Art in Dispute Catholic Debates at the Time of Trent. With an Edition and Translation of Key Documents (Brill’s Studies on Art, Art History, and Intellectual History, 59) 9004421289, 9789004421288

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Art in Dispute

Brill’s Studies on Art, Art History, and Intellectual History General Editor Walter S. Melion (Emory University)

volume 59

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bsai

Art in Dispute Catholic Debates at the Time of Trent. With an Edition and Translation of Key Documents

By

Wietse de Boer

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Boer, Wietse de, author. Title: Art in dispute : Catholic debates at the time of Trent : with an edition and translation of key documents / by Wietse de Boer. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2022] | Series: Brill’s studies on art, art history, and intellectual history, 1878–9048 ; volume 59 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021039523 (print) | LCCN 2021039524 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004421288 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004472235 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Council of Trent (1545–1563 : Trento, Italy) | Idols and images—Europe—History of doctrines—16th century. | Christianity and art—Catholic Church—History—16th century. | Christian saints—Cult—History of doctrines—16th century. Classification: LCC BX830 1545 .B66 2022 (print) | LCC BX830 1545 (ebook) | DDC 262/.52—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021039523 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021039524

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1878-9048 ISBN 978-90-04-42128-8 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-47223-5 (e-book) Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface vii List of Illustrations ix Abbreviations x

part 1 History 1 Premises: The Sacred Image in an Age of Religious Crisis 3 1 The Thomist View and Its Critics 9 2 Early Catholic Responses to Reformation Critiques 15 3 The Image Question in the Mid-Sixteenth Century 19 4 Marcello Cervini and the Image Debate 23 2 Disputes: The Sacred Image and the Counter-Reformation 32 1 The Traditions of Martín Pérez de Ayala 32 2 In Defense of Thomism: Matthieu Ory 43 3 Ory and Calvin 61 4 How to Honor Images: Ambrogio Catarino 66 5 Nacchianti’s Road to Orthodoxy 79 3 Reverberations: St. Germain, Trent, and Beyond 86 1 On the Sidelines of Trent: Eliseo and Ninguarda 88 2 Diego Laínez between St. Germain and Trent 93 3 Trent: The French Connection 102 4 A Previously Unknown Draft 109 5 A Question about Honor 118 6 Beyond Trent: Paleotti to Bellarmino 124 7 Conclusion 129

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Contents

part 2 Documents Note on Editions and Translations 135 I

Martín Pérez de Ayala Corollarium de imaginibus sanctorum / Corollary Concerning the Images of Saints 136

II

Matthieu Ory De cultu imaginum / The Cult of Images 188

III Matthieu Ory – Jean Calvin Opposing Views on Sacred Images 282 IV Ambrogio Catarino Politi Disputatio de cultu et adoratione imaginum / Disputation on the Cult and Adoration of Images 296 V

Iacopo Nacchianti Digressio de imaginum usu ac cultu in ecclesia Dei / Digression about the Use and Cult of Images in God’s Church 358

VI Council of Trent Draft of the Decree on Saints, Relics, and Images / Draft of the Decree on Saints, Relics, and Images 370

Appendices 379 Selected Bibliography 392 Index of Bible References 407 Index of Names and Subjects 409

Preface This book revisits an old problem: the Catholic Church’s response to the contestation of sacred images by Protestant and, in some cases, Catholic reformers during the sixteenth century. That response is frequently equated with the decree on the cult of the saints, their relics and images approved by the Council of Trent during its closing days in 1563. Yet this famous text is succinct and, at points, cryptic. My project started as an attempt to make sense of its significance by exploring possible connections – beyond those already studied by previous scholarship – to seminal debates on the image question held by Catholic theologians in the previous fifteen years. Subsequently, these debates showed their intrinsic interest. They reveal two vital issues. On the one hand, the interlocutors engaged critically, and at times contentiously, with scholastic interpretations of the religious image. On the other, they selectively probed recently rediscovered records of the Byzantine image controversies, particularly the Second Council of Nicaea, for authoritative support. Of the first element hardly a trace can be found in the Tridentine decree; the influence of the second is patently, but deceptively, obvious. Both aspects, this book argues, are essential to understand the making of the decree. They also suggest underappreciated continuities in the image discussions preceding and following its promulgation. Finally, they highlight particular bones of contention fought over by Catholic intellectuals as they confronted the pressing need to justify the cult of images – to account intellectually for the working of visual representation and the devotional engagement with material artifacts. The documentation examined and edited in the following pages is little known or even unknown to most scholars today. It includes a previously unpublished set of disputations by the French Dominican Matthieu Ory and a newly discovered draft of the Tridentine decree. The approach taken in studying and presenting these sources is historical and philological. The following chapters are historical in their effort to understand the varied positions in the image debate – involving complex philosophical and theological questions – as conditioned by the evolving religious and political circumstances of the day. The approach is philological in its attempt to decode the frequent appeal to church tradition by considering the then-current state of knowledge. Authoritative sources, such as the letters of Gregory the Great, were regularly quoted without awareness of their textual histories; and citations were often indirect. I have therefore privileged contemporary (rather than modern) editions of such sources, in order to grasp better how sixteenth-century authors put them to use.

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This book has grown out of contributions to several collaborative projects in which I have participated in recent years: a 2013 conference at Trent on the occasion of the 450th anniversary of the conclusion of the eponymous council; a conference at Munster on Jesuit image theory the following year; and the preparation of a collective volume on Jerónimo Nadal’s Evangelicae Historiae Imagines. I thank all participants for the thought-provoking discussions, and mention in particular Pierre Antoine Fabre and Ralph Dekoninck, whose research has at times crossed paths with mine. I owe special gratitude to Walter S. Melion, who invited me to publish this book in the Brill series in which it now appears, for his unfailing interest and encouragement. I am also grateful to the anonymous peer reviewers who read the manuscript, and to the personnel of the Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, the Biblioteca Casanatense, the Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma, the Archivio Storico della Pontificia Università Gregoriana, the Bibliothèque de Genève, and the Miami University Libraries for their kind assistance. As always, I much appreciate the unstinting support and professionalism of the Brill editors and staff, including Arjan van Dijk, Ivo Romein, and Wilma de Weert.

Illustrations 1 2 3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

Workshop of Jacopo Tintoretto, The Worship of the Golden Calf, c. 1594. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington 5 Jacopino del Conte (attr.), Portrait of Card. Marcello Cervini degli Spannocchi. Reproduced by courtesy of the Galleria Borghese, Rome 24 Giuseppe Franco (attr.), Second Council of Nicaea. Salone Sistino, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Reproduced by permission of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, all rights reserved 25 Benvenuto Tisi detto Garofalo, The Conversion of Constantine, Gallerie Estensi. Pinacoteca di Ferrara, c. 1520–30. Reproduced by permission of the Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali e per il turismo – Archivio fotografico Direzione regionale Musei dell’Emilia Romagna; further reproduction or duplication by any means is prohibited 38 Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, beginning of Book I. Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fol. 170r. Photo: Mario Setter. Reproduced by permission of the Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome 45 Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, beginning of Book II. AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fol. 286r. Reproduced by permission of the Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, all rights reserved 46 Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, cover sheet of Book I. Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fol. 169r. Photo: Mario Setter. Reproduced by permission of the Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome 48 Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, cover sheet. AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fol. 277r. Reproduced by permission of the Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, all rights reserved 49 Anonymous, Council of Trent (mid-16th century), oil on canvas, Musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo: Franck Raux. © RMN-Grand Palais / Art Resource, NY 103 Andrea del Sarto, The Trinity, c. 1511, arch medallion in the Cenacolo di San Salvi, Florence. Image in public domain 115 Paolo di Stefano (attr.), after design of Donatello, Virgin & Child with Eve, painted relief, c. 1435–40. © Victoria and Albert Museum, London 117 Santi di Tito, Vision of St. Thomas Aquinas, oil on wood, 1573, Cenacolo di San Salvi, Florence. Photo credit Scala / Art Resource, NY 131

Abbreviations AAV ARSI ASCN

Archivio Apostolico Vaticano Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea. Edited by Richard Price, 2 vols. Liverpool University Press, 2018 Baluze-Mansi Stephani Baluzii Tutelensis Miscellanea novo ordine digesta et non paucis ineditis monumentis opportunisque animadversionibus aucta opera ac studio Joannis Dominici Mansi Lucensis. 4 vols. Lucae: apud Vincentium Junctinium, 1761–64 BAV Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Bibl. Cas. Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome CCOP Crabbe, Petrus, ed. Concilia omnia tam generalia quam particularia … tomus primus. Coloniae: Petrus Quentel, 1538 CCOS Crabbe, Petrus, ed. Secundus tomus Conciliorum omnium tam generalium quam particularium … Coloniae Agrippinae: Ex officina Ioannis Quentel, 1551 CCT Concilium Constantinopolitanum a. 691/2 in Trullo habitum (Concilium Quinisextum). Edited by Heinz Ohme, with the assistance of Reinhard Flogaus and Christof Rudolf Kraus. Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ser. 2, vol. 2, pars 4. Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2013 COD Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta (1962). Edited by Giuseppe Alberigo et al. Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1991 CDCT Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent. Translated by Theodore Alois Buckley. London: George Routledge and Co., 1851 CSCP Carranza, Bartolomé, ed. Summa Conciliorum et Pontificum a Petro usque ad Paulum tertium succincte complectens omnia, quae alibi sparsim tradita sunt. Venetiis: ad signum Spei, 1549. Reprint of the first edition, printed by the same publisher in 1546 CT Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum. Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1901–2001 Concilium Universale Nicaenum Secundum. Edited by Erich Lamberz. CUNS Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ser. 2, vol. 3, partes 1–3. Berlin-New York, 2008–16 DBI Dizionario biografico degli Italiani. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1960–

Abbreviations DSI

GMRE

GPRE

HCAC

LCN

PG PL Šusta

Thomas

xi

Dizionario Storico dell’Inquisizione. Edited by Adriano Prosperi, in collaboration with John Tedeschi and Vincenzo Lavenia. 4 vols. Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2010 S. Gregorii Magni registrvm epistvlarvm libri I–VI / VIII–XIV, Appendix. Edited by Dag Norberg. 2 vols. CCSL 140 and 140A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1982) Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum. Edited by Paulus Ewald and Ludovicus M. Hartmann, MGH Epistolae, vol. 2. Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1992 Hervet, Gentien, ed. Canones SS. Apostolorum, Conciliorum Generalium et Particularium … Omnia Commentariis Theodori Balsamonis Antiocheni Patriarchae explicata et de Graecis conversa. Parisiis: apud Guil. Morelium, 1561 Longolius, Gilbertus, ed. Concilium Nicenum. Synodi Nicenae quam Graeci septimam vocant … actiones omnes contra iconoclastas et iconomachos … Opus nunc recens inventum et e Graeco versum per G. Long. Coloniae: Petrus Quentel, 1540 Patrologia cursus completus: series Graeca. Edited by J.P. Migne. Paris: Migne, 1857–1866 Patrologiae cursus completus: series Latina. Edited by J.P. Migne. Paris: Migne, 1844–1902 Die römische Curie und das Concil von Trient unter Pius IV. Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Concils von Trient. Edited by Josef Šusta. 4 vols. Vienna: Hölder, 1904–14 References to Thomas Aquinas’s works use the conventional titles and section indicators. The standard modern edition is the Editio Leonina (1884–), partly available at https://www.corpusthomisticum.org. The translations of reference are those, based on Laurence Shapcote’s versions, prepared by the Aquinas Institute, at https://aquinas.cc (where the plain Latin texts are offered in parallel). In the present edition, citations from Thomas’s work, and their English translation, follow the source texts, which may deviate from the modern editions.

Abbreviations of Bible books follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 578–80.

part 1 History

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chapter 1

Premises: The Sacred Image in an Age of Religious Crisis I announce to you that, by the grace of my Lord Jesus Christ, I too shall be with you until the consummation of the world, albeit not in the sacrament – for this is not allowed – but in painted and sculpted images. And how will you know that I am present in that image? At such a time, surely, when you see miracles occurring there.1

∵ These are the words coming from the mouth of the Virgin Mary in a latefifteenth-century prophetic text attributed to the Portuguese Franciscan Amadeus Menez de Sylva (d. Milan, 1482). They point to the continued centrality, in the Christian cult of the saints, of the expectation of their presence and power in and through images.2 This widespread credence provoked deep controversies across Europe, and in missionary territories beyond, during the following century. Educated religious elites, in particular, fiercely debated the problem in theoretical, polemical, and apologetic terms. 1 Cited in Anna Morisi, Apocalypsis nova. Ricerche sull’origine e la formazione del testo dello pseudo-Amadeo (Roma: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1970), 77 (“Notum facio vobis quod gratia domini mei Jesu Christi etiam ego corpore ero vobiscum usque ad consummationem saeculi, non quidem in sacramento, quod id non licet, sed in imaginibus pictis et sculptis. Et quomodo scietis quod ego sum praesens illi imagini? Tunc certo, quando ibi miracula fieri videbitis”). 2 The importance of this passage has been noted by Adriano Prosperi in several articles that offer important context for the theme of this book: “Cultura popolare e cultura d’élite” (1995), in Prosperi, America e Apocalisse e altri saggi (Pisa: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1999), 283–305; “Il problema storico nelle polemiche sulla santità” (1991), ibid., 321–41; “Tra mistici e pittori: Vittoria Colonna” (1997), ibid., 367–79. Seminal discussions of the problem of the saint’s presence in earlier periods include Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (1980; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 86–105; Carlo Ginzburg, “Representation: The Word, the Idea, the Thing” (1991), in Id., Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 63–78; and Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art (1990), trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_002

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The early modern period in European art may be called an era of idolatry (Fig. 1), then, on the understanding that the term was no neutral tool of description, but a flexible weapon at the disposal of religious polemicists of different persuasions, in Europe and in missions around the world.3 Framed by each tradition’s conceptual schemes, the problem of presence moved front and center in reflections about, and reactions to, visual representations. This trend resulted in repeated outbursts of iconoclasm, but these were only the surface expressions of broader and deeper concerns. Varying assumptions about the relations between matter and spirit underpinned both the ideological battles of the Reformation and European perceptions of different cultures elsewhere. It was in the confrontation with other religions, or with heterodox movements or denominations within one’s own, that charges of idolatry served to delegitimize one’s adversaries and reaffirm the purity of one’s own doctrines and practices.4 The defense against such charges performed a similar function and could also motivate internal ‘reforms’ of established practices, even if the latter were not explicitly acknowledged to be idolatrous. That defensive posture deeply affected the ways in which the Catholic Church responded to the growing – and varied – Protestant attacks on the cult of saints and their images during the central decades of the sixteenth century, with significant consequences for artistic theories and practices in the Catholic world well past the Reformation crisis.5 The present chapter is meant to sketch the premises of this response. 3 Michael W. Cole and Rebecca Zorach, “Introduction,” in The Idol in the Age of Art. Objects, Devotions and the Early Modern World, ed. Cole and Zorach (Ashgate: Farnham, Surrey-Burlington, VT, 2009), 1–2. 4 For this characteristic in earlier periods, see for the period of Byzantine iconoclasm Paul Speck, Ich bin’s nicht, Kaiser Konstantin ist es gewesen. Die Legenden vom Einfluss des Teufels, des Juden und des Moslem auf den Ikonoklasmus (Bonn: Habelt, 1990) and Jaś Elsner, “Iconoclasm as Discourse: From Antiquity to Byzantium,” The Art Bulletin 94, 3 (2012), 368–94; and for the High Middle Ages, Michael Camille, The Gothic Idol: Ideology and Image-making in Medieval Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Jean-Claude Schmitt, Le corps des images. Essais sur la culture visuelle au Moyen Âge (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), esp. 75–95, 146–51. 5 For a broad survey, see Helmut Feld, Der Ikonoklasmus des Westens (Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, 1990). A sampling of numerous studies on the Protestant Reformation include Carlos M.N. Eire, War against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Bilder und Bildersturm im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Bob Scribner (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990); Sergiusz Michalski, The Reformation and the Visual Arts: The Protestant Image Question in Western and Eastern Europe (London-New York, 1993); Lee Palmer Wandel, Voracious Idols and Violent Hands: Iconoclasm in Reformation Zurich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Macht und Ohnmacht der Bilder. Reformatorischer Bildersturm im Kontext der europäischen Geschichte, ed. Peter Blickle, André Holenstein, Heinrich Richard Schmidt, and Franz-Josef Sladeczek,

Premises: The Sacred Image in an Age of Religious Crisis

figure 1

5

Workshop of Jacopo Tintoretto, The Worship of the Golden Calf, c. 1594 Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington

It has long been a matter of debate whether Catholic religious art in the later sixteenth century (and beyond) can be defined as Counter-Reformation, or post-Tridentine, art. Commonly accepted, however, has been the assumption that the era saw a broad theological agreement among Catholics about the nature and functions of sacred images. Christian Hecht, for example, in a major work on early-modern Catholic image theology, speaks of a “unanimity (Einmütigkeit) which generally prevailed on the image question” – a unanimity (he adds) epitomized by the decree of the Council of Trent on the invocation of saints and the veneration of relics and images.6 That decree confirmed the Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte (Neue Folge), vol. 33 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002). Koenraath Jonckheere, Antwerp Art after Iconoclasm: Experiments in Decorum 1566–1585 (Brussels-New Haven, Conn.: Mercator Fonds / Yale University Press, 2012). 6 Christian Hecht, Katholische Bildertheologie der frühen Neuzeit. Studien zu Traktaten von Johannes Molanus, Gabriele Paleotti und anderen Autoren (1997), 3d edition (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2016), 18; elsewhere, however, the author recognizes “innerkatholische Streitigkeiten” which Trent deliberately left unaddressed (ibid., 140). Studies of the decree have emphasized the complex politics behind its preparation, but assumed substantive agreement among the council fathers. See especially Hubert Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite des Trienter Dekrets über die Bilderverehrung” (1935), in idem, Kirche des Glaubens, Kirche der Geschichte. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Vorträge, 2 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1966), 2:460–98; John O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images, and Catholics’ Senses of the Sensuous,” in The Sensuous in the Counter-Reformation Church, ed. Marcia B. Hall and Tracy E. Cooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28–48; and Pierre Antoine Fabre, Décréter

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traditional use of sacred images in religious worship, especially as defined by the Second Council of Nicaea (787), and ordered bishops to be vigilant against practices considered abusive. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the decree has come to be identified as the baseline position of the Catholic establishment of the time. Nor was it unexpected that the scholarship on image theory – taking its cue from broader historiographical trends – has focused on art treatises that appeared in the wake of the Council’s decree: famous texts by Giovanni Andrea Gilio, Gabriele Paleotti, Johannes Molanus, and others.7 In one influential interpretation, Paolo Prodi proposed that Paleotti’s seminal treatise on sacred art (1582) be seen as an expression of the Catholic Reformation, at least until the time when the aging author, disillusioned by the lack of progress in this matter, came to envisage a harsher, disciplinarian approach in the form of an index of forbidden images.8 This interpretative tradition suffers from a significant overstatement of Trent’s importance: assuming the council’s image decree as a firm starting point to which subsequent theories could be reduced, it has created the very notion of post-Tridentine art. In so doing, it has overlooked the fact that – a few valuable studies notwithstanding – much remains unknown about the conciliar debates that resulted in this decision. Yet more importantly, even those aware of the long history of the image debate have generally ignored the immediate prehistory that conditioned these debates. This perspective has l’image? La XXVe Session du Concile de Trente (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013), esp. 45–77. Feld, Der Ikonoklasmus, 193–200, largely follows Jedin’s interpretation, but notes (without elaboration) that Trent offered “keine Weiterführung oder Entscheidung in irgend einer Frage innerkatholischer Bildertheologie” (ibid., 198–99). 7 Besides older work, including David Freedberg, “Johannes Molanus on Provocative Paintings,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 34 (1971): 229–45, see also Johannes Molanus, Traité des saintes images, ed. François Boespflug, Olivier Christin, and Benoît Tassel, 2 vols. (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996); Hecht, Katholische Bildertheologie; Giovanni Andrea Gilio, Dialogue on the Errors and Abuses of Painters, ed. and trans. Michael Bury, Lucinda Byatt, and Carol M. Richardson (Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 2018); Jesse M. Locker, “Introduction: Rethinking Art after the Council of Trent,” in Art and Reform in the Late Renaissance: After Trent, ed. Locker (New York: Routledge, 2018), 10–18; and the scholarship on Paleotti cited in the next footnotes. Locker, “Introduction,” provides an overview of the older historiographical roots of this perspective. 8 Paolo Prodi, “Ricerche sulla teorica delle arti figurative nella riforma cattolica,” Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà 4 (1965): 121–212; reprinted as a book with a new “Postfazione” (Bologna: Nuova Alfa, 1984) and, again, as a chapter in Paolo Prodi, Arte e pietà nella Chiesa Tridentina (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), 53–189. In this last book, Prodi reiterated and updated his original argument in his “Introduzione. Storia, natura e pietà,” ibid., 9–52. An earlier version of this essay appeared in English as the “Introduction” to Gabriele Paleotti, Discourse on Sacred and Profane Images, trad. William McCuaig (Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 2012), 1–42.

Premises: The Sacred Image in an Age of Religious Crisis

7

also underestimated the extent to which post-Tridentine debates and practices continued to be conditioned by the era’s wave of contestation of image veneration, on the assumption that the Catholic diagnosis of the problems marring the practice was relatively uniform. Finally, the interpretation of Trent and of Paleotti’s work has long privileged the reform measures proposed in each – that is, the responses to the abuses they diagnosed – leaving their theoretical positions in the shadows.9 The few scholars who have attempted an analysis of Trent’s doctrinal stance have had to contend with the problem that the image decree is succinct on this point.10 As a result, an earlier round of theological debates about sacred images has faded into the background, and with it significant disagreements among established Catholic theologians of the day. In fact, around the middle of the sixteenth century several prominent intellectuals had come forward to settle internal differences concerning the theological foundation and justification of image devotions. This debate, we argue here, remained unresolved at the time, but the contrasting viewpoints that emerged at that time carried over into the following decade, played a role behind the scenes of the Council of Trent, and re-emerged in its aftermath. Hence the importance of reconstructing them.11 These discussions revolved around the key concern that fueled the controversies surrounding the religious image: the problem of its materiality. The latter, in turn, raised seminal questions about the psychology of visual perception 9

10 11

Note, for example, that Prodi emphasized the discussion of Book II of Paleotti’s work, dedicated to the reform of abuses, at the expense of Book I, which articulates the cardinal’s theoretical positions. Several subsequent studies have developed but not significantly altered the premises of Prodi’s work: see Ilaria Bianchi, La politica delle immagini nell’età della Controriforma: Gabriele Paleotti teorico e committente (Bologna: Editrice Compositori, 2008) and Ruth S. Noyes, “Aut numquid post annos mille quingentos docenda est Ecclesia Catholica quomodo sacrae imagines pingantur? Post-Tridentine Image Reform and the Myth of Gabriele Paleotti,” Catholic Historical Review 99, 2 (2013): 239–61. Less conditioned by Prodi’s historiographical perspective, and more attentive to the theoretical issues, but equally limited in its attention to pre-Tridentine debates, is Holger Steinemann, Eine Bildtheorie zwischen Repräsentation und Wirkung. Kardinal Gabriele Paleottis “Discorso intorno alle imagini sacre e profane” (1582) (Hildesheim-Zürich-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006). Fabre, Décréter l’image?, 17–44. Studies on that prehistory include Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite”; Giuseppe Scavizzi, “La teologia cattolica e le immagini durante il XVI secolo,” Storia dell’arte 21 (1974): 171–213; idem, Arte e architettura sacra: cronache e documenti sulla controversia tra riformati e cattolici (1500–1550) (Reggio Calabria: Casa del libro editrice, 1981); idem, The Controversy on Images from Calvin to Baronius (New York: Peter Lang, 1992). I have not been able to consult François Lecercle, Le Signe et la relique. Les théologies de l’image à la Renaissance (thèse de doctorat d’État inédite, Université de Montpellier, 1987).

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and devotion. How should one explain the sensory and affective engagement with images and their holy subjects? What was the relation between such material objects and the spiritual realities to which they referred – between the representation and the represented? What implications did this have for the proper conduct of image veneration and for the understanding and use of religious artifacts? The theologians who addressed these questions included the Spanish prelate Martín Pérez de Ayala, who offered a moderate defense of images in an anti-heretical tract published in 1549; the French Inquisitor General Matthieu Ory, who vigorously attacked Pérez’s views in 1552; the Italian polemicist Ambrogio Catarino Politi, who published an equally combative treatise in the same year; and a bishop with a tainted past, Iacopo Nacchianti, who pursued a strictly orthodox position in an exegetical work of 1557. Prior scholarship has included these authors in the parade of Catholic image apologists who stood up against Protestant critics. Yet, not only are they better seen as part of an internal Catholic debate, they were also connected in other ways, not all visible to the naked eye. Three of these four authors (Pérez, Catarino, and Nacchianti) participated early on in the Council of Trent, and yet their debate bypassed the council (at least for the time being) and was centered in Rome; two of these three were to attend the council’s final phase. Another threesome (Ory, Catarino, and Nacchianti), all members of the Dominican order, had close relations with Julius III (1550–55) and a key curia member, Cardinal Marcello Cervini (the subsequent pope Marcellus II, 1555). Yet the background, purpose, and stakes of their interventions are yet to be established. Most of the texts presented here have been known to scholars, at least to some degree; among the least examined are Ory’s two disputations, which have remained unpublished until now, and Nacchianti’s excursus on sacred art. An analysis of the interrelations among these documents and their historical context shows how Reformation-era challenges laid bare deep fault lines in the understanding of religious art, which went beyond the polemics against Protestant and Erasmian charges of idolatry. This animated debate among Catholic theologians came at a crossroads in the history of the Reformation, as the future of the Catholic Church hung in the balance between the reform diplomacy conducted at Trent and a power struggle under way in papal Rome, where an ascendant, intransigent Holy Office of the Inquisition came to overpower more moderate factions of the curia. Even as the fight against heresy became more intense, to affect even the highest levels of the church leadership, the new pope Julius III (1550–55) was under pressure to launch his own, ultimately unsuccessful, effort at church reform. While the latter was centered mostly on institutional restructuring, it

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also ventured into some areas of pastoral care and devotional life. The debate about images may be seen as part of this effort, but was also animated by the sharp-edged pursuit of orthodoxy. In this, it was aided by the rediscovery of ancient patristic texts, particularly those connected to the Byzantine controversies over iconoclasm. But another fact is equally worthy of note: most treatises with which we are concerned here were authored by Dominicans, and all spoke Thomist language, even if they reached different conclusions. They selectively drew on this intellectual heritage to address the Protestant critiques of the cult of images while accounting for fundamental problems concerning the materiality of religious artifacts, the nature of perception, and the affective impact of images. This analytical framework, we submit, informed the discussions of the following decade, first in France, and then at Trent. Yet it also provoked controversy. Thus, while influential voices couched the underlying theoretical problems in neo-scholastic terms, there was enough disagreement and fear of controversy to muffle this perspective in the Tridentine decree. It was to re-emerge, however, in subsequent art-theoretical treatises. The present volume offers an edition of the above-mentioned midcentury texts in the original Latin, along with two brief texts in French, and a previously unknown draft of Trent’s conciliar decree on images – all accompanied by new English translations.12 This and the following chapters offer background on these documents and their authors, historical context, and an assessment of the significance of the debates highlighted here.13 We will start with a doctrine that was at their heart – the Thomist theory of image veneration. 1

The Thomist View and Its Critics

“The same reverence should be shown to an image of Christ as to Christ himself.” This seemingly simple and narrow injunction, made by Thomas Aquinas 12

13

It should be noted that the French texts – a little known defense of sacred images by Matthieu Ory and a response by John Calvin – are offered here not only for their intrinsic interest, but also as a complement to Ory’s longer image disputations. They are not meant to distract from this volume’s focus on intra-Catholic debates. These chapters draw on and develop my earlier articles, “The Early Jesuits and the Catholic Debate about Sacred Images,” in Jesuit Image Theory, ed. Wietse de Boer, Karl A.E. Enenkel and Walter S. Melion (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016), 53–73; “Trent, Saints, and Images: A Prehistory,” in Trent and Beyond: The Council, Other Powers, Other Cultures, ed. Michela Catto and Adriano Prosperi (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 121–41; and the forthcoming “Image, Adoration, Meditation: Debates in the Margins of Trent,” in Genèse et postérité des Evangelicae Historiae Imagines (1593–1594), ed. Pierre Antoine Fabre, Ralph Dekoninck, and Walter S. Melion (Rome: École française de Rome).

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in his Summa Theologiae, contains a theoretical position with broad implications and enduring influence.14 It is all the more important in that it appears to be Thomas’s sole direct explication of the function of religious images, in the sense of physical artifacts made by human hands; a fuller understanding of his ideas on the subject has to be pieced together from scattered remarks elsewhere. How did Thomas reach his position, and how did other scholastic theologians respond to it? Thomas’s statement was part of a Christological inquiry. Under discussion here – in part III, quaestio 25 of the Summa – was the adoration of Christ. Article 3 asked whether an image of Christ should be adored with the same adoration of latria as Christ himself. Latria, a Greek term adopted from patristic theology, denoted the strongest possible form of worship – that reserved to God, as distinct from the veneration extended to the Virgin Mary and other saints and martyrs. In the previous articles, Thomas had established that Christ’s humanity should be adored with the same adoration as his divinity (art. 1) and that it was deserving of latria inasmuch as it was integral to his divine person (art. 2). As for the legitimacy of adoring images of Christ, Thomas raised several possible objections, including the second commandment prohibition of graven images and St. Paul’s warning not to follow the pagans in “chang[ing] the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man” (Rom. 1:23). Thomas drew on Aristotle’s theory of visual perception to propose the following framework of analysis. According to the philosopher, an image is observed in a twofold “movement of the soul” (motus animi, in Latin renditions of Aristotle’s De memoria et reminiscentia). In one, the soul is directed to the image as “a certain thing”; in the other, to the image qua image, that is, insofar as it is an image of something else. These forms of perception, Thomas proceeded, are fundamentally different. On the one hand, observing an image understood as a thing differs from observing the thing it represents; on the other, observing an image qua image is the same as observing the represented. Applied to veneration, this had two consequences: 1) an image of Christ is owed adoration only insofar as it is an image, not as a thing 14

Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 25, a. 3 (“Sequitur quod eadem reverentia exhibeatur imagini Christi et ipsi Christo”). For Thomas’s ideas about images, see Günther Pöltner, “Der Begriff des Bildes bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Bilder der Philosophie. Reflexionen über das Bildliche und die Phantasie, ed. Richard Heinrich and Helmuth Vetter (Vienna-Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 176–99; Jean Wirth, “Structure et fonctions de l’image chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in L’image. Fonctions et usages des images dans l’Occident médiéval, ed. Jérôme Baschet and Jean-Claude Schmitt (Paris: Le Léopard d’Or, 1996), 39–57; and Olivier Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image. Une archéologie du visuel aux Moyen Âge. Ve–XVIe siècle (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2008), 267–76, 281–84, and passim.

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(for instance, as something made of wood); and 2) the adoration of the image is the same as that of its subject, i.e. Christ. Jean Wirth has suggested that Thomas here misread Aristotle, perhaps due to an ambiguity in the Latin translation: the philosopher had made the aforementioned distinctions, but without suggesting that the soul’s movement to the image qua image is identical to the movement directed to the represented. This misinterpretation is significant, as it highlights Thomas’s understanding of the process of perception (and veneration) as unified. It became the foundation of a semiotic theory underpinned by a powerful psychological rationale.15 Understood this way, images were signs that relayed knowledge about the things they signified – a knowledge made possible by the likeness of image and model. This knowledge, in turn, was the basis of affective and devotional engagement, which proceeded in like manner. Thus, when the faithful saw the image (qua image), they at once saw the represented. When they adored the sign, they simultaneously adored the signified. Consequently, the image deserved the same adoration as its model, since both forms of adoration were, in fact, one and the same. In other words, an image of Christ deserved latria. The Thomist position is all the more noteworthy in that it represented a significant break with prior Christian tradition. This included the authoritative doctrine of the Second Council of Nicaea, which, recognizing the limitations of material artifacts, had reserved a lesser form of adoration for images of Christ, namely dulia. Recent scholarship has reconstructed the steps by which medieval scholastics gradually redefined such traditional understandings to erase the gap between the representation and the represented.16 The influential John of Damascus, whose De fide orthodoxa was translated into Latin in the mid-twelfth century, accorded an image of Christ a lesser participation in divinity than Christ himself: a physical image rendered the nature of its divine subject only imperfectly. Yet Western theologians, even as they absorbed John’s work, worked to diminish or even remove the distance. They did so in part to resolve a nettlesome contradiction in earlier positions. The cult of images was justified, as St. Basil had stated, by the fact that “the honor given to the 15 16

Wirth, “Structure et fonctions,” 51–55. See Boulnois, Au de-là de l’image, 151–87; and Wirth, “Structure et fonctions”; idem, “Les scolastiques et l’image,” in La pensée de l’image. Signification et figuration dans le texte et dans la peinture, ed. Gisèle Matthieu-Castellani (Vincennes: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1994), 19–30; idem, “La critique scolastique de la théorie thomiste de l’image,” in Crises de l’image religieuse. De Nicée II à Vatican II / Krisen religiöser Kunst. Vom 2. Niceanum bis zum 2. Vatikanischen Konzil, ed. Olivier Christin and Dario Gamboni (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1999), 93–109; and idem, L’image à l’époque gothique (1140–1280) (Paris: Cerf, 2008).

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image is transferred to the prototype.”17 If that was so, there was no reason to honor the image less than the model. A similar tension was reflected in a linguistic ambivalence: should one speak of adoring Christ in (or through, or before) the image, or was it legitimate to speak of adoring Christ’s image? In the Aristotelian theory of motus animi – or at least, his understanding of it – Thomas found an elegant solution. By limiting the visual and devotional engagement with the image to its referential function, he could endorse Basil’s dictum while sidelining problems raised by the materiality of the image – such as the concern about idolatry Thomas himself had cited. The soul’s movement towards the image qua image ensured that the observer bypassed the ‘thing,’ which was merely the substrate of the representation, to focus on the prototype. Nevertheless, Thomas took a notably expansive view of the likeness between image and model that undergirded the process. The image not only showed the appearance of the subject, but also rendered “equality of proportion” (equalitas proportionis) and offered insight into the structure, nature, and individuality of the represented, while not necessarily including all accidental features. A discussion of mental images of the Trinity clarifies Thomas’s idea: an image differs in this way from a trace (vestigium), in that a trace is a disorderly and imperfect likeness of something, but an image represents the thing in a more determinate way according to all its parts and the arrangement of its parts, from which something can also be perceived of the thing’s interior features.18 This last point is especially significant: for Thomas, images evidently offered insights going beyond the surface characteristics apprehended by the sense of vision. Elsewhere, as he explained the same distinction with recourse to the theory of cause and effect, he suggested that this extended to individual identity: some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form, just as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called the representation of a trace, for a trace shows the movement of a passer-by, but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the likeness 17 18

Wirth, “Structure et fonctions,” 51. Thomas, In I Sentent., dist. 3, q. 3, a. 1: “imago in hoc differt a vestigio: quod vestigium est confusa similitudo alicuius rei et imperfecta; imago autem repraesentat rem magis determinate secundum omnes partes et dispositiones partium, ex quibus etiam aliquid de interioribus rei percipi potest.” See further Wirth, “La critique scolastique,” 94; Boulnois, Au de-là de l’image, 263–67.

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of its form, as generated fire represents generating fire, and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is the representation of an image.19 This confidence in the representational powers of images, Wirth has suggested, may have been prompted by the rise of realistic, individualized representation of the human figure in thirteenth-century art, especially sculpture and subsequently painting – in other words, it was connected with the birth of the portrait. Certainly, as far as learned theological discourse is concerned, Thomas’s position meant that “the identification of the image and God had never been pushed this far in Christianity.” Paradoxically, then, even as Thomas’s analysis excelled in precision and rationality, the association it posited – that between sacred representation and divine represented – is so close as to resemble popular beliefs.20 In other words, the thirteenth-century theology of images of Christ skirted the notion of divine presence without going so far as to state it explicitly. This is significant at a time that saw the formal proclamation, at the Fourth Lateran Council, of the doctrine of transubstantiation, the official downgrading of the status of saints’ relics, and the emerging use of material substitutes called ‘representations’ – some mimetic, others symbolic – to serve in royal funeral rites in France and England. To keep the threat of idolatry at bay, theologians were careful to qualify the status of sacred images. Reflecting a similar caution, representations of Christ across Europe were regularly accompanied by the following verses (or close variants), at times attributed to the Second Council of Nicaea: Hoc Deus est, quod imago docet, sed non Deus ipse: Hanc recolas, sed mente colas, quod cernis in illa. (God is what the image teaches, but the image is not God himself: You meditate on it, but you worship mentally what you discern in it.)21 19

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Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 7: “aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem: et talis repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii; vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repraesentat causam quantum ad simulitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, et statua Mercurii Mercurium: et haec est repraesentatio imaginis.” Wirth, “Structure et fonctions,” 56–57. On this theme, see further idem, “Peinture et perception visuelle au XIIIe siècle,” in La visione e lo sguardo nel Medio Evo II, special issue of Micrologus. Natura, scienze e società medievali 6 (1998): 113–28, esp. 124–25. On the broader evolution in this direction, see Schmitt, Le corps des images, esp. 75–95. This paragraph draws on Ginzburg, “Representation.” The quote (ibid., 76) relies on Ragne Bugge, “Effigiem Christi, qui transis, semper honora. Verses Condemning the Cult of

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Unsurprisingly, perhaps, even Thomas’s theological position was soon believed to overstate the likeness of sacred images and their prototypes.22 Scholastics like Henry of Ghent, Durand de St. Pourçain, and William Ockham reduced it to a similarity in physical appearance rather than nature: it referred to the subject’s accidental features, not its nature, much less its individuality. Furthermore, these theologians distinguished images according to their mode of production. Natural images were those resemblances that derived from direct generation, such as that of parent and child. Artificial images, in contrast, were the products of human hands, and thus less intimately connected to their prototypes: they revealed the maker as much as the model. Finally, some of Aquinas’s critics raised doubts about his understanding of perception. In Thomist epistemology, cognition rested on the mediation of intelligible species, or mental images, which allowed the mind to apprehend external phenomena. For Durand, such images were accidental: at best, they revealed the object’s external features; at worst, they were the phantasms of which dreams are made. For Ockham, the utility of images thus did not lie in passing on new knowledge, but in retrieving from memory things already known. The undermining of any ontological connection (or a semblance thereof) between image and prototype, and of the cognitive power of sense perception, obviously had implications for the veneration of images. Henry of Ghent and subsequent critics relied on an old distinction between adoration per se (of things that are themselves the object of adoration) and per accidens (of things that refer or are connected to the object of adoration) to relegate images to the latter category. For Henry, this accidental relationship had two consequences. On the one hand, the adoration of images was of the same degree as that of the model to which it was directed. On the other, it was not of the same kind: thus, given God’s invisibility, it could never be latria. Durand de St. Pourçain went a step further by denying the value of the Aristotelian distinction of motus animi upon which Aquinas had constructed his theory. Given the accidental relationship between images and their holy subjects, the two could never be perceived

22

Sacred Images in Art and Literature,” Acta ad archaeologiam et artium historiam pertinentia 6 (1975): 127–39. See on these verses further Robert Favreau, “L’inscription du tympan nord de San Miguel d’Estella,” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 133, 2 (1975): 237–46; Jan Royt, “The Mining Town of Jáchymov: Reformation and Art,” Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice 5, 2 (2005): 305–12, at 309–310; Peggy McCracken, “Miracles, Mimesis, and the Efficacy of Images,” Yale French Studies 110 (2006): 47–58, esp. 52. It was also cited by Pérez, De traditionibus, §24; Ory in his disputations of 1552, §88; and Paleotti, Discourse on Sacred and Profane Images, 135. See also chapter 3, p. 127, n. 98. For this and the following paragraph, see especially Wirth, “La critique scolastique” and Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 363–84.

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in one and the same process. Properly speaking, then, there was no basis for the veneration of images. Instead, this term referred to an act of recollection that occurred when the faithful stood before an image. The radical implications of this position are evidenced by the suspicions of heresy surrounding some who subsequently adopted it, such as Jan Hus and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.23 Such persistent criticisms notwithstanding, Thomist image theory was to re-emerge during the sixteenth century, and so was its contestation. In multiple ways, the resulting debates continued to follow the tracks carved out by the medieval antecedents outlined here. This is true, first and foremost, for the framing of the discussions. As we shall see, Martín Pérez de Ayala premised his critique of scholastic interpretations of sacred images on Thomas’s view of images of Christ; and this was precisely the point on which Matthieu Ory and Ambrogio Catarino focused their responses. This renewed engagement with the Thomist tradition is to be explained especially in light of contemporary concerns, especially fears of popular idolatry, and it was conditioned, if not prompted, by the Reformation crisis itself. On the one hand, Catholic theologians – and church leaders generally – felt compelled to disprove the accusation of idolatry levelled by Protestant and some Catholic reformers; on the other, they found themselves under growing pressure to demarcate the lines of orthodoxy. By midcentury, a critical time in the escalating confrontation, two strategies had emerged: one was a renewed embrace of Thomist image theory; the other was the rediscovery of Byzantine refutations of iconoclasm, particularly those advanced at Nicaea II. Yet while the terms of debate were often traditional, the outcomes were anything but predictable, and more complex than might be suggested by the oft-cited landmark legislation of the time – the image decree of the Council of Trent. 2

Early Catholic Responses to Reformation Critiques

During the first decades of the Reformation, the attack against sacred images reflected a range of views but took two distinct forms. On the one hand, a number of German and Swiss reformers, particularly Karlstadt, Zwingli, and Bullinger, articulated iconoclastic positions, triggering the violent removal or destruction of images in their cities, mostly during the 1520s. On the other hand, humanist critiques of Catholic ceremonies and material culture, especially in the hands of Erasmus, assailed abuses in the cult of the saints and their images. Catholic responses to these attacks were similarly episodic and 23

Cf. Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra, 12–14 and 21–25.

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largely confined to the German-speaking world. Polemical texts or sermons by Hieronymus Emser, Johann Eck, Georg Neudorfer, Ambrosius Pelargus and, in the early 1540s, Johann Cochlaeus defended the veneration of images, often in the larger context of the invocation of saints.24 These apologetic texts usually limited their defense to the discussion of relevant biblical passages (especially Exodus 20), the church historian Eusebius (for alleged examples of early Christian images), and patristic sources by Augustine, Gregory I, and John of Damascus. Even Dominicans like Georg Neudorfer, who penned an apologetic text Von der heiligen erung unnd anrüffen (“On the veneration and invocation of saints,” 1527), and Ambrosius Pelargus, in his pamphlet In iconomachos sive eos, qui demoliuntur divorum imagines (“Against iconoclasts or those who destroy saints’ images,” 1531), did not engage in Thomist arguments concerning the psychology of image perception and adoration.25 Of a very different nature was the most extensive response to critics of the cult of images before 1548, Alberto Pio di Carpi’s noted polemic with Erasmus. In the mid-1520s, deprived of his small princedom of Carpi, this refined humanist worked in Rome to shore up the papal defenses against the Reformation, among whose instigators he identified Erasmus. When the Dutch humanist wrote to ask for a clarification, Pio launched a lengthy attack against Erasmus’s critique of the corruption of the Church, the riches of its temples and the lavishness of its ceremonies. Subsequently, when the Sack of Rome had forced Pio to take refuge in France, he prepared the text for publication under the title Ad Erasmi Roterodami expostulationem responsio accurata et paraenetica (1529).26 Erasmus reciprocated with an counter-attack (Ad exhortationem clarissimi doctissimique comitis Alberti Pii Carporum principis responsio, 1529), which in 24

25

26

For a comprehensive edition, see Von Strittigkeit der Bilder. Texte des deutschen Bildstreits im 16. Jahrhundert, ed. Jörg Jochen Berns, 2 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014); for introductory studies, see the bibliography listed above in notes 5, 6, and 11. On the early Catholic responses, see esp. Christine Göttler, “Die Disziplinierung des Heiligenbildes durch altgläubige Theologen nach der Reformation. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Sakralbildes im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit,” in Bilder und Bildersturm im Spätmittelalter, 263–97. Georg Neudorffer, Von der heiligen erung unnd anrüffen sampt ettlicher einred wider der heiligen bild (Tüwingen: Morhart, 1528), esp. art. 22, fols. E1v–E2r; Pelargus’s text was included in his miscellany, Ambrosii Pelargi opuscula nunc primum excusa … (s.l. [Coloniae]: Ioannes Gymnicus, 1534), 164–95. Both texts are discussed in Nikolaus Paulus, Die deutschen Dominikaner im Kampfe gegen Luther (1518–1563) (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1903), 199 (Pelargus) and 281–82 (Neudorffer). Alberto Pio, Ad Erasmi Roterodami expostulationem responsio accurata et paraenetica, ed. Fabio Forner, 2 vols. (Florence: Olschki, 2002).

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turn prompted Pio to write a new treatise, posthumously published as Tres et viginti libri in locos lucubrationum variarum D. Erasmi Roterodami (1531).27 It was thus a broader polemic concerning the moral, ritual, and institutional life of the Church that prompted a discussion of sacred images. In this matter Pio deployed not only the conventional arsenal of biblical, patristic, and conciliar sources in defense of the cult of the saints, but also a Platonic understanding of images as tools in a spiritual trajectory of ascension. If the latter view reflected the Roman humanism of the day, Pio’s later Tres et viginti libri also took a theological turn. In fact, the work is noteworthy for a lengthy defense of theologians: Pio explicitly took the side of scholastics scorned by Erasmus: John Duns Scotus, the “divine” Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, Bonaventure, and Albertus Magnus. Their work, he stressed, was particularly important in preparing the Church for the attacks of pagans and heretics.28 For Pio, this was no sudden conversion: the prince had long nurtured theological interests and frequented theologians; yet a turn to religion was unmistakable towards the end of his life, which he concluded in Franciscan habit. It is not surprising, then, to find a scholastic argument in Pio’s discussion of sacred images, and even a straightforward Thomist definition: “we venerate the image and the imaged with the same adoration, just as Christ’s humanity is also worshipped with the same latria when conjoined with his divinity.” In spite of this, Pio rejected any and all latria towards images as things devoid of sense (“rebus sensu carentibus”). Hence, “if [Christ’s humanity] is worshipped separately, that is, in a different act, such honor and reverence is not attributed to it, but the far lesser worship of dulia; thus also the material image [is honored].” In other words, the image had a lesser status, which was true even when it was considered only in view of what it represented: “although, qua image, it must be venerated with proper reverence and gesture only on account of what it references, nevertheless it must not be worshipped with the same adoration, as if it is adored at once with the thing it represents.”29 And Pio further qualified his position as he proceeded, in a passage worth quoting in its entirety: 27 28 29

See Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra, 154–86 for a summary of the exchange, including references to earlier literature. Alberto Pio, Tres et viginti libri in loco lucubrationum variarum D. Erasmi Roterodami ([Parisiis]: Iodocus Badius Ascensius, 1531), fols. LXXVIr–LXXIXv, esp. LXXVIIv (defense of scholastics) and LXXVIIIv (preparedness against heresy). Pio, Tres et viginti libri, fol. CXXXVr. The entire sentence reads in Latin: “Cum eadem adoratione imaginem et imaginatum veneremur, quemadmodum et eadem latria colitur Christi humanitas cum divinitate coniuncta; quae si separatim, hoc est diverso actu, coleretur nequaquam talis honor vel reverentia ei tribueretur, sed longe minor ut eduliae

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For in the way in which the image partakes of the [adoration], when we cease our mental operation without progressing to the endpoint on account of which we venerate it – this [endpoint], in fact, is what we properly adore – the highest honor cannot be fitting for it, even less so if it is considered according to its nature, which is nothing but a kind of material figured for this purpose. For we know that the form imposed on it is nothing but a feeble quality or an even weaker perspective (respectus). Therefore, if only the effigy of someone’s statue is observed, and we consider the skill of the artist who made it, as one who extracted live features from marble, but ignore what it signifies and will not venerate it, then – with the signification of the sign removed – we judge unworthy of veneration whatever [the effigy] is, even if we hold it to be dear and precious for the excellence of the art that formed it, or the nobility of its material.30 In short, if Pio applied scholastic analysis here, he represented not so much the views of Thomas as those of his late-medieval critics. Not only did he deny latria to any sacred images but he went on to diminish their connection to what they represented. In the end, his point was to warn against a form of appreciating visual representations – as material objects or artistic achievements – that made them altogether unfit for veneration. In the context of the polemic against Erasmus, the argument is noteworthy: under the guise of a defense of images, it conveyed a subtle critique of the very artistic culture – that of High Renaissance Rome – that had raised the ire of the northern humanist.

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cultus, ita et materialis imago. Licet, ut imago est, veneranda sit propria reverentia et actu tantum propter id quod refert, non tamen eadem adoratione colenda, quasi simul cum re quam repraesentat adoretur.” Ibid.: “Namque uti imago est in illa, dum sistimus mentis nostrae operationem, nec ultra progredimur ad terminum, videlicet ratione cuius et illam veneramur (ipsum autem proprie adoramus), is summus honor nequaquam ei congruere potest, quanto autem minus si secundum naturam suam consideretur, quae nil aliud est quam talis materia eo pacto figurata. Non autem ignoramus ipsam formam illi superinductam nil aliud esse quam aut exilem quandam qualitatem aut respectum adhuc imbecilliorem. Quamobrem et si sola effigies statuae cuiuspiam cernatur ingeniumque artificis qui illam perfecit suspiciamus, utpote qui eduxerit vivos de marmore vultus, attamen si ignoremus quid signet nequaquam illam venerabimur, sublata enim significatione signi nulla veneratione dignam censemus quaecumque illa fuerit, etsi eam charam ac preciosam habebimus ob artis praestantiam, qua formata sit, vel materiei nobilitatem.”

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Regardless, Pio’s anti-Erasmian invective offered plenty of resources to subsequent generations of Catholic polemicists.31 But in his day, his effort appears to have remained isolated. 3

The Image Question in the Mid-Sixteenth Century

It was only much later that scholastic interpretations of sacred images came to play a significant role in Catholic debates about the subject. When they did, in the late 1540s, they were not invoked to fend off the attacks of heretics against the cult of the saints and their images – for this, the tools of scholastic theology were not considered appropriate – but rather to settle a sharp internal disagreement among Catholic theologians. That disagreement arose from the need to articulate an orthodox understanding of image veneration and to reform its practice so as to curtail perceived abuses. Much of this debate played out in or near the papal court in early 1552. At that time, in fact, a series of theological discussions concerning the nature, legitimacy, and appropriate forms of the cult of images took place in Rome. This occasion resulted in two texts by the French Dominican Matthieu Ory, one of which responded to a recent publication by the Spanish bishop Martín Pérez de Ayala. An additional disputation, published the same year by the Italian polemicist Ambrogio Catarino, clearly intervened in the same debate. A fourth theologian, Iacopo Nacchianti, weighed in on the issue a few years later. In the next chapter we will examine these texts – published in the second part of this volume – and the specific circumstances in which they were written. Here it is worth asking more generally whether, or how, they related to the political context of the day. It has been suggested that the Roman discussions stood in connection with the Council of Trent, which was in session from the fall of 1551 until the spring of 1552. Hubert Jedin, for example, suspected that they responded to the growing threat of French Calvinism and were meant to prepare the ground for a conciliar decision.32 Yet there is no evidence to suggest that the image 31

32

It is worth noting that the manuscript of Pio’s first response to Erasmus (the basis of his future Ad Erasmi Roterodami expostulationem responsio accurata et paraenetica, 1529) later came into the possession of Guglielmo Sirleto, according to Hermannus von der Hardt, Historia Literaria Reformationis (Frankfurt: Officina Rengeriana, 1717), 112. As we shall see, Sirleto’s historical and textual scholarship influenced Rome’s later responses to the Reformation and the doctrinal debates at the Council of Trent. Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 470. The connection is also assumed in Ralph Dekoninck, “Le double mouvement de l’âme vers l’image: une théorie aristotélico-thomiste

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question was on the council’s agenda. In the past, the issue had occasionally been mentioned as requiring a response: during a general congregation in 1547, for example, Francisco de Navarra y Hualde, bishop of Badajoz, had opposed the council’s transfer to Bologna for fear that it might disrupt the proceedings; and in a long list of outstanding agenda items, he had mentioned indulgences, purgatory, and the veneration and invocation of saints, as well as their images.33 The first two items were in fact subject of theological disputation during the inconclusive Bologna meetings, but not the third.34 And when the council resumed in Trent in 1551, it focused on three sacraments, the Eucharist, penance, and extreme unction. Nor do the texts with which we are concerned here mention any connection with the Council: the disputation by Ambrogio Catarino, for instance, was published in a miscellaneous volume of this Dominican’s theological treatises or papers, but it was not labeled as advisory to the council, as several other texts in the collection were. While the conciliar fathers may have been concerned about the issue, a more direct background for the image debates is to be found in the papal city itself. Clearly, they came at an important juncture for the Roman Church. The 1540s had seen the founding and ascendancy of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which, under the leadership of Cardinal Gian Pietro Carafa, consistently pursued an uncompromising approach not only in the prosecution of overt Protestants but also of spirituali and other dissenting groups within the Church hierarchy. This was the decade, as is well known, in which leading figures of Italian heterodoxy, including the Franciscan general Bernardino Ochino and the bishop of Capodistria, Pier Paolo Vergerio, saw themselves forced to flee. The midcentury point marked a breakthrough that placed the Holy Office effectively in charge of papal policy for years to come. As scholars have come to understand, the Roman congregation was a major force working behind the scenes of the Council of Trent or, when Cardinal Carafa became pope in 1555, blocking its resumption. Amidst proliferating investigations of friars, preachers, and other suspects across the peninsula, the Holy Office also pressed successfully for trials of Italian prelates it considered enemies of the Church, including Iacopo Nacchianti (1548–50), Giovanni Grimani (1551),

33 34

au cœur des débats du milieu du XVIe siècle sur le juste rapport à l’image religieuse,” forthcoming in Revue de théologie et de philosophie, numéro spécial ‘Art et piété,’ 153 (2021). I thank Professor Dekoninck for sharing his text with me. CT 5:1021. Hubert Jedin, Geschichte des Konzils von Trient, 4 vols. in 5 (1949–75), repr. of the 3d edition (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2017), 3:76–87.

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Vittore Soranzo (1551 and 1557–58), Pietro Antonio Di Capua (1552–53), and especially Giovanni Morone (1557–59).35 Yet the growing power of Carafa and the Holy Office was not entirely unopposed. After the long-time pope Paul III died in November 1549, the lengthy conclave that followed featured an intense power struggle among Europe’s major powers. The election of Reginald Pole, one of Carafa’s archenemies, was avoided by a hair – thanks to the last-minute arrival of the French delegation – but for Carafa the situation was not much ameliorated when the papal tiara went to Cardinal Giovanni Maria Ciocchi del Monte. The cardinal, a career diplomat in the curia who had left his mark as papal legate at Trent during the council’s first phase, was clearly not a hardliner. Early in his tenure, in defiance of the Holy Office, the new pope Julius III formalized an alternative approach to doctrinal dissent by granting members of the young Jesuit order the right to absolve of heretical offenses.36 He also undertook increasingly ambitious reform efforts to supplement what had been accomplished at Trent. When, upon his accession, the pontiff appointed a committee of cardinals to pursue church reform, this could be seen as little more than the pro-forma fulfillment of an election promise. Yet the following year, on February 18, 1551, Julius named an enlarged reform committee – including cardinals of varying outlooks, such as Carafa, Pole, Marcello Cervini, and Giovanni Morone – charged with “starting the reform” ahead of the reconvening of the council later that year. There is little evidence that the committee accomplished much, but in 1552, after the Council of Trent had disbanded again on April 28, with uncertain prospects for its resumption, the pope decided on more decisive action. A new, six-member committee was headed by the reform-minded cardinals Marcello Cervini, Julius III’s former colleague as Tridentine legate in the 1540s, and Bernardino Maffei. In a consistory meeting of September 16, Julius announced a sweeping agenda, with prospective reforms ranging from the Roman curia all the way down the church organization to include the religious life of the laity. Effectively, the goal was to replace the conciliar path of reform. Over the following years Cervini’s committee (Maffei died in 1553) produced a draft papal 35 36

Massimo Firpo, La presa di potere dell’Inquisizione romana, 1550–1553 (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2014). Salvatore Lo Re, “Ambrogio Catarino Politi e alcuni retroscena delle sue controversie (in margine al Processo Morone),” in Mario Rosa (ed.), Eretici esuli e indemoniati nell’età moderna (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1998), 13–60; Giorgio Caravale, “Ambrogio Catarino Politi e i primi gesuiti,” Rivista storica italiana 117 (2005): 80–109; idem, Sulle tracce dell’eresia. Ambrogio Catarino Politi (1484–1553) (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2007), esp. 273–81 (Engl. trans. by Don Weinstein, Beyond the Inquisition. Ambrogio Catarino Politi and the Origins of the Counter-Reformation [South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2017]).

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bull, Varietas temporum, that included major institutional reforms, confirmed conciliar decrees on justification, original sin, and other matters, and provided instructions for preaching. In the end, the work came to naught: at the time of Julius’s death in 1555, the decree was still under review and remained unfinished. A revision was ordered by Cervini himself upon his election as Marcellus II, but his 22-day papacy was obviously too short for this to be realized. Under his successor Paul IV, the former Cardinal Carafa, the effort was abandoned altogether.37 This does not diminish its significance during the pontificate of Julius III. The draft of Varietas temporum itself indicates that indulgences, purgatory, and the cult of the saints and images were very much on the papal reform agenda in the early 1550s. All three subjects were addressed, if briefly, in the instructions for preaching. The passage on images reads: What must be preached about the invocation and images of saints. Regarding the glory of saints, their invocation, veneration, and worship, and likewise the adoration and cult of images and relics of holy bodies, they will preach and thus confirm what has been established and confirmed by ancient, enduring custom of all Catholic churches and by the holy councils.38 At first glance, this instruction seems modest in scope: without even hinting at the contemporary theological controversies or accusations of abuse, it was limited to a simple confirmation of established norms and practices. But this appearance may be deceptive. A further consideration of the author of this section of the bull, Marcello Cervini, who was the driving force behind Julius III’s reform efforts more generally, suggests that the image problem was a far greater concern than may be imagined.39 37

38

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Vinzenz Schweitzer, “Zur Geschichte der Reform unter Julius III,” Fünf Vorträge von der Paderborner Generalversammlung. Drittes Vereinsschrift der Görresgesellschaft (Köln: J.P. Bachem, 1907), 51–66; Jedin, Geschichte des Konzils, 4/1:2–6; William V. Hudon, Marcello Cervini and Ecclesiastical Government in Tridentine Italy (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), 144–51; and Chiara Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 1501–1555. Riforma della Chiesa, Concilio, Inquisizione (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010), 338–44. CT 13/1:261–90, at 287: “De invocatione et imaginibus sanctorum, quomodo sit praedicandum. sanctorum et eorum invocatione ac veneratione et cultu, ac similiter de adoratione et cultu imaginum et reliquiarum sanctorum corporum ea praedicent et praedicando confirment, quae ab ipsa antiqua et diuturna in cunctis catholicis ecclesiis consuetudine et a sacris conciliis comprobata sunt et confirmata.” On the instruction for preachers, see William V. Hudon, “Two Instructions to Preachers from the Tridentine Reformation,” in Sixteenth Century Journal 20, 3 (1989): 457–70;

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Marcello Cervini and the Image Debate

Recent scholarship has portrayed Marcello Cervini (Fig. 2) as a pivotal yet enigmatic figure in papal Rome in the early 1550s.40 In those years, the former legate served as bishop of Gubbio, cardinal librarian, influential member of the Holy Office and, as noted, close associate of the pontiff. Known for his prudence, he was clearly intent on remaining on good terms with multiple factions. While his commitment to restoring Catholic orthodoxy was obvious, he was open both to working through inquisitorial channels and to exploring alternative means of achieving the same goal, including diocesan reforms and religious propaganda. As an inquisitor and a bishop he gained direct insight into the diffusion of heterodox practices. In 1548–50 he became familiar with the charges leveled against a fellow-bishop, Iacopo Nacchianti, which included a disdain for the cult of the saints and their images. As bishop of Gubbio, Cervini addressed the same issue in two diocesan documents, a set of synodal constitutions and instructions for preachers (the basis, not coincidentally, for those included in Varietas temporum). This second text was addressed to the controversial Franciscan preacher Bartolomeo Golfi of Pergola. Earlier in the decade Bartolomeo della Pergola had been found guilty of numerous heretical views brought to light by his preaching in Modena; now suspicions had reemerged, and it fell to Cervini to investigate him again. It was thus significant that Gubbio’s diocesan instructions for preachers read like an “orthodox catechism” on the very questions raised by the investigations of the friar.41 At the same time, the text testifies to Cervini’s conviction that the religious crisis of the day was to be addressed as much by indoctrination as by repression. Cervini’s scholarly and cultural ventures betray a similar outlook. Here, too, the image question turns out to have been a central concern, and his engagement with the rediscovery of the Second Council of Nicaea (Fig. 3) is especially noteworthy. For decades, Cervini, a sophisticated humanist and scholar of both Greek and Latin, had cultivated a network of humanist friends and promoted publication projects. In the 1540s, these projects were ever more focused on patristic studies and defined to help the Catholic Church regain the

40 41

idem, “The Papacy in the Age of Reform,” in Early Modern Catholicism. Essays in Honour of John W. O’Malley, S.J., ed. Kathleen M. Comerford and Hilmar M. Pabel (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001), 46–66, at 53. Besides Hudon, Marcello Cervini and Samuele Giombi, Un ecclesiastico tridentino al governo diocesano. Marcello II Cervini (1501–1555) e la riforma della chiesa fra centro e periferia (Ancona: Edizioni di Studia Picena, 2010), see especially Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini. Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 351–52 (the expression ‘orthodox catechism’ was coined by Massimo Firpo and Fabrizio Biferali).

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Jacopino del Conte (attr.), Portrait of Card. Marcello Cervini degli Spannocchi Reproduced by courtesy of the Galleria Borghese, Rome

upper hand in the apologetic and propaganda wars of the Reformation. In 1540 Cervini had visited the Netherlands, where he had collected both heretical texts and Catholic controversial literature. In Italy and elsewhere, he promoted the search for original documents of church history and doctrine, especially Greek patristic manuscripts. As papal legate at Trent and, later, as librarian of the Bibliotheca Palatina (around that time renamed Vaticana) he availed himself of the scholarship of men like Guglielmo Sirleto and Gentien Hervet. Sirleto, an eminent grecist, regularly sent Cervini excerpts of patristic and conciliar

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Giuseppe Franco (attr.), Second Council of Nicaea. Salone Sistino, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana © 2021 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, all rights reserved

sources relevant for the Tridentine debates – a practice he kept up with other legates until the very end of the council. The Frenchman Hervet, known as a translator of ancient Greek theological texts, served as Cervini’s secretary at Trent. There, he also contributed to the preparation of an edition of prior church councils, undertaken in the margins of the Tridentine proceedings by the Spanish Dominican Bartolomé de Carranza. The work, patronized by the imperial ambassador Diego de Mendoza, led to the publication of a summa of conciliar decrees in 1546. Hervet was responsible for Greek translations of the Third Council of Constantinople and portions of the Second Council of Nicaea; he was thus intimately familiar with the resolution of the Byzantine iconoclasm crisis.42 Hervet’s scholarship culminated fifteen years later in his own collection of conciliar sources (1561).43 42

43

Summa Conciliorum et Pontificum a Petro usque ad Paulum tertium succincte complectens omnia, quae alibi sparsim tradita sunt (Venetiis: ad signum Spei, 1546), henceforth CSCP. André Duval, “La Summa Conciliorum de B. Carranza,” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 41/3 (1957): 401–27, esp. 410–13. Gentien Hervet (ed.), Canones SS. Apostolorum, Conciliorum Generalium et Particularium … Omnia Commentariis Theodori Balsamonis Antiocheni Patriarchae explicata et de Graecis conversa (Parisiis: apud Guil. Morelium, 1561); henceforth HCAC. This collection included the canons of the Quinisext Council, not included in the earlier conciliar edition of Petrus Crabbe (volumes of 1538 and 1551); this council was cited in the draft of the Tridentine decree on images (see below, pp. 370–71). On the work of Sirleto and Hervet at the Council, see Jedin, Geschichte des Konzils, 2:398–99 and passim; Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 440 and passim. On Sirleto, see Pio Paschini, “Guglielmo Sirleto prima del cardinalato,”

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As for Cervini, he continued to expand his sponsorship of edition projects from the late 1540s onwards: even as he promoted censorship as member of the Holy Office, he revitalized the Vatican Library and drew on its rich resources to advance the Catholic cultural front in the religious wars of the day.44 The literature regarding the use of sacred images was a key interest of the Catholic establishment across Europe, and Cervini shared it. He owned two Latin versions of the acts of the Second Nicaean Council, namely the early medieval translation by Anastasius Bibliothecarius and a recent one published in Cologne by the Dutch humanist Longolius (1540).45 The latter was reprinted in the second volume (1551) of Petrus Crabbe’s monumental publication of church councils.46 Likewise, Cervini was probably aware of the new editions of the Carolingian critique of Nicaea II, the newly rediscovered Libri Carolini published in Paris in 1549,47 and of Jonas of Orléans’ De imaginum cultu, which appeared five years

44 45

46 47

in idem, Tre ricerche sulla storia della Chiesa nel Cinquecento (Roma: Edizioni liturgiche, 1945), 155–81; and Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, ad indicem. Pio Paschini, “Un cardinale editore: Marcello Cervini,” in Miscellanea di scritti di bibliografia ed erudizione in memoria di Luigi Ferrari (Firenze: Olschki, 1952), 383–413; Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 428–58. See Paola Piacentini, La biblioteca di Marcello II Cervini. Una ricostruzione dalle carte di Jeanne Bignami Odier (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2001), 1 (B 4), 9 (B 40), 12 (B 57), and 163 (D 411). The latter was Concilium Nicenum. Synodi Nicenae quam Graeci septimam vocant … actiones omnes contra iconoclastas et iconomachos … Opus nunc recens inventum et e Graeco versum per G[ilbertum] Long[olium] (Coloniae: Petrus Quentel, 1540; henceforth CNL). On Longolius, i.e. Gijsbert van Langerak of Utrecht (1507–43), see Abraham J. van der Aa, Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden (Haarlem: Brederode, 1852–78), 11:595–97 and, more recently, Heinz Finger, Gisbert Longolius: ein niederrheinischer Humanist (1507–1543) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1990); see also Erich Lamberz, “Einleitung,” in Concilium Universale Nicaenum Secundum, 1:LVI, and Olivier Christin, “Edition et citation du Concile de Nicée II dans la polémique contre les protestants en France,” in Nicée II, 787–1987. Douze siècles d’images religieuses. Actes du colloque international Nicée II tenu au Collège de France, Paris les 2, 3, 4 octobre 1986, ed. F. Boespflug and N. Lossky (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987), 339–43, at 340. This translation was intended to fill a lacuna left by Petrus Crabbe’s widely used edition of church councils, published in 1538: Concilia omnia tam generalia quam particularia, ab apostolorum temporibus in hunc usque diem a sanctissimis patribus celebrata … Tomus primus … Coloniae: Petrus Quentel, 1538. Secundus tomus Conciliorum omnium tam generalium quam particularium…, ed. Petrus Crabbe (Coloniae Agrippinae: Ex officina Ioannis Quentel, 1551, henceforth CCOS). On the so-called Libri Carolini, published by Bishop Jean du Tillet of Brieuc (Opus inlustrissimi et excellentissimi seu spectabilis viri, Caroli Magni, … contra Synodum, quae in partibus Graeciae pro adorandis imaginibus stolide sive arroganter gesta est [s.l., s.e., 1549]), and this work’s influence on Protestant critics of sacred images, especially Calvin, see Scavizzi, “Storia ecclesiastica e arte nel secondo Cinquecento,” Storia dell’arte 59 (1987): 29–46, at 33; Olivier Christin, Une révolution symbolique. L’iconoclasme huguenot et la

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later.48 The Roman curia probably harbored deep concerns about these historic texts, and certainly about the first. A manuscript copy of the Libri Carolini owned by the Vatican Library, reported missing in 1542, turned up again in a 1548 catalog. Handwritten notes by Guglielmo Sirleto suggest that the text was subsequently (probably under Paul IV) moved to a room of prohibited books, and then turned over to the Holy Office for being “heretical.”49 Other publishing projects show a more direct involvement. When Livio Podocataro, archbishop of Nicosia, sent Cervini the Greek original of John of Damascus’s Adversus oppugnatores sanctarum imaginum (“Against the opponents of sacred images”), he immediately put Niccolò Maiorano in charge of a new edition. The work appeared in 1553, with a dedication to Gian Pietro Carafa. Crediting Guglielmo Sirleto with the manuscript’s discovery “ex tenebris,” Maiorano stressed the work’s importance for the long battle against heresy.50 Cervini also pressed for a Latin translation of this work by a former collaborator of Gian Matteo Giberti of Verona, Pier Francesco Zini, who by then had absorbed the hardline politics of the current bishop of Verona, Luigi

48 49

50

reconstruction catholique (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 49–51; James R. Payton, Jr., “Calvin and the Libri Carolini,” Sixteenth Century Journal 28, 2 (1997): 467–80. For a modern edition of the until-then long-forgotten text, now attributed by most to Theodulf of Orléans, see Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum (Libri Carolini), ed. Ann Freeman, Concilia, Tomus II, Supplementum I (Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1998). Recent studies include Kristina Mitalaïté, Philosophie et théologie de l’image dans les Libri Carolini (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2007) and Thomas F.X. Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), esp. 158–206. Jonas of Orléans, Libri tres de cultu imaginum ad Carolum Magnum adversus haeresin Claudii praesulis Taurinensis (Coloniae: Apud haeredes Arnoldi Birck, 1554). Hubert Bastgen, “Das Capitulare Karls des Grossen über die Bilder oder die sogenannten Libri Carolini, II,” Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde 37 (1912): 13–51, at 39–40; during the 1562 Colloquy of St. Germain (on which see chapter 3), Cardinal Ippolito d’Este informed Carlo Borromeo that the moderate party had used the Libri Carolini to support their case; and he asked the cardinal nephew that the French edition be checked against the Roman manuscript. See also Mario Scaduto, Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia, vol. 3, L’epoca di Giacomo Laínez. L’azione, 1556–1565 (Roma: Edizioni La Civiltà Cattolica, 1974), 30, based on Pio Paschini, “Letterati e Indice nella Controriforma,” Atti dell’Accademia degli Arcadi 15–16 (1936–37), 38 and Giovanni Mercati, “Per la storia del codice vaticano dei ‘Libri Carolini’” (1921) in idem, Opere minori, vol. 4. Studi e testi 79 (Roma: Biblioteca Vaticana, 1937), 134–42. Του ἄγιου Ιωαννου του Δαμασκηνου λογόι τρεῖσ άπολογητικοὶ πρὸσ τους διαβαλλοντασ τασ ἄγιασ εἰκόνασ (Romae: apud Stephanum Nicolinum Sabiensem, 1553), “Illustrissimo et Reverendissimo Ioanni Petro Carafae Episcopo Tusculano S.R.E. Cardinali Nicolaus Maioranus S[alutem],” fols. Aiir–[vii]v; this publication includes Theodorus Studita’s brief text on the same subject, Δογματικὴ περὶ τιμῆσ καὶ προσκυνήσεωσ τῶν ἄγίων εἰκόνων. Cf. Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 446; also Paschini, “Guglielmo Sirleto,” 189–90.

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Lippomano.51 Published in 1554, his translation was dedicated to Cervini. Unlike Maiorano, who did not address the polemic about sacred images in his preface, Zini offered an elaborate diagnosis. He sought to resolve the paradox raised by the Old Testament prohibition against images and their New Testament promotion as beneficial: why did the Devil use them to lure ancient Hebrews while now prodding Christians to reject them? Once, when images served the Devil, there was no greater danger than these in turning God’s chosen people away “from the true knowledge and devotion of God.” Now, “while the prince of this world [Christ] has been thrown out and nearly all his images and likenesses have been overturned and destroyed,” there was no greater asset in “lead[ing] and draw[ing] men to piety and knowledge of the things which the Son of God, after being made human and living on earth among men, has done and accomplished for our salvation, both through himself and in his members.” By viewing images, Zini added, “the sweet memory and knowledge of the deeds of Christ and the saints flow effortlessly into the souls not only of learned men, but also of unkempt and simple women and children.”52 But just as the Catholic Church defended, allowed, and commended the use of sacred images, by the same token obscene and impious [images], which are seen everywhere in public and private buildings, with great cost to modesty and good manners and to the shame of the Christian republic, must be 51

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Luciano Bossina and Enrico Valdo Maltese, “Dal ‘500 al Migne. Prime ricerche su Pier Francesco Zini (1520–1580),” in I padri sotto il torchio. Le edizioni dell’antichità cristiana nei secoli XV–XVI. Atti del convegno di studi Certosa del Galluzzo (Firenze, 25–26 giugno 1999), ed. Mariarosa Cortesi (Firenze: Sismel Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2002), 217–87. Sancti Ioannis Damasceni adversus sanctarum imaginum oppugnatores orationes tres, Petro Francisco Zino Veronensi interprete (Venetiis: Aldus, 1554), dedication to Cervini (dated April 1, 1554), fols. A2v–A3r: “Itaque cum humana felicitas in ipsius veri Dei cognitione et cultu sita sit, miseria autem in eo potissimum consistat ut vero Deo ignorato neglectove divini falsis numinibus honores tribuantur, nihil autem aut olim, cum ipse Diabolus ab omnibus fere gentibus in rerum procreatarum simulacris et imaginibus coleretur, magis esset periculosum, quum ne unus ille populus, quem sibi Deus elegerat, simulacrorum et imaginum cultu a vera Dei cognitione et pietate averteretur: aut nunc, cum princeps huius mundi eiectus est foras, et omnes propemodum illius imagines et simulacra eversa deletaque sunt, magis homines ad religionem, et eorum quae Dei filius, posteaquam factus est homo et in terris cum hominibus versatus, pro salute nostra tum per se, tum in membris suis gessit et pertulit, cognitionem ducat et trahat, quam sanctae imagines, quarum aspectu sine ullo legendi labore dulcis in animos non solum virorum eruditorum sed etiam rudium et simplicium muliercularum et puerorum memoria et cognitio rerum, quae a Christo et sanctis hominibus gestae sunt, influat; propterea, Diabolo semper adversante, et Iudaeis quondam pravus imaginum usus vetitus fuit, et bonus nobis concessus et commendatus.”

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destroyed and forbidden. For everyone can easily understand how much venom the tender souls of children, women, and really all people will draw from these images, which depict the nefarious love affairs, crimes, and disgraceful acts of false gods and immoral men.53 And Zini demonstrated the resulting infamy of the Christian name by using a humanist trope that would not have displeased Thomas More – namely the shock that would be experienced by a visitor from the New World: [I]f someone from those regions which, unknown to the ancients, have been discovered by the ingenuity of our men, enters a city of Christian princes, he will conclude, based on the pictures and statues he will see, that he is not observing a city of a holy people, who worship the one true God, but of an impious and impudent people of demon-worshippers.54 Given the abundance of such artifacts, Zini asked, who could be behind “such a depraved and perverse custom,” but the Devil, “who, while he cannot remove the most sacred images and thus threaten the worship of the true God, tries to achieve the same with a nefarious mass of the worst images?” Hence the call to replace the omnipresent “obscene and impious paintings” with sacred images. This would be very easy, Zini added in a scolding tone, if princes set a good example. And he concluded that the “holy use of images is of greater importance than can be easily explained.”55 The best weapon against the ambition,

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55

Ibid., fol. A3r: “Atque utinam, quemadmodum sacrae imagines ab Ecclesia Catholica defensae comprobataeque sunt, sic obscoenae et impiae, quae passim in publicis privatisque aedificiis magna cum pudicitiae bonorumque morum iactura et Christianae Reipublicae dedecore cernuntur, delerentur atque interdicerentur. Quantum m veneni ex imaginibus istis, quibus nefarii falsorum deorum et improborum hominum amores et scelera atque flagitia describuntur, hauriant teneri puerorum et mulierum, immo vero omnium animi, facile quivis potest intelligere.” Ibid.: “Quanta autem inde nomini Christiano inuratur infamiae atque ignominiae nota, ex eo patet quod, si quis e regionibus illis quas a veteribus ignoratas solertia nostrorum hominum adinvenit, in aliquam Christianorum principum urbem ingrediatur, ex picturis et statuis quas intuebitur, se non gentis sanctae et unum ac verum Deum colentis, sed impiae atque impudicae et daemonas venerantis civitatem cernere existimabit.” Ibid., fol. A3v: “quaenam tam pravi et perversi moris causa potest esse, nisi summa Diaboli astutia, qui cum sanctissimas imagines tollere nequeat, atque ita veri Dei cultum imminuere, nefaria nequissimarum imaginum multitudine idem conetur efficere? Quo magis optimo cuique elaborandum est, ut patefacta hostis malitia picturis undique obscoenis et impiis exturbatis, non solum templa, sed etiam publica et privata aedificia sanctis imaginibus exornentur. Quod erit facillimum, si principes, quorum mores et facta populus

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avarice, and lechery of men was offered by the ancients, particularly John of Damascus’s work. This zealous outburst of the Veronese churchman reads as a sort of alternative iconoclasm, deflecting Erasmian and Protestant charges of idolatry to target the presumed secularized art of the Italian elites. No doubt Zini reacted both against older episodes of violent image destruction in Switzerland and elsewhere and to the “soft iconoclasm” evident among heterodox church critics in the Veneto.56 His indictment veered between the claim that all images of Christ had been destroyed and the observation that the Devil was unable to eradicate the cult of images. Regardless, his arguments also mirror those made two years earlier in two Roman documents: one concerns the sharp contrast, drawn especially by Matthieu Ory, between Jewish and Christian law; the other echoes Catarino’s invective against immoral and licentious art.57 These connections may not be coincidental, as Zini’s superior, Bishop Luigi Lippomano, was a close associate of Marcello Cervini. In fact, it was the cardinal of Santa Croce who had recommended the selection of the Veronese bishop as papal legate during the 1551–52 phase of the Council of Trent.58 Surely Lippomano was aware of the Roman image debates. In his own work, as well, he was attentive to questions regarding the cult of saints and images. To counter attacks on the cult of the saints, the bishop edited an influential series of saints’ lives, whose first volume, the Sanctorum priscorum patrum vitae numero centum sexagintatres, appeared in 1551. In it, arguments in defense of images were sprinkled across multiple vitae: that their use was licit and ancient; that their veneration was grounded in the mental reference to their prototypes; that kneeling and praying before images were honorific gestures addressed to what they represented, not to the wood or stone of which they were made (as the heretics charged); that these customs were therefore good and pious; and that in this regard images resembled Christ’s cross.59 These were all points

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imitatur, non tam edictis, quam exemplis id sanxerint. Maioris certe momenti est sanctus imaginum usus, quam ut facile possit explicari.” Adriano Prosperi, “Tra venerazione e iconoclastia. Le immagini a soggetto religioso tra Quattrocento e Cinquecento” (2000), in Eresie e devozioni. La religione italiana in età moderna, 3 vols. (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010), 3:307–34; Massimo Firpo and Fabrizio Biferali, Immagini ed eresie nell’Italia del Cinquecento (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 2016). I borrow the term “soft iconoclasm” from Alexander Nagel, The Controversy of Renaissance Art (Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See below, pp. 53, 66, and 77–79. Cf. also Pio’s response to Erasmus, discussed above. Jedin, Geschichte des Konzils, 3:238 and 487. Besides multiple in-text references, see especially the glosses that make these points, which can be found in the Vitae, respectively at fols. 33v/4, 74v/3, 101r–v/2–3, 173r/1; 112r/5, 323r/35–36, 345r/55, and 21r–v/13–16 (here the numbers following the / refer to the numbering of the glosses); see also brief summaries with references in the volume’s index.

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made in prior years by Pérez de Ayala and other Catholic apologists; and they also reflected ancient sources, especially the acts of Nicaea II. The Nicene influence is particularly evident in another, contemporary apologetic work by Lippomano, the Confirmatione et stabilimento di tutti li dogmi catholici (1553).60 There, a discussion of the cult of the saints ushered in a justification of sacred images, “because in our time they are condemned by many out of the same ill-considered zeal for the honor of God.” Lippomano’s defense relied especially on the Second Nicaean Council, both for its patristic documentation, which proved the ancient origins of the practice, and its doctrinal arguments.61 On this basis the book insisted especially on the Christological foundations of the use of images. On the one hand, Christ’s humanity signified his similarity to humans in matters of the flesh, hence (Lippomano implied) his representability. On the other hand, images had to be “commemorative signs” of, especially, the incarnation, life, passion, and resurrection of Christ, as well as of the holiness of the Virgin Mary, whose body was touched by the divine unlike that of any other human or angel. The images of saints, in turn, offered the devout a mirror to recall and emulate their holy lives. Thus the honor accorded these images did not concern their matter or form, but was extended to the subject whose memory was represented in them. In this regard images were similar to Christ’s cross and the relics of the saints. But images should be installed in churches only when their subjects were “commended by true and pious histories” and “painted without pomp and secular leggierezza.” These points have noticeable resonances with Ambrogio Catarino’s 1552 tract. Sirleto, Hervet, Maiorano, Zini, Lippomano: all these scholars and authors are united by connections with Marcello Cervini and the theological debates and apologetic ventures under way around the middle of the sixteenth century. And so were three of the authors featured in this volume. When, during a stay in Rome, the French Dominican Matthieu Ory composed a disputation on the image controversy, soon followed by a second one, he dedicated his work to Cervini, in whose library it ended up. Ory’s order brother Ambrogio Catarino, who produced a disputation on the subject in the same year, was a key Vatican operator in Julius III’s orbit, and also closely associated with Santa Croce. A third Dominican to intervene in the controversy, Iacopo Nacchianti, was equally close to both church leaders, albeit only following a deep crisis in his relations to the institutional Church. These connections, and their relevance for the image question, are the subject of the next chapter. 60 61

The full title reads: Confirmatione et stabilimento di tutti li dogmi catholici, con la subversione di tutti i fondamenti, motivi et ragioni delli moderni heretici sino al numero 482 (In Venetia: al Segno della Speranza, 1553). Ibid., fols. 169v–176r, at 169v.

chapter 2

Disputes: The Sacred Image and the Counter-Reformation The midpoint of the sixteenth century (as the previous chapter showed) witnessed a surge of interest in the image question. This can be explained in part by Calvin’s expanding polemic against the cult of images, by proliferating skepticism about elite and popular uses of religious art – even in Catholic heartlands such as Italy – and also by a growing sense among Catholic leaders that an effective response – scholarly, educational, and repressive – was necessary. In this as in other respects the moment marked a decisive turn in Church government. The texts on images produced around this time, including those collected in this volume, emerged from this cultural moment. They were interrelated in more or less direct ways: they engaged with the ancient Christian image tradition, staked out positions on the legacy of scholastic image theory, and, in some cases, responded to one another. Yet they also reflected the political and religious conditions in different parts of Europe – the Holy Roman Empire, France, and Italy. This chapter outlines the background of their authors, the contexts in which the texts came about, their connections to each other, and their main contents. 1

The Traditions of Martín Pérez de Ayala

In his De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus (1549), the Spanish theologian Martín Pérez de Ayala (1503–66) articulated an opinion on the image question that was at once conciliatory and provocative. At the time Pérez was a theological adviser in the entourage of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V.1 Born 1 For the following biographical sketch, see especially the entry on Pérez by C. Guttiérez in Diccionario de Historia Eclesiastica de España, ed. Quintín Aldea Vaquero, Tomás Marín Martínez, José Vives Gatell, 4 vols. (Madrid: Instituto Enrique Flórez, 1972–75), 3:1963–65. See also Gonzalo Díaz Díaz, Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1998), 6: 369–72 (including bibliography); Juan Higueras Maldonado, Humanistas Giennenses (S. XIV–XVIII) (Córdoba: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Córdoba, 1999), 78–84; and among older studies, Hubert Jedin, “Die Autobiographie des Don Martín Pérez de Ayala († 1566),” Spanische Forschungen der

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into a noble family at Segura de la Sierra (province of Jaén), he had received a thorough humanist education in Alcalá and then pursued theological studies, first in Salamanca, where he attended the course of the great scholastic Francisco de Vitoria, subsequently in Alcalá, where he studied under Juan de Medina. Upon the founding of the University of Granada by Charles V, Pérez was appointed as a theology professor; while there, he published his first work, a treatise on scholastic logic, Dilucidarium quaestionum super quinque universalia Porphyrii (“Explication of questions about Porphyry’s five universals”). Soon, however, his career took a different path. In early 1540 he moved back to Jaén, at the invitation of the bishop, to serve as confessor, lecturer, and church visitor in the diocese. That position also brought him in contact with Charles V: in 1543 he accompanied his bishop on a trip to Germany with the emperor. But, following a stop in Trent, he went on to Louvain to study Greek and Hebrew; there he was exposed to the growing heretical literature that was coming off northern European presses. His stay in the Netherlands also brought him deeper into the emperor’s orbit: at Charles V’s request Pérez served as a theologian at the 1545 Diet of Worms. The following year he was named chaplain of the emperor, whom he accompanied to the Diet of Regensburg later that year. From here he was sent to Trent to participate in the church council that had been in session since December 1545. From August 1546 the Spanish theologian participated actively in the proceedings, intervening especially in the crucial debates on justification. It is worth noting that in Trent Pérez was the guest of the Spanish ambassador Diego de Mendoza. In this way he must have become acquainted with Mendoza’s scholarly circle, which included Bartolomé de Carranza, the editor of the Summa Conciliorum; and he may well have learned of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (the Third Council of Constantinople) and the Seventh (the Second Council of Nicaea), which were key elements of the Summa.2 On these councils, as we shall see, he was to draw extensively in his discussion of images. Upon the conclusion of the first phase of the council, Pérez travelled to Rome at Mendoza’s invitation, with multiple stops in major Italian cities along the way, including Venice, Milan, Bologna, and Florence. In the spring of 1547 he was back in Trent, from where the emperor called him back to Germany, specifically to Augsburg.

Görresgesellschaft 11 (1955): 122–64. See also Fabre, Décréter l’image?, 69–93 (including a discussion of Catarino, but not Ory). 2 On Pérez’s stay in Trent, see Jedin, “Die Autobiographie,” 130. The Summa advertised the canons of the Sixth Council and the acts and canons of the Seventh in a shortlist of the work’s novelties (CSCP, verso of title page). On Carranza and the Summa, see chapter 1, p. 25.

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Thus Pérez found himself at the emperor’s side at an important juncture in the German Reformation. As is commonly known, the long standoff between Charles V and the Lutheran princes and imperial cities that had joined the Reformed cause had given way, shortly after Luther’s death in 1546, to armed conflict. The Schmalkaldic War ended the following year when the Protestant league by that name was routed by the imperial troops at the Battle of Mühlberg on April 24, 1547. In the wake of this feat, Charles V and his collaborators began work on a religious settlement to be proposed to the Imperial Diet convened later in the year and continuing into the next. This settlement took the form of the so-called Augsburg Interim, promulgated on May 15, 1548. The emperor first entrusted preparation of the text to a secret committee of Catholic theologians; when their work raised concerns that it might be unacceptable politically, he charged a second committee to develop their own proposals. This group included Bishop Julius von Pflug of Naumburg, Michael Helding, auxiliary bishop of Mainz, and the Lutheran theologian Johannes Agricola. Perhaps Martín Pérez de Ayala, as a trusted theological advisor to the emperor, had an role in its formulation.3 It may not be a coincidence that Pérez was named bishop of Guadix on May 16, 1548, the day after the Interim was announced. Is there a connection between the politics of the Interim and Pérez’s agenda in De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus? The Interim, as is well known, sought to develop a framework for reunifying the empire’s diverging religious doctrines and practices. Flush with victory, the imperial side made sure that it was largely Catholic in letter and spirit. Nevertheless, after the sidelining of the first, hardline committee, it allowed some concessions to the Protestant side: a Lutheran interpretation of justification was deemed acceptable, as were some Reformed practices such as clerical marriage and lay communion under both species. All this was provisional, since only the Council of Trent could set the terms for a permanent arrangement. Regardless, even as the evangelical princes convened at the Diet reluctantly agreed to the interim settlement, it was doomed to fail due to broad opposition among Lutherans across the empire. That this attempt at a religious settlement informed Pérez de Ayala’s De divinis … traditionibus is suggested by the book itself. It was completed at about 3 Thus C. Guttiérez, “Martín Pérez de Ayala,” Diccionario de Historia Eclesiastica de España, 3:1964: “colaborando, según parece, en la elaboración del Interim expedido en el receso de la Dieta …”; similarly, Jedin, “Die Autobiographie,” 132. Pérez’s role is not discussed in Horst Rabe, “Zur Entstehung des Augsburger Interims 1547/48,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte / Archive for Reformation History 94 (2003): 6–104; nor in idem, Reichsbund und Interim. Die Verfassungs- und Religionspolitik Karls V. under der Reichstag von Augsburg 1547/48 (CologneVienna: Böhlau, 1971).

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the same time as the Interim; its preface was dated May 6, 1548, just days before the formal announcement of the Interim. Pérez addressed this introduction to “the assiduous followers of Christ as they enjoy ecclesiastical peace” (Ad studiosos Christi, ecclesiastica pace gaudentes), calling upon them not to be taken in by the false apostles, novatores, and pseudo-evangelists of the day but rather to persist in, or return to, the safety of established Catholic traditions. In August, Pérez added a dedication to Charles V’s son Philip, at the time regent of Spain, in the hope that the prince’s high patronage would protect him “against the bites of crooked and wayward men (contra morsus pravorum et morosorum hominum).” The political context of Pérez’s work becomes even clearer in its final section, directly addressed to the German princes, prelates, and magistrates.4 While the completion of Pérez de Ayala’s work coincides with the Interim, and the book alludes to its agenda, we do not know when the author first conceived his project. Pérez’s own suggestion in his dedicatory letter that he had worked on it “for a long time” (diu) is too vague to be helpful. Pérez certainly did not begin his work before moving to the Netherlands in 1543, and probably not before joining Charles V’s entourage in 1545. Most likely, he wrote the bulk of the work in 1547–48, when he was back from Trent and preparations for the Interim were under way. But its conception no doubt has to be understood in light of Charles V’s protracted efforts – between the Regensburg Colloquy and the Augsburg Interim – to untie the Gordian knot that was the confessional situation in the Holy Roman Empire. In this context, the De divinis … traditionibus is a remarkable book: it offered a comprehensive response to the German religious crisis, and may even be read as a theological blueprint for its resolution. Critical in this sense was the book’s focus on ‘traditions’ divine, apostolic, and ecclesiastical, as the title indicated. Of course, this terminology referred, at least in part, to the vexed question of the sources of Christian authority. The issue had been vigorously debated at the very beginning of the Council of Trent and resulted in a decree that stipulated the equal authority of scripture and tradition. This had happened in January 1546, before Pérez appeared on the conciliar scene, but he was surely informed about the discussions. His book, then, drew heavily on the full range of scriptural tradition, patristic (both Greek and Latin) and scholastic literature, and papal, episcopal, and conciliar legislation. He justified his 4 Martín Pérez de Ayala, De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus deque authoritate ac vi earum sacrosancta adsertiones ceu libri decem in quibus fere universa Ecclesiae antiquitas circa dogmata apostolica, orthodoxe elucidatur (Coloniae: Iaspar Gennepaeus, 1549), fols. Aii-r–v and Aiii-r–Aiv-r.

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approach in the introductory part of his book, emphasizing two points. First, it was impossible for the Bible to explicate all matters of doctrine, or to present them in a self-evident way – hence the need for interpretation. Second, for this interpretation to be authoritative, no “private spirit” (privatus spiritus) was capable of resolving differences of opinion; for this, it was necessary to have recourse “to the public instruction of the Holy Spirit” (ad spiritus sancti publicum magisterium) contained in the apostolic traditions and the “sense of the Church.” Even more notable was what the term ‘traditions’ meant for the book’s subject matter. Pérez focused his attention entirely on religious or ecclesiastical practices rather than theological doctrines, bypassing some of the major disputes at the heart of the Reformation, especially those concerning justification and grace, works and Christian freedom, election and predestination. Thus, Pérez devoted the second part of his book to discussions about the sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, purgatory, the cult of the saints, relics, and images; and he proceeded, in the third part, to treat devotional practices like fasting and celibacy, and ecclesiological principles regarding church authority (versus civil governance) and the powers of bishops. He added a fourth, final part to refute objections of Protestant opponents. In other words, his book bore the marks of the imperial approach to resolving the crisis in the Catholic Church – one which privileged church reform over the settlement of doctrinal differences. It was this approach which, only a few years earlier, had run into the firm opposition of the papal curia when it came to setting the agenda of the Council of Trent. Even the resulting compromise, which consisted in addressing doctrinal and reform issues simultaneously, had left the pope concerned.5 And multiple issues which Pérez treated in his second book, including the image question, were not discussed until the very end of the Council of Trent. Thus it is tempting to see in Pérez’s book, behind the veil of his vast erudition and theological excursions, the persistent effort to develop a template for Charles V’s politics of religious accommodation – one that sought to preserve the Empire’s loyalty to the Catholic Church, its doctrines, rituals, and traditions, but was open to considering some reformers’ grievances and demands. The matter that concerns us here – the veneration of images – may allow us to test this hypothesis. The Augsburg Interim discussed the issue in the context of the Church’s use of material artifacts in its ceremonies. The relevant passage reads as follows:

5 Adriano Prosperi, Il Concilio di Trento: Una introduzione storica (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 35–41.

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The altars, priestly vestments, church vessels, banners, crosses, candles, and images must be kept in churches, but in such a way that they serve only for remembrance and that these things are not bestowed the cult of latria. Nor shall there be any superstitious thronging to statues and images.6 This statement contains, in a nutshell, three key elements of Pérez’s views on sacred images: his emphasis on the mnemonic role of images, his rejection of forms of veneration that approached adoration, and his concerns about the superstitious abuse of images. Let us consider his argument more closely. In his discussion of sacred images, Pérez sought to answer three questions: whether the Church allowed sacred images, whether they might be venerated, and if so, how (or with what “honor”) they should be venerated. He proposed to answer each question based on both reason and tradition. The opening pages offered an argument from reason for the use of sacred images, along with an assortment of ancient authorities in support of the practice. In a second section, the longest of his text, Pérez argued at length that image veneration was deeply embedded in Catholic history and traditions, as evidenced by ancient stories about sacred images such as the picture of the apostles Peter and Paul offered to Constantine by Pope Sylvester (Fig. 4). The following section addressed the third question – on the “honor” with which veneration should take place – both from reason and patristic sources. Here Pérez took issue with the scholastic view of how, in the act of veneration, the representation related to the represented. Pérez’s extensive discussion of authoritative sources, particularly in the second part, is worth some comment. First, these sources are limited almost entirely to the early-Christian and early-medieval periods. Unlike other Catholic apologetic texts, Pérez offered little discussion of biblical, and especially Old Testament passages; nor did he engage here with any text dated after the year 1000. Second, while some of his references – statements by St. Basil, Eusebius’s church history, several letters of Gregory the Great, John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa, and conciliar or synodal decrees – had long been cited in debates about religious images, the Spanish theologian relied most heavily on the acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (here usually called 6 Das Augsburger Interim von 1548, ed. Joachim Mehlhausen, Texte zur Geschichte der evangelischen Theologie, 3 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1970), 137 (art. 26): “Altaria, vestes sacerdotum, vasa ecclesiae, vexilla, item cruces, candelae, imagines retineantur in ecclesia, sed ita tamen, ut sint monimenta nec cultus latriae in hoc genus transferatur, nec ad imagines et statuas superstitiose concursus fiat.”

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Benvenuto Tisi detto Garofalo, The Conversion of Constantine, Gallerie Estensi. Pinacoteca di Ferrara, c. 1520–30 © Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali e per il turismo – Archivio fotografico Direzione regionale Musei dell’Emilia Romagna

the Seventh [Ecumenical] Council). As noted earlier, these massive proceedings had recently been made available in a new Latin translation by Gilbertus Longolius (1540). This was clearly the edition Pérez consulted and cited or paraphrased on a regular basis. He did so not only to reference the conciliar debates and decisions, but also, repeatedly, to quote ancient sources cited by the council. Thus Pérez found in the Nicaean monument of Greek orthodoxy a new bulwark against Protestant attacks on the sacred image. In so doing, he incorrectly assumed that in its day the Greek council had represented a consensus view of the Church: he cited the Carolingian Council of Frankfurt (794) as if it had agreed with, rather than criticized, Nicaea II; and he was unaware of the publication in 1549 of the Libri Carolini.7 Amidst his numerous, sometimes lengthy quotations it is easy to miss that Pérez went beyond a general historical justification of sacred images to make 7 On the Council of Frankfurt, see Thomas F.X. Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), esp. 158–60, 169–80; and cf. Pérez’s text below, § 15. On the Libri Carolini, see chapter 1, 26–27 and nn. 47 and 49.

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a specific argument about their nature and proper use. In his opening paragraphs, he introduced his central contention, namely that images were indispensable for their role in aiding human memory in the service of stimulating devotion. This view, he claimed with a reference to Aristotelian faculty psychology, was consonant with the very nature of human perception and cognition. Not surprisingly, he cited Pope Gregory’s famous letter on the didactic value of images as the books of the illiterate. But in the following section Pérez went well beyond this point. In his engagement with the sources of the Byzantine iconoclasm crisis we see reflected, as if in a mirror, Pérez’s position in the controversies of his own day. Thus, the defense of religious images became a token of Catholic orthodoxy, clearly demarcated from its historic and present enemies. Images are used “to counter heretics who blaspheme the humanity of Christ” (§ 6). “[A]nyone bearing the name of Christ” will support their use lest they be seen as “sid[ing] with the Manichaeans, the Feliciani, condemned barbarians, and iconoclasts” (§§ 7 and 18), with “stubborn heretics, who always indulge their inclinations” (§ 15), and with “Saracenes” and “obtuse Jews, who stick all too much to the letter of the [Old Testament] text” and think “that by this alone they exhibit great allegiance to God” (§ 13). At the same time Pérez staked out a position within the range of Catholic opinion on the proper use of images. He was concerned that there be “no superstition or idolomania” (§§ 12, 16), insisted that no “divine honors” be offered to images (§§ 13, 17), and denounced both the belief that “anything numinous” inhered in them and the adoration of “false powers and heroes” (§ 17). Consequently, the Spanish theologian rejected visual representations of the deity (God the Father and the Holy Spirit), evidently exempting Christ because of his humanity. To a lesser degree, he also objected to images of “other spiritual things, like angels” (§ 17), while implying that the effectiveness of images derived from the “natural likeness” (§ 16) with which they rendered their subjects. In these scattered references we may see a reflection of the policy on religious images and artifacts articulated in the Augsburg Interim, as it defended Catholic tradition while guarding against any suspicions of superstition or idolatry. But Pérez’s remarks also implied positions in complex theological debates. Particularly, they signaled a sharp departure from an alternative theoretical stance on sacred images. This becomes explicit in the final section of Pérez’s discussion, an overt attack on the “scholastic,” specifically Thomist, interpretation of sacred images. The motives behind this pointed discussion remain unclear: while it is possible that Pérez simply wished to engage a leading school of interpretation, it is more likely that he responded to internal debates among Catholic theologians in the empire, perhaps even within the court of Charles V.

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The subject of this final section was the “honor” to be given sacred images. The word stands apart from several other, partly overlapping terms that formed the coinage of the image debate: veneration (veneratio), adoration (adoratio), cult or worship (cultus), along with more specialized concepts (latria, dulia, hyperdulia). Unlike these specifically theological concepts, “honor” was a social term, denoting the external expressions of respect and reverence vis-à-vis persons and the objects associated with them. In the context of sacred images, honor was expressed in act (such as touching or kissing), speech (prayer or other form of address), gesture (bowing, prostration), other ritual forms (perfuming with incense), and setting (a clean, proper, respectable location). It is significant that intra-Catholic disagreements regarding the proper way of venerating images emerged especially in the context of discussions about honor. This is true for Pérez and, as we will see, Ory and Catarino as well. Evidently, the term raised questions about how sacred objects and their use were to be understood more generally, also in a theological context. Pérez attacked scholastic theologians on one central premise – the notion that sacred images were owed the same veneration or adoration as their holy subjects. Here, the Spanish theologian explained the Thomist-Aristotelian interpretation we have already reviewed: an image and what it represented were perceived in the same cognitive process, with the caveat that ‘image’ was here understood only as a representation of something else, not a ‘thing’ considered on its own (absolute), such as a piece of wood. In other words, the movement of the soul (motus animi) directed to the image ‘qua image’ was identical to that directed to the imaginatum, or ‘imaged.’ In the language of medieval semiotics, the sign and the signified were known simultaneously, in one and the same act of perception. This theory was especially relevant for the problem of sacred images insofar as the assumption made for the cognitive aspect of sensory apprehension also applied to its affective component, that is, to the devotional engagement. Thus, veneration of the image qua image and veneration of the imaginatum were part of the same process. For Pérez this doctrine was unfounded in the evidence that mattered most to him: scripture, church tradition, along with patristic and conciliar sources. Even assuming the distinction between the image ‘qua thing’ and the image ‘qua image,’ the cognitive act by which the latter was known could never be identical to that by which the imaginatum was known. This could not be concluded from either Aristotle or Aquinas. To demonstrate the difference, Pérez used two comparisons. First, there was the relationship between father and son: resemblance between the two could be equated with the likeness of the image and its model, while the genetic connection strengthened the bond even further. Yet, for Pérez, this did not mean that the two were known in the same

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cognitive act. Second, he used an example derived from Augustine, whom he went on to quote on this point. Take a king (or emperor) and his purple gown. If the king wore the gown, the two formed one whole: any honor extended to them was identical. On its own, however, the gown might be associated with the king, but should not be revered in the same way as the person. This was the case even more for an image of the king (or emperor): not being “part and parcel” of the person, the distance between representation and represented was even greater; and, in fact, no one venerated an image of their ruler in the same way as the ruler.8 If these examples were to clarify the difference between a figurative representation and what it represented to support his position on the veneration of sacred images, it is important to note that Pérez’s attack on the scholastics had a Christological focus throughout.9 In fact, he opened his critique of the scholastics (§ 19) with a discussion of the representation of Christ – the core, as we have seen, of Thomas’s image theory. This was precisely where Pérez believed that the scholastics’ erroneous understanding of visual perception was most glaring. For if it was obvious that Christ, given his divinity, merited the highest form of adoration (latria), this was not so for an image of Christ, which should not be treated on par with its elevated subject. An image, regardless what or whom it represented, could never escape the status of an inanimate thing; only a created being endowed with reason was susceptible of veneration. Pérez proceeded to quote patristic evidence to contest the notion that images could be adored. This position, he argued, was articulated by Augustine in his interpretation of the biblical injunctions against idolatry. It was also the point of an oft-cited letter of Gregory the Great, which had emphasized the mnemonic function of images, while cautioning against idolatrous uses. Pérez did not know that the passage in question was an eighth-century interpolation, which probably reflected a Carolingian image-critical position in the iconoclasm controversy of that period.10 But it served his purpose, which was to reserve proper veneration and, especially, adoration for the holy subjects represented in sacred images, while allowing for the latter at best veneration 8 9

10

On these Augustinian analogies, see Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 29–31, 269–70. It is worth noting in this context that Augustine’s example of the royal gown was meant to clarify a Christological position: the humanity (the ‘gown’) of Christ (the ‘king’) was adored because it was united with his divinity. On its own, however, Christ’s humanity would not merit the worship of latria: neither Augustine nor the scholastics, Pérez emphasized, would have endorsed this. Pérez’s other example, the relation father-son, was regularly cited in scholastic theology and also had Christological ramifications. See Pérez’s text below, § 23 and n. 39 (Latin). On the Carolingian interpolation, see further Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians, 146–47.

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“in some fashion.” And he returned to John of Damascus and the Sixth and Seventh Councils for further confirmation. As he concluded his discussion of sacred images, Pérez brought his learned reflections back to the realities of the day. Earlier in his text, he had already stressed that while pagan custom “blindly offered divine honors to its idols, thinking that something numinous inhered in them … [w]e, however, do not attribute anything numinous to the image, nor give it divine honors, nor adore false powers or heroes through them, but true things” (§ 17). The point was evidently meant to respond to Reformed and Erasmian accusations that the cult of images amounted to idolatry. Now, echoing Augustine’s fear that the adoration of images might lead “human and carnal weakness” to idolatrous error, Pérez noted that the illiterate were nevertheless likely to conflate the image and what it represented, “as I personally learned from many uneducated folk, when I inquired what they thought of this issue” (§ 22). To many people, then, sacred images had become “a source of scandal” (§ 24). It was an even clearer reference to Germany’s religious turmoil. Hence, for Pérez, the need to teach people straightforwardly that they ought to venerate sacred images both for what they represent and because they are signs established for this purpose by their superiors. Rather than remaining stuck in [these images], they must be taught through them to lift up their entire intellect and affect to the things represented; and in the presence [of images] placed for this purpose in churches, they should adore or venerate what they represent (§ 24). Thus Pérez positioned himself cautiously – affirming Catholic tradition, distancing himself from the Thomist legacy, and avoiding the very notion of ‘adoration’ of images – in an evident attempt to help forge a path towards religious unity in the Empire.11 At the same time, his attack on Thomism appears to echo late-medieval critics who had contested Aquinas’s stance on the relation between representation and represented. It has even been suggested that the Spanish theologian in his discussion of the image of Christ “shar[ed] the same point of view as heretics like John Hus.”12 Any such suspicion, and the awareness of Pérez’s involvement in imperial religious politics, must have raised 11

12

Compare Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 468: “Es ist unverkennbar, daß Pérez diese seine Auffassung von der Bilderverehrung […] ausgebildet hat, um leichter der gegnerischen Argumentation zu entgehen”; and Scavizzi, The Controversy, 66: “The position of this theologian must have seemed so similar to that of some Protestants, it is understandable that others took up the pen to refute him.” Scavizzi, The Controversy, 66.

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eyebrows among Catholic theologians wedded to the scholastic tradition and suspicious of heterodoxy. 2

In Defense of Thomism: Matthieu Ory

Among the most prominent of these was the French inquisitor Matthieu Ory (1492–1557).13 Decades earlier this Dominican had risen to prominence in France’s religious establishment. He had received his doctorate in theology at the Sorbonne (1528), became noted for his oratorical skills as a preacher, and was appointed prior of the Parisian convent of St. Jacques, where he was also a professor. From the late 1520s, as his influence in French ecclesiastical circles grew, Ory was involved in many important theological issues. Thus he investigated the orthodoxy of the young Ignatius of Loyola and his early companions during their stay in Paris, ending up absolving them of the suspicions surrounding them and teaching them scholastic theology at St. Jacques. In the mid-1530s, Ory was named inquisitor of the French kingdom by the Dominican provincial (1534), an appointment confirmed by King Francis I two years later. In 1538, while in Rome, he testified in support of Ignatius when renewed concerns about his orthodoxy led to a fresh investigation. During the same stay, Pope Paul III named him Inquisitor General of France, as well as apostolic penitentiary. From this time, Ory maintained close connections with the Roman curia. Following his return in France, he developed a central role in religious affairs which he was to maintain until his death in 1557. Indefatigable in the suppression of heresy, he was instrumental in steering numerous high-profile inquisition cases, such as those of Etienne Dolet (1542) and Michael Servetus (1553), which earned him the fear and loathing of French Huguenots.14 At the behest of King Henry II, he traveled to Ferrara in 1544 to convince Renée de France to turn away from her sympathies for the Reformed cause. His 13 14

Henri Bernard-Maître, “L’inquisiteur dominicain Mathieu Ory et son Alexipharmacon contre les hérétiques (1544),” Revue des Sciences Religieuses 30, 3 (1956): 241–60 and Alain Tallon, “Ory, Matthieu,” DSI 2:1148–49. See the scathing poem, written at the occasion of the Dolet trial, “Contre Mathieu Ory, Inquisiteur de la foy,” c. 1542, attributed to Clément Marot, in Œuvres poétiques complètes, vol. II, ed. Gérard Defaux (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1993), 710 and notes at 1299–1301. Ory was apparently also referenced, in scatological manner, as the preacher “maistre Doribus” in an addition to the original (1531/32) edition of Rabelais’ Pantagruel, chap. XIV; however, his name was replaced by that of the deceased Guillaume Duchesne (in 1537): see François Rabelais, Pantagruel. Première publication critique sur le texte original, ed. V.L. Saulnier (Genève: Librarie Droz, 1965), 125 and cf. 201 and 246–47. See also Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 117.

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anti-heresy tract, the Alexipharmakon, appeared in Paris the same year and was republished in Venice in 1551, hence shortly before the Roman image debates we are concerned with here. It was perhaps a harbinger of Ory’s renewed engagement with the Roman curia, particularly the inner circle of Julius III. Ory’s interest in the image question is evidenced by a treatise we may call De imaginum cultu libri duo, even if it never appeared under that title. Of this work, most scholars have been familiar only with the preface (a dedication to Cardinal Marcello Cervini) and the second book, extant in one manuscript of the Vatican archives.15 But the first book survives as well, similarly in a single manuscript, owned by the Biblioteca Casanatense in Rome (Fig. 5).16 The Vatican manuscript provides unambiguous information about the date of composition, title, and authorship. Its title page reads: De cultu imaginum liber secundus a Matthaeo Doctore Parisino Ordinis Praedicatorum compositus Romae, 1552. A date added at the end of the manuscript, March 8, 1552, specifies the date of completion. The opening sentences of Book II (Fig. 6) provide further information about the background of the work. After composing a “disputation on images held here in Rome,” the author writes, a papal referendary (also archpriest of Auch) by the name of Bernardo Del Bene had given him a copy of Martín Pérez de Ayala’s De traditionibus. The reference to Del Bene offers a glimpse into Ory’s network: besides his positions as papal referendary and familiaris, the Florentine had close ties to the French Church. In July 1551 he was appointed ecclesiastical judge in Avignon and, at the end of the year, vicar general to the powerful Cardinal François de Tournon, archbishop of Toulouse, who had long been a close associate of Matthieu Ory.17 As we have seen, the book Ory received from Del Bene, Pérez’s De traditionibus, contained a pointed attack against Thomist arguments in favor of the adoration of images. Ory was clearly provoked and penned a lengthy response: it is, in fact, the entire focus of Book II. As if to justify this attack, he also wrote an impassioned preface to the volume he envisioned. Its purpose was to defend the scholastic method, while pointing out the limitations of humanism and 15 16

17

Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum liber secundus, AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 277r and 283r–305v (for more detail see below, p. 188, n. 1). Matthieu Ory, De imaginum cultu / De imaginibus liber primus, Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fols. 169r–176v (see below, p. 198, n. 10). To my knowledge, the only scholar to have examined the Casanatense manuscript is François Lecercle in his unpublished thesis, Lecercle, Le Signe et la relique; it is cited in Dekoninck, “Le double mouvement.” My requests for permission to consult Lecercle’s thesis have been unsuccessful. Bruno Katterbach, Referendarii utriusque Signaturae a Martino V ad Clementem IX et praelati Signaturae Supplicationum a Martino V ad Leonem XIII (Vatican City: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1931), 95.

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Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, beginning of Book I. Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fol. 170r Photo: Mario Setter. Reproduced by permission of the Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome

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Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, beginning of Book II. AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fol. 286r © 2021 Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

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the abuses of its practitioners. Towards the end Ory felt compelled, if not to apologize, at least to explain his open attack on a theologian and churchman of Pérez’s stature: No one should think that I want to count the bishop of Guadix among those good-for-nothings: I hear that he is otherwise a learned and true Catholic. Nevertheless I wish that he had more consideration for the scholastics, as he himself recognizes how necessary their authority and practice is. It is not for this reason, I should say, that I have sought to refute his judgment on images, but because I think that he does not seem to have understood the scholastics’ interpretation; and I have learned to my regret that he berates them undeservedly. May the reader be just and fair and consider me to be someone whose writing is motivated not by contentiousness but by the desire to investigate and defend the truth. In contrast, the Casanatense manuscript requires some analysis to justify its attribution. Written in a sixteenth-century scribal hand, the manuscript offers no direct evidence of its background, authorship, and provenance. Yet its identification as the earlier “disputation” – hence Book I of the entire work – to which Ory referred in the Vatican manuscript, can be established based on four elements. First, the disputation was originally entitled De imaginibus, and the author described his work in these terms further on (“in hoc de imaginibus libello,” § 12). This was also the way Ory referenced his older disputation in the opening sentence of Book II (“Posteaquam scripsimus disputationem de imaginibus…,” § 31). The title of the Casanatense manuscript was amended with the addition (in a different hand) of the words liber primus on the title page, obviously to distinguish it from a newly written book II. Second, both the Casanatense and Vatican manuscripts carry the identical, subsequently added number 1127 – with a dash above it – written in the same hand at the same location of the respective cover sheets (Figs. 7 and 8). The number not only demonstrates an unequivocal connection between the two texts, but points to the library to which they belonged before being separated: the numbering system (including the dash) was typical for the manuscript and book holdings of none other than Marcello Cervini, the dedicatee of the work.18 Third, there 18

The system for numbering Cervini’s library holdings was first reconstructed by Giovanni Mercati and has been confirmed by scholarship since then. For a summary see Piacentini, La biblioteca, XVIII–XXIV. It is important to note that Ory’s work is not listed in the surviving manuscript catalogues of Cervini’s collection in BAV, Vat. lat. 8185/II. Instead, it was erroneously included in one of the registers of printed books in the same manuscript, published by Piacentini (see ibid., 117, no. D 216 [401]), under the title De cultu immaginum

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Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, cover sheet of Book I. Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fol. 169r Photo: Mario Setter. Reproduced by permission of the Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome

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Matthieu Ory, De cultu imaginum, cover sheet. AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fol. 277r © 2021 Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, all rights reserved

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is one place in the Casanatense manuscript where the author clearly refers to himself, as he dismissed concerns about popular superstitions regarding sacred images: he had never heard, he said, that confessors or penitentiaries raised this issue (§ 27). This remark was consonant with the outlooks of an apostolic penitentiary like Ory, the more so since (as we shall see) he was about to author a treatise on penance. Fourth, as will also become evident, the two manuscripts show a clear continuity in content: their subject matter, arguments, and scholastic methodology suggest the same authorship. There is one remark that might at first glance raise questions about this attribution of the Casanatense manuscript. Early in book II, Ory introduced his comment on a passage of Pérez’s De traditionibus by noting that he had already considered the issue in his “first disputation.” He articulated it in the form of a scholastic query: “whether the concept (notitia) of an image qua image and of the thing signified by it are one and the same.” The Casanatense text does not discuss this issue directly and precisely in these terms. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that Ory formulated the query based on the terminology used by Pérez. Moreover, at multiple points the Casanatense manuscript refers to the problem of how the viewer’s engagement with the image and with the signified relate, even if the emphasis here is less on the cognitive process than on the act of veneration. Certainly the author assumed the Thomist-Aristotelian theory of the motus animi as the appropriate analytical tool: signs, he said for example, “take our mind directly to God, that is, in one and the same movement” (§ 18); and elsewhere he noted the connection between the cognitive and the volitional or affective faculties: “A movement of the will or desire follows an act of the intellect” (§ 20). These assumptions were precisely the basis upon which Ory constructed his entire response to Pérez. If we may thus take the attribution question as settled, the Casanatense text allows us better to understand Ory’s role in the Roman image debate. He himself explained the background, if only generically, in introducing this disputation. Amidst the contentiousness on a number of “matters concerning our [sic] lib. primus et 2.us. Piacentini tentatively but incorrectly identified this volume as Jonas of Orléans, Libri tres de cultu imaginum, published in Cologne by the heirs of Arnold Birckmann in 1554. Instead, it is almost certainly Ory’s work, given its ascertained ownership by Cervini and the title’s reference to two libri, instead of Jonas’s three. This would also explain why the shelf number 1127 does not appear in the manuscript catalog, since (as Mercati pointed out) the catalogues of print books do not include the numbers. See the next chapter, pp. 119–20, for a discussion of why and how the larger second part of Cervini’s ms. 1127 was sent to the Council of Trent (eventually to be archived among the Tridentine papers in the Vatican Archives), while the other, separated from this point, ended up in the Biblioteca Casanatense.

