Argumentation: Analysis and Practices [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110869170, 9783110130270

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Argumentation: Analysis and Practices

Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis (PDA) This series contains reports on original research in both pragmatics and discourse analysis. Contributions from linguists, philosophers, logicians, cognitive psychologists, and researchers in speech communication are brought together to promote interdisciplinary research into a variety of topics in the study of language use. In this series several kinds of studies are presented under headings such as 'Argumentation', 'Conversation' and 'Interpretation'. Editors

Frans Η. van Eemeren Rob Grootendorst University of Amsterdam Department of Speech Communication

Argumentation: Analysis and Practices Proceedings of the Conference on Argumentation 1 9 8 6

Frans Η. van Eemeren Rob Grootendorst J. Anthony Blair Charles A. Willard (eds.)

1987 FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht-Holland/Providence-U.S.A.

Published by: Foris Publications Holland P.O. Box 509 3 3 0 0 A M Dordrecht, The Netherlands Sole distributor for the U.S.A. and Canada: Foris Publications USA, Inc. P.O. Box 5 9 0 4 Providence Rl 0 2 9 0 3 U.S.A. CIP-DATA

ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN

90 90 90 90 90

6765 6765 6765 6765 6765

321 256 319 320 257

7 3 5 9 1

(complete set) (volume 3) (volume 3A) (this volume) (volume 3 A + 3B)

© 1986 by the authors No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, w i t h o u t permission f r o m the copyright owner. Printed in The Netherlands by ICG Printing, Dordrecht.

Contents

Introduction

1

ARGUMENTATION EVALUATION 1 2 3 4

Walter Ulrich Argumentative Validity as α Function of the Argumentative Forum 7 Wayne Grennan A 'Logical Audit' Scheme for Argument Evaluation 17 Alec Fisher Using Assertibility Conditions to Extract and Evaluate Arguments 25 Peter Jan Schellens Types of Argument and the Critical Reader 34

FALLACIES 5 6 7 8

Dennis Rohatyn When is a Fallacy a Fallacy? 45 Michael Wreen When No Reason is Good Reason 56 J.I. Biro A Sketch of an Epistemic Theory of Fallacies Robert Maier Cognitive Development and Fallacies 74

65

LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 9

Thomas J. Hynes Jr. Interpretation, Law, and Argument: Prospects for Cross Fertilization 85 10 Joseph W. Dellapenna and Kathleen M. Farrell Modes of Judicial Discourse: The Search for Argument Fields 94 11 A. Soeteman Deduction in Law 102 12 Kees Waaldijk Can we Require Legislatures to State the Reasons for their Legislative Decisions? 110

vi

13

Thomas-M. Seibert The Arguments of a Judge 119 14 Maarten Henket Ne Bis in Idem and Related Principles 123 15 Raymond W. Buchanan The American Jury Trial: The Art of Argument in Voir Dire and Opening Statements 131 16 Patricia Riley, Thomas A. Hollihan and Keith D. Freadhoff Argument in the Law: The Special Case of the Small Claims Court 142 17 L. Raymond Camp The 'Lawyer's Dialect' and Sir Edward Coke's Advice on Courtroom Argumentation 152 SPECIAL FIELDS 18

Eugene Garver Arguing over Incommensurable Values 163 19 Rita C. Manning Beyond Argumentation: The Role of Narrative in Moral Reasoning 170 20 Sharon Bailin Moral and Aesthetic Argumentation 178 21 Michael Hudson The Fallacy of the Improbable Cure 187 22 D o n Brownlee Quantification of Claims of Value: Counting the Birds 191 23 David M. Beruhe Policy Science as an Argumentative Paradigm 199 24 Läszlo Tarnay On Dialogue-Games, Argumentation, and Literature 209 25 Kristiane Zappel Argumentation and Literary Text: Towards an Operational Model 217 26 Michael David Hazen The Universality of Logic Processes in Japanese Argument 225 27 Gregg B. Walker Communicating Across Cultures: Argument and International Negotiation 238 CASE STUDIES 28

29

Michael S. Bruner The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War: A Case Study ment 253 A.M. Simon-Vandenbergen Pronouns for Strategic Purposes 261

in Public

Argu-

vii

30 Roland Kaehlbrandt Politique et fete: Elements de rhetorique dans des voeux presidentiels de de Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing et Mitterand 270 31 Richard Fiordo The Keegstra Case: The Anti-Semitic Argument in Modern Day Alberta Schools 278 32 Janice Schuetz Political and Legal Convergence: A Case Study of the Sacco-Vanzetti Trial 289 33 David Cratis Williams Representations of Ideology: Analogons, Images, and Ideographs 298 34 Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila Aristotelian Dialectic and Reasoning in Das Kapital of Marx 308 35 P.A. Smit An Argumentation-Theoretical Analysis of Lenin's Political Strategies 317 36 Viveka Adelswärd The Argumentation of Self in Job-Interviews 327 37 Allan W. Futrell Argument Strategies Used by Female Immates Requesting Parole Hearings 337 EDUCATION IN ARGUMENTATION 38 Donald M. Nolen A Critical Theory of Critical Thinking 349 39 Harvey Siegel Skills, Attitudes, and Education for Critical Thinking 358 40 Lenore Langsdorf The Form of Television and the Possibility of Critical Thinking 41 Josina M. Makati Perspectives on Argumentation Instruction 376 42 Ernest Marshall Formalism, Fallacies, and the Teaching of Informal Logic 386 43 Stephen P. Norris and James Ryan Designing a Test of Inductive Reasoning 394 44 Judith Collison A Program for Teacher Education in Reasoning Skills 404 List of Contributors

411

366

Introduction Frans Η. van Eemeren, Charles

A.

Rob Grootendorst,

J. Anthony

Blair

and

Willard

A great many students of argumentation assembled in June 1986 in the Netherlands to attend the first International Conference on Argumentation of the University of Amsterdam. The Conference was called to cultivate the interdisciplinary study of argumentation and its applications. Its aim was to bring together argumentation scholars from around the world to listen to each other, to talk together, and in general to increase the exchange of ideas about argumentation. The three volumes in the series Studies of Argumentation, constitute the record of its formal presentations. The papers contained in these three volumes are certainly a mixed offering. They represent differences in disciplines, divergencies among research traditions, and cultural differences. By no means do they make up a unified body of knowledge. The conference's aim was to stimulate the flow of discourse across the main boundaries, not in the hope that one or another particular tradition would eventually subordinate the others but in the hope that cross-boundary communication among these traditions would strengthen them all. These Proceedings, as was the Conference, are truly international in scope. Europe is represented by scholars from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany and Yugoslavia; other continents, by contributors come from Israel and Morocco, Canada, the United States and the West Indies, and Australia - in fact, some 60 percent of the more than 150 papers read at the Conference were flown in, and as far as quantity goes the English-speaking world clearly outweighed the plurilingual Continentals. The geographical diversity of the theorists represented in these volumes is exceeded by the range of their intellectual backgrounds. There are philosophers and linguists, logicians and rhetoricians, speculative theorists and empirical researchers, generalists and specialists - and some who are all of these combined. Many work in Speech or Communication, or Philosophy departments, others came from institutes for educational research and development, colleges of Arts and Sciences, Psychology laboratories, and schools of Language or Social Studies (or their local equivalents). These scholars cultivate a striking diversity of disciplines, and favour a wide variety of professional organizations and movements, ranging from the American Forensic Association (AFA) and the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) on one side of the Atlantic, to, for example, the Centre Europeen pour l'Etude de ^Argumentation (CEEA) and the International Centre for the Study of Argumentation (SICSAT), on the other. As well, many theorists not committed to any organization or manifesto play a major role. The Conference objective of drawing different scholars together was clearly

2 successful. Its goal of stimulating the exchange of ideas and insights was sought by a programme which embodied as many aspects of argumentation theory as possible. Thus, the programme had several sections, each representing either a theoretical perspective on argumentation or a major topic of study by argumentation scholars. Those papers which were suitable for publication have been included in these Proceedings of the Conference. As a result, these volumes contain a smorgasbord: something for everyone. Although the merits of other arrangements: by country of origin, or by different traditions, are undoubted, their demerits are equally obvious. We have chosen to arrange the papers thematically - more or less according to the broad outlines of the Conference programme - in order to capture by their juxtaposition in the Proceedings the exchange of ideas that occurred at the Conference when scholars from different countries and traditions rubbed shoulders in the same section of the programme. The Proceedings are divided into three volumes. The papers read by the invited speakers, which have a more general interest for argumentation theory, are assembled in the first: Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline. The main themes which are already to be found in this volume, are elaborated on in the second and third volumes. Argumentation: Perspectives and Approaches stresses the theoretical aspects and Argumentation: Analysis and Practices the more practical ones. Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, opens the trilogy. Its first three sections draw different perspectives on the study of argumentation. In (7) Logical and Dialectical Perspectives, are the papers by the philosophers and logicians Scriven, Barth, Johnson, Govier, Lorenz and Taha. They are joined, in ( I I ) Rhetorical and Epistemological Perspectives, by their rhetorically and epistemologically oriented colleagues - Finocchiaro, Cox, Wenzel, Geissner, Meyer, Goodnight, Willard, Airaksinen and Parret. With {III) Pragmatic and Conversational Perspectives, are added the papers of the linguists and language philosophers - Kopperschmidt, Blair, van Eemeren, Jackson, Jacobs, Kline, Trapp & Yingling & Wanner, and Fogelin. The reward for this crisscrossing of disciplinary borders may well be the relocation of the boundary lines. In any case, the reader is given fair warning by this volume's title. Across the Lines of Discipline applies also to the last two sections of volume one, where the focus is on specific topics of argumentation studies. (IF) Argumentation Analysis, Evaluation and Fallacies, group together papers by Kienpointner, Hitchcock, William Benoit, Krabbe, McKerrow, Walton, Grootendorst and Woods, and (V) Applications of Argumentation Theory, contains the work of Vedung, Rieke, Tirkkonen-Condit, Paul, Weddle, and Hoaglund. In these two sections the authors deal with similar problems in the study of argumentation, but approach them with various intellectual backgrounds and from diverse starting-points. Argumentation: Perspectives and Approaches, the second volume, contains the papers which seem to relate most naturally to the three theoretical perspectives of volume one, but they have been subdivided further and ordered differently. Thus, corresponding to section III of volume one ('Pragmatic and Conversational Perspectives') are in volume two: (7) Pragmatic Approaches, with papers by Sbisä,

3 Benjamin, Kryk, Losier, Primatarova-Miltscheva, Carroll & Simon-VandenBergen & Vandepitte, Lundquist, van Eemeren & Kruiger, and Komlosi & Knipf; (II) Conversational Approaches, containing papers by Allen & Burrell & Mineo, Gnamus, Pander Maat, Schwitalla, Bax, Verbiest, and Pamela Benoit; and ( I I I ) Cognitive and Empirical Approaches, which includes the papers of Brandon, van Ditmarsch, Caron & Caron-Pargue, Dascal & Dascal & Landau, Volzing, Willbrand, Meyers & Seibold, Benoit & Lindsey, and Hample & Dallinger. Relating to section 7 / o f volume one ('Rhetorical and Epistemological Perspectives'), volume two contains (IV) Rhetorical Perspectives, containing the papers of Brandes, Brinton, Prelli & Pace, Alexandrova, Tindale & Groarke, Rossetti, Varga and van der Zwaal; and (V) Epistemological Perspectives, with the contributions of Caton, Fuller & Willard, Gasser, Wohlrapp, Fusfield, Gross, Furlong, van den Hoven, Weinstein, Murnion, Astroh and Gutenberg. The closing section of the second volume, (VI) Formal Perspectives, with papers by Apotheloz, Nolt, Pena, Hirsch and Brown, corresponds most closely to the first section of volume one ('Logical and Dialectical Perspectives'). Argumentation: Analysis and Practices - volume three - collects the papers corresponding to the second part of volume one (IV 'Argumentation Analysis, Evaluation and Fallacies' and ^'Applications of Argument Theory'). Thus there is, first, (T) Argumentation Evaluation, with papers by Ulrich, Grennan, Fisher and Schellens, and (IT) Fallacies, containing the papers of Rohatyn, Wreen, Biro and Maier. Second, there are four sections of papers on applying argumentation theory. (ΙΙΓ) Legal Argumentation, includes papers on argument and law by Hynes Jr., Dellapenna & Farrell, Soeteman, Waaldijk, Seibert, Henket, Buchanan, Riley & Hollihan & Freadhoff, and Camp. (IV) Special Fields, covers different kinds of argumentation practices, varying from moral and aesthetic argumentation to argument in international organization, with papers by Garver, Manning, Bailin, Hudson, Brownlee, Berube, Tarnay, Zappel, Hazen and Walker. (V) Case studies, contains analyses of such specific argumentations as those concerning the SaccoVanzetti trial, the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, and job interviews, with papers by Bruner, Simon-VandenBergen, Kaehlbrandt, Fiordo, Schuetz, Williams, KakkuriKnuuttila, Smit, Adelswärdand Futrell. Lastly, in (VI) Education in Argumentation, there are collected papers concerned with the teaching of argumentation by Nolen, Siegel, Langsdorf, Makau, Marshall, Norris & Ryan, and Collison. Each volume, Across the Lines of Discipline, Perspectives and Approaches and Analysis and Practices, is a valuable collection in its own right. Of course, these books can be read independently of one another, but just one or another alone will not suffice to get a good picture of the state of the art in argumentation theory. For that purpose, one has to read all of them. Their interconnectedness then, no doubt, becomes more distinct. This would already be a good result for the study of argumentation, for although falling short of the cross-fertilization and even the fusing of disciplines which are some argumentation theorists' dreams of the future, such an understanding is an indispensable starting-point for co-operation in the further development of argumentation theory, which is exactly the main goal of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), founded at the end of the Amsterdam Conference. These three Argumentation volumes are the first step in realizing this goal.

Argumentation Evaluation

1

Argumentative Validity as a Function of the Argumentative Forum Walter Ulrich

O'Keefe used

in

(1977)

at

produces

least

that

argument

has two

suggested senses:

product.

has

focused

In

on

examining

the

examining

fallacies,

the

been

on

approach product leads for an

the

to

without

to

a

argument argument

strength

of

arguments critical

an

role

there

to is

in

often

the such

as

of

little

when

of

a

of of

of

an

in

strength

to

attack

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this

at

the

the

product

test of

which

in

for

the

individual

arguments

argument

of m o s t

rules

weaknesses

best

of

of

logicians

look

product

forum

on

work

understanding

the the

that

argumentation

produces

through

The

the

arguments.

While

be

literature

informal

work

that

beyond

process

From

worthwhile,

argument

are

plays

a

arguments.

inevitably

argumentative

argument

between are

argument

formal

the

can

Forum

difference

specific

rules

the

the the

of

an a d v o c a t e

weighed.

Argument

part

of

argument,

the

to

of

that

process

go

"argument"

product.

to

process

evaluating

Standards

context

the

and

the

a

much

helping

determining

of

as

or

much

argument.

should

examine

become

an a r g u e r .

in

the of

term

individual

evaluating

developed

process

critic

in

to

Importance The

view

argument

and

generated,

The

and

past,

of

of

the

product

certainly

examining

is u s e f u l

the

focus

is

distorted

a

syllogism

content

argument

to

argument

logicians has

that

logic

a

forum. critic

applied forum. are

requires

by

In of

the

While

violated,

in

the

practice,

argument

critic a

there

and

only

few are

in

cases, clear

8 guidelines

for

discovering judgement

evaluating

the

on

the

part

(1985)

generic

weaknesses

of

that

on

factual

or

rather

may

premises

not

criticism

that

that

may

be

these

to

of in

forum

which

creates

the

forum

oversimplifies

than

a

single

In

cases, of

a number

in

country,

assurance

that

the

look

seek

out

at all

a

that

this

evaluate single

the

To

arguers

a

depend

the

initial

opportunity not

reason

information

both

end

the that

and

choose

must

who

what

evaluate

makes

position

of

is

the

individual

to

the

make

an

need

to

by

look not on

on

the

gathered

truth

has of

relevant

a

at be

that

single

the

it

a of

single a

large

requires

some

amount

to a we

off

rigorous

is n o t

statement;

the

intervene

on

statement.

more

statement.

adequate

subjected

that

are

to

based

on

support

macroargument;

evidence an

texts

arguments

a statement, to

the

the weighing

been

support

ignoring

that

A decision

based

rely

the

traditional

most

would

be

examining

arguments

supported

have

to

without

argument

Many

evidence the

must

arguments

example,

arguments.

in

microarguments.

it w o u l d

such

to

may

counterargument

individual

Unfortunately,

of

of

fully

that

indictment

the

should

a

with

critic

by

have

argued

responses.

makers

for

instead

and

A valid

argument

hardly

conclusion

decision

combination

To

is

on m i c r o a r g u m e n t s :

complex

test.

The

arguments.

conclusion.

information

not

often

the

individual

a

number

is

contested

critic

evaluating

or u n d e r m i n e

another

have

a generic

criticisms

complete

these

problem

microargument;

subjective

arguments

fatal.

as

arguments

a I

as

attack

viewed

the

argument

second

most

These

premises.

another

focus

be

does

of

decisive.

evaluation

argument

not

be

example,

is m a k i n g

or

should

majority requires

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fallacy

attack).

the

fallacies

unfortunately,

be u s e d

of of

unbiased

may

or

enthymematic;

should

critic.

may a

in

argument

view

as

they

be

is

truth

A

the

an

should

Whether

often,

to

Argument the

that

of

the

assumptions

respond

may

we

argument

(who

argument;

of

that

argument.

advocate to

an

argument,

weaknesses

earlier

classifies

an

enough should

9 This works

is

no

on

evaluate final

easy

decision

relevant

is

in

through

adversary

the

discovery Hart

advocates is t h e

premises

of

for

and

is

a

all

new,

test

reached;

argument

and

way

to

which most

critical

the

of

the

assumptions,

emphasis

including

an

components

on

the

emphasis

such

as

the

a complete

set

etc.

in

law

to d e v e l o p

situations

that

gathers of

several

best

through

deal

related

unanticipated

argument

the

that

great

are

its

possible

cover

defend

process

is

reviewed

that

process

to

cross-examination,

that

may

the

attempt

decisions

it

(1977)

it a p r o c e s s

there

system

that

conditions

is

Mann

concluded

examine

it

law

which

process,

denies

to

dos

and

and

reached;

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on

of

is

material;

process

Janis

making

decisions

decision

etc.

task.

(1948/1949:

exceptions

should

be

should

to t h e

designed

attempt

181).

to

to

New

rule.

It

generate

the

test

proposed

premises. In

science,

suggested through the

that

a

scientific such,

but

and

formal

that

of

and

nature

of

be

court

technical testing

of

currently (1972:

have

to

that

Kantrowitz

decided

by

system.

disputes

a He

is

scientific

to

influenced

by

the

the

the in

court,

suggests

that

those

a

of

which

the

community,

the

that

loosely

modeled

best

way

permit and

are

controls

arguments,

Matheny

"

systems

enterprises

the

that

of

judgements,

proposed

forum

While

of

but

cross-sections:

concepts,

the

that

conceptual

structure

the

has

structure

enterprises

members

(1975)

theories.

or

This

evaluate

develop

or

have

rules,

suggests

temporary

which

135).

science

example,

logical

accepted

other

(1972)

rigid

for

are

Toulmin to

of

by

and

according

activities

procedures

individuals

recently,

disputed legal

the

human

changed"

individuals

not

concepts

the

not

Toulmin,

the of

1977)

strongly

of

access More

is

attribute,

systems

criticized

develops,

an

sets

specifically,

(1970,

community.

is

particular

Kuhn

science

process

rationality as

both

and

so

on.

scientific after to a

Williams

the

resolve rigorous (1981)

10 suggest

that

science, in

the

that

it

there

does

process the

may

be

some

illustrate by

forum

which can

an

limitations

interest

arguments

effect

are

the

in

to

the

this

scientific

generated

types

approach

of

and

to

community

evaluated

arguments

and

that

are

accepted. Arguments argument

cannot

depends

elsewhere

on

that

a

(1984).

Decisions

support

than

in

some

microarguments argument

the

single that

are

a

of

often

a

matter

those

dialectic,

as

Grootendorst Walton

and

(1982),

dialectic

and

the

others, to

would

be

more

of

debate.

dialectic

test

should

some

level

suggested

considered

ideal the

of

that to

be

Evaluating not

simply

standard

of

standard.

attention

theorists

Rescher

to

seem

suggested

that

arguments. to

to

potential prefer

forum.

(1977),

understand be

a lower

arguments,

an

productive To

argued

(1985).

debate-oriented

have

used

I

have

an

Argument

these

(1984),

be

utility

of

inappropriate

have

normally

utility

and

a

examine this,

Eemeren, Woods

version

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of

preference argument

both

the

the

and the is from

debate

examined.

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to

it

perspective

process

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among

should

unfortunate; the

Kruiger

a

I

do n o t m e e t

of

is

require

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directed

to

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that

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opposed

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are

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argument.

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argument.

for

that

great

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forums

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unimportant

have

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of

decisions.

individual and

isolation.

standard

arguments

is

in

context

even

may

measuring

evaluated

important

cases,

fallacious

be

there

share

inherently

a

are few

several common

a closed

versions

of

the

limitations.

system.

While

debate

dialectic,

First, may

be

they

all

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dialectic

open

to

the

seem is

biases

11 of

the

audience,

intellectual dialectic.

A

who

overlooks

is

less

respondent

who

gives

a line

used

ideal.

(i.e.,

to it

without

of

ideal

form

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more

train

of

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of

little

debate

dialectic

is

would

linear;

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about

and

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as

ideally

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aims on

at

a

to

conclusion.

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the

goal

probability,

other

forums

may

be

of be

based

in on

information

the

other debate

dialectic)

in

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evaluating dialectic

exists of

in

the

ordinary

little

hand,

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is

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use

most

debate

forum,

what

in

public so

features

productive. focusing useful be

other. the

that,

argument superior

on

in

proved

an

individual

some

arguments,

conclusively.

Argument

The

that at is to

is n o t

debate

testing

conclusion

conclusions

only

bring

of

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assumes.

suited

not

problems

other to

and

be

each

use

have

and

be

the

cannot

against

dialectic

that

easily

testimony

it

would

often

may

if

like

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forums

conclusions

questioner

outside

utility

relationship

thought.

hand,

ideas.

nature

do

outside

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dialectic

some

the

evidence.

little

argument.

in

decisions

same

and

a conclusion

they if

debate

arguments.

of

least

by the

of

very

ordinary

solid

to w e i g h

tidy

theory at

the

world

the

a

dialectic

If

hand,

from

evaluating is

the

or

cannot

(eyewitness

generated

argument,

evaluating

Finally,

for

real

of

has

suffers

easily

reach

other

dialectic

dialectic

discourse.

examining

the

in

biases

involved

dialectic

will

the

the

produce

world.

they On

evidence

the

forums

argument

outside

too

might

addition,

then

dialectic

uses

in

individuals

the

support

Second,

as

The of

standards

produce

In

to

individuals

questioning

information.

testimony),

need

of

opinions,

incomplete is

the

knowledge

outside

subject

of

evidence.

limited

is

blindspots

than

external

dialectic

model,

and is

best, lowered

always on

the

weighing

of

certain; have from

dialectic.

We

much

probable truth

to

12 Debate The is,

of

debate

most

articulate John

is

if m u l t i p l e

that

ultimately

truth

consistent

with

determined

by

open

an

the

best

test

new

ideas

and

method

of

by

truth

and

over

be

of

in a n

forum,

open

is

forum

ideas

certainly

truth

argument,

a

argument behind

could

free

unnecessary; that

be

speech

in

reality

encourages

by e x p o s i n g

introduction

the

problems

the

marketplace.

of

the

the

dialectic forum

In (such

of

them

to

as

debate

its and

it

ideas in

best,

real

debate

problems an

with

overreliance

degenerates

(1982: does

19).

not

should

useful

are

not not

into

Rescher

result

intrinsic

so m i g h t of

or

imposition the

to to

in

a

to

debate

debate,

in

by

and the

reasoning some

of

regulations

on

weaknesses

testimony

the

overcome of

us

argument.

ignored

problems debate

cause

for

inherent

overcomes the

not

forum

participants

eyewitness

of

103).

a

some

at

ambiguity

are

through

addition,

inadequate

efficiently

worse

validity,

rules,

an

decisions,

its

(1977:

strategies

through

that,

that

attacks

by

as

testimony,

and

as

being

marketplace

operate

At

strong

debate

Just

at

The

argued

some

these

as

not

26).

falsity

of

of

truth.

eyewitness

is

while

eliminated

forums

for

assumption

if

an

attacked

flattery,

advocate.

debate

would

non-objective

(1982:

Undesirable

the

been

have

forum many

be

of

existing

Walton

evidence

attacks,

process.

form

of

does

insincerity,

Initially,

essay;

establish

often

testimony

the

forum

position

to

the

unreliable

of

reject

this

the

test

at

unstable

the

These

could

and

that

victory

of

is

a The

advanced

This

ideas

frequently

and

sophistry, argues

idea

as

counterarguments.

