Arab Political Demography : Population Growth, Labor Migration and Natalist Policies [1 ed.] 9781782844235, 9781845197599

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Arab Political Demography P

Revised and Expanded Third Edition

O

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Arab Political Demography POPULATION GROWTH, LABOR MIGRATION AND NATALIST POLICIES

Revised and Expanded Third Edition

Onn Winckler

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Copyright © Onn Winckler, 2017. The right of Onn Winckler to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Volumes 1 and 2 were published in 2005 and 2009, respectively.

ISBN 978-1-84519-759-9 (Cloth) ISBN 978-1-84519-760-5 (Paper) ISBN 978-1-78284-423-5 (PDF) First published in 2017 in Great Britain by SUSSEX ACADEMIC PRESS P.O. Box 139 Eastbourne BN24 9BP and in the United States of America by SUSSEX ACADEMIC PRESS

ISBS Publisher Services 920 NE 58th Ave #300 Portland, Oregon 97213, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Winckler, Onn. Arab political demography : population growth, labor migration and natalist policies / Onn Winckler. — Rev. and expanded 3rd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-84519-759-9 (h/c : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-84519-760-5 (p/b : alk. paper) 1. Arab countries—Population. 2. Demography—Research—Arab countries. 3. Arab countries—Economic conditions. 4. Fertility, Human—Arab countries. 5. Arab countries—Population policy. I. Title. HB3660.A3W56 2009 304.60917’5927—dc22 2008031492

Typeset and designed by Sussex Academic Press, Brighton and Eastbourne. Printed by TJ International, Padstow, Cornwall.

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Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Charts Preface and Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Introduction: The Methodological Framework of Political Demography

1 Global Demographic History 1 2 3 4

Global Population Growth: A Historical Perspective The Demographic Transition Theory The Various Global Demographic Patterns Summary and Conclusions: A New Demographic Transition?

2 Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States 1 A Historic Overview of Demographic Records in the Arab Region 2 The Division of the Arab States according to the Quality of the Demographic Records 3 The Lacuna of Accurate Official Employment Data 4 The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Demographic Records on the Arab Countries 5 Summary and Conclusions

3 Arab Population Growth 1 The Historical Dimension of the Arab Population Growth 2 The Causes for the Rapid Population Growth of the Arab Countries 3 Arab Fertility Decline since the mid-1980s 4 The Impact of the Arab Spring: The Reversal of the Fertility Patterns 5 The Factor of Religion in Fertility Differentials 6 The Revolution in Mortality Rates and its Consequences 7 Summary and Conclusions

vii xi xiii

1 6 6 9 14 37

40 40 44 60 63 64

65 65 67 74 82 85 86 91

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Contents

4 The “Victory” of Numbers: The Emergence of Structural Unemployment 1 Introduction 2 The “Heart” of the “Low Income Trap”: Low Labor Force Participation Rates 3 The Implications of the Young Age Pyramid for Future Employment Demands 4 Employment Trends in the Arab Countries in Retrospect 5 Summary and Conclusions

5 The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences 1 Introduction: Modern International Labor Migration Patterns 2 The Socioeconomic Structure of the Arabian Gulf Prior to the “Oil Era” 3 The GCC States’ Strategy for Development following the “Oil Boom” 4 The Inevitable Result: Rapid Growth of Foreign Labor 5 The Uniqueness of the GCC Labor Migration Pattern 6 The GCC Labor and Immigration Policies: From Encouragement through Limitation to Surrender 7 Evaluating the GCC Labor Immigration and Employment Policies 8 The Ethno-Religious Composition of the GCC Foreign Labor 9 The Labor Emigration Policies of the Arab Labor-Exporting Countries 10 Summary and Conclusions

6 Between Pro-Natalism and Anti-Natalism in the Arab Countries 1 The Attitude toward Population Growth in Historical Perspective 2 What is a “Population Policy”? 3 Historical Examination of the Natalist Policies of the Arab Countries in Global Perspective 4 Evaluation of the Family Planning Programs in the Arab Countries 5 “Direct” or “Indirect”? The Contribution of Family Planning to Fertility Decline 6 Summary and Conclusions

93 93 94 97 98 114

116 116 118 119 125 129 133 145 150 152 157

160 160 162 162 193 195 200

Summary and Conclusions: The Road to the “Arab Demographic Winter”

201

Notes Bibliography Index

212 258 296

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List of Tables, Figures, Charts and Boxes

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3

World Population Growth: Past and Future (millions) Sweden’s Natural Increase Rate, 1800–2014 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Western European Countries, 1950–2014 1.4 Total Population in some Western European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 1.5 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2014 1.6 Total Population in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 1.7 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in the “Pure Immigration Countries,” 1960–2013 1.8 Crude Birth Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some East-Asian Developed Economies, 1960–2014 1.9 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Developing Countries, 1950–2015 1.10 Total Population in some Developing Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 1.11 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2015 1.12 Total Population in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 2.1 Population Censuses in the Arab Countries, 1940–2015 2.2 Alternative Estimates of Qatar’s Indigenous Population, 1970–2015 3.1 Population Growth in some Oil and non-Oil Arab Countries, 1950–2015 (thousands) 3.2 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 1950–2008 3.3 The Percentage of the Urban Population within the Total Population in some Arab Countries, 1950–2014 (%) 3.4 Bahrain’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1971–2013 (nationals only, per 1,000 women) 3.5 Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy (both sexes) in some Arab Countries, 1960–2014

7 11 17 19 21 23 26 28 32 33 34 36 43 61 66 68 70 75 77

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List of Tables, Figures, Charts and Boxes

3.6

Literacy Rates among Males and Females in some Arab Countries, 1970, 1985, 2000–2001, 2005–2013 (%) 3.7 Yemen’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1977–2005 (per 1,000 women) 3.8 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 2009–2014 3.9 Egypt’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1960–2014 (per 1,000 women) 3.10 Average Number of Persons per Physician in some Middle Eastern and Developed Countries, 1960–2013 3.11 The Age Structure of some Arab Countries, 1960, 1980, 2014 4.1 GDP Growth Rate in some non-oil Arab Countries, 1960–2015 (%) 5.1 Crude Oil Prices and GCC Oil Export Revenues, 1974–2015 5.2 Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Populations, 1975–2015 (thousands) 5.3 Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Labor Forces, 1975–2014 (thousands)

81 82 83 84 88 89 107 120 127 130

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 5.1 5.2 5.3

World Population Growth, 1650–2000 8 World Population Growth, 1950–2050 8 Sweden’s Natural Increase Rate, 1800–2014 12 Total Fertility Rate in some Western European Countries, 1950–2014 18 Total Population in some Western European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 20 Total Fertility Rate in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2014 22 Total Population in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 24 Total Fertility Rate in the “Pure Immigration Countries,” 1960–2013 27 Total Fertility Rate in some East-Asian Developed Economies, 1960–2014 30 Total Fertility Rate in some Developing Countries, 1950–2015 31 Total Population in some Developing Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 33 Total Fertility Rate in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2015 35 Total Population in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2030 (millions) 37 Population Growth in some Oil and non-Oil Arab Countries, 1950–2015 (thousands) 67 Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 1950–2008 69 The Percentage of the Urban Population within the Total Population in some Arab Countries, 1950–2014 (%) 70 Bahrain’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1971–2013 (nationals only, per 1,000 women) 75 Infant Mortality Rate in some Arab Countries, 1960–2014 76 Total Fertility Rate in some non-Oil Arab Countries, 2009–2014 84 Egypt’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1960–2014 (per 1,000 women) 85 The GCC Oil Export Revenues, 1974–2015 (current prices, US$ billions) 121 Crude Oil Prices, 1974–2015 (current prices, US$) 122 Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Populations, 1975–2015 (thousands) 128

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List of Tables, Figures, Charts and Boxes 5.4

| ix

Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Labor Forces, 1975–2014 (thousands) 129

Charts 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 6.1 6.2 6.3

The Age Pyramid of the US, 2015 The Age Pyramid of Canada, 2015 The 1968 Census of the Seven Emirates which Comprise the UAE Saudi Arabian Demographic Data Prior to 1996 From the Homepage of Qatar Statistics Authority The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries until the mid-1960s The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries during the “Oil Decade” The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries following the “Oil Decade”

25 25 49 56 58 172 179 190

Boxes 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 5.1 5.2 5.3

The “Population Momentum” phenomenon The “Demographic Gift” Age Structure “Failed State” The Human Development Index (HDI) Population Census The GCC “Rentier State” The Naturalization of Foreigners in the GCC States The GCC kafala system

13 24 36 36 44 123 124 138

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To Hadar and Yael

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Preface and Acknowledgments

Since the 1970s, but particularly with the end of the bonanza “oil decade” in 1983, the “demographic problem,” also frequently named the “demographic challenge,” has become the most acute socioeconomic problem for an increasing number of non-oil Arab countries. This book examines the connection between demography and politics in the Arab countries from three major perspectives: internal political dimensions; inter-Arab political dimensions; and the nature of relationships between the Arab and the developed Western countries. A better understanding of the “demographic factor,” I believe, is crucial for broadening our understanding of the modern history of the Arab countries. Specifically, the book aims to describe and analyze six major areas. The first related to the history and the current trends of the global demography in order to locate the Arab countries in the broader global demographic picture. The second focus relates to the various demographic sources of the Arab countries, their limitations, and the reasons for these limitations. The third focus is on the process of the intensified rapid population growth of the Arab countries since the early twentieth century until present. The fourth area is the fundamental socioeconomic consequence of the extremely high natural increase rates, namely, the emergence of the structural unemployment problem and its various socio-political implications. The fifth area is the inter-Arab labor migration, which massively intensified following the “oil boom.” The sixth area is the natalist policies of the Arab countries, both the non-oil and the oil-based alike since the mid-twentieth century. Parts of Chapter 4 are based on my article, “The Demographic Dilemma of the Arab World: The Employment Aspect,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 617–636. Parts of Chapter 5 are based on three of my articles: “Was it Worth It? A Reexamination of the Cost/Benefit Balance of the Inter-Arab Labor Migration,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Summer 2006), pp. 38–59; “Labor and Liberalization: The Decline of the GCC Rentier System,” in Joshua Teitelbaum (ed.), Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 59–85; and “The Gulf Cooperation Council States,” Country Profile, No. 25 (December 2012), published by Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BPB). Parts of Chapter 6 are based on an article written with Gad G. Gilbar, “Nasser’s Family Planning in Perspective,” in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds.), Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), pp. 282–304. The sections dealing with Syria and Jordan’s fertility policies are based on my previous two books, published by

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Sussex Academic Press: Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, 1950–1994 (1997); and Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba‘thist Syria (1999). Parts of the Summary and Conclusions Chapter are based on my paper “The Arab Spring: Socioeconomic Aspects.” Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 68–87. Regarding the transliteration of the Arabic names, I followed the most common rules. However, for personal names, I followed the most common usage rather than the transliteration rules. Many people helped me during the process of writing this third edition. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to Professor Gad G. Gilbar from the Department of Middle Eastern History at the University of Haifa, and the former Rector of the University, not only for his instruction in both my M.A. and Ph.D. theses and his ongoing support and guidance during the past three decades, but also for his useful comments on the manuscript of this book. I have been fortunate in receiving help in the process of collecting the sources for this book from the librarians in the Middle East Documentation Unit at Durham University, UK; the Arab World Documentation Unit at the University of Exeter, UK; the Cairo Demographic Center; the Newspaper Archive of the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University; and the University of Haifa Library. Last, but not least, I would like to thank Ms. Livia Goldenblatt for editing the manuscript.

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List of Abbreviations

ADB ALO AUC b/d BMA CAPMAS CBR CBS CDR CDS CDSI DHS ECWA/ESCWA EIU ECA EU FAO FDI FY GCC GCHS GDP GFHS GNI GNP HEW HPC IBRD ICBS IJMES ILO IMF IMR IOM IPPF

African Development Bank Arab Labor Organization African Union Commission barrel per day (oil) Bahrain Monetary Agency Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (Egypt) Crude Birth Rate Central Bureau of Statistics Crude Death Rate Central Department of Statistics Central Department of Statistics & Information (Saudi Arabia) Demographic and Health Surveys UN Economic (and Social) Commission for Western Asia Economic Intelligence Unit UN Economic Commission for Africa European Union UN Food and Agricultural Organization Foreign Direct Investment Fiscal Year Gulf Cooperation Council (states) Gulf Child Health Survey Gross Domestic Product Gulf Family Health Survey Gross National Income Gross National Product Human Rights Watch Higher Population Council (Jordan) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Israel Central Bureau of Statistics International Journal of Middle East Studies International Labour Office International Monetary Fund Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) International Organization for Migration International Planned Parenthood Federation

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LE MECS MEED MEES MENA NBS NGO NI NIR NMB NPC NRR PCBS OECD OPEC PNA PLO PPP PRB QIE QSA SA SAMA SR TFR UNDP UNECA UNECE UNESCO UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNPF UNRWA USAID WB WHO WTO

List of Abbreviations Life Expectancy Middle East Contemporary Survey Middle East Economic Digest Middle East Economic Survey Middle East and North Africa National Bureau of Statistics Non-Governmental Organization Natural Increase Natural Increase Rate Net Migration Balance National Population Commission (Jordan) Net Reproductive Rate Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Palestinian National Authority Palestinian Liberation Organization Purchasing Power Parity The Population Reference Bureau Qatar Information Exchange Qatari Statistics Authority Statistical Authority Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Saudi Riyal Total Fertility Rate United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations Refugee Agency United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Population Fund United Nations Relief and Works Agency United States Agency for International Aid The World Bank [UN] World Health Organization [UN] World Tourism Organization

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Introduction The Methodological Framework of Political Demography

Generally speaking, the term “population” raises a variety of images. To some, “population” is a set of numbers, tables and figures. To others, it is a target group for companies, businesses and other commercial organizations in their attempt to sell products and services. Both views approach “population” as a static entity. To the demographer, on the other hand, “population” is a dynamic feature. This is because a “population” never remains the same and is always changing in many respects. First, the number of a “population” always changes through fertility, mortality and migration of both in-migration (immigration) and out-migration (emigration). Other dynamic demographic aspects are the constant changes of the spatial distribution of the population as well as the socioeconomic characteristics of the population (per capita income, educational level, etc.).1 These dynamics constitute the core of modern demographic research. Demography (in Latin demos — population and graphia — study or record) is a disciplinary research which deals with various issues of the human population, including population growth, the age pyramid of the population, the gender composition, the spatial distribution of the population, immigration and emigration patterns and lastly the demographic policies of the authorities. Overall, demographic change in any given society is a result of two components: (a) The natural increase (NI) of the population, namely, the number of births minus the number of deaths.2 The NI pattern has a tremendous impact on a variety of aspects in any given society, first and foremost the age structure of the population. (b) Migratory increase, like NI, can be positive (if the number of immigrants is higher than the number of emigrants) or negative (if the number of emigrants is higher than the number of immigrants). The combination of these two components consists of “the population growth” of any given society. The research of John Graunt (1620–1674), a haberdasher from London,3 Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a following Index, and Made upon the Bills of Mortality, published in 1662, is considered the first demographic research ever. Graunt tried to find a pattern in the two most important demographic phenomena, namely,

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births and deaths. He found differences in the birth patterns between the city of London itself and its countryside. He also recorded the biological fact that the number of male births is systematically higher than the number of females. The two terms included in Graunt’s book title, “natural” and “political,” demonstrates that Graunt already recognized the two major factors affecting demographic trends: the biological and the socio-political aspects.4 It should be mentioned that until Graunt’s time, there was hardly any research interest in the issue of demography. The few censuses that were conducted were only for purposes of tax collection or military conscription. Thus, Graunt opened the way for a new research discipline: “population study.” Since Graunt, researchers have attempted to compare various demographic data between periods, regions, and later, countries, in order to understand mankind’s demographic behavior.5 The first person to use the term “demography” is probably Achille Guillard (1799–1876), a Belgian statistician, in the title of his book, Éléments de Statisuue Humaine ou Démographie Comparée [Elements of Human Statistics and Comparative Demography], published in 1855. According to Guillard, “demography is a statistical study of human population.”6 Since the nineteenth century, researchers have been trying to discover not only mankind’s demographic behaviors, but even more important, the factors which shape each of the demographic phenomena, the most significant among them being births, deaths, and migration.7 At the initial stage, the main focus of the demographic research was on mortality patterns and building life tables. This emphasis was mainly due to the fact that fertility levels in the pre-Industrial Revolution period were more or less stable at the highest biological limit, while mortality rates often fluctuated due to frequent famines and epidemics. In addition, a substantial decline in mortality rates was a clear sign for “good governance.” Since the mid-twentieth century, worldwide demographic research went through four stages: (a) The collection of demographic data and its processing. Already in the 1950s, about 80% of the world’s population was measured by modern demographic censuses.8 A decade later, in the mid-1960s, almost the entire global population was measured by modern demographic censuses. The main effort at that stage focused on the collection and processing of data in order to explore the demographic structure of the developing countries, many of which having received independence during the two decades following World War II. It should be noted, however, that in numerous of these newlyformed states, the censuses of the 1950s and the 1960s were the first comprehensive enumeration of their population within their new borders. The data collected in these censuses were the basis for the establishment of both socioeconomic development plans as well as anti-natalist programs which were aimed at curbing the extremely high fertility rates. (b) The second stage, which started in the 1980s, concentrated on “the second demographic transition.” This new demographic phenomenon expanded rapidly to almost all of the developed states and was characterized by both a higher CDR (crude death rate) and a rapid drop of the CBR (crude birth rate) leading to zero or even negative NIR. The main focus of the research was to explore the reasons behind the prolonged low fertility rate as well as the various policies aiming to promote higher fertility rate in order to escape the tremendous negative consequences of the population ageing phenomenon (see below).

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(c) The third stage was the research of the unique demographic patterns of the former European Communist states. During the 1990s, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, a unique demographic pattern developed in these countries: a sharp decline in the fertility rates. As will be examined in Chapter 1, while in the Western European countries the fertility decline was gradual, in the former European communist countries, the fertility rates declined from about two children per woman in the late 1980s to around 1.2 in the mid-1990s. Thus, while until the late 1980s the fertility rate in the former Communist countries was higher than in the Western European countries, within less than a decade, the situation changed radically and the fertility rates of the former Communist countries drastically declined. What were the core reasons for this radical change? (d) In recent years, particularly following the onset of the current global recession in 2008, a new demographic phenomenon started to attract the attention of researchers: The massive exodus of tens of millions of people from “failing states.”9 This phenomenon, as opposed to the past, is not a result of a civil war in a specific country or region. The vast majority of these new refugees are “economic refugees,” looking for a better life in one of the developed states. The main focus in this new area is first to measure the number of the refugees, and second to offer policies for effectively dealing with this situation to the host countries, mainly to the Western European countries which constitute “the first base” for the vast majority of these refugees. Although according to Fargues, political demography as a scientific disciplinary method did not yet exist,10 in the following section, the connection between demography and politics in the context of the Arab countries will be examined. This will be done from an historical perspective, as “demography is too important to be left to demographers.”11 The examination will be carried out in line with three basic categories: (a) The ethno-religious composition of the society. The ethno-religious composition of the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Bahraini or the Israeli populations, for example, has constituted the single most important factor in their political history. In the case of the Arab Spring, as will be examined in the Summary and Conclusions chapter, in the countries where the authorities were backed by a religious sect, such as in Syria and Bahrain, despite everything, the regime has survived. In the countries where the regime did not have the support of a specific religious sect or group of tribes, such as in Mubarak’s Egypt and Ben ‘Ali’s Tunisia, the regime collapsed almost immediately. The political “fingerprints” on the demographic records in each of the Arab countries can be seen even in the early stages of data collection, namely, in the decision-making as to what to include and what to exclude in the censuses and the civil registration records in terms of ethno-religious categories. Each of the Arab countries, without exception, is “hiding” something: either the religious or the ethnic composition of its population. There is a wide range of political reasons for this which varies from one country to another (see Chapter 2). (b) The national political struggle based on ethno-religious factors. The most representative case of this category in the Middle East is the Palestinian–Zionist conflict and to a lesser extent the Sunni–Shi‘ite revival in Bahrain and Iraq. In the case of the Zionist–Palestinian conflict, the demographic quantity factor has played a major role since its onset more than a century ago. Each side was and still is trying to increase the number of members in its community at the expense of the other. Thus, the two sides,

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the Palestinians and the Zionists, adopted a pro-natalist strategy from the beginning of the conflict.12 With their constant emphasis on the “demographic factor,” the authorities on both sides have indeed succeeded in creating a “pro-natalist environment” among the populations themselves. (c) The political influence on demographic policies, namely, the political “fingerprint” on the natalist and labor migration policies. In recent years, the connection between “politics” and “demography” has become even more firm, as at the core of the Arab Spring was the development of the immense imbalance between the socioeconomic situation on the one hand, and the aspirations of the young middle class on the other. Accordingly, it is the goal of this book to address the mutual influence of demography and politics in the case of the Arab countries. Until the 1970s, three major demographic patterns had ruled worldwide. Since then, however, but particularly in the past generation, an additional four new patterns have developed, widening the “demographic gap” worldwide to its highest peak ever. Thus, the first part of Chapter 1 outlines the Global Demographic History. The second part addresses the validity of the “Demographic Transition Theory” from the historical dimension viewpoint. The final and the major part of the chapter examines the various demographic patterns that currently prevails globally in order to place the Arab countries in the global demographic picture. The aim of Chapter 2, Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States, is twofold: First, to examine the quantity and quality of the demographic records of the Arab countries. The second part considers the impact of the Arab Spring on the demographic records of the Arab countries, particularly in the countries which are trapped in prolonged civil wars. In these countries, the central regimes lost their ability to control their territory, and consequently the ability to collect socioeconomic data. Since much of the demographic data are currently not collected, any future demographic research on these countries will suffer from a lacuna in basic demographic data. Chapter 3, Arab Population Growth, deals with the patterns of population growth of the Arab countries since their establishment following World War I. The first part addresses the factors which account for the high fertility rates in the Arab countries until the 1970s. It is followed by an examination of the causes for the fertility decline in the Arab countries since the mid-1980s. The final part examines the major fertility trends in the Arab region following the onset of the Arab Spring. Chapter 4, The “Victory” of Numbers: The Emergence of Structural Unemployment, analyzes the most acute consequence of the high NIRs in the Arab countries, namely, the emergence of the immense employment pressure. The first part of the chapter deals with the short- and long-term consequences of the wide-based age pyramid. It concentrates on the labor force participation rates and on the “demographic momentum” phenomenon and its influence on future population and labor force growth rates. The second part examines the emergence of the unemployment problem, both open and disguised, since the early 1980s. The third part discusses the major differences between the unemployment patterns of the non-oil Arab countries and the unemployment characteristics of the developed countries. The final part examines the employment trends caused by the Arab Spring.

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Chapter 5, The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences, deals with the new but extremely important demographic phenomenon of intra-Arab labor migration. The first part provides the theoretical framework of international labor migration and the prevailing perceptions on the cost/benefit balance of both the labor-exporting and the labor-importing countries. The second part examines the macroeconomic development strategy of the GCC countries13 following the October 1973 “oil boom” and the subsequent rapid growth of foreign labor. The third part examines the nature of the inter-Arab labor migration. The fourth part discusses the labor migration policy of both the labor-importing and the labor-exporting countries. The final part analyzes the overall cost/benefit balance of the intra-Arab labor migration for the major Arab labor-exporting countries. Chapter 6, Between Pro-Natalism and Anti-Natalism in the Arab Countries, analyses the natalist policies of the Arab countries. The first part examines the different attitudes toward rapid population growth since this phenomenon first emerged in Europe in the late eighteenth century. The second part discusses the various natalist policies implemented by the Arab countries since the 1950s. The final part examines the crucial question of why some Arab countries more than others have succeeded in the implementation of family planning programs. The Summary Chapter, The Road to the “Arab Demographic Winter,” examines the “demographic fingerprint” of the Arab Spring which, in many respects, has drawn a new political map of the whole Arab region in line with its traditional ethno-religious composition.

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1 1

Global Demographic History

Global Population Growth: A Historical Perspective

During most of human history, only a few million people lived on earth due to the limited ability of the hunting and gathering way of life to support more people.1 The annual population growth rate was probably below 0.01%, that is, doubling the population every 8,000–9,000 years.2 However, with the development of agriculture, approximately 10,000–12,000 years ago, the earth’s “carrying capacity” grew substantially. Until modern times, during periods of epidemics, such as the Black Death (1347–13503) and prolonged droughts, the world’s population decreased, sometimes even substantially. According to the prevailing estimates, the world’s population numbered about 250 million in 1 AD, rose to between 245–275 million around the year 1000,4 climbed to 545 million by 1650 and reached 728 million by 1750. This means that during 1750 years, the world’s population increased less than threefold.5 The Industrial Revolution first started in Britain in the mid-eighteenth century and later spread to other European countries during the nineteenth century, leading to accelerated population growth mainly in Western Europe and North America. By the year 1900, the world’s population numbered approximately 1.6 billion. This means that during the nineteenth century alone, the global population increased by almost 80%, representing a net increase of about 700 million people. During the twentieth century, particularly in the second half, the world’s population grew more rapidly than ever before. By 1950, the world’s population numbered 2.56 billion, an increase of 60% within only half a century, compared to 37% during the second half of the nineteenth century. During the second half of the twentieth century, world population growth rates accelerated, peaking at more than 2% on annual average during the early 1960s.6 Thus, the world’s population numbered 3.7 billion by 1970 and reached 6.1 billion in mid-2000. During the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, the global population continued to rapidly increase, albeit, as one can see in Figure 1.2, significantly slower than previously due to the sharp decline of the NIRs of the developing countries.7 By mid-2015, the world’s population numbered almost 7.3 billion (see Table 1.1).

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Global Demographic History Table 1.1 Year 1 (AD) 1650 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 1960 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2025 2050

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World Population Growth: Past and Future (millions) Estimated World Population (millions)

Nominal Population Increase (millions)

250 545 728 906 1,171 1,608 2,558 3,043 3,713 4,451 4,534 4,615 4,695 4,775 4,856 4,940 5,027 5,115 5,201 5,289 5,372 5,456 5,538 5,619 5,699 5,779 5,858 5,935 6,012 6,089 6,165 6,242 6,319 6,396 6,473 6,551 6,630 6,709 6,788 6,866 6,944 7,022 7,101 7,179 7,256 8,007 9,408

295 183 178 265 437 950 485 670 738 83 81 80 80 81 84 87 88 86 88 83 84 82 81 80 80 79 77 77 77 76 77 77 77 77 78 79 79 79 78 78 78 79 78 77 751 1,401 –

Sources: Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development, seventh edition (Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1999); The US, Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, International Data Base.

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Millions 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 1

Figure 1.1

1650

1750

1800

1850

1900

1950

2000

World Population Growth, 1650–2000

Millions 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 1950

Figure 1.2

1960

1970

1980

1990

World Population Growth, 1950–2050

2000

2010

2025

2050

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Global Demographic History

2

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The Demographic Transition Theory

Since CBR and CDR determine the NIR, the connection between them, or the mutual influence of one on the other, was and still is a major research topic. The core aim is to find a “grand theory” which could explain the changing fertility regime from high to low and the connection between CBRs and CDRs.8 The basic theory on the relationship between CBRs and CDRs is the Demographic Transition theory.9 The first signs of the theory appeared in 1929 in an article written by Warren Thompson in which he classified the global countries into three types with different NIRs: The first group included countries with fertility rates which declined faster than death rates, namely, countries whose NIR was in a declining process. The second group included countries where CDRs declined earlier and faster than the CBRs, that is, countries where the NIR was increasing. The third group included countries in which neither CBRs nor the CDRs were under control. These were countries whose demographic regime remained in its “traditional form.”10 By this classification, Thompson practically laid the three fundamental “stages” of the Demographic Transition theory. The theory was finally formulated in 1945 by Frank Notestein, the director of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University.11 The basic assumption of the Demographic Transition theory is that the number and the pattern of births in any given society in any given period are based on a rational decision of the parents.12 Therefore, in pre-industrial agrarian societies, a large number of births was an inescapable necessity due to the high death rates, particularly among infants (0–1) and children (1–5). Moreover, due to the lack of machinery, a large number of children was essential for cultivating the fields. The Industrial Revolution brought with it rapid machinery development, thus reducing the need for child labor. Improvements were made in nutrition, healthcare facilities, and both private and public sanitation. Furthermore, the development of the steam engine in boats and trains during the nineteenth century allowed for the transfer of food supplies from one place to another. A rapid urbanization process took place, accompanied by the spread of education from the elite to the middle class and later to the lower strata as well. All of these developments led to a steady decline in all of the age specific death rates, which, combined with rapid economic development, was followed by a decline in fertility rates as well. The basic theme of the Demographic Transition theory is that “modernization,” namely, the transformation from an autarkic pre-industrial economy13 to the modern pattern of an industrial urban market economy also led to changes in the desired number of children. In the modern urban economy, a large number of children is considered an economic burden rather than an economic asset. The importance of the Demographic Transition theory is that it “rationalized” the fertility behavior in both pre-modern and modern societies, while previously the common perception was that high fertility rates in pre-modern societies were the result of irrationality which characterized pre-modern societies in many respects, including in fertility behavior.14 As economic modernization originally occurred in the major cities, the process of fertility decline was first evident in the major urban centers and only subsequently in the countryside where socioeconomic development was slower. Overall, the basic “rule” of the Demographic Transition theory is that when incomes flows from children to parents, as it is the case in traditional agrarian societies, fertility rates are high, while in modern urban societies, where the incomes flows from parents to children,

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fertility rates naturally decline. In other words, the direction of the income flow dictates fertility patterns. As Notestein argued, “There are abundant evidences that the [fertility] decline came about primarily through rational control.”15 In line with this basic assumption of “the rationalization of fertility,” the demographic history of the Western developed countries can be divided into four main stages, with the transition from one stage to another explained as an outcome of macroeconomic and socio-cultural developments. The first stage of the Demographic Transition was characterized by high CBR and CDR, leading to low, or even negative NIR. This stage ruled most of human history until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. During that period, the world was governed by “a cruel demographic regime” in which a large number of births was necessary in order to offset the high mortality rates, particularly among infants and children.16 On the eve of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-eighteen century, both the CBR and the CDR fluctuated between 30 and 40 per 1,000 people.17 The average life expectancy was very low accordingly — less than 40 years.18 Under this “cruel demographic regime,” it was necessary to have at least five live-births per woman just to ensure population replacement. Although demographic censuses for that period do not exist (see Chapter 2), it seems that until the mid-eighteenth century, the NIR of the world’s population was marginal, averaging as low as 0.1% annually,19 and increasing to 0.4% during the second half of the eighteenth century.20 The second stage of the Demographic Transition, which began in the early nineteenth century, was characterized by a steady decrease in the death rates. Therefore, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the world’s population substantially increased, particularly in the developed Western European areas. This increase was a result of continuous high fertility rates despite the marked decline of the death rates, particularly among infants and children. The continuous high fertility rates during the first stage of the Industrial Revolution was due to the fact that it took several decades until the population became aware of the change in the “death regime.” Sweden’s CBR for example averaged 32 per 1,000 during the first half of the nineteenth century (see Table 1.2). A similar trend prevailed in Germany, Austria and England as well.21 During the second half of the nineteenth century, with the spread of the Industrial Revolution, the trend of the decline in death rates was strengthened by the steady decrease of infant and child mortality rates along with a considerable increase in life expectancy. In the case of Sweden, the CDR declined from more than 30 in the early nineteenth century to less than 20 in the 1860s and to about 17 at the turn of the twentieth century. In Norway the CDR declined from approximately 30 in the 1740s to less than 20 a century later, in the mid-nineteenth century, and further declined to less than 15 toward the end of the century. A similar trend occurred in Denmark as well.22 The decline in the CBRs, however, was much slower. In Sweden, for example, the CBR declined from 31–33 during the first half of the nineteenth century to 27 in 1900 (see Table 2.2). In Britain (including Wales), the CBR in the early nineteenth century was estimated at 35,23 while the TFR was 5.8.24 A century later, during the 1908–1913 period, Britain’s CBR declined to 25.25 Hence, the NIRs in the Western European developed countries substantially increased throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the annual NIR in each of the Western European countries reached above 1%.26 Overall, during the 1800–1914 period, despite the massive emigration from Europe to North America and to the European colonies

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Global Demographic History Table 1.2

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Sweden’s Natural Increase Rate, 1800–2014

Year

Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 people)

Crude Death Rate (per 1,000 people)

Natural Increase Rate (per 1,000 people)

Natural Increase Rate (%)

1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

28.8 32.9 32.8 32.8 31.3 31.7 34.5 28.7 29.4 27.9 26.9 24.6 23.5 15.3 15.0 16.4 13.6 13.6 11.7 11.4 10.2 12.3 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8

31.5 31.6 24.3 24.0 20.2 19.7 17.5 19.8 18.1 17.1 16.8 14.0 13.2 11.7 11.4 10.0 10.0 9.9 11.0 11.1 10.5 9.6 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.1

–2.7 1.3 8.5 8.8 11.1 12.0 17.0 8.9 11.3 10.8 10.1 10.6 10.3 3.6 3.6 6.4 3.6 3.6 0.7 0.3 –0.3 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.7

–0.27 0.12 0.85 0.88 1.11 1.20 1.70 0.89 1.13 1.08 1.01 1.06 1.03 0.36 0.36 0.64 0.36 0.37 0.07 0.03 –0.03 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.27

Sources: Statistics Sweden.

around the world, Europe’s population more than doubled, swelling from 188 million to 455 million.27 The third stage of the Demographic Transition in the developed countries began following World War I. This stage, which stretched until the late 1960s, was characterized by a steady fertility decline which occurred much faster than the drop in the death rates. By 1970, the TFR in all of the developed countries worldwide approached replacement-level, or slightly above it. This new transition from high to low fertility rates, like the earlier transition, involved enormous socioeconomic as well as political changes, the most prominent of which were the radical changes of women’s status, primarily in the employment arena (see below). By the end of the third stage, the NIR in the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” (see below) was close to zero. In Sweden the NIR in 1980 was 0.7 per 1,000 (0.07%), namely a rate in which the population doubled itself after 1000 years! A similar rate prevailed in Italy and Greece as well (see Table 1.3). The fourth stage of the Demographic Transition started in the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” during the 1970s when the TFR declined to below the

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Per 1,000 35.0

30.0

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0 1800

1840

1880

1920

1940

1950

Crude Birth Rate

Figure 1.3

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2014

Crude Death Rate

Sweden’s Natural Increase Rate, 1800–2014

replacement-level. By 1990, the TFR was 1.9 in Norway, 1.8 in UK, France and Spain, 1.7 in Denmark, 1.6 in Switzerland and only 1.3 in Italy. Thus, as noted by Eastebrook, “on paper at least, means that Italy will be a theme park in a few generations.”28 Sweden and Ireland were the only “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” where their TFR was 2.1, that is, at the replacement-level itself (see Table 1.3). Despite the extremely low age-specific death rates,29 the CDR not only did not decline accordingly, but even increased, due to the population ageing phenomenon. Consequently, during the past three decades, the NIR in the “ethnically homogeneous developed states” has been very low, in most cases approaching zero, or even negative as is the case in Germany. This new phenomenon of zero or negative NIR in many of the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” is called “the Second Demographic Transition,” or “the Fourth Stage of the Demographic Transition.”30 In recent years, however, a “fifth stage” of the Demographic Transition emerged. While in the 1960s the TFR of the developing countries was 3 and even 4 children higher than in the developed countries, this gap declined to 2 children in the late 1980s. In the early 2000s, the difference was about 1 child and in the late 2000s the TFR became almost equal. In the early 2010s, however, the TFR in many developed states was higher than that of many of the “non-failed developing states” worldwide.31 Thus for example, by 2013, the TFR in Brazil, Costa Rica and Iran was 1.8, in Cuba it was 1.7 and only 1.5 in Puerto Rico, as compared to 2.0 in France and Ireland, 1.9 in the US, the UK, Australia and Sweden, 1.8 in Belgium and about 1.7 in many other developed states.32

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Global Demographic History

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Two main factors led to this new stage of the Demographic Transition: The first and the most important was large-scale immigration to the developed countries, not only to the pure immigration states (see below), but to the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” as well. Since this large-scale migration movement was mainly comprised of young people of childbearing age, it naturally led not only to increased fertility rates in the destination countries, but at the same time to decreasing fertility rates in the original countries. The second factor was the natalist policy: The pronatalist policy of the developed countries, particularly in the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries,” was and still is a major factor which is keeping the TFR of the new immigrants in these countries above the average national level (see below). Thus, the greater the percentage of the new immigrants of childbearing age in the destination country, the higher the national average TFR. The large percentage of new immigrants in both France and Sweden is the principal reason for the success of these states to keep their TFR at around the replacement-level even today. Conversely, in the original countries of the immigrants, the higher the percentage of the young emigrants of the overall cohorts of the population of childbearing age, the lower the TFR. This large-scale emigration, as will be examined below, is the central reason for the extremely low TFR in the former European Communist countries. Thus, up to and including the fourth stage of the Demographic Transition the main factor determining the fertility rate was the degree of the socioeconomic development of the state, in the fifth stage determining factor for the fertility rates is the scale of migration. However, since many of the countries worldwide are in the second and third stages of the Demographic Transition, their young age pyramid will dictate the continuation of quite a rapid global population growth, albeit slower than in the past, for the next five to six decades — a result of the population momentum phenomenon (see Box 1.1). Thus, according to the US Census Bureau, the global population will reach 8 billion in mid-2025 and will continue to increase to 9.4 billion in mid-2050 (see Table 1.1).33

Box 1.1 The “Population Momentum” phenomenon The Population Momentum phenomenon refers to the effect of the current age pyramid of any given society on its future NIR. The long-term demographic implication of the wide-based age pyramid is that even if the TFR declines to the replacement-level, namely 2.1 children per woman, or even below it, the NIR will continue to be positive. This is because the number of women at the reproductive age (15–49) will continue to increase for a number of decades before finally stabilizing. Only at that point will the population start to decline, in the case of below replacement-level fertility rate; or stabilize, in the case of maintaining the replacement-level rate. Overall, the younger the age-pyramid, the longer the period between the achievement of replacement-level fertility rate and the stabilization of the NIR at zero. This period is called the population momentum. The population momentum could also be negative. This would be the case after a long period of a below replacement-level fertility rate which without massive immigration would lead to a situation in which the number of women entering the reproductive age would be lower than the number of women leaving this age group. The “negative momentum” would last until the number of women entering the reproductive age would be equal to the number of those leaving.

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The great weakness of the Demographic Transition theory is that it ignores the impact of any natalist policy. As will be examined in Chapter 6, it appears that a proper anti-natalist policy could bring about a substantial fertility decline, despite non-significant socioeconomic changes. Thus, in these countries, due to a successful anti-natalist policy, there is no direct correlation between the socioeconomic situation and fertility rates. The most famous example in this case is China.34 However, even in many countries where the anti-natalist policy was voluntary and not compulsory as it was in China, the fertility rates sharply declined due to a voluntary anti-natalist policy. This was the case in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, for example, where fertility rates have markedly declined since the 1970s, reaching the replacement-level rate during the first half of the 2010s.35 In these countries, the Demographic Transition was “a planned transition,” engineered by the authorities through effective family planning policies and not a “spontaneous transition,” that is, without direct governmental involvement, as it was the case in the Western developed countries.36 However, with the exception of some countries that succeeded in “isolating” the fertility rates from the socioeconomic situation by means of a successful anti-natalist policy, most of the countries worldwide “follow” the basic assumptions of the Demographic Transition theory, namely the existence of a high correlation between fertility rates and the socioeconomic development. Hence, despite all of the criticism of the Demographic Transition theory, it still remains the most useful framework for analyzing demographic changes from a historical perspective. In this respect, Kirk noted that: “Its greatest strength is the prediction that the transition will occur in every society which is experiencing modernization.”37 Harbison and Robinson noted that the Demographic Transition theory was “a major step forward in our understanding of the mechanics of population change, because it saw fertility and mortality as interacting with social and economic forces.”38

3

The Various Global Demographic Patterns

According to the World Bank, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world’s countries are classified into three fertility categories: the first includes countries with high fertility rates (over 5); the second comprises countries with intermediate fertility rates (2.5–5.0) and the third includes countries with low fertility rates (below 2.5).39 To a large extent, the World Bank classification is similar to that of Thompson from the 1920s. However, a close examination of the current global demographic picture reveals the existence of seven categories of countries.

3.1

The “Ethnically Homogeneous Developed Nations”

This category mainly includes the Western European developed countries. The demographic patterns of these countries during the past two centuries are almost identical and followed the Demographic Transition theory’s basic assumptions. The main demographic characteristic of these countries following the end of World War II was a substantial increase of the fertility rates as compensation for the extremely low fertility rates during the decade and a half of the “Great Depression” and World War II (1930–1945). The CBRs, of course, increased accordingly by 10%–20%.

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Global Demographic History

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Overall, during the two decades following World War II, in all the Western European countries the TFR was much above the replacement-level. Since the early 1970s, however, all of these countries, without exception, were witnesses to a dramatic drop in their fertility rates. Yet, until the late 1970s the fertility rate in many of these countries succeeded in “floating above” the replacement-level. Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, however, despite extensive pro-natalist measures that these countries implemented, their fertility rates dropped to below the replacement-level. In 2014, none of these countries succeeded in achieving replacement-level: the countries which came closest to replacement-level were France and Ireland with a TFR of 2.0, and Sweden and UK with 1.9. Thus, while until World War I the highest NIRs worldwide were in the Western European countries due to relatively low CDRs, since the 1980s, the NIRs of these countries have been almost zero or even negative (see Table 1.3). Why has the fertility rate of these countries dropped so dramatically despite the enormous pro-natalist measures which were implemented by the authorities of those countries since the 1970s? (a) The transition to the “dual salaries household” model. The transition from a model of a “one salary household” to the “dual salaries household” was not only a result of the feminist revolution, but was also driven by the huge increase in the cost of living in the urban centers of these countries. Thus, for example, women’s labor force participation rate (aged 15–64) of Denmark increased from 42.7% in 1960 to 71.2% in 2000. In Belgium, the increase during the corresponding period was from 29.6% to 51.1%. In the other Western European countries, the same phenomenon occurred.40 Overall, there is a high correlation between women’s labor force participation rate and the fertility rate such that the higher the first, the lower the second. The end result was a postponement of marriage and consequently of giving birth. (b) “Neo Capitalism.” Adopted by all of the Western economies since the 1980s, the neo-capitalism in effect brought about the end of the “Fordism lifetime secured job” model which was one of the prominent characteristics of the labor markets of these countries until the 1980s. Thus, employment insecurity, which had previously prevailed almost exclusively among employees in the lowest rank, became prevalent among the middle rank of the labor market as well. A major reason for the widespread employment insecurity was the sharp decline in the percentage of public sector employees among the total employees within the overall ideological framework of transition to “thin government” (The “Washington Consensus” 41). The addition of employment insecurity to the middle class brought about not only postponement of marriages and consequently births, but couples, in advance, preferred to have less children due to economic insecurity.42 (c) “Modern slavery.” The long working hours which characterized the “new labor market” was an additional factor. Many of those who worked in high-tech and IT companies had to choose between family commitments and job promotion and in many cases even between family and survival in the job itself. Consequently, while in the past there had been a large number of unwanted pregnancies, in recent years, the actual fertility rates in the more developed countries have been much below the desired number.43 (d) Rapid urbanization. Throughout the world, the fertility rates in the countryside and the peripheral areas are substantially higher than in the major urban centers. The reason for this global phenomenon, in both developed and developing economies, has its source in two major factors: in the rural areas in many cases, even today, children

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contribute to the family income, while in the urban centers, children represent an economic burden. The second factor is the much higher cost of living, mainly in the area of housing, in the urban centers compared to both the countryside and the peripheral areas. Hence, as the urbanization rates increased, the fertility rates decreased accordingly. (e) Changing social attitudes towards childless women. In recent decades, within the overall framework of the feminist revolution, childless women no longer have to put up with a negative image as had been the case until very recently. All of these factors together led to a steady decline of the TFR in these countries to below replacement-level and consequently to a steadily ageing population. By 2014, in all of the ethnically homogeneous developed countries, the percentage of the 65 and over population was substantially higher than the 0–14 age group.44 According to the UN projection, by 2050 the median age in Italy and Germany will be above 50 while in Austria, Greece and Spain it will be slightly lower than 50.45 This steadily ageing population leads, accordingly, to both rising CDRs and lowering CBRs, resulting in a steady decrease of the NIRs. The following numbers illustrate the sharp decline in Europe’s fertility rates during the twentieth century: while in 1900 the number of births in Europe was 9.9 million out of a total population of 300 million, this number declined to 5.9 million in 1996 out of a total population of 500 million. This means that while Europe’s population increased by two-thirds, the nominal number of births declined by 40%.46 The end result of this process is the creation of “a negative population momentum.” According to the calculations of Demeny, if Europe’s fertility and mortality rates in the future are to remain the same as they were in 2000, “a generation of 1,000 persons would be replaced by a second generation of 645, followed by a third generation of 416, a fourth of 268 and so on.”47 Lutz and associates claim that in the year 2000, Europe’s population “began to generate negative momentum: a tendency to decline owing to shrinking cohorts of young people that was brought on by low fertility over the past three decades.”48 Hence, from a purely demographic viewpoint, these countries have become “immigration dependent.” Overall, during the 1995–2004 decade, the population of the EU-25 countries increased by a mere 2.3%49 — less than the average growth rate of the Arab countries in a single year! Even in Sweden — the country with the highest fertility rate among the EU countries — the NIR in 2013 was 0.23%, which means that at this rate, without immigration, it would take about 300 years until the population doubled! The vast majority of Sweden’s population growth (0.68%) in 2013 was due to immigration.50 Overall, in 2010, 14.7% of Sweden’s total population was born outside the country, as compared to a mere 4.0% in 1960.51 However, even with this massive immigration, the population growth rate in Sweden in the first half of the 2010s was still much lower than it was during the second half of the eighteenth century, prior to the start of the Industrial Revolution. In the case of Norway, during the 1990–2009 period, the number of immigrants amounted to 420,000, that is, 10% of Norway’s total population in 2009, without taking into consideration both the births of the immigrants and those who immigrated to the country prior to 1990.52 In 2010, Norway’s population increased nominally by 65,000, of whom 68.5% were immigrants. In the UK as well, the population growth during the past two decades was almost solely due to immigration. Thus, for example, during the 1998–2005 period, of a total net population growth of 1.735 million, 1.151

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Table 1.3

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Western European Countries, 1950–2014 1950–1955 1960–1965 1970–1975 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR

Denmark Germany Greece Ireland Spain France Italy Sweden Norway UK Switzerland

17.8 15.6 18.6 21.9 20.6 19.1 18.2 15.4 18.7 15.1 17.2

9.1 11.1 9.5 12.8 10.3 12.8 10.0 9.8 8.6 11.8 10.1

2.6 2.1 2.3 3.4 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.3

17.3 17.6 18.2 22.2 21.2 18.1 18.6 14.9 17.4 18.3 18.9

9.8 11.9 9.4 11.8 8.8 11.3 9.9 10.1 9.5 11.8 9.7

2.6 2.5 2.2 4.1 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.6

14.4 11.4 15.7 23.7 19.4 16.0 16.2 13.5 15.2 13.5 14.3

10.1 12.4 10.3 10.9 8.6 10.8 9.9 10.4 10.1 11.9 9.2

2.0 1.7 2.3 3.8 2.9 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.9

11.2 10.1 15.4 21.8 15.1 14.9 11.4 11.7 12.5 13.4 11.5

10.9 11.6 9.1 9.7 7.7 10.2 9.5 11.0 10.1 11.8 9.3

1.6 1.6 2.3 3.2 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.6

12.3 11.4 10.1 15.1 10.1 13.3 9.9 14.4 14.3 13.9 12.7

11.9 11.5 9.3 9.0 8.6 9.3 9.4 11.1 10.8 11.1 9.5

1.7 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6

12.6 9.3 11.7 14.3 9.9 13.2 9.4 10.2 13.2 11.5 10.2

10.9 10.2 10.5 8.2 9.0 9.1 9.7 10.5 9.8 10.3 10.5

1.8 1.4 1.3 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.5

11.4 9.8 1.9 10.1 9.4(b) 8.3 10.5 1.4 8.6 11.1(b) 10.3 9.8 1.5 8.5 10.2(b) 16.5 6.1 2.0 14.4 6.2(a) 10.4 8.2 1.4 9.2 8.3 12.9 8.6 2.0 12.4 8.8 9.5 9.8 1.4 8.3 10.0 12.3 8.2 2.0 11.9 8.3 12.6 8.5 2.0 11.5 8.1 12.9 8.9 1.9 12.0 9.0 10.3 8.0 1.5 10.2 8.0

1.7 1.5 1.3 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.5

(a) Data relates to 2011. (b) Data relates to 2013. Sources: UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); The European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook, various issues (Luxemburg); Population Reference Bureau (PRB), Fertility Rates for Low Birth Rate Countries, 1995 to Most Recent Year Available, February 2011; PRB, World Population Data Sheet, various issues (New York); Francesco C. Billari, “Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe: Exploring the Causes and Finding some Surprises,” The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2008).

Global Demographic History

Year Country

| 17

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Global Demographic History

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5

1950_1955

Figure 1.4

1980

2000

Switzerland

UK

Norway

Sweden

Italy

France

Spain

Ireland

Greece

Germany

Denmark

0

2014

Total Fertility Rate in some Western European Countries, 1950–2014

(66.3%) was due to immigration.53 The Netherlands’s nominal population growth in 2015 amounted to 79,000, of whom 71% were immigrants. This means that the Netherlands’ NIR in 2015 was a mere 0.13%.54 In the rest of the Western EU countries, despite the massive immigration, the population growth rate is still close to zero. The large-scale immigration, it should be noted, contributed to the population growth of these countries not only nominally, namely, through the increased numbers of population due to the immigration itself, but also by keeping the TFR at 1.6–2.0 and not 1.2–1.4 as it is among the native women. In France, for example, the average TFR of women born in France averaged 1.7 during the 1991–1998 period, while it was 2.9 for women who immigrated from Tunisia and Morocco and 3.2 for women who immigrated from Turkey. According to the 2001 Austrian census data, the TFR of Austrian Muslim women was 2.3, compared to 1.3 for Roman Catholic Austrian women.55 With regards to the Netherlands, the TFR of first generation immigrant women from Morocco was above 3, compared to less than 2 among native Dutch women.56 In the UK, in 2011, the TFR of first generation immigrant women from Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh was above 3 and above 4 among women born in Somalia.57 The same pattern of much higher fertility rates among immigrant women from Asia and Africa than among the Western European Christian native women can be found in the other EU developed countries as well. The result of the combination of young immigrants and higher-than-nationalaverage fertility rates is a younger age pyramid than it would be with the local population alone in all of the developed EU countries. In France, for example, by the early 2000s, as many as half of the Muslims were under the age of 24.58 This means that the vast majority of French Muslims are either in the reproductive age group or will be entering their reproductive period during the coming generation. Thus, already in the near future, the percentage of the first and second immigrant generations in the overall population of the host EU countries will be much higher than their current

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Global Demographic History

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percentage. Given that a considerable percentage of the immigrants to the EU countries are Muslims, the percentage of Muslims in the EU countries will continue to rapidly increase at least in the foreseeable future. The total dependence on immigration for the basic “demographic survival” forces Western European countries to choose between two bad options: The first is to allow large-scale immigration which will prevent the TFR from deteriorating to a level of 1.2–1.4. This option, however, will soon lead not on1y to their loss of the ethnic-religious-cultural identity, but as has been proven in many cases, large-scale immigration is extremely dangerous from a security point of view: migrants from Muslim countries are often involved riots based on claims of discrimination, and recently there is the issue of Islamic fundamentalist terror in Europe. The second option is not to allow large-scale immigration. This option, however, will lead to a rapidly ageing population and consequently to a steady deterioration of the dependency ratio.59 At present, these countries are “walking a fine line”: Although they allow largescale migration, their first priority is to increase the fertility rates of their indigenous population as the first option to deal with the ageing population. However, even with both these measures, namely, large-scale immigration and pro-natalism, the population growth rates of these countries are projected to be very low or even negative. According to the UN projection, German’s population will amount to 79.3 million in 2030 compared to 80.6 million in 2014. The populations of Greece, Spain and Italy are also expected to shrink, while those of Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK are estimated to increase slightly (see Table 1.4). Table 1.4

Total Population in some Western European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

Year Country

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2014

2030

Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Sweden Norway UK Switzerland

8.6 4.3 69.8 2.9 7.6 28.1 41.9 46.6 7.0 3.3 50.6 4.7

9.1 4.6 72.5 2.8 8.3 30.3 45.5 50.0 7.5 3.6 52.2 5.3

9.7 4.9 78.3 2.9 8.8 33.6 50.5 53.7 8.0 3.9 55.5 6.2

9.9 5.1 78.2 3.4 9.6 37.2 53.7 56.4 8.3 4.1 56.3 6.3

9.9 5.1 79.1 3.5 10.1 38.8 56.6 56.7 8.5 4.2 57.2 6.7

10.2 5.3 82.2 3.8 10.9 40.0 58.8 56.7 8.9 4.5 58.8 7.2

11.2 5.7 80.6 4.7 11.0 46.3 64.1 59.8 9.7 5.1 64.3 8.2

12.0 6.0 79.3 5.2 10.5 45.9 68.0 59.1 10.8 5.9 70.1 9.2

Sources: UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issue (New York); UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); The European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook, various issues (Luxemburg).

3.2.

The Former European Communist Countries

The collapse of the Communist Bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by some of the former Communist countries entering the EU, brought about tremendous

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20

Global Demographic History

Millions 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1950

Figure 1.5

2000

2014

Switzerland

UK

Norway

Sweden

Italy

France

Spain

Greece

Ireland

Germany

Denmark

Belgium

0

2030

Total Population in some Western European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

demographic changes in all of the Eastern European former Communist countries. As one can see in Table 1.5, until the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the TFR of these countries were much above that of the Western European countries. In fact, even in 1990, the TFR in almost all of the former Communist countries was around the replacementlevel with the lowest rate of 1.8 in Bulgaria and Romania. During the 1990s, however, the fertility rate of all of these countries rapidly declined. In 2000, the prevailing TFR in these countries was 1.2–1.3, namely, a decline of more than 30% within only one decade. During the early 2010s, the TFR of these countries somewhat recovered, reaching 1.4–1.5 in 2014 (see Table 1.5).60 The sharp fertility decline of the former European Communist countries is manifested mainly by the sharp increase of the median age of first marriage for women and consequently also in the median age for first birth. In the Czech Republic, for example, the mean age of women at first birth increased from 22 years in 1980 to 27 in 2008. In Hungary, it increased from 23 to 28 and in Bulgaria from 22 to 25 during the corresponding period.61 What were the main factors that led to this sharp fertility decline in the former European Communist countries? (a) Extreme and unexpected socioeconomic insecurity. The Communism of Eastern Europe crashed almost without any warning. Thus, the populations of these countries found themselves without any preparation in a totally new socioeconomic order, or maybe more accurately, in a “new socioeconomic disorder” which was characterized by the elimination of all of the socioeconomic protections which had been implemented

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Table 1.5

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2014

Year Country

1950–1955 1960–1965 1970–1975 CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR

1980 1990 2000 2010 CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR

2014 CDR TFR

Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Ukraine

21.3 21.0 29.7 25.6 26.9

11.1 13.6 9.8 10.4 11.3(a)

14.4(c) 12.8(c) 10.1(c) 12.4(c) 13.1(c)

10.3 11.3 10.9 10.7 11.0

2.5 2.7 3.6 3.1 2.9

2.2 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.0

14.5 13.9 19.5 18.0 16.7(a)

12.1 14.1 10.2 10.6 11.2

1.8 11.2 14.1 1.9 9.7 13.5 2.1 9.9 9.6 1.8 10.5 11.4 1.9 8.6 15.2

1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2

20.4 17.9

2.5 2.1

18.2(a) 10.2(a) 1.3 15.1 10.3 15(a) 12.0(a) 2.0 12.7 12.1

2.1 10.2 9.8 1.9 7.8 15.4

1.3 11.2 9.9 1.4 10.2 9.6(c) 1.4 1.1 10.9 15.2 1.4 11.1(b) 14.6(c) 1.5

7.8 2.9 19.3 8.1 2.1 15.5

9.4 9.4

2.1 1.9 2.3 2.4 1.9

11.7 12.1 14.3 13.6 13.4

10.2 9.0 10.9 10.5 12.6

14.6 13.0 9.8 12.1 14.2

1.6 9.4 1.3 9.5 1.4 9.9 1.3 9.2 1.4 13.4

1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.8

(a) Data relates to 1980–1985. (b) Data relates to 2012. (c) Data relates to 2013. Sources: Francesco C. Billari, “Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe: Exploring the Causes and Finding some Surprises,” The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2008); UN, Population Division, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); The European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook, various issues (Luxemburg); Population Reference Bureau (PRB), Fertility Rates for Low Birth Rate Countries, 1995 to Most Recent Year Available, February 2011; PRB, World Population Data Sheet, various issues (New York).

Global Demographic History

27.3 10.1 3.6 25.5 11.7 2.8

16.7 8.2 2.2 16.1 9.7 13.5 10.2 1.9 15.5 11.7 19.6 7.7 2.8 17.5 8.4 16.5 8.4 2.1 20.0 9.4 21.1 8.1 2.6 15.4 9.4

| 21

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22

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Global Demographic History

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5

1950_1955

Figure 1.6

1980

2000

Ukraine

Slovakia

Russian Federation

Romania

Poland

Hungary

Bulgaria

0

2014

Total Fertility Rate in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2014

in the Communist system, such as employment security, subsidies, free public services, etc. In Russia, for example, the unemployment rate leapt sharply from 4.7% in 1992 to 15.2% in early 1999.62 In Romania the unemployment rate in the late 1990s was more than 10%.63 In the rest of the former Communist countries the socioeconomic situation during the 1990s was quite similar to that of Russia and Romania and all of them had high inflation and increased unemployment. (b) Increasing divorce rates. This phenomenon of increasing divorce rates is common in any given society in transition, particularly following a radically changing socioeconomic policy or among immigrant societies. Overall, in each of the former Soviet Bloc countries, there was a substantial increase in the divorce rates, and in Russia, in particular.64 (c) Massive emigration to the Western European countries following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, but especially after some of these countries entered the EU in 2004.65 Thus, for example, in late 2009, approximately 472,000 citizens of Eastern European countries were working in the UK as compared to only 13,000 in 1997.66 This massive emigration, which naturally included young people, led to both a fertility decline and an increase of the CDRs due to the increase in the median age in the home countries of these young migrants. Thus, while the median age in Bulgaria was 27.3 years in 1950, it increased to 43.5 in 2015. In Poland the increase went from 25.8 in 1950 to 39.6 in 2015.67 Consequently, the percentage of the elderly population increased accordingly. In Hungary, for example, the percentage of the 65 and above age group of the total population increased from 15.5% in 2004 to 17.5% in 2014. In the Czech Republic, it increased from 14.0% to 17.4% during the corresponding period.68

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Global Demographic History Table 1.6 (millions)

Total Population in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2030

Year Country

1950

1960

Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Ukraine

7.3 9.3 24.8 16.2 102.8

7.9 10.0 29.7 18.6 119.9

3.4 37.3

4.1 42.7

1970

1980

1990

8.5 10.3 32.8 20.5 130.1

8.9 10.8 35.8 22.6 138.1

8.8 10.4 38.2 23.5 147.6

4.5 47.1

5.0 50.0

5.3 51.4

2000

2014

2030

8.0 10.2 38.5 22.1 146.4

7.2 9.9 38.6 19.7 143.4

6.3 9.3 37.2 17.6 138.7

5.4 48.8

5.4 45.0

5.4 40.9

Sources: UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); The European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook, various issues (Luxemburg).

The end result of the prolonged fertility decline together with the massive emigration of young people is an ongoing increase of the CDRs and a decrease of the CBRs, leading to negative NIRs. By 2014, in each of the Eastern European countries, the NIR was negative at a level of 2–5 per 1,000 (see Table 1.5). Thus, while the population of the vast majority of the Western European countries is projected to increase in the coming two decades due to massive immigration, the populations of the Eastern European countries are expected to decrease due to massive emigration combined with negative NIRs (see Table 1.6). From a historical perspective, there is no doubt that the decision of the Eastern European countries to join the EU was a mistaken one. Since they became part of the EU, these countries are constantly losing their young generation in favor of the Western European countries. Without this young generation, not only will their next generation simply not be born due to the constant shrinking young generation, but their labor force participation rates will also deteriorate rapidly, leading to “demographic suicide.”

3.3. The “Pure Immigration Countries” The countries that are included in this group, namely, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were initially formed as “immigrant societies.” Thus, since the beginning of their state-building and until the present day, the prominent factor which has shaped both their population growth and age structure is immigration. Therefore, as one can see in Charts 1.1 and 1.2, as opposed to the situation in the “ethnically homogeneous developed states,” the age structure of the pure immigration states is perpetually that of “the demographic gift” (see Box 1.2). This is a consequence of both massive immigration of young people and positive NIRs due to higher CBRs because of both the large percentage of women in the reproductive age group, and low CDRs because of the relatively small percentage of the elderly population.69 By 2013, the NIR of the US was 4.5 per 1,000 and that of Australia was 7.1. In Canada and New Zealand as well, the NIR was positive. The “price” for this constant “demographic gift age pyramid,” is “non-ethnic-cultural-religion” identity. Who is “an American”? “The Indian;” the “white European immigrant,” the Mexican who immigrated to the US,

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24

|

Global Demographic History

Millions 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Bulgaria

Hungary

Poland

1950

Figure 1.7

Romania

1990

Russian Federation

2014

Slovakia

Ukraine

2030

Total Population in some Former Communist European Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

Box 1.2 The “Demographic Gift” Age Structure The term “demographic gift” or “demographic dividend” refers to an age structure in which the vast majority of the population, usually 70% at least, is in the working age group (15–64). There could be two reasons for this favored age structure: the first is a sharp fertility decline which leads to a shrinking of the under 15 age group while the 65 and above age group is still small. However, this favored age structure will end after a maximum of three to four decades. This is because the current large percentage of the working age population will gradually “climb” into the elderly age group, while the previous under 15 age group, which is currently small due to the previous fertility decline, will become a relatively small working age population. This process will lead to a situation where the number of those entering the working age population will be smaller than the number of those leaving this age group and moving into the elderly age group. The second reason for creating a “demographic gift” age structure is through constant immigration of people in the working age group. These immigrants add numbers to the working age group without first being in the under-15 age group. Source: Gavin W. Johns, “Where are All the Jobs? Capturing the Demographic Dividend in Muslim Countries,” in Hans Groth and Alfonzo Sousa-Poza (eds.), Population Dynamics in the Muslim Countries (London and New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 33–37.

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Global Demographic History Male

15

United States - 2015

12

9

6

3

Population (in millions)

0

100+ 95_99 90_94 85_89 80_84 75_79 70_74 65_69 60_64 55_59 50_54 45_49 40_44 35_39 30_34 25_29 20_24 15_19 10_14 5_9 0_4

0

3

Age Group

| 25

Female

5

9

12

15

Population (in millions)

Chart 1.1 The Age Pyramid of the US, 2015 Source: US Census Bureau

Male

Canada - 2015

Female

100+ 95_99 90_94 85_89 80_84 75_79 70_74 65_69 60_64 55_59 50_54 45_49 40_44 35_39 30_34 25_29 20_24 15_19 10_14 5_9 0_4

2

1.6

1.2

Population (in millions)

0.8

0.4

0

0

Age Group

0.4

0.8

1.2

1.6

2

Population (in millions)

Chart 1.2 The Age Pyramid of Canada, 2015 Source: US Census Bureau

or maybe the Afro-American who was brought to America much earlier than the vast majority of the immigrants from Europe? This is also the same in the rest of the countries included in this category.

3.4. The “Asian Tigers”: The End of the Demographic Gift The term “Asian Tigers” refers to four countries in East Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, all of which tremendous socioeconomic successes since the

|

Year Country

CBR

The US Canada Australia New Zealand

23.7 26.7 22.4 25.5

1960 CDR TFR 9.5 7.8 8.6 8.8

3.7 3.9 3.5 4.2

CBR

1970 CDR

18.3 17.4 20.6 22.1

7.9 7.3 9.1 8.8

TFR CBR 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.2

15.9 15.4 15.3 16.2

1980 CDR TFR 8.7 6.5 7.4 7.2

1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0

1990 CBR CDR TFR

2000 CBR CDR TFR

16.6 15.2 15.4 17.9

14.7 10.7 13.0 14.7

8.7 7.2 7.0 7.9

2.1 1.7 1.9 2.2

8.7 7.1 6.7 6.9

2.1 1.5 1.8 2.0

CBR 12.6(b) 11.0(a) 13.6(b) 13.1

2013 CDR TFR 8.1(a) 7.0(a) 6.5(b) 6.6

(a) Data relates to 2011. (b) Data relates to 2012. Sources: UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); WB, The World Bank Data; Population Reference Bureau, Data Finder; OECD Data.

1.9 1.6 1.9 2.0

Global Demographic History

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in the “Pure Immigration Countries” 1960–2013

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26

Table 1.7

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Global Demographic History

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4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 The US

Canada

1960

Figure 1.8

1980

Australia

2000

New Zealand

2013

Total Fertility Rate in the “Pure Immigration Countries,” 1960–2013

1960s.70 A major part of their socioeconomic boom was a sharp fertility decline. Thus, as one can see in Table 1.8, while in 1960 the TFRs of these countries were similar to those of other developing countries worldwide, they radically declined during the 1960s and 1970s. The most radical decline occurred in Singapore where the TFR declined from 4.6 in 1960 to only 1.8 in 1980. In the other three countries as well, the TFR radically declined during these two decades. By 1990, in all of these countries, the TFR was already much below the replacement level. Since then, the TFR of these countries continued to decline and during the early 2010s, they were among the lowest worldwide at the rate of 1.2–1.4. In Hong Kong and South Korea, the CBR declined to below the 10 per 1,000 mark — the lowest worldwide.71 At the initial period following the radical fertility decline, namely, during the 1970s-1990s, these countries benefited from the “demographic gift” age structure with the vast majority of their population in the working age group. Thus, while in 1962 the under-15 population constituted 42.4% of South Korea’s total population,72 this rate declined to 31.7% in 1984,73 and further to only 23.8% in 1994.74 In Hong Kong the percentage of the under-15 age group of the total population declined from 40.1% in 1964,75 to 23.9% in 1983,76 and reached as low as 19.4% in 1994.77 This favorable

|

Year Country

CBR

Japan Hong Kong Singapore South Korea Taiwan

17.2 36.0 38.7 38.5 39.5

1960 CDR TFR 7.6 6.2 6.3 9.7(a) 6.9

2.0 4.9 4.6 6.0 5.8

CBR

1980 CDR

13.6 16.8 17.1 23.4 23.3

6.2 5.0 5.2 6.7 4.8

TFR CBR 1.8 2.2 1.8 3.0 2.5

9.9 11.7 18.9 15.0 16.6

1990 CDR TFR 6.6 5.4 4.4 5.6 5.2

1.6 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.8

2000 CBR CDR TFR

2010 CBR CDR TFR

9.4 8.1 11.7 13.5 13.8

8.4 12.6 10.1 11.4 9.5

7.7 5.4 4.6 5.4 5.7

1.4 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.7

9.3 6.0 4.6 5.3 6.3

1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9

CBR 8.1(b) 7.9(c) 10.3(c) 9.6(b) 9.0

2014 CDR TFR 10.1 6.4 4.8 5.7 7.0

1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2

(a) Data relates to 1961. (b) Data relates to 2012. (c) Data relates to 2013. Sources: PRB, Fertility Rates for Low Birth Rate Countries, 1995 to Most Recent Year Available, February 2011; UN, Demographic Yearbook; various issues (New York); UN, Population Division, Partnership and Reproductive Beheviour in Low-Fertility Countries (New York, May 2003); UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); Republic of China (Taiwan), National Statistics, Yearly Statistics, various issue (Nantou City); ESCAP, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, various issues (Bangkok); M.C. Chang, “Taiwan’s Transition from High Fertility to Lowest Low Levels,” Asian Journal of Health and Information Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006); The Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Population Projections for Taiwan: 2010-2060.

Global Demographic History

Crude Birth Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some East-Asian Developed Economies, 1960–2014

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28

Table 1.8

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Global Demographic History

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age structure constituted a major catalyst for their rapid economic development. Not only did labor force participation rates radically improve, but governmental expenditures on the young substantially declined. Parallel to the decline of the young population, the percentage of the elderly population was still small, due to the past high fertility rates.78 Thus, in 1994, the working age group (15–64) constituted 70.7% of South Korea’s total population,79 as compared to 49.8% in 1966.80 The same process of a steady increase of the percentage of the working age population of the total population at the expense of the under-15 population has occurred in the other two Asian Tigers countries as well. However, due to the prolonged much below the replacement-level fertility, the population of these countries gradually became older. South Korea’s median age increased from 19.0 years in 1950 to 40.6 in 2015 and that of Singapore increased from 20.0 to 47.0 during the corresponding period.81 Thus, this ongoing process of both much below the replacement-level fertility on the one hand and the prevention of large-scale immigration on the other, will soon lead to the end of the “demographic gift” period due to the steady increase in the percentage of the elderly population. By 2015, this age group constituted 12.5% of South Korea’s total population, but its share is projected to increase to 23.9% in 2030. In Singapore the 65 and over population constituted 8.9% in 2015, and is projected to increase to 15.3% in 2030.82 Thus, with the end of the “demographic gift” period, these countries, like that of the “ethnically homogeneous developed countries,” have no choice but to allow large-scale immigration; otherwise their economies will soon suffer from shrinking labor force participation rates. Although Japan and China are not part of the Asian Tigers, their demographic trends in recent years are similar to those of the Asian Tigers. While Japan’s TFR during the 1960s and 1970s was much below that which prevailed in the Asian Tigers, it still succeeded in keeping it around the replacement-level. Since the 1980s, however, Japan’s TFR has steadily deteriorated, averaging 1.4 during the past two decades, despite the various pro-natalist measures taken by its authorities.83 As Japan has prevented large-scale immigration (see Chapter 5), its population is steadily ageing. In recent years, Japan holds “the dubious record” of being “the most ageing country worldwide.” By 2015, Japan’s median age was 46.5 years compared to 22.3 in 1950 and 32.6 in 1980. According to the UN projections, by 2030 Japan’s median age will reach 51.5 — again, the highest worldwide.84 With such a high median age, the percentage of the elderly population (65 and over) of the total population is extremely high accordingly, amounted to 26.7% according to the October 2015 census.85 According to the UN projection, the 60 and over population is projected to climb to 42.5% in 2050 as compared to 33.1% in 2015.86 Therefore, Japan also has no choice but to open its gates to massive immigration of young people in order to revive its working age population.87 In China, the CBR averaged 33 in the late 1960s and declined to 27 in the mid1970s.88 The TFR, which was above 4 until the late 1960s, has declined accordingly to 3 on average during the 1975–1980 period. Since the early 1980s, however, due to the “One Child Policy,” China’s TFR steadily declined, reaching 1.6 during the first half of the 2010s.89 The sharp fertility decline led to a steadily shrinking of the under-15 population and an increase of the median age from 23.7 years in 1950 to 37.0 in 2015 and it is projected to reach 43.2 in 2030.90 Thus, already in the near future, China, like Japan and the Asian Tigers, will have to deal with the demographic challenge of an ageing population.

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Global Demographic History

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Japan

Hong Kong

1960

Figure 1.9

Singapore

1980

South Korea

2000

Taiwan

2014

Total Fertility Rate in some East-Asian Developed Economies, 1960–2014

3.5. The “Classic” Developing Countries This is the largest group and includes the majority of countries worldwide. The prominent demographic characteristic of these countries is a gradual decline in both fertility and mortality rates since the 1960s. It should be noted that these declines were a result of socioeconomic developments along with the implementation of effective family planning programs. However, more detailed observation reveals that this group is comprised of two sub-groups: The first includes countries where major demographic changes had started to occur only in the early 1970s and in some cases even in the late 1970s. In the case of Mexico for example, during the first half of the 1970s, the TFR was similar to those that prevailed in the early 1950s. In the case of Iran, for example, the TFR in the early 1970s was similar to that of the early 1950s. This was also the case in Brazil. Although the fertility rates in these countries remained almost identical in the early 1970s to those which prevailed in the early 1950s, the CDRs on the other hand radically declined, leading to a skyrocketing of the NIRs. Thus, by the first half of the 1970s, in each of these countries the NIR was the highest ever, amounting to 2.7% in Iran, 2.6% in Thailand and 2.4% in Brazil and Mexico. Argentina, however, is the most extreme case in this group. This is because its TFR even in the early 1990s was almost identical to that which prevailed in the early 1950s, namely 3.2 per woman (see Table 1.9). In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, however, the TFRs of these countries started to decline and reached 0.2–0.3 child above the replacement-level in the early 2010s. However,

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Global Demographic History

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since the fertility rates started to decline only in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, their median age is currently still young,91 leading to a relatively low CDR and consequently to a relatively high NIR of approximately 1%–1.5%. Among the Arab countries, as will be examined in Chapter 3, only Tunisia and Lebanon belongs to this group of countries. The second group in this category includes countries where the fertility rates started to decline already in the 1960s. In Malaysia for example, while the TFR averaged 6.2 during the first half of the 1950s, it declined to 4.6 during the first half of the 1970s, 3.6 during the second half of the 1980s and reached the replacement-level during the first half of the 2010s. The same trend of a gradual decline of the fertility rates since the 1960s has occurred in Turkey which also reached replacement-level rate in the first half of the 2010s. However, due to past high NIR, despite the decline of the TFR to the replacement-level or even to below it, as is the case in Thailand and Malaysia for example, the NIR of these countries remained positive in the early 2010s as well (see table 1.9). Hence, despite reaching replacement-level fertility rate, or close to it, the population of all of these countries will continue to increase at least in the coming three decades due to relatively low CDRs — a result of the Population Momentum phenomenon. In the case of Iran for example, despite the fact that during the first half of the 2010s its TFR averaged 1.8, its population is projected to reach 88.5 million in 2030 compared to 79.1 million in 2015. Brazil’s population is also projected to increase from 207.8

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Argentina

Brazil

Iran

_ 1950 1955

Figure 1.10

Malaysia _ 1970 1975

Mexico _ 1985 1990

Thailand

India

_ 2010 2015

Total Fertility Rate in some Developing Countries, 1950–2015

Turkey

|

Year Country

1950–1955 CBR CDR TFR

1960–1965 1970–1975 CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR

1985–1990 CBR CDR TFR

2000–2005 CBR CDR TFR

Argentina Brazil Iran Malaysia Mexico Paraguay Thailand India Turkey Uruguay

25.4 44.2 50.7 42.7 48.3 44.2 42.5 43.6 51.2 21.2

23.2 42.3 46.4 39.5 44.6 41.2 42.2 41.5 44.1 21.9

22.2 26.4 38.2 28.7 29.8 35.0 20.5 33.0 28.0 18.2

19.2 19.8 17.9 19.7 23.0 25.1 13.5 25.3 25.0 15.9

9.1 15.6 26.8 14.4 16.7 8.8 15.5 26.8 24.5 10.5

3.2 6.2 6.9 6.2 6.8 6.5 6.1 5.9 6.6 2.7

8.8 12.6 20.3 9.5 11.5 7.9 12.3 21.1 18.8 9.5

3.1 6.2 6.9 6.0 6.8 6.5 6.1 5.9 6.1 2.9

23.4 33.9 41.3 31.4 43.7 35.6 34.7 38.4 39.7 21.1

9.0 9.5 14.3 6.7 9.2 7.0 9.2 16.1 14.1 10.0

3.2 4.7 6.2 4.6 6.7 5.4 5.1 5.4 5.3 3.0

8.4 7.5 9.1 5.0 5.7 6.6 5.6 11.6 8.8 9.9

Source: UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York).

3.1 3.1 5.6 3.6 3.8 4.8 2.3 4.7 3.4 2.5

7.8 5.9 5.1 4.4 4.6 5.6 7.0 8.4 6.1 9.4

2.5 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.6 3.2 1.6 3.1 2.4 2.2

CBR

2010–2015 CDR TFR

17.8 15.1 18.1 16.9 19.3 21.7 11.2 20.4 17.3 14.4

7.6 6.1 4.7 4.8 4.8 5.6 7.7 7.4 5.7 9.3

2.4 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.6 1.5 2.5 2.1 2.0

Global Demographic History

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Developing Countries, 1950–2015

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32

Table 1.9

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Global Demographic History Table 1.10

| 33

Total Population in some Developing Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

Year Country

1950

Argentina Brazil Iran Malaysia Mexico Paraguay Thailand Turkey Uruguay

17.2 54.0 17.1 6.1 28.0 1.5 20.7 21.2 2.2

1980

2000

28.2 121.3 38.3 13.9 69.3 3.2 46.5 44.4 2.9

2015

36.8 167.7 63.7 23.5 100.6 5.4 61.8 67.4 3.3

43.4 207.8 79.1 30.3 127.0 6.6 68.0 78.7 3.4

2030 49.4 228.7 88.5 36.1 148.1 7.8 68.3 87.7 3.6

Sources: UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York), pp. 24–27, table S.2; UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); US Census Bureau, International Database. Millions 250

200

150

100

50

0

Argentina

Brazil

Iran 1950

Figure 1.11

Malaysia 2000

Mexico 2015

Thailand

Turkey

2030

Total Population in some Developing Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

million in 2015 to 228.7 million in 2030, despite the fact that its TFR only averaged 1.8 during the first half of the 2010s. Even the population of Thailand with an average TFR of 1.5 in the first half of the 2010s, is expected to reach 68.3 million in 2030, a little bit higher than in 2015 (see Table 1.10). After 2030, if the TFRs of these countries will not

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Global Demographic History

increase to above the replacement-level, and unless there is substantial immigration of young people, the population of these countries will gradually start to decline.

3.6. The “Dying Continent”: The Sub-Saharan African Countries Among the various global demographic regimes, the smallest demographic changes since the mid-twentieth century have occurred in the Sub-Saharan African countries. As one can see in Table 1.11, the CBRs of these countries have remained almost without change since the early 1950s. In Angola for example, the CBR during the 2010–2015 period averaged 46.2, compared to 52.9 in the 1985–1990 period and 56.1 during the 1950–1955 period. This means that during 60 years, Angola’s CBRs only declined by less than 18%! In Mali and Nigeria as well, there was only a minor change in the TFR from the 1950s and until the present day. In some of the Sub-Saharan African countries, however, there was quite a substantial decline in the fertility rates. The greatest success story in fertility decline is that of Rwanda where the CBR declined from 53.8 on average during the 1950–1955 period to 39.3 during 2000–2005 and 32.9 during the first half of the 2010s. But even in Rwanda, which is considered a unique case due to its successful implementation of an effective anti-nalalist policy,92 the fertility rate remained very high by any international comparison. Also in Kenya and Liberia there was some decline in the TFR to less than 5. In the other Sub-Saharan African countries, the TFR, even in the first half of the 2010s, remained above 5 and in some, such as in Somalia, Mali and Angola, they were even higher than 6 — no doubt, the highest worldwide. The main reason for the current high fertility rates in all of the Sub-Saharan African countries is the continuation of extremely high death rates, particularly among infants and children.93 Consequently, the life expectancy of these countries is also the lowest worldwide: In 2013, the life expectancy at birth was 50.2 years (average females and males) in the Central African Republic, 51.9 years in Angola and 53.0 in Botswana.94 Thus, despite their extremely young age pyramid, the CDRs of these countries has remained very high, in most cases over 10 (see Table 1.11).

Table 1.11 Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2015 Year Country

1950–1955 CBR CDR TFR

1970–1975 2000–2005 2010–2015 CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR CBR CDR TFR

Angola Kenya Liberia Mali Nigeria Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Uganda

56.1 51.2 47.0 51.7 46.1 53.8 46.3 48.9 51.3

53.0 50.8 49.2 50.4 46.8 51.1 46.0 46.0 48.7

36.4 23.6 30.5 39.2 29.6 25.0 35.5 29.8 24.5

7.3 7.5 6.3 7.0 6.4 8.0 6.0 7.3 6.9

26.5 14.4 23.2 30.1 21.8 20.3 26.9 22.2 16.7

7.4 8.0 6.8 7.2 6.6 8.3 6.1 7.1 7.1

50.3 38.7 41.6 48.4 42.8 39.3 43.8 47.4 47.8

17.7 13.0 13.9 16.6 17.0 14.4 21.5 15.0 14.7

6.8 5.0 5.7 6.9 6.1 5.4 6.1 7.4 6.8

46.2 35.4 35.7 44.4 40.3 32.9 36.9 43.9 43.7

14.2 8.7 9.0 11.0 13.3 7.5 14.1 12.4 10.2

6.2 4.4 4.5 6.4 5.7 4.1 4.8 6.6 5.9

Sources: UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various years (New York).

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The main reason for both high CBRs and CDRs in the sub-Saharan African countries is that basically these countries are “failed states” (see Box 1.3). Consequently, the vast majority of the Sub-Saharan African countries rank at the bottom of the HDI (see Box 1.4).95 The extremely poor socioeconomic situation also led to the failure of most of the family planning programs implemented in these countries.96 Thus, by 2010, only 18% of the married women in the Sub-Saharan African countries used any contraceptives.97 In Somalia and Chad the contraceptive use rate among married women in 2008 was less than 2% and 5% in Angola and Niger!98 Consequently, by the first half of the 2010s, the NIR in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries was above 3%. The extremely high NIR led to the most rapid population growth worldwide during the past two generations, despite massive emigration. Thus for example, the Nigerian population increased from 38 million in 1950 to 81 million in 1980 and reached more than 182 million in 2015. Angola’s population increased from 4.4 million in 1950 to 25 million in 2015 (see Table 1.12). Overall, the future of these countries is unclear mainly due to two reasons: The first is that because of their current wide age pyramid, even if they succeed, in one way or another, to bring their very high fertility rates close to the replacement-level, their population growth rates will continue to be very elevated, at least for the coming four decades, because of the population momentum phenomenon. Angola’s population, for example, will reach almost 40 million in 2030 compared to 25.0 million in 2015. Kenya’s population is projected to amount 65.4 million in 2030 compared to 46.1 million in 2015. Can these countries support such numbers? They are failing to support them now with a much smaller population; how will they manage to support a much higher population? The second reason is the wide-scale “brain drain” which has “emptied” these countries of the most qualified young 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Angola

Kenya

Liberia

1950_1955

Figure 1.12

Mali

1970_1975

Nigeria

Rwanda

2000_2005

Sierra Leone

Somalia

2010_2015

Total Fertility Rate in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2015

Uganda

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|

Global Demographic History

Box 1.3 “Failed State” A failed state is a state where the government can no longer deliver the most essential political goods and public services to its citizens, particularly in the areas of “law and order,” public sanitation, education and healthcare services. In most cases, a country becomes a failed state due to civil war, which leads to humanitarian disaster. An extreme case of a failed state is a collapsed state, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia which lack any central regime. On the definition of failed stated, see: Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 1–25.

Box 1.4 The Human Development Index (HDI) The HDI is an integrated statistical index which includes many parameters in three categories: health (mainly life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates) education (mainly literacy rates and the enrollment ratio in the various educational levels) and per capita income (in PPP terms). It aims at ranking countries worldwide according to their socioeconomic situation and the quality of life of their citizens. The HDI makes it possible to trace changes in the socioeconomic development level over time and to compare the socioeconomic development between the various countries worldwide. The index was established by the UN in 1990. See: Elizabeth A. Stanton, The Human Development Index: A History, PERI Working Papers Series, No. 127 (Amherst, MA: February 2007).

Table 1.12

Total Population in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

Year Country

1950

1980

Angola Congo Kenya Liberia Mali Nigeria Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Uganda Zambia

4.4 0.8 6.1 0.9 4.7 37.9 2.2 1.9 2.3 5.2 2.1

7.7 1.5 16.7 1.8 7.0 80.6 5.2 3.3 4.6 13.2 5.8

2015 25.0 4.6 46.1 4.5 17.6 182.2 11.6 6.5 10.8 39.0 16.2

2030 39.4 6.8 65.4 6.4 27.4 262.6 15.8 8.6 16.5 61.9 25.3

Sources: UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York).

people. Hence, while the traditional colonialism emptied these countries of their most lucrative natural resources, the post-colonialism is emptying them of their most talented, trained and qualified young. These countries are no doubt “the backyard” of the world.

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Global Demographic History

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Millions 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Angola

Kenya

Mali 1950

Figure 1.13

1980

Rwanda 2015

Somalia

Uganda

Zambia

2030

Total Population in some Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1950–2030 (millions)

3.7. The Arabian Gulf Oil States 99 In this group of countries, which includes the GCC countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE (United Arab Emirates), Bahrain and Qatar, there exists a unique demographic pattern since the “oil boom” of 1973 — extremely high fertility rates and extremely low death rates. This pattern is a consequence of their exceptional socioeconomic-political pattern of “pure rentier states.” Thus, while in the SubSaharan African countries the high fertility rates are a direct result of their poor socioeconomic situation, in the Arabian Gulf oil economies, the high fertility rates is a direct result of their rentier nature (see Chapter 5).

4

Summary and Conclusions: A New Demographic Transition?