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faith,” he noted, major errors were made for lack of proper analysis. Hence “a true teaching system” – clearly a reference to the scholastic method – might serve to resolve disputed questions. He offered “this booklet on images” to an unnamed patron, “your most illustrious and reverend Lordship” – presumably, Cardinal Cervini – in the hope that, should it please him, Ory could proceed with “other questions that are under discussion in different places.” We know that he did. On April 10, 1552 he had completed a Tractatus de Poenitentia, also dedicated to Marcello Cervini.19 The theme was obviously of current concern, as the sacrament of penance had been debated at Trent the previous autumn. But in his preface Ory noted that, several years earlier, the pope had asked him, in his capacity as apostolic penitentiary, to record his reflections on the topic.20 Nevertheless, it was clearly his presence in Rome in 1552, and his relationship with Cervini, that prompted him to realize the idea. Meanwhile, Ory’s writings on sacred images retained the semi-complete form in which they survive today. The three texts (preface, Book I, and Book II), which we have assembled and integrated for purposes of the present edition, were apparently prepared for formal presentation if not publication in print. The manuscripts offer secretarial copies that are clean and largely devoid of corrections or additions. All three, but especially the preface and book II have typographic markers (capitalization, decorative elements, section headings, and so forth) that suggest deliberate editing and preparation for publication. However, the process was not completed, as is suggested by inconsistencies in organization, capitalization, and other elements of presentation. At this point we can only speculate about the reasons why Ory’s treatise remained unpublished. (We will return, however, to the question of its influence.) Similarly unclear are the motives that prompted Ory to write the first, and shorter, of his two disputations on the image question. Besides the prefatory words we have seen, the author did not provide any clues about the occasion. Thus the text offers a largely abstract discussion, whose purpose becomes clear as it unfolds. It was to define images, the holiness of sacred images, and their 19

20

BAV, Vat. Lat. 6170, fols. 193r–206v: R.di P. Magistri Matthaei Ory Theologiae Professoris, inquisitoris Franciae, et S.mi D.N. Poenitentiarii Tractatus de Poenitentia. The ms. is a clean copy in a professional scribal hand, dated “Romae Apr. 10” at the end, fol. 206v. The preface and dedication to Cardinal Cervini (ibid., fol. 193r–v) is dated “Romae mense Aprilis, 1552.” The formatting of the document is similar to that of the AAV manuscript of Ory’s Book II on images, but the texts are written by different hands. Ibid., fol. 193r: “Hac cogitatione excitatus non infructuosum laborem meum fore putavi, nec ab officio meo alienum, si ego in numerum poenitentiariorum sum. Pontificis iam aliquot annos cooptatus, ea mandarem litteris quae de poenitentia morali, evangelica et sacramentali sum compendiose meditatus, erroresque detegerem qui solent in hoc negocio tractando occurrere.”

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veneration, and finally, to refute Old Testament prohibitions against graven images. These four topics made up as many sections of the disputation.21 At the beginning Ory laid out his methodology for addressing them: on each question he proposed, he would provide a definition of the central concept, analyze it, and respond to erroneous views. Underlying Ory’s discussion was a semiotic understanding of images grounded in Aristotle’s logic and philosophy of perception. The image – considered only in its function of representation, not for its material, aesthetic, or other qualities – was a sign directing the mind to what or whom it represented. Thus it was an instrument of cognition. Because of its referentiality, ‘image’ was a relative, not absolute concept. For the same reason it did not constitute the substance of an object, but was merely an accidental feature. This had implications for an image considered sacred: its holiness depended entirely on the holiness of the subject it represented, hence it had no intrinsic holiness outside of the representation. It was, in other words, a holy sign, no different in this sense from a holy word or text. Accordingly, its degree of holiness was proportional to the degree of holiness of the represented. By the same logic it deserved veneration only insofar as it was sacred based on what it signified; this was true for an external image as much as an internal one. And the degree of veneration the image deserved was again proportional to the veneration owed to the represented. All three concepts (image, holiness, veneration) were thus tied together by a common theory of signs. Yet, according to Ory, this theory was the source of major misunderstandings. Critics of sacred images, he noted, confused the image as ‘thing’ with the image qua sign, and did not properly distinguish a venerated image (understood as an end point of veneration) from its venerated subject (the true terminus of worship). In brief, the problem Ory sought to correct was the conflation of idol and icon. Emerging from Ory’s analysis was thus the specter of idolatry. The critics of sacred images to whom Ory referred obliquely – he probably had Erasmians, Reformed theologians, and perhaps even some Catholic reformers in mind – had made their case especially on the basis of Old Testament prohibitions of graven images. This was the reason why Ory, in the final section of his disputation, sought to refute such arguments. The laws of the ancient Hebrews, he contended, had been superseded thanks to Christ’s death by the law of the gospels, which was based on reason and faith. Only the moral precepts of the Old Testament retained their validity, not because of their Mosaic origin, but 21

The four sections are the following: 1) “being and essence” of the image (§§ 13–15); 2) its sanctity (§§ 16–17); 3) its veneration (§§ 18–20); and 4) the Old Testament prohibition of graven images (§§ 21–29).

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their consistency with natural reason. In contrast, the ritual and legal norms of the Jewish people had once been appropriate to address their historic conditions, but had become null and void with the advent of Christianity. These included the prohibition of graven images. This was justified by the Hebrews’ inclination to idolatry, and their exposure to the paganism of neighboring peoples. But this restriction on image-making was not complete – Ory offered some examples of accepted representations in the Old Testament – in an indication that there was a legitimate use of the medium. The Christian image, then, was devoid of idolatrous dangers, given its immaterial status as sign. For Ory this meant, conversely, that Christians who continued to adhere to the Old Testament prohibition of idolatry were ‘judaizers.’ This allegation, which tapped into an anti-Semitic trope widespread in the later Middle Ages, was not uncommon in Catholic polemics against Protestants, but Ory dwelt extensively on this virulent charge.22 Almost as noteworthy as Ory’s stated arguments are the omissions in his disputation. Except for his discussion of biblical evidence, he entirely disregarded conventional arguments in defense of images – arguments reproposed, still unbeknownst to him, by Pérez de Ayala: the notion of images as the books of the illiterate, the role of the visual in fostering affective piety, and the authority of church tradition, councils, and fathers. Nor, even more notably, did this disputation broach difficult questions about how to characterize the devotional use of images: the terms adoration, latria, dulia, and honor are almost entirely absent from this text (Ory only used the word veneration), as is any discussion about whether the sacred image might be worthy of veneration as a sacred object. His silence on these points only reinforces the sense that the disputation was narrowly but precisely tailored to demonstrate the validity of the scholastic method to address the attack on images as idolatrous. Soon enough, however, Ory himself was to break this silence. The occasion for the French Dominican’s second disputation on images is as clear as that for the first remains shrouded in uncertainty. As we have seen, Ory wrote it in response to Pérez de Ayala’s discussion of sacred images in De traditionibus, specifically his explicit critique of the Thomist interpretation. That discussion touched a nerve in Ory, whose second disputation is not only much longer than the first, but also betrays an intellectual ardor, at times bordering

22

Norbert Schnitzler, “Der Vorwurf des ‘Judaisierens’ in den Bilderkontroversen des späten Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit,” in Macht und Ohnmacht der Bilder, 333–58, esp. 348–52; see also, in the same volume, the pertinent remarks by Hans Belting, “Macht und Ohnmacht der Bilder,” ibid., 28–31.

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on agitation, absent in the previous text. This also explains his broader defense of scholasticism in the preface. The second disputation was evidently written in haste: it is not devoid of repetitiveness, has a somewhat tangled structure, and appears to have been edited only slightly. At the beginning, Ory noted that two foundations upheld his argument about sacred images, namely reason and faith. In the first book he had already made the same point, which confirms the link between the two texts. In the second, it was also an organizational device: “reason” refers to the first part of the disputation, a refutation of Pérez’s critique of the scholastic justification of sacred images (§§ 32–80); and “faith” denotes the authoritative sources which Ory felt obliged to cite in support of his scholastic interpretation: scripture, councils, and church fathers (§§ 81–100). Yet the treatise has another, partly overlapping, organizing principle. This is based on the two quaestiones it addresses: the first concerns the cognitive aspect of visual perception (§§ 32–66); the second is about the adoration of images (§§ 67–100). The scholastic analysis constitutes by far the longest part of this disputation. Ory’s main reason for writing it was, after all, the desire to rebut Pérez’s attack on the scholastics. Claiming to represent the “common teaching of the scholastics” (§ 31) – a claim we must revisit – Ory used the full toolkit of medieval logic to take apart the details of Pérez’s analysis, and thus to discredit it. The focus was almost exclusively on two paragraphs (Pérez, §§ 19–20), which he quoted in extenso in his own text. Throughout, Ory’s core argument was identical to the one presented in the first disputation. Aided by the Thomist-Aristotelian theory of the motus animi, he posited the fundamental unity of the act of perceiving a sacred image – considered only in its function of image, hence as a sign – and the represented or signified. Thus the perception bypassed the ‘image qua thing.’ The reason was that the terminal object of observation, both for purposes of cognition and desire (appetitus), was the represented. The image, understood as representation, was merely a way station towards this end goal, or terminus ad quem. Put differently, it was an obiectum quo (‘object by which’), that is, a means by which observers were led to the ultimate destination, the obiectum quod (‘object-which’). This was true as much for the external, or visual, image – the image perceived by the sense of vision – as it was for the internal image or phantasm – the concept of the thing perceived which the intellect needed to perceive the represented.23 In sum, viewed in this mediat23

In the course of his discussion, Ory embeds these ideas within a larger theory of cognition. Knowledge depends on the mind’s engagement of cognitive concepts. Here, Ory uses not only the term conceptus but also and especially notitia, which he defines as “a sign that naturally represents the thing of which it is the concept” (§ 54). Knowledge is

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ing role, the image had no separate status as a thing (res) or being (ens). In Aristotelian terms, it was part of the same motus animi that encompassed the entire act of perception. Ory proceeded to challenge Pérez’s rendering of scholastic analysis. The fundamental issue was the Spaniard’s contention that knowing the image qua image and knowing the represented were two distinct instances of cognition. Ory rejected this assumption on the grounds that both shared the same intelligible species – the concept of what is being known. Thus the cognitive act was one and the same. For Ory, the crucial distinction was that between the image qua thing and the image qua image. Not only did Pérez repeatedly confuse the two, but he was also misguided in his understanding of the first element, the image qua thing. Pérez, Ory noted, suggested that ‘thing’ (res) here was the equivalent of a substance or absolute concept. But this was mistaken for two reasons: 1) ‘image’ did not refer to a substance, because the matter of which the image was made was not the ‘image,’ that is, its representational aspect; and 2) according to the theory of predicates the res could very well be something predicated about the image being a likeness, relative concept, or something else. Ory’s argument remains abstract here, but subsequent remarks suggest he thought of statements characterizing images as, for instance, bright, beautiful, or resembling their subject. Such assertibles represented the object of knowledge, and the act of knowing ended here. This observation, however, could appear to create complications of its own. Someone might object that if an image could be seen as a res (when understood, for instance, as a relative concept), this would imply that knowing the image was a different cognitive act from knowing the represented. Ory marshalled another distinction – between statements made intentionally (in actu signato) versus those made practically (in actu exercito) – to argue that in effect the mind took the objects of knowledge to be identical. Someone hearing the word ‘man’ thought of the concept ‘man,’ not the word ‘man.’ Hence the unity of cognition (and perception) was salvaged. This discussion was largely technical, but it had significant implications. As subsequent paragraphs make clear (§§ 46–47), Ory included in the notion of the image qua thing features like color, artistic quality or correspondence with the prototype, and setting or location. In other words, he excluded from the generated when a ‘habitual’ or latent concept (notitia habitualis) is activated to become ‘actual’ or ‘final’ (notitia actualis or finalis, also called verbum cordis). Ory also alludes to a further distinction relevant for the problem of images: a sign representing something present is an ‘intuitive concept’ (intuitiva notitia), one representing something absent is an ‘abstracted concept’ (notitia abstractiva). For background, see The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapters 21–22.

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concept of image ‘qua image’ – that which mattered for purposes of signification (and, as we will see, of veneration) – far more than its material substance. All that remained was its semiotic function. It was possible to consider a sign (such as an image or a word) as an object of knowledge outside its relationship with the signified, but the knowledge thus derived was ‘penultimate.’ The ‘ultimate concept’ remained the signified; and, as noted, the identification of sign and signified was normally automatic: a thing was known in the same act as its likeness or image. Pérez’s argument about the resemblance between father and son offered Ory another opportunity to clarify his position on the nature of signification and representation. That genetic relationship was not, as Pérez had claimed, on par with the relation between sign and signified. Missing in the former was the intentional act of signifying inherent in the latter. Nor, according to Ory, did this comparison help to establish Pérez’s contention that two cognitive acts were involved in knowing the father and the son, and the sign and the signified, respectively. Insofar as both pairs were considered as relative concepts, Ory argued, only one cognitive act was involved: ‘father’ necessarily implied ‘son,’ and vice versa; and the same was true for sign and signified. Moreover, Pérez’s claim that knowing the son did not mean simultaneously knowing the father was problematic for three reasons. First, if this was so, it was not on account of father-son being a relative concept, but for a different reason: the ‘representational’ relationship between the two (the father is ‘represented’ in the son), which involved two distinct cognitive acts. In sum, Ory’s opponent confused relation and representation. Second, Pérez’s expression ‘knowing the father’ implied shifting the discussion from an accidental feature (the relation father-son) to a substantial one (knowing the father). Third, Pérez also appeared to suggest that the two knowledge acts (of father and of son) were simultaneous after all. This, for Ory, not only implied a contradiction of what Pérez had claimed earlier, but also nullified his claim that there were two distinct cognitive acts in the first place. In the end, Ory concluded, the unity of the cognitive act was grounded in the unity of the object of knowledge. At first sight, this debate about the cognitive aspect of visual perception may appear to be of limited relevance for the question of image veneration. Yet Ory’s persistence in deploying the full arsenal of scholastic analysis – dialectic, propositional logic, and theories of knowledge – arose from more than his intellectual culture and professional identity. As his first disputation already showed, there was an additional reason why he strongly resisted the idea that the observation of images was to be differentiated from the apprehension of what they represented. If the sensory engagement with sacred images was distinct or dissociated from the mental apperception of the represented, this

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could blur the lines between their representational function and all other features, including their material substance. That, in turn, could validate charges of idolatry and lead to a diminished or redefined role of images in religious devotions. This concern returns in the second part of his disputation, dedicated to the adoration of images. Here the difference with Pérez becomes macroscopic. As noted earlier, the Spanish theologian had argued that, regardless of the cognitive aspect of visual perception, the distinction between image and representation was critical when it came to the veneration or adoration of religious images. There remained, quite simply, an insurmountable difference between the image as an inanimate object and the holy subject it represented. Even if the perception of the two were cognitively one unitary process, the same could not be said for the act of devotion. Ory rejected this differentiation based on scholastic faculty psychology. He categorized cult, veneration, and adoration as forms of affective engagement subject to the will. Following Aristotle, the will acted upon the knowledge produced by the sensory and cognitive faculties. In other words, volition followed intellect. If the image and imaginatum were one, so were the objects of adoration. The latter – sign and signified – were equal in holiness, hence equally deserving of honor and veneration. If the act of perception was unitary, so was the act of devotion. In contrast, if the cult were differentiated – Ory mentions the case of Christ and an image of Christ, the starting point of Pérez’s discussion – the image would be unworthy of any veneration, because images were honored only insofar as they were signs directing the faithful to the holy objects of veneration, that is, to the represented. Any different or lesser veneration would imply that the image was worshipped on other, hence illegitimate, grounds. Yet this conflicted with the premise that images were venerated only qua signs. Here, Ory suggested, the confusion between the image as sign and as thing caught up with Pérez, who had emphasized himself that an image deserved no veneration as an inanimate object. A similar confusion marred Pérez’s discussion of the king and his purple gown. Here, Ory argued, his opponent failed to distinguish between the fundamental unity of the act of veneration or adoration and its quality or intensity. In this regard, the Dominican noted, there might be differentiation, depending on whether the thing being honored was present or absent, whether it was seen directly or mediated by an image, or (in the case of God) known through the Eucharist or the Bible. But these differences simply reflected various modalities of worship. Ory’s polemic culminated in his discussion of the “honor” that was to be given sacred images. As we have seen, this term denoted the external acts of respect directed to devotional representations – a flashpoint of controversies

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regarding their legitimacy. Here, for once, Ory responded not only to Pérez but also addressed “others of similar views.” We will return to the question as to whom he may have had in mind here. His critical target was the attempt – made by Pérez, as we have seen, if not others – to downgrade the veneration of images as distinct from what they represented. For Pérez had accepted that “some kind” of veneration was warranted “in the presence” of images. This raised two questions. What kind of veneration or honor was this? And on what grounds was it extended to these artifacts? If the image ought to be honored in a different fashion than its object of representation, this suggested that something besides the signified was worthy of veneration. In that case, in other words, the veneration had two terminal objects, of which the (physical) image was one. This constituted idolatry, because images could be venerated only in reference to their holy subject. The only alternative was (here Ory reiterated his earlier argument) to consider the process as a unitary act, in which images assisted in the cognitive and devotional process, and were hence worthy of exactly the same veneration as their object of representation. In this rebuttal of Pérez, the ultimate implication of Ory’s argument becomes apparent. His semiotic analysis allowed him to salvage the notion that images could be adored unreservedly as signs – here, unlike in his first disputation, Ory emphatically employed the term ‘adoration,’ no doubt to accentuate his disagreement with Pérez. Yet his solution came at the price of ignoring all other features of sacred images, not only as material objects, but also as human artifacts having color, design, beauty, resemblance to their subjects, and so forth. In his hands, then, they became purely conceptual. This position, however, had two notable consequences. First, it meant a tacit denial of the nearontological dimension of Aquinas’s doctrine regarding images – one premised on substantial likeness – and an equally unacknowledged support for some of his late-medieval critics. Ory’s stance was grounded in a referential or symbolic understanding of images, which placed them on par with words and texts. Second, his view of images of Christ put him at odds with an ancient authority in the image controversy: the Second Council of Nicaea. Let us see how. In the long, final stretch of his second disputation, Ory turned to a discussion of scriptural, patristic, and conciliar texts, to counter Pérez’s extensive analysis of these sources and add his own. This section, which Jedin called “very inadequate and meager,” was no doubt an afterthought.24 Yet Ory’s extensive quotes from Pérez, followed by his own comments, allow the reader to compare their exegetical methods up close. Not surprisingly, Ory read the sources entirely through the lens of Thomist interpretation, and ended up 24

Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 469 (“sehr unzureichend und dürftig”).

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restating many points he had already made earlier. In some cases it is obvious that for Ory, unlike some of his contemporaries, a detached analysis of historical documents was not a priority as he prepared his treatise. Thus, he found support for his view in an observation attributed to Gregory the Great, also quoted by Pérez, without being aware that it was a later, probably scholastic interpolation not found in sixteenth-century editions of the pope’s Registrum epistolarum (§ 88).25 More significant is Ory’s reading, or misreading, of the Second Council of Nicaea. The issue at hand was the nature and legitimacy of latria in the cult of images. It will be remembered that the starting point of Pérez’s critique of the scholastics was precisely this issue – that is, the veneration to be accorded to the cross or images of Christ. For Ory the answer was simple: the unitary nature of veneration – of image and imaginatum – implied that this was latria. He had said so, briefly, earlier in his second disputation, but returned to the issue in the section devoted to authoritative sources. In this vein he interpreted several biblical passages; and he also discussed the image decree of Nicaea II, relying on a brief summary provided by Pérez, to take issue with the Spaniard’s reading. Pérez took the stipulation that “true latria … is reserved only to divine nature” to mean that the veneration of images was not latria: Nicaea II compared this veneration to “the kind [bestowed upon] the figure of the venerable cross and the holy gospels.” Ory maintained, to the contrary, that this last specification explained the semiotic function of images, implying that latria was thus extended to representations (or signs) of God, not merely to God himself. This thoroughly academic position also informed Ory’s response to concerns of popular superstitions. He acknowledged the risk: For if one adores an image as if it were God, or believing that God is similar to that image, or that there is something numinous in the image in real being, or if the shape of the image is worshipped, then the created thing is served, not the Creator, since the worship ends in the image qua thing (§ 94). However, Ory was not overly worried about the intellectual shortcomings of “the simple and uneducated,” as long as they were taught to pursue the proper devotional goal: But it is enough that they know that the image is a representation of holy things and that they are taught by these images to worship what is 25

Cf. below p. 182 n. 40, p. 183 n. 37, and pp. 270–71.

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represented by them, by transferring their understanding and affect to the things signified without remaining stuck in these images. This is the true doctrine of the Church, which we need to pass on to ordinary folks without learned disquisitions on whether the image is a quality or relation, or has the genus of the sign, and things of that sort. In this regard the scholastics and the book’s author [Pérez] largely agree (§§ 94–95). Given this agreement, it is legitimate to wonder why Ory devoted such a detailed rebuttal to Pérez’s critique of the scholastic understanding of images. His preface, addressed to Cardinal Cervini, provides some helpful background. It was a full-throated defense of scholasticism. Ory intended, first, to distinguish rhetoric from dialectic, and second, to explain the importance of dialectic (here tacitly assumed to be the equivalent of the scholastic method). He acknowledged the importance of rhetoric as the art of persuasion: it was what was needed to instruct the illiterate masses. This point was obviously in accordance with the just-cited note on which Ory’s second disputation ended. Yet in his preface Ory warned against the abuse of rhetoric, which without ‘truth’ – the truth produced by the dialectic of the schools – was bound to be empty and, worse, an instrument of manipulation of the masses in the hands of heretics. The reference was obviously to those Christian (Protestant or Catholic) humanists like Erasmus whose deceptive eloquence had swayed so many minds in Reformation Europe; similarly, Ory inveighed against the heretics who promoted direct access to the Bible for ordinary laypeople. The upshot of the ensuing harangue was clear: the French Inquisitor General saw in the scholastic method the only acceptable tool to put a halt to the resulting aberrations and re-establish orthodoxy in matters of the faith. But how was all this relevant to the debate at hand? Towards the end of the preface, Ory made a noteworthy transition to get to that point. For although one can never sufficiently pursue the heretics, since they lead so many souls into error and perdition, it is nevertheless regrettable that some who truly are and are held to be Catholics write down and publish their reflections not to defend the scholastic positions but rather to attack them. This should certainly be done even less by our own, the more aware we are now of the most brutal war declared against the scholastics by open enemies of the Church. In other words, it was this “most brutal war” waged by Protestant reformers that exacerbated Ory’s consternation about intra-Catholic dissent regarding scholastic views. The theology of the schools was the guarantor of orthodoxy.

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Ory and Calvin

If Ory’s inquisitorial mindset thus flares up in his impassioned preface, underlying the text were probably more specific concerns than a direct reading reveals. This becomes clear from a remarkable confrontation of Ory’s views with those of the most prominent mid century critic of sacred images following the death of Erasmus in 1536, namely John Calvin. Since the appearance in that same year of the first edition of his Institutes, the Genevan reformer had greatly expanded his comments on images and idolatry in subsequent editions, including the latest of 1550, along with other writings. He focused especially on the significance of the second commandment as a cornerstone of his critique of all manner of external rituals, including the cult of images.26 In 1553 the views of none other than Matthieu Ory directly challenged Calvin to respond. The circumstances are not entirely clear, but the communication occurred in the context of the quite risky exchange of letters between Calvin (as well as other Reformed leaders) and Huguenots imprisoned in Lyon – letters which in the next year made their way into the first edition of Jean Crespin’s famous martyrology.27 In early 1553, Calvin was sent a copy of a “paper” (papier) on sacred images, which ostensibly recorded Ory’s views on the matter. The inquisitor had apparently written it in response to a request: a group of Huguenots imprisoned and on trial in Lyon had asked that he explain the difference between the commandments of the Old Testament and the New Testament. There should be little doubt about the attribution to Ory: the views expressed in the papier bear a clear similarity with the arguments the inquisitor had made a year earlier in his Roman disputations. More surprisingly, according to the scribal heading, the prisoners had been given the document with the request that they forward it to Calvin. That assumes that the inquisitor was aware of, and not opposed to, their correspondence; and it would suggest that he had an apologetic or polemical intent. However this may be, the text reached Geneva, and Calvin acknowledged receipt in a letter of March 7, 1553, probably addressed to the prisoners Matthieu Dymonet, a merchant of Lyon, Denis Peloquin of Blois, and presumably also five students who, while 26

27

On the evolution of Calvin’s views of sacred images, see Scavizzi, The Controversy, 9–23. On Calvin and idolatry, see also Eire, War Against the Idols, 195–233; and Randall C. Zachmann, Image and Word in the Theology of John Calvin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 49–54, 373–77. For such correspondences, see Mark Greengrass, “Informal Networks in Sixteenth-Century French Protestantism,” in Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559–1685, ed. Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 78–97, esp. 82.

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travelling from Lausanne, had been arrested in Lyon.28 The letter began with the sad acknowledgement of the news that the prisoners (or some of them) had been sentenced to death “by the enemies of the truth.” Calvin also referred to an intermediary who had recently visited him, at which time he had written letters on their behalf (“telle forme de lettres qu’il me sembloit estre expedient d’escrire”). He further noted: I have received a certain paper containing some quite subtle arguments by this miserable beast Ory, to prove that it is licit to make idols. I do not know if you have sent it to me, and whether you are expecting my response. I have not wanted to touch it, because I was in doubt about that, and in fact I believe that you do not have great need for it on your part. But if you wish, you will have a response forthwith.29

28

29

On the case of the Lausanne students, see Rudolf Schwarz, Die hugenottischen Märtyrer von Lyon und Johannes Calvin (Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1913); Gonzague Truc, “Calvin et les cinq prisonniers de Lyon,” Revue des études historiques 26 (1920): 43–54; Mirjam G.K. van Veen, “‘… les sainctz Martyrs …’ Die Korrespondenz Calvins mit fünf Studenten aus Lausanne über das Martyrium (1552),” in Calvin im Kontext der Schweizer Reformation. Historische und theologische Beiträge zur Calvinforschung, ed. Peter Opitz (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2003), 127–45 (including a brief reference to Calvin’s text on images, but without mention of Ory’s, at 131); Karine Crousaz, L’Académie de Lausanne entre humanisme et Réforme (ca. 1537–1560) (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012), 290–96. It is not entirely clear who the addressees of the letter were: Bonnet suggested (Lettres de Jean Calvin, ed. Jules Bonnet, Lettres françaises [Paris: Ch. Meyrueis et Comp., 1854], 1:371–72n) that they were the Lausanne students, the editors of the Calvini Opera argued that Dymonet and Peloquin were the primary addressees (Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, Corpus Reformatorum 42, vol. 14 [Brunsvigae: Apud C.A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1875], Thesaurus Epistolicus Calvinianus, ed. Eduardus Cunitz and Eduardus Reuss, 5:490–91n). Van Veen assumes without discussion that Calvin addressed the Lausanne prisoners. It is possible that the reformer wrote the letter to all Huguenot prisoners in Lyon. Calvini Opera, vol. 14, Thesaurus Epistolicus Calvinianus, no. 1708, 5:490–92, at 492: “Iai receu un certain papier contenant des argumens bien subtils de ceste malheureuse beste Orry, pour prouver quil est licite de faire des idoles. Ie ne sai si vous le mavez envoye, et si vous entendez que iy face response. Ie ny ai point voulu toucher, pource que ien estois en doubte, et de fait ie croi que vous nen avez pas grand besoin de vostre coste. Mais si vous le desirez, vous en aurez response par le premier.” On Dymonet, see ibid., col. 467n; on Peloquin, ibid., 491n. The edition of this letter (already published in Bonnet’s edition of Calvin’s letters) is based on Jean Crespin, Histoire des martyrs persecutez et mis à mort pour la verité de l’Evangile, depuis le temps des Apostres iusques à present (s.l. [Geneva], s.e. [Jean Vignon?], 1608), Livre 4, fol. 247v, where it has the following heading: “Autre Epistre par M. Iean Calvin aux susdits prisonniers detenus pour la parole de Dieu à Lyon.” This heading is similar to that of the document by Ory received by Calvin; see below, p. 282.

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It is unclear whether the prisoners replied to this letter, but Calvin did write a response, which is published in the present volume, along with Ory’s “paper.” It is a remarkable set of documents. On the one hand, we have a detailed exposé on a specific doctrinal issue by the inquisitor, Matthieu Ory, who apparently led the heresy proceedings against the suspects in question – an exposé perhaps written at their request, and certainly forwarded to the foremost theological authority of the Church to which they professed to belong. On the other hand, we have the rebuttal of this authority, namely Calvin, evidently written to aid the prisoners in their defense against charges of heresy. If they received it, it was to no avail: all prisoners were executed later that year. Yet Jean Crespin’s Actes des martyrs, which was the first to publish Calvin’s letter, demonstrates that this exchange was not exceptional. In fact, there was a regular correspondence between Geneva and the prisoners of Lyon in this period, and at times Calvin or his associates provided information on precise doctrinal issues.30 As for Dymonet, he was instructed to “answer the enemies with reverence and modesty, according to the measure of faith God will give you. I say this because it is not given to all to debate, just as the martyrs were not great clerics, nor subtle [enough] to enter into deep disputations. Thus, be humble under the guidance of God’s spirit and answer soberly according to your knowledge, following the rule of scripture [Ps. 115:10; 2 Cor. 4:13]): I believed, therefore I will speak.”31 It is unclear whether Dymonet received Calvin’s instruction in time for his interrogations in late January 1553. But within a year Crespin included Dymonet’s own account of his treatment and experiences in the first edition of his martyrology, published in 1554. Dymonet started with a report of his arrest on January 9, 1553: questioned on that occasion, he rejected the invocation of the saints, purgatory, and sacramental confession. The following day, Thursday, January 10, 1553, Dymonet was interrogated more extensively by 30

31

See Calvin’s responses to several theological questions in his letter of June 10, 1552 to the imprisoned students of Lausanne (Bonnet, Lettres françaises, 340–45; Calvini Opera, vol. 14, Thesaurus Epistolicus Calvinianus, no. 1631, 5:331–34); and Pierre Viret’s instructions to the prisoners about baptism, cited in Van Veen, “Korrespondenz,” 131. Postscript of Calvin’s first letter to Dymonet, dated January 10, 1553, Calvini Opera, vol. 14, Thesaurus Epistolicus Calvinianus, no. 1699, 466–69, at 469 (and Bonnet, Lettres françaises, 367–71, at 371): “Iavoi oublie un poinct, cest que vous respondiez aux ennemis avec reverence et modestie, selon la mesure de foi que Dieu vous donnera. Ie di ceci pource quil nest pas donne a tous de disputer, comme aussi les Martyrs nont pas este grands clercs, ne subtils, pour entrer en disputes profondes. Ainsi en vous humiliant sous la conduite de l’Esprit de Dieu, respondez sobrement, selon vostre conoissance, suyvant la reigle de l’Escriture: Iay creu, pourtant ie parlerai.” As the Calvini Opera editors note, the dating of the letter is problematic, since Dymonet was arrested on January 9.

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Inquisitor Ory and other officials. The suspect immediately stated that he did not recognize them as his judges. Even when “urged by the aforementioned Ory, who said that he was appointed inquisitor by the king and the pope, I told him repeatedly: I do not know you, and I have nothing to do with you. But he pressured me harder under pain of excommunication.” In the following weeks, then, Dymonet ended up being questioned repeatedly about the full range of his religious convictions. This included his views about sacred images. Asked “whether images installed to induce [the faithful] to pray to God and the saints are evil,” he answered: God has forbidden them expressly, saying: You shall not make a graven image, nor any likeness of things, etc. The entire scripture is full of similar prohibitions, and also of those who have been reproached and severely punished because of images and idolatry. St. John says: “Children, keep yourselves from images” [1 John 5:21]. And St. Paul: “Those have been filled with darkness who, believing they were sages, have become mad and have changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of images of a corruptible man, of birds, and beasts” [Rom. 1:21–23].32 This reply prompted the question, “who taught and explained these things to me, what company I have kept, and whether I have been in Geneva, among other things.” Dymonet responded as follows: I have learned them in the school of him who says, “Search the scriptures, for those give testimony of me” [John 5:39]. Men, however, forbid their being read, but it is more important to obey God than men. I have never been in Geneva and have not kept any company where I have learned

32

Jean Crespin, Le livre des martyrs (s.l. [Geneva], s.e. [Jean Crespin], 1554), 582 (due to a printing error, the following is supplemented, from the page break onwards, by the later edition entitled Actes des martyrs deduits en sept livres depuis le temps de Wiclef et de Hus iusques à present [s.l.: Crespin, 1564–65], 435): “Demande, Si les images qui sont mises pour induire a prier Dieu et les saincts sont mauvaises. Response, Dieu les a deffendues expressement, disant, Tu ne te feras image taillée, ne semblance aucune des choses, etc. Et aussi toute l’Escriture est plaine de semblables deffenses, et aussi de ceuz qui on esté reprins et grievement punis à cause des images et de l’idolatrie. S. Iean dit, Enfans, gardezvous des images. Et S. Paul, Ceux on esté remplis de tenebres, lesquels cuidans estre sages, sont devenus fols, et ont mué la gloire de Dieu incorruptible, en la semblance d’image d’homme corruptible, d’oiseaux et de bestes.”

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these [doctrines], but it is [by] the grace of God, by his Son Jesus Christ, and his Holy Spirit.33 Dymonet was surely disingenuous here, as he recycled Reformed stock replies to the question about the legitimacy of sacred images: the Bible passages he quoted recurred in Calvin’s own response to Ory later that spring. What is more, very similar remarks were made by Dymonet’s fellow-prisoners Denis Peloquin, Pierre Navihères, and Charles Fauré.34 And they were hardly the first to do so: two years earlier, to name but one example, a certain Claude Monier noted, when questioned, “that because we are by nature so inclined to idolatry, and we entertain ourselves and are attracted more by what we see than by what we do not see, such images have no place among Christians”: adoration was due only to the invisible, “that is, one God only, who is spirit.”35 For our purposes, the testimonies of the Lyon prisoners are valuable for several reasons. On the one hand, they document changing attitudes in Reformed circles in France regarding the cult of the saints and images, which laid the 33

34

35

Crespin, Actes des martyrs (ed. 1564–65), 435: “D[emande], Qui m’avoit enseigné et apprins ces choses, et quelles compagnies i’avoye suyuies, et si i’avoye esté à Geneve, et autres choses. R[eponse], Ie les ay apprinses à l’escole de celuy qui dit, Cherchez les Escritures, car ce sont celles qui rendent tesmoignage de moy. Et cependant les hommes defendent de les lire, mais il vaut mieux obeir à Dieu qu’aux hommes. Ie ne fu iamais à Geneve, et n’ay suyvi nulles compagnies où ie les aye apprinses, mais c’est la grace de Dieu, par son Fils Iesus Christ, en son S. Esprit.” Crespin, Le livre des martyrs, 421: Fauré remarked in May 1553: “Tout ainsi que nostre Seigneur est d’une essence spirituelle, aussi veut-il estre adoré en esprit et verité … Pource il ne faut point adorer Dieu en choses materielles, corruptibles et caduques, comme en or ou en argent, ou en autres choses precieuses. Ny aussi Dieu ne veut point estre representé ny servi aucunnement par images taillées, qui se corrompent avec le temps, et sont mangées des vers….” Ibid., 475: Navihères, May 1553: “Ie croy pareillement que puis que Dieu est esprit immortel et invisible, qu’il ne peut et ne doit estre representé par chose corruptible: ains doit estre adoré en esprit et verité. Parquoy, qui les veut representer par image, et en icelle le servir, fait contre les commandemens…” (with further references to the epistles of Paul and John, as well as Augustine’s City of God). Ibid., 512: Peloquin, arrested in October 1552, testified: “Quant à leur faire images, ie leur ay dict que c’est une superstition damnable que cela, laquelle est grandement condamnée de Dieu, comme il appert au 2. commandement de la loy …” Ibid., 293: “Interrogué s’il failloit avoir des images: Ie respon que pource que de nostre nature nous sommes si enclins à idolatrie, et que nous nous amusons et arrestons plus à ce que nous voyons, qu’à ce que nous ne voyons point, telles images n’ont point de lieu entre les Chrestiens. Car aussi vous savez bien, mes freres, qu’il faut adorer ce qu’on ne voit point: à savoir un seul Dieu, qui est esprit.” For an earlier example, see the case of the former Dominican Pierre Brully, an associate of Calvin in Strassbourg, executed in Tournai in 1545, ibid., 194–95.

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groundwork for the iconoclastic outbursts of the following decade and, indirectly, to Catholic efforts to suppress them. On the other hand, the prisoners clarify the background not only of Matthieu Ory’s exchange with Calvin, but also of the theological positions the French Inquisitor General defended in his disputations presented to fellow-Catholic leaders in Rome a year earlier. Speaking in both instances was a leading prosecutor on the front lines of the battle against heresy, who was well aware of the growing threat of Calvinism in the matter of images. His insistence on Thomist orthodoxy is thus not a surprise. A comparison between Ory’s near-contemporary texts further elucidates the connection between image theory and religious-political context. His papier reviewed by Calvin did not explain his scholastic interpretation of images in any detail, but the basic principle was certainly there: religious images were signs, which were equally valuable as texts in signifying what they represented; and they were sacred not for being holy in “real being,” but only in “significant being.” Yet the emphasis was clearly elsewhere: on the Old Testament prohibitions of graven images. Here, Ory was likely reflecting both what he heard from Huguenot suspects in France and what he could have read in Calvin’s commentary on the second commandment in the Institutes (a commentary, as noted, which had been growing with every new edition). Ory’s argument, then, was straightforward: the Old Testament rules against idolatry had been abrogated by the coming of Christ. He made this case in the same manner as he had done in his second disputation: of Old Testament norms, only moral laws and those conforming with reason, not ritual laws, remained in force in the New Testament. Protestants who judged otherwise were ‘judaizers.’ The continuity between Ory’s texts is thus undeniable, even if we account for the different audiences – one internal, the other external. The main difference is that he did not engage Calvin in discussion on the finer points of Thomist theology. 4

How to Honor Images: Ambrogio Catarino

The direct target of Ory’s scholastic critique in his second Roman disputation was, as we have seen, the imperial theologian Martín Pérez de Ayala, who was identified and half-apologetically addressed at the end of the work’s preface. The point was that, faced with the heretical onslaught, Catholics should refrain from sowing division among themselves – as Ory put it, among “our own.” Clearly, he referred here to others besides the Spanish prelate. It will be recalled that, in his discussion of the honor to be extended to images, Ory responded not only to Pérez but also addressed “others of similar views.” These

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almost certainly included his fellow-Dominican Ambrogio Catarino Politi. Indeed, during the same months the latter, residing in Rome, penned his own disputation on sacred images, and no doubt shared his views in papal circles. Catarino’s stated goal was precisely to resolve existing disagreements among Catholic theologians, and his text explains some of them. The Sienese polemicist went on to articulate a distinctive view of the way in which images were to be honored, which may have been a source of Ory’s objections. Catarino’s disputation is doubtless the best known of the documents discussed in these pages, particularly among art historians. On their part, scholars of Italian religious heterodoxy have long recognized the author as a key player in Italian church affairs around the middle of the sixteenth century. Yet there remain multiple areas of his activities that have remained obscure until recently. Particularly his role in the papal curia in the late 1540s and early 1550s is relevant to gain a better understanding of his treatise on images. The Sienese Dominican, whose name in the world was Lancillotto Politi (1484–1553), is best known as an early and persistent anti-Protestant polemicist.36 Originally trained as a jurist, he was among the first to pen a defense of the Catholic faith against Martin Luther, the Apologia pro veritate catholica (1520). But it was especially after a lengthy stay in France (1534–37) that he moved the battle against heresy to the center of his activities. The emergence of several well-connected groups of reform-minded Catholics provided the occasion: thus, Catarino developed close relations with Vittoria Colonna, in whose orbit powerful figures like Reginald Pole discussed church reform, and he frequented the Neapolitan circle of spirituali close to the Spanish mystic Juan Valdés. In the early 1540s Catarino’s oppositional stance led to a number of apologetic works targeting key themes of Protestant teaching, such as justification and grace. He left his mark especially with a refutation of the cryptoCalvinist Beneficio di Cristo in a tract entitled Compendio d’errori et inganni luterani (1544), along with denunciations of the former Franciscan preacher, and religious exile, Bernardino Ochino. Catarino’s sharp mind, eloquent pen, and combative spirit are all on display in his disputation on sacred images. Another aspect, as we will see, is equally evident here, namely his detachment from the theological orthodoxies of the Order of Preachers, especially the Thomist tradition. From his early days as a friar, Catarino, who had embraced the religious life following a legal career and received only limited theological instruction, did not hesitate to contest 36

Josef Schweizer, Ambrosius Catharinus Politus (1484–1553). Sein Leben und seine Schriften (Munster: Aschendorff, 1910); Caravale, Sulle tracce dell’eresia (trans. Beyond the Inquisition).

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the ideas of a leading Dominican theologian like Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, or to criticize his order’s policy against the celebration of the immaculate birth of the Virgin Mary, a devotion to which Catarino was much attached. In the 1540s, his theological positions even led to accusations of heresy from an influential figure like the Master of the Sacred Palace, Bartolommeo Spini, and the prominent Spanish theologian and fellow-Dominican, Domingo de Soto. Such attacks did not stop Catarino’s rise to prominence in the Catholic establishment. He was named papal theologian to participate in the first period of the Council of Trent (where, not surprisingly, he clashed with Soto); and with the support of the papal legates, Marcello Cervini and Giovanni Maria Del Monte, he was named bishop of Minori in 1546, a promotion followed in 1552 by the appointment to the archbishopric of Conza. At that time – hence when he wrote his disputation on sacred images – he was clearly at the height of his influence, after his patron Cardinal Del Monte, whom he had known from his early years in Siena, had ascended the papal throne in early 1550. During the same years Catarino took on another, much less public role, which has come to light only in recent scholarship. Over the course of the decade, as we have noted, the newly founded Holy Office of the Roman Inquisition (1542) developed ever more aggressive strategies to contain the spreading of heterodox ideas in Italy, particularly within the church hierarchy and among influential members of the religious orders. Catarino, in contrast, preferred a different approach: he turned to persuasion to induce key suspects of heresy to return to the Catholic fold. He apparently did so in collaboration with members of the Jesuit order, particularly Alfonso Salmerón. Catarino knew Salmerón, as well as Ignatius and other early companions of the fledgling order, from his time in France in the 1530s. Thus Catarino may have been involved in efforts to get the exile Ochino to reconsider his departure from Catholic orthodoxy, and he certainly helped engineer the ‘conversion’ of the Bolognese heretic Giovan Battista Scotti in 1547. Early in the pontificate of Julius III, this alternative strategy of countering the heresy crisis received a critical endorsement when the new pope extended rights of absolution from heresy to the Jesuits. It remains unclear whether Catarino obtained any formal privileges to support his effort, but at that time, when he had taken up residence in the Vatican, his role behind the scenes appears undisputed. Thus he was engaged at the highest levels of the curia, and in close rapport with Julius III, in efforts to address the heresy crisis.37

37

Lo Re, “Ambrogio Catarino Politi”; Caravale, “Ambrogio Catarino Politi e i primi gesuiti”; idem, Sulle tracce dell’eresia, 273–81; and see chapter 1, p. 21.

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Catarino’s publications of these years provide further glimpses of this role. Between late 1551 and early 1552 the papal publisher Antonio Blado printed a varied set of his writings, bundled with a commentary on Genesis, the Enarrationes … in quinque priora capita libri Geneseos (1552).38 Some of these twenty-two documents, the publisher pointed out in an editorial note, were rushed to press in November 1551 due to their being “mature” and immediately relevant. The pope himself had made the selection and pressed for this publication schedule, as he intended these works to be sent to Trent (as in fact they were, the printer noted) for consideration during the conciliar deliberations taking place that fall.39 Explicitly addressed to the council fathers, these texts examined the problems of grace, predestination, and the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary (an enduring concern of the author). The second batch of texts was printed in April of the following year, right around the time when the Council was dismissed again. The first of these writings was Catarino’s disputation on sacred images; others discussed a range of issues concerning baptism, penance and the Eucharist, matrimony, and the censorship of books. This complex publication history suggests that Catarino’s disputation on images was not finished, or even written, by late 1551. Instead, it points to a completion by the following April.40 This chronological element helps establish the relation between this work and Ory’s two books on sacred images (a problem to which we shall return shortly). The sequential printing of Catarino’s book also furthers our understanding of the dedication to Julius III, which 38 39

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Enarrationes R.P.F. Ambrosii Catharini Politi Senensis Archiepiscopi Compsani in quinque priora capita libri Geneseos. Adduntur plerique alii tractatus et quaestiones rerum variarum … (Romae: Apud Antonium Bladum Camerae Apostolicae typographum, 1552). Catarino, Enarrationes, 403–04: in a note to the reader, the typographus points out that Catarino was identified on the title page as the Archbishop of Conza, but in several of the treatises collected in the work as Bishop of Minori. The explanation lies in the staggered publication schedule. The pope appointed Catarino to the Conza see “before the entire editing of the volume had been completed” (“ante absolutam tomi integram editionem”). The appointment took place on June 3, 1552. At that time, all the texts had been printed (as noted, in November 1551 and April 1552), except for the title page and Catarino’s dedication of the entire work to the pope (which he signed as Archbishop of Conza), the dedication of the Enarrationes, and the index of the latter work. The note described the pope’s role in the publication schedule as follows: “But he [Julius III] advised that those [works] be edited first which were mature enough to be sent to the Holy Tridentine Council, as in fact was done” (“Sed consilium eius fuit, ut ea prius ederentur quae mature possent ad S. Synodum Tridentinam transmitti, quemadmodum et factum est”). This hypothesis would be strengthened by the possibility that Catarino cited the Second Council of Nicaea, as he did repeatedly, in Longolius’s Latin version included in Petrus Crabbe’s edition of ecumenical councils, which appeared in Cologne in 1551 (CCOS), rather than the original 1540 edition of that translation (CNL). See below, p. 340 nn. 27 and 29.

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Catarino wrote for the entire volume at a time when he had been promoted to archbishop of Conza, hence after June 3, 1552. He opened his letter to the pontiff by condemning the Protestant movement for opening a Pandora’s box of conflicting viewpoints. It was the premise for a call on all Catholics to adhere to a solid theology grounded in church tradition. But Catarino also noted the presence of dissent in the Catholic ranks, clearly hinting at his personal experiences: he claimed to publish his book at the insistence of friends, yet he also expected malevolent critics to stand up and oppose his views. “A good part of his work,” he confirmed, had been sent to the Council of Trent for review, but this had not been completed. It was a clear reference to the closure of the proceedings in late April of that year. This, Catarino argued, put the onus on the pontiff to take the reform movement in hand. Here he evidently spoke of the major reform initiatives Julius III had announced earlier in his pontificate, but which had yet to get off the ground. Catarino characterized that effort as follows: “You set yourself a difficult and arduous task, that is, to remove the innumerable abuses from the Church and restore her handsome and beautiful face.” He laced this reminder with stern warnings. Before correcting and punishing others (an obvious reference to the fight against heresy) the pope should first put his own house in order and remove the beam from his own eye [Matt. 7:5], since “the just is the first accuser of himself” [Prov. 18:17].41 The dedication is revealing for Catarino’s perspective on this critical moment in church affairs. Not only did he register his concern about papal weakness at a time when decisive action was of paramount importance, but he also hinted at the deep disagreements within the Roman curia on how to move forward. This was, as noted, the time when the Holy Office, under Cardinal Carafa’s leadership, moved aggressively to set the course of the Counter-Reformation Church, close the door on any reconciliation efforts, and settle the accounts against reform-minded members of the hierarchy; at the same time, a fledgling counter-movement explored different options for the curia to deal with the heresy crisis. This included, as Catarino here told the pope, the effort to address the ‘abuses’ in his own house – an issue whose correction the papacy had long been reluctant to entrust to a church council, but which clearly, in Catarino’s view, required a resolution. His introduction to the Enarrationes also sheds light on the agenda underpinning the writings published here. Some of these were expressly meant to 41

“Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Domino Iulio Tertio Pontifici Maximo Fr. Ambrosius Catharinus Politus Archiepiscopus Compsanus felicitatem,” in Catarino, Enarrationes, fols. *ii-r–*iii-v, at *iii-v: “Rem, fateor, difficilem et arduam tibi proponis, innumeros scilicet ab Ecclesia auferre abusus, et suam illi pulchram ac speciosam faciem restituere.”

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inform the proceedings at Trent, but all could now, following the council’s indefinite suspension, serve the pope’s reform efforts. This has clear implications for Catarino’s disputation on sacred images. When he wrote the text – probably in early 1552, as we have seen – its premise was the need to resolve internal theological disagreements about the way in which images should be venerated. He did not make explicit whose views he had in mind, or how he learned about them. Yet there is a good case to be made that Catarino responded to Ory’s Roman disputations on the subject, particularly the French inquisitor’s diatribe against the compromise formula developed by Pérez de Ayala. Ory’s combative stance almost certainly made waves in Rome’s curial circles and may have generated further debate. It is hard to imagine, then, that a Vatican insider like Catarino was unaware of it; his disputation likely came in response to it. Conversely, assuming that Catarino shared his own opinions orally in curia circles before entrusting them to the written page, it is equally plausible that the French inquisitor was aware of Catarino’s somewhat contrarian positions when he penned his own. Be that as it may, Catarino’s work went beyond doctrinal debates to articulate a clear reform agenda. His largely theological tract culminated in a substantial section describing, amidst outbursts of indignation, the abuses that tainted the cult of images and prescribing countermeasures. It is uncertain whether he envisioned his counsel to be taken up at Trent at some future time, but by including it in the Enarrationes the Sienese Dominican signaled his wish that it shape the papal reform efforts. In this sense Catarino’s work differed significantly from the interventions of both Pérez and Ory. As we have seen, the imperial theologian intended to justify the veneration of saints in terms that were firm but moderate enough to be palatable in the political context of the Holy Roman Empire; the French inquisitor attacked the theological foundation of this formula. But neither discussed abuses at any length; much less did they offer solutions. Instead, they focused on the question as to how to respond to the heretics’ theological critique. In this regard, they had more in common with an earlier polemic in which Catarino had examined sacred images as part of a defense of the cult of the saints. As the title indicates, these Disputations and Assertions on the Certain Glory, Invocation, and Veneration of the Saints against the Impious, published in 1542 in a miscellaneous collection, had a plainly anti-heretical objective.42 The origins 42

Ambrogio Catarino Politi, De certa gloria, invocatione ac veneratione sanctorum disputationes atque assertiones catholicae adversus impios, in idem, Opuscula … magna ex parte iam aedita, et ab eodem recognita ac repurgata … (Lugduni: apud Matiam Bonhomme, 1542). For a summary of the arguments made here, see Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra,

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of the text probably go back to the end of the previous decade, when Catarino had resumed his religious polemics even while he frequented prominent circles of Italian heterodoxy.43 In those years the cult of the saints was a central theme of religious controversy, on par with justification, predestination, penance, and the Eucharist.44 Yet, whereas in these last areas the major doctrinal challenges had come from Luther, Zwingli, and other early Protestants, it was Erasmus who had done the most to question the central role of the saints in the late-medieval devotional economy, contributing to an anti-materialist animus that had inspired outbursts of iconoclasm in Wittenberg, Basel, and elsewhere.45 Thus Erasmus, whose death in 1536 was still recent when Catarino wrote his diatribe, was his main target. He explicitly cited the Dutch humanist’s De modo orandi [Deum] (1524) and two more recent works, De amabili ecclesiae concordia and the Explanatio symboli apostolorum, both of 1533. Here, as elsewhere, the humanist had disparaged many devotions connected to the cult of the saints on two grounds: on the one hand, as lacking in scriptural or other authoritative foundation; on the other, as materialist and superstitious, and hence contravening Old Testament prohibitions of idolatry and the New Testament injunction to worship “in spirit and truth” (John 4:24). Catarino sought to refute these arguments systematically. Concerning the doctrinal basis for the cult of the saints, he emphasized both scriptural support and the unerring authority of the Church to proclaim saints, privileging the latter over the often disputable evidence of miracles and saints’ lives. Like other Catholic

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186–93. On the circumstances in which Catarino wrote the text, see Caravale, Sulle tracce, 110–11. That the text was at least several years old is suggested by Catarino’s remark that it had languished for some time when his patron in Lyon, the Florentine Card. Niccolò Gaddi, insisted that he publish it. Gaddi, he noted in his dedication of the Opuscula to the cardinal, “ad hoc me impulit ut quae de certa sanctorum gloria et debito illis cultu iam olim scripsi et latitabant, nunc tandem in lucem aederem” (Catarino, De certa gloria, 2). In the early years of the Reformation, Catholic apologists had defended the cult of the saints in works like Kaspar Schatzgeyer, De cultu et veneratione sanctorum ([Augsburg], [Sigmund Grimm], 1522–23); idem, De sanctorum imploratione et eorum suffragiis scriptum (s.l.: Ex Monaco, 1524 and Tubingae: U. Morhart, 1527); and Josse Clichtove, De veneratione sanctorum opusculum (Parisiis: Ex officina Simonis Colinaei, 1523). Around 1540, the theme re-emerged, no doubt in response to Erasmus’s later work, perhaps also due to the rising challenge of Calvinism. See, e.g., Guillaume Pépin, De sanctorum imitatione (s.l.: s.e., 1541); Albertus Pighius, Controversiarum praecipuarum in comitiis Ratisponensibus tractatarum (Coloniae: Ex officina Melchioris Novesiani, 1542); Johannes Cochlaeus, De sanctorum invocatione (Ingolstadtii: Ex officina Alexandri Vueissenhorn, 1544); and Antonius Solaerius, Opusculum de veneratione et invocatione sanctorum … aeditum in Desiderium Erasmum Roterodamum (Parisiis: Apud Ioannem André, 1548). Eire, War against the Idols.

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apologists, he also disputed the applicability of the Old Testament commandment forbidding graven images. For Catarino (as later for Ory), Christ’s birth had superseded that prohibition: it was the incarnation that allowed the holy to be represented. This could take multiple forms, including the cross and images of Christ and his “friends,” the saints. Here, too, church authority mattered: whereas the adoration of the Hebrews was “private,” the veneration of images of Christ and the saints patently belonged to public worship. Going beyond his defensive arguments, Catarino also insisted on the affective power of images and hence their devotional utility. Images, he argued, were devices of mediation, which employed the sensory faculties to unlock the mind’s engagement with the Christian drama unfolding in scripture and the saints’ stories; hence they allowed the faithful to ascend to the invisible world of the spirit. That Catarino may have been influenced here by the Spiritual Exercises, as has been suggested, is possible, given his acquaintance with Ignatius and his companions, but remains hypothetical at this point.46 When Catarino returned, ten years later, to the more specific question of sacred images, his position was in important ways continuous with his more succinct defense in the 1542 treatise; he even recycled particular points, such as the significance of Christ’s incarnation. More broadly, he supported his position with the authority of church fathers and councils rather than scholastic argument. This was in line with a polemical stance that had already brought him in conflict with Soto during the Council of Trent. There, during the debates about justification in the summer of 1546, he said that it was better to follow the fathers than the scholastics, if the two disagreed, and that we must proceed on the basis of the scriptures, from which true theology is derived, and not the cleverness of philosophy from which the schools have proceeded. He himself had been of the latter view but, having studied the scriptures and the fathers, he had found the truth.47 In his 1552 disputation, this position underpinned two notable developments vis-à-vis Catarino’s earlier text on the cult of the saints. First, he considerably expanded his discussion of historical sources, particularly the Second Council of Nicaea. In this regard, he participated in the recent upsurge in scholarly engagement with the Greek church tradition, in northern Europe as well as 46 47

Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra, 192. Paolo Sarpi, Istoria del Concilio tridentino, ed. Corrado Vivanti, 2 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), 1:331.

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among Italian scholars in Cervini’s entourage. As far as Nicaea II was concerned, he relied like his contemporaries on the Longolius translation first published in 1540. There is some evidence to suggest that he actually consulted the recent reprint of this text in the second volume of Petrus Crabbe’s monumental edition of church councils (1551). From this edition Catarino cited extensive passages to support his refutation of Thomist arguments about the adoration of images. For example, extending latria to images was rejected “multiple times in the bishops’ responses during the Seventh Council and most evidently in its decree.” Catarino went on to suggest – in a hypothesis confirmed by modern scholars – that the conciliar text “did not make it into the hands of St. Thomas [Aquinas]. For if it had, he would not have transmitted that doctrine to us, or he would at least have mentioned the holy council and somehow have reconciled its doctrine with his own.” The observation is noteworthy for several reasons. Reflecting the new historical mindset, Catarino challenged Aquinas not merely on his intellectual merits – a point to which we will return – but on his sources. Moreover, he signaled a strategic choice in the image dispute that was to reverberate, a decade later, in the chambers of the Council of Trent – the choice, that is, to rely on established (or rediscovered) church legislation rather than resolving the image question based on scholastic methodology. More immediately, Catarino’s remark implied a rebuke to Ory, who had premised his defense of sacred images precisely on the vindication of scholasticism. In fact, the critique of scholasticism, specifically of Thomism, constituted the core of the Disputatio; this was the second area in which Catarino expanded his earlier defense of the cult of the saints. In this disputation, he noted in its opening sentence, he staked out his position in an internal Catholic dispute. The circumstances in which he wrote his tract allow us to discern behind this generic allusion the interventions of Ory and, less directly, Pérez. As we will see, the arguments of both men can be recognized without too much difficulty in Catarino’s discussion. More generally, the Disputatio may be used as a guide to the debates taking place in Rome at the time: a central section of the work was devoted to a refutation of common arguments to account for the function of images.48 The bulk of these criticisms attacked the Thomist interpretation of sacred images through the neo-Aristotelian lens of motus animi. Catarino worked his way through several versions of this argument, to reject them all with a crescendo of dismissiveness and indignation. His starting point was the same as Ory’s, namely the question as to whether images of Christ should be venerated with latria. Pérez’s critique of the scholastics, as may be recalled, began in fact 48

See §§ 18–26 of Catarino’s text.

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with this point, and so did Ory’s refutation. In turn, Catarino, without naming Ory, described the latter’s argument in a nutshell: materials such as wood or bronze could never be venerated, since veneration was limited to created things endowed with reason; yet considered as image, the representation could and should be adored. Here Catarino mentioned the cross as an example, as Ory had done as well. Catarino then summarized, again in the terms used by the French Dominican, the Thomist view that emphasized the fundamental unity of the acts of perception and veneration, thus permitting the adoration of images while sidelining concerns about their materiality. Yet, according to Catarino, this focus on the beholder was misguided. Citing medieval critics of Aquinas like Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), Durand de St. Pourçain (d. 1334), and Robert Holkot (d. 1349), he argued that however much the representation and the represented might blur in the mind of the perceiver, this did not alter the status of the object, or objects, of observation. In the case of an image of Christ, the fundamental distinction between Christ (who was God) and the representation of Christ (which was by no means God) remained. This point, already made by Pérez, had implications for those who contemplated the image. If they did not acknowledge the distinction, they erred gravely by considering the image to be divine. If they did, they consciously offered latria to something other than God, which was equally impermissible. The Thomist theory of a unified process of perception could not solve the problem, since its assumption that the latria was truly directed to the represented (God) implied that the image was not the (or an) object of adoration after all. For it was impossible for there to be one act of adoration and two objects. Catarino proceeded to examine four additional scholastic arguments aimed at salvaging the Thomist position. Ory had mentioned two of them, but only in passing, suggesting that here Catarino reflected a wider discussion, possibly on the occasion of the Roman disputations of early 1552. The fact that, with minor exceptions, Catarino cited no older sources here reinforces the sense that these arguments reflected a fresh debate. They can be summarized as follows: 1) the image and the represented constitute “one total object of adoration,” hence the adoration is unitary as well (and accordingly, in the case of Christ, should be latria). On this point Ory had briefly spoken of the “unity of the object” as necessarily deriving from the unity of perception. 2) Adoration per se (directed only to God) should be distinguished from accidental adoration (directed only to the image). 3) While the adoration does not end in the image, the image qua image is nevertheless adored based on the similarity between the two (a point Ory had made as well). 4) In exercising its function of image, that is, representing the represented, the sacred image is the same as the imaginatum (an argument made by Cajetan).

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Catarino had little patience for any of these arguments. Whereas he had examined the Thomist position with some attention and detachment, he dismissed the additional defenses as, respectively, “amazingly confusing,” “ridiculous,” “incomprehensible,” and so baffling as to “make one go mad or reduce others to insanity.” This last qualification, part of a critique of his nemesis Cajetan, ushered in a denunciation of tribalism among Thomas’s modern disciples, which underpinned Catarino’s polemic more generally. To this theme he returned later in his disputation, after pointing out an inconsistency in Thomas’s own discussion of the image question. There he registered his wish “that ours (nostri) who have committed themselves to his doctrine will not defend everything they read there so aggressively.” The point was no doubt addressed to Catarino’s fellow-Dominicans, presumably including Matthieu Ory. The remark also provides a clue about the setting of the Roman image debate. It suggests a venue where this reference was easily understood, perhaps a Dominican institution like Santa Maria sopra Minerva. What followed was a summary of Catarino’s own position on the vexed issue of adoration. The basic principle was that the veneration of sacred images was a legitimate practice approved by church tradition. Not only were they the books of the illiterate, endowed with the great power to inspire piety in the faithful, but precisely in their function of representing the holy they became sacrosanct and worthy of honor themselves. Thus Catarino rejected the idea that sacred images served only to stimulate memory and recall. This did not mean that they should be adored. Images served as stand-ins for the holy figures to whom they referred; and, downplaying the risk that sign and signified might be confused, Catarino found the notion of the image being adored understandable in common parlance. It was no worse, in his view, than the learned formula of ‘adoration of the image qua image.’ But both were technically wrong and objectionable, especially if they involved latria. It was possible to say, Catarino allowed, echoing Pérez, that the image was “in some way” adored. The faithful beheld and venerated the represented “as if it [were] present” in the image. This as-if function was a concession to the weakness in the nature of humankind, “who wish to see what they worship and have present those they love and address.” This was essentially a psychological argument, albeit different from the one made by Ory. Formally speaking, however, it was more prudent to speak of adoration in, to, or before the image – again, a position also taken by Pérez. More distinctive was a second rationale Catarino developed in defense of image veneration. Besides their representational function, images derived a special status from their designation as sacred objects by the Church, like other things “disposed to such sacred uses.” While they needed no consecration or

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blessing – as did churches, shrines, and altars – this status was critical for their religious function. As long as they remained in an artist’s workshop, they were unworthy of veneration, but that changed as soon as they were installed in a place intended for this purpose. The consideration of images as sacred objects was obviously not new, but Catarino did not reveal the potential sources for his argument.49 Nor did he address an obvious question raised by this argument: if images deserved veneration as sacred objects as well as representations, how did the two relate to each other? Ory, in responding to Pérez, had already pointed out this problem and its thorny ramifications, but Catarino chose to ignore it here. Nor did he recognize the potential for concerns about idolatry. If images, as he suggested, helped the faithful encounter “that peculiar presence of God, which we also experience in sensory ways (sensibiliter),” how far removed was this position from the assumption that something numinous inhered in them – a standard definition of idolatry? Instead, the Sienese Dominican focused his critique of materialist uses of sacred images differently. Redirecting the charge of idolatry – beloved by Protestant critics – from established religious tradition to the secular sins of Catholics, he included these in the category of ‘abuses’ to be mended. That term was by no means neutral or obvious. In a general sense, it represented a strategic choice in Catholic debates about how best to respond to the religious crisis of the day: it assumed the recognition that it behooved the Church to prioritize ‘reforming’ its own house rather than focusing on the persecution of opponents internal and external. This, as we have seen, was the political line Catarino supported during Julius III’s pontificate. In the context of the image debate, this meant identifying problematic practices as much as, or even more than, quibbling over philosophical details. It also involved assigning oversight over religious images to particular church officials. In Catarino’s proposal, this responsibility was first and foremost the bishop’s. The particulars of Catarino’s list of concerns further clarify his agenda. The first half was about profane, not sacred representations. With true zeal the Dominican attacked private art collecting as idolatrous. One object of his ire 49

A possible source may have been Alberto Pio di Carpi, whose defense of images was integrated in a larger discussion of sacred spaces and objects: see the section “De ornato templorum” (Pio, Tres et viginti libri, fols. CXX-v–CXXXIII-v), which precedes the section “De imaginum sanctorum et sanctarum veneratione.” E.g, on altars: “Namque legisti primos illos patres […] altaria domino dedicasse et quaedam loca divino cultui mancipata sacrosancta esse voluisse, in quibus et solemni ritu secundum eius temporis morem Deo altissimo sacrificarunt” (ibid., fol. CXXVIII-r: “For you have read that the early fathers […] dedicated altars to the Lord and wanted spaces devoted to divine worship, in which they sacrificed to the highest God according to the custom of the time, to be sacrosanct”).

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was the restoration of antique, pagan paintings or sculptures for placement in homes and gardens. He rejected the counter-argument that this was not done for purposes of religious worship. Again, as for religious images, context mattered: the appearance of idolatry was unavoidable when the likenesses of “demons” were “placed like sacred things in lofty places.” And Catarino criticized a humanist like Platina, “versed in the books of the pagans,” for dissimulating about an injunction of Pope Gregory to destroy pagan statues in order to avoid distracting Roman pilgrims. Besides rejecting the “false deities” they represented, and their quasi-sacred settings, Catarino offered a moral objection: these images offered the eyes nothing but vanity, lust, and debauchery. It was far better to redirect the great expenditures made on art to the poor, all the more “when these vain things are bought with church property and goods.”50 Unmistakably, the Dominican’s invective was directed here against the Church’s own aristocratic elite, many of whom were no doubt his friends. But he was undeterred: I know the proverb, consent makes friends, the truth produces hatred. But that is all wrong. For hatred is not really generated by the truth, which is attractive in itself: it is a vicious soul that causes the truth to be taken as hatred. Those who have ears will understand what a benevolent spirit suggests to them. The same moralistic zeal found a more obvious target in the abuse of sacred images, to which Catarino devoted the final part of his disputation. The bottom line was his insistence that sacred images be produced, installed, maintained, and used in ways that respected them both as representations and sacred objects. As representations, they should avoid anything “false, fictive, or apocryphal.” A telling example was the depiction of the Virgin Mary weakened by the pains of childbirth – a notion Catarino, as a passionate advocate of Mary’s immaculate conception, strongly rejected. Proper representation also meant avoiding both rough and ugly execution and immoral allusion, especially anything that might incite lechery. As sacred objects, Catarino argued further, images should be kept in appropriate places and decorous conditions. This included the avoidance of representations on pavement that might be stepped upon, or of dirt, rot, and other forms of neglect.51 Thus, in their treatment, sacred images deserved the same honor extended to them in their 50 51

Note that Catarino made the point twice: earlier in the same paragraph he spoke of “things taken from churches and owed to the poor” (§ 45). Here, again, Alberto Pio may have been a source: see Pio, Tres et viginti libri, fol. CXXIV-v.

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veneration. Catarino laid the responsibility for ensuring proper practice at the feet of the bishops: just as they deserved blame for the existing abuses, they should be charged with addressing them in the future. In laying out this reform agenda, Catarino diverged most sharply from scholastics like Ory. His insistence on the importance of the artistic rendering of religious subjects, and on their condition and location, stands in contrast to Ory’s dismissal of these issues as pertaining to the ‘image qua thing’ and hence irrelevant to theological discussions about the orthodoxy of image veneration. But, as we shall see, it was these views of Catarino’s – his reliance on Nicaea II, his reform proposals, and the role he assigned to bishops – that not only were aligned with the reform programs discussed in Marcello Cervini’s circle, but re-emerged eleven years later in the image decree defined at Trent. In contrast, the theological position on which they rested had a more uncertain future. 5

Nacchianti’s Road to Orthodoxy

In the meantime, there was another instance in which the image question appeared at the intersection of church reform and the defense of the faith. Iacopo Nacchianti was the third Dominican, following Ory and Catarino, to publish his views on sacred images in mid-sixteenth-century Rome. The author had followed a tortuous path to get to that point: in this, in fact, lies a good deal of the interest of the document. Nacchianti (1502–69) was by general acknowledgment a brilliant theologian; he had been a reform-minded bishop of Chioggia since 1544 and participated in both periods of the Council of Trent (he was to return for the third as well).52 His brief excursus on the cult of images in a learned commentary on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans offered a vigorous, orthodox defense of images. Without polemicizing with his order’s Thomist legacy (as Catarino had done) he offered an alternative to Ory’s semiotic theory of perception as he responded to the image controversies of the day. Yet Nacchianti’s views constituted a sharp reversal for a man who only years earlier had undergone an inquisitorial investigation on charges that included disrespect for the cult of the saints and the material artifacts associated with it. He owed his absolution in early 1550 to the newly elected pope Julius III. Thus 52

The following pages draw on my biographical entry, “Nacchianti, Jacopo,” DBI, 77:655–58; and my article “Trent, Saints, and Images”; in addition to the literature cited there, see also Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, ad indicem, and Massimo Firpo and Germano Maifreda, L’eretico che salvò la Chiesa. Il cardinale Giovanni Morone e le origini della Controriforma (Turin: Einaudi, 2019), ad indicem.

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Nacchianti personally experienced the deep pressures caused by the heresy crisis and the ensuing power struggle in the Roman hierarchy. Inevitably, his public stance in the image controversy was colored by those circumstances. Nacchianti was by any measure a talented and ambitious churchman. Born in Florence into a prosperous notarial family, he became a novice in the convent of San Marco at the age of fifteen. Theological studies in Bologna (where he met Michele Ghislieri, the future cardinal, inquisitor, and pope Pius V) laid the foundation, in the 1530s, for a range of administrative and teaching assignments in several Dominican convents. In 1541 he was appointed theology professor at Rome’s Santa Maria sopra Minerva. Yet his stay in this prestigious convent was not unproblematic: apparently a conflict with the order led him to start frequenting the papal curia instead. In this setting, where he participated in literary, theological, and philosophical disputations held at the papal mensa, Nacchianti clearly made an impression and earned the trust and respect of Paul III. In 1544, the pontiff named him bishop of the small maritime diocese of Chioggia in the Veneto despite stiff competition and objections from the Venetian authorities. An invitation to participate in the Council of Trent followed shortly thereafter. Here, however, Nacchianti’s temperament and contrarian attitudes soon began to ruffle feathers, and not much later made him enemies among the leadership aligned with Rome, including the papal legates and the powerful secretary, Cardinal Angelo Massarelli. Even before the council started, Nacchianti was rumored to downplay the value of church tradition as an authoritative source of Catholic teaching. That subject was on the agenda soon after the Council had opened, and the fears proved correct. Having first resisted a rapid reconfirmation of the biblical canon, Nacchianti then objected to the majority opinion that scripture and tradition had equal standing and authority. His characterization of this position as “impious” resulted in his dismissal from the council. He traveled to Rome to justify himself before the pope. Given the choice to stay in the papal city or return to his diocese, he chose the latter option. In Chioggia Nacchianti undertook an ambitious reform program, including measures to enhance clerical discipline and pastoral visitations. This program quickly ran into the opposition of most of the cathedral clergy; at the same time, his pastoral activities became fodder for critics seeking to taint him as a heretic. As a result, a school teacher denounced him to Rome at the beginning of 1548, and by the end of that year Nacchianti was under arrest in Rome as an inquisitorial procedure began. Investigations ensued in Chioggia and elsewhere in the Veneto, first by the secretary of the Council of Trent, Cardinal Massarelli, subsequently (after Massarelli had been accused of partiality and

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improper process) by Annibale Grisonio, a canon of Capodistria. The interrogations conducted by Grisonio appeared to confirm suspicions that Nacchianti endorsed Lutheran doctrines, such as justification by faith alone, had engaged in conversations with a heterodox group, and read heretical works. But they also revealed a deep reserve of discontent among the common faithful, who complained that Nacchianti had sowed confusion about the Eucharist and disparaged many daily rituals of popular devotion, especially those associated with the cult of the saints.53 As scholars of medieval Christianity have argued, these two problems were connected by the problem of representation. On the one hand, the doctrine of transubstantiation, in positing Christ’s physical presence in the Eucharist, could raise questions about the relation between its substantial being and visual appearance. On the other, as we have seen, a ‘strong’ view on the likeness between sacred images and their prototypes could suggest the notion that saints were present in their images. Both concerns emerged during the investigations of Nacchianti. Thus, while the bishop endorsed the adoration of the Eucharist, he was suspected of interpreting the sacrament in a symbolic manner. Judging by accounts of one sermon, the problem of visual representation was his rationale. The canon Giuseppe Marangon testified as follows: One day … when he preached about the sacrament of the altar, I heard him say the following: in this host you adore Christ in flesh, bones, and blood. But you are mistaken, because he is not there in this way, but only spiritually and in commemoration of Christ; and if he were there in flesh, bones, and blood, the host would have to be as big as a man. For Nacchianti, then, it was the impossibility of physical likeness – specifically, corresponding size – that argued against the scholastic interpretation of transubstantiation, namely that the substance of the host was transformed, but not the accidents. Nor, evidently, was he convinced that Christ’s body could be present in multiple locations – another assumption of eucharistic theology. As he explained the sacrament, other witnesses declared, he had waved an arm, saying “that Christ was not in the Eucharist like that arm, because Christ’s body

53

Gianmario Italiano, “La pastorale eterodossa di Iacopo Nacchianti a Chioggia (1544–48),” Rivista storica italiana 123 (2011): 741–91; Silvana Seidel Menchi, Erasmo in Italia 1520–1580 (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1987), 68–72.

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is glorified in heaven.” As a result, the bishop had not only confounded his flock, but also raised suspicions about his orthodoxy.54 Even more shocking to many were Nacchianti’s attitudes about the saints. Multiple accounts suggest that the bishop, like many Protestant and Catholic reformers of the day, propagated a Christ-centered devotional life. Yet he accompanied this advocacy with an overt disdain for the cult of the saints. He neglected to preach about them, made jokes about popular saints, or laughed about the ways in which parishioners decorated their statues during festive occasions. Worse yet, he offended the most deeply rooted cult – that of the Virgin Mary – by making scornful remarks about women praying the rosary, neglecting the devotions of a local Marian shrine (the site of an apparition of the Virgin in 1508), and replacing an image of the Virgin Mary in the episcopal palace with the coat of arms of his patron Pope Paul III. In sum, Nacchianti’s suspected spiritual understanding of the Eucharist was matched by his rejection of the physical representations of the saints as objects of devotion. The inquisition trial which Nacchianti underwent in Rome between late 1548 and early 1550 ended up provoking a radical change of mind, if not heart, in this confident intellectual. We know little of the circumstances, as no records of the proceedings have survived. Evidently, the bishop was absolved by Pope Julius III upon his election in February 1550. This outcome has to be understood in light of the power struggle playing out between the new pontiff and the Holy Office. The pope’s decision, in fact, was met with loud disapproval in the congregation of the Inquisition.55 Another likely player involved in deciding Nacchianti’s fate is identified in a rare letter that has survived from the suspect’s lengthy detention in the Roman convent of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. On May 25, 1549 Nacchianti wrote to Marcello Cervini to declare his dependence on the influential cardinal’s good will and to promise that Cervini would “know [him] in another way than he has experienced in the past” – a clear reference to Cervini’s legatine role at Trent.56 Thus Cervini, a close confidant of Julius III, may have had a hand in Nacchianti’s absolution. The 54

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See the trial transcription published in Pietro Mozzato, Jacopo Nacchianti: un vescovo riformatore (Chioggia 1544–1569) (Chioggia: Edizioni Nuova Scintilla, 1993), 134 (“Un giorno … predicando lui del sacramento dell’altare, io lo sentì ch’el disse queste parole: voi adorate in questa hostia Christo in carne, ossa et sangue. V’ingannate perché el non gli è a questo modo, ma gli è solamente spiritualmente et in commemoration di Christo; et s’el ge fusse in carne, ossa et sangue, bisognaria che quell’hostia fusse grande come un homo. Ma si de’ però ben adorare”) and ibid., 169 (“non esse Christum in Eucharistia ut bracchium illud, quia corpus Christi glorificatum erat in coelo,” according to Doctor Antonio Bruni). Firpo and Maifreda, L’eretico che salvò la Chiesa, 373–74. Cit. in Quaranta, Marcello II Cervini, 312.

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obvious condition sine qua non was the suspect’s readiness to renounce his earlier views and embrace orthodoxy in strict loyalty to the pope. Once Nacchianti was reconciled to the Church, he not only resumed his work as bishop of Chioggia, but also initiated an assiduous effort to apply his theological acumen in the defense of Catholic orthodoxy and papal primacy. Among the exegetical and controversialist works he published in subsequent years was a voluminous commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans (1557). In it, he included several “digressions” on burning contemporary issues whose discussion was “not only opportune but necessary.” The topics included the Trinity, the origins of the papacy, original sin, predestination, as well as sacred images.57 The latter issue was prompted by a passage in which Paul chided those who had subverted proper worship: even though they knew God, they did not glorify him as God. In their hands, “the glory of the incorruptible God” was turned “into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man and of birds, and of four-footed beasts and of creeping things” (Rom. 1:23). On the latter Nacchianti commented as follows: Although these are nothing (for also an idol, Paul says, is nothing, because no doubt it is a figment and fiction), nevertheless it is to them, as though to a divine power and immortal God, that they have not only bowed their heads, bent their knees, dedicated anathemas, and addressed requests for suffrage, but also constructed temples and immolated victims and sacrifices. I do not deny that images of humans, birds, reptiles, and fourfooted animals can refer to celestial figures, which the astronomers have described in the eighth sphere – reckoning there to be 48 when they determined [that there were] 12 in the zodiac, 21 in the arctic hemisphere, and the remainder in Antarctica – and which we do not taint as being revered superstitiously and even worshipped by many. Nevertheless, in this passage, I would believe that the apostle rather detested these likenesses, from which it is quite clear that the wise men of the world have become raving mad and most irreverently insulting to God, as can easily be learned from Eusebius, Strabo, and others.58 57

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Iacopo Nacchianti, Enarrationes piae, doctae, et catholicae in epistolam D. Pauli ad Romanos … Accedunt et tractationes peculiares de mysterio sacratissime Trinitatis, de tempore quo Petrus extitit Romae, de recto imaginum cultu, de originali labe, et de praedestinatione ac reprobatione hominum … (Venetiis: apud Iosephum Vicentinum, 1557), fol. A1v. Nacchianti, Enarrationes, fol. 40r. The comment ends with a grammatical note: “On the literal level, the first part [of the scriptural passage] must be rendered not as an accusative but an ablative, and the singular in Hebrew usage stands for a plural, as [is the case] elsewhere: day for days [Gen. 2 / Exod. 8], fly for flies. This is also the case in the word ‘man,’ if

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The Pauline passage, and Nacchianti’s comment, may have raised more questions than they answered – in fact, the same statement had been taken by Protestant interpreters, including Calvin in his response to Ory, as biblical evidence against the veneration of images. This no doubt prompted Nacchianti to insert a longer discussion of that very issue – the section published in the present volume. Not surprisingly, given his recent conversion, the bishop defended the cult of sacred images in the most vigorous terms. He did so both with conventional arguments and examples from tradition and textual sources, but also by echoing the Thomist position. Thus Nacchianti took a strong view of the likeness of representation and represented: unlike the Second Council of Nicaea, he argued that images were to be adored with the same adoration as their prototypes, whether latria, dulia, or hyperdulia. In fact, Nacchianti appears to be going beyond Ory. Like the Frenchman, he relied on the Thomist-Aristotelian theory of the movement of the soul. Yet, eschewing Ory’s semiotic and psychological argument, he went on to suggest the deep, intrinsic, and perhaps even ontological connections between image and prototype. These, he said, not only “reflect each other mutually,” but also “in a certain way exist in a reciprocal relationship.” The image inhered in the prototype like a building that rose from its foundation. The represented was in the image “as if in a mirror,” which not only referred to the prototype, but contained it.59 As the image was observed, the prototype was adored. Nacchianti agreed again with Ory in considering the artistic aspects of images – whether they were “beautifully and skillfully painted or sculpted, or fashioned with certain features, gestures, location, aspect, and other things of this kind” – off-limits for veneration, just as the materials of which they were made. Yet this argument created a paradox: the mirror-like similarity of image and prototype justified adoration, but the material means conveying that likeness were declared alien to this devotional act. For Nacchianti, however, there was a different feature supporting the case for veneration. Images ought to be adored in part due to their designation for that role, and their installation in a church to serve this purpose. Here, then, Nacchianti diverged sharply from Ory to adopt a distinctive element of Catarino’s reasoning. This left unresolved a logical problem raised by Ory: how could there be one movement of the soul if it had two objects – the represented mirrored in the image and the image

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in fact likenesses are made not of just one man but many, and divine honors are rendered to them.” Nacchianti here develops an Augustinian analogy, on which see Boulnois, Au-delà de l’image, 31.

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considered as sacred object? As we shall see, this vexing problem was to return at a later stage of the image debates. Nevertheless, the core of Nacchianti’s defense aligned with that of the French inquisitor: not only was his argument far removed from the learned skepticism and spiritual leanings of his younger years, but he also steered well clear of any compromise solutions, like that offered by Pérez. “Hence,” he declared, “not only should we say that the faithful in church adore before an image, as some do perhaps out of caution, but also, without any scruple, that they adore the image. Indeed they venerate it with the same worship as its prototype …” In concluding, Nacchianti returned to the Pauline passage that was the occasion for his excursus, to emphasize the difference between pagan forms of idolatry and legitimate forms of image veneration. That, in the latter, there might be the possibility of abuse remained only a passing suggestion. Thus the rehabilitated bishop of Chioggia found in Thomism his stamp of orthodoxy. That approach to the image question was to resurface in the following decade, albeit in a different form and in different circumstances.

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Reverberations: St. Germain, Trent, and Beyond The theological discussions reviewed in the previous chapter sought to justify the veneration of sacred images, explain their devotional function and efficacy, and promote the practice. The motivation here was less the intent to respond to Protestant attacks – even though Calvin’s expanding criticism of this church tradition no doubt fueled a sense of urgency over the issue – than to sort out internal differences over theology, politics, and strategy. Multiple questions converged in this effort, but all related in one way or another to the underlying problem of idolatry, in which critics of the Church had identified the Achilles heel of the cult of images. Barring certain exceptions, such as the consecrated host, the notion that divinity inhered in a material object was problematic. In the case of images, this raised the question: what is the status of a visible artifact vis-à-vis the holy or divine person it represents? Erasmian and Protestant attacks often rested on the allegation that popular devotions involving representations of the saints were effectively idolatrous. The issue raised a crucial question as to the attitudes of Europe’s educated elites towards the religious experiences of the large illiterate populations of the continent and its growing areas of influence elsewhere: was the cult of images not bound to lead ordinary Christians into erroneous views about the relations between matter and spirit? The Catholic intellectuals engaged in the mid century image debates were largely unconcerned about this problem. Only Martín Pérez de Ayala appeared inclined to take it seriously, emphasizing the didactic role of images over the strength of the relationship between image and represented. But the other authors largely dismissed this concern either as irrelevant or as a misunderstanding to be remedied by an educational effort. Why, then, was the debate so contentious? The answer lies, no doubt, in the complex politics surrounding the issue. To be sure, there were legitimate philosophical questions raised by the complex legacy of scholastic thought; equally clearly, the answers that were proffered aligned with the intellectual traditions to which the participants in the debate subscribed. The views we have examined centered in large measure on the assessment of the long contested Thomist interpretation of perception and affective engagement in the cult of images. Matthieu Ory framed this interpretation as the proper, and necessary, intellectual response, while dismissing critics as humanists. Their skills of rhetoric, he insisted, could certainly be useful, but only to disseminate views thoroughly vetted by scholastic theology.

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Pérez and Catarino, who both criticized scholastic analysis, would surely have disagreed with this verdict. Their discussions of the matter at hand privileged the Church’s scriptural, patristic, and conciliar tradition. In other words, they stressed arguments of authority as much as, or more than, the finer points of faculty psychology. But these differences, and the heated tone of the debate, have to be explained on more than intellectual grounds. At stake was the need to define the boundary between orthodoxy and heresy, which was an eminently political question. It is hardly a coincidence that the imperial advisor Martín Pérez de Ayala, to facilitate a religious truce in Germany, articulated a viewpoint deeply grounded in church tradition – only recently rediscovered – that might undercut the objections of his opponents. Taking the opposite, confrontational stance, a prominent inquisitor like Matthieu Ory – based in a country affected by the growing Huguenot movement – insisted on the strongest articulation of the holiness and power of religious images: that derived from Thomas Aquinas. In Italy, at a time of hardening repression, the case of Iacopo Nacchianti demonstrates how politics was personal. He signaled orthodoxy and loyalty by insisting on a firm scholastic position, similar to Ory’s, which he had previously ridiculed as an astute intellectual engaged with the challenging questions raised by Lutherans and spirituali. The equally combative Catarino, meanwhile, carved out a unique position in Italy: on the one hand, he was a Dominican gadfly who criticized major figures in his order’s intellectual tradition; on the other, he joined allies in Julius III’s entourage to pursue a path of moral reform that would purify a religious culture seen as corrupted by worldliness. By the early 1560s, much had changed. Many of the actors in this story had died, including Ambrogio Catarino (1553), Julius III (1555), Marcello Cervini (Marcellus II, 1555), Matthieu Ory (1557), and Gian Pietro Carafa (Paul IV, 1559). The image debate of the previous decade had receded, just as Julius III’s reform plans and any thought of reconvening the Council of Trent had been abandoned, especially during Paul IV’s hardline papacy. But the image question re-emerged under his successor, Pius IV. As Hubert Jedin demonstrated long ago, the immediate impetus came from France. There tensions between the Catholic establishment and growing congregations of Huguenots quickly mounted, with regional rebellions and outbursts of iconoclasm marking the deterioration of civic order. The question of sacred images was thus front and center during the religious colloquies convened by the Regent Catherine de Médicis in late 1561 and early 1562. The inconclusive outcome of these talks created pressure for the issue to be addressed at the reconvened Council of Trent (1562–63). A French delegation led by Cardinal Charles de Guise joined the council in late 1562, and it was largely at his insistence that the council, in

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its closing days, rushed to formulate a decree on the invocation and cult of the saints, along with the veneration of their relics and images. The decree text on images itself, Jedin argued long ago, was based on a position paper produced by Sorbonne theologians at St. Germain; and according to John W. O’Malley, it may have been influenced indirectly by the Council of Sens (1527).1 This broadly accepted interpretation, which reduced the impetus behind Trent’s decree largely to French political pressures and precedents, effectively turned the decree’s outsize influence on post-Tridentine art into an accident of history. It may also have contributed to the tendency, noted earlier, to see Trent as a starting point rather than an outcome or a manifestation of a broader debate. The midcentury discussions at the center of this volume open up different perspectives, as this chapter seeks to demonstrate. First, there is good evidence to suggest that they directly informed the Tridentine debates and decisions; the discovery of a previously unknown draft text of the decree further circumscribes the French influence on its content. Second, the concerns about sacred images – intellectual, political, strategic – before, during, and after Trent display continuities not immediately perceptible in the decree. Third, these same continuities also highlight areas of change in the understanding and uses of religious representations. 1

On the Sidelines of Trent: Eliseo and Ninguarda

In devising its norms on sacred images, scholars have noted, the Council of Trent reaffirmed the doctrine of Nicaea II and abandoned Thomism. Both points are indisputable and will be confirmed in this chapter. The first, however, has to be qualified: as we shall see, the adoption of Nicaea II involved a subtle but significant shift in emphasis. On the second point, a good starting point is offered by Jean Wirth: for him, the Tridentine fathers followed in the footsteps of “the most brilliant scholastic doctors” who from the end of the thirteenth century had criticized Aquinas’s image theory. The latter – the “most favorable” view of the image in the history of Christianity – was thus eroded.2 In fact, the Tridentine image decree deliberately shied away from using Thomist language. But this does not mean that scholastic interpretations were not considered. Knowledge of the Tridentine discussions on the subject, particularly the decisive closed-door work sessions held between November 30 1 Hubert Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” esp. 473–85; O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images,” esp. 32–33 and 36. A further discussion of Jedin’s analysis follows below, pp. 109–10. 2 Wirth, “La critique scolastique,” 93.

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and December 1, 1563, is limited. Yet several voices raised in the council’s orbit suggest that defenders of Thomism had hardly been silenced. Two Dominicans discussed the image question in publications that appeared in 1563 and were likely available by the time the critical conciliar discussions were under way.3 Both texts were vigorous anti-heretical tracts that confronted charges of idolatry and the growing specter of iconoclasm with the armor of Thomist doctrine. Theirs, essentially, was the defensive stance taken in the previous decade by Ory and Nacchianti – a continuity that has been overlooked by the scholarly literature. The first was an apologetic work by the Neapolitan theology professor and Dominican prior Tommaso Eliseo,4 dedicated to his compatriot, Cardinal Giovanni Michele Saraceni, a former protégé of Julius III who still served as a curia official: in 1563 the conservative cardinal counseled the pope on conciliar matters, and at the end of the year he joined the Holy Office. In the face of the heresy crisis, the combative Eliseo wrote his book to serve as a “shield” (clypeus) in defense of Catholic orthodoxy. Thomas Aquinas, he noted in his letter of dedication, was his lodestar.5 In fact, his explication of the veneration of images relied largely on Thomist doctrine; he cited other traditional sources, including Nicaea II, but without discussing the discrepancies among them. On the critical issue of the modality of worship, he affirmed that sacred images were owed the same veneration as their prototypes. He acknowledged some diversity of opinion, and discussed the views Pérez de Ayala had expressed in his “recent” De traditionibus in some detail. Eliseo’s tone here was notably irenic – “God knows what may be [the merit] of this opinion” – perhaps in acknowledgment of the great prestige of Pérez, by then bishop of Segovia and Spanish delegate at Trent. But the Dominican’s position was clear: on the one hand, “no rightthinking Christian” believed that any divinity inhered in a sacred image; on the other, it was the “common judgment of the theologians” that images of Christ were owed latria; of Mary, hyperdulia; and of the saints, dulia.6 3 These works are mentioned in Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 464, 470 and idem, Geschichte, 4/2:208. Tommaso Eliseo (Thomas Elysius), Piorum clypeus adversus veterum recentiorumque hereticorum pravitatem fabrefactus (Venetiis: apud Salamandram, 1563). That the work was available by the time of the final session at Trent is likely given that the Registrum is dated “Venetiis, 1562” (unnumbered folio at end of volume). Feliciano Ninguarda’s Assertio fidei catholicae (Venetiis: apud Dominicum Nicolinum, 1563) contains a recommendation by the Dominican Master General Vincenzo Giustiniani, dated Trent, October 22, 1562, and one by the conciliar legates, dated December 19, 1562. 4 See Paolo Portone, “Eliseo, Tommaso,” DBI 42 (1993). 5 Eliseo, Clypeus, fol. A2v. 6 Eliseo, Clypeus, fols. 238r–43r, esp. 242r.

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A similar position was proposed, around the same time, by a second Dominican with a direct connection to the Council of Trent: Feliciano Ninguarda, a native of the Valtellina (Graubünden), who had held multiple administrative and theological positions in the Holy Roman Empire and attended the final phase of the council as procurator of the Archbishop of Salzburg.7 In an apologetic treatise entitled Assertio fidei catholicae,8 Ninguarda offered a pointby-point refutation of the famous Confession de foi of the recently executed Calvinist Anne Du Bourg (d. December 23, 1559).9 The French parliamentarian had penned these articles of faith in prison while on trial for heresy, but they soon became public.10 Ninguarda’s swift and lengthy response was a measure of the notoriety of the case and the concerns it had raised among the Catholic leadership. In fact, his treatise received a strong endorsement from the papal legates Ercole Gonzaga, Girolamo Seripando, Stanislaus Hosius, and Lodovico Simonetta, articulated in a prefatory statement penned by Angelo Massarelli, secretary of the Council of Trent, and dated in Trent on December 19, 1562. Thus, Ninguarda’s forceful intervention in French religious politics had a Tridentine imprimatur.11 What is more, this stamp of approval was given shortly after the arrival in Trent of Cardinal Charles de Guise, a major player in the prosecution of Du Bourg, and may therefore be read as a political message to the pugnacious French cardinal. The latter, of course, went on to have a decisive influence on the remainder of the council, and was instrumental in pushing through the image decree.12 In his Assertio, Ninguarda responded extensively to Du Bourg’s rejection of the invocation and cult of the saints, including the veneration of sacred 7 8 9 10

11 12

Alexander Koller, “Ninguarda, Feliciano,” DBI 78 (2013). Feliciano Ninguarda, Assertio fidei catholicae (Venetiis: apud Dominicum Nicolinum, 1563). An edition of the Confession de foi can be found in Matthieu Lelièvre, Anne Du Bourg, Conseiller au Parlement de Paris et Martyr (1520–1559) (Toulouse: A. Chauvin et Fils, 1903), Appendix, 111–28. The text was published in L’exemplaire et forme du procez commis, faict par les commissaires du Roy contre Maistre Anne Du Bourg … Contenant au vray les Interrogations à lui faictz, et les responses et confession de sa foi … (Envers [Genève]: par Jean Steltius, 1560), cited in Lelièvre, Anne Du Bourg, 5. Subsequently, it was included in Crespin, Actes des martyrs (1564–65), 920–26. This intervention may be connected to Du Bourg’s role in French debates about the council, on which see Alain Tallon, La France et le Concile de Trente (1518–1563) (1997), 2nd ed. (Rome: École française de Rome, 2017), 259–60. Preceding the text of the Assertio are further a letter of support (dated Trent, October 22, 1562) by Vincenzo Giustiniani, general of the Dominican order and Tridentine council father in that capacity, and a dedication of the work, by Ninguarda, to Johann Jakob Khuen-Belasi, archbishop of Salzburg (dated Salzburg, February 19, 1561).

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images. Du Bourg had based his critique of the latter especially on biblical prohibitions of idolatry, to conclude: “Therefore I believe that the beginning of all idolatries has been the conception and invention of images.”13 Ninguarda, in his rebuttal, argued that Christian images were fundamentally different from those targeted in the Hebrew scriptures.14 This was well-trodden territory. But Ninguarda went further: not only did he dwell on the nature and production of images but, like Eliseo, he also commented on the modes of adoration.15 He reiterated the Thomist interpretation of images, starting with the well-known distinction of different movements of the soul. Here and in subsequent passages Ninguarda hewed more closely to Ory’s argument than Eliseo had done; and what he lacked in technical detail, he made up in rhetorical flourish. Thus he reaffirmed the identity of representation and represented in the act of adoration: An image of Christ or a saint must be venerated with the same adoration as he of whom it is an image, whether it be Christ or another saint, since the movement of the soul towards an image of Christ or another saint (insofar as it is his image) is the same as the movement of the soul directed to Christ himself or to another saint.16 As a consequence, the adoration of an image of Christ, or a crucifix or relic of Christ, was full latria. Similarly, the saints’ images and relics merited the same veneration they deserved in person. Here Ninguarda offered a remarkable secular parallel: Nor should this seem absurd to anyone. Is it not common for someone who sees an image of his deceased wife or children in his room, or their clothes or jewelry in their dressing room, to kiss these, wet them with tears, and clasp them? Yet this man does not deserve rebuke, for he does

13 14 15 16

Lelièvre, Anne Du Bourg, 117: “Aussi je crois que le commencement de toutes idolâtries a été l’excogitation et invention des images.” Ninguarda, Assertio, fols. 87r–93r (“De imaginibus idolorum vitandis”). See, respectively, ibid., fols. 79v–87r (“De esse imaginum”), fols. 93r–95v (“De modo conficiendi imagines in Ecclesia Christi”), and fols. 95v–101v (“De diversis modis adorandi sanctorum imagines, et ea quae ipsorum fuerint”). Ibid., fol. 96r: “Inquantum autem Christi, vel alicuius sancti est imago, eadem est adoratione veneranda, qua et ille, cuius est imago, sive sit Christus vel alius sanctus: cum motus animae in Christi vel alterius sancti imaginem (ut illius imago est) idem sit cum animae motu qui est erga ipsum Christum, vel aliquem alium hominem sanctum …”

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not honor the image or jewelry, but with his kisses and caresses declares his love for his wife or children wrapped up in these [objects].17 Similarly, Ninguarda continued, children who missed their traveling father might stroke the domestic objects they associated with him: his image, cane, chair, or coat. It was the same affective response that had led the patriarch Jacob to kiss Joseph’s blood-soiled cloak and to adore his staff. This was the key of the Dominican’s interpretation: Jacob had not adored the wood of the staff, but Joseph. In the same way, Christ (prefigured by Joseph) was to be adored in the cross (announced by Joseph’s staff), his chair, bed, and sepulcher, in his stable and in other homes, and in the river Jordan, site of his baptism. Thus, unlike Eliseo’s comments, Ninguarda’s elaboration departed notably from his starting point. Having confirmed the Thomist idea of the image as a saint’s likeness, he moved on to imply that objects and places associated with that saint were equally serviceable as substitutes or reminders. Not only did this have the effect of imputing sacrality to multiple objects besides the image, but it displaced the attention from object to spatial environment. This is even more evident in Ninguarda’s subsequent description of a meditation on the life and passion of Christ: With great, inexplicable love for him we worship and adore as God’s place (tanquam Dei locum) [the sites] where he rose and where he sat down, where he appeared, or what he touched or entirely put in his shadow – venerating not the area or the rocks, but him who dwelled, appeared, and was known in the flesh there, and who freed us from error – Christ our Lord.18 In a parallel form of spatialization, the focal point of this striking imaginative exercise – Christ and his passion – was to be associated with the settings of the meditator’s life: 17

18

Ibid., fol. 96v: “Nec cuiquam hoc videatur absurdum. An non quilibet saepe uxoris aut filiorum mortuorum imaginem in camera, in vestarioque vestes, aut ornamenta videns, illa osculatur, lachrymis rigat, amplexaturque? Et tamen in hoc damnandus non est homo ille: quia non imaginem aut ornamenta illa honorat, sed erga uxorem aut filios qui illis amiciebantur per huiuscemodi oscula et amplexus suum declaravit amorem.” Ibid., fol. 97r: “Magno enim et inexplicabili erga eum amore, quo ascendit, ubi resedit, ubi apparuit, aut quid tetigit, aut omnino obumbravit, tanquam Dei locum colimus et adoramus: non ipsam regionem aut lapides venerantes, sed eum qui in illis conversatus est, apparuit, et in carne cognitus est, quique nos ab errore liberavit, Christum Dominum nostrum.”

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Hence, also, because of Christ and Christ’s sufferings we place this figure variously in churches, homes, in the square, in paintings, storerooms, and on garments – in short, everywhere – so that by continuous contemplation we may bring them [Christ’s sufferings] to mind and will not forget our Lord Jesus Christ, unlike what Anne Du Bourg and similar heretics have done.19 With this last point the discussion returned, almost abruptly, to its premises. Sacred images and relics must be adored, Ninguarda concluded, “not as if they contain any power by which to relieve or aid human frailty, but as signs of Christ and the saints, who can offer help to those who ask.”20 In other words, this Dominican’s semiotic understanding of visual perception led him to justify the cult of images by its connections to the affective meditation on places and things. It is surely no coincidence that the technique he described bore a striking similarity to the compositio loci central to Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises.21 2

Diego Laínez between St. Germain and Trent

At this time, in fact, the Jesuits themselves were very much engaged with the image question. The participation of Alfonso Salmerón and especially Diego Laínez in the Tridentine debates and the drafting of the 1563 image decree is well known, despite a lack of detail about their specific contributions. In midJuly 1563, the council leadership decided that the invocation of saints and their veneration in relics and images, among other controversial issues, were to be resolved by a special committee to avoid lengthy delays that full theological debates would entail. The committee was to include the papal theologians 19

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Ibid.: “Hinc etiam propter Christum Christique passiones passim in ecclesiis, in domibus, in foro, in picturis, in promptuariis, in vestibus, omnibus denique in locis hanc figuram ponimus, quo continue contemplantibus nobis haec in mentem veniant, et Domini nostri Iaesu [sic] Christi non obliviscamur, sicut Annas Burgensis et ceteri sibi similes haeretici sunt obliti.” Ibid.: “Sic igitur concludendo Christi et sanctorum omnium imagines et reliqua similia adorari dicimus: non quasi in ipsis aliqua sit virtus, unde relevari aut iuvari humana possit infirmitas, sed tanquam signa Christi et sanctorum, qui auxilium ferre possunt postulanti.” See Pierre Antoine Fabre, Ignace de Loyola. Le lieu de l’image (Paris: Vrin, 1992); and, for an excellent demonstration of how these principles were applied in artistic programs, Steffen Zierholz, “‘To Make Yourself Present’: Jesuit Sacred Space as Enargetic Space,” in De Boer, Melion, and Enenkel, Jesuit Image Theory, 419–60; and idem, Räume der Reform. Kunst und Lebenskunst der Jesuiten in Rom, 1580–1700 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2019).

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Salmerón and Laínez. It took months, however, before this initiative came off the ground. On November 15, three separate committees were formed to deal with indulgences, purgatory, and images; the image committee included Salmerón. Any work done at this stage has left no traces. Yet another committee was formed in the final days of the council; this time Laínez was among its members. Jedin correctly emphasized the Jesuit general’s role in the formulation of the decree on saints and images. And he was aware of the importance of a summary statement which Laínez had produced eighteen months previously during the Colloquy of St. Germain.22 Yet he remained unaware of a far more extensive body of declarations and notes Laínez had produced on that occasion. The latter allows a fuller understanding of the position he brought with him to Trent. As is well known, the French queen regent, Catherine de Médicis, had convened the colloquies of Poissy and St. Germain to restore and preserve religious union and civil peace at a fractious time. But the grand compromise she desired proved elusive. The first gathering, held at Poissy between August and October 1561, and largely focused on discussion of the Eucharist, ended in discord. At this point Catherine was ready to adopt limited freedom of worship, made official, at least provisionally, in the Edict of St. Germain of January 1562. Even before this time, she sent a reform proposal – composed by a centrist group of bishops and theologians around Cardinal Odet de Châtillon – to Pope Pius IV in an effort to keep Catholic critics within the fold. The question of sacred images was the first on a list of three. Citing Gregory the Great, the authors objected to the adoration of images (and hence their placement on altars), and they denounced multiple abuses in the practice, including fraud, financial gain, and false miracles.23 The initiative evidently came to naught. 22 23

Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 479–80. Jedin subsequently published the heavily corrected manuscript (Rome, Archivio Storico della Pontificia Università Gregoriana, ms. 621rec, fol. 174r–v) in CT 13/1:583–84. The letter, dated ante December 12, 1561, is published in CT 13/1: 517–25 (doc. 81); see for context Tallon, La France et le Concile, 326 and 709–11. The section on images reads in part: “Il primo è che dicono che la primitiva chiesa non havea punto l’imagini, et loro detto che Dio ha espressamente prohibito di metterle in luocho d’adoratione. Dicono che S. Gregorio medesmo ha proibito di adorarle, tutti li buoni, che da poi l’hanno ricevute, hanno dechiarato ch’elle non serveno se non à representare alli popolari la memoria delli absenti et che queste sono come historie scritte per li semplici et ignoranti. Vedeno ancora li grandi et enormi abusi, menzogne, imposture et falsi miracoli, che da qualche tempo in qua sono stati discoperti in questo regno …” The regent went on to ask for concessions to appease the critics: “Onde per disarmare gli aversari della chiesa, et levar loro ogni occasione di parlare sinistramente di dette imagini, et per contenere quegli che desiderano di non si separare, il nostro Santo Padre consideri, se li piace, se saria ragionevole ch’elle

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The image question was also central in the second religious conference, held at the castle of St. Germain-en-Laye between January 27 and February 11, 1562.24 The debates pitted the Catholic side, represented both by Sorbonne theologians and a papal delegation (including Cardinal Ippolito d’Este and Diego Laínez), against the Protestant representatives led by Théodore de Bèze, with a moderate faction headed by Claude d’Espence in-between. These discussions remained inconclusive, but they did produce written statements on the participants’ views, including those of Laínez.25 Of particular interest are two reports in which Laínez, at the behest of the queen regent, summarized oral arguments he had presented at St. Germain. The Roman archives of the Society of Jesus possess two drafts: the first, shorter text was evidently based on only one presentation by Laínez; the second, much longer account, on two. This last document offers a lucid assessment of the issues and the positions. Images, the Jesuit general noted, could serve four

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fussero levate da gli altari et collocarle all’intorno delli tempii ò sia di dentro ò di fora, fondando la permissione sopra di questo che l’avaritia di qualche questuarii et l’ignorantia d’altri sono state cagioni ch’il popolo n’ha abusato contra l’ordine della chiesa.” On the discussions about images at St. Germain, see David Willis-Watkins, The Second Commandment and Church Reform. The Colloquy of St. Germain-en-Laye, 1562 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1994) and Fabre, Décréter l’image?, 111–229 (a section published earlier as “L’image malentendue. Recherches sur la conférence de Saint-German-en-Laye (janvier–février 1562),” Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento 23 [1997], 29–82). For Laínez’s role, see (besides the scholarship already cited) Scaduto, Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia, 3:127–30, 256–59; Lydia Salviucci Insolera, “Laínez e l’arte. All’origine della concezione dell’arte nella Compagnia di Gesù,” in Diego Laínez (1512–1565) and his Generalate: Jesuit with Jewish Roots, Close Confidant of Ignatius of Loyola, Preeminent Theologian of the Council of Trent, ed. Paul Oberholzer (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2015), 565–92 (at 570–73); and eadem, “La formulazione del Decreto sulle immagini nei manoscritti di P. Diego Laínez,” in Immagini e Arte Sacra nel Concilio di Trento. “Per istruire, ricordare, meditare e trarne frutto,” ed. Lydia Salviucci Insolera (Rome: Artemide, 2016), 101–18. The Laínez mss. are held in ARSI, Opp. NN, vol. 209, fols. 327r–368v (see also fols. 381r–402v for responses to Huguenot positions on subjects including images); Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma, Ges. 640/10, fols. 130r–45r (noted with an incomplete folio range in Salviucci Insolera, “La formulazione del decreto,” 104). A complete critical edition of this rich but complex documentation is regrettably still lacking. However, parts of the ARSI mss. have recently been published: fols. 365r–66v can be found in Salviucci Insolera, “Edizione critica di De usu imaginum. Ad Reginam Galliae responsio ad obiecta Beza Haeretici,” appendix to eadem, “Laínez e l’arte,” 585–91; fols. 356r–63v are published as Diego Laínez S.J., “Sulle immagini sacre,” ed. and trans. M. Saulini, in Immagini e Arte Sacra, 204–35. For a comment, see Pierre Antoine Fabre, “Une théorie en mouvement: Lainez et les ‘images’ entre Paris et Trente (1562–1563),” in The Council of Trent: Reform and Controversy in Europe and Beyond (1545–1700), ed. Wim François and Violet Soen, 3 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018), 3:9–29.

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objectives: decoration of a space, honor for those portrayed, instruction of the viewer, and adoration of the divine or saintly subjects. The first two goals being uncontroversial, the debate at St. Germain had focused on the remaining two: instruction and adoration. Here, again, Laínez outlined four options. 1) Some found both uses inadmissible for being idolatrous: this was the position of “those who call themselves ministers,” that is, the Reformed delegation led by Bèze. 2) Some considered both functions legitimate: this was the view of “all true Catholics”; it was specifically supported by “the doctors of the Sorbonne and the theologians of the most Illustrious Legate,” Cardinal Ippolito d’Este. 3) “A few other doctors” accepted the didactic use of images but not their veneration: among them Laínez no doubt included a moderate like Claude d’Espence, who had offered a compromise solution for the image question.26 4) The idea of endorsing the adoration of images but not their cognitive (hence didactic) function was absurd, and thus not endorsed by anyone. Going beyond the participants in the French assembly, it is tempting to see in the second option identified by Laínez a reflection of the positions taken – even allowing for their differences – by Matthieu Ory and Ambrogio Catarino; the third option appears closer to the stance of Pérez de Ayala. In what followed, the Jesuit clarified both the Thomist underpinning of his thinking and his vicinity to the two Dominicans. The earlier, shorter statement to the regent contains his most succinct definition of images: “the image of which we speak here is a thing made to represent something else. It is in its nature that when it is presented to someone who knows it to be an image, it immediately takes his mind to the cognition of the thing represented.”27 This resembles Ory’s argument that the perception of the image qua image and of the represented was simultaneous. As if to affirm this point, Laínez proceeded to compare this cognitive phenomenon to the knowledge of father and son, and to interpret it as Ory (not Pérez) had done: “Since one cannot understand someone to be a son without knowing that he has a father, we cannot know the image as image without knowing the thing it represents.”28 26

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28

On D’Espence, see Henry Outram Evennett, “Claude d’Espence et son Discours du colloque de Poissy. Étude et texte,” Revue historique 64, 1 (1930): 40–78; and Un autre catholicisme au temps des réformes? Claude d’Espence et la théologie humaniste à Paris aux XVIe siècle, ed. Alain Tallon (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010). ARSI, Opp. NN, vol. 209, fol. 366r; Salviucci Insolera, “Edizione critica,” 589: “l’imagine della quale qui si parla è una cosa fatta per rappresentare un’altra: ha in se questa natura, che come si presenta a uno, che sa che la è imagine, subito rapisce la mente alla cognitione della cosa rappresentata.” Ibid.: “Imperoche come non si può intendere uno essere figliuolo senza che si conosca ch’ha padre, così non si può conoscere la imagine, come imagine, che non si conosca la cosa rappresentata.”

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On this epistemological basis Laínez constructed an argument – especially in the longer account of his oral presentations – in defense of images, defining their applications both in instruction and veneration. The latter area was most critical, given the disagreements among Catholics he had outlined at the beginning. Laínez’s starting point was the observation – again expressed in Thomist terminology – that adoration did not end in the image, because images by themselves are incapable of reason or virtue and have no divinity. Instead, adoration, both internal and external, was directed to the thing represented: to God, if the image was of God, or to a “member or temple” of God, if the image was of a saint. Venerating the image meant allowing it to remind one of Christ and adore him in its presence; in the case of a saint’s image, this meant honoring God in the saint, who was not honored “because of his own nature but because of his sanctity.” In short, this adoration might honor the image “externally and materially,” but was directed “formally and properly” to the image’s prototype. This was not a contradiction, Laínez assured his audience, nor did it imply the existence of two distinct forms or acts of honor (one to the image, the other to the prototype). Instead, it was one undivided process: “Thus, the same honor that goes entirely to the image, or bark, on the outside goes entirely to the prototype, or the pith.”29 Again the echoes of Ory’s discussion of motus animi are unmistakable; and like Ory, Laínez did not dwell on the ontological similarity or dissimilarity of the image and its subject. Equally important, in stressing the unitary nature of adoration, he rejected (like Ory) Pérez’s distinction of two kinds of honor and implicitly raised questions about Catarino’s recognition that images deserved honor as sacred objects as well as representations (a point to which we will return). The same emphasis is evident in the Jesuit’s remarks on the didactic role of images. Here Laínez made two arguments. First, sacred images were justified by their cognitive function: they condensed knowledge, like hieroglyphs, based on the visual representation of essential features. Laínez’s analysis was semiotic: images resembled words and texts, which were “low and imperfect signs compared to the things they signify.” If hieroglyphs and words were permissible, so were images. Second, Laínez posited the equivalence of physical and mental images, again echoing Ory: if the devout could entertain mental images of Christ and the saints, it was equally legitimate “to express them outwardly” (esprimerle di fuora) and use the resulting images as teaching tools and memory aids. Laínez identified a biblical foundation for this correspondence of 29

Ibid., fol. 338r–v. The last passage reads: “Et così un medesimo honore il quale tutto si fà alla imagine quanto all’esteriore et la scorza si fa tutto al prototypo quanto alla sua medulla.”

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external and internal images: the visions of “patriarchs, prophets, and apostles […] were nothing but certain paintings made by God or his angels, either in their intellect or in their imagination.”30 Even more relevant for our purposes is a reference to meditation: if the use of mental or imaginative images of Christ and the saints was legitimate in spiritual exercises, it was equally permissible to express them externally to teach the faithful and help them remember. Here Laínez compared images to the designs and models used by architects as they prepared and executed their building plans. Yet, as this example demonstrates, Laínez recognized that images were partial, incomplete renderings of their prototypes. In this insistence the Jesuit departed most clearly from the Thomist tradition. Any attempt at depiction of God or sacred figures was bound to be inadequate. Nor was an exact and complete correspondence necessary for the mnemonic goal to be achieved: rather than expressing the subject “al vivo,” it was “sufficient for the image to store it in [one’s] memory.”31 Thus, if images ‘re-presented’ the absent, they did so in limited but nonetheless significant ways. The observation of nature could lead one to contemplate the divine, “in the sense that, when seeing the sky, or a blade of grass or a rock, I can bow down to it to adore God.” In the same way “I can use an image to remind myself of God or a saint and with the purest intention bow down to it to adore him.”32 In any case, the use of images was instrumental: they allowed the faithful to emulate the saints or, in John of Damascus’s revealing words, to become themselves “animated statues and images.”33 For this reason any concerns about idolatry, even in the uneducated, were unnecessary. There were very few who 30 31 32

33

Ibid., fol. 328r: “Le visioni anchora, le quali il Signor Dio per se ò per li angioli suoi formava nella mente d’i patriarchi, profeti et apostoli non erano altro che certe pitture fatte da Dio o dai suoi angeli o nell’intelletto o nella fantasia loro.” Ibid., fol. 334r: “ne accade che lo esprima la immagine al vivo, ma basta che lo possa ri­durre alla memoria.” Ibid., fol. 347v–48r: “Nono, l’inchinarsi verso l’imagine al representato si puo fare senza mala volontà nessuna et con molto buona et pia volontà, perche secondo che, vedendo il cielo, o una herba, o una pietra, mi posso inchinare verso quella a adorare Dio, del quale mi son ricordato per occasione di quella creatura, come diceva Sant’Antonio che tutto il mondo gl’era libro, per lodare et benedire il creatore, cosi posso pigliare occasione d’una imagine per ricordarmi d’Iddio o d’un santo et con buonissima volontà inchinarmi verso quella a adorarlo.” Ibid., fol. 329r: “Santo Giovanni Damasceno nel libro 4.o. ca. 16 […] dice, Statuas illis erigamus et visibiles imagines, et nosipsi animatae statuae et imagines ipsorum virtutum imitatione efficiamur.” See John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Sancti Patris Ioannis Damasceni […] opera summo Henrici Gravii studio […] collate (Coloniae: ex officina Petri Quentel, 1546), 197.

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did not distinguish the image from the thing, Laínez noted in another set of notes, again echoing Ory. Instead, Although they may not be aware of it, having their eyes fixed on the image, the image does its job, that is to seize the mind, not to fixate it on [the image] itself, but to direct it to the model, which is properly what is being honored: the honor ends up in the latter, not the former …34 To describe this spiritual process Laínez repeatedly used the term ascension. Since man was created in the image of God, self-knowledge or the knowledge of one’s neighbor might be a stepping-stone for this process that led to the knowledge of God. But while it was “laudable” in this way “to ascend to the knowledge of the Lord and the angels and saints,” it was an arduous process especially for the “rudi et grossi.” For them, images were an especially useful tool to initiate the spiritual trajectory.35 Here, even more than in Ninguarda’s apology, a selectively Thomist understanding of perception becomes the premise of a defense of images – both physical and mental – as the foundation of meditative practice. But the Jesuit’s thinking went even further: scattered across his text we find remarkable, albeit unsystematic, suggestions of an emblematic understanding of images. As already noted, Laínez compared the latter to hieroglyphs. They were like pictograms, which not only signify complex phenomena, but also reveal their essential features or lessons: “To write God they depicted an eye and a staff, meaning that he sees everything and is just in punishment.”36 This analysis was again reflected in biblical interpretation. Laínez pointed out that theologians who read Old Testament episodes as types or signs also called them images. In 34

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Ibid., fol. 386v: “Et quantunque essi tenendo gl’occhi fissi alla imagine non si ne accorgono, tamen l’imagine fa l’officio suo, che è rapire la mente et non fermarla in se ma mandarla all’esemplare, il quale è proprie quello che è honorato: perche in lui et non in lei si termina l’honore et cosi è vana et falsa la gloria delli heretici che dicono che per la sua dottrina liberano gli huomini dalla idolatria.” The expression “mandare la mente all’essemplare” can also be found ibid., fol. 365v; Salviucci Insolera, “Edizione critica,” 589. ARSI, Opp. NN, vol. 209, fol. 330v (marginal addendum): “Nono, la cognitione ch’ha l’huomo di se stesso o del prossimo suo gli giova a conoscer Dio, cui viva imagine è l’huomo, et è licito et laudabile ascendere alla cognitione del Signore et delli angioli et santi suoi per la cognitione di se stesso. Dunque sarà licito à suo modo ascendere a questa cognitione per l’uso delle imagini, il quale è piu facile et commune alli rudi et grossi che non la cognitione di se stesso.” Ibid.: “Per scriver Iddio dipignevano un’occhio et un bastone, significando che vede il tutto et ch’è giusto per castigare. Se era dunque licito usare queste lettere ch’erano imagini delle cose, sara etiam licito depignere il signore con gli santi.”