Mill

from

expert

of

are

out.

examining

an

debate

On L i b e r t y .

positions

thesis

arriving

incomplete on

of

of

Mill's

win

a rigorous

Woods

suffers

the

of

has

envisioned life.

will

marketplace

range

Debate

Stuart

simply

and

a wide

defense

course,

and

of

specific

appeals

to

13 authority) for

may

example, These

be

how

We

identify might

channels of

examine

the

forum

several

components

might of

arguments

arguments

in

we

can

debate

by

to

example, debate

these For

that

policy

can

we

decision

improve

the

to

in

to

has

we

order

to

access

to

access

to

the

identified

improve

be

wish

advocates,

unequal

making

might

our

components,

guaranteed

be u s e d

guide

the

these

example,

unclear,

may

forum;

example,

for

that

to

components

providing

George,

should

ways

identifying

alter

standards

still more

that

participants

eyewitnesses.

for

argument.

argument

The

strength

without forums

is

the

(1980).

quality

Lave

employed

to

has weigh

8-28).

the

argument.

to

foreign

crimes

typical

addressed

different

if

argument,

of

it

attention

After

strategies

(1981:

Even

a

communication.

specific

identified

the

be

of

ways

process

our

etc.

matter;

debate

Initially,

evidence,

then

improve the

the

critic,

subject

solve

current

direct

forum.

the

can

with

might

argumentative

to

dialectic

weaknesses

research.

the

inherent

in

forum

develop

can

the

argument.

attach

will

In

this

bias

could

be

decision

rules

that

counter

conducive to a s s i s t

us

forum,

the

the

to

result

dispute;

not

theories

sophisticated

we

process

is

the a

bias

minimized balanced

effective

in

evaluating

greater

conclusion

addition,

in

to

imperfections

toward

if

this

some

the

reached

one

side

evaluator

in

the by in the

developed

bias.

CONCLUSION Argument truth;

will

this

is

non-scientific whereby

the

important process

rarely clear

whereby

in

discourse.

best

to

result

look

science, What

conclusions beyond

arguments

in

the are

we

are

the and

discovery it

need

content generated,

should to

reached. of

of

seek To

the

the be is

this

absolute

clearer a end,

arguments

developed,

and

in

process it to

is the

evaluated.

14 The

forum

in w h i c h

the

argument.

information Argument argument;

A good

is

is

the

turn,

be

is

to

explored.

simple

are

often

of

shapes

the

ensures

tested,

substance

that

and

all

of

ambiguous,

and

weighed.

standards the

determinations

of

relevant

properly

application

factual

we

The

role

should

turn

including

is

and our

law,

sociology.

The

useful

place.

for

argumentation

argumentative

advocates

fully

the

Initially,

participants

takes

forum

organized,

making

necessary

directions.

be

place

to

an

application that

may,

in

debatable.

attention

that

than

the

takes

argumentation

standards

requires

the

argument

gathered,

more

often

What

an

argument

from

be e x p l o r e d , evaluator

attention

decision focus we

This

characteristics

of

the

if

forums.

on

to

of

the

of

form

understand

from

the

wide

individual forum

the

This

organizational of

forums

from a

in

turn

take

perspective

argument.

works

to

can

ideal

especially

making, the

critics

their several

should

of

be

different

perspective effort

range

of

requires fields,

communication, arguments which

this

of

can

and only

analysis

15 References Eemeren,

F.Η.

van,

Study George,

A.L.

(1948-49).

Rights. Janis,

I.L.,

&

Mann,

Kantrowitz.

A.

Ed. Kuhn,

T.S.

and

The

Ascription

of

of

the

(1977).

(1975).

The

( 1977).

of

The

Scientific

Decision

Choice,

63:

of

Chicago

Advice.

The

Westview.

Society.

Making:

and

Policy:

Responsibility

A_

Technology

and

171-194.

Psychological

Commitment.

Scientific

Free

Press.

Democratically.

Revolutions.

2nd.

Press.

Essential

Tradition

(1984).

505-509.

Structure

University

Τ.

iη F o r e i g n

Aristotelian

Controlling

Scientist.

(1970).

Decisionmaking

Information

of C o n f l i c t ,

American T.S.

L.

Kruiger,

of

Proceedings

Analysis

Kuhn,

Use

&

Irvington.

Presidential

Effective

H.L.A.

R.,

Argumentation.

( 1980).

The Hart,

of

Grootendorst,

Tension:

and

Change.

Selected

Studies

University

of

in

Chicago

Press. Lave,

L.B.

(1981).

The

Frameworks Matheny,

A. R.

&

O'Keefe,

D.J.

N.

(1977).

Theory

Press.

Court. Two

Forensic

(1977).

the

Policy.

Social

Brookings (1981).

in

Concepts

of

Association.

An

Disputes

Q u a r t e r 1 y. J3: Argument. 13:

State

and

Evaluation

of

341-364.

Journal

of

the

121-128.

Controversy-Oriented

Knowledge.

Deci sion

Institute. Scientific

Policy

A

Regulation:

Pol i c y - M a k i n g :

Law

Dialectics: οf

of

Β.A.

Procedures

Science

American Rescher,

for

Williams,

Adversary the

Strategy

University

Approach of

New

to

York

16 Toulmin,

S.

( 1972).

Evolution U l r i c h . W.

Human

Under standing:

( 1 9 8 4 ) . An

Ad! H o m i n e m for

( 1985). Sillars

In &

Proceedings

of

Argumentation. Woods,

J.

&

Walton,

Fallacies.

Defense

G.B.

Examination

the E v a l u a t i o n

the A m e r i c a n F o r e n s i c W.

Collective

of C o n c e p t s . P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y

as a P a r a d i g m

Ulrich,

The

of

Association. of

the

Walker, the

eds. Fourth

of

(1982).

McGraw-Hill.

Testing

Journal

In

J.R.

Cox,

in

SCA/AFA

Conference

Argument:

of

1-8.

Argument

Speech Communication D.

Hypothesis

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Argument.

Fallacy.

Use

M.O.

Transition: on

Association. The

Logic

of

the

2 A 'Logical Audit' Scheme for Argument Evaluation Wayne Grennan

In this paper I present a scheme designed to promote accuracy in judging the degree to which arguments prove their conclusions.

It

is based upon the use of a set of rating symbols and a diagram format for a logical audit structure.

The utilization of these

resources in argument evaluation is analogous to an audit of the financial health of Wayne Grennan except that in this case it is logical "health" that is being audited. The diagram format for argument depiction is a variant of that given

by

symbolized circle

Michael

Scriven

in

Reasoning.

by a letter and each assertion

containing

that

letter,

logically compound assertion.

or several

Each

proposition

is represented letters

is

by a

if it is a

The circles containing the

letters

are connected together by arrows, with the arrow indicating the "direction" of inference.

For example, the argument "Humans are

fallible, so we all make mistakes" can be diagrammed by letting A stand for 'Humans are fallible* and Β for "We all make mistakes':

Using this type of diagram

format we can depict the logical

structure of arguments with any amount of complexity.

We can also

use the diagram as a place for expressing our judgment about the extent

to which

its assumptions

and

inferences

contribute

to

18 proving

its conclusion.

In my Argument Evaluation

(University

Press of America, 1984) I present a rating scheme that utilizes the diagram format in this way.

Here I want to present a more refined

version, and to point out the benefits of using such a scheme in evaluating natural arguments. In recent years people writing texts for applied logic courses have come to recognize the need for their audiences

(university

undergraduates, principally) to arrive at an overall judgment of the quality of arguments

they critique.

Michael

Scriven,

Reasoning, was in the vanguard in stressing this need.

in

In earlier

times the preference for teaching symbolic logic disposed

text

writers to concentrate on only half the job, i.e., to regard the evaluation task as solely one of inference evaluation.

Such a

restriction

as the

is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e

if logic

is c o n c e i v e d

identification of principles of good inference-making, but when we decide

that the role of applied

logic

includes making

overall

judgments of the extent to which arguments prove their conclusions, the logician's tasks will extend to the development of systems and procedures for doing this reliably. A number of writers have made contributions in this area. Reasoning, Scriven presents a seven-step procedure.

In

At Step Seven

we are expected to give an "Overall Evaluation of [the] argument in the

light of

exhorts

[steps]

the reader

1 through

6" (p. 39, First

Edition).

He

to "...make yourself give an overall grade.

It's a cop-out not to.

You must decide whether it does have force,

and how much, for you" (p.45).

Scriven's procedure is articulated

satisfactorily, but, in common with other works of the same genre, he does not extend it to a formal rating scheme.

I believe that

such a scheme can be helpful in arriving at an accurate judgment of argument

soundness

when

grafted

onto

an

appropriate

diagram

depicting argument structure. The first order of business in designing a rating scheme is to decide what rating terms to use, since the goal is to be able to describe understand.

the

quality

of

people's

arguments

in

terms

We need terms to describe three appraisable

of arguments:

they

elements

inference validity, premise probability, and the

degree of proof of the conclusions.

19

Stephen Thomas, in Practical Reasoning In Natural Language, uses words

to

indicate

inference

quality

representations of arguments.

on his

diagrammatical

Thomas's vocabulary for inference

rating consists of these expressions:

'nil', 'weak', 'moderate',

'strong', 'very strong', and 'deductively valid'.

He regards the

terms as referring to the degree of support that reasons give to conclusions.

Of course, such support is only conditional on the

reasons being true so it would be clearer and safer to talk of inferential

support.

Thomas's set of terms is vastly superior to the

traditional

valid - invalid set, which is far too "coarse grained" to provide for the quality discriminations we wish to make. fine-grained?

But is his too

For purposes of evaluating actual arguments I am

inclined to think so.

He says that a rating of "strong" means that

the "...evidence supports the conclusion strongly enough to warrant acting as if that conclusion were true."

(p. 75, First Edition).

For practical purposes, I would submit that an argument that meets this

standard

is s a t i s f a c t o r y .

In the ratings s c h e m e

I am

proposing, then, inferential support shall be expressed as "nil", "weak", "moderate", or "strong". Although Thomas enters his inference judgments on his diagrams, there are good reasons for introducing a set of special symbols corresponding to our set of terms for the purpose of recording our judgments on our diagrams.

First, they result in less clutter.

Secondly, a single set can be used to express judgments of all three appraisable elements.

This uniformity makes it easier to

determine the overall argument rating, as will be seen. The symbol set chosen consists of "O", "+", "++", and

"+++".

These will represent, among other things, inference ratings of "nil", "weak", "moderate", and "strong", What needs to be done now

respectively.

is to provide definitions of the

ratings in probabilistic terms.

The obvious way of doing this is

to divide the probability spectrum from zero to one into segments reflecting the meaning the terms normally have in this kind of use. The term 'nil' in this context seems best defined as covering the range from zero to 1/2.

A premise that, if true, would make

the probability of its conclusion 1/2 makes it as likely false as true.

In other words, the premise is irrelevant to the truth of

20 the conclusion.

Below

false than true.

1/2, it m a k e s the c o n c l u s i o n m o r e

In b o t h c a s e s t h e r e

is n o i n f e r e n t i a l

likely support

provided. W i t h r e s p e c t to t h e o t h e r t h r e e s y m b o l s , I a m d i s p o s e d to h a v e them

apply

to e q u a l

probability

increments

between

1/2 a n d

1.

There is s o m e arbitrariness in such a s s i g n m e n t s , w h i c h a l l o w s us to take advantage of this convenient arrangement. however, always

that

arbitrariness

context-dependent.

" + " range say,

the

is a r b i t r a r y

7/10,

because

is v i c i o u s .

Choosing in t h a t

This is not to say, Arbitrariness

2/3 as the upper

limit

I cannot defend this value

of v a g u e n e s s

in t h e t e r m

'weak'.

But

d e f e n d it o v e r c h o o s i n g 3/4 by a p p e a l i n g t o o u r s h a r e d intuitions. are

to

be

In a s c h e m e given

it

is

simply

more

appropriate

"moderate' in conjunction w i t h a p r o b a b i l i t y of There

is a n o t h e r

vicious.

reason

for saying

the

over, I

can

linguistic

in w h i c h the t e r m s 'moderate' and

places,

of

is

'strong' to

use

is

not

3/4.

the a r b i t r a r i n e s s

T h e g o a l of the s y s t e m of e v a l u a t i o n

is t o a r r i v e at a

reliable decision on the overall quality of a r g u m e n t s ,

w h i c h is to

be e x p r e s s e d in s o m e natural language such as English.

The process

c a n be s e e n as o n e in w h i c h j u d g m e n t s e x p r e s s e d

in l a n g u a g e

are

"translated" into s y m b o l s having m a t h e m a t i c a l definitions, then the s y m b o l s a r e m a n i p u l a t e d a c c o r d i n g to p r o b a b i l i t y r u l e s u n t i l the appropriate

symbol

a r r i v e d at.

for the

overall

We then translate

counterpart.

quality

of

this s y m b o l back

the

argument

into its

verbal

T h u s , the s y m b o l s s e r v e o n l y as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s

a r r i v i n g a t the a p p r o p r i a t e v e r b a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n .

is in

If s o m e o n e

thought that the boundary b e t w e e n "+" and "++" should be set at 0.6 a n d t h a t b e t w e e n " + + " a n d "++ + " s h o u l d be at 0.9, t h e i r r a t i n g of the t w o - i n f e r e n c e a r g u m e n t s h o w n near the end of the paper w o u l d be the s a m e as mine.

They w o u l d also say (given their definitions of

the

the

symbols)

support

for

probability

that

argument

provides

"a m o d e r a t e

degree

of

its conclusion".

In an i m p o r t a n t sense, then, h o w

the

spectrum

1/2 and

the

between

1 is divided

in defining

t h r e e s y m b o l s is n o t c r i t i c a l , so l o n g as the m e a n i n g s of 'weak', 'moderate', definitions.

and 'strong' are seen as providing

constraints on

those

21

In assigning a probability range to the three terms other than "0", then, I divide the range from 1/2 to 1 into equal portions. This means that a premise that provides "weak" evidential support for a conclusion makes it between 1/2 and 2/3 probable.

The mean

of the increment is at 7/12, so the conclusion is somewhat more likely to be true than false.

The term 'weak' seems appropriate in

this situation. The range for 'moderate' is 2/3 to 5/6, with 3/4 being the mean. Thus,

there is about a 1/4 probability

false, given a true premise.

that the conclusion

is

So with a "moderate" rating there is

a distinct possibility the conclusion would not be proved.

This

seems roughly appropriate. We are left, then, with 'strong' referring to the range from 5/6 to 1.

Among other things this means that a deductively

inference

valid

is said to be "strong", but so is an inductive one in

which there is less than one chance in six that the conclusion is false.

Both of these implications seem in accord with what we

would mean by saying "a premise provides strong inferential support for its conclusion". With the foregoing probabilistic definitions for our inferential support terms we can select correlative terms for premise truth value judgments that match up with those definitions, then do the same for degree-of-proof judgments. four

symbols

judgments.

that

Having

can

serve

Then we will have a set of

to e x p r e s s

the symbols do triple

the

three

duty

is

types

of

appropriate

because each represents a measure of probability. For premises, the probability range from zero to 1/2 covers cases in which they are likely false as true (1/2) and more likely false than true (under 1/2).

The range from 1/2 to 2/3 corresponds

to "likely true"; the range 2/3 to 5/6 (average 3/4) corresponds to "probably "true",

true".

The

provided

we

range do

not

5/6 to one insist

corresponds

on e q u a t i n g

simply

'true'

to

with

'certain' . For describing

the extent

to which

the premises prove

the

conclusion it is possible to use the same concept of degree of support that was used in inference evaluation.

We might think of

degree of proof as a matter of the degree of overal1 support that the premises provide.

Thus, we can talk of overall rating of an

22 argument, by saying an argument provides

no/weak/moderate/strong/

support for its conclusion. The following table summarizes the rating scheme: Symbol 0

+ ++ +++

Probability Range

Premise Judgments

Inferential Support

Overall Support

Under 1/2 or 1/2

More likely false than true or as likely.

Evidence against or irrelevant

None

1/2 to 2/3

Likely

Weak

Weak

2/3 to 5/6

Probable

Moderate

Moderate

5/6 to 1

True

Strong

Strong

Some of the value of expressing evaluation judgments using the special symbols can be shown by considering how they function in arguments having only one premise.

With one premise the overall

support for (degree of proof of) a conclusion is the product of the probability

of

the premise,

p(P), and

the probability

conclusion given the truth of the premise, p(C/P).

of

the

Now given the

probability ranges assigned to each of the rating symbols and using this formula, we can express the overall support for the conclusion for various permutations of premise and inference ratings in a grids Inference Rating + ++ +++ 0 Premise Rating 0 +

0

0

0

0 +

0

0

++

0

0

0 +

++

+++

0

+

++

+++

The grid embodies the following principles: (1)

When one rating is "+++" the overall rating is the same as the

other (2)

rating.

When neither rating is "+++" the overall rating is "0", except

that it is "+" when both are rated "++". The above grid represents, in effect, a "recipe" for assigning an overall degree-of-proof rating to an argument whose premise and inference system

ratings have been determined.

(and

similar

ones) offers

an

As such, this rating

important

advantage

ratings approaches that operate without ratings symbols:

over

it makes

23 the step of judging degree of proof a formal, mechanical, step. Perceived weaknesses of an argument are reflected in premise and inference ratings and do not enter into making this judgement. This

is especially

arguments.

important

in

training

people

to

evaluate

Their natural response prior to training is to accept

the argument as proving its conclusion when the conclusion seems true, or argue against it when it strikes them as false.

The first

strategy is incorrect when the argument is to be evaluated and the second can be successful only when the conclusion is dubious or false.

By forcing them to base their overall rating on premise and

inference ratings we can help them learn the proper approach to argument evaluation. Furthermore, with an informal approach to an overall judgment of argument quality, even if people attempt to make a judgment based on premise and inference unreliability

and

judgments,

inconsistency

there is bound to be some

arising

combine the two to get an overall judgment. operative

is a tendency

algorithm

other

when

they

attempt

One factor that can be

to use s o m e u n a r t i c u 1 a t e d

than the p r o d u c t

to

personal

rule stated above.

experience such algorithms tend to yield over-positive

In my

judgments.

For example, I asked an introductory Philosophy class (34 people) to assess the degree of support for the claim that a dice shows a number under four when someone, who alone can see it who tells the truth only 75% of the time, says that it shows a number under five. The students were asked to rate the degree of support as "strong", moderate", "weak", or "nil". The students' situation can be conceived as one in which they are faced with a three-assertion argument. is given in Figure 1 on the next page.

An appropriate diagram

"A" stands for "X says the

dice shows under five", "B" stands for "The dice shows under five", and "C" stands for "The dice shows under four".

According to the

rating scheme given in this paper, the premise would be rated "+++" since it is a given claim. since X is said

to tell

The inference from A to Β is rated "++" the truth only

75% of the time.

The

inference from Β to C is rated "++" also, since the probability that a dice shows under four, given that it shows under five, is 75%.

Figure 2 shows the original diagram with these ratings added.

24 The

next

step

intermediate earlier, final

at

inference "+",

to

get

conclusion

the

B.

degree-of-proof

Referring

to

rating

the

grid

of

the

presented

we f i n d t h a t t h e r a t i n g t o be p l a c e d a t Β i s " + + " .

step

placed

is

is to find the

rating

for

C.

rating

at

Using

the

the

whole argument,

Β and

f r o m Β t o C, t h e g r i d shows t h a t

indicating

the

rating

the rating

The to

for

the

should

t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e s o n l y weak s u p p o r t

the conclusion.

Figure

3 shows t h e argument

in i t s

be be for

final

rated

very

nicely

form. The

student's

my c l a i m

that

situations

responses

people

tend

to the question

to

t h e problem

who r e l y

illustrates

on p e r s o n a l

t o make o v e r - p o s i t i v e

algorithms

judgments.

in

The b e s t

'What d e g r e e o f s u p p o r t does t h e e v i d e n c e

these answer

provide?'

i s " w e a k " , b u t 17 o f 34 (50%) s a i d " m o d e r a t e " and s e v e n (21%) s a i d 'strong'

©

Θ

Θ

Τ0

0 0

0 0

+++ ++

FIGURE 1 scheme

and d i s c u s s e d

inferences

its

certain

++

application

FIGURE 3 for

arguments

paper.

rating

containing

The s c h e m e c a n be a p p l i e d w i t h

to arguments having m u l t i p l e

complications.

be t h e theme o f a n o t h e r

++ ++

I have p r e s e n t e d an argument

from s i n g l e p r e m i s e s .

surprising effectiveness despite

++

FIGURE 2

In t h e p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n

+++

However,

this

topic

premises,

shall

have

to

3 Using Assertibility Conditions to Extract and Evaluate Arguments Alec Fisher

Introduction This paper outlines a systematic method for (i) extracting an argument from its written context and

(ii) evaluating it.

The

method is non-formal and applies to a wide range of both everyday and theoretical arguments; furthermore it applies to ordinary reasoning as expressed in natural language. It belongs to a tradition which owes a great deal to Michael Scriven's Reasoning.

Two excellent and relevant recent works in

that tradition are Stephen Thomas's Practical Reasoning in a Natural Language and Trudy Govier's A Practical Study of Argument The belief underlying this tradition is that people can be taught to argue clearly and logically about almost any subject but that teaching elementary formal logic, or classics, or mathematics, or whatever does not achieve that objective.

The problem is to

describe a method which does achieve it.

Some preliminaries (i) We use language for many purposes besides reasoning of course, but when we are reasoning we tend to use particular words to signal this fact.

The language of argument - of reasons and

conclusions, of proof and evidence - contains

'key' words which

indicate the presence of reasons and conclusions.

Words like

'because', 'since', 'for', 'follows from' and many others signal the presence of a reason and are called

'reason-indicators'.

26

Words like therefore', 'hence', 'thus', 'so' and others signal the presence of a conclusion and are called 'conclusion-indicators'. We shall refer to both as 'argument-' or 'inference-indicators'. (ii) Reasons are presented as supporting their conclusions. Reasons which are presented without themselves being supported by further reasons will be called basic reasons. The conclusion of one part of an argument may be used as a reason for some further conclusion: we call such a conclusion an intermediate conclusion. If a reason R is presented for some conclusion C and the argument contains no intermediate conclusion between R and C, then we call R an immediate reason for C. A conclusion which is not used in the argument to support any further conclusion will be called a main conclusion. (There may be more than one.) Thp method of extracting arguments outlined People who are unfamiliar with this tradition usually do not realise how difficult it can be to extract an author's intended argument from a written, natural language text. What distinguishes our approach from others in the literature is the use of the Assertibility Question. The method, in short, is as follows; 1. Read through the text to get its sense, circling - (thus) all the inference indicators as you go. 2. Underline - thus - any clearly indicated conclusions, and bracket - (thus) - any clearly indicated reasons. 3. Identify what you take to be the main conclusion and mark it C. 4. Starting with C, ask 'What immediate reasons are presented in the text for accepting C?' or 'Why (in the text) am I asked to believe C?' Use inference indicators to help answer the question. If the question is hard to answer because the author's intentions are not transparent (not explicit), ask the Assertibility Question, (AQ): (AQ) 'What argument or evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusion C? (What would I have to know or believe to be justified in accepting C?) Having done this look to see if the author asserts these

27

same claims (reasons). If he does, it is reasonable (and accords with the Principle of Charity) to construe him as having intended the same argument. If he doesn't, you have no rational way of reconstructing his argument (on the basis of the text alone). 5.

For each reason, R, already identified, repeat the process described in step 4 above. Do this until you are left with only basic reasons and then display the argument in a perspicuous way.

Notice that the issue is 'What does the text/author present as a reason, conclusion etc.?' not 'What is a good reason .. etc.?1. But note also that to find the answer to the first question we may have to ask ourselves the second one. The rationale of the method so far (i) Inference indicators may make an author's intentions completely clear (quite certain). But if this is not the case the only way you can divine the author's intentions (given only the text) is to construct the best argument you can and ask whether the author could be construed as presenting it. The extent to which you can grasp the author's meaning will depend on your understanding of the language and your knowledge of the subject (and so will be a matter of degree). (ii) The fundamental justification for using the AQ to find an author's intended argument is empirical - either it helps students or it doesn't - and this is something which needs to be tested. (iii) The philosophical justification for the use of the AQ is based on the assumption underlying the whole of this paper, that is (*) If you understand a proposition you must be able to give at least some account of how you could decide whether it was true or false, what evidence or argument would show it to be true or false (otherwise you don't understand it at all). We shall return to this claim in the last section of this paper.

28 Evaluating an argument Once it is clear what argument we are considering then we are in a position to decide whether it establishes its conclusion. In general, if an argument is to do this (1) its premisses must be true

(except that

(a) if they are

independent premisses only one need be true and

(b) if

suppositions are counted as premisses they need not be true to play their proper role in establishing a conclusion. and

See Fisher

(1986).)

(2) its conclusion must follow from its premisses.

The big question is how to decide whether a conclusion does follow.

(2) is the case - whether

The standard test is basically this,

'Could the premiss be true and the conclusion false?' If the answer to this question is 'Yes' the conclusion does not follow from its premisses.

If the answer is 'No' then it does and

one who accepts the premisses must accept the conclusion. test is open, of course, to different

The

interpretations.

Consider an orthodox scientific case for believing that the Earth is not flat, but is roughly spherical, or for believing that bodies of different mass fall under gravity with the same acceleration; consider the historian's case for believing that Hitler died in Berlin in 1945; consider the case for believing that certain things will happen, that President Reagan will not have a third term as President or that the sun will continue to rise; consider the case for believing that someone writhing on the ground with a terrible injury is in pain.

