ASEAN and the Law of the Sea 9789814376525

Citation preview

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interests are focussed on the many-faceted problems of Modernization and Development and Political and Social Change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, a~ well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911 and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of &outheast Asian Studies, Singapore."

ASEAN and the Law of the Sea A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of Regional Co-operation

by

Peter Polornka

Occasional Paper No. 36 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$4 . 00

Dr. Peter Polomka's "ASEAN and the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of Regional Co-operation" is the thirty-sixth publication in the Institute's Occasional Papers series . This series was inaugurated in 1970 and for the most part consists of discussion and other papers presented at the Institute ' s Occasional and In-House Seminars. Growing out of a larger research pro j ect currently i n progress, Dr . Polomka's preliminary invest i gation of ASEAN and the Law of the Sea - specifically prospects for regional co-operation with regard to 'A Regional Ocean Community ' - should be of considerable interest to students of Southeast Asian affairs . Perhaps even more important, let us hope it will st i mulate further work and discussion not only along these lines but also on the various other issues surrounding the whole question of the Law of the Sea and its implications for the region . In the meantime, while wishing Dr. Polomka and his study all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Polomka and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters. 25 September 1975

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

ASEAN and the Law of the Sea A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of Regional Co-operation

Few regions have felt the impact of the growing congestion in world shipping lanes and the scramble for ocean and seabed resources more acutely in the past decade than Southeast Asia. The million gallon oil spill from the Japanese tanker Sh owa Maru early this year, for instance, highlighted the dramatic increase in the size and number of 'Very Large Crude Carriers' (VLCCs) passing through the Straits of Ma l acca - and the consequent hazard that transit may now en t ail - since the emergence of supertanker in the 1960s. With often more than 1,000 ships navigating the Straits each week, and many apparently discharging oily bilge-waters and refuse in neighbouring seas, the region has every reason for growing alarm lest it become, as a Malaysian leader has warned, a 'dirty marit i me backlane.•l The explosive growth of offshore oil exploration since the late 1960s has further aggravated the pollution problem and led neighbouring states into conflicting demarcation claims. The South China Sea, it will be recalled, had the dubious distinction of witnessing the first armed clash among contemporary offshore territorial claims when Chinese gunboats unceremoniously evicted troops of the former South Vietnamese leadership from the Paracel Islands last year. Pollution and over-fishing are threatening the livelihood of scores of thousands of coastal fishermen, and could even be leading to, or have already caused, serious and possibly permanent ecological imbalance in some of the region's waters. Nor do the still inconclusive deliberations of the 140-odd states attending the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea appear to promise much respite for vulnerable states such as those of Southeast Asia in providing a new international maritime code of behaviour more in keeping with present-day demands than those of half-a-century ago . The vulnerability of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) lies partly in their geographic disposition. Indonesia, the world's largest archipelago, spans some 3,400 miles from east to west. The combined coastlines of its 13,000-odd i slands and islets 1

Attorney-General Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Yusof, speaking as leader of the Malaysian delegation to the Caracas session of the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference . Strai ts Ti mes (Kuala Lumpur), 12 July 1974 o

- 2 -

exceed the length of the Equator. The Philippines, with about 7,100 1slands, ensures that the north-south dispersion of the ASEAN states encompasses roughly 2,000 miles . Apart from Thailand, Peninsular Malaysia and the islands of Sumatra and Borneo, the dominant aspect of ASEAN's configuration is that of ocean rather than of land . On l y Singapore, a 225 square mile island sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, presents a contrast by lacking even minimal territorial seas . The ASEAN states presently lack the capacity to police pollution adequately, prevent over-fishing and poaching, or conduct much needed marine research in the seas of the region. So far they have achieved little more than fix some joint seabed boundaries to facilitate offshore oil exploration . Tripartite co-operation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore has also made some headway on problems of safety of navigation and pollution control in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. But the potential of their interlocking seas as a source of wider co-operati on - and a unifying rather than a divisive force in the future - among both ASEAN and other Southeast Asian states still remains largely an unexplored question . Regional

Co-o~ration

Since World War II, when Southeast Asia first came to be thought of as a regional entity,2 the thrust towards regional co-operation has often been marked more by conflict and uncertainty than confidence and purpose. Partly, this has been a consequence of the diverse motives that have given birth to regional bodies: for instance, externally inspired offsprings of the Cold War - and the desire of the United States of America to contain the influence of China such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC) always lacked persuasive regional commitment and rapidly became obsolete with the onset of dite nte. Different- per~eptions of which states constituted the 'region' and what co-operation could

2

The most commonly accepted definitLm of Southeast Asia, and that subscribed t o in this paper, is that of Burma, Thai l and, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Mal aysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as the British-protected state of Br unei and the Portuguese colonial possession on the i sland of Ti mor .

