Aristotle and Information Theory: A Comparison of the Influence of Causal Assumptions on two Theories of Communication 9783110813616, 9789027918499

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JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA

MEMORIAE

N I C O L A I V A N WIJK DEDICATA edenda curat C. H. V A N S C H O O N E V E L D Indiana University

Series Maior,

35

ARISTOTLE AND INFORMATION THEORY A COMPARISON OF THE INFLUENCE OF CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS ON TWO THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION

by

LAWRENCE WILLIAM ROSENFIELD

f§ 1971

MOUTON THE HAGUE · PARIS

© Copyright 1971 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 74-159470

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

Dedicated to Mrs. Doris B. Chamberlain ...teacher of English, whose guidance is still fondly recalled...

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several persons have made substantial contributions to this work and to the well-being of its author. Among them: Professor Karl Wallace of the University of Illinois, who roused my interest in Aristotelian thought; Professor Carroll Arnold, an advisor whose wisdom never fails to inspire; doctoral committee members R. B. MacLeod, E. C. Nuttall, and Τ. M. Scheidel, whose patience, good humor, and friendly criticism made writing much less painful; my wife, Sylvia, who displayed the rare combination of understanding and editorial firmness; and daughter Alison, whose quiet cooperation was unexpected in one so young. Parts of chapter II originally appeared in Speech Monographs (1966).

TABLE O F CONTENTS

Acknowledgments I. II.

III.

IV.

7

Introduction

11

A Model of Aristotelian Causation

21

Perfective Impulses Active and Acquiescent Powers Dynamic Re-Alignment Dynamic Equilibrium Tendency to Order Referential Grid Summary

24 25 27 33 35 44 59

An Aristotelian Theory of Communication Institutional Contexts Modes of Proof

61 66 69

Topical Aids to Speech Construction Summary

91 94

"Information Theory": Causality and Criticism Definition of "Information Theory"

97 98

The Concept of Entropy

101

Epistemological Status Referential Grid Sources of Observed Change

102 105 112

Statistical Relationships Entropy as a Causal Model of "Information Theory"

119 121

Implications of the "Information Theory" / Causal Model for Rhetorical Criticism

123

10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary V. A Comparison of Critical Perspectives

135 137

Bibliography

147

Index of Authors

148

I INTRODUCTION

In a field little noted for agreement among its members as to their professional function, 1 there is a remarkable consensus on the part of rhetorical critics that the ultimate purpose of criticism is to study the effects of rhetorical discourse.2 Typical of this attitude is the position taken by Thonssen and Baird in their standard work on the subject of rhetorical criticism: Λ rhetorical judgment is a composite of data and interpretation that is intended to reveal the effect of a given speech upon a particular group of listeners. The word effect, or response, is all-important. It suggests the central reason for the rhetorical criticism. Since speaking is a communicative venture, and since a speaker seeks to communicate a particular set of ideas and feelings to a specified audience, it must follow that the rhetorical critic is concerned with the method employed by a speaker to achieve the response consistent with his purpose.* Others, including Wichelns4 and Brigance,5 have evidenced a similar attitude toward the study of effect as the critic's primary task. Two distinguishing features of rhetorical criticism are implied in this position. First, the determination of effects logically obligates the critic to make interpretative 1

Cf. L. D. Reid, "The Perils of Rhetorical Criticism", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXX (1944), 416-422; L. H. Mouat, "An Approach to Rhetorical Criticism", The Rhetorical Idiom, Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language, and Drama, ed. D. C. Bryant (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958), 161-178; K. R. Wallace, "On the Criticism of the MacArthur Speech", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), 69-74; Μ. H. Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 49-78 [hereafter cited as: Nichols, Rhetoric]; A. J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLII (1956), 283-291 [hereafter cited as: Croft, "Rhetorical Criticism"]; Ε. B. Black, "Method in Rhetorical Criticism", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Speech and Drama, Cornell University, 1962 [hereafter cited as: Black, "Method"], 1-26. * Cf. Black, "Method", 2-9, for a discussion of the scope intended by 'rhetorical discourse'. As used in this study, rhetorical discourse refers to "acts of human-to-human communicative behavior" and is not restricted to the special case of public address. 8 L. Thonssen and A. C. Baird, Speech Criticism. The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal (N.Y., Ronald Press, 1948), 9. 4 H. A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory", Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans, ed. A. M. Drummond (1925; N.Y., Russell and Russell, 1962), 209. 6 W. N. Brigance (ed.), A History and Criticism of American Public Address, 2 vols. (N.Y., McGrawHill Book Co., 1943), I, viii.

12

INTRODUCTION

judgments about certain aspects of the discourse under consideration. If his statements pertaining to "effects" are to have any meaning, he must observe the rhetorical event and, in some orderly fashion, he must relate observations of the communicator's methods with observations of the responses of the audience. Secondly, the act of judgment entails invoking critical standards of some sort,® standards which, we shall find, are inherent in the theory of communication adopted by a rhetorical critic. These features serve to place rhetorical criticism within the context of the general theory of criticism enunciated by I. A. Richards: Criticism, as I understand it, is the endeavor to discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them. We cannot do this without some understanding of the nature of experience, or without theories of valuation and communication. Such principles as apply in criticism must be taken from these more fundamental studies.7 Richards takes the business of criticism to be the study of acts of communication,8 and on this basis recognizes the need for the critic to concern himself ultimately with communicative effect.9 But of special interest is Richards' belief that critical remarks are shaped by the manner in which one's theory of communication relates an object of art to one's experience in the presence of the object.10 Because of this, the critic who wishes to make statements about the effects of communicative events will have to take cognizance of the influence of his theory of communication as a mediating factor between the rhetorical event and his own comments about it.11 The import of Richards' position is that criticism is not simply a report of what occurred. What is said concerning a rhetorical act is as much a product of the critic's theoretical orientation as it is of the events which took place. A theory of criticism will select for our attention only certain aspects of an event — relationships have different meanings and receive a different locus in the hands of critics who do not have similar rhetorical theories.12 According to Kenneth Burke: If there were only some few "true" things to be said about a poem's structure, and if men of various sorts readily made these same observations independently of one another, one might be justified in considering these observations a matter of "induction". But since so many valid things are to be said, a given vocabulary coaches us to look for certain things rather than others — and this coaching of observations is a deductive process, insofar as one approaches the poem with a well-formed analytic terminology prior to the given analysis, and derives observations from the nature of this terminology. Hypothetically, one " P. M. Buck, Jr., Literary Criticism (N.Y., Harper & Bros., 1930), 17. ' I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (1925; N.Y., Harcourt, Brace & Co., n.d.) [hereafter cited as: Richards, Principles], 2. 8 Richards, Principles, 26-27. • Richards, Principles, 176-179. 10 Richards, Principles, 20-25, 44-48. 11 Richards, Principles, 86-91. 13 Cf. R. McKeon, "The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism", Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952) [hereafter cited as: McKeon, "Philosophic Bases"], 489-490.

INTRODUCTION

13

might be perceptive enough or imaginative enough to transcend any vocabulary, as one might hypothetically add enough "epicycles" and other qualifications to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy to make it do the work now done by the modern system of astrophysics. But under conditions of ordinary experience, such a transcending of vocabulary is decidedly limited. Ordinarily we see somewhat beyond the limits of our favorite terms — but the bulk of our critical perceptions are but particular applications of these terms. The terms are like "principles", and the particular observations are like the judicial casuistry involved in the application of principles to cases that are always in some respects unique.11 It becomes the critic's responsibility to be aware of and to account for the mode of expression in which his remarks are cast as a function of his theoretical orientation. What has this to do with effect as the primary concern of rhetorical criticism? Simply that statements of effect will be as much determined by the critic's philosophical notions about effects (as those notions are embodied in his rhetorical theory) as by the nature of the particular rhetorical discourse under investigation.14 Those aspects of a rhetorical event which are classified as effects are a function of the meaning that the critic attributes to 'effect'. However, because of the pervasive use of the word 'effect', the critic is usually unaware of the assumptions implicit in the specific way in which he uses the term. Furthermore, and of great importance, is the fact that in his attempts to discuss effects, the critic is also forced to take account of the correlative philosophical term 'cause'.15 As a result of the correlative nature of these terms, each is to be understood only within a context including the other, in the same way that the term 'husband' cannot be understood without the correlative term 'wife'. Each term has no meaning except with reference to the other, for there can be no concept of 'husband' unless there is, or has been, a wife. With respect to 'cause' and 'effect', it has been traditional in philosophy to discuss the problem using the vocabulary of causation. For the sake of convenience, we, too, will speak in terms of causation in this study. Thus, if he investigates his thinking carefully, the critic will discover that his theory of communication is entirely composed of statements of what may roughly be called a causal nature, such as the statement that one kind of thing is more likely to occur or may be more easily brought about than some other kind of thing.16 The importance of the critic's understanding how he uses 'cause' and 'effect' is brought out by McKeon, who has suggested that the differences among the major schools of criticism may be explained largely by the differences in meaning that the schools attach to such key philosophical concepts as cause and effect.17 That these are real differences, and ones difficult to make explicit, can be better understood with reference to Langer's discussion of cause as one of the "basic concepts": 18

K. Burke, A Grammar of Motives (N.Y., Prentice-Hall, 1945) [hereafter cited as: Burke, Grammar of Motives], 472. 11 McKeon, "Philosophic Bases", 464. 15 Cf. D. S. MacKay, "Causality and Effectuality", University of California Publications in Philosophy, XV (1932) [hereafter cited as: MacKay, "Causality"], 129-144. " G. H. Sabine, "What is a Political Theory?", Journal of Politics, I (1939), 6. " McKeon, "Philosophic Bases", 471-472.

14

INTRODUCTION

If we are asked: "Who made the world", we may answer: "God made it", "Chance made it", ... or what you will. We may be right or we may be wrong. But if we reply: "Nobody made it", we will be accused of trying to be cryptic, smart, or "unsympathetic". For in this last instance, we have only seemingly given an answer; in reality we have rejected the question. The questioner feels called upon to repeat his problem. "Then how did the world become as it is?" If now we answer: "It has not 'become' at all", he will be really disturbed. This "answer" clearly repudiates the very framework of his thinking, the orientation of his mind, the basic assumptions he has always entertained as common-sense notions about things in general. Everything has become what it is; everything has a cause; every change must be to some end; the world is a thing, and must have been made by some agency, out of some original stuff, for some reason. These are natural ways of thinking. Such implicit "ways" are not avowed by the average man, but simply followed. He is not conscious of assuming any basic principles. They are what a German would call his "Weltanschauung", his attitude of mind, rather than specific articles of faith. They constitute his outlook; they are deeper than the facts he may note or propositions he may moot.18 The formulation of experience which is contained within the intellectual horizon of an age and a society is determined, I believe, not so much by events and desires, as by the basic concepts at people's disposal for analyzing and describing their adventures to their own understanding.19 From this point of view, it follows that the notion of causation embodied in the critic's theory of communication will in some undefined way influence the focus and the meaning that the critic gives to critical statements which deal with the effects to be noted, expected, or preferred in rhetorical discourse. The phrases 'notion of causation' and 'focus and meaning' both require clarification. The first, 'notion of causation', surely does not refer to the logic of necessary and/or sufficient conditions which may be said to characterize an event.20 Rather, it more closely approximates the concept an observer has about the characteristic relationships of order he is likely to observe in dynamic, continuous processes.21 Causality is merely a name for the dynamic aspect of nature, 22 and one's notion of causation will correspond to the assumptions one makes about the nature of that dynamism. As used here, 'notion of causation' has a meaning similar to that which Bunge accords 'determination', in the sense of its being one's explanation for the way (act or process) in which an object acquires characteristics or properties. 28 Spe" S. K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (1942; N.Y., New American Library, 1958) [hereafter cited as: Langer, Philosophy], IS. " Langer, Philosophy, 17. 10 Cf. C. Ε. M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy (N.Y., Dover Publications, 1936) [hereafter cited as: Joad, Guide], 207-228. 11 Cf. W. R. Dennes, "Causation as Continuity and Production", University of California Publications in Philosophy, XV (1932) [hereafter cited as: Dennes, "Causation"], 147-176. " MacKay, "Causality", 144. ™ M. Bunge, Causality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science (N.Y., World Publishing, 1963) [hereafter cited as: Bunge, Causal Principle], 6-26. Support for reversing Bunge's mechanistic use of 'causality' and 'determinism' — as was done in this study — is found in R. W. Sellers, "Levels of Causality: The Emergence of Guidance and Reason in Nature", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XX (1959), 1-17, and in A. G. Van Meisen, The Philosophy of Nature Duquesne Studies: Philosophical Series, Vol. II (New York, Duquesne University, 1953) [hereafter cited as: Van Meisen, Philosophy of Nature].