In retrospect, the worldwide NIR, which averaged 1.7% during the 1950s, skyrocketed to more than 2% in the second half of the 1960s, at the peak of the second stage of the Demographic Transition in many developing countries worldwide, including all of the Arab countries. The meaning of an annual 2% growth rate is so great that “if the human race had begun with a single couple at the time of Christ and had grown steadily at 2% per year since then, there would now be 20 million people for every person alive on the earth today.”100 Since the early 1970s, however, the decline in worldwide CBRs has been higher than the decline in the CDRs, leading to a consistent decline in worldwide NIR. During the 1970s, the worldwide NIR declined back to 1.7%, and further declined to 1.4% during the 1990s, and 1.2% in 2000 (a CBR of 21 and a CDR of 9101). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the vast majority of countries worldwide were still at the beginning of the third stage of the Demographic Transition, that

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is, their CBRs, albeit considerably lower than those in the 1970s and the 1980s, were still far above the CDRs. Consequently, their NIRs were higher than 1.5% annually. During the 2010s, the process of fertility decline in the developing countries largely accelerated, with the exception of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Overall, by the mid-2010s, the worldwide TFR averaged 2.5102 — lower than the rate which prevailed in the more developed economies in the 1950s and the 1960s. Currently, more than 90% of the global population lives in countries in which the TFR is either below the replacement-level or close to that level, while only 8% of the global population lives in countries which still have a high TFR of above 4, mainly in the Sub-Saharan African countries.103 Overall, by mid-2015, the worldwide population numbered 7.3 billion and it is projected to reach 8.0 in 2025 and 9.4 billion in 2050 (see Table 1.1). Thus, despite the substantial fertility decline in the vast majority of the countries worldwide, the global population will continue to growth quite rapidly during the next four decades at least. Can the Demographic Transition theory explain the ongoing widening gap in the fertility rates between the various groups of countries worldwide? The basic assumption of the Demographic Transition theory is the existence of a relationship between births and deaths in the form that births rates declined as an outcome of the decline in the death rates. This was indeed the case in all countries globally, but only until the third stage of the theory. In the fourth stage, however, the reduction of the fertility rates to much below the replacement level, despite the various pro-natalist measures, could not be explained any longer by changes in the death rates or the socioeconomic situation. It should be emphasized, however, that the current extremely low fertility rate in the ethnically homogeneous developed countries is a unique phenomenon. This uniqueness is not because of the fertility decline itself; during the Great Depression in the 1930s, the fertility rates in Europe and North America also radically declined, but it surged again during the two decades following the end of World War II. This, however, is not the case in the ethnically homogeneous developed countries. The current low fertility rate has stretched for four decades and there is no sign that it is going to end soon. Moreover, the current low fertility rates of these countries are not changing in line with the socioeconomic situation or governmental natalist policies. Thus for example, in Germany, despite the extreme pro-natalist measures taken by the government, the TFR during the past decade stabilized at 1.4. The only reason that Germany’s TFR is not even below 1.4 is the much higher fertility rates of the immigrant women. Thus, while it is obvious that the fertility rates in the poorest countries worldwide remain high even today given the extremely high death rates, what can explain the prolonged extremely low fertility rates in all of the ethnically homogeneous developed countries since the 1980s? It seems that the answer to this crucial question lies in the connection not between birth and death rates, but rather between fertility patterns and the economic survival of the individual. In pre-industrial societies, it was crucial for the individual to be a part of a large group of people for basic economic survival. This is because a single person or even a small number of people could neither protect themselves physically nor produce the foods they needed. Hence, a large number of people was needed for the basic survival of each of the individuals of the group. In light of the extremely high death rates, the highest possible number of births was needed. In other words, the

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higher the number of people in the group, the better the economic and security situation of each of the individuals in the group. The Industrial Revolution and the establishment of the “modern state” allowed for the survival of individuals in much smaller groups of people, namely, “the nuclear family.” This was because production moved from a common agricultural cultivation to working, in most cases, as salaried employees in industrial factories in the urban centers. However, since the salaries were extremely low and with the absence of any social protection of the state, all the members of the nuclear family were forced to work. Since children were working from very young age, the actual meaning of a large number of children meant a higher per capita income of each of the members in the nuclear family. This mode of family income structure changed only in the 1950s and 1960s with the establishment of the “welfare state.” Since that time, children were transformed from an economic asset to an economic burden. From that time on, having children has become an option rather than an essential need. Naturally, when something is transformed from a basic need to an economic burden, couples have fewer children. In this respect, it should be noted that whatever the governmental pro-natalist measures may be, many women still choose to have less children in order to achieve self-fulfillment in the labor market. This is the core reason for the prolonged low fertility rates in the developed states and for this reason these low fertility rates will continue to persist in the foreseeable future as well, regardless of governmental pro-natalist measures. This is the core of the “catch 22” of all of the ethnically homogeneous developed countries. They become developed due to women’s liberation, but the “price” is fertility decline which transform these countries into “migration dependent” ones. Thus, within a short period of time, these countries will change from “ethnically homogeneous developed states” into “pure immigration countries,” similar to the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The reverse side of the ethnically homogeneous developed states are the SubSaharan African countries which actually many of them are no longer function as “states” due to their political disorder. One of the major outcomes of this political disorder is huge emigration. Hence, while during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries Western European colonization changed Africa forever, in the twenty-first century, Africa changed the Western Europe countries forever. Where are the Arab societies situated in this complicated global demographic structure?

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

Numbers are not neutral: they are framed and defined by their creators, distorted and redefined by those responsible for their collection and reconstituted and reordered by those who select, display, use and analyze them for their purpose. Numbers are a powerful tool in the hands of those who decide to gather them and to use them. Pat Hudson, 20001

1

A Historic Overview of Demographic Records in the Arab Region

The extent and quality of statistical data are major indicators of the degree of the central authority’s control over the population and the territory. Generally, the more extensive and accurate the socioeconomic statistical data, the better the regime’s control. Population censuses and registration of births, deaths, marriages, and divorces, as well as changes in place of residence — all of which constitute the most important sources for comprehensive demographic research — have had a very short history in the Arab region. Thus, the improvement in the overall socioeconomic data, particularly the demographic data of the Arab countries since the 1950s, has occurred along with the increase in control of the central authorities over their populations and territories. However, in many cases, governments try to “hide” sensitive demographic facts and thus either do not collect or do not publish specific data. Hence, while until the 1950s the lack of demographic data in the Arab region was a result of the inability of the central regime to collect it, since then, the lack of demographic data has been a result of the unwillingness of the regime to collect or publish politically sensitive demographic data, in most cases, data related to the ethno-religious composition of the population. The Arab Spring, however, had a reverse effect on the collection of socio-demographic data in many of the Arab countries. The deterioration of the quantity and quality of the sociodemographic data, it should be emphasized, has occurred not only in the countries where regimes collapsed or are trapped in prolonged civil wars, as is

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

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currently the case in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq, but also in many other Arab countries where “old regimes” have survived.

1.1

Demographic Data during the Ottoman Period

Modern censuses were carried out only in two Arab regions prior to World War I — in Egypt, since 1882, colonized by Britain at the time, and in Algeria, since 1886, which was then colonized by the French.2 Overall, prior to World War I, population censuses were implemented only in places that were controlled directly, either by the French or by the British. This was because these censuses served the interests of the colonial states (for tax collecting, to evaluate the local workforce, to evaluate the scale of local markets for selling consumer products, etc.). It should be noted, however, that these censuses had a variety of shortcomings; the most crucial was the under-enumeration of the nomadic and semi-nomadic populations as well as the young children, primarily young girls. Together with age misreporting, this produced noticeable distortions in the apparent age-sex distribution of the population.3 In the rest of the Arab regions which were under the Ottoman rule, in place of population censuses, there were only general population estimates which were based on partial censuses or general enumerations that were conducted by the local Ottoman authorities. Generally, the Ottomans never took a real interest in counting the whole populations under their rule. Moreover, the flimsy rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab provinces until the mid-nineteenth century was not conducive to comprehensive population registration. Given that the Ottoman regime provided almost no social services to its subjects and tax collection was based on the Iltizam system,4 there was no need for accurate demographic data. Consequently, only very limited demographic data of the Arab regions that were ruled by the Ottomans are available. Shaw noted that: “No problem has perplexed students of modern Ottoman history more than that of determining the state of the empire’s population during its last century.”5 The only sources regarding the scope of the population in many Ottoman regions during the early nineteenth century are the sporadic estimates of European travelers, such as Volney, Seetzen and Burckhardt,6 whose figures were, naturally, based on observation, often exaggerated or inconsistent.7 Since the mid-nineteenth century, as part of the reform movement (Tanzimat) that took place in the Ottoman Empire, the demographic data also improved accordingly. A census was carried out during the years 1831–1838 by Sultan Mahmud II as part of his efforts to create a new army and bureaucracy. Only men were included in the census because only they served in the army and paid taxes. Although Christians and Jews did not serve in the Ottoman army at that time, they were also recorded, as they were subject to a head tax (harac). Females, however, were not recorded in this census at all.8 Knowledge of the size and changes in the spatial distribution of the population throughout the Empire became much more important during the latter part of the nineteenth century. This was mainly because of administrative factors, such as roads, railways, and a variety of professional schools which were planned in accordance with the spatial distribution of the population.9 As the Ottoman control over the provinces improved during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the population records improved accordingly.

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| 1.2

Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

Demographic Data during the Mandatory Period

Since the beginning of the Mandatory period following World War I, there has been a steady improvement in the socioeconomic statistical database, including the demographic data, in all of the Arab countries. The French authorities implemented population censuses in Syria during 1921–1922 and in Lebanon in 1932. In North Africa, they implemented a population census in 1931 in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and in 1936 a second round of censuses in Algeria and Morocco. In Libya, the first census was carried out in 1931.10 The British mandatory authorities conducted population censuses in Palestine in 1922 and again in 1931. The censuses that were carried out during the mandatory period, however, suffered from many limitations and were basically no more than counting the population in the new states which were created in the Arab region (see below). However, following the implementation of these censuses, for the first time ever, the most basic demographic data of the Arab regions were available, namely, the number of the population in each country.

1.3

Demographic Data following Independence

A further improvement of the demographic records on the Arab countries occurred following independence. The large-scale socioeconomic development plans of the 1960s as well as the changing economic policy from capitalism which ruled during the mandatory period to socialism-étatism required accurate socio-demographic data, particularly with regard to age and sex composition, educational level and the spatial distribution of the population, due to the wide variety of public services which the new regimes provided. Therefore, as one can see in Table 2.1, almost all of the Arab countries conducted at least one population censuses during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The most dramatic improvement in the demographic data of the Arab countries occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of both the implementation of the socioeconomic development plans and the steady rise in awareness of many Arab governments regarding the “demographic subject.” Thus, the population censuses conducted during the 1960s and 1970s also included information on fertility patterns, education, occupation and many other socioeconomic characteristics that had been missing from the previous censuses. The results of these censuses provided the database needed for the earlier demographic research on the Arab countries. In Jordan, for example, although the first census was carried out in 1952,11 the 1961 census is considered the first comprehensive census in line with the modern type of census. During the 1980s, however, but more so since the early 1990s, the acceleration of the devastating results of the rapid population growth (see Chapter 4) led many Arab governments to adopt national family planning programs (see Chapter 6). The precondition for implementing these programs was detailed fertility data, mainly according to women’s age, educational level, employment status, median age of first marriage, family income, and fertility differences between rural and urban dwellers. In addition to the censuses, some of the Arab countries implemented specific demographic surveys during the 1970s and early 1980s, such as the 1978 World Fertility Survey, which among the Arab countries included Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Syria and the Republic of Yemen (North Yemen). Other data were obtained from demographic and health surveys which were implemented under the auspices of the

Population Censuses in the Arab Countries, 1940–2015 1940–1949

1950–1959

1960–1969

1970–1979

1980–1989

1990–2000

2001–2009

Algeria

31.10.1948

31.10.1954

11.2.1977

20.3.1987

25.6.1998

16.4.2008

Egypt

26.3.1947

22.11.1976

17.11.1986

18.11.1996

21.11.2006

Libya Morocco Sudan

1.2.1947

1.2.1960 4.4.1966 20.9.1960 30.5.1966(a) 31.7.1964 18.6.1960

31.7.1973 20.7.1971 3.4.1973

31.7.1984 3/21.9.1982 1.2.1983

11.8.1995 2.9.1994 15.4.1993

15.4.2006 1.9.2004

1.9.2014

Tunisia Bahrain

11.1.1946 22.1.1941

3.5.1966 13.2.1965

8.5.1975 3.4.1971

30.3.1984 5.4.1981

20.4.1994 16.11.1991

28.4.2004 7.4.2001

23.4.2014 27.4.2010

Iraq Jordan Kuwait

19.10.1947

14.10.1965 18.11.1961 20.5.1961 25.4.1965

17.10.1987

16.10.1997 15.12.1994

2.10.2004

20.4.1985

20.4.1995

20.4.2005

20.4.2011

Lebanon Oman Qatar

1932

17.10.1977 10.11.1979 19.4.1970 21.4.1975 15.11.1970(a) 4.5.1970

16.3.1986

1.12.1993 1.3.1997

7.12.2003 16.3.2004

27.9.1992 3/9.9.1994 17.12.1995

15.9.2004 22.9.2004 5.12.2005

12.10.2010 21.4.2010 21.4.2015 28.4.2010

16.12.1994(b)

16.12.2004

Saudi Arabia Syria UAE

March 1947

31.7.1954 15.4.1951 1.7.1955 2.9.1956 1.2.1956 3.3.1950 2.5.1959 12.10.1957 8.9.1952 28.2.1957

20.9.1960 15.3.1968

9.9.1974 22.9.1970 31.12.1975

3.9.1981 15.12.1980 17.12.1985

Yemen (United)

2010–2015

17.12.2014

(a) Sample Census. (b) North and South Yemen were united into one country in May 1990.

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Sources: The US, Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau [http:/www.census.gov]; GeoHive [http://geohive.com]; UN, Population Division, Operational Aspects of Census Taking in the ESCWA Region: Results of ESCWA Questionnaire, by Ahmed Hussein (New York, August 12, 2005); Eliance Domschke and Doreen S. Goyer, The Handbook of National Population Censuses: Africa and Asia (New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1986); UN, Statistics Division, “Population and Housing Censuses,” New York, October 5, 2005; UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010 World Population and Housing Census Programme [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/censusdates.htm];Henry Joachim Dubester, Population Censuses and Other Official Demographic Statistics of Africa (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1950).

Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

Period Country

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Table 2.1

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Box 2.1 Population Census A population census is an official, in most cases periodic, full enumeration of the population in a given territory, usually a state. Full cooperation is forced upon the public by law. This is because the data collected in the census are crucial for the proper running of the state. The word census has its origins in ancient Rome, coming from the Latin word censere, meaning “to assess” or “to estimate.” The first known population census was taken by the Babylonians in 3800 BC. In 2500 BC, Egypt conducted a census in order to assess the workforce available for building the Pyramids. From a very early period, China placed great importance on carrying out a population census. The Roman census, which took place every five years, was the most developed of any recorded census in the Ancient World and provided a register of citizens and their property. Censuses and the recording of births and deaths were carried out in some of the city-states of Renaissance Italy. The first modern population censuses were in Quebec (Canada) which held 15 censuses during the 1665–1754 period. In Europe, systematic records of population began in the early eighteenth century. In 1719, Frederick William I of Prussia commenced half-yearly counts of the population. In the US, the first census was taken in 1790. Both England and France started conducting population censuses in 1801, and Norway censuses began in 1815. In 1837, the registration of births and deaths became compulsory in England and Wales. Regular censuses began in Belgium in 1829, in the Netherlands in 1839, and in Switzerland in 1850. The first panGermanic census was held in 1852. Source: Michael Anderson, Population Change in North-Western Europe, 1750–1850 (London: Macmillan Education, 1988).

Arab League. The most prominent of these were: the Pan-Arab Child Health Survey initiated during the late 1980s; the Pan-Arab Project for Family Health (al-Mashru‘ al‘Arabi li-Sihat al-Usra) carried out during the early 2000s in seven member states of the Arab League, namely, Algeria, Djibouti, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen;12 or within the framework of the GCC organization, such as the Family Health Survey which was conducted in the mid-1990s (see below).

2

The Division of the Arab States according to the Quality of the Demographic Records

Despite the considerable improvement in the overall demographic database of the vast majority of the Arab countries, particularly since the 1980s, a variety of basic demographic data are still absent. Until the start of the Arab Spring, this absence was not a result of the inability of the authorities to collect the data (as was the case during the Ottoman and the Mandatory periods), but rather purely due to political calculations. Overall, until the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Arab countries could be divided into several categories according to the availability of their demographic records:

2.1 Countries that Publish Minimum Data on the Ethno-Religious Composition These countries are highly homogeneous from the ethno-religious viewpoint. Thus, although the ethno-religious composition of their population is not politically sensi-

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tive, they published neither the ethno-religion composition of their population on a regular basis nor the basic demographic characteristics according to religious (fertility rates, marriage and divorce data and etc.). This category includes: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. In the following section the history of the demographic data of Egypt and Jordan will be examined. Egypt Egypt had one of the longest history of a demographic record worldwide, stretching back thousands of years. The official Egyptian argument is that Egypt’s earliest census dates back to 3340 BC.13 In modern times, Egypt’s first census was conducted during the French occupation in 1800. Regular censuses started in 1882, following the British occupation of Egypt. The next census was carried out in 1897. During the twentieth century, Egypt conducted ten censuses — more than any other Arab country — in 1907, 1917, 1927, 1937, 1947, 1960, 1966, 1976, 1987, 1996. Egypt’s latest census was carried out in December 2006 (see Table 2.1). In addition to the censuses, the second important source for Egypt’s demographic database is the ten national-level Demographic and Health Surveys. The first survey was the 1980 Egypt Fertility Survey (1980–EFS); the second was the 1984 Egypt Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (1984–ECPS). This was followed by the 1988 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (1988–EDHS) after which there was the 1991 Maternal and Child Health Survey (1991–EMCHS). The next seven surveys were the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) of 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2005 and the latest was in 2014.14 The primary aim of these surveys was to gather and analyze data on the key demographic and health indicators of Egypt’s population. As for its ethnic composition, Egypt is the most homogeneous of the Arab countries, as Arabs constitute almost 100% of its entire population. The data on the religious composition of the Egyptian population are collected in both the population censuses and the demographic surveys.15 However, despite the availability of the data, CAPMAS publishes neither the religious composition of the Egyptian population on a regular basis nor the basic vital statistics of the population according to religion.16 Thus, it is impossible to examine the fertility rates or the marriage and divorce patterns of the Christians in Egypt. All we have is the division of the total population according to religion in each of the censuses. The database, of course, exists but the authorities do not publish it. Jordan The 1952 housing census was the first full enumeration of the Jordanian population following independence (1946). However, since it was a housing rather than a full population census, it only ascertained the total number of the Jordanian population according to sex and place of residence with no other data. Consequently, its overall usefulness for comprehensive demographic research is very limited. The first comprehensive population census in Jordan was carried out in November 1961. The coverage of the census was considered reasonably complete. The reported NIR of approximately 3% was also reasonable and was consistent with the demographic data of other sources, official and unofficial alike.17 The second population census in Jordan was conducted in November 1979 in order to establish a comprehensive demographic database for purposes of formulating the Kingdom’s socioeconomic development plans. It was also the first census following the June 1967 War in which Jordan lost the West Bank and East/Arab Jerusalem and absorbed

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approximately 380,000 Palestinian refugees following their displacement from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.18 The third census in Jordan was carried out in December 1994; and the latest census was conducted in October 2004. The coverage rate of this census was 96.4%.19 In addition to the population censuses, the demographic and health surveys constitute another important source for Jordanian demographic research: The 1972 National Fertility Survey (1972–NFS); 1976 Jordan Fertility Survey (1976–JFS); 1981 Jordan Demographic Survey (1981–JDS); 1983 Jordan Fertility and Family Health Survey (1983–JFFHS); and 1985 Jordan Husbands’ Fertility Survey (1985–JHFS). The next four surveys were the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS) of 1990, 1997, 2002 and the latest was in 2012. From a religious viewpoint, Jordan is almost entirely homogenous with Arab Sunni-Muslims constituting approximately 93% of all its citizens. The largest minority group is that of the Christians, which constituted 2.3% of the total Jordanian population in 2015.20 However, despite the fact that the Christians constitute only a tiny percentage of the Jordanian citizens, and despite the fact that since 1961 the census questionnaire has included a question on religion, the Hashemite regime still does not publish the distribution of the Jordanian citizens according to religion on a regularly basis.21 Thus, although the data on the religious composition of the Jordanian population is not politically sensitive, the Jordanian authorities still do not publish it. From an ethnic viewpoint, there are two major minorities in Jordan. One is the Circassians, who were deliberately planted in the area of current Jordan by the Ottomans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.22 Looking through the various sources from recent years, one can find numerous estimates regarding the number of the Circassians in Jordan, running from a low estimate of 20,000 to a high of 100,000.23 The second important ethnic minority in the Kingdom is the Shishanis, most of whom having arrived in Jordan during and following World War I. Their number was estimated at 2,000–4,000 in the early 1990s.24 The only “demographically sensitive” issue in Jordan is the division between “Jordanians” and “Palestinians.” Generally speaking, the fear of the Hashemite regime in this respect was that if the regime officially admits that the majority of Jordanian citizens are of Palestinian origin, its legitimacy would be harmed. Thus, the only official demographic data regarding the Palestinians in Jordan is the number of Palestinians living in the refugee camps and the total number of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan. Both of these numbers are published on a regular basis by UNRWA and not by the Jordanian authorities themselves. Hence, the only methodological possibility of estimating the percentage of “Jordanians,” that is, those who were living on the East Bank of the Jordan River before the 1948 War and their offspring within the total number of Jordanian citizens, is to add the NIRs to the number of the East Bank population before 1948, assuming a zero net migration balance. This is because there are neither official nor unofficial figures regarding the scale of Jordanian citizens who emigrated from the Kingdom according to their “origin.” The only figure on the East Bank population prior to the 1948 War is recorded by the British — 433,659 in 1946.25 Assuming an NIR of 3% on an annual average and zero net migration balance since 1948, by 2013, the number of “original Jordanians” in Jordan could not be more than 3 million. Taking into consideration that in mid-2013, Jordanian citizens numbered 6.53 million,26 this means that the “original Jordanians” and their offspring represented some 45%–46% of the total Jordanian citizens.

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Following the collapse of Saddam Husayn’s regime in Iraq in 2003, but more so following the beginning of the Syrian civil war in mid-2011, the most unknown demographic data in Jordan is the number of those who are living in the Kingdom who are neither Jordanian citizens nor Palestinian refugees or foreign workers. This is not only due the constant inflow of refugees (see below), but also because the Iraqis in Jordan are not considered “refugees” but rather “guests.”27 Consequently, they are neither registered as refugees nor as foreign workers and certainly not as Jordanian citizens. In other words, they have lived in Jordan for many years but without any official documentation.28

2.2 Countries with Nothing to Hide, but Even So, Totally Disregard the Religious Composition While the countries in the first category gather and publish at least some data on the religious composition of their citizenry population, the countries in this category totally disregard it, although the religious composition of their citizens is not politically sensitive. The countries in this category include: Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. Paradoxically, these countries publish more ethno-religious data of their foreign population than they do on their citizenry. Kuwait Among the GCC countries, Kuwait has the longest history of population censuses, after Bahrain. The first census was carried out in 1957 and was followed by nine others, the latest one implemented in April 2011.29 Registration of births and deaths has been required in Kuwait since 1952. Although six health bureaus were subsequently established, this did not initially result in accurate registration because of the many births that did not take place in public hospitals, especially among desert dwellers.30 By 1970, however, it seems that birth registration had become virtually universal and death registration almost complete as well.31 The major source for fertility patterns among the indigenous Kuwaiti population during the 1980s is the 1987 Kuwait Child Health Survey (1987–KCHS). The survey provides data on the levels, trends and differentials of fertility and child mortality. In 1996, Kuwait, like the other GCC countries, conducted a Family Health Survey that provides data on a wide variety of demographic issues, including fertility, marriage patterns and contraceptive prevalence rates among married indigenous Kuwaiti women. Oman Oman has the shortest history of population censuses and demographic surveys, not only among the GCC countries, but among all the Arab countries. As a result of the severe limitations on the entrance of foreigners into the country, combined with the absence of accurate and updated statistical data, very little was known about Oman’s socioeconomic situation until the 1970s. Eickelman noted that: “Oman was almost as isolated as Tibet until a British-supported palace coup in 1970 replaced the Sultan with his son, the present ruler, Qabus bin Sa‘id.”32 The only source regarding the Omani demographic composition during the 1970s is the 1975 household survey, which was conducted in five towns and later extended to another six. The topics covered by this survey included: name, sex, age, place of birth, age at first marriage,

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number of children, educational level, relationship with the head of the household, nationality and basic economic information.33 From the late 1970s onward, however, the demographic data on Oman steadily improved. The improvement of the socioeconomic data collection in Oman was a direct outcome of the massive socioeconomic development plans, starting with the First Five-Year Development Plan, 1976–1980. More accurate socioeconomic data, including demographic data, were also required for attracting foreign investments which, from the early 1970s, were considered crucial due to the Sultanate’s relatively low oil reserves.34 However, despite the improvement in socioeconomic data collection, Oman only held its first population census in December 1993. The second Sultanate’s population census was conducted a decade later, in December 2003 and the most recent one in October 2010. The second significant source of Oman’s demography is the two demographic surveys which provide data on fertility patterns and contraceptive prevalence rates: the 1989 Oman Child Health Survey (1989–OCHS) and the 1995 Oman Family Health Survey (1995–OFHS). The third major demographic source for Oman is the Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plans, covering the 1976–1980 period, until the present plan, covering the years 2016–2020. These plans include data and official estimates regarding the labor force structure, both national and foreign. In addition, all of the development plans contain detailed data regarding educational services, including the number of students and their distribution according to age and sex at each educational level. Such information is important for demographic research in any country, but particularly in a country like Oman which lacked many of the basic demographic statistics until the first census was conducted. Following the 1993 population census, the Omani demographic database became the most diverse, updated and accurate among all of the GCC countries. Thus, Oman is currently the only GCC country publishing data on an annual basis regarding CBR, CDR, TFR and IMR of the Omani indigenous population,35 as well as the number of foreign workers and their breakdown according to nationality.36 However, in Oman as well, the ethno-religious composition of the indigenous population remains unknown, as the authorities have not included it in the three censuses that were carried out thus far. The UAE The first census in the Emirates which comprise the UAE was conducted during March-April 1968, when they were still under British control.37 This census was “little more than a brief breakdown of the population by age, sex, religion, occupation, literacy, and level of education.”38 However, like Qatar, the UAE authorities also combined nationals and foreigners in their published demographic data. Thus, as one can see in Chart 2.1, in the first Statistical Handbook of the UAE, published in 1973, the only demographic information from the 1968 census was the total population of each emirate, with a breakdown of males and females, but not according to nationality. The second census of the UAE was carried out in 1975. However, only very limited data from the census was released by the authorities. Although this was more detailed and comprehensive than the 1968 census, the most important demographic data, namely, the distribution of the population according to nationality, had not been released. Consequently, the most standard demographic indicators, mainly CBR, CDR, TFR, and infant and child mortality rates, were of little value as they combined

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States Chart 2.1 Emirate

The 1968 Census of the Seven Emirates which Comprise the UAE. Population. 1968 Census and estimated total for 1973. Males

Females

Total

35,620 34,863 17,660 13,249 5,220 2,212 1,982

58,971 46,375 31,668 24,387 9,735 4,246 3,744

1,100

23,351 11,512 14,008 11,138 4,515 2,034 1,762 _

Total 1968 Census

111,906

68,320

180,226

1973 Estimated Total

200,000

120,000

320,000

Dubai Abu Dhabi Sharjah Ras al Khaimah Fujairah Ajman Um al Quaiwain Trucial Oman Scouts

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1,100

Source: UAE, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Handbook-1973 (Abu Dhabi, 1973), p. 2, table 2.

both nationals and foreigners together.39 Birks and Sinclair noted that: “A very limited amount of data has been released on the composition of the population [of the UAE] in 1975. We know that in 1978 there were about 115,000 nationals.”40 Therefore, in the mid-1970s, it was impossible to categorize the UAE indigenous population even according the most basic demographic indicators.41 During the 1980s, two censuses were carried out in the UAE, the first in 1980 and the second in 1985. The fifth census was conducted in 1995. The latest census was carried out in 2005. The uniqueness of the 2005 census was that for the first time the authorities published the census data with the breakdown of the population according to nationality in many of the basic demographic indicators.42 In April 2010, another federal census was planned, but it was not implemented. Only Abu Dhabi and Fujairah carried out censuses in 2011.43 Other important sources for demographic research in the UAE are the two health surveys: the Child Health Survey and the 1995 UAE Family Health Survey. Both of them collected baseline data on major social and demographic indicators. However, despite the availability of the demographic data, and despite the fact that the religious composition of the national population in each of the above-mentioned countries is not politically sensitive,44 none of these countries published any data on this matter and one cannot find any reference of the authorities to this effect. Thus, basic demographic questions, such as the difference in the fertility or marriage patterns between Shi‘is and Sunnis remain unanswered. Another major obstacle to implementing detailed demographic research on these countries is that the demographic data published by international organizations do not distinguish between the indigenous and the foreign populations and combine them into a single unit. Thus, for example, in the World Bank’s World Development Report–1990, Kuwait’s CBR in 1988 was put at 26.45 In reality, however, while the CBR of the Kuwaiti nationals in that particular year was 42.2, it was only 18.4 for the foreign

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population.46 In the case of the UAE, one can find the same pattern: while the World Bank put the CBR in 1988 at 23,47 in reality this rate was 39.6 among the indigenous population and 22.2 among the foreign population.48 This mistaken approach of combining the demographic indicators of the foreign and the national GCC populations led, naturally, to mistaken conclusions. For example, in an article published in 2005, Tabutin and Schoumaker claimed that Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia and Lebanon were examples of “very advanced model” of the demographic transition process.49 Mirkin noted in 2010: “While several countries in the Region are already hovering at or near replacement level fertility (Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia and UAE), other countries and areas continue to exhibit high levels of fertility (the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen).”50 This conclusion, although true regarding Tunisia and Lebanon, is totally mistaken regarding UAE, Qatar and Kuwait; in each of them the TFR of the indigenous women even in the early 2010s was far above the replacementlevel (see Tables 3.8).

2.3 No Collection of Ethno-Religious Composition Data Due to Political Sensitively This group includes: Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain. In these countries, the ethno-religious composition of the population is politically sensitive. Consequently, the authorities do not even collect the data on this matter. Syria The first census in Syria following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was conducted by the French mandatory regime in 1921–1922.51 However, there were many defects in the census. As Widmer commented: “The census of 1921–1922 . . . can scarcely be considered as even an approximation.”52 Even during the decade and a half after independence (1946), Syrian demographic data remained unreliable, preventing the carrying out of any comprehensive socio-demographic research. As Hansen wrote in the late 1960s: “Syrian population statistics are poor.”53 Since that time and until the beginning of the civil war in mid-2011, both the quality and the quantity of the Syrian socio-demographic data have substantially improved. This improvement has found expression mainly in the following three areas: (a) Population censuses: Since its independence and up to the present, Syria has carried out five censuses. The first was conducted in 1947 with the sole aim of establishing an election list for the parliament. The results of the census have never been published, other than those relating to the distribution of the population by sex and religion.54 The need for reliable socio-demographic data was underscored in the late 1950s with the preparation of the First Five-Year Development Plan, 1960–1965. Therefore, the 1960 census, which was conducted under the United Arab Republic (UAR) regime,55 constituted the first comprehensive population census, which covered the entire Syrian population.56 The third census took place in September 1970.57 The fourth census was held in September 1981, followed by a census in September 1994. The most recent census was carried out in September 2004. (b) Demographic and health surveys. The second important source for Syrian demographic research are the demographic surveys that were carried out by the CBS, the most important of which were: the 1973–Infant and Child Mortality Survey in Damascus;

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the 1976–1979 Follow-Up Demographic Survey; the 1978–Syrian Fertility Survey (1978–SFS); the 1993–Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey (1993–SMCHS); the 2001 Syria Family Health Survey (2001–SFHS) and the latest one is the 2009 Syria Family Health Survey (2009–SFHS). (c) The Civil Registration System. The Syrian Civil Registration System, although established as early as 1923 by the French Mandate, continued to experience high underreporting rates during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly with regard to death registration. Only in the 1970s was the registration complete or at least was close to it.58 In contrast to the detailed data on the various demographic variables, the 1960 census, which was conducted under the rule of the UAR, was the latest one which provided data on the ethno-religious composition of the Syrian population. Since the rise to power of the Ba‘th party in March 1963, the official Syrian statistics divided the population into three categories in line with the secular party’s ideology of al-Qawmiyya al-‘Arabiyya (Arab nationalism): Syrian citizens, Palestinian refugees and foreigners. Since the 1960 census, however, some major developments occurred in Syria that substantially affected its ethno-religious composition. The most prominent are as follows: (a) The majority of the Syrian ‘Alawites are still rural dwellers. As in the other Arab countries, fertility rates in the Syrian rural areas are much higher than in the urban centers (see Chapter 3). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the average fertility rates of the Syrian ‘Alawites since the implementation of the 1960 census were considerably higher than the national average. (b) There was a large-scale emigration during the 1950s and 1960s mainly of urban middle class Sunni-Muslims and Christians,59 who resented the new socioeconomic policy (al-Ishtiraqiyya al-‘Arabiyya).60 Hence, it is also reasonable to assume that their share of the total Syrian population decreased considerably since 1960. (c) The fertility rates of the Syrian Christians were considerably lower than the national average, inter alia, since almost all of them belong to the urban middle class. Together with large-scale emigration, one can assume that since the implementation of the 1960 census the percentage of the Christians within the total Syrian population has steadily decreased. How much is the difference? According to the 1947 census data, the Syrian ‘Alawites numbered 339,466 and they constituted 11.2% of Syria’s total population.61 According to the 1960 census results, their number amounted to 495,000,62 that is, 10.6% of the total Syrian population. This decline was probably a result of the higher than national average mortality rates of the ‘Alawites as a result of their lower living standard. According to the EIU estimate, in the late 1990s, the Syrian population was comprised of some 70% Sunni-Muslims, while the rest of the population consisted of ‘Alawites (12%), Christians of the Maronite, Greek, Armenian and Syrian Orthodox churches, as well as Protestant and Roman Catholic sects of Christianity (9%). In addition there were Druze (3.5%), and the rest were Isma‘ilis and Shi‘is.63 Was the percentage of the ‘Alawites in the late 1990s indeed 12%, namely, almost without any change since the early 1960s? My estimate is that due to the above-mentioned factors, the percentage of the ‘Alawites within the total Syrian population on the eve of the civil war was actually much above the traditional estimate of 12%, although we do not have the methodological tools to set a new percentage.

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With regard to Syria’s ethnic composition, the largest ethnic minority, located in the north of the country near the Syrian–Turkish border, is the Kurds. On the eve of the civil war, they represented some 6.6% of the total Syrian population. While the vast majority of the Kurds in Syria are Sunnis, a small number are Yazidis.64 The second ethnic minority is that of the Armenians, all of whom are Christians. There is also a small number of Turkman and Circassian minorities.65 In the case of ethnic composition as well, we do not have any methodological tool to evaluate the accuracy of the common estimates, all of which are based on the 1960 census data. The civil war twisted Syrian demographic composition due to the following four factors: (a) The huge number of deaths during the war itself. Although, of course, there is no official data, according to the most common estimates, the number of deaths so far, at the time of writing this book in the summer of 2015, amounts to more than 500,000. This number unfortunately is steadily increasing from one day to the next as the war continues without an end in sight. (b) The huge number of refugees. Thus far, the number of Syrian refugees is estimated at 9 million, among them 6.5 million internal refugees while the others have taken refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Meanwhile, about 150,000 Syrians already have been given asylum in the European Union, the vast majority — approximately 85% — in Germany.66 (c) A huge decline in the fertility rates. Naturally, during a civil war, fertility rates sharply decline. This decline, it should be noted, will influence the Syrian demographic pattern for the coming three generations. The most crucial impact of the decline will be the small workforce in the next generation as many of those who should enter the workforce in the 2030s and 2040s will not be born due to the prolonged civil war. (d) A huge increase in the death rates. Due to the steadily worsening socioeconomic and sanitation situations and with the absence of appropriate healthcare, the infant and child mortality rates have significantly increased as has that of the elderly population. Thus, the NIR of the Syrian population is steadily shrinking as long as the civil war continues. Of late, since the beginning of the civil war, the Syrian CBS stopped publishing demographic data.67 Hence, it is impossible to implement any demographic research on Syria following 2010. As the civil war continues, and the data is not gathered, it will also be impossible to carry out detailed demographic research regarding the civil war period in the future. Lebanon The most famous case among the Arab countries in regard to the absence of official demographic data is Lebanon. According to the 1932 census, the only one which has been carried out until the present day, Christians constituted a slight majority (51.7%) of the total population.68 The Lebanese political structure, as outlined in the 1943 National Pact, was based on this small Christian majority, mandating that the head of the state, the President, would be a Christian-Maronite.69 However, the percentage of the Christians within the total Lebanese population has markedly decreased, particularly following the start of the Second Civil War in 1975, mainly due to the following two factors:

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(a) The large-scale emigration of Christians, which actually began in the late nineteenth century.70 This emigration substantially increased with the First Civil War (1958), and turned into a “flood” following the beginning of the Second Civil War. According to research conducted by the Lebanese Information Center, during the 1975–2011 period, almost 1.6 million people emigrated from Lebanon.71 (b) The much lower fertility rates of the Christians compared to the Muslims, particularly the Shi‘is. The reason for this is that the Lebanese Christians, like many other Middle Eastern Christian communities, entered into the third phase of the Demographic Transition, namely a reduction in the birth rates (see Chapter 3), much earlier than most of the Middle Eastern Muslim communities. Thus, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the NIR of the Lebanese Christians was remarkably lower than that of the Muslims. The large-scale emigration of young Christians at childbearing age also contributed to the much lower CBRs of the Lebanese Christians. In light of the above, what is the religious composition of the Lebanese population? By 1990, according to Held, 33% of the Lebanese population were Shi‘is, 20% Sunni-Muslims, 20% Maronite, 8% Greek Orthodox, 6% Greek Catholic, 4% Armenian-Christians and 8% Druze.72 Thus, by 1990, according to Held’s estimate, the percentage of the Christians within the total Lebanese population had declined to less than 40%. This being the case, it is understandable why the Lebanese Christian authorities have refrained from carrying out a population census. Faour noted in this respect that: By controlling the vital registration system, Maronite public officers were able never to disclose or publish data on the birth and death rates of the various [religious] sects. Nor have they released the number of citizens registered by religion. As a result, most of the published statistics on population size and religious composition are estimates that have unknown margins of error.73

Although the Arab Spring has not spilled over to Lebanon, the huge numbers of Syrian refugees have again distorted the Lebanese demographic structure. According to the latest estimate, their number in mid-2015 has amounted to more than 1.1 million.74 Amnesty International claimed that in early September 2015, their number reached 1.2 million.75 Bahrain Among the GCC countries, Bahrain has the longest history of population censuses, dating back to 1941. The latest was carried out in April 2010. In addition to the population censuses, another important demographic source is the Civil Registration System, which has kept an almost complete record of births and deaths of the indigenous population since the early 1980s.76 The third important source is the fertility and health surveys, the first of which — 1989 Bahrain Child Health Survey — was conducted within the framework of the Gulf Child Health Survey Program (GCHS); and the second was the 1995 Bahrain Family Health Survey.77 However, despite the availability of accurate and updated demographic data, the Bahraini authorities do not publish any data regarding the religious composition of its national population. In the 2010 census results, for example, the religious composition of the Bahraini national population is not even mentioned in any of the various tables. Also the foreign population is divided by their nationality only, but not by religion.

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The reason for this official disregard of the religious composition of both the indigenous and the foreign population is because 65%–70% of the Bahraini citizenry are Shi‘is (Ja‘fari school), and the rest, including the royal family, Al Khalifa, are Sunnis.78 The Al Khalifa is the only ruling family among the GCC countries that belongs to the religious minority rather than to the religious majority. Since the mid-1990s, the indigenous Shi‘is in the country have been active against the Sunni regime, claiming that they are “second class citizens” compared to the Sunnis minority. These activities against the Al Khalifa family, which is comprised almost solely of young Bahraini Shi‘is, significantly grew since March 2011 within the overall framework of the Arab Spring. Thus, the disregard of the Bahrain regime of the SunnaShi‘a division of the population is a matter of political survival.

2.4 Hiding the Basic Demographic Data for Political Reasons: The Case of Saudi Arabia 79 With the exception of Qatar (see below), the Arab country that presents the greatest challenge from a demographic research point of view is Saudi Arabia. This is because for many years the Saudi authorities distorted the number of Saudi citizens in addition to their total disregard of the Sunna-Shi‘a division of the Saudi nationals. The following section will first examine the availability and the reliability of the Saudi official demographic data and later will deal with the issue of the Sunna-Shi‘a division of the Saudi citizenry. According to the 1962–1963 census data, the Saudi national population numbered 3,302,330.80 The 1962–1963 census, however, did not solve the problem of the accuracy of the number of the Saudi population. This is because while the Saudi authorities considered this census incomplete, mainly due to large-scale under-enumeration of the nomadic population,81 Birks and Sinclair on the other hand argued that “the 1962/63 census figure of 3.3 million was of the right order.”82 In any case, only parts of the census results, i.e. those pertaining to certain cities, were published by the Saudi CDS.83 In general, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the Saudi practical policy regarding publication of demographic data was that of omission. This omission is best illustrated by the absence of a demographic chapter from the Statistical Yearbooks of the CDS, published since 1965. This absence, however, is very unique, as normally, a country’s general statistical abstract/yearbook contains a separate demographic chapter, usually the first or the second. The second Saudi census, carried out in September 1974, was considered to be the first complete enumeration of the population. According to the census results, the Kingdom’s nationals numbered 6,218,361 and the rest (794,282) were foreign workers and their accompanying family members.84 However, some serious problems in the accuracy and reliability of the census data were apparent. Consequently, many researchers claimed that the official figure for Saudi citizens in the 1974 census was “too high.” True indigenous Saudi population estimates in 1974–1975 varied, running from as low as 3.3 million to 5.6 million.85 Thus, following the implementation of the second census, the true number of Saudi citizens continued to be questionable.86 According to the third Saudi census, carried out in September 1992, the Saudi national population numbered 12,310,053.87 However, as was the case in the 1974 census, in the third census as well the official data regarding the number of Saudi

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citizens were doubtful and unofficial estimates put the true number of the Saudi citizens much below the official census data. According to an estimate of Birks and Sinclair, for example, by mid-1992 Saudi national population numbered only 8.07 million.88 Regarding the reliability of the Saudi official demography data in the early 1990s, Wilson and Graham claimed: “Staffers at both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy told the authors that they regularly used padded figures on the orders of their superiors.”89 This substantial gap between the various official, semi-official and the unofficial sources regarding the true number of the Saudi nationals looks strange. This is particularly so because since the 1960s, but primarily following the October 1973 “oil boom,” the Saudi government has provided various public services to its citizens, some of which, such as healthcare and education, require accurate data not only regarding the total nationals, but also accurate data according to age and sex. Moreover, many of the governmental payments, such as welfare payments, are directed to specific persons or families. Indeed, data on such governmental payments, for both individuals and families, have been published by the CDS since 1970.90 It is obvious that the prerequisite for governmental direct payments to individuals is a precise database of all potential beneficiaries. The reasons which were raised by the researchers for the inflation of the number of the Kingdom’s citizenry by the Saudi authorities are varied; the most prominent being: First, the Saudi authorities desired to show that the Kingdom is not only rich in oil, but also has a large national population. Second, the Saudi authorities desired to minimize the declared share of the foreigners within the Kingdom’s total population. Another reason is that the absolute number of the population was an important factor in determining OPEC quotas for oil production. This was particularly important following the end of the “oil decade” in 1983 when oil prices were low and each member of OPEC attempted to increase its quota at the expense of the others.91 Finally, the Saudi authorities wanted to minimize the percentage of the Shi‘a minority within the total Saudi national population.92 Following the 1992 census, however, the Saudi official demographic data, on both the indigenous and the foreign populations, have been largely expanded. The first Statistical Yearbook which included any demographic data was that of 1993 which provided the basic results of the 1992 census, namely, the total population with a breakdown into nationality and sex (see Chart 2.2). The Statistical Yearbook of 1996 was the first which had a separate demographic chapter. The chapter included the main results of the 1992 census.93 The next two issues, those of 1997 and 1998, included the same data as that of the 1996 issue. Since 1999, the demographic chapter of the Statistical Yearbook has presented the updated demographic situation in the Kingdom. The next census in Saudi Arabia was carried out in September 2004. The results of the census showed that the Kingdom’s total population numbered 22,673,538 people, 16,529,302 of whom were nationals (72.9%).94 These data reveal that the Saudi national population increased by 34.3% during 12 years, 2.49% on annual average, compared to an annual average of 3.87% during the period between the 1974 and the 1992 censuses.95 These data, however, raises some major reservations. The most prominent is that both the Saudi official and the semi-official data on the NIRs of the indigenous Saudi population during the period between the 1992 and the 2004 censuses were significantly higher than 2.5%, which was the average annual population growth rate

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States Chart 2.2

Saudi Arabian Demographic Data Prior to 1996

Population and Housing: Preliminary results of the population and housing census taken on 1/4/1413 AH. (27/9/1992 AD.) show the following: Total population is Number of Saudis is Number of Saudi males is Number of Saudi females is Number of non-Saudis is Number of non-Saudi males is Number of non-Saudi females is Number of houses is

16,929,294 12,304,835 representing 72.7% of total population 6,211,213 representing 50.5% of Saudi population 6,093,622 representing 49.5% of Saudi population 4,624,459 representing 27.3% of total population 3,255,328 representing 70.4% of non-Saudi population 1,369,131 representing 29.6% of non-Saudi population 2,791,044 some of which are occupied by a large number of inhabitants

Source: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, CDS, Statistical Yearbook-1995 (Riyadh, 1996), p. 16.

between the 1992 and the 2004 censuses. In fact, during most of this period, the annual NIR of the indigenous Saudi population was estimated at more than 3%.96 As population growth is the sum of NIR and NMB, one explanation for the wide gap between the population growth rates and the NIR is a negative NMB of the Saudi citizens which compensates for the much higher NIR. This, however, as is well known, was not the case. The NMB of the Saudi nationals was positive from the beginning of the oil era, although not in considerable numbers (see Chapter 5). The prohibition of the Saudi law on dual citizenship contributed to the positive NMB. This is because Saudi citizens, naturally, did not want to lose their Saudi citizenship. Moreover, as the vast majority of those who became naturalized as Saudi citizens were women who married Saudi males,97 this by itself contributed to both higher CBRs and a higher positive NMB. Therefore, if the NMB was positive, the only remaining explanation for the substantial lower population growth rates during the 1992–2004 period than the NIR is either that the reported Saudi nationals number was inflated in the 1992 census, or that of the 2004 census was deflated. My assumption is that the 2004 census data is the accurate figure, based on four main arguments: First, the Saudi regime has no reason to “deflate” the number of the kingdom’s nationals. Second, the reasons, both internal and external, that might have brought the Saudi authorities to previously inflate the number of Saudi citizens, had become irrelevant, particularly following the collapse of Saddam Husayn regime. In addition, “the demographic connection” of OPEC oil production quotas became irrelevant following al-Qa‘ida attacks on the US (September 11, 2001). This is because since then, from both the political and economical viewpoints, the Saudi regime has been eager to increase the Kingdom’s oil production as much as possible in order to preserve the kingdom’s role as a “swing producer.”98 At last, under the leadership of King ‘Abdallah, a profound change occurred in Saudi Arabia, allowing for an open discussion on many previously taboo political, social and economic topics. Within the framework of this new approach, the

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Saudi authorities became more open to supplying information that they had previously been reluctant to provide, including in the demographic arena.99 Thus, the only question remains is by how much was the 1992 official data of the Saudi nationals inflated? Taking into consideration the most accepted NIRs during the 1992–2004 period, namely an annual average of 3.3% for 1992–1999 period and 2.6% for 2000–2004 period, calculations put the population at approximately 11.6 million for September 1992 — about 700,000 less than the official census data. Even if we assume a population growth rate of 3.2% on annual average for the whole 1992–2004 period, then the Saudi nationals numbered no more than 11.4 million in September 1992. In any case, it seems unreasonable that the Saudi nationals numbered less than 11.2 million in September 1992. Since the implementation of the 2004 census, the Saudi demographic data are accurate, up-to-date and diverse, covering the range of age structure, spatial distribution of the population, fertility and mortality rates. The surprising 2004 census data solved the half-century debate on the true number of the Saudi citizens. The 2010 census results strengthened the reliability of the 2004 official data. According to the 2010 census data, the Saudi citizens numbered 18,707,576,100 namely, an increase of 13.2% compared to the 2004 census results. Thus, the average annual population growth rate during these six years was 2.2% — a reasonable increase rate taking into consideration the NIRs during that period,101 and the NMB. According to latest Saudi official figures, by mid-2014 the Saudi nationals numbered 20,702,536,102 namely an increase of 10.66% within four years with an average annual population growth rate of approximately 2.4%, again a reasonable rate taking into consideration the Saudi national fertility patterns, the age structure and the NMB (see Chapter 3). The only remaining major demographic question regarding the Saudi nationals is the number of the Shi‘is, most of whom concentrated in al-Hasa (the Eastern) province, mainly in the cities of Qatif, Dammam, and around the city of Madina. The Saudi authorities never published any data regarding the number of the Saudi Shi‘is. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, in total contrast to that of Bahrain, the disregard of the Saudi authorities of the “Shi‘i issue” is purely theological, namely, the rejection of the Shi‘a by the Wahhabism.103 In any case, according to unofficial sources, the Shi‘is represent some 10% to 15% of the total Saudi nationals, namely about 2.2 to 3.2 million people in 2014.104

2.5

Qatar: A State without Demographic Data105

Qatar is the only country in the Middle East and probably worldwide as well, that not only does not publish the ethno-religious composition of its citizens, but also does not even make public the total number of its citizens. Jure Snoj tried to explore the number of Qatari citizens. He approached the Qatari Statistics Authority (QSA) and asked them for the data. The answer was: “We regret to inform you that the required data is not available.”106 The non-publication of this data, it should be noted, is not a result of the absence of the data, but rather due to the wish of the Al Thani regime to hide this data. The Qatari authorities continue to “stick” to their traditional policy of publishing only data which relate to the total population including both nationals and nonnationals without any distinction, as one can see in Chart 2.3. Why are the Qatari authorities hiding the number of Qatari citizens? It seems that this decision is for two reasons: First, as will examine below, the percentage of the

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Chart 2.3

Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

From the Homepage of Qatar Statistics Authority

foreign population of the total Qatari population is the highest worldwide. The second reason is the wish of the Qatari authorities to hide the fact that they naturalized large number of foreigners as opposed to their public statements on this subject. The first Qatari census, which was the first and the last official publication of the number of Qatari citizens, indicated that Qatar’s indigenous population numbered 45,039.107 According to an estimate by Birks and Sinclair, in 1975 Qatar’s national population numbered 60,300, a rise of 34% compared to the 1970 official census result. ECWA estimated Qatar’s nationals as 65,357 in 1980. In 1985, The HRD Base Ltd. estimated Qatar’s indigenous population at 84,240, namely 29% higher than ECWA’s estimate in 1980. In 1990, Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd. estimated Qatar’s nationals at 103,400. Since then, as one can see in Table 2.2, the only estimates were that of ESCWA of which Qatar is a member state. The following section will explore the number of Qatari citizens since the 1970 census and until the latest census of April 2015 based on “hard relevant data” which were drawn either from the data of the five censuses that were implemented following that of 1970, or from the vital statistics data which were published by the QSA. The methodology which this section is based on rests on two basic assumptions: First, in contrast to the Saudi demographic official data until the 2004 census, the data which were published by the Qatari authorities is accurate. This is because the QSA simply did not publish sensitive data which it did not want to explore. The second assumption is that the data are up-to-date and complete, as following the “oil boom” Qatari citizens have every reason to report all demographic events due to the various financial benefits and allowances which they receive from the government, such as children allowances, marriage allowances, etc. As for the 1970 census, since it was assumed that the under-enumeration of the census was approximately 6%, mainly of females and children,108 it seems that at the time that the census was implemented, Qatar’s indigenous population numbered approximately 47,700. The next relevant “hard data” are from the March 1986 census. Although the QSA did not publish the total number of the Qatari citizens, it published the number of Qatari citizens aged 15 years and above (54,502).109 According to ESCWA data, the Qatari citizens in the 1986 census totaled 101,859.110 The combination of these two figures is reasonable, as they point to a median age of 16 years which

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was sensible, based on the wide-based age pyramid of the Qatari indigenous population at that time due to the high NIRs. In the March 1997 census, the QSA published the number of Qatari citizens 10 years and above (103,273).111 In addition to the partial data of the censuses that were published, since 1980 and until 2014, QSA published the number of live births, the total number of deaths and infant deaths according to nationals and non-nationals. Hence, regarding this period, it is possible to calculate both the nominal NI and the number of Qatari nationals in the age group of 0–10.112 The combination of these figures and the number of Qatari citizens 10 years and above yields the total number of Qatari citizens in 1997 census at 151,771 (see Table 2.2). The next “fulcrum” is the March 2004 census. In this census, the QSA published data regarding citizens 3 years old and above, totaling 168,958.113 Adding the live births minus infant deaths during the three years prior to the implementation of the census produces the “missing age group” of 0–3. This age group numbered 19,059,114 which implies a total Qatari indigenous population in March 2004 of 188,017. Measuring the nominal NI between the 1997 and the 2004 censuses suggests the figure of 36,748.115 Thus, the 1997 census data plus the NI between the two censuses suggest 188,519, namely, 500 more than the actual 2004 census results — an insignificant gap which is probably due to measuring the NI by months and not by days. The calculated number according to the Qatari NI data suggests the figure of 194,092 in mid-2004 (see Table 2.2) which is about 3% higher than the author’s calculation for the census’ results. The next census was carried out in April 2010. As in the 1997 census, the Qatari authorities published data only regarding the population 10 years old and above.116 According to the Qatari census data, the 10 years and above age group of nationals numbered 174,279. If we add 65,763, which is the live births minus infant deaths during the decade prior to the census,117 the result is the total Qatari indigenous population of 240,042 in late April 2010. However, while the 2004 census results match those of 1997, as the nominal NI between the two censuses was almost equal to the actual population growth, this is not the case when one looks at the 2004 and 2010 censuses data. This is because adding the nominal NI between the two censuses (38,641118) to the 2004 census data yields 226,658 — namely, 13,384 less than the actual 2010 census results. This substantial gap could not be explained by an under-enumeration of births. Moreover, because of the short time between the two censuses, it is quite easy to compare the age groups in these two censuses. Overall, under a condition of “zero naturalization balance,” the number of Qatari citizens in the age group of 4–58 found in 2004 census should have been identical to the 10–64 age group of the 2010 census.119 In reality, however, while the 4–58 age group in the 2004 census numbered 155,024,120 the 10–64 age group in the 2010 census numbered 166,932,121 a difference of almost 12,000 people. Finally, despite the rapid decline of the TFR of the Qatari women (from 4.2 in 2004 to 3.6 in 2010),122 the CBR remained stable at 32–34 per 1,000.123 The reason for this stable CBR despite the sharp TFR decline was the sharp increase in the number of women of childbearing age (15–44) from 43,713 in the 2004 census,124 to 55,673 in the 2010 census,125 an increase of 27.4% within only six years. Thus, while the difference in the number of Qatari citizens between the 1970 and the 1986 censuses could be explained, at least partially, as a result of an under-enumeration of births, particularly during the 1970s when the Qatari civil registration system

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was in its infancy, this was certainly not the case in the period between the 2004 and the 2010 censuses. The only logical conclusion is that during the period between these censuses there was a large-scale naturalization of about 13,400 people, which represents approximately 5.6% of the total Qatari citizens in 2010. According to the Qatari NI database, there was a huge increase in the number of Qatari citizens in 2007 and 2008. While the total Qatari population increased from 215,199 in mid-2007 to 232,267 in mid-2008, the nominal NI in those 12 months was less than 7,000,126 that is, about 10,500 less than the actual growth. However, since we are not sure when this large-scale naturalization actually occurred, I decided to divide the “extra” growth beyond the nominal NI equally across the six year period between the two censuses. The latest Qatari census was carried out in April 2015. Thus far, the Qatari authorities published only the total population — 2,404,776.127 However, the Qatari authorities publish the 15 years and above population on a regularly basis in the Labor Force Sample Survey which is implemented on a quarterly basis. The latest data which the Qatari authorities published thus far are those of the first quarter of 2015 (JanuaryMarch 2015). This data, naturally, should be close to the April 2015 actual census data. According to this data, the 15 years and above Qatari citizens totaled 190,161.128 The calculation of births and infant deaths in the period of 1999–2014 yields the 0–15 age group in early 2015 which totaled 103,689.129 Combining these two data, namely the 15 and above population and the 0–15 population in early 2015, one can conclude that the Qatari nationals numbered approximately 294,000 in April 2015. According to an official Qatari statement from September 2014, “the population growth rate for Qataris is around 3%.”130 Without naturalization, this means that the Qatari citizens in early 2015 was supposed to number about 278,000. However, as was calculated above, the actual number of Qatari citizens in early 2015 was about 294,000, namely 16,000 higher than the number of Qatari citizens in 2010 census plus the nominal NI between the two censuses. The inescapable conclusion is that the massive naturalization which started in the mid-2000s continued into the first half of the 2010s. A major indicator for this massive naturalization is the numerous complaints and warnings of the Bahraini authorities toward the Qatari authorities that they are harming Bahrain’s national security by “luring” Bahraini citizens to take Qatari citizenship.131

3

The Lacuna of Accurate Official Employment Data

The employment issue poses another prominent challenge for any socio-demographic and economic research on the Arab countries. This is because official unemployment data are either almost totally absent, as in the cases of Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and Yemen regarding most of the period examined in this book, or are reported as being much lower than they are in reality, as in the case of most other Arab countries. Thus, as Wilson claimed in the mid-1990s: “Any unemployment statistics which are published in the region are meaningless, even those reported to the ILO.”132 Generally speaking, the misreporting of employment data in the Arab countries has four major characteristics: (a) Under-counting of female employment. The reason for this is that in many cases, females work in agriculture within the rural household framework and thus are not taken into consideration when calculating the overall national female labor force participation. This is because the official female employment data is calculated only

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States Table 2.2 Year

1970(c) 1975 1980 1984 1985 1986(c) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997(c) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(c) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(c)

2015(c)

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Alternative Estimates of Qatar’s Indigenous Population, 1970–2015 Semi-official and unofficial estimates

Author’s calculation of total Qatari citizens according to the NI data (mid-year)**

Author’s estimate

45,039(c) 60,300 65,357 – 84,240 99,754 (uo) /101,859 (so) – – – 103,400 – 141,000 – 128,986 – 133,450 151,673 142,341 – 152,449 – – – 192,586 – – – – – 280,000–300,000 (uo-Gray) 250,000 (uo-Kamrava) 243,073 (uo-GLMM) –

– – – 91,979 95,698 99,642 103,594 107,533 111,639 116,081 120,461 124,820 129,735 134,861 140,440 145,670 151,624 157,573 163,388 173,514 179,867 184,983 190,435 194,092 202,222 209,120 215,199 232,267 –

47,700(c) – – – – 101,859(c) 105,340* 109,064* 113,268* 117,504* 121,949* 126,279* 130,935* 135,976* 140,981* 145,920* 150,848* 151,771(c) 155,664* 160,533* 165,500* 170,636* 176,032* 181,415* 187,109* 188,017(c) 194,390* 202,385* 210,510* 219,269* 228,509* 237,590*

– –

240,042(c) 245,770* 294,000

(c) = census. (uo) = unofficial estimates. (so) = ESCWA semi-official data. * End of the year. ** Based on data draw from Qatar Information Exchange. Sources for Semi-official and unofficial estimates: 1970: British Embassy in Beirut, Middle East Development Division, by N.B. Hudson, The First Population Census of Qatar, April/May 1970 ( Beirut, October 1970), p. 17. 1975 (uo): J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, International Migration Project, Country Case Study: The State of Qatar (University of Durham, Department of Economics, February 1978), p. 6, table 1. 1980 (so): ECWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the ECWA, No. 3 (Beirut, May 1982), p. 131, table 1.

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1985 (uo): HRD Base Ltd., Lloyds Bank Chambers, Socio-Demographic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (Newcastle, May 1987), p. 151, table 1. 1986 (so): ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 153, table 9.1. 1986 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) [gulfmigration.eu/population-by-nationalityqatari-non-qatari-census-1970–2010]. 1990 (uo): Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report-1990 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, May 1990), p. 108, table 1.1. 1992 (uo): Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report-1992 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, 1992), p. 82, table 1.1. 1994 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 8 (1995), p. 92, table 1. 1996 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 9 (1997), p. 84, table 1. 1997 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM). 1998 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 10 (1999) p. 83, table 1. 2000 (so): ESCWA, Demographic Data Sheets, No. 11 (2001), p. 116, table 1. 2004 (uo): Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM). 2010 (uo): Gray, Qatar, p. 222; Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), p. 5; Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM). 2015: Qatar Information Exchange, Labor Force Sample Survey, First Quarter of 2015, table 2; Qatar, Ministry of Development, Planning and Statistics, The Simplified Census of Population, Housing and Establishments, 2015 (Doha, April 2015); idem, Vital Statistics, Annual Bulletin Births & Deaths: 2014 (Doha, May 2016).

on the basis of those women who receive salaries, mainly in the urban formal sectors. Since the rural population constitute a significant percentage of the population of the non-oil Arab countries, it is quite clear that the actual female labor force participation rates in the rural areas are considerably higher than the official figures. Large-scale women employment in the informal sector also exists in the urban centers of the poorer Arab countries. Consequently, it is quite reasonable to assume that the official employment figures regarding female employment rates in the non-oil Arab countries are considerably lower than the actual figures.133 (b) Inaccurate employment data relates to lower class urban dwellers who are unable to find employment in the formal economy. These people work in jobs such as servants, porters, watchmen, and newspaper and cigarette vendors. In these varied capacities, they constitute another considerable segment of the urban informal employment, though many of them are included on the waiting list for public sector employment and are officially categorized as “unemployed.” (c) The deliberate under-reporting of actual unemployment rates by the authorities in an effort to hide the steady increase of unemployment rates. This phenomenon was particularly prevalent in the GCC states. The lack of accurate and updated employment data on Saudi Arabia prompted ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid to write the article in late 1999 entitled “Saudi Arabia without Data.”134 The fear of the GCC royal families was that public acknowledgement of the high unemployment rates among nationals parallel to the general deterioration in the living standard during the 1990s would be tantamount to an admission of the failure in their basic role as “providers.” This would put the basis of the “rentier” political system in danger (see Chapter 5). As a result, officials in the governmental bureaucracy as well as high-ranking politicians constantly denied the existence of high unemployment rates among the indigenous workforce. Among the poorer Arab countries, the phenomenon of official unemployment rates being considerably lower than the actual rates existed as well. For example, while the

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official Jordanian unemployment rate for 1998 was 15.2%, unofficial sources estimated the real rate as almost double the official figure.135 In the case of Egypt, the official unemployment rate for the year 2000 was 8%,136 yet unofficial sources estimated that the actual rate was more than double, between 15% and 25%.137 Two years later, in 2002, the official number of the unemployed in Egypt was 1.9 million, while unofficial sources argued that this number was “far lower than reality.”138 In the case of Yemen, the official figure indicated an unemployment rate of 11.5% in 2000; however, unofficial sources claimed that the rate “exceeded 23%.”139

4

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Demographic Records on the Arab Countries

The events of the Arab Spring, however, present a great challenge for conducting demographic research on the Arab countries due the following three reasons: (a) The weakening of the central regimes. In some of the Arab countries the central regime, even if it survives, as in the cases of Syria and Yemen, in effect has no ability to collect the socioeconomic data. Neither the Syrian nor the Yemenite CSB has published any accurate socioeconomic data, including demographic data, since the outbreak of the civil wars. In the case of Yemen, the authorities stopped the implementation of the 2014 population census due to security problems. (b) Changing de facto borders. Some of the Arab countries, in effect, do not exist anymore, at least not in their previous form. Historical Iraq was actually replaced by three new political entities: The Kurdish entity in the north, The Islamic State, and the rest of the territory which is controlled by the Shi‘i central government. Syria is also actually divided into separate entities: The area which is controlled by the traditional Ba‘thi regime; the area which is controlled by the Islamic State; and the rest of the territory which is controlled by an enormous number of rebel groups. Libya, as well, has split into two entities with two governments. Moreover, the “borders” of these “new states” are constantly changing. Consequently, any data, if available and if accurate at all, is relevant for a short period of time only. (c) The number of refugees. The most challenging problem relating to contemporary demographic research on the Arab region is the number and distribution of the refugees. From the 1948 Palestine War and until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990), the only refugees in the Arab region were the Palestinians. However, the Palestinian refugees were regularly counted by UNWRA, the PLO, and the countries where they lived. In the official Syrian statistics, the Palestinian refugees appeared separately form the rest of the Syrian population. The Iraqis who fled from Iraq since early 1991 are concentrated almost entirely in Jordan. Thus, it was quite easy to monitor them by both the Jordanian authorities and the various organizations and bodies that supported them. This, however, is not the case with the Arab Spring refugees. First, the refugees are from many countries and areas. Second, their number is unfortunately constantly increasing as the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Libya continue. In addition, as opposed to earlier cases, the Arab Spring refugees fled to many countries. Due to the above-mentioned factors, our knowledge about the Arab Spring refugees is sporadic and partial at best. In the case of the Syrian refugees, for example, numerous estimates were “thrown up in the air” as each side in the civil war has an interest, either to inflate

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their number or to minimize it. Thus, the VQR reported that the number of Syrian refugees totaled 3 million at the end of 2014.140 AMNESTY International reported that at the end of 2014 the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq alone totaled 3.8 million.141 These are only two of the numerous estimates regarding the number of Syrian refugees. We, of course, do not have any analytical tool to examine the reliability these estimates.

5

Summary and Conclusions

Despite all of the above-mentioned obstacles, in many Arab countries detailed demographic research could be carried out since the 1960s and until the onset of the Arab Spring. The censuses that were carried out by many Arab countries since the mid-1980s were computerized and their under-enumeration rates were much lower than in the previous censuses. The latest censuses of Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE are good examples of this improvement. The sharp improvement of the demographic data collected and published by the Arab governments since the mid-1980s is a result not only of the fact that the control of the central authority of the population has sharply improved, but should be attributed to some other factors as well, the most important of which are the following: (a) Greater political openness of the Arab regimes since the mid-1980s and certainly since the 1990s, even of the traditionally “closed regimes” of the GCC countries. The most prominent expression of this “new openness” was, and to a large extent still is, the publication of data that could reflect a failure of the authorities, such as the continuing high fertility rates. (b) Intensification of the socioeconomic problems which is directly related to the steady increase of the “demographic pressure,” primarily in the employment arena. In other words, the continuing covering up the real situation was not practical any more. The high unemployment rates, particularly among the younger generation, had become “too visible.” (c) The aim of many Arab regimes to increase the scale of foreign investments and international aid, which, as a precondition, required detailed socioeconomic data, including in the demographic arena. (d) The decision of many Arab regimes, particularly the non-oil based, to “share” the responsibility for the socioeconomic problems with their own citizens in order to increase their awareness of the crucial need for adopting family planning programs and macroeconomic reforms in order to revive the economy. Thus, the publication of “the real situation” in both the demographic and macroeconomic arenas was aimed at presenting the unpleasant reality to the public. The Arab Spring, however, changed the situation in many parts of the Arab region dramatically, not only in the political arena, but in the area of collecting and processing socioeconomic data. The de facto border changes, the “disappearances” of states that until the onset of their civil wars were treated as “stable states” and the huge number of refugees inside and outside the Middle East, together make it impossible to sketch an accurate demographic situation in increasing parts of the Arab region. This inability is not only with regard to the present day, but also for future research.

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Arab Population Growth

The Historical Dimension of the Arab Population Growth

Although demographic statistics on the Middle East prior to the nineteenth century are almost completely lacking, Issawi noted that in the second century AD., the population of the Middle East was estimated at 40–45 million — a fifth of the total global population at that time. Subsequently, the region’s population fluctuated without a clear trend until the nineteenth century, when a steady rise in numbers became evident. During the 1840–1914 period, the Middle Eastern population doubled at an average annual growth rate of just under 1%.1 This was the beginning of the second stage of the Demographic Transition which rapidly intensified. By 1914, on the eve of World War I, the Middle Eastern population (including Iran and Turkey) was estimated at 68 million.2 By 2000, it reached 374 million (including Iran, Turkey, Israel and the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).3 Thus, within less than nine decades, despite the huge emigration from the region, the Middle Eastern population increased almost six-fold as a result of the accelerating NIRs. Like other developing regions worldwide, the Middle Eastern population grew by markedly accelerated rates during the three decades between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s and until the present, the rate of the population growth in the entire Arab countries has steadily decreased due to the declining CBRs on the one hand and stable CDRs on the other. In nominal numbers, however, the population growth in all of the Arab countries not only did not decline, it rather increased due to the population momentum phenomenon. By mid-2015, Egypt’s population amounted to almost 88 million compared to 21.4 million in 1952, at the time of the “Free Officers” coup d’etat. Morocco’s population increased from 9.3 million in 1950 to 34.4 million in mid-2015, while that of Algeria grew from less than 9 million to almost 40 million during the corresponding period (see Table 3.1). A particularly rapid population increase occurred in the GCC countries. This extremely swift population growth was the result of three main factors: (a) exceptionally high NIRs of the indigenous population; (b) a positive net migration balance (NMB); (c) and above all, large-scale immigration.4 Hence, the population of Saudi

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Table 3.1

Arab Population Growth Population Growth in some Oil and non-Oil Arab Countries1950–2015 (thousands)

Year Country Egypt Jordan* Syria Tunisia Morocco Algeria Saudi Arabia** Bahrain** Kuwait** Oman**

1950 21,437(b) 600 3,252 3,517 9,343 8,872 – 91 100(a) –

1960

1970

1980

26,085 33,053 42,126 781 1,668 2,218 4,656 6,305 8,704 4,149 5,099 6,443 11,626 15,379(f) 19,380 10,784 14,330 18,666 3,302(e) 5,935(g) 7,079 119(c) 178(f) 238(h) 162(d) 347 566 – – 805

– No data available. * East Bank only. ** Nationals only. (a) Data relates to 1949 (b) Data relates to 1952 (c) Data relates to 1959 (d) Data relates to 1961

1990

2000

55,543 3,453 12,116 8,207 24,167 25,022 8,847(i) 323(j) 581 1,321

70,492 5,178 16,320 9,590 28,466 30,416 16,210 391 832 1,778

(e) Data relates to 1962–1963 (f) Data relates to 1971 (g) Data relates to 1974 (h) Data relates to 1981

2004

2015

76,117 87,963 5,611 7,595 18,017 – 9,975 11,254 30,172 34,387 32,364 39,667 16,529 20,703(l) 438 615(k) 975 1,160(k) 1,803 2,283

(i) Data relates to 1988 (j) Data relates to 1991 (k) Data relates to 2013 (l) Data relates to 2014

Sources : Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Cairo); idem, Egypt in Figures, various issues (Cairo); The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Amman); Syrian Arab Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, CBS, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Damascus); State of Kuwait, Central Statistical Bureau, Annual Statistical Abstract, various issues (Kuwait city); Kingdom of Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Manama); idem, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Riyadh); Sultanate of Oman, National Centre for Statistics and Information, Statistical Yearbook (Muscat); al-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya, al-Mandubiyya al-Samiyya lil-Takhtit, Qisem al-Ihsa’iyyat al-‘Amma, al-Nashra al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya lil-Maghrib, various years (Rabat); alJumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya, al-Ma‘had al-Watani lil-Ihsa, al-Nashriyya al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya Li-Tunis, various years (Tunis); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); UN, World Population Prospects, various issues (New York); ECWA, The Population Situation in the ECWA Region-Saudi Arabia (Beirut, 1979); ECWA/ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, various issues (Baghdad, Amman and Beirut); idem, Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region, various issues (New York); Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse, 1982); The NCB Economist, Vol. 15, Issue 6 (April 26, 2005); R. McGregor, “Saudi Arabia: Population and the Making of a Modern State,” in J. I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher (eds.), Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: A Geographical Approach (London: University of London Press, 1972).

Arabia — the largest among these countries — increased from approximately 3.3 million in 1960 (see Table 3.1) to 30.8 million in mid-2014 (among them 20.7 million Saudi nationals and the rest foreign workers and their accompanying family members).5 Bahrain’s population increased from 70,040 in 1941 to 405,667 in 2001 and reached 1.253 million in mid-2013 (among them, 614,830 were Bahraini nationals and the rest were foreign workers and their accompanying family members).6 The population of the UAE increased from 111,906 according to 1968 census data,7 to 8.264 million (of them 947,997 UAE nationals) in 2010.8 This means that within only 42 years, the UAE population increased 74-fold! — no doubt, the highest rate worldwide.

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Thousands 1,00,000 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

Egypt

Jordan

Syria

1950

Figure 3.1

2

1970

Tunisia

1990

Morocco

2000

Algeria

Saudi Arabia

2015

Population Growth in some Oil and non-Oil Arab Countries, 1950–2015 (thousands)

The Causes for the Rapid Population Growth of the Arab Countries

Despite the lack of population censuses and accurate demographic records in many of the Arab countries until the 1960s (see Chapter 2), from what is available it appears that during the first half of the twentieth century, like other developing regions worldwide, the fertility rates in the Arab regions were very high. For example, in 1907 Egypt’s CBR was 45.9 and remained at that level throughout the three decades which followed.9 In 1950, Egypt’s CBR was 48.7,10 slightly higher than what it had been at the beginning of the century. In the other Arab countries, one can find similar fertility patterns as well. Hence, the fertility level in the Arab societies during the first half of the twentieth century was “natural fertility,”11 as there were no deliberate efforts to limit fertility other than “naturally,” such as prolonged breastfeeding and early widowhood.12 This, in fact, was the beginning of the second stage of the Demographic Transition in the Arab societies, namely, high fertility rates despite the decline of death rates, particularly among infants (0–1) and children (1–5). From the 1950s until the early 1980s, as one can see in Table 3.2, the TFRs in the Arab countries, in both the oil-based and the non-oil based, continued to be very high by any international comparison despite the sharp decline in the death rates. These two decades, namely the 1960s and the 1970s, were the peak of the second stage of the Demographic Transition in which the Arab countries, without exception, achieved the

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 1950–2008

Year Country

1950–1955 CBR CDR TFR

Egypt Jordan Syria Lebanon Tunisia Morocco Algeria Saudi Arabia* Kuwait* Oman* Bahrain*

50.6 47.4 50.8 40.2 45.5 51.3 50.2 – – – –

25.4 20.4 19.2 12.9 26.6 20.2 23.1 – – – –

CBR

1960 CDR TFR

6.2 42.9 16.9 7.4 47.4 19.9 7.2 47.9 17.7 5.7 30.9 7.5 6.7 43.1 10.1 6.1 46.1(a) 18.7(a) 7.3 43.4 9.9 – 48.9 22.5 – 44.4 9.7 – 50.0 27.8 – 46.3 14.8

6.1 6.8 7.3 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.1

CBR 35.1 47.5 47.8 34.4 36.4 49.5 49.1 47.9 48.2 50.0(b) 42.8(b)

1970 CDR 15.1 15.7 13.5 9.1 16.0 16.5 16.9 18.1 5.7 19.0(b) 8.0(b)

TFR 5.2 7.1 7.6 5.5 6.5 7.1 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 6.7

CBR

1980 CDR TFR

37.5 10.0 46.9 10.0 45.8 8.3 27.0 7.5 35.2 11.0 45.4 13.6 43.4(c) 13.4 45.9 14.4 48.3 6.1 50.0 13.3 39.8 7.2

5.2 7.3 7.3 4.2 5.3 6.9 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.2 5.7

CBR 30.9 39.0 44.0 25.2(e) 25.8 29.1(f) 31.0 43.0 39.9(e) 44.7 29.8(e)

1990 CDR 7.1 6.0 7.0 4.8(e) 6.4(e) 8.1(f) 6.4(f) 7.0 2.4(e) 7.6 4.8(e)

TFR 4.3 5.8 6.5 2.9(e) 3.7 4.5 5.1 7.1 6.2 6.5(d) 3.9

2000 CBR CDR TFR

CBR

25.7 28.9 28.0 20.5 16.9 18.8 19.4 28.9 36.9 38.7 27.7

27.3 30.1(j) 38.2 21.5(i) 16.1 20.4 20.8 27.6 32.4 27.3 24.1

6.8 3.3 4.7 3.8 4.3 3.8 6.6 2.4 5.8(g) 2.5 3.5(g) 3.1 4.2 2.7 4.0 4.0 2.7 4.9 3.8 6.2 3.9 3.5

2008 CDR 5.8 7.0(j) 4.4 5.6(i) 5.9 5.8 4.9 4.1 3.0 3.3 2.7

TFR 2.9 3.8(j) 3.5 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.4 3.3 4.2(h) 3.3 2.7

– No data available. CBR = crude birth rate. CDR = crude death rate. TFR = total fertility rate. * Nationals only. (a) Data relates to 1962 (b) Data relates to 1971

(c) Data relates to 1981 (d) Data relates to 1988

(e) Data relates to 1992 (f) Data relates to 1993

(g) Data relate to 1999 (h) Data relates to 2005

(i) Data relates to 2007 (j) Data relates to 2009

Sources: Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Cairo); The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Amman); Syrian Arab Republic, CBS, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Damascus); al-Jumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya, al-Ma‘had al-Watani lil-Ihsa, al-Nashriyya al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya Li-Tunis, various years (Tunis); Sultanate of Oman, National Centre for Statistics & Information, Statistical Yearbook (Muscat); idem, Facts & Figures, various issues (Muscat); Kingdom of Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Annual Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Riyadh); idem, Indicators for Fertility by Nationality (Riyadh); Kuwait, CSB, Annual Statistical Abstract, various issues (Kuwait); idem, Annual Bulletin for Vital Statistics: Birth and Death, various issues (Kuwait); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); ECWA/ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, various issues (Beirut, Baghdad and Amman); idem, Statistical Abstract of the ECWA/ESCWA Region, various issues (New York, Baghdad and Amman); idem, Population Situation in the ESCWA Region-1990 (Beirut, May 1992).

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Table 3.2

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8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

1960

Figure 3.2

1970

1990

ain Ba hr

Om an

wa it Ku

Sa A r udi ab ia

Al ge ria

oc co or M

Tu ni sia

Le ba no n

Sy ria

an rd Jo

Eg y

pt

0

2008

Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 1950–2008

highest NIRs in their history and one of the highest worldwide. Thus, for example, in 1980, Egypt’s TFR was 5.2 — a rate similar to that of 1970 despite the decline of the CDR from 25.4 on average during the 1950–1955 period to only 10.0 in 1980. Syria’s TFR in 1980 was the same as it was in 1960 despite the decline of the CDR from almost 20 on average during the 1950–1955 period to only 8.3 in 1980. The TFR of Kuwaiti national women also remained stable at 7.2 during the 1960s and the 1970s despite the sharp decline of the CDR. The TFR of Saudi women in 1980 was also the same as it was in 1960. Why the Arab countries, both non-oil and the oil-based alike, did not follow the common transition pattern that characterized the vast majority of the worldwide developing societies during the 1960s and 1970s of fertility decline following substantial socioeconomic improvement? It appears that there are nine major factors which account for the delay in the fertility decline in the Arab countries: (a) Children as a cheap labor force. In pre-industrial agrarian societies, children constituted an important workforce from a very early age, sometimes even from the age of four or five. Up to and including today, it is very common in Egypt, Morocco, Syria, the Palestinian Territories and even in Jordan, to see small children working in the family fields. It should be remembered that with the exception of Lebanon, Jordan and the GCC countries, until the 1970s all of the Arab countries were still agrarian societies in which more than half of the population resided in rural areas. By 1970, the rural population constituted 58% of Egypt’s total population, 57% in Syria, 61% in Algeria, and 65% in Morocco. Even during the late 1980s, the percentage of the rural population within the total population of the non-oil Arab countries remained

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Table 3.3 The Percentage of the Urban Population within the Total Population in some Arab Countries, 1950–2014 (%) Year Country

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2014

Egypt Syria Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Morocco Algeria Yemen Saudi Arabia Kuwait Oman

31.9 32.7 37.0 32.0 32.3 26.2 22.2 5.8 21.3 61.5 8.6

37.9 36.8 50.9 42.3 37.5 29.4 30.5 9.1 31.2 74.9 16.4

41.5 43.3 56.0 59.5 43.5 34.5 39.5 13.3 48.7 85.7 29.7

43.9 46.7 60.0 73.7 50.6 41.2 43.5 16.5 65.9 94.8 47.6

43.5 48.9 73.3 83.1 57.9 48.4 52.1 20.9 76.6 98.0 66.1

42.8 51.9 79.8 86.0 63.4 53.3 59.9 26.3 79.8 98.1 71.6

43.1 57.3 83.4 87.7 66.6 59.7 70.1 34.0 82.9 98.3 77.2

Sources : ESCWA, Urbanization and Sustainable Development in the Arab Region, Vol. 5, Issue 4 (2015), p. 4, table 2.