In any of these

cases, if you apply the standard test 'strictly' you may say,

Ί

suppose all the reasons could be true and yet the conclusion false? In that case you may well be launched into philosophy but you will make very little progress in learning what we can in science, in history, about the future and about 'other minds'. Such extreme scepticism is quite remote from normal - and appropriate - standards of argument.

The solution is to revise

the standard test so that it accords with these standards and so that it makes the reference to such standards explicit.

The test

should be, 'Could the premisses be true'and the conclusion false judging

29 by appropriate standards of evidence or appropriate standards of what is possible?' Of course this test begs several questions, notably how to decide the 'appropriate standards', and we shall return to this question shortly after briefly considering two examples. Two examples One of the virtues of the modern informal logic movement is that it forces logicians to abandon those hackneyed examples which were invented (by logicians) to illustrate logical points and to look instead at real, natural language arguments; arguments which were constructed by their authors in order to persuade their readers of substantial issues. So let us look now at two examples to illustrate how the assertibility question works. Both examples are arguments about nuclear weapons, a subject in which reasoning plays an enormously important part. In the summer of 1982 the American Government was increasingly worried by the growth of the European peace movement in the face of proposals to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defence Secretary, sent a letter to the editors of newspapers in NATO countries and it was published widely throughout Europe. In the letter Weinberger explains deterrence, argues that the Soviet Union has aggressive intentions and capabilities and concludes: "In the face of all this, it is my responsibility and duty as Secretary of Defence to make every effort to modernise our nuclear forces in such a way that the United States retains the capability to deter the Soviet Union from ever beginning a nuclear war. We must take the steps necessary to match the Soviet Union's greatly improved nuclear capability. That is exactly why we must have a capability for a survivable and endurable response -" (Weinberger (1983) Most of the letter lacks argument indicators (although it is presenting a very sustained argument) but here we have one "That is exactly why". The question is 'What is his reasoning?'. "That is exactly why" clearly refers to his previous sentence but that is not enough. So what is the rest of his reasoning? If we

30

ask the AQ we see that we also need the premiss (assumption) that "the Soviet Union has a capability for a survivable and endurable response" - and Weinberger makes it very clear elsewhere that he believes this is true. If we go on to ask what is his argument for "We must take the steps necessary to match the Soviet Union's greatly improved nuclear capability" there are no argument indicators at all to help us. So, ask the AQ, in short 'What would justify such a claim?' The obvious way to justify such a claim would be to cite some objective "to deter the Soviet Union from ever beginning a nuclear war" and to claim that this was the only way to achieve that objective: this is precisely what Weinberger does and argues for. In another example, the former British Conservative politician Enoch Powell (a former Oxford classics don) arguing the case for unilateral disarmament in Britain argued that American nuclear weapons had not kept the Russians from invading Western Europe: "My conclusion is that the mutually countervailing nuclear armament of Russia and the United States has not been the reason why Russia has not advanced beyond the limits established at the end of the 1940's." Powell (1982). There are no clear argument indicators to show his reasoning and it is hard to discover, so we have to use (AQ). Surely, to justify this conclusion we would have to know that even if the USA had not had nuclear weapons during this period, still the USSR would not have wanted to or been capable of invading Europe. Powell does not argue this case though he does argue that "Russia does not want to occupy Western Europe" but that, of course, begs the question. 'Appropriate standards', meaning and argument analysis We conclude by explaining briefly how to decide 'appropriate standards'. We do this essentially by contrasting some of the ideas underlying this paper with certain widely held philosophical beliefs. First there is the truth-condition theory of meaning (derived from Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein). On this view the

31

meaning of a proposition is given by stating the conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for its truth. What is true need not be known of course, but on the classical view what is true need not be humanly knowable either and is independent of how we could come to know it. On this view then, the meaning of a proposition may be knovn quite independently of what justifies us (human beings) in believing it - what counts as conclusive reasons or evidence for us. Clearly this view conflicts with the principle (*) underlying this paper. Here the thesis is that the meaning of a proposition is given by stating the conditions under which we are justified in asserting or denying it and these must be things we could know (constituted as we are not as we might be). On this view the meaning of a proposition cannot be knovn independently of what counts for or against it. Secondly, there is the traditional distinction between deductive and inductive arguments. It is usually said in this connection that only a deductively valid argument can establish its conclusion with certainty - can be conclusive; inductive arguments yield only probability. Some people will feel that our revised test is too "open1 and that it is preferable to evaluate arguments by the 'well-defined' standards of deductive and inductive validity. But this is a mistake. Although deductive validity is sometimes important it is rare in ordinary, natural language arguments. In general, attempting to convert such a non-deductive argument into a deductively valid one by specifying the 'appropriate standards' as extra premisses will not work because these will be incompletely statable. Of course any argument can be converted into a deductively valid argument by adding the premiss 'If the reasons are true the conclusion is' but this doesn't help at all in evaluating the argument (you still have to decide if the premiss is true). Inductive validity is not the answer either. There is no general standard of inductive validity. The appropriate standards differ in every sort of case and there is no escaping the need to recognise this. Thirdly there is the view that certainty is the impossibility of doubt (inspired especially by Descartes): if you can imagine

32

any circumstances in which the reasons could be true and the conclusion false then the conclusion is not certain, does not follow, is not conclusively established. Clearly this paper does not accept the Cartesian standard as appropriate in extracting and evaluating arguments. Ask the Cartesian sceptic what would prove that Hitler died in Berlin in 1945. A body which was witnessed by many who knew him to be Hitler's, which medical records confirmed to be his and which independent witnesses testified to be his? The sceptic replies 'There is always the possibility that he made a miraculous escape, substituted the body of a double, faked medical evidence, duped witnesses'. But why should we accept that the sceptic has described a possibility? What would show it to be true? A revelation from the real Hitler now dying in Brazil with confirming papers, witnesses and other evidence? But why should we believe this? Perhaps we are being duped again? And so on ad infinitum. Along this path there is no certainty and we should not grant that the sceptic has described a possibility unless we could know it to be true. To conclude, in ordinary circumstances (outside the philosophy seminar) we do not use the sceptic's standards in evaluating arguments. The normal standards embedded in standard linguistic usage are the right standards to begin with when judging 'appropriate standards' (tho' they are subject to criticism of course). Furthermore one cannot even extract the author's intentions from his text using the sceptic's standards (unless the author happens to be employing them but this is almost never the case). Evaluation of an argument has to be in terms of what is meant and we can't even discover this without assuming the author is using language as everyone else does. It is fitting that this paper should be delivered in Amsterdam. It is inspired by the theory of meaning underlying intuitionistic mathematics and pioneered by Brouwer and Heyting in this city. The same theory inspired Wittgenstein's later work (which generalises it) and the implication of this paper is that argument analysis has much to learn from Brouwer and Wittgenstein (c.f. Baker 1974).

33

Baker, G.

(1974). Criteria: A New Foundation for Semantics. RATIO Vol. XVI. No.2. December 1974, pp. 156-189.

Fisher, A .

(1986). Suppose for the sake of argument that ... Paper d e l i v e r e d to Conference o n Informal L o g i c and Critical T h i n k i n g , Newport N e w s , V i r g i n i a , April 1986.

Govier, T.

(1985). A Practical Study of A r g u m e n t . Wadsworth.

Powell, E.

(1982). S p e e c h delivered at Crest Hotel, B r i s t o l , 29th O c t o b e r 1982.

Scriven, M. Thomas, S.

(1975). Reasoning.

McGraw-Hill.

(1986). Practical Reasoning in a Natural (3rd edition). P r e n t i c e - H a l l .

Language.

Weinberger, C. (1982). Letter p u b l i s h e d in The Guardian, 26th A u g u s t 1982.

4

Types of Argument and the Critical Reader Peter Jan Schellens

The

question of the acceptability of argumentation can be answered

at quite diverse levels of abstraction.

I ask this question at the

concrete level of the language user, and, more specifically, of the reader: the

what Instruments are available to him If he wants to Judge

acceptability

looking

for

'reasonable assesses

Is

of argumentation. an

operational

argumentation':

(as

In other words,

definition

of

the

what

I

am

notion

of

a definition which Indicates how

one

a reader) whether one will accept

argumentation

as

reasonable or reject it as unreasonable. This should

implies, not

be

argumentation

first, so

that

strict

the definition

as to

leave

a

of

reasonableness

large

In colloquial language out of the

proportion

picture.

I

of

hold

that it is possible,

for instance in discussions of a political or

aesthetic

nature,

to

arguments,

even if none of them meet the requirements of deductive

proof.

distinguish

between

sound

and

unsound

A definition of reasonable argumentation which regards such

debates

merely

as

belonging

to

the

field

of

propaganda

or

arbitrariness offers the reader nothing to go by. Second,

my

definition needs to be workable,

studying argumentation but also, with an average schooling.

not only to those

and particularly so,

to

readers

Pupils In secondary education should be

able to learn how to handle It. Research reference

aimed at

at

its

this

issue has

disposal in the

some

valuable

literature

of

points

of

argumentation,

particularly in cases where usual abstractions are undone. As (1969)

a

first

who

set

Instance I refer to

Perelman

up an inspiring Inventory

of

&

Olbrechts-Tyteca the

argumentation

35 techniques

with

audience.

which

language users attempt to

convince

their

Unfortunately they do not answer the question when

audience

would

or

would

not

do wisely

to

let

that

themselves

be

convinced.

However, their argumentation techniques lend themselves

very

ae

well

a starting point for such a

critical

rather

than

rhetorical approach. A second point of reference are the expositions on argumentation in

handbooks

(1969) .

of academic debate,

There,

too,

an

such ae

attempt

for

instance

Freeley

is made to make insights

into

argumentation productive for a language user with a highly specific task,

i.e.

the

argumentation, interest

debater. and

more

the

than

His

discussion

of

various

types

of

sure

to

expositions on stock issues are debaters

alone.

Critical

readers

of

argumentative texts may benefit from them as well. A

report of my research was presented in my PhD.

thesis (1985)

Both the points of reference in the literature mentioned the

now,

and

analysis of instances of argumentation in dally newspapers and

weeklies be

have convinced me that reasonable argumentation can

defined

operationally if first a distinction is

made

only

between

various types of argumentation. Standards handle,

for argumentation in general are,

or

feel,

are not much help to the reader in passing a

judgement. validity

I

This of

hard

to

critical

holds for instance for an evaluation in terms

forms and truth of premises .

It also holds

of

for

an

evaluation in terms of the model of Toulmin (1958): acceptable data and

an acceptable warrant on the basis of a solid backing are

superfluous requirements, enough:

they

not

but they are not formulated specifically

are too far removed from the argumentation a

reader

has to evaluate to offer sufficient handhold. My

claim

standards

is,

for

first,

that

it

is possible

various types of argumentation,

to

specify

depending

such

on

the

question whether for instance in an argument an appeal is made to a causal relationship or a legal rule.

Second, my claim implies that

a type related specification of standards is not only possible also

necessary

if

one

wants to provide language

users

workable evaluation apparatus. Looking for that apparatus I therefore attempted to: a. distinguish a number of types of argumentation;

with

but a

36 b. characterize

each

type

by means of

an

argumentation

scheme

specifying the nature of premises and the conclusion; c. provide each scheme with a number of evaluation questions on the basis

of

which a distinction can be made between

reasonable

and

unreasonable application of that scheme. The

argumentation

evaluation

schemes

questions,

distinguished,

constitute

my

together

operational

with

definition

of

reasonable argumentation. First I will give an example of a scheme with questions which will

use to illustrate my method.

I

After that I will go into three

main categories which I have distinguished. One

of

the

schemes,

for

very

simple

forms

of

pragmatic

argumentation, is as follows: Action A leads to Β Β is desired So: A is desired The relevant evaluation questions are: 1.

Is Β indeed desired?

2.

Does Implementation of A indeed lead to Β

3.

Is A practicable?

4.

Is A admlssable?

5.

Do

the

advantages of A balance

the

disadvantages

and

costs of A? 6.

Are

there

alternatives for A with more

advantages

and

less disadvantages? A simple example of this argumentation is the following: 'Raising

the

speed limit on motorways to 120 kilometers

hour is desired.

per

It would, especially at long distances, lead

to a considerable reduction of travelling time. Evaluation question 2 might here evoke the counterargument that the time gain is less than one would think;

within the Netherlands the

time gain would be no more than a few minutes.

Evaluation question

5 may evoke the counterargument that higher speed may also lead

to

more road accidents, a higher fuel consumption, more air pollution, and an Increase of noise level. Does that outweigh the time gain?

37 As the example shows, the evaluation questions have the function of evoking possible counterarguments. the

reasonableness

question

1

negative,

- 5

then

reasonable questions

of

are the

the form

concerned:

if

positive and the answer relevant

argumentation. forms

At the same time they define

realization

the

to

of

answers

question

the

scheme

to

6

is

is

a

In that way each scheme with evaluation

part of my operational definition

of

reasonable

argumentation. To

enable the construction of a sound and usable instrument

in

that way, schemes and evaluation questions have to meet a number of requirements. First, the reader has to be able to analyse the argumentation in a

text

by

schemes.

means of the

Pragmatic

schemes.

This

argumentation,

for

calls

for

Instance,

recognizable

is

liable

require a more complex scheme than the one just mentioned, the

to

because

argumentation to be analysed consists of more than one desired

consequence, disadvantages and costs, and rejected alternatives. Second,

the

evaluation

together

sufficient

relevant

scheme.

standards

have to

be

necessary

as a definition of a reasonable

Eventually

holding

difference

questions

this

concerns

the

in an argumentative community.

of opinion.

For instance,

use

and

of

the

formulation This may

cause

in the strict sense of

word 'pragmatic' my evaluation question 4 is out of place·

of

the

In this

view, trespassing a standard or rule only counts if trespassing has negative effects, for instance, an high probability of punishment. Third, the

the subdivision into types of argumentation has to

usual

requirements of sound

categorization:

principles

applied should be clear and unequivocal,

should

exhaustive

be

demands,

and should not overlap.

the

These

meet

divisional

the

division

are

common

but that does not mean they are easy to meet. The current

divisions into types of argumentation seldom do. Fourth, means

the division has to fulfill its evaluative

goal.

This

that no more and no less distinctions should be made than is

necessary with the view to the assessment of evaluation. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca distinctions distinguish, to means,

(1969:

than

is

266

ff·),

necessary

in

for view

besides the pragmatic argument,

an argument of waste,

instance, of

my

make goal.

more They

an argument from end

and an argument of direction. All

38 these forme can,

from the viewpoint of evaluation,

pragmatic argumentation. malce

too

be regarded as

On the other hand, it is also possible to

few distinctions.

Thus

Freeley

(1969:

120-124)

asks

himself with regard to one general category 'causal reasoning': "Is there

reasonable probability that no undesirable effect may result

from in

this particular cause?" This question is of course pragmatic

effect

or

argumentation,

from

furthermore

effect

asks:

to

but in argumentation from cause

it

is

to

That,

feel,

is

a

requirement that

is

that cause obviously more

they

well?

appropriate

In other words,

to

Freeley makes

distinctions than is necessary with a view to the

character:

a

in which a probable cause is established

on the basis of an observed effect. of argumentation.

Freeley

but does it have to be necessary as

diagnostic argumentation, less

to

"Is the cause necessary and sufficient?" For

be sufficient, I

cause

irrelevant.

prediction on the basis of an observed cause, has

important

evaluation

This gives his evaluation questions an arbitrary sometimes

do and sometimes do not apply

to

the

category in question.

1. Argumentation on the basis of regularity and argumentation on the basis of rules In

his model,

idea

I think Toulmln (1958) correctly started

that in argumentation always,

explicitly or

appeal is made to a general statement: to

enable

the

from

implicitly,

the an

in his model, a warrant has

step from data to claim.

For

the

evaluation

of

argumentation it is highly important to recognize that there may be differences in the nature of that general statement: it may concern a statement which claims to represent a regular state of affairs in reality,

for Instance a causal relationship, a correlation, or the

observed

characteristics

of a certain class.

I will denote

general statements as descriptive generalisations. regularity. prescribe what

However,

They

such

establish

it may also concern general statements which

a desired state of affairs,

is beautiful or ugly,

for instance,

good or bad,

standards of

or rules specifying

desirability or admissslbillty of actions.

the

Such general statements

will be called prescriptive generalisations or rules. Αβ

long

as one confines oneself to

analyses,

the

difference

39 between

rules and regularities can be overcome:

argument

can be the same in an appeal to,

relationship

between

A and B,

the form

for instance,

or to a rule which

of

the

a causal

says

that

in

condition A action Β is justified. However, the

assessment is where differences crop up. First of all,

acceptability

dependent

on

of a descriptive generalisation

empirical

evidence,

is

ultimately

while the acceptability

of

a

normative generalisation is not. The statements that members of the parliament

serve

the

common good

is

in

principle

empirically

checkable; the statement that they should do so, is not. Second, other

argumentation

evaluation

based on a probable regularity calls for

questions

than

argumentation

based

on

an

acceptable rule. In the former case, one should ask oneself whether in

that

case

situations

occur

which

possibly

disrupt

the

regularity. Is the occurence of an exception probable? On the other hand, the

argumentation question

exception.

on the basis of an acceptable rule hinges

whether

In

the

situations occur which

case considered do other

justify rules

making

apply?

on an

Could

application of the rule in this case have undesirable effects which justify an exception? Of new.

course, For

the distinction between rules and regularity is not

instance,

Perelman

& Olbrecht-Tyteca

between

premises

concerning the

distinguish concerning

the

preferable.

However,

(1969:

real

they do

not

66

and

ff.)

premises

define

these

premises by means of corresponding evaluation criteria,

but on the

basis

particular

of

the presupposed agreement of a universal

audience.

Subsequently

they

structure of reality (p.

do

or

discuss arguments based

on

the

261 ff.), but a category 'arguments based

on (the structure of) the preferable' is lacking. The

distinction

corresponds

of

value.

and

regularity

In the literature

also

on

value

partly

argumentation

argumentation as a support to factual claims is

among types of argumentation. to

rule

with the distinction between propositions of fact

propositions debate

between

claims

is

and

discussed:

However,

argumentation as a support 3 discussed either scantily or not at all.

Argumentation

on the basis of aesthetic or

argumentation

on

the

and

basis

moral

of Ideological or

entirely ignored in traditional discussions.

standards, legal

rules

and are

40 For chat natter, are

merely

rule based and regularity based

overall

categories in which,

different evaluation criteria,

argumentation

again for the

sake

of

different subcategories have to be

distinguished. I will not go into that here.

2. Argumentation on the basis of regularity find rule A

third

own

is

main category in my division which has a position of pragmatic

argumentation Intended of

its

argumentation.

Generally

speaking

its

pragmatic

can be described as argumentation for or against

an

action on the basis of the desirability or undesirability effects.

This

type of argumentation,

important in social discussions of any kind,

one

of

the most

is best characterized

as argumentation on the basis of both regularity and rules. Pragmatic

argumentation effects

appeals

to causal regularity

prediction

of

of the intended action.

That

evaluation

needs to be made of the causal relationships

in

is why

the an

on which

the prediction is based. However, pragmatic argumentation also appeals to rules of value: in the positive and negative valuation of effects, and in balancing these

advantages and disadvantages against each other.

Of course,

they too are evaluation points for the critical reader. Finally, general preferred

pragmatic

rule

of

argumentation

always appeals to

conduct which says that that

action

which provides the greatest profits at the

and disadvantages. the

evaluating

that

pragmatic

a

highly

should

least

be

costs

As in the application of other rules of conduct

reader should ask himself whether

application

rule does not bring him into conflict

with

of

other

rules, of moral or legal nature, for instance. This

special

corresponds

with

propositions

of

pragmatic as well.

position

of

pragmatic

the traditional treatment of policy.

stock

My evaluation questions with

partly

issues regard

for to

argumentation have been partly derived from stock issues However,

in the discussion of stock Issues one gets

Impression that they have nothing to do with of

argumentation

argumentation:

the

types

argumentation

are discussed elsewhere, and no place has been 4 reserved there for pragmatic argumentation. The appeal to rules of

value

and rules of conduct implied by pragmatic

argumentation

is

41 usually utterly ignored. With

regularity based,

have

only

given

argumentation. into

the

rule based,

and pragmatic argumentation I

a rough indication of my division

I

studying

types

have hardly been able to offer you any

subcategories and the relevant

questions.

of

However, types

of

I

schemes

and

insights evaluation

do hope I have given an indication of

argumentation

can

bring

us

of

nearer

to

how an

evaluative apparatus for the critical reader.

Notes

1.

For brevity's sake I will only refer to Freeley (1969) which I consider one of the best handbooks on argumentation and debate available.

2.

Schellens

(1985)

procedure

as

proposed

shows

circular

on

account

that

a

formal

by Lambert & of

the

logical

Ulrich

enthymemic

evaluation

(1980)

becomes

character

of

argumentation. 3.

See e.g. Freeley (1976: 39-40, 115-127).

4.

See e.g. Freeley (1976: 52, 115 ff.)

References

Freeley, A.J. (1976). Argumentation and debate. Wadsworth: Belmont (Calif.) (fourth edition). Lambert,

K.

& W.

Ulrich (1980). The nature of argument. McMillan:

New York. Perelman,

Ch.

&

L.

Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).

The new rhetoric: a

treatise on argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame / London. Schellens,

P.J.

(1985).

Redelijke argumenten: een onderzoek naar

normen voor kritische lezers. (with a summary in English).. Foris Publications: Dordrecht / Cinnaminson N.J. Toulmin,

S.

(1958).

The uses of argument.

Press: Cambridge.

Cambridge

University

Fallacies

5 When is Fallacy a Fallacy? Dennis Rohatyn

I.

The dilemma

In John 8:3--7 we read:

"And the scribes and Pharisess brought

unto him a woman taken in adultery, and when they had set her in the midst, they say unto him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very

act.

should be stoned:

Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such but what sayest thou?

This they said, tempting

him, that they might have to accuse him.

But Jesus stooped down,

and with his finger wrote on the ground, as though he heard them not.

So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and

said unto them, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." Did Christ

commit a fallacy?

creating a tu quoque argument?

In particular, is he guilty of

Of course not.

For Christ is God,

and God could not possibly make a logical mistake.

At least, not if

we trust in an appeal to (the ultimate) authority.

Contrarily, if

we are skeptical of Christ's stature as a moral teacher, we could remind him that two wrongs don't make a right, while the woman taken in adultery might chide males or "Biblical/ partriarchs for adhering to a double standard of sexual ethics. I

choose

this example

for a variety

of reasons.

First,

it

illustrates the pitfalls of interpreting Scripture--a point glossed over, by contemporary opponents.

Second,

dangerous)

it

is

evangelists it

shows

to m a k e

how

no

less

easy

judgments,

than

(and

their

humanist

correspondingly

especially

when we

culturally and temporally distant from the persons we judge. that is precisely why Jesus' remark is so apt. many of us admire him. I had said them.

are

Third,

Fourth, this is why

Reading or hearing these words makes me wish

If Jesus did commit a fallacy, then as fallacies

go his was a damn good one J

Fifth, apart from making me aware of

46 envy or ressentiment, deploring

student

John

8:7 forces me to think

relativism

(as professors

are

twice

wont

about

to

do).

Relativism may be logiclly untenable, but it expresses a plaintive demand

for

tolerance,

fallibility.

even

humility

of w e a k n e s s

And those are values worth preserving.

we have our own versions of relativism with which to contend? Sixth, Christ's problem:

in light

when

is

Besides, don't

(Kuhn, Feyerabend,

Rorty)

Or is that just another tu quoque argument?

rejoinder a

confronts

fallacy

us

a fallacy?

squarely That

with

is, under

simply, what is a fallacy?''

More

Proponents of the strong view, such as

Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, appear to maintain that and

the what

circumstances or conditions is a given argument fallacious?

are necessary

and

sufficient

conditions

there

for distinguishing good

arguments from bad ones:2 "by fallacy we mean a violation of one of the criteria which govern good arguments."

I call this the strong

view because it assumes (or argues) that once we label something a fallacy, it's always a fallacy to reason (or conclude) in that way. A fallacy is a proscription—a rule we must never break, so long as we adhere to norms of honesty and (searching for) truth.

But if the

Christ (counter-)example proves anything, it's that sometimes we can and should break such rules, for the sake of those very norms. course we want to discourage

logical promiscuity:

break the rules whenever we feel like it.

Of

we can't just

We must have

reasons,

reasons which overcome the presumption in favor of the rule. rule is defeasible, but not any do.

The

(self-serving) justification

Let's call this the weak view.

will

I know of no one who holds the

weak view explicitly, though Stephen Toulmin and Stephen N. Thomas come close.3 My position on fallacies is more ambiguous than either of these alternatives. guided. world

I reject the strong view because

of propositional valid

inference

logic.

Even

substitution follow

separating

instances,4

mereological

them?

conceives of fallacies relaxing

that

remark

is subject

to

For (as Douglas Walton reminds us) formal fallacies

I reject

while

patterns.5

distinguish between formal and informal line

it's mis-

There are no rules without exceptions, except in the tidy

qualification! have

I feel

"informal" now

then

modes

of

shall

we

logic, once we erase

the weak view, because

as violations of procedural

rules

the

it too while

the requirement that those rules be universal and excep-

47 tionless.