- 3 -

be expected to achieve also contributed towards the limitat1ons of other organizations: the more 'functional' groupings, for example, such as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP: formerly ECAFE) and the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO ) , while often promoting wide-ranging regional communication, and even consultation, rarely involve much in the way of significant common commitment. Finally, the indigenous regional bodies, such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and its successor, ASEAN, which aspires even to a measure of regional integration, confront complex and deep-seated political, economic and social differences among member states. As an indigenous grouping, incorporating five states and more than two-thirds of the region's population, ASEAN must be arguably the most significant and successful Its members, regional co-operative initiative to date. nonetheless, suffer few illusions concerning its continuing inability to function as much more than a device for promoting national rather than regional interests. This may be partly because the former are more readily perceived. It is also, as Singapore has argued,3 the consequence of current limitations on the scope for regionalism in Southeast Asia . These include: The need of states to give priority to solving more urgent domestic problems - social, economic and political. The reluctance to compromise newly gained sovereignty over economic matters by newly independent states. The heterogeneity of the region in sociocultural terms and also the great disparities in level of development, technology and economic infrastructure. Incompatibility in economic policies with some favouring 'inward looking' industrialization through import substitution and tariff protection

3

See Kawin Wilairat, "Singapore's Foreign Policy in the Seventies: The Reconci liation of Global and Regional Interests," in Southeas t Asi an Affairs 19 ?4, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p . 28 8 .

- 4 -

and others favouring 'outward looking' industrialization through foreign investment and export promotion with minimal tariff protection. If these are among the 'harsh facts of life,' or 'unwelcome truths' of ASEAN, then it must be quickly added that they should not obscure the valuable co-operation that has already developed among member states within these limitations. This has perhaps been most effective in the search for a common position on some major issues that impinge on the region, such as the need to adJUSt regional and international relationships in response to the development of detente . Co-operation in diverse fields such as commodity marketing, tourism, telecommunications, narcotics control and so forth, has also helped foster a sense of regional 'identity' and consciousness from which future initiatives should derive considerable benefit. Various arguments have been advanced as to how ASEAN might become a more effective regional force. For some, it is mainly a matter of developing a 'new political will' and an institutionalized basis to regional development. Such a view attaches considerable importance to the establishment of the proposed ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta. Others empha~ize the need for a realistic acceptance that ASEAN is a 'political' organization despite its economic and socio-cultural objectives. In this view, past stress on 'non-political' goals through 'political' means has led to a less than satisfactory development of the essentials of co-operation, such as mutual understanding, trust and a common regional outlook. Another position is that ASEAN has so far failed to give proper attention to the potential of the uniqueness of the 'Malay culture' as distinct from its Indian, Islamic and Chinese counterparts in developing regional unity. New initiatives have also been proposed in economic, commercial, trade and industrial activities both in terms of particular projects as well as overall regional planning. In addition, it is asserted, ASEAN must become more than a political market place for advancing and accommodating perceived national interests. Ideally, it should acquire a 'corporate' existence establishing some shared central and integral view of the region in terms of territorial definition, strategic horizons and political perceptions.4 4

Quoted from Regionalism in Southeast Asia: First Con ference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs~ Jakarta~ October 22-25~ 19 ? 4~ papers presented at a conference organized by the Centre fo r Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta .

- 5 -

To some extent, the problem with ASEAN may be less one of direction than momentum. Past caution in moving forward centipede-like with tedious reliable small steps while not without justification - may have to give way to bolder measures. Both new challenges and opportunities are emerging in Southeast Asia's changing political and economic environment that will severely test ASEAN's capacity to remain in the forefront of regional co-operation. ASEAN and the Law of the Sea At first glance, the seas of Southeast Asia may seem one of the least promising areas for new initiatives in Indeed, with some justi fication, regional co-operation . the region can be viewed as a microcosm of the myriad conflicting interests that have bedevilled the ongoing international negotiations on Law of the Sea for the past six years. Not only must Southeast Asia reconcile the differing national interests of arch i pelagic, semi-continental, land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged states in It must also accommodate the needs of the region . international trade and fishing interests as well as the strategic concerns of the superpowers. Aspects of the conflicting interests of the ASEAN states are briefly outlined below: Indonesia The Republic's position is advanced in terms of what Indonesian leaders call the 'special needs and imperatives' of the archipelago's national existence. Concerned with the establishment, maintenance and development of political, economic, cultural and social unity, as well as the territorial integrity of an , archipelagic-state of more than 13,000 islands, it seeks: The right to draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago . The right to sovereignty over the waters within the baselines, the airspace above the waters, the water column, the seabed and the subsoil, as well as the resources therein . The right to measure from these baselines the extent of territorial seas, economic and other

- 6 -

jurisdictions of the State with regard to the sea around it.S Indonesia first asserted these claims in a government declaration in December 1957, signed by Premier Djuanda. The claim was condified in Government Law No . 4/1960, which includes a list of baseline co-ordinates, and Government Regulation No . 8/1962, which dealt with sea and air traffic in and through the claimed archipelagic waters . 6 The claim involves 5 baselines in excess of 100 nautical miles, the maximum distance listed being 12 2. 7 nautical miles ,. According to one set of figures, which includes the Indonesian claim to 12-mile territorial waters measured from these baselines, the total area involved is about 8 . 75 million square kilometres, of which about 2 million square kilometres are land.7 With regard to transit Indonesia's posit i on has been to recognize the right 'to innocent passage' through archipelagic waters or through designated sea-lanes, taking into account that the passage should not prejudice the peace, good order and security of the archipelagic state . While international reaction in 1958 generally rejected the Indonesian stand, the present-day climate is much more favourably disposed towards recognizing the special

5

Quoted from stat ement made by H. E. Prof. Dr . Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Justice and Leader of the Indonesian Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Caraca s, July 15, 1974, pp . 3-4.

