Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle In the Middle East 9781685852283

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Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East

Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East

edited by Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1990 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 1990 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Arab nonviolent political struggle : prospects for the Middle East / edited by Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim. Includes bibliographical references. I S B N 1 - 5 5 5 8 7 - 2 2 2 - 0 (alk. paper) 1. Arab countries—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 4 5 - 2. Nonviolence. I. Crow, Ralph E. II. Grant, Philip. III. Ibrahim, Saad E. D S 6 3 . 1 . A 6 7 5 1990 320.956—dc20 90-31413 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Preface

1

2

3

vii

Introduction: Why Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East? Saad E. Ibrahim

1

Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Arab History Khalid Kishtainy

9

The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action Chaiwat Satha-Anand

(Qader Muheideen)

25

4

Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle Brad Bennett

41

5

Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Occupied Territories Philip Grant

59

6

Questions and Controversies About Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East Ralph E. Crow and Philip Grant

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Appendix A: The Role of Power in Nonviolent Political Struggle Gene Sharp

91

Appendix B: The Techniques of Nonviolent Action: Some Principles of Its Nature, Use, and Effects Ronald M. McCarthy

107

Bibliography Index About the Book

121 123 129

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Preface

This book was inspired by the discussions and debates that went on over the three days of a conference in Amman, Jordan, on nonviolent political struggle. The conference was sponsored by the Arab Thought Forum. There were approximately thirty participants in regular attendance throughout the conference, plus a number of other people who made important contributions but were unable to attend regularly. Roughly half of the participants were of Arab origin and half of other nationalities. They came from many countries, including those of the Middle East, North America, Europe, and Asia. Perhaps the basis on which they varied most, however, was their degree of experience and commitment to nonviolence: Among the group were leading advocates and practitioners of nonviolent struggle, as well as those who were skeptical about its relevance and importance and about the motives of those who raised the issue at this time and place. Ten papers were prepared, circulated, and presented for discussion. For each, a designated commentator presented a critique. In addition to the papers, four sets of case studies were offered. Following each presentation, discussion by all participants ensued. During these discussions—which were open and frank—there was a refreshing atmosphere of getting directly to basic issues, and consequently, fundamental disagreements quickly appeared, to the point of direct confrontations on several occasions. Because this was always in good faith and impersonal, it was also constructive. Without resolving all the basic issues, participants agreed they had learned a little about both violent and nonviolent struggle. The discussion ranged over topics from philosophy and religion to specific historical contexts and even current events. Although it was often disjointed and thoughts were interrupted, later to be taken up again, a few clear and continuing themes dominated the conference. First, advocates of nonviolent struggle differed significantly about the

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range of commitment they felt was demanded. Some viewed nonviolent struggle as a creed—a total life view encompassing one's state of mind, attitude, and relations with other individuals, and as an outgrowth of that, a form of social and political action. At the other extreme were those advocates who saw nonviolent struggle as a policy that can be applied through the use of specific techniques, skills, and analysis. In this form, nonviolent struggle can coexist with many other approaches, even violent struggle. Obviously, the implications for the use and application of nonviolent struggle vary greatly depending on what degree of one or the other of these two views a person adopts. A second underlying theme revolved around the essential character of nonviolent struggle. Many conference participants viewed it as a negative concept (as implied in the non- prefix) and defined it as the absence of violence. Others insisted it was a positive concept denoting a posture that, while not harming others, provides a dynamic alternative method of pursuing personal, social, and political goals. The negative view equated nonviolent struggle with pacifism and assumed that it implied surrender to violence or, at best, a compromise with those who threaten or use violence. Naturally, this view of nonviolent struggle has little to commend itself to people who have been unable to relieve through violence the oppression and injustice they suffer. The third strand of thought weaving in and out of the discussion was the question of the scope of applicability of nonviolent struggle. While some advocates of nonviolent struggle assumed its universal utility (given appropriate analysis, strategy, and tactics), others expressed doubts about its feasibility in situations of military occupation, such as in the West Bank in Palestine or in Afghanistan, particularly when the occupation is sustained by outside political and military support. Questions were also raised about the kind of social structure and political regime required to ensure the success of nonviolent struggle. In addition to these main themes, a number of related or derived issues assumed importance in the discussions. The more philosophical facets of nonviolent struggle raised questions of religion and particularly of the attitude of Islam toward violence and nonviolence, including the meaning of jihad. Education and training for nonviolent struggle were deemed to be central, whether one regarded nonviolent struggle as a creed or as a policy. Ralph E. Crow Philip Grant Saad E. Ibrahim

1 Introduction: Why Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East? Saad E.

Ibrahim

Nonviolent political struggle is not usually associated with that part of the world commonly called the Middle East. Yet recent research has revealed the nearly worldwide influence of the use of nonviolent techniques. This book attempts a preliminary examination of nonviolent political struggle in the Arab world. It is hoped that this will begin a much-needed corrective of conventional stereotypes of a people who have contributed so much to world culture. Several reasons account for the current image of the Middle East as a region where violence is as ubiquitous as the desert. The importance of the Middle East to world politics has historically made the area highly vulnerable to intervention by great powers. More recently, the logic of modernization has contributed to increasing the region's social and economic volatility. Together these forces have produced a disproportionate incidence of struggle at all levels of social organization. Often the conflicts have become violent, protracted, and costly in their expenditure of human life and material resources. The Middle East (including all the Arab world, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey) is home to less than 10 percent of the world's population, yet in the last four decades has witnessed about 20 percent of all armed conflicts. Of the world's forty most recent wars, the Middle East has had seven of the largest. The human suffering and massive destruction wrought by these conflicts will be addressed later. Underlying armed struggle in the Middle East is the region's extreme importance in global politics. It is located at a vitally strategic intersection of three continents, two oceans (the Indian and Atlantic), five seas (the Mediterranean, the Red, the Arabian, the Caspian, and the Black), and five waterways (the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, Bosporus, Gibraltar, and the Gulf of Suez). Nearly every empire builder in recorded history, from Alexander the Great to the present superpowers, has attempted to control this region.

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The blessing—or curse—of Middle Eastern geography has been compounded by the history of the region, which has given rise to most of the world's known civilizations and all of its monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Their shrines and holy places add a set of highly charged religious passions to the area's extremely critical strategic importance. In the past, the economic resources of the Middle East were not particularly more plentiful than in other parts of the world. The use of the region by the Mesopotamians, the Persians, and the Romans as the granary of the world ended with invasion, exhaustion of the soil, and encroachment by the desert. Early in this century, however, the discovery of oil added an extra dimension of importance to the Middle East. With about half of world production and more than two-thirds of proven reserves, the area has become "the most valuable piece of real estate in the world," to use the words of former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower. More recently, especially after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the region has also emerged as a substantial financial power. During the last decade, its earnings from the sale of oil and gas alone have averaged more than $300 billion annually. Ambitious development plans and the unleashing of consumerism have made the region one of the world's greatest markets for every conceivable commodity, from children's toys to lethal weapons. The susceptibility of the Middle East to intervention by outside powers has made its multifaceted importance a mixed blessing. Since the seventeenth century, all the rising actors in international politics have attempted to penetrate and control the region. In a game of political "follow the leader," Portugal, Spain, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany engaged in a series of two-tiered conflicts, fighting each other for spheres of influence within the region as well as fighting with indigenous peoples for colonial domination. In the post-World War II era, the United States and the USSR eventually replaced these older colonial powers as the leading competitors for influence in the region, each superpower seeking to control Middle Eastern events directly or through means of proxy countries. Several events in recent years illustrate the Middle East's high vulnerability to intervention. In the autumn of 1987, the naval and air forces of the two superpowers and three other major nations (Britain, France, and Italy) were on alert or actively engaged in and around the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the eastern Mediterranean. The United States attacked Libya in 1986 for "punitive" reasons and secretly supplied Iran with weapons (through controversial means that rocked the Reagan administration), only to attack and destroy Iranian naval boats a year later. In the early 1980s, land forces from the United States, Britain, France, and Italy were stationed in Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of that country; they were then drawn into armed conflict with tragic consequences. In the 1970s,

Introduction:

Why Nonviolent

Political Struggle?

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the Middle East witnessed similar military intervention from the two superpowers that nearly culminated in nuclear confrontation during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. These are only some of the more dramatic of the numerous cases of recent intervention in the Middle East by major powers. It is actually more accurate to designate such interference as a continual political, military, and economic process. In addition, although they are often publicly acknowledged only several years after the fact, clandestine and covert operations are no less an important part of this process. Such overt and covert intervention testifies to both the importance and vulnerability of the region. It also underscores the economic greed and hunger for power of the main actors in the contemporary international system. Power politics and economic greed among world powers are nothing new in history. The quest for expansion and domination applies to almost every nation able to exert its will on weaker nations. However, even when different regions of the world have equal importance, not all are equally vulnerable. The susceptibility of the Middle East to violent conflict does not stem solely from the maneuverings of the major powers. Internal structural factors also contribute to the socioeconomic and political volatility of the area. The colonial legacy of Middle Eastern societies has hampered and distorted their transition from "traditionalism" to "modernity"—a process that is not yet complete. From the seventh to the seventeenth centuries, although regional centers of power shifted from Mecca and Medina to Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and Istanbul, the profound influence of Islam and the Arabic language shaped much of the area into one sociocultural unit. Significant indigenous social and political mechanisms were developed and perfected to accommodate diverse populations within a unified region. Although the rise and fall of local empires and dynasties contributed to the endemic nature of interregional conflicts, these were always short in duration, limited in scale, and quickly healed. The traditional symbiosis of the Middle East was shattered by Western encroachment. Since that time, conflicts have become more armed, bloodier, more protracted, and more difficult to contain or heal. One major outcome of Western domination was the Balkanization of the region into numerous "states" that previously did not exist. Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the last of the successive indigenous Islamic empires, were captured by Western powers and restructured to suit their own ends. For example, the Fertile Crescent, historically one socioeconomic subregion often ruled from Damascus or Baghdad, was fragmented by Britain and France into Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. To make matters worse, the boundaries of these new states were arbitrarily and hurriedly drawn by the major powers in their scramble to assert domination over the region. The indigenous population of one of these countries, Palestine, was eventually uprooted to

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make room for establishing the settlers' colony of Israel. In Kurdistan, an entire community rooted in a centuries-old ancestral homeland was scattered among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the USSR. Similar upheavals took place in other subregions of the Middle East—the Arabian peninsula, the Nile valley, and North Africa. The many new states carved out by the colonial powers attained their independence in the post-World War II period. Created as they were, they have been condemned ever since to suffer multiple agonies. First, there are great disparities and imbalances among the Middle Eastern states. Some of them are among the world's tiniest (Bahrain and Djibouti), while others are among the world's largest (Sudan and Saudi Arabia). Some boast populations as large as fifty million (Egypt, Turkey, and Iran); others barely reach the half million mark. The United Arab Emirates has the highest annual income per capita in the world, about $20,000, in sharp contrast to Somalia's $200, one of the world's lowest. Besides these glaring disparities, the new nations faced the fundamental challenge of integrating their traditional past with the requirements of a modern society. This was in addition to the problems of economic development; the forging of a national identity; the generation of new loyalties transcending kinship, tribe, locality, and ethnicity; the preservation of independence; and the creation of modem institutions. Equally worrying to new Middle Eastern states was the widespread questioning of their legitimacy by substantial portions of their own populations. Because these people were expected to provide active support to the new states through assuming the role of citizens, their disaffection further undermined the already shaky regimes. However, the weak foundations of the new states (as well as of their ruling elites) might have been repaired had their performance in handling new and inherited difficulties been successful or even reasonable. Unfortunately, their record of achievement left much to be desired, making almost inevitable the likelihood of future conflicts as outside powers perceived internal weakness. There is a long list of violent conflicts in the Middle East caused directly by nations outside the region. In the last of the colonial wars, France intervened in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt (19451956), while Britain interfered in Palestine, Egypt, and South Yemen (19451967). More recently, the United States became involved in conflicts in Lebanon (1958 and 1982-1984), Libya (1985), Iran (1980), and the Persian Gulf (1987-1988). Similarly, the USSR precipitated a bloody war during its occupation of Afghanistan (1980-1989). The artificial boundaries forced upon unwilling indigenous populations in the Middle East often prompted conflict between the newly created states. The most dramatic and protracted of these confrontations came as a result of the creation of the state of Israel in the territory traditionally called Palestine.

Introduction:

Why Nonviolent

Political Struggle?

5

Endorsed by the United States and Britain, the formation of the new nation and the subsequent Jewish migration to it entailed the uprooting of most of the Palestinian population. The rejection of the new country by its Arab neighbors plunged the area into a conflict that is still raging. In five ArabIsraeli wars (1948-1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982), Arab nations tried both to liberate the land occupied by Israel and to restore the rights of dispossessed Palestinians. In addition, since 1967, there has been continual conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. Moreover, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel produced fierce conflict between the two countries that continues to this day. In the last four decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict has claimed the lives of nearly a quarter million, with three times as many maimed or wounded, mostly on the Arab side. 1 Equally as dramatic as the Palestinian conflict was the war between Iran and Iraq. Lasting from 1980 to 1988, the war killed nearly one million people while maiming and wounding almost twice that number. Chemical weapons were used on civilian targets, and commercial shipping was devastated in a struggle that produced material losses estimated at $200 billion. Moreover, like the Arab-Israeli struggle, the Iran-Iraq war easily might have brought the superpowers into conflict. The United States had warships in the Persian Gulf that frequently skirmished with the Iranians as Soviet ships cruised nearby in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, other less dramatic conflicts between states in the Middle East have included Syria/Lebanon, South Yemen/North Yemen, Sudan/ Ethiopia, Libya/Chad, and Algeria/Morocco. Additional examples in the last three decades include Egypt/Saudi Arabia over Yemen, Somalia/Ethiopia, Egypt/Libya, and again, Algeria/Morocco. All of these have something to do with unresolved disputes left behind from the colonial period. Civil wars represent one more type of collective violence in the region. These struggles are mostly over sectarian or ethnic issues, the most well known being the hostilities in Lebanon, Sudan, and Iraq. The Lebanese civil war, which at this writing is entering its fifteenth year, had by April 1987 cost the lives of 130,000 and maimed and wounded 150,000 people. Another 30,000 people have been reported kidnapped or simply missing. Material losses have been estimated at $50 billion, and the currency devalued to an unprecedented degree. In addition, estimates are that over one million people, a full third of the population, have been displaced from their homes. 2 Sudan's civil war has erupted periodically since the country's independence in 1956. It is rooted in the conflict over national identity and the sharing of power and resources between the mostly Arab north and the predominately non-Arab south. No accurate figures detailing the enormous loss of life and property are available. As in Lebanon, Sudan's civil was has been compounded by outside intervention. And in the most recent rounds of

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fighting, a severe drought has added millions of starving refugees to the tens of thousands of war casualties. Like Sudan, Iraq has seen its civil war flare up repeatedly since the 1960s. Because of the earlier colonialist division of the Kurdish homeland among five different and often hostile nations, the Iraqi government's conflict with its own Kurdish minority has invited external interference. No precise figures are available on the losses to life and property caused by this war. At present, no other region in the world matches the Middle East in number of violent conflicts. In the last four decades, armed struggles have claimed at least three million lives and left millions more wounded and uprooted. Homeless and stateless, these victims have become vulnerable to harm and violent manipulation, including terrorism. The Middle East leads the world in buying and using lethal weapons and devices for mass destruction. In the early 1980s, the average annual military expenditure for the region surpassed $100 billion. If such mass violence is to be justified, the argument must be that it leads to the resolution of conflicts. Ironically, this is not the case in the Middle East—none of its major conflicts of the last four decades has been resolved by violent means. But in a few instances, solutions have been achieved through nonviolent struggle. A case in point is the partial deescalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict by President Anwar Sadat's bold initiative in 1977 for peace. The Iraq-Iran cease-fire in 1988 is another example of a successful diplomatic effort. Likewise, several internal conflicts in the states of the region have been resolved through nonviolent means. These include the ouster of despotic military regimes in Sudan by civilian uprisings in 1964 and 1985. Several Middle Eastern states (Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Somalia, and the Gulf states) gained independence not through wars of liberation but through negotiation, mass strikes, demonstrations, and civil disobedience. Egypt provides an early example of liberation won through nonviolent struggle. A mass civil disobedience movement launched against the British occupation lasted several months. Known in Egyptian history as the 1919 revolution, it started as a peaceful campaign to collect one million signatures calling for Egyptian independence. A score of Egyptian leaders were to carry the petition to the peace conference held at Versailles at the conclusion of World War I. In response to this challenge to their rule, the British resisted the campaign and prevented the leaders headed by Saad Zaghlul from leaving Egypt to attend the peace conference. 3 After these actions generated widespread protest, the British exiled the popular leaders to Malta. The protest then became more widespread, resulting in an almost complete shutdown of the nation. Eventually the British capitulated and released the leaders with permission to go to Versailles. Two years later, Egypt obtained its independence and was accepted into the League of Nations. This Egyptian

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Why Nonviolent

Political Struggle?

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nonviolent struggle impressed Gandhi, who, after twenty years in South Africa mounting a nonviolent campaign for civil rights, was on his way to India to help achieve home rule. He incorporated some of the Egyptian practices into his comprehensive theory and practice of nonviolent struggle, called the satyagraha. A contemporary example of nonviolent struggle in the Middle East is the intifada, the current uprising in Palestine that began in 1987. Although world news agencies primarily report acts of violence, the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank is relying to a considerable degree on nonviolent means. The Palestinians exert economic pressure against Israel by withholding taxes, customs fees, and water bills, as well as by interrupting tourism and refusing to provide cheap labor. Boycotts of Israeli goods and other items exported to the occupied territories through Israeli companies are also cutting into any increase in the estimated $5.5 billion profit already realized by the Israeli economy from the occupation. The tactics of nonviolent struggle have also tied down large numbers of Israeli troops, thereby causing additional pressures on the Israeli economy. More positively, an alternative Palestinian social and economic system is being created to help promote greater self-reliance in the occupied territories. Local industries and agricultural production are becoming more labor-intensive as Palestinians make do with the limited resources they possess. In addition, significant elements of a "cooperative" Palestinian economy are emerging to counteract the previously dominant competitive ethic the Israelis have been able to exploit. Moreover, as the authorities close down schools and hospitals, small home-based health and educational institutions are developing to meet neighborhood needs. To absorb workers who no longer sell their labor to Israeli employers, alternative labor markets are being created. These contemporary examples from the Middle East demonstrate real possibilities for the use of nonviolent political struggle in current controversies. The images and stereotypes of the region as irretrievably violence-ridden are recent and only partly warranted. Another side and another tradition appear in the collective repertoire of the peoples of the Middle East. Although nonviolent political struggle has been less sensational, it has proven at least as effective as armed struggle in resolving conflicts in the region. The fact that violent means have settled no major Middle Eastern conflict of the last four decades strengthens the case for serious examination of an alternative nonviolent course. The extension of nonviolent political struggle in the region might be made easier by appeals to Middle Eastern cultures and religions. The fact that violence has victimized so many people in the area, to no avail, also might enhance such an effort. Human rights organizations already are mushrooming

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in Arab lands. In Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, and the West Bank, trade unions and professional organizations are seriously involved in these efforts. It was professional groups that played a key role in the nonviolent ouster of the Numeiri military dictatorship in Sudan in 1985. Likewise, Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic popular movements played a part in getting Iraqi and Iranian acceptance of the United Nations-brokered cease-fire in the Gulf in 1988. Conferences and seminars devoted to the study of the nonviolent alternative, including the meeting that prompted this book, are beginning to sprinkle the Arab intellectual landscape. In Israel, the Peace Now movement has made its presence felt domestically, regionally, and internationally. Recently, Chairman Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) announced his commitment to a nonviolent solution to the problems of Palestine. Of course, nonviolent political struggle is still a very long way from becoming a dominant philosophy and practice in the sociopolitical discourse of the Middle East. But the roots, the tradition, and the need are all in place, creating a fertile ground for the dissemination of important seed ideas. Nonviolent political struggle—as neither passivity nor submission but as one of the most effective ways of resolving conflicts—can be implanted in the minds of people, just as the ideas of war and violence have long been taught.

Notes 1. The figures in this and subsequent sections are from Ali-Eddin Hilal (ed.) Challenges to Arab National Security in the Coming Decade (Arabic) (Amman: the Arab Thought Forum, 1986). See especially the introduction by H. R. H. Crown Prince Al-Hassan Bin Talal, pp. 15-16. 2. These figures are from a government report issued by Lebanon's Police Department, Beirut, September 1987, and are quoted in Al Ahram, Cairo daily newspaper, October 1, 1987, p. 4. 3. Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, New York: Macmillan. Arabic translation, 5th edition.

2 Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Arab History Khalid

Kishtainy

The term "Arab nonviolent struggle" sounds strange and contrived to most people. The Arabs are supposed to be bloodthirsty, easily aroused to violence, indifferent to the sanctity of life, and bent on war and murder. The Arabs themselves often endorse this opinion and find any mention of nonviolence hollow and remote. For one thing, they frequently believe in the identification of the sword with Islam and the spread of this faith through conquest and war. Yet on closer examination, these concepts lose a great deal of their validity and in many respects become totally false. Unfortunately, nations always like to look upon themselves as heroic and to equate heroism with conquest and military valor. The main reason for this misconception is the Arab conquests. They were so spectacular and swift that they appear on the surface to have been the result of some exceptional military capability. Within roughly a half century, the Arabs were able to carry their banners westward to the Atlantic Ocean and eastward to the borders of China. Nothing comparable had ever been recorded in history before. As the Muslims crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and swept through Spain and southern France, the Europeans conjured up the image of the Arab as a ruthless warrior, speeding fearlessly on his Arabian horse, brandishing his curved sword, and shouting the martyrdom call of "Allah Akbar!" This picture, which appears in many European paintings, soon gets blurred as we examine the historical facts. One of the primary factors that contributed to the Arab conquest was the absence of a formidable opposition. The two major powers of the seventh century, Byzantium and Persia, were absolutely exhausted as a result of their bitter and protracted war of twenty-six years. Persia was weakened further by palace rebellions, and Byzantium by racial and religious conflicts, especially between the Greeks and the Armenians. The Emperor Heraclius was a spent force, an ailing and exhausted old man. After their defeat by the Arabsat Qadesiya (Iraq) and the Yarmuk (Jordan), neither the Byzantines nor the Persians made any serious attempt to drive the Muslim banner back to the

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desert. For the Arabs, it became a matter of riding on. Jerusalem and Egypt opened their gates peacefully upon honorable terms. In North Africa, there was no effective government of any substance. The Spaniards were fighting among themselves. When the Europeans finally sensed the danger and decided to make a stand at Poitiers in France the Arabs halted their advance and retreated all the way back to central Spain. The fervor of the new faith was another determining factor in the story. Nothing could have been achieved without the selfless dedication to the glory of Islam. The same can be said about the fanaticism that is recounted in some shocking records. No attempt is made here to deal with all the factors behind the Islamic conquest, but the tangible impression is that militarism was low on the list. The Arabs had little knowledge of military professionalism, technique, and organization and committed an endless series of blunders. Not unlike the British, they treated warfare as a part-time occupation. Most of their generals were either merchants like Abu Sufian and Amr Ibn al-As, poets like Abu Firas al-Hamdani, or tribal chieftains like al-Muthanna Ibn Harith alShaybani. Khalid Ibn al-Walid was probably the only one who truly dedicated his life to the arts of war. Despite the frequent pre-Islamic warfare of the desert, the Arabs had never developed the kind of commitment, training, and dedication associated with the historical militarist caste of the Spartans, the Prussians, the Samurai, the Turkish Janissaries, or the Karalis of India. Nor did they later develop during their imperial era any military organization comparable with that of the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, or the Persians. Indeed, the Arabs seem to have treated military craft with contempt. When discussing the selection of a commander for the important campaign against Persia, the Caliph Omar (A.D. 634-644) happened to see Abu Ubaida al-Thaqafi, a native tribesman from southern Arabia, called for the man, and put him at the head of the army. The hapless Thaqafi made a mess of it and paid for it with his life. The Arabs, or at least the ruling caste, were inherently merchants and looked upon such things as military grandeur with the cynical and opportunistic eye of the mercantile class. In the famous duel between Imam Ali (Caliph 656-661) and Amr Ibn al-As, the Imam prevailed upon al-As, and just when he was about to kill him, al-As turned his back to his adversary, uncovered his bottom, and ran for it. Imam Ali drew back his sword. Al-As was probably acting according to a common saying, "Twothirds of valor is flight." The great poet al-Mutanabbi (915-965) was about to repeat a similar feat when he faced his enemies, but to his misfortune, his slave reminded him of his famous heroic verse: The horse, the night and the desert know me, The sword, the lance, the pen and the paper.

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The poet had to stand his ground and was lost. A short while before his death, he passed through the lust orchards of Sha'b Buan and wrote: At Sha'b Buan, my horse said to me, "How can people leave this and go to war? Your father Adam started the sins And taught you the abandonment of paradises." Arab military spirit is best in defense, which requires the maximum stamina, endurance, and readiness to die. Arab history has no Carthage, Troy, Gallipoli, Stalingrad, or Berlin. Indeed, it is remarkable how the Arabs surrendered their jewel of the East, Baghdad (in 1259), without shedding any blood. The two major battles of which that history is proud, the Qadesiya and the Yarmuk, were offensives lasting not more than four days. According to General John Glubb's accounts, even the pre-Islamic "long wars" were, in fact, no more than skirmishes and raids that caused little loss of life. 1 The preceding remarks may sound negative—even offensive—to some nationalists who may consider military valor and heroic deaths as the sole source of national pride and the only qualities to which the nation should subscribe. However, the assessment is not meant to suggest any cowardice or weakness. The Arabs could never have established their empire or, more recently, overthrown the foreign yoke of imperialism if such were their qualities. It is just that they seem to have a better and more-balanced sense of priorities. To them life is more meaningful than death, joy a better quality than suffering. One look at any Arab funeral and lamentation is sufficient to appreciate the extent to which the Arabs hold death in abhorrence and fear. It was in Mesopotamia that the first epic, the Babylonian "Epic of Gilgamesh," was written to express the agony associated with it. "No one loses except the dead" is a typical Arabic proverb. The spirit of Masada as quoted in the Old Testament is not an Arab spirit. There is no record of Arab mass suicide, nor are there Arab counterparts to the Christian martyrs who died in the Coliseum rather than deny the Master. Although Islam urges its followers to fight and die in defense of their faith, it considers suicide a sin; the preservation of one's life, to many Muslims, takes priority over all other considerations, including the profession of the faith. Hence they embrace the concept of tagia (avoidance), whereby a Muslim is expected to pretend and conceal his beliefs for the sake of saving his lie. Under such a philosophy, the Marranos of Andalusia escaped persecution and even death by presenting themselves as Christians to the outside world and practicing Judaism or Islam at home. Of course, the Arabs had their share of wars and violence, but given the living conditions of the desert, with its scarcity of water as well as food, it is a wonder the inhabitants did not turn to cannibalism. Yet, it was in this land

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that the concept of "Do not kill" was first codified. The Arabs not only considered war evil and ugly (Arab literature is replete with such reminders) and gave it ugly nicknames (like kariha—the detested), but also acted accordingly. They engaged in war only as a last resort and broke off from fighting at the first opportunity. The recent war between Iraq and Iran was exceptional. Caliph Imam Ali despaired of rousing his people to war and was forced to utter these memorable words in addressing them: If I order you to march on them on warm days, you say "This is the fire of summer. Give us time until the heat is over." If I ask you to march on them in winter, you say "This is the bite of the frost. Give us time until the cold is over." All this and you fleeing from the heat and the cold, but, by God, you are more in flight from the sword. 2

As soon as the conquests were completed, the Arabs settled down to enjoy life in peace. One province after another split off from the empire without causing concern to the ruling caliph or prompting him to mass armies for their recovery. Leaving war and soldiering to other Muslims (Persians, Turks, and Tartars), Arabs turned their attention to the attractive aspects of civilization, i.e., the adoption of former cultures; the translation of the Greek and Indian classics; the development of science, mathematics, and philosophy; and the enjoyment of art, poetry, literature, music, love, sophisticated cuisine, and travel—all that may be bracketed as joie de vivre. These are the fields where the Arabs made their contributions to history. The world learned practically nothing from the Arabs in the field of warfare. All the major military developments—the introduction of the horse, the use of the stirrup, the building of warships, the discovery of gunpowder and dynamite, the use of artillery, and finally the splitting of the atom—came from outside the Arab world. In contrast, the Arabs taught Europe the use of comfortable cushions and upholstered furniture to replace hard wooden chairs and benches. They taught the Europeans to wear silk and dainty linen instead of coarse wool and to drink from delicate glassware rather than heavy metal mugs. From the women of the Arab world, European women learned the use of perfume, henna, mascara, and other cosmetics, as well as the food additives of saffron, rosewater, and spices. Many scholars have written about the Arab influence on the rise of European chivalry, the tradition of romantic love, and the dedication of one's life to a lady. Leafing through the New Oxford English Dictionary (many English words of Arabic origin may be found, especially under the letters "al"), I did not come across any word remotely connected with war or warfare. The words I could find adopted from the Arabs were either scientific/artistic (algebra, alchemy, almanac, alcohol, alcaval, algorism, alidad, amalgam, alkitran, Arabesque, couplet) or related to sophisticated living (lute, divan, alpaca,

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alcove, alameda, muslin, damask, kohl, kabaya, alcanna, musk, saffron, halva, alkermes, sherbet, alisan). Alas, an Arabic word not borrowed by the Europeans is rahma, a word with no real English equivalent. It denotes a mixture o f mercy, pity, compassion, and forgiveness. Rahma, one o f the most common and yet inspiring words in Arabic, is most easily understood through the following story: A traveler on horseback met a struggling traveler on foot, and the struggler begged him to give him a lift in the name of rahma. The horseman did so, but the stranger availed himself of an opportunity and ran off with the horse. Its owner shouted after him, "Don't kill the rahma among the people -.vith this deed of yours." The thief stopped and brought back the horse. I have witnessed many instances in which a man stopped beating another when the other appealed to him in the name o f rahma. From this word come the adjectives of rahim and rihman, two derivative names for the Almighty. Gandhi thought it significant that the Muslims called God Rahim and the Hindus used the name Rama. It would be naive to think of the Arabs as nonviolent people—no people on earth can be so described. But there are very few wanton murders in the Arab world and no reports comparable to those of the mysterious and incomprehensible crimes that seem to occur daily in the West. Nor are there detective writers or mystery crime stories in the Arab world. The A r a b resort to violence is almost always activated by some understandable reason or pressing need. Arabs do not attack or kill for the fun of it. Respect for human life and individual honor is taken for granted. A Westerner has every right to marvel at the phenomenon o f the charming young Arab woman who crosses the lonely desert without fear of being molested or raped, or at the sight of the small children who play and wander around in the streets of Arab towns well into the night without fear of being kidnapped or molested. It is ironic that the people who suffer daily incidents of fellow citizens being assaulted, kidnapped, mugged, or even killed should point their fingers at the Arabs and accuse them of violence and terrorism. One o f the most common misconceptions about the Arab world is related to the idea of jihad. Even Muslims misconstrue this term and equate it with fighting for the faith. In his Philosophy of Jihad, A b d al-Hafiz A b d Rabboh, professor at al-Azhar University in Cairo, warns that fighting in defense of Islam is only a minor part of jihad. The word itself means the exertion o f effort. In terms of religion, the effort is related to the enhancement of the faith, which can be accomplished through charity, good work, performance o f God's orders, avoidance of sins, propagation of religion, and protection of Islam. On return from battle, the Prophet used to say, "We return from the minor jihad to the major jihad"—to the nonviolent struggle to uphold the commands of God and lead a virtuous life.