INTRODUCTION

15

cifically, 'notion of causation' may be defined as a person's assumptions concerning the ontological nature of order and change. Causality as such is merely a name for the dynamic aspect of nature. When, however, we consider causality such as, say, the movement of one body by another, the qualification implies both a context and a selected perspective within which alone such a sequence has any meaning.24 For example, a theory which treated communication as a direct transfer from speaker to listener or as communion in an identical experience would necessarily entail some transcendental notion of cause.26 The observer who adopts a consistent theory of communication automatically commits himself to the notion of causation implicit in that theory; and that notion of causation in turn determines and limits for him the kinds of causal relations he may expect to observe. In order to better understand how causation affects the critic, it is valid to turn for comparison to the set of analytic assumptions which define a scientific theory. It is possible to distinguish between the ordinary hypotheses which comprise a scientific theory and the formal assumptions implicit in the theory. The hypotheses are descriptive of empirical events, and so may be subjected to tests of empirical verification. The assumptions, in contrast, are logical statements without direct empirical reference. They may be said to express the relationships which are utilized by the hypotheses.26 These formal assumptions are themselves unverifiable since: ...they do not make any assertion about the empirical world, but simply record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion.3' On a broader plane, the set of formal assumptions in a theory, treated as a whole, are termed a model, and this model operates under similar conditions: A model is not itself a theory; it is only an available or possible or potential theory until a segment of the real world has been mapped into it. Then the model becomes a theory about the real world. As a theory, it can be accepted or rejected on the basis of how well it works. As a model, it can only be right or wrong on logical grounds. A model must satisfy only internal criteria; a theory must satisfy external criteria as well.88 Although the logical description of a formal scientific model is suggestive, it is too narrow to provide a full description of a causal model. The assumptions making up a model of the type discussed by Osgood and Sebeok and by Coombs et al. are merely logical abstractions, incapable of explaining the relationships they posit. " MacKay, "Causality", 144. " Richards, Principles, 176. "· C. E. Osgood and T. A. Sebeok (eds.), "Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems", Supplement to Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIX (1954) [hereafter cited as: Osgood, Sebeok, "Psycholinguistic Survey"], 26. " A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. rev. (N.Y., Dover Publications, 1946), 31. 88 C. H. Coombs, H. Raiffa, and R. M. Thrall, "Some Views on Mathematical Models and Measurement Theory", Decision Processes, ed. by R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis (N.Y., Wiley & Sons, 1954), 25-26.

16

INTRODUCTION

Returning to the causal model, we find that it seems to occupy a middle ground between the simple, formal order of analytical statements and the empirical quality of hypotheses. It makes an "ontological commitment", but one that cannot be empirically verified.29 Instead of being regarded as if the assumptions said something about reality as do the logical relations of the ordinary model, the assumptions of a causal model purport to say something about reality as it is. They constitute a kind of unverifiable declaration of faith in a particular formulation of existence.30 It is this ontological commitment that apparently distinguishes such "basic concepts" as cause from both scientific hypotheses and the formal propositions of the scientific model, and it is to the examination of the influence of such existential assumptions that this study addresses itself. The other phrase needing clarification is 'focus and meaning'. It is plain from our definition of 'notion of causation' that a critic's assumptions as to the ontological relationship between "cause" and "effect" are not at all clear from the mere use of those terms; in other words, concepts of causality can differ. It remains to be seen whether and in what measure differences in causal assumptions will be reflected in the statements made by critics. Although Burke and McKeon certainly suggest that philosophic principles will strongly influence one's criticism, they do not indicate the nature of such an influence. Since causality is of paramount importance to the rhetorical critic, we should intuitively suspect that here, if anywhere, variations in philosophic orientation would manifest themselves in different types of critical statements. Our problem, therefore, can be stated as that of attempting to discover what difference, if any, it makes that a rhetorical critic adopt a particular notion of causation as his critical perspective on dynamic events; that is, How does the vantage point implied by the critic's philosophic assumptions correlate with the mold in which he casts his criticism? This is not to confuse the problem of the nature of the vantage point with an essentially separate question, namely, What observations and criticism is it possible to make from a particular vantage point? Our concern is with the critical apparatus rather than with criticism per se. The question which is germane to the present study is: Do the causal assumptions implicit in different rhetorical theories impose different critical perspectives; and if so, in what respects will these differences in the causal model be reflected in the critic's performance of his tasks? It is now possible to restate the relationship among critic, theory of communication, and causal model as a function of the focus and meaning which a critic attaches to his remarks. The rhetorical critic employs a theory of communication as an integral part of his effort to understand effect in rhetorical discourse. His theory is a set of (hopefully) consistent hypotheses intended to relate various conditions to observed or inferred effects. But the formal relationships embodied in the hypo" M. Black, Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1962) [hereafter cited as: Black, Models and Metaphors], 227. •· Cf. Black, Models and Metaphors, 228; Bunge, Causal Principle, 4-6.

INTRODUCTION

17

theses are undergirded by unstated causal assumptions about the nature of ontological order and change. These causal assumptions, which together constitute a causal model (again, hopefully internally consistent), commit the user of the theory to a particular causal world-view and, ultimately, to a certain format of critical statements respecting the nature of effects in rhetorical discourse. It has already been noted that the rhetorical critic brings a fairly well formulated theory of communication to the critical act. To the extent that the critic is equipped to perform his task, he will be in possession of hypotheses adequate to his needs. From what has been said above, it would seem reasonable to expect the critic to be aware of the causal limitations imposed upon him by his particular set of hypotheses. Yet rhetorical critics evidently seldom investigate the ontological underpinnings of their theories.31 There is clearly nothing new in the attempt to discover the influence of a causal model on a scientific theory. Parts of this study find their antecedents in works which have attempted to accomplish similar tasks, most often under the labels of "history and philosophy of science" or of "philosophy of nature". Some efforts have been directed specifically to the critiquing or comparison of various causal models or assumptions.32 Others have traced the consequences of causal assumptions for human understanding.83 Still others have related premises (causal and otherwise) to particular concepts in philosophy and science.84 Indeed, studies such as those by Brunschvicg, Frank, and Bunge have served in part as models for my own thinking. But there has been no systematic effort to perform such an operation in rhetorical criticism where the critic's reliance on a theory of human communication would make such an analysis inherently valuable.36 It is hoped that this study will S1

In addition to Richards, others who have discussed various aspects of the relation of criticism to rhetorical theory, and so may have at least wrestled with the problems raised here, include: Matthew Arnold, George Campbell, Kenneth Burke, and Albert Croft. If other rhetorical critics have considered the influence of causal assumptions on their work they have not left public record of it. " Cf. Bunge, Causal Principle· Dennes, "Causation"; A. Metz, "Causalitä scientifique et Causalit6 premiere", Archives de Philosophie, XXIV (1961), 517-541; Ε. Meyerson, Identity and Reality, trans. K. Loewenberg (1908; N.Y., Macmillan, 1930) [hereafter cited as: Meyerson, Identity]. ** Cf. F. G. Collingwood, Philosophy of Nature (Englewood ClifTs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961); L. Brunschvicg, Ecrits Philosophique, Vol. Ill (Paris, Presses Universitäres de France, 1958); A. G. Van Meisen, Philosophy of Nature·, L. Brunschvicg, L'expirience humaine et la causaliti physique (1922; Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1949) [hereafter cited as: Brunschvicg, L'expirience humaine]; A. Michotte et al., Causaliti, permanence et rialite phinominales (Louvain, Publications Universitaires, 1962); J. Piaget, The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, trans. M. Gabain (1930; Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960) [hereafter cited as: Piaget, Physical Causality]. 84 H. Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, edited by M. Reichenbach (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1956) [hereafter cited as: Reichenbach, Direction of Time]; N. Wiener, Cybernetics, (1948; 2nd ed. rev., N.Y., Wiley & Sons, 1962) [hereafter cited as: Wiener, Cybernetics]; P. Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1957) [hereafter cited as: Frank, Philosophy]; D. E. Steg, "A Philosophical and Cybernetic Model of Thinking", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Education, University of Pennsylvania, 1962 [hereafter cited as: Steg, "A Model of Thinking"]. 86 In two articles in the 1955 Quarterly Journal of Speech, the psychologist R. F. Hefferline attempted

18

INTRODUCTION

in part remedy the neglect of such inquiry in the literature on rhetorical criticism. Using two theories of communication which have found favor with those interested in human communication, this study seeks to accomplish three specific aims: (1) to abstract or otherwise amplify the causal notions implied in each theory; (2) to reinterpret the theories in light of their causal assumptions with a view to discovering what effect, if any, such a reinterpretation has on the theories as they are used by the critic in examining acts of human discourse; and (3) to compare the two causal notions and the two theories of communication in order to discover the extent to which the concepts of causation render each theory appropriate for use in rhetorical criticism. The two theories of communication adopted for study here are (1) Aristotle's theory as set forth in his Rhetoric and (2) the modern conception of the "information theorist", as originally proposed by Shannon and Weaver36 and later adapted by psychologists for application to human communication behavior.37 The labels "Aristotelian" and "information theory" are at best unsatisfactory for reasons which will be discussed in greater detail in the relevant chapters. The body of literature which claims the title "Aristotelian" is huge, very often contradictory, and just as often appears to contradict the corpus alleged to have been produced by "the" Aristotle. Hence, it will be necessary to delineate clearly in just what sense we intend to apply the label "Aristotelian" in this study. It is even more frustrating to try to find an adequate label for the group of ideas for which the term "information theory" is often used. As MacLeod has pointed out,38 "information theory" is neither a theory nor does it treat information in the common sense of that term. However, for the sake of convenience we have adopted the most common title used in connection with "information theory" concepts. Although we will provide a more careful delineation in a later section, we shall continue to use the label with full awareness of its inadequacy and the restricted sense in which it is to be understood. A critic need not accept either those or any other theory of communication in toto in order to do his work. But insofar as a critic is willing to accept any theory he must also be prepared to accept its causal model, and to just that extent will the results to develop a theory of human communication which took account of its causal model. The significance for rhetorical criticism of Hefferline's idea was apparently ignored, however. Cf. R. F. Hefferline, "Communication Theory: I. Integrator of the Arts and Sciences", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), 223-233; R. F. Hefferline, "Communication Theory: II. Extension to Intrapersonal Behavior", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), 365-376. " C. E. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana 111., University of Illinois Press, 1949). 37 Cf. G. A. Miller, Language and Communication (N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1951) [hereafter cited as: Miller, Language and Communication]·, E. C. Cherry, On Human Communication (N.Y., Wiley & Sons, 1957) [hereafter cited as: Cherry, Human Communication]; W. R. Garner, Uncertainty and Structure as Psychological Concepts (N.Y., Wiley & Sons, 1962) [hereafter cited as: Garner, Psychological Concepts]. 88 R. B. MacLeod, "The Other Person: How We Communicate with It", Proceedings of the International Congress of Psychology, XVI (1960), 567-569.

INTRODUCTION

19

of this study have relevance for critics desiring to use either of the explored theories to any degree. The Aristotelian and "information theory" formulations have been selected for investigation for three reasons. In the first place, both are dynamic theories of communication and so necessarily require a causal perspective. As Randall constantly emphasizes, Aristotle's is a thorough-going philosophy of process which cannot be understood in its particular application without recourse to dynamic concepts of functionalism: Logos

must be analyzed as itself a process, a verb: to dialegesthai, communication."

