and public discussion forums with Christian pastors and priests, as well as public confessions of Islam by new Muslims (shahadah). In commer­ cial complexes, Islam-related booklets are displayed at corners; they are writ­ ten in languages such as Tagalog, Urdu, and Malayalam and are addressed to migrant workers and tourists. Excursus of Islamic lectures and articles on fatwa (Islamic interpretation) related to questions raised by readers or viewers are 7 In Saudi Arabia, all stores are closed at the time of prayers, and customers are kept out of the buildings. Other Arab Gulf states are not as strict as Saudi Arabia. 8 In the uae, those who eat and drink during the daytime during Ramadan will be targets of punishment, even if they are foreigners (Fukushima 2011).

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often delivered through m ­ edia such as the television, Internet, and radio pro­ grams. During Eid-al-Fitr, one of the two Eids (Islamic festivities), after Rama­ dan, various events take place. Among them, there are events that involve the handing over of gifts to thouse who have newly embraced Islam during the month of Ramadan.9 Whether these activities have come to fruition, the num­ ber of foreigners converting to Islam in the Arab Gulf states has increased dramatically; it was reported that, in Dubai alone, 19,945 foreigners from 75 underwent religious conversions to Islam between 1996 to September 2012 (see Nazzal 2012). Meanwhile, how do the governments of these countries perceive the mi­ grant workers who embrace the same religion as their citizens? In the uae, the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department oversees da’wa, whereas the Islamic Affairs Ministry is the supervisory body in Qatar. One of the aims of these authorities is to heighten religious consciousness in all com­ munities. For neighboring Kuwait, the “community” initially referred to that of nationals. However, as the number of migrant workers has increased, the gov­ ernment has begun to expand the category and include communities of for­ eigners. In order to not threaten the ethical norms of the nationals, it was perceived that da’wa was necessary for other nationalities in the country (Ah­ mad 2012). Thus, it is probable that, in the uae, where 90 percent of the popu­ lation is of foreign nationality, the expansion of the scope of da’wa evolved in the same way. The targeting of non-nationals with da’wa can be observed from national newspaper articles on the Islamic conversion of migrant workers. For example, a high officer of the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department in the uae stated, “the Muslim code of conduct and the good treatment some people had received at the hands of uae nationals were the major reasons for dozens of people of various nationalities converting to Islam.” (see Nazzal). In another article, the director of the New Muslim Division said that “the (Indian) family of five visited the department on their own will and with an honest wish to declare their Islam after knowing the true principals of Islam.” (see Nazzal 2012). In Qatar, knowing that 800 migrant workers embraced Islam within six months, the director of an Islamic center praised how, “these numbers reflect the efforts of the (Islamic) centre to bring the message to all the communities.” (see Toumi 2011). These articles show that the key to actual Islamic propagation in these countries are the Islamic Centers under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned 9 This is the distribution of zakat (charity) in Eid-al-Fitr. It is stated in the Qur’an, Chapter 9, Verse 60, that there are eight kinds of people who should be given a portion of zakat.

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Table 8.1  Islamic centers in dubai (as of December 2017)

Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Language

Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashed Center for English Cultural and Social Understanding (women) Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashed Center for English Cultural and Social Understanding Islamic Information Center English, Tagalog, Chinese, Russian, and Urdu Kalemah Center English, Tagalog, Chinese, Urdu, and Indonesian Manahel Al Khair Center n/a Jumeira Islamic Learning Center English Al Farooq Omar bin Khatab Center English Indian Islahi Center English and Malayalam Sunni Cultural Center English and Malayalam Sunni Center for Islamic Education n/a Abu Bakr Assiddiq Islamic Center English, Tagalog, Chinese, and other languages Jamia Saadiya Arabiya Indian Center English and Malayalam Dubai Kerala Muslim Center English and Malayalam Anjuman-E-Najmi n/a China Islamic Center Chinese Al Manar Centre English and Malayalam South African Islamic Center English

Source: Website of the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department, the uae (https://www.iacad.gov.ae/en/info/MuslimGuide/Pages/AuthorizedIslmaic-Institutions-In-Dubai.aspx, accessed 30 December 2017), and the website of each center

authorities.10 To respond to the presence of various foreign nationalities, some of the centers propagate and support education with personnel who speak the respective mother tongues. In the uae, for example, there are 17 Islamic Cen­ ters in Dubai, as listed on the website of the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department; among them, many conduct activities in different lan­ guages, like Malayalam, Chinese, and Tagalog, in addition to English, to serve 10

The Department calls them Islamic institutions; however, in this chapter, they will be called Islamic Centers to emphasize their characteristic of “space.”

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certain foreigners (Table 7.2). Who, then, are assembling in these centers? In the next section, I will look at Filipino converts to Islam in detail. 4

Phenomena of Filipinos’ Conversion to Islam

Before posing my argument, I shall explain the situation of Muslims in the Philippines. Comprising around 5 to 10 percent of the total population, Mus­ lims in the Philippines have been residing on Mindanao and neighboring is­ lands as their homeland and have been the targets of discrimination and bias from the majority Christian population. In addition to this, because of their armed separatist movements since the 1970s, Muslims have been stigmatized as barbarians, terrorists, and suppressors of women. They are referred to as Philippine Muslims, or Muslim Filipinos, but here in this chapter I call them “ethnic Muslims” to emphasize that they are, divided into 13 ethno-linguistic groups. On the other hand, there are some Filipinos not from the 13 ethnolinguistic groups above who have embraced Islam, amounting to exceed 200,000 people at the time of 2005 (International Crisis Group 2005).11 These converts, in contrast to the ethnic Muslims, are referred to as balik-Islam, literally mean­ ing “reverts.” Some of the growth in the number of balik-Islam may be attribut­ ed to relationships with friends and intermarriages, but the conversions are mostly a result of the converts’ own working experiences in the Middle East or the influence of family members or friends who have worked there.12 For most who became Muslim in the Arab Gulf states, they confessed their faith in Is­ lamic Centers, studied a three-month class on Arabic, Islamic doctrine, and Qur’an interpretations, and were taught Islamic knowledge and practices. Who are the people learning there? Let us take an Islamic Center in Dubai as an example. In February 2012, this center had 45 male and 55 female Filipino students, together with other few foreigners. Of these, the male students were service sector workers, engineers, skilled workers, and office workers, whereas the female students were service sector workers, office workers, and domestic workers, among others.13 11 12

13

Angeles (2011), who also argued the role of converts to Islam in relation to overseas labor migration to the Middle East gave an estimation of 220,000 from her fieldwork in mid-2000s. There were people who embraced Islam in the Philippines before the height of the huge migrant flow to the Arab Gulf states. Under armed conflict in the southern Philippines, Christians who lived closer to the Muslim community became Muslims to protect them­ selves (Lacar 2001). Moreover, there were many others, especially women, who converted from Christianity to Islam because of their marriage to Muslims (Watanabe 2012). Interview with a Filipino staff member of an Islamic Center (12 February 2012).

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There are three categories of turning points in the conversion of Filipinos to Islam in the Arab Gulf states, attesting explanations of Angeles (2011) and Ah­ mad (2011). First, a turning point arises from having a new social relations. In this category, Filipinos are invited by Muslim acquaintances or colleagues to embrace Islam, or they develop an interest in the teachings by reading the booklets distributed in the city. In the Arab Gulf states, a single migrant worker can find the simple, lonely living conditions immersed in work. Likewise other migrant workers from different countries, Filipino workers reside in “bed spac­ es” of shared apartments or single-room units, and they spend their time trav­ eling to and from their workplace and residence. In such situations, they ­become attracted and accustomed to the occasions of gathering and offering at Islamic Centers on the invitation of friends and fellow citizens. The second category, which is especially common among women, is mar­ riage to Filipinos or foreign Muslims of both Arab and non-Arabic origin. In Islamic Centers, quite a number of women belong to this category. For the mar­ ried women, they were wed to Filipinos or foreign Muslims before schooling in the Islamic Centers, and for single women, half of them met new men or mar­ ried the men to whom they were engaged after taking these classes. Migrant workers, in the course of working for long periods of time, may widen the psy­ chological distance to their families back home and fall into romantic relation­ ships with co-workers or acquaintances. In the Philippines, divorce is not ­allowed by the constitution, but for the Muslims in the country, the constitu­ tion exceptionally allows for divorce and polygamy under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Presidential Decree 1083). Because of this code, some Filipino men embrace Islam to attain the legal security of having several relationships in their destination while leaving their family back home. In contrast, for international marriages, binding themselves to new conjugal relations by conversion is regarded as an alternative means to seeking happi­ ness for female migrant workers in the Gulf countries.14 Furthermore, improvements in labor environments or economic situations may lead to conversion to Islam. Although migrant workers’ worksites are mul­ tinational, their salaries and positions differ according to their nationalities, and conditions are generally more tolerable for those who practice Islam. Be­ cause the supervisory posts are dominated by Arabs and their direct bosses and colleagues are mostly Muslim, many of the non-Muslim Asian workers oc­ casionally feel a sense of alienation and unfairness. Against this background, 14

In the uae and Qatar, the law bans men and women who are not in marital relationships from being alone together in private spaces. If the authorities find out that this law has been broken, migrants will be detained, dismissed, and deported. In Saudi Arabia, this law falls also in the public sphere.

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many converts have reported that their labor environments and social rela­ tions improved after their embracing of Islam. After their conversion, many of these service sector and office workers remarked that they “had the salary in­ crease,” “were able to get the desired job,” “had the problem in workplace solved,” and “had less financial demands from the family back home,” and fur­ thermore, that these changes were because of “Allah’s mercy.” Some Islamic Center even had a lawyer who would solve employment contracts of migrant workers with the local sponsors. At one time in Dubai, new Muslims received a cash stipend from Islamic Centers.15 This reimbursement amounted to 2,500 dirhams (equivalent to 675 us dollars in 2000), so it would have been a great help for those who embraced Islam in difficult situations. Today, new converts do not receive cash but instead are given goods like stand clocks, as reported by a Filipino teacher in an Islamic Center.16 5

The Islamic Center as a Community

Islamic Centers are essential spaces for converts. The activities of the centers aimed at converts are as follows: providing Islam-related publications, accept­ ing shahadah that recognizes the embracing of Islam, issuing certificates of conversion through the authority of their superintendent (required for mar­ riage17 and employment), teaching the performing of prayer to new Muslims, advising new Muslims on how to explain their conversion to Islam to acquire comprehension from family members, instructing other practices of Islam, and helping those who are in need of financial assistance. As Islamic Centers are located in different parts of the country, migrant workers staying in the uae and Qatar assemble to learn Islam and, thus, form a community of foreign Muslims. At the Islamic Centers, Muslims of various nationalities learn from a teacher who speaks English from Sunday 15 16 17

Because of this, some Filipino men who embraced Islam were jeered as “fils boys” by fel­ low nationals in Dubai. A fil is a fractional currency unit in the uae, and 100 fils is equiva­ lent to 1 uae dirham. In other words, it means “petty money”. Interview with a Filipino staff member of an Islamic Center (20 February 2013). According to a Filipino administrative staff member of an Islamic Center, there are in­ creasing numbers of cases where Filipinos become Muslims only for the sake of marriage, which has created serious problems with the husbands’ in-laws. Thus, since 2012, the con­ cerned parties are required to attach a certificate issued by the Islamic Centers to their marriage documents. The certificate includes an imam’s instructions and reviews wheth­ er the convert took shahadah properly, understood the five obligations and six pillars of Islam, knew how to perform prayer, and took hold of the rights and obligations of Muslim women and marriage, among other things.

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to ­Thursday, hold conversations, and spend leisure time together. On Fridays, however, the Centers turn into a Filipino hub where converts can assemble and study with the instruction of a Tagalog-speaking teacher. According to their learning level, the classes are divided into beginner and advanced classes. In the beginner class, the newly converted learn basic things in a separate room, such as how to properly dress as Muslims and how to pray in Islam. The day that the Centers cater for most participants is Friday, and domestic workers can leave the house, if given permission by their employ­ ers, and attend classes in the Centers. On Fridays, they go to a nearby mosque after their morning class to participate in the noon congregation prayer and eat a halal (meaning “approved” in Islam) meal together. Here, some Filipino dishes are often brought by other participants. After a cozy lunchtime, the afternoon class begins and continues until 5 p.m. Thus, the Islamic Centers are places where Filipinos gather and take breathing spells, away from the watchful eyes of their employers. Moreover, in addition to obtaining Islamic knowledge, the converts go through different experiences and changes. First, they are referred to as Sister or Brother (Sister Fatimah or Brother Ismael, for example) and are given a Muslim name after their conversion to Islam. Next, there will be changes in their attire. In the case of a new Filipina Muslim, although already wearing a scarf on her head, she might be wearing tight-fitting T-shirts and jeans at the beginning; gradually, she would take on different attire, wearing the scarf more skillfully and wearing the abāyah (a black overcoat worn by Arab Muslim women) to hide her body lines. Some women even start to wear niqāb (a veil to cover the face except for the eyes), just like the nationals in their working country. Moreover, with an increase in association with other converts, a change would be evident in that new friends would replace previous friends. On the grounds of relationship, attire, served food, confessions of Islam, and lectures in the Islamic Centers, the new Muslims are taught “the way to the right path” and “how to be a good Muslim.” They are pressed to confirm that, above all else, they are Muslim. Hence, the Islamic Centers serve as entry points for new Muslims to become members of the Islamic society. In the Islamic Centers, one can see the forming of socioeconomic relation­ ships among the members. The women in the centers attempt to obtain mu­ tual financial aid through the buying and selling of cosmetics and slimming products from the Philippines, as well as non-standard (referring as “class A”) branded bags that can be easily obtained in the Arab Gulf states. Some new Muslims ask for knowledge and advice from senior converts. Others consult on economic and ­personal issues with fellow members and share various experi­ ences and information. It has been confirmed that, as a way of persistently

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caring for new Filipino converts, a center in Dubai actively bring Filipino con­ verts over from the Philippines as teachers for their center, thus creating a mi­ gratory network across borders. For their future work destinations, converts often prefer the Arab Gulf states and some Muslim countries in Southeast Asia so that they can practice Islam properly. To meet converts’ aims, there are re­ ferrals for places of employment among the Muslim converts in Manila, once they are back in their home country. The above section has proven that communities of mutual aid are formed in the Islamic Centers, and they promote awareness for new Muslims of their membership in the larger Islamic society. What actual changes, then, would be brought about in relationships with those in- and outside of the centers? In the next section, I will analyze cases of relationship changes among Filipinos, be­ tween Filipinos and other nationalities, and between Filipinos and the nation­ als of the host societies. 6

Expanding, Alienating and Forging of Personal Relationships

6.1 Changes in Relationships among Filipinos At the beginning of this article, I raised the question of how personal relation­ ships are expanded, alienated, and forged by foreigners’ conversion to Islam in the uae and Qatar. In my research, I discovered some breaching of ties owing to changes in the living environment, which are described as follows. Semiskilled workers, such as store workers, hotel housekeeping staff, and welders, receive relatively low salaries and save some money by sharing costly room rents. Because of this, they share kitchens, toilets, and bathrooms. However, if one tries to practice Islam, inconvenient situations are often faced. In Dubai, where one can obtain pork and alcohol, there were some new Muslims who, after embracing Islam, moved out of their shared flats with Christian relatives and in-laws. They felt that they could not pursue their religious practice in situ­ ations where they would cook with the same frying pan that others used to cook pork, for example, or where there were parties with alcohol every week­ end. After moving out, most newly converted Muslims started living with other Filipino converts. As previously mentioned, one must question whether these Filipino con­ verts would cut all of their close ties with others simply because of their ­conversion. Case 1 provides a good example of a person who holds a strong Fili­ pino identity after becoming Muslim and who participates in social activities for the sake of Filipino fellowship.18 18

All names introduced in the cases are pseudonyms.

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6.1.1 Case 1: Isa Isa, who is in his forties and embraced Islam in 2010, had been working at a vehicle company in Doha, Qatar, for seven years. As he did not own a car, he had been spending a humdrum life commuting between his worksite and dor­ mitory, so when he was invited by a Sri Lankan Muslim for a free meal at the Is­ lamic Center, he was delighted to join him. This was his first encounter with ­Islam. Isa went to the Islamic Center every weekend and eventually em­ braced Islam. Sometime after his conversion, he told his Syrian supervisor at the worksite that he had converted to Islam. Although his supervisor re­ proached Isa by a­ sking, “Why didn’t you tell me earlier?,” he was pleased with Isa’s conversion. Following his shahadah, Isa had a wider circle of friends. His supervisor even helped him buy a car at a low price. However, Isa maintained his ties with the Filipino community and spent time with his fellow Christian Filipinos in his dormitory to obtain various information. He did not mind min­ gling with them while avoiding pork and alcohol, because these items were practically unobtainable in Qatar. Recently, Isa became a member in the Qatar branch of a Filipino political party that supports fellow Filipinos who live overseas. Case 2 shows one aspect of a paradox in Filipino Muslim society and illus­ trates the gap between ethnic Muslims and newly converted Muslims. 6.1.2 Case 2: Amina Amina, who is in her thirties, was a born-again Christian when she was young in the Philippines. Since her grandfather was killed by Muslims during the armed conflict in Mindanao, she only had hatred toward their religion. After her first job in Saudi Arabia, she noticed that she misunderstood the beliefs of Islam, and she took shahadah at an Islamic Center after she moved to Qatar. In those days, Amina worked as a kindergarten teacher attached to a French school in Doha. There, however, the practice of Islam was prohibited, although the country is a Muslim society.19 If her religion were discovered, she would inevitably be dismissed. Thus, while working she was careful in practicing Is­ lam. For example, after putting her kindergarten students to sleep, she would tell co-workers that she needed to go to the bathroom but would instead quick­ ly perform prayer where no surveillance cameras were installed. She was also cautious about her attire and put on a scarf after she left the school premises. Amina did have an ethnic Filipina Muslim colleague, but this woman appeared

19

In France, the wearing of a headscarf in public spaces is banned because it is regarded as propagating Islamic activity.