6

For the text of these and ot her -documents pertaining to Indonesian claims, see Himpu.nan: Peraturan Hukum Laut

Indonesia - R. U. U. - R. P. P. ; Persetujuan-Perjanjian Dengan Negara Tetangga Yang Berkaitan Dengan Hukum Laut, Sub Panitia Persiapan Konperensi Hukum Laut, Direkto r at Organisasi2 International Departamen Lua Negeri, Jakarta, 1974 . 7

Figures quoted by K, Romimohtarto, A. S.Ilahude and A. Nontji, National Institute of Oceanology, Jakarta., in a paper ~ "Marine Research in Indones i a with Special Refe rence to the National Institute of Oceanology (LO . N. ) ," published in ECAFE Committee for Co-ordinating of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian offshore areas, Report of the Ninth Session 19?2, Bandung, Indonesia, 19 72, p . 76 .

- 7 -

difficulties archipelagic states confront in maintaining national unity and security. At the same time, the extent to which the Indonesian claim (especially in view of widely supported moves internationally for a 200-mile 'economic zone '' extending from national baselines) impinges on the interests and traditional rights of neighbouring states, international shipping, and the area of 'high seas' in the region, obviously poses major problems in securing its general acceptance. Philippines These latter questions are further compounded by similar archipelagic claims by Indonesia's northeastern For instance, if the archipelagic concept, as neighbour . advanced by these two states in conjunction with Fiji and Mauritius, gained international recognition, among other things, all the major East-West shipping routes in Southeast Asia would be affected. Singapore Among ASEAN states, Singapore finds itself most disadvantaged by current trends towards greater jurisdiction over adjacent waters by coastal states. Hemmed in by the claims of neighbours, it was moved to play a leading role in organizing the so-called 'land-locked' group of states at the Law of the Sea conference sessions. Singapore's dependence on sea communications and trade, and especially on the Straits of Malacca remaining 'freely accessible to all nations without discrimination' has largely determined its primary stress on the importance of maintaining maximum freedom of communications on the world's oceans, and especially those of the region. Its second major concern is that it should have adequate access to ocean and seabed resources.8 Malaysia Although supporting the archipelagic concept, Malaysia is concerned that the northern projection of the Indonesian

8

See, for example, Statement in Parliament by the Minister for

Foreign Affairs, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, Friday, March 1?, 1972, and a further statement by the Minister published in the Sunday Times (Singapore), 14 July 1974 .

- 8 -

claim into the South China Sea effectively divides peninsula Malaysia from eastern Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Chinese claims, which are believed to include the Tsengmu Reef adjacent to the coast of Sarawak, could conceivably further restrict Malaysia's sea and air communications in the region . Malaysia's interests in the future movement of international shipping through the Malacca Straits also may not parallel those of Indonesia- which, among other things, has long-range plans to develop major ports along the southern coasts of Sumatra and Java - as closely as its leaders earlier seemed to believe o In addition, Malaysia has an interest in maintaining access to fishing grounds that would come under Indonesian control through the archipelagic concept. Thailand Finding itself in an area of semi-enclosed sea, Thailand has a primary interes .t in mai.ntaining freedom of communications within the region and access to hlgh seas . A further major concern is with access,t to resources and especially fishing Thailand also has complex demarcation problems grounds. wi th neighbouring states, arising partly from disputed offshore island claims and uncertainty over the way baselines may be drawn to de t ermine jurisdiction over adjacent waters. In brief, individual ASEAN states have generally found common cause more with similar ~y . advant_a ged or disadvantaged states outside the i r own ranks during the Law of the Sea negotiations . For instance, Indonesia and the Philippines joined Fiji and Mauritius in formulating their archipelagic claims in treaty drafts; Thailand and Malaysia both tabled individual provisions concerning archipelagos to safeguard their particular interests; and Singapore co-sponsored draft treaty proposals aimed at safeguardin~ the economic interests of land-locked and geographlcally disadvantaged states . 9 Nonetheless u the ASEAN states recognize a . common interest in both safeguarding the seas of the region as well as ensuring that they are primarily of benefit to the states and peoples of Southeast Asia " 9

For details of draft treaty proposa l s of individual and groups of states~ see Official Records of . the United Nations Third. Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York and Caracas, 1973-74, New York, 1975. For the attempted integration of these proposals see United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text, Parts I-III, May 1975 c

