Aristotle’S Conception of Moral Weakness 9780231878562

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Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness

Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness

James Jerome

Walsh

Columbia University Press New York and London 1963

The Stanwood Cockey Lodge

Foundation

has generously provided funds toward the cost of publication of this work.

Copyright © 1960 Columbia University Press First published in book form 1963 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-17695 Manufactured in the United States of America

To my

Mother

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many debts of gratitude which I wish to record. This study was completed during time made available for research through grants by the Ford Foundation, the Samuel S. Fels Foundation, and Columbia University. Publication has been made possible through the generosity of the Stanwood Cockey Lodge Foundation. I can only hope t h a t such consistent and generous support is justified in some degree by this study. To my teachers and colleagues I owe more than the usual gratitude of the scholar. Professor James Gutmann and Professor Robert Cumming provided stimulus and encouragement over a considerable period of formless endeavor. Professor Albert Hofstadter helped me through the difficulties of making a beginning and provided thorough criticism, not all of it heeded, at the end. Professor Charles Kahn, Professor Paul Kristeller, and Dr. Emerson Buchanan read all or part of an earlier version of the manuscript and saved me from not a few mistakes of interpretation. My debts to Professor John H. Randall, Jr. and Professor Edwin Garlan are of a different order. I owe to them not only a first meeting with the wisdom of Aristotle, but also many hours of fruitful instruction and precious controversy as to his meaning. I should also like to thank Arlene Gutzeit for devotion beyond the call of duty in typing the manuscript twice over, and Joan Teitel of the Columbia University Press for a considerable improvement of a wordy and laborious style. The passages from Cornford's translation of the Timaeus are used by permission of the Humanities Press. Passages from the Loeb Classical Library, including Xenophon's Memorabilia, Plato's Protagoras, Phaedo, Laws, Laches, Meno, Republic, and Sophist, and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and De Anima are reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press and The Loeb Classical Library.

Vili

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the help of my wife, not only for the labors of all scholars' wives in coping with the mechanics of manuscripts, but also for discussion of the issues involved. Her grasp of the realities of moral life and her insistence on simplicity have saved me more than once from total misapprehension of those issues. After all this support and assistance, what misapprehensions may remain, needless to say, are mine alone.

CONTENTS

Introduction

1

Chapter I. The Socratic Denial of Akrasia

4

Chapter II. The Development of Plato's Thought

28

Chapter III. Some Preliminary Questions

60

Chapter IV. Aristotle's Analysis of Akrasia

85

Chapter V. Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine

118

Chapter VI. Some Criticisms of Aristotle's Doctrine

159

Appendix.

The Authorship of Chapter 3, Book vii of the

Nicomachean Ethics

183

Bibliography

189

Index

193

SHORT TITLES USED IN CITATION

l-'ull publication data is given in the bibliography. Allan, "Aristotle's A c c o u n t "

D.

J.

Allan,

"Aristotle's

Origin of Moral Ando, Aristotle's

T. Ando, Aristotle's

Theory

Account

of

the

Principles" Theory of Practical

Cog-

nition Bonitz,

H . Bonitz,

Index

Burnet, The

Index

Aristotelicus

J. Burnet, The Ethics

Ethics

of

Aristotle

de Vogel, "Quelques r e m a r q u e s "

C. J. de Vogel, "Quelques remarques à propos

Dirlmeier, Nikomachische

Aristoteles, Nikomachische

du premier chapitre de l'Éthique de Nicomaque" Ethik

Ethik,

übersetzt von

F. Dirlmeier. E.

E.

Aristotle, Eudemian

N.

E.

Aristotle, Nicomachean

Ethics, trans. H . R a c k h a m . Ethics,

trans.

H.

Rackham. Gauthier, La

Morale

Gauthier and Jolif,

R . - A . Gauthier, La Morale L'Éthique

R.-A.

Gauthier

et

J. Y .

d'Aristote Jolif,

L'Éthique

à

Nicomaque Gould,

Development

Hardie, A Joachim,

Study Commentary

J. Gould, The

Development

W . F. R . Hardie, A Study H . H. Joachim,

The

of Plato's in

Ethics

Plato

Nicomachean

Ethics,

A

Commentary Kullmann,

Beiträge

E . Kullmann, Beiträge griff

Nuyens,

L'Évolution

der

zum Aristotelischen

Be-

"Prohairesis"

F. Nuyens, L'Évolution

de la

Psychologie

d'Aristote Robinson, "L'acrasie" Snell,

Discovery

R . Robinson, "L'acrasie selon Aristote" B . Snell, The Discovery of

Cook Wilson,

of the

Mind

J. A . Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean

Stewart, A'oies Structure

Ethics

Aristotle

J. Cook Wilson, On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean

Ethics,

Chapters

I-X

. . . video meliora

proboque, deteriora sequor. Ovid, Metamorphoses

vii.20.

The good that I would do I do not; the evil that I would not, that I do. Paul, Romans

vii.19.

. . . this yielding to oneself is nothing but ignorance, and mastery of oneself is as certainly wisdom. Plato, Protagoras 358c.

Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness

INTRODUCTION

Akrasia (axgaata) is t h e t e r m Aristotle uses to refer to w h a t is sometimes called moral weakness, weakness of will, or incontinence. A literal translation m i g h t be "powerlessness," and he occasionally gives it this meaning. B u t for t h e most p a r t , it is applied to t h e c h a r acter of a person who claims to believe a moral principle b u t w h o does n o t act a p p r o p r i a t e l y . The morally weak m a n (o dxQaTrjs) habitually submits to t e m p t a t i o n , and, a t least on other occasions, would a d m i t to doing so. Aristotle seems to suggest t h a t m o s t m e n border on this condition, and one would suppose t h a t this kind of c h a r a c t e r would come into prominence when morality becomes ascetic or when moral education is n o t a d e q u a t e to moral d e m a n d . Akrasia, in one form or a n o t h e r , has a t t r a c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of m a n y t h i n k e r s , b u t neither in their case nor in t h a t of Aristotle has t h e interest been primarily due to t h e statistical prominence of t h e character. It is r a t h e r w h a t is implied for conceptions of h u m a n action by the possibility of such a c h a r a c t e r t h a t has interested philosophers, poets, and theologians. Akrasia m a y seem to imply t h a t belief is powerless before passion, or t h a t w i t h o u t grace m a n is helpless to obey t h e divine law, or t h a t intellect does not determine will, or t h a t m o r a l belief is logically distinct f r o m moral c o m m i t m e n t — a l l implications with wide ramifications. Those who hold the opposites to t h e s e positions m a y t h u s be led to scrutinize this kind of character closely, a n d to offer analyses which will nullify or a t least qualify these implications. From Socrates to H a r e there has been a succession of ingenious t r e a t m e n t s of t h e subject along these lines. For the most p a r t , this s t u d y concentrates on the Aristotelian t r e a t m e n t , and a m o u n t s to t h e unraveling of the complexities of one small passage in the Nicomachean Ethics: chapter 3 of Book vii. This passage has a l w a y s been intriguing to scholars and has a t t r a c t e d m a n y brief t r e a t m e n t s , t h e inconsistencies of which are occasionally

2

INTRODUCTION

amusing. It has seemed t o some that Aristotle rejects and refutes the Socratic denial of the reality of akrasia, and t h a t this is in line with Aristotle's rejection of rationalism in ethics and intellectualism in psychology. B u t it has seemed to others t h a t Aristotle supports the Socratic position, and t h a t this reveals the limitations of those other rejections. I think t h a t a close reading and a comprehensive interpretation of the passage supports the latter view; the main purpose of this study is to prove this case in a thorough way. The Socratic emphasis of Aristotle's position becomes more clear when it is seen against the background of earlier discussions, and this background is presented in the first two chapters. Students of Aristotle's moral philosophy cannot be unaware t h a t much recent philosophical work in the field of moral psychology is highly relevant to the understanding of Aristotle—indeed, some of this work is rooted in Aristotle. There is a strong temptation to utilize recent distinctions and emphases in the interpretation of the texts. A certain portion of recent work directly critical of Aristotle's position is discussed in the final chapter of this study. But the direct application of recent philosophy to ancient texts requires great care, and I have been sparing in this practice. However, the recent emphasis on choice and intention may be of some help in leading us into the problems we are to consider. In this study we shall be concerned only for the Socratic phase of the discussion of akrasia, and the difficulty for a modern—a difficulty perhaps shared by Euripides—is to understand the Socratic problem as anything more than hopeless psychological naivete. Perhaps the normal understanding of Socratism is t h a t moral belief is somehow automatically effective in action, and the obvious reply to this is that, in point of fact, men constantly fail to live up to their beliefs. Why should there be anything puzzling about this? But there is some evidence, which will be adduced in the first chapter, t h a t Socrates looked upon action as the expression of choice. He would in t h a t case be emphasizing the intentional character of action. It may be naive to think of action in this way, but if so, the naivete is shared by many thinkers, modern as well as ancient. Now, then, if what men do when they act counter to their beliefs is really action in this full intentional sense, something quite puzzling occurs. For if the contravened beliefs enter into the choice, we have a situation not unlike t h a t of a man who believes that two

INTRODUCTION

3

and two is four, acknowledges t h a t here is two and here is two, and then says t h a t these add up to five. Something is wrong. The suggestion which I am making, then, is t h a t perhaps the ancient problem of akrasia can be brought home to a modern if he will place the easy generalizations about "Greek intellectualism" in the context of an emphasis on choice and intention. Apart from the direct interest of the subject, another reason for undertaking this study is the recent appearance of a number of important works concerning the Nicomachean Ethics, which might almost be termed a new wave of Aristotelian scholarship. I have tried to evaluate much of this material as it bears on Aristotle's analysis of akrasia. The volumes of commentary by Gauthier and Jolif, which are meant to accompany their French translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, appeared too late for systematic use here; but this loss is not as serious as it might be, since the controlling interpretations have been presented by Gauthier in a separate work, La Morale d'Aristote. Full use has been made of this. In case any readers are unaware of the systems of reference normally employed in Platonic and Aristotelian scholarship, it should be noted t h a t the Platonic references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 a t Paris and the Aristotelian references are to the Bekker edition of 1831-1870 sponsored by the Berlin. Academy. In the Platonic system, numbers refer to pages and letters to portions of pages. In the Aristotelian system, the first numbers refer to pages, letters refer to colums, and the last numbers refer to lines. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations in the Loeb Classical Library have been used. One practice occasionally produces oddities in the text: because of the frequency of its occurrence, it has often seemed advisable to transliterate the term axgaaia.