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not to put on scarf even outside of the school, was hardly seen performing prayer, and wore clothing that was not in accordance with Muslim standards. Rather, she kept her distance from Amina, who solemnly followed Islam, and would decline Amina’s offers to join her at Friday congregation prayers or oth­ er Islamic events. As such, their relationship remained superficial. As some articles mention, there are tensions between ethnic Muslims and new Muslims (balik-Islams) in the Philippines (Angeles 2011), and I have also encountered several such cases in Manila’s Muslim communities. While con­ ducting my fieldwork, I often observed that new Muslims have separate com­ munities from those of the ethnic Muslims, and that the former eagerly ­practice Islam because they were “late-comers in Islam.” They frequently claimed that “this is the right practice of Islam” to the “pure” ethnic Muslims, whereas the ethnic Muslims disfavored those who rightly decried their views (Watanabe 2012). These tendencies of having separate communities have been observed in the Arab Gulf states and are reflected in there being no overall Fili­ pino Muslim community that aggregates both ethnic and new Muslims. 6.2 Changes in Relationships between Filipinos and Other Nationalities As illustrated by the example of Isa in Case 1, conversion to Islam may lead to changes in relationships within worksites. However, the most strongly bond­ ed ties between different nationalities are intermarriages, and the embracing of Islam is required before marriage to a Muslim. Among the 18 interlocutors that I have interviewed, 9 were married to Muslims. Because there were no statistics available on these intermarriages between Filipinos and other na­ tionalities, the figures from my interlocutors could be a sample to deduce the ­tendencies. These new Muslim, unlike ordinary migrant workers, would be incorporated deeply within their host society as members of the Islamic community. Their social relations would change according to their spouses’ nationalities, as shown in Case 3; whether they are nationals of the host soci­ ety or Muslim migrant workers, whether they are Arabs or not, and to what class they belong are all the factors that make a difference in their social relationships. 6.2.1 Case 3: Raheema Raheema, who is in her thirties and attends the class in a Dubai Islamic Center every Friday, met a Pakistani worker at the camera shop where she worked and married him in 2007. As of March 2012, they did not have any children. The couple alternate their long annual vacations between Pakistan and the Philip­ pines. Raheema was not a Muslim when she married her husband, but as they planned to move to her husband’s country after saving enough to start a

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b­ usiness, she started to attend classes in the Islamic Center in order to learn his culture and Islam, which she eventually embraced. She was taking a Friday beginner class instructed in Tagalog when I met her. In addition to her work at the camera shop, she had a side job selling soaps to fellow Filipinas in the Is­ lamic Center. The people she usually accompanied were those who were also married to a Pakistani or new Muslim couples. There were some female con­ verts to Islam in her class who had married nationals. Raheema reported that “they are different [from us]” and that they were plain housewives who at­ tended the school pushing their baby strollers. Their makeup and attire were like that of the “locals [the nationals],” and they dressed themselves from head to toe in brand products. They led “stable” lives, unlike Raheema and other migrant intermarriage couples who had to leave the uae for either the wife’s or the husband’s country once they were no longer able to work. Because of these differences, Raheema maintained some distance from those Filipinas who were married to nationals. Not only personal effort but also the attributes of the foreign spouse may affect the next life stages taken by intermarried Filipinas in the uae. According to the nationality and class of their spouse, a hierarchy of the intermarried Fili­ pinas in the Islamic Center develops. That is to say, there are various economic and legal statuses, even if their spouses are likewise Muslim. Some of the ex­ amples include whether the spouses are wealthy nationals or other Arabs and whether they are legally well-established nationals or migrant workers who would have to move to their home country or an altogether new country when dismissed. Indeed, Nurina, a converted Filipina Muslim married to a Palestin­ ian who acquired nationality as a citizen of the uae, later got a job at a govern­ ment office in Dubai. Appointed as a person in charge of the government’s contact with other Filipinos embracing Islam, she holds a strong position among the Filipino Muslim society in her office, as well as in Dubai. Changes in Relationships between Filipinos and the Nationals in the Host Societies Among the different factors surrounding migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states, domestic workers exert the most influence on nationals in the house­ hold and vice versa. Domestic workers have been dealt with in related ­literature on migrant workers’ converting to Islam (for example, Ahmad 2011; Angeles 2011). Indeed, among the 18 Filipino female converts I spoke to, seven of them were domestic workers. As they are not covered under the labor laws in the uae and Qatar as of 2013, domestic workers are regarded as the most vulnera­ ble because many of them face no days off, long working hours, delays in salary payment, and physical abuse and sexual assault, among other problems 6.3

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(Ishii 2011). Yet, if these women embrace Islam, the same religion as that of their employers, what experience do they go through? 6.3.1 Case 4: Jenna Jenna is in her thirties, and she started working as a domestic worker in Doha in 2013. Jenna entrusted her baby girl to her mother in the Philippines and came to Qatar. In the Philippines, although she had a husband who became Muslim while he was working in Saudi Arabia and although she was informed with knowledge of Islam, Jenna was hesitant to embrace Islam. When she com­ municated these feelings to her employer in Doha, the employer brought her to the Islamic Center and prompted her to “learn Islam properly.” After attend­ ing classes for a month, she took shahadah. Her incentives for becoming a Muslim included prompts from fellow Filipino domestic workers in the class who advised, for example, “if you convert to Islam, you have more trust from your employer,” “they will celebrate you,” and “you will have a higher salary.” Knowing her conversion, the employer held a party for her, and she received a watch and some cash from the family. Moreover, she was removed from her cleaning job and was entrusted with caring for her employer’s two-year-old boy, which was a less demanding job. Jenna also thought that, in a scenario where there were many problematic cases of domestic workers’ abuse of em­ ployers’ children, being entrusted with their dear child was proof that her em­ ployers had faith in her. Jenna finished attending classes at the Islamic Center within two months. She would like to continue her study because she enjoyed meeting with and talking to domestic workers in similar circumstances, but she had no way of telling whether her employer would permit it or not. Islamic Centers are rare places that provide opportunities to acquire and exchange information for live-in domestic workers, who are often blocked off from outside ties. In an Islamic Center in Qatar, there are three-month begin­ ner classes and three-month advanced classes. After the end of the term, the center holds a graduation ceremony and a picnic in the nearby park. For the domestic workers to attend the graduation, the teachers and administrative staff make contact with their employers so that they can obtain permission to leave the house. Because public transportation is not well-developed in this country, many of the employers order their drivers to send and pick up the domestic workers. However, as a teacher in this center claimed, several of the employers do not want their domestic workers to attend classes more than is necessary. In the background to this claim, employers experience fears and doubts that the domestic workers may display deviant behaviors, such as get­ ting pregnant or running away, if they let them go to places where many Filipi­ nos gather. This fear arises from geographical conditions because the centers

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are sometimes situated at the middle of the city and are also, at times, close to the “Filipino Markets” where one can find a large number of Filipinos. The em­ ployers assume that, if the domestic workers are given permission to go to Is­ lamic Centers, they might sneak out of the class to meet their boyfriends or, with the referral of other Filipinos, they might just move to other employers who would provide them with better working conditions. Thus, in some cases, the psychological distances between domestic workers and their employers might be reduced if the workers convert to Islam, and feel­ ings of trust might develop between them. On the other hand, the employer– employee relationships may continue to be based on the differences between nationalities, which made them struggle to understand each other’s behaviors. Would these relationships continue for a long time? 6.3.2 Case 5: Khadijah Khadijah, in her fifties, is a mother and wife who left her four children, now fully grown, with her husband in the Philippines. As of 2012, she had devotedly worked for one Qatari family as a domestic worker for more than 22 years. Af­ ter carefully watching how her employers treated others, pursued their ­lifestyles, and generally thought about life based on the context of Islamic teaching, Khadijah embraced Islam five years after her service for the family began. Her employer was happy to know about her conversion and even helped her to learn more at the Islamic Center. “My madam treats me like her own family,” said Khadijah. Since then, she has been allowed to serve as a volunteer at the center twice a week while working at her employer’s house. She was taken to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and has been given presents regu­ larly. When it came to domestic work, she was only asked to perform the lighter tasks, whereas other maids were engaged in the heavy labor. These differences in treatment and trust, Khadijah regarded, were caused by their religious affili­ ations. She felt that her psychological distances to her employers, other teach­ ers in the center, and new Muslim volunteers were narrowed through her ­conversion. She also found her place and “mission” in serving fellow newly converted Muslims in psychologically supportive ways. On the other hand, Khadijah lost her chance to confess to her family that she has converted to Is­ lam. Khadijah has not returned to the Philippines for 15 years now, does not send regular remittances to her family any more, and has lost contact with her family. Khadijah’s case shows an example of one of the paths followed by converts to Islam. In her case, as time went by after she became a Muslim, she felt proud of herself to be “madam’s favorite” and was acutely aware of her attachment to her employer’s family. Whether her employer’s gentle words were rhetoric

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used to tame the domestic workers or were merely perceived by the domestic workers themselves, it is still worth careful exploration. Khadijah also experi­ enced stronger ties with the new Muslims in the Islamic Centers. Above all, although it was a limited space compared to that in the Philippines, she found a place where she could make a significant contribution and feel a sense of belonging with what was once her temporal migratory destination. In this section, I have examined the transitions of Filipino migrants’ rela­ tionships through religious conversion. Here, I analyze how they have opened up new ties while distancing themselves from other relationships. With respect to relationships with Filipinos, as shown in the case of Isa, some maintain their ties with fellow Christian Filipinos, whereas others alien­ ate these ties because of the differences in food culture or zealous religiosity. On the other hand, as Amina’s case has shown, underlying differences do often surface between ethnic Muslims and new Muslims. These divergences in rela­ tionships may be attributed by the differences in the meanings of religious conversions for each of them—Isa was more of opportunistic manner, while Amina situated her faith as a guiding principle of her life. Here, I can deduce that, in religious practices, there may exist chasms even among those of the same nationality. Yet, as respects to the activities that call on the unity of the Filipinos, the recognition of these differences fades away in order to achieve larger goals. Since acquiring nationality in the uae and Qatar is almost impossible due to non-integration policy, they were invoked to make contribution as Filipinos regardless of their faith. This was illustrated by the case of Isa, who participated in activities for the sake of improving the status of migrant workers. In terms of the relationships between new Filipino Muslims and Muslims of other nationalities, I have referred to cases of intermarried people. By meeting with their husbands, female converts to Islam had more chances of becoming acquainted with their husbands’ relatives, friends, and fellow nationals. Mean­ while, it was revealed that it was not the intermarried Filipinas themselves but rather the attributions of their husbands that created differences among the Filipina wives. In the Islamic Center, at the point of becoming Muslim, any in­ dividual will take the position of a “newly embraced Muslim.” Nevertheless, what will divide these women into the groups that they associate and share values with are the hierarchies of nationality and class in the host society (that is, the nationalities and classes of their husbands). The husbands’ religious cul­ tures (such as the way they perceive their wives’ roles and the ideal family) and economic conditions have a profound effect on their place in the hierarchy. Thus, as shown in Raheema’s case, the Filipinas who marry nationals will form new ties with other Filipinas whose husbands are from the uae, Qatar, or other

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gcc countries, whereas Raheema herself deepened exchanges mainly with other Filipinas married to Pakistanis; this creates differences among these groups of people. The relationships in the workplace with different national superiors and employers may have an upturn when Filipinos became “fellow Muslims,” and in some cases, the migrant workers may acquire greater trust from or improved treatment by employers as seen in the case of Isa. Domestic workers, who have the most contact with the host nationals, undergo similar experiences. There are several cases similar to that of Jenna, who converted to Islam in an attempt to ease the tension between herself and her employer. Khadijah, during her path of embracing Islam, perceived distinctions between her employer’s treat­ ment and trust towards Muslim and non-Muslim domestic workers. She sensed growing ties with her employer over the course of time, and she eventually found her own place within her employer’s family and the Islamic Center. Whether intermarriage, work-related, or spiritual sustenance, the meaning and act of conversion to Islam differs to each individual and owes to their per­ sonal reasons. Attempt of transcending boundaries are resulted from the ap­ proaches of each individual; some actively seek to do so, while others, who sought one’s own place in the faith, for instance, show less appetite for such changes. In that sense, as supported by the role of Islamic Centers for new Muslims to be members of the Islamic society, the act of taking shahadah itself does not provide a way to be part of new community, rather his/her continu­ ous effort and approach, interaction with the members that would lead to form new connections in segregated society over a long time. 7 Conclusion Earlier in this chapter, I raised questions about whether, by becoming a mem­ ber of the Islamic community, there would be a chance for converts to con­ struct relationships with migrant workers of other nationalities with whom they had no previous contact, and about whether the converts would tran­ scend the boundaries of hierarchies of class and nationality. Thus far, this chapter has elucidated that the phenomenon of Filipino migrant workers’ embracing Islam did not necessarily seem to bring them into the majority society, nor did it necessarily seem to create a “coexistent” community that surpasses the borders of nationalities. There lies strong parting mechanisms of nationality, employer-employee relationships based on kafala system and politics of exclusion that induce the compartmentalization of the Arab Gulf society.

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Indeed, in the uae and Qatar, there is cohesion among Muslim communi­ ties along with nationality and language by the Islamic Centers playing as their focal points. Because these communities provide financial, legal, and spiritual assistance to followers under the supervision of a government office, there is little chance and needs that other informal actors conducing unity which sur­ pass nationality in importance, owing to the multi-hierarchic situation and lack of common interest. Yet, when looking into detail of the informal support and assistance, sharing food and dwelling place are seen among Filipino newly converts, social activi­ ties are conducted among Filipinos in general, financial help are observed among them as well as from the nationals to the Filipino converts, and spiri­ tual and emotional supports are found among not only Filipino newly converts but with the in-laws of the foreign husbands. Moreover, with regard to female domestic workers and workers of Islamic Centers, there are rare cases of forg­ ing familial relationship with female employers in the long-term commitment such that domestic helpers who converted to Islam teach doctrine of Islam to the Muslim employers, and the Arab supervisors consult their personal dis­ tress to the Filipino workers, among others. These narratives come out from interviews to Filipinos but these seem to be kept within the domestic sphere, and does not extend to general phenomenon, since they are formally deter­ mined in sponsor system, nevertheless of personal intimacy. Thus, suppose, for example, that the newly converted Muslim were able to form a small community slowly over time; this community would not develop greatly but would instead be narrowly comprised of family and friends. As a result of conversion, the worker may eventually form a closer relationship with their employers or co-workers during their long-time sojourn; and their con­ nectedness are maintained subtle in small spheres tactically abiding politics of exclusion and non-integration policy. Bibliography Abdullah, Afkar. 2017. “Filipino prisoners convert to Islam in Sharjah,” Khaleej Times. 21 November 2017. Accessed 29 December 2017. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/ nation/sharjah//filipino-prisoners-convert-to-islam-in-sharjah. Ahmad, Attiya. 2011. “Explanation is Not the Point: Domestic Work, Islamic Da’wa and Becoming Muslim in Kuwait.” In Diasporic Journeys, Ritual, and Normativity among Asian Migrant Women, edited by Pnina Werbner and Mark Johnson, 89–106. Oxford: Routledge.

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Ahmad, Attiya. 2012. “Beyond Labor: Foreign Residents in the Persian Gulf States.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 21–40. London: Hurst & Co. Angeles, Vivienne S.M. 2011. “The Middle East and the Philippines: Transnational Link­ ages, Labor Migration and the Remaking of Philippine Islam.” Comparative Islamic Studies 7(1): 157–181. Aoyama, Waka. 2006. Hinkon no Minzokushi: Phipippin, Davao-shi no Sama no Seikatsu [An Ethnography of Poverty: Socioeconomic Life of Five Sama Families in Davao City, Philippines]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. In Japanese. Beckford, James A. 2015. Migration and Religion (The International Library of Studies on Migration series). London: Edward Elgar. Bonifacio, Glenda Tibe and Vivienne S.M. Angeles. 2010. “Building Communities through Faith: Filipino Catholics in Philadelphia and Alberta.” In Gender, Religion, and Migration: Pathways of Integration, edited by Glenda Tibe Bonifacio and Vivi­ enne S.M. Angeles, 190–234. Lanham: Lexington Books. Bristol-Rhys, Jane. 2012. “Socio-Spatial Boundaries in Abu Dhabi.” In Migrant in the ­Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 59–84. London: Hurst and Co. Dajani, Haneen. 2010. “Surge in Conversions to Islam.” The National. 27 May 2010. Ac­ cessed 25 August 2013. http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/surge-in-con versions-to-islam#ixzz2czaQpssx. Dumia, Mariano A. 2009. Of Dreams, Sweat, and Tears: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Modern Filipino Heroes. Manila: New Day Publishers. Enoki, Miki. 2010. Indo no “Tatakau” Bukkyoutotachi: Kaishuu Fukashokumin to Boumei Chibetto-jin no Kunan to Genzai [“Struggling” Buddhists in India: Hardships and Present of Converted Scheduled Castes and Tibetans in Exile]. Tokyo: Fūkyosha. In Japanese. Fukushima, Takeshi. 2011. “Shuukyou: Islam to Ikyouto tono Kyouzon” [Religion: Islam and Co-existence with Kaffir]. In Arab-Shuchōkoku-Renpō (uae) wo shirutame no Rokujyusshō [Sixty Chapters to know about the United Arab Emirates (UAE)], edited by Takeru Hosoi, 46–49. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. In Japanese. Hajar, M. D. Rachel. 2011. My Life in Doha: Between Dream and Reality. Connecticut: Strategic Book Group. Hawwa, Sithi. 2000. “From Cross to Crescent: Religious Conversion of Filipina Domes­ tic Helpers in Hong Kong.” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 11(3): 347–367. International Crisis Group (icg). 2005. “Philippines terrorism: The role of militant Is­ lamic converts.” Accessed 31 October 2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/ Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/110_philippines_terrorism_the_role_of_mili tant_islamic_converts.pdf.