Where

Johnson

and Thomas prefer my

paper

is

a

facie

"sometimes"

expresses

fallacy

a

guides,

the

problem

fallacy?

reliable,

contingencies

If

such

quickly

principles. exceptions

as

to

and

there

exceptions

fallacies

we

cannot

reductio.

views

positions,

without

my

thereby

'fallacy'

is

since

an

this

fallacies.6

to

incompleteness (ii) of

quoque,

is

for

with

sometimes

of

Prof.

either

the

I had

technocracy?

fallacies,

of

which on

without

neither

can

the

task,

but he will

If

does

own

grounds may

to

proponents

it

must

polemic no

against

But

first-order to

of

predicate traditional

protest Is

my

deprives not,

against (i)

i.e. if

mainstream

be

be unable

willing

to

yet

himself

that

a

(i)

Goedel's

then

not

any

effective

extends

is

be

Hence

argumentation, he

their

Defining

calculus.

If

the

(e.g.)

claims.

it.

or

backfire.

i.e. y i e l d which

simple

strong

but

Massey's

so, M a s s e y

in

surely

a

ubiquitous.

impossible

object

Massey

is

proof

caricatured

and nomenclature

Massey's to

best

in each case.

propositional

becomes

The

fallacies

that

(1936),

permissible

mandarin

of

the

example?

Massey

of

indispensability

curriculum.

"undecidable,"

it

dismissing

bankrupt

T h e n the r e s p e c t i v e

the a p p a r a t u s

criticisms

vocabulary

messy

logic

is w e l l - n i g h

(1931),

relevance,

the

fallacy

rules

firmly in the

exasperating

theorem

of

to

is, p r o v i d e d we

a straw arguer

and

are

theorem

bereft

illegitimate the

explanation, There

are

generalizaiton,

rules?

complain

unlike

Church's

tu

at

to

handicaps

relevance

prima-

Or are

approach

M a s s e y r o u n d l y d e p l o r e s the f a c t t h a t

procedure,

fallacies

hoc

(examining)

category

paradox

or

in advance?

(the s t u d y of) f a l l a c i e s w i l l

decision

wrongs"

with

elusive

of

another

the

attacking

fallacies

logic'

indices

of

when

under what conditions

attempt

characterization

the

just

alternative

I believe

justly

a t t e m p t to e l i m i n a t e

thanks

ad

The title

face:

rough

A piece-meal

into

of

away

could

possible, Just

any

(or b o t h ) w e r e i n a c c u r a t e .

those

are

Toulmin

altogether.

part

do

Suppose

weak view of

as

approach must

infallible,

third

Don't misunderstand me. that

this

defeat

no

or " n e v e r , "

"for the m o s t p a r t . "

fallacies

degenerates

Is

"always"

and can we know this

veer away from rules talk the

say

u s to go c a s e b y c a s e ?

treatment

of

or

but by no means

these guides compelling

and Blair

what live

to l i v e w i t h o u t

of

"two about APA with them.

48

II. Grasping the horns The weak view has its attractions. It encourages us to speak of rules of thumb, rather than making us defend Platonic (or Kantian) absolutes. If no 9-legged spider is ever a spider but always a mutant, then taxonomy is unrevisable or (in principle) immune to falsification. This is why Quine gave up the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. Likewise, if every sound tu quoque is not "really" a tu quoque (since only bogus arguments count), then logicians can never learn from experience, or be genuinely surprised by events; thus we are permanently trapped in our classificatory schemes. That's a f a l l a c y in its own right (some texts call it 'invincible ignorance'). Nor is the weak view simply a parasite, feeding off the inadequacies of the strong view. We might plausibly compare fallacy pedagogy to (country or folk) medicine. A doctor inspects a patient, determines whether (s)he has fever, a rash, nausea, pain, pressure or other symptoms. Prior experience plus knowledge of the individual lead to an educated guess: measles, pneumonia, tuberculosis, AIDS. Tests, exploratory surgery and medication may (dis)confirm the original hypothesis, which is based on a statistical generalization framed from previous data. The physician's inference is causal, probable, and perforce inductive. It is expert, yet (like all forecasts) liable to error. In the same way, my "diagnosis" that a student has committed a logical blunder is based on comparing her sentences to similar formulations I have seen on exams and papers, coupled with my (imperfect) knowledge of her intellectual history. Of course, I may be wrong (or premature) in calling it fallacious. There may be mitigating (or vindicating) circumstances, as in Jesus' case. Yet even then, such diagnosis is a worthwhile precaution, since it alerts us to the need to find or produce reasons which override or outweigh the fallacy charge. Like improper diet, committing a fallacy is usually a bad habit. Bad, but indulgable. It's OK to eat chocolate bars occasionally, but not all day every day, unless the only other choice is starvation. So too, occasional lapses of reason cause no alarm, but a steady procession of "boners" is worrisome, unless discourse has deteriorated to the point where the sole alternatives are madness or silence. The medical analogy suggests that the aim of the competent practitioner is to foster or restore logical health to the clients whom (s)he treats. Of course, there are obese doctors, doctors who

49

smoke

(too much), doctors who don't heed their own advice.

wise, there are logicians who resort to dirty verbal

Like-

tricks, who

suppress evidence and who create havoc at academic meetings I

Alas,

not practicing what you preach reflects and reinforces dualism, the schism

between

thought and

action, between

private and

public

spheres, between sentiment and bureaucracy, which is the paramount problem of our age.

This does not undermine but instead strengthens

the analogy. Despite these advantages, the weak view has shortcomings. major defect is lack of a clear for determining when to apply

Its

(or in some cases, any) criterion

(or suspend) a rule of thumb.

If an

argument is sometimes valid

(sound) and sometimes not, when is it

which, and how do we tell?

We warn our students never to beg the

question.

Did von Neumann beg the question when he "proved"

that

quantum mechanics was complete because (he reasoned) if it weren't, experience wouldn't agree so well with theory? 1

with a modern variant of 'quod licet Jovi :

I'm tempted to reply we should all grow up

to argue in circles as elegant as those von Neumann drew. you

But can

ever redeem a fallacy with another fallacy, as I have just

tried to do?

And if we give up the search for hard-and-fast rules,

what would be left?

I suspect we would

fall back on intuition

and/or rely on the "smell" of any particular situation we confront. It's no wonder that proponents of the strong view find the weak view (equally) unacceptable. can establish

The analogy with medicine works only if we

that our guesses are educated, not wild.

And what

does 'educated' mean?

III. People are people.

Going between the horns Therefore, fallacies are here to stay.

As

therapists, this news should be mildly comforting, since it means continued employment. fallacies?

But as theorists, how

Is our craft

should we

approach

an art, a science, or neither?

tempted to maintain that fallacies

I am

(invariably) occur whenever

we

presume "without further ado" that we have shown X (not) to be the case, that we have proved open for

discussion.

or dismissal. ®

8

(or refuted) a contention which is still

Fallacies are all forms of hasty acceptance

(So are some fallacy accusations, which is why we

must take the charge seriously and be careful about wielding But even this conception

it.)

is troublesome, since (as Popper would

50 insist) every proposition

is perpetually open to review.

If so,

then every attempt to close off debate "beyond a reasonable doubt" is fallacious!

Once more, the guest for a fallacy algorithm is

bound to end in frustration. essences?

Why persist in a misguided quest for

Why not say that fallacies breach, not a rule but an

implicit bond of trust between communicators.

A fallacy

is an

uncooperative gesture, a threatened dissolution of the partnership between members of a (linguistic) community. sational maxims"

H. P. Grice's "conver-

(be relevant, be clear, be brief, be orderly, do

not say that for which you lack adequate and appropriate make these requirements quite e x p l i c i t . y e t tives are neither exhaustive nor sacrosanct.

evidence)

even these imperaWhether we draw

or

depend upon Grice's notion of "conversational implicature," Habermas 's "communicative competence" or Barth-Krabbe for rational discussants"

"code of

makes no difference.

conduct

We cannot fully

specify such codes in advance; moreover, they can be challenged

(or

broken) on behalf of a higher code, or sometimes, in the name of the code itself.

Socrates, Christ, Thoreau and Nietzsche come to mind

as historical examples of code breakers and defiers of order whose memory we rightly cherish.11 The obvious but difficult moral of the story is that the longer and harder we struggle to find an infallible criterion to justify acceptance of logical norms, the more we argue in a circle or launch infinite regresses. this,

which

is

demonstration between

Aristotle

why

one

distinguished

(apodeixis),12

'showing' and

and Wittgenstein knew w

intuition

(and feared) (nous)

from

hile the other finely discriminated

'saying. ' 13

perhaps we can do no better.

This however is no reason to despair.

Whenever we try to bury

discourse, we succeed merely in resurrecting it.

In searching for a

common denominator among fallacies, my suspicion

is that we

have

looked in the wrong place, like the drunkard who scrambled for a key under a lamp-post, because Instead,

I propose

(he said) the light was better

that we resort

to analogy.

there.

I construe

the

relation between good and bad arguments as akin to the differnece between

eroticism

possessive. fies

and

and

pornography.

One

is loving,

the

other

One respects both persons and flesh, the other objecti-

d e h u m a n i z e s .

1 ^

One

exploitative--like

Socrates'

other is monologic:

vengeful

is dialogic: relation

sensual,

but

never

to Athenian youth. 15

and authoritarian.

One

is

The

frank,

51

vulnerable

and

open,

whereas

yielding, while the other and closed.

other

is o p p r e s s i v e ,

lusts

for power.

self-sealing,

One

is

voyeuristic,

One is c o m m i t t e d w h e r e its opposite number is detached-

- a n d vice v e r s a . develop

the

them

Already

Striking

further, I

hear

Intangibles?

as

these

but

leave you

loud

protests

Definitely.

Controversial?

Undoubtedly.

parallels

are,

to ponder what in

my

own

I shall they

not

imply.

imagination.

Subjective?

Unavoidably.

F o r these reasons, you w o n ' t find such

ideas e x p o s i t e d in texts and treatises, a n c i e n t or m o d e r n .

Rather,

they u n d e r l i e w h a t logicians do articulate.

What m a k e s a fallacy

fallacy

its

is n o t

the

particular

mistake

but

tone.

'The

killeth, but the spirit g i v e t h life' m i g h t be a fitting Granted, take

some m i s t a k e s are h o n e s t m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s ,

the

pains

dishonesty nized,

to

correct

and breed

irreversibly

self-deception

toward others.

them.

But

bad character.

is far m o r e distractive

letter

epitaph.

which

repeated

is why

mistakes As

a

we

beget

Plato

recog-

than d o i n g our

worst

Hence we are the primary losers whenever we commit a

fallacy, even t h o u g h the loss may be intangible and therefore hidden from ourselves. among

us--a

Moreover,

subset

there

are

of e v i l - d o e r s ,

incorrigible

who will

fallacy-mongers

not respond even

to a

generous appeal and hence are virtually beyond hope. Surely

this is the p r o p e r d e s c r i p t i o n of someone like Col. Khad-

dafi, whose recent "appeals to force" deserve proper rebuttal. President

Reagan's

response

don't make a right, but merely

is

likewise

fallacious.

Two

(and usually) a third w r o n g .

But

wrongs

18

Lest

we appear smug and self-righteous, bear in m i n d that every one of us is fully and constantly capable of logical as well as moral

degene-

racy.

support

we

The reasons why w e do not succumb include the ongoing

obtain

completely conferences

from

teachers,

safe,

immune

students,

to futher

would be unnecessary,

and

peers.

temptation,

Nor

or else

e v e n as p r o p h y l a c t i c

are we classes

ever and

measures.1®

F a l l a c y physicians will never lack for w o r k - - i n c l u d i n g , healing each other. Two

questions

fallacies? as

follows:

This

remain:

the

future,

how

should w e

for now, what do we tell our students?

in trun means

that w e

ineffable,

to bear

can never

succeed

in

is, yet we must never give the S i s y p h e a n b u r d e n

with

describe

My answers

(1) W e m u s t avoid b o t h fanaticism and

cisely w h a t a fallacy the

in

are

obscurantism.20

formulating

pre-

up trying to eff grace.

As

Paul

52 Tillich remarked in a vastly different context, "that symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy." 2 1

(2) Tell them the truth--that we don't have the

answers but are groping purposefully toward them, that we know the limitations of the textbook tradition but are not yet prepared to abandon it entirely. the long run.

Embarrassing, but easier and less costly

in

Besides, some of those students may end up contribu-

ting to advances and breakthroughs

in the

subject.

Let

it be

because of our efforts, not in spite of them. These course.

proposals

and

recommendations

are

not

foolproof,

And they are much easier to state than to carry out.

of

But I

flatter myself that even their potential weaknesses place me in good company. Didn't Christ draw our attention to the difference between sin and sinners?

Didn't he remind us that

sinners can always be saved, and selves?

(with few

exceptions)

that none of us can save our-

Consequently, should my remarks appear unfaithful to logic,

let whoever is fallacy-free hurl the first objection.

NOTES 1. As Douglas Walton succinctly summarizes the textbook tradition, an argument commits a fallacy when it is invalid, unsound or inaccurate. Walton's own definition of fallacy is "a type of weakness, deficiency or an inadmissible move which leaves one open to criticism" by appeal to reasonable standards. See "Fallacy, Argument and Dialogue," keynote address at this conference. 2. R a l p h J o h n s o n and J. Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense, 1983: 33. Johnson and Blair define good arguments as fulfilling three criteria: relevance, sufficiency, acceptability. Hence bad arguments are deficient in one or more of these respects. 3. For Toulmin, since humans invent novel ways of erring, "...the catalog of fallacies will forever remain incomplete." Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke and Alan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, 1984: 131. For Thomas, validity "and perforce soundnessf are matters of degree, to be mapped on a continuum rather than treated dichotomously. Stephen N. Thomas, Practical Reasoning in Natural Language, 1985: 135. 4. Walton, "Fallacy, argument and dialogue," cited in note 1. Also see S. K. Wertz, "When Affirming the Consequent is V a l i d , " International Logic Review, 16, 17-18. Since 'if ρ then q; q;

53 therefore ρ' is the basis for all should make us pause.

inductive

reasoning, this

5. Likewise, set theory conveniently and powerfully characterizes "informal" fallacies such as composition and devision, respectively. 6. "The Fallacy Behind Fallacies," Midwest Studies in _ Philosophy, 6, 489-500 and "The Pedagogy of Logic," Teaching Philosophy, 303-336. Ermanno Bencinvenga sharply rebuts some of Massey's earlier work in "On Good and Bad Arguments," Journal of Philosophical Logic, 247-259. 7. Stephen N. Thomas makes a similar claim about the in principle irreducibility of "natural" logic to purely syntactic or extensional terms. See Practical Reasoning in Natural Language (1985): Appendix I, 454-461. 8. Cf. G. E. Moore's famous 'open question argument' for a variation on this theme. Principia Ethica, 1903, rev. ed. 1922: 15-16. 9. Harvey Siegel asks (personal communication) whether "essentialism is unavoidable," and in particular whether I am guilty of propounding the very ideology I criticize. I appreciate Siegel's fears, especially because the questions he raises demonstrate both the utility and indispensability of tu quoque arguments. 10. Robert J. Fogelin reprints some relevant passages from Grice's writings on conversational implicature in Understanding Arguments, 1978: 335, 342. For a discussion of Grice's work in relation to fallacies, see A. R. Martinich, Meaning and Reference, 1984: 95-101. 11. Ralph Johnson forcefully advanced this contention at the Pacific Division AILACT meeting held in Los Angeles, CA on March 28, 1 986 . 12. Posterior Analytics A2, 72a15--19; A3, 72b19--23; A9, 76a16--21; B6 , 92a1 5 — 1 9 ; B19, 100b13 — 1 4 . 13. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.022, 4.1212, 5.62, 6.36. 14. Here one thinks immediately of DeSade. See Michael Winter, "The Expolsion of the Circle: Science and Negative Utopia," in E. M e n d e l s o h n and H. N o w o t n y , eds., Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science between Utopia and Dystopia (Sociology of the Sciences, Vol. VIII), 1984: 73-90 for an astute appraisal of DeSade's roots in the Copernican and liberal political traditions. 15. Alan Brinton reminded me to emphasize this fact. 16. Much of my thinking about pornography coincides with Susan Griffin, whose masterful essay "Pornography and Silence" depicts the inverted relation between culture and nature which imposes t e r r o r on women while suppressing the erotic innocence of children. Her account explains (mutatis mutandis) what is s ο disturbing about sophistry and (self-)deceptive argument: denial

54

of one's own involvement, an attempt to manipulate bystanders while precluding further debate, plus cynical aloofness which masks fear. "The man who stares at a photograph of a nude woman is a voyeur...an invisible line separates him from the image he perceives. He will not be overwhelmed by the presence of her flesh. He need not encounter the knowlege of his own body. He can hide from the deepness of his own soul....Over and over again, the pornographer must reverse his own humiliation, his own enslavement, his own terror... .Fearing that he will die of his own desire, he places her loveliness under his control... fearing the object he has made, he destroys her....Above all, the voyeur must see and not feel. He keeps a safe distance. He is not touched by reality. And yet in his mind, he can believe he possesses reality. For he has control over these images he makes and he shapes them to his will...even as we escape ourselves we confront ourselves... pornography gives us a lucid mirror of itself...0 it/ records the ultimate despair of its own final solutions...what the pornographer would really annihilate is a part of himself...which is vulnerable." Made from this Earth, 1982: 123-4, 137-8, 141. 17. Richard Paul suggested this motto as a watchword for our mutual disdain for the false dichotomy between having inflexible rules or else no "road maps" to guide reasoning at all. I have adapted it to pose my own tertium datur. 18. Deliberate (Socratic, Nietzschean) use of fallacy teaches audiences which might otherwise be forever beyond reach. This also explains Christ's strategy in John 8:3--7. Is a deliberate fallacy still a fallacy? Or are saints and heroes exempt from the charge of committing them? 19. There's a hidden agenda behind this innocent remark, which is worthy of a paper in its own right. For example, consider the Principle of Charity, which obliges us to reconstruct an argument more adequately (plausible, accurately, strongly) than did its original proponent. What is this, if not a secular version of turning the other cheek? Why shouldn't I (consistently) repay bad arguments with (equally) bad ones, instead? Even if teachers and scholars have a special duty to be helpful, why does this injunction apply to students or ordinary citizens? In short, why should I be logical, or be persuaded to join the logician's nondenominational religion? Try to answer this without begging the question--that is, without violating another self-prescribed disciplinary norm. And if anyone assumes that (formal) logic is "value free," ask them to justify the concept of proof in"neutral" terms. Why prove anything at all? As a means to secure agreement? Why agree? Why play the (meta)game? 20. Cf Kant on the permanence of the antinomies, or Hume on the disputes pervading natural theology. 21. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 1957: 45. Tillich's comment concerns the difference between faith and idolatry, yet it addresses Siegel's doubts (note 9 above) about the inescapability of rules.

55 REFERENCES Aristotle. Posterior Analytics A2, 72a15--19; A3, 72b19--23; A9, 76a16 — 21; B6 , 92a15--19; B19, 100b13--14. Bencinvenga, E. (1979). On good and bad arguments. Philosophical Logic, 8^, 247-259. Grice, H. P. (1978). Griffin, Earth.

In R. J. Fogelin, Understanding Arguments.

S. (1982).

Pornography

Johnson, R. & J. A. Blair (1983). Martinich, A. R. (1984).

and

silence.

Thomas, S. N. (1985). Tillich, P. (1957). T o u l m i n , S., Reasoning.

from

this

Meaning and Reference.

The pedagogy of logic.

Moore, G. E. (1922).

Made

Logical Self-Defense.

Massey, G. (1981). The fallacy behind fallacies. Studies in Philosophy, 6_, 489-400. Massey, G. (1981). 303-336.

Journal of

Midwest

Teaching Philosophy, 4^

Principia Ethica. Practical Reasoning in Natural Language. Dynamics of Faith.

R. Rieke

& A. Janik

(1984).

Wertz , S. K. (1 985 ). When affirming International Logic Review, 16.

An

Introduction

the consequent

is

to

valid.

Winter, M. (1984). The explosion of the circle: Science and negative utopia. In E. Mendelsohn & H. Nowotny, eds., Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia. Wittgenstein. 6.36.

Tractatuss Logico-Philosophicus 4.022, 4.1212,

5.62,

6

When No Reason is Good Reason Michael Wreen Many

a

contemporary

logic

text,

argumentum ad iqnorantiam. or appeal to ignorantiam

contains

a

discussion

of

ignorance.

Argumentum

ad

is a -fallacy, it is claimed, and consists in appealing

to ignorance in order to prove a point. Somewhat the

-fallacy

is

said

more

rigorously,

to be committed i-f (and only if, I take it)

someone argues that a proposition is true because it has shown

to

be

been

-false, or that a proposition is -false because it has

not shown to be true (Brody, 1967: 6 4 ) — t h a t or some near usually

not

relative

does duty as a definition. The (so-called) -fallacy is many

times then illustrated with a number o-f examples, and the reader is invited to try his hand at detecting it, and a number of other such -fallacies, in cases provided in the -form o-f exercises. Apart -from a couple

of

journal

professional

book

articles or

two,

and that

some is

passing

remarks

in

a

pretty much all there is to

report on ad ianoratiam. Until this paper, that is. In it, I'll

be

challenging the claim that there is anything like a general fallacy of

ad

ianoratiam

and

goodness of good ad

trying,

ignorantjams

very briefly, to show wherein the lies.

I

begin,

though,

where

everyone else does, with a textbook example. Consider

the

following arguments "No one has ever been able to

prove the existence of extrasensory perception. Me conclude

that

extrasensory

perception

must

therefore

is a myth" (Hurley, 19B5s

117). This argument is given in an exercise set in

a

logic

text,

and is supposed to commit the fallacy of argumentum ad iqnorantiam.

57 It is an example -found in a number o-f other texts, too 1982s

101).

But

I

don't

think it's -fallacious.

shall first apply what I take to be sound reconstruction,

then

go

on

to

To show why, I

principles

evaluate

(e.g., Copi ,

the

o-f

argument

argument

so

reconstructed. First point: the term

'prove' in the premise is

too

strong

if

read in the mathematician's sense; and, given the context, probably should

not

be

approximately, something

so

read.

It is better to think of it as meaning,

'provide good

inductive

evidence

'myth,'

in

the

conclusion,

is

emotionally loaded one. To preserve the while

at

That,

or

like that, is close to the everyday meaning of the term,

and is clearly how charity dictates we interpret point:

for.'

the

a

it

here.

Second

strong

term,

and an

force

of

the

conclusion

same time removing unwanted emotional connotations,

let's rewrite it as 'Extrasensory perception doesn't exist.'

Third

point: arguments do not occur in isolation but in a certain context and

against

a

backdrop

of

knowledge,

beliefs,

purposes. As far as the argument at hand is means

is

that

we

supply

interests, and

concerned,

what

this

a context and impute normal background

beliefs, knowledge, and so forth to the speaker. That said, we

can

reconstruct the argument as No one has ever been able to provide strong inductive for the

existence

of

extrasensory

perception;

therefore,

extrasensory perception doesn't exist, and proceed. The next thing that needs to be noted is that the reconstructed,

is

an

inductive

one.

No

one

argument, with

so

normal

intelligence, knowledge, and beliefs would think that the truth

of

58 the

premise

necessitated

the

truth

of

the

inductive argument, its evaluation is context being

at

least

partly

conclusion.

sensitive

As an

(strength

a -function o-f context) , content sensitive

(strength being at least partly a function of the exact content the

proposition

being argued for), and dependent upon whether low

or high standards of evidence are employed one

of

conclusion

as

to

the

argument's

perhaps quite another).

The

argument

(low standards strength,

differs

yielding

high standards

from

a

deductive

argument in all of these respects. How

does

it

fare,

context is probably people)

then?

simply

a

Quite well, it seems to me. For the discussion

(between

however

many

in which the existence of extrasensory perception has been

asserted or called existence

of

a

into

question;

certain

kind

the

of

evidence are relatively high, as

content

is

phenomenon;

high

as,

the

but

no

the

alleged

standards of higher

than,

scientific standards always are when a phenomenon is said to exist; and,

most

important of all, the relevant background knowledge and

beliefs at the disposal of the arguer have),

the

evidence

upon the argument, is standing,

and

which

any

hearers

he

after

epistemically

careful,

secure,

impartial,

of

community

other

the

words,

despite

attempts to gather evidence for the positive existential,

"There is extrasensory perception,' despite efforts and

by

to uncover any evidence for the existence of

extrasensory perception have all failed. In numerous

long

interpersonal

investigation. I allude to the fact that repeated attempts scientific

might

(in all likelihood) he has which bears

extensive,

reached

(and

kinds

spanning

many

years,

many

of

experiments,

experimenters, no positive results have been forthcoming.

all and

sorts many

Such

an

59 investigation

with

absolutely

nil in the way of positive results

justi-fies not only the premise but also the move to the conclusion. The inductive inference to the conclusion is the

warranted,

by

-fact that a sustained, determined, thorough, and conscientious

search

-for

reasons

perception—that

is,

-for for

the

existence

reasons

for

o-f

the

the

argument—has

sort, in fact,

yielded nothing.

which

justify

belief

extrasensory

positive existential

corresponding to the negative one which figures as of

then,

the

conclusion

It is reasons of Just this in

most

of

the

negative

existentials that we do in fact b e l i e v e . — W h y , for instance, do you believe

that

there

is

no

golden

ball

in

n o w ? — T h e failure of all the arguments for a constitutes

a good reason for belief

front positive

of you right existential

in the corresponding

negative

existential. Thus, contrary to the accepted view, the complete failure of all of the arguments for at least some p's but

only

a

little

more

(actually, I think all

p's;

relevant to such a strong claim will

be

found below), namely, p's that are positive existentials, is itself a

'disproof,'

not—p's,

the

a

good

reason

for

the

been thorough, fair, and scrupulously point

the

corresponding negative e x i s t e n t i a l s — a t

examination of the arguments for

My

believing

here,

it

should

be

positive

corresponding least if the

existentials

have

conducted. noted,

is not that there is a

presumption in favor of negative existentials, for my claim is that the inference to the negative existential and

is warranted

only

after

because repeated attempts to discover reasons for the positive

have all failed. Still, there does seem to be an asymmetry arguments

for

between

positive and for negative existentials: the failure

60 of all the arguments -for the non-existence Walter

Weber

if,

but

of

universals,

of

of

only if, Me exclude from consideration for

the moment the 'no reasons' argument defended examination

or

above—even

if

the

those arguments were impartial and thorough, would

not constitute a good reason for belief in universals, or in Walter Weber.