CHAPTER

I

THE SOCRATIC DENIAL OF AKRASIA Akrasia

and the Morality

of

Decision

T h e suggestion has been m a d e t h a t akrasia poses a philosophical problem for a moral philosophy in which choice and decision are assumed t o be of f u n d a m e n t a l importance in h u m a n c o n d u c t . Is there evidence t h a t t h e Socratic tradition exemplifies such a moral philosop h y ? In this section we will review such evidence and begin to t r a c e its bearing on the interpretation of t h e Socratic denial of akrasia, especially as t h a t denial is presented by X e n o p h o n . This suggestion is a development of t h e analysis m a d e by B r u n o Snell of one of the themes in the tragedies of Aeschylus. Snell draws a t t e n t i o n to the fact t h a t often the c h a r a c t e r s of Aeschylus are faced w i t h a situation in which they m u s t ponder a l t e r n a t i v e s a n d come to a decision. Snell concentrates on t h e position of K i n g Pelasgus in b u t perhaps the position of Orestes in the Libation the Suppliants, Bearers is more familiar. Apollo has c o m m a n d e d him to avenge his f a t h e r ' s d e a t h by killing his mother. Orestes has some i n t i m a t i o n s of t h e guilt he will incur by this act, a n d a t the crucial m o m e n t he hesit a t e s and t u r n s to his companion for advice. The companion reminds him of Apollo's oracle. Orestes says, "I judge t h a t you win. Y o u r advice is good." 1 He then goes on with his deed. This t h e m e of decision runs t h r o u g h o u t t h e Oresteia. In t h e Agamemnon, Agamemnon m u s t choose whether or not to walk upon the carpet, as he once had t o choose w h e t h e r or not to sacrifice his d a u g h t e r . In t h e Eumenides, the jury of Athenians m u s t decide w h e t h e r or not Orestes shall be delivered over to the Furies. Snell sees in such situations one of the keys to Aeschylean t r a g e d y : Aeschylus presents these pointed situations because he is less interested in what happens than in what is done, and because he feels t h a t the

1

A e s c h y l u s , Libation

Bearers,

trans. R. Lattimorc, line

902.

THE

SOCRATIC DENIAL

OF

AKRASIA

5

essence of human action is to be found in the act of decision. A chemist combines in his test tube several substances which are rarely or never found together in nature in order to form a clear and precise idea of their reactions. Likewise the dramatist constructs his actions with a view to isolating the quintessence of action." The Greek terms for such a decision are algeaig and Ttgoaigeaig; Kullmann has collected occurrences of these terms in Greek literature from Homer through Aristotle, thus providing evidence t h a t the concept of decision was in wide use among the Greeks. 3 Of s o m e w h a t greater interest for us are passages in which the concept plays an important part in determining philosophical doctrine. Xenophon presents one such passage which relates the Socratic doctrine regarding akrasia to a philosophical generalization of the concept of choice: When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: "No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent." 4 For Socrates as X e n o p h o n presents him, men choose what t h e y do; and when men choose, t h e y choose what they think best. Therefore, there can be no one who at once knows what is best and does w h a t is worst. We shall return to Xenophon's elaborations on this doctrine. 2

Snell, Discovery, p. 106. Snell's elaboration of t h i s p o i n t occupics p p . 99-108. Snell's f u r t h e r thesis t h a t t h e t h e m e of decision is f i r s t found in Aeschylus is criticized by K u l l m a n n , in Beiträge, pp. 24 ff. K u l l m a n n argues t h a t t h e t h e m e is p r o m inent in H o m e r . 3 I a m a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e differences between t h e Greek t e r m s algeatg and jigoaigcaig, a s well as t h o s e between t h e linglish terms "choice" and "decision," are n o t i m p o r t a n t a t t h i s stage of t h e inquiry. The differences between t h e former m a y h a v e considerable bearing on A r i s t o t l e ' s conception of moral v i r t u e . The differences between t h e l a t t e r could s t a n d extensive i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 4 Memorabilia iii.9.4. There is a d i f f i c u l t y in t h e Greek of t h i s passage. The t e x t bas aoipovg Te xai ¿yxgazelg etvai vo/ii^ot. The sense requires t h a t ¿yxgarelg be dxgazelg. See G a u t h i c r and Jolif, L'f'lhique II, 591. " H a v e a choice" t r a n s l a t e s ngoaigov/jevovg. G a u t h i e r ' s claim t h a t the word ngoaigEOis only appeared a l i t t l e before Aristotle and t h a t it is not found in X e n o p h o n , and found only once in P l a t o is a l i t t l e forced. See I.a Morale, p. 28. The word ngoatgeaii; may n o t occur, b u t other forms of the v e r b nooaigeaOai certainly do. See K u l l m a n n , Beiträge, p p . 40-41, for a collection of occurrences in P l a t o .