-

9 -

ASEAN and the Economic Zone Apart from widespread support among nations attending the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea for a ' l2-mile territorial sea, a measure of agreement has also emerged for an 'economic zone' extending 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. At the Geneva session of the conference this year, the informal consultative group considering the question of the economic zone started from the assumption that the coastal state would have sovereign rights to the renewable and non-renewabl e resources in this zone . The main issues considered were: What other interests may be c accornmodated in the economic zone and the extent of those interests. Rights or jurisdiction of the coastal state other than those related to resource exploitation . Coastal state rights relating to scientific research, artificial islands and installation s, and other uses of the sea such as energy production. Navigation o The consultative group reached no decisions, and major issues of contention remain between the maritime powers, the developing coastal states and the land-locked and geographical ly disadvantage d states. These include: The extent to which a coastal state should be given jurisdiction in respect of control and abatement of pollution within its economic zone. Whether a high seas rights should apply to navigation or whether the coastal state can exercise control over navigation other than with respect to p:ollution. The degree of control by the coastal state of scientific research within its economic zone. Access to renewable and non-renewabl e resources. 10 . h . . h Allocation of residual r1g ts 1n t e econom1c zone.

10

Quoted from Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the

Sea~

Third Session Geneva, SWitzerland, 17 March-9 May 1975, Report of the Australian De le gation~ pp , 18-19 .

- 10 -

Of the ASEAN states, Singapore and Thailand have expressed the greatest reservations over the concept of the economic zone. Singapore has stated its preference for the establishment of regional or subregional economic zones rather than individual state economic zones. In the absence of such arrangements, however, it wants 'equal access to the living resources of the economic zones of neighbouring coastal states' guaranteed in the convention , As far as non-renewable resources are concerned, Singapore has stressed the principle that these resources should be considered the 'common heritage of mankind' and an appropriate system of revenue sharing developed.ll Thailand has stated that its acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone was 'conditional upon a satisfactory solution to the question of what was included in coastal States' national jurisdiction and on measures to ensure compensatory rights or benefits for the countries which did not have the potential to extend their jurisdiction to that limit.' Thailand has focused especially on the living resources of the economic zone, arguing that interests of other countries could be JUstified on many grounds, including the fact that the living resources were renewable and, if under-exploited, would result in waste. Many nations also depended heavily on fishing as a source of food and economic development. Categories of states whose rights should be guaranteed by the provisions of any convention - even though their exercise would require regional or subregional agreement - included, in the Thai view, neighbouring states, whether land-locked or coastal which had fished in the area, geographically disadvantaged states, states bordering on enclosed or semi-enclosed seas and states which could not extend their jurisdictional area to the maximum distance.l2 As an issue, fishing rights have always been contentious. Of the four conventions adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, the convention on Fishing and the Conservation of Living Resources received the lowest number of ratifications - although still sufficient to bring it into force. Current negotiations have generally revealed a deep conflict between the world's major fishing nations, who are naturally anxious

11

See General Statement: by Mro H.T. Chao, Deputy Leader of the Delegation of Singapore (at Caracas) July 9, 19?4.

12

See statement by Dr o Arun Panupong, Head of the Delegation of Thailand, in Provisional Summary Record of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting (2nd Committee), held at the Parque Central~ Caracas, 1 August 1974 .

- 11 -

to maintain narrow national fisheries zones with the greatest possible freedom of international fishing, and developing coastal states anxious to preserve for their exclusive use the widest possible national fisheries zones. At Caracas last year, there was some movement towards a middle position. Both the United States and the Soviet Union indicated their acceptance for the first time of the concept of natural fishing rights extending over a 200-mile zone, and Japan also hinted that it might accept the concept if the eventual regime took into account the interests of traditional fishing states. This latter question is especially important to countries such as Japan since if the concept wins acceptance, the major fertile fishing grounds of the world will come under control of coastal states. An informal negotiating text produced by the 1975 Geneva session of the United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference included some 11 articles on fisheries and delimintation, which suggested the terms and general approach of future possible agreement. These included: The coastal state shall assume management and conservation responsibilities within its 200-mile economic zone, determini.ng the allowable catch for each species, and co-operating, as approptiate, with other relevant states, subregional, regional and global organizations. The coastal state shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone; where it does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements, give other states access to the surplus. Access to other states will take into account all relevant factors, including, inter aLia, the significance of the renewable resources of the area to the economy of the coastal state concerned and its other national interests, the requirements of developing countries in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in states where nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. Nationals of other states fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the conservation measures and other terms and regulations which may