It is not so much that a presumption rides with a

existential

negative

as that a burden of proof rests on a positive. Failure

to carry that burden is good reason to

believe

the

corresponding

negative existential. This methodological principle, it is important to notice, is not an

arbitrary

one.

Given

that

for

any

of the vast, indeed the

infinite, number of pairs of positive and negative existentials, it must be that either the positive or the

negative

is

true;

given

that

some means must, in principle, be available to decide in each

case

which

is

existence"

true;

and

given

that

"literal,

has to do with 'standing out,' or

full-blooded

'being there,' in the

broad sense of being, in principle, findable, with this broad sense of

'findable' not necessarily restricted

(Mackie,

to

space—time

occupancy

1977» 258-259)—given these f a c t s — o r even given just the

last o n e — a judgment of rise

to

a

'not found after a diligent

provisional

judgment

of

'not

search'

findable,'

existent,' and so to the negative existential. This,

in

gives

or fact,

'not is

the basic justification of Ockham's Razor; and it is a metaphysical justification, not a pragmatic one, as many philosophers would have it. Much

the

same

holds

for

singular predications. If assiduous

efforts to gather evidence for the truth of toes' all fail

'Walter Weber

has

ten

singular

comes

in

first

in the sense that in

position,

followed

by

the

1st

d I the person

plural, while the reverse order is found in D 11, Reagan has a consistently higher

frequency

of

"I",

as

compared

with

Mondale.

This

is

shown

in Table 3. 1

First Debate (D I) |

Reagan

Second Debate (D II)

Mondale

Reagan

| 1

I

42.9 %

34.0 %

| You

I

9.8 %

14.1 %

29.7 % 7.8 %

1 He | We

I

4.4.%

8.5 %

5.2 %

I

35.3 %

32.3 %

41.4 % 15.6 %

| They 1 7.3 % I Total I 489 = 100 %

10.9 % 467 = 100 %

I

| I

Mondale

| 1

I

25.2 %

|

I

8.1 %

|

1 I

9.1 % 46.1 %

1 |

I

11.2 %

|

511 = 100 % I 427 = 100 % |

Table 3 The difference between D I and D i l can be explained from the topics that were

discussed:

topics such with

the

separately.

dealt

with

domestic

policies

and

as personal leadership and religious beliefs,

foreign

frequencies

D I

found

policy for

more

while D II dealt

of the USA. The differences between the

the two candidates

are

discussed

personal

for each

relative pronoun

264 4. Description 4 . 1 . First Person Singular A high (see e . g .

frequency

of

"I" is

Fowler et a l .

normally

1979:201).

associated

with

personal

speech

The higher frequency of this pronoun

in Reagan's speech noted above therefore seems to fit in with the intuition that

Reagan

has

indeed

effect he creates comes

across

is

a

"personal"

way

of

speaking.

that he speaks to i n d i v i d u a l s ,

as "a regular

guy"

(cf.

The

overall

not to audiences,

New York Times Oct 9,

and

1984). The

frequent use of "1" seems* to be one feature of his style, together with his tone of voice and the non-linguistic features (small g e s t u r e s ) , contributing to this general effect of "directness". If in

one

looks

at

the debates,

and

reaction) to

account

their

"believe", (e.g.

of

processes

that

receive

that mental processes approximately

an

explicit

(especially

50 % of all

of

"I"

cognition

I-utterances,

while

account for another 25 %· This means that speakers refer

"know",

and

past

"guess",

"wish",

anything else. Verbs

for

present

"hope",

types

it appears

verbal processes more

the

beliefs

(especially

"understand",

"want",

"admire",

"assume", "support",

"I

think",

etc.) "like",

but

and

also

attitudes

e t c . ) than to

These two categories can however not be strictly separated.

such as "I »gree/disagree",

"1 feel/don't

feel",

"1 object to",

"I'm

opposed to" express beliefs as well as attitudes. It

is

interesting

candidates processes

find

the

that

in

the

these

different

debates

that occur in 1-utterances.

positions

is

of

the

has to express

which

the

There are two important differences.

Mondale has to argue for changing the existing state of

affairs

solve

in

reflected in the types of

and hence bears the "burden of proof".

state

he can

note

themselves

The first is that affairs,

to

warrants

a

change

problems better than

his disagreement.

of

He has to show (i) that leadership,

Reagan.

and ( i i )

In other words,

that

Mondale

There are indeed frequent expressions of

disagreement in Mondale's discourse ( e . g . "what I object to", "where I draw the line", "1 don't agree", "I'm opposed to . . . " ,

etc.).

The second difference between the candidates is that the President has status-power.

As suggested above,

Mondale has to remain respectful in his

attacks. Again, we do indeed find various expressions of "respect": (1)

I respect the president, I respect the presidency, and 1 think he knows that

(M 1 , 1 ) 2 .

Within utterances types.

The first

referring

to verbal

processes

we can distinguish two

type makes reference to the primary

discourse

situation,

265 i.e.

to the present discourse in the debate:

"but

1 tell

you

second type earlier this

now",

reference

statements

for either

"I've

also

"1 would c a l l

I say",

made

by

the

"let me suggest",

to your attention",

is made to a secondary

of two reasons:

(always)

"as

speaker.

discourse The

etc.

situation,

candidates

i.e.

usually

either to affirm their r e l i a b i l i t y

said and s t i l l s a y " )

In the

or to deny an accusation

to do

(Message:

(Message "I

never said what you claim I s a i d " ) . (2)

1 never said any such thing (R 1 1 , 3 ) . C l e a r l y , although the burden of proof lies with Mondale, as said above,

the burden

of rebuttal

In R e a g a n ' s

shifts

back

and forth between the two c a n d i d a t e s .

discourse we distinguish the following

two types of

statements

( i ) "I am the president" (affirmation of status-power); ( i i ) "I deny the accusation"

(defense).

A large

and relational processes with the f i r s t

number of material

singular

in

Reagan's

took office in 1981" "I

started

position

I

this

(R 1 , 1 ) ;

...

hold"

speech

and

(R

I

1,8),

are

indeed

status-affirming:

"people in positions continue etc.

In

it

in

office" to

(R

future

1,4);

actions,

again is frequently on the defensive ( i . e . "I deny": example (3) Never would 1 do such a thing

I

such as I'm in" (R 1 , 4 ) ;

this

references

person

"when "in

the

Reagan

(3).

(R 1 , 2 3 ) .

4 . 2 . F i r s t Person Plural In the non-dyadic debates, "we" is used for referring to the speaker and various

participants,

and is an important

s t r a t e g i c tool.

The

participation

framework can be represented as follows: Journalists (Republican. P a r t y ) " ' —

Possible

referents

journalist(s); audience; Types few

(ii)

of

Reagan — Mondale — \ / Audience:American people

"we"

my

are

therefore:

"I,

party/administration;

(Democratic Party)*'

the (iii)

speaker", the

and

opponent;

( i ) the ( i v ) the

(v) the American people. (i)

instances

and only.

(iv)

are the least interesting

uses,

and are found in a

In such cases the reference is to the debate

situation

as such. Examples (4) and (5) illustrate this usage. (4)

But Jesse Jackson is an independent l e t ' s talk about people we do control.

person. I don't control him, and (M 11,11)

266 (5)

We just heard the p r e s i d e n t ' s

In

(4),

"let's"

includes

issue,

in

cases,

however,

(v)

is

(5)

"we" the

therefore

the

" w e " is f r e q u e n t l y used, (6)

the

speaker

audience "we"

of

"we"

solidarity:

"we

less

to

this

programme type

of

in

use

the

who in r e a l i t y

are

form

solidarity

r e f e r to actions

audience.

In

most

people".

Type

American

Americans".

as in

when

as in

it

( 7 ) and

of

"we"

taken

utterances "what

is that or

in

we

is

This

the

solidarity

(6):

used

with

processes

(8):

where

the

to be taken,

have no state-power,

is even c l e a r e r (10)

responsibility

in references to past

to/need

to

speakers

as in

use puts part

the

speakers

allegedly

This

of

which

have

We need to end those d e f i c i t s as w e l l

refer

do".

effective

"we", (11)

strategy

from

which

of

opponent

state-power)

"the American

people",

(9): (M

11,15).

on the

shoulders of the v o t e r s ,

an

in

alliance

is

debate

is

the

( a s in 11) or as " t h i r d p a r t y "

( a s in

the

We a l l (M 11,22)

the

speaker

alliance. 13

and

Reagan

instances,

disagreement, (13)

I'll

opponent it

all

either

as i l l u s t r a t e d in finally, are

is

that

is

only

refer

type

of

solidarity

excluded, (Μ

either

while to

the

as

1,24)

( i i i ) , in which

infrequent,

once,

since

"we"

Mondale's debate

"we"

But

includes

expresses

speech

discourse

...

an

contains

or

express

(13):

tell you where we disagree

type

opponent's

his uses

which

Type ( 4 1 ) , this

use

as the

1 accept his o b j e c t i v e and his dreams. We a l l do . . .

It i s according t o the expectations

as

12).

If you just t e l l us, what y o u ' r e going to do . . .

(12)

sub-

actions:

establishing

the

their

Another

(who have

by

type

to

And when we sought to assault Social Security and Medicare, record shows w d i d , I think that was m e a n - s p i r i t e d . (M 1,26)

addressee

(H)

raised

(M 1,26)

(9)

of

"the

who's

. . . our morale is high (R 1,25) But do we want a constitutional amendment a d o p t e d ' of the proposed by the President . . ? . . . We d o n ' t want that . (M 1,9)

Related

An

the

innocent,

innocent

expressing b e l i e f s and attitudes, (7) (8)

journalist and

with

and can be v e r y

becomes

the

is equated

The question is our future .

Solidarity

(M 11,10)

and

includes

the

answer.

speaker

the

found where the

(M

11,6).

corporate speaker

"we".

The

clearest

contrasts corporate

instances

"we"

with

the

party.

Remember (R 1,24)

there

was

a

trillion

dollars

in

debt

before

we

got

here

267 There "we"

is in

however the

accounts

two

interesting

speakers'

for 42.5

corporate

an

difference

discourses.

In

in

the

Reagan's

% of a l l occurrences of "we",

frequency

speech

while

"we" i s found in only 3 . 5 % of a l l c a s e s . The P r e s i d e n t ' s message

few corporate w e - u t t e r a n c e s

very

corporate "we"

The e x p l a n a t i o n i s in

have

Mondale's

this

in Mondale's speech

the nature of the s i t u a t i o n . done.

of

is:

This i s what "we" mostly refer to the

future. It

is

different

to

be

expected

"we" t y p e s .

that

speakers

In some p a s s a g e s

will

make

In

use

of

as in

(15).

. . . with none of the b e n e f i t s that we think are normal and n a t u r a l for workers in our country . . . We don't thinl< that those people should be allowed to continue o p e r a t i n g f r e e . (R 11,13) the

first

sentence

"we think"

refers to the American people,

while "we

don't think" in the second sentence refers to R e a g a n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . shifting two

is

"we's"

hearer's

a

regular

are

simply

process,

and

fused

together

discursive

in

both

Generic

"you"

and

generic

in

is

only

"you"

found

is

in

used

41

in

the

is

This

that

the

s p e a k e r ' s and

the

% of

the d e b a t e s in both i t s all

"you"-instances

17 % in Mondale's d i s c o u r s e . elevate

one's

conventional wisdom" ( L a b e r g e & Sankoff

1979).

(16)

effect

Person

The second person pronoun and non-generic s e n s e s .

speech,

the

minds.

4 . 3 . Second

of

the

they s h i f t indeed very s u b t l y from

s o l i d a r i t y "we" to corporate "we" or v i c e v e r s a , (15)

strategic

is

"to

in

generic Reagan's

The d i s c u r s i v e

statement

to

the

function plane

of

If you got the government down to the lowest l e v e l that you yourself could say could not go any lower and s t i l l perform the s e r v i c e s for the people, . . . then I had s a i d once t h a t , y e s , you would then have to look to see if t a x e s should not be a d j u s t e d . (R 1,17)

Generalized statements of t h i s kind are l e s s l i k e l y to be denied. The higher frequency

in

Reagan's

implicating the h e a r e r . Non-generic

"you"

audience/American most i n t e r e s t i n g , (17)

speech

may

also

be

part

of

his

"personal"

style,

(The message i s : "I'm sure you would do the same"). refers

people.

to Here

the

opponent,

again,

the

as may be i l l u s t r a t e d in

(17):

the

journalists,

switching

cases

Four y e a r s ago in similar circumstances 1 asked you people a question. I a s k e d : "Are you better off than y e a r s before?" . . . Now, maybe I'm expected to ask that a g a i n , I'm not going to, because I think that all of everyone, those people that are in those pockets of

and

the

are

the

the American you were four same question you - or, not poverty and

268 h a v e n ' t caught up, them to - (R 1,25) In

this

passage,

they",

i.e.

there

from

participation.

they is

direct

The

a

couldn't

switch

from

address

discursive

answer

to

effect

"all

the

of you"

excluding is

way

very

I

would

to "those

want

people -

one

group

from

direct

strong:

"those

people"

are

presented as a marginal group. 4 . 4 . Third person Referring

singular

to o n e ' s

opponent in the third person makes him an

to the communication, (See e . g .

(12)).

In

to "a president", in

and the addition

speakers indeed r e g u l a r l y to t h i s ,

Mondale

use1

outsider

this

uses generic " h e " ,

tactic.

referring

in statements of "what a president should know, do,

contrast with

"what

this

president

knows,

does,

etc.".

In

etc.",

example

(18) this contrast is very c l e a r : (18)

The bottom line of national strength is that the command, he must l e a d . And when a president y e a r s into Tils administration that our arms-control because he d i d n ' t know that most Soviet missiles are things a president must know to command (M

president must be in . . . discovers three efforts have f a i l e d , were on l a n d , these 11,1).

4 . 5 . Third Person P l u r a l As as

pointed

"we",

combined thus

out,

"you", with

states

"the

and

"they",

what

American

"they".

people"

Mental

processes

as was the case

"they"

want,

feel,

are

sometimes, are

with s o l i d a r i t y

etc.

referred

to

also

strategically

"we".

The

speaker

Further " t h e y " is sometimes used

without an antecedent, though the referent is unambiguously "the opponent's p a r t y " . In such c a s e s " t h e y " has a negative connotation. (19)

··· every (R 1,22)

time

they

do that

they

scare

millions

of senior

citizens

In other cases " t h e y " is deliberately vague '· (20) Don't talk about growth because even though we need growth, t h a t ' s not helping, i t ' s going to go in the other direction, as they' ve estimated (M 1,24) 5 . Conclusion The (1)

most that

important both

speakers

and oppositions; in

their

features

which

emerge

from

this

description

use pronouns to signify r e a l o r potential

are:

alliances

(2) that the relationship between the speakers is reflected

respective

part of the s p e a k e r s '

use

of

pronouns;

individual

styles.

(3)

that

pronominal

usage

is

also

269 Notes 1.

The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of processes is based on Halliday

(1985).

2.

In the references given in b r a c k e t s , the roraan figures 1 and I I refer to the f i r s t and second debates respectively; the a r a b i c numerals refer to the speaking t u r n s . Thus Μ 1,1 means: from the 1st debate, Mondale's f i r s t speaking t u r n .

3.

In the participation scheme the respective " P a r t i e s " are in brackets because they are not autonomous p a r t i c i p a n t s : they are referred to as "they" or "we".

References Bolinger,

Fowler,

D. (1979). Pronouns in Discourse. Semantics. Volume 12. Discourse New York. R.,

Hodge, B . , Kress, G . , Trew, T. (1979). Language and Control. Routledge & Kegan P a u l . London, Boston and Henley.

Goffman,

E. (1981). Forms Philadelphia.

Halliday,

M.A.K. (1985). An Arnold. London.

Laberge,

The

of

Talk.

University

Introduction

of

Pennsylvania

to Functional

Grammar.

S . , Sankoff, G. (1979). Anything You Can Do. I n : Syntax and Semantics. Volume 12. Discourse Academic P r e s s . New York.

New York Times. Oct. 7 , 1984. 'Debating the D e b a t e s ' .

The New York Times. Oct. 9, 1984. Reagan and Mondale'. Seidel,

I n : T. Giv0n, ed. Syntax and and S y n t a x . Academic P r e s s .

G.

Press. Edward

T . Giv6n, ed. and Syntax.

'Questions Are Ready - Are Answers?'; 'TV Review - A Look at Debate between

(1975). Ambiguity in Political Discourse. I n : M. Bloch, ed. P o l i t i c a l Language and Oratory in Traditional Society. Academic P r e s s . New York.

30

Politique et fete: Elements de rhetorique dans des voeux presidentiels de de Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing et Mitterand Roland Kaehlbrandt "Franyaises, Franyais! souvent

dans

ces

termes que

le d e r n i e r

jour d e

lis

alors,

seront

d'un

spectacle

d'un

Je vous lea

telespectateurs

l'annfee, a d r e s s e r pour

qui,

les

pour

cinq

du P r e s i d e n t

spectateurs

qui,

entre

qui

s u i v e n t , temoins

impact

Du

point

Comment

de vue du

peut-on

ambiance

est

quelqu'un

de

qui,

selon

position

est h a b i l e ,

des

partis,

lui d o n n e

un message

qu'en en

p r i v e e d e s tfelfeen f a m i l l e

ou

apolitique.

la q u e s t i o n

dans

'genus de

est

suivante:

alors

comme

les

dans

de

en fetant s o u t e n u

1958I par

passer,

son

condition,

toutefois,

de ne pas

signifie

son d i s c o u r s u n e

que

(Lausberg

compatriotes

ou

1960:

image

s'il

d'homme outre-

discours.

le l o c u t e u r

certaine

se

derniers.

en g a r d a n t

son

C'est

devrait

ces

de pouvoir faire

se p l a c e

monar-

autres.

tout

lequel

laudativum'

ses

tout

persuasif,

cela

pas

la C o n s t i t u t i o n

le p r i v i l e g e

'factions'. A

ä la f o r m e ,

d'introduire du

compte

officielle

d e p a r son p o u v o i r p r e s q u e

de

contexte dans

les v e r t u s

la v i e

auditoire qui

1'esprit

passer

a.-d.

ä sa c a u s e u n

tenir

a. conquferir. C e s t

rassembles

se p o s e

politique

des

Quant

et

d'Etat.

1

la p o l i t i q u e

sont

un homme

au-dessus le

se

doit

essentiellement il

la Rfepublique,

cependant

situer au-dessus Cette

terrain

chef

apolitique?

Le President chique

evenement

Chef d'Etat

gagner

du

persuasif,

la R e p u b l i q u e

a cette heure-ci,

a m i s p o u r ffeter u n

voient,

ou d i x m i n u t e s

avoir un

de

se

leur

s entrechoquent:

la p e r s o n n e

franyais par

1

deux domaines

C1est

annee!"

la p a r o l e

certain n o m b r e de difficultes

ce m o m e n t

une

souhaite une b o n n e

dose

se v o i t

contraint

de panegyrique,

§ 62,3),

l ' o e u v r e histDrique

p.e. a

en

c.-

fevoquant

accomplir

271 ou encore la grandeur de la Prance. Pour ce qui est du contenu, il ne peut se presenter que de maniere passablement gen&ralisee, harmonis&e, vu le besoin de consensus qui est a 1'ordre du jour. C'est dire en merae temps le peu de choix que serable avoir l'orateur dans les sujets qu'il

se propose d'aborder. Cela ctant, on pourrait se demander si

les voeux presidentieIs ne devraient pas presenter un aspect tristement uniforme, aspect duquel rfesulterait un seul modele de persuasion politique valable pour tout orateur, de quelque couleur politique qu'il soit. Pourtant il est concevable que des differences apparaissent et ceci au moins sur deux plans: 1. Le discours peut fetre argumentatif ou non. S'il est argumentatif, la structure argumentative peut etre alors plus ou moins complexe, c.-a.-d. simple, coordonnee et/ou subordonnee. (Nous nous rfefferons ici au modele propose par van Eemeren et alii (198^: 19/20): une argumentation simple suit le schema 'a,b, c 1 est pourquoi c 1 ; une argumentation coordonn&e se r'esume comme 'a,b et c,d, e'est pourquoi e' et une argumentation subordonnfee comme 'a,b, e'est pourquoi c, e'est pourquoi d, e'est pourquoi e' et ainsi de suite.) 2. Outre la structure, l'orateur pourra varier ce que nous appelons la qualite de 1'argumentation, a savoir le degre d'abstraction de ses arguments, (p.e. dans son bilan de la politique menee au cours de 1'annee, dans ses attaques contres des adversaires ou encore dans 1'usage qu'il fait de lieux communs.) Ce η'est pas un hasard si nous avons choisi trois discours de trois presidents fran^ais bien differents. En analysant des voeux du Gfeneral de Gaulle, de Giscard d'Estaing et de Mitterand, nous nous mettons a la recherche de formes persuasives en politique dans un contexte de f£te apolitique. La question qui se pose est de savoir qui l 1 empörte: l'uniformitfe ou la variete, et d'etablir des modeles au cas ou variete il y a. Vu le peu d'espace a notre disposition, on nous pardonnera de ne pas traitor toutes les structures argumentatives se trouvant dans les trois discours, mais de nous limiter aux plus importantes.

272 II. Pour ce qui est du Gfenferal de Gaulle, notons d'abord qu'il tient un discours nettement politique, vu les sujets qu'il aborde: bilan politique gfenferal (§1), bilan et pronostic de la politique intferieure (§ 2 et 3)t puis description et bilan de la politique fetrangere (§*0 et enfin l'fepilogue evoquant l'unitfe nationale (§5)· Quant aux structures argumentatives, leur remarquable complexity mferite d'etre regardfee de plus pr£s. - Le § 2 presente une argumentation fortement qui pourrait fetre rfesumfee ainsi:

'Puisque notre PNB

a

subordonnee

augmente, nous

connaissons un d&veloppement extraordinaire, ce qui nous met a meme d'accroitre les investissements sociaux. Vu les augmentations, en pourcentage, de ces investissements, voila la preuve de nos bonnes intentions et de 1'amelioration de fait. Cela etant prouvfc, toute contestation ne saurait &tre que le rfesultat d'un jugement sans examen.' II s'agit lä. d'abord d'ktayer le bilan politique tant et si bien qu'il est parfaitement plausible. Cette plausibilite une fois acquise, le Gfenferal peut mfeme concfeder des insuffisances (le logement), mais surtout il peut en profiter pour anihiler ceux qui le mettent en doute. Comment le fait-il? La preuve que la situation feconomique et sociale s'est amfelioree, de Gaulle ne l'apporte apparemment pas de bon gr'e. Car, comme il dit, "le bilan est catfegorique", c.-a.-d. positif, et "au fond chacun le sait". Or, si le Gfenferal justifie son bilan quand m&me, c 1 est qu'il feint d'y fetre force, d'abord par des faiblesses humaines et ensuite et surtout par la contestation de ses adversaires politiques. Ces derniers, non seulement le Gfenferal

ils paraissent

contraindre

argumenter bien que tout soit clair, mais encore ils le

font par simple bassesse, puisque, selon de Gaulle, ils "affectent" seulement d'avoir des doutes (§2). Si done de Gaulle introduit dans son discours des arguments quelque peu tatillons puisque consistant en chiffros et pourcentages, e'est la faute aux adversaires qui desinforment le public. Voila p.e. comment on fepouse un terrain apolitique tout en tenant un discours qui, lui, est fermcment politique. L'argumentation au paragraphe suivant (§3) est, eile aussi, etonnament complexe. La raison en est que l'orateur s'efforce ici d'harmoniser deux intentions contradictoires: 1'exhortation et

l'apaisement

de son public. "II nous faut, dit le General, produire toujours plus et toujours mieux (...) sous peine (...) d'etre colonisfes par les

273

participations fetrangeres" pour ajouter ensuite: "Mais il n'y a rien la - bien au contraire - qui puisse intimider la France nouvelle ou pousse une jeunesse fort heureusement nombreuse et ambitieuse." Le bien-fonde de la mise en garde repose sur une argumentation coordonnfee: d'une part sur les souhaits felargis d e s Fran^ais et la croissance dfemographique, d'autre part sur la concurrence europfeenne et am&ricaine. Cette dernifere dfebouche sur le spectre d'une colonisation de la France par l'fetranger, menace on ne peut plus grave pour l'esprit gaullien, d'oü le maximum d'Evidence rendu a 1' avertissement: 'il faut travailler encore plusI'Mais pour apaiser

son public passablement inquifetfe, 1'ora-

teur est obligfe alors d'etayer autant justement le contraire de ce qu'il vient de dire: il n'y pas de quoi se faire des soucis. Car d'une part les avantages de 1'effort national font coraprendre a tout le monde qu'il faut poursuivre la tkche et d'autre part la jeunesse, en faisant face au defi, rend superflue toute inquifetude. Mais il n'en reste pas moins que la mise en garde est toujours lä. C'est ce qui se voit dans la conclusion finale: "En 195 nous ne reliicherons done pas notre effort." Le futur a ici une fonction double: rassurer et exhorter tout a la fois. Solution tres habile, qui revlt une rh&torique de la carotte et du baton. Pour ce qui est de la qualite de 1'argumentation gaullienne, eile se caracterise largement par des lieux communs de l'ideologie gaulliste: l'unitb nationale et 1'independence nationale. L'unite nationale explique l'essor feconomique (§1) et motive l'attaque contre les adversaires interieurs (§2). L'indfependance nationale justifie 1'avertissement (§3),sous-tend les coups portes contre les Etats Unis (§4) et la formule de cl6ture (§5)· (N'oublions pas que ce sont la des axiomes qui - en France notamment - garantissent une large approbation). S'il y a quand mfeme des arguments concrets dans le discours du Genferal, ils sont - nous l'avons vu - justifies par la desinformation venant du parti opposfe. Quel est alors lo modele persuasif du discours gaullien? II repose sur l'autoritfe et la raison de l'Etat. C'est eile qui parle, rfeclamant le plus naturellement du monde son droit de parier politique quand bon lui semble. Fort de sa legalite, le President de Gaulle estime legitime d'apparaitre en tant que tel face a un public qui par consequent se voit contraint

- en ce jour de f&te - d'abandonner son

274

humanitfe pour reendosser sa citoyennete. Et c'est exactement cette position-la qui, de par

le caractere solennel que le General lui

confere, harmonise ce qui parait contradictoire: politique et f&te.