6

T H E SOCRATIC D E N I A L O F

AKRASIA

The ways in which Plato utilizes and interprets the concept of choice are much more complex than this simple doctrine presented by Xenophon, and to explore them all would a m o u n t to a m a j o r inquiry. We will content ourselves with three passages, spread over the course of Plato's career, to make it clear t h a t the concept of choice, or decision, was never very far from his mind. The first passage is from the Protagoras. Socrates is trying to show t h a t a certain art of measurement would be salvation in life, if acting well consisted in choosing large things and rejecting small things. He concludes thus: Well then, my friends, since we have found that the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice (atgeaig) of pleasure and pain—of the more and the fewer, the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the remoter—is it not evident, in the first place, that measurement is a study of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other 7 (357AB)

One of the most humorous and dramatic passages in Plato is found in the Phaedo, a t the point at which Socrates is recounting his intellectual development, and tells of his disappointment in the doctrines of Anaxagoras. He explains t h a t if one were to ask for the cause of the conversation they are now conducting, one kind of answer would mention "voice and air and hearing," and another kind would mention the opinions of Socrates a n d the Athenians as to w h a t is best. He then goes on: But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and t h a t I act with intelligence but not from the choice (aigeoig) of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. (99AB) Finally, in the Laws, there comes a point at which Plato acknowledges t h a t men will only choose what is pleasant over what is painful, and sets himself the task of showing the superior pleasantness of the t e m perate life. He begins in this way: What, then, and how many are the lives in which a man—when he has chosen (ngoaigeodai) the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and the involuntary and has made it into a private law for himself, by choosing what is at once both congenial and pleasant and most good and noble—may live as happily as man can? (733DE)

THE SOCRATIC D E N I A L

OF

7

AKRASIA

It is because men make choices, then, that the art of measurement can constitute their salvation; because they make choices, that purely physical and mechanical conditions are inadequate to the explanation of human action; and because they make choices, that the superior pleasantness of the virtuous life should be set forth by the philosopher. W e are assuming that the Protagoras the Phaedo

is a relatively early dialogue,

a middle dialogue, and the Laws a late dialogue.

theme of choice and decision is thus an important one

The

throughout

the development of Plato's reflection on human life. W i t h Aristotle, there is hardly any need for emphasizing the importance of the concept of decision.

In both the Eudemian

(1225bl8-1227a5) and the Nicomachean

Ethics

Ethics (111 l b 4 - l 113al4) there

is an extensive discussion of ngoaigeaiQ

in which the affiliations of

this concept with those of appetite and knowledge are worked out. More important, virtue is described in the Eudemian TiQoaiQETixrj (1227b8), and in the Nicomachean tues

are said

to

be

xgoaigeaeig

rives

rj ovx

avev

as a

Ethics

the vir-

Ethics

ngoaigeaeuis

(1106a3-4). That is, virtue is a disposition to choose, a form of choice, or at least not without choice.

It is the importance of the concept

of choice in his account of the virtues that, in part, makes it so necessary for him to clarify the related concept of the voluntary.

We

will examine portions of his account of these two concepts below. As we explore the various efforts of Plato and Aristotle to interpret the phenomena of akrasia in such a w a y that the effectiveness of reason in action is preserved, we should remember the importance of the concept of choice or decision to them; and we should remember the position which is stated baldly and simply by Xenophon: since men choose what they do and since they choose what

they think

is best for them, it is impossible that they should really act against what they think is best. Having

gone this far in relating

the

moral

philosophy

of

the

Socratic tradition to the concerns of modern analytic philosophers, it is tempting to go farther and to seek, in this way, a deeper undertanding of the meaning of Socrates' doctrine.

But, as is widely

acknowledged, it is not easy to discover precisely what

Socrates'

doctrine was, let alone what its deeper meaning might have been. Into the vexed question of the relative value of

Xenophon,

Plato,

and Aristotle as testimony to the doctrines of Socrates we are fortunate-

8

THE

SOCRATIC DENIAL

OK

AKRASIA

ly not obliged to enter, for all three agree t h a t according to Socrates, one of the consequences of the doctrine t h a t no one does wrong voluntarily is t h a t akrasia does not really occur. 5 It has been argued t h a t w h a t animated Socrates in these doctrines was the understanding of knowledge as practical knowledge, in some fairly narrow sense of the term ''practical." We should consider this possibility, for it would be of the greatest value in understanding Plato and Aristotle to have some sense of the point of departure of the development of the Socratic tradition. There is a passage in Xenophon and a n o t h e r in the Laches which suggest t h a t the kind of knowledge which Socrates had in mind in his assertion of the effectiveness of knowledge in action was practical knowledge of some sort: Between wisdom {ooyia) and prudence (auxpooavvrf) he drew no distinction; but it a man knows and practices (yiyvcoaxovra %(>fja6cu) what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids ( e l d o x a evXa^eiadat) what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. ( M e m o rabilia, iii.9.4) The passage from the Laches includes a similar practical reference, in this case, a reference to the bringing a b o u t of goods: Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew (eiSevai) all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past (u>q yiyverat xai yevijaerai xai yeyove) and all about evil things likewise? (199D) In both cases the practical reference makes it somewhat a m b i g u o u s whether the knowledge to which Socrates refers is exclusively practical — thus, in the first passage, if wisdom were itself practical, there would seem to be no need to add t h a t a man should practice and avoid as well as know; and similarly for the second passage. To add the reference to knowledge a b o u t production suggests t h a t knowledge simpliciter does not include knowledge of production. B u t the references are quite possibly mere emphatic amplifications of what is already contained in the verbs of knowing. It has been suggested by several scholars t h a t t e r m s referring to knowledge in earlier Greek writings, and to some e x t e n t in nonphil5

N.E.

See X e n o p h o n , 1145b22-27.