% 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Egypt

Syria

Jordan

Lebanon

Tunisia

1950

1970

Morocco

1990

Algeria

Yemen

Saudi Arabia

Oman

2014

Figure 3.3 The Percentage of the Urban Population within the Total Population in some Arab Countries, 1950–2014 (%)

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relatively high by international comparison, amounting to 57% in Egypt, 51% in Syria, 52% in Morocco, and 49% in Algeria in 1990 (see Table 3.3). Consequently, the high percentage of the rural population within the total population had an overall impact on the national average fertility rate in these countries. (b) Children as “social security” for the elder generation. In most developing societies until very recently, and in many countries even today, a national social security system in the Western form of a “welfare state” either does not exist or is inadequate. This refers to the government’s responsibility for providing a “minimum living standard” through elder allowances, children allowances, allowances to poor people, unemployment allowances, disability allowances, and so forth. Such provisions are not available in the Arab countries, with the exception of the GCC states. Moreover, in the poorer Arab societies, the average income, not to mention the income of the lower urban strata or that of the rural population, is not enough to allow anyone to save for a pension. Thus, the major, and sometimes the sole economic security of the elderly population is provided by their male children.13 Consequently, parents attempt to produce the required number of adult boys in order to secure their own future. Three to four adult male children are generally considered as a minimum, meaning that parents in poor agrarian societies would need to have six to eight adult children. Hence, the marked socioeconomic improvement did not translate into economic security for the elderly population, and it was still necessary to depend on their own children. (c) Women’s status. The status of women in any given society has a critical impact on fertility rates.14 Generally speaking, as the status of women rise, fertility rates decline. As long as the woman’s role is to raise children and as long as her status in the extended family is a function of the number of her children, particularly male children, it is in the interest of the woman herself to bear as many children as possible.15 The main argument of the modern feminist literature regarding the family planning issue is: “Women must be the subjects, rather than the objects, of population policy — or population policy simply won’t work.”16 Indeed, Western Europe’s fertility decline since the 1960s has occurred simultaneously with the changing family model from the traditional form of “one breadwinner” to “two breadwinners.” As will be examined in Chapter 6, the Arab societies are no different in this respect. The prominent factor for the huge fertility differences between Tunisia and Lebanon on the one hand, and Yemen and Sudan on the other, lies in this parameter of women’s status. (d) The cultural-religious factor. Throughout history, societies have suffered from high infant and child mortality rates along with low life expectancy. The vast majority of the pre-industrial societies worldwide have adopted socio-cultural and religious concepts that encourage high fertility, including a ban on contraceptive use. In many cultures, including the Islamic culture, early marriage of females is a deeply rooted norm. As Weeks describes it: “Once married, there is immediate pressure to bear a child, in order especially to prove the wife’s fecundity to her husband’s family . . . Youthful marriage is thus part and parcel of the traditional family system, reinforced by (but not necessarily caused by) Islam.”17 Naturally, the vast majority of people conform to the prevailing norms of their own society, including those relating to age of marriage and fertility. With respect to “cultural fertility,” it should be emphasized that in many Arab societies there is no apparent difference between urban and rural patterns. This is best demonstrated in the GCC societies. Although they underwent a rapid urbanization process following the

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discovery of oil (see Table 3.3), fertility rates did not decline in accordance with the Demographic Transition model until the mid-1990s and in some cases even until the early 2000s. One major reason for this, it appears, was that these societies maintained their extended family arrangements and even tribal systems in the cities as well. Another factor accounting for high fertility rates in traditional societies is the absence of openness regarding sex, including the proper use of contraceptives for married women. As a result, a large number of unwanted pregnancies occur even among married couples (see Chapter 6). It can be said in general that the more traditional the society, the lower the willingness to use contraceptives and, consequently, the higher the fertility rates. This argument is supported by research conducted among elites, whose fertility rates traditionally were and still are considerably lower than those found among the lower strata. As noted by Moghadam: “As women from elite families are generally those with the most access to education and employment, fertility is also variable by class.”18 The question is whether the lower number of children among elites is a function of higher educational level, accessibility to contraceptives themselves and knowledge about their proper use, or whether it should be attributed to other factors, such as lower infant and child mortality rates or absence of the need for a large number of children from a purely economic viewpoint. Although this question remains open, it would appear that higher accessibility to contraceptives and family planning knowledge would likely play a role in determining fertility behavior and reducing fertility rates, given the considerable number of unwanted pregnancies in developing societies. (e) Early age at first marriage. Another important factor contributing to the high fertility rates in the Arab countries was the early marriage of women, which is clearly evident from the population censuses and the demographic surveys which have been conducted in the Arab countries since the 1960s. For example, according to the 1960 Syrian census, the average age at first marriage for females was 19.5 years. According to the 1978-SFS, 52.5% of the females aged 45–49 were married before the age of 20.19 According to the 2003–EIDHS, 60.8% of the Egyptian women aged 45–49 were married before the age of 20 and as high as 85.8% before the age of 25.20 The result of 2012–JPFHS is no different: while 34.1% of the Jordanian women in the 45–49 age group were married before the age of 20, this rate was only 19.4% among women in the 20–24 age group.21 However, the median and average age at first marriage for women in almost all of the Arab countries has increased considerably since the 1970s, with the exception of Yemen where early age at first marriage continues to be very common.22 For example, whereas in 1956 only 43% of the women aged 15–24 in Tunisia were unmarried, this rate dramatically increased to 75% in 1980.23 By 1995, only 3% of Tunisian women under 20 years old were married.24 One finds a similar phenomenon of increased age at first marriage among Syrian women. According to the 1993–SMCHS, the median age at first marriage increased from 18 years for women aged 35–39 to 20 years for women aged 25–29.25 Also in Bahrain the median age at first marriage rose from 15 years for women currently aged 45–49, to 21 years for women currently aged 30–34 and to 23 years for women currently aged 25–29.26 It should be taken into consideration, however, that despite the increase in the average age of women at first marriage, in most of the Arab countries early marriages remained quite common during the 1980s as well. For example, according to the 1993SMCHS, 2.4% of women aged 20–24 were married between the ages of 10 to 14.27 In

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the case of Egypt, according to the 2003–EIDHS, as many as 36.3% of the women aged 20–24 were married before the age of 20 and 18.5% were married before the age of 18.28 In Morocco, despite the marked fertility decline during the 1980s, in 2004, the age specific fertility rate (ASFR29) for the age group of 15–19 was still considerable at 19.1 per 1,000 women.30 Since the rise in age at first marriage has occurred simultaneously with the considerable lengthening of the reproductive period, the older age at first marriage did not translate into a reduction in the length of the reproductive period within the marriage framework. Consequently, the higher age at first marriage did not affect the overall fertility rates. (f) High marriage stability. Another prominent characteristic of Arab-Islamic societies that has implications for fertility rates is the low divorce rates. For example, according to the 1978-SFS, 92.9% of the women who participated in the survey reported that they were still married to their first husbands. Among the remaining 7.1%, only 3.1% were divorced.31 From the 1993–SMCHS data, it appears that 95% of the women who participated in the survey were still married to their first husbands.32 The marriage stability in the GCC societies was even higher than in the non-oil Arab societies. The 1987–SACHS indicated that almost all of the Saudi women participating in the survey were still married to their first husbands.33 According to the GFHS (carried out during 1995–1998), the percentage of divorcees within the total participants was 2.9% in Bahrain and the UAE, 3.4% in Kuwait, 3.8% in Oman, 3.2% in Qatar and 2.1% in Saudi Arabia.34 (g) Political instability. In times of war and intensive international political conflicts, the authorities tend to be more focused on managing the situation at hand rather than on operating in line with long-term socioeconomic calculations. Moreover, in many cases, it appears that the basic instinct of both the authorities and the public itself is to treat a large population as a security-political asset. The Arab–Israeli conflict constitutes a good example in which each side has attempted to increase its population as a political-security asset. Since many of the Arab countries were involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict, either directly or indirectly, or in other regional conflicts (such as the Iraq–Iran War, 1980–1988), the issue of family planning was widely neglected until the mid-1980s and in some countries even until the early 1990s (see Chapter 6). Higher fertility levels are also desired in cases of local tribal conflicts or in rural areas where the presence of a central authority is ineffective in enforcing law and order, thereby creating the need for as many fighters as possible.35 In the case of the GCC societies, in which the political structure was and to a large extent still is based on “tribal politics” and Asabiyya (group solidarity),36 each tribe has an incentive to increase the number of its members. The phenomenon of a “pro-natalist environment” in periods of political-security tension, however, is not limited to the Arab states alone, and similar situations existed during the 1960s and 1970s in Southeast Asia. Thus, for example, in 1977, Shin Hyon Hwack, South Korea’s Minister of Health and Social Affairs, was worried that the success of South Korea’s family planning policy would leave the country at a disadvantage in the conflict with North Korea, despite the fact that South Korea’s population outnumbered North Korea’s by 20 million! Likewise, Thai leaders were worried that the larger population of neighboring Vietnam would give them the advantage in times of conflict between the two countries. A similar phenomenon prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s among South American leaders as well.37

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(h) The socioeconomic policy. The policy of al-Ishtiraqiyya al-‘Arabiyya (“Arab Socialism”) which was adopted during the 1950s and 1960s in all the non-oil Arab countries (with the exception of Lebanon) in effect promoted higher fertility, although it was not its initial intention. In retrospect, it seems that one of the major obstacles to Egypt’s successful first family planning plan during the second half of the 1960s was the high subsidies provided for basic foodstuffs, healthcare facilities, educational services, transportation, electricity, gasoline, housing and the like. In effect, this policy created a situation in which the government, rather than parents, was responsible for providing the basic needs of children (see Chapter 6). It should be noted that in the Arab monarchies which did not adopt the Arab Socialism policy, many socialist components were adopted, particularly in the area of substantial governmental subsidies along with large-scale public sector employment (see Chapter 4). (i) The absence of national family planning programs. The Arab countries, with the exception of Tunisia, were among the latest worldwide to implement effective national family planning programs. In retrospect, it appears that avoiding the adoption of comprehensive national family planning programs contributed to the continuing high fertility rates in many of the Arab countries during the 1970s and 1980s, and in some, such as Syria, Jordan and Algeria, during the 1990s as well. A major factor accounting for this avoidance was the effects of the “oil boom” (see Chapter 6).

3

Arab Fertility Decline since the mid-1980s

Since the mid-1980s, fertility rates in all of the Arab countries, even in Yemen and Sudan although to a lesser extent, started to decline. Thus, for example, Egypt’s TFR in 1990 was 4.3 compared to 5.2 in 1970 and 1980. The CBR declined accordingly from 37.5 in 1980 to 30.9 in 1990. Tunisia’s TFR in 1990 was 3.7 compared to 5.3 in 1980. Even in the Arab countries that did not have an anti-natalist policy the fertility rates substantially declined during the 1980s. In Algeria, the TFR declined from 7.3 in 1980 to 5.1 in 1990. In Bahrain it declined from 5.7 to 3.9 and in Kuwait from 7.2 to 6.2 during the corresponding period (see Table 3.2). This trend picked up speed throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. By 2000, Egypt’s CBR was 25.7 compared to 30.9 in 1990. Tunisia’s CBR had declined from 25.8 in 1990 to 16.9 in 2000 while its TFR declined from 3.7 to 2.5 during the corresponding period. Algeria’s TFR in 2000 was 2.7 compared to 5.1 in 1990, while that of Morocco declined from 4.5 to 3.1 during that decade. The most dramatic decline occurred in the GCC countries. In the case of Bahrain, the TFR declined from 6.7 in 1971 to 4.5 in 1988, 3.3 in 1998 and reached 2.7 in 2004 — lower than in most of the non-oil Arab countries. Bahrain’s dramatic fertility decline was due mainly to the sharp decline in the fertility rates of young women in the ages 15–29. The combined ASFR per 3,000 women in the ages 15–29 declined from 1,027 in 1971 to 450 in 1985 and reached a low level of 281 in 2004. Thus, while in 1971 one of three Bahraini women in the 15–29 age group gave birth in that year, this rate declined to less than 9% in 2004 (see Table 3.4). In the case of Saudi Arabia, until the mid-1990s, the TFR was extremely high; in fact almost without any change from the 1970s. By 1994, the TFR of the Saudi women was 6.1,38 compared to 7.3 in 1970 — prior to the “oil boom” (see Table 3.2). By 2004, only a decade later, the TFR of Saudi women was 3.6 and further declined to less than 3.2 in 2010.39

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Arab Population Growth Table 3.4

Bahrain’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1971–2013 (nationals only, per 1,000 women)

Year Age Group 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR

1970

1985

1992

1998

2004

2010

2013

288 411 328 188 95 24 6 6.7

37 164 249 227 130 56 42 4.53

18.0 133.9 205.3 193.5 138.8 60.1 21.9 3.86

18.3 126.7 171.1 182.1 117.1 42.8 8.3 3.33

13.0 103.3 164.6 122.9 98.2 31.1 2.8 2.68

9.2 101.4 166.4 146.8 91.4 29.1 3.1 2.72

10.9 102.8 165.1 145.3 93.0 27.5 2.9 2.74

Sources: Kingdom of Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); Statistical Abstract, various issues (Manama); UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Fertility Patterns-2009 (New York, 2010); UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Fertility Data-2012.

Hence, the fertility rates of all of the Arab countries had declined during the last 15 years of the twentieth century. However, while in the poorer non-oil Arab countries this decline started in the 1980s, and in some of them even in the 1970s, in the GCC states the decline started during the 1990s. What factors are responsible for this general fertility decline among all of the Arab countries since the mid-1980s? Why has this process taken place almost simultaneously during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s in almost all the Arab countries, regardless of whether they were pro-natalist oil-based or non-oil anti-natalist Per 1,000 women 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

15_19

20_24

25_29

1970

Figure 3.4

30_34

1985

35_39

1998

40_44

45_49

2013

Bahrain’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1971–2013 (nationals only, per 1,000 women)

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countries? It seems that the following factors can provide a satisfactory explanation to this question: (a) A sharp drop in infant and child mortality rates. Until the mid-twentieth century, infant and child mortality rates in the Arab countries were very high, amounting to almost one-third of live births. Since the 1950s, however, under-5 mortality rates in all of the Arab countries radically declined. In the Arab countries, it should be noted, the pace of the decline of the under-5 mortality rates during the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s was faster than in most other developing countries worldwide — a direct result of the “oil boom” that led to a sharp improvement in the living standards.40 Thus, as one can see in Table 3.5 (overleaf) and the corresponding Figure 3.5 below, while Egypt’s IMR was 179 per 1,000 live births in 1960, this rate declined to 60 in 1990 and to only 15 in 2013. In Jordan the IMR declined from 135 in 1960 to 17 in 2014 and in Tunisia from 159 to 16 during the corresponding period. The most radical decline was in the GCC states, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The under-5 mortality rate declined accordingly. In the case of Egypt, it declined from 244 per 1,000 live births on average during the 1965–1969 period, to 36 in 2004 and 21 in 2012. In Jordan the under-5 mortality rate declined from an average of 139 during the 1960–1964 period, to 26 on average during the 1995–1999 period and to 19 in 2012. In Algeria it dropped from 262 on average during the 1955–1959 period to 20 in 2012 and in Morocco from an average of 161 during the 1965–1969 period to 31 in 2012. As in the other health indicators, the most radical decline occurred in the GCC states. In Kuwait the under-5 mortality rate declined from 106 on average during the 1960–1964 to 11 in 2012.41 As a result of the sharp decline in the under-5 mortality rates, the “desired number of children” could be reached by having a much lower number of births. Once the Per 1,000 live births 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Algeria

Tunisia

Morocco

1960

Figure 3.5

Egypt

Jordan

1980

Iraq

Saudi Arabia 2000

Infant Mortality Rate in some Arab Countries, 1960–2014

Oman

2014

Kuwait

Bahrain

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Arab Population Growth

Table 3.5 Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy (both sexes) in some Arab Countries, 1960–2014 Year Country

1960 IMR LE

1970 IMR LE

1980 IMR LE

1990 IMR LE

Algeria Tunisia Morocco Egypt Jordan Syria Iraq Saudi Arabia Oman Kuwait Bahrain

165 159 163 179 135 132 139 185 193 89 128

139 127 120 144 90 98 104 128 158 49 74

98 72 99 124 58 67 78 91 128 34 75

67 65 50 44 67 22 67 62 41 60 66 46 40 69 30 43 66 25 63 65 103 65 65 18 66(a) 61(a) 18 14(a) 75(a) 9 33(a) 71(a) 16

47 48 47 46 47 50 47 43 39 60 56

53 54 52 51 52 55 51 52 44 66 62

59 62 56 55 63 65 56 60 49 70 64

2000 2005 IMR LE IMR LE 70 70 68 67 70 71 58 73 72 76 74

31 25 42 33 17 30 50 13 20 10 17

73 75 71 71 78 70 69 76 73 77 74

2014 IMR LE 21 16 26 15(c) 17 – 37 16 10 8(b) 8(c)

74 76 74 71 74 – 69 74 77 74 76

IMR = Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births. LE = Life expectancy at birth (years, both sexes). (a) Data relates to 1988 (nationals only). (b) Data relates to 2012. (c) Data reletes to 2013. Sources: Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Key Indicators (Riyadh); WB, World Tables, 1984–1995, various issues (Washington, D.C.); idem, African Development Indicators, various issues (Washington, D.C.); ECWA/ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the ECWA/ESCWA Region, various issues (Baghdad, Amman and Beirut); idem, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 1978–2001, various issues (Baghdad, Amman and Beirut). UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); ECA, African Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Tunis).

parents were convinced that the survival chances of their offspring indeed markedly increased, they naturally reacted by reducing fertility. The period between the reduction of the under-5 mortality rates and the beginning of fertility decline constituted the second stage of the Demographic Transition.42 (b) Rapid urbanization. All of the population censuses and demographic surveys conducted in developing societies, including the Arab countries, point to the fact that the fertility rates in urban centers were and still are much lower than those in rural areas. The process of transformation from agrarian to urbanized economy not only led to profound socioeconomic changes, but influenced fertility patterns as well. This phenomenon occurred in both the oil-based Arab economies and the poorer countries alike. For example, according to the 1989-OCHS, while the TFR in the Omani urban centers averaged 5.3, it was as high as 9.1 in the rural areas.43 A similar trend was found in the 1995-OFHS, according to which the TFR in urban centers averaged 6.6, compared to 8.0 in rural areas.44 According to the 1993-SMCHS data, while the TFR in Syrian urban centers averaged 3.6, this number was 5.1 in the countryside.45 According to the 2001–SFHS, the TFR in urban centers averaged 3.4, compared to

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4.4 in rural areas. The Syrian 2004 census results recorded that the TFR in urban centers was 3.2 compared to 4.1 in rural areas.46 According to 2002–JPFHS, while the TFR in Jordanian urban centers averaged 3.5, it was 4.2 in rural areas. The same gap was evident in the 2012–JPFHS as well.47 Likewise, in Morocco, according to the National Survey on Population and Health–1992, the TFR in urban areas averaged 2.5 — less than half of the 5.5 in rural areas.48 By 2004, the TFR in the Moroccan urban centers had declined to the replacement level of 2.1, compared to 3.1 in rural areas.49 In the other North African countries, one can find a similar trend of much higher fertility rates in rural areas than in urban centers.50 Overall, as the percentage of the urban population was higher, the fertility rate was lower. One major reason for the continuation of extremely high fertility rates in Yemen, almost without change, even in the 1990s — 6.5 in 199651 — was the low percentage of the urban population within the total population (see Table 3.3). In general, it seems that the reasons for the considerably lower fertility rates in the major cities than in the countryside are five-fold: (1) In the urban centers, children, in most cases, no longer constitute an economic asset to their parents. (2) The cost of housing in major cities is much higher than in the countryside. This factor is particularly important among the middle class which on the one hand wants a better living standard, including better housing conditions, while on the other hand does not have the financial ability to acquire large apartments in major cities. This factor, it seems, is common to both developed and developing countries worldwide. Among the lower urban classes in the developing countries, as will be examined below, not only do many families live in informal housing in the cities’ suburbs, but their children also constitute a major economic asset. These children are employed in the informal sector. On one of my visits to Cairo, there was a young child of around ten years old in front of my hotel who “pounced” on every tourist, offering to carry suitcases or to summon a taxi. Monitoring his activities from the sidelines, I calculated that this child earned much more money in tips than the average salary of an adult male in the middle rank of the Egyptian public sector. No doubt, this child was a major contributor to his family’s income. In such cases, of course, all cost/benefit calculations of raising children in the cities are rendered irrelevant. According to The World Bank figures, more than 18% of the children in Egypt aged 10 to 14 were working in 1980, though this rate declined to 11% in 199652 and further declined to 8% in 2005.53 This rate was 13% in Morocco in the late 1990s and 7% in Syria in 2006.54 Hence, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, child labor was still a common phenomenon in the poorer Arab countries. According to data collected by the Arab League, this phenomenon expanded in the early 2000s, particularly in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon,55 as a result of increasing unemployment and decreasing real wages. Although we do not yet have hard data, it seems that this phenomenon of child labor probably increased following the beginning of the Arab Spring as a result of the overall economic deterioration (see Chapter 4). (3) In the oil-based and the poorer Arab countries alike, the higher education system is concentrated in the major cities, making for greater accessibility to higher education in those areas. The result is a higher than average educational level of women in the cities, particularly in the capitals. Since women’s educational level represents one of the two paramount factors impacting fertility rates, the increased percentage of the

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urban population within the total population contributed to a decline in the national average fertility rate. (4) Women’s employment patterns in the cities are not conducive to taking small children with them to their jobs, like they tend to do on the household farm in the countryside. (5) The social and cultural environment in rural areas is much more conductive to higher fertility than in urban centers, particularly the major cities.56 (c) The sharp improvement in women’s educational level. From population censuses and demographic surveys conducted during the past four decades in developing societies worldwide, it appears that women’s educational level is a major factor in determining fertility behavior. The higher the woman’s educational level, the lower the number of children. For example, according to the 1995–EDHS, while the TFR for illiterate Egyptian women averaged 4.5, this number sharply declined to 3.0 among women with secondary education and above.57 In the 2014–EDHS, one can find the same pattern with the mean number of children ever born for women in the 40–49 age group with no schooling was 4.3 compared to 3.2 for women with secondary education and above.58 In the case of Jordan, according to the 2012–JPFHS, the mean number of children ever born to women in the 40–49 age group with no formal education was 5.8 compared to 3.9 for women with higher education.59 According to the 2000–Palestinian Health Survey, while the average TFR in the 1997–1999 years among women with 13 years of schooling and above was 3.4, this rate was 5.4 among women with 1–6 years of schooling.60 In terms of the huge fertility gap created by women’s educational level, there were no differences between the oil-based and the poorer Arab countries. Thus, for example, according to the 1995-OFHS, while the TFR among illiterate Omani women averaged 8.6, this rate declined to 4.7 among women with preparatory education and even further declined to 3.8 among those with secondary education and above.61 A comparable trend can also be found in the 1987–Kuwait Child Health Survey.62 The correlation between women’s education and fertility rates is so high that the fertility rate of minimally educated women, that is women who can read and write only, is substantially lower than among illiterate women. The marked fertility decline among the Saudi and the Qatari women which occurred during the past decade without a massive increase in their labor force participation rate (see Chapter 4), provide indisputable proof for the crucial factor of women’s educational level for fertility patterns. Overall, the high correlation between women’s educational level and fertility rates can be summarized as follows: (1) The higher the woman’s educational level, the greater her tendency to marry at an older age, in most cases after the completion of her education. Thus, for example, according to the 2012–JPFHS while the median age for first marriage for Jordanian women with no formal education was 21.9 years, it was 25.0 for women with higher education.63 (2) The higher the woman’s educational level, the greater her tendency to work outside the home. Since having a large number of small children acts as a hindrance to a woman’s career, women working outside the household tend to have fewer children. According to the Syrian 1970 census, for example, the average number of children ever born to women who were economically active in non-agricultural occupations was 3.9, compared to 5.4 on average among women who were engaged in agriculture.64 According to the 2014–EDHS, while only 11.2% of the Egyptian women with no formal education were employed, this rate was 20.5% among women with a secondary

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educational level and above.65 The same pattern of much higher labor force participation rate among educated women was found in the 2012–JFHS: While 81.9% of the Jordanian women with no formal education were never employed, this rate was only 36.6% among women with higher education.66 (3) Since there is a high correlation between educational level and salary level, the “lost income” of educated women for each additional child is higher than that of uneducated women, particularly those working in the family fields. (4) Educated women usually have a better understanding of the correlation between the number of children and their standard of living. Consequently, they tend, naturally, to bear fewer children in line with the “consumption aspiration model.”67 (5) Educated women tend to be more aware of the various family planning options and thus have better knowledge of contraceptive methods and their proper use, thereby, to a large extent avoiding the probability of unwanted pregnancies. Therefore, the number of children ever born to educated woman is, in most cases, close to the desired number of children. (6) Educated women in developing societies are more aware of the outside world. They are fully aware of the basic contradiction between a modern lifestyle and having a large number of children. This basic contradiction has various features, but it is most illustrated through the basic contradiction between the acquisition of modern consumer goods on the one hand, and large families, i.e., smaller per capita income, on the other.68 As one can see in Table 3.6, in each of the Arab countries since the 1950s “an educational revolution” has occurred. Examination of the educational expenditure in the Arab countries reveals that each of them devoted a substantial percentage of their budgets to education. This was true even in periods of severe recession. Thus, for example, in 1985–1987, during the time of the lowest oil prices since the October 1973 “oil boom” (see Table 5.1), the outlay for education of the total governmental expenditure amounted to 15.8% in Jordan, 14.0% in Syria, 14.8% in Tunisia, and as much as 21.5% in Morocco. This high investment in education continued into the 1990s and the 2000s as well. Therefore, during the years 2002–2004, the average public spending on education of the total governmental expenditures amounted, for example, to 18.2% in Tunisia and to as much as 26.4% in Morocco — more than twice as much as in many developed countries worldwide.69 Thus, while until the 1950s, education in all Arab societies was concentrated almost totally among the elites, since then, it has rapidly spread to the lower strata, as education at all levels has become free of charge. Consequently, while the literacy rate among Egyptian women in 1970 was 20%, it increased to 44% in 2000 and 86% in the early 2010s. In Jordan, the female literacy rate increased from 29% in 1970 to 99% in the early 2010s and in Oman from a mere 12% in 1985 to 98% in the early 2010s (see Table 3.6). The 10.1% “leftovers” of female illiteracy rate which remained in 2013 in the Arab region is almost totally made up of elderly women (60 and above) who were of schooling age before the 1960s.70 As for higher educational level, by 2014 the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER71) for females in the tertiary educational level amounted to 24% in Morocco, 42% in Algeria, 52% in Jordan in 2012 and as high as 60% in Saudi Arabia in 2014.72 (d) Increased employment opportunities for women. As will be examined in Chapter 4, since the 1980s, but particularly since the early 2000s, there has been a steady rise in the economically active participation rates of women in all of the Arab countries, even in the GCC states which traditionally did not encourage female employment. Among the Arab countries, it is the Tunisian women that have both the highest labor force

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Table 3.6 Literacy Rates among Males and Females in some Arab Countries,1970, 1985, 2000–2001, 2005–2013 (%) Year Country Egypt Syria Jordan Tunisia Morocco Algeria Saudi Arabia Kuwait Oman

1970 Males Females 50 60 64 44 34 39 15 65 –

20 20 29 17 10 11 2 42 –

1985 Males Females 59 76 87 68 45 63 71 76 47

30 43 63 41 22 37 31 63 12

2000–2001 Males Females 67 88 95 81 62 78 84 85 80

44 61 84 61 36 57 67 80 62

2005–2013 Males Females 92 97 99 98 89 94 99 99 97

86 95 99 96 74 89 99 99 98

Sources: PRB, Population Reference Bureau Data Finder; UNDP, Human Development Report, various issues (New York).

participation rates and the lowest fertility rates. The same patterns can be found among the Lebanese women. (e) Increased family planning activities. Since the mid-1980s, following the end of the “oil decade,” the activities of the Arab governments in the family planning area, both direct and indirect, were largely intensified. Even in countries such as Syria, Jordan, Oman and Algeria, which had previously implemented hidden indirect antinatalist measures, family planning activities became open and targeted since the early 1990s (see Chapter 6). (f) Changing socioeconomic policies. The substantial macroeconomic policy changes in the entire world since the 1980s (“the Washington Consensus”73), have constituted a major factor in fertility decline among many developing societies worldwide, including the poorer non-oil Arab countries. The basic assumption of the capitalist approach is that the fundamental responsibility for supporting children lies with their parents, as opposed to the state under the socialist-étatist approach. In this regard, it must be recognized that in many of the Arab countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and Syria, the declining fertility rates and the withdrawal from the socialist policy occurred simultaneously. The adoption of the market economy involved the narrowing of many state subsidies, leading to a general increase in the cost of raising children. Even among the Palestinians refugees in the Occupied Territories, despite the pronatalist approach,74 and despite the low female labor force participation rate,75 during the past decade and a half there was a marked fertility decline. By 2010, the TFR in the West Bank was 3.8 compared to 5.6 in 1997 and in the Gaza Strip the decline was from 6.9 to 4.9.76 The paramount reason for this marked decline, despite the low female labor force participation rates and despite the continuation of the pro-natalist approach, was, no doubt, the improvement in female educational level. Hence, it is no surprise that Yemen — the country with the lowest percentage of the urban population (26.3% only in 2000, see Table 3.3), the lowest female educational level (7.7 years of schooling on average for females in 2014 77) and the lowest female labor force participation rates — has the highest fertility rate among all of the Arab countries: 5.2 in 2005 (see Table 3.7).

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Arab Population Growth Table 3.7

Yemen’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1977–2005 (per 1,000 women)

Year Age Group

1977

1990

1996

2002

2005

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR

175 346 346 334 229 197 75 8.51

102 283 315 284 258 172 120 7.67

105 279 301 258 196 105 54 6.49

83 245 286 255 182 111 69 6.16

80 211 247 221 156 78 39 5.16

Source: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Fertility Data-2012.

4

The Impact of the Arab Spring: The Reversal of the Fertility Patterns

Following the beginning of the Arab Spring, however, the trend of gradual fertility decline in the non-oil Arab countries largely reversed. In some countries, not only did the fertility rate stop declining, it even slightly increased. Egypt’s TFR in both 2013 and 2014 was higher by 0.8 child than in 2009 and 2010 (see Table 3.8). Overall, in 2012, the number of births in Egypt was 560,000 higher than in 2010. This increase is the highest ever in Egyptian demographic history!78 Thus, while in 2010, the last year of Mubarak’s regime, Egypt’s population increase nominally by 1.7 million, this number has increased by 100,000 each year since then. The main increase in the fertility rate was in the age group of 20–29, which was the main target of the anti-natalist policy implemented under Mubarak’s regime. Therefore, while Egypt’s ASFR for the 20–24 age group was 169 in 2008, it increased sharply to 213 in 2014. In the 25–29 age group, the increase was from 185 to 200, again a substantial increase of 8% (see Table 3.9). The reason for this substantial fertility rise is no doubt the halt in the governmental anti-natalist activities following the collapse of Mubarak’s regime (see Chapter 6). Although the fertility rate in Jordan did not increase following the onset of the Arab Spring, it did not decline either and remained at the high level of 3.5 during the 2012–2014 period. This stagnation in the fertility rates following the beginning of the Arab Spring was evident in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as well. However, while in the case of Tunisia this stagnation maintains the fertility rate at around the replacement-level, in the cases of Jordan and Morocco it keeps the fertility rate much above the replacement-level. As for Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, if they can still be defined as “states” at all, demographic patterns as all other socioeconomic data have not been collected since the start of their civil wars. In the GCC pro-natalist states, on the other hand, the trend of gradual fertility decline continued in the first half of the 2010s as well. Thus, in 2014, the TFR of Saudi women dropped to below 3 — less than half compared to 1990. Even more interesting is the fact that in recent years, the Saudi TFR is substantially lower than that of Egypt which implemented anti-natalist policies since the mid-1960s. In Oman

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Table 3.8

Natural Increase Rate and Total Fertility Rate in some Arab Countries, 2009–2014

Year Country

2009 CBR CDR

TFR

CBR

2010 CDR

TFR

CBR

2011 CDR

TFR

CBR

2012 CDR

TFR

CBR

2013 CDR

Egypt Jordan Tunisia Morocco Algeria Saudi Arabia* Oman* Bahrain* Kuwait*

28.8 30.1 17.7 20.3 24.1 27.2 29.5 24.8 23.7

2.9 3.8 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.2 3.3 2.8 –

28.7 30.1 18.6 18.8 24.7 26.7 31.0 23.8 31.9

6.1 7.0 5.7 5.6 4.4 4.1 5.1 2.5 2.7

2.9 3.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.2 3.7 2.7 –

30.3 28.9 18.8 19.2 24.8 26.3 31.2 23.0 30.2

6.1 7.0 5.9 5.8 4.4 4.0 3.9 2.6 2.5

2.8 3.8 2.2 2.6 2.2 3.1 3.7 2.5 –

31.9 28.1 19.9 22.6 26.1 25.8 32.1 24.6 30.1

6.4 7.0 5.8 6.3 4.5 4.0 3.7 2.6 2.8

2.8 3.5 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.7 2.7 –

31.0 28.1 20.3 18.3 25.1 25.4 33.8 24.6 28.7

6.0 7.0 5.6 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.7

5.8 7.0 5.9 5.8 5.1 4.1 4.5 2.6 3.1

2014 TFR CBR CDR TFR 3.5 3.5 2.2 2.1 2.8 3.0 3.9 2.7 3.9

31.3 26.7 17.0 22.5 25.9 24.8 33.9 – –

6.1 6.0 5.7 6.3 4.4 3.9 3.6 – –

3.5 3.5 2.0 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.9 – –

Sources: Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Cairo); The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Amman); Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de la Santé, Enquête Nationale sur la Population et la Santé Familiale (ENPSF)2011,Rapport Préliminaire (Rabat, 2011); al-Jumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya, al-Ma‘had al-Watani lil-Ihsa, al-Nashriyya al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya Li-Tunis, various years (Tunis); Sultanate of Oman, National Centre for Statistics and Information, Statistical Yearbook (Muscat); Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); African Development Bank Group, African Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Tunis); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Annual Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Riyadh); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Indicators for Fertility by Nationality (Riyadh); State of Kuwait, Central statistical Bureau, Annual Bulletin for Vital Statistics: Births and Deaths, various issues (Kuwait); PRB, World Population Data Sheets, various years (Washington, D.C.); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various years (New York);

Arab Population Growth

– No data available. CBR = crude birth rate. CDR = crude death rate. TFR = total fertility rate. * Nationals only.

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4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

Egypt

Jordan 2009

Tunisia 2011

Morocco 2013

Algeria

2014

Figure 3.6

Total Fertility Rate in some non-Oil Arab Countries, 2009–2014

Table 3.9

Egypt’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1960–2014 (per 1,000 women)

Year Age Group

1960

1970

1980

1988

2000

2005

2008

2014

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR

34 219 343 366 196 58 18 6.2

32 204 236 240 173 100 44 5.1

78 256 280 239 139 53 12 5.3

72 220 243 182 118 41 6 4.4

51 196 208 147 75 24 4 3.5

48 175 194 125 63 19 2 3.1

50 169 185 122 59 17 2 3.0

56 213 200 134 69 17 4 3.5

Sources: Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook-2014, table 3–5; US Bureau of Census, A Compilation of Age-Specific Fertility Rates for Developing Countries, International Research Document, No. 7 (New York: US, US Bureau of Census, December 1979), p. 16.

the TFR declined from 6.2 in 2000 to 3.9 in 2014, while in Bahrain it remained stable at 2.7 — the lowest among all of the Arab countries with the exception of Tunisia and Lebanon. Overall, while until the 1990s the fertility rates in the pro-natalist GCC countries was much higher than those in the non-oil Arab countries, in recent years this trend has turned around.

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Per 1,000 women 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

15_19

20_24

1960

Figure 3.7

25_29

1980

30_34

2000

35_39

2008

40_44

45_49

2014

Egypt’s Age Specific Fertility Rate, 1960–2014 (per 1,000 women)

5

The Factor of Religion in Fertility Differentials

A crucial question in the area of fertility patterns in the Arab countries is the “factor of religion.” Is there any correlation between fertility patterns and religion in the Arab countries? This question, although crucial from a socio-political viewpoint, not to mention its academic interest, cannot be answered, as none of the Arab countries, as was examined in Chapter 2, publish socio-demographic data according to an ethno-religious differential. Moreover, the rapid urbanization process that occurred in each of the Arab countries, combined with the large-scale internal migration, abolished the tradition of settlement according religion and ethnicity. Although there are some exceptions to this “shifting settlement pattern,” such as the concentration of the Kurds in Northern Syria and Iraq, the Druze in the Syrian Jabel Druze and the Shi‘a concentration in al-Hassa province in Saudi Arabia, even in these cases, it is impossible to estimate the fertility patterns of each administrative because there is no official vital statistics data according to administrative areas. Israel is an exception in this respect, as it is the only Middle Eastern country which publishes fertility data according to religion (see Chapter 2). By 2014, the TFR of the Israeli-Muslims was 3.35, down from 4.57 on average during the 2000–2004 years and 9.23 on average during the 1960–1964 years — the highest rate measured ever in any

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given society.79 The sharp decline in the TFR of the Israeli-Muslims since 2003 occurred simultaneously with the sharp decline in the Israeli child allowances and the other pro-natalist financial benefits. Were the Israeli-Muslims in 2014 less religious than a decade or two earlier? The answer is a definitive no, as during the past two decades the Islamic movement in Israel substantially strengthened. In many Muslims non-Arab societies worldwide, the fertility rates declined radically in response either to an anti-natalist policy or as a response to tremendous socioeconomic changes. This was the case in Bangladesh and Indonesia — two Muslim countries where fertility rates radically declined during the past generation.80 Another interesting question relates to the Sunni–Shi‘a fertility differential: Are there any differences in the fertility rates between Sunnis and Shi‘is in the same country? In the case of Bahrain, although the authorities do not publish demographic data according to religion, the various informal sources reveal that the fertility rate among the Shi‘is is higher than among the Sunnis. However, specifically in the case of Bahrain, it seems that the higher fertility rate among the Shi‘is is a direct response to their much lower socioeconomic condition as compared to the Sunnis, and not a result of the fact that they are Shi‘is.81 With respect to the Lebanese Shi‘is, although the Lebanese authorities do not publish demographic data according to religion, it appears that the fertility rate of the Shi‘is is quite low in comparison to any other Arab-Shi‘a community. This assertion is based on the following logical assumption: As the Shi‘is in Lebanon constitute at least half of the total population, and Lebanon’s TFR was estimated at 1.7 on average during 2010–2015 years,82 it is not possible that the TFR among the Lebanese Shi‘is is currently higher than the replacement-level. Thus, by the early 2010s, not only was Iran’s (where more than 90% of its population are Shi‘is) TFR substantially below the replacement-level (see Table 1.9), but also that of the Lebanese Shi‘is. The only “mystery” in this respect is the fertility rates of the Saudi Shi‘is. Thus, one could conclude that the TFR of the Shi‘is in the Middle East is lower than that of the Sunnis. In general, in the case of the Arab societies, it appears that the “factor of religion,” by itself, does not have any influence on fertility rates. The fertility deferential between Sunnis and Shi‘is in Bahrain, between the Druze and the Christians on the one hand and the Muslims on the other hand in Israel are a direct response to the socioeconomic gaps rather than to a different religious approach toward fertility behavior.

6

The Revolution in Mortality Rates and its Consequences

The tremendous increase in the NIRs of the Arab countries since the mid-twentieth century, as in many other developing societies worldwide (see Chapter 1), was a result of the sharp decline in CDRs. The causes for the “Arab death rate revolution” were many and varied. It was a process that started in Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth century at a slow pace, and later spread over other regions of the Ottoman Empire in line with economic developments and the adoption of a market economy. At that time, the most important factor accounting for the declining death rates in the Middle East was the improvement of the roads, which for the first time allowed for the transfer of food in considerable quantities from one location to another. This provided

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the means for overcoming starvation as well as the accompanying diseases that had previously blighted the area. Another important factor was the stabilization of the political regimes in the area, first in Egypt under Muhammad ‘Ali (1805–1848) and later in the other regions of the Ottoman Empire as part of the Tanzimât.83 According to prevailing estimates, the Middle Eastern average CDR declined from 42–44 at the end of the eighteenth century to 32–34 at the end of the nineteenth century.84 During the first half of the twentieth century, the rapid decline in death rates in the Arab regions was mainly the result of the sharp improvement and expansion of healthcare services, including preventive health services. The rise in the living standard also contributed to the declining death rates. For example, Egypt’s CDR declined from 28.4 in 1907 to 21.4 in 1947.85 Thus, the decline of Egypt’s CDRs, although slow, was steady. A similar process of slow but steady decline in death rates occurred in other Arab countries during the Mandatory period as well. During the second half of the twentieth century, however, the process of declining death rates strongly accelerated in all the Arab countries. In the case of Egypt, the CDR declined from 24.5 on average during the 1950–1955 period, to 15.1 in 1970, 6.8 in 2000 and 5.8 in 2008. In Tunisia the CDR declined from 26.6 on average during the 1950–1955 period, to 5.9 in 2008. In the other non-oil Arab countries one can find the same trend of a radical and rapid decline of the CDRs during the second half of the twentieth century (see Table 3.2). In the GCC countries, the decline in the CDRs was faster than in the non-oil Arab countries. In 1960, Oman was the country with the highest CDR among all of the Arab countries and one of the highest rate worldwide — 27.8 per 1,000 people. Only two decades later, in 1980, Oman’s CDR declined to 13.3 and reached only 3.3 — one of the lowest worldwide — in 2008. Saudi Arabia’s CDR declined from 22.5 in 1960 to only 4.1 in 2008. In the other four GCC oil states the same trend has occurred (see Table 3.2). In addition to the overall improvement in the standard of living, particularly following the adoption of the al-Ishtirakiyya al-‘Arabiyya [“Arab Socialism”] policy, which included both the provision of various public services free of charge and huge subsidies on basic food and energy products, the sharp decline in death rates in the Arab countries since the mid-twentieth century was a result of the marked improvement in healthcare services and facilities. This was mainly achieved through the declining ratio of both physicians/population and hospital-beds/population, despite the rapid population growth. For example, by 2006–2013, there was one physician for every 353 people in Egypt, compared to one for every 2,250 people in 1960. In Tunisia, the physician/population ratio improved from one physician for every 10,030 people to one for every 820 people during the corresponding period. As with the other socioeconomic indicators, the improvement of the healthcare services in the GCC states was the most impressive of all of the Arab countries. The most dramatic improvement occurred in Oman, where the physician/population ratio declined from one physician for every 31,180 people in 1960 to one for every 1,900 people in 1980 and only one for every 450 people in 2006–2013 (see Table 3.10). As for the hospital-beds/population ratio, here too, the improvement was considerable, although less than in the physician/population ratio. Also in this respect the best achievement was in the GCC countries. For example, there was only one hospital in Qatar in 1945 and two in Kuwait in 1949. Prior to the establishment of the UAE in

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Table 3.10 Average Number of Persons per Physician in some Middle Eastern and Developed Countries, 1960–2013 Year Egypt Syria Jordan Tunisia Morocco Algeria Saudi Arabia Kuwait Oman

1960 2,250 4,630 5,800 10,030 9,410 5,530 16,370 1,210 31,180

1970

1980

1990

1998

2006–2013

1,900 3,860 2,480 5,930 13,090 8,100 7,460 1,050 8,380

Arab Countries 970 2,270 1,700 3,690 10,750 2,630 1,670 570 1,900

1,320 1,160 770 1,870 4,840 2,330 660 – 1,060

595(b) 694(d) 602 1,429 2,174 1,182(b) 602 529 752(d)

353 667 391 820 1,613 826 1,299 559 450

1,176(c) 826(d)

– 585

330 181 322 253(d) 358(b) 142(b)

314 244 306 334 408 483

Non-Arab Middle Eastern Countries Iran Turkey

3,860 2,800

3,270 5,930

6,090 1,630

3,140 1,870

Developed Countries France Italy Sweden Belgium United States Canada

930 640 1,050 780 750 910

750 550 730 650 630 680

580 340 490 400 520 550

350 210 370 310 420 450

Notes: The data on physicians for the 1995–1998 period are taken from the WHO database, while the population data are taken from the US Census Bureau, International Data Base. (a) Data relates to 1984. (b) Data relates to 1995. (c) Data relates to 1996. (d) Data relates to 1997. Sources: WB, World Development Report, 1978–1999/2000, various issues (Oxford); WHO, WHO Statistics, Estimates for Health Personnel; WHO, World Health Statistics-2014 (New York).

1971, healthcare services existed only in the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.86 By the early twenty-first century, however, the GCC citizens enjoyed one of the top healthcare services worldwide, with health centers spread throughout the area, including hospitals with the most advanced facilities.87 No less important is the wide coverage of healthcare services provided to the indigenous populations free of charge, including treatments abroad in cases where the necessary treatment cannot be provided in local hospitals. The result of the sharp decline in the under-5 mortality rate was an increase of the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population, despite the substantial rise of the life expectancy.88 In the case of Egypt, for example, the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population increased from 42.8% in 1960 to 50.8% in 1980. In Jordan the increase was from 45.6% to 50.7% during the corresponding period and in Syria from 46.3% in 1960 to 49.3% in 1981. In the case of Tunisia, on the other

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The Age Structure of some Arab Countries, 1960, 1980, 2014

Age Group Country

0–14

15–64

65+

53.7 50.6 48.9 50.1 51.1

3.5 3.8 4.8 3.6 4.2

45.6 46.6 46.3 53.8 51.7 51.0

3.6 2.7 4.4 4.4 2.7 2.4

64.4 59.5 69.5 67.7 58.5 60.8

4.3 3.2 7.0 6.1 (f) 5.0 4.2

1960 Egypt Jordan (a) Syria Tunisia (b) Morocco

42.8 45.6 46.3 46.3 44.7 1980

Egypt Jordan (c) Syria (d) Tunisia (d) Morocco (d) Oman

50.8 50.7 49.3 41.8 45.6 46.6 2014

Egypt Jordan (e) Tunisia Morocco (e) Saudi Arabia Oman (a) Data relates to 1961 (b) Data relates to 1966

31.3 37.3 23.5 26.2 36.5 35.0 (c) Data relates to 1979 (d) Data relates to 1981

(e) Data relates to 2013 (f) 60 years and above

Sources: Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Cairo); The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Amman); GCC Statistical Centre, Social, Economic & Demographic Characteristics of the GCC Population (Riyadh, February 11, 2015); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Riyadh); Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Muscat); Syrian Arab Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, CBS, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Damascus); al-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya, alMandubiyya al-Samiyya lil-Takhtit, al-Nashra al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya lil-Maghrib, various years (Rabat); al-Jumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya, Wizarat al-Tanmiyya, al-Ma‘had al-Watani lil-Ihsa, al-Nashriyya al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya Li-Tunis, various years (Tunis); UN, Demographic Yearbook, various issues (New York); ECWA/ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, various issues (Beirut, Baghdad and Amman); African Development Bank Group, African Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Tunis).

hand, the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population declined from 46.3% in 1966 to 41.8% in 1981 as a result of the sharp decline in the fertility rates already occurring during the 1970s (see Table 3.11). During the past two decades, however, the trend of broadening the age structure was reversed due to the fertility decline. Thus, the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population sharply declined. In the case of Egypt, the decline was from 50.7% in 1980 to 31.3% in 2014 and from 50.7% in 1979 to 37.3% in 2013 in the case

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of Jordan. In 2014, the lowest percentage of the under-15 population of the total population among all of the Arab countries was in Tunisia in line with its lowest TFR since the 1980s. Since the mid-2000s, the process of lowering the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population spread to the GCC countries as well. By 2014, the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population in Oman was 35.0% compared to 46.6% in 1980. Overall, while in 1980 the percentage of the under-15 population of the total population was much above 40% in all of the Arab countries, in 2014, this percentage was significantly below 40% in all of the Arab countries and in Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco even below 30%. In contrast to the situation in the ethnically homogeneous developed countries in which the decrease of the under-15 population was as a result of an increase in the percentage of the elderly population (65 and above), in the Arab countries this decrease was as a result of the sharp increase in the percentage of the working age population (15–64). Thus, for example, in the case of Egypt, the percentage of the working age population of the total population increased from 45.6% in 1980 to 64.4% in 2014. In Jordan the increase was from 46.6% in 1979 to 59.5% in 2013, while in Oman the increase was from 51.0% in 1980 to 60.8% in 2014. While in 1980 the percentage of the working age population of the total population was less than 50% in all of the Arab countries, in 2014 this rate was much above 50% and in Tunisia and Morocco it reached almost 70% (see Table 3.11). Overall in the early twenty-first century, the entire Arab countries, with the exception of Yemen and Sudan, entered into the Demographic Gift period with the vast majority of their population in the working age group. However, the current relatively young age pyramid will dictate the continuation of a rapid population growth in all of the Arab countries in the foreseeable future despite the fertility decline — a result of the demographic momentum phenomenon (see Box 1.1). In countries with a current TFR of above 3, the future population growth will be extremely rapid. Thus, Egypt’s population is projected to reach 117.1 million in 2030 compared to 88 million in 2015. Jordan’s population is expected to reach 9.1 million in 2030 compared to 7.6 million in 2015 (not including the refugees). Algeria’s population is projected to reach 48.3 million in 2030 compared to 39.7 million in 2015. Rapid population growth is expected to occur even in Tunisia despite the fact that it achieved the replacement-level fertility rate more than a decade ago.89 It should be noted, however, that although the NIRs of the non-oil Arab countries are steadily declining due to lowering fertility on the one hand, and stabilization of the CDRs on the other, in nominal numbers the NI of recent years is much higher than a decade ago when the NIR was much higher. In the case of Egypt for example, the nominal NI in 2014 was 2.185 million compared to 1.339 million in 2004.90 In Tunisia the nominal NI in 2013 was 160,761 compared to 135,603 in 2010 and in Algeria, the nominal NI in 2014 was 840,467 compared to 730,836 in 2010.91 The indigenous populations of the GCC states are projected to increase in the foreseeable future much faster than in the non-oil Arab countries for two main reasons: Firstly, the percentage of their under-15 population of the total population is still considerable higher than those of most of the non-oil Arab countries. Consequently, the current median age of their national populations is younger than that of the nonoil Arab countries with the exception of Yemen and Sudan. The second factor is that their NMB, in contrast to all of the non-oil Arab countries, is positive.

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Although numerous demographic projections were published by official organizations regarding the GCC countries, all of them, without exception, combined their national and the non-national populations. As for official projections of the countries themselves, the only one which I found was that of the Saudis, based on the 2010 census data. According to this projection, the Saudi national population will increase from 18.97 million in 2010 to 23.19 million 2020 and will reach 25.0 million in 2025. This suggests that in 15 years, the Saudi national population is projected to increase by 31.8% with an annual average of 2.1% — equal to its current NIR.92 According a research conducted in Sultan Qaboos University, Oman’s national population in 2023 will amount to 3.19–3.27 million and to 4.74–5.05 million in 2053.93 Although the research was published in 2012, its basic data is the 2003 census results at the time that Oman’s TFR was still extremely high — over 5 (see Table 3.2) — while in 2014 this rate was only 3.9 (see Table 3.8). Overall, by mid-2014 Oman’s national population amounted to 2.261 million and its NIR was 3.03%.94 Thus, even if this rate continues in the coming decade as well, the Omani national population in 2023 will number 2.96 million, namely 240,000 less than the minimum projection of Kabir and Rahman. Since it is reasonable to assume that Oman’s TFR will continue to decline, the NIR of the Omani national population will probably be lower than 3%. Consequently, the Omani national population in 2023 will be even lower than 2.96 million. As for Kuwait, Bahrain and UAR, no projection for their national population was found, either official or unofficial. In any case, one thing is sure: In the coming three decades, the GCC national populations will double, since the current NIR of each of them is still higher than 2.0%. The youngest Arab Middle Eastern society is that of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories with a median age of 17.6 years, followed by that of Yemen with 17.8.95 Thus, in these two societies the Population Momentum will extend for the longest period, even if their fertility rates rapidly decline in the near future.

7

Summary and Conclusions

The decline in the death rates since the nineteenth century along with the continuously high fertility rates led to the steady increase of the NIRs in all of the Arab societies since the late nineteenth century through the mid-1980s. Since then, however, the decline in the TFR in all of the Arab societies has been sharper and faster than the decline in the CDR, leading to a marked drop of the NIRs. Nevertheless, despite the considerable decline in fertility rates, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Tunisia and Lebanon were the only Arab countries that succeeded in reaching a replacementlevel fertility rate which ensures that in the future they will achieve a stable population. Therefore, while in the mid-twentieth century there was a great similarity among all of the Arab countries in terms of their basic demographic characteristics — namely, high birth and death rates — with only minor differences from one country to another, two generations later, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a huge demographic gap existed between them. Currently, in the mid-2010s, four different “demographic patterns” can be seen in the Arab region: (a) The first group includes only Tunisia and Lebanon which have achieved the targeted replacement-level fertility rate. From a purely demographic viewpoint, these

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countries function in a way which is similar to the developed countries worldwide. (b) The second group includes Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman — countries that have succeeded in substantially lowering their TFR from 6–7 in the 1970s and the early 1980s to 2.7–3.5 in the early 2010s. The most interesting country in this group is Saudi Arabia. This is because the fertility rate of the Saudi indigenous women has rapidly declined since the early 2000s, despite their low labor force participation rates and the absence of any form of governmental antinatalist measures. As for Egypt, Jordan and to lesser degree Algeria, the marked fertility decline which has occurred in these countries during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, somewhat came to a halt during the past decade and even slightly increased following the onset of the Arab Spring events. (c) The third group includes the “Arab failed states,” namely Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya. Since we cannot predict the consequences of their civil wars, their overall future is “shrouded in fog.” (d) The fourth group includes the smaller GCC states, namely, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, which have created an unparalleled demographic pattern of extremely low infant and child mortality rates on the one hand, and have preserved relatively high fertility rates on the other. This unique demographic pattern is a direct consequence of their basic nature of “pure rentier states” with extremely high per capita rental income (see Chapter 5). Hence, in retrospect, it appears that these countries were rich enough to reduce the death rates, but at the same time they were also “traditional enough” to preserve their traditional lifestyle which does not encourage fertility decline. Whatever the future fertility patterns of the Arab states, both the oil and the nonoil alike, their population will at least double until the 2050s, due to their current young age pyramid. Thus, the Middle Eastern Arab population which amounted to less than 50 million on the eve of World War I, climbed to more than 300 million in 2010 and is expected to amount more than half a billion in 2050s.96

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4

The “Victory” of Numbers: The Emergence of Structural Unemployment

Unemployment is a bomb that will explode sooner or later in the Arab region if we are not prepared to confront it now. Husni Mubarak, March 20011

Forget weapons of mass destruction: the biggest challenge to the Arab world is not to be found in the laboratories of evil scientists, but in countless cradles in the homes of Arab families. John Martin, November 20032

1

Introduction

As far back as the end of the nineteenth century, the Egyptian government considered bringing in Chinese workers to fill the agricultural labor shortage. Since its independence following World War II and until the mid-1970s, the Syrian authorities implemented a pro-natalist policy, due, at least in part, to a labor shortage. Likewise, from the October 1973 “oil boom” through the 1990s, the GCC states implemented extensive pro-natalist policies due to an extreme labor shortage which was dealt with the import of millions of foreign workers. In the mid-1970s, unemployment in Jordan was less than 2%, and it became a labor-importer in order to avoid a labor shortage. During the 1980s, both Iraq and Iran implemented pro-natalist policies, and Iraq also imported more than a million Egyptian workers due to its labor shortage. A generation later, by the end of 2010 and early 2011, the huge unemployment rates, particularly among the educated young, was the paramount cause of the Arab Spring events. Overall, the “Arab employment dilemma” which emerged in the 1980s has two sides: The first is a low dependency ratio which was the result of low labor force participation rates, particularly among women; and the second is the rapid increase of both open and hidden unemployment and underemployment.3 The examination of the development of these two parameters is the principal aim of this chapter.

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The “Heart” of the “Low Income Trap”: Low Labor Force Participation Rates

A basic “rule” is that in any given society with a high NIR, female labor force participation rate is accordingly low. This is because, as was examined in Chapter 3, a large number of children constitute the principal barrier to women employment.4 Thus, in all of the Arab countries, the female labor force participation rate was traditionally low. In Egypt, for example, in 1960, the female labor force participation rate was 5.2% (15 years and above), increasing slightly to 6.4% in 1976 and 9.8% in 1986. In Algeria the female labor force participation rate was as low as 3.8% in 1977 and increasing slightly to 7.8% in 1987. It reached 11.8% in 1997. In Jordan, this rate was 4.4% in 1961 and increased slightly to 6.7% in 1979. In Tunisia, although this rate increased much faster than in all of the other Arab countries — from 5.5% in 1966 to 21.9% in 1984 and reached 23.7% in 1997 — it was still considerably below the worldwide average.5 The low female labor force participation rates combined with the large percentage of the population outside the working age group (under 15 and above 65) translated into very low overall labor force participation rates in all of the Arab countries. In Egypt, for example, the 1986 census recorded a labor force participation rate of only 27.7% (48.1% among males and as low as 6.2% among females). Jordan’s labor force participation rate in 1991 was estimated to be even lower than Egypt’s, with only 23.8% (39.9% among males and 6.6% among females).6 The same phenomenon existed in the North African countries. In Algeria, for example, the overall labor force participation rate in the early 1980s was less than 20%.7 In recent years, however, there has been an increase in the overall labor force participation rate in most of the Arab countries. By 2010, the overall labor force participation rate was 39.5% in Jordan, 41.7% in Algeria, 43.7% in Syria, 46.9% in Tunisia, 49.6% in Morocco and the highest rate was in Egypt with 50.3%.8 Since the beginning of the “oil era,” the lowest labor force participation rates among the Arab countries were in the GCC countries. In the case of Kuwait, for example, the labor force participation rate among the indigenous population in 1965 was recorded as low as 19.5%. The rate further declined to 18.8% in 1970,9 and remained at that level during the 1970s and the 1980s.10 In Qatar, as well, the labor force participation rate of the indigenous population was very low, amounting to only 19.0% in the mid-1980s.11 During the 1990s, the labor force participation rates of the GCC indigenous populations, with the sole exception of Bahrain (see below), continued to be the lowest among all of the Arab countries. For example, the total number of Saudis employed in both the public and private sectors amounted to 3.2 million in 1999.12 Considering the unemployment rate of 14% among the nationals (see Chapter 5), the total Saudi labor force in 1999 totaled approximately 3.7 million, representing a labor force participation rate of only 22%. This low labor force participation rate continued into the early 2000s as well. By 2002, the Saudi labor force participation rate was estimated at 19.0%,13 and increased to 23.5% in 2004.14 Kuwait has a similar situation of a low labor force participation rate, where, according to the 1995 census, the national workforce numbered 147,768 while the number of Kuwaiti citizens amounted to 653,616 — meaning a labor force participation rate of only 22.6%.15

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Thus, despite the marked decline of the percentage of the population outside the working age population due to the sharp fertility decline since the late 1990s, the overall labor force participation rate of the GCC countries remained extremely low. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the working age population in 2014 numbered 12.4 million while the total Saudi national workforce numbered only 2.7 million, representing less than 22% of the total working age population.16 In the case of Oman, by 2014 the working age population numbered 1.372 million.17 The total Omani national workforce, however, was no more than 600,000,18 namely 43%–44% of the total working age population and a mere 26% of the total Omani national population. The extremely low labor force participation rates of the indigenous GCC populations since the October 1973 “oil boom” can be attributed to the following four factors: (a) An extremely wide-based age pyramid which was the result of the high NIRs (see Chapter 3). (b) Early retirement. One of the major tools used by the GCC royal families to distribute the oil rental wealth among their citizens was to employ the vast majority of the indigenous labor force in the public sector (see Chapter 5). Early retirement enabled the GCC authorities to employ new entrants into the labor force in the public sector and thus to increase the scale of the citizens who could benefit from public sector salaries or pensions. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, the official retirement age in the public sector is 55 years, 10 to 12 years earlier than in the developed economies.19 In Kuwait the situation is similar with early retirement for males after 20 years and females after 15 years of employment.20 (c) Very low female labor force participation rates. None of the GCC countries, other than Saudi Arabia, have explicit legislative restrictions on women’s employment outside the household. Yet, in practice, a wide variety of occupations are considered “not suitable for women.” In this regard, in an interview with the weekly MEED in 1979, the Qatari Education Under-Secretary, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abdallah al-Turki, said as follows: We make use of women here, but we are an Islamic country and we have special traditions. We find it very difficult, because of these traditions, to go into fields for the employment of women other than nursing and education.21

The ILO Global Employment Trends–2013 noted in this respect that: In some [Arab] countries, gender segregation in public spaces as well as limitations for women to take up certain occupations or make particular educational choices limit their employment opportunities and widen incentives for inactivity.22

The lowest female labor force participation rate among the GCC indigenous women is in Saudi Arabia due to the legislative restrictions on indigenous women employment, including prohibitions on women driving or mixing together with males in the workplace.23 These severe limitations mainly stem from the fears of the ‘ulama (the Muslim clergy) that large-scale women employment will lead to socio-cultural changes in male-female relationships and thus to a gradual changes in the religiouscultural structure of Saudi society as a whole. The Saudi royal family prefers not to confront the ‘ulama on this issue in order to maintain the status quo between them. Indeed, the balance of power between the ‘ulama and the royal family is the dominant criterion determining the overall position of women in each of the GCC societies. The

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greater the political power of the ‘ulama, the lower the position of women. Thus, as Wilson and Graham noted: “women continue to serve as convenient scapegoats for the regime.”24 Abdalla claimed that: “The limited participation of women in the labor force is related to GCC traditions and values which date back to the pre-oil era.”25 This is, of course, true, but the main question is why these traditions, norms and values did not change in the wake of the overall socioeconomic development which occurred in these countries following the start of the oil era. The answer to this question, paradoxically, is related directly to the oil era itself. The huge oil revenues enabled the GCC authorities to preserve their traditional norms in many aspects, including the traditional attitude toward women. In other words, these countries had sufficient financial resources to employ foreign women instead of employing their own indigenous women. Thus, since the beginning of the oil era, although the GCC women had free education, this education, in many cases, could not be translated into employment. In addition to the traditional social-cultural norms, the high salaries paid to male national employees in the public sector also hampered increasing women’s participation in the labor force with the exception of Bahrain (see below).26 In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, however, due to the difficult economic situation which was the result of the prolonged low oil prices on the one hand and continued rapid population growth on the other, the Saudi authorities became more open toward the option of indigenous female employment in order to achieve reduced dependence on foreign labor and lower fertility rates (see Chapter 6). Thus, for example, in the SAMA 2000 Annual Report it was written that: It is important to expand Saudi female participation in the labor market . . . to take into consideration the high expenses incurred by the government for the education of Saudi females and the loss of economic returns . . . 27

However, despite all of these statements and decisions, even today, the labor force participation rate of the indigenous Saudi women remains extremely low. By 2014, the total number of Saudi women employed, both in the public and the private sectors, amounted to 864,030. Taking into consideration a 32.1% unemployment rate among the Saudi women,28 this means that the total Saudi women workforce in 2014 amounted to approximately 1.15 million, while the total Saudi women of working age population (15–64) was more than 6 million,29 representing a labor force participation rate of no more than 19%. Although this rate is 6% higher than what it was in 2006,30 it is still extremely low by any international comparison. According to the IMF estimate, in 2013 the labor force participation rate of the Saudi women was 16.4%.31 The Saudi official figure for early 2016 was 22%.32 In any case, even if the Saudi official figure is true, it is still an extremely low rate. As in many other socioeconomic areas, in the area of women employment, Bahrain is also unique among the GCC countries. Not only are women not barred from employment outside their households, but they are actually encouraged to enter the labor market. According to official Bahraini figures, female labor force participation rate increased from just 5% in 1971 to almost 40% in 2001. By 2013, the total Bahrain national women employed (ages 15–64) amounted to 60,099, while the total number of Bahraini women in the working age group amounted to 195,000.33 This means a labor force participation of 31% — one of the highest among all Arab countries. The higher

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women’s labor force participation rate in Bahrain is attributed to the fact that Bahrain’s per capita oil revenues are the lowest among the GCC countries.34 Consequently, the salaries in Bahrain’s public sector are also the lowest among the GCC countries. As a result, many women must work in order to contribute to the family income. Since the early 1990s, the Omani authorities have also been trying to increase female labor force participation rate as part of their labor force nationalization policy (see Chapter 5).35 In addition to their ambition to reduce dependence on foreign labor, the Omani authorities aim to increase the indigenous women’s labor force participation rate as part of their overall anti-natalist policy (see Chapter 6). It should be noted, however, that some official publications combine national and foreign women in their figures, thus producing much higher average labor force participation rates of the GCC women.36 A major reason for the low priority of women employment in the GCC countries is that they are employed almost exclusively in the public sector.37 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that those who attempt to enter the labor force would also do so primarily through the public sector. This would only increase the employment pressure on that sector, which already suffers from huge overstaffing (see Chapter 5). Overall, despite the improved age structure toward a higher percentage of working age population (see Chapter 3), the dependency ratio38 in the Arab countries is still among the lowest worldwide, which together with the low women’s labor force participation rates — 23.3% in 201339 — produce the “low income trap.”

3

The Implications of the Young Age Pyramid for Future Employment Demands

Despite the current below average worldwide labor force participation rates, the nominal number of those entering the labor force in each of the Arab countries is steadily increasing due to the wide-based age pyramid. In the case of Syria, for example, during the 1960–1970 period, the working age population increased nominally by 688,598, representing an average annual increase of less than 70,000.40 Three decades later, during the 1991–2001 decade, the net increase in the Syrian working age population amounted to 3.630 million,41 representing an average annual increase of 363,000, or 5.3 times the corresponding figure three decades earlier. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, despite the decline of the NIRs, the trend of the steady nominal expansion of the working age population continued in all of the Arab countries, even in those which achieved the targeted replacement-level fertility rate or close to it. In Tunisia — the country with the lowest fertility rate among all of the Arab countries since the 1980s — in September 2014 the working age population (15–64) numbered 7.51 million,42 compared to 5.25 million in September 1994.43 In countries with higher fertility rate, the increase in the working age population was much higher accordingly. The Syrian working age population increased from 4.08 million in mid-197944 to 9.44 million in mid-200145 and amounted to 12.41 million in mid-2011,46 representing an increase of more than three-fold within three decades and 31.5% within only one decade. The Egyptian working age population, which numbered 35.88 million in 1996,47 amounted to 48.19 million in 2006,48 and reached 55.94 million in mid-2014.49 Overall, Egypt’s working age population increased nominally by more than 20 million in less than two decades. Therefore, it appears that the argument of Shaban and associates from the mid-1990s that “over the coming two decades,

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demographic pressures on labor markets are expected to subside somewhat in countries that have already achieved substantial reductions in fertility, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia,”50 was not correct. The most acute problem in this respect is in Gaza Strip — the area with the highest fertility rates of the Arab societies. By mid-2000, the 0–4 age group numbered 231,392, compared to 41,235 in the 40–44 age group. This means that the number of those who enter the working age population in the 2016–2020 period will be as much as 5.6 times higher than the number of those retiring.51 According to official data published by the PCBS, the Gaza Strip population numbered 1.76 million in 2014, while the percentage of the working age population (15–60 years) constituted 53.1% of the total population, namely, almost a million people,52 as compared to a total population of 1.39 million according to the 2007 census with a working age population of 727,915.53 This means that during the 2007–2014 period the Gaza Strip working age population increased by almost 25% — higher than in any other Arab society and probably the highest worldwide. Overall, during the two decades of 1991–2009, the annual labor force growth rate in the Arab countries amounted to 3.3% — the highest among worldwide developing regions.54 Saudi Arabia’s annual national labor force increased during the 2002–2013 period by as much as 4.75% on average — one of the highest rate worldwide — and it is expected to continue to increase at that rate in the foreseeable future due both to the wide-based age pyramid and the steady increase of the women’s labor force participation rate.55 In all, during the 2015–2025 decade, 1.9 million Saudi nationals are expected to join the workforce.56 Thus, although since the mid-1980s the fertility rates declined remarkably in all of the Arab countries, in all of them the working age population will continue to expand for the next three decades at least. This is the principal meaning of the “demographic momentum.”

4

Employment Trends in the Arab Countries in Retrospect

In retrospect, it appears that the employment history of the Arab countries since the mid-twentieth century can broadly be divided into seven main periods as follows:

4.1 Rapid Employment Expansion during the “Romantic” Arab Socialism Period Some of the Arab countries were already plagued by high unemployment rates during the 1950s and 1960s. This was short-lived in most cases, due to internal political instability, wars or a combination of these two factors. For example, in Jordan during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the economy was forced to deal with both the severe economic consequences of the June 1967 War and the armed struggle between the Hashemite regime and the PLO. High unemployment rates also prevailed in Egypt in the 1967–1974 period as a result of the four wars in which Egypt was involved during that period.57 These cases, however, are the exceptions. They lasted for no more than a few years and were followed by rapid economic expansion. Hence, during the 1950s and 1960s, unemployment in the vast majority of the Arab countries was quite low, a result of the following three factors:

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(a) The low scale of labor forces. The low scale of labor forces at that time was due both to the relatively small working age population along with extremely low labor force participation rates. In 1960, among all of the Arab countries, only Egypt, Morocco and Algeria had a population of more than 10 million (see Table 3.1). In Syria, for example, the total labor force, including those in the army and the various civilian security services, amounted to a little more than one million, with a labor force participation rate of 23%–25%. Taking into consideration the large number of those who served in the army and the security forces, this means that the civilian labor force amounted to a maximum of 750,000. Among them, more than half were directly engaged in agriculture, leaving the urban civilian workforce at no more than 400,000. In the case of Jordan, the labor force in 1970 amounted to less than half a million, including those in the army and the civilian security forces, representing a maximum civilian labor force of 400,000. Among them, approximately 100,000 were employed outside the Kingdom, the vast majority in the GCC states (see Chapter 5). In Egypt, in 1960 the labor force amounted to approximately 7 million. In Egypt, as well, about half of the labor force was employed in agriculture. (b) The socialist-étatist socioeconomic policy. One of the principal aims of the socialist-étatist socioeconomic policy which was adopted by all of the Arab countries (with the exception of Lebanon and Jordan) was the elimination of unemployment as a measure for eradicating poverty and reducing the wide socioeconomic gaps. The étatist policy included large-scale employment of the urban labor force in the rapidly growing public sector. (c) The implementation of large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. These projects contributed to the rapid increase in the number of employment opportunities not only in the major urban centers, but in remote areas and the countryside as well. These huge projects included, for example, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the Tabaqa Dam on the Euphrates in Syria, both of which were accompanied by largescale land reclamation, along with the establishment of many public sector factories for agriculture products processing. A similar macroeconomic policy and rapid expansion of public sector employment occurred in many other Arab countries during the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, the employment situation in the poorer Arab countries improved considerably during the 1960s. Within the framework of Egypt’s First Five-Year Development Plan (1960–1965), more than one million new work opportunities were added58 and “led to almost full employment in the 1960s . . . ,” as claimed by ElGhonemy.59 According to one estimate, the number of unemployed in Egypt amounted to only 175,000 in the early 1960s.60 Overall, according to El-Ghonemy, during the Nasserite period (1952–1970), the Egyptian economy achieved an average annual real GDP growth rate of 5.7% — more than twice the population growth rate during the corresponding period61 — higher than ever before and after. The Syrian economy also grew rapidly during the decade following its independence (1946), based on the rapid growth in the agricultural sector.62 The 1955 IBRD report on Syria estimated that during the 1939–1955 period, Syria’s national income almost doubled. Later, between 1954 and the collapse of the unification with Egypt (September 1961), although Syrian economic expansion markedly slowed to an annual average of 3.2%, it was still higher than the population growth rate.63 In general, Syria’s economic growth during the two decades of 1953–1973 was estimated at 4.5% on

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annual average,64 namely, almost twice the population growth rate. Regarding that period, Sayigh noted that: “Syria is one of the very few Arab economies which managed, on the whole, to achieve a reasonable rate of growth without the benefit of large petroleum resources and without the inflow of substantial foreign aid.”65 These two and a half decades of the 1950s, the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s were the “peak” of “Arab Socialism” in which absorption into the public sector of the rapidly growing workforce was the core of the employment policy. In the case of Jordan for example, while in 1960 the share of government employment among new entrants to the workforce was only 5%, this percentage increased to as high as 50% in the mid-1970s.66 In the GCC countries, with the exception of Oman,67 the overall economic situation largely improved during the 1950s and even more so during the 1960s and the early 1970s, following the rapid increase of oil production. Overall, the “core” of the “authoritarian social contract” was one where the population exchanged political participation in return for the provision of various socioeconomic benefits, primarily public sector employment (“lifetime jobs”), free healthcare and educational services, massive subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products and low taxation.68 The only group which did not accept this “authoritarian bargain” was the Muslim Brotherhood which at that time did not have much public support.

4.2

The “Oil Decade” (1973–1982)

The October 1973 “oil boom” changed the socioeconomic situation in all of the Arab countries, but particularly in the oil economies, turning them, from the early 1980s onward, into some of the richest countries worldwide. The GCC royal families now possessed the financial resources needed for the massive large-scale socioeconomic development plans that provided enormous employment opportunities for the indigenous labor forces, with the end result that by the mid-1970s there were negligible unemployment rates among the nationals (see Chapter 5). In retrospect, the “oil decade” was the “bonanza period” not only for the Arab oil economies, but for the Arab non-oil economies as well. This is because the vast majority of these countries achieved the highest economic growth rates ever in their modern history (see Table 4.1). Thus, for example, during the years 1973–1983, the annual average GDP growth rate amounted to 8.8% in Egypt, 8.0% in Syria, and reached as high as 11.1% in Jordan.69 At the peak of the “oil decade,” during the years 1976–1980, the Jordanian economy expanded by 62%70 — higher than in any other period in its entire history. The rapid expansion of the non-oil Arab economies during the “oil decade” was due mainly to the combination of the following factors: (a) The surge of revenue from oil exports of the smaller Arab oil-exporters, mainly Sudan, Yemen, Egypt and Syria, as a result of the overall increase in oil prices. (b) The sharp rise in aid received from the Arab oil countries, which dramatically increased after the Baghdad Arab Summit, held in late March 1979 (following the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty), to the countries that did not enter into peace negotiations with Israel. In 1980, Arab aid to Jordan peaked at $1.3 billion,71 representing one-fourth of the total Jordanian GDP. The Arab aid to Syria in 1979 amounted to $1.85 billion, compared to $500–$600 million in the mid-1970s.72 Although Egypt

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stopped receiving financial support from the Arab oil countries following the Baghdad Arab Summit, it started to receive financial support from the US in 1976 which intensified following the signing of the peace treaty with Israel (March 1979).73 (c) The massive labor migration wave from the poorer Arab countries to the Arab oil countries and, to a lesser extent, to Jordan. By 1973, on the eve of the “oil boom,” the number of Egyptians working abroad was estimated at 160,000.74 This number increased dramatically following the “oil boom,” amounting to about 1.4 million by the late 1970s.75 Egypt’s Foreign Minister estimated the number of Egyptians working in the Arab oil countries at 2.9 million in 1982,76 representing approximately 15% of the total Egyptian labor force at that time. By mid-1983, the number of Egyptian workers in other Arab countries was estimated at approximately three million.77 According to Jordan’s 1961 census data, the number of Jordanian workers in other Arab countries was 15,901.78 Their number dramatically increased following the “oil boom,” amounting to 139,000 (from the East Bank only) in 197579 and reached as high as 250,000–300,000 in 1980, representing approximately 30% of the total Jordanian civilian labor force.80 By 1983, according to official Jordanian figures, the number of Jordanian workers in the other Arab countries was 271,200,81 increasing to 328,000 in 1985,82 namely, more than 40% of the total Jordanian civilian workforce at that time — the highest rate among all of the Arab labor-exporting counties ever. The third major Arab labor-exporter was North Yemen (YAR). By the mid1980s, between 850,000 and 1.25 million North Yemenites were employed in the GCC countries, with the vast majority of them in Saudi Arabia.83 Besides these three major Arab labor-exporting countries, other Arab countries also exported substantial numbers of workers. In the case of Syria, for example, by 1985 approximately 68,000 Syrians were working in other Arab countries, mainly in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.84 Overall, from the labor-exporters’ viewpoint, large-scale labor emigration had immense importance in four major areas: (1) Large-scale labor emigration brought about considerable relief of employment pressures through both the emigration of a significant number of the local workforce, and the creation of a substantial number of work opportunities in the home countries driven by the workers’ remittances. (2) Massive financial aid from the rich Arab oil states enabled the non-oil Arab countries to absorb many employees into the public sector. For example, 44% of the new entrants into the labor force in Egypt during the 1976–1986 decade were employed in the public sector, and an additional 19% were absorbed in public enterprises. In the early 1980s, 28% of the total Egyptian workforce were employed in the public sector85 — an extremely high percentage considering that 15% of the total Egyptian workforce at that time were working abroad and another 35% were working in agriculture. In Jordan, civil service employment grew by 9% on annual average during the 1970s and by 5% during the 1980s, reaching 50% of the total national labor force in 1987.86 (3) The surge in hard currency obtained through the workers’ remittances and the financial aid from the Arab oil states led to substantial relief from the balance of payments deficits. (4) The large-scale intra-Arab labor migration created a “mutual dependence” in the inter-Arab arena whereby the oil states needed the workers from the poorer countries, while the poorer countries needed both the financial aid and the work opportunities provided by the oil states.87

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The end result of the combined rapid economic expansion and the large-scale labor emigration was a sharp decline in unemployment rates in the poorer Arab countries. By 1982, Egypt’s unemployment rate was estimated at only 5.7%,88 declining from 8.4% in 1976.89 Jordan’s unemployment rate declined from 14% in 197290 to only 1.6% in 1976 and slightly increased to 3.9% in 1981.91 Thus, in the mid-1970s, a new problem emerged in Jordan: a labor shortage that led the Jordanian authorities to permit labor immigration. By 1975, the number of foreign workers in Jordan was estimated at 32,800,92 increasing to almost 140,000 by the end of 1984,93 and reaching 186,506 in 1985.94 Overall, the “oil decade” was “the bonanza decade” for all of the Arab countries, the oil-based and the non-oil alike.

4.3

Sobering Up from the “Oil boom” Illusion

The Arab economies, both the oil-based and the non-oil alike, began to rapidly deteriorate following the end of the “oil decade” in 1983 and even more so with the drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s.95 Generally speaking, the scale of the deterioration of the non-oil economies was a function of their dependence on the Arab oil economies. Since the early 1970s, among the non-oil Arab countries, Jordan became the most dependent on the GCC countries. As Tayseer Abdel Jaber noted, “Jordan became an oil economy without having oil.”96 Therefore, its economy experienced the worst deterioration as a result of the decline in aid given by the Arab oil states, from the peak of $1.3 billion in 1980 to only $600 million in 1987,97 and the decline in the workers’ remittances from more than $1 billion in the early 1980s to only $632 million in 1989.98 The end of the Iran-Iraq War (September 1988) was also a major factor in Jordan’s economic recession. This is because during the war a considerable percentage of the activities in the ‘Aqaba port were related to Iraq, while the Basra port was almost totally paralyzed. Moreover, during the war, a substantial portion of Jordan’s exports of goods went to Iraq.99 According to an IMF report: “[Jordan’s] Real GDP declined at an average rate of 6.4% during 1986–1990, with the worst recession in the recent history of Jordan occurring in 1989 when real GDP contracted by 20.9%.”100 The severe recession was accompanied by a sharp increase in the external debt which reached as high as double the GDP and inflation intensified, climbing to 27% in 1989.101 Naturally, the severe economic recession affected the unemployment rates, which sharply increased from 3% during the early 1980s to more than 10% by the end of the decade.102 The steady increase in unemployment rates in Jordan during the 1980s occurred along with the steady rise in the number of foreign workers in the Kingdom, estimated at 196,000 in early 1990.103 The basic assumption of the Jordanian authorities had been that cheap foreign workers would replace the Jordanian nationals who had migrated to the Arab oil economies and that the Jordanian economy would benefit from the gap between the much higher remittances of the Jordanian workers abroad compared to the low salaries of the foreign workers in the Kingdom, the vast majority of whom were unskilled Egyptian and Syrian workers.104 This assumption, however, collapsed in the mid-1980s, when the Jordanian migrants started returning from the GCC countries, while the foreign workers did not leave the Kingdom. Thus, in the late 1980s, a new employment situation emerged in Jordan: a parallel increase in the unemployment rates of the nationals and in the number of foreign workers. The harsh economic recession led the Jordanian authorities to adopt austerity measures in April 1989 in exchange for an IMF loan of $125 million in addition to

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$100 million from the World Bank. The austerity measures included governmental budgetary cuts which led to dramatic price hikes due to the sharp decline in subsidies. The public discontent from the price hikes resulted in large-scale riots which began in Ma‘an in the south of the Kingdom — a region that traditionally was the most loyal to the Hashemite regime. As a result of the riots, the Prime Minister, Zayd al-Rifa‘i, was forced to resign and some of the austerity measures were abolished.105 The Syrian economy also greatly deteriorated during the second half of the 1980s due to political factors as well as a sharp drop in oil prices. The drop in oil prices led to a parallel reduction in the aid received from the rich Arab oil countries, which dropped to only $500 million on annual average during the years 1986–1988 — representing less than a third of the amount received in 1980.106 In addition, Syria was itself a smaller oil-exporter,107 meaning that the overall decline in oil prices affected Syria’s oil revenues as well. Although from 1982 until the end of the 1980s, Iran supplied Syria with oil, this assistance did not fully compensate for the decrease in Arab aid. Another factor contributing to the Syrian economic downturn was a marked reduction in workers’ remittances. The final, and the most important factor was the huge economic burden of the strategic balance parity with Israel that Syria adopted following the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty.108 By the mid-1980s, Syria’s military expenditures constituted between 50%–60% of the governmental budget.109 The severe economic recession was accompanied by double-digit inflation110 and a chronic current account deficit.111 In real terms,112 the Syrian average wage in 1986 was about one-quarter less than in 1982.113 According to unofficial estimates, Syria’s unemployment rate amounted to approximately 10% in the late 1980s.114 The severe economic recession also began to have an impact on the stability of the Syrian regime. As Perthes noted, “for the first time since coming to power in 1970, President Hafiz alAsad and his regime were threatened by a loss of legitimacy as a result of economic rather than political problems.”115 Egypt, like Jordan and Yemen, also suffered from the decline of the demand for Arab labor in the Arab oil states during the second half of the 1980s. By mid-1990, the number of Egyptian workers in the other Arab countries was estimated at 1.96 million,116 compared to approximately 3 million in the mid-1980s. It should be emphasized, however, that the decline in the number of Egyptian workers in the GCC countries during the second half of the 1980s had nothing to do with the boycott imposed on Egypt following its peace treaty with Israel.117 Overall, during the years 1986–1989, Egypt’s GDP declined by 6% in real terms.118 Consequently, while in 1985/6 Egypt’s per capita income was $750, it declined to only $600 in 1990.119 Egypt’s economic recession was naturally manifested by an increase in unemployment. According to the 1986 census, the unemployment rate in Egypt was 14%,120 while according to unofficial estimates the rate in 1988 was as high as 20%.121 In addition to the severe recession, another major factor for the rapid increase of Egypt’s unemployment was the inability of the public sector to absorb considerable numbers of young newcomers to the workforce.122 The economic recession of the 1980s affected the North African countries as well. Although the factors that led to the recession in the North African countries (with the exception of Libya, which was a pure “oil economy”) were quite different from those in the other Arab non-oil countries, the impact on the labor markets was the same — a steady unemployment increase. In the case of Morocco, the recession was the combined result of a decline in phosphate prices, droughts that hit North Africa first

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in the early 1980s and then again in the late 1980s, and increasing security expenditures due to the war in the Sahara.123 Overall, Morocco’s unemployment rate rose from 9% in 1980 to 14% in 1986 and reached more than 16% in 1989 — higher than ever since World War II.124 In Algeria, the unemployment rate in 1990 was estimated at 19.8%,125 while in Tunisia unemployment increased persistently during the second half of the 1980s to above 13% in the early 1990s.126 The sharp drop in oil revenues during the second half of the 1980s had only a minor effect on the employment situation of the GCC nationals. The GCC governments exploited their huge financial reserves from the “oil decade”127 to maintain the living standard of the indigenous population, including their vast employment in the public sectors. Although the number of foreign workers in the GCC countries did not decline during the second half of the 1980s, the number of new employment opportunities for foreign workers was considerably lower than that of the previous decade. At the same time, there was a shift from Arab to Asian workers (see Chapter 5).

4.4

The Impact of the Kuwaiti Crisis (1990–1991)

Among the major Arab labor-exporting countries, the economic situation during the 1990s was an outcome not only of performances of their own economy, but also an outcome of their attitude toward the Kuwaiti Crisis in the form that countries that joined the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition benefitted from numerous economic rewards while those which supported the Iraqi side suffered from “economic punishments.” Egypt’s rewards for the support of the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition included a debt erasure of half of its $20.2 billion to the US and other Western allies,128 in addition to massive recruitment of Egyptian labor to the GCC economies at the expense of workers from the Arab countries that did not join the anti-Iraqi coalition. According to the December 1996 census, 2.18 million Egyptian citizens temporarily migrated abroad.129 By early 2001, the number of Egyptian workers abroad was estimated at 1.9 million.130 In addition, during the first half of the 1990s, the Egyptian economy saw a flood of tourists from the GCC countries. Overall, during the first half of the 1990s, the Egyptian GDP growth rate amounted to 18.7% in real terms — almost twice the population growth rate.131 However, even this remarkable growth rate was not high enough to bring about an unemployment decline. According to official Egyptian figures, the numbers of the unemployed increased from 1.4 million in the FY1990/91 to 1.9 million the FY1994/95. In percentage, the increase was from 8.8% to 11.3%. The reason for this paradox is that the Egyptian workforce increased from 15.9 million to 17.0 million during the corresponding period.132 Among the non-oil Arab economies that supported the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition, Syria achieved the highest economic growth rates throughout the first half of the 1990s, amounting to almost 7% on annual average.133 This rapid growth was the combined result of large-scale grants from the GCC countries which amounted to more than $3 billion during the 1991–1993 period;134 increased oil production from 200,000 b/d to 600,000 b/d;135 a marked increase in agricultural production due to the good weather in the early 1990s;136 and a sharp rise in the number of Syrian workers abroad, mainly in Lebanon, Jordan and the GCC countries. By the mid-1990s, the number of Syrian workers in Lebanon alone was estimated at more than a million, approximately onefifth of the total Syrian workforce.137 In addition to those who worked in Jordan and

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the GCC countries, it seems that in the mid-1990s about one-quarter of the Syrian civilian workforce were working abroad. However, starting in the mid-1990s, the Syrian economy began to deteriorate again as a result of two years of drought; low rates of private investments due to the slow privatization process and, most importantly, the diminishing prospects for a SyrianIsraeli peace treaty. In per capita terms, the GDP growth rate was 1.8% in 1996, 1.3% in 1997, 1.5% 1998, and 0.6% in 1999.138 The economic recession of the second half of the 1990s, combined with the inability to increase the number of workers abroad and the continued rapid expansion of the labor force due both to high NIRs and a steady increase of women’s labor force participation rates led to an unemployment increase. According to official figures, by 2003, the unemployment rate was 11.7%, an increase from 9.5% in 2000 and 7.2% in 1995.139 However, as in the cases of Egypt and Jordan, unofficial sources claimed a much higher unemployment rate, estimating it at 15%–20% in the late 1990s.140 Since 2000, however, the performance of the Syrian economy substantially improved, mainly due to an improved economic relationship with Iraq that contributed to the Syrian economy in two main areas: First, the export of goods to Iraq rose from only $200,000 in 1995141 to as high as $3 billion in 2002.142 Second, the flow of 180,000–200,000 b/d Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline enabled Syria to keep its oil exports at 400,000 b/d, bringing oil export revenues to a level of $1.8 billion by 2002.143 The increase in governmental revenues led the Syrian authorities to adopt an ambitious employment program with two major provisions: mandatory retirement from the public sector at the age of 60 and acceleration of the absorption of university graduates into the public sector.144 However, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 ended the economic relationship between Syria and Iraq. Yemen and Jordan, which supported the Iraqi side in the Kuwaiti Crisis, experienced an economic recession during the first half of the 1990s. The most acute “punishment” was the deportation of the workers of these countries from the GCC economies. Hence, in the early 1990s, Jordan was forced to deal with 350,000 returnees from the GCC countries (mainly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).145 In addition, by 1991, Jordan’s external debt amounted to $9.054 billion, of which $2.462 billion was a short-term debt,146 while Jordan’s total GDP that year was slightly above $4 billion.147 This meant that Jordan’s external debt was more than twice the GDP. Jordan was not prepared to take in hundreds of thousands of returnees in the space of only a few months. Consequently, many of the socioeconomic problems, particularly in the employment area, that had been “hidden” during the “oil decade” immediately rose to the surface. By late 1991, Jordan’s unemployment rate reached 22.9%. Many economists, however, believed that the Kingdom’s actual unemployment rate was approximately 35%.148 Although the peace treaty with Israel (October 1994) did provide some major benefits to the Jordanian economy,149 these were not enough to bring about a relief in the employment situation and unemployment continued to increase throughout the second half of the 1990s. In addition to an insufficient economic growth rate, another factor for the continuing increase in unemployment rate in Jordan, particularly among young graduates, was the steady decline of the share of the government in total employment.150 By 1998, Jordan’s official unemployment rate was 15.2%. According to unofficial estimates Jordan’s real unemployment rate was 21% in that year.151 Although the Jordanian economy saw a remarkable growth of 6.2% on annual average

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during the 2001–2006 period, it was still not enough to bring about unemployment relief.152 The high unemployment rates among Jordanian citizens during the 1990s, however, did not bring about a reduction in the number of foreign workers in the Kingdom. All attempts made by the Jordanian authorities to limit their number failed. According to the December 1994 census data, the number of foreigners in the Kingdom was 314,965153 — almost twice their number in mid-1990. By 1995, the Ministry of Labor estimated the number of foreign workers in the Kingdom at 300,000.154 During the second half of the 1990s their number remained more or less stable at 250,000–300,000.155 Due to Yemen’s support of the Iraqi side during the Kuwaiti Crisis, an estimated 800,000–900,000 Yemenites were forced to leave Saudi Arabia and return to Yemen.156 The Yemenite authorities, however, claimed that the number of returnees was actually much higher, amounting to one million.157 As a result of this mass return of workers, Yemen was deprived of both workers’ remittances and employment opportunities for its nationals. Thus, during the years 1990–1994, Yemen’s real GDP growth rate only reached 1.9% on annual average.158 Hence, by 1996, Yemen’s unemployment rate climbed to 25% — the highest level of any of the Arab countries159 — and remained at that level during the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s.160 In the North African countries, as well, the unemployment rates substantially increased during the 1990s. In Tunisia, the average unemployment rate was more than 15% during the 1994–2000 period,161 despite a GDP growth rate of 4.7% on annual average during the 1990s. In Morocco the unemployment rate was estimated at 17.8% in 1996162 and increased to approximately 19% by the end of the decade,163 while the GDP growth rate was more than 4% on annual average during the second half of the 1990s.164 In Algeria the unemployment rate was even higher than in Tunisia, climbing from 20% in 1991 to 28% in 1997,165 and reaching approximately 30% in 2000,166 while the GDP growth rate during the second half of the 1990s averaged more than 3%.167

4.5

The “Roots” of the Arab Spring

The macroeconomic reforms which were adopted by the vast majority of the non-oil Arab countries since the mid-1980s indeed succeeded in enhancing the economic performances of these countries. As one can see in Table 4.1, in all of the non-oil Arab countries, the economic expansion rates during the 1990s and the early 2000s were substantially higher than the population growth rate, leading to marked per capita GDP growth rates. Logically, under conditions of GDP growth rate of at least twice the population growth rate, unemployment was supposed to decline. This, however, did not happen and the unemployment rate in all of the non-oil Arab countries not only did not decline, it rather substantially increased. The answer for this paradox lies in the new form of unemployment that emerged in all of the non-oil Arab countries, namely the structural unemployment which represents a new situation in which both the economy and unemployment expanded simultaneously. In Egypt, during the second half of the 1990s, although the economic expansion produced approximately 400,000 new jobs annually, the annual labor force increase was 500,000.168 By the year 2000, although Egypt’s official unemployment rate was 8%,169 according to unofficial estimates the rate was more than double — approximately 15%–25%.170 Thus, despite the fact that during the 1990s Egypt achieved a

Period 1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Country 1970 1980 1990 1999 Egypt Jordan Syria Tunisia Morocco

4.3 – 4.6 4.7 4.4

7.4 9.3 10.0 7.5 5.6

5.0 – 2.1 3.6 4.0

4.1 4.2 5.6 5.0 2.6

5.4 4.3 2.3 4.7 1.8

3.5 5.3 3.7 5.0 7.6

3.2 5.8 5.9 1.7 3.3

3.2 4.2 1.1 5.6 6.3

4.1 8.6 2.8 6.0 4.8

4.5 7.1 3.3 4.0 3.0

6.8 6.3 4.4 5.5 7.8

7.1 6.0 5.7 6.3 2.7

7.2 7.6 4.7 4.5 5.6

4.7 2.3 6.0 3.1 4.8

2013 2014 2015

5.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.2 –3.4 –30.9 –36.5 –10.5 2.6 –1.9 3.7 2.3 2.3 3.6 5.0 2.7 4.4 2.9

3.2 3.0 –7.0 2.7 2.4

– No data available. Sources: WB, World Development Report, various issues; WB, World Bank Data ; IMF, World Economic Outlook, various editions (Washington, D.C.); ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the Arab Region, 2014-2015 (Beirut, 2015).