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The many references in the Quran to jihad convey different meanings dependent upon the kind of effort required. The term "jihad" can mean persuasion and argument, fulfillment of God's will, service to religion, or fighting in defense of Islam. The Prophet himself seems to have laid more emphasis on the peaceful side of jihad, as in his sayings "Pilgrimage is one of the highest forms of jihad" and "Some of the men of learning are mujahidin." After considering the linguistic roots and derivatives of jihad, Abd Rabboh concludes: "None of the meanings discussed implies that jihad is a synonym of war or fighting."3 Muslim scholars, however, divide jihad into three categories: (1) jihad against the visible enemy, (2) jihad against the devil, and (3) jihad against one's failings. The Sufis followed Muhammad's division of jihad into the minor jihad (fighting) and the major jihad (observing God's commandments). This was also the division accepted by al-Bajuri, the eminent Muslim theologian. 4 There are two trends in the Quran vis-à-vis the question of violence. In the early suras (chapters) that were written before the hejira (the emigration from Mecca to Medina), there is a distinct nonviolent approach. The persecution suffered by the Muslims was endured with sabr (patience), fortitude, and prayer. Persecution was answered with argument, persuasion, and setting a good example. Even when the Prophet was subjected to extreme provocation and aggression and his followers sought his permission to deal with his tormentors, the Prophet replied: "I am not ordered to fight! I am not ordered to fight!" Time and time again, the Quran encourages him to resort to gentle reasoning and persuasion. "Invite all to the way of the Lord with wisdom and fine preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious." 5 There was a marked change of orientation following the emigration to Medina and the formation of the first Muslim administration. Forced to deal with the world of real politics, the Muslims found their security constantly threatened and their community on more than one occasion militarily invaded. Like many pacifists who had to accept violence when they acceded to the responsibilities of office, the Muslims had to draw their swords and defend themselves. New revelations were received by the Prophet calling on him to fight for Islam, and herein lies another misconception related to the spread of the new faith in Arabia. The Prophet applied skillful diplomacy and superb propaganda techniques in winning over the tribes and villages. The bulk of Arabia was secured with peaceful negotiations and treaties, not with the sword. Muhammad's reentry into Mecca was a triumphant "blessed march," adequately matched by his peaceful and forgiving proclamation that he began by citing the Quran: "Oh people! I have created you from a male and a female and made you into tribes and nations to be acquainted with each other. The best of you in the sight of God is your most pious." The Prophet then asked them, "People of Quraish! What do you think I shall do with

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you?" They answered, "You will do good. A gracious brother and a gracious nephew." He then declared, "Peace be with you. I can only tell you what Joseph had said to his brothers. Today, there is no blame on you. Go! You are free." 6 Despite all the battles Muhammad had to fight, he remained inherently a nonviolent leader, even in difficult circumstances. He often had to restrain his followers from violence, as he did in the case of the Hudaibia peace treaty that he concluded with Quraish, the leading polytheistic tribe, when his companions protested that he made far too many concessions to his enemies. He was not a fighter and knew little about warfare. Like a true Arab, he loved life and savored its joys. Among all the monotheistic prophets, he stood out for his ample sense of humor, and he exchanged jokes and cherished the men of wit. 7 "Othman will enter paradise laughing because he makes me laugh," he said once about the third caliph. Laughter, of course, is one of the surest means of defusing violence and tension. The examples in which he revealed his gentleness, forgiveness, and inclination to avoid bloodshed and waive punishments are too numerous to recount here. Although Muhammad's teachings and the Quranic directives treat war and violence as an evil that sometimes cannot be avoided, aggression is altogether repudiated. "Commit no aggression, for God does not love the aggressors," says the Quran, many verses of which call on believers to forgive and to embrace peace. It has often been mentioned that the name "Islam" is derived from salam (peace) and the Quranic and Muslim way of greeting and blessing is "Peace be upon you." Fighting among Musims is strictly prohibited: "If two factions of believers fight, conciliate between them." Fighting the people of the Book (Jews, Christians, and other believers in God) is also prohibited unless they stand in the way of Islam or endanger it. Muhammad taught that Muslims were entitled to carry the word of God to the nations. Non-Muslims were given the choice: They could embrace Islam, or they could accept the Muslim government, pay the tax of jizia, and live in peace. The tax was in lieu of the military service from which nonMuslims were exempted. Christians who did fight on the side of the Muslims were therefore exempted from the tax. Failure to meet one of the two conditions was interpreted as an obstruction to the cause of Islam, which provided the Muslims with justification for fighting. The form of fighting was meticulously prescribed: "Only fighters may be fought." Children, women, old people, farmers in their fields, monks, and priests were not to be molested. No trees could be pulled down, buildings destroyed, temples desecrated, or animals killed unless for food. Caliph Omar banned his forces from entering the villages under Muslim occupation lest they should misbehave. Fighting within the villages was proscribed to prevent their being turned into battlefields, 8 and the enemy had to be given

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adequate warning and choice of alternatives. According to Salman al-Farisi, a companion of the Prophet, it was the custom of the Prophet to address his opponents thus: "I was a man like you and then God the Almighty guided me to Islam. If you accept Islam, you will share our rights and our duties. If you refuse that, then you may pay the jizia in humility. If you refuse that, then we fight on equal terms. God abhors the treacherous!" The Prophet would repeat this warning for three days and would engage the enemy only on the fourth day. These carefully drawn rules for fighting reveal that modern warfare, with its shock tactics and indiscriminate killing and destruction, contravenes the tenets of Islam, and a case can be made for banning war altogether on these grounds. A primary tenet of Islam relevant to nonviolence is the concept of the family of man. The belief that all people are the children of Adam and Eve is repeatedly mentioned as a pointer to the need for universal brotherhood and peaceful harmony. Muslim theologians pursued this concept of the family of man to develop further social conclusions. Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328) argued in these terms: "The desire to be above other people is injustice because all people are of the same species. A man's desire to put himself higher and reduce the others lower is unjust." 9 A similar effect may be inspired by the notion of predestination. The Prophet is reported to have said, "All children are born innocent. Their parents make them Jews, Christians or Majous." It is therefore sinful to try to force religion on other people, as the Quran makes quite explicit: There is no compulsion in religion. Right and wrong have become distinct. Those who wish so may believe and those who may wish otherwise may disbelieve. Do you want to compel the people to become believers? The resultant spirit of racial and religious coexistence and tolerance drew criticism at times. Some scholars held the Arabs responsible for the disintegration of their state and its eventual collapse because of the centrifugal forces emanating from such a conglomeration of races, nationalities, and religions. What were the options for nonviolence in Arab history? Almost all the forms of nonviolence have had precedents in that history. The idea of winning the case by persuasion, arguing, and suffering has already been discussed. The setting of a good example was another approach that has left the same impressive record. The first example, of course, was the Prophet himself, who was called al-Amin (the Honest) and who—like all good nonviolent leaders—won the support of his followers and disarmed his opponents by the strength of his faith and the irreproachable style of his

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opponents by the strength of his faith and the irreproachable style of his conduct. His words and his deeds left their mark on his companions. All Arab school children learn the story about Caliph Omar entering Jerusalem. He had only one camel, which he and his camel driver rode alternately all the way from Hejaz to Palestine. When they arrived at the Holy City, it was the camel driver's turn to ride and the great caliph walked behind. The Christians wanted to honor him by inviting him to say his prayers in the Holy Sepulcher, but the caliph declined and prayed outside, in fear that the Muslims might then take over the church and turn it into a mosque. In yet another story, al-Buthuri reports that when Abu Ubaida Ibn alJarrah, the commander in chief in Syria, was forced to retreat from Homs, he called the inhabitants and returned the protection money they had paid him, explaining that his departure meant he could no longer keep them secure and thus he could not keep their money. 10 The Christian inhabitants wept as they saw the Muslims retreating and closed the city gates against the advancing fellow Christians, the Byzantines. It was with such examples and not with the sword that the Muslims won the hearts and minds of the nations. The absence of such examples in contemporary Arab politics has been one more cause behind the general apathy and ills afflicting Arab society. In his Chatham House lecture of October 15, 1986, the prime minister of the Sudan, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, referred to the introduction of Arabism and Islam into the Sudan by exactly those peaceful methods and drew the conclusion that Sudan's present problems and civil war in the south should only be solved by the same method of persuasion, argument, and negotiations. It is also interesting to note how the national forces of the country took a leaf from that nonviolent history: They concluded an agreement to protect the democracy of the country against any military coup d'état by resort to civilian resistance—flooding the streets with the people, suspending all work, and disobeying any orders given by the military junta. 11 The Arabs supposedly have an explosive, temperamental, and emotional psychology, a notion that has prompted many observers to discount the possibility of nonviolence among them. This is somewhat oversimplified. Although it is true that such characteristics may easily arouse people to violence, it can also be argued that they would just as readily respond to peace and reconciliation. The sight of Arab leaders swearing at each other one month and kissing and hugging the next is all too familiar. It is a question of finding the right mechanism—and there is one available: the well-established concept of sabr (patience), which is a primary ingredient in all nonviolent actions. Once more we find a wealth of literature on the subject. There are over a hundred verses in the Quran dealing with sabr and recommending it to Muhammad and the Muhammadans. "If any show patience and forgive, that

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would be an exercise of courageous will and resolution in the conduct of affairs." 12 One of the most common calligraphic panels seen in any house or cafe in the Middle East simply cites the Quran: "Inna Allaha Ma'a al-sabirin" (God is with those who are patient). A typical phrase in the Quran, Arabic literature, and everyday language is sabrun jamil (beautiful patience). The Prophet must have sensed the magic remedy of patience because he used it throughout his mission with staggering success. His courageous will for patience was amply demonstrated when his opponents showered him with dung while he was praying. He calmly continued his prayer, and when his followers wanted to chase the offenders, he restrained them and simply said, "God, I leave them to you." Civil disobedience and withdrawal of cooperation are two concepts that have had many practical and theoretical applications in Arab history. The Arabs are stiff-necked individualists, not overawed by authority. Although the Quran states "Obey god, his Messenger and those in charge of your affairs," 13 the Arabs did not believe in the divine right of the ruler and took note of other Quranic stipulations that those in charge must rule with justice and piety. The Prophet himself recommended civil disobedience by saying, "A believer should not humiliate himself." When asked how a believer could do that, he replied, "By putting up with afflictions beyond his endurance." The relationship between subjects and their ruler was more in the nature of a social contract. The custom was for the ruler to outline his policy, after which the people would then give their approval of his enthronement (the bay'ah). Muhammad's successor, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, established this tradition by his famous words to the electors: "Obey me as long as I obey God in my rule. If I disobey him, you will owe me no obedience." It was well understood that the ruler's obedience to God included his rule with justice, compassion, and care for the welfare and safety of the state and its subjects. Abu Bakr's pledge was repeated by successive caliphs and was further elaborated by Imam Ali with his statement "No obedience is allowed to any creature in his disobedience of the Creator." The governor of Iraq, the tyrannical Ziyad Ibn Abih, put this concept more bluntly: "The lies of the pulpit are famous and notorious. If you find I have lied to you, you will be free to disobey me." The Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (699-765), one of the twelve imams of the Shia, deemed it blasphemous to put up with injustice: "Those who pledge their allegiance to an unjust ruler have no religion." Most scholars supported the right of the people to depose an unjust ruler. Among them was al-Mawardi (1058), who considered the deviation of the ruler from religiousness to ungodliness included "immorality, injustice, suppression of rights and neglect of the religious commandments." In his discussion, al-Mawardi cited the words of Caliph Omar: "Do not bind yourselves by the rights of those who did not bind themselves by your rights." An interesting point about nonviolence was made by the famous

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scholar and theologian Imam al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who proposed that no obedience was due a ruler unless he governed according to the tenets of Islamic law (Shari'a). Any disobedience toward God and neglect of justice absolved the subjects from obedience. Yet, al-Ghazali argued, the overthrow of an unjust ruler must be carried out without fitnah (violent strife). If it would be impossible to depose him except by force, then there was a duty to obey him because such obedience would be better than fitnah. Ibn Taymiya reached similar conclusions when he prescribed disobedience if the ruler's orders were contrary to the shari'a, but he differentiated between the two alternatives of raising arms against the ruler to depose him or of practicing simple disobedience: The first was wrong, the second permissible, according to him. Other Islamic sects like the Ibaziyah, the Khawarij, and the Mu'tazila allowed the overthrow of the ruler by force. Indeed, the Mu'tazila sect treated the entire relationship between the government and the people in terms of a social contract. 14 These theoretical teachings had their practical applications. Arab history is riddled with instances of the people rejecting unjust or foreign administrations. Unfortunately, most of these uprisings took a violent form, but there were ample nonviolent exercises. Abu Hayan al-Tawhidi, a notable literary figure of the Abbasid era, mentions that after the capture of Mosul by the Byzantines and the sultan's failure to rescue the city, the people met and sent a delegation to Kufra to meet Emir Bukhtiar and give him this warning: Had we had a diligent Caliph, a prince or a governor, things would not have drifted to this abyss. A prince of the believers, who is obedient to God, is appointed by God to look after the affairs outside his door and to spend the night thinking of his subjects' interests and to carry out by day such orders and prohibitions that may enrich religion and benefit all men, near and far. Otherwise we owe no obedience. 1 5

The earliest incident of civil disobedience in Islam was the refusal of the Arabs in Egypt to carry out the orders of Caliph Uthman Ibn Affan (644656) after he was charged with nepotism. They sent a delegation to put their case before him, intending to resolve matters with a peaceful siege laid around his house, but tension reached the breaking point and the caliph was finally killed. In more recent history, the Palestinians agitated against the Turkish governor, Ahmad Rashid Bey, who breached the law by allowing Jewish immigrants to settle in Palestine. The sultan was finally forced to withdraw him in 1906. 16 The Palestinians made a more serious attempt at civil disobedience and noncooperation during the British occupation. In 1923, Jamal al-Husseini called on the people to refuse to pay taxes to the government, but the Palestine Congress rejected his call. Gandhi influenced the Higher Arab Committee, the main organization representing the

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Palestinians, to return to the subject in 1933. Although the committee discussed the subject of a campaign of civil disobedience, noncooperation, boycott of British goods, and refusal to pay taxes, it endorsed only the proposal to boycott the government's social occasions, such as tea parties and the king's birthday celebration. 17 Mass civil disobedience campaigns have been rare in Arab history, but the Arabs have shown a considerable inclination toward the concept at the individual level. Indeed, one of the most difficult problems facing Arab governments is how to induce the public to respect their orders and decisions. A great many arbitrary regulations have been rescinded or shelved as a result of quiet campaigns to bypass and disobey them. Although this furtive, individualistic form of civil disobedience may have a negative aspect, it nevertheless offers a fountain of experience and psychological readiness for this form of nonviolent action. Noncooperation has also had its place in Arab history, and the Quran again provides a lead toward this approach: "Cooperate with one another in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate on acts of sin and aggression." 1 8 This method was followed by many sects, especially the Shia, who considered the existing government illegitimate and refused to accept its jobs or serve under its banner. The Shia developed their noncooperation with the Ottomans into a form of parallel government. They had their own courts, ran their own schools, collected their own tax, and administered their own welfare service. When the Ottoman government tried to recruit them into the army, they resisted to the point of armed rebellion. When the British forces occupied Iraq and the Iraqis rebelled, it was the Shia leaders who issued a fatwa (formal legal opinion in Islamic law) calling for civil disobedience and banning Muslims from cooperating with the foreign authorities. There is in these examples evidence of another psychological tendency toward the use of noncooperation as a form of nonviolent action. This inclination stems from the deep-seated suspicion of authority arising out of the centuries of foreign misrule and religious schism. The Arabs have always disliked those in office and advised against coming near them. A common saying simply states: "He who partakes in the gravy of the Sultan will have his lips split." Another story tells of a man who saw a clergyman at the gate of the governor's palace. When the man posed a religious question, the clergyman replied, "Is this the place to ask me?" The man said, "Is this the place for a clergyman to be?" Arab history is full of anecdotes about religious and secular dignitaries turning down government office and refusing to cooperate with the government on moral, religious, or political grounds. A more common form of nonviolent struggle in modem Arab history is the boycott. This weapon has found its widest use among the Palestinians,

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how have sometimes carried it to such an extreme that many observers have blamed them for lost opportunities. The boycott has taken the political form of avoidance of elections, negotiations, conferences, and organizations. In its economic form, the most obvious example is the boycott of Israeli goods and companies dealing with Israel. The economic boycott was taken to extreme lengths in the case of the boycott of Coca-Cola by the the Iraqi Communists in the 1950s. Various calls for the boycott of European products were also made during the struggle for national independence, but none of them achieved any tangible effect. Here again, this nonviolent weapon seems to have an earlier history. During the early days of Islam, the mushrikin (idolators) in Mecca tried to combat the new faith by agreeing among themselves not to sell the Muslims anything, buy their goods, or in fact deal with them at all. The boycott lasted only a few years, but put the small Muslim community to great hardship. Strikes and demonstrations, also popular and commonly used, have antecedents going back many centuries. It was reported that when the Turks and Persians fought over Baghdad in 1638, inflicting terrible losses and suffering on its inhabitants, the people rushed out into the streets shouting "Ildad! Aman!" (Enough! Safety!). Their action was effective—the Turks retreated to their barracks and brought the slaughter to an end. 1 9 Other demonstrations occurred at times of famine or inflation during the Ottoman era, with the people demanding bread and protesting the exorbitant prices. The noteworthy feature of these demonstrations is that they were usually spontaneous and without any leadership or guidance. Numerous demonstrations have swept the Arab world in modem times. Perhaps the most successful and entirely nonviolent of these was staged in Iraq in 1946 against the Portsmouth Treaty between Britain and Iraq. The treaty was seen as a symbol of submission by the government of Iraq to an imperialist power. Waves of well-organized young people filled the streets, defying the armed police. Steadfast in their patience, they resisted provocations and gave their lives bravely. The demonstration ultimately forced the resignation of the government of Salih Jabr, and the treaty was canceled. The most notable strike in modem history was the general strike staged by the Palestinians in 1936 against British policies allowing Jewish immigration to the country. The strike, initially scheduled by the Higher Arab Committee to last six months, was extendable if Jewish immigration remained unchecked. The strike continued from April to October, accompanied by such operations as the cutting of the oil pipeline to Haifa and the wrecking of roads, railways, and telegraph services, as well as the more violent acts of armed attacks carried out by various bands. The Higher Arab Committee called off the strike in response to the mediation of the proBritish Arab leaders of Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

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Palestinian and Arab nationalists have viewed the termination of the strike as a treason to the cause of the Palestinians, an unwarranted interference by other Arab leaders, and the beginning of the rise of Zionist power. Had the strike continued a few weeks longer, they have argued, the British administration would have had no option but to yield to Arab demands. As it happened, the Palestinians won nothing but another commission of inquiry, and they lost the harbor and transport work to the Zionists, who availed themselves of the strike and took over the work of the strikers. 20 Whereas strikes in the West are normally economic and rarely political, the reverse is true in the Arab world, where it is more common to hear of student strikes than of industrial strikes. The Arabs have freely resorted to this weapon, at times failing to realize that its use can damage the economic and industrial base of the nation and jeopardize the educational and academic attainment of the rising generation. Hejira (emigration), one of the oldest forms of nonviolent action, is epitomized by the emigration of the Muslim community from Mecca to Medina. Recognizing its supreme historical significance, the Arabs made the hejira the beginning of the Islamic lunar calendar. The muhajirin (emigrants) were praised in the Quran, the concept of hejira recommended: "he who emigrates in the cause of God finds in earth many a refuge, wide and spacious. Should he die as a refugee from home, for God and his Apostle, his reward becomes due and sure with God." 21 Hejira has more than one meaning in the Quran, and Muslim scholars divide it into two categories. It can be physical, as in the actual emigration from an evil state, or moral, as in leaving the evil ways of others and of one's self. Various Muslim sects resorted to hejira in advancing their cause. After the massacre the Khawarij suffered in 710 A.D., the survivors emigrated to other parts of the Arab world, propagating their beliefs in the process. 22 During the Arab revival of the twentieth century, Arab expatriates in Europe helped to inspire the national struggle against the Turks and then the British and French. Later, a different type of hejira emerged with what the Arabs call the "emigration of brains"—the brain drain. It was estimated in 1979 that 100,000 Arab university graduates worked in the United States and that 27 percent of Egypt's doctors and 10 percent of the country's teachers worked abroad. Since then, the influx of Arab professionals to the West has greatly increased. One field study revealed that political conditions in the home countries, not the financial gain often mentioned, were the main reasons for the exodus. 23 Unfortunately, the hejira of talent occurred on an individual basis, without any organization or clear political direction. The only modem politically organized hejira known to me was prompted by the Iraqi Communist Party in the 1970s, when it called on its senior cadres to leave Iraq and regroup in Europe for action, an insignificant move and probably counterproductive to the party. Although many of the emigrants

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during their diaspora carried out intensive political work on behalf of their countries and their ideas, the point of their hejira was lost, and they were made to appear by rulers as a selfish minority seeking personal gain and pleasure. Yet many of these emigrants have rejected the financial incentives offered to induce their return, and there has often been an enthusiastic push to return home after a popular democratic change there. These facts suggest that financial gain is not the main consideration—indeed, many of these professional expatriates could earn more in the Arab world than they are making in the West. Hejira is a double-edged weapon and can be counterproductive in many situations, as the Palestinians have learned from their disastrous exodus in the face of Israeli occupation; the other approach, sabr (patience), would have been the more effective response. Diplomacy, publicity, and propaganda are nonviolent techniques well established in Arab history. Oratory and poetry, which form the bulk of Arabic literature, have been used at all times in the service of political and religious causes. So susceptible are the Arabs to the impact of the power of the word that one legend tells of an entire revolt being quelled with a single letter written by Abd al-Hamid al-Katib. The sermons from the pulpits of the mosques have always been used for political and social ends, and mosques like the Haydarkhana Mosque of Baghdad, the Azhar of Cairo, and the Mosque of the Rock of Jerusalem became the launching platform for the liberation struggle. It is part of the Islamic faith that Muslims should congregate in the mosque, not only for prayers but also to discuss the affairs of their religion and their states. The Friday prayers became a centerpiece for the political struggle throughout the Muslim world, as did the religious processions, especially those connected with the martyrdom of the saintly imams. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca offered another traditional outlet for exchanging ideas, disseminating propaganda, and arousing the will of the Muslim world. A few religious agitators expelled from their countries took refuge in Mecca, from where they continued to press their cause. Islam is a religion of rituals, many of which are conducive to nonviolent struggle. Fasting is a natural training for hunger strikes. The ritualistic prayers and the formation of the worshipers into parallel lines, the people speaking and moving in strict uniformity, are excellent preparation for the discipline needed for nonviolent demonstrations, sit-ins, and assemblies. Religious chanting of the type so familiar in Islam has become the foundation of peaceful marches, protest meetings, and prison songs. The aweinspiring call of "Allah Akbar" (God is great), chanted individually or collectively, has become the battle cry for millions of Muslim fighters, violent and nonviolent, throughout the world. The idea of suffering for one's faith and rights is exemplified by Christ, Muhammad, and their disciples, who offer inspiring examples for Christian

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and M u s l i m Arabs. N o n v i o l e n t activists h a v e p l e n t y o f assets and ready potentialities in such national heritage and experience. But too little attention has b e e n g i v e n in m o d e r n Arab history to this m o r e h u m a n e and l e s s c o s t l y form o f struggle, t h o u g h it could help ensure democratic d e v e l o p m e n t o f the nation.

Notes 1. Sir John Glubb, Great Arab Conquests (London, 1963). 2. Al-Sharif al-Radhay, Nahj al-Balagha (Beirut, 1978), vol. 1, p. 77. 3. A b d al-Hafiz Abd R a b b u h , Falsafat al Jihad [Philosophy of Jihad] (Beirut), p. 28. 4. Khalid Kishtainy, Nahw al Onf [Towards Nonviolence] (Amman, 1984), p. 96. 5. Quran, Surat al-Nahl, 125. 6. Abd Rabbuh, p. 181. 7. Khalid Kishtainy, Arab Political Humour (London, 1985), pp. 18-19. 8. Kishtainy, Towards Nonviolence, p. 39. 9. Abd Rabbuh, p. 240. 10. M u h a m m a d A h m a d Bahmil, Hurub al ¡slam fl Suria [Islamic Wars in Syria] (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1980), p. 79. 11 .Al-Dastur, October 27, 1986. 12. Quran, Al-Shura, 43. 13. Quran, Al-Nisa, 58. 14. A b d a l - A z i z a l - D u r i , " D e m o c r a c y in the P h i l o s o p h y of A r a b Government," al-Mustaqbal al-Arab, September 9, 1981. 15. Abu Hayyan al-Tauhidi, al-Imta' wa al-Mu' anasa [Fun and Entertainment] p. 153. 16. Elias Saad, Al-Hijra al Yahodia ila Falastin al Muhtalla [Jewish Immigration to Palestine] (Beirut, 1969), p. 18. 17. Kishtainy, T o w a r d s Nonviolence, p. 104. 18. Quran, Al-Ma'idah, 2. 19. Ali al-Wardi, Lamhot Ijtemai'ya min Tarekh al Iraq al Hadith [Social Aspects of Modern Iraqi History] (Baghdad, 1969), p. 84. 20. C. Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London, 1965), pp. 1 8 6 - 1 8 7 . 21. Quran, Al-Nisa, 100. 22. Dictionary of Islam (New Delhi, 1976), p. 270. 23. For more details, see U N Economic Commission for Western Asia, The Arab Brain Drain (London, 1981).

3 The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action Chaiwat Satha-Anand

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Muheideen)

From 1982 to 1984, Muslims from two villages in Ta Chana district, Surat and Thani, in southern Thailand had been killing one another in vengeance; seven people had died. Then on January 7, 1985, which happened to be a maulid day (to celebrate Prophet Muhammad's birthday), all parties came together and settled the bloody feud. Haji Fan, the father of the latest victim, stood up with the Holy Quran above his head and vowed to end the killings. With tears in his eyes and for the sake of peace in both communities, he publicly forgave the murderer who had assassinated his son. Once again, stories and sayings of the Prophet had been used to induce concerned parties to resolve violent conflict peacefully. 1 Examples such as this one abound in Islam. Their existence opens up the possibilities of discussing the notion of nonviolence in Islam with confidence. They promise an exciting adventure into the unusual process of exploring the relationship between Islam and nonviolence. This chapter is an attempt to suggest that Islam already possesses the whole catalogue of qualities necessary for the conduct of successful nonviolent actions. An incident that occurred in Pattani, southern Thailand, in 1975 is used as an illustration. Finally, several theses are suggested as guidelines for both the theory and practice of Islam and the different varieties of nonviolence, including nonviolent struggle.

Jihad A discussion of Islamic action against injustice is necessarily an examination of one of the most controversial concepts in Islam—Jihad. Generally translated as "holy war," the term jihad connotes to non-Muslims desperate acts of irrational and fanatical people who want to impose their worldview on others. But this imposition is virtually impossible because the Quran says "Let there be no compulsion in religion." In fact, it can be argued that the

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great Arab conquests were essentially political and ideological. The Muslims were willing to tolerate pluralistic societies, which allowed the tensions of older tyrannies to be relaxed. Islam simply offered many peoples of the seventh and eighth centuries a freer, more secure and peaceful life than they had experienced in the past.2 Sometimes the conversion process took place in exchange for a Muslim divine's bureaucratic, religious, and educational services. Historically, especially in Southeast Asia, Islam seemed to stress continuity rather than conflict with previous cultures.3 What then is the meaning of jihadl Some Muslims considered jihad to be the sixth pillar of Islam.4 Among the Muslim legal school, the Khawarij ("seceders") used jihad to impose their opinion on the rest of the Muslim community in the name of transcendent and extreme idealism. They insisted that because the Prophet spent most of his life in war, the faithful should follow his example—that the Islamic state should be organized for war and heretics forcibly converted or put to the sword.5 But for Muslims, whose criteria for conduct are the Quran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet), historical examples pale in the face of the Quranic verses. Fight in the cause of God Those who fight you, But do not transgress limits; For God loveth no transgressors.6 According to this verse, aggression is prohibited in Islam, and the fighting that is permitted has its limits. The admonition of other relevant verses provides clarification: And fight them on Until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there prevail Justice and faith in God? or And fight them on Until there is no more Tumult or oppression, And there prevail Justice andfaith in God Altogether and everywhere.8 One of the reasons for fighting oppression is

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For tumult and oppression Are worse than slaughter.9 In this sense, fighting in the cause of God in Islam is basically synonymous with fighting for justice. The Quran has a precise injunction to substantiate this point: And why should ye not Fight in the cause of God And of those who, being weak Are ill-treated (and oppressed)? Men, women and children, Whose cry is "Our Lord! Rescue us from this town. Whose people are oppressors; And raise for us from Thee One who will protect; And raise for us from Thee One who will help!10 There is no need to probe deeper into the exegesis of these verses. For the puipose of this analysis, it can be concluded that jihad means to stand up to oppression, despotism, and injustice (wherever it is committed) and on behalf of the oppressed (whoever they may be). In its most general meaning, jihad is an effort, a striving for justice and truth that need not be violent. According to Abd ar-Raziq's reading of the Quran, God has instructed the Muslims to propagate their religion only through peaceful persuasion and preaching.11 Classical Muslim scholars have placed jihad in three categories. Ibn Taymiya, for example, argues that jihad is achieved sometimes by the heart, sometimes by the tongue, and sometimes by the hand. Jihad of the heart, or against one's own weaknesses and inner evil, is often described as the "greater jihad," while the "lesser jihad" is fought against external enemies. Ibn Taymiya also suggests that there are two cardinal rules of jihad by the tongue and by the hand: understanding and patience.12 But jihad can also be differentiated according to direction (inner or outer) and method (violent or nonviolent). The inner jihad in the narrowest sense is fought within the individual. In a broader sense, the outer jihad may be seen as a struggle to eliminate evil within the ummah (community). On an even broader reading, jihad can be thought of as a struggle within that portion of humanity that accepts some form of spiritual guidance in order to purify itself. 13 In short, jihad is the command of Allah Almighty and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad that demand a perpetual self-reexamination

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in terms of one's potential to fight tyranny and oppression—a continual reassessment of the means for achieving peace and inculcating moral responsibility.14 The point, however, is not to dwell on the conventional wisdom of separating the concept of jihad into wars and self-purification. What is most important for contemporary Muslims is that jihad categorically places the notion of war and violence in the moral realm. The purpose of jihad, ultimately, is to put an end to "structural violence."15 But the means used are not independent of moral scrutiny. On the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah, rules have been enunciated to forbid Muslims to kill noncombatants. One of the Hadiths reports these instructions by the Prophet: "Go in God's name, trusting in God, and adhering to the religion of God's messenger. Do no kill a decrepit old man, or a young infant, or a woman; do not be dishonest about booty, but collect your spoils, do right and act well, for God loves those who do well." 16 Not only are the lives of the noncombatants deemed sacred, but the Quran requires that even a tree must be spared: Whether ye cut down (O ye Muslims) The tender palm-trees Or ye left them standing On their roots, it was By leave of God, and In order that He might Cover with shame The rebellious transgressors.11 The placing of jihad within the Islamic ethical sphere also means that wanton destruction of an enemy's crops or property is strictly forbidden. This principle was clearly stated in a speech the first caliph, Abu Bakr, made when he sent his army on an expedition to the Syrian borders: Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services, leave them alone. 1 8

Transgressors of these principles were rebuked. At one time during the conquest, the authorities apprehended a girl who had been publicly singing satirical poems about Caliph Abu Bakr and amputated her hand. When Abu

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Bakr heard this news, he was shocked and wrote a letter to the muhajir who had punished the girl. I have leamt that you laid hands on a woman who had hurled abuses on me, and therefore, had her hand amputated. God has not sought vengeance even in the case of polytheism, which is a great crime. He has not permitted mutilation even with regard to manifest infidelity. Try to be considerate and sympathetic in your attitude towards others in the future. Never mutilate, because it is a grave offence. God purified Islam and the Muslims from rashness and e x c e s s i v e wrath. You are well aware of the fact that those enemies fell into the hands of the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) who had been recklessly abusing him; who had turned him out of his home; and who fought against him, but he never permitted their mutilation. 1 9