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International Labour Migration. 2017. “ILO global estimates on migrant workers.” Accessed 1 August 2018. https://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_436343.pdf. Ishii, Masako. 2011. “Fukugō-Kakusa wo Idō suru: Wangan-Sanyukoku de Kaji-Rōdōsha toshite Hataraku Firipin no Musurimu Josē” [Moving through Multiple Layers of Complex Disparities: Muslim Filipina Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf states]. In Sekai de Mottomo Mazushiku aru to iukoto [Being the Poorest in the World], edited by The Peace Studies Association of Japan, 25–46. Tokyo: Waseda University Press. In Japanese. Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department of the uae. Accessed 28 June 2013. http://www,iacad.gov.ae/en/Pages/default.aspx. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. New York: Ithaca Press. Lacar, Luis Q. 2001. “Balik-Islam: Christian converts to Islam in the Philippines, c. 1970– 98.” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 12(1): 39–60. Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder: Westview Press. Mahdavi, Parvis. 2013. “Gender, Labour and the Law: The Nexus of Domestic Work, Hu­ man Trafficking and the Informal Economy in the United Arab Emirates.” Global Networks 13(4): 425–440. Nazzal, Nasouh. 2013. “35 Convert to Islam in Six Months.” Gulf News. 13 August 2013. Ac­ cessed 25 August 2013. http://m.gulfnews.com/35-convert-to-islam-in-six-months -1.422891. Nazzal, Noor. 2012. “Family of Five Converts to Islam: Son Helped Rest of Family Con­ vert.” Gulf News. 30 October 2012. Accessed 25 August 2013. http://gulfnews.com/ news/gulf/uae/general/family-of-five-converts-to-islam-1.1096051. Pingol, Alicia. 2011. “Filipino Women Workers in Saudi: Making Offerings for the Here and Now and Hereafter.” In Diasporic Journeys, Ritual, and Normativity among Asian Migrant Women, edited by Pnina Werbner and Mark Johnson, 394–406. Oxford: Routledge. Rambo, Lewis R. 1993. Understanding Religious Conversion. New Haven: Yale University Press. Saunders, Jenifer B., Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Susanna Snyder. 2016. Intersections of Religion and Migration: Issues at the Global Crossroads. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shaaban, Ahmed. 2011. “5,000 More Embrace Islam.” Khaleej Times. 13 January 2011. Ac­ cessed 25 August 2013. http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile= data/theuae/2011/January/theuae_January307.xml§ion=theuae. The National. 2015. “More than 500 convert to Islam in Dubai.” The National. 13 April 2015. Accessed 29 December 2017. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/more-than-500 -convert-to-islam-in-dubai-1.34279.

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Toumi, Habib. 2011. “800 convert to Islam in six months in Qatar.” Gulf News. 10 Sep­ tember, 2011. Accessed 25 August 2013. https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/800 -convert-to-islam-in-six-months-in-qatar-1.864152. Watanabe, Akiko. 2012. Firipin Manira ni okeru Musurimu Komyuniti no Keiseikatei [Formation Process of a Muslim Community in Metro Manila, the Philippines]. PhD dissertation. Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University. In Japanese. Watanabe, Akiko and Naomi Hosoda. 2015. “Transforming Intimate Spheres and Incor­ porating New Power Relationships: Religious Conversions of Filipino Workers in the United Arab Emirates.” In Southeast Asian Migration: People on the Move In Search of Work, Refuge and Belonging, edited by Khatharya Um and Sofia Gaspar, 92–113. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. Werbner, Pnina and Mark Johnson, eds. 2011. Diasporic Journeys, Ritual, and Normativity among Asian Migrant Women. Oxford: Routledge. World Bank. 2010. “Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010.” Accessed 13 February 2013. http://ecion.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTEC/EXTDECPROSPECT S/0,,contentMDK:22803131~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00 .html.

Chapter 9

Transnational Community Networks of Goan Migrant Workers Kyoko Matsukawa 1 Introduction Indian expatriates showed their powerful presence to the world as we entered the 2000s and the new millennium. This was indicated by the economic growth of India and the numbers of Indians spreading around the world. According to figures provided by the Ministry of External Affairs of India (mea), the number of overseas Indians at the end of 2017 is 31.2 million.1 This population comprises two categories of people: Non-Resident Indians (nris) and Persons of Indian Origin (pios).2 The same statistics offered by the mea tell us that these people reside in more than 200 countries. The United States (us), Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates (uae), Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and South Africa have the largest Indian communities. In the figures, both nris and pios are counted. In the us, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and South Africa, pios are dominant. Apart from the us, the strong presence of Indians is the product of migration that happened during the British colonial period. The numbers of nris and pios in the us, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and South Africa are shown in the list below. The figures are taken from the same statistics of the mea mentioned above. As the figures of the mea show, the Arab Gulf states receive a substantial number of migrant workers from India, who are mostly nris. A report of the High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora shows that the number amounted to 3 million in 1999. Saudi Arabia had 1.2 million Indian migrant workers and

1 “Population of Overseas Indians (Compiled in December 2017).” Accessed 15 February 2018. http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf. 2 nris are Indian citizens who reside outside India, whereas pios are foreign citizens whose ancestors were originally from India (Kondo 2010: 136–137). In addition, the “Overseas Indian Citizenship” scheme started in 2006. People who registered themselves as PIO under new PIO card scheme 2002 are now deemed to be “OCI (Overseas Citizens of India) Cardholder” after the merger of the former to the latter scheme in 2015. They are entitled to benefits, such as staying in India more than 180 days without registering with the police and multiple visits to India without a visa, for life. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_013

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Table 9.1  The number of overseas indian population in top 7 countries

Unit: persons

United States Saudi Arabia Malaysia United Arab Emirates Myanmar Sri Lanka South Africa

nris

pios

Total

1,280,000 3,253,901 225,000 2,800,000 8,690 14,000 60,000

3,180,000 1,963 2,750,000 3,751 2,000,000 1,600,000 1,500,000

4,460,000 3,255,864 2,975,000 2,803,751 2,008,690 1,614,000 1,560,000

Source: “Population of Overseas Indians (Compiled in December 2017).” Accessed 15 February 2018. http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs _1.pdf

the uae followed with 750,000. The numbers had substantially increased by 2017: 3.2 million reside in Saudi Arabia and 2.8 million in the uae. They used to come from southern states, among which Kerala was a major sender state in the 1970s and 1980s. Recently the trend has changed. Northern states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, began providing more migrant workers (Jain 2016). Mostly they are in the lower strata of employment. According to the Embassy of India in the uae, 65 percent belong to the blue-collar category, 20 percent are white-collar non-professionals, and 15 percent are professionals, businessmen, and their family members (see Embassy of India 2018). Over the last decade, a number of anthropological studies on the lives of Indian migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states have been published. They shed light on the hardships of Indian migrants that stem from their low status in the hierarchy at the top of which the nationals dominate. Gardner did fieldwork in labor camps where low-paid construction laborers lived together and revealed their harsh living conditions (Gardner 2010). Vora (2013) dealt with the idea of citizenship among middle-class Indians living in Dubai. Osella and Osella (2012) have followed the movement of Muslim migrants from the state of Kerala for years. Their studies clarify the economic and legal torments of Indians, whether they are unskilled laborers or middle-class white collar workers. Unskilled construction workers are forced to accept low salaries, have their passports taken away by their employers, and cannot change jobs. They always fear that, if they are fired, they will not be able to afford to buy an air ticket to fly home and will become illegal residents (Gardner 2010). Middle-class people who reside in the Arab Gulf states for more than two decades with their

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s­ pouses and children also face problems. Their salaries are much smaller than those of their American and British colleagues as a result of different pay scales based on nationality. They also bear the burden of rapidly increasing room rents (Vora 2013). Only a limited group of people have close connections with Arabs and can obtain favors in business (Osella and Osella 2012). Most Indian residents in the Arab Gulf states are forced to negotiate under unequal employment relations with the nationals of the region on the basis of the kafala (sponsorship) system; this is the reason behind their insecurity. In the case of India, the government set up a new ministry, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (moia), in 2004. It monitored the recruitment processes in order to protect prospective migrant workers from the wrong doings of agencies. In 2016, the moia was merged into the mea, which took over the inspection work. At state level, Kerala and Goa founded independent organizations to support people. However, the official mechanism is often unable to take action that meets the migrants’ imminent needs. What, then, can they rely on? They turn to their individual networks, based on kinship and local connections, as well as the “community networks” that associations create. Associations are usually set up to cater to the members’ common needs. These vary from sports to religious activities. Most Indian associations in the Arab Gulf states are local, in the sense that the members come from the same region, speak the same language, and often observe the same religion, whereas the number of national Indian associations is limited. This is because India, which has a population of over 1.2 billion according to the 2011 census, has a variety of regional languages and even the caste structure varies from one place to another. The community networks formed through interactions with other association members and the movements of people and information between the Arab Gulf states and their homes strengthen the regional identities of being “Malayalis” or “Goans,” the latter of which will be dealt with in this chapter. This transnational, but locally bound, identity formation is a characteristic found among Indians living in the region, and it has an influence on identity politics back in India. I also point out the geographical proximity of the states of Kerala and Goa to the Arab Gulf states, which enables migrants from these areas to go home more easily than other nationalities, such as Filipinos, can. This concern with both transnational movement and the local contexts of migrants situations resonates with recent calls to examine the concept of transnationalism in scholarship. Brickell and Datta point out that, at the start of the twenty-first century, “it became apparent that many of the transnational networks are shaped through the specificity of locales” and transnationalism should be more grounded/rooted (Brickell and Datta 2011: 9). Indian migrant

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workers to the Arab Gulf states are far from being deterritorialized. Their ways of moving to and fro happen in the unique historical and present contexts of the places wherein they experience their life. Bearing the aforementioned points in mind, in this chapter, I will particularly discuss the case of Goan Christians. Goa is a small state on the west coast of India, which has a population of 1.4 million at the time of 2011. It was under Portuguese rule from 1510 to 1961, whereas other parts of India were mostly under British rule. Portugal was a Catholic kingdom, and, after its conquest, it sent missionaries who converted many locals to Christianity. St. Francis Xavier, a Jesuit, stayed briefly in Goa before he preached the gospel in the Malay Archipelago and ­Japan.3 As a result of this historical background, Christians, mostly Catholics, account for approximately 25 percent of the population of Goa as a state, whereas they account for only 2.5 percent of India’s national population. The rest of the population in Goa mostly follow Hinduism (65.78 percent) and Islam (8.34 percent), according to the result of 2011 census. Historically, the migration of Goan Christians started after they were hired as sailors by the British in the late eighteenth century. They began moving to the Gulf countries that were under British rule in the early twentieth century. Because they were Christians, they tended to form communities based on church activities (Albuquerque 1986). In this chapter, I will first give an overview of the migration of Indian workers to the Arab Gulf states. I will describe how the movement of Goan Christians preceded that of most Indians, who began finding employment in the region after the oil boom in the 1970s. Secondly, I will outline the present situation of the migration of Goan Christians to the Arab Gulf states. Lastly, I will present data based on my research in two Emirates of the uae—Dubai and Sharjah—in 2007 and 2008.4 Bearing the historical background of the migration of Goan Christians in mind, I will analyze the data with a focus on the transnational community network formation and the present conditions of the migrants’ relations to their homeland. At the end, the significance of the historical background of Goa, that is, the colonization by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, Christianization, and migration movements from the nineteenth century are discussed to understand the formation of transnational community networks and migrants’ relationships with other Indians. 3 A relic of St. Francis Xavier is housed in the Basilica of Bom Jesus in Old Goa, which used to be the headquarters of the Viceroy of Portuguese India. 4 The data in this chapter were collected during my field work in Dubai and Sharjah in 2007 and 2008. I am grateful for the financial support provided by jsps kakenhi (Grant numbers 17401036 and 17720229).

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Figure 9.1 Location of Goa Source: This map was produced by the author and is based on http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=16645&lang=en.

2

The Increase of Indian Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf States and the Historical Background of Goan Migration

After the Independence of India in 1947, there were two main destinations for Indian migrant workers. The first was a group of developed countries including Britain, the us, and Canada. Owing to the postwar recovery and economic prosperity after World War ii, there was a scarcity of laborers for the workforce

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in Britain, which attracted migrant workers from the West Indies and the ­Indian subcontinent. However, the economic slowdown in the late 1960s drove Britain to control the number of migrants from former British colonies. The us abolished the national origins quota system in the 1965 Immigration Act, and, since then, a large number of migrants have started to flow in. At the same time, the number of emigrants to Canada increased. Engineers and professionals have mostly constituted the group of migrants (Koga and Nakamura 2000: 16–17; Sasikumar 2001). The second destination for Indians was the Arab Gulf states. The oil booms of 1973–74 and 1979 accelerated the movement of people, mostly semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Sasikumar (2001) indicates some differences between the emigration movement to the Middle East before and after 1973. Before that year, the majority of emigrants were from former British India. They used both legal and illegal means to find employment. Bombay (Mumbai) was the port for illegal migrant workers. The years following 1973 witnessed a sudden surge in workers from India, especially from the state of Kerala. Sasikumar estimates that there were 350,000 Indian workers in the Middle East in 1979 and that half of that population was from Kerala. Professionals, engineers, and managers accounted for only 14 percent of all Indian migrant workers in the Middle East (Sasikumar 2001). Goan Christians, too, began moving out of Goa and seeking their service in connection with the British Empire. Goa was under Portuguese rule from 1510 to 1961. During this period, however, it was briefly under British protection against Napoleonic France from 1797 to 1813. The British army employed Goan Christians as sailors, because the latter were already accustomed to Western styles of dress and food. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a large ­number of Goan Christians began migrating to British India, Bombay, Pune (Poona), Karachi, and even Burma. The breakout of the Civil War in America (1861–1865) brought about a suspension of cotton exports from the US, which forced Britain to depend on cotton from India. Bombay prospered in the cotton boom and drew in a large workforce from the neighboring areas. In 1939, the numbers of Goans in British India were as follows: 45,000 in Bombay, 4,500 in Karachi, 2,500 in Pune, 1,200 in Calcutta (Kolkata), and 800 in Rangoon. Three quarters of these populations were Christians, and the rest were Hindus and Muslims. Some established businesses, whereas others were employed as low-ranking officers of the British government. Those without literacy skills had to find other jobs, such as cooks and ayahs (nursemaids or nannies). Many Goans served as sailors. There were 15,000 Goan sailors during World War i (­Office for the Commissioner of nri Affairs, Government of Goa (hereafter, nri Commission of Goa) 2009: 30–31).

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In the nineteenth century, the British-India Steam Navigation Company e­ntered service between India and East Africa via the Arabian Peninsula (Aden) (Sawa 1985). The establishment of this transportation system crossing the Arabian Sea prompted migrants to head for Kenya, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika (Tanzania). After the Uganda Railways began construction, Goan Christians were hired as foremen, clerks, and low-ranking servants of the British government. There were 2000 Goans in Kenya in 1921 (Carvalho 2010: 36). They founded associations in Nairobi and Mombasa. Some noted Goans, such as Pio Gama Pinto,5 for instance, devoted themselves to the movement for the independence of Kenya from Britain (Albuquerque 1999: 75–91). Goan Christians began migrating to the Arab Gulf states before the oil boom of the 1970s. Selma Carvalho, a Goan migrant, herself living in UK, indicated in her book on the migration of her family and the history of Goan migrants that her uncle went to Kuwait via Karachi in 1958 (Carvalho 2010). A majority of Goan Christians became cooks, clerks, and engineers. As mentioned above, a large number of Goan Christians established themselves in Portuguese Africa and British East Africa in the early twentieth century. However, they were forced to re-migrate after these African countries became independent (Tanganyika in 1961, Kenya in 1961, and Mozambique in 1975). Some went to Portugal and Britain, whereas others proceeded to the Arab Gulf states (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 33–37). Among my interlocutors, some spoke about their work experiences in the region. A Goan Christian man in his seventies found a job in Bahrain in the 1970s. He spotted an advertisement about vacancies in a newspaper and sent his CV when he was in Bombay. He worked for the company for 25 years and retired at the age of sixty in the early 2000s. He returned to Goa after his retirement. 3

The Present Situation of Goan Migration to the Arab Gulf States

The Goa Migration Study 2008 (nri Commission of Goa 2009) gives us detailed information about the present situation of Goan migration all over the world. The report is based on a survey conducted by the Centre for Development Studies in cooperation with the Office for the Commissioner of nri Affairs 5 Pio Gama Pinto (1927–1965) was born into a house of Goan migrants in Nairobi, Kenya. He went to India for education and committed himself to the freedom movement of Goa from Portugal in Bombay. He returned to Kenya in 1949. He was actively involved in the independence movement of Kenya as a journalist of the Kenya African National Union. He was assassinated in 1965 (Vaz 1997: 241–243).

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(nri Commission of Goa) in 2008. The center is an independent research institute located in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, and is known for its research in the field of migration. According to the results of the survey, which was conducted among 6,000 households, 718 (12 percent) answered that at least one household member was residing abroad (nri Commission of Goa 2009: xi). The number of emigrants was 968. The report states that “the Gulf accounts for 54 percent of the total emigrants from Goa”6 (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 45). Among them, 19.4 percent were in the uae, 13.4 percent in Kuwait, 6 percent in Bahrain, 5 percent in Qatar, 5 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 4 percent in Oman (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 37, 45). There were 266 households that answered that some of them had returned from abroad, which accounted for 306 people (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 52). The Goa Migration Study 2008 also dealt with migration movement to countries other than the Gulf countries. However, it can give us an overview of the characteristics of Goan migration to the region. Eighty one percent of the emigrants were from areas in the three talukas (administrative districts), Salcete in South Goa and Bardez and Tiswadi in North Goa, where strong influences from the Portuguese can still be found (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 38–39). The majority, 74.5 percent, of the emigrants were Christians, whereas Hindus accounted for only 20.5 percent. Those households with members abroad tended to own consumer goods, such as televisions and refrigerators, and had had their houses reconstructed (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 40–41). There are two ways to procure a job and make passage to the Arab Gulf states. The first is to use recruiting agencies. The second is to request that family members, relatives, friends, or neighbors in the Arab Gulf states find an employer and have a visa issued. According to a survey by Breeding, most of the recruiting agencies in Goa are illegal, and only five agencies have approval from the moia (Breeding 2012).7 A survey carried out by myself with the assistance of a Goan research assistant in February and March in 2013 (70 respondents: 22 males and 48 females) revealed that only four men utilized recruiting agencies to find their employers in the Gulf countries. Sixty-one respondents (14 males and 47 females) asked family members and friends. Others achieved their aims through introductions by schools or companies. 6 In this case, “the Gulf” could include Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, in addition to the six Arab Gulf states. 7 According to a Goan recruiting agent whom I and other project members interviewed on 29 August 2013, there are detailed rules to getting approval from the government. An agency is required to reapply to the authorities for a certificate of approval every five years or every 10,000 recruits. See the website of the MEA for details on these rules: https://www. mea.gov .in/ (Accessed 1 September 2019).