Memorabilia

iii.9.4ff.; Plato,

Protagoras

352A-353A;

Aristotle,

THE

SOCRATIC DENIAL

OF

9

AKRASIA

osophical w r i t i n g s f r o m the later period are innocent of the distinction between

the

practical

and

the

theoretical. 6

We

will

examine

one

recent and s u g g e s t i v e a t t e m p t to capitalize on this position, and to utilize

a distinction

prominent

reach an

understanding

by

Gould

John

of

in

modern

Socratic

to e x p l a i n

analytic

doctrine.

the p r a c t i c a l i t y

of

philosophy,

T h i s is the Socratic

to

attempt

wisdom

by

turning t o a c c o u n t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between " k n o w i n g t h a t " and " k n o w i n g h o w " which has been presented b y Professor G i l b e r t R y l e . 7

Ryle's

position is t h a t m a n y of the terms which w e use in ascribing intelligence to p e o p l e refer to their abilities to s a t i s f y criteria in p r a c t i c e , and

to

regulate

correctly.

He

their

behavior

is opposed

to

critically

the

in the e f f o r t to

"intellectualist"

perform

interpretation

this " k n o w i n g h o w , " according to which p e r f o r m i n g

of

critically is ac-

t u a l l y d o i n g t w o things, c o n t e m p l a t i n g some proposition and c a r r y i n g out some physical m o v e m e n t .

W e can put this position in s y n o p t i c

f o r m b y s a y i n g t h a t intelligence is m a n i f e s t e d in skill.

G o u l d ' s uti-

lization of this position is presented in the f o l l o w i n g remarks: Briefly what I wish to suggest is this. In putting forward the thesis that aQExr¡ is only to be attained b y emcrrijfirj, Socrates was not asserting that a g e r t j necessarily results from a personal apprehension of the nature of good and e v i l (still less of Good and E v i l ) , but that for the achievement of aoer>] what is required is a f o r m of moral ability, comparable in some respects to the creative or artistic ability of potters, shoemakers and the like; that the EniOTi'i/j.r¡ which Socrates envisaged was a form of knowing how, that is, how to be moral.' H e emphasizes w h a t is intended b y r e m a r k i n g s o m e w h a t later

that

" e v e n f o r Socrates and P l a t o , to achieve dper»; is not to a r r i v e a t a v a l i d ethical t h e o r y , but to attain v a l i d moral

6

Snell, Discovery,

behaviour."8

p. 185, says that Socrates' language enforces close relations

between knowledge and practical interest.

E . R . Dodds expands the scope of verbs

of k n o w i n g t o include moral charactcr and personal feeling; see The Greeks and the Irrational,

pp. 16-17.

R . B . Onions develops the H o m e r i c background and relates

this t o Socrates and P l a t o ; see The Origins 7

Gould, Development,

and M o r a l i t y . "

The distinction between

presented by R y l e in The H o w and K n o w i n g

Gould, Development,

9

Ibid.,

p.

13.

Concept

That."

8

oj European

Thought,

pp. 13-22.

especially Chapter I: " T h e Socratic Theory of K n o w l e d g e

p. 7.

of

"knowing t h a t " and "knowing

Mind,

especially

in chapter

II,

h o w " is "Knowing

10

T H E SOCRATIC D E N I A L O F

AKRASIA

No doubt for Socrates, or for that matter, for any other Greek, the concept of ageTrj is in some sense a practical concept. At least he would have rejected a man's claim to have it if the man could not live up to the claim and perform appropriately. It would seem to follow that if aget»j is somehow dependent on or identical with £7tiQoovvr) is a kind of iyxgaTeia of the a p p e t i t e s . The reason for t h i s l a c k of d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s is, of course, that Plato's doctrine of the parts of t h e soul allows h i m t o analyze self-control into the constituent virt u e s of courage and temperance.

DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S

THOUGHT

35

Perhaps we can give to this added psychological dimension the title of the motivational strength of reason and knowledge, as distinct from the epistemological strength, although the general problem of reason's effectiveness in action may outrun the limitations of the term "motivational." This kind of consideration is buried in the Protagoras by t h e agreement of Socrates and Protagoras t h a t knowledge is noble and commanding. Here in the Republic, Plato faces t h e problem of how it is t h a t these commands of reason are obeyed, for to say an action was commanded, does not sufficiently explain it. We will return to this general subject of reason's motivational or psychological powers shortly. The moral of the story of Leontius is t h a t sometimes we find anger fighting against desire as "an alien thing against an alien." From the story, Plato develops a division of the soul into three " p a r t s , " just as he has previously divided society into three classes. It is first established t h a t the same thing will neither do nor suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing a t the same time. Then it is established t h a t desires are not self-qualifying; desire cannot impede itself. B u t desires are impeded, and, what is especially important, they are impeded in connection with rational calculations. (436C-437E. 439D) Therefore, what inhibits is different from what desires, and t h u s reason is different from appetite. The story of Leontius establishes t h a t anger, or the spirited part, is different from appetite, by the same line of argument; and the fact t h a t children have high spirit without having reason establishes t h a t the spirited part is different from reason. (441 A-C) There are thus three parts to the soul: appetite, spirit, and reason. A host of questions could be asked about this demonstration, and it has been the subject of many critical discussions, including a very i m p o r t a n t one by Aristotle. It would be pointless for us to linger too long over possible objections, but there is one ambiguity which we should point out in view of criticisms of the doctrine of the tripartite soul which we will consider later. In the demonstration itself, appetite or desire seems to be taken in a generic way. It would be very simple to say that, although a given desire might not sensibly be said to inhibit itself, there is nothing illogical about saying t h a t one desire is inhibited by another. For instance, the desire for liquid might be inhibited by the desire for rest, in the case of a man

36

DEVELOPMENT

t o o t i r e d t o reach f o i a d r i n k .