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a similar vein, he cited John of Damascus to suggest that natural phenomena (the sun, light, a river, a rose, or a plant) could signify by way of similitude a theological concept or entity like the Trinity. New Testament stories that founded key rituals of the Church, too, suggested an emblematic reading: the sacraments themselves were “images and similitudes of the interior and spiritual things they represent.” For example, “washing the body in baptism is an image of the cleansing of the soul by the grace of the Lord. The outward eating of the Eucharist is an image of the nourishing of the soul …”37 Of Laínez’s emblematic, quasi-sacramental interpretation of images, focused on their capacity to trigger or sustain meditative practice, fairly little transpired in the brief Latin policy recommendation he drafted, at the queen regent’s request, towards the end of the colloquy of St. Germain. In seven brief points he reaffirmed that the veneration of images was grounded in scripture, tradition, and reason. Hence no one was to criticize or impede the external cult of images. While abuses must be corrected, it was first to be established whether controversial practices were not in fact legitimate devotions. Finally, the Jesuit noted that any final determination in this or other matters of faith was reserved to the pontiff or the Council of Trent. In this succinct statement only a limited part of the intellectual scaffolding of Laínez’s oral argument was still in evidence. On the critical issue of adoration, his final verdict was twofold. On the one hand, idolatrous practice – the adoration of images as if a divine power inhered in them – was prohibited. On the other, adoration was licit as long as “it was the intent” of the faithful, in kneeling before or displaying other signs of reverence to images, “to extend the same kind of honor or worship to the prototype represented by these images.”38 In this way Laínez defended and preserved the term adoration, but made its legitimacy dependent on proper intent. In other words, in the engagement with sacred images the overlap between the representation and the represented was no longer a given. As the Sorbonne theologians present at St. Germain drafted their own sententia on the image question, they went even farther down this path. Echoing Laínez’s views on the solid foundations of the cult of the saints, they agreed that the honor expressed in the veneration of images had “to be referred to 37

38

Ibid., fol. 330r: “Secondo, tutti li sacramenti del nuovo testamento sono anchora imagini et similitudini delle cose interiori et spirituali che representano, come verbi gratia lavare il corpo nel battesimo è imagine della ablutione dell’anima per la gratia del signore. Il mangiare esteriore che si fà nella Eucharistia è imagine del nutrimento dell’anima …” As noted, Jedin published the document in CT 13/1: 583–84; it is not evident, as Jedin claimed in “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 479, that this text was a sketch (“Entwurf”) of the Sententia of the Sorbonne delegation discussed hereafter.

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that which they represent.” Yet the term adoration practically disappeared from their text.39 This is certainly no accident. Much of this Sententia instead emphasized the didactic role of images. Their “fruitfulness and usefulness” was twofold: that “the people may be reminded of the benefits and gifts we receive from Christ,” and “that the gifts and salutary examples of the saints may be represented to us.” The desired outcome was for the faithful to praise God and imitate the saints. This statement went beyond that of Laínez in two ways. First, it increased the distance between the images and what they represented. The Sorbonne doctors, like Catarino ten years earlier, rejected abuses much more emphatically than the Jesuit general did. They condemned not only idolatrous practices, but also the appreciation of images for improper motives – their cost, materials, beauty, decorative elements, or age. Second, the Sententia clearly distinguished the veneration of Christ from that of the saints, albeit without resorting to the traditional distinction of latria and dulia. The faithful ought to honor Christ, just as they prayed to him, as the Savior (“author totius nostri boni”); in contrast, they had to approach the saints as “our intercessors.” The prayers of the Church went by way of the “commemoration of the saints” but “ended with Jesus Christ.” Both elements converged in one recommendation: in prayer, the faithful “must focus their mind and thought not on the image but on what it represents, and refer everything to God.” The Sorbonne Sententia, even more than Laínez’s statement, evidently reflected the Huguenots’ fierce attacks on the cult of saints and images, and assiduously sought to inoculate it against the contagion of idolatry. The declaration effectively moved the discussion closer to the middle ground than the Parisian theologians may have cared to admit – closer, that is, to the position of those who, in Laínez’s initial dissection of the different camps at St. Germain, stressed the didactic role of images while rejecting their veneration. This was the position paper that, as Jedin showed, was consulted when the Tridentine pronouncement on sacred images was being drafted.40 In sum, Dominicans like Eliseo and Ninguarda and Jesuits like Laínez engaged Thomist theory in their defense of sacred images, developing their semiotic and mnemonic functions, but downplaying the strong identification of image and represented assumed by Aquinas. The position of Laínez is doubly important since he represents a vital link between St. Germain and Trent. 39 40

The only exception is the reference to the devotion displayed before an image of Christ, “adoring in it who is represented by it” (“in eo adorando, qui per ipsum repraesentatur,” CT 13/1, 582). Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” esp. 474, 481–85, and 488. On this point, see below pp. 109–10.

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Trent: The French Connection

The connection between the French colloquies and the Council of Trent has been known at least since the time of Hubert Jedin’s noted 1935 article on the image controversies of the sixteenth century. It is quite likely that the invocation of saints, their relics and images would never have ended up on the Tridentine agenda without the French decision, in 1562, to renew its participation in the Council on a more than diplomatic level. An essential reason was the failure of the religious talks of Poissy and St. Germain to contain the spiraling conflict between French Catholics and Huguenots. The iconoclasm crisis being a key point of controversy, its resolution was left for the Council to resolve. This was exactly what the Catholic delegation concluded as the Colloquy of St. Germain ended. How the French went from being a marginal factor to the key player in the council’s final stages is a remarkable story, which has often been told.41 Yet, as far as the image question is concerned, it still has notable gaps, some of which can be filled by supplementing what is known with new documents. One of these, as we will see, necessitates a significant revision of Jedin’s thesis. To explain how, a summary chronology of the changing French role is in order. At the Council of Trent (Fig. 9), the news that France intended to rejoin the council was followed with apprehension, especially from the time when the delegation, led by Cardinal Charles de Guise of Lorraine, left on its transAlpine journey in the autumn of 1562. On the one hand, news of ongoing incidents of iconoclasm caused great consternation among the council fathers. On the other hand, they harbored deep mistrust of the French intentions at a time when many Frenchmen in Northern Italy were under surveillance on suspicion of being Huguenot agents. Just as Catherine de Médicis had sought a compromise formula to settle the religious conflicts in her country, the Cardinal of Lorraine was feared to have conciliatory plans in store for the council. The cardinal nephew, Carlo Borromeo, was especially alarmed by the possibility of a French alliance with the German Lutherans, and perhaps even with the Anglicans and Huguenots. The fear was that French pressure to reopen debate on settled doctrinal matters such as justification and the Eucharist, and to pursue compromise in matters of worship, such as the prohibition of image veneration, would jeopardize the orderly conclusion of the council. On the other side, Lorraine’s arrival in Trent also raised hopes and expectations in

41

The fundamental account remains that of Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite”; recent accounts include O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images,” and Fabre, Décréter l’image?, 45–68.

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Anonymous, Council of Trent (mid-16th century), Musée du Louvre, Paris Photo: Franck Raux. © RMN-Grand Palais / Art Resource, NY

evangelical circles: the exiled Italian heretic Pier Paolo Vergerio took this occasion to send the cardinal a letter and several of his works.42 In fact, as if to make good on such expectations, the French royal legate and four bishops in Trent drafted a broad reform proposal in December 1562. On the issue of images, it reflected Queen Catherine’s request of late 1561 that sacred images no longer be adored, but only serve didactic purposes. However, due to disagreements between the French diplomats and prelates, the official version of the plan presented on January 4, 1563 was considerably watered down. The council was asked to provide that the faithful be instructed about the proper cult of images (as well as indulgences, pilgrimages, relics, and confraternities) and to take measures against superstitions and abuses.43 Even this proposal, however, received a lukewarm reception, judging by the opinions that have 42

43

Tallon, La France et le Concile, 618–21. Already at the time of St. Germain, a French memorandum addressed to the pope, and presumed to speak on behalf of Catherine de Médicis, had provoked the indignation of Pius IV and Carlo Borromeo; its proposals, deemed “evil and impious,” included the removal of sacred images from altars (Noël Valois, “Les essais de conciliation religieuse au début du règne de Charles IX,” Revue d’histoire de l’Église de France 31/119 (1945), 237–76, at 263–64). CT 13/2, 104–08, art. 29 at 108. On this episode, see Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 485; O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images,” 34; and Tallon, La France et le Concile, 711–12.

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survived. Neither the legates nor the Roman curia saw the need for a conciliar decree on the issue, following the recommendation of a group of canonists that simply left the matter for a future catechism to explain. Only Cardinal Giovanni Morone and the curia official Tommaso Campeggi seemed open to a reaffirmation of the relevant decree of Nicaea II, with the latter agreeing “that abuses and superstitions should be removed.”44 A longer, anonymous opinion found it sufficient if bishops taught the Nicaean doctrine to the faithful. However, this author noted, should there be a need for a more explicit statement, “the fathers of this council can easily summarize, based on the trusted doctrine of the ancient fathers, of what use images are to us, what kind of honor and worship should be extended to them, and where we must especially direct our mind as we worship them.”45 This idea eventually became reality, but as we will see, it was far less easy than the anonymous cleric assumed. At the time, however, it hardly garnered much support, and the request that the council address the image issue was dropped. But this did not mean, as has been suggested, that the French concerns did not resonate with the other council members or the broader Church. Rather, the dismissive reception seems to have stemmed from a reluctance to open debate about an issue that had led the French crown only recently to demand a radical departure from established practice.46 By the summer, the situation had changed considerably. At that time there was increasing pressure on the council leadership, especially on papal legate Giovanni Morone, to bring the venture to a conclusion. This objective led him to develop a working relationship with Cardinal de Guise, whose politics were no longer in doubt and who also proved willing to collaborate. Yet he would not surrender his main priorities, especially the need for decrees on issues of vital importance to the French: saints and images, purgatory, and indulgences. By late June, it became clear that on such issues Lorraine was willing to limit debate, foregoing the normal process for theological discussions, so as to allow a timely completion of the council, at that time planned for September.47 However, after the council’s Session 23 had surmounted a major roadblock concerning episcopal versus papal authority, it became clear that the Spanish objected to an abbreviated process, raising concerns in Morone’s mind that full treatment of the remaining matters would require months or years. As if to 44 45 46 47

For these assessments, see CT 13/2:115, 117, 120, 125. CT 13/2, 132–40, at 138. I here qualify the assessment of O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images,” 32; the point is made in greater detail in my “Trent, Saints, and Images,” esp. 122 and 139–40. Thus Bishop Carlo Visconti of Ventimiglia, Apostolic Nuncio to the Council of Trent, in letters to Card. Carlo Borromeo of June 27 and 28, 1563: Baluze-Mansi 3:475, nos. 46–47.

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illustrate the point, a debate on the Mass saw several theologians speaking for hours, well beyond the half-hour time limit.48 To preempt this, Morone agreed with Lorraine on the formation of a committee that would prepare the work of a deputation of prelates, who would draft the relevant decrees. Represented on the committee were, besides two order generals, only France, Spain, Portugal, and the papacy (the latter by Salmerón and Laínez). Yet the committee’s work apparently did not come off the ground.49 Further delays pushed the conciliar operations into the fall. For much of that time the fathers were mostly occupied with preparations for the 24th session (November 11), concerning matrimony and general reform measures, and with an issue that ended up in the 25th: norms about the regular orders. By late October, however, it became clear that the Cardinal of Lorraine had not given up on his desiderata, and that theological input was sought after all – perhaps by the committee formed during the summer. At that time, in fact, a list of 24 articles on open issues was circulated for discussion by the Council’s theologians. The topics included not only indulgences, the invocation and veneration of saints, sacred images, and purgatory, but also church laws and rules on excommunication and magistrates. A draft of this text, overlooked by previous scholarship, has survived.50 It provides valuable insight into the issues raised for debate, as well as the process considered at that time to resolve them. Regarding the veneration of the saints, three questions were posed: whether prayer to the saints diminishes the benefit of Christ’s mediation; whether the saints understand our vows and desires, and can intercede for us; and whether we must venerate the relics and martyr-tombs of saints, and whether pilgrimages made to them are recognized before God.51 On images, the questions were the following:

48 49 50 51

Jedin, Geschichte, 4/2:178–79. Thus Carlo Visconti’s letter to Borromeo of July 19, 1563 (Baluze-Mansi 3:482). For further discussion, see Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 487, based also on Šusta 4:134ff. The articles and procedural rules are found in AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 316r–317v. Ibid., fols. 316r–v: “De veneratione sanctorum. / An precari sanctos deroget beneficio mediatoris Christi. / An sancti cum Christo regnantes intelligant vota nostra et desideria, et pro nobis intercedant. / An reliquias et martiria sanctorum debeamus venerari, et an probentur | coram Deo quae ad ipsa fiunt peregrinationes.”

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whether it is allowed to have images of Christ and the saints; whether Christ’s cross and the images of saints are to be venerated; and whether the use of images is ancient, and on what grounds they were introduced in God’s Church.52 In a reflection of earlier time concerns, the theologians received strict instructions aimed at succinctness and efficiency. Only those who presented written opinions were allowed to partake in the disputations. Each opinion (sententia) should be supported by scriptural evidence, if available, and very brief statements of church fathers and councils. One or at most two arguments could be added if so desired; and any textual support should be limited to references, not quotes. Repetitiveness, unproven suppositions, digressions beyond the posed questions, or new questions were to be avoided.53 The sense of urgency reflected in these guidelines was matched by the skepticism of some: the Avisi di Trento, which reported on the initiative on October 28, gave it little chance of success: “If these articles are proposed, it is certain and communis opinio that this council cannot be concluded for another two years.”54 In fact, at least a few opinions were produced.55 Yet the process was soon sidelined for a speedier solution.56 In fact, the situation came to a head in November. On one side, the French threatened to hold a national council and insisted that, to avoid it, Trent

52 53 54 55

56

Ibid., fol. 316v: “De imaginibus. / An liceat imagines Christi et sanctorum habere. / An crux Christi et sanctorum imagines sint venerandae. / An sit antiquus usus imaginum, et qua ratione fuerint [sic] introductus in Dei ecclesiam.” Ibid., fol. 317r (“Circa modum procedendi”). CT 9:906, n. 3. These can be found in the same location: they mostly concern indulgences (ibid., fols. 318r–24r); one addresses several topics, including the veneration of saints, where it is noted that the first two questions were already addressed in Session 6, cap. 3 and can. 5 (ibid., fols. 325r–v). The articles are still mentioned in a letter of Archbishop Muzio Calini of November 15, 1563, but at that point the process had already been abandoned for the sake of speeding up the conclusion of the council: “Furono divulgati già alquanti giorni parecchi articoli dogmi che si doveano disputare da Theologi, come de Indulgentiis, de Purgatorio, de Imaginibus, de ecclesiasticis constitutionibus, et alcune altre materie. Ma poiche è giudicato che sia tanto ispediente accelerare la fine del Concilio, si crede che saranno lasciati addietro, o se pure per sodisfare a’ Francesi s’haverà a definire alcuna cosa delle Indulgenze et delle Imagini questo si farà senza disputa, et per via di conclusioni risolute” (Muzio Calini, Lettere conciliari [1561–1563], ed. Alberto Marani [Brescia: Geroldi, 1963], 566–68, at 567); earlier the letter was published in Baluze-Mansi 4:346, but with an erroneous date (see CT 9:1069).

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should conclude its proceedings by Christmas. On another, the Count of Luna, the ambassador of the Spanish crown, strongly objected to a rush to the finish line, repeating an argument already made in July: it was unacceptable if resolutions on matters of faith were passed without full theological discussion. Entering into the calculus were also political considerations: the conclusion of the Council of Trent would also mark the end of the Interim that had governed the affairs in the Empire for fifteen years. On November 13, these pressures led to a closed-door meeting at Morone’s residence to discuss the path towards a quick resolution of the outstanding issues. These, Lorraine reportedly argued, could be wrapped up in one more council session (session 25). Three committees were formed to prepare proposals for the issues most pressing to the French: purgatory, indulgences, and the cult of saints and images. Yet these subjects were not to receive full theological scrutiny: they had to be treated as matters of reform, and the resulting decree was largely meant to address existing abuses. The committee on images was composed of five prelates (including the bishop of Lanciano, Leonardo Marini, a confidant of the papal legates) and five theologians (including the Jesuit Alfonso Salmerón). The committee went to work, but, as Jedin noted, there is no evidence that it produced any tangible results. Close to two weeks later, Morone reported to Carlo Borromeo that the French kept pressuring him about the image issue. Now he intended to discuss it in a “private congregation of 50 or 60 prelates.” His goal was to see whether any proposal could be generated that might be passed with a placet in a public congregation; if not, he would try to convince Lorraine to conclude the council without addressing this issue, among several others.57 Two days later, Morone met with the French cardinal to make his case. He informed Lorraine that he wanted to move the final session earlier, to the following Thursday (Dec. 2), because the “reform matters” had had “enough time to be expedited.” He hoped to resolve “by way of reform and without disputations” the questions concerning “images, purgatory, and the invocation of the saints.” Yet, Morone added, he still feared that “some malign spirit” would demand that these issues be discussed as matters of “dogma,” causing “long and various contentions.” 57

Letter of Morone to Borromeo, November 25, 1563, AAV, Conc. Trid. 28, fol. 213r–v: “Ne vien fatta qualche instantia per il dogma dell’imagini da Lorena et Francesi, dicendo che questo importa molto per la Francia. Se ne parlerà in una congregatione privata de cinquanta o sessanta prelati [canc. et altri della professione], et se vederemo che ne possi riuscire proponendosi nella publica [i.e., congregatione] che passi per un placet si proponerà, altrimenti faremo ogni cosa per che Lorena si contenti di lasciarlo da banda come gli altri per finire secondo il desiderio di Sua Santità et per uscir quanto prima delli pericoli di questo Concilio non hauend’io al mondo cosa che più mi sia a cuore di questa.”

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Thus he tried to get Lorraine to back off on treating these themes at all, considering that the Spanish ambassador (clearly the “malign spirit” the legate had in mind) remained unaware of Morone’s negotiations with Lorraine. But this was already a moot point: the previous evening Luna had heard the news from French sources. Over the following days he exposed Morone to a torrent of grievances and objections to a quick conclusion of the council, and announced that he would request further instructions from the Spanish king. Meanwhile, Lorraine continued to insist that French interests required decrees about purgatory and images, and he again threatened a French national synod in case Trent did not come through.58 Pending a response from Spain, Morone went ahead and convened the meeting of prelates he had envisioned a few days earlier, but also included cardinals and ambassadors. While the imperial emissaries agreed with the French on the need for decrees on saints, purgatory, and indulgences – these being among the original causes of the Reformation – the conversation quickly produced “such varied and confused” opinions that the legates feared the “intrigue” that might ensue once the actual discussion got started.59 This was no doubt the reason for the formation, on the morning of November 29, of a new deputation, charged with drafting the three remaining decrees.60 This committee met the same afternoon in the residence of the Cardinal of Lorraine, in the presence of Cardinal Ludovico Madruzzo of Trent, who was aligned with the emperor. Simultaneously, as if to underscore the political differences, Count Luna held a secret meeting with the Spanish delegation. He also complained to Morone that “articles of faith were being discussed in secret and private congregations.” Yet Lorraine’s committee continued work over the next two days. On the morning of December 1, the news that Pope Pius IV was gravely ill put further pressure on these activities. That afternoon, some reform articles were distributed to voting members of the Council, while draft texts on purgatory and the veneration of the saints were submitted for review to a number of bishops and theologians. The goal was to prevent that dissent would erupt 58 59 60

Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 490 (based on Šusta 4:420); see also Baluze-Mansi 4:348 (letter of November 29, 1563, specifying Lorraine’s threat of a French national synod). Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 491; Baluze-Mansi 4:348, letter of November 29, 1563. According to a list reported in Šusta 4:422, the committee included five archbishops (including prominent Iberian leaders like Pedro Guerrero of Granada and Bartolomeu dos Mártires of Braga, and the Italian Leonardo Marini of Lanciano), nine bishops (including Martín Pérez de Ayala of Segovia, Egidio Foscarari of Modena, and Iacopo Nacchianti of Chioggia), and the papal theologian Diego Laínez. Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 491 considers this list more accurate than the somewhat different one in CT 3:758, n. 1 (which of the individuals named above lacks only Nacchianti).

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at the general congregation. As it happened, that meeting, held the following day, produced no real roadblocks. After the draft decrees – still new to many – were read, Cardinal Morone assured the assembly that they had been prepared by men of great learning and piety and already approved “by many.”61 Hence his urgent request for brevity in the present meeting. In fact, all remaining decrees – including the reform measures concerning the regular orders – were approved within an hour; and they were published on December 3, during the council’s final session. However, the proceedings did not keep several council fathers from voicing their discontent about the hasty, perfunctory manner in which the council had dispensed with “such serious matters.”62 This rapid succession of events, unfolding amidst a tense political confrontation, suggests a narrow window within which the decree on the invocation of saints, their relics and images was prepared. In all likelihood, as Jedin already noted, no significant text had been produced before November 29. Two days later, a draft was ready for circulation among a select group of reviewers and for approval the next day. 4

A Previously Unknown Draft

How did this text come about? Jedin acknowledged that he did not have it. Yet he claimed to have discovered a key source for it (or at least for the final decree), namely the Sorbonne Sententia produced eighteen months earlier at St. Germain.63 In fact, during the above-mentioned meeting of November 13 61 62

63

Thus Paleotti, in CT 3:760; a similar account, by Nicolas Pseaume of Verdun, in CT, 2:875; and see also Sarpi, Istoria 2:1239. The discontent (also cited in Feld, Der Ikonoklasmus, 198–99; cf. further Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 492–93; and idem, Geschichte, 4/2:180–81) concerned both the decree on purgatory and that on saints and images. Antonio da San Michele Rodríguez, bishop of Montemarano, noted that “due to lack of time, he had not been able to form his opinion, and thus left it to that of the Pope and the Apostolic See,” while Melchor Alvarez, bishop of Guadix, objected not to the “truth of the articles” but to the “rush with which they were published” (CT 9:1079; and cf. Sforza Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento, 2 vols. [Roma: Angelo Bernabó dal Verme Erede del Manelfi, 1656–57], 2:1008 [lib. 24, c. 5]). A day later, Alvarez again noted his displeasure “that such serious matters were so rushed”; and Diego Gilberto Nogueras, bishop of Alife, protested that these decrees “do not affirm many things that must be affirmed, and do not condemn some things that must be condemned, as the needs of the present time require” (ibid., 1097). The French version, presented as the Catholic opinion at St. Germain, is in Paris, Archives Nationales, ms. G8* 588. The text was published by Henri Klipffel, Le Colloque de Poissy: Étude sur la crise religieuse et politique de 1561 (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1867), 176–79; and earlier in Collection des procès-verbaux des Assemblées-Générales du Clergé de France

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the Cardinal of Lorraine, evidently to speed up the discussion and push the French views on the image question, had held up a “decree of the Sorbonne” as a model for the Tridentine legislation – a proposal that was reportedly well received. According to one source, Pallavicino’s history of the Council of Trent, the council leadership judged that in this as in other remaining dogmatic questions – purgatory, indulgences, the invocation of the saints – prior conciliar pronouncements would suffice, but that current abuses needed to be addressed.64 A comparison of the Sententia with the Tridentine decree, or more precisely the portion concerning images, led Jedin to find considerable overlaps and hence to declare the Sententia the model (Vorlage) of the decree. Jedin’s argument was suggestive: the Sententia appeared to clinch his case that Trent’s image decree was largely the result of Lorraine’s intervention, arising from French religious conditions and aimed at addressing them. That case, which has been followed by subsequent scholarship, remains strong as far as the politics are concerned, and the influence of the Sententia is undeniable. Yet Jedin’s interpretation needs to be qualified. The reasons are twofold. First, a critical examination of Jedin’s textual comparison suggests that he may have overstated the decree’s dependence on the Sententia. Second, analysis of the newly discovered document published in this volume – a draft of the decree that is more likely to be the Vorlage which Jedin sought – allows for a more complete and coherent explanation of the textual history. (For the sake of convenience, we will refer to this text as the Draft, and to the final decree on saints, relics, and images as the Decree.) Let us start with Jedin’s comparison (reproduced in Appendix 1). The German scholar discovered several instances in which the Decree evidently adopted specific terminology of the Sententia. The Decree’s norms for the bishop’s educational role included two instructions already given in remarkably similar terms in the Sententia:

64

depuis l’année 1560 jusqu’à présent, tome 1 (Paris: Guillaume Desprez, 1767), 38–39. For an English translation see Wallis-Watkins, The Second Commandment, 25–27. The Latin text (based on AAV, Conc. Trid. 41, ff. 287r–88r) is published in CT 13/1:581–83. A contemporary source is the diary of Pedro Gonçalez de Mendoça of Salamanca (CT 2:633–719, at 712; cf. Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 488): “Y el card. de Lorena mostrò un decreto que se avía hecho en Paris sobre la adoracion de las imagines, que agradó mucho a todos.” Pallavicino noted this recommendation in his Istoria del Concilio di Trento (cf. Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 474): “Intorno a’ dogmi non ancora quivi decisi per professione sopra il Purgatorio, le Indulgenze, la Invocazione de’ Santi, e le Immagini, fu considerato che assai se ne troverebbe ne’ Concilij passati, nondimeno volersi dirne alcuna cosa per maniera di corregger gli abusi. E specialmente intorno all’ultimo punto il Cardinal di Loreno mostrò un decreto della Sorbona che molto lor soddisfece” (Pallavicino, Istoria, 2:995 [lib. 24, § 6]).

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that the people be instructed through pictures, representations, images, and stories of our redemption and confirmed in the articles of faith; and Thus it is a clear benefit to have images because of the profit and utility which may be derived from them, so that, on the one hand, the people are admonished about the benefits and gifts we receive from Christ and, on the other, that the gifts and salutary examples of his saints are represented to us, so that we may praise God for them and imitate their virtue and on this account are moved to love God, correct our lives, and practice piety …65 In other instances the Decree appears to have adopted a phrase from the Sententia – “if someone places trust in images, just as the pagans did in their idols” – but moved it to a different part of the text, raising the question whether the Decree derived its structure from the Sententia.66 Yet other parallels noted by Jedin convey similar points but exhibit a weaker likeness of wording: “to make and have images and place them in churches” versus “that images must be had and kept especially in churches.” It may be doubted that a similarity like this resulted from conscious borrowing.67 In fact, such wording was already found in the decree of Nicaea II, as well as the Draft. A subtle but more significant influence is the emphatic distinction in the Sententia between the latria owed to Christ and the dulia due to the saints. The drafters of the Decree did 65

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See for the Latin text, Appendix 1, § 2. The parallel passages in the Decree read in translation: “that, by means of the histories of the mysteries of our Redemption, depicted by paintings or other representations, the people are instructed, and strengthened in remembering, and continually reflecting on the articles of faith”; and “as also that great profit is derived from sacred images, not only because the people are thereby admonished of the benefits and gifts which have been bestowed upon them by Christ, but also because the miracles of God through the means of the saints, and their salutary examples, are set before the eyes of the faithful; that so for those things they may give God thanks, may order their own life and manners in imitation of the saints, and may be excited to adore and love God, and to cultivate piety” (CDCT, 214). See Appendix 1, § 4 of the Sententia; for another example, see § 3 of the same text (“si in imaginibus existimaretur esse aliqua divinitas aut virtus …”) found in the opening sentence of the Decree’s section on images. Appendix 1, § 1. For another example, see § 5: “ne cui privato liceat ullam erigere aut erigendum curare imaginem absque authoritate episcopi” (Sententia) versus “nemini licere ullo in loco vel ecclesia, etiam quomodolibet exempta, ullam insolitam ponere vel ponendum curare imaginem, nisi ab episcopo approbata fuerit” (Decree); in fact, the final language was based largely on the Draft (see Appendix 3, § 13).

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not adopt this terminology and its dense theological connotations. Yet in revising the Draft (which envisioned “adoration” for both Christ and the saints) they reserved “adoration” for Christ and only “veneration” for the saints – and, in each instance, only for their prototypes, not their images. Beyond these possible influences, however, considerable stretches of the Decree bear no textual resemblance to the Sententia; vice versa, several significant points and passages of the latter are ignored in the Decree. Absent in the Decree is the Sententia’s qualified endorsement of the representation of the Trinity and its explicit prohibition of image-breaking.68 Equally ignored is much of the Sorbonne theologians’ discussion of abuses, an issue whose urgency was stressed in the same passage in which Pallavicino cited the usefulness of the Sententia.69 The Draft not only allows us to settle several of these doubts, but in the process also emerges as a more direct Vorlage for the Decree. The text occupies two folios in volume 7 of the series Concilium Tridentinum at the Vatican Archives. At first sight, the document presents several philological challenges. It bears no title, is undated, unsigned, nor otherwise characterized or classified by the author or later archivists. It is written in a professional scribal hand, which can also be found elsewhere in the volume. Yet its archival location offers some guidance: much of volume 7 concerns deliberations held during the last few months of the Council, including extensive documentation on the debates about matrimony (session 24) and monastic reform (session 25). More significantly, the Draft was inserted (and subsequently bound) within another document, namely the text of the preface and book II of Ory’s De imaginum cultu discussed above.70 An archivist later marked this quire as pertaining to “Session 25”; the same hand similarly identified other documents in this archival unit.71 That the Draft is thus found adjacent to Ory’s text constitutes a significant clue, to which we will return shortly. First we must consider how the document’s content, combined with our knowledge of the decree’s preparation, allows us to identify it as a draft, in all likelihood prepared, discussed, and revised between November 29 and December 1, 1563. 68

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On the discussions about the Trinity at St. Germain, see Jan Hallebeek, “Papal Prohibitions Midway between Rigor and Laxity. On the Issue of Depicting the Holy Trinity,” in Iconoclasm and Iconoclash: Struggle for Religious Identity, ed. Willem van Asselt et al. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), 353–83, esp. 366–67. For these points in the Sententia, see Appendix 1, §§ 2, 5, and 3–5, respectively. The Ory text occupies the bulk (fols. 283r–305v) of the quire starting at fol. 277 and ending at fol. 309 of AAV, Conc. Trid. 7; the Draft is at fols. 279–80. For more details, see the notes accompanying the editions of these texts, pp. 188 and 370 below. The documents, bound in AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, starting at fols. 4r, 35r, and 77r are marked “Ad Sess. 24”; that starting at fol. 125r, “Ad Sess. 14 et 24”; and those starting at fols. 205r, 237r, 277r, and 310r, “Ad Sess. 25.”

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The Draft offers a complete and fairly polished decree text which corresponds to the content and structure of the entire Decree (unlike the Sententia, which is only concerned with sacred images). This makes it improbable, but not impossible, that it was written prior to November 29: as we have seen, other sources indicate that at that point the image question was still considered open and unresolved. The Draft is roughly organized into two parts. The first offers a defense of the cult of the saints, relics, and sacred images on the basis of prior conciliar legislation, especially the Sixth and Seventh Ecumenical Councils, along with scripture, patristic literature, and tradition. The Sixth Council (the Third Council of Constantinople, 680–681) had defended the invocation of the saints, whereas the Seventh (the Second Council of Nicaea, 787) was largely devoted to a defense of the veneration of images.72 As the authors turned to this subject (§ 3), they referred again to Nicaea II, but also cited the Roman Synod (731), convened by Pope Gregory III to condemn iconoclasm, and the Council of Frankfurt (794). This last reference is remarkable: like Pérez in his De traditionibus, they were evidently still unaware that the Carolingian council had actually condemned Nicaea II.73 The second, longer part of the Draft discusses abuses, particularly in the making and veneration of images. The document thus reflects suggestions made during Morone’s negotiations with Lorraine that the decree limit itself to affirming earlier councils and addressing abuses. As we compare it to the final text, we note that the Decree replaced the references to the earlier councils with the authority of Trent. Furthermore, the Draft text was slimmed down as elaborations and examples, especially in the section on abuses, were cut. Third, some terminology common in scholastic debates about images (sign, word, adoration) was removed. Finally, a few sections were revised using language from the Sententia. This last point requires some explanation, as it could be objected that the Sententia might have formed the basis of the Draft. Textual analysis quickly rules out that possibility. Precisely those phrases from the Sententia that show the most direct influence on the Decree clarify the process of composition. They do not occur in the Draft, and hence must represent a revision of the 72

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See for the 1551 Crabbe edition most likely consulted by the council fathers, CCOS, 416 (Constantinople III, canon 7, ordering that the faithful “solo Deo creatore suo adorato, invocet sanctos, ut pro se intercedere apud maiestatem divinam dignentur”) and 461–609 (Nicaea II), particularly 598–99 for the decree text. It should be noted that neither Crabbe’s three-volume edition of church councils nor Carranza’s shorter selection contained the text of the Council of Frankfurt. Yet its critical stance vis-à-vis Nicaea II was noted in the introduction of the 1549 Paris edition of the Libelli Carolini, fols. [vi]v–[viii]r. For Pérez, see above, chapter 2, p. 38 and n. 7.

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latter. For example, the condemnation of pagan fiducia, or trust, in images is not found in the Draft.74 As the first paragraph on images in the Draft was revised, the phrase was lifted from a later section in the Sententia and thus ended up in the Decree. Similarly, the final text adopted the wording of the Sententia, replacing a similar point of the Draft, in referring to idolatrous beliefs in some “divinity or power” inherent in images.75 Third, the explanation of bishops’ teaching responsibilities in the Decree was clearly meant to improve on the third paragraph of the Draft, which merely stated “that the people receive clear explanation” of what prior councils, synods, church fathers, and tradition had declared; this generic language was removed and the wording of the Sententia ended up in the Decree.76 In all these cases, it would be hard to explain how the Sententia served as the original basis of the Draft. Clearly, the opposite was the case. This conclusion also allows us to account for the weaker similarities in Jedin’s comparison.77 Here, the Decree simply used the language of the Draft, with at most minor revisions, while the Sententia made similar points in different words. The discovery of the Draft thus enriches our understanding of the Tridentine image decree. While we do not know who authored the document, its existence and its precedence over the Sententia no doubt diminish the influence of the French document on the Decree – the core of Jedin’s thesis. The text also clarifies the genesis of the Decree in a way the Sententia does not: by showing how the council document evolved out of a reflection on prior councils, especially Nicaea II, and how it was additionally focused on the problem of abuses, to which the bulk of the text was devoted. On this last point, the Draft offers multiple concrete examples the council fathers had in mind as they condemned aberrations which the final Decree described only in general terms: representing the Trinity as a three-headed man, carrying around relics or images in ritual fashion, erecting family monuments in church, and so forth. The rejection of depictions of a tricephalous deity is noteworthy: despite a well-known condemnation of this representation by Antoninus of Florence, it had taken on new life in the Savonarolan movement of the sixteenth century: hence its use by artists close to the convent of San Marco, such as Fra Bartolommeo, Pontormo, and Andrea del Sarto (Fig. 10).78 The prohibition of 74 75 76 77 78

See Appendix 1, § 4. Appendix 1, § 3; cf. Appendix 3, § 4. Appendix 1, § 2; cf. Appendix 3, § 2. Appendix 1, §§ 1 and 5; cf. Appendix 3, §§ 4 and 13. See Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, “La Trinité trifrons en France dans le sillage de Savonarole,” in Circulation des idées et des pratiques politiques, France et Italie (XIIIe–XVIe siècle) (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 2013), 235–48 (241 and 244–45 on the Italian painters

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figure 10 Andrea del Sarto, The Trinity, c. 1511, arch medallion in the Cenacolo di San Salvi, Florence Image in public domain

this motif in the Draft is all the more interesting given the approval, in the Sententia, of representations of “signs and figures” under which the Trinity had appeared in the Bible: perhaps discussions on the topic had failed to produce consensus, and both stipulations were omitted. One further example is worth separate mention: the depiction of the Virgin Mary in pain due to childbirth. Ambrogio Catarino had already listed this among the ‘abuses’ to be avoided in light of Mary’s unique status. The specificity of this link suggests that the close to San Marco). Deswarte-Rosa rightly mentions that Catarino, a fervent Savonarolan in his younger years, came to reject the friar as a false prophet in the 1540s (ibid., 241; and cf. Caravale, Sulle tracce, 258–73); it should be noted, however, that the Sienese Dominican, in his disputation on sacred images, endorsed the representation of the Trinity (e.g., in § 10) and did not include the tricephalous Christ in his list of abusi. For further background on the three-headed Trinity, see Hallebeek, “Papal Prohibitions”; for a recent literature review, see Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, “Not So Unorthodox: A Reevaluation of Tricephalous Images of the Trinity,” Theological Studies, 79, 2 (2018), 399–426. These authors are unaware of the Tridentine discussions, but note the subsequent criticism of Molanus and the papal prohibitions by Urban VIII (1628) and Benedict XIV (1745).

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similarities between the influential Dominican’s Disputatio and the Tridentine decree (already noted in chapter 2) may have rested on direct consultation of this work. Equally significant, the same point, while removed from the Decree, reappeared in the form of a doctrinal clarification in the Tridentine Catechism. “To Eve it was said,” we read there, “‘in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children’ [Gen. 3:16]. Mary was exempt from this law, for preserving her virginal integrity inviolate she brought forth Jesus the Son of God without experiencing […] any sense of pain” (Fig. 11).79 Other parallels confirm that, as far as the discussion of abuses was concerned, the Tridentine fathers may have drawn on Catarino’s disputation as much as, or more than, on the Sententia. Heading the list of abuses, in Catarino’s text and the Decree, was “falsehood,” and other problems noted in both included impropriety in the settings and care for sacred images and lascivious representations. This last point deserves special mention, since recent scholarship has claimed, based on Jedin’s reconstruction, that the concern about lecherous art was French and, by implication, not shared by the Italians and others. To make this point, the genealogy of this element of Trent’s decree has even been extended backward from the Sententia to the Council of Sens (1527).80 Yet a comparison of this section of the Decree with the Draft shows that the latter was unquestionably the source; seen in this light, the similarity with the Sententia appears superficial even if the underlying concern was the same. 79

80

Catechismus ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini ad Parochos Pii V. Pont. Max. iussu editus (Romae: apud Paulum Manutium, 1566), 50: “Evae dictum est: In dolore paries filios. Maria hac lege soluta est, ut quae, salva virginalis pudicitiae integritate, sine ullo doloris sensu, ut antea dictum est, Iesum filium Dei peperit.” The translation is that of Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests, trans. John A. McHugh and Charles J. Callan (New York-London: Joseph Wagner/Herder, 1923), 46. The earlier passage referenced is: “… quo modo solis radii concretam vitri substantiam penetrant, neque frangunt tamen aut aliqua ex parte laedunt: simili, inquam, et altiori modo Iesus Christus ex materno alvo sine ullo maternae virginitatis detrimento editus est” (ibid., 49; trans. Catechism, 45–46). O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images”; and based on this, idem, Trent: What Happened at the Council (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 244. It is worth noting that besides Italian authors, such as Catarino and Zini, authoritative voices in Germany also voiced concern about lascivious images. See, e.g., Charles V’s Formula Reformationis issued at the time of the Augsburg Interim: “Similiter petulantes et obscenae imagines, libidinum incitamenta cum multa foeditate ostendentes, vel ad ludibrium religionis, aut ad certorum hominum infamiam effigiatae, prohibeantur” (“Similarly, lascivious and obscene images, which show lecherous incitements with great filthiness, or are depicted to deride religion or defame certain people, must be prohibited”; Formula Reformationis per Caesaream Maiestatem, Statibus Ecclesiasticis, in Comitiis Augustanis ad deliberandum proposita et ab eisdem … probata et recepta [Augustae Vindelicorum: Ulhard, 1548], fol. G-r).

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figure 11 Paolo di Stefano (attr.), after design of Donatello, Virgin & Child with Eve, painted relief, c. 1435–40 © Victoria and Albert Museum, London

Finally, the Draft confirms the disinterest of its authors – members of the small committee installed in late November – in broaching doctrinal matters beyond the reaffirmation of prior teaching and tradition, especially Nicaea II. In making this choice, they appeared to follow the path taken by one in their midst, Martín Pérez de Ayala, now bishop of Segovia, in his De traditionibus of 1549, while ignoring his attack against the scholastics. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that this attack, and the responses it had elicited, were actually discussed at Trent. Let us see how.

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A Question about Honor

Amidst the reticence surrounding the composition of the reform decrees on saints, images, and purgatory, one source describes a disagreement during a meeting, allegedly held in November 1563, in which the image question was discussed. According to Paolo Sarpi’s Istoria del Concilio Tridentino, the Dominican Leonardo Marini, archbishop of Lanciano, had pointed out that images were to be honored only “in relation to the thing signified.” This had prompted an objection from Diego Laínez, who argued instead that an image, once installed and dedicated in a sacred space, deserved a separate honor owed to all consecrated objects, such as sacred vessels and vestments. This honor was “objective” and to be distinguished from the “relative” honor addressed to the subject of the image. Laínez’s point would have raised nettlesome questions. Was the veneration of images a single or dual act? If its “objective” component was addressed to the materiality of the image, this might renew fears of idolatry. These difficulties would explain the solution proposed by the meeting chair, Cardinal Legate Stanislaus Hosius. He preferred Marini’s “clear and simple” wording, but suggested that the decree stay away from “language that could reflect poorly on the other,” that is, Laínez’s view. In other words, the cardinal wished to avoid the appearance of a theological problem or disagreement.81 We do not know if Sarpi’s account is accurate. If it is, the exchange likely occurred during one of the closed-door meetings concerning the image decree – those held between November 29 and December 1, 1563. Both Marini and Laínez were members of the committee charged with resolving this issue. Hosius’s presence may be explained not only by his role as legate, but also based on the familiarity this former papal nuncio to the Empire had with Protestant theological literature; at this stage, as we have seen, the imperial party had joined the French in their demand for decrees on images, purgatory, 81

Sarpi, Istoria, 2:1232–33. Trent’s image decree, formulated in the language of Nicaea II rather than scholastic terminology, speaks of only one kind of honor: “honos, qui eis [imaginibus] exhibetur, refertur ad prototypa, quae illae repraesentant” (COD, 775). According to Sarpi, a similar approach was taken to overcome a disagreement about purgatory (“meglio era non dir altro…,” Sarpi, Istoria, 2:1232). In discussing the general congregation of December 2, Sarpi again noted Hosius’s role: “furono letti li decreti del purgatorio e de’ santi come erano stati formati dal cardinal varmiense et altri deputati” (Sarpi, Istoria, 2:1239). Sarpi’s account is noted in Fabre, Décréter l’image, 95–100, who seems to doubt its historicity. Yet Fabre assumes incorrectly that Hosius was no longer legate and had already left Trent, and that Sarpi conflated the 1563 meeting with one held in November 1562. In reality, Hosius was the last of the legates to depart, on December 14, 1563 (Jedin, Geschichte 4/2: 225); his active involvement until the end is evident from a letter by Morone discussed below.

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and indulgences. Hosius’s role may appear more surprising in light of his apparent opposition to Morone’s push to finish the council without reconciling the Spanish; nevertheless, even Morone recognized that as a legate Hosius had no choice but to “obey the will of Our Lord.”82 However this may be, Sarpi’s source remains unclear, and the author has been mistrusted by some for his assumed parti pris. Yet here, if not elsewhere, it may be misguided to discount the astute Servite. Not only does the exchange have a specificity that suggests a measure of reliability, but the reported exchange highlights unresolved theological issues raised by the midcentury authors discussed earlier, particularly Pérez, Ory, and Catarino. In fact, their views may have directly informed the discussions at Trent. First, we should consider the presence of Ory’s treatise (at least the preface and book II) among the files of the council in its final stages. We know that in the late summer of 1563 Carlo Borromeo had promised the legates a shipment of texts concerning the cult of images, gathered by Protonotary Guglielmo Sirleto, including a Vatican copy of Nicaea II and, presumably, the Ory manuscript.83 That the latter ended up in the same archival location as the Draft decree – which, in fact, was inserted into it – strongly suggests that the disputation was considered during the deliberations on the image question. Archbishop Marini’s remark reported by Sarpi may help clarify how and why. As we have seen, at the heart of Ory’s argument was the notion that the observation (and, likewise, the veneration) of sacred images was a phenomenon 82

83

See n. 60 above for the membership of the committee; Sarpi was evidently unaware of the earlier committee, formed on November 13 to consider the remaining decrees on purgatory, indulgences, and saints, relics, and images. On Hosius, see Jedin, Geschichte, 4/1, 57–58 (and passim). Morone reported Hosius’s reluctance, which was shared by his fellow legate Navagero, in a letter to Borromeo of November 29, 1563, acknowledging that both men “come legati non potevano non ubidir la volontà di N.S.re” (Š usta 4:426; see also Borromeo’s reply, ibid., 453–54). The letter (AAV, Conc. Trid. 68, no. 87) is cited by Paschini, “Guilelmo Sirleto prima del cardinalato,” 265: “si manderanno medesimamente la VIIa Sinodo de Imaginibus che era in libraria Vaticana ed alcun’altre scritture e volumi che il Protonotario Sirleto ha trovato e mette insieme per aiutar queste materie”; see also Giovanni Mercati, Opere minori, 6 vols. (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1937–84), 3:371; Šusta, 4:162. Throughout the fall, Sirleto sent sets of excerpts of ancient patristic and conciliar sources on the subjects being discussed at Trent. They included two letters, of November 24 and 27, containing sources on sacred images; it is unclear whether these letters arrived in time to be considered for the decree. For these letters, and partial transcriptions, see Pierre Antoine Fabre, “Le problème de l’image dans le dernier acte du Concile de Trente: documents inédits du mois de novembre 1563,” in La dramatique conciliaire de l’Antiquité à Vatican II, ed. Guillaume Cuchet and Charles Mériaux (Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2019), 115–36 (I thank Professor Fabre for sending me a copy of his article).

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mediated by, but bypassing, the material object. Here he strongly rejected Pérez’s contention that, in the act of veneration if not that of perception, the image and the represented could never be the same. For Ory, this implied that there were two objects of perception and veneration, which he found absurd. Hence the inevitable conclusion: the perception of the image and the imaged, the sign and the signified, was one and the same process; the same held true for veneration. In making this case, Ory repeatedly explained the nature of the image qua image as relational. Iacopo Nacchianti, another member of Trent’s image committee, had made a similar argument (while, as we have seen, placing greater stress on the likeness of image and represented) in his Romans commentary of 1557. It is not surprising that Marini, a Dominican like Ory and Nacchianti, would have adopted a semiotic analysis as a simple way to explain the veneration of images while avoiding materialist implications. The remark attributed to Laínez seems at first more surprising, as it goes beyond what he had argued at St. Germain. There he had emphasized that perceiving, venerating, and honoring images was a unitary process of engagement with the represented rather than the representation. It was a position, quite similar to Ory’s, which he may have deemed necessary in that charged public setting to defend the practice against charges of idolatry. Yet it is conceivable that at Trent, in a closed meeting among likeminded men, he may have felt free to discuss the image question as part of a broader understanding of sacred objects and spaces; this would explain the remark Sarpi attributed to him.84 There were, moreover, several precedents. In his famous disputation, Ambrogio Catarino, well known to Laínez, had not only distinguished internal and external forms of honor, but also identified a reason why images deserved respect on account of being sacred objects installed in holy spaces. Thus the question of how the faithful were to approach images received a twofold answer, namely: with that honor and veneration that is owed them due to what they refer to, and due to the sanctification they receive by being set up for these sacred uses, so that we will adore and invoke the Majesty before them, and give her thanks and glory and perform the other parts of prayer, pleading, requesting, and beseeching. Just as temples, shrines, and altars are consecrated, blessed, and made worthy to be called house or place of prayer, likewise images intended for this holy office, no doubt with the inspiration of the holy Ghost, deserve and obtain sanctification, so that 84

This perspective, as I have argued elsewhere, appears to have matured among leading Jesuits in the 1560s and 1570s. See my forthcoming “Image, Adoration, Meditation.”

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whoever violates them is considered to have violated something sacred, not profane, and also incurs the crime of lèse-majesté (41). For Catarino, consequently, there was a major difference between a painting while it remained in an artist’s workshop and one that had been installed in a church or shrine; yet he stopped short of requiring a special dedication. Again, it was Nacchianti who had made the same point – perhaps based on his reading of Catarino – in his exegesis of Paul’s letter to the Romans: images were held sacred in their own right thanks to their context and location in a church building, shrine, or other religious site. But neither Catarino nor Nacchianti had solved a concomitant theoretical problem identified by Matthieu Ory: did the sacrality of images have one source or two – as sacred object and sacred representation – and hence require one or two kinds of honor?85 It was a challenging issue, and not only because it affected the way in which one accounted intellectually for the process of perception and veneration. When it came to defending the practice against Protestant charges of idolatry, the key issue was whether the material artifact – the image qua thing – had any place in the definition of its sacrality. If we assume that Sarpi was correct, this problem had re-emerged at Trent. If so, it was precisely the kind of theological conundrum the council leadership wished to avoid. That would explain why Legate Hosius took the diplomatic route and suppressed it altogether. The result was a pregnant silence, however, as it left the underlying problem unresolved. Sarpi’s account thus suggests a way in which the deliberations at Trent may have been connected to the midcentury debates about images. It does not address the question whether Pérez or Nacchianti – both members of the image committee – took a position in the dispute reported here. Regardless, both embodied the continuity of debate. The reconstruction sketched here – especially insofar as it depends on Sarpi’s account – no doubt remains provisional at this point. Yet it may find support in a closer analysis of the theological language and definitions deployed in the surviving texts – the Draft, the Sententia, and the Decree – and the principles of revision they document. Such an analysis further confirms the cautious approach taken by the authors of the Decree. This is most evident in the first section of the discussion of sacred images, the only one to define their value and function. As noted, on that issue the Draft referred back to the Second Council of Nicaea. In fact, in describing their use it adopted some of the very 85

Ory (§§ 42 and 69) had made the point in objecting to Pérez’s distinction between the image and the represented. This implied, incorrectly according to Ory, that neither perception nor veneration was a unitary process.

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language used in the then-current Longolius translation of the Nicene decree.86 A comparison of the two texts shows some noteworthy structural similarities and terminological borrowings (see Appendix 2), suggesting that the authors of the Draft consulted the Byzantine decree or even drafted the relevant section of their own on this basis. Thus the aforementioned phrase “images to be held and kept especially in churches” (Imagines … in templis praesertim habendas et retinendas) marked by Jedin as derived from the Sententia, appears to be based directly on the Nicene text (imagines … in templis sanctis Dei collocandas habendasque). More broadly, the Tridentine fathers retained the core concepts of Nicaea II: the idea that images had a legitimate place and function in churches; that they deserved to be honored by the faithful; and that this honor was to be addressed to their prototypes. Yet in the revision process multiple significant changes occurred. The Nicene decree, in defining the legitimate cult of images, ended in the following distinction: adoration and honor ought to be rendered to images of Christ and the saints not as if these acts were “the true worship (latria) corresponding to our faith, which pertains to the divine nature alone,” but in the way they were traditionally bestowed on the cross and the gospels, and in offerings of incense and light. The reason was as follows: “the honor paid to the image passes over to the prototype, and whoever adores the image adores in it also the depicted subject.”87 The Draft abbreviated this passage as follows, introducing two different distinctions. First, external acts of devotion before images (kneeling, kissing, uncovering and bowing the head, and so forth) expressed an internal affect directed at their prototypes. Second, “the adoration and honor are not of the images but of Christ and the saints who by way of those images occur to our memory” (emphasis added). In the process, the argument had subtly shifted: whereas the Nicene decree had compared images to other sacred objects (and the cult of images to other 86

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Of course, the council fathers may have relied on another translation (or even the Greek text). Particularly, the ninth-century translation by Anastasius Bibliothecarius was available in manuscript form (of which a modern edition is in CUNS, where the decree is found at 827). It is possible that this was the version that Cardinal Sirleto sent to Trent in the summer of 1563 (see above, n. 83); his library contained two copies (currently, BAV, Ottob. lat. 767 and 994; see CUNS, xlii–xliii; and Francesco Russo, “La biblioteca del Card. Sirleto,” in Il Card. Guglielmo Sirleto [1514–1585]. Atti del convegno di studio nel IV Centenario della morte, 5–7 ottobre 1986, ed. Leonardo Calabretta and G. Sinatora [Catanzaro-Squillace: Istituto di scienze religiose, 1989], 219–99, at 243 and 265). Nevertheless, if Nicaea II was consulted at Trent, the Longolius version appears a more likely candidate; for example, Longolius used the term prototypus (rather than Anastasius’s primitivus) adopted in the Draft and the Decree. Translations based on ASCN 2: 565, but revised to reflect Longolius’s Latin version.

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devotions), the Draft focused only on the adoration of images, to emphasize that it was not aimed at the object but at the represented. If this point was also intended by Nicaea II, it seemed contradicted by Longolius: his translation (adopted by Crabbe, but corrected by later Latin versions) implied that an image was adored both as an object and a representation: “whoever adores the image adores in it also the depicted subject” (emphasis added).88 As we saw, the Draft corrected this line with a flat denial that the image itself was being adored (“the adoration and honor are not of the images but of Christ and the saints …”). Yet this went a step too far for the final editors at Trent: they removed the first part of the phrase.89 The final Decree thus erased the fathers’ consideration of the image as object, both by removing an explicit statement on the issue from their draft and by avoiding the Nicene comparison with other sacred objects. Here we see the clearest internal evidence of the Tridentine discussion described by Sarpi and the solution he attributed to Cardinal Hosius. Furthermore, the final redaction reserved the term ‘adoration’ for Christ, not (as both Nicaea II and the Draft allowed) for the saints, who were to be venerated. As suggested earlier, the term ‘veneration’ may have been borrowed from the Sententia (where it no doubt served to preempt continued Huguenot accusations of idolatry), but the distinction was made this clearly only at Trent. The addition of explanations of idolatrous or superstitious attitudes – one element was introduced in the Draft, then revised; a second was based on the Sententia; and a third was added anew – reflected the same objective. Equally noteworthy is what did not make its way into the Decree. Absent in the final text is any discussion, or even a hint, of the scholastic debates about images – about the working of perception, the relation between sign and 88

89

LCN, fol. 88r; similarly, Petrus Crabbe’s 1551 edition (CCOS, 599) derived from LCN (see above, p. 26 and n. 46). Later Latin translations, such as that in COD, 136, omit the word “also” (quoque). Lamberz’s critical edition of the original Greek text and the ninth-century Latin translation by Anastasius Bibliothecarius demonstrates that the council never used the word: see CUNS, 826–27. In another way, the fathers’ reliance on Longolius’s translation may have played into their tendency to diminish the substantive bond between the image and the imaged. In the sentence quoted in this paragraph (“whoever adores the image adores in it also the depicted subject”), Longolius translated the Greek hypostasis with the Latin argumentum (“subject”), unlike Anastasius, who had used the term subsistentia (“substance”). This might help explain what Pierre Antoine Fabre has called the “rupture [made by Trent] of the alliance between prototype and hypostasis in the Nicene formula” (Fabre, “Qu’est-ce que la postérité du Concile de Trente? Le cas du culte des images,” in Trent and Beyond: The Council, Other Powers, Other Cultures, ed. Michela Catto and Adriano Prosperi [Turnhout: Brepols, 2017], 83–99, at 84).

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signified, or the distinction between the image ‘qua thing’ and ‘qua image.’ This may also have been the reason for the elimination of references to ‘memory’ (present both in the Nicene text and the Draft), ‘internal affect,’ ‘word’ (vox), and ‘sign’ (all in the Draft, ‘sign’ also in the Sententia). Only the term ‘representation’ occurs in the Decree, borrowed from the Sententia; in fact, the concept appears to have been used unproblematically in earlier sixteenth-century debates. In sum, the final text – in its doctrinal passages considered here – reflected a concerted effort, externally, to ward off Protestant attacks against sacred images and, internally, to steer clear of the thickets of Catholic theological debate. 6

Beyond Trent: Paleotti to Bellarmino

Scholarship of the last two decades has stressed that the Council of Trent, for all its importance, was by no means the sole arbiter of what has traditionally been called ‘post-Tridentine’ Catholicism. Particularly, the papacy and the Holy Office, whose early development has been subject of major studies since the opening of its archives in 1998, have been (re)discovered as major players behind the scenes. The point does not merely concern the implementation of the conciliar decrees, but also the policies and decisions that bypassed the council altogether. Recent studies have thus drawn attention to what Adriano Prosperi has called the “history that did not pass through Trent.”90 The question of sacred images might never have been discussed, much less decided, by the Tridentine assembly, had it not been for the French insistence that the council take a stance in this matter. Yet, as we have seen, even the decree that was eventually promulgated deliberately avoided entering into theoretical debates that had been revived in the previous fifteen years. What is more, the complex questions raised during that period continued to reverberate in post-Tridentine art-theoretical writings. A full examination of this influence is beyond the scope of this book. It may be helpful, however, to suggest how some key issues and trends of the 1550s and early 1560s returned in later debates. In a nutshell, we can say that the tension between two ways of understanding the sacred image continued to play out: a referential view of the image as a sign of something else; and its categorization as a sacred object among others.

90

Prosperi, Il Concilio di Trento, 143.

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On the one hand, it is clear that Thomist formulations of the function of sacred images did not disappear. They re-emerged in multiple post-Tridentine art treatises, including Gabriele Paleotti’s seminal Discorso intorno alle imagini. Interpretations of this treatise have often focused on the work’s reform proposals laid out in Book II.91 But it is in Paleotti’s theological discussions in Book I that we can detect continuities with earlier theoretical debates. Speaking of the “much debated and scrutinized” nature of veneration, he followed Trent’s lead in vowing to “leave scholastic questions aside,” but nevertheless posed the central issue in those terms: “Whether the same cult is owed to a sacred image as the cult suitable to its ‘imaged’ prototype, and whether this is a single act, and how.”92 Paleotti’s answer was plainly affirmative. Sacred images, he explained, deserved honor neither for their material properties nor for the design and artistry of their maker, but only on account of their representational function: It is on this basis that the honor appropriate to the represented thing can also be mysteriously attributed to the images, according to the grades of latria, hyperdulia, and dulia explained above. Nor will these be two different acts aiming at two distinct terms but one and the same act bearing on the same object, although in one mode for the image and another mode for the “imaged” [l’imaginato].93 This interpretation follows Ory almost literally. In fact, the Bolognese cardinal moved even closer to a strong Thomist identification of representation and represented by stressing the need for images of saints to represent their models “vividly and realistically” (vivamente e realmente). The point is striking, for it implies that the work of the artist had more to do with the suggested 91 92

93

See on this point chapter 1, pp. 6–7. Gabriele Paleotti, Discorso intorno alle imagini sacre e profane, book I, chapters 30–32, in Trattati d’arte del Cinquecento, ed. Paola Barocchi, 3 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1960–62), 2:246– 58 (quotes at 251 and 254); English trans. by William McCuaig, Discourse on Sacred and Profane Images (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2012), 131–39 (quotes at 134 and 136). See further Elisabetta Selmi, “Un contributo per la teoresi delle ‘immagini sacre’ nella trattatistica figurativa del Cinquecento,” in Visibile teologia. Il libro sacro figurato in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento, ed. Erminia Ardissino and Elisabetta Selmi (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012), 285–308. Paleotti, Discourse, 137; the Italian reads: “… di qui nasce che quell’onore che si conviene alla cosa rappresentata si potrà ancora misteriosamente tribuire alla imagine, secondo i gradi di latrìa, iperdulìa e dulìa, di sopra da noi dichiarati. Né saranno questi due atti diversi, che mirino due termini distinti, ma è un istesso atto, portato in un medesimo oggetto, ancorché sotto modo diverso tra la imagine e l’imaginato” (Trattati d’arte del Cinquecento, 2:255).

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likeness – and hence with the honor that could “mysteriously” be attributed to it – than Paleotti’s own theoretical position allowed.94 But it was in line with that position that he spoke unapologetically of the ‘adoration’ of sacred images – a term the Sorbonne theologians at St. Germain and the council fathers at Trent had shied away from. This was not a route taken by all. But in a different way, the semiotic theory of perception central to scholastic interpretations of the religious image had a lasting influence. As we have seen, theologians like Feliciano Ninguarda and Diego Laínez developed this interpretive tradition to articulate the role of sacred images in meditative practice. This legacy endured especially within the Jesuit order, as is evidenced, for instance, in Jerónimo Nadal’s profoundly influential project of the Adnotationes et meditationes, with its accompanying series of images, which appeared in the 1590s.95 On the other hand, the ambivalence surrounding the distinction between the image-qua-image and image-qua-object continued to rear its head, despite its suppression during the Council of Trent. Did religious images merit veneration (or adoration) only because of their referential function? Or did they also have a holiness derived from their status as sacred objects? Nadal seems to have favored the latter opinion. When, in his Orationis observationes, he called for a meditation on the sensible world in the light of faith, he added a cautionary reminder of the need to establish the “dogma about the use of images,” including their theological and moral rationale, based on “the scriptures, the sacred councils and other church canons, the doctors, consensus, tradition, and succession.” Yet this did not prevent him from articulating an expansive understanding of the sacrality of objects.96 At the very least, “God’s power is experienced and comprehended in all things of the Church, such as images, altars, holy places, blessed objects, and religious rites and ceremonies.”97 In the work of Roberto Bellarmino we find a more systematic elaboration of this point. What is more, this nephew of Marcello Cervini directly referenced the midcentury debate on this very issue, with which his uncle had been deeply involved. Bellarmino’s De Ecclesia triumphante, sive de gloria et cultu 94

95 96 97

Cf. Carla Benzan, “Coming to Life at the Sacro Monte of Varallo: the Sacred Image al vivo in Post-Tridentine Italy,” in Ad vivum? Visual Materials and the Vocabulary of Life-Likeness in Europe before 1800, ed. Thomas Balfe, Joanna Woodall, and Claus Zittel, Intersections 61 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2019), 224–46. Ralph Dekoninck, Ad imaginem. Status, fonctions et usages de l’image dans la littérature spirituelle jésuite du XVIIe siècle (Genève: Droz, 2005), 23–24, 45, 104–105, 114. Hieronimo Nadal, Orationis Observationes, ed. Michael Nicolau (Romae: apud Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1964), 196; unfortunately, the section is undated. Ibid., 66 (c. 1546–1547): “Virtus divina sentitur et capitur in omnibus rebus ecclesiasticis, ut in imaginibus, in altaribus, in templis, in rebus benedictis, in observationibus et ceremoniis ecclesiasticis.”

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sanctorum (published with other controversialist writings between 1586–89) recalls in its title the defense of the cult of the saints written about fifty years earlier by Ambrogio Catarino, but now cast in triumphal mode. In an extensive discussion of sacred images, Bellarmino reviewed three opinions regarding the nature of veneration. The first denied images any honor not directed to the represented; this view, Bellarmino noted, rested on a passage of St. Basil cited during Nicaea II, but had already been rebutted by Catarino.98 The second opinion was the Thomist view (shared, Bellarmino said, by a range of theologians from Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure to Cajetan) that the same honor was referred to the image as to the represented: thus an image of Christ deserved latria. Among the reasons in support of this argument Bellarmino listed the neo-Aristotelian theory of motus animi.99 Then the Jesuit described a third, intermediate position, clearly preferred by him, namely that images must be honored in their own right, but with a lesser honor. That, he added, was the opinion of Martín Pérez de Ayala and Ambrogio Catarino. But he went further than Pérez, rejecting the compromise formula of veneration before the image, rather than of the image: such “improper” veneration was anathema to Nicaea II. The Greek council, he added, equated the veneration of images with that of the gospels and sacred vessels. This position necessitated the plain recognition of the sacrality of the object: something sacred is truly inherent in the image itself, an unquestionable likeness to a sacred thing and its dedication or consecration to divine worship; hence they [images] are worthy of honor in themselves, and not only as stand-ins for their prototypes.100 Bellarmino’s view did not remain confined to the learned pages of theologians: within a few years it was cited as authoritative in an art treatise like Gregorio Comanini’s Figino: the honor owed to images meant that these “were the endpoint of the veneration when considered by themselves, and not only

98

Roberto Bellarmino, Primi tomi septima controversia generalis de ecclesia triumphante, tribus libris explicata (Ingolstadii: Adam Sartorius, 1587), 224. Note that Bellarmino, like Pérez, Ory, and Paleotti, here referenced the verses found in St. Mark’s basilica in Venice (“Nam Deus est quod imago docet, sed non Deus ipsa: / Hanc videas, sed mente colas quod cernis in ipsa”); Bellarmino here also mentions that Sabellico, liber 8 Enneadis, 8, cites these verses. See on this passage also chapter 1, p. 13 and n. 21. 99 Cf. J. de la Servière, La théologie de Bellarmin (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie, 1909), 316–18. 100 Bellarmino, 227–28.

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as representing their model.”101 Ironically, it was within his own Church that the eminent theologian encountered opposition. Around the time when Comanini’s treatise was published, during the pontificate of Clement VIII, Bellarmino was caught up in the Molina affair – the virulent controversy stirred up by the doctrine of grace of the Jesuit Luis de Molina. The affair turned into a theological standoff between the Spanish Jesuits and Dominicans, which came to involve the Inquisition and the papacy. To represent the Dominicans was especially the leading neo-scholastic Domingo Báñez (1528–1605), who in a 1597 booklet addressed to the pope summarized the Thomist view; he further requested that the silence imposed on both sides, pending a papal decision, be lifted for the Dominicans. Báñez cited Bellarmino’s views on sacred images as one of multiple Jesuit “novelties” deviating from Thomist orthodoxy. The Jesuit cardinal, a key figure in the Roman curia, did not hesitate to respond to this and other charges. His priority (he noted) was to follow the determinations of councils and popes rather than St. Thomas, who had not been aware of these, either because they had not been published or because they had not yet been written. Clearly, the reference was in part to Nicaea II and its approval by pope Hadrian I; and in pointing to Aquinas’s ignorance of both, the Jesuit echoed a remark already made by Catarino. But Bellarmino’s statement also applied to Trent’s image decree, which not only had not cited Aquinas on this point, but had reconfirmed Nicaea II, taking care to avoid terms like adoration and latria. In the fight against heresy, other councils (such as those of Sens and Mainz) and authors like Pérez and Sanders had taken the same precaution.102 Other Jesuits, meanwhile, went even farther than Bellarmino (and earlier, Catarino). In his De cultu adorationis (1593) Gabriel Vásquez developed a view adumbrated in Laínez’s notes for the colloquy of St. Germain: worthy of adoration were not only sacred images and objects designated for divine worship, but all created things, animate and inanimate. All were “image[s] of God.”103 101 Gregorio Comanini, Il Figino, in Trattati d’arte del Cinquecento, 3:307–08. 102 See Livinus de Mayer, Historiae controversiarum (Bruxellis: Typis Antonii Claudinot, 1715), lib. 2, cap. 26, 231–39, at 235–36, followed by Gerardus Schneeman, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus (Freiburg i. Breisgau: Herder, 1881), 197–99 and Joseph de la Servière, Théologie de Bellarmin (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1909), 317–18n. And cf. Nicholas Sanders, De typica et honoraria sacrarum imaginum adoratione libri duo (Lovanii: apud Ioannem Foulerum, 1569). For the Molina affair, see Franco Motta, Bellarmino. Una teologia politica della Controriforma (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2005), 477–564. 103 Gabriel Vásquez, De cultu adorationis libri tres (Moguntiae: ex officina Ioannis Albini, 1601), lib. 3, ch. 2, 453–62. The chapter starts in no uncertain terms: “Perspecta bene doctrina a nobis tradita 2. libro disput. 8. et 9., non solum imago depicta et res sacra autoritate publica in cultum Dei exposita, sed quaevis etiam alia res mundi, sive inanima et

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And in explicating the Old Testament story of Jacob’s vision of the place in which he had erected a stone and anointed it (Gen. 28:16–17: Vere locus iste sanctus est), he appeared to extend the sacrality of an object to the space in which it was installed – a notion we already saw articulated by Ninguarda and Laínez. Yet this did not mean that sacredness could be attributed arbitrarily to objects. Concurring with Cajetan, Vásquez noted: “danger in this kind of adoration does not threaten those who, sincerely considering an object and God in it, adore it, but the dumb folk to whom something is offered indiscriminately for adoration.”104 Their gestures of reverence could appear indecent and superstitious, which is why such devotions should not be practiced in public. For this reason, images and other things proposed for the worship of God or saints were expressly called sacred and venerable, indicating their common cultic use, whereas others lacked both that designation and this use. It was a noteworthy conclusion: any continued concern about popular idolatry and superstition was addressed not by prohibiting the objects of worship but, as Catarino had already suggested, by designating them as sacred, a decision obviously reserved to the Church. 7

Conclusion

Thus in the “age of art” – Belting’s well-known formula – Catholic defenders of sacred images largely ignored their artistic features and the hand of their makers. Against charges of idolatry all emphasized the referential function of images over their materiality and avoided the troublesome issue of the saint’s presence. Even so, disagreement persisted on whether or not religious artifacts were worthy of honor as sacred objects. But this last assumption – no doubt widespread among the faithful – was problematic enough that it remained unaddressed by the Council of Trent. Effectively, this amounted to a rejection of the Thomist understanding of the strong correspondence between the sacred image and what it represented. If it is true, as has been argued, that Aquinas developed this conception in conjunction with the rise of realistic representation in early Renaissance art, the iconophobic tendencies of the Reformation era represented a profound backlash when that artistic movement was at its peak.105 irrationalis sive rationalis, ex natura rei et secluso periculo (de quo postea dicemus) rite cum Deo, sicut imago ipsius, adorari potest.” 104 Ibid., fol. 185r. 105 Wirth, “Structure et fonctions,” 56–57; “Les scholastiques et l’image,” 27.

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It was, in other words, the very power of the visual – and the skillfulness of Renaissance artists in exploiting and enhancing it – that raised concerns and caused many to rethink its connections to the sacred. Even some leading Catholic apologists recognized the capacity of visual artifacts to deceive or tempt the faithful. Thus the denial that sacred images were per se idolatrous had as its corollary the notion that some were abusive: the problem was thus displaced from the field of orthodoxy to that of morality. This prompted new rules to ensure correctness, decorum, and austerity.106 Yet, Trent notwithstanding, many theologians continued to believe that such artifacts, when properly used for devotional purposes, were sacred even apart from their representational function and that their effectiveness could be enhanced with aesthetic means. Given that the forms of censorship promoted by some – one thinks of bishops like Paleotti and Borromeo – appear to have remained fairly marginal, one may question the longer-term effects of the debates highlighted in this volume. The answer lies, at least in part, in the recognition that the fierce charges of idolatry prompted renewed debates about the sensory, affective, imaginative, and mnemonic engagement with images. While these debates drew on longer traditions of speculation about faculty psychology, the Reformation disputes over the orthodoxy of image devotions focused Catholic minds on the need to avoid materialist implications. This appears to have stimulated controlled devotional practices grounded in the semiotic, cognitive, and affective aspects of visual representation. In the wake of Trent, the Thomist idea of the likeness of image and represented might have lost its luster, but the psychological theory of the movements of the soul opened up new avenues. Purposefully deployed as signs, emblems, or hieroglyphs, and strategically placed in sacred spaces, images could serve as the language of new devotional or meditative practices.107 Regardless of their purpose, and perhaps because of their very sophistication, such theories were never able to dispel the suggestion of physical presence in religious artifacts. Certainly the resurgence of Thomism following the Council of Trent aligned powerful interests behind the Dominican’s ideas about sacred images. Only a few years after Aquinas had been declared a doctor of the Church by the Dominican Pope Pius V (1567), the painter Santi di Tito, at the behest of the oratory of St. Thomas in Florence, produced an altarpiece depicting a vision of Christ reported in the saint’s hagiographies (Fig. 12). 106 On this point, see the still useful remarks of David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 368–69. 107 Compare the thoughtful conclusion of Boulnois, Au delà de l’image, 449–53, which, however, ignores the enduring influence of Thomism.

Reverberations: St. Germain, Trent, and Beyond

figure 12 Santi di Tito, Vision of St. Thomas Aquinas, oil on wood, 1573, Cenacolo di San Salvi, Florence Photo credit Scala / Art Resource, NY

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Towards the end of his life (so the story went), while Thomas labored on the third part of his Summa Theologiae, he had taken up the habit of meditating upon the “image of the crucified” on the altar of St. Nicholas in the Neapolitan church of San Domenico. There he was observed levitating as he saw the figure of Christ come to life. The Savior had approved of Thomas’s work, whose draft rested on the altar, in which the theologian had expounded on the Eucharist and on the cult of Christ’s image. In Santi di Tito’s representation we thus see the embodiment of Thomas’s doctrine of latria. The painter produced a second version twenty years later, and the theme gained favor with artists across Counter-Reformation Europe.108 Intended no doubt to vindicate Thomas’s doctrine of visual worship, perhaps Santi’s painting actually demonstrated the power of art and the skills of artists – that is, their ability to control those ‘accidental’ features of sacred images dismissed by Thomist theologians – along with the lasting allure of the saint’s presence. 108 Ralph Dekoninck, “Visio intellectualis vel sensualis: la vision napolitaine/parisienne de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’après Santi di Tito,” in Voir l’au-delà. L’expérience visionnaire et sa représentation dans l’art italien de la Renaissance. Actes du colloque international (Paris, 3–5 juin 2013), ed. Cyril Gerbron (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 135–52. Idem, “Visual Representation as Real Presence. Otto van Veen’s Naples Vision of Saint Thomas Aquinas,” in The Secret Lives of Art Works. Exploring the Boundaries between Art and Life, ed. Caroline van Eck, Joris van Gastel, and Elsje van Kessel (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2014), 179–99.

part 2 Documents

∵

Note on Editions and Translations The edition of the Latin and French texts published in this volume is faithful to the spelling found in the originals. To improve legibility, a few conversions have been made: consonant u → v; j → i; vv → w. Punctuation, highly variable in the originals, has been updated to improve legibility. The paragraph division of the original documents has generally been observed, except in a few cases were the paragraphs were excessively brief or long. A vertical stripe ( | ) marks a page break in the original document; folio numbering has been added in the margins. Square brackets ([ ]) indicate editorial additions to number paragraphs, provide or complete source references (e.g. Bible quotations), to correct a printer’s error, to cite a term in the original language, or to clarify meaning. Pointed brackets () indicate completion of a source text where a letter or letters are missing or illegible due to damage or a tight margin. The marginal annotations found in the originals have been reproduced. Biblical references are also identified in the margins, whether or not the author provides this information. Quotes from biblical or other sources are indicated by quotation marks, even where the text abbreviates or deviates somewhat from the source. Footnotes added to the original (left-page) texts provide information about the edition or textual elements, e.g. to explain corrections of errors in the source text, or to identify sources. Footnotes to the translations offer explanation of concepts, background, or points made in the text. Abbreviations of Bible books follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 578–80. The edition of reference for the Vulgate text is Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, ed. Robertus Weber et al., 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1983); for the translation, The Holy Bible: Douay-Reims Version (Charlotte, NC: Saint Benedict Press, 2009). Throughout, the wording of the original sources has been paramount to establish the text of both editions and translations. To identify references to, or quotations from, other ancient sources, every effort has been made to list contemporary editions that may have been available to the authors or that were cited in indirect sources; on occasion modern editions may be referenced as well. Translations are my own, except where otherwise noted. Block quotes mark longer passages presented by the author as quotations, whether they are literal citations or paraphrases. In such quotes, an occasional inquit (‘he says’) interjected by the author is placed between round brackets. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_005

I. Martín Pérez de Ayala Corollarium de imaginibus sanctorum

113v

114r

[1] De sacris imaginibus tria se offerunt breviter determinanda: primo, an pie et laudabiliter in ecclesia permittantur; secundo, an sint venerandae; tertio, quali honore venerandae sint.1 Videbimus quid in his omnibus ratio ipsa suggerat, quidve divina traditio introduxerit. Quo ad primum, qui usum imaginum in ecclesia damnant, non modo in ecclesiam, qui nihil adulterinum potest admittere, sunt blasphemi, sed contra omnem prorsus naturam loquuntur. Nam cum usus imaginum introductus sit ad retinendam et refricandam memoriam eorum cuius sunt, et omnis cognitio nostra fiat in imagine et similitudine, ut Aristoteles autor est (necesse enim est intelligentem phantasmata speculari),2 certe autorem naturae damnat,3 qui hunc modum cognoscendi per imagines in nobis excogitavit; ac subinde qui in imagines has externas veluti insani saeviunt, in seipsos, mentem et sensus suos, debuissent | etiam prius desaevire, utpote qui nihil cognoscunt sine formata in cognitiva facultate imagine. Nam quid obsecro refert, an visus externe moveatur per imaginem externam, an sensus interior et intellectus per internam, cum utrobique sit eadem ratio et modus cognoscendi, puta per modum similitudinis naturalis inter imaginem et rem imaginatam? Quare traditio ecclesiastica de imaginibus ad excitandas mentes fidelium, quae veluti libri essent, in quibus rustici et simplices et tardi homines exempla Christi et sanctorum cognoscerent, et cognoscendo admirarentur, et admirati, ad imitationem excitarentur heroicarum virtutum, non solum laudabiliter, sed etiam naturae modum satis conformem excogitavit, quo homines moveret, et excitaret, et ex consequenti barbari isti imaginum amolitotes et

2. De anima

1 This edition is based on De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus deque authoritate ac vi earum sacrosancta adsertiones ceu libri decem in quibus fere universa Ecclesiae antiquitas circa dogmata apostolica, orthodoxe elucidatur. Authore R.P. Domino Martino Peresio Aiala, Guidixiensium Episcopo ac S. Theologiae professore (Coloniae: Iaspar Gennepaeus, 1549), fols. 113v–21v, which comprises a section entitled “Corollarium de imaginibus sanctorum.” For context and background, see chapter 2, pp. 32–43. 2 Actually, the reference appears to be to Aristotle, De anima, iii (esp. iii.3 and 7–8). For a contemporary edition, see Aristotelis de anima libri tres, trans. Ioannis Argyropylos (Salmantica: Andreas a Portonariis, 1555), 92–105. 3 The intended meaning must be damnant, since the subject refers to the above-mentioned critics, and qui to autorem naturae.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_006

I. Martín Pérez de Ayala Corollary Concerning the Images of Saints

[1] Regarding sacred images three things need to be determined briefly: first, whether the Church permits them piously and laudably; second, whether they should be venerated; third, with what honor they are to be venerated. We shall see what reason suggests for all three questions, and what divine tradition has introduced. As for the first, those who condemn the use of images in the Church not only commit blasphemy against the Church, which cannot allow any falsehood, but they also speak against all of nature. For since the use of images was introduced to retain and renew the memory of those they represent, and since our cognition occurs entirely through image and likeness, as Aristotle has written (for those who comprehend necessarily observe phantasms),1 certainly they [these critics] condemn the creator of nature, who has invented this mode of cognition through images in us. Consequently, those who rage like madmen against these external images, should first and foremost rage against themselves, their mind and their senses, inasmuch as they know nothing without forming an image in their cognitive faculty. What difference does it make, I ask, whether vision is externally set in motion by an external image, or the interior sense and intellect by an internal one, since both share the same method and mode of cognition, that is, by way of the natural likeness of the image and the thing imaged? Therefore church tradition, to inspire the minds of the faithful, conceived of images as books, from which simple and obtuse country folk would learn the examples of Christ and the saints, and knowing them would admire them, and in admiration would be prodded to imitate their heroic virtues – a method to move and inspire people that was not only laudable, but also conforming to nature. Consequently, those barbarians

1 Actually, the reference appears to be to Aristotle, De anima, III (esp. III.3 and 7–8).

De anima, 2

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eversores, non ecclesiae solum, sed ipsius naturae4 autori magnam iniuriam fecerunt. [2] Hinc sequitur, quod quando Deus benedictus filiis Israel prohibuit, ne sculptile aliquod fabricarent aut similitudinem depingerent, non intendit usum imaginum simpliciter damnare – pugnaret enim cum naturae ordine ab ipsi praescripto – sed tantum praetendit idololatriam in eis evitare, ad quam ille populus valde propensus erat, ita ut non faceret huiusmodi simulachra, quibus deferrentur aut facile impendi possent divini honores. Et hoc significabat quando dicebat Exodi vigesimo: “Non facietis mecum deos argenteos,” quasi diceret: cavete ab omni similitudine depingenda et sculptili fabricando, cui facile honores mihi debitos possitis deferrre. Unde Deuteronomii capite quinto, quasi hoc praeceptum declarans, postquam dixit: “Non facietis sculptile neque similitudinem,” statim adiungit: “Non adorabis ea neque coles.” Et licet non depingere et non adorare videantur esse distincta praecepta, unum tamen erat finis alterius. Non enim praetendebat Deus damnare, ut dixi, imagines, nisi in hoc populo, quem durae cervicis esse agnoscebat, et ad idololatriam valde propensum ex consuetudine longa, quam cum superstitiosis et idololatris Aegyptiis traxerunt, qui bovem, ibin, feles, leones et caepas adorabant insani homines. Idcirco hoc intendens in suo populo praecavere eos divina providentia vetuit imagines depingere et simulachra conficere, ne fortassis putarent Deum ipsum verum aliqua corporali imagine posse exprimi, ac subinde existimarent eum esse corporeum, qui summe simplex et spiritualis est. Utramque hanc rationem insinuavit S. Moyses, optimus legis interpres Deute. quarto ubi hoc praescriptum de non faciendis imaginibus declarat:

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Quare filiis Israel prohita imago.

Exod. 20[23]

Deut. 5[8–9]

Deuter. 4[15–19]

Custodite (inquit) sollicite animas vestras: non vidistis aliquam similitudinem in die qua locutus est vobis Dominus in Horeb de medio ignis, ne forte decepti faciatis vobis sculptam similitudinem aut imaginem masculi vel foeminae, similitudinem omnium iumentorum quae fiunt super terram vel avium sub coelo volantium atque reptilium quae | moventur in terra sive piscium qui sub terra morantur in aquis, ne forte elevatis oculis ad coelum videas solem et lunam et omnia astra coeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas quae creavit Dominus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quae sub coelo sunt. 4 Corr. from ipsium inaturae, in accordance with the 1562 edition of Pérez’s work: De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus … (Parisiis: apud Gulielmum Iulianum, 1562), fol. 214r.

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who remove and destroy images cause great offense not only to the Church, but to the creator of nature itself. [2] From this it follows that when the blessed God forbade the children of Israel to make any graven image or paint any likeness, he did not mean simply to condemn the use of images – for that would contradict the order of nature ordered by himself – but only to avoid the idolatry visà-vis these [images] to which his people was very much inclined, so that they would not make this kind of likenesses, upon which divine honors could easily be conferred and expended. This was meant when Exodus 20 stated, “You shall not make gods of silver,” as if to say: refrain from painting any likeness and making anything sculpted, upon which you may be tempted to confer honors owed to me. Thus in order to clarify this precept, Deuteronomy, chapter 5, after stating, “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing or likeness,” immediately added: “Thou shalt not adore them and thou shalt not serve them.” Although ‘do not paint’ and ‘do not adore’ appear to be different precepts, one was the goal of the other. As I said, God did not intend to condemn images except in this people, whom he recognized as being hardheaded and much inclined to idolatry rooted in ancient customs – customs they borrowed from the superstitious and idolatrous Egyptians, those foolish people who adored the cow, the ibis, cats, lions, and onions. Therefore, seeking to prevent this in his people, divine providence prohibited the painting of images and the manufacture of likenesses, so that they would not by chance think that the true God could be expressed in some corporeal image, and consequently consider him to be corporeal who is the supremely pure and spiritual. Both these reasons were suggested by the holy Moses, the foremost interpreter of the law, in 4 Deuteronomy, where he explains the precept against the making of images. Keep your souls carefully (he says): you saw not any similitude in the day that the Lord God spoke to you in Horeb from the midst of the fire: lest perhaps being deceived you might make you a graven similitude, or image of male or female, the similitude of any beasts that are upon the earth, or of birds that fly under heaven, or of creeping things that move on the earth, or of fishes that abide in the waters under the earth: lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven.

Why the image was forbidden to the children of Israel.

Exod. 20[23]

Deut. 5[8–9]

Deuter. 4[15–19]

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Cum igitur haec ratio legis in ecclesia Christi minime inveniatur, utpote quae per unctionem spiritus sancti, qua edocta est et adiuta, ad huiusmodi idolorum vanitates propensa non sit, cessavit et merito lex. Quae etsi pro infirmitate populi illius erat illis quodammodo naturalis, nobis tamen reddita est ceremonialis, extendendo nomen ceremoniale ad id, quod simpliciter non est mandatum morale. Adde quod ipse Deus non absolute prohibuit illis rerum imagines: nam et habebant filii Israel Cherubin, serpentem aeneum, malogranata, ex Dei instituto introducta: sed praecipiebatur illis, ut ipsi non facerent sibi imagines, propter periculum iam dictum, quod satis expressit sanctus Moyses in loco a nobis dudum citato. [3] Quod vero non ad alium usum principaliter imagines sunt introductae, omnes sancti declarant. Dicit enim D. Basilius homilia quadragesima de martyribus:

Basilius.

Res (inquit) in bello fortiter gestas, tum eloquentes homines saepenumero, tum pictores exprimunt:5 illi sermone ornantes, hi tabulis deliniantes, et utrique multos ad fortitudinem excitant. Quae enim sermo historiae per auditum exhibet, ea pictura tacens per imitationem ostendit: martyrum enim encomium et adhortatio est congregatorum ad virtutem.6 Recte dixit, quisquis ille est, picturam esse mutam poesim.7 [4] Beatus Gregorius quoque ad Serenum Massiliensem episcopum idipsum confitetur. “Quod legentibus,” inquit, “scriptura, hoc idiotis praestat pictura cernentibus, quia in ipsa ignorantes vident quod sequi debeant,

Gregor.

5 Corr. from exprimuut. 6 Pérez’s source for this famous passage from St. Basil’s Homilia in quadraginta martyres is unclear; his wording may be a partial paraphrase of an existing translation, such as that in Godefroy Tilman’s Operum D. Basilii Magni Caesariae Cappadociae quondam Archiepiscopi prior tomus (Parisiis: Ex officina Carolae Guillard, 1547), fol. 128r–v: “Nam magnifica in bellis gesta et oratores saepenumero et pictores pulcherrime demonstrant. Hi oratione, illi tabulis describentes atque ornantes: amboque plures ad fortitudinem imitandam inducentes. Quae enim sermo historiae per inductionem [sic] praebet, eadem et pictura tacens per imitationem ostendit. Sic et nos martyrum virtutem commemorantes, vos astantes excitabimus …” Parts of the passage are cited repeatedly in Longolius’s Nicaea II edition, albeit again in a different translation; see LCN, (fol. 5r, 13v, 44v, 70r, 74v). See also CUNS, 1:59, 1:141, 3:689–91. 7 Erasmus (De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis, in Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi: Ordinis primi tomus secundus [Amsterdam: Huygens Instituut/Brill, 1993], 235) noted that “Plutarchus poesim appellat picturam loquentem et picturam mutam poesim.”

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Since this legal rationale is hardly found in Christ’s Church – for the latter, instructed and sustained by the blessing of the Holy Spirit, is not inclined to the vanities of this kind of idols – the law has rightfully remained idle. Because of the weakness of that people, it was somehow natural to them, but to us it has become ritual, when we apply the term ‘ritual’ to that which is not a straightforward moral mandate. Moreover, God himself did not absolutely prohibit images of things to them, for the children of Israel had cherubim, a bronze serpent, and pomegranates, introduced by God’s ordinance. But they were commanded not to make themselves images because of the already mentioned danger that the holy Moses expressed in the above-cited passage. [3] Now, all the saints explain that images were mainly introduced for just that purpose. For St. Basil says in his homily on the forty martyrs: Deeds pursued vigorously in war (he says) are sometimes told by eloquent men, sometimes by painters, the first adorning them in speech, the second sketching them in pictures; both inspire many to be strong. What the discourse of history conveys through hearing, the picture shows silently for purposes of imitation: the praise of the martyrs is at once an exhortation to virtue for the congregation. Right is he – whoever he is – who calls a picture a mute poem. [4] St. Gregory made the same point to Bishop Serenus of Marseille. “What scripture offers to readers,” he says, “an image presents to the uneducated who observe it, for in it the ignorant see the path they should follow, and to those who are illiterate the picture is like a lecture.” The Sixth Council

Basilius [Homily on the forty martyrs].

Gregory [I].

The [Sixth Ecumenical] Council.

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et his qui literas nesciunt pro lectione pictura est.”8 Aliam rationem videtur insinuare VI synodus, eas videlicet iure in ecclesia esse receptas, maxime imaginem Domini nostri Iesu Christi, propter Martionitas et Manichaeos haereticos, qui veritatem humanae naturae in Christo negabant, ut universali usu ecclesiae veritas benedictae humanitatis Christi populi suaderetur: quam credo primam imaginem fuisse ex his quae in templis receptae sunt, neque id immerito, nam plura et magis inextimabilia repraesentat nobis beneficia, quam aliae imagines.9 [5] Unde Gregorius II, cuius verba allegantur in praefata synodo: “ecclesiae,” inquit, “capita permiserunt imagines, quo forma Domini nostri Iesu Christi secundum humanam naturam nobis proponeretur, per quam humilitatis et Dei altitudinem nosceremus, pariter et beneficia exhibita per passionem et resurrectionem.”10 Laudabilis certe modus, quo excitari 8 9

10

Synodus.

Gregor. [II].

Cf. Gregory’s letter to Serenus (October 600), Sancti Gregorii magni ecclesie doctoris precipui opera (Parrhisiis: in edibus Joannis Parvi, 1518), fol. 425r; modern ed. in GMRE (CCSL 140), 873 (letter XI, 10). The reference is to canon 82 of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (the Third Council of Constantinople, 680–81). Pérez’s knowledge of this canon, now attributed to the Quinisext Council (692), was probably based on its repeated but partial citation at Nicaea II (see § 12, and n. 25, below). The full text was available at the time in CSCP, fol. 286r: “Can. 82. Ut Christus deinceps in figura humana pingatur, non agni. Inter venerabilium imaginum picturas agnus digito praecursoris monstratus depingitur, qui in figuram receptus est gratiae, adumbrans nobis verum illum (per legem) agnum Christum demonstratum. Antiquas e[r]go illas figuras et umbras velut quasdam veritatis notas adumbrationesque ecclesiae traditas vendicantes, gratiam eisdem praeponimus, et veritatem hanc (ut legis complementum) suscipimus. Itaque hoc iam quidem re perfectum, pictorum artibus ante omnium oculos praescribatur et picturam illius agni Christi Dei nostri, qui tollit peccata mundi, ut humanus character valet exprimere, et in imaginibus imposterum pro vetere agno ergendam sancimus, per quam humilitatem Dei verbi contemplamur, et velut manuducimur ad memoriam illius conversationis in carne, et passionis eiusque mortis salutaris et redemptionis quae huic pro mundo facta est.” For the Greek text, see CCT, 54. The Council in question is actually the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II). During that council, a letter by Pope Gregory II to Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, was read in session IV. The passage Pérez paraphrases and partly quotes reads, in Longolius’s translation: “Ergo ecclesiae capita et columnae talia fieri permiserunt et tradiderunt, ut in omnium oculis eiuscemodi picturae exhiberentur, sacer ille et venerandus typus, quo iuxta humanitatem Christus qui peccata mundi abstulit, velut columna erigeretur, per quam humilitatis dei altitudinem nosceremus, et dispositionem illius incarnationis in memoriam reduceremus, inque agnitionem sacratae mortis illius, veluti manu duceremur, quemadmodum ad eam quae illius contigit liberationem, neque tamen in hoc quicquam quod a divinis discordat, dicitur” (LCN, fol. 42r; close parallels italicized); note that Pérez’s rendering gives the beginning of the sentence a different meaning. Longolius pointed out that he had not been able to consult Gregory’s epistolarium directly. A contemporary

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suggests another rationale, namely that the Church rightfully accepted [images], especially the image of our Lord Jesus Christ, because of the Marcionite and Manichaean heretics, who denied the truth of Christ’s human nature, so that the people would be convinced of the truth of Christ’s blessed humanity by the universal custom of the Church. His image I believe was the first among those accepted in churches, justly so, because it represents more, and more priceless, benefits for us than other images.2 [5] Hence the words of Gregory II included in the aforementioned council: “the decrees of the Church,” he said, “allowed images, so that the likeness of our Lord Jesus Christ according to his human nature would be presented to us, by which we will know the height of God’s humility, as well as the benefits offered by the passion and resurrection.”3 Praiseworthy is

Gregory [II].

2 The reference is to canon 82 of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (the Third Council of Constantinople, 680–81). Pérez’s knowledge of this canon, now attributed to the Quinisext Council (692), was probably based on its repeated but partial citation at Nicaea II (see § 12, p. 156 n. 25, below). 3 The Council in question is actually the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II). During that council, a letter by Pope Gregory II to Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, was read in the fourth session.

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possit nostra tarditas ad saepius recolendum grandia et inexistimabilia beneficia Dei nobis exhibita. Atque utinam coelum, terra, aqua, atque elementa omnia, nobis haec omni momento repraesentarent, mentemque nostram tardam, | ad ea quae per imagines repraesentantur eveherent, ne ingrati inveniremur tanto benefactori. [6] Sanctus quoque Nillus, qui in praefata septima synodo allegatur, percontanti proconsuli Olympidiorum,11 qui ab eo sciscitatus fuerat, qualiter quoddam templum ornari possit ab ipso erigendum, per epistolam consuluit ut venerandae crucis imaginem orientem versus in templo statueret, propterea quod passione Domini nostri Iesu Christi per unicum salutiferae crucis lignum, totum genus humanum liberatum sit, ut per hanc desperabundis undique spes salutis annuncietur; in parietibus autem novi et veteris Testamenti historias quoque curaret depingere, quibus scilicet hi qui literas ignorant, neque sacram scripturam legere queunt, contemplatione picturae in memoriam reducant, quam fortiter illi Deo nostro per virilia facta servierunt, ut ad certamen exercentur gloriosorum facinorum, per quae coelum pro terra commutarunt.12 Haec ille. Ex his autoritatibus duas causas habes usus imaginum: altera, ut haereticis obvietur, qui in Christi humanitatem sunt inventi blasphemi; altera, ut idiotae et simplices habeant quibus moneantur et excitentur, tum ad gratias agendum Deo, tum etiam ad imitandum sanctorum exempla, quae per imagines repraesentantur.

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De antiquitate imaginum [7] Rursus repraehensibile esse non potest quod a tempore Christi et apostolorum in ecclesia receptum est, imaginum autem sacrarum usus. Sic se habet, ergo repraehendi non potest a quoquam qui Christi

11

12

edition of the pope’s letters, based on the ninth-century Latin translation of Nicaea II by Anastasius Bibliothecarius, offers a quite different translation: Epistolarum decretalium summorum pontificum. Tomus secundus (Romae: In aedibus Populi Romani, 1591), 666–69 (at 667). Baronius, in discussing this letter, noted the textual variations, which he attributes to discrepancies between the Latin original and a Latin version of a Greek translation of the text: Cesare Baronio, Annales Ecclesiastici, t. 9 (Antverpiae: Ex officina Plantiniana, 1601), 59. Sic. This is clearly a misreading (retained in later editions of Pérez’s work) of the personal name Olympiodorus cited in the acts of Nicaea II: LCN, fol. 34r (“ad Olympiodorum proconsulem”); similarly, the Greek original and the Latin translation of Anastasius Bibliothecarius: CUNS 334–35. This passage, starting at the beginning of the paragraph, is part paraphrase, part quotation of Nicaea II: LCN, fol. 34r.

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certainly this way in which our sluggishness can be stirred to cultivate the great and priceless benefits God has extended to us. If only [these images] would represent to us, every moment, heaven, earth, water, and all the elements, and would draw our sluggish mind to the things represented by the images, so we will not be found ungrateful to such a benefactor. [6] Saint Nilus, too – mentioned in the aforementioned Seventh Council4 – when questioned insistently by the proconsul Olympiodorus on how a church he planned to build could be decorated, advised him by letter to install in the church an image of the venerable cross directed towards the East, because the entire human species was liberated by the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ through the sole wood of his salutory cross, so that by [this image] the hope of salvation would be announced to the desperate everywhere. On the walls, however, he should have scenes of the New and Old Testaments depicted, by which those who are illiterate and cannot read the holy scripture may, by contemplating the picture, impress upon their memory how strongly [the depicted] served our God in virile deeds, so that they may be driven to the battle of glorious deeds, by which they will exchange earth for heaven.5 Thus St. Nilus. From these authorities you derive two motives for the use of images: first, to counter the heretics who blaspheme the humanity of Christ; second, so that the unlettered and simple-minded can be admonished and inspired, both to offer thanks to God and to imitate the saints’ examples represented by the images.

The antiquity of images [7] In other words, what the Church has inherited from the time of Christ and the apostles, that is, the use of sacred images, cannot be reprehensible. This being the case, it cannot be reprehensible for anyone bearing the name of Christ, unless they side with the Manichaeans, the Feliciani,6

4 Pérez refers here to the Seventh Ecumenical Council, or Second Council of Nicaea (787); this confirms that the preceding reference to the Sixth Council was in fact erroneous (see previous note). 5 This paragraph partly quotes, partly paraphrases a passage in the acts of Nicaea II; see ASCN 1:284–85. (Pérez misread the name Olympiodorus: see note on opposite page.) This example was to be mentioned later by Federico Borromeo, in his Musaeum: see Federico Borromeo, Sacred Painting: Museum, ed. and trans. Kenneth S. Rothwell, Jr., introd. and notes by Pamela M. Jones, I Tatti Renaissance Library 44 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 16–19; see also Paleotti, Discourse, 238–39. 6 The reference is to followers of the Spanish bishop Felix of Urgell (d. 818), a follower, with Elipandus of Toledo, of adoptionist views of Christology. See John C. Cavadini, The Last

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nomen portat, nisi cum Manichaeis, Foelicianis, barbaris damnatis, iam iconomachis, vult sentire: clarus est discursus, maior est etiam manifesta. Alias apostoli, apostolici viri et martyres Deo sanctissimi, de idololatria essent incusandi: quod impium est de sanctis et Deo plenis viris sentire. Restat ut minor probetur exemplis decurrentis ecclesiae, nec non testimoniis sanctorum et probatorum virorum. [8] Narrat beatus Damascenus, libro quarto de fide orthodoxa, capite decimo septimo, quod volens benignissimus Iesus (propriis Damasceni verbis utor) pio Abagaro toparchae Aedisenorum satisfacere, qui mirum in modum cupiebat Iesum videre, sacratissimam sui vultus imaginem ad eum transmiserit.13 Divus quoque Athanasius in libello illo qui in synodo Caesariensi eius nomine oblatus est a Petro Nicomediae urbis episcopo, ubi narratur qualiter crassi quidam et barbari Iudaei atrociter saevierint in Christi imaginem apud Beritum Syriae urbem, quam Christianus per oblivionem in domo a qua migraverat, reliquit: post patrata miracula et reno- | vata passionis Christi prodigia, quae narrat, ait, vocatum fuisse Christianum illum cuius erat illa imago, a metropolitano coram omni populo, et

Damascenus.

Athanasius.

interrogatum quomodo imago apud se devenisset, vel a quo tam mirabiliter disposita esset. Respondit dicens, quod Nicodemus qui ad Iesum nocte venerat, propriis manibus eam composuisset, et moriens Gamalieli tradidisset: Gamaliel autem doctoris gentium Pauli διδάσκαλοσ, cum diem sibi cerneret adesse extremum, Iacobo eam reliquit, et Iacobus Symeoni, et Symeon Zacchaeo: et sic per successores temporum Hierosolymae perduravit: usque quo subversio illius urbis patrata est quadragesimo et tertio anno post ascensionem Domini salvatoris ad coelos, sed biennium antequam Titus Vespasianus eandem urbem subverteret, admoniti sunt a spiritu sancto fideles atque discipuli Christi, ut relicta urbe ad regnum 13

Here Pérez does not actually cite John of Damascus literally, judging by a contemporary edition of the text: John of Damascus, De orthodoxa fide, lib. 4, cap. 17, in Sancti Patris Ioannis Damasceni … universa quae obtineri hac ivce potuerunt opera summo Henrici Gravii studio … collata (Coloniae: ex officina Petri Quentel, 1546), 200: “Fertur autem et quaedam historia, quod dominus Abagaro Edessenorum civitatis regi, qui pictorem miserat, ut domini similem pingeret imaginem, non valente autem pictore ob resplendentem faciei suae claritatem, ipse vestimentum suae faciei divinae et vivificae applicans, in vestimento suiipsius imaginem abstersit, et sic desideranti misisse Abagaro.” On the textual tradition concerning the Abgar legend, see (also for further bibliography) Mark Guscin, The Image of Edessa (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009).

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condemned barbarians, and iconoclasts: the argument is clear, and the major evident. Otherwise the apostles, apostolic men and the holiest martyrs to God would have to be accused of idolatry, which is impious to think about the saints and men wholly dedicated to God. It remains for us to prove the minor with examples from Church history and testimonies of holy and approved men. [8] The holy [John] Damascene, in book IV of his De fide orthodoxa, chapter 17, tells how the most benign Jesus (I use John of Damascus’s own words here), to please the pious Abgar ruler of Edessa, who very much desired to see Jesus, sent him a most sacred image of his face. The divine Athanasius, too, in the book which Peter, bishop of Nicomedia, presented in his name at the Council of Caesarea, recounts how near the Syrian city of Beirut some rude and barbarous Jews violently attacked an image of Christ, which a Christian had forgetfully left in a house from which he had moved. After narrating how several miracles occurred and tokens of Christ’s passion appeared, he explains that the metropolitan called the Christian to whom this image belonged before the entire people.

Damascene.

Athanasius.

Asked how he had obtained the image and by whom it had been so wonderfully created, he answered that Nicodemus, who had visited Jesus during the night, had made it with his own hands, and upon his death had left it to Gamaliel. Gamaliel, the teacher of Paul, doctor of the gentiles, when he felt that his last day was near, left it to James, and James to Simon, and Simon to Zacheus: and thus it was passed on over time, remaining in Jerusalem, until the destruction of that city was brought about in the forty-third year after the ascension of our Lord and Savior to heaven. Yet two years before Titus Vespasian sacked that city, the faithful and disciples of Christ were warned by the Holy Spirit to leave the city and move to the kingdom of Agrippa, because Agrippa was then in a federation with the Romans. They left the city and, taking with them all that seemed to pertain to the observance of our religion and faith, moved to

Christology of the West: Adoptionism in Spain and Gaul, 785–820 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).

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transirent Agrippae regis, quia ipse tunc Agrippa Romanis foederatus erat. Qui egressi ab urbe, omnia quae ad cultum nostrae religionis vel fidei pertinere videbantur secum auferentes in has regiones transtulerunt. Quo tempore etiam imago cum caeteris rebus ecclesiasticis deportata, usque hodie in Syria permansit: quam ego ipse a parentibus ex hac luce migrantibus mihi traditam iure haereditario usque nunc possedi. Haec certa et manifesta ratio est de imagine sancta Domini salvatoris, qualiter ex Syria in Iudeae partes devenerit.14 De Luca etiam evangelista constans fama est, quod Christi et virginis intemeratae imagines depinxerit. Eusebius secundo libro suae historiae super testimonio martyrii apostolorum Petri et Pauli, qualiter a Nerone ambo Romae martyrio coronati sunt, introducit quendam Caium antiquum scriptorem Christianum, qui tempore Severi Imperatoris

Eusebius.

adversus quendam nomine Proculum Cataphrygam disputans, haec de monumentis apostolorum affirmat: Ego, inquit, habeo trophaea apostolorum, quae ostendam. Si enim procedas via regali quae ad Vaticanum ducit, aut via Ostiensi, invenies trophaea defixa, quibus ex utraque parte statuta, Romana communitur ecclesia.15 Quae certe trophaea cum templa quae modo sunt in eorum honorem, post haec tempora a magno Constantino erecta fuerunt, neque ante esse vehemens est apparentia, cum haec dicit esse defixa in locis martyriorum, aliqua signa sensibilia eo temporis fuisse, per quae ad memoriam martyrii tantorum apostolorum quasi excitabantur fideles: quae sive sint imagines sive non, perinde est, si visibilia sive recordativa erant, et in honore habebantur. Lampadias quoque autor est Alexandrum Severum 14

15

Pérez here cites a (since discredited) sermon attributed to Athanasius of Alexandria, as read at the Council of Nicaea II (not Caesarea), from Longolius’s translation, LCN, fols. 32v–33r; for a modern English translation based on the Greek text, and commentary, see The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, ed. and trans. Richard Price, 2 vols. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018) [henceforth ASCN], 1:277–81. Pérez lightly edited the wording, most notably by correcting “Titus et Vespasianus … subverterent” to “Titus Vespasianus … subverteret,” and by replacing Longolius’s “icona” with “imago.” Iacopo Nacchianti, in his discussion of images, also draws on this text: see pp. 360–61 below. Cf. also Catarino’s reference to this story, pp. 312–13 below. Eusebius, Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 2, cap. 25, in Eusebii Pamphili Caesariensis … Opera (Basileae: per Henricum Petri, 1549), 495; here, too, Pérez slightly edits the text.

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those regions. The image, removed with the other ecclesiastical objects, remains in Syria to this day. Since my parents transferred it to me when they passed from this world, I have owned it by inheritance to this day. This is the certain and manifest explanation for how from Syria it ended up in Judean parts.7 Moreover, persistent word has it that Luke the evangelist painted images of Christ and the chaste Virgin. Eusebius, in the second book of his history, discussing testimony of the martyrdom of the apostles Peter and Paul – about how Nero crowned both with martyrdom in Rome – introduces a certain Caius, an ancient Christian writer, who at the time of Emperor Severus,

Eusebius.

in a discussion with a certain Proclus, the leader of the Montanists, speaks as follows of the monuments of the apostles: I can point out the trophies of the Apostles, for if you follow the Via Regalis that leads to the Vatican, or the Via Ostiensis, you will find on both sides the trophies [of those] who fortified the Roman church.8 These memorials – for the churches which now stand in [the apostles’] honor were erected subsequently by Constantine the Great and thus, we strongly suspect, did not exist before, since [Eusebius] says that they were set up in the places of their martyrdom – were at that time truly sensory signs by which the faithful were inspired, as it were, to remember the martyrdom of so many apostles, regardless of whether they were images or not, whether they were visible or commemorative and held in honor. Lampadius, moreover, wrote that Alexander Severus held the portraits of Christ and Abraham in his domestic shrine in such veneration that he worshipped there in the morning hours.9 7 Pérez here cites a (since discredited) sermon attributed to Athanasius of Alexandria, as read at the Council of Nicaea II (not Caesarea): LCN, fols. 32v–33r; for a modern English translation based on the Greek text, and commentary, see ASCN, 1:277–81. Pérez has lightly edited the wording, most notably by correcting “Titus and Vespasian” to “Titus Vespasian,” and by replacing Longolius’s icona with imago. Iacopo Nacchianti, in his discussion of images, also draws on this text: see pp. 360–61 below. 8 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, trans. Kirsopp Lake and J.E.L. Olton, Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926–32), 1:183 (slightly modified to reflect the Latin translation of Eusebius’s Greek original). 9 The reference is to the life of Alexander Severus, in the Historia Augusta, attributed to Aelius Lampridius (not Lampadias).

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in larario suo Christi et Abrahami effigiem in tanta veneratione habuisse, ut matutinis horis ibi rem divinam faceret.16 [9] Item in vita beati Sylvestri legitur, quod magno Constantino ostenderit imagines Petri et Pauli, ut ex illarum conspectione comprobaret, an visio sibi revelata vera esset nec ne.17 | Tritissimum etiam omnibus est quod narrat Eusebius lib. vii. de statua illa salvatoris apud Caesaream Philippi aere fusa, habitu viri vestita, et dextram statuae mulieris iuxta positae porrigenti, ad cuius pedes herba quaedam nascebatur, quae cum exorta cresceret usque ad fimbriam vestis statuae, mira virtute (si herba tunc contingeretur) omnes morbos depellebat.18 Quae quidem statua in tanto honore priscis illis temporibus fuit habita, ut impius Iulianus illo in loco statuam suam collocaret, ut hac saltem occasione adorari videretur a Christianis, teste Socrate, uno ex autoribus Tripartitae, cuius verba sunt:

Eusebius.

Socrates.

Cum agnovisset Iulianus in Caesarea Philippi civitate Phoeniciae, quam Paneada vocabant, insigne Christi esse simulachrum, quod mulier illa sanguinis liberata profluvio constituerat, ea deposita suam ibi statuam collocavit. Quae violento igne de coelo cadente circa pectus eius divisa est et caput cum cervice una parte deiectum; reliqua pars hactenus superfuit et fulminis indicium reservavit. Statuam vero Christi quidam pagani trahentes confregerunt; postea vero Christiani frustra colligentes in ecclesiam recondiderunt, ubi hactenus reservantur.19 16

17

18 19

The reference is to the life of Alexander Severus, in the Historia Augusta, attributed to Aelius Lampridius (not Lampadias), chap. 29, in Historia Augusta, vol. 20, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924), 234–35: “matutinis horis in larario suo, in quo et divos principes sed optimos electos et animas sanctiores, in quis Apollonium et, quantum scriptor suorum temporum dicit, Christum, Abraham et Orfeum et huiuscemodi ceteros habebat ac maiorum effigies, rem divinam faciebat.” Pérez’s source is not obvious, but the passage was sufficiently well known to be referenced (with or without mention of the pagan deities) in dictionaries such as Ambrogio Calepini’s Dictionarium (Parisiis: In Academia Parisiense, 1509), s.v. lararium. The legend, part of Constantine’s conversion story, is told in the forged Vita beati Sylvestri, for which see Migne, PL 8:572–73; it was retold during Nicaea II: LCN, fol. 12r–v. See further the account in Sylvester’s life in the hagiographical collection edited by Luigi Lippomano and Laurentius Surius, De probatis sanctorum historiis, t. 6, Novembis et Decembris (Coloniae Agrippinae: apud Gervinum Calenium & haeredes Quentelios, 1575), 1055. Cf. Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, lib. 7, cap. 14, in Eusebii … Opera, 582. The passage was also cited at Nicaea II: see LCN, fol. 46r–v. Historia Tripertita [sic] … Cassiodori Senatoris viri Dei de regimine Ecclesie primitive (Lugduni: apud Jacobum Giuncti, 1534), lib. 6, cap. 41 (no pagination). For a modern edition, see Historia Tripartita, ed. W. Jacob and R. Hauslik, CSEL 71 (1972), lib. 6, cap. 41, 363.

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[9] Likewise, we read in the life of the holy Sylvester that he showed Constantine the Great images of Peter and Paul in order to establish by their inspection whether a vision he had received was true or not.10 Equally well known to all is what Eusebius recounts in book VII about the statue of the Savior near Caesarea Philippi, cast in bronze, clad in the garment of a man, and extending his right hand to the statue of a woman standing beside him. At its feet grew an herb which, when it sprouted and shot up to the fringe of the garment, upon touch miraculously expelled all illnesses.11 In those ancient times this statue was held in such honor that the impious Julian placed his own statue in that place. This was the only occasion on which he was seen being adored by Christians, as is testified by Socrates, one of the authors of the Tripartita, who states:

Eusebius.

Socrates.

When Julian learned that in the Phoenician city of Caesarea Philippi, which was called Paneas, there was a remarkable statue of Christ, installed by the woman who was healed of the issue of blood, he pulled it down and placed his own statue there. But the latter was broken in the chest by a violent thunderstrike: the head with the neck was thrust aside, while the rest survived and bore the mark of lightning. Some pagans dragged the statue of Christ away and smattered it; Christians later gathered the pieces and reassembled them in a church, where they are still kept.

10

11

For the complex history of Constantine’s conversion legend, of which this story is a part, see Tessa Canella, “Gli Actus Silvestri tra Oriente e Occidente. Storia e diffusione di una leggenda costantiniana,” Enciclopedia Costantiniana (Treccani, 2013), at http://www.trec cani.it/enciclopedia/. While Pérez could have known the text from the incunable edition by Bonino Mombrizio (Sanctuarium sive Vitae sanctorum collectae ex codicibus mss., 1475), it is more likely that he drew on the account given in the acts of Nicaea II: see note on opposite page. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 2:175–77. The passage was cited at Nicaea II: see The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, 1:354.

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Hos honores antiqua ecclesia deferebat Iesu Christi imagini. [10] Genadius quoque Constantinopolitanus patriarcha, vir sanctus et miraculorum patrator, qui tempore Leonis primi imperatoris floruit, tale de sacris imaginibus reliquit testimonium, quod allegatur etiam a septima synodo, cuius verba sunt:20 Non offendat quenquam quod ante sanctorum imagines luminaria et suave olentia accenduntur. Symbolicos enim ista fiunt, non lignis aut lapidibus ipsis, sed in honorem illorum, quibus cum Christo requies est, et quorum honor ad ipsum recurrit. Hoc ipsum attestante sapiente Basilio in haec verba: “Qui erga conservos bonos honorem, erga ipsum Dominum benevolentiae signa exhibet.”21

Genadius.

Basilius.

Luminaria, fidei lumen: odoramenta, boni operis imitationem designant. Scribit etiam de hoc sancto Nicephorus historiographus, quod cum quidam pictor vellet Christum ad similitudinem Iovis depingere, arefacta est manus eius, quem post peccatum confessum, oratione sua subito sanavit Genadius.22 20

21

22

Note that, according to Nicaea II, this passage was part of a letter of Patriarch Germanus of Constantinople read at the council. Later sources, such as Jean-Étienne Durant, De ritibus ecclesiae catholicae libri tres (Romae: Ex Typographia Vaticana, 1591), 56, make the same attribution and identify the letter as Germanus’s Epistolae, lib. 7, cap. 14, ep. 2. In LCN, fol. 46r, the passage reads: “Verum ne quempiam offendat quod ante sanctorum imagines lumina et suave olentia thymiamata accenduntur. Symbolicos enim ista fieri in honorem illorum opinandum est, quorum cum Christo requies, quorum honor ad ipsum recurrit, hoc ipsum testante Basilio, quod erga conservos bonos honor, erga ipsum dominum commune benevolentiae signum exhibet.” Note also the following sentence, which Pérez appears to paraphrase after the quote: “Sensibilia enim lumina symbolum sunt immaterialis illius et ad Deo dati luminis, aromatum autem incensio, synceram et totum sancti spiritus afflatum et repletionem significat.” The phrase “non lignis aut lapidibus ipsis” in the quoted passage appears to be an interpolation from another, similar remark during the same council, ibid., fol. 36v: “Ita, o homo, Christianorum populus quascunque crucis et imaginum eius figuras amplectuntur, non ipsis lignis aut lapidibus, vel auro aut corruptibili imagini, aut capsulae aut reliquiis cultum praestant, verum per haec Deo omnium factori gloriam, venerationem, et cultum exhibent. Siquidem qui in sanctos impenditur honor, in ipsum recurrit.” Here Pérez appears to paraphrase Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulus, Ecclesiasticae Historiae Libri Decem et Octo, sacratiss. Rom. Regis Ferdinandi liberalitate, opera vero ac studio doctiss. viri Ioannis Langi, Consiliarii Regii e Graeco in Latinum sermonem translati, nunque primum in lucem editi (Basileae: Oporini, 1553), 807. The work was translated by the grecist Johann Lange, translator of many patristic works and counselor to King (later Emperor) Ferdinand of Hapsburg (1503–64). On Lange (1503–67), see Adolf Schimmelpfennig, “Lange, Johann,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 17 (1883), 638–39;

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Such honors did the ancient Church reserve for an image of Jesus Christ. [10] Moreover, Patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople, a holy man and worker of miracles, who was active in the time of Emperor Leo I, left this testimony about sacred images, cited by the Seventh Council:12 It gives no offense to anyone when lights and sweet-smelling substances are lit before the images of saints. These in fact become symbolic, not in reference to those pieces of wood or stone, but in honor of those who rest with Christ and whose honor reverts to him. The wise Basil makes the same point with these words: “Who honors his good fellow servants confers the signs of benevolence on the Lord himself.”13

Gennadius.