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GDP Growth Rate in some non-oil Arab Countries, 1960–2015 (%)

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Table 4.1

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remarkable GDP growth rate of 4.1% on annual average (see Table 4.1), unemployment did not even slightly decline. This trend of relatively high economic growth rates along with climbing unemployment continued during the 2000s as well. In the early 2000s, the Egyptian economy continued to present a healthy growth rate of about twice the population growth rate. However, the steady worsening of the employment situation continued. In Syria, as well, although the economic growth rate during the first half of the 2000s was substantially higher than the population growth rate, unemployment continued to increase, climbing to 20% in 2005.171 The same process occurred in Jordan. Although the Jordanian economy expanded by 6.5% on annual average during the 2000–2009 period, the unemployment rate did not decline even slightly, and was “stuck” at 13%–16%.172 A similar trend of healthy economic growth rate on the one hand and worsening of the employment situation on the other occurred in the 2000s in the North African countries as well. In the case of Morocco, although the economic expansion in 2003 and 2004 amounted to 6.5% and 4.8%, respectively, unemployment did not decline.173 In Algeria, despite the continuation of rapid economic expansion during the first half of the 2000s,174 unemployment continued to be very high, and was estimated at 21% in 2005.175 Also in Tunisia, despite the strong GDP real growth rate, unemployment rate remained unchanged at approximately 14% during the first half of the 2000s.176 During the second half of the 2000s, although Tunisia’s economy continued to present high growth rates, even in 2008 and 2009 at the peak of the global economic recession,177 unemployment remained very high, amounting to 13.0% in 2010.178 The major question is: “What went wrong”? Why was the healthy economic growth of the non-oil Arab countries during the 2000s not translated into massive job creation? It seems that the answer to this paradox is mainly due to the following factors: (a) The changing employment policy. In the late 1980s, but more so during the 1990s, it became clear that the authorities of the non-oil Arab countries could not maintain their role in the traditional “authoritarian social bargain.” In all of the non-oil Arab economies, the governments were forced to implement macroeconomic reforms in the forms of privatization of state-owned factories and enterprises, liberalization of the foreign trade, and reduction of the subsidies for basic foodstuff and energy products.179 Above all, the non-oil Arab countries had to narrow the absorption of new employees into the public sector. Since the mid-1950s, in practice, public sector employment was offered to every young higher education graduates. In 1962, ‘Abd alNasser guaranteed a public sector job to any university graduate. In the other Arab countries the same policy of absorbing university graduates into the public sector was adopted as well. Assaad noted in 2013 in this regard: The rapid expansion of education was the result of a social contract between the middle class, or those aspiring to join the middle class, and the region’s authoritarian governments, whereby education would provide them with lifetime secure jobs in the public sector. In return, the authority of the government was unchallenged. This authoritarian social contract created a tremendous demand for education, which was key to entering the public sector.180

By absorbing the vast majority of the tertiary graduates into the public sector, the Arab governments succeeded in creating a wide “loyal young middle class” which traditionally was the most politically dangerous in many developing countries. This

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“loyal young middle class,” in practice, constituted the “core of the regime itself.” Over time, however, this policy led to a spread of disguised unemployment and underemployment.181 For example, a labor survey conducted in Egypt in 1979 revealed that in Cairo alone there were 240,000 public sector employees “with nothing to do.”182 A Forbes Magazine report on the Egyptian economy noted in late 1982: The government promises every college-educated Egyptian a job, and piles them into offices with little to do but complicate the ministries and public companies. Such employees are not paid much . . . but they cannot be fired, either. Many hold two jobs to make ends meet. Others demand “lubrication” [baqshish] . . . for any effort.183

Despite the liberalization and privatization measures taken by many Arab countries during the 1980s and the 1990s, the public sector continued to be the larger employer for the urban workforces. In the case of Egypt for example, in 1995, an estimated 35% of the total civilian workforce was employed in one way or another by the public sector.184 In 2001, the number of public sector employees in Egypt skyrocketed to 5.5 million.185 In 2000, the Syrian workforce totaled approximately 4 million, 1 million of whom were employed outside of the country, mainly in Lebanon and Jordan, and another 1–1.1 million were self-employed in agriculture. This means that more than 60% of the urban workforce were employed in one way or another by the public sector.186 Fahed al-Fanek estimated the number of governmental employees in Jordan in 1998 at 157,000. An additional 44,000 worked in other non-governmental public sector establishments and factories, and 85,000 served in the army.187 Therefore, in the late 1990s, even in Jordan, which had not adopted “the Arab socialism” policy, as much as 35% of its civilian workforce was employed in the public sector. According to a World Bank study, during the late 1990s, the percentage of public sector employees among the total non-agricultural employees in the Middle East was the highest among the developing countries worldwide.188 Thus, during the second half of the 1990s, public sector salaries in the Middle East represented 11% of the GDP — twice the average of developing countries worldwide.189 This pattern of public sector employment as the “first-resort” of the young graduates in the non-oil Arab countries, however, largely ended in the late 1990s. In the case of Jordan for example, the share of the government in employment fell from 38% in the mid-1990s to 32% in the early 2000s and remained at that level thereafter.190 In the case of Egypt, while in 1980, about 69% of those with secondary and higher education were employed by the public sector, this percentage sharply declined to 21% in 2012.191 In the rest of the non-oil Arab economies the same trend of steadily shrinking the public sector of the total urban employment occurred. (b) The failure of economic transformation. Although the macroeconomic reforms that were adopted since the mid-1980s improved the macroeconomic indicators, they failed to bring about a comprehensive economic change in the form of development of modern industries and services that could compete in the international markets. This had been the case in the Asian Tigers for example during the 1970s and the 1980s and Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and even some former Eastern European Communist countries in recent years. The non-oil Arab economies, in contrast, continued to concentrate in the production of lower value-added petroleum-related products, basic foodstuff, and raw materials for the chemical, rubber and plastic industries. The contribution of all these to job creation, particularly for university graduates, was marginal.

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Moreover, job opportunities in the service sector remained at the lower end of the value chain, given that the non-oil Arab economies were unable to keep pace with the development of modern information technology and financial services.192 Cammeett and associates noted in this respect that: “When agriculture fell but manufacturing did not rise, low-productivity services rose by default.”193 A World Bank report on Tunisia noted in this regard: “The failure to adapt the economic policies meant that Tunisia never moved beyond creating low wage jobs.” 194Also the BTI Report on Egypt related to this economic paradox by stating that: “The overall growth of the economy does not have a significant impact on employment.”195 In the case of Jordan, during the first half of the 2000s, approximately 63% of the newly created jobs were filled by foreign workers196 who earned extremely low wages.197 The Jordanian nationals continued to be concentrated in the public sector whose numbers increased by as much as 10.9% during the 2007–2010 period only.198 A major reason for the failure of the privatization of state-owned enterprises to translate into an employment generation was that this “privatization” was, to a large extent, a crony privatization in the form of members of the political and military elites gaining control of public sector assets under the cover of “privatization.” The Arab Development Challenges Report of 2011 noted in this respect that: “Growth dividends have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of political and economic elites with preferential access to crucial assets and resources.”199 Specifically in the case of Tunisia, a World Bank report noted that: “Cronyism and corruption increasingly became rampant, and those in power recurrently bent the rules to serve their interests.”200 (c) The impact of the age pyramid. Since the 1990s, but more so during the past decade, all of the Arab countries (with the exception of Yemen and Sudan) entered into the favorable stage of the Demographic Gift period (see Box 1.2). Overall, in the early 2010s, the number of people in the Arab countries in the main working age population (15–59 years) totaled 145 million.201 In addition to the increase in employment demands due to the age structure, the steady increase of women’s labor force participation rates should be taken into consideration as well. The case of Egypt illustrates the enormous increase of the employment demand which rose from 500,000 on annual average during the second half of the 1990s to 650,000 during the first half of the 2000s.202 Even in Tunisia — the country with the lowest TFR among all of the Arab countries — the workforce continued to expand steadily in recent years (from 3.52 million in 2007 to 3.94 million in 2012).203 (d) The shrinking options of employment abroad. Since the 1950s, but more so following the October 1973 “oil boom,” the young educated from the non-oil Arab countries were employed in vast numbers in the public sector of the GCC states. These young graduates were the “cornerstones” of the public sectors of these countries. Since the 1980s, but more so since the early 1990s, however, many of these educated young Arabs were replaced by educated GCC nationals. During the past two decades, the GCC states themselves have had “university graduate inflation” (see Chapter 5). Moreover, during the 1970s and the 1980s, in addition to the vast number of employment options for young Arabs in the Arab oil states, there were also numerous employment opportunities for young Arabs in the Western European economies, the US, Canada, Australia and so forth. However, during the 1990s, and more so since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, these options, gradually declined.

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The Inevitable Result: The Emergence of the “Youth Bulge”

Youth are the first victims of unemployment in the [Middle East] region. ESCWA, 2013204

Unlike the Eastern European countries, whose adoption of the capitalist economic approach in the 1990s resulted in the privatization of many governmental factories and enterprises that led, inter alia, to the mass dismissal of employees, the major source of unemployment in the Arab countries since the mid-1980s was the inability of new entrants into the labor force to find employment in the first place. From an employment survey conducted in 11 Arab countries in the mid-1980s, it appears that 59% of the unemployed were first-time job seekers.205 In 1989, while the overall unemployment in Tunisia was 14%, it was as high as 40% among the 18–26 age group.206 In the same year, the unemployment rate among young urban Moroccans was 30% — almost twice the national average.207 In Saudi Arabia, in 1999, the unemployment rate among the 20–24 age group was 26.4%, while it was almost zero among the age group of 30 and above.208 This trend of much higher unemployment rates among the younger age groups, particularly among first-time job seekers, was further exacerbated during the 1990s and 2000s. By 1999, as many as 89.4% of the unemployed in Egypt were under the age of 30, and 60.1% were under the age of 25.209 In Syria, unemployment among the age group of 14–24 was estimated to be as high as 42.4% in 1999.210 By 2003, about 80% of the unemployed in Algeria were under the age of 30.211 Likewise, up to 60,000 Omanis under the age of 24 were unemployed in early 2003.212 Paradoxically, since the 1980s, among the Arab young, the sector suffering the most from high unemployment has been that of university graduates. Azzam estimates that in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, more than 50% of the unemployed in the late 1990s were high school and higher education graduates.213 In the case of Jordan for example, by the end of 2002, according to official data, the unemployment rate among young university graduates was 32.1%. Unofficial sources claimed an even higher rate.214 The worst situation existed in Egypt with an unemployment rate of 40% among male university graduates and 50% among female university graduates in 2005.215 This trend was further exacerbated during the second half of the 2000s. In Tunisia for example, in 2010, the unemployment rate of university graduates was above 20% and above 30% for young university graduates.216 One common argument for the high unemployment rates among the ranks of the young educated in the Arab countries is: “the educational system’s failure to provide its students with the kinds of skills needed for private sector jobs.”217 While this argument is relevant to the Arab labor-importing countries, it is totally irrelevant in the case of the poorer non-oil Arab countries, considering that in these countries, with the exception of Jordan and Lebanon, there are no foreign workers. Overall, in 2010, on the eve of the onset of the Arab Spring, the youth unemployment rate in the Arab countries was four-times the average adult unemployment rate.218 The Egyptian case most illustrates this catastrophe: in 2013, 69% of the unemployed were in the ages 15–29, while more than 82% of them were university graduates.219 In light of this process, no wonder that ESCWA noted in 2014 that: “The [Arab] region now has the world’s lowest return on education and, with declining wages, offers little incentive for future generations to invest in schooling.”220

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The Emergence of Huge Female Unemployment

Until the 1980s, women’s labor force participation rates in the entire Arab countries were extremely low. Since then, however, they steadily increased. This increase, as was examined in Chapter 3, was the result of both improved educational levels and governmental encouragement as a part of the overall anti-natalist efforts. However, female employment, although recognized by the Arab authorities as a paramount tool for fertility decline as well as a way to improve the breadwinner/dependent ratio, was always and still is a secondary governmental priority in relation to male employment. This employment gap was largely intensified following the start of the Arab Spring mainly due to two factors: The first was the sharp decline in tourism activities in all of the non-oil Arab countries (with the exception of Morocco). As the percentage of women employed in the tourism industry is much higher than in any other non-governmental occupations, the recession of the tourism industry was a severe blow to the non-governmental job opportunities for females. The second factor was that the governments of both oil and non-oil based alike absorbed many new employees into the public sector as large-scale unemployment was the major factor for its onset (see the Summary and Conclusions chapter). The vast majority of these new recruits were young educated males. This was because they were treated by the authorities as the most politically dangerous. Thus, in 2014, the female unemployment rate was 20% in Jordan, 21% in Tunisia and as high as 33% in Saudi Arabia — much above the males unemployment rates.221 The unemployment problem was and still is most crucial among women first-time job seekers. In the case of Saudi Arabia, in 2013 the unemployment rate among women in the age group of 15–25 amounted to the unthinkable rate of 60.3%.222 In the rest of the Arab countries, in both the oil-based and the nonoil alike, one can find the same trend of extremely high unemployment among young women first-time job seekers. The decline in the job opportunities available for women since the beginning of the Arab Spring led not only to an increase in the unemployment rate of women, but to a decline in their overall labor force participation rate. In the case of Egypt for example, women’s labor force participation rate declined from 22.6% in 2013 to 22.1% in 2014.223 Since women’s labor force participation rate constitutes one of the two most prominent factors affecting fertility, the recent decline in the women’s labor force participation rate explains, at least partially, the recent increase in Egypt’s TFR (see Chapter 3).224

4.8

The “Shock” of the Arab Spring and Beyond

The Arab Spring events, however, not only did not bring about an economic improvement, as had been the situation in previous regime changes in the Arab countries, but led to an overall economic deterioration. Egypt’s GDP growth rate in 2011 was 1.8% — even less than the population growth rate. It was the first year since the 1952 Free Officers revolution that Egypt’s GDP growth rate was negative in per capita terms. A worse situation, however, was in Tunisia with a negative growth rate of -1.9% in 2011. Even in Jordan where the regime has survived, the GDP growth rate in 2011 was 2.6% compared with 3.1% in 2010. Since 2013, although the new regimes in both Egypt and Tunisia stabilized, their economic performances were still far below those of the preArab Spring period (see Table 4.1) with an annual GDP growth of less than 3%, namely

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a stagnation in per capita terms. The Syrian, Yemenite, Libyan and Iraqi economies are all collapsing due to their prolonged civil wars. In the case of Yemen, unemployment was among the highest worldwide even before the onset of the civil war, estimated by the IMF at more than 25% and almost 40% among the youth in 2011.225 The only exception among the non-oil Arab countries is Morocco which succeeded in exploiting the deterioration of the Tunisian tourism industry and increasing its own tourism activities.226 The tremendous deterioration of the employment situation in the non-oil Arab countries during recent years was the result of the combination of three factors: the collapse of the tourism industry and its related services and industries;227 the outbreak of civil war in Libya which had previously employed a vast number of Arab foreign workers,228 mainly Egyptians, Tunisians and Moroccans; and lastly the prolonged global economic recession which led to a further decline in the demand for foreign labor in the Western labor-importing countries. As Tunisia was affected by all of the above-mentioned factors more than any other Arab country, its employment situation deteriorated the most. In 2011, not only did the number of employment opportunities in the Tunisian economy not increase, it rather decreased. To the mounting deterioration of the Tunisian economy itself, one should add the return of more than 41,000 Tunisian workers from Libya following the onset of the Libyan civil war.229 Thus, the unemployment rate in Tunisia went up from 13.0% in 2010 to 18.9% in 2011.230 By mid-2012, unemployment in Tunisia somewhat declined to 17.6%.231 However, due to the rapid increase in the workforce, in nominal numbers unemployment continued to increase from 491,000 in 2010 to 720,000 in May 2011 and 750,000 in May 2012.232 In late 2013, the unemployment rate among the Tunisian academicians amounted to 31.9% (242,000) — higher than ever before.233 In 2014, the Tunisian economy continued to stagnate with an annual GDP growth of only 2.3%, while the inflation rate hit 5.7%.234 The continuation of economic stagnation in 2014 as well, led, inter alia, to an increase in unemployment which reached 15.2% in the first quarter of 2015.235 The major reason why the unemployment rate in Tunisia is not much higher than the current level is the massive absorption of new employees into the public sector. Overall, during the 2011–2014 years, the number of public sector employees increased by as much as 20%, many of whom were absorbed into the security forces.236 In Egypt, the official unemployment rate climbed to 12.6% during the second quarter of 2012 compared to 11.8% a year earlier. In mid-2012, according to the official figures, the number of unemployed in Egypt amounted to 3.4 million, more than 25% of whom had recently lost their jobs.237 Breaking down Egyptian unemployment according to age groups reveals a disastrous situation with the unemployment rate for the 15–29 age group amounting to 77.5% in mid-2012!238 In Jordan, unemployment remained stable at the rate of 12.6% during the 2011–2014 period, ranging from 10.5% in Amman to 17.1% in Tafila. Young people, ages 15–24, accounted for almost half of the unemployed!239 However, in contrast to the other non-oil Arab countries, a major factor of the high unemployment among the Jordanian nationals is the huge number of foreign workers. According to official Jordanian data, by early 2013 the number of foreign workers in the Kingdom amounted to 860,000, approximately 600,000 of whom did not have valid work permits.240 In addition to the huge number of foreign labor, following the collapse of Saddam Husayn’s regime, but more so following the onset of the Syrian civil war,

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Jordan was forced to absorb a steadily increasing number of refugees, many of whom naturally trying to find employment. It should be noted that the employment situation deteriorated in recent years in Morocco as well, despite the fact that its economy expanded by the highest rates among the non-oil Arab countries since 2011 (see Table 4.1).241 Although during the 2010–2014 period, the unemployment rate in Morocco was running between 9% to 10%, it was as high as 20% among young people.242 As a result of the deterioration of the employment situation, in October 2013, about 2,000 young unemployed Moroccans marched in the capital Rabat demanding to be absorbed by the public sector since the private sector did not offer them any suitable employment.243 Also in Algeria, although it is an oil-based economy, unemployment has climbed in recent years, estimated at 10% in 2014.244 Overall, according to The Arab Labor Organization estimate, in 2012 there were about 20 million unemployed people in the Arab countries, and that number is steadily increasing.245

5

Summary and Conclusions

Since the 1950s, the Arab governments, both the non-oil and the oil-based alike, succeeded in building an employment model which was based on stable employment in the public sector (“lifetime jobs”) with decent wages and social benefits (such as pension, annual vocation etc.) on the one hand, and a welfare state providing various highly subsidized services on the other. By implementing this kind of socioeconomic model, particularly in the employment arena, the Arab regimes as a whole succeeded in achieving rapid economic expansion along with a huge improvement in the standard of living, primarily for those at the middle and lower strata. The most prominent achievement of this model was the creation of a large middle class comprised mainly of young people who received education free of charge and guaranteed public sector employment. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that these regimes had mass support although they were by their nature autocratic regimes. During the 1970s, while in many developing countries worldwide the socialistétatist policy began to collapse due to its inefficiency, it continued in all of the non-oil Arab countries as before. This was because the “oil boom” hid its shortcomings primarily by “exporting” the surplus workforce to the Arab oil economies. Thus, while in the developed economies the middle class shaped the state’s socioeconomic and political nature, in the Arab countries, both the oil-based and the non-oil alike, the state took an opposing path and “invented” the middle class. This middle class “survived” as long as the state had the ability to finance this lifestyle. Consequently, while in the developed economies the middle class is the largest tax payer, in the Arab countries the middle class is the largest state budget consumer. With the absence of modern industries and services, its contribution to the state economy is marginal at best. Although the economic recession of the second half of the 1980s “revealed” the basic shortcomings of the non-oil Arab economies, mainly in the area of the lack of modern industries and services, within just a few years, this recession was replaced with economic growth in the countries which supported the anti-Iraqi coalition in the Kuwaiti crisis, primarily Egypt and Syria.

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The improvement in Arab–Israeli relations during the 1990s, which included the September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords, the October 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, and the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations throughout the 1990s, also “refueled” many of the non-oil Arab economies mainly due to increasing Western, particularly US, financial support and the massive expansion of the tourism industry. Within only a few years, it became the largest non-agricultural non-governmental employer. Thus for example, in the fiscal year 2000/2001 the number of international tourists in Egypt reached 5.4 million while the number of tourist hotel nights amounted to 32.7 million.246 The Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, Tunisian and Moroccan tourism industries also rapidly expanded during the 1990s and the 2000s. This rapid tourism growth not only served as a major source for hard currency, but created millions of job opportunities for all educational levels and professional skills. The 1995 UN-Iraqi agreement of “oil-for-food” led to a substantial increase of the exports of Egypt, Jordan and Syria to Iraq in addition to the very cheap oil which the latter two received from Iraq. All of these events, however, led to only temporary economic relief. The removal of Saddam Husayn’s regime in 2003; the rapid increase in oil prices since 2004 which led to a surge in governmental expenditures on subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products; the preference of the GCC countries to replace the Arab by non-Arab workers and lastly the global economic recession, all led to a steady intensification of the employment pressure in all of the non-oil Arab countries. In the 91st Session of the ILO, held in June 2003, Jordan’s King ‘Abdallah, clearly underscored the connection between political stability and the employment situation by saying that: Young people who desperately need opportunities and hope see themselves and their societies held back by poverty, health crises, illiteracy and more . . . Is it any surprise that these communities can become recruiting grounds for extremist ideologies?247

In fact, during the past decade, the employment pressure, particularly among the first time job seekers, has constituted the most crucial socioeconomic and political problem of almost all global economies, developed and developing alike,248 leading to many governmental changes, such as those which occurred in Greece, France and Spain. In 1988, George Alan wrote an article about the Syrian economy entitled “An Economy Saved by Circumstances.”249 It seems that this title is also fitting for the rest of the non-oil Arab economies until the early 2000s. Since then, however, despite the quite substantial GDP growth rates, the non-oil Arab governments failed to fill their most important part in the “authoritarian social contract,” namely vast public sector employment. The failure to develop modern competitive industries and services on the one hand and the inability of the public sectors to absorb the “huge army” of young graduates on the other, reduced the employment opportunities of the “Arab young allegedly middle class” which eventually revolted.

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5

The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences

In some areas of the [Arabian] Gulf, you can’t tell whether you are in an Arab Muslim country or in an Asian district. The Bahraini Minister of Labor, Majeed al-Alawi, October 20071

1

Introduction: Modern International Labor Migration Patterns

While much of modern international migration is brought about by political factors due to both civil and international wars, the vast extent of international migration following World War II is comprised of labor migration, legal and illegal alike.2 According to UN figures, by 2000, the numbers of international labor migrants amounted to 175 million.3 This number greatly increased during the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, amounting to 243.7 million in mid-2015.4 The remittances to developing countries totaled $436 billion in 2014, a 4.4% increase over 2013.5 These figures point to the fact that workers’ remittances not only substantially surpass official global development aid, but surpass the GDP of most countries worldwide as well. The neo-classical economic theory treated international labor migration as a factor of production in line with the International Trade theory.6 Hence, the basic assumption of the neo-classical International Labor Migration theory is that labor is a kind of commodity and thus should be examined within the overall framework of “market” in which the forces of “demand” and “supply” interact and the price is determined according to the balance between them. In other words, a worker’s production is traded in exchange for income. According to this perspective, uneven patterns of labor demand produce wage differentials, which, in turn, stimulate an increased labor supply through the mechanism of international migration. This produces a redistribution of human capital from areas of low salaries to areas of higher salaries. The motivation for emigration is a calculation of cost/benefit balance, namely, the prevailing wage in the home country versus the prospective wage in the migration destination minus the cost of the emigration process itself. Insofar as the gap is higher, the greater the motivation of the

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potential migrant. At the national level, through the international labor migration mechanism, countries can exchange surplus workforce in exchange for capital (through workers’ remittances) in the same way as exports/import of other goods and services. As such, both countries benefit — the labor-exporter and the labor-importer — making international migration a “win-win situation.”7 Since the 1970s, in many developing countries worldwide, workers’ remittances have become the most lucrative and stable source for hard currency, as FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) “often move pro-cyclically, raising incomes during booms and depressing them during downturns.”8 Thus, according to the common perception, “remittances offset some of the output losses of a developing country from the emigration of its highly skilled workers.”9 In sum, through the workers’ remittances, “an economy can spend more than it produces, import more than it exports or invest more than it saves.”10 The common perception in the academic literature regarding the cost/benefit balance of labor immigration is also positive for several reasons. Firstly, labor immigration provides the host countries with the necessary workforce, in terms of both quantity and quality, at a much cheaper price than the local workforce, thus preventing inflation which appears in periods of labor shortage. Moreover, the migrants contribute to raising the labor force participation rates and thereby improving the dependency ratio. This factor is crucial in many developed economies due to their steadily ageing population phenomenon (see Chapter 1). Specifically regarding the inter-Arab labor migration, al-Yousif claims that: Many expect globalization to lead to an increase in international migration, which like capital flows and trade offers potential gains to both the host country and the country of origin. This is so because the flow of labor improves the welfare of the migrants through higher earning income, their countries of origin through remittances, and the flow of labor benefits the host country by providing them with the skills they need at lower cost. The experience of the GCC countries during the last three decades is one example of this phenomenon.11

The absorption of migrant workers and even their naturalization in the host countries was regarded, in most cases, as a blessing within the overall framework of multiculturalism which ruled the politics of many Western developed countries during the second half of the twentieth century. It was a natural reaction to the pre-World War II nationalism which was regarded by many as the main cause for the outbreak of World War II. To this pattern of international labor migration, one should add the wide-scale intra-EU labor migration, particularly from the less developed countries which joined the EU in 2004 to the more developed EU countries, primarily to the UK, Germany and France, which became so common that in mid-2012 there were 2.33 million immigrants from the other EU countries in the UK alone.12 Overall, following World War II, four main international labor immigration patterns emerged: (a) International labor migration as a fundamental tool for the state-building process. In the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the process of state-building was, and still is, based on large-scale labor immigration. As such, the emphasis of the demographic policy of these countries is not natalist-based, but rather one which keeps labor immigration in line with labor market demands. For these countries, each labor immigrant is “a potential citizen.”13

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(b) Labor migration as a “no choice option.” This group is mainly comprised of the EU “ethnically homogeneous developed countries” that are experiencing a severe labor shortage. This situation has come about mainly due to prolonged low fertility rates which led to rapid population ageing and the “living without work” option as part of their “welfare state” (see Chapter 1). As these countries are by their very nature ethnic societies, they naturally strive to conserve their traditional cultural-religious nature. Consequently, they are trying to find solutions for their severe labor shortage and ageing population mainly through pro-natalist measures. However, since these countries are democracies, many of the labor immigrants and their accompanying family members eventually succeed in becoming citizens of the host countries. The end result is that the percentage of the first and second generation of immigrants of the total population of these countries is steadily increasing. Due to the continuation of extremely low fertility rates (see Chapter 1), these countries are steadily becoming labor immigration countries similar to the countries of the first category.14 (c) A “near total ban” on labor immigration. The leading countries in this small group are Japan and South Korea. However, due to their prolonged extremely low fertility rates, even lower than in the EU countries (see Chapter 1), these countries started to gradually alleviate their strict labor-immigration policies in order to prevent a substantial deterioration of their dependency ratio. In the case of Japan, in 2010 the migrant workers numbered 650,000, that is, 1.7% of the total workforce.15 In the case of South Korea, the number of foreign labor grew even more rapidly, amounted to more than 5% of the total workforce in early 2013.16 (d) The unique GCC rentier labor-immigration pattern. This pattern is the main subject of this chapter.

2

The Socioeconomic Structure of the Arabian Gulf Prior to the “Oil Era”

Historically, the Arabian Gulf region was comprised of city-states, called Shaykhdoms, each ruled by a dominant extended family. The current GCC oil states are an expansion of these city-states with the historical ruling families in power until the present. This is the case with the Al Khalifa family which has ruled Bahrain since 1870s; the Al Thani family in Qatar since the 1820s; the Al Sabah family in Kuwait since the early eighteenth century; the Al Sa‘ud family in all the three historical Saudi states; the Al Bu Sa‘id family in Oman for over 250 years; and the ruling families of the Shaykhdoms which comprise the current UAE. Hence, the GCC countries are new states with traditional long-life regimes. With the exception of the two holy Muslim cities in the Hejaz, Mecca and Medina, from both economic and geo-political viewpoints, the Arabian Gulf region was marginal to the Ottomans. Consequently, they never implemented a direct rule in the area. Therefore, the socioeconomic developments that had occurred in the vast majority of the Middle East region during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century largely neglected the Arabian Gulf region. The British who ruled much of the area following World War I also did not impose direct rule. Hence, prior to the beginning of the oil era — first in Bahrain in 1932, then in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1938, in Qatar in 1940, in the UAE in 1952 and lastly in Oman in 1967 — the Arabian Gulf region was one of the poorest areas worldwide,

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with its economy mainly based on pearl diving, subsistence agriculture in the coastal areas, international trade in the coastal cities and a traditional nomadic economy in the interior areas. In the early 1930s, however, the region’s pearling industry collapsed as a result of the sharp decline in world demand for pearls due to the Great Depression and the development of Japanese cultured pearls which were considerably cheaper than natural pearls.17 In addition, the number of the Hajj pilgrims markedly declined due to the Great Depression. Consequently, the Arabian Gulf region as a whole went into a severe recession, which lasted until the late 1940s with the beginning of the oil era. According to Saudi official sources, until the end of World War II, the Saudi government revenues were never higher than $4 million annually.18 As a result of its poor socioeconomic condition, the Arabian Gulf region was sparsely populated prior to the beginning of the oil era. At the end of World War I, the population of the area of present day Saudi Arabia numbered approximately 1.5–2 million, the population of Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait together numbered approximately 175,000, and about half a million people lived in present day Oman and the UAE.19 The only foreigners who were present in the region prior to the beginning of the oil era were merchants from the neighboring regions and from India who traded with the Arabian Gulf merchants. In addition, there were some workers from neighboring areas who came to work on a seasonal basis in the fishing and pearling industries.20 Following the discovery of oil, the peripheral status of the Arabian Gulf changed immediately. One of the instant results was the beginning of rapid population growth. This was brought about mainly by increasing the number of foreign labor in order to fill the professional occupations in the oil industry and later in the rapidly expanding public sectors. In Bahrain — the first among the Arabian Gulf states to extract oil — as early as 1941 the foreign population amounted to 15,930, representing 17.7% of its total population.21 Kuwait’s population in 1949 numbered approximately 100,000 compared to only 60,000 in 1930.22 In the other Arabian Gulf states, the same pattern of rapid population growth occurred. Overall, in the early 1970s, prior to the “oil boom,” the number of foreigners in the Arabian Gulf oil countries was estimated at between 800,000 and 1.25 million, including both workers and their accompanying family members.23

3

The GCC States’ Strategy for Development following the “Oil Boom”

No region in the world economy has experienced more profound economic and social changes over the past half-century than the Arabian Peninsula. John Willoughby, 200524

Following the October 1973 “oil boom,”25 the GCC countries had to deal with the dilemma of what to do with the sudden inflow of huge oil revenues (see Table 5.1). As the price of oil fluctuated substantially, the development of alternative sources for both income and employment became the paramount aim of the GCC authorities. Thus, the primary objective of the Second Saudi Five-Year Development Plan (1975–1980) was “diversifying sources of national income and reducing dependence on oil.”26

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Table 5.1 billions) Year

The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences Crude Oil Prices and GCC Oil Export Revenues, 1974–2015 (current prices, US$

Crude oil price (US$/Barrel)

Oil export revenues Total GCC

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

10.4 10.7 11.6 12.4 13.0 29.8 35.7 34.3 31.8 28.8 28.1 27.5 13.0 16.9 14.2 17.3 22.3 18.6 18.4 16.3 15.5 16.9 20.3 18.7 12.3 17.5 27.6 23.1 24.4 28.1 36.1 50.6 61.1 69.1 94.5 61.1 77.5 107.5 109.5 105.9 96.3 49.5

51.2 46.2 57.9 63.8 60.7 93.8 150.3 157.8 108.3 76.1 70.5 60.0 38.3 45.6 40.6 50.8 69.0 64.7 75.7 71.3 67.4 76.3 90.9 85.9 59.6 76.1 130.1 109.4 112.2 142.8 191.1 282.7 339.2 371.1 511.1 313.1 401.6 559.5 604.4 590.9 536.1 293.2

Saudi Arabia 31.1 27.6 36.1 41.1 37.8 57.2 101.4 111.5 73.3 44.8 36.3 27.5 20.0 22.7 21.1 24.1 40.1 43.3 47.6 41.4 39.2 42.7 52.1 48.9 33.7 43.2 74.3 59.6 63.6 82.1 110.4 161.1 188.2 205.3 281.0 163.1 215.2 285.0 305.2 294.0 269.8 147.1

Oil prices: 1974–1987: Arabian Light/Dubai. 1988–2015: OPEC Reference Basket (ORB): From January 1, 1987 to June 15, 2005, OPEC calculated an arithmetic average of seven crude oil streams to estimate the OPEC basket price. Since June 16, 2005, OPEC decided to change the composition of the basket in order to better reflect the average quality of crude oil in OPEC member countries. The new basket is made up of 11 crude streams.

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Sources: Oil prices: Paul Rivlin, World Oil and Energy Trends: Strategic Implications for the Middle East, Memorandum No. 57 (Tel Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, September 2000), p. 17, table 1; OPEC website [http://www.opec.org]; EIA website [www.eia.doe.gov]. GCC and Saudi Arabia oil export revenues: ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA Region, 1998–1999, pp. 45–46; Survey, 2000–2001, p. 28, table 13; Survey, 2003–2004, p. 14, table 4; Survey, 2004–2005, p. 10, table 3; Survey, 2007–2008, p. 11, table 4; Survey, 2009–2010, p. 15, table 5; Survey, 2012–2013, p. 11, table 1.5; Survey, 2014–2015, p. 21, table 4.

In later Saudi development plans, as in those of the other GCC countries, one can find a similar aim of economic diversification in order to reduce the dependence on oil income.27 Among the GCC leaders, Sultan Qabus of Oman was the most explicit. During the tenth anniversary of Oman’s National Day on November 18, 1980, he made the following statement: Self-reliance is to be the keynote of all our plans for the future. Our first priority must therefore be the consolidation and expansion of our economy. It has long been our intension that our economy should be so diversified that our dependence on the one resource — oil — is reduced.28

In order to achieve the principal aim of economic diversification, the GCC development plans following the October 1973 “oil boom” concentrated on two major arenas:

Current prices, US$ billions 700 600 500 400 300 200

0

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

100

Total GCC

Figure 5.1

Saudi Arabia

The GCC Oil Export Revenues, 1974–2015 (current prices, US$ billions)

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Current prices, US$ 110.0 100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0

Figure 5.2

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

0.0

Crude Oil Prices, 1974–2015 (current prices, US$)

(a) Rapid expansion of infrastructure facilities which included everything from roads, highways, airports, seaports, telecommunication systems, water desalination devices and power stations as well as establishing governmental ministries and other public services. The rapid expansion of the infrastructure facilities constituted a preconditional step in the shift from a developing into a developed economy. (b) Massive industrial development, particularly oil-related ones, such as petrochemicals, steel and aluminum, in which the GCC economies had a clear comparative advantage of cheap energy. In this respect, Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted that in contrast to the developed countries which achieved their wealth through industrialization, “the GCC countries were trying to achieve industrialization through wealth.”29 These large-scale development plans, however, required an extensive workforce of a size and quality that could not be supplied by local sources as the GCC indigenous workforces were both small (see Table 5.2) and low-skilled.30 The illiteracy rate in Saudi Arabia in 1974 was estimated to be 65% among males and as high as 98% among females. In the other GCC countries, one can find a similar high illiteracy rate among both males and females.31 As a result of these two basic limitations, the GCC authorities decided that for the short-term, the necessary workforce would be supplied through immigration. For the longer run, the required workforce, or at least its vast majority, would be supplied locally through massive investments in education and professional training together with generous pro-natalist measures in order to maintain the high fertility rates (see Chapter 6). It is important to emphasize, however, that the GCC royal families never considered addressing the labor shortage through mass naturalization of foreign labor,

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The Arabian Gulf “Rentier State”

The term “rental income,” created by Adam Smith and further developed in the early nineteenth century by David Ricardo, relates to “income derived from the gift of nature.” The term “rentier state” refers to a situation in which the rental income, which largely dominates the governmental revenues, is external to the domestic production. Although some rental income exists in any given country, in the GCC states, rental income — stemming predominantly from oil revenues — amounts to at least 80% of total governmental revenues. Hence, in a rentier economy the scale of the national income does not reflect the performance of the domestic production only, but it is rather a function of the price of the rentier resource in the international market. Rental income, it should be emphasized, is not only tangible natural resources, such as oil or gas, but include also “non-tangible” resources such as geographical locations, water resources, weather and so on. In the case of the Arabian Gulf countries, the history of the rental incomes date back to the late nineteenth century with the treaties with the UK in which the Arabian Gulf ruling families guaranteed safe passage to East Asia in exchange of military and financial support. Since the 1930s, the major rental income of these countries has been the oil and gas exports and recently the tourism and aviation industries have been added. Thus, a “rentier government” does not deal with the redistribution of internal resources through taxes on the one hand and supplying various social services, subsidies and allowances on the other, in return for political participation. It rather deals with the distribution of the external rental incomes among the indigenous population in the most beneficial political manner. Therefore, the major difference between the “democratic welfare states” and the GCC rentier states is that while in the former those who benefited the most from the welfare state system were the lower strata through massive allowances and highly subsided public services, while the upper strata paid high taxes in order to finance public services and allowances, in the GCC rentier states, the opposite occurred. Although all citizens benefit from the rentier system, those who enjoy it the most are the upper strata, mainly through the lack of personal income taxes. Following the October 1973 “oil boom,” a “rentier mentality” emerged among the citizens of the GCC societies in which the government is not a political representative body, but rather a supplier of allowances, subsidies and various free public services and above all a guarantee of public sector employment, in exchange for concessions on political participation. Hence, although the rentier system prevents any effective political participation on the part of the citizens, citizenship in a rentier state is a source of financial benefits. The core of the politics in the GCC countries is “no taxation and no representation” in the form that the GCC ruling families “buy” the loyalty of their nationals, something akin to a “give and take” relationship and not “a common destiny” as it the case of the social-democratic countries. From a purely political viewpoint, this policy succeeded to a great extent. In none of the GCC countries, no form of nationalist movement or any other sort of modern ideological party has thus far developed. Opposition to the ruling family, if it exists at all, remains mainly in the traditional forms of Sunni/Shi‘is rivalry and Islamic fundamentalism (mainly in Saudi Arabia). Sources: Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, pp. 85–98; Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 251–252; Gregory III Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), pp. 42–77; Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, “Nationality of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait,” in David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (eds.), The Transformation of the Gulf (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 168–181; Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 14–21; Neil Partrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States,” in Held and Ulrichsen (eds.), The Transformation of the Gulf, pp. 47–65; Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 45.

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Box 5.2

The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences The Naturalization of Foreigners in the Arabian Gulf Oil States

In order to preserve traditional “intimate society” norms, in which the individual is not regarded as an autonomous being, but rather as part of a certain tribe, an urban extended family or a religious sect, from the beginning of the oil era, the GCC ruling families treated foreign workers as a temporary necessity. Thus, although many foreigners are, in fact, second and third generation and have lived in the Gulf their entire lives, they still continue to be treated as “temporary immigrants.” Overall, the right to bring accompanying family members to one of the GCC countries depends on minimum wage. Therefore, only those employed in managerial and professional occupations can enjoy this privilege, while non-professional employees are not entitled to this. Moreover, marriage of a foreign male to a GCC woman does not entitle the groom to citizenship. Until recently, even children of a GCC woman and a foreign father were not entitled to automatic citizenship. A foreign woman who marries a GCC groom, on the other hand, is entitled to automatic citizenship. This difference in attitude is because according to the shari‘a the religion of the children follows that of the father. Thus, the vast majority of those who did receive citizenship in one of the GCC countries were females who married GCC grooms. In the case of Oman, marriage of a national, both male and female, to a non-GCC citizen required prior permission from the Ministry of the Interior. In 2011, a UAE Presidential decree granted children of an Emirati woman who was married to a non-Emirati the right to apply for citizenship after the age of 18. Birth in one of the GCC countries does not entitle the newborn to citizenship or even permanent residency. Only in exceptional circumstances might the ruler grant citizenship to a foreigner who has “provided outstanding service” to the state. In recent years, however, the strict restrictive policy of the naturalization of males has been somewhat eased, mainly in cases of highly and unique professional workers who stay in the country for a long period of time. In any case, the number of males who were eventually naturalized in one of the GCC countries remained extremely low. A major problem in the GCC countries is that of the bidun (bidun jinsiyya), namely, “without nationality” or “stateless persons,” mainly concentrated in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These people, although having lived in the Arabian Gulf area their entire lives, are not considered citizens of one of the GCC countries. In the case of Kuwait, the issue of the bidun is particularly crucial due to their vast numbers. Although the Kuwaiti authorities granted citizenship to many of them and their numbers declined from approximately 250,000 prior to the Iraqi invasion to 113,000 in 2001 and about 105,000–110,000 in 2013, they still represent a substantial percentage of the Kuwaiti non-foreign population. In Saudi Arabia, according to the estimates, the bidun population numbered about 70,000 in 2013. In the UAE, the number of the bidun although substantial, is unknown, running from the low governmental official figure of only 10,000, to about 100,000 according to unofficial estimates. Sources: U.S., Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006, Vol. II (Washington, D.C., 2008); Nasra M. Shah, The Management of Irregular Migration and its Consequence for Development: Gulf Cooperation Council, ILO, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (March 2009); Philippe Fargues and Imco Brouwer, “GCC Demography and Immigration: Challenges and Policies,” in Steffen Hertog (ed.), National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2012), pp. 231–263; Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE,” GLMM, No. 7/2015; The Bidoun of the United Arab Emirates, 2012 (London, 2012); Bloomberg News, March 30, 2008; UK, Home Office, Country Information and Guidance Kuwaiti Bidoon (London, February 3, 2014); The Saudi Gazette, August 30, 2014; Gulf News, August 12, 2014.

inter alia, because of the large resistance from the local populations.32 Thus, since the beginning of the oil era and until the present, the number of foreigners who were naturalized in any of the GCC states remained negligible (see Box 5.2).

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The Inevitable Result: Rapid Growth of Foreign Labor

The enlistment of massive numbers of foreign labor following the “oil boom” did not demand substantial efforts on the part of the GCC countries. This is because the foreigners were offered wages that were several times higher than the prevailing wages in their home countries. Thus, for example, according to a survey conducted in 1977, the wages for Egyptian construction labor in one of the GCC countries were 780%–1,130% higher than those in Egypt itself.33 In the late 1970s, while the annual wage of an Egyptian teacher was $600–$700 in Egypt, it was approximately $12,000 in Saudi Arabia.34 Similar wage gaps also existed in comparison to the other non-oil Arab countries. For example, while the monthly wage for a non-skilled construction worker in Syria in the late 1970s was less than $70, the worker could earn about five-times that amount for the same work in one of the GCC countries.35 The combination of extremely high salaries, the liberal migration policy (see below), and the fact that for the Arab-Muslim migrants the religious-cultural life in the Arabian Gulf was quite similar to that in their home countries turned the GCC countries into a preferred migration destination. In addition to the huge wage gaps between the Arab oil-based and the non-oil Arab countries, two other major factors contributed to the massive intra-Arab labor migration following the “oil boom”: The first and the most important was the substantial improvement of intra-Arab political relationships. During the Nasserite period, intraArab politics was characterized by a harsh struggle between “the revolutionary countries,” namely those countries that were ruled by army officers, and those which were ruled by traditional monarchies, particularly those of the Arabian Gulf. However, following the death of ‘Abd al-Nasser (September 1970), this struggle ended, as Anwar al-Sadat’s intra-Arab policy was that of cooperation and appeasement. The second factor was the adoption of encouraging labor emigration policy on the part of the poorer Arab countries (see below). Thus, in 1975, barely two years following the “oil boom,” the total number of foreigners in the GCC countries amounted to almost 2 million, 1.4 million of whom were workers (70%) while the rest were accompanying family members. During the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the process of rapid increase in the number of foreign labor continued in line with the acceleration of the infrastructure development projects. Hence, by 1985, the number of the foreign population in the GCC countries climbed to 5.8 million, among whom 4.4 million were workers (75%) while the rest were accompanying family members (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). In the mid-1980s, there was a widespread feeling that the process of rapid increase in the number of foreign labor in the GCC countries had ended and from that point on their numbers would steadily decline.36 This feeling was based on four fundamental factors: The first was the sharp decline of oil revenues, particularly following the collapse of oil prices in mid-1986.37 The second factor was the adoption of labor force nationalization policies (see below). The third was the rapid increase of the indigenous workforce due to the accelerated population growth along with the sharp improvement in its quality due to the huge investments in education and vocational training. The fourth factor was the completion of the major infrastructure projects, mainly roads, seaports and airports. This widespread concept is well illustrated in the GCC development plans from the mid-1980s when each of them, almost without exception, predicted a sharp decline in

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the number of foreign labor in the near future. For example, the Saudi Fourth FiveYear Development Plan (1980–1985) noted that: “For the first time since the First Plan [1970–1975], when rapid economic development began, not only the share, but also the absolute number of non-Saudi workers in the Kingdom will decline, while the economy will absorb substantial numbers of new Saudi entrants.”38 During the 1984–1987 period, in most of the GCC countries, some decline in the number of foreign labor indeed occurred. The number of work permits granted to foreign workers by the Saudi authorities dropped by more than 10% in 1983 compared to the previous year.39 In Oman the number of foreign labor declined by 27,000 in 1986 alone.40 In the other GCC countries, the same trend occurred. However, the recovery of oil revenues after 1986 led to the reversal of the process and the number of foreign labor in each of the GCC countries, without exception, began to rise again, although at a slower pace than during the “oil decade.” By mid1990s, the number of foreign labor in the GCC countries totaled 5.2 million compared to 4.4 million in 1985 (see Table 5.3). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) led to dramatic demographic changes in the GCC countries. In contrast to Birks and Sinclair’s projection that “massive returns of non-national Arab workers to their source countries from the GCC are unlikely,”41 a large-scale departure of approximately 2 million Arabs and some hundreds of thousands of non-Arabs eventually occurred.42 After the large exodus of the foreigners, it was widely accepted among both researchers and politicians that the number of foreigners in the GCC countries would never again reach the numbers which had existed prior to the Iraqi invasion. This widely-held perception rested on four basic assumptions: (a) There is a high correlation between oil prices and the number of foreign workers, based on the belief that the number of foreign labor is a direct function of the scale of the economic expansion. Due to the extreme financial damage to the GCC countries as a result of the Iraqi invasion, particularly to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,43 combined with the very low oil prices during the early 1990s (see Table 5.1), the scale of new development projects had dramatically decreased. Hence, the natural consequence would be a dramatic decline in the demand for foreign labor. (b) The large-scale departure of foreigners during the Kuwaiti crisis created a great opportunity for the GCC authorities to regain their control over the number of foreigners following two decades in which a huge number of illegal foreigners entered the GCC countries almost unrestrictedly (see below). (c) The large-scale departure of foreign labor during the crisis emphasized to the GCC authorities how much their economies depended on foreign labor and how much this dependence was problematic. Thus, following the end of the crisis, the GCC authorities repeated on many occasions that they would never let this situation of “being a minority in their own country” recur. Naturally, the Kuwaiti authorities were the most decisive on this issue. On July 9, 1991, at the first National Council session following the liberation, the Prime Minister, Sa‘ad ‘Abdalah al-Salim Al Sabah, announced that: “Reaching the desired balance in the population composition is no longer considered to be a social objective . . . instead, it has become an inescapable necessity . . . ”44 (d) In addition to the political aim of reducing the dependence on foreign labor, since the mid-1980s, but more so during the 1990s, the GCC authorities implemented a labor force nationalization policy in order to replace foreign workers by nationals (see below).

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The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences Table 5.2

Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Populations, 1975–2015 (thousands)

Country

Nationals

Foreigners

Total

% Foreigners

Saudi Arabia (a) Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

6,218 472 214 550 60 170 7,684

1975 791 523 56 132 97 388 1,987

7,009 995 270 682 157 558 9,671

11.3 52.6 20.7 19.4 61.8 69.5 20.5

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

7,849 750 295 816 105 434 10,249

1986 2,570 1,072 140 494 284 1,239 5,799

10,419 1,822 435 1,310 389 1,673 16,048

24.7 58.8 32.2 37.7 73.0 74.1 36.1

Saudi Arabia (b) Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

8,847 572 336 1,024 100 531 11,410

1990 5,939 1,563 167 371 350 1,014 9,404

14,786 2,135 503 1,395 450 1,545 20,814

40.2 73.2 33.2 26.6 77.8 65.6 45.2

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

15,589 832 391 1,778 152 703 19,445

2000 5,258 1,358 261 624 428 2,187 10,116

20,847 2,190 652 2,402 580 2,890 29,561

25.2 62.0 40.0 30.6 73.8 75.7 34.2

Saudi Arabia Kuwait (c) Bahrain Oman Qatar (d) UAE Total

18,710 1,090 569 1,957 245 948 23,519

2010 8,430 1,976 666 816 1,454 7,316 20,658

27,140 3,066 1,235 2,773 1,699 8,264 44,177

31.1 64.4 53.9 29.4 84.8 88.5 46.8

Saudi Arabia (f) Kuwait Bahrain (e) Oman Qatar (d) UAE (g) Total

20,702 1,294 615 2,345 305 1,120 26,381

2015 10,068 2,893 638 1,814 2,042 8,037 25,492

30,770 4,187 1,253 4,159 2,347 9,157 51,873

32.7 69.1 50.9 43.6 87.0 87.8 49.1

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Note to Table 5.2 (a) Figure relates to 1974 (b) Figure relates to 1988 (c) Figure relates to 2011 (d) Author’s calculation, based on 2010 census data (e) Figure relates to 2013 (f) Figure relates to 2014 (g) Author’s estimated based on 2010 GCC data.

Thousands 30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Nationals

Figure 5.3

2015

2010

2000

1990

1986

1975

0

Foreigners

Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Populations, 1975–2015 (thousands)

These optimistic projections, however, eventually did not materialize. In fact, the opposite occurred. Throughout the 1990s, the number of foreign workers in each of the GCC countries substantially increased. By 1999, the number of foreign workers in all the GCC countries amounted to 7.1 million compared to 5.2 in 1990. As one can see in Table 5.3 (page 130) and the corresponding Figure 5.4 (page 129), the most substantial increase occurred in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Hence, by the end of the twentieth century, in each of the GCC countries, the foreigners represented much more than half of the workforce. In the private sector, as will be examined below, the foreign workers represented more than 80% of all employees. In Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, the share of the nationals in the workforce declined to less than 20% and in many occupations, mainly construction and agriculture, national employees were not represented at all. During the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, despite of the extensive labor force nationalization policy (see below), not only did the number of foreign labor not decline, it rather continued to increase, and even more rapidly than during the 1990s. By 2015, the foreign population of the GCC countries skyrocketed to 25.5

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million, fivefold their number in the mid-1980s. The number of foreign workers in these countries estimated in 2014 at 18.2 million compared to 11.4 million in 2010 and 7.1 in 1999. In Qatar and the UAE, the share of nationals in the workforce declined to less than 10% and less than 1% in the private sector (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3).

5

The Uniqueness of the GCC Labor Migration Pattern45

The common approach taken in the academic literature regarding the GCC labor migration is that it essentially resembles other global labor migration movements. Kapiszewski argued in 2001 that: [The] GCC states have become mother countries for an increasing number of non-nationals, despite the objectives set up by the authorities . . . Thus, the development of modern societies in the GCC countries is already under way, although it is likely to take quite some time to develop all the bonds that a mature structure of this type requires.46

A similar view was expressed by Massey and associates who claim in 1998 that: Migrant networks and social institutions have nonetheless arisen to promote the perpetuation of migration and the emergence of settled communities, especially among migrants from the Arab world.47

Thousands 20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000

Nationals

Figure 5.4

2014

2010

1999

1990

1985

1975

0

Foreigners

Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Labor Forces, 1975–2014 (thousands)

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Table 5.3 Country

The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences Nationals and Expatriates in the GCC Labor Forces, 1975–2014 (thousands) Nationals

Foreigners

Total

% Foreigners

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

1,027 92 46 137 13 45 1,360

1975 773 213 30 71 54 252 1,393

1,800 305 76 208 67 297 2,753

42.9 69.8 39.5 34.1 80.6 84.8 50.6

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman (a) Qatar UAE Total

1,440 126 73 167 18 72 1,896

1985 2,662 544 101 300 156 612 4,375

4,102 670 174 467 174 684 6,271

64.9 81.2 58.0 64.2 89.7 89.5 69.8

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

1,934 118 127 189 21 96 2,485

1990 2,878 731 132 442 230 805 5,218

4,812 849 259 631 251 901 7,703

59.8 86.1 51.0 70.0 91.6 89.3 67.7

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar (b) UAE (b) Total

3,173 221 113 312(c) 36 124 3,979

1999 4,003 1,005 194 503 244 1,165 7,114

7,176 1,226 307 815 280 1,289 11,093

55.9 82.0 63.2 61.7 87.1 90.4 64.1

Saudi Arabia Kuwait (e) Bahrain Oman (f) Qatar (e) UAE (d) Total

3,838 358 137 582 77 223 5,215

2010 4,310(e) 1,742 375 897 1,200 2,914 11,438

8,148 2,100 512 1,479 1,277 3,137 16,653

52.9 83.0 73.2 60.6 93.4 92.9 68.7

Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE Total

2,719 410 189 718 94 221 4,351

2014 8,543 1,961 528 1,498 1,505 4,196 18,231

11,262 2,371 717 2,216 1,599 4,417 22,582

75.9 82.7 73.6 67.6 94.1 95.0 80.7

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(a) Figure relates to 1986 (b) Figure relates to 1997 (c) Since the Omani authorities did not publish data on the scale of the Omani national workforce in 1999, and only that of the foreign workforce, the data on the Omani national workforce in 1999 was calculated by the author on the basis of the 1995 data (d) Figure relates to 2009 (e) Figure relates to 2011 (f) Based on author’s calculations. Sources for Tables 5.2 and 5.3: The State of Kuwait, CSO, Annual Statistical Abstract, various issues (Kuwait); The Kingdom of Bahrain, CSO, Statistical Abstract, various issues (Manama); idem, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama); Central Bank of Bahrain, Statistical Bulletin, various issues (Manama); Sultanate of Oman, NCSI, Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Muscat); idem, Population Statistics Bulletin, various issues (Muscat); Saudi Arabia, Central Department of Statistics & Information, Annual Statistical Yearbook, various issues (Riyadh); SAMA, Annual Report, various issues (Riyadh); State of Qatar, SA, Annual Statistical Abstract, various issues (Doha); idem, Labor Force Sample Survey, various issues (Doha); Qatar National Bank, Qatar Economic Review, various issues (Doha); UAE, NBS, Population by Age Group, 1975-2005 (December 25, 2010); GCC, Statistical Bulletin, various issues (Dubai); ILO, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, (Geneva, 1980); International Migration for Employment: Manpower and Population Evolution in the GCC and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, World Employment Programme Research, Working Paper, by J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair (Geneva, 1989); ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA Region, various issues (Beirut, Baghdad and Amman); idem, Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region, various issues (New York); idem, Compendium of Social Statistics and Indicators (Beirut, 1992); UN, World Population Prospects: 2015 Revision; WB, World Bank Data; HRD base Ltd., Lloyds Bank Chambers, Socio-Demographic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (Newcastle, May 1987); Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report, 1990 and 1992 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre 1990; 1992); Andrzej Kapiszewski, National and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001); Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Oman,” Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), No. 9/2015; idem, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar,” GLMM, No. 8/2014; idem, “labour Force by Nationality (Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti), Activity Sector and Sector of Economic Activity” (total, 2013); The EIU, UAE Expatriates and the Bottom Line (London, 2014); Nasra M. Shah, “Labour Migration from Asian to GCC Countries: Trends, Patterns and Policies” Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 5 (2013).

However, some superficial similarities notwithstanding, the labor migration system in the GCC countries radically differs from that of other international labor migration systems in four distinct ways: (a) The GCC workforce structure. There is no equivalent anywhere worldwide in which the national workforce is no more than “a complement to the foreign labor.”48 In many cases, it is an unnecessary complement which is employed almost exclusively in the public sector under lucrative work conditions and high salaries as part of the overall rentier system. Paradoxically, foreign labor even makes up the vast majority of the security forces, one of their major roles being to enforce the labor and immigration regulations. This being the case, it is necessary to reject the common notion of “integration” of foreign workers and their accompanying family members into the local GCC societies, where the indigenous population represents only a tiny fraction of the total workforce. This is because large-scale naturalization would turn the indigenous population into a minority in their own countries. Moreover, since the early 1990s, as the vast majority of the foreign workers in these countries are not Arabs (see below), the actual meaning

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of large-scale naturalization is that these countries would lose their Arab-Islamic identity. The situation in countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even in the more developed EU countries is, of course, totally different, as the number of migrants is still relatively small in comparison to the indigenous population. (b) Lack of employment stability. In contrast to the common Western migration pattern, the position of foreign workers in the GCC countries is extremely unstable. According to the GCC migration rules, a foreign worker can be deported without prior notice. This shaky position was most evident during the Kuwait crisis when the vast majority of the Palestinians and the Jordanians in Kuwait and the Yemenites in Saudi Arabia were deported, despite the fact that they had been settled in these countries for decades. An ESCWA report described the situation of the Arab migrants who were forced to leave the GCC countries as follows: The belief of some [Arab] emigrants that they would be able to settle forever in the host countries proved to be an illusion, revealing their unrealistic understanding of the conditions, principles and policies of emigration in these host countries.49

Two major factors account for the unstable position of the foreign workers in the GCC countries: First, as opposed to Western labor-importing countries, the GCC countries are not democratic. In democratic labor-importing countries, the legal system itself provides protection for the foreign workers through labor laws and regulations, civil rights and the like. Second, while assorted NGOs in the democratic labor-importing countries protect the foreign workers from both the authorities and employers, such organizations do not exist in the GCC countries. (c) Permanent settlement is not desired by the foreign workers themselves. Whereas the aim of the vast majority of migrant workers to the Western countries is to become a citizen of the host country, the typical labor migration scenario in the GCC countries is that of a migrant worker who only comes for several years in order to earn as much money as possible before returning to his home country. As noted by Cammett and associates in 2015: “The vast majority of the migrants want to return home. Neither they nor the receiving countries view labor migration as permanent resettlement.”50 An Indian migrant worker, who was employed in the UAE together with his brother, described their employment motives in an interview for a field research project implemented in the late 1990s as follows: “Together, we decided to save some money and establish a small business in Kerala . . . ”51 (d) An extensive interest in cheap foreign labor. In developed labor-importing countries, the import of cheap foreign workers is mainly in the interest of the economic elite, but not in that of the whole population, due to the competition in the labor market, particularly in low wage occupations. In the GCC countries, however, the mass import of cheap foreign workers was and still is in the interest of all citizens. The unlimited availability of cheap foreign workers enabled the GCC middle classes, which constituted the bulk of the GCC nationals, to employ them in their small businesses and as domestic workers, while their own employment was guaranteed in the public sector. Thus, in the GCC countries, neither the migrants nor the indigenous societies have the ambition of mutual integration. The separation between nationals and foreigners in the GCC countries is so decisive that in many cases it also includes a physical separation in which many foreign workers are housed in work camps. The most extreme case is Qatar where, in April 2016, according to official data, 1.4 million foreign workers were living in labor camps.52 Under such different socioeconomic-political

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patterns, it is understandable why the labor migration pattern of the GCC countries was and still is so different from the common Western patterns.

6

The GCC Labor and Immigration Policies: From Encouragement through Limitation to Surrender

The GCC labor and immigration policies should be examined in relation to three main parameters: (a) The need for foreign labor, in terms of both quantity and quality, as a factor in the overall socioeconomic development programs. (b) The attitudes of the GCC authorities toward Middle Eastern political developments. (c) The internal political situations in the GCC countries themselves. Taking the above-mentioned three parameters into consideration, the GCC labor and immigration policies since the October 1973 “oil boom” can broadly be divided into the following periods:

6.1

Liberal Labor Immigration policies during the “Oil Decade”

Following the October 1973 “oil boom,” all of the GCC countries implemented liberal labor and immigration policies. The wish for rapid development suppressed any other consideration, including the issue of security.53 Overall, during that period, the GCC countries’ unrestricted labor and immigration policies included the following measures: (a) A liberal attitude toward accompanying family members. Within the framework of the liberal labor immigration policies, the GCC authorities enabled almost free entrance for accompanying family members of foreign labor. In addition, the GCC authorities subsidized education and healthcare services for the accompanying family members. Hence, the cost of living of the foreign workers during that period was relatively low. (b) The cancellation of personal income tax for foreign labor. In order to increase the attraction of their labor markets, anyone who came to work in these countries was not subject to personal income tax.54 (c) Encouragement of foreign companies to bring their own workers. The need for rapid implementation of the major infrastructure projects led the GCC authorities to allow foreign companies to bring their own workers. In addition to saving time, this policy enabled the GCC authorities to place the responsibility for the entry and exit of the foreign workers on the companies themselves. Beyond the purely socioeconomic factors, the liberal labor and immigration policies toward Arab foreigners had a clear political aim: To change the intra-Arab balance of power in their own favor through the employment of large numbers of workers from the poorer Arab countries, in addition to the financial aid given to these countries. Within the framework of this policy, in April 1975 the Saudi government announced an easing of entry requirements for Arab foreign labor and their accompanying family members.55

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Limiting Foreign Labor Following the End of the “Oil Decade”

Since 1982, oil prices in the international market sharply declined. In 1983, the total GCC oil export revenues amounted to only $76.1 billion and further declined to only $38.3 billion in 1986, compared to the peak of $157.8 billion in 1980 (see Table 5.1). The sharp drop in oil export revenues led the GCC countries to change their macroeconomic policies accordingly. Generally speaking, the socioeconomic policy adopted by the GCC countries following the end of the “oil decade” rested on three main principles: The first and most important was that despite the sharp decline in oil export revenues, the living standard of the indigenous populations should not be affected. It seems that the Islamic Revolution in Iran in early 1979 reinforced this decision.56 Thus, while the “normal” reaction to a severe recession is to adopt a policy which includes a sharp decline in government subsidies, public sector wages and allowances on the one hand, and directs the vast majority of the available financial resources to economic generation mechanisms on the other, the GCC ruling families adopted a contrary approach. This included reducing public sector infrastructure investments,57 while maintaining the various governmental wages, subsidies and allowances. This policy was financed through increasing governmental budgetary deficits to levels of more than 10% of the GDP, something unfamiliar in developed economies. It seems that this kind of socioeconomic policy reflects, more than anything else, the fundamental rentier nature of the GCC countries. The second principle was to substantially cut the aid to the poorer Arab countries (see Chapter 4). Hence, the slogan of “al-Wahda al-‘Arabyya” (“Arab Unity”) became meaningless in the early 1980s. The third principle was to decrease the numbers of the foreign labor through the nationalization policy. Although the unemployment rates among nationals in the early 1980s were still low, the GCC authorities realized that the former concept of absorbing almost the entire indigenous workforce in the public sector was no longer a viable option. Overall, the GCC labor force nationalization policy which was adopted following the “oil decade” included the following measures: (a) Deportation of illegal foreign workers. Since the late 1970s, but more so during the early 1980s, a large number of illegal foreign workers were deported from the GCC countries.58 The deportation of illegal foreign workers was primarily aimed at opening up additional employment opportunities for nationals through the eradication of the “black labor market.” (b) Limitations on the entry of accompanying family members of the foreign workers. This is because imposing restrictions on the entry of family members would not harm the economy, but would save substantial financial resources.59 (c) Limitation on social services for foreign labors. In the case of the UAE, for example, the government decided in 1983 that from that point on, the accompanying family members of foreign workers would no longer receive free healthcare and education.60 The aim of this measure was not only to save expenses, but also to substantially increase the cost of living for the foreign workers in order to reduce their motivation for bringing their families in the first place.61 (d) Adoption of a quota system for nationals in the private sector. The aim of this measure was to apply some of the costs of employing the national workforce on the private employers, rather than placing the entire burden on the public sector.

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The first among the GCC countries to adopt a labor force nationalization policy as early as 1978 was Bahrain — the least rentier among the GCC countries. In 1985, the Kuwaiti authorities adopted a long-term nationalization policy aimed at equalizing the sizes of the national population and the foreign population by the year 2000. The Kuwaiti authorities hoped to accomplish this target by reducing the need for foreign labor by introducing advanced technology; implementing stricter control over the entry of accompanying family members; and intensifying efforts to develop the national labor force. In order to promote the employment of nationals in the private sector, the Kuwaiti government imposed welfare service costs for foreign workers and their accompanying family members on the employers themselves rather than on the state.62 In March 1985, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs announced that “any non-Kuwaiti applying for a visa for his family must provide a statement to the effect that he has a minimum income of KD(Kuwaiti Dinar) 450 per month if employed by the government, or KD600 if employed in the private sector.”63 This policy of limiting the option of foreign labor of bringing their dependents through minimum income continues in Kuwait until the present.64 Likewise, the major aim of the Saudi Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1985–1990) was to reduce the number of foreigners in the Kingdom by 1.2 million by the end of the plan.65 In addition, from the mid-1980s, senior foreign workers were required to provide professional training to nationals as an integral part of their contracts so that nationals would be prepared to replace them in the future.66 In order to increase the available job opportunities for nationals, in early 1988 the Saudi government adopted the principle of not approving the recruitment of any foreign worker for any position which could be filled by a national.67 In April 1987, the Omani Minister of Labor stated that foreign workers could no longer be hired in eleven job categories, including public relations personnel, typists, security officers, apprentices, drivers, fishermen, and shepherds.68 The aim was to increase the available job opportunities for nationals, and to “share” the costs of employing nationals with the private employers. In August 1989, the Bahraini government initiated an ambitious five-year labor force nationalization program by which it hoped to replace as many as one-third of foreigners with Bahraini nationals. Letters were sent to most private sector companies directing them to increase the number of nationals they employed by 5% annually. Specific job categories were singled out for takeover by nationals, including senior administrative personnel, supervisors, engineers, technicians, computer operators, nurses, clerks, accountants, secretaries, sales and marketing personnel, and hotel and restaurant workers. The goal was that some 400 companies, employing approximately 60,000 foreign workers, lay off 20,000 and replace them with nationals.69 Despite the slower pace of the increase in the number of foreign labor in the GCC countries in the second half of the 1980s compared to the previous decade, still, as previously examined, the numbers in each GCC country were substantially higher in mid-1990 than in 1985. Why did the number of foreign labor continue to increase during the second half of the 1980s, despite the rapid increase of the number of national workforce and its substantial improvement? (a) The “no rush attitude.” Although the GCC authorities were fully aware of the importance of decreasing the dependence on foreign workers, the prevailing feeling among the decision-making ranks was that the problem was not an immediate one, but rather one for the longer run. Thus, for example, the Saudi Industry Minister,

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Ghazi al-Gosaybi, noted in mid-1979 in regard to the need for nationalizing the labor force that: “Sometime in the future, be it in three, ten or fifteen years, there will no longer be such a surplus of wealth in the country — people [nationals] will welcome any work to earn a living . . . ”70 The “no rush” attitude prevented the GCC authorities from firmly implementing their labor force nationalization policy. Thus, in practice, many of the former norms of the “oil decade” remained in force. According to a survey held by the Saudi newspaper Ukaz in mid-1990 on the subject of the implementation of the labor force nationalization policy, it was viewed by many young Saudis as a “mere slogan.” One young Saudi noted that the Saudization advertisements to the effect were “nothing more than a meaningless routine...in fact, the positions went to expatriates.”71 (b) Preference of nationals for public sector employment. The GCC nationals preferred employment in the public rather than in the private sector due to the more convenient working hours, job security, attractive wages and higher social status.72 In mid-1990, a Saudi governmental official commented on this subject as follows: The private sector demands from workers some qualities like patience and hard work, while Saudi youths are often running after comfort and salary increases. If they want to work at all in the private sector, they do so only until they get a government job.73

Ramady noted in this respect that “due to negative attitudes about certain types of work among Saudis, there are many expatriates in the Kingdom, even though it is the only country in the GCC with a large enough population to carry out the country’s development on its own.”74 A NCB report from mid-1995 expressed a similar observation: “Jobs in the public sector are still the first choice of employment for new graduates, not only because they are perceived to be more secure but also because they provide more convenient working hours, and have typically a more congenial work environment.75 Thus, by 1994, the Saudi nationals employed by the industrial sector did not exceed 4% of the total Saudi employees.76 In Kuwait, there was even a greater dichotomy in the labor market than in Saudi Arabia. By 1997, only 7% of the national workforce worked in the private sector while 93% were employed by the public sector.77 (c) The preference of private employers for foreign workers. This preference was and still is a result of several factors, the most prominent being that the wages demanded by foreign workers are much lower than those demanded by nationals. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, a survey of the manufacturing industry in the early 1990s revealed that Saudi workers’ wages were more than twice those of foreign workers while Saudi workers were only half as productive, making actual costs four times higher.78 By the years 1996–1997, the monthly wage of Saudi nationals averaged SR(Saudi Riyal) 5,704 compared to SR1,901 for foreign labor. In many occupations, the wage of a Saudi national was as much as three times higher than that of a foreign worker.79 By 2001, while the monthly average wage for Saudi national male was SR6,684, it was only SR1,710 for male foreign labor.80 A similar situation existed in Kuwait. In an interview with KPC (Kuwait Petroleum Corporation) managers, it was found that their failure to fill entry and mid-level positions with qualified Kuwaitis was driven by the ability of Kuwaiti nationals to get easier jobs, working fewer hours for the same pay in other governmental agencies.81 (d) A lack of skilled workers in technical occupations. Many employers blamed the educational system for failing to produce the kind of qualifications needed in the labor market.82 Indeed, in the 1993/94 academic year, of the 153,780 students in the Saudi

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institutions of higher education, only 25,266 (16.4%) were enrolled in engineering, the exact sciences, agriculture and medicine, while the rest studied arts and literature, education and Shari‘a. In Qatar, in the 1995/96 academic year, of the 8,271 students, only 1,627, or less than 20%, were enrolled in science, engineering and technology programs.83 In the other GCC countries one can find the same trend. Askari and associates presented this problem as follows: Unfortunately, by artificially creating employment opportunities for nationals in the public sector, governments have reduced the incentives to pursue courses of study that are in demand by private sector employers. The problem is not the quantity of education but rather its quality and its mix.84

The GCC rulers did not learn from ‘Abd al-Nasser’s mistake that promised public sector employment for every higher educational institution graduate. The result was that it destroyed any reward for excellence and professionalism and just “dumped” the public sector with an increasing number of graduates until their marginal contribution became negative. As public sector salaries of engineers and those in the exact science occupations were the same as those of graduates in the humanities and social sciences, the tendency of GCC students to concentrate on the humanities and social sciences was quite natural. (e) The “sponsorship (kafala) system.” The sponsorship system not only encouraged the expansion of the rentier mentality among GCC citizens, but also led to the import of additional foreign workers even if they were not really needed. This was because until recently, a foreigner was not allowed to work in the GCC countries without local sponsorship. Thus, many nationals used the system for easy profit by serving as a sponsor for foreign workers (see Box 5.3). Overall, during the 1970s and the 1980s, the GCC labor markets operated almost without regulations. In this respect, there is no doubt that the GCC labor markets were indeed unique. Cammett and associates noted in this respect that: “In effect, the GCC is the only region of the world where wages are truly set by a global labor market, ensuring that it gets the cheapest wage-to-skill ratio in the world.”85 Specifically in the case of Saudi Arabia, Said Abdullah al-Shaikh, the NCB Chief Economist, noted in 2000 as follows: The free labor-importing policy created a wage structure that reflected the flexibility of importing different skills and not the extent of searching domestically. The relative scarcities of local labor skills did not affect the wage structure [for nationals] since demand for all needed skills could be met through imports . . . Therefore, wages do not necessarily reflect the interaction of domestic labor supply and demand forces . . . The implication of this is that both the level and the structure of wages that prevailed in Saudi Arabia have been determined independently from the supply of Saudi local labor.86

Thus, during the two decades following the “oil boom,” a unique pattern of a dual labor market — with the public sector almost exclusively for nationals and the private sector almost exclusively for foreigners — developed in each of the GCC countries. Beblawi noted in 1990 in this regard: “Though utterly free enterprise-oriented, the number of government employees in the oil states is only matched by socialist-oriented states.”87 Consequently, the labor force nationalization policy was efficient only in the public sector in which the government, not the free market mechanism, determined both salaries and employment conditions.

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Box 5.3

The Intra-Arab Labor Migration: Scale, Causes and Consequences The GCC kafala system

The kafala (sponsorship) system provides the legal basis for residency and employment of migrant workers in the GCC countries. According to the system, any migrant worker is tied to a specific employer (kafil) who is responsible for his/her entry visa, monitors him/her during the stay in the country and approves the exit visa at the end of the employment contract. In the public sector, the kafil is the specific agency/ministry/department which employs the foreign worker; in the private sector the specific employer is the kafil. In the event that the kafil withdraws sponsorship, there is no legal basis for the foreign worker to continue to stay in the country and s/he must leave immediately. Consequently, migrant workers are contractually bound to their employers without any recourse for bargaining over wages or work conditions. According to a report issued in 2013 by Amnesty International, the passports of 90% of the foreign workers in Qatar were held by the employers, preventing the foreign workers from exiting the country or moving to other employers without prior permission of the current one. In addition, the phenomenon of non-payment of the promised salary and much longer hours working than those originally agreed upon is widely common. Recently, however, most of the GCC countries have alleviated the kafala regulations mainly by allowing a foreign worker to switch employers without the prior consent of the current one. The UAE authorities have recently implemented wage protection by requiring private employers to pay the wages of foreign labor directly into their bank accounts in order to better monitor the timely and full payment of salaries. Sources: Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the GCC States, No. 15 (March 2011); UNDP, Migrant Rights, Immigration Policy and Human Development, by Martin Ruhs, Human Development Research Paper 2009/23 (New York, April 2009); Nasra M. Shah, The Management of Irregular Migration and its Consequence for Development: Gulf Cooperation Council (ILO, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, March 2009); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Dependence, Disdain, and Distance: State, Labor, and Citizenship in the Arab Gulf States,” in Jean-Francois Seznec and Mimi Kirk (eds.), Industrialization in the Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 125–142; HRW, Country Study: Saudi Arabia (January 24, 2011); Tariq Al-Hasan, “Labor Market Policies in Bahrain,” in Steffen Hertog (ed.), National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2012), pp. 107–147; George S. Naufal, “Labor Migration and Remittances in the GCC,” Labor History, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2011), pp. 307–322; ESCWA, Survey 2009–2010; Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE,” GLMM, No. 7/2015; idem, “The Socio-Political Background and Stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the Workforce in Saudi Arabia: The Nitaqat Policy,” GLMM, No. 3/2015; Laurence Louër, “The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain,” City & Society, Vol. 20, Issue 1 (June 2008), pp. 32–53; Andrew M. Gardner, “Why Do They Keep Coming?,” in Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Badar (eds.), Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst, 2012), pp. 41–58.

During the 1990s, the inescapable consequence of the dual labor market on the one hand, and the rapid increase in the number of indigenous entrants into the labor markets on the other, was a sharp increase in unemployment among young newcomers to the workforce. In 1993, the unemployment rate among Omani nationals amounted to 11.9%.88 The unemployment rates of the Bahraini and the UAE nationals were even higher, amounting to 15% in early 1993.89 In Saudi Arabia, the unemployment rate among nationals was estimated at 20% in the mid-1990s.90 Hence, the highest unemployment rate among the national workforce in the GCC countries paradoxically prevailed in the only country which potentially had the ability to run its economy without foreign labor.

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6.3 Strengthening Labor Force Nationalization Measures since the mid1990s In the mid-1990s, the GCC authorities realized that two prominent employment issues had to be addressed urgently: One involved narrowing the number of foreign workers in order to decrease the huge amounts of their remittances. In the case of Saudi Arabia, in 1994 the remittances flows from the Kingdom amounted to $18.1 billion — higher than ever before,91 while the oil export revenues in that year totaled $39.2 billion (see Table 5.1). This means that in that particular year, the remittances constituted almost a half of the total oil export revenues.92 In the other GCC countries the situation was similar with the remittances “bite” a large percentage of the oil export revenues. The second issue was to provide suitable job opportunities to the rapidly growing national workforces. Hence, during the 1990s, the GCC labor markets turned around from a market which was “resource pressured on population,” as Gilbar defined it during the “oil decade” (that is, the population was too small in proportion to the labor demands),93 into “demographic pressured on the economy,” particularly in the employment arena. Consequently, since the mid-1990s, the GCC countries, without exception, increased their efforts in the area of labor force nationalization which became their top socioeconomic priority. This was particularly notable in Saudi Arabia and Oman — the two most populous GCC countries. Since the mid-1990s, the migration and employment policies of the GCC countries have concentrated mainly on the following measures, with some of them representing a new approach and others constituting a continuation of previous policies: (a) Tightening the rules regarding employment of foreigners in the private sector. Rules and regulations regarding employing foreigners in the private sector were tightened after the mid-1990s in order to eliminate the need of nationals to compete with foreign workers. Although all the GCC countries had taken steps in this direction already in the 1980s, since the mid-1990s, two new tools were added: The first was the wide use of a quota system by which the government determined the minimum percentage of nationals to be employed in each area. For example, Saudi Arabia’s Resolution No. 50/1995 required every private sector establishment which employs 20 or more workers to employ a minimum of 5% Saudis.94 This minimum percentage increased to 25% in September 2000,95 and was raised to 30% in 2002.96 In order to enforce the nationalization regulations, the Saudi authorities established “Saudization committees” in the major regions of the Kingdom.97 The second tool was to ban the employment of expatriates in specific job categories in which nationals could supply the demand. In the case of Oman, in 1995, the Central Bank stipulated that by the year 2000 Omanis should hold at least 75% of senior and middle management positions and 95% of clerical positions in each bank.98 During the second half of the 1990s, the Omanization quota was expanded to other sectors. The new Omani labor law also stipulated that companies which do not comply with quota requirements would face fines and would not be able to hire new foreign workers.99 (b) Deportation of illegal foreign workers. In order to stabilize the GCC labor markets, it was of paramount importance to sharply decrease the number of illegal foreign workers. To accomplish this aim, the GCC authorities implemented two major

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steps: The first was the announcement of an “amnesty period” during which illegal foreign workers could leave the country without any penalty. Those who would be caught following the end of the amnesty period would be sentenced to heavy penalties.100 The second measure was increasing supervision on private employers in order to prevent them from employing illegal foreign workers. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, a substantial number of illegal foreign workers either left the GCC countries by themselves or were deported.101 This policy of deporting illegal foreign labor continued into the 2000s as well. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, during the four months from March to June 2005, in Jeddah alone, the police arrested 150,000 illegal foreigners.102 In late 2007, the UAE authorities deported about 100,000 illegal Indian workers.103 (c) Training of nationals for certain private sector occupations. Since the mid-1990s, the GCC authorities have been trying to enforce private labor employers to train nationals in order to give them the qualifications required to replace foreign employees. The new Saudi Labor Law, issued in early 2006, specified that: “Every [private sector] employer should prepare the Saudi workforce and improve their standards in the technical, administrative and professional fields in order to gradually employ them in the jobs [currently] occupied by the non-Saudi workers.”104 (d) Emphasizing technological education. In order to reduce dependence on skilled foreign workers, more emphasis was placed on technological education at the secondary and university levels. Taking Saudi Arabia as an example, in the year 2000, only 6,000 of 31,000 physicians were Saudi nationals.105 In this respect, Bahrain was the first among the GCC countries to change its educational and vocational training system to adapt it to the labor market demands. In 1996, the Bahraini Cabinet approved a national plan for preparing a well-educated and well-trained national workforce.106 Two years earlier, in 1994, Oman had established a separate ministry for higher education.107 Since then, promoting national professional education has received top governmental priority. One of the paramount aims of Oman’s Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1996–2000) was “linking education and training policies with the requirements of the labor market.”108 This issue was also on the top priority list of the Saudi Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (2000–2004).109 (e) Directing new entrants into the labor market to the private sector. The combination of the high percentage of salaries within the total government expenditures,110 and the growing public sector disguised unemployment, led the GCC authorities to the conclusion that only the private sector has the ability to absorb new labor force entrants. In late 1998, when oil prices were the lowest ever (in real terms) since the “oil boom,”111 the Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, ‘Abdul Nabi ‘Abdallah al-Shuala, said: The private sector has to play a major role and share the responsibility of providing jobs to nationals. It is being done everywhere in the world and we want to do that as well.112

A MEED report on the Saudi economy from late 2000 noted in this regard: “The government has made clear through its words and actions that it sees private sector investment as the main driver of job creation.”113 To promote the employment of nationals in the private sector, the Saudi Seventh Five-Year Development Plan focused on improving the productivity of nationals, increasing the private sector’s capacity to employ nationals and establishing a comprehensive labor market database.114 Among

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the GCC rulers, the most decisive in this direction was Sultan Qabus of Oman. In his speech on the National Day of November 18th, 1998, he said: We assert that it is important that citizens should be aware of their vital role in working for the success of the government’s plan for private sector employment, and for the gradual replacement by Omanis of skilled and unskilled expatriates. There are abundant opportunities for honorable work in this sector.115

(f) Diminishing the cost gap between employing foreigners and nationals. While the public sector can bear the gap between the costs of employing nationals and foreigners, the private sector acts in accordance with one rule only — being profitable to the greatest possible extent. Hence, the only way to overcome the natural preference of the private sector to employ foreign workers is to diminish the huge wage gaps between nationals and foreigners. Indeed, all of the GCC countries have been actively addressing this matter since the mid-1990s by increasing the costs of employing foreigners through taxation on the one hand, and by reducing the costs of employing nationals through government subsidies on the other. Oman was the first among the GCC countries to act in this direction. In 1995, the Omani authorities imposed a new tax on private employers of foreign workers (7.5% of their salaries) in order to finance vocational training for nationals.116 The new Omani Labor Law, enacted in May 2003, prohibits nationals from taking payment from a foreigner in exchange for employment.117 In effect, it was an abolishment of the kafala system. In June 2000, the Saudi authorities established the Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) in order to subsidize the training of nationals for employment in the private sector. In addition, the HRDF assumed payment of as much as 75% of the salaries of young Saudis employed in the private sector for their two first years of employment, up to a maximum of SR2,000 per month.118 (g) Using labor migration as a political tool. During the 1980s, the GCC rulers made a clear distinction between their attitude toward a certain “regime” and its “citizens.” The most prominent example of this was in regard to Egypt. While the GCC authorities officially boycotted the Egyptian government in keeping with the resolution of the second Baghdad Arab Summit (March 1979), the number of Egyptian workers in each of the GCC countries, as well as in Iraq, which led the boycott of Egypt, substantially increased. By mid-1990, the number of Egyptian workers in the GCC countries was more than 600,000, that is, more than twice their number in 1979, prior to the boycott.119 The official reason for this was that the Arab countries boycotted “the Egyptian government” but not “the Egyptian people.” The real reason for continuing to employ Egyptians was that at that time the GCC countries were in fact dependent on them. It should be taken into account that the GCC educational and justice systems were adopted from Egypt. Thus, employing Egyptians in these systems was in effect inevitable. During the 1990s, however, the GCC nationals replaced the vast majority of the Arab foreign workers in the public sector. Consequently, in contrast to the 1970s and the 1980s, during the 1990s the GCC authorities could use the migration option as an inter-Arab political tool. Hence, the citizens of countries that supported the anti-Iraqi coalition during the Kuwait crisis were welcomed; workers from countries that did not support the anti-Iraqi coalition were deported (see Chapter 4). Thus, during the 1990s, while the number of Egyptian and Syrian workers in the GCC countries substantially increased, the number of Yemenites, Sudanese and Palestinians radically declined.

