Antisemitism Today and Tomorrow: Global Perspectives on the Many Faces of Contemporary Antisemitism 9781618117458

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ANTI SEMITISM .

TODAY AND

TOMORROW

Antisemitism Studies Series Editor DAVID PATTERSON (University of Texas at Dallas)

ANTI SEMITISM .

TODAY AND

TOMORROW GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MANY FACES OF CONTEMPORARY ANTISEMITISM E D IT E D BY M I KA E L S HA I N K MA N

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shainkman, Mikael, 1976-editor. Title: Antisemitism today and tomorrow: global perspectives on the many faces of contemporary antisemitism / edited by Mikael Shainkman. Description: Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2018. Series: Antisemitism studies | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2018023153 (print) | LCCN 2018023457 (ebook) | ISBN 9781618117458 (ebook) | ISBN 9781618117441 (hardcover) Subjects: LCSH: Antisemitism—History—21st century. Classification: LCC DS145 (ebook) | LCC DS145. A6454 2018 (print) | DDC 305.892/4—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018023153 ISBN 9781618117441 (hardback) ISBN 9781618117458 (electronic) Copyright© 2018, Academic Studies Press Book design by Kryon Publishing Services (P) Ltd. www.kryonpublishing.com Cover design by Ivan Grave Published by Academic Studies Press in 2018 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.co

For Celia and Jackie Michonik, with appreciation for their generosity and for their constant struggle for Jewish and universal causes

Table of Contents

 Acknowledgments   Introduction: The Continuity and Change of Antisemitism   Mikael Shainkman  Different Antisemitisms: On Three Distinct Forms of Antisemitism in Contemporary Europe, with a Special Focus on Sweden   Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi  Holocaust Memory and Holocaust Revisionism in Poland and Moldova: A Comparison   Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska

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  Honoring the Collaborators: The Ukrainian Case   Irena Cantorovich

49

  The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Jews   Michael Whine

62

  The Worrisome Defiance of the Golden Dawn   Michal Navoth

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  The Struggle over the International Working   Definition of Antisemitism   Dina Porat

86

 Discrimination against Muslims and Antisemitic Views among Young Muslims in Europe   Günther Jikeli

101

 Debates on Islamized Antisemitism in Austria in the Wake of the Israel-Gaza Conflict, 2014   Julia Edthofer

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 Antisemitism and the Struggle for the “Good” Society: Ambivalent Responses to Antisemitic Attitudes and Ideas in the 2014 Swedish Electoral Race   Kristin Wagrell

142

 Mohamed Omar and the Selective Detection of Non-Nazi Antisemitism   Mathan Ravid

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 After the Charlie Hebdo Attack: The Line between Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech   Andre Oboler

171

 Online Antisemitic Propaganda and Negationism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ahmadinejad and His Enduring Legacy   Liora Hendelman-Baavur

184

 The Nisman Case: Its Impact on the Jewish Community and on National Politics in Argentina   Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

205

 Venezuela’s 2012 Presidential Elections: Introducing Antisemitism into Venezuelan Political Discourse   Lidia Lerner

217

  About the Authors

225

 Bibliography

228

 Index

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Acknowledgments

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or more than a quarter of a century, the staff at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University has been monitoring and analyzing current antisemitism worldwide. This book is the product of their years of unceasing work, as well as that of friends and ­colleagues from around the world. Their knowledge and expertise have been crucial for the realization of this project. In this context, I would be remiss if I did not thank the director of the Kantor Center, the indefatigable Professor Dina Porat. Of course, none of the work at the Kantor Center would have been ­possible without the generous support from Dr. Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress. He deserves a deep and heartfelt thank-you, as does Advocate Arie Zuckerman, chairman of the Kantor Center’s Executive Board. I would also like to express my gratitude to the editors at Academic Studies Press, David Michelson and Alessandra Anzani. Zelda Katz and Lauren Hill, who have proofread the manuscript correcting the English, also deserve my thanks. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank Celia and Jackie Michonik, without whose generous support this book would never have seen the light of day. This volume is dedicated to them. Mikael Shainkman Rishon Lezion, June 2018

Introduction: The Continuity and Change of Antisemitism Mikael Shainkman

T

here was a time at the end of the twentieth century when antisemitism was relegated to the margins of public discourse. In the general atmosphere of increasing tolerance and fight against all kinds of prejudices and increased protection of minorities, Jews lived in security and even started to take that state of affairs for granted. Following the Holocaust, no one who wanted to be taken seriously in the Western world would accept the epithet antisemite. Prejudice and hatred against Jews, based either on ancient Christian anti-­ Jewish teachings or nineteenth-century racist theories about the inferiority of Jewish blood, disappeared together with their most vociferous propagators in the Third Reich. Anyone still clinging to the beliefs that the Jews controlled the world via a stranglehold on the media, the financial markets, and ­politicians— be it on Capitol Hill, in Whitehall, or in the Kremlin—had to either hide those beliefs or express them only behind closed doors to avoid running the risk of social ostracism. The populist lies blaming the Jews for all the ills of the world lost much of their mass appeal when Allied soldiers threw open the gates of German concentration camps and revealed the unspeakable atrocities that were the outcome of Nazi antisemitic propaganda.1

  1 It is telling, for instance, that books on antisemitism published at the end of the twentieth century did not treat traditional right-wing antisemitism as a current problem. Instead, these books dealt extensively with antisemitism in the Arab world, in the communist bloc, or within the Left in the West but hardly even mentioned right-wing antisemitism. See, for example, Michael Curtis, ed., Antisemitism in the Contemporary World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

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Also, within Christian circles, the horrors of the Holocaust gave cause for reflection and penance. Most important, the Catholic Church drastically changed its views on Judaism and the Jewish people in a way that cannot be described as anything other than revolutionary. At the Second Vatican Council in Rome, 1962–1965, church teachings on eternally continuous Jewish guilt for the death of Jesus was revoked, and the liturgical language was altered to remove words that were insulting or inciting against Jews. Furthermore, Pope John Paul II, who was a young man in Poland during the Second World War and witnessed the obliteration of his country’s Jewish communities, worked hard and conscientiously during his long reign to address the antisemitic legacy of the Catholic Church. His successors on the Throne of Saint Peter, Benedict XVI and Francis, have continued this policy of rapprochement and fraternal relationship between Christianity and Judaism.2 Despite the fact that there is opposition to this policy from within conservative pockets of the Catholic Church, and from other Christian sects as well, the improvement in Judeo-Christian relations in the second half of the twentieth century is truly remarkable. All in all, the second half of the twentieth century offered Europe and most of the rest of the Western world an almost unprecedented period of political stability, economic growth, and increasing international interdependency through transnational organizations like the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union. Thanks to the combination of unprecedented prosperity and peace on the one hand and the haunting memories of the Holocaust on the other, antisemitism seemed to be a thing of the past.

THE RETURN OF TRADITIONAL ANTISEMITISM Unfortunately, the twenty-first century hardly had time to get out of the starting blocks before Jews around the world were disabused of that notion. In the last decade and a half, we have witnessed the return of what the eminent scholar of antisemitism Robert Wistrich called “the longest hatred.”3 Ironically enough,   2 See, for instance, Dina Porat, Karma Ben Johanan, and Ruth Braude, eds., Ba-Et Ha-Zot: Mismakhim U-Mechkarim al Ha-Knesiyah Ha-Katolit Ve-Ha-Yehudim Lenokhach Ha-Shoah U-Ve-Ikvoteyah (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2015), 80–118.   3 See, for instance, Dina Porat, ed., Antisemitism Worldwide 2001/2 (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, 2002); Roni Stauber, “The Academic and Public Debate over the Meaning of the ‘New Antisemitism,’” Kantor Center Position Papers (Tel Aviv: Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2009); and US Department of State, Report on Global Anti-Semitism, July 1, 2003– December 15, 2004, December 30, 2004.

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the first signs that this might in fact not be the end of either history or antisemitism came with the fall of the Iron Curtain—the very event that was supposed to herald the final victory of liberal democracy, capitalism, and a new, free world for everyone. When the Cold War ended, old conflicts generally thought to have been dead and a part of a departed era reappeared. It soon became evident that they had not been eradicated under communism in the Soviet Union and its satellite states but merely suppressed. The newly liberated Eastern European states embraced not only free speech and capitalism but also old prejudices, irredentism, and nationalist chauvinism. The most explosive and deadly consequences were seen in the Balkans, where Yugoslavia disintegrated amid the turmoil of a bloody and savage civil war.4 Even though the development was far less dramatic elsewhere, the long, and sometimes painful, readjustment to a new political and economic system of government gave rise to populist and extreme right-wing political movements and parties. Such groups had formed already in the 1990s, but the global financial crisis of the first decade of the twenty-first century elevated them to positions of power and influence in a number of former communist countries, most notably Hungary. Among extreme rightwing nationalists in Eastern Europe, it is not uncommon to blame the Jews for the forty years of communist dictatorship and the poor economic situation that followed.5 The fall of communism and the reintegration of Eastern Europe into the family of European nations have also forced people who lived behind the Iron Curtain to reevaluate their twentieth-century history—most notably what really happened during the Second World War and the Holocaust. Following the Soviet lead, communist countries had distorted the memory of the Nazi crimes, and the Jewish identity of the victims of the Holocaust was obfuscated, ignored, or sometimes even denied.6 For instance, historian Barbara Törnquist-Plewa talks about the “Polonisation of the Holocaust,” in which the Polish Communist authorities played down Jewish suffering during the German occupation and instead emphasized Polish suffering in education, art, and museums. Auschwitz became the symbol of Polish victimhood, with a   4 Kerstin Nyström, “The Holocaust and Croatian National Identity: An Uneasy Relationship,” in The Holocaust—Post-War Battlefields: Genocides as Historical Culture, ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Malmö: Sekel, 2006), 277.   5 Randolph L. Braham, ed., Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 10.  6 Braham, Post-Communist Eastern Europe, 4.

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plaque proclaiming that “four million Poles and citizens of other nations” had perished there, with no mention of the fact that some 90 percent of all those victims were Jewish.7 After the Cold War, when Poland drew nearer to Europe, especially in practical terms, and applied for membership in the European Union, this required a revision of the national narrative of the Holocaust and a critical new look at antisemitism in the country. This was a sometimes painful process with mixed results.8 Even though the situation there has been far less volatile, Western Europe has not been immune to the growth of populist extremist political movements. The financial crisis, in combination with dramatic demographic changes amid a large influx of immigrants from the third world, has fed extreme rightwing populist movements in faltering countries like Greece but also in stable democracies that by most objective standards have few reasons to worry about their economy, like those in Scandinavia. Nonetheless, extreme right-wing groups have gained momentum and electoral strength in countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and many others. The extreme right in the West rages against an increasingly globalized economy, the undermining of traditional values, and the weakening of the nation. Even though most extreme right-wing politicians who draw large crowds of voters in Western Europe today tend to blame Islam and Muslim immigrants for the current woes of Europe, it should be noted that all these accusations have traditionally been pinned on the Jews, and this is increasingly the case once again—both in Europe and in the Americas.9

A “NEW” ANTISEMITISM? Nonetheless, Western Europe has seen the emergence of a different kind of antisemitism in the past fifty, and most notably in the last fifteen, years. This form of antisemitism, sometimes called “new,” is characterized by its antisemitic narrativization of the state of Israel, and in that respect it might be called new—it presents a new rationale for hating Jews. This form of antisemitism has been around for decades, but there was a sudden e­ xplosion  7 Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, “The Jedwabne Killings: A Challenge for Polish Collective Memory,” in Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Culture in Contemporary Europe, ed. KlasGöran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), 146.   8 Ibid., 168–69.   9 Murray Gordon, The “New Anti-Semitism” in Western Europe (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2002), 11.

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of Israel-related antisemitism, in terms of both incidents and rhetoric, following the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada in the fall of 2000. This tsunami of attacks on Jews, primarily in Western Europe, sparked a lot of interest in “new” antisemitism, and a host of articles and books on the topic were ­published at the time.10 Rage at Israel was channeled into attacks on local Jews and Jewish communities all over Europe, when haters of Israel, consciously or ­unconsciously, conflated the Jewish state and Jews, wherever they lived. In that way, Jews in Europe were considered legitimate targets and attacked in response to escalating violence in the Middle East. Holocaust terminology was also inverted and used against Israel and Jews. For instance, Nobel Prize laureate José Saramago compared Ramallah to Auschwitz. Israel was routinely accused of carrying out a genocide, whereas Israeli security concerns were mocked, and lethal attacks on Israeli civilians were minimized or exculpated.11 Many Jews were shocked by this development, and especially religious Jews changed their way of life in order to keep safe from attacks. Hiding one’s Jewish identity became routine, and security at Jewish sites such as synagogues and community centers was upgraded—sometimes with detrimental costs to the small, local Jewish communities. Many Jews also felt a sense of abandonment, since Western European governments were slow to react to the explosion of antisemitism, sometimes even denying it or justifying it as merely a venting of justified frustration at Israeli aggression.12 The majority society’s widespread silence in the face of this wave of antisemitic attacks was to a large degree due to its political dimension and the connection to the state of Israel. The Jewish state is far from popular in Europe, because of its policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the way the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is depicted in the media. This widespread support and sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians—seen as innocent, oppressed victims of Israeli aggression by many in Europe—made many public figures, politicians, reporters, and intellectuals reluctant to condemn Israel-related antisemitism, especially among immigrants. They were afraid that ­condemning 10 See, for instance, Hillel Halkin, “The Return of Anti-Semitism,” Commentary, February 2002, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-return-of-anti-semitism; Ron Rosenbaum, ed., Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Antisemitism (New York: Random House, 2004); and Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin, eds., A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in the 21st Century (London: Profile Books, 2003). 11 Gordon, Western Europe, 3. 12 Ibid., 11.

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antisemitic incidents and rhetoric fueled by Israeli policies might be interpreted as support for those very policies, and some even could not see past their own antipathy toward Israel in order to realize that the attacks on local European Jews were not defensible or justified. Furthermore, there was a fear that criticizing antisemitism among immigrants might fuel racism against already marginalized groups. Needless to say, this dilemma was not facilitated by the fact that there is no consensus on the issue of what constitutes legitimate criticism of Israel as opposed to antisemitism masquerading as criticism of Israel. Abraham Foxman, then national director of the Anti-Defamation League, was one of those who tried to draw such a distinction. He made his position clear that far from all criticism of Israel is antisemitic but that modern antisemitism often employs the language of anti-Zionism. Furthermore, he pointed out that anti-Zionists who are antisemites claim that the Jews, unlike all other nations in the world, do not have the right to a state of their own, that there is no connection—historical, religious, or cultural—between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, and that the state of Israel is illegitimate and needs to be dismantled.13 A few of the more extreme, but rather vocal, supporters of Israel would be quick to label any and all critics of Israel as antisemites or selfhating Jews. Dug down in the other trench, other would-be extremists ardently clamored for the position that there is no such thing as “new,” or Israel-related, antisemitism, only legitimate criticism of an illegitimate state.14 The roots of this form of antisemitism are to be found in the Soviet Union already in the 1950s. Even though antisemitism was illegal and officially no longer existed in the Soviet Union, targeting Israel was a part of Stalin’s anti-Jewish campaign as well as his foreign policy in the Middle East, where he tried to win Arab favor and dislodge British and French imperial holds over the region. In their attacks on Israel, Soviet authorities and propagandists made ample use of classic antisemitic stereotypes and tropes common in prerevolutionary Russia. The comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany can also be traced back to the Soviet Union in the 1950s.15 In the decades that followed, the accusation that Israel is the new Nazi Germany spread both to the Middle East and left-wing circles in the West, where it grew in popularity. It is a 13 Abraham H. Foxman, Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 17. 14 Michael Berenbaum, ed., Not Your Father’s Antisemitism: Hatred of the Jews in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008), 289. 15 Stauber, “‘New Antisemitism,’” 13–14. See also Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, The New Anti-Semitism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

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compelling rhetorical image—the victim becoming the perpetrator—that lends itself well to enraged speeches and political cartoons. Antisemitism scholar Peter Pulzer blames such demonizing of the State of Israel for creating an “antisemitic atmosphere,” and when that image spread from Soviet and Arab propaganda to left-wing circles to finally reach parts of the mainstream media and academia, it brought that atmosphere with it.16 Murray Gordon of the American Jewish Committee concurs, and he notes that these denunciations of Israel “have given rise to much of the Judeophobia that plagues Western Europe today. A close fit has developed between the demonization of Israel they preach and antisemitism.”17 Murray also notes that many on the left, intellectuals, activists, academics, and politicians, deny the rise of “new” antisemitism altogether. Their reaction to the rise in attacks against Jews in Europe in the last fifteen years has often been to claim that this is due only to Israeli aggression and not a sign of antisemitism per se. The State of Israel is to blame, and it needs to end its occupation of Palestinian lands or cease to exist. When it does, antisemitism will automatically disappear.18

THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN INCUBATOR FOR ANTISEMITISM As noted above, the perpetrators of the lion’s share of attacks against Jews in Europe today have roots in the Middle East. They are far from always Islamists or even particularly religious but motivated to lash out against local Jews as symbolic representatives of Jews elsewhere, more specifically in Israel. Such attacks are rarely planned but rather spur-of-the-moment incidents when spotting someone identifiably Jewish in the street.19 The more serious, and lethal, attacks that require planning and organization, like the ones carried out in France and in Denmark in later years, were, however, carried out by ­perpetrators who were ideologically motivated Islamists. It is generally agreed that antisemitism historically has not been a grave concern in the 16 Peter Pulzer, “The New Anti-Semitism, or When Is a Taboo Not a Taboo?,” in Iganski and Kosmin, A New Antisemitism?, 97–112. See also Alain Finkelkraut, “In the Name of the Other: Reflections on the Coming Anti-Semitism,” Azure, no. 18 (Fall 2004): http://azure. org.il/article.php?id=211; Roni Stauber, “Anti-Zionism as an Expression of Judophobia after the War,” Masua, no. 31 (1993): 37–53; and Pierre-André Tauguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 97–100. 17 Gordon, Western Europe, 13. 18 Ibid., 10. For one example cited by Gordon, see Tony Judt, “Goodbye to All That?,” The Nation, December 16, 2004, https://www.thenation.com/article/goodbye-all. 19 Stauber, “‘New Antisemitism,’” 6.