Basil.

Lights connote the light of faith; odors, the imitation of good works. Nicephorus the historian, too, writes about this saint that when a painter wanted to paint Christ in the likeness of Jupiter, his hand became arid; after he confessed his sin, Gennadius immediately healed him with a prayer.14

12 13 14

According to Pérez’s source, Nicaea II, the patriarch in question was Germanus of Constantinople, whose letter containing the following passage was read at the council. Cf. The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, 1:352. LCN, fol. 46r. Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulus is the Latinized name of the fourteenth-century Byzantine author of the Historia Ecclesiastica (see note on opposite page).

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[11] Cum hac pia opinione usque ad haec tempora, religiose et utiliter in templis admittebantur et venerabantur sacrae imagines; quousque Zenonis tempore, qui praefato Leoni in imperio successit, surrexit quidam (ut idem Nicephorus refert) Xenaias nomine, fortuna servus, natione Persa, secta gentilis, et minime baptizatus, qui dominum suum fugiens, villas quae circa Antiochiam sunt, simulans se Christianum, a fide retrahebat, et inter alia corrupta dogmata quae disseminabat, Domini et sanctorum dicebat non recipiendas esse imagines. Quem damnatus Petrus Gnapheus Patripassianus, qui per violentiam eo tempore sedem Antiochiae tenebat, non solum recepit, sed ipsum Hierapoleos episcopum ordinavit, | et cum ipsum minime baptizatum esse didicisset, aiebat blasphemus ille: sufficit pro baptismo consecratio.23 Hic ergo episcopus indigne creatus et contra ordinem ecclesiae constitutus, quae neophytum inhibet episcopum fieri, hoc dogma iudaicum et Sarracenicum per totum fere Orientem disseminavit. Cum vero eo tempore imperatores, qui Constantinopoli agebant, tam in fide quam in obedientia Romani pontificis fuissent instabiles (nam et concilium Chalcedonense multi eorum non receperunt) multum invaluit haec pestis, levitate imperatorum ad eam ultro accedente. Ab hoc ergo perdito homine Luciferiana haeresis ortum habuit, mansitque dogma istud absque hoc quod ecclesia suum interponeret iudicium, usque ad tempora Gregorii magni, qui Mauricium imaginum adversarium monuit et corripuit. Sed non multo post coacta est VI synodus Constantinopolitana, tempore Agathonis, in qua Monothelitae et Foeliciani sunt damnati, erga usum et receptionem imaginum, quam negabant, dum imperaret Constantinus Pogonatus et Iustinianus secundus, filius eius. Huius enim tempore peracta fuit sexta synodus, qui in atrio S. Sophiae Constantinopoli imagines depingere fecit, interponente in hoc suam autoritatem Constantino primo papa. Damnationem huius synodi in forma non legi, sed approbationem imaginum tam quo ad retentionem, quam quo ad venerationem, bene legi. Tria testimonia de hac re sunt, quorum duo satis trita et communia, et ab

23

Niceph[orus].

Unde coepit in ecclesia falsa de imaginibus existimatio. Pet[rus] Gnapheus.

the entry mistakenly states that the Nicephorus translation was first published in 1588. See also John Flood, Poets Laureate in the Holy Roman Empire: A Bio-Bibliographical Dictionary, 4 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 3:1076–78; and Michael Erbe, “Johann Lange of Karvinà,” in Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutscher, 3 vols. (Toronto etc.: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 2:290. Pérez, who frequented Hapsburg circles when writing his De traditionibus, possibly consulted Lange’s translation in manuscript before its publication. Again Pérez seems to follow Lange’s translation of Nicephorus, Ecclesiasticae Historiae, 845–46.

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[11] Based on this pious view, sacred images were accepted and venerated religiously and profitably all the way back to those times. Yet, as the same Nicephorus recounts, in the time of Zeno, who succeeded the aforementioned Leo as emperor, a man by the name of Xenaias stood up, a slave by lot, of the Persian nation, pagan in doctrine, and unbaptized, who in flight from his lord pulled the villages around Antioch away from the faith by feigning to be a Christian, and spread corrupt teachings, saying among other things that the images of the Lord and the saints were unacceptable. The condemned Patripassianist Petrus Gnapheus,15 who in that time had taken the see of Antioch by force, not only received him, but ordained him bishop of Hierapolis. Upon learning that he was not baptized, that blasphemer said: the consecration is adequate for baptism. Now this man who was unworthily created bishop, against the order of the Church, which prohibits a neophyte to become bishop, spread this Jewish and Muslim teaching across the entire East. Since at that time the emperors who ruled in Constantinople were fickle in their faith and obedience to the Roman pontiff (many had even refused to accept the Council of Chalcedon), this plague prevailed, further aided by the emperors’ indifference. With this lost man, then, that develish heresy originated, and this doctrine persisted without the Church intervening with its judgment, until the time of Gregory the Great, who admonished and chided Mauritius, the opponent of images. Not long afterwards, however, at the time of Agatho,16 the Sixth Council convened at Constantinople, which condemned the Monothelites and the Felicians regarding the use and reception of images, which they denied, when Constantine [IV] Pogonatus and Justinian II, his son, were emperors.17 In this time, in fact, the Sixth Council took place, which had images depicted in the atrium of the Saint Sophia in Constantinople, to which Pope Constantine I lent his authority. I have not read the formal condemnation of this council, but have closely read its approval of images, both for their retention and veneration. There are three witnesses in this matter, two of which are rather obvious and well-known, and approved by the every church. Gratian, in 15

16 17

Niceph[orus]. How a false opinion about images took hold in the Church.

Petrus Gnapheus.

Petrus Fullo or Gnapheus was a fifth-century monophysite known for his attempt to usurp the patriarchate of Antioch c. 469 CE (see the entry in William Smith, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, online at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/ hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aalphabetic+letter%3DP%3Aent ry+group%3D17%3Aentry%3Dpetrus-bio-18). Pope Agatho (r. 678–81). The inclusion of the Felicians, the followers of Felix of Urgell (see n. 6 above), in this discussion appears to be erroneous.

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omni ecclesia approbata sunt. Gratianus de consecratione, distinctione prima ex VI synodo illa generalissima sic refert:

Gratianus, 6 synodus.

Venerabiles imagines Christiani non deos appellant, neque serviunt eis ut diis, neque spem salutis ponunt in eis, neque ab eis expectant futurum iudicium, sed ad memoriam et recordationem primitivorum venerantur eas et adorant. Sed non serviunt eis cultu divino, nec alicui creaturae.24 [12] Secundum canonem citat septima synodus, qui sic habet: In quibusdam venerandarum imaginum picturis, agnus digito praecursoris indicatus, qui in typum gratiae est assumptus, verum illum nobis per legem praesignificatum agnum Iesum Christum indicat. Veteres igitur typos et umbras veluti veritatis symbola et praefigurationes ecclesiae traditas amplexantes, gratiam et veritatem veneramur.25 24

25

Decretum Gratiani cum glossis ad vetustorum exemplarium fidem novissime recognitum (Parisiis: apud Oudinum Parvum, 1542), Tertia pars de consecratione, dist. III, cap. 28, fols. 666r–v. However, the attribution (by Gratian as well as Pérez) to the Sixth Ecumenical Council is erroneous; the text is in the acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Nicaea II). Longolius translated the statement (not a canon or decree), read by Epiphanius, as follows: “Venerandas itaque imagines Christiani neque deos appellant, neque ut Deo cultum exhibent, neque salutis spem in illis constituunt, neque ab iis iudicium aliquando futurum expectant. Quod si autem in recordationem et memoriam, item quod singulari quadam affectione in ipsa prototypa ferebantur, salutaverint et honorifice adoraverint imagines, non tamen ob id illis latriam exhibuerunt aut divinam venerationem adscripserunt. Absit haec calumniatio” (LCN, fol. 61r; significant parallels italicized); for the different translation of Anastasius Bibliothecarius, see CUNS, (3:629). LCN, fol. 60r–v. The canon was issued by what is now known as the Quinisext Ecumenical Council, c. 82, but is cited here in a truncated version, eliminating the decree’s central point – that henceforth Christ be represented only in human form. As noted above (p. 142 n. 9), the full text was available at the time in CSCP, fol. 286r. Moreover, its content was explained more fully in LCN, fol. 35r; and the Decretum Gratiani, fol. 666v, citing a letter of Hadrian to Patriarch Tarasius, had already captured the intent of the decree (“Verum igitur agnum dominum nostrum Jesum Christum secundum imaginem humanam ammodo etiam in imaginibus pro veteri agno depingi iubemus”). For the Greek text, see CCT, 54. See the introduction, ibid., LXXXII–XC, on the council’s reception in the West (including the attribution of its canons to the Sixth Ecumenical Council). However, the editor errs in assuming that the first published Latin version is that of Gentien Hervet, in HCAC, 244 (as nr. 83). However, the same Hervet, secretary of Cardinal Marcello Cervini at the Council of Trent (see above p. 25), translated the Greek canons for Carranza’s Summa Conciliorum (CSCP). See Duval, “La Summa Conciliorum,” 410–13.

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his first distinction on consecration, discusses them generally, citing the Sixth Council as follows: Christians do not call venerable images gods; nor do they serve them as gods, place any hope of salvation in them, or expect a future judgment from them. Instead, they venerate and adore them to remember and recall their models. Yet they do not serve them in divine worship, nor any created being. [12] The second canon is cited by the Seventh Council. It reads thus: In some depictions of venerable images, a finger points to the lamb as forerunner, which is understood as a sign of grace and points us to Jesus Christ the Lamb as announced by the law. Therefore, in embracing the ancient types and shadows as symbols of truth and prefigurations transmitted to the Church, we venerate grace and truth.

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Quid magis catholicum dici potest atque syncerum? Hic nihil superstitionis, nihil idolomaniae est. [13] Tertius canon expressus est in his regulis quae nomine huius sanctae synodi graeco idiomate scriptae deferuntur, et penes me integrae sunt, estque LXXIII in ordine, qui hoc modo de veneratione signi crucis decernit:

Canon de crucis veneratione.

Cum crux quae vitam reddidit demonstret illud nobis salutare, omne nos studium adhibere oportet ut dignus honor tribuatur illi per quam liberati sumus a veteri delicto, adorationem illi tribuentes, crucis figuras in pavimento ab aliquibus extructas deleri omnino iubemus, ne conculcatione ambulantium tropheum nostrae victoriae contumelia afficiatur; qui igitur | in posterum crucis figuram in pavimento struxerint, diffinimus excommunicandos.26

117r

Omnium autem crudelissime in imagines saevitum est, quo tempore Leo tertius imperium tenuit, qui praeter impietatem, quam a praecedentibus imperatoribus contraxerat, tanta illi fuit cum Maumetanis necessitudo, ut pene ad deserendum Christianismum persuaderetur, Gisidiumque principem Arabum in arctissima amicitia habuerit, a quo persuasus est ut in imagines saeviret et in veneratores eorum crudeliter animadverteret. Sarraceni enim a crassis Iudaeis cortici literae nimium adhaerentibus hoc acceperunt, ut in universum damnent omnes images, putantes se ob id solum magnum Deo obsequium praestare, quasi nos divinos honores imaginibus tribuamus. [14] Tunc imperatorem Gregorius tertius monuit ut ab insania hac desisteret; qui cum contumax esset, coacta synodo Romae XCIII episcoporum, usum imaginum et venerationem earum approbavit, et contrarium sentientes anathemate damnavit, anno Christi septingentesimo tricesimo tertio.27 Leone vero imperatore e medio sublato successit filius 26

27

Grego[rius III].

Pérez here translates canon 73 of the Quinisext Council. The Greek acts had been published in 1540 by Jean du Tillet: Joannes Tilius, Κανόνεσ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν άγίων συνόδων. Apostolorum et sanctorum conciliorum decreta (Parisiis: per Conradum Neobarium, 1540); c. 73 is at fol. 105r. Evidently, he did not use Hervet’s translation in the 1546 CSCP, 284v, whose wording is quite different, as is that of Hervet’s 1561 translation (HCAC, fol. 240). For a modern edition, see CCT, 51–52. The synod of Rome of 731 (sic), as cited by Nicaea II, decreed: “si quis deinceps antiquae consuetudinis et apostolicae ecclesiae fidelem usum contemnens, adversus eandem venerationem sacrarum imaginum, videlicet Dei et domini nostri Iesu Christ, et genitricis eius semper virginis immaculatae atque gloriosae Mariae, beatorum apostolorum et omnium sanctorum, depositor atque destructor, et prophanator vel blasphemus extiterit,

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What can we say that is more Catholic and sincere? There is no superstition or idolomania here. [13] The third canon is formulated in the rules stated in Greek in the name of this council, and which I have in full, namely number 73, which determines the veneration of the sign of the cross in this way: Since the cross that has restored life shows us what is salutary, we need to make every effort to offer worthy honor to it, by which we are freed from the old offense, bestowing adoration on it: [hence] we order that figures of the cross which some have drawn in pavements be entirely removed to avoid any affront which the trophy of our victory might suffer under the footsteps of passersby. We declare excommunicated those who in the future draw the figure of the cross in a pavement. But the one who raged most harshly against images was Leo III who, when holding imperial authority, not only adopted the impiety of previous emperors, but had such need of the [support of the] Muslims that he was almost swayed to abandon Christianity, and had the closest friendship with the Arab prince Gisidius, who persuaded him to rage against images and had a harsh attitude towards those who worshipped them. The Saracenes, in fact, took from the obtuse Jews, who stick all too much to the letter of the text, the idea of universally condemning all images, thinking that by this alone they exhibit great allegiance to God, as if we offer divine honors to images. [14] At that time Gregory III admonished the emperor to desist from such folly; and when the latter proved stubborn, he convened a synod of ninety-three bishops in Rome in the year 733, where he approved the use and veneration of images, while condemning by anathema those who felt otherwise.18 When Emperor Leo III passed away, his son Constantine succeeded him. Far worse than his father, he burned the sacred scriptures, removed the name of the Virgin Mary, destroyed the images of saints with brute force, and perpetrated many other abominations, which we do not need to review. In the end he finished his terrible life impenitent 18

Gregory III.

The synod was actually held in 731. The decree reads: “henceforth, if anyone, disregarding the faithful usage of ancient tradition and the apostolic Church, demolishes, destroys, profanes, or insults the veneration of sacred images, namely of God and our Lord Jesus Christ, his mother, the always immaculate and glorious Virgin Mary, the blessed apostles and all the saints, he will be banished from the body and blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the united body of the Church.”

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eius Constantinus, patre longe deterior, qui sacras literas combussit et nomen Mariae virginis iussit auferri, et in sanctorum imagines barbaro quodam impetu desaeviit, et multa alia abominanda fecit, quae non opus est recensere. Ad ultimum sine poenitentia pessimam vitam finiens, ad inferos descendit. Reliquit iste filium Leonem quartum, imperii et impietatis avitae haeredem; modestior tamen forte effectus est propter pietatem Hyrennae uxoris suae, quae post ipsum maritum defunctum, una cum filio suo Constantino VI imperium tenens, generalem synodum interveniente Adriani Papae consensu, in Nicaea coegit, quae et septima synodus dicta est, ubi tertio iam et ultimo error de non recipiendis imaginibus communi utriusque ecclesiae consensu damnatur et exploditur. Ubi praeter sanctorum patrum autoritates, quas sancta synodus in confirmationem veritatis adduxit, calculum et magisterium suum synodus ipsa unanimiter apposuit, tam circa receptionem earum, quam venerationem, et librorum etiam qui in favorem erroris scripti erant abolitionem. Damnatio sic habet: Oportet nos ecclesiasticas traditiones sive scripto sive consuetudine in ecclesia retentas, quarum de numero est imaginum effiguratio quibus in hoc utimur ut recordemur et affectu amplectamur res significatas, unanimiter et inviolabiliter observare, quodque huiusmodi imaginibus honor debeat exhiberi: non quidem ille qui Deo debetur, quam latriam appellant solique creatori a creaturis omnibus debet exhiberi, sed tantum is qui in recordatione, quemadmodum et typo reverendae et vivificantis crucis, et sanctis evangeliis, et reliquis sacris oblationibus, suffitus facimus, luminaria reverenter accendimus, prout veteribus pie hoc in consuetudinem fuit. Sic enim sanctorum nostrorum patrum putamus obtinere disciplinam et tra- | ditionem catholicae ecclesiae, quae a finibus usque ad fines evangelium suscepit.28

117v

28

Damnatio iconomachorum.

sit extorris a corpore et sanguine domini nostri Iesu Christi, vel totius ecclesiae unitate atque compage” (LCN, 435, based on the Liber pontificalis). In this block text, Pérez partly abbreviated, partly paraphrased two passages from session VII of LCN, fols. 87v–88r (with literal overlaps in italics): “Fatemur aut[em] unanimiter nos ecclesiasticas traditiones, sive scripto sive consuetudine in ecclesia retentas, quarum de numero est imaginum effiguratio … Quo scilicet per hanc imaginum pictarum inspectionem omnes qui contemplantur, ad prototyporum memoriam et recordationem et desiderium veniant, illisque salutationem et honorariam orationem exhibeant. Non secundum fidem nostram veram latriam, quae solum divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae et vivificantis crucis, et sanctis evangeliis et reliquis sacris oblationibus suffitorum et luminarium reverenter accedimus, quemadmodum veteribus

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and went down into hell. He left as heir to his empire and ancestral impiety his son Leo IV. But the latter turned out more moderate thanks to the piety of his wife Irene. Upon the death of her husband, holding imperial authority with her son Constantine VI, she convened a general council in Nicaea – also called the Seventh Council – with the approval of Pope Hadrian. There the error of rejecting images was condemned and disapproved for the third and last time by common consent of both Churches. There, the holy council went beyond the authoritative texts of the holy fathers, which it marshaled to confirm the truth, to establish its own, unanimous decision and doctrine, both regarding the acceptance of images and their veneration, and also about the censuring of books written in favor of this error. The condemnation states the following: We need to preserve unanimously and inviolately the ecclesiastical traditions, whether laid down in writing or in church custom. One of these is the figuring of images, which we use to recall and affectively embrace the things they signify. And to this kind of images we must extend honor, not that which is owed to God, which is called latria and which all created beings must exhibit to him alone, but only that [which is displayed] in remembrance, just as we incense the image of the venerable, life-giving cross, the holy gospels, and other holy offerings and reverently light candles, as was the devout custom among the ancients. In this way, in fact, we believe we uphold the teaching of our holy fathers and the tradition of the Catholic Church, which has accepted the gospel from one end of the earth to the other.19

19

Condemnation of the iconoclasts.

In this block text, Pérez partly abbreviated, partly paraphrased two passages from session VII of Nicaea II. Cf. The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, 2:564–65.

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Haec synodus. Specialius autem in septima actione de his imaginibus hoc modo instituitur: Venerandas imagines ex quavis materia commode paratas et in templis sanctis collocandas habendasque, tum in parietibus [sive] tabulis, tum aedibus privatis, maxime imaginem Domini nostri Iesu Christi, et deiparae virginis, venerandorumque angelorum, et omnium deinde sanctorum, quos scilicet per hanc imaginum pictarum inspectionem omnes si contemplentur, ad prototyporum memoriam et recordationem et desiderium veniant, illisque salutationem honorariamque orationem exhibeant: non veram latriam, quae solum divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae crucis, et sanctis evangeliis, et reliquis oblationibus suffitus et luminaria reverenter accendimus ex traditione veterum.29 Ad ultimum damnat quotquot ausi fuerint contrarium sentire aut docere, aut more impiorum haereticorum ecclesiasticas traditiones contemnere, aut novam quandam vaniloquentiam inducere, aut quicquam de consecratis ecclesiae ad cultum aut ad recordationem Dei, qualia sunt

29

pie in consuetudinem hoc adductum est. Sic enim sanctorum nostrorum patrum putamus obtinere disciplinam et traditionem catholicae ecclesiae, quae a finibus usque ad fines evangelium suscepit.” Largely the same text is in CSCP, fol. 312r–v, a different translation in CUNS, 3:825–27. Again, Pérez edited and abbreviated the text from session VII of LCN, fols. 87v–88r: “His se sic habentibus regiam viam incedentes, et sanctorum nostrorum et divinorum patrum doctrinae insistentes, et catholicae ecclesiae in qua sanctus spiritus inhabitat traditionem observantes, definimus cum omni diligentia et cura venerandas et sanctas imagines ad modum et formam venerandae et vivificantis crucis e coloribus et tessellis aut alia quavis materia commode paratas dedicandas, et in templis sanctis Dei collocandas habendasque, tum in sacris vasis et vestibus, tum in parietibus et tabulis, in aedibus privatis, in viis publicis, maxime autem imaginem Domini et Dei servatoris nostri Iesu Christi, deinde intemeratae dominae nostrae deiparae, venerandorum angelorum, et omnium deinde sanctorum virorum. Quo scilicet per hanc imaginum pictarum inspectionem omnes qui contemplantur, ad prototyporum memoriam et recordationem et desiderium veniant, illisque salutationem et honorariam orationem exhibeant: non secundum fidem nostram veram latriam, quae solum divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae et vivificantis crucis, et sanctis evangeliis et reliquis sacris oblationibus suffitorum et luminarium reverenter accedimus, quemadmodum veteribus pie in consuetudinem hoc adductum est.” Largely the same text is in CSCP, fol. 312r–v, a different translation in CUNS, 3:827.

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Thus the council. Regarding such images the seventh session establishes in particular that venerable images, suitably made from any material, are to be placed and held in holy temples, whether on walls or panels, or in private residences – particularly images of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mother of God, the venerable angels, and all saints, by which all, when viewing and contemplating upon these images, are spurred to remember, recall, and yearn for their prototypes. To these they will offer greeting and honorific prayer – not true latria, which pertains to the divine nature alone, but in the same way in which we reverently burn incense and light candles for the image of the venerable, life-giving cross, the holy gospels, and other holy offerings, according to the tradition of the ancients.20 Finally, [the council] condemns anyone who has the presumption to believe or teach otherwise, or spurn the ecclesiastical traditions in the way of impious heretics, or to instigate novel and idle talk, or reject any of the things consecrated by the Church for the worship or remembrance of God, such as the cross, images, and true relics of the saints, and lastly those who employ these sacred things of God as vile and profane objects.21

20 21

Ibid. Cf. ibid., 566.

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crux et imagines et veraces sanctorum reliquiae, abiicere, denique illos qui sacratis Dei rebus tanquam vilibus et prophanis utuntur.30 Ubi etiam per sanctos illos patres concluditur quod a tempore apostolorum usque ad magnum Constantinum mos erat in oratoriis imagines depingere. [15] De libris vero contra usum imaginum descriptis, hoc modo disponit praefata synodus canone nono: Omnes pueriles nugas et insanas debacchationes, falsas scilicet scripturas contra venerandas imagines compositas, oportet adferre in domo episcopi Constantinopolitani, ut cum exteris haereticis libris reponantur. Si quis vero haec occultasse depraehendatur, si episcopus et presbyter vel diaconus fuerit, deponatur: si autem laicus aut monachus, excommunicetur.31 Eadem fere decernuntur in Franconiana synodo, hac etiam tempestate coacta, contra Foelicianam haeresin. Acta sunt haec tempore Caroli magni imperatoris, cuius synodi determinationem universalis ecclesia venerabiliter recepit, et modo etiam tenet, exceptis nonnullis cervicosis haereticis, quibus proprius sensus semper placuit. [16] Unde manifeste habes imaginum usum et venerationem a tempore apostolorum usitatum fuisse in ecclesia universaliter, parvipendium autem earum a perditis et infamibus hominibus post quingentos annos quam ecclesia plantata est, subortum fuisse. Et re vera si pie et syncere 30

31

Ibid., again with variations from the Longolius translation (LCN, fol. 88r), which reads: “Igitur qui ausi fuerint aliud sentire aut docere, aut more impiorum haereticorum ecclesiasticas traditiones contaminare, aut novam quandam vaniloquentiam inducere, aut quicquam de consecratis in ecclesia abiicere evangelii inquam depictum codicem, aut figuram crucis, aut imaginis alicuius picturam, aut reliquias martyrum quas sciverint esse germanas et veras, aut contra ista vafre et improbe aliquid excogitare, quod sit contra constitutionem ecclesiasticam, aut uti tanquam communibus sacratis Deo, repositis pretiosis, aut monasteriis reverendis, si fuerint epicopi aut clerici deponuntor [sic], si monachi aut laici communione privantor [sic].” See also CSCP, fols. 312v–13r, and cf. CUNS, 3:829. This constitutes the end of the decree. Pérez has thus omitted the council’s sanction. Also note that his next remark constitutes his conclusion, not the council’s. LCN, fol. 94r has only an abbreviated version of the canons concerning punishable offenses, including no. 9 (“Omnes iuveniles lusus, et insanae debacchationes falsaque commentaria et scripta contra venerandas imagines aedita”). CSCP, fol. 315r, offers a fuller, but different translation; CUNS, 911, has yet another version. Thus Pérez’s source for the passage remains unclear.

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Here, too, these holy fathers conclude that from the time of the apostles to Constantine the Great it was customary to paint images in houses of prayer. [15] The aforementioned council, canon 9, deals as follows with books written against the use of images: All childish jesting and raving, namely the false texts written against venerable images, must be taken to the episcopal palace in Constantinople, to be deposited with other heretical books. If anyone is found hiding them, if he is a bishop, priest, or deacon, he is to be deposed, and if a layman or monk, he is to be excommunicated.22 About the same was determined in the Frankish council, convened in the same period, against the Felician heresy.23 This occurred at the time of Charlemagne, whose council’s decisions were respectfully accepted and have been maintained up till now by the universal church, except for some stubborn heretics, who always indulge their own inclinations.24 [16] Thus it is manifest that from the time of the apostles the use and veneration of images was universally accepted in the Church, but that five hundred years after its founding contempt for them arose among some lost and infamous men. In truth, if their worship and veneration is done

22 23

24

Cf. ibid., 616. The author here refers to the Council of Frankfurt (794), which condemned both the Adoptionist heresy, namely the teachings of Elipandus of Toledo and Felix of Urgell (art. 1), and the image doctrine of the Second Council of Nicaea (art. 2). Art. 2 reads: “Allata est in medio questio de nova Grecorum synodo, quam de adorandis imaginibus Constantinopolim fecerunt, in qua scriptum habebatur, ut qui imagines sanctorum ita ut deificam trinitatem servitio aut adorationem non inpenderent, anathema iudicaverunt: qui supra sanctissimi patres nostri omnimodis adorationem et servitutem rennuentes contempserunt atque consentientes condempnaverunt”: Concilia, Tomus II, Concilia Aevi Karolini I, Pars I, ed. Alfredus Boretius, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum Sectio II (Hannover-Leipzig: Hahn, 1906), 165. Modern scholars agree that neither the Council of Frankfurt nor Theodulf of Orléans’ Opus Caroli contra Synodum (Libri Carolini) interpreted Nicaea II correctly. Pérez, whose source is unclear, is evidently unaware of the true intent of the Carolingian council; nor did he know the Libri Carolini, which appeared in Paris in 1549 (hence around the same time as his De traditionibus) and was to provide critics of images, including Calvin, with significant polemical material (see pp. 26–27 and 38 above).

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cultus earum et veneratio fiat, sancta est et utilis huiusmodi institutio, quam et traditio apostolica introduxit, et usus universalis ecclesiae affirmavit, accedente consensu percelebrium et generalium synodorum, tam in Oriente quam in Occidente. Id quod ipsa ratio etiam naturalis dictat, nam cum imagines naturaliter repraesentent Christum, sanctos et trophea eorum, et ex similitudine naturali quam ad res | representatas habent, ad ipsas res quas repraesentant videantur pertinere et aliquid eorum esse: igitur etsi sancti Dei iure venerantur a nobis, eadem ratione et res quae ad eos pertinent venerari debent, modo unicuique rei pro sua dignitate servato. Veneramur enim impulsu quodam naturae ducti regum et imperatorum, parentum et valde dilectorum imagines, propter naturalem similitudinem, quam ad eos quos repraesentant, habent. Adde quod ea ratione qua simplices docent, et tardos et obliviosos excitant, valde utiles nobis sunt. Ob idque praeciosae nobis esse debent, honorifice eas tractando, in sublimibus locis et honestis reponendo, et in earum praesentia eas et res quas repraesentant venerando tanquam signa efficacia a sanctis patribus ad huius rei finem salubriter instituta. Itaque triplici nomine, meo quidem iudicio, eis debetur honor: primo, quia repraesentant; deinde, quia a maioribus ad hoc ut signa instituta sunt, quam ob causam etsi homines et rationales creaturae imagines Dei sint, adorari non debent hac sola ratione, quia non sunt nobis a Deo proposita, ut signa recordationis et reverentiae; tertio, quia valde utiles nobis sunt. Decretum vero illud Illiberitanae synodi, quo videtur prohibere canone XXVI ne imagines in ecclesia depingantur,32 non arguit illo tempore imagines fuisse reiectas, quin potius ex ea constat tunc fuisse in usu, sed tantum caveri videtur ne in parietibus ecclesiae indecenter depingantur. Cito enim huiusmodi imagines sic depictae venustatem perdunt et formam vel partem formae facile amittunt, et vix bene depingi possunt, ita ut plerumque irrisio sit transeuntibus quod ad rem sanctam repraesentandam institutum est. Assignans enim causam concilium suae determinationis dicit ne quod colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur. Vel si imagines in totum haec synodus prohibuit, potuit fieri ut gratia evitandi alicuius magni scandali hoc effecerit, sicut legimus fecisse Ezechiam regem cum serpentem illum aeneum confregit, quia illi honores divinos tribuebat iudaicus populus, ne scilicet putarent infirmi aliqui adorationem Deo debitam imaginibus tribui. Quod fieri potuit, cum eo 32

[IV] Reg. 18[4]

Council of Elvira, in CCOP, fol. 168v (also CSCP, fol. 41r–v), where the canon is numbered XXXVI (“Placuit picturas in ecclesia esse non debere, ne quod colitur aut adoratur in parietibus depingatur”).

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piously and sincerely, the practice is holy and useful: apostolic tradition introduced it and the custom of the universal Church has confirmed it, supported by the consensus of famous general councils both in the East and the West. Natural reason itself dictates it, since when images naturally represent Christ, the saints, and their trophies, and when – based on the natural likeness they have to the things represented – they appear to pertain to these things they represent and be some part of them (aliquid eorum esse), then just as we rightly venerate God’s saints, for the same reason we must venerate the things that pertain to them as well, assuming that everything is kept up in dignity. For we venerate, guided by a natural urge, the images of kings and emperors, ancestors and loved ones based on the natural likeness they have with the persons they represent. Moreover, they are quite useful to us, because they teach the uneducated and inspire the dull-witted and forgetful. For this reason we must hold them dear, treating them with honor, placing them in lofty and respectable places, and in their presence venerating them and those they represent as efficacious signs beneficially instituted to this end by the holy fathers. Thus, in my view, honor is owed them for three reasons: first, since they represent; second, because our superiors have instituted them as signs for this purpose – hence while humans and rational creatures are images of God, they ought not to be adored for this reason alone, because God has not proposed them to us as signs of remembrance and reverence; third, since they are most useful to us. A decree of the Synod of Elvira, which in canon 26 appears to prohibit the painting of images in church,25 does not declare that images were rejected at that time. Rather, it establishes that they were then in use, but only warned against painting them indecently on church walls. In fact, painted in this way, such images quickly lose their beauty, easily fade, wholly or in part, and can scarcely be painted well, so that what is instituted to represent a sacred thing is often an [object of] mockery for passersby. For the council, providing the rationale of its determination, says “that what is worshipped and adored not be painted on walls.” If, instead, this council prohibited images entirely, it could be that this was done to avoid some great scandal, in the way in which we read that King Hezekiah shattered the bronze snake, because the Jewish people attributed divine honors to it – to avoid, that is, that superstitious folk would consider offering to images the adoration owed to God. This is possible, because in that era 25

4 Kings 18:4

This early fourth-century council decreed in canon 36 (sic): “We have determined that images must not be present in church, so that what is worshipped and adored is not painted on walls.”

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tempore non fuerat hic articulus ab ecclesia declaratus; tempore enim Constantini magni synodus ista coacta fuit, quae satis arguit illo tempore imagines templorum fuisse in usu. Ad hunc modum interpretari debet id quod de D. Epiphanio dicitur, quod imaginem in velo pendentem (cum venisset Abethel ad villam quae dicitur Anablatha) sciderit eamque ut mortuus involueretur dederit, quia forte ut adoraretur eam ibi positam esse putarit. Nonnullos libros huius doctoris allegarunt iconomachi in septima synodo, sed testimoniis patentibus comprobatum est illos esse falsos et adulterinos, et nomine Epiphanii ab iconomachis obtrusos.33 [17] Quo fit ut magno intervallo distet ecclesiae doctrina ab instituto gentilitatis in venerationem imaginum: coeca enim gentilitas divinos honores | tribuebat suis idolis, putans aliquid numinis eis inesse, eo quod daemon plerumque in ipsis dabat responsa. Item verorum deorum putabat imagines illas esse, cum essent falsorum. Nos autem nihil numinis tribuimus imagini, neque ei divinos honores damus, nec falsa numina aut heroas [sic] adoramus per illas, sed veras res, et ad memoriam quam imaginum praesentia in nobis excitant rem praesentatam ultimo adoramus et veneramur; nec in hoc est aliquod periculum, sed magna ut dixi utilitas. Quod vero in nonnullis templis Dei patris aut spiritus sancti aut rerum aliarum spiritualium imagines depingantur, ut sanctorum angelorum: certe quantum ad duas saltem personas attinet, et maxime patrem, non admodum probo picturas, sicut nec et Damascenus probat. Dicit enim libro quarto, capite octavo, quod impietas est figurare quod divinum est, quia praeter hoc quod res simplicissima et spiritualis imagine exprimi non potest, proxima occasio est inducendi errorem in mentibus simplicium, quo putent Deum patrem corporeum esse aut propter caniciei habitudinem vetustate caducum.34 De angelorum vero picturis non est tantum periculi, qui licet non sint corporei, ut possit per

33 34

Cf. LCN, fols. 72v–73v. The reference appears to be to John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 4, cap. 17 (not 8), “De adoratione imaginum,” in Theologia Damasceni (Parisiis: per Henricum Stephanum, 1512), fol. 170v (“Ad haec invisibilis et incorporei, incircunscriptibilis et infigurabilis Dei, quis potest facere repraesentationem? Insipientiae igitur et extremae impietatis est figurare divinitatem”).

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the Church had not yet explained this point. The time of Constantine the Great, in fact, saw the convening of a council that amply demonstrates that in those days images were in use.26 Thus we must interpret the story about St. Epiphanius, that he, while traveling from Abethel to the town called Anablatha, tore up an image hung in a cloth and handed it over in the way a corpse is wrapped, perhaps because he believed that it was placed there to be adored.27 During the Seventh Council the opponents of images adduced several books by this doctor, but clear evidence proves that these are false and adulterated and put forward by iconoclasts in Epiphanius’s name.28 [17] This is why the doctrine of the Church regarding the veneration of images is far removed from pagan custom, which blindly offered divine honors to its idols, thinking that something numinous inhered in them, since a demon commonly responded through them. Likewise, these were thought to be images of true gods, even though they were false. We, however, do not attribute anything numinous to the image, nor give it divine honors, nor adore false powers or heroes through them, but true things; and at the memory stirred up in us by the presence of images, we ultimately adore and venerate the thing presented. There is no danger in this, but rather, as I have said, great usefulness. However, that in some of God’s churches images of the Father and the Holy Spirit, or of other spiritual things (such as holy angels) are depicted, I do not approve – certainly as far as these two persons, and particularly the Father, are concerned – just as John of Damascus does not approve it either. For he says in his fourth book, chapter 8, that it is impious to figure what is divine, since, besides the fact that a most pure and spiritual thing cannot be expressed in an image, it is a proximate occasion of inducing error in the minds of the simple, by which they may believe that God the Father is corporeal and, because of his white appearance, frail from old age.29 There is not so much danger in the pictures of angels. While they are not corporeal (in 26 27

28

29

The reference is to the First Council of Nicaea (325). This famous episode, reported in a late fourth-century letter by Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis, to Bishop John of Jerusalem, is known to us through a Latin translation by Jerome. For an English translation, see https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf206.v.LI .html. More correctly, during the council iconoclasts were cited as having relied on works by Epiphanius in support of their views. See The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, 2:496– 500. Modern scholarship has qualified the Nicaean view of Epiphanius; see Hans Georg Thümmel, “Die bilderfeindlichen Schriften des Epiphanius von Salamis,” Byzantinoslavica 47 (1986), 169–88; Andrew S. Jacobs, Epiphanius of Cyprus. A Cultural Biography of Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016). The reference appears to be to John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, lib. 4, cap. 17 (not 8).

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imaginem eorum substantia cognosci, proprietates tamen eorum, explicari possunt quodammodo per picturas: per puerilem vultum intelligimus innocentiam, per venustatem vultus, decorem et perfectionem, quibus a Deo dotati sunt; per alas agilitatem eorum indicibilem imagines eorum repraesentant. [18] Monstravimus ergo iam non solum, quod imaginum usus sit laudabilis, sed quod etiam venerari debeant tam traditionis antiquitate quam totius ecclesiae et sanctorum patrum consensu. Atque haec sunt quae circa imagines quilibet Christianus oportet ut teneat qui non vult cum Foeliciano et barbaris iconomachis damnari; nec amplius per ecclesiae magisterium, cui refragari minime licet, ostendi potest.

119r

Restat ut videamus quali honore sacrae imagines venerandae sunt. [19] Omnes fere scholastici in hoc sunt, quod imago Christi et sanctorum adorari debent eadem adoratione qua et res quae repraesentantur. Ideo imagini Christi et signo crucis sanctissimo, in eo quod Christum repraesentant, latriae adorationem illis deberi affirmant. Unde dicunt ex Aristotele quod duplex potest esse motus animae in imaginem: prior, quo in ipsam imaginem fertur in quantum est quaedam res absolute considerata, utputa lignum, aes, aut lapis; alter est motus in ipsam imaginem ea ratione qua repraesentativa est. Inter quos motus hanc ponunt differentiam, quia prior ducit in imaginem et sistit in ea; alter vero una cum imagine ad rem tendit repraesentatam, et eodem motu cognoscitur etiam ipsa imago. Ex qua partitione ex parte cognitionis | descendunt ad aliam quae ad propositum videtur facere, dicentes quod si consideremus imaginem Christi vel sanctorum prout sunt quaedam res absolutae, tunc nulla reverentia debet eis exhiberi, quia reverentia rationali creaturae tantum debetur. Sed si consideremus imaginem Christi vel sanctorum ut repraesentativa est, sic debetur illis reverentia et adoratio quae et ipsis rebus quas repraesentant debetur. [20] Cuius doctrinae nullum (quod ego viderim) afferunt validum fundamentum quod possit fideles ad id quod docent obligare: nam neque scripturam, neque traditionem ecclesiae, neque communem sensum sanctorum, neque concilii generalis determinationem aliquam, nec etiam rationem qua hoc efficaciter suaderi possit, adducunt. Porro, quod

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the sense that their substance can be known from the image), their properties can in some way be shown by images: we know their innocence from their childlike faces, and the grace and perfection with which God has endowed them from the beauty of their features; and their ineffable nimbleness is represented in images of them by their wings. [18] We have shown not only that the use of images is laudable, but also that they ought to be venerated both for the antiquity of tradition and by the consensus of the Church and the holy fathers. This is what needs to be observed in the matter of images by every Christian who does not wish to be condemned with Felicianus and the barbaric iconoclasts. Nor is there anything else that can be shown by the magisterium of the Church, which may not be opposed in any way. Finally we need to consider the kind of honor With which images ought to be venerated. [19] Almost all scholastics agree that images of Christ and the saints are to be adored with the same adoration as the things represented by them. Therefore they affirm that an image of Christ and the most holy sign of the cross are owed the adoration of latria, inasmuch they represent Christ. Hence they say, based on Aristotle, that the movement of the soul to the image can be dual. On the one hand, it can be directed to the image insofar as it is a thing considered in an absolute sense (absolute), such as a piece of wood, copper, or stone. On the other, it can be a movement towards the image understood as something representational. They posit the following difference between these kinds of movement: the first is directed towards the image and ends in it; but the second is aimed, along with the image, at what is represented, and by the same act the image itself is known. From this cognitive distinction they derive another one on this issue: if we consider an image of Christ or the saints as absolute things (res absolutae), then we do not need to display any reverence to them, because reverence is owed only to a rational creature. But if we consider an image of Christ or the saints insofar as it is representational, we do owe them the reverence and adoration owed to the things they represent. [20] As far as I can tell, they offer no valid foundation for this doctrine that can bind the faithful to what they teach. They cite neither scripture nor Church tradition, nor the consensus of saints, nor any pronouncement of a general council, nor even a compelling reason. Furthermore, as far as the likeness is concerned, from which this doctrine appears to be

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ad similitudinem attinet unde haec doctrina videtur deduci, etsi verum sit dupliciter posse a nobis cognosci imago aliqua, aut absoluta quadam ratione, aut in ordine ad rem repraesentatam, res tamen repraesentata non cognoscitur eadem notitia qua cognoscitur ipsa imago in ordine ad rem repraesentatam, quod faceret pro ipsis, quamvis multum in hac re discrucietur Ariminensis ille acerrimus disputator in suo secundo sententiarum. Nec enim est maior connexio inter signum et rem signatam quam est inter patrem et filium, quae proprie relativa et ad aliquid dicuntur, et mutuo etiam se repraesentant, tum naturali similitudine, tum etiam sicut effectus causam, et causa effectum. Constat autem quod cognitione illa qua filium agnosco, ea ratione qua filius est, non cognosco simul huius filii patrem, alias quomodo salvaretur relativa oppositio, et diffinitionum correlativorum diversitas? Sed mediante alia notitia, quae simul cum ista gignitur, patrem agnosco, ob idque Aristoteles dixit, relativa esse simul natura, et ad mutuam etiam dici concertantiam. Non enim video qua ratione dici possit quod unica et particulari cognitione cognoscantur multa, et non per modum unius: ut recte etiam D. Thomas docet, quare sicut hic non est una cognitio, qua fertur anima in ea quae sunt mutuo correlativa, ita nec una erit cognitio qua cognoscitur imago in eo quod imago et res imaginata, quamvis simul cum cognitione imaginis, quatenus imago est, sit cognitio rei quam repraesentat. Aristoteles autem solum dicit duplicem esse cognitionem imaginis, quod a nemine negatur, aliud tamen ubi dixerit non vidi, etsi totum Aristotelem legi, quare nihil concludunt illa similitudine: et quamvis res ita se haberet quod eadem cognitione feramur in imaginem et rem imaginatam, non inde concluditur idem fieri posse in adoratione et veneratione. Est enim maxima dissimilitudo inter hoc et illud, nam imagini in eo quod imago est non repugnat quod eadem cognitione cognoscatur qua cognoscitur res repraesentata. Pugnare autem videtur cum imagine, etiam in quantum imago est, ut eadem reverentia revereatur qua res cuius est imago,

Aristoteles, in Cathegoriis [7: 6b1–8b1].

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derived, it is true that we can know the image in two ways, either in an absolute way or in relation to the thing represented, yet the thing represented is not known with the same concept [notitia] by which the image, as it relates to the thing represented, is known – as it would for them – even if that sharpest of debaters, [Gregory] of Rimini, agonizes a lot over this issue in his [commentary on the] Second Book of the Sentences.30 Nor is the connection between the sign and the signified greater than that between father and son, which is properly called relative and vis-àvis something: they mutually represent each other both in natural resemblance and in the way the effect resembles the cause, and the cause, the effect. But it is certain that the knowledge by which I know the son on account of his being son does not make me simultaneously know the father – otherwise how would the opposition of relative terms and the difference between correlative definitions be saved? Instead I know the father by virtue of another concept that arises simultaneously. Hence Aristotle said that relative terms are bound together in nature but are also said mutually to contend with each other.31 For I do not see on what grounds it can be said that multiple things can be known in a single, particular [instance of] cognition, and not by one mode [of cognition]. Saint Thomas, too, rightly teaches that just as it is not by one [instance of] cognition that the soul is directed to things that are mutual correlatives, neither is it one [instance of] cognition by which the image qua image and the thing imaged are known, even though the cognition of the image qua image is simultaneous with the cognition of the thing represented.32 Aristotle says only that the cognition of the image is dual – which no one denies – and nothing else, as far as I can tell, having read Aristotle completely. Hence they draw no conclusions from the likeness; and even if it were the case that we are directed to the image and to the thing imaged in the same [act of] cognition, it does not follow that they are the same in adoration and veneration. In fact, there is a great difference between one 30

31 32

Aristoteles, in the Categories [7: 6b1–8b1].

The Augustinian theologian Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300–58) delivered his lectures on the Sentences between 1342 and 1344. Cf. Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, ed. A. Damasus Trapp and Venicio Marcolino, 7 vols. (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 1987–). See also Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation, ed. Heiko Oberman (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 1981). Cf. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 10–14. Cf. R.W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according to St. Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 133–40. On scholastic elaborations on Aristotle’s doctrine of relatives more generally, see Jeffrey Brower, “Medieval Theories of Relations,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, at .

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cum imago illa in eo quod imago non excedat limites | insensibilis creaturae, cui, ut doctores isti recte concedunt, reverentia minime debetur. Imago igitur in quantum repraesentat, cum naturam non mutet, nec accedere possit ad latitudinem rationalis creaturae. Consequitur ex his quae ipsimet docent, reverentiam quae rei imaginatae debetur imagini non posse convenire. [21] Dicent fortasse, nunquid purpura regis [et] paludamentum imperatorium quibus induitur imperator non venerantur eadem veneratione cum ipso? Fateor, ob id est quod unico actu reverentiae totus ipse imperator indutus veneratur, a quo vestes minime separantur, sicut necque alia quae per modum habitus et dispositionis ipsum circumstant, et cum eo quodammodo unum faciunt. Caeterum si purpura ab eo separetur, quamvis ab aliquo cognoscatur ut regis purpura, non opus est ut eadem veneratione tunc veneretur qua ipse imperator: imago autem imperatoris non facit unum cum ipso imperatore substantialiter nec accidentaliter, ideo non est similitudo inter imaginem et purpuram qua indutus est imperator. Nec aliquis unquam vidit, nisi tyranni alicuius forte coactione interveniente, quod eadem veneratione veneretur imago ipsius, qua ipse rex aut imperator: licet minime negandum sit aliquem honorem illius imagini deberi. Recte hoc declarat Augustinus de verbis Domini, loquens de adoratione, quae humanitati Christi debetur, homilia LVIII:

Augustinus.

Perfectam (inquit) in Christo humanitatem propterea adoro quod a divinitate suscepta atque unita deitati est, ut non alium atque alium, sed unum eundemque Deum et hominem Dei filium esse confiteor. Et paucis interpositis circa finem subiungit: Cum rex purpura fuerit indutus, periculum mortis incurrit, si eam simul cum rege adorare contempserit.35 35

Homiliae de verbis Domini, in Tomus decimus operum Divi Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi (Parisiis: Apud Carolam Guillard viduam Claudii Chevallonii et Gulielmum Desboys, 1555), sermo LVIII (on John 14:1), fol. 48r: “Ego dominicam carnem, imo perfectam in Christo humanitatem, propterea adoro, quod a divinitate suscepta atque deitati unita est, ut non alium atque alium, sed unum eundemque deum et hominem dei filium

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and the other. For there is no contradiction in the image qua image being known by the same [act of] cognition as the represented. But it would if the image, even insofar as it is an image, were revered with the same reverence as the thing of which it is an image, because that image, considered qua image, does not exceed the limits of an insensible artifact, to which (as the doctors rightly admit) not the slightest reverence is owed. Thus, since the image, insofar as it represents [something else], does not change in nature, it cannot access the level of the rational creature. From this follows what the same [doctors] teach, namely that the reverence which is owed to the imaged thing cannot be appropriate for the image. [21] They may say: but are not a king’s purple gown and the imperial cloak worn by an emperor venerated with the same veneration as he is himself? I say, this is why the emperor is venerated in a single act of reverence – in his whole attire, and inseparable from it, since there are no other things that attach to him by way of outfit and disposition, and that are somehow one with him. In fact, if his purple gown were to be separated from him, even if some might recognize it as the royal gown, it ought not to be venerated with the same veneration as the emperor himself. Yet the image of the emperor is not part and parcel of the emperor, neither in substance nor in accident, therefore there is no similarity between this image and the purple gown worn by the emperor. Nor has anyone ever seen, except perhaps by force of a tyrant’s intervention, that an image of a king or emperor is venerated with the same veneration as he is, although it cannot be denied that his image is owed some honor. Augustine rightly states this in his De verbis Domini, homily 58, where he speaks of the adoration owed to the humanity of Christ: I adore the perfect humanity in Christ because it is received by his divinity and united with the deity, wherefore I confess not one and the other, but one and the same God and man, son of God. And he adds towards the end, following a few other remarks: When a king wears his purple gown, whoever refuses to adore it along with the king risks his life.

Augustine.

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Iam vides Augustinum non ob aliam causam humanitatem Christi per latriam adorare, nisi quia unita verbo est in unitate suppositi, cui vera adoratio latriae debetur, eo modo quo purpura adoratur simul cum rege purpurato: id quod Cyrillus, Damascenus, Ephesiana synodus, et tota ecclesia confitetur. Si igitur humanitas Christi a verbo esset separata, nec Augustinus nec aliquis scholasticorum concederet nec concessit, debere adorari eadem adoratione qua verbum. Et hoc non ob aliud, nisi quia non faceret tunc quodammodo unum cum ipso verbo. Ergo cum imago multo minus faciat unum cum re imaginata, non videtur quod eadem adoratione adorari possit cum ea. Adde quod cum adoratio recognitionem includat, qua recte existimamus de re quam adoramus, impossibile est quod eadem existimatio conveniat imagini, ut signum est, et rei cuius est imago: cum illa mortua quaedam res sit, haec vero viva et rationalis. Quomodo ergo potest esse una adoratio? Praeterea videtur mihi doctrina sanctorum et sanctarum synodorum generalium huic assertioni adversari. [22] Augustinus epistola CXIX, ad Ianuarium:

Cyrillus, Damascenus, Ephesiana synodus.

Augustinus.

In primo (inquit) Dei prae- | cepto prohibetur coli aliqua in figmentis hominum Dei similitudo: non quia non habet imaginem Deus, sed quia nulla imago eius coli debet, nisi in [sic] illa quae hoc est quod ipse.36

120r

Hic aperte prohibet Augustinus latriae cultum ab imaginibus, non ea ratione qua res naturales quaedam sunt, puta lignum aut lapis, nam non opus erat ut de hoc moneret nos Augustinus, sed loquitur de illis ea ratione qua nobis repraesentat qui libro primo quoque de Trinitate, capite sexto, idololatras appellat qui simulachris eam servitutem exhibent quae

36

confitear. Denique si hominem separaveris a deo, ut Photinus vel Paulus Samosatenus, illi ego numquam credo nec servio. Velut si quis nostrum aut purpuram aut diadema regale iacens inveniat, nunquid ea conabitur adorare? Cum vero ea rex fuerit indutus, periculum mortis incurrit, si ea simul cum rege quis adorare contempserit.” Augustine, Epist. 119 to Ianuarius, in Secundus tomus operum divi Aurelii Augustini episcopi Hipponensis, complectens illius epistolas (Parisiis: in aedibus Carolae Guillard, 1541), fol. 118r (modern edition: Augustinus, Epist. 55, in Epistulae I–LV, ed. K.D. Daur, CCSL 31 [Turnhout: Brepols, 2004]).

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Here one sees that Augustine adores the humanity of Christ as latria for no other reason than that it is united with the Word by unity with the suppositum33 to which the true adoration of latria is owed, in the same way that the purple gown is adored simultaneously with the king wearing it, as Cyrillus, John of Damascus, the Synod of Ephesus, and the entire Church all affirm. If, therefore, the humanity of Christ were separate from the Word, neither Augustine nor any scholastic would allow, or has allowed, that it ought to be adored with the same adoration as the Word – and this for no other reason than that in that case it would not in some way be one with that Word.34 Hence since the image is much less one with the thing imaged, it does not appear that it can be adored with the same adoration. Moreover, because adoration entails recognition, by which we correctly judge the thing we adore, it is impossible that the same judgment befits the image qua sign and the thing of which it is an image: the former is a dead thing, the latter alive and endowed with reason. How then can the adoration be one? Furthermore it seems to me that this assertion is contradicted by the teaching of the saints and holy councils. [22] Augustine says in Epistle 119 to Januarius:

Cyrillus, the Damascene, the Synod of Ephesus.

Augustine.

God’s first commandment prohibits the worship of any likeness of God in the features of men, not because God has no image, but because no image of him may be worshipped, except that which is the same as he is. Here Augustine explicitly forbids the cult of latria by images, not because these are natural things, such as wood or stone, for there was no need for Augustine to warn us against this; but he speaks of these in the sense he conveys to us when, in his first book of De Trinitate, chapter 6, he calls idolaters those who display to images the servitude owed to God. Nor was Augustine unaware that there were few or none among the gentiles who believed the matter thus sculpted to be gods or God. Instead, he appears to condemn them because they offered divine honors to images on the 33 34

A suppositum is defined as “a substance that is complete in itself and uncommunicated; an ultimate complete subject of its own being” (Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy [Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2012], 120–21). The argument is later taken up by Francisco Suárez, Tertia pars summae theologiae doctoris sancti Thomae Aquinatis cum commentariis et disputationibus, in Id., Opera omnia, vol. 18, ed. Carolus Berton (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1866), Dis. LXXX, sect. III, q. 25, art. 2: “Utrum humanitas Christi sit adoranda adoratione latriae.”

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debetur Deo.37 Nec ignorabat Augustinus paucos aut nullos esse inter gentes, qui materias idolorum sic sculptas deos aut Deum esse putarent. Sed ob id videtur eos damnare quod honores divinos simulachris tribuerint, ea ratione qua Deum repraesentabant. Multa enim idola erant, in quibus nec daemon aliquis respondebat, sed tantum benefactorem Deum repraesentabant: sed neque omnia quae gentes colebant, falsum Deum significabant. Erat enim ara Athenis ignoto Deo erecta. “Praeteriens,” inquit Paulus Atheniensibus, “simulachra vestra inveni et aram in qua scriptum erat ignoto deo.” Quare cum haec inhibebat Augustinus, sequitur veritas nostri propositi. Quod autem haec sit intentio Augustini, ex his quae in Psalmum centesimum decimum tertium exponens illum locum, “Simulachra gentium argentum et aurum”, ubi tam eos qui simulachra deos putabant, quam eos qui in simulachris aliquod numen divinum latere putabant, et omnes etiam qui per corporalem effigiem Deum adorabant, damnare videtur. Relinquo duo membra, quia ad nostrum propositum minime sunt, eo quod nemo recte institutus Christianus imagines adorat, putans illos deos esse, neque in ipsis latere aliquod numen existimat. Ad tertium membrum venio.

Actor. 17[23]

[Ps. 113:12 (4)]

Videntur (inquit) sibi purgatioris esse religionis, qui dicunt, nec simulachrum nec daemonium colo, sed per effigiem corporalem eius rei signum intueor, quam colere debeo. Et paulo inferius: Quis autem adorat vel orat intuens simulachrum, qui non sic afficiatur, ut ab eo se audiri putet, ac ab eo sibi praestari quod desiderat speret? Contra hunc adfectum, quo humana et carnalis infirmitas facile capi potest, cantat scriptura: Simulachra gentium argentum et aurum, etc.38 Certe haud dissimile, imo forte maius scandalum infirmis paratur, qui has distinctiones prorsus ignorant, nec possunt nisi errando intelligere (ut ego ipse in multis simplicibus experimento depraehendi, cum ab eis 37 38

Augustine, De trinitate, lib. 1, cap. 6, in Divi Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi de summa Trinitate (Nuremberg: Joannis Koburger, 1520), fol. 5r–v. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps. 113, “Concio secunda de secunda parte psalmi,” in Divi Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Enarrationes sive Commentarii in Psalmos mysticos (Parisiis: apud Christianum Wechelum, 1542), fol. 277r–v (with several lines omitted in the second quote); modern edition, Enarrationes in Psalmos CI–CL, ed. E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, CCSL 40 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956).

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grounds that they represented God. For there were many idols through which no demon spoke, but in which they solely represented a beneficent God; nor did all things worshipped by the gentiles signify a false god. In fact, in Athens there was an altar erected to an unknown god. “For passing by,” Paul said to the Athenians, “I found your graven images and an altar with the inscription: ‘To an unknown god.’” From Augustine’s prohibition the truth of my argument follows. That this is in fact Augustine’s intended meaning becomes clear from his exposition of Psalm 113, “The graven images of the gentiles are silver and gold,” which appears to condemn both those who believed the graven images to be gods, and those who believed that some divine power rested in the images, and all those who adored God through a bodily effigy. I will pass over the first two clauses, because they are not pertinent for our purposes, given that no educated Christian adores images thinking that they are gods, or believes that some divine power rests in them. I turn to the third clause. There are some (he says) who fancy themselves to be of a purer religion, who say, I worship neither a graven image nor a demon, but in the corporeal effigy I behold a sign of the thing I must worship. And a bit further down: Who adores or prays, looking upon an image, and does not become so affected by it as to believe that it hears him, and to hope that it will grant him his wishes? Against this affect, by which human and carnal weakness may easily be tempted, the scripture intones: “The graven images of the gentiles are silver and gold,” etc. A similar but even greater scandal lies in wait for the weak, who ignore these distinctions altogether and are unable to understand without error – as I personally learned from many uneducated folk, when I inquired what they thought of this issue – the notion that an image is to be adored with the same adoration as the thing it represents. For when they see a graven image painstakingly sculpted, polished by the artist, placed in a prominent place in a church, and venerated by the crowd, and then learn that they have to honor it with the same honor with which the things they represent are worshipped, then surely the simple-minded

[Acts 17:23] [Ps. 113:12 (4)]

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sciscitarer, quid de hac re sentirent) in eo quod dicitur eadem adoratione adorandam esse imaginem, qua et rem cuius est. Nam cum videant simulacrum operose sculptum, a fabre expolitum, in eminenti loco templi positum, ipsumque a multitudine veneratum, et super haec audiant, quod eodem honore debeat honorari quo et res cuius est, colitur, certe in multis simplicibus periculosissimus erroris affectus facile potest adge- | nerari, quo putent aliquid numinis latere in imagine, sic quoque rei repraesentatae tum nomen, tum gloriam, ad imaginem facile possunt tra[n]sferre: quod maxime periculosum esse iudico. [23] Gregorius quoque magnus scribens ad illum Massiliensem episcopum quem antea merito correxerat de temeraria confractione imaginum, hoc tantum sacratis imaginibus tribuit quod per eas repraesentatorum recordamur, illasque veneramur, et ante illas rem repraesentatam adoramus. Haec sunt Gregorii verba:

Gregorius.

Imagines quas tibi dirigendas per Dulcidium diaconum rogasti misimus (miserat autem ad eum Iesu Christi et apostolorum Petri et Pauli imagines) unde valde nobis tua postulatio placuit, quia illum toto corde diligis, cuius imaginem prae oculis habere desideras. Et paulo post: Scio quidem quod imaginem salvatoris non ideo petis ut quasi Deum colas, sed ut per recordationem in eius amore recalescas, et nos quidem non quasi ante divinitatem ante illam prosternimur, sed illum adoramus quem per imaginem aut natum, aut passum, et in throno sedentem recordamur.39 Obsecro, ignorabat ne Gregorius episcopum illum materiam illarum imaginum non debere adorare? Non hoc putari poterat de homine, qui in ipsas imagines non multo ante desaevierat. Ergo ab ipsis imaginibus quatenus imagines sunt, et ut nos ducunt in cognitionem rerum quas significant, adorationem quae Deo debetur, prorsus adimit: nec iuvat 39

These quotes largely follow the version of St. Gregory’s letter to Secundinus (not Serenus) in Sancti Gregorii … opera, fol. 409v (Registrum Epistolarum, lib. 7, no. 53). Actually, the entire passage is an eighth-century interpolation: see S. Gregorii Magni registrvm epistvlarvm libri VIII–XIV, Appendix, ed. Dag Norberg, CCSL 140A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1982), Appendix X, 1104–1111, esp. 1111; also Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum Libri VIII–XIV, ed. Paulus Eward and Ludovicus M. Hartmann, Monumenta Germaniae Historica-Epistolae 2 [(Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1992), 142–49, esp. text note at 146–49].

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may be susceptible to a most dangerous error, by which they think that something numinous lies hidden in the image, and thus they can easily transfer both the name and the glory of the represented to the image – something I judge to be most dangerous. [23] Gregory the Great, as well, writing to the same bishop of Marseilles he had previously chided – and rightly so – for the reckless breaking of images, attributed only this [function] to sacred images, that they remind us of the things represented by them, that we venerate them, and that in front of them we adore the thing they represent. Gregory’s words were the following:

Gregory [the Great].

We sent you the images which you requested through the deacon Dulcidius’s mediation ([Gregory] had in fact sent him images of Jesus Christ and the apostles Peter and Paul) because your request pleased us very much: you love with all your heart those whose image you wish to have before your eyes. And a little further: I know of course that you do not ask for the image of the Savior in order to worship it like a god, but so that his memory may reignite your love, and so that we do not prostrate ourselves before it as before a divinity, but adore him whom we remember by an image as he is born, suffers the passion, and is seated on his throne.35 Did Gregory not know, I ask, that this bishop should not adore the matter of those images? He could not believe that about a man who not much earlier had savaged those images. Therefore he removed from these images – insofar as they are images and lead us to the cognition of the things they signify – the adoration we owe to God. But those who say that this adoration must not remain in that image but in the thing it represents do not help the matter. For I ask them: since this act of adoration

35

This passage is no longer attributed to Gregory the Great: it is from an eighth-century interpolation in the pope’s letter to Secundinus of May 599. See note 39 on the opposite page for details.

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quod dicunt illa adoratione non debere sisti in ipsam imaginem, sed in rem quam repraesentat: nam ego quaero ab eis, actio ista adorationis cum sit unica (de propria adoratione loquor) terminatur ne ad imaginem partialiter, ita ut ipsam simul cum Deo habeat pro obiecto (quod dicunt) terminativo necne? Si in ipsam partialiter tendit adoratio, quid refert quod postea honor iste ad Deum tandem referatur, cum iam creaturae partialiter honorem divinum impenderis: quod Gregorius et omnes sancti et adhuc ipsa ratio negat. Si autem vellent dicere quod ipsa actio adorationis procedat ab imagine tanquam ab obiecto motivo, et non terminativo, quae tanquam signum ab ecclesia ad hoc impositum invitat, ut in praesentiam ipsius adorem aut venerer rem quam repraesentat, hoc plane non est eadem veneratione adorare imaginem et rem imaginatam, quod ipsi videntur docere, sed simul venerando quodammodo imaginem, formando cognitionem illius rei quam repraesentat, vere et proprie rem repraesentatam venerari aut adorare, longe tamen alia veneratione; et ad hunc sensum trahi debent verba quae sequuntur in praefata epistola Gregorii. Dicit enim loquens de Christi imagine: Dum nobis ipsa pictura quasi scriptura ad memoriam filium [Dei] reducit, animum nostrum aut per resurrectionem laetificat aut per passionem demulcet. Et si genuflexi homines coram aliqua imagine aut triumphali signo sanctae crucis precantur, non lignum hoc sive lapidem adorant figuratum (attende verba: non permittit Grego| rius ut ipsa imago ea ratione qua ducit nos in cognitionem rei repraesentatae adoretur) sed (inquit) summum Deum colunt, et quem sensibus perspicere non valent, imaginem ex instituto illum referentem venerantur et adorant, non in illa sistentes, sed adorationem ad repraesentatum transferentes.40

121r

Haec ille. Quae verba, ut dixi, temperanda sunt, in intellectum praecedentium verborum.

40

The first sentence of this quote is again from the eighth-century interpolation discussed in the previous note. The remainder of the quote (“Et si genuflexi homines … transferentes”) is a second interpolation, not found in sixteenth-century editions of Gregory’s letters I have consulted. It is presumably a scholastic comment in a theological text that was Pérez’s direct source.

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is unique (I speak here of proper adoration), does it not end partially in the image, in such a way that it has as its so-called terminal object at once [the image] and God, or not? If the adoration is partially directed to the former, what does it matter that the honor is subsequently referred only to God, when you have expended divine honor partially to something created – which Gregory, all the saints and reason itself deny. If, however, they mean that the act of adoration itself proceeds from the image as motive (instead of terminal) object, which invites it as a sign established by the Church for this purpose, that I may adore or venerate in its presence the thing it represents, then clearly this is not to adore the image and the thing imaged with the same veneration, as they appear to teach, but rather – by simultaneously adoring the image in some fashion and gaining knowledge of the thing it represents – truly and properly to venerate and adore the thing it represents, but very differently from the other [kind of] veneration. In this sense the following words in Gregory’s aforementioned letter must be understood. In fact, speaking about the image of Christ, he says: While this picture stores the son [of God] in our memory like a text, it either lifts our spirit because of the resurrection, or softens it because of the passion. And when people pray, kneeling before an image or triumphal sign of the holy cross, they do not adore the piece of wood or stone that carries the image (note the words: Gregory does not allow for this image to be adored by the same ratio by which it leads us to the cognition of the thing represented), but (he says) they worship the highest God. They venerate and adore him, whom they cannot perceive with their senses, through the image that refers to him, not remaining stuck in it, but transferring their adoration to the represented.36 Thus Gregory. As I mentioned, these words are to be taken into account for a proper understanding of the previous words.

36

The first sentence of this passage is, again, from the eighth-century interpolation in the pope’s letter to Secundinus. The remainder of the quote is a second interpolation, not found in sixteenth-century editions of Gregory’s letters. It is presumably a scholastic comment in a theological text that was Pérez’s direct source. See note 40 on the opposite page for details.

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[24] Damascenus etiam in hac sententia est lib. IV, cap. XII ut adoratio imaginis ad prototypon, exemplar imaginisque veritatem transferatur.41 Et nota bene quod in his verbis nec in verbis VI synodi licet dicantur adorari et venerari debere imagines ad memoriam primitivorum, non tamen dicunt quod eadem adoratione debent adorari qua et res, sed diversis, ut et nos fatemur, extendendo nomen adorationis ad venerationem.42 Adde quod in determinatione synodi VII in qua haec materia ad unguem agitata est, nihil refertur de hac adoratione, imo dicitur, quod figuratis imaginibus utimur ut recordemur et affectu amplectamur res significatas: et addit, loquens de omnibus imaginibus, qualis honor eis debeatur exhiberi: non quidem (inquit) “veram latriam, quae sola divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae crucis et sanctis evangeliis.”43 Constat autem sanctis evangeliis, quamquam ad vivum totam Trinitatem per auditum et per visum quodammodo repraesentant, adorationem latriae minime deberi, qua et ipse Deus qui repraesentatur solet adorari, quare nec ulli imagini taliter ut ad eam partialiter terminetur adoratio. Adde quod nec sacramentum baptismi, quod spiritus sancti praesentiam ex institutione divina designat, et quodammodo ipsum in anima baptizati praesentem facit, nemo unquam adoravit hac adoratione. Visuntur quoque Venetiis in aede aurea vetusta carmina, ex Graeco in Latinum translata, quibus colendi imaginem Christi formam septima haec synodus complexa est, ubi totus cultus transfertur in ipsum Christum repraesentatum per imaginem; carmina sic habent: “Nam Deus est quod imago docet, sed non Deus ipsa. Hanc videas, sed mente colas quod cernis in ipsa.”44 Quare synodus negavit hanc adorationem imaginibus in universum deberi. Rursus si eadem adoratione adorari debet imago qua res ipsa, sequitur quod eadem ratione vovere et sacrificare possemus imagini Christi una cum Christo: non enim pugnat magis adorare adoratione latriae imaginem, quam imagini sacrificare, cum haec sit etiam pars latriae. At nemo dixit unquam, nec dici possit sine blasphemia, cum Deo sacrifico coram imagine Dei me etiam eodem sacrificio imagini sacrificare. Quare nec aliud videtur mihi dici debere. Scio aliquem bonum sensum posse admittere illa verba, sed quia res eiusmodi est quod si parum deflectatur a recto veritatis tramite in huiusmodi adorationibus, incurri 41 42 43 44

Damascenus. 6. Synodus.

7. Synodus.

John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, lib. IV, cap. 17 (above n. 34), fol. 170v (“Sic et imaginis honor ad prothotypum, exemplar imaginisque veritatem transfertur”). See earlier, p. 156 and n. 24. LCN, fol. 88r. For this text, see chapter 1, p. 13 and n. 21.

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[24] John of Damascus agrees with this judgment in book IV, chapter XII, [namely] that the adoration of the image should be transferred to the prototype, exemplar, and truth of the image. And be aware that although these words and those of the Sixth Council state that images must be adored and venerated to remember the ancients, they do not say, however, that they must be adored with the same [kind of] adoration as the things [represented], but differently, as we say as well, extending the term adoration to veneration. Moreover, the determination of the Seventh Council, which discussed this matter to a hair, does not say anything about this adoration, but rather notes that we use figurative images to remember and affectively embrace the things signified [by them], specifying, in reference to all images, what honor needs to be offered them: “not true latria,” it says, “which is owed only to the divine nature, but the type [of honor bestowed on] the figure of the venerable cross and the holy gospels.” In fact, it is certain that the holy gospels, although they in some way represent from life the entire Trinity through hearing and vision, are not owed any adoration of latria, by which God himself, when he is represented, is wont to be adored – nor therefore [is it owed] to any image in such a way that the adoration partially ends in it. Nor, moreover, has anyone ever adored with this [kind of] adoration the sacrament of baptism, which designates the presence of the holy spirit by divine institution and makes it present in some fashion in the soul of the baptized. In Venice’s golden house one can see the ancient verses, translated from Greek into Latin, whose form of worshipping the image of Christ the Seventh Council has embraced, in which the entire worship is transferred to the Christ represented by the image, as follows: “For God is what the image teaches, but [the image] is not God. You see it, but you worship mentally what you discern in it.”37 Therefore the council denied that this adoration is owed universally to images. In contrast, if an image must be adored with the same [kind of] adoration as the thing, it follows that by the same logic we can make vows and sacrifices to an image of Christ as well as Christ himself: it is no greater offense to adore an image with the adoration of latria than to sacrifice to an image, since this is also a part of latria. Yet no one has ever said, nor anyone can say without blasphemy, that when I sacrifice to God before the image of God, thereby I also sacrifice to the image. For this reason, it seems to me, I cannot say otherwise. I know that those words may contain some good sense, but since it is the case that if one deviates only slightly from the straight path 37

On this passage, see chapter 1, p. 13 and n. 21.

John of Damascus. Sixth Council.

Seventh Council.

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potest non leve conscientiae periculum saltem in idiotis et simplicibus, qui ista audiunt et minime distinguere sciunt. Rectius mihi videtur, si | absque illo prorsus offendiculo populus doceretur simpliciter ut sacras imagines veneraretur, tum propter id quod repraesentant, tum etiam quia signa sunt a maioribus ad hoc imposita. Et per eas doceatur levare totam intelligentiam et affectum ad res quas repraesentant, nullatenus in eis sistentes, et quod in praesentia earum quae ad hoc in templis positae sunt, rem quam repraesentant adorent aut venerentur, et hoc solum est quod volunt sacrae synodi. Nullo tamen modo velim dicere quod eadem adoratione adorarentur qua et res quas significant adorantur, quandoquidem neque scriptura, neque traditio, neque ecclesiae determinatio hoc iubet, et ut dixi, multis etiam scandalo sunt. Sed istud et quicquid hic a me dictum est, ecclesiae iudicio submitto, nihil in hac re diffiniens, praeterquam quod illa sentit et senserit: cuius in hac re et multis aliis magnopere censuram desidero, nec non episcoporum diligentiam et vigilantiam, cuius munus praecipuum est totis nervis incumbere, ne greges sibi commissi inter pietatis pabula, quae sine impietatis et superstitionis offendiculo esse debent, mortiferum aliquid deglutiant, in re praesertim tanti momenti, quod plerumque in huiusmodi rebus evenire solet, maxime apud idiotas et simplices.

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of the truth in this kind of adoration, the conscience may incur no small danger, at least in the illiterate and simple-minded who hear these things and hardly know to make distinctions. It seems to me better to avoid this obstacle and teach people straightforwardly that they ought to venerate sacred images both for what they represent and because they are signs established for this purpose by their superiors. Rather than remaining stuck in [these images], they must be taught through them to lift up their entire intellect and affect to the things represented; and in the presence [of images] placed for this purpose in churches, they should adore or venerate what they represent. This alone is what the sacred councils want. In no way would I say that [sacred images] should be adored with the same [kind of] adoration as the things they signify, since neither scripture nor tradition nor ecclesiastical decision commands it, and, as I have said, to many they are a source of scandal. But I submit this and anything else I say to the judgment of the Church, without stating anything in this matter besides what she judges and has judged. In this and many other issues I very much desire her correction, as well as the diligence and vigilance of bishops, whose particular task it is to apply all their strength to ensure that the flock committed to them do not swallow anything deadly during their devotional meals, which should be free of impiety and superstition, especially in an area of such importance. For this often happens in these matters, especially among the illiterate and simple-minded.

II. Matthieu Ory De cultu imaginum 283r

Reverendissimo et Illustrissimo Domino1 D. Marcello Cervino Sanctae Crucis Ecclesiae Cardinali Presbytero

∵ [1] Dialecticam atque rhetoricam inter liberales artes non infimum locum obtinere unanimi doctorum virorum consensu receptum est, ita ut de nulla re quisquam neque solide possit neque dilucide loqui, nisi fuerit his artibus diligenter instructus. Dialectica namque totius causae quasi primas lineas ducit. Rhetorica autem vivos addit colores. Dialecticae munus et officium est claris et compendiosis verbis veritatem ipsam protinus ob oculos ponere. Idem rhetorica praestat, sed maiori verborum copia atque apparatu eandem veritatem studet amplificare, quo facilius eam possit auditoribus persuadere. Praeclare igitur a Zenone Stoicorum principe quod inter utramque artem esset discriminis ostensum est. Nam cum digitos compresserat pugnumque fecerat, dialecticam aiebat eiusmodi esse; cum autem diduxerat et manum dilataverat, palmae illius similem esse eloquentiam dicebat. Haec ad permovendos hominum affectus est vivacior: illa ad intellectum informandum est efficacior. Haec plus 1 This edition is based on the assemblage of the text’s two unique, complementary manuscripts; for the rationale and further analysis, see chapter 2, pp. 44–50. AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 283r–305v contains the prefatory dedication to Cardinal Marcello Cervini as well as Book Two. The title page to this fascicle, which is found ibid., fol. 277r, reads: “DE CVLTV IMAGINVM LIBER SECVNDVS a Matthaeo Doctore Parisino ordinis praedi- / catorum compositus Romae. MDLII.” Two archival notes, in different hands, have been added subsequently: “1127” (top left) and “Ad sess. 25” (below the title). Fols. 306r–09v are blank; fol. 309 is the back cover of the quire, corresponding to fol. 277. The title of the Liber secundus, AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fol. 286r, is: “R.P. Magistri Matthaei Ory Ordinis Praedicatorum Doctoris Parisiensis et in regno Franciae Inquisitoris ac Sanctissimi D.N. Penitentiarii De cultu imaginum liber secundus.” The ms. of Book I is found in Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fols. 169r–76v. At the top left of fol. 169r, the same number “1127” has been added, in the same hand, as it was in the Vatican manuscript; another archivist has written “II.” The title was originally “De imaginibus”; a different hand has added “liber primus.” Fol. 170r gives the title as “De imaginum cultu.” Fol. 169v is blank, as are fols. 177r–v and 178r–v.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_007

II. Matthieu Ory The Cult of Images

To the most reverend and illustrious Lord D. Marcello Cervini Cardinal Priest of the Church of Santa Croce

∵ [1] Learned men unanimously agree that dialectic and rhetoric are not the least of the liberal arts. Thus no one who has not been diligently taught these arts can speak cogently or clearly about anything. Dialectic draws as it were the first lines of every argument. Rhetoric adds vivid colors. The task and purpose of dialectic is always to place the truth with clear and succinct words before our eyes. Rhetoric accomplishes the same goal, but seeks to elaborate that truth with more words and fanfare, the more easily to convince the audience. Zeno, the prince of the Stoics, has most clearly shown the difference between the two arts. He would fold his fingers together to make a fist, and say that dialectic is similar; then he would relax and open his hand, and say that eloquence was like his palm. The latter is a livelier means to move the affects of people; the former is more effective in informing the intellect. The latter offers more enjoyment to sway the audience, the other more power to force it.

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delectationis ad ducendum, illa plus roboris ad stringendum auditorem habet. [2] Ex quo fit ut apud eos etiam qui sacrarum litterarum studio sunt dediti vigeant duo genera docendi. Alterum quo in concionibus coram imperita multitudine utuntur, dum ad virtutes et vitae totius probitatem exhortantur, et a vitiorum sordibus deterrent. Alterum vero cum in scholis | dialecticorum more se exercent, et quid verum, quidve falsum sit, quid item iustum, vel quid iniustum censeri debeat, argumentando, dividendo, distinguendo et denique definiendo inquirunt et ostendunt. Duplicem hunc docendi modum requirit in episcopo apostolus scribens ad Titum: “Ut potens sit,” inquit, “exhortari in doctrina sana,” quantum ad priorem modum pertinet; “et eos qui contradicunt arguere,” quod ad posteriorem referendum est. Hoc idem non obscure commendavit princeps apostolorum, ubi ait: “Parati estote semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea, quae in vobis est spe” et fide. Est enim posterior haec docendi ratio eousque necessaria, ut sine illius adminiculo prior omnino subsistere non possit. Nam ut in pictura nihil prosunt vivi colores nisi adsit symmetria quaedam et lineamentorum proportio congrua, non secus in oratione nihil iuvat verborum elegans apparatus, nisi ut in eleganti corpore anima sana, ita in his veritas insit, ex qua vim suam et robur accipiat recta argumentorum constitutio. Alioqui non eloquentia, sed vaniloquium; non doctrina, sed mera deceptio dicenda erit. [3] Cum igitur ita sese res habeat, quis aequo et patienti animo ferendos putet quosdam impudentissimos nostrae aetatis sciolos, qui non sunt veriti posteriorem hanc docendi rationem, quam a scholis apposite vocamus scholasticam, impugnare, vituperare, et (quod in eis fuit) penitus tollere de medio? Id autem quamobrem, nisi crassa ignorantia ducti, qui Apostolo B. Iuda teste, “quaecumque ignorant blasphemare” consueverunt? Verissimum quippe est quod dici solet, scientiam neminem habere sibi inimicum propter ignorantem. Et quod est omnium nequissimum, cum isti sint meri sophistae, quippe qui sua omnia argumenta vanis et apparentibus rationibus apud indoctum vulgus concludere soliti sint, ut ita suis praestigiis audientes ludificari, eos tamen qui rectam doctrinam insolubilibus confirmant argumentis, et invictis rationibus etiam ipsorum vanitatem | redarguunt et ostentui ponunt, eos inquam fronte plusquam meretricia sophistas appellant. At si velint eum esse sophistam qui recte argumentando veritatem ipsam statuit, nonne coguntur miseri et Platonem et Aristotelem, et gravissimos quosque philosophos qui disputando naturas rerum investigarunt et litteris prodiderunt, indignissime sophistas nuncupare?

[Titus 1:9]

1 Pet. 3:15

[Jude 10]

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[2] For this reason two kinds of teaching prevail among those who devote themselves to the study of the sacred scriptures. They use one in sermons to inexpert crowds, to exhort them to virtues and general probity of life, and to deter them from sordid vices. They practice the other in the schools in the manner of the dialectics, to inquire and show – arguing, analyzing, distinguishing, and finally determining – what must be considered true, and what false; what just, and what unjust. Writing to Titus, the apostle [Paul] requires this twofold method of teaching of a bishop, so that (he says) “he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine,” as far as the first mode is concerned; “and to convince the gainsayers,” in reference to the second. The prince of the apostles recommends the latter quite clearly, when he says: “be ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you,” and that faith. This second method of teaching is all the more necessary since without its support the first cannot subsist at all. Just as there is no point in having lively colors in a painting unless it has symmetry and a well-proportioned design, similarly an elegant display of words is of no use in a discourse unless it contains truth – like a sound mind in a shapely body – from which the correct order of arguments derives its force and power. Otherwise it will not be called eloquence, but empty talk; not teaching, but mere deception. [3] Since this is the way things are, who thinks that one should accept with resignation and equanimity certain shameless smatterers of our time, who dare to impugn, disparage, and (as is their wont) altogether destroy this second method of teaching, which is appropriately named scholastic from schools? And why do they do this if not driven by gross ignorance – they who, as the apostle Jude testifies, tend to “blaspheme whatever things they know not”? It is most true, as the saying goes, that knowledge has no enemy but the ignorant. Worst of all, since they are mere sophists, who are used to demonstrating all their arguments with idle, superficial reasons to an illiterate crowd, thus to deceive their audience with trickery, they will nevertheless call those who affirm the correct doctrine with incontestable arguments and who with watertight reasoning contradict and expose their vanity – they will call them, I say, not merely whores but sophists. Yet if they want a sophist to be the person who states the truth by right reasoning, are not the wretched compelled shamefully to call sophists both Plato and Aristotle, along with several serious philosophers who have investigated the nature of things by disputation and discussed them in writing? .

[Titus 1:9]

1 Pet. 3:15

[Jude 1:10]

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[4] Quin et de redemptore nostro2 nonne legimus quomodo annos natus duodecim inventus est in medio doctorum eosdem audiens et interrogans? Etsi enim turbam parabolis et similitudinibus ad veritatem adduceret, pharisaeos tamen et legisperitos non raro alia docendi via aut instruit, aut repugnantes et insidias struentes redarguit et confutat. Idem habetur in [libro] Act[uum] de beato prothomartyre Stephano, qui adversarios ita disputando superavit ut omnino “spiritui et sapientiae illius resistere non possent.” Idem praestitit apostolus Paulus tum Iudaeis disputans et Graecis. Sed quemadmodum illo tum cum se victos conscientia teste persentiebant et fateri erubescebant, ad saxa, ad convitia, ad insidias et caedes sunt conversi, eodem furore rapiuntur scioli nostrae aetatis qui dum solidis rationibus resistere nequeunt, seque in angustum vi clarae conclusionis coniici et premi moleste ferunt, quo honestius elabi possint, sophisticum esse quod dicitur, vociferantur. Animadvertunt enim quantum perfidis illorum conatibus huius artis cognitio et rectus usus detrimenti afferat. [5] Quamobrem minime mirum videri debet si qui a fide defecerunt exosam habeant et persequantur humanarum scientiarum cognitionem, cum non sint adeo stupidi ut non intelligant se efficacius per huiusmodi scientias quam vel per scripturas sanctas convinci. Nam scripturis ipsis abuntuntur et in eum sensum contorquent qui suis perniciosis dogmatibus saltem apparenter favere videatur, cui tanta pertinacia3 haerent, ut nisi vi argumentorum confusi nolint omnino ab eo recedere. Quod egregie ratio docendi a scholasticis accepta efficit. Ob eam causam | callide suis partibus consulunt, dum catholicis arma per quae confodiuntur eripere conantur, non secus atque olim Philistaei qui subdole caverant “ne faber ferrarius inveniretur in Israel,” ut secura possessione populum Domini sub tyrannide sua continerent. [6] Hoc ipsum tentavit insignis ille apostata4 Iulianus qui (ut D. Augustinus refert) cum videret a viris christianis se nec sapientia nec eloquentia inferioribus, quales ab initio aliquot sempre habuit ecclesia, validius quam existimaverat, suis obiectionibus responderi, nec deesse qui insana in Christum iactata convicia in furibundum ipsius caput aptissime retorquerent, quique (iuxta Sapientis verbum) “stulto” auderent et possent “iuxta stultitiam suam” respondere, ne sibi ac suis nimium sapiens

2 nostro added superscr. in other hand. 3 pertincia in ms., with -a- added superscr. between -n and -c. 4 Ms. apostota.

[Acts 6:10]

[1 Sam. 13:19]

[Prov. 26:5]

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[4] Why indeed do we read that our redeemer at the age of twelve was found among the doctors, listening to them and interrogating them? And while he led the crowd to the truth by means of parables and similes, he often used another method of instruction either to teach the Pharisees and lawyers, or to disprove and refute their objections and insidious teachings. The book of Acts similarly reports that the protomartyr Stephen subdued his adversaries so decisively in debate that “they were not able to resist his spirit and wisdom.” The apostle Paul accomplished the same in debating both Jews and Greeks. However, while Stephen’s enemies felt defeated before their conscience and blushed to admit it, they resorted to rock throwing, insults, assault, and murder. The same fury takes hold of today’s smatterers who, unable to stand their ground with sound reasons, and driven into a tight corner by force of clear argumentation, proclaim the sophistication of what they said, just to save face. For they are aware how much damage the knowledge and right use of this art does to their wicked efforts. [5] Therefore it must hardly seem surprising if these defectors from the faith have and pursue an odious knowledge of the humanities, because they are not so foolish as not to understand that they can be refuted more effectively by way of these disciplines than by the holy scriptures. For they abuse and distort these scriptures in a sense that at least superficially appears to favor their pernicious teachings, to which they will cling so stubbornly as to refuse altogether to back down from them unless confounded by the force of argument. This is precisely what the scholastic teaching method does perfectly. For this reason they shrewdly take care of their own by seeking to wrest from the Catholics the weapons by which they are pierced, no differently from the Philistines who once deceitfully made sure that “no smith was to be found in Israel” in order to keep the Lord’s people under their tyrannical control. [6] The notorious Julian the Apostate tried to achieve the same goal, but as St. Augustine reports, some Christians who were his peers in knowledge and eloquence (of whom the Church has always boasted some from the beginning) answered his objections more effectively than he had expected. There were also a few who skillfully returned some of his insane insults against Christ to his own raving head, and others who (in the words of the Proverbs) dared and were able to “answer the fool according to his folly,” so that he would not seem wise to himself or his associates. It is easy to see, then, that he did not accomplish his design and was unable to realize his vow, as long as worldly knowledge and eloquence thrived

[Acts 6:10]

[1 Sam. 13:19]

[Prov. 26:5]

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videretur, facile advertit non effecturum se quod conceperat animo, nec posse voto potiri, donec inter Christianos vigeret sapientia et eloquentia seculi, quibus solis a consequendo proposito se impediri existimabat. Simplicitatem namque christiani dogmatis facile superare se confidebat, si secularis esset sapientiae praesidio destituta. Hoc itaque animo, illo suggerente a quo possidebatur et agitabatur perfida belva, publico edicto ne Christiani liberales artes vel docerent vel discerent prohibuit.5 [7] Haec ex B. Augustino, in quibus prudens lector facile recognoscet eodem vafro spiritu haereticos nostri temporis obsideri, qui ad seducendos simpliciorum animos eisdem blandiuntur, et sacras litteras obtrudunt passim omnibus legendas seu potius conculcandas, negantes quicquam esse a Christianis discendum quod diserte in Scriptura non sit expressum, ne scilicet rationibus et modo dicendi convincantur ab iis qui egregie sunt in philosophia et seculari sapientia veluti hastis et ensibus instructi. Verum “non est sapientia, non est potentia, non est consilium contra Dominum.”6 Meminisse enim deberent isti qui tanta temeritate de scripturarum scientia gloriantur, “lectulum Salomonis,” hoc est ecclesiam et Christum in ea quiescentem, sexaginta viris ad | bella fortissimis circundari, “uniuscuiusque ensis super femur suum propter timores nocturnos.” Quid, rogo, accommodatius significare possunt strenui isti milites, quam ecclesiae sanctae doctores et magistros qui variis rationibus et argumentis resistunt et repellunt haereticos lucifugos, et tenebrosis dogmatibus clarissimum fidei christianae nitorem et decus obscurare molientes?7 Etenim cum per naturam homines per gratiam simus Christiani, necesse est prorsus ad christiani hominis perfectionem duplicem quoque adesse scientiam, qua utraque pars perfici possit. Itaque sic scientiae humanae sunt perfectiones naturae, quemadmodum et divinae sunt perfectiones gratiae. Nec gratia naturam destruit, quin potius eam statuit et perficit: et ita nec fides scientiam humanam repudiat, sed eam amplectitur et dirigit. [8] Quare missos iam faciamus huiusmodi calumniatores et puros sophistas qui nihil aliud8 moliuntur quam ecclesiae sanctae facessere negotium, ut proposita vitiorum impunitate et effraenata vivendi licentia

[Prov. 21:30]

[Cant. cant. 3:7–9]

5 Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. XVIII, cap. 15; Confessions, ed. and trans. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), lib. VIII, cap. 5. 6 Note that standard editions of the Vulgate have prudentia instead of potentia. 7 molientes added superscr. 8 aliud added superscr.

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among Christians, which alone he thought prevented him from achieving his purpose. For he was confident that he could easily overcome the simplicity of Christian teaching if it lacked the assistance of worldly knowledge. With this in mind, and at the instigation of the perfidious beast by whom he was possessed and driven, he forbade Christians by public edict both to teach and to learn the liberal arts.1 [7] Thus far St. Augustine’s account, in which the attentive reader will easily recognize the same cunning spirit that possesses the heretics of our time, who in order to seduce simple folk flatter them and push them all towards indiscriminate reading of – or rather, trampling on – the sacred scriptures, while denying that there is anything to be learned by Christians that is not clearly stated in scripture, so that they will not be convinced by the reasoning and speech of those perfectly equipped, as it were, with the spears and swords of philosophy and worldly knowledge. But “there is no wisdom, there is no power, there is no counsel against the Lord.”2 Those who boast with such temerity about their scriptural knowledge should remember that “the litter of Solomon” – that is, the Church and Christ who rests in it – is protected against war by sixty mighty men, with “every man’s sword upon his thigh, because of fears in the night.” What, I ask, can those nimble soldiers signify more fittingly than the doctors and masters of the holy Church, who with various methods and arguments resist and fight off the light-shunning heretics – those who seek to obscure the bright splendor and beauty of the Christian faith with dark dogmas? Since, in fact, we are humans by nature, but Christians by grace, the perfection of the Christian requires a twofold knowledge, by which each part can be perfected. Thus the perfection of nature belongs to human knowledge, while the perfection of grace belongs to divine knowledge. Grace does not destroy nature, but rather establishes and perfects it; hence faith does not reject human knowledge, but embraces and directs it. [8] For this reason let us dismiss those tricksters and plain sophists who do not exert themselves for anything but to cause trouble for the Church, in order to drag their disciples with them – offering impunity for

[Prov. 21:30]

[Song of Sol. 3:7–9]

1 Cf. Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. Gerald G. Walsh and Daniel J. Honan, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 2:175 (book 18, chap. 15); Confessions, ed. and trans. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), lib. VIII, cap. 5. 2 Note that standard editions of the Vulgate read prudence instead of power.

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abducant discipulos post se, et eos mendacibus insectentur convitiis qui technas ipsorum et impias opiniones detegunt, et ostentui ponunt non solum per scripturas, sed etiam per philosophiae et secularium artium disciplinas, quas ii soli spernunt et blasphemant, qui vel ignorant, vel si norint ab eis sibi veluti a luce latrones et fures sibi metuunt et extinguere laborant. Sunt enim scientiae humanae ancillatrices et pedissequae, quibus in suo ministerio utitur regina, idest Scriptura ipsa, cui quandiu inserviunt, minime sunt otiosae iudicandae: quin immo hae tutantur reginam suam vigilantes ne quis subdolus ad eam contaminandam penetrare audeat. At hoc cuperent magnopere spiritus maligni, et omnes suae nequitiae nervos in eam turris David partem intendunt, ut clypeis et necessariis praesidiis spoliata mox hostium incursionibus et praedis pateat. Sed non praevalebunt hypocritae, quoniam “cadent a latere tuo,” ait propheta, “mille et decem millia a dextris tuis, ad te autem non appropinquabit.” Conculcabitur | enim leo et draco, et isti omnes basilisci et serpentes reguli qui suis venenatis sibilis et flatibus animos simpliciorum perdere satagunt. [9] Haec autem praefari visum est nobis operaepretium, praesertim hoc tempore9 infelici, quo omnibus fere id licere quod libeat videtur. Nam etsi haereticos nullus possit pro dignitate satis persequi, cum tot ac tantas animas secum trahant in errorem ac perditionem, dolendum est tamen ab iis qui vere sunt et habentur catholici, quique suas lucubrationes litteris mandare et in lucem venire procurant, non defendi scholasticorum partes, sed potius impugnari. Quod certe minus a nostris fieri deberet, quo iam plus nimio animadvertimus ab apertis ecclesiae hostibus scholasticis acerrimum esse indictum bellum. Itaque cum in subsequenti tractatu, qui est de imaginibus, non solum scripturarum, sed etiam philosophorum rationibus et argumentis et sententiis ab humana ratione ductis uti necesse nobis fuerit, placuit prius ostendere quas vires habeat humanarum scientiarum et artium (praesertim rhetoricae et dialecticae) cognitio, ad ea idonee tractanda et explicanda quae ad veram pertinent theologiam, et ad refellendos male de ea sentientium errores. [10] Nullus vero putet me velle R.D. Episcopum Guidixiensium cum illis nebulonibus numerare, quem et virum alioqui doctum et vere catholicum audivi. Tamen desideravi in eo maiorem in gratiam scholasticorum circunspectionem, quorum ipsemet non ignorat quam sit necessaria autoritas et exercitatio. Absit inquam ut ad eum finem illius sententiam de imaginibus refellere studuerim, sed ob eam rationem quod mihi 9 tempore added at end of line.

[Cant. cant. 4:4]

[Ps. 90:7]

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their vices and unbridled licentiousness – and pursue with mendacious insults those who reveal and expose their tricks and shameless views, not only based on the scriptures but also the teachings of philosophy and the secular arts – teachings which they alone scorn and revile who either do not know them or, if they do, fear them, like robbers and thieves afraid of the light, and seek to extinguish them. For the humanities are aides and attendants whom the queen, that is scripture, uses for her ministry. As long as they serve her, they are not to be judged idle; to the contrary, they protect their queen, watching out so that no one cunning dare enter and defile her. Yet this is precisely what malign spirits would desire, and all point the bowstrings of their wickedness to that part of David’s tower which, when deprived of its shields and necessary defenses, is quickly exposed to enemy incursions and plunder. But the hypocrites will not prevail, for “a thousand may fall at your side,” as the prophet says, “ten thousand at your right hand, but it will not come near you.” The lion and the adder will be trampled under foot, as will all the basilisks and vipers which with their venomous hisses and breathing busy themselves to ruin the souls of the simple folk. [9] These things seemed to me worth saying by way of preface, especially in these unhappy times, in which almost all appear to consider permissible whatever they please. For although one can never sufficiently pursue the heretics, since they lead so many souls into error and perdition, it is nevertheless regrettable that some who truly are and are held to be Catholics write down and publish their reflections not to defend the scholastic positions but rather to attack them. This should certainly be done even less by our own, the more we are aware now of the most brutal war declared against the scholastics by open enemies of the Church. Therefore, since it was necessary in the following treatise about images to use not only scriptural reasons, but also philosophical ones, along with arguments and judgments based on human reason, we deemed it useful first to show what power the knowledge of the human arts and sciences (especially rhetoric and dialectic) has, so as properly to discuss and explain the elements of true theology, and to rebut the errors of those who hold misguided views of it. [10] No one should think that I want to count the bishop of Guadix among those good-for-nothings: I hear that he is otherwise a learned and true Catholic. Nevertheless I wish that he held the scholastics in higher regard, as he himself recognizes how necessary their authority and practice is. It is not for this reason, I should say, that I have sought to refute his judgment on images, but because I think that he does not seem to

[Song of Sol. 4:4]

[Ps. 90:7]

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videtur sensum scholasticorum non percepisse, quodque moleste tuli ab eo eos esse immerito reprehensos. Lector aequi bonique consulat, et me eum esse existimet qui non contentionis studio, sed inquirendae et defendendae veritatis desiderio ad scribendum sim impulsus. DE [CULTU] IMAGIN[UM] LIBER PRIMUS10

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[11] Superioribus annis quum de rebus nostrae fidei ageretur, deque his varie, ut fit, a multis sententiae ferrentur, ac subinde falsae opiniones orirentur non paucae, bonam errorum partem, ab iis qui super hoc negocio in disceptationem venerunt, inde oriri comperimus, quod dum ista tractant, id ipsum de quo loquuntur, neque diffiniunt, neque diuidunt. Et proinde confusa ut plurimum illorum est disputatio. [12] Nos igitur cupientes ab his alieni fieri et veram docendi rationem tenere, nonnullas illorum questiones in eam methodum reduximus quae omnium certissima est, primum res ipsas diffiniendo, deinde dividendo, postremo errores circa haec occurrentes reprobando. Et hunc quidem ordinem in hoc de imaginibus libello sequuti sumus; quem si ab Ill.ma et R.ma D.ne V.a probatum iri intellexerimus, coeteras quoque quae passim disputantur questiones eodem modo tractabimus.

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De esse et essentia imaginis [13] Primo igitur videndum est, quid sit imago, si de ipsius sanctitate et veneratione loqui voluerimus. Est autem imago similitudo repraesentans sive figurata similitudo ad repraesentandum ordinata. Duo enim sunt de ratione imaginis, scilicet quod ipsa sit similitudo rei significatae; scundo quod originem sumat ex illa, vel in esse reali, ut filius a patre, ve in esse intelligibili, ut imago Caesaris a Caesare intellecto, qui est in mente artificis. [14] Ex hac diffinitione primo sequitur, quod imago est de genere relativorum, et non absolutorum. Nam similitudo est de genere relativorum; imago autem est similitudo (ut dictum est). Ergo imago est de genere

10

Quid imago. Quae sint de ratione  Imaginis.

Imago, ut similitudo, ad aliquid dicitur.

Here begins the Casanatense manuscript (Bibl. Cas., Ms. 2116, fols. 169r–178v); see note 1 above. The cover page originally listed the title as “De imaginibus”; a different hand later added “liber primus.” Fol. 170r gives the title (here removed) as “De imaginum cultu.” Fol. 169v is blank, as are fols. 177r–v and 178r–v.

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have understood the scholastics’ interpretation; and I have learned to my regret that he berates them undeservedly. May the reader be just and fair and consider me to be someone whose writing is motivated not by contentiousness but by the desire to investigate and defend the truth. ON THE CULT OF IMAGES BOOK ONE [11] When, in years past, matters concerning our faith were under discussion and, as it happens, many people put forward varied judgments on these issues, giving rise to numerous false opinions, we found that a good part of the errors committed by the participants in such debates derived from the fact that they neither defined nor analyzed the very subject of which they spoke. Hence their discussion was highly confused. [12] The wish to stay clear of them and to follow a true teaching system has led us to approach some of their questions with the most certain method of all, first by defining the things themselves, then analyzing them, and finally rejecting the errors made in their regard. This, then, is the order which we have followed in this booklet on images. If we learn that it meets with the approval of your most illustrious and reverend lordship, we will treat in the same way the other questions that are under discussion in different places.

On being and essence of the image [13] First, then, we need to see what an image is, if we wish to discuss its holiness and veneration. An image is a likeness that represents, or is figured in order to represent. The rationale of an image is twofold, namely to be a likeness of something that is signified; second, to derive its origin from that thing, either in real being, as a son does from his father, or in intelligible being, like an image of Caesar from the concept of Caesar, which is in the mind of the artist. [14] It follows from this definition, first, that the image belongs to the genus of relative, not absolute, [concepts]. For a likeness belongs to the genus of relatives; an image is a likeness (as we have said). Hence an image belongs to the genus of relatives. Second, it follows that the image is a sign, because everything that by its very nature is constituted

What an image is.

An image, qua likeness, is said to relate to something.

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relativorum. Secundo sequitur, quod imago est signum, nam omne quod suapte natura | ordinatur ad significandum, est signum. Imago autem de sui ratione ordinatur ad significandam rem cuius est imago. Igitur imago est signum. Errant igitur qui putant imaginem esse lignum, lapidem, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Nulla enim similitudo est substantia. Imago autem est similitudo rei quam representat; lignum, lapis, et alia id genus sunt substantiae. Ideo imago non est lignum, aurum, aut argentum; sed est in ligno, auro, et argento. Confirmatur quod uni est accidens, nulli est substantia. Similitudo autem in rebus similibus est accidens; ideo esse non potest substantia. [15] Causa vero erroris eorum qui dicunt imagines esse ligna et lapides vel aliquid huiusmodi, ex tribus ignorantiis procedit, scilicet logicae, quae docet imaginem esse in praedicamento ad aliquid sive relationis, quia totum eius esse est ad aliud se habere. Nam quicquid per imaginem significatur, totum ad aliud refertur, scilicet ad rem significatam; ideo est in praedicamento ad aliquid. Hoc autem praedicamentum realiter differt a praedicamento substantiae, ut patet ex Libro praedicamentorum.11 Ergo apud dialecticos imago dici non potest substantia, scilicet lignum, lapis, vel aliquid huiuscemodi. Secundo hic error procedit ex ignorantia philosophiae. In philosophia siquidem docetur, omne id quod accidit substantiae post eius esse completum esse accidens. Accidit autem ligno vel lapidi quod taliter vel taliter figuretur, et per consequens quod in talem vel talem imaginis formam fiat. Igitur figura quae est in ligno vel lapide non est substantia ligni vel lapidis; sed illis accidit. Tertio errant contra theologiam. Docet enim scriptura sacra filium Dei esse imaginem patris, atqui proprietas personalis in divinis non potest dici substantia sive essentia Dei, alioquin esse imaginem equaliter conveniret tribus personis, sicut et ipsa essentia. Ex quo liquet imaginem non esse substantiam, sed relationem personalem, quae convenit filio, et non patri aut spiritui sancto.

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Quia imago repraesentat, est signum.

Ratio erroris eorum.

Secunda causa erroris.

Tertio causa erroris.

De sanctitate imaginis [16] Quoniam imagines Christi et sanctorum dicuntur sanctae et venerabiles, videndum est diligenter, primo quomodo sint sanctae, deinde

11

The reference is to Aristotle’s Categories. Cf. for a contemporary edition: Liber praedicamentorum (Viennae Austriae: typis Egidii Aquilae, 1550).

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to signify is a sign. An image is by its nature constituted to signify the thing of which it is an image. Hence an image is a sign. Those, therefore, who think that an image is [a piece of] wood, stone, or something similar are mistaken. No likeness is a substance. Now an image is a likeness of the thing it represents; wood, stone, and other things of this kind are substances. Hence an image is not wood, gold, or silver, but it is in wood, gold, or silver. This is confirmed by the fact that what is an accident to one thing, is substance to none. The likeness in like things is an accident, hence it cannot be a substance. [15] The cause of the error of those who say that images are [pieces of] wood, stone, or something else derives from three kinds of ignorance, namely [first], of logic, which teaches that the image belongs to the category of ‘[relating] to something,’ or of relation, because its entire being consists in relating to something else. For whatever is signified by the image relates entirely to something else, namely to the signified thing; therefore it belongs to the category of ‘[relating] to something.’ This category really differs from the category of substance, as is clear from the Categories.3 Hence for the dialectics an image cannot be said to be a substance, such as wood, stone, or anything of this kind. Second, this error derives from ignorance of philosophy. Philosophy teaches that all that occurs to a substance after it is complete is an accident. It occurs, then, to [a piece of] wood or stone that it is figured in this or another way, and consequently obtains this or another form of an image. Hence the figure in the wood or stone is not the substance of the wood or stone, but occurs to it. Third, they err against theology. For the holy scripture teaches that the Son of God is the image of the father, and yet the personal quality in the divine cannot be called the substance or essence of God, otherwise ‘being image of’ would apply equally to the three persons [of the Trinity], just as their essence. From this it is evident that the image is not substance, but personal relation, which applies to the Son, but not the Father or Holy Spirit.

The reason of their error.

The sanctity of the image [16] Since images of Christ and the saints are called sacred and venerable, we must diligently consider, first, how they are sacred, and then how they are venerable and must be venerated. As for the former, we say that

3 The reference is to Aristotle’s Categories. See The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1:3–24.

What should be called holy.

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quomodo venerabiles et venerandae. De primo unum quodque dicitur sanctum, secundum, quod habet sanctitatem. Igitur quomodo aliquid habet sanctitatem, eo modo est sanctum. Imagines autem non habent sanctitatem formaliter, scilicet in esse reali, sed tantum significative, videlicet in esse repraesentativo. Ideo imagines non sunt res sanctae, sed signa sancta. Sanctitas igitur his duobus aequivoce convenit, scilicet rebus et signis. Nam id quod habet in se sanctitatem formaliter est res sancta; et hoc solum convenit intellectualibus et rationalibus creaturis, quia solae tales creaturae sunt divinae sanctificationis capaces, scilicet gratiae gratificantis, fidei, et charitatis, quae sunt divinae perfectiones quibus sanctificat Deus suas rationales creaturas. Ideo solae personae intellectuales et rationales possunt dici, proprie loquendo, res sanctae formaliter, scilicet in se formam et perfectionem sanctitatis habentes. Quod vero significat rem sanctam est signum sanctum, et ipsius generis sunt tria, scilicet voces, scripturae, et similitudines rerum sanctarum sive images, quae proprie loquendo dici non possunt res sancta, quia in se non habent sanctitatem, sed eam dumtaxat significant. Et ob id signa sancta dicuntur. Sic ergo sanctitas in ipsis est tamquam in signo, et in rebus tamquam in subiecto. Proinde manifestum est sanctitatem aequivoce dici de rebus et signis. [17] Ex quibus primum sequitur quod si voces, scriptura, imagines idem significent et eodem modo, aequaliter erunt sanctae. Nam unum quodque signum dicitur sanctum, quia sancte significat. Ideo voces, scriptura, et images, si eandem rem sanctam significent et eodem modo, erunt | aequaliter sanctae, id est, aequaliter signa sancta. Sequitur deinde, quod imagines quae significant res magis sanctas dicuntur et vere sunt magis sanctae. Nam signum dicitur magis aut minus sactum secundum quod rem magis aut minus sanctam significat, cum signum et signatum sint relativa. Igitur tota sanctitas signi dicitur in ordine ad rem significatam. Non parum igitur errant qui non discernunt inter rem sanctam et signum sanctum, nec intelligunt quae sit sanctitas rei, quae signi. Quo fit ut plurimi imagines idola putent. Quod longe secus est. Nam imagines sunt signa sancta, quae Graeci εἴκονασ appellant; idola vero ab idolatris putabantur res sanctae in se sanctitatem habentes et aliquid numinis. Quum tamen eorum simulacra essent argentum et aurum, opera manuum hominum nihil habentia sanctitatis et numinis, neque in esse reali

Quid dicatur sanctum.

Sanctitas aequivoce dicitur de rebus et signis.

Signa quae idem significant sunt aequaliter sancta.

Differentia, quam ponunt theologi inter εἴδωλα et εἴκονασ.

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something whatsoever is holy, and second, that it has holiness. Therefore, something is holy in the way in which it has holiness. Now images do not have holiness in the formal sense, namely in real being, but only qua signification, namely in representative being. Therefore images are not holy things, but holy signs. Holiness therefore applies ambiguously to both, namely to things and signs. For that which contains holiness in a formal sense is a holy thing; this applies only to creatures endowed with intellect and reason, because only they are capable of divine sanctification, namely of gratia gratificans,4 faith, and charity, which are the divine perfections by which God sanctifies his rational creatures. Therefore, properly speaking, only persons endowed with intellect and reason can be said to be holy things in the formal sense, namely having in themselves the form and perfection of holiness. However, something that signifies a holy thing is a holy sign, of which there are three kinds, namely words, texts, and likenesses or images of holy things; properly speaking, these cannot be said to be holy things, because they do not have holiness in themselves, but merely signify it. For this reason they are called holy signs. In these, then, the holiness lies in the sign; in things, in the subject. Hence it is clear that holiness is attributed ambiguously to things and signs. [17] From this it follows, first, that if words, texts, and images signify the same things, and in the same way, they will be equally holy. For anything is called a holy sign, when it signifies in holy fashion. Therefore if words, texts, and images signify the same holy thing in the same manner will be equally holy, that is, equally holy signs. It follows, further, that images that signify holier things are called, and really are, holier. For a sign is said to be more or less holy depending on whether it signifies a more or less holy thing, because sign and signified are relatives. Thus the entire sanctity of the sign is attributed in connection to the thing signified. A major error, therefore, is committed by those who do not distinguish between a holy thing and a holy sign, nor understand what is the holiness of a thing and the holiness of a sign. As a result many consider images to be idols, which is far from the truth. For images are holy signs, which the Greeks call icons; idols, however, are holy things which idolaters believed to have holiness and something numinous in themselves. Since their images were made of silver and gold, [these were] the work of human hands that contained nothing holy or numinous, neither in real being nor

Holiness is said ambiguously of things and signs.

Signs which signify the same things are equally holy.

The difference theologians posit between idols and icons.

4 Gratia gratificans is defined as “the habit of grace […] infused into the sinner by which the sinner is justified or made righteous”: Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1985), 131.

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neque in esse repraesentativo. Ideo dicitur in secundo concilio Niceno, Christiani iconas non idola adorant.

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De veneratione imaginis [18] Unum quodque est veneratione dignum, quatenus est sanctum, imagines autem sunt sanctae, quatenus significant res sanctas. Igitur quae res magis sanctam significant, maiori veneratione debent venerari, ita scilicet ut veneratio feratur in imaginem tamquam in obiectum quo et in rem significatam, tamquam in obiectum quod. Etenim omne signum est id mediante quo fertur mens in signatum. Imago autem est signum, ut supra dictum est. Ideo mediante imagine mens fertur in rem significata. Et hoc verum est de imagine tam interiori quam exteriori. Secundo eadem veneratione imago veneratur qua res per eam significata. | Nam idem est motus animi in signum et signatum. Imago autem est signum, et res per imaginem significata est signatum; ideo idem est honos qui exhibetur imagini et rei significatae. Habetur enim in libro De memoria et reminiscentia quod idem est motus animi in imaginem et rem per eam significatam; et proinde imago et crux Christi coluntur eodem cultu quo colitur Christus, quum in ipsis et per ipsas Christus ipse colatur. Non enim aliam habent dignitatem nisi quod signa sunt Christum significantia. Errant igitur qui putant venerationem terminari ad imaginem tanquam ad obiectum quod veneratur. Nam veneratio debetur rei in se habenti aliquid honore dignum. Imago autem non est res habens in se aliquid honore dignum, sed rem tantummodo significat quae honore dignum est. Ideo honos non debetur imagini tamquam rei sanctae, sed tamquam signo sancto. Quid igitur est, quod aliqui disputant de Virgine, de clavis usualibus, de asino quem Christus ascendit, ac caeteris similibus, an debeant haec divinis honoribus coli? Nam haec omnia sunt res et non signa; et habent proprios usus. Ideo per illa mens nostra non directe fertur in Deum, uno scilicet et eodem motu. Quare sequitur quod talibus rebus divini honores non sunt exhibendi. [19] Ex praedictis constat eos graviter errare qui dicunt imagines esse idola aut gentium simulacra. Nam idola sunt dii gentium, et simulacra earum sunt argentum et aurum, quae non sunt facta ad significandum sed ad adorandum. Imagines autem non sunt dii, neque aurem vel argentum, sed sunt signa rerum quas repraesentant. Ideo imagines Christianorum non sunt idola, neque simulacra gentium. Causa erroris istorum est

Quare aliquid veneratur.

Quomodo duppliciter aliquid veneratur.

Sola signa, et non res in imaginib(us) coluntur.

Quid idolum et quid simulacrum gentium. Putant idolatrae idolum esse rem sanctam.

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in representative being. Therefore the Second Council of Nicaea says that Christians adore icons, not idols.

The veneration of the image [18] Something is worthy of veneration insofar as it is holy; images are holy insofar as they signify holy things. Therefore things that are holier must be venerated with greater veneration, namely in such a way that the veneration is directed to the image as the object-by-which, and to the signified as the object-which. Now every sign is that by means of which the mind is taken to the signified. The image is a sign, as has been said earlier. Therefore the mind is taken by means of the image to the signified thing. And this is true both for the interior and the exterior image. Second, the image is venerated with the same veneration as the thing that is signified by it. For the movement of the soul to the sign and the signified is the same. An image is a sign, and the thing signified by it is the signified; therefore the honor exhibited to the image and the thing signified is the same. In fact, the book On Memory and Remembrance states that the movement of the soul directed to the image and the thing signified by it is the same; accordingly, the image and the cross of Christ are worshipped with the same worship as Christ, because Christ is worshipped in them and by them. They have no other dignity except as signs signifying Christ. Mistaken are therefore those who think that the veneration ends in the image as the object that is being venerated. For the veneration is owed to a thing that contains something worthy of honor. Now the image is not a thing that contains anything worthy of honor, but merely signifies something that is worthy of honor. Therefore the honor is not owed to the image as a holy thing, but as a holy sign. Why then is it that some argue about whether the Virgin, ordinary nails, the donkey Christ rode, and similar things must be worshipped with divine honors? All these are things and not signs; and they have their proper uses. Hence they do not take our mind directly to God, that is, in one and the same movement. It follows, then, that such things are not to be exhibited divine honors. [19] Based on the aforesaid it is certain that those who say that images are idols or pagan likenesses make a grave error. Idols are the gods of the pagans, and their likenesses are [objects made of] silver and gold, which are not made to signify but to be adored. Images, however, are not gods, nor [objects made of] gold or silver, but they are signs of the things they represent. Therefore the images of the Christians are neither idols nor

Why something is venerated. How something is venerated in a double way.

What an idol is, and what a pagan likeness is.

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quia non discernunt inter rem et signum, inter sanctitatem rei et sanctitatem signi, inter cultum huius et cultum istius. Nam omni iure malum est mutare gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis hominis corruptibilis, aut volucrum, aut quadrupedum, aut serpentis, | et servire creaturae potius quam creatori. Haec autem faciunt qui putant idolum esse deum et in ipsum divinos honores transferunt. Ideo malum est et idolum facere et idolum colere. Facere vero imagines et eas colere religiosum est et sanctum. Nam exprimere foris bonam animi conceptionem bonum est et sanctum. Imago autem interior Christi salvatoris et sanctorum bona est de Christo et sanctis conceptio, utputa quod Christus crucifixus est pro nobis, quod sancti mortui sunt pro veritate et iustitia. Ergo imago exterior id significa(n)s erit bona et sancta, nam exterior non habet bonitatem vel malitiam nisi ab interiori. Ergo si interior Christi et sanctorum imago sit bona, erit et exterior, quae est obiectum ipsius, aut ab interiori formaliter procedens. Ea autem interior imago est bona, quando ad bonum inducit; imo est adeo necessaria ut sine ipsa nihil intelligi possit. [20] Sunt qui dicunt imagines fieri posse ad significandum, sed non ad adorandum. Sed contra, unum quodque colitur et amatur sicut intelligitur. Si ergo in imagine et per imaginem agnoscuntur Christus et sancti, sic etiam per imaginem coluntur. Et si exosculamur scripturas sanctas et genu flectimus ad verba significantia misteria gratiae, quomodo non idem faciemus in imaginibus idem nobis significantibus? Non quidem quod cultus terminetur ad imaginem. Iam enim deficeret a propria imaginis ratione, quae est hominis mentem in rem significatam transferre. Errant igitur qui putant imagines fieri posse ad significandum, sed non ad adorandum. Nam motus voluntatis est rectus et bonus, quando sequitur et est conformis intellectui recto. Recta autem est intellectio rei significatae per ver imaginem, ergo rectus est actus voluntatis illi conformis, quemadmodum sunt amor veneratioque sive cultus. Causa vero istius erroris est aequivocatio adorationis. Nam imagines fieri non possunt ut adorentur sicut res; tunc enim non adorarentur imagines | quatenus imagines, sed quatenus res sanctitatem in se habentes. Nam aliud est adorare imaginem vel scripturam quatenus signum sanctum, et eam adorare quasi rem sanctam, ut supra dictum est.