III. Au debut de cet exposfe nous avions constat^ qu'un discours de ffete n&cessite un certain degre d'harmonisation, de gfen&ralite. Mais Giscard d'Estaing, quant a lui, dissout ses arguments dans une genferalite telle qu'il est presque impossible d'y reperer l'objectif habituel d'une argumentation, a savoir rendre reconnaissable ou evident ce qui ne l'est pas a premiere vue (Göttert 1978 : 2). II n'y a, en plus, que des argumentations simples, p.e.: 'La France est capable de surmonter les problemes actuels, done eile doit avoir confiance en elle'(§ k) ou bien

'la France a deja surmontfe tant de problemes

dans son histoire qu'elle peut avoir confiance en elle'(§

ou en-

core 'il y a une forte competition entre les peuples, la France a done besoin de capacite' (§ 7)· Tout ceci a apparemment pour fonction de definir et de justifier ce qui est le "bonheur" pour la France. Mais dejä le

bonheur

est une notion dont les contours peuvent diffi-

cilement fetre dfeliraites. II en va de m&me pour les termes dont Giscard d'Estaing parait essayer de prouver la pertinence: confiance (§ 4), efficacitfe (§ 6), capacitfc (§ 7)· Bref, il s'agit la d'une argumentation qui tourne dans le vide. Quelle en est la fonction? Elle doit seulement faire progresser le discours, et ceci dans une certaine regularity oratoire, sans qu'elle n'apparaisse chargee d'une

contrainte

logique plus propre au genre dfelibferatif (genus deliberativum). Ce dernier se trouve, en effet, scrupuleusement fecarte. Car l'objectif giscardien est de ne faire du mal a personne en renoncant a tout ce qui pourrait engager soit le public, soit l'orateur. D'ou le fait qu'il n'ya point de bilan, ni de pronostic, ni non plus aucune attaque contre 1'adversaire. Et lorsque l'orateur evoque deux problemes normalement politiques: le chftmage (§ 6) et la concurrence internationale (§ 7), ces probleraes-lä. ne sont pas places dans un contexte politique. S'ils sont la, c'est pour 4tre constatfes. Ce sont des problemes du 'temps', tristes mais fatals, tel le chftmage ou encore sont-ils tout simplement

'la', tels la concurrence internationale et le manque

d'unitfe nationale (§ 5)·

275 Dans ce discours pan&gyrique,

l 1 obligation qu'assume l'orateur quant

a. la plausibilitfe de ses arguments est beaueoup moins grande que celle d'un discours affichant beratif. Pourtant

sans ambages son caractere politique et deli-

ce que l'orateur gagne en liberte logique, il le

perd en liberte politique. Ainsi lui est-il impossible desormais de justifier ou de recommander une politique concrete quelconque et son argumentation repose alors n4cessairement

sur des lieux commune non

politiques comme nous les avons reperes. Le seul axiome de nature politique qu'on trouve dans le discours giscardien, l'unitfe (§ 5)»

est

encore prive de sa nature puisqu'integre dans une comparaison avec la fami lie (!) ou bien glisse dans une citation de caractere on ne peut plus harmonieux: "Si tous les gars de France voulaient main..."

se donner la

(§ 9)·- Si Giscard d'Estaing se desiste d'un discours poli-

tique proprement dit et partant d'une argumentation au sens strict du terrae, ce n'est pourtant pas pour renoncer ä l'objectif de persuasion. II s'agit la seulement d'un autre modele persuasif. C'est

celui

du compromis maximum. Car ce president-ci se pr&sente a nous comme un parmi nous. C'est quelqu'un qui semble oublier pour un moment

sa charge

politique pour devenir 'homme' ("ce soir, ce n'est pas le Chef de l'Etat qui vient vous parier de politique. C'est 1'un d'entre vous..." Mais c'est aussi quelqu'un qui sait trouver des formules

(§ 1)).

solennelles,

tel un pr&tre.

IV. Le discours de Franyois Mitterand, par son caractere nettement politique et argumentatif,

plus

s'approche du modele gaullien. Comme le

Genferal, l'orateur expose ici un bilan politique a deux volets: d'abord les succes feconomiques et ensuite les reformes sociales (§ 3)· Ces deux volets concourent

sous forme d'une argumentation

pour rendre plausible les deux conclusions principales:

coordonnee "nous sommes

sur le bon chemin" (§ 3) et "il faut continuer" (§4 et 6), entendez 'la politique de la gauche'.- Outre cette relative complexity tative il y a un autre parallele par rapport au modele

argumen-

gaullien:

Mitterand fait usage du m&me stratageme pour justifier le fait qu'il enumere les exploits dc son gouvernement. Uno fois de plus, co sont les adversaires qui l'y contraignent. Ainsi le premier volet introduit par: "Los catastrophes annoncees avec tant

est-il

d'insistance,

276 jour apr^s jour et pendant des ann&es, ne se sont pas produites." De m&me pour le deuxieme volet: "On a dit que nos reformes sociales avaient coüte trop eher." (§ 3). Du m&me coup - troisieme parallele enfin - les adversaires sont-ils convaincus de disinformation, de panique

et - pour ce qui est des reformes sociales - de malveillance

et de petitesse de coeur. Si dans 1'Enumeration des atouts gouvernementaux,les

arguments

1

avanefes sont relativement concrets, il η en reste pas moins le caract£re fort genferal de plusieurs argumentations. P.e. celle traitant de la mentalite fran^aise. Les Fran^ais "protestent toujours, mais ils sont courageux" (§ 3) dont la premiere partie est tres rfepanduo en France sous la forme de "les Fran^ais sont rouspeteurs" ou

bien

celle mettant a profit le mythe de la grandeur: "un peuple, pour fetre grand, doit &tre solidaire" (§ 4) ou encore cet axiome politique deguisfe en fayon de parier: "surtout ne lachons pas la rampe" (§ 4). Mais l'orateur ne se borne pas ä ces imperatifs relativement vagues. II rompt au contraire 11 abstraction observfee par

ses deux predecesseurs

en se pla9ant a la fin de son discours sur un plan nettement fclectoraliste. Au § 6 Mitterand aborde les Elections proches et va jusqu'a solliciter son public: "Mais je vous demande de preserver ce qui a eth conquis sur 1'injustice sociale et sur la crise Iconomique." Cette insistence, on la retrouve aussi dans d'autres formes telles que voyez, demandez done (§ 3 ) »

cr0yez-moi (§ 4). Ici le locuteur

abandonne son tr6ne pour devenir petitionnaire.- Mais ce n 1 est que pour devenir enfin plus

1

presidentiel 1 que les autres. Car toujours

a la fin de son discours, Mitterand entend souligner sa position de premier arbitre, et il le fait de maniere tout a fait formelle: "Quant a moi, dit-il, garant de l'unitfe nationale, je serai la pour assurer la continuity de nos institutions..." (§ 6). Ceci est, on le sait, presque mot a mot l 1 article 5 de la constitution de 1958. Le modele mitterandien est done mixte. D'une part il rev&t un caractere politique et m&me autoritaire, ce qui I'approche du discours gaullien, d 1 autre part il est plus proche de son public en le priant que justice soit faite. Autorit^ politique et pfetitionnaire moral: e'est

en jouant sur la gravitfe de ces deux fonctions que

Mitterand essaie de convaincre son public.

Pour revenir a notre question initiale, il est clair que la varifetfe des formes persuasives 1'empörte sur 1'uniformitfe. Variete que nous avons d'abord repferfee au niveau de la structure argumentative: eile etait complexe dans les discours de de Gaulle et de Mitterand, simple dans le discours giscardien. Variete aussi au niveau de la qualitfe de 1 1 argumentation: plus de topoi proprement politiques dans les discours du General et de Mitterand et aussi plus d 1 arguments concrete, notamment dans les bilans. Variete enfin et surtout dans les attitudes et les images affichfees: Dieu cache (de Gaulle), bon voisin et pr&tre (Giscard d'Estaing), president et petitionnaire (Mitterand), autant de modeles a la recherche d'une solution persuasive dans le conflit entre politique et ffete, entre presence de l'Etat et presence de la vie privee.

Rfefferences textes: de Gaulle, C. (1971): Discours et messages. Pour 1*effort. Aofit 1962 - dfecembre 1965· Paris. Giscard d'Estaing, V. (1974-1979): Allocutions radiotfelfcvisfees prononcfees par le President de la Rfepublique. Paris:Documentation Franpaise. Mitterand, F. ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 ) :

Voeux de Monsieur le President de la Rfe-

publique. Paris: Documentation Fran9ai.se. oeuvres scientifiques: Eemeren.F.H. van/ Grootendorst, R./Kruiger, T. (1984): The Study of Argumentation. New York: Irvington. Göttert, K.-H. (1978): Argumentation. Grundzüge ihrer Theorie im Bereich theoretischen Wissens und praktischen Handelns. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Lausberg, H. ( i 9 6 0 ) : Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft. München: Max Hueber.

31 The Keegstra Case: The Anti-Semitic Argument in Modern Day Alberta Schools Richard Fiordo

Since the depiction of the "Keegstra Case" in Alberta newspapers was inextricably interlaced with the media's handling of it, the media presentation of this case will be the source of our data on Keegstra's anti-Semitic arguments presented in his public school social studies classes. The Calgary Herald and A Trust Betrayed by Bercuson and Wertheimer (1985) serve as the sources for the coverage of the Keegstra case. The Calgary Keegstra case.

Herald

alone published

over

160 articles

on the

Other news papers covered the story with equivalent

force.* I selected the Calgary Herald because of its comparatively responsible reporting of the Keegstra case. A Trust Betrayed, a synthesis and sequel to the case and its media coverage, serves as an additional source of public opinion post facto of the Keegstra 2

case as well as an historical source. The anti-Semitic teachings of Jim Keegstra in Alberta classrooms was judged to be a legal violation of the teaching code. While Alberta's Jim Keegstra is not alone - British Columbia's Robert Noyes, a school teacher and principal from British Columbia, reportedly "pleaded guilty to 19 accounts of sexually assaulting children" (Alberta Report, 1986:42) - his misdeeds may have been as salient as the basic argument the media present in reporting them. The crucial argument of the press considers what as well as who is on trial. The main concern of the press rests with what allows such people as Keegstra to work in the schools of western Canada. Keegstra's misconduct alone is not on trial. Rather, the entire school system of Alberta, "if not the whole process of public

279

education western own"

in western

Canada

at

the

Canada"

allegedly public's

(40) , is on trial.

constitute

expense.

"a system

Through

The

schools of

that protects

protectionism

its

for

its

teachers, western Canada's laws create a legal straightjacket

for

its classroom victims (43). The argument of the media constructed in this paper pertaining to

Keegstra's

system

of

Alberta

misconduct. occur

anti-Semitism

the

obstructing

legal

and

educational

justice

and

tolerating

The charge continues that Keegstra's violations could

anywhere

haphazard

with

charges

-

"wherever

teacher

loose

evaluation

provide the opportunity"

and

teacher weak

training

supervision

standards, of

teachers

(Bercuson and Wertheimer, 194).

In fact,

the claim is made that "complacency can undermine the integrity of any educational system, anywhere" (xvii). Background on Keegstra Jim Keegstra was the last of seven born to agricultural Dutch immigrants mechanic

on

in

30

March

1957,

1934

Keegstra,

in in

Vulcan, 1959,

Alberta.

already married

years, entered the University of Alberta at Calgary University

of Calgary)

to obtain

in the Dutch

drawn to Fundamentalist Americans party

residing

influence

Canada's most

of

Reformed

effective

"Bible

degree

was

eventually

churches common to North

in farm communities. -

three

He graduated in 1967.

Church, Keegstra

and Evangelical

William

for

a

(currently the

a Bachelor of Education

with a specialization in industrial arts. Raised

Becoming

Under the Social

Bill"

radio evangelists

-

and

Aberhart, former

Alberta, Keegstra became a vehement Social Creditor.^

Credit one

of

Premier

of

He attended

Aberhart's Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute and joined the Social Credit party in 1957 (6-10) . Although he admitted meeting few Jews in his youth June

1983), Keegstra read anti-Semitic

Talmud

Unmasked:

The

Secret

(Herald, 3

literature: one being The

Rabbinical

Teachings

Concerning

Christians (1892), another being The Jewish Religion: Its Influence Today

(1983), and other anti-Semitic literature cited in Extremism

on the Right: A Handbook

(1983) .

Journalistic sources implied that

Keegstra was an anti-Semitic Don Quixote attacking Jewish windmills after devouring anti-Semitic literature of extreme right mentality. Keegstra began teaching industrial arts, science, and

280 mathematics in Cremona, Alberta in 1961. In 1963, he taught automative mechanics in Red Deer. In 1966, he moved to Medicine Hat where he taught social studies and law as well as industial arts. After earning his Bachelor's degree in 1967, in 1968 he began teaching in Eckville initially industrial arts and eventually social studies. In Eckville, he became a deacon and Sunday School teacher at the Diamond Valley Full Gospel Church. In 1974 and 1980, he was elected to the Eckville Town council and was in 1980 elected mayor of Eckville (Bercuson and Wertheimer, 16-18). From 1968 to 1982, Keegstra taught at Eckville High School. He unofficially taught anti-Semitism for approximately this entire period. In December of 1981, the Lacombe County superintendent, Robert David, investigated a formal complaint (pertaining to anti-Semitic material taught by Keegstra) from the parents of a student at Eckville High School. In the spring of 1982, Robert David admonished Keegstra about his anti-Semitic teachings. After facing a hearing by the County Board of Education, Keegstra was forbidden to teach the theory of a global Jewish conspiracy as though it were a fact. Failing to comply with the request of the Board, Keegstra was fired on 7 December 1982. On 14 April 1983, Madam Justice Elizabeth McFavden of Alberta Court of Queen's Bench upheld Keegstra's dismissal by the Board. In May of 1983, the Social Credit party of Alberta suspended Keegstra as party vice-president for 60 days. In August of 1983, the police seized Keegstra's library. The Alberta Teachers Association recommended Keegstra be suspended in October of 1983; and on 17 October 1983, Keegstra was defeated in a bid for his second term as Eckville mayor. On 12 January 1984, Keegstra was charged with willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group - Jews. This was a Criminal Code offense carrying a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. After appealing the decision of the Teaching Profession Appeal Board, his appeal was rejected on 17 February 1984. The Education Minister Dave King cancelled Keegstra's teaching certificate on 11 April 1984. After a preliminary hearing and trial in Red Deer beginning in June of 1984, Keegstra was convicted of his charges on 20 July 1985. In September of 1984, he ran as a Social Credit candidate for Red Deer in the federal

281

election and lost (Herald, 21 July 1985, B7). Sample of Keegstra's Anti-Semitic Arguments From a student essay appearing as Document 11 of the Appendix in A Trust Betrayed, the anti-Semitic arguments of Keegstra become visible. This essay was given by Keegstra to Robert David on 18 December 1981 and to the courts as well. Parts of it will be delivered here. The general argument holds that Jews in general are anti-Christian and a select group of wealthy Jews in particular form a global Jewish conspiracy to control the world for Jewish purposes. Keegstra argues that Jesus warned that Jews would be a curse to all nations allowing them to enter. This prophecy fulfils itself in the fact that the "Talmud teaches the Jews to hate Christians" and the "Jew today follows the writings of the Talmud." Through "welfare states and bloody revolutions," the Jews believe they will control the world by the year 2000 through a world dictatorship. This will be accomplished through groups like the UN and NATO. Such groups are easily infiltrated and controlled by Jews, who are also the "controlling heads behind all communist and socialist governments in the world today" (Bercuson and Wertheimer, 213). The first large organization controlled by Jews was the Illuminati, founded in 1776 by Adam Weishaupt, and aimed to destroy Christianity and establish a world government. Of the five aims of the Illuminati, one deserves note: All religions, especially Christianity, should be destroyed. Since "religion makes people moral," Christianity will teach people right from wrong. Since Christians do not worship false gods, they "will not worship the Jews" (214). The Jews started the French Revolution, which was the beginning of the Jewish world takeover. This was done by Jews hoarding food in warehouses, creating a period of starvation in France, inciting riots through anarchists, and using "lackies like Robespiere [sic] to carry out the Reign of Terror" (215). Keegstra's reasoning extends in like manner to alleged Jewish treachery in Germany, Russia, and the United States in the 19th century. Given all of these alleged crimes by Jews, because they "work through deception and false tales to achieve their ends," as

282 a "formidable sect," Jews "must be put in their place" short, the world

according

to Keegstra,

reportedly

(223).

In

is a Semitic

stronghold identical with the anti-Christ and must be communicated as well as opposed by Christians everywhere. News Arguments of Keegstra's Teachings The two major lines of argument presented

through the Calgary

Herald were quasi-logical arguments (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger, 229-230) by sign

(Ziegelmueller and Dause, 1975, 104-106)

with unexpressed premisses

(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1982 and

1983) .

The newspaper

reports served

as argumentative

exempla of

the items in the definition of argumentation set forth in The Study of Argumentation serving

to

(1984) as a "social, intellectual, verbal activity

justify

constellation approbation

of

of

constellation

or

refute

statements

an of

and

audience" claims

an

opinion,

directed

(7).

aimed

The

at

consisting

towards news

getting

obtaining

reports

the

of

the

offered

approval

a a

of

the

press

and

Calgary readership. One

line

of

argument

justified

the

bias

of

the

discredited Keegstra and most items associated with him or what he reportedly

represented.

Keegstra's

anti-Semitic

functioned as signs (Fiordo, 1977) of anti-Semitism.

arguments

To attack the

sign

(or scapegoat) of anti-Semitism served as a symbolic victory

over

anti-Semitism

and, by

symbolic

generality,

any

un-Canadian

activity. A

second

provincial

and

transcendent

system

of

education

line

of

and

the

provincial system of education. of

Education

inhumanely

attacked

pertaining

to

the the

extended

to

The inefficiency of the

the

provincial

laws

that

restrict the Boards of Education and the schools from

removing miscreants Keegstra

was

laws

Keegstra became a symbol of the

inefficiency of the Board of Education. Board

argument,

was

like Keegstra.

implicitly

The Herald argued

and

Given the newspaper

presumably

guilty

before

account,

his

trial.

implicitly that assuming Keegstra is a type of

problem occurring in Alberta schools, the school system should be accountable more than Keegstra and his type. The argument of the press condensed and simplified way. might read:

might be formally expressed in a In traditional form, the syllogism

283 (1) All un-Canadian viewpoints are condemnable. (2) Jim Keegstra's viewpoint is un-Canadian. (3) Therefore, Keegstra's viewpoint is condemnable. As

an

argument

from

sign,

its

expression

might

be

this

polysyllogism: (1) Jim Keegstra is a sign of anti-Semitism. (2) Anti-Semitism is a sign of un-Canadian thought, (3) Un-Canadian thought is a sign of danger to Canadians. (4) A sign of danger to Canadian is condemnable. (5) Therefore, Jim Keegstra is condemnable. The

reports

symbolize:

attacked

anti-Semitism,

fanaticism, right-wing martyrdom

Jim

to

name

Keegstra,

and

violation

all

of

that

the

he

came

public

to

trust,

extremism, anti-heroism, clownishness, and

but

several.

A

selection

of

headlines

from

articles in the Calgary Herald suggest the condemnable nature of Keegstra.

Bob Warwick's article of 12 April 1985 announces that

"Students

tell

Keegstra's

of

Keegstra

anti-Semitic

'facts'."

account

of

The

"facts"

history.

On

referred

25 April

to

1985,

Warwick stated that "Keegstra's student saw hate in notes"? yet on 26 April

1985, Warwick

conspiracy";

but

on

said

"Keegstra

27 April

taught

1985, Warwick

only

wrote

some Jews that

in

"Witness

still believes Keegstra's lessons"; and on 3 May 1985, Warwick ran an article on

"Ex-student

frightened

by

teaching."

On

28 April

1985, another journalist covering the Keegstra case, Paul De Groot, wrote

that

a

"Right

wing

group

sees

anti-Christ

conspiracy";

Howard Solomon wrote on 11 May 1985 that "Students frightened Jews would

get

world

control"

Judaism ruining world."

and

on

14 May

1985

that

"Essay

says

Bob Bettson, explained on 1 May 1985 that

"Anti-semitism must be challenged."

And earlier, in 1984, Bettson

wrote on 10 March that "Hatred comes cloaked in Christian guise," while Warwick announced on 6 June "Passing grade given to essay on killing Jews" and "Roosevelt

was

contra-arguments

on

dupe

8 June that Keegstra of

Stalin."

Similar

told

the courts

articles

that

presenting

(van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger, 1984, 12)

against Keegstra flourished. Arguments opposing Keegstra formed the basis of the more subtle ones opposing the educational system of Alberta. The argument

284

against the educational system of Alberta attacked the protectionist and obstructionist nature of education in Alberta. Based on articles in the Calgary Herald and on A Trust Betrayed, it may be expressed in this quasi-argument form of modus ponens: (1) If an educational system is tolerant of fanatics, that system is condemnable. (2) The provincial educational system in Alberta is tolerant of fanatics. (3) Therefore, that system is condemnable. Another related and implicit argument may be expressed in this way: (1) If an educational system allows fanatics legal and media coverage, that system is condemnable. (2) The provincial educational system in Alberta allows fanatics legal and media coverage. (3) Therefore, that system is condemnable. The articles and their headlines from the Calgary Herald that suggested such lines of argument were numerous. An article on 21 July 1985 read that the "Trial exposes hate law." Another by Warwick on the same day announced "Unrepentant ex-teacher hit with $5,000 fine." On 23 July, Roman Cooney stated "Keegstra able to teach with private school." Christopher Young charged on the same day that "Law hands fanatics what they crave most." In 1984, William F. Gold wrote on 15 January that "Legal action puts Keegstra back in limelight." Ron Callister claimed on 5 February 1984 that the "Trial gives Keegstra another soapbox." And Rabbi Peter Hayman, quoted by Howard Solomon on 21 July 1985 in an article entitled "Keegstra slurs meant anguish for Jews" reportedly asserted: "I wondered how it was possible for a man for 14 years in the public school system to teach such nonsense without being exposed" (B6). Bercuson and Wertheimer declare that Keegstra "got away with it primarily because of complacency, misguided loyalty and the failure of colleagues and school officials to understand the depths of his fanaticism." Further, Keegstra was forced into accountability "because a handful of parents . . . did not want their children to learn his lessons in hate" - "not because the system finally began to function" (194). Although Keegstra perpetrated hatred toward Jews, he succeeded through the "passive help of an educational

285 system

which

students."

...

Such

protected

protectionism

the

allowed

than

system fail to stop Keegstra, according to Bercuson

and

the whistle."

what

"gave him more than ten years of opportunity

unmolded

minds

of

a generation

fill them with the stuff of Nazism" its

"teach

his

the

Through

to

protected

Not only did

anyone blowing

him

it

did

Wertheimer, but it take

more

he

for so long without educational

him

coverage,

argumentative means

young

Eckvillians

Keegstra

case

argumentative

served

ends.

as

Journalists

able to attack the perpetration of pedagogical injustice and the educational

to and

(64).

the

to broad

of

system in Alberta with

an were

charge

culpability.