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Muslim world, especially not compared with the situation in Europe, and that anti-­Jewish sentiments have intensified as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli ­conflict. Furthermore, it is clearly the case that the number of antisemitic incidents in Europe rises whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalates, fed by both televised images from the Middle East and antisemitic incitement in the public discourse in the Muslim world.20 Nevertheless, as historian Roni Stauber points out, the claim that Islamist terror attacks against Jewish targets are merely a form of retaliation for Israel’s actions—“The Jews must pay”—is contradicted by both the statements and deeds of these Islamist groups.21 The Muslim world, and especially Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Iranian regime, and others, have clearly absorbed antisemitic tropes and myths exported from Europe that were absent from the Middle East before the era of European ­colonization of the region. This is why so many old, debunked European antisemitic myths have been recycled and are now to be found in the Middle East.22 Even the blood libel—that is, the lie that Jews kidnap and ritually murder Christian children in order to use their blood to bake matzah for Passover— has found its way to the Arab world, where the Saudi paper Al-Riyadh tweaked it into a story about how Israelis kidnap and murder Muslim children and use their blood to bake oznei Haman, the pastries eaten on the holiday of Purim.23 Also, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion has found a new lease on life in the Muslim world. The Protocols is an antisemitic forgery purporting to be documentation of a Jewish plan for world domination that was first published in Russia in 1903. The Times published an article in 1921 proving beyond any doubt that The Protocols was in fact a forgery, but that did not stop Adolf Hitler and the Nazis from claiming that it was a reflection of the genuine truth.24 After the Second World War, however, The Protocols had few readers in Europe, but in later years it has experienced a revival in the Middle East. In 2002, The Protocols was adapted to television in a forty-one-episode Egyptian series called Knight 20 Foxman, Never Again?; Jonathan Sacks, “A New Antisemitism?,” in Iganski and Kosmin, A New Antisemitism?, 39–40;and Robert Wistrich, “Muslims, Jews and September 11: The British Case,” in Iganski and Kosmin, A New Antisemitism?, 180. 21 Stauber, “‘New Antisemitism,’” 12. See also Martin Kramer, “The Jihad against the Jews,” Commentary, October 1994, 38–42. 22 Berenbaum, Not Your Father’s Antisemitism, xix. 23 “Saudi Government Daily: Jews Use Teenagers’ Blood for ‘Purim’ Pastries,” MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 354, March 12, 2002. 24 For more on The Protocols, see Esther Webman, ed., The Global Impact of “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”: A Century-Old Myth (London: Routledge, 2011).

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without a Horse, which was aired on twenty-two Arabic-language channels during Ramadan. This way, an antisemitic forgery that never had a particularly large readership received a mass audience, and unlike in Europe when The Protocols was first published, there is no one willing to go on record in public to point out that the series was based on an antisemitic lie.25

ANTI-ANTISEMITISM AS A MEANS TO AN END In the antisemitic discourse emanating from the Muslim world, we see, then, how the “new” antisemitism focusing on Israel takes on the content of the “old” antisemitism of Christian and racist Europe. Antisemitism focusing on the State of Israel is by necessity “new” in the sense that the State of Israel was established only in 1948, whereas antisemitism has been around for some two millennia. At the same time, however, there are many aspects of this supposedly “new” antisemitism that bear the hallmarks of the “old.” It is perhaps more illuminating to view antisemitism as old, perhaps even the “longest hatred” in Wistrich’s words, but as a hatred that renews itself in every age and knows how to adapt in every situation so that it may always remain relevant, no matter the time, place, or context. At the same time, it can retain elements from previous phases, and some older aspects can endure or even come back under the right circumstances. That is why today, when the West is more secularized, the religious charges against the Jews for deicide and host desecration are less popular, because people care less about religion. In the nineteenth century, antisemitism was racist because race was a prime category of thinking and ordering the world. Jews were considered aliens disturbing the racial harmony of the nation. Today, prejudice against Jews can come cloaked in the high-minded language of universalism and human rights. A hundred years ago, Jews were accused of spreading secularism, and today they are vilified for primitive and patriarchal religious practices. Another popular accusation today is that Jews, e­ specially in Israel, are too nationalistic—a sin that was a virtue a century ago when Jews were accused of being too cosmopolitan. So, even though religion and racism are not important driving forces behind contemporary antisemitism, c­ omponents of this antisemitism still endure from previous eras. One such component is the idea that the Jews have an improper influence, even 25 Richard S. Levy, “The Migration of Discredited Myths: The Wandering Protocols,” in Berenbaum, Not Your Father’s Antisemitism, 178–79.

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control, over the media, financial markets, and politicians. The only difference is that today many proponents of this antisemitic trope prefer to talk about the “Israel lobby” or “Zionist influence” instead of “the Jews,” but this is merely a play with words—a dog whistle for antisemites.26 From the Left, accusations of antisemitism have almost always been met with outrage. Most left-wing politicians and intellectuals are self-proclaimed and vocal anti-racists, and for them the concept of antisemitism is truly ­abhorrent. It is also true that most people on the left are quick to recognize and condemn antisemitism when it comes in the form of right-wing racist propaganda but have developed a blind spot to antisemitism within their own ranks or among immigrant groups. It becomes especially hard, all but ­impossible, for them to recognize antisemitism if it comes cloaked as criticism of Israel. In fact, accusations of antisemitism directed at left-wing politicians or intellectuals are routinely met with the counteraccusation that the claim is made in bad faith in order to silence criticism of Israel. Sociologist David Hirsh calls this phenomenon “the Livingstone formulation” after the former mayor of London Ken Livingstone, who used to employ it.27 This reluctance of the Left to face and deal with antisemitism under the guise of anti-Zionism has drawn criticism in the last fifteen years or so, not only from Jewish organizations but also increasingly from the Right. Several right-wing writers, journalists, pundits, and politicians, both in Europe and in the United States, have embraced Israel and routinely condemn antisemitism. Despite this, the majority of Jews on both sides of the Atlantic, fearing the Greeks even when they bring gifts, have been hesitant to endorse such politicians and other public figures. Indeed, much of this right-wing support for Israel and outspokenness against antisemitism has been more of a political means to an end than actual worry about the well-being of Jews. Many rightwing supporters of Israel see the Jewish state as the bulwark in a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam, and they use antisemitism as a weapon to attack and vilify Muslim immigrants in Europe and in America. In the last few years, Jewish skepticism regarding the sincerity of this right-wing support has proven to be well founded. Several of the extreme right-wing populist parties in Europe that are most vocal in their support of Israel also have several antisemites in their ranks, and the 2016 US presidential elections also brought 26 Denis MacShane, Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2008), 124–26. 27 David Hirsh, “The Livingstone Formulation,” Engage, April 29, 2016, https://engageonline. files.wordpress.com/2016/04/livingstone-formulation-david-hirsh.pdf.

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forward troubling antisemitic statements from prominent right-wing voices in America. And when the very same people who were so vocal about Muslim and extreme left-wing antisemitism are faced with such right-wing antisemitism, they choose not to condemn but rather to minimize or exculpate—much in the same way that they criticize the Left for treating antisemitism within their own ranks and among immigrants. The Livingstone formulation has even been reversed, to deny any antisemitism on the grounds that the accused support Israel. In other words, the hatred of Jews as an idea is almost universally repugnant in the West, but most politicians and intellectuals will speak out against it in practice only if it is politically expedient and serves their own ideological goals. The Jews, in the meantime, are left between the Scylla and Charybdis of two forms of antisemitism with very few true allies. At such a time, a volume like this is more relevant than ever.

THE OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK This book is composed of chapters on various aspects of antisemitism today, offering concentrated, in-depth analyses of situations and phenomena touched on above. Each chapter forms a piece in a large mosaic giving a bigger picture, illustrating the state of affairs in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first chapter, written by Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi, offers a sociological analysis of the phenomenon of contemporary antisemitism in Europe. This chapter studies eight European countries, investigating how the level of antisemitism as registered in national populations relates to the perception of antisemitism by the Jewish population in the same country. Furthermore, Dencik and Marosi empirically identify distinct aspects of antisemitism, deconstructing the concept of antisemitism and breaking it up into three kinds of objectively differently based and composed antisemitisms: classic antisemitism, Israel-derived antisemitism, and Enlightenment-based antisemitism. This chapter also elaborates on some more general implications for the understanding of the character of antisemitism in contemporary Europe, and in light of that, it presents some perspectives on the development of the three distinct antisemitisms in contemporary Europe. In her chapter, Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska illustrates the process facing post-communist countries that are forced to revise their history of the Holocaust, as mentioned above. She analyzes how, after 1989, post-communist countries such as Poland and Moldova have been faced with the challenge of

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reinventing their national identity and rewriting their master narratives, shifting from a communist one to an ethnic-patriotic one. In this context, the fate of local Jews and the actions of Poles and Moldovans during the Holocaust have repeatedly proven difficult or even impossible to incorporate into the new national narrative. As a result, Holocaust denial in various forms initially gained ground in post-communist countries, since denying the Holocaust or blaming it on someone else, even on the Jews themselves, was the easiest way to strengthen national identities. In later years, however, Polish and Moldovan paths toward re-definition of self have taken different paths. At least in part, this can be explained as a product of Poland’s incorporation in the European unification project, while Moldova remains in limbo, in terms of both identity and politics—between the Soviet Union and Europe, between the past and the future. Irena Cantorovich also analyzes the tension between different, indeed clashing, historical narratives in Eastern Europe. During World War II, members of the local population in German-occupied territories collaborated with the occupiers, including in the implementation of the Final Solution. These collaborators were motivated by antisemitism, greed, and career advancement, among other factors. In the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, there was an additional motive: the ambition to regain independence, fueled by hatred of the Soviets who had taken it. Ukrainian nationalists considered all means legitimate, even collaborating with the Germans in the murder of Jews, in order to persuade the Germans to help reestablish an independent Ukraine. However, even when those who called themselves freedom fighters and partisans realized that the Germans had no intention of fulfilling their dream, they did not cease their involvement in the Holocaust, continuing to regard Jews as hated representatives of the Soviets. To this day those Ukrainians and their supporters see them as heroes and patriots who risked their lives for the independence of their country. On the other hand, in Jewish memory, they are perceived as collaborators and murderers. Cantorovich discusses attitudes of Ukrainian nationalists toward the Jews during the war and contemporary attempts to honor collaborators in Ukraine as well as abroad. Michael Whine maps the rise of the radical Right in Europe and ­analyzes its attitude to the Jewish population. Whine is careful to note that the radical Right should be differentiated from other trends on the far right. The radical Right includes the emerging anti-immigrant populist and social movements, which are racist, are sometimes antisemitic, and may have neoNazi origins, but which may also have rejected them. The extreme Right

Mikael Shainkman

includes neo-Nazis, neo-Nazi skinheads, autonomous nationalists, and Third Positionists, the majority of whom have adopted antidemocratic and sometimes violent means to pursue their ideologies. The following chapter, written by Michal Navoth, offers an illustration of the development in one of the European countries where the extreme Right has had the largest electoral successes in the last years—namely, Greece. In the wake of the deep economic crisis and the tough austerity measures in Greece, a previously insignificant and marginal movement, the Golden Dawn, has grown to become the country’s third-largest party. It stands strong in the polls and elections despite increasing evidence of its involvement in organized violent crimes and its unabashed racist, antisemitic, and neo-Nazi ideology. The voters still flock to the party, since it has managed to capitalize on the anger of the public against the austerity measures—not least by carrying out highly ­publicized charity work “for Greeks only.” The Golden Dawn’s ability to achieve and consolidate its present prominent position, despite an u­ nprecedented crackdown undertaken by the Greek authorities since mid-September 2013, is worrisome from the perspective of its potential long-term influence on Greek society. The dramatic rise in antisemitic incidents in the first years of the twentyfirst century led to attempts to combat resurging antisemitism in Europe. A part of this effort was to find a universally agreed-upon definition of what antisemitism is. In her chapter, Dina Porat chronicles the difficulty in navigating academic, cultural, and political concerns in the attempts to develop such a definition. On January 28, 2005, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, then based in Vienna, reached a definition of antisemitism that was later prominently referred to at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Cordoba Conference in June of that year. Since then, many other bodies have advocated its use. The one-page “Working Definition of Antisemitism” evolved as a result of the concerted efforts of a large number of institutes and individual experts. Those efforts lasted for two years (2003–2004), during which time many questions were elaborated regarding both the principles and parameters of the definition. Nonetheless, and despite the definition’s proven usefulness in the field, it came under attack. Its detractors seemed to be especially averse to the recognition of the fact that criticism of Israel could sometimes take antisemitic forms. In his chapter, Günther Jikeli offers an overview of the complex position of Muslim immigrants in Europe today. As noted above, many contemporary antisemitic incidents emanate from this population, but at the same time, Muslim communities in Europe face a number of socioeconomic

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challenges, as well as discrimination, themselves. One in three Muslims in the European Union has suffered discrimination, and Muslim organizations point to mounting fears and anger among the communities about the rise of antiMuslim sentiments. Simultaneously, many young Muslims in Europe exhibit antisemitic attitudes. While polls reveal that only a minority of European Muslims endorse antisemitic views, they also show that the level of antisemitism is significantly higher among Muslims than among non-Muslims. The genesis of antisemitic views cannot be reduced to a single factor. Ethnic or religious identity and interpretations of Islam are significant for some. Here, the use of the term Muslim antisemitism is apt. Others relate their hostility toward Jews to their hatred of the State of Israel. Many use classic antisemitic attitudes that are also widespread in mainstream European society. While discrimination and exclusion of Muslims in Europe is still a reality, this does not seem to be a relevant factor influencing antisemitic attitudes. The next several chapters explore what Dencik and Marosi call Israelrelated antisemitism in Europe and the difficulty in combating it. Julia Edthofer takes as her starting point the Israel-Gaza conflict of 2014 and explores what the reactions to it can say about Austrian society. The so-called Operation Protective Edge brought about a massive outburst of anti-Israeli protest and was followed by a marked rise of antisemitic incidents all over Europe, including in Austria. Many rallies were organized by Muslim organizations or attended by a considerable number of people identifying as Muslims, which sparked media discussions about the rise of an Islamized antisemitism and social tensions within Europe’s multicultural migrant societies. However, an analysis of the debates shows that rather than tackling the problem, the events were often either used for anti-Muslim arguments and a deflection of Austrian antisemitism or downplayed as a supposedly “anti-racist” reaction to the anti-­Muslim bias in the media coverage. This chapter seeks to illustrate such ambivalent entanglements of antisemitic and anti-Muslim resentment. It is argued that notwithstanding the extensive discussions about the necessity to fight “Muslim antisemitism,” the core of new antisemitism (namely, the “colonial framing” of the Israeli state) is a view widely shared not only by Muslim actors but also by the Far Right, the Far Left, and—albeit lacking the conspiracy-theory component—even mainstream Austrian society. Kristin Wagrell also uses Operation Protective Edge in 2014 as the basis for her study of antisemitism in the campaign for the Swedish general elections that same year. Several candidates from various parties were caught making antisemitic statements or comments on Facebook and in other contexts.