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The Government of Goa has a support system for migrants to the Arab Gulf states. A Commissioner for nri Affairs is appointed, and the nri Commission of Goa (founded in 2006) is responsible for assisting Goans.8 It is necessary to apply for an Emigration Clearance certificate according to the Emigration Act of 1983 before one can find a job, obtain a visa, and fly to the Arab Gulf states. The nri Commission of Goa has recently strengthened the surveillance mechanism on the recruiting agencies to make the aforementioned migration ­process smoother. One of these attempts was the amendment of the Travel Agencies Act. There are many travel agencies that illegally conduct business as recruiting agencies. After the amendment, the act states that agencies are required to procure an approval from the Protector General of Emigrants (nri Commission of Goa 2011: 12). The state government also set up the Overseas Employment Agency of Goa in January 2007. This agency offers aspiring Goan youngsters technical improvement and training courses that focus on safety standards and how to use instruments and facilities. It also tries to spread information about the work and living environment in the Arab Gulf states (nri Commission of Goa 2011: 11). These courses are held in Industrial Training Institutes or private training centers approved by the government. All courses are free for admission. As of 2011, 502 workers had attended these courses on topics such as plumbing, electrical wiring, refrigerator and air conditioner repair, tailoring, food production, and beverage service. In addition, various courses on medical skills, mobile repair, and food production have been held for school dropouts to support them in finding employment in- and outside Goa; these have had 362 attendants. The Overseas Employment Agency of Goa checks the information of the companies for which Goan workers are expected to work, with the support of government offices abroad. Some job offers come directly to the agency. 4

The Networks of Goan Christians in Dubai

4.1 The Life of Goan Christians in Dubai There are no official statistics on the number of Goan Christians in each country of the Arab Gulf states. The Goa Migration Study 2008 informs us that 1,200 8 The nri Commission of Goa is in charge of supporting non-resident Goans all over the world. It helps Goans living in the Arab Gulf states solve problems and conducts courses, as mentioned. It also tries to build up networks of overseas Goans and carries out a program that invites young Goans who are abroad to Goa. U.D. Kamat, the Director of the Goa Commission, told me that they recently started to issue a “Goa Card.” The cardholders are entitled to benefits offered by the government, private hospitals, and hotels. Interview with U.D. Kamat at the nri Commission of Goa (30 August 2013).

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Goans stayed in Iraq (Baghdad and Basra), Iran (Abadan), Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia in 1956 and there were 150,000 in the whole Gulf region in 1987 (nri Commission of Goa 2009: 38–39). As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, the number of non-resident Indians in the Arab Gulf states can be found in the report of the High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora. However, the figures do not tell us how many migrants are from each state of India. A newspaper article on Goans in the uae estimates that around 5,000 are staying in Abu Dhabi and 50,000 are based in Dubai. It is said that Goans are mainly hired by the hotel industry.9 As discussed in the aforementioned studies of Gardner and Vora, the status of Indian migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states is much lower than that of the Arab nationals and Western expatriates, and the majority are forced to put up with a harsh work environment (Gardner 2010; Vora 2013). Most of the Goan Christians I interviewed were employed by private companies or hotels and were in a better environment than that of unskilled construction workers. However, they, too, had problems, especially with regard to being pressured for time. I now discuss the case of a family; the husband and wife worked in Dubai, but they lived in Sharjah. Their case helps us understand the life of a middleclass family in the Arab Gulf states. Mario Fernandes (pseudonyms are used for all interviewees hereafter) was the son of a couple with whom I stayed in Goa from 2000 to 2001. He was working for a local English newspaper. He went to Dubai in 1985, before his ­marriage. He married Rosita in 1994. He rented a three-bedroom flat with his family (wife, a 12-year-old daughter, and a 5-year-old son). Rosita was born in Bombay (Mumbai), completed her education, and worked for a branch of a multinational corporation after her graduation. After her marriage, she came to Dubai and transferred to the Dubai branch of the same company. In the beginning, they lived in Dubai, but the increasing rent forced them to move to Sharjah, a neighboring Emirate to Dubai. The children went to an Indian school in Sharjah. When Mario arrived in Dubai, he saw deserts all around the airport, whereas the city had high-rise buildings. He told me, “Our life in Dubai is not rosy at all. We can only earn money in dirham. The currency used to have a better exchange rate to the Indian rupee. But now the value of the rupee has risen, so it is rather meaningless to work here now.”10 9

10

U.D. Kamat, the Director of the nri Commission of Goa, told me that Goans in the Arab Gulf states mostly work in the tourism sector. However, after the Dubai Crisis in 2009, the economic situation in the Arab Gulf states slowed down, and an increasing number of Goans now choose to become sailors. Interview with U.D. Kamat at the nri Commission of Goa (30 August 2013). Interview with Mario Fernandes in his house in Sharjah (6 May 2007).

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Whenever I interviewed a Goan Christian in Goa, I heard that one or two of his/her family members or relatives were in the Arab Gulf states. Most of the brothers of Mario and Rosita live in Dubai. Rosita has three younger brothers, and two of them were employed by five-star hotels in Dubai and Bahrain. One of them was an electrical engineer whose wife came to Dubai in 2007 and found a clerical job at a real estate company.11 The last brother of Rosita was a sales representative for a company. Mario’s brother also went to Dubai in 2000 and worked as an accountant for a rental car company for three years. He returned to Goa and is now working for a furniture company. Rosita named three problems of their life in Dubai: (1) high living costs, (2) time pressures, and (3) education for their children. She told me about her life as follows: I wanted to be a housewife after I came to Dubai and worked for five years, but it did not happen. I hired a maid when our children were small. Now it is difficult to hire a maid. We need to pay fees to the government of Dubai, and all costs other than her salaries, such as for health insurance, should be incurred. When we go back to Goa, we need to take her, too. To rent a flat is expensive. Renting a room by sharing a flat with another family costs you 6,000 dirhams. Even when you share a room with others, you need to pay at least 3,000 dirhams. I get up at 5 o’clock every day. My children go to school at 6:15. After that, I leave our house at 6:30. It takes at least one hour to drive to my office located at the center of Dubai. My working hours start at 9:00, so I can read newspapers. I finish at 18:00 and reach home after 19:00. The children return from school in the afternoon. [Once I come home] they continuously speak to me about what happened to them during the day [so I do not have a time for myself]. It is not certain how much their salaries are, but it is assumed that both earn more than 10,000 dirhams per month. João, a Goan who was working for a church in Dubai as a secretary, told me about the housing conditions, saying, “Unless you receive more than 10,000 dirhams monthly, you cannot have a good life here. Those who stay with their family have such good salaries. Many years have passed since they came to Dubai.”12 11 12

The wife of one of the brothers was living in Goa with her parents-in-law. He told me that seven members of a band who played music at a Goan restaurant stayed in a tiny room with bunk beds and paid 1,200 dirhams each monthly. Interview with João D’Souza at St. Mary’s Catholic Church (21 August 2008).

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Mario and Rosita rarely had time to talk on weekdays. Mario was usually at home when their children came back because he worked the night shift. He went to the office when his wife returned home. They could spend time together only on weekends (Fridays and Saturdays). They were worried about their children’s education, too. Their daughter and son were attending an Indian school in Sharjah. They were concerned about where they would send their children for higher education after they finished the twelfth grade (higher secondary school).13 In 2008, Rosita told me the following: I am wondering if it would be better to go back to India after my daughter finishes the tenth standard. My husband will follow us later. Considering the educational environment, Poona (Pune) would be nice. Its educational environment is good, and many of my relatives are there. My son cannot speak Konkani [Goan official language]. It is no use for him to [go back to Goa and] attend a Konkani middle school.14 4.2 Networks and Community Activities The Fernandes family, whose life in Dubai was discussed above, had two types of networks other than their work relations in Dubai. The first was their ties with family members and relatives. Two of Rosita’s brothers were staying in Dubai, and they were in contact frequently. They were all busy shopping for food and daily necessities at the weekends, so they usually spoke on mobile phones. Since the year 2000, the decline in mobile phone prices and the spread of internet services have enabled Indian migrant workers to speak with their family members regularly. In the case of Mario, he called up his parents in Goa every Friday. He sometimes phoned his younger sister in Goa in order to collect information about other family members and relatives. In addition, he tried to return to Goa with his wife and children at least once every year. Recently, they

13 14

The government of the uae allows an expatriate male resident to sponsor his wife and children, on the condition that the person has the minimum salary of 4000 dirhams (1090 us dollars) per month or 3000 dirhams (817 us dollars) plus accommodation. Government.ae: The official portal of the uae government. Accessed on 26 February 2018. https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/visa-and-emirates-id/ sponsoring-residency-visa-by-expatriates. In the Indian educational system, primary and secondary education is for students from the first through tenth standards. Higher secondary education is for those from the eleventh through twelfth standards. After that, students go to college for three years. After graduating from a higher secondary school in Sharjah, Mario’s daughter entered a college in Dubai. As of April 2015, Mario’s sister told me that she shifted to a British college to pursue her studies in architecture.

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have been actively sharing information via messaging services. In 2013, Mario, Rosita, and their daughter were connected to Mario’s brother and nephew through Facebook. Another network for Mario is St. Mary’s Catholic Church. They attend Konkani mass once every week and maintain contact with their Goan friends. I would now like to explain how Goan Christians form their networks at church. St. Mary’s Catholic Church is a center for activities in Dubai. The church is located near the Karama area, where most of the residents are Indian. It was built in 1967 on a plot that was donated by the then Emir, Sheikh Rasid bin Saeed Al Maktoum. As of 2013, nine priests were residing at the church. They were from various places: India (the states of Kerala, Goa, and Tamil Nadu), the Philippines, and the us. Multi-lingual masses are provided for the congregation. People can attend masses in Arabic, French, Konkani, Malayalam, Sinhalese, Tagalog, and Urdu, as well as English. There is a Goan community group (St. Mary’s Goan Community, formerly called St. Mary’s Goan Sodality) at the church. According to its website,15 the group had more than 500 members and organized the following activities every year: 1. Festival of St. Joao (June) 2. Picnic (October) 3. Celebration of the festival of St. Francis Xavier (3 December, held the first Saturday of December) 4. Christmas tree party Among the above activities, the festival of St. Joao is celebrated in Dubai by renting a pool and a hotel room. It is a popular festival throughout Goa and takes place on 24 June. Young men jump into wells or ponds to retrieve gifts thrown in by villagers. In the case of the 2012 event of St. Joao Festival in Dubai, the fees were 100 dirhams for an adult and 50 dirhams for a child. All participants decorated their heads with flowers and jumped into the hotel pool. They enjoyed performances by a Goan traditional band and DJs (see xavierpereira3 2012). Outside the activities of the Goan Community of St. Mary’s Church, Goan Christians hold other events, for instance, an annual inter-village football tournament. The popularity of football is very high, and there is a league in Goa. The main organizer of the tournament in Dubai was United Goans Dubai. In 2012, twelve teams participated. The Goan teams, such as the Morjim Sports Club, FC Siolim, and Mapusa Sports Club, all had the names of Goan villages 15

Website of St. Mary’s Goan Community. Accessed 2 September 2013. http://www.goancommunity.com.

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and towns (see Staff reporter 2012). João, a Goan who was active in church activities, told me about the importance of the event, saying “[Without such a tournament], young people just go out drinking [after their working hours]. They do not interact with others. [It is good and healthy for youngsters that] they practice to prepare for the tournament and go home.”16 4.3 Goan Theater, tiatr, and the Belongingness of Goan Christians In addition to the events of St. Mary’s Church and the football tournament, the performances of tiatr, the Goan local theater, provide Goan Christians with opportunities to get together. Tiatr (tiatro) is a musical theater performed in Konkani. The theater is not only an entertainment but has an aspect of social enlightenment. The first tiatr was staged in Bombay in 1892. The majority of the tiatr performers and the audience are Christian. Live performances by a musical band and knockabout comedies are the two main constituents of tiatr as an entertainment. The band, with musical instruments such as a trumpet, saxophone, drum, electric guitar, and keyboard, sits in front of the stage, and they play music and accompany Konkani songs, kantarams (cantarams). There is a main plot and sub-plots within the performance. In the latter, characters that are not closely related to the former appear and provoke laughter through comic acts and funny lines. Ironic comments about Goan politicians and funny behaviors by male comedians in female attire are popular among the Goan audience. Although tiatr is an entertainment for Goans, the themes for the main plots are often very serious. Social issues in Goa are adopted into a family story. For instance, political corruption and conflict between a father and son or the desire for money and disputes about the succession of brothers and sisters can be combined into one story. The action of the main plot takes place in the setting of a living room of a family house. The sub-plots are inserted between the acts of the main plot. Their comic performances and the kantaram singing entertain the audience in front of backdrops on which beautiful scenes from Goa—a fountain, street corner, or beach—are painted. The duration of a program is usually 3 to 3.5 hours, including an intermission. Every year, tiatr troupes from Goa hold tours in the Arab Gulf states, especially in Dubai, the uae, and Kuwait. The events offer Goan Christians a chance to socialize with each other. Before and after the performance, as well as during the intermission, people are busy catching up with their friends and relatives. In Dubai, tiatrs are staged in a hall of Al Nasir Leisureland near St. Mary’s Catholic Church. 16

Interview with João D’Souza at St. Mary’s Catholic Church (21 August 2008).

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Tiatr performances are arranged by Goan Christians working in the Arab Gulf states. Roberto Oliveira, in Dubai, is one of the organizers.17 He is from Margao in South Goa and worked for a Japanese company at that time. He brought his wife and children from Goa to Dubai. He said that he himself was a comedian and that he sometimes appeared on stage in events such as those organized by St. Mary’s Goan Community. In 2005, he started inviting a Goan troupe to Dubai. He invited one of the most popular groups led by a leading comedian in the tiatr industry in Goa in 2006. Roberto and the actor went to the same primary school, which enabled them to maintain a close relationship, although they lived in different countries. Various procedures are required to make tiatr events possible. It is necessary to find sponsors and rent a venue for the performance. In 2007, a ticket cost 50–60 dirhams (13.5 US dollars). This is very expensive compared with the rate in Goa, which was only 80 Indian rupees (1.2 US dollars) for a ticket. However, Goan Christians came to the event from Emirates other than Dubai. For the tiatr “Maim, Tuzo Upkari Hanv,” presented by the troupe of Roseferns, another leading tiatr actor in Dubai in 2008, so many Goan Christians came to Dubai from Abu Dhabi and Fujairah that the hall became full and some could not watch the performance.18 Tickets can be purchased at the counters of Al Nasir Leisureland, but people usually call the mobile numbers written on the poster or flyer to reserve their tickets. A troupe normally gives two performances while in Dubai and Kuwait for three days and then flies back to Goa. Roberto not only arranged tiatr performances in Goa but had also released two CDs of kantarams by 2007. To record the second CD, he went back to Goa for 15 days. The CDs include not only his songs but also others performed in the same way as other Konkani kantarams. The songs depict various aspects of Goan society. Some songs praise the beautiful scenery of Goa, whereas others deal with Goan political issues by criticizing corrupt politicians. Among the kantarams, some songs based on life in the Arab Gulf states became popular. The title song of a hit CD in 2010 by Francis de Tuem in Goa was “Gulfachem Verem” (The wind of the Gulf).19 Tiatr troupes carry Konkani CDs as well as dvds whenever they make trips to the Arab Gulf states to sell them in the performance venue. It is said that many pirated CDs and dvds are produced and sold. Kantarams are sung and heard in both Goa and the Arab Gulf states. Like Roberto, there are people who devote themselves to tiatr performances and producing kantarams in Dubai. They contribute to the formation of the “Goan 17 18 19

Interview with Roberto Oliveira at a Goan Restaurant, Viva Goa, in Dubai (7 May 2007). From a post to a mailing list for Goans on goanet.org. De Tuem used to work in Kuwait. A photo of Kuwait Tower is used for the cover of the CD.

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Christian identity” that extends from Goa to the Gulf by going back and forth between the two places, bringing tiatr programs from the homeland to the Gulf. 5

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined the formation of transnational community networks among Goan Christians in the Arab Gulf states. Goan Christians expanded to East Africa through historical connections with the British Empire in the early twentieth century. They reached the Gulf region earlier than other Indians did. Relative to other Indian migrant workers from the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, they are more likely to belong to the middle class. The characteristics of the community network formation of Goan Christians are as ­follows. (1) Although they are in the Arab Gulf states, they maintain a close relationship with their families and relatives through mobile phones and message services. (2) They strengthen the unity of the community through events, such as the celebration of Goan festivals and organization of inter-village football tournaments. Some of these are arranged by church groups. (3) They share the “Goan identity” with other Goan people by watching tiatrs, which present social issues in Goa. Some are actively involved in tiatr activities by arranging tours of Goan troupes to the Arab Gulf states, appearing on stage themselves, and singing Konkani songs or kantarams. As shown above, the networks among Goan Christians are maintained closely and transnationally, even though people residing in the Arab Gulf states are pressed for time. However, when we turn our attention outside the circle of Goan Christians, no significant cooperative activities can be found with Indian migrant workers from other states. One exception is a relationship with Christians from Mangalore in the state of Karnataka. Their mother tongue is Konkani, as is that of the Goan Christians. They sometimes organize events, such as singing contests, together. In terms of interactions with other nationalities, the number of marriages between Goan Christian men and Filipino Christian women recently increased. However, they meet and fall in love while employed on ships, rather than in the Arab Gulf states.20 For Goan Christians, the relationship with other Catholics seems to be more significant than that with fellow Indians. Looking at the life experience of Goan Christians residing in the Arab Gulf states, the historical background of Goa—the conquest by the Portuguese and 20

Interview with U.D. Kamat at the nri Commission of Goa (30 August 2013).