Conclusion An anecdote by a judge ends: As

a

lawyer,

(Taylor,

I had

Buchanan,

Keegstra's Calgary

all

and

journalism,

Herald

both

the

Real

argues

form of television,

Now

1984,

my

and

is

reported

beliefs,

In

be

criticizing

Wertheimer

While

text

the

factual

right"

showed

pressures

the

that

sits

unexpressed

Culture

radio, records,

atop

of

information

(1977),

with

in

the

films, books, periodicals,

and

practices]

in

[culture

a mass

manner

"media

in the ....

form

the

social

premisses

of

pyramid"

Keegstra's

(viii

& xi) .

journalism

of

primarily

serve the interest of the relatively small political-economic elite

the

consistency.

Mass-Mediated

and

to

correct.

given

other means of communication that transmit symbols,

I have

24).

judgment

Bercuson

sources

in

win,

throughout,

satisfactory accuracy and As

was

Strawn,

leanings

circumstance,

do

I hope

and

argumentative

to

"When I was a lawyer I had it easy!

power

Expressing demonstrated

that his beliefs and practices in his classroom served as

arguments

from sign of the generic Keegstra as well as arguments from sign of the

systemic

contingencies

that

allowed

the

generic

Keegstra

reinforcement. This

brief

I have merely of this case. in reporting

paper been

offers able

Keegstra's

a

to deliver

By examining

(1983) encourages,

but

glimpse

of

a reduced

the argumentative

anti-Semitic

to consider

the and

depleted

case. version

role of public

teachings,

the principles

Keegstra

I tried

media

as Willard

of argumentation

"their place in a larger philosophy of the public sphere"

(100).

and

286 Notes 1. Other sources

included

the Edmonton the Alberta

the Edmonton

Sun, the Alberta

Journal, the Calgary

Teacher's Association

Sun,

Bulletin,

Report, the Eckville Examiner, the La combe G1obe,

the Red Deer Advocate, the Globe and Mail, The Jewish Star, and others.

This

is

not

to

mention

its

coverage

by

radio

and

television in Alberta and even in national news. 2. As Hogan explains: "Historians know they must inevitably report only a small slice of past reality, and that their data may be selectively historians

preserved strive,

persuasiveness.

or

not

otherwise so

much

sketchy.

for

Thus,

objectivity,

modern but

for

All historiography is partial and subjective."

This viewpoint applies to the historical account by Bercuson and Wertheimer. 3. Mac Pherson

reports

that

the originator

of the

Social

Credit

theory that the purchasing ability of citizens was limited by the amount that had to be paid on the interest on loans was the English engineer Major C. H. Douglas.

According to Kostash, Jim

Keegstra, by 1967, had read most of Major Douglas' writings.

287 References Bercuson,

D. & Wertheimer, D. (1985). A Trust Betrayed; The Keegstra Affair. Toronto: Doubledav Canada Limited.

Bettson, B. Anti-semitism must be challenged. May 1985. .

Hatred comes cloaked in Christian guise. 10 March 1985.

Calgary Herald. Callister,

R. Trial gives Keegstra Herald. 5 February 1984.

Groot,

Extremism Fiordo,

R.

Gold, W. F. Hogan,

another

soapbox.

Calgary

Calgary Herald.

21

P. Right-wing group sees anti-Christ Calgary Herald. 28 April 1985.

conspiracy.

of the Right: A Handbook (1983). Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

New

York:

A. (1977) . Charles Morris and the Criticism Discourse. Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press. Legal action puts Keegstra back in limelight. Herald. 15 January 1984.

M. Eckville, Alberta - The agony Chatelaine. February 1984, p. 51.

Pherson, C. B. (1953). Democracy in University of Toronto Press, p. 95.

O.Callaghan, J. P. Keegstra: Dogmatic Herald. 21 July 1985. Pranaitis,

Public

Calgary Herald.

of

Calgary

J. M. (1985). The rhetoric of historiography: New left revisionism in the Vietnam era. In J. R. Cox, M. 0. Sillars, and G. B. Walker, eds. Argument and Social Practice: Proceedings of the Fourth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation. Annandale, VA. : Speech Communication Association, p. 340.

Kostash, Mac

1

3 June 1983.

Chronology of events leading to conviction. July 1985. De

Calgary Herald.

a

trial.

Alberta

Report.

(1977) . Mass-Mediated Culture. Jersey: Prentice-Hal1.

small

Alberta. or

clown?

J. B. (n.d.). The Talmud Unmasked: Rabbinical Teachings Concerning Christians. Virginia: Liberty Bell Publications.

education on 40-45.

Real, M.

martyr

of

Toronto: Caglary

The Secret Ready, West

31 March

Englewood

town.

1986, pp.

Cliffs,

New

288 Solomon, Η. Keegstra's slurs meant Herald. 21 July 1985. . Taylor,

for Jews.

Student frightened Jews would get world control. Herald. 11 May 1985. K.

Calgary Calgary

P., Buchanan, R. W., and Strawn, D. U. (1984). Communication Strategies for Trial Attorneys. Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Trial exposes hate law. van

anguish

Calgary Herald.

21 July 1985.

Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. (1982). Unexpressed premisses: Part I. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19, pp. 97-106. .

(1983). Unexpressed premisses: Part II. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19, pp. 215-225.

van Eemeren, F. Η., Grootendorst, R., and Kruiger, T. (1984). The Study of Argumentation. New York: Irvington Publishers. Warwick, B. Ex-student frightened by teaching. May 1985. .

Keegstra's student saw hate in notes. 25 April 1985.

Passing grade given to essay on killing Jews. Herald. 6 June 1984.

Calgary

Witness Herald.

C.

Calgary Herald. Calgary

Unrepentant ex-teacher Herald. 21 July 1985.

Young,

3

Keegstra taught only some Jews in conspiracy. Herald. 26 April 1985.

Students tell of Keegstra's "facts". April 1985.

Willard,

Calgary Herald.

hit with

still believes 27 April 1985.

Calgary Herald.

$5,000

Keegstra's

12

fine.

Calgary

lessons.

Calgary

C. A. (1983). Problems, puzzles, and progress: A microsketch toward a philosophy of the public sphere. In D. Zarefsky, Μ. O. Sillars, and J. Rhodes, eds. Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association. Law hands fanatics what Herald. 23 July 1985.

Ziegelmueller, G. W. and Dause, Inquiry and Advocacy. Prentice-Hall.

they

crave

most.

Calgary

C. A (1975). Araumentation: Englewood Cliffs^ New Jersey:

32

Political and Legal Convergence: A Case Study of the Sacco-Vanzetti Trial

Janice Schuetz In p o l i t i c a l political

trials

sphere

jurisdiction.

the g o a l s

converge

Belknap

because

to e n f o r c e

the v a l u e s and

(1977:

characteristics benefits

from

the c o u r t s

2). of

perjury

and

defendants,

and

state

participation

on the

use

machinery

"judicial

(Kirchheimer, Becker

conceives

xii-xvi). that

are

1961:

The

authority

defendants

with

because

independence

such

prosecution

and

uphold based

Finally,

and

were

"use

of

from

political

trials

objectives"

legal

trial

because

limitations.

seditious

were

on a c o n t i n u u m

a c t s , and

is an e x a m p l e

charged

"trial"

with

where

the

as the C h i c a g o judge

Eight

voiced

in a " p o l i t i c a l indictment,

but

abridge

Such

trials

espionage. of this

The

political and

at the o u t s e t

of

the

In t h i s c a s e ,

the

prejudices

throughout

the court

the d e c i s i o n

appears

upon

legal e v i d e n c e .

type

of

anarchists,

foreigners,

political

of the

trials

convergence

trial

but c o n v i c t e d and

draft

since

The the

evaders.

from o t h e r

of

legal and

the

to

on g r o u n d s

differ

the

of the court

this

for m u r d e r

trial

commit

than

charged

indict

type of to

impartiality

trial,"

crimes

they

a distinctly

trial.

their

identifies

conspiracy

features

(1977:

reasons

were

because

"political

case e x e m p l i f i e s

Specifically, trials

in nature

of 1 9 5 2

m o r e on p o l i t i c a l

defendants

rule

defining

proceedings

political

trials

political

in a c o n t e x t

a nonpolitical

Sacco-Vanzetti

they

type of

trial

the

provide

the a c c u s e d

of the c o u r t are q u e s t i o n a b l e

proceedings

those who

gains

is

seeking

the r e p u t a t i o n

In g e n e r a l ,

. . . to a t t a i n

treason,

tried

scene.

legal justice

state

of

the court

to r e m o v e

political

A political

indictment

trial.

of

the d e f e n d a n t s

espionage.

the s t a t e

to harm

the "all

of the

policies

the

46).

political

government

Rosenberg-Sobel1

seeks

by

resemblances

trials:

contempt"

public

first

clearly

the

prosecution";

defamation,

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291 and

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295 witness's

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Both

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296 unrelated

information

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1971:

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American

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and

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political

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hand,

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Morgan,

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persons

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to

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pictured On

foreigners

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of

conspiracy

government. as

between

144-48).

prosecution

the

foreigners

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(Levin,

An example trial

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case

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Vanzetti

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and

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legal the

state.

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(1921, October 27)

(1921, October 24), New York Times, p. 1.

Trial record: the Sacco-Vanzetti case (1969). Paul A. Appel, Vol. I, II, III, IV.

New York:

Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., and Janik, A. (1979). An introduction to reasoning. New York: Macmillan.

33 Representations of Ideology: Analogons, Images, and Ideographs David Cratis Williams

Bill Nichols, after citing a common definition of "ideology" as "views that serve to rationalize the vested interests of some group," observes that while "views are usually thought of as arguments or stated beliefs, . . . they may also be, literally, views.

After all, seeing is believing, and how we see ourselves

and the world around us is often how we believe ourselves and the world to be" (1981: 5).

Not surprisingly, most twentieth-century

political propagandists, those purveyors of ideology, have acknowledged the importance of "viewing," of photographic and cinematic images.

Hitler's Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and

Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, writes that the cinema is "one of the most modern and far-reaching media that there is for influencing the masses."

(Taylor, 1979: 29)

photographic images to Goebbels

1

A primary attraction of

p r o p a g a n d i s t s ends, according

to Doob's analysis of Goebbels' diaries, is that they provide "'proof' for many of his major propaganda contentions:

visual

i m a g e s — n o matter how he himself manipulated them before they were released—possessed greater credibility than spoken or written words"

(1950: 427).

One example of propagandistic use of film imagery to represent ideological tenets is an anti-Semitic 1940 Nazi mock-documentary called The Wandering Jew,

which aimed, in the words of a contemp-

orary reveiwer, "to exert its effect only through the incorruptible image" (Taylor, 1979: 190).

Composed primarily of newsreel

material, shot mainly in the overcrowded Jewish ghetto of conquered Warsaw purports,

(Manvell and Fraenkel, 1971: 88), The Wandering Jew in Goebbels 1 words, to show "Jewry as it really is"

(Leiser, 1974: 76).

The film evidently works through a series of

299

imagistic associations and cinematic juxtapositions, both equating Jews with, among other things, "barbaric" Orientals and wandering packs of rats, and, according to the transcript,

re-

vealing "Jews as they really looked before they concealed themselves behind the mask of civilised Europeans" 85).

(Leiser, 1974:

As Manvell and Fraenkel report, "The purpose of the film is

announced as exposing what the Jews are really like, the

'discov-

ery' of them in their 'natural state,' the ghettos of Poland" (1971: 88).

The repugnant conditions of the ghetto, it should be

clear, were themselves creations of Nazi policy 88).

(Leiser, 1974:

Following these associations, the film moves toward its

coup de grace: slaughter.

"genuine" footage of a kosher ritual animal

The film narrator says, "These pictures are unequivo-

cal evidence of the cruelty of this form of slaughter.

At the

same time they reveal the character of a race that conceals its crude brutality under the cloak of pious religious practices." The audience is then shown, in Taylor's words, "the horrifying sequence of an animal, its legs tied, having its throat split open, writhing in agony, moaning and groaning, while a grinning Jewish butcher pulls out its entrails."

The ideological message

is clear; indeed, the film concludes with a litany of Nazi decrees which not only curtail such slaughters but also portend the "final solution":

"Just as it dealt with this cruel slaughter,"

the film text reads, "so the Germany of Nationalist Socialism will deal with the whole race of Jewry"

(Taylor, 1979: 204).

The

film, in short, metonymically reduces complex ideological argument into a series of visual images designed to demonstrate that Jews "are not human beings but pests which have to be exterminated" (Leiser, 1974: 85). The Wandering Jew impresses upon its audience vivid, haunting images which by virtue of their photographic medium may indeed seem unimpeachable, if not "incorruptible."

The film's "visual

documentation," as the Nazi Security Service (SD) report on audience response terms it, presents a "starkly realistic portrait of the Jews" (Leiser, 1974: 157-158).

The fusion of a condensa-

tion of abstract ideology into representative form and the selfarticulate vividness of the representative images produces a highly propagandistic effect; as Taylor puts it, "The Wandering

300

Jew builds to a climax that can make even a Jew feel anti-Semitic"

(1979: 190).

The Wandering Jew illustrates the importance of serious consideration of the issues involved in the "re-presentation" of ideological argument, not only for the academic pleasure to be gained from such analysis but also because of the pressing need in our danger-fraught world to be aware of the nature of the cure proffered by our various social "medicine men" (Burke, 1973).

It is

the purpose of this essay to offer in tentative fashion a methodological orientation toward the "reading" of such "re-presentations" of ideology, for, as Goebbels said, "Propaganda becomes ineffective the moment we are aware of it" (Taylor, 1979: 230). Perhaps that is why in 1937 Goebbels banned all art criticism, including film criticism: "From now on," he declared, "the reporting of art will take the place of criticism which sets itself up as a judge of a r t — a complete perversion of the concept of 'criticism' which dates from the time of the Jewish domination of the arts" (Hull, 1969: 95). The remainder of this essay will advance three arguments promoting such a methodological orientation toward propaganda.

The

first advocates a definition of 'formal ideology' as an ideal argumentative structure, fully integrated and articulated.

The

second promotes a conception of 'ideological argumentation' as argument which in its genius and its implications leads willynilly into the complex argumentative web of formal ideology.

In

this sense ideological argumentation is always partial; it is always synecdochic with the formal ideology.

The relationship

between ideological argumentation and the formal ideology may be examined along two dimensions:

the representativeness of ideolog-

ical argument in relation to its formal ideology and the degree of "presence," or un-negated concreteness or totalization, of the ideological argument.

The third argument is that these two

dimensions of ideological argumentation provide a means for a more advanced understanding of the 'master analogies' of ideological argument:

analogons, images, and ideographs.

To treat of "ideology" as an ideal argumentative form is to harken back to de Tracy's original coinage of the term to mean something along the lines of a "science of ideas."

From this

301

perspective,

"ideology" has no necessary relationship either to

"false consciousness," or falsehood in general, or to an a r g u m e n t ative "rationalization" of things as they are; rather, names a configuration, a structure, of inter-related

"ideology"

arguments

which, if taken as a "screen" through which to view the world (Burke, 1966), not only m a k e s the world coherent but also tends to place the individual

in relation to it.

In this sense,

ideolo-

gies other than the particular one employed as a screen may appear as "false consciousnesses," but in a formal,

structural

sense the self-proclairaed "true" p e r s p e c t i v e and the disparaged so-called "ideology" m a y appear more similar than dissimilar. would name each an

I

ideology.

In an earlier essay, I have attempted to describe what appear to be some characteristic argumentative structures of an ideal ideology

(1985).

Specifically,

it seems useful to view an ideal

ideology as a configuration of arguments which:

(1)

revolve

about, evolve from, and devolve into central core tenents or p r o positions

(Burke, 1969: 135);

of explanation

(2) "encompass" competing

systems

(Burke, 1973: 138-167), or perhaps, in Fisher's

use of the term, "subsume" those alternative strategies 3) ; (3) turns questions of legitimacy

(1984:

inward, in a s e l f - r e f e r i n -

cing gesture which, if pressured toward totalization, tautological and therefore non-falsifiable; and

becomes

(4) invites

in-

stantiation in m y r i a d cultural forms ranging from slogans to narratives to visual images.

The formal characteristics

an ideal ideology, but in actual discourse "ideological

describe argu-

ments" are more common; indeed, "ideological arguments" may p r e ceed in chronology the ideologue's "discovery" of the

ideology

proper, but for purposes of analysis it is preferable to

"flesh-

out" as fully as possible the formal ideology and then

"work-back-

wards" to understand the functioning of any particular

ideologi-

cal argument

ideologi-

(Williams, 1985: 258).

cal force of any particular

In appraising the

ideological argument, the argument

critic must concentrate on at least two issues:

the

represent-

ativeness of the argument visa-vis the formal ideology and the degree of presence attributed to that

argument.

Representative ideological argumentation stands in a s y n e c dochic relationship with the formal

ideology.

At a theoretical

302 level, the formal ideology and ideological argumentation each imply the other.

Each is "identified with" or "represents" the

other, much as microcosm and macrocosm imply each other 1945: 508).

(Burke,

Thus, ideological argumentation appears in the light

of the formal ideology as a reduction of that ideology, or as a form of that "special application of synecdoche" called "metonymy" (Burke, 1945: 509).

In this sense ideological argument, as

a metonym of the formal ideology, appears in discourse as what Black calls an "idiomatic token of an ideology"

(1970: 115).

By

pursuing the genius implicit in these idiomatic tokens, one is led willy-nilly into the macrocosm of the formal ideology.

The

test of the relationship between these realms, the macrocosm of formal ideology and the microcosm of ideological argumentation, is one of representativeness.

Burke's discussion of the "repre-

sentative anecdote" provides a guide to this analysis:

the issue

of the representative anecdote "arises as soon as one considers the relation between representation and reduction in the choice and development of a motivational calculus.

A given calculus

must be supple and complex enough to be representative of the subject matter it is designed to calculate.

It must have scope.

Yet it must also possess simplicity, in that it is broadly a reduction of the subject matter" (1945: 60).

In analyzing

ideological argument, then, the first concern must be one of representation; since the degree of representativeness is unique to the relationship between each particular formal ideology and its own ideological arguments, however, no external hierarchic typology of representative forms seems possible. The second issue, that of the degree of presence attributed to an ideological argument, does suggest the possibility for such a typology.

The word "presence" is much-used, and it often carries

quite diverse implications.

The sense in which I am using it is

really two inter-related senses:

(1) "Presence" may function as

a measure of an argument's ability to stand-out or call attention to itself.

This is the sense in which Perelman and Olbrechts-

Tyteca use the term when they urge "the theory and practice of argumentation" to take presence into consideration

(1969: 116-

117); and, indeed, scholarly efforts to address those concerns are underway (Kauffman and Parson, 1984).

(2) "Presence" may

303

suggest the degree of totalization, or self-identity, of a proposition, that is the degree to which it _is what it _is (undeconstructed; unhindered by negation).

As the Derridean

critique of language suggests, assertive propositions must, through the deconstructive swirls of metaphor and paradox and their implication in "otherness," suffer the embarrassment of self-negation

(1972, 1982a).

The paradoxical, deconstructive nature of language itself is heightened in considerations of representation between two linguistic realms, as with that between formal ideology and ideological argument, because such a synecdochic relationship necessarily and always locates meaning in the other; in this manner, meaning is kept aswirl between microcosm and macrocosm. While formal ideology, in its self-referencing and tautological structure moves toward totalization, deconstruction occurs from within that would-be totalization, both demonstrating how it is always already deconstructed and revealing why no ideology can be argumentatively perfect. In the Derridean frame, a totalization, or self-identity, is linguistically speaking an impossibility; there is, however, a desire for it, and the fulfillment of that desire is named "truth."

Significantly, Derrida finds that the desire for total-

ization, for truth, is expressed in metaphors of sight, in "vision without concept."

Apocalypse, for instance, is the revela-

tion of truth; that is, it is the un-veiling, the bringing to sight, of that which is there (1982b).

Ulmer pursues the implica-

tions of such thought and concludes that perhaps the most significant aspect of Derrida's writings is not deconstruction per se, not the rigorous unmasking of the duplicity contained in the interpretation of writing as imitative of speech, but rather in the science of grammatogy, as a new form of non-linear writing which grafts the visual to the textual

(1985: 98-102).

In Barthes'

terms, such visualization "anchors" the range of meanings attributable to an argument

(1977).

Arguments which are visually, and

perhaps more generally sensorily, present are less susceptible to the deconstructive turn in linguistic representation: tions they simply are.

as sensa-

Moreover, as Miller suggests in his study

of the rhetorical strategies of Jonathan Edwards, sensory appeals

304 possess a great deal of force: (1950).

they call attention to themselves

Pursuing these suggestions, it is now possible to offer

in tentative fashion a hierarchic typology of argumentative forms based on their respective degrees of presence. In examining ideological argumentation along the dimensions of presence, three "master analogies" emerge as characteristic forms.

These are:

and ideographs.

ideological analogons, ideological

images,

Each of these analogies posits a relationship be-

tween ideological arguments (and implicitly formal ideology) and sensory data, suggesting that it may be possible to arrange hierarchically the forms, or analogies, in relation to their degree of self-presence.

In tentative fashion, then, the following hier-

archy is suggested:

ideological analogons are most self-present;

ideological images are second, and ideographs are least selfpresent.

An ideological analogon is a "Edenic image."

It is

visually present, in the nature of a photograph or film image (Barthes, 1977).

The category of ideological image includes

three "sub-analogies": analogical images.

sensory images, experiential images, and

Sensory image refers to images generated by

appeals to, and validated by reference to, human senses, most often the visual sense

(in this context, the ideological analogon

may be thought of as a special case of visual imagery). of sensory images would include sensory metaphors, and representational art.

Examples

stereotypes,

Experiential image refers to images

which resonnate with, and seek validation from, the rhythms of life.

The most prominent example of the experiential is the

narrative, which seeks to establish "narrative fidelity" through stories which "ring true with stories they

[the auditors] know to

be true in their lives" (Fisher, 1984: 8).

Analogical image re-

fers to images which instantiate ideological claims in arbitrary, 'artificial' vehicles, which are in themselves self-present. Examples of such analogical images would include flags and other such logos as well as geo-political "meccas" (If the ideology is a geo-political one, however, such a mecca may in fact constitute an analogon).

The third analogy, the ideograph, is less self-

present in that it is strictly linguistic and typically nonsensory .

The ideograph, as a one-term summation of an ideology,

may take the form of a slogan, a maxim, an aphorism, etc.

(McGee,

305 I960).

The synchronic structure of the ideology

(which in elab-

orated form would constitute the formal ideology) is constructed from materials available in the culture; thus, ideologies in the same culture would tend to appropriate the same ideographs but, through appeal to separate diachronic traditions and through different synchronic configurations, would suggest different "semantic loadings" for the terms.

Hence, an ideograph's meaning is

not nearly as self-present as is the case in the other analogies. While this typology is suggested in a tentative way, I am not tentative about the argument that visual "anchoring" of an ideological argument may be strongly propagandistic.

Indeed,

Speier's analysis of Nazi propaganda clearly suggests that they believed "that the immediate sensory experience" conveyed in "vicarious participation" exerts "a more powerful influence on men's attitudes than arguments do."

When linguistic arguments

were required, Nazis used techniques that fostered "the illusion of immediacy and concreteness"

(1943).

Where possible, however,

they attempted to represent their ideology in "picture units" which condensed propositional argument into self-present images. In this fashion they attempted to "supersede rational argumentation by 'pictures and symbols."

Perhaps it is for this

reason that in Nazi newsreels the visual image is accompanied by words only 31% of the time, whereas in American newsreels the corresponding figure is 80 to 90 per cent

(Kracauer, 1943).

And

certainly the image of the debased and vile Jew was representative of German ideology; it was, in Goebbels' words, the "central theme"

(Doob, 1950: 431).

In this context, The Wandering Jew may

be interpreted as an ideological analogon of the first order. Or, as Hull concludes, it is "certainly the 'hate' picture of all time, and one of the great examples of the way in which the film medium can be used as a propaganda tool far greater than the printed or spoken word alone"

(1969: 173-174).

306

Notes 1 Entitled Der ewige Jude, it is also translated as The Eternal Jew.

Producer:

the film division of Goebbels' Propaganda

Ministry.

Director:

division.

Script:

Dr. Fritz Hippler, head of the film Eberhard Taubert.

2

Propositional argument per se

is considered as a movement

toward articulation of the formal ideology and not as a synecdochal representation of that ideology.

That is, analogons,

images, and ideographs "re-present" ideologies whereas propositional arguments attempt to articulate the particular ideology. References Black, E. (1970) .

The Second Persona.

Quarterly Journal of

Speech, 56. Barthes, R. (1977).

Image-Music-Text.

Trans. Heath, S.

Hill

and Wang. Burke, K. (1945).

A Grammar of Motives.

Burke, K. (1969) .

A Rhetoric of Motives.

Burke, K. (1973).

Philsophy of Literary Form, 3rd ed. California

Derrida, J. (1972).

Prentice-Rail. California.

Structure, Sign, and Play.

Donato, eds. The Structuralist Controversy. Derrida, J. (1982a). trans. Bass, A.

Johns Hopkins.

In MARGINS of Philosophy,

Chicago.

Derrida, J. (1982b). Doob, L. W. (1950).

White Mythology.

In Macksey and

Of An Apocalyptic Tone.

Semeia, 23.

Goebbels* Principles of Propaganda.