[Rom. 1:23]

Si bona est interior imago, bona est etiam exterior.

Motus voluntatis sive appetitus sequitur actum intellectus.

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the likenesses of the pagans. The cause of their error is that they do not distinguish between the thing and the sign, between the holiness of the thing and the holiness of the sign, and between the worship of the former and the worship of the latter. For it is evil by any law to change the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of an image of a corruptible human, or of birds, four-footed animals, or a serpent, and worship the creature rather than the creator. But that is what is done by those who believe that an idol is a god and bestow divine honors on it. Therefore it is evil both to make and to worship an idol. But making and worshipping images is pious and holy. For it is good and holy to express outwardly a good concept of the soul. Now an interior image of Christ the Savior and of the saints is a good concept concerning Christ and the saints, for instance that Christ was crucified for us and that the saints died for truth and justice. Therefore the exterior image that signifies this is good and holy, because the exterior [image] does not have goodness or malice except [as derived] from the interior one. Hence, if the interior image of Christ and the saints is good, so is the exterior, which is its object and formally proceeds from the interior. Now the interior image is good when it is conducive to good; nay, it is so necessary that without it nothing can be understood. [20] There are some who say that images can be made to signify, but not to adore. On the contrary, something is worshipped and loved in the way in which it is known. If, then, Christ and the saints are known in and through an image, likewise they are also worshipped through the image. If we kiss the holy scriptures and kneel to the words that signify the mysteries of grace, how shall we not do so with images that signify the same to us? It is not the case, however, that worship ends in the image. That would detract from the very rationale of the image, which is to transport a person’s mind to the thing that is signified. Mistaken, therefore, are those who believe that images can be made to signify but not to adore. For the movement of the will is right and good when it follows and conforms to the right understanding. Now the understanding of a thing signified by a true image is right and so, therefore, is the act of the will that conforms to it, such as love, veneration, and worship. The cause of this error is an ambiguity in [our understanding of] adoration. For images cannot be made to be adored as things, since in that case the images are not adored as images, but as things that have holiness in themselves. As noted earlier, it is one thing to adore an image or text as a holy sign, and another to adore it as a holy thing.

The idolaters believe that the idol is a holy thing. [Rom. 1:23]

If the interior image is good, so too is the exterior image.

A movement of the will or desire follows an act of the intellect.

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[21] Multi detestantur imagines, eo quod putent eas esse prohibitas a Deo. Nam scribitur Exodi vigesimo et Deuteronomi quinto, “Non facies tibi sculptile, neque omnem similitudinem quae est in caelo desuper et quae in terra deorsum, neque eorum quae sunt in aquis sub terra; non adorabis ea, neque coles.” In primis animadvertendum est diligenter, quod nulla praecepta veteris legis post mortem Christi obligant, exceptis moralibus, quae manent non quatenus sunt praecepta legis Mosaicae, sed quatenus sunt de ratione naturali. Praeceptum autem de non faciendis imaginibus et rerum similitudinibus, atque de ipsis non colendis, quatenus imagines sunt, non est de ratione naturali, ut dictum est; quia sicut res est bona quae habet in se bonitatem, ita signum est bonum vel malum, quatenus bene vel male significat. Imagines autem sunt signa rerum significatarum, ut dictum est. Ideo si imagines significent misteria salutis et gratiae, perinde atque scripturae sanctae, consequitur sanctas esse imagines, quemadmodum et scripturae sanctae sunt. Et e contrario malas esse constat et ad regnum Satanae pertinere quae obscenae sunt et ad malum inducunt. [22] Item tempore legis evangelicae non obligamur, nisi ad legem rationis et fidei: rationis quidem quatenus sumus homines, fidei vero quatenus Christiani. Si ergo praeceptum de non faciendis sculptilibus atque non colendis non est de lege naturali neque de lege evangelica, constat illud | nullo modo nos obligare. Constat autem non esse de lege evangelica. Nam nihil in novo testamento habetur de sculptilibus non faciendis aut non adorandis, sed tantummodo dicitur, “fugite ab idolorum cultura.” Neque similiter est de lege rationis non facere sculptile seu similitudinem rerum ad significandum et adorandum, ut dictum est, alioqui Deus numquam apparuisset in imagine aut rerum similitudine, neque fuisset loquutus patribus in visionibus propheticis, quae fiebant per imagines rerum, scilicet sedentis super thronum excelsum aut antiqui dierum aut similitudinis filii hominis. Nam omnes istae erant visiones imaginariae quae fiebant a Deo per rerum imagines et similitudines. Ideo malum esse non potest, tales Dei aut sanctarum rerum imagines effingere quas Deus in scripturis sanctis effinxit. [23] Relinquitur ergo quod haec sunt praecepta specialiter data Iudaeis propter conditionem ipsius gentis et temporis. Nam quia ipsi Iudei

[Exod. 20:4–5] [Deut. 5:8–9]

Prohibitum est facere sculptile gentilium, sed non sculptile imaginum.

Duae regulae vitae, ratio et fides.

Primae ad Corinth. 10 [14]  et primae Joan. ult. [5:21]

Esaiae 6o [1]  Danielis 7 [9],  Apocal. primo [13]

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How to understand the Old Testament command that prohibits the making and adoration of graven images [21] Many abhor images believing that they are forbidden by God. For it is written in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5, “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any things that are in heaven above, or that are in the earth beneath, or that abide in the waters under the earth. Thou shalt not adore them, and thou shalt not worship them.” First we must take care to note that no precept of the old law obliges after Christ’s death, with the exception of moral precepts, which remain not because they are precepts of Mosaic law, but because they are grounded in natural reason. The precept against making images and likenesses of things and worshipping them on account of their being images does not pertain to natural reason, as noted, because just as a thing is good when it has goodness, thus also a sign is good or bad when it signifies in a good or bad way. Now images are signs of the things they signify, as noted. Therefore, if images signify the mysteries of salvation and grace in the same manner as the holy scriptures do, it follows that these images are holy, just as the holy scriptures are. In contrast, those that are obscene and conducive to evil are bad and belong to Satan’s kingdom. [22] Moreover, in the time of evangelical law we are bound only by the law of reason and faith: reason because we are humans, faith because we are Christians. If, then, the precept against making and worshipping images derives neither from natural law nor from evangelical law, it is evident that it obliges us in no way. It manifestly does not derive from evangelical law, because the New Testament does not contain anything against the making or adoring of graven images, but says only: “fly from the service of idols.” Similarly, as we have said, the law of reason does not prohibit the making of graven images or likenesses of things for purposes of signifying or adoration, otherwise God would never have appeared in an image or likeness of things, nor would he have spoken to the fathers in prophetic visions which took the form of images of things, i.e. of someone sitting upon a high throne or of an ancient of days or the likeness of the Son of man. All these were imaginary visions God made using the images and likenesses of things. For this reason it cannot be bad to depict images of God or sacred things similar to those God depicted in the sacred scriptures. [23] It follows, then, that these are precepts specially given to the Jews because of the condition of that people and their time. For since the Jews

[Exod. 20:4–5] [Deut. 5:8–9]

It is forbidden to make the idols of the pagans, not [Christian] images.

Two life rules,  reason and faith.

1 Cor. 10 [14] and 1 John final verse [5:21]

Isa. 6 [1]  Dan. 7 [9]  Apoc. 1 [13]

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habitabant inter idolatras atque etiam ex sese admodum proclives erant ad idolatriam, voluit Deus omnem occasionem et speciem mali illis adimere, ut nec verbo nec signo inter eos et gentes conveniret. Ideo talia praecepta nunc non obligant, sicut nec praeceptum de observatione sabbati, aut de non comedendo carnem cum sanguine. Quae sunt praecepta veteris testame(n)ti data Iudaeis, non Christianis. Ubi autem non erat periculum idolatriae, poteran Iudaei imagines rerum facere, ut patet de imagine serpentis elevata in deserto (Numeri 21o). Et hoc apparet primo ex hoc quod licebat maioribus quibus non imminebat periculum habere imagines, ut puta sacerdotibus qui habebant in templo imagines cherubin. Secundo patet ex decursu decalogi veteris testamenti, in quo simul habentur praecepta moralia et ceremonialia. Ideo ex ea parte argui non potest talia praecepta obligare, quando quidem multa sunt alia in eadem scriptura quae non sunt moralia sed tantum ceremonialia ad tempus data, ut puta de faciendo altari de terra | et de non ascendendo ad ipsum altare per gradus. Tertio patet ex lege evangelica, quae nusquam meminit istius prohibitionis, sed solum praecepit Deum adorandum et diligendum ex tota corde. De sculptili autem aut rerum similitudinibus nihil omnino habetur nisi quod prohibetur idolorum cultus. Ideo relinquitur quod haec praecepta et similia, licet sint in lege veteris testamenti, eo quod non sunt de ratione naturali aut de lege evangelica, non obligant eos qui sunt sub lege novi testamenti. [24] Iudaizant ergo qui volunt observare praecepta decalogi ut scribuntur in veteri testamento. Et hoc quidem in tribus. Primo quidem, quia in veteri testamento movebantur Iudaei ad observandum praecepta aut amore mercenario aut timore paenae. Nam ibidem dicitur, quia “ego sum dominus Deus tuus qui eduxi te de terra Aegipti,” et subiungit, “Ego sum fortis, zelotes, visitans iniquitates patrum in filios ad tertiam et quartam generationem.” Haec autem, scilicet beneficium eductionis de Aegipto et timor paenae, non sunt causae observationis praeceptorum novi testamenti, sed potius amor charitatis et timor filialis, ut docet Augustinus, dicens: “Parva differentia est legis et evangelii, amor et timor,”12 iuxta illud: “Non enim accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed acceptistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum.” Ergo qui agunt timore paenae,

12

Aliqua praecepta sunt  uni populo necessaria, et non alteri.

[Num. 21:8–9]

Primae ad Cor. 10 [14] et 1 Joan. ult. [21]

[Exod. 20:2 and 20:5]

[Rom. 8:15]

This appears to be an indirect quotation by way of Thomas (Summa, I–II, q. 91, a. 5): “Et ideo dicit Augustinus, contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, quod brevis differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor.” Augustine’s wording was somewhat different (Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum liber unus, PL 42, 17.2: “Nam haec est brevissima et apertissima differentia duorum Testamentorum, timor et amor”).

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lived among idolaters and were themselves also inclined to idolatry, God wanted to take every occasion and kind of evil away from them, so that they would not agree in word or sign with the pagans. Hence such precepts do not bind us now, like those regarding the observation of the sabbath or the prohibition against eating meat containing blood.5 These are Old Testament precepts given to the Jews, not to the Christians. Yet where no danger of idolatry existed, the Jews could make images of things, as is clear from the image of the serpent erected in the desert (Numbers 21). This first becomes evident from the fact that the elders not exposed to danger were allowed to have images, for instance the priests who had images of the cherubim in the temple. Second, it is clear from the Old Testament list of the Ten Commandments, which contains at once moral and ceremonial precepts. On this basis it cannot be argued that such precepts are binding, when many others in the same scripture, which are not moral but only ceremonial, are given for the time, for example those against altars made from stone or going up steps to that altar.6 Third, it is evident from evangelical law, which nowhere reminds us of this prohibition, but only orders us to adore and love God with all our heart.7 Yet it has nothing whatsoever about graven images or likenesses of things except for prohibiting the worship of idols. It follows that these and similar precepts, although they occur in the Old Testament, do not oblige those under New Testament law, because they do not derive from natural reason or evangelical law. [24] Those, therefore, who want to observe the Ten Commandments as recorded in the Old Testament, judaize. They do so in three ways. First, because in the Old Testament the Jews were moved to observe the precepts either out of mercenary love or for fear of punishment. There in fact it is written, “I am the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt,” and subsequently, “I am mighty, jealous, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon their sons to the third and fourth generation.” In the New Testament it is not these [factors] – the benefit of being led out of Egypt and the fear of punishment – that motivate the observance of precepts, but rather the love of charity and filial fear. As Augustine teaches, “There is a slight difference between the law and the gospel: love and fear,” according to the following: “For you did not receive a spirit of servitude to fall back into fear, but you received a spirit of adoption of children.” Therefore those who act out of fear for punishment, which proceeds from 5 Cf. Lev. 7:26–27; 17:10–14. 6 Cf. Exod. 20:25–26. 7 Cf. Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30 and 33; Luke 10:27.

Some precepts are necessary for one people, and not for another.

[Num. 21:8–9]

1 Cor. 10 [14] and 1 John final verse [21]

[Exod. 20:2 and 20:5]

[Rom. 8:15]

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qui procedit ex amore mercenaria, sunt quasi servi sub lege. Qui vero ex charitatis amore, ex quo procedit filialis timor, sunt tamquam filii sub gratia constituti. Ergo motivum ad observationem ipsius praecepti in novo testamento non est aut beneficium temporale aut timor paenarum, quae erant motiva in veteri testamento. [25] Secundo iudaizant in modo observationis sive impletionis praceptorum. Nam illi qui erant sub veteri testamento observabant ea praecepta secundum literam et rationem humanam. Nos autem qui sumus sub lege novi testamenti | observamus ea secundum spiritum et fidem, ut Joannes in Evangelio refert dominum dixisse: “Mandatum novum do vobis ut diligatis invicem.” Et idem Joannes in prima canonica dicit esse mandatum novum et vetus: novum quidem si observetur secundum rationem fidei, vetus autem si impleatur secundum rationis directionem. Ideo qui amat Deum et proximum, quatenus monstrat ratio hoc esse faciendum, implet praeceptum vetus. Qui vero amat Deum et proximum secundum cognitionem fidei, hoc est, secundum quod Deus et proximus cognoscuntur lumine fidei et sunt ex scripturis sacris diligendi, implet praeceptum novum. Nam amor sequitur cognitionem. Ideo sicut dupplex [sic] est cognitio, scilicet rationis et fidei, ita dupplex est amor, scilicet naturalis, quo implemus praeceptum vetus, et supernaturalis, scilicet charitatis, quo implemus praeceptum novum. [26] Tertio iudaizant qui observant omnia praecepta quae Exodi vigesimo et Deuteronomii quinto habetur, nam multa eorum sunt iudicialia et ceremonialia. Illic enim praemittitur ubi haec praecepta commemorantur: “Audi Israel ceremonias atque iudicia, quae ego loquor in auribus vostris, hodie discite ea, et opere complete,” etc. Et paulo post: Et ait dominus, ego sum Deus, qui eduxi te de terra Aegipti de domo servitutis; non habebis deos alienos in conspectu meo. Non facies tibi sculptile, nec similitudinem omnium quae sunt in coelo desuper, etc. Non adorabis ea et non coles. Ego enim sum Deus aemulator, etc. Ex quibus verbis facile patet aliquid esse morale in eo praecepto, scilicet, non habere deos alienos, et aliquid ceremoniale, scilicet, “Non facies tibi sculptile, nec similitudinem omnium quae sunt in coelo desuper,” etc. Et idem dicendum est de observatione sabbati, quae immediate

Joan. 13 [34] Primae Joan. 2 [7]

[Deut. 5:1] [Exod. 20:1–4]

[Deut. 5:9]

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mercenary love, are like slaves under the law. Those, however, who act out of the love of charity, from which filial fear flows, are constituted like children under grace. Hence the motivation for observing this precept in the New Testament is not, as was the case in the Old Testament, a temporary benefit or the fear of punishment. [25] Second, they [who observe the Ten Commandments as recorded in the Old Testament] judaize in the way in which they observe or fulfill precepts. Those who lived under the Old Testament observed those precepts according to the letter and human reason. We, however, who live under the law of the New Testament, observe them according to the spirit and faith, as John reports the Lord saying in his gospel: “I give you a new commandment, that you love one another.” And the same John says in the first canonical letter that the commandment is both new and old, new if it is observed in the manner of faith, old if it is satisfied according to the manner of righteousness. Therefore, those who love God and their neighbor because reason shows that this must be done, fulfill the old precept. Those, however, who love God and their neighbor according to the knowledge of faith, that is, following the notion that God and one’s neighbor are known by the light of faith and must be loved according to the holy scriptures, fulfill the new precept. For love follows knowledge. Hence, just as knowledge is dual, namely reason and faith, thus love is dual, namely natural, by which we fulfill the old precept, and supernatural, that is, charitable, by which we fulfill the new precept. [26] Third, those who observe all precepts contained in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5 judaize because many of these are legal and ceremonial. For where those precepts are recorded we find the premise: “Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments, which I speak in your ears this day: learn them, and fulfil them in work.” And a little further: And the Lord spoke: I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any things that are in heaven above, etc. Thou shalt not adore them, and thou shalt not worship them. For I am a jealous God, etc. From these words it is obvious that there is something moral in this precept, namely not to have strange gods, and something ceremonial, namely “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any things that are in heaven above, etc.” And the same must be said

John 13 [34] 1 John 2 [7]

[Deut. 5:1]

[Exod. 20:1–4]

[Deut. 5:9]

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subiungitur. Nam quiescere ab exterioribus, ut Deo intendamus et illum colamus et adoremus, morale est. Quod autem illa die, scilicet sabbati, et ea ratione, scilicet quia | Deus quiescit in ea, hoc facimus, ceremoniale est, spectans ad populum veteris testamenti. Et simile est in caeteris veteris testamenti praeceptis in quibus est aliquid morale et aliquid ceremoniale. Quare necesse est ut diligenter videatur in eis praeceptis veteris testamenti, quid sit morale et quid ceremoniale atque iudiciale. Nam id solum quod morale est nunc observandum est in lege veteris testamenti, sed quatenus est de ratione naturali. Ceremoniale vero et iudiciale non sunt hoc tempore legis evangelicae observanda. Ideo Deus simpliciter prohibuit illi populo ne facerent deos aureos sive argenteos, quod est morale. Et quia voluit ut ab omni specie mali abstinerent, et inter eos et gentes nullo modo conveniret, prohibuit etiam tunc temporis imagines fieri et rerum similitudines. [27] Relinquitur ergo quod non habere deos alienos et propterea non facere deos aureos aut argenteos est praeceptum morale. Ideo prohibitum, quia malum. Non facere autem sculptile aut rerum imagines et similitudines est ceremoniale. Ideo malum erat Iudeis, quia prohibitum tamquam habens speciem mali propter idolatriae similitudinem. Nunc autem inter christianos non est tale periculum, ut supra praedictum est, ideo cessat tale praeceptum. Sed diceret quis, ubi fuit periculum idolatriae, Ezechias rex destruxit imaginem serpentis aenei. Ergo si idem periculum idolatriae ex imaginum cultu nunc oriretur, deberet ecclesia imagines tollere. Ad istam obiectionem respondetur, nullum nunc esse periculum idolatriae, quia usque adeo promulgata est fides, ut nemo sit qui putet imaginem esse Deum aut eam rem sanctam quam repraesentat. Nam doctrina evangelic idolatriam prorsus abolevit et cognitionem unius veri Dei omnibus populis sic tradidit ut nemo iam sit qui noscatur idola colere, ut faciebant gentiles, qui ad simulacra muta, prout ducebantur, ibant. Nam neque | ego novi unquam qui loco Dei aut sanctorum coleret imagines, neque intellexi unquam quod tales casus ad confessores sive poenitentiarios pervenerint. Ideo sicut utile est res significare vocibus et verbis, sic et imaginibus ac figuris. Et hoc quidem est utile non solum simplicibus, quibus datae sunt pro libris, verum etiam spiritualibus viris, quibus dantur pro memoria et recordatione misteriorum salutis. Nam sicut humanae mentes vocibus et scripturis moventur,

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about the observation of the sabbath, which follows immediately. For to take a rest from external matters to attend to God and worship and adore him, is moral. That we do this on that day, namely the sabbath, and for this reason, namely because God rests then, is ceremonial, and concerns the people of the Old Testament. The same is true for the other precepts in the Old Testament. For this reason we must diligently consider what in these Old Testament precepts is moral, and what is ceremonial and legal. For today only that which is moral in Old Testament law must be observed, but because it derives from natural reason.8 The ceremonial and legal, however, are not to be observed in this time of evangelical law. Therefore God simply forbade people to make gold or silver gods, which is moral. And because he wanted that they refrain from all kinds of evil and not conform in any way with the gentiles, he also prohibited the making of images and likenesses of things at that time. [27] It follows, then, that it is a moral precept not to have strange gods and thus not to make gold or silver gods. It is prohibited, because it is evil. However, the precept not to make anything sculpted or images and likenesses of things is ceremonial. Thus it was bad for the Jews: it was forbidden because it had the appearance of evil due to its similarity to idolatry. Now, among Christians no such danger exists, as noted above, therefore this precept is void. But someone will say: where was the danger of idolatry? King Ezechias destroyed the image of the bronze serpent. Hence if the same danger of idolatry arose now from the cult of images, the Church should remove images. The answer to this objection should be that there is no danger of idolatry now, because the faith has been proclaimed to such a point that no one would think that the image was God or the holy thing it represented. Evangelical doctrine abolished idolatry altogether and handed down the knowledge of the one true God to all peoples in such a way that there is no one left who is known to worship idols, as did the pagans, who turned to mute likenesses, just as they were led by them. I myself have never known anyone who worshipped images instead of God or the saints, nor have I ever heard that such cases were brought to confessors or penitentiaries. Hence, just as it is useful to signify things with sounds and words, so it is with images and figures. And it is useful not only for the illiterate, to whom they are given in lieu of books, but also for spiritual men, to whom they are given to further the 8 The word “but” in this sentence suggests an elision. The intended meaning clearly is: Old Testament moral laws must be observed not because they are found in the Old Testament, but because they derive from natural reason.

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sic etiam rerum similitudinibus et exemplis. Ideo maxime in templis et orationum locis, in quibus humanae mentes debent in Deum ferri et ad virtutum profectum tendere, debent fieri imagines. Quia non semper fit illic praedicatione aut scripturis haec sacrorum recordatio. Utile igitur est, ut per rerum imagines id fiat. [28] Praeter haec solent plerique dubitare an fieri debeant et coli rerum spiritualium imagines, quae nullo modo per corporalium rerum similitudinem possun repraesentari? Aiunt enim imagines esse rerum similitudines, quae fiunt ad repraesentandum. Nulla autem esse potest deitatis, aut Trinitatis, aut aliorum spirituum corporalis expressa similitudo. Et hac ratione argui vident qui gloriam incorruptibilis Dei13 mutant in similitudinem imaginis hominis corruptibilis, aut volucrum aut quadrupedum aut serpentum. Et Esaias propheta deridet eos qui deitatem corporali similitudine expromere volunt, dicens, “Cui similem facietis Deum, aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?” Etc. Ad quae facile respondetur. Nam si spiritus angelici et Deu ipse per imagines et rerum corporalium similitudines nobis monstr sunt, nobis etiam licebit id facere. Si enim sic Deus nos docere voluit, malum esse non potest sic doceri et in docendo caeteros modum eius imitar. At qui Deus in scripturis sanctis se et angelicos spiritus nobis monstrvit sub variis similitudinibus et diversis imaginum formis. Ergo argui non poterunt qui tales Dei et angelorum imagines, in quibus Deus et angeli nobis apparuerunt, formare volunt.14  [29] Nec obstat quod Deus ipse per tales corporalium rerum imagines et similitudines non significatur, quum ipse sit spiritus, quia voluit per sensibilia nobis manifestari secundum quod significari possunt Dei perfectiones per signa sensibilia, ut eius aeternitas monstratur sub imagine antiqui dierum. Sic enim in scripturis visus est. Atque Trinitas quando Abraham tres vidit et unum adoravit. Ideo aeternitas atque personarum unitas his similitudinibus exprimi possunt, et Dei filius imagine representari potest, sicut apparuit in carne; et spiritus sanctus, sicut monstratus est in columbae specie. Et hanc personarum imaginem, in qua secundum scripturas Deus apparere voluit, pie et religiose facimus, et sub ea similitudine ipsum fideliter adoramus. Quod vero Esaias negare videtur Dei invisibilis imaginem fieri posse, atque Paulus arguere eos qui 13 14

Dei added in marg. Corr. from voluit.

[Rom. 1:23]

[Isa. 40:18]

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memory and recall of the mysteries of salvation. For just as human minds are moved by sounds and texts, so they are by likenesses and copies of things. Therefore images must be made especially in churches and places of prayer, in which human minds must be lifted up to God and strive towards the increase of virtues. There this reminder of sacred things does not always occur through preaching or scriptures. Hence it is useful that this be done by images of things. [28] In addition, many question whether images must be made, or worshipped, of spiritual things that in no way can be represented by the likeness of corporeal things. They say that images are likenesses of things, which are made to represent them. But there can be no corporeal likeness of the deity, or the Trinity, or other spirits. For this reason those are censured who change the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of a corruptible man, or of birds, four-footed animals, or snakes. The prophet Isaiah scorns those who want to show the deity through a corporeal likeness, in saying: “To whom then have you likened God, or what image will you make for him?” Etc. The answer to this is simple. If angelic spirits and God himself are shown us by images and likenesses of corporeal things, then we will be allowed to make them. For if God has wanted to teach us in this way, then it cannot be evil to teach in this way and to imitate his method while teaching others. Now in the holy scriptures God has shown himself and angelic spirits under various likenesses and in several kinds of images. Those, therefore, who want to represent God and the angels with the images in which they have appeared cannot be criticized. [29] Nor does it matter that, since God is spirit, he himself is not signified by such images of corporeal things and likenesses, because he wished to manifest himself through sensory things to the extent that they can signify his perfections, as for instance his eternity is shown through the image of an ancient of days. Thus, in fact, he is seen in the scriptures. And so is the Trinity when Abraham saw three men and adored one. Hence the eternity and the unity of persons can be expressed by these likenesses; and God’s Son can be represented by an image as he appeared in the flesh, and the Holy Ghost as it was shown in the form of a dove. We piously and devoutly make this image of the persons [of the Trinity] in which according to the scriptures God wanted to appear, and under this likeness we faithfully adore him. However, that Isaiah appears to deny that an image of the invisible God can be made, and that Paul criticizes

[Rom. 1:23]

[Isa. 40:18]

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Dei gloriam in hominis corruptibilis aut aliarum rerum similitudinem transferunt, sanctissime quidem id per eos fit, ut damnent eos qui Dei substantiam huiusmodi figuris exprimi putant, atque illos qui divinos honores in simulacra transferunt, non autem eos qui per tales imagines Dei potentiam, aeternitatem, humanitatem atque bonitatem utcumque significare voluerunt. [30] Relinquitur ergo quod sensus dicti praecepti, quatenus est morale, continet non habere deos alienos et non facere deos aureos argenteosve; atque illis non tribuere divinos honores. Ait enim dominus, “Gloriam meam alteri non dabo et laudem meam sculptilibus.” Ideo non videntur prohiberi sculptilia simpliciter, sed ea quibus fiunt dii aurei et argentei. Nam facere rerum similitudines, sive sculpendo sive pingendo aut aliter, malum esse non potest, nisi quia prohibitum, ut supra dictum est. Nec similiter malum est dare gloriam imaginibus quatenus imagines sunt, sed tantummodo si per hoc gloria Dei transferatur in idola vel simucra, ut gentiles faciebant, et fecerunt Israelitae, quando eorum exemplo | mutaverunt gloriam Dei in similitudinem vituli15 comedentis foenum, dicentes, “Hi sunt dii tui, Israel, qui te eduxerunt de terra Aegipti.” Nec propter errorem aut scandalum aliquorum tollendae sunt imagines, quia eorum error est crassus, et scandalum eorum est phariseorum, scilicet acceptum et non datum; quoniam, ut ait Esaias, “repleta est terra scientia domini, sicut aquae mare operientes.” Ideo nemo est fidelium christianorum qui nesciat imaginem non esse Deum aut sanctum, sed eos tantum repraesentare; et hoc quidem post legem evangelicam ita promulgatam et tam late propagatam.

Esaiae 42 [8]

[Exod. 32:8]

[Isa. 11:9]

DE CULTU IMAGINUM LIBER SECUNDUS16

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[31] Posteaquam scripsimus disputationem de imaginibus hic Romae habitam, nobis oblatus fuit a Reverendo D. Bernardo del Bene Sanctissimi D. N. Referendario et Archidiacono Auxitano liber reverendi in Christo patris et domini D. Martini Peresii Guidixiensium Episcopi de divinis et apostolicis traditionibus, in quo agens de honore sacris imaginibus debito

15 16

vituli added superscr. to replace erased veluti. Here the Vatican manuscript (AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 283r–305v) resumes (see n. 1 above). In the ms. the full title of the second book is given as “R.P. Magistri Matthaei Ory Ordinis Praedicatorum Doctoris Parisiensis et in regno Franciae Inquisitoris ac Sanctissimi D.N. Penitentiarii De cultu imaginum liber secundus.”

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those who transfer God’s glory to the likeness of a corruptible man or of other things, they did so in the holiest manner to rebuke those who think they express God’s substance by such figures, and those who bestow divine honors onto images, but not those who by means of such images of God wanted to signify in some way God’s power, eternity, humanity, and goodness. [30] It follows, then, that the sense of the above-mentioned precept, insofar as it is moral, is not to have strange gods and not to make golden or silver gods, and not to bestow divine honors on them. For the Lord says: “I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise to graven things.” Therefore graven things are not forbidden generally, but [only] those by which golden and silver gods are made. For it cannot be bad to make likenesses of things, in sculpture, painting, or otherwise, unless it is forbidden, as explained above. Nor, similarly, is it bad to offer glory to images insofar as they are images, but only if by this act God’s glory is transferred to idols or likenesses, as the pagans did, and as the Israelites also did when, following their example, they changed God’s glory into the likeness of a hay-eating calf, saying: “These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” Nor should we remove images because of the error or scandal caused by some, because their error is clumsy and their scandal is Pharisaical, that is, received and not given.9 For, as Isaiah says, “the earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the covering waters of the sea.” Hence there is no one among faithful Christians who does not know that an image is not God or a saint, but only represents them – and this after the evangelical law was thus promulgated and spread far and wide.

Isa. 42 [8]

[Exod. 32:8]

[Isa. 11:9]

ON THE CULT OF IMAGES BOOK TWO [31] After I wrote the disputation on images held here in Rome, the Reverend Lord Bernardo del Bene, Referendarius of the Most Holy Lord and Archdeacon of Auch, handed me a book by the Reverend Father and Lord in Christ D. Martín Pérez [de Ayala], bishop of Guadix, on the divine and apostolic traditions.10 In it, as the author discusses the honor owed 9 10

These terms refer to the moral-theological distinction between a scandal that is unintentional on the part of the sinner and one that is actively provoked. For background, see chapter 2, p. 44.

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multa dicit quae videntur non modo nostris, verum etiam sanctorum scriptis adversari.17 Quare operaepretium duxi ea disputando examinare quae cum scholasticorum communi doctrina pugnant, ut vel sic clarius cognosci possit quid veritatis, quidve falsitatis in eis contineatur. Ut autem ordine quodam in inquirenda veritate eorum quae in disputationem veniunt procedatur, primo referemus dictum autoris. Secundo, subiungemus scholasticorum sententiam. Tertio, inquiremus quid sit veritatis in utrisque. [32] In primis autor libri sic incipit: Omnes fere scholastici in hoc sunt, quod imago [sic] Christi et sanctorum adorari debent eadem adoratione qua et res quae repraesentantur. Ideo imagini Christi et signo crucis sanctissimo, in eo quod Christum repraesentant, latriae adorationem illis deberi affirmant.18 Et paulo post subiungit: Cuius doctrinae nullum (quod ego viderim) afferunt validum fundamentum quod | possit fideles ad id quod docent obligare. Nam neque scripturam, neque traditionem ecclesiae, neque communem sensum sanctorum, neque concilii generalis determinationem aliquam, nec etiam rationem qua hoc efficaciter suaderi possit, adducunt.19

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Haec ille. [33] In quibus verbis dictus autor sententiam scholasticorum de imaginum cultu et veneratione referre et reprobare nititur ex omnibus capitibus ex quibus aliqua doctrina videtur habere validum fundamentum. Quamobrem in hac praesenti disputatione nostra inquirendum est in primis de firmo atque valido fundamento doctrinae quam scholastici tradunt de adorandis imaginibus eodem cultu quo res per eas significatae adorantur. Cum autem omnis doctrina fundetur in ratione aut fide, firmum atque validum erit fundamentum, humanum scilicet et divinum, 17

18 19

Martin Pérez de Ayala, De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus deque authoritate ac vi earum sacrosancta adsertiones ceu libri decem (Coloniae: Iaspar Gennepaeus, 1549). The section on images (above, pp. 136–87) is at fols. 113v–21v; the discussion of honor mentioned by Ory is at fols. 118v–21v (above, pp. 170–87). For background, see chapter 2, pp. 32–43. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 19. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20.

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to sacred images, he says many things that appear contrary not only to our writings but also those of the saints. Therefore I consider it worthwhile to examine in a disputation those [views] that are contrary to the common teaching of the scholastics, and to establish as clearly as possible what in them is truthful, and what is false. To proceed with order in inquiring about the issues in dispute, I will first report what the author says; second, I will add the judgment of the scholastics; and third, I will investigate what is truthful in each. [32] As for the first, the book’s author starts as follows: Almost all scholastics agree that images of Christ and the saints are to be adored with the same adoration as the things represented by them. Therefore they affirm that an image of Christ and the most holy sign of the cross are owed the adoration of latria, inasmuch they represent Christ.11 A bit further on he adds: As far as I can tell, they offer no valid foundation for this doctrine that can oblige the faithful to what they teach. They cite neither scripture nor Church tradition, nor the consensus of saints, nor any pronouncement of a general council, nor even a reason to make a compelling case for it.12 Thus far Pérez. [33] With these words the author seeks to represent and reject the scholastics’ view on the worship and veneration of images based on all criteria by which a doctrine appears to have a valid foundation. Therefore the present disputation needs to inquire first into the solid and valid foundation of the doctrine the scholastics have passed on about the way in which images are adored with the same worship as the things signified by them. But since every doctrine is founded on reason and faith, scholastic doctrine will have a solid and valid foundation, both human and divine,

11 12

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 19. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20.

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doctrinae scholasticorum, si monstraverimus ratione et scripturis imagines et res per eas significatas eadem adoratione esse adorandas. [34] In primis Philosophus dicit quod duplex est motus animi in imaginem, scilicet ut est res quaedam, et ut est signum sive repraesentativa. In qua distinctione fundatur primo doctrina scholasticorum, scilicet quod motus animi quo quis movetur in imaginem ut est res quaedam est alius a motu qui est in rem significatam; et quod motus animi qui est in imaginem quatenus est imago est unus et idem cum illo qui est in rem repraesentatam. Et huius doctrinae veritas manifeste sequitur ex praedictis Philosophi verbis. Et primo quod idem sit motus animi in imaginem quatenus est imago | et in rem repraesentatem. Omnis enim motus animi terminatur ad ens sive bonum sive verum. Imago autem quatenus imago non est ens sive res; immo in praedicta distinctione distinguitur contra ens. Ergo motus animi non sistit seu terminatur in eam, sed in rem repraesentatam tanquam in suum obiectum, quod est verum vel bonum. Et hoc est primum scholasticorum fundamentum ex Philosopho acceptum. Et qui hoc non accurate perpendunt, non cognoscunt conclusionem in praemissis, nec res in imaginibus et signis. Ideo recte dicunt ex Philosopho theologi quod motus animi qui fertur in imaginem quatenus est res quaedam, est alius a motu qui est in rem [significatam]; et quod motus qui est in imaginem quatenus est imago, est unus et idem cum illo qui est in rem significatam. Nam qui dicit unum ex quo aliud necessario sequitur, etiam illud ex consequenti dicit. Sicut qui dicit hominem esse rationalem, dicit eundem esse risibilem. Ideo Philosophus distinguens motum animi qui fertur in imaginem quatenus est res, a motu animi qui fertur in imaginem quatenus est imago, ex consequenti dicit hunc posteriorem animi motum per imaginem ferri in rem repraesentatam, cum omnis animi motus ad ens terminetur; at imago quatenus imago (ut dictum est) non est ens. Omnis enim actus animi qui fertur in rem tanquam in obiectum quod intelligitur aut appetitur, sistit in ea, cum omnis actus

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if we prove by reason and the scriptures that images and the things signified by them are to be adored with the same adoration. [34] Above all, the Philosopher13 says that the movement of the soul directed to the image is dual, namely insofar as it is a thing and insofar as it is a sign or representational thing. On this distinction is founded, first, the scholastics’ doctrine that the movement of the soul with which someone is moved to the image qua thing is different from that directed to the signified, and that the movement of the soul directed to the image qua image is one and the same as that directed toward the thing represented. The truth of this doctrine follows manifestly from the aforementioned words of the Philosopher; first, that the same movement of the soul is directed to the image qua image as to the thing represented. In fact, every movement of the soul ends in a being that is good or true. However, an image qua image is not a being or thing; to the contrary, in the previous distinction it is distinguished from a being. Therefore the movement of the soul does not rest or end in it, but in the represented thing that is its object, which is something true or good. This is the first foundation of the scholastics, received from the Philosopher. Who does not consider this carefully will not understand the implications of the premises, nor the things in images and signs. Therefore the theologians correctly conclude from the Philosopher that the movement of the soul directed to the image qua thing is different from the movement of the soul directed to the thing [signified]; and that the movement of the soul directed to the image qua image is one and the same as that directed to the thing signified. For someone who says one thing from which something else necessarily follows, also states the consequence. For example, someone who says that man is rational also says that he can laugh.14 Therefore the Philosopher, in distinguishing the movement of the soul directed to the image qua thing from that directed to the image qua image, implies by consequence that the latter movement of the soul is directed by the 13 14

Here and in the following, Ory follows this conventional way of referring to Aristotle. This was a common example in scholastic logic. Here and throughout this disputation, Ory draws on scholastic theories of consequence, on which see Ivan Boh, “Consequences,” in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 300–314; Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “Medieval Theories of Consequence,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, at URL = .

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terminetur ad suum obiectum, et in eo quiescat seu sistat. Sola autem res sive ens est obiectum intellectus et appetitus. Ergo in ipsa re intellecta vel appetita terminatur, sistit, et quiescit motus intellectus et appetitus. [35] Tenet egregie consequentia: quia omnis motus quiescit in suo termino ad quem, et omnis actus est motus quidam cuius obiectum est terminus ad quem. Ergo omnis actus intellectus vel appetitus ter- | minatur et quiescit in suo obiecto, quod est res sive ens. Nihil enim intelligitur nisi quatenus ens et res quaedam. Et nihil appetitur nisi quatenus ens et bonum. Ergo tum intellectus quam appetitus habet pro termino ad quem sive obiecto (quod idem est) rem sive ens. Et per consequens ex verbis Philosophi sequitur quod motus animi qui fertur in imaginem ut res est, sistit in ea. Et rursus ex eisdem Philosophi verbis sequitur, quod motus animi qui fertur in imaginem quatenus est repraesentativa, non sistit in ea. Non enim sistit motus animi nisi in suo obiecto, quod est eius terminus ad quem. Imago autem quatenus repraesentativa non est obiectum terminans actum intelligendi vel appetendi, sed est id mediante quo intellectus et appetitus feruntur in suum obiectum, in rem scilicet intellectam et appetitam. Tenet consequentia: nam actus qui fertur in imaginem quatenus est imago habet aliquid pro obiecto. Sed talis actus non habet imaginem pro obiecto, cum imago non sit ens. Ergo habet rem per imaginem repraesentatam. [36] Rursus alia ratione probatur in hunc modum. Idem est motus animi in obiectum quo, et obiectum quod. Ideo sicut eodem actu visionis corporalis videtur color et res colorata, figura et res figurata, sic eodem actu visionis intellectualis videmus phantasma et rem significatam, verbum cordis sive conceptum ultimatum rei intellectae, et ipsam rem intellectam. Nam sicut in visione corporali color et figura sunt obiectum quo videtur aliquid, et res colorata vel figurata est obiectum quod videtur, sic in visione intellectuali phantasma et conceptus ultimatus sunt rerum

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image to the thing represented, since all movement of the soul ends in a being; but, as noted, an image qua image is not a being. For every act of the soul which is directed to the thing as an object that is known or desired, remains in it, since every act ends in its object and stops and remains in it. But only a thing or being is the object of the intellect or desire. Therefore the movement of intellect or desire ends, remains, and rests in the thing that is known or desired. [35] The consequence holds perfectly: every movement stops in its terminus ad quem, and every act is a movement whose object is a terminus ad quem. Hence every act of the intellect or desire ends and stops in its object, which is a thing or being. Nothing, in fact, is known except as a being or thing; and nothing is desired except as a being and good. Hence both intellect and desire have as terminus ad quem or as object (which is the same) a thing or being. By consequence it follows from the words of the Philosopher that the movement of the soul directed to the image qua thing stops in it. In contrast, it also follows from these words of the Philosopher that the movement of the soul directed to the image as representation does not stop in it. For the movement of the soul stops only in its object, which is its terminus ad quem. An image qua representation, however, is not an object in which the act of knowing or desiring ends, but the medium by which intellect and desire are directed to their object, namely the thing that is known and desired. The consequence holds: for an act directed towards an image qua image has something as its object. Yet this act does not have the image as its object, since the image is not a being. Hence it has [as object] the thing represented by the image. [36] This can also be proved by another argument, as follows. The movement of the soul towards the object-by-which [obiectum quo] is the same as that towards the object-which [obiectum quod]. Just as we see in the same act of corporeal vision a color and a colored thing, or a figure and a figured thing, so we see in the same act of intellectual vision the phantasm and the thing signified; and the verbum cordis, or complete concept of the known thing, and the known thing itself.15 For just as in corporeal vision color and figure are the object through which something is seen, 15

On the notion of verbum cordis (‘heart’s word’) as a distinct phase or state of cognition, see Hans Arens, “‘Verbum cordis’: Zur Sprachphilosophie des Mittelalters,” in Studies in Medieval Linguistic Thought Dedicated to Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall, ed. E.F.K. Koerner, Hans-Josef Niederehe, and Robert H. Robins (Amsterdam-Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1980), also in Historiographia Linguistica 7/1–2 (1980), 13–27. Specifically on Thomas Aquinas, E. Ecker Steger, Verbum Cordis According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (diss., Catholic University of America, 1967); and Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

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imagines sive similitudines, quae dicuntur obiectum quo; et res ipsae repraesentatae sunt quae visione intellectuali videntur seu | intelliguntur, et dicuntur obiectum quod. Et sic relinquitur quod prior quidem motus in imaginem, scilicet ut est res quaedam, sistit in ea, ut dictum est. Alter vero qui tendit in imaginem quatenus est signum, sive repraesentativa, simul fertur in rem significatam. Sola enim res, et non signum, est obiectum terminans actum intellectus et affectus, quod ex supra dictis manifeste patet. Nam imago sive in rebus visibilibus sive intellectualibus est id mediante quo res videtur aut intelligitur, et sic non terminat actum videndi aut intelligendi, sed res per eam significata. [37] Quis enim est, obsecro, qui nesciat visionem fieri per rei visae imaginem sive similitudinem, et intelligentiam fieri per conversionem ad ipsa phantasmata, quae sunt rerum imagines seu similitudines corporales, et actum intelligendi per verbum cordis sive conceptum ultimatum in rem per eum conceptum sive verbum cordis significatam ferri et terminari? Et hoc quidem fieri uno et eodem actu quis ignorat? Non est enim alia visio qua video rem ipsam et eius similitudinem. Neque alius actus quo intelligitur phantasma et res per ipsum significata. Et ita de caeteris rerum similitudinibus sive imaginibus per quas fit visio seu intellectio sentiendum est. Id autem per quod fit motus non habet rationem termini, sed medii. Ergo ex dicta Aristotelis distinctione manifeste sequitur, eundem esse animi motum in imaginem quatenus est imago, et in rem significatam. [38] Hanc Philosophi distinctionem de imagine attigit quidem libri autor, attamen non videtur intellexisse ex ea manifeste sequi eundem esse animi motum in imaginem et in rem significatam, cum manifestum sit actum intelligendi quo intelligimus imaginem in ipsam minime terminari, sed in rem per eam significatam, ut superius iam abunde probavimus. [39] Quoniam vero hanc Philosophi et scholasticorum doctrinam, ut videtur, non intellexit autor, iccirco eam reprobare conatus est, aiens: Scholastici docent ex Aristotele quod duplex potest esse motus animi in imaginem: prior, quo in ipsam imaginem fertur inquantum est quaedam res absolute considerata, utputa lignum, aes, aut lapis; alter vero est motus in ipsam imaginem ea ratione qua

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and the colored or figured thing is the object that is seen, thus in intellectual vision the phantasm and the complete concept are the images or likenesses of things, which are called the object-by-which; and the things represented are those which are seen or known by intellectual vision, and which are called the object-which. Thus it stands, as we have said, that the first kind of movement towards the image – namely insofar as it is a thing – stops in it. The other, however, which is directed towards the image qua sign or representation moves simultaneously to the thing signified. For only the thing, not the sign, is the object that ends the act of intellect and affect, as is plain from the preceding remarks. In fact, the image, be it in visible things be it in intellectual things, is that through which the thing is seen or known, and thus it does not end the act of seeing or knowing; instead, it is the thing signified by it [that does]. [37] Who, I ask, does not know that vision is based on the image or likeness of the thing that is seen? That knowledge is based on its conversion to those phantasms which are the images or corporeal likenesses of things? And that the act of knowing by the verbum cordis or completed concept is directed to, and completed in, the thing signified by this concept or verbum cordis? And who does not know that this is done in one and the same act? For the act by which I see the thing itself is no other than the one by which I see its likeness. Nor is the act by which the phantasm is known other than that by which the thing signified by it is known. The same is to be believed about other likenesses or images by which vision or intellection occurs. That by which the movement occurs does not serve as terminus but as means [medium]. Thus it follows clearly from Aristotle’s above-mentioned distinction that the movement of the soul towards the image qua image is the same as that towards the thing signified. [38] The book’s author did touch upon the Philosopher’s distinction regarding the image, yet he does not appear to have understood its clear consequence that the soul’s movement to the image and to the thing signified is one and the same, because it is manifest that the act of knowing by which we know the image hardly ends in it, but rather in the thing signified by it, as we have abundantly demonstrated above. [39] Since the author, as is evident, has not understood this doctrine of the Philosopher and the scholastics, he has tried to criticize it by saying: The scholastics teach, based on Aristotle, that the movement of the soul to the image can be dual. On the one hand, it can be directed to the image insofar as it is a thing considered in an absolute sense (absolute), such as a piece of wood, copper, or stone. On the other,

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repraesentativa est. Inter quos motus hanc ponunt differentiam, quia prior ducit in imaginem et sistit in ea; alter vero una cum imagine ad rem tendit repraesentatam, et eodem actu cognoscitur etiam ipsa imago.20

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Haec illius verba. [40] Ubi triplici in errore versatur. Primo quidem ea in parte qua existimavit Philosophum et scholasticos de substantia imaginis tantummodo esse loquutos, cum docent motum animi ferri posse in imaginem quatenus est res. Ait enim: “ut lignum, aes, aut lapis,” quod falsum esse ostenditur. Nam talis animi motus qui fertur in imaginem quatenus lignum vel quid aliud materiale, non fertur in imaginem, sed potius in materiam eius, quae non est imago. Res enim quae est imago differt a substantia in qua est. Ob eam causam ratio scholasticorum est intelligenda de omni motu animi qui fit in imaginem quatenus est res alicuius praedicamenti, sive illa sit substantia, sive similitudo, sive forma repraesentans, aut aliquid huiuscemodi. [41] Secundo lapsus est ubi ait: “Etsi verum est quod imago possit a nobis dupliciter cognosci, aut absoluta quadam ratione, aut in ordine ad rem repraesentatam.”21 Praesupponit enim imaginem | non cognosci quatenus est res, nisi absoluta quadam ratione, quod falsum est. Cognoscitur enim ut est res quaedam relativa, utputa quando pensatur ut similitudo, aut quod relative dicitur ad rem imaginatam. Relatio autem est res quaedam spectans ad praedicamentum ad aliquid. Itaque male intellexit autor et male recensuit sententiam scholasticorum. [42] Tertio subiungit: “Res tamen repraesentata non cognoscitur eadem notitia qua cognoscitur ipsa imago,”22 circa quod versabitur prima nostra disputatio: An una et eadem notitia sit imaginis quatenus imago et rei per eam significatae. Quod autem falsum sit non esse eandem notitiam imaginis et rei significatae sic ostenditur. Nam omnis notitia vel habitualis est vel actualis. Una autem et eadem est species intelligibilis ipsius imaginis et rei per eam significatae. Species autem intelligibilis est notitia habitualis rerum quae cognoscuntur. Ergo eadem est habitualis notitia imaginis, et rei per imaginem significatae. Et similiter est eadem notitia

20 21 22

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 19. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20. Ibid.

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it can be a movement towards the image understood as something representational. They distinguish these two movements as follows: the first is directed towards the image and ends in it; but the second is aimed, along with the image, at what is represented, and by the same act the image itself is known.16 Thus the author. [40] Here he errs in three ways. First, [he errs] in his contention that the Philosopher and the scholastics, in teaching that the movement of the soul can be directed toward the image-qua-thing, merely spoke of the substance of the image. He says, in fact: “such as a piece of wood, copper, or stone,” which is demonstrably false. For such a movement of the soul directed toward the image qua piece of wood or any other material thing is not directed towards the image, but rather towards its matter, which is not the image. The thing that is the image is different from the substance in which it exists. For this reason the method of the scholastics is to determine of every movement of the soul towards an image in what way a thing (res) is being predicated, whether it is a substance, likeness, representing form, or something similar. [41] Second, he errs where he says: “Although it is true that we can know the image in two ways, either in an absolute way or in relation to the thing represented.”17 Here he assumes that the image is not known as a thing except in an absolute way, which is false. In fact, it is known as a relative thing, for instance, when it is considered as a likeness or something that is said in relation to what is imaged. A relation is a thing that concerns what is predicated of something. Hence the author has poorly understood and examined the opinion of the scholastics. [42] Thirdly, he adds: “Yet the thing represented is not known with the same knowledge [notitia] by which the image is known.” Our first disputation was concerned with this question, [namely] whether the knowledge of an image qua image and of the thing signified by it are one and the same. That it is false to assume that the knowledge of the image and of the thing signified are not the same, is shown as follows. All knowledge is either habitual or actual. The intelligible species of the image and of the thing signified by it is one and the same. The intelligible species is the habitual knowledge of things that are known. Therefore the habitual knowledge of the image and of the thing signified by the image is the 16 17

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 19. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20.

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actualis. Nam idem est verbum cordis imaginis et rei per imaginem significatae. Illud autem verbum est actualis notitia, cum sit terminus actus intelligendi. Ergo est eadem notitia actualis imaginis, et rei per imaginem significatae. Tenet consequentia, quia eadem notitia et actualis et habitualis producitur per imaginem et per rem significatam. Acquirimus enim eandem notitiam alicuius rei per visionem rei in se et in eius imagine. Hic est enim duplex modus quo devenimus in cognitionem rerum. Praesentatur siquidem imago alicuius, ut vel sic per eam cognoscatur is qui est absens. Et sic etiam videndo faciem nativitatis nostrae in speculo, nos ipsos sic intuendo facie cognoscimus, qui alias nosipsos intueri et sic facie cognoscere non possumus. Utraque autem est visio rei in ima- | gine. Et similiter causatur eadem notitia ex visione rei in se. Ergo est eadem notitia quae causatur ex cognitione rei in se, et in sua similitudine sive imagine. Hunc etiam duplicem modum perveniendi in unam atque eandem eiusdem rei notitiam docet nos scriptura, dicens: “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.” Ergo est eadem res quae per imaginem videtur in speculo, et quae videtur facie ad faciem. Et per consequens est eadem notitia eiusdem rei quae habetur per imaginem et rem significatam. [43] Ex his manifeste patet veritas sententiae scholasticorum, nimirum eundem esse motum in imaginem et in rem significatam. Nam idem est animi motus in phantasma, et in rem per phantasma repraesentatam, iuxta illud: “Necesse est intelligentem phantasma speculari.”23 Phantasma autem est imago sive similitudo rem ipsam cuius est phantasma repraesentans. Ideo eodem actu intelligitur phantasma et res per illud significata et intellecta. Et idem dicendum est de specie intelligibili mediante qua formamus actum intelligendi, qui terminatur ad verbum cordis, sive ad conceptum ultimatum, tanquam ad terminum quo intrinsecum, et ad rem conceptam sive per conceptum repraesentatam tanquam ad terminum ad quem extrinsecum. Et simile est de omnibus rerum similitudinibus, ideis, et imaginibus. Est enim unus atque idem animi motus qui in illas fertur et in res significatas. [44] Et haec est sententia Philosophi docentis duplicem esse animi motum in imaginem, scilicet quatenus est res quaedam, et quatenus est imago sive signum. Nam quatenus est res quaedam, sive absoluta sive

23

Aristotle, De anima, III, 8, 432a10.

[Iac. 1:23]

[1 Cor. 13:12]

Confirmatio doctrinae scholasticorum.

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same. The same goes for the actual knowledge, for the verbum cordis of the image and of the thing signified by the image is one and the same. That concept (verbum) is the actual knowledge, since it is the endpoint of the intellective act. Therefore the actual knowledge of the image is the same as that of the thing signified by the image. The consequence holds, since the image and the thing signified produce the same knowledge both actual and habitual. Thus we acquire the same knowledge of a thing by the vision of the thing in itself and in its image. This is the twofold way by which we arrive at the cognition of things. An image of someone is shown so that one who is absent may be known. Thus, like someone beholding his own countenance in a glass, we know ourselves by watching our face – the only way in which we can see ourselves and know ourselves by our face. In both cases we see the thing in its image. Likewise, the same knowledge is produced by the vision of the thing in itself. Therefore the same knowledge is produced by the cognition of the thing itself and by its likeness or image. Scripture teaches us this twofold mode of acquiring one and the same knowledge of a thing with the words: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.” Therefore the thing we see through an image in a mirror is the same we see face to face. Consequently, the knowledge we have of a thing through an image and that of the thing signified is the same. [43] From the preceding the truth of the scholastics’ view is patently clear, namely that the movement towards the image and towards the thing signified is unquestionably the same. For the soul’s movement toward a phantasm and toward the thing represented by it is the same, according to the following: “Thinking requires observing phantasms.”18 A phantasm, in fact, is an image or likeness representing the thing of which it is a phantasm. Therefore the phantasm and the thing signified and known by it are known in the same act. The same is to be said of the intelligible species through which we form the act of knowing, which ends in the verbum cordis, or complete concept, as an intrinsic terminus quo, and to the thing conceived, or represented by the concept, as an extrinsic terminus ad quem. And the same is true of all likenesses, ideas, and images of things. For the soul’s movement that leads to these is the same as that which leads to the things signified [by them]. [44] This is the Philosopher’s judgment when he teaches that the soul’s movement toward the image is dual, namely insofar as it is a thing, and insofar it is an image or sign. Insofar as it is a thing, whether absolute 18

Aristotle, De anima, III, 8, 432a10 (The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1:687).

[James 1:23]

[1 Cor. 13:12]

Confirmation of the scholastics’ teaching.

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relativa, terminat actum intelligendi, cum sit | obiectum eius. Inquantum vero est imago sive repraesentativa non terminat, cum non contineatur sub ratione obiecti,24 quod est ens sive res; immo contra ipsum distinguitur a Philosopho. Iccirco necesse est ut per eam humana mens feratur eodem actu et eadem notitia in eam et in rem significatam. [45] Nec obiicias quod signum relative dicitur ad signatum, et imago ad imaginatum, et per consequens imago quatenus imago est res quaedam, cum sit in praedicamento ad aliquid. Nam licet in actu signato haec relative dicantur, scilicet si considerentur secundum modum significandi (signum enim ex modo suae25 significationis refert signatum, sicut genus speciem) non tamen in actu exercito, idest, quando accipiuntur pro re significata, de qua verificantur. Nam sicut res significatae per genus, scilicet animal, vel arbor, et similia, non dicuntur relative, sic res significatae per signum, puta voces et scripturae et quae huiusmodi sunt, non dicuntur relative, cum tamen vere sint signa, sicut et animal vere est genus. Animal enim, lapis, et huiusmodi, sunt genera et de his genus vere dicitur. Homo autem et equus sunt species, et tamen haec relative non dicuntur, licet genus et species relative dicantur. Et proinde recte dicunt logici aliquid verificari de illis et similibus terminis significativis quandoque in actu signato, idest, ex parte signi significantis, et quandoque in actu exercito, idest, ex parte rei significatae. Nam tales termini habent significationem relativam, sed res significata non est relativa. Ideo concluditur quod licet in actu signato imago, signum, et similia dicantur relative secundum modum suae significationis, non tamen in significato sive actu exercito, quia res significata non est | relativa. Nam exercitium sive proprium imaginis seu alterius signi officium est rem significatam demonstrare secundum eius conceptum ultimum. Ideo imaginis, quatenus est signum, exercitium et officium proprium est rem significatam demonstrare, et animum in eius cognitionem transferre nulla consideratione adhibita an tale signum sit in tali vel tali materia, vel an sit relativum aut absolutum. Nam talis consideratio signi est indirecta: sicut quum profert quis hanc vocem homo aut quampiam significativam, si motus animi feratur in rem significatam sine consideratione vocis, est directa cognitio. Si autem consideretur vox quatenus est dissyllaba, aut taliter vel taliter prolata, est cognitio indirecta, nec tunc habet rationem signi,

24 25

De actu signato et exercito.

Regula logicorum.

Ms. immo erased. This word appears to be an addition made by erroneously correcting the hyphenated, end-of-line si- (the beginning of the following word) into suae.

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or relative, it ends the act of knowing, since it is the object of the latter. Insofar as it is an image or representation, it does not end [the act of knowing], since it is not constituted as an object, which is a being or thing; in fact, the Philosopher distinguishes it from the latter. For this reason [the image] necessarily leads the human mind by the same act and cognition to itself and the thing it signifies. [45] Nor should you object that a sign refers in a relative way to the signified, and the image to the imaged (imaginatum), and consequently that an image qua image is a thing, because it is predicated of something. For although in actu signato these statements are made in a relative way, namely if they are considered according to the mode of signification (according to its mode of signification, in fact, a sign refers to the signified, just as a genus to a species), that is not the case in actu exercito, that is, when they are accepted for the thing signified, about which they are verified.19 Just as the things signified by a genus, e.g., animal or tree, and similar things, are not said in a relative way, thus things signified by a sign, for instance words, texts, and so forth, are not said in a relative way, but truly are signs, just as animal is truly a genus. Animal, stone, and so forth, are truly genera, and about these we truly speak of genus. But man and horse are species, and yet they are not said to be relative, although genus and species are. Therefore the logicians rightly say that something is verified about these and similar signifying terms, sometimes in actu signato, that is, on the part of the signifying sign, and sometimes in actu exercito, that is, on the part of the thing signified. For such terms have relative signification, but the thing signified [by them] is not relative. Therefore we conclude that although in actu signato the image, sign, etc. are said in a relative way according to their mode of signification, this is not so in the signified or in actu exercito, since the thing signified is not relative. The role and proper function of an image or another sign is to show the thing signified according to its ultimate concept. Therefore the role and proper function of the image, insofar as it is a sign, is to show the thing signified and to lead the mind to its cognition without any consideration of whether this sign inheres in this or that matter, or whether it is relative or absolute. For this consideration of the sign is indirect. When someone utters a word or anything that has meaning, direct cognition occurs if the movement of the soul is directed towards the thing signified without 19

In actu signato versus in actu exercito.

The rule of the logicians.

This remark rests on the distinction made by medieval logicians between an ‘signed’ or intended effect (in actu signato) and a non-intended, concomitant or practical effect (in actu exercito).

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sed rei actum intelligendi terminantis. Directa quidem cognitio fit per ultimatum ipsius signi vel vocis conceptum, qui est repraesentativus rei significatae. Indirecta vero fit secundum conceptum non ultimatum qui est repraesentativus et similitudo vocis vel signi. [46] Quando autem imago et quodvis aliud signum habeat rationem rei vel signi, tripliciter cognosci potest. Primo, quandocumque pensatur imago vel signum aliquod ut subiectum de quo aliquid dicitur, tunc consideratur ut res. Ergo si consideretur imago quatenus est similitudo, vel quatenus est figura, et circa unumquodque constans forma, aut quatenus minus vel magis repraesentat, tunc pensatur ut res de qua aliquid praedicatur. Iccirco motus animi qui sic fertur in imaginem, in eam fertur ut est res, et (ut verbis utar autoris) etiam si pensetur ut bene colorata, vel picta et in sublimi loco posita, quis nescit haec omnia spectare ad aliquod praedicamentum? Praedicamenta autem sunt rerum decem genera. Ideo si imago pensetur quatenus similitudo aut figura, aut in sublimi loco posita, cognos- | citur ut res vel absoluta vel relativa. [47] Secundo, omnis motus animi qui fertur in imaginem tanquam in obiectum quod intelligitur, fertur in eam tanquam in rem. Nam res sive ens est obiectum intellectus. Imago autem quando pensatur ut bene vel male repraesentativa, taliter vel taliter figurata, aut in tali loco posita, cum terminet actum intelligendi est obiectum quod intelligitur. Ideo motus animi fertur in eam tanquam in rem quandam. Quando vero solum per eam mens fertur in aliud (scilicet in rem significatam) tunc habet propriam imaginis rationem, et motus animi fertur in eam quatenus imago est, cum nihil indirecte de ipsa imagine pensetur secundum ipsius conceptum non ultimatum, de quo egimus superius. [48] Tertio, quod uni videtur inesse, et omni. Sed uni signo, nempe voci, convenit ut res per eam significata intelligatur, etiam si de ipsa voce nihil pensetur. Ergo hoc idem convenit omni signo. Nam vox est signum

Tripliciter cognosci posse quin imago habeat rationem signi.

Secunda cognitio.

Tertia cognitio.

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consideration of the sound. But if the word is considered for being dissyllabic or uttered in this or that manner, it is indirect cognition; then it does not have the aspect of a sign, but instead of a thing in which the act of understanding ends. Direct cognition is concerned with the sign’s or word’s ultimate concept, which represents the thing signified. Indirect cognition, on the other hand, is concerned with the non-ultimate concept that is representational and the similitude of the word and sign. [46] There are three ways to know whether the image or any other sign has the mode of a thing or a sign. First, whenever an image or sign is thought of as the subject about which something is said, then it is considered as a thing. Therefore, if the image is considered insofar as it is a likeness, figure, or stable form of something, or insofar as it represents [something else] to a greater or lesser extent, then it is thought of as a thing of which something is predicated. Here the movement of the soul directed to the image is directed to it qua thing; and even if it is considered as well colored, painted, or placed in a sublime space (to quote the author), who does not know that these are all predicates? Now, predicates are the ten genera of things.20 Therefore, if we think of an image as a likeness, figure, or as something placed in a sublime place, it is known either as an absolute or relative thing. [47] Second, every movement of the soul directed towards an image as object of knowledge is directed to it as to a thing. For a thing or being is an object of the intellect. An image when considered as a good or poor representation, as figured in this or the other way, or placed in such a space, is the object of knowing, since the act of knowing ends in it. Therefore the movement of the soul is directed toward [the image] qua thing. But when the mind through this [image] is only directed towards something else (that is, the signified) then it has the proper ratio of image, and the movement of the soul is directed towards it qua image, because nothing is thought indirectly of this image according to its non-ultimate concept, which we discussed above. [48] Third, what inheres in one inheres in all. It is fitting, in the case of one sign, and surely of a word, that the thing signified by it is understood even without thinking about that word. Therefore this applies to every 20

Three ways to know whether an image has the mode of a sign.

The second way.

The third way.

This refers to Aristotle’s classification of predicates, on which see Robin Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/aristotle -logic. For the reception by Boethius and others, see Monika Asztalos, “Nomen and Vocabulum in Boethius’s Theory of Predication,” in Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought, ed. Thomas Böhm, Thomas Jürgasch, and Andreas Kirchner (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 31–52.

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quatenus per eam res significata intelligitur, utputa quum dicitur ‘homo’: si per eam vocem formo conceptum ultimatum qui est verbum cordis naturaliter repraesentans rem significatam, tunc ‘homo’ vere est vox significativa, et proprie dicitur signum, eo quod proprium eius officium sit significare hominem. Et tunc de ipsa voce prolata nihil pensatur, quod videlicet dulcis aut sonora sit, vel dissyllaba aut aliquid huiuscemodi; quia si sic pensaretur, tunc ut res quaedam, et non ut signum intelligeretur. [49] Hoc aperte docent logici dicentes quod conceptus ultimatus est similitudo expressa rei significatae. Et conceptus non ultimatus est similitudo ipsius vocis sive signi. Et primus intelligendi modus vocatur directus. Alter vero indirectus sive reflexus. Et sic concluditur quod omnis actus intelligendi qui terminatur ad rem sig- | nificatam per vocem vel imaginem est directus, et ad illam terminatur secundum conceptum ultimatum vocis vel imaginis significantis, etiam si nihil fuerit actus reflexi circa ipsum significans, sed tota mens feratur in rem significatam. Si vero animi motus terminetur in ipsam vocem vel imaginem, quocunque modo id fiat, ea cognitio est indirecta, et fit secundum conceptum non ultimatum. Et hoc verum est in omnibus signis. Nam cognitio rei significatae dicitur directa, et res quae intelligitur dicitur obiectum quod terminat actum intelligendi mediante concepto ultimato ipsius signi. Consideratio autem ipsius signi secundum se, quocunque modo fiat, dicitur cognitio indirecta, quae fit per conceptum non ultimatum ipsius vocis, scripturae, aut imaginis significantis. [50] Haec omnia non satis intellexisse videtur autor, quandoquidem plerumque aequivocat ab imagine quatenus est imago, ad eam quatenus est res. Neque distinguit inter obiectum quo et obiectum quod. Nam similitudo rerum sive interior sive exterior est obiectum mediante quo res significatae intelliguntur. Ipsae autem res significatae ad extra sunt obiectum quod intelligitur. Etenim per imaginem hominis et similitudinem intelligo ipsum hominem. Et hoc idem contingit in caeteris.

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Rem ipsam eodem actu cum sua similitudine cognosci probatur.26 [51] Quod autem eodem actu cognoscatur res ipsa cum sua similitudine sive imagine, clarum esse videtur. Nam quemadmodum eodem actu videtur color, qui est obiectum quo, cum ipsa re taliter colorata, et simul intelligitur phantasma, quod est interior rei similitudo, cum re per

26

This and all subsequent headings were added by a different hand.

Logicorum doctrina.

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sign. For a word is a sign insofar as the thing signified is known by it, for instance when one says ‘man’: if by this word I form an ultimate concept which is the verbum cordis that naturally represents the thing signified, then ‘man’ is truly a signifying word, and is properly called a sign, because its proper function is to signify man. Thus no one will think anything of the utterance of this word, namely that it is soft or loud, or bisyllabic or anything of this kind. For if it is considered in the latter way, it is considered as a thing, not as a sign. [49] The logicians clearly teach this, saying that the ultimate concept is the express likeness of the thing signified; and the non-ultimate concept is the likeness of the word or sign. The first mode of knowing is called direct, the second indirect or reflected. Thus we conclude that every act of knowing that ends in the thing signified by a word or image is direct; and it ends there according to the ultimate concept of the signifying word or image, even if there is no reflected act involving the signifier, but the mind is wholly directed to the thing signified. If, however, the movement of the soul ends in that word or image, in whichever way this is done, that cognition is indirect and occurs through a non-ultimate concept. This is true for all signs. For cognition of the thing signified is called direct, and the thing that is known is called an object that ends the act of knowing by means of the ultimate concept of the sign. However, the consideration of that sign on its own, in whichever way this is done, is called indirect cognition, which occurs through the non-ultimate concept of that signifying word, text, or image. [50] The author appears not to have understood all this adequately, because he often equivocates between the image qua image and the image qua thing. Nor does he distinguish between the object-by-which and the object-which. For the likeness of things, whether exterior or interior, is the object by means of which the things signified are known. But the things signified on the outside are the object that is known, for it is by a person’s image and likeness that I know that person. The same applies generally.

Here it is proven that a thing is known in the same act as its likeness. [51] That a thing itself is known in the same act as its likeness or image seems to be clear. For just as a color, which is an object-by-which, is seen in the same act as the thing colored with it, so too is the phantasm, which is the interior likeness of the thing, known at the same time as the thing

The logicians’ teaching.

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ipsum repraesentata. Sic etiam imago, quae est | similitudo eiusdem rei exterior, simul intelligitur cum ipsa re repraesentata. Non enim differt imago exterior alicuius rei a phantasmate eiusdem rei, nisi quia una est imago interior, et alia exterior. Et propterea de utraque proposuit exemplum Philosophus, scilicet de phantasmate et imagine depicta in tabella, dicens posse utramque considerari ut rem et ut signum sive imaginem. Et sicut concurrit phantasma ad actum intelligendi, sic etiam exterior rerum similitudo concurrit ad intelligendum res significatas. Utraque enim concurrit ad productionem eiusdem speciei intelligibilis, quae producitur in mente ab obiecto vel eius exteriori imagine, mediante interiori similitudine quae est phantasma. Quoniam necesse est (ut superius docuimus) intelligentem phantasma speculari. Quamobrem utraque imago tam interior quam exterior concurrit ad eundem actum intelligendi rem per eas significatam. [52] Et per consequens simul unoque et eodem actu animus fertur in illas et in rem repraesentatam. In illas quidem tanquam in rationem et medium intelligendi. In res autem significatas tanquam in id quod intelligitur, amatur, aut colitur. Exempli gratia, vox significativa ad placitum, ut ‘homo,’ quando profertur, si mens in rem significatam feratur nihil cogitando de ipsa voce reflexe, sed tantum per eam intelligat rem significatam, tunc est motus animi in signum quatenus signum, qui terminatur in rem significatam: et tunc eodem actu intelligitur significatio vocis et res significata. Et idem prorsus sentiendum est de caeteris signis, nimirum scriptura et imagine, seu rerum similitudine. Nam si eodem actu non intelligeret quis significationes signorum et res significatas, non simul intelligeret significationes signorum et res significatas. Neque enim possunt esse simul plures actus intelligendi. Ideo sicut uno actu cognoscitur res visa in se, ita etiam | visa27 in sui similitudine, et utrobique eadem res est quae uno et eodem actu intelligitur. Et hoc commune est omni significativo, sive imago fuerit sive scriptura. Nam eodem actu intelligitur signum significare et res significata. Nunquam enim intelligeretur res significata per signum nisi simul significatio signi intelligeretur. Et sic concluditur tam ex Philosopho quam ex multiplici ratione quod idem est motus animi in imaginem quatenus imago, et in rem significatam; simulque et eodem actu intelliguntur, amantur, et coluntur.

27

Corr. from visu.

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represented by it. Likewise the image, which is the exterior likeness of that thing, is known at the same time as the thing represented. For the exterior image of a thing does not differ from the phantasm of that thing except insofar one is an interior image, the other an exterior one. The Philosopher explained both elements by stating that each, namely the phantasm and the image painted in a picture, can be considered as a thing and as a sign or image. And since the phantasm contributes to the act of knowing, likewise the exterior likeness of things contributes to the knowledge of the things signified. Each, in fact, contributes to the production of the intelligible species thereof, which the object or its exterior image produces in the mind by means of the interior likeness that is the phantasm. For as we taught above, cognition requires observation of a phantasm. Therefore both images, interior and exterior, contribute to the same act of knowing the thing signified by them. [52] As a consequence, the mind is directed at once, in one and the same act, to these [images] and to the thing signified – to the images, that is, as means and medium of understanding; to the things signified as that which is known, loved, or worshipped. Take for instance a randomly chosen signifying word, such as ‘man.’ If the mind, when the word is uttered, is directed to what it signifies, not thinking in a reflexive way about that word, but only knowing through it the thing signified, then the movement of the soul is at once [directed] towards the sign qua sign, which ends in the thing signified, and thus the signification of the word and the thing signified are known in one act. The same must be believed about other signs, and surely about a text or image, or a likeness of things. For if someone did not know the significations of signs and the things signified in one and the same act, then he would not known them at once, and there cannot be multiple acts of knowing at once. Therefore, just as a thing seen in itself is known in one act, the same holds true if it is seen through its likeness, and in both cases the thing that is known in one act is the same. And this is true for every signifier, whether an image or a text. For the signifying of the sign is known in the same act as the thing signified. Never, in fact, would the signified be known through the sign unless the signification of the sign was known simultaneously. Thus we conclude both from the Philosopher and from multiple arguments that the soul’s movement toward the image qua image is the same as that toward the signified; and they are understood, loved, and worshipped simultaneously and in the same act.

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Refellitur duplex error circa rem ipsam et medium sive rationem cognoscendi. [53] Videtur autem autor in duobus errare. Primo enim putat non eodem actu cognosci rem ipsam et medium sive rationem cognoscendi. Et videtur nescire imaginem esse medium cognoscendi rem significatam, qua in parte evidenter decipitur. Nam ratio cognoscendi est de essentia cognitionis, ut patet in visione corporali, intellectuali, et supernaturali. Neque enim alio actu videt quis lucem, colorem, et rem coloratam, sed uno et eodem. Neque alio et alio actu cognoscit quis evidenter rem aliquam et demonstrationem, quae est ratio evidentis cognitionis. Neque diversis actibus videt quis rem propheticam et prophetiam sive lumen propheticum, sed uno et eodem actu. Alioqui neque hic sciret cognitionem suam esse propheticam, neque ille sciret se habere evidentem cognitionem, nisi sciret ille28 rationem suae cognitionis esse propheticam et ipse29 rationem talis suae cognitionis esse evidentem. Quemadmodum igitur simul et eodem actu video aliquid et experior me illud videre, sic etiam eodem actu cognosco rem aliquam evidenter, et scio me evidenter eam cognoscere; et per consequens res ipsae et medium sive ratio eas cognoscendi semper uno et eodem actu cognoscuntur. Constat autem | species rerum sive imagines esse media sive rationes, quibus res repraesentatae cognoscuntur. Ideo non potest esse alius animi motus in imaginem quatenus est30 imago, et in rem repraesentatam. [54] Secundo videtur non intelligere quid sit imago quatenus signum sive repraesentativa. Nam ut in pluribus considerat imaginem in quantum est imago sub ratione entis et rei, utputa quando dicit eam “non exced[ere] limites insensibilis creaturae,” aut taliter vel taliter pictam, aut in loco sublimi positam.31 Nam istae sunt rerum, non autem signorum considerationes, cum aliquod talium pensetur esse reale, et non solum significare. Manifestum est autem quod tantum differunt imago quatenus imago sive signum, et imago quatenus res aliqua, sive absoluta sive relativa, quantum inter se distant significare et esse. Significare enim abstrahit ab esse reali, quoniam non cadit in rationem sive definitionem aut considerationem signorum. Ita quod aliud est esse reale, et aliud esse significativum,

28 29 30 31

Prima deceptio.

Secunda deceptio.

Notandum.

ille added superscr. in other hand. ipse corr. in other hand from ille. est added superscr. in other hand. Cf., respectively, Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20 (“cum imago illa in eo quod imago non excedat limites insensibilis creaturae”), and § 10 (“cum quidam pictor vellet Christum ad similitudinem Iovis depingere …”), and § 9 (“ut impius Iulianus illo in loco statuam suam collocaret …”).

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Rebuttal of a twofold error concerning the thing and the medium or means of knowing it. [53] The author appears to be mistaken in two ways. First, he believes that a thing is not known in the same act as the means or mode of knowing it. And he appears not to know that an image is a means for knowing the thing signified: in this respect he is clearly mistaken. For the mode of knowing concerns the essence of cognition, as is evident in corporeal, intellectual, and supernatural vision. For one sees light, color, and a colored thing in one and the same act, and not otherwise. Nor is it in separate acts that someone evidently knows a thing and its demonstration, which is the mode of evident cognition. Nor does someone see a prophetic thing and a prophecy or prophetic light in different acts, but in one and the same act. Otherwise the latter would not know that his cognition was prophetic, nor the former that he had evident knowledge, unless the first knew that his mode of knowledge was prophetic, and the second that his mode of cognition was evident. Therefore, since it is in one and the same act that I see something and experience myself seeing it, thus it is also in the same act that I know something evidently and am aware of knowing it evidently. Consequently, the things themselves and the means or mode of knowing them are always known in one and the same act. It is certain that the species or images of things are means or modes by which things represented are known. Therefore there cannot be one movement of the soul directed towards the image qua image, and another directed towards the thing represented. [54] Second, he appears not to understand what the image is qua sign or representation. In multiple instances he considers the image qua image in the mode of a being and thing – for instance, when he says that it “does not exceed the limits of the insensible artifact,” or that it is painted in one way or another, or placed in a sublime location. Now, these considerations concern things, not signs, since such a thing should be thought of as real being, and not only signifying. But it is plain that an image qua image or sign differs as much from an image qua thing, whether absolute or relative, as signifying differs from being. For signifying abstracts from real being, because [the latter] does not fall under the mode, definition, or consideration of signs, inasmuch as real being is different from significant being. This can easily be observed in the concept (notitia), which is

The first mistake.

The second mistake.

Nota bene.

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sicut de notitia, quae est signum naturaliter repraesentans rem cuius est notitia, facile videri potest. Ea enim habet duplex esse, scilicet significativum et reale, quorum primum dicitur esse notitiae sive significatum, alterum vero dicitur esse qualitatis sive reale. Notitia enim in esse notitiae est signum rei significatae, cum rem ipsam cuius est notitia naturaliter repraesentet, ut pulchre docent logici distinguentes notitiam in esse qualitatis a notitia in esse notitiae, quia illa est ens, et ista signum. Et si quidem repraesentet rem praesentem obiective, dicitur intuitiva notitia; si vero rem absentem, dicitur abstractiva. [55] Neque vero inquiras quid est illud esse notitiae quatenus notitia, neque imaginis quatenus imago, aut signi quatenus signum. Nihil enim aliud est quam esse significativum, cum notitia habitualis sit species intel- | ligibilis, et notitia actualis sit conceptus ultimatus sive verbum cordis repraesentans rem cuius est conceptus et naturaliter32 et actualiter. Utraque enim est naturalis similitudo rei, et illa quidem habitualiter, ista vero actualiter repraesentat rem cuius est notitia et signum sive imago, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut esse et significare differunt, et unum abstrahit ab alio, et vario modo concipiuntur, sic etiam esse reale et esse significativum, et per consequens imago ut res, et imago ut signum. Et hoc idem duplex esse docent theologi aientes scientiam Christi esse infinitam in esse scientiae, et gratiam eius in esse gratiae, sed non in esse qualitatis sive entis. Et idem dici potest de omnibus Christi perfectionibus quae ratione suppositi sunt infinitae in esse perfectionis, et per consequens in esse acceptationis et gratiae. Et tamen in esse reali sive qualitatis sunt res creatae, et ita finitae. Idem etiam dicendum est de illius operibus quae ratione suppositi sunt infinite33 grata, infinite bona et meritoria, et tamen sunt opera creata et per consequens secundum substantiam actus finita. Itaque sicut minime confundi debent esse gratiae, notitiae, et acceptationis cum esse rerum sive qualitatum, sic nec esse signi sive imaginis quatenus significativa, cum esse reali sive imaginis quatenus res est.

32 33

Naturaliter added superscr. by other hand to replace materialiter, which is crossed out. Corr. from infinitae.

De esse notitiae.

De scientia et operibus Christi.

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the sign that naturally represents the thing of which it is the concept. This in fact has dual being (duplex esse), namely significant and real: the former is called its conceptual or significant being, the latter is called its qualitative or real being. The concept in conceptual being is the sign of the thing signified, since it represents naturally the thing of which it is the concept, as the logicians explain nicely, distinguishing the concept in qualitative being from conceptual being. The former is a being (ens), the latter a sign. And if it represents a present thing objectively, it is called an intuitive concept; if an absent thing, it is called abstractive.21 [55] But you should not ask what this conceptual being is qua concept, nor what its being as an image is qua image, nor what its being as a sign is qua sign. For this is nothing but its significant being, since the habitual concept is an intelligible species, and the actual concept is an ultimate concept or a verbum cordis that represents the thing of which it is the concept both naturally and actually. Both are in fact a natural likeness of the thing: the first habitually represents the thing of which it is the concept, sign, or image; the latter does so actually, as we have said above. Therefore, since being and signifying are different, since one abstracts from the other and each is conceived in a different manner, the same holds for real being and significant being, hence the image as thing and the image qua sign. This, too, is twofold, as the theologians teach: they point out that the knowledge of Christ is infinite in the state of knowledge (in esse scientiae) and his grace in the state of grace (in esse gratiae), but not in quality or being. The same can be said of all of Christ’s perfections, which by reason of the suppositum22 are considered infinite in the state of perfection and hence in the state of acceptance and grace. Yet in real or qualitative being they are created, hence finite, things. The same must be said about his works, which by reason of the suppositum are considered infinitely pleasing, good, and meritorious, and yet are created things, and consequently, in the substance of the act, finite. Therefore, just as the states of grace, knowledge, and acceptance should not be confused with real or qualitative being, neither should the state of sign or image of something that signifies be confused with its real being or state of image qua thing. 21 22

On conceptual being.

The knowledge and works of Christ.

On the latter distinction, see John F. Boler, “Intuitive and abstractive cognition,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 460–78. A suppositum is “a substance that is complete in itself and uncommunicated; an ultimate complete subject of its own being” (Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy [1956; repr. Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2012], 120–21).

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[56] Videtur denique errare autor in eo quod subiungit, dicens: Non est maior connexio inter signum et rem signatam quam inter patrem et filium, quae proprie relativa et ad aliquid dicuntur, et mutuo etiam se repraesentant tum naturali similitudine, tum etiam sicut effectus causam, et causa effectum. Constat autem quod cognitione illa qua filium cognosco, ea ratione qua filius est, non cognosco simul huius filii patrem […], sed mediante alia notitia quae simul cum ista gig- | nitur patrem agnosco.34

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Et haec est prima ratio qua probare nititur non esse eandem notitiam signi et signati, in qua multa dicit quae non probat. Nam primo quidem quod non sit maior connexio inter signum et signatum quam inter patrem et filium, non videtur esse verum, quia inter signum et signatum est connexio relativa, sicut inter patrem et filium, et cum hoc est similitudo ad significandum ordinata, quae non est proprie in filio. Licet enim filius dicatur imago patris, quando illi assimilatur, non est tamen factus ad significandum patrem, sed ad essendum, cum sit res quaedam in esse absoluto quatenus substantia, et in esse relativo quatenus filius. Ideo in vera imagine invenitur duplex connexio, scilicet relationis et propriae repraesentationis. In filio autem invenitur quidam connexio relationis, sed non propriae significationis et repraesentationis, cum ipse non sit factus ad repraesentandum. Et ideo non proprie pertinet ad rationem signi. [57] Deinde non probat id quod subiungit, nimirum quod ea cognitione qua cognosco filium ea ratione qua filius est, non cognosco patrem.35 Si enim ad aliquid est unum praedicamentum, et praedicamenta sunt genera rerum, omnia quae ponuntur in aliquo praedicamento sunt res sive absolutae sive relativae. Omnis autem res uno atque proprio conceptu cognoscitur. Ideo relatio, cum sit res et ens, una cognitione cognoscitur et uno conceptu concipitur. Omnis quippe res proprium conceptum ipsam sicuti est repraesentantem habet. Totum autem esse filii quatenus est filius, est ad se patrem se habere. Ergo tota cognitio eius secundum esse relativum dependet ex cognitione patris. Nam per patrem cognoscitur et definitur. Filius enim est res habens patrem. Ergo per patrem definitive

34 35

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20. Ibid.

In quo deceptus est autor libelli.

Quid autor libelli non probaverit.

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[56] Therefore the author is in error when he adds: Nor is the connection between the sign and the signified greater than that between father and son, which is properly called relative and towards something: they mutually represent each other both in natural resemblance and in the relation between cause and effect. It is certain, in fact, that the concept by which I acknowledge the son on account of his being son does not make me simultaneously know his father […] Instead I know the father by virtue of another concept that arises simultaneously. This is the first argument with which he attempts to prove that the knowledge of the sign and of the signified are not the same; here he says many things that he does not prove. First, the claim that there is no greater connection between sign and signified than that between father and son does not appear to be true. Between sign and signified there is a relative connection, just as there is between father and son, but along with this the likeness is geared towards signification, which is not the case with the son. For although the son may be called the image of the father, if he resembles him, he is nonetheless not made to signify his father, but to be, since he is a thing with absolute being qua substance, and with relative being qua son. Thus in a true image we find a double connection, that is, of relation and proper representation. In the son, however, we find a relative connection, but not one of proper signification and representation, because he is not made to represent. Therefore he does not properly belong to the category of the sign. [57] Moreover, he does not prove his further claim, namely that I do not know the father with the same cognition with which I know the son on account of his being son. If, in fact, a predicate is towards something, and predicates are categories of things, everything that is posited in a predicate is either an absolute or a relative thing. But everything is known by one proper concept. Therefore a relation, since it is a thing and a being, is known by one [instance of] cognition and conceived by one concept. Everything, in fact, has its own concept that represents it such as it is. A son’s being, insofar as he is a son, entirely relates to the father. Therefore all knowledge of him, in its relative aspect, depends on the knowledge of the father: he is known and defined by the father. A son is a thing that has a father. Therefore he is known definitively by the father, and nothing about him is or is known except in relation to the father. Therefore

Where the book’s author is mistaken.

What the book’s author has not proven.

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cognoscitur et nihil eius est aut cognoscitur | nisi per ordinem ad patrem. Ergo filius secundum quod filius cognoscitur eadem cognitione qua pater. Et haec est naturalis proprietas relativorum, esse simul natura et intellectu. Posita enim se ponunt, et perempta se perimunt tam in esse reali quam in esse intellectuali. Veritas enim intellectus sumitur ex conformitate ad rem. Iccirco intelligens rem sicuti est, vere intelligit. Si igitur intelligit quod totum esse relativi est ad aliud se habere, recte intelligit. Et qui secus relativa non relative intelligit, male intelligit et errat.36 [58] Et in hoc dicto aequivocat praeterea autor a relativa connexione ad repraesentativam. Quia licet duplex sit filii connexio ad patrem, relativa scilicet et repraesentativa, prosequitur tamen solum de relativa, dicens: “Constat autem quod cognitione illa qua cognosco filium, ea ratione qua filius est, non cognosco simul huius filii patrem.”37 Quod quidem verum est de persona patris, quae per filium cognoscitur non ratione connexionis relativae, sed repraesentativae. Per illam enim cognoscitur correlativum filii, scilicet pater. Per hanc vero cognoscitur res repraesentata per filium quatenus est imago et similitudo patris. Et in hunc sensum dixit Christus: “Qui videt me, videt et patrem.” [59] Deinde aequivocat a relatione ad substantiam, dicens: “Si cognosco filium ea ratione qua filius est, non simul cognosco huius filii patrem.”38 Transit enim a relatione patris, quae est accidens, ad personam patris, quae est substantia. [60] Tertio videtur sibi in hoc dicto contradicere, dum ait quod ea cognitione qua filium cognosco ea ratione qua filius est, non cognosco simul huius filii patrem. Et tamen paulo post dicit quod quamvis non sit una cognitio qua cognoscitur imago et res ima- | ginata, simul tamen cum cognitione imaginis quatenus imago est, gignitur cognitio rei quam repraesentat. Superius vero dixerat quod filius est imago patris. Ergo dicit eas notitias esse simul et non esse simul. Et cum hoc falsum est quod dicit, simul cum cognitione qua cognosco filium gigni aliam notitiam qua patrem cognosco. Et similiter loquens de imagine ait quod cum cognitione imaginis quatenus imago est, simul est cognitio rei quam repraesentat. Non enim possunt esse simul duo actus intellectus, nec possunt plura simul intelligi nisi per modum unius, ut ipsemet ingenue fatetur.

36 37 38

Relativorum proprietas.

Aequivocatio.

[John 14:9]

Contradictio.

non appears crossed out in the ms., presumably in error; male intelligit is preceded by et ideo, but the latter words are underlined with dots, presumably to expunge them. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20. Ibid.

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the son qua son is known with the same knowledge as the father. This is the natural property of relatives in nature and the intellect. Things are posited or demolished both in real being and in intellectual being. Intellective truth, in fact, derives from conformity to the thing. Therefore who knows a thing as it is, understands truly. Thus if he knows that the being of a relative consists entirely in relating to something else, he understands correctly; and who understands relatives in a non-relative way understands them poorly and is in error. [58] Here, moreover, the author equivocates between relative and representational relations. While the connection of the son to the father is twofold – that is, relative and representational – he follows up only on the relative one: “It is certain, in fact, that the knowledge by which I know the son on account of his being son does not make me simultaneously know the father.” This is true of the person of the father, who is known through the son not on account of their relative connection, but a representational one. By the former, in fact, the correlative of the son – that is, the father – is known. By the latter, however, the thing represented by the son is known, inasmuch as he is the image and likeness of his father. And in this sense Christ says: “Whoever sees me, sees the Father.” [59] He further equivocates between relation and substance when he says: “If I know the son on account of his being son, I do not simultaneously know this son’s father.” Here he moves from the relation with the father – an accident – to the person of the father – a substance. [60] Thirdly, in this quote he appears to contradict himself when he says that the cognition by which I know the son on account of his being son does not make me simultaneously know this son’s father. Yet a bit further on he says that although the cognition by which the image and the thing imaged are known is not one and the same, even so the cognition of the thing represented emerges at the same time as the cognition of the image qua image. Earlier, however, he had said that the son is the image of the father. Therefore he says that these concepts are simultaneous and not simultaneous. Thus it is false, as he claims, that simultaneously with the knowledge with which I know the son there emerges another concept by which I know the father. Similarly, speaking about the image, he says that simultaneous with the cognition of the image qua image is the cognition of the thing it represents. Two acts of the intellect cannot be simultaneous, nor can multiple things be known simultaneously except in one such act, as he freely admits. Hence in the intellect there cannot be two

The property of relatives.

An equivocation.

[John 14:9]

A contradiction.

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Non possunt ergo duae esse cognitiones, neque duae notitiae simul in intellectu. Ergo cum filii cognitione non gignitur alia notitia qua conoscitur pater. Neque cum imaginis cognitione simul producitur alia cognitio quae sit rei imaginatae. [61] Tenet consequentia, quia unitas actus sive cognitionis sumitur ex unitate obiecti sive rei intellectae. Si ergo non potest intellectus simul ferri in multa obiecta sive multa simul per modum multorum intelligere, non potest simul multos actus sive cognitiones habere, et per consequens neque multas notitias, ut docet Philosophus,39 aiens quod sicut corpus non potest multis et diversis figuris figurari, sic nec intellectus potest simul diversis rerum similitudinibus actu formari.40 Intellectus siquidem noster fit similis rei quam intelligit, immo fit unum cum illa, iuxta illud Philosophi: intelligibile in actu est intelligens in actu.41 Non potest autem actu simul fieri similis diversis rebus, nec simul esse multa in actu, sicut nec una materia potest simul actu informari diversis formis, cum ut Commentator dicit: “Magis fiat unum ex intellectu et re intellecta, quam ex materia et forma.”42 [62] Praeterea videtur autor confundere cognitionem cum notitia. Cum tamen cognitio proprie sit actus intellectus, et notitia habitualis, quae est species intelligibilis, sit principium ipsius cognitionis sive actus intelligendi. Actualis autem notitia, de qua nunc loquimur, est conceptus ultimatus rei, qui est terminus ad quem intrinsecus actus intelligendi, et dicitur a philosophis verbum cordis sive notitia actualis. Et de hac intelligitur quod non potest intellectus actu fieri similis diversis rebus.

39 40 41 42

Nota.

Cognitio differt a notitia.

More directly, Ory appears to be quoting the scholastic tradition, e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 8, a. 14. formari: apparently corr. from de- or reformari. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate catholicae fidei contra gentiles, lib. II, cap. 78. The reference is to Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, III, referenced in a Thomist commentary such as that of Cardinal Cajetan: Summa sacrae theologiae … cuius prima pars hoc primo tomo pertractatur Reverendissimi Thomae a Vio Caietani … commentariis illustrata (Antverpiae: Apud Viduam et Haeredes Ioannis Stelsii, 1576), 55: “… quod ex intellectu et specie fit magis unum quam ex materia et forma, ut Averroes in tertio de anima recte docuit” (comment on Summa, I, q. 12, a. 2).

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[acts of] cognition nor two concepts simultaneously. Therefore with the knowledge of the son there does not arise another concept by which the father is known. Nor does there arise, simultaneously with the cognition of the image, another [instance of] cognition of the thing imaged. [61] The consequence holds: the unity of the act or cognition is derived from the unity of the object or the thing that is known. If therefore the intellect cannot simultaneously be directed to multiple objects or simultaneously know multiple things by means of multiple [acts], it cannot simultaneously have multiple acts or instances of cognition, nor, consequently, multiple concepts, as the Philosopher teaches: just as the body cannot be figured by multiple or different figures, neither can the intellect be formed simultaneously by different likenesses of things. Our intellect is similar to the thing known by it, indeed it is one with the latter, according to the Philosopher: the object of knowledge (intelligibile) in action is the subject of knowing (intelligens) in action. Yet something similar cannot arise from different things in a simultaneous act, nor can many things be simultaneous in one act, just as one matter cannot in a simultaneous act be informed by different forms, as the Commentator says: “the intellect and its object (res intellecta) form more of a unity than do matter and form.”23 [62] Moreover, the author appears to confuse cognition and concept (notitia). Cognition is properly an act of the intellect, while a habitual concept, which is an intelligible species, is the beginning of that cognition or act of intellection. An actual concept, which is under discussion here, is the ultimate concept of a thing, namely the intrinsic terminus ad quem of the act of intellection; the philosophers call it verbum cordis or actual concept. Thus it is understood that in an act of the intellect something similar cannot arise from different things.

23

The Commentator is Averroes; for more detail, see n. 42 on the opposite page.

Nota bene.

Cognition is different from concept.

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[63] Denique non sequitur quod si relativa non simul et eadem notitia cognoscuntur, quod imago et res per eam repraesentata non eadem cognitione et notitia cognoscantur. Nam aliud est esse relativum, aliud vero esse repraesentativum, cum illud sit reale, istud autem intentionale et significativum. Ideo quod assumit relativa non simul et una cognitione cognosci, falsum est, ut ostendimus. Quod si verum esse daremus, non propterea tamen sequeretur non esse eandem notitiam imaginis et rei per eam repraesentatae. Nam esse relativum non infert esse repraesentativum, nec econverso; et ipse aequivocat ab uno ad aliud. [64] Quamobrem omittam quasdam illius rationes, quibus tantum abest ut scholasticorum refellat sententiam, ut contra per eas suam potius impugnet. Etenim ait quod si non esset alia notitia filii et patris, ac imaginis et imaginati, “quomodo salvaretur relativa oppositio, et definitionum correlativorum diversitas?” Et paulo post dicit “relativa esse simul natura, et ad mutuam dici convertentiam.”43 Tum subiungit se minime videre quomodo unica cognitione cognoscantur. Ex quibus tamen dictis manifeste sequitur, correlativa simul cognosci. Nam duo correlativa sunt una relatio,44 sive unum ad aliquid. Ergo sunt unum ens. Ergo eorum est una notitia sive unus conceptus ultimatus. Alioqui daretur res aliqua (scilicet relativa) quae non proprie conciperetur, nec intelligeretur, quia non haberet | proprium conceptum. Et idem dicendum est de oppositione relativa, quae cum sit una species oppositionis de qua potest aliquid praedicari potest vere concipi. Omne autem quod concipitur est res sive ens, cum terminet actum intelligendi. Ideo sicut oppositio contraria est aliquid, sic etiam oppositio relativa. Igitur duo correlativa, ut sunt pater et filius, imago et imaginatum, in actu signato simul et eadem notitia intelliguntur. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, quod relativa sunt simul natura. Item cum una propositio, et omnis alia res composita, simul et uno actu affirmando vel negando intelligatur, non mirum si et correlativa quae dicuntur ad convertentiam (ut ipsemet autor fatetur) et in una propositione ponuntur, ut cum dicitur: filius est res habens patrem, simul et uno actu intelliguntur.

43 44

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20 (with reference to Aristotle’s Categories). Note that Pérez has concertantiam instead of convertentiam. Corr. in ms. from relativa.

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[63] Therefore it does not follow that if relatives are not known simultaneously and with the same concept, the image and the thing represented by it are not known through the same [act of] cognition and concept. For relative being and representational being are different: the former is real, the latter intentional and significant. Now the [author’s] assumption that relatives are not known at once and in one [act of] cognition is false, as we have shown. [But even] if we allow this to be true, it does not follow that the concept of the image and the thing represented by it are not the same. For relative being does not imply representational being, nor vice versa; and he equivocates between the two. [64] For this reason I will omit some of his arguments, which are so defective in refuting the scholastics’ judgment that they impugn his own instead. For he says that if there were no difference in the concept of father and son, and of image and the imaged, “how would the opposition of relative terms and the difference between correlative definitions be saved?” And a bit further he says “that relative [terms] are bound together in nature and are said to concern each other mutually.” Then he adds that he does not see how these are known by the same [act of] cognition. But it follows manifestly from these remarks that correlatives are known simultaneously. For two correlatives are one relation, or one thing to something [else]. Therefore they are one being. Hence they have one concept (notitia) or one ultimate concept. Otherwise there would be a thing (namely a relative thing) which would not be properly conceived or known, because it would not have a proper concept. The same must be said about relative opposition, which can truly be conceived because there is a species of opposition of which something can be predicated. Everything that is conceived is a thing or being, because it completes the act of intellection. Thus, since a contrary opposition is something, so is a relative opposition. Therefore two correlatives, such as father and son, image and imaged, are known intentionally (in actu signato) at once and by the same concept. And this is what the Philosopher says, [namely] that relatives are bound together by nature.24 Thus since a proposition or any other composite thing is known, by affirmation or negation, simultaneously and in one act, it is no surprise that correlatives that are said to be convertible (as the author himself states) and are put together in one proposition – as when one says: a son is a thing that has a father – are also known simultaneously and in one act. 24

The Aristotelian phrase relativa sunt simul natura was frequently discussed and commented on in the scholastic tradition: see above p. 173, n. 32.

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[65] Et sic relinquitur quod relativa tam una notitia incomplexa quam complexa simul intelliguntur. Primum quidem in ratione relationis quae est unum ens, et per consequens unum obiectum intellectus, ut cum dicitur ‘pater,’ id quod concipitur est terminus actus intelligendi, et est res incomplexa, relativa tamen. Secundo autem quando per propositionem sive complexum significabile exprimuntur. Tunc enim secundum se, quamvis sint plura, intelliguntur tamen per modum unius, ut cum dicitur, ‘pater diligit filium.’ Nec per hoc tollitur oppositio relativa. Nam licet in esse reali relativa sic sint opposita, ut unum relativum non possit esse suum correlativum, in esse tamen intellectuali unum oppositorum cognoscitur per aliud, et hoc quidem una notitia, sive uno conceptu complexo vel incomplexo; quae quidem notitia cum sit una qualitas in intellectu, non potest esse sibi contraria in esse reali sive qualitatis, sed tamen in esse significativo, eo quod repraesentat sibi invicem opposita. Et hoc quidem verum est in relativis privativis, et contradictorie oppositis. Et | similiter contrariorum est eadem disciplina. Nec similiter tollitur definitionum correlativorum diversitas, quia licet definitiones eorum sint distinctae, unum tamen eorum per aliud cognoscitur. Definitur enim pater res habens filium, quae definitio licet non sit filii, per filium tamen definitur pater45 et cognoscitur. Est enim de ratione patris quatenus est pater habere filium. Et qui sic non intelligit, non cognoscit patrem quatenus pater est. [66] Itaque relinquitur verum esse quod si cognosco personam filii non cognosco personam patris, sed si scio eum esse filium vel aequalem, scio eum habere patrem vel coaequalem. Sed cum cognoscitur filius quatenus filius est, cognoscitur et pater cognitione relativa: alioqui nulla res relativa haberet unum conceptum, si una intellectione non intelligeretur relatio et ipsius relationis terminus sive correlativum. Neque enim potest aliomodo intelligi, quod simul cum unius relativi notitia gignatur et sit alia. Intellectus enim non potest plura per modum plurium intelligere, quia non potest actu simul per varias species fieri similis rebus diversis, ut superius demonstratum est. Ideo res relativa cum sit unum ens uno conceptu concipitur, una specie intelligibili repraesentatur, et uno actu intelligendi, sive una cognitione cognoscitur.

45

pater superscr.

Relativa simul intelliguntur.

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[65] Thus it stands that relatives are known simultaneously by an incomplex or complex concept. First, on account of the relation, which is one being, and consequently one object of the intellect; as when one says ‘father,’ that which is conceived is the end of the intellective act, and it is an incomplex thing, albeit relative. Second, when they [relatives] are expressed by a proposition or complex signification. For then, although they are multiple, they are known as one, as when one says, ‘the father loves the son.’ Nor does this remove the relative opposition: while relatives are opposed in real being, since one relative cannot be its own correlative, in intellectual being, however, one of the opposites is known by the other, albeit in one concept, whether a complex or incomplex concept. Since this concept is one quality in the intellect, it cannot be contrary to itself in real being or qualitative being, but [it can be] in significant being, since it represents two things that are mutually opposite to each other. This is also true in relatives of deprivation and opposites of contradiction; and the same teaching holds for contraries. Nor is the difference in definitions of correlatives removed, because, although their definitions are distinct, one of them is nevertheless known by the other. A father is in fact defined as a thing that has a son. Although this does not define the son, the father is nonetheless defined and known by the son and known. For it is on account of his being father that a father has a son. Who does not understand this, does not know the father qua father. [66] In short, it is true that if I know the person of the son, I do not know the person of the father, but if I know him to be a son or equal, I know that he has a father or co-equal. But if the son is known qua son, the father is also known by relative cognition; otherwise no relative thing would have one concept, if we did not understand in one cognitive act the relation and the terminus or correlative in that relation. Otherwise it cannot be understood that with the concept of one relative there emerges, and is, another one. For the intellect cannot know multiple things by way of multiple [acts], because it cannot simultaneously do the same for different things through various species, as has been shown above. Therefore since a relative thing is one being, it is conceived in one conception, represented in one intelligible species, and known in one act of intellection or cognition.

Relative things are known simultaneously.

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Discutiuntur verba autoris circa adorationem imaginis et rei per imaginem significatae. [67] Secunda nostrae disputationis quaestio praecipua est de adoratione imaginis et rei per imaginem significatae, de qua libri autor sic ait: Quamvis res ita se haberet quod eadem cognitione ferretur mens in imaginem et | rem imaginatam, non inde concluditur idem fieri posse in adoratione et veneratione. Est enim maxima dissimilitudo inter hoc et illud. Nam imagini, in eo quod imago est, non repugnat quod eadem cognitione conoscatur qua cognoscitur res repraesentata. Pugnare autem videtur cum imagine, etiam in quantum imago est, ut eadem reverentia revereatur qua res cuius est imago, cum imago illa in eo quod imago non excedat limites insensibilis creaturae, cui (ut doctores isti recte concedunt) reverentia minime debetur.46

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Verba autoris.

Haec ille. [68] Sicut superiori disputatione actum est de una atque eadem cognitione imaginis et rei per eam significatae, ita nunc quoque videndum est de eodem cultu et veneratione imaginis et rei per eam significatae. Ait ergo autor libri non sequi si eodem actu cognoscantur imago et res per eam significatae, quod eadem adoratione debeant adorari. Sed contra argumentamur et dicimus: voluntas non fertur in suum obiectum nisi secundum quod praesentatur illi per intellectum. Ergo si per modum unius obiecti praesentatur imago et res per eam significata, per modum unius obiecti adoratur et colitur imago et res significata. Alioqui voluntas ferretur in incognitum, aut sine rationis lumine tenderet in suum obiectum, vel in aliquem modum illius non sibi praesentatum per intellectum. Imago enim et res per eam significata non sunt nisi unum ens, cum imago quatenus imago distinguatur contra ens. Ergo non sunt nisi unum obiectum sive intellectus sive appetitus. Nihil enim intelligitur aut appetitur nisi ens, quod intelligitur sub ratione veri et appetitur sub ratione boni. Imago autem non est res sive ens, quemadmodum superiori distinctione monstratum est. Ergo non est obiectum terminans motum intellectus aut appetitus. [69] Praeterea, ubi est eadem ratio adorationis, ibi est una atque | eadem adoratio. Sed eadem est sanctitas sive excellentia quae est in imagine tanquam in signo, et in re sancta tamquam in subiecto, quae est ratio 46

Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20.

Primum argumentum.

Alia probatio.

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Discussed here are the author’s remarks about the adoration of the image and the thing signified by the image. [67] The second main question of our disputation concerns the adoration of the image and the thing signified by the image. On this issue the book’s author says the following:

The author’s words.

Even if it were the case that the mind is directed to the image and the thing imaged in the same [act of] cognition, it does not follow that they are the same in adoration and veneration. In fact, there is a great difference between one and the other. For there is no contradiction in the image qua image being known by the same [act of] cognition as the represented. But it would if the image, even insofar as it is an image, were revered with the same reverence as the thing of which it is an image, because that image, considered qua image, does not exceed the limits of an insensible artifact, to which (as the doctors rightly admit) not the slightest reverence is owed. Thus the author. [68] Just as, earlier in the disputation, we dealt with [the notion of] one and the same cognition of the image and the thing signified by it, so we must now consider [the problem of] the same worship and veneration of the image and the thing represented by it. The book’s author, then, says that if the image and the thing signified by it are known in the same act, it does not follow that they must be adored in the same [act of] adoration. We argue against this and say: the will is directed to its object only according to what it has been presented by the intellect. Thus if an image and the thing signified by it are presented as one object, then the image and the thing signified by it are [also] adored and worshipped as one object. Otherwise the will would be directed to an unknown, or it would approach its object without the light of reason, or in some way not indicated by the intellect. For the image and the thing signified by it are nothing but one being, although the image qua image should be distinguished from a being. Hence they are nothing if not one object, either of intellect or desire. Nothing is known or desired except a being that is known by virtue of being true and desired by virtue of being good. But the image is not a thing or being, as is demonstrated by the above-mentioned distinction. Therefore it is not an object that ends the movement of intellect and desire. [69] In addition, where the reason for adoration is the same, there the adoration is one and the same. But the holiness or excellence that is in

The first argument.

Another proof.

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adorationis, cum nulla sit realis sanctitas in signo, sed tamen in esse significativo, eo scilicet quod rem sanctam significat. Ergo est eadem adoratio rei et signi. Et istud copiose superius comprobatum est, nimirum ubi est eadem excellentia, ibi eundem esse honorem exhibendum, cum honor debeatur virtuti et excellentiae. Nam cum omnis operatio sequatur iudicium practicum tanquam suam regulam, ubi est unum iudicium practicum in intellectu ibi est una operatio in voluntate. Manifestum autem uni excellentiae unum honorem esse exhibendum. Ergo ubi est hoc iudicium in intellectu, quod imagini et rei per eam significatae est idem honor exhibendus, cum sit in eis una tamen sanctitas sive excellentia, ibi erit in voluntate una tamen operatio per tale iudicium regulata, quae erit eadem adoratio. [70] Item, si eadem adoratione non colitur imago Christi qua et ipse Christi, sequitur quod nulla adoratione colitur. Nihil quippe est sanctitatis in imagine in esse reali, sed tamen in esse significativo. Ideo nihil est subiective et realiter in ipsa honore dignum, quoniam sanctitas imaginis non est sanctitas rei seu signi.47 Idem est autem animi motus in signum et signatum. Ideo est eadem adoratio imaginis et rei significatae, licet non eodem modo, quia imago colitur ut signum et in ordine ad aliud. Res vero per imaginem significata colitur in se tanquam habens aliquam sanctitatem. [71] Secundo subiungit: “Imago quatenus imago non excedit limites insensibilis creaturae, cui reverentia minime debetur.”48 At hic aequivocat ab imagine in quantum imago ad imaginem quatenus est res quaedam. Nam signum | quatenus huiuscemodi abstrahit ab omni ratione rei. Non enim vox quatenus signum pensatur gravis vel acuta. Alioqui iam aliquid de ipsa praedicaretur, et sic esset res quaedam; sed solum est signum per quod mens humana fertur in signatum. Aequivocavit igitur a signo ad rem, et manifeste loquitur pugnantia. Ait enim: “cui (scilicet imagini) nulla reverentia debetur.” Et tamen superius dixit quod honor et veneratio debetur imaginibus. Et hoc idem in fine concludit dicens sacris imaginibus honorem et reverentiam deberi. Ergo aequivocat de imagine et sibi manifeste contradicit. [72] Consequenter concedit quod eadem veneratione veneratur rex et purpura eius qua induitur, quia vestis ab eo minime separatur. Imago autem non est unita cum rege vel Caesare. Ideo non facit unum nec 47 48

rei seu signi added in margin. Crossed out (before sanctitas): rei ipsius. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 20.

Nota.

Aequivocatio in verbis autoris.

De veneratione regis et purpurae eius.

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the image qua sign is the same as that in the holy thing qua subject. This is the reason for adoration, since there is no real holiness in the sign, but only in significant being, namely in the sense that it signifies a holy thing. Therefore the adoration of the thing and the sign is the same. Above we have given elaborate proof for this: surely where there is the same excellence, there also the same honor has to be offered, since honor is owed to virtue and excellence. For since every operation follows a practical judgment as its rule, where there is one practical judgment in the intellect, there is one operation in the will. Obviously, one honor is to be bestowed on one [form of] excellence. Therefore, where there is one judgment in the intellect, namely that the same honor is to be bestowed on an image and the thing signified by it, since there is but one [form of] holiness or excellence in them, there will be only one operation in the will directed by that judgment, namely one and the same [act of] adoration. [70] Also, if the image of Christ is not worshipped by the same [act of] adoration as Christ himself, it follows that it is not worshipped by any adoration. An image has no holiness in real being, but only in significant being. Therefore nothing in it is subjectively and really worthy of honor, since the holiness of the image is not the holiness of the thing or the sign. Now the soul’s movement towards the sign and the signified is the same; therefore the adoration of the image and the thing signified is the same, albeit not in the same mode, because the image is worshipped as sign and in function of something else. But the thing signified by the image is worshipped in itself as something that has holiness. [71] Secondly, he adds: “the image qua image does not exceed the limits of an insensible artifact, to which no reverence whatsoever is owed.” Here he equivocates between the image qua image and the image insofar as it is a thing. For a sign understood in this mode entirely abstracts from the ratio of the thing. A word understood as sign is not thought of as deep or sharp. Otherwise something would already be predicated about it, and thus it would be a thing. But it is only a sign by which the human mind is taken to the signified. Thus he equivocated between sign and thing, and manifestly says contradictory things. For he states: “to which (namely, the image) no reverence is owed.” Yet he said earlier that honor and veneration are owed to images. At the end he comes to the same conclusion, saying that sacred images are owed honor and reverence. Therefore he equivocates about the image and contradicts himself manifestly. [72] Consequently, he allows that a king and the purple gown he wears are venerated with the same veneration, since the garment is hardly separate from him. But the image is not united with the king or Caesar.

Nota bene.

An equivocation in the author’s words.

The veneration of the king and his purple gown.

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substantialiter nec accidentaliter cum eo. Hic autor bene concedit quod licet purpura secundum se non sit alicuius honoris capax, cum eam tamen induit Caesar, una adoratione cum eo colitur, etiam si nihil de purpura cogitetur ab eo qui Caesarem veneratur. Deinde dicit hoc fieri, quia est coniuncta cum Caesare. Imago autem non est coniuncta cum Caesare, nec cum re significata, per hoc concludens quod non est simile. At hoc falsum est, quia in esse intelligibili imago sic est coniuncta cum re significata ut unum sine altero minime intelligatur aut separatim49 cognoscatur. Imago enim de qua loquimur quatenus repraesentativa est signum cum re significata coniunctum, et unum cum ea in esse intelligibili perfectius quam vestis cum Caesare in esse reali. [73] Subiungit: “nec aliquis unquam vidit, nisi forte tyranni alicuius coactione, quod eadem veneratione veneretur imago ipsius regis, qua rex ipse, licet minime negandum sit aliquem honorem illius imagini deberi.”50 Verum hoc dictum apparet manifeste | falsum. Nam honor qui exhibetur imagini non exhibetur ligno aut figurae seu colori. Alioqui dicat nobis, obsecro, quidnam sit illud quod honoratur in imagine? Etenim nullus honor ei secundum se debetur. Ergo si honoratur, est propter aliud, quia scilicet est aliquid Dei aut alterius rei dignae honore. Quando autem unum est propter aliud, iam non sunt dicenda duo, sed unum dumtaxat. Honoratur autem imago propter rem significatam: ideo est unus honor qui exhibetur rei per imaginem significatae et ipsi imagini. [74] Videtur itaque aequivocare de eadam veneratione ad eundem modum venerationis. Nam eodem actu et una tantum veneratione veneratur imago et res significata, quia imago est obiectum quo, et res significata est obiectum quod, sed non eodem modo, quia ista veneratur ut sanctitatem realiter in se habens. Illa autem veneratur ut rem sanctam repraesentans sive significans. Insuper, sicut res cognoscitur, ita colitur. Alio autem modo cognoscitur res in se, et alio modo in sua imagine.51 Nam perfectius cognoscitur quae videtur in se quam quae videtur in imagine. Et magis movet cognitio rei praesentis quam absentis. Ideo ferventius honoratur et colitur res praesens quam absens, et in se quam in

49 50 51

Corr. in ms. from separatum. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 21 (with minimal text variation). imagine superscr.; corr. from origine.

Verba autoris.

Confutatio.

De adoratione et modo adorandi.

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Therefore it is not one with him, either in substance or accident. Here the author correctly concedes that although the purple gown in itself is not susceptible of honor, nevertheless when Caesar wears it, it is worshipped in the same [act of] adoration as he is, even if the person who venerates Caesar does not think in any way about the purple gown. Then he says that this occurs because it is conjoined with Caesar. But the image is not conjoined with Caesar, nor with the thing signified, and thus he concludes that this [case] is not similar. Yet this is false, because in intelligible being the image is conjoined with the thing signified in such a way that the one cannot be understood without the other, nor can either be known separately. The image of which we speak qua representation is a sign conjoined with the signified thing, and one with it in intelligible being, more perfectly than the garment with Caesar in real being. [73] He adds: “nor has anyone ever seen, except perhaps forced by some tyrant, that the image of a king is venerated with the same veneration as the king himself, although it can hardly be denied that his image is owed some honor.” But this statement seems patently false. For the honor bestowed on the image is not bestowed on the wood, the figure, or the colors. Otherwise, I ask, he should tell us: what is it that is honored in the image? Indeed, according to him it is owed no honor. Therefore if it is honored, that is because of something else, namely because it is something divine or something else worthy of honor. But when something is [the case] because of something else, these cannot be said to be two, but only one. Now, an image is honored because of the thing signified. Therefore the honor bestowed on the thing signified by the image and on the image itself is one and the same. [74] Thus he appears to equivocate between the [notion of the] same veneration and the same mode of veneration. For the image and the thing signified are venerated in the same act and with only one [instance of] veneration, because the image is the object-by-which, and the thing signified is the object-which, but not in the same way. The latter is venerated as something that really contains holiness, but the former is venerated as something representing or signifying a holy thing. Moreover, just as a thing is known, thus it is worshipped. But a thing in itself is known in one way, and in its image in another way. For a thing that is seen in itself is known more perfectly than something seen in an image. And the cognition of a present thing moves [the soul] more than that of something absent. Therefore a present thing is honored and worshipped more fervently than an absent thing; [something perceived] in itself more than [something perceived] in an image. Further, who does not know that the

The author’s words.

Confutation.

The adoration and the mode of adoration.