Berlo, too, lists Aristotle as one who produced a theory of communication-as-process.40 He also believes that "information theory" treats communication as a dynamic process.41 Further support for the inclusion of "information theory" as a causalbased theory is the fact that the "information theorist" usually treats communication as belonging to the class of irreversible events;42 and irreversibility or unidirectionality of change is one of the distinguishing features of causality as a general principle.43 A second reason for examining these two theories is their importance in the contemporary study of discourse. Ε. B. Black demonstrates that the dominant mode of rhetorical criticism practiced in America today claims to derive its outlook from Aristotle's Rhetoric,44 Marie Hochmuth Nichols suggests that some of "our most mature critics" have "at one time or another committed themselves to an Aristotelian theory of rhetoric".45 The case for "information theory" is slightly different. Although not used in traditional criticism, "information theory" has achieved wide recognition over the past fifteen years for its contributions to the study of human communicative behavior. It therefore deserves the attention of the critics, who may discover in it new and profitable standards and procedures for use in conjunction with their critical task. The third reason for treating these two theories is that they are sufficiently different from one another to encourage objectivity and perspective throughout the investigation. This is the same rationale that moves comparative linguists to study non-IndoEuropean language. Because the Aristotelian and "information theory" notions of communication differ so markedly, it seems reasonable to expect that their causal concepts will also display differences. The existence of wide differences lowers the " J. H. Randall, Jr., Aristotle (1960; N.Y., Columbia University Press Paperback, 1962) [hereafter cited as: Randall, Aristotle], 297. 40 D. K. Berlo, The Process of Communication (N.Y., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) [hereafter cited as: Berlo, Communication], 28-29. 41 Berlo, Communication, 28-29. " Cf. Wiener, Cybernetics, 32-43. " Cf. Brunschvicg, L'expirience humaine, 348-349; Bunge, Causal Principle, 170-172. 41 Ε. B. Black, Method, 16-26. 46 Nichols, Rhetoric, 68.

20

INTRODUCTION

likelihood that elements of the causal models will pass unexamined because they seem so "natural" or obvious in the context of the theory under consideration. A different procedure is used for determining the causal model of each theory and for then assessing the significance of the respective models in influencing critical perspective. Methodology will therefore be discussed at appropriate points in the study. The study itself will treat the Aristotelian and "information theory" notions in turn, delaying major comparison for the final chapter. Throughout this study it must be recognized that the major question asked has to do neither with criticism per se nor with rhetorical theory. Rather we are seeking to determine what perspective on dynamic events is imposed on the critic whenever he accepts the causal model implicit in a given theory. A restatement of the questions asked by the thesis might therefore run as follows: To what focus and orientation does the critic-as-observer commit himself when he attempts to treat dynamic rhetorical events with either Aristotelian or "information theory" tools of analysis? Does a comparison of these two orientations reveal similarities and differences which might significantly affect the nature of his criticism? The first of these questions is the subject of the three chapters to follow. The second question is the subject of the final chapter.

II Α MODEL O F ARISTOTELIAN CAUSATION

A critic in search of a functional frame of reference cannot approach the Aristotelian corpus with a view to extracting a single, consistent, and explicit causal principle. This is true in at least three senses. In the first place, Aristotle is so encyclopedic that one must be careful to distinguish those causal principles which apply to human communicative transactions from those discussing causation in the heavens,1 in theology,8 and in reference to a logical "Unmoved Mover". 3 None of these latter concepts of causation has immediate application to human behavior. It is possible to leave out these threads when considering causation in communication and one may do so without essential damage to the notions of process required in that context.1 Secondly, as Randall has noted of the Metaphysics, there is no way to interpret Aristotle in a wholly consistent manner, for he contradicts himself: The Metaphysics is in composition the most complicated and contradictory of the Aristotelian writings. ... There are changes in style ... there are fundamental changes in the position maintained, there are even changes in the conception of what the science and its object are. Hence, despite the many attempts made over the centuries to extract a consistent body of doctrine from the Metaphysics, to modern critical scholarship it seems hopeless to try to "harmonize" everything in these collected papers — there are too many glaring contradictions.' Runner* has made a similar observation respecting the Physics. More general studies 1

Aristotle, De Caelo [hereafter referred to as: De Caelo], trans. J. L. Stocks, Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (N.Y., Random House, 1941) [hereafter cited as: Basic Works], 398-466. * Aristotle, Metaphysics [hereafter referred to as: Metaphysics], trans. W. D. Ross, Basic Works, 1068a 18-1076a 4. * T. Organ, "Randall's Interpretation of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover", Philosophical Quarterly, ΧΠ (1962), 297-305. * Cf. W. E. Kennick, "A Methodological Approach to Metaphysics", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Cornell University, 19S2 [hereafter cited as: Kennick, "Metaphysics"], 46. * Randall, Aristotle, 107. * Η. E. Runner, The Development of Aristotle: Illustrated from the Earliest Books of the Physics (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, 1951) [hereafter cited as: Runner, Development of Aristotle].

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by Jaeger,7 Solmsen,8 and others have supported the view that the works of Aristotle contain several distinct positions on matters such as causality. Finally, it is dangerous to depend totally on explicit statements in Aristotle for a full explanation of causality. The works of Chen,9 Grant,10 Gomperz,11 Marx,12 Ross,18 Sieburth,14 Spicer,15 and Slakey18 exemplify the results of combing Aristotle for statements on a particular topic. The fact that each of these men arrives at a unique interpretation of Aristotle's meaning on a particular topic such as causation, despite the fact that each is working with literally the same set of quotations, suggests that this approach has severe limitations. In this study, though we are interested in isolating an Aristotelian view of causality, we are, happily, free from the necessity of demonstrating that Aristotle, himself, held a single, consistent, explicated view. Our object is to discover what interpretations might reasonably be drawn from Aristotle by a rhetorical critic in search of causative assumptions; our aim is not necessarily to provide an interpretation of Aristotle as revealed in his words, but a point of view that a reasonable critic might derive from studying Aristotle carefully. We are seeking: ...his attitude of mind, rather than specific articles of faith. They constitute his outlook; they are deeper than facts he may note or propositions he may moot.17 For this purpose the Aristotelian corpus must be utilized in a more flexible manner than would be fitting in formal Aristotelian commentary. The critic in search of negotiable assumptions will not hesitate to read meaning into explicit statements. He will use Aristotle's words as suggestive points of departure rather than as absolute limits on thought. For present purposes, then, a suitable procedure is to concentrate on works and passages wherein Aristotle is allegedly treating things as they exist in the experienced '

W. Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. R. Robinson (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934). F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World—Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, ΧΧΧΠΙ (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1960) [hereafter cited as: Solmsen, Aristotle's System]. • C. H. Chen, Ούσία and Ενέργεια: Two Fundamental Concepts in the Philosophy of Aristotle (Taipei, China Series Publishing Committee, 1958) [hereafter cited as: Chen, Concepts]. 10 A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, I, 1876 (London, Longman, Green, 1885) hereafter cited as: Grant, Ethics], 11 T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, IV (N.Y., Scribner's Sons, 1912.) 11 W. Marx, The Meaning of Aristotle's 'Ontology' (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1954). 18 W. D. Ross, Aristotle (N.Y., Scribner's Sons, 1924) [hereafter cited as: Ross, Aristotle] 11 G. Sieburth, "The Axioms of Mathematics and Ontology in Aristotle's Philosophy" unpublished M.A. thesis, Dept. of Classics, Cornell University, 1952. 15 Ε. E. Spicer, Aristotle's Conception of the Soul (London, University of London Press, 1934). " T. J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception and Thinking: A Critical Analysis", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Cornell University, 1960 [hereafter cited as: Slakey, "Critical Analysis"]. " Langer, Philosophy, 15. β

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18

world and as they undergo natural processes. From such passages it is possible to abstract a viable set of implicit assumptions which remain faithful to Aristotle's explicit statements on causation in the human world and make meaningful a causal explanation of the theory of human communication found in the Rhetoric. This is the procedure followed in this chapter. The critic must allow his mind to range away from the printed page if he is to make of Aristotle anything more than the "syllogistic gentleman with a category for every emergency".19 He must forget the logician-philosopher who headed the Lyceum and must instead imagine an intelligent, sensitive man living in a primitive society, denied such modern tools of observation as the microscope or telescope, and lacking the warnings of a 2500-year written record of other men's folly. This man observes the world about him and attempts to make of the "blooming, buzzing confusion", meaningful sense. What form can this meaningfulness take? Langer has suggested one kind of answer: Primitive men live in a world of demonic Powers. Subhuman or superhuman, gods or spooks or impersonal magic forces, good or bad, luck that dwells in things like an electric charge, are the most impressive realities of the savage's world. ... In a world perceived as a realm of mystic Powers, the first created image is the dynamic image.20 But though Aristotle is a member of a primitive society, he is a sophisticated man. His is no child-like view of process involving demons and Powers. He seeks instead an orderly conception of process and change;21 hence he attempts to discover causal laws operating in the universe. If at times his notions seem to resemble those of a child, it is partly because this is the best he can do with the instruments and the notions at his disposal; and if one is willing to consider those notions fairly and without a condescending attitude toward "primitive mentality", they may prove a fertile source for several not-so-simple-minded assumptions. Let us then begin with some of the dynamic assumptions this man, Aristotle, living in his primitive society, might accept. If he were able to state them in words, what ideas might he have about force, process, and interaction as they relate to change in the world of human beings? The answers to these questions will constitute the foundation on which the Aristotelian critic can orient his observations of changethrough-communication.

11

Randall, Aristotle, 109-110. It is for this reason that we shall not treat the doctrine of the four causes, which is recognized as having logical rather than ontological reference. Cf. W. A. Heidel, The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System — University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, No. 11 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1896) [hereafter cited as: Heidel, Aristotelian System], 23-26. 19 Heidel, Aristotelian System, 294. ä0 S. K. Langer, Problems of Art (N.Y., Scribner's Sons, 1957), 12. " Metaphysics, 1069a 18-22.

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PERFECTIVE IMPULSES

Langcr's comment on Powers existing like electric charges in things suggests that Aristotle's dynamic notions might be summed up in the term 'animism'. But Aristotle is not naive, and if we use the term 'animism' it must not imply that he superstitiously conceives of all things as alive82 or possessed of consciousness 28 in the way the child's animism engenders the fantasy that his teddy bear can talk. 24 Rather, Aristotle's animistic conceptions involve ontological premises of a very high order. For instance, he takes it as given that there are impulses or powers within every natural object and that these are striving to perfect the essential nature of that object. According to Randall, everything in the world has: ...a drive, an impulse, a tendency. ... Aristotle calls it a horme ... to put its powers into operation, a horme "implanted" in each thing to become the kind of thing it can become. The verb, oregatai, for this impulse or drive, is often translated "strives": Acorns "strive" to become oak trees, eggs "strive" to become chickens, heavy bodies "strive" to reach the center of the earth. Occasionally Aristotle even says, the stone "strives" to become a doorstep."

By this striving impulse Aristotle means the ability of a particular lump of matter2® to incorporate a form and so become differentiated from the rest of matter by virtue of its formal characteristics: Yet the form cannot desire itself, for it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly, the beautiful.... 2 7

That it is matter that contains the striving impulse rather than the object qua object is seen in Aristotle's definition of "nature" as "...the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change".28 Again, the essential nature which impulses seek to perfect derives from the innate characteristics of the object rather than from those attributes which are characteristic of the particular function it is performing: 11

Aristotle, Historia Animalium, trans. D. W. Thompson, Basic Works, 588b 4-589a 9; Aristotle, Physica [hereafter referred to as: Physica], trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Basic Works, 192b 27-35. " Aristotle, De Anima [hereafter referred to as: De Animä], trans. J. A. Smith, Basic Works, 413a 20-414a 4. " J. Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World, trans. J. Tomlinson and A. Tomlinson (1929; Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams, 1960), 169-252. 15 Randall, Aristotle, 127. We shall follow Randall's convention of transliterating Greek terms into English script except where they may appear in quotations by others. " Physica, 192b 32-34. " Physica, 192a 20-23. The term here translated as "desires" is oregesthai, which Randall translates as "strives". Its root is orego "to reach, stretch out, yearn for". Hope, in his Aristotle's Physics (Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1961) [hereafter cited as: Physics], translates the term as "tends towards". " Physica, 193a 28-29.