Mikael Shainkman

Even though these candidates were eventually forced to resign and drop out of the electoral race, the complacency and apologetic attitude that met most of them speaks to a deeper problem in the Swedish political discourse. There is a widespread inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to recognize antisemitism when it does not present itself in the form of neo-Nazism. This became even clearer when contrasted with the shock and condemnation that met the sweeping electoral gains of the extreme right-wing Sweden Democrats. As long as self-avowed anti-racists allow themselves and others to employ antisemitic language, especially in the name of defense of the downtrodden, it won’t be possible to combat the problem of antisemitism in any meaningful way. In his chapter, Mathan Ravid stays in Sweden, but he shifts the focus away from politics to the media. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Mohamed Omar was a respected poet, cultural journalist, and intellectual. In January 2009, however, he became Sweden’s most outspoken supporter of Islamist movements, as well as the Iranian and Syrian regimes. His hate propaganda was directed almost entirely against Israel, Zionism, and the Jewish people in general, focusing on alleged Jewish-Zionist conspiracies and Holocaust denial. Omar was successful in creating a platform for those sharing his radical views, regardless of political affiliation, demonstrating how antisemitism can serve as a bridge between different and even opposing ideological groups: Islamist, radical Left, and Islamophobic extreme Right. Most mainstream Swedish media outlets and organizations soon stopped giving Omar a platform. However, it took a while for some journalists on the left, notably from the Social Democratic Aftonbladet (Sweden’s largest tabloid), to label Omar an antisemite and to marginalize him. It was mainly his association with the Swedish extreme Right that made them change their attitude. Omar’s case is an example of how self-­proclaimed “critics of Israel” without clear or outspoken links to the extreme Right, who present their notions of “Jewish power and manipulations” in anti-Zionist terminology, are not always condemned or even criticized. Andre Oboler also focuses on the public discourse and discusses how the terror attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris on January 7, 2015, sparked a debate on freedom of speech versus freedom of religion. These two basic values of a democratic society may seem to be at odds, but only when failing to make the distinction between attacks on a religion and attacks on people belonging to that religion. Increased clarity on how to define freedom of religion, freedom from religion, and hate speech on racial or ­religious grounds will serve to create a consistent approach in combating intolerance in an increasingly multicultural society.

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Liora Hendelman-Baavur also deals with the media, albeit media working under other conditions. In her chapter, she analyzes how, during his two terms as president of Iran (2005–13), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad went further than any of his predecessors in making antisemitic declarations and became internationally infamous for negating the veracity of the Holocaust. Ahmadinejad’s statements received much attention from the media and the international community, but the ways in which Iranian media participated in propagating antisemitism and negationism throughout his presidency, especially through the use of the Internet, has not been addressed in any systematic manner. Under Ahmadinejad, antisemitism and negationism became a leitmotif of Iran’s foreign policy, and they were systematically endorsed, sponsored, and disseminated online by the state apparatus as a part of the Islamic Republic’s hybrid anti-Zionist and antisemitic political agenda. Since his election in 2013, President Hassan Rouhani has distanced himself from his predecessor’s rhetoric and has made a U-turn in Iran’s public-diplomacy exploitation of antisemitism and negationism. Nonetheless, most of the antisemitic and negationist material produced in the course of Ahmadinejad’s presidency continues to be available on the Internet and still forms an undisputed part of Iran’s state ideology. The last two chapters focus on the situation in South America. Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner describe how the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, which killed eighty-five people, as well as the long and scandal-ridden investigation into the deadly attack, still cast their shadow over modern Argentinian politics. The bombing and the controversy surrounding the investigation, as well as the death of Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman, played a prominent part in the 2015 presidential election. Even though its effects on the outcome are hard to measure, the so-called Nisman case still served to galvanize the central Jewish institutions on the political scene. Thus, this became the first election in which a Jewish issue appeared prominently in a presidential race. Nonetheless, the Peronists did not respond with the kind of antisemitic smear campaigns that have been launched in other Latin American countries, most notably Venezuela. A major reason for this may actually be the memory of the AMIA bombing and other instances of persecution of Jews in Argentina during the country’s long years of dictatorship, an important element in the country’s human rights movement. In the last chapter, Lidia Lerner describes how the situation for Jews in Venezuela gradually deteriorated following the election of Hugo Chávez as president. While not concealing their sometimes virulent anti-Zionist rhetoric, Chávez and his government have denied charges of antisemitism.

Mikael Shainkman

However, recent years have witnessed a rise in antisemitic manifestations, including vandalism, media attacks, caricatures and physical attacks on Venezuelan Jewish institutions. The roots of Chávez’s antisemitism, and that of his followers, are various: racist, political, opportunistic and, in some cases, religious. Chávez was strongly influenced by the late Norberto Ceresole, an ultra-nationalist Argentinean antisemite and Holocaust denier, who served as his adviser and mentor from 1994. Chávez’s strong links with Iran also play a significant role in his attitude toward Israel and Jews. Following the attempted coup against Chávez in 2002, the level of antisemitism escalated further. Since then, there has been a persistent growth of antisemitic expressions in the speeches and publications of government circles, pro-government organizations, and the Left. The tone is set by Chávez himself, who generally blames the Jews or the Israeli government for perceived historical or contemporary injustices.

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Different Antisemitisms: On Three Distinct Forms of Antisemitism in Contemporary Europe, with a Special Focus on Sweden Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

I

n this chapter, we combine and compare results from two major but ­differently focused cross-national surveys on antisemitism. On the one hand, we have data from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ (FRA) survey of Jews’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in eight EU member states—Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.1 This survey was carried out in the second half of 2012. On the other hand, we use the results from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) survey of attitudes toward Jews, with representative samples of each country’s population, carried out at the end of 2013. This study covers 102 countries all over the world.2 In this chapter we will focus only on the same eight EU countries that were included in the FRA study.3   1 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013).  2 Anti-Defamation League, ADL Global 100: An Anti-Semitism Index (New York: AntiDefamation League, 2014), http://global100.adl.org.   3 The countries were selected by FRA from EU member states. Originally, nine countries were selected for a web-based survey among Jewish residents in the respective countries. Romania, however, had to be excluded from the analysis because its data were too weak for statistical analysis.

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Between July 2013 and February 2014, the ADL carried out a survey of attitudes toward Jews with representative samples in 102 countries around the world. The respondents were presented with the following eleven propositions about Jews and asked to indicate whether they found the suggested proposition “probably true” or “probably false.”   1. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [the country they live in].   2. Jews have too much power in the business world.   3. Jews have too much power in international financial markets.   4. Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind.   5. Jews have too much control over global affairs.   6. People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.   7. Jews think they are better than other people.   8. Jews have too much control over the United States government.   9. Jews have too much control over the global media. 10. Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust. 11. Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars. An index was constructed implying that respondents who answered that at least six of the eleven statements are “probably true” are defined to harbor antisemitic attitudes. It should be noted that we find the ADL survey’s criteria for judging a respondent as antisemitic to be quite crude. On the one hand, you may of course be antisemitic even if you find just five or even one of the statements probably true, and on the other hand, there might be reasons other than antisemitism to find it “probably true” that, for example, “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.” We also note that at least nine of the eleven items the respondents were asked to take a stand on are part of what could be labeled classic antisemitic stereotypes. In any case, results of the ADL survey give some indication of how the general population in a given country regards Jews. According to the index used, the level of antisemitism in each of eight European countries we are studying is distributed as in Figure 1. As can be seen, Hungary and France harbor the largest segment of what subsequently will be labeled classic antisemites, whereas the United Kingdom

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 1.  Proportion of the population in the country h­ arboring antisemitic attitudes, according to the ADL index.

and Sweden have the smallest proportion of this kind of antisemites. In fact, Sweden ranks number 100 of the 102 investigated countries all over the world—only in Laos and the Philippines do smaller proportions of the country’s population harbor classic antisemitic stereotypes than in Sweden, according to this ADL survey. Unlike the ADL survey, the FRA survey was directed exclusively to persons in eight EU member states who regard themselves as being in some sense Jewish. They were asked several different questions about their experiences of antisemitism in their country of residence and about how they as Jews perceive antisemitism. On the question of how big a problem they consider antisemitism to be in their country of residence, these Jewish respondents answered as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.  The FRA survey: Proportion of Jews perceiving antisemitism as a problem in their country. (n = 5,846)

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We can note that more than three-quarters of the Jews in three of the countries, Hungary, France, and Belgium, find antisemitism in their country to be a very big or a fairly big problem. The Jews in the United Kingdom and Latvia do so to a lesser extent. It is, however, noteworthy that 20 percent of the Jewish respondents in Sweden perceive antisemitism to be a very big problem. In this context, we should bear in mind that the city of Malmö, the third-largest Swedish city, harboring one of Sweden’s three Jewish communities, has become infamous worldwide for an extraordinary number of antisemitic incidents in the years preceding the present study. In further analysis, we have found that the perception of antisemitism as a very big problem in Sweden is, to a great extent, due to what has occurred in Malmö, where approximately 4 percent of the Jewish respondents in Sweden reside.

ATTITUDES OF ANTISEMITISM VERSUS THE PERCEPTION OF ANTISEMITISM Is there a correspondence between the Jews’ experiences and perceptions of antisemitism and the proportion of antisemites in the population of the ­country where they live? Comparing the two measures we have presented so far—namely, the level of (classic) antisemitism in the general population and the degree to which the Jews in the same country perceive antisemitism as a problem in their c­ ountry— we achieve the picture presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3.  Proportion of the ­population harboring ­antisemitic stereotypes compared to the proportion of Jews perceiving antisemitism as a problem in their country.

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

What is most remarkable in this picture is the large discrepancies in the United Kingdom and Sweden between the proportion of the population ­harboring classic antisemitic attitudes and the Jews’ perception of antisemitism as a problem in the country. In the two most antisemitic countries according to the ADL measure, Hungary and France, the Jews perceive antisemitism as a problem by about a factor of two, as compared to the level of antisemitism registered in the general population of the country, whereas the Jews in the United Kingdom do so by approximately a factor of six, and the Jews in Sweden, the country harboring the smallest percentage of classic antisemites, do so by a factor of fifteen. This may be further illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4.  Proportion of the population harboring antisemitic stereotypes divided by the proportion of Jews experiencing antisemitism as a problem in their country.

In light of this, we ask, if the presence of classic antisemitic stereotypes is not what alerts the Jews in Sweden to find antisemitism to be a problem in their country, are the Jews there and in the United Kingdom just more sensitive or paranoid about antisemitism? Or are there other elements, not measured by the ADL index, that Jews associate with the presence of antisemitism in these societies? To find out about this, we ask whether there are any differences in the extent to which the Jews of the countries have heard a non-Jewish person in the country utter what they perceive as an antisemitic comment. If there are no significant differences between the countries in this respect, this might indicate that there are statements other than the classic antisemitic ones that are perceived as “antisemitic” by the Jews in the country. Figure 5 is a picture of the percentage of Jewish respondents in the eight investigated countries who personally within the last twelve months have heard a non-Jewish person utter an antisemitic comment.

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Figure 5.  The FRA survey: The percentage of Jewish respondents who personally within the last 12 months have heard a non-Jewish person utter antisemitic comments. (n = 5,846)

It is noteworthy here that a vast majority in all eight countries—and more than nine out of ten of the Jewish respondents in six countries—have heard an antisemitic comment within the last twelve months. The figure in Sweden and the United Kingdom is slightly lower than in the other countries but still a large majority. The slight difference between the eight countries with respect to having heard an antisemitic comment is, however, distinct from the vast difference between the United Kingdom and Sweden on the one hand, and the other countries investigated in this study on the other, when it comes to the proportion of antisemites in the country (cf. Figure 1). There are two possible reasons for this: The criterion for qualifying as an antisemite according to the ADL survey is to agree to at least six of the eleven statements listed above. Thus, the criterion overshadows the fact that people who score below that level—for example, by agreeing to five or four of the eleven statements—may also have uttered such an antisemitic statement, and hence caused the Jews around them to hear one. Another, and in a way more challenging, reason is that something other than classic antisemitism can also be perceived as antisemitism by the Jews in the eight countries. This may particularly be the case in the United Kingdom and Sweden. This is illustrated in Figure 6. We have noted remarkable discrepancies between the registered level of classic antisemitism in the general population and the degree to which Jews in the same country perceive or experience “something antisemitic.” Are there also similar discrepancies between particular antisemitic attitudes in the general population and the degree to which the Jews of the country have actually been confronted with such attitudes?

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 6.  Proportion of the population harboring antisemitic stereotypes divided by the proportion of Jews who within the last 12 months have heard a non-Jewish person utter antisemitic comments.

We will investigate this by scrutinizing the relation between the registered frequency in the population of some of the singular components of classic antisemitism and the degree to which the Jews in the country report that they have actually experienced them. Thus, we compare how often a Jew has heard that “Jews have too much power in the country” with the degree to which people in the general population of the country find such a statement to be “probably true.” This is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7.  FRA data on how often a Jew has heard non-Jewish people suggest that “Jews have too much power in one’s country” compared to ADL data on the degree to which the general population in the country believes that “Jews have too much power.”

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The most striking element of this picture is the discrepancy in Sweden and the United Kingdom between the degree to which this stereotype is present in the population on the one hand, and on the other, how often the Jews in the country have heard someone utter such a statement. The same tendency also appears when it comes to the proposition that “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.” In comparing how often a Jew has heard this statement with the degree to which people in the general population of the country find it “probably true” that “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust,” the picture shown in Figure 8 emerges.

Figure 8.  FRA data on how often a Jew has heard non-Jewish people suggest that “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood” compared to ADL data on the degree to which the general population in the country believes that “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.”

Again, we can notice a striking discrepancy with respect to the two c­ olumns when it comes to Sweden and the United Kingdom. One might suspect that there is a consistent pattern with respect to this. To find out about that, we examine one of the classic antisemitic items—namely, that

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 9.  FRA data on how often a Jew has heard non-Jewish people suggest that “Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis” compared to ADL data on the degree to which the general population in the country believes that “Jews have too much power in the business world.”

“Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis.” This is shown in Figure 9. Comparing the Jews’ subjective perceptions with the measure of the ­frequency of people in the general population in the respective countries who think it is probably true that “Jews have too much power in the business world,” the same pattern of discrepancy emerges, albeit less drastically. In this connection, we may also note that there is a correlation between the extent to which the general population in a country harbors the viewpoint that “Jews have too much power in the business world” and the proportion of Jews in the country who have heard that “Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis.” Again, Sweden diverges from this general pattern by a somewhat larger discrepancy between the two measures, mainly consisting of a considerably lower presence of the latter stereotype in their population (9 percent). Still, almost four out of ten Jews in Sweden claim to have come across such an attitude within the last twelve months. Do Jews in Sweden consistently confront antisemitic statements to a lesser extent than Jews in other European countries? With respect to the suggestion that “the Holocaust is a myth,” it seems so. See Figure 10.

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Figure 10.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, how often have you personally heard non-Jewish people in your country suggest that the Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerted? (n = 5,846)

This also holds true when it comes to the proposition that “the interests of Jews in our country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population.” See Figure 11.