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imagine. Porro quis nescit eandem esse Dei adorationem dum praesens est et videtur, et quando per scripturas, imagines, aut voces cognoscitur? Nam idem est Deus qui colitur et uno atque eodem latriae cultu atque una ratione, scilicet summae excellentiae; et tamen alio modo colitur et amatur quando videtur hic in52 eucharistiae sacramento vel in patria quam colatur aut ametur quum videtur seu cognoscitur in scripturis. [75] Putat forsitan autor quod cum osculamur evangelia aut ad verba sancta caput inclinamus non colere nos eadem veneratione Deum qua illum in eucharistia colimus. At hoc falsum est, quia utrobique | est adoratio latriae quae soli Deo debetur; et licet non eodem modo fiat, tamen ratio adorandi est eadem, scilicet recognitio supremae excellentiae. [76] Relinquitur ergo quod omnia quae sunt Dei, sive in esse reali sive in esse significativo, coluntur et adorantur eadem adoratione qua Deus ipse; immo, Deus ipse est qui in ipsis colitur et adoratur. Nam id quod Dei est non solum sapientius aut fortius, sed etiam est nobilius omnibus hominibus, ut docet Apostolus, et ideo maiori honore dignum. Praeterea, nihil ibi colitur nisi Deus, quia nihil in esse reali est in imagine seu aliis signis honore dignum, sed tantum in esse repraesentativo, eo scilicet quod significant res honore dignas. Et per consequens, quia nulla alia ratio adorationis in ipsis invenitur, una et eadem adoratione signa ipsa et res significatae coluntur. Cum igitur concedat aliquem honorem imaginibus deberi, sed non eum qui rei repraesentatae debetur, dicat (obsecro) quisnam alius honor debeatur imaginibus, aut ratione cuius excellentiae? Quod si hoc minime possit assignare, multo equidem minus poterit debitum honorem illis dare.

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Quomodo adoranda evangelia.

1 Cor. 1:25

In quo decipiantur autor et nonnulli alii circa honorem sacris imaginibus exhibendum. [77] Ex istis manifeste patet triplex error autoris et similium. Primus est, qualiter asseverant quidem sacris imaginibus aliquem deberi honorem, et tamen nesciunt quem eis honorem debeant exhibere, et per consequens nec honorem illis debitum exhibere possunt.

52

sacrosancto crossed out.

Primus error.

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adoration of God while he is present and seen is the same as when he is known by the scriptures, images, or words? Identical is the God who is worshipped in one and the same cult of latria, and for one reason, namely his utmost excellence; and yet he is worshipped and loved in a different way when he is seen here in the sacrament of the Eucharist or in paradise than when he is seen or known in the scriptures. [75] Perhaps the author thinks that when we kiss the gospels or bow our head to its holy words we do not worship God with the same veneration with which we worship God in the Eucharist. But this is false, because in both there is the adoration of latria, which is owed only to God; and although this is not done in the same way, nevertheless the reason for adoration is the same, that is the recognition of supreme excellence. [76] In short, all things that are of God either in real or significant being are worshipped and adored with the same adoration with as God himself; in fact, it is God himself who is worshiped and adored in them. For that which is God’s is not only wiser and stronger than all men, as the Apostle teaches, but also more noble and therefore worthy of greater honor. Furthermore, here nothing is worshipped but God, because the image or other signs contain nothing in real being that is worthy of honor, but only [things that are so] in representational being, namely in the sense that they signify things that are worthy of honor. Consequently, since no other reason for adoration is to be found in them, these signs and the things they signify are worshipped with one and the same adoration. When he [the author] assumes, then, that some [kind of] honor is owed to images, but not the same that is owed to the thing represented, what other honor (I ask) is owed to images, or by reason of what excellence? If we cannot assign this honor, much less can we give due honor to those images.

How the gospels must be adored.

1 Cor. 1:25

On the ways in which the author and several others are mistaken concerning the honor to be bestowed on sacred images. [77] From these points three errors of this author and others of similar views become evident. The first is that they assert that sacred images are indeed owed some kind of honor, and yet they do not know what kind of honor to exhibit to images, nor, as a consequence, can they exhibit the honor that is owed them.

The first error.

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[78] Secundus error est, quia dicunt honorem deberi sacris imaginibus, et tamen negant eas honorari debere, sed tantum res significatas in praesentia imaginum. At hic error manifeste patet. Nam | ex cognitione imaginis movetur mens ad adorandam rem imaginatam. Nemo enim negat imagines concurrere ad actum intelligendi, cum earum proprium officium sit ducere mentem in rem significatam. Omne autem quod concurrit ad actum intelligendi, concurrit similiter ad actum53 honorandi. Et ideo si imagines et caetera signa concurrunt ad actum intelligendi, necesse est ut etiam concurrant ad actum adorandi. Nam per ea movetur homo ad intelligendum et iudicandum tales res significatas esse adorandas, et per consequens ad adorandum illas. Quocirca non adoratur solum res significata in praesentia imaginis, sed etiam ipsa imago, eo quod concurrat ad actum adorationis, qui est unus atque idem quo adoratur res et imago, immo potius res in imagine sive per imaginem, et hoc quando adoratio causatur ex intuitu ipsius imaginis. [79] Tertius error est, quia putant imagines quatenus signa sunt non posse simul et una adoratione adorari cum re significata. At hoc falsum est, quando unum in alio vel per aliud adoratur. Nam uno actu volumus media et finem, quando volumus media propter finem, ut docet Philosophus dicens quod eodem actu intelligo conclusionem et praemissas, quando intelligo conclusionem propter praemissas, vel conclusionem in praemissis. Imago autem est medium ad adorandam rem significatam. Ergo eodem actu voluntas fertur in imaginem et rem significatam, quando fertur in rem per imaginem et sic in ipsa imagine colit rem significatam. Non ergo colitur imago ut obiectum partiale in quod feratur adoratio, sicut libri autor existimare videtur, sed ut obiectum quo, seu mediante quo, fit intellectio et adoratio. Nam si esset obiectum partiale, esset ens. Imago autem quatenus imago distinguitur contra ens. Ergo nullo modo est obiectum quod. Non enim consideratur neque ut similitudo neque ut figura taliter vel | taliter colorata, aut in sublimi loco posita. Qui enim sub tali consideratione imagines colerent, essent idololatrae, quoniam adorarent opus manuum hominum, quae sunt res quaedam et non tamen signa.

53

inte crossed out.

Secundus error.

Tertius error.

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[78] The second error is that they say that sacred images are owed honor, and yet they deny that these images must be honored, but [assert that] only the things signified [must be honored] in the presence of images. Here the error is obvious. For the mind moves from the cognition of the image to the adoration of the object of the image. No one, in fact, denies that images assist in the act of intellection, since their proper function is to lead the mind to the thing signified. Now, everything that assists in the act of intellection similarly assists in the act of honoring. Therefore, if images and other signs assist in the act of intellection, they necessarily also assist in the act of adoration. By them, in fact, man is moved to understand and judge that such things that are signified must be adored, and consequently to adore them. Hence not only the thing signified is adored in the presence of the image, but also the image itself, because it assists in the act of adoration: it is one and the same [act] in which the thing and the image – better yet, the thing in the image or through the image – are adored. This [occurs] when the adoration is caused by the observation of the image. [79] The third error is that they think that images qua images cannot be adored simultaneously in the same act of adoration as the thing signified. Yet this is false, when one thing is adored in or through something else. For we want the means and the end in one act when we want the means because of the end, as the Philosopher says: I know the conclusion and its premises in the same act when I know the conclusion because of the premises, or the conclusion in the premises. Now, an image is a means to adore the thing signified. Therefore the will is directed in one act to the image and the thing signified when it is directed by the image to the thing and thus worships in the image the thing signified. Therefore, the image is not worshipped as the partial object to which the adoration is directed, as the book’s author seems to think, but as the object by which, or by means of which, the intellection and adoration occur. In fact, if it were a partial object, it would be a being. But the image qua image is distinct from a being. In no way, therefore, is it an object-which. For it is not considered either as a likeness nor as an image colored this way or that, or placed in a sublime location. Those who worshipped images with this kind of consideration would be idolaters, because they would adore a work of human hands, which are things and not signs.

The second error.

The third error.

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[80] Et istud est quod B. Augustinus ait, quod prohibetur primo Dei praecepto coli in figmentis hominum Dei similitudo.54 Et eos vocat idololatras qui simulacris, idest imaginum figuris, eam servitutem exhibent quae debetur soli Deo. Hanc enim esse B. Augustini mentem constat ex verbis eiusdem in expositione illorum verborum apud Psalmistam, ubi dicitur: “Simulacra gentium argentum et aurum.” Nam ibi damnat tria idololatrarum genera, scilicet eos qui simulacra Deum putant; et qui in simulacris aliquod numen esse credunt; et item eos qui per corporalem effigiem Deum adorant, existimantes eum esse corporalem et tali effigiei similem. Habent enim qui eiusmodi errore involvuntur malam de Deo cognitionem, et iccirco, sicut male credunt, ita male colunt. Et haec dicta sint de primo doctrinae scholasticorum fundamento, quod humanum est ex Philosopho et ratione sumptum.

Ps. 113:12 (4)

Auctoritate sacrarum scripturarum probant scholasti[ci] eadem adoratione coli similitudinem quae repraesentat et rem ipsam repraesentatam.



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B. Augustinus.

[81] Secundum fundamentum scholasticorum validum et firmum sumitur ex scripturis, et istud est divinum. Innititur enim doctrinae Spiritus Sancti. Scripturae autem nos docent quod una atque eadem adoratione adorantur similitudo repraesentans et res repraesentata. Aiunt enim quod Abraham, divinae Trinitatis repraesentatationem | atque unitatis conspiciens, in ea Deum adoravit. Tres enim in imagine sive similitudine sibi apparente vidit, et unum adoravit, illi facto ipso divinos honores tribuens, et similiter verbo dicens: “Domine, si inveni gratiam in oculis tuis, etc.” Tunc enim Deum adoravit, sicut ipsum cognovit. Ipsum autem cognovit per imaginem sive similitudinem corporalem, cum non videret eum facie ad faciem. Ergo adoravit eum in ea imagine sive similitudine in qua apparebat ei. [82] Similiter et Moyses, videns angelum in rubo Deum repraesentantem, ipsum adoravit ea adoratione quae soli Deo debetur, quem ipse angelus referebat, dicens: “Ego sum Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Jacob.” Et tunc Moyses discalceatus dicitur accessisse ad Deum qui loquebatur ei. Et tamen non erat Deus in persona, sed in imagine et similitudine sive repraesentatione. Et rursus ipse idem angelus, cum loqueretur Moysi in monte Sinai, similiter est adoratus latria non a solo Moyse, verum etiam a toto Israelitico populo, dicente: “Omnia quaecunque loquutus est nobis 54

De adoratione facta angelis ab Abraham. [Gen. 18:3]

De adoratione facta a Moyse. [Exod. 3:6]

[Exod. 24:3]

The reference is to Augustine, Epist. 55, in Id., Epistulae I–LV, ed. Kl.D. Daur, CCSL 31 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004).

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[80] This is also what St. Augustine says, namely that God’s first commandment prohibits God’s likeness to be worshipped in images of men. He calls idolaters those who display such servitude to effigies, that is the figures of images, as is owed to God alone. That this is in fact St. Augustine’s understanding is evident from his interpretation of the following words of the Psalmist: “The idols of the gentiles are silver and gold.” There, in fact, he condemns three kinds of idolaters, namely those who consider effigies to be God; who believe there to be some divine power in effigies; and those who adore God in a corporeal effigy, in the belief that he is corporeal and resembles that effigy. Those who are trapped in this error have a poor knowledge of God, and thus their worship is mistaken just as their belief is. This must be said about the first foundation of scholastic doctrine, on what is human, based on the Philosopher and on reason.

St. Augustine.

Ps. 113:4

On the authority of the sacred scriptures the scholastics prove that the likeness that represents and the thing represented are worshipped in the same [act of] adoration. [81] The second, valid and sound, foundation of the scholastics is derived from the scriptures. This foundation is divine, because it rests on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Now the scriptures teach us that the representing likeness and the thing represented are adored in one and the same [act of] adoration. For they say that Abraham, as he observed the representation of the divine Trinity and union, adored God in it. In the image or likeness that appeared to him he saw three, and he adored one, rendering the latter ipso facto divine honors, and likewise expressing this verbally: “My Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight, etc.” Then he adored God in the way he knew him. He knew him through his image or corporeal likeness, because he did not see him face to face. Therefore he adored him in the image or likeness in which he appeared to him. [82] Similarly, when Moses saw in the burning bush an angel representing God, he adored him with the adoration owed only to God, to whom the angel referred, saying: “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” And then Moses, having removed his sandals, is said to have approached God, who spoke to him. Yet it was not God in person, but in an image and likeness or representation. Again, the same angel, when he spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, was similarly adored with latria, not only by Moses, but by the entire people of Israel, as they said: “We will do all the words of the Lord, which he hath spoken.” However,

Abraham’s adoration of the angels.

[Gen. 18:3]

Moses’s adoration. [Exod. 3:6]

[Exod. 24:3]

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Deus faciemus.” Non tamen erat Deus ipse in persona qui dabat legem Moysi, sed angelus in persona Dei, iuxta illud Apostoli: “Lex data est per angelos in manu mediatoris,” hoc est, Moysi.55 Et alibi: “Accepistis legem in dispositionem angelorum.”56 [83] Similiter et Isaias, quando vidit “Dominum sedentem super solium excelsum,” cui dabantur divinae laudes a seraphin, dicentibus “Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus,” simul et eadem adoratione adoravit imaginem qua et ipsum Deum per imaginem significatum et repraesentatum. Tunc enim adoravit Deum visum non in se, sed in ipsius imagine sive similitudine. Et sic concluditur ex scripturis veteris testamenti quod Deus colitur non solum in se adoratione latriae, sed etiam in sua imagine et similitudine. Nam colitur | sicut cognoscitur. Non solum autem cognoscitur in se, sed etiam in eo quod ipsum significat aut repraesentat. Et iccirco quando angeli apparebant in persona Dei adorabantur perinde atque Deus. Nam ea in parte exercebant imaginis officium, et ideo adorabantur tanquam medium ducens in cognitionem et adorationem rei significatae, et sic tanquam obiectum quo mediante fit intellectio et adoratio Dei repraesentati. Igitur quatenus repraesentabant, adorabantur eadem adoratione qua et res significata, ut superius dictum est de aliis imaginibus. [84] B. Joannes Evangelista in Apocalypsi videns similitudinem “filii hominis vestiti podere cecidit ad pedes eius,” et tamen non erat Deus, sed angelus similis filio hominis loquens ipsi Joanni. Ergo imago repraesentans adoratur eadem adoratione qua res repraesentata. Et propterea quandocumque angelus apparuit et loquutus est in persona Dei, vocatus est Deus in scripturis et adoratus perinde atque Deus. Ac proinde quando ipsi Joanni loquebatur57 ac si fuisset Christus (ut quum dicebat: “Ego sum primus et novissimus,” etc.) ipse Joannes semper deferebat illi divinos honores. Quando autem in propria persona loquebatur prohibebat ne sibi Joannes talem exhiberet honorem. Et constat multas dictarum visionum fuisse imaginarias, quoniam non videbantur res in se, sed in suis imaginibus et repraesentationibus. Quamobrem concluditur eundem esse honorem qui tribuitur rebus visis in se et visis in sua imagine vel similitudine, licet non eodem modo.

55 56 57

[Gal. 3:19] [Acts 7:53] Isaias [6:1, 6:3]

Notandum.

[Apoc. 1:13 and 1:17]

[Apoc. 1:17]

Gal. 3:19 reads: “lex […] ordinata per angelos in manu mediatoris.” dispositionem corr. from dispositione; cf. Acts 7:53: “qui accepistis legem in dispositionem angelorum …” Corr. in ms. from loquebantur.

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it was not God in person who gave the law to Moses, but an angel in the person of God, according to the word of the Apostle: “‘The law was given by angels through the hand of a mediator,’ that is, Moses.” And elsewhere: “You have received the law by the disposition of angels.” [83] Thus also Isaiah, when he saw “the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and elevated,” and seraphs who offered him divine praise, saying “Holy, Holy, Holy,” simultaneously and in the same [act of] adoration adored the image and God himself, signified and represented by the image. For at that time he adored God as seen, not in himself, but in his image or likeness. In this way we conclude from the Old Testament that God is worshipped not only in himself, by adoration of latria, but also in his image and likeness. For he is worshipped in the way he is known. He is known not only in himself, but also in that which signifies or represents him. And thus when the angels appeared in the person of God, they were adored in the same manner as God. For in that role they had the function of an image. Therefore they were adored as a means leading to the cognition and adoration of the signified, and thus as object by means of which the intellection and adoration of the represented God took place. Hence insofar as they represented [God], they were adored with the same adoration as the signified, as we have said above about other images. [84] When St. John the Evangelist in the book of Revelation saw the likeness “of the Son of man clothed with a garment down to the feet,” he “fell at his feet,” and yet it was not God, but an angel similar to the Son of man who spoke to John. Therefore the representing image was adored with the same adoration as the thing represented. For this reason, when the angel appeared and spoke in the person of God, he is called God in the scriptures, and hence adored like God. Accordingly, when he spoke to John as if he were Christ (as when he said: “I am the first and the last,” etc.), John still bestowed divine honors upon him. But when he spoke in his own person, he forbade John to honor him in this way. It is certain that many of these visions were imaginary, because things were not seen in themselves, but in their images and representations. For this reason we conclude that the honor bestowed on things seen in themselves is the same as that offered to things seen through their image or likeness, albeit not in the same way.

[Gal. 3:19] [Acts 7:53] Isaias [6:1, 6:3]

Nota bene.

[Apoc. 1:13 and 1:17]

[Apoc. 1:17]

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[85] Similiter usus ecclesiae universalis habet, ut fideles adorent signo et verbo crucem Christi eadem latriae adoratione qua et ipsum Christum, quamvis ipsa crux non sit Christo coniuncta in esse reali, | sed tantum in esse repraesentativo et intelligibili. Nam in die parasceves prostrati adoramus crucem Christi, et divinos honores ei tribuimus, qui soli Deo conveniunt, dicentes: “O crux ave spes unica, hoc passionis tempore, auge piis iustitiam, reisque dona veniam.”58 Ideo eam adoramus et verbo et signo, quibus colimus ipsum Christum crucifixum; immo potius in ea colimus Christum crucifixum, sicut in purpura regem, etiam nihil reflexe cogitantes de signo crucis, sicut nec de purpura regis, sed tantum de Christo crucifixo, et de rege purpurato, eo quod sicut purpura est quodam modo unum cum rege, quia est illi coniuncta in esse reali, ita signum est unum cum signato coniunctum ei in esse intelligibili et significativo. [86] Praeterea, in omni cultu signorum et imaginum est aliquid59 quod adoratur sive cui reverentia exhibetur. Hoc autem non est ipsum signum sive imago, cum ea sint obiecta quibus mediantibus motus animi fertur in id quod intelligitur aut quod colitur. Ergo id quod colitur seu adoratur est res significata per imagines et signa; et id quo mediante fit adoratio est imago vel signum. Est autem manifestum ex praedictis quod eodem actu adoramus signum et signatum. Ergo est unus atque idem honor qui exhibetur cruci et qui exhibetur Christo crucifixo. [87] Insuper sacra concilia hoc ipsum docent. Dicitur enim in septima synodo: “Figuratis imaginibus utimur ut recordemur et affectu amplectamur res significatas.”60 Nam illud est propriissimum imaginis officium quatenus imago est et signum, repraesentare scilicet et mentes nostras in res significatas transferre etiam nulla adhibita cogitatione de ipsa imagine. Omnis quippe cogitatio quae seorsum fit de aliquo signo fit de ipso quatenus res est, | quia quando de ipso sic cogitatur, ipsum est

58

59 60

Idem probatur ab auctoritate ecclesiae.

Ab auctoritate conciliorum.

Hymn based on a stanza added to Venantius Fortunatus’s Vexilla regis prodeunt; see F.J.E. Raby, A History of Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginning to the Close of the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 88–90; Ruth E. Messenger, The Medieval Latin Hymn (Washington: Capital Press, 1953), 85–86. Corr. in ms. from aliquod. Actually, the quote is from Pérez’s discussion of Nicaea II: De traditionibus, § 24. For Nicaea II, see LCN, fol. 88r (and cf. COD, 135–36).

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[85] Similarly, the custom of the universal Church has it that the faithful adore Christ’s cross by sign and word with the same adoration of latria with which they adore Christ himself, although the cross is not conjoined with Christ in real being, but only in representational and intelligible being. For on Good Friday we prostrate ourselves to adore Christ’s cross and bestow him divine honors, which are fitting only for God, and we say: “Hail, oh cross, our only hope in this time of suffering, increase justice for the pious, and offer mercy to the sinful.”25 Thus we adore the cross by word and sign, by which we worship the crucified Christ himself. Or rather, in this [cross] we worship the crucified Christ, just as we honor the king in his purple robe, while having no conscious thought about the sign of the cross or the king’s purple robe, but [thinking] only about the crucified Christ and the king clad in purple. Just as the purple gown is somehow one with the king, since it is conjoined with him in real being, so the sign is also one with the signified, conjoined with it in intelligible and significant being. [86] Moreover, in any worship of signs and images there is something that is adored or upon which reverence is bestowed. However, this is not the sign or the image itself, because these are objects by means of which the movement of the soul is directed to that which is known or worshipped. Hence that which is worshipped or adored is the thing signified by images and signs; and that by means of which the adoration occurs is the image or sign. But it is plain from the preceding that we adore the sign and the signified in the same act. Therefore the honor bestowed upon the cross and the crucified Christ is one and the same. [87] This, moreover, is also what the holy councils teach. The Seventh Council in fact stated: “We use figurative images to remember and affectively embrace the things signified.”26 This is the most proper role of the image, insofar as it is an image and sign, namely to represent and transfer our minds to the things represented without even expending a thought on that image. Indeed, any reflection made separately about a sign is about that sign qua thing, because when we think about it in this way, it is the object of knowledge, since it ends the act of cogitation. Therefore it is a being or a thing. However, the Philosopher and the scholastics rightly 25

26

The same is proven by the authority of the Church.

The authority of the councils.

Hymn based on a stanza added to Venantius Fortunatus’s Vexilla regis prodeunt; see F.J.E. Raby, A History of Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginning to the Close of the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 88–90; Ruth E. Messenger, The Medieval Latin Hymn (Washington: Capital Press, 1953), 85–86. Actually, the quote is from Pérez’s discussion of Nicaea II: De traditionibus, § 24.

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intellectus obiectum, cum terminet61 actum cogitandi. Ergo est ens sive res. Imago autem quatenus repraesentativa distinguitur (et recte quidem) a Philosopho et scholasticis a seipsa quatenus est res quaedam. Ideo propria imaginis ratio est ut per eam recordemur et affectu amplectamur res significatas. Et istud est adorare imagines quatenus sunt repraesentativae, ut dicitur in praedicta synodo, quam libri autor citavit. Ibi enim dicitur quod adorari debent et venerari imagines ad primitivorum memoriam.62 Et hoc vere est adorare imaginem, nimirum per eam ferri in rem significatam et adoratam. [88] Denique sacri doctores hoc idem docent. Nam sanctissimus pontifex Gregorius loquens de Christi imagine sic scribit:

Ab autoritate s. doctorum.

Dum nobis ipsa pictura quasi scriptura ad memoriam filium [Dei] reducit, animum nostrum aut per resurrectionem laetificat63 aut per passionem demulcet. Et si genuflexi homines coram aliqua imagine aut triumphali signo sanctae crucis precantur, non lignum hoc sive lapidem adorant figuratum, sed summum Deum colunt. Et quem sensibus perspicere non valent, imaginem ex instituto illum referentem venerantur et adorant, non in illa sistentes, sed adorationem ad repraesentatum transferentes.64 Haec ille ex B. Gregorio. At quid, obsecro, haec verba sonant, nisi illud ipsum quod aiunt theologi, scilicet imaginem Christum referentem debere venerari et adorari, non sistendo in illa, sed adorationem in rem significatam transferendo? Adoratur ergo imago et non sistitur in ea, sed est id mediante quo res per eam significata adoratur et colitur. Et hoc idem exprimunt carmina illa ab autore citata, quae omnibus pene christianis nota sunt. Dicunt enim: Nam Deus est quod imago docet, sed non Deus ipsa. Hanc videas, sed mente colas quod cernis in ipsa.65 61 62 63 64

65

terminet: added in marg. Again the quote is from Pérez, De traditionibus, §§ 11 and 24, who referred erroneously to the Sixth Council. Corr. in ms. from laetificando. Ory again cites from Pérez, De traditionibus, § 23: like Pérez, Ory ends the passage attributed to Gregory the Great with “Haec ille,” but with ille Ory here refers to Pérez (not Gregory), since he adds, “ex B. Gregorio.” The first sentence of this passage is from an eighth-century interpolation in Gregory’s letter to Secundinus. The remainder of the quote (“Et si genuflexi homines … transferentes”) is a second interpolation, not found in sixteenth-century editions of Gregory’s letters: see above pp. 59, 182 n. 40, 183 n. 36. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24 and, on these verses, p. 13 and n. 21.

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distinguish the image qua representation from itself, insofar as it is a thing. Thus the proper purpose of the image is that through it we remember and affectively embrace the things it signifies. This is [what it means] to adore images qua representations, as stated by the aforementioned council, which the book’s author cited. There, in fact, it is stated that images must be adored and venerated in remembrance of the ancients.27 This is what it truly means to adore an image, that is, to be directed by it to the thing that is signified and adored. [88] Finally, the holy doctors teach the same [doctrine]. Speaking of the image of Christ, the most holy pontiff Gregory [I] writes:

The authority of the holy doctors.

While this picture stores the son [of God] in our memory like a text, it either lifts our spirits because of the resurrection, or softens it because of the passion. And when people pray, kneeling before an image or triumphal sign of the holy cross, they do not adore the piece of wood or stone that carries the image, but they worship the highest God. They venerate and adore him, whom they cannot perceive with their senses, through the image that refers to him, not remaining stuck in it, but transferring their adoration to the represented.28 Thus Pérez, citing St. Gregory. What, I ask, do these words call out, if not what the theologians say, namely that the image referring to Christ must be venerated and adored without remaining stuck in it, but transferring the adoration to the signified? Thus we adore the image and do not remain stuck in it: it is the means by which the thing signified by it is adored and worshipped. The same [idea] is expressed by the verses cited by the author, which are known to almost all Christians: For God is what the image teaches, but it is not God. The image you see, but in your mind you offer cult to what you discern in it.29

27 28

29

Again the quote is from Pérez, De traditionibus, §§ 11 and 24, who referred erroneously to the Sixth Council. Ory again cites from Pérez, De traditionibus, § 23. The first sentence of this passage is from an eighth-century interpolation in Gregory’s letter to Secundinus. The remainder of the quote is a second interpolation, not found in sixteenth-century editions of Gregory’s letters: see above pp. 59, 182 n. 40, 183 n. 36. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24 and, on these verses, p. 13 and n. 21.

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| Et hoc idem est quod dicit Damascenus, quod “adoratio imaginis ad prothotypon imaginisque veritatem transferri debet.”66 Et ideo non est imago id quod colitur seu adoratur, sed est id quo res ipsa adoratur.

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Ostenditur verba septimae synodi non favere autori circa adorationem imaginum. [89] Contra haec obiicit libri autor, et primo citat verba synodi quae (ut putat) dubitationem sustulit. Ait igitur: septima synodus,

Obiectio autoris.

in qua haec materia ad unguem agitata est […], loquens de omnibus imaginibus, qualis honor eis debeat exhiberi, non quidem (inquit) vera latria, quae soli divinae naturae competit, debet exhiberi, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae crucis et sanctis evangeliis. Constat autem sanctis evangeliis […] adorationem latriae minime deberi, qua […] ipse Deus qui repraesentatur solet adorari. Quare nec ulli imagini taliter, ut ad eam partialiter terminetur adoratio.67

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Haec ille. [90] Nos vero ad hanc obiectionem respondemus verba ipsa sacrae synodi secum afferre suam interpretationem. Non enim adoramus imagines tanquam res sanctas, sed tanquam typum et rerum sanctarum similitudines. Adoratur quidem res ipsa, quoniam in se habet sanctitatem; imago vero quia est typus rem habentem68 sanctitatem significans. Ideo alius est modus adorationis rei sanctae et signi sancti, et alia ratio adorandi, quia adoratur res tanquam quid excellens, et imago tanquam eam excellentiam significans. Non est autem eadem sanctitatis ratio rei et signi, quemadmodum nec est eadem sanitatis ratio in animali et urina. Nam in illo est tanquam in subiecto; in hoc autem est tanquam in signo. Porro rei et signi non potest esse eadem | ratio. Ideo latria, quae soli divinae naturae competit, non exhibetur69 imaginibus tanquam rebus excellentiam

66 67 68 69

Dilutio.

Again, the passage was already cited (with slightly different wording) by Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24. Pérez, § 24. The ms. repeats habentem erroneously. Following the word exhibetur, di- crossed out before the line break.

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[John] Damascene makes the same point: “the adoration of the image must be transferred to the prototype and truth of the image.”30 Therefore the image is not what is worshipped or adored, but it is that through which the thing itself is adored.

Here it is shown that the words of the Seventh Council do not support the author regarding the adoration of images. [89] The book’s author objects to this. First he cites the council’s words, which he believes raise a doubt. He says, in fact, that the Seventh Council,

An objection by the author.

which discussed this matter to a hair […], specifying, in reference to all images, what honor needs to be extended to them, says that [on these] true latria, which is owed only to the divine nature, is not to be conferred, but some form [of honor bestowed on] the figure of the venerable cross and the holy gospels. For it is certain that the holy gospels […] are not owed any adoration of latria, by which God himself, who is represented in them, is wont to be adored. Nor, then, [is it owed] to any image in such a way that the adoration partially ends in it.31 Thus the author. [90] To this objection we answer that the words of the holy council convey their own interpretation. We adore images not as holy things, but as figure (typus) and as likenesses of holy things. The thing itself is adored because it has holiness in itself; the image, however, since it is a figure signifying the thing that has holiness. Therefore the mode of adoration, and its meaning (ratio), is different for the holy thing and the holy sign: the thing is adored as something excellent, and the image as something that signifies that excellence. For the meaning of sanctity is not the same for thing and sign, just as the meaning of health is different in reference to an animal and to urine.32 It refers to the former as to its subject, to the latter as to a sign. Thus the meaning of thing and sign cannot be the 30 31 32

Justification.

Again, the passage was already cited (with slightly different wording) by Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24. Pérez, § 24. The medical comparison to clarify the distinction between subject (‘an animal has health’) and sign (‘urine is a sign of health’) is already found in Thomas Aquinas: see Ralph McIrney, “Saint Thomas on De hebdomadibus,” in The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca-London: Cornell University

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in se habentibus, sed velut typis et signis res sanctas significantibus, ut verba concilii ostendunt. Idem tamen est actus adorationis et rei et signi. [91] Secundo, falsum est quod subiungit, dicens quod sancta Dei evangelia non adoramus adoratione latriae. Nihil enim est in ipsis honore dignum, nisi quatenus rem sanctam significant. Iccirco si quis eis exhibetur honor, terminatur in rem excellentem et honore dignam, quae est Deus ipse, quem verba evangelii et signa repraesentant et significant. Alioqui dicat quo animi motu et qua reverentia ipse veneretur sancta Dei evangelia, et cuius est excellentia cui per eam reverentiam testimonium perhibeat? Nam sicut honor debetur virtuti, sic reverentia excellentiae. Non est autem aliqua in evangeliis excellentia aut caeteris signis, nisi quatenus res excellentes repraesentant. Ergo reverentia sive veneratio quae eis exhibetur, non sistit in eis, sed per eas fertur et terminatur in res significatas. Insuper cum id quod Dei est fortius sit et nobilius hominibus, necesse est ut veneretur maiore honore quam quaecumque alia sancta. Scripturae autem et imagines Christi sunt aliquid Dei in esse significativo, ergo coluntur cultu Dei, non quidem sicut res, sed sicut signa. [92] Videtur autem in hoc deceptus, quod nullum discrimen statuit inter eandem adorationem et eundem adorationis modum. Deus enim ut cognoscitur, sic et colitur. Alio autem modo cognoscitur in se, et alio modo in suis signis, scilicet scriptura et imagine. Ideo alio modo colitur quum videtur, et alio modo quum illius signa videntur. Cum autem idem sit Deus qui colitur in seipso, et qui in sua imagine, et variis adorationibus non adoretur Deus, sed una | tantum quae dicitur latria, et fit in recognitionem supremi dominii, uno genere adorationis colitur Deus sive in se70 sive in sua imagine. [93] Quod autem subiungit, dicens nec ulli imagini talis honor debetur qualis ipsi Deo qui per imaginem repraesentatur, “ut ad eam partialiter terminetur adoratio,”71 hic manifeste aequivocat ab imagine quatenus est imago ad imaginem quatenus est res. Nam omne id quod terminat actum intelligendi et adorandi est ens sive res honore digna. Ideo sive totaliter

70 71

se added superscr. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24.

In quo deceptio autoris.

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same. Therefore latria, which is reserved to the divine nature alone, is not bestowed upon images as things that have excellence in themselves, but as figures and signs that signify holy things, as the words of the council show. But the act of adoration of thing and sign is the same. [91] Second, what he proceeds to say is false, namely that we do not adore God’s holy gospels with the adoration of latria. For nothing in them is worthy of honor, except to the extent that they signify a holy thing. If therefore someone extends honor to them, this ends in the excellent thing worthy of honor, that is God himself, whom the gospel’s words and signs represent and signify. Otherwise by what movement of the soul and what reverence will he say that he venerates God’s holy gospels, and whose excellence is it to which he offers witness by this reverence? For just as honor is owed to virtue, thus reverence is owed to excellence. For there is no excellence in the gospels or in other signs, except insofar as they represent excellent things. Therefore the reverence or veneration exhibited to these things does not remain in them, but is transferred by them and ends in the things signified. Moreover, since what is of God is stronger and more noble than men, it necessarily should be venerated with greater honor than whatever other holy things. The scriptures and images of Christ are something of God in significant being, therefore they are worshipped with the cult of God, not, however, as things, but as signs. [92] Here the author appears to be misguided in the sense that he made no distinction between the adoration and the mode of adoration. God is worshipped in the same way in which he is known. But he is known differently in himself and in signs, such as scripture and an image. Thus he is worshipped in a different way when he is seen than when signs of him are seen. Since, however, the God who is worshipped in himself is one and the same as the God who is worshipped in his image, and since God is not adored in various forms of adoration, but only one, called latria – something that is done in recognition of his supreme dominion – there is one kind of adoration by which God is adored, either in himself or in an image of him. [93] However, he adds that no image is owed such honor as is owed to the God who is represented by the image, “so that the adoration partially ends in the latter.”33 Here he clearly equivocates between the image qua image and the image qua thing. For everything that ends the act of knowing and adoring is a being or thing worthy of honor. Thus an image [that]

33

Where the author is misguided.

Press, 1991), 74–97, at 87; Id., Boethius and Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990; repr. 2012), 234. Pérez, De traditionibus, § 24.

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sive partialiter imago terminet actum intelligendi et adorandi, est res et non signum. [94] Et tandem concludit autor quod in huiusmodi adorationibus potest incurri non leve peccatum et periculum conscientiae si a veritatis recto tramite deflectatur in iis qui ista audiunt et minime norunt distinguere. Ubi dicit magnum esse periculum si a vero cultu imaginum deflectatur, recte quidem dicit. Nam si adoraretur imago perinde atque Deus, aut putando Deum esse tali imagini similem, aut aliquid numinis esse in imagine in esse reali, aut si figura imaginis coleretur, tunc serviretur creaturae et non Creatori, quia cultus terminaretur ad imaginem tanquam ad rem quandam. Nullum est tamen periculum si simplices et idiotae nesciant definire imaginem aut speculative distinguere imaginem a substantia ipsius, perinde atque logici et philosophi distinguunt figuram a re figurata. Sed sufficit quod sciant imaginem esse repraesentationem rerum sanctarum et ut per eas imagines doceantur colere id quod repraesentatur per illas, transferendo intelligentiam et affectum ad res significatas et in ipsis imaginibus72 non sistendo. [95] Haec est vera ecclesiae doctrina, quam tradere debemus simplicibus sine disceptationibus cogitationum, an scilicet imago sit qualitas | vel relatio, vel in genere signi, et quae huius generis. In hac quidem conclusione satis inter scholasticos et autorem libri convenit. Nam hic dicit quod populus doceri debet ut sacras imagines veneretur propter id ad quod repraesentandum ordinatae sunt, et ut doceatur per eas levare intelligentiam et affectum ad res significatas nullatenus in eis sistendo. Theologi vero et scholastici nihil aliud unquam docuerunt. Nam imagines quatenus repraesentativae nullum aliud habent officium praeter illud quod est significare. Ideo per imaginem mens transfertur in rem significatam, neque sistit quovis modo in substantia imaginis vel figura, aut aliquo alio ipsius rei quae est imago. [96] Et licet dictus autor in sententia et conclusione cum scholasticis conveniat, differt tamen in verbis. Etenim dicit non esse hoc adorare imaginem, sed in praesentia imaginis rem significatam colere. Et propterea addidit: Nullo tamen modo (inquit) velim dicere quod eadem adoratione adorantur imagines qua et res significatae, quandoquidem neque

72

imaginibus added superscr.

Quid periculi potest incurri in cultu imaginum.

In quo autor cum scholasticis et conveniat et discrepet.

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ends the act of knowing and adoring, whether completely or partially, is a thing and not a sign. [94] In the end the author concludes that in this kind of adorations a major sin and danger to the conscience may occur if among those who listen to these [discussions] and do not know how to make the proper distinctions some stray from the straight path of the truth. He is right where he says that there is great danger in straying from the true cult of images. For if an image is adored as if it were God, or in the belief that God is similar to that image, or that there is something numinous in the image in real being, or if the figure of the image is worshipped, then the created thing is served, not the Creator, since the worship ends in the image qua thing. But there is no danger if the simple, uneducated folk do not know how to define the image, or speculatively to distinguish the image from its substance, in the way in which logicians and philosophers distinguish a figure from a figured thing. But it suffices for them to know that the image is a representation of holy things and that they are taught by these images to worship what is represented by them, by directing their intellect and affect to the things signified without remaining stuck in these images. [95] This is the true doctrine of the Church, which we need to pass on to ordinary folks without learned disquisitions on whether the image is a quality or relation, or has the genus of the sign, and things of this sort. In this regard the scholastics and the book’s author largely agree. For he says that the people need to be taught that they should venerate sacred images because of what these are designed to represent; and that they are to lift up their intellect and affect to the things signified without remaining stuck in [the images]. The theologians and scholastics have never taught otherwise. For images, insofar as they are representations, have no function other than to signify. Thus the mind is transferred by the image to the thing signified, and in no way does it remain stuck in the substance or figure of the image or in any other aspect of the thing that is the image. [96] And although the author agrees with the scholastics in his assessment and conclusion, he differs in his formulation. For he says that this is not to adore the image, but to worship the thing signified in the presence of the image. For this reason, he added: In no way would I say that the images are adored with the same adoration as the things signified, inasmuch as neither scripture nor

What danger may be incurred in the cult of images.

Where the author agrees and disagrees with the scholastics.

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scriptura neque traditio ecclesiae73 hoc iubet, et (ut dixi) multis etiam scandalo sunt.74

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Haec ille. Itaque falsum est illud quod dicit, hoc scilicet non esse adorare imaginem, sed in praesentia imaginis. Nam actus adorationis terminatur in rem significatam mediante imagine. Et hoc est uno actu adorare imaginem tanquam obiectum quo, etiam si de ipsa nihil pensetur, et rem significatam tanquam obiectum quod adoratur. Ergo falsum est quod hoc non sit adorare imaginem quatenus repraesentativa est. Quanquam verum est quod hoc non est adorare imaginem quatenus res est.  [97]  Tenet consequentia quia si quovis modo terminaretur actus in imaginem, scilicet de ipsa pensando vel ipsam venerando tanquam habentem sanctitatem, tunc imago esset res sive ens, et non imago quatenus signum vel repraesentativa. [98] Falsum est denique quod adorare rem significatam per imaginem sit solum in praesentia imaginis adorare rem significatam. Nam ipsa imago tunc concurrit ad actum intelligendi et adorandi rem significatam. Concurrit enim tanquam obiectum ad productionem conceptus eam repraesentantis, cum ipse conceptus sit idem realiter cum ipso actu intelligendi. Terminus enim ad quem alicuius motus est idem realiter cum ipso motu. Ergo imago concurrit et ad actum et ad conceptum rei significatae producendum, sed actus intellectus concurrit ad actum voluntatis. Nam voluntas fertur in suum obiectum secundum quod praesentatur ei per intellectum. Si ergo praesentetur ei res excellens, movebitur voluntas ad ipsam adorandam. Imago autem concurrit tanquam obiectum ad praesentandum voluntati rem excellentem per imaginem significatam. Ergo quemadmodum concurrit ad actum cognitionis, sic quoque et ad actum adorationis. Nam idem est obiectum utriusque, illius quidem sub ratione veri, istius autem sub ratione boni et excellentis. Obiectum autem, ut Philosophus docet, movet potentiam et concurrit ad productionem actus. Ergo adorare imaginem non est solummodo in praesentia imaginis rem significatam colere, sed est ipsam imaginem concurrere ad actum intellectus et voluntatis obiective. Nam mediante imagine mo- | vetur intellectus ad cognoscendum rem excellentem, et voluntas ad illam venerandam.

73 74

traditio (following ecclesiae) has a dotted line underneath, evidently to erase it. Peréz, De traditionibus, § 24 (Ory’s quote varies slightly from the source).

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the tradition of the Church orders this, and (as I said) they are scandalous to many.34 Thus the author. Hence what he says is false, namely that this is not adoring the image, but in the presence of the image. For the act of adoration ends in the signified by means of the image. This means to adore in one act the image as object-by-which (even if one does not think of it) and the thing signified as object that one adores. Therefore it is false to claim that this is not adoration of the image insofar as it is representational, although it is true that this is not adoration of the image insofar as it is a thing. [97] As a consequence, if the act somehow ended in the image, that is, in thinking of it or venerating it as something that has holiness, then the image would be a thing or being, and not a sign or representation. [98] Therefore it is false [to assert] that to adore a thing signified by an image means only to adore the thing signified in the presence of the image. In that case, in fact, the image itself assists in the act of knowing and adoring the thing signified. It assists as object in the production of the concept that represents it [the signified], since this concept is identical realiter with the act of knowing. For the terminus ad quem of a movement is identical realiter with that movement. Thus the image assists in producing both the act [of the intellect] and the concept of the thing signified, but the act of the intellect assists in the act of the will. For the will is directed to its object based on what it is presented by the intellect. Hence if the will is presented an excellent thing, it will be moved to adoration. The image assists as object in presenting to the will an excellent thing signified by the image. Therefore, just as it assists in the act of cognition, so it does in the act of adoration. For the object of both is the same, the former on account of its truth, the latter on account of the good and excellent [it contains]. Now, as the Philosopher teaches, an object moves a potentiality and assists in the production of the act. Therefore to adore an image means not only to worship the thing signified in the presence of the image, but for the image to assist objectively in the act of intellect and will. For by means of the image the intellect is moved to know an excellent thing, and the will to venerate it.

34

Peréz, De traditionibus, § 24 (Ory’s quote varies slightly from the source).

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[99] Et idem dicendum est de verbis et scripturis ac caeteris signis quae movent animos, sive corrumpendo bonos et sanctos mores, sive movendo ad bonum et ad ipsius virtutis amorem. Et hac ratione merito improbantur et depingi prohibentur impudicae imagines, quandoquidem imagines et exempla plus solent movere quam verba. Quamobrem libri autor errare deprehenditur, dum nullam posuit differentiam inter praesentiam localem et obiectivam. Nam res quae est tantummodo praesens localiter non concurrit ad actum intelligendi vel adorandi, quia neque monstrat rem adorandam neque movet ad colendum eam. Immo non raro solet contingere ut ab adorante nesciatur esse praesens, quia nullo modo ab eo percipitur. Res vero quae est praesens obiective immutat potentiam et ab eo75 percipitur atque movet intellectum sub ratione veri, et affectum sive voluntatem sub ratione boni. Et ob eam causam nobis diserte in scriptura praecipitur ut avertamus oculos a vanitate sive rerum sive imaginum. Eos vero convertamus ad res honestas atque sanctas quae inducunt et plurimum movent ad amorem verae virtutis verique boni. Et per consequens talis adoratio non solummodo fit in praesentia imaginis, sed etiam ipsa concurrente et movente ad intelligendum et ad adorandum rem significatam. [100] Praeterea talis conceptus, qui est actualis notitia rei per imaginem significatae, producitur in mente non solum per visionem rei in se, sed etiam per visionem rei in imagine. Ideo | eadem notitia potest produci ex visione rei in se et ex visione rei in sua similitudine. Et per consequens, sicut res ipsa in se visa movet obiective ad intelligendum et adorandum, ita res visa in sua imagine. Et hoc est vere adorare imaginem quatenus imago est, nimirum per eam ferri in rem adoratam. Etenim proprium imaginis officium (ut superius abunde ostendimus) est in memoriam reducere rem repraesentatam sive mentem transferre in rem significatam sive intelligendo sive adorando. Romae, 8 martii 155276

75 76

Ms. ea. Date added by different hand, sideways at the bottom right side of the page.

Cur prohibendae scripturae quaedam et imagines.

Praesentia localis et obiectiva differunt.

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[99] And the same must be said about words, texts, and other signs that move souls, either by corrupting good and holy mores, or by moving them to the good and the love of virtue itself. For this reason painting indecent images is justly condemned and forbidden, inasmuch as images and examples tend to move [the soul] more than words. Therefore the book’s author is found to be in error when he assumes no difference between local and objective presence. For a thing that is only present locally does not assist in the act of knowing or adoring, because it neither shows the thing that is to be adored nor moves [the soul] toward its veneration. Indeed, it often happens that its presence remains unknown to the person in adoration, because he does not perceive it in any way. But a thing that is present objectively alters its potentiality, it is perceived by him, and it moves the intellect on account of its truth, and the affect or the will on account of its goodness. For this reason scripture orders us clearly to avert the eyes from vain things or images. Instead we ought to turn them to decent and holy things, which lead and move [us] very much to the love of true virtue and goodness. Consequently, this adoration not only occurs in the presence of the image, but also because the latter assists and moves [us] toward knowing and adoring the thing signified. [100] Furthermore, this concept, which is the actual concept of the thing signified by the image, is produced in the mind by the visual perception not only of the thing in itself, but also of the thing in the image. Therefore, the same concept can be produced from the visual perception of the thing in itself and that of the thing in its likeness. Consequently, just as the thing seen in itself moves [one] objectively to knowing and adoration, so does the thing seen in its image. This is truly [what it means] to adore an image qua image, namely to be directed by it towards the thing that is adored. In fact, the proper function of an image is (as we have abundantly shown above) to store the thing represented in memory or to lead the mind towards the thing signified in intellection or adoration. Rome, March 8, 1552

Why some texts and images must be prohibited.

The difference between local and objective presence.

III. Matthieu Ory – Jean Calvin Opposing Views on Sacred Images 70r

Coppie d’un pappier de l’inquisiteur Horrys donne aux prisonniers pour la parolle a Lion pour faire tenir a Monsr. Calvin1

∵ [1] Memoire a Monsr. le prient de remonstrer que les commandemens de la vielle loy ne sont pas les commandemens donnez aux Chrestiens. [2] Premierement la ou il y a un[e] autre loy, la sont autres commandemens. Au nouveau testament il y a une autre loy qui se nomme evangelique quil ny avoit au vieil testament auquel estoit la loy mosaique. Dont les commandemens donnez aux Chrestiens sont autres que les commandemens donnez aux Israelites. [3] Secondement les chrestiens ne sont tenuz d’observer aucuns commandemens silz ne sont moraux, qui est a dire de la loy naturelle ou evangelique, qui est a dire de la loy de la foy, qui sont deux reigles de vivre, cest assavoir humaine et divine. Dont la premiere convient a lhomme entant quil est humain, et la seconde luy convient entant quil est chrestien. Dont tout commandement qui nest point de la loy de nature, cest assavoir de raison naturelle ou de la foy ne nous oblige point, combien quil soit escrit au vieil testament.

1 Published in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Guilielmus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, Eduardus Reuss, vol. 10, pars prior, Corpus Reformatorum 38, pars prior (Brunsvigae: apud C.A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1871), Consilia, cols. 197–99, which has here been checked and corrected based on the manuscript in the Bibliothèque de Genève, Ms. lat. 113, fol. 70r–v. At the top of fol. 70r, a different hand has added: “Memoire d’un inquisiteur addresse à Calvin.” The title given (“Coppie d’un papier … Calvin”) is found on fol. 70v. Note that the expression “prisonniers pour la parolle [de Dieu]” was also used by Jean Crespin in references to the Lyon prisoners: see his Histoire des martyrs persecutez et mis à mort pour la verité de l’Evangile, depuis le temps des Apostres iusques à present (s.l. [Geneva], s.e. [Jean Vignon?], 1608), Livre 4, fol. 247v, where the heading of one letter reads: “Autre Epistre par M. Iean Calvin aux susdits prisonniers detenus pour la parole de Dieu à Lyon.” See further chapter 2, pp. 61–66. I thank Mme Paule Hochuli Dubuis, conservatrice at the Bibliothèque de Genève, for her generous assistance in locating the documents edited in this section.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_008

III. Matthieu Ory – John Calvin Opposing Views on Sacred Images

Copy of a paper by Inquisitor Ory given to the imprisoned for the Word in Lyon to be sent to Mons. Calvin

∵ [1] Note to Monseigneur: they ask him to explain that the commandments of the old law are not the commandments given to the Christians. [2] First, where a different law exists, there are other commandments. In the New Testament there is another law, called evangelical, which did not exist in the Old Testament, which was under Mosaic law. Hence the commandments given to the Christians are different from those given to the Israelites. [3] Second, Christians are not bound to observe any commandments that are not moral, that is to say, pertaining to natural or evangelical law, that is to say, the law of faith, which consists of two rules of living, human and divine. The first is fitting for men insofar as they are human, the second insofar as they are Christians. Hence every commandment which does not pertain to natural law, that is to say, natural reason, or to the faith does not oblige us, even though it is written in the Old Testament.

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[4] Tiercement le precepte donne au vieil Israel de ne faire point d’image taillee et de ne l’adorer nest point de raison naturelle. Et par consequent ce nest pas un precepte moral et nest point de la loy. Car il nest point escrit en levangile et nouveau testament. Parquoy cest un precepte donne speciallement au peuple d’Israel pour le preserver d’idolatrie, a laquelle il estoit fort enclin et induict a la similitude des gentilz, entre lesquelz il habitoit. [5] En premier lieu il est bien manifeste que ledict precepte nest point moral. Car il nest point contre raison de parler par images et signes, comme Dieu souvent a parle aux prophetes et saintz des2 viel et nouveau testament. Et par diverses similitudes a vouleu nous represanter les choses distantes. Parquoy ainsi quil nest point contre raison d’enseigner son prochain par parolle ou escriture, aussi nest il point contre raison de lenseigner par images represantivez et similitudes, ainsi que Dieu a fait. Et par ainsi nous est licite en ensuivant d’ainsi faire. [6] Et mesmement il a commande faire deux images corporelles des cherubins dedans le temple et cest represante et fait adorer a Abraham. Et en lapocalypse en son image et semblance du filz de lhomme. Parquoy ainsi comme nous enclinons la teste quant on lit le nom de Dieu et mistere de grace qui nous sont represantez par les parolles; et ainsi que nous baisons les evangiles, pourtant quelles signifient la verite divine, aussi nous enclinons la teste et venerons en baisant les images entant quelles representent icelles choses saintes que signifient les divines parolles et saintes escritures. Car tous les troys, cest assavoir parolles, escritures, et images ne sont que signes saintz. Cest a dire qu’en eux il nia point de saintete selon l’estre real comme pensoient les idolatres de leurs idoles mais seulement y a une saintete en leur estre signifiant, scavoir pour autant quelles signifient les choses saintes. [7] Et aussi ce precepte nest point de la foy ne commande par Iesuchrist et son esprit au nouveau testament. Parquoy ceux qui les veulent observer iudaizent et renoncent la foy, protestant de fait que Iesuschrist par sa mort na pas aboly la vielle loy. Qui est contre les escritures du nouveau testament. Et encore plus plainement iudaizent quilz pensent que le chappitre 20e d’Exode contienne les commandemens de nostre loy; et qui ainsi les impriment ou font escrire en leurs colonnes les proposant comme commandemens donnes aux chrestiens, ilz errent grandement. Car lescriture nous enseigne que ceux la sont les vieux3 preceptes et ceux 2 des added superscr. 3 Followed by precheptes preche, erased.

[Apoc. 1:13–16]

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[4] Third, the precept given to ancient Israel not to make any graven image and not to adore it does not pertain to natural reason. Consequently, it is not a moral precept and does not pertain to the law, for it is not written in the gospel and the New Testament. Therefore, it is a precept given especially to the people of Israel to preserve them from idolatry, to which they were much inclined and induced, in the same way as the gentiles among whom they lived. [5] In the first place, it is quite evident that the aforementioned precept is not a moral one. For it is not against reason to speak through images and signs, just as God often spoke to the prophets and saints of the Old and New Testaments, and through various likenesses wished to represent remote things to us. Therefore, just as it is not against reason to teach one’s neighbors by word or text, thus it is not against reason to teach them through representational images and likenesses. God has done so. And hence we are allowed to follow him and do the same. [6] Likewise, he commanded that two corporeal images of cherubim be made in the temple, and he represented himself to Abraham to be adored; and in the Apocalypse [he appeared] in the image and likeness of the son of man. Therefore, just as we bow our head when one reads the name of God and the mystery of grace, which are represented to us by these words; and just as we kiss the gospels inasmuch as they signify the divine truth, thus we bow our head and venerate images, kissing them, inasmuch as they represent those holy things signified by the divine words and holy scriptures. For all three – to wit, words, scriptures, and images – are nothing but holy signs. That is to say, there is no holiness in them according to real being, as the idolaters believed about their idols, but there is only holiness in their significant being, namely, insofar as they signify holy things. [7] Furthermore, this precept is not of the faith nor commanded in the New Testament by Jesus Christ and his Spirit. Therefore, those who want to observe it judaize and renounce the faith, effectively affirming that Jesus Christ has not abolished the old law by his death. This against the New Testament scriptures. They judaize even more clearly by thinking that Exodus 20 contains the commandments of our law; and those who print or publish them in their pages, proposing them as commandments given to Christians, are in grave error. For the scripture teaches us that those are old precepts, and that the evangelical ones are the new precepts.

[Apoc. 1:13–16]

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de levangile sont les nouveaux. Et le motif d’accomplir les vieux commandemens sont les biens temporelz et les craintes de peines, comme estre tire d’Egypte, et estre batu et puni iusques a la tierce et quarte generation qui ne les observent. Et le motif de ceux du nouveau testament cest lamour de Dieu et des biens celestes. Parquoy nous n’avons pas receu derechief lesprit de4 servitude en crainte, mais lesprit filial pour faire et accomplir la loy de grace par amour. Et aussi ceux la du vieux testament s’accomplissent selon raison et selon la loy de Moyse, ceux cy selon la foy et loy evangelique. Et pourtant il y a autant de difference entre les deux genres de commandemens comme il y a entre Adam et Iesus, entre lhomme humain et lhomme chrestien. | A ceste cause Iesuchrist nous a dit quil nous donne un commandement nouveau contenant5 nouvelles ordonnances. [8] Et davantage ceux qui sarrestent a la lettre qui est escrite audict chapitre et autres escritures de la vieille loy il est necessaire quil confond et mesle ce quest ceremonial avec le moral. Et par ainsi ils iudaizent et gardent le decalogue du vieil testament, pensent chrestiennement vivre et garder le decalogue du nouveau testament. Car la dedans le texte est dit quil faut observer le sabbat et ne faire point d’autel de pierres ains seulement de terre et sans degrez et autres telles choses qui sont escrites dans la lettre du decalogue de Moyse et tout cela est reseque au decalogue evangelique donne par Iesuchrist et expressement mis aux evangiles et escritures du nouveau testament.

[Exod. 20:8 and 20:24–26]

[Jean Calvin] S’il est licite de faire des images pour representer Dieu6 [9] La question est, ascavoir sil est licite de faire des images pour figurer Dieu et les adorer en l’honneur de celuy lequel elles figurent. [10] En premier lieu, on ne peult nier que Dieu n’aye expressement deffendu en sa loy, quant il dict: “Tu ne te feras images taillées, ny similitudes aucunes. Tu ne les adoreras, et ne leurs porteras honneur.”

[Exod. 20:4–5]

4 Followed by servt, crossed out. 5 Followed by Et davantage, crossed out. 6 Published in Ioannis Calvini opera, vol. 10, pars prior, Consilia, coll. 199–202, which has here been checked and corrected based on the manuscript in the Bibliothèque de Genève, Ms. fr. 145, fols. 119r–120v (fols. 121r–122r are blank); the title is given on fol. 122v, along with the note: “Question proposée par frere Matthieu Horris inquisiteur.” On fol. 119r, top left, a later hand added, “Consultation sur la fabrication des images.”

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The motive for satisfying the old commandments is [the acquisition of] temporal goods and the fear of punishments, such as being freed from Egypt and being beaten and punished until the third and fourth generation for those who do not observe them. The motive of those under the New Testament is the love of God and celestial goods. Therefore we have not again received the spirit of servitude in fear, but the filial spirit to follow and realize the law of grace in love. The [commandments] of the Old Testament are realized by reason and the law of Moses; those [of the New Testament] by faith and evangelical law. Thus there is as much difference between to the two kinds of commandments as there is between Adam and Jesus, and between the human and the Christian. To this end Jesus Christ has told us that he gives us a new commandment containing new orders. [8] Moreover, those who stop at the letter of the aforementioned chapter and other scriptures of the old law necessarily confuse and mix up the ritual and the moral. Thus they judaize and keep the decalogue of the Old Testament, believing that they live in a Christian manner and keep the decalogue of the New Testament. For that text [the Old Testament] tells us to observe the sabbath and not to make altars of stones, but only of earth, and without steps, and other [norms] described in the letter of Moses’s Ten Commandments; all that is removed from the evangelical decalogue given by Jesus Christ and expressly included in the gospels and the New Testament scriptures.

[Exod. 20:8 and 20:24–26]

[John Calvin] Whether it is licit to make images to represent God [9] The question is whether it is licit to make images to figure God and to adore these in honor of him who is figured by them. [10] In the first place, one cannot deny what God has expressly forbidden in his law, saying: “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any things. Thou shalt not adore them, and thou shalt not honor them.”

[Exod. 20:4–5]

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[11] Frere Matthieu Horis pour montrer le contraire allegue que nous ne sommes point tenuz a observer la loy de Moise, mesmes qu’elle est abolie quant aux Chrestiens, et que ceux qui luy veullent donner authorité entre nous iudaisent. [12] Que telle responce soit meschante et en tout repugnante a la verité il appert par trop de raisons. Moise aiant publié la loy proteste avec iurement solennel qu’en icelle est contenue la vie, et la mort. Item, c’est cy la voie, chemine en icelle. Davantage cest chose plus que notoire que Dieu a donné les dix parolles comme une regle de iustice perpetuelle et immuable. Pour laquelle raison il est dict: “Qui fera ces choses, il vivra en icelles.” Suyvant cela nostre Seigneur Iesus ne dict pas qu’il faille mettre la loy soubz le pied, mais en l’exposant il veult qu’elle soit tenue et gardée en sa pureté. Et quant un l’interrogue quelle est la façon de bien vivre, il respond: “Si tu veux entrer a la vie, garde les commandemens.” Et sainct Paul parlant aux Chrestiens ne leur baille point une nouvelle forme pour servir a Dieu, mais plustost les ramene a la loy, comme quant il dict au xiiie des Romains: “Celuy qui ayme son prochain a accomply la loy.” Car ces commandemens: tu ne paillarderas point, tu ne seras ne meurtrier, ny larron, sont compris en ce sommaire: Tu aymeras ton prochain comme toy mesmes. Item au 5.e des Galatiens: “Servez l’un a l’autre en charité.” Car toute la loy est accomplie en ce mot: “Tu aymeras ton prochain comme toymesmes.” Item aux 6e des Ephesiens: “Enfans obeissez a voz peres et meres. Car cela est iuste,” comme il est escrit: “Honore ton pere et ta mere, qui est le premier commandement aveques promesses.” Brief l’escriture est plaine de telz tesmoignages. Et quiconques nye que la loy ne soit commune a tous fidelles tant Chrestiens que Iuifz, cestuy la renonce plainement Dieu et sa iustice. Car toute perfection de saincteté est contenue en la loy. [13] Au reste, quant l’escriture dict que la loy a prins fin a la venue de Iesus Christ, cela s’entend des ceremonies, comme c’est une doctrine si claire qu’elle est tournée quasi en proverbe: Que la loy moralle dure a iamais, combien que la loy ceremonielle soit abolie. [14] Item quant l’escriture dict que les Chrestiens sont afranchiz de la servitude de la loy, cela s’entend avec les conditions et qualitez qui y estoient apposées, a ce qu’elle ne nous tienne plus | en sa rigueur pour nous condamner. Mais cependant la doctrine ne laisse point d’avoir sa vigueur. Et quiconques veult obeir a Dieu, il doit la conformer sa vie et s’y assubiectir. Parquoy il est a conclurre que frere Matthieu Oris banissant la loy des dix parolles de l’eglise chrestienne blaspheme trop villainement contre Dieu, qui en est l’autheur, foullant aux piedz son authorité. Car il nous

[Gal. 3:12; cf. Lev. 18:5]

[Matt. 19:17]

[Rom. 13:8]

[Gal. 5:13] [Matt. 22:39; Rom. 13:9] [Eph. 6:1–2]

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[11] To demonstrate the opposite, Brother Matthieu Ory argues that we are not held to observe the law of Moses, even that it has been abolished for Christians, and that those who wish to give it authority over us, judaize. [12] For multiple reasons it is evident that this response is evil and altogether contrary to the truth. After announcing the law, Moses averred under solemn oath that in it is contained life and death. Also, they contain the way and the path. Moreover, it is well known that God has given us these ten words as a perpetual, immutable rule of justice. For this reason he has said: “He that doth those things, shall live in them.” Accordingly, our Lord Jesus has not said that we must step on the law, but, as he explains it, he wants that it be kept and guarded in its purity. And when someone asks him for the way to live well, he answers: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” And St. Paul, speaking to the Christians, does not bring them a new way to serve God, but rather returns them to the law, as when he says in Romans 13: “For he that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the law.” For these commandments – thou shalt not fornicate, thou shalt not murder nor steal – are contained in this summary: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Likewise in Galatians 5: “By charity serve one another.” For the entire law is accomplished in this word: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Likewise in Ephesians 6: “Children, obey your fathers and mothers, for this is just.” As it is written: “Honor thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with a promise.” In short, scripture is full of such testimony. And whoever denies that the law is common to all faithful, both Christians and Jews, clearly renounces God and his justice. For all perfection of holiness is contained in the law. [13] Besides, when scripture says that the law has come to an end with the coming of Jesus Christ, that refers to rituals. This doctrine is so clear that it has almost been turned into a proverb: the moral law lasts forever, as much as ritual law is abolished. [14] Also, when the scripture says that Christians are freed from the servitude of the law, that is to be understood to mean with the conditions and qualities attached to it, so that it no longer holds us tightly to condemn us. Meanwhile, however, doctrine does not lose its force. And those who wish to obey God must conform their lives and subject themselves to it. Hence it must be concluded that Brother Matthieu Ory, in banishing the law of the ten words from the Christian Church, blasphemes most wickedly against God, who authored it, treading its authority underfoot. For

[Gal: 3:12; cf. Lev. 18:5]

[Matt. 19:17]

[Rom. 13:8] [Matt. 22:39; Rom. 13:9] [Gal. 5:13] [Eph. 6:1–2]

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doit souvenir que sainct Iaques, voulant monstrer que c’est a Dieu qu’il appartient de saulver et damner, nous ramene a ce point la, qu’il a donné sa loy pour gouverner noz ames. Vray est que le commandement du sabbat est bien ceremonial en partie, mais quant a la substance et verité il demeure en son entier et doit valloir entre les Chrestiens, combien que ce qui concernoit les umbres et figures aict cessé. [15] Mesmes cela faict contre ce cafart. Car en toutes les dix parolles ou ne trouvera rien qui apartienne aux ceremonies anciennes excepté l’observation du sabbat, comme aussi Sainct Augustin en parle, notamment au livre De spiritu et litera.7 Dont il s’ensuit que la deffense de faire images est comprinse en la loy moralle, a laquelle tous ceux qui ne veullent estre subiectz reiectent le ioug de Dieu. [16] Frere Matthieu Oris adiouste consequemment que tous les commandemens de la loy ne sont valides entre les Chrestiens, sinon entant quilz sont conformes a la raison naturelle. [17] A quoy ie respons que s’il prent la raison telle qu’elle est en ceux qui sont descenduz d’Adam, assavoir corrumpue par le peché, il s’abuse trop lourdement. Car c’est aultant comme s’il disoit qu’il ne fault iuge par la veue des aveugles. Mais cependant ie dy aussi a l’opposite, que ce commandement second de la loy est prins et extraict de l’ordre de nature, assavoir qu’on ne doit figurer Dieu par quelques images visibles. Car Dieu n’a pas simplement deffendu de parolles precises qu’on ne le figurast point, mais aussi quant et quant a adiousté la raison naturelle pourquoy cela ne se devoit faire: comme il est escrit au 4. du Deuteronome, item au 46. d’Esaie: “A qui m’avez vous faict semblable?” Parquoy toutes idoles sont aultant de monstres contre nature, qui desguisent la verité de Dieu et la convertissent en mensonge. Suyvant cela il est dict tant par le prophete Ieremie comme par Abacuh que les images ne sont que faulseté.8 [18] Quant a ce que le frere Matthieu Oris allegue, qu’il est licite de paindre toutes figures ausquelles Dieu est apparu, il fauldroit qu’on fust bien beste pour luy accorder un si sot argument. Car Dieu ne s’est iamais monstré en espece visible a telle intention qu’on en fist des paintures. Qui plus est, aux visions qu’ont eu les sainctz peres il a tousiours imprimé quelque marque de sa maiesté, laquelle ne se peult exprimer par main d’homme, ne par artifice. Parquoy ceux qui veullent paindre la maiesté de Dieu soubz couleur des visions qu’il en a données, la falsifient.

7 Cf. Augustine, De spiritu et littera, ed. William Bright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914). 8 Corr. by different hand from faulceté.

[Deut. 4:15–18] [Isa. 46:5]

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we must remember that St. James, wishing to show that it is up to God to save and condemn, returns us to this point, that he has given his law to govern our souls. It is true that the commandment of the sabbath is partly ritual, but in its substance and truth it stands entirely and must be valid among Christians, even if that which concerned its shadows and figures has become void. [15] Even that argues against this misbeliever. For in all these ten words one will find none that pertains to ancient rituals except for the observation of the sabbath, as St. Augustine observes as well, especially in his book On the Spirit and the Letter. Hence it follows that the prohibition against making images is comprised within moral law, to which those who reject God’s yoke do not wish to be subjected. [16] Brother Matthieu Ory then adds that all commandments of the law are invalid among Christians unless they conform to natural reason. [17] To this I respond that if he takes reason such as it exists in the descendants of Adam, that is, corrupted by sin, he is most severely mistaken. For this is as if he said that one must judge by the eyes of the blind. But meanwhile I also say, to the contrary, that the second commandment of the law is taken and derived from the order of nature, that is to say that one must not figure God by some visible images. For God has not simply forbidden with precise words that he be figured, but he has also added time and again the natural reason why that must be done: as is written in Deuteronomy 4, and again in Isaiah 46: “To whom have you likened me?” Therefore all idols are as many monsters against nature, who disguise God’s truth and convert it into lies. Accordingly, the prophets Jeremiah and Habakkuk have said that images are nothing but falsehood. [18] As for Brother Matthieu Ory’s contention that it is licit to paint all figures to whom God has appeared, one must be quite dumb to concede him such a foolish argument. For God has never shown himself as a visible species intending that paintings be made thereof. What is more, in visions that the holy fathers have had he has always imprinted some mark of his majesty which cannot be expressed by human hand or artifice. Therefore, those who want to paint God’s majesty under the color of the visions he has given of it, falsify it.

[Deut. 4:15–18] [Isa. 46:5]

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[19] En l’aultre argument frere Matthieu Oris est encores plus ridicule. | C’est qu’il est licite de figurer Dieu par les choses ausquelles il s’accompare. Car dela on tomberoit en des absurditez trop lourdes, qu’il le9 fauldroit paindre en figures de montagne, de lion, et d’ours. Et qu’il fauldroit paindre le iugement de nostre Signeur Iesus en figure de larron. Ainsi tout ce qu’amene ce cafart ne faict rien a montrer que les idoles ne soient du tout repugnantes a la raison et ordre de nature. Et de faict sainct Paul au sermon qu’il fist en la ville d’Athenes, lequel sainct Luc recite au 17. des Actes, ne mect point en avant la loy de Moise pour prouver qu’on ne doit point figurer Dieu par images visibles, mais addressant son propoz aux payens les ramene a l’ordre de nature: d’aultant que nous sommes genre de Dieu, nous ne devons pas cuider qu’il soit semblable a l’or, ou a l’argent, ou a pierres, ou a tout ce qui est imaginé par les hommes. [20] Touchant ce qu’allegue frere Matthieu des cherubins, c’est merveilles qu’il n’aperçoit point10 quil y a manifeste contradiction en ses propoz. Mais voila comme Dieu abrutit ses ennemys. Il confesse que les idoles ont esté deffendues aux Iuifz. Or en despit de ses dens il faut quil confesse touchant les cherubins quilz11 n’ont esté que pour le temps de la loy. Il s’ensuit donques qu’ilz n’ont pas esté faictz pour figure de Dieu, comme aussi la chose le monstre. Car estans posez au sanctuaire pour couvrir le propiciatoire, ilz signifioient que la maiesté de Dieu est invisible. Et en cachant leurs visages aveques leurs ailes ilz avertissoient les hommes de la reverence et sobrieté qu’ilz doivent avoir en cherchant Dieu. A quoy il n’y a rien plus contraire que d’attenter de luy faire quelque remembrance corporelle. [21] La raison qu’il allegue que les images ont esté deffendues aux Iuifz pour ce qu’ilz estoient enclins a idolatrie fait contre luy mesmes.12 Car ça esté un vice general a tous peuples et qui est enraciné aux coeurs des hommes. Car la source d’idolatrie est que nous sommes charnelz, et apprehendons Dieu selon nostre fantasie. Parquoy ie conclu au contraire: puis que la raison, sur laquelle est fondée la deffense de faire images, dure encores au iourdhuy, que la mesme deffence nous apartient et doit estre appliquée à tous aages iusques à la fin du monde. Car iusques a ce que les hommes soient plainement renouvellez, il est impossible qu’ilz ne s’adonnent a idolatrie, quant ilz en auront quelque obiect. Et defaict 9 10 11 12

le added superscr. point added superscr. il faut … quilz added in margin by different hand. fait contre luy mesmes added in margin by same hand as in previous note.

[Acts 17:23–29]

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[19] In his other argument Brother Matthieu Ory is even more ridiculous. According to this, it is licit to figure God through the things he compares himself to. From here one falls into the deepest absurdities, [such as] that he must be painted with figures of mountains, of a lion, and a bear; and one should paint the judgment of our Lord Jesus with the figure of the thief. Thus everything this misbeliever adduces shows nothing except that idols are altogether contrary to reason and the natural order. In fact, St. Paul, in the sermon he gave in the city of Athens, recorded by St. Luke in Acts 17, does not put forward the law of Moses to prove that God may not be figured by visible images, but, addressing the pagans, leads them to the order of nature: inasmuch as we are God’s offspring we must not think that he is similar to gold, silver, stones, or anything that is imagined by humans. [20] As for what Brother Matthieu contends about the cherubim, it is surprising that he is unaware that there is a plain contradiction in his points. But that is how God confounds his enemies. He admits that idols have been prohibited to the Jews. Now he needs to admit, in spite of himself, that the cherubim existed only for the time of the law. It follows, then, that they have not been made as a figure of God, as this episode shows. For having been installed in the sanctuary on top of the propitiatory, they signified that God’s majesty is invisible. And by hiding their faces with their wings, they warned humans of the reverence and sobriety they need to have in searching for God. Nothing is more contrary to this than to try to make him some form of corporeal memorial. [21] The reason why he contends that images have been prohibited to the Jews, [namely] that they were inclined to idolatry, contradicts itself. For that has been a vice common to all peoples and one that is rooted in the hearts of men. For the source of idolatry is that we are carnal and apprehend God by our fantasy. For this reason I conclude, to the contrary: since the reason on which the prohibition against making images is based still endures today, the same prohibition appertains to us and must be applied to all ages until the end of the world. For until the time when men are fully renewed it is impossible for them not to give themselves over to

[Acts 17:23–29]

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voila comme Lactance, Sainct Augustin, et aultres docteurs anciens en ont parlé. [22] Cependant frere Matthieu Oris est par trop effronté en disant que par tout le nouveau testament on ne trouvera point passage qui condamne les idoles. Car Sainct Iehan en son Epistre canonique non seulement retire les Chrestiens de l’idolatrie, mais leur commande de se garder des idoles. Qui plus est, encores qu’il eust esté licite soubz la loy d’avoir quelques signes ou remembrances pour la rudesse du peuple, au iourdhuy cela ne devroit avoir lieu, suyvant la sentence de Iesus Christ: “L’heure est venue que les vrays serviteurs de Dieu l’adoreront en esprit et verité.” Car qui notera | bien toute la circonstance du lieu, il y a la une deffence plus estroitte d’avoir images exterieures que iamais elle n’a esté faicte aux Iuifz. Et quant Sainct Paul condamne les hommes davoir “converty la verité de Dieu en mensonge,” quant ilz y ont converty13 “sa gloire en similitude d’homme corruptible et en images d’oiseaux ou de bestes,” il ne parle point seullement pour un temps, mais donne une regle universelle, qu’on faict iniure a Dieu en le voulant ainsi representer.

13

converty added superscr.

[1 John 5:21]

[John 4:23–24]

[Rom. 1:25] [Rom. 1:23]

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idolatry when they have an object for it. Thus, in fact, have Lactantius, St. Augustine, and other ancient doctors spoken about it. [22] Brother Matthieu Ory, meanwhile, is most brazen in saying that one will not find any passage condemning images in the entire New Testament. For St. John, in his canonical letter, not only holds Christians back from idolatry, but orders them to watch out for idols. What is more, even if it had been licit under the law to have some signs or reminders, due to the people’s ignorance, this should not occur today, according to the saying of Jesus Christ: “But the hour has come that the true adorers of God shall adore him in spirit and in truth.” For when we remove every consideration of place, we have here a stricter prohibition against having exterior images than has ever been imposed on the Jews. And when St. Paul chides people for “changing the truth of God into a lie,” when they have converted “his glory into the likeness of a corruptible man and in images of birds and beasts,” he speaks not only about one time, but gives a universal rule, namely that one insults God by wishing to represent him in this way.

[1 John 5:21]

[John 4:23–24]

[Rom. 1:25] [Rom. 1:23]

IV. Ambrogio Catarino Politi

Disputatio de cultu et adoratione imaginum

121

[1] Christianorum cultum et adorationem1 ad imagines alio libello adversus haereticos defendi, non tamen quaestiones ibi quae inter catholicos versantur excussi.2 Nam cum nemo catholicus sit qui non probet usum imaginum ad memoriam et doctrinam et animi excitationem, dubitant tamen nonnulli, nunquid ipsis imaginibus ullus cultus ac veneratio debeatur, et quaenam et quo pacto. Qua de re nunc facere disputationem censui non inutile. [2] Ut ergo propositae quaestionis veritas illucescat, primo videndum est utrum pingere aut sculpere simulacra sit revera in scripturis prohibitum. Videtur enim prima facie, ut Iudaei volunt, prohibitum in decalogo, dicente Domino: “Non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem quae est in coelo desuper et quae in terra deorsum nec eorum quae sunt in aquis sub terra,” etc. Quod si fateamur prohibitum, additur utrum ex se sit malum, an contra potius iccirco malum quia prohibitum. Quod autem non ex se sit malum facile potest ratione persuaderi, cum et pictura et sculptura inter artes ponantur non illaudatas, unde et multi cum laude in historiis memorantur et vivunt; immo in ipsa scriptura sancta laudatur Beseleel quod fabre effigiaret instructus a Domino. Hoc si ex se malum esset, nunquam Deus eam artem illum docuisset nec iussisset sculpi propitiatorium et arcam et cherubim et leones et boves, nec mandasset Moysi ut serpentem aeneum erigeret in deserto. [3] Cum igitur non sit ex se malum pingere aut sculpere simulacra et imagines, videndum est utrum revera simpliciter sit prohibitum in

[Exod. 20:4]

Facere imagines non est ex se malum.

1 The full title reads: “Disputatio R.P.F. Ambrosii Catharini Politi Episcopi Minoriensis De cultu et adoratione imaginum.” This edition is based on the text included in Ambrogio Catarino Politi, Enarrationes In Quinque Priora Capita Geneseos. Adduntur Plerique Alii tractatus et quaestiones rerum variarum ac scitu dignissimarum … (Romae: Antonio Blado, 1551–52), coll. 121–44. On the complex composition history of this volume, see chapter 2, p. 69. 2 The reference is to Ambrogio Catarino Politi, De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (Lugduni: Apud Mathiam Bonhomme, 1542), 1–88, in Id., Opuscula F. Ambrosii Catharini Politi Senensis Ordinis Praedicatorum magna ex parte iam aedita et ab eodem recognita ac repurgata … (Lugduni: Apud Mathiam Bonhomme, 1542).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_009

IV. Ambrogio Catarino Politi

Disputation on the Cult and Adoration of Images

[1] In another booklet I have defended the cult and adoration of images by Christians against the heretics, but without examining the questions [on the subject] debated among Catholics.1 While no Catholic will disapprove of the use of images to sustain memory, teaching, and the inspiration of the soul, nonetheless some question whether these images ought to be offered worship and veneration, or of what kind and on what terms. I think that a disputation on this matter would be useful at this time. [2] For the truth in the proposed question to emerge, we have to see, first, if painting or sculpting of images is truly prohibited in the scriptures. For it appears at first sight, as the Jews claim, that this is prohibited in the Ten Commandments, since God says: “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any things that are in heaven above, or that are in the earth beneath or that abide in the waters under the earth,” etc. If we deem it forbidden, we should add [the question as to] whether it is bad in itself or rather whether it is bad because it is forbidden. Reason can easily persuade us that it is not bad in itself, because both painting and sculpture are counted among the praiseworthy arts, so that many [artists] are praised in life and in history books; even the holy scripture praises Bezalel for what he skillfully constructed following the Lord’s instructions. If this were bad in itself, God would never have taught him that art, nor would he have ordered that the propitiatory, the ark, cherubim, lions and oxen be fashioned, nor would he have commanded Moses that he erect a bronze serpent in the desert.2 [3] Since therefore it is not in itself evil to paint or sculpt likenesses and images, we must see whether the scriptures really prohibit this generally, which was the first proposition. Some in fact assert that to paint or sculpt images and likenesses is not forbidden generally, but only conditionally, [namely if the goal is] to worship them. Thus, if something were not

[Exod. 20:4]

It is not evil in itself to make images.

1 The reference is to Ambrogio Catarino Politi, De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (Lugduni: Apud Mathiam Bonhomme, 1542), 1–88, in Id., Opuscula F. Ambrosii Catharini Politi Senensis Ordinis Praedicatorum magna ex parte iam aedita et ab eodem recognita ac repurgata … (Lugduni: Apud Mathiam Bonhomme, 1542). 2 See, respectively, Exod. 36:1, Exod. 37:1–9, 3 Kings 7:29, and Num. 21:9.

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scripturis, quod erat propositum prius. Sunt enim qui negent simpliciter fuisse prohibitum pingi aut sculpi imagines et simulacra, sed solum conditionaliter, ad colendum ea, ita ut si non ob hanc causam pictum quid aut sculptum fuisset, non fuisset praevaricatio mandati. Huic autem opinioni videtur attestari scriptura ubi legitur: “Non faciatis vobis idolum et sculptile, nec titulos erigetis, nec insignem lapidem ponetis in terra vestra ut adoretis eum,” etc. Ecce quomodo non simpliciter videtur esse prohibitum facere sculptile aut imaginem | et huiusmodi, sed hac mente, videlicet ad adorandum et colendum ea. Sed est aliorum sententia verior, ut simpliciter interdictum intelligamus Iudaeis pingere aut sculpere quidpiam quod posset more gentium redigi in cultum, a quarum ritibus volebat Deus illum suum populum abhorrere. Quare, tametsi ex se non esset malum sculpere aut pingere ullam imaginem ad aliquem usum non malum, saltem ad oculorum oblectationem, attamen quia poterat facile inde exoriri malum, ut more gentium adorarent et colerent idola (nam et ipsi in hoc scelus sua quadam admirabili insania provocabantur, quasi aemulatione gentium), idcirco simpliciter dicendum est (sicut et universaliter semper intellectum fuit) non licuisse Iudaeis propria et privata autoritate ullas imagines aut ulla simulacra effingere. Non enim semper quod prohibetur, ideo prohibetur quia sit malum, sed vel ad tentationem et verae obedientiae exactionem, sicut primis parentibus contigit, quibus interdictum fuit de ligno vitae edere, vel ad cautionem, ne quod non est ex se malum, si permittatur ac liceat, facile ad malum atque illicitum adducat aut impellat. Sicut quum prohibentur cives portare arma, non prohibentur quia simpliciter portare arma sit malum, sed quia in civitate forte seditiosa ea licentia perduceret ad malum. [4] Ita erat in proposito, sicut dictum est, videlicet propter periculum idololatriae prohibitum fuisse simpliciter ne ullum sculptile aut ullam similitudinem facerent. Huic autem sententiae attestatur scriptura ubi prius absolute ait: “Non habebis deos alienos coram me.” Et subdit: “Non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem quae est in coelo,” etc. Et confestim subiecit: “Non adorabis ea neque coles.” Ubi duo apparent praecepta divisim: alterum non facere, alterum non colere. Astipulatur huic sententiae et quod legitur Deuteronomio cap. 5 et cap. 4, ubi habetur: Non vidistis aliquam similitudinem in die qua locutus est vobis Dominus in Horeb de medio ignis, ne forte decepti faciatis vobis sculptam similitudinem omnium iumentorum quae sunt super

[Lev. 26:1]

Imagines facere prohibitum Iudaeis.

Exodus 20 [3–5]

[Deut. 4:15–19]

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painted or sculpted for that reason, there would not be a violation of the norm. Scripture appears to attest this opinion where it reads: “You shall not make to yourselves any idol or graven thing, neither shall you erect pillars, nor set up a remarkable stone in your land, to adore it,” etc. Note how here it is not prohibited generally to make a graven thing, an image, or something similar, but with that intention, namely to adore and worship them. Closer to the truth, however, is the judgment of others, that we know that it was generally prohibited to the Jews to paint or sculpt anything that might lead them to worship in the manner of the gentiles, from whose rites God wanted to turn away that people of his. Hence, although it was not bad in itself to sculpt or paint any image for a purpose that was not evil, but only to delight the eyes, yet because this could easily result in the evil that they would adore and worship images in the manner of the gentiles (for they were provoked to this offense by a strange folly, as if to emulate the gentiles), therefore it was generally said – and always universally understood – that it was not allowed to the Jews to make any images or likenesses on their own, personal authority. But what is prohibited is not always prohibited because it is evil, but either to solicit and demand true obedience – as happened to our first parents, who were forbidden to eat from the tree of life – or as a precaution, so that what is not bad in itself would not, if permitted and allowed, easily lead and push towards something evil and illicit. Similarly, when citizens are forbidden to bear arms, they are not forbidden to do so because bearing arms is generally evil, but because perhaps in a factious city this freedom might lead to evil. [4] Thus, as noted, it was for a reason, namely because of the risk of idolatry, that it was generally forbidden to them to make anything graven or any likeness. This judgment is attested by scripture, which first says generally: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before me,” and then adds: “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing that is in heaven,” etc. And immediately there follows: “Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them.” Here we see two separate commands: one, not to make; the other, not to worship. Supporting this judgment is also what we read in Deuteronomy chapters 5 and 4; the latter says: You saw not any similitude in the day that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb from the midst of the fire: lest perhaps being deceived you might make you a graven similitude of any beasts that are upon the earth, or of birds that fly under heaven, or of creeping things that

[Lev. 26:1]

It was prohibited to the Jews to make images.

Exod. 20 [3–5]

[Deut. 4:15–19]

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terram vel avium sub coelo volantium atque reptilium quae moventur in terra sive piscium qui sub terra morantur in aquis, ne forte elevatis oculis ad coelum videas solem et lunam et omnia astra coeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit Domi- | nus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quae sub coelo sunt.3 Haec ibi, ubi videtur omnino simpliciter prohibitum quicquam sculpi propter idololatriae periculum. [5] Sed hinc oritur dubium: si periculi gratia vetabantur similitudines ne adorarentur, cur Dominus iussit sculpi cherubim et propitiatorium, quod erat oraculum, et ibi fieri adorationes? Et cur iussit exaltari serpentem et ad illum spectari, quod non erat nisi quidam adorationis modus? Unde et incensum illi adolebant, ut ait scriptura. Quod si per has similitudines serpentis et cherubim et boum et leonum non dabatur causa ad scelus, nec incurrebatur periculum, cur ergo prohibitum fuit tam universaliter ne quam ipsi formarent sibi similitudinem? Difficile hoc argumentum profecto. Verum ex illius resolutione veritatis resultabit manifestatio. [6] Errorum pericula versabantur ex omni parte hanc circa rem, quibus oportuit occurri. Si enim non prohibuisset fieri simulacra Deus et similitudines, periculum idololatriae incurrebatur, sicut iam diximus. Rursum, si stante illa prohibitione non iussisset pingi vel sculpi et erigi aliquid aliquo modo adorabile, reliquisset magnam rationem Iudaeis omnino reprobandi omnem imaginem ac similitudinem et omnem modum adorandi ad illas; et merito putassent illud ex se esse malum, et nulla ratione posse unquam licitum reddi; quod certe praeiudicasset veritati ac legi gratiae quam praeordinaverat. Stabat igitur prohibitio illis eo tempore congruentissima, ne quam ipsi propria et privata autoritate sibi facerent similitudinem. Et ut hoc non tanquam ex se malum arbitrarentur fuisse prohibitum, alia parte providit dum iussit erigi serpentem illum, et sculpi cherubim et leones et boves. Voluit enim per figuras illas significare illud per quod reddi poterant licita simulacra et quandoque etiam adorationes ad illa. Nam per serpentem proculdubio Christus crucifixus designabatur, et per illos duos cherubim Christus et mater. Creditur enim traditione acceptum illos cherubim fuisse humanae formae, sed alterum marem, alterum vero foemellam, sponsum et sponsam, puerum ac puellam, ut summa puritas et innocentia significaretur eorum, scilicet Filii et Matris, sponsi et sponsae, per quos ad nos propitiatio et redemptio veniebat. Erant enim super propitiatorium, alter ex una parte, alter ex alia, qui 3 Note the omission, in verses 16–17, of “aut imaginem masculi vel feminae, similitudinem.”

Cur Dominus iussit fieri cherubim etc.

Cherubim quid significarent.

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move on the earth, or of fishes that abide in the waters under the earth: lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven.3 Thus Deuteronomy, where it appears to be prohibited entirely and generally to sculpt anything because of the danger of idolatry. [5] Yet here a question arises: if likenesses were prohibited for fear that they might be adored, why did the Lord order that cherubim and a propitiatory (which was an oracle) be fashioned, and that prayers be held there? And why did he order that the serpent be exalted and looked upon, which could only be a form of adoration? Hence they also burned incense for it, as scripture says. If these likenesses of a serpent, cherubim, oxen, and lions were no cause for offense, nor posed any danger, why then were they so universally forbidden to make themselves any likeness? This is truly a difficult question. Yet its resolution will manifest the truth. [6] This matter was surrounded on all sides by the risk of errors, which needed to be remedied. If God had not prohibited the making of images and likenesses, the danger of idolatry would have arisen, as we have already said. If, however, in light of this prohibition, he had not ordered that anything be painted, sculpted, or erected that could in some way be adored, this would have left the Jews with a strong reason altogether to reject every image, likeness, and manner of adoring them; and they would rightly have thought that this was evil in itself and could for no reason ever be made acceptable. This would certainly have harmed the truth and the law of grace which he [God] had preordained. Thus the prohibition was most fitting for them during that time, so that they would not make themselves any likeness on their own personal authority. Yet to prevent that they would consider this forbidden as evil in itself, he also took care to order the mounting of the serpent and the sculpting of the cherubim, lions, and oxen. He wanted those figures to signify what could legitimize images and sometimes also their adoration. For no doubt the serpent alluded to the crucified Christ, and those two cherubim to Christ and his mother. Indeed, it is a belief handed down by tradition that those cherubim had human form, one male, the other female, groom and bride, boy and girl, to signify their highest purity and innocence, namely that of

Why the Lord ordered cherubim, etc., to be made.

What the cherubim signified.

3 Note the omission, in verses 16–17, of “or image of male or female, the similitude.” The same passage is cited by Pérez, § 2.

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extendentes alas super propitiatorium sive oraculum tegebant illud, et sese mutuo et illud respiciebant. Hoc nunquam intellexerunt Iudaei carnales, nec habent quicquam quod super his loquantur et dubia literae resolvant. [7] Nos autem nunc ad rem nostram illud sanae doctrinae accipimus prohibitionem illam sculptilium et omnis similitudinis factam fuisse ad compescendam privatam autoritatem, et ipsius prohibitionis rationem solummodo fuisse periculum idololatriae, ut eo periculo cessante etiam mandatum cessaret, et huius rei ad- | monerentur Iudaei in tempore Messiae et agnoscerent quem ignorantes coluerunt. [8] Quo in loco insurget quis et dicet: si periculum idololatriae erat causa illius prohibitionis, potuisset igitur aliqua similitudine exculpi ipse Deus et adorari eius imago, cum Deus ipse sit omni veneratione et cultu dignus, ac per hoc nullum fuisset idololatriae periculum; et tamen neque hoc Hebraei quasi licitum sibi arbitrabantur. Ad quod respondemus: Deus ipse verus non poterat ulla similitudine repraesentari; ideo quicquid de pictura aut sculptura mente exciperemus nullo pacto nobis repraesentare Deum verum potuisset. Quicquid ergo pictum aut sculptum fuissset gratia repraesentandi Deum ipsum quodvis aliud magis repraesentasset quam Deum. Quapropter si etiam repraesentatum coleretur, aliquid aliud quam ipse Deus coleretur pro vero Deo; quod esset idololatria manifesta. Quamobrem B. Ioannes Damascenus in capite de imaginibus dixit: “Magnae impietatis et insipientiae est figurari quod divinitatis est.”4 Praedixerat enim scriptura: “Cui similem fecistis Deum aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?” Et B. Paulus: “Non debemus aestimare auro et argento et lapidi sculpturae artis et cogitationis hominis divinum esse simile.” [9] Verum nec sic quiescimus. Nam Deus seipsum per similitudines nonnunquam ostendit prophetis, ut patet in sacris literis: cur igitur non licuisset eo modo illum pingere? Exempli gratia, Danieli ostensus est omnipotens Deus Pater per imaginem viri antiqui dierum sedentis in throno candido, induti vestimento tanquam nive, et capilli tanquam lana

[Isa. 40:18] [Acts 17:29]

[Dan. 7:9]

4 Cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Theologia Damasceni, fol. 170v: “Insipientia igitur et extremae impietatis est figurare divinitatem.” Catarino’s version of this line may be derived from a different translation, or may be an indirect quotation (e.g., Bonaventure, In III. Librum Sententiarum, in Id., Opera omnia, vol. 3 [Quaracchi: ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1887], 203, dist. 9, a. 1, q. 2).

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the Son and the Mother, groom and bride, through whom atonement and redemption came to us. In fact, they were placed on the propitiatory, the first on one side, the second on the other; extending their wings over the propitiatory, or oracle, they protected it, and looked to each other and to it. This the carnal Jews never understood, nor do they have any means to interpret these [cherubim] and to resolve the text’s difficulties. [7] We, however, at present and for our purposes accept as sound doctrine that that prohibition of graven images and any likeness was made to curb personal authority, and that its rationale was only the danger of idolatry, so that once this danger subsided, the order would be removed. At the time of the Messiah the Jews would be advised of this and recognize whom they had worshipped in their ignorance. [8] But here someone might object and say: if the danger of idolatry was the reason of that prohibition, God himself could have been fashioned with some kind of likeness, and his image adored, because God is worthy of all veneration and worship, and therefore there would be no danger of idolatry; and yet the Hebrews did not judge this lawful either. To this we respond: the true God could not be represented by any likeness; therefore anything that we might derive mentally from a painting or sculpture, could in no way have represented the true God. Hence whatever was painted or sculpted for the sake of representing God would represent something other than God. Therefore, even if this representation were worshipped, something other than God himself would be worshipped as the true God, which is manifest idolatry. For this reason St. John of Damascus said in his chapter on images: “It is most impious and foolish to fashion the divine.” For scripture had already said: “To whom then have you likened God? Or what image will you make for him?” And St. Paul: “we must not suppose the divinity to be like unto gold, or silver, or stone, the graving of art, and device of man.” [9] Yet this is not all we can say. For God has sometimes revealed himself to the prophets by way of likenesses, as is clear from the sacred scriptures. Why, then, would it not be allowed to paint him in that way? For instance, the omnipotent God the Father has appeared to Daniel through the image of an old man seated on a white throne, wearing a garment resembling snow, and hair like white wool. If God was indescribable and unportrayable, why then did he appear this way to the prophet? And

[Isa. 40:18] [Acts 17:29]

[Dan. 7:9]

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alba. Si igitur incircumscriptibilis erat Deus et ineffigiabilis, cur tamen sic apparuit prophetae? Et cum talem haberent iam designatum in scriptura per prophetam, cur idem prohibeatur fieri in pictura per artifices? Et quod de Deo dico, etiam de angelis dictum volo, qui cum sint et ipsi incorporei, consequenter ineffigiabiles sunt. Praeterea, nunc in ecclesiis non solum angeli, verum etiam sanctissima ipsa Trinitas depingitur et colitur, et Spiritus sanctus per columbam significatur. Quo pacto igitur redditus est Deus effigiabilis, qui ante non erat? Et ubi illud, “Ego Deus et non mutor”? Quod si hoc malum est, cur tolerat ecclesia Dei sancta? [10] Respondetur ad haec: cum Dominus prophetis illis figuris seipsum designabat, simul intelligentiam quoque praestabat, ne per illas prophetae fallerentur; nec bonum erat sic illum proponere turbis sicut sese indicabat prophetis. Illae enim ut crassae et imperitae et indociles, facile inde contraxissent errores: siquidem et plerique viri docti concipientes5 mente Deum, sicut non nisi in specie et forma humana concipiebant, nec alia species occurrebat: sic etiam talem esse arbitrati sunt, hoc est, Deum esse corporeum et humanae forma; quod est manifeste falsum atque insulsum, et ab omnibus in ecclesia Dei iam explosum. Nunc igitur cum iam manifestatus sit hic error, et | christianitas repleta sit scientia Dei, et omnes obligati sint credere apostolicae et catholicae doctrinae, quae de Deo recta sentit et tradit, non est metuendum ne praetextu picturae aut sculpturae in errorem ullum incurramus, sicut nec incurrimus praetextu scripturae, quae Deum certa aliqua imagine ac similitudine prophetis ostensum fuisse describit, sed in qualibet similitudine aliquam Deo convenientem proprietatem licebit absque errore agnosci. Verbi gratia, depingatur Deus Pater ut est apud Danielem, in specie viri, antiquus dierum, sedens in throno candido; significabitur nobis ea pictura, divina maiestas, aeternitas, sapientia; et ille thronus candidus significabit ecclesiam sine macula et ruga, in qua quiescit; et ita caeterae circunstantiae depictae aliquid nobis referent conveniens Deo. Nec quisquam adeo desipiet iam nunc, ut ex illa figura accipiat sibi propterea, ut certum praestituat, Deum esse corporeae aut humanae formae, cum nemo nesciat pictores non omnia imitari posse et formare ad veritatem. Quod si quis forte hebes et imperitus aliter sentiat, videlicet Deum aut angelum esse humanae formae, non hoc tam ex pictura accipiet quam ex priore falsa illi haerente existimatione; siquidem, ut Marcus Tullius ait, quicunque Deum imaginatur sive vigilans sive per somnium dormiens, nullam aliam illi formam tribuere potest quam humanam, cum nullam 5 Corr. from concipienies.

[Mal. 3:6]

[Dan. 7:9]

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since the prophet had already indicated him as such in scripture, why would artists be forbidden to do the same thing in painting? And what I say about God, I also want to extend to angels, who, since they are also incorporeal, are hence unportrayable. Moreover, not only angels, but the most holy Trinity, as well, is nowadays depicted and worshipped in churches; and the Holy Spirit is signified by a dove. In what way, then, has God become portrayable if he were not so before? And whence the verse, “I am the Lord, and I change not”? If this is evil, why does God’s holy Church tolerate it? [10] The answer is: at the same time that the Lord referred to himself through those figures, he also provided the prophets with insight, so that they would not be mistaken about them. Yet it was not good to present him to the masses in the way he indicated himself to the prophets. For the masses, being dumb, ignorant, and unteachable, would easily run into errors. In fact, even many learned men, in mentally conceiving of God, conceived of him only in human species and form, and no other species occurred to them: and hence they considered him such, that is, that God was corporeal and of human form – which is manifestly false, absurd, and long since rejected by all members of God’s Church. Now, then, when this error has already been exposed, and Christendom is full of the knowledge of God, and all are obliged to believe apostolic and Catholic doctrine, which correctly believes and teaches about God, we need not fear that we will incur any error on account of a picture or sculpture, just as we incur none on account of scripture, which describes how God is revealed to the prophets with a certain image or likeness. Instead, we are allowed without error to identify a property associated with God in a certain likeness. For instance, God the Father may be depicted in the species of a man, as he is in Daniel, advanced in years, seated on a white throne. To us this picture will signify divine majesty, eternity, wisdom; and the throne will signify the Church, devoid of blemish or wrinkle, in which he rests. Similarly, other features that may be depicted will refer us to something associated with God. Nor will anyone be so foolish as to assume as a given, based on that figure, that God is of corporeal or human form. For everyone knows that painters cannot imitate and give form to everything according to truth. If a slow-witted and ignorant person should think otherwise, namely that God or an angel are of human form, he will not derive this idea from the picture but from a prior false judgment, since, as Marcus Tullius [Cicero] says, whoever imagines God either awake or asleep and dreaming can assign him only a human form, because we do not see any other that is more admirable. For this reason

[Mal. 3:6]

[Dan. 7:9]

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nos videamus spectabiliorem.6 Et ob hanc causam angeli in ea specie apparuerunt hominibus et quasi homines in scripturis describuntur, ut beatissimus Pater Dionysius eleganter docet.7 Quin et Dominus noster in parabolis Deum per hominem et patrem familias saepe designat. Quamobrem instruendi sunt rudes de veritate rei, non autem propter eos omittenda est quae potest de ipso Deo a cordatis viris etiam per picturas salubri recipi disciplina ac notitia. Quod vero Spiritus sanctus in figura columbae depingitur minus praestat ad errorem occasionem. Nam, ut beatus Dionysius eleganter docet, quanto sunt dissimiliores similitudines quae nobis referunt Deum, tanto minus periculosae sunt. Nemo enim ita est stultus ut Spiritum sanctum putet esse columbam aut formam habere columbae, sed confestim in columba eius sanctitatem ac puritatem intelligit significari. [11] Quod vero de Messia, qui in specie hominis expectabatur, nulla olim fieret similitudo rectum erat. Nondum enim venerat, nec erat satis tunc revelatum de illo, nec eius dignitas bene cognita, nec certa erant magnifica eius acta ac gesta, ut in illis posset per simulacra et picturas ostendi; et adhuc manebat nonnihil periculi idololatriae, ne similiter ad alios prophetas transferretur hic honor, et ad Mosen potissimum aut Abraham et David patres eius. Non enim erat dignum illud eis tribuere ut per imagines colerentur quod et Deo et Messiae et angelis negabatur; nec fuisset illa licentia citra idololatriae periculum. Et revera non decuit tunc quicquam esse ad hoc religiosum adorationis opus vere sanctificabile et aliquo cultu et ho- | nore dignum antequam ipse omnium sanctificator veniret, eo quod durante peccato cuncta erant immunda. [12] Verum unus adhuc scrupulus restat dissolvendus. Legimus enim quod Domini mandato Moses erexit serpentem illum aeneum, et diximus quod eum Hebraei colebant, quoniam incesum ei adolebant, et,

[Dionysius Areopagita], De coelesti hierarchia, cap. 15

Dubium de adoratione serpentis.

6 Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, De natura deorum, liber I, 18: 46–47, in M.T. Ciceronis De philosophia volumen secundum (Francofurdi, apud Andreae Wecheli haeredes, 1590), 14: “Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones, ratio hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam cum praestantissimam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae conformatio liniamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior?”; for a modern edition, see Cicero, De natura deorum. Book I, ed. Andrew R. Dyck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 7 Dionysii Coelestis hierarchia, Coelestis hierarchia, Ecclesiastica hierarchia … ([Parisiis:] per Henricum Stephanum, 1515), fols. 41v–44r.

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angels will appear in this shape to humans, and are described in the scriptures as humans, as the blessed father Dionysius elegantly explains. Indeed, our Lord himself refers to God in parables as a man and family father. Therefore the unlettered are to be taught the truth of the thing, but we should not on their account omit what judicious men may also derive from pictures in salutary instruction and knowledge about God. That the Holy Spirit is depicted by the figure of the dove hardly creates an occasion for error. For, as the blessed Dionysius elegantly explains, the more dissimilar the likenesses that reference God for us, the less dangerous they are. For no one is so foolish as to think that the Holy Spirit is a dove or has the shape of a dove: everyone will immediately understand that in the dove its holiness and purity are signified. [11] That there was once no likeness for the Messiah, who was expected under the species of man, was right. In fact, he had not come yet, nor had enough been revealed about him, nor was his dignity well known, nor were his magnificent deeds and actions certain [to the degree] that in these he could be shown by means of statues and paintings; and there still was some danger of idolatry, [namely] that this honor might similarly be transferred to other prophets, especially to Moses, Abraham, and David, his forefathers. For they were not worthy to be granted the worship by images that was denied to God, the Messiah, and the angels; nor would such license be without danger of idolatry. And it was really inappropriate that at that time there be something which might be sanctified for this religious practice of adoration and made worthy of worship and honor before the arrival of the sanctifier of all, because all things were unclean while sin endured. [12] But one difficulty has yet to be resolved. We read that Moses on God’s order erected the bronze serpent, and we said that the Hebrews worshipped it, because they burned incense for it. It is especially noteworthy that this was observed until the time of King Hezekiah. Here we ask whether this cult was appropriate and in accordance with God’s command, or not. If one declares it appropriate, why then did Hezekiah prohibit it and order that the serpent be destroyed, cursing it and derisively calling it Nehushtan, that is, little bronze thing. Scripture appears to record this fact in praise of that king. But if one denies that this cult

[Dionysius the Areopagite], The Celestial Hierarchy, chap. 15

A question concerning the adoration of the serpent.

[Num. 21:8–9 / 4 Kings 18:4]

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quod est magnopere considerandum, hoc servatum fuit usque ad tempus Ezechiae regis. Hic enim quaeritur, utrum ille cultus esset conveniens et iuxta Dei mandatum, an non. Si asseritur conveniens, cur ergo Ezechias prohibuit et iussit eum serpentem confringi, vituperans illum et derisorie eum appellans Neustan, idest, aenulum? Quod factum scriptura in laudem illius regis commemorare videtur. Quod si negatur fuisse conveniens cultus ille, quomodo ergo Moses et alii prophetae et David tam diu illam superstitionem tolerarunt, nec Dominus misit in aliquem prophetarum spiritum zeli, ut eam idololatriam detestaretur et admoneret? Vere hic locus non facilem videtur habere resolutionem, nisi dixeris quod revera male fecerunt adolentes ei incensum, idest, sacrificantes illi. Neque enim fuit eis mandatum a Domino ut sacrificarent ei, sed hoc solummodo ut ad illum aspicerent quasi signum. Quod autem est signum alterius signum est, ut sic intelligerent non ab eo exire illam sanandi virtutem quae ex illo exire videbatur. Nam quid virtutis poterat ex inspectione illius statuae procedere ad sanandos saucios a verorum serpentum morsibus? Illa ergo virtus non signo sed signato erat tribuenda, et similiter illa statua tanquam signum erat aspicienda, ut inde mens ad prototypum evolaret. Quod quia non est factum, sed eo processum ut more gentium illud simulacrum adoraretur tanquam ibi esset illa virtus sanandi, et non in exemplari: iccirco Ezechias iussit illud serpentis simulacrum confringi. Quia igitur adoratio et exhibitio incensi poterat esse conveniens, et certe fuisset si relata fuisset ad prototypum, iccirco tacite fuit tolerata ac permissa, cum error esset in mente adorantis, non autem in externo illo cultu, qui (ut dixi) defendi poterat si non signo, sed signato redditus fuisset. Error ergo processerat in hoc quod non iam inspiciebatur et adorabatur illud (sicut praecepit Dominus) ut signum referens signati virtutem, sed quasi habens in se sanctificationem et vim aliquam divinam, sicut existimabant gentes de idolis suis. Quare ad hunc gentium errorem amovendum iussit Ezechias confringi serpentem illum, vocans aenulum, ut quiddam despicabile et indignum cultu. [13] Hactenus ergo vidimus quid prohibitum erat Iudaeis, ut errores gentium non incurrerent. Prohibebantur enim primum adorare deos alienos, et hoc quia malum erat ex se et scelus gentium. Prohibebantur item nedum adorare, sed etiam facere propria autoritate simulacra, ne similiter more gentium adorarent ea. Quae autem Dei mandato sive picta sive sculpta in tabernaculo et in templo erant, debebant dum- | taxat habere pro signis et figuris eorum quae futura erant in ecclesia, et non adorare illa, sed ad illa seu coram illis externam habere adorationem,

[Num. 21:8–9 and 4 Kings 18:4]

Solutio dubii.

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was appropriate, why then did Moses, the other prophets, and David tolerate this superstition for such a long time, and why did the Lord not imbue one of the prophets with holy zeal, so that he would execrate and warn against this idolatry? This text appears not to have a simple solution except by saying that those who burned incense for it, that is, sacrificed to it, were wrong. Nor did the Lord order them to sacrifice to it, but only that they look upon it as a sign. But a sign is a sign of something else: thus they would understand that the healing power that appeared to issue from [the serpent] did not in fact do so. For what power could proceed from the observation of this statue to heal those wounded by the bites of real serpents? That power, then, was to be attributed not to the sign, but to the signified. Accordingly, that statue ought to be looked upon as a sign, so that the mind would move from it to the prototype. But this was not done: instead, they proceeded to adore the likeness, in the manner of the gentiles, as if the power of healing was there, and not in the original. For this reason Hezekiah ordered that the likeness of the serpent be destroyed. Hence, since the adoration and exhibition of the incense could be appropriate, and certainly would have been if it had been referred to the prototype, therefore it was tacitly tolerated and allowed, because the error was in the mind of those who adored, not in the external cult, which (as I said) could be defended if it had been rendered to the signified, not the sign. The error thus resulted not from the fact that [the statue] was observed and adored, as the Lord ordered, as a sign referencing the power of the signified, but as if it contained in itself sanctification and some divine power, as the gentiles believed about their idols. To remove this error of the gentiles, therefore, Hezekiah ordered that the serpent be destroyed, calling it a little bronze thing, something despicable and unworthy of worship. [13] So far we have seen what was prohibited to the Jews, so that they would not succumb to the errors of the gentiles. They were forbidden, first, to adore alien gods, because it was bad in itself, and an offense of the gentiles. Second, they were forbidden all the more, not only to adore images but also to make them on their own authority, so that they would not adore them in the manner of the gentiles. And they had to consider the paintings and sculptures that by God’s command were held in the tabernacle and the temple only as signs and figures of things that were

The solution of the question.

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referentes omnem cultum spiritualem ad Deum et Christum qui in illis significabatur. [14] Ex his iam dictis, ex parte quid sit dicendum de imaginibus aut simulacris in ecclesia Dei, acutus lector facile potest educere: nempe illud primum, ut omne quod ex se malum est etiam in ecclesia prohibitum intelligatur. Ergo totum hoc, videlicet habere deos alienos, et simulacra illis erigere, et colere atque adorare illa quovismodo, ut pote malum ex se ideo perpetua prohibitione interdictum. Haec enim in gentibus detestatur scriptura. [15] Verum fuit nescio quis, ut B. Augustinus testatur, qui cum esset idololatra, suas volens tueri partes, adversus scripturas conquerebatur, quod immerito ab eis eo nomine gentes damnarentur, quasi essent idolorum vel simulacrorum cultores. Aiebat enim: “Non ego illum lapidem colo, nec illud simulacrum quod est sine sensu, nec audit auribus, nec videt oculis. Non ego illud colo, sed adoro quod video et servio ei quem non video.”8 Haec ille. Cuius hic erat sensus, quod quamvis externum honorem redderet ante lapidem, internus tamen, qui erat latriae, ferebatur in numen quod colebat, et in lapide repraesentabatur. Poterat fortassis ille homo hoc ita de se testari, sed universaliter aliud erat: unde alii ea excusatione non defendebantur, qui, teste scriptura, in ipsis simulacris esse aliquam virtutem divinam arbitrabantur propter daemonum deceptiones, qui in illis responsa reddebant et nonnulla prodigia ostendebant. Neque tamen ille homo se propterea defensabat a scelere, quoniam et si forte recte sensisset de lapide, non tamen recte de numine qui erat falsus aliquis deus. Quocirca duplici tenebatur errore. Primo, quod falsum deum pro vero Deo colendum sibi proposuisset; deinde, quod etiam eius imaginem adorasset, aliquem illi cultum exhibens propter numen, hoc vel ipso confitente cum dixerit: adoro quem video. Sed ad rem nostram. [16] Secundo ex dictis illud etiam educitur, cum iam Deum verum non ignoremus, et iamdudum falsos deos abiecerimus, et ab ipso vero Deo servos et sanctos eius recta ratione disiungimus, et in cultu nostro interiore segregamus, nulli latriam praeterquam ipsi Deo deberi scientes: nihil pericli posse accidere eorum quae gentibus contingebant de falsis diis, ac propterea iam nullum habere locum quod legitur in decalogo: “Non facies tibi sculptile,” etc., cum praeceptum illud ita tunc absolutum

Quid dicendum de imaginibus inter christianos.

Gentilium error circa simulacra.

Nullum periculum Christiano ex imaginibus. [Exod. 20:4]

8 Divi Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Enarrationes sive Commentarii in Psalmos mysticos (Parisiis: apud Christianum Wechelium, 1542), fol. 230v (Ps. 96).

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to come in the Church, and not worship them, but only exhibit external worship towards them or before them, referring all spiritual worship to God and Christ, who was signified in them. [14] From the aforesaid the astute reader can easily deduce what should be said about images or likenesses in God’s Church – first and foremost, that everything that is evil in itself is also understood to be prohibited in the Church. Hence all this – to have alien gods, to erect likenesses for them, and to worship and adore these in any fashion – is therefore forbidden by perpetual prohibition as something that is evil in itself. Scripture, in fact, detests these things in the gentiles. [15] But, as Augustine testifies, there was once an idolater who, to defend his position, complained that the scriptures unjustly condemned the gentiles for being worshippers of idols or images. He said: “I do not worship that stone, nor that image, which has no sensation and does not hear with ears or see with eyes. It is not that which I worship: I adore what I see but serve him whom I do not see.” So far his words. His point was that, although he rendered external honor before the stone, the internal honor, namely latria, was addressed to the divine power he worshipped, and which was represented in the stone. Perhaps this man could state this about himself, but in general things stood differently. His defense therefore did not excuse others, who, as scripture testifies, believed that some divine power inhered in these images, due to the deception of demons, who generated [such] responses in them and showed some portents. But even that man did not shield himself from sin. Even if he thought rightly about the stone, he did not do so about the numinous power that was this false god. In this regard he was in the grips of a twofold error. First, he resolved to worship a false god as if he were the true God; further, he also adored his image, rendering it some worship because of its numinous power, which he admitted himself by saying: I adore what I see. But back to our subject. [16] Second, since we know the true God and have long since rejected false gods, and since we rightly distinguish the true God from his servants and saints, separating them in our inner worship in the knowledge that latria is owed to none except God himself, from the aforesaid it also follows that no danger of the kind that befell the gentiles concerning false gods can occur [to us]. Hence there is no occasion for what we read in the Ten Commandments – “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing,” etc. – because at that time this general precept (as we have said) did not prohibit something that was evil in itself, but [aimed to] prevent that its toleration would attract or lead to evil, to wit that false gods would be

What must be said about images among Christians.

The gentiles’ error regarding images.

Images pose no danger to a Christian.

[Exod. 20:4]

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rem prohiberet (sicut diximus) non ex se malam, sed ea ratione ne ea licentia ad malum alliceret aut induceret, videlicet ut falsi dii pro veris inducerentur et colerentur, cuius rei tunc periculum magnum erat in Iudaeis promptis ad aemulandum gentes, ut passim sacrae scripturae docet historia, et | sic inanimatis signis divinus honor tribueretur. At iam nunc, hac periculi ratione cessante, merito et ipsum praeceptum cessavit, cum de idolis et falsis diis iamdudum triumphaverit Dominus Iesus et liberatae sunt gentes, nec metuendum est ne rursum ad idololatriam propter imagines recurrant, sicut calumniosissime haeretici incusant, atque impiissime Dei ecclesiam matrem suam sugillant. Praeterea, iam illud mandatum, ut diximus, eo pertinebat, ne quis privata propriaque autoritate sculperet quidpiam aut similitudinem faceret. At imaginum in ecclesia introductio et approbatio non privata hominum autoritate contigit, sed spiritu Dei apostolos et servos suos inspirante et ecclesia ipsa approbante et praecipiente. Est enim veterum traditionibus acceptum ab apostolis hoc imaginum institutum incoepisse. Fertur, B. Athanasio narrante, Nicodemus primo imaginem Christi habuisse et Gamalieli reliquisse, qui illam tradidit beato Iacobo apostolo fratri Domini.9 Nota item est historia illius sanctae mulieris quae a fluxu sanguinis curata fuit. Ipsa enim rem gestam curavit sculptura exprimi, ut semper ante oculos haberet Domini beneficium.10 Eusebius a Seth filio Adae primum coepisse pingi Dominum nostrum narrat.11 B. Lucam quoque evangelistam et Christi et Virginis nonnullas reliquisse pictas imagines constantissima est populorum fides et antiquissima, quae et variis in locis solemniter ostenduntur. Sunt praeter haec historiae multae ac testimonia sanctorum virorum Basilii, Chrysostomi, Damasceni, et aliorum plurimorum pro hoc imaginum ritu, quae contemnere non potest nisi homo superbus et

9 10 11

Haereticorum calumnia.

Imaginum usus ab apostolis introductus.

Pseudo-Athanasius, De passione imaginis, in PG 128, 89ff. But cf. also p. 148 n. 14 above. Cf. Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, book VII, 18: Autores historiae ecclesiasticae: Eusebii Pamphili Caesariensis episcopi libri novem, Ruffino interprete … (Parisiis: a Galeoto Pratensi, 1541), 166. The gospel references are: Matt. 9:20–22, Mark 5:25–34; Luke 8:43–48. The reference is unclear. Eusebius discussed Seth (Shem) as the inventor of writing in his Praeparatio Evangelica, 31d–32a, ed. E.H. Gifford (Oxford, 1903), 1:42 (cit. in A.F.J. Klijn, Seth in Jewish, Christian and Gnostic Literature [Leiden: Brill, 1977], 50).