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Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations — i.e., insofar as they are products of art — have no impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent — which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.2'

This point is emphasized by Brunschvicg: .. .l'imperfection d'un monde oil mous voyons entrer en conflit al finalite de la nature et la r6sistance de la n6cessit6 suggfere la notion d'un monde oil le changement anquel la mature est soumise acquerrait une valeur de perfection.80

To take an example, the coat does not strive to be worn as the ideal coat, but the matter of which the coat is made strives continually to perfect those attributes innate to it. Some of these attributes justify the choice of that material for use in a coat. The acorn differs from the wall in that the one contains matter striving to achieve characteristics which are typical of "acornness" while the other is made of material striving to achieve perfect "stoneness". If the acorn were not made of matter striving to achieve a unique form, it would not exist as an entity.81 If certain stones did not strive to achieve their essential qualities, one would not be justified in selecting them to construct walls. ACTIVE AND ACQUIESCENT POWERS

It is not enough, however, to posit that matter strives to perfect its formal attributes in particular objects. It is also necessary to know how this striving manifests itself, that is, the nature of the forces involved in change. Aristotle may be interpreted as having many different concepts about force and powers,32 but it is fair to say that the man, Aristotle, as a citizen of a primitive society, had a notion of objects striving to perfect themselves through forces of "acting and suffering".38 By this Aristotle meant that the action of change involves the mutual cooperation of two striving impulses: one existing in the agent of change as an active power capable of inducing change in another object, and the other manifesting itself in an acquiescent power located in the object undergoing change.84 This distinction is made in the Metaphysics: ... in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be 'capable' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but "

Physica, 192b 12-23. Brunschvicg, L'expirience humaine, 145. 51 De Anima, 415a 26-415b 3. " Cf. Runner, Development of Aristotle, 98-106, 147-154. 3 * Solmsen, Aristotle's System, 353. " Kennick, "Metaphysics", 55. 30

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in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g., heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build.88 An illustration of Aristotle's view of change may be seen in the case of an axe used to chop wood. Aristotle would claim that in this paradigm the axe is not undergoing change but that it has the power to induce change in the wood. The axe therefore possesses a kind of appetitive or active power with respect to wood. The wood, in contrast, does not possess the power to change the axe, but it does have the passive capacity to be changed by the axe. However, wood probably does not have the power to be changed by a feather: no matter how long or hard one were to chop away with a feather, no change would occur in the wood. The point of this illustration is that both the active and the acquiescent powers involved are manifestations of the respective animistic striving in the objects. Contrast the chopping paradigm with one drawn from Newtonian physics, which lacks any animistic conceptions. By denying the concept of striving, the Newtonian is forced to accept the notion of inertia; i.e., if things do not strive to be changed, they must simply lie inert until moved by an active force. In an inertia-based theory of causation, there are no acquiescent forces. A stationary billiard ball remains stationary until struck by a moving object, which in some sense "transfers" the power to move to it. In this view, wood is an inert substance, and all powers are vested in the moving axe which transmits energy to the wood, thereby literally causing chips to fly. It is essential to emphasize Aristotle's quite different idea, that the object undergoing change manifests its striving in an acquiescent power; through this conception, Aristotle focuses on the characteristics of the object being changed and thereby avoids postulating a uniform force such as energy or a concept such as inertia. For him change is at least as much a function of the characteristics of the thing changed as it is a function of the application of external force by another thing.3® It is logically possible, under the inertia system of causation, for an acorn to be changed into an apple if the proper forces are brought to bear. But for Aristotle the acorn's powers limit it to becoming an oak tree, food for squirrels, or perhaps fuel for a fire. The Aristotelian scheme assumes that passive factors within the object being changed influence and indeed modify the kinds of changes that can occur.87 It is clear then that Aristotle recognizes both active and passive powers, and that there is a qualitative difference between these powers.38 Why this difference is no semantic quibble may be seen in Aristotle's psychological theory: " Metaphysics, 1046a 19-27. " De Anima, 426a 4-11. *7 Randall, Aristotle, 216. ,8 Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione [hereafter referred to as: De Generatione], trans. Η. H. Joachim, Basic Works, 335b 30-32.

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The two highest functions involved in living, sensing and knowing, which he ... treats as "passive powers", ... must be seen in the context of the active power of desire (orexis), for they modify and direct it: that is why they are grouped together as to kritikoti, the power of discriminating and selecting." It is not enough to know what stimuli are impinging on an organism in order to predict what response the organism will make. It is also necessary to know the kinds of responses a particular organism is capable of making to any given stimulus.40 In modern terms we might say that Aristotle recognizes qualitative differences in energies, that an active force merely sets in operation the energy peculiar to a particular object, and that the object, in a sense, brings about its own change with the aid of the outside force: Every operation is really a cooperation of two different powers, a joint operation of the power of acting and the power of being acted upon. It is the peculiarity of Aristotle's usage that he assigns the locus of this cooperation to the thing being acted upon. A modern would probably deal more pragmatically with the question of locus, and assign it in terms of where the process could most effectively be controlled.41 In this concept of the cooperation of powers, the pervasive influence of animism is once again evident. Another aspect of the qualitative difference in energies is the assumption that any individual object may possess an inexhaustible number of powers,42 each capable of coming into play relative to a particular stimulus. An axe may possess an active power to chop wood and an acquiescent power to be melted by fire; similarly, wood has the passive power, for example, to be chopped or shaped into a house, as well as the active power to hurt a dog (when used as a stick) or to break glass. Whether a thing is agent or passive object will depend on the kinds of active and passive powers involved. All the pushing in the world will not turn water to ice, for water possesses a passive power to be turned to ice only by cold. Change occurs m the passive object only with the cooperation of that object. In sum, the second causal assumption postulates that the perfective impulses will be manifested in the process of change as cooperating active and acquiescent forces.

DYNAMIC RE-ALIGNMENT

The third dynamic assumption about causality first may be approached negatively — it is the denial of energy transmission. It is common for us in the modern world to think of energy as a kind of quantum, like ether or phlogiston. The layman's idea of a process is that an object containing "energy" comes in contact with one lacking "

Randall, Aristotle, 69. For a modern recognition of this attitude, see W. E. Vinacke, "The Complexities of Thinking", Psychological Bulletin, LIX (1962), 450-456. 41 Randall, Aristotle, 191-192. 42 Randall, Aristotle, 176. 40

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it and transmits or transfers the energy, thereby altering the second object. For example, a hammer strikes a nail and transfers the kinetic force to the nail, which in turn is imbedded in wood. The critic drawing his assumptions from Aristotle finds that Aristotle's idea is quite different. Because Aristotle demands a generic relation between objects of change and agents of change, he hesitates to claim that there is any such thing as "energy". In this he resembles the child: In child dynamics ... every substance is endowed with a sui generis force, unacquired and untransmissible, constituting the very essence of its activity. Every body, since it is alive, is the seat of personal activity. One living being may very well "give force" to another living being, but there is no question here of any transmission. The one simply excites or awakens the force of the other. This is why, if we try to find out exactly what a child means when he says that a force sets an object in motion, we always discover the idea of mutual excitation: the external force simply calls forth the internal force which belongs to the moving object. There is no transitive movement, there is only excitation of one living thing by another. Force is not transmitted, but awakened. 48

Of course Aristotle recognizes the difference between living and non-living things and he is unwilling to grant consciousness or will to inanimate objects: "To have the principle of motion within oneself is not entirely the same as to be moved by oneself".44 But neither is he ready to give up the notion of personal force for one involving the transmission of an unobservable entity like "energy", which smacks of magic and non-systematic thought. Instead Aristotle visualizes the powers involved in change as clearly distinct even though change itself is seen as a unified process: ... in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be 'capable' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on. ... But the other potency is in the agent.... 44

In fact, Aristotle explicitly denies the presence of an intermediate agent or quantum between active and passive objects in contact with each other: That which is the first movement of a thing — in the sense that it supplies ... the source of the motion — is always together with that which is moved by it (by 'together' I mean that there is nothing intermediate between them). This is universally true wherever one thing is moved by another. 4 * It is evident, therefore, that between the extremities of the moved and the movement that are respectively first and last in reference to the moved there is nothing intermediate. 47

In place of "energy", Aristotle postulates a motivational force in the object, a force stimulated to operation by contact from the agent.48 He notices that agent and ob"

Piaget, Physical Causality, 118-119. Solmsen, Aristotle's System, 100-101. " Metaphysics, 1046a 19-26. 44 Physica, 243a 2-5. 4 ' Physica, 245a 19-245b 2. 44 Metaphysics, 1033a 23-1033b 32. 44

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ject must contact each other in order for movement to occur,*® but he is not able to see anything resembling a flow of energy. He instead chooses to assume that objects are capable of "natural" motion if the agent, in a sense, reacts in such a way that obstacles to such motion are removed.60 He goes on to define movement as: ...the fulfillment of the movable qua movable, the cause of the attribute being contact with what can move...." The emphasis is on "fulfillment". The agent may act as vehicle for the form matter will take; but it is this undifferentiated matter of the movable that incorporates the impetus to become a "this".62 Inorganic objects will of course contain non-volitional internal motivations which are capable of being activated by the proper external agent. A stone, for instance, does not have the ability to shape itself into a statue as the acorn has of growing into a tree. But by exerting a readiness to be cut, the stone does partake of the shaping process.63 What it lacks is the power to direct its energy constructively, a power supplied by the agent: So it is clear that in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself the source of motion — not of moving something or of causing motion, but of suffering it.54 The distinction between the active and acquiescent forces is repeated in organic objects, including the behavior of humans. It is illustrated in the process of sensing,66 where the power of seeing and the power to be seen are distinct and in no way connected by the transmission of "energies".66 Again, in social relations, though the teacher may act as an agent in the learning process the teacher's energies require the cooperation of energies within the student if learning is to occur.67 It is especially germane to the purpose of this thesis to note that Aristotle specifically extends the idea of cooperating forces, as opposed to energy transfer, into the realm of artistic process: The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of thought: — since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g. a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something which he himself can produce. Then the process from this point onward, i.e., the process toward health, is called a 'making'. Therefore it follows that in a sense health comes from health and house from house, that with matter from that without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and of the house, and when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence.58 "

Physica, 244a 14-16. Physica, 255b 13-256a 3; Solmsen, Aristotle's System, 101. " Physica, 202a 6-8. " Physica, 202a 9-11. ·» Metaphysics, 1034a 10-21. " Physica, 255b 29-31. " De Anima, 424a 17-24. " De Anima, 433b 13-30. " Physica, 202b 10-17. " Metaphysics, 1032b 6-14.

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When we come to consider the Aristotelian critic's point of view respecting communicative process we shall have need to recall this denial of "transmission" in favor of motivational stimulation. In connection with the denial that a single entity such as "energy" exists, it has been inferred that what causes change is a kind of hypostatic end which exerts a "pulling" force on the object: ...everything that comes to be moves toward a principle, i.e., an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired. For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight in order that they may see. And similarly men have the art of building in order that they may build. ... Further, matter exists in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form. And the same holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a movement.89 Aristotle's commentators 80 err in reading volition rather than simple striving into this passage, an interpretation which Aristotle denies to all but living things. 61 Taken literally the passage is merely saying that certain dynamic processes result in predictable ends: The active power is a 'cause' in the sense of that from which the process originates; but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not 'active'. (That is why health is not 'active', except metaphorically). For when the agent is there, the patient becomes something: but when 'states' are there, the patient no longer becomes but already is — and 'forms' (i.e., 'ends') are a kind of 'state'. As to the 'matter', it (qua matter) is passive. Now fire contains 'the hot' embodied in matter; but a 'hot' separate from matter (if such a thing existed) could not suffer any action.42 The end is indeed an integral part of change, but it is external to the process itself. The end is the goal toward which the object strives, the essential and inherent form of being that matter tries to achieve: ...it is the stimulus (though not a mechanical stimulus), the point toward which the process is directed.98 In the Aristotelian conception of psychological processes, the end is the object of desire, not itself affected by being desired. In fact, the end is external to the process in the same way that food may act as a stimulus to a hungry person's desires and yet be external to the psychological process of desiring and seeking food. The end is the fulfillment of the subject-in-process. 64 Our purpose in exploring at length the relation of the end to dynamic process in M

Metaphysics, 1050a 7-18. Ross, Aristotle, 177; Brunschvicg, L'expirience humaine, 131-153. n Metaphysics, 1048a 1-24. ,a De Generatione, 324b 14-21. 63 Randall, Aristotle, 71. ·* Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium [hereafter referred to as: De Partibus], trans. W. Ogle, Basic Works, 640a 33-640b 5.