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following Christianization—still has an influence over the formation of transnational community networks and relationships with other Indians. To understand this phenomenon, we need a close examination of the experiences of migrant workers from each Indian region, as well as the movements of migrant workers between the Gulf and India, as shown in the precedent works (Gardner 2010; Osella and Osella 2012; Vora 2013). By doing so, we will have a better understanding of the background of the present situation of “Indian migrant workers,” who are, in fact, divided into different communities. Bibliography Albuquerque, Teresa. 1986. The Love is to Serve: Catholics of Bombay. Bombay: Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture. Albuquerque, Theresa. 1999. Goans of Kenya. Bombay: Michael Lobo. Breeding, Mary. 2012. “India-Persian Gulf Migration: Corruption and Capacity in Regulating Recruitment Agencies.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 137–154. New York: Columbia University Press. Brickell, Katherine and Ayona Datta (eds.). 2011. Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, Connections. Surrey: Ashgate. Carvalho, Selma. 2010. Into the Diaspora Wilderness. Saligao: Goa 1556. Embassy of India (Abu Dhabi, uae). 2018. “uae Indian Community.” Accessed 3 July 2018. http://www.indembassyuae.org/eoi.php?id=UAE. Emirates 24/7. 2013. “uae has 2.2 m Indians: 40% from Kerala.” 13 May 2013. Accessed 17 February 2018. http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-has-2-2m-in dians-40-from-kerala-2013-05-13-1.506273. Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Jain, Prakash C. 2011. “British Colonialism and International Migration from India: Four Destinations.” In Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives, edited by S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot, 23–48. New Delhi: Routledge. Jain, Prakash C. 2016. “In Search of El Dorado: Indian Labour Migration to Gulf Countries.” In South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development, edited by Prakash C. Jain and Zinu Zacharia Oommen, 123–140. Abington: Routledge. Koga, Masanori and Heiji Nakamura. 2000. “Kokusaiteki na Imin no Doukou to Indokei Imin” [Trends of International Migration and Indian Migrants]. In Imin kara Shimin he: Sekai no Indo-kei Komyuniti [From Migrant to Citizen : Studies on South Asian Communities Overseas], edited by Masanori Koga, Masao Naitō, and Tsuneo Hamaguchi, 1–23. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. In Japanese.

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Kondo, Ayako. 2010. “Indo-jin Diaspora: Kaigai Imin Zempan” [Indian Diasporas: Overview of Overseas Migrants]. In Tōnan/ Minami Ajia no Diaspora [Labour Migration and Human Security in East and Southeast Asia], edited by Motoko Shutō, 136–156. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. In Japanese. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India. 2013. “Annual Report 2012– 2013.” Accessed 2 August 2013. http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/Annual_Re port_2012-2013.pdf. nri Commission of Goa (Office for the Commissioner of nri Affairs, Goa, India). 2009. Goa Migration Study 2008. Panjim: Government of Goa. nri Commission of Goa (Office for the Commissioner of nri Affairs, Goa, India). 2011. Action Taken Report on Issues Raised During Visit of Commissioner for NRI Affairs to Gulf Countries in 2007 & Global Goans Conventions Held in Lisbon, Portugal 2007, Toronto, Canada 2008, Muscat, Oman 2009 and Kuwait 2010. Panaji, Portugal: Government Printing Press. Osella, Caroline and Filippo Osella. 2012. “Migration, Networks and Connectedness across the Indian Ocean.” In Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, edited by Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 105–136, London: Hurst & Co. Sasikumar, S.K. 2001. International Labour Migration from Independent India, nli ­Research Studies Series, No.2001/022. Noida, India: V. V. Giri National Labour Institute. Sawa, Kishiro. 1985. “Buritishu India Kisengaisha no Seiritsu to Hatten: Tōyō Kōro heno Jōkisen no Sinshutsu to Teikikōro no Kaisetsu” [Rise of the British India Steam Navigation Company: Steam Navigation to the East (2)]. Tōa Keizai Kenkyū [Asian Economic Review] 49(3/4): 211–232. In Japanese. Staff Reporter. 2012. “Ninth Ramadan Football Tourney on Cards: Iranian Sports Club to Host Tournament for Ninth Year.” Gulf News. 22 July 2012. Accessed 1 September 2013. http://gulfnews.com/sport/football/ninth-ramadan-football-tourney-oncards -1.1052224. The Ministry of External Affairs (mea). 2017. “The Population of Overseas Indians.” Accessed 17 February 2018. http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf. The Ministry of External Affairs (mea). 2017. “Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme.” Accessed 17 February 2018. http://www.mea.gov.in/overseas-citizenship-of-india -scheme.htm. Vaz, J. Clement. 1997. Profiles of Eminent Goans: Past and Present. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. Durham: Duke University Press. xavierpereira3. 2012. “SAN JOAO DUBAI.” YouTube. Accessed 17 February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM2AeRhOusk.

Excursus 3

Recruitment of Bangladeshi Migrants in the Arab Gulf States: A Typology of Work Visas Md Mizanur Rahman Migrant flows from South Asia and the Arab world to the Arab Gulf states now account for by far the world’s largest south-to-south migration (Fargues and De Bel-Air 2015). The migration of such a huge number of migrant workers to the Gulf countries raises questions of how migrants are recruited to the Arab Gulf states for work and, particularly, how the migrants are brought to the Gulf. In general, several types of migration-focused institutions assist in bringing prospective migrants to the Gulf for work: employers who recruit prospective migrants directly, public employment services that match local workers with ­foreign jobs, migrant networks that facilitate access to foreign labor markets, and private recruitment agencies that serve the prospective migrants for profit (for details, see Martin 2006; Kuptsch 2006; Colton 2010; International Organization for Migration (iom) 2010; Shah 2010). Prospective migrants in the origin countries usually consult with and use the services of these labor intermediaries and, in some cases, more than one. One of the aspects of recruitment is the procurement of the work visa that a potential migrant requires in order to migrate to the Gulf for work. Potential migrants procure these visas in a number of ways, such as through recruiting agencies and personal connections. There are differences not only in the procurement of visas but also in the nature of the visas. In the research on Gulf recruitment, we have hardly found any interpretation of the different types of work visa in the recruitment process. By drawing on the experiences of Bangladeshi migrants, this Excursus looks into the types of work visa and the ways migrants that procure them for migrating to the Arab Gulf states. However, it is important to note that the types of visa discussed here are different from the official category of work visas, which is quite straightforward in that a potential migrant requires a work visa to migrate to the Arab Gulf states. Within this official category, we also find a few different types of visa that are available to potential migrants migrating to the Arab Gulf states. I draw on the migrants’ experiences to illustrate the procurement of different types of visa and develop a typology of the work visas in the Arab Gulf states.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��20 | doi:10.1163/9789004395404_014

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Work Visas

Migration for work through a recruiting agency proceeds as follows. A recruiting agency in an Arab Gulf state places a “demand letter” with their counterpart in Bangladesh, asking for certain number of migrants for certain ­occupations. The recruiting agency in Bangladesh approaches to the Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (bmet), a Bangladeshi government body to monitor outward migration, for initial clearance. Once the agency receives clearance, they search out prospective migrants and ask them to submit a passport, pictures, biographic information, information about work experience (including relevant certificates), and a partial payment to begin the recruitment process. At this juncture, the Bangladeshi recruiting agency contacts their counterpart in the Arab Gulf states for visa processing. The potential sponsor–employer will then secure the visa from the relevant authority and pass the visa to the recruiting agency in the receiving country. The recruiting agency in the Arab Gulf states then sends the visa to the recruiting agency in Bangladesh. From the time that the potential migrant gives his passport to the agency to the time that he or she flies can be as little as a few weeks or as long as several months (Rahman 2011; Rahman and Ullah 2012). Although this general overview of how the recruiting agencies work may seem simple, the actual recruitment procedures are much more complex and multi-layered. Along with formal recruiting agents, some informal agents located at different points throughout the system assist with the recruitment procedures. Generally, most prospective migrants hail from villages in Bangladesh, so recruiting agencies based in the capital city of Dhaka encounter difficulty in locating prospective migrants who might be suitable for particular jobs and ready to pay the required fees. As a result, the recruiting agents rely overwhelmingly on a group of middlemen called subagents, who act as mediators between prospective migrants and licensed recruiting agents. For an extra fee, these subagents help prospective migrants to find jobs and help agencies to find prospective workers in a timelier fashion. Although the position of the subagent in the official structure is nominal, they play a critical role in matching the demand for specific labor and the supply of such labor. The subagents approach the prospective migrants and convince them to take up a particular offer in the Arab Gulf states. The true hurdle in this job is the subagents’ ability to earn the trust of prospective migrants. Given the fact that migration can cost a few thousand dollars, a prospective migrant from a village prefers to deal with someone who embodies trust, such as the rural religious, economic, and political elites, so that they have a local contact to

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a­ pproach in cases of fraud and exploitation. Subagents are generally based in small cities or villages and have good contacts with these elites, if they themselves are not already one (Rahman, 2015). Subagents assist prospective ­migrants with a wide range of activities, such as paperwork, passports, bank accounts, medical checkups, and transportation to the airport. In addition to facilitating the actual migration process, they sometimes vouch to the traditional moneylenders that potential clients have already secured jobs in the Arab Gulf states and are therefore eligible for credit. They can even act as guarantors for some potential migrants who, otherwise, could not secure the necessary loans for migration. The role of subagents, therefore, transgresses beyond a simple matching task. 2

Flying Visas

As migration matures, many potential migrants learn more about the process of migration and the ways to seek alternative services for jobs in the Arab Gulf states. Instead of finding jobs with agencies, many potential migrants seek jobs arranged with sponsor–employers in the Arab Gulf states through migrant brokers with whom they are connected by social and symbolic ties. Migrant brokers, or what Bangladeshi migrants call “dalal” (broker) or “adam babshahi” (human-trader), are usually former migrant workers who have lived in the Arab Gulf states for a considerable amount of time and have greater access to the local recruitment structure and visas (Suter 2005; Rahman 2015). A working visa arranged through personal networks is called a “urro” or “flying (work) visa” because it flies directly from the migrant broker in the Arab Gulf states to the prospective migrant in Bangladesh, bypassing local recruiting agencies and their subagents. This is different from getting a visa through a recruiting agency, whereby the sponsor–employer passes the visa to the foreign recruiting agency, and it is then passed to the Bangladeshi recruiting agency and finally the prospective migrant. The arrangement of a flying visa usually proceeds as follows. A migrant broker finds a job for a friend or relative, usually with his kafeel (sponsor-­employer) or his kafeel’s network of friends and relatives (Shah and Menon 1999; De BelAir 2011; Fargues 2011; Rahman 2017). After successfully identifying a potential kafeel, the migrant broker arranges a photocopy of the passport, a picture, and other relevant papers, depending on the profile of the employee (skilled or unskilled), to pass to the potential kafeel for a work visa (Gardner 2010). Once a work visa has been procured, the migrant broker sends it to the potential migrant in Bangladesh and asks them to finish all local procedures, such as a

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medical check-up and bmet clearance, and to fly to the particular Arab Gulf state within a stipulated period (usually less than three months). The flying visa benefits the mediating contacts because they charge a commission to the potential receiver, and it benefits the kafeels because they save agency fees in their country of origin, in addition to kickback fees in most cases. More importantly, the strategy of procuring a working visa through personal connections shows the individual migrant’s ability to circumvent bureaucratic procedures and the rising costs of Gulf migration. Procurement of a flying visa does not involve local mediators in Bangladesh, especially the subagents and agents, so flying visas benefit the potential migrants who receive them. Depending on the nature of the ties (social or symbolic) between the prospective migrant and the migrant broker, the amount of fees and timing of the payment can vary considerably (Rahman 2016). The direct benefit of a flying visa is that the recipients usually pay part of the set fees out of the first several months’ wages in the destination country and, thereby, avoid being indebted to moneylenders in Bangladesh. Although the ever-increasing costs of recruitment have made it difficult for many poor potential migrants to secure jobs in the Arab Gulf states, a thriving trade in flying visas has opened the door to affordable employment in the Arab Gulf states for a growing number of Bangladeshis. It is important to note that Bangladeshi migration to the Arab Gulf states is deeply rooted in social processes organized through networks and forged through everyday interpersonal connections (Rahman 2016). It is founded on a social organization infrastructure that includes common bonds of kinship and friendship, which are adopted and transformed through the reciprocity of mass migration. A landless villager in Bangladesh may be poor in financial capital but is often rich in the social resources (social capital) that are inherent in such close-knit connections. The beauty of social capital is that it can be converted into other forms of capital, such as financial capital or access to overseas employment (Faist 2000). The actual merit of personal connections is that they increase the affordability of Gulf migration for those who may not otherwise envision undertaking such a costly venture. 3

Free Visas

Apart from the flying visa, there is another type of visa, popular among Bangladeshi potential migrants to the Arab Gulf states, called a “free visa.” This type of visa is an invention of migrant brokers in the Arab Gulf states who are involved in the trade of work visas. Although there is no official category of visas called “free visas” in the Arab Gulf states, the term is widely used among m ­ igrant

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communities. Pakistanis and some Indian Muslim migrants call it an “azad” (free) visa. This unofficial category of visa allows a potential migrant to enter an Arab Gulf state for work under the kafala system, but the sponsor–employer who officially sponsors the migrant does not offer paid work. Migrants on free visas are free to find their own jobs in any sector of the economy, although it is illegal to work in another sector or with a sponsor–employer other than one’s own (Shah 2008:7). In other words, a free visa is legal but, paradoxically, when free-visa holders start working for others, they become illegal by law and are vulnerable to deportation. The free visa is obtained through similar procedures to those described for personal networks and recruiting agencies earlier. Both migrant brokers and recruiting agents are involved in the trade of free visas in Bangladesh. As there is no legal job available for a free-visa holder, a free visa is cheaper than a flying visa. Many migrant brokers do not recommend free visas to their close relatives for fear that they may lose social credibility and respect in their communities of origin if the free-visa holder does not find gainful employment and encounters deportation. Being for-profit organizations, recruitment agencies dominate the free-visa market. Like many work visas and flying visas, free visas also generate kickback fees for kafeels, and this has perhaps given birth to such a dubious category of visas in the Arab Gulf states. The benefit of a free visa is that the holder can bargain their labor and get a good deal. However, the tradeoff is that, if the free-visa holder is caught during working hours by the lawenforcement authority, the holder is liable to deportation. 4 Conclusion This Excursus has described the visa procurement of Bangladeshi migrants heading to the Arab Gulf states for work. The study has identified three types of visa: work visas, flying visas, and free visas. It has attempted to demonstrate how migrants procure different types of visas by scrutinizing the role of recruitment agencies and personal connections in the recruitment process. In doing so, this research illustrates both institutional and network players in the recruitment process. Migrants obtain different types of work visa through recruiting agencies and migrant networks. The recruitment agencies and migrant brokers have different but complementary roles in the overall recruitment process. Bangladeshi recruiting agencies work in collaboration with their counterparts in the Arab Gulf states and use subagents to reach out to the potential migrants. They

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are formal profit-making organizations that serve prospective migrants by providing formal work visas, which migrants call “work visas” for short. With recruitment through networks, a migrant broker in an Arab Gulf state secures a work visa, known as a “flying visa,” for a prospective migrant in Bangladesh. The procurement of flying visas shows how social and symbolic ties facilitate migration of Bangladeshis to the Arab Gulf states. Migrant brokers have also invented another type of visa, called the “free visa,” to meet the ­ever-increasing requests from relatives and community members in the origin society. Free visas are cheaper and affordable for many potential migrants. A ­free-visa sponsor is not morally liable for offering paid jobs to the free-visa holder; holders are free to find their own employment. Although this study has attempted to provide insights into the visa procurement of Bangladeshi migrants, it could not shed adequate light on some other aspects of visa procurement, such as the political economy of visa trading at both ends of the process. This study should be seen as an initial attempt to explore this understudied field; building on it may further the analysis of migrant recruitment and visa procurement in the Arab Gulf states. Bibliography Colton, Nora Ann. 2010. The International Political Economy of Gulf Migration: Migration and the Gulf, Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute. De Bel-Air, Françoise. 2011. “Reforming the Sponsorship (Kafala) in the GCC Countries: What Socio-Political Stakes? The Case of Saudi Arabia.” Conference paper, presented in Workshop 12, Migration in the Gulf, at the Gulf Research Meeting, 6–9 July 2011, University of Cambridge, UK. Faist, Thomas. 2000. The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Space. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fargues, Philippe. 2011. “Immigration without Inclusion: Non-nationals in Gulf State Nation Building.” Conference paper, presented at the Gulf Research meeting, 6–9 July 2011, University of Cambridge, UK. Fargues, P., and De Bel-Air F. 2015. “Migration to the Gulf States: The Political Economy of Exceptionalism.” In Global Migration Old Assumptions, New Dynamics, edited by D. Acosta Arcarazo and A. Wiesbrock, Vol. 1. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. New York: Cornell University Press. International Organization for Migration (iom). 2010. Intra-Regional Labour Mobility in the Arab World, Geneva: iom.

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Kuptsch, Christiane, ed. 2006. Merchants of Labour. Geneva: iom. Martin, Philip. 2006. “Regulating Private Recruiters: The Core Issues.” In Merchants of Labour, edited by Christiane Kuptsch. Geneva: iom. Rahman, Md Mizanur. 2011. “Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the UAE: Gender-­ Differentiated Patterns of Migration Experiences.” Middle Eastern Studies 47(2): 395–412. Rahman, Md Mizanur. 2015. “Migrant Indebtedness: Bangladeshi Migrants in the GCC Countries.” International Migration 53(6): 205–219. Rahman, Md Mizanur. 2016. Bangladeshi Migration to Singapore: A Process-Oriented Approach. New York: Springer. Rahman, Md Mizanur. 2017. “Beyond Labour Migration: The Making of Migrant Enterprises in Saudi Arabia.” International Sociology, first published on the 13 December 2017. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580917745770. Rahman, Md Mizanur, and AKM Ahsan Ullah, eds. 2012. Asian Migration Policy: East Asia, Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia. New York: Nova. Shah, M Nasra. 2008. Recent Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-rich Gulf: How Effective Are They Likely to Be? Geneva: International Labour Organization. Shah, M Nasra. 2010. “Building State Capacities for Managing Contract Worker Mobility: the Asia-GCC Context.” In World Migration Report 2010. Geneva: iom. Shah, M Nasra and Indu Menon. 1999. “Chain Migration through the Social Network: Experience of Labour Migrants in Kuwait.” International Migration 37(2): 361–382. Suter, Brigitte. 2005. Labour Migration in the United Arab Emirates: Field Study on Regular and Irregular Migration in Dubai, imer, Malmo University, Sweden.