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introduced and worshipped as true ones – which at that time was a great danger for Jews eager to imitate the gentiles, as biblical history teaches throughout – and that divine honor would thus be rendered to inanimate signs. But now that this risk has subsided, so has [the rationale of] that very precept, because the Lord Jesus has long since triumphed over the idols and false gods, and the gentiles have been freed, nor is there reason to fear that they will return to idolatry on account of images, as the heretics falsely charge and impiously taunt their mother Church of God. Moreover, as we have said, that command already included the prohibition for anyone to sculpt something or make a likeness on his own personal authority. But in the Church the introduction and approval of images does not occur on the personal authority of men, but by the spirit of God inspiring his apostles and servants, and by the approval and the command of the Church. For it is received knowledge of the ancient traditions that this use of images began with the apostles. As St. Athanasius explains, Nicodemus was said to be the first to have an image of Christ and to have left it to Gamaliel, who passed it on to St. James, the apostle and brother of the Lord.4 Well known is also the history of the saintly woman who was cured from an issue of blood.5 She commissioned the event to be recorded in a sculpture, so that she would always have the Lord’s favor before her eyes. Eusebius relates that Seth, the son of Adam, was the first to paint our Lord.6 Further, it is an enduring and most ancient popular belief that St. Luke the evangelist left painted images of Christ and the Virgin, which are solemnly exhibited in several places.7 In addition, there are many histories and testimonies of the holy Basil, Chrysostom,

The slanders of the heretics.

4 The story, from a text inaccurately attributed to Athanasius, was a popular reference among Catholic defenders of images. Thus it was cited by Hieronymus Emser, in That One Should Not Remove Images of the Saints from the Churches … [1522], published in A Reformation Debate: Karlstadt, Emser, and Eck on Sacred Images. Three Treatises in Translation, trans. and ed. Bryan D. Mangrum and Giuseppe Scavizzi, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1998), 52 and n. 15. 5 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 2:175–77. The gospel references are: Matt. 9:20–22, Mark 5:25– 34; Luke 8:43–48. 6 The reference is unclear. Eusebius discussed Seth (Shem) as the inventor of writing in his Praeparatio Evangelica, 31d–32a, ed. E.H. Gifford (Oxford, 1903), 1:42 (cit. in A.F.J. Klijn, Seth in Jewish, Christian and Gnostic Literature [Leiden: Brill, 1977], 50). 7 Cf. Clemens M. Henze, Lukas der Muttergottesmaler (Louvain: Bibliotheca Alfonsiana, 1948); Gisela Kraut, Lukas malt die Madonna: Zeugnisse zum künstlerischen Selbstverständnis in der Malerei (Worms: Werner, 1986); J.O. Schaefer, “Saint Luke as Painter: From Saint to Artisan to Artist,” in Artistes, artisans et production artistique au Moyen Âge, ed. X. Barral i Altet, 2 vols. (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), 1:413–27; Michele Bacci, Il pennello dell’Evangelista. Storia delle immagini sacre attribuite a san Luca (Pisa: Gisem-Ets, 1998).

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omnino male catholicus, praesertim cum et in plerisque synodis et sexta ac septima fuerit contra haereticorum insaniam et rabiem commendatus et confirmatus hic imaginum usus in ecclesiis; et B. Gregorius Serenum Massiliensem episcopum temeritatis arguerit, quod iussisset imagines auferri de templis. [17] Non est ergo fas ulterius contra ritum imaginum quicquam audere, quo solo ausu comprobantur haeretici et schismatici quicunque sive facto sive verbo contra imagines insurgunt. Etenim a sacris imaginibus multum utilitatis percipit homo si his legitime utatur, non autem ad oculorum oblectationem, quemadmodum fit ubi quam fabre et eleganter sculptum quid aut pictum sit contemplamur, ipsam solummodo artem et artificis manum admirantes, non de eo quod repraesentatur cogitantes. Hoc autem est curiosorum. Non enim id solatii et oblectationis oculorum intendit in usu imaginum ecclesia, quae non vult nos sistere in imagine, sed ad id maxime quod imagine repraesentatur continuo animum evolare. Et propterea imagines quas probat ecclesia illae sunt quae nobis referunt certam rem, sive personam, sive aliquid gestum vel actum quod ad doctrinam vel memoriam vel aedificationem et excitationem pertineat spiritualem. Indigent enim | his idiotae et illiterati ad doctrinam mysteriorum et beneficiorum Dei, ut quod alii de scripturis addiscunt, ipsi hauriant de picturis. Sicut ergo violare scripturas sacrilegium est, quia libros literatorum sacros violas, ita violare picturas, cum sint et ipsae sacri libri idiotarum. Indigent etiam praeter idiotas caeteri mortalium imaginibus ad rememorandum et recolendum ea quae assidue ante nostros oculos versare deberent de Christo, quae pro nobis gessit, quae passus est. Cum enim simus homines, non angeli, et per sensus hauriamus quaecunque mente inspicimus et pertractamus, ea quae mente quasi sopita delitescunt, eiusmodi sensibilibus obiectis excitantur et fit rememoratio. Obiecta enim nobis per imagines angelica salutatione, continuo illud immensum recolimus beneficium, quo nullum poterat nec excogitari nec esse maius ad dignitatem et felicitatem nostram. Hinc excitamur ad gratiarum actiones et glorificationem summae Trinitatis, et animus ad fervorem dilectionis in spiritu humilitatis et obedientiae miris modis incenditur. Et quum nobis repraesentatur Christus ex utero beatissimae Virginis recens natus et in praesepi positus, adoratus a Virgine, clarificatus ab angelis hymno sancto, quae (rogo) in pio corde et quam ingens creatur delectatio, dum exultat et dicit: Puer natus est nobis, filius datus est nobis? Mitto caetera mysteria. Sola illa imago Christi crucifixi quantus est liber, quam longum latumque volumen? Ibi enim maxime et cuivis contemplari licet quae sit longitudo, latitudo, altitudo et profundum

[Is. 9:6]

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Damascene, and many others in support of the observance of images, which can only be disdained by a proud man and bad Catholic, especially since this use of images has been commended and confirmed by multiple councils – both the Sixth and the Seventh – against the madness and rage of heretics; and St. Gregory denounced Serenus of Marseilles for the temerity of ordering images to be removed from churches. [17] It is therefore not right to attempt anything further against the ritual use of images. Such brazenness only gives license to those heretics and schismatics who protest in word or deed against images. For people who use images legitimately experience great benefit, but not [those who do so] for the pleasure of the eyes: the latter arises from the observation of something that is skillfully and elegantly sculpted or painted, when we admire only the art and the hand of the artist, while ignoring that which is represented. This is for the curious. In the use of images, the solace and pleasure of the eyes are not the objective of the Church, which does not want us to remain stuck in the image, but rather that our soul continuously soars towards that which is represented by the image. For this reason the images the Church approves are those which direct us to a certain thing, person, gesture, or act that pertains to a spiritual doctrine, memory, or form of edification or inspiration. These are what the uneducated and illiterate need to gain knowledge of God’s mysteries and benefits: what others learn from the scriptures, they derive from pictures. Just as it is a sacrilege to violate the scriptures – for thus you violate the holy books of the literate – in the same way it is [sacrilegious] to violate images, since these, likewise, are the holy books of the uneducated. Other mortals besides them also need images to retrieve memories and mull over the things before our eyes upon which they need to meditate assiduously in relation to Christ – the things he has done for us, what he has suffered. For since we are humans, not angels, and receive from the senses whatever we see and deal with mentally, the things that lurk in the mind as in a slumber are revived by this kind of sensible objects, triggering remembrance. When images confront us with the Hail Mary, we constantly reflect on that immense benefit, which is greater for our dignity and happiness than any other that exists or can be conceived. Hence we are inspired to offer thanksgiving and glorification of the supreme Trinity, and the soul is wondrously enflamed with the fervor of love in the spirit of humility and obedience. And when Christ is represented to us as a newborn from the womb of the most blessed Virgin, placed in the crib, adored by the Virgin, and praised in a holy hymn by the angels, what love (I ask), and how immense, is created in a devout heart, when it

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potentiae, bonitatis, sapientiae, et consilii eius; inde omne exemplum cunctarum virtutum accipere et omnem excitationem bonorum desideriorum. Verum de his latius alio libello scripsimus.12 Nunc satis est innuisse, quoniam hac de re non est inter catholicos controversia. [18] Verum (ut ab initio diximus) de ipsarum imaginum cultu ac veneratione etiam inter Catholicos aliqua est disputatio, videlicet, praeter utilitates praedictas et solatia spiritualia quae de imaginibus capiuntur, utrum etiam ad hoc sculpantur vel pingantur imagines ut ipsae adorentur, et aliquis eis cultus reddatur. Sunt enim qui hoc omnino negent et clament esse idololatriam. Videntur autem non futilibus argumentis moveri, nec absque maiorum, immo scripturarum, autoritate. Haud enim dubium scripturam vituperasse idola et simulacra paganorum, non solum quia repraesentabant falsos deos, verum etiam quia ipsa idola erant opera manuum hominum, et sine ullo sensu, ut vel ex hoc ipso nullam mererentur venerationem et cultum ex seipsis. Et hanc opinionem probare videntur nonnulli antiquorum doctorum si quod aliquando scripserunt consideremus. Ecce B. Gregorius qui doctrinam maiorum callebat, iam recepto usu pingendarum imaginum, Serenum quendam Massiliensem episcopum, qui imagines ne adorarentur confringi iussit, his verbis prima epistola admonuit: Praete- | rea indico dudum ad nos pervenisse quod fraternitas vestra quosdam imaginum adoratores aspiciens easdem ecclesiae imagines confregit atque proiecit. Et quidem zelum vos, ne quid manufactum adorari possit, habuisse laudavimus, sed frangere easdem imagines non debuisse iudicamus. Iccirco enim pictura in ecclesiis adhibetur, ut hi qui literas nesciunt saltem in parietibus videndo legant, quae legere in codicibus non valent. Tua ergo fraternitas et illas servare et ab earum adoratu populum prohibere debuit,

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An imagines sint adorandae.

B. Gregorius in libro 7 Epistolarum, Epist. 109

The reference is again to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 2).

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exults and says: “A child is born to us, and a son is given to us”? Here I pass over the other mysteries. How great a book is the sole image of the crucified Christ? How long and wide this volume? For in it anyone may fully contemplate the length, width, height, and depth of its power, goodness, wisdom, and counsel, and from this derive every model of all virtues and every inspiration for sound desires. But about this I have written extensively in another booklet.8 Here it suffices to hint at it, because in this matter there is no controversy among Catholics. [18] Yet, as we said at the outset, there is some dispute, also among Catholics, about the cult and veneration of these images, namely about whether – besides the aforementioned benefits and spiritual consolations provided by images – images are sculpted or painted also to this end that they be adored and that some kind of worship be given them. In fact, there are some who reject this altogether and call it idolatry. They appear to be moved by arguments that are not pointless, nor without the authority of major authors and even the scriptures. The Bible no doubt condemned the idols and images of the pagans, not only because they represented false gods, but also because those idols were made by human hands and lacked sensation: on this basis alone they did not merit veneration and worship in themselves. Several ancient doctors appear to prove this opinion, if we consider what they wrote on occasion. Thus St. Gregory, who knew the teachings of the fathers, at a time when the custom of painting images was already established, admonished a certain Serenus, bishop of Marseilles, who ordered images to be smashed to prevent their adoration, as follows in his first letter [to the bishop]: Furthermore, we indicate that it has recently come to our attention that your Fraternity saw some people adoring images, and you smashed those images and threw them out of the churches. And we certainly applauded you for having had the zeal not to allow anything made by human hands to be adored, but we judge that you ought not to have smashed those images. For a picture is provided in churches for the reason that those who are illiterate may at least read by looking at the walls what they cannot read in books. Therefore, your Fraternity should have preserved them and should have prohibited the people from their adoration, so that both the illiterate might have a way of acquiring a knowledge of history,

[Is. 9:6]

Whether images should be adored.

St. Gregory, Epistles, book 7, epist. 109

8 The reference is again to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 1).

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quatenus et literarum nescii haberent, unde scientiam historiae colligerent, et populus in picturae adoratione minime peccaret.13 Haec ille. Et ad eundem in alia epistola, iterum illum corripiens et praecipiens ut rei veritatem populo praedicaret, in hunc modum scripsit: Dic, frater, a quo factum sacerdote aliquando auditum est quod fecisti? Si non aliud, vel illud te non debuit revocare ne despectis aliis fratribus solum te sanctum et esse crederes sapientem? Aliud est enim picturam adorare, aliud per picturae historiam quid sit adorandum addiscere. Nam quod legentibus scriptura, hoc idiotis praestat pictura cernentibus, quia in ipsa etiam ignorantes vident quod sequi debeant, in ipsa legunt qui literas nesciunt. Unde et praecipue gentibus pro lectione pictura est: quod magnopere a te qui inter gentes habitas attendi debuerat, ne dum recto zelo incaute succenderis, ferocibus animis scandalum generares. Frangi vero non debuit quod non ad adorandum in ecclesiis sed ad instruendas solummodo mentes fuit nescientium collocatum, et quia in locis venerabilibus sanctorum depingi historias non sine ratione vetustas admisit.14 Et paulo post, quia illo facto episcopus ad se plebem suam alienaverat, subdit sanctus pontifex: Convocandi enim sunt dispersi ecclesiae filii, eisque scripturae sacrae est testimoniis ostendendum, quia omne manufactum adorare non liceat, quoniam scriptum est: “Dominum Deum tuum adorabis et illi soli servies.” Ac deinde subiungendum est: quia picturas imaginum, quae ad aedificationem imperiti populi fuerant factae, ut nescientes literas ipsam historiam attendentes discerent quid actum sit, quia transisse in adorationem videras, iccirco commotus es, ut eas imagines frangi praeciperes. Atque eis dicendum: si hanc instructionem ad quam imagines antiquitus factae sunt habere vultis in ecclesia, eas modis omnibus et fieri et haberi permitto. Atque 13 14

[Matt. 4:10; Luke 4:8; cf. Deut. 6:13]

Except for minor differences, this text coincides with modern editions: S. Gregorii Magni Registrum Epistularum libri VIII–XIV, ed. Norberg, 768 (IX, 209). Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum Tomus II., ed. Hartmann, 195 (IX, 208). S. Gregorii Magni Registrum, 873–74 (XI, 10). Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum Tomus II, 270 (XI, 10).

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and the people would not be sinning at all in their adoration of a picture.9 Thus far St. Gregory. The latter, in another letter to the same bishop, corrected him again and ordered him to preach the truth of the matter to the people, as follows: Tell me, brother, when have you ever heard of some other priest doing what you did? If never, should that not have warned you that you were despising all other brethren in your belief that you alone were holy and wise? For the adoration of a picture is one thing, but learning what should be adored through the story on a picture is something else. For what writing provides for readers, this a picture provides for uneducated people looking at it, for in it the ignorant see what they should follow and the illiterate read the same from it. Thus a picture serves as a text, especially for pagans. And you should have paid great attention to this, as you live among pagans, to avoid creating an impediment for ferocious minds, while you are rashly inflamed by righteous zeal. And so you should not break what has been placed in churches not for adoration but simply to instruct the minds of the ignorant, and because antiquity allowed the stories of saints to be depicted in venerable places for a good reason.10 And since the bishop by his actions had alienated his flock, the holy pontiff adds shortly thereafter: For you must call together the divided sons of your church and must show them with the testimonies of holy scripture that it is unlawful to adore anything made by human hand, since it has been written: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve.” And then you must add that painted images were made for the edification of ignorant people, so that not knowing how to read, they might learn what was said by studying the actual story. And when you saw that this had turned into worshipping them, you were so aroused that you ordered those images to be broken. And 9 10

[Matt. 4:10; Luke 4:8; Deut. 6:13]

The translation of this passage (and the following) is based on The Letters of Gregory the Great, ed. and trans. John R.C. Martyn, 3 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004), 2:674. Ibid., 3:745 (slightly modified).

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indica quod non tibi ipsa visio historiae, quae pictura teste pandebatur, displicuerit, sed illa adoratio quae picturis fuerat incompetenter exhibita. Atque in his verbis eorum mentes demulcens eos ad concordiam tuam revoca. Et si quis imagines facere voluerit, minime prohibe, adorare vero imagines omnibus modis devita. Sed hoc solicite fraternitas tua admoneat, ut ex visione rei gestae ardorem compunctionis percipiant et in adoratione solius omnipotentis sanctae Trinitatis humiliter prosternantur.15 131

Haec ille sanctus, ex quibus nulla distinctione adhibita | aut considerata negare omnino videtur adorandas esse imagines, et solummodo ad memoriam et doctrinam et excitationem esse inventas. Idem fere et B. Ambrosius, aiens:

B. Ambrosius

Habeat Helena quae legat, unde crucem Domini recognoscat. Invenit ergo titulum: Regem adoravit, non lignum utique, quia hic gentilis est error et vanitas impiorum; sed adoravit illum qui pependit in ligno.16 Haec ille. Ex quibus patet quod adorationem cruci non tribuebat, sed crucifixo. [19] Verum haec opinio, quae omnem venerationis sive adorationis modum videtur imaginibus denegare, habet et communem doctorum sententiam refragantem et usum ecclesiae ipsum repugnantem, cum

15 16

S. Gregorii Magni Registrum, 874–75 and Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum Tomus II, 271. Ambrose, Oratio de obitu Theodosii, in Tertia pars operum sancti Ambrosii episcopi Mediolanensis (Basilea: in officina Adae Petri, 1516), fol. 49v (PL 16, 1400C–1401B). This same passage was quoted polemically in Luigi Lippomano, Sanctorum priscorum patrum vitae … nuper per R.P.D. Aloysium Lipomanum Episcopum Veronensem in unum volumen redactae, cum scholiis eiusdem omnium praesentium haereticorum blasphemias et delyramenta profligantibus (Venetiis: ad signum Spei, 1551), fol. 112r; a marginal comment on this passage reads: “Hoc etiam modo fideles recte genuflectunt et procumbunt ante imagines crucifixi, beatissime Virginis et sanctorum, ad rogandum Christum et sanctos quos representant, non adorantes lignum et lapides, ut calumniantur haeretici.”

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you must say to them: if you wish to have this type of instruction in the church, for which images were created from ancient times, I do permit them to be made and kept there in every way. And indicate that it was not the sight of the story shown by the picture that displeased you, but the adoration which had been exhibited unsuitably to the pictures. And appeasing their minds with these words, recall them to agreement with you. And if someone should want to paint images, do not prohibit him at all, but in every way avoid adoring the images. But let your Fraternity give this advice with concern, that from the observation of a past event they may receive a strong feeling of remorse and they should bow down humbly in adoration only of the almighty holy Trinity.11 Thus far the saint, whose words deny without making or considering any distinctions that images are to be adored, and [claim instead] that they were invented solely to further memory, doctrine, and inspiration. St. Ambrose says very much the same:

St. Ambrose

Let Helena have something to read, whereby she may recognize the cross of the Lord. She discovered, then, the title. She adored the King, not the wood, indeed, because this is an error of the gentiles and a vanity of the wicked. But she adored him who hung on the tree.12 Thus far Ambrose. From these words it is clear that he did not direct the adoration to the cross, but the crucified. [19] But this opinion, which appears to deny every kind of veneration or adoration of images, is opposed by a common view of the doctors and resisted by church practice, since we see some form of adoration vis-à-vis 11 12

The Letters of Gregory the Great, 3:745–46 (slightly modified). This passage from Ambrose’s oration On the Death of Theodosius is here cited in the translation of Roy J. Deferrari, in Funeral Orations by Saint Gregory Nazianzen and Saint Ambrose, trans. Leo P. McCauley, John J. Sullivan, Martin R.P. McGuire, and Roy J. Deferrari (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1953), 327. This same passage was quoted polemically in Luigi Lippomano, Sanctorum priscorum patrum vitae … nuper per R.P.D. Aloysium Lipomanum Episcopum Veronensem in unum volumen redactae, cum scholiis eiusdem omnium praesentium haereticorum blasphemias et delyramenta profligantibus (Venetiis: ad signum Spei, 1551), fol. 112r; a marginal comment on this passage reads: “In this way, also, the faithful rightly kneel and prostrate themselves before images of the crucified, the most blessed Virgin and the saints, to petition Christ and the saints these [images] represent, not adoring the wood and stone, as the heretics slander [them].”

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videamus nonnullam esse adorationis speciem erga imagines. Et ideo ipse B. Gregorius alibi non negavit aliquem venerationis modum, nec in citatis locis, si recte considerentur, ut suo loco dicemus. [20] Sunt ergo qui econverso dicunt imagines non solum adorandas esse, verum etiam latria adorandas si Christi imagines fuerint, hac tamen distinctione servata, quod si imago consideretur ut est quaedam res, puta aes aut lignum et quaevis materia, nulla ei adoratio convenit, quia veneratio et adoratio non convenit nisi rationali creaturae. Sin vero consideretur ut est imago, puta crucifixi, exhiberi debet illi veneratio eadem quae ipsi debetur crucifixo. Crucifixo autem latria debetur, igitur et imagini. Medium quo haec conclusio probatur est quoniam, ut ait Aristoteles, motus in imaginem ut est imago, et in illud cuius imago est, unus motus est. At vero haec positio et prima facie falsa videtur et fundamento inniti valde infirmo. Et quidem contra ipsam positionem sunt argumenta Henrici, Durandi, Olchot et aliorum quorundam scholasticorum, sed cuncta unum habent medium in quod resolvuntur, nempe hoc: latria nulli rei debetur quae non sit Deus; soli enim Deo haec species adorationis et cultus debetur. Imago autem quovis modo considerata, etiam ut imago, non est Deus, cui imagini si conveniat illiusmodi adoratio, profecto alii rei quam Deo conveniret ac deberetur, cuius contrarium sumpsimus omni acceptione dignum. Quod vero ad probandam illam opinionem affertur, quod unus est motus in apprehensione imaginis ut est imago, et rei cuius est imago, nihil facit, quia hic motus unus veritatem rei non tollit aut invertit. Non enim faciet unquam meus quilibet motus, ut quod non est Deus sit Deus, neque ut cui non debetur latria, debeatur. [21] Ad haec rogo de motu illo adorationis. Qui enim adorat, in id respicit quod adorat, nec enim aliter adoraret. Adorans ergo imaginem, quem (obsecro) conceptum habet de illa? Utrum quod illa sit Deus, an non? Certe imago ut imago est, non est Deus, sed repraesentans Deum. Si igitur habet illam pro Deo, et quod sit vere Deus, error est horribilis et detestandus. Sin agnoscit illam non esse Deum, sed solummodo referre Deum, et nihilominus adorat latria, hoc | non est aliud quam alteri a Deo latriam reddere. Quod si dixeris: haec adoratio est unus motus qui fertur in imaginem et exinde in imaginatum, itaque una adoratione adoratur imago

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images. Elsewhere St. Gregory himself did not reject a kind of veneration, and neither did he do so in the cited passages, if properly considered, as we will explain in the proper place. [20] In contrast, there are those who say that images not only should be adored but, if they are images of Christ, adored with latria, with the caveat that if the image is considered as a thing – for instance a piece of bronze or wood or any other material – no adoration is appropriate, because veneration and adoration is appropriate only for a created being endowed with reason. If, however, it is considered qua image, for instance of the crucified, it must be offered the same veneration as the crucified himself. For the crucified is owed latria, hence also the image. The means by which this conclusion is proven is that, as Aristototle says, the movement toward the image qua image and toward that of which it is an image, is one and the same. This position appears both false at first sight and resting on a quite weak foundation. Against it there are the arguments made by Henry, Durandus, Holkot, and several other scholastics,13 but all share the same means of resolving [the problem], namely: latria is owed to nothing except God, for only to God this kind of adoration and worship is owed. Yet an image, however considered, also qua image, is not God. Now if this kind of adoration of the image were appropriate, then it would actually be appropriate and owed to something different from God, which is contrary to what we assumed to be acceptable. The argument adduced to prove this opinion – that the movement [involved] in apprehending the image qua image and the thing of which it is an image, is one and the same – does not work, because this single movement does not annul or change the reality of the thing. For no movement of [my soul], of whatever kind, will ever turn what is not God into God, or mean that latria should be rendered to something to which it should not. [21] Here I question this movement of adoration. For those who adore look at what they adore: they adore in no other way. Then what concept, I ask, do those who adore an image have of it? That it is God, or not? Surely the image qua image is not God, but it represents God. If, then, they hold it to be God – that it is truly God – this is a horrible, detestable error. If they acknowledge that it is not God but merely refers to God, and nonetheless adore it with latria, this is the same as rendering latria to something other than God. If you say: this adoration is one movement leading to the image and from there to the thing imaged, therefore the image and 13

The references here are to Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), Durand de St. Pourçain (d. 1334), and to Robert Holkot (d. 1349). For these critics of the Thomist-Aristotelian theory of adoration, see chapter 1, p. 75.

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et imaginatum; et cum sit una adoratio, non potest esse nisi latria – si (inquam) ita dixeris, hic dicendi modus non satisfacit. Si enim verum est dicere quod adoratur imago, necesse est ipsam imaginem esse obiectum adorationis, ac propterea aliquo modo ipsa imaginis adoratio terminetur in imagine. Quod si non terminatur in illa, sed in imaginato, non potest dici adoratio imaginis, sed imaginati. Nec videtur consistere quod duo sint adorata, et una sit adoratio. [22] Est autem qui, ut argumentum resolvat, dicit quod imago et imaginatum sunt veluti unum totale obiectum adorationis, et ideo sit una adoratio tantum, et illa est latriae. Verum mira est haec confusio, ut pari modo respiciatur ut obiectum imago et imaginatum, et terminetur adoratio pariter in utrunque. Quod si dixerint incipere quidem ferri adorationem in imaginem, sed terminari in ipsum imaginatum, non est ergo vera adoratio imaginis, in quam adorationis terminatio non extenditur. Et quomodo erit imago obiectum partiale, si nullo modo in ipsam adoratio terminetur? [23] Evadunt quidam alia via, qui hanc opinionem volunt defendere, et dicunt: est adoratio latriae duplex, quaedam per se, quaedam vero per accidens. Et illa quae per se, debetur ipsi uni et vero Deo; illa autem quae per accidens, etiam creaturae potest reddi, ut est imago Christi. Verum haec responsio non stat cum priore, quae unam constituit adorationem imaginis et imaginati: ut sic una numero existens adoratio, sit adoratio per se et per accidens, quod est ridiculum. Praeterea, quod est per accidens non est reputandum, alioquin quaelibet res posset adorari latria per accidens. Quare consideratio haec non est iuxta mentem eorum qui imagini adorationem latriae tribuunt. [24] Sunt et qui dicant adorationem hanc imaginis non terminari ad imaginem, sed ad imaginatum tantum, et tamen ipsi volunt eandem adorationem esse imaginis ut est imago, quae ut sic non est imaginatum. Quare adorabitur imago ut imago absque termino adorationis in imaginem, quae non sunt intelligibilia. Quamobrem Capreolus volens aliquo modo tueri dictum magistri, huc tandem se trusit, dicens: “licet signum et signatum, exemplar et imago, realiter, semper et quandoque conceptibiliter distinguantur, tamen quandoque philosophi et theologi ea quae

Capreolus.

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the thing imaged are adored in one single [act of] adoration, and since it is one [act of] adoration, it can only be latria – if this is what you say, your wording is unsatisfactory. For if it is true to say that the image is adored, that image is necessarily the object of adoration, and hence the adoration of the image ends somehow in the image. If it does not end in the latter, but in what is imaged, it cannot be called adoration of the image, but of the imaged. It seems inconsistent for two things to be adored, and there to be one [act of] adoration. [22] But there are those who, to resolve this problem, say that the image and the imaged [imaginatum] are like one comprehensive object of adoration, and therefore there is only one [act of] adoration, namely of latria. But this is astonishingly confusing – that the image and the imaginatum are observed in similar fashion as object, and that the adoration ends similarly in each. If they say that adoration begins by being directed to the image but ends in the imaginatum, there is no true adoration of the image, for in the latter the adoration is not meant to be completed. And how can an image be a partial object, if the adoration in no way ends in it? [23] A different route is taken by some others who want to defend this opinion. They say: the adoration of latria comes in two ways, either by itself or per accidens. If by itself, it is owed to the one true God; if per accidens, it can also be rendered to a created thing, such as an image of Christ. But this response is not consistent with the previous one, which constitutes a single [act of] adoration of the image and the imaginatum: thus an [act of] adoration that is one in number is both adoration by itself and per accidens – which is ridiculous. Furthermore, what is per accidens should be not valued, or else anything can be adored with latria per accidens. Accordingly, this argument is not in accord with the thought of those who confer the adoration of latria to an image. [24] There are also those who say that this adoration of the image does not end in the image, but only in the imaginatum, and yet they also want the same adoration to be of the image qua image, which as such is not the imaginatum. Therefore the image is adored qua image, yet the adoration does not end in the image – which is incomprehensible. In this vein Capreolus,14 in an effort to salvage the his master’s statement, even feels compelled to say: “although the sign and the signified, the original and the image, must really, always, and whenever be distinguished conceptually, 14

Capreolus.

Ioannes Capreolus (d. 1444) was a French Dominican, known particularly as a scholastic commentator and defender of the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

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dicuntur de uno, attribuunt alteri, sicut dicit S. Thomas, De veritate, q. 4, art. 8.”17 Sic dixit Philosophus: “anima est quodammodo omnia.”18 Et ipse D. Thomas: “similitudo creaturae in verbo est quodammodo vita creaturae.” Haec ille in Summa.19 Verum nec sic defenditur positio. Licet enim imago et imaginatum sint quodammodo idem, nunquam tamen vere et proprie dicentur esse idem, sicut nec Philosophus ausus est dicere animam esse omnia, sed di- | xit est quodammodo omnia. Et D. Thomas similiter non dixit quod similitudo creaturae in Verbo sit vita creaturae, sed quodammodo. Quare illo argumento hoc saltem obtinetur quod non proprie dicitur, imago adoratur adoratione latriae, sed improprie, reddendo imagini quod vere competit in imaginatum quodam figurato dicendi modo, qui non est proprius philosophorum aut theologorum, sed rhetorum et poetarum. Non enim magis proprie dicitur, imago adoratur adoratione latriae, quam imago est imaginatum; quod proprie loquendo nullus sanae mentis concederet. [25] Non me latet Caietanum hunc modum dicendi, “imago ut imago adoranda est adoratione latriae,” conari defendere ut omnino verum ac proprium dictum, sic exponens: “imago ut imago, idest, ut exercens imaginis officium” repraesentans imaginatum,20 quia ut sic, idem est imago quod imaginatum; quod ego certe non possum capere, quoniam nullo exercitio imaginis (ut ita loquar) aut hominis per imaginem fieri potest haec metamorphosis et conversio. Si dixisset: quia in imagine inspicitur imaginatum fit mihi ipsa imago quodammodo unum cum imaginato, ex

17

18 19

20

Ioannes Capreolus, In tertio Sententiarum, dist. IX, q. 1 (“Utrum humanitas Christi sit adoranda adoratione latriae”), a. 3, § 2, in Johannis Capreoli Tholosani … defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Ceslai Paban and Thomas Pègues (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1904), 5:140. Aristotle, De anima, III, chap. 5: Aristotelis de anima libri tres, Ioanne Argyropylo Byzantio interprete (Salmanticae: Andreas a Portonariis, 1555), 106. Actually, the reference is to Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, q. 4, art. 8, in D. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris Angelici complectens Quaestiones, quae disputatae dicuntur, et Quaestiones Quodlibetales, sive Placitorum … (Romae: apud Iulium Accoltum, 1570), fol. 319r. The reference is no doubt to Cajetan’s extensive gloss on Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 25, a. 3, “Utrum imago Christi sit adoranda adoratione latriae.” Cajetan notes among other things: “Et quia [motus adorationis] terminatur ad ipsam [imaginem Christi], non quatenus est res […] sed quatenus est imago, hoc est, quatenus exercet actum imaginis, ideo Christus, cuius est imago, est ratio quod imago eius adoratur …” (my emphasis). See Tertia Pars Summae Sacrae Theologiae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis … Reverendiss. Domini Thomae a Vio Caietani … Commentariis adaucta atque illustrata (Antverpiae: Apud Viduma et Haeredes Ioannis Stelsii, 1567), 138.

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still philosophers and theologians always attribute the things they say about one also to the other, as St. Thomas has said (De veritate, q. 4, a. 4).” The Philosopher has said: “the soul is in a way all [existing] things.”15 And St. Thomas himself: “the likeness of the creature in the Word is in a way the life of the creature.” Thus his Summa.16 Yet not even thus can this position be defended. Although the image and the imaginatum are in a way the same, they can never truly and properly be said to be the same. Hence Aristotle did not dare to say that the soul is all things, but he said that it is in a way all things. Likewise St. Thomas did not say that the likeness of the created in the Word is the life of the created, but in a way. From this argument, therefore, we gather at least that it is not properly said, ‘the image is adored with the adoration of latria,’ but improperly, by conferring on the image what really belongs to the imaginatum in a figurative way of speaking, which is not proper for philosophers or theologians, but for rhetoricians and poets. For one says no more properly, ‘the image is adored with the adoration of latria,’ than ‘the image is the imaginatum,’ which properly speaking nobody of sane mind would concede. [25] I am aware that Cajetan has tried to defend this expression, “the image qua image is to be adored with the adoration of latria,” as an entirely true and proper statement by explaining “the image qua image” as “performing the function of the image” in representing the imaginatum.17 If so, the image is identical to the imaginatum, something I cannot understand, because by no action of an image (so to speak) or of a human through an image can this metamorphosis and conversion be accomplished. If he had said, ‘since the imaginatum is seen in the image, the image appears to me as somehow one with the imaginatum, on which basis I accept

15 16 17

Aristotle, “On the Soul,” III, ch. 8 (431b20–21), Complete Works of Aristotle, 2:686. Actually, the reference is to Thomas’s Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 4, art. 8 (see footnote on opposite page). The reference is no doubt to Cajetan’s extensive gloss on Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 25, a. 3, “Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of latria.” Cajetan commented: “And since the movement of adoration ends in the image of Christ, not insofar it is a thing […] but insofar it is an image, that is, exercises the function of image, therefore Christ, whose image it is, is the reason why the image is adored …” (my emphasis). See note on opposite page for details.

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quo rationem adorationis accipio, et in illud ipsam termino adorationem, poterat substineri. At velle defendere secundum quemlibet conceptum verum quod imago ut imago vel ut exercens officium imaginis (quod est repraesentare) sit ipsum imaginatum, et quod adoratio latriae terminetur quovismodo in ipsam imaginem, non est aliud quam velle insanire aut alios ad insaniam redigere. Sed hoc facit amor ille sectarum inordinatus, cui ad tuendum quodvis a magistro emissum verbum satis est Pytagoricum illud, “ipse dixit.” [26] Est igitur et alius quorundam dicendi modus, qui negant vere ac proprie dici esse adorandas imagines quovismodo, sed potius adorationem esse faciendam ad imagines, vel ante imagines, vel in imaginibus, ipsum Deum verum ibi adorando. Contra hunc tamen loquendi modum, qui parum differt a primo, qui omnem adorationis terminum aufert ab imaginibus, videtur mos ecclesiae, quoniam et gestus et verba adorationis et ipsa latriae signa dirigimus in imagines, quibus adolemus et thus. Sic et crucem salutamus adorantes et dicentes: “O crux ave spes unica,” etc. Nec valere debet quorundam impietas et male sobria sapientia, qui hoc factum derident ut superstitiosum et ad idololatriam pertinens, et huius rei gratia in haeresim incurrunt et schismata moliuntur. Talis fuit Erasmus, qui seditiosissime ac mendacissime scripsit haec verba:

Erasmus in symbolo.

Ut imagines sint in templis, nulla praecipit vel humana constitutio. Et ut facilius, ita tutius quoque est omnes imagines e templis summovere, quam impetrare ut nec modus praetereatur, nec admisceatur superstitio. Iam ut animus sit ab omni superstitione purus, tamen non caret superstitionis specie orantem ad ligneum simulacrum procumbere, in hoc intentos habere oculos, ad hoc | verba facere, nec orare prorsus absque imagine. Illud addam, quicunque sibi aliusmodi fingunt Deum quam est, contra praeceptum hoc colunt sculptilia.21

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21

Erasmus Roterodamus, Dilucida et pia explanatio symboli quod apostolorum dicitur, decalogi praeceptorum, et dominicae praecationis (Antverpiae: ex officina Michaelis Hillenii, 1533), fol. Kv. Along with minor differences, Catarino skips the words, “huic oscula figere” following “ad hoc verba facere.”

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the rationale of adoration and end that adoration in the [imaginatum]’, this could be sustained. But to want to defend as some true concept that the image qua image, or performing the task of the image (which is to represent) is the same as the imaginatum, and that the adoration of latria somehow ends in that image, can only make one go mad or reduce others to insanity. But that is what this inordinate love of sects does, for which the Pythagorean ‘He said so himself’ suffices to defend any word uttered by the master.18 [26] There is yet another expression, of those who deny that images can in any way truly and properly be said to be adored, but [who claim] instead that adoration is to be made to images, before images, or in images, thereby really adoring God himself. Against this expression – hardly different from the first, which dissociates the end goal of adoration from the images – stands the tradition of the Church: we direct both the gestures and the words of adoration, as well as the very signs of latria, to the images, for which we also burn incense. Likewise, as we adore the cross we greet it with the words: “Hail, cross, our sole hope,” etc. Nor is there validity in the impiety and intemperate cleverness of those who deride this practice as superstitious and pertaining to idolatry, and who on account of this commit heresy and bring about schisms. Such a person was Erasmus, who most seditiously and mendaciously wrote these words: Not even human regulations prescribe that there should be images in churches. It is both easier and safer to remove all images from churches than to assure that their use is kept within limits and free of superstition. Even if the soul is free of superstition, a person may not be free of its semblance, falling down in prayer before a wooden figure, keeping the eyes riveted on it, addressing it in words, not praying at all except before the image. I will say more – whenever humans fashion for themselves a God different from what he is, they worship graven things in violation of this commandment.19

18 19

Erasmus in his Symbolum.

The reference is to reports, mentioned by Cicero (De natura deorum, 1.10), that followers of Pythagoras would sometimes settle arguments by referring to the authoritative view of the master. Desiderius Erasmus, Explanatio symboli apostolorum, trans. Louis A. Perraud, in Erasmus, Spiritualia and pastoralia, ed. John W. O’Malley, 5 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988–97), 5:367. Heinrich Bullinger cited the same passage by Erasmus, approvingly, in his In librum de origine erroris circa invocationem et cultum deorum ac simulachrorum (1539), cit. in Eire, War Against the Idols, 52 n. 90.

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Haec ille; cui abunde in alio libello respondi.22 [27] Nunc ergo quod ad rem pertinet (quoniam, ut verum fatear, haud dubie credo catholicorum mentem unam fuisse et idem omnes sensisse, licet inter se verbis discrepent, et alius alium se mutuo non intelligentes reprehendat) in hoc mihi video esse laborandum, ut quae minus erudite ac parum proprie ab aliquo dicta sunt, ad sensum verum ac proprium redigantur, in quem omnes consentiunt, et paucis conclusionibus tota res perstringatur. [28] Concludo ergo primo ex iam dictis posse Deum et ipsam sanctam Trinitatem et beatos angelorum spiritus picturis nobis significari, quod nunc usus ecclesiae probat. Quod autem D. Ioannes Damascenus dixit, summae impietatis et insipientiae esse effigiare quod est divinum, hoc verum est (ut diximus) quando ex ea opera aliquid erroris veniret, non autem si potius aliqua notitia et devotio et excitatio, sicut accidit a pictura sanctae Trinitatis et Spiritus sancti in specie columbae. Nam si in scripturis monstrantur nobis hae personae eo modo quo pinguntur, cur culpabitur pictura cum non culpetur scriptura? Non me latet aliquos doctores hoc non probasse, antequam usus esset in ecclesia. [29] Secundo concludo de Christo iam nullam esse dubitationem cum fuerit incarnatus, ac per hoc effigiabilis redditus. Et addo posse et ipsum figurari et adorari in specie agni, quanquam et hoc aliquando prohibitum fuisset vitandi erroris gratia, cum adhuc idololatriae sacrilegium non penitus esset extinctum. Sed quis nunc adeo hebes, qui possit putare Dominum venisse in forma agni, quia in ea specie videat illum pictum, ac non potius per eam picturam intelligat, quae in illo animali singulariter conspiciuntur, in Christum eminenter competere, videlicet, innocentiam et mansuetudinem et sacrificium pro peccato? Profecto nimis soliciti sunt qui volunt propter idiotas eiusmodi prohibere picturas, ne quis in eum errorem incidat, in quem qui incideret, proculdubio non peccaret, sed excusaret eum Deus propter insignem et stolidissimam suam simplicitatem. [30] Tertio concludo quod usus imaginum utilitatem plurimam in multis praestat, sicut dictum est, quia sunt libri idiotarum et rememorant beneficia Dei, reddentes quodammodo illa nobis praesentia. Quod si sermones et scripturae hoc faciant, fortius tamen hoc agunt repraesentationes per picturam et sculpturam, sicut quidam eleganter dixit: “Segnius

22

Summa praedictorum per conclusiones.

I

Nota.

II

III Utilitas ex imaginibus.

The reference is again to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 2); the point is also noted in Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra, 207 n. 159.

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Thus Erasmus, to whom I have abundantly replied in my other booklet.20 [27] Now, as far as the matter at hand is concerned, to tell the truth, I have little doubt that Catholics are of one mind and all feel the same way, even if they may differ in their wording, and some may reproach each other due to a mutual misunderstanding. Hence I see it as my task to reduce what some have said in a less informed or proper way to its true and proper meaning, to which all consent, and to tie everything up with a few conclusions. [28] From the aforesaid I conclude, first, that God, the holy Trinity, and the blessed spirits of the angels can be signified to us through pictures – something that is currently approved by church practice. However, what St. John of Damascus has said, namely that it is of the utmost impiety and folly to portray the divine, this is true (as we have said) when some error should come of this effort, but not if it were some insight, devotion, or inspiration, as occurs with a picture of the Trinity or the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove. For if the scriptures show us these persons in the same way in which they are painted, why should the picture be blamed but not the scripture? I am aware that some doctors did not approve this before it was a custom in the Church. [29] Second, I conclude that there is no doubt that Christ was incarnated, and hence rendered portrayable. I add that he can also be represented and adored in the form of the lamb, even though this was forbidden at one time to avoid error, when the sacrilege of idolatry was not fully extinguished. But who is so obtuse now as to think that the Lord came in the form of a lamb, because he sees him depicted in that form, instead of understanding from that picture that the specific qualities seen in this animal eminently apply to Christ, namely innocence, gentleness, and sacrifice for sin? Certainly some are anxious to prohibit this kind of pictures because of uneducated folk, so that no one may run into this error. But anyone who does would definitely not sin, but be excused by God for such great and most foolish simple-mindedness. [30] Third, I conclude that the use of images offers multiple rewards to many people, as we have said, because they are the books of the illiterate and remind them of God’s benefits, rendering these in some way present to us. If sermons and scriptures do this, how much more strongly do representations in painting or sculture achieve this, as has been said

20

Summary and conclusions.

I

Nota bene.

II

III The usefulness of images.

The reference is again to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 1).

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irritant animos demissa per aures, quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus, quae ipse sibi tradit spectator.”23 Et hinc alia magna utilitas, quia per ea spectacula emollitur | cor et excitatur animus ad adorandum et orandum et reddendum gratias et gloriam Deo, quum videt per imaginem Iesu Christi repraesentari sibi illa immensa atque admiranda beneficia et dona. Testabatur de se Gregorius Nissenus, quoties respiciebat imaginem crucifixi, totiens excutiebantur sibi lacrymae ex oculis.24 Excitatur ergo quivis christianus ab aspectu imaginis crucifixi ad execrandum ingratitudinem suam et petendam veniam admissorum et deliberandum firmiter amplius non offendere. Excitatur et ad imitationem sui ducis et magistri, cernens in picturis gesta eius heroica et crucis trophaea. Nec dicat mihi quisquam haec fieri posse commode, immo et melius, absque picturis, cum Dominus dixerit, Patrem quaerere adoratores qui adorent in spiritu et veritate, quasi vero obstent nobis imagines ne adoremus in spiritu et veritate: cum vel ad hoc valde adiuvent, ut nemo (nisi qui suae sit nescius conditionis) inficiari potest, quod mox latius declarabo. [31] Quarto igitur concludo quod recte et vere et proprie dicitur adorationem latriae fieri commodissime ad imagines vel ante imagines Iesu Christi propter repraesentationem personae ipsius, qui Deus est verus, per quem excitatur fervor adorationis et orationis. Nec sentio cum illis qui dicunt non deberi Christo latriam per id quod nobis repraesentatur per talem imaginem, eo quod solummodo repraesentatur humanitas Christi, quae non est adoranda (ut volunt) adoratione latriae. Non sento, inquam, cum his, eo quod per illam Christi imaginem repraesentatur mihi totus Christus et ipsa persona Christi, et non sola humanitas. Ex figura enim traho conceptum personae, non humanitatis solummodo distinctae a persona. Alioqui nulla pictura mihi hominem repraesentabit, quia animam hominis, quae incorporea est, non repraesentat. Homo autem sine anima nullus est, et tamen nemo negaret hominem pingi. Et ideo vana est proculdubio illa consideratio, sapiens metaphysicalem abstractionem

23

24

[John 4:23–24]

IV

Horace, Ars poetica, 180–81, with minor variation in: Q. Horatii Flacci Ars poetica, cum trium doctissimorum commentariis … (Lugduni: Franc. Iustus, 1536), 120; cf. Horace, Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica, ed. and trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (London-New York: William Heinemann and G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), 464. See LCN, fol. 13v (“divus Gregorius Nissae episcopus de patriarcha Abraham sermonem faciens dixit: Vidi non infrequenter passionis figuram, neque sine lachrymis eiuscemodi picturam transii, cum scilicet opus artificii in personam significatam demonstratum esse viderem”); and similar remarks at fols. 29r and 77v.

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elegantly: “Less vividly is the mind stirred by what finds entrance through the ears than by what is brought before the trusty eyes, and what the spectator can see for himself.”21 From this flows another benefit, because the viewing of the image softens the heart and inspires the heart to adore, pray, and give thanks and glory to God, since [viewers] see by way of the image of Jesus Christ that these immense and wondrous benefits and gifts are being represented to them. Gregory of Nyssa testified that whenever he looked upon the image of the crucified, tears would well up in his eyes. Christians are thus stirred by the sight of the image of the crucified to curse their ungratefulness, ask forgiveness for their admitted sins, and firmly resolve not to commit offenses anymore. They are also inspired to imitate their leader and master, as they discern his heroic deeds and the trophies of the cross in pictures. Nor should anyone tell me that this can be done easily, yes even better, without pictures, because the Lord has said that the Father seeks adorers who will adore him in spirit and in truth, as if images obstruct our adoration in spirit and in truth. For they aid very much in this, as no one (except those who are unaware of their condition) can deny, as I will shortly explain further. [31] Fourth, then, I conclude that we can rightly, truly, and properly say that the adoration of latria can be done conveniently to or before images of Jesus Christ because of the representation of his person, who is true God, by which the fervor of adoration and prayer is stirred up. Nor do I agree with those who say that Christ is not owed latria through that which is represented to us by such an image, because it represents only the humanity of Christ, which (they claim) must not be adored with the adoration of latria. I do not agree with them, I say, because to me this image of Christ represents the entire Christ, and the very person of Christ, not only his humanity. For from the figure I derive the concept of the person, not only of his humanity as distinct from the person. Otherwise no picture will ever represent a human being to me, because it does not represent the human soul, which is incorporeal. But humans are nothing without a soul, yet no one denies that they can be painted. Therefore this consideration is undoubtedly pointless, knowing that in this context metaphysical abstraction is inappropriate – such, therefore, as the Seventh Council opposes. I leave the question of the adoration of

21

[John 4:23]

IV

Horace, Ars poetica, 180–81: Horace, Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica, ed. and trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (London-New York: William Heinemann and G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), 465.

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hoc in loco importunam, denique talis cui septima synodus adversatur. Mitto quaestionem de adoratione humanitatis Christi, quae meo iudicio etiam supervacua est. Quis enim adorans separet Christi humanitatem a Verbo? [32] Quinto etiam concludo et illud recte ac vere et proprie dici in imagine adorari Christum et venerari. Nec hic dicendi modus significat quod etiam adoretur imago, sed quod imago est per cuius officium mihi repraesentatur Christus, et ipsum ibi repraesentatum adoro, sicut adorans Christum in cruce non adorat crucem, sed per illam et in illa Christum verum sibi repraesentat et agnoscat, et illum adorat. [33] Sexto concludo quod aliquo modo etiam potest dici, ut est apud B. Thomam, adorari ipsam imaginem | et deberi illi latriae adorationem, non ut est res quaedam, idest, non ut secundum materiam consideratur, quoniam sic considerata non est digna ullo honore, nisi forte propter contactum aliquem, ut dicimus de cruce illa ubi Christus pependit (de qua re etiam dicemus), sed ut imago est, hoc est, ut iam officium fecit imaginis, quod est ita repraesentasse imaginatum ut ipsa imago quodammodo nobis in ipsum evadat imaginatum, quod in illa tanquam ibi praesens suspicimus ac veneramur; et quae interne ad ipsum habemus verba, externe ad eius imaginem illa dirigimus tanquam si ibi esset, aut tanquam si illa imago esset ipsum imaginatum. Hinc illa ecclesiae vox: “O crux ave spes unica,” etc., quae certe verba nimis offenderent nisi in haec resolvas ut dicas: ave o crucifixe mihi per crucem repraesentate, qua utor perinde ac illa tu esses, mihi id tua benignitate concedens, qui miserae conditionis naturae nostrae misereris, et illi inclinaris, quae desiderat videre quem colit, et sibi esse praesentem quem diligit et affatur. Nullus enim est Christianorum qui ita desipiat ut arbitretur idem esse crucem quod est crucifixus et idem esse Christi imaginem quod est ipse Christus. Quod si rogaretur: cur ergo invocas crucem, dicens, “O crux ave,” etc., responderet: non illam sive rem sive imaginem invoco ut ipsa intelligat, quam sensum non habere scio, sed ut ille intelligat et exaudiat quem vere recolo et invoco in illa. [34] Cum ergo sic imaginem accipimus ut nobis serviat pro imaginato, et dicimus adorari imaginem latria, non est detestandus penitus hic sermo. Idem est enim ac si dixerimus adorari imaginatum latria, quia imago pro imaginato sumitur. Sed nunquam bene dicitur adorari imaginem latria ut

V

VI

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Christ’s humanity aside, then, which in my judgment is superfluous. For who adores Christ and separates his humanity from the Word? [32] Fifth, I also conclude that it can be said rightly, truly, and properly that Christ can be adored and venerated in the image. This expression does not mean that the image is also adored, but that it is the image through whose function Christ is represented to me, and that I adore him represented there, just as those who adore Christ in the cross do not adore the cross, but through it and in it represent the true Christ to themselves, and acknowledge and adore him. [33] Sixth, I conclude that in a way it is also possible to say, as St. Thomas has it, that the image itself is adored and owed the adoration of latria, not insofar as it is a thing, that is, not considered according to its matter – for thus considered it is not worthy of any honor, except perhaps because of some contact with it, as we say about the cross from which Christ hung (to which we will return) – but insofar as it is an image, that is, as it performs its function, which is to represent the imaged in such a way that to us the image in a way turns into the imaged, which we behold and venerate in [the image] as if it is present there; and any words for the imaged that occur to us internally, we direct externally to its image as if it were there, or as if the image were the imaged. Hence the Church’s expression: “Hail, oh cross, our only hope,” etc. – words which would certainly be offensive unless one explains them to say: hail, oh crucified, represented to me by the cross, which I use as if you were it, taking this liberty thanks to the benevolence of you, who commiserates with the miserable condition of our nature and is well disposed to the [faithful] who wish to see what they worship and have present those they love and address. There is no Christian who is so lacking in understanding as to consider the cross to be the same as the crucified, and an image of Christ the same as Christ himself. If one is asked, why then do you invoke the cross with the words, “Hail, oh cross,” etc., the answer should be: I do not invoke it, neither the thing nor the image, so that something which I know has no sense will understand me, but so that he whom I truly worship and invoke in it will understand and hear me. [34] Since we thus allow the image to stand in for the imaged, and say that the image is adored with latria, this expression is not to be entirely condemned. It would be the same as if we said that the imaged is adored with latria, because the image is taken to be the imaged. But it is never

V

VI

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est imago, quia hic sermo designat adorationem terminari ad imaginem et non ad imaginatum, quia imago ut imago non est imaginatum. [35] Concludo igitur quod haec non proprie dicuntur neque secundum veritatem iuxta communem acceptionem vocabulorum, scilicet quod imago ut imago, aut ut exercens officium imaginis, quod est repraesentare Christum aut Deum, sit adoranda adoratione latriae. Quapropter ille modus dicendi iam multos offendit, et quia offendit, nec ab re cum sit improprius mittendus est, quanquam si pie et indulgenter accipiatur, permitti queat propter autoritatem tanti viri et nonnullum commune in abusum sermonis. Nam et imaginem Domini demonstrando solemus dicere, hic est Christus, ut sit sensus quod qui per imaginem repraesentatur est Christus, sicut dixit de petra B. Paulus: “petra erat Christus.” Nullus tamen sanae mentis intelliget petram illam vere fuisse Christum, sed per eam petram Christum significari. Dicimus etiam percussa regis imagine percussum esse regem, haud tamen vere et proprie. Cautius ergo et absque offen- | sione dixerunt et magis proprie qui ita sunt locuti, Christum ad imaginem aut ante imaginem aut in imagine adorandum esse latria. Unde D. Athanasius dixit: “Qui imaginem adorat, in ipsa imperatorem adorat,” ac si dixerit: non vere ipsam, sed in ipsa illum quem repraesentat imago adorat vera latria.25 Nam revera nullus antiquorum (quantum ego legerim et animadverterim) dixit unquam imagines quovismodo adorandas adoratione latriae, sed hunc dicendi modum abominati sunt omnes. Nam quum simpliciter B. Gregorius negabat imagines adorandas, de hac latriae adoratione proculdubio intelligebat, non excludens omnem adorationis modum ac venerationem. Nolebat enim imagines more idolatrarum haberi pro Deo. Quapropter in alia septimi libri epistola 53, mittens ad Secundinum Dei servum quasdam imagines, et laudans illum quod eas desiderasset atque expetivisset, admonens illum dixit:

[1 Cor. 10:4]

Scio quod imaginem Salvatoris non ideo petis ut quasi Deum colas, sed ob recordationem Filii Dei in eius amore recalescas, cuius te imaginem videre consideras. Et nos quidem non quasi ante divinitatem ante illam prosternimur, sed illum adoramus quem

25

Catarino’s source is unclear. Cf. Athanasius of Alexandria, Orationes contra Arianos, 4, in B. Athanasii Archiepiscopi Alexandrini Opera quae reperiuntur omnia (Heidelbergae: ex officina Commeliana, 1600), 254: “Qui igitur adorat imaginem, in illa adorat ipsum regem”; PG 26, 531. Note that the phrase is also cited at Nicaea II, albeit without the attribution to Athanasius: LCN, fol. 69r.

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good to say that the image qua image is adored with latria, because this expression means that the adoration ends in the image and not the imaged, because the image qua image is not the imaged. [35] Hence I conclude that, even according to the truth of the common understanding of the words, it is incorrect to say such things, to wit that an image qua image, or as exercising the function of image, which is to represent Christ or God, must be adored with the adoration of latria. This manner of speaking offends many, and because it does, it is best avoided as being inappropriate, although if it is taken in a pious and forgiving manner, it can be allowed based on the reputation of such a person and a certain common tendency to abuse language. For when we show an image of the Lord we also tend to say, ‘This is Christ,’ meaning that it is Christ who is represented by the image, just as St. Paul said about the rock: “the rock was Christ.” Anyone of sane mind will not think that the rock truly was Christ, but that Christ was signified by that rock. We also say that when an image of a king is hit, the king is hit, but not really and properly. Yet those speak more cautiously, without offense, and more properly, who say that Christ must be adored with latria to, before, or in his image. Hence St. Athanasius has said: “Who adores an image, adores the emperor in it,” as if to say, it is not that [image], but the person in it who is represented by it that is adored with true latria. For really none of the ancients (as far as I have read and noticed) has ever said that images must in some way be adored with the adoration of latria, but all have abhorred that manner of speaking. For while St. Gregory generally denied that images must be adored, he no doubt meant by this the adoration of latria, not excluding all manner of adoration nor veneration. For he did not want images to be considered as God in the way of the idolaters. Therefore, in another letter, number 53 from Book VII, as he sent God’s servant Secundinus a few images and praised him for desiring and requesting them, he told him with a warning: I know that you do not request the image of the Savior to worship it as God, but so the memory of the Son of God may revive your love of him, as you contemplate seeing his image. We, in fact, do not prostrate ourselves before it as before a divinity, but adore him whom

[1 Cor. 10:4]

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per imaginem aut natum aut passum, sed et in throno sedentem recordamur.26 Haec ille, ubi duo licet inspicere in huius sanctissimi pontificis doctrina. Alterum negari latriam imagini, cum negat eam esse habendam et colendam quasi Deum. Alterum non negari prostrationem ante imagines, quod certe modum aliquem venerationis in imagines ipsas significat. Nam et ipsas exosculamur, et verba in illas dirigimus, ut ille audiat qui repraesentatur in illis. [36] Redeo ad rem. Dicebam, sicut et verum est, neminem antiquorum dixisse unquam adorandas esse imagines adoratione latriae. Et tamen si haec est vera, imago ut imago est adoranda adoratione latriae, etiam haec simpliciter erit vera: imago est adoranda adoratione latriae, quia formaliter accipiendo propositionem hanc, imago est adoranda, etc., idem est apud sapientes ac si explicatum fuisset, imago ut imago, etc. Formales enim sermones sapientiorum sunt. At in antiquis scriptoribus non solum non habetur imaginem esse adorandam adoratione latriae, verum econverso habetur ea adoratione imaginem non esse adorandam. Hoc vero multoties in responsis episcoporum protestatum legimus in septima synodo et in decreto ipso quam manifestissime, quod ad manus B. Thomae non pervenisse certissime credo. Si enim pervenisset, non eam nobis tradidisset doctrinam, aut saltem mentionem sanctae synodi fecisset, et aliquo modo suam cum illius doctrina conciliasset. Ibi enim haec legimus:

Verba decreti Septimae Synodi in ultima actione.

His se sic habentibus regiam viam incedentes, et sanctorum nostrorum et divinorum patrum doctrinae insistentes, et catholicae ecclesiae, in qua sanctus Spiritus inhabitat, traditionem observantes, definimus, cum omni diligentia et cura venerandas et | sanctas imagines ad modum et formam venerandae et vivificantis crucis e coloribus et tessellis aut alia quavis materia commode paratas dedicandas et in templis sanctis Dei collocandas habendasque, tum in sacris vasis et vestibus, tum in parietibus et tabulis, in aedibus privatis, in viis publicis, maxime autem imaginem Domini et Dei

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26

Cf. for a sixteenth-century edition, “Liber epistolarum ex Registro divi Gregorii,” lib. VII, epist. 53, in Sancti Gregorii magni doctoris precipui opera … (Parrhysiis: in edibus Joannis Parvi, 1518), fol. 409v. As noted above (p. 180, n. 39), modern scholarship has established that this passage is an interpolation, in place by the eighth century, in Gregory’s letter of May 599 to Secundinus.

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we recall by the image in his nativity or passion, but also seated on his throne. Thus far the letter, in which we may observe two aspects of the teaching of this holiest pontiff. First, he rejected latria to the image, since he denies that it should be kept and worshipped as God. Second, he did not reject prostration before images, which certainly means some kind of veneration vis-à-vis these images. For we kiss these and address words to them, so as to be heard by him who is represented in them. [36] I return to our subject. I said earlier, as is true, that none of the ancients ever said that images must be adored with the adoration of latria. And yet, if this [proposition] is true: ‘the image qua image must be adored with the adoration of latria,’ the following is generally also true: ‘the image must be adored with the adoration of latria,’ because when we formally understand the proposition, ‘the image must be adored’ etc., it is the same as if the learned explained it as: ‘the image qua image,’ etc. For formal speech belongs to the more learned. Yet in the ancient authors not only do we not find that the image must be adored with the adoration of latria, but to the contrary [we find] that the image must not be adored with that [kind of] adoration. This, we read, was proclaimed multiple times in the bishops’ responses during the Seventh Council and most evidently in its decree, which I firmly believe did not make it into the hands of St. Thomas [Aquinas]. For if it had, he would not have taught us that doctrine [of his], or he would at least have mentioned the holy council and somehow have reconciled his doctrine with the council’s. For there we read: These things being so, we, travelling the royal road, and following the teaching of our holy and divine fathers, and observing the tradition of the Catholic Church, within which the Holy Spirit dwells, decree with all faithfulness and care that venerable and holy images, fittingly made in colors or mosaic or other materials, in the same way and form as the venerable and life-giving cross, are to be placed and kept in the holy churches of God, on sacred vessels and vestments, on walls and panels, in private houses and public streets, especially the image of our Lord and God, our Savior Jesus Christ,

The words of the decree of the Seventh Council in its last session.

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salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi, deinde intemeratae Dominae nostrae deiparae, venerandorum angelorum, et omnium deinde sanctorum virorum, quo scilicet per hanc imaginum pictarum inspectionem omnes qui contemplantur, ad prototyporum memoriam et recordationem et desiderium veniant, illisque salutationem et honorariam adorationem exhibeant. Non secundum fidem nostram veram latriam, quae solum divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae et vivificantis crucis et sanctis evangeliis, et reliquis sacris oblationibus suffitorum et luminarium reverenter accedimus, quemadmodum veteribus pie in consuetudinem hoc adductum est. Imaginis enim honor in prototypum resultat, et qui adorat imaginem in ea adorat quoque descriptum argumentum. Sic enim sanctorum nostrorum patrum obtinet disciplina vel traditio catholicae ecclesiae, quae a finibus usque ad fines evangelium suscepit, etc.27 Haec ibi. Et Epiphanius: “Nemo Christianorum eorum qui sub coelo sunt imagini latriam exhibuit. Etenim hoc est gentilium fabulamentum daemonumque inventio.”28 Et iterum:

Nota.

In sexta actione Septimae Synodi.

An nondum sentimus probam et laudabilem esse imaginum erectionem? […] Sane sentimus. Quapropter non indignas habebimus eas honore, salutatione et veneratione, debitamque adorationem illis dare debemus. Sive igitur placebit salutationem sive adorationem appellare, idem profecto erit: modo sciamus excludi latriam. Haec enim est alia a simplici adoratione, ut alibi saepe est ostensum.29 Haec ille Epiphanius. [37] Concludo ergo septimo loco quod ipsae quoque imagines ut sunt imagines Christi vel beatissimae Virginis, aut angelorum et sanctorum venerandae sunt, salutandae atque exosculandae, et aliquo modo 27 28 29

VII

CNL, fols. 87v–88r; CCOS, 599. A minor disparity between Catarino’s text (“His se sic habentibus”) and Crabbe’s (“His sic se habentibus”) may indicate that he used the 1540 edition, which has the same word order. LCN, fol. 62r; CCOS, 559. LCN, fol. 84r; CCOS, 594. In the elision […] noted in the text, Catarino leaves out the following sentence from his source: “An non sentimus spiritualiter nos per eas referri ad prototyporum recordationem?” In the third sentence, Catarino has “indignas,” as does Crabbe; if Catarino used the Longolius edition (see n. 27 above), he may have corrected the latter’s erroneous “indignam” independently of Crabbe.

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further of our immaculate Lady the holy mother of God, of the venerable angels, and further of all the holy men, so that all who behold them by viewing the depiction in images come to remember, recall, and yearn for their prototypes, and will accord them greeting and the veneration of honor, not indeed the true latria corresponding to our faith, which pertains to the divine nature alone, but in the same way as this is accorded to the figure of the venerable and lifegiving cross, to the holy gospels; and we approach them with other sacred offerings of incense and lights, in accordance with the pious custom of the men of old. For the honor paid to the image passes over to the prototype, and whoever adores the image adores in it also the depicted subject. For in this way the teaching of our holy fathers stands firm, and the tradition of the Catholic Church which received the gospel from the end [of the earth] to the other, etc.22 Thus far [the council]. And Epiphanius said: “No Christian under heaven exhibits latria to an image. For this is a fable of the pagans and an invention of demons.”23 And again:

In the sixth session of the Seventh Council.

Do we not yet feel that the erection of images is proper and praiseworthy? […] We are right to do so. Therefore we shall keep them dignified with honor, greeting, and veneration, and we must offer them the requisite adoration. Whether it will please us to call this greeting or adoration, that is all the same; we should just know that we exclude latria. This is different from simple adoration, as has been repeatedly demonstrated elsewhere.24 Thus Epiphanius. [37] Seventh, therefore I conclude that images, such as those of Christ or the holiest Virgin, or of the angels and saints, must themselves be venerated, greeted and kissed, and in some way adored, albeit not with latria, as has already been concluded, but with another [kind of] veneration, and not because of their material or colors, but because of their archetype, in such a way that the greater honor and veneration is bestowed on 22 23 24

VII

Here I largely follow Price’s translation, based on the original Greek text, in ASCN 2:564– 66, but with some alterations, as needed to reflect the wording of Longolius’s Latin translation (see note 27 on the opposite page). Ibid., 2:457 (somewhat modified). Here the original text (and hence Price’s translation, ibid., 2:544) deviates considerably from the Longolius edition.

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adorandae, non quidem latria, ut iam conclusum est, sed alia veneratione, neque id propter materiam aut colores, sed propter archetypon, ita ut maior honor et veneratio tribuatur Christi imagini quam imagini Virginis deiparae, et maior ipsius deiparae imagini quam imaginibus angelorum vel sanctorum. Quod autem talis veneratio illis reddatur, illa synodus passim ac multis argumentis et autoritate maiorum testatur, ita ut secundum B. Thomae doctrinam potius detrahatur imaginibus suus honor qui in ipsas imagines terminari debet – non inquam propter seipsas, sed propter personas quas repraesentant, quarum gratia etiam illae sacrosanctae habentur, et aliqua veneratione dignae, cum ad cultum Dei serviant non solum propter memoriam, sed quia Dei cultus magis convenienter circa | ipsas fit ob proprietatem naturae nostrae, qui per sensibilia ducimur et instruimur. [38] Falsa est igitur ac reprobata quam manifestissime in ea synodo assertio haec, sufficere usum imaginum ad memoriam tantum, non autem eiam ad adorandum et salutandum. Unde ille Epiphanius recte dixit: Qui vero dicunt sufficere usum imaginum ad memoriam solum, non vero ad salutationem eas habendas, illud quidem recipientes, hoc vero recusantes, semiprobi quadantenus et falsoveri (ut ita dicam) deprehenduntur: altera quidem parte veritatem confites, ex altera vero perverse agentes.30 Haec ille. Unde satis apparet, parum considerate dixisse Erasmus non carere superstitionis specie orantem ad ligneum simulacrum procumbere, in illud oculos intendere ipsumque alloqui.31 Non enim vidit hoc datum conditioni naturae nostrae, ut imagine quasi prototypo abutamur. Sic et David ante arcam gestiens saltavit (ut scriptura inquit) coram Domino, ut intelligas in illa arca respectum fuisse Dominum a rege, et quod externe fiebat in arcam illam, interne in ipsum Dominum dirigebatur. Verum hanc rem Michol despexit atque derisit. Putasne lector propter Michol tantum illud fuisse scriptum? Minime, sed in illa Michol comprehensus fuit Erasmus et illi similes, qui ob suam ipsorum nimiam sapientiam, ut ipsi sapere soli videantur, cuncta despiciunt quae suae prudentiae non arrident. Hos autem Dominus Deus sicut illam Michol

30 31

In Erasmum.

[2 Sam. 6:14, 16, 23]

LCN, fol. 84v (which has an erroneous “quadamtenus,” unlike Catarino or Crabbe); CCOS, 594. See the discussion above, § 26.

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the image of Christ than on the image of the Virgin mother of God, and more on the latter than on images of angels or saints. That such veneration must be given them has been proven throughout, with many arguments, and with the authority of the elders by that council. In this way the honor which, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, should rather be withheld from these images, must end in them – not, I say, because of [the images] themselves, but because of the persons they represent, thanks to whom they, too, are considered sacrosanct and worthy of some [kind of] veneration, because they serve the worship of God not only for the sake of memory, but [also] because they render the worship of God easier due to the peculiar nature of us, who are led and instructed by sensible things. [38] False, therefore, and most clearly condemned by that council, is the assertion that the use of images serves memory alone, not also adoration and greeting. Hence Epiphanius rightly said: But those who say that images should be used only as a reminder, not to greet them, accepting the former but rejecting the latter, show themselves to be half-virtuous and true-false, so to speak, acknowledging the truth in one respect but acting perversely in another.25 Thus far Epiphanius. This amply demonstrates that Erasmus was thoughtless in saying that someone who during prayer falls prostrate before a wooden likeness, raises his eyes to it, and speaks to it is not devoid of superstition.26 He does not see this as conditioned by our nature, that we use the image as if it were the prototype. Thus, scripture says that David, gesticulating before the ark, danced in the face of the Lord, to make us understand that the king beheld the Lord in the ark, and that what externally occurred to the ark, was directed internally to the Lord. Yet Michal despised and scorned this. Do you think, reader, that this was written only about Michal? Hardly, for subsumed in Michal were Erasmus and likeminded people, who due to their inflated self-esteem, according to which they alone appear to know, they despise everything that does not please their judgment. But the Lord God will punish them deservedly,

25 26

Cf. The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea, 2:545–46 (somewhat modified). See the discussion above, § 26.

[2 Sam. 6:14, 16, 23]

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opprobrio sterilitatis merito ulciscitur. Valeant igitur cum sapientia sua ii derisores matris suae.32 [39] Ex disputatis ergo constat abunde christianum et ecclesiasticum ritum circa erigendas in ecclesiis imagines ad pietatem attinere, non solum doctrinae gratia propter idiotas, et universaliter propter omnes, memoriae, excitationis, et orationis causa (quia sic animus excitatur ad amorem et devotionem et orationem et varios laudabiles ac pios affectus, ad gratiarum actionem, et glorificationem Dei, ad imitationem optimarum virtutum) verum etiam adorationis seu venerationis gratia, sicut declaratum est. Neque enim quum venerandas aut salutandas aut exosculandas aut etiam adorandas esse imagines asserebat et docebat antiquitas, intelligebat per haec latriae cultum. Unde praefatus Epiphanius: Venerandas itaque (inquit) imagines Christiani neque deos appellant, neque ut Deo cultum exhibent, neque salutis spem in illis constituunt, neque ab his iudicium aliquando futurum expectant. Quod si autem in recordationem et memoriam, item quod singulari quadam affectione in ipsa prototypa ferebantur, salutaverint et honorifice adoraverint imagines, non tamen ob id illis latriam exhibuerunt aut divinam venerationem adscripserunt. Absit haec calumniatio.33

140

Haec ille. [40] Non me latet ipsos sanctos patres hanc vocem adoratio varie usurpasse, et quosdam ita | illam angustasse, ut solum per illam summum latriae cultum intelligerent, sicut fuit B. Hieronymus, qui negavit adorationem reliquiis sanctorum, et venerationem concessit. Et similiter B. Gregorius accepit, ut superius diximus. Et B. Epiphanius dixit: veneretur Maria, adoretur Dominus.34 Verum contra tam arctam acceptionem vocis huius plurimi docuerunt, et scripturae ipsae, quae passim hanc vocem usurpant in laxiorem significationem. Adnotavit enim D. Chrysostomus 32 33 34

Imaginum usus non ad memoriam tantum.

In 6. actione

Adoratio varie sumitur.

Cf. Prov. 10:1 (“Filius sapiens laetificat patrem, filius vero stultus maestitia est matris suae”) and Prov. 9:7–8 (for the invective against the “derisorem”). LCN, fol. 61r; CCOS, 557. Epiphanius of Salamis, Contra octoaginta haereses opus, Panarium sive Arcula aut Capsula Medica appellatum, … una cum aliis Epiphanii operibus, Iano Cornario Medico Physico Interprete (Basileae: Per Robertum Winterum, 1545), lib. III, t. 2, 508 (“Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus adoretur. Mariam nemo adoret, non dico mulierem immo neque virum. Deo debetur hoc mysterium”). Catarino’s version of this quote is also found in Pérez de Ayala, De traditionibus, fol. 96v. A Greek edition of the Panarium had appeared with Johann Herwagen in Basel in 1544.

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just as he punished Michal with the dishonor of infertility. Farewell then with their wisdom to those who scorn their mother.27 [39] From what we have discussed it is abundantly clear that the Christian and ecclesiastical custom of erecting images in churches promotes piety. It does so not only through instruction of the illiterate, and generally of all [faithful], because of [their role in supporting] memory, stimulation, and prayer – for in this way the soul is aroused to love, devotion, prayer, and various laudable and devout sentiments, to thanksgiving, the glorifying of God, and the imitation of outstanding virtues – but also by adoration or veneration, as I have explained. Nor did the ancient tradition, in asserting and teaching that images should be venerated, greeted, kissed, and also adored, understand this as the cult of latria. Hence the abovementioned Epiphanius pointed out: Thus Christians do not call the venerable images gods, nor worship them as God, nor place their hope of salvation in them, nor await the coming judgment from them. But it was in remembrance and commemoration and moved by affection for their prototypes that they kissed images and adored them with honor, but by this they did not display latria to them or attribute them divine veneration. Perish the accusation!28 Thus far Epiphanius. [40] I am not unaware that the holy fathers used the word ‘adoration’ in various ways, and that some narrowed it in such a way as to understand it only as that highest form of latria, as did St. Jerome, who denied adoration to the relics of the saints, but allowed veneration. St. Gregory had the same understanding, as we said earlier. And St. Epiphanius said: Mary should be venerated, but the Lord should be adored. But several [fathers] have taught against such a restrictive understanding of this word, as do the scriptures, which employ this word in several places with a looser meaning. St. Chrysostom noted that the scripture speaks wisely in saying: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve.” For, he notes, it does not say, ‘only the Lord thy God shalt thou adore,’ because adoration is also owed to others besides God; but it rightly says, ‘him only shalt thou serve,’ which pertains to latria. For in Greek we read 27 28

Images serve more than memory.

In Session VI.

Adoration is understood in various ways.

[Matt. 4:10]

Cf. Prov. 10:1 (“A wise son maketh the father glad, but a foolish son is the sorrow of his mother”) and Prov. 9:7–8 (for the invective against the “scorner”). Cf. ASCN 2: 452 (note the minor differences).

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sapienter loqui scripturam ubi ait: “Dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies.”35 Non enim (inquit) dictum est, Dominum Deum tuum solum adorabis, cum adoratio etiam aliis debeatur quam Deo; sed bene dictum est, illi soli servies, quod ad latriam pertinet. Graece enim legitur λατρεύσεις.36 Adorationis igitur appellatione non continuo auditur latriae cultus, nec in scripturis nec in sanctis patribus, sed ut habet et Graeca et Hebraica dialectos, et ab eruditis declaratum fuit in praefata sancta synodo, adorare, salutare, inclinari, genuflectere, amplecti, osculari, unum sunt, signa amoris et honoris cuncta, sed non cultum latriae profitentia, qui est internus in spiritu et veritate, Christo. Et hinc acutus lector de crucis atque imaginum Christi et aliorum sanctorum adoratione, quod Graece dicitur προσκυνεῖν,37 resolutionem sibi conflare potest, ut sane et irreprehensibiliter respondeat cuivis quaerenti. [41] Si ergo quaerat quis, suntne adorandae imagines?, intrepide respondeat: adorandae. Num latriae cultu? Nequaquam. Quo ergo? Eo honore et veneratione quae illis debetur propter illum quem referunt, et propter sanctificationem quam eo ipso accipiunt quod ad hos sacros usus disponuntur, ut ante illas adoremus et invocemus maiestatem, et illi gratias agamus, eamque glorificemus, et reliquas orationis partes exerceamus, deprecando, postulando, obsecrando. Sicut enim templa et sacella et arae consecrantur et benedicuntur et digna fiunt ut dicantur domus sive locus orationis, non minus imagines ad hoc sanctum officium Spiritu sancto proculdubio inspirante destinatae, hanc sanctificationem promerentur et assequuntur, ut qui illas violaverit non rem prophanam, sed sacram violasse censeatur, et crimen etiam laesae maiestatis incurrat. Nam et ipse Dominus ibi esse particulari quodam modo rectissime creditur, dum ad imagines ostendit virtutes et suam praesentiam, cum saepenumero illis utatur ut inde effundat oracula, ut et hac parte impleatur quod ipse dixit: “Ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem seculi.” Propter illam ergo peculiarem Dei praesentiam, quam etiam sensibiliter experimur, et ego (quamquam peccator et indignus et mirum in modum ingratus) si dixerim me nunquam expertum esse, mendax fuerim, imagines inter alia sacra quae absque mente existunt digna sunt eximia adoratione praeter 35

36 37

[Matt. 4:10; Luke 4:8; cf. Deut. 6:13]

[Matt. 28:20]

For a similar point, see LCN, fol. 37v, where, however, it is attributed to Anastasius of Theopolis; cf. also fols. 71v and 93r. The biblical passage is discussed, but without this specific interpretation, in D. Ioannis Chrysostomi … opera quatenus in hunc diem latio donata noscuntur, tomus primus (Venetiis: in signum Spei, 1549), fol. 113v. Λατρεύσεις is in fact the word used in Matt. 4:10. Note that this Greek term is discussed in LCN, fol. 37v. Corr. from προσκεινεῖν. Note that this Greek term is discussed in LCN, fol. 92v.

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‘shalt thou serve.’ The term ‘adoration,’ therefore, does not directly imply the cult of latria, neither in the scriptures nor in the holy fathers, but as both the Greek and the Hebrew languages have it, and as was declared in the above-mentioned holy council, adoring, greeting, bowing, genuflecting, embracing, kissing. These are one thing, all signs of love and honor, without declaring the cult of latria, which is internal in spirit and truth, [that is] Christ. And from this astute readers can form themselves an opinion [about questions] regarding the adoration of the cross and images of Christ, and of other saints, which in Greek is called ‘to adore,’ so as to have a sensible and irreproachable answer for whoever may ask. [41] So if someone asks, should images be adored?, we may answer without fear: they should. With the cult of latria? By no means. How then? With that honor and veneration that is owed them because of what they refer to, and because of the sanctification they receive by being set up for these sacred uses: thus we will adore and invoke the Majesty before them, giving him thanks, glorifying him, and performing the other parts of prayer, pleading, requesting, and beseeching. Just as temples, shrines, and altars are consecrated, blessed, and made worthy to be called house or place of prayer, likewise images intended for this holy office, no doubt with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, deserve and obtain sanctification: whoever violates them is considered to have violated something sacred, not profane, and also incurs the crime of lèse-majesté. The Lord himself is correctly believed to be there in a special way, when he extends his presence and powers to images. For he often uses them to produce prophecies, in fulfillment of what he has said himself: “I am with you to the consummation of the world.” We experience this particular presence of God also in a sensory way: I, too, although a sinner, unworthy, and strangely ungrateful, would lie if I said I had never experienced it. Because of this presence, images – among other sacred things which exist outside the

[Matt. 28:20]

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latriam, quoniam ad haec spiritualia officia peculia- | riter sanctificatae sunt. [42] Verum contra hanc sanctificationem quam dicimus haereticus quidam iconoclasta sub nomine Gregorii, cuius dissertatio in ea synodo recitatur, in hunc modum argumentabatur, dicens neque Christi neque apostolorum traditione coepisse hunc ritum imaginum, nec habere ullam precationem sacram qua sanctificarentur, sed manere communes sive prophanas et inhonorabiles sicut apud pictorem. At Epiphanius ille qui contra haereticum eleganter disseruit, ita respondit, primo redarguens illum de mendacio in eo quod negavit usum imaginum non fluxisse a Christo, siquidem secus narrant ecclesiasticae historiae.38 Et nos Romae vultum sanctum quem Veronicam vocant in templo B. Petri adoramus et veneramur. Et sunt patrum testimonia de apostolis quod et ipsorum aliqui Christi et beatissimae Virginis imaginem gestabant et (quod satis esse deberet non protervis) nunquam ecclesia damnavit hunc usum, immo nunquam non reprehendit ac damnavit damnantes. Nam et B. Chrysostomus devotionis gratia in caera ferebat sacram Christi imaginem, memoriae et devotionis gratia, ut ipse aiebat.39 Quod vero dixerat ille haereticus, nulla precum sanctificatione eas a prophanitate segregari, ac propterea ita manere sicut absolvit pictor, ut rem clare falsam retudit, dicens quod etsi nulla precatione consecrarentur, attamen eo ipso quod ad hoc proponuntur ut serviant enarratis modis, divino cultui continuo dedicatae et sanctificatae sunt, nec tales sunt quales apud pictorem inveniuntur adhuc venales: cuius rei illud est signum, quia ibi, idest, apud pictorem nullus salutat, nullus adorat, donec alicubi ad hoc ipsum eriguntur, et propterea consecrantur: quanquam revera nunc in ecclesiis saepe ad consecrationem imaginum adhibentur solemnes preces, quae tamen necessario non requiruntur. [43] Illud tamen ex praedictis etiam concludendum, quod illa crux Christi superbenedicta, ubi ille fuit affixus, etiam alio nomine et peculiari honore est veneranda, ut quaedam res quam dignatus est Dominus suo contactu et aspergi ac sanctificari suo superbenedicto sanguine. Non tamen cultus latriae est ei exhibendus, sicut docuit B. Thomas in

38 39

Imagines in ecclesiis quomodo sacrae fiunt.

Catarino here paraphrases Gregory’s position and summarizes Epiphanius’s response, as found at LCN, fol. 68v. This information is probably derived from LCN, fol. 6r: “Divus Ioannes Chrysostomus inquit: [follows Greek text and] Hoc est, ego ex caera fusilem picturam pietate plenam amavi”; similar remarks at fols. 29r and 41v.

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mind – are worthy of extraordinary adoration, short of latria, because they are specially sanctified for these spiritual functions. [42] But a heretical iconoclast named Gregory, in a discussion cited by that council, argued against the above-mentioned sanctification, saying that this rite of images did not begin in the tradition of Christ or the apostles; nor was it associated with any holy prayer that sanctified them: they remained common, profane, and unworthy of honor, as they were with the painter. Yet Epiphanius, who elegantly argued against this heretic, answered as follows. First he rejected his lie that the use of images did not derive from Christ: the ecclesiastical histories tell a different story. And in Rome we adore and venerate the holy face called the Veronica in St. Peter’s church. There are also testimonies by the fathers that some of the apostles carried the image of Christ and the most holy Virgin, and (something that should suffice for anyone who is not shameless) the Church has never condemned this tradition, and what is more, has never not reproached and condemned those who condemn it. St. Chrysostom, too, carried a sacred wax image of Christ for purposes of commemoration and devotion, as he said himself.29 And he [Epiphanius] undercuts as clearly false the heretic’s claim that there is no sanctification by prayer that changes the profane status of images, and hence that they remain the way the painter released them: for even if they are not consecrated by any prayers, nevertheless by the very fact of being proposed to serve in the above-mentioned ways they are immediately dedicated and sanctified for divine worship, and they do not remain as they they were when on sale with the painter. In a sign of this, there, that is, [in the workshop of] the painter, no one greets, no one adores images until they are installed somewhere for this purpose and hence consecrated. Although, in truth, today solemn prayer is often offered for the consecration of images, this is not really required. [43] From the aforesaid we must also conclude that the most blessed cross of Christ, where it is installed, is venerated under a different name and with special honor, as a thing which the Lord has dignified by his touch to be sprinkled and sanctified with his most blessed blood. Yet no worship of latria is to be exhibited to it, as St. Thomas has taught in his Commentary on the Sentences, although in the Summa he has contradicted himself, as Capreolus has also pointed out, so that in this matter

29

This information is probably derived from a remark in the acts of Nicaea II; see note on opposite page for details.

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Scriptis, quamvis sibiipsi in Summa contradixerit, id quod et Capreolus confitetur,40 ut videas nobilissimum illum doctorem in hac materia non satis constantem. Quod dictum non in eius detractionem accipi volo, cuius doctrinam soli non admirantur qui vel malevoli sunt vel scioli aut diversis scholis addicti, sed ut nostri qui eius doctrinae se addixere, non ita proterve cuncta defendant quae ibi legunt. Quod si quis velit vel hoc defendere, videlicet D. Thomam non fuisse in hoc sibi contrarium, quia Caietanus illum a contradictione defendat, videat ne apud doctos fiat ridiculus. Ego enim ut in multis sum admiratus Caietanum in- | credibiliter aberrantem, in hoc certe pene obstupui. Nam B. Thomae verba in Summa hoc plane sonant de cruce illa, “quod etiam ut est quaedam res ex contactu Christi, eadem adoratione cum Christo adoratur, nempe latriae.”41 In Scriptis autem dixerat “non posse adorari eadem adoratione cum Verbo, sed hyperdulia.”42 Caietanus vero haec invicem non pugnare contendit. Me vero in tam perspicuis verba fundere nimium taedet. Qui vult videat illum in Commentariis ad B. Thomam.43

40

41

42

43

Capreolus cited several passages Thomas dedicated to this question, including the two Catarino goes on to cite (see following notes): Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae sancti et gloriosi angelici doctoris Thome de Aquino tertio Sententiarum (Venetiis: per Georgium Arrivabenum, 1514), fol. 44v (Sententiarum Dist. IX, q. unica). Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 25, a. 4. Catarino slightly paraphrased a part of Thomas’s discussion, which reads: “Si ergo loquamur de ipsa cruce in qua Christus crucifixus est, utroque modo est a nobis veneranda, uno modo scilicet inquantum repraesentat nobis figuram Christi extensi in ea; alio modo, ex contactu ad membra Christi, et ex hoc quod eius sanguine est perfusa. Unde utroque modo adoratur eadem adoratione cum Christo, scilicet adoratione latriae.” Thomas Aquinas, Sent., III, d. 9, a. 2, solutio 4: “Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod crux Christi, etiam ipsa in qua Christus pependit, potest dupliciter considerari; vel inquantum crucifixi imago, et sic adoratur eadem adoratione sicut crucifixus, scilicet latria…; vel inquantum est res quaedam, et sic cum non pertineat ad personam verbi sicut pars eius, non potest eadem adoratione adorari cum verbo, sed adoratur inquantum est res quaedam Christi ratione ipsius, hyperdulia; sed aliae cruces non adorantur nisi ut imago; et ideo adorantur tantum latria.” Cf. Cajetan’s gloss on Thomas’s discussion in Summa Theologiae, III, q. 25, a. 4: “Adverte hic quod Durandus, ubi supra, et Ioannes Capreolus crediderunt autorem retractasse hic quod in Tertio Sententiarum dixerat, scilicet crucem illam in qua pependit Christus esse adorandam non solum ut imaginem Christi latria, sed ut quandam rem Christi hyperdulia, quasi crux illa Christi non sit capax adorationis, ut est quaedam res Christi. Parcant mihi domini isti: non retractavit, sed magnificavit hic autor doctrinam ibi traditam, quoniam crucem illam ut quandam Christi rem per contactum, ibi hyperdulia, hic latria adorandam dicit. Hoc enim patet non esse revocationem dicti, quod crux illa

Disputation on the Cult and Adoration of Images

351

the noblest doctor appears to be not quite consistent.30 I say this without intending to speak evil of him, whose doctrine is frowned upon only by the malevolent, the sciolists, or those beholden to other schools, but so that our [members]31 who have committed themselves to his doctrine will not defend everything they read there so aggressively. Someone who wants to defend him from this, namely that on this issue St. Thomas contradicted himself (Cajetan in fact denies his inconsistency), will come off as ridiculous to scholars. While in many areas I am surprised that Cajetan goes incredibly astray, I am truly astonished by this. For St. Thomas’s words in the Summa plainly state that the cross, even when considered as a thing [that was] “in contact with Christ,” “is adored with the same adoration as Christ, namely latria.”32 In his Commentary on the Sentences, however, he had said that it “could not be adored with the same adoration as the Word, but with hyperdulia.”33 But Cajetan contends that these [statements] do not contradict each other. It greatly annoys me to waste words on such an obvious issue. Who wishes can see this in [Cajetan’s] commentaries on St. Thomas.

30

31 32

33

Ioannes Capreolus cited several passages Thomas dedicated to this question, including the two Catarino goes on to cite (see following notes): Ioannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae sancti et gloriosi angelici doctoris Thome de Aquino tertio Sententiarum (Venetiis: per Georgium Arrivabenum, 1514), fol. 44v. With the term “ours” (nostri) Catarino appears to refer to fellow-Dominicans. Thomas, Summa, III, q. 25, a. 4: “If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways – namely, in one way insofar as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ, and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of latria.” Thomas, Sent., III, dist. 9, quaestiuncula 4: “The cross on which Christ was hung can be considered in two ways: either as an image of the crucified, and thus it is adored with the same adoration as the crucified, namely latria […], or as a thing, and thus, since it does not pertain to the person of the Word, as a part of him, it cannot be adored with the same adoration as the Word, but is adored insofar as it is a thing on account of Christ, with hyperdulia, but other crosses are adored only as an image and hence are adored only with latria.”

352

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[44] Caeteras quaestiones quae praeter praedictas in hac materia possunt incidere, puto vel satis ex disputatis resolvi vel inde ad earum resolutionem quemlibet sibi viam et modum facilem comparare posse. [45] Superest nunc ut abusus multos qui circa imagines incuria praelatorum, ne quid etiam deterius dicam, admittuntur, brevibus perstringamus. Sunt autem picturae et sculpturae quaedam prophanae, quaedam vero sacrae. Peccatur ergo primum in prophanis sive picturis sive sculpturis non modicum, dum magna diligentia idola gentium exquiruntur, ut quae ceciderant et confractae erant, erigantur et sarciantur ad ornandas aedes et lucos. Nec respondeant mihi corrupti homines et faciles ad excusanda delicta, quod haec erigantur et sarciantur non venerationis aut adorationis causa, sed spectaculi et memoriae antiquorum gratia, et ostentandi artificum peritiam. Ego vero dico non excusari propterea curiositatem, vanitatem, prodigalitatem, cum multo pretio comparentur, quod ex ecclesiis accipitur et pauperibus debebatur, solum ad oculorum oblectationem. Nec deest quaedam apparentia cultus ipso facto etsi forte non animo, quum similiter ut sacra in editis locis ponuntur. Gaudent enim daemones dum iterum erigi iam prostrata simulacra sua perspiciunt quavis de causa, nec se omnino prostratos fatentur ut est eorum superbia, quum sua vident restitui ac instaurari habitacula. Nam cum tanti fiunt ut celebria loca sibi vendicent, quae imaginibus veri Dei debentur, immo cum ipsa haec idola plures habeant spectatores et contemplatores, et pluris fiant quam sacrae ipsae divorum imagines, profecto nonnihil ob hoc factum laetantur daemones et recreantur. Fertur B. Gregorius multas urbis statuas iussisse confringi, eo quod peregrini et qui sanctorum basilicas visitare veniebant per illarum spectacula a pia illa opera distrahebantur. Sunt vero animales homines qui in sanctum illum pontificem clamant indignum facinus, piaculum magnum. Platina vero huius rei gratia, ut pontificem defendat, factum negat, quod si fuisset factum, non valuisset inficiari male factum. Verum non mirum hominem versatum in libris gentilium ea magnifacere quae spiritualis oculus floccifacit. Quod si duntaxat ad hoc ponerentur ut artificum manus admiraremur, nec in editis locis extollerentur, nec memoriam simul falsorum illorum numinum susci- | tarent, nec ad libidinem moverent spectantium oculos dum nuda Veneris aut Dianae membra conspiciunt, et satyrorum salaces gestus, et Bacchi et baccantium turpes et vinosos furores, minus peccaretur

Abusus circa imagines prophanas.

ut quaedam Christi res est veneranda, sed magnificationem illius” (Tertia Pars Summae Sacrae Theologiae, 140).

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[44] I think that other questions that may arise in this matter, besides the above-mentioned, are adequately resolved by what we have discussed; or, on this basis, a simple way and manner can be found towards their solution. [45] We are now left with the task briefly to summarize the many abuses concerning images which are allowed to happen due to the neglect of prelates (not to say worse). Some paintings and sculptures are profane, others sacred. As for profane paintings and sculptures, a serious sin occurs when pagan idols are sought out with great eagerness, and fallen or broken pieces are assembled and restored to decorate homes and gardens. Let corrupt men, quick to excuse their crimes, not reply that these are not assembled and restored to be venerated or adored, but for the sake of display and the memory of the ancients, and to show off the craftsmanship of the artists. But I say that curiosity, vanity, or wastefulness are not thereby excused, when things taken from churches and owed to the poor are purchased at great expense, solely to please the eyes. Nor is some appearance of worship, albeit unintended, ipso facto lacking when [these artifacts] are placed like sacred things in lofty places. Demons rejoice when they see their once prostrate likenesses put up again for whatever reason, and do not acknowledge, as befits their pride, that they were entirely prostrate when they see their homes restored and repaired. For when there are so many who claim for themselves distinguished places that are owed to images of the true God, when these idols have many spectators and viewers, and are worth more than the sacred images of gods themselves, then indeed the demons are quite gladdened and reinvigorated by this. St. Gregory is said to have ordered many statues destroyed in the cities, because their sight distracted pilgrims and visitors in the basilicas of the saints from their pious activity. But the people who accuse this holy pontiff of an unworthy deed and a great crime are animals. Platina, however, to defend the pope in this matter, denies that it happened, for if it had, he would have been unable to deny the misdeed.34 It is not surprising that a man versed in the books of the pagans makes much of things disregarded by the spiritual eye. For if they were merely installed so that we could admire the artists’ hands, if they were not erected in lofty places, nor at the same time evoked the memory 34

Abuses concerning profane images.

On this ancient charge, see Tilmann Buddensieg, “Gregory the Great, the Destroyer of Pagan Idols. The History of a Medieval Legend concerning the Decline of Ancient Art and Literature,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 28 (1965): 44–65 (on Platina, 56–57).

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attamen vanitas esset et curiositas. Quanto melius et religiosius Deoque gratius illam tantam pecuniam qua vana ista emuntur et collocantur, erogasse Christi amore in pauperes, et hoc pacto sibi praeparasse aeterna multoque incomparabiliter iucundiora spetacula in summis coelorum templis? Dicent aliqui forsan: hoc facimus, et illud in pauperes non omittimus. At multo melius hoc omisisse, ut illud erga pauperes abundantius fieret; quod ut abundantius, ita multo Deo gratius foret. Mitto quod fortassis hae voluptuosae expensae valde superant pias erogationes. Illud vero quam odiosum est, quum haec vana de peculio et bonis ecclesiarum comparantur ad concupiscentiam oculorum explendam. Sed utinam quae sobrie et animo tranquillo, gratia duntaxat veritatis et religionis, scribere impellor, ea mente exciperentur qua deberent. Novi proverbium: “obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.”44 Sed falsum hoc omnino. Non enim revera parit odium veritas, quae ex se amabilis est, sed animi pravitas facit ut veritas odio habeatur. Qui habet aures intelligat quid suggerat benignitas spiritus. Et haec satis de prophanis imaginibus sive statuis. [46] Venio ad abusus qui circa sacras imagines admittuntur. Primus est quum per illas quippiam repraesentatur falsum aut fictum aut apocryphum. Vidi enim ego in nonnullis locis picturam B. Virginis qua recumbens in lectulo ostenditur quasi puerpera, quae passa dolores ex ipso partu, invalida et imbecillis reddita, corpus suum sustinere non queat. At hoc est iniuria in Christum et matrem. Non enim fuit unquam illa sub ea sententia adversus mulierem cui dictum est: “In dolore paries filios.” Neque conveniebat Filio ullum dolorem exhibere matri partu sui. Quanquam adversus hanc catholicam persuasionem Erasmus ille omnium haeresum quae nunc vigent excitator malignus, quaepiam effutiverit, de quibus alibi scripsimus.45 Debet ergo in ecclesiis saltem ac publicis locis animadverti antistitum diligentia et cura, ne quicquam ibi pingatur non certae receptaeque veritatis: et si quae huiusmodi sunt, penitus obliterari aut expungi procuret. 

44 45

Abusus circa imagines sacras.

[Gen. 3:16]

Terence, Andria, 1.68, in Id., The Woman of Andros. The Self-Tormentor. The Eunuch, ed. and trans. John Barsby, Loeb Classical Library 22 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 56. The reference is to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 2).

Disputation on the Cult and Adoration of Images

355

of those false deities, nor moved to lechery the eyes of the viewers as they observed the nude limbs of Venus or Diana, the salacious gestures of satyrs, and the disgraceful drunken ravings of Bacchi and bacchantes, then there would be little sin, but there would still be vanity and curiosity. How much better, more devout, and more welcome to God would it be to spend on the poor, for the love of Christ, all that money with which these vain things are bought and installed, and in this way to prepare oneself for the eternal and incomparably more joyous spectacles in heaven’s supreme temples? Some may say: we do this without omitting the other thing for the poor. But it would be much better to omit the former and do the latter for the poor more abundantly: the more so, the more pleasing it will be to God. I pass over the fact that these lavish expenses perhaps far exceed the pious distributions. Yet how odious is it when these vain things are bought with church property and goods to satisfy the lust of the eyes. If only what I am impelled to write soberly, with a tranquil spirit, merely for the sake of truth and religion, would be heard with the mindset it deserves. I know the proverb: “fawning begets friends, the truth begets hatred.”35 But that is all wrong. For hatred is not really generated by the truth, which is attractive in itself: it is a vicious soul that regards the truth as hatred. Those who have ears will understand what a benevolent spirit suggests to them. This will suffice for profane images or statues. [46] I now turn to abuses that are allowed to happen regarding sacred images. The first occurs when they represent something false, fictive, or apocryphal. In some places I have seen an image of the blessed Virgin in which she is shown reclining in bed like a woman following childbirth, who is ill and weak after suffering the pains of delivery, and who cannot keep her body upright. But this is an injustice to Christ and his mother. For she was never subject to the sentence that said: “In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children.” Nor was it fitting that during birth the Son should cause any pain to his mother, although Erasmus – that malicious inciter of all the heresies raging today – has prattled about this, as we have written elsewhere.36 Hence bishops should carefully check that in churches and public places nothing is painted that is not of certain and accepted truth, and if such things are found, make sure that they are entirely erased and destroyed.

35 36

Abuses regarding sacred images.

[Gen. 3:16]

Terence, The Lady of Andros, 1.68. The reference is to Catarino’s De certa gloria, invocatione, ac veneratione sanctorum (see above n. 1).

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[47] Est et secundus abusus circa loca et res ubi pinguntur imagines. Nunc enim nimis (meo iudicio) sunt frequentes, ita ut minuatur devotio, et (quod valde indignum est) collocantur in locis minime decoris, atque etiam contra principum constitutiones ubi pedibus conculcantur. Est etiam videre illas et crucem in locis turpibus et quae memorare non est honestum. Ubicunque igitur respicis ipsam crucem aut imagines alicubi pictas sive sculptas indecore et non commode ad cultum (quod frequenter licet deprehendere) abusum esse negare non possumus. [48] Est et tertius nec dissimulandus abusus, quum imagines non repraesentant decenter archetypon, eo quod ipsae turpes sunt et ab artificibus imperitis fabricatae, nescientibus per artem imitari naturam. Vidi enim ego quasdam imagines ita inconditas ut vix humanam speciem referrent, sed potius monstrosa membra. Alias autem econtrario tanta arte compositas ut quibusdam importunis gestibus interim personarum decorem non servent, nihil gravitatis habentes, nihil devotionis excitantes. Quod vero est omnium deterrimum, hac tempestate in excelsis templis ac sacellis offendas picturas tantae lasciviae, ut quicquid natura oculuit turpe nostrum, ibi liceat contemplari, ad excitandum non devotionem, sed cuiusvis demortuae carnis libidinem; quod tantum nefas nostra, idest, praelatorum culpa contingere, qui et haec nedum patiuntur turpissima spectacula, sed eorum nonnunquam etiam autores sunt, nemo potest inficiari. [49] Est denique postremus abusus in hoc, quod quamvis decenter et suis locis collocatae sint imagines, non tamen ea custodia servantur qua deberent a carie et situ et aliis noxiis. Quae si etiam serventur, non tamen venerantur eas homines ut par esset, et ideo verum inde fructum non referunt quem deberent. Non dico ut inde expectent oracula et signa, quae rara sunt, neque curiosis conceduntur, nec expediret imperfectis ea dari, perfectis autem minime necesse est, sed ut inde post adorationes et gratiarum actiones veri et devoti adoratores recedant recreati spiritu, animatiores ad humilitatem et obedientiam, ad charitatem et patientiam; ut placeamus per has veras et christianas virtutes Deo Patri et Christo, ut quem in terris per inanimes imagines conspicimus, digni habeamur in coelis per veram et vivam speciem facie ad faciem contemplari. Amen.

Disputation on the Cult and Adoration of Images

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[47] A second abuse concerns the places where and things on which images are painted. Today [images] are all too numerous, in my view, so that devotion is diminished, and – what is most shameful – they are located in quite indecorous places, and they are trampled on in defiance of princely constitutions. It also happens that we see them, as well as the cross, in indecent places and [observe other] things too immoral to mention. Anywhere you see the cross or images painted or sculpted indecorously or in a manner that is inappropriate for worship (as happens frequently), we cannot deny that there is an abuse. [48] A third, undeniable abuse occurs when images do not represent their archetype in a decent manner, because they are ugly and produced by inexpert artists, who do not know how to imitate nature by art. Some images I have seen are so irregular that they hardly represent the human form, but rather monstrous limbs. Others, instead, are composed so artfully that sometimes, due to certain unsuitable gestures, they do not serve the decorum of persons, as they have no gravity nor incite devotion. But the worst of it is that in lofty churches and chapels you nowadays find paintings so lascivious that whatever foulness nature makes visible to the eye can be observed there, inciting lewdness towards any sort of dead flesh rather than devotion. No one can deny that such a sin happens due to our fault, that is, of the prelates, who rather allow such sordid spectacles, and sometimes are even their creators. [49] A final abuse occurs when images, while they are positioned decently and in appropriate places, are not protected with the requisite care from rot, dirt, or other harms. Or, even if they are, people do not venerate them as is right, and therefore they do not receive the real fruit they should garner. I do not say that they should expect prophecies and signs, which are rare and not given to the curious, nor appropriate for the imperfect, and entirely unnecessary for the perfect. Instead, they should return from their acts of adoration and thanksgiving as true and devout worshippers, restored in spirit and more inspired to [practice] humility and obedience, charity and patience. Thus, by these true Christian virtues we may please God the Father and Christ, so that we may be considered worthy in the heavens to contemplate him, whom we see on earth through inanimate images, in his true and live appearance, face to face. Amen.

V. Iacopo Nacchianti

Digressio de imaginum usu ac cultu in ecclesia Dei

40v

Manichei, Marciani. Leo 3 imperator. Platina de vitis Pontificum. Leo 4. Irene.

Valdenses.

[1] Verum quia in ecclesia Dei, non modo celebris est imaginum usus, sed et cultus, illeque sacrosanctus, forte non reputabitur importunum, si quid ea de re brevi tractetur.1 Ergo attendendum quod, etsi de imaginum cum usu tum cultu non nunquam digladiatum est, etsi a non paucis et impie et schismatice sunt aliquando sublatae, ac veluti res execranda a Chris­ tianorum veneratione reiectae, sicut tamen moris est in qualibet veritate quod ad tempus potest, tum humana iniquitate, tum perversa Sathanae suggestione, offundi, deprimi, calumniari, quae tamen non modo oppor­ tune resurgit, sed perinde ac aurum in fornace redditur rutilantior ac celebrior: haud secus et de usu cultuve imaginum in ecclesia factum est. Et missis qui religioso sed indiscreto zelo illas aliquando delerunt, ut Serenus Massiliensis episcopus, quem Gregorius monuit et ut restaurari curaret adhortatus est, constat primum (ut septima attestatur synodus) Manicheos et Marcianos imagines respuisse,2 deinde et opera Leonis ter­ tii, qui Constantinopolitanum gerebat imperium, e templis esse dimotas destructasque, propter quod et iure a Gregorio tertio tum imperio tum fidelium communione privatus est;3 quem et sequutus est Constantinus quintus, et post illum Leo quartus, qui fuit filius eius: cui impietati et Constantinus sextus, Leonis quarti filius, sanctionem aspernatus sacro­ sanctae synodi quae illius assensu, dum minoris esset aetatis, Irene matre administrante imperium, Nicenae ex trecentis et quinquaginta praesu­ libus congregata est, provectior grandiorque factus, favit et adhaesit. Et quanquam ea haeresis a doctoribus valide est explosa et a conciliis sac­ rosanctis merito condemnata, nihilominus a4 Valdensibus post multos annos ab Orco denuo excitata est, quam et non longe post amplexatus est

Digladiatio de ven­ eratione imaginum.

Serenus episcopus. Impia imaginum sublatio. Septima Synodus.

Gregorius 3. Constantinus 5. Constantinus 6.

Secunda Nicena Synodus. Ioan.

1 Iacopo Nacchianti, Enarrationes piae, doctae, et catholicae in epistolam D. Pauli ad Romanos … Accedunt et tractationes peculiares de mysterio sacratissime Trinitatis, de tempore quo Petrus extitit Romae, de recto imaginum cultu, de originali labe, et de praedestinatione ac reprobatione hominum … (Venetiis: apud Iosephum Vicentinum, 1557), fols. 40v–43r. For context and back­ ground, see chap. 2, pp. 79–85. 2 See CCOS, 472 (where the Marcionites are referred to as Marcionistae). 3 Bap. Platinae Cremonensis de vitis ac gestis summorum pontificum ad sua usque tempora liber unus (Coloniae: Fucharius Cervicornus Agrippinas, 1540), 97. 4 Corr. from Valcenses.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_010

V. Iacopo Nacchianti

Digression about the Use and Cult of Images in God’s Church

The Seventh Council. Emperor Leo III. Platina, Lives of the Popes. Constantine V. Second Council of Nicaea.

[1] Since in God’s Church not only the use of images, but also their cult, is frequent as well as sacrosanct, perhaps it will not be considered inap­ propriate to treat this matter briefly. Consider then that – although there have always been fights over both the use and the cult of images, and some have occasionally thrown them out, impiously and schismatically, and removed them from Christian veneration as if they were execrable things – nonetheless, just as it is common for any truth occasionally to be covered up, repressed, and insulted, so it will not only rise again at the right time, but then like gold in a furnace shine more brightly and be more celebrated. No different has been the case for the use and cult of images in the Church. Leaving aside those who have occasionally destroyed them out of a pious but ill-advised zeal (such as Bishop Serenus of Marseilles, reproached and urged to restore them by Gregory [I]), it is certain, as the Seventh Council testifies, that images were first rejected by the Manicheans and Marcionites, and later removed from churches and destroyed due to the actions of Leo III, who ruled the empire of Constantinople, for which Gregory III deprived him by law of the empire and the community of the faithful. He was followed by Constantine V and, after him, his son Leo IV. This impiety was also favored and adopted by Leo IV’s son, Constantine VI, after he had rejected – once a grown man of more exalted status – the decree of the sacrosanct council which with his assent, while he was a minor and his mother Irene administered the empire, had gathered 350 church leaders in Nicaea. And although that heresy was strongly rejected by the doctors, and rightly condemned by sacrosanct councils, after many years it was nevertheless revived from the

Dispute over the veneration of images.

Bishop Serenus. The impious removal of images. Manicheans, Marcionites. Gregory III. Leo IV. Constantine VI. Irene.

360 Carolstadius.

Chrisos­ tomus, Damascenus, Athanasius. 41r

Iacopo Nacchianti

Ioannes Vuiteleff, et demum nostra tempestate Carolstaldius5 aliis cum haereticis. [2] Verum imagines Christi et sanctorum fuisse usui ecclesiae Dei et apostolorum tempore indubitatum est, non solum ex testimonio patrum, Chrisostomi, Damasceni, Athanasii, qui et in memorato concilio de imag­ ine attestantur salvatoris a Nicodemo effecta, et postmodum ad apostoli Iaco- | bi manus deducta, et tandem Beryti stupendo miraculo conse­ crata ac clarissima reddita.6 Et exploratissimum est Lucam evangelistam plures Virginis depinxisse imagines; et Eusebius se vidisse refert imagi­ nem Christi, quae a muliere quae curata fuit a sanguinis fluxu Caesareae suis pro foribus erecta est; item, de pervetustis imaginibus Petri et Pauli7 – et forte quod fuerunt illae, quas Adrianus pontifex testatur Sylvestrum praedecessorem magno ostendisse Constantino, postquam nocte apos­ tolorum principes apparuerunt ei.8 Sed etiam evidentissimum est ex usu sacrosanctae ecclesiae, qui semper fuit in ea, ut in eodem concilio affirmatur, quin et ut haeretici semper sunt habiti, et pro haereticis in conciliis sacrosanctis definiti, qui earum usui ac pio cultui contraire prae­ sumunt. Ergo fas non est usum cultumve imaginum in dubium fidelibus revocare, sed aequum est a calumniis illas9 eximere, et quonam pacto colendae venerandaeque sint ob oculos aliquando reducere, ne quorun­ dam abusibus earum veneratio depravetur, et in superstitionem pietas dilabatur. [3] Igitur attendendum imagines, puta sacratissimae Trinitatis, salvato­ ris nostri, crucis gloriosae, sanctissimae matris, angelorum, sanctorum omnium usui esse in ecclesia, potest multis modis intelligi, quandoqui­ dem et admitti possunt, et gratia succurrendi memoriae, ut recordemur quod in nomine sanctissimae Trinitatis tincti sumus, illique manum dedimus in baptismo, quod per Christum sumus salvati et in illius cruce redempti, quod Virgo nostra est advocata, quod angeli sunt custodes semperque pro nobis suspiciunt faciem Patris, quod sancti intercedunt

Vuiteleff Imagines fuerunt ecclesiae usui etiam apostolorum tempore.

7. Historia ecclesiastica 14 ca.

Qui imag­ inibus prae­ sumpserunt detrahere, semper habiti sunt ut haeretici.

Imagines in ecclesia multiplici usui esse possunt.

5 Sic. 6 This account, in a (since discredited) sermon attributed to Athanasius of Alexandria, was read at the Council of Nicaea II, LCN, fols. 31v–32r; CCOS, 509–12. See also Pérez de Ayala’s discussion of the same story, § 8. 7 Eusebius, Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 7, cap. 14, in Eusebii Pamphili Caesariensis … Opera, 582. 8 The reference is to the legend of Constantine’s dream, retold at Nicaea II, and also referenced by Pérez, § 9; see the note accompanying that passage for details. 9 Corr. from lllas.

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John Wyclif.

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netherworld by the Waldensians and not long afterwards embraced by John Wyclif, and finally during our time by Karlstadt and other heretics. [2] But there is no doubt that images of Christ and the saints were already in use by the Church of God at the time of the apostles. [This is] not only based on the testimony of the fathers, Chrysostom, Damascene, and Athanasius, who in the above-mentioned council attested to [the existence of] an image of the Savior made by Nicodemus, subsequently handed over to the apostle James, and finally consecrated and rendered most renowned by a stupendous miracle in Beirut.1 It is also well explored that the evangelist Luke painted multiple images of the Virgin; and Eusebius reports that he saw an image of Christ installed before her door in Caesarea by the woman who was cured of a flow of blood; likewise, [he reports] on the very ancient images of Peter and Paul2 – perhaps those which, as Pope Hadrian testifies, his predecessor Sylvester showed to Constantine the Great, after the princes of the apostles had appeared to him at night.3 But it is also most evident from the fact that the sacrosanct Church always used [images], as was affirmed by the same Council, and indeed that those who dare oppose their use and devout cult have always been seen as heretics, and defined as such by the councils. Therefore it is not right to renew doubts among the faithful about the use and cult of images; rather, it behooves us to protect them from slander and occasion­ ally to remind people how they are to be worshipped and venerated, so that their veneration does not suffer from abuses, and piety does not slide into superstition. [3] Be aware, then, that there are many ways to know that images, for instance, of the holiest Trinity, of our Savior, the glorious cross, the holiest mother, the angels, and all the saints, were in use by the Church. Hence they can be allowed, also in support of our memory, so that we recall that in baptism we are bathed in the name of the holiest Trinity, and sur­ render to it; that we are saved by Christ and redeemed by his cross; that the Virgin is our advocate; that the angels are our guardians and always on our behalf look up at the Father’s face; that the saints intercede for us; and that they were similar to us and yet in the present struggle persevered

Waldensians. Karlstadt. Images were also in church use at the time of the apostles. Chrysostom, Damascene, Athanasius.

Ecclesiastical History, 7, chap. 14

Those who dare spurn images have always been considered heretics.

In the Church images can be used for multiple purposes.

1 For this account, in a (since discredited) sermon attributed to Athanasius of Alexandria, as read at the Council of Nicaea II: ASCN, 1:277–81; obviously, the named church fathers were only cited as evidence for the existence of the painting. See also Pérez de Ayala’s discussion of the same story, § 8. 2 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 7, chap. 18 [sic], 2:175–77. 3 The reference is to the legend of Constantine’s dream, retold at Nicaea II, and also referenced by Pérez, § 9; see the note accompanying that passage for details.

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pro nobis, et quod erant similes nobis et tamen eo robore in praesenti perstiterunt agone, ut assequuti sint palmam. Admittuntur et ut sint veluti idiotarum libri, utque et heroica eorum gesta, etiam doctis, exhi­ beantur in promptu; et denique ut et illis debitus impendatur honor et cultus, in quo et totum huius rei negocium est. [4] Qua in re perspicaciter attendendum imagines de quibus diximus posse trifariam discuti. Uno quidem modo, ut in semet res quaedam sunt, puta aurum, lapis, lignum, color, pictura; item, ut pulchrae, et fabre pic­ tae vel sculptae, ut talibus lineamentis, gestibus, situ, aspectu, et id genus aliis finctae; et hoc pacto compertissimum est, nemine reclamante, quod nequeunt honorari | nec coli. Alio vero modo, uti res benedictae ac quo­ dam pacto Deo consecratae. Siquidem quamprimum in templo constitu­ tae sunt, etiam si non alia dicarentur benedictione, uti eius portiones ac membra censentur, et per hoc, sicut sacrosanctum est templum illudque prophanare immane est piaculum, ita et sacrosanctae redduntur imag­ ines, et ideo illas suo privare honore execrandum est scelus. Praeter id quod in templo positae non modo sunt rerum quas representant imag­ ines, sed et illis peculiariter sunt addictae, immo et eorum loco erectae. Ergo et hoc pacto indubie dignae sunt debita observantia, honore ac veneratione. [5] Tertio autem modo, uti imagines, et quidem ea sub ratione praecise. Quod ut clare percipiatur, adverte quod imago, ut imago, relativum est et ad prothotypon, hoc est, representatum refertur. Et quoniam relativa mutuo respicere habent sese, necesse est, e diverso, ut et prothotypon quodam pacto referatur ad eam.10 Nec id tantum est de ratione imaginis prothotypique ut mutuo respiciant sese, sed ut et certo modo existant in invicem, tam etsi non una eademque ratione: quandoquidem imago in representato est, velut in fundamento a quo sortitur, ut vera illius habea­ tur imago ut quae non solum ab illa exprimitur deduciturque, sed et in illo eius veritas substentatur et absolvitur, representatum vero in imag­ ine est, velut in speculo in quo et cernitur, et si par est honoratur. Ergo cum plura sint de ratione imaginis, quia non sola relatio qua ad prothoty­ pon refertur absolute, sed et continentia qua illud perinde ac speculum continet, haud dubium quod cum de imaginis adoratione, ut imago est, sermo sit, non restringitur ad eam tantum imaginis partem qua ad pro­ thotypon absolute refertur, sed et eam complectitur, immo et haec potis­ simum consideratur, qua et illud uti speculum continet, quandoquidem 10

For the reference to Aristotle’s Categories, see also Pérez, § 20.

Imagines possunt trifariam discuti.

Imagines in templo censentur uti aliquid templi.

Imago ut imago diligenter excutitur. Aristoteles in praedica­ mentis.

Etsi plura sunt de ratione imaginis, in praesenti tamen potius quod continet prothotypon est.