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non-volitional as well as artistic contexts is to establish clearly the philosophical basis of the critic-observer when he adopts an Aristotelian causal model. It is obviously possible for an observer who has limited and unreliable knowledge of the personal volition of the participants in communication to still make meaningful statements about the course change will take. He merely shifts his focus from the non-observable volitions of the participant to the end aimed at, which is external and observable. Foss has captured the significance of the end as a contextual variable operating in a system which denies the transmission of energy: In this process the necessary meaning lies permanently ahead of the potential consciousness as its direction and future. This meaning appears, therefore, as revealed. But this "revelation" does not originate in a realm foreign to the entity to which it is addressed and does not reach backward from a future, totally detached from the present. The future, although in the course of developing, is somehow already there. ... This inner articulation of the actual and potential, of present and future, is an awareness, not of a detached object, but of its own direction and development.'6 In order to restrict the range of possible ends one should expect to observe in a given process, Aristotle makes the kind of change which occurs a function of the context.66 Actuality, that is, the end, understood as context: ...is prior both to potency and to every principle of change.·' The end is the fulfillment of incomplete processes68 as evidenced by motion; 69 thus, actuality is nothing more than a manifestation of the kind of striving forces at work in a particular context: ...coming-to-be and passing-away occur within the field of 'that which can-be-and-not-be'. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of the material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their 'end', is their 'figure' or 'form' — and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.70 For example, though water does not possess the power to evaporate by itself, so that heat must act as agent in the process,71 we nevertheless get some insight into the essential forces in water (those related to its attribute of suffering evaporation) by noting the manner in which its qualities may be realigned in the context wherein change occurs.72 The Metaphysics makes this interpretation explicit: Is there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spheres, or a house apart from the bricks? Rather we may say that no 'this' would ever have been coming to be, if this had been so, 85 M. Foss, Symbol and Metaphor (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1949) [hereafter cited as: Foss, Symbol], 73-74. " Metaphysics, 1050a 23-28. 47 Metaphysics, 1051a 2-3. •8 T. Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition (Kyoto, Japan, By the author, 1958) [hereafter cited as: Ando, Cognition], 106. ·» Metaphysics, 1047a 32. 70 De Generatione, 335b 4-8. 71 De Generatione, 335b 30-336a 11. " De Generatione, 319b 5-20.

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but that the 'form' means a 'such' if not a 'this' — a definite thing; but the artist makes, or the father begets a 'such' out of a 'this', and when it has been begotten, it is a 'this such'. ... In some cases indeed it is even obvious that the begetter is of the same kind as the begotten (not, however the same nor one in number, but in form) ... for man begets man. ... Obviously, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to set up a Form as a pattern, ... the begetter is adequate to the making of the produce and to the causing of the form in the matter ... and they are different in virtue of their matter ... but the same in form; for their form is indivisible.™ Context will thus delimit the kind of change which can result and provide information as to the peculiar configuration of forces being aligned and manifested in a particular piece of matter.74 But the fact that the essential form must arise out of characteristics inherent in the matter indicates that the agent plays a limited role in the process; the object being changed contains the necessary forces and these are restructured by the particular stimulation of the agent: ...every product of art is produced from a thing which shares its name ... for the cause of a thing's producing the produce directly per se is a part of the product. The heat in the movement caused heat in the body, and this is either health, or a part of health, or is followed by a part of health or by health itself. And so it is said to cause health, because it causes that to which health attaches as a consequence. Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art. For the seed is productive in the same way as the things that work by art; for it has the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in a sense the same name as the offspring. ...78 The source of change may be either inside or outside the object, but unless the object is in a state of readiness to change, or be changed, the mere presence of an external stimulus is insufficient." The power to be changed must itself be translated into a readiness to change in the absence of an impeding context,77 and such a translation does not involve a transmission of energy. This complicated account of how dynamic realignment must be understood without the aid of an energy-transfer concept begins to do more than merely postulate the ontological nature of change. It also lays the ground for observing and talking about change in terms that will satisfy the critic of human communication. The assumptions about change begin to form a unified system for defining the observer, his observations, and the causal propositions the observer will be justified in using when discussing those observations. We have so far accounted for three such assumptions concerning change: (1) All parts of matter are continually striving to take on the form which their nature allows them to assume. " 74 75 7β 77

Metaphysics, 1033b 19-1034a 8. De Generation:, 338b 6-20. Metaphysics, 1034a 21-1034b 1. Metaphysics, 1048b 36-1049a 18. Physica, 254b 31-255a 7.

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33

(2) Change requires the presence of both active and acquiescent powers relative to a particular context. (3) The process of change involves no such thing as a transmission of energy. Rather, it consists of a realignment of forces in the acquiescent object under the stimulation of contact from the agent. The particular kind of stimulation exerted by the agent and responded to by the object will be reflected in the resulting process or product emerging from the motion. The particular end does not "pull" the object toward its perfective form, but once the context is determined, a given kind of end will necessarily follow.78 Thus far we have been dealing with Aristotelian explanations for change illustrated by the phenomenon of one day seeing a small kitten and in its place a few months later, a large cat. By positing animistic tendencies and forces in all objects, Aristotle finds at least a partial explanation for the changes he observes. But what of things that do not change? The book lying motionless on the table also has animistic energies; why does it appear to remain stable?

DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM

Aristotle is able to reconcile observation and premise with a fourth postulate: of those things that are sometimes at rest and sometimes changing, the state of rest is actually a manifestation of a stable equilibrium existing between the object and its environment. Thus: The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by not having a potency but by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a 'potency' and because they 'can' do something and are in some positive state." Hence lack of change will be due to a positive force in the object which can resist the particular agent, thus sustaining the object: ...all potencies are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e., the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change.80 ,s

We are treating here the logic of dynamic process in a particular event rather than the teleological character of some generic process such as evolution. This explains the seeming contradiction to the assertion that "the end does not pull" found in Physics, 198b l-199b 1. '· Metaphysics, 1019a 26-31. Metaphysics, 1046a 9-15.

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...bodies are insusceptible so long as they are not in contact either with one another or with other bodies which are by nature such as to act and suffer action.81

Wood will be cut by iron, for iron has an active force which is the complement of wood's passive force. Wood also possesses a force to resist cutting attempts by cotton fiber.82 Contrast this notion of dynamic forces in equilibrium manifested in a stable context with the mechanistic conception of stability. For the mechanist, the billiard ball exists in a static condition until a moving object strikes it, transfers kinetic energy to it, and thus imparts motion to the heretofore inert object.83 Similarly, a loaf of bread rests inert on the table until someone translates energy into a form suitable to act on it, usually, but not necessarily using a knife. The conception of interacting forces here is quite different from the Aristotelian conception we have just reviewed. Moreover, for Aristotle, the opposite of change84 is not a static but a dynamic state: ...we must not say that this absence of change is a state of rest: we must say that it is similar to a state of rest and call it absence of change.85

This concept of an equilibrium in a context is applicable to processes as well as to products and objects. Food and a living organism, for instance, incorporate forces which maintain the process of living: ...the psychic power which we are now studying may be described as that which tends to maintain whatever has this power in it of continuing such as it was, and food helps it to do this work. That is why, if deprived of food, it must cease to be.86

If Aristotle had possessed our vocabulary, he might have said that stable contexts and processes exhibit homeostatic characteristics. However, without the benefit of our experience or terminology, he had to approach such concepts obliquely. Yet if stability is itself a dynamic equilibrium of forces, how does it differ from the process of change? This problem brings us to a crucial passage in Aristotle. If change or motion results from an imbalance of forces, then the resolution of this imbalance exhibits an orderly structure, such that dynamic tension is restored by an adjustment in the context to accommodate the forces involved: But we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it does not; for it is not at any and every time. For example, is earth potentially a man? No — but rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then. It is just as it is with being healed; not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy. And (1) the delimiting mark of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hin81 83 88 81 85 88

De Generatione, 327a 2-4. Physica, 200b 5-8. Joad, Guide, 185. Physica, 229b 22-230a 8. Physica, 230a 16-17. De Anima, 416b 17-19.

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35

ders, while the condition on the other side — viz. in that which is healed — is that nothing in it hinders the result. ... And (2) in the case in which the source of the becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. For example, the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass).*7

On the one hand this passage gives further confirmation of the assumption that an object which does not change is either not in a suitable context or else does not contain a readiness or tendency to change in a given way and so must contain forces resisting the agents of that particular change. But on the other hand, the passage suggests that the paradigm of a single book lying motionless on a table is too simple to explain the process of change in the language of order, which is the requirement of the fifth postulate.

TENDENCY TO ORDER

Consider how Aristotle, as a member of a primitive society, might accommodate the following more complicated cases to his notion of dynamic tensions and equilibriums. First, he notices two books leaning upright against each other and so supporting each other in the form of a stable triangle (with the table forming the base). When pressure is applied to one book the dynamic equilibrium is replaced by an imbalance of forces. This imbalance necessarily resolves itself as both books topple over and achieve a new equilibrium, this time with both books flat on the table. Or he considers a related paradigm in the realm of natural change. An acorn is left on the ground. Left to itself the acorn will interact with its environment and eventually achieve a stable equilibrium as it grows into an oak tree. But a squirrel may come along and eat the acorn. In this case the acorn will still reach a resolution with the environment, changing in this context into part of the squirrel. And for the squirrel's part, the eating of acorns satisfies a dynamic imbalance in him which manifests itself as hunger. The squirrel does not chew gravel, for gravel does not contain forces necessary for the resolution of its hunger. Such paradigms as these seem to have had two implications for Aristotle. First, change or motion is a manifestation of a kind of dynamic imbalance existing among forces in the context. Second, the change or motion will be orderly in the sense that it will reflect an accommodation or adaptation of forces in the context to each other. Given a particular type of dis-equilibrium, a suitable adjustment of forces will follow, restoring dynamic tension under the new conditions. The acorn swallowed by the squirrel always becomes a squirrel, never an oak tree. In this respect it is instructive to compare Aristotle with the modern Gestalt psy87

Metaphysics, 1048b 36-1049a 18.

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chologist.88 The Gestalt law of "Prägnanz" suggests that, due to the tendency of dynamic "fields" to maintain equilibrium, the psychological field of the organism (or organ) will always exhibit direction and stability of a particular sort.89 But the Gestaltist makes one distinction which Aristotle does not make. Although recognizing the "functional" basis of psychological process in external physical events,90 the Gestalt psychologist believes that the mind exerts an important influence over and above actual physical events in organizing our cognitive environment.91 Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to feel that the order exists prior to mind, "out there". The mind does not contain the forms and impose them on the world, for mind, as nous, is passive and merely receives forms,92 separating them out from the objects in which they naturally inhere and apart from which they do not exist.93 This brings us to the question of how dynamic imbalances occur. Imbalances of forces may occur in a context for a number of reasons: they may arise in the natural course of things as objects strive to perfect themselves;94 or one object may move so as to hinder an ongoing process;96 or objects with conflicting or contrary tendencies might come into contact, as in the case of fire and water.9® This "imbalance" will in fact be a confrontation of forces which demands a resolution or return to a stable equilibrium: ...all things that are capable respectively of affecting and being affected, or of causing motion and being moved, are capable of it not under all conditions, but only when they are in a particular condition and approach one another: so it is on the approach of one thing to another that the one causes motion and the other is moved, and when they are present under such conditions as rendered the one motive and the other moved. So if motion was not always in process, it is clear that they must have been in a condition not such as to render them capable respectively of being moved ... and one or other of them must have been in process of change... ... everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this. And it has the potency in question when the passive object is present and is in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act. (To add the qualification "if nothing external prevents it" is not further necessary; for it has the potency on the terms on which this is a potency of acting, and it is not ·· Randall, Aristotle, 67.

" K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (N.Y., Harcourt, Brace, 1935), 110; E. R. Hilgard, Theories of Learning (1948; 2nd ed., N.Y., Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), 227-229. ,0 W. Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (1947; N.Y., Mentor Paperback, 1959) [hereafter cited as: Köhler, Gestalt Psychology], 124.

" Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, 102-127; for a neurological explanation of this position see K. S. Lashley, "The Problem of Serial Order in Behavior", Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior, ed. L. A. Jeffress (N.Y., Wiley and Sons, 1951), 112-136. »2 De Anima, 431b 24-432a 14. " Metaphysics, 1033b 19-24. M Physica, 320b 13-321a 20. " Physica, 254b 20-36. »· De Generatione; 327a 2-4; Randall, Aristotle, 173-174. ·'

Physica, 251b.