Figure 11.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, how often have you personally heard non-Jewish people in your country suggest tha the interests of Jews in your country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population? (n = 5,846)

And even more so when the suggestion is that “Jews are not capable of integration into your society.” See Figure 12.

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 12.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, how often have you personally heard or seen non-Jewish people in your country suggest that Jews are not capable of integrating into your society? (n = 5,846)

What may explain this pattern? In order to find out, we need to investigate to what degree the Jews in the respective countries feel that they belong to the country they live in. In doing so, we find an opposite pattern to what we have found so far. Jews in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France feel strong ties to the country they live in, whereas Jews in Germany and Latvia do so to a much lesser extent. The last observation is readily explainable by the fact that a large number of Jews in Germany and Latvia are fairly recent immigrants from Russia. But in Sweden, many of the Jews living there are Holocaust or post-Holocaust immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, and Sweden is actually the only European country where there are considerably more Jews today than before the Holocaust. How is it that Jews in Sweden feel stronger ties to the country they live in than Jews in any of the other European countries? When we take into account whether the respondents were born in the country they live in, the picture becomes even clearer. These relations are shown in Figure 13. Almost one-third of the Jewish respondents in Sweden were not born in the country; still, almost 85 percent of them say they feel a strong sense of belonging to the country. The same holds for France. There are, however, differing backgrounds for the immigrant Jews’ sense of belonging to France and Sweden, respectively. The majority of Jewish immigrants to France come from the former French colonies in the French-speaking Maghreb. Most of them had already identified as French while they were

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Figure 13.  The FRA survey: How many of the Jewish respondents feel that they belong to the country they live in, compared to whether they are born in the country or not? (n = 5,846)

there, which of course facilitated their feeling of belonging to France after actually moving there. The Swedish case is radically different. Most Jewish immigrants to Sweden come from Eastern and Central Europe; they didn’t speak Swedish and had no previous identification with anything Swedish. Many were survivors of the Holocaust; others came a little later from communist-dominated Eastern and Central European countries. For many in both of these groups, being accepted and being given living opportunities in the well-developed Swedish welfare state was somewhat like arriving in the promised land. Many of them did well in Sweden and approved of identifying as Swedes. In Hungary the relation is reversed: there, almost all the Jews, 95 percent of them, were born in the country, but only a little over 70 percent feel they belong to the country. Latvia is also a special case—while over 70 percent of the Jews there were born in the country, only 40 percent of them feel they belong to contemporary Latvia. If people do not feel they belong to their country of residence, it may depend on their being in some sense regarded as “strangers” by the other inhabitants of the country. By combining three measures—namely, the extent to which people in the country hold the opinion that “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in,” that “the interests of the Jews are very different from the interests of the rest of the population,” and that “Jews are not capable of integration into the country”—we may achieve a picture of

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 14.  How “strange” Jews are perceived to be in the country where they live. (n = 5,846)

the degree to which Jews are perceived as strangers in the country they live in. See Figure 14. We note that Hungary and Sweden are radical opposites in this respect. On all three measures we have included as indicators of “strangeness” whether Jews are seen as capable of integration into the country, whether they are regarded as having different interests than the general population of the c­ ountry, and whether they are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in. The population of Hungary scores higher on these measures than any of the other European countries, and on all of them the population of Sweden scores lower than any of the other countries. In Hungary, where almost all Jews living there were born in-country, Jews are still seen as “strangers” by approximately twothirds of the population, whereas in Sweden, where a large portion of the Jews are immigrants or children of immigrants, the Jews are regarded as a “strange” element in the Swedish society by only around a quarter of the Swedish population. In this connection, we may also note a correlation that in countries where less of the population holds the view that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in, the Jews living there feel a stronger sense of belonging.

HARASSMENT AND FEAR Jewish respondents in the countries were also asked whether, in the last twelve months, they personally had been verbally insulted or harassed or been physically attacked because they are Jewish. As shown in Figure 15, we surprisingly found that more Jews in Sweden and France than in any of the other investigated European countries claim to have been physically attacked because they are Jews.

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Figure 15.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, have you personally been verbally insulted or harassed, or been physically attacked because you are Jewish? (n = 5,846)

Figure 16.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, have you personally witnessed anyone being verbally insulted or harassed, or being physically attacked because he/ she is Jewish? (n = 5,846)

As displayed in Figure 16, this picture also holds when we ask these Jewish respondents whether they personally have witnessed anyone being attacked physically or verbally for being Jewish. These findings are remarkable in light of the fact that Sweden and France are among the countries where Jews have a stronger sense of belonging than in other countries (cf. Figure 13). How is it that there is a seemingly positive correlation between the Jews’ feeling of belonging to the country and experiences of physical attacks on Jews? One possible reason might be that although they are relatively well integrated in society, they are still regarded by some as a rather alien element in society, which

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is perceived as an ambiguity among those who seek “clarity” and “pure lines.” The phenomenon of “intolerance of ambiguity” is well known in social psychology,4 and it has been scientifically established that the p­ erception of ambiguity triggers aggression among those for whom it is too much of a p­ sychological challenge to harbor ambiguities.5 The fact that a majority of Jews in Germany were well integrated, not to say even assimilated, into the German society up to the Nazi Machtübernahme in 1933 did not prevent them from being targets of harassment at first, and then extermination. Perhaps rather the opposite is true. A relevant question, following the observation that Jews, particularly in Sweden and France, are attacked because they are Jews, is how this impacts them mentally. Will they be afraid? Will they manifest that fear by, for instance, hiding the fact that they are Jewish, and perhaps also by avoiding visiting Jewish sites more than Jews do in the other investigated countries? We asked the Jewish respondents in the investigated countries if they ever avoid publicly wearing, carrying, or displaying items that might help people recognize them as Jews. The extent to which Jews in the eight countries do so is presented in Figure 17.

Figure 17.  The FRA survey: Do you ever avoid wearing, carrying, or displaying things that might help people recognize you as a Jew in public? (n = 4,523)  4 Else Frenkel-Brunswick, “Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable,” Journal of Personality 18 (1948): 108–23; Adrian Furnham and Joseph Marks, “Tolerance of Ambiguity: A Review of the Recent Literature,” Psychology 4, no. 9 (2013): 717–28.   5 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); William F. Stone, Gerda Lederer, and Richard Christie, eds., Strengths and Weaknesses: The Authoritarian Personality Today (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993).

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We find that particularly in Sweden and France, more Jews avoid wearing, carrying, or displaying things that might help people recognize them as Jews in public, which corresponds with the findings concerning experience of physical attacks. We also asked the Jewish respondents, “How often do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because you do not feel safe as a Jew there, or on the way there?” The answers are presented in Figure 18.

Figure 18.  The FRA survey: How often do you avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because you do not feel safe as a Jew there, or on the way there? (n = 5,846)

Not surprisingly, the response pattern to this question is quite similar to the way Jews in the different countries replied to the question about hiding their Jewish symbols in public and approximately corresponds to the degree of physical attacks on Jews in the respective countries.

ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION In this context we should also note that Jews in the United Kingdom, where, as in Sweden and France, Jews also feel that they strongly belong, display a completely different pattern in relation to manifesting fear. The contrasting pattern between Sweden and the United Kingdom is striking. The Swedish data suggest that Swedish Jews both feel that they belong to their country of residence more than Jews do in any of the investigated countries and still avoid displaying their Jewish identity more than Jews do in any of the other countries. The Jews in the United Kingdom also feel that they strongly belong to the country they live in, almost to the same extent as the Jews in Sweden. But in contrast to Jews in Sweden, they do not avoid wearing things that might help people

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recognize them as Jews, nor do they avoid visiting Jewish sites and events because they do not feel safe as Jews there. At the same time, they report having been physically attacked or having witnessed others being physically attacked because of their Jewishness to a lesser extent than in most other c­ ountries in Europe. Why these differences? Perhaps an explanation can be found in the fact that Sweden until recently has been culturally and religiously a very homogeneous society, whereas the United Kingdom has long been a multicultural society where different minorities live in accordance with their own customs and traditions. The different patterns concerning Jews in Sweden and the United Kingdom might be interpreted as expressions of assimilation, as opposed to integration. The Swedish data convey a picture that indicates that Jews in Sweden are subjected to a situation that triggers assimilation, whereas the British data show a picture that might be interpreted as indicating that the Jewish population there benefits from a condition that allows for integration.

THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT: ISRAEL-DERIVED ANTISEMITISM A puzzling question is Jews’ high level of avoiding displaying their Jewish identity in Sweden, where classic antisemitic attitudes are almost absent in the general population, as compared to the relatively lower level of avoidance in Hungary, where antisemitic stereotypes are much more frequent than anywhere else in the investigated EU countries. If the prevalence of classic antisemitic attitudes in the population cannot account for these differences, then one needs to ask what else could explain it. Could it, for instance, have anything to do with the impact of the Israeli-Arab conflict in their respective countries? To find out, we asked our Jewish respondents to what extent the Israeli-Arab conflict affects how safe they feel as Jews in the country they live in. The answers are presented in Figure 19. Besides noting that Jews’ sense of security is affected by the IsraeliArab conflict in Belgium and France to a considerably larger extent than in the other countries, we should note that more than one-third of the Jewish respondents in Sweden state that the Israeli-Arab conflict affects their sense of security “a great deal”—the third-highest level, after Belgium and France—whereas the figure in Hungary is considerably lower, just over 12 percent.

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Figure 19.  The FRA survey: To what extent does the Israeli-Arab conflict impact how safe you feel as a Jewish person in your c­ ountry? (n = 5,846)

As shown below in Figure 20, this discrepancy becomes even more marked when we focus on the tendency to blame Jews in European countries for anything done by the Israeli government. In this context, the relatively recent concept of “new antisemitism” comes to mind. This concept attempts to capture a new form of antisemitism that has developed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This kind of “new antisemitism” manifests itself mainly as opposition to Zionism and the State of Israel. The concept generally posits that much of what purports to be criticism of Israel is, in fact, tantamount to demonization of the State of Israel, and results in attacks on Jews and Jewish symbols outside “the Jewish state” as well.

Figure 20.  The FRA survey: How often do you feel that people in your country accuse or blame you for anything done by the Israeli government because you are Jewish? (n = 5,846)

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Several concerned Jewish scholars and intellectuals have criticized the concept, arguing that it conflates anti-Zionism with antisemitism, defines ­legitimate criticism of Israel too narrowly and demonization too broadly, trivializes the meaning of antisemitism, and exploits antisemitism in order to silence political debate about Israeli actions and policies.6 Although, as we have just demonstrated, many Jews in Europe are, as a matter of fact, often blamed for “anything done by the Israeli government,” we share this critique of the concept of “new antisemitism.” It is too broad-based, its connotations are too wide, and it comprises too much to be useful for our purpose. To capture the phenomenon we have actually observed—that is, that Jews in Europe are attacked, verbally or physically, just because they are Jews, or because of what those who attack them perceive the State of Israel is or does—we need a more precise concept, one that does not include criticism of Israel or of Zionism as such. We will call this particular kind of antisemitism Israel-derived antisemitism. In the context of Figure 20, we notice that in no country do the Jews feel that they are blamed “all the time” for anything done by the Israeli government as much as in Sweden, and in no country other than Latvia (a special case in this study) is the corresponding figure as low as in Hungary. This might indicate that there are different sources for what is perceived as “antisemitism” in the different countries. Now, if what is perceived as manifestations of antisemitism differs, this may also trigger different reactions to such manifestations. What may seem surprising from one understanding of antisemitism may well be adequate as a reaction to other manifestations of other kinds of antisemitism. For instance, Jews differ to some degree between the countries when the question is to what extent they find it antisemitic to criticize Israel. Figure 21 demonstrates that Sweden differs again in this respect from the other countries. Jews in Sweden consider it less definitively antisemitic if a nonJew criticizes Israel than Jews in the other countries, particularly in France and Belgium, do.

  6 Brian Klug, “The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism,” The Nation, February 2004; Brian Klug, “Interrogating ‘New Anti-Semitism,’” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (October 2012): 468–82; Michael Lerner, “There Is No New Anti-Semitism,” Baltimore Chronicle, February 2, 2007; Antony Lehrman, “Jews Attacking Jews,” Haaretz, September 12, 2008.

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Figure 21.  The FRA survey: Would you consider a non-­Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she criticises Israel? (n = 5,846)

Even when the question concerns support of boycotts of Israeli goods and products, the picture remains stable, as shown in Figure 22. Actually, a majority of Jews in all countries would regard a non-Jew suggesting a boycott of Israeli goods to be antisemitic, but Jews in Sweden would do so to a considerably lower extent than in the other investigated countries.

Figure 22.  The FRA survey: Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products? (n = 5,846)

One may wonder why this is so. Could it be that Jews in Sweden are more able than Jews in the other countries to distinguish anti-Zionism from antisemitism? Or is it that Jews in Sweden have internalized the rather hegemonic and frequently voiced anti-Zionist and also anti-Israeli public discourse in their country more than Jews in the other countries? Sweden is so far (as of 2016) the only one of the eight countries that has officially acknowledged Palestine as a state; the present Swedish foreign minister, Margot Wallström, a Social Democrat, has also publicly accused Israel of carrying out extralegal executions of  Palestinians, and so forth.

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In any case, there is no doubt that regardless of their individual stand on Israel, the sense of security and degree of acceptance the Jews feel they have in all eight European countries involved in this study is to a considerable degree affected by events in and around Israel and by the national and international reactions to these events.

“AUFKLÄRUNGSANTISEMITISMUS” Whatever the reason that Jews in Sweden diverge from the way Jews in other European countries regard critique of Israel, this is not the only aspect of anti-Jewish discourse in which the situation in Sweden differs from the general picture in Europe. Figure 23 illustrates that proposals to prohibit core Jewish traditions and practices such as brit mila (circumcision of newborn boys) and shechita (slaughtering of animals according to religious prescriptions) are more often heard in Sweden, the most modernized and secularized country in this study (and perhaps in the world), than in any other country. Interestingly, in Hungary, the country in the study with the largest proportion of citizens holding classic antisemitic attitudes, these kinds of anti-Jewish suggestions are much less heard than in the other investigated countries.

Figure 23.  The FRA survey: In the last 12 months, have you personally heard non-Jewish people suggest that circumcision and traditional Jewish slaughter should not be allowed to take place in your country? (n = 5,846)

Critique of core Jewish practices such as circumcision of baby boys and slaughtering of animals according to certain religious prescriptions is not necessarily based in antisemitic sentiments. Jewish persons may, however,

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in light of their historical experiences of previous antisemitic campaigns and sense of cultural vulnerability in the society they live in, perceive it as such. In the contemporary world, some of this kind of critique of significant Jewish customs appears to be based on modern ideas of children’s rights and concern for the welfare of animals. The French Italian historian Diana Pinto has labeled this form of ­anti-Jewish attitudes and critique Aufklärungsantisemitismus— that is, basically an Enlightenment-based critique of traditional Jewish practices. As shown in Figure 23, this Enlightenment-inspired attitude is most pronounced and frequent in the most clearly Protestant, modernized, and secularized countries of this study: Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Those who hold such views are often people with liberal political viewpoints. Liberals are usually among those who most consistently defend the idea of religious freedom. In this instance, that idea comes in conflict with another idea, central to the liberal ideology: the individual’s right to make personal decisions, which is reinforced by the equally liberally inspired idea of children’s rights. For some liberals, such as Bengt Westerberg, former leader of the Liberal Party and minister of social affairs in Sweden, the aforementioned viewpoints apparently carry more weight than the idea of religious freedom. For other liberals the reverse is true. Whether or not this kind of anti-Jewish position, voiced from an Enlightenment standpoint, attacking customs like brit mila or shechita should, in fact, be considered another kind of antisemitism remains to be discussed. In relation to this, it might be relevant to reflect on possible differences in the driving forces behind the critique of traditional Jewish customs and classic antisemitic attitudes—and, for that matter, on whether attacks on Jews in European countries that are motivated by perceptions of the policies and actions of the State of Israel have different driving forces than classic antisemitism and Aufklärungsantisemitismus. There might also be interesting and perhaps significant differences with respect to the social, political, intellectual, and cultural backgrounds of people who hold these different kinds of anti-Jewish sentiments. We will return to this question in the conclusion.