From the verses of the Quran and these examples from one of the Prophet's companions, it can be concluded that the lesser jihad—the use of physical violence against others—has certain limits. These moral injunctions are possible because Muslims have to practice greater jihad—the process of struggle against worldly passion in oneself. The perpetual inner and greater jihad will guide the conduct of lesser jihad in both its objectives and its conduct. This requirement in Islamic teaching raises the question of whether a lesser jihad can ever be practiced in an age of mass warfare and nuclear weapons. It is interesting to note that the first symposium in the Islamic world on the nuclear arms race (organized in Karachi, Pakistan, by the World Muslim Congress in cooperation with the University of Karachi in March 1984) was held with the theme "The Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament: The Muslim Perspective." Inamullah Khan, secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) said: Since 1976, it [the OIC] has addressed itself regularly every year to a consideration of the twin issues of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and of the establishment of nuclear-weaponfree zones . . . an enunciation of the principles that nuclear disarmament must be universal and non-discriminatory for it to have any sense . . . 2 0

Echoing the same idea, a retired Pakistani general candidly pointed out the frightening capacity of nuclear overkill: "What is worse, there are no signs of reduction in the stockpiles. Instead there is an unbridled race for qualitative and quantitative superiority and more sophisticated weapons are being added to the nuclear arsenal every year." 21 He then suggested that Muslims must make their full contribution to the international efforts for

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general and complete nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-free zones should be established in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, with the ultimate aim being to rid the entire globe of nuclear weapons. States possessing nuclear weapons should extend unconditional and legally binding assurances to refrain from using or threatening to use such weapons against states without nuclear arms. Instead, peaceful nuclear technology must be shared among the people of the world. Finally, the Muslims should strengthen themselves through political unity, economic development, and acquisition of necessary technologies, including know-how in the nuclear field. The argument against nuclear wars and nuclear weapons is fundamental to the question of Islam and violence in the nuclear age. Inamullah Khan argues that although Islam permits fighting, it insists that the use of force be minimal. Furthermore, the Muslim conduct of war must be as humane as possible. A Muslim soldier does not fight for self-glory or plunder, and he is ordered not to kill indiscriminately. Given this mandate, Islam prohibits nuclear weapons because they are weapons of mass destruction and can in no way distinguish between combatants and noncombatants nor between military targets and fields and factories.22 It is important to note that this argument is incomplete. Inamullah Khan twice pointed out that "Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war. They are instruments of mass extermination." But the analysis that Muslims are not permitted to use these weapons because they do not conform to the Islamic conduct of violence overlooks an important fact: Nuclear weapons are not the only kind of weapons that cannot distinguish between combatants and noncombatants or between military targets and farmers' villages. Khan's omission of this point arises out of an incomplete consideration of the nature of modern warfare. War casualties have dramatically increased in the twentieth century, which has been characterized as "the century of total war." 23 In its first fifty years, over 100 million people, military and civilian, were killed or died as a result of war wounds. In World War I, one million civilians were directly killed, and World War II claimed almost 35 million civilian lives. 24 This astonishing rate of civilian casualties is basically a result of new technologies such as aerial bombardment, submarine warfare, and chemical/ biological warfare.25 It can thus be said that throughout modern history, especially since the onset of the industrial revolution, technology has had profound implications for the capacity to wage war.26 The issue has become more complicated with the proliferation of terrorism. Over the decades, the tendency has been to choose methods that minimize the terrorists' risks. As a result, the targets increasingly have become defenseless victims who have little value as symbols or who

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are not responsible for the conditions the terrorists say they want to alter. 27 This analysis holds that the critical variables for understanding terrorism are not related to technology but rather to the purpose and organization of particular groups and the vulnerabilities o f particular societies to them. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the societies' vulnerabilities more of less depend on the level of destruction of the technology used in terror. If the effect of terror becomes the prime focus of an analysis, then the extent of damage done to human life by modern and sophisticated weapons must be taken into account. In this sense, technology assumes paramount significance. Michael Walzer points out that one of the hardest questions in the theory of war (or violence in the modem age) is how those victims of war who can be attacked and killed are to be distinguished from those who cannot. The moral quality of war lies, among other things, in the tendency to set certain classes of people outside the permissible range of warfare, so that killing any of their members is not a legitimate act of war but a crime. 28 Perhaps one of the best sets of guidelines for judgment in conduct of violence includes two major principles: proportionality and discrimination. The principle of proportionality centers on the means of violence. It implies that battlefield use of particularly inhumane weapons should be restricted. The principle of discrimination centers on the objects of violence. It suggests that the belligerents should discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and that noncombatants should be protected. 29 The question is how noncombatants can be protected when the level of violence used is so overpowering that it destroys the possibility of discriminating between combatants and noncombatants. Moreover, some users of violence do not intend to discriminate but instead want the terrorization per se to attract attention from the world media so that their causes can be furthered. A s a result, it is virtually impossible for the innocents to remain safe in an age when the sophistication of modern technology of destruction is coupled with the growing disregard of human life. Islam does not tolerate such indiscriminate methods. Nor does it allow God's creations—human lives, trees, animals, the environment—to be destroyed. For example, the use of napalm is unacceptable, as are explosions in department stores, hijacking and killing hostages on any means o f transportation, and bombing civilian targets. 30 The modern world has made primitive weapons obsolete, but the encompassing moral sphere of Islam also renders modern weapons morally illegitimate. Does this conflict mean that oppressed Muslims should submit and ignore the command of God to fight? Is there any alternative for Muslims in the contemporary world? Before these questions can be discussed, Islamic ideas and teachings conducive to the absence o f violence should be first appreciated.

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Islam and the Promotion of Life In the Beginning, Allah Almighty said: Behold the Lord said to the angels 7 will create a vicegerent on earth.'31 God created people to be the vicegerents on earth and instilled His spirit in every man, woman, and child. When I have fashioned him In due proportion and breathed Into him of My spirit, Fall ye down in obeisance Unto him.32 This verse suggests the sacredness of human life because the spirit of the Creator resides within the otherwise empty body. In this sense, also, mankind is one. Mankind was one single nation, And God sent Messengers With glad tidings and Warnings33 The unity of mankind is a message made repeatedly in the Quran. Mankind was but one nation, But differed later. Had it not Been for a Word That went forth before From thy Lord, their differences Would have been settled Between them.3* Once these verses are appreciated, then it is possible to construe the meaning of a verse such as this: And if anyone saved a life, It would be as if he saved The life of all the people.35 Human life is thus sacred. Mankind is one single family, and every human life has a value equivalent to the sum total of all human lives.

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Murder is considered one of the four major sins in Islam. 36 Yet there is a paradox: If Islam values the sanctity of life, how can Muslims fight "tumult and oppression" to the end? Unless Muslims forsake the methods of violence, they cannot follow the seemingly contradictory injunctions. It is evident that fighting against injustice cannot be avoided. But the use of violence in such fighting can be eschewed. Alternatives to violence must be adopted if the sanctity of life is to be preserved. Because nonviolent alternatives do exist, 37 an argument can be made that for Muslims to be true to their faith, they have no alternative but to utilize nonviolent action in the contemporary world. The question then is whether Islam embodies conditions conducive to the use of effective nonviolent actions.

Nonviolent Action as an Islamic Mode of Struggle What does it take to practice nonviolent action? Gandhi answers: Belief in non-violence is based on the assumption that human nature in its essence is one and therefore unfailingly responds to the advances of love. . . . The non-violent technique does not depend for its success on the goodwill of the dictators, for a non-violent resister depends on the unfailing assistance of God which sustains him throughout d i f f i c u l t i e s which could otherwise be considered insurmountable. 3 8

In another place, he writes: "Truth and non-violence are not possible without a living belief in God, meaning a self-existent, all-knowing, living force which inheres in every other force known to the world and which depends on none, and which will live when all other forces may conceivably perish or cease to act." 39 A Muslim following Gandhi's teaching would not feel estranged. In fact, it may be possible to trace the Islamic influence on Gandhi concerning the omnipotent and incomparable God. Faith in the supreme Allah already exists in the hearts of every true Muslim. If Gandhian nonviolence is not sufficient, a modern theory of power may suffice. Gene Sharp writes: Political power disintegrates when the people withdraw their obedience and support. Yet, the ruler's military equipment may remain intact, his soldiers uninjured, the exiles unscathed, the factories and transport systems in full operational capacity, and the government buildings undamaged. But everything is changed. The human assistance which created and supported the regime's political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has disintegrated. 40

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For Muslims, this so-called modern theory of power simply embodies the basic Islamic principle that a person should submit only to the will of God. As a result, a Muslim is not bound to obey anyone whose power has been used unjustly. The Quran gives the following warning: When (at length) the order For fighting was issued to them, Behold a section of them Feared men as— Or even more than— They should have feared God.41 Yet there is assurance as well: Behold! verily on the friends Of God there is no fear, Nor shall they grieve.*2 Complete submission to the will of Allah means that if Muslims are oppressed and too weak to fight back, they nevertheless must refuse to obey an unjust ruler. They do have a means to refuse—they can leave. And leave they must, because the command of God on this issue is quite clear. When angels take The souls of those Who die in sin Against their souls, They say: "In what (plight) Were ye? " They replied: 'Weak and oppressed Were we in the earth." They say: "Was not The earth of God Spacious enough for you To move yourselves away (From evil)"?«* Whether Muslims are weak or strong, they must do something, and it is this tendency toward action that enables them to engage easily in nonviolent struggle. As a technique, nonviolent action is not passive: "It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent." 44 Hence, by definition, nonviolent action cannot occur except by the replacement of passivity and submissiveness with activity, challenge, and struggle.

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Nonviolent Action in Pattani, 1975 The proximity between Islam and nonviolence can be illustrated with a case study. On November 29, 1975, five adult Malay Muslims and a thirteen-yearold boy traveling in Narathiwat were stopped and put into a dump truck by a group of people dressed in dark green suits. When the truck reached the Kor Tor bridge separating Narathiwat from Pattani, the six civilians were stabbed in the back, their skulls crushed, and their bodies thrown into the river. Fortunately, the boy survived, and the massacre was brought to public attention by a group of Muslim activists who began a protest.45 The people started their peaceful demonstration on December 12, 1975, in the compound of the central government house in Pattani, then formed the Civil Rights Protection Center to keep the protest going. On behalf of the Muslims, the center issued four demands to the government: (1) arrest of the criminals by rule of law; (2) compensation for the victims' families; (3) withdrawal of government troops within seven days; and (4) a meeting by December 16 between Prime Minister M. R. Kukrit Pramoj and the people. The government did not seem to take these demands seriously, but the Muslims persevered. On December 13, 1975, university students from institutions in the south came to join the protest. The military and the police surrounded the city of Pattani. During a panel discussion that evening, a bomb exploded among the people. One of the coordinators of the protest rushed to the microphone shouting "Do not flee!" He was fatally shot on the stage. The police came and put an end to the protest. There were twelve deaths and more than thirty people injured, seven of whom were women and children. This incident caused the people grave concern and sadness. On the same day, around fifty thousand gathered again at the central mosque in Pattani, patiently braving the torrential rain. In retaliation, schools in Pattani and Narathiwat were burned, and the people accused the soldiers of committing arson. One more officer of the Civil Rights Center was stabbed to death. The government did not yield—but neither did the people. On December 21, Muslims from Bangkok rallied at their central mosque to pray for those killed. On the following day, nine educational institutions joined the protest by suspending classes. The government responded by saying that the protest was but a minor incident involving only a few hundred people, a claim that prompted a huge demonstration on December 28. The mass of people formed themselves into a parade more than three kilometers long, marching in orderly fashion with the Thai flags and portraits of the Thai king and queen leading their procession. Even a heavy rain could not weaken their will as they walked toward the Toh Ayah graveyard. The organizers pointed out that this demonstration was an attempt to fight for justice, display the people's

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strength, and demonstrate that the protest was not the "minor" incident the government claimed it to be. The protesters prayed for the souls of the deceased and then dispersed at 6:00 p.m. On January 2, 1976, Thai Muslim government officials from the five southern provinces met to consider how to encourage the prime minister to come to Pattani. They announced January 4 they would strike on the following day if their demands were not met. On January 10, their representatives met with the prime minister, who promised to go to Pattani. The protest ended after forty-five days with, among other things, the removal of Pattani's governor and his replacement by a Muslim. 46 There seem to be five conditions that enabled the Muslim protesters to stage a sustained nonviolent protest in Pattani. First, they possessed the will to disobey, without which no nonviolent action can be realized. The Muslims are willing to disobey because for them God alone is supreme. This total submission to Allah in turn means a rejection of any other form of absolute authority, including the state's. Second, the Pattani Muslims were courageous despite severe repression by the state apparatus. Because they submitted to Allah alone, they did not have to fear any mortal. Muslims believe as a precept of iman (faith) that all the good and bad incidents in their lives are bestowed upon them by God. As a result, resignation while working for a just cause, without fear of punishment, becomes possible. In the final analysis, they believe God will take care of them. Third, Muslim discipline enabled the gathering, the protest march, and even the threat to resign en masse to be carried out efficiently. All of the activities were well orchestrated. The quality of discipline bears little relationship to the leadership of the group because it takes time to cultivate such a collective trait. The Muslims, however, are already disciplined in their everyday life; that they pray five times a day contributes to this quality. Fourth, the concept of ummah (community) is very strong among Muslims, who find this unity of brotherhood expressed in the Quran: And hold fast All together, by the Rope Which God stretches out For you and be not divided Among yourselves.47 Fifth, the feeling among the Pattani Muslims was anything but passive. Islam repeatedly encourages action, and although jihad can be performed by the heart, the tongue, or the hand, the important requirement is that it be performed in one way or another. It is also important to note that two out of three ways of performing jihad are action-oriented. Action, therefore, is of

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paramount importance for Muslims, just as it is at the core of the modern theory of nonviolence. These five characteristics of the Muslims, evident in the Pattani case, can be termed the "Five Pillars of Muslim Nonviolent Action." Interestingly, these correspond well with the sacred Five Pillars of Islam: shahadat (a vow that proclaims there is no god but God and Muhammad is His messenger); salat (prayers at specific times five times a day from sunrise to sunset, each preceded by proper ablution); zakat (compulsory religious tax that every Muslim has to pay); sawn (fasting in the month of Ramadan every year by abstaining from food and drink from sunrise to sunset while purifying both the tongue and the heart in the process); and hajj (pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca at least once in a lifetime if one can afford it). Each of these five pillars produces a special quality for those who continually practice them. The shahadat vow by a Muslim is an act asserting that the person will not allow other things to supersede the will of God. This obedience to God entails the possibility of disobedience to any power that contradicts God's command. The salat, at a lower level of understanding, is an exercise in disciplinary action. When offered in a congregation, which is usually encouraged, it becomes an assertion of equality because the poor can stand shoulder to shoulder with the rich in such a prayer. The zakat reminds Muslims of their obligation to society at large because the tax sensitizes them to the problems of others and induces them to do something about it. The sawn, both a lesson of self-sacrifice and empathy, enables Muslims to develop patience, the quality that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the nonviolent struggle by the Pathans against the British, regards as crucial for nonviolence in Islam. 48 Finally, the hajj is a reaffirmation of brotherhood and the belief that all Muslims form one nation, regardless of race, color, nationality, or class. It is a return to the beginning, an immersion in the eternal source of life that has guided their ancestors for millennia. In other words, a practicing Muslim should possess the potential for disobedience, discipline, social concern and action, patience and willingness to suffer for a cause, and the idea of unity—all of which are crucial for successful nonviolent action. 4 9 It remains to be seen how Muslim intellectuals will attempt to tap the fertile resources of nonviolent thought within their own tradition and resolve the paradox of living as a true Muslim in the contemporary world.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to address Muslims and others interested in the relationship of Islam to the modern world. The points of references made here are primarily sources most Muslims accept—the Quran and the Hadith. It is

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indeed essential that Islam is looked at from a fresh angle. Because the conventional worldview accepts violence as normal, a nonviolent Muslim must part with this paradigm. To have a paradigm shift, the fundamental acceptance of violence must be seriously questioned. The eight theses on Muslim nonviolent action that follow are suggested as a challenge for Muslims and others who seek to reaffirm the original vision of Islam so that the true meaning of peace—the absence of both structural as well as personal violence—can be obtained: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

For Islam, the problem of violence is an integral part of the Islamic moral sphere. Violence, if any, used by Muslims must be governed by rules prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith. If violence used cannot discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, then it is unacceptable in Islam. Modem technology of destruction renders discrimination virtually impossible at present. In the modem world, Muslims cannot use violence. Islam teaches Muslims to fight for justice with the understanding that human lives—as all parts of God's creation—are purposive and sacred. In order to be true to Islam, Muslims must utilize nonviolent action as a new mode of struggle. Islam itself is fertile soil for nonviolence because of its potential for disobedience, strong discipline, sharing and social responsibility, perseverance and self-sacrifice, and the belief in the unity of the Muslim community and the oneness of mankind.

That such theses of Muslim nonviolent action are essential to peace in this world and the true meaning of Islam is evident form the Quran: Peace!—a Word (Of salutation) from the Lord Most Merciful!50

Notes 1. Sanyaluck: A Reporting and Analyzing Thai Newspaper vol. 7, no. 137 (January 30, 1985). 2. Robert Goldstein, The Sword of the Prophet (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1979), p. 55. 3. Nehemiah Levtzion, Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier).

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4. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: Univ. of Texas, 1982), p. 2. 5. John Ferguson, War and Peace in the World's Religions (London: Sheldon Press, 1977), p. 132. 6. A. Yusuf Alii, The Glorious Koran (Muslim Students Association, 1977), chap. 2, verse 109. 7. Ibid., chap. 2, verse 193. 8. Ibid., chap. 8, verse 39. 9. Ibid., chap. 2, verse 191. 10. Ibid., chap. 4, verse 75. 11. Enayat, p. 64. 12. Zainddin Sardar, "The Other Jihad: Muslim Intellectuals and Their Responsibilities," Inquiry (London), vol. 2, no. 10 (October 1985), pp. 40-45. 13. Gary Legenhausen, "A Sermon on Jihad," Muslim Students Association of Hawaii Newsletter, vol. 5, no. 6 (January 1985). 14. Munawar Ahmad Annes, "Responsible Strength," Inquiry (London) vol. 2, no. 10 (October 1985), pp. 52-53. 15. Johan Galting, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research (1969) 3, pp. 167-169. 16. James Robson (trans.), Mishkat al Masabih (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1975), p. 838. 17. Alii, chap, verse 5. 18. Abdil Hamid Siddiqi (trans.), Sahib Muslim (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976-1979), vol. , p. 940. 19. Siddiqi, vol. p. 940. 20. Proceedings of the World Muslim Congress, Karachi, Pakistan, March 1984. I cannot help but ask if a full-scale war breaks out between any two powers, will any of the "ordinary" states survive? 21. Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan, "Horror of Nuclear War," Defence Journal (Pakistan), vol. 10, no. 5 - 6 (May-June 1984), pp. 13-16. 22. Inamullah Khan, "Nuclear War And the Defence of Peace: The Muslim View," International Peace Research Newsletter, vol. 23, no. 2 (April 1985), pp. 9-11. 23. See Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955). 24. Francis Beer, Peace Against War (San Francisco: W.W. Freeman, 1981), pp. 3 5 - 3 7 . 25. Andrew Wilson, The Disarmer's Handbook (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 19. 26. Steven E. Miller, "Technology and War," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December, 1985), pp. 4 6 ^ 8 . 27. Dnidc Rapgiort, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Political Traditions," American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 658-677. 28. Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust War (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . Medieval writers distinguish jus ad bellum (justice of war) from jus in bello (Justice in war). "Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments about aggression and self-defence while jus in bello primarily concerns the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement." Walzer, p. 21. 29. Beer, pp. 91-92; Wilson, pp. 289-290. 30. Blonc.

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31. Alii, chap. 2, verse 30. 32. Ibid., chap. 15, verse 29. 33. Ibid., chap. 2, verse 213. 34. Ibid., chap. 10, verse 19. 35. Ibid., chap. 5, verse 35. 36. Robson, p. 16. 37. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). 38. Mohandas K. Gandhi, Nonviolence in Peace and War (Ahmedabad: Navajiwian Publishing House, 1978), vol. 1, p. 175. 39. Mohandas K. Gandhi, Nonviolence in Peace and War (Ahmedabad: Navajwan Publishing House, 1979), vol. 2, p. 112. 40. Sharp, pp. 63-64. 41. Alii, chap. 4, verse 77. 42. Ibid., chap. 10, verse 62. 43. Ibid., chap. 4, verse 97. 44. Sharp, pp. 64-65. 45. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand 1976-1981, Thai Jihad Research Institute, Thammasat University, August 1983. Translated by author into Thai, Thai Research Institute, Bangkok, 1984. 46. Thai Rath (Thai daily paper), December 13, 1975-January 26, 1976. 47. Alii, chap. 3, verse 103. 48. Eknath Easwaran, A Man to Match His Mountain (Blue Mountain, Calif.: Ailgiri Press, 1984), p. 117. 49. Sharp, parts 1 and 2. 50. Alii, chap. 36, verse 58.

4 Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle Brad Bennett

Egypt, 1919-1922 Although nationalist sentiment existed in Egypt throughout the first two decades of this century, it was not until the period 1919-1922 that Egyptians rebelled on a mass scale and won their independence from the British. They accomplished this revolution through a variety o f means, including nonviolent noncooperation in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. At first, the British merely supervised a basically Egyptian administration and even allowed a legislative assembly to be formed in 1913. The assembly met only once, however, before the British dissolved it at the outbreak of World War I. At the same time, Britain proclaimed Egypt a British protectorate and declared martial law. Egyptian Prime Minister Rushdi Pasha was promised that Egyptian self-government would be considered after the war if Egypt cooperated. Many Egyptians disliked the protectorate arrangement. Despite a pledge that Egyptians would not be directly involved in the war, more than 1.5 million Egyptian citizens were recruited, sometimes forcibly, into the Labour Corps. Food, animals, and fodder were conscripted and severe censorship of communication was imposed. Several early protests were waged, including a 1916 boycott by law school students of the visit by the British-supported sultan from Turkey and a protest in early 1916 in Cairo against the severe militarization of Egyptian society. On November 11, 1918, two days after the armistice ending the war was signed, Saad Zaghlul, a former assembly member, and other nationalist leaders submitted a request to form a delegation to go to London to present demands for Egyptian independence. The British authority in Egypt refused their request. Zaghlul began to organize a permanent delegation, called AlWafd al-Misri, to agitate for Egyptian independence. He collected two million signatures on a petition stating that the Wafd was the official representative

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of the nation authorized to negotiate Egypt's political future, and calling for complete independence through legal and peaceful means. Later in November, Zaghlul applied to the British military authorities for travel permits so that the delegates could present their demands in London. After refusing for several months to grant these permits, the British arrested Zaghlul and two other Wafd leaders on March 8, 1919, and exiled them to Malta. Zaghlul's arrest provoked demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities and strikes by students, transport workers, judges, and lawyers. Some of the demonstrations were violent and resulted in the destruction of public property. A few British military representatives were killed, but most casualties were demonstrators. British troops brutally attacked the demonstrations, killing several protesters. By this time, General Edmund Allenby had been sent to deal with the deteriorating political situation in Egypt. On April 7, he announced the release of Zaghlul and the other Wafd leaders, who then left Malta to attend the Paris peace conference. A new Egyptian government was formed on April 9, headed by Rushdi Pasha. However, the Paris peace conference recognized the British protectorate over Egypt, and strikes and demonstrations occurred throughout April. A major component of Egyptian resistance was the use of strikes by much of the population. Cairo and Alexandria, the two major cities, saw widespread strikes. Students and lawyers struck first, followed soon afterward by postal, telegraph, tram, and railway workers. Some intimidation through picketing forced some workers to strike. Many of the demonstrators were women. Egytian government officials stopped work and set up a special committee that demanded recognition of the Ward's mandate, the abolition of martial law, and the dissolution of the protectorate. Allenby issued a proclamation on April 20, 1919, stating that all striking officials would be dismissed if they continued their strike. The strike by civil servants collapsed under this threat, and other strikes ended soon after. The reassertion of the protectorate provoked Rushdi Pasha to resign on April 21. One month later, the British helped form another government headed by Muhammad Said Pasha and sent a commission of inquiry headed by Lord Milner to study the conflict in Egypt. The Wafd spearheaded a social and political boycott of the Milner mission. Its members stayed in Egypt from December 1919 to April 1920, only to find that Egyptians refused to assist them or cooperate in any way. For example, when a member went to observe a court session, the judge and lawyers left the room. The Milner commission left Egypt convinced that martial law was no longer appropriate in governing Egypt. The Milner report, finally published in February 1921, recommended that Britain abandon the protectorate structure and set up a different arrangement with Egypt. Allenby issued a declaration on February 22, 1922,

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recognizing Egypt as an independent state on certain conditions: Britain retained the right to maintain a military force in Egypt to protect communications and economic interests, the right to defend Egypt militarily, and the right to control the Sudan. Thus, Egypt achieved limited independence through the pressure caused by nonviolent noncooperation in the form of strikes, boycotts, and the refusal of Zaghlul and other civil servants to be co-opted by British policies.

Peshawar Pathan Defiance, 1930 Gandhian nonviolent satyagraha campaigns inspired many Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, to commit themselves to nonviolent resistance to British rule. One such devotee was known as the "Frontier Gandhi." Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Pathan tribesman of the Northwest Frontier, founded the Khudai Khidmatgars, or "Servants of God," a nonviolent army devoted to freedom and serving the people. He led thousands of Muslim Pathans in defiance against the British. The Muslim Pathans lived in the "free" areas in the Peshawar valley on the western border of the Northwest Frontier and governed themselves. This province had never been fully subjugated by the British, and fighting occurred between the British and the Pathans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Pathans were inspired by badal, a code of honor demanding revenge for any insult or transgression, which fostered frequent violence both among the Pathans and between the Pathans and the British. Given this violent tradition, the British were caught off guard by the Pathan nonviolent campaign of 1930. After the Northwest Frontier war of 1897, the province became a police state, isolated from other provinces and subject to strict regulations enforced by a 6,000-member police force. One of many Indians inspired by Gandhi's commitment to serving the people, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited nearly all the villages of the Frontier in the 1910s and 1920s, setting up schools, teaching agricultural skills, and promoting sanitation. Inspired by Gandhi's call for a general strike in 1919, many Pathans gathered for a political rally in Utmanzai, Khan's home village. The British reacted to this political dissent by declaring martial law, arresting Khan, and sentencing him without trial to six months in prison. By this time, Khan had decided to fight nonviolently for Indian home rule. But it was not until 1929 that Khan formed the Khudai Khidmatgars. Composed of men and women who pledged to refrain from violence and devote two hours a day to social work, the Servants of God were trained and uniformed and followed basic army discipline. They drilled, carried flags, and even formed their own bagpipe corps. This nonviolent army, also called Red

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Shirts for the color of their uniform, marched into villages and opened schools, organized work projects, and kept order at nationalist gatherings. They also engaged in peaceful picketing of law courts and liquor stores. On the last day of 1929, the Indian National Congress announced a new campaign for home rule. On March 12,1930, Gandhi and hundreds of Indians embarked on the famous Salt March. The Frontier Servants of God launched their own education campaign, communicating the declaration of freedom and the technique of satyagraha. At a gathering on April 23, Khan urged civil resistance to British rule, and he and other leaders were immediately arrested. Thousands of Pathans protested their arrest, surrounding the jail and demanding their release. The Servants of God led protests throughout the province, and in Peshawar, after some red-shirted Servants of God were arrested, the city erupted into a spontaneous general strike. The British reacted to this Pathan defiance with violence. At the Kissa Khani bazaar in Peshawar on April 23, a large crowd protested the arrest of the Servants of God. The crowd had been completely nonviolent and had begun to disperse as the British and their own leaders had requested, when the British troops suddenly opened fire. For six hours, the troops fired on the Pathans, killing almost three hundred and wounding many more. When the Garhwal Rifles, an Indian military division, refused to shoot their fellow tribespeople, the entire platoon was arrested, court-martialed, and given heavy sentences. A few days later, the British declared the Servants of God illegal. Their offices were closed down, their funds confiscated, and the Frontier isolated once again. Before dawn on May 13, in Khan's village of Utmanzai, the British cavalry surrounded the group's headquarters. After the Servants of God refused to take off their uniforms as ordered, they were stripped and beaten, their office building was bumed down, the village was looted, and all Servants of God were arrested. Such incidents occurred throughout the Frontier, and "gunning the Red Shirts" became a popular sport for British troops. Some Servants of God were driven to suicide rather than submit to humiliation by the British. In spite of this severe repression, the Servants of God remained almost completely nonviolent, although there was violence by other Pathans against the British in other areas of the province. This adherence to nonviolent discipline by a people previously highly prone to violence unnerved the British, and their attempts to provoke the Pathans to violence met with failure. Indeed, although Khan had recruited only about 1,000 Servants of God before his arrest, British repression indirectly caused 80,000 Pathans to join the cause by the end of the summer of 1930. The British finally conceded in 1933 by declaring the Frontier a fullfledged governor's province, with political parity with other provinces. Khan continued his work throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, though he eventually spent a total of fifteen years in jail during his life. The

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Pathan defiance he led in Peshawar was symbolically important in several respects. First, it helped to dispel the myth that nonviolent struggle can work only for those who are already predisposed to nonviolent action. Second, the Servants of God represented one of the first examples of a nonviolent army. Third, the Pathan nonviolent campaign contributed to the general Indian struggle for independence.

Palestine General Strike, 1936 Palestine was created as a political entity as part of the World War I peace settlement, and Great Britain was given a mandate over Palestine, to rule the country until it was "ready for self-rule." In the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the British had declared their sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations and pledged to work toward the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Arabs in Palestine objected to the British mandate and to Jewish immigration and the move toward establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. This dissent coalesced into the 1936 general strike, which marked the beginning of a three-year revolt by Palestinians. Although much of the subsequent revolt was carried out by violent resistance, the general strike that provided the impetus was an example of nonviolent action. Arab nationalist protest centered around several demands: the conversion of Palestine into a sovereign Arab state, the termination of the British mandate and plans for a Jewish national homeland, and the cessation of Jewish immigration and the purchase of Arab-owned lands by Jews. In the 1920s, Palestinian protest took the form of nationalist writings, delegations to London to press for Palestinian concerns, demonstrations and mass protests, and scattered acts of violence. By 1933, nationalist protest had intensified, and the Higher Arab Committee voted for a social boycott of government receptions, a political boycott of government boards, and an economic boycott of British and Zionist goods. Committee members also called a one-day general strike on September 13, 1933, to publicize their demands, and on October 13, they staged a demonstration. But major organized resistance did not emerge until 1936, fueled by economic recession, increased Jewish immigration (illegal and legal), continued Jewish acquisition of previously Arab-owned lands, and the refusal of many Jewish employers to hire Arabs. In April 1936, Jewish-Arab clashes, in which several people were killed, precipitated the general strike. Beginning April 20, Arab "national committees," calling for a nationwide general strike to press for previously articulated nationalist demands, were formed in Nablus and Jaffa and soon spread to other towns. Strikes were first called spontaneously and independently, but on April 25, the Higher Arab Committee was created as the general organizing body directing the general

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strike, while the national committees coordinated the strike on the local level. On May 7, a congress of national committees called for a campaign of civil disobedience, including the continuation of the general strike, tax resistance, and a campaign to halt the work of the municipal governments. By the end of April, virtually all Arab business and transportation had come to a standstill. Many local mayors went on strike, while national government officials, fearful that if they participated, their positions would be taken by Jews, agreed to contribute 10 percent of their salaries to the strike fund. Arab violence first erupted after the British announced the May 18 immigrant quota of 4,500. Violent resistance increased during the summer in reaction to British repression in the form of village searches, destruction of parts of villages, and imprisonment without trial. Guerrilla warfare broke out, instigated by Arabs in Palestine and Syrian guerrilla leader Fawzi alQawuqji. Encouraged by the significant concessions Syrian nationalists had just won from the French as a result of a fifty-day strike, the Arabs in Palestine continued their strike through the summer, despite concerted attempts by several intermediaries to negotiate a settlement. On August 30, the Higher Arab Committee announced its continued commitment to the strike. On September 7, the British Colonial Office, in a change of policy, declared martial law and began an offensive campaign to rid Palestine of guerrilla activity. More troops were ordered to Palestine, bringing the total to 20,000, and many Arabs became pessimistic about the possibilities of defeating the far-superior British military forces. Moreover, the Arab community was suffering greater losses than the Jewish community, and many Arab leaders feared that the strike had become counterproductive. Finally, the Higher Arab Committee urged leaders of Arab nations to appeal for an end to the strike. On October 11, the heads of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Yemen promised continued aid and pressed the strikers to stop the campaign. The Higher Committee called for an end to the strike and violence that same day. Scattered violence and small strikes continued in the following weeks, but organized Arab resistance was broken. Although nonviolent action continued to play a role in Palestinian resistance (for example, there was a short boycott of the British Royal Commission sent in November 1936 to study the Palestinian conflict), much of the poststrike resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare. Arab nationalist guerrillas suffered much greater losses than did 3ritish forces. But by 1939, the British admitted that the mandate and the Royal Commission's 1937 partitioning scheme were both unworkable. The boycott and strike did affect Jewish economic life. The Arab boycott reduced Jewish manufactures by 10 percent. Transport problems disrupted commerce, and the Jewish construction of new buildings slackened. The strike also demonstrated the political will and commitment of Palestinian

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Arabs, and the British were forced to recognize Arab nationalism in Palestine and to abandon the mandate and partitioning scheme. The six-month strike did not, however, halt Jewish immigration, and the Arab community was weakened by the struggle.