- 12 -

relate, inter aZia, to licensin g of fisherme n, fishing vessels and equipme nt, includin g payment of fees and other forms of remuner ation, which in the case of developi ng coastal states, may consist of adequate compens ation in the field of financin g, equipme nt and technolo gy relating to the fishing industry . Land-loc ked states shall have the right to particip ate in the exploita tion of the living resource s of the exclusiv e economic zones of adjoinin g coastal states on an equitab le basis, taking into account the relevan t economic and geograp hical circums tances of all the states concerne d. The terms and conditio ns of such particip ation shall be determin ed by the states concerne d through bilater al, subregio nal or regiona l agreeme nts. Develop ing coastal states which are situated in a subregio n whose geograp hic peculia rities make such states particu larly depende nt for the satisfac tion of the nutritio nal needs of their populati ons upon the exploita tion of the living resource s in the economic zones of their neighbo uring states and developi ng coastal states which can claim no exclusiv e economic zones of their own shall have the right to particip ate, on an equitab le basis, in the exploita tion of living resource s in the exclusiv e economi c zones of other states in a subregio n or region. The delimita tion of the exclusiv e economic zone between adjacen t or opposite states shall be effected by agreeme nt in accordan ce with equitab le princip les, employin g, where appropr iate, the median or equidist ance line, and taking into account all relevan t circums tances. Two central question s - conserv ation and access - emerge in this kind of approach . The control a coastal state may acquire over adjacen t fisherie s will carry conside rable respons ibilities , not only in maintain ing optimal utilizat ion of living resource s within the 200-mile economic zone but also in making Solomon -like decision s concern ing the way part of the permiss ible catch may be apportio ned among various claiman t states. 13

See Annex B, Report of the Australia n Delegation ., op.cit • .,

Part II, pp . 20-26.

- 13 -

Both questions promise to raise complex difficulties for the states of Southeast Asia. Fish is a major item in the diet of most of the region's population, being the prime, and in some cases, the only source of animal protein . For several states, and notably Thailand , the fishing industry has also become a major foreign currency earner. Under the impetus of these rapidly rising regional and export demands, the past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the exploitation of fisheries with some areas, such as the Gulf of Thailand, the west coast of peninsular Malaysia and Manila Bay in the Philippines already showing signs of full or even over-exploitation. While the potential for further expanding production remains, especially among the region's pelagic resources, the standard of management and conservation practices established during the next decade will probably determine whether Southeast Asia retains its fertile fishing grounds or progressively inherits vast underwater deserts through mismanagement and over-exploitation. A Regional Ocean Community? To suggest that the answer to both the particular problem the region confronts in safeguarding and developing its fisheries as well as the wider challenge of maintaining the thrust towards effective regional co-operation may at least partly be found in the formation of yet another regional body, runs the risk of failing to win serious consideration simply because there may already be too many ineffective regional organizations. Even the more successful bodies, such as ASEAN, are quite widely criticized within the member-states themselves (albeit often in private) for indulging in too much diplomatic 'chit-chat' and pointless bureaucratic paper shuffling. If existing bodies, however, can broadly be categorized as either 'political' or 'functional ' l4 then what is being proposed here as a Southeast Asian Regional Ocean Community (SEAROC) could be considered more as a 'corporate' type of organization. As a new type of regional organization, the proposed Regional Ocean Community would have several im~ortant distinguishing marks. Firstly, member states, under terms

14

For this categorization, see Somsakdi Xuto, Regi onal Cooperati on i n Southeast Asia, Problems, Possibi liti es and Prospects, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn Universi t y, Bangkok, 1973, p . 78 ,

- 14 -

jointly agreed upon by founding members and ratified by their respective statutory authorities, would vest a measure of national jurisdiction over their fisheries in the Community. Secondly, its activities and responsibilities, namely the effective management and exploitation of the living resources under its control, would allow the Community eventually to be self-financing. Thirdly, the nature of its day-to-day activities, being essentially technical and commercial, wou l d permit the Community to operate - and its performance to be assessed - largely in a technical and economic environment rather than that of the political market-place . At first glance, an organization of this kind may seem to lie outside the current limitations that have already been noted on the scope for regionalism in Southeast Asia. To begin with, newly independent states - and those of the region have not shown themselves to be exceptions - are reluctant to compromise their newly gained sovereignty over economic matters . However, the rights at issue here would be new entitlements under the concept of the 200-mile In the event of the failure of the Law of economic zone. the Sea Conference to establish these rights in a new international convention, they would be rights that most coastal states are now expected to assert on a uni-, bior multi-lateral basis, as a movement has already begun in that direction , 15 Either way, national leaders should be able to approach their political publics without awakening the strong emotions that might be aroused were the rights among those acquired directly through the struggle to Indeed, they should be able to achieve independence. present their initiative as a progressive, pace-setting Moreover, the rights development for others to follow. appertain to a resource that not only is renewable, but also cannot be successfully managed and developed within arbitrary oceanographic boundaries. A Regional Ocean Community would also not encounter the same problems of incompatibility in economic policiesas, for example, a regional-oriented industrial project. Existing disparities . in the level of development of the

15

Among countries apparently least willing to wait to see if the negotiating text leads to proper negotiations are Canada, Iceland, Mexico and Norway, and to some extent, the United States . . See article by '1a lcolm Rutherford · of the London F'ina:naiaZ ·Times iri Australian Financial RevievJ, 14 Hay 1975.