PERPETRATORS OF ANTISEMITIC COMMENTS AND ATTACKS What we have identified as classic antisemitic prejudices are, as shown in Figure 24, heard more frequently by Jews in Hungary than by Jews ­anywhere else in Europe. Statements of this kind are rarely heard in the United Kingdom

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 24.  The FRA survey: What percentage of the Jewish population in the country has frequently heard non-Jews in the country utter classic antisemitic prejudices? (n = 5,846)

and generally are heard less in the Protestant and most modernized and secularized countries than in the other investigated countries. Jews in Sweden are confronted by such ideas to a slightly lesser degree than Jews in general in continental Europe. We asked our Jewish respondents how they would describe the person or group that made the antisemitic comments or attacks they had witnessed or experienced. (It should be emphasized that we do not know exactly what the respondents referred to when answering that question. It is the respondent’s subjective opinion of what constitutes antisemitism that counts in this context.) The respondents were asked to categorize the alleged perpetrator as belonging to one of the following four groups: A person with right-wing political views A person with left-wing political views A person with Muslim extremist views A person with Christian extremist views In Figure 25 we see that Jews in Hungary, where the classic form of antisemitism is most predominant, mainly found the antisemitic attackers to be right-wingers. This is also, but to a lesser extent, true for Italy, but much less so in the other investigated countries, and least of all in Sweden, Latvia, and France.

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Figure 25.  The FRA survey: How would you describe the persons who made antisemitic comments? – Someone with right-wing political views. (n = 5,384)

Correspondingly, Jews in Hungary attributed the antisemitic remarks to perpetrators from the left wing of the political spectrum to a considerably lesser extent than Jews in the other countries. In contrast, as shown in Figure 26, a majority of Jews in France, Italy, and Belgium felt that the antisemitic comments they had experienced were carried out by persons with left-wing political views.

Figure 26  The FRA survey: How would you describe the persons who made antisemitic ­comments? – Someone with left-wing political views. (n = 5,384)

The balance or ratio between supposedly left-wing and right-wing perpetrators naturally differs sharply between Hungary and France. Figure 27 demonstrates that their patterns are in fact almost opposite. Interestingly, the left-wing/right-wing ratio is almost equal in Sweden and the United Kingdom, and many other response patterns resemble each other most closely in these two countries. In both countries, the Jewish respondents attribute almost 60 percent more antisemitic comments to left-wingers than to right-wingers.

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi

Figure 27.  The FRA survey: How would you describe the persons who made antisemitic comments? – Someone with left-wing political views or right-wing political views. (n = 5,384)

In the ongoing public debate, Muslims are often targeted as ­perpetrators of terrorist attacks. In many cases such attacks are openly motivated by ­something that has to do with Israel and actions taken by the Israeli state. Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 28, we see that many Jews, particularly in France and Belgium, where some major events of this type took place shortly before our survey, attributed the antisemitic attacks to Muslims. To a lesser extent, this is also the case in the United Kingdom and Sweden (again on almost the same level). On July 7, 2005, some years before our study, a large-

Figure 28.  The FRA survey: How would you describe the persons who made antisemitic comments? – Someone with Muslim extremist views. (n = 5,384)

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scale terrorist attack carried out by Muslim activists took place in London. On December 11, 2010, a failed terrorist attempt, including heavy bombs, took place in central Stockholm. The perpetrator was a Muslim activist who blew himself up but miraculously did not succeed in killing anyone else. It is understandable that such major events may color the perceptions of the Jewish population in these countries. Closer analysis shows that the Swedish figure also relates to more recent events in the city of Malmö—a relatively small city with only a tiny Jewish community but with a relatively large proportion of Muslims originating from the Middle East. Malmö has become infamous for continuous ­harassment of Jews in the city, and for the former mayor Ilmar Reepalu’s expressions of his tacit understanding of that—referring to actions taken by Israel. If  Muslims may be viewed as perpetrators of antisemitic comments because of their disgust for Israel and its policies, Jews might perceive Christians as the source of another kind of religiously inspired anti-Jewish critique. To some extent this seems to be the case. We find that a considerable percentage of comments perceived as antisemitic are attributed to people with a Christian point of view in Italy and Hungary, the two most outspokenly Catholic countries included in this study, as shown in Figure 29. In radically modernized and secularized Sweden, this is much less frequent than in any of the other countries.  

Figure 29.  The FRA survey: How would you describe the persons who made antisemitic comments? – Someone with a Christian extremist view. (n = 5.384)

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So far, we have dealt with people whom Jewish respondents identify as uttering the antisemitic comments they hear or read. A different but related question is whom they perceive to be the perpetrators of physical attacks or threats they have experienced because they are Jewish. We asked those in our sample who indicated that they had experienced physical attacks or threats in the preceding five years, “Thinking about the incident where somebody attacked or threatened you in a way that frightened you because you are Jewish—who did this to you?”7 The respondents were given an opportunity to choose between several kinds of possible perpetrators, among them members of one of the four groups we discussed above—someone with right-wing or left-wing political views or with Christian or Muslim extremist views.8 The results are shown below in Figure 30.

Figure 30.  The FRA survey: Thinking about the incident where somebody attacked or threatened you in a way that frightened you because you are Jewish–who did this to you? (n = 403)

  7 The number of respondents who reported being victims of such attacks was around 7 percent. The number of persons in Latvia who reported such experiences was too few to constitute a base for statistical description.   8 The list of options to choose from read: (1) Family/household member; (2) Neighbor; (3) Colleague, boss, or supervisor at work; (4) Someone from school, college, or university; (5) A customer, client, or patient; (6) Someone with a right-wing political view; (7) Someone with a left-wing political view; (8) Teenager or group of teenagers; (9) Doctor, healthcare worker; (10) Police officer or border guard; (11) Public official (e.g., a civil servant); (12) Private security guard; (13) Someone with a Christian extremist view; (14) Someone with a Muslim extremist view; (15) Someone else (specify); Don’t know. Approximately 50 percent of those who identified perpetrators categorized them as belonging to one of the four categories we have focused on here.

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In all the participating countries, except for Hungary and Italy, the perpetrators of threatening antisemitic physical attacks were mostly identified as persons or groups with Muslim extremist views. In Hungary the group most frequently associated with antisemitic violence was right-wing activists, and in Italy both right-wing and left-wing activists were more often seen as perpetrators of antisemitic violence than were Muslim extremists. However, it should also be noted that in all the other countries, persons with Muslim extremist views were seen as perpetrators of antisemitic violence much more than any of the other groups we focused on.9 In this connection, it is also interesting to note the discrepancy between those who were identified as uttering antisemitic comments and those who were identified as perpetrators of antisemitic physical violence and threats. Although when it comes to antisemitic comments, two of the four groups we study here (namely, those with left-wing views and those with Muslim extremist views) are “blamed” for being the source of such comments to more or less the same degree,10 this is far from the case when the issue is physical violence and threats. On the contrary, physical attacks and threats are much more often attributed to those with Muslim extremist views than to any of the other groups we have discussed here. Hence, even if such attacks and threats do not occur frequently, the fact that such acts are perceived as caused by Muslim extremists might constitute a much higher level of fear among Jews in areas where people with Muslim extremist views live (such as Malmö, Sweden) than in areas where antisemitic comments are ubiquitous but where no significant number of people with Muslim extremist views live (such as Hungary). In this context a note of caution is warranted: what has been registered by the FRA study is who is perceived as the persons or groups who have uttered the antisemitic comment or launched the antisemitic attack or threat the responding Jews have experienced. Perceptions are often colored both by rumors circulating in the public debate and by the respondents’ own stereotypes and prejudices. Nevertheless, these perceptions might of course still be accurate, and regardless of whether they are, they constitute a significant sociological fact in and of themselves.   9 Whether the person identified as such is in fact a Muslim extremist we cannot know. 10 In most but not all countries, left-wingers are actually perceived as the source of antisemitic comments somewhat more often than Muslim extremists, and both of these groups are generally identified as such more often than right-wingers and much more often than Christian extremists (except in Hungary and Latvia).

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Our study has led us to distinguish between three different kinds of antisemitism. •• One of them is based on classic antisemitic stereotypes. We refer to this as classic antisemitism. There is a clear racist component in this kind of antisemitism and also a strong element of conspiratorial thinking. •• Another of these antisemitisms consists of accusations and attacks on Jews because they are Jews, and it is motivated by perceptions of Israel and actions taken by the Israeli state. There is a strong political component in this kind of antisemitism, and a certain degree of conspiratorial thinking is also involved here. We have labeled this kind of antisemitism Israel-derived antisemitism. •• A third kind of possible antisemitism is the critique of core Jewish practices. There are often (but probably not only) humanitarian concerns, liberal ideas about the individual’s right to make personal decisions, and concern for the well-being of animals involved in this critique of Jewish traditions. We use the term Aufklärungsantisemitismus to summarize this phenomenon. Figure 31 shows the degree to which the three different antisemitisms are represented in the eight countries included in this study.

Figure 31.  Comparison of different measures and aspects of antisemitism between and within the eight countries of the FRA survey. (n = 5,846)

Each of the three rather distinct antisemitisms we have discerned seems to be based on a particular and underlying “philosophy.” It appears that they are also carried by rather distinct sociological types of persons/

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persecutors. The ways these different forms of antisemitism are manifested publicly also seem to differ significantly. It is probably not too far-fetched to suppose that the psychological driving forces triggering manifestations of these diverging antisemitic positions also differ among their respective persecutors.

Antisemitism and Political Exploitations of Fear What could explain why the Jews in the country with the lowest level of classic antisemitism in the population, Sweden, manifest the highest level of fear and avoidance behavior in manifesting their Jewish identity (cf. Figure 17, and Figure 18)? Two factors appear to be in operation here: One is the fact that Swedish Jews are, like most inhabitants in Sweden, rather indifferent to religious practices and symbols as such. It is not so important for most Jews in Sweden to openly manifest their often very strong Jewish identity by carrying religious symbols, since their Jewish identity can for the most part be described as “ethno-cultural” rather than “religious.”11 With very few individual exceptions, there are no openly Orthodox Jews (in terms of dress code, etc.) in Sweden. Sweden is a highly secularized country, and symbols and manifestations of religious affiliation are not part of daily life in Sweden in any case. The other significant factor in this context is the fact that public critique of Israel is almost ubiquitous in Sweden. Those groups and persons who are prone to Israel-derived antisemitism might find a kind of tacit understanding—however misplaced!—or even legitimization of their attacks on Jews in that framework. At the very least, many Jews in Sweden may harbor that fear. In Sweden, not least in the city of Malmö, perpetrators of Israel-derived antisemitic attacks might have felt that they are somewhat justified, if not excused, by statements by the then leading political power-holder in the city (Ilmar Reepalu, representing the Social Democratic Party). In this connection, it should be noted that actions motivated by Israel-derived antisemitic sentiments tend to manifest themselves in violence and threats to a much greater extent than the other kinds of antisemitism. Consequently, since carrying things that flaunt one’s Jewish affiliation or visiting a synagogue is not important for most Jews in Sweden 11 Lars Dencik, “The Dialectics of Diaspora: On the Art of Being Jewish in the Swedish Modernity,” in A Road to Nowhere: Jewish Experience in Unifying Europe, ed. Julius H. Schoeps and Olaf Glöckner (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 121–50.

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anyway but doing so might trigger attacks based on hostility and anger toward Israel, it might be understandable that many Jews in Sweden tend to avoid manifesting their Jewishness in public—even if they, as we know from other studies,12 for the most part have a quite strong Jewish identity. The purpose of those who attack Jews in Europe because of their hatred for Israel is clearly to arouse fear in the Jewish community living in these countries, and they actually seem to be succeeding. This is also the idea of ISIS (Daesh): one effect of their actions is the “destruction of the gray zone”—that is, to create political polarization and disturb the fabric of civil life—in this case, Jewish civil life. Even if violent attacks are not frequently experienced, the very fact that they have taken place—and that there is a constant threat that they may occur again—is enough to trigger fear. This might be comparable to a pyromaniac operating in a residential area. Most inhabitants in the area, or even neighboring areas, would feel justified in being afraid that the pyromaniac would choose their house for his next attack—even if the likelihood that this would indeed happen is actually low. Nevertheless, probably none of them would claim that the actions taken by the pyromaniac are only the “tip of the iceberg” of an ­underlying “pyromanianism” in society. However, when it comes to Israelderived antisemitic attacks on Jews, certain commentators tend to do so. Such attacks are often—rightly or wrongly—interpreted as the tip of an iceberg indicating an underlying and widespread antisemitism in society. This is fully in line with the ambitions of the antisemitic perpetrators. It facilitates their exploitation of the attacks for their political purposes. However, there are also other political forces that have an interest in exploiting Israel-derived antisemitic attacks, often instigated by certain Arab/ Muslim groups, for their own political purposes. One such political force is the populist anti-Muslim camp in the society. For them it is easy and more than tempting to generalize from single cases and to make claims like “Look! That’s how they are! We cannot have ‘these Muslims’ around in our society!” Another political force interested in generalizing and exploiting fear and antisemitic attacks for its particular political purpose is the Zionist camp: “Look! That’s how it is there (in Sweden/Europe). Antisemitism is ubiquitous

12 Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi, Judiskt Liv i Sverige: Identitet, levnadsvanor och attityder bland medlemmarna i de judiska församlingarna i Sverige vid ingången till 2000-talet (Stockholm: Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige, 2007).

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in these societies. It has just manifested its ugly face again. Jews cannot live there” (implying: move to Israel, make aliyah!). Our question is, is there really an “iceberg of antisemitism” underlying the violent antisemitic attacks that we can indeed observe? Or are we dealing with certain “pyromaniacs” creating fear among the inhabitants, along with certain, but seemingly opposed, political forces that are successfully exploiting such fears to advance their political interests? Either conclusion is in need of empirical evidence to back it up.

Distinctions between the Three Antisemitisms Classic antisemitism—antisemitism based on traditional antisemitic stereotypes about Jews—is most frequent in the Hungarian population, where it is also by far the predominant form of antisemitism. Those who manifest this kind of antisemitism are identified mainly as right-wingers. This kind of antisemitism is primarily manifested in derogatory verbal personal or public remarks and in acts of social discrimination. As can be seen in Figure 31, this kind of antisemitism is present to a considerable degree also in the French population but much less so in the United Kingdom and in Sweden. Israel-derived antisemitism—attacks on Jews emanating from hostility toward the State of Israel or from anger because of actions taken by the Israeli state—is frequently observed by Jews in Belgium, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. Those who carry out such attacks are identified mainly as persons with Muslim extremist views or as left-wingers. This kind of antisemitism is relatively often demonstrated by acts of violence toward Jewish institutions, symbols, and persons. This kind of antisemitism is much less present in the former communist Eastern European countries Hungary and Latvia than in the Western European countries that have absorbed large numbers of Muslim immigrants in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Aufklärungsantisemitismus—the critique of core Jewish practices—and accusations against Jewish representatives and individuals because of it are very frequently heard in Sweden and Germany, and often, but not as intensely, in the United Kingdom and France. To some extent, this kind of critique might actually be a disguised attack on the numerically much more significant Muslim population in the country. Muslims and Jews share the tradition of circumcising their sons—albeit at quite different stages in the boys’ development and by slightly

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different techniques—and slaughtering animals according to similar religious prescriptions. Those who criticize these religiously based traditions are mostly persons who perceive themselves as “progressive,” liberal, and left-wing oriented. The critique is usually presented as comments in the public debate and sometimes takes the shape of proposing legal prohibition of the Jewish practices in question. As can be seen in Figure 31, the three forms of antisemitism are present today in various degrees in the countries included in this study. In Belgium and France, all three forms exist on a fairly high level, whereas in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the kind of anti-Jewish sentiments that dominate the picture, Aufklärungsantisemitismus, should perhaps not be counted as proper antisemitism, even if it is, of course, clearly anti-Jewish. Many of those who advocate that position do not share the values and attitudes of those who manifest the two other kinds of antisemitism. There might, of course, be persons who share all three sets of antisemitic attitudes. The popular idea that it is “the same old antisemitism” that again and again pops up and “shows its ugly face” does not, however, find support in our study. It is more likely that there are actually three distinct antisemitisms in play. Of course, a number of persons might at the same time, for example, hold classic antisemitic stereotypes, be hostile toward Israel, and be in favor of prohibiting core Jewish customs such as circumcision and the manufacture of kosher meat products. However, our data do not suggest that there should be a significant correlation between them; rather, they suggest that these antisemitisms are inspired by different underlying “philosophies,” carried by different social groups, and manifested in different ways.