OF P L A T O ' S

THOUGHT

B u t P l a t o remains a t the generic level.

T a k i n g t h e a r g u m e n t in this g e n e r i c sense, one m i g h t

conclude that

in this d i v i s i o n of t h e soul w e h a v e s o m e t h i n g a k i n t o t h e m o r e m o d ern d i v i s i o n of e x p e r i e n c e i n t o t h e a f f e c t i v e , c o n a t i v e , d i m e n s i o n s or aspects.

and

cognitive

B u t it is i m p o r t a n t to resist this c o n c l u s i o n ,

as P l a t o himself does in a passage l a t e r in t h e

Republic:

T h e three parts h a v e also, it appears to m e , three kinds of pleasures, one peculiar t o each, and similarly three appetites and controls. . . .One part, w e say, is that w i t h which a m a n learns, one is that with which he feels anger. B u t the third part, o w i n g to its m a n i f o l d forms, w e could not easily designate b y any one d i s t i n c t i v e name, but g a v e it the name of its chief and strongest e l e m e n t ; f o r w e called it t h e a p p e t i t i v e part because of the intensity of its appetites concerned w i t h f o o d and drink and l o v e and their a c c o m p a n i m e n t s , and likewise the m o n e y - l o v i n g part, because m o n e y is the chief instrument f o r the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of such desires. (580DE) T h e a p p e t i t i v e p a r t , t h e n , is n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h a l l desire, f o r t h e r e is a desire f o r rule, c o n q u e s t , a n d f a m e i n v o l v e d in t h e s p i r i t e d and a desire f o r k n o w l e d g e i n v o l v e d in t h e r a t i o n a l p a r t .

part,

This

does

n o t m e a n t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of t h e p a r t s is n o t r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t seriously i n t e n d e d .

or

I t is t r u e t h a t S o c r a t e s s a y s of t h e d i v i s i o n

t h a t " i n m y o p i n i o n w e shall n e v e r a p p r e h e n d this m a t t e r

accurately.

( a x Q t f t & s ) f r o m such m e t h o d s as w e a r e n o w e m p l o y i n g in discussion. F o r t h e r e is a n o t h e r l o n g e r and h a r d e r w a y t h a t

conducts to

this.

Y e t w e m a y p e r h a p s discuss it on t h e l e v e l of our p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t s and i n q u i r i e s . " 8 a c c o u n t and

an

B u t this points to the distinction exact

one,

not

between

a

between

fallaciously

a

rough

superficial

a c c o u n t and a t r u e o n e w h i c h w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t it. S o c r a t e s s a y s t h a t it is hard t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r w e " l e a r n w i t h o n e p a r t of o u r s e l v e s , f e e l a n g e r w i t h a n o t h e r , and w i t h y e t a t h i r d desire t h e pleasure of nutrition

8

435D.

and g e n e r a t i o n

and their kind, or whether

T h i s passage is echoed at 504B.

lation of the Republic,

it is w i t h

the

H . D . Lee says, on p. 184 of his trans-

that this first passage implies that what f o l l o w s is at the

level of "ordinary conversation" and that we are t o set the doctrine of the tripart i t e soul against the "single stream of mental energy m a n i f e s t i n g itself in d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s " which is suggested by the Symposium.

T h e doctrine of the t r i p a r t i t e

soul seems t o me t o be too f u l l y developed in the Timaeus tional convenience, even though the Timaeus, at 27D f f .

t o be a mere conversa-

t o o , absolves itself f r o m exactitude,

D E V E L O P M E N T OK P L A T O ' S

THOUGHT

37

entire soul t h a t we function in each case when we once begin." (436AB) H a r d though this may be, the argument t h a t ensues is pointless unless it purports to determine it. W h a t is not told us in this rough account of the p a r t s of the soul is precisely what kind of a division this is—that is, we are not given an account of how we are to take the concept of p a r t in t h e case of the soul. The doctrine of the three parts of the soul is also prominent in the Timaeus, but there the problem is complicated by the fact the parts are treated as sub-souls and are given location in t h e appropriate regions and organs of the body. (69 ff.) T h e i m p o r t a n t point about these parts is t h a t they affect conduct. T h a t this is P l a t o ' s attitude comes out in a passage in the Laws, where spirit is identified as "one element" in the nature of t h e soul, either "affection" or " p a r t " (eire ri nadog eire r t ^¿Qog), and is classed with pleasure and ignorance as things t h a t "urge each man often to go counter to the actual bent of his own inclination" (PovXrjaig). (863B-E) For the subject of akrasia, what is of most interest in the division of t h e soul is t h e importance assigned to the spirited part, dv/uog, which we have also translated more simply as "anger." It is imp o r t a n t to understand just what psychic functions Plato assigns to this part of the soul, especially since a hasty reading of the argument we have summarized might lead one to suppose t h a t in 6vfxo$ we have an approach to t h e modern conception of the will, in the sense of a distinctive executive faculty whose weakness explains the failure of moral reason to be effective in the situation of akrasia. In some ways Plato's doctrine of the psychic functioning of Ovpioi; does represent an approach to t h e concept of the will, but it is necessary to place dvjuog in t h e wider context of a complex and sophisticated position to understand this correctly. There seems to be no d o u b t t h a t for Plato reason itself is an efficient cause. In the analysis of the most general categories of things presented in t h e Philebus, reason is the presiding cause of the mixture of the unlimited and the limiting. (26E-31B) There is no need to seek for some further faculty to explain the fact t h a t things are governed according to reason. Nonetheless, Plato pays a great deal of attention to what might be called reason's instruments. In the Timaeus a distinction is made between the primary cause, which is purposive intelligence, and accessory causes, which are moved by other things,