- 15 -

fishing industries of the f i ve ASEAN states in particular In regulating the need not . present a significant barrier . ction, the jurisdi its under exploi t ati on of f isherl es communi ty could have powers along the l i nes suggested in the informal negotiat i ng text quoted above relating to payment of fees and other forms of remuneration, which might include compensation in the field of financing, equipment and The Community technology relati ng . to the f i shing industry. itself might seek to fi l l gaps in the existi ng fishing capabilities of member states, such as in the cap i talDevising what i ntensive requirements of deep-sea fishing. would obviously be a complex formula of revenue shar i ng based on the area and potential of ocean ceded, and tak i ng into account traditional and other claims states mi ght advance, as wel l as technical and financia l ass i stance they might contribute towards the Community's initial development, should not be beyond the realms of possibility if the will to develop regional co-operation exists. In addition, co-operation in the field o f fishing should encounter fewer diffi culties aris i ng f r om the constraints of socio-cultural heterogeneity and the urgency of domestic problems than co-operation in other fields . While it is not be i ng suggested that SEAROC should exercise j urisdiction over fishing wi thin the territorial waters of member states, it cou l d play a constructive role in helping resolve problems of poverty and dec l ining living standards among millions of Nine out of every ten fishermen small fishermen i n the region. Indonesia alone has an estimated belong to this category: Wh i le some may engage full-time two mill i on small fishermen. in fishing, most supplement their incomes by farming and Surveys and studies by the Ma l aysian other activities. Min i stry of Agri culture and the University Sains Malaysia suggest that 90% of all fishermen along the East Coast of Pen i nsular Malaysia subsists on an average i ncome of M$25 a In the Philippines, 2% of the fishermen month, or less . produce 50% of the total - catch; in Thai l and the big fishermer:. takes 65% of the catch . As a result, although the region makes a substanti al contribution to the world's total fishing catch, the majority of its fishermen are among the One approach to this problem, to which poorest of people. could contribute, is the Community a Regional Ocean potential of coastal and inland enormous the of development rece~t i mproved knowledge and Comparatively ture. l aquacu given dramat ic i ncreases in have eld i f this n technology i that not only can indicate also figures FAO y i eld . living standards for higher for way the open aquaculture investment foreign the millions of small fishermen, of that required less, even or one-tenth, only required is

-

16 -

to return comparable fish production from capital- i ntensive commercial fishing . l6 In conclusion, the preliminary nature of the abov e observations and comment should be stressed. It has not been the intenti on to try to examine the many aspects of Law of the Sea that could be raised in relation to the ASEAN states . Rather was the aim to focus on a point of possible co-operation, somewhat in isolation from the many obstacles that clearly present themselves, in order to draw attention to the fact that despite obvious conflicts of interests, the oceans of Southeast Asia merit close attention as a possible focus for fresh initiatives in regi onal co-operation . The purpose of the paper is primarily to promote discussion . Events have already indicated the importance of the economic and security ramifications of Law of the Sea negotiations. Three major points of interest have i mpor tant domest i c, regional and international i mpl i cations for Southeast Asian states in general, and ASEAN states in particular. These are: (1) th e question of 'innocent passage ' through Straits that would be brought under the nat i onal jurisdiction of coastal states by, as now seems likely, the i nternational acceptance of 12-mile territorial waters; (2) the potenti al for conflict over competition for economi c resources, the demarcation of economic zones or the legitimacy of access by other countries; and (3) the problems of safeguarding economic zones. The latter especially raises major questions for most states other than the superpowers and points to the importance of neighbouring states being able to recognize common interests rather than indulge in economic and political rivalry. A major point for discussion therefore is that of the developing relationship between the ASEAN states and the former Indochina states. It may well be that in the process of developing bilateral relations between the communist and non-communist states of Southeast Asia their oceans should become a common .meeting point and lead to mutually acceptable arrangements for joint membership with i n a Southeast Asian Reg i onal Ocean Community.

16

See FAO Regional Projects for Asi a and the Far East (Draft) , Sector Agri cul ture , Forestry and Fisher i es, FAO Regiona l Office f or Asia and the Far East, Bangkok, Thai land, Feb ruary 1975 .

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

SINGAPORE

LIST OF PUBliCAnONS

Occasional Papers 1

Harry J. Benda, Research in Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, 1970. lOpp. Gratis {Out-of-print }

2

P. Lim Pui Huen, Newspapers published in the Malaysian 1970. Area: With a union list of local holdings, t}. {Out-of-prin 42pp. Gratis

3

Chan Heng Chee, Nation-Buildi ng in Southeast Asia: The Singapore Case, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 {Out-of-prin t}.

4

Eva Horakova, Problems of Filipino Settlers, 1971. 24pp. S$2.00 {Out-of-prin t}.

5

Causes and Effects of Mochtar Nairn, Merantau: Minangkabau Voluntary Migration, 1971. l9pp; S$2.00 {Out-of-prin t}.

6

Paul Pedersen, comp., Youth in Southeast Asia: A Bibliography. Modified and Expanded by Joseph B. Tarnney and others, 1971. 69pp. S$4.00. {out-of print)

7

J.L.S. Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myths, 1971. 26pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print }.

8

R.P. Dore, Japanese Industrializa tion and the Developing Countries: Model, Warning or Source 6f Health Doubts? 1971. l8pp. S$3.00.