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37

in all circumstances but on certain conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances ...·* ...no absurdity is involved in the fact that something not in motion may be set in motion, that which caused the motion from without being at one time present, and at another absent.·· Motion is evidence of the imbalance of forces in a given context, for it suggests a process of becoming or of perfecting, a tendency toward a stable actuality: ...a thing that is merely capable of having a certain size is not undergoing change, not a thing that is actually of a certain size, and motion is thought to be a sort of actuality, incomplete, the reasons for this view being that the potential whose actuality it is is complete.100 ...the potential is in process to actuality, and motion is an incomplete actuality of movable. 101

yet but inthe

In this sense, change can be seen as a kind of adjustment which occurs in a context where forces are not in harmony. In the case of fire, which naturally has an upward motion, 102 whenever a fire occurs, the flame will display an upward motion even if it is directed downward and thereby unnaturally hindered. 103 This natural tendency will constitute part of the essence of fire.104 The context exhibits a lack of adjustment when a heavy object is unnaturally held aloft. 106 Such an imbalance of forces does not indicate that the object has become a different thing, but only that its qualities are adaptable to a context in flux: ...our assumption is that things that are undergoing alteration are altered in virtue of their being affected in respect of their so-called affective qualities, since that which is of a certain quality is altered in so far as it is sensible. ... But the alteration of that which undergoes alteration is also caused by the above-mentioned characteristics, which are affections of some particular underlying quality. 10 · Or the lack of adjustment may involve the striving or hindrance of such striving of a particular relative to its form: ...excellence is a perfection ... while defect is a perishing of or departure from this condition. So just as when speaking of a house we do not call its arrival at perfection an alteration ... the same also holds good in the case of excellences and defects and of the persons or things that possess or acquire them: for excellences are perfections of a thing's nature and defects are departures from it: consequently they are not alterations. 107 Thus it is perfectly reasonable to speak of objects possessing essential natures which " "

Metaphysics, 1048a 13-20. Physica, 253a 2-4. 100 Physica, 201b 29-32. 101 Physica, 257b 8-9. 1M Physica, 230b 10-15. 10 » Physica, 255b 20-25. 104 Physica, 255b 14-17. 105 Physica, 254b 24-255a 5. 1M Physica, 244b 2-6. 107 Physica, 246a 12-246b 2.

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exist in and adjust to contexts which may retard these objects from achieving their essence. In a museum, a stone becomes a statue, i.e., in a radically unsuitable context where adjustment is impossible, there is the same essence, material, etc., but a new "this". It has been altered by the artist in the usual manner, so that its appearance as a particular form is also part of its reality; this manifestation is adapted to the order of the context.108 The object may temporarily cease its perfective striving without losing it,109 for: ...just as there is unnatural motion, so, too, a thing may be in an unnatural state of rest.110 The relation of an object or process to a context where forces are in flux is most clearly expressed in the act of sensing: ...that which makes something such as it itself actually is makes the other such because the other is already potentially such. That is why when an object of touch is equally hot and cold or hard and soft we cannot perceive; what we perceive must have a degree of the sensible quality lying beyond the neutral point... . l u In this instance, the existence of an unadjusted context does not result in a literal movement,112 for sensing is in and of itself an activity;113 but in order for sensation to occur there must first exist two dissimilar factors (the colored object and the standard of color in the eye), which create a contrast to serve as the basis for an adjustment in the act of comparison.114 At any rate, it is not the particular object itself which is out of balance, but those of its forces which are not adjusted to the context in which the object finds itself: ...how can we account for the motion of light things and heavy things to their proper situations? The reason for it is that they have a natural tendency respectively towards a certain position: and this constitutes the essence of lightness and heaviness. ... Thus not only when a thing is in water is it in a sense potentially light ... for it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position. ... The process whereby what is of a certain quality changes to a condition of active existence is similar...116 Aristotle is willing to grant that some things are either always at rest116 or always in motion,117 and since these things do not change118 they are of no concern to us. But for things that may either rest or move, rest will be achieved in a context where forces are in harmonious equilibrium. A pen may be close enough to equilibrium so that it will simply lie on the table and resist the forces of decay. In a given context, some 1M

Physica, 200b 34-201a 3; Metaphysics, 1034b 8-19. ' Physica, 251b 29-252a 1. 110 Physica, 231a 8-9. 111 De Anima, 424a 1-4. 111 De Anima, 431a 5-8. 113 De Anima, 417a 12-20. 114 De Anima, 417b 6-418a 6. 115 Physica, 255b 14-23. lle Physica, 260a 11-19. 117 Physica, 261b 27-29. 118 Physica, 254a 12-13. 10

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objects or processes, however, exhibit instability of force. A lifted rock tends to press downward; but if the rock is unnaturally prevented from falling, it may seem to be in a state of rest. To the extent that it is unable to satisfy its natural tendencies, the object's qualities are required to adjust to the context,119 while the object maintains its essential identity, in this case, a bit of earth. This accommodation of the object to the context involves adjustment of the forces which are in disequilibrium, an adjustment which displays a tendency to order in the universe120 through the type of resolutions which are effected. Brunschvicg sees in this tendency to order a notion contrary to Aristotle's animistic postulates: Car nous touchons au point ou divergent inevitablement les deux tendances dominantes de la philosophic aristotelicienne: Vartificialism et le naturalisme. Aristote parle tour ä tour comme un sculpteur et comme un biologiste: sculpteur et biologiste ne peuvent pas ne pas interpreter en sens contraire les rapports de la mature et de la forme.121 Mais cette fonction de prdvision ne s'accomplit pas en faisant de l'avenir la resultant ηέcessaire d'un certain nombre de conditions dont chacune est prealablement d£termin6e; l'anticipation de ce qui sera n'est que le souvenir de ce qui a ete. L'homme explique l'enfant, en ce double sens que l'enfant devient homme, et que l'enfant vient de Fhomnie. L'attitude d'Aristote est une attitude esthetique, non seulement devant l'art lui-meme, mais devant la vie. Au lieu de procöder des parties au tout, des moyens ä la fin, il veut n'apercevoir les moyens qu'ä travers la fin, les parties qu'ä travers le tout. De ce point de vue, chaque etre se suffit a lui-meme, en relation avec son moteur invisible qui le guide vers sa destinee, et qui est son ame. L'enfant devient homme parce qu'il a une ame humaine. Mais cette äme lui a 6t6 transmise: il l'a re?ue de son generateur. Entre rhomme et l'honune, l'un qui est le pfere et l'autre qui est le fils, il y a la relation qui est entre deux existences distinctes, il y a l'opposition de la cause ä l'effet. Ainsi, comme il arrive ä tant de formules aristoeliciennes, la proposition que l'homme engendre rhomme, laisse l'esprit ind&is entre deux directions contraires: immanence et transcendance. D'une part, les etres se developpent en realisant la forme propre qui leur est inhörent, qui est eux-memes en ce que leur rdalitd a d'intime et de sp6cifique. D'autre part, cette realisation suppose, en chacun d'eux cependant, une aspiration a dipasser son 6tat actuel, qui ne peut pas s'expliquer tout entire sans un attrait vers une fin supirieure et, en une certaine mesure, extirieure."2 To understand Brunschvicg's interpretation, it is necessary to realize that resolutions of forces are spoken of in two senses. Imagine Aristotle, the naive observer, trying to account for the alterations which may occur to a simple lump of stone. If he throws it in the air it adjusts to the context by resisting the upward motion and falling back to earth. If he heats it, it adjusts by itself becoming hot and thereby maintaining a kind of harmony in the context. These events would lead one to expect that a resolution of forces involving an alteration in the particular object are merely modifications of a sort: "· 1.0 1.1

Metaphysics, 1050b 28-1051a 13. Physica, 252a 12-13. Brunschvicg, Vexpirience humaine, 134. Brunschvicg, Vexpirience humaine, 152.

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For the subject or substratum is differentiated by being a 'this' or not being one; i.e., the substratum of modification is, e.g., a man ... while the modification is 'musical' or 'pale'.1®8 And the extent to which the object is able to adjust to the environment will be determined by the essential configuration of forces in the particular object or process. In living things, for instance: ...we must ask what is the force that holds together the earth and the fire which tend to travel in contrary directions; if there is no counteracting force they will be torn asunder; if there is, this must be the soul and the cause of nutrition and growth. By some the element of fire is held to be the cause. ... A concurrent cause in a sense it certainly is, but not the principal cause; that is rather the soul; for while the growth of fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply of fuel, in the case of all complex wholes formed in the course of nature there is a limit or ratio which determines their size and increase, and limit and ratio are marks of soul but not of fire, and belong to the side of formulable essence rather than that of matter.124 In the case of a particular change it is a resolution of forces in the context that occurs. When the rock is heated, it is not a hypostatic heat that is involved, but a manifestation of dynamic adjustment in the form of heating.125 It is in this sense of manifestation of adjustment in terms of attributes of a particular object that motion is defined as "...the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially..."12® By this Aristotle means that the resolution of forces in a context is relative to a particular object or process within that context rather than to what the object might be in its perfective (and hence quiescent) state: ...corruptible things imitate the incorruptible, by being always in act as far as the limitations of movement allow.127 Efficient causality therefore involves imperfection. It is something incomplete. It has its ultimate actuality in something else. ... The efficient cause is of its nature always in act, as far as motion allows.128 Aristotle understands simple alteration as an adjustment brought about as a subject in process relates to its context. But he is puzzled. He cuts his rock in a certain way, and it is no longer just a rock but a statue: Bronze is potentially a statue. But it is not the fulfillment of bronze as bronze which is motion.129 ...when a particular formation of a thing is complete, we do not call it by the name of its material: e.g. we do not call the statue 'bronze' or the pyramid 'wax' or the bed 'wood', 128

Metaphysics, 1049a 26-29. De Anima, 416a 6-18. 126 Metaphysics, 1067b 5-14. 1M Physica, 201a 10-11. 127 J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics" (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951) [hereafter cited as: Owens, Doctrine], 251. 128 Owens, Doctrine, 253. 12 » Physica, 201a 30-31. 134

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but we use a derived expression and call them 'of bronze', 'waxen', and 'wooden respectively. But when a thing has been affected and altered in any way we still call it by the original name: thus we speak of the bronze or the wax being dry or fluid or hard or hot. And not only so: we also speak of the particular fluid or hot substance as being bronze, giving the material the same name as that which we used to describe the affection. Since, therefore, having regard to the figure or shape of a thing we no longer call that which has become of a certain figure by the name of the material that exhibits the figure, whereas having regard to a thing's affections or alterations we still call it by the name of its material, it is evident that becomings of the former kind cannot be alterations. Though it may be true that every such becoming is necessarily the result of something's being altered, the result, e.g., of the material's being condensed or rarefied or heated or cooled, nevertheless it is not the things that are coming into existence that are altered, and their becoming is not an alteration. Again, acquired states, ... are not alterations. For some are excellences and others are defects, and neither excellence nor defect is an alteration: excellence is a perfection ... while defect is a perishing of or departure from this condition.180 Does not this change of terminology from 'bronze' to 'statue' somehow indicate that a new essence has manifested itself and replaced that of bronzeness? The man who above all else wishes to abolish the mysterious from his dynamic conception has in this simple linguistic event come upon a seemingly impenetrable paradox. 181 Aristotle escapes his dilemma by insisting that we can only comprehend these dynamic forces of nature by recognizing the end for which their operations are manifested;132 that is, by knowing the particular context in which change occurs,183 we can understand the orderly process in which the forces have been resolved. If a changing process occurs whereby the stone is altered and still remains a stone, the change is clearly understood. The case of perfective change, i.e., the striving of an object's forces to achieve the perfect state, is similar: in both cases it is the same forces which are realigned in the observable products: ...we have a complete doctor or a complete flute player, when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their proper excellence. And thus, transferring the word to bad things, we speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even call them good, i.e., a good thief and a good scandal-monger. And excellence is a completion. ... The things which have attained their end, this being good, are called complete; for things are completed in virtue of their having attained their end.1'4 In the same way, if we accept our inability to observe the forces themselves and confine our explanations to the ends manifested, we will perceive that when a transcendent change of form (as from "statue" to "statue of Hermes") occurs in a single particular, the change implies the same orderly realignment of forces as in simple altera180

Physica, 245b 9-246a 17. Brunschvicg, La philosophie de Vesprit (Paris, Presses Universitäres de France, 1949), 49. 182 S. Mansion, Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote (Paris, Brouver, 1946) [hereafter cited as: Mansion, Jugement (Γexistence], 82. 188 J. P. Anton, Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957) [hereafter cited as: Anton, Contrariety], 27. 184 Metaphysics, 1021b 16-26. 181

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tion, and in fact allows us to perceive an order which was implicit in the particular object all along: And the case is similar in regard to the states of the soul, all of which ... exist in virtue of particular relations, the excellences being productions of nature and the defects departures from it; moreover, excellence puts its possessor in a bad condition to meet his proper affections. Consequently these cannot any more than the bodily states be alterations, nor can the processes of losing and acquiring them be so, though their becoming is necessarily the result of an alteration of the sensitive part of the soul, and this is altered by sensible objects.... 1 "

Aristotle can observe that alterations occur in the particular and that these manifest changes can lead to what he considers an entirely new configuration of forces.136 Speaking in terms of resolution of forces (genetically), the change which occurs is a mere alteration. But from the point of view of the emergent object, the end assumes a qualitatively different character: ...for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially. ... We also speak of a thing's nature as being exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained. ... What grows qua growing grows from something into something. Into what then does it grow? Not into that from which it arose but into that to which it tends.1®7

Thus it is a statue that emerges from the cutting operation and not just a cut stone. That a new thing emerges in this type of change does not imply a magical substitution of objects. Rather, it indicates a major reconstitution of the forces in an orderly configuration: Now the order of actual development and the order of logical existence are always the inverse of each other. For that which is posterior in the order of development is antecedent in the order of nature, and that is genetically last which in nature is first... In order of time, then, the material and the generative process must necessarily be anterior to the being that is generated; but in logical order the definitive character and form of each being precedes the material. This is evident if one only tries to define the process of formation. For the definition of house-building includes and presupposes that of the house; but the definition of the house does not include, nor presuppose that of housebuilding; and the same is true of all other productions. 188

Imagine how Aristotle would conceive of a stretching rubber band. When stretched to just short of the breaking point, the rubber band has been altered without a major reconstitution of the forces taking place. If the rubber band now breaks, there is a new object, i.e., a totally new force configuration has been produced although the matter remains essentially the same. In one sense, there has just been a further alteration by means of the stretching process. But yet a different thing is there, i.e., a piece of rubber instead of a rubber band. 1,5 138 137 1,8

Physica, 246b 20-147a 8. Physica, 236a 7-14. Physica, 193b 7-18. De Partibus, 646a 25-646b 5.