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with such strength that they obtained the palm. They are allowed also because they are like the books of the illiterate, and as their heroic his­ tories are publicly exhibited, also for the learned, and finally, so as to be offered the requisite honor and worship, which is their whole purpose. [4] In this respect, we should carefully consider that the images of which we have spoken can be considered in three ways. First, as being things in themselves, for instance gold, stone, color, painting; further, beauti­ fully and skillfully painted or sculpted, or fashioned with certain features, gestures, location, aspect, or otherwise. On this understanding it is most certain, and uncontested by anybody, that they may not be honored or worshipped. In another way, however, [images may be considered] as things that are blessed or in some way consecrated to God. For once they are installed in a church, they are considered parts and members of it, even if they are not specially blessed. Hence, since a church is sacrosanct, and desecrating it is an enormous sacrilege, thus images are also made sacrosanct, and therefore it is an appalling crime to deprive them of their honor. Besides, when placed in a church they are not only images of the things they represent, but also particularly assigned to them, and indeed installed in their stead. Also on this account, therefore, they are without a doubt worthy of the requisite observance, honor, and veneration. [5] Third, [images can be considered] as images, and precisely in this function. To perceive this clearly, note that the image qua image is rela­ tive and refers to the prototype, that is, the represented. And since rela­ tives concern each other mutually, it is necessary, on the other hand, that the prototype also refers in some way to the [image].4 Nor does the ratio of image and prototype imply only that they concern each other mutu­ ally, but also that in a certain way they exist reciprocally, albeit not in one and the same mode. Since an image is in the represented as if in the foundation from which it arises – so that one has a true image not only when it expresses and brings out [the represented], but also when [the latter] supports and releases its truth – hence the represented is truly in the image, as if in a mirror in which it is perceived, and is honored when appropriate. Hence, since the ratio of the image has multiple aspects – not only the relation by which it refers in an absolute sense to the proto­ type, but also the content by which it contains [the prototype] just like a mirror – there is no doubt that when there is discussion of the adoration of an image qua image, this is not limited only to that part of the image 4 For the reference to Aristotle’s Categories, see also Pérez, § 20.

Images can be consid­ ered in three ways.

Images in a church are considered part of the church.

The imago qua image is diligently examined. Aristoteles, Categories.

Since the ratio of the image has multiple aspects, in its present form it is especially that which contains the prototype.

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et secundum hanc partem rationemque et maxime illi exhibendus est honor et cultus. [6] Quare et scite dicitur quod utique adoratur imago et non secundum quam volueris rationem, sed secundum eam, qua prothotypon relucet in illa, unde etsi imago colitur, ratio tamen absolute ipsa non est, qua colatur, sed res representata, ac in ea contenta, ratio adorationis est. Et quoniam sicut unum de facto non est divisum ab alio, quoniam etsi pro­ thotypon absolute aliud ab imagine est, ut tamen in ea emicat, ab illa segregatum non est, ita nec amborum divisus | est cultus aut adoratio, sed unus eademque utriusque est, sicut ex phylosophorum11 placitis liquet.12 Siquidem tradunt unum eundemque motum, ad imaginem et ad rem cuius imago est terminari, eo quod et unum ratio est alteri, ut unus integerque13 constituatur terminus a quo et unus denominatur motus. Ergo non solum fatendum est, fideles in ecclesia adorare coram imagine, ut nonnulli ad cautelam forte loquuntur, sed et adorare imaginem sine quo volueris scrupulo: quin et eo illam venerantur cultu, quo et prothoty­ pon eius, propter quod, si illud habet adorari latria, et illa latria, si dulia, vel hyperdulia, et illa pariter eiusmodi cultu adoranda est. [7] Ex his arduum non est animadvertere, quantum sit discriminis inter gentes et nos de imaginum cultu, quandoquidem illae simulachra colen­ tes putabant ea nacta aliquid numinis, vel ex constellatione sub qua fuer­ ant sculpta, vel ex miris oraculis ac responsis quae procedere videbantur ab eis, illa Sathana occupante ac eo pacto homines seducente. Quod si nonnulli venerabantur ea non uti res quaedam, sed uti prothotypon continentia, tamen14 illud vel res erat prophana, immo scelesta,15 sicut­

11 12

13 14 15

Quo sensu, quave ratione imago dicitur coli.

Aristoteles, De somno et vigilia. Fideles adorant non solum coram imagine, sed adorant imaginem. Discrimen fidelium et gentium de adoratione imaginum.

Sic. For a contemporary Latin translation of, and commentary on, Aristotle’s De somno et vigilia by the Paduan philosopher Niccolò Leonico Tomeo, see Aristotelis Stagiritae Parva naturalia … Omnia in latinum conversa et antiquorum more explicate a N. Leonico Thomaeo [1523] (Venetiis: Iacobus Fabrianus, 1546). While both the Aristotelian text and the com­ ment discuss movement, perception, and image in connection to each other (cf. ibid., fols. 117v–118r, 119r), Nacchianti’s direct reference is unclear. Corr. from intergerque. Corr. from quia tamen (following the 1567 edition of Nacchianti’s Opera: Iacobi Naclanti Clugiensis episcopi operum tomus primus (secundus), 2 vols. [Venetiis: apud Iuntas, 1567]). Corr. from scelestis (following the 1567 ed.).

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that refers in an absolute sense to the prototype, but also comprises that part – indeed this is especially considered – by which [the image] contains it [the prototype] like a mirror, since indeed it is particularly because of this part and ratio that we must display honor and worship to [the image]. [6] Therefore it is aptly said that the image is adored in any case, not for some arbitrary reason (ratio), but because the prototype shines through in it. Hence, although the image is worshipped, it is not in an absolute sense the reason why it is worshipped; instead, the thing represented by and contained in it is the reason for adoration. And just as, de facto, the one is not separate from the other – because while the prototype is in an absolute sense different from the image, in order to leap up in it, [the prototype] is not separate from it – thus neither is the worship or adora­ tion of the two divided, but each is of both, as is clear from the verdicts of the philosophers.5 Since they transmit one and the same movement, they end in the image and the thing of which it is an image, inasmuch as one is the reason for the other: thus one integral terminus a quo is constituted and one movement is named. Hence not only should we say that the faithful in church adore before an image, as some do, perhaps out of caution, but also, without any scruple, that they adore the image. Indeed, they venerate it with the same cult as its prototype, so that if [the prototype] must be adored with latria, dulia, or hyperdulia, similarly [the image], too, must be adored with the same worship. [7] From this it is not hard to notice how great the difference is between the pagans and us in the cult of images, for the pagans thought that the likenesses they worshipped had something numinous, either because of the constellation under which they were sculpted or because of the won­ drous oracles and responses that seemed to emanate from them, since Satan occupied them and in this way seduced people. Although some venerated them not as a thing but as something containing a prototype, nevertheless the latter or the thing [representing it] – as in images of Hercules, Bacchus, or someone else – was profane, nay abominable, not dissimilar from a monster that had to be solemnly cursed as supersti­ tious, abnormal, and unworthy of worship, as when the planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, or the heavenly signs Aries, Taurus, and Capricorn were represented. These are a long distance removed from what is practiced

Aristoteles, On sleep and wakefulness.

Not only do the faithful adore before the image, but they also adore the image. The differ­ ence between the faithful and pagans concerning the adoration of images.

The impious images of the pagans.

5 For Aristotle’s On Sleep, see Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, 1:721–28. See further the comment on the opposite page.

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simulachrum Herculis, Bacchi, aut alterius, non dissimilis monstri, quod rite debuerant execrari vel superstitiosa seu prodigiosa ac nullo cultu digna, ut quando representabantur planetae, Saturnus, Iuppiter, Mars, aut signa coelestia, Aries, Taurus, Capricornus.16 Quae longo dissident17 intervallo, ab his quae fiunt a nobis: qui Deum in imaginibus colimus, et sanctissimos coelestis regionis heroes absque ullo fuco ullove errore, suspicimus ac veneramur. [8] Verum etsi permittitur aliquos (licet perpaucos18) ante idola inclina­ tos, vel ut morem gererent vulgo eoque pacto idiotarum mederentur calumniis furoribusque, vel ut deum ipsum extrinsecus peculiari colerent ratione, utputa quia omnibus iuvat, in statua Iovis, quia omnes exsaturat in simulachro Saturni: nihilominus etiam si res hunc in modum haberet sese, haud dubium eiusmodi cultum longe disentire adorationi fidelium, quippe qui non colunt imagines in gratiam vulgi, sed ut religiose inservi­ ant Deo, nec ementitis idolis fingunt Dei munificentias, non ignari quod illo plena sunt universa, nempe qui coelum et terram replet et irriguis suae bonitatis | cuncta perfundit. Praeter id, quod etsi ex parte posset res eo dissimulari praetextu, enimvero nihil afferetur operculi de idolis animalium, volucrum, serpentum, quadrupedum: quae Paulo attestante, constat mundi sapientes, etiam insigni locupletes notitia Dei, passim adorasse illisque procubuisse. Nec est cur serpentem obiicias aeneum, quandoquidem etsi in illum religiose aspiciebat populus, etsi forte obtu­ lit in deserto thura: haud dubium, quod sine idololatria factum est. [9] Siquidem cum certum esset ex lege non procumbendum idolis minusque sacrificandum eis (profecto ut procumbebant sacrificabantque gentes), obscurum esse non potest quod Deus, qui serpentem instituit, mysterium serpentis pandere non dissimulavit: quod indubie nec Mosen, nec seniores populi fugit. Cum enim, ut Servator docet, typum sui ger­ eret, ut in quo vetus crucifigendus erat Adamus, qui a serpente seductus infectusque non iniuria illi similis per peccatum est redditus, et per hoc, mores serpentinos indutus, non immerito est et uti serpens existimatus: non est obscurum quod tam eximium edocti sacramentum poterant qui­ dem sine idololatriae labe in serpentem illum respicere et respiciendo futuri Christi fidem exercere, et per hoc et illi religiose procumbere. Et

16 17 18

Corr. from Capricornns (following the 1567 ed.). Corr. from disdent (following the 1567 ed.). Corr. from perpauci (following the 1567 ed.).

Impia gentium simulacra.

Amica sed insufficiens interpretatio idolo­ latriae pro philosophis.

Cultus imagi­ num anima­ lium nullo praetextu excusari potest. Num. 21[9]

Serpens aeneus qua ratione in deserto ado­ ratus est.

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by us, who worship God in images and behold and venerate the most holy heroes of the celestial region without deceit or error. [8] Now, we concede that some, albeit very few, have bowed before idols either to carry on a custom for the populace and in this way to remedy the insults and follies of the uneducated, or externally to worship a god himself for a particular reason, for instance, because he helps everyone (before a statue of Jupiter) or because he satiates all (before an image of Saturn).6 But even if this were the case, there is no doubt that this kind of cult differs greatly from the adoration of the faithful, who in fact do not worship images to please the populace, but piously to serve God, nor by fabricating idols conjure up God’s bounties, in the knowledge that all things are full of him, who indeed has replenished heaven and earth and irrigated all things with the waters of his goodness. Moreover, although under this pretext the thing can in part be disguised, no cover can be provided for the idols of animals, birds, serpents, and four-footed beasts: it is certain, as Paul testifies, that the wise of the world, even including those provided with remarkable knowledge of God, have adored these everywhere and knelt before them. Nor should that lead you to bring up the brazen serpent: while the people piously looked upon it and perhaps offered it incense in the desert, no doubt this was done without idolatry. [9] For although by law it was certainly not allowed to kneel before idols, much less to sacrifice to them (as, in fact, the gentiles did), it must be well known that God, who introduced the serpent, did not dissemble in explaining its mystery; no doubt, this did not escape either Moses or the ancients of the people. As the Savior teaches, the figure (typus) of him [Christ], in which the old Adam was to be crucified, would be carried by the person who, seduced and corrupted by the serpent, was rightfully rendered similar to it by sin, and hence, having adopted serpentine ways, was deservedly compared to a serpent. Therefore it is clear that they [the ancient Israelites], instructed about such an extraordinary sacrament, could without the stain of idolatry look upon that serpent and, in doing so, practice the faith of the future Christ, and hence piously kneel also to

A friendly but insufficient interpreta­ tion of idolatry in support of the philosophers.

The cult of images of animals cannot be excused by any pretext.

Num. 21[:9]

The reason why the brazen serpent was adored in the desert.

6 These examples clearly play on assumed etymological connections between iuvare (to help) and Iuppiter (gen. Iovis), and exsaturare (to satiate) and Saturnus.

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licet non omnes forsan sacramentum caperent, quia tamen maiorum, et maxime Mosis, et forte septuaginta delectorum ab eo suoque impartito­ rum spiritu, ut promiserat Deus, fide in multis dirigebatur populus, ad illosque resolvebat sese: profecto illis nefas non erat, si rem prorsus non penetrabant, sed provectiorum consilio se committebant, ac eo pacto ut decretum fuerat seniorum serpentem observabant colebantque. Quare postquam illius superstitiosus factus est cultus, ut tempore Ezechiae regis merito confractus est. [10] Ex praemissis etiam facile est calumnias haereticorum retundere, quibus inurunt nos scelere idololatriae ac plusquam abominabilis sacri­ legii, mentientes nos et idola colere, quemadmodum et gentes, et contra praeceptum Domini erigere sculptile, quod etsi quandoque in scripturis admittitur, non tamen ut adoretur. A quibus ut a manifestissimis impos­ turis ex praedictis eximimur ac liberamur. Et quanquam non detrahimus aliquos in his abusus posse contingere, sicut et in multis aliis ad religio­ nem spe- | ctantibus, ecclesia tamen Dei illis non favet, sed sanctorum reveretur imagines rite et religiose, ut potest ex determinatis clara luce deduci.

Num. 11[:16]

4 Reg. 18[4] Diluuntur haereticorum calumniae.

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him. While perhaps not all took the sacrament, the people were guided in great numbers by the faith of their elders, particularly Moses, and per­ haps of the seventy men chosen by him who shared his spirit, as God had promised; and to these [leaders] the people yielded. Therefore it was not at all unlawful, if they did not pursue the matter more deeply, but com­ mitted themselves to the counsel of the seniors, to observe and worship the serpent in the way it was decreed by their elders. The herefore, after their cult had become superstitious, it was rightly broken at the time of King Ezechias. [10] Based on the foregoing it is easy to rebut the slanders by which the heretics brand us with the crime of idolatry and the most abominable sacrilege. They lie that we, like the pagans, worship idols and against God’s commandment erect graven images; while this is occasionally allowed in the scriptures, their adoration is not. From these slanders we clear and free ourselves with the previous arguments as from the most obvious impostures. And although we do not ignore that in these mat­ ters, as in many others pertaining to our religion, some abuses may occur, God’s Church does not favor these, but instead duly and piously reveres the images of saints, as can be concluded clearly from what we have determined.

Num. 11[16]

4 Kings 18[4] The slanders of the heretics are dissolved.

VI. Council of Trent

Draft of the Decree on Saints, Relics, and Images

279r

[1] Cum clara, concors atque constans catholicorum doctorum et universalium synodorum 6. et 7. sententia sit deiparam virginem et reliquos cum Christo regnantes magno cum fructu spiritus et corporis a nobis ut pro nobis Deum orent invocari,1 et hunc morem ab initio usque in hodiernum diem tota per orbem servet ecclesia catholica, ita ut haereticos iudicarit qui hanc fidelium consuetudinem oppugnarunt, ideo sanctorum patrum inherens vestigiis precipit sancta synodus omnibus episcopis et aliis populum christianum docentibus quod2 doceant et exhortentur plebem sibi commissam ut matrem Dei et reliquos sanctos sedulo ut pro se orent, invocent, vitentque diligenter omnes eos qui sanctos cum Christo regnantes invocandos negant sive qui asserunt aut eos pro nobis non orare, aut eorum ut pro nobis orent invocationem esse idololatriam vel adversari honori mediatoris Dei et hominum hominis Iesu Christi qui dedit semetipsum3 redemptorem pro omnibus, aut stultum esse mente vel voce regnantibus in coelo supplicare. [2] Cum etiam constet ex unanimi et firma doctorum catholicorum sententia totiusque ecclesiae catholicae antiqua consuetudine et synodo 7. universali sanctorum cum Christo regnantium reliquias, quae membra Christi et templa sunt Spiritus sancti ad aeternam gloriam statim resuscitanda, esse a fidelibus veneranda[s] et venerantibus multa pro ea beneficia prestari, usque adeo ut reliquiarum sanctarum venerationem improbantes habiti sunt in ecclesia haeretici, mandat sancta synodus ut de hac re populus diligenter doceatur, ne sequatur illos qui sanctorum ossa dicunt aut non esse veneranda aut inutiliter a fidelibus opis eorum obtinendae causa visitari.

[1 Tim 2:5–6]

1 AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 279r–280v. The document is part of a quire consisting of fols. 278r–281v (of which fols. 278r–v and 281r–v are blank); the quire is inserted in, and bound with, Ory’s image treatise. The undated text was drafted in Trent, probably between November 30– December 1, 1563. See for details, chapter 3, pp. 109–17. 2 Corr. from quae. 3 Corr. from semeptipsum.

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VI. Council of Trent

Draft of the Decree on Saints, Relics, and Images

[1] Since it is the clear, unanimous, and constant judgment of the Catholic doctors and the Sixth and Seventh Ecumenical Councils that the virgin mother of God and the other [saints] who reign with Christ are invoked by us, with great profit for spirit and body,1 so that they may pray to God on our behalf, and since the entire Catholic Church has observed this practice across the world from the beginning to the present day, so that it has judged those who have opposed this custom of the faithful to be heretics, therefore this holy council, following in the footsteps of the holy fathers, commands that all bishops and other teachers of the Christian people instruct and admonish the people entrusted to them diligently to invoke the mother of God and the other saints, so that they may pray for them, and carefully to shun all those who deny the invocation of the saints reigning with Christ or who assert that these [saints] do not pray for us, that their invocation to pray for us is idolatry or contrary to the honor of the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, who gave himself a redemption for all, or that it is foolish to supplicate mentally or orally those who reign in heaven. [2] Since it also certain, based on the unanimous and firm judgment of the Catholic doctors, the ancient custom of the entire Catholic Church, and [the decrees of] the Seventh Ecumenical Council, that the relics of the saints reigning with Christ – which are members of Christ and temples of the Holy Spirit bound to be resuscitated immediately to eternal glory – are to be venerated by the faithful and in return offer those who venerate them many benefits, so much so that the Church holds those who reject the veneration of holy relics to be heretics, the holy council orders that in this matter the people be diligently instructed, to keep them from following those who say that the faithful should not venerate the bones of the saints or visit them uselessly to obtain these saints’ assistance.

[1 Tim 2:5–6]

1 AAV, Conc. Trid. 7, fols. 279r–280v. The document is part of a quire consisting of fols. 278r–281v (of which fols. 278r–v and 281r–v are blank); the quire is inserted in, and bound with, Ory’s image treatise. The undated text was drafted in Trent, probably between November 30– December 1, 1563. See for details, chapter 3, pp. 109–17.

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[3] Denique ne populus ab haereticis decipiatur omnino requirit sancta synodus ut clare populo proponatur id quod ex antiqua ecclesiae traditione et consuetudine atque sanctorum patrum manifesta doctrina definierit universalis synodus 7a et Gregorius tertius in synodo Romana 93 episcoporum et synodus Francfordiensis sub Adriano papa tempore Caroli Magni celebrata. [4] Nempe imagines4 domini nostri Jesu Christi et sanctorum cum eo regnantium in templis | habendas ad exhortandam per earum inspectionem memoriam eiusdem salvatoris nostri atque sanctorum eius, easque adorandas, osculandas sive salutandas, non quasi aliquid divinitatis vel vitae haberent, sed hac ratione tamen quia externae illae actiones, genuflexio, osculum, capitis vel apertio vel inclinatio, et si quae sunt similes quae coram imaginibus vel ante eas fiunt, ad hoc ut protestemur et acuamus internum affectum quem erga prototypa gerimus: adoratio et honor sunt non imaginum sed Christi et sanctorum qui per imagines nostrae memoriae occurrunt. Audito nomine Jesu, non vocem sed rem per vocem significatam externo signo honoramus, sicut iuramus per creaturas non eis honorem divinae scientiae et potentiae tribuentes, sed illi tamen quem in creaturis in iuramento assumptis fulgere intelligimus, sicut Dominus ait, “Qui iurat in coelo, iurat in throno Dei et eo qui sedet super eum.” [5] Quoniam autem in has sanctas et salutares observationes pastorum sonnolentia, vulgi temeritate et Satane suggestione plurimi abusus irrepserunt, eos prorsus aboleri et exterminari sancta synodus vehementer cupit, qui ut cogniti facile vitentur nonnullos ex iis nominandos duxit, omnes vero ad quinque capita redigendos, ut si qui alii extiterint ad ea genera referri possint. [6] Primus abusus ex falsitate contingit, cum pro sanctis coluntur qui sancti non sunt, vel in quorum sanctitas ex fictis vel incertis historiis aut visionibus probatur, cum falsae vel incertae sanctorum reliquiae pro veris aut certis obtruduntur; huc pertinet predicatio falsorum vel incertorum miraculorum. Item cum ita extolluntur miracula sancti alicuius ut

4 Corr. from imaginis.

[Matt. 23:22]

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[3] Therefore, to prevent the people from being deceived by the heretics, the holy council requires that the people receive clear explanation of what the Seventh Ecumenical Council, Gregory III in the Roman Synod of ninety-three bishops, and the Council of Frankfurt (celebrated under Pope Hadrian at the time of Charlemagne) have declared based on ancient Church tradition, custom, and the manifest doctrine of the holy fathers.2 [4] Images of our Lord Jesus Christ and the saints reigning with him should certainly be kept in churches, to elicit by viewing them the memory of our Savior and his saints; and [these images] must be adored, kissed, and greeted, not as if they have any divinity or life, but so that these external actions – genuflexion, kissing, uncovering or bowing the head, and the like – which are done vis-à-vis or before them, express and sharpen the internal affect we have for their prototypes: the adoration and honor are not of the images but of Christ and the saints who by way of those images occur to our memory. Upon hearing Jesus’s name, we honor not the word but the thing signified by it with an external sign, just as we swear by created things, according the honor of divine knowledge and power not to them, but to him who we understand gleams in the created things used in the oath, as the Lord said: “He that sweareth by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon.” [5] But since multiple abuses have crept into these holy and salutary practices because of the somnolence of pastors, the impertinence of common people, and Satan’s suggestion, the holy council wishes ardently to abolish and eradicate these [abuses] altogether. Since those that are known are easily forbidden, it has thought to name some of them, organizing them all under five headings, so that any others that may remain can be assigned to those categories. [6] The first abuse arises from falsehood, when those are worshipped as saints who are not saints, or whose holiness is proven based on fictional or uncertain histories or visions, when false or uncertain relics of saints are pushed as true or certain; to this belongs the preaching of false or uncertain miracles. Likewise, when the miracles of a saint are praised in such a way that the virtues to be imitated are in no way or hardly touched

[Matt. 23:22]

2 The references are to the Second Council of Nicaea (787), the Synod of Rome (731), and the Council of Frankfurt (794). The Roman Synod and the Council of Frankfurt were also mentioned by Pérez, §§ 14–15: see pp. 158–59 and 164–65; and cf. chapter 2, p. 38, and 3, p. 113.

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virtutes quae imitandae sunt aut nullo modo aut vix attingantur, aut cum tali modo virtutum alicuius sancti proponitur quasi nunquam peccator fuerit aut post paenitentiam sine ullo omnino peccato vixerit, ita ut plebs ab imitandi studio prorsus deterreatur. [7] Item cum sanctus qui colitur aliis sanctis ex privato affectu anteponitur | vel anteponendus sit disputatur. Vel si pro colentibus se aliquam promissionem quae ex sacris scripturis vel universalis ecclesiae traditione non probatur habere praedicetur vel credatur. Item si invocetur non ut Deum oret, sed ut ex se ipso quasi ex se ipso prestet quod petitur, quasi certae rei esset deus vel plenus dominus. Cum creditur sanctus plagam immissurus nisi colatur, aut quasi Deus nullo modo opitulari velit, nisi ad certum sanctum peculiariter accedatur. Item cum in templis statuuntur falsi dogmatis imagines vel rudibus periculosi erroris occasionem praebentes, cuiusmodi sunt imagines beatae Mariae Virginis ob dolorem partus in lecto decumbentis vel sub cruce impatientiam ostendentis. Item ubi Deus veluti homo triceps pingitur vel quando quis divinitatem figurare quasi certis limitibus definiatur aut, quasi corporeis oculis conspici posset, coloribus eam exprimere conatur, quanquam illae historiae et narrationes sacrae scripturae in quibus aliquid de personis Trinitatis veluti signis quibusdam declaratur per imagines exprimi et figurari possunt, attamen ea[e] tamen quarum expressio rudibus expedire intelligitur. Item si imago creditur aliquid vitae vel occulte virtutis habitae cum fingitur sudare, flere, arridere, oculos torquere. [8] Secundus abusus est superstitionis cum sancti coluntur ritu a vanis hominibus excogitato, ut certo numero dierum qui si non observetur frustraneum sit omne quod agitur. Item certis alligationibus, circuitibus, circulationibus reliquiarum vel imaginum certo modo gradiendi faciendis aliisque similibus quae nihil ad sanctorum honorem aut invocationem vel populi aedificationem faciunt. Item si sanctus invocetur vel eius reliquiae portentur ut huiusmodi auxilio sint ad sua prava desideria explenda. Item si una imago alteri in cultu atque honore praeferatur ob solam antiquitatem vel quia artificiosius picta est aut ex preciosiore materia perfecta. Non est tamen abusus si una imago alteri preferatur

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upon, or that with this kind of virtues of a saint it is proposed that there was almost never a sinner who even after penance lived entirely without sin, so that common people are utterly deterred from the effort of imitating [these virtues]. [7] Also, when out of personal affection a saint being worshipped is preferred over other saints, or is claimed to be preferable. Or when [a saint] is preached or believed to offer worshippers a promise which is not proved by the sacred scriptures or the tradition of the universal Church. Likewise, if [saints] are invoked not to pray to God, but to deliver by themselves – as if by themselves – what is being asked, as if they were god or full lord over a certain thing. [Or] when a saint is believed to bring on a plague unless he is being worshipped, or as if God does not wish to give aid in any way unless a certain saint is especially approached. Also when images are placed in churches that contain false teachings or give occasion to dangerous error in the uneducated, such as images of the holy Virgin Mary reclining in bed in pain from delivery, or showing impatience under the cross. Also, where God is depicted as a three-headed man or when someone attempts to figure the divinity as if he were circumscribed within certain limits, or to depict him with colors, as if he can be seen by corporeal eyes, although the histories and narratives of the sacred scripture, in which some aspect of the persons of the Trinity is explained by some signs, can be expressed and represented by images, albeit only those [narratives] whose expression is known to be profitable to the uneducated.3 Likewise, if an image is believed to have some kind of life or occult power when it is thought to sweat, weep, laugh, or roll its eyes. [8] The second abuse is superstition, [which occurs] when the saints are worshipped in a rite contrived by deceptive men, for instance [involving] a certain number of days, which, if unobserved, would render ineffective all that is being done; also, [involving] certain bindings, circling, or carrying around of relics or images to be done with a certain manner of walking, or other such things, which contribute nothing to the honor of the saints, their invocation, or the edification of the people. Further, if saints are invoked or their relics carried around to somehow aid someone in satisfying immoral desires. Further, if one image is preferred over another in cult and honor, merely because of greater antiquity, or because it is painted more skillfully or made from a more precious material. But it is not an abuse if an image is preferred over another because it is believed 3 On these norms concerning the representations of the Trinity, see chapter 3, pp. 112–15.

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quia a sancto viro facta creditur, aut simili aliqua ratione. Item si ferae in memoriam miraculorum sumptuose alantur.  [9] Tertius abusus est quaestus, cum sanctorum praedicatio, reliquiarum5 visitatio [vel] imaginum cultus non ad sanctorum imitationem et intercessionem pro iis quae a Deo petimus obtinendis, sed ad quaestum referuntur, si quicquid ex oblationibus fidelium provenit uno numo elocetur, si vilibus hominibus oblationes reducentibus praedicandae aut circunferendae reliquiae tradantur. [10] Quartus abusus ad lasciviam pertinens contingit cum sanctorum celebratione et reliquiarum visitatione homines ad commessationes et ebrietates libere et veluti in honorem sanctorum patrandas abutuntur. Item cum imagines procaces ad libidinem vel aliam vanitatem provocantes in templis statuuntur. Item si ad inanem ostentationem alicuius familiae tropheis parietes ornantur, illa tamen insignia atque vexilla quibus victoria contra infideles parta signatur religiose in Dei honorem in templis suspenduntur. [11] Postremus est negligentiae abusus, qui tunc committitur cum sanctorum reliquiae locis sordidis vel non satis honestis conduntur, cum in pavimentis crucis et sanctorum imagines pinguntur, cum reliquiae mulieribus vel vilibus hominibus custodiendae et praedicandae traduntur, cum pulvere atque aliis sordibus reliquiae vel imagines squalore6 sinuntur, cum imagines prophanae aut etiam gentiles in templis esse permittuntur. [12] Hos atque alios abusus episcopi tollere curent atque ut abusus in posterum tollantur. [13] Statuit sancta synodus nemini licere ullam novam imaginem in templo ponere nisi ab episcopo fuerit approbata atque dedicata. Item nulla nova miracula vel reliquias esse recipiendas nisi approbante episcopo, qui cum primum adverterit concursum populi ad aliquas reliquias vel7 imaginem aut fontem aut alium quenvis titulum sub praetextu novae revelationis aut miraculi statim cum theologis et aliis piis ac prudentibus et eruditis viris rem examinare teneatur, et agere apud populum quod expedire iudicaverit. 5 praedicatio del. 6 Corr. from squalere. 7 The word vel is followed by the letters ig, crossed out.

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to have been made by a holy man, or for a similar reason. Also, if wild animals are lavishly kept in memory of miracles. [9] The third abuse is profiteering, when sermons about the saints, the visitation of relics, and the cult of images are aimed not at the imitation of the saints and their intercession to obtain the things we ask from God, but at profit making; if any part of the gifts of the faithful is loaned for a penny, or if relics are handed over, for purposes of preaching or parading them, to vile men seeking donations. [10] The fourth abuse, which pertains to lasciviousness, occurs when men freely, and as if to honor the saints, abuse the celebration of saints and visitation of relics to engage in revelry and drunkenness. Further, when images that are conducive to lechery or elicit another [kind of] vanity are placed in churches. Also, if by idle ostentation their walls are decorated with family trophies. But those signs and banners with which a victory against the infidels is recognized are piously hung in churches to honor God. [11] The last abuse is negligence, which is committed when the relics of saints are kept in dirty or insufficiently proper places, when images of the cross and the saints are painted on floors, when relics are turned over to women or lowly men for safekeeping and preaching, when relics or images are left in squalor due to dust or other dirt, and when profane or even pagan images are allowed to be in churches. [12] Bishops must take care to remove these and other abuses and ensure that they are removed in the future. [13] The holy council has determined that no one is permitted to place any new image in a church unless it has been approved and dedicated by the bishop. Further, that no new miracles or relics may be accepted without the approval of the bishop, who, as soon as he notices a crowding of people to some relics, image, font, or any other token, under the pretext of a new revelation or miracle, will immediately examine the matter with theologians and other pious, prudent, and learned men, and take action vis-à-vis the people in accordance with what he deems appropriate.

appendices

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images 1

Comparison between the Sorbonne Sententia and the Tridentine Decree Text on Sacred Images

The comparison was proposed by Jedin, “Entstehung und Tragweite,” 481–83. Italicized words and passages are those Jedin marked as similar and (in his view) denoting a direct influence of the Sententia on the Decree. For discussion and background, see chapter 3, 109–14. The editions used here are listed in the footnotes below. Sententia1 [1] Iesu Christi sanctorumque et sanctarum et facere et habere imagines easque ponere in templis et oratoriis minime pugnat cum Dei praecepto. Ita venerari et honorare imagines, ut qui eis habetur honor, referatur ad id, quod ipsae repraesentant, ex traditione et usu ecclesiae non est superstitio nec idololatria nec repugnat sacrae scripturae, quae solum prohibet idololatriam. Prosterni ante Iesu Christi imaginem in eo adorando, qui per ipsum repraesentatur, ut ait S. Gregorius, et ante sanctorum imagines inclinari et geniculari et eiusmodi alia agere, quae sunt externa signa decentis reverentiae, sunt actiones pii et religiosi animi, non autem idola colentis aut superstitiosi. Thure item suffire, cereos et candelas accendere, Deo vovere et aliquid offerre ante D.N. Iesu Christi et sanctorum imagines, quae sunt collocata

Decree2 Imagines porro Christi, deiparae Virginis et aliorum sanctorum in templis praesertim habendas et retinendas, eisque debitum honorem et venerationem impertiendam, non quod credatur inesse aliqua in iis divinitas vel virtus, propter quam sint colendae, vel quod ab eis sit aliquid petendum, vel quod fiducia in imaginibus sit figenda, veluti olim fiebat a gentibus, quae in idolis spem suam collocabant: sed quoniam honos, qui eis exhibetur, refertur ad prototypa, quae illae repraesentant, ita ut per imagines, quas osculamur, et coram quibus caput aperimus et procumbimus, Christum adoremus, et sanctos, quorum illae similitudinem gerunt, veneremur. Id quod conciliorum, praesertim vero secundae Nicaenae synodi decretis contra imaginum oppugnatores est sancitum.

1 AAV, Conc. Trid. 41, fols. 287r–88v. Ed. in CT 13/1, 581–83. The French text presented at St. Germain was published by Klipffel, Le Colloque de Poissy, 176–79; and earlier Collection des procès-verbaux des Assemblées-Générales du Clergé de France depuis l’année 1560 jusqu’à présent, tome 1 (Paris: Guillaume Desprez, 1767), 38–39. For an English translation see Wallis-Watkins, The Second Commandment, 25–27. 2 The edition of the entire decree used in these appendices is COD, 773–76. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004472235_012

380 in ecclesiis, hymnos et cantica in honorem Dei canere sanctorumque laudabilem facere commemorationem, dum honorantur et orantur, sunt in ecclesia catholica sempre fieri solita et sanctorum patrum sententiis approbata. In processionibus et supplicationibus crucem ferre sanctorumque reliquias et memorias, ut fiebat tempore sanctorum Chrysostomi et Augustini, res est pia et laudabilis. [2] Quod autem ad Sanctae Trinitatis imaginem attinet et effigiem, quamvis Deus in tribus personis sit spiritus, qui comprehendi non potest nec effingi, non debet tamen videri alienum et reprehendendum si pingantur aut aliqua alia ratione repraesententur signa et figurae, in quibus sacra declarat scriptura eum apparuisse et sic manifestasse hominibus, ut contineatur et exerceatur populus in fide articuli Sanctae Trinitatis, qui est praecipuum fundamentum christianae religionis, quomodo per picturas, effigies, imagines et historias mysteriorum nostrae redemptionis instituitur et confirmatur in coeteris articulis nostrae fidei, nempe nativitatis, passionis, resurrectionis et ascensionis. Quo fit, ut sit perspicuum bonum esse retinere imagines propter fructum et utilitatem, quae ex eis capitur, tum ut admoneatur populus beneficiorum et donorum, quae a Christo accepimus, tum ut eius sanctorum dona et salutaria exempla nobis repraesententur, ut pro iis Deum laudemus et eorum etiam virtutem imitemur et eadem ratione excitemur ad Deum diligendum vitamque corrigendam exercendamque pietatem, eosque

appendices

Illud vero diligenter doceant episcopi, per historias mysteriorum nostrae redemptionis, picturis vel aliis similitudinibus expressas, erudiri et confirmari populum in articulis fidei commemorandis et assidue recolendis; tum vero ex omnibus sacris imaginibus magnum fructum percipi, non solum quia admonetur populus beneficiorum et munerum, quae a Christo sibi collata sunt, sed etiam quia Dei per sanctos miracula et salutaria exempla oculis fidelium subiiciuntur, ut pro iis Deo gratias agant, ad sanctorumque imitationem vitam moresque suos componant, excitenturque ad adorandum ac diligendum Deum, et ad pietatem colendam. Si quis autem his decretis contraria docuerit aut senserit: anathema sit.

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images honoremus et eorum auxilium invocemus, ut pro nobis apud Deum intercedant. [3] Neque tamen inficiamur, quin in iis acciderint aut possint accidere nunnulli abusus adversus ecclesiae doctrinam et mentem. Eiusmodi esset abusus plane intolerabilis, si in imaginibus existimaretur esse aliqua divinitas aut virtus, propter quam essent venerandae aut honorandae, et quamvis sit laudabile, pietatis et religionis instinctu ire ad aedes sacras easque visere in memoriam sanctorum, propterea quod Deus sua inscrutabili voluntate ac providentia nobis aliquando suam magis ostendat operationem et virtutem in uno loco quam in alio et aliqua magis ratione quam ulla alia, magis tamen ad unam quam ad aliam currere imaginem eamque pluris facere et magis venerari, quod sit ex ditiori et pretiosiori materia, aut sit eius forma speciosior ac recentior aut antiquior aut ornatior et elegantior ac concinnius expressa, id vero plane abusus est et superstitio. [4] Est etiam abusus, si quispiam in imaginibus suam collocet fiduciam, ut olim gentes in suis idolis. Non parvus quoque est abusus si pingantur et effingantur imagines forma impudica et lasciva et quae non conveniat castitati et integritati sanctorum et sanctarum quos repraesentant. Est etiam abusus minime tolerandus, sicubi falsa et commentitia excogitentur miracula et eiusmodi imposturae. [5] Ut his autem in similibus occurratur abusibus nobis videtur expedire, ut frequentibus praedicationibus et exhortationibus de his erudiatur populus. Qui est etiam docendus alium honorem

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In has autem sanctas et salutares observationes si qui abusus irrepserint, eos prorsus aboleri sancta synodus vehementer cupit, ita ut nullae falsi dogmatis imagines et rudibus periculosi erroris occasionem praebentes statuantur. Quod si aliquando historias et narrationes sacrae scripturae, quum id indoctae plebi expediet, exprimi et figurari contigerit, doceatur populus, non propterea divinitatem figurari, quasi corporeis oculis conspici vel coloribus aut figuris exprimi possit. Omnis porro superstitio in sanctorum invocatione, reliquiarum veneratione, et imaginum sacro usu tollatur, omnis turpis quaestus eliminetur, omnis denique lascivia vitetur, ita ut procaci venustate imagines non pingantur nec ornentur, et sanctorum celebratione ac reliquiarum visitatione homines ad comessationes atque ebrietates non abutantur, quasi festi dies in honorem sanctorum per luxum ac lasciviam agantur. Postremo tanta circa haec diligentia et cura ab episcopis adhibeatur, ut nihil inordinatum aut praepostere et tumultuarie accommodatum, nihil profanum nihilque inhonestum appareat, quum domum Dei deceat sanctitudo.

382 deberi Christo D.N., alium vero sanctis, quos honoramus videntes eorum imagines, ex quo sequitur, ut alio etiam modo sint orandi: ad Christum quidem dirigendae sunt preces nostrae tamquam ad eum, qui est author totius nostri boni utque solus noster redemptor et servator; ad sanctos autem tanquam ad intercessores nostros, ut id, quod nobis opus est, a Deo impetremus per charissimum suum filium Jesum Christum, ut mos est solemnis ecclesiae, ad Deum suas preces dirigere, cum sanctorum commemoratione et per Iesum Christum eas terminare. Est etiam erudiendus populus, ne cum orat mentem et cogitationem suam defigat in imagine, sed in eo, quod ipsa repraesentat, et totum ad Deum referat. Providendum est etiam, ne cui privato liceat ullam erigere aut erigendam curare imaginem absque authoritate episcopi, neque ulla admittantur miracula, nisi quorum legitime facta fuerit fides, et quae non fuerint approbata ab episcopo. Prohibeatur etiam aufferre et frangere imagines, propterea quod id valde adversetur honori Dei et eius sanctorum et religioni christianae magnum afferat detrimentum. [6] Definiendae autem et decidendae huius controversiae et aliarum, quae ad fidem pertinent, et totius reformandae ecclesiae non est alia melior et commodior ratio, quam si ad oecumenicum referatur concilium aut ad sanctam sedem apostolicam.

appendices

Haec ut fidelius observentur, statuit sancta synodus, nemini licere ullo in loco vel ecclesia, etiam quomodolibet exempta, ullam insolitam ponere vel ponendam curare imaginem, nisi ab episcopo approbata fuerit; nulla etiam admittenda esse nova miracula, nec novas reliquias recipiendas, nisi eodem recognoscente et approbante episcopo, qui, simul atque de iis aliquid compertum habuerit, adhibitis in consilium theologis et aliis piis viris ea faciat, quae veritati et pietati consentanea iudicaverit. Quod si aliquis dubius aut difficilis abusus sit exstirpandus, vel omnino aliqua de iis rebus gravior quaestio incidat, episcopus, antequam controversiam dirimat, metropolitani et comprovincialium episcoporum in concilio provinciali sententiam exspectet; ita tamen, ut nihil inconsulto sanctissimo Romano pontifice novum aut in ecclesia hactenus inusitatum decernatur.

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images

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Comparison of the Decree of Nicaea II and the Tridentine Draft Text on Images

The following compares the Draft with the decree on images of the Second Council of Nicaea, in the then-current Latin translation of Longolius. Overlaps in terminology and argument are shown in italics. Nicaea II1 Fatemur aut[em] unanimiter nos ecclesiasticas traditiones, sive scripto sive consuetudine valentes et decretas, retinere velle, quarum de numero est imaginum effiguratio, ut quae historiae evangelicae promissionis concinat ad credulitatem verae et non phantasticae incarnationis Dei et ad utilitatem similitudinis quam nobis exhibet utiliter inventam. His se sic habentibus, regiam viam incedentes et sanctorum nostrorum et divinorum patrum doctrinae insistentes et catholicae ecclesiae in qua sanctus spiritus inhabitat traditionem observantes, definimus cum omni diligentia et cura venerandas et sanctas imagines ad modum et formam venerandae et vivificantis crucis e coloribus et tessellis aut alia quavis materia commode paratas dedicandas et in templis sanctis Dei collocandas habendasque, tum in sacris vasis et vestibus, tum in parietibus et tabulis, in aedibus privatis, in viis publicis, maxime autem imaginem domini et Dei servatoris nostri Iesu Christi, deinde intemeratae dominae nostrae deiparae, venerandorum angelorum, et omnium deinde sanctorum virorum. Quo, scilicet per hanc imaginum pictarum inspectionem, omnes qui

Draft Denique ne populus ab haereticis decipiatur omnino requirit sancta synodus ut clare populo proponatur id quod ex antiqua ecclesiae traditione et consuetudine atque sanctorum patrum manifesta doctrina definierit universalis synodus 7a et Gregorius tertius in synodo Romana 93 episcoporum et synodus Francfordiensis sub Adriano papa tempore Caroli Magni celebrata.

Nempe imagines domini nostri Jesu Christi et sanctorum cum eo regnantium in templis habendas ad exhortandam per earum inspectionem memoriam eiusdem salvatoris nostri atque sanctorum eius, easque adorandas, osculandas sive salutandas, non quasi aliquid divinitatis vel vitae haberent, sed hac ratione tamen quia externae illae actiones, genuflexio, osculum, capitis vel apertio vel inclinatio et si quae sunt similes, quae coram imaginibus vel ante eas fiunt ad hoc ut protestemur et acuamus internum affectum quem erga prototypa gerimus: adoratio et honor sunt non imaginum sed

1 LCN, fols. 87v–88r; CCOS, 599. Compare for the ninth-century translation by Anastasius Bibliothecarius, CUNS, 827 (on which see above, pp. 26 and 122 n. 86).

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appendices

contemplantur, ad prototyporum memoriam et recordationem et desiderium veniant, illisque salutationem et honorariam adorationem exhibeant, non secundum fidem nostram veram latriam, quae solum divinae naturae competit, sed quemadmodum typo venerandae et vivificantis crucis, et sanctis evangeliis, et reliquis sacris oblationibus suffitorum et luminarium reverenter accedimus, quemadmodum veteribus pie in consuetudinem hoc adductum est. Imaginis enim honor in prototypum resultat, et qui adorat imaginem, in ea adorat quoque descriptum argumentum. Sic enim sanctorum nostrorum patrum obtinet disciplina vel traditio catholicae ecclesiae, quae a finibus usque ad fines evangelium suscepit …

3

Christi et sanctorum qui per imagines nostrae memoriae occurrunt.

Audito nomine Jesu, non vocem sed rem per vocem significatam externo signo honoramus, sicut iuramus per creaturas non eis honorem divinae scientiae et potentiae tribuentes, sed illi tamen quem in creaturis in iuramento assumptis fulgere intelligimus, sicut Dominus ait, “Qui iurat in coelo, iurat in throno Dei et eo qui sedet super eum.”

Comparison of the Full Tridentine Draft and the Council’s Final Decree on Saints, Relics, and Images

In the following, italics represent overlaps in terminology and argument with the decree of Nicaea II; words in small caps indicate (additional) similarities between the Draft and the Decree; wording in bold resembles or derives from the Sententia. Draft [1] Cum clara, concors atque constans catholicorum doctorum et universalium synodorum 6. et 7. sententia sit deiparam virginem et reliquos cum Christo regnantes magno cum fructu spiritus et corporis a nobis ut pro nobis Deum orent invocari, et hunc morem

Decree Mandat sancta synodus omnibus episcopis et ceteris docendi munus curamque sustinentibus, ut iuxta catholicae et apostolicae ecclesiae usum, a primaevis christianae religionis temporibus receptum, sanctorumque patrum

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images ab initio usque in hodiernum diem tota per orbem servet ecclesia catholica, ita ut haereticos iudicarit qui hanc fidelium consuetudinem oppugnarunt, ideo sanctorum patrum inherens vestigiis precipit sancta synodus omnibus episcopis et aliis populum christianum docentibus quod doceant et exhortentur plebem sibi commissam ut matrem Dei et reliquos sanctos sedulo ut pro se orent, invocent, vitentque diligenter omnes eos qui sanctos cum Christo regnantes invocandos negant sive qui asserunt aut eos pro nobis non orare, aut eorum ut pro nobis orent invocationem esse idololatriam vel adversari honori mediatoris Dei et hominum hominis Iesu Christi qui dedit semetipsum redemptorem pro omnibus, aut stultum esse mente vel voce regnantibus in coelo supplicare.

[2] Cum etiam constet ex unanimi et firma doctorum catholicorum sententia totiusque ecclesiae catholicae antiqua consuetudine et synodo 7. universali sanctorum cum Christo regnantium reliquias, quae membra Christi et templa sunt Spiritus sancti ad aeternam gloriam statim resuscitanda, esse a fidelibus veneranda[s] et venerantibus multa pro ea beneficia prestari, usque adeo ut reliquiarum sanctarum venerationem improbantes habiti sunt in ecclesia haeretici, mandat

385

consensionem, et sacrorum conciliorum decreta: in primis de sanctorum intercessione, invocatione, reliquiarum honore, et legitimo imaginum usu fideles diligenter instruant, docentes eos, sanctos, una cum Christo regnantes, orationes suas pro hominibus Deo offerre; bonum atque utile esse, suppliciter eos invocare et ob beneficia impetranda a Deo per filium eius Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, qui solus noster redemptor et salvator est, ad eorum orationes, opem auxiliumque confugere; illos vero qui negant sanctos aeterna felicitate in coelo fruentes invocandos esse; aut qui asserunt, vel illos pro hominibus non orare, vel eorum ut pro nobis etiam singulis orent, invocationem esse idololatriam, vel pugnare cum verbo Dei, adversarique honori unius mediatoris Dei et hominum Iesu Christi; vel stultum esse in coelo regnantibus voce vel mente supplicare: impie sentire.

Sanctorum quoque martyrum et aliorum cum Christo viventium sancta corpora, quae viva membra fuerunt Christi et templum Spiritus sancti, ab ipso ad aeternam vitam suscitanda et glorificanda, a fidelibus veneranda esse, per quae multa beneficia a Deo hominibus

386 sancta synodus ut de hac re populus diligenter doceatur, ne sequatur illos qui sanctorum ossa dicunt aut non esse veneranda, aut inutiliter a fidelibus opis eorum obtinendae causa visitari.

[3] Denique ne populus ab haereticis decipiatur omnino requirit sancta synodus ut clare populo proponatur id quod ex antiqua ecclesiae traditione et consuetudine atque sanctorum patrum manifesta doctrina definierit universalis synodus 7a et Gregorius tertius in synodo Romana 93 episcoporum et synodus Francfordiensis sub Adriano papa tempore Caroli Magni celebrata. [4] Nempe imagines domini nostri Jesu Christi et sanctorum cum eo regnantium in templis habendas ad exhortandam per earum inspectionem memoriam eiusdem salvatoris nostri atque sanctorum eius, easque adorandas, osculandas sive salutandas, non quasi aliquid divinitatis vel vitae haberent, sed hac ratione tamen quia externae illae actiones, genuflexio, osculum, capitis vel apertio vel inclinatio, et si quae sunt similes quae coram imaginibus vel ante eas fiunt, ad hoc ut protestemur et acuamus internum affectum quem erga prototypa gerimus: adoratio et honor sunt non imaginum sed Christi et sanctorum qui per imagines nostrae memoriae occurrunt. Audito nomine Jesu, non vocem sed rem per vocem significatam externo

appendices praestantur: ita ut affirmantes, sanctorum reliquiis venerationem atque honorem non deberi, vel eas aliaque sacra monumenta a fidelibus inutiliter honorari, atque eorum opis impetrandae causa sanctorum memorias frustra frequentari: omnino damnandos esse, prout iampridem eos damnavit et nunc etiam damnat ecclesia.

Imagines porro Christi, deiparae Virginis et aliorum sanctorum in templis praesertim habendas et retinendas, eisque debitum honorem et venerationem impertiendam, non quod credatur inesse aliqua in iis divinitas vel virtus, propter quam sint colendae, vel quod ab eis sit aliquid petendum, vel quod fiducia in imaginibus sit figenda, veluti olim fiebat a gentibus, quae in idolis spem suam collocabant: sed quoniam honos qui eis exhibetur refertur ad prototypa, quae illae repraesentant: ita ut per imagines, quas osculamur et coram quibus caput aperimus et procumbimus, Christum adoremus, et sanctos quorum illae similitudinem gerunt veneremur. Id quod conciliorum, praesertim vero secundae Nicaenae synodi, decretis

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images signo honoramus, sicut iuramus per creaturas non eis honorem divinae scientiae et potentiae tribuentes, sed illi tamen quem in creaturis in iuramento assumptis fulgere intelligimus, sicut Dominus ait, “Qui iurat in caelo iurat in throno Dei et eo qui sedet super eum.”

[5] Quoniam autem in has sanctas et salutares observationes pastorum sonnolentia, vulgi temeritate et satane suggestione plurimi abusus irrepserunt, eos prorsus aboleri et exterminari sancta synodus vehementer cupit, qui ut cogniti facile vitentur nonnullos ex iis nominandos duxit, omnes vero ad quinque capita redigendos, ut si qui alii extiterint ad ea genera referri possint.

387

contra imaginum oppugnatores est sancitum.

Illud vero diligenter doceant episcopi, per historias mysteriorum nostrae redemptionis, picturis vel aliis similitudinibus expressas, erudiri et confirmari populum in articulis fidei commemorandis et assidue recolendis; tum vero ex omnibus sacris imaginibus magnum fructum percipi, non solum quia admonetur populus beneficiorum et munerum, quae a Christo sibi collata sunt, sed etiam quia Dei per sanctos miracula et salutaria exempla oculis fidelium subiiciuntur, ut pro iis Deo gratias agant, ad sanctorumque imitationem vitam moresque suos componant, excitenturque ad adorandum ac diligendum Deum, et ad pietatem colendam. Si quis autem his decretis contraria docuerit aut senserit: anathema sit. In has autem sanctas et salutares observationes si qui abusus irrepserint, eos prorsus aboleri sancta synodus vehementer cupit, ita ut nullae falsi dogmatis imagines et rudibus periculosi erroris occasionem praebentes statuantur.

388 [6] Primus abusus ex falsitate contingit, cum pro sanctis coluntur qui sancti non sunt vel in quorum sanctitas ex fictis vel incertis historiis aut visionibus probatur, cum falsae vel incertae sanctorum reliquiae pro veris aut certis obtruduntur, huc pertinet predicatio falsorum vel incertorum miraculorum. Item cum ita extolluntur miracula sancti alicuius ut virtutes quae imitandae sunt aut nullomodo aut vix attingantur, aut cum tali modo virtutum alicuius sancti proponitur quasi nunquam peccator fuerit aut post paenitentiam sine ullo omnino peccato vixerit, ita ut plebs ab imitandi studio prorsus deterreatur. [7] Item cum sanctus qui colitur aliis sanctis ex privato affectu anteponitur vel anteponendus sit disputatur. Vel si pro colentibus se aliquam promissionem quae ex sacris scripturis vel universalis ecclesiae traditione non probatur habere praedicetur vel credatur. Item si invocetur non ut Deum oret, sed ut ex se ipso quasi ex se ipso prestet quod petitur, quasi certae rei esset Deus vel plenus Dominus. Cum creditur sanctus plagam immissurus nisi colatur, aut quasi Deus nullo modo opitulari velit, nisi ad certum sanctum peculiariter accedatur. Item cum in templis statuuntur falsi dogmatis imagines vel rudibus periculosi erroris occasionem praebentes, cuiusmodi sunt imagines beatae Mariae Virginis ob dolorem partus in lecto decumbentis vel sub

appendices

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images cruce impatientiam ostendentis. Item ubi Deus veluti homo triceps pingitur vel quando quis divinitatem figurare quasi certis limitibus definiatur aut, quasi corporeis oculis conspici posset, coloribus eam exprimere conatur, quanquam illae historiae et narrationes sacrae scripturae in quibus aliquid de personis Trinitatis veluti signis quibusdam declaratur per imagines exprimi et figurari possunt, attamen ea tamen quarum expressio rudibus expedire intelligitur. Item si imago creditur aliquid vitae vel occulte virtutis habitae cum fingitur sudare, flere, arridere, oculos torquere. [8] Secundus abusus est superstitionis cum sancti coluntur ritu a vanis hominibus excogitato, ut certo numero dierum qui si non observetur frustraneum sit omne quod agitur. Item certis alligationibus, circuitibus, circulationibus reliquiarum vel imaginum certo modo gradiendi faciendis aliisque similibus quae nihil ad sanctorum honorem aut invocationem vel populi aedificationem faciunt. Item si sanctus invocetur vel eius reliquiae portentur ut huiusmodi auxilio sint ad sua prava desideria explenda. Item si una imago alteri in cultu atque honore praeferatur ob solam antiquitatem vel quia artificiosius picta est aut ex preciosiore materia perfecta. Non est tamen abusus si una imago alteri preferatur quia a sancto viro facta creditur, aut simili aliqua ratione. Item si ferae in memoriam miraculorum sumptuose alantur.

389

Quod si aliquando historias et narrationes sacrae scripturae, quum id indoctae plebi expediet, exprimi et figurari contigerit, doceatur populus, non propterea divinitatem figurari, quasi corporeis oculis conspici vel coloribus aut figuris exprimi possit.

Omnis porro superstitio in sanctorum invocatione, reliquiarum veneratione et imaginum sacro usu tollatur,

390 [9] Tertius abusus est quaestus, cum sanctorum praedicatio, reliquiarum visitatio [vel] imaginum cultus non ad sanctorum imitationem et intercessionem pro iis quae a Deo petimus obtinendis, sed ad quaestum referuntur, si quicquid ex oblationibus fidelium provenit uno numo elocetur, si vilibus hominibus oblationes reducentibus praedicandae aut circunferendae reliquiae tradantur. [10] Quartus abusus ad lasciviam pertinens contingit cum sanctorum celebratione et reliquiarum visitatione homines ad commessationes et ebrietates libere et veluti in honorem sanctorum patrandas abutuntur. Item cum imagines procaces ad libidinem vel aliam vanitatem provocantes in templis statuuntur. Item si ad inanem ostentationem alicuius familiae tropheis parietes ornantur, illa tamen insignia atque vexilla quibus victoria contra infideles parta signatur religiose in Dei honorem in templis suspenduntur. [11] Postremus est negligentiae abusus, qui tunc committitur cum sanctorum reliquiae locis sordidis vel non satis honestis conduntur, cum in pavimentis crucis et sanctorum imagines pinguntur, cum reliquiae mulieribus vel vilibus hominibus custodiendae et praedicandae traduntur, cum pulvere atque aliis sordibus reliquia vel imagines squalore sinuntur, cum imagines prophanae aut etiam gentiles in templis esse permittuntur. [12] Hos atque alios abusus episcopi tollere curent atque ut abusus in posterum tollantur.

appendices omnis turpis quaestus eliminetur,

omnis denique lascivia vitetur, ita ut procaci venustate imagines non pingantur nec ornentur, et sanctorum celebratione ac reliquiarum visitatione homines ad commessationes atque ebrietates non abutantur, quasi festi dies in honorem sanctorum per luxum ac lasciviam agantur.

Postremo tanta circa haec diligentia et cura ab episcopis adhibeatur, ut nihil inordinatum aut praepostere et tumultuarie accommodatum, nihil profanum nihilque inhonestum appareat, quum domum Dei deceat sanctitudo.

Sources of the Tridentine Decree on Sacred Images [13] Statuit sancta synodus nemini licere ullam novam imaginem in templo ponere nisi ab episcopo fuerit approbata atque dedicata. Item nulla nova miracula vel reliquias esse recipiendas nisi approbante episcopo, qui cum primum adverterit concursum populi ad aliquas reliquias vel imaginem aut fontem aut alium quenvis titulum sub pretextu novae revelationis aut miraculi statim cum theologis et aliis piis ac prudentibus et eruditis viris rem examinare teneatur, et agere apud populum quod expedire iudicaverit.

391

Haec ut fidelius observentur, statuit sancta synodus, nemini licere ullo in loco vel ecclesia, etiam quomodolibet exempta, ullam insolitam ponere vel ponendum curare imaginem, nisi ab episcopo approbata fuerit. Nulla etiam admittenda esse nova miracula, nec novas reliquias recipiendas, nisi eodem recognoscente et approbante episcopo, qui, simul atque de his aliquid compertum habuerit, adhibitis in consilium theologis et aliis piis viris ea faciat, quae veritati et pietati consentanea iudicaverit. Quod si aliquis dubius aut difficilis abusus sit exstirpandus, vel omnino aliqua de his rebus gravior quaestio incidat, episcopus, antequam controversiam dirimat, metropolitani et comprovincialium episcoporum in concilio provinciali sententiam exspectet, ita tamen, ut nihil inconsulto sanctissimo Romano pontifice novum aut in ecclesia hactenus inusitatum decernatur.

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Durant, Jean-Étienne. De ritibus ecclesiae catholicae libri tres. Romae: Ex Typographia Vaticana, 1591. Du Tillet, Jean (Joannes Tilius), ed. Κανόνεσ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν άγίων συνόδων. Apostolorum et sanctorum conciliorum decreta. Parisiis: per Conradum Neobarium, 1540. Du Tillet, Jean (Joannes Tilius), ed. Opus inlustrissimi et excellentissimi seu spectabilis viri, Caroli Magni, … contra Synodum, quae in partibus Graeciae pro adorandis imaginibus stolide sive arroganter gesta est. S.l., s.e., 1549. Eliseo, Tommaso (Thomas Elysius). Piorum clypeus adversus veterum recentiorumque hereticorum pravitatem fabrefactus. Venetiis: apud Salamandram, 1563. Epiphanius of Salamis. Contra octoaginta haereses opus, Panarium sive Arcula aut Capsula Medica appellatum, … una cum aliis Epiphanii operibus, Iano Cornario Medico Physico Interprete. Basileae: Per Robertum Winterum, 1545. Erasmus Roterodamus. Dilucida et pia explanatio symboli quod apostolorum dicitur, decalogi praeceptorum, et dominicae praecationis. Antverpiae: ex officina Michaelis Hillenii, 1533. Eusebius of Caesarea. Eusebii Pamphili Caesariensis … Opera. Basileae: per Henricum Petri, 1549. Eusebius of Caesarea. Autores historiae ecclesiasticae: Eusebii Pamphili Caesariensis episcopi libri novem, Ruffino interprete … Parisiis: a Galeoto Pratensi, 1541. Eusebius of Caesarea. Ecclesiastical History. Translated by Kirsopp Lake and J.E.L. Olton. Loeb Classical Library. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926–32. Formula Reformationis per Caesaream Maiestatem, Statibus Ecclesiasticis, in Comitiis Augustanis ad deliberandum proposita et ab eisdem … probata et recepta. Augustae Vindelicorum: Ulhard, 1548. Gilio, Giovanni Andrea. Dialogue on the Errors and Abuses of Painters, ed. and trans. Michael Bury, Lucinda Byatt, and Carol M. Richardson. Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 2018. Gratian. Decretum Gratiani cum glossis ad vetustorum exemplarium fidem novissime recognitum. Parisiis: apud Oudinum Parvum, 1542. Gregory I. Sancti Gregorii magni ecclesie doctoris precipui opera. Parrhisiis: in edibus Joannis Parvi, 1518. Gregory I. S. Gregorii Magni registrum epistularum libri I–VII / VIII–XIV, Appendix. Edited by Dag Norberg. 2 vols. CCSL 140 and 140A. Turnhout: Brepols, 1982. Gregory I. Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum Libri I–VII / VIII–XIV. Edited by Paulus Eward and Ludovicus M. Hartmann. Monumenta Germaniae HistoricaEpistolae 2. 2 vols. Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1992. Gregory I. The Letters of Gregory the Great. Edited and translated by John R.C. Martyn. 3 vols. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004.

396

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Hervet, Gentien, ed. Canones SS. Apostolorum, Conciliorum Generalium et Particularium … Omnia Commentariis Theodori Balsamonis Antiocheni Patriarchae explicata et de Graecis conversa. Parisiis: apud Guil. Morelium, 1561. Historia Tripertita [sic] … Cassiodori Senatoris viri Dei de regimine Ecclesie primitive. Lugduni: apud Jacobum Giuncti, 1534. Jonas of Orléans. Libri tres de cultu imaginum ad Carolum Magnum adversus haeresin Claudii praesulis Taurinensis. Coloniae: Apud haeredes Arnoldi Birck, 1554. Laínez, Diego. “Sulle immagini sacre.” Edited and translated by M. Saulini. In Immagini e Arte Sacra nel Concilio di Trento. “Per istruire, ricordare, meditare e trarne frutto.” Edited by Lydia Salviucci Insolera, 204–35. Rome: Artemide, 2016. Lippomano, Luigi. Sanctorum priscorum patrum vitae … nuper per R.P.D. Aloysium Lipomanum Episcopum Veronensem in unum volumen redactae, cum scholiis eiusdem omnium praesentium haereticorum blasphemias et delyramenta profligantibus. Venetiis: ad signum Spei, 1551. Lippomano, Luigi. Confirmatione et stabilimento di tutti li dogmi catholici, con la subversione di tutti i fondamenti, motivi et ragioni delli moderni heretici sino al numero 482. In Venetia: al Segno della Speranza, 1553. Lippomano, Luigi and Laurentius Surius. De probatis sanctorum historiis. 7 vols. Coloniae Agrippinae: apud Gervinum Calenium & haeredes Quentelios, 1576–86. Longolius, Gilbertus, ed. Concilium Nicenum. Synodi Nicenae quam Graeci septimam vocant … actiones omnes contra iconoclastas et iconomachos … Opus nunc recens inventum et e Graeco versum per G. Long. Coloniae: Petrus Quentel, 1540. Molanus, Johannes. Traité des saintes images. Edited by François Boespflug, Olivier Christin, and Benoît Tassel, 2 vols. Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996. Nacchianti, Iacopo. Enarrationes piae, doctae, et catholicae in epistolam D. Pauli ad Romanos … Accedunt et tractationes peculiares de mysterio sacratissime Trinitatis, de tempore quo Petrus extitit Romae, de recto imaginum cultu, de originali labe, et de praedestinatione ac reprobatione hominum … Venetiis: apud Iosephum Vicentinum, 1557. Nacchianti, Iacopo. Iacobi Naclanti Clugiensis episcopi operum tomus primus (secundus). 2 vols. Venetiis: apud Iuntas, 1567. Nadal, Hieronimo. Orationis Observationes. Edited by Michael Nicolau. Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1964. Neudorffer, Georg. Von der heiligen erung unnd anrüffen sampt ettlicher einred wider der heiligen bild. Tüwingen: Morhart, 1528. Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulus. Ecclesiasticae Historiae Libri Decem et Octo, sacratiss. Rom. Regis Ferdinandi liberalitate, opera vero ac studio doctiss. viri Ioannis Langi, Consiliarii Regii e Graeco in Latinum sermonem translati, nunque primum in lucem editi. Basileae: Oporini, 1553.

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Ninguarda, Feliciano. Assertio fidei catholicae. Venetiis: apud Dominicum Nicolinum, 1563. Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum (Libri Carolini). Ed. Ann Freeman. In Concilia, Tomus II, Supplementum I. Munich: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 1998. Paleotti, Gabriele. Discorso intorno alle imagini. In Trattati d’arte, 2:117–509. Paleotti, Gabriele. Discourse on Sacred and Profane Images. Translated by William McCuaig; introduced by Paolo Prodi. Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 2012. Pallavicino, Sforza. Istoria del Concilio di Trento. 2 vols. Roma: Angelo Bernabó dal Verme Erede del Manelfi, 1656–57. Pelargus, Ambrosius. Ambrosii Pelargi opuscula nunc primum excusa … S.l. [Coloniae]: Ioannes Gymnicus, 1534. Pépin, Guillaume. De sanctorum imitatione. S.l.: s.e., 1541. Pérez de Ayala, Martín. De divinis, apostolicis atque ecclesiasticis traditionibus deque authoritate ac vi earum sacrosancta adsertiones ceu libri decem in quibus fere universa Ecclesiae antiquitas circa dogmata apostolica, orthodoxe elucidatur. Coloniae: Iaspar Gennepaeus, 1549. Subsequent editions: Venetiis: Ad Signum Spei, 1551; Parisiis: Apud Gulielmum Iulianum, 1562. Pighius, Albertus. Controversiarum praecipuarum in comitiis Ratisponensibus tractatarum. Coloniae: Ex officina Melchioris Novesiani, 1542. Pio da Carpi, Alberto. Tres et viginti libri in loco lucubrationum variarum D. Erasmi Roterodami. [Parisiis]: Iodocus Badius Ascensius, 1531. Pio da Carpi, Alberto. Ad Erasmi Roterodami expostulationem responsio accurata et paraenetica. Edited by Fabio Forner. 2 vols. Firenze: Olschki, 2002. Platina, Bartolommeo. Bap. Platinae Cremonensis de vitis ac gestis summorum pontificum ad sua usque tempora liber unus. Coloniae: Fucharius Cervicornus Agrippinas, 1540. A Reformation Debate: Karlstadt, Emser, and Eck on Sacred Images. Three Treatises in Translation. Translated and edited by Bryan D. Mangrum and Giuseppe Scavizzi. 2nd ed. Toronto, Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1998. Sarpi, Paolo. Istoria del Concilio tridentino. Edited by Corrado Vivanti. 2 vols. Turin: Einaudi, 1974. Schatzgeyer, Kaspar. De cultu et veneratione sanctorum. S.l. [Augsburg], s.e. [Sigmund Grimm], 1522–23. Schatzgeyer, Kaspar. De sanctorum imploratione et eorum suffragiis scriptum. S.l.: Ex Monaco, 1524; Tubingae: U. Morhart, 1527. Solaerius, Antonius. Opusculum de veneratione et invocatione sanctorum … aeditum in Desiderium Erasmum Roterodamum. Parisiis: Apud Ioannem André, 1548. Trattati d’arte del Cinquecento fra Manierismo e Controriforma. Edited by Paola Barocchi. 3 vols. Bari: Laterza, 1960–62.

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Vásquez, Gabriel. De cultu adorationis libri tres. Moguntiae: ex officina Ioannis Albini, 1601. Von Strittigkeit der Bilder. Texte des deutschen Bildstreits im 16. Jahrhundert. Edited by Jörg Jochen Berns. 2 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.



Secondary Literature

Bastgen, Hubert. “Das Capitulare Karls des Grossen über die Bilder oder die sogenannten Libri Carolini, II.” Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde 37 (1912): 13–51. Belting, Hans. Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art (1991). Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Benzan, Carla. “Coming to Life at the Sacro Monte of Varallo: the Sacred Image al vivo in Post-Tridentine Italy.” In Ad vivum? Visual Materials and the Vocabulary of Life-Likeness in Europe before 1800. Edited by Thomas Balfe, Joanna Woodall, and Claus Zittel, 224–46. Intersections 61. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2019. Bernard-Maître, Henri. “L’inquisiteur dominicain Mathieu Ory et son Alexipharmacon contre les hérétiques (1544).” Revue des Sciences Religieuses 30/3 (1956): 241–60. Bianchi, Ilaria. La politica delle immagini nell’età della Controriforma: Gabriele Paleotti teorico e committente. Bologna: Editrice Compositori, 2008. Blickle, Peter, André Holenstein, Heinrich Richard Schmidt, and Franz-Josef Sladeczek, eds. Macht und Ohnmacht der Bilder. Reformatorischer Bildersturm im Kontext der europäischen Geschichte. Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte (Neue Folge), vol. 33. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002. Bossina, Luciano and Enrico Valdo Maltese. “Dal ‘500 al Migne. Prime ricerche su Pier Francesco Zini (1520–1580).” In I padri sotto il torchio. Le edizioni dell’antichità cristiana nei secoli XV–XVI. Atti del convegno di studi Certosa del Galluzzo (Firenze, 25–26 giugno 1999), edited by Mariarosa Cortesi, 217–87. Firenze: Sismel Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2002. Boulnois, Olivier. Au-delà de l’image. Une archéologie du visuel au Moyen Âge. V e–XVIe s. Paris: Seuil, 2008. Brower, Jeffrey. “Medieval Theories of Relations.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2018 Edition. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, at . Brown, Peter. The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (1980). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Buddensieg, Tilmann. “Gregory the Great, the Destroyer of Pagan Idols. The History of a Medieval Legend concerning the Decline of Ancient Art and Literature.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 28 (1965): 44–65.

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Bugge, Ragne. “Effigiem Christi, qui transis, semper honora. Verses Condemning the Cult of Sacred Images in Art and Literature.” Acta ad archaeologiam et artium historiam pertinentia 6 (1975): 127–39. Camille, Michael. The Gothic Idol: Ideology and Image-making in Medieval Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Caravale, Giorgio. “Ambrogio Catarino Politi e i primi gesuiti.” Rivista storica italiana 117 (2005): 80–109. Caravale, Giorgio. Sulle tracce dell’eresia. Ambrogio Catarino Politi (1484–1553). Firenze: Olschki, 2007. English version: Beyond the Inquisition. Ambrogio Catarino Politi and the Origins of the Counter-Reformation. Translated by Don Weinstein. South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 2017. Christin, Olivier. “Edition et citation du Concile de Nicée II dans la polémique contre les protestants en France.” In Nicée II, 787–1987. Douze siècles d’images religieuses. Actes du colloque international Nicée II tenu au Collège de France, Paris les 2, 3, 4 octobre 1986. Edited by F. Boespflug and N. Lossky, 339–43. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987. Christin, Olivier. Une révolution symbolique. L’iconoclasme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991. Cole, Michael W. and Rebecca Zorach, eds. The Idol in the Age of Art. Objects, Devotions and the Early Modern World. Ashgate: Farnham, Surrey-Burlington, VT, 2009. Crousaz, Karine. L’Académie de Lausanne entre humanisme et Réforme (ca. 1537–1560). Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012. De Boer, Wietse. “Nacchianti, Jacopo,” DBI 77:655–58. De Boer, Wietse. “The Early Jesuits and the Catholic Debate about Sacred Images.” In Jesuit Image Theory. Edited by Wietse de Boer, Karl A.E. Enenkel, and Walter S. Melion, 53–73. Intersections 45. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016. De Boer, Wietse. “Trent, Saints, and Images: A Prehistory.” In Trent and Beyond: The Council, Other Powers, Other Cultures. Edited by Michela Catto and Adriano Prosperi, 121–41. Turnhout: Brepols, 2017. De Boer, Wietse. “Image, Adoration, Meditation: Debates in the Margins of Trent.” In Genèse et postérité des Evangelicae Historiae Imagines (1593–1594). Edited by Pierre Antoine Fabre, Ralph Dekoninck, and Walter S. Melion. Rome: École française de Rome (forthcoming 2022). Dekoninck, Ralph. Ad imaginem. Status, fonctions et usages de l’image dans la littérature spirituelle jésuite du XVIIe siècle. Genève: Droz, 2005. Dekoninck, Ralph. “Visual Representation as Real Presence. Otto van Veen’s Naples Vision of Saint Thomas Aquinas.” In The Secret Lives of Art Works. Exploring the Boundaries between Art and Life. Edited by Caroline van Eck, Joris van Gastel, and Elsje van Kessel, 179–99. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2014.

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Dekoninck, Ralph. “Visio intellectualis vel sensualis: la vision napolitaine/parisienne de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’après Santi di Tito.” In Voir l’au-delà. L’expérience visionnaire et sa représentation dans l’art italien de la Renaissance. Actes du colloque international (Paris, 3–5 juin 2013). Edited by Cyril Gerbron, 135–52. Turnhout: Brepols, 2017. Dekoninck, Ralph. “Le double mouvement de l’âme vers l’image: une théorie aristotélico-thomiste au cœur des débats du milieu du XVIe siècle sur le juste rapport à l’image religieuse.” Forthcoming in Revue de théologie et de philosophie, numéro spécial ‘Art et piété,’ 153 (2021). De la Servière, Joseph. Théologie de Bellarmin. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1909. Deswarte-Rosa, Sylvie. “La Trinité trifrons en France dans le sillage de Savonarole.” In Circulation des idées et des pratiques politiques, France et Italie (XIIIe–XVIe siècle), 235–48. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 2013. Duval, André. “La Summa Conciliorum de B. Carranza.” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 41/3 (1957): 401–27. Eire, Carlos M.N. War against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Elsner, Jaś. “Iconoclasm as Discourse: From Antiquity to Byzantium.” The Art Bulletin 94/3 (2012): 368–94. Evennett, Henry Outram. “Claude d’Espence et son Discours du colloque de Poissy. Étude et texte.” Revue historique 64/1 (1930): 40–78. Fabre, Pierre Antoine. Ignace de Loyola. Le lieu de l’image. Paris: Vrin, 1992. Fabre, Pierre Antoine. Décréter l’image? La XXVe Session du Concile de Trente. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013. Fabre, Pierre Antoine. “Qu’est-ce que la postérité du Concile de Trente? Le cas du ‘culte des images.’” In Trent and Beyond: The Council, Other Powers, Other Cultures. Edited by Michela Catto and Adriano Prosperi, 83–99. Turnhout: Brepols, 2017. Fabre, Pierre Antoine. “Une théorie en mouvement: Lainez et les ‘images’ entre Paris et Trente (1562–1563).” In The Council of Trent: Reform and Controversy in Europe and Beyond (1545–1700). Edited by Wim François and Violet Soen, 3 vols., 3:9–29. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018. Fabre, Pierre Antoine. “Le problème de l’image dans le dernier acte du Concile de Trente: documents inédits du mois de novembre 1563.” In La dramatique conciliaire de l’Antiquité à Vatican II. Edited by Guillaume Cuchet and Charles Mériaux, 115–36. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2019. Favreau, Robert. “L’inscription du tympan nord de San Miguel d’Estella.” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 133, 2 (1975): 237–46. Feld, Helmut. Der Ikonoklasmus des Westens. Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, 1990. Firpo, Massimo. La presa di potere dell’Inquisizione romana, 1550–1553. Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2014.

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Firpo, Massimo and Fabrizio Biferali. Immagini ed eresie nell’Italia del Cinquecento. Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2016. Firpo, Massimo and Germano Maifreda. L’eretico che salvò la Chiesa. Il cardinale Giovanni Morone e le origini della Controriforma. Turin: Einaudi, 2019. Freedberg, David. “Johannes Molanus on Provocative Paintings,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 34 (1971): 229–45. Freedberg, David. The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Ginzburg, Carlo. “Representation: The Word, the Idea, the Thing” (1991). In idem, Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance, 63–78. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Giombi, Samuele. Un ecclesiastico tridentino al governo diocesano. Marcello II Cervini (1501–1555) e la riforma della chiesa fra centro e periferia. Ancona, Edizioni di Studia Picena, 2010. Greengrass, Mark. “Informal Networks in Sixteenth-Century French Protestantism.” In Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559–1685. Edited by Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, 78–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Guscin, Mark. The Image of Edessa. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009. Hallebeek, Jan. “Papal Prohibitions Midway between Rigor and Laxity. On the Issue of Depicting the Holy Trinity.” In Iconoclasm and Iconoclash: Struggle for Religious Identity. Edited by Willem van Asselt et al., 353–83. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007. Hecht, Christian. Katholische Bildertheologie der frühen Neuzeit. Studien zu Traktaten von Johannes Molanus, Gabriele Paleotti und anderen Autoren (1997). 3d edition. Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2016. Hudon, William V. “Two Instructions to Preachers from the Tridentine Reformation.” Sixteenth Century Journal 20, 3 (1989): 457–70. Hudon, William V. Marcello Cervini and Ecclesiastical Government in Tridentine Italy. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992. Hudon, William V. “The Papacy in the Age of Reform.” In Early Modern Catholicism. Essays in Honour of John W. O’Malley, S.J. Edited by Kathleen M. Comerford and Hilmar M. Pabel, 46–66. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001. Italiano, Gianmario. “La pastorale eterodossa di Iacopo Nacchianti a Chioggia (1544– 48).” Rivista storica italiana 123 (2011): 741–91. Jedin, Hubert. “Entstehung und Tragweite des Trienter Dekrets über die Bilderverehrung” (1935). In idem, Kirche des Glaubens, Kirche der Geschichte. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Vorträge, 2:460–98. 2 vols. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1966. Jedin, Hubert. Geschichte des Konzils von Trient, 4 vols. in 5 (1949–75). Repr. of the 3d ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2017. Jedin, Hubert. “Die Autobiographie des Don Martín Pérez de Ayala († 1566).” Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft 11 (1955): 122–64.

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Klipffel, Henri. Le Colloque de Poissy: Étude sur la crise religieuse et politique de 1561. Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1867. Kretzmann, Norman, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, eds. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Lamberz, Erich. “Die Überlieferung und Rezeption des VII. ökumenischen Konzils (787) in Rom und im lateinischen Westen.” In Roma fra oriente e occidente, 2:1053– 99. Settimane di studio del Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, XLIX. 2 vols. Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’alto Medioevo, 2002. Lecercle, François. Le Signe et la relique. Les théologies de l’image à la Renaissance. Thèse de doctorat d’État inédite. Université de Montpellier, 1987. Lelièvre, Matthieu. Anne Du Bourg, Conseiller au Parlement de Paris et Martyr (1520– 1559). Toulouse: A. Chauvin et Fils, 1903. Locker, Jesse M., ed. Art and Reform in the Late Renaissance: After Trent. New York: Routledge, 2018. Lo Re, Salvatore. “Ambrogio Catarino Politi e alcuni retroscena delle sue controversie (in margine al Processo Morone).” Eretici esuli e indemoniati nell’età moderna. Edited by Mario Rosa, 13–60. Firenze: Olschki, 1998. McCracken, Peggy. “Miracles, Mimesis, and the Efficacy of Images.” Yale French Studies 110 (2006): 47–58. Mercati, Giovanni. “Per la storia del codice vaticano dei ‘Libri Carolini’” (1921). In idem, Opere minori, 4:134–42. Studi e testi 79. Rome: Biblioteca Vaticana, 1937. Mitalaïté, Kristina. Philosophie et théologie de l’image dans les Libri Carolini. Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2007. Motta, Franco. Bellarmino. Una teologia politica della Controriforma. Brescia: Morcelliana, 2005. Mozzato, Pietro. Jacopo Nacchianti: un vescovo riformatore (Chioggia 1544–1569). Chioggia: Edizioni Nuova Scintilla, 1993. Nagel, Alexander. The Controversy of Renaissance Art. Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Noble, Thomas F.X. Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Novaes, Catarina Dutilh. “Medieval Theories of Consequence.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2016 Edition. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, at . Noyes, Ruth S. “Aut numquid post annos mille quingentos docenda est Ecclesia Catholica quomodo sacrae imagines pingantur? Post-Tridentine Image Reform and the Myth of Gabriele Paleotti.” Catholic Historical Review 99/2 (2013): 239–61. O’Malley, John W. “Trent, Sacred Images, and Catholics’ Senses of the Sensuous.” In The Sensuous in the Counter-Reformation Church. Edited by Marcia B. Hall and Tracy E. Cooper, 28–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

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O’Malley, John W. Trent: What Happened at the Council. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. Paschini, Pio. “Guglielmo Sirleto prima del cardinalato.” In idem, Tre ricerche sulla storia della Chiesa nel Cinquecento, 155–81. Roma: Edizioni liturgiche, 1945. Paschini, Pio. “Un cardinale editore: Marcello Cervini.” In Miscellanea di scritti di bibliografia ed erudizione in memoria di Luigi Ferrari, 383–413. Firenze: Olschki, 1952. Paulus, Nikolaus. Die deutschen Dominikaner im Kampfe gegen Luther (1518–1563). Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1903. Payton, Jr., James R. “Calvin and the Libri Carolini.” Sixteenth Century Journal 28, 2 (1997): 467–80. Piacentini, Paola. La biblioteca di Marcello II Cervini. Una ricostruzione dalle carte di Jeanne Bignami Odier. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2001. Pöltner, Günther. “Der Begriff des Bildes bei Thomas von Aquin.” In Bilder der Philosophie. Reflexionen über das Bildliche und die Phantasie. Edited by Richard Heinrich and Helmuth Vetter, 176–99. Vienna-Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991. Prodi, Paolo. “Ricerche sulla teorica delle arti figurative nella riforma cattolica.” Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà 4 (1965), 121–212. Prodi, Paolo. Arte e pietà nella Chiesa Tridentina. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014. Prosperi, Adriano. “Cultura popolare e cultura d’élite” (1995). In idem, America e Apocalisse e altri saggi, 283–305. Pisa: Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1999. Prosperi, Adriano. “Il problema storico nelle polemiche sulla santità” (1991). Ibid., 321–41. Prosperi, Adriano. “Tra mistici e pittori: Vittoria Colonna” (1997). Ibid., 367–79. Prosperi, Adriano. Il Concilio di Trento: Una introduzione storica. Turin: Einaudi, 2000. Prosperi, Adriano. “Tra venerazione e iconoclastia. Le immagini a soggetto religioso tra Quattrocento e Cinquecento” (2000). In idem, Eresie e devozioni. La religione italiana in età moderna, 3 vols., 3:307–34. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010. Quaranta, Chiara. Marcello II Cervini, 1501–1555. Riforma della Chiesa, concilio, Inquisizione. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010. Rabe, Horst. Reichsbund und Interim. Die Verfassungs- und Religionspolitik Karls V. under der Reichstag von Augsburg 1547/48. Cologne-Vienna: Böhlau, 1971. Rabe, Horst. “Zur Entstehung des Augsburger Interims 1547/48.” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte / Archive for Reformation History 94 (2003): 6–104. Royt, Jan. “The Mining Town of Jáchymov: Reformation and Art.” Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice 5, 2 (2005): 305–12. Russo, Francesco. “La biblioteca del Card. Sirleto.” In Il Card. Guglielmo Sirleto [1514– 1585]. Atti del convegno di studio nel IV Centenario della morte, 5–7 ottobre 1986. Edited by Leonardo Calabretta and G. Sinatora, 219–99. Catanzaro-Squillace: Istituto di scienze religiose, 1989.

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Salviucci Insolera, Lydia. “Laínez e l’arte. All’origine della concezione dell’arte nella Compagnia di Gesù.” In Diego Laínez (1512–1565) and his Generalate: Jesuit with Jewish Roots, Close Confidant of Ignatius of Loyola, Preeminent Theologian of the Council of Trent. Edited by Paul Oberholzer, 565–92. Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2015. Salviucci Insolera, Lydia. “La formulazione del Decreto sulle immagini nei manoscritti di P. Diego Laínez.” In Immagini e Arte Sacra nel Concilio di Trento. “Per istruire, ricordare, meditare e trarne frutto.” Edited by Lydia Salviucci Insolera, 101–18. Rome: Artemide, 2016. Scaduto, Mario. Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia, vol. 3, L’epoca di Giacomo Laínez. L’azione, 1556–1565. Roma: Edizioni La Civiltà Cattolica, 1974. Scavizzi, Giuseppe. “La teologia cattolica e le immagini durante il XVI secolo.” Storia dell’arte 21 (1974): 171–213. Scavizzi, Giuseppe. Arte e architettura sacra: cronache e documenti sulla controversia tra riformati e cattolici (1500–1550). Reggio Calabria: Casa del libro editrice, 1981. Scavizzi, Giuseppe. “Storia ecclesiastica e arte nel secondo Cinquecento.” Storia dell’arte 59 (1987): 29–46. Scavizzi, Giuseppe. The Controversy on Images from Calvin to Baronius. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. Schmidt, R.W. The Domain of Logic according to St. Thomas Aquinas. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Schmitt, Jean-Claude. Le corps des images. Essais sur la culture visuelle au Moyen Âge. Paris: Gallimard, 2002. Schneeman, Gerardus. Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus. Freiburg i. Breisgau: Herder, 1881. Schwarz, Rudolf. Die hugenottischen Märtyrer von Lyon und Johannes Calvin. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1913. Schweitzer, Vinzenz. “Zur Geschichte der Reform unter Julius III.” Fünf Vorträge von der Paderborner Generalversammlung. Drittes Vereinsschrift der Görresgesellschaft, 51–66. Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1907. Schweizer, Josef. Ambrosius Catharinus Politus (1484–1553). Sein Leben und seine Schriften. Munster: Aschendorff, 1910. Scribner, Bob, ed. Bilder und Bildersturm im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990. Seidel Menchi, Silvana. Erasmo in Italia 1520–1580. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1987. Selmi, Elisabetta. “Un contributo per la teoresi delle ‘immagini sacre’ nella trattatistica figurativa del Cinquecento.” In Visibile teologia. Il libro sacro figurato in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento. Edited by Erminia Ardissino and Elisabetta Selmi, 285–308. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012.

Selected Bibliography

405

Smith, Robin. “Aristotle’s Logic.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2020 Edition. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2020/entries/aristotle-logic. Speck, Paul. Ich bin’s nicht, Kaiser Konstantin ist es gewesen. Die Legenden vom Einfluss des Teufels, des Juden und des Moslem auf den Ikonoklasmus. Bonn: Habelt, 1990. Steinemann, Holger. Eine Bildtheorie zwischen Repräsentation und Wirkung. Kardinal Gabriele Paleottis “Discorso intorno alle imagini sacre e profane” (1582). HildesheimZürich-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006. Tallon, Alain. La France et le Concile de Trente (1518–1563) (1997). 2nd ed. Rome: École française de Rome, 2017. Tallon, Alain. “Ory, Matthieu,” DSI 2:1148–49. Tallon, Alain, ed. Un autre catholicisme au temps des réformes? Claude d’Espence et la théologie humaniste à Paris aux XVIe siècle. Turnhout: Brepols, 2010. Thiessen, Gesa Elsbeth. “Not So Unorthodox: A Reevaluation of Tricephalous Images of the Trinity.” Theological Studies 79, 2 (2018), 399–426. Truc, Gonzague. “Calvin et les cinq prisonniers de Lyon.” Revue des études historiques 26 (1920): 43–54. Utheman, K.-H. “Severian von Gabale in Florilegien zum Bilderkult.” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 66 (2000): 5–47. Van Veen, Mirjam G.K. “‘… les sainctz Martyrs …’ Die Korrespondenz Calvins mit fünf Studenten aus Lausanne über das Martyrium (1552).” In Calvin im Kontext der Schweizer Reformation. Historische und theologische Beiträge zur Calvinforschung. Edited by Peter Opitz, 127–45. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2003. Willis-Watkins, David. The Second Commandment and Church Reform. The Colloquy of St. Germain-en-Laye, 1562. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1994. Wirth, Jean. “Les scolastiques et l’image.” In La pensée de l’image. Signification et figuration dans le texte et dans la peinture. Ed. Gisèle Matthieu-Castellani, 19–30. Vincennes: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1994. Wirth, Jean. “Structure et fonctions de l’image chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin.” In L’image. Fonctions et usages des images dans l’Occident médiéval. Edited by Jérôme Baschet and Jean-Claude Schmitt, 39–57. Paris: Le Léopard d’Or, 1996. Wirth, Jean. “Peinture et perception visuelle au XIIIe siècle.” In La visione e lo sguardo nel Medio Evo II, special issue of Micrologus. Natura, scienze e società medievali 6 (1998): 113–28. Wirth, Jean. “La critique scolastique de la théorie thomiste de l’image.” In Crises de l’image religieuse. De Nicée II à Vatican II / Krisen religiöser Kunst. Vom 2. Niceanum bis zum 2. Vatikanischen Konzil. Edited by Olivier Christin and Dario Gamboni, 93–109. Paris: Les Editions de la Maison des Science de l’Homme, 1999. Wirth, Jean. L’image à l’époque gothique (1140–1280). Paris, Cerf, 2008.

406

Selected Bibliography

Zachmann, Randall C. Image and Word in the Theology of John Calvin. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. Zardin, Danilo. “Le ‘Adnotationes et meditationes’ illustrate di Nadal sui Vangeli del ciclo liturgico: il modello e il riuso.” In Visibile teologia. Il libro figurato in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento. Edited by Erminia Ardissino and Elisabetta Selmi, 3–23. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012. Zierholz, Steffen. “‘To Make Yourself Present’: Jesuit Sacred Space as Enargetic Space.” In Jesuit Image Theory, edited by Wietse de Boer, Walter S. Melion, and Karl Enenkel, 419–60. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016. Zierholz, Steffen. Räume der Reform. Kunst und Lebenskunst der Jesuiten in Rom, 1580– 1700. Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2019.

Index of Bible References References are based on the Vulgate and the Douay-Rheims versions. Old Testament 28, 37, 39, 52–53, 61, 66, 72–73, 99, 128, 208–15, 266–67, 282–87 Genesis Gen. 2 Gen. 3:16 Gen. 18:3 Gen. 28:16–17

83n.58 116, 354–55 264–65 129

Exodus Exod. 3:6 Exod. 8 Exod. 20 Exod. 20:1–5 Exod. 20:8 Exod. 20:23 Exod. 20:24–26 Exod. 24:3 Exod. 32:8 Exod. 36:1 Exod. 37:1–9

264–65 83n.58 16, 212–13, 284–85 208–13, 286–87, 296–99, 310–11 286–87 138–39 211n.5, 286–87 264–65 218–19 297n.2 297n.2

Leviticus Lev. 7:26–27 Lev. 17:10–14 Lev. 18:5 Lev. 26:1

211n.5 211n.5 288–89 298–99

Numbers Num. 11:16 Num. 21:8–9

368–69 210–11, 297n.2, 307–08, 366–67

Deuteronomy Deut. 4:15–19 Deut. 5:1 Deut. 5:8–9 Deut. 6:13

290–91, 298–99 212–13 138–39, 208–09, 212–13, 298–99 318–19, 345–46

1 Kings (1 Samuel) 1 Sam. 13:19

192–93

2 Kings (2 Samuel) 2 Sam. 6:14, 16, 23

342–43

3 Kings 3 Kings 7:29

297n.2

4 Kings 4 Kings 18:4

166–67, 307–08, 368–69

Psalms Ps. 90:7 Ps. 96 Ps. 113:12 (4) Ps. 115:10

196–97 310n.8 178–79, 264–65 63

Proverbs Prov. 9:7–8 Prov. 10:1 Prov. 18:17 Prov. 21:30 Prov. 26:5

344n.34, 345n.27 344n.34, 345n.27 70 194–95 192–93

Canticle of Canticles (Song of Solomon) Song of Sol. 3:7–9 194–95 196–97 Song of Sol. 4:4 Habakkuk 290–91 Isaiah Isa. 6:1–3 Isa. 11:9 Isa. 40:18 Isa. 42:8 Isa. 46:5

208–09, 266–67 218–19 216–17, 302–03 218–19 290–91

Jeremiah 290–91 Daniel Dan. 7:9

208–09, 302–05

Malachias Mal. 3:6

304–05

408

Index of Bible References

New Testament 28, 61, 66, 72, 100, 208–13, 282–87, 294–95 Matthew Matt. 4:10 Matt. 7:5 Matt. 9:20–22 Matt. 19:17 Matt. 22:37 Matt. 22:39 Matt. 23:22 Matt. 28:20

318–19, 345–46 70 312–13 288–89 211n.7 288–89 372–73 346–47

Mark Mark 5:25–34 Mark 12:30

312–13 211n.7

Luke Luke 4:8 Luke 8:43–48 Luke 10:27

318–19, 345–46 312–13 211n.7

John John 4:1 John 4:23–24 John 5:39 John 13:34 John 14:9

1 Corinthians 1 Cor. 1:25 1 Cor. 10:4 1 Cor. 10:14 1 Cor. 13:12

260–61 336–37 208–09, 210–11 230–31

2 Corinthians 2 Cor. 4:13

63

Galatians Gal. 3:12 Gal. 3:19 Gal. 5:18 Ephesians Eph. 6:1–2

288–89 266–67 288–89 288–89

1 Timothy 1 Tim. 2:5–6

370–71

174n. 72, 294–95, 332–33 64 212–13 246–47

Titus Titus 1:9

190–91

Acts of the Apostles Acts 6:10 Acts 7:53 Acts 17:23–29 302–03

1 John 1 John 2:7 1 John 5:21

212–13 64, 208–11, 294–95

192–93 266–67 178–79, 292–93,

Jude Jude 10

190–91

Romans Rom. 1:21–23 Rom. 1:25 Rom. 8:15 Rom. 13:8–9

79, 121 10, 64, 83–84, 206–07, 216–17, 294–95, 366–67 294–95 210–11 288–89

Apocalypse Apoc. 1:9–20 Apoc. 1:13 Apoc. 1:17

284–85 266–67 266–67

Index of Names and Subjects Abgar 146–47 Abraham (patriarch) 148–50, 216–17, 264–65, 284–85, 306–07, 332n.24 abuses 6–7, 15, 19, 37, 47, 70–71, 77–79, 85, 94, 100–01, 103–04, 107, 110, 112–16, 130, 352–57, 360–61, 368–69, 372–77, 381–82, 387–91 Adam 286–87, 290–91, 312–13, 366–67 Agatho, Pope 154–55 Agricola, Johannes 34 Agrippa II, Marcus Julius 147–48 Albertus Magnus 17 Alexander of Hales 17, 127 Alexander Severus 148–50 altars 37, 77, 94, 95n.23, 103n.42, 120, 126, 132, 178–79, 210–11, 286–87, 346–47 Alvarez, Melchor 109n.62 Anastasius Bibliothecarius 26, 122n.86, 123n.88, 123n.89, 144nn.10–11, 156n.24, 383n. Anastatius of Theopolis 346n.35 angels 31, 39, 98, 110, 162–63, 168–69, 216–17, 264–67, 304–07, 314–15, 330–31, 340–43, 360–61, 383 Antoninus of Florence  114 Aristotle 10–12, 14, 39–40, 50, 52, 54–55, 57, 74, 84, 127, 136–37, 148–49, 170–73, 190–91, 200–201, 204–05, 222–23, 226– 27, 230–31, 234–35, 248–51, 269–70, 278–79, 322–23, 326–27, 362–65 Athanasius of Alexandria 146–49, 312–13, 336–37, 360–61 Augsburg Interim 34–36, 39, 107, 116n.80 Augustine of Hippo 16, 41–42, 65n.34, 174–79, 192–95, 210–11, 264–65, 290–91, 294–95, 310–11, 380 Bacchus 365–66 Báñez, Domingo 128 baptism 63n.30, 69, 92, 100, 154–55, 184–85, 360–61 Baronio, Cesare 144n.10  Bartolomeo della Pergola see Pergola, Bartolomeo

Basil of Caesarea 11–12, 37, 127, 140–41, 152–53, 312–13 Bellarmino, Roberto 126–28 Benedict XIV, Pope (Prospero Lorenzo Lambertini) 115n. Bèze, Théodore de 95–96 Blado, Antonio 69 Bonaventure 17, 127, 302n. Borromeo, Carlo 27n.49, 102, 103n.42, 104n.47, 105n.49, 107, 119, 130 Borromeo, Federico 145n.5 Brully, Pierre 65n.35 Bruni, Antonio 82n.54 Bullinger, Heinrich 15, 329n.19 Cajetan, Cardinal (Tommaso de Vio) 68, 75–76, 127, 129, 248n.42, 326–27, 350–51  Calini, Muzio 106n.56 Calvin, John 9n.12, 26n.47, 32, 61–66, 84, 86, 165n.24, 282–95 Calvinism 19, 66–67, 72n.44, 90 Campeggi, Tommaso 104 Carafa, Gian Pietro 20–22, 27, 70, 87   See also Paul IV, Pope Carranza, Bartolomé de 25, 33, 156n.25 Catarino Politi, Ambrogio 8, 14n.21, 15, 19–20, 31, 33n.1, 40, 66–79, 87, 96, 101, 115, 116n.80, 119–21, 127–29, 296–357 censorship 26, 69, 130 Catherine de Médicis, Queen and Regent  87, 94, 102–03   Cervini, Marcello (Card. of Santa Croce; Pope Marcellus II) 8, 21–22, 23–28, 30–31, 44, 47, 50n., 51, 60, 68, 74, 79, 82, 87, 126, 156n.25, 188–89 Charlemagne 164–65, 372–73, 383, 386 Charles V, Emperor 32–34, 39 Châtillon, Odet de 94 cherubim 140–41, 210–11, 284–85, 292–93, 296–97, 300–03 Chrysostom, John 312–13, 344–45, 348–49, 360–61, 380 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 304–06, 329n.18 Ciocchi del Monte, Giovanni Maria see Julius III

410 Cyrillus of Alexandria  176–77 Clichthove, Josse 72n.44 Cochlaeus, Johann 16, 72n.44 Colloquy of Poissy 94, 102 Colloquy of St. Germain 27n.49, 88, 94–96, 100–02, 103n.42, 109, 112n.68, 120, 126, 128, 379n.1 Colonna, Vittoria 67 Comanini, Gregorio 127–28 Commandment, Second (First) 10, 61, 66, 73, 177, 264–65, 290–91, 328–29, 368–69 Commandments, Ten 61, 210–13, 282–91, 296–97, 310–11 confession, sacramental 63 Constantine I, Emperor 37–38, 148–49, 150–51, 164–65, 168–69, 360–61 Constantine I, Pope 154–55 Constantine IV, Emperor 154–55 Constantine V, Emperor 158–59, 358–59 Constantine VI, Emperor 160–61, 358–59 Council, Fourth Lateran 13 Council of Chalcedon 154–55 Council of Constantinople, Third (Sixth Ecumenical Council) 25, 33, 42, 113, 141–42, 143n.2, 145n.4, 154–57, 184–85, 270n.62, 271n.27, 314–15, 370–71, 384 cf. also Quinisext Council Council of Ephesus 176–77 Council of Frankfurt 38, 113, 164–65, 372–73, 386 Council of Nicaea, Second (Seventh Ecumenical Council) 6, 11, 13, 15, 23, 25–26, 31–33, 37–38, 42, 58–59, 69n.40, 73–74, 79, 84, 88–89, 104, 111, 113–14, 117, 118n., 119, 121–23, 127–28, 140n.6, 142nn.9–10, 143nn.2–3, 144nn.11–12, 144–45, 148n.18, 149n.7, 150nn.17–18, 151nn.10–11, 152–53, 156–57, 158n.27, 160–65, 168–69, 184–85, 204–05, 268–69, 272–73, 314–15, 333–34, 336n.25, 338–41, 349n.29, 358–59, 360n.6, 360n.8, 361n.1, 361n.3, 370–73, 379, 383–85 Council of Sens (1527) 88, 116 Council of Trent 5–9, 15, 19–21, 24–25, 30, 33–36, 50n., 51, 68–71, 73–74, 79–80, 82,

Index of Names and Subjects 87–90, 93–94, 100–01, 102–24, 125–26, 128–30, 156n.25, 370–77, 379–91 Council, Quinisext see Quinisext Council Crabbe, Petrus 25n.43, 26, 69n.40, 74, 113nn.72–73, 123, 340n.27, 340n.29, 342n.30 Crespin, Jean 61–65, 90n.10, 282n. cross 30–31, 59, 73, 75, 92, 106, 122, 144–45, 158–63, 170–71, 182–85, 204–05, 220–21, 268–73, 320–21, 328–29, 332–35, 338–39, 340–41, 346–51, 356–57, 360–61, 374–77 Damascene see John of Damascus Daniel (prophet) 302–05 and see Index of Bible References David 196–97, 306–09, 342–43 Decalogue see Commandments, Ten Del Bene, Bernardo 44, 218–19 Del Monte, Giovanni Maria Ciocchi see Julius III, Pope De Vio, Tommaso see Cajetan, Cardinal Di Capua, Pietro Antonio 21 Dionysius the Areopagite 306–07 Dolet, Etienne 43 Du Bourg, Anne 90–91, 93 dulia 11, 17, 40, 53, 84, 89, 101, 111, 125, 364–65 Duns Scotus, John 17 Durand de St. Pourçain 14, 75, 322–23, 350n.43 Dymonet, Matthieu 61–65 Eck, Johann 16 Elipandus of Toledo 145n.6, 165n.23 Eliseo, Tommaso 89, 91–92, 101 Emser, Hieronymus 16, 313n.4 Epiphanius, deacon 156n.24, 340–45, 348–49 Epiphanius of Salamis  168–69, 344–45 Erasmus, Desiderius 15–19, 60–61, 72, 140n.7, 328–31, 342–43, 354–55 Espence, Claude d’ 95–96 Este, Ippolito d’ 95–96 Eucharist 20, 57, 69, 72, 81–82, 94, 100, 102, 132, 260–61 Eusebius of Caesarea 16, 37, 83, 148–51, 312–13, 360–61

411

Index of Names and Subjects Eve 116–17 extreme unction 20   Farnese, Alessandro see Paul III, Pope Fauré, Charles 65 Feliciani 39, 144–45, 154–55, 164–65, 170–71 Felix of Urgell 145n.6, 155n.17, 165n.23 Foscarari, Egidio 108n.60 Fra Bartolommeo 114 Francis I, King 43 Francisco de Navarra y Hualde 20 Gaddi, Niccolò 72n.43 Gamaliel 146–47, 312–13 Gennadius of Constantinople 152–53 Germanus of Constantinople 142n.10, 143n.3, 152n.20, 153n.12 Ghislieri, Michele (Pope Pius V) 80 Giberti, Gian Matteo 27 Gilio, Giovanni Andrea 6–7, 109n.61 Giustiniani, Vincenzo 89n.3, 90n.12 Gnaphaeus, Petrus (Fullo) 154–55 Gonzaga, Ercole 90 gospels 52, 59, 122, 127, 160–63, 184–85, 260–61, 272–75, 284–87, 340–41 grace 36, 65, 67, 69, 100, 128, 156–57, 194–95, 202–03, 206–09, 212–13, 242–43, 284–87, 300–301 Gratian  155–56 Gregory (iconoclast) 348–49 Gregory I, Pope 16, 37, 39, 41, 59, 78, 94, 140–41, 142n.8, 154–55, 180–83, 270–71, 314–23, 336–39, 344–45, 352–53, 358–59, 379 Gregory II, Pope 142–43 Gregory III, Pope 113, 158–59, 358–59, 372–73, 383, 386 Gregory of Nyssa 332–33 Gregory of Rimini 172–73, 180–83, 270–71, 314–23 Grimani, Giovanni 20 Grisonio, Annibale 81 Guerrero, Pedro 108n.60 Guise, Charles de (Cardinal of Lorraine) 87, 90, 102, 104–05, 107–08, 110, 113  Hadrian I, Pope 128, 156n.25, 160–61, 360–61, 372–73, 383

Hebrews 28, 52–53, 73, 302–03, 306–07 Helding, Michael 34 Helena, mother of Constantine I 320–21 Henry II, King of France 43  Henry of Ghent 14–15, 17, 75, 322–23 Hercules 365–66 Heresy 8, 15, 17n.28, 19, 21, 27, 43–44, 63, 66–68, 70, 80, 87, 89–90, 128, 155, 165, 329, 355, 359 anti-heresy literature 8, 44, 71, 89, heretical books 24, 27, 33, 81, 165, 195, 197, 297 heretical offenses 21, 23 heretics 17, 19, 23, 30, 39, 42, 60, 68, 71, 80, 93, 99n.34, 103, 143, 145, 163, 313, 315, 321n.12, 349, 361, 369, 371, 373 Hervet, Gentien 24–25, 31, 156n.25 Hezekiah, King 166–67, 306–09  Holkot, Robert  75, 322–23 Holy Office 8, 20–21, 23, 26–27, 68, 70, 82, 89, 124 Hosius, Stanislaus 90, 118–19, 121, 123 Hus, Jan 15, 42 hyperdulia 40, 84, 89, 125, 350–51, 364–65 iconoclasm 15–16, 30, 39, 66, 72, 87, 89, 102, 147, 161, 169, 171, in Byzantium 4n.4, 9, 15, 25, 39, 113, 349 Carolingian response to 38, 41, 113, 165, 373 idolatry 4, 8, 12, 13, 15, 30, 39, 41, 42, 52, 53, 57–58, 61, 64, 65, 66, 72, 77, 78, 85, 86, 89, 91, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 123, 129–30, 138–39, 146–47, 210–11, 214–15, 284–85, 292–95, 298–303, 306–13, 316–17, 328–29, 330–31, 366–71, 379, 385 Ignatius of Loyola 43, 68, 73, 93 immaculate conception of Virgin Mary  68–69, 78, 340–41 indulgences 20, 22, 94, 103–08, 110, 119 Inquisition, Roman 8, 20–21, 23, 26–27, 68, 70, 82, 89, 124, 128 Irene of Athens, Empress consort and regent 160–61, 358–59 Isaac (patriarch) 264–65 Jacob (patriarch) 92, 128–29, 264–65 James (apostle) 146–47, 290–91, 312–13, 360–61

412 Jews 39, 146–47, 158–59, 192–93, 208–11, 214–15, 288–89, 292–95, 296–303, 308–09, 312–13 John (evangelist) 266–67 and see Index of Bible References John of Damascus 11, 16, 27, 30, 37, 42, 98, 100, 146–47, 168–69, 176–77, 184–85, 272–73, 302–03, 312, 315, 330–31, 360–61 Jonas of Orléans 26–27, 50n. Joseph, patriarch 92 judaizing 53, 66, 210–13, 284–87 Julian the Apostate 150–51, 192–93 Julius III, Pope (Giovanni Maria Ciocchi Del Monte) 8, 21–22, 31, 44, 68–70, 77, 79, 82, 87, 89 justification 22, 33–34, 36, 67, 72–73, 81, 102 Justinian II, Emperor 154–55 Karlstadt, Andreas Bodenstein 15, 361 Kuehn-Belasi, Johann Jakob 90n.12 Lactantius 294–95 Laínez, Diego 93–101, 105, 108n.60, 118, 120, 126, 128–29 Lange, Johann 154n.22 Langerak, Gijsbert van see Longolius, Gilbertus latria 10–11, 14, 17–18, 40–41, 53, 59, 74–76, 84, 89, 91, 101, 111, 122, 125, 127–28, 132, 156n.24, 160–63, 170–71, 176–77, 184–85, 220–21, 260–61, 264–69, 272–75, 310–11, 322–29, 332–51, 364–65, 384 lechery 30, 78, 354–55, 376–77 Leo v, Emperor 152–53 Leo III, Emperor 158–59, 358–59 Leo IV, Emperor 160–61, 358–59  Lippomano, Luigi (Alvise) 27–28, 30–31, 150n.17, 320n.16, 321n.12,   Longolius, Gilbertus (Gijsbert van Langerak) 26, 38, 69n.40, 74, 122–23, 140n.6, 142n.10, 148n.14, 149n.7, 156n.24, 164n.30, 340n.29, 341n.22, 341n.24, 383 Lorraine, Cardinal of see Guise, Charles de Luke (evangelist) 148–49, 292–93, 312–13, 360–61 see also Index of Bible References Luna, Count of (Claudio Fernández de Quiñones) 107–08 Luther, Martin 34, 67, 72 

Index of Names and Subjects Madruzzo, Ludovico 108 Maffei, Bernardino 21 Maiorano, Niccolò 27–28, 31 Manichaeans 39, 142–45 Marangon, Giuseppe 81 Marcellus II, Pope 22 See also Cervini, Marcello Marcionites 142–43, 358–59 Marini, Leonardo 107, 108n.60, 118, 120 Marot, Clément 43n.14 Mártires, Bartolomeu dos 108n.60 Mass 36, 105 Massarelli, Angelo 80, 90 matrimony 69, 105, 112 Medici, Giovan Angelo see Pius IV, Pope Médicis, Catherine de see Catherine de Médicis Medina, Juan de 33 Mendoza, Diego de 25, 33 Mendoça, Pedro Gonçalez de 110n.64  Menez de Sylva, Amadeus 3 Mercury 13 miracles 3, 72, 94, 111n.65, 146–47, 152–53, 160–61, 372–73, 375–77 Molanus, Johannes 6, 115n. Molina, Luis de 128 Monier, Claude 65 Monothelites 154–55 More, Thomas 29 Morone, Giovanni 21, 104–05, 107–09, 113, 118n., 119 Moses 139, 141, 264–67, 286–89, 292–93, 296–97, 306–09, 366–69 Nacchianti, Iacopo 8, 19–20, 23, 31, 79–85, 87, 89, 108n.60, 120–21, 148n.14, 149n.7, 358–69 Nadal, Jerónimo 126 Navagero, Bernardo 119n.82 Navihères, Pierre 65 Nero 148–49 Neudorfer, Georg 16 Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulus  152–55 Nicodemus 146–47, 312–13, 360–61 Nilus, St. 144–45 Ninguarda, Feliciano 89n.3, 90–93, 99, 101, 126, 129 Nogueras, Diego Gilberto 109n.62

Index of Names and Subjects Ochino, Bernardino 20, 67–68 Ockham, William 14 Olympiodorus, proconsul 144–45 Ory, Matthieu 8, 9n.12, 15, 19, 30–31, 33n.1, 40, 43–66, 71, 73–77, 79, 84, 86–87, 89, 96–97, 99, 112n.70, 119–21, 125, 188–295 Paleotti, Gabriele 6–7, 109n.6, 125–26, 127n.98, 130 Pallavicino, Sforza 109n.62, 110n.64, 112 Paul of Samosata 176n.35 Paul, apostle 37, 65, 146–51, 180–81, 360–61 and see Index of Bible References Paul III, Pope (Alessandro Farnese) 21, 43, 80, 82 Paul IV, Pope 22, 27, 87   see also Carafa, Gian Pietro Pelargus, Ambrosius 16 Peloquin, Denis 61, 62nn.28–29, 65 penance, sacrament of 20, 50–51, 69, 72, 375 Pépin, Guillaume 72n.44 Pérez de Ayala, Martín 8, 15, 19, 31, 32–43, 44, 47, 50, 53–60, 66, 71, 74–77, 85–87, 89, 96–97, 108n.60, 113, 117, 119–21, 127–28, 136–87, 196–99, 218–21, 228–29, 240–41, 244–45, 250–51, 254–59, 268n.60, 269n.26, 270–75, 278–79, 301n.3, 344n.34, 360n.6, 360n.8, 361n.1, 361n.3, 362n., 363n., 373n. Pergola, Bartolomeo Golfi della 23 Peter of Nicomedia 146–47 Pflug, Julius von 34 Philip II of Spain 35 Photinus 176n.35 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 15 Pighius, Albertus 72n.44 pilgrimage 103, 105 Pio di Carpi, Alberto 16–19, 77n., 78n.51 Pius IV, Pope (Giovan Angelo Medici) 87, 94, 103n.42, 108 Pius v, Pope (Michele Ghislieri) 80, 130 Platina (Bartolomeo Sacchi) 78, 352–53, 358–59 Plato 190–91 Podocataro, Livio 27 Poissy see Colloquy of Poissy Pole, Reginald 21, 67 Politi see Catarino Politi, Ambrogio Pontormo (Jacopo Carucci) 114

413 Porphyry 33 Proclus the Montanist 148–49 purgatory 20, 22, 36, 63, 94, 104–05, 107–08, 110, 118, 119n.82 Quinisext Council 25n.43, 142n.9, 143n.2, 156n.25, 158n.26 Rabelais, François 43n.14 relics 5, 13, 22, 31, 36, 88, 91, 93, 102–03, 105, 109–10, 113–14, 119n.82, 162–63, 344–45, 370–77, 380, 385–86, 388, 390 Renée de France 43 Rodríguez, Antonio da San Michele 109n.62 sabbath 210–12, 214–15, 286–87, 290–91 Sacchi, Bartolomeo see Platina Sack of Rome 16 saints cult of 3–4, 17, 19–20, 22–23, 30–31, 36, 65, 71–74, 79, 81–82, 88, 90, 104–05, 107–08, 111–13, 127 invocation of 5, 15–16, 20, 22, 63–64, 88, 90, 93, 100–02, 105, 107, 109–10, 113, 334–35, 370–71, 374–75, 381, 384–85, 389 Salmerón, Alfonso 68, 93–94, 105, 107 Sanders, Nicholas 128n.102 Santi di Tito 130–32 Saracenes 39, 158–59 Saraceni, Giovanni Michele 89 Sarpi, Paolo 73n.47, 109n.61, 118–21, 123 Sarto, Andrea del 114–15 Schatzgeyer, Kaspar 72n.44 Schmalkaldic War 34 Scotti, Giovan Battista 68 Secundinus 180n.39, 181n.35, 270n.64 Serenus of Marseille 140–42, 180n.39, 314–17, 358–59 Seripando, Girolamo 90 Servetus, Michael 43 Seth, son of Adam 312–13 Severus, Emperor 148–49 Simon (apostle) 146–47 Simonetta, Lodovico 90 Sirleto, Guglielmo 19n.31, 24–25, 27, 31, 119, 122n.86 Solaerius, Antonius 72n.44 Soranzo, Vittore 21

414 Soto, Domingo de 68, 73 Spini, Bartolommeo 68 spirituali 20, 67, 87 St. Germain Edict of 94 see also Colloquy of St. Germain St. Pourçain, Durand de see Durand de St. Pourçain Strabo 83 Suárez, Francisco 177n.34 superstition 37, 39, 50, 59, 65n.34, 72, 83, 103–04, 123, 129, 138–39, 158–59, 186– 87, 308–09, 328–29, 342–43, 360–61, 365–66, 368–69, 374–75, 379, 381, 389 Surius, Laurentius 150n.17 Sylvester I, Pope 37, 150–51, 360–61 Synod of Elvira 166–67 Synod of Ephesus 176–77 Synod of Rome 113, 158–59, 372–73 Tarasius of Constantinople 156n.25 Thomas Aquinas critics of 14–15, 76, 128   image theory 9–15, 17–18, 41, 74, 76, 132, 173, 210n.12, 225n., 248n. 39, 248n.41, 273n.32, 325n., 327, 335, 339, 343, 348–51   Thomists 76, 87, 89   vision of 130–32

Index of Names and Subjects Tillet, Jean du 26n.27, 158n.56 Titus, Emperor 146–47, 148n.14, 149n.7 Tomeo, Niccolò Leonico 364n.12 tricephalous deity 114, 115n., 374–75   See also Trinity Trinity, the 12, 83, 100, 112, 200–01, 314–15, 320–21 representation of 114–15, 184–85, 216–17, 264–65, 304–05, 330–31, 360–61, 374–75, 380 See also tricephalous deity Urban VIII, Pope (Maffeo Barberini) 115n. Valdés, Juan 67 Varietas temporum (bull) 22–23 Vásquez, Gabriel 128–29 Venantius Fortunatus 268n.58 Vergerio, Pier Paolo 20, 103 Visconti, Carlo 104n.47, 105n.49 Vitoria, Francisco de 33 Waldensians 358, 361 Zacheus (apostle) 146–47 Zeno 200–201 Zini, Pier Francesco 27–31, 116n.80 Zwingli, Huldrych 15, 72