38

DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

and set other things in motion. (46C-E) The distinction recalls t h a t of t h e Statesman (281 ff.) between the causal and cooperative arts. These accessory causes of the Timaeus include movements of the soul as well as corporeal mechanisms, and the Laws contains a passage giving a very full list of these: Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. (896E-897B) The context of this passage indicates t h a t Plato has in mind both t h e cosmic soul and the individual human soul. It is curious t h a t dv/io; does not appear on the list. It should be apparent t h a t dvpog is not itself to be identified as t h e executive power of the soul, but t h a t it performs some more restricted function. If we turn to the social doctrine of the Republic, where things are easier to discern because they are larger, we find t h a t t h e spirited class is first introduced as a military class to defend the community in its external wars, and t h a t a problem is raised as to how t h e ferocity of the kind of person fitted for such a role can be kept from venting itself inside the community. (374-375) After an account of how education can achieve this selective taming, t h e role of t h e class is expanded. It will now protect the community from enemies within as well as without, adding t h e task of police to t h a t of t h e military. 9 Those who were called guardians should now be called auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.

8 Plato no doubt does not think of this as an added function. H e introduces it in an offhand way, at 414B. Police as d i s t i n c t from the military are, after all, a modern invention. And to one w i t h the Peloponnesian War in m i n d , the difference between an external and an internal enemy might not have seemed funda-

mental.

D E V E L O P M E N T O F P L A T O ' S THOUGHT

39

This emphasis on the fundamentally repressive role of dvpog is enhanced by t h e parallel account for the individual soul given in the Timaeus a t 69 ff. The rational part of the soul is immortal and is lodged in the head, separated by the neck from the mortal parts. The spirited part is the nobler of the mortal parts of the soul and is located in the chest, separated from the appetitive part by the diaphragm. The function of the spirited part is carefully described: That part of the soul, then, which is of a manly spirit and ambitious of victory they housed nearer to the head, between the midriff and the neck, that it might be within hearing of the discourse of reason and join with it in restraining by force the desires, whenever these should not willingly consent to obey the word of command from the citadel. The heart, then, the knot of the veins and the fountain of the blood which moves impetuously round throughout all the members, they established in the guardroom, in order that, when the spirit should boil with anger at a message from reason that some act of wrong is taking place in the members, whether coming from outside or, it may be, from the desires within, then every sentient part of the body should quickly, through all the narrow channels, be made aware of the commands and threats and hearken with entire obedience, and so suffer the noblest part to be leader among them all. (70AB. Cornford translation.) It is worth noticing t h a t the immediately following passage gives an account of an alternative system of control which is apparently quite independent of dv/xog. The passage concerns the appetitive p a r t : And because they knew that it would not understand the discourse of reason and that, even if it should become aware of any such discourse, it would not be in its nature to take any heed, whereas it would most readily fall under the spell of images and phantoms both by night and by day, the god, designing to gain this very influence formed the liver and set it in the creature's dwelling-place, and contrived that it should be a substance close in texture, smooth and bright, possessing both sweetness and bitterness. The purpose was that the influence proceeding from the reason should make impressions of its thoughts upon the liver, which would receive them like a mirror and give back visible images. This influence would strike terror into the appetitive part, at such times as, taking a part in the liver's bitterness, it threatens with stern approach; swiftly suffusing this bitterness throughout the liver, it would cause bilious colours to appeal thereon; make it all rough and wrinkled by contraction; and as it shrinks and bows down the lobe, obstructs the vessels, and closes the entrance, produce pain and nausea. 10 10

71A-E.

On p p . 2 8 6 - 2 8 7 of Plato's

Cosmology,

Cornford n o t e s the o b s c u r i t y of

t h e Greek in t h i s p a s s a g e , b u t n o n e of t h e problems of t r a n s l a t i o n w h i c h he m e n -

40

DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

0v/x6g exercises what we might call the secondary function of repression, not the primary function of execution. Why, then, does this part of the soul occupy such an important place in the Republic? Surely this is because Plato's political and moral thought in this stage develops from an assumption of crisis and permanent danger. He sees the bodily appetites and the appetitive masses as perpetually threatening to overcome the restraints necessary to personal integration and social harmony. This theme is almost constant throughout Plato's career. In the Gorgias, one may perhaps take Callicles as the voice of the appetitive man, and he certainly expresses anarchical views, at 484 and 491. At Cratylus 403-404, there is mention of the flustering and maddening desires of the body which resist the containment of virtue. The theme is greatly elaborated a t Phaedo 66, where the body is a source of endless trouble through its desires, and is always breaking in upon philosophizing, causing turmoil and confusion. The appetitive horse of Phaedrus 253-254, is the mate of insolence and pride and can hardly be controlled. The most vivid image for the bodily appetites is the many-headed monster of Republic 588, which, however, contains both wild and tame heads. At Philebus 45, the true nature of bodily pleasure is found in diseased and vicious conditions. At Timaeus 43, a Spinozistic touch is added in the observation that the body is caught up in a shifting relation of influx and efflux with the world. At Timaeus 70, the appetitive part is compared to a wild animal chained up within men, which must be nourished if man is to exist. Even in the Laws, where the position on the bodily appetites is on the whole significantly more relaxed, there is a passage at 647 which seems to suppose t h a t the struggle against the shameless and unrighteous temptations of pleasures and lusts is to be regarded as normal. Plato's position, then, is that there are certain appetites which in their own nature are anarchic, and that there is also a form of anger which can be directed against these appetites, much as a squad of t i o n s affect what is of interest for our purposes. These images m u s t h a v e something t o do w i t h the images of the divided line in the Republic. T h e y could perhaps be identified with the whip and reins in the m y t h of the chariot and the horses a t Phaedrus 246A, where the noble horse is presumably to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h dvftdg. B u t one should probably not look for a too nice construction of details in such an inspired but not necessarily functionally coherent figure.