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Holocaust Memory and Holocaust Revisionism in Poland and Moldova: A Comparison Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska

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his chapter will focus on some aspects of the debate over Holocaust memory and its link to national identity in two post-communist countries, Poland and Moldova, after 1989. Although their historical, political, and social contexts and factors differ, both countries have a similar, albeit not identical, communist legacy, and both countries had to accept “inconvenient” truths, such as participation of members of one’s own nation in the Holocaust, while building and rebuilding their new post-communist national identities during the period of social and political transformation. While in the West the issue of the Holocaust has been increasingly discussed since the 1970s, in Eastern Europe it became a new challenge after the fall of the communist system. There, reexamining the past was accompanied by victimhood rivalries and Holocaust denial, which appeared in both Poland and Moldova. There are several forms of Holocaust denial or Holocaust revisionism in Eastern Europe. Historian Michael Shafir defines three of them: “outright,” “deflective,” and “selective” negation.1 While outright denial rejects the very historical veracity of the Holocaust, the phenomenon of deflective negation focuses on historical enemies or national minorities. Here deniers might ­transfer the blame to others, as well as use positive self-presentation, trivialization and mitigation of the seriousness of the other’s negative behavior, and 1 Michael Shafir, Between Denial and Comparative Trivialization: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe ( Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 2004), 52.

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justification of the genocide.2 Holocaust deniers often transfer the blame to the Jews themselves—for example, by accusing them of being loyal to the communist regimes.3 The most widespread type of Holocaust denial in Eastern Europe is selective negation. Its advocates “do not deny the Holocaust as having taken place elsewhere, but exclude any participation of members of one’s own nation or seriously minimize it.”4 Deborah Lipstadt refers to “hardcore” and “softcore” Holocaust denial.5 Hardcore denial refutes the very existence of the Holocaust. Softcore denial includes all types of minimization and trivialization, and it is more difficult to recognize and to counteract. In order to understand how various types of Holocaust denial found roots in Poland and Moldova, it is necessary to examine their historical background and the way collective memory has been constructed in these countries. Before the Second World War, Jews comprised a significant percentage of the populations in both Poland and Moldova. More than three m ­ illion Jews lived in Poland before the Second World War, almost 10 percent of the total population at that time, and in 1930 there were 205,000 Jews (7 percent of the total population) in Bessarabia (Moldova).6 The vast majority of these Jews were killed in the Holocaust, and today both countries have very small Jewish populations. According to the last census, from 2004, the total number of Jews in Moldova is 3,509 out of a total population of 3.5 million. Unofficial figures vary—up to 20,000, according to Jewish organizations.7 In the last census in Poland, taken in 2011, 7,508 individuals declared that their first or second identity was Jewish, out of a total population of 38.5 million.8

 2 Ibid.  3 Ibid.; Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska, How to Understand and Confront Holocaust Denial, United for Intercultural Action, thematic leaflet no. 2, 2007.  4 Shafir, Between Denial, 52.   5 Amy Klein, “Denying the Deniers: Q & A with Deborah Lipstadt,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 19, 2009.   6 Clara Jignea, Yakov Kopansky, and Semion Shoikhet, “The Jews of Moldova,” in Jewish Roots in Ukraine and Moldova: Pages from the Past and Archival Inventories, ed. Miriam Weiner (New York: Routes to Roots, 1999), 395–400.   7 Igor Safonov, “Evrei v Moldove: 500 let vmeste,” Press obozrenie, April 15, 2011; “Skol’ko nas,” Dorledor, April 15, 2011.   8 Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Ludność: Stan i Struktura Demograficzna-spoleczna; Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2013).

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COLLECTIVE MEMORY In Poland, as sociologist Joanna Michlic notes, collective memory of the Second World War includes a wide range of complex issues. In this context she notes that “among all the dark sides of Poland’s war past, Polish-Jewish relations seem to be the most difficult to process in the Polish collective memory.”9 The image of the Poles as the main victims of Nazism is still deeply rooted and widespread in Polish national memory, and it continues to dominate Polish society. During communism Jews were not regarded as the group that suffered the most during the Second World War—an opinion that still might be met in the Polish public discourse. It is generally believed that a majority of Poles helped Jews during the war. Here I would like to refer to my own experience as an education specialist and guide at the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews. In light of my firsthand observations while guiding various Polish groups through the core exhibit and its Holocaust gallery since its opening in October 2014, I have often noticed remarks and questions from visitors about Polish Righteous Among the Nations. In this context some visitors usually ask why the topic is not explored enough in the gallery, as Poland has the largest number of Righteous Among the Nations (an example of banalization and instrumentalization of symbols— the Righteous Among the Nations become banalized symbols of Polish patriotism).10 In their opinion, the Polish help to Jews should be stressed the most. In light of my firsthand observations, I can assume that the part of the Holocaust gallery where different attitudes among non-Jewish Poles toward the fate of Polish Jewry, attitudes ranging from hostility and passivity to rescue efforts, is the most sensitive one for Polish visitors.11 Like Poland, Moldova was ruled by communists in the decades following the Second World War; moreover, Moldova was an integral part of the Soviet   9 Joanna Michlic, Coming to Terms with the “Dark Past”: The Polish Debate about the Jedwabne Massacre ( Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 2002), 3. 10 For more information about politicization and banalization of the Polish Righteous Among the Nations, see Jan Grabowski and Dariusz Libionka, “Bezdroża polityki historycznej: Wokół Markowej, czyli o czym nie mówi Muzeum Polaków Ratujących Żydów podczas II Wojny Światowej im. Rodziny Ulmów” [Historical policy gone astray: What the Ulma Family Museum of Poles Saving Jews in World War II fails to discuss], Zagłada. Studia i Materiały [Holocaust studies and materials; Polish Center for Holocaust Research], no. 12 (2016): 619–42. 11 For more, see Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska, “Visitor Reactions to the Holocaust Gallery at the POLIN Museum,” Holocaust Studies and Materials, no. 12 (Fall 2016): 659–78.

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Union, sharing the narrative of the Second World War and absorbing attitudes toward the Jewish tragedy that was common in all the Soviet republics, a ­central feature of which was not to see Jews as a separate victim. There was also a feature of wartime conditions that was specific to Moldova. During the war Moldova was occupied by the Romanian army of Ion Antonescu, who was Hitler’s ally, and the Romanian army along with Nazi Germany was the perpetrator of the Holocaust on what was then Romanian (but now Moldovan) territory. According to American historian of Moldovan origin Vladimir Solonari, “at least 130 thousand Jews from Transnistria were liquidated by the Romanians in 1941–1944, which brings the whole number of perished Jews to about 250 thousand. This makes Transnistria one of the worst sites of the Holocaust in the whole of Europe, and Romania the second only to Germany in terms of its ‘contribution’ to that tragedy.”12 Generally speaking, in the post-communist countries after 1989, everything that had been forbidden for decades entered the public discourse. Michlic describes this phenomenon as “an explosion of different memories after 1989.”13 She divided the years that followed the fall of communism into two periods that underscore the differences between various countries in the region; the variances between Poland and Moldova are significant. In Poland, as well as in other post-communist countries, the focus in the first part of the period from 1989 to the mid-late 1990s can be characterized as “ethno-nationalistic,” discussion dominated by a monolithic ethnic perspective of the world that excluded the memory of local Jews and other national and ethnic minorities.14 During this period of unbridled nationalism, the “center of gravity” for Holocaust deniers, who faced increasing delegitimization in the West, shifted to Eastern Europe symbolically or physically. Their writings began to be ­translated and published in Eastern Europe, and some of them even moved to live in Eastern Europe, where they enjoyed an audience and esteem. One example is the Swiss Holocaust denier Jürgen Graf, who moved to Belarus and Russia. It was a period when one grand narrative was replaced by many different narratives, providing an opening not only for the positive changes but also for the different kinds of historical denial. As Rafal Pankowski writes wryly, “In just five years ‘historical revisionism’ in Poland has come a long way, from 12 Vladimir Solonari, “From Silence to Justification? Moldovan Historians on the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Transnistrian Jews,” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 3 (2002): 435. 13 Joanna Michlic, “Przerwane milczenie: O pamięci Zagłady w postkomunistycznej Europie,” Miesięcznik Znak, no. 685 (2012): 28. 14 Ibid.

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a lunatic fringe to the right-wing academic establishment.”15 The first revisionist articles appeared already in 1994 and 1995 in the extreme right-wing magazine Szczerbiec (The Sword), the house organ of the National Revival of Poland, a group that claims to be the heir and successor of the violently antisemitic interwar groups. The magazine, for example, republishes articles by David Irving and other internationally known Holocaust deniers and maintains a strong connection with the US-based Polish Historical Institute, which was already engaged in denial of the pogrom in Kielce, for instance.16 Another example is Dariusz Ratajczak, a lecturer at the University of Opole. He became known after publishing his book Dangerous Topics, in which he denied that people were killed with Zyklon B and claimed that Nazis did not have plans for the extermination of the Jews. Following the protests over his book, he was suspended from his university post and subsequently convicted by the court.17 The second part of this period pertains to the mid-late 1990s and early years of the new millennium. Michlic defines this as a pluralistic and civic era, which attempted to incorporate into national memory the Holocaust and other inconvenient events. She notes that it was understood then that the past was more complex than the black-and-white discourse that communist-dominated historiography suggested.18

BETWEEN A JEWISH NARRATIVE AND REMEMBERING THE JEWS With regard to “nostalgia for the multiethnic past” (as Joanna Michlic calls it) in general and the attitude toward the Jewish past in particular, Poland and Moldova are clearly not at the same stage. In this regard Poland has progressed much further than Moldova. Although there is only a tiny Jewish community in Poland, there are two main Jewish magazines (Midrasz in Polish and Słowo Żydowskie/Dos Jidysze Wort in Polish/Yiddish), and most of the readers are non-Jews. In Warsaw, there is an official Jewish theater with plays in Yiddish and an annual Jewish movie festival, and the city of Krakow hosts many Jewish 15 Rafal Pankowski, “From the Lunatic Fringe to Academia: Holocaust Denial in Poland,” in Holocaust Denial: The David Irving Trial and International Revisionism, ed. Kate Tayler (London: Searchlight Educational Trust, 2000), 75. Paradoxically, as in Poland, the phenomenon of Holocaust denial contradicts the idea of Poland suffering the most under Nazis, as writes Piotr Forecki in “Od Shoah do strachu: Spory o polsko-żydowską przeszłość i pamięć w debatach publicznych,” Gazeta Wyborcza, October 12, 2011. 16 Pankowski, “From the Lunatic Fringe,” 76. 17 Sineaeva-Pankowska, How to Understand. 18 Michlic, “Przerwane milczenie,” 28–30.

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events, such as an annual Jewish culture festival. The Museum of the History of Polish Jews, which was officially opened in April 2013, is also a characteristic example. In short, the Poles today are increasingly taking an interest in Jewish culture. In contrast, however, it seems that Moldova is still not among the countries with a growing interest in Jewish culture. Although the Jewish population has made a significant contribution to the country’s economic and social development, the long history of Jewish life in Moldova is generally unknown to contemporary Moldovans. The absence of information about the Jewish past is accompanied by an unwillingness to include Jewish narratives such as the Holocaust in its national history. The fact that there was a ghetto in Chisinau is also mostly unknown to the general population (it is known only to a small group of specialists in the topic).19 There is almost no trace left of the 366 synagogues in Moldova before 1940, 70 of which were in its capital, Chisinau, alone. The public space reveals this disinterest in the Jewish point of view: there are two major/dominant types of monuments in Moldova—Soviet ones, which support the Soviet narrative of the Second World War, and pan-­Romanian nationalistic ones. The Jewish narrative is absent from both. For example, in the heart of the former Chisinau ghetto territory, there is a street named after an infamous Romanian nationalistic poet and minister, Octavian Goga, who introduced antisemitic legislation in interwar Romania and never even visited Moldova. There is a monument to the victims from the Chisinau ghetto, which held between nine and eleven thousand Jews during the war, but it was built by the Association of Former Prisoners of Ghettos and Concentration Camps in Moldova in 1992 without any state support. Its location is not in the center of the city and not as visible as other monuments, and it is known mostly to the Jewish community. Although according to official information, the Holocaust is an optional subject and taught in forty schools, teachers themselves often refuse to discuss the subject with their pupils or talk only of Nazis’ responsibility.20 As historian Dmitry Tartakovsky writes, “In the history textbooks used by most public secondary school students in Moldova, titled The History of the Romanians, very little mention is made of the Holocaust. The texts note only that the Jews, who were accused of supporting the Bolshevik regime, were gathered into camps and ghettos. Romania’s Second World War past is ­generally 19 Interviews conducted in Moldova between 2013 and 2014. 20 Interview with a history teacher from Olanesti, Moldova, December 10, 2015.

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described as one of victimization between Soviet oppression and German betrayal.”21 In regard to Poland, Michlic believes that it is in the last phase of the ­long-term post-communist period. In her opinion the second, “pluralistic,” phase advanced to a high level, characterized by the debate about Jedwabne, among other topics. In 1941, during the first days of Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union, in several small towns in the northeastern Jedwabne region of Poland, several pogroms against Jews were organized by their Polish neighbors encouraged by Nazi propaganda. The fact that the pogroms were implemented by Poles was covered up for many years. In 2001 the Polish American historian Jan Tomasz Gross published his book Neighbors in Polish and English, in which he presented his research about the massacre of sixteen hundred Jews and its Polish perpetrators. The publishing of Gross’s book sparked a heated debate about the role of local populations in the Holocaust. Since then many other Polish scholars, such as Jan Grabowski, Alina Skibinska, Barbara Engelking, and many others, have researched different aspects of the Holocaust as well. The Jedwabne debates that are taking place in Poland show that in fact “a victim can be a cruel victimizer at the same time,”22 as “Poles were t­ hemselves victimized under both Soviet and German occupation.”23 However, many other countries in the region are still in what Michlic characterizes as the first, “ethno-nationalistic” phase, marked by serious difficulties in initiating a public discourse about to the fate of the Jews. In Moldova, for instance, there is continued denial of the nation’s responsibility for the Holocaust, where, as noted, two types of denial are prevalent, deflective and selective. In fact, its problems are double. First, there is an unwillingness to discuss Romanian responsibility for the extermination of the Jews, since the Romanians are considered “brothers” with whom the majority of Moldovans share an ethnic identity. This unwillingness is paradoxical, since the Romanians themselves have published the international findings on the Holocaust in Romania elaborated by the Elie Wiesel Commission in 2004.24 21 Dmitry Tartakovsky, “Conflicting Holocaust Narratives in Moldovan Nationalist Historical Discourse,” East European Jewish Affairs 38, no. 2 (2008): 212. 22 Michlic, Coming to Terms, 2. 23 Ibid. 24 The report, published in 2004, states that “Romania under Antonescu was a dictatorial regime, and Antonescu’s orders could condemn to death the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina, just as they might allow for the survival of most [of] the Jews of Moldavia and Walachia. The entire repressive military, police, and judicial apparatus was mobilized against the Jews during the first half of the war.” http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1117716572750. Retrieved November 13, 2016.