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43

To amplify further, imagine a child trying to explain a kaleidoscope. A given field suddenly reconstitutes itself into a totally new configuration. The child recognizes elements of the prior pattern, but insists that this is a new pattern, not just a modification of the old one. And in speaking of the process of change the child will be forced to compare what is to what was. It will be impossible for him to tell how the present pattern will shape future patterns. And even if specific patterns seem to recur, as in a very simple kaleidoscope, the child will recognize that they are not the same pattern, but only resemble earlier patterns: ... it is evident that those things whose 'substance' — that which is undergoing the process — is ... perishable ... must 'return upon themselves' in the sense that what recurs though specifically the same, is not the same numerically.138 And through it all the child will recognize a common structure imposed by the mechanism in the box and manifested in the recurrent colors and symmetry observed. Any attempts such as these to explain force resolutions with naive intuition depend on the ability to formulate laws which describe how given types of contexts are observed resolving themselves. If man is unable always to predict the course of change, that is because he can observe only the products, never the forces of nature. Given the end products he is able to explain the change which has occurred as the result of orderly processes tending always toward greater order in the context.140 These then are the animistic postulates that a critic might draw as a coherent concept of causation from the Aristotelian corpus. For Aristotle they are less mysterious than ineffable, for he had no tools of observation with which to verify their existence. Implicit in his discussion are these premises about reality: (1) All things, both objects and processes, contain impulses striving to perfect the essential nature of the thing. (2) These impulses are manifested in a given context where change is occurring by the mutual interaction of generically related forces of acting and suffering. (3) There is no transfer of energy in the process of change and so the end of change must be implicit in the elements involved in the change within the given context. (4) Stability is a manifestation of dynamic equilibrium; change is a manifestation of imbalance of forces. (5) An imbalance of forces is resolved by a re-adjustment in the context, exhibiting a simple alteration as the object undergoing change accommodates some of its impulses to the context, or displaying a change that calls for a change of terminology as when there is a drastic realignment of forces and a new or emergent order is observed in the context. The point to emphasize in the last assumption is that everywhere there is order in nature; never do energies release into pure action. Impulses are always modified and controlled in a context. If the essential forces of an object are drastically altered, "» De Generation:, 338b 12-19. Physica, 224b 26.

110

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the object does not disintegrate, but simply reflects the reconfiguration of forces in a new contextual order. Aristotle could never conceive of an atomic bomb. REFERENTIAL GRID

The concept of order gives rise to a sixth assumption about causation: Aristotle discusses order by means of a referential system. This perhaps clarifies Brunschvicg's contention that the conflict between animism and artificialism arises because Aristotle fails to account for the reference point of the observer.141 As Brunschvicg sees it, one who speaks of dynamic tensions and impulses is, as it were, "inside the event or object itself". But Aristotle also assumes order, and order implies a position external to the context, so that the relationship may be perceived. To explore Aristotle's notion of order in terms of a referential system, we must resort once again to our device of speculating about the man rather than the author, Aristotle. He wishes to treat causation in a logical and scientific manner, but how can unseen animistic forces, equilibriums, and strivings be treated? He faces the same problem faced by modern scientists who wish to treat force fields, electrons, and wave perturbations without having actually seen such things. The modern scientist contents himself with mathematical descriptions of the things whose character he cannot know first hand. For example, the modern physicist speaks of "force" as the product of "mass" and "acceleration" as though they were real things. But pressed for a definition of any one of these "entities" he can only explain it in terms of the other two concepts and within the context of the formula. It is almost as though these concepts were tangible objects and the formula were a law which has to be obeyed because it is enforced. We of course realize that this is nonsense, and so does Aristotle,142 but neither the physicist nor Aristotle is able to express himself any other way. Both the physicist and Aristotle conceive of order as a relationship, and each must handle it within a structural system. The only way that Aristotle can describe the orders and processes by which dynamic change is manifested is through a concept similar to the one used to locate a place. Where is Ithaca, New York? It is about 45 miles north of Binghamton, New York. Then where is Binghamton? About 200 miles northwest of New York City. And where is New York City? In the southeast corner of New York State. And where...? The regress is infinite. It is impossible to locate any place except with reference to another place. There is no "place" except within a contextual frame of reference. Just, in fact as the vessel is transportable place, so place is a non-portable vessel. So when what is within a thing which is moved, is moved and changes its place, as a boat on a river, 141

Brunschvicg, L'experience humaine, 138.

"» Metaphysics, 1076a 38-1077b 10.

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what contains plays the part of a vessel rather than that of place. Place on the other hand is rather what is motionless: so it is rather the whole river that is place because as a whole it is motionless. Hence we conclude that the innermost boundary of what contains is place.1" There must be a stable point of departure if we are even to conceive of one particular locus as distinct from others. The modern scientist has such a problem in describing his dynamic concepts and it might be illuminating to follow him as he tries to express himself within a structural system. Suppose he is trying to determine the effect of X amount of a chemical on the weight Y of an object. The scientist is fully aware that he will not be able to "see" what the chemical will do to the object, but that he will only'be able to determine the effect of X on Y with respect to the measurable aspect of Y, the weight. He is also aware that he must systematize his observations in some manner in order to be able to formulate his results in a logical and coherent fashion. To this end, he attempts to orient the elements of his universe. He starts with a stable referential coordinate system within which to locate all of his observations with respect to each other. His referential system consists of an X and Y axis. He may draw the two axes as a horizontal and a vertical line, or at various angles to each other, or in any other manner he chooses. They are merely a referential grid, serving to orient the scientist with respect to his observational data. The scientist marks units on each of his axes, but these units of measurement, say cubic centimeters of chemical and grams of weight, are in a sense arbitrary: they need not correspond to each other and they are selected to suit the convenience of the scientist; for they too are referential devices. The units are intended to aid in distinguishing between various events, and they are considered adequate if it is possible to distinguish event A from event Β with reasonable precision. On his referential grid the scientist proceeds to map his observations. In a way this is an impossible task for he can never take absolutely precise measurements, and even if he could, the mark he would make with his pencil to represent the state of the object-as-observed would be a gross pencil mark covering much more of the grid than necessary. Let us call the exact state of the object as it might be conceived of on the grid, the "point". In turn, the rough approximation of the object's state as it is coarsely represented on the grid is a "dot". The point cannot exist apart from the dot except in the observer's mind, just as the process itself cannot exist apart from its manifestation in the weight of the object. Whether the chemical burns away the object or looses demons to eat it away is beyond the capacity of the observer to say purely on the basis of his measurements. Similarly, the scientist is unable to express the static essence of his observations except with the approximate representation afforded by the dot.144 However, the observer must be satisfied to chart these manifestations of different "» Physica, 212b 13-21. 144 Cf. M. Black, Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1949), 25-28.

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conditions or contexts with a series of dots to represent the effects of varying quantities of the chemical X on the weights of objects Y. The scientist may next connect the dots with a line (though lines are no more real than points) and claim that the line-mark represents the observable effects of the whole process, whereas the dots only represented particular observations of the subject-in-process. He may even speak of "vectors" in conjunction with the line. The line-mark may be considered then as a representation of the vectors at work, just as the dot is a representation of a given static state of the object, for example, "as X increases, Y decreases". Finally, the scientist may go further and devise an "equation" which he claims expresses the essential nature of the process in terms of the successive observations he has made of the outward manifestation (weight of the objects) of the process. With this equation the scientist claims to have captured at least the quantitative aspect of process. In fact, he has merely expressed an orderly relationship between the elements of the event in the context of his stable referential grid. The mysterious creatures which abide in the chemical and/or object may be molecules or demons, and they may operate with enzymes or tiny hammers; it makes no difference. The scientist has brought order to the process by ignoring the causative elements per se and concentrating on representing the manifestations of the process in the oriented space provided by his referential grid. His dots represent the static states of the process, his connecting lines represent the course of change which the manifested aspects follow, and his equation is designed to represent the behavior to be expected in a given state no matter what the context in which the object may find itself. This system of mapping successive static observations gives the appearance of having mapped a dynamic process, though in fact it has only represented successive stages of the process which have been isolated and symbolized by static dots. Perhaps it is the smooth motion of the hand as the dots are connected, or perhaps it is the way the mathematician talks that gives the erroneous impression that the graph is something more than a succession of static approximations.145 It is an easy error to make, but one that must be recognized. Aristotle also faced the problem of how to relate his observations of dynamic events to the static symbols he used to talk about the events. How he met the problem is of crucial concern to the critic. His solution is embodied in the sixth causal assumption. Aristotle treats referentially the aspects of dynamic process that he is otherwise unable to express. In conceiving of order as an aspect of change Aristotle employs a geometric procedure analogous to that used by the modern scientist in testing dynamic events. He deals with the observable, structural aspects of manifestation though he assumes unseen motivational forces at work; he devises a mapping system designed to express the orderly relationships which are representations of the dynamism inherent in process. There are three ideas inherent in such a treatment: 116

Cf. R. P. Agnew, Analytical Geometry and Calculus with Vectors (N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1962) [hereafter cited as: Agnew, Vectors], 124 on the misconception implied in the phrase "The limit of X as Y approaches infinity", which suggests "galloping X's and Y's".

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(1) that one will be able to speak of particular concepts or entities only in relation to other concepts or entities;148 (2) that certain parts of the conceptual system will have to be accepted as given, without discussion;147 and (3) that the formal concepts and structures thus treated will seem to have a kind of existence apart from the objects and processes being examined, although they do not.14® That Aristotle recognizes the need for a referential system is pointed out by Randall: Things can be understood in the way they can be talked about, and they can also be understood as taking part in a dynamic process of change. They lend themselves to intelligible expression in terms of language, and they also have a career, a kind of life. Aristotle therefore developed and used one set of distinctions appropriate to talking, to discourse or logos, and also another set of distinctions appropriate to becoming, to living.14· Aristotle understands that there is a reality which is reflected beneath the sensible appearances which we describe, that manifestations are not the whole of reality, and that those who take the observable world as the only reality are mistaken,160 for: ...if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were not. ... For sensation is surely not sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation; which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case.161 Together with all particular objects and processes,162 there is an aspect of existence which Aristotle recognizes may be separated for speculative purposes.153 The physicist is concerned with this formal aspect of things to the extent that it helps explain the particular things he deals with,164 though he understands full well that it is not the whole of reality. The aspect of reality, called "discursive" by Randall156 and "distributive" by Anton,166 which can be treated in this formal way will be the manifest and thereby static aspect of process, that is, the structure. Instead of the points and dots of the scientist, Aristotle represents observations by using subjects and predicates in the form of propositions. For example, in the statement, "Socrates is a man", "Socrates" is the particular force in the process of becoming, and "man" is the stable manifest structure toward which they strive relative to other forces. Even if Socrates has one leg and "man" is a "two-legged animal", so that "Socrates" is an imperfect configuration, 14e

Metaphysics, 1020b 26-1021b 11. Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora [hereafter referred to as: Analytica Posteriora], trans. G. R. G. Mure, Basic Works, 76a 29-35. 148 Metaphysics, 1033b 26-1034a 8. 14 ' Randall, Aristotle, 59. 1,0 Metaphysics, 1009b l-1010a 2. 151 Metaphysics, 1010b 30-101 la 2. " a Chen, Concepts, 37-40. "» De Anima, 431b 12-19. 144 Physica, 194b 10-15. 164 Randall, Aristotle, 121. "· Anton, Contrariety, 10-11. 147

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"man" is the clear case toward which a class of particulars strive. This striving is represented in the proposition. Why are not those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped? ... if ... one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak' [sic.]; for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze?' The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What, then, causes this — that which was potential to be actual — except ... the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere's becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either. Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality. ... But of the things which have no matter [i.e., Forms] ... each is by its nature a kind of unity [i.e., an orderly relationship].... ...as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually. ... Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality.167 Ando notes that both desire and movement are peculiar to incomplete things, for a complete thing is static and cannot act except to contemplate itself.168 Thus, movement is evidence of incompleteness, whereas form (symbol) is static. The Platonic ideal form is never attained, but Aristotle attempts to explain movement and change in terms of energy and forces striving to attain these ideal states. Thus, change is evidence of striving for perfection of form, which results in order. Further, every science utilizes an axiomatic method by which a question and answer can be treated with reference to the stable points of orientation established by the premises: Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess, each of them, their own genera; so that if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another, the genus must be either absolutely or to some extent the same. If this is not so, transference is clearly impossible...16' The expression of observations in formal terms, whether linguistic or mathematical, will depend on a set of unproven postulates to establish the focus required in relating observations to each other.160 The animistic premises serve this function in orienting statements referring to causation in human communication. It is this referential aspect of expressing the dynamic process to which both Anton and Cassirer refer when interpreting Aristotle: ι

Ultimately, awareness of process or movement is given with every particular act of sensation and every act is necessarily a disclosure of some quality. Since every particular sensa157 168

1,0

Metaphysics, 1045a 16-1045b 25. Ando, Cognition, 106. Analytica Posteriora, 75b 7-11. Cf. Analytica Posteriora, 77b 16-33.