41

DEVELOPMENT O F PLATO'S THOUGHT

police can be directed against a n unruly mob. Presumably, when this b a t t l e is won by the mob, we have akrasia. W h a t , then, of the doctrine t h a t akrasia is ignorance ? We should note t h a t in all we have said so far, the dimension of psychological conflict supplements rather t h a n replaces the kind of position we found in the Protagoras. This can be seen most clearly in the definition of courage, the virtue of the spirited part, given in the Republic: the preservation of opinion about which things are to be feared and which not under conditions of pleasure and pain. (429B-D, 430B, 442C) Perhaps the most f u n d a m e n t a l police operation of dvfiog is to guard against the t h e f t of opinion; a n d in t h e passage we cited from the Timaeus, dvfioq seems to play the role of herald as much as t h a t of police. In t h e Republic, in the Timaeus, and perhaps in the Phaedrus, Plato emphasizes the affinity of Ovfiog to reason. In the Republic, dvfj.6C is t h e ally of reason. (440B-E) In the Timaeus, the spirited p a r t is described as being within hearing of reason, whereas the appetitive p a r t is deaf a n d can neither understand nor heed the discourse of reason. (70D-71A, 73A) The spirited horse in the Phaedrus will respond to the word, whereas the appetitive horse is deaf. (253E) These passages seem to imply t h a t , j u s t as desire is not restricted to the appetitive p a r t , w h a t we might call cognitive functioning is not restricted to the rational p a r t . At least in t h e Republic, Plato seems to attrib-ite opinion to this spirited part itself. 11 B u t it should not be forgotten t h a t it is through education, and especially through "music," t h a t

11

W h e t h e r we are t o go on and say, as Hardie does, t h a t the real j u s t i f i c a t i o n

for the inclusion of Ov/iiq as a part of t h e soul is that it bridges t h e gap between reason and t h e unruly appetites is not so clear. H e would make 0v/i6g

See Hardie, A Study,

pp. 138-45.

t o be the e x e c u t i v e faculty b y claiming t h a t Plato has t w o

c o n c e p t i o n s of reason: a fuller conception, which includes the efficeint powers we h a v e m e n t i o n e d , and a narrower conception, as the faculty for true knowledge alone. H e sees Bvfiiif as explaining how people in w h o m reason itself is undeveloped manage t o act as if t h e y were rational.

Surely t h i s latter is just the problem of the

and is solved there b y means of the notion of right o p i n i o n .

Meno

Hardie seems t o be

capitalizing on the confusion of executive and repressive functions which Plato's suspicion of a p p e t i t e produces in the Republic.

A t Symposium

2 0 2 ff., it is ¿(¡cos

which is cast for the role of mediator and is associated w i t h right opinion. See Gould, Development, lines.

p. 54, for an unilluminating

explanation of akrasia along

those

42

DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

t h e conversion of a natural affinity t o t h e presence of right opinion is accomplished. 1 2 W h e t h e r we are to say t h a t it is t h e spirited part to which t h e facu l t y of opinion belongs, or whether we are to say merely t h a t spirit can he so educated t h a t it will defend right opinion, is perhaps the kind of question which cannot be answered by t h e "shorter we are given in t h e P l a t o n i c dialogues themselves.

way"

W h a t is impor-

t a n t is t h a t if we return to the wandering of opinion mentioned in t h e Meno,

we now have a way to prevent this wandering: t h e devel-

opment and education of a spirited p a r t of t h e soul.

Akrasia can

still be analyzed as ignorance, b u t ignorance is now to be explained as a failure of Ovpóg as much as it is t h e deception of desire. T h e correction

of this failure is through g y m n a s t i c s and music,

are to make

the

soul

"color-fast

in

right

G y m n a s t i c s and music are significantly measurement.

opinion."

different

which

(429D-430A)

from t h e a r t

of

T h e proper opposite to akrasia will be courage, and

for our purposes we can say t h a t t h e doctrine of t h e Republic

is cen-

tered on t h e virtue of courage. P l a t o m a y well have gone even farther than this in his recognition of t h e reality and importance of psychological conflict.

T h e r e is a

passage in the Sophist which can be considered as t h e c l i m a x of this psychological stage of P l a t o ' s thought in t h a t it appears to separa t e conflict from ignorance altogether.

In presenting it we will o m i t

those responses which do nothing to a d v a n c e the thought: We must say that there are two kinds of evil ( x a x i a ) in the soul. The one is comparable to a disease (vóaog) in the body, the other to a deformity (ala%o