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Moreover, on July 22, 2015, Romania’s president Klaus Iohannis signed amendments to ­existing legislation that bans fascist, racist, or xenophobic organizations and symbols and Holocaust denial with punishment of up to three years in prison.25 On August 31, 2016, the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania was appointed by the government to develop the idea of the first state museum of Jewish history and the Holocaust in Romania, in Bucharest.26 The Parliament of Moldova approved the report of the Elie Wiesel Commission only recently, on July 22, 2016.27 Secondly, there is still silence about, and lack of knowledge (study) of, the local Moldovan population’s involvement in the Holocaust. Thus, in addition to the difficulties of acknowledging Romanian involvement, contemporary Moldovans still need to come to grips with local Moldovan responsibility. As Simon Geissbühler writes, “The local perpetrators themselves have received only modest scholarly attention. Jan T. Gross’s groundbreaking work on neighbors as perpetrators in Poland (of course preceded by lesser-known works) has yet to be replicated for Romania. In light of recent research on the summer 1941 pogroms in Galicia and Poland, there is a need for a general examination of analogous actions in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.”28 According to Vladimir Solonari, most post-Soviet Moldovan historians of the pan-Romanian school, such as Anatol Petrencu, copied the Romanian nationalist historiographical tradition. They attempted to shed all Soviet ideological motifs and turned instead toward the patriotic past. They look to Romania for the formation of a new national identity and national symbols, including Ion Antonescu, who still remains a leading pan-Romanian icon of patriotism for many.29 25 “Romania Bans Holocaust Denial, Fascist Symbols,” Times of Israel, July 22, 2015. 26 “Romania to Open First State-Run Jewish Museum,” Times of Israel, October 10, 2016. 27 The first attempts were undertaken in 2014. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and the Bureau for Interethnic Relations organized a meeting to raise awareness about the Holocaust in the country and to prepare events around January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, for the first time. The second expert meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova on October 7, 2016. As a result of the meeting, a working group was composed to prepare events around January 27. It was initiated by ODIHR. 28 Simon Geissbühler, “‘He Spoke Yiddish like a Jew’: Neighbors’ Contribution to the Mass Killing of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, July 1941,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 28, no. 3 (Winter 2014): 432. 29 Solonari, “From Silence to Justification?”

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“Apologetics for Antonescu is an important part of the Second World War narrative from the contemporary pan-Romanian historical perspective,” writes Tartakovsky.30 This patriotic past presents the Romanian nation as the victim of Bolshevism and the Jews as the main perpetrators—a typical ­mixture of deflective and selective negations. A central argument, one deeply rooted in pan-Romanian public discourse in Moldova, is the strong belief that the Jews were communists and welcomed the invading Red Army. In addition to this inverse victimhood narrative, the image of the Jews as ­communists and traitors is widespread in both Moldova and Romania. After Moldova gained independence, most leading local historians, such as Anatol Petrencu, Veaceslav Stavila, Anatolie Moraru, and many others, adopted a pan-Romanian identity and immediately began to focus on these motifs in their writings. Alleged Jewish disloyalty to the Romanian state and loyalty to the Soviets were emphasized.31 A conspicuous example of this trend is the French writer of Moldovan descent Paul Goma. In 2002, he published a book, Saptamana Rosie (Red Week), focusing on the Soviet occupation and accusing the Jewish population of aiding it. The book is an example of deflective Holocaust denial, as it blames the Jews themselves for the Holocaust by accusing them of supporting the Bolshevik regime. The theses presented in the book were immediately supported by right-wing pro-Romanian politicians, media, and members of the intelligentsia. In Moldova it was republished by one of the largest rightwing newspapers, Timpul (Time), which is known for its nationalistic proRomanian stance and which is sponsored by the Romanian government. Then it was republished and distributed among some schools in Moldova by a rightwing politician in 2005. At the same time, the book was harshly criticized by the Jewish community, other minorities, left-wing and center-left politicians, and a very small group of Moldovan intellectuals (for instance, Viorel Mihail and his weekly Saptamina). As Tartakovsky stresses, for the sake of a national myth grounded in a Romanian victimization narrative, pan-Romanian historians “de-emphasize and rationalize the Holocaust.” Simultaneously, they stress the repressive communist past while seeking “to recover the interwar years as a ‘Golden Age’ of Romanian national freedom and greatness to which Moldova and Moldovans clearly belong.”32 30 Tartakovsky, “Conflicting Holocaust Narratives,” 220. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 221.

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The interwar period is quite important for the general understanding of pan-Romanian nationalism today. As Tartakovsky writes, “Perspectives that challenge this nationalist paradigm, such as that interwar Romania was a problematic era marked by growing antisemitism, national chauvinism, violence, corruption, economic mismanagement, and destruction of civil liberties, are not welcome by many historians seeking to construct a patriotically usable past. Contradicting narratives are actively silenced by patriotic historiography in Moldova.”33 It is not surprising that most inhabitants of Bessarabia, not only minorities, including Jews, were against the Romanization policy, and many in fact supported the Red Army. Michlic points out that the myth of “Judeo-communism” appeared in all Eastern European states after the collapse of communism—the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine. Up until today “it has been a central element in the ideology of many right-wing politicians, journalists and historians.”34 Its main aim is to support and minimize crimes against Jews during the Holocaust and afterward, as well as to strengthen the nation’s martyrdom during the war and during communism. It can be called a deflective denial, in which the guilt is transferred to Jews themselves. It seems that the myth of “Judeo-communism” is common to both Poland and Moldova and is still a driving force of contemporary antisemitism. The Jedwabne debate is a reflection of the process of democratization in Poland.35 Since Gross’s book was published and the earlier documentary of Agnieszka Arnold under the same title was shown on Polish television, the debate about Polish-Jewish relations in the context of the Holocaust was reactivated. It was originally initiated by Jan Blonski in 1987, when he wrote his essay “Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” published in the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. To a certain extent the general atmosphere was compared by some to the ­situation in Germany after the publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s book Hitler’s Willing Executioners in 1996.36 Goldhagen’s book attempts to show that ordinary Germans participated in the Holocaust willingly for antisemitic reasons grounded in German national identity.37 Although the Polish debates were 33 34 35 36

Ibid., 211. Michlic, “Przerwane milczenie,” 28. Dominika Kozłowska, “Po co nam Gross?,” Miesięcznik Znak, no. 670 (2011). Laurence Weinbaum, The Struggle for Memory in Poland: Auschwitz, Jedwabne and Beyond ( Jerusalem: WJC Policy Study, 2004), 7. 37 It was already after the first wave of debates known as the Historikerstreit (the historians’ dispute) occurred in West Germany at the end of the 1980s. At the heart of the debate was

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more intense, nobody questions the German role in the Holocaust in these debates.38 The Polish version of Gross’s Neighbors, which was published in 2000 by the foundation Pogranicze (Borderland), did provoke the same kind of broad debates as its English-language version, published by Princeton University Press in 2001. Because it touched on the national identity of Poles, the reaction was immediate, and it concerned the representation and reputation of Poland abroad as well.39 However, the inconvenient truths about Polish behavior toward the Jews during the Holocaust were relatively accepted, also on an official political level, as illustrated by the apologies of President Aleksander Kwasniewski during the sixtieth commemoration of the Jedwabne pogrom and later in 2011 of the current president Bronislaw Komorowski.40 Intellectual circles, which included leading dailies Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, accepted Gross’s book and agreed on the necessity to conduct such research to have a more sophisticated picture of the war after decades of silence and stifling of debate. It demonstrated that Polish elites are capable of accepting their country’s difficult past, and the role of elites in raising such issues should not be underestimated. They can play both a positive and a negative role. Moldova, however, has not advanced much in this direction since 1989, perhaps indicating the weakness of the Moldovan intellectual and political elites, arguably with an exception of former president Vladimir Voronin. As a report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) pointed out in 2007, “ECRI is pleased to learn that the President of the Republic has participated in several events commemorating the victims of the Holocaust in Moldova and has condemned antisemitism at such occasions.”41 Nevertheless, this does not reflect the general trend.

a conflict between such right-wing historians as Ernst Nolte, who equalized the Nazi and the Soviet regimes, and left-wing intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas, who insisted that by equalizing both regimes, Nolte wanted to trivialize the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. Public opinion was more on Habermas’s side by the end of these debates, which lasted from 1986 to 1989. Today Deborah Lipstadt often refers to Nolte’s position as an example of Holocaust trivialization or soft-core denial. 38 Weinbaum, Struggle for Memory in Poland, 7. 39 Michlic, “Przerwane milczenie.” 40 Tadeusz Komorowski, “Jeszcze raz proszę o przebaczenie,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 10, 2011. 41 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Moldova (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2007).

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ADDITIONAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION For both countries the Holocaust is closely linked to their national identity, and with the fall of communism in 1989, both countries have undergone a process of reconstructing their national identities, shifting from a communist to a patriotic ethnic narrative. As Annamaria Orla-Bukowska writes, post-­communist countries needed to “re-activate their identities.”42 The communist state has been replaced by the nation, and this, she writes, gives people “stability and togetherness.”43 She argues that the current stage of the debate about the Second World War and Polish-Jewish relations in this context brought Poles to a situation in which they “question and deconstruct” their post-communist national identity. The main challenge for them is to incorporate the Jewish minority’s memory narratives into their inclusive identity.44 Certainly, the process of accepting inconvenient narratives is not easy, but as Vladimir Solonari says in the context of Moldova, “Without coming to grips with [the Holocaust] Moldovans will never be able to construct their multidimensional democratic identity.”45 The same can be said to hold true for Poles as well. Poland had different historical periods when its territories were divided and occupied and belonged to different empires. As Annamaria O ­ rla-Bukowska writes, “Thus, Polish identity in the nineteenth century developed along ­ethno-cultural and blood lines instead of along civic and territorial lines. Instead of separation of church and state, religion was the sole consistent carrier of the national ethos for the divided people, who thereafter fought with the church against the state.”46 In this context, the category “Poles” includes only Catholic ethnic Poles, and the perception of the Holocaust can be seen through this prism. As Rafal Pankowski writes, in Poland “the nationalist principle has expressed itself most often in the form of ethno-nationalism, where ethnic bonds of shared ancestry take priority over civic affiliations. The civic nationalism of Józef Piłsudski was, arguably, an exception to this rule. . . . Any broader popular awareness of that multicultural aspect of the Polish national tradition is largely a thing of the past.”47 42 Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “New Threads on an Old Loom: National Memory and Social Identity in Postwar and Post-Communist Poland,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ed. Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 201. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Solonari, “From Silence to Justification?,” 436. 46 Orla-Bukowska, “New Threads,” 179. 47 Rafal Pankowski, The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots (London: Routledge, 2011), 3.

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In Moldova, the essential elements of the national identity are more elusive. Tartakovsky writes that identity is “for many Moldovans today a subject of tangled debate to a greater extent than for most other peoples of Eastern and Central Europe.”48 Charles King goes as far as to claim that Moldova is the only European country where the key existence of a separate identity is still questioned.49 He writes that “history of shifting borders and political allegiances has long been reflected in the overlapping and situational identities of Bessarabia’s inhabitants, including their descendants in present-day Moldova.”50 In fact, Moldovan history is the history of a country on the borderland between cultures and empires, and Moldova has been a meeting point of civilizations throughout its history. For centuries it was a peripheral province of foreign powers, and as a result, it absorbed influences of multiple countries. In the sixteenth century, Moldova became a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, nevertheless retaining the attributes of statehood with a certain degree of a­utonomy. Trying to regain independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Moldovan elite looked to Russia for support, and since the beginning of the eighteenth century, Moldova had been a theater of wars among three empires—Turkey, Russia, and Austria. In 1812 the territory of Moldova became a part of the Russian Empire. In 1917 the Moldovan Democratic Republic was declared as an independent state in the wake of the disintegration of the Russian Empire. On January 24, 1918, full independence was declared by the National Assembly. Nevertheless, independence was short-lived, because already on March 26, a union with Romania was announced. The policies of the Romanian state vis-à-vis Moldova were strongly nationalizing. In 1940 the territory of Bessarabia was annexed by the Soviet Union. In 1941 Moldova was occupied by the Romanian army led by Ion Antonescu, which was allied with Nazi Germany. The country was under Romanian occupation until 1944. In 1944 Moldova once again became part of the Soviet Union with the status of a union republic, which included a majority of the territory of Bessarabia and a part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which had existed on the left bank of the Dniester (in the so-called Transnistria district) from 1924 until 1940. In 1991 Moldova regained independence as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 48 Tartakovsky, “Conflicting Holocaust Narratives,” 212. 49 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 229. 50 Ibid., 12.

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Largely because of its history, contemporary Moldova is not an ethnically homogeneous country like Poland, and there are several models of interacting and sometimes competing identities. In this context, there are also strong divisions in approaches to and understanding of the Holocaust. Among the identity models there are three main (ideal) types—pan-Romanian, pan-Soviet, and the Moldovenist identity.51 The pan-Romanian version of the national identity, which is based on cultural similarities and the mythology of common descent of Moldovans and Romanians, is strongest in the academic and educational fields; therefore, it is the main narrative in the discussion about the Holocaust in Moldova. The subject “History of the Romanians”—that is, the history of an ethnic group—was introduced in Moldovan schools and ­universities in the early 1990s. An attempt of a later left-wing government to change it into the history of the country (i.e., the history of Moldova) proved unsuccessful. According to a recent opinion poll, 64 percent of Moldovans think that the correct course in schools should be History of Moldova, against 15 percent who support the History of the Romanians.52 The pan-Romanian narrative clashes with Soviet and Moldovan narratives, which are less influential than the pan-Romanian one. Nonetheless, Soviet identity is still strong in Moldova, and with regard to the Holocaust, it has more influence among minorities. The Victory memorial and Jassy-Kishinev Operation are very significant points of reference for minorities but for the majority of ethnic Moldovans too. Victory Day on May 9 is still an important holiday, although it is not celebrated on the same scale as in the Soviet era. From the perspective of the pan-Romanian identity, Moldova was the victim of the Nazis and the Soviets during the Second World War. Here Antonescu is the main hero, and Jews are considered main allies of the Bolsheviks. The last narrative in some ways is similar to the Polish one, which also presents Poland as a victim of two totalitarian regimes. In both cases the identification as victim is strong; however, in the case of Moldova there is also a tendency to justify the pro-Nazi war criminal Antonescu. Interestingly enough, all these tendencies and different narratives somehow coexist in Moldova.

51 Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska, “Multiple Identities as a Basis for Construction of (Post) Modern Moldovan Identity,” in Beyond Imagined Uniqueness: Nationalisms in Contemporary Perspective, ed. Joan Burbick and William Glass (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 269. 52 Barometer of Public Opinion issued by the Institute for Public Policy in Moldova, April 2012, http://www.ipp.md/lib.php?l=en&idc=156.

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Holocaust Memory and Holocaust Revisionism in Poland and Moldova

A common European identity is another factor influencing the Holocaust debates. Poland became a part of the European Union in 2005, and since the Holocaust is a part of European memory and identity, the strengthening of ties with Europe has made Poland more open to debate and reflection on the nation’s own role during the Holocaust than is the case in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union. Since Moldovan identity is still in the process of crystallizing itself, it is more difficult for the country to accept its tragic past and allow minority narratives as a part of the Moldovan collective identity. Should Moldova also join the European Union in the future, the same forces that encourage openness and inclusiveness and complexity can enhance the possibilities that minority narratives will grow and gain legitimacy as part of the national narrative, opening the door for Moldova as well to embark on reworking the nation’s with a critical eye.

Honoring the Collaborators: The Ukrainian Case Irena Cantorovich

D

uring World War II, many among the local population in the ­territories occupied by the Germans collaborated with them in various ways, including in the perpetration of atrocities against the Jews: handing over Jews, guarding ghettos and camps, escorting the Jews to the killing fields, and sometimes even participating in their murder. The collaborators were motivated by a number of things, among them antisemitism, material benefits, and career advancement. In the Soviet Republic of Ukraine (and even more so in the Baltic states), there was an additional motive for collaboration with the Nazis: the ambition to regain independence, fueled by hatred of the Soviets who had deprived them of it. Those who held this view considered that all means were legitimate, even collaborating with the Germans in the murder of Jews, if this was what was needed in order to convince the Germans to help reestablish an independent Ukrainian state. However, even when those who called themselves freedom fighters realized that the Germans had no intention of fulfilling their dream, they did not cease their involvement in atrocities against the Jews, continuing to regard them as representatives of the Soviets, toward whom their hatred proved to be stronger than their dream of independence. To this day, those Ukrainians see themselves as freedom fighters, while their supporters view them as heroes and patriots who risked their lives for the independence of their country. On the other hand, in Jewish memory as well as in the memory of other ethnic groups who lived in this region, they are perceived as collaborators and murderers. This conflict of views will probably never be solved. The Jews will forever regard the collaborators as accomplices in the attempt to realize the Nazi ideology of a “New Order” free of Jews, while

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their supporters will always claim that only a few of them participated directly in the murder of Jews and that everything they did was for the sake of an independent state, which could be established with the help of the Germans. In order to obtain this much-needed aid, they were forced to collaborate with them. Two leading Ukrainian nationalist leaders, Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich, will be the focus of the following analysis. On January 20, 2010, as one of his last actions as Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree posthumously honoring Stepan Bandera as Hero of Ukraine. The announcement stated, inter alia, that Bandera had demonstrated “heroism and self-sacrifice in fighting for an independent Ukrainian state.”1 Three years earlier, on October 12, 2007, Yushchenko had signed a similar decree posthumously bestowing on Roman Shukhevich the title of Hero of Ukraine for his “contribution to the national liberation struggle for the freedom and independence of Ukraine.”2 These events triggered both positive and negative reactions in Ukraine. This analysis will cast light on central aspects relating to the attitudes of Ukrainian nationalists toward the Jews during the Second World War and especially the attempts to honor collaborators in Ukraine in the beginning of the twentieth century. It will also detail the responses in Ukraine and abroad to this whitewashing campaign.