9

Michael Stenson, The l948 Communist Revolt in Malaya: A Note of Historical Sources and Int~rpretation and A Reply by Gerald de Cruz, 1971. 30pp. S$3.00 (Out-of-prin t).

10

Riaz Hassan, $ocial Status and Bureaucratic Contacts Among the Public Housing Tena .Lts in Singapore, 1971. 16pp. S$2.00 (Out-of-prin t).

11

Youth in Southeast Asia: Edited Proceedings of the Edited by Joseph Seminar of 5th - 7th March l97l. 75pp. S$4.00 (01Jt--of-prin t). B. 'T'amnPy, 1Cl77 .

12

A.W. Stargardt, Problems of Neutrality in South East Asia: The Re levance of th e European Experience, 1972. 29pp. S$3.00.

13

William R. Roff, Autob iograp hy & Bi o graphy in Malay Hi stor ir?al Studi e s., 1972. 2lpp. S$2.00 (Out-of-print ).

The

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Regional Security: Djakarta Conference on Cambodia, 1972. 20pp. S$3.00

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 19?1 19?5: A Critique, 1972. 16pp. S$3.00

16

Harold E. Wilson, Education al Policy and Performan ce in Singapore , 1942 - 1945, 1973. 28pp. S$3.00

17

Richard L. Schwenk, The Potential for Rural Developme nt in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Prelimina ry Backgroun d Report, 1973. 39pp. S$4.00

18

Kunio Yoshihara , Japanese Direct Investmen ts in Southeast Asia, 1973. 18pp. S$4.00

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter-in surgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency , 1974. 54pp. S$5.00

20

John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia' s Trade Relations with China, 1974. 3lpp. S$3.00

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethn ic Marriage in Singapore : A Study of Interethn ic Relations , 1974. 85pp. S$6.00

22

Tatsumi Okabe, Revival of Japanese Militarism ? 1974. 26pp. S$3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangeme nts and AMDA: Some Observatio ns on the Nature of an Evolving Partnersh ip, 1974. 2lpp. S$3.00

24

Peter Carey, The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteenth Century Java: Pangeran Dipanagar a, a Case Study, 1974. 56pp. S$4.00

25

Chandrase karan Pillay, The 19?4 General Elections Malaysia: A Post-Morte m, 1974. 20pp. S$3.00

26

I.W. Mabbett, Displaced Intellectu als in Twentieth Century China, 1975. 45pp. S$4.00

27

J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor: Dilemmas and Opportun ities, 1975. 28pp. S$4.00

28

M. Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand, 1975. 27pp. S$4.00

~n

29

Joseph Camilleri, Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy, 1975. 37pp. S$5 .00

30

Wellington K.K. Chan, Politics and Industrialization in Late Imperial China, 1975. 19pp. S$4.00

31

Leslie E. Bauzon, Philippine Agrarian Reform 1880 1965: The Revolution that Never Was, 1975. 2lpp. S$4.00

32

Paul H. Kratoska, The Chettiar and the Yeoman: British Cultural Categories and Rural Indebtedness in Malaya, 1975. 29 pp. S$4 . 00

33

Morris I. Berkowitz, The Tenacity of Chinese Folk Tradition -Two Studies of Hong Kong Chinese, 1975. 32pp. S$4.00

34

M. Rajaretnam, U.S. Energy-Security Interests in the Indian Ocean, 1975. 36pp. S$5.00

35

Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Some Foreign Press React i ons, Forces~ 1963- 73: 1975. 25pp. S$4.00

36

Peter Polomka, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Look at the Prospects o f Re gional Co-operation, 1975. I6pp. S$4.00

37

Sharon A. Carstens, Ch i nese Associations in Singapore Society: An Examination of Function and Meaning, 1975. 30pp. S$4.00

Library Bulletins 1

Rosalind Quah, Library Resources in Singapore on Contemporary Mainland China, 1971. llpp. S$2.00

2

Quah Swee Lan, comp., Oil Discovery and Techn i cal Change in Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Bibl i ography, 1971. 23pp. S$2.00

3

P. Lim Pui Huen, comp., Directory of Microfilm Facilities in Southeast Asia, 1972. 24pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

4

Checkl i st of Current Ser i als i n the Li brary, 1972 . 30pp. S$3.00

5

Tan Sok Joo, Library Resources on Burma &n Singa por f , 19 7 2 • 4 2 pp . s $ 3 • 00

6

Quah Swee Lan, comp c , Oil Discovery and Technical Change i n Southeast As i a: A Bibliography, 1973. 32pp. S$3.00 (Out of Print)

7

P. Lim Pui Huen, comp., Directory of Microf il m Facilities in Southeast Asia, 2d Edition, 1973. S$4.00

32pp.

8

Ng Shui Meng, comp., Demographic Materials on the Khmer Republic~ Laos and Vietnam, 1974. 54pp. S$5.00

9

Saengthong M. Ismail, Library Resources on Thailand in Singapore, 1974. 130pp. S$7.00

Trends in Southeast Asia 1

Trends in Indones i a:

1971. 2

58pp .