Iraq Uprising, 19481 At the end of World War II, many Arab countries were still under British hegemony. At that time, in an effort to update existing arrangements with Arab nations by loosening direct authority while still maintaining control, Britain decided to reformulate treaties with these countries, beginning with Iraq. The British were to be met with widespread Iraqi resistance to their efforts in the form of a predominantly nonviolent uprising in 1948. The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty had granted Britain two military bases in Iraq and other concessions. In 1948, British foreign officials had revised this treaty slightly and invited Iraqi Prime Minister Salih Jabr to Portsmouth, England, to sign it. In what was to be the first of a series of treaties between Britain and Arab countries, it allowed for the continuation of British influence and military bases in Iraq. Although no Arabic translation of the treaty was prepared and only portions of the English version were available, the Iraqis sensed the implications of the treaty immediately. As soon as news about the treaty reached Iraq's capital of Baghdad, students of the engineering and law colleges left classes and protested in the streets. The protest quickly grew, and soon all college and high school students went on strike, followed by many workers. Protest against the treaty was linked with outrage over food shortages, and Baghdad's main street was jammed daily with demonstrators demanding the resignation of the Jabr regime. Prime Minister Jabr continued to assert that he was in control of the situation. But upon his return from Britain, he could land only at the British air base of Habbania and was forced to travel to Baghdad in disguise. The government held an emergency meeting at the royal palace to determine policy. The main point of contention at the meeting was whether to use peaceful means or military force to quell the uprising. Finally, Jabr called for the use of force, and in a radio broadcast on January 26, 1948, he announced he had ordered police to use machine guns to disperse the protest demonstrations. Angered by Jabr's threat of force, thousands of Iraqis poured into the streets in protest. The police commander ordered his troops to position machine guns on two mosques on either side of a bridge over the Tigris River, and they intermittently fired on the crowds throughout most of the day. Over one hundred were killed and several hundred were wounded, but the Iraqis continued to demonstrate and protest in the streets. Finally, the

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soldiers' morale broke, and they refused to fire on the civilians. At 8:00 p.m., a radio announcement reported the resignation of the Jabr government. The people gathered in the streets once more, this time to congratulate each other and sing and dance with joy. Although much of the protest activity of this uprising was nonviolent in nature, some actions were violent. Army officers called for a military coup. One policeman was killed in the protest demonstration, and the American Information Center was burned to the ground. But otherwise, foreigners were unmolested, property was generally left untouched, and shops were not looted. The revolt was predominantly nonviolent. The uprising started as a simple protest of the treaty, but it erupted into an organized movement. Strikes and demonstrations continued for ten days after the resignation of Salih Jabr, and the people maintained pressure until the final repudiation of the treaty was announced. One of the major components of the resistance movement was the political poetry of al-Jawahiri and Bahr al-Ulum, two of Iraq's most famous poets of the period. Bahr al-Ulum spent many hours reciting poetry while being carried on the shoulders of fellow demonstrators. When his brother was killed in the massacre near the bridge, al-Jawahiri was inspired to write his famous poem foretelling the impending revolution. Unfortunately, the unity that characterized the revolt of January 1948 was overshadowed by subsequent events. The Iraqi military intervention in the 1948 war in Palestine served as an excuse for some Iraqi leaders to establish a military dictatorship in Iraq. Many of the gains of the uprising were reversed, and left-wing forces were persecuted. But the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty was never implemented, and Britain eventually concluded a collective agreement with Arab countries in the Baghdad Pact. The largely nonviolent Iraqi uprising of 1948 led to the resignation of an unpopular administration and the repudiation of an unpopular treaty.1

Iran Revolution, 1978-1979 The unpopular authoritarian Shah of Iran was deposed through an insurrection in the late 1970s that was primarily nonviolent in nature. The revolt was characterized by huge public demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and many other forms of noncooperation, although there were armed guerrillas fighting at the same time. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah, who first came to power in 1941, formed SAVAK (secret police) in 1957. Originally created to fight communism, SAVAK was used primarily to instill such fear in the Iranian people that they would not resist. With arrests, imprisonment, and torture common, the Shah by 1963 possessed virtually absolute decisionmaking authority.

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Spontaneous acts of protest against the Shah's oppressive regime occasionally erupted, however. One of the first anti-Shah demonstrations, in Qom in October 1963, ended in brutal suppression by the army and the death of thousands. Much of the nonviolent resistance during the 1960s and 1970s was underground; Ayatollah Khomeini, a leader of the opposition, was forced into exile from 1963 to 1979. Armed resistance also occurred during this period, headed by the Fedayeen and Mujahedin guerrilla organizations. Protests also were mounted abroad: In one of many student actions in other countries, six students chained themselves inside the Statue of Liberty in New York on February 10, 1977, to protest treatment of Iranian political prisoners. Open resistance in Iran began in 1977. Ayatollah Khomeini sent explicit messages to the opposition in Iran in which he called for strikes, boycotts, and noncooperation. Three prominent political figures sent the Shah a plea in June for political and social freedom, and thousands of copies of their letter were circulated. On January 8, 1978, the day after a national newspaper published an article critical of Khomeini, a large crowd demonstrated in Qom to protest. Police fired on the nonviolent demonstrators, killing dozens. This event initiated a cycle of open resistance and repression. In Islamic tradition, a death is mourned publicly for forty days. Thus, every time people were killed in an anti-Shah demonstration, another demonstration occurred forty days later. The January 8 event in Qom led to many demonstrations that year. On February 17, forty days later, protests took place in Tabriz; demonstrations in late July in thirteen cities were brutally broken up by security forces, and people were injured and killed. On the night of August 28, the Cinema Rex movie theater in Abadan was set on fire, and 410 people locked inside were killed. Many Iranians believed that government representatives set the fire. On September 4 and 7, marches were held in Tehran and other cities to mourn the dead in Abadan. The Shah declared martial law on September 7, and the next day 15,000 gathered at Jaleh Square in Tehran early in the morning. The crowd was primarily peaceful, but soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing 3,000 people. The fire at Abadan and the massacre in Tehran both contributed to the Iranian will to resist. Soon after these events, opposition leaders announced a campaign of noncooperation. On October 7, state hospital employees went on strike. Several days later, two major newspapers stopped publication to protest the Shah's censorship. In the city of Mashad, a general strike was called. On October 31, oil workers struck, demanding the release of all political prisoners and totally shutting down the oil industry. November 6 brought a one-day nationwide general strike throughout Iran. Oil workers returned to work in mid-November because the government was arresting strike leaders, but they continued to show their noncooperation by staging slowdowns.

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During this period, the Shah attempted to give radio propaganda speeches at 8:30 every night, but technical workers would cause a "power failure" until the show was finished. Conflict intensified in December. Many oil workers renewed their strike on December 4, and thousands demonstrated in Tehran on December 3 and 10. On December 16, a Khomeini-inspired day of mourning and general strike occurred. Again on December 28, all oil workers went on strike, completely shutting down the industry. On December 30, the Shah attempted to salvage the political situation by naming Shapur Bakhtiar as prime minister. He was denounced on January 13, 1979, by Khomeini, who called for continued resistance and appointed a Provisional Revolutionary Council in Iran to create an alternative government. The Shah fled the country on January 16, and on February 1 Khomeini returned from his seventeen-year exile, welcomed by millions of Iranians. On February 5, he appointed Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister, thus creating a parallel government. The Shah's appointee, Bakhtiar, finally resigned on February 11, and the Shah's regime collapsed. During the resistance, thousands of Iranians—most of them nonviolent demonstrators—lost their lives at the hands of Savak and the army. Martyrdom was a vital component of the revolt, fueling the spirit to resist. Khomeini and other religious leaders had called for all forms of noncooperation, and organized violence played a small role in the strategy of revolutionary leaders. Strikes, tax resistance, solidarity, civil disobedience, demonstrations, and rallies were the major methods of the resistance.

Golan Druze Resistance, 1981-19822 The Druze are a distinct Arab population, most of whom now live in isolated villages in the mountains of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Faced with Israeli attempts to annex the Golan Heights, Syrian Druze villagers waged a nonviolent noncooperation campaign against Israeli occupation in the early 1980s. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel initiated a gradual and systematic plan to annex the Golan Heights (located on Israel's northeast comer). Israel considered the Golan and other occupied territories "administered" areas, but rather than attempt formal annexation and risk international reprobation, Israel decided to pursue an assimilation process. Thus, the government offered Israeli citizenship to the Golani Druze, hoping that sufficient numbers of them would request citizenship to allow for the indirect annexation of the Golan. From 1979 to 1981, the Golani Druze were pressured to apply for Israeli identification cards, but opposition to this campaign soon began to solidify. Those Druze who accepted the identification cards were ostracized by

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their community, and many who had originally accepted identity cards returned them. On December 14, 1981, Israel officially annexed the Golan and began to attempt to force the Druze to accept Israeli identification. When the Druze petition for a reversal of the decision failed, they publicly announced they would not cooperate with Israel's campaign to coerce them into accepting Israeli citizenship. Nonviolent resistance, soon widespread among Golani Druze, took many forms. Druze workers went on strike, severely hampering industry in northern Israel. When a village ran out of food, the villagers walked en masse to the nearest village to acquire more, defying Israeli soldiers who had been ordered to prevent Druze fraternization. In one village, Israeli soldiers refused orders to fire on a large crowd demonstrating in a village square. On other occasions, groups of Druze women surrounded Israeli soldiers, wrested their weapons from their hands, and returned them to army officers, telling them to leave. Elderly and young Druze violated curfew to harvest crops. Arrest of the elders strengthened the population's commitment to noncooperation. When some of the children were arrested and taken away via helicopters, many more replaced them in the fields, eager for a ride. One village organized a "reverse strike" when the Israeli government denied them funds to complete a major sewer project. Because they were home from work on strike, the villagers dug the trenches and installed the necessary pipeline themselves. Many cooperative economic structures and schools were organized during this period. After four months of protracted negotiations, Israel indicated that it would suspend its plan to force Golani Druze to accept Israeli citizenship, but instead escalated its military repression. Approximately 15,000 soldiers occupied the area, isolating the Golan Heights and imposing a state of siege that lasted forty-three days. Homes were destroyed, many people were arrested, and some were shot and wounded, but the Druze continued to refuse to cooperate. The Israeli government finally lifted the siege after realizing the futility of coercing the Golani Druze to accept its demands. The Druze strike continued, however, until Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. The Israeli government initially agreed to several points of a compromise, including noninterference with Druze civil, water, and land rights; no conscription of Druze youths into the Israeli army; and permission for open economic relations with Syria. But Israel did not fulfill many of its promises, and the compromise did not resolve the issue of the identity of the Golani Druze. The Druze continued to resist. Many simply refused to carry any identification. When five Druze were arrested for not carrying identification cards, their entire village gathered at the local court, demanding that they too be tried. On September 23, 1983, a funeral procession for

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Kamal Kanj Abu Salen, a Druze spiritual leader and strike organizer, turned into a huge demonstration by an estimated 35,000 people. The Golani Druze nonviolent resistance also had an effect on the Israeli troops. Villagers defied curfew to place tea and cookies outside their houses for Israeli soldiers, and many Druze talked with the soldiers in their native Hebrew. The soldiers were affected by this reception, and morale and discipline broke down. The Israeli division commander complained that the Golan campaign was "ruining" some of his best soldiers. Israel was unsuccessful in forcing the Druze to comply with its intended plans because the disciplined and committed Druze population refused to cooperate with Israel's campaign of coercion. The Golani Druze demonstrated the efficacy and power of collective nonviolent resistance in combating repressive military action.2

Defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem Since Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June of 1967, there have been over 100 assaults by Jewish extremists on the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Muslim holy sites in East Jerusalem. Faced with these attacks, Muslims have organized themselves to protect the holy sites through the use of nonviolent guards and extensive popular support. This approach thus far has prevented Jewish extremists from destroying the mosque. Though the Israelis occupied Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli government continued officially to recognize Muslim authority over the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. In addition, halacha (oral religious Jewish law) forbids Jews from entering the area. But Jewish extremists regard as a holy site the archaeological remains of the Temple Mount, destroyed in A.D. 70. Shortly after 1967, they declared their intention to break into Al-Aqsa, destroy the mosque, and rebuild a temple in its place. The Temple Mount Faithful organization was established in 1967 to pursue this goal, and members have continued to attempt to pray and raise the Israeli flag within the mosque grounds. Jewish extremists have attempted several times to attack Al-Aqsa Mosque or to enter the grounds to pray or protest. In August 1969, Dennis Michael Rohan set fire to the mosque. Alan Goodman, an Israeli soldier, burst into the area shooting wildly in April 1982; two died and almost sixty were wounded. In March 1983, forty-six Jewish settlers tried to take over AlAqsa with guns and digging equipment, and men carrying explosives were caught climbing the walls the following January. June 1986 saw attempts by rightist groups to break into the mosque. These break-in attempts have failed primarily because of the vigilance of

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the organized guard units at the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Although Israeli army and police have guarded it since 1967, Palestinian Muslims have organized their own guard units as well. Twenty-four guards are employed in shifts to protect the site around the clock. They are not allowed to carry weapons and are not a trained military force, nor do they have sophisticated warning devices. Instead, they physically prevent attempted attacks and alert the Israeli army and police guards when the assaults occur. The January 1984 attempt to blow up the mosque was prevented by the Palestinian guards on duty at the time. That July, the guards aborted another attempt to gain access to the grounds when a car was crashed into a wooden gate. In many assault attempts, the guards have aided Israeli border troops and police in capturing the attackers. A second nonviolent strategy employed by the population and the Islamic Higher Council is the assembly of large crowds of Muslim worshipers. When the council learns of plans to forcibly enter the holy site, they call over the mosque's loudspeakers for all worshipers nearby to gather immediately to defend the holy places. Those who live close by convey the message to the rest of the city, and people quickly converge on the mosque. In February 1979, Rabbi Meir Kahane of the Jewish Defense League announced his intention to enter Al-Aqsa with his followers for prayers. Within fifteen minutes, over 25,000 people flocked to the site in order to prevent this from occurring. After the March 1983 assault attempt, 10,000 Muslims attended Friday prayers and staged a small demonstration. Palestinian Muslims have protested these assaults using other nonviolent means. On March 21, 1983, the Islamic Higher Council called a two-hour general strike. Workers in Jerusalem and the West Bank responded to this call to protest the March 10 assault by bringing East Jerusalem business to an almost complete halt for two hours. On November 5, 1984, the council called for a one-day general strike in the occupied territories to protest the continued presence of Israeli police and army personnel inside the Al-Aqsa compound. The council composed a list of demands that included the recognition of the council as the ultimate authority over the holy sites and the removal of Israeli guards from inside the compound. The strike lasted all day in East Jerusalem and other cities and was accompanied by demonstrations. In January and February 1986, several one-day strikes were held in East Jerusalem to protest Jewish extremist attempts to hold defiant prayers on the mosque compound and intentions to build a synagogue next to the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The strikes coincided with a symbolic thirty-minute work stoppage in other Muslim countries to draw international attention to Israeli measures against Muslim holy sites in occupied territories. The Palestinian Muslims have so far successfully used several nonviolent means to defend the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock holy sites from the destructive intentions of Jewish extremists. The

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nonviolent guard unit, the mass demonstrations of support, and the strikes in Jerusalem and elsewhere have all contributed to protecting the holy sites from violent attack. The resistance has also helped to inspire Palestinian nationalist sentiment throughout the occupied territories.

Sudan Insurrection, 1985 Mass demonstrations and a general strike in the capital city o f Khartoum precipitated the overthrow of Sudanese President Ja'far Numeiri in late March and early April 1985. The rebellion started as a small popular protest against food price increases, but quickly turned into a broad political opposition movement. The nonviolent demonstrations and strikes eventually led to a bloodless military coup on April 8. Numieri came to power in the Sudan in a military takeover in May 1969. His reign was characterized by political unrest, coup attempts, and brutal repression of opposition leaders. Drought and famine conditions, in addition to deep economic and political problems, contributed to the solidification o f opposition to Numeiri . In late March 1985, Numeiri announced increases in the prices of bread and basic commodities. On Tuesday, March 26, about 4 0 0 students from the Islamic university in Omdurman demonstrated in the streets of Khartoum and set fire to fuel tanks. On Wednesday, Numeiri left Sudan for a ten-day visit to the United States for talks with President Reagan on aid for Sudan. That same day, a mass demonstration by students and unemployed persons erupted. Starting near the university and shouting anti-Numeiri slogans, they marched toward the center of the city, smashing shop and car windows and overturning vehicles on the way. Riot police fired tear gas and live rounds into the crowd and arrested many protesters. The riots continued the next day. A total of 2,642 people were arrested during the week of demonstrations. Emergency courts tried 851 people and sentenced them to prison terms, fines, or flogging. The rest were detained for deportation to their homelands in the western provinces. More than fifty demonstrators had been shot, some at point-blank range, and eighteen deaths were recorded by doctors. The struggle then took a nonviolent turn. Over 6 0 0 doctors at the Khartoum teaching hospital voted for an immediate strike to protest the brutality of the security forces. The doctors first called for a 24-hour strike, but they renewed this initial pledge daily. They distributed leaflets denouncing Numeiri and praising as martyrs those how had died during the week. On Friday, March 29, in a secret meeting, the leaders of professional organizations representing doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, and students called for a general strike and civil disobedience campaign to start on Monday, April 1.

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In the meantime, other sectors of Khartoum society were joining the opposition. Some sections of the police force stated in leaflets that they were prepared to disobey orders to use force against the Sudanese. The Organization of Free Officers, composed of progressive young officers, declared its support of the popular revolt. The Committee of Judges also joined the opposition. Government arrests of leaders of the doctors' committee over the weekend did not dissuade the general population. Khartoum's striking doctors were now joined by the lawyers. On April 3, thousands of people demonstrated against Numeiri in downtown Khartoum. The demonstration, led by professional associations, was now joined by many workers. The crowd marched on the presidential palace, and the judiciary declared a "civil rebellion." All international telex and telephone connections were cut off. Many workers went on strike, shops and offices were closed, and transportation, power, and water supplies were severely curtailed. On Thursday, radio stations were shut down and airports were closed, preventing Numeiri's return to the country. The strike had become general, effectively paralyzing much of the economic life of Khartoum and, to a lesser degree, other cities; it reportedly received approximately 80 percent support in Khartoum. Through Friday, April 5, the civil disobedience campaign and general strike gained momentum. Many riot police declared their refusal to confront the protesting crowds, and individuals and professional organizations called on Numeiri to resign. On the morning of April 6, General Siwar al-Dhahab, minister of defense and army commander in chief, announced a military takeover removing Numeiri from power. Thousands of Sudanese poured into the streets to celebrate the dictator's overthrow. One large crowd marched to the Kober prison, broke down cell doors with axes, and released over one thousand prisoners. The next day, the new regime released all remaining political prisoners. The general strike did not end immediately. Leaders voted to continue it in order to pressure the new military government to disband the national security forces and to arrest Numeiri's political supporters. Thousands of demonstrators marched on army headquarters, demanding civilian rule immediately and rejecting the new regime's suggestion of transfer after six months. After a meeting between military leaders and representatives of the protesters on April 8, the new government announced the dissolution of the national security forces and the arrest of many Numeiri supporters, and the general strike was called off. A civilian cabinet was formed two weeks later, and the government vowed to hold the first sessions of a newly created parliament by April 1986. The new Sudanese government still faced severe economic problems and civil war in the south, but the nonviolent civil disobedience campaign and general strike, led primarily by doctors

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and other professionals, had successfully toppled an unpopular, repressive regime.

Notes 1. This section is based on material from Khalid Kishtainy, "The Wathba: The 1948 Uprising of Iraq," unpublished manuscript. 2. This material is from R. Scott Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Nonviolent Resistance," in Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1985).

For Further Reading Egypt, 1919-1922. Chirol, Sir Valentine. The Egyptian Problem. London: Macmillan and Co., 1920. Pp. 190-205. Vatikiotis, P. J. The History of Egypt. Third Edition. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Pp. 247-270. Young, George. Egypt. London: Ernest Benn, 1927. Pp. 231-254. Peshawar Pathan Defiance, 1930. Easwaran, Eknath. A Man to Match His Mountains: Badshah Khan, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam. Petaluma, CA: Nilgiri Press, 1984. Sharp, Gene. Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1960. Palestine General Strike, 1936 Dajani, Souad. "Civilian Resistance Under the Israeli Occupation: The West Bank." Paper presented at the Conference on Nonviolent Political Struggle, November 15-17, 1986, Amman, Jordan. Lesch, Ann Mosely. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 217-221. Quandt, William B., Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 34-39. Iraq Uprising, 1948 Kishtainy, Khalid. "The Wathba: The 1948 Uprising of Iraq." Unpublished notes. Iran Revolution, 1978-1979 Fischer, Michael M. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. 181-231. Keddie, Nikki R. Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. 231-258. Shivers, Lynne, "Inside the Iranian Revolution." In David H. Albert, ed.. Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution. Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society Press, 1980. Pp. 58-80. Golan Druze Resistance, 1981-1982 Kennedy, R. Scott. "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Nonviolent Resistance" in Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1985.

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Defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque Al-Fajr: Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly. Various issues from 1982 to present. Dajani, Suoad. "Palestinian Case Study: Al-Haram Al-Sharif." Unpublished notes. Sudan Insurrection, 1985 Greenfield, Richard. "Two Months That Shook Sudan." Horn of Africa. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1985, pp. 5 - 2 0 . "Sudan's R e v o l u t i o n a r y Spring." MERIP Reports. Vol. 15, No. 7, September 1985, pp. 2 - 2 8 .

5 Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Occupied Territories Philip Grant

Effects of the Israeli Occupation

on the West Bank and

Gaza1

Although the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip affected all dimensions of Palestinian life, the political consequences were the most striking. An entire generation grew up for whom the only familiar system of law and order was one imposed by a foreign army of conquest. Absent from the experience of these young Palestinians was an exposure to the elements that legitimize a political system—fairness, freedom, equality, and self-determination. Apologists for the occupation have argued that the Palestinians were much better off under Israeli rule than they had been under Jordanian authority. But this claim ignores a basic political fact: Most people prefer some participation in a grossly imperfect system to having none under a more prosperous regime. Slaves, however comfortable, are more likely to dream of freedom than are servants. The economic and social consequences of the occupation were also considerable. Many peasant farmers, the Palestinian fellahin, were lured off their land by the promise of high wages in Israel or in newly built Palestinian factories. The traditional society was slowly transformed from a self-sustaining agricultural system into a consumer society. This process was accelerated by the Israeli policy of seizing supposedly untitled Palestinian land and encouraging Jewish settlements on it. In addition, illegal settlement was condoned through authorizing the army to protect squatters until they could build defensible quarters on land once owned by Palestinians. In these ways much of the water resources of the territories were expropriated. Gradually, the agricultural, service, and industrial sectors of the Palestinian economy became integrated with those of Israel. Although originally most of the world, including the international Jewish community, expected the occupation of the territories to be brief, it still continues. Several reasons account for this. First, for most Israelis, security concerns are far more important than historical and religious claims.

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The West Bank especially provides strategic depth against infiltration or invasion, and Israelis are skeptical about the durability of peace agreements. Passionate as they may be, only a small fundamentalist minority has insisted that messianic destiny ordains Israel to rule "Judea and Samaria" forever. Young families moving to the West Bank suburbs of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv oppose territorial compromise for a second reason: personal interest. According to Israel's West Bank expert, Meron Benvenisti, these new suburbanites are not ideologically committed, but "can be relied upon to fight any scheme involving territorial compromise in order to protect their newly acquired 'quality of life' in the territories." 2 These suburban commuters comprise nearly three-fourths of the 70,000 settlers in the West bank. 3 Recently these numbers have swelled through the arrival of Soviet Jews who are expected to join the commuter ranks. The economic benefits from the occupation constituted a third reason for maintaining the status quo. Many sectors of the Israeli economy benefited from the $800 million trade surplus Israel was running with the West Bank and Gaza 4 and from the 90,000 low-wage laborers who daily crossed the "Green Line" (pre-1967 borders). 5 Benvenisti estimated that revenues from taxes on such commerce and wages covered the entire budget of the military government and may even have provided a surplus to the Israeli treasury. 6 Significantly, 25 percent of Israel's scarce potential water resources originate in the West Bank and Gaza. 7 Political

Resistance

to the

Occupation

The most publicized resistance to the occupation took place outside of the territories in the form of a policy of "armed struggle" conducted by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Besides attacking Israeli borders from first Jordan and then Lebanon, the PLO engaged in a series of hijackings, assassinations, and assaults against Israeli property, officials, and civilians everywhere in the world. Diplomatic isolation and economic boycotts of Israel were also attempted by the PLO leadership in concert with other Arab nations, especially the oil-rich countries. Inside the territories, struggle against the Israeli occupation was significantly shaped by the internal changes it had brought about. Besides spontaneous uprisings by students, shopkeepers, refugees, and prisoners, more-organized resistance was begun after the October 1973 war. To direct the struggle, the underground Palestinian National Front (PNF) was founded by a coalition of professionals, students, trade unionists, and others. Two of their main goals were "self-determination" by Palestinians and the repatriation of refugees. 8 Although these groups were heavily influenced by PLO policy and never embraced nonviolent struggle as a philosophy, out of

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necessity their methods were mostly nonviolent and included protests, resolutions, demonstrations, and petitions. In 1978, after the Camp David accords, the PNF was replaced by the National Guidance Committee (NGC). Foremost among its goals was opposition to any effort to legitimize the occupation through cosmetic changes masquerading as authentic proposals for self-rule. In addition to organizing strikes, demonstrations, and meetings, the NGC sought to establish local guidance committees in the major towns of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And, unlike the PNF, the NGC put considerable effort into mobilizing political activity in the villages. Israel banned the NGC in 1981 and arrested and deported many of its members. After 1985, two smaller organizations began to have some influence in organizing nonviolent struggle against the Israelis. A group of Palestinians and radical Jews, the Committee Confronting the Iron Fist, cooperated with Palestinian prisoners and their families in organizing hunger strikes, demonstrations, and international publicity to press for improvement in the treatment of prisoners. Also, at the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, Mubarek Awad, a youth counselor, sought to educate and demonstrate to his people the power of nonviolent political struggle by leading resistance activities in the West Bank. In an influential article first published in English in the Journal of Palestine Studies and later translated into Arabic and distributed throughout the territories, Awad outlined many of the classic methods and techniques of nonviolent struggle that since have been utilized by the intifada.9 In addition to popular and organized political resistance to the occupation, the Palestinians created and developed indigenous social and economic organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. It was hoped that the emergence of these voluntary and local associations would better enable Palestinians to retain control of their land and promote and protect their rights and interests under military rule. Moreover, groups were formed to provide essential services in the areas of health, social welfare, and education. Featured prominently among such associations were the In'ash A1 Usra Society, women's committees, work committees, and medical relief groups. Similar service organizations also emerged that were especially designed to help rural areas long-neglected by the more traditional organizations. 10 There was, then, a loosely organized infrastructure of resistance in place before the general uprising of late 1987. And although most of the methods employed by resisters were nonviolent, by no means could these activities be labeled a "nonviolent movement." They were merely common sense— practical responses to a military occupation that could not be realistically opposed through armed struggle. Periodically, violent acts would be ordered against the Israeli occupation forces by the PLO leadership in exile. Only Awad's group and a few others unreservedly recommended nonviolent struggle

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as superior to the use of arms on both ethical and practical grounds. There was little discussion of a comprehensive strategy of nonviolent struggle that contemplated a sustained, long-term effort. Almost all Palestinians, if asked, would have repeated the PLO party line that only through armed struggle could all of Palestine be liberated. Yet even the occasional use of nonviolent means by those seeking to oppose the occupation from within the territories prompted a familiarity with some of the weapons of nonviolent combat that later significantly affected the policy and practice of the intifada. Israeli Responses

to the

Resistance

The Israeli military's response to all forms of political struggle inside the territories was governed by an official order that banned "incitement and hostile propaganda" and granted the military governor broad discretion to prohibit any assemblies and activities he deemed politically provocative. If a gathering was unauthorized, the army usually dispersed the demonstrators and made arrests through actions ranging from mild crowd control to tear gas, clubs, and warning shots. If the demonstrators answered with stone throwing, Israeli soldiers sometimes shot them down. Institutions or associations hosting illegal meetings were shut down, their suspected leaders detained, restricted, and deported. Similarly banned were commercial or labor strikes that took on a political character. Strikes were routinely broken by cutting the locks off closed shops or by welding the doors shut and later fining the shop owners. 11 The interpretation and enforcement of Israeli military orders varied with the philosophies and personalities of the different military governors. Seemingly innocuous gatherings often were banned, but the government on a number of occasions permitted politically charged public events. For example, during one seven-month period (beginning in November 1979), 24 political assemblies were permitted, including mass demonstrations of 3,000 people protesting land seizures. 1 2 Other small gatherings were simply ignored. When faced with illegal but very large, highly emotional, and internationally visible outpourings—particularly expressions of mourning— the military government usually looked the other way rather than risk inciting further unrest and negative publicity. After the massacres of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian militias in 1983, the Israeli army chose not to interrupt a large-scale commercial strike in East Jerusalem that continued for several days. 13 Similarly, the army discreetly withdrew from Nablus before the funeral for its assassinated mayor, Zafer al-Masri, in March 1986. The funeral procession turned into perhaps the largest political rally in West Bank history and an open demonstration of support for the PLO. Despite flagrant

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violations of military orders prohibiting support for hostile organizations, no demonstrators were arrested.14 Although the sheer weight of Israeli military power prevailed in most confrontations, there were a few times when the Israelis backed down in the face of determined nonviolent action. One case in January 1986 involved AlAsqa Mosque (see Chapter 4). Another incident the same month was described as follows: After Jewish settlers from Tekoa seized several lots from a neighborhood village by constructing a fence around them, activists from the Center for the Study of Nonviolence led a large group of villagers to move the fence back. When armed setders threatened to shoot, the villagers responded, "Go ahead and shoot us. It will only show the world that you are killers." N o shots were fired and the villagers reclaimed their land. 1 5

At the policy level, the vast majority of nonviolent protests failed to win any changes by Israel. Yet there were some cases in which Israeli compromise, concessions, and retreats were brought about by nonviolent political struggle. Some examples follow:

•

•

Shortly after the 1967 war, when Israeli authorities sought to impose Israeli texts and curriculums on West Bank schools, parents and teachers went on strike. Three months later, a compromise satisfying most of the teachers' demands was reached and the schools were reopened.16 Israeli authorities arrested and prepared to deport Nablus Mayor Bassam Shak'a on November 9, 1979. Other West Bank mayors resigned in protest, and strikes and demonstrations spread throughout the West Bank. International pressure and fear of disrupting the peace process led Defense Minister Eizer Weizmann to cancel the deportation order and ftee Shak'a on December 5. 17 In November 1983, the military government relented on its demand that foreign faculty at West Bank universities sign loyalty oaths denying support for the PLO. This decision followed fourteen months of deportations, strikes, demonstrations, and protests supported by academic-freedom groups in Israel and the West. 18 A 34-day hunger strike in late 1985 led to the release and dropping of charges against a securty prisoner, Jabril Rajoub. According to the International Red Cross, the major factor in his release was the world attention brought by international human rights groups contacted by the Committee Confronting the Iron Fist. 19

Such successes were unusual, but they demonstrated that when the issue

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was of relatively low political or security priority, Israeli authorities sometimes relented and compromised. The likelihood of success increased when the domestic and foreign climate was favorable, the nonviolent campaign sustained, international attention captured, and Israeli policymakers or public opinion divided. In general, then, it would be accurate to say that Israel maintained a typical military occupation of a foreign country, with all of the violations of rule of law and civil rights that such an effort requires. The prevailing Israeli attitude to this occupation was best expressed by a former West Bank military governor, General Shlomo Gazit, in 1970: One can describe the Israeli policy in the territories as a success story. . . . Israel continues to hold the territories and rule over their population, while the burden resulting from it is minimal, neither an unbearable security burden, nor an economic burden, nor even—as far as the local Arab population is concerned—a political burden.20

All of this changed in December 1987.