THE PAST—THE OUN AND THE UPA The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was at the center of anti-Polish activity in Galicia, western Ukraine, which till World War II was part of Poland. In 1938, its leader was Andrei Melnik, who collaborated with   1 See for example, “Yushchenko Honors War Nationalist,” Moscow Times, January 25, 2010, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yushchenko-honors-war-­nationalist/398082. html, accessed in February 2010; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Ukrainian Honor for Wartime Nationalist Angers Jews,” January 26, 2010, http://www.jta.org/news/­articleprint/2010/01/26/1010326/ukrainian-honor-to-wartime-nationalist-angers-­jews?TB_ iframe=true&width=750&height=500, accessed in February 2010.   2 “Ukrainian President Grants Posthumous Honor to Anti-Soviet Guerrilla Leader,” Red Orbit, October 14, 2007, http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/1101700/ukrainian_president_ grants_posthumous_honour_to_antisoviet_guerrilla_leader/, accessed in October 2007; “Ukraine President Defends Posthumous Honor to Alleged Head of Pogrom,” Haaretz, November 15, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/ukraine-presidentdefends-posthumous-honor-to-alleged-head-of-pogrom-1.233238?­t railingPath= 2.169%2C2.216%2C, accessed in October 2007.

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the Nazi regime after he made contact with Abwehr, the German military ­intelligence. Following the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine, he moved to the area that was controlled by the Germans, and later to Berlin. The Germans regarded Ukraine as a suitable place for colonization because of its fertile black soil, which could be exploited in order to turn Ukraine into the grain supplier of Europe. However, in order to conceal these plans and win the local population’s support, the Germans sided with Ukrainian independence aspirations. As early as 1938, they initiated radio broadcasts for Ukrainians, both in eastern (Soviet) Ukraine and western (Polish) Ukraine.3 The partition of Poland in September 1939 as a result of the RibbentropMolotov Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and the USSR’s annexation of western Ukraine compounded the eagerness of Ukrainian nationalists to fight for independence, especially in light of the brutal sovietization of the area and the deportation of many thousands of Ukrainians and others (including Jews) to the inner regions of the Soviet Union. In parallel, many of their leaders were released from jail, including Stepan Bandera, who succeeded in uniting young supporters of the OUN under his leadership. When Bandera’s supporters accused Melnik and his followers of not doing enough for Ukrainian independence, the organization split into two parts: OUN-M (the original organization) and OUN-B (Bandera’s faction), with German support divided between them.4 When the Soviets occupied eastern Galicia, some thirty thousand Ukrainian nationalists fled to the General Government.5 In 1940 the Germans began to set up military training units of Ukrainians, and in the spring of 1941 the Wehrmacht established Ukrainian units. The first unit, created in the General Government, was called Nachtigall (Nightingale). Most of its command was German, the rest Ukrainian. Roland was another such unit.6  3 Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 1941–1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), 9; Wolodymyr Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 165.  4 Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 114–16; Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2004), 10. For more on the beginning of the Bandera movement, see Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, 62–70.   5 Gabriel N. Finder and Alexander V. Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust,” East European Jewish Affairs 34, no. 2 (2004): 98.  6 John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (Littleton, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980), 73–74. For more on the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, see, for example, Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, 128–36.

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On June 22, 1941, the Germans attacked the Soviet Union and within eight days had reached Lvov. Accompanying the Wehrmacht were groups of OUN followers, some of them part of the Nachtigall Battalion.7 Immediately, they declared the reestablishment of the Ukrainian state, with Lvov as its capital. Simultaneously, Ukrainian nationalists were displaying considerable initiative, conducting purges and pogroms against Jews, Russians, and Poles. Between July and September 1941, many of Bandera’s men were arrested, others went underground, and he himself was taken to Berlin and jailed there.8 Later in the same year, members of the OUN-M were also arrested.9 By November 1941 the Germans, assisted by Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, and Slovak units, occupied all of Ukraine. Many locals, particularly in western Ukraine, welcomed them: “We were all so happy to see them. They were going to save us from the Communists who had taken everything and starved us” was a common refrain.10 Many Ukrainian nationalists, and others, too, were recruited to the Order Police, whose non-German members were called Schutzmannschaft (Shuma, in short), or Hilfspolizei (auxiliary police). They were indoctrinated into believing that the Jews must be exterminated, among other ideas, and subsequently took part in that process.11 They participated in raids on Jews and in their registration, and guarded ghettos. During mass shootings, the auxiliary police helped assemble the Jews, transferred them to the shooting grounds, and guarded those locations during the killings. In Krivoi Rog (Dnepropetrovsk District), for example, “the entire Ukrainian auxiliary police were put to use” during the murder of local Jews.12 It should be noted, however, that some members of the auxiliary police, including entire battalions, later deserted and joined the Ukrainian Insurgent  7 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 77.   8 Bandera was released a few days after his arrest but was not allowed to leave Germany. He was later rearrested and released in September 1944 in order to set up OUN headquarters in Berlin. The Soviet KGB poisoned Bandera in Munich, Germany, on October 15, 1959. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Bandera#cite_ref-31; Yad Vashem, http://www. yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205935.pdf.  9 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 119–21; Finder and Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia,” 100; Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, 98–101. 10 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 11, 20–21. 11 Ibid., 42, 62–64. 12 Dieter Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and the Reich Commissariat Ukraine,” in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 55.

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Army (UPA), which since late 1942–early 1943 was dominated by Bandera supporters.13 They now aimed at fighting against all the “invaders” (Soviets, Poles, and Germans), while the Soviets remained the most important enemy.14 Like the OUN, the UPA too was active mainly in the western parts of Ukraine—Volyn and Galicia.15 Because of the shortage of doctors in its ranks, the UPA even recruited some Jewish physicians.16 Roman Shukhevich was a member of the OUN-B and one of the commanders of the Nachtigall unit. A controversial issue in connection with this unit is whether it participated in the murder of Jews and Poles in Lvov in the summer of 1941, and in particular, in the murder of about four thousand Jews and dozens of members of the Polish intelligentsia (the Professors’ Massacre) in July 1941. The participation of Ukrainians in the murder of the Jews and Poles was not even discussed during the Nuremberg trials, and the entire blame was put on the Germans. By the end of the 1950s, the subject was raised as part of East German propaganda against Theodor Oberländer, the Abwehr ­liaison officer to Nachtigall who subsequently had to resign from his position as a ­minister in the West German government.17 In November 1941 about 650 Ukrainian Nachtigall personnel were reorganized by the Germans to form the 201st Schutzmannschaft Battalion. Shukhevich was appointed its deputy commander. In March 1942 the battalion was sent to Belorussia to fight partisans and Jews, but following the expiration of their contracts after a year, almost all members refused to renew them, and the battalion was disbanded. Shukhevich escaped arrest by the Germans and became head of the military section of the OUN. In August 1943, during its Third Grand Congress, he was elected director of the OUN and supreme commander of the UPA. After the end of World War II, his units continued 13 Kamenetsky, Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 81; Finder and Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia,”100. 14 S. V. Kul’cayts’kyi et al., eds., Orhanizatsiia Ukraiins’kykh Natsionalistivi Ukraiins’ka Povstans’ka Armiia: Istorychni Narysy (Kiev: Nauk. Dumka, 2005), 174–77. 15 Kamenetsky, Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 70; Kosyk, The Third Reich and Ukraine, 222. The UPA continued to fight against the Soviets till September 1949, and some units were active even till 1956. See, for example, “69th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—Kiev,” Demotix, October 14, 2011, http://www.demotix.com/news/873479/69th-­ anniversary-ukrainian-insurgent-army-kiev, accessed in December 2011. 16 Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 53. 17 John-Paul Himka, “True and False Lessons from the Nachtigall Episode,” BRAMA, March 19, 2008, http://www.brama.com/news/press/2008/03/080319himka_nachtigall.html, accessed in April 2008. See the operative correspondence by the Ukrainian KGB: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Oberlander1.jpg, accessed in September 2017.

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fighting against the Soviets. He was killed in combat with the Soviets in Lvov on March 5, 1950.18 As for the attitudes of these organizations toward the Jews, the OUN’s standpoint was already clear ten years before the outbreak of World War II. Many Ukrainian nationalists (even prior to the OUN’s establishment) had connections with National Socialists in Germany. As the Germans advanced eastward, and atrocities against the Jews were committed in the occupied territories of Poland, the negative sentiments of Ukrainian nationalists toward the Jews intensified. OUN archival documents, for example, include a statement by Yaroslav Stechko, who in June 1941 became prime minister of the Ukrainian government in Lvov (appointed by the OUN). He stated, “Jews help Moscow to keep Ukraine in captivity; that is why I hold that Jews should be annihilated and the German method of destruction of Jewry is necessary.”19 A second phase in the OUN’s attitude began in August 1941 and lasted till August 1943. As noted, when the Ukrainian nationalists realized that Germany was not planning to grant them independence and even arrested some of them, several members went underground. As a result, their negative attitude toward the Jews changed. According to the resolution accepted at the eleventh conference of the OUN-B in April 1942, “It [is] pointless at the present moment to participate in anti-Jewish operations. . . . We do not want to divert the attention of the masses from the primary enemy.” Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalists continued to take part in exterminating Jews.20 A more significant shift (although too late for most of Ukraine’s Jewry) occurred during and after the Third Grand Congress of the OUN-B in August 1943. Then racism was condemned, and there were discussions about equal rights for all citizens, regardless of nationality. This turnabout may be attributed to developments at the front and to German losses at the time. However, the reality was different. According to the OUN-B’s “Temporary Instructions” from early 1944, “the Jewish question has stopped being a problem (very few of them have remained). This does not apply to those who actively stand against us.”21 We might therefore ask, how in the forests did 18 For more information, see S. Konkin, S. Bohunov, and H. Boriak, eds., Roman Shukhevych u Dokumentakh Radianskykh Orhaniv Derzhavnoii Bezbeky (1940–1950), vol. 2 (Kiev, 2007). 19 Aharon Weiss, “The Attitude of the Ukrainian Nationalist Groups towards Jews during the Second World War,” in Nazi Europe and the Final Solution, ed. David Bankier and Israel Gutman ( Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), 266–67. 20 Ibid., 271. 21 Ibid., 272–73.

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they distinguish between Jews who “actively stand against us” and those who did not? The OUN’s attitude toward the Jews was a factor of necessity. When they required the help of Jewish doctors, for example, they provided them with false documents and accepted them into their ranks. In other cases, they acted against the Jews: in early 1942 the Ukrainian police in the Rovno District gathered weapons for the OUN-B. When the Germans discovered the collection, the police said it was confiscated from Jews.22

THE PRESENT—“HEROES OF UKRAINE” During the Soviet era, the issue of the collaboration of the local population with the Germans was not aired publicly. The authorities feared that such a discussion would harm the image of the “friendship of peoples” against the German invader. At the same time, Ukrainian collaborators were held up as an example of people who chose to join the German occupier because of their “bourgeois background.”23 In addition, Bandera’s name became synonymous with a man who had betrayed his people and chosen to join the Soviet Union’s enemies. The collapse of the Soviet regime and the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1991 strengthened the nationalist atmosphere and the public discourse of subjects that could contribute to shaping a national consciousness. One such topic was collaboration, with those who served in the UPA and OUN being presented as a legitimate force that fought during World War II for Ukraine’s independence. After the Orange Revolution in 2004–2005, the process of recognizing members of those units as having rights that equaled those of Red Army veterans was accelerated. In 2006 the Education Ministry was instructed to stress the participation of the Ukrainian people as a whole, including the nationalist units, in World War II.24 In the eastern and southern areas of Ukraine, where a high percentage of the population is Russian-speaking Ukrainians, both the population and its politicians do not support this change. Some regional councils even called on 22 Alexander R. Dyukov, The Minor Enemy: OUN, UPA and the Solution of “Jewish Question” (Riga: Institute of European Studies, 2010), 76. 23 Anatoly Podolsky, “Collaboration in Ukraine during the Holocaust: Aspects of Historiography and Research,” in Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust, ed. Roni Stauber (London: Routledge, 2010), 48. 24 Presidential Decree number 879, October 14, 2006, http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/ documents/5098.html [in Russian], accessed in 2007.

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the president to cease the promotion of a narrow point of view about World War II, supported by a small “group of people who are guilty of committing the most bloody crimes against humanity.”25 On October 14, 2007, some one thousand right-wing extremists held a rally in Kiev to commemorate the sixty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the UPA. According to a statement issued by the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, the participants gave the Nazi salute and shouted Nazi slogans. The Jewish community of Ukraine condemned the event.26 In March 2008, Kryivka, a popular coffee shop in Lvov, was adorned with UPA posters, as well as a stool with gallows “for traitors.” At the entrance a man with a machine gun asked all those entering to swear that they were neither a Yid nor a Moskal (derogatory nicknames for Jew and Russian, respectively). Kryivka is the name of a hiding place used by UPA members during World War II.27 Two years later, on March 2, 2010, people of all ages marched through Kiev and Lvov, holding torches and wearing UPA uniforms and traditional Cossack dress, to mark the sixtieth anniversary of Shukhevich’s death. Besides the OUN and UPA, other units have also been honored. In April 2009, for example, posters with symbols of the Ukrainian SS Halychyna Division (14 Waffen Grenadier-Division der SS Galizische) appeared on the streets of Lvov.28 The posters, in the Ukrainian language, read, “Ukrainian Halychyna Division. They defended Ukraine.” The initiator was a local branch of the extreme-right and antisemitic Svoboda party.29 Beginning in fall 25 See, for example, the announcement of the Regional Council of Kharkov from November 29, 2007, http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/events/218946-harkovskij-oblsovet-priznaloun-upa-soratnikami-fashistov [in Russian], accessed in September 2017. 26 RT, “Ukraine Nationalists Rally in Support of WW2 Insurgents,” October 14, 2007, http://rt.com/news/ukraine-nationalists-rally-in-support-of-ww2-insurgents/,  accessed in September 2017. 27 Agenstvo Evreiskikh Novostei, “Not a Yid and not a Moskal—[You Can] Enter the Coffee Shop” [in Russian], March 26, 2008, http://www.aen.ru/index.php?page=brief&article_id=48480&PHPSESSID=dapus9m1muat0m6 m0k0jnrsjg0, accessed in 2008; Iryrna Yehorova, “Kryivka for Entertainment, Not Hiding” [in Ukrainian], Gazeta Den, November 20, 2007, http://www.day.kiev.ua/290619?idsource=191789&mainlang=eng, accessed in 2007. 28 RT, “Ads Praising Nazi WWII Division Pop Up in Ukrainian Town,” September 27, 2009, http://rt.com/news/ads-praising-nazi-wwii-division-pop-up-in-ukrainian-town, accessed in October 2009. 29 It should be noted that Svoboda (Freedom) was very popular during this period. See, for example, Konstantin Dymov, “Nazification of Galicia” [in Russian], Globo Scope, April 2, 2009, http://www.globoscope.ru/eng/content/articles/479, accessed in September 2009. On October 31, 2010