Public

Opinion Quarterly, 14. Fisher, W. (1984). Paradigm.

Narration as a Human Communication

Communication Monographs, 51.

Hull, D.S. (1969).

Film in the Third Reich.

Kauffman, C. and Parson, D.W. (1984). Argument.

California.

Metaphor and Presence in

Presented at the Wake Forest Argumentation

Conference, 19 84.

307

Kracauer, S. (1943). Screen.

The Conquest of Europe on the

The Nazi Newsreel, 1939-40.

Leiser, Ε. (1974). David Wilson.

Nazi Cinema.

Trans. Gertrude Mander and

Macmillan.

Manvell, R. and Fraenkel, H. (1971). McGee, M. C. (1980). and Ideology.

Social Research, 10.

The 'Ideograph';

The German Cinema.

A Link Between Rhetoric

The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66.

Miller, P. (1950).

The Rhetoric of Sensation.

Perspectives in Criticism. Nichols, B. (1981).

In Levin, H. ed.

Cambridge.

Ideology and the Image.

Indiana.

Perelman, Ch. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). Rhetoric.

JM Dent.

The New

Notre Dame.

Speier, H. (1943).

Nazi Propaganda and Its Decline.

Social

Research, 10. Taylor, R. (1979) . Ulmer, G. L. (1985).

Film Propaganda.

Applied Grammatology•

Williams, D. C. (1985). of "Truth."

Croom Helm. Johns Hopkins.

Ideological Analogons:

Portraits

In Cox, Sillars, and Walker, eds. Argument and

Social Practice.

SCA.

34 Aristotelian Dialectic and Reasoning in Das Kapital of Marx Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila The purpose of this paper is to give a short illustration a general

thesis which,

implications. Aristotelian for

modern

recent the

To

about

It

science

discussions

in

the

of Kuhn,

science seems

not

amount

as

a

very

I

claim

that

utmost

importance

and

of

have

In

The

stressed

problem-solving what

they

have

problem-solving

much.

the

science.

etc.

theoretical, that

interesting

of

Laudan

however,

research to

is

several

philosophy

Lakatos,

to me,

theoretical

does

briefly,

of

of

tivity.

it

conception

writings

view

put

to my mind, has

of

fact,

in

our

acsaid

science

old

friend

Aristotle has a lot more to say about these matters. 1. The Aristotelian conception of science When speaking have

about the Aristotelian conception of science I

something

terpretation.

else

According

sciences

have

logistic

axioms

through

in mind than the standard text-book

a

deductive are

Acccording

instead,

to

a

this dual shows

(Owen,

standard

syllogistic

necessary

gumentative structure.

Owen

the

view,

truths

in

1968),

the

circles

has

a double

his which

syl-

sciences

are

(Ross, 1971.) recent

interpretation

of Aristotelian

paper

called

unhappily

structure.

science

"Tithenai

is only

of Aristotle-scholars,

tive. A similar

The

generated

they have a dialectical, that is ar-

fairly model

theoretical

structure.

self-evident

induction. On the other hand, practical

not deductive,

Owen,

to

in-

little

by

G. E.

is not ta

L.

valid.

phainomena"

known

outside

that Aristotle's

Physics

It is both deductive

result has been gained

and

argumenta-

by Simo Knuuttila

connection with the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

in

309 Let

us

start

with

double-model

and

the

deductive

take

an

example

Ethics. For Aristotle, ethics politics the

and

point

science called

view

of

the

from

aspect

the

generic

happiness,

individual.

premiss.

the

Nichomachean

eidaimonia,

from

subject

each

The

is specified by the first premiss of the the

of

is a species of the science of

as such deals with

of

axiomatic

The

generic

of

axiomatics,

premiss

of

ethics

says that "Happiness belongs to the activity of the soul

ac-

cording to the virtue". The next two axioms express the division of the genus tue"

into two

intellectual moral

"action of the soul

species,

according to the

"action of the soul

according

vir-

to

the

virtue" and "action of the soul according to the

virtue".

In consequence, we achieve

of the theorems connecting

syllogistic

proofs

the subspecies and the genus,

example, as follows (Knuuttila,

for

1981):

Happiness belongs to the activity of the the soul according to the virtue Activity of the soul belongs the activity (1) of the soul according to the moral

virtue

Happiness belongs to the activity of the soul according to the moral

The

activity

realized

in

liberality, species,

of

the

soul

according

traditional temperance

infima

virtues,

and

species,

virtue.

courage.

which

to

the

moral

virtue

is

such

as

generosity,

These

are

the

contain

no

lowest

subpsecies.

The

second layer of syllogisms prove that the infima species fall under the highest genus. The first premiss of the

syllogistic

proof is the theorem proved in (1) and the second premiss one of the new axioms.

For example, we may have

(ibid.):

is

310 Happiness belongs to the action of the soul according to the moral virtue The action of the soul according to the moral (2)

virtue belongs to generosity

Happiness belongs to generosity.

Now we may

turn to the dialectical-argumentative

the double-model

of Aristotelian science. The

aspect

of

interpretation

offered by Qwen is surprisingly elegant. I shall give a short sketch of the basic ideas of Owen with some further elaborations from Hintikka and Knuuttila. It may be correct to say that the axioms of a science are established by induction from the phenomena, but then it must be noticed that both "induction" and "phenomena" mean

some-

thing else for Aristotle than for us. Owen points out that in Topics Aristotle mentions induction, epagoge, "as one of two cardinal methods of dialectic"

(Owen, 1968,171).

In Physics,

epagoge, when used in connection with an argument concerning the notion of place "proves to

be not a review of observed

cases

of

but

a dialectical

'in'" (op.cit. 173).

survey

the

senses

of the

word

This means that induction for Aristotle

is a method of conceptual

analysis. The same point has been

brought out by Jaakko Hintikka. After all, this should not be too great a surprise in view of the fact that the axioms of a science

are

definitions

for

the

concept

in

question.

(Hintikka 1980, and forthcoming a sect. 11.) In a similar fashion, the Aristotelian concept of has often

been misinterpreted.

Owen

claims

that

phenomena phenomena,

phainomena, not only refer to observed facts, but also cover endoksa and legomena, which include common conceptions on the subject in question, matters of linguistic usage, as well as philosophical

thesis concerning these (Owen, 1968,170,

It is the collection of different

kinds of phenomena

174). which

311 form the starting-point of critical

analysis. Those parts of

the phenomena mena which survive the critical scrutiny may be accepted as premisses for further research. This may be an inductive step, for the Aristotelian induction does not operate on singular empirical to Hintikka,

statements. According

induction for Aristotle means reconciling

tial generalizations

(Hintikka forthcoming

addition to partial

empirical

par-

a, sect. 11).

generalizations,

the need

In for

such a reconciliation may arise in connection with ambiguous terms or seemingly contradictory claims. In concequence, the task of the inductive generalization is to reveal the partial truth contained in each reconciled conception. Beside induction, Aristotle uses general philosophical

argu-

ments to support his views. Owen discusses several cases form Physics

(Owen,

Knuuttila

1968,

mentions

177-190).

the

As

principle

an example of

from

teleology

ethics,

in the

con-

struction of the generic premiss (Knuuttila, 1981, 18). In summary of the Aristotelian concept of science, we may say that the syllogistic axioms are generated not only by induction but also by other methods of dialectics

starting

from

the various forms of previous knowledge. It seems to me that the importance of the Aristotelian conception of science lies in the fact that it is a conception of theoretical research. But at first we have to notice that the Aristotelia concept of "saving the phenomena" means quite another thing as the instrumentalistic type of saving of the phenomena in astronomy (see Duhem, 1969). I want to mention three points which I consider relevant for modern discussions in the philosophy of science. Firstly, the Aristotelian type of saving the phenomena gives a reasonable criteria research.

for the

acceptance of the

results

of

theoretical

Aristotle demands a critical synthesis of previous

knowledge such that the truth included in it is revealed in

312 the

argumentation

for

the

present

conceptions.

Epistemologically this implies that no part of the phenomena is given ä preferred status. views

that

have

lately

This is in accordance with the

been

called

"theory-ladennes

of

observations". Secondly, Aristotle's writings are a rich source of methods on theory-generation. This aspect has been largely neglected in modern philosophy

of science. This still

writers, such as Laudan

holds even

for

(1977), who stress the relevance of

concept-formation and problem-solving in scientific research. Thirdly,

Aristotle

has

a point

to make

to

the

discovery-

justification discussion of our days. The double-model of argumentation

and deduction

of

support

for the basic principles of science. The dialectical

methods

of generating

the

yields

definitions

a double-model

of a science obviously

have

epistemic force. Besides generative justification, the basic principles

get

sequences

support through

one may count

their

conseguences.

both the deductive

As

con-

consequences

as

well as the problem-solving faculty. 2. Reasoning in Das Kapital In

conclusion,

reasoning that

I

shall

in Das Kapital

the Aristotelian

give

a

short

of Karl Marx.

type

of saving

illustration

of

the

I am of the opinion the

phenomena

is

the

most profitable approach to analyze the conception of science inherent in Das Kapital. (See of this author, forthcoming b.) Evidently,

the

basic

ideas

of the

Aristotelian

concept

of

science need not be disturbed if we widen the range of permissible methods of theory-generation and -presentation. Hegelian

categories,

the

method

of

idealization

and

The con-

cretization (Nowak, 1980), and the other familiar methods of Marx

can

be

methodological the phenomena.

understood

as

special

object-dependent

tools subordinate to the main ideas of saving

313 In

the

following,

argumentative

I

shall

structure

of

confine

the

first

my

comments

four

on

the

of

Das

chapters

Kapital. There should be no grave objection to this

because

that part of the book seems to form an argumentative with

a

double

Nichomachean definitions

of

capitalistic

structure

Ethics.

similar

The

the

first

principal

concepts

pure,

The

is

the

grasping

the "com-

"capital".

that

for

give

These concepts are defined in their syllogistic order: and

its

Aristotelian

form.

"money"

in

the

chapters

idealized

modity",

economy

to

four

whole

resulting

syllogistic

axioms can be taken as premisses for the following proof:

Commodity belongs to money (3) Money belongs to capital

Commodity belongs to capital.

The complex definitions given for these terms in Das Kapital are

the

result

of

views of political critical

arduous

confrontation

with

the

received

economy during which Marx developed

methodological

devices. Apparently,

the

his

argumenta-

tion presented in Das Kapital does not repeat all the trials and errors done during the research. Instead, it offers a rationally

reconstructed

path of discovery.

For each of

the

concepts, "commodity", "money" and "capital", Marx points out a problem Then

he

in the phenomena, that proceeds

to

construct

is in the previous definitions

by

views.

using

the

Aristotelian type of induction as well as argumentation. His definitions

can

be

seen

generative

support

and

to

receive

support

double

through

justification: problem-solving

faculty. As an example, I shall take the construction of the concept "commodity".

Commodity

exchange-value.

is

a

thing

with

use-value

It is the term "exchange-value" which

and turns

314 out to be ambiguous. The basic ambiguousness lies iη that on the

one

hand

"exchange-value"

is

a

relation

between

com-

modities which changes with time and place. On the other hand it is an inner property of a commodity.

In the first place,

it seems to me that the Aristotelian type of induction is at work here, as the two aspects of "exchange-value" are reconciled as partial truths. For that purpose, Marx makes a clear distinction

between

the

inner

aspect of "exchange-value".

property

and

the

relational

This can be counted as a clear

case of meaning-change of the term "exchange-value" that term is spared

for the relational

because

aspect, whereas

the

term "value" is taken to refer to the inner property logically connected with it (see of this author, forthcoming a). Next we may struction guished

consider

of

the

eight

reconstructed surpressed deductive pirical

the

concept

argumentative

"exchange-value".

argumentative

steps

from

them as enthymematic

premisses.

Each

argument with

aspect

of

I have Marx's

can

be

distinand

partially

rewritten

philosophical

con-

text

arguments with

them

a general

of the

as

and an

a

em-

premiss.

If we want to put in use some of the main ideas of the interrogative model of science developed by Hintikka

(forthcoming

b), we

can

as

answers

to

understand

the

six different

argumentative questions.

The

steps

questions

reasoned may

formulated as follows: 1)How is exchange between equivalents possible? 2)What is the epistemic nature of the common property of commodities? 3)What is its ontological

nature?

4)What is its substance? 5)What are its specific properties? 6)What is its measure?

be

315 The

answer

to the

first

question

reads

something

like

the

following: because the commodities are equivalent, they have a

qualitatively

and

quantitatively

determined

common

property. The

presupposition

equivalents

that

the

exchange

takes

is the first and most general

back-ground of all theory-formation

place

between

hypothesis at the

in Das Kapital.

As can

be easily seen, all the questions and consequently answers to them depend

on this presupposition.

two important theoretical

The presupposition

has

implications. First it reveals the

Marxian way of conceptualizing

exchange as a process

deter-

mined solely by the properties of commodities. This is quite another assumption as the one on which neoclassical

economic

theory is based on. Moreover, the concepts are generated for an ideal

process between exactly equivalent commodities.

In

order to apply to the capitalistic economy, the concepts need to be concretized. The

presupposition

of

the

whole

analysis

of exchange,

the

principle of equivalence does not get any support at the instant

of

its

introduction.

receive support

It

can,

however,

later on in the theory.

be

seen

It serves to

to

solve

the ambiguity problem of the term "exchange-value" as well as the

other

theoretical

problems

connected

with

the

terms

"money" and "capital". If we

want

a wider

appraisal

of

the

equivalent-hypothesis

this means an evaluation of the Marxian theory on the whole. This

again

phenomena

of

involves his

time

studying Marx

such

succeeds

questions

as

which

in

or

which

saving

phenomena of our time it can be extended to save. Bibliography Duhem, Pierre (1969): To Save the Phenomena, The University of Chicago Press, USA. Hintikka, Jaakko (1980): "Aristotelian Induction", Revue

316 Internationale de Philosophie, 34, 422-439. (forthcoming a): "The Concept of Induction in the Light of Interrogative Approach to

Inquiry"

(forthcoming b): "What is the Logic of Experimental Inquiry". Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Marja-Liisa Appearance in Scientific

(forthcoming a): "Essence and

Progress",

(forthcoming b): "Ilmiöiden pelastaminen Marxin Päaomassa". Knuuttila, Simo (1981): Introduction to the translation of the Nichomachen Ethics of Aristotle, Gaudeamus, Juva. Laudan, Larry (1977): Progress and Its Problems,

Routledge

and Kegan Paul, London and Henley. Nowak, Leszek (1980): The Structure of (synthese Library), Reidel,

Idealization,

Dordrecht.

Owen, G. L. E. (1968): "Tithenai ta phainomena", in J. Μ. E. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle, Philosophy), Macmillan,

(Modern Studies in

London.

Ross, David (1971); Aristotle, Methem,

London.

35 An Argumentation-Theoretical Analysis of Lenin's Political Strategies P.A. Smit

In his now famous book, Breaking with Moscow (1985), Arkady N. Shevchenko - who worked with Khrushchev, Gromyko, Brezhnev and in the whole political scene of the Kremlin of the postwar period and who was Under Secretary General of the United Nations from 1973 onwards - mentions many interesting cases of Soviet policy-making that make very clear, that the way this policy is pursued, the instance that performs it, and the purposes for which it is executed are materialized by reference to the written work o'f Lenin. To give one example Shevchenko states: ^Soviet leaders and ideologists have never tried to hide the fact that their policy then and now adheres to the conclusions Lenin articulated soon after the 1917 Revolution in Russia. Lenin's slogan "Who will win?" a ory of determination to wage a "life-and-death struggle between capitalism and Communism"(Lenin, vol. 3 1975, 727) - continues as the unchallenged bottom line. At the Twenty-sixth Party Congres in 1981 Brezhnev clearly reconfirmed that position by stressing as'his basic thesis that all nations will inevitably become socialist"(1985, 381). In Shevchenke's book one finds many other examples that begin with: "ΉβΓβ again, the Soviets are guided by Lenin's formulas..."(ibid. 385), or* ^...the Soviet leadership still accepts Lenin's theory that...(ibid.

386). 1 According to Shevohenko it is the leninist nomenclatura that, as long as it remains what it is, is responsible for the fact that the Soviet challenge to the world is ideologically as threatening as it was some sixty years ago. This nomenclatura refers to the hierarchical structure of the Party system, the ideological justification for its maintenance,

318 and the expansion of its influence, the origins of which are genuinely 2 leninistic.

Indeed, as Leonard Schapiro (1934) made clear, it was Lenin

who added to the store of political devices an entirely new type of mechanism, one which has since been imitated in many parts of the world. According to Schapiro, the whole notion of Bolshevik monopoly of power was Lenin's aa well as the vital device of using the Party system as the instrument for maintaining it. One of the crucial ingredients of this type of political and ideological mechanism is the way in which it manipulates human criticism and disagreement in relation to the Party system. In order to map out the ideological basis and the political effects of the leninist nomenclatura and the dialogical (mis-)management to which its implementation gives rise, I want to present two examples of Lenin's political strategies. The first example bears on Lenin's strategy in relation to the parliamentary election for the Constituent Assembly of 1917. The second example is meant to give an argumentations-theoretical analysis of Lenin's use of the word "obiective"' in the context of an exchange with a comrade of his, Balabanova, in which Lenin defends the rather spurious statement that socialists who

3 have dedicated all their lives to the cause of the exploited are traitors. Lack of space prevents me from giving more than the trunk-lines in these matters. Lack

of space also makes it impossible to give more than an

impression of the fact that the systematic mapping of the semiotic constants of Lenin's discourse from an argumentation-theoretical perspective, can help us understand more fully the effects the discourse has on the minds 4 of millions of people in the world. Perhaps on the basis of that understanding we can bring some change in the still existing climate of closed argumentation. I. Lenin's strategy of the Tro.jan horse. The elections for the Constituent Assembly, which took place shortly after the Revolution of 1917, were of utmost importance mainly because it could imply the serious beginning of a parliamentary democracy in Russia. A close study of the vicissitudes of the Constituent Assembly of 1917 gives us a more complete insight in the leninist strategy that is still the backbone of Soviet policy today, as the book of Shevchenko succinctly showes.

319 After several postponements, the election for the Constituent Assembly took place at 25 November 1917. Lenin appeared to be a fervent supporter of the electionand the subsequent convocation of the Assembly

in January

1918. In December 1917 he published a paper in the Pravda (no. 207) titled "On the opening of the Constituent Assembly" in waich he states the following t "...rumours have been circulated that the Constituent Assembly, as at present constituted, would not be convened at all. The council of People's Commissars (of which Lenin

was the chairman, P.A.S.) deems it

necessary to declare that these are absolutely false rumours, deliberately and maliciously spread by the enemies of the Soviets of Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies"(vol. 26, 367). However, the elections showed only approximately 25 % of the votes for Lenin and the bolsheviks. Y/hen the Assembly had its first meeting in January 1918, the session was dispersed after the bolsheviks walked out of it. It is interesting to see what are the arguments Lenin puts forward to justify this apparently contradictory attitude of his in relation to the Assembly. To begin with, he is not in the least obscure about his intentions with respect to the parliament. In a letter to his comrade Bordiga in 1920 he wrote: "One has to know in which way one can destroy a parliament. If you can do this through an armed rising in all countries, than that is very well. You know, that we in Russia have proved not only in theory, but also in practice our will to destroy the bourgeois parliament. But you have forgotten that this is impossible without a sufficiently long preparation and that in most countries it is

still not possible to destroy the parliament in one blow"

(emphasis mine, F.A.S.). According to Lenin, "...we are forced to fight within the parliament to destroy.it". This is what I call the strategy of the Tro.jan horse. The question almost naturally arises why Lenin wants to destroy the parliaments in general and the Constituent Assembly especially. To give an answer, I deem it necessary to introduce the diamat purview (i.e. an acronym for the dialectical materialistic conception). I will do so by quoting the most relevant passages from an article Lenin published in the Pravda (no. 213) in which he gives a legitimation of his politics in the form of 19 theses on the Constituent Assembly. In the first thesis, Lenin says the following: "She demand for the convocation of a Constituant Assembly was a perfectly legitimate part of the program of revolutionary Social-Democracy, because

320 in a bourgeoi s republic the Constituent Assembly represents the highest form of democracy...". In the second thesis he says: "While demanding the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever since the beginning of the Revolution of 1917 repeatedly emphasized that a Republic of Soviets is a higher form of democracy than the usual bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly". To understand the underlying diamat conception in what Lenin is saying here, one has to imagine a historical developmental continuum with several degrees of value, lower and higher ones. On a low

plane there is the bourgeois

republic with its highest possible manifestation: a Constituent Assembly. This lower plane has to be passed through and digested only to leave it behind in order to reach the higher level which is in this case a republic of Soviets with its highest manifestation: the socialist system. Like Lenin says in the third thesis: "For the transition from the bourgeois to the socialist system, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Republic of Soviets (of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies) is not only a higher type of democratic institution (as compared with the usual bourgeois republic crowned by a Constituant Assembly), but it is the only form capable of securing the most painless transition to socialism" (emphasis mine, P.A.S.). But, if according to Lenin the republic of Soviets is the only form, is it also the ultimate form? That is, does Lenin intend to realize as his main purpose the right to self-determination of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, which can be regulated by democratic means? It does not seem like that at all when Lenin writes in October of 1917: "All the experience of both revolutions, that of 1905 and that of 1917, and all the decisions of the bolshevik Party, all its political declarations for many years, may be reduced to the concept that the Soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies is a reality only as an organ of insurrection, as an organ of revolutionary power. Apart from this, the Soviets are a meaningless plaything that can only produce apathy, indifference and disillusion among the masses, who are legitimately disgusted at the endless repetition of resolutions and protest... a refusal on the part of the bolsheviks to transform the Soviets into organs of insurrection would be a betrayal both of the peasants and of the cause of the world socialist revolution" (emphasis mine, P.A.S.). So the Soviets are nothing else than another means to a more ultimate end: the world socialist revolution.

321 In the meantime Lenin had won a majority in the Soviets on. the basis of which he began to plead for a re-election of the Constituent Assembly, because of "...the discrepancy

between the composition of the elected

Constituent Assembly and the actual will of the people..." (emphasis mine, P.A.S.). Apparently, Lenin thinks that "...the actual will of the people·* - an expression which is used 7 times in his theses - can only be expressed when the election for the Constituent Assembly abides by the following conditionss "... to accept the law of the Central Executive Committee on those new elections, to proclaim that it unreservedly recognizes Soviet power, the Soviet revolution, and its policy on the question of peace, the land and the workers' control...". Lenin gives the warning that "...unless these conditions are fulfilled, the crisis in connection with the Constituent Assembly can be settled only in a revolutionary way, by Soviet power adopting the most energetic, speedy, firm and determined revolutionary measures...". So, Lenin confronts the Constituent Assembly with an ultimatum: either it abides by the rules prescribed by the Soviets - in which Lenin has the majority - or the Assembly will be dealt with in a revolutionary way. In fact, by dictating a re-election on the prescribed conditions he jeopardizes the democratic openness that normally would inhere in the whole procedure. What is the right Lenin pretends to have to act like "a grand interpreter" of "the actual will of the people"? Lenin has an answer to this in his theses 16 and 17 when he states: "Naturally, the interests of this revolution stand higher than the formal rights of the Constituent Assembly...Every direct of indirect attempts to consider the question of the Constituant Assembly from a formal legal point of view, within the framework of ordinary bourgeois democracy and disregarding the class struggle and civil war, would be a betreyal of the proletarian cause, and the adoption of the bourgeois standpoint". This answer is in line with the diamat purview as indicated above. The dialogical implicatures of this leninist strategy are enormous indeed. First, Lenin sets himself free from any possible criticism of an opponent: Lenin did support the election and convocation of the Assembly but at the same time took a higher standpoint from which the dispersion of the Assembly was necessary in the developmental line of diamat. Second, by uttering criticism, the opponent testifies to the fact that he/she impinges upon the "'higher revolutionary standpoint"; which is, according to Lenin's own statement, a sign of betrayal. And these were the kind of circumstances

322 in which Lenin felt so strong that he was able to say: "Those who point out that we are now 'dissolving* the Constituant Assembly although at one time we defended it are not displaying a grain of sense, but are merely uttering pompous and meaningless phrases". Against the background of the above analysis, in which I tried to show that Lenin's politics and polemic style is grounded in a powerful strategy and developmental view (the diamat), in the following I will try to scrutinize his dialogical stance with respect to the use he makes of the word "Objective". IX. Lenin's strategy of "the objective logic of class-relationships". It was Schapiro (1967) who stressed the importance of a discussion between Lenin and Balabanova, an Italian socialist and bolshevik comrade of Lenin in the years following the revolution of 1917. Schapiro states it as follower "She (i.e. Balabanova) once asked Lenin why he called "socialists who have dedicated all their lives to the cause of the exploited, traitors*. She received the reply that while he did not intend to suggest dishonesty, treason was "objectively" the result of their conduct. When Balabanova retorted that, for the ordinary worker, "traitor" means what it says and the finer distinctions remain incomprehensible, Lenin shrugged his shoulders and walked away. The whole history of bolshevism is mirrored in this incident" (1967, 9, emphasis mine, P.A.S.). To analyse the dialogical dynamics of this exchange, we need an argumentation-theoretical instrument that satisfies the following conditions: (1) to give a systematic reconstruction of the arguments of the proponent and opponent; (2) t