The

Intifada

Until the end of 1987, Palestinians living inside the territories placed most of their hopes for liberation on the combined military, economic, and diplomatic measures initiated by their leadership in exile, the PLO. Resistance inside the territories did not become a threat to Israeli rule until after the November 1987 Arab summit meeting in Amman, Jordan. At that conference, other Arab powers gave the occupation of the territories such a low priority and so decisively snubbed the PLO that residents of the West Bank and Gaza were bitterly offended. They faced the prospect of twenty more years of occupation and the gradual annexation of their land by the Israeli state. This especially affected the young people, who until then had been content to follow the lead of the external leadership in determining resistance policy. In December 1987, however, they began to struggle with the only weapons available—nonviolent means and stones. 21 At first, the resistance seemed completely spontaneous, with much of the activity dominated by stone-throwing children and by strikes, protests, and demonstrations. Braving heavily armed police, young Palestinians daily marched through the streets of their towns and villages, burning tires, chanting slogans, and waving the illegal Palestinian flag. Little boys often ran ahead of the processions, firing their slingshots at troops dispatched to disperse them. Some coordination of these actions soon began to appear. Mysterious leaflets issued by a "Unified Command" gave orders to engage in specific

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resistance activities. These official appeals adopted nonviolent means of struggle as the main strategy of the intifada, although violent actions were sometimes recommended. One analysis of number 18 through 39 of the Unified Command leaflets found that almost 20 percent of them listed some sort of strike as the recommended means of carrying on the struggle. 2 2 The next largest percentage asked Palestinians to engage in different forms of support to those sections of the community particularly vulnerable to Israeli reprisals. Suggested support activities included visiting the graves and families of those killed by Israeli troops and settlers, giving financial assistance to associations and groups, visiting prisoners and hospitalized resisters, and volunteering to help work the land of those killed, injured, and imprisoned. The third greatest number of directives instructed the people to stage demonstrations and marches; praying and fasting were recommended almost as much. The Unified Command leaflets contained many other suggestions: replace Israeli-controlled institutions with indigenous ones, withhold taxes, boycott Israeli products, display the Palestinian flag, engage in violent confrontation (stone throwing), refuse to work for Israelis, resign offices, defy school closures, refuse to cooperate with Israeli officials, hold symbolic funerals, ring church bells, refuse to pay fines, break curfews, ostracize collaborators, block roads into settlements, march in religious processions, mount graffiti campaigns, and express national mourning. Ordinarily these commands were followed, often through the issuing of more detailed supplemental leaflets by resistance committees set up in each populated area. This new form of leadership coordinating the resistance provided for increased participation at the grass roots in the making of decisions and also for the easier replacement of apprehended leaders. Besides participating in making or ratifying directives for the entire struggle, these committees formulated their own plans based on local circumstances and then sent these proposals to PLO headquarters in Tunis for approval. Over a dozen separate committees were formed in each locale. 23 Sometimes the externally initiated directives did not match the mood of the people in the territories. When one leaflet called for the death of one Israeli for each Palestinian killed during the intifada, there was little response from the grass roots and no increase in potentially lethal attacks on Israelis. Intifada participants later told interviewers that they considered their greatest successes to have come through nonviolent means, and they expressed unwillingness to abandon this tactic on such a wide scale as the directive recommended. 24 But as the intifada continues, so too does some violence. Suspected collaborators are murdered, although intifada supporters claim that this occurs only after repeated warnings to cease "traitorous" activities. Violence is

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directed against Israeli settlers, which Palestinians say is done strictly in selfdefense, after repeated attacks and harassment. The usual pattern of violent confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces is fairly predictable. Upon orders from the Unified Command or village committees, protesters will engage in some action, often declaring a piece of land "Free Palestine" and then setting up barricades around it. Israeli soldiers then will rush to the spot to arrest those responsible. Stones will be thrown by Palestinian children or women, to which the Israelis respond with force, often lethal. Israeli

Responses

to the

Intifada

In the face of the general uprising, Israeli soldiers initially tried to contain it as a police force; later on they used beatings, tear gas, and bullets. "Soldiers are now permitted to shoot at anyone wearing a head covering or fleeing orders to stop. Undercover agents have been seen killing activists in the street." 25 Many thousands of Palestinians have been arrested, imprisoned, and tortured. Foreign relief workers report there are over 16,000 Palestinians in prison at any one time. In addition, hundreds have been deported, heavy taxes imposed, properties confiscated, and the homes of demonstrators demolished in punishment for disobedience. Outside of Palestine, Israel retaliates for intifada actions by bombing Palestinian camps in Lebanon. In Tunis, Israeli commandos assassinated Abu Jihad, the PLO official believed to be responsible for coordinating intifada policy from abroad. 26 To date, all of this has proved useless—the uprising continues unabated. Israel has sustained only a small fraction of the number of Palestinian casualties, now estimated in the tens of thousands. Consequences

of the Intifada

for the

Palestinians

As the intifada proceeded, the sheer energy displayed at the grass roots caused significant changes in official Arab policies. King Hussein was forced to renounce the Jordanian claim to govern the West Bank. The PLO leadership in Tunis formed a government in exile, acknowledged the right of Israel to exist, and entered into diplomatic relations with the United States. Other Arab states that were previously willing to let King Hussein negotiate for the Palestinians immediately recognized the new Palestinian government. Yasir Arafat renounced terrorism and embraced nonviolent struggle while at the same time allowing Palestinians to use violence in all cases of "self-defense." He also expressed his willingness to pursue a "two-state" solution to the problem of Palestine. Interestingly, the PLO also endorsed symbolic nonviolent actions, such as the "Ship of Return," a boat commissioned to

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bring exiled Palestinians back to their homes in Haifa. (Before embarkation, it was blown up by Israeli agents in Cyprus.) Of all the Arab states, only Syria has remained aloof from endorsing the new Palestinian initiatives. Because Syria's president, Hafez Assad, wants to control the PLO, official intifada policy is always mixed with measures designed to placate him. Among the Arab states and in the Fatah there is a great wariness of Palestinian splinter organizations based in Damascus that occasionally try to demonstrate Assad's influence through committing violent acts. Significantly, the other Arab governments have not supported the intifada with money or food. One of the most remarkable accomplishments of the intifada has been the growth of confidence among Palestinians in their ability to resist the occupation. The practical experience in standing up to the Israelis has significantly contributed to a growing sense of "nationhood," 27 which in turn has led to important changes in Palestinian political, social, and economic relations. Politically, the grass-roots leadership has loosely unified the oncecompetitive PLO factions of Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Communists. Where once the leaders of these groups publicly fought and engaged in mutual assassinations, the intifada has caused them to present a united front to the world. In Palestine itself, all of the factions now reiterate the necessity of working together as "Palestinians." Even Hamas, an Islamic fundamentalist organization, sometimes feel compelled to coordinate their actions with the other groups. One might conclude that, as in other popular revolutions, the success of the struggle has created a practical understanding of the meaning of "citizenship" in an emerging Palestinian state. On the social level, the intifada has altered relations between the sexes, parents and their children, and traditional leaders and their followers. The role of women has changed from one of providing support to the male resisters to being leaders in many kinds of struggle. Women routinely are at the front of strikes, protests, and demonstrations and serve as couriers and coordinators between different groups and villages. 28 Children have become quite independent of their parents. In mass confrontations with soldiers, young people often take the brunt of the casualties. Some observers think that to curb this "children's crusade," the Israelis have let the traditional Palestinian educational institutions reopen in the West Bank and Gaza. But as in Northern Ireland and South Africa, a question remains about the willingness of active participants in a popular uprising to submit to the old forms of classroom discipline. In addition to these changes, the old clans and leaders who traditionally guided the towns and villages have now been superseded by those individuals responsible for organizing the resistance in their places of residence. As with

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the leadership of other revolutionary movements, competence in directing the resistance has replaced family ties as the leading criterion for the possession of rank. Institutionally, the intifada has increasingly relied on the creation of indigenous social organizations. The medical services required by the struggle are enormous, and have spurred the growth of village and neighborhood clinics and first-aid stations in every populated area. Clandestine schools and day-care centers babysit children while providing instruction in the aims and purposes of the uprising. The boycotts of Israeli goods and the closing of stores have driven Palestinians to start cottage industries, grow victory gardens, expand indigenous industries, and raise small animals for food. Everywhere in the West Bank and Gaza, the inhabitants are learning to live with bare essentials, even at great discomfort. 29 Effects of the I n t i f a d a on the Israelis The effects of all this on Israel's economy have been considerable. Israelis can no longer rely on the accessibility of the cheap labor of Palestinian day workers, the once-easy collection of tax monies, Palestinian consumption of Israeli goods, or easy transport of their products throughout the territories. More ominously a mood of pessimism has been cast over investment in the Israeli economy as entrepreneurs seek to avoid risks until the situation is resolved. Tourist money from the religious shrines in the West Bank has dried to a trickle of what it was before the intifada. Israel's Gross Domestic Product dropped from 5.2 percent in 1987 to between only 1 and 2 percent in 1988. 30 The main consequence of the uprising has, however, been the political polarization between those Israelis wishing to reach an accomodation with the Palestinians and those recommending even more oppressive measures of occupation. Already, extreme conservatives like Ariel Sharon have left the Likud Party because of the possibility of discussions with a joint EgyptianPalestinian delegation over elections in the territories. Even the Labor party is deeply divided in sentiment if not in declared policy over how to deal with the intifada. A top Labor leader was recently quoted as saying at a dinner party that "the sooner the Palestinians return to terrorism, the better it will be for us." 31 The mood of West Bank and Gaza settlers has turned to one of fear. With cars being firebombed and stoned, roads to their homes sometimes blocked and barricaded, utilities cut, and supplies often unavailable except in Israel, some of the settlers have turned to vigilante actions. Palestinians have been beaten and killed, their homes looted, their fields burned. The rate of settlement has slowed considerably below the levels of previous years. In response the Likud government has attempted to flood the territories

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with newly arrived settlers from the Soviet Union, creating an international outcry among Arab nations and their friends. Large loan guarantees to Israel from the United States have been made conditional upon preventing any new settlements in the territories to house these new immigrants, a development sure to provoke internal squabbling within Likud. But in spite of this Israeli reluctance to make any concessions or to negotiate over the future of the territories, and standing in stark contrast to public opinion before the intifada, many pools now show that most Israelis believe there will be some sort of a Palestinian state in the near future.

The Future of the Intifada The most unexpected result of the uprising has been the acceptance by both Palestinians and Israelis that the situation in the territories can never be as it was before. The Palestinians are now united and committed, two essential elements in any successful political struggle. The intensification of efforts by the Israeli military to crush the rebellion has failed. However, continuing this course can only lead to a protracted and increasingly violent confrontation between the two sides. The question needing constant debate by the Palestinians is what strategy of struggle will now bring closer the goal of an independent Palestinian state. Currently, the intifada is being conducted by primarily nonviolent means. The resisters have turned to violence a small percentage of the time, but these acts have elicited fierce reprisals by the Israelis. Thousands of Palestinians have been killed or wounded by Israeli troops. These casualties have come largely through Israeli response to the stone throwing that accompanies repressive measure by Israeli troops after they enter towns and villages in which liberation has been proclaimed. The high casualty rate has prompted some of the younger Palestinians to question the use of controlled violence like stone throwing. In response to the Israeli shooting of his friends, one youthful leader exclaimed: "Why lose 15 of our people over 15 days? No one cares. Let's lose 15 in a day—but take some Israelis with us." 32 Paradoxically, advocates of a stronger nonviolent strategy agree with the futility of the drawn-out bloodletting. The casualties sustained through a strategy of mixing violent and nonviolent means have led Awad and others to argue that nonviolent struggle could secure all of the victories so far achieved by the uprising while avoiding most of these casualties. Yet Palestinians are unwilling to adopt a completely nonviolent approach. Why? First, there is a pervasive lack of conviction by the resisters that nonviolent struggle will bring them victory. This doubt stems mainly from a lack of education in the advantages of nonviolent struggle. If the alternative education that is being so well promoted by intifada organizers could give

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systematic instruction in the rationale of nonviolent political struggle, then confidence in nonviolent means could be strengthened. There are no present signs of that happening. Second, a deep-seated resentment against the Israelis often erupts unexpectedly during confrontations with Israeli troops. This reaction is especially likely when the stone throwers are children. As said by Faisal Husseini, an acknowledged spokesman for the intifada: "It (violence) is a natural thing. When so many lives are being lost, some individual is bound to lose control. The actions will surely cause high casualties on the other side." 3 3 A reimposition of discipline by adults convinced of the utility of nonviolent struggle would be necessary to overcome this. The young people could then be used to spearhead certain nonviolent confrontations that require the energy and courage these young resisters have clearly displayed. These two factors are perhaps expressions of a third problem with the intifada—the lack of strategic thinking. This is missing partly because of the spontaneous nature of the uprising and partly because the leadership in exile is attempting to maintain an uneasy harmony among the PLO's different factions. It is much easier to avoid doctrinal squabbling by concentrating on day-to-day efforts at resistance. To date, the PLO has assumed that these daily confrontations will produce diplomatic pressure on Israel to negotiate at an international conference. Lack of strategic thinking is thus tied to an unwillingness by the people of the territories to believe they can attain their goals unaided by outside forces. No doubt economic factors play a large role in the persistence of this belief. At present none of the Arab governments seem willing to funnel money to the territories in order to facilitate a more complete break with the Israeli economy. Alternatively, building a sufficient economic infrastructure to adequately support the intifada has not been accomplished by the local committees. This would be difficult but not impossible if the Palestinians were willing to further steel themselves to a subsistence standard of living. But this economic undermining of Palestinian self-confidence is also due to the failure of the intifada leadership to evolve into a fully functioning underground government that could coordinate both the administration of services and resistance activities. No doubt the efficiency of the Israeli intelligence in detecting intifada leaders is a key reason for this failure (and a leading cause, incidentally, for the increase in the number of murders of accused collaborators). However, means of evading the Israelis could conceivably be found and the failure in leadership corrected if territorial leaders were to realize the utter necessity for some integrated supervision of the resistance within the territories themselves. The present disagreement between local leaders and the PLO leadership in Tunis over the goals of the intifada could possibly encourage the development of such a de facto territorial government. Paradoxically, the stability and direction provided by a territorial

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governing council would also strengthen the negotiating position of the Palestinians. Any agreement on elections or autonomy would merely ratify a fait accompli. The roots of a new Palestinian state would, in effect, already have been established. And in the future, any leadership chosen by the people under authorized elections, however restricted in their power, would be able to more effectively build the infrastructure required for more complete Palestinian autonomy and eventual independence. Another missing factor necessary for the successful use by the intifada of nonviolent struggle is an understanding of how it might influence the Israelis. The history of the Arab-Israeli struggle since 1947 has generally shown that the Israelis cannot be moved by violent confrontation if they feel their security is deeply threatened. On the other hand, the criticism within Israel of the occupation has demonstrated the existence of a potent potential ally in the struggle for Palestinian independence. The current treatment of Palestinians in the territories violates many of the ideals of justice and freedom espoused by Israel's wisest citizens. Through a strong nonviolent campaign by Palestinians, this Israeli population could be mobilized to change its government's official policy. 34 Small nonviolent actions already have brought together Palestinians and radical Jews. In fact, the Palestinians could be the teachers of nonviolent struggle to the Israelis if ever the intifada renounced violent means. Perhaps the Holocaust prevented the growth of much of a nonviolent tradition within Israel. But just as American blacks taught white middle-class Americans how to struggle nonviolently in the 1960s, so too might a Palestinian nonviolent movement produce imitators inside Israel. And if the upper strata of Israeli society embraced this effort, they might possibly be joined by Israeli Arabs. A nonviolent chain could conceivably be forged—with links uniting Palestinians and Israelis, Arabs and Jews. 35 The seeking of an alliance with Israeli Jews could possibly be the key to allaying Israel's fears and suspicions about the real intent of the intifada. Until Israeli citizens are convinced that the Palestinians really wish to live in some kind of harmony with Israel, the process of withdrawal from the territories will be tenaciously resisted through every kind of tactic imaginable. Even if it were to develop, a strong Palestinian nonviolent movement would still be viewed with hostility unless it had enlisted the support of significant portions of Israeli society. This is not to underestimate the tremendous power a completely Palestinian nonviolent movement could exert in forcing Israeli withdrawals. But without the alchemy that comes through daily acts of reconciliation between Arab and Jew it is doubtful that increased Palestinian autonomy in the territories will bring true peace to the most violent region of the world. It is therefore possible that at the very time the Berlin Wall has fallen an equally formidable barrier to peace could be constructed around independent Palestinian enclaves.

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In any event, the international community would also be more supportive of a Palestinian state if nonviolent means ever became official intifada policy. The already waning support for current Israeli policy among international Jewry, especially in the United States, would be further weakened. And U.S. aid to Israel would not be so readily forthcoming in the face of a sustained nonviolent struggle by Palestinians. Moreover, when a likely U.S.-Soviet agreement on Middle East stability is added to these factors, the possibility of inducing Israel to abandon its refusal to recognize a Palestinian state would be much increased. It should be apparent, however, that logic does not currently prevail in the occupied territories. As the intifada becomes more violent in the face of increasing Israeli violence, the result might be a downward spiral that could easily destroy all hope for the great Palestinian victory a nonviolent struggle might achieve. Then, the occupied territories in the future might begin to resemble today's Lebanon—not a new Arab nation on the eve of independence.

Notes 1. Material in this section is taken from Souad Djani, "Civilian Resistance in the W e s t Bank," and T h o m a s R. Smerling, "Prospects for a N o n v i o l e n t M o v e m e n t in the West Bank and Gaza," in S.E. Ibrahim, Arab Nonviolent Struggle (Amman, Jordan: Arab Thought Forum, 1987) in Arabic. 2. M e r o n Benvenisti, "1986 Report: D e m o g r a p h i c , E c o n o m i c , Legal, Social and Political Developments in the West Bank" (Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Base Project, 1986), p. 50. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 3. Meron Benvenisti, "West Bank Data Project" (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 65. New York Times, N o v e m b e r 2, 1986, pp. 1, 14. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 4. "The Occupied Territories: The Price of Withdrawing," Ha'aretz, June 22, 1986, p. 1. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 5. Benvenisti, "1986 Report," p. 11. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 6. Benvenisti, "1986 Report," pp. 18-19. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 7. Benvenisti, "1986 Report," p. 20. Quoted in Smerling, p. 13. 8. Jan Metzgar, martin Orth, and Christian Sterzing, This Land Is Our Land: The West Bank Under Israeli Rule (London: Zed Press, 1983), p. 161. Quoted in Djani, p. 7. 9. Mubarek Awad, "Nonviolent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 13, no. 52 (Summer 1984). Quoted in Djani, p. 28. 10. Djani, pp. 9 - 1 0 . 11. The Palestine Yearbook of International Law, vol. 1 (Nicosia, Cyprus, 1984), pp. 177-178. Quoted in Smerling, p. 7. 12. Israel National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by Israel (Tel Aviv, Israel: T Z A Z , 1981), pp. 7 6 - 7 9 . Quoted in Smerling, p. 8. 13. Ha'aretz, September 21, 1982, p. 3. Quoted in Smerling, p. 8.

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14. Washington Post, March 4, 1986, p. A20. Quoted in Smerling, p. 9. 15. News article in the Jerusalem Post and Al Fajr during January 1986. Quoted in Smerling, p. 9. 16. Ann Mosley Lesch, Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1980), chaps. 2, 3, 4, 6. Quoted in Smerling, p. 10. 17. R a f i k Halaby, West Bank Story (1985), pp. 130-135. Quoted in Smerling, p. 10. 18. Adam Roberts, Boel Joergensen, and Frank Newman, Academic Freedom Under Israeli Military Occupation (London and Geneva: World University Service and International Commission of Jurists, 1984), pp. 62-64. Quoted in Smerling, p. 10. 19. Telephone interview with the Reverend Donald Wagner, Director, Palestine Human Rights Campaign, July 11, 1986. Quoted in Smerling, p. 11. 20. Menahem Wilson, "How Not to Occupy the West Bank," Commentary (April 1986), p. 21. Quoted in Smerling, p. 14. 21. See Jim Lederman, "Dateline West Bank: Interpreting the Intifadeh," Foreign Policy, no. 72 (Fall 1988), pp. 230-246. 22. Hal Gangnath and Nafez Assaily, "Intifadeh: Palestinian Nonviolent Protest," The Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, Jerusalem, May 1989. 23. Ibid. 24. Telephone interview with R. Scott Kennedy, Middle East Program Staff Officer, Resource Center for Nonviolence, Santa Cruz, California, August 14, 1989. 25. Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1989, p. 1. 26. Alan Hart, Arafat: A Political Biography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 524-532. 27. Lederman, pp. 230-246. 28. Aaron David Miller, "Palestinians and the Intifadeh: One Year Later," Current History, vol. 88 (February 1988), pp. 73. 29. Palestine Althawra, December 1988. 30. Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989), p. 410. 31. I b i d . 32. Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1989, p. 1. 33. I b i d . 34. Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1989, p. 9. 35. See Johan Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989).

6 Questions and Controversies About Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East Ralph

E. Crow and Philip

Grant

In the Arab world, much skepticism and suspicion accompany any suggestion that nonviolent political struggle be employed to combat injustice and oppression. Nonviolent resisters often are seen as "pacifists" or "principled" persons so opposed to the use of force that they would permit the continuation of widespread suffering rather than resort to violent resistance. Such a perspective equates nonviolent struggle with "conflict management"—the use of techniques of negotiation and compromise designed more to avoid the spread and intensification of violence that to attack the causes underlying it. This interpretation assumes that nonviolent struggle is a passive, not active, form of struggle, a weapon of the weak and not of the strong. Nonviolent

Struggle

Prevents

Legitimate

Self-Defense

Such assumptions about nonviolent struggle prompt Arab critics to associate it with the Israeli demand that Palestinians formally renounce violence before they will be permitted to negotiate for the return of territories illegally occupied by Israel after the 1967 war. This conflating of the two ideas leads to the belief that the adoption of nonviolent struggle would prevent Arab people from protecting themselves against aggression. Any discussion of nonviolent struggle is considered symptomatic of Arab defeat and Israeli victory. Nonviolent

Struggle

Is an Imperialist

Strategem

Similarly, efforts to diffuse a knowledge of nonviolent struggle among the Arabs are sometimes seen as attempts by former colonial and imperialist powers to deflect the revolutionary potential of the Arab people. Often this position is accompanied by the belief that engaging in nonviolent struggle would deprive the Arabs of their right to wage wars of national liberation in

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an effort to throw off the last shackles of their colonial legacy. Arabs view hostility to wars of liberation as a convenient denial of their past importance to Europeans. The liberation of many nations, they point out, followed from the sentiments of nationalists like Italy's Giuseppe Mazzini, who wrote: "Insurrection—by means of guerrilla bands—is the true method of all nations desirous of emancipating themselves from a foreign yoke. . . . It forms the military education of the people and consecrates every foot of the native soil by memory of some warlike deed." 1 Nonviolent

Resistance

Is Not Found in Arab

History

The entire subject of nonviolent struggle is sometimes regarded as an ideology imported from the West or the East rather than as a way of thought and action indigenous to Arabs or consistent with Islam. Because many Arabs think of themselves as traditionally valuing chivalry, courage, and the open confrontation of opponents, they wonder how a system of resistance perceived as passive—one that rejects the use of arms—can be considered part of the Arab heritage. Equating nonviolent struggle with actions by American blacks or Indian Hindus, Arabs do not view it as a technique natural to their own people. Violent Struggle Is Necessary to Establish and Strength Among the Oppressed

Dignity

Opponents of nonviolent struggle in the Middle East also claim that violent struggle is necessary for the psychological health of the oppressed. This view holds that centuries of colonization and occupation by militarily superior non-Arab powers have rendered the Arab nations incapable of thinking they can equal the status of their former rulers. Any Western political hegemony that remains in the Middle East is interpreted as the consequence of centuries of indoctrination into the myth of inherent European strength and Arab weakness. Despite the tremendous financial influence of the Arabs in the international economy, the psychological effects of growing up in a postcolonial world dominated by the Western military establishments are said to be devastating to the personalities of Arab children. Only through military struggle can the cycle of weakness be broken—guns are the great equalizers with which the psychologically weak can regain dignity, pride, and strength. Such a view is especially important when Israel's continuing expansion is understood to be a new stage in the colonization of the Arab world by Western powers. Many Arabs are convinced the Palestinians must engage the Israelis militarily to dispel the legend of Israeli invincibility. Palestinians are continually urged to emulate the Lebanese, who successfully drove the Israeli army of occupation from southern Lebanon.

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Nonviolent

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Inefficient

Critics of nonviolent struggle also argue that violent resistance is often the most efficient way to attain political goals. Nonviolent political movements, it is claimed, require extraordinary training while producing only problematic results. Alternatively, the best solution to mass suffering at the hands of a brutal regime is said to be a quick coup d'état or armed insurrection or even outside intervention. Nasser's coup in 1952 and the success of the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus are held up as cases in point. Violent Struggle Can Mobilize World Opinion Against Oppression Some Arabs think that violent resistance is also the most effective way to attract world attention to injustices in the Middle East. They argue that before the commission of violent acts by the PLO, the world was on the verge of forgetting the Palestinian problem. Only political assassinations, kidnappings, and hijackings forced the international community to consider more actively how Palestinians were to be assured of a homeland.

Arab Arguments Against Nonviolent Struggle in the Occupied Territories Palestinians and Israelis Lack Common Bonds, Which Makes Nonviolent Struggle Pointless Arab critics of nonviolent struggle in the occupied territories think that the racial and cultural barriers between Palestinians and Israelis are unbridgeable. The conviction that the Jews are favored by God makes impossible Israeli recognition of the legitimacy of any Palestinian claim. Moreover, because this "chosen people" doctrine sees the territory now jointly inhabited by Israelis and Palestinians as God's gift to the Jews, the property rights of Palestinians will be continually violated in order to force them to emigrate. Critics charge that nonviolent struggle will merely provide a pretext for Israeli authorities to deport all Palestinian resisters and retaliate by expropriating their land. Lack of Requisite Makes Nonviolent

Cultural Struggle

Conditions Difficult

Opponents of nonviolent resistance in the occupied territories also emphasize that the Palestinian culture has few elements similar to those in other nations

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where nonviolent struggle has been effectively organized. Most glaring is the absence of a strong tradition of popular participation in decisionmaking, a deficiency that has only worsened under the Israeli refusal to grant Palestinians self-rule. It is claimed that without a politically activated citizenry, the mass support needed for the practice of nonviolent techniques cannot arise. It is also argued that Palestinian culture has no heritage of compromise and negotiation that has been institutionalized sufficiently to settle peaceably the disagreements among the different Palestinian factions. In the face of Israeli prodding, these factional conflicts easily could be fanned into violent clashes, destroying any chance for a nonviolent movement. According to some observers, claims of leadership in Palestinian society today depend upon how many armed resisters a person commands, and the charge has even been made that the gun is the only means by which Palestinians can resolve disagreements. Nonviolent Struggle Within the Islamic

Is Not Tradition

Other critics of nonviolent resistance argue that the nonviolent approach would be unworkable in the occupied territories because of the role played in the Islamic tradition by jihad (holy war). All sects of Islam accept the legitimacy of conducting a violent defense against attacks on the Islamic tradition. With the growth of Jewish fundamentalism and menacing moves by extremists to violate Islamic shrines and take Palestinian land, the feeling is growing that the Israeli occupation is an attack on Islam. In the face of such religious fervor, it is though that an appeal to nonviolent struggle would prove incomprehensible to Palestinian Muslims. Nonviolent Struggle Is Inconsistent with Superpower Interests This argument holds that because both superpowers are deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, no solutions can emerge without their consent. If the Palestinians try to liberate themselves through a nonviolent struggle, the USSR or the United States will intervene through their proxies to prevent any possibility of success. The superpowers will not allow any future independent Palestinian state to threaten their system of alliances in the Middle East, which means the people of the occupied territories must await their freedom until Moscow and Washington reach an accord.

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Arab Arguments for Nonviolent Struggle in General Nonviolent Resistance Is a Weapon Against the Status

Quo

Supporters of nonviolent political struggle in the Middle East are adamant in insisting they are calling for action, not inaction. They point out that past examples of nonviolent political struggle all movingly illustrate a willingness among the people to risk injury or death in the pursuit of their goals. These struggles have taken place in countries of widely varying social, economic, and political circumstances, but they had a common objective: to change a policy or a regime felt to be responsible for violating widely accepted canons of fairness and freedom. The claim that those who urge such nonviolent resistance are apologists for imperialist and reactionary forces ignores the fact that some of the most successful nonviolent movements have arisen as a direct challenge to imperialism (Egypt 1922, Iraq 1948) and colonialism (Pakistan 1930) as well as internal repression (Iran 1979, Sudan 1985). Nonviolent Political Struggle Is Not Pacificism Advocates of nonviolent resistance thus draw an important distinction between "nonviolent struggle" and "pacificism." Popular confusion of the pacifist movement with doctrines such as "appeasement" has liked the meaning of "pacificism" with "peace at any price." Pacifists are imagined to favor substituting discussion, negotiation, and compromise for violence at the cost of abandoning both a concern with redressing social grievances and a commitment to change unjust social structures. Nonviolent political struggle cannot, therefore, be equated with this idea or with any doctrine of renunciation of violence that would in practice perpetuate existing systems of injustice. The purpose of nonviolent political struggle is to mobilize people—not to paralyze them—so that they put unrelenting pressure on the authorities to change oppressive policies. The choice of nonviolent means is made out of conviction that only they can ensure that changes made will be truly remedial instead of temporary and superficial. Nonviolent political activists believe that if their kind of struggle becomes part of a nation's political culture, future conflicts will be more likely to be conducted in a manner that respects human dignity.