Pro ceedings and Background Paper,

S$3.00 (Out of print)

Trends in Malaysia: . Proc eedings and Background Paper,

Edited by Patrick Low, 1971. (Out of print) 3

l20pp.

S$5 . 00

Trends in the Ph ilippines . Edited by Lim Yoon Lin.

(Singapore University Press), 1972. 4

Trends in Indonesia.

5

Trends in Thailand.

6

Trends in Malaysia II.

7

Trends in Singapore.

140pp.

S$5.00

Edited by Yong Mun Cheongo (Singapore University Press), 1972. 140pp. S$5.00

Edited by M. Rajaretnam and Lim So Jean. (Singapore University Press), 1973. 14 2 pp . s $ 7 • 00 Edited by Yong Mun Cheong. (Singapore University Press), 1974. 154pp. S$7.00

Edited by Seah Chee Meow. (Singapore University Press), 1975. 15lpp. S$10.00

Field Report Series 1

Conflic~s within the Prijaji World of the Parahyangan in West JavaJ 1914 - 192?,

Yong Mun Cheong, 1973.

2

42pp.

S$3.00

Patrick Low and Yeung Yue-man, The Proposed Kra Canal: A Critical Evaluation and Its Impact on Singapore,

1973.

39pp .

S$3 . 00 (Out of print).

3

Robert Fabrikant , L egal Aspect s of Production Sharing Contrac~s

2d

4

in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry,

~di tion.

1973.

235pp.

S$25 . 00

The Ind o nesian Petroleum Industry: Miscellaneous Source Materials. Collected by Robert Fabrikant.

1973.

516pp .

S$25 . 00 (Out of print)

5

C.V. Das and V.P. Pradhan, Some Internat iona l Law Probl ems Regarding the Straits of Malacca, 1973. 95pp. S$10.00 (Out of print)

6

M. Rajaretnam, Pol itics of Oil in the Phil ippine s, 1973. 81pp . S$5.00

7

Ng Shui Heng, The Populat i on of Indochina: Some Preliminary Obs er v a tions , 1974. 126pp. S$7.00

8

Ng Shui Meng, The OiZ System in Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Survey, 1974. 93pp. S$10.00

9

Wong Saik Chin, Public Reaction to the Oil Crisis: Th e Singapore Case, 1975. 87pp. S$6.00

10

Kawin Wilairat, Singapore's Forei gn Pol ic y: First Decade, 1975. 105 p~ . S$10 . 00

The

Current Issues Seminar Se ri es 1

Multinational Corporations and their Implications for Southeast Asia. Edited by Eileen Lim Poh Tin,

1973 . 2

66pp.

S$6.00

Southeast Asia Today:

1973. 4

S$12 o00 (Out of print)

Economic and Political Trends in Southeast Asia,

1973. 3

140pp.

110pp.

Problems and Prospects,

S$10.00

Japan as an Economic Power and its . Implicat ions for South e ast Asia c Edited by Kernial S. Sandhu and

Eileen P. T. Tang . (Singapore University Press), 1974. 147pp. S$15 . 00 5

The Future Pattern of Japanese Economic and Political Relations with Southeast Asia, 1975. 82pp. S$6.00

Oral Histo ry Programme Ser i es 1

Philip Hoa1im, Senior, The Malayan Democratic Uniori: S in g apore ' s First Demo cratic Pol itical Party,

1973 .

26pp.

S$3.00

2

Andrew Gilmour, My Role i n the Rehabilitation of Singapore: 1946 - 1953, 1973. lOOpp. S$6.00

3

Mamoru Shinozaki, My Wartime Experiences in Singap ore , 1973. 124pp. S$6 . 00 (Out of print)

Southeast Asian Perspectives 1

U. Khin Mg. Kyi and Daw Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns in Histori cal Burma, 1973. 67pp. S$3.00

2

Harsja W. Bachtiar , The Indon esian Nation:

Some Problems of Integr at ion and Disinte grat io n, 1974.

62pp . 3

S$5.00

Pol itical and Social Change in Singapore ,

Wu Teh-Yao.

200pp.

Edited by

S$10.00

Monog_raphs 1

Sartono Kartodirdjo, Prot est Movements in Rural Java (Oxford University Press), 1973. 229pp. S$18.00

2

Modern ization i n Southeast As i a o

Edited by HansDieter Evers (Oxford University Press), 1973. 249pp. S$18 . 00

Annual Rev i ews 1

Sou thea s t Asian Affairs 1974 ,

19 7L

350pp.

S$15.00

(Out of print) 2

South e ast As ian Affairs 19 ? 5.

1975 .

256pp .

(FEP International Ltd.),

S$30 . 00

The above publications are available for sale at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, House No c 8 , University of Singapore Campus, Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 10 . Tel: 514211

TilE AUTHOR Dr. Peter Polomka is a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies under the ISEAS Fellowship Programme in Australian-Southeast Asian Relations, and is currently on leave of absence from the Priorities Review Staff, Prime Minister's Department, Canberra.