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6.4 The “Sobering Stage”: Using Foreign Labor for the Eradication of Unemployment Economic success comes at a price. In the case of the UAE, that price is a growing demographic imbalance. MEED, September 2006120

In the late 1990s, the GCC authorities realized that large-scale replacement of foreigners by nationals in the private sector was not practical. The wage gaps as well as the rentier nature, in practice, prevented the successful implementation of the previous labor force nationalization policies. Consequently, the GCC authorities realized that in order to avoid an “employment catastrophe,” they had no other choice but to create suitable employment options for nationals as their top priority rather than concentrate on the replacement of the foreign labor in the private sector. The core of the new GCC employment policy was to use cheap foreign labor as a tool to create suitable employment opportunities for nationals in the private sector. This new policy, of course, was not an official one, as it represented a failure of the previous policy. In the case of Saudi Arabia for example, the number of Saudi nationals in the private sector increased dramatically from 485,726 in 2004 to 623,465 in 2005 and reached 1.55 million in 2014. This increase, however, was not at the expense of foreign labor, but rather in line with the sharp increase in their number which climbed from 4.163 million in 2004 to 8.47 in 2014.121 In Oman, too, one can find a similar “dual increase”: By 2014, the number of Omanis employed by the private sector amounted to 197,510,122 compared to 87,064 in 2004.123 Beyond the financial sector, the sector that succeeded in expanding the number of employment opportunities for nationals through the large-scale use of cheap foreign workers is the tourism industry. During recent years, all of the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia that had traditionally opposed any sort of tourism,124 have devoted immense financial resources for the development of the tourism industry. This is mainly due to the fact that the tourism industry, by its basic nature, is heavily labor intensive. Indeed, in 2013, the Saudi national employees in the tourism sector represented 27.1% of the total employees — higher than in any other private sector area. This percentage slightly increased to 27.4% in 2014.125 In the case of Bahrain, the tourism industry was identified as one of the six key sectors targeted for leading the overall economic development.126 In Oman as well, the tourism industry was recognized as one of the most promising non-oil related sectors.127 By 2013, the tourism industry contributed 2.3% to the total Sultanate’s GDP ($1.8 billion), increasing from 2.0% in 2011. In 2013, Oman’s tourism facilities included 14,369 hotel-rooms, increasing from 10,491 in 2008. The Omani authorities are hoping that the tourism industry will not only boost the non-oil sector, but will also create a large number of work opportunities for its rapidly growing national workforce.128 Therefore, while until the early 1990s the GCC countries promoted heavy-capital industries, aiming to reduce the dependence on foreign labor, since then, they have been promoting labor-intensive sectors. They realized that the only viable option for alleviating employment pressure among the indigenous workforce without changing the current rentier political formula is through adding substantial suitable job opportunities for nationals in the private sector through the use of massive cheap foreign labor.

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Among the GCC economies, Dubai is the best example of both the employment potential of the tourism industry on the one hand, and the “price” of the increased dependence on foreign labor on the other. Overall, since the early 1990s, the tourism industry became Dubai’s paramount development “engines,” achieving one of the highest growth rates worldwide. The development of the tourism industry was within the overall framework of the “Dubai Development Model” which promotes economic diversification through the development of non-hydrocarbon sectors, such as tourism, international aviation, logistics, transportation and offshore financial services.129 By 1985, there were 42 hotels in Dubai with 4,601 rooms. The number of tourist nights in hotels and hotel apartments amounted to 1.09 million.130 In 2015, the number of hotels in Dubai amounted to 461 and the number of hotel rooms and hotel apartment amounted to 98,333.131 The number of tourist nights reached 44.7 million in 2014.132 The current aim of Dubai’s tourism development is to increase the number of tourists to 20 million by 2020.133 Indeed, in mid-2015, the unemployment rate among Dubai’s nationals was 2.58% — one of the lowest worldwide.134 However, the “price” for this massive employment creation for Dubai’s nationals was a sharp increase in the number of foreign labor. According to the 2010 data, the number of Dubai’s nationals was 168,029,135 while the total population amounted to more than 1.9 million. Among the 1.9 million Dubai’s residents, only 22.1% were females.136 By 2015, the number of Dubai’s nationals was 222,875, while the total population of Dubai amounted to 2,446,675. This means that Dubai’s citizens represent only 9% of the total Emirate population.137 It should be taken into consideration, however, that although Dubai succeeded in diversifying its economy away from oil, and despite its rapid economic expansion during the past decade, the “Dubai Development Model” is only suitable for a small economy. This is because its rapid economic expansion was achieved not by developing modern comparative industries and services, but rather through “activity in sectors with limited productivity growth, such as tourism, retail trade, and construction,” as noted by the IMF in its report from December 2014.138

6.5. The Impact of the Arab Spring on the GCC Labor and Immigration Policies The outbreak of the Arab Spring and its spread to the Arabian Gulf region in early 2011, mainly to Bahrain and Oman, led the GCC authorities practically, although not officially, to withdraw from their previous labor force nationalization policies of directing the young entrants to the labor force to the private sector. Instead, they decided to concentrate on reducing the unemployment of their youth and improving the living standard of the nationals, regardless of the longer-run implications on the labor market. On March 18, 2011, Saudi King ‘Abdulla announced the implementation of new economic reforms which included: immediate payment of two months’ salary to all governmental employees as compensation for the rise in living costs; a monthly payment of SR2,000 (US$533) as an unemployment allowance; setting a minimum wage of SR3,000 (US$800) for all national employees in the public sector; and adding 60,000 positions in the Interior Ministry.139 However, raising public sector salaries and generous unemployment allowances, as noted by the IMF “provide a disincentive for nationals to seek private sector employment.”140 In fact, the Saudi “rentier-reaction” to prevent the spread of the Shi‘i uprising which occurred in Bahrain

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from extending to the Saudi Kingdom reached the huge amount of $129 billion.141 The Kuwaiti authorities announced a provision of $3,500 in cash to every citizen.142 At the same time as the expansion of the employment opportunities for the young nationals in the public sector, in September 2011 the Saudi Ministry of Labor launched a new Saudization program — the Nitaqat (“ranges”) — which classified private sector companies according to the percentage of their national employees into four bands: red, yellow (low Saudization rates), green and premium (high Saudization rates). The target of nationals for each private sector employer was set according to the occupation (41 different categories) and the number of employees (0–9, 10–49, 50–499, 500–2,999, 3,000 and over). Private sector employers that do not comply with its quota will be punished, in addition to a high fine, by depriving them from renewing the work permits of their foreign workers; those who comply with the quota will of course benefit.143 The Nitaqat program, in contrast to previous nationalization programs, included all private sector employers, thus enabling the Saudi government not only to know for the first time the actual spread of Saudis in the private sector, but also to operate effectively against any company/business that does not comply with specific Saudization target. Indeed, during 2011–2012, the number of Saudi national males employed by the private sector increased by 23% while that of Saudi national women by 117%.144 Overall, according to data released by the Saudi Ministry of Labor, employment of women in the private sector increased from 70,000 in 2012 to 160,000 in 2013.145 Despite this undisputable achievement, it should not be forgotten that although the unemployment rate among the Saudi women declined from 35.7% in 2013 to 32.1% in 2013, it was still the highest among all of the non-failed Arab countries.146 The Saudi Vision 2030 aims to boost women employment considerably. The Plan specifically noted in this regard that: “Our economy will provide opportunities for everyone — men and women — so they may contribute to the best of their abilities.”147 The Bahraini government also acted in a similar manner. In January 2013, the government adapted the National Development Plan for the Advancement of Bahraini Women, 2013–2022, aiming to enhance the employment of women in the private sector.148 In early 2011, the Bahraini government announced the absorption of 20,000 nationals into the Ministry of Interior, namely an increase of 20% of Bahrain’s total governmental employees at that time.149 The Omani authorities also reacted to the popular demonstrations during January-April 2011 in the Sultanate’s major cities by adding 50,000 public sector jobs and raising the minimum wage for Omani nationals from $364 to $520 in both the public and the private sectors. Above all, there was the implementation of unemployment allowances for nationals of OR150 ($390) monthly which was slightly above the median salary of Omani nationals employed by the private sector. This naturally led to the resignation of many Omanis from private sector jobs.150 The reaction of the three GCC richest countries, namely Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, to the Arab Spring was minor as in these countries almost the entire national workforce was already employed in the public sector. In addition to the absorption of young Omanis into the public sector and raising their salaries, the Omani authorities started to act more firmly against illegal foreign workers.151 The Saudi authorities also acted in the same manner: in 2013 the Saudi government granted an amnesty period for foreigners to rectify their sponsorship status or leave the Kingdom.152 According to official Saudi data, in 2012, prior to the implementation of the new regulations, there were approximately 5 million illegal

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migrants in the Kingdom, many of them pilgrims who did not leave the Kingdom after the expiration of their Haj or Umrah visas, or persons that entered the Kingdom illegally through its unsecured borders, especially that with Yemen.153 Indeed, this policy was quite successful and until the end of 2013 more than a million illegal foreigners left the Kingdom.154 The marked increase in governmental expenditures on the one hand, and the sharp decline of oil revenues on the other, led to a substantial increase in the GCC budgetary deficits. Thus, Bahrain’s budget deficit was estimated at 15.8% in 2015, while that of Oman was estimated at 10.3% and that of Saudi Arabia at 11.4%. The break-even point of oil prices to balance the budget of each of these three countries at the current production level was almost fourfold higher than it was in 2015. There is no doubt that ongoing low oil prices in the coming years will cast a heavy shadow over the ability of the GCC authorities to continue with their current policy of both reducing the high levels of young unemployment through massive absorption of young nationals into the public sector and increasing public sector salaries. Thus far this policy was and still is financed by drawing from the huge financial reserves that accumulated during the past decade (see the Summary and Conclusions chapter). Obviously, this solution is temporary and short-term only. .

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Evaluating the GCC Labor Immigration and Employment Policies

At first glance, the labor force nationalization policy in the public sector in all of the GCC countries succeeded to a great extent. By 1999, about 90% of Bahrain’s public sector employees were nationals.155 In Oman, the number of foreign labor in the public sector declined from 35,812 in 1994156 to 22,990 in 2005.157 In Saudi Arabia, by 2005, Saudi nationals represented 91.0% of the total Saudi governmental employees, increasing from 85.3% in 1997.158 Even in the UAE — the country with the highest percentage of foreign labor following Qatar — by early 2004 the nationals comprised 85% of the total public sector employees.159 However, a large proportion of the increase in the percentage of nationals within the public sector employees is meaningless from a purely productive viewpoint. This is because public sector employment of GCC nationals, as rightly noted by ESCWA, “can be thought of increasingly as a domestic subsidy, since marginal productivity in the public sector is very low and a large proportion of additions to the labor force in this sector are simply made to absorb new entrants into the job market.”160 As noted by al-Dosary and Rahman, the GCC public sector has become “a vast social welfare system.”161 Louër defined the GCC nationals as the “aristocracy of labor.”162 On many occasions, the Arabian Gulf newspapers themselves laugh at the widespread hidden unemployment of nationals in the public sector. The following two cartoons from the Kuwaiti al-Watan well illustrate the employment paradox of GCC nationals in the public sector. The first cartoon (5.1), presents a Kuwaiti national employed by the public sector, reading a newspaper. The only difference between working before the Ramadan and during the Ramadan is that during the Ramadan he is not drinking coffee and water due to the fast. Cartoon 5.2 presents an Indian foreign worker scratching the nose of his Kuwaiti employer. At the top of the cartoon alItakaliyya — “dependence” — is written, namely, the GCC nationals use the foreigners even for scratching their noses.

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Cartoon 5.1 Source: al-Watan, October 10, 2006.

Cartoon 5.2 Source: al-Watan, July 7, 2004.

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Thus, the real examination of the success of the GCC labor force nationalization policy should not concentrate on the public sector but rather on the private sector. In this respect, as the data reveals, despite three decades of the implementation of a labor force nationalization policy, foreign workers continue to constitute the core of the workforce in each of the GCC countries. As will be illustrated below, there is a correlation between the per capita rental income of the state and the rate of nationals employed in the private sector. Qatar is the most extreme example: In 2011, nationals comprised a mere 0.5% of the total private sector workforce.163 This percentage did not change much and in 2013, out of a workforce of 1.54 million, 1.45 million were foreign workers with 81% of the nationals employed by the public sector.164 In Kuwait and the UAE, in 2010, more than 90% of the national workforce was employed by the public sector.165 The current Kuwaiti Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) aims to increase the number of nationals employed by the private sector from 92,000 to 137,000. This means that even in early 2015, the percentage of nationals employed by the private sector remained negligible. Moreover, many of them are self-employed or ghostworkers166 with their employment only due to the quota system imposed by the authorities.167 In Saudi Arabia, however, while in mid-2005 the nationals constituted 11.6% of the total private sector employees,168 this rate increased to 15.5% in 2014.169 The current Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 aims to further boost the employment of nationals in the private sector in order to create “healthier employment opportunities for citizens.” The paramount aim of the plan is to lower the unemployment rate of nationals from 11.6% to 7%.170 In Oman, as in Saudi Arabia, the nationals represented 11.3% of the total private sector employees in 2003.171 In Bahrain — the least rentier among the GCC countries — the situation was much better and the percentage of nationals within the total private sector workforce was and still is much higher: As early as 1995, 29.3% of all Bahrain’s private sector employees were nationals.172 This percentage remained more or less stable in the decades that followed.173 Although the number of Saudi nationals working in the private sector considerably increased during the past decade, the vast majority of them are employed in “clean white collar occupations.” By 2010, for example, of the 62,574 persons who were employed as administrative and business directors in the Saudi private sector, 89.9% were Saudi nationals and only 10.1% were foreign workers. In the field of clerical jobs, among the 179,331 employees, 171,033 (95.4%) were Saudi nationals. In contrast, in the agricultural sector, from among a total workforce of 492,440, only 8,880, a mere 1.8%, were Saudi nationals. 174 Although we do not have official data, it is quite reasonable to assume that the vast majority, if not all Saudis employed in the agricultural sector, were self-employed. Subtracting the number of self-employed and ghostworkers reveals that the contribution of the Saudi national employees to the private sector production is in many areas minor at best. Since in the smaller GCC countries, with the exception of Bahrain and Oman, the number of nationals employed by the private sector is tiny, it is useless to examine their occupations or employment characteristics; the vast majority of those who are not employed by the finance sector are owners of various businesses and companies. In the UAE for example, in 2013, the Emiratis comprised a mere 0.5% of private sector employees.175 A major consequence of the GCC dual labor market is low productivity.176 This problem was specifically addressed in the Saudi Ninth Five-Year Plan (2010–2014): “Despite the efforts made to promote productivity of Saudi workers, it is still relatively low.”177 It is quite natural that as long as the private sector has the option of employing

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an unlimited number of cheap foreign workers, even at the price of absorbing a certain percentage of nationals, private employers have no incentive to exchange the cheap foreign labor with advanced technology as was the case in the developed economies. For private sector employers, the quota for nationals is no more than a tax, aiming to alleviate the burden of the public sector of employing all of the nationals. As long as the quota is low, the private employer can continue to act in this manner. Thus, as rightly claimed by al-Kibsi, Benkert and Schubert “The availability of cheap foreign workers has delayed the formation of a skilled national workforce and prevented the development of a diversified and productive private sector that could help absorb new entrants into the workforce.”178 From the point of view of the nationals themselves, they have no incentive to be employed by the private sector, unless of course they are self-employed.179 The massive absorption of young nationals into the public sector following the start of the Arab Spring together with the increase of public sector wages only strengthened this attitude. As rightly claimed by Wilkinson in 2015 regarding Oman: “The unintended effect of measures to quell social unrest . . . made private sector employment less attractive.”180 A report of the IMF on the GCC economies from December 2014 clearly presented this employment mismatch: The relatively higher wages and benefits available for nationals in the public sector often makes it a more attractive employment choice, particularly for lower-skilled workers, compared with the private sector. At the same time, for firms, producing goods and services to meet the consumption and investment needs of the domestic market while relying on low-wage foreign labor is a more reliable income source than attempting to enter riskier export markets.181

Thus, the GCC countries not only failed to direct a substantial portion of the national workforce into the private sector through imposing quotas, they also failed to achieve high productivity in the private sector industries and services. Hence, despite the huge investment in education and vocational training, the national workforce did not become an economic asset but rather an economic burden as the vast majority is still employed by the public sector. Also the cheap foreign labor did not yield an advantage as it prevented the adoption of modern technologies which would enable the GCC industries to compete in international markets. In the areas of top managerial positions and highly skilled occupations, the labor force nationalization policy has almost totally failed. Nearly all of the top managerial jobs, such as hotel managers, engineers in high positions and so forth are still occupied by foreign workers. In 2013, non-nationals still constituted 52% of the “managers” and “specialists” in the Saudi labor market.182 These tens of thousands of employees were working in the Kingdom not because they were cheaper than their parallel Saudis, they were even much more expensive, but simply because there were not enough nationals to fill the high ranking positions. Hence, as noted by ESCWA in 2010: Despite heavy investment in human resource development to promote employment of a national workforce in the private sector, the dependency of GCC countries on expatriate workers has remained significant for private sector development and its expansion during the last few years had boosted the demand for expatriate workers.183

It should be taken into account that the huge number of foreign workers in the GCC countries is not a result of pure economic necessity. This is because many of them are “luxury foreign workers” in the form of domestic workers. According to Qatari offi-

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cial figures, by 2011, from among the 1,196,394 foreign workers, 131,515 (11%) were employed in domestic services.184 In 2007, 24% of all foreign workers in Kuwait was employed in domestic services.185 In early 2015, there were more than 1 million Filipino and Indonesian housemaids in Saudi Arabia alone.186 In fact, the GCC countries are the only countries worldwide in which the public sector middle-class employees employ domestic services. The number of domestic servants one has is a status symbol. In some cases their number is higher than that of the family members. Thus, as noted by Fernandez: “The high demand for migrant domestic workers in the GCC is attributable to the affluent lifestyles supported by oil rich states, rather than the shift to a dual wage earner economy as has been the case in OECD countries.”187 Thus, although the “fourth stage” of the GCC labor force nationalization policy was more successful than previous ones, unemployment among the GCC nationals still remained high by any international standards with the exception of the smallest and richest oil states of UAE and Qatar which achieved extremely low unemployment rates through the almost exclusive employment of nationals in the public sector. However, with the exception of Qatar and the UAE, unemployment of nationals, particularly among young graduates, remains very high despite the massive absorption of new employees into the public sector since 2011. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the unemployment rate among nationals in 2014 amounted to 11.8%, a slight decline from 12.0% in 2013.188 Among the young age groups, the unemployment rate was much higher, amounted to 28.4% among the 15–24 age group in 2013 — more than twice the national average.189 The reason is simple: These young people did not yet succeed in getting a public sector position. Thus, unemployment among the national workforces in the GCC countries is not a function of the performance of the economy, but rather a function of the financial ability of the ruling family “to pile” additional nationals onto the public sector. In the case of Saudi Arabia for example, during the 2008–2014 period, of the 1 million new jobs that were filled by nationals, the vast majority were in the public sector.190 The end result was a steady increase of the public sector wage bill which amounted to 7.4% of the total GDP of the GCC countries in 2008 and increased to 9.4% in 2013, with the highest increases recorded in Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait. The public sector wage bills of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain are among the highest worldwide.191 The decline in oil prices since mid-2014 led of course to a steady increase in the share of public sector wages of the total governmental expenditures. Overall, almost seven decades following the start of the oil era, the GCC authorities had to choose between two undesirable scenarios: either to subsidize the wages of the national employees in the private sector, or to absorb them in the public sector. The IMF noted in this regard: “wage subsidies are expensive, but so is public sector employment.”192 Thus, although during the latest “oil decade” (2004–2014), there was a substantial increase in the number of private sector employment opportunities, the vast majority of them were irrelevant for nationals due to the extremely low wages. Overall, in 2014, more than 80% of private sector jobs in the GCC economies were held by low-skilled low-waged foreign workers.193 It appears that the failure of the labor force nationalization policy of the GCC countries is the other side of their failure to reduce the dependence on rental revenues through economic diversification. Although diversification was the major economic aim of all of the GCC countries since the beginning of the oil era seven decades ago, none of the GCC economies have really achieved this paramount aim. Even in the case

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of Oman — the least rentier of all the GCC economies together with Bahrain — in 2010, oil and gas revenues constituted 80.8% of the total governmental revenues.194 In the other GCC economies, the oil and gas revenues represented more than 90% of the total governmental revenues, the same rate it had been four decades earlier during the 1970s. In Kuwait, for example, in 2011 rental incomes, namely oil exports and investments incomes, amounted to as high as 95.8% of the total governmental revenues.195 Therefore, the GCC authorities must constantly increase their rental incomes in order to avoid taxation on the one hand or living standard deterioration on the other. Since these countries failed thus far to diversify their income sources, the break-even price of oil for balancing their budgets is constantly increasing. In the Saudi case, at the current production level, this price was higher than $100 per barrel already in 2012,196 namely more than a twice the current prices. In Oman and Bahrain, the breakeven point is of course even higher. Only Qatar and to a lesser extent the UAE can continue to manage their current budgets without deficits at the current oil prices of $50 per barrel.

8

The Ethno-Religious Composition of the GCC Foreign Labor

Officially, all of the GCC countries are obligated to employ nationals first, then nonnational Arabs and only after that, non-national non-Arab.197 Indeed, during the first stage of the development process in the GCC countries, namely, from the early 1950s until the early 1980s, the vast majority of the foreign labor came from the other Arab countries, mainly from Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Palestine (the occupied Palestinian territories), Syria, Lebanon and Sudan. Overall, prior to the 1973 “oil boom,” more than 80% of the foreign workers in the GCC countries were Arabs.198 The Arab foreign workers were needed in order to establish the new government bureaucracy, the educational system, the legal and justice systems and other public sector services. Theses Arab foreign workers were needed not only because of their specific professional qualifications, but also because they were the only available workforce which could establish all of these institutions, services and systems in Arabic. One major reason for the rapid development of the GCC state institutions and public services, in addition of course to their huge financial resources, was the high availability of skilled and professional Arab workers. Hence, until the 1980s, there was a kind of “mutual dependence” between the nonoil Arab countries and the GCC states. The first were badly in need of employment opportunities due to their bulging workforces, while in the GCC states there was no other choice but to employ Arabs in their public sectors. Moreover, the employment of millions of workers from the non-oil Arab countries strengthened the GCC countries in the intra-Arab political arena. It “ensured” that the non-oil republican Arab countries would, in effect, “abandon” their “Arab unity” ideas which had previously jeopardized the position of the GCC ruling families. Thus, employing Arabs served the GCC states from both the socioeconomic as well as political viewpoints. Following the end of the “oil decade,” however, a gradual replacement of Arabs by non-Arab Asian workers began even in Kuwait which constituted the “fortress” of the Arab foreign workers in the GCC countries. Thus, while in 1975 the percentage of Arabs of the total foreign workforce in Kuwait was 69%,199 this percentage radically declined to less than 40% in 2007.200 In the Saudi case, the percentage of the Arabs of

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the total foreign population declined from more than 90% in 1975,201 to only 37% in 1992202 and to little more than 30% in the early 2000s.203 In Oman, although Asian workers constituted the vast majority of the foreign workers since the beginning of the oil era due to the traditional relationship between Oman and the Far East, in 1975 Arabs still constituted 12.4% of the total Sultanate’s foreign workers.204 In 2008, however, with the exception of less than 11,000 Egyptian workers (1.4% of the total foreign workers) there were no other Arab foreign workers in the Sultanate.205 Overall, in 2004, the total number of non-national Arabs (including both workers and accompanying family members) in all the GCC countries amounted to 3–3.5 million. This means that the number of Indians alone in the GCC countries in the early 2000s was higher than the total number of non-GCC Arabs.206 In 2010, almost three-fourths of the migrant workers in GCC countries were Asians.207 Why did the GCC authorities not accomplish their official policy of giving preference to non-national Arab workers? The common answer in the academic literature concentrates on two main reasons — political and economic: From the political viewpoint, the GCC rulers were afraid that Arab foreigners would spread “pan-Arab and socialist ideas” which the GCC rulers were opposed to.208 However, it seems that if this argument is relevant, it applies to the 1970s alone. This is because since the early 1980s, it is quite meaningless to speak about any kind of “pan-Arab threat” regarding the GCC monarchies. Moreover, if the GCC rulers were indeed concerned about the spread of “pan-Arab ideas,” Jordanians should have been preferred over Egyptians and Syrians — the two countries that led the pan-Arab ideology. In reality, however, as was previously examined, following the Kuwaiti crisis, while the Jordanian workers were deported from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Egyptian and Syrian workers were most welcome. In this respect, the indisputable factor for the preference of Asians at the expense of Arabs was that the Asians were “passive observers,” as they were defined by Choucri.209 Thus, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran (February 1979) and the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Juhayman al-Otaybi and his followers (November 1979), the assassination of Sadat by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (October 1981) and lastly the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria during the early 1980s, the GCC rulers were afraid of the spread of Islamic radicalism to their own countries as well. From the economic viewpoint, the Asian workers were much cheaper than the Arabs210 and much easier to lay-off.211 In addition, in contrast to the Arab workers, the Asian workers usually came to the GCC countries alone,212 leaving their family members behind, thus reducing the cost of subsidized goods and services to the accompanying family members as well. Moreover, in the private sector, mainly in construction, agriculture, tourism and other industries which have become the largest employers of foreign labor, knowledge of Arabic is not relevant. Furthermore, one should take into consideration that many of the infrastructure projects in the GCC countries were implemented by Asian companies which brought their own workers with them. Lastly, due to massive investments in education, nationals replaced the vast majority of non-national Arabs in the public sector. This trend of preferring Asian workers at the expense of Arab foreign workers has largely strengthened following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In the case of Saudi Arabia, among 10.2 million migrants in 2015, only 2.6 million, namely 25.5%, were Arabs — exactly the same rate as in mid-2010, prior to the start of the Arab Spring.

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In the UAE, among 8.1 million migrants in 2015, 1.46 million, namely 18% were Arabs, as compared to 15.5% in mid-2010. The most extreme example is Qatar where among 1.69 million migrants in 2015, a mere 272,700 were Arabs, namely a little more than 16%. In the other three GCC countries one can find the same trend. 213 The logic for this is simple: If massive foreign labor is a “necessary evil,” a permanent settlement of the foreign workers should be more seriously addressed. Since the Asian workers not only tend to come alone, but the salaries of the vast majority of them are extremely low, in reality they do not even have the choice of permanent settlement in the Gulf. Thus, it appears that the GCC countries were willing to financially support some of the non-oil Arab countries that were affected by the Arab Spring, but not to support them in their most crucial problem: the steadily increasing employment pressure. Even Egypt under Sisi, who firmly supported the Saudis, did not succeed yet in increasing the number of Egyptians workers in Saudi Arabia itself. It should be noted that the refusal of the GCC countries to allow a larger number of Arab foreign workers was and still is not connected to any professional issue, as more than 80% of the foreign workers in these countries are low-skilled low-paid employees. It was and still is a purely political decision: the fear of the spread of the Arab Spring or even worse, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, to their own countries. The switch from Arab to Asian foreign workers has had an immense impact on the gender distribution of the GCC population. Overall, there is a high correlation between the percentage of the Asian workers of the total foreign workers and the percentage of females among the non-national population. In the case of Qatar, in May 2016 females represented only 24.4% of the total Qatari population, including both nationals and foreigners.214 The gender composition in the UAE is similar. By mid-2010, females constituted only 22.3% of the UAE foreign population and 25.4% of the total population.215 In contrast, in Saudi Arabia, where the percentage of the foreign population of the total population is much lower and the percentage of Arabs of the total foreign population is higher, females constituted 29.7% of the total foreign population and 43.0% of the Kingdom’s total population.216 According to Dubai’s official data, by 2015, among 2.455 million people living in the Emirate, 69.5% were males.217 Due to the continuing rapid increase in Asian workers, which is still predominantly male, it seems unlikely that the gender composition in the GCC countries will be more balanced in the foreseeable future.

9

The Labor Emigration Policies of the Arab Labor-Exporting Countries

Generally speaking, the research on labor emigration policy, including in the Arab countries, has thus far not received sufficient academic attention. The main emphasis is, naturally, on the labor immigration policy which dictates the scale and direction of the international labor migration trends. However, in the case of the intra-Arab labor migration, although the labor-importing countries dictated the scale of the migrant workers, the labor emigration policy has had a great influence on the nationality composition of the migrant workers. A close examination of the labor emigration policy of the Arab labor-exporting countries reveals a distinct difference between two periods: prior to the oil price collapse in the mid-1980s and since then.

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9.1 The Labor Emigration Policies of the non-oil Arab Countries until the mid-1980s Seccombe and Lawless divided the labor migration policies of the non-oil Arab countries during the first period into the following four categories:218 (a) Preventive labor emigration policy. The two countries that accomplished this policy of almost complete restriction of labor emigration were South Yemen and Algeria. In the case of Algeria, as will be examined in Chapter 6, the preventive labor emigration policy resulted from the overall demographic approach which was based on the assumption that the country is under-populated. In the case of South Yemen, due to its small population in any case, the labor emigration potential of the country was insignificant.219 (b) Selective labor emigration policy. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Syria experienced a scarcity of skilled labor as a result of the huge “brain drain” of the 1960s, following the adoption of the socialist socioeconomic policy of the Ba‘th regime.220 Consequently, the Syrian authorities restricted labor emigration of public sector employees without prior approval. Those who emigrated without prior approval were subject to severe penalties.221 The second measure which aimed at preventing “brain drain” was a direct appeal of the Syrian authorities to the Arab labor-importing countries not to employ Syrian citizens in certain occupations. Thus, for example, in March 1979 the Syrian Minister of Education approached the Saudi authorities with the request not to renew the contracts of Syrian teachers.222 However, the labor emigration of unskilled workers and fellahin (peasants) was unregulated, and even encouraged.223 In the case of Egypt, since the 1950s the Egyptian authorities sent Egyptian teachers to work in other Arab countries as part of Egypt’s overall seniority status in the Arab world.224 However, at the same time, the Egyptian authorities prevented the emigration of necessary skilled public sector employees.225 By 1965, the number of Egyptian temporary labor emigrants was estimated at only 100,000,226 namely, about 1% of the total Egyptian workforce. (c) Encouraging temporary labor emigration. The countries that most implemented this policy were Egypt following the October 1973 War, Jordan, Tunisia and Sudan. The two fundamental aims of encouraging temporary labor emigration were to attract as many workers’ remittances as possible and to alleviate employment pressure. The Egyptian supportive labor emigration policy since the early 1970s included: abolishing all of the previous restrictions on labor emigration; signing contracts with the major labor-importing countries to which the Egyptian government would supply professional employees (teachers, physicians, etc.); and activating pressure on the Arab labor-importing countries to employ Egyptians.227 Among these countries, Jordan implemented the most supportive policy. The basis of the Jordanian policy rested on two basic assumptions: The first was that without extensive labor emigration, the Jordanian economy would not be able to deal with the massive influx of Palestinian refugees following the June 1967 War. The second assumption was that the workers’ remittances were the most accessible option for hard currency.228 It should be remembered that the problem of a negative balance of payment had accompanied Jordan since its independence. Thus, it is not surprising that by 1985, with the end of the oil decade, the number of Jordanian workers abroad was estimated at 328,000,229 representing more than 40% of the total Jordanian civilian workforce — the highest rate among all of the Arab labor-exporting counties ever.

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(d) Non-intervention labor emigration policy. This policy, which was based on market forces, was implemented by Morocco, Lebanon and North-Yemen. It should be emphasized, however, that in the case of Lebanon, in contrast to Morocco and North Yemen, the non-intervention policy was due to the weakness of the central regime that could not impose any other policy — neither restrictive nor supportive — particularly following the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in April 1975.

9.2 The Labor Emigration Policies of the non-oil Arab Countries since the mid-1980s During the second half of the 1980s, all of the non-oil Arab countries adopted, in various degrees, a supportive labor emigration policy. The core reason for this change in policy was the intensification of the various socioeconomic constraints, primarily in the employment arena (see chapter 4). The rulers of the non-oil Arab countries reached the inescapable conclusion that the structural unemployment which emerged in their countries required the adoption of this policy, as all other measures for alleviating the employment pressure in the short-run would not bring about sufficient relief. The country that changed its labor emigration policy the most was Syria. Within just a few years, its previous selective-preventive labor emigration policy was turned into a supportive labor emigration including that of public sector employees. In the late 1980s, Syria abolished all of the previous limitations on labor emigration. One of the prominent reasons that led the Syrian authorities to join the anti-Iraqi coalition during the Kuwait crisis was to facilitate a substantial increase in the number of Syrian labor in the GCC countries. By the late 1990s, Syrian workers in the GCC countries numbered 265,000,230 compared to only 53,000 in mid-1990.231 In addition, the reconstruction of Lebanon following the October 1989 Ta’if Agreement and direct Syrian control over Lebanon following the May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination opened up the opportunity for Syrians to find employment in Lebanon. Overall, as was examined in Chapter 4, in the mid-1990s about one-quarter of the Syrian civilian workforce were working abroad. Egypt intensified its previous policy of encouraging labor emigration since the mid1980s in line with its worsening employment situation. However, while until the late 1980s the GCC countries employed Egyptians for purely practical reasons, following the Kuwaiti crisis, the preference given to the Egyptian workers was a “gift” for Egypt’s support of the anti-Iraqi coalition. In retrospect, there is no doubt that in the labor migration arena, the most bizarre situation exits in Jordan. As was described in Chapter 4, during the 1990s and the 2000s, despite increasing unemployment, the number of foreign workers in the Kingdom rose rapidly. The end result was that by the late 2000s, the employment situation in the Kingdom was similar to the one that existed in the GCC countries, namely a large number of foreign workers despite high unemployment rates among the citizens, particularly among the younger generation. The massive inflow of Iraqi refugees to Jordan after the collapse of Saddam Husayn’s regime in 2003 only worsened Jordan’s employment situation (see the Summary and Conclusions chapter). Therefore, the Jordanian authorities tried to alleviate the employment pressure by increasing job opportunities for Jordanians in the GCC countries.

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9.3 Was it Worth It? The Cost/Benefit Balance of the Inter-Arab Labor Migration for the Labor-Exporting Countries What was the cost/benefit balance of the inter-Arab labor migration for the Arab labor-exporting countries? The prevailing perception in the academic literature is generally positive. Thus, for example, Cammett and associates wrote in 2015: Emigration on balance has had a beneficial impact on the economies of the sending countries . . . [T]here is little reason to believe that economic growth would have been more rapid in these countries had these workers remained at home . . . 232

The basic assumption of these researchers was that the massive labor emigration only reduced the huge hidden unemployment and underemployment. Thus, not only was there a lack of evidence for a labor shortage, but in many cases an increase in labor productivity seemed to emerge. The increases in real wages during the “oil decade” in all of the Arab labor-exporting countries, at least allegedly, support this assumption. Other researchers emphasize the fact that the inter-Arab labor migration brought together the financial resources of the Arab oil countries and the human capital of the non-oil Arab countries. Tabbarah for example claimed that the inter-Arab labor migration promoted “the social and economic integration of the Arab world.”233 Along the same line of thought, Sell noted that “the Egyptian migration processes will promote economic and social integration in the region.”234 Other researchers, although few, hold the opposite opinion toward the cost/benefit balance of the inter-Arab labor migration for the labor-exporting countries. Generally, their most common reservations are centered in two areas: (a) The contribution of the workers’ remittances to the economic development of the labor-exporting countries was minor, given their sharp fluctuation and the fact that a large proportion of the remittances was spent in unproductive areas, mainly housing and consumer goods.235 In addition, as the workers’ remittances belonged to the migrants themselves, the ability of the state to use them was quite marginal. (b) The large-scale “brain drain” hampered the economic development of the laborexporting countries. Oweiss for example claimed in 1980 that: “Unless there is compensation to Egyptian society as a whole, this migration can impede the economic and social development of Egypt.”236 Halliday argued in 1984 that the overall cost/benefit balance of the inter-Arab labor migration for the labor-exporting countries was negative since the result was to: [D]epress local production, to reduce — through the loss of large numbers of skilled personnel — the countries’ capacities to develop their own economies, and to increase dependency on external sources of finance, sources which are, at best, fluctuating and impossible to sustain.237

A similar argument is made in 1982 by Nagi: Not only is the productive capacity of the migrants lost during their most active years, but, also, the process is selective and tends to draw away many of the most able members within each skill level of the labor force. Countries of origin are losing manpower from the very sectors that are most crucial to their development. Remittances . . . do not make up for this investment in labor which the poorer country has lost . . . 238

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Serageldin and associate also claimed in 1983 that the contribution of the workers’ remittances, although substantial, did not compensate for the manpower losses: The countries supplying manpower have trained labor at considerable cost in the skills which the oil-rich countries attracted. Remittances, it is asserted, do not make up for this investment in labor which the poorer country has lost. 239

In retrospect, however, it appears that these reservations were, in most cases, groundless, considering the lack of evidence that the productive sectors of the labor-exporting countries actually experienced labor shortages, either in terms of quality or quantity. Overall, it is quite hard to talk about agricultural labor shortages in the 1970s and certainly not in the 1980s in any of the non-oil Arab countries. Similarly, in the industrial sector, there is little, if any, evidence of labor shortage in any of the Arab labor-exporting countries. Egypt’s industrial growth rate, for example, increased from 3.8% on annual average during the 1965–1973 period to as high as 10.6% on annual average during the 1973–1983 decade. In Jordan and North-Yemen, the industrial production growth rate reached as high as 14.7% and 13.2%, respectively, on annual average during the “oil decade.”240 Moreover, the large-scale workers’ remittances, “official” and “unofficial” alike, raised local demand for goods and services and thus contributed to the economic development of the labor-exporting countries, primarily by a substantial raise in the living standard.241 The more important question, however, is: Was the inter-Arab labor migration indeed a “win-win situation” in the longer run as well? This question will be examined below regarding the two most crucial parameters: (a) The effect on the labor market structure. While there is no doubt that the shortterm effect of the massive labor emigration was positive, in the longer run it damaged the labor markets of the Arab labor-exporting countries insofar as it created “an illusion” of relief from employment pressure. In practice, the two most promising employment possibilities, particularly for first-time job seekers, were either entry into the public sector or emigration to one of the Arab labor-importing countries. When these options were sharply reduced in the mid-1980s, the employment pressure resurfaced in full severity until it “exploded” and constituted the “core” of the Arab Spring. (b) The demographic effect. Although it is clear that in the short run the massive labor emigration considerably reduced the demographic pressure in the major laborexporting countries, in the longer run the consequence was extremely devastating. This is because, as opposed to the worldwide trend of fertility decline following rapid socioeconomic development, in the major Arab labor-exporting countries, not only did fertility decline not occur, but fertility rates even increased. In trying to explain the increase in Egypt’s fertility rates during the “oil decade,” Fargues argues that: “the migration itself contributed to the renewed rise in the birth rate because of the Egyptians’ contact with the large family standard common in the Gulf.”242 I fully agree with Fargues that the “oil boom” indeed led to an increase in Egypt’s fertility rates, but for a different reason. The real effect of the “oil boom” in the demographic arena was that the Egyptian government almost totally abandoned the issue of family planning — at least in practice. In a similar manner, other Arab labor-exporting countries, such as Syria and Jordan, failed to adopt comprehensive family planning programs during the 1970s and the 1980s since labor emigration provided them with a temporary “shelter” from the deleterious consequences of the “demographic explosion” (see

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Chapter 6). The meaning of two decades of neglecting the family planning issue translated into millions of added people in each of the non-oil Arab countries, and tens of millions in the case of Egypt due to the long-term demographic momentum effect. Thus, it appears that in contrast to the neo-classical economic interpretation on labor-exporting as an export of any other commodity or services, or the more recent approach that labor-exporting is a kind of FDI through the workers’ remittances, in the case of the non-oil Arab countries, the massive labor emigration was similar to a huge loan. Although in the short run the economic situation largely improved, in the longer run these countries had to return this loan with extremely high interest rates. However, one should take into consideration that the massive labor emigration kept the non-oil Arab countries from becoming “Bangladesh” for many years as was predicted by Boutros Boutros-Ghali regarding Egypt in light of its rapid population growth.243

10

Summary and Conclusions

It is a well-established fact that technology and a highly skilled workforce are the two most important assets for a modern economy, leading to both a high national income and economic diversification. However, by guaranteeing public sector employment for the indigenous workforce, with high salaries and luxurious work conditions, the GCC authorities, in effect, abolished the basic condition for free market capitalization, namely, labor market competition and the allocation of wages according to productivity. As such, although the GCC countries are basically capitalist economies, they certainly do not function as such when it comes to the labor market. Thus, while in the rest of the labor-importing countries worldwide, massive labor immigration depressed national wages due to competition with the foreign labor, particularly in the lower skill levels, in the GCC countries this did not happen. Instead, a unique employment pattern emerged: the dual labor market with a clear dichotomy between the nationals and the foreign labor. Overall, one can find four main differences between the GCC labor markets and those of the labor-importing developed economies: (a) In the developed economies, in most cases, educated and skilled employees first prefer to find employment in the private sector while the public sector is only a second choice. In the GCC countries, however, private sector employment, in most cases, is not relevant to nationals. (b) The most lucrative economic advantage of the developed economies is their highly skilled workforce; in the GCC countries, the national workforce is in many cases a burden on the economy as the authorities have no choice but to absorb them into the already overcrowded public sector. (c) While the unemployment rate in the developed economies is a function of economic performance, in the GCC countries, unemployment of nationals is a function of the ability of the authorities to absorb additional nationals into the public sector. Thus, since mid-2014, despite the substantial deceleration in the economic development of the GCC countries due to the collapse of the oil prices, unemployment of nationals did not increase and even somewhat declined simply because the authorities used their financial resources from the last “oil decade” (2004–2014) to absorb huge number of young first-time job seekers in the public sector.

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(d) While in the developed economies foreign labor is predominantly employed in the DDD (dirty, difficult, dangerous) jobs, in the GCC countries foreign workers fill all positions from top managerial and professional positions to DDD jobs. Hence, as long as the economic expansion was rapid and the indigenous labor force was relatively small, the dual labor market constituted “a win-win situation” and worked to the benefit of both the indigenous as well as the foreign workers: private sector employers were allowed to recruit cheap foreign labor almost without limitations, thereby maximizing their profits, while the GCC citizens were guaranteed the luxury of public sector employment, regardless of their professional background and skill level. Through the adoption of this kind of employment policy, the GCC royal families were guaranteed full public compliance. However, the dual labor market mechanism prevented large-scale replacement of foreign labor by nationals in the private sector. Consequently, in recent years, the GCC authorities were forced to impose quota for national employees in the private sector in order to create at least some work opportunities for nationals in the private sector. In retrospect, it appears that whatever economic diversification has actually been achieved, it was done at the “price” of increasing dependence on foreign labor and not through developing industries and services in which nationals constituted the majority of employees. The examples of UAE and Qatar best illustrate this phenomenon. In the early 2010s, four decades following the “oil boom,” the economies of these countries are indeed the most diverse among the GCC economies. However, this economic diversification was achieved through the rapid increase in the number of foreign workers, while 90% or even more of their national workforces are employed with luxury wages and excellent employment conditions in the public sector. The political implication of the rentier system is no less crucial. Historically, the GCC rulers were dependent on the big merchants and the Bedouin tribes. This dependence, however, also remained in force during the oil era. Although the GCC rulers no longer need the taxes which the big merchants paid in the pre-oil era, they still need their political support, particularly in a period of economic recession. On the part of the big merchants, although they withdrew from their traditional claim for political participation, this withdrawal was in exchange for the continuation of their economic privileges, including the availability of almost unlimited cheap foreign labor and the absence of personal income taxes. On many occasions, when the GCC authorities tried to narrow the scale of work permits for foreign workers, the big merchants “squeezed” the authorities to cancel this intention.244 Thus, the rapid increase of the GCC national workforce did not translate into either decreasing dependence on foreign labor or rental revenues, as the vast majority of the national workforce continue to be employed by the public sector. As the foreign workers continue to increase, the percentage of males over females will continue to increase accordingly. Today in Qatar, UAE and Kuwait females already represent less than a quarter of the total population. What will the social situation in these countries be when females constitute 15% of the total population or even less? Is there any society worldwide that can survive with such a twisted gender composition in the long run? Will this twisted gender composition encourage crime, particularly that which relates to women? The answers to these crucial questions are the key to the basic survival of the GCC current socio-political rentier structure.

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As for the Arab labor-exporting countries, their tragedy is that while during the “oil decade” of the 1970s the employment relationship between them and the GCC countries was characterized by “mutual dependence,” in the mid-1980s this “mutual dependence” ended as a result of the sharp improvement in the educational level of the GCC nationals. However, instead of using “the amnesty period” of the “oil decade” and preparing their economic structure for the “post labor emigration era,” they chose the “easy way out” and did almost nothing in the area of socioeconomic as well as demographic reforms. The end result, as will be examined in the Summary and Conclusions chapter, was the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

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6

Between Pro-Natalism and Anti-Natalism in the Arab Countries

Man can undo himself with no other force than his own brutality. The roots of the brutality . . . are in the lack of population control. Paul Ehrlich, 19681

1

The Attitude toward Population Growth in Historical Perspective

Until the mid-twentieth century, with very few exceptions, the conventional attitude toward the new phenomenon of accelerated NIRs was positive and was viewed within the overall Mercantilism economic theory which ruled Europe until the late eightieth century.2 This positive attitude toward rapid population growth rested on the assumption that a large nation is a strong nation and that rapid population growth would facilitate the adoption of modern mass production techniques. In contrast to this conventional positive attitude toward accelerated population growth were the few economists and philosophers, starting in the late eighteenth century, who argued that in the long-run rapid population growth would have devastating economic and political consequences. The first among the latter few was Adam Smith who doubted the conventional attitude that rapid population growth is the most important indicator for the economic situation of any given society.3 Smith’s basic demographic attitude was that the desired population growth rate is not constant, but changes according to the labor market supply/demand balance. Thus, in his famous book, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith claims that: “Countries are populous not in proportion to the number of people whom their produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can feed.”4 Put simply, Smith was the first to claim that rapid population growth should not always be welcome, but should rather be regulated according to economic conditions. The French mathematician and philosopher, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) argued in a book entitled, Esquisse d’un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l’Esprit Humain [Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind], published in 1795, that modern technologies and new

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agricultural production methods would increase the level of food production. At the same time, educational reforms would bring education to the lower strata. Thus, fertility decline would ensue and the overpopulation problem would be solved naturally without the use of coercive means by the authorities.5 The most famous among those who opposed the conventional positive attitude toward rapid population growth was the English reverend and philosopher, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), who is considered the “father of the family planning policy.” In 1798, Malthus published the book entitled An Essay on the Principle of Population. His basic argument was that while population increases in a geometric ratio,6 the means of subsistence increases in an arithmetic ratio.7 Thus, the inevitable result would be a steady decrease of per capita agricultural land and eventually a steady decrease in the marginal food production for every additional agricultural laborer in line with the law of diminishing marginal productivity. The essence of the Malthusian theory can be summarized as follows: Population is density-dependent. When population size exceeds the carrying capacity of its given resources base, feedback loops active checks that prevent further growth or even bring about a reduction in numbers.8

Malthus’ conclusion was that in order to avoid conflicts over means of food production, people should voluntarily limit the number of their offspring. This theory was entitled “the Malthusian Population Trap.”9 Following the publication of the first version of An Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus was criticized by many. The modern criticism on Malthus’ theory is that he disregarded the most important dimension of the Industrial Revolution — the huge technological progress that led to a steady increase in food availability. Overall, although the world’s population increased fourfold during the twentieth century, the world’s GDP increased twenty to forty times during the corresponding period, leading to a sharp rise in living standards, even in the least developed sub-Saharan African countries.10 During the second half of the twentieth century, the world’s economy performed better than at any time in human history with an annual GDP growth rate of 3.8%.11 Thus, the highest economic growth rates occurred simultaneously with the highest population growth rates. Is there any connection between them? Did the rapid population growth serve as a catalyst for accelerated economic development? In retrospect, it appears that the answer to this question is negative. This is because the economic development was much faster in the countries where the NIRs were quite low. As to the vast majority of the developing countries, although their socioeconomic situation at the end of the twentieth century was much better than in the mid-century, their economic growth rates were substantially lower than that of the developed economies. In general, during the past two generations, across the world, the higher the NIR, the lower the economic growth rate (with the exception of the GCC oil-rentier states). Thus, it seems that there is a strong correlation between economic development and population growth, but this correlation is negative. The case of the non-oil Arab countries best illustrates this argument. In general, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, only religious clerics still support rapid population growth. This, it should be noted, is neither from socioeconomic nor from political-security reasons, but rather from a cultural-religious one. Hence, Malthus “won the battle” although his basic assumption regarding the population/food balance proved to be mistaken.

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2

What is a “Population Policy”?

Rulers of any political unit have a stake in the size and composition of the population over which they have authority, hence an incentive to try to influence demographic change in a desired direction. Paul Demeny, 200312

What is the meaning of a “population policy”? When can it be said that a government is implementing any kind of population policy and, even more importantly, how can it be clarified as to which policy is being implemented in cases when the policy is hidden due to the religious-cultural-political sensitive nature of the whole demographic issue? The US National Academy of Sciences defined “population policy” as “policies related to change in the quality and quantity of the population and its geographical distribution . . . ”13 According to the definition of the UN Population Division, a population policy includes “all policies and programs — including social and economic policies — concerned with the major population variables: fertility, mortality, internal migration and geographical distribution of population, and international migration.”14 Allan and Anne Findlay defined “population policy” as “those policies that seek in a deliberate way to change the size, growth, composition or distribution of a country’s population.”15 From these and many other definitions, it appears that a population policy, both pro- and anti-natalist alike, is a part of the broader socioeconomic policies of any given government. In general, there are two components of a “natalist policy.” The first is that of a responsive policy, which attempts to counter the negative consequences of rapid population growth, particularly in the areas of supplying basic foodstuff, housing, employment opportunities and public services (mainly healthcare, education, transportation, sanitation, water and electricity). The second component is that of an influencing policy, which aims at influencing the fertility behavior itself, either through direct measures (such as family planning policy, child allowances, minimum age at first marriage and a ban on polygamy), or through indirect measures (primarily by encouraging women’s education and their employment outside the household, or by preventing their employment as a pro-natalist measure).16 It should be emphasized, however, that almost any governmental action has an influence of some kind, whether direct or indirect, on at least one of the major demographic variables of any given population. For example, the provision of full government subsidies for education, particularly for women, has an immense influence on fertility patterns. However, during the past two generations, at least elementary and secondary education is universally provided free of charge, even in countries that are trying to promote higher fertility rates, such as the EU countries and the GCC countries.

3

A Historical Examination of the Natalist Policies of the Arab Countries in Global Perspective

The attitude of the European countries toward accelerating the population growth rates in their colonies was naturally positive. This is because the implication of a larger population in their colonies meant higher consumption of imported goods. It should

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be taken into consideration that the colonial countries did not provide any public services to the colonies’ populations, thus larger population did not translate into higher expenses on the part of the colonial countries. Following World Word II, however, the attitude of the developed countries toward the rapid population growth in the developing countries radically changed in favor of fertility decline. This changing attitude was mainly due to two factors: First, the vast majority of them reached independence, freed from the rule of the Western European colonialist countries. The second factor was the acceleration of the NIRs to levels that never existed in any given society, in some cases even higher than 3% annually (see Chapter 1). Many of the developed countries leaders became worried about the socioeconomic and the political consequences of this new process not only in the developing countries themselves, but in the international arena as well. The only viable solution that emerged in the developed countries for “the third world demographic problem” was to reduce the fertility rates through comprehensive family planning programs. These programs were initially based on the assumption that although “modernization” is “the best contraceptive,” the developing countries could not afford to wait until fertility rates would naturally decline in response to socioeconomic development. Therefore, the process of fertility decline had to be accelerated through “outside intervention” in the form of anti-natalist programs.17 In order to promote family planning activities in developing countries, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) was established in 1952 as an NGO with funding from private foundations as well as from some Western governments. The first members of the organization came from the US, the Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany, Singapore and Hong Kong.18 The aims of the IPPF were to increase awareness about the issue of family planning, to improve family education and to support family planning services in developing countries. To achieve these aims, the IPPF encouraged the establishment of a parallel association in each developing county that would pioneer family planning activities and bring about a favorable climate in public opinion toward the importance of rapid fertility decline. The IPPF’s basic assumptions were that knowledge of modern contraceptives is a basic human right and that a balance between worldwide population and natural resources is a preliminary condition for achieving economic prosperity, political stability and peace.19 Since the mid-twentieth century, at the time that many of the Arab countries achieved independence, and until the present, the natalist approach of the Arab countries changed in line with three variables: economic growth rate; changes in internal politics and the shift in the worldwide natalist perception. In the following sections, the natalist approach of the Arab countries, both the oil-based and the non-oil alike, will be examined according to the changes in the above-mentioned three variables.

3.1

The 1940s and 1950s: “Rapid Population Growth is a Blessing”

At the beginning of the process of accelerated NIRs in the 1950s, the leaders of many developing countries worldwide believed that population growth is not at the heart of poverty in line with the traditional attitude toward population growth. Therefore, they made no attempts to limit it. The attempts made by Western leaders to convince them of the need to curb population growth were unsuccessful because the majority of the

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developing countries’ regimes, as well as common public opinion, considered these Western attempts as an “imperialist conspiracy” and a variant of “neo-colonialism.”20 It should be taken into account that many developing countries had received independence from Western colonialism only a decade earlier. In addition, the Dependency theory was widely accepted in the developing countries.21 Accordingly, it was widely believed that the end of Western colonialism, combined with the adoption of socialistétatist socioeconomic policies, would bring about rapid socioeconomic development which would be much higher than the population growth rate, leading to a rapid improvement in living standard. The issue of fertility decline by itself was widely considered as “by product” of the overall socioeconomic development. Furthermore, many in the developing countries believed that the heart of the reason behind the Western countries attempts to advocate fertility decline in the developing countries was not because of their care for the future socioeconomic prosperity of these newly independent countries, but rather because of their fear of changing the balance of power in the international political arena in favor of the developing countries through their much larger population. India, it should be noted, was an exception as it adopted a national family planning policy as early as 1951.22 In line with the common approach among developing countries during the 1950s and early 1960s, many Arab leaders also viewed the new phenomenon of rapid population growth as a blessing.23 Within the overall framework of the pro-natalist approach, in the former North African French colonies, the 1920 French law forbidding abortions and the use of contraceptives was still in force.24 Although the common approach was pro-natalist among the Arab countries at that time, in practice only Syria carried out specific pro-natalist measures. In 1949, the propaganda, distribution and the use of contraceptives was forbidden. Two additional regulations were ratified by the Syrian authorities in 1952: The first determined that families with more than three children would be granted discounts on pubic transportation; and the second was that these families would enjoy a special government bonus. Another decree in 1952 entitled state employees to a government subsidy in addition to their salary according to their number of children. Originally, this subsidy was meant to subsidize education costs for families with many children, but it soon became an instrument for encouraging higher fertility among state employees.25 In 1956, Youssef Helbaoui, the head of economic analysis in Syria’s Planning Department, noted: “Malthus could not find any followers among us.”26 It seems that the major reasons behind Syria’s pro-natalist policy during that period were political and economic alike. From a political viewpoint, the feeling of the Syrian leadership was that the Syrian population was too small in relation to the country’s military needs. Economically, the massive agricultural development in the northern region (al-Jazira) needed a large workforce. By 1950, Syria’s population totaled less than 3.3 million (see Table 3.1). Subtracting the under-15 population and the above60 population left Syria with a potential workforce of no more than 750,000, taking into consideration the low women’s labor force participation rates at that time. In the case of Egypt, there were some who warned that the rapid population growth would lead to a Malthusian Population Trap. Following publication of the 1917 census results, Dr. Levi, the Chief of the Egyptian Department of Statistics, wrote: “Given the state of its economic organization, the density of the population has reached a level that is only surpassed perhaps by China and certain parts of India.”27 However, the most famous document published during the Monarchy period that warned against

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the economic consequences of Egypt’s rapid population growth was Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt.28 Despite these warnings, the Monarchy regime not only did not promote fertility decline, but actually adopted a pro-natalist approach. Muhammad al-Razaq, a senior official in the Ministry of Health, claimed in 1962 that under the Monarchy regime, he delivered a memo to the Minister of Health on the urgent need to narrow the fertility rates. In response, the Minister rebuked him, stating that: “the King [Faruq] wants to be a king of 100 million people regardless of whether they are naked or starving.”29 In contrast to Syria, however, the Egyptian authorities did not carry out any specific pronatalist measures. Moreover, the Egyptian Monarchy regime did not prevent private activities in the area of family planning, such that of the Child Society of Ma‘adi which started to provide family planning services in 1945.30

3.2. “The Buds of Change”: Rapid Population Growth is at the Heart of Poverty The first among the Arab leaders to become aware of the devastating long-term results of rapid population growth was ‘Abd al-Nasser. In early 1953, a short time after the Free Officers Revolution (July 1952), a parliamentary National Committee for Population Matters was established — a move that reflected official recognition of the existence of a demographic problem in Egypt.31 At that time, the new regime began to operate in the area of demography in two directions: One was to encourage emigration of fellahin from Egypt to other Arab countries;32 and the second was to establish 20 experimental family planning clinics.33 Additionally, a voluntary family planning association, the Egyptian Association for Population Studies, was established in 1953.34 Muhammad Nagib, Egypt’s first president, was also worried about Egypt’s demographic pressure, arguing in 1955 that Egypt should act in two major areas: enlarging the cultivated area and narrowing the high fertility rates.35 Toward the end of the 1950s, however, ‘Abd al-Nasser changed his basic demographic concept and started to advocate the approach that rapid economic development could raise the low living standard without the need for direct governmental family planning activities. This approach was evident in an interview he gave to the Christian Science Monitor in October 1959: “Instead of teaching people how to exercise birth control, we would do better to teach them how to increase their land production. . . . ”36 ‘Abd al-Nasser himself never explained the reasons for the change in his demographic approach. Issawi claimed that this change was caused by an accelerating sense of nationalism in Egypt following the Suez War and the concept that a large population would provide a source of military strength for the continuing military conflict with Israel.37 Abdel-Aziz Sayed argued that Egypt’s unification with Syria in February 1958 raised strong feelings for overall Arab unity, which included sharing oil resources and redistributing the whole Arab population throughout the united Arab state that would be established.38 Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted that: “Some observers at the time suspected that Nasser, himself a father of five children, felt that a bigger population gave Egypt much greater weight in Arab, Middle Eastern, and international affairs.”39 In addition to the above-mentioned factors, one might speculate that another purely political factor accounting for ‘Abd al-Nasser’s changing demographic concept during the late 1950s, was the struggle with Iraq for seniority in the Arab world.40

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Official adoption of a family planning program could serve the Iraqi propaganda against ‘Abd al-Nasser, accusing him, personally, of acting against the “Arab cause” and serving “Western neo-colonialism” as well as Zionist interests. Hence, ‘Abd alNasser could not adopt an official anti-natalist policy, even if he was personally convinced of the need to reduce Egypt’s fertility rates. Although the 20 family planning clinics that were established in 1958 continued to operate in the early 1960s, it was on an experimental basis only.41 The overall approach of the Nasserite regime during the first decade of the Revolution was to leave the demographic issue to the public itself without any direct governmental involvement. Thus, we can conclude by saying that despite the awareness of the Nasserite regime of the devastating results of the rapid population growth, it preferred not to adopt a full scale national family planning program and instead took “the economic approach,” which, of course, did not arouse any opposition. From a short-term political viewpoint, this was the “easy way,” but certainly not the best way, in light of Egypt’s accelerating demographic pressures at that time. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Nasser chose not to use his immense popularity following the Suez War to promote fertility decline. As part of his populist style of leadership,42 ‘Abd al-Nasser continued to operate within the broadest consensus possible, including in the natalist arena. In the words of Ajami: “Under Nasser . . . the state tried to be many things to many groups.”43 From ‘Abd al-Nasser’s viewpoint, implementing a declared family planning program was an admission that Egypt under his leadership could not achieve rapid economic development without marked fertility decline. This admission was, of course, totally opposed to the populist leadership nature of his regime. In the other Arab countries, the issue of demographic pressure did not arise at all simply because the population of the other Arab countries during the 1950s and early 1960s was quite small (see Table 3.1).

3.3. The Changing Agenda: From Awareness to Action The results of the population censuses that were conducted in many developing countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s showed that the NIRs were actually higher than previously assumed. At the same time, many developing countries’ leaders became increasingly aware of the negative correlation between economic development and population growth. In addition, the adoption of socialist-étatist policy, including a wide variety of subsidies and public sector services free of charge, led to a steady increase in governmental spending in line with the population growth rates. Thus, during the 1960s, some developing countries adopted a national family planning program in order to achieve two goals: first, a marked fertility decline; and second, a more balanced age pyramid in order to increase economic activity rates — the most important catalyst to overcome the “low income trap.” The change in the demographic perception first began in Asia, with South Korea being the first to adopt a national family planning program as early as 1961, followed by Singapore in 1965, Indonesia and Taiwan in 1968 and Thailand and the Philippines in 1970.44 It later moved to some South American countries as well as some, albeit very few, Arab countries (see below). Following the election of Kennedy as US President in 1961, the US began to be involved in worldwide demographic issues and became the largest donor to UNFPA.45 By channeling the funds through the UN and not directly to the countries themselves, the US administration was trying to avoid charges of “neo-imperialism” and “racism,”

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of which Western countries, particularly the US, were very often accused.46 In 1965, the USAID started to support demographic research and the implementation of family planning programs in some developing countries.47 In the early 1960s, the Catholic Church was also forced to change its traditional negative attitude toward contraceptives use for two reasons: The first was the rampant poverty in Latin America; and the second was the innovation of the birth control pill, which, from the beginning, was a cheap and easily used contraceptive method. Thus, in 1962, the Vatican Council decreed that “couples are autonomous in determining the number of their offspring.”48 In line with many developing countries worldwide, in the mid-1960s in some Arab countries the traditional pro-natalist approach began to change as well. The publication of the results of the censuses that were carried out in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see Table 2.1) highlighted the acceleration of the NIRs. The initiative for adopting family planning programs in the Arab countries, it should be emphasized, came from the political elite and not from “grassroots sources.” In other words, it was not a natural reaction of the population itself to long-term socioeconomic changes, but purely a leadership initiative. Based on the results of a comparative study on the decision-making processes among the political elite on the issue of family planning in 17 countries, including Egypt, Thomas and Grindle note that: “Rarely, in fact, does population policy become an agenda item through social mobilization and pressure . . . ”49 In the case of Egypt, this was clearly illustrated by the fact that women’s organizations and physicians had been trying to promote family planning since the 1930s but without much success. Although family planning associations established in the Arab countries were formally NGOs, in practice they were governmental initiatives. The reason for this was the weakness of the civil society in the Arab countries — a direct consequence of their authoritarian regime. Among the Arab leaders, the first to go beyond paying lip service on the subject of family planning was Tunisia’s President, Habib Bourguiba. He realized that in order to substantially reduce fertility rates, direct anti-natalist measures would have to be taken.50 Indeed, in 1961, Tunisia was the first among the former French North African colonies to abolish the 1920 French law forbidding abortions and the use of contraceptives.51 In March 12, 1962, Habib Bourguiba stated: With our rapidly growing population, the rising generations are exerting pressure on us. If we are not careful now, in ten to twenty years’ time, there will be a marked disproportion between the national income and the number of people we have to feed. A race against the clock is going on between our economic development and the demographic increase. Unless we take, as of today, the necessary measures, the country in a few decades will experience convulsions.52

In June 1964, Tunisia officially adopted a national family planning program. The direct measures of the plan included the provision of family planning information and services within the existing mother-and-child healthcare clinics, as well as sterilization procedures in public clinics and hospitals.53 In contrast to ‘Abd al-Nasser’s concern about Egypt’s rapid population growth, which was naturally due to Egypt’s vast population, Bourguiba’s anti-natalist perception by the early 1960s is quite surprising, given the small size of Tunisia’s population at that time — only 4.533 million in 1966.54 Hence, despite Tunisia’s small population, Bourguiba realized the true meaning of the long-term implications of the demographic momentum.

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In the early 1960s, following the publication of the 1960 census results, ‘Abd alNasser as well realized that Egypt’s rapid population growth could be treated only through substantial and rapid fertility decline. On May 21, 1962, ‘Abd al-Nasser presented the National Charter [al-Mithaq al-Watani] in which he admitted that the population growth “constitutes the most dangerous obstacle that faces the Egyptian people in their drive toward raising the standard of production . . . Attempts at family planning deserve the most sincere efforts . . . ”55 It is widely accepted in the academic literature that the National Charter constituted “a turning point” in Egypt’s natalist attitude. This approach, however, should be re-examined. If the National Charter was indeed “a turning point,” why, then, did it take three years, until mid-1965, for the Nasserite regime to actually start to implement a national family planning program? If the demographic pressure was so great and constituted “the most dangerous obstacle to further economic development,” as ‘Abd al-Nasser admitted in the National Charter, then one would have expected the immediate implementation of an intensive anti-natalist policy. It seems that one major factor accounting for the three year delay in carrying out the family planning program was the rapid economic growth achieved in the 1960–1963 period. This progress was reflected in the vast number of new employment opportunities created in Egypt: the construction of the Aswan High Dam; the establishment of heavy industries in Hilwan; and the rapid expansion of public services, primarily healthcare and education. These developments contributed to ‘Abd alNasser’s feelings that although the long-term devastating consequences of the high NIRs are obvious, at least at the moment, he could avoid implementing direct antinatalist measures and thus not enter into direct confrontation with the Muslim Brothers which decisively opposed any form of family planning. To this “economic factor” one should also add a political one: the collapse of the union with Syria (September 1961) which was the first political defeat for ‘Abd al-Nasser.56 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that ‘Abd al-Nasser preferred to avoid taking any controversial steps such a short time after the collapse of the union. Consequently, the declaration of the importance of the demographic issue in the National Charter did not translate into immediate practical actions. In the mid-1960s, however, it appeared that the socioeconomic problems caused by the rapid population growth had intensified even further. At the same time, it was quite clear that the Second Five-Year Development Plan for the years 1966–1970 would not even get off the ground due to the inability of the Egyptian authorities to raise the necessary capital. Robinson and El-Zanaty claimed that Egypt’s drop of the “economic solution” for the demographic problem was “something approaching desperation.”57 Thus, in 1965, after 13 years in power, the Free Officers regime eventually adopted a national family planning program. The Supreme Council for Family Planning chaired by the Prime Minister was established through a presidential decree in order to coordinate all of the various mother and child healthcare and family planning activities.58 The basic assumption of the Egyptian plan, as that of Tunisia and other anti-natalist plans of many other developing countries worldwide, was that if young couples were provided with adequate information and family planning services, they would naturally reduce their number of children by limiting the number of unwanted births. In other words, couples desire to reduce fertility, but they lack effective means to do it so. Hence, providing wide-scale accessibility to family planning services and modern

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contraceptives would naturally bring about substantial fertility decline. The paramount short-term aim of the Egyptian program was to reduce the CBR from 41 in 1966 to 30 in 1978.59 In 1966, Morocco also adopted a national family planning program, as the Moroccan government had come to realize the longer run demographic momentum effects. The IBRD report that was presented to the Moroccan government in that year clearly pointed out this problem: “It is not so much the present density of population as its rate of growth which is so worrying . . . ”60 Another concern of the IBRD report was that the population growth rate would soon be higher than the economic expansion, leading to a negative growth in per capita terms.61 A similar observation also appeared in the Moroccan Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968–1972) which indicated the necessity of paying attention to the “unfavorable demographic situation, not only because of the rate of increase, but also because it results in an age pyramid in which the dependent population constitutes a large proportion of the total population.”62 However, despite the clear recommendation of the IBRD report “to adopt policies to encourage family limitation,”63 the 1968–1972 Five-Year Plan lacked any practical anti-natalist measures.64 The solution for the intensified demographic problem within the framework of the Plan was “to encourage labor emigration” in order to both reduce employment pressure and draw workers’ remittances.65 Within the framework of the next Moroccan Five-Year Development Plan (1973–1977), the natalist policy which was adopted was to “inform, educate and motivate the population to practice voluntary family planning.”66 In practical terms, this means that although the Moroccan regime was fully aware of the demographic problem, it still chose to avoid taking any concrete anti-natalist measures quite comparable to the Nasserite approach in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. One could summarize by observing that during the 1960s the governments of the most populated Arab countries became worried not about the nominal number of their citizens, but about the long-term implications of the demographic momentum, primarily in the areas of supplying employment opportunities for the rapidly growing workforce and the increasing financial burden of both supplying various public services and the subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products. However, at that stage, among the leaders of the Arab countries that officially adopted anti-natalist policy, Bourguiba was the only one to take the political risk of strongly and publically supporting the anti-natalist policy. In the case of King Hassan II of Morocco, Lapham wrote that: “It is not surprising that not much happened in terms of a vigorous family planning program, especially since in the background Hassan II remained silent on the question of family planning . . . ”67 As such, it is not surprising that the fact that King Hassan II signed the UN Declaration in support of family planning (see below) was not even reported in the Moroccan press, while the High Commission on Population was convened only twice between 1965 and 1975.68 This “silence,” it should be noted, was despite the clear recommendation of the 1966 IBRD report of the crucial need of “enthusiastic support from the highest levels of leadership”69 for the success of the family planning program. Overall, several patterns were common to the national family planning programs implemented in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco during the 1960s. The first was that they emphasized the “supply side” so as to fulfill the perceived “unmet demand” for modern contraceptives. It was widely assumed at that time that the newly invented birth control pill and intrauterine device (IUD) would serve as “magic bullets” to bring about

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fertility decline.70 These contraceptives and related medical services were mainly distributed through the existing mother-and-child clinics, which were already well established in these countries, even in remote rural areas.71 The second common pattern was to mobilize the ‘ulama to support anti-natalist policies in order to overcome the religious opposition of the Muslim Brothers. The authorities of these countries made use of prominent official Muftis to publish numerous fatwas in the mass media, emphasizing that the use of contraceptives is not contradictory to the Shari‘a. It was quite clear that without strong support of the ‘ulama, the programs would not succeed. The third common pattern was the establishment of family planning associations as voluntary organizations in order to achieve three main goals: to coordinate between all the bodies involved in the various aspects of family planning; to promote cooperation with the IPPF; and to create a “partition” between the regimes themselves and the family planning activities. Although these three Arab countries were among the first developing countries worldwide to officially adopt family planning programs, only in Tunisia did the issue of fertility decline actually receive top governmental priority. In the case of Egypt, the program was practically abandoned following the June 1967 War, along with other socioeconomic issues. During his last three years in power (1967–1970), ‘Abd alNasser concentrated mainly on the ongoing military conflict with Israel and even initiated the War of Attrition in early 1969, which only ended in August 1970, just prior to his death in September 1970. Other major obstacles to the successful implementation of the Egyptian family planning program during the late 1960s were: limited financial resources; lack of experience and knowledge among the plan’s leaders in organizing and running such a program; lack of coordination between the various bodies involved in the program; lack of medical staff training; and shortages of contraceptives.72 In the other Arab countries at that time, not only was family planning rejected, but in some of them active pro-natalist attitudes emerged. In Algeria the anti-natalism was perceived as a “false solution” for the socioeconomic problems and as a kind of “neocolonialism.”73 In his Independence Day speech of 1972, Algeria’s President, Houari Boumédiènne, said that the country’s population “is too small” in comparison to its large territory and natural resources and that increasing the size of the population “is a long-term investment.”74 Courbage claims that Boumédiènne’s pro-natalist approach at that time was a result of the fact that: “It was commonly held that the power and glory of the nation-state depended on the sheer weight of numbers, and President Boumédiènne set himself to forging a new African dragon which could feed 50 million people.”75 Within this demographic concept, the Algerian authorities decided to discontinue the labor migration agreement with France, to encourage its expatriates to return to Algeria and to denounce emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence.76 In 1974, Boumédiènne said in the UN General Assembly that Algeria “refused [family planning] . . . as an alternative to development.”77 In a speech delivered on April 1978, Boumédiènne said that the two options for overcoming the steady consumption increase as a result of the rapid population growth are “either by increased production or by importation.”78 As one can see, Boumédiènne did not even mention the option of limiting population growth through fertility decline in order to overcome the steady consumption increase.

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In addition, as in many other developing countries, the Algerian opposition to family planning was also based on the fact that following independence, Algeria aligned itself with the Soviet Union and thus, naturally, rejected any Western idea, including in the family planning area.79 Hence, it is not surprising that Algeria took the lead in the Bucharest Conference (see below) against the “imperialist conspiracy aimed at limiting the size of the Third World population.”80 In addition to the abovementioned two “conventional” pro-natalist factors, which were not unique to Algeria alone, specifically in the case of Algeria, the pro-natalist approach was also driven by the feeling that rapid population growth was desirable in order to compensate for the numerous losses incurred during the War of Independence against France (1954–1962). It should be noted, however, that the crucial factor that enabled Algeria to maintain such a pro-natalist approach was the dramatic increase of its oil revenues following the October 1973 “oil boom.” In this respect, Algerian natalist policy should also be examined within the broader framework of the natalist concept of the Arab oil countries (see below). Overall, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the fertility rates in the Arab countries remained extremely high — with a CBR of around 40 (see Table 3.2) — even in the Arab countries that had officially adopted national family planning programs, with the exception of Egypt. However, in the case of Egypt, it is widely agreed that the fertility decline of the late 1960s and early 1970s was not brought about by the family planning program, but rather by the economic hardships endured in Egypt following the June 1967 War and the War of Attrition, combined with the fact that over one million Egyptians were in the military service at that time.81 This is actually also the official Egyptian explanation: The decline in birth rate in A.R.E. [Arab Republic of Egypt] between 1966 and 1972 is due to the Arab–Israelian War and conscription of a large number of young adults for military services and consequently the postponement of their marriage. Beside, the economic problems that faced A.R.E. during this period and the commencement of the national family planning program have also contributed to the mentioned phenomenon.82

Hence, Egypt’s fertility decline during the late 1960s and early 1970s was a result of ‘Abd al-Nasser’s failures and not as a result of a successful family planning policy. Thus, the increased fertility rate following the October 1973 War, according to the official Egyptian explanation, was the result of “the accomplishment of many marriages which were previously postponed because [of] the war.”83 In 1966, twelve countries, including three Arab countries (Sweden, Columbia, Finland, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, South Korea, Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) submitted a document to the UN calling for fertility reduction in the developing countries, giving its various devastating socioeconomic consequences. This document constituted a cornerstone in the changing natalist approach of the major international organizations. On December 17, 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2211, calling on the UN Secretary-General to intensify population programs in developing countries, to support demographic research, and to disseminate demographic knowledge worldwide.84 Consequently, in 1967, UNFPA was established with the aims of assisting developing countries to implement family planning programs and expanding overall activities of the UN on demographic issues. The population censuses that were conducted in many Arab countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s pointed to substantial increases of the NIRs. The first in many cases

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The dichotomy perception of the developed countries toward “the desire fertility rates”

With the exception of Egypt, “the population problem is not so severe”

Strong religious opposition to family planning

Chart 6.1

A large population is a basic condition for national power

Population Growth by Itself is not the “Core of Poverty”

“The Dependency Theory”: The core reason for underdevelopment

The best “cure” for poverty is rapid economic development

Family planning is an “Imperialism Scheme”

Lack of awareness to the long-term consequences of rapid population growth

The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries until the mid-1960s

to become aware of the long-term implications of the continuing high NIRs were the professionals in the governmental departments dealing with the demographic and related issues. Thus, for example, in a report of the Syrian CBS from 1973, it was written that: It seems that high population growth rates have adversely affected the efforts exerted for securing [a] better life for all members of the population. Despite the high economic development rates which were achieved during the last decade, such rates are still not sufficient to meet basic population needs . . . The high percentages of dependent children have led to increased consumer expenditure and a decreased volume of savings . . . 85

Consequently, in the early 1970s, prior to the “oil boom,” the Syrian traditional pro-natalist approach began to change. Although the Syrian population at that time was still quite small in number (6.3 million in 1970), the Syrian authorities became aware of the long-term implications of rapid population growth, even though they did not implement any practical anti-natalist measures at that stage. In the early 1970s, the Jordanian authorities also became aware of the severe consequences of high NIRs. In 1972, the Department of Statistics initiated a conference of

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demographic experts with the intention of drawing up a comprehensive demographic policy for the Kingdom.86 In January 1972, the US Department of Health reported that: “Family planning and advices are available from the clinics of the Jordan Family Planning and Protection Association, from clinics of Women’s Federation and the clinics operated by the Near East Council of Churches.”87 In 1973, the National Population Commission (NPC) was established with the aim of advising the authorities in the area of population policies.88 However, as in the Syrian case, this awareness did not translate into practical anti-natalist measures. In the 2002-JPFHS it was written that: Because of the sensitive nature of the topic, the NPC took no distinct actions or steps. The Ministry of Health, through its Maternal and Child Health Centers, provided optional and predominantly free family planning services as an unofficial and indirect intervention in the population policy.89

Thus, although the vast majority of the non-oil Arab countries’ leaders became aware of the devastating consequences of the rapid population growth, they still chose not to transform the demographic issue into a top governmental priority. The main reason for this inaction was purely political: While the benefits of fertility decline have value in the long run, the political risk is in the short run. Practically, the anti-natalist policy was hidden and the promotion of contraceptive use was done through the family planning associations, which allegedly were voluntary organizations, while the ministry of health provided family planning services as part of the wider range of healthcare services that was provided to the population free of charge. The most crucial element that was lacking in all of these plans (with the exception of Tunisia) was a declared responsibility of the authorities to the demographic issue. In the early 1970s, due to the acceleration of the devastating results of the rapid population growth in many developing countries, the international awareness of the crucial need to curb the high fertility rates moved forward. In 1973, of 117 developing countries worldwide, 32 countries implemented a declared and direct national family planning program.90 The most important indication of this increasing international awareness to the demographic issue was the initiation of the First World Population Conference in Bucharest in August 1974. It is widely acknowledged that this conference constituted a turning point in the world’s family planning history. It was the first world conference to deal with population policy itself, rather than with demographic research as a whole, as did the first two UN demographic conferences (Rome in 1954 and Belgrade in 1965).91 Moreover, the Bucharest Conference was extensively covered by the international media. This increasing awareness gave political legitimacy to many developing countries’ leaders to start implementing declared national family planning programs. During the conference itself, however, a crucial “chicken and egg” debate arose between the US and many developing countries regarding the role of family planning programs within the broader socioeconomic development approach. While the US suggested that the developing countries should implement comprehensive national family planning programs as a major tool for overcoming their socioeconomic problems, most developing countries, including China and India, argued that the better way to solve their socio-demographic problems was through changing the “world economic order” by improving the developing countries’ ability to export their services and goods to the developed countries, rather than through aggressive family planning programs.92

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Thus, during the conference, many developing countries’ delegations argued that “instead of being a leading cause of underdevelopment, rapid population growth itself is a function of lack of development.”93 Hence, the conference’s slogan was that “development is the best contraceptive.”94 This new demographic perception was driven not only by new demographic knowledge, but rather by a clear political factor: the aspiration of many developing countries to change the international political and economic balance in favor of the developing countries. For example, in his statement to the 1984 Second World Population Conference, held in Mexico City (see below), the Moroccan Prime Minister, Karim Lamrani, pointed to the worldwide population/resources imbalance, stating that: The unequal and unfair relations among nations have led, and will always lead, to a lack of balance between population density and the concentration of wealth. This is the tragic reality of our contemporary world . . . Therefore we should keep searching for a new international [economic] order . . . 95

At the local level, the insistence of many developing countries’ leaders, including the non-oil Arab countries, on the “indirect approach” was a result of the immense sensitivity of the family planning issue from both political and religious-cultural viewpoints. Donaldson noted that: “Third world leaders worry first about staying alive and in command and then, as time allows, about development.”96 The Arabian Gulf oil states prior to the “oil boom” of October 1973 lacked any natalist policy. In the case of Bahrain for example, the US Department of Health reported in January 1972, that: “There is no policy of family planning at the moment and there is no family planning association. However, contraceptives supplies are available commercially.”97

3.4 Back to Square One: “Awareness without Action” Following the “Oil Boom” In retrospect, the “oil boom,” more than any other factor, was responsible for the indirect anti-natalist approach of the non-oil Arab countries during the “oil decade.” As a result of the high economic growth rates (see Chapter 4), the non-oil Arab countries were provided with a “shelter,” albeit a temporary one, and could put off dealing with this politically sensitive issue as with other sensitive socioeconomic issues, such as massive subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products. Thus, although Syrian authorities had already become aware of the long-term devastating consequences of rapid population growth in the early 1970s, the tremendous improvement in the country’s economic condition following the start of the “oil boom” prevented this awareness from being translated into explicit anti-natalist measures. Furthermore, the “oil boom” was used as an excuse for the Ba‘thi-‘Alawi regime to avoid taking any unpopular socioeconomic measures in order to keep its legitimacy among the Muslim-Sunni majority population. This was extremely crucial, as since the mid-1970s, the Syrian regime and the Muslim Brothers had clashed over the control of the country.98 Implementing a national family planning policy could have been used by the Muslim Brothers as a propaganda tool. Consequently, in their public expressions, the Syrian authorities tried to build a picture in which the increasing NIRs was due to socioeconomic progress that had caused a substantial

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Cartoon 6.1 Source: al-Thawra, July 26, 1984.

decline in death rates. For example, in one of the few demographic references made by Hafiz al-Asad, at the 1984 World Population Conference, he said that the “mortality rate declined sharply . . . due to socioeconomic development.”99 In an attempt to maintain a low profile on the demographic subject, following the “oil boom” the Syrian authorities adopted an indirect anti-natalist approach. Thus, the Syrian Family Planning Association was established in 1974, not as an official governmental body but as an allegedly NGO one, although, as in other Arab countries, it was financially supported by the government. Another indirect indicator was that the Syrian official press began to publish reports, articles, and cartoons about the socioeconomic consequences of the rapid population growth at the family rather than at the national level, as was the case in Egypt (see below). The aim was to connect the problem of large families to the socioeconomic situation of the families themselves, rather than to the national level. Thus, for example, cartoon 6.1, published in July 1984, shows a very poor family with a large number of children, illustrating “the difficulty of bringing bread to a large family.” The campaign to increase birth intervals was made to appear that the family planning services is only one among many other public services provided by the government for the welfare of the mother and child.100 This kind of policy is well illustrated in the interview given by Wahida al-‘Azma, the Head of the Syrian branch of the IPPF, to the Tishrin newspaper in 1982 in which she said that the aim of the family planning program is “to enable the parents to determine the timing of bringing children as well as their number according to the family’s economic situation.”101 Another indicator for the Syrian indirect anti-natalist policy was the tendency of the regime not to deal with the high fertility rates as an isolated problem, but rather within the broader framework of the “population policy,” including labor emigration and urbanization. As such, the financial pro-natal regulations were not cancelled.102

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As in Syria, Jordan adopted an indirect approach to fertility decline for very similar reasons: on the one hand, the high economic growth rates which skyrocketed during the 1970s and the early 1980s (see Table 4.1) and the substantial alleviation of employment pressures due to massive labor emigration (see Chapter 5), and on the other, the escalation of Islamic opposition. As Susser noted, the Hashemite regime “strove to deepen its Islamic legitimacy in light of the new reality in the region.”103 In order to avoid further confrontation with the Islamic opposition, the Hashemite regime chose to implement the following indirect anti-natalist measures: financial assistance was provided for NGO activities in the family planning area and family planning services were offered free of charge through the maternal and child health clinics. These clinics, it should be noted, did not actively promote the use of contraceptives, but rather supplied them upon request. Lastly, the option of sterilization was given as a legal method.104 It should be emphasized, however, that in contrast to Syria, the Hashemite regime neither financed active pro-natalist measures, nor prohibited the distribution or the use of contraceptives. Thus, the transition from “non-interfering natalist policy” to “an unofficial anti-natalist policy” did not involve any legislative changes. However, as in Syria, the effect of the Jordanian indirect anti-natalist measures was minor at best. In 1990, Jordan’s fertility rate remained very high by any international comparison, with a CBR of 39.0 and a TFR of 5.8 (see Table 3.2). Sadat also preferred the indirect family planning approach. In 1973, a new family planning program was initiated by the Supreme Council for Population and Family Planning [al-Majlis al-A‘la lil-Sukan wa-Tanzim al-Usra] for a period of ten years, with the aim of reducing the CBR from 34 in 1973 to 24 in 1982 through an increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate from 16% to 35%. The plan’s long-term goal was that Egypt’s population would not exceed more than 60 million by the year 2000. In order to implement the new plan, in June 1973 a Department of Population was established in the Ministry of Health. The new plan emphasized indirect measures for fertility decline, mainly by improving women’s educational level and employment opportunities; increasing agricultural mechanization in order to diminish the need for child labor in agriculture; and reducing infant and child mortality rates in order to increase parents’ confidence in the survival chances of their offspring. Within the framework of the new plan, in 1974, population concepts were introduced into intermediate and secondary school textbooks.105 This trend of integrating the family planning issue within the broader aspect of socioeconomic and human resources development was clearly evident in the next Egyptian family planning program of 1980, entitled “National Strategy Framework for Population, Human Resource Development and the Family Planning Program.” The plan’s long-term goal was to reduce the CBR to 20 by the year 2000.106 Sadat’s adoption of the indirect family planning approach was motivated by both political and economic considerations. From the political viewpoint, Sadat preferred to take the indirect approach as part of the overall policy of rapprochement toward the Muslim Brothers.107 From the economic viewpoint, Sadat was “dazzled” by the rapid economic growth during the “oil decade” and the alleviation of employment pressure due to the large-scale labor emigration to the Arab oil states and Jordan. Hence, he chose “the easy way.” As Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted, Sadat “hardly paid any attention to the [demographic] problem.”108 Lippman wrote: “Sadat and his prime ministers hardly even gave lip service to birth control, despite all their speeches about

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the demands posed by the rising population. They did not hide their embarrassment at the dogged, outspoken support for family planning by the only prominent figure to make that commitment — Sadat’s wife, Jihan.”109 During Sadat’s eleven years in power (October 1970–October 1981), Egypt’s fertility rates not only did not decline, but rather increased, climbing to a CBR of 37 in 1981,110 compared to 35 in 1971.111 Overall, during Sadat’s rule, Egypt’s population increased from 33.8 million in mid-1971112 to 43.3 million in mid-1981,113 representing an increase of 28% within only eleven years — a net increase of 9.5 million people. However, even more critical than the population growth itself was the widening of the age pyramid. By 1980, the percentage of the under-15 population within Egypt’s total population amounted to 50.8%, compared to 42.8% in 1960 (see Table 3.11). The ascendancy of Husni Mubarak to the presidency following the murder of Sadat in October 1981 did not lead to a change in Egypt’s family planning policy. In fact, during the first four years of his presidency, the demographic issue was almost totally ignored.114 As in the case of Sadat, Mubarak also preferred not to confront the Muslim Brothers on the family planning issue. In addition, the rapid economic growth continued during the early 1980s, with the real GDP growth rate reaching as high as 7.9% by the FY1982/83. At the same time, the current account deficit narrowed from over $2 billion in the FY1981/82 to around $1 billion in the FY1983/84.115 Like his two predecessors, Mubark decided to “sacrifice” Egypt’s long-term socioeconomic development so as to avoid posing a threat to his regime in the short-term. Consequently, during the first half of the 1980s, Egypt’s CBR continued to increase, amounting to 39.8 in 1985116 — higher rate than in the early 1960s — prior to the adoption of the first family planning program. Hence, following two decades of implementing direct and declared family planning policy, Egypt’s fertility rate was higher than ever before! Overall, following the “oil boom” the issue of rapid population growth in the nonoil Arab countries was viewed as posing a challenge, but only in the longer run. As Yousif and Hammouda noted: “Population growth and its ramifications were seen as long-term problems which were undeniably important, but neither pressing nor urgent. Population issues were of secondary importance.”117 A major factor for this neglect was related to the overall “employment illusion” that existed due to the massive intraArab labor migration. As put in the 2004 MENA employment report: “It is not surprising that under those conditions [of low unemployment], earlier predictions of rising labor supplies because of population dynamics elicited little concern on the part of policymakers in the region.”118 In addition to the “oil boom” effects, there was also a widespread feeling in the overpopulated Arab countries that the demographic trends for the short run, namely, for the coming generation, were already set and that the ability to change them, even through an extensive national family planning program, was very limited. As Hilmi ‘Abd al-Rahman, the advisor to the Egyptian Prime Minister, stated in 1975: The development of the population for the next 25 years has already been determined . . . Our population will double in the next 25 years with only a 20% possibility of variation . . . Therefore, for the next 20 or 25 years the problem in Egypt is mainly to meet the requirements of an increase in population.119

Moreover, the World Bank staff that evaluated Egypt’s demographic policy in August 1978 was optimistic regarding Egypt’s future demographic characteristics and the successful outcome of the indirect family planning policy being carried out at that

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time. The World Bank staff projected that by the year 2000, Egypt’s population would number 59.374 million, while during the second half of the 1990s the CBR would average 23.3 and the TFR would average 2.9.120 Following the election of Ronald Reagan in January 1981, who opposed abortions and family planning from a religious point of view, the US natalist concept radically changed. Instead of implementing family planning policies, the developing countries were encouraged to adopt a liberal economic policy that would bring about economic prosperity and thereby also bring about fertility decline without direct governmental involvement.121 Reagan rejected the accusation that the “world economic order” was the cause for the underdevelopment of the developing countries. He claimed that a free market economy (the “Washington Consensus”) is the sole solution for the developing countries’ socioeconomic problems. Hence, Reagan’s demographic approach was reminiscent of the 1974 Population Conference slogan that “development is the best contraceptive.” Indeed, at the 1984 Second World Population Conference, the US delegation presented their platform that “government control of economies . . . had caused population growth in developing countries to change from an ‘asset’ to a ‘peril.’”122 Overall, it is quite clear that all of the above-mentioned factors for not implementing direct anti-natalist measures were only “excuses,” aiming at avoiding direct confrontation with the Islamist opposition. In retrospect, it is quite hard to believe that Sadat, Mubarak, Hafiz al-Asad and King Husayn of Jordan truly believed that the high fertility rates could substantially decline without their extensive and declared personal involvement in family planning issue. Among the non-oil Arab countries, Tunisia was the only exception because even during the “oil decade” it did not abandon its direct family planning policy. In his statement to the 1984 Second World Population Conference, the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed Mzali, said: Since 1956 . . . our country has adopted sweeping legislation and bold measures in the areas of family planning, sexual equality and the protection of children and young people . . . A further step was taken this year when President Bourguiba set up the Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women.123

In contrast to the other non-oil Arab countries, the Tunisian authorities neither tried to blame the “West” for the high fertility rates — although Tunisia was only released from French control in 1956 — nor to present the rapid population growth as “a governmental achievement” as did the Syrian authorities, but presented the demographic situation “as it actually was,” namely an acute problem that must be seriously treated by the highest political rank. A major factor for the Tunisian direct anti-natalist policy during the “oil decade” as well was the relatively low amount of workers’ remittances combined with the minor financial aid from the Arab oil countries.124 In sharp contrast to the non-oil Arab countries, the family planning activities in many non-Arab developing countries during the late 1970s and the early 1980s were substantially expanded. This phenomenon was attributable to two main factors. First, the socioeconomic problems resulting from the high NIRs were steadily worsening, including: increasing employment pressures, inadequate public services, housing problems, and above all, low GDP growth rates due to the sharp increase in oil prices. The second factor was that the socioeconomic improvement of the 1960s and 1970s did not bring about substantial fertility decline. Hence, it became quite clear that indeed “the best contraceptive is development,” but only in the long run. In the short run, direct

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“Demographic fatalism” Enhancing Islamic opposition toward family planning

The demographic experience of the Western countries

Rapid economic development

“Awareness without activities”

E normous rental incomes

Large -scale labor migration to the Arab oilstates

“economic development is the best contraceptive” Alleviating Employment pressure

Chart 6.2

The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries during the “Oil Decade”

anti-natalist measures had to be carried out in order to rapidly curb the high fertility rates. Regarding the demographic perception of many developing countries during the early 1980s, Finkle and Crane wrote that: They no longer spoke of international population assistance as racist, genocidal, or imperialistic, or accused Western nations of advocating population control as a substitute for foreign aid.125

Thus, the demographic slogan of the 1980s returned to that of the late 1960s, namely, “the best contraceptive is a contraceptive.” The practical meaning of the renewed slogan was the promotion of direct family planning activities in many developing countries. In 1983, 76% of the developing populations worldwide were living in countries that had an official family planning program, and an additional 17% were living in countries that supported family planning as a tool for healthcare and welfare improvement, but not as a direct anti-natalist tool.126 Without entering into the debate on the role of direct family planning activities in fertility decline (see below), one thing is indisputable: In many developing countries

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that adopted direct family planning programs, the fertility rates substantially declined. For example, Brazil’s CBR declined from 42.3 on average during the 1960–1965 period to 26.4 on average during the 1985–1990; in Thailand it declined from 42.2 to 20.5 during the corresponding period; and in India from 41.5 to 33.0 (see Table 1.9). As opposed to this, in the non-oil Arab countries, with the exception of Tunisia, the fertility rates did not decline during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Therefore, it can be said that from a purely demographic point of view, the “oil decade” was a “lost decade.”