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Nonviolent Struggle Is More Appropriate to Long-term Solutions Although advocates of nonviolent struggle are as concerned with effectiveness as are proponents of armed struggle, they more radically question the relationship between means and ends in politics. They ask if violent means can truly remedy a violent and oppressive condition. The question is not strictly empirical—involving as it does moral and metaphysical presuppositions about human nature and the nature of cause and effect in the social world—but proponents of nonviolent struggle still point to data they consider relevant to their arguments. Most obvious is the extensive evidence assembled by anthropologists and sociologists showing that use of violent means in political struggle eventually results in a "culture of violence." Nonviolent responses to the political, social, and personal controversies of life are then no longer given serious consideration. Violence becomes institutionalized as the social groupings of society lose the capacity for nonviolent interaction at the most elementary level, like decisionmaking within the family or church. Such a development, it is argued, strikes at the very heart of the concept of "community," usually defined as a body of individuals who decide disputes through methods that avoid violence. In the Middle East, for example, a series of military coups and political assassinations has created a climate in which peaceful transfers of power are becoming increasingly rare. In Lebanon especially, the practice of violence has so eroded the moral energies of the people that the political skills necessary to reconstruct the social fabric of the country might have to be rediscovered through long years of trial and error. Violent means have effectively eliminated the mutual trust and respect the different Lebanese communities and religious sects need to coexist harmoniously. Moreover, ordinary citizens have become inert and subservient in the political process as arms have become the badge entitling their possessors to exclusive participation in political decisions. Many proponents of nonviolent struggle wish to transform such a culture of conflict to make it more amenable to truly political solutions. They argue that tolerance and civility are critical to the political process: the mutual search for and pursuit of common goals within a civil society. Ever since the religious wars of the sixteenth century between Catholics and Protestants, political philosophers in the West have argued that violence in politics is bound up with self-righteousness—a refusal to recognize the possibility for error in one's own beliefs. Consequently, anyone holding contrary opinions is characterized as being willfully in error and less than human. Many proponents of nonviolent action think that unless these problems are addressed, violence will

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and Controversies

About

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always recur whenever a serious disagreement erupts within a political community. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, it is obvious that each side believes it alone possesses the full truth about the causes of the condition in which the parties now find themselves. This is not to say that in instances of oppression like the Israeli occupation that the Palestinians might not see more clearly than the Israelis. But possessing more of the truth might be the very thing that has hindered serious consideration of nonviolent struggle by the Palestinians. The illusion of absolute truth creates an inability to understand that the Israelis can in any way be justified in their actions. A continuance of the occupation is therefore attributed to a kind of absolute evil that must be violently confronted. This perspective can also explain the increasing use of violence by Israel since its founding in 1948. The full truth of the causes and consequences of the Holocaust provides an irresistible opportunity for self-righteous action by the Israelis. The "never again" assumption that lurks behind most Israeli political thinking causes any conflict with Israel, legitimate or not, to be interpreted in the most apocalyptic of terms. The significant absence since 1945 of scholarly books by Jewish authors on the subject of nonviolence or nonviolent struggle, in comparison with authors of other faiths, has been cited as an indication of the extent of the problem. Sadly, the same can be said of Islamic authors. Proponents of nonviolent struggle like Khan in Pakistan and Martin Luther King, Jr., in the United States held to Gandhi's conviction that nonviolent action followed from the realization that no one side in a political struggle has a monopoly on the truth. Their awareness that the truth they possessed was always relative to what they might attain required them to confront their opponents in a way that would allow both sides to correct their ideas and their image of the other party. Consequently, nonviolent struggle was seen as a method capable of changing objective social conditions, subjective conceptions, and internal perceptions through a many-sided and evolving dialectic. Through the emergence of a new political ethic, these advocates believed, the rules of political engagement could be more permanently transmuted. In a society in which a predominance of violent force has convinced the authorities they need not listen to the common people, nonviolent struggle is the last chance of carrying on a true dialogue about critically needed change. Other supporters of nonviolent political struggle hold a narrower but no less ambitious focus. They think nonviolent struggle rests upon a social power much more potent than any that can be brought against it. Once the citizens of an oppressed society realize that by not participating in the daily round of social activities they can bring to heel even the mightiest of tyrants, this will permanently change the political formula upon which government

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rests. Such an exercise of popular power is not dependent upon any change in values or perception by the usurping authority. A nation's political culture can thus be transformed through instilling into the people an awareness of their immense potential in preventing future abuse at the hands of their rulers or would-be invaders. After such a display of popular will, it would be only a matter of time before this mobilized social power took effective control of all public affairs. In situations such as that of the occupied territories, advocates of the Gandhian approach point out that without a change in the mutual perceptions of Palestinians and Israelis, any withdrawal to pre-1967 borders would not be accompanied by any lessening of tensions. With neither side having changed its basic understanding of the other, there might be independence but not peace for the future Palestinian state. Continuing Israeli and Palestinian recriminations would prompt unending attempts to interfere and sabotage the well-being of the other side. By contrast, those who base nonviolent struggle upon the concept of social power feel that a nonviolent mobilization of popular will against the occupation will so convince the Israelis of the futility of armed force that they will have no choice but to stop interfering in Palestinian affairs. Ignorant and prejudiced Israeli perceptions of the Palestinian people would prove irrelevant in the face of a realistic appraisal of the overwhelming supremacy of nonviolent Palestinian power. Only if the Palestinians resorted to violent acts in the future would the Israelis risk violent responses. Nonviolent Struggle and Support for fust

Evokes Causes

Sympathy

Supporters of nonviolent action also challenge the contention that violence is useful in attracting attention to inequities and injustices long ignored. Is it the case, they ask, that the world's concern for Palestinians has increased as a result of daring acts of violence? Or is it more likely that hijackings and assassinations have focused public attention on the violence committed by Palestinians rather than on Israeli injustice? Another argument by nonviolent proponents is that violent acts have created a backlash in world opinion against the Arabs while reinforcing conventional stereotypes of them as uncontrollably volatile and irrational. Moreover, the killings of travelers and civilians by Arab assassination teams are said to have caused countries that have long sought better relations with Arab governments to unite with nations traditionally unfriendly to the Arab world in an alliance of mutual defense against the threat of terrorism. In parliamentary nations especially, the negative publicity of violent acts against civilians has drastically limited the flexibility of foreign-policy

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makers who otherwise might have been inclined to support Arab causes more vigorously. Conversely, the voluntary acceptance of suffering by nonviolent resisters can do much to win widespread support for their cause. The history of nonviolent struggle is replete with examples of public outpourings o f sympathy for the goals of nonviolent resisters after reports and photographs of unmerited suffering have been circulated by word of mouth or the press (Pakistan 1930, Iraq 1948). It is generally acknowledged that television coverage of police dogs being set loose on black civil rights marchers in Alabama during the 1960s was a critical factor in gaining white allies in the black nonviolent struggle for full citizenship. Today the violence inflicted upon nonviolent black resisters by the apartheid regime of South Africa has so swung world opinion in favor of the protesters that press censorship has been rigidly imposed in an attempt to stem the tide. This cannot, however, silence the grapevine, which can spread the news perhaps faster than can the press. Nonviolent Struggle Is the Surest Way to Build Psychological Strength The defenders of a policy o f nonviolent political resistance do not deny that violence can act as a regenerating force on the personalities o f a people who believe themselves incapable of fighting oppression. Even Gandhi believed that violent resistance to injustice was better than doing nothing. But proponents o f nonviolent struggle also point out that the use of violence can cripple the personality, giving rise to guilt, self-hatred, and insanity. In fact, through treating Algerian independence fighters during their war against the French, observers became aware of the debilitating effects of violence on the personality. More recently, the high incidence of drug use and desertion among the militias o f Lebanon has been attributed to decades of continual warfare. In the recent Gulf war, the Iraqi army was plagued by constant problems with morale, while the Iranians had to resort to a kind o f religious mesmerism to keep their troops motivated. Furthermore, Western nations are only now coming to terms with the emotional destructiveness o f violent wars; years after withdrawing from Vietnam, the United States is having to confront the psychological damage the war caused participants. Effective nonviolent resistance, however, can generate psychological benefits among the oppressed as great as those produced by violent struggle, but without the negative side effects. Participants in nonviolent resistance movements in nations as diverse as Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Sudan, and the United States have testified how courage and confidence have resulted from successfully confronting the agents o f

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oppressive systems without resorting to the use of violence. Advocates of nonviolent resistance thus claim that nonviolent means rather than guns are the great equalizer that allows the common citizen to compete successfully with military force. In fact, nonviolent resistance demonstrates to the people the meaning of a truly democratic system of defense. Their opponents, on the other hand, must rely on a specially trained elite to do their fighting for them. Nonviolent Struggle Is the Weapon of the Strong, Not the Weak Nonviolent resisters win their battles through courage, commitment, and the subtle potency of nonviolent methods of struggle. By contending that political power is subservient to social power, the nonviolent resister seeks to redefine the terms "strong" and "weak." Traditionally, politicians in the Middle East and the West have assumed that power flows from the top downward, the difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes stemming solely from the extent to which those at the bottom can somehow condition the actions of those at the top. Theorists of nonviolent struggle, on the other hand, emphasize that political power is wholly "a by-product of social activity and the complex web of human relationships, as expressed through a variety of groupings, from the family upward." 2 The nonviolent resister tries to tap the latent potential of this immense force through educating the people. In the case of societies whose institutions have been corrupted, a nonviolent movement will attempt to introduce new standards of social behavior and build new institutions. Proponents of nonviolent struggle thus claim that its acceptance and use by the citizenry can alter the social contract that implicitly exists between rulers and ruled. With skill and experience in the art of opposing injustice without weapons, the people can tame any dictator or usurper and render illegimate any unjust edict, law, or administrative practice. A realization by the people of their true political potential could make the idea of popular sovereignty more than a convenient fiction, making obsolete Rousseau's observation that in most democracies the people are only free while they are voting. Oppressors Fear Nonviolent Struggle More Than Violent Resistance The immense strength of nonviolent struggle is revealed in the desperate measures taken by authoritarian regimes to suppress it. Part of the reason for

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such a response is the arrogance of unjust rulers in assuming that a monopoly of superiority of violent force is sufficient to keep them in power. Because the nature of social power is misunderstood, tyrants have customarily assumed the main challenges to their tyranny will come from violent struggle. When confronted by nonviolent resistance, their attempts to suppress it are inappropriate, appearing at best clumsy and comical and at worst genocidal. In the United States, for example, the white establishment in the South was much more comfortable fighting a violent black movement because the whites had an overwhelming superiority in conventional force. But when women and children were firebombed while holding prayer vigils, the rottenness of the existing system was plainly exposed for all to see. Even the white power structure became demoralized at witnessing the brutal measures taken by its own supporters against unarmed demonstrators.

Arab Arguments for Nonviolent Struggle in the Occupied Territories All Unjust

Systems

Are Vulnerable

to Nonviolent

Struggle

Those who recommend nonviolent resistance in the occupied territories believe that Israeli power rests upon a social base as surely as did British power before the partition of 1947. If the Palestinian* were to engage in a strategically directed series of boycotts, strikes, and work stoppages, nonviolent proponents think these could prove as threatening to Israeli authority as similar actions were to the British in the 1930s. Nonviolent Resistance Can Bridge the Gap Between Oppressors and the Oppressed Besides uniting a divided community, the universality behind nonviolent struggle allows its proponents to claim it can bridge the enormous social distance that exists between Israelis and Palestinians. In most instances of imperialism and colonialism, the oppressors justified their domination by arguing that the oppressed were somehow inherently inferior. Nonviolent movements have sometimes succeeded in transcending this barrier by appealing to that common core of humanity within each official or soldier of the corrupt regime. The willingness of unarmed, ordinary people to die for their beliefs can be extremely effective in breaking through the psychological barriers constructed by prejudice and propaganda.

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Can Educate the

Oppressor

Some advocates of nonviolent struggle think that the willingness of the oppressed to suffer voluntarily for a just cause forces their opponents to question fundamentally the rationale of their oppression. These nonviolent advocates believe that the way to lessen social distance is to address its psychological root. Because social systems of injustice are supported by fear, an appeal to reason and conscience by nonviolent resisters is not enough to convince oppressors of the error of their actions. Nonviolent resistance can weaken this fear by showing participants in the system of injustice that they will not be harmed by the resisters. Once this underlying fear is allayed, any assumptions about inherent superiority that have previously separated oppressor and oppressed may no longer be believed with the same conviction. The way could then open for a constructive dialogue between the two sides. Nonviolent Struggle Can Overcome the "Chosen People" Doctrine This same moral power can be used to challenge the barriers erected between oppressor and oppressed by doctrines such as that of the "chosen people." Proponents of nonviolent struggle point out that although most doctrines of alleged racial superiority rest upon some appeal to abstractions—God, History, Reason, Natural Law, for example—this has never deterred subjugated peoples from successfully challenging these false doctrines through nonviolent campaigns. Gandhi's opponents in South Africa and India were as racist as any other imperialist power, yet they eventually succumbed to nonviolent campaigns—for an extension of human rights in South Africa and for independence in India. What makes the situation in Palestine somewhat different is the belief that a particular piece of ground has been given by God to the Jews, although apparently not all of them accept this doctrine literally because many live outside Israel. Some nonviolent proponents think that the "chosen people" doctrine can even be used to engage the Israelis in a moral dialogue not possible with other people. Because the belief in being "chosen" requires Jews to adopt a high moral posture, it seems a perfect avenue upon which a nonviolent Palestinian movement could travel. Furthermore, the Jewish fear of genocide inherited from World War II makes the Israelis extremely vulnerable to moral condemnation for inflicting violence on nonviolent protesters. Advocates of nonviolent struggle in the occupied territories emphasize that violent Palestinian acts will serve only to remind the Jews of the persecution they suffered in the concentration camps, whereas nonviolent resistance will give

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them no excuse to continue the occupation on grounds of protecting themselves against extermination. The Concept of J i h a d Can Mean Inner

Struggle

In response to the charge that Jewish threats to Islam will make the concept of jihad the basis for popular resistance against the Israelis, supporters of nonviolent resistance reply that the well-educated Palestinians are more likely to be open to attempts to include nonviolent political struggle within the meaning of jihad. The term itself has many connotations for the educated Muslim, not the least of which is that of an inner struggle—of striving against one's own weaknesses in living up to the commandments of God. As in other religions, Islam puts strict limits on acceptable violence. The life of the Prophet was one in which the qualities of mercy and forgiveness of enemies were continually stressed, while revenge was constantly condemned. In one of the Hadiths, the Prophet says the best jihad is hejira (flight) and the best hejira is to flee from evil to good. Nonviolent Struggle Can Develop Social and Economic Strength and International

Autonomy

Advocates of nonviolent resistance also recommend that the social divisions within the Palestinian community and between Israelis and Palestinians can be lessened by a constructive program in which free, egalitarian social and economic institutions would be started in embryo as part of the nonviolent movement. These centers could serve as training camps where people could leam the skills necessary to become self-reliant guardians of their political rights and social responsibilities. Such a program would also initiate economic activities designed to develop the resources of the occupied territories in ways that would benefit the local inhabitants rather than foreign powers. Moreover, self-sufficient economic institutions would guarantee that a liberated Palestine would not be vulnerable to economic blackmail by its neighbors. The Israelis in turn would be assured that an autonomous Palestine would not become the economic satellite of a hostile power. A constructive program would also demonstrate to the Palestinians that they need not depend upon superpower politics for economic and military aid in establishing their own state. Many new nations become economically dependent upon outside powers through an underdevelopment of human resources, an overdevelopment of imported technology, and an enormous indebtedness incurred through arms purchases. Once the Palestinians become aware of their capacity to regenerate their old institutions and build new ones,

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the usual pattern of dependency could be avoided. Moreover, reliance on a nonviolent system of defense against outside aggression could save the new nation billions of dollars.

Issues of Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East Nonviolent

Struggle

Is Both a Creed and a Policy

The preceding arguments in support of nonviolent political struggle contain a mix of pragmatic and moral considerations. At the root of the difference between these two spheres is the distinction that nonviolent struggle can be seen either as a policy or a creed. As a policy, nonviolent struggle rests upon the assumption that only it accurately recognizes the nature of social power. Once properly understood, this idea could be used to release an energy in politics metaphorically comparable to that of nuclear power in the physical world. Nonviolent resistance as a creed, on the other hand, refers to something akin to what the Muslim saints Nuri, Raqqam, and Bayazid called the divine love of God—complete compassion and unselfishness toward all creatures. Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan referred to this idea as "soul force," something Saint Paul and Martin Luther King, Jr., termed "agape." The claims made for the power of nonviolent struggle as a creed are as great as those advanced for nonviolent struggle as a policy. Gandhi believed that because the basis of all life was truth—reflected in the natural world through uniform patterns and polarities we call "laws of nature"—any attempt by men and women to live for truth would be supported by the complete intelligence of the universe, God. Leading

the Nonviolent

Struggle

The distinction between nonviolent struggle as a policy and a creed also extends to the theory of nonviolent leadership. Those advocating the policy believe that an education in the techniques and tactics of nonviolent struggle will equip the masses with the weapons they need to conduct successful resistance. Directing this education would be people who have studied the full range of nonviolent methods and gained an understanding of the strategic principles revealed by past struggles. After the dissemination of such knowledge, leaders would emerge spontaneously to put the strategy and tactics into practice. The replacement of imprisoned or deported leaders would be easier as an understanding of the principles of nonviolent struggle became more widespread. Advocates of nonviolent struggle as a creed suggest that something more

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than education is required of the leaders of a nonviolent movement. They must be the "shock troops" of the struggle, specially trained in the ethical principles of a nonviolent way of life. With this knowledge and commitment, they can lead through the power of example, inspiring the people with the courage and confidence needed to face police batons and bayonets. These leaders would have to completely identify with the people, in a Maoist sense, and at the same time be "secular monks" as George Eugene Sorel and Gandhi understood. Totally devoted to the success of the resistance, this vanguard would produce new leaders through the power of example, the unflagging dedication of the pioneers inducing others to follow in their wake. Supporters of nonviolent struggle as a creed argue that this conception of leadership in a nonviolent movement is the most realistic because it accounts for the irrational in human nature. Most human beings fear death and will not risk their lives against the guns of an armed oppressor. To ask people to fight without the seeming security offered by weapons requires more than education in the strategy and tactics of nonviolent combat. It is necessary to inspire the people through the example of those few who are not afraid to die in pursuit of a just cause. If these leaders are imprisoned or harmed in the course of their duties, the personal sacrifices they have made for the movement will arouse in others the moral strength to take their place and risk their lives in turn. The distinction between nonviolent struggle as a policy and a creed need not be absolute in practice. As some writers have pointed out, the concept of nonviolent struggle is great enough to accommodate many interpretations. What seems critical is that there be agreement on a minimal set of criteria about the meaning of nonviolent action in order to offer a basis for an overall strategy. If some people within the movement wish to adopt nonviolent struggle as a creed, that should not dissuade others from joining the cause. Similarly, if some are attracted to resist nonviolently because of its practical advantages, this should not interfere with the more ethical concerns of fellow resisters. More worrisome is the chance that some resisters might abandon nonviolent struggle when it seemed expedient, thereby threatening the overall success of the movement. Proponents of nonviolent struggle as a creed maintain that this possibility would be reduced the more resisters adopted the nonviolent ethic. Pledges, vows, and internal policing could then be used to reinforce self-discipline. Conclusion Whatever one's perspective on the merits of nonviolent struggle in the Middle East, it can hardly be denied that much more attention should be given to it. As the case studies and discussions in this book have shown,

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nonviolent response to the abuse of power by rulers and invaders has been a time-honored part of the politics of the Middle East. Proponents of nonviolent political struggle have pointed out how these efforts were active attempts at fighting oppression—they were not acquiescence to social evils. What is much less common in history, however, is an organized nonviolent campaign that is part of a general strategy to change the distribution of power within a nation or between nation-states. Advocates of nonviolent action claim this is possible in every part of the world, including the Middle East. This confidence still awaits confirmation in a region that has known little peace in the twentieth century.

Notes 1. Quoted in Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. 49-50. 2. Rashavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Concord Grove Press, 1983), p. 57: See also Gene Sharp, Appendix A of this volume.

Appendix A The Role of Power in Nonviolent Political Struggle Gene Sharp

Nonviolent struggle is based upon the very nature of power in society and politics. The practice, dynamics, and consequences of nonviolent struggle are all directly dependent upon the wielding of power and its consequences on the power of the opponent group. This technique is not understandable without consideration of this important element in its nature. This perception is in direct contradiction to the popular misconceptions that nonviolent action is powerless, that it conceptually and politically ignores the reality of power in politics, and that its advocates are naive in not accepting that violence is the real source of power in politics. These misconceptions, however, are themselves rooted in a denial or ignoring of the nature of power in politics and the crucial role of power in the operation of nonviolent struggle. Nonviolent struggle is a political technique that needs to be understood in its own right, not explained or assessed by an assumption of its close association or identity with quite different phenomena. This technique of action uses social, psychological, economic, and political methods of applying sanctions, that is, pressures and/or punishments, rather than violent methods.1 The technique includes nearly two hundred identified methods of symbolic protest, social noncooperation, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention (ranging from sit-ins to parallel government). These many methods are also called the "weapons" of nonviolent action. The nonviolent technique is not to be confused with the important but separate phenomena of religious and ethical beliefs that espouse abstention from violence. 2 Those beliefs may be shared by the same persons or movement using nonviolent action. However, far more frequently the practice of nonviolent struggle has been conducted by people and movements that lacked a principled commitment to nonviolent means. They had previously

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used violence or would be w i l l i n g to do so in the future in other circumstances. Under the current conditions, however, people were willing to follow a grand strategy of nonviolent struggle for a particular purpose. They were willing to use these nonviolent weapons in place o f violence and to maintain nonviolent discipline, even though they were not committed to those means in other possible situations. The overwhelming reason for this choice of nonviolent means in conflicts has been that reliance on this type of struggle would increase the chances o f their being successful in the current conflict. Nonviolent struggle is a technique of matching forces against an opponent group that usually has significant administrative, economic, political, police, and military capacity. The opponent group is commonly itself the state apparatus, controlled by an elite seen as hostile and injurious to the welfare and interests of a wider population. Or, the opponent group is frequently a nonstate body backed by the state apparatus. The broad population that feels itself to be negatively affected by a policy or action of the opponent group may be called the "grievance group." This body may be concerned with limited issues or a broad policy, or it may even repudiate the whole regime. T h e group actually participating in nonviolent struggle is smaller than the general grievance group, although the size o f the population and the number and types of institutions that participate in the nonviolent struggle will vary widely. Power is an integral part of nonviolent struggles. These conflicts cannot be understood or waged intelligently without attention to power capacities and power relationships. "Power" is used here to mean the totality of all influences and pressures, including sanctions, available to a group or society for use in maintaining itself, implementing its policies, and conducting internal and external conflicts. Power may be measured by relative ability to control a situation, people, and institutions, or to mobilize people and institutions for some activity. Such power may be used to enable a group to achieve a goal; to implement or change policies; to induce others to behave as the wielders of power wish; to engage in opposition or to maintain the established system, policies, and relationships; to alter, destroy, or replace the prior power distribution or institutions—or to accomplish a combination of these. Political p o w e r may be possessed by governments, the state, institutions, opposition movements, and other groups. Such power may be directly applied, or it may be a reserve capacity, having influence merely by its existence. For example, power is present in negotiations as well as in war. In order to understand the role of power in nonviolent struggles, it is necessary to examine the nature and dynamics of the power available both to the opponent group and to the nonviolent group.

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Dependent Rulers It is an obvious, simple, but often forgotten observation of great theoretical and practical significance that the power wielded by individuals and groups in highest political positions of command and decision in any government— whom we shall for the sake of brevity call "rulers"—is not intrinsic to them. Such power must come from outside themselves. The political power they wield as rulers comes from the society they govern. Thus, if persons are to wield power as rulers, they must be able to direct the behavior of other people, draw on large resources (human and material), wield an apparatus of sanctions, and direct a bureaucracy in the administration of their policies. The rulers of governments and political systems are not omnipotent, nor do they possess self-generating power. All dominating elites and rulers depend for their sources of power upon the cooperation of the population and of the institutions of the society they would rule. The availability of those sources depends on the cooperation and obedience of many groups and institutions, special personnel, and the general population. Political power appears to emerge from the interaction of all or several of the following sources: 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

Authority. The extent and intensity of the rulers' authority or legitimacy among the subjects. Human resources. The number of persons who obey, cooperate, or provide special assistance, their proportion in the population, and the extent and forms of their organizations. Skills and knowledge. The skills, knowledge, and abilities of such persons, and their capacity to supply the needs of the rulers. Intangible factors. Psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission. Material resources. Property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication, and transportation. Sanctions. The type and extent of pressures and punishments available for rulers to use against their own subjects and in conflicts with other rulers.

It is almost always a matter of degree to which some or all of these sources of power are present; only rarely, if ever, are all of them completely available to rulers or completely absent. Their availability is subject to constant variation, however, which brings about an increase or decrease in the rulers' power. The degree of the rulers' power is determined by the extent to which there is unrestricted access to these sources.

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A closer examination of the sources of power indicates that the rulers depend intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the governed. If the subjects reject the rulers' right to rule and to command, they are withdrawing the general agreement, or group consent, that makes the existing government possible. This loss of authority sets in motion the disintegration of the rulers' power. That power is reduced to the degree that they are denied authority. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular government is threatened. Denial of authority leads to restriction or refusal of cooperation. This is a serious setback for any regime because by their cooperation the subjects contribute to the operation and perpetuation of the established system. Both the economic and the political systems operate because of the contributions of many people, individuals, organizations, and subgroups, and the rulers are dependent on their cooperation and assistance. The more extensive and detailed the control by the rulers is, the more such assistance they will require. The rulers' power depends on the continual availability of all this assistance, not only from individual members, officials, employees, and the like but also from the subsidiary organizations and institutions that compose the system as a whole. These may be departments, bureaus, branches, committees, and the like. If these individuals, groups, and institutions refuse to provide sufficient assistance, the rulers will be unable to maintain their position or implement their policies.

Limits of Enforcement In the face of widespread noncooperation and disobedience, if rulers do not make significant concessions they will have to place increased reliance on enforcement. In efforts to ensure the needed degree of assistance and cooperation, the rulers may apply sanctions (or punishments). Such sanctions are usually possible because very often while one section of the populace rejects the rulers' authority, another section remains loyal and is willing to carry out their policies. Loyal police and soldiers can be used to inflict sanctions on the remainder of the people. That is not the whole story, however. The ruling group (foreign or domestic) will itself still be united by something other than sanctions and therefore vulnerable to other influences. Furthermore, the ability of rulers to apply sanctions at home or abroad arises from and depends upon a significant degree of help from the subjects themselves, which can be restricted or refused. Also, rulers need more than grudging, outward forms of compliance by the population and the multitude of helpers they require. However, efforts to obtain this assistance by compulsion will inevitably be inadequate as long as the rulers' authority is limited.

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Sanctions are important in maintaining the political power of rulers— especially in crises. However, whether those sanctions are effective depends on the response of the subjects against whom they are threatened or applied. In many cases people have, as do soldiers in wars, regularly refused to retreat in the face of dangers; there is a role for an act of will, for choice. To be effective, the sanction must be feared, and the people must become willing once more to cooperate and obey. They may, however, not do so. If they do not, then the power relationship remains uncompleted and the rulers' power is threatened fundamentally.

Corporate Resistance The availability of each of the sources of power is, then, related to, or directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance that the rulers are able to obtain from their subjects and the institutions of the society. That dependence makes it possible, under certain circumstances, for the subjects to restrict or sever these sources of power by reducing or withdrawing their necessary cooperation and obedience. If the rulers' power is to be controlled by withdrawing help and obedience, the noncooperation and disobedience must be widespread. These must, in addition, be maintained even in the face of repression aimed at forcing a resumption of submission. Once, however there has been a major reduction of, or an end to, the subjects' fear, and once there is a willingness to suffer sanctions as the price of change, large-scale disobedience and noncooperation become possible. Such action then becomes politically significant. The rulers' will is thwarted in proportion to the number of disobedient subjects, the extent of noncooperating institutions, and the degree of the rulers' dependence upon them. The answer to the problem of apparently uncontrollable power, therefore, may lie in learning how to carry out and maintain such withdrawal of cooperation. If the withdrawal of acceptance, cooperation, and obedience can be maintained in the face of the rulers' punishments, then the end of the regime is in sight. Thus, all rulers are dependent for their positions and political power upon the cooperation of their subjects. The theory that power derives from violence, and that victory necessarily goes to the side with the greater capacity for violence is false. Instead, the will to defy and the capacity to resist become central. If this insight into the dependent nature of political power is to be implemented, the question is how. The lack of knowledge of what to do has been one reason why people have not more often acted effectively on this insight and long since abolished tyranny and oppression. Two of the components of implementation are clear. First, the citizens' rejection of the

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tyrannical government must be actively expressed in a refusal to cooperate. This refusal may take many forms, as we shall see. Second, there must be group or mass action. When the ruling minority is unified but the ruled majority lacks independent organization, the subjects are usually incapable of corporate opposition. They can be dealt with one by one. Effective action based on this theory of power requires corporate resistance and defiance.

The Structural Basis The structural condition of the society is therefore highly important in determining the general capacity of a society to control its rulers. This structural condition refers to the existence of various loci of power. These are bodies or institutions in the society where power is located, converges, or is expressed. The precise form and nature of these loci of power vary from society to society and from situation to situation. They are, however, likely to include such social groups and institutions as families, social classes, religious groups, cultural and nationality groups, occupational groups, economic groups, villages and towns, cities, provinces and regions, smaller governmental bodies, voluntary organizations, and political parties. Most often the loci are traditional, established, formal social groups and institutions. Sometimes, however, loci of power may be less formally organized and may even be recently created or revitalized in the process of achieving some objective or of opposing the ruler. Their status as loci will be determined by their capacity to act independently, to wield effective power, and to regulate the effective power of others, such as the rulers or other locus or loci of power. Their numbers, the degree of their centralization or decentralization, their internal decisionmaking processes, and the degree of their internal strength and vitality are all then very important. The society's power structure, that is, these relationships, in the long run determines the sphere and the degree of the rulers' maximum effective power. When power is effectively diffused throughout the society among such loci, the rulers' power is most likely subjected to controls and limits because such bodies provide the capacity for resistance to governmental control. This condition is associated with political "freedom." When, on the other hand, such loci have been seriously weakened, effectively undermined, or have had their independent existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of superimposed controls, the rulers' power is most likely to be uncontrolled. The ability for corporate resistance is then drastically weakened or destroyed. This is associated with "tyranny." The condition of the society's loci of power will in large degree

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determine the long-term capacity of the society to control the rulers' power. A society in which groups and institutions exist that possess significant social power and are capable of independent action is more capable of controlling the rulers' power, and thus of resisting tyranny, than is a society in which the subjects are all equally impotent because there are no groups through which the populace can act together to gain objectives and to resist the ruler. The sources of the rulers' power are normally only threatened significantly when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld by large numbers of subjects at the same time, that usually is by social groups and institutions. The ability of such bodies to withhold the sources of power they supply is then pivotal. That ability will be influenced by various factors, including the subjects' skill in applying the technique of struggle by noncooperation, and also the rulers' relative need for the sources of power that the subjects and their institutions may provide. Important, too, is the degree to which these groups possess the capacity to act independently against the ruler. The capacity of the society's nonstate institutions to control the rulers' actions will, then, be influenced by (1) the relative desire of the populace to control the rulers' power; (2) the number of the subjects' independent organizations and institutions; (3) the organizations' relative strengths and the degree of their independence of action; (4) the sources of power these organizations control; (5) the amount of social power they can independently wield or control; and (6) the subjects' relative ability to withhold their consent and assistance. If these factors are all present to a high degree, the loci may choose to make freely available the sources of power needed by the rulers, or instead they may choose to restrict or sever the sources the rulers require. The variations in the rulers' power are therefore directly or indirectly associated with the willingness of the subjects to accept the rulers, and to obey them, cooperate with them, and carry out their wishes.

Dissolving the Power of Rulers When people refuse their cooperation, withhold help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation that any government or hierarchical system requires. Subjects may disobey laws they reject. Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may become lax in inflicting repression; they may even mutiny. If people and institutions do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no

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longer have power. The persons who have been "rulers" become simply ordinary people. Everything is changed because the human assistance that created and supported the regime's political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has dissolved. Generalized obstinacy and collective stubbornness are not enough, however, to wield effective power against entrenched rulers. General opposition must be translated into a strategy of action. People will need to understand the technique based on this insight into power, including the specific methods of that technique, its dynamics of change, requirements for success, and principles of strategy and tactics. The implementation must be skillful. This includes knowing how to persist despite repression. We need, therefore to understand more fully the technique of nonviolent action—which is built on this insight into power.