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tion is due to some process, change, modification occurring in substances and to effected processes or changes in the cognizing subject, then with each sensation there emerges the experience of process. This permeative characteristic of process as a subjective and objective event gives it... universality. ...1W Only in afixedthing — like substratum, which must first be given, can the logical and grammatical varieties of being in general find their ground and real application. Quantity and quality, space and time determinations, do not exist in and for themselves, but merely as properties of absolute realities which exist by themselves. The category of relation especially ... is not independent of the concept of real being; it can only add supplementary and external modifications to the latter, such as do not affect the real "nature".163 Aristotle's referential approach to process is also explained by Apostle, who shows that by the process of successive abstractions one arrives ultimately at a stable, formal unity apart from the actual processes and changes which are occurring.163 But the modern scientist does not capture the process of change when he weighs his object, for weight is only a manifestation of a process he assumes is occurring. Weight measurement, apart from process, is a static or structural factor rather than a dynamic element. So it is with Aristotle's referential system. Of necessity the manifestations of process which he treats become static because of the discursive nature of the treatment. There can be no other way: ...it is clear that the motion is in the wood, not in its form; for the motion is neither caused nor experienced by the form or the place or the quantity. So we are left with a mover, a moved, and a goal of motion. I do not include the starting point of motion: for it is the goal rather than the starting-point of motion that gives its name to a particular process of change. ... Now ... every goal of motion ... is immovable, as, for instance, knowledge and heat.1·4 This is not to deny that there is a real substance and process apart from the static form which is emerging;186 it does suggest that the observation and description of process will be limited to an observation and description of static structures: What is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own 'nature', and does not exist 'by nature', until it receives the form specified in the definition, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is. Thus ... it would be the shape or form (not separable except in statement) of things which have in themselves a source of motion. ... The form indeed is 'nature* rather than matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained fulfillment than when it exists potentially.18· 1,1

Anton, Contrariety, 159. E. Cassirer, Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, trans. W. C. Swabey and M. C. Swabey (Chicago, Open Court, 1923) [hereafter cited as: Cassirer, Substance and Function]I, 8. 1U H. G. Apostle, Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952) [hereafter cited as: Apostle, Mathematics], 14-16. lM Physica, 224b 4-12. 1,5 Physica, 190b 9; De Generation»?, 317b 22-24. Physica, 193a 36-193b 8.

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These structures, in so far as they are actual,147 will be expressed by formulae: ...in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed.1·8 Both essence and attributive aspects of the static structure will be susceptible to such expression,149 so that when we speak of an actual thing by naming it we are implying all of the structural qualities of that kind of thing as well as the particular object being referred to.170 It is important to recognize that Aristotle's referential system treats of static structural configurations in formulary nature, for apart from these manifest ends or "accomplishments", nothing of the instant of process can be described. As such ends, they possess the status of 'beginnings' of understanding, for it is in the light of configurations and final achievements that inquiry, discourse in general, states the essences of beings. Actuality is a functional concept in the sense that it stands for the completeness and the formal integration of a subject-in-process.1'1 Actuality is thus descriptive of the manifest configuration to be found in every subject-in-process at a given instant.178 From what has just been said, it is apparent that Aristotle employs a referential approach when describing process; and that when this procedure is used, order is treated as the static structural aspect of the dynamic factors involved in process. It is not our present intention to explore the entire referential system as Aristotle conceived of it. There is a vast literature devoted to the study of various aspects of Aristotle's referential conceptions.178 Our aim is to provide a synoptic view of process as an Aristotelian may conceive of it, for any critic committing himself to Aristotelian explanations would, presumably, have recourse to the same kind of referential description and analysis. Turning to this referential system, we discover that it is very similar to the geometric analysis used by the modern physicist. There are four principal features in Aristotle's mapping procedure. (1) Categories are analogous to coordinate axes in geometric space. Corresponding to the stable orientation devices, which locate objects in space, 1,7

Cf. Grant, Ethics, 234 on potentiality and actuality as poles on a continuum. Metaphysics, 1029b 19-20. "· Metaphysics, 1030a 2-17. 170 Metaphysics, 1030b 13-25. 1,1 Anton, Contrariety, 78. De Partibus, 640a 30-640b 5. 173 Cf. Kennick, "Metaphysics"; M. G. Evans, "Aristotle, Newton and the Theory of Continuous Magnitude", Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (1955), 548-557; W. J. Verdenius and J. H. Waszink, Aristotle on Coming-to-Be and Passing Away (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1946); L. M. Regis, L'opinion selon Aristote (Ottawa, Institut d'dtudes M6di6vales d'Ottawa, 1935); Mansion, Jugement d'existence; Owens, Doctrine.

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are the categories, a set of ten ultimate, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive classes,174 which orient the referential aspects of a particular: Ontology is a matter of categories, the categories of being as being.17' Change is the actualization of potentiality as such in any category of being.17* There is no movement apart from things; for change is always according to the categories of being, and there is nothing common to these and in no one category.17' Hence neither will motion nor change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned, for there is nothing over and above them.17' Aristotle intends that the four categories — substance, quality, quantity, and place179 — which relate to the process of change will act as referential dimensions by which the particular may be oriented with respect to other particulars and to its own evolving characteristics: But not only regarding substances does our argument prove that its form does not come to be, but the argument applies to all the primary classes alike, i.e., quantity, quality, and the other categories. For as the brazen sphere comes to be, but not the sphere nor the brass, and so too in the case of brass itself, if it comes to be, it is its concrete unity that comes to be (for the matter and the form must always exist before), so is it both in the case of substance and in that of quality and quantity and the other categories likewise; for the quality does not come to be, but the wood of that quality, and the quantity does not come to be, but the wood or the animal of that size. But we may learn from these instances a peculiarity of substance, that there must beforehand in complete reality another substance which produces it, e.g. an animal if an animal is produced; but it is not necessary that a quality or quantity should pre-exist otherwise than potentially.180 It has been suggested181 that, in contrast to modern spatial axes which are commonly orthogonal, the dimensions of the categories are arranged in some hierarchical fashion;182 but it is our purpose to show that the categories do serve as stable dimensions, not to discuss their use as such. Here it is sufficient to note that an object in process may change with respect to more than one of the axes, but that the dimensions are not themselves hypostatic in the sense that an object's "quality" is not able to change to "quantity". 188 For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found through these signify either something's 174 1,5 176 177 178 179 180 181 188 188

Kennick, "Metaphysics", 33. Kennick, "Metaphysics", 32. Kennick, "Metaphysics", 54. Metaphysics, 1065b 7-9. Physica, 200b 34-201a 3. Anton, Contrariety, 61-67. Metaphysics, 1034b 8-19. Chen, Concepts, 38; Kennick, "Metaphysics", 34. Cf. De Generation, 319a 11-17; Metaphysics, 1038b 1-36. Metaphysics, 1057a 26-28.

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essence or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types. ... For when a ... white color is set before [a man] and he says that what is there is 'white' or is 'a color', he states its essence and signifies a quality...184 Motion is different from change in that motion cannot involve the category of substance: I mean that there must be something that is in motion, e.g. a man or gold, and it must be in motion in something, e.g. a place or an affection, and during something ... but it is the three together that make it one without qualification....1" There is thus no such thing, for example, as pure change of quality. 18 · The change is always of a particular sort occurring with respect to one or more of the four dimensions. (2) Generic subclasses serve to break the categorical dimensions into units by which manifested states may be distinguished with some degree of precision. The ontological world is one which exhibits: ... "kinds" of thing, eide, and more inclusive "kinds", gene, a world in which are to be found real species and genera, a world in which individual things are what they are because they are of a certain kind, because they belong to a certain species. And this species is what it is because it in turn belongs to a more inclusive kind, to a certain genus. In such a world, science ... is concerned ... with this structure of kinds, with what a given species is, and what are the differentia marking it off from all the other species in the same genus, and with all the properties that species or kind possess....187 The definition of a thing will orient it within this structure of kinds much as the location of a town may be specified with reference to larger units such as the county, or to more "stable" locations such as nearby cities. Aristotle speaks the language of the trained scientist who trusts the plural manifestations of his subject-matters. Potentiality is a generic concept and matter is plural. The locus is what makes matter significant, and as such, it is an arche, an irreducible assumption and an undemonstrable beginning.188 In terms of Stevens' four-fold classification of measurement scales,18® Aristotle's classification system corresponds to a nominal scale, since the units are qualitatively distinct: For measure is that by which quantity is known; and quantity qua quantity is known either by a 'one* or by a number. ... And hence in the other classes too 'measure' means that by 184

Aristotle, Topica [hereafter referred to as: Topical, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, Basic Works, 103b 24-33. 195 Physica, 227b 24-30. 184 Aristotle, Categoriae [hereafter referred to as: Categoriae], trans. Ε. M. Edghill, Basic Works, 15b 11-12. 187 Randall, Aristotle, 49-50. 188 Anton, Contrariety, 83. 188 S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement, and Psychophysics", Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (N.Y., Wiley & Sons, 1951), 23-30.

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which each is first known, and the measure of each is a unit. ... In all these, then, the measure and the starting point is something one and indivisible... The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured; the measure of spatial magnitude is a spatial magnitude, ... that of articulate sound an articulate sound... Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, ... is a measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality.180 Aristotle speaks here of the quantitative measurement of static physical objects, but his approach can be generalized to include the other dimensions. Thus, the dimension of substance will be broken into units such that the individual man will be located in the species 'man' and as part of the genus 'animal'. 191 And within this classification the individual will again be differentiated from his fellows, perhaps along the qualitative dimension,192 until the individual is located precisely within the referential framework: And the process wants always to go on till it reaches the species that contains no differences. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae.1®8 The classification system is structured on carefully defined rules194 such that it is possible to locate every single particular with respect to every other particular in the universe by their orientation on the referential grid. It is clear what value this grid will have for mapping change. If, for example, alteration is change within the same kind from lesser to greater or from greater to lesser,195 it will be possible to determine the extent of change if we also know what "accidental", i.e., non-essential, qualities were involved and to what extent they were changed in the particular object. This latter information is provided by the proposition, which is the form that Aristotle uses to represent his observations of structure. The proposition signifies what change the object is striving to perfect, and is a symbol of the manifest status of the object. (3) As the subject-in-process corresponds to a point in space, so will predication of an attribute in a proposition be analogous to a dot. A further consideration of language as an instrument will be undertaken in the next chapter, so language as such will not be extensively investigated here. However, in line with the present discussion, it is important to note that Aristotle sees language as reflecting the order of reality in the sense that what is said of a thing is inherently related to what a thing is: Aristotle's epistemological realism is in a serious way connected with his view that language and its structure share in the stability of the universe. ... To him the Greek language was the perfect instrument for the articulation of the order of processes. The rationality of the 1.0 1.1 1,1 1M 1M 1M

Metaphysics, 1052b 2