3.5

The Emergence of Pro-Natalism in the Arab Oil Countries

In the Arab oil countries, a new demographic situation emerged following the “oil boom.” As was examined in Chapter 5, the short-term strategy adopted by these countries regarding the supply of labor was to import large numbers of temporary foreign workers, while the long-term goal was to supply the necessary workforce from local sources through a tremendous improvement in the educational and professional training systems, along with adopting pro-natalist policies. According to the Demographic Transition theory, fertility rates would naturally decline without direct governmental involvement following a reduction in infant and child mortality rates, combined with a surge in economic development and women’s educational level. Thus, the GCC pro-natalist policy was aimed at changing this natural demographic evolution and maintaining high fertility rates despite tremendous socioeconomic improvement. Overall, various direct pro-natalist measures were taken by the GCC governments following the beginning of the “oil era” in order to maintain high fertility rates. The intensity of the measures varied from one country to another in line with the per capita oil revenues. The most intensive measures were taken by Kuwait and Qatar, the richest among the GCC countries, and the least intensive measures were taken by Bahrain and Oman, the poorest among these countries. In retrospect, during the “oil decade,” the GCC countries implemented the most extreme pro-natalist measures known worldwide. The most prominent measures were the following: (a) The initiation of public housing projects whereby the government sold housing at cost or provided land for building while offering loans at very low interest rates.127 Besides encouraging high fertility rates, the policy of distributing land to the nationals also had a political target: to increase support for the royal families as part of the rentier system. In Kuwait, by the 1950s, this policy constituted a major channel for distributing the oil revenues to the merchant elite and tribal notables. The regimes of Qatar and the UAE also adopted a similar policy, and in Saudi Arabia, the system of land gifts has been in force since the beginning of the Ibn Sa‘ud regime.128 (b) The encouragement of early marriage through large marriage grants. Despite the severe damage to the Kuwaiti economy caused by the Iraqi invasion, a large increase in the marriage grant to Kuwaiti nationals was approved by the Council of Ministers at the beginning of 1992. According to this decision, eligible Kuwaiti males were entitled to receive $14,000 (half as a grant and half as a loan) for their marriage to Kuwaiti women. This amount was twice the previous sum. The reason for such a large increase, according to the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance, Nasser ‘Abdullah al-Roudhan, was “to encourage Kuwaiti youths to marry.”129 (c) Full governmental subsidies for education (including books, clothing, etc.) provided from the first grade through university.

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(d) Child allowances for each child of nationals employed in the public sector.130 In addition to the above-mentioned direct measures, a major indirect pro-natalist measure taken by the GCC countries (with the exception of Bahrain) was to maintain the low status of women. Generally speaking, pro-natalist policies related to women’s status in three basic forms: (a) A prohibition on contraceptive use and abortion. In 1975, following the publication of the September 1974 demographic census, the Saudi authorities banned the import, the distribution and use of contraceptives “as they contradict the teaching of Islam.”131 A similar policy of preventing or at least minimizing the use of contraceptives was implemented by the Libyan authorities in the early 1970s. The US Department of Health reported in January 1972 regarding the Libyan natalist policy that: Pharmacies are not allowed to sell contraceptives without medical prescriptions and doctors are instructed not to prescribe them except for medical reasons. Abortion is illegal, but punishment may be reduced if the pregnancy is illegitimate.132

(b) Since the most influential factor determining fertility behavior is a woman’s economic activity, imposing various barriers on women’s employment, legally or socially or both, as in the Saudi case, would eliminate the most influential factor for fertility decline. (c) Generous child allowances and subsidies on the one hand, and high salaries for nationals employed in the public sector on the other (with the exception of Bahrain), in practice eliminated the need for the “dual salary household” which was the prominent factor for the sharp fertility decline in the developed countries since the 1960s (see Chapter 1). It should be noted, however, that with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the pronatalist policies in the other GCC countries were carried out on a voluntary basis only. However, even in Saudi Arabia, despite the official restrictions on contraceptive use, in practice they were available during the 1970s, at least in the major cities.133 In retrospect, the GCC pro-natalist policy achieved its primary goal: While the educational level of all the GCC indigenous women significantly improved and the death rates radically declined, fertility levels remained extremely high. In 1985, the CBR and TFR were 44.7 and 5.9, respectively, in Bahrain; 46.9 and 7.2, respectively, in Qatar; 46.3 and 7.5, respectively, in the UAE; and 46.0 and 7.5, respectively, in Saudi Arabia.134 Fargues argued in this respect that “by giving them [to the citizens] more money so they could have large families with mothers staying at home, it has, in a way, funded the preservation of patriarchal society and delayed the onset of the demographic transition.”135 Also the Iraqi authorities implemented pro-natalist measures during the 1970s, but more so during the 1980s at the time of the Iran-Iraq War (September 1980–August 1988) by investing efforts to restrict access to contraceptives. Indeed, this policy was effective and in 1989 only 10.4% of Iraqi married women used modern contraceptive.136

3.6 “Demographic Sobriety”: Direct Family Planning Programs is the Only Solution The end of the “oil decade,” and more so the drop in oil prices in 1986, led to a severe recession in all of the Arab economies, the oil-based and non-oil alike (see Chapter 4). Consequently, the natalist approach of the overpopulated Arab countries dramatically

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changed, heralding a new period that can be called “Demographic Sobriety.” In general, since the mid-1980s, the anti-natalist measures introduced in the overpopulated Arab countries have been markedly intensified. The first Arab country that changed its natalist perception following the end of the “oil decade” was Algeria. In 1983, under the rule of Chadli Bendjedid, Algeria adopted its first family planning program.137 A year later, in 1984, the legal minimum age at marriage was set at 18 years for women and 21 years for men. In 1985, the 1976 abortion law was liberalized for the purpose of family planning.138 As in the case of Syria, the Algerian family planning policy during the early 1980s was somewhat hidden, and emphasized the “birth spacing” for the benefit of mothers and children, rather than as a national aim. In 1986, the National Committee on Population was established. The Algerian family planning policy found its legal basis in Act No. 85-05 of February 16, 1985. The law defined the framework for maternal and child protection, which consisted of a set of medical and social measures aimed at protecting the mother’s health by offering medical and social conditions before, during and after pregnancy.139 However, even this hidden policy was effective and the contraceptive prevalence rate substantially increased, amounting to 57.5% of married women of childbearing age in 1992 in urban centers compared to 17.5% in 1970, while in the countryside, the increase was from 4% to 44.1% during the corresponding period.140 In the case of Egypt as well, the end of the “oil decade” led to a substantial revision in the family planning policy. In 1985, under Presidential Decree No. 18, the National Population Council was established, headed by Mubarak himself.141 A year later, in 1986, a new family planning program was announced with the aim of reducing the NIR from 2.8% in 1986 to 2.1% in 2001. In order to increase the availability of family planning services, the number of family planning units increased to 4,043 as compared to 2,301 in 1966. In 1992, the number of the units amounted to 4,356.142 There were two basic assumptions of the new Egyptian plan: First, rapid population growth by itself constitutes a major socioeconomic problem, and thus a comprehensive national family planning program is necessary to reduce the high fertility rate. Second, a sharp fertility decline would bring about certain structural changes that would help raise the living standard.143 Although the new plan included many elements of previous ones, it reflected change in two critical areas. First, the demographic problem was given top governmental priority; and second, emphasis was placed on both supply and demand measures simultaneously.144 On the “demand side,” the new plan put particular emphasis on a strong public information and education program conducted by the Egyptian State Information Service with technical assistance from the USAID.145 A central part of the “demand side” was to convince the population that using contraceptives is permitted through numerous fatwas issued by the most senior Islamic clerics.146 Thus, for example, in early 1989, the Egyptian Grand Mufti, Muhammad Sayd Tantawi, said that the Shari‘a allowed and even required the use of contraceptives in cases of a woman’s weakness or illness as well as in cases of economic hardship.147 In April 1990, in a seminar organized by the Women Secretariat of the National Party, Tantawi said that neither the Quran nor any other Islamic jurisprudence oppose family planning “as long as there was a need for it.”148 These are only two of numerous fatwas issued by official Egyptian Islamic religious clerics permitting the use of contraceptives for the purpose of family planning. After focusing on enhancing public awareness of the “demographic problem” as a whole, the second phase of the new plan concentrated on providing more concrete information on the various family planning options.149

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On the “supply side,” the aim of the new plan was to eliminate the large-scale unmet need for contraceptives.150 According to the 1984 Egypt Contraceptive Prevalence Survey, the average desired number of children was 3.3, but the actual TFR was much higher, probably as a result of the considerable unmet need of contraceptives.151 Thus, in early 1987, the Ministerial Committee for Social Services decided to establish one family planning unit to serve every 2,000 families throughout the country.152 In 1987, the Tunisian authorities limited child allowances to families with a maximum of four children and one year later, in 1988, to three children only. In 1988, a maternity leave of two months at full pay, followed by four months at half pay, was limited to the first three children.153 The year 1987 also marked a turning point in the Syrian natalist policy. In that year, the financial benefits given to large families were cancelled. At the same time, the Ministry of Health appealed to young families through the mass media to take family planning steps, while the range of activities of the Syrian Family Planning Association was markedly expanded.154 What were the major factors that led to intensifying family planning activities in many of the Arab countries starting in the mid-1980s? (a) The collapse of the “economic solution” thesis. In the mid-1980s, many leaders of the Arab overpopulated countries realized that their previous conviction that prolonged socioeconomic improvement would bring about fertility decline without direct anti-natalist activities was no more than a convenient belief. (b) The collapse of the inter-Arab labor migration option. The leaders of the largest Arab labor-exporting countries realized in the mid-1980s that alleviating the employment pressure through large-scale labor emigration to the Arab oil countries was no longer a realistic option, given the large-scale replacement of Arab labor by Asian workers (see Chapter 5). (c) The sharp cut in grants from the Arab oil countries. Although in the mid-1980s there were some who continued to believe in Arab unity, it was quite clear that the Arab oil countries would not continue to financially back the poorer Arab countries and that each country would have to operate according to its own interests. Thus, it became more expedient for these countries to promote direct anti-natalist activities in order to compensate for the lack of financial backing from the Arab oil countries. The split of the Arab countries during the Kuwaiti crisis was the best indicator of the “new intra-Arab political order.” (d) The success of family planning programs in many non-Arab developing countries. In the mid-1980s, it became clear that a growing number of developing countries, such as the “Asian Tigers,” Brazil, India, Malaysia, Turkey and Mexico, were successful at reducing their previously high fertility rates through voluntary family planning measures without the need of implementing the radical Chinese family planning measures.155 (e) The change in the global political economy. In the second half of the 1980s, an increasing number of developing countries worldwide fell into an economic recession and became increasingly dependent on aid from Western countries and international financial institutions, which forced them to adopt macroeconomic reforms that were more conducive to implementing national family planning programs.156 During the 1990s, there was a further acceleration in the direct anti-natalist activities in many Arab countries. In 1991, the government of Yemen157 adopted a long-term

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family planning program aimed at reducing the TFR from 7 in 1990 to 4 in 2018158 and raising the contraceptive prevalence rate to 50%.159 The short-term aims were to reduce the TFR to 6 by the year 2000. Actually, by 1997, the contraceptive prevalence rate in Yemen amounted to 21%, compared to only 10% in 1991/2.160 Despite this improvement, however, Yemen’s TFR remained extremely high throughout the 1990s, amounting to 6.3 in 2000.161 In Egypt, family planning activities were also expanded during the 1990s. In 1991, the Egyptian government set two major demographic targets for the year 2007: The first was that the contraceptive prevalence rate would increase to 65% and that the CBR would decline to 25.162 The increasing attention being devoted to the demographic issue was reflected in the fact that the Five-Year Development Plan for 1992/3–1996/7 period contained, for the first time ever, a separate chapter on the demographic challenge.163 Another important direct anti-natalist measure which started to be implemented in the early 1990s was that the cartoons which illustrated the devastating consequences of rapid population growth were appearing not only in the press, but in governmental publications as well, such as the following two that were published by the National Population Information Center in 1991.164 The first cartoon (6.2) presents a strong hand named, al-Ziyada al-Sukaniyya [“population growth”] hitting a woman, named, al-Tanmiyya [“economic development”] over the head, with the pregnant woman serving as a hammer. The second cartoon (6.3) presents a dead tree, named, Ziyadat al-Nasel [“multiple children”] showing that the tree’s branches are

Cartoon 6.2

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the most devastating consequences of the rapid population growth, such as unemployment, ignorance, etc. The importance of these cartoons is far beyond the simple fact that they appeared in a governmental publication, but rather that for the first time they are openly presenting the most devastating consequences of the rapid population growth at the national level. The combination of the appearance of these cartoons in an official governmental publication and their focusing on the national rather than the family level represent the move of the Egyptian government to an explicit and declared antinatalist policy.

Cartoon 6.3

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The setting of the 1994 World Population Conference in Cairo was an international acknowledgement of Egypt’s successful anti-natalist efforts. In January 1996, the Ministry of Health became the Ministry of Health and Population, reflecting the Ministry’s increased responsibility for population policy activities. Within the framework of a new family planning policy, adopted in October 1995, the national family planning services were integrated into the broader mother-and-child healthcare services, and greater emphasis was placed on the rural areas, particularly those of Upper Egypt, where fertility rates were traditionally much higher than in the major cities.165 Overall, by 1996, the number of family planning units operating throughout Egypt amounted to 4,733, 62.1% of which were in the rural areas.166 In the year 2000, the Egyptian government adopted a new long-term demographic strategy, known as “vision 2017,” covering the 2000–2017 period. The major aims of the new strategy were: reducing the fertility rate to the replacement-level; achieving better spatial distribution of the population; improving the socioeconomic characteristics of the population; and reducing the socioeconomic and demographic gaps between Egypt’s various regions.167 Within the framework of the “vision 2017” strategy, the number of family planning units largely increased, amounting to 6,005 in 2005, representing an increase of 27% from their number in 1996.168 In addition to continuing the expansion of the “supply side,” the Egyptian family planning policy proceeded to concentrate in three major parameters in order to maximize the “demand side” as well: First, religious justification for contraceptive use; second, convincing parents that a large number of children is the main reason for their poverty; and third, publishing numerous cartoons in the various mass media which emphasize the devastating consequences of the rapid population growth to both the family itself and the country as a whole.169 In Jordan, following the return of some 350,000 Jordanian citizens from the GCC countries (see Chapter 4), the authorities realized that the only viable option for reducing the socioeconomic burden was through sharp fertility decline. Hence, in 1993, within the framework of the Five-Year Development Plan, 1993–1997, the Jordanian government approved the Birth Spacing National Program.170 The program contained very similar components in terms of the characteristics of “supply” and “demand” to family planning programs implemented in other Arab countries.171 The target set by the plan was to reduce the CBR by 1 point each year.172 In the early 2000s, due to the increasing burden of the rapid population growth, the issue of family planning received higher governmental attention. In 2000, the NPC established the National Population Strategy that comprised four dimensions: (a) reproductive health; (b) population and sustainable development; (c) gender equality and empowerment of women; (d) and population and enhancing advocacy. This strategy was activated by the establishment of the Higher Population Council (HPC) at the beginning of 2002, headed by the Prime Minister.173 At a meeting of the HPC, held on May 26, 2003, Jordan’s Prime Minister, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Ragheb, called for initiating a detailed action program on demographic issues, claiming that Jordan’s rapid population growth “has an adverse impact on various aspects of life since it is disproportionate to growth in the available national resources.”174 In mid-2004, the Jordan Times reported that: “Population challenges currently top the government’s list of priorities . . . ”175 The overall aim of the Jordanian National Population Strategy, 2000–2020 was to reduce the TFR to 2.9 in 2010 and 2.5 by 2017 and to reach the replacement-level by 2020 with the end of the plan.176 At it looks today, Jordan is far

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behind this target and there is no chance that this will be achieved, certainly not in 2020. Syria’s family planning activities were also intensified during the 1990s, starting with many conferences on the various demographic aspects. These conferences were designed to highlight the dangers of uncontrolled population growth to the Syrian society as a whole and to convince the population that there were no religious restrictions on contraceptives practice.177 By mid-1993, the overall number of family planning clinics in Syria was 552, approximately two-thirds of which were in the rural areas.178 It should be emphasized, however, that despite the cancellation of the financial benefits to large families, as opposed to Jordan, the Syrian anti-natalist approach during the 1990s continued to remain hidden. We cannot find any expression of Hafiz al-Asad himself or any other senior official publicly advocating an explicit anti-natalist policy. Thus, for example, at the conference “Economic and Investment in Syria,” held at the University of Damascus in March 1997, the Syrian Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Muhammad al-‘Imadi, said that the demographic challenge of Syria “can only find its response in constant work, in the optimum use of the innovations of science and technology, and in a development policy that is compatible with the labor market.”179 As one can see, the minister did not even mention the need for a direct antinatalist program in order to curb the high fertility rates. It seems that the major factor for the Syrian hidden anti-natalist approach during the 1990s as well, was that the country had previously implemented an explicitly pro-natalist policy. Thus, while the Jordanian changing natalist policy from a nonintervention policy to an anti-natalist one was “smooth,” as it had not previously implemented a pro-natalist policy, in the Syrian case, the actual meaning of changing from pro-natalist into anti-natalist was to admit that the previous policy was a mistaken one. Thus, during the 1990s, although the direct family planning measures, primarily in terms of increasing accessibility to family planning services, substantially expanded, the official anti-natalist policy remained hidden. In May 2002, however, the Syrian authorities took a further step toward promoting fertility decline by announcing that henceforth child allowances would be paid according to the number of children, rather than according to a fixed amount for each child, as had previously been the case. The highest allowance of 200 Syrian pounds (S£) would be paid for the first child, S£150 for the second child, S£100 for the third child, and another S£25 for families with more than three children. The maximum for child allowances was set at S£475. Thus, the higher the number of children, the lower the average allowances paid for each child.180 This change represents the transformation of the Syrian natalist policy from an indirect into a direct and explicit one. Although Algeria succeeded in markedly reducing its fertility rates during the 1980s, by 1990, its NIR was still as high as 2.5% (see Table 3.2). As was examined in Chapter 3, during the 1990s, the Algerian socioeconomic challenges, above all, the steady unemployment increase, markedly intensified. Consequently, the Algerian government decided to strengthen its anti-natalist measures, concentrating on expanding family planning and reproductive health services. In March 1997, the Algerian authorities adopted a new family planning program with a target of achieving a 60% contraceptive prevalence rate by the year 2000. The new plan mainly included the following three measures: (a) provision of contraceptives free of charge through public healthcare facilities; (b) improving the quality of family planning services through advanced training of the medical staff in the clinics; upgrading the equipment

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in the clinics; and diversifying the available contraceptive methods; and (c) advancing information, education and communication activities in order to promote the awareness of the population as to the importance of fertility decline. 181 A major characteristic of the anti-natalist measures implemented in the Arab countries since the early 1990s was that the activities, in contrast to the past, were carried out openly. Many Arab governments, particularly those of Syria, Jordan and Algeria, stopped trying to hide their ambitions to reduce the fertility rates. This openness characterized the regional Arab organizations as well. Thus, for examples, the 2004 Regional Arab Population Forum recommended that: “Comprehensive reproductive health should be made generally available and include the provision of information and counselling on family planning . . . ”182 It should be noted, however, that the changing approach of many Arab governments from hidden to open anti-natalist policy since the early 2000s was not unique. This was actually the trend in many non-Arab developing countries as well. The 2005 World Population Policies noted that: “Unlike in the past, when perceptions of high fertility were usually not accompanied by policy intervention, virtually all countries which viewed fertility as too high in 2005 intervened to lower it.”183 Overall, it seems that several factors contributed to make the anti-natalist policy an official policy among the non-oil Arab countries since the early 2000s: (a) Exacerbation of the devastating socioeconomic consequences of rapid population growth. The severity of these socioeconomic consequences became overwhelming, even in countries that were relatively not overly populous until the 1980s, such as Jordan, Syria and Yemen. The leaders of the non-oil Arab countries as a whole reached the inescapable conclusion that they would soon have to face a real political threat on socioeconomic grounds, as they could not “deliver the goods” anymore and live up to their promises for “a better life” under their regimes. The steadily increasing oil prices since 2004 led to raising the prices of basic foodstuff and energy products as these countries could no longer bear the cost of maintaining the prices through subsidies (see the Summary and Conclusions chapter). Hence, the governments of the non-oil Arab countries were forced to make corresponding adjustments in their socioeconomic policies, including in the natalist arena, to the new demographic-economic situation. This realization, it should be emphasized, occurred at the same time as steadily increasing pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to implement economic reforms in line with the “Washington Consensus.” (b) The “Iranian religious umbrella.” In December 1988, Iran’s High Judicial Council announced that “there is no Islamic barrier to family planning.”184 A year later, in December 1989, Iran officially declared the adoption of a national family planning program (see below). Thus, the adoption of a national family planning policy by the Iranian regime gave “a religious umbrella” to other Muslim countries to adopt a similar policy. (c) The weakening of the Arab–Israeli conflict. A major argument of those who were opposed to family planning in Egypt and Syria during the 1960s and 1970s was the continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict. However, the diminishing of the conflict, starting with the March 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty and followed by the October 1991 Madrid Conference, the September 1993 Palestinian–Israeli Oslo Accords, the October 1994 Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty and the de facto peace with Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Qatar and the UAE since the mid-1990s, all contributed to reducing the level of the conflict from an overall Arab–Israeli conflict to a specific

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Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Thus, the Arab–Israeli conflict could no longer constitute an “excuse” for not implementing an anti-natalist policy. (d) The collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the Communist ideology in the late 1980s led to the creation of one superpower not only in the political realm but in the economic arena as well. This factor constituted a major lever for promoting family planning activities in many developing countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union, it should be remembered, was brought about on purely socioeconomic grounds and was not the result of war or any other kind of international conflict. As such, the SocialistCommunist ideology, which was opposed ideologically to any kind of family planning, was rendered as irrelevant. It was quite apparent then that the only economic policy which could be of any use in the modern globalized economy was that of capitalism, which supported anti-natalist policy as the best option for curbing high fertility. (e) The reversal in the US demographic policy. Following the election of Bill Clinton to the office of US President in January 1993, the US reversed its demographic policy toward developing countries to that which had prevailed prior to the election of Ronald Reagan.185 This renewed support also includes increasing financial aid to family planning programs in developing countries through the USAID. (f) Easier access to the targeted population. During the 1990s, it was much easier for the Arab governments to act in the area of family planning and related issues mainly due to two factors: First, the sharp improvement in women’s educational levels since the 1960s meant that the women who were the target of the family planning programs in the 1990s were much more educated than those of previous decades. Since women’s educational level constitutes one of the two most important factors shaping fertility rates, the likelihood of women availing themselves of the contraceptives being offered by the family planning programs in the 1990s was greater than ever before. Second, the widespread use of mass media, particularly electronic media, enabled the Arab governments to disseminate their messages on the subject of family planning more effectively than in the 1960s and 1970s, when such media were either scarce or not widely available, particularly in the countryside and remote areas. (g) The weakening of the threat of the Islamic opposition. During the 1990s, the leaders of the non-oil Arab countries were becoming more confident of the stability of their regime. Throughout the decades that these regimes existed, they built immense security forces whose only aim was to protect the regime’s survival. The oil rental incomes enabled them to finance these huge security forces. Thus, paradoxically, the “oil boom” that was one of the paramount factors for strengthening the Islamic opposition, simultaneously served to finance the various security forces. The commanders of the security forces were, in most cases, relatives of the leaders themselves and the majority of their employees were either from the leader’s tribe (in the case of Saddam Husayn’s Iraq), its religious sect (in the case of Syria) or its best allies (the Circassians in the case of Jordan). The hold of the security forces, in any circle — in both the army and civilian organizations — combined with technological improvements, enabled them to spy on potential opposition groups more easily than before. Thus, as opposed to the situation in the 1950s and 1960s, the non-oil Arab regimes could implement a policy which was totally in conflict with the Islamist opposition. It should be noted in this respect, however, that the Islamist oppositions were opposed not only to antinatalist policies, but to the economic liberalization measures as well, both of which were vigorously implemented since the early 1990s.

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Increasing international pressure on the need of fertility decline

Easier implementation of the family planning programs

Increasing international awareness to the demographic issue Western international aid for family planning

“The Sobriety Stage”: Family planning is the only solution

The consequences of the “demographic momentum”

The collapse of the Communist ideology

Religious legitimacy toward family planning Declining labor migration to the Arab oil states

Chart 6.3

3.7

The Natalist Perception of the non-Oil Arab Countries following the “Oil Decade”

The Changing Natalist Policy of the GCC Countries during the 1990s

The most dramatic natalist perception change during the 1990s occurred in Oman and, to a lesser extent, in Saudi Arabia. These two countries gradually moved away from their traditional pro-natalist approach and started to advocate fertility decline. In Oman, the natalist perception change was the outcome of several factors: First, the continued high NIRs, combined with the increasing women’s labor force participation rates ensured a steady increase in the potential indigenous labor force. Hence, the most important factor for encouraging high fertility became irrelevant. The second factor was the prolonged low oil prices following the end of the “oil decade,” which led to economic stagnation.186 The third factor was the growing unemployment problem among the nationals (see Chapter 4). Thus, following the publication of the 1993 census results, Sultan Qabus started to publically promote fertility decline. In January 1994, he said: We need to take another look at family planning. The recommended figure in the world as a whole is five members per family. When we see that the Omani family averages seven members, and that there is a strong belief that the creator will provide, we should also realize that almighty God has also given us intelligence and urged us to use it.187

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Within the framework of “Oman 2020,” the demographic issue was given high priority. The first aim of the Human Resource Development Strategy was: “To achieve a balance between population and economic growth by reducing the current population growth rate . . . ”188 Hence, Oman became the first among the GCC countries that started to promote fertility decline, not only practically but officially and openly as well. In October 1994, the Birth Spacing Services Program was incorporated into the governmental maternal and child health clinics,189 where contraceptives were distributed free of charge.190 In May 1999, the National Population Policy was officially declared and the National Population Committee was established. Its official goals were “to channel economic and social development so that population growth matches available resources and to modify the administrative and geographical distribution of population where desirable.”191 Overall, by the year 2000, the percentage of married Omani women using contraceptives was 32%, compared to only 9% in the late 1980s.192 In Saudi Arabia, in the early 1990s the authorities eventually reached the inescapable conclusion that the high fertility rate of the indigenous population did not bring about a decline in foreign labor dependence. Indeed, the Saudi Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, 1995–2000, acknowledged that: “Although the rapid growth of the Saudi population is not an entirely new phenomenon, it has now reached the stage of exerting considerable influence on many aspects of economic and social policy.”193 A clear indicator of the changing Saudi natalist approach was the abolishment in 1996 of the law forbidding the promotion, distribution or use of contraceptives.194 Another indicator of the Saudi changing natalist policy was the admission of the authorities of the existence of a demographic problem in the Kingdom, in contrast to their previous representation of the high fertility rates as an outcome of the successful socioeconomic policies.195 For example, the SAMA 2002 Annual Report noted: “High population growth is straining public services.”196 It should be emphasized, however, that the change in the Saudi natalist approach was very slow, in line with the overall “slow Saudi pace” — political and socioeconomic alike — aiming not to shake the Kingdom’s “rentier order.” In addition, in contrast to Oman, the Saudi authorities until recently refused to admit that their natalist approach changed into an anti-natalist one. For example, in response to a question by a MEED reporter in mid-2004 about the role of the tourism industry in generating employment opportunities for Saudi nationals, Prince Sultan bin Salman bin ‘Abdulaziz Al Sa‘ud, the Secretary-General of the Saudi Supreme Commission for Tourism (SCT), said as follows: “More than half of the people in the country are under 25. I do not see this as a problem. It is a problem if the majority of the population is older and needs . . . medical care. [The young population] is our biggest asset . . . ”197 However, in late December 2014, the Arab News reported that: “King Abdullah is considering implementing a population control policy following a doubling of the population in just 15 years.”198 Despite this openly admission of the Saudi authorities that there is a “population problem” in the Kingdom, in practice the authorities did not implement any practical measure in order to curb it. It seems that in light of the Saudi “rentier order,” the best that they could implement in order to reduce the high fertility rates was to increase the accessibility of family planning services and even more importantly, to get the official support of the highest rank of the ‘ulama. This support, however, has not yet been given. The indigenous populations of the other four GCC countries are very small and, with the exception of Bahrain, foreigners constitute more than 70% of the total population

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and more than 90% of the labor force (see Chapter 5). Given this demographic profile, the promotion of anti-natalist policy is not relevant in their case. However, although the basic fertility orientation of these countries, other than Bahrain, remains pro-natalist, family planning services are available through the public healthcare clinics within the framework of the overall healthcare services offered to the indigenous populations free of charge. Thus, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the GCC countries were all overtly pronatalist, at the beginning of the twenty-first century only the smallest remains pro-natalist, while the larger promote fertility decline. In an article published in 1988, Birks raised a question about whether it is possible that the GCC countries would implement anti-natalist measures in the future. His answer was definitively negative due to three main factors. First, the GCC rulers believed that the international and security positions of their countries would be too vulnerable as a result of their small indigenous populations. Second, the impact of family planning activities would be felt only after a period of at least a generation, and the perspective of the GCC rulers is much shorter. Third, the GCC rulers traditionally considered rapid population growth a lever for enhancing economic development.199 The reality, however, was the opposite of Birks’s prediction and within less than a decade the natalist approach of the largest GCC countries, namely Saudi Arabia and Oman, radically changed in favor of anti-natalist.

3.8

Survival Above All: The Impact of the “Arab Spring”

What was the impact of the Arab Spring on the natalist policies of the Arab countries? Is there any connection between the halt in the process of fertility decline in the nonoil Arab countries and the events of the Arab Spring? Why didn’t the Arab Spring events affect the fertility trends of the GCC countries which continued to decrease even in the less affluent countries of Oman and Bahrain? It seems that the answer to the first and the major question, namely the “turning course” of the fertility rates in the non-oil Arab countries following the start of the Arab Spring, is quite clear: none of the regimes of the non-oil Arab countries, both those which succeeded in surviving and the new ones that took power (in Egypt and Tunisia), did not want to deal with this sensitive issue. In the case of Egypt, although Muhammad Mursi was fully aware of the crucial need to continue with Mubarak’s anti-natalist policy, he represented a movement that traditionally was opposed to any kind of anti-natalist policy. Throughout the “Free Officer” regime, the Muslim Brothers consistently insisted that the main reason for poverty in Egypt was not rapid population growth, but rather the bad management of the economy. Thus, how could Mursi publically support family planning? Hence, the traditional opposition to any anti-natalist policy continued throughout Mursi’s rule. For example, Hamid al-Daly, a representative of the Islamist al-Nour party and a member of the Health Committee in the Upper House, presented in May 2013 the traditional attitude of the Islamist movement to the family planning issue as follows: “The population in China is over a billion, but there is good management and good utilization of resources. The population is a blessing if we use it well, and a curse if we mismanage the crisis.”200 Moreover, it would be quite ridiculous and artificial to implement an anti-natalist policy when the vast majority of representatives of Mursi’s party in the parliament, the Freedom and Justice, themselves have five and even six children.201 Hassan Zaky, an Egyptian demographer at the American University in Cairo,

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described Mursi’s government attitude towards family planning in May 2013 as follows: “Before, there was a clear policy. Now, we don’t know where we are going. We don’t know the view of the state.”202 Overall, during Mursi’s rule, the demographic issues as a whole simply vanished from the public discourse although the Egyptian new Islamist regime continued to financially support the anti-natalist policy. The ascendancy to power of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in July 2013 represents a turning point in Egypt’s natalist policy. In contrast to his predecessor, al-Sisi admitted publically that: “Increasing population is one of Egypt’s main problems.”203 In March 2015, al-Sisi appointed Hala Youssef to the position of the Minister of Population — a position that previously had never existed in Egypt.204 In June 2015, the Egyptian government initiated a new anti-natalist program aiming to reduce the TFR to 3.0 in 2020 and further to 2.4 in 2030. These aims would be achieved through providing governmental financial incentives to keep children in school; expanding family planning services throughout the country; and boosting public awareness of the devastating results of the continued rapid population growth.205 The new family planning program is one part of a large-scale economic plan aimed at boosting the Egyptian economy. However, due to the short period since the launching of the program, it is, of course, impossible to evaluate its efficiency at this point. It should be noted, however, that even under al-Sisi regime, although the issue of family planning receives much higher attention compare to Mursi’s period, it still remains at the “margin” of the overall new Egyptian socioeconomic discourse. A prominent sign for the marginality of the issue is that in the IMF report on Egypt from February 2015, namely, more than four years of steady fertility increase, the demographic issue as a whole was still not mentioned even once!206 In recent years, the TFR slightly increased in Morocco as well, from 2.2–2.3 to 2.6 according to the ENPSF–2011 results,207 and remained at that level during the following three years (see Table 3.8). This increase, it should be noted, occurred despite the steady rise in the contraceptive prevalence rates. The data from the ENPSF–2011 showed that in 2011, 57% of Moroccan currently-married women of reproductive age (15–49) were using a modern contraceptives as compared to 36% in 1992.208 It should be noted however, that the slight increase in the Moroccan TFR during the 2009–2014 period could also be a result of some mistaken measurement. This is because we do not have a detailed fertility measurement based on a census or a national survey between the 2004 census and the ENPSF–2011.

4

Evaluation of the Family Planning Programs in the Arab Countries

As the data reveal, fertility rates in all of the Arab countries, even in the GCC countries, have substantially declined during the past three decades. This decline, however, started two decades after it started in many non-Arab developing countries. Thus, while Turkey’s TFR in 1960 was higher than Egypt’s, in the first half of the 2010s Turkey’s TFR was 2.1 and in Iran even lower than 2 (see Table 1.9) as compared to 3.5 in both Egypt and Jordan (see Table 3.8). A crucial question is why the fertility rates in the non-oil Arab countries (with the exception of Tunisia and Lebanon), even before the beginning of the Arab Spring, failed to decline to the replacement-level and stabilized at 3–3.5. This stabilization is totally contrary to the common perceptions of the previous decade that predicted the

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continuation of the fertility decline in the whole Arab region. Thus for example, the IBRD 2004 MENA report predicted that: “It is safe to assume, however, that the era of high population growth is over. Evidence increasingly suggests that MENA is on a trajectory of declining population growth rates for the foreseeable future.”209 Robinson and El-Zanaty argued in 2005 that: “Egypt is . . . well along in a ‘transition’ from high to low fertility and to ultimate stabilization.”210 Why did these predictions, together with many others, not materialized? Many researchers attribute this phenomenon to two main factors: Islam and the low status of women. Cammett and associates, for example, claim that: “International evidence suggests a positive correlation between Islam and fertility.”211 However, the argument of the tight connection between the Islam and high fertility is problematic: If Islam plays a major role in the high fertility rates, how is it possible to explain the huge fertility dichotomy between the Muslim countries themselves — Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon, Malaysia and Indonesia on the one hand, and Yemen and the Palestinians in the occupied territories on the other?212 Regarding the second factor, the status of women and their labor force participation rates, although there is no doubt that these factors are crucial in determining fertility patterns, still the status of women along with women’s labor force participation rate are far better in Egypt than in Saudi Arabia, but in recent years the TFR in Egypt is higher than in Saudi Arabia. Thus, in light of these reservations, what can explain not only the delay in the fertility decline process in almost all the Arab countries, but also the huge dichotomy in the fertility rate between the Arab countries themselves? Whereas the short-term factors have already been examined in Chapter 3, the long-term factors will be examined below: (a) Low awareness of the important role played by fertility decline in accelerating economic development. This low awareness not only led to delays in the implementation of family planning programs, but also to their marginality in the overall development strategy, even in those countries that eventually implemented an anti-natalist policy. The lack of awareness was not only among politicians but of among academicians as well. Thus, for example, in the 2003 Arab Human Development Report, the authors explained the socioeconomic gap between the Arab countries and the “Asian Tigers” through the gap in the per capita human capital investment, but they did not even mention the main factor for this gap — the different age structure, which is a direct consequence of the different fertility rates.213 The overall result is that the most prestigious academic and research bodies concentrated their recommendations for accelerating socioeconomic development in the non-oil Arab countries on the consequences of the rapid population growth rather than dealing with the core of the problem itself — the high fertility rates. (b) The Arab states, both the poorer and oil-based alike, were characterized by their “soft state” nature.214 This was reflected not only in the high subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products in line with free public services, but also in the weak enforcement of basic laws that related to fertility patterns, mainly the minimum age at first marriage and restrictions on child employment. Thus, for example in Egypt, in recent years, it is estimated that about 7% of girls are married before their eighteenth birthday, namely below the minimum legal age.215 Egypt’s Minister of Population, Hala Youssef, announced in late July 2015 that about 15% of all marriages in Egypt

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are child marriage.216 Consequently, it is not surprising that according to the data revealed from the 2014–EDHS, the age specific fertility rate (per 1,000 women) for the age group of 15–19 was 79 in the rural areas of Upper Egypt and 71 in the rural areas of Lower Egypt.217 In Sweden, for comparison, this rate was 5.5 during the 2010–2015 period.218 The same phenomenon of large-scale child marriage can be found in Jordan as well.219 This “soft state” nature was based on a populist socioeconomic policy which existed in all of the non-oil Arab countries (with the exception of Lebanon, Yemen and Sudan) whereby the population was not forced to sacrifice by paying higher taxes or by shouldering any other personal economic burden in order to support the rapid population growth in addition to weak enforcement of social laws, including the minimum age for marriage and the prohibition on polygamy — both of them of course encourage high fertility. Regarding Egypt, Khalid Muhi al-Din wrote that ‘Abd al-Nasser thought that he could raise sufficient financial resources for implementing massive development plans, for improving and expanding public services and for increasing consumption by massive subsidies through the nationalization of the Suez Canal company and the nationalization of foreign assets.220 (c) The “Dutch Disease” Syndrome221 led many of the leaders of the non-oil Arab countries until the late 1990s to believe that they could succeed in achieving economic expansion and substantial improvement in the living standard despite the rapid population growth. Lavy and Sheffer righty claimed in 1991 that the massive foreign aid and the workers’ remittances received by Jordan and Egypt had an overall negative effect on their economies insofar as they did not see the need to implement macroeconomic reforms in line with the changing world economic order.222 The failure to adopt a comprehensive anti-natalist program was part and parcel of this overall socioeconomic shortsightedness, as indicated by Richards: The worst legacy of the oil boom is not that the benefits were not widely shared but that they were widely shared: Labor exporters as well as oil producers caught the Dutch Disease, leaving the Arab world poorly equipped to face the challenge of an increasingly competitive international economy.223

In addition, since the 1970s, in all the developed countries worldwide, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of childless women, which largely contributed to the sharp decline of their average TFR. Moreover, in many developing economies, this phenomenon of childless women has largely expanded in recent years (see chapter 1). As opposed to this, the percentage of childless women, even today, remained insignificant in the Arab countries, in the non-oil and the oil-based alike.224 The childless women phenomenon is so crucial for fertility decline that in the case of Egypt for example, if only 10% of the Egyptian women remain childless, Egypt’s TFR would decline to 2.3.225

5. “Direct” or “Indirect”? The Contribution of Family Planning to Fertility Decline Chesnais argued in the late 1990s that: “Fertility is elastic; it can be reduced by family planning programs when it is considered too high; it can also be stimulated by social policies when it is considered too low.”226 Is it true?

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5.1 The Efficacy of the Family Planning Programs: The Theoretical Framework The key question is whether the fertility decline which occurred in almost all of the developing countries worldwide during the past four decades was an outcome of the family planning programs carried out in these countries, or whether it was the outcome of prolonged socioeconomic development, similar to the fertility decline pattern which occurred in the developed countries. The indirect approach views fertility patterns primarily as determined by the desire for children, which is basically a function of their cost/benefit balance, the socio-cultural perceptions of the parents and women’s status, first and foremost in the employment arena. Consequently, the access to contraceptives and their cost are not of much importance in determining fertility behavior.227 Therefore, for the most part, the technical supply of contraceptives has only a limited impact on fertility patterns. The direct approach on the other hand, holds the view that a well-designed family planning program can effectively reduce fertility levels, particularly through preventing unwanted childbearing.228 Based on the demographic surveys carried out in 93 developing countries in the early 1970s, Lapham and Mauldin noted that: “organized family planning programs affect demand, primarily by reducing the costs and increasing the availability of fertility regulation.”229 Also Todaro claimed that “family planning programs are needed to provide them [the parents] with the technological means to avoid unwanted pregnancies.”230 Ali claimed that “family planning programs do not just reduce the number of children and regulate reproduction. Rather, they also introduce or foster notions of individual choice and responsibility.”231 The 1994 World Bank demographic study presents the “integrative approach”: The answer is not ‘either/or’ but rather ‘both’ and, even better, a balance of both that is responsive of the specific needs and conditions of different countries at different levels of the demographic transition and socioeconomic development.232

Overall, the aim of a family planning program is to overcome the “natural” barriers for rapid fertility decline.233 It is obvious, however, that if per capita income is high, infant and child mortality rates are low, women’s educational level and their labor force participation rates are high and social security for the elderly population is sufficient, fertility rates will be low, even in cases where there is a pro-natalist policy (as is the case in the developed EU countries during the past four decades). Moreover, even if women’s labor force participation rate is still low, but women’s educational level is high and infant and child mortality rates are low, fertility rates would sharply decline even under conditions of extreme pro-natalist policies (as is the case in Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE during the past decade).

5.2 The Efficacy of the Family Planning Programs: “The Middle Eastern Lesson” In the following section, the contribution of family planning programs in fertility decline will be examined in relation to the Middle Eastern experience.

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The Middle Eastern “Direct” Approach Analyzing Mubarak’s family planning policy and based on Egypt’s fertility decline since 1985, in 1993, Gilbar reached the conclusion that Mubarak’s family planning policy was a major factor in Egypt’s overall fertility decline during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.234 Saad Eddin Ibrahim also regarded Mubarak’s family planning policy as a successful one. In 1995, he claimed that: “Despite the zigzagging and ambiguity, Egypt’s population policy seems to be taking shape and proceeding on a well-defined track . . . While still short of the performance . . . , the results of the last five years are quite impressive.”235 In 1998, Wisensale and Khodair argued that Egypt’s successful experience in family planning “represents one model from which other nations can learn.”236 In the case of Jordan, the 2004–JHDR noted that the declining fertility of the recent decade, “can be largely attributed to the impact of considerable investment in family planning and reproductive health . . . ”237 The Middle Eastern “Indirect” Approach The basic argument of those who support the indirect approach regarding Middle Eastern fertility decline is that this decline was mainly the result of both changing socioeconomic policy and women’s educational improvement. Regarding Egypt’s fertility reduction during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, Fargues claimed in 1997 that: No causal relationship has ever been established between the direct action of the Egyptian state to reduce the birth rate and its actual reduction . . . The lowering of the Egyptian birth rate is not a result of the systematic extension of family planning services . . . but rather a response to the country’s changing economic, social, and political circumstances.238

In another article, published in 1994, Fargues claimed that: “The next stage of the demographic transition [in the Arab countries], and particularly the fall in the birth rate, was instead a result of widening access to education . . . It seems that state intervention has fueled a trend which had already begun rather than initiating it.”239 A similar argument was raised by Courbage who claimed in 1999 that in the Arab countries “fertility transition is linked to the decline of the rent economy.”240 Also in the Syrian case, Courbage attributed the fertility decline of the late 1980s and early 1990s not to the changing natalist policy, but rather to the economic recession. This recession, according to Courbage, forced an increasing number of women to look for employment, as one salary became insufficient to support the family. Thus, without direct governmental intervention, Syria’s fertility rates naturally declined in line with the increase in women’s labor force participation rates.241

5.3

The “Middle Eastern Lesson” under a Reality Check

An examination of the “Middle Eastern lesson” reveals that there is no correlation between both the economic situation and women’s educational level on the one hand, and fertility rates on the other. Thus, for example, although the female educational level in Jordan during the 1980s was much better than in both Egypt and Tunisia,242 Jordan’s fertility rate was much higher than in these two countries. Also among the Palestinians fertility rates remained extremely high despite the sharp improvement of women’s education at all levels. In the case of the correlation between fertility rates and economic performances, one also cannot find a negative correlation: In the case

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of Syria, for example, fertility rates substantially declined during both periods of the deep recession of the second half of the 1980s as well as during the rapid expansion period of the first half of the 1990s and again in the early 2000s. A similar inconsistency exists in many other Arab countries during the past three decades. On the other hand, one can find a high correlation between fertility decline and the intensity of the family planning programs. This high correlation can be found not only among Arab countries, but among non-Arab Islamic societies as well. A close examination of the Iranian fertility trends during the past four decades reveals a high correlation between the natalist policy and fertility trends in the form of decreasing fertility rates during “anti-natalist periods” and increasing fertility rates during the “pro-natalist period.”243 In 1966, prior to the implementation of the first family planning program, Iran’s TFR was 7.7,244 declining to 6.5 in 1976 and increasing again to 7.0 in 1980. In 1986, prior to the implementation of the national family planning program, Iran’s TFR was measured at 6.3. Ten years later, in 1996, Iran’s TFR declined to 2.8 and approached replacement-level at 2.2 in 2000.245 In recent years, Iran’s TFR declined to below-replacement level, averaged 1.8 during the first half of the 2010s (see Table 1.9). The socioeconomic changes in Iran during the past two decades were not so dramatic that they can, by themselves, provide a sufficient explanation for this fertility decline. The only logical explanation for the Iranian unprecedented fertility decline since the early 1990s is the extensive family planning program. The experience of Bangladesh also reveals a high correlation between a national family planning program and fertility decline. Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries worldwide,246 adopted a national family planning program in 1976.247 By 1980, Bangladesh’s TFR was 6.0,248 declining to 4.6 in 1990,249 3.3 in 1999/2000,250 and reached as low as 2.2 by the first half of 2010s.251 Also in the case of Bangladesh, the socioeconomic indicators do not support such a rapid fertility decline. It was claimed by the CPD and UNFPA that Bangladesh’s fertility decline “took place almost in the absence of concurrent improvement in income level and standards of living.”252 Thus, the only logical explanation for the sharp fertility decline in Bangladesh during the past two and a half decades is the extensive anti-natalist measures taken by the government. Overall, it seems that two main questions arise from the fertility trends in the Arab countries during the past two decades: The first is why didn’t the fertility rate in Egypt and Jordan decline further and stabilize at 3.3–3.4 despite the explicit and extensive anti-natalist policy. In both these cases, the continuation of high fertility rates is not a result of low awareness of modern contraceptive methods. However, while awareness is universal, the prevalence use rates are much lower, amounting in 2014 to 59% in Egypt and 61% in 2012 in Jordan.253 Why do so many Egyptian and Jordanian women choose not to use contraceptives? It seems that the heart of the answer is the connection between fertility patterns and socioeconomic situation. In the case of Egypt, although the population of the rural regions in Upper Egypt constitutes a quarter of Egypt’s total population, almost half of Egypt’s births in recent years are in this area.254 The high fertility rate in this area is of course connected to the widely common phenomenon of marriage of girls below the legal age. Thus, by 2011–2014, while the TFR in Egypt’s major cities averaged 2.5, in the rural areas of Upper Egypt it was as high as 4.1!255 The same phenomenon of high fertility gaps between the various regions can be found in Jordan as well. While the TFR in Amman was measured by the JPFHS–2012 at 3.2, it was as high as 4.1 in Ma‘an and Mafraq and 4.3 in Jarash.256 Also in Morocco

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one can find the same phenomenon of much higher fertility rate in the poorer rural areas than in the major cities. According to ENPSF–2011 results, while the TFR in the urban centers was 2.15, it was as high as 3.2 in the rural areas.257 Hence, as long as these countries continue to have “poverty islands” with one major socioeconomic characteristics being wide-scale early marriage and consequently high fertility, the TFR at the national level will remain much above the replacement-level. In the cases of the non-oil Arab countries, one can say that the much above replacementlevel fertility rate of the recent decade is a purely indicator for their “soft nature.” The fertility increase in these countries in recent years may be attributed to the fact that these countries had become even “softer” than before the onset of the Arab Spring events. The reason why among all of the non-oil Arab countries Tunisia and Lebanon alone achieved the targeted TFR at around the replacement-level is that the percentage of the population in these countries which live in extreme poverty is substantially lower than in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Syria previous to the onset of the civil war. In the case of Tunisia, the economic performances since the 1970s and until the early 2000s enabled the country to reduce the poverty scale from 19.7% in 1990 to 10% in 2010. At the same time, Tunisia has been successful in raising the population’s living standards, which helped develop a considerable middle class which amounted to as high as 80% of the total population.258 The “poverty scale factor” should be added of course to the fact that the status of women in both Tunisia and Lebanon, particularly in the employment arena, is much better than in all of the other non-oil Arab countries. Hence, in the case of the non-oil Arab countries, it appears that the targeted TFR at around the replacement-level could be achieved only through reducing the scale of extreme poverty in line with increasing women’s labor force participation rates. The second question relates to the GCC countries. By the early 2010s, as one can see in Table 3.8, the TFR in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was lower than in Egypt and Jordan and a little bit higher than in Morocco. Hence, the fertility decline of the GCC countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia which traditionally implemented extreme pro-natalist policy, impose a heavy shadow on the necessity of a direct anti-natalist measures for fertility decline. The answer to this paradox lies in three factors: the first and the most important is the absence of “poverty islands.” A major outcome of the rentier policy of these countries was that in contrast to Iran under the Shah, the ruling families of these monarchies succeeded in creating a “middle class society” in which almost the entire citizens belong to the middle class. Second, the women’s educational revolution that occurred in these countries led to a substantial delay in first marriage and even more importantly to an increase in the intervals between pregnancies. The third factor is of course the increase, albeit quite modest, in women’s labor force participation rates, even in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 5). Hence, “the Middle Eastern lesson” is that extensive governmental anti-natalist policy indeed brought about a substantial fertility decline from 6 and even 7 in some cases to about 3–3.5 in the non-oil poorer countries. However, the targeted TFR close to the replacement-level could be achieved only through the combination of poverty eradication and promoting women’s status, primarily in the employment arena. These, indeed, are the main targets of the new Egyptian family planning policy. In the case of the GCC countries, as long as the basic perception remains pro-natalist within the overall framework of the rentier order, the TFR will remain around 3. Indeed, in

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Bahrain — the least rentier among the GCC countries and with the highest women’s labor force participation rate — the TFR in recent years has declined to below 3 and probably will decline further in the foreseeable future.

6

Summary and Conclusions

During the second half of the twentieth century, the fertility trends of the Arab countries were widely different from those of most other developing countries worldwide. While in the early 1980s the fertility rates of Arab countries, the oil-based and the nonoil alike, skyrocketed, many non-Arab developing countries were deep in the third stage of the Demographic Transition and many of them achieved the targeted replacement-level in the 1990s. Overall, it appears that two major barriers prevented the implementation of extensive family planning programs in the non-oil Arab countries until the mid-1980s. The primary barrier was the “oil effect” which blinded the leaders with the faith that substantial socioeconomic development could be achieved without radical socioeconomic reforms. Hence, from a socioeconomic viewpoint, “the oil decade” was “a lost decade” as the economic expansion was based on rental sources rather than on internal production expansion. Thus, with the end of the “oil decade” in the mid-1980s, all of the non-oil Arab countries, with the exception of Tunisia, found themselves in a situation of extremely high population growth rates on the one hand, and deep economic recession on the other. The second barrier was the Islamic perception. As was previously examined, many attributed the high fertility rates in the Arab countries to the “Islamic factor,” namely, that the Islamic culture, by definition, encourages high fertility. From the “Middle Eastern lesson,” it appears that this common perception is a mistaken one. This is because during recent years, three Islamic Middle Eastern countries — Tunisia, Lebanon and Iran — achieved replacement fertility rate, while Turkey is approaching this target. Thus, it was not the “Islamic factor” that delayed fertility decline, but rather paralysis that affected the leaders of the non-oil Arab countries with regard to their willingness to confront the Islamic fundamentalist oppositions on the issue of family planning. This wavering anti-natalist policy ended in the mid-1980s as a result of the collapse of both the “oil alternative” and the “pan-Arab ideology.” The inescapable solution was radical socioeconomic changes, including in the area of natalist policy. Thus, since the mid-1980s, the family planning activities of the non-oil Arab countries were greatly intensified, and no less important, public. Moreover, they no longer “hid” behind “healthcare treatment” for the mother and child as they previously had. However, for some of these countries, particularly for Egypt, this “awakening” was too late, as they were forced to deal not only with a much larger population in nominal term, but also with a much younger population, dictating the Demographic Momentum consequences. In hindsight, if the non-oil Arab countries had initiated comprehensive anti-natalist measures along with macroeconomic reforms in the early 1970s instead of waiting until the late 1980s and early 1990s, they could possibly have reached a stable population by the early twenty-first century. Egypt’s population would then have stabilized at 75 million rather than the current 92 million and maybe could even have avoided the Arab Spring which was, as will be examined in the Summary and Conclusions chapter, the political expression of the colossal failure in the socioeconomic arena.

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Summary and Conclusions: The Road to the “Arab Demographic Winter”

Phase I: The 1950s and the 1960s: Population Growth as an Outcome of Socioeconomic Improvement The demographic and socioeconomic history of the Arab countries during the twentieth century reveals that despite the unprecedented rapid population growth, the Malthusian Population Trap theory has proven to be a mistake. Hence, as noted by Gilbar in respect to the Arab countries: “specifically during the [twentieth] century despite the fact that the natural increase rates increased the most, mass death from insufficient food stopped.”1 Overall, it appears that in the parts of the world where starvation and epidemics did occur during the second half of the twentieth century, mainly in the sub-Saharan African countries, they were caused by political-security instability that prevented socioeconomic development rather than by a limited amount of water or arable land, as the Malthusian Population Trap theory would explain it. In this respect, the case of the Arab countries was no different. Since the early 1950s and until the mid-1970s life expectancy at birth increased by as much as 25 years while the child mortality rate declined from almost one-third of live births to less than 10%.

Phase II: The 1980s: The Worst Legacy of the “Oil Boom” During the “oil decade,” while the vast majority of the developing countries worldwide were going through a recession as a result of the huge oil price increase which forced them to implement macroeconomic reforms, in the Arab region, not only were the Arab oil-based countries caught in the “rental trap,” but the non-oil Arab countries were as well. Richards explains the main difference between the Asian Tigers and the Arab countries as follows: “Unlike the East Asian case, incomes in the Middle East grew for reasons which were fundamentally exogenous to the difficult process of structural transformation.”2 In other words, the rapid economic expansion in the non-oil Arab countries during the “oil decade” was “a fabricated development.” This is because the “rental option,” either through massive labor-exporting or huge financial

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aid, in effect, constituted an alternative to macroeconomic reforms and the implementation of comprehensive anti-natalist policies. Global modern history reveals that only in a few cases have regimes conducted harsh socioeconomic reforms when they had other options. As a result, harsh socioeconomic reforms, which would lead to deteriorating living standard in the short-run and would thus certainly raise large-scale resistance, would be carried out only after the regime realized that there were no other options. In the case of the non-oil Arab countries, in contrast to other developing countries worldwide, neither the recession periods nor the socioeconomic problems were harsh enough to force the regimes to carry out these reforms. Therefore, although the performances of the non-oil Arab economies were poor by any international comparison, they were good enough to enable the regimes to continue to keep the “social contract” alive. Laipson argued that the rapid population growth of the Arab countries “has taken place in circumstances of political distress and poor governance.”3 It seems that it was actually the opposite. The rapid population growth in the nonoil Arab countries (with the exception of Yemen and Sudan which were failed states by the 1960s) was because of the strength of the central regimes due to their massive rental incomes.4 However, although the regimes of the non-oil Arab countries could guarantee their survival through the large-scale rental incomes, they were constantly forced to confront the Islamic fundamentalist opposition. The end result of massive rental incomes on the one hand, and the severe resistance of the Islamic opposition to the implementation of any kind of anti-natalist measures or macroeconomic reforms on the other, was stagnant socioeconomic policies throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s. Only in the second half of the 1980s and more so during the 1990s when most of the “rental income options” markedly declined, did it become clear that both, the natalist approach and the macroeconomic policy, must radically change in order to avoid economic catastrophe. Then, and only then, were some macroeconomic reforms and anti-natalist measures adopted almost simultaneously in all of the non-oil Arab countries in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank. Yet, large-scale demonstrations against the reforms were staged in many Arab countries, including the “food riots” in Egypt in January 1977, protests in Morocco during the early 1980s, demonstrations in Jordan in April 1989 and again in August 1996, and in Yemen in 1998 and again in 2005. These reforms, albeit put into effect mostly in the 1990s, long after most of the other developing economies worldwide, succeeded in reviving the Arab non-oil economies. As one can see in Table 4.1, since the early 1990s and until the mid-2000s, the GDP growth rates in each of the non-oil Arab countries was much higher than the population growth rate, thus enabling the authorities to maintain their part in the “social contract.” However, the accelerating GDP growth rates of the 1990s and 2000s, although much higher than the population growth rates, had failed to bring about a relief in the employment pressure, as the supply of the workforce was much larger than the demand. Thus, since the early 1990s, the most acute shortcoming of the “rental trap” was exposed: The overreliance on exogenous sources for employment. Therefore, it seems that the worst legacy of the “oil booms” of 1973/74 and again in 1980/81 was not only the “economic Dutch Disease” as claimed by Richards,5 but even more so a

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“demographic Dutch Disease” that created an ongoing increase in the incongruity between the demand and supply of the workforce in each of the non-oil Arab economies.6 Thus, with the collapse of both exogenous factors in the late 1980s, namely the option for employment abroad and the substantial financial aid, the improving dependency ratio as a result of decreasing fertility rates was “wasted” due to the inability of the private sectors to absorb the bulging workforces. Hence, one could say that in the case of the non-oil Arab countries “the demographic gift” of the 2000s instead of leading to economic boost as it was the case in the Asian Tigers,7 has become “a sociopolitical burden.” Moreover, the non-Arab developing countries that adopted macroeconomic and demographic reforms during the 1960s and the 1970s did so in a period when the international economic environment was much more in favor of increasing involvement of developing economies in the global economy than the situation was two decades later, in the 1980s and 1990s. This is because the technological gap between the developed and the developing economies toward the end of the twentieth century had already become too great. In retrospect, it appears that the main difference between the non-oil Arab countries and many of the developing countries worldwide is what Rivlin noted regarding the difference between South Korea and Egypt during the 1960s: “The leadership in South Korea gave priority to economic growth, while that in Egypt did not.”8 The basis of this difference was that a considerable proportion of many of the resources of the non-oil Arab regimes were directed toward a “hate and hostility ideology,” either toward “the Zionist entity” or toward “Western civilization.” In the name of this “hate and hostility ideology,” many leaders of the non-oil Arab countries, the most prominent of whom were ‘Abd al-Nasser and Hafiz al-Asad, realized that “their main task,” following, of course, continued control over their countries, was to “win this battle” even at the expense of socioeconomic achievements.

Phase III: The 2000s: The Rupture of the “Social Contract” Since the mid-2000s, the non-oil Arab economies, despite accelerating economic growth rates (see Table 4.1), could no longer bear the cost of the “social contract” in four major areas: (a) The steady deterioration of employment options, particularly for the young educated. Thus, for example, although the Jordanian economy expanded by 6.5% on annual average during the 2000–2009 period, namely, almost three times the population growth rate, the unemployment rate did not even slightly decline (see Chapter 4). As noted by the ILO report of 2012 on the Jordanian labor market: “ . . . evidence suggests that growth has not translated into a diversified economic structure and a reduction of unemployment and poverty rates.”9 In the case of Tunisia, although during the 1990s and 2000s the economic growth rate averaged 5% annually, namely almost three-time the population growth rates, unemployment not only failed to decline but even continued to climb. In 2008, on the eve of the global economic crisis, Tunisia’s unemployment rate amounted to 12.4% and it was as high as 28.4% among the 15–24 age group.10 Also the BTI 2012 Report on Egypt related to this employment paradox.11

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(b) The steadily rising cost of living. A major pillar of the “social contract” was free public services and high subsidies on basic foodstuff and energy products (see Chapter 4). Since 2004 and until mid-2014, however, except for only a few months in late 2008 and early 2009, oil prices were extremely high, and peaked at $140 in July 2008. Due to the high correlation between oil prices and food and energy prices, the prices in the international markets of not only fuel, electricity and cooking gas, but those of the basic foodstuffs as well, markedly increased. The combination of rapidly increasing prices and rapidly increasing demand due to the high population growth rates, led to a sharp increase of the governmental expenditures on the subsidies on basic foodstuffs and energy products. In the case of Egypt, for example, in the FY2009/10, governmental expenditure on subsidies on energy products alone amounted to $12.3 billion compared to $6.9 billion in the FY2005/6.12 Tunisia’s governmental expenditures on subsidies tripled between 2000 and 2010.13 However, even this increase in governmental subsidy expenditures was not enough to maintain the prices of basic commodities. In the case of Egypt, for example, during the 2008–2010 period, local food prices increased by as much as 37%!14 In practice, as noted by Kandil, “the standard of living for almost all Egyptians was getting progressively worse.”15 The inescapable result of the increasing cost of oil-related commodities was high inflation. In the case of Egypt, by 2006, inflation amounted to 7.6% and rose to 9.3% in 2007, 18.3% in 2008, and fell to 11.8% in 2009 due to decreasing oil prices in the first few months of that year.16 In the case of Jordan, in 2007 inflation started to rise, and in 2008 it reached a double-digit level due to the government’s inability to fully compensate for the steady international price rise of oil and foodstuffs.17 (c) Increasing economic gaps. A primary pillar of the socialist-étatist policy which ruled the non-oil Arab economies since the 1950s was narrowing the huge socioeconomic gaps. Closing socioeconomic gap during the socialist-étatist period was first and foremost between the urban dwellers and those of the countryside and remote areas mainly though agrarian reforms and the establishment of various public services in these areas. However, the gradual adoption of a market economy since the mid-1980s, naturally led to the steady increase of socioeconomic gaps.18 Since economic development concentrated in the urban centers, mainly due to the development of the tourism sector and trade, the economic gaps between city dwellers and those of the countryside naturally intensified.19 In the case of Tunisia for example, the average poverty rates was three-times as high in the interior areas as in richer coastal areas. Consequently, the unemployment rate in the interior areas was double those of coastal areas.20 Hence, it is not surprising that in Tunisia the outbreak of the Arab Spring took place in the periphery. (d) “No more shame.” A major reason for the increasing socioeconomic gap in the non-oil Arab countries was the crony capitalism which characterized the privatization process.21 In many respects, these countries returned to the situation which characterized them in the pre-revolutionary periods in which the political elite was identical to the economic elite. This was the case with Mubarak’s son, Gemal; the ‘Alawite elite in Syria and the Trabelsi family in Tunisia.22 These families and their allies exploited their political power and appropriated public assets under the cover of “privatization.” Thus, the privatization process did not bring about private investors, new jobs, new technologies, or increasing cooperation between local and international companies, but was, in practice, the transfer of public assets into the hands of the rulers and their allies.

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Phase IV: The Inevitable Result: The Uprising of the Young Middle Class This process of transforming these countries into a “monarchies in practice,” jumlukiyya, in the words of Sa‘ad al-Din Ibrahim, a product of the two words jumhuriyya [republic] and malakiyya [monarchy], naturally led to a widespread grievance among the public, particularly among the young educated. The regimes themselves, due to their exaggerated self-confidence, did not even try to hide these corruptions. The combined result of these two factors, namely the rupture of the “social contract,” and the widespread corruption in line with steadily increasing political oppression, was the creation of the “underlying dynamics that were driving popular discontent,” as noted by the 2011 UNDP report.23 Hence, as pointed out by ESCWA, “Hope for change swept across the Arab region in 2011. It was driven by a middle class newly awake to the sense that longstanding trade-offs were no longer delivering on the promise of a better life.”24 However, although the roots of the Arab Spring were mainly on socioeconomic grounds, it brought about an economic catastrophe not only to the countries in which the “old regimes” were replaced, but to all of the other non-oil Arab countries with the sole exception of Morocco. Hence, as one can see in Table 4.1, Egypt’s GDP growth rate deteriorated from 5.1% in 2010 to a mere 1.8% in 2011 and to little more than 2% in the following two years. Thus, in per capita terms, Egypt’s GDP growth rate since the fall of Mubarak and until the present was negative. The same process occurred in Tunisia. Although following 2011, which was its worst year from an economic viewpoint since its independence with a negative GDP growth rate of -1.8%, the Tunisian economy succeeded in returning to a positive growth, this growth, however, was 2% annually, namely stagnation in per capita terms. In Jordan as well, despite the survival of the Hashemite regime thus far, the economy has largely deteriorated since 2011 with a GDP growth rate of less than 3%. Hence, while the uprising by young army officers of the 1950s and 1960s brought about a substantial improvement of living standards, mainly of the lower strata, the Arab Spring, in contrast, not only led to an overall economic deterioration, but did not involve any new socioeconomic changes. Although each government, either the new ones which took power following the collapse of the old regimes, or the regimes which succeeded in surviving, reacted separately to the Arab Spring events in line with the specific events in its own country, one can identify a common pattern, namely the separation of their reactions into two basic periods: (a) Expansionary fiscal policy. This policy characterized the non-oil Arab regimes in the two years following the Arab Spring events, namely until late 2012. Overall, this policy included three main pillars: (1) Keeping the prices of basic foodstuffs and energy products constant despite their huge price increases in the international market. The price stability was achieved through steady subsidy increases. In the case of Egypt for example, in the FY2011/12, the petroleum subsidy alone amounted to $15.7 billion, equivalent to 6% of Egypt’s total GDP.25 In the FY2012/2013, under Mursi’s regime, Egypt’s subsidies bill totaled $23.9 billion, among which 70% were on energy products.26 In Jordan, the energy subsidy bill in 2011 reached 6.3% of GDP ($1.3 billion) compared to only 1.3% in 2010.

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In 2012, the cost of the subsidies for electricity and petroleum in Jordan amounted to $1.7 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively.27 In Morocco the subsidy bill in 2012 amounted to 6.5% of GDP — equivalent to the total governmental deficit at that year.28 (2) Increasing public sector employee wages in order to “lower the flames” of the public as a result of the steady price increases.29 In Tunisia, in 2011 public sector wages increased by 4.7% while the security forces were provided with additional benefits.30 In the FY2012/13, the elected Egyptian government under the Mursi regime raised the wages of public sector employees by tens of percent.31 In Jordan the minimum wage for all Jordanian employees was raised in February 2012. 32 (3) Recruitment of new employees to the public sector in order to alleviate employment pressure, particularly among the educated young. Overall, in 2011, in both Egypt and Jordan, public sector employees constituted approximately 35% of the total workforce.33 Taking into consideration that about 35% of the Egyptian workforce was still employed in agriculture, this means that most of the Egyptian urban workforce was and still is employed by the public sector in one way or another. Also the new Tunisian regime reacted to the increasing unemployment by recruiting large numbers of employees to the public sector. Overall, during 2010–2014, the number of Tunisian public sector employees increased by as much as 20%. Of that increase, 40% was in security and defense personnel.34 Consequently, in 2013, the Tunisian government wage bill amounted to 12.4% of the total GDP.35 The end result of the economic deterioration on the one hand and expansionary fiscal policy on the other, was a rapid increase of the fiscal deficits. Jordan’s governmental expenditures in 2011 was JD700 million above the original budget (JD6.95 billion), leading to a fiscal deficit of 7% of the GDP.36 Without the foreign grants, Jordan’s fiscal deficit in 2011 would have amounted to 12.7% of the GDP!37 In the following three years, Jordan continued to experience huge governmental deficits which were covered by substantial financial aid mainly from the GCC countries.38 In 2015, Jordan’s fiscal deficit would amount to $3.6 billion — equivalent to 10% of the Kingdom’s total GDP.39 In the case of Egypt as well, the expansionary fiscal policy led to a huge increase in the fiscal deficit which amounted to 11% of the GDP in the FY2011/12.40 In the next fiscal year, 2012/13, Egypt’s governmental deficit increased to 13.7% and slightly declined to 12.8% in the FY2013/2014 due to a one-time financial aid in the amount of $10.6 billion that was received from the GCC countries.41 An IMF report described Egypt’s economic situation in June 2013, on the eve of Mursi’s collapse, as follow: “Egypt’s economy was in a precarious position with low growth, high unemployment, wide fiscal and external imbalances, and low reserves buffers.”42 The inability of Mursi to improve the economic situation was the principal trigger to its collapse. In the case of Tunisia, the fiscal deficit widened from 1.1% of the GDP in 2010 to 3.5% in 2011, 7.0% in 2012 and reached 8.2% in 2014, mainly due to lower non-tax revenues on the one hand and higher expenditures on wages and subsidies on the other.43 The worst situation existed in Lebanon in which its public debt in 2013 was equivalent to 141% of its total GDP. 44 The Arab Spring, it should be noted, led to the implementation of expansionary fiscal policies by the GCC governments as well, particularly following the protests in Bahrain and Oman. While the protests in Bahrain had been going on since the 1990s and at the heart was the struggle between the Shi‘is which represent the majority of the

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citizens, and the Al Khalifa Sunni ruling family (see Chapter 2), in the case of Oman, the protests were solely on socioeconomic grounds, primarily the high unemployment among the young and the rising prices of basic commodities.45 In the Saudi case, on March 18, 2011, King ‘Abdulla announced the implementation of new economic reforms which included: immediate payment of two months’ salary to all national employees by the government as compensation for the rise in living costs; a monthly payment of SR(Saudi Riyal) 2,000 as an unemployment allowance; setting a minimum wage of SR3,000 for all national governmental employees; and adding 60,000 positions in the Interior Ministry (see Chapter 5). Moreover, in order to alleviate the housing shortage, the Saudi government allocated an imaginary amount of $76 billion for the 2011–2016 period in order to build 500,000 housing units.46 In September 2011, the Qatari government announced a 60% raise in the salaries and pensions of the nationals employed by the public sector and a 120% raise in the wages of the security forces personnel.47 The UAE 2013 federal budget allocated $6.2 billion to social spending. In addition, the minimum monthly wage for UAE nationals employed by the public sector rose to $2,723.48 Even Bahrain — the least rentier among the GCC countries — adopted an expansionary fiscal policy from 2011, which included, inter alia, a raise of public sector salaries and investment in social services.49 The Omani authorities also reacted to the Arab Spring with an increase in governmental expenditures, mainly by raising the minimum wage.50 These additional massive social spending, “relieved the pressure to enact political reform,” as noted by the BTI report on Saudi Arabia.51 During the 2011–2014 period, the GCC expansionary fiscal policies were financed by the high oil revenues due both to high prices and large-scale production. By 2012, GCC oil export revenues was higher than ever before, amounting to $604.4 billion compared to $559.5 billion in 2011 and only $282.7 billion in 2005 (see Table 5.1). A major factor for the much higher oil prices in 2011 and 2012 was the Arab Spring itself. Thus, paradoxically, the worse the economic and consequently the political situation in the non-oil Arab countries, the better the economic situation in the GGG countries. The sharp decline in oil prices since mid-2014,52 however, did not lead the GCC governments to withdraw from their former expansionary fiscal policies.53 The huge deficits which were created by much lower oil revenues were and still are financed by the huge financial reserves that were accumulated during the second “oil decade” of 2004–2014.54 (b) The “recuperation stage.” During 2012, it became clear to the non-oil Arab governments that without substantial reforms their economies would soon collapse. Moreover, the IMF made loans conditional on implementation of basic reforms, primarily in the area of subsidies cuts. Consequently, the non-oil Arab countries began to try to implement some reforms in order to stabilize their deteriorating economies. The first to implement subsidy cuts were the two non-oil monarchies with the highest political stability, namely Jordan and Morocco. In November 2012, the Jordanian government abolished fuel and diesel subsidies.55 In January 2014, the Moroccan government also abolished the subsidies on fuel and diesel.56 In Egypt subsidy cuts started during Mursi’s term in December 2012.57 One of the items in Egypt’s current Five-Year Plan (see below) is to abolish all of the subsidies by the end of the FY2018/19.58 In addition to the subsidy cuts, all of the Arab countries, with the exception of course of those countries which had become “failed states” (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya

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and Sudan), adopted long-term economic plans. In mid-2014, a new Five-Year Development Plan, 2014/15–2018/19, was adopted by al-Sisi’s new regime. The aim of the plan is to boost the GDP growth rate from 2.2% in the FY2014/15 to 6% in the FY2018/19; to decrease the unemployment rate to a single digit; and to reduce the fiscal deficit to 8%–9% of the GDP.59 A prominent pillar of the new Egyptian plan is reviving the tourism industry. The targets of the development plans of the other non-oil Arab countries are quite similar to those of the Egyptian plan. Among the GCC countries, one can find a similar trend of adopting long-term economic strategies. Since the 1960s, when oil became their major financial resource, the development strategy of these countries rested on three pillars: economic diversification (in order to reduce the dependence on oil revenues); implementing a pro-natalist policy (in order to reduce the dependence on foreign labor); and improving educational and vocational training systems (in order to enable the local workforces to replace the foreign labor at the top managerial positions and highly skilled occupations). Although there is no doubt that in each of the GCC countries there was a tremendous development in the area of public services and infrastructure facilities, these developments have not yet transformed these economies from a rental-based into production-based ones. As Ayubi noted in this respect, “economic expansion is not an economic development.”60 In mid-2014, the adoption of a new economic strategy in these countries became even more crucial. This urgent need was due not only to the huge oil price decrease, but rather due to the realization that oil prices would not increase to above $50–$60 per barrel, at least not in the foreseeable future.61 The most crucial problem in this respect was that despite the various labor force nationalization plans which started more than three decades ago, even today only a tiny percentage of the nationals are employed by the productive private sector. An IMF report on the Saudi economy from October 2015 clearly demonstrated this “employment paradox”: Since 2000, the [Saudi] non-oil economy grew on average by over 7% a year and created more than 3.6 million jobs in the private sector, but only one fifth of these went to nationals . . . Job creation for nationals has been concentrated in the government and community service sectors, which contributed more than 70% of total jobs created for nationals, but only 15% to GDP growth.62

Consequently, public sector employment has continued to increase. As a result, the Saudi governmental wage bill reached approximately 12% of GDP in 2014.63 Hence, although during the past decade the percentage of the working age population within the total national population of all of the GCC countries has substantially increased, due to the huge unemployment — both open and disguised — the actual meaning of the rapid increase of the working age population is only increasing pressure on public sector employment. Therefore, while in the developed economies foreign workers constitute a supplement to the national workforces, in the GCC economies, the indigenous workforces are a supplement to the foreign workers. In Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, nationals represent only a small percent of the total workforce — no doubt a unique situation without anything similar worldwide. At top managerial positions as well, the GCC countries have failed to replace the majority of foreign workers by nationals. The new economic plans of the GCC countries aim to deal with these two acute problems. The most famous among these plans is the “Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030.”