A Nonviolent Weapons System Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of "battles," requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its "soldiers" courage, discipline, and sacrifice. (The casualty rates, however, are usually much lower than in conventional or guerrilla wars.) People seeking victory by nonviolent struggle must increase their basic strength, apply skillfully their chosen technique of action, and to fulfill its requirements for success to the maximum of their capacity. Although it is widely assumed that nonviolent action must always take longer to succeed than does violent struggle, this is not necessarily so. It has at times succeeded within weeks or even days. The many methods of nonviolent action can be viewed as limited implementations of the theory of power presented above. Three broad classes of nonviolent weapons exist within the technique of nonviolent struggle: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. These "weapons" can change the selected social, economic, or political relationships, and can at times alter fundamentally the balance of forces. Nonviolent protest and persuasion is a large class of mainly symbolic actions of peaceful opposition or of attempted persuasion, extending beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of noncooperation or nonviolent intervention. Among these methods are parades, vigils, picketing, posters, teach-ins, mourning, and protest meetings. Overwhelmingly, the many methods of nonviolent action involve noncooperation with the opponent. Noncooperation, therefore, involves the deliberate discontinuance, withholding, or defiance of certain existing social, economic, or political relationships. The action may be spontaneous or

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planned, legal or illegal. The methods of noncooperation are divided into three main classes: (1) social noncooperation (including social boycotts); (2) economic noncooperation (subdivided into economic boycotts and strikes); and (3) political noncooperation (political noncooperation is also called the political boycott). The capacity of the nonviolent struggle group to wield the weapons of noncooperation is of extreme importance in the dynamics of a particular nonviolent struggle. The third class of methods of nonviolent action is that of nonviolent intervention. These methods intervene in the situation and disrupt or basically change it in some way. These methods include fasts, sit-in strikes, nonviolent obstruction, the establishment of new social patterns, stay-in strikes, alternative economic institutions, the seeking of imprisonment, work-on without collaboration, and parallel government.

Wielding Power Nonviolent action wields power, both to counter the power of an opponent group, and to advance the objectives of the nonviolent group. By striking at the sources of the opponents' power, the nonviolent technique may be viewed as operates more directly than does political violence. For example, if the issues at stake are primarily economic, the resistance can be economic. If the issues are political and the opponents require the political cooperation of the population, the resistance, too, can be political. Instead of striking indirectly at the opponents' military forces, which are the outward expression of the opponents' power, the nonviolent sanctions strike directly at the sources of that power: cooperation and obedience. For example, massive strikes can paralyze the economy and large-scale mutinies can dissolve the army. The technique of nonviolent action may also be viewed as striking at the opponents' power more indirectly than does violence. Instead of confronting the opponents' police and troops with forces of the same type, the nonviolent group counters them indirectly. This operates to undermine the opponent while helping the resisters to mobilize increased strength and support for their cause. For example, by responding to repression nonviolently instead of by counterviolence, the nonviolent resisters may demonstrate that the opponents' repression is incapable of cowing the populace. Their continued resistance while maintaining nonviolent discipline may cause the opponents' usual supporters to become alienated from the rulers and thus weaken their relative power position. The numbers of resisters may grow, and support for them may also increase significantly. (This process is discussed more fully later.) All this may happen because the opponents' violence is countered indirectly instead of violently. The whole course of the conflict will be highly influenced by the

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strategy and tactics applied by the nonviolent group. They need, therefore, to plan their strategy with extreme thoughtfulness and care, drawing upon the best available resources about strategic principles and their own knowledge of nonviolent struggle and the conflict situation.

Repression The challenge by nonviolent action may be a mild one and disturb the status quo only slightly. In extreme cases, however, the challenge may shatter it. The opponents' difficulties in coping with the nonviolent action are associated with the special dynamics and mechanisms of the technique. These tend to maximize the influence and power of the nonviolent group while undermining those of the opponents. Their difficulties do not depend on their being surprised by the nonviolence or from being unfamiliar with the technique. Repression is a likely response. Repression can be applied with such means as censorship, confiscation of funds and property, severance of communications, economic pressures, arrests, imprisonments, conscription, concentration camps, use of agents provocateurs, threats of future punishment, beatings, shootings, torture, martial law, executions, or retaliation against others. The amount and type of repression will depend on a variety of factors. Because repression may be counterproductive to the opponents' cause, the repression against nonviolent action may be significantly more limited than that applied against a violent rebellion, guerrilla warfare, or conventional war. The likelihood of violent repression is strong evidence that nonviolent action can pose a real threat to the established order. This is a confirmation of, and a tribute to, the power of the technique. Repression and even brutalities are no more reason for abandoning nonviolent action than is the enemy's military action in a war. Nonviolent action is designed to operate against opponents who are willing and able to use violent sanctions.

Combative Nonviolent Discipline Contrary to what might be expected, repression will not necessarily produce submission. For sanctions to be effective, they must operate on the minds of the subjects, producing fear and the willingness to obey. Just as in war, however, there is the possibility that planning and discipline, or some overriding loyalty or objective, will cause the nonviolent struggle group to persist despite the dangers. The nonviolent group in this situation needs to

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maintain nonviolent discipline to gain increased control over the opponents, reduce the violence against themselves, and increase their chances of winning. To have the best chance of success, the nonviolent group must stick with their chosen technique. An extensive, determined, and skillful application of nonviolent action will cause the opponents very special problems, which will disturb or frustrate the effective utilization of their own forces. The nonviolent struggle group will then be able to throw their opponents off balance politically, causing their repressive tactics to undermine their support and weaken their power. Faced with repression, the nonviolent resisters, if they have the strength, must persist and refuse to submit or retreat. There are in history many examples of groups defying overwhelming violence, both violently and nonviolently. The nonviolent struggle group must defy repression. This response continues the noncooperation and avoids the trap of shifting to fight with the opponents' chosen weaponry (in the possession and use of which the grievance group is inferior). Nonviolent discipline also facilitates the process of "political jujitsu," which can shift power relationships significantly (as discussed below). News of brutalities may eventually leak out despite censorship, and harsher repression may increase, rather than reduce, hostility and resistance to the regime. The maintenance of nonviolent discipline in the face of repression is not an act of moralistic naïveté. Instead, it contributes to success and is a prerequisite for advantageous changes in the distribution of power. Nonviolent discipline can only be compromised at the severe risk of contributing to defeat.

Political Jujitsu By remaining nonviolent while continuing the struggle, the nonviolent group will help improve its power position in several ways. As cruelties to nonviolent people increase, the opponents' regime may appear still more despicable, and sympathy and support for the nonviolent group may increase. The general population may become more alienated from the opponents' regime and more likely to join the resistance. Third parties may increase support for the victims of the repression and opposition to the opponents' violence and policies. Although the effect of national and international public opinion varies, it may rally to the support of the nonviolent resisters and may at times lead to significant political and economic pressures. The opponents' own citizens, agents, and troops, disturbed by the brutalities against nonviolent people, may begin to doubt the justice of the policies. Their initial uneasiness may grow into internal

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dissent and at times even into noncooperation and disobedience in their own camp in the form of strikes and mutinies. Thus, repression of nonviolent resisters can rebound against the opponents; this is "political jujitsu" at work.

Power Changes To a degree that has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent technique operates by producing power changes. These result from several factors, among them the process of political jujitsu previously mentioned, which has the potential to shift power to the nonviolent group and away from the opponents. In addition, the group engaged in nonviolent struggle can seek continually to increase its strength. It will usually gain growing support and participation from the grievance group. The nature of nonviolent action makes it possible for the resisters to win considerable support for their cause among third parties and even among the opponents' population and aides. The potential for recruiting such support is far greater than in violent struggles. The ability to gain these types of support gives the nonviolent group a capacity directly and indirectly to influence—and at times to regulate—their opponents' power, by reducing or severing its sources, as discussed above. The ways this occurs will differ from case to case; the pattern in an intrasocietal conflict will differ from that in a conflict with a foreign occupation regime, whose power bases of administration and enforcement largely lie outside the country. The process is, however, generally applicable in both situations. The size of the resistance group may therefore vary widely within a single conflict. At times, the population and numbers of institutions participating in the struggle will grow or shrink dramatically; similarly, extreme shifts may occur for the opponent group. These changes will be influenced, directly and indirectly, by the actions and behavior of the nonviolent group, among other factors. Frequently, power relationships will also be influenced by third parties, which may shift from positions of indifference or neutrality to support or oppose one side or the other. The course of a nonviolent struggle is likely to cause, and to reflect, shifts in the power capacity of each side and the relative power of each in comparison with the other. The power of each of the contending groups can change continuously, rapidly, and extremely during the course of the struggle. These shifts do not seem to have a parallel in conflicts in which both sides use violence. Usually, the results of these complex changes in the absolute and

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relative power positions of the contenders will determine the struggle's final outcome. Four Mechanisms

of Change

Despite the variations from one case of nonviolent action to another, it is possible to distinguish four general "mechanisms" of change that operate in nonviolent action: conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. In conversion, the opponent, as a result of the actions of the nonviolent group, adopts a point of view and accepts that the goals of the nonviolent group are good. Conversion occurs only occasionally. In the mechanism of accommodation, the opponents are neither converted nor nonviolently coerced; yet elements of either or both are involved in their decision to grant concessions to the nonviolent group. In accommodation, the opponents grant demands—occasionally all of them but usually only some—without fundamentally changing their minds about the issues. The opponents yield because they calculate that is the best course. Their aim may be to undercut internal dissension, minimize losses, avoid a larger disaster, or save face. This appears to be the most common mechanism. Accommodation is therefore similar to nonviolent coercion and disintegration in that these mechanisms bring success by changing the social, economic, or political situation, and the grievance group itself by nonviolent action, rather than changing the opponent, as does conversion. Basic power relationships are changed so as to alter the entire picture. The third mechanism, nonviolent coercion, can gain the grievance group's objectives and produce success against the will of the opponent. Nonviolent action becomes coercive when the struggle group succeeds, directly or indirectly, in withholding to a major degree the necessary sources of the opponents' power. Nonviolent coercion may be produced when the opponents' will is blocked. This may occur because (1) the defiance has become too widespread and massive to be controlled by repression; (2) the system is paralyzed; or (3) the opponents' ability to apply repression and implement policies has been drastically undermined by widespread mutiny of soldiers and police, large-scale refusal of assistance by the bureaucracy, or massive withdrawal of authority and support by the populace. Yet the opponents retain some power and continue to exist as a body, able to capitulate or survive the imposed changes. Disintegration, the fourth mechanism, occurs when the sources of power to the opponents are so completely severed or dissolved that they simply fall apart as a viable group. No coherent body remains, even to accept defeat. The opponents' power has been completely dissolved.

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Removing the Sources of Power Nonviolent action may reduce the availability of each of the sources of political power in the following ways: 1. Authority. The nonviolent challenge to the opponents offers a clear demonstration of the degree to which their authority is already undermined. The struggle may help to alienate from the opponents more people who have previously supported them. At times there will be a clear transfer of loyalty from the opponents to another authority, even a rival parallel government. 2. Human resources. Widespread nonviolent action may also reduce or sever the human resources necessary to the opponents' political power by withholding the general obedience and cooperation of the masses of subjects who maintain and operate the system. The sheer numerical multiplication of noncooperative, disobedient, and defiant members of the grievance group creates severe enforcement problems for the opponents. The opponents' traditional supporters may also withdraw their previous support, thereby increasing the opponents problems further. The withdrawal of human resources will also affect other needed sources of power (skills, knowledge, and material resources). Thus the opponents require greater power at the very time their enforcement capacity is being reduced. If the resistance grows while the opponents' power weakens, eventually the regime may become powerless. 3. Skills and knowledge. Certain people or groups possess special skills or knowledge of particular importance; these include special administrators, officials, technicians, and advisers. Withdrawal of their assistance disproportionately weakens the rulers' power. In addition to outright refusal, reduced or deliberately incompetent assistance may also be important. 4. Intangible factors. Habits of obedience and loyalty to authority may be threatened by widespread nonviolent action. 5. Material resources. Nonviolent action may reduce or sever the supply of material resources to the opponents: control of the economic system, transportation, means of communication, financial resources, raw materials, and the like. 6. Sanctions. Even the opponents' ability to apply sanctions may on occasion be negatively influenced by nonviolent action. Their supply of military armaments may be threatened by a foreign country's refusal to sell them or by strikes in the munitions factories and transportation system. In some cases, the numbers of agents of repression—police and troops—may be curtailed as the number of volunteers declines and potential conscripts refuse duty. Police and troops may carry out orders inefficiently, or may refuse them completely, that is, potentially leading to nonviolent coercion or disintegration of the opponents as a viable group.

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The most significant long-run results of the struggle are likely to be its impact on the resolution of the issues at stake, on the attitudes of the groups toward each other, and on the distribution of power between and within the contending groups. In all these respects the contributions of nonviolent struggle are highly significant.

Changes in the Struggle Group Nonviolent action is likely to have several important effects on the participants. For example, as people learn about and experience this technique of action, they may gain increased self-respect, enhanced self-confidence in their ability to influence the course of events, general reduction of fear and submissiveness, and greater awareness of their own power. In common with experience in other types of conflict, the group using nonviolent action tends to gain greater unity, internal cooperation, and solidarity. However, there also appear to be special qualities in nonviolent action that contribute to these results. The nonstate institutions of the society (loci of power) that have been the social bases for resistance are likely to have been strengthened. The population will therefore have in the future strong structural bases for resistance in crises. The struggle is also likely to have taught the participants how to struggle effectively against apparently overwhelming forces of administration and violent repression. The result is likely to be a growth of popular empowerment that may have significant long-term effects.

Political Relevance Nonviolent action is possible, and it is capable of wielding great power even against ruthless rulers and military regimes because it attacks the most vulnerable characteristic of all hierarchical institutions and governments: dependence on the governed. If, despite repression, the sources of power can be restricted, withheld, or severed for sufficient time, the result may be the paralysis of the political system and the impotence of the regime. In severe cases, the rulers' power will progressively die, slowly or rapidly, from political starvation. This insight into political power and the cross-cultural practice of nonviolent sanctions based upon it demonstrate that nonviolent struggle is not restricted by cultural or national boundaries. It is, therefore, potentially relevant to the problems of liberation, international aggression, and internal usurpation in all parts of the world.

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Notes 1. See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 vols. (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). 2. See Gene Sharp, "Types of Principled Nonviolence," in Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979), pp. 201-234.

For Further Reading In

Arabic

Gene Sharp, Almuqawama Bila Ounf (Nonviolent Resistance), 377 pp. East Jerusalem: Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, 1985. In

English

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Nonviolent Sanctions: Their Strategic Use in Conflict and Defense. Forthcoming. Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military Coups," Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), vol. XII, no. 1 (1975), pp. 19-36. , ed., The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression. 320 pp. London: Faber & Faber, 1967. U.S. edition: Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Non-violent Action Against Aggression. Harrisburg, Pa., USA: Stackpole Books, 1968. Gene Sharp, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System. 165 pp. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. . "The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XIX, no. 1 (Autumn 1989), pp. 3-13. — . The Politics of Nonviolent Action. 902 pp. three volumes. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973. . Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence. 252 pp. London: Taylor & Francis, 1985 and Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985. Second edition with a Foreword by George Kennan, 190 pp. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1986. . "Nonviolent Struggle," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XVII, no. 1 (Autumn 1987), pp. 37-55. . Social Power and Political Freedom. 440 pp. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980.

Appendix B The Techniques of Nonviolent Action: Some Principles of Its Nature, Use, and Effects Ronald M.

McCarthy

The terms "nonviolent" and "nonviolence" are commonly used to describe events as different as day-to-day peaceful behavior, crimes accomplished without force, and proposals to undertake fundamental social change. Because we intuitively recognize that "nonviolent action" means something different from "nonviolent crime" or "nonviolent revolution," this ambiguity in usage hampers a clear understanding of what we are attempting to analyze. To discover what nonviolent action is, we might begin with some popular views or, more accurately, stereotypes of what nonviolence means. One stereotype depicts nonviolent action as "passivity"—the acceptance, perhaps with mild protest, of injustices that demand action. Another view is that nonviolent action is a Western-imposed idea intended to make Third World people quietistic and unable to institute needed social change. 1 A very different meaning is suggested by those who say nonviolent action can only include means that do not create confrontation. Finally, some argue that actions causing any sort of loss, discomfort, or anxiety—let alone pain— cannot be considered nonviolent. There is clearly a problem here. Actions commonly considered nonviolent do include active challenges to injustice. In the forms of boycotts, strikes, and disobedience, nonviolent behavior may well arouse discomfort or impose costs on adversaries, police, or bystanders. Therefore, instead of beginning with an arbitrary, a priori definition of nonviolent action, it would be preferable to consider the concept as referring to many different methods of struggle, but all of which arise out of the search by common people for means to carry on conflicts. These people might have stumbled across methods that could be termed nonviolent without having any objection to violence in principle. Rather than being viewed as one-half of a rigid violent-nonviolent dichotomy, nonviolent action then would be understood as a set of options with special characteristics that set it apart from either normal politics or violence. 2 It remains to identify these special characteristics.

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Characteristics of Nonviolent Action To distinguish nonviolent action from other related ideas, it must be placed within the context of the total range of options available to people engaged in a conflict. This might be an ethnic conflict, a struggle for land and jobs, or a grab for power. The conflict might be obvious or concealed. A list of possible responses to such a situation is given in Table A. Members of an affected group might fail to recognize the conflict, accept it as something they cannot influence, avoid it, or withdraw from it (even by emigration). If these people do choose to respond to the conflict, they may attempt to resolve it rather than use any sort of force or pressure. They may try persuasion and negotiation, mediation by third parties, active reconciliation with their antagonists, or arbitration if that option exists. Institutions of law and government also have a conflict-settling role. The legal machinery can be useful for working out conflicts that can be presented according to the established rules and procedures. Electoral politics and administrative procedures, depending on the system, also serve as forums for resolving conflict. Other institutionalized procedures may exist as well, ranging from old-boy networks to trade and professional groups that have the ear of government. In some conflict situations, essentially peaceful processes and the organs of law and government, backed by the power of the state, may be unavailable, ineffective, or actively hostile to a group's needs. At this point, the possibilities for response pass into the realm of collective action. 3 Three types of actions are possible within collective action: methods that actively raise a challenge by symbolic protest, refusal to cooperate as expected, and interference in the ordinary operation of life. This nonviolent action will be discussed again later. Another form of collective action is material destruction, such as sabotage or damage to opponents' property. A third form, collective violence, is itself a highly developed option, ranging from protest violence such as riots, through various kinds of lightly armed challenges, to armed struggle. At this point, we leave the arena of social protest and enter that of war. The idea of nonviolent action as a technique of struggle and conflict is based on the observation that nonviolent methods in all their variety have important features in common. First, they are active attempts to work toward change during conflict. Second, they do not depend upon institutional ways of bringing the power of the state to bear (although they may in fact seek this result by making challenges from the outside), nor do they rely upon the force that may be found in material destruction or violence for their effect. Instead, nonviolent methods rest on the view that mutual participation in social, economic, and political life—even when that participation is involuntary, enforced, and unequal—offers a source of power and pressure to

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Table A The Response To Conflict: Options Nonconflictual Responses

Conflict Resolution

Institutional Procedures

Collective Action

Nonrecognition

Negotiation

Nonviolent Action

Acceptance

Mediation

Political/ Governmental/ Administrative

Adaptation

Réconciliation

Legal/Juridical

Avoidance Withdrawal

Arbitration Nongov emmental

protest and persuasion noncooperation nonviolent intervention Material Destruction sabotage Collective Violence protest violence armed struggle

those willing to refuse to act as expected. 4 As Sharp reminds us, "people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which arc forbidden to them." 5 Nonviolent action as a technique begins with that refusal.

Principles of Nonviolent Action The diversity of methods that make up nonviolent action have common features that unite them into a technique. Although this technique is based on principles not fully understood at present, researchers have defined some of the factors that assist in understanding nonviolent action in three important areas: its nature as a technique, the rules of its use, and the conditions determining its effects. 6 The Nature

of Nonviolent

Action

Nonviolent action is active. Few people use the term "passive resistance" anymore, but some continue to think of nonviolent action as only a form of

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self-expression or persuasion that, they stress, renounces violence. Concentrating on restraint is misleading if it gives the impression of passivity. In fact, nonviolent action unites and employs the energies and commitment of active groups of people. It is used where desired change must be accomplished through struggle rather than through persuasion alone. In nonviolent action, the rules of conflict apply as surely as in struggle by any other means. 7 For this reason, a strategy—even in Karl von Clausewitz's sense 8 —and tactics assume immense importance. 9 The study of labor strikes contains a clarifying example of this point in the idea of "perishable disputes." These are disputes in which the mere passage of time will favor one party unless the other side responds effectively. 1 0 This principle holds true for other examples of nonviolent conflict as well: Not responding means the same as accepting an injustice. In addition, three principles have been identified that govern the amount of violence in a conflict, especially when used by authorities: recognition, organization, and accountability.n Normally, the forces of social control in a society are more likely to use violence if they will not be punished for their actions, if they are disorganized (no effective command), or if the group they face is not recognized as having a claim to be truly part of the society. The principle of organization applies to protesters or demonstrators as well as to police or troops. The importance of the recognition factor makes clear why many struggles involve conflict over recognition, legitimacy, and the demand to be consulted when decisions affect an excluded group. 12 Nonviolent struggle is not a weapon of the weak. Because it is employed more often by those out of power than those in power, nonviolent action is often regarded as a means used only by the weak and powerless. This view ignores that those in power possess the authority of office and the right to use legal force against all challengers. This state power is traditionally the means by which an organized and active elite may dominate a passive or excluded mass. When the normal political channels of change are closed, protesting groups generally turn to irregular means like nonviolent action to pursue their ends. It is thus preferable to view nonviolent struggle as the choice of those members of a society who are potentially strong but currently excluded from exercising power. Nonviolent struggle brings about "creative disorder." It magnifies existing social and political tensions even when it is orderly and peaceful. Nonviolent action threatens people who have benefited from an existing system and therefore will not profit from change. Groups challenging the status quo ordinarily have not yet gained the right to participate as equals in the political process. They are forced to press their case by means of protest and noncooperation, trying to turn any advantages of maintaining the existing system into disadvantages. 13 The term "creative disorder" is used to describe the employment of

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nonviolent means to impose greater costs on those who want to maintain their advantages under the existing regime. 14 Although protesters might try inducements perceived as attractive by opponents 15 —such as promises to buy goods—it is more likely that nonviolent collective action will achieve its ends by making it more costly to do "business as usual." 16 Nonviolent action uses force, not just persuasion. Many people find it difficult to conceive of nonviolent means and force as being linked in any way, whereas others wish to keep nonviolent means free of the taint of force. Alternatively, when nonviolent action is used, it is common for some members of society to object even to its relatively mild means because they feel compelled to act against their will. Even the use of strong, meaningful symbols is often perceived as an attempt to enforce change in the people at whom they are aimed. It must be understood that the disruption of normal patterns of life, efforts to make change via outside channels, and imposing costs on opponents are forceful ways of acting. We might, then, identify a further force: depriving opponents of their ability to continue to influence a situation. This is essentially what happened to Ferdinand Marcos during the military revolt and demonstrations of 1986 in the Philippines. 17 Admittedly, using the term "force" in the ways suggested here is broad, but it serves to stress that nonviolent means depend on more than persuasion and symbolism. Knowledge of the technique of nonviolent struggle facilitates nonviolent action. Personal commitment, creativity, and spontaneity are of the greatest importance in nonviolent struggle. But alone, or backed only by false assumptions about the technique, these qualities have led to avoidable suffering and failures and to premature abandonment of nonviolent means. Evidence is mounting that knowledge of the technique contributes to success. 18 The Use of Nonviolent

Action

Nonviolent action affects three constituencies. In the course of a struggle, actions can be aimed at and can influence the behavior of direct beneficiaries, the opponent group, and third parties. Direct beneficiaries are the people most likely to improve their condition if collective action is effective. Nevertheless, they often do not support actions taken on their behalf and need encouragement. Nonviolent action can affect four groups among the beneficiaries: (1) the core action group, (2) waverers and peripheral activists, (3) the uncommitted, and (4) those hostile to any change. The opponent group consists of those people who actively try to halt change. Such a group generally claims to represent a wider category of people, such as ethnic brethren or coreligionists, or to defend broad values, such as law and order or constitutional rule. There are four categories within

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this group: (1) core adversaries, (2) sympathizers, (3) uncommitted and passive beneficiaries of the status quo, and (4) the hostile. Third parties are those outside the central conflict who nevertheless may be drawn into it. They may be engaged on the basis of values or interests and, if involved, may support either side. Four significant third-party constituencies are (1) powerful outside groups, such as voluntary or nongovernmental organizations, (2) conscience constituencies that support a struggle for reasons of values rather than benefits, (3) potential indirect beneficiaries, and (4) potential indirect losers. Separate mention must be made of conscience constituencies, which are a special kind of third party consisting of individuals who devote time, resources, and personal effort to a struggle that directly benefits others. 19 White Americans who traveled from the North to the South to join civil rights demonstrations are an example. Third parties or members of the opponent's own group may be moved to sympathy with the challengers. Indeed, shifting the sentiments of the opponent's own group is a key factor in the success of nonviolent struggle. 20 Moral appeals, accepting suffering without retaliation, and laying bare the violence upon which the opponent depends may increase this sympathy among conscience constituencies. However, some people argue that this claim about increased sympathy should be greeted with caution and viewed as only part of the effects of nonviolent action. 2 1 It is possible, they say, that the public may find government justified in the use of force. 22 On occasion, a knowledgeable adversary may refuse to inflict visible suffering on protesters. 23 Furthermore, open conflict is likely to polarize opinion within a society 24 and strengthen the opponent's support temporarily. 25 Conflict is generally over real issues, and it is to be expected that those affected will protect their own needs and values until a clear and preferable alternative is shown. It is important to distinguish which actions affect the action group and which affect the opponent group. Robin Williams maintains that, "nonviolent protest actions may be undertaken either primarily to express and reinforce certain values and beliefs among members of the in group or primarily as a means of attempting to influence opponents or third parties." 26 Groups using nonviolent means are not always clear on which group they intend to influence and how. Nonviolent action can have great significance in uniting the action group and changing the behavior of the opponent group, but not all actions serve both ends. Many of the most visible and symbolic methods, such as large-scale demonstrations, are intended to show the support the struggle enjoys rather than to place direct pressure on opponents. These have been called identification moves, aimed at the action group's constituency to "demonstrate . . . their own true strength." 27 Groups also may lay great stress on the ways an action contributes to the growth and ultimate success of a

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struggle, even when it may be a loss in the short run. There may be compensatory values even in a lost cause. 28 However, compensatory values and identification moves must be seen for what they are: In particular, personal values and personal experience of comradeship and commitment cannot substitute for real gains in important conflicts. The action group can choose its means of struggle. If nonviolent action is sometimes characterized as reactive, this is largely because its users have behaved reactively. Those unfamiliar with the nonviolent technique have often assumed that violence must be met with violence. As discussed later, neither violence nor any other doctrinally chosen means should be adopted in the face of the opponent's repressive violence simply because the adversary has been violent. Otherwise, the opponent, not the action group, is choosing the means of struggle. Nonviolent struggle can create space for action in very repressive situations. (Space is a term used to designate the relationship of those forces that can constrict or expand the range of nonviolent methods usable in a particular situation. 29 ) In many societies, dissent and opposition are punished and repressed mercilessly, but challengers can nevertheless work to create space where dissent can be expressed. Thus, conducting a demonstration that will be promptly repressed may be a poor choice for expanding space, whereas wearing and displaying symbols encouraging the struggle may be possible and may successfully evoke other nonviolent actions—at least until the opponent grasps the purpose. The Pope's visit to largely Roman Catholic Chile created space for increased nonviolent resistance by allowing and legitimizing mass gatherings that were turned to quasi-political ends. 30 Thus, groups can create space for action through careful choice of methods or can take advantage of space created by other forces in the society. Third parties can be mobilized by challenging cultural stereotypes. Although it is useful to secure the support and participation of third parties, they share with members of the opponent group their society's prejudices. Challenging and reducing biased perceptions is an important aspect of gaining support from third parties or reducing their acceptance of the opponent. Social distance, stereotypes, and contrast conceptions all refer to the sense of difference that one group feels toward another and the sense that harsh treatment is justified by such difference. 3 1 The feeling that "bad outsiders" are worse than "comparable insiders"—called the out-group polarization effect—explains in part why challenging groups are viewed unfavorably, even by those expected to support them. 32 In response, activists may summarily reject the search for cooperation with people outside their group on the premise that "anyone not for us is against us." Regardless of whether they are justified in this analysis, this is not a good basis for nonviolent strategy. Actions that reduce stereotyping and social distance by

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challenging their relevance or replacing them may increase the challenger's power. 33 Familiar and easily organized actions such as labor strikes, demonstrations, and civil disobedience are common in many societies. But nonviolent action is broader than any of these and has revealed remarkable innovation and creativity, with new methods and variations invented regularly. "Noise barrages" of many people beating pots together have been used in Chile and the Philippines. Samizdat (a method of uncensored print communication) and magnitizidat (taping protest songs on cassettes and copying them) as ways of distributing protest music were developed in the USSR. As the opponent learns to counteract these methods, flexibility and creativity are important in the selection of other methods to reach the same goals. Actions depending on drama may lose their force when they become commonplace or when protesters concentrate on symbols that speak to them but not to the wider society. Actions benefiting from surprise may likewise decline in forcefulness. The first Manila noise barrage, for example, helped lead to the government's capitulation, but some people question whether this tactic can work repeatedly. 34 Knowledge of the opponent's strong points and weak points is critical. Nonviolent action has often gone forward without an informed sense of where the opponent's strengths or weaknesses reside, which can result in actions that fail to influence the opponent toward change. One of the must obvious failures in the U.S. civil rights movement, for example, occurred in Albany, Georgia, when movement groups challenged city government in a variety of ways, only to discover that none of them truly inconvenienced the opponent. Thorough research and preparation, including preliminary negotiations, are needed as groundwork for nonviolent action. 35 This is not because the nonviolent activists are kinder or more moral than other people, but because clarity about the focus of struggle, the opponent's position and likely responses, and the goals of the action group are the factors that contribute to eventual success. Such nonviolent means as boycotts hold out the possibility of inflicting real discomfort on others. In addition, the repressive response of an opponent may inflict pain on the action group that another method might avoid. Action choices involve both ethical and strategic elements, but the two are not entirely separable. 36 In particular, a group may have ethical concerns about imposing discomfort on its opponent. Such costs are probably unavoidable, but these choices can be made while keeping the principle of reversibility in mind. With some exceptions, nonviolent action inflicts costs that are reversible in the sense that they can be withdrawn when a settlement is reached without leaving permanent damage. 3 7 No one can take back the wounds of violence, the lost years of imprisonment, or the pain of exile—but workers can return to the factory

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after a strike, boycotters can begin trading at shops again, and mass meetings and marches can be called off. The Effects of Nonviolent

Action

That the opponent reacts with violence is indication that nonviolent action is taken seriously. Choosing nonviolent action is the challenger's option, not the opponent's. Nonviolent action does not cease when opponents respond with violence, even if it seems they have broken faith by doing so. It is not a sign that the nonviolent action group has failed when it meets violence. Nor is it a sign that nonviolent means themselves have failed. In fact, quite the reverse is true: Opponents use violence because nonviolent opposition mounts a credible challenge to which they think they must respond with escalating repression. 3 8 It is testimony to the perceived power of the opposition when nonviolent means are declared illegal and violently suppressed, as has occurred many times over the years in South Africa. Our modem experience raises the question of how nonviolent action has a chance of success against brutal and ruthless repression. This is a question that cannot yet be answered fully. What must be discovered is whether the use of nonviolent means has factors that serve to limit the violence of the adversaries and undermine not only their violence but their assumed restraint. The Chilean women's struggle for democracy appears to have reduced the effects of violence through hit-and-run demonstrations that break up when the police attack, only to form again quickly. Also, violence may reinforce the challenger. Extreme violence seldom punishes resisters alone, but attacks the entire population from which they came. Brutal violence failed to produce compliance with Nazi rule by all Poles because the doctrine of "collective responsibility" punished everyone equally—there was no inducement for nonresisters to separate themselves from resisters. 39 Repression and even violence must be expected, withstood, and turned into a fresh point of departure for a nonviolent movement. 40 Violence by opponents reveals that their domination is based on force, not legitimacy. Persistent opposition in the face of violence will begin to strike at the base of that system, weakening the aid of supporters and disturbing the passive acceptance of the uninvolved. This tenacity can counteract the fear and acquiescence upon which once rested the obedience of a now-resisting population. The best defense against future brutality is to change the system that will inflict it. Effects on the opponent group can be maximized even as costs to the action group are minimized. There is often more than one course of action to reach a given goal. Action has costs—and it is well to place the bulk of them on the opponent. Some of these costs are literally an expense or deprivation; others work to place the burden of maintaining a discredited system onto its

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supporters. Examples from the U.S. civil rights movement in the South illustrate this. Boycotts were only a slight inconvenience for each member of the movement, but placed a significant burden on business. This prompted influential business people to urge the government to become involved; one person even contacted President Kennedy. 41 One mayor replied in the negative when asked if he thought discrimination was moral. He was unable to defend discrimination based on race, and eventually pressure grew to do away with it. 42 In dangerous situations, methods can be chosen that reduce the threat to participants. In Poland, for example, many people were killed in demonstrations and violent street clashes in uprisings before 1980. The Solidarity trade union later gave workers the option of going on strike and occupying their factories instead of marching in the streets, thus reducing their exposure to repression. 43 "Goals" and "success" have several meanings. A seemingly simple interpretation might be to speak of an action group's goals and to measure the group's success in reaching them. However, distinctions become muddied in the midst of conflict. The meaning of the word "goals" depends on the situation. Three levels of goals may be distinguished: First, ultimate goals are the changes that an action group wants to achieve in the end. For some, this means change in a specific concrete situation, while other people seek revolutionary change. Process goals are the activities that must be accomplished in order to have a reasonable chance of success. These include the basic tasks of conducting actions, such as bringing a core group together and choosing actions suited to ultimate goals. Other process goals are secondary, such as approaching third parties and conscience constituencies, building elaborate organizations, or raising extra funds. The third level is achievement goals, which are the accomplishments a group desires from its actions and are of two types: immediate and intermediate. Immediate achievement goals are the hoped-for effects of a single action or group of actions. Conducting a demonstration, making an identification move that brings in many people, or gaining recognition of the right to conduct a protest are immediate but often significant achievement goals. One community organizer in the United States, Saul Alinsky, recommended to the people he advised that they choose as their first action something that would lead to a small but clear victory, knowing that it would give them confidence. 44 Intermediate achievement goals are the changes that contribute directly to reaching the final goal. Creating an organization that can survive repression, learning that an organization can survive repression, discovering more sophisticated means of action, or opening dialogue with other forces in the society are examples. Groups may easily mistake these intermediate changes

Appendix

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of Nonviolent

Action

117

for ultimate goals, be satisfied with immediate gains, or confuse the actions taken to give them a chance at success with success itself. In these cases, the means may become ends in themselves. T h e word "success" also has different levels of meaning. Sometimes success is spoken of "in a very confusing way" in studies o f nonviolent struggle. 4 5 People often mean that they carried out an action well and that many people participated; other times success means achieving ultimate goals. There are three levels o f success—more accurately, effectiveness—in nonviolent struggle. First is success in conducting action, that is, in organizing and deploying the forces at hand so that an action is well performed. Qualities such as skill and commitment may be more important than the quantity of participants. 46 Reaching intermediate goals needed for the achievement of ultimate goals, a second level of success, is illustrated by someone who gains recognition as a legitimate representative of a point of view. A final meaning o f success is, of course, reaching an ultimate goal. Groups conducting nonviolent action must be aware that success has these three aspects and that satisfaction with taking a step along the road does not end the journey. But this discussion does not exhaust the ambiguity of the idea of success. Many groups in armed as well as in nonviolent conflict have achieved all or most of their aims, only to be dissatisfied that they did not gain more. Dissension may follow despite the advances. Success, in short, requires careful judgment as to what values and material ends are worth struggling for. There are known threats to success. Choosing to take a case outside of regular channels is likely to unite powerful forces against a group. Threats to success can come from within the group as well. T w o internal barriers to success are collapse and goal displacement, both of which can result from lengthy struggles that reach no clear conclusion. Collapse refers to the loss of resources and support necessary to continue the struggle. G o a l displacement occurs when a group cannot reach a satisfactory goal and decides to pursue other and usually less challenging aims. 47 Threats to success from outside include suppression, co-optation, and preemption. A group can be overcome by force and suppressed. Co-optation is more insidious, occurring when a group's goals are given a gratifying but hollow lip-service response or its leaders are brought into the existing system without change. Preemption occurs when a group's demands are adopted into the program o f those in power without the legitimacy of the group itself being accepted. 48 Success can be achieved in three ways. In Appendix A , Gene Sharp identifies three processes, which he calls "mechanisms," by which nonviolent struggle reaches its goals. 4 9 In conversion, opponents come to accept the goal values or viewpoints expressed by the action group and to acquiesce in

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its objectives.50 Where conversion cannot be gained, steady resolve may lead to the accommodation of the opponent to the action group's wishes. 51 Finally, nonviolent coercion occurs when the action group succeeds against the will of its opponent, as happened in the Philippines during the February 1986 revolution.