Excursus 4

An Indian Expartriate’s Perspective about the uae N. Janardhan 1 Introduction An academic anthropologist friend who visited Dubai a few years ago narrated a phrase from one of her interviewees that has stuck in my head. When an ­expatriate college student was asked to comment on his social identity, he reportedly replied: “I am Indian, head to toe, but a Dubai-ite at heart” (see Vora 2013). The term “Dubai-ite” could be easily substituted with “uae-ite” to affirmatively state that there is “a uae model” in the minds of every expatriate genre living in the uae. In this excursus, I will use a semi-academic approach—a mix of anecdotes, empirical evidence, and academic interpretations of expatriates and other ground realities linked to them—to argue that what expatriates perceive as a uae model is not just a figment of the imagination. It is unique in the context of the Arab Gulf states and beyond, it has become a hot topic of conversation around the world, and slowly but surely, it is beginning to be replicated elsewhere in the Gulf region as well. Although the primary analysis of this issue will be from a middle-class ­Indian perspective (about 30 percent of the expatriate population in the uae is Indian), this would also reflect an Asian perspective (about 70 percent of the expatriate population is Asian). 2

Overwhelming Transformation

With about 200 nationalities among its population, the uae hosts one of the most multicultural environments in the world and is an example of tradition amid modernity. As evidence for its development agenda for the last 13 years, it would not be inappropriate to cite a tagline observed on a real estate development on Sheikh Zayed Road a few years ago: “The uae is not just the center of the Arab world, but the Arab center of the world.” A former Indian diplomat’s recollection encapsulates how the uae’s work culture had changed, along with its physical development, from the times he visited, first in the 1980s and then in mid-2000:

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When I first visited here, ibm was very famous. No, not ibm computers, but the uae’s own ibm work culture—Inshallah, Bukra, and Maalish (God willing, tomorrow, sorry)—which basically meant not delivering anything. Somewhere along the way and now, decision-making and implementation seems to reflect the catchphrase of Maggi Noodles—ready in just two minutes.1 3

Challenging Nation-State Theory

Expatriates in the Arab Gulf states are designated as “temporary contractual workers.” As a result, they live in a “permanent state of impermanence” (Ali 2010), but they also enjoy most of the benefits that the citizens enjoy, without paying income tax. Many of them from developing Asia experience a ­standard of living that is beginning to look better than that available in several developed countries. A 2010 study reported that the uae government spent an ­average of 14,066 dirhams (US 3,583 dollars) per expatriate worker per year. However, an expatriate pays only 2,507 dirhams (US 687 dollars) in various fees to government departments, which leaves a massive bill of 50 billion dirhams (US 13.7 billion dollars) for the government to bear as subsidies (Al Awad 2010). [The] elimination of nationhood (in the uae) as a basis for identity portends a global future. It is the closest thing to a community organised by capitalism…workers and management have recourse to a language beyond citizenship. It is not [just] the greater good of the nation, but the good of the individual and of humanity at large that is invoked here.2 This unique socioeconomic model is evident in one of my daily experiences. As an Indian professional (from Bengaluru) working in the uae’s private think tanks and government entities since 2000, I am also a fitness and sports buff. Within a radius of three kilometers from my rented apartment in Dubai, I have at least half a dozen municipality parks that offer tennis facilities for me, ­basketball facilities for my son, and a walking track for my wife, all free of cost. On analyzing the reason for such facilities, I realized that it could be the 1 Conversation with Lalit Mansingh, Indian former ambassador to the uae (1980–83), Dubai, March 2011. 2 Faisal Devji. “Welcome to Dubai, the Society that Capitalism Built.” Financial Times (London), 5 February 2007.

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g­ overnment’s way of ensuring that the skilled and talented pool of expatriates does not leave the country as soon as they get better job or salary offers elsewhere. These and other facilities have indeed influenced many expatriates, including me, to stay on in the uae rather than take up more lucrative opportunities in other countries. Furthermore, these facilities have served as a platform for interactions among various expatriate communities. For example, my tennis friends include French, Filipino, Pakistani and Egyptian expatriates, among other nationalities. 4

Share in the Pie

As a means of diversifying the economy and containing the practice of expatriates transferring billions of dollars home in remittances annually, Dubai was the first to liberalise its economy among its regional neighbors. It was the first to allow expatriates to completely own businesses in free zones, own real estate properties, and trade on the stock exchanges, which has ensured that money hitherto sent home as savings is invested in the uae (see Fukuda, excursus 2). Of the estimated 102 billion US dollars transferred by expatriates from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2014, India received about 25 billion US dollars in remittances.3 This blend of providing opportunities to create personal wealth and tapping the same to enhance local economic development resulted, for example, in there being 33,000 Indian dollar millionaires in the uae in 2005, according to a Merrill Lynch report. In comparison, there were about 70,000 Emirati dollar millionaires during or around the same period.4 These numbers must have been increased significantly between 2005 and 2008, which was the best phase of economic development in the country and the world. Furthermore, according to 2016 statistics revealed by the Dubai Land Department, Indians were the largest contingent of buyers of real estate in Dubai. Out of 151 billion dirhams worth of deals between January 2016 and June 2017, Indians invested 20 billion dirhams.5 In addition, 2016’s most expensive villa in Dubai was purchased by an Indian for 53 million dirhams.6 3 4 5 6

“Remittances to India Hit $72b.” Khaleej Times (uae). 8 December 2015. M. Aftab. “The Indian Diaspora in Dubai and difc.” Khaleej Times. 25 December 2005. “Indians, Pakistanis Pour Dh27b into Dubai Real Estate.” Gulf News (uae). 29 August 2017. “Costliest Property Purchase: Indian Buys Dubai’s Most Expensive Villa for Dh53 Million.” Khaleej Times. 2 February 2017.

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From Recipient of Experts to Provider of Expertise

From being viewed as just another place in the Arab Gulf states to go to and make quick money, the uae has now become a world class service provider in the very countries that exported its workforce. Although Asian expatriates were perceived to be “building” the uae, the uae is currently involved in ­building airport, seaport, real estate, and energy projects in several Asian countries. Emirates airlines, for example, flew more international travellers in and out of India than Air India in 2011–12, cornering over 13 percent of the total market share of India, or 4.53 million passengers. Air India and its subsidiaries, on the other hand, carried 4.13 million. Likewise, the Kochi container terminal in the Indian state of Kerala is owned and operated by DP World, and the Hyderabad International Convention Centre and Commonwealth Games Village in Delhi were built by Emaar Properties. SmartCity Kochi, a joint venture between Dubai Holding’s Tecom Investments and the government of Kerala, inaugurated the first phase of the project—a 650,000 square foot it tower—in 2016.7 Although we are aware of several rags-to-riches stories among Asian expatriates in the Arab Gulf states, a new trend is that the wealth generated by expatriates in the uae is now being ploughed back into their countries of origin. For example, Indians in the uae are replicating their uae-based successful businesses in India. Tapping into India’s growing economy, the Indian-owned LuLu Hypermarket chain, which is the largest Asian brand in this sector in the Arab Gulf states, with nearly 100 outlets across the region and a turnover of over 4 billion US dollars, has just established its first mall in India. The shopping complex in the state of Kerala is also set to have a luxury hotel. Many other Indian-owned hospital and hotel chains that are operating in the uae are also setting up shop in India. The success of Indians abroad has led some to light-heartedly categorize non-resident Indians (nris)8 as “never really Indian,” “never relinquished India,” or “national reserve of India.” Although these comments could be construed as a positive attribute, nris are ridiculed too. For instance, Indians refer to their country folks in the United States as abcds: American-born confused desis (Indian natives). In the Arab Gulf states too, they are sometimes referred to as abcds: aayas (nannies), butlers, cooks, and drivers; however, this could now also be interpreted as architects, business people, chartered accountants, and doctors.

7 “India’s Smart City Push Gets Boost from the uae.” The National (uae). 10 February 2016. 8 Non-resident Indians are Indian passport holders working or living abroad.

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Economic Sense Is Common Sense

They say “home is where the heart is,” but from a practical viewpoint, home is where the job is. This tiny dot of a country in the Arab Gulf states has not only been my home for the last 17 years but has given me a chance to spread my wings and soar to heights unimaginable just about a decade ago. It has allowed me to blossom as a person, professional, and family man, which has made the uae a truly special place for me and my family. As part of my official job as a political and policy-making analyst for the federal government, I am often forced to wear an Emirati thinking cap over my Indian heart and mind. My wife jokes that I have schizophrenia (split personality) and am Indian at heart but an Emirati in the mind! One of the biggest impacts of living in the uae for an extended period of time has been my improved understanding of religion and cultural tolerance. Although I was never a practicing Hindu in the real sense of the term, life in the uae has made me more secular than I was in India. If I were in India, I would have been reminded of my identity on a daily basis. For example, because every major locality has a temple in India, I would have visited them on a fairly regular basis, which would have sought to reinforce my identity. Being in the uae, however, has meant that I have developed a more secular outlook. Religion is more of a private affair than a public expression, which has definitely been more comforting for me. Interestingly, this has positively impacted my approach towards Pakistan and Pakistanis, with whom India and Indians have, unfortunately, had strained relations for nearly seven decades. I now have a very good Pakistani friend, who visits our home with his family for dinner, just as we eat at his place. And, I am now able to better enjoy India–Pakistan cricket matches, which, according to me, is one of the main sources of friction between the people of the two countries. Growing up in this milieu, my son is one step ahead of me. His association with the realities of the uae and its religious aspects—mosque, azaan, and Islamic studies—is a good example for promoting the concepts of “universal religion” and “global citizens.” When my son, who is currently 14 years old, was about 2 years old, my wife and I would point to mosques and tell him they were temples. We would ask him to fold his hands in prayer (like a namaste) every time the azaan was heard. This became such an integral part of his conscience that, if he heard the azaan even when he was half asleep, he would involuntarily fold his hands in prayer. Today, he knows a few verses from the Qur’an, which he learnt in school, is keen to fast during Ramadan because his friend adheres to it, and wants to

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a­ ttend Islamic studies classes in school; according to him, “we must respect all religions.” He is also learning Arabic, and I am proud that he has been good enough to do well in Arabic without taking private tuition—the only one among his growing friends to manage it himself. He sings the uae national anthem, Ishi Biladi, just as well as he can sing the Indian national anthem, Jana Gana Mana, and he plays both tunes just as well on the keyboard. In case you are wondering how all of this is relevant, it is worth linking it to the liberal and tolerant religious and cultural milieu that the uae has encouraged to ensure that expatriates feel at home. In fact, there are more varieties of Indian vegetables here than I ever got in India! Temples, churches, and gurudwaras (Sikh temples) exist in the uae; festivals like Holi, Diwali, Onam, Christmas, Easter, and Good Friday, and the festivities associated with them, are just as intense as they are in the home countries of expatriates, pork is sold in some supermarkets and restaurants, and liquor is available across the counter in many Emirates. All this means that economic sense is common sense, and this has triumphed over religious ideology in the uae to evolve a socioeconomic model that is unparalleled in the region. 7 Conclusion Looking ahead from a personal viewpoint, I will obviously return to India, my home, where my heart belongs, after I retire or am forced to retire. Although this is a certainty, I am uncertain about my son and his future. He is Indian only in terms of possessing a passport. He has spent only about 350 days in India during the last 14 years. Every time, we travel abroad—India, Asia, or the West—he yearns to return to his “home, sweet home,” his “cozy and comfortable bed at home” in the uae. This connects with my anthropologist friend’s catchphrase at the beginning of this excursus—“I am Indian, head to toe, but a Dubai-ite at heart.” So, the way I feel now and the way my son feels now and is likely to continue to feel in the future means that most expatriates will remain schizophrenics and will continue to sustain their own livelihoods by contributing to the growth of the uae. Bibliograpy Aftab, M. 2005. “The Indian Diaspora in Dubai and DIFC.” Khaleej Times, UAE. Al Awad, Mouawiya. 2010. “The Cost of Foreign Labor in the United Arab Emirates.” Institute for Social and Economic Research, Zayed University, uae.

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Ali, Syed. 2010. Dubai: Gilded Cage. New Haven: Yale University Press. Devji, Faisal. 2007. “Welcome to Dubai, the Society that Capitalism Built.” Financial Times, London. Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. Duke University Press, United States.

Excursus 5

Education, Career, and the Future of Middle-Class Asian Children Kyoko Matsukawa and Naomi Hosoda In many cities of the Arab Gulf states, we see families roaming around in shopping malls. You can spend the whole day there by doing window shopping, having lunch at a food court, and visiting a supermarket for the weekly food and grocery shopping. Besides Arab families, a large number of Asian expatriate families can be spotted. This is a typical scene that the authors came across in Dubai and Kuwait City at the weekends (in the Arab Gulf states, Friday and Saturday are holidays). Construction workers and domestic workers usually attract more attention in terms of migrants’ issues in these cities. In the case of Dubai, among the total non-Emirati population of 2.69 million, laborers in the construction sector amounted to more than 50,000 in 2016.1 They are mostly male workers from the Indian subcontinent. If they are married, they leave their wives and children behind, hoping that they will make enough money as migrant workers for an improvement in life back home. Kuwait had the total population of 3.58 million in 2010, out of which the number of non-Kuwaitis was 2.43 million. Domestic workers numbered over 569,000 in total, among which female workers were 310,000. They too, come to the Arab Gulf states alone, largely from South and Southeast Asian countries.2 On the other hand, many non-professional white collar workers and professionals bring their families and stay with them ­ during their sojourn. The Embassy of India in the uae estimates that ­non-professional white collar workers (clerical staff, shop attendants, 1 The number for the non-Emirati population in Dubai was taken from the figures prepared by the Dubai Statistics Center, Government of Dubai. The Emirati population in Dubai was 233,430. For further information, see the Government of Dubai’s website: https://www.dsc .gov.ae/en-us/Themes/Pages/Population-and-Vital-Statistics.aspx?Theme=42. (Accessed on 18 February 2018.) The number of construction workers was given by the Permanent Committee for Labour Affairs (pcla) and was cited in an article of the Gulf News, an English newspaper published from Dubai. See Gulf News Staff Reporter (2016). 2 The figures were retrieved from Timothy and Sasikumar (2012), and the website of Gulf Research Center: http://gulfmigration.eu/kuwait-population-by-nationality-kuwaiti-non-kuwa iti-1990-2013/. (Accessed on 28 August 2018.).

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s­ alespersons, etc.) constitute 20 percent, while professionals, business persons, and their family members constitute 15 percent of the Indian migrants. For some of them, their period of sojourn can be over twenty years if they continually renew their visas. In the course of life, their children are born and grow up. What, then, are the educational and career options ahead of them? Are they different from those back home (that is, in the country of their parents)? In this excursus, we will show how the specific conditions surrounding them in the Arab Gulf states give them contradictions: the ability to speak English and global mobility, as well as financial burdens and the insecure feelings of needing to find another place to settle. Data on Indians and Filipinos are presented for the purpose. 1

Education for Migrant Children in Kuwait and the uae

In both Kuwait and the uae, the children of migrant workers are sent to private schools, whereas Kuwaitis and Emiratis are entitled to go to public schools free of charge. Parents choose a school according to their criteria: nationality, curriculum, or fee structure. Indians tend to choose Indian schools, and many Filipinos find Philippine schools suitable for their children. These ethnic schools are based on the same curricula as those in the home countries. This makes it easier for children to be transferred to another school back home if their parents lose their jobs and can no longer stay in the Arab Gulf states. It does not matter whether the children are Gulf-born and consider the country as their home. Once their parents became disqualified from staying and are unable to sponsor them, they have no choice other than to leave. This “they can anytime be forced to leave” situation is behind the uncertain feelings of migrant children about their future. Let’s look at the situation of Indians in Kuwait. They are the largest expatriate group of more than 800,000. Out of this number, 100,000 are dependents (spouses or children), and there are 42,000 students studying in 20 Indian schools.3 Mostly, they follow the curriculum of the Central Board of Secondary Education in India, and a school has classes from kindergarten to twelfth grade. Schools usually admit not only Indians but also other nationalities. A school principal told the author that Arab parents select Indian schools because they are renowned for the quality of their education and the fees are much lower 3 Based on the data from the Embassy of India, Kuwait, “Statistics of Indian Nationals in ­Kuwait, 2015” available at: http://www.indembkwt.org/Pages/IndCommunity.aspx. (­Accessed on 20 February 2018.).

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than those of the American or British schools. As a result, children can interact with students from other countries. The majority are from other South Asian countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. However, students from Arab countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, can also be found in the schools. Even among Indian students, their parents’ places of birth vary. Students communicate with each other in English, which is adopted as the medium of instruction by Indian schools. A girl who was born in Kuwait to Goan parents was present when the authors visited the country in 2017; she was a student of an Indian school run by a missionary. She told us that her classmates were from other states such as Kerala and Gujarat, so they utilized Hindi for chats.4 As a result, she became more fluent in Hindi than her mother tongue, Konkani. Hindi can be chosen as the second foreign language in the curriculum at Indian schools. The other option is French. Arabic and Islamic Studies are compulsory. Students are given chances to be exposed to Indian culture through ­various activities (for instance, research and presentation of Indian regional cultures). Kuwaiti nationhood is especially celebrated on the occasion of the National Day (February 25) and Liberation Day (February 26). Before these holidays, the schools are full of children wearing clothes in the colors of the Kuwaiti flag (green, black, white, and red). In this way, the educational space that Indian schools provide exists at the intersection of globalization, Indianness, and Kuwaiti nationhood. Among the other communities in Kuwait, the second largest is Egyptians with a population of 586,000, followed by Filipinos (241,000) and Bangladeshis (198,000), in 2016. Although Filipinos come third in terms of population, there are only two Philippine schools. The small number indicates that most Filipino workers stay without their children. These schools fall under the category of Philippine Schools Overseas and follow the curriculum of the Department of Education. One of the schools we visited (established in 1999) had 517 ­students.5 4 In multilingual India, which has 1,474 mother tongues (after scrutinizing), as reported at the 2011 census, Hindi has the largest number of speakers with 528,347,193. The girl spoke English with her parents and the medium of instruction at the school was English, so it is assumed that she mainly communicated in Hindi with other students. At the same time, the use of Hindi as a “lingua franca” can happen with those who are not good at English. Hindi, or rather Hinglish (a mix of Hindi and English) has recently been popularized as a result of the influence of popular Bollywood films all over India (Gera Roy 2013). The above figures were taken from the Census of India 2011, “Paper 1 of 2018 Language India, States and Union Territories (Table C-16),” available at: http://censusindia.gov.in/2011Census/C-16_25062018_NEW.pdf. (Accessed on August 15 2018.). 5 See the website of Philippine Schools Overseas: http://www.cfo-pso.org.ph/schools/ku wait/42-the-new-kuwait-philippine-international-school.html. (Accessed on 21 February 2018.).