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The plan, announced in late April 2016 by Muhammad bin Salman, the King’s son and the Chairman of the Council for Economic and Development, aims first and foremost to remove the total dependence of the Kingdom on oil revenues;64 to shift a large percentage of the national workforce from the public to the private sector; to attract foreign investments; to increase women’s labor female force participation rates; to develop modern industries, including the promotion of the tourism industry beyond the Haj pilgrimage; to establish military industries; to reduce subsidies on energy products; and lastly to impose taxes in order to produce non-rental fiscal revenues.65 The major long-term aims of the development plans of the other GCC countries, namely, Oman 2020, Qatar National Vision 2030, Bahrain Economic Vision 2030, Kuwait Vision 2035 and UAE Vision 2021, are similar to the Saudi plan.66

Phase V: What Next? The main question is whether the aims of the development plans of both the Arab oilbased countries which are experiencing prolonged low oil prices, and those of the non-oil countries which are undergoing political turmoil, are realistic. Looking at the various economic analyses during the two years following the start of the Arab Spring reveals their general optimistic approach regarding the ability of the non-oil Arab countries of regaining socioeconomic improvement. In May 2012, the IMF predicted that the Jordanian growth rates “are projected to recover in the medium term,” between 3% and 4% annually on average for the 2014–2017 period.67 As for Tunisia, in September 2012, the IMF predicted an even faster economic recovery with a real GDP growth rate of 4.1%, 5.3%, 5.5% and 6.0% during the 2014–2017 period.68 The IMF overall approach to the Tunisian economy was that “Tunisia’s medium-term economic growth potential remains favorable.”69 These are only a few of many other analyses, all of which predicted a high potential for economic recovery for the non-oil Arab countries if they implement certain reforms. In reality, however, the chances of these countries have of regaining substantial socioeconomic improvement are quite low. There is no doubt that the worst situation exists in Egypt due to its large population which amounted to more than 92 million in December 2016 and will certainly continue to increase to at least 140 million within three decades, even if Egypt’s current fertility rate of 3.3 soon declines to the replacement level. Since the ascendancy of al-Sisi in July 2013, there is indeed some improvement of the Egyptian economy with the GDP growth rate in the first half of the FY2014/15 (July-December 2014) up to 5.6% compared to 1.2% in the corresponding period of last year.70 However, it is estimated that approximately $200–$300 billion are needed in order to get the Egyptian economy back on track.71 Since Egypt’s budget is already stretched to the limit, this huge amount should be raised from private investors. Is it possible to raise this sum at the current Egypt’s socioeconomic-political situation? Which sectors can attract such an amount? Can the Egyptian tourism industry compete with those of Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Morocco which since the onset of the global recession in 2008 offers Triple-S (sun, sea, sand) tourism products at very cheap prices? In other words, what are the comparative advantages of the Egyptian economy that can attract substantial private investments? Indeed, a report of the IMF on the Egyptian economy from February 2015 is quite skeptical regarding

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Egypt’s overall ability to regain substantial economic growth not only because of Egypt’s internal problems, but also due to the ongoing global economic stagnation and the overall political instability in the entire Middle East region: Egypt remains particularly vulnerable to adverse shocks. There is a high likelihood of slower growth in advanced and emerging economies, and this or an abrupt surge in global financial market volatility could have a large impact on expected external inflows, including official support, FDI, and tourism.72

Since the collapse of Mubarak’s regime and until the present, the Egyptian economy has succeeded in escaping from collapse due to massive financial aid from the GCC countries, particularly from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi aid substantially increased following the ascendancy of al-Sisi. In 2014 alone, Saudi Arabia provided Egypt with $7.8 billion.73 During his visit to Cairo in April 2016, the new Saudi King, Salman, promised to increase financial support to Egypt.74 Kuwait and the UAE also supported Egypt with $4 billion during the 2011–2014 period.75 As for Tunisia, an IMF report from October 2015 analyzed its economic situation as follows: “Weak tourism receipts, buoying imports (especially energy and capital goods imports), and declining oil and phosphate exports widened the current account deficit to 8.8% of GDP in 2014, its highest level since the 1980s.”76 The Lebanese economic recovery is also very doubtful. This is mainly due to the effects of the prolonged Syrian civil war which has led to the total collapse of the Lebanese tourism industry and a massive inflow of Syrian refugees whose numbers by mid-2015 had amounted to 1.5–1.8 million — approximately 40% of the current total Lebanese population.77 Not only has the Lebanese government had to bear the cost of hosting the Syrian refugees, but these refugees have naturally “shaken” the Lebanese labor market as they have created a situation of a huge supply of labor that is willing to work almost under any conditions and any wages.78 As for Jordan, although thus far it has presented reasonable performances with GDP growth rates of slightly above the population growth rates, it should be taken into consideration that like Egypt, the only reason that the Jordanian economy did not collapse yet, is the massive financial aid which the Kingdom received from the GCC countries, the US and the international financial institutions. There is no doubt that Jordan’s most acute problem is the huge number of refugees from both Iraq and Syria which by the end of 2015 amounted to more than a million (not including the Palestinian refugees).79 The presence of massive number of refugees constitutes unbearable costs to the Kingdom, which in mid-2015 was estimated at $3.5 billion annually.80 In light of these circumstances it is not surprising that the Kingdom’s 2016 budget shows a steady, inexorable climb toward a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 100%.81 Hence, in contrast to the common expectations from 2012 and even 2013 that if the non-oil Arab economies implement the necessary macroeconomic reforms they will manage to escape from their current socioeconomic disaster, it seems that in reality these economies are “trapped” in an impossible situation: Implementing the necessary reforms will reduce the standard of living of a substantial percentage of the population, particularly that of the lower and the middle class, namely, those which started the Arab Spring events. On the other hand, not implementing these reforms will certainty lead to collapse in the near future. Moreover, the continuation of the current huge GCC fiscal support to both Egypt and Jordan is questionable in light of the prolonged low oil prices. The only short-term

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practical solution to the employment pressure of the non-oil Arab economies is largescale recruitment of their surplus workforce by the GCC countries. This, however, is not happening and as was examined in Chapter 5, these countries, without exception, continue to prefer non-Arab foreign labor. As for the GCC countries, although their economic situation is of course much better than those of the non-oil Arab countries, they also have to compete with tremendous challenges in light of decreasing oil revenues on the one hand and a rapidly increasing national population on the other. Can the Arab countries deal with these challenges? And if not, what will the political consequences be?

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Notes

Introduction 1 2

3 4

5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12

Charles B. Nam and Susan G. Philliber, Population: A Basic Orientation, second edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984), p. 2. The natural increase rate (NIR) is usually measured to 1,000 people. It could be positive, if the number of births is higher than the number of deaths, or negative, if the number of deaths is higher than the number of births. John Graunt along with William Petty had developed early human statistical and census methods which later provided a framework for modern demographic research. On Graunt’s research, see: D. V. Glass, “John Graunt and His Natural and Political Observations,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 159, No. 974 (1963), pp. 2–37; John C. Caldwell, “Demography: Scope, Perspectives and Theory,” pp. 1–2; Donald T. Rowland, Demographic Methods and Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 14–15; Helen Ginn Daugherty and Kenneth C. W. Kammeyer, An Introduction to Population, second edition (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 12–13; 17–19. Caldwell, “Demography: Scope, Perspectives and Theory,” pp. 1–2. Jacques Vallin, “Population and Individuals,” in Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin and Guillaume Wunsch (eds.), Demography: Analysis and Synthesis, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), p. 5. On the development of the demographic discipline since Graunt, see: Frank Lorimer, “The Development of Demography,” in Philip M. Hauser and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), The Study of Population (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 124–179. ICBS, The Census: Historical Perspective. On the definition of failed state, see: Box 1.3. Philippe Fargues, “Demography and Politics in the Arab World,” Population: An English Selection, Vol. 5 (1993), p. 1. Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” Population Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1996), p. 373. On the demographic approach of the PLO, see: Matti Steinberg, “Lir’ot et ha-Nolad: haGorem ha-Demography be-Re’iyat Asha”f,” in Ami Ayalon and Gad G. Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1995), pp. 153–189 (Hebrew). On the Israeli pro-natalist policy, see: Onn Winckler, “The Failure of Pronatalism of the Developed States ‘with Cultural-Ethnic Hegemony’: The Israeli Lesson,” Population, Place and Space, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 119–123.

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Notes 13

The GCC organization was established in 1981 and includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE.

Chapter 1 1 2 3 4 5

6 7

8 9

10

11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18

19

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Global Demographic History

Allan Findlay and Anne Findlay, Population and Development in the Third World (London and New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 1. Geoffrey Gilbert, World Population: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, California: ABC CLIO, 2001), pp. 8–9; p. 31. The Black Death was one of the worst natural disasters in world history. The total number of deaths from the pandemic is estimated to be 75 million people. John Durand, “Historical Estimates of World Population: An Evaluation,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1977), p. 259, table 2. On the various estimations of world’s population growth rates during the first millennium, see: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennium Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 231, table B-1; Joel E. Cohen, How Many People Can the Earth Support? (New York: Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 400–401, Appendix 2. WB, World Development Report–1992, p. 271, table 27. On the decline of the NIRs in the vast majority of the developing countries since the 1990s, see: WB, Population Issues in the 21st Century: The Role of the World Bank (Washington, D.C., April 2007), pp. 4–5. See: Findlay and Findlay, Population and Development in the Third World, pp. 29–31. The academic literature on the Demographic Transition Theory is immense. A summary of the theory appears in John B. Casterline, “Demographic Transition,” in Paul Demeny and Geoffery McNicoll (eds.), Encyclopedia of Population (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2003), pp. 210–216; Roland Pressat, The Dictionary of Demography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 52–55; Ibrahim Bushnaf Bendardaf, Socioeconomic Modernization and Demographic Changes in Syria (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Missouri, 1988), pp. 1–6. Warren S. Thompson, “Population,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 6 (1929), pp. 959–975. On Thompson’s demographic classification of the world’s countries, see: Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” pp. 361–363. Frank W. Notestein, “Population – The Long View,” in Theodore W. Schultz (ed.), Food for the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), pp. 36–57. John Cleland, “Marital Fertility Decline in Developing Countries: Theories and the Evidence,” in John Cleland and John Hobcraft (eds.), Reproductive Change in Developing Countries: Insights From the World Fertility Survey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 225–228. An autarkic economy refers to economic self-sufficiency with minimal trade at both the domestic and international levels. Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” pp. 369–370. Notestein, “Population – The Long View,” p. 40. Jacques Vallin, “The End of the Demographic Transition: Relief or Concern?” Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), p. 107. Michael Anderson, Population Change in North-Western Europe, 1750–1850 (London: Macmillan Education, 1988), p. 31, figure 2. Thus, for example, the life expectancy in England averaged 34.6 years (both sexes) during the years 1726–1751 and 37.8 years in Sweden during the period 1751–1755 (both sexes). In Japan, life expectancy during the first half of the nineteenth century averaged 33.7 years (both sexes). See: Maddison, The World Economy, p. 29, table 1-4. Shirley Forster Hartley, Population – Quantity vs. Quality: A Sociological Examination of the Causes and Consequences of the Population Explosion (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, 1972), p. 4.

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214 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30

31 32 33

34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47

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Nam and Philliber, Population: A Basic Orientation, second edition, p. 19, table 1.3. Massimo Livi-Bacci, The Population of Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 134, table 6.3. Anderson, Population Change in North-Western Europe, 1750–1850, p. 31, figure 2. Michael S. Teitelbaum, “Relevance of Demographic Transition Theory for Developing Countries,” Science, Vol. 188 (2 May 1975), p. 422. Jean-Claude Chesnais, “Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15): Facts and Policies, 1960–1997,” Review of Population and Social Policy, No. 7 (1998), p. 92, table 7. Thompson, “Population,” pp. 960–961, table 1. For example, during the period 1908–1913, the annual average NIR was 1.3% in Germany, 1.2% in Italy, 1.1% in England and 1% in Switzerland and Spain. Source: Thompson, “Population,” pp. 960–961, table 1. Livi-Bacci, The Population of Europe, p. 126. Gregg Eastebrook, “Overpopulation Is No Problem – In the Long Run,” New Republic, October 11, 1999, p. 24. The age-specific death rate is a CDR for a specific age group. A discussion on the phenomenon of below replacement-level fertility and its factors in Western-European countries appears in: Dirk J. van de Kaa, “The Past of Europe’s Demographic Future,” European Review, Vol. 7, Issue 4 (October 1999), pp. 529–550. In the failed states, as will be examined below, the TFR has remained extremely high as a result of high death rates across all age groups. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, pp. 87–103. Any projection beyond 2050 is speculation only, as it is impossible to project the global socioeconomic situation — the most important factor influencing demographic patterns — for more than three decades. On the uniqueness of the Chinese anti-natalist policy, see Chapter 6. The TFR in Bangladesh dropped from 7.2 in 1970 to 2.2 in 2013, while in Sri-Lanka it declined from 4.3 to 2.1 during the corresponding period. See: PRB, 2014 World Population Data Sheet, p. 19. See: John C. Caldwell, “The Global Fertility Transition: The Need for a Unifying Theory,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1997), pp. 803–812. Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” p. 365. Sarah F. Harbison and Warren C. Robinson, “Policy Implications of the Next World Demographic Transition,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2002), p. 38. WB, Population Issues in the 21st Century, pp. 7–12. Christopher Pissarides et al., “Women in the Labour Force: How Well is Europe Doing?” p. 71, table 2.1. The Washington Consensus, which emerged in the early 1980s during Reagan’s term, maintained that only private sector-led export-oriented economies, based on governmental budgetary balance, privatization, low inflation, tax reform, market-determined prices and reduced governmental regulations, have the ability to promote economic performances and job creation. See: Melani Cammett, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015), pp. 275–278. See, for example, OECD, Social Policy Division, Labour and Social Affairs, Ideal and Actual Number of Children. Chesnais, “Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union,” p. 83. Eurostat Statistics Explained. UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (New York, 2009), pp. 58–62, table A.12. Chesnais, “Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union,” p. 86. Paul Demeny, “Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003), p. 3.

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Wolfgang Lutz, Brian C. O’Neill and Sergei Scherbov, “Europe’s Population at a Turning Point,” Science, Vol. 299 (March 2003), p. 1991. EU, Eurostat Yearbook–2005, p. 62. Statistics Sweden, Population Statistics. Statistics Sweden, Summary of Population Statistics, 1960–2010. Espen Thorud et al., International Migration, 2009–2010, SOPEMI–Report for Norway (Paris, December 2010), p. 13. David G. Blanchflower, Jumana Saleheen and Chris Shadforth, “The Impact of the Recent Migration from Eastern Europe on the UK Economy,” Paper provided by Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England, Discussion Papers, No. 17 (London, January 2007), p. 34, table 2. Statistics Netherlands, “Population Growth Fueled by Immigration,” Press release, January 28, 2016. Charles F. Westoff and Tomas Frejka, “Fertility and Religiousness among European Muslims,” Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, March 29–31, 2007, p. 3, table 2; pp. 5–6, table 3. Joop Garssen and Han Nicolaas, “Fertility of Turkish and Moroccan Women in the Netherlands: Adjustment to Native Level within One Generation,” Demographic Research, Vol. 19 (July 2008), p. 1251, figure 1. James Robards and Ann Berrington, “The Fertility of Recent Migrants to England and Wales: Interrelationships between Migration and Birth Timing,” Centre for Population Change, Working Paper No. 65 (June 2015), p. 6. Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 22. See: Wolfgang Lutz, Vegard Skirbekk and Maria Rita Testa, “The Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis: Forces that May Lead to Further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe,” in Dimiter Philipov et al. (eds.), Vienna Yearbook of Population Research–2006 (Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography, 2006), pp. 167–192. PRB, World Population Data Sheet-2015 (New York, 2015), p. 15. UNECE, Statistical Database, Mean Age at First Marriage by Sex; Idem, Mean Age of Women at Birth of First Child. T. Tchetvernina, A. Moscovskaya, I. Soboleva and N. Stepantchikova, “Labour Market Flexibility and Employment Security: Russian Federation,” International Labour Office, Employment Sector, Employment Paper 2001/31 (Geneva, 2001), p. 19, table 1.17. See also: Ernest Raiklin, “Unemployment Trends in Russia of the 1990s,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1999), pp. 1378–1388. Emilia Herman, “Inflation and Unemployment in the Romanian Economy,” Annals of the University of Petroşani, Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2010), p. 162, table 1. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2008, pp. 790–791, table 25. In 2004, eight former Communist countries entered the EU: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Guardian, April 29, 2010. UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, pp. 32–37, table S.8. Eurostat Statistics. By 2015, the median age in Australia was 37.5 years, 40.6 in Canada and 38.0 in the US and New Zealand, as compared to 46.2 in Germany, 45.9 in Italy 43.6 in Greece and 42.3 in Switzerland. See: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, pp. 33–36, table S.8. On the economic development of these countries during the 1960s and 1970s, see: Paul Rivlin, Arab Economies in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 73–81. On the demographic transition and the natalist policy of Taiwan, see: M.C. Chang, “Taiwan’s Transition from High Fertility to Lowest Low Levels,” Asian Journal of Health

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and Information Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–15. On that of South Korea, see: Take Il Kim and John A. Ross, “The Korean Breakthrough,” in Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross (eds.), Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), pp. 177–192; Ik Ki Kim, “Policy Responses to Low Fertility and Population Aging in Korea,” Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Aging and Population Decline, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (New York, October 16–18, 2000); Kwang-Hee Jun, “The Transition to Sub-Replacement Fertility in South Korea: Implications and Prospects for Population Policy,” The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 2005), pp. 26–57. On that of Hong Kong, see: Susan Fan, “Hong Kong: Evolution of the Family Planning Program,” in Robinson and Ross (eds.), Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs, pp. 193–200. On that of Singapore, see: Yap Mui Teng, “Singapore: Population Policies and Program,” in Robinson and Ross (eds.), Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs, pp. 201–219. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1964, p. 142, table 5. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1984, p. 206, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1994, p. 198, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1964, p. 140, table 5. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1984, p. 204, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1994, p. 196, table 7. See: Geoffrey McNicoll, Policy Lessons of the East Asian Demographic Transition, Population Council Working Paper No. 210 (New York, 2006). UN, Demographic Yearbook–1994, p. 198, Table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1972, p. 254, table 8. UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 36, table S.8. US Census Bureau, International Database. See: Peter McDonald, “Low Fertility and the State: The Efficacy of Policy,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2006), pp. 500–505. UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 34, table S.8. The Japan Times, June 29, 2016. UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 28, table S.6. See: BBC News, February 26, 2016; The Japan Times, October 27, 2016. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1972, p. 475, table 16; UN, Demographic Yearbook– 1977, p. 285, table 9; UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 38, table S.9. UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 38, table S.9. Ibid., p. 33, table S.8. By 2015, the median age of the Argentinian population was 31.3 years, that of Mexico 27.4 and that of Paraguay 24.9. See: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, pp. 33–35, table S.8. On Rwanda’s fertility decline and its causes, see: Pierre Claver Rutayisire, Pieter Hooimeijer and Annelet Broekhuis, “Changes in Fertility Decline in Rwanda: A Decomposition Analysis,” International Journal of Population Research (2014). In the early 2010s, the IMR in Angola for example was 95.2, 75.1 in Nigeria, 64.4 in Zambia, 62.9 in Congo, 51.0 in Kenya and the lowest — 31.0 — in Botswana. Source: ADB, AUC and UNECA, African Statistical Yearbook–2014 (Tunis, 2015), p. 96. See also: WB Data (infant mortality rate). Ibid; See also: UN, Demographic Yearbook–2013, pp. 470–476, table 19. UNDP, Human Development Report–2014 (New York, 2014), p. 162, table 1. On the family planning policies implemented in the Sub-Saharan African countries, see: James Gribble and Joan Haffey, “Reproductive Health in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Population Reference Bureau (October 2008); John G. Cleland, Robert P. Ndugwa and

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Eliya M. Zulu, “Family Planning in sub-Saharan Africa: Progress or Stagnation?,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 89, Issue 2 (2011), pp. 137–143. USAID, “The Status of Family Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa,” July 26, 2010. Mona Sharan, Saifuddin Ahmed, John May and Agnes Soucat, “Family Planning Trends in sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, Prospects, and Lessons Learned,” in Puman Chuhan-Pole and Manka Angwfo (eds.), Yes Africa Can: Success Stories from A Dynamic Continent (Washington, D.C.: The WB, 2011), p. 446, figure 25.1. Until 1981, the name which I used for the group of countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE, was Arabian Gulf oil states. However, following the establishment of the GCC organization in 1981, I have use the common name of GCC countries. Hartley, Population, p. 4. PRB, World Population Data Sheet–2002, p. 4. UN, World Fertility Patterns–2015, p. 3. Ibid., p. 6.

Chapter 2 1 2 3 4

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Sources for Demographic Research of the Arab States

Pat Hudson, History by Numbers: An Introduction to Quantitative Approaches (London: Arnold, 2000), p. xvii. On the Algerian censuses until the independence in 1962, see: Dorothy Good, “Notes on the Demography of Algeria,” Population Index, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January, 1961), p. 7, table 1. Georges Sabagh, “The Demography of the Middle East,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May 15, 1970), pp. 1–2. The Iltizam system was based on renting the right of tax collection from a specific area on an annual basis in exchange for a fixed amount of tax that had to be delivered to the central authorities. The revenue of the tax collector, the Multazim, was the gap between the amount that he succeeded in collecting and the amount that he was obligated to deliver to the Ottoman regime. Stanford J. Shaw, “The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914,” IJMES, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1978), p. 325. Haim Gerber, “The Population of Syria and Palestine in the Nineteenth Century,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1979), p. 58. Dominique Tabutin and Bruno Schoumaker, “The Demography of the Arab World and the Middle East from the 1950s to the 2000s,” Population, Vol. 60, Nos. 5 & 6 (2005), p. 514. Shaw, “The Ottoman Census,” pp. 325–327; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, second edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 90. Kemal H. Karpat, “Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–1893,” IJMES, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1978), p. 242. Henry Joachim Dubester, Population Censuses and Other Official Demographic Statistics of Africa (Washington, D.C, US Department of Commerce, 1950). The 1952 census only collected data on the nominal number of inhabitants according to their place of residence. See: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, 1952 Census of Housing (Amman, 1953). On the Pan Arab Project for Family Health, see the official website of the project [http://www.papfam.org/papfam/indexEn.htm]. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1992, p. 3. See the website of the DHS [http://www.measuredhs.com]. See for example, the questionnaire that each of the women who participated in the 2005–EDHS filled (p. 306); and the results of the 1986 census: Egypt, CAPMAS, Population, Housing and Establishment Census–1986 (Cairo, June 1987), p. 15, table 4. See: Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook–2014, chapter 2.

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25

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30

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ECWA, The Population Situation in the ECWA Region–Jordan (Beirut, 1979), p. 2. According to UNRWA data, some 140,000 Palestinians already registered as refugees were part of the new exodus from the East Bank and Gaza Strip together with about 240,000 Jordanian citizens of the West Bank who are referred to as “displaced persons.” See UNRWA website. On the Jordanian 2004 census, see the official website of the Jordanian Department of Statistics [http://www.dos.gov.jo/census2004/page1_e.htm]. CIA, The World Factbook-2015. See also: Philippe Fargues, “Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries,” SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2001), p. 106. See: Jordan, Statistical Yearbook–2013, pp. 26–35. W. B. Fisher, “Jordan: A Demographic Shatter-Belt,” in J. I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher (eds.), Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: A Geographical Approach (London: University of London Press, 1972), pp. 211–212. See, for example, James Stokes (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), p. 154; CIA, The World Factbook-2015. Insight Guides [http://www.insightguides.com]; EIU, Country Profile–Jordan, 1993–94, p. 11; Moshe Ma‘oz, Middle Eastern Minorities: Between Integration and Conflict, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Washington, D.C., 1999), p. 18. Peter Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events (Boulder: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 12; Asher Susser, “Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Yarden,” in Ayalon and Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav, p. 131 (Hebrew). Jordan, Statistical Yearbook–2013, p. 6, table 2.1. According to UNHCR, there were about 452,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan in 2012. ESCWA, International Migration Statistics and Measurement Issues in Arab Countries, written by Anna Di Bartolomeo (New York, August 2014), p. 2. On the history of the Kuwaiti demographic data collection, see: State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Statistics and Census Center (CSC). Statistics and Census Sector: A Brief Profile (Kuwait, January 2007). Mustafa al-Shalkani, “A System for Collecting Vital Statistics in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries,” Population Bulletin of ESCWA, Nos. 35–37 (December 1989–December 1990), p. 47. Allan G. Hill, “The Demography of the Kuwaiti Population of Kuwait,” Demography, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1975), p. 537. Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropology Approach, third edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 368. See also: John E. Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 136. ECWA, “Achievements, Plans and Recommendations Relating to Population and Housing Censuses in the Sultanate of Oman,” ECWA Expert Group Meeting on Census Techniques, Beirut, December 12–16, 1977, pp. 1–2. By 1974, Oman’s oil reserve was estimated at only 1.49 billion barrels. See PDO (Petroleum Development Oman) website [http://www.pdo.co.om/Pages/Home.aspx]. The Sultanate of Oman, Statistical Yearbook–2001 (Muscat, 2002), pp. 416–417. Ibid., pp. 40–41, 47. The UAE, previously known as the Trucial States, became independent in December 1971. In February 1972, Ras al-Khaima joined the union that since then has been made up of the seven independent emirates that merged into a federal state. ECWA, The Population Situation in the ECWA Region–United Arab Emirates (Beirut, 1980), p. 2. Ibid. J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: Country Case Study: The United Arab Emirates (Durham: The University of Durham, Department of Economics, 1978), p. 3.

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See, for example: UAE, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1972–1976 (Abu Dhabi, 1977), p. 43, table 5. UAE, Ministry of Economy, Preliminary Results of Population, Housing and Establishments Census-2005 (Abu Dhabi, 2006). Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE,” GLMM, No. 7/2015, p. 6. In Kuwait, the Shi‘is constitute about 30% of the national Kuwaiti population. See: The Telegraph, July 28, 2013. In UAE the Shi‘is constitute 15% of the national population. See: US Department of State, United Arab Emirates. In Oman the Shi‘is constitute no more than 5% of the total Omani national population. See: US Department of State, Oman. WB, World Development Report–1990, p. 231, table 27. ESCWA, Population Situation in the ESCWA Region–1990 (Amman, 1992), p. 112, table 6.7. WB, World Development Report–1990, p. 231, table 27. ESCWA, Population Situation in the ESCWA Region–1990, p. 200, table 12.3. Tabutin and Schoumaker, “The Demography of the Arab World and the Middle East,” p. 522. UNDP, Arab Human Development Report: Population Levels, Trends and Policies in the Arab Region: Challenges and Opportunities, by Barry Mirkin (New York, 2010), p. 7. On the 1921–1922 census, see: Mohamed Chafic Dibbs, “The Relationship between Censuses and Civil Registration in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Population Bulletin of ECWA, No. 18 (June 1980), p. 82. Robert Widmer, “Population,” in Said B. Himadeh (ed.), Economic Organization of Syria (Beirut: The American University of Beirut Press, 1936), p. 3. Bent Hansen, Economic Development in Syria (California: The Rand Corporation, 1969), p. 16. Eliane Domschke and Doreen S. Goyer, The Handbook of National Population Censuses, Africa and Asia (New York, Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 835. Egypt and Syria were politically unified during February 1958–September 1961. Domschke and Goyer, The Handbook of National Population Censuses, Africa and Asia, p. 838; Syrian Arab Republic, State Planning Commission and CBS in collaboration with the Population Council, by Nader M. al-Hallak et al., Composition and Growth of Population in the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus, September 1979), pp. 1–2. On the coverage rate of the census and quality of its data, see: ECWA, The Population Situation in the ECWA Region–Syrian Arab Republic (Beirut, 1980), p. 2. M. N. al-Hallak, “Demographic Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Expert Group Meeting on the Application of Demographic Data and Studies in Development Planning of the UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut, December 7–12, 1970, pp. 7–8. M.E. Sales, International Migration Project: Syrian Arab Republic (Durham: The University of Durham, Department of Economics, 1978), p. 59; al-Khalij, January 11, 1985. On the socialist measures taken by the Nasserite and later by the Ba‘thi regimes, see: Ziad Keilany, “Socialism and Economic Change in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1973), pp. 65–69. Syrian Arab Republic, Statistical Abstract-1950 (Damascus, 1951), p. 17, table 3. Mahmud A. Faksh, “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1984), p. 134, table 1. EIU, Country Profile–Syria, 2000–2001, p. 10. The Yazidi religion has elements of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as of Paganism. The Bible and the Qur’an are both considered sacred. In 1964, there were approximately 10,000 Yazidis in Syria. Source: Library of Congress Country Studies [http://lcweb2loc.gov].

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Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, second edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 208–209; EIU, Country Profile–Syria, 2000–2001, p. 10. http://syrianrefugees.eu/. http://www.cbssyr.sy/index-EN.htm. Arnon Soffer, “Lebanon-Where Demography is the Core of Politics and Life,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1986), p. 199, table 2. On the Lebanese 1943 National Pact, see: Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 187–188; Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 24–26. On the emigration of the Christian-Lebanese in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, see: Akram Fouad Khater, Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Lebanese Information Center, The Lebanese Demographic Reality (Beirut, January 14, 2013), p. 3. Held, Middle East Patterns, p. 221. Muhammad Faour, “The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1991), p. 631. The Guardian, September 14, 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers. UN, Population Division and UNFPA, Population Policy Compendium-Bahrain (New York, 1981), p. 2; ESCWA, Population Situation in the ESCWA Region–1990, p. 25. On the Gulf Family Health Surveys framework, including the number of the surveyed population, their sex, age, spatial distribution and the like, see: al-Lajna al-Iqtisadiyya wal-Ijtima‘iyya lil-Gharbi Asia, al-Nashra al-Sukaniyya, No. 49 (2000), p. 31, table 1. May Seikaly, “Women and Social Change in Bahrain,” IJMES, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1994), p. 418; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 120. This section is based on my paper “The Surprising Results of the Saudi Arabian 2004 Demographic Census,” IJMES, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 12–15. R. McGregor, “Saudi Arabia: Population and the Making of a Modern State,” in Clarke and Fisher (eds.), Populations of the Middle East and North Africa, p. 224; Al-Sayid Khalid al-Matri, Sukan al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya (Riyadh: Al-Dar al-Sa‘udiyya lilNashr wal-Tawzi‘, 1998), p. 16, table 1. ECWA, The Population Situation in the ECWA Region–Saudi Arabia (Beirut, 1979), p. 2; Abdulla H. M. al-Khalifeh, “Population Spatial Distribution Policies in Saudi Arabia,” in ESCWA, Population Spatial Distribution (Amman, 1993), p. 138. ILO, Migration for Employment Project: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: The Key Countries for Employment. World Employment Programme Research, Working Paper, by J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair (Geneva, May 1979), p. 8. See also: Ashraf Abdul Salam, “Population and Household Census, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2010: Facts and Figures,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 16 (August 2013), p. 259. ECWA, The Population Situation-Saudi Arabia, p. 2. Muhammad Ahmad al-Ruythi, “Sukan al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya,” in Muhammad Ahmad al-Ruythi (ed.), Sukan al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi: al-Waqi‘ wal-Mustaqbal (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Abikan, 2003), p. 172, table 1; ECWA, The Population SituationSaudi Arabia, p. 2. J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, International Migration Project, Country Case Study: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Durham: The University of Durham, Department of Economics, 1979), p. 4; MERI Report, Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 4;

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Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, third edition (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 45. See in this regard: The WB and the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Planning, Saudis in Transition: The Challenges of a Changing Labor Market, by Ismail A. Sirageldin, Naiem A. Sherbiny and M. Ismail Serageldin (Published for the WB by Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 30. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, CDS, Statistical Yearbook–1997, p. 477. Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report–1992 (Durham: Mountjoy Research Centre, May 1992), p. 99, table 1.1. Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 33, note 8. See, for example, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Achievements of the Development Plans, 1390–1404 AH [1970–1984], (Riyadh, 1985), p. 118. Gilbar, “Mavo: Beyn Demographya ve-Politiqa ba-Mizrah ha-Tikhon,” in Ayalon and Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav, pp. 14–15 (Hebrew). See, for example: EIU, Country Profile–Saudi Arabia, 1987–88, p. 7. Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–1996, pp. 465–481. Al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya, Wizarat al-Iqtisad wal-Takhtit, al-Nata’ij alAwaliyya lil-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-1425AH. [2004] (Riyadh, 2004), p. 3. The NCB Economist, Vol. 15, Issue 6 (April 26, 2005), p. 6, table 1; SAMA, Forty-First Annual Report–1426H [2005], p. 321, table 17.2. See: Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya alSa‘udiyya, al-Nata’ij al-Awaliyya lil-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-1425AH. [2004]; SAMA, Annual Report, various issues; ESCWA, Demographic and Related SocioEconomic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, various issues (Amman and Beirut). Thus, for example, during the years 1994–1998, according to Saudi Ministry of Interior data, 22,065 foreigners obtained Saudi citizenship, 18,983 (86%) of whom were females. See: Saudi Economic Survey, April 12, 2000, p. 11. Onn Winckler, “The Economic Consequences of the Iraqi Crisis on the Mashreq Countries,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2006), pp. 410–412. See, for example, Saudi Arabia, Eighth Development Plan, 2005–2009, chapter 33. See also: EIU, Country Profile–Saudi Arabia, 2006, p. 21. Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2010, table 2.1. During the period between the two censuses, the average CBR of the indigenous Saudi population was 27 while the CDR was about 4, thus producing a NIR of 2.3%. See: Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2014, chapter 2. Ibid., table 2.1. Under the name of the founder of this sect, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791), Wahhabism began in the Najd region during the eighteenth century as a reaction to the popular practice of Sufism. On the Wahhabism, see: David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London, I.B. Tauris 2009). EIU, Country Profile–Saudi Arabia, 2003, p. 10; International Crisis Group, “The Shi‘ite Question in Saudi Arabia,” p. 1; BBC News, March 24, 2009; Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi‘a, p. 180. This section is based on my paper: “How Many Qatari Nationals Are There?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015). Jure Snoj, “Population of Qatar,” bq magazine, December 18, 2013 [http://www.bqdoha.com/2013/12/population-qatar]. The British Embassy in Beirut, Middle East Development Division, by N.B. Hudson, The First Population Census of Qatar, April/May 1970 (Beirut, October 1970), p. 17. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

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109 State of Qatar, The Planning Council, Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile–2006 (Doha, April 2006), p. 96, table 1/4. 110 ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 153, table 9.1. 111 Dawlat Qatar, Majlis al-Tahtit, al-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-1997 [1997 Census] (Doha, February 1999), p. 65, table 13. 112 See the publication of Qatar’s Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin: Births and Deaths. 113 Dawlat Qatar, Majlis al-Tahtit, al-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-2004 [2004 Census] (Doha, December 2004), p. 141, table 1; p. 154, table 8. 114 QSA, Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin: Births and Deaths-2010, 26th Issue (Doha, July 2010), tables 10 and 53. 115 The nominal NI between the 1997 and the 2004 censuses was calculated as follows: half of the NI in March 1997 plus the whole NI of the rest of that year; the NI of the whole period of 1998–2003; and the NI of January, February and half of March 2004. 116 QSA, The General Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment, April-2010 (Doha, 2010), table 24. 117 QSA, Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin: Births and Deaths, various issues. 118 The nominal NI between the two censuses was calculated as follows: half of the NI in March 2004 plus the whole NI of the rest of that year; the NI of the whole period of 2005–2009; and the NI of January–March and two-third of April 2010. 119 Since there is no available data for the age group of 55–59 each year, the total population of this age group was divided by 5 (since this cohort contains 5 years) and multiplied by 4 (since we need only 4 not 5 years for the comparison), thus producing 2,606 people for the age group of 55–58. 120 QSA, Al-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin–2004, p. 141, table 1; p. 154, table 8. 121 QSA, The General Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment–2010, table 14; QSA, Summary Results of 2010 Population, Housing and Establishments Census (Doha, 2010), p. 11, table 2-1. 122 QSA, Women and Men in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile–2006, p. 27; idem, Woman and Man in the State of Qatar: A Statistical Profile–2012 (Doha, 2013), p. 16, table 1/5. 123 QSA, Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin: Births and Deaths-2010, 27th Issue, July 2011, table 3. 124 QSA, Al-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin-2004, p. 157, table 10. 125 QSA, The General Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment-2010, table 14. 126 Qatar Information Exchange. 127 Qatar, Ministry of Development, Planning and Statistics, The Simplified Census of Population, Housing and Establishments, 2015 (Doha, April 2015), p. 28, table 1. 128 Qatar Information Exchange, Labor Force Sample Survey, First Quarter 2015, table 2. 129 Qatar Information Exchange, Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin: Births and Deaths, various issues. 130 Permanent Population Committee, Sukkan, Issue 25 (September 2014), p. 2. 131 See, for example, Al-Sharq a-Awsat, September 18, 2014; Reuters, August 7, 2014; Gulf News, August 7, 2014. Due to the tribal-historical connection between the indigenous populations of these two countries, the Qatari authorities prefer to naturalize SunniBahrainis. 132 Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 65. 133 See, for example: Sulayman S. al-Qudsi, “Labour Participation of Arab Women: Estimates of the Fertility to Labour Supply Link,” Applied Economics, Vol. 30, No. 7 (1998), p. 932. 134 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 20, 1999, p. 7. 135 Jordan Times, November 18, 1999; ESCWA, Survey, 1998–1999, p. 51. 136 ESCWA, Survey, 2000–2001, pp. 30–31; MEED, April 20, 2001, p. 28. 137 EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 2001, p. 33.

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138 Al-Ahram Weekly, February 27–March 5, 2002. 139 ESCWA, Survey, 2001–2002, p. 18. 140 http://www.vqronline.org/multimedia/2014/10/mapping-flight-syrian-refugees; http://syrianrefugees.eu/. 141 AMNESTY International, “Facts & Figures: Syria Refugee Crisis & International Resettlement,” December 5, 2014.

Chapter 3 1

2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11

12 13 14

15

16

17 18 19 20 21

Arab Population Growth

Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 93. See also: Abdel R. Omran and Farzaneh Roudi, “The Middle East Population Puzzle,” Population Bulletin, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), p. 5. Issawi, An Economic History, p. 93, table 6.1. The data for the Arab labor-importing countries only refer to the indigenous populations. See: UNDP, Human Development Report–2002, pp. 162–165, table 5; ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, No. 11 (2001). On the large-scale immigration to the Arab oil countries, see Chapter 5. Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2014, chapter 2, table 1. Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization, Bahrain in Figures, various issues (Manama). UAE, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Handbook-1973 (Abu Dhabi, 1973), p. 2, table 2. GCC Statistical Centre, Social, Economic & Demographic Characteristics of the GCC Population (Riyadh, February 11, 2015), table 1.1. A. M. Abdelghany, “Evaluating the Application of the Stable Population Model of the Population of Egypt,” Population Bulletin of ECWA, No. 21 (December 1981), p. 109, table 3. See also: Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, 1952–1972 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 29, table 2.2. Warren C. Robinson and Fatma H. El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt (Boulder: Lexington Books, 2005), p. 26, table 3.3. The term natural fertility was proposed by Louis Henry in 1961. The term describes couples that regardless of the current number of offspring continue to behave without any family planning. See: Livi-Bacci, The Population of Europe, p. 108. See: Robinson and El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, p. 32. See: Omran and Roudi, “The Middle East Population Puzzle,” p. 12. On women’s status in the Middle East, see: Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach, fourth edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 180–186. In the case of the Arab countries, see: John R. Weeks, “The Demography of Islamic Nations,” Population Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1988), p. 25; Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, “Islam, Women and Politics: The Demography of Arab Countries,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 45–56. Laurie Ann Mazur, “Beyond the Numbers: An Introduction and Overview,” in Laurie Ann Mazur (ed.), Beyond the Numbers: A Reader on Population, Consumption, and Environment (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1994), pp. 14–15. Weeks, “The Demography of Islamic Nations,” p. 21. Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 119. Syrian Arab Republic, CBS, Syria Fertility Survey–1978 (Damascus, 1982), p. 36, table 4.2. Egypt Arab Republic, Ministry of Health and Population, National Population Council, Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey–2003 (Cairo, 2004), p. 18, table 2.4. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012 (Amman, October 2013), p. 44, table 4.5.

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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48

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In the early 2000s, 59% of the Yemenite women aged 20–24 were already married. See: Abla Mehio Sibai and Rouham Yamout, “Family-Based Old-Age Care in Arab Countries: Between Tradition and Modernity,” in Hans Groth and Alfonzo Sousa-Poza (eds.), Population Dynamics in the Muslim Countries (London and New York: Springer, 2012), p. 17, table 5.3. Roderic Beaujot and Mongi Bchir, Fertility in Tunisia: Traditional and Modern Contrasts (Washington, D.C., PRB, 1984), p. 21, table 3. ECA, The State of Demographic Transition in Africa (Addis Ababa, December 2001), p. 36. Syrian Arab Republic, CBS and League of Arab States, Pan-Arab Project for Child Development, Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey–1993 (Damascus, 1999), p. 220. UN, Social Development Division, Women Empowerment and Gender Mainstreaming, Country Profile–Bahrain. Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey–1993, p. 220. Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey–2003, p. 18, table 2.4. Age specific fertility rate (ASFR) is calculated by dividing the number of live births in each age group by the total female population in each age group. Al-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya, al-Nashra al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya lil-Maghrib–2006 (Rabat, 2006), p. 28, table 1-11. Syria, CBS, Syria Fertility Survey–1978, pp. 40–41, tables 4.7 and 4.8. Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey–1993, p. 15. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Health, Saudi Arabia Child Health Survey, edited by Yagob al-Mazrou and Samir Farid (Riyadh, 1991), p. 269. Al-Lajna al-Iqtisadiyya wal-Ijtima‘iyya lil-Gharbi Asia, al-Nashra al-Sukaniyya, No. 49 (2000), p. 32. On this subject, see: Mohammad Taghi Sheykhi, “The Socio-Psychological Factors of Family Planning with Special Reference to Iran: A Theoretical Appraisal,” International Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1995), p. 72. See the Introduction of Joseph Kostiner to his edited volume, Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 2–5. Peter J. Donaldson, Nature Against Us: The United States and the World Population Crisis, 1965–1980 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 114–115. ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socioeconomic Data Sheets, No. 8 (1995), p. 106, table 3. Saudi Arabia, CDSI, Indicator of Fertility by Nationality. UNDP, Arab Human Development Report–2002, p. 39. Omar B. Ahmad, Alan D. Lopez and Mie Inoue, “The Decline in Child Mortality: A Reappraisal,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 78, No. 10 (2000), p. 1180, table 1; UNDP, Human Development Report–2006, pp. 315–318, table 10; UNDP, Human Development Report–2014, pp. 184–187, table 7. Peter N. Hess, Population Growth and Socioeconomic Progress in Less Developed Countries: Determinants of Fertility Transition (New York and London: Praeger, 1988), p. 17. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Health, Oman Child Health Survey, edited by Murtadha J. Suleiman, Ahmed al-Ghassany and Samir Farid (Muscat, 1992), p. 203, table 11.4. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Health, Oman Family Health Survey–1995, edited by Ali J.M. Sulaiman, Asya al-Riyami and Samir Farid (Muscat, 1996), p. 30, table 7.3. Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey–1993, p. 169, table 12.11. Syria, Statistical Abstract-2006, p. 68, table 8/2. Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012, p. 48, table 5.1. Morocco, Ministry of Public Health, National Survey on Population and Health–1992 (Rabat, 1992), figure 2 (no page). A similar trend appeared in the demographic survey

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51 52

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58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68

69 70 71

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conducted in the country in 1995. See: Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de la Santé Publique, Enquête de Panel sur la Population et la Santé–1995 (Rabat, Janvier 1996), p. 24, table 3.1. Al-Mamlaka al-Maghribiyya, al-Nashra al-Ihsa’iyya al-Sanawiyya lil-Maghrib-2006, p. 28, table 1-12. Hassan M. Yousif, Anne Goujon and Wolfgang Lutz, Future Population and Education Trends in the Countries of North Africa (Luxemburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, September 1996), pp. 10–13. UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Fertility Data–2012. WB, African Development Indicators-1998/99 (Washington D.C., 1998), p. 284, table 11-2. See also: Hayam El-Beblawi and Azza Mohamed Abedo, “Some Aspects of Child Labor in Egypt,” CDC Working Paper, No. 41 (1999); Mohamed Abdel Rahman, “SocioDemographic Aspects of Child Labor in Egypt,” in CDC, Population & Sustainable Development, Research Monograph Series, No. 5 (Cairo, 1998), pp. 349–368. WB, World Development Indicators–2010, p. 82, table 2.6. Ibid., p. 83, table 2.6. Gulf News, November 13, 2003. Yousif, Goujon and Lutz, Future Population and Education Trends in the Countries of North Africa, pp. 12–13. Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Health and Population, National Population Council, Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–1995 (Cairo, September 1996), p. 39, table 3.2. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2014, p. 41, table 4.2. Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012, p. 49, table 5.2. PCBS, Al-Khusuba fi al-Aradi al-Falastiniyya (Ramallah, May 2002), p. 11, figure 1. Oman Family Health Survey–1995, p. 30, table 7.3. State of Kuwait, Ministry of Health, Kuwait Child Health Survey, edited by Rashid alRashoud and Samir Farid (Kuwait, 1991), p. 216, table 11.4. Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012, p. 45, table 4.6. Mahmoud Farag, “Differences in Age at Marriage in Syria,” in S.H. Huzayyin and G. T. Acsadi (eds.), Family and Marriage in some African and Asiatic Countries, Research Monograph Series, No. 6 (Cairo: CDC, 1976), p. 503, table 24.7. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2014, p. 35, table 3.6. Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012, p. 33, table 3.4. See: Youssef Courbage, New Demographic Scenarios in the Mediterranean Region (Paris: National Institute of Demographic Studies, 1999), p. 14. On the connection between female education and fertility, see: Hamed Abu-Gamrah, “Fertility Levels and Differentials by Mother’s Education in some Countries of the ECWA Region,” in CDC, Determinants of Fertility in some African and Asian Countries, Research Monograph Series, No. 10 (Cairo, 1982), pp. 199–201; ESCWA, Gender and Population Dynamics in the ESCWA Region, by Batool Shakoori (Beirut, 2000), pp. 6–7; Anne Valia Goujon, “Population and Education Prospects in the Arab Region,” in Ismail Sirageldin (ed.), Human Capital: Population Economics in the Middle East (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), p. 118, figure 5.1; Courbage, New Demographic Scenarios in the Mediterranean Region, p. 14; Yousif, Goujon and Lutz, Future Population and Education Trends in the Countries of North Africa, pp. 13–15; al-Qudsi, “Labour Participation of Arab Women,” p. 933. UNDP, Human Development Report, various issues (New York: UNDP). ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 64. The GER is a statistical measure used in the educational sector to determine the ratio of the actual number of students at a specific educational level to the total population at the relevant age. UNESCO Data Centre; ESCWA, Survey, 2014–2015, p. 55.

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76 77 78 79 80

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84 85 86

87 88

89 90 91 92 93

94 95 96

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On the Washington Consensus, see Chapter 1. The aid policy of UNRWA was and still is based on the number of family members. See: Philippe Fargues, “Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2000), pp. 464–466. PCBS, Ihwal al-Sukan al-Falastiniyun al-Muqayamin fi al-Aradi al-Falastiniyya (Ramallah, 2011), p. 16. UNDP, Human Development Report–2015 database. The Guardian, February 16, 2014. Israel, CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel–2014 (Jerusalem, 2015), table 3.13. Indonesia’s TFR declined from 5.6 on average during the second half of the 1960s to 2.5 on average during the 2010–2015 years. Bangladesh’s TFR declined from 6.9 to 2.2 during the corresponding period. See: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision database. See: Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 78–79. UN, World Fertility Patterns–2015, p. 22; UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, table 9. The Tanzimât was a period of reformation that began in 1809 and ended with the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and was characterized by various attempts of the Ottoman authorities to modernize the Empire. Gad Gilbar, Kalkalat ha-Mizrah ha-Tikhon ba-‘Et ha-Hadasha (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1990), pp. 30–31 (Hebrew). Abdelghany, “Evaluating the Application of the Stable Population Model of the Population of Egypt,” p. 109, table 3. K. L. Kohli and Musa‘ad al-Omaim, “Mortality Levels, Trends and Differentials in Kuwait, 1957–1983,” Population Bulletin of ESCWA, No. 28 (June 1986), p. 119; State of Qatar, Ministry of Information, Qatar into the Seventies (Doha, May 1973), p. 79; Jacqueline Ismael and Tareq Y. Ismael, “Social Policy in the Arab World,” Cairo Papers in Social Science, Vol. 18, Monograph 1 (1995), p. 68. See: WHO, World Health Statistics-2014 (New York). On the process of the development of a wide-based age pyramid due to high NIRs, see: Ismail Sirageldin, “Population Dynamics, Environment, and Conflict,” in Ismail Sirageldin and Eqbal al-Rahmani (eds.), Population and Development Transformations in the Arab World (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1996), pp. 189–196. UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, pp. 18–22, table S.2. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook–2014, table 3.1. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, tables 9 and 18. Saudi Arabia, CDSI, Taqdirat al-Sukan fi Muntasaf al-‘Aam lil-Manatiq al-Idariyya walMuhafazat (Riyadh, no date), p. 6. M. Kabir and M.S. Rahman, “Population Projection of Oman: Implications for Future Development,” Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern, Vol. 5, Issue 3 (2012), p. 167, table 3. Oman, Statistical Yearbook–2015, p. 64, table 1.2. Mirkin, Arab Human Development Report, p. 11. Ibid., p. 5.

Chapter 4 1 2 3

Notes

The “Victory” of Numbers: The Emergence of Structural Unemployment

Al-Ahram, March 23, 2001 (Quoted from: MEED, April 20, 2001, p. 24). John Martin, “The Population Time Bomb,” The Middle East, November 2003, p. 6. Underemployment is a situation in which a worker is employed below his/her educational or skill level, or availability in the form of less than full-time. For example, people in the

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tourism industry who are not employed all year or an engineer who is forced to work in the informal sector due to a lack of suitable employment for engineers, or a graduate of the tertiary educational level who is forced to work as a taxi driver. This “worldwide rule” has only one exception: that of the ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel. In this society, the parents switch tasks: The husband studies in the Yeshiva and the wife usually works outside the home. However, even in this unique society, in most cases, only one of the parents works outside the house in a full-time job. ILO, LABORSTA Internet. ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various issues (Geneva). Euromonitor Publications Limited, Middle East Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor Publications Ltd., 1986), p. 81. ILO, Department of Statistics, Statistical Update on Arab States and Territories and North African Countries (Geneva, May 2011), p. 3. See also: UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011: Towards the Developmental State in the Arab Region (Cairo, 2011), p. 40. Shamlan Y. Alessa, The Manpower Problem in Kuwait (London and Boston: Kegan Paul International, 1981), p. 17, table 2.4. ESCWA, Survey 1995, p. 40, table 12; Robert E. Looney, Manpower Policies and Development in the Persian Gulf Region (Westport and London: Praeger, 1994), p. 30, table 3.2. MEED, January 27, 1989, p. 3; Looney, Manpower Policies, p. 30, table 3.2. Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, CDSI, Seventh Development Plan, 1420/21–1424/25AH. [2000–2004] (Riyadh, 1999), p. 62, table 2.1. ESCWA, Survey, 2002–2003, p. 16. SAMA, Fortieth Annual Report–1425H [2004], p. 305. The State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract-2000 (Kuwait, 2001), p. 91, table 76. Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2014, p. 62, table 2; SAMA, Fifty-First Annual Report–1436[H]-2015 (Riyadh, June 2015), p. 39, table 2.10. See also: MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 30. Oman, Statistical Yearbook–2015, p. 73, table 9-2. Ibid., p. 99, table 4-1; Oman Daily Observer, April 25, 2015. Rodney Wilson et al., Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (London and New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 97. On the Saudi pension system, see: IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 14/292, September 2014, p. 16, box 1. Anh Nga Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States,” in Nils A. Butenschon et al. (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 183. MEED, “Special Report–Qatar,” November 1979, p. 11. ILO, Global Employment Trends–2013, p. 83. On the limitations on the Saudi women in the employment arena, see: Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible are Islamic Margins?” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999), pp. 568–583. Wilson and Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm, p. 250. Ikhlas A. Abdalla, “Attitudes towards Women in the Arabian Gulf Region,” Women in Management Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1996), p. 29. Adil Osman Gebriel, “Overview of Major Issues in the Development of National Human Resources in the Gulf,” in Abbas Abdelkarim (ed.), Change and Development in the Gulf (London: Macmillan Press, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 152–153. SAMA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report–1421H [2000], pp. 267–268. IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 14/292, September 2014, p. 6.

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Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2014, p. 62, table 2. SAMA, Forty-Third Annual Report–1428H [2007], p. 214, table 18.2. IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 14/292, p. 6. Saudi Gazette, April 26, 2016. Kingdom of Bahrain, CIO, Bahrain in Figures-2013. Oil production in Bahrain averaged 200,000 b/d in 2015. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Development, The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, 1996–2000 (Muscat, July 1997), p. 213; Dawn Chatty, “Women Working in Oman: Individual Choice and Cultural Constrains,” IJMES, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2000), pp. 241–254. See, for example, ESCWA, Survey, 2014–1015, p. 58, figure 29. William Scott-Jackson, et al. “Maximising Women’s Participation in the GCC Workforce,” Oxford Strategic Consulting-Gulf; Emilie Rutledge, et al., “Women, Labour Market Nationalization Policies and Human Resource Development in the Arab Gulf States,” Human Resource Development International, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2011), p. 186; Diana Zovighian, “Gulf Women’s Participation in the Labor Market: Paid Labor, Care and Social Protection in Patriarchal Systems,” in Steffen Hertog (ed.), National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2012), p. 186. Harry Wes, “Employment Creation and Localization: The Crucial Human Resource Issues for the GCC,” The International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007), p. 138. The dependency ratio is the ratio of the economically dependent population (under 15 and over 64) to the population in the working age group (aged 15–64). Hence, the dependency ratio is equal to the number of individuals aged under 15 and above 64 divided by the number of individuals aged 15–64. ESCWA, Survey, 2014–1015, p. 58. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1970, pp. 296–297; Demographic Yearbook–1975, pp. 240–241. Syria, Statistical Abstract-1991, p. 60, table 10.2; 2001, p. 65, table 9/2. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, pp.187–188, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2002, p. 150, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–1979, p. 226, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2002, p. 189, table 7. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, p. 229, table 7. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook–2015, table 2-9. Ibid., table 2-10. UN, Demographic Yearbook–2014, p. 176, table 7. Radwan A. Shaban, Ragui Assaad and Sulayman S. al-Qudsi, “The Challenge of Unemployment in the Arab Region,” International Labour Review, Vol. 134, No. 1 (1995), p. 69. ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, No. 11 (2001), p. 99, table 1. PCBS, Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997–2016 (Ramallah, 2016). PCBS, Al-Ta‘dad al-‘Amm lil-Sukan wal-Masakin wal-Munsha’at-2007 (Ramallah, 2012), p. 61, table 1. UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011, p. 40. IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 14/292, September 2014, p. 4. MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 31. The War in Yemen (1962–1967), the June 1967 War, the War of Attrition (1969–1970) and the October 1973 War. Moshe Efrat, “Tokhnit he-‘Asor ve-Totzoteha,” in Shimon Shamir (ed.), Yeridat haNasserism, 1965–1970: Shqi‘ata shel Tenu‘a Meshikhit (Tel Aviv: Mif‘alim Universitayim,

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1978), p. 66 (Hebrew); Ragui Assaad, “The MENA Paradox: Higher Education but Lower Job Quality,” in Moving Jobs to the Center Stage, Berlin Workshop Series (Berlin: BMZ, 2013), p. 33, figure 1. M. Riad El-Ghonemy, “An Assessment of Egypt’s Development Strategy, 1952–1970,” in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds.), Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), p. 258. Al-Mussawar, No. 3377, June 30, 1989, p. 17. El-Ghonemy, “An Assessment of Egypt’s Development Strategy,” p. 257. Hansen, Economic Development in Syria, p. 13. Foreign Areas Studies Division, Area Handbook for Syria (Washington, D.C.: The American University, July 1965), p. 236. Yusif A. Sayigh, The Economies of the Arab World: Development Since 1945 (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 229. Ibid. Ragui Assaad, “The Structure and Evolution of Employment in Jordan,” Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series, No. 674 (Cairo, May 2012), p. 7. Oman remained a poor country during the 1960s as well, due both to the socioeconomic approach of the Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur and to the fact that oil exports only started in 1967. UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011, p. 4. WB, World Development Report–1985, pp. 175–176, table 2. Middle East International, February 22, 1985, p. 16. Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Jordan’s Economy: From Prosperity to Crisis,” Occasional Papers, No. 106 (The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, May 1989), p. 41. MEED, April 11, 1987, p. 36. On the financial dividend of Egypt from the peace treaty with Israel, see: William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981 (New York: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 174–199. J. S. Birks, C. A. Sinclair and J. A. Socknat, “The Demand for Egyptian Labor Abroad,” in Alan Richards and Philip L. Martin (eds.), Migration, Mechanization, and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 118. The Arab Economist, April 1980, p. 25; al-Ahram, January 14, 1980. Ralph R. Sell, “Egyptian International Labor Migration and Social Processes: Toward Regional Integration,” International Migration Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1988), p. 91. MEED, September 16, 1983, p. 22; EIU, QER, Egypt, Country Profile, 1986–87, p. 8; Gil Feiler, “Migration and Recession: Arab Labor Mobility in the Middle East, 1982–1989,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991), p. 136. M.A.J. Share, “The Use of Jordanian Workers’ Remittances,” in Bichara Khader and Adnan Badran (eds.), The Economic Development of Jordan (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 33, table 3.1. J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, International Migration Project: Country Case Study: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Durham: The University of Durham, Department of Economics, November 1978), p. 9, table. 3; Ian J. Seccombe, “Labour Emigration Policies and Economic Development in Jordan: From Unemployment to Labour Shortage,” in Khader and Badran (eds.), The Economic Development of Jordan, p. 120. J.S. Birks, I. Seragelding, C.A. Sinclair and J. A. Socknat, “Who is Migrating Where? An Overview of International Labor Migration in the Arab World,” in Richards and Martin (eds.), Migration, Mechanization, and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt, p. 115, table 2; Share, “The Use of Jordanian Workers’ Remittances,” p. 34, table 3.2; al-Dustur, March 24, 1981. Jordan, Statistical Abstract–1989, p. 83, table 4/2/3. Al-Ra’y, July 14; July 29; November 27, 1986.

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Allan M. Findlay, “Return to Yemen: The End of the Old Migration Order in the Arab World,” in W. T. S. Gould and A. M. Findlay (eds.), Population Migration and the Changing World Order (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), p. 214. Winckler, Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba‘thist Syria, p. 93, table 4.1. EIU, QER, Egypt-Annual Supplement, 1985, p. 30. Bayan Tabbara, “Labour Markets in the ESCWA Region During the Past 25 Years,” in ESCWA, Proceedings of the Expert Group Meeting on Assessment of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA Region During the Last 25 Years and Priorities for the Next Decade, 1999–2009 (New York, 1999), pp. 109–110. On the development of the intra-Arab “mutual dependence” following the “oil boom,” see: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Oil, Migration and the New Arab Social Order,” in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (eds.), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order (Boulder: Westview Press and Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1982), pp. 17–70. El-Ghonemy, Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East, p. 183. A. S. M. Kashef, “Egypt,” in John Dixon (ed.), Social Welfare in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 26. Tayseer Abdel Jaber, “Jordanian Labor Migration: Social, Political and Economic Effects,” in Mohammad Shtayyeh (ed.), Labor Migration: Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and Israel (Jerusalem: Palestine Center for Regional Studies, 1998), p. 85. Muhammad Sa‘ad ‘Amirah, “Waqi‘ al-Bitala fil-Urdun wa-Nazara Nahwa alMustaqbal,” in Mustafa al-Hamarneh (ed.), al-Iqtisad al-Urduni: al-Mushkilat wal-Afaqa (Amman: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Istratigiyya, 1994), p. 224, table 2. J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (Geneva, 1980), p. 135, table 10. Al-Ra’y, November 21, 1984. HRD base Ltd., Lloyds Bank Chambers, Socio-Demographic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (Newcastle, May 1987), p. 44, table 3.2. By June 1986, the price of oil barrel was less than $10 compared to $36 per barrel in 1980 (current prices). In constant 1990 prices, the decline in oil prices was from $49.6 in 1981 to $17.1 in 1986 (spot crude prices). See: Paul Rivlin, World Oil and Energy Trends: Strategic Implications for the Middle East, Memorandum No. 57 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, September 2000), p. 17, table 1. Abdel Jaber, “Jordanian Labor Migration,” p. 83. Kanovsky, “Jordan’s Economy: From Prosperity to Crisis,” p. 41. WB, World Tables, 1995 Edition, pp. 386–387. On the Jordanian-Iraqi economic relationship prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, see: Amatzia Baram, “Ba‘thi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1991), pp. 56–58. IMF, Jordan: Background Information on Selected Aspects of Adjustment and Growth Strategy (August 29, 1995), p. 16. El-Ghonemy, Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East, p. 196. ‘Amirah, “Waqi‘ al-Bitala fil-Urdun,” p. 224, table 2. Al-Dustur, April 17, 1990. On the Jordanian replacement labor migration policy, see: Ian J. Seccombe, “Immigrant Workers in an Emigrant Economy: An Examination of Replacement Migration in the Middle East,” International Migration, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1986), pp. 382–384. Curtis R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 52–53; Philip Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 166–170; Joseph Nevo, Jordan: In Search of Identity (Ra‘anana: The Open University, 2005), pp. 280–283.

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106 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Syria,” in Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East (London and New York: British Academic Press, 1993), p. 188. 107 By 1985, Syria’s oil exports amounted to 150,000 b/d. 108 On the Syrian Strategic Balance Parity policy, see: Moshe Ma‘oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace Making (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 183–200. 109 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 31–32; Onn Winckler, “Hafiz al-Asad’s Socio-Economic Legacy: The Balance of Achievements and Failures,” Orient, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2001), p. 451. 110 By 1986, the Syrian inflation rate amounted to 36% compared to 6%–19% during the first half of the 1980s. See: IMF, Syrian Arab Republic: Staff Report for the 1987 Article IV Consultation (February 18, 1988), p. 4. 111 Al-Ittihad, March 14, 1987; al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, May 30, 1988. 112 In real terms means the change in a financial number after correcting for the effect of inflation. 113 IMF, Syrian Arab Republic: Staff Report for the 1987 Article IV Consultation, p. 4. 114 Al-Hayat, January 26, 1992. 115 Volker Perthes, “The Syrian Economy in the 1980s,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), p. 37. 116 ESCWA, Return Migration: Profiles, Impact and Absorption in Home Countries (New York, 1993), p. 20, table 6. 117 See: Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, “The Boycott that Never Was: Egypt and the Arab System, 1979–1989,” Durham Middle East Papers, No. 72 (December 2002), pp. 32–36. 118 WB, World Tables, 1995 Edition, pp. 4–5, table 2; pp. 28–29, table 7. 119 El-Ghonemy, Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East, p. 182. 120 Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, February 13, 1989; ESCWA, Return Migration, p. 17. 121 EIU, Country Report–Egypt, No. 4 (1988), p. 10. 122 Assaad, “The MENA Paradox,” p. 31. 123 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Masoret, Gidul Okhlosiya ve-Tikhnun Mishpaha beMarocco,” in Ayalon and Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav, p. 58 (Hebrew). 124 El-Ghonemy, Affluence and Poverty in the Middle East, p. 188. 125 EIU, Country Profile–Algeria, 2004, p. 36. 126 WB, The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs and Greater Wealth to All Tunisians (Washington, D.C., May 2014), p. 5. 127 For example, the Saudi foreign currency reserves declined from $125 billion in 1980 to $65 in 1990. See: Middle East International, September 24, 1993, p. 20. 128 The New York Times, May 27, 1991. 129 Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1992–1998, p. 11, table 1-15. 130 EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 2001, p. 15. 131 ESCWA, National Accounts Studies of the ESCWA Region, Bulletin No. 16 (1996), p. 3. 132 Central Bank of Egypt, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, December 2003, p. 70, table 29. 133 MEED, February 9, 1996, p. 2; EIU, Country Profile–Syria, 2006, p. 31. 134 MEED, November 18, 1994, p. 10. 135 ESCWA, Survey–1995, p. 159, table 81. 136 By the early 1990s, the agricultural sector represented approximately 30% of the total Syrian GDP. Syria, Statistical Abstract-2000, pp. 536–537, table 29/16. 137 On the Syrian workers in Lebanon following the Ta’if agreement, see: John Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 145–148; Gary C. Gambill, “Syrian Workers in Lebanon: The Other Occupation,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (February 2001). 138 ESCWA, National Accounts Studies of the ESCWA Region, Bulletin No. 19 (1999), p. 6.

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139 ESCWA, Survey, 2001–2002, p. 17; The Economic Research Forum, Syria Country Profile: The Road Ahead for Syria (Cairo, February 2005), p. 11. 140 EIU, Country Profile–Syria, 2000–2001, p. 20. 141 ESCWA, External Trade Bulletin of the ESCWA Region, eleventh edition (2002), pp. 84–86, table II-4. 142 Eyal Zisser, Be-Shem ha-Av: Bashar al-Asad: Shanim Rishonot ba-Shilton (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2004), p. 200 (Hebrew); ESCWA, Oil for Food: Impact on Iraq and its Main Arab Trading Partners (Beirut, 2003), p. 6. 143 EIA, “Major Non-OPEC Countries Oil Revenues” (June 2003). 144 ESCWA, Survey, 2001–2002, p. 18. 145 MEED, August 14, 1992, p. 19. 146 ESCWA, Survey–1994, p. 65, table 38. 147 WB, World Tables, 1995 Edition, p. 29, table 7. 148 Jordan Times, October 14, 1991. 149 On the benefits for the Jordanian economy from the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, see: Gad. G. Gilbar and Onn Winckler, “The Economic Factor of the Arab–Israeli Peace Process : The Cases of Egypt, Jordan and Syria,” in Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (eds.), Arab–Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Reconciliation? (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), pp. 200–202. 150 Assaad, “The Structure and Evolution of Employment in Jordan,” 6. 151 ESCWA, Survey, 1998–1999, p. 51; Jordan Times, November 18, 1999. 152 IMF, Jordan: 2006 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 07/128, March 2007, p. 6. 153 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics. 154 Jordan Times, August 7, 1996. 155 ESCWA, Survey, 2000–2001, p. 31. 156 The Middle East, October 1991, p. 36; Nicholas Van Hear, New Diaspora: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal, and Regrouping of Migrant Communities (London: UCL Press, 1998), p. 87. 157 Findlay, “Return to Yemen,” p. 218. 158 In regard to the overall impacts of the mass return on the Yemenite economy during the early 1990s, see: Nicholas Van Hear, “The Socio-Economic Impact of the Involuntary Mass Return to Yemen in 1990,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vo. 7, No. 1 (1994), pp. 18–38. 159 ESCWA, Survey, 1996–1997, p. 36. 160 Gulf States Newsletter, April 18, 2003, p. 19. 161 EIU, Country Profile–Tunisia, 1999–2000, p. 22; p. 41, table 2; Country Profile–Tunisia, 2001, p. 25; IMF, Tunisia: Recent Economic Developments, Country Report No. 00/37, March 2000, pp. 17–18. 162 IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook–1999, p. 665. 163 Nora Ann Colton, “The Maghrebi Economies as Emerging Markets?” in Yahia H. Zoubir (ed.), North Africa in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), p. 162; Henry T. Azzam, The Arab World Facing the Challenge of the New Millennium (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 118; ILO, World Employment Report–2001, p. 361, table 4. 164 WB, World Bank Data. 165 IMF, Algeria: Selected Economic Issues, Country Report No. 98/87, September 1998, p. 49, table 15; Country Report No. 96/71, August 1996, p. 35, table 6. 166 EIU, Country Profile–Algeria, 2001, p. 32. 167 WB, World Bank Data. 168 EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 1999–2000, p. 28. 169 ESCWA, Survey, 2000–2001, pp. 30–31; MEED, April 20, 2001, p. 28. 170 EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 2001, p. 33.

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171 EIU, Country Profile–Syria, 2006, p. 32. 172 IMF, Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Jordan, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 12/38, April 20, 2012, p. 1; idem, Jordan: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 12/120, May 2012, p. 14; idem, Arab Countries in Transition: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges, Tokyo, October 12, 2012, p. 8; Assaad, “The Structure and Evolution of Employment in Jordan,” p. 3; ILO, Macroeconomic Policies and Employment in Jordan: Tackling the Paradox of Job-Poor Growth, Employment Working Paper, No. 118, by Sahar Taghdisi-Rad (Geneva, 2012), p. 3. 173 IMF, Morocco: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 13/110, May 2013, p. 19. 174 By 2005, Algeria’s GDP growth rate amounted to 5.5%. EIU, Country Profile–Algeria, 2006, p. 33. 175 IMF, Algeria: 2006 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 07/72, February 2007, p. 5. 176 IMF, Tunisia: 2007 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 07/302, August 2007, p. 5; EIU, Country Profile–Tunisia, 2006, p. 33. 177 UN, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Realizing the Millennium Development Goals through Socially Inclusive Macroeconomic Policies, Country Study: The Republic of Tunisia, by Mohamed A. Chemingui and Marco V. Sánchez (New York, October 2011), p. 8. 178 IMF, Tunisia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 12/255, September 2012, p. 42; ILO, Studies on Growth with Equity: Tunisia: A New Social Contract for Fair and Equitable Growth (Geneva, 2011), p. 22. 179 ESCWA, Arab Middle Class: Measurement and Role in Driving Change (Beirut, 2014), pp. 14–15. 180 Assaad, “The MENA Paradox,” p. 31. 181 Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 65. 182 Henry J. Bruton, “Egypt’s Development in the Seventies,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1983), p. 690. 183 FORBES, October 25, 1982, p. 48. 184 ESCWA, Survey, 1998–1999, pp. 174–175. 185 EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 2001, p. 14; Ha’aretz, May 1, 2002 (Hebrew). 186 ESCWA, Survey, 2000–2001, p. 23; Syria, Statistical Abstract-2004, p. 92, table 9/3. 187 Jordan Times, February 21, 1999. 188 WB, Labor Market Reforms, Growth and Unemployment in Labor-Exporting MENA Countries, by Pierre-Richard Agénor et al (Washington, D.C., 2003), p. 6. 189 Adam Bennett, “Failed Legacies,” Finance & Development, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2003). 190 Assaad, “The Structure and Evolution of Employment in Jordan,” p. 6. 191 ESCWA, Arab Middle Class, p. 81. 192 Ibid., p. 16; p. 56. 193 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 56. See also: ESCWA, The Promises of Spring: Citizenship and Civic Engagement in Democratic Transitions, written by Maha Yahya et al. (Beirut, 2013), p. 43; Boughzala, “Youth Employment and Economic Transformation in Tunisia,” p. 4. 194 WB, The Unfinished Revolution, p. 5. 195 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012- Egypt Country Report, p. 23. 196 WB, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Resolving Jordan’s Labor Market Paradox of Concurrent Economic Growth and High Unemployment, Report No. 39201-JO (December 23, 2008), p. i. 197 In 2011, about 85% of foreign workers in Jordan earned monthly salaries below JD150 (US$211) with many earning even below the minimum wage of JD143. See: QNB (Qatar National Bank), Jordan Economic Insight-2012 (Doha, 2012), p. 6.

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Ibid., p. 7. UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011, p. 2. WB, The Unfinished Revolution, pp. 5–6. Mirkin, Arab Human Development Report, p. 12. MEED, April 13–19, 2007, pp. 29–30. Mongi Boughzala, “Youth Employment and Economic Transformation in Tunisia,” Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institute, Working Paper, No. 57 (January 2013), p. 3, table 2. ESCWA, Survey, 2012–2013, p. 58. Kashef, “Egypt,” p. 26; Shaban, Ragui and al-Qudsi, “The Challenge of Unemployment in the Arab Region,” p. 75. EIU, Country Profile–Tunisia, 1989–90, p. 10. See also: Euromonitor Publications Limited, Middle East Economic Handbook, p. 381. Mohamed Farid Azzi, “Maghrebi Youth: Between Alienation and Integration,” in Zoubir (ed.), North Africa in Transition, pp. 113–114. SAMBA, “Saudi Arabia’s Employment Profile,” October 8, 2000, p. 3; Wilson et al., Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, p. 98. ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics-2002, pp. 487–488, table 3B. The Economic Research Forum, Economic Trends in the MENA Region–2002 (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), p. 91. EIU, Country Profile–Algeria, 2004, pp. 36–37. MEED, May 2, 2003, p. 23. Azzam, The Arab World Facing the Challenge of the New Millennium, p. 11. Jordan Times, July 10, 2003. EIU, Country Profile–Egypt, 2005, p. 40. Boughzala, “Youth Employment and Economic Transformation in Tunisia,” pp. 5–6. See, for example, Edward Gardner, “Wanted: More Jobs,” Finance & Development, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2003). ESCWA, Survey 2009–2010, p. 60. ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 69. ESCWA, Arab Middle Class, p. 16. ESCWA, Survey, 2014–2015, pp. 60–61; SAMA, Fifty-First Annual Report–1436H (2015), p. 40; MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 30; IMF, Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 15/286, October 2015, p. 70; UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011, p. 41. De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” GLMM, No. 1/2014, p. 4. ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 63. See also: Caroline Krafft, “Why Is Fertility on the rise in Egypt? The Role of Women’s Employment Opportunities,” Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series, No. 1050 (Cairo, September 2016). IMF, Republic of Yemen: 2014 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility, Country Report No. 14/276, September 2014, p. 11, figure 2. In 2013, the number of international tourists in Morocco was 10 million while the tourism receipts amounted to $7.1 billion — higher even in comparison to the pre-Arab Spring period. See: MEED, April 25–May 1, 2014, p. 28. On the impact of the Arab Spring on the performances of the tourism industry of the Arab countries, see: Yoel Mansfeld and Onn Winckler, “Can this be Spring? Assessing the Impact of the “Arab Spring” on the Arab Tourism Industry,” Tourism, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2015), pp. 205–223. In the case of Egypt for example, the tourism receipts declined by as much as 50% during the three years following the collapse of Mubarak’s regime. See: IMF,

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Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report, Country Report No. 15/33, February 2015, p. 12. The onset of the civil war in Libya led to a drop of 7% in Egypt’s total workers’ remittances. See: MEED, May 20–26, 2015, p. 24. Central Bank of Tunisia, Annual Report–2011, p. 43. See also: Emanuele Santi, Saoussen Ben Romdhane and Mohamed Safouane Ben Aïssa, “Assessing the Preliminary Impacts of the Libya’s Crisis on the Tunisian Economy,” Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies, Vol. 14 (September 2012), p. 7; Florence Eid, “Intra-Regional Remittances: Our Tooth Fairy,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 1109, August 2–8, 2012. IMF, Tunisia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 12/255, September 2012, p. 42. IMF, Arab Countries in Transition, p. 15. Boughzala, “Youth Employment and Economic Transformation in Tunisia,” p. 3, table 1. Central Bank of Tunisia, Annual Report–2013, p. 30. MEED, April 29–May 5, 2015, p. 16. MEED, March 25–31, 2015, p. 19; IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 15/285, October 2015, p. 7. IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, p. 17. Ahram Online, September 5, 2012. Hend El-Behary, “Egypt’s Unemployment Rate Hits Record High in Second Quarter,” Ahram Online, August 14, 2012. IMF, Jordan: 2104 Article IV Consultation, Third and Fourth Reviews under the Stand-By Arrangement, Country Report No. 14/152, June 2014, pp. 18, 22. Nuqady, “Jordanian Unemployment is Higher than Reported,” March 19, 2013. See also: IMF, Morocco: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 13/110, May 2013, p. 5. IMF, Morocco: 2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, Country Report No. 15/43, February 2015, p. 20. See the report of Al Arabiya News, October 6, 2013. MEED, “2014 Economic Review,” p. 39. ESCWA, Survey, 2012–2013, p. 51; MEED, “Youth Activation,” February 2016, p. 16. Central Bank of Egypt, Statistical Bulletin (December 2004), p. 92, table 41. The official website of the ILO, Press Release. See in this regard: ILO, World Employment and Social Outlook: The Changing Nature of Jobs-2015 (Geneva: ILO, 2015), p. 13. George Alan, “Syria: An Economy Saved by Circumstances,” The Middle East, December 1988, pp. 27–29.

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Dylan Bowman, “Millions of Expats Could be Kicked Out of Gulf,” Arabian Business.com, October 1, 2007. M. G. Quibria, “Migrant Workers and Remittances: Issues for Asian Developing Countries,” Asian Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1986), p. 79. IOM, “Facts and Figures on International Migration,” Migration Policy Issues, No. 2 (March 2003). UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration Stock: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015), table 1. WB, Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook, Migration and Development Brief, No. 24 (Washington, D.C., April 13, 2015). The International Trade theory, developed by David Ricardo in the early nineteenth century, was a logical consequence of the Comparative Advantage theory which explains why it can be beneficial for two parties to trade without barriers if one is more efficient at producing goods or services needed by the other side. In that case, free trade, both locally

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and internationally, is a “win-win situation.” On Ricardo’s International Trade theory, see: Andrea Maneschi, “Ricardo’s International Trade Theory: Beyond the Comparative Cost Example,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (1992), pp. 421–437. Findlay, “Return to Yemen,” p. 206; Douglas S. Massey et al., “An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1994), p. 701. Dilip Ratha, “Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Finance,” in IBRD, Global Development Finance: Striving for Stability in Development Finance (Washington, D.C., 2003), p. 157. Ibid., p. 164. Claudia M. Buch and Anja Kuckulenz, “Worker Remittances and Capital Flows to Developing Countries,” Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), Discussion Paper No. 04-31 (2004), p. 3. Yousif Khalifa al-Yousif, “Oil Economies and Globalization: The Case of the GCC Countries,” p. 9. Daily Mail, July 12, 2012. David Bartram, International Labor Migration: Foreign Workers and Public Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 2; 38–39. See, for example, Charles B. Keely, “Demography and International Migration,” in Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield (eds.), Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), p. 53. International Organization for Migration database. Eunkyung Seo, “South Korea’s Hottest Import: Foreign Workers,” Bloomberg Businessweek, February 21, 2013. Rodney Wilson, The Economies of the Middle East (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 74–75. On the pearl industry in the Arabian Gulf region during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, see: Mohamed G. Rumaihi, “The Mode of Production in the Arab Gulf Before the Discovery of Oil,” in Tim Niblock (ed.), Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 50–60. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Third Development Plan, 1400–1405 AH. [1980–1985] (Riyadh, 1980), p. 8. Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 76. Lorimer estimated that Oman’s population in 1907 numbered approximately half a million. See: Muhammad Zahra, “Sukan Sultanat Uman,” in Muhammad Ahmad al-Ruythi (ed.), Sukan al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi: al-Waqi‘ wal-Mustaqbal (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Abikan, 2003), p. 358, table 2. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean, Panteion University, Athens, Greece, January 2005, p. 4. Bahrain, CIO, Statistical Abstract–2000, table 2.01. Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 117. Abbas Abdelkarim, “Oil, Population Change and Social Development in the Gulf: Some Major Trends and Indicators,” in Abdelkarim (ed.), Change and Development in the Gulf, p. 33; Sharon Stanton Russell, “International Migration and Political Turmoil in the Middle East,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1992), p. 720; Birks and Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, p. 26. John Willoughby, “Ambivalent Anxieties of the South Asian-Gulf Arab Labor Exchange,” American University, Washington, D.C., Department of Economics, Working Paper Series No. 2005-02 (March 2005), p. 1. The term “oil boom” relates to the sudden huge increase in oil prices in late 1973 which increased from below $3 per barrel prior to the October 1973 War to $5.12 on October 16, 1973 and $11.64 in early January 1974.

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28 29 30

31 32

33

34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44

45

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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Second Development Plan, 1395–1340 AH [1975–1980] (Riyadh, 1975), p. 20. ESCWA, Economic Diversification in the Oil-Producing Countries: The Case of the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies (New York, 2001), p. 1; Wilson et al., Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, pp. 20–21. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, The Speeches of H.M. Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 1970–1990 (Muscat, n.d), p. 78. Quoted from: Douglas S. Massey, et al., World in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 134. See: Nader Fergany, “Manpower Problems and Projections in the Gulf,” in M. S. ElAzhary (ed.), The Impact of Oil Revenues on Arab Gulf Development (London: Croom Helm and Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 157–159; Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, pp. 504–505. ECWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, No. 2 (1978), country pages. Baquer Salman al-Najjar “Population Policies in the Countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council,” in Abbas Abdelkarim (ed.), Change and Development in the Gulf (London: Macmillan Press and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 138–139. ILO, Employment Opportunities and Equity in a Changing Economy: Egypt in the 1980’s: A Labour Market Approach, by Bent Hansen and Samir Radwan (Geneva: ILO, 1982), p. 91, table 34. Roger Owen, Migrant Workers in the Gulf (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1985), p. 4. Nidhal al-Falahin, July 12, 1978; al-Thawra, January 23, 1980. See, for example, Alan Richards and Philip L. Martin, “The Laissez-Faire Approach to International Labor Migration,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1983), p. 465; Feiler, “Migration and Recession,” p. 137; Sell, “Egyptian International Labor Migration and Social Processes,” p. 101; Ann M. Lesch, “Egyptian Labor Migration,” in Ibrahim M. Oweiss (ed.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), pp. 90–91. In 1987, oil export revenues of the GCC countries totaled $45.6 billion compared to $157.8 billion in 1981 (see Table 5.1). Saudi Arabia, Fourth Development Plan, 1405–1410 AH [1985–1990], p. 50. Al-Bayan, August 13, 1984. EIU, Country Profile–Oman, 1992/93, p. 13. J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, “Repatriation, Remittances and Reunions: What is Really at Stake for Arab Countries Supplying Labour to the Gulf Co-Operation Council States,” in Charles E. Davies (ed.), Global Interests in the Arab Gulf (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 105. Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 504. See: Winckler, “The Economic Consequences of the Iraqi Crisis on the Mashreq Countries,” pp. 396–397. Muhammad Ali al-Ramadhan, “New Population Policy in Kuwait: The Quest for a Balance in the Population Composition,” Population Bulletin of ESCWA, No. 43 (1995), p. 39. This section is based on my article “Labor and Liberalization: The Decline of the GCC Rentier System,” in Joshua Teitelbaum (ed.), Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 59–85. Andrzej Kapiszewski, National and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001), pp. 197–198. Massey et al., World in Motion, p. 159.

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238 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56

57

58 59 60 61

62

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64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

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Owen, Migrant Workers in the Gulf, p. 4. ESCWA, Return Migration, p. 10. Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 509. Sulayman Khalaf and Saad al-Kobaisi, “Migrants’ Strategies of Coping and Patterns of Accommodation in the Oil-Rich Gulf Societies: Evidence from the UAE,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1999), p. 282. Channel News Asia, June 5, 2016. Sharon Stanton Russell, “Politics and Ideology in Migration Policy Formulation: The Case of Kuwait,” International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1989), p. 36. For example, in April 1975, the Saudi authorities abolished income tax for foreign labor. See: EIU, QER, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, No. 2 (1975), p. 5. UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division and UNFPA, Population Policy Compendium-Saudi Arabia (New York, 1981), p. 5. A prominent factor in the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran was a mistaken socioeconomic policy implemented by the Shah since the early 1960s in which the oil wealth was concentrated in the hands of the elite, while the vast majority of the population, particularly those of the lowest strata, not only did not benefit from the oil wealth, but rather suffered greatly from the consequences of hyperinflation. See: Jahangir Amuzegar, “The Iranian Economy before and after the Revolution,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), pp. 414–415. In the case of the UAE, for example, development expenditures declined by more than half in 1983 compared to the previous year, the last one of the “oil decade.” See: Al-Bayan, August 15, 1984. J. S Birks, I. J. Seccombe and C. A. Sinclair, “Labour Migration in the Arab Gulf States: Patterns, Trends and Prospects,” International Migration, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1988), p. 270. “Growing Concern Over Dependence on Foreign Labor,” Arab Oil, Vol. 13, No. 9 (1983), p. 28. MERI Report, United Arab Emirates (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 46. The UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Restrictive Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf: Effectiveness and Implications for Sending Asian Countries,” by Nasra M. Shah (May 5, 2006), p. 4. K. L. Kohli and Musa‘ad al-Omaim, “Changing Patterns of Migration in Kuwait,” Population Bulletin of ESCWA, No. 32 (June 1988), p. 92; UN, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Case Studies in Population Policy: Kuwait, Population Policy Paper No. 15 (New York, 1988), p. 51. The difference in the required minimum income was due to the fact that government employees, including foreigners, enjoyed the privilege of certain services, while those employed in the private sector did not. See: UN, Case Studies in Population Policy: Kuwait, p. 38. Shah, “Restrictive Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf,” p. 1. Saudi Arabia, Fourth Development Plan, 1405–1410 AH [1985–1990], pp. 50–51. MEED, March 29, 1986, p. 8. Saudi Economic Survey, March 16, 1988, p. 8. Middle East Newsletters, Gulf States, April 20, 1987, pp. 11–12. Gulf States Newsletter, August 21, 1989, p. 13; EIU, Country Report, Bahrain, Qatar, No. 2 (1993), p. 10. MEED, “Special Report–Saudi Arabia,” June 1979, p. 8. Gulf States Newsletter, July 9, 1990, p. 14. See, for example: Gulf States Newsletter, November 20, 1995; Rob Franklin, “Migrant Labor and the Politics of Development in Bahrain,” MERIP Reports, Vol. 15, No. 4 (May 1985), p. 10; Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 5; Robert E. Looney, The Economic Development of Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the Oil Prices Decline (Greenwich and London: JAI Press, 1990), p. 80.