The Power of Nonviolent Struggle If this discussion has at times seemed overly analytical, it is only because our knowledge of nonviolent action has grown to the point where the technique offers a serious alternative in even the most severe conflicts. Nonviolent struggle is increasingly capable of making an active contribution to the settlement of the conflicts that beset our world. This knowledge is there for use by those individuals who take seriously their responsibility to find solutions to violence without resorting to violence. Indeed, the nonviolent option grows in importance as armed struggle becomes increasingly discredited. The belief of earlier decades that violent struggle would sweep away oppression has given way in many circles to a more sober appraisal of its limited possibilities. In contrast, the power of struggle without weapons of violence has been shown often in our times. Even in such intractable conflicts as those in the Middle East, interest in the nonviolent alternative is growing. It might, however, have to be called by a different name. Nevertheless, if performed with attention to the factors that help it operate effectively, nonviolent struggle offers the possibility of active prosecution of necessary conflicts to the point of resolution—without destruction and violence.

Notes 1.John Gerassi, "Violence, Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America," in Irving L. Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (eds.), Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements (New York: Vintage Press, 1969), p. 486. 2. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), chap. 2; Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 379-382. 3. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978). See also Chapter 5 of this volume. 4. Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 114-115, and chaps. 3-8. 5. Ibid., p. 63. 6. Ibid., chaps. 9 - 1 4 . 7. James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1957); Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs,

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Action

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N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Louis Kriesberg, The Sociology of Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). 8. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N J . : Princeton University Press, 1976). 9. Robin M . Williams, Jr., Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 2 1 5 - 2 1 8 ; Christopher Kruegler, "Implications of Prototypical Nonviolent Resistance for the Conduct of Civilian-Based Defense," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 1987. 10. Richard Hyman, Strikes, 2d ed. (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 34. 11. Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, pp. 3 3 7 - 3 4 3 . 12. Tilly, pp. 125-126; William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1975). 13. O b e r s c h a l l , Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 308; Robin Williams, pp. 2 1 6 - 2 1 8 . 14. Arthur Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-in, 1919 and the 1960s: A Study in the Connection Between Conflict and Violence (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), pp. 2 7 6 - 2 8 0 , 2 8 8 - 2 9 0 . 15. Johan Galtung, "On the Meaning of Nonviolence," in Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), pp. 3 6 4 - 3 6 7 . 16. William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 7 4 - 7 9 . 17. Marilies von Brevern, The Turning Point: Twenty-Six Accounts of the February Events in the Philippines (Manila: Lyceum, 1986). 18. See Kruegler for a preliminary report of a study of strategy in nonviolent struggle based on this premise. 19. Anthony Oberschall, "The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements," in Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 1 (Englewood Cliffs, N J . : Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 266. 20. H a r v e y Seifert, Conquest by Suffering: The Process and Prospects of Non-violent Resistance (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965). 21. Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, chap. 12. Civil Rights Years, 195422. R. Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's 1965 (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 . 23. This happened in Albany, Georgia, in 1961. David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Morrow, 1986), pp. 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 . Williams, pp. 169-172. 24. C o l e m a n , Community Conflict. 25. Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 5 2 4 - 5 2 6 . 26. R. Williams, p. 223. 27. Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, pp. 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 . 28. E. T . Hiller, The Strike: A Study in Collective Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 212. 29. Alex S c h m i d , "Social D e f e n s e Against the Soviet Union," seminar presented at the Program on N o n v i o l e n t Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1986. 30. X i m e n a Bunster, "Nonviolent Action in the W o m e n ' s M o v e m e n t in Chile," seminar presented at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1987. 31. T a m o t s u S h i b u t a n i and Kian M . K w a n , Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 383-391.

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32. S u s a n T . Fiske, and Shelley E . T a y l o r , Social Cognition (Reading, Mass.: A d d i s o n - W e s l e y , 1984), p. 165. 33. Ibid., p. 166; Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 711, 727. 34. L y d i a C a s a m b r e a n d Steven R o o d , "Nonviolent Political Strategy and the F u t u r e of the P h i l i p p i n e s , " s e m i n a r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e H a r v a r d - R a d c l i f f e Philippine Study Group, Harvard University, 1987. 35. S h a r p , Politics of Nonviolent Action, p p . 461-473. 36. R . Williams, p p . 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 . 37. R . W i l l i a m s , p. 218. 38. T h e o d o r E b e r t , Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative zum Buergerkrieg (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1970), p p . 4 6 - 6 3 . 39. Jan T. Gross, Polish Society Under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernment, 1939-1944 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 1 9 9 - 2 1 2 . 4 0 . Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, p p . 5 3 7 - 5 6 5 . 4 1 . H o w e l l Raines, My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 162-166. 4 2 . J. W i l l i a m s , pp. 1 3 8 - 1 3 9 . 4 3 . Jan Z i e l o n k a , "Strengths a n d W e a k n e s s e s of N o n v i o l e n t Action: T h e Polish Case," Orbis 30 (1986), pp. 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 . 4 4 . Saul A l i n s k y , Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage, 1972). 4 5 . Z i e l o n k a , p. 103. 4 6 . Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action, p p . 4 7 5 - 4 7 9 . 4 7 . M e y e r N . Z a l d a n d R o b e r t a Ash, "Social M o v e m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n s : Growth, Decay and Change," Social Forces 4 4 (1966), pp. 5 - 8 4 . 4 8 . G a m s o n , Strategy of Social Protest, p p . 5 1 - 5 4 . Action, chap. 13. 4 9 . S e e also Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent 50. This o f t e n h a p p e n s w h e n o p p o n e n t s view their o w n violence in the mirror of a third party's condemnation. See Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, pp. 3 2 0 - 3 2 3 ; R. Williams, pp. 2 2 4 - 2 3 0 . 51. Fisher and U r y suggest that well-conducted negotiations can e x p a n d the c o m m o n g r o u n d b e t w e e n the parties a n d c o n t r i b u t e to long-lasting a n d j u s t settlements. A c c o m m o d a t i o n may occur without any sort of talks or c o m p r o m i s e s in recognition of the strength of nonviolent struggle. R o g e r Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981).

Bibliography

Alinsky, Saul, 1972. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Vintage,. Brevem, Marilies von, 1986. The Turning Point: Twenty-six Accounts of the February Events in the Philippines. Manila: Lyceum. Bunster, Ximena, 1987. "Nonviolent Action in the Women's Movement in Chile." Seminar presented at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Casambre, Lydia and Steven Rood, 1987. "Nonviolent Political Strategy and the Future of the Philippines." Seminar presented at the Harvard-Radcliffe Philippine Study Group. Harvard University. Clausewitz, Karl von, 1976. On War. Trans, and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Coleman, James E., 1957. Community Conflict. New York: Free Press. Dajani, Souad, 1987. "A Strategy for Civilian Resistance on the West Bank." Seminar presented at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Ebert, Theodor, 1970. Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative zum Buergerkrieg. Frankfurt: Fischer. Fager, Charles, 1985. Selma: The March that Changed the South. 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon. Fisher, Roger and William Ury. 1981. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Boston: Beacon. Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor, 1984. Social Cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Galtung, Johan, 1976, (1965). "On the Meaning of Nonviolence." Pp. 341-377 in Peace, War and Defence, Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 2. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers. Gamson, William A., 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. , 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. Garrow, David, 1986. Bearing the Cross; Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: Morrow. Gerassi, John, 1969. "Violence, Revolution, and Structural Change in Latin America." Pp. 471-495 in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds. Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements. New York: Vintage.

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Gross, Jan Tomasz, 1979. Polish Society Under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernment, 1939-1944. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hiller, E. T „ 1928. The Strike: A Study in Collective Action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hyman, Richard, 1977. Strikes. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Kruegler, Christopher, 1987. "Implications of Prototypical N o n v i o l e n t Resistance for the Conduct of Civilian-Based Defense." Paper presented at Annual Convention of International Studies Assn., Washington, DC. Kriesberg, Louis, 1973. The Sociology of Social Conflicts. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Oberschall, Anthony, 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. , 1978. "The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements." Pp. 257-289 in Louis Kriesberg, ed. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. Vol. 1. Raines, Howell, 1983, My Soul is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered. Paperback ed., New York: Penguin. Schmid, Alex P., 1986. "Social Defense Against the Soviet Union?" Seminar presented at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. , 1985. Social Defense and Soviet Military Power: An Inquiry Into the Relevance of an Alternative Defense Concept. Leiden, The Netherlands: Center for the Study of Social Conflict. Seifert, Harvey, 1965. Conquest by Suffering: The Process and Prospects of Nonviolent Resistance. Philadelphia: Westminster. Sharp, Gene, 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent. —, 1979. Gandhi as a Political Strategist. Boston: Porter Sargent. , 1980. Social Power and Political Freedom. Boston: Porter Sargent. Shibutani, Tamotsu and Kian M. Kwan, 1965. Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach. New York: Macmillan. Tilly, Charles, 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Waskow, Arthur I., 1966. From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960s: A Study in the Connection Between Conflict and Violence. New York: Doubleday Anchor. Williams, Juan, 1987. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 19541965. New York: Viking. Williams, Robin M„ Jr., 1977. Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash, 1966. "Social Movements Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change." Social Forces 44:5-84. Zielonka, Jan, 1986. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Nonviolent Action: The Polish Case." Orbis 30:91-110.

Index

Abd Rabboh, Abd al-Hafiz, 13 Abih, Ziyad Ibn, quote of, 18 Accommodation, 16, 103, 118 Accountability, violence and, 110 Action groups, 112-113 Activists, training, 2 3 - 2 4 Affan, Caliph Uthman Ibn, 19 Agape, 88 Aggression, prohibitions on, 2 6 - 2 7 Ali, Caliph Imam, 10, 12; quote of, 18 Alinsky, Saul, 116 Allenby, Edmund, 42 Al-Aqsa Mosque, defense of, 52-54, 63 Arab conquest, 12, 26; swiftness of, 9 -

10

Arabic language, influence of, 3 Arafat, Yasir, nonviolence commitment by, 8, 66 al-As, Amr Ibn, 10 Assad, Hafez, PLO and, 67 Assassinations, 80; backlash from, 77, 82 Authority, 93, 104 Awad, Mubarek, nonviolence of, 61, 69 Azhar Mosque, 23 Badal, Pathans and, 43 Baghdad Pact, 48 al-Bajuri, 14 Bakhtiar, Shapur, appointment of, 50 Bakr, Abu, speech by, 28 Balfour Declaration, 45 Barriers: cultural, 77-78; psychological, 85; racial, 77 Bayazid, 88 Bazargan, Mehdi, 50 Benvenisti, Meron, 60

Bey, Ahmad Rashid, 19 Boycotts, 7, 41, 43, 48, 65, 68, 85, 107, 114, 116; calls for, 49; economic, 45, 60, 91, 99; impact of, 46-47; political, 45, 46, 49, 99; social, 45, 98; using, 20-21 British Colonial Office, martial law declaration of, 46 British Royal Commission, boycott of, 46 Brotherhood, 37; Quran on, 36 Bukhtiar, Emir, warning from, 19 al-Buthuri, 17 Change, mechanisms of, 103-104 Chemical weapons, using, 5 Chivalry, Arab influence on, 12, 76 "Chosen people" doctrine, 86-87 Citizenship, sense of, 67 Civil disobedience, 46, 50, 54, 55, 94, 102, 107, 114; examples of, 18-20, 95; potential for, 37, 38 Civilization, building, 12 Civil Rights Protection Center, formation of, 35 Coercion, nonviolent, 103-105, 118 Coexistence, 16 Collective action, forms of, 108 Collective responsibility, doctrine of, 115 Colonialism, 79; justification of, 85; legacy of, 3 - 4 ; psychological effects of, 7 5 - 7 6 Commitment, importance of, 113 Committee Confronting the Iron Fist,

61

Committee of Judges, 55 Community, concept of, 80

123

124

Index

Compensatory values, 113 Compromise, heritage for, 78 Comradeship, importance of, 113 Condemnation, vulnerability to, 86 Conflict management, nonviolence and, 75 Conscience constituencies, 112 Consent, withholding, 98 Contrast conceptions, 113 Conversion, 103, 117-18 Creative disorder, definition of, 110— 11 Defense, 14; penchant for, 11-12 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), intifada and, 67 Demonstrations, 21-23, 35, 41, 45, 50, 54, 63, 64, 98, 112, 114; antiShah, 48-49; children and, 67; funerals and, 51-52, 62-63, 65, 99; hit-and-run, 115; space and, 113; women and, 42, 61, 67. See also Protests al-Dhahab, Siwar, 55 Dialogue, developing, 81 Diplomacy, using, 23 Direct beneficiaries, nonviolence and, 111 Discipline, maintaining, 100-102 Discrimination, principle of, 31 Disintegration, 103-105 Disobedience. See Civil disobedience Dome of the Rock, 52 Druze, nonviolent resistance of, 50-52 Economic strength, 3, 4, 7; nonviolence and, 8 7 - 8 8 Egypt, nonviolent liberation of, 6 - 7 , 41 Eisenhower, Dwight, 2 Emigration, protest by, 22-23. See also Hejira "Epic of Gilgamesh," 11 Ethics, 91, 114; political, 81 Extremists, attacks by, 52-53, 78 Fan, Haji, 25 al-Farisi, Salman, 16 Fasting, 23, 99. See also Strikes, hunger Fatwa, definition of, 20 Fear, reducing, 105

Fedayeen, 49 Fighting: injustice of, 33; proscriptions against, 15-16 Fitnah, 19 Five Pillars of Islam, description of, 37 Funerals, political use of, 51-52, 6 2 63, 65, 98 Gandhi, 7, 13, 19, 44, 81, 88, 89; Islamic influence on, 33; quote of, 33; on violence, 83 Garhwal Rifles, court-martial of, 44 Gaza Strip: occupation of, 52, 59; Palestinian organizations in, 61 Gazit, Shlomo, quote of, 64 Genocide, fear of, 81, 86 al-Ghazali, Imam, 19 Glubb, John, 11 Goals: achievement, 116-117; displacement of, 117; process, 116; reaching, 117; ultimate, 116, 117 Golan Heights, annexation of, 50-51. See also Druze Goodman, Alan, attack by, 52 Grievance group, 92 Guerrilla warfare, 6, 101; in Iran, 48 Hadith, 26, 28, 37, 87 Halacha, disobeying, 52 Hamas, intifada and, 67 al-Hamdani, Abu Firas, 10 Haydarkhana Mosque, 23 Hejira, 87; counter-productivity of, 23; protest by, 22-23. See also Emigration Heraclius, Emporer, 9 Higher Arab Committee, 19; boycotts by, 45; strikes by, 21-22, 45^46 Hijackings, backlash from, 77, 82 Holocaust, consequences of, 81, 86 Home rule, quest for, 44 Human dignity, respect for, 79 Human rights organizations, growth of, 7 - 8 Husseini, Faisal, 70 al-Husseini, Jamal, 19 Ibaziyah sect, 19 Identification moves, using, 112113

Index Immigration, 69; protesting, 45-47; Soviet Jewish, 60. See also Settlements Imperialism: justification of, 85; nonviolent resistance to, 11, 79 In'ash A1 Usra Society, 61 Independence, 41-42; negotiation for, 6 - 7 ; noncooperation and, 43 Indian National Congress, home rule and, 44 Influence, depriving, 111 Institutions, resisting, 95 Intervention, 14, 20, 98, 108; legacy of, 1 - 4 Intifada: future of, 69-72; impact of, 66-69; Israeli fears of, 62-64, 66, 68-69, 7 1 - 7 2 ; nonviolence and, 7, 61, 62, 64-66, 69-72; strategy for, 70; violence and, 72 Intimidation, using, 4 2 Iran-Iraq war, 5, 12; negotiated end to,

8

Iranian Revolution, nonviolent aspects of, 4 8 - 5 0 Iraq: civil war in, 6; uprising in, 4 7 48 Iraqi Communist Party, 22; boycott by, 21 Islam, influence of, 2, 3, 10, 16, 17 Islamic Higher Council, nonviolent strategy of, 53 Jabr, Salih: problems for, 47-48; resignation of, 21, 48 al-Jarrah, Abu Ubaida Ibn, 17 Jihad, 25-31, 78; greater, 27, 29; inner, 27, 87; lesser, 27, 29; major, 13-14; minor, 13-14; outer, 27; performing, 36-37 Jihad, Abu, assassination of, 66 Jizia, paying, 15-16 Journal of Palestine Studies, 61 Jus ad bellum, 39(n)28 Jus in bello, 39(n)28 Justice, Quran on, 27 Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 53 Khan, Inamullah, 30; quote of, 29 Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, 37, 81, 88; work of, 4 3 ^ t 5 Khawarij sect, 19; emigration of, 22; war and, 26

125

Khomeini, Ayatollah, influence of, 49-50 Khudai Khidmatgars. See Servants of God Kidnappings, impact of, 77 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 81, 88 Kukrit Pramoj, M. R., 35 Kurdistan, division of, 4; war in, 6 Labor Party, intifada and, 68 Labour Corps, 41 Leadership, nonviolent, 88-89 League of Nations, Egypt and, 6 - 7 Lebanon, civil war in, 5, 80 Legitimacy, questioning, 4 Life, promotion of, 3 2 - 3 3 Likud Party, intifada and, 68 Loyalty, 94; rating, 4 Magnitizidat, using, 114 al-Mahdi, al-Sadiq, lecture by, 17 Marcos, Ferdinand, 111 Marranos, 11 Martial law, declaring, 46, 49 Martyrdom, 11, 23; impact of, 50 Masada, 11 al-Masri, Zafer, funeral of, 62-63 Massacres, 49, 62 al-Mawardi, 18 Mazzini, Giuseppe, quote of, 76 Militarism, disdain for, 10-11 Military coups, 80 Military science, Arab contributions to, 12 Military struggle, necessity of, 76 Milner, Lord, report by, 42—43 Modernization: integrating, 3 - 4 ; intervention and, 1 Mosque of the Rock, 23 Mosques, defending, 52-54, 63 Mu'tazila sect, 19 Mujahedin, 49 Murder, 33; disdain for, 13 Mushrikin, boycott by, 21 al-Mutanabbi, 10-11 Mutinies, 44, 100, 102 National committees, general strikes and, 45—46 National Guidance Committee (NGC), 61 National identity, striving for, 4

126

Index

Nationalism, 41 Nationhood, sense of, 67 Negotiation, 6, 14, 108; heritage for, 78; power in, 94 Noise barrages, using, 114 Noncombatants, protection for, 28, 31 Noncooperation: political, 91, 98; Quran on, 20; social, 91; using, 1 8 19, 4 1 - 4 3 , 4 8 - 5 2 , 9 3 - 9 5 , 98, 1 0 0 - 1 0 2 , 108 Nonviolence, 18-19, 34, 71; arguments against, 7 5 - 7 8 ; arguments for, 7 9 - 8 8 ; barriers to, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 6 - 8 7 , 115; characteristics of, 107-109; creative means of, 114; as creed, 88, 89; doubting, 6 9 70, 75; effects of, 1, 7 - 8 , 115-18; failure of, 63; Jewish authors and, 81; means of, 14, 33, 3 6 - 3 7 ; nature of, 1 0 9 - 1 1 1 ; options for, 16-17; pacifism and, 79, 9 1 - 9 2 ; as policy, 88, 89; potential for, 38; power and, 91, 92, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 103, 105, 1 0 8 109, 118; precedents for, 8, 9, 25, 76, 78, 90; preparations for, 114; principles of, 38, 109-118; role of, 98; successes of, 6 3 - 6 5 , 71; superpower interests and, 78; teaching, 8 8 - 8 9 ; techniques of, 100; threats to, 89; using, 44, 1 1 1 115; weapons of, 9 8 - 9 9 Northwest Frontier war of 1897, 43 Nuclear arms, Islam and, 2 9 - 3 0 Numeiri, Ja'far, ouster of, 8, 54, 55 Nuri, 88 Obedience, 93; power and, 95; Quran on, 34 Occupation, 52; benefits of, 7, 5 9 - 6 0 , 71; nonviolent resistance to, 6 0 64, 66, 8 5 - 8 8 Omar, Caliph, 10, 15; quote of, 18; story about, 17 Opinion, polarizing, 68, 77, 112. See also Sympathy Opponents, 92; educating, 86; nonviolence and, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 ; knowledge of, 114 Oratory, using, 23 Organization, violence and, 110 Organization of Free Officers, 55 Out-group polarization effect, 113

Pacifism, 11, 34, 109-110; disdain for, 79; nonviolence and, 79, 9 1 - 9 2 Palestine Congress, 19 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): Assad and, 67; intifada and, 6 4 - 6 7 , 70; nonviolent commitment of, 8; occupation and, 60 Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, 61, 63 Palestinian National Front (PNF), organization of, 6 0 - 6 1 Parallel government, establishing, 99 Pasha, Muhammad Said, 42 Pasha, Rushdi, 41; resignation of, 42 Pathans, nonviolent resistance of, 4 3 45 Patience, 14, 23, 27; concept of, 1 7 18 Pattani, nonviolence in, 25, 3 5 - 3 7 Peace Now, growth of, 8 Perishable disputes, 110 Persuasion, nonviolent, 16, 27, 98, 108-111 Philosophy of Jihad, 13 Pluralism, toleration of, 26 Poetry, using, 23 Political culture, transformation of, 81-82 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), intifada and, 67 Portsmouth Treaty, demonstrations against, 21, 4 7 - 4 8 Power: awareness of, 105; controlling, 97, 99; dissolving, 98, 104-105; financial, 2; measuring, 9 2 - 9 4 ; nonviolence and, 91, 92, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 103, 105; politics, 3, 91; social, 85, 8 7 - 8 8 ; source of, 91, 9 2 - 9 3 , 95-97, 104-105, 109-110; structure, 96 Prayers: political struggle and, 23; ritualistic, 23 Principle of reversibility, 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 Propaganda, 50, 62; using, 23 Proportionality, principle of, 31 Protests, 64, 67; nonviolent, 99; symbolic, 91, 108. See also Demonstrations Provisional Revolutionary Council, appointment of, 50 Punishments, suffering, 9 4 - 9 5

Index

Qadesiya, 9, 11 al-Qawuqji, Fawzi, 46 Rahma, definition of, 13 Rajoub, Jabril, 63 Raqqam, 88 ar-Raziq, Abd, 27 Recognition, violence and, 110 Red Shirts. See Servants of God R e f u g e e camps, massacres in, 62 Repression: exposure of, 115-116; means of, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 Resistance committees, 65; size of, 102-103 Resources: economic, 2, 93, 104; human, 8 7 - 8 8 , 93, 104 Riots, 54, 101, 108 Rohan, Dennis Michael, attack by, 52 Rulers: dependency of, 9 4 - 9 7 ; power and, 9 2 - 9 5 ; subjects and, 18-19, 84 Sabotage, 108 Sabr, 14, 23; concept of, 17-18 Sacrifice, moral strength through, 89 Sadat, Anwar, nonviolent initiative of,

6

al-Sadiq, Imam Ja'far, quote of, 18 Saint Paul, 88 Salen, Kamal Kanj Abu, funeral of, 52 Samizdat, using, 114 Sanctions, importance of, 9 3 - 9 5 , 101, 104 Satyagraha, using, 7, 43, 44 SAVAK, role of, 48 Self-confidence: increasing, 84, 105; undermining, 70 Self-determination, 59, 60, 109 Self-discipline, reinforcing, 89 Self-purification, 28 Self-sufficiency, developing, 87 Servants of God, contributions of, 4 3 45 Settlements, illegal, 5 9 - 6 0 , 69. See also Immigration Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 48 Shak'a, Bassam, arrest of, 63 Shari'a, 19 Sharon, Ariel, 68 Sharp, Gene, 117; quote of, 33 al-Shaybani, al-Muthanna Ibn Harith, 10 Shia, noncooperation and, 20

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Shrines, defense of, 5 2 - 5 4 , 63, 78 al-Siddiq, Abu Bakr, quote of, 18 Social contract, 18-19, 84 Social distance, 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 Solidarity, nonviolent actions by, 116 Sorel, George Eugene, 89 Soul force, 88 South Africa, nonviolence in, 115 Space, creating, 113 State apparatus, 92 Stereotypes, creating, 113 Stone throwing, 6 4 - 6 6 , 69 Strategy, importance of, 110 Strikes, 36, 41, 43, 48, 64, 85, 91, 100, 102, 107, 116; calls for, 49; effectiveness of, 42; general, 4 4 47, 49, 50, 5 3 - 5 5 ; hunger, 23, 61, 63, 99; impact of, 4 6 - 4 7 ; labor, 110, 114; political, 2 1 - 2 2 ; reverse, 51; teachers, 63; women and, 67 Structural conditions, 97 Subjects: power and, 95; rulers and, 18-19, 84 Submissiveness, 34, 36, 101; reduction of, 105 Success: barriers to, 117; nonviolent, 6 3 - 6 5 , 71; types of, 116, 117 Sudan: civil war in, 5 - 6 , 5 4 - 5 6 ; Islam in, 17 Suffering: accepting, 112; idea of, 2 3 24 Sufian, Abu, 10 Sufis, 14 Suicide, disdain for, 11 Sunnah, 28 Superpowers: dependence on, 8 7 - 8 8 ; intervention by, 2 - 3 Sympathy, generating, 23, 61, 8 2 - 8 3 , 102, 112. See also Opinion Tactics, 114; importance of, 110 Tagia, 11 al-Tawhidi, Abu Hayan, 19 Tax resistance, 6, 18-20, 50, 65, 68 Taymiya, Ibn, 16, 19; on jihad, 27 Tehran: demonstrations in, 50; massacre in, 49 Temple Mount, 52 Terrorism, 60; backlash from, 6 8 - 6 9 , 77, 8 2 - 8 3 ; proliferation of, 3 0 - 3 1 ; renouncing, 66; understanding, 31 al-Thaqafi, Abu Ubaida, 10

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Index

Third parties, nonviolence and, 111-

112 Traditionalism, transition from, 3, 4 Truth, relativity of, 81 Tyranny, resisting, 96 Ummah, concept of, 36 Unified Command, 66; leaflets by, 6 4 65 Violence, 1, 6, 81; collective, 108; debilitating effects of, 83; exposure of, 112, 115; Gandhi on, 83; Hadiths on, 38; institutionalization of, 80; morality and, 28; necessity of, 76; provocation of, 13; Quran on, 14-17, 38, 87; renouncing, 75; strength and, 110; susceptibility to, 3; world opinion and, 77

al-Wafd al-Misri, 4 1 - 4 2 al-Walid, Khalid Ibn, 10 Walzer, Michael, 31 War, 26, 43; Arab-Israeli, 2, 3, 50; civil, 5 - 6 , 54-56, 80; colonial, 4, 75-76; disdain for, 11-12; guerrilla, 6, 48, 100; Iran-Iraq, 5, 8, 12; morality and, 28, 30 Weapons: illegitimate, 29-31; nonviolent, 9 7 - 9 8 Weizmann, Eizer, 63 West Bank: occupation of, 52, 59-60; resistance on, 61, 63 World Muslim Congress, 29 Yarmuk, 9, 11 Zaghlul, Saad, 6, 41^12 Zionists: aspirations of, 45; strikes and, 22

About the Book

This pioneering book represents a preliminary examination of nonviolent political struggle in the Arab World. Though the authors' opinions and points of view on the topic vary, they are unified in their desire that their work serve to counter conventional stereotypes of the Middle East and its people. Among the themes included in the book are the essential character of nonviolent struggle, the differences between those who perceive nonviolence as a creed and those who view it as a policy, and the arenas in which nonviolent struggle is most likely to be effective. Ralph Crow has taught public administration for more than 20 years at various universities in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Philip Grant served for several years on the political science faculty of the American University in Beirut; at present he is conducting research in East Asia. Saad E. Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo, is secretarygeneral of the Arab Thought Forum.

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