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Filipino students were the majority of 82 percent; the rest were other nationalities: Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Fijians, Indonesians, and Australians. According to the principal, it used to take Kuwaiti students, too. However, the Department of Education banned the school from admitting Arab students in 2008.6 The school tried to propagate Filipino culture. The annual fees were 600 Kuwaiti dinars (2,000 us dollars). In addition, payments were required for textbooks and the school bus. The school is owned by a Kuwaiti educational ­establishment company and complies with the regulations of the Kuwaiti government, which is the same for all privately run schools. The Ministry of Education conducts an annual inspection to investigate whether the schools meet the standards set by the government. After the twelfth grade, children of Asian migrants need to decide where to go for higher education. There are three options for them: (1) Staying where they are brought up and proceeding to a private university in the Arab Gulf states; (2) going back to the home country of their parents; or (3) leaving for other countries, such as the US or UK. The Arab Gulf states have been developing their higher education systems since the establishment of the University of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia in 1957. The number of universities proliferated in the whole region in the 1970s and 1980s (El-Sanabary 1992: 21). The privatization of higher education at the turn of the twenty-first century yielded universities following American curricula (Coffman 2003). At the same time, the number of branch campuses of American or British universities or institutions increased. Dubai’s International Academic City hosts more than twenty branch campuses of American, Australian, British, and Indian universities. Fees are very expensive, and most foreign parents cannot afford them. For instance, Murdoch University, an Australian institution, has a branch campus in Dubai. It offers foundation, undergraduate, and postgraduate courses. To complete the three-year undergraduate course for a degree in commerce costs 156,000 dirhams (42,500 us dollars). The university offers students a chance to transfer to the Australian campus, which is an attraction for students. Amity University, an Indian university, offers a course for a BA in commerce with much lower fees of 40,000 dirhams (10,900 us dollars). Amity has thirteen campuses in India, as well as international campuses in London, Singapore, New York, California, and Mauritius. Students can spend a part of the course at any campus.7

6 Interview with the principal of the New Kuwait Philippines International School in Kuwait (22 February 2017). 7 For the case of American branch campuses in Qatar, See Vora (2014).

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As such, the first option of remaining in the Arab Gulf states for higher education is costly. It is thus common for the children of Asian migrants to go out of the Arab Gulf states after finishing the secondary education. A majority choose to “go back” to the home country of their parents. There are advantages to going home: fees are lower than at the universities in the Arab Gulf states, US, or UK, they can rely on relatives, and they are not alien to the place because they have often accompanied their parents to spend holidays in the country. But if parents can afford to send their children to the US or UK, they do so. This is partly due to the problems of adjusting to the environments of their own home countries, India or the Philippines, that their children may face. Malika,8 an Indian parent originally from the state of Maharashtra, told us that there were challenges for Gulf-born children back home. Her daughter, Falak, was in the twelfth grade at the time of the interview and was preparing for the matriculation examination, the results of which are crucial for admission to colleges in India.9 According to Malika, the level of hygiene in Kuwait is high. Toilets are kept clean, and garbage is rarely spotted in streets. One can move smoothly anywhere by car. On the other hand, by the standards of ­Kuwait, the public toilets in India are dirty, the piles of garbage stink, and the traffic is unorganized. In addition, she was worried about Falak going to India alone, given the protection that she had been provided with so far. However, because of geographical proximity and availability of support from relatives and friends, she hoped that her daughter would be admitted to a college in Mumbai. Another Indian parent, Savio, from the state of Goa, searched hard for an appropriate college where his daughter, Filomina, could study comfortably. He travelled all over India and eventually found one in the state of Karnataka. Although the college was located in a rural area, the campus was equipped with all facilities: hostels, stores, and banks. Filomina wanted to major in architecture, for which the institution provided excellent teaching. In addition, she could make friendships with many non-resident Indian (nri) students like herself. Her roommate was a nri girl from Fujairah in the uae. Savio said that he could save money because Filomina took the common entrance examination of the college and obtained good marks, so that they did not have to make use of the nri quota.10 In India, every college reserves a certain percentage of seats for nris,11 overseas Indians who hold Indian passports. If she had not 8 9 10 11

All names appearing in this excursus are pseudonyms. Interview with Malika in Kuwait City (19 February 2018). To use an nri quota, you do not need to appear the entrance examination. If you fulfil minimum eligibility conditions for admission, you can enter the university by submitting necessary documents and paying higher fees. 15 percent of the seats are usually reserved.

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scored the marks required for a “normal merit seat,” they would have had to pay exorbitant fees of 8,000 US dollars per year to secure an nri quota seat.12 Others rely on relatives to take care of their children while they study in ­India. John was born in Kuwait in 1972. His father, a mechanical engineer originally from the state of Kerala, arrived in Kuwait in the 1950s to work for an oil company. The Gulf War forced himself and his family to leave Kuwait. John entered a college in Kerala. He returned to Kuwait with his father in 1995. At the time of the interview, he was the father of three children, two sons and one daughter. The elder son, Alex, was a student at an engineering college in Kerala. He stayed in a hostel on weekdays and went to his grandmother’s house at the weekends.13 In this way, parents in the Arab Gulf states try to secure protection for their children. A few decide to pursue degrees in the US or UK, even though the fees and living costs are high. Fatima, a Malayali girl born in 1993, made a decision to study at the University of Nottingham in the UK. Later she opted for being transferred to the Malaysian campus, which was one of the overseas campuses of the university, because of her desire to study international business.14 Fatima believed that she had become an independent and mature person in ­Malaysia. She had not even known how to use a washing machine before. “I am now confident of solving problems on my own,” she said. Her younger brother was majoring in medicine at the branch campus of the Weill Cornell Medicine College, a part of Cornell University in the US, in Qatar.15 Fatima’s father was a wealthy businessman who owns restaurants, so he could afford to send the children to British and American universities. 2

Career and Future

Thus, the children of migrant workers select their pathway among a wide range of choices, according to their desires for the future and their economic position. What kind of career do they then wish to have and where do they want to go? A Filipino boy, Arvin, 24, was a student of Murdoch University in Dubai at the time when the authors interviewed him. He came to Dubai in 2002, following his father at the age of eight. After completing primary and secondary 12 13 14 15

Interview with Savio in Kuwait City (20 February 2017). Interview with John in Kuwait City (21 February 2017). Another campus is located in China. Interview with Fatima in Kuwait City (23 February 2017).

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e­ ducation at a Philippine school in Dubai, he entered a university in Manila. However, over a year, he encountered many hardships, such as typhoons and floods, which he had never experienced in Dubai. After coming back to Dubai, he was trying to obtain a double degree in marketing and business information systems. Reflecting on the future, he said, “It is harder to get the future in the Philippines. Here in Dubai, we have opportunities and jobs, being creative and with good salaries.” However, he felt that “temporariness,” that is, being a temporary resident with a visa, was the problem in Dubai. He dreamt of having a permanent place to settle down, perhaps in Australia or Canada. He was contemplating being transferred to the main campus of Murdoch University in Australia. Even though there were better chances in employment and better salaries in Dubai, Arvin felt that there were “certain rules to be followed if they want to stay [in Dubai].”16 Ambika, in her early forties, was an Indian woman who was born in Kuwait in 1976. Her parents were originally from the state of Maharashtra. When she was fourteen, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. The incident forced her and her family to leave the country that she had felt a part of. She returned to Kuwait after finishing the higher secondary level (twelfth grade) in India. She took correspondence courses provided by a university in India. She joined a logistics company and worked for 11 years. At the time of the interview, she was in charge of public relations at an aviation service company. She too had the uncertain feeling of being a temporary resident in Kuwait.17 In her case, not only her stay on a visa but also the dispersion of her friends caused by the invasion was behind the feeling. In 2017, a reunion of classmates occurred for the first time in 27 years. Her uncertain plans for the future were also caused by the increasingly discriminatory policies of the Kuwaiti government toward migrants. They had assured her that she could not stay in Kuwait forever. In 2013, the newspapers reported that a public hospital introduced a six-month trial ban on foreigners receiving treatment in the morning, except for emergencies. Another hospital followed the same policy and declared that it would accept only nationals in the morning in 2016 (see Toumi 2016a). The government is planning to build new hospitals and clinics exclusively for foreigners. Health insurance fees are expected to increase from 50 Kuwaiti dinars (166 US dollars) to 130 Kuwaiti dinars (433 US dollars) per year (see Omar and Agencies 2017). The hike in electricity and water costs for foreigners are leading the way. In new tariffs, the prices of electricity will be 7.5 times more for foreigners (see afp 2016). Ambika was worried about the stricter policies for her parents to 16 17

Interview with Arvin at Dubai International Academic City (8 March 2016). Interview with Ambika in Kuwait City (24 February 2017).

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stay under her sponsorship.18 When we asked her if she would go back to India after retirement, she answered, “if they [the Kuwaitis] allow me to say so long.” She was contemplating moving to the US where her sister-in-law resides. She had a son who went to an Indian school and was in the second grade. Ambika was pondering whether to send her son to another school following the British curriculum because she wanted him to settle down in the US in the future.19 For the first generation of migrant workers, the priority is to go back to their home country when time comes. For the second generation, the situation is more complicated. The Arab Gulf states are their “home,” where they were born and brought up. However, there is no hope of obtaining citizenship. They are required to renew their visas, whether they are on visas sponsored by their father or on their own visas, if they want to stay.20 Once the contract of employment for their father or themselves is terminated, they are forced to leave the country. They could return to the country whose nationality they have. But many of them have uneasy feelings about India or the Philippines. These are principally caused by the differences in living standards, as shown above. The prevailing images back home of Gulf returnees as rich and colorful can also 18

19

20

Four months after the interview with Ambika, the Ministry of Interior declared its decision not to grant new visas to expatriates’ parents and siblings. It said that those who currently have residence visa can continue to stay only after they produce certificates for the payment of private and health ministry insurances. The cost for the insurances could amount to 1,700 Kuwaiti dinars (5,610 US dollars) annually. See Al-Rai (2017). British schools in Kuwait usually follow the National Curriculum of England and Wales and many offer examinations for International General Certificate of Secondary Education (igcse) which is for students in the 14–16 age group, run by the Cambridge Assessment International Education, as well as General Certificate of Secondary Education (gcse), and General Certificate of Education Advanced Level (gce A Level). These qualifications are recognized by both British and American universities. See Sengupta (2010) and Clark (2014). For the curriculum of the British School of Kuwait, see: http://www.bsk .edu.kw/information. (Accessed on 29 August 2018.). The government of the uae allows an expatriate male resident to sponsor his wife and children, subject to conditions including a minimum salary of 4,000 dirhams per month or 3,000 dirhams plus accommodation. In Abu Dhabi, a woman can sponsor her husband and children only if she is a professional, such as an engineer, and her monthly salary is over 10,000 dirhams or 8,000 dirhams plus accommodation. Girls can be sponsored by their fathers until they are married, whereas boys need to obtain their own visas once they turn nineteen. But if they are students in the uae or abroad, they can be sponsored until the age of twenty-one. See the official portal of the uae government, “Sponsoring residency visa by expatriates”: https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/visa -and-emirates-id/sponsoring-residency-visa-by-expatriates. (Accessed on 26 February 2018.) In Kuwait, the minimum salary to sponsor dependents used to be 250 Kuwaiti dinars (834 US dollars), but the Ministry of Interior decided to raise the amount to 450 Kuwaiti dinars (1,500 US dollars) in 2016 (Toumi 2016b).

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make them uncomfortable. Thus, the children of migrant workers long for a place for future settlement. At the moment, they are in the Arab Gulf states, not knowing where that place will be. Bibliography afp. 2016. “Kuwait to Raise Power, Water Price on Expats.” Gulf News. 13 April 2016. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-to-raise-power-water-price-on-ex pats-1.1711225. Accessed on 15 August 2018. Al-Rai. 2017. “Up to KWD 1,700 Annual Fee for Parent’s Visa.” Kuwait Times. 21 June 2017. http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/kd-1700-annual-fee-parents-visa/. Accessed on 15 August 2018. Clark, Nick. 2014. “A Guide to U.K. School Qualifications Offered Internationally.” World Education News + Reviews. February 3, 2014. https://wenr.wes.org/2014/02/ a-guide-to-uk-school-qualifications-offered-internationally. Accessed on 29 August 2018. Coffman, James. 2003. “Higher Education in the Gulf: Privatization and Americanization.” International Higher Education 33: 17–19. El-Sanabary, Nagat. 1992. Education in the Arab Gulf states and the Arab World: An Annotated Bibliographic Guide. New York: Garland Publishing. Gera Roy, Anjali. 2013. “The Politics of Hinglish,” In Lionel Wee, Robbie B.H. Goh and Lisa Lim (eds.), The Politics of English: South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific, pp. 21–36. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Gulf News Staff Reporter. 2016. “More than 500,000 Labourers Working in Dubai.” Gulf News. 19 January 2016. https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/more-than-500 -000-labourers-working-in-dubai-1.1656267. Accessed on 15 August 2018. Omar, Faten, and Agencies. 2017. “Expats to Pay Increased Health Insurance of KWD 130 Annually.” Kuwait Times. 15 November 2017. http://news.kuwaittimes.net/web site/expats-pay-increased-health-insurance-kd-130-annually/. Accessed on 15 August 2018. Sengupta, Chiranti. 2010. “The Right Curriculum.” Gulf News. 20 October 2010. https:// gulfnews.com/life-style/parenting/the-right-curriculum-1.695938. Accessed on 29 August 2018. Thimothy, Rakkee, and Sasikumar, S.K. 2012. Migration of Women Workers from South Asiat to the Gulf. New Delhi: V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, NOIDA, and UN Women South Asia Sub Regional Office. https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/global/sites/de fault/files/migration_women_southasia_gulf.pdf. Accessed on 29 August 2018. Toumi, Habib. 2016a. “Kuwait Hospital Bans Foreigners in the Morning.” Gulf News. 6 March 2016. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-hospital-bans-foreign ers-in-the-morning-1.1684997. Accessed on 15 August 2018.

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Toumi, Habib. 2016b. “Kuwait Raises Minimum Salaries for Family Visa.” Gulf News. 13 October 2016. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-raises-minimum-sal ary-for-family-visas-1.1911818. Accessed on 26 February 2018. Vora, Neha. 2014. “Between Global Citizenship and Qatarization: Negotiating Qatar’s New Knowledge Economy within American Branch Campuses.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37: 2243–2260.

Index Abaya/Abāyah 118, 162, 205 Abu Dhabi 77–78, 80–82, 103, 119, 137, 160, 174, 176, 182, 184, 187, 187n6, 188, 188n7, 189, 198, 227, 232, 257n20 Abu Dhabi Dialogue 36, 46 Abuse 36n7, 38, 42, 45, 47, 83, 92, 99, 119, 125, 132–134, 145, 147–148, 156, 156n7, 161, 165–167, 173, 176, 209, 210 see also maltreatment, human rights violation, violence Agency (organization) 17, 39n13, 126, 131, 137, 148, 154, 167n12, 168, 175, 181, 220, 225n7, 239, 256 employment 12, 37, 226 recruitment/recruiting 90–91, 114, 128, 130, 133–135, 137, 149, 179, 225–226, 236–238, 240 training 119 American(s) 31, 82, 167n12, 196, 220, 246, 252–253, 253n7, 255, 257n19 Amnesty 3n1, 25, 27, 39, 45, 147, 159, 166, 166n12, 167n12 program 27 Amnesty International 3n1, 25, 45, 147 Arab Spring 59 Association 13, 39n13, 42, 74, 149, 157, 172, 183–184, 187–188, 187n6, 188n7, 189n8, 190, 205, 220, 224, 247 Australia 32, 43, 180, 253, 256 Australian(s) 253 Authoritarian 15, 53, 55–56, 70–71, 74, 76 monarchies 15, 53 Authoritarianism 56, 68, 74 Bachelor 27, 27n3 Bahrain 1, 9, 10n3, 16, 26, 28, 32, 34, 39n13, 41–44, 56–59, 69, 73, 75–76, 104n1, 146, 151, 151n3, 155, 158, 172, 173n1, 224–225, 227–228 Balik-Islam 163, 202, 208 Bangladesh 13, 27–28, 35, 43, 125, 129, 195n2, 198, 237–241, 252

Bangladeshi(s) 10–11, 13, 38n12, 116n16, 236–241, 252–253 Bed space 175–178, 181, 185–186, 203 Bedouin 106 Branch campus 82, 253, 253n7, 255 British 44, 46, 73–74, 103–104, 104n1, 218, 220–221, 223–224, 229n14, 233, 252–253, 255, 257, 257n19 Briton(s) 163 Broker 12, 137, 238–241 Buddhism 197n4 Buddhist 148 Burj Al Arab 79 Burj Khalifa 45, 79–80, 115n14 Canada 29, 32, 129, 158, 180, 222–223, 256 Catholic(s) 174, 178, 184–186, 221, 228n12, 230–231, 231n16, 233 see also Christian(s), Christianity Central Board of Secondary Education 251 Christian(s) 13, 132, 150, 178, 184–187, 194–196, 199, 202, 202n12, 206–207, 212, 221, 223–228, 230–233 see also Catholic(s), Christianity Christianity 13, 185, 195, 202n12, 221 see also Catholic(s), Christian(s) Citizenship 2, 5, 12, 29n6, 37n11, 155–156, 172, 195, 218n2, 219, 244, 257 migrant 155–156 Civil society 132, 136 Coexistence 195 pseudo- 40 Consulate 159, 160n8, 162, 164–166, 183, 187, 187n6 Conversion 13, 194–195, 197–207, 198n6, 209–214 to Islam 197, 199, 202–206, 208, 213 Crime 38–40, 39n14, 93n3 Da’wa 199–200 De-Arabization 11n5, 86 Demographic imbalance 35, 40, 53, 117–118, 118n18