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85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

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Gulf States Newsletter, July 9, 1990, pp. 14–15. See also: MEED, March 12, 1993, p. 46. Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements and Challenges (New York: Springer, 2005), p. 360. “Gulf Population and Labour Force Structure,” The NCB Economist, Vol. 5, Issue 6 (June/July 1995), p. 8. Saudi Economic Survey, December 6, 1995, p. 5. MEED, August 14, 1998, p. 2; Azzam, The Arab World Facing the Challenge of the New Millennium, p. 176. M. Endo, “Saudization: Development in the Early 1990’s and Prospects for the Rest of the Decade,” JIME REVIEW (Winter 1996), p. 79. See also: The NCB Economist, Vol. 5, Issue 4 (June/July 1995), p. 8; Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 361, table 12.4. Said Abdullah al-Shaikh, “Demographic Transitions in Saudi Arabia and their Impact on Economic Growth and the Labor Market,” Saudi Economic Survey, September 13, 2000, p. 20, tables 3 and 4; Ishac Diwan and Maurice Girgis, “Labor Force and Development in Saudi Arabia,” paper presented at the symposium Future Vision for the Saudi Economy, Riyadh, September 2002, p. 14, figure 15. In regard to the UAE, see: Steffen Hertog, “Arab Gulf States: An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies,” GLMM, No. 1/2014, p. 7. SAMA, Annual Report–2002, p. 321, table 18.9. Mary Ann Tetreault, “Kuwait’s Economic Prospects,” Middle East Executive Report (January 1993), p. 12. “Gulf Population and Labour Force Structure,” The NCB Economist, Vol. 5, Issue 6 (June/July 1995), p.7; Gulf States Newsletter, November 20, 1995, p. 10. ESCWA, Statistical Abstract, Sixteenth Issue, pp. 145–146. Hossein Askari, Vahid Nowshirvani and Mohamed Jaber, Economic Development in the GCC: The Blessing and the Curse of Oil (Greenwich and London: JAI Press, 1997), pp. 71–72. Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 338. Al-Shaikh, “Demographic Transitions in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 15, 19, 21. Beblawi, “The Rentier State,” p. 91. See also: Peter N. Woodward, Oil and Labor in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and the Oil Boom (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 19. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Development, General Census of Population, Housing and Establishments-1993 (Muscat 1995), p. 55. MEED, March 12, 1993, p. 8; Gulf States Newsletter, April 8, 1996, p. 13. Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 233. SAMA, Annual Report–1997, p. 267, table 2. Overall, during the 1970–2008 period, the workers’ remittances sent from Saudi Arabia alone reached the inconceivable amount of $327 billion. See: Mohamed A Ramady, The Saudi Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges, second edition (New York: Springer, 2010), p. 31. Gilbar, “Mavo: Beyn Demographya ve-Politiqa ba-Mizrah ha-Tikhon” in Ayalon and Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav, p. 4. EIU, Country Profile–Saudi Arabia, 2003, p. 19; The Middle East, December 2005, pp. 27–28; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, Vol. 2 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 273–274. ESCWA, Survey, 2000–2001, p. 35. ESCWA, Survey, 1996–1997, p. 37. SAMA, Annual Report–2002, p. 324. EIU, Country Profile–Oman, 2003, p. 23; MEED, May 4, 2001, p. 24. The Middle East, November 1996, p. 28; EIU, Country Profile–Oman, 2005, p. 23. Nasra M. Shah, “Arab Migration Patterns in the Gulf,” in IOM and League of Arab States, Arab Migration in a Globalized World (Cairo, May 2004), p. 107.

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101 See, for example: Saudi Economic Survey, February 15, 1995, p. 8; Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 83; Shah, “Arab Migration Patterns in the Gulf,” p. 107; Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, “Oman 2000;” EIU, Country Profile–Bahrain, 2004, p. 22. 102 Shah, “Restrictive Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf,” pp. 5–6. 103 Akhbar al-Khalij, November 16, 2007. 104 Saudi Economic Survey, February 8, 2006, p. 19. 105 Saudi Economic Survey, February 21, 2001, p. 7. 106 Hamad Al-Sulayti, “Education and Training in GCC Countries: Some Issues of Concern,” in The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), Education and the Arab World: Challenges of the Next Millennium (Abu Dhabi, 1999), p. 272. 107 Mohamed El-Shibiny, “Higher Education in Oman: Its Development and Prospects,” in K.E. Shaw (ed.), Higher Education in the Gulf: Problems and Prospects (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), pp. 156–157. 108 Oman, The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, p. 112. 109 Saudi Arabia, Seventh Development Plan, p. 116. 110 In 1994, for example, salaries for public sector employees constituted about half of the total Bahraini governmental expenditures. MEED, November 24, 1995, p. 26. By 2002, public sector salaries amounted to as much as 40% of the total Kuwaiti governmental expenditures. MEED, October 10–16, 2003, p. 33. 111 In December 1998, OPEC Reference Basket price was $9.7 per barrel (current prices). In constant prices, this price was equal to the price prior to the October 1973 “oil boom.” 112 MEED, December 11, 1998, p. 22. 113 MEED, December 1, 2000, p. 38. 114 Saudi Arabia, Seventh Development Plan, p. 157. 115 Times of Oman, November 19, 1998. 116 EIU, Country Profile–Oman, Yemen, 1998–1999, p. 11; Hertog, “Arab Gulf States,” p. 8. 117 Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, “Oman Labour Law.” 118 Saudi Economic Survey, August 30, 2000, p. 7; Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 359. 119 Podeh and Winckler, “The Boycott that Never Was,” pp. 32–36. 120 MEED, September 8–14, 2006, p. 12. 121 SAMA, Annual Report–2006, p. 281, table 18.6; Annual Report–2015, p. 39, table 2.10. 122 Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report–2015, p. 27, table 2.5. 123 Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report–2008, p. 24, table 2.5. See also: MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, p. 21. 124 On the development of the GCC tourism industry, see: Yoel Mansfeld and Onn Winckler, “The Tourism Industry as an Alternative for the GCC Oil-Based Rentier Economy,” Tourism Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2007), pp. 333–360. 125 SAMA, Annual Report–2015, p. 29. 126 MEED, March 31–April 6, 2006, p. 8. 127 On the development of the Omani tourism industry, see: Onn Winckler, “The Birth of Oman’s Tourism Industry,” Tourism, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2007), pp. 221–234. 128 MEED, November 7–13, 2014, pp. 27, 42. 129 Sean Foley, The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 144–147; Martin Hvidt, “The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Development-Process Elements in Dubai,” IJMES, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2009), pp. 401–402. 130 Mansfeld and Winckler, “The Tourism Industry as an Alternative for the GCC Oil-Based Rentier Economy,” p. 344, table 2; p. 346, table 3; p. 347, table 4. 131 Dubai Statistics Center, “Hotels and Hotel Apartments — Emirate of Dubai.”

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132 Dubai Statistics Center, “Guests and Residence Nights at Hotel — Emirate of Dubai;” “Guests and Residence Nights at Hotel Apartment — Emirate of Dubai.” 133 MEED, December 5–11, 2014, p. 34. 134 Dubai Statistics Center, “Dubai’s 0.30% Unemployment Rate is the Lowest in the World.” 135 UAE, NBS, Population Estimates, 2006–2010 (Abu Dhabi, 2011), p. 10. 136 Dubai Statistics Center, Statistical Yearbook–2013, table 1.1. 137 Dubai Statistics Center, Statistical Yearbook–2015, table 1.2. 138 IMF, Economic Diversification in the GCC: The Past, the Present, and the Future, prepared by Tim Callen et al. (Washington, D.C., December 2014), p. 13, box 3. 139 Tatjana de Kerros, “Saudi Arabia: From National Strategies to Economic Realities,” The Entrepreneurialist, March 18, 2011; IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2011 Article IV Consultation–Staff Report, Country Report No. 11/292, June 29, 2011, p. 11; Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23 (2012), p. 83; MEED, February 10–16, 2012, p. 33. 140 IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2011 Article IV Consultation, p. 19. 141 Matthew Gray, A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Occasional Paper, No. 7 (2011), p. 22. 142 Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” p. 83. 143 Françoise De Bel-Air, “The Socio-Political Background and Stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the Workforce in Saudi Arabia: The Nitaqat Policy,” GLMM, No. 3/2015, p. 13; idem, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 4–5; Mohamed Ramady, “Gulf Unemployment and Government Policies: Prospects for the Saudi Labour Quota or Nitaqat System,” International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Vol. 5 (2013), p. 476; ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 68; ESCWA, Survey, 2012–2013, p. 36; IMF, Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 15/286, October 2015, p. 74; p. 75, box 1. 144 ESCWA, Survey, 2014–2015, p. 61. 145 ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 66. 146 IMF, Saudi Arabia: 2014 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 14/292, September 2014, p. 6. 147 Saudi Gazette, April 26, 2016. 148 ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 68. 149 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States: An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies,” p. 14. 150 MEED, “2011 Economic Review,” p. 12; MEES, January 16, 2012, pp. 20–21; Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Oman,” GLMM, No. 9/2015, p. 5; Hertog, “Arab Gulf States: An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies,” p. 8; MEED, March 11–17, 2015, p. 34. 151 De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Oman,” pp. 5–6. 152 ESCWA, Survey 2013–2014, p. 56. 153 De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” p. 7; idem, “The Socio-Political Background and Stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the Workforce in Saudi Arabia: the Nitaqat Policy,” p. 7. 154 Hertog, “Arab Gulf States: An Assessment of Nationalisation Policies,” p. 15. 155 ESCWA, Survey, 1998–1999, p. 53; EIU, Country Profile–Bahrain, 2001–2002, p. 19. 156 Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report–2001, p. 17. 157 Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report–2005, p. 25, table 2.5. 158 SAMA, Annual Report–2006, p. 276, table 18.3. 159 Emiratisation.org., April 6, 2004; UAE Interact, May 2, 2005. 160 ESCWA, Economic Diversification in the Oil-Producing Countries, p. 38. 161 Adel S. Al-Dosary and Syed Masiur Rahman, “Saudization (Localization): A Critical Review,” Human Resource Development International, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2005), p. 500.

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162 Laurence Louër, “The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain,” City & Society, Vol. 20, Issue 1 (June 2008), p. 37. 163 Qatar, QSA, Labor Force Sample Survey (LFSS)–2011, p. 11. 164 MEED, April 29–May 5, 2015, p. 32. 165 Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the GCC States, No. 15 (March 2011), p. 14. 166 “Ghostworkers” are those who are allegedly employed by private sector employer in order to fill the quota percentage imposed by the authorities. Al-Kibsi, Benkert and Schubert note in this respect that: “Some companies even choose to pay low-performing [national] employees simply to meet the quota but ask them to stay home.” See: Gassan al-Kibsi, Claus Benkert and Jörg Schubert, “Getting Labor Policy to Work in the Gulf,” The McKinsey Quarterly (February 2007), p. 25. 167 MEED, February 18–24, 2015, p. 18. 168 MEED, March 16–22, 2007, p. 5. 169 SAMA, Annual Report–2015, p. 39, table 2.10. 170 Saudi Gazette, April 26, 2016. 171 The Middle East, June 2004, p. 53. 172 ESCWA, Survey, 1998–1999, p. 53; EIU, Country Profile–Bahrain, 2001–2002, p. 19. 173 Bahrain Monetary Agency, Economic Indicator, No. 5 (September 2004), p. 4. 174 SAMA, Annual Report–2011, pp. 207–217. 175 De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE,” p. 3. 176 See, for example: al-Kibsi, Benkert and Schubert, “Getting Labor Policy to Work in the Gulf,” pp. 22–23; Neelofer Mashood, Helen Verhoeven and Bal Chansarkar, “Emiratisation, Omanisation and Saudisation — Common Causes: Common Solutions?” (2009), p. 5; Ibrahim Awad, “International Labour Migration and Employment in the Arab Region: Origins, Consequences and the Way Forward,” paper presented at the Arab Employment Forum, Beirut, October 19–21, 2009, p. 6; Ingo Forstenlechner et. al., “Determining the Factors that Influence the Recruitment Decisions of Employers in the UAE,” The International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2012), p. 408; Steffen Hertog, “A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC,” in Steffen Hertog (ed.), National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Berlin and London: Gerlach Press, 2012), pp. 75–77; 88–89. 177 Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, The Ninth Development Plan, 1431–1435(H) [2010–2014] (Riyadh, 2009), p. 175. 178 Al-Kibsi, Benkert and Schubert, “Getting Labor Policy to Work in the Gulf,” p. 20. See also: ESCWA, Survey, 2003–2004, p. 44. 179 ILO, Global Employment Trends–2013 (Geneva: ILO, 2013), p. 84. 180 MEED, March 11–17, 2015, p. 34. 181 IMF, Economic Diversification in the GCC: The Past, the Present, and the Future, p. 5. 182 De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” p. 6. 183 ESCWA, Survey 2009–2010, p. 57. 184 Qatar, QSA, Labor Force Sample Survey–2011, p. 37. 185 Nasra M. Shah, “Migration to Kuwait: Trends, Patterns and Policies,” paper prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa,” Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, American University in Cairo, Egypt, October 23–25, 2007, p. 7. 186 MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 30. 187 Bina Fernandez, “Essential yet Invisible: Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC,” GLMM, No. 4/2014, p. 4. 188 SAMA, Annual Report–2015, pp. 39–40; MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 30.

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189 De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” p. 4. 190 MEED, April 8–14, 2015, p. 30. 191 IMF, Labor Market Reforms to Boost Employment and Productivity in the GCC — An Update, Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors, Kuwait City (October 25, 2014), p. 13, box 1. 192 Ibid., p. 32. 193 Ibid., pp. 6–10. 194 Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report–2011, p. 8. 195 MEES, July 25, 2012, p. 18. 196 MEED, January 20–26, 2012, p. 7; MEES, January 16, 2012, p. 11. 197 See, for example, the Qatari labor law from 1962 in Emile A. Nakhleh, “Labor Markets and Citizenship in Bahrayn and Qatar,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1977), p. 149; Qatar, Qatar into the Seventies, p. 77. 198 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 504. 199 Birks and Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, p. 137. 200 Shah, “Migration to Kuwait,” p. 14. 201 Birks and Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, p. 137. 202 Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report–1992, p. 103. 203 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries,” paper presented at UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, May 15–17, 2006, p. 9. 204 Birks and Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, p. 137. 205 Oman, Ministry of National Economy (MNE), Statistics Online. 206 Middle East International, January 21, 2005, p. 23. 207 Migration News, January 2012. 208 See, for example: Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 59; Abdelkarim, “Oil, Population Change and Social Development in the Gulf,” pp. 36–37. 209 Nazli Choucri, “Asians in the Arab World: Labor Migration and Public Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1986), p. 252. 210 For example, the data collected in 1987 from Saudi factories employing at least 100 employees illustrated that the salaries of the non-national Arabs were twice that of the Asian employees. This gap increased threefold in 1989. See: ESCWA, League of Arab States and UNFPA, “Arab Labour Migration,” Meeting of Senior Officials and Experts (Amman, April 4–6, 1993), p. 7. 211 Ibid., Kapiszewski, “Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries,” pp. 6–7. 212 See, for example: ESCWA, Survey, 1992, p. 120; Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, p. 142. 213 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration Stock, various issues. 214 Qatar Information Exchange, Qatar Monthly Statistics (June 2016), p. 13. 215 UAE, NBS, Population Estimates, 2006–2010 (Abu Dhabi, 2011), p. 10. 216 Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbook–2010, table 2-1. 217 Dubai Statistics Center, Population by Sex–2015. 218 Ian J. Seccombe and Richard I. Lawless, “State Intervention and the International Labour Market: A Review of Labour Emigration Policies in the Arab World,” in Reginald Appleyard (ed.), The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1989), pp. 69–78. 219 By 1978, South Yemen’s population numbered 1.8 million. See: ECWA and League of Arab States, Statistical Indicators of the Arab World for the Period of 1970–1979 (Beirut, 1981), p. 4, table I-1. 220 Winckler, Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba‘thist Syria, p. 87.

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ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 192. MEED, May 29, 1979, p. 47. Sales, International Migration Project: Syrian Arab Republic, pp. 63–64. On the “export” of Egyptian teachers to other Arab countries during the Nasserite period, see: S. A. Messiha, “The Export of Egyptian School Teachers,” Cairo Papers in Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1983). On the Egyptian labor emigration policy prior to the June 1967 War, see: Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “The Shift in Egypt’s Migration Policy: 1952–1978,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1982), pp. 55–56. Ralph R. Sell, “Gone For Good?” Cairo Papers in Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1987), p. 28; “Employment Opportunities and Equity in Egypt,” Part III, M.E.N. Economic Weekly, November 25, 1983, p. 10. Lesch, “Egyptian Labor Migration,” pp. 102–106. John M. Wardwell, “Jordan,” in William J. Serow et al. (eds.), Handbook of International Migration (New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 168. Al-Ra’y, July 14; July 29; November 27, 1986. Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 65, table 3.3. Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd., GCC Market Report–1990. Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 507. A similar view was presented by Shafik, who claims that the large-scale inter-Arab labor migration was to the benefit of Egypt, Jordan and Yemen in light of their surplus workforces. See: Nemat Shafik, “Has Labor Migration Promoted Economic Integration in the Middle East?” in Sirageldin and al-Rahmani (eds.), Population and Development Transformations in the Arab World, p. 178. Quoted from: Georges Sabagh, “Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries: ‘Sojourners’ or ‘Settlers”? in Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, p. 350. Sell, “Egyptian International Labor Migration and Social Processes,” p. 87. See, for example: Nasrah M. Shah, “Arab Labour Migration: A Review of Trends and Issues,” International Migration, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1994), pp. 10–11; UNDP, Jordan Human Development Report–2004 (Amman, 2004), p. 36. Ibrahim M. Oweiss, “Migration of Egyptians,” L’Égypte Contemporaine, No. 381 (July 1980), p. 6. See also: Rodney Wilson, “Whither the Egyptian Economy?” British Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, No.2 (1993), pp. 211–212. Fred Halliday, “Labor Migration in the Arab World,” Merip Reports (May 1984), p. 8. Mostafa H. Nagi, “Labor Migration and Development in the Middle East: Patterns, Problems, and Policies,” International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1982), pp. 204–205. WB, Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa, by Ismail Serageldin et al. (Published for the WB by Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 68. WB, World Development Report–1985, pp. 176–177, table 2. On the discussion of the contribution of the workers’ remittances to the Arab laborexporting countries, see: Kapiszewski, “Arab Labor Migration to the GCC Countries,” pp. 126–129. Philippe Fargues, “Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?,” in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 166. In the late 1980s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali said regarding Egypt’s demographic burden that: “Egypt with 20 million people could have been a Mediterranean country, a Greece or Portugal. Egypt with 70 million people will be Bangladesh.” Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 164. See, for example: Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 208.

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Between Pro-Natalism and Anti-Natalism in the Arab Countries

Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. xiii. Mercantilism (originally from the Latin mercāns, or “buyer”) also called “commercialism,” is an economic theory which dominated the more developed parts of Europe during the fifteenth until the late eighteenth century after the decline of the feudal system. The core of the theory is that the wealth of nation rests first and foremost on a positive balance of trade. Thus, the main aim of any government in the economic arena is to implement policies that would secure an accumulation of monetary reserves as much as possible. This policy was one of the main trigger for the European colonialism. William Petersen, Founder of Modern Demography: Malthus (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 40. Ibid., p. 143. On Condorcet’s demographic perception, see: Steven K. Wisensale and Amany A. Khodair, “The Two-child Family: The Egyptian Model of Family Planning,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1998), p. 503; Nam and Philliber, Population, p. 38; John Avery, Progress, Poverty and Population: Re-reading Condorcet, Godwin and Malthus (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 1–12. Geometric ratio: 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 etc. Arithmetic ratio: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, etc. Harbison and Robinson, “Policy Implications of the Next World Demographic Transition,” p. 38. See also: Jacob Oser and William C. Blanchfield, The Evolution of Economic Thought, third edition (New York: Harcourt Brance Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 104–109. The academic literature on Malthus’ demographic perception is enormous. See, for example: Avery, Progress, Poverty and Population: Re-reading Condorcet, Godwin and Malthus, pp. 55–75; John C. Caldwell, “Malthus and the Less Developed World: The Pivotal Role of India,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1998), pp. 675–696; Todaro, Economic Development, seventh edition, pp. 224–226; Nam and Philliber, Population, pp. 38–40. UN, Population Division, World Population Monitoring-2001: Population, Environment and Development (New York, 2001), p. 1. Maddison, The World Economy, p. 125. Paul Demeny, “Population Policy: A Concise Summary,” Population Council, Policy Research Division, Working Paper No. 173 (New York, 2003), p. 4. National Academy of Sciences, Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 70. UN, Population Division, National Population Policies (New York, 1998), p. 1. Findlay and Findlay, Population and Development in the Third World, p. 67. Another two definitions, one of a UN demographic expert group and the second of Bernard R. Berelson, the President of the Population Council (1968–1974), appear in Hanna Rizk, “Population Policies: Scope, Goals, Means and Problems,” Population Bulletin of ECWA, No. 7 (July 1974), pp. 132–134. National Academy of Sciences, Rapid Population Growth, p. 70. Dov Friedlander, Barbara S. Okun and Sharon Segal, “The Demographic Transition Then and Now: Process, Perspectives, and Analyses,” Journal of Family History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1999), pp. 496–497. Peter J. Donaldson and Amy Ong Tsui, “The International Family Planning Movement,” Population Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1990), pp. 9–10. Stanley P. Johnson, World Population—Turning the Tide: Three Decades of Progress (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 103–104. Neo-Colonialism is a political term that was widely used during the 1950s and 1960s by which the Western political-military dominance over the developing countries was simply replaced by “economic dominance.”

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See: Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East, second edition, pp. 17–19. See: Joseph Chamie, “Trends, Variations, and Contradictions in National Policies to Influence Fertility,” in Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh (eds.), The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning, Supplement to Vol. 20 of Population and Development Review (New York: The Population Council, 1994), p. 37; Kelley Lee and Gill Walt, “Linking National and Global Population Agendas: Case Studies From Eight Developing Countries,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1995), p. 259. Gabriel Baer, ‘Arviyey ha-Mizrah ha-Tikhon, second edition (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1973), p. 39 (Hebrew). UN, Population Division, Fertility, Contraception and Population Policies (New York, 2003), p. 20. Adnan Habbab, “Family Planning in the Syrian Arab Republic,” paper presented at the First Regional Population Conference of ECWA, Beirut, February 18–March 1, 1974, pp. 5–6. Quoted from: Youssef Courbage, “Fertility Transition in Syria: From Implicit Population Policy to Explicit Economic Crisis,” International Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1994), p. 142. I. Lévi, “Le Recensement de la Population de l’Egypte de 1917,” L’Egypte Contemporaine, Vol. 13, No. 67 (1922). Quoted from: Philippe Fargues, “State Policies and the Birth Rate in Egypt: From Socialism to Liberalism,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997), p. 116. Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt (Lancaster, PA: Science Press Printing Company, 1936). Azriel Karni, “Temurot be-Yahas la-Piquah ‘al ha-Yeluda ba-Mizrah ha-Tikhon,” Hamizrah Hehadash, Vol. 17 (1967), p. 230 (Hebrew). Ayman G. Zohry, “Population Policies and Family Planning Program in Egypt: Evolution and Performance,” In CDC 26th Annual Seminar on Population Issues in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, 1997 (Cairo, 1997), p. 195. Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, June 5, 1989; Zohry, “Population Policies and Family Planning Program in Egypt,” p. 194. Karni, “Temurot be-Yahas la-Piquah ‘al ha-Yeluda ba-Mizrah ha-Tikhon,” p. 231. J. Mayone Stycos et al., Community Development and Family Planning: An Egyptian Experiment (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 14. Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition, A World Bank Country Economic Report (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 110. Mohammed Naguib, Egypt’s Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955), pp. 158–162; Nazek Nosseir, “Egypt: Population, Urbanization, and Development,” in Dan Tschirgi (ed.), Development in the Age of Liberalization: Egypt and Mexico (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), p. 191. Quoted from: Saad M. Gadalla, Is there Hope? Fertility and Family Planning in a Rural Egyptian Community (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1978), p. 212. Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 302. Hussein Abdel-Aziz Sayed, “The Population Family Planning Program in Egypt: Structure and Performance,” Population Studies, Vol. 11, No. 70 (July–September 1984), p. 7. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “State, Women, and Civil Society: An Evaluation of Egypt’s Population Policy,” in Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer (ed.), Family, Gender, and Population in the Middle East (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995), pp. 59–60. Though I did not find any official evidence to support this factor. Stycos et al., Community Development and Family Planning, p. 14; Sayed, “The Population Family Planning Program in Egypt,” p. 7.

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On ‘Abd al-Nasser’s populist leadership style, see: Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, “Introduction: Nasserism as a Form of Populism,” in Podeh and Winckler (eds.), Rethinking Nasserism, pp. 18–28. Fouad Ajami quoted in the Preface of Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), p. 9. Donaldson, Nature Against Us, p. 117. Other major donors to the UNFPA were Japan and Sweden. Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh, “The New Politics of Population,” in Finkle and McIntosh (eds.), The New Politics of Population, pp. 8–9. Donaldson, Nature Against Us, p. 42; p. 48, table 3.1. Nam and Philliber, Population, p. 299. John W. Thomas and Merilee S. Grindle, “Political Leadership and Policy Characteristics in Population Policy Reform,” in Finkle and McIntosh (eds.), The New Politics of Population, p. 53. G.M. Stubbs, “Population Policy in the Arab Countries,” in Abdel-Rahim Omran, Population in the Arab World: Problems and Prospects (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 181. UN, Fertility, Contraception and Population Policies, p. 20. IBRD, The Population Program of the Government of Tunisia: A Second Review, Report No. 651-TUN (February 27, 1975), p. 6. On the earlier stages of the Tunisian family planning program, see: IPPF-Middle East and North Africa Region, “Family Planning and Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” in James Allman (ed.), Women’s Status and Fertility in the Muslim World (New York and London: Praeger, 1978), pp. 42–43; Robert J. Lapham, “Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1 May 1977), pp. 7–8. IBRD, The Population Program of the Government of Tunisia, p. 3. Al-Ahram, May 22, 1962. The English translation appears in: Nissim Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology: Its Exponents and Critics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), pp. 195–265. On the factors for the collapse of the unification between Egypt and Syria, see: Elie Podeh, The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), pp. 110–158. Robinson and El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, p. 43. On Egypt’s family planning program during the second half of the 1960s, see: Gad G. Gilbar, “Family Planning Under Mubarak,” in his Population Dilemmas in the Middle East, pp. 117–119; Gadalla, Is There Hope?, pp. 213–219. Wisensale and Khodair, “The Two-child Family,” p. 505. IBRD, The Economic Development of Morocco (Published for IBRD by The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1966), p. 10. Ibid., p. 91. IPPF-Middle East and North Africa Region, “Family Planning and Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 37. IBRD, The Economic Development of Morocco, p. 94. Farzaneh (Nazi) Roudi, “Fertility Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” paper presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, March 21–25, 2001, p. 22. Philippe Fargues, “International Migration in the Arab Region: Trends and Policies,” paper presented at the UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, May 15–17, 2006, p. 16. Allman, “The Demographic Transition in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 292. Lapham, “Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 6.

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87 88 89 90 91 92

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Scott D. Grosse, “The Politics of Family Planning in the Maghrib,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1982), p. 28. IBRD, The Economic Development of Morocco, p. 94. Muhammad Faour, “Fertility Policy and Family Planning in the Arab Countries,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 20, No. 5 (1989), p. 256; Mazur, “Beyond the Numbers,” p. 11. Sayed, “The Population Family Planning Program in Egypt,” pp. 9–12. See also: WB, Egypt: Staff Appraisal of a Second Population Project (Washington, D.C., August 14, 1978), p. 4. Gadalla, Is there Hope? pp. 215–219; Mahasen Mostafa Hassanin et al., “Estimating Family Planning Target Population of Egypt in 1997,” in CDC 24th Annual Seminar on Population Issues and the Challenges of the 21st Century in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, Research Monograph Series No. 24 (Cairo, 1995), p. 441; Robinson and El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, pp. 46–47. Fargues, “Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?” p. 165. Chamie, “Trends, Variations, and Contradictions,” p. 37. Youssef Courbage, “Economic and Political Issues of Fertility Transition in the Arab World: Answers and Open Questions,” Population and Environment, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1999), p. 370. Fargues, “International Migration in the Arab Region: Trends and Policies,” p. 16. London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and the UNPF, by Kelley Lee et al., Population Policies and Programmes: Determinants and Consequences in Eight Developing Countries (London, 1995), p. 20. Population and Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1978), p. 373. Lee and Walt, “Linking National and Global Population Agendas,” p. 259. Roudi, “Fertility Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 14. Gilbar, “Nasser’s Soft Revolution,” pp. 84–85. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1984, p. 3. Ibid. Hartley, Population: Quantity vs. Quality, pp. 310–311; Johnson, World Population, p. 93. Syrian Arab Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, CBS, Socio-Economic Development in Syria, 1960–1970, Studies Series No. 73 (Damascus, 1973), p. 47. Charles W. Warren et al., “Fertility and Family Planning in Jordan: Results from the 1985 Jordan Husbands’ Fertility Survey,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1990), pp. 33–34. US Department of Health, IPPF Situation Report: Jordan (Washington, D.C., January 1972), p. 14. ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 101. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2002 (Amman, June 2003), p. 3. Ronald Freedman and Bernard Berelson, “The Record of Family Planning Programs,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1976), p. 5. UN, Fertility, Contraception and Population Policies, p. 16. Donaldson and Tsui, “The International Family Planning Movement,” p. 11; Godfrey Roberts, “Population Policy Issues in Selected Asian Countries,” in Godfrey Roberts (ed.), Population Policy: Contemporary Issues (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 86. ECA, Food Security and Sustainable Development Division, “Population Policies, Environment and Sustainable Development in the ECA Region,” paper presented at Nexus Seminar, North Africa sub-Regional Development Center, Tangier, June 26–29, 1998, pp. 2–3. WB, Population and Development: Implications for the World Bank (Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 51–52. UNFPA, Population Perspectives: Statements by World Leaders (New York, 1984), p. 100.

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Donaldson, Nature Against Us, p. 114. US Department of Health, IPPF Situation Report: Bahrain, p. 2. On the confrontation between the Ba‘thi-‘Alawi regime and the Muslim Brothers since the mid-1970s, see: Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba‘thist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 291–299; Moshe Ma‘oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp. 159–163. UNFPA, Population Perspectives: Statements by World Leaders, p. 145. See, for example: Tishrin, June 22, 1980. Tishrin, May 30, 1982. A broader discussion on the Syrian natalist policy during the “oil decade,” appears in: Winckler, Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba‘thist Syria, pp. 111–114. Asher Susser, “ha-Ahim ha-Muslemim be-Yarden: Du-Qiyum ve-‘Imut Mevuqar,” in Meir Litvak (ed.), Islam ve-Demoqratyya ba-‘Olam ha-‘Aravi (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1997), pp. 125–126 (Hebrew). On the Jordanian anti-natalist measures, see: Gad G. Gilbar, “Jordan’s Road to Family Planning Policy,” in his Population Dilemmas, pp. 73–76; Onn Winckler, Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, 1950–1994 (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1997), pp. 82–84. Charles F. Gallagher, “Population and Development in Egypt, Part 1: Birth and Death on the Nile,” American University Field Staff Report, No. 31 (1981), p. 11; Robinson and ElZanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, pp. 53–59; Allen C. Kelley, Atef M. Khalifa and M. Nabil El-Khorazaty, Population and Development in Rural Egypt (Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982), pp. 40–41; Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2005, p. 3; Sayed, “The Population Family Planning Program in Egypt,” p. 19; WB, Egypt: Staff Appraisal of A Second Population Project, p. 5; Stycos et al., Community Development and Family Planning, p. 15; al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, June 21, 1982; June 5; June 12, 1989. Roudi, “Fertility Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 16; Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2005, p. 3; al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, February 6, 1982. On the relationship between Sadat and the Islamic opposition in Egypt, see: Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 206–208. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “State, Women, and Civil Society,” p. 65. Lippman, Egypt After Nasser, p. 162. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1992, p. 28, table 1-18. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1984, p. 30. Ibid., p. 8. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1992, p. 28, table 1-18. Ami Ayalon, “Demographya, Politiqa, ve-Masoret be-Mitzrayim shel Mubarak,” in Ayalon and Gilbar (eds.), Demographya ve-Politiqa be-Medinot ‘Arav, p. 32 (Hebrew). MEED, December 2, 1983, p. 10; August 10, 1984, p. 10. Egypt, CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1992, p. 28, table 1-18. Hassan M. Yousif and Ahmad A. Hammouda, “Alternative Population Projection Scenarios by Education Attainment for Egypt, the Sudan and Tunisia,” Population Bulletin of ESCWA, No. 43 (1995), p. 68. See also: Jeffrey G. Williamson and Tarik M. Yousef, “Demographic Transitions and Economic Performance in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Sirageldin (ed.), Human Capital, p. 17. IBRD, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward A New Social Contract, by Tarik Yousef et al. MENA Development Report (Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 17.

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119 Cited from: John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 44. See also: al-Ahram alIqtisadi, December 20, 1982. 120 WB, Egypt: Staff Appraisal of a Second Population Project, p. 4, table 2. 121 On the change in the US demographic approach following the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan, see: Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, “Ideology and Politics at Mexico City: The United States at the 1984 International Conference on Population,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1985), pp. 11–16; Donaldson and Tsui, “The International Family Planning Movement,” pp. 12–14. 122 Finkle and Crane, “Ideology and Politics at Mexico City,” p. 11. 123 UNFPA, Population Perspectives: Statements by World Leaders, pp. 151–152. 124 During the 1965–1973 period, Tunisia’s GDP growth rate was 6.5% on annual average, compared to 4.1% during the 1973–1983 decade. Hence, Tunisia was the only non-oil Arab country where its economic expansion during the “oil decade” was lower than in the previous decade. 125 Finkle and Crane, “Ideology and Politics at Mexico City,” p. 1. 126 Ronald Freedman, “Family Planning Programs in the Third World,” The Annals of the American Academy, No. 510 (July 1990), p. 34. 127 Baquer Salman al-Najjar, “Population Policies in the Countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council: Politics and Society,” Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1993), p. 212. 128 Gregory Gause III. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 54. 129 Gulf States Newsletter, April 6, 1992, p. 5. 130 UN, Population Division, “Qatar,” World Population Policies, Vol. III (1990), pp. 39–40; Gause, Oil Monarchies, pp. 60–61; al-Najjar, “Population Policies in the Countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council,” p. 212. 131 See: Allan G. Hill, “Population Growth in the Middle East and North Africa: Selected Policy Issues,” in A. L. Udovich (ed.), The Middle East: Oil, Conflict and Hope (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 36; Allman “The Demographic Transition in the Middle East and North Africa,” pp. 24–25. 132 US Department of Health, IPPF Situation Report: Libya, p. 25. 133 Shirley Kay, “Social Change in Modern Saudi Arabia,” in Tim Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 180. 134 ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, No. 5 (1987), p. 4, table 2; p. 164, table 2; p. 184, table 2; p. 224, table 2. 135 Fargues, “Demography and Politics in the Arab World,” p. 5. 136 Hashem Nimeh Fayyad, Fertility in Iraq: Trends, Evolution and Influential Factors (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies–ACRPS, 2012), p. 65. 137 Lee and Walt, “Linking National and Global Population Agendas,” p. 264. 138 Louisiana Lush et al., “Politics and Fertility: A New Approach to Population Policy Analysis,” Population Research and Policy Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2000), p. 9. 139 Report submitted by the Algerian government to the UN under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, September 1, 1998 [http://www.algeria-un.org/default.asp?doc=1426]. 140 Ibid. 141 Gilbar, “Family Planning Under Mubarak,” p. 120; ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 96. 142 Zohry, “Population Policies and Family Planning Program in Egypt: Evolution and Performance,” pp. 199–200. 143 Kamran Asdar Ali, Planning the Family in Egypt: New Bodies, New Selves (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), pp. 30–31.

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144 Mona A. Khalifa, “Family Planning and Sustainable Development in Egypt,” CDC Series on Population and Development, No. 5 (Cairo, 1994), pp. 4–5; Gilbar, “Family Planning Under Mubarak,” p. 120. 145 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey–2003, p. 41. 146 Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, February 24, 1988. 147 Al-Ahram, February 7, 1989. See also Tantawi’s other speech in the issue of family planning in al-Ahram, October 22, 1989; Ayalon, “Demographya, Politiqa, ve-Masoret be-Mitzrayim shel Mubarak,” pp. 34–36 (Hebrew). 148 Al-Ahram, April 20, 1990. 149 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey–2003, p. 41. 150 Ali, Planning the Family in Egypt, p. 33; Khalifa, “Family Planning and Sustainable Development in Egypt,” pp. 12–13. 151 Population Today, Vol. 15, No, 5 (May 1987), p. 5. 152 The Egyptian Gazette, February 11; July 23, 1987. 153 UN, Population Division, “Tunisia,” World Population Policies, Vol. III (1990), pp. 159–160; Faour, “Fertility Policy and Family Planning in the Arab Countries,” p. 260. 154 ESCWA, Population Situation-1990, p. 192. 155 On the Chinese “one-child policy,” see: UN, Population Division, Case Studies in Population Policy: China, Population Policy Paper No. 20 (New York, 1989), pp. 37–45; Susan E. Short and Fengying Zhai, “Looking Locally at China’s ‘One-child Policy,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1998), pp. 373–385; Edwin A. Winckler, “Chinese Reproductive Policy at the Turn of the Millennium: Dynamic Stability,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2001), pp. 379–418. 156 See, for example: Lee and Walt, “Linking National and Global Population Agendas,” p. 264. 157 In May 1990, North and South Yemen were again united into one country. 158 Nazy Roudi, “Population Policies Vary in Middle East,” Population Today, Vol. 21 (April 1993), p. 10. 159 Gihan A. Shawky, “Detecting Changes in Fertility in Algeria, Egypt and Yemen,” CDC Working Paper No. 42 (1999), pp. 36–37; ESCWA, Population Policies and Programmes in the Arab World, by Hussein A. Sayed, Arab Population Conference, Amman, April 4–8, 1993, p. 5. 160 UN, Population Division, “Levels and Trends in Fertility in Oman and Yemen,” by Eltigani E. Eltigani, Workshop on Prospects for Fertility Decline in High Fertility Countries, New York, July 9–11, 2001, pp. 5, 9. 161 ESCWA, Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, No. 11 (2001), p. 177, table 4. 162 Mohamed Kamel Marwan, “Population Strategy, 1992/2007,” Population Studies, Vol. 14, No. 75 (July-September 1992), pp. 113–115. 163 Hassanin et al., “Estimating Family Planning Target Population of Egypt in 1997,” p. 442; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “State, Women, and Civil Society,” p. 62. 164 Arab Republic of Egypt, National Population Information Center, special issue, Cairo, October 14, 1991. 165 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2000, p. 4; Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2005, pp. 3–4. 166 Naguib Ghita, “A Seminar on the Preliminary Results of the 1996 Census on Population, Housing and Establishments in the Light of the National Population Strategy,” Population Studies, Vol. 16, No. 81 (January–March 1998), p. 103. 167 Robinson and El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, p. 115. 168 USAID, Egypt’s Population Program: Assessing 25 Years of Family Planning, by Scott Moreland (New York, March 2006), p. v. 169 See, for example, al-Ahram, December 8, 2002; al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, August 4; August 11, 2003.

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170 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2002, p. 3; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning, Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1993–1997 (Amman, 1993), p. 155. 171 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–1997, pp. 2–3. 172 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning, Economic Aid Coordination Unit, Partners in Development, No. 31 (December 1999), p. 5. 173 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey–2012, pp. 3–4. 174 Jordan Times, May 27, 2003. 175 Jordan Times, July 23–24, 2004. 176 Ebba Augustin, “Demographic Transition and Gender Systems: The Case of Jordan and Yemen,” in Hans Groth and Alfonzo Sousa-Poza (eds.), Population Dynamics in the Muslim Countries (London and New York: Springer, 2012), p. 167. 177 See: Eyal Zisser, “Syria,” MECS, Vol. 18 (1994), p. 619. 178 Syrian Maternal and Child Health Survey–1993, p. 177. 179 Mohammed al-Imadi, “The Economic and Investment Policies in Syria,” in Hans Hopfinger and Raslan Khadour (eds.), Economic Development and Investment Policies in Syria (Neustadt an der Aisch: Verlagsdrucherei Schmidt, 1998), p. 22. 180 Tishrin, May 19, 2002. 181 Report submitted by Algeria to the UN under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, September 1, 1998. 182 ESCWA, Regional Arab Population Forum, Beirut, November 19–21, 2004 (Beirut, March 2005), p. 6. 183 UN, Population Division, World Population Policies-2005 (New York, 2006), p. 13. 184 Roudi, “Fertility Policies in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 19. 185 Alison McIntosh and Jason L. Finkle, “The Cairo Conference on Population and Development: A New Paradigm?” Population and Development Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1995), p. 240; Mazur, “Beyond the Numbers,” pp. 12–13. 186 In both 1994 and 1995, Oman’s real GDP growth rate averaged only 4%. See: WB, World Data Bank. 187 International Republican Institute, Oman: Political Development & the Maglis Ash’Shura (Washington, D. C., July 1995), pp. 26–27. See also the speech of Sultan Qabus in his annual meet-the-people tour of January 1994 in al-Wasat, January 24, 1994. 188 Oman, The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, 1996–2000, p. 192. See also: The Middle East, November 1997, p. 26. 189 On Oman’s Birth Spacing Program, see: Alasdair Drysdale, “Population Dynamics and Birth Spacing in Oman,” IJMES, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 123–144. 190 ESCWA, Survey, 1996–1997, p. 133; Eltigani, “Levels and Trends in Fertility in Oman and Yemen,” p. 9. 191 Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of National Economy, Oman 2003–2004; See also: al-Khalij, April 28, 2007. 192 Eltigani, “Levels and Trends in Fertility in Oman and Yemen,” p. 5. 193 Saudi Arabia, Sixth Development Plan, p. 89. 194 UN, Fertility, Contraception and Population Policies, p. 23. 195 See, for example: SAMA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report–1421H. [2000], p. 261. 196 SAMA, Thirty-Eighth Annual Report–1423H [2002], p. 56. 197 MEED, July 23–29, 2004, p. 6. 198 Arab News, December 30, 2014. 199 J. S. Birks, “The Demographic Challenge in the Arab Gulf,” in B. R. Pridham (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 136–137. 200 The New York Times, May 2, 2013. 201 The Guardian, February 16, 2014. 202 The New York Times, May 2, 2013.

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203 Ahram Online, May 1, 2014. 204 Dr. Youssef, professor of public health at Cairo University, previously worked for the Population Council. In September 2015, she was replaced by Ahmed Rady. See: The Economist, June 6, 2015. 205 Al-Jazeera, June 9, 2015. 206 IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015. 207 Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de la Santé, Enquête Nationale sur la Population et la Santé Familiale (ENPSF)-2011,Rapport Préliminaire (Rabat, 2011), p. 17, table 9. 208 Paola Scommegna, “In Morocco, More Modern Contraceptive Use Plays Key Role in Decreasing Maternal Deaths,” PRB [http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2012/ morocco-maternal-deaths.aspx]. 209 IBRD, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa, p. 4. 210 Robinson and El-Zanaty, The Demographic Revolution in Modern Egypt, p. 3. 211 Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 133. See also: Obermeyer, “Islam, Women and Politics,” p. 33. 212 Jennifer Olmsted, “Reexamining the Fertility Puzzle in MENA,” in Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney (eds.), Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy & Society (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 86–87. 213 UNDP and AFESD, Arab Human Development Report–2003 (Amman, 2003), pp. 90–91. 214 A soft state, a term initiated by Gunnar Myrdal, refers to countries where “policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enforced at all, and in that the authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place obligations on people.” See his Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon, Random House, 1968), p. 66. 215 Girls not Brides, “Child Marriage around the World: Egypt.” [http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/egypt]. 216 Egyptian Streets, August 1, 2015. 217 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2014, p. 40, table 4.1. 218 UN, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 219 Girls not Brides, “Child Marriage around the World: Jordan.” [http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/jordan]. 220 Leonard Binder, “Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser: Iconology, Ideology and Demonology,” in Podeh and Winckler (eds.), Rethinking Nasserism, p. 57. 221 The term Dutch Disease is connected to the term rentier state and refers to a situation in which a country enjoys large revenues from the export of a natural resource and then deteriorates into a deep recession following a sharp decline in the rentier revenues. This economic phenomenon is known as the Dutch Disease because its existence was first noted in the Netherlands in the 1960s following the discovery of North Sea gas. After a relatively short period of high revenues from gas exports, the Dutch economy went into a deep recession. 222 Victor Lavy and Eliezer Sheffer, Foreign Aid and Economic Development in the Middle East: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991). 223 Alan Richards, “Oil Wealth in the Arab World: Whence, to Whom, and Whither?” in Dan Tschirgi (ed.), The Arab World Today (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 68. 224 See, for example, USAID and Egypt Population Council, Achieving Replacement-Level Fertility in Egypt: Challenges and Potential Opportunities, by John B. Casterline and Ronia Roushdy (New York, October 2006), p. 2. 225 Ibid. 226 Chesnais, “Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union,” p. 85. 227 See, for example: Lant H. Pritchett, “Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1–55.

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228 In the early 1990s, it was estimated that in the developing countries (excluding China), as much as a quarter of the pregnancies were unwanted and an even higher percentage were unplanned. See: Mazur, “Beyond the Numbers,” p. 16; David Bloom et al., “Economic Growth and the Demographic Transition,” NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper No. 8685 (Cambridge, December 2001), p. 52. 229 Robert J. Lapham and W. Parker Mauldin, “Family Planning Program Effort and Birthrate Decline in Developing Countries,” International Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1984), p. 110. 230 Todaro, Economic Development, seventh edition, p. 240. 231 Ali, Planning the Family in Egypt, p. 1. 232 WB, Population and Development, pp. 2, 6. See also: Susan H. Cochrane and David K. Guilkey, “The Effects of Fertility Intensions and Access to Services on Contraceptive Use in Tunisia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1995), pp. 779–804. 233 See, for example: UN, Fertility, Contraception and Population Policies, p. 7. 234 Gilbar, “Family Planning Under Mubarak,” pp. 132–133. 235 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “State, Women, and Civil Society,” p. 77. 236 Wisensale and Khodair, “The Two-child Family,” p. 513. 237 UNDP, Jordan Human Development Report–2004, p. 18. 238 Fargues, “State Policies and the Birth Rate in Egypt,” p. 115. 239 Fargues, “Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?” pp. 157, 165. 240 Youssef Courbage, “Issues in Fertility Transition in the Middle East and North Africa,” Economic Research Forum, Working Paper No. 9903 (Cairo, 1999), p. 7. 241 Courbage, “Fertility Transition in Syria,” p. 145. 242 ESCWA, Arab Women in ESCWA Member States (New York, 1994), p.78, table 8. 243 On the Iranian natalist policies since the 1960s, see: WB, Fertility and Family Planning in Iran, by Rodolfo A. Bulatao and Gail Richardson, Discussion Paper Series No. 13 (December 1994); Homa Hoodfar and Samad Assadpour, “The Politics of Population Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2000), pp. 19–34; Mohammad Jalal Abbasi et al., “Revolution, War and Modernization: Population Policy and Fertility Change in Iran,” Journal of Population Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002), pp. 25–46; Meimanat Hosseinin-Chavoshi and Mohammad Jalal AbbasiShavazi, “Demographic Transition in Iran: Changes and Challenges,” in Groth and Sousa-Poza (eds.), Population Dynamics in the Muslim Countries, pp. 106–109. 244 Abbasi et al., “Revolution, War and Modernization,” p. 26. 245 Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi and Peter McDonald, “National and Provincial-Level Fertility Trends in Iran, 1972–2000,” The Australian National University, Demography and Sociology Program, Working Paper in Demography, No. 94 (February 2005), p. 4. 246 By 2011, Bangladesh’s per capita GDP (PPP terms) was $3,191 and it was ranked 142 in the HDI. See: UNDP, Human Development Report–2015, p. 210, table 1. 247 On Bangladesh’s family planning policy, see: John C. Caldwell et al., “The Bangladesh Fertility Decline: An Interpretation,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 67–84; UN, “Bangladesh,” World Population Policies, Vol. 1 (1987), p. 44; Population Today, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 1998), p. 7. 248 WB, World Development Report–1982, p. 144, table 18. 249 WB, World Development Report–1992, p. 270, table 1; UNICEF, The State of the World’s Childrem-2005, p. 142, table 10. 250 Carl Haub, “Flat Birth Rates in Bangladesh and Egypt Challenge Demographers’ Projections,” Population Today, Vol. 28, No. 7 (October 2000), p. 4. 251 UN, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, p. 38, table S.9. 252 Center for Policy Dialogue (CPD) Bangladesh and UNFPA, “Re-thinking Population Policy in Bangladesh,” CPD–UNFPA Paper Series, No. 24 (June 2003), p. 1.

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253 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2014, p. 11, table 8; Jordan Population and Family Health Surbey-2012, p. 69. 254 Daily News, Egypt, April 6, 2015. 255 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey–2014, p. 10, table 6. 256 Jordan Population and Family Health Surbey-2012, p. 49, table 5.2. 257 Royaume du Maroc, Enquête Nationale sur la Population et la Santé Familiale (ENPSF)–2011, Rapport Préliminaire, p. 17, table 9. 258 IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, p. 64.

Summary and Conclusions: The Road to the “Arab Demographic Winter” 1 2 3 4

5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27

Gilbar, Kalkalat ha-Mizrah ha-Tikhon, p. 40. Richards, “The Political Economy of Economic Reform in the Middle East,” p. 7. Ellen Laipson, “The Middle East’s Demographic Transition: What Does It Mean?” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), p. 177. On the tight connection between rental income, regime survival and democracy, see: Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2001), pp. 325–361. Richards, “The Political Economy of Economic Reform in the Middle East,” p. 7. See: Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, “The Economics of the Arab Spring,” World Development, Vol 45 (2013), p. 297. Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, “Economic Growth and the Demographic Transition,” pp. 26–27. On the pattern of the rapid economic expansion of South Korea and Taiwan see: Dani Rodrik, “Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich,” Economic Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 55–107. Paul Rivlin, “Nasser’s Egypt and Park’s Korea: A Comparison of their Economic Achievements,” in Podeh and Winckler (eds.), Rethinking Nasserism, p. 278. ILO, Macroeconomic Policies and Employment in Jordan: Tackling the Paradox of JobPoor Growth, p. 3. IMF, Tunisia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, p. 42. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012- Egypt Country Report, p. 23. MEES, July 2, 2012. African Development Bank, Tunisia: Economic and Social Challenges Beyond the Revolution (Tunis, 2012), p. 17. The Economist, March 17, 2012. Hazem Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (July 2012), p. 210. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012, Egypt Country Report, p. 20. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012, Jordan Country Report, p. 18. Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, p. 29. See, for example, UNDP and ILO, Rethinking Economic Growth: Towards Productive and Inclusive Arab Societies (Beirut, 2012), p. 18. IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, October 2015, p. 22, box 6. See on this respect, Cammett et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East, fourth edition, pp. 30–31; 282–283; Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East, second edition, pp. 167–171. The family of Ben Ali’s second wife, Leila. UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report–2011, p. 1. ESCWA, Arab Middle Class, p. 14. MEES, July 16; December 14, 2012. MEED, “2014 Economic Review”, p. 40. MEES, February 8, 2013.

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256 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

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Notes

IMF, Morocco: 2013 Article IV Consultation–Staff Report, Country Report No. 14/65, March 2014, p. 16; MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, p. 44. ESCWA, Survey, 2011–2012, p. 28. IMF, Tunisia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 12/255, September 2012, pp. 6, 11. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015, p. 11; Ahram Online, September 5, 2012. ILO, Macroeconomic Policies and Employment in Jordan, p. 6. Masood Ahmed, “Youth Unemployment in the MENA Region: Determinants and Challenges,” IMF News, June 2012. IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, October 2015, p. 17, box 5. IMF, Tunisia, Country Report No. 13/161, June 2013, p. 18. ILO, Macroeconomic Policies and Employment in Jordan, p. 6. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Country Assessment: Jordan (London, September 12, 2012), p. 13. MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, p. 52. MEED, July 29–August 11, 2015, pp. 44–45. Reuters, September 11, 2012. MEES, November 14, 2014; MEED, “2014 Economic Review”, p. 41; April 25–May 1, 2014, p. 22; ESCWA, Survey, 2013–2014, p. 41; IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015, p. 6. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015, p. 6. IMF, Tunisia, September 2012, pp. 6, 11; idem, Tunisia, Country Report No. 13/161, June 2013, p. 7; Central Bank of Tunisia, Annual Report–2014, p. 21. IMF, Lebanon: 2014 Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, Country Report No. 14/237, July 2014, p. 47. On the protests in Oman within the framework of the Arab Spring, see: James Worrall, “Oman: The “Forgotten” Corner of the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Fall 2012), pp. 98–115. MEED, January 6–12, 2012, p. 22. MEED, March 9–15, 2012, p. 38. MEES, November 9, 2012. ESCWA, Survey, 2011–2012, p. 27; MEED, June 15–21, 2012, p. 20. MEED, “2011 Economic Review,” p. 12. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012, Saudi Arabia Country Report, p. 4. Oil price fell from $115 per barrel in June 2014 to around $40 per barrel in the following two years. In 2015, the Saudi budget deficit amounted to $98 billion. MEED, “Youth Activation,” February 2016, p. 42. By the end of July 2014, the total gross international reserves of the GCC countries amounted to $906 billion, up from $75 billion in 2000. See: IMF, Economic Diversification in the GCC, p. 17, box 4; MEED, “Youth Activation,” February 2016, p. 25. On the financial reserves of each of the GCC countries, see: MEED, Yearbook 2016, p. 12. MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, pp. 52–53. IMF, Morocco: 2013 Article IV Consultation, March 2014, p. 17; MEES, March 20, 2015. MEES, December 14, 2012. MEED, “Middle East Power & Water-2014,” p. 8. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015, p. 13; MEES, October 24, 2014; MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, p. 40. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p. 248. MEED, “2015 Economic Review”, p. 6. IMF, Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 15/286, October 2015, p. 70.

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Notes 63 64 65

66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

| 257

Ibid., p. 74. In 2015, oil revenues accounted for 90% of the total Saudi governmental revenues and 44% of the GDP. See: IMF, Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues, October 2015, p. 5. The full program appears in: Saudi Gazette, April 26, 2016; [http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/ntp]. See also: MEED, “Youth Activation,” February 2016, pp. 42–44; MEED Business Review (May 2016), pp. 60–61. On the long-term economic development strategy of the GCC countries, see: Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Political Economy of Arab Gulf States (London: Edwar Elgar Publishing, 2016), p. 64, table 3.1; IMF, Economic Diversification in the GCC: The Past, the Present, and the Future, p. 11, box 2. IMF, Jordan: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 12/120, May 2012, p. 34, table 1. IMF, Tunisia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, September 2012, p. 26, table 1. Ibid., p. II. MEES, March 27, 2015. MEED, March 18–24, p. 6; August 12–25, 2015, p. 18. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2014 Article IV Consultation, February 2015, p.14. MEED, March 18–24, 2015, p. 6. MEES, April 8, 2016. MEED, March 18–24, 2015, p. 7. IMF, Tunisia: 2015 Article IV Consultation, October 2015, p. 8. MEED, June 30–July 14, 2015, p. 40. ESCWA, Survey, 2013–2014, p. 42, box 6. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Jordan. MEED, July 29–August 11, 2015, p. 44. MEES, March 25, 2016.

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Daily Newspapers Arabic Al-Ahram (Cairo). Akhbar al-Khalij (Manama). Al-Bayan (Dubai). Al-Dustur (Amman). Al-Hayat (London). Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi). Al-Khalij (Sharja). Al-Ra’y (Amman). Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London). Al-Thawra (Damascus). Tishrin (Damascus). Al-Watan (Kuwait).

English Bahrain Tribune (Manama). Daily Mail (London). Daily News, Egypt (Cairo). The Economist (London).

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The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo). Emirates News (Abu Dhabi). Financial Times (London). The Guardian (London). Gulf News (Dubai). International Herald Tribune (Paris). Japan Times (Tokyo). Jordan Times (Amman). Kuwait Times (Kuwait). The New York Times (New York). Oman Daily Observer (Muscat). The Saudi Gazette (Jeddah). Times of Oman (Muscat).

Weeklies and Monthlies Arabic Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi (Weekly, Cairo). Al-Mussawar (Weekly, Cairo). Nidhal al-Falahin (Monthly, Damascus). Al-Wasat (Weekly, London).

English Africa Monitor (Monthly, London). Al-Ahram Weekly (Weekly, Cairo). The Arab Economist (Monthly, London). EIA, International Petroleum Monthly (Washington, D.C.). Gulf States Newsletter (bi-weekly, West Sussex). MEED (Middle East Economic Digest, Weekly, London). MEES (Middle East Economic Survey, Weekly, Beirut). M.E.N. Economic Weekly (weekly, Cairo). The Middle East (Monthly, London). Middle East International (Weekly, London). The New Republic (bi-weekly, New York). Population Today (Monthly, New York). Saudi Economic Survey (Weekly, Riyadh).

Quarterlies and Annuals EIU (Economist intelligence Unit). Country Report and Profile. Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS). (Annual, The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University). The Middle East and North Africa (Annual, Europa Publications, London).

Internet Websites, News and Databases Ahram Online [http://english.ahram.org.eg/]. AMNESTY International [https://www.amnesty.org/en]. Arab News [http://www.arabnews.com]. Al Arabiya News [https://english.alarabiya.net]. Australian Bureau of Statistics [http://www.abs.gov.au].

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Index

‘Abdallah, King of Jordan, 115 (see also Jordan) Age Specific Death Rate-ASDR (definition), 9, 12, 214 (see also crude death rate) Age Specific Fertility Rate-ASFR (definition), 214, 224 (see also total fertility rate) Age Structure/Pyramid (see according to the countries) Algeria (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 83 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68, 83 demographic projection, 90 demographic record, 41, 43–44, 217 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 104, 106, 108, 114, 187, 233 education, 80–81 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 68–69, 74, 82–84, 92, 187 health indicators and services, 76–77, 88, 187 labor emigration (size and policy), 153, 170 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 94 natalist policy, 153, 170–171, 182, 187–188 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 90, 187 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 171 population (size and growth rate), 65–67, 90, 170

unemployment, 104, 106, 108, 111, 114, 187 urban population (%), 69–71 Angola (crude) birth rate (CBR), 34–35 (crude) death rate (CDR), 34 demographic projection, 35–36 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate, 34–35 health indicators and services, 34, 216 natalist policy, 35 (see also Natalist policy) population (size and growth rate), 35–37 Arab Spring (see also Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen) demographic implications, 3–5, 52, 82–85, 92, 143–145, 148, 151–152, 192–193 demographic record, 4, 40–41, 44, 50, 63–64 refugees, 47, 52–53, 63–64, 210 socioeconomic causes, 4–5, 110, 156, 158, 203–205 socioeconomic implications, 4, 78, 92, 112–114, 205–209, 234 Argentina age structure/pyramid, 216 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 31–32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 33 (total) fertility rate, 30–32 natural increase rate (NIR), 32 population (size and growth rate), 33–34

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Index (al)-Asad, Hafiz, 175, 178, 187, 203 (see also Syria) “Asian Tigers” (see according to the countries) Australia age structure/pyramid, 16, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 23, 26 (crude) death rate (CDR), 23, 26 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 23, 26–27 labor immigration (size and policy), 23, 39, 117–118, 132 natural increase rate (NIR), 23, 26 Austria (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 16, 215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 10, 16 (crude) death rate (CDR), 16 demographic projection, 16 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 16

| 297

naturalization, 124 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 97, 118, 145, 150, 228 population (size and growth rate), 60, 66, 119 unemployment, 138 women’s status, 144, 200 Bangladesh economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 198, 254 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 14, 86, 214, 226 natalist policy, 14, 86, 198, 254 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 14 Belgium (see also the EU countries) demographic projection, 19–20 demographic record, 44 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 women’s status, 15

Autarky economy, 9, 213 “Authoritarian social contract/bargain,” 100, 108, 115, 188, 202–205 (see also Rentier state) Bahrain age at first marriage, 72 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 83, 181 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68, 83 demographic record, 43, 53–54, 86 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 140, 142–143, 145, 149–150, 206–207, 209, 240 education, 140 ethno-religious composition, 3, 53–54, 57, 60, 86, 143–144, 206–207, 222 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 68–69, 74–75, 83–84, 86, 92, 181, 199–200 health indicators and services, 76–77 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 94, 96–97, 140, 142, 144–145, 147, 200, 207, 240 labor immigration (size and policy), 119, 127, 130, 135, 147, 243–244 natalist policy, 174, 180–181, 191–192 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68

Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine, 3, 255 (see also Tunisia) Bendjedid, Chadli, 182 (see also Algeria) (crude) Birth Rate (see according to the countries) (the) Black Death, 6, 213 Boumédiènne, Houari, 170 (see also Algeria) Bourguiba, Habib, 167, 169, 178 (see also Tunisia) Brazil age structure/pyramid, 31 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32, 180 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 31, 33 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 30–32 natural increase rate (NIR), 30, 32 population (size and growth rate), 31, 33–34 Canada age structure/pyramid, 23, 25, 215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 23, 26

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298

|

Index

(crude) death rate (CDR), 23, 26 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 26–27 labor immigration (size and policy), 23, 39, 117–118, 132, 214 natural increase rate (NIR), 23, 26 (population) Census (definition, history), 2, 10, 40, 44, 212 (see also Demographic record according to the countries) Child labor (see according to the countries) China age structure/pyramid, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 28–29 (crude) death rate (CDR), 28 demographic projection, 29 demographic record, 44 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 28–29 natalist policy, 14, 29, 173, 183, 214, 251, 254 (see also Natalist policy) Crony Capitalism, 110, 204–205 (see also Arab Spring) (crude) Death Rate (see according to the countries) “Demographic Gift,” 23–24, 27, 29, 90, 110, 203 (see also age structure/pyramid according to the countries) Demographic Momentum, 4, 12–13, 16, 31, 33, 35, 65, 90–91, 98, 156, 167, 169, 190, 200 Demographic research, 1–3, 212 Demographic Transition theory, 2, 4, 9–14, 38–39, 50, 53, 65, 67–69, 71, 77, 180–181, 196–197, 200, 213 Denmark (see also the EU countries) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 10, 17 demographic projection, 19–20 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 17 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 women’s status, 15 Dependency Ratio (definition), 228

Dependency theory, 164, 172 Dubai (see also United Arab Emirates-UAE) economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 143 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 208 labor immigration (size and policy), 143, 152 population (size and growth rate), 143, 152 unemployment, 143 “Dutch Disease,” 195, 202–203, 253 (see also Rentier State) Egypt age at first marriage, 72–73, 194–195, 198 age structure/pyramid, 88–90, 177 Arab Spring (socioeconomic causes and implications), 200, 203–209 (see also economic development and Arab Spring) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 67–68, 74, 83, 169, 171, 176–177, 197 child labor, 69, 78 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68–69, 83, 87 demographic projection, 90, 156, 177–178, 194, 209 demographic record, 41–45, 164, 168, 217 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 74, 81, 98–100, 103–104, 106–108, 110, 112–115, 125, 156, 168, 171, 176–177, 184, 193, 202–210, 234–235 education, 80–81, 137, 168, 197 ethno-religious composition, 45 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 68–69, 74, 79, 81–84, 92, 112, 156, 171, 177, 183, 186, 193–195, 197–199, 209 foreign aid, 100–101, 206, 210–211 health indicators and services, 76–77, 86–88, 168, 186 July 1952 revolution, 165–166 labor emigration (size and policy), 100, 103–104, 141, 151–155, 165, 176, 235, 244 labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 79–80, 93–94, 97, 99, 101, 103–104, 106, 108–110, 153, 194, 206 Muslim Brothers, 168, 176–177, 192, 251

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Index natalist policy, 74, 82, 164–166, 168–170, 175–177, 182–186, 192–193, 197–199, 247, 251, 253 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 90, 182 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 100 peace treaty with Israel (economic dividends), 100, 103, 188, 229 population (size and growth rate), 65–67, 82, 90, 104, 108, 112, 177, 200, 244 unemployment, 62, 98–99, 102–104, 106, 108, 111–113, 154, 203, 206, 235 urban population (%), 69–71 workers’ remittances, 195, 235 Étatism, 42, 81, 99, 114, 164, 166, 204 (the) European Union (EU) Countries (see also according to the member states) age structure/pyramid, 16, 18–19 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 14 (crude) death rate (CDR), 15 demographic projection, 18–19, 23 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 15 ethno-religious composition, 18–19 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 14–19, 118, 214 health indicators and services, 10 labor immigration (size and policy), 3, 15–16, 18–19, 23, 117–118 natalist policy, 13, 15, 19, 118, 196 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 10–12, 15–16, 18 population (size and growth rate), 10–11, 16, 18–19 women’s status, 15 Failed State, 3, 12, 35–36, 39, 92, 202, 207–208, 212, 214 Family Planning (see Natalist policy) (total) Fertility Rate-TFR (see according to the countries) France (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 18 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 17

| 299

demographic projection, 19–20 demographic record, 44 ethno-religious composition, 18 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12–13, 15, 17–18 labor immigration (size and policy), 13, 18, 117 natalist policy, 13 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 17 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 (the) GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) States (see according to the member states) Germany (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 16, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 10, 16–17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 16–17 demographic projection, 16, 19–20 demographic record, 44 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18, 38 labor immigration (size and policy), 117 natalist policy, 38 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 12, 16–17, 214 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 Global population (see Worldwide population) Graunt, John, 1–2, 212 (see also Demographic research) Greece (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 16, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 17 demographic projection, 16, 19–20 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 11, 17 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 Guillard, Achille, 2 (see also Demographic research) Hassan II, King of Morocco, 169 (see also Morocco)

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300

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Index

Hong Kong age structure/pyramid, 27, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 24, 27–28 (crude) death rate (CDR), 28 demographic projection, 29 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 27, 29 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 24, 27–30 natural increase rate (NIR), 28 Human Development Index (HDI), 34, 36

economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 198–199, 238 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 30–32, 86, 193, 198, 200 Islamic revolution (1979), 134, 151, 238 natalist policy, 93, 188, 198, 254 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 30, 32 population (size and growth rate), 31, 33–34

Hungary (see also the EU countries) age at first marriage, 20 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 21 (crude) death rate (CDR), 21 demographic projection, 24 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 20–21 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 21–22 natural increase rate (NIR), 20–21 population (size and growth rate), 23–24

Iraq civil war, 92, 113 demographic record, 43 ethno-religious composition, 3, 63, 85 family planning (see natalist policy) health indicators and services, 76–77 labor immigration (size and policy), 93, 141 natalist policy, 93, 181, 254 (see also Natalist policy)

Husayn, King of Jordan, 178 (see also Jordan)

Israel ethno-religious composition, 85–86 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 85–86, 227 labor immigration (size and policy), 227 natalist policy, 3–4, 86, 212, 227 (see also Natalist policy)

Husayn, Saddam, 47, 56, 113, 115, 154, 189 (see also Iraq) India (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32, 180 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31–32 labor emigration (to the GCC states), 151 natalist policy, 164, 171, 173, 183 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 32 Infant and child mortality rate (see health indicators and services according to the countries) (the) International Trade theory, 116, 235–236 (see also David Ricardo) Iran age structure/pyramid, 31 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 31, 33

Italy (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 16, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 16–17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 16–17 demographic projection, 12, 16, 19–20 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 11–12, 16–17, 214 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 Japan age structure/pyramid, 27, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 28 (crude) death rate (CDR), 28 demographic projection, 29 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 28–30, 118 health indicators and services, 213 labor immigration (size and policy), 29, 118

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Index natalist policy, 29 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 28–29 Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom of age at first marriage, 72, 79, 195 age structure/pyramid, 88–90 Arab Spring (socioeconomic causes and implications), 203–209 (see also economic development and Arab Spring) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 83, 176, 186 child labor, 69, 78 (crude) death rate (CDR), 69, 83 demographic projection, 90 demographic record, 42–43, 45–47, 63, 217–218 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 81, 98–100, 102–103, 105–108, 112–113, 115, 156, 176, 186, 202–207, 210, 230 education, 80–81, 197 ethno-religious composition, 46, 189 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 68–69, 74, 78–79, 81–84, 92, 176, 193, 197–199 foreign aid, 100, 102, 115, 206, 210–211 health indicators and services, 76–77, 88, 173, 176, 186 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 80, 94, 99–101, 105, 109–110, 153, 206 labor immigration/emigration (size and policy), 93, 99, 101–102, 104–106, 110–111, 113, 132, 141, 151, 153–154, 156, 176, 186, 230, 233, 244 natalist policy, 81, 156, 172–173, 176, 186–188, 197–198, 212, 249 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 46, 68, 172 Palestinians population/refugees (in Jordan), 46–47, 153, 210, 218 peace treaty with Israel (economic dividends), 105, 115, 188, 232 population (size and growth rate), 46, 66–67, 186 refugees (Iraqis and Syrians), 47, 63, 113–114, 154, 210, 218 (see also Arab Spring) unemployment, 63, 93, 98, 102, 105–106, 108, 111–113, 154, 203, 235 urban population (%), 70, 102 workers’ remittances, 102, 153, 195

| 301

Kenya (crude) birth rate (CBR), 34 (crude) death rate (CDR), 34 demographic projection, 35 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 34–35 health indicators and services, 216 population (size and growth rate), 35–37 Korea, South age structure/pyramid, 27, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 27–28 (crude) death rate (CDR), 28 demographic projection, 29 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 27, 29, 255 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 27–28, 30, 118 labor immigration (size and policy), 28–29, 118 natalist policy, 166, 171 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 28 Kuwait (crude) birth rate (CBR), 49–50, 68, 83 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68–69, 83 demographic record, 43, 47, 218 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 126, 144, 147, 149–150, 209, 240 education, 81 ethno-religious composition, 219 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 68–69, 74, 79, 83, 92, 196 health indicators and services, 76–77, 87–88, 92, 191 labor immigration (size and policy), 126–128, 130, 132, 135–136, 145, 149–150, 158, 240 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 94–95, 135–136, 144–145, 147, 240 natalist policy, 180–181, 191, 196 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 92 naturalization, 124 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 118, 150, 180 population (size and growth rate), 66, 119

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302

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Index

(the) Kuwaiti Crisis (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 1990), 104–106, 114, 126, 151, 154, 183 Labor Force (see according to the countries) (international) Labor migration (size and policies), 13, 116–118, 129, 131–132, 244 (see also labor emigration/immigration according to the countries) Lebanon Arab Spring (socioeconomic causes and implications), 210 (see also economic development and Arab Spring) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68 (crude) death rate (CDR), 53, 68 demographic projection, 91 demographic record, 42–44, 52–53, 86 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 99, 115, 199, 206, 210 education, 81 ethno-religious composition, 52–53, 86, 220 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31, 50, 53, 68–69, 71, 81, 84, 86, 91, 193, 199–200 labor emigration/immigration (size and policy), 53, 104, 111, 154, 220 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 81 natural increase rate (NIR), 53, 68, 91 population (size and growth rate), 91 refugees (Syrians, see also Arab Spring), 53, 210 urban population (%), 70 women’s status, 71, 199 Libya civil war, 92, 113, 235 (see also Arab Spring) demographic projection, 92 demographic record, 42–43, 63 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 103, 113 labor immigration (size and policy), 113 family planning (see natalist policy) natalist policy, 181 (see also Natalist policy) Life Expectancy (see health indicators and services according to the countries)

Malaysia (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 33 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31–32 natalist policy, 183 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 31–33 population (size and growth rate), 33–34 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 161, 164, 201, 245 Marquis de Condorcet, 160–161, 245 Median Age (see age structure/pyramid according to the countries) Mercantilism, 160, 245 Mexico age structure/pyramid, 216 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 33 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 30–32 natural increase rate (NIR), 31–32 population (size and growth rate), 33–34 Middle Class, 4, 9, 15, 51, 78, 108–109, 114–115, 132, 199, 205, 210 Morocco age at first marriage, 73 age structure/pyramid, 89–90, 169 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 83 child labor, 69, 78 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68, 83 demographic record, 42–45, 193 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 81, 103–104, 106–108, 112–115, 169, 202, 205–207, 234 education, 80–81 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 68–69, 73–74, 78, 81–84, 92, 193, 198–199, 224–225 health indicators and services, 76–77, 88 labor emigration (size and policy), 154 labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 94

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Index natalist policy, 169–170, 174, 193, 253 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 169 population (size and growth rate), 65–67 unemployment, 104, 106, 108, 111, 114 urban population (%), 69–71 workers’ remittances, 169

| 303

demographic projection, 19–20 demographic record, 44 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18, 216 labor immigration (size and policy), 16 natural increase rate (NIR), 16–17 population (size and growth rate), 16, 19–20

Mortality Rate (see crude death rate according to the countries)

Notestein, Frank W., 9–10 (see also Demographic Transition theory)

Mubarak, Husni, 3, 82, 93, 177–178, 182, 192, 197, 204–205, 210, 234 (see also Egypt)

Oil price, 5, 55, 96, 100, 102–103, 115, 120, 122, 125–126, 134, 140, 145, 149, 157, 178, 181, 188, 190, 201, 204, 207–208, 210, 230, 236–237, 240, 256–257 (see also OPEC and according to the oilexporting countries)

“Muslim Brothers” (see according to the countries) Mursi, Muhammad, 192–193, 205–207 (see also Egypt) Nasser, Gamal ‘Abd al-, 99, 108, 125, 137, 165–171, 203, 219, 247 (see also Egypt) Natalist policy (definition and worldwide trends), 2, 5, 14, 162–164, 245, 254 (see also according to the countries) Natural Increase Rate-NIR (definition), 1, 9–10, 212 (see also according to the countries) Neo-Colonialism, 164, 166, 245 New Zealand age structure/pyramid, 23, 215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 26 (crude) death rate (CDR), 26 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 26–27 labor immigration (size and policy), 39, 117–118, 132 natural increase rate (NIR), 26 Nigeria (crude) birth rate (CBR), 34 (crude) death rate (CDR), 34 demographic projection, 36–37 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 34–35 health indicators and services, 216 population (size and growth rate), 35–37 Norway (crude) birth rate (CBR), 17 (crude) death rate (CBR), 10, 17

Oman age structure/pyramid, 48, 89–90 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 83 (crude) death rate (CBR), 68, 83 demographic projection, 91 demographic record, 43, 47–48, 64, 190 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 100, 121, 140, 142–143, 145, 149–150, 190–191, 207, 209, 229, 240, 252 education, 80–81, 140–141 ethno-religious composition, 48, 219 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 68–69, 77, 79, 82–84, 91–92 health indicators and services, 48, 76–77, 87–88 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 95, 97, 139, 141–142, 144, 147–148, 190–191, 207 labor immigration (size and policy), 97, 126–127, 130, 135, 139–142, 144–145, 151, 245 natalist policy, 48, 81, 97, 180–181, 190–191 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 91, 190 naturalization, 124 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 48, 118, 121, 139, 145, 150, 218, 229 population (size and growth rate), 66, 91, 119, 236 unemployment, 111, 138, 144, 190 urban population (%), 70

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OPEC, 55–56, 120–121 (see also Oil price) Ottoman Empire demographic record, 41 Iltizam system, 41, 217 Tanzimat, 41, 87, 226 Palestinians (in the Occupied Territories) age structure/pyramid, 91, 97 child labor, 69 demographic projection, 91 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 115 education, 197 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 79, 81, 97, 197 labor emigration (size), 132, 141 labor force (size and participation rate), 81, 97 natalist policy, 3–4, 81, 212, 226, 252 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 91 population (size and growth rate in the Occupied Territories), 91, 97 refugees (in the Occupied Territories), 63, 81, 218 Poland (see also the EU countries) age at first marriage, 20 age structure/pyramid, 22 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 21 (crude) death rate (CDR), 21 demographic projection, 24 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 20–21 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 21–22 natural increase rate (NIR), 21 population (size and growth rate), 23–24 Population Ageing Phenomenon, 2, 12, 16, 118 (see also age structure/pyramid according to the countries) Population policy (see Natalist policy) Qabus bin Sa‘id (Sultan of Oman), 47, 121, 141, 190, 252 (see also Oman) Qatar age structure/pyramid, 58–60, 222 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 59, 181

demographic record, 43, 48, 54, 57–61, 222 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 48, 58, 150, 158, 207, 209 education, 137 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 59–61, 79, 92, 181, 196 health indicators and services, 59, 87, 92, 191 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 60, 94–95, 144–145, 147, 158, 207–208 labor immigration (size and policy), 57–58, 127–130, 132, 138, 145, 147–149, 152, 158 natalist policy, 180–181, 191, 196 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 59–61, 92, 222 naturalization, 57, 59–60, 124, 222 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 118 population (size and growth rate), 57–61, 119 unemployment, 149 Reagan, Ronald, 178, 189, 214, 250 (see also United States) Refugees (see Refugees according to the countries and Arab Spring) Rentier state, 37, 62, 92, 123, 131, 134–135, 142–144, 147, 149–150, 158, 161, 180, 191, 199–200, 202, 253, 255 (see also “Soft State” and Dutch Disease) Ricardo, David, 235–236 (see also International Trade theory) Russian Federation age at first marriage, 20 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 21 (crude) death rate (CDR), 21 demographic projection, 23–24 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 21–22 labor emigration (size and policy), 22 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 23 natural increase rate (NIR), 21

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Index population (size and growth rate), 21–23 unemployment, 22 Rwanda (crude) birth rate (CBR), 34–35 (crude) death rate (CDR), 45 demographic projection, 36–37 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 34–35, 216 health indicators and services, 216 natalist policy, 34 (see also Natalist policy) population (size and growth rate), 36–37 Sub-Saharan African Countries (see according to the countries) (al)-Sadat, Anwar, 125, 151, 176–178, 249 (see also Egypt) Al Sa‘ud, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (Ibn Sa‘ud), King of Saudi Arabia, 180 (see also Saudi Arabia) Saudi Arabia age structure/pyramid, 57, 89, 98 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 56, 68, 83, 181, 221 (crude) death rate (CDR), 68, 83, 221 demographic projection, 91, 98 demographic record, 43, 54–57, 62, 64, 86, 181 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 55–56, 119, 121, 126, 140, 142–145, 147–150, 191, 207–209, 231, 238, 256–257 education, 55, 80–81, 122, 136–137, 140 ethno-religious composition, 54–55, 57, 85–86, 143–144 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 57, 68–69, 74, 79, 82–83, 86, 92, 96, 181, 194, 199 health indicators and services, 55, 76–77, 87–88 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 94–96, 98, 135–136, 139–145, 147–149, 194, 199, 207–209, 227 labor immigration (size and policy), 101, 126–128, 130, 132–133, 135–137, 139–140, 142, 145, 149–152, 191, 227, 238, 243–245

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natalist policy, 81, 92, 96, 180–181, 190–192, 199 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 55–57, 68, 91, 221 naturalization, 56, 124, 221 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 55–56, 96, 118, 120–121, 139, 145, 150, 209, 257 population (size and growth rate), 54–57, 65–67, 91, 119 unemployment, 94, 96, 111–112, 138, 143–144, 147, 149, 207 urban population (%), 70 Wahhabism, 57, 221 women’s status, 144, 181, 227 workers’ remittances, 139, 239 Singapore age structure/pyramid, 27, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 27–28 (crude) death rate (CDR), 27–28 demographic projection, 29 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 27, 29 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 27–28, 30 labor immigration (size and policy), 28–29 natalist policy, 166, 171 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 28 (al)-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 152, 193, 208–210 (see also Egypt) Smith, Adam, 160 “Soft State,” 194–195, 199, 253 (see also Rentier state and Dutch disease) Spain (see also the EU countries) age structure/pyramid, 16 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 16–17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 16–17 demographic projection, 16, 19–20 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 16–17, 214 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 (the) Sponsorship (kafala) system, 137–138, 141, 144

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Sudan civil war, 92 demographic record, 43 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 71, 74 labor emigration (size), 141, 153 Sweden (see also the EU countries) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 10–11, 17 (crude) death rare (CDR), 10–11, 17 demographic projection, 19–20 ethno-religious composition, 16 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12–13, 15–18, 195 health indicators and services, 10, 213 labor immigration (size and policy), 13, 16 natalist policy, 13 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 10–12, 16–17 population (size and growth rate), 16, 19–20 Switzerland age structure/pyramid, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 17 demographic projection, 19–20 demographic record, 44 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 17–18 natural increase rate (NIR), 17, 214 population (size and growth rate), 19–20 Syria age at first marriage, 72 age structure/pyramid, 88–89, 164, 172 Ba‘th party/regime, 50, 153, 174, 219, 249 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 58 child labor, 69, 78 civil war, 50–52, 63, 92, 113–114, 199, 210 (see also Arab Spring) (crude) death rate (CDR), 52, 68–69, 174–175 demographic projection, 92 demographic record, 42–44, 50–52, 63, 218–219 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 50, 99–100, 103–105, 107–108, 113–115, 125, 164, 172, 197–198, 219, 231 education, 80–81 ethno-religious composition, 51–52, 63, 85, 204, 219

family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 52, 68–69, 74, 77–79, 197–199 foreign aid, 100, 103 health indicators and services, 52, 88, 182 labor emigration (size and policy), 101, 104–105, 109, 141, 151, 153–154, 156, 231 labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 93–94, 97, 99, 105, 109, 154, 164, 197 Muslim Brothers, 151, 174, 249 natalist policy, 81, 93, 156, 164–165, 172–176, 178, 182–183, 187–188, 197, 249 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 52, 68, 105, 174–175 population (size and growth rate), 66–67, 108, 164, 172 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 100, 103–105, 231 refugees (see also Arab Spring), 52, 63–64 unemployment, 103, 105, 108, 111 urban population (%), 69–71 workers’ remittances, 103 Taiwan age structure/pyramid, 27, 29 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 28–29 (crude) death rate (CDR), 28 demographic projection, 29 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 255 family planning (see natalist policy) labor immigration (size and policy), 29 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 28–30 natalist policy, 166 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 28 Thailand (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32, 180 demographic projection, 33–34 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31–33 natalist policy, 166 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 30–33 population (size and growth rate), 33–34 Thompson, Warren S., 9, 14, 213 (see also Demographic Transition theory)

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Index Tunisia age at first marriage, 72 age structure/pyramid, 88–90 Arab Spring (socioeconomic causes and implications), 203–209 (see also economic development and Arab Spring) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 68, 74, 83 (crude) death rate (CDR) 68, 83, 87–88 demographic projection, 90–91 demographic record, 42–45 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 81, 105, 107–108, 110, 112–113, 115, 178, 199–200, 203–206, 210, 235, 250 education, 80–81, 197 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31, 50, 68–69, 71, 74, 81–84, 90–91, 97, 110, 180, 193, 197, 199–200 health indicators and services, 76–77, 87–88 labor emigration (size and policy), 153, 235 labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 80–81, 94, 97, 110, 113, 206 natalist policy, 74, 167–170, 173, 178, 192, 247 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 68, 90 population (size and growth rate), 66–67, 90–91, 167, 200 unemployment, 104, 106, 108, 111–113, 203–204, 206 urban population (%), 70 women’s status, 71, 199 workers’ remittances, 178 Turkey (crude) birth rate (CBR), 32 (crude) death rate (CDR), 32 demographic projection, 33 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 31–32, 193, 200 natalist policy, 183 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 32 population (size and growth rate), 33–34 Underemployment (definition), 226–227 Unemployment (see according to the countries)

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United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see also Dubai) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 50, 181 demographic record, 43, 47–49, 64 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 150, 158, 207, 209, 238 ethno-religious composition, 219 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 92, 181, 196 health indicators and services, 87–88, 92, 191 (national) labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 144–145, 147, 156, 207–208 labor immigration (size and policy), 127–130, 134, 140, 142, 145, 152, 158 natalist policy, 180–181, 191, 196 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 92 naturalization, 124 oil (production, reserves and revenues), 118 population (size and growth rate), 49, 66, 119 unemployment, 138, 149 United Kingdom (UK) (see also the EU countries) (crude) birth rate (CBR), 10, 17 (crude) death rate (CDR), 10, 17 demographic projection, 19–20 demographic record, 44 labor immigration (size and policy), 16–18, 22, 117 ethno-religious composition, 22 (total) fertility rate (TFR), 10, 12, 15, 17–18 health indicators and services, 213 natural increase rate (NIR), 10, 16–18, 214 population (size and growth rate), 16–20 United Nations (UN) 1974 World Population Conference (Bucharest), 171, 173, 178 1984 World Population Conference (Mexico), 174–175, 178 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo), 186

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United States (the US) age structure/pyramid, 23, 25, 214–215 (crude) birth rate (CBR), 23, 26 (crude) death rate (CDR), 23, 26 demographic record, 44 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 12, 26–27 labor immigration (size and policy), 23, 39, 117–118, 132 natalist policy, 250 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 23, 26 USAID, 167, 182, 189 UNRWA, 46, 218, 226 (see also Palestinians) Urbanization (see according to the countries) “Washington Consensus,” 15, 81, 178, 188, 214, 226 Welfare State, 39, 71, 114, 118, 123 (see also Authoritarian social contract/bargain) Women’s Status, 11, 60, 62, 71, 162, 180–181, 194, 196, 199, 223 (see also according to the countries) Workers’ Remittances (see according to the countries) Worldwide Population (crude) birth rate (CBR), 9–10, 37 (crude) death rate (CDR), 9–10, 37–39, 213 demographic projection, 13, 38, 214 demographic record, 44 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 9–10, 14–16, 37–38

health indicators and services, 9–10, 213 labor emigration/immigration (size and policy), 116–118 (see also according to the countries) natalist policy, 38, 166–167, 171, 173–174, 178–179, 188–189 (see also Natalist policy) natural increase rate (NIR), 6–7, 9–11, 37–38, 161, 213–214 population (size), 6–8, 10, 13, 38, 161, 213 Yemen age at first marriage, 72, 224 age structure/pyramid, 90–91 civil war, 63, 92, 113 (see also Arab Spring) demographic projection, 92 demographic record, 42–44, 63 economic development (GDP growth and economic policy), 106, 113, 156, 202, 232 education, 81 family planning (see natalist policy) (total) fertility rate (TFR), 50, 71, 74, 78, 81–82, 184 labor emigration (size and policy), 101, 106, 132, 141, 153–154, 232, 244 labor force (size, policy and participation rate), 81 natalist policy, 183–184 (see also Natalist policy) oil (production, reserves and revenues), 100 population (size and growth rate), 243 unemployment, 60, 62, 106, 113 urban population (%), 70, 78, 81 women’s status, 71 workers’ remittances, 106

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