262 Dependence on foreign labor 100 Deportation 164, 167, 181, 183, 189, 240 Dhaka 237 Division of labor 53, 55–57, 71, 83 Doha 45, 77, 79–82, 207, 210 Domestic worker(s) 5, 7, 7n2, 8n2, 9–11, 10n3, 13, 15, 25, 28n5, 36n7, 38, 42–43, 45, 83–100, 92n2, 104–107, 109–112, 109n4, 111n7, 112n8, 112n9, 114–120, 115n13, 117n17, 118n18, 125–128, 125n1, 126n2, 130–133, 134n4, 135–137, 145–153, 145n1, 151n3, 152n4, 155–157, 156n7, 159–163, 165–168, 166n12, 175–176, 185, 185n5, 188, 195–196, 198–199, 202, 205, 209–214, 250 Dubai 1, 13, 26, 27n3, 33, 39n14, 45, 77–81, 87, 89, 103, 105, 116, 115n14, 119, 149, 172–174, 176–189, 187n6, 197, 200–202, 204, 204n15, 206, 208–209, 219, 221, 221n4, 226–231, 227n9, 229n14, 232n17, 243–246, 244n1, 244n2, 245n4, 245n5, 245n6, 248, 250, 250n1, 253, 255–256, 256n16 “Dubai (debt) Crisis” 33, 80, 227n9 Dubai International Airport 79 Education 30, 42, 75, 82, 84–85, 97–99, 107, 113, 117, 127, 130–131, 133, 155n6, 199, 201, 224n5, 227–229, 250–256, 257n19 City 82 primary and secondary 229n13, 255 higher 97, 229, 253–254 see also private school, university Educational 81, 126, 148, 160, 174n2, 175, 229, 229n13, 251–253 and career paths 13 Egypt 27–28, 34–35, 54, 195n2 Egyptian(s) 11, 74, 116n16, 163, 245, 252 Embassy 157, 159, 160n8, 166, 167n12, 174, 176, 183, 187, 187n6, 198, 219, 250, 251n3 Emirati(s) 104–105, 107n2, 109n4, 110, 110n5, 113, 116–120, 117n17, 245, 247, 250–251, 250n1 Emiratization 125n1 Energy 73, 112, 246 English 92, 112, 112n8, 159, 174n2, 180, 196–197, 201, 204, 227, 230, 250n1, 251–252, 252n4 Ethiopia 28, 28n5, 45, 125, 130, 198 Ethiopian(s) 10, 116n16, 132, 160, 166

Index Facebook 159, 185, 230 Family 12, 14–15, 27, 27n3, 36n10, 37–38, 37n11, 56, 80, 84–86, 88–89, 90–98, 100–101, 103–105, 107–108, 107n2, 110–120, 111n7, 112n8, 113n10, 113n10, 115n13, 116n16, 117n17, 118n18, 127–128, 130–132, 134–137, 147, 155, 161–163, 165, 168n14, 172–173, 174n2, 175–176, 178–179, 182–183, 185, 187–188, 190, 198–200, 202–204, 210–214, 219, 224–225, 227–229, 231, 233, 247, 250–251, 255–256 extended 84, 97, 100, 111, 117 nuclear 111, 111n7 reunification 27, 36n10, 37, 37n11 structure(s) 104, 108, 111, 117 transnational 85 visa 37 see also kinship networks Feminization 97 of migration 83, 85, 146, 156 fifa (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) 2022 World Cup 26, 26n2, 37, 45, 81 Filipino(s) 11, 13, 15, 27, 28n5, 91, 116n16, 127, 137, 145–146, 149–151, 153, 156–157, 156n7, 159–160, 162–167, 167n13, 172–191, 173n1, 184n4, 188n7, 189n8, 195–198, 198n6, 202–214, 202n13, 204n15, 204n16, 204n17, 220, 233, 245, 251–253, 255 community 146, 156–157, 159, 165, 175, 180, 184, 187, 190, 207 see also Philippines, Overseas Filipino worker Filipina(s) 10–11, 10n4, 13–14, 128, 149–150, 156, 156n7, 160–163, 165–167, 166n12, 173, 178, 198–199, 205, 207, 209, 212–213 Flor Contemplacion 133, 157 Free Trade Agreement (fta) 41–42 Free zone(s) 79, 81, 245 see also Jebel Ali Free Zone Gender 2, 15, 27, 83, 88–89, 97, 108, 109n4, 130, 132, 136, 145–147, 185 norm 8n2, 98 role 87, 98–99, 101, 108 Generation 15, 84, 100, 111, 117–118, 117n17, 257 gaps 118 second 13 Ghatra 118

263

Index Ghost employment/Ghost employee(s) 65, 67–68, 70–71 Global care chain 85, 99 Global Forum on Migration Development (gfmd) 25 Global householding 83, 85, 87, 97–98 Goa 13, 220–233, 221n3, 224n5, 226n8, 227n9, 228n11, 232n17, 233n20, 254 Goan(s) 13–14, 220–221, 223–233, 224n5, 225n7, 226n8, 227n9, 228n12, 230n15, 232n17, 232n18, 252 Gulf Corporation Council (gcc) 16, 30, 36, 36n8, 41, 79, 146–147, 196, 213, 245 Gulf War 8, 255 Hajj 73 Hareem system 110, 110n5 Hawala 32 Heritage 118 Hindi 252, 252n4 Hindu(s) 197n4, 221, 223, 225, 247 Human right(s) 37n11, 38, 41, 45, 47, 83, 119–120, 145, 156 group(s) / organization(s) 3, 25, 45, 152 violation(s) 2–3, 5, 14, 25, 43, 133, 137, 147–148, 156, 173 see also abuse, maltreatment, violence Human Rights Watch 3n1, 10n3, 37n8, 45, 147, 151, 151n3 Human trafficking 41, 132, 148 Illegal(s) 27, 27n3, 38–39, 116, 119, 165, 223, 225, 240 migrant(s) 90, 159, 165–166, 223 resident 27, 219 India 6, 10–13, 27–28, 34–35, 37, 42–43, 45, 73–74, 79, 104, 114, 125, 130–131, 190, 195n2, 197n4, 198, 218–224, 227, 229–230, 245–248, 250–257 Indian(s) 3, 11, 13–14, 45, 79, 114, 115n13, 116n16, 160, 173–174, 177–178, 190, 195n2, 200–201, 218–224, 227, 229–230, 232–234, 240, 243–248, 250–254, 256–257 traders 106 Informal 15, 38, 145, 149, 167, 172, 214, 237 safety nets 13, 145–146, 149, 156–157, 166–167, 173, 183

sectors 148 support activities 150, 161 protection 13, 150, 161, 165, 167 Indonesia 28, 35, 42–43, 42n15, 92, 92n2, 94, 104, 114, 114n12, 125, 128–131, 133, 198 Indonesian(s) 10–11, 42n15, 92n2, 94, 96, 116, 127–128, 131, 133, 160, 201, 253 Integration 2, 4, 14, 36, 36n10, 39–40, 47, 83, 105, 115, 118n18, 129, 148, 212, 214 Intermarriage(s) 2, 198, 199, 202, 208–209, 213 see also marriage(s) International 3–5, 8–9, 14–17, 23–26, 29, 32, 34–35, 40–41, 45–47, 74, 74n1, 79, 81, 83, 85, 99, 106, 109, 119, 125, 127, 131, 136, 150–153, 156n7, 159, 174, 180, 182, 203, 246, 253, 255 human rights pressure 38, 45 institution 41, 45–47 International Labor Organization (ilo) 16, 25, 41, 126, 128, 132, 137, 145–146, 146n2 International Organization for Migration (iom) 16, 25, 41, 128–13 International Trade Union Confederation (ituc) 46, 126 Iqama 100, 166, 167n12 Iran 1, 16, 28, 35, 43, 79, 81, 106, 177, 225n6, 227 Iranian(s) 11, 73, 79–80, 115n13, 177, 195n2 Iraq 1, 16, 34, 225n6, 227, 256 Iraqi 256 Islam 13, 15, 73, 135, 163, 184, 194–200, 202–214, 221 Islamic 93, 111n5, 152, 161, 199–211, 213, 247–248, 252 Islamic Center 197, 200–214 Israel 54, 74, 74n1 Japan 43–44, 156, 158, 221 Jebel Ali Free Zone 79 see also free zone Jeddah 1, 159, 162, 165–166 Jordan 1, 28, 35, 43–44, 252 Jordanian(s) 116n16 Kafala 2–3, 5, 25, 36–38, 56, 213, 220, 240 see also sponsor Kafeel 4, 37, 238–240 see also sponsor

264 Kerala 37, 201, 219–220, 223, 225, 230, 233, 246, 252, 255 Kinship networks 98 see also family Kish Island (Iran) 1, 177 Knowledge based economy 113 Kochi 246 Kuwait 1, 4, 8–9, 10n3, 16, 25–26, 28–29, 32, 34–35, 37, 43, 46, 56–59, 69, 73, 75, 126, 146–147, 151, 153, 155, 157–158, 166n12, 167, 167n13, 197, 200, 224–225, 231–232, 232n19, 250–252, 253n6, 254–256, 257n18–20 Kuwait City 1, 250, 254n9, 255n12, 255n13, 255n15, 256n17 Labor 2–5, 7–8, 10, 12, 15–16, 23–27, 28n5, 29, 34–35, 36n8, 37–38, 40–43, 45–47, 53–57, 59, 63–64, 67–71, 74, 76, 83–86, 96–100, 103, 110–112, 113n10, 119–120, 125–126, 128–131, 136–138, 151, 151n3, 152–154, 157, 160, 166, 173, 176, 179, 183, 189–190, 202n11, 203–204, 219, 236–237, 240 Child 41 Law(s) 36n9, 87, 125–126, 131, 137, 147, 150–152, 209 Code(s) 153, 176 Reproductive 147 Labor-brokering regime/state 154 Lebanon 28, 35, 43–44, 146, 149, 195n2, 252 Lebanese 116n16 Maltreatment 83, 93 see also abuse, human rights violation, violence Marriage(s) 85, 98, 198, 202n12, 203–204, 208, 227, 233 see also intermarriage(s) Middlemen 237 “Masdar City” 81 Mindanao 150, 161, 163–164, 197, 202, 207 Monarch(ies) 15–16, 23, 53, 55, 74 Moneylender(s) 238–239 Muslim(s) 5, 91, 94, 98, 114n12, 132–133, 135, 149–150, 161, 163–164, 166, 195–214, 219, 223, 240 Nationality 2, 4–7, 10–11, 13–14, 16, 27–30, 56, 71, 86, 88–89, 108, 114, 116n16, 146, 148,

Index 156–157, 159–161, 167–168, 172–173, 177, 180, 184, 189–190, 194–196, 200–201, 203–204, 206, 208–209, 211–214, 220, 233, 243, 245, 251, 253, 257 Nationalization 64, 68, 100, 110 Naturalization 16, 36n10 Nepal 27–28, 34–35, 44, 125, 129, 198 Niṭāqāt 65–68, 100 No Objection Certificate 38 Non-governmental organization(s) (ngo(s)) 7, 24, 42, 45–46, 74, 128, 130, 133, 146, 148, 150, 154, 157, 159, 160n8, 161, 164–165, 174, 183 Non-resident Indian (nri) 218–219, 223–224, 226, 227n9, 233n20, 246, 254–255 quota 254–255 Occupational preference 54, 59, 62 Oil 8, 10, 16, 23–24, 26, 53–57, 59–60, 62–64, 66, 68–71, 73–83, 85–87, 99–101, 103–104, 106, 108–109, 114–115, 120, 147, 153, 175, 255 embargo 74 boom 3, 8, 11, 24, 32, 83, 86, 146, 175, 221, 223–224 revenue 55–56, 69, 70, 74, 77, 81 shock 153 Oman 1, 8–9, 10, 16, 25–28, 32, 39, 41, 43–44, 56–57, 69, 73, 75, 104, 126, 155, 157–158, 162 Omani 27 Overseas Filipino workers (ofws) 153–158, 165 see also Filipino, Filipina Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (owwa) 128, 134, 137, 150, 155, 160, 164, 167 Overstay 38, 159, 183 Pakistan 27–28, 35, 44, 73, 129, 190, 195, 198, 208, 247, 252 Pakistani(s) 11, 73, 174, 190, 198, 208–209, 213, 240, 245, 247, 253 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (poea) 10, 128, 133, 153, 160, 174 Philippine Overseas Labor Office (polo) 128, 137, 150

265

Index Philippines 6, 11–12, 14, 28, 35, 42, 44–45, 91–92, 94, 104, 114–116, 125, 127–130, 132–133, 135–136, 145, 148, 151–156, 159–161, 163, 173–174, 176–185, 187, 190, 195, 197–198, 202–203, 205–208, 210–212, 230, 253–254, 256–257 see also Filipino Policy 2–5, 7–10, 12, 14–16, 23–25, 35–37, 39–40, 46–47, 54–56, 59, 64–65, 67–68, 70–71, 81, 86, 110, 113, 115, 117–118, 132, 146–149, 154, 160, 173, 189, 212, 214, 247, 256 Polygamy 199, 203 Pre-departure Orientation Seminar (pdos) 128, 133–135, 154 Pre-departure program 125–126, 128–132, 134–138 Private schools 251 see also education Private sector 43, 56–57, 59, 62–63, 65–69, 71, 75 Private sphere(s) 83, 87, 95, 97, 120 Protection 3, 13, 15, 24, 37, 41–42, 45–46, 119, 126–128, 131, 136–137, 147–154, 156, 161, 165, 167, 223, 254–255 measures 126, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153–154, 156, 167 Protectorate 74, 104 Public sector 54, 56–57, 59, 61, 63–65, 75 Public sphere 116, 117n17, 153, 203n14 Qatar 1, 8–10, 13, 16, 26–29, 32–33, 35, 37–38, 41, 43–46, 56–59, 70, 73, 75–77, 81–82, 126, 149, 151, 155, 157–158, 161, 194–195, 197–200, 203–204, 206–207, 209–212, 214, 225, 253, 255 Qatari(s) 26, 198, 211 Quality of living 113 Qur'an 107, 200, 202, 247 Ramadan 91, 93, 96, 98, 166, 199–200, 247 Recruiter 154, 161–162, 165 see also agency Religion 7, 11, 13, 73, 152, 194–197, 199–200, 207, 210, 220, 247–248 Remittance(s) 15, 24, 32–35, 42, 125, 134, 154–155, 211, 245 Rentier state(s) 8, 55, 68, 71, 75 Reproductive sphere(s) 10, 83, 85–86, 145 Resilience 125–128, 130, 132, 136–138

Runaway 90, 98, 128, 149, 163, 165–166 Safety net(s) 13, 15, 127, 145–146, 149, 156–157, 165–168, 173, 183, 190, 194 Saudi(s) 28, 45, 59–70, 84, 87, 92–101, 149, 152, 159, 165 Saudi Arabia 1, 9–10, 16, 25–26, 28–29, 32, 34, 41–45, 53, 56–57, 59–60, 62, 65, 67, 69, 73–76, 81, 83–87, 90, 92, 94, 96–98, 100, 109, 126, 149, 151–153, 155, 157–163, 165–167, 173–174, 197, 199, 203, 207, 210, 218–219, 225, 227, 253 Shahadah 199, 204, 207, 210, 213 Sheikh Zayed Road 243 Sheila 118 Singapore 133, 155–156, 158, 173, 253 Slavery 4, 10, 46, 85, 108 Social capital 167, 239 Sponsor 2–5, 25, 36–40, 47, 95, 155, 175, 179, 183, 204, 214, 220, 229, 232, 237–238, 240–241, 251, 257 see also kafala, kafeel Sri Lanka 28, 35, 42, 44, 114, 126, 129–131, 148, 162, 198, 218–219, 252 Sri Lankan(s) 10–11, 131, 160, 207 Standard employment contract 151–152 Subsistence economy 108 Sudan 28 Sudanese 11 Survival strategy 11, 13, 71, 149, 172–173, 189 Syria 35, 43, 89, 195, 252 Syrian 28, 116, 207 Tadbeer offices 119 Tagalog 174, 184, 197, 199, 201, 205, 209, 230 Tago ng tago (tnt) 163 Tax(es) 8, 27, 55, 69–71, 74–75, 99, 181, 244 Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (tesda) 130, 134–135, 155 Temporariness 256 Tradition 4, 15, 27, 45, 54, 83–86, 96, 98, 100, 104–105, 107, 110–112, 117–118, 120, 127, 135, 147, 181, 230, 238, 243 Tribal belonging 107 Tribal family 104 Unemployment 12, 25, 40, 53, 56, 59, 64–65, 67, 71, 153 rate 53, 55, 98

266 Undocumented 27, 125, 173, 183 worker(s) 163, 173 United Arab Emirates (uae) 1, 5, 8–11, 13, 15–16, 25–30, 32–33, 35–37, 39–40, 43–46, 56, 59, 64, 69, 73–75, 77–78, 80, 103–120, 126, 128, 133, 146–152, 155–158, 160–161, 172–176, 178–185, 187–191, 194–195, 197, 199–201, 203–204, 206, 209, 212, 214, 218–219, 221, 225, 227, 229, 231, 243–248, 250–251, 254, 257 2030 Vision Plan 119 United Kingdom (uk) 28, 32, 43, 158, 224, 253–255 United Nations (un) 27, 41, 99, 104, 129–130, 139, 253 United States (us) 8, 29, 32, 40, 79, 81–82, 157–158, 174, 180, 218–219, 223, 246, 253–255 University(ies) 81–82, 165, 174–175, 187, 253–257 see also education Ustaj 163

Index Value 9, 57, 61–65, 68, 80, 87, 99, 108–109, 118, 128, 134–135, 181, 212, 227 system 87, 101 Violence 4, 39, 74, 83, 90, 109, 145, 176 see also abuse, human rights violation, maltreatment Visa(s) 14, 25, 37–39, 65, 90, 152, 159, 174, 177–179, 181–182, 218, 225–226, 236–241, 251, 256–257 visit 15, 37, 138, 173, 176–181, 190 work 13, 236–241 “Visa run” 181 Wage(s) 2, 10, 27n3, 28, 38, 42, 54, 56–59, 63–65, 67–70, 75, 83, 90, 146, 150–151, 156, 160–161, 167–168, 239 difference(s) 63 minimum 10n4, 42, 67, 160 Welfare 59, 103, 153–154 Yemen 1, 28, 34–35, 43, 74, 195n2, 225n6 Yemeni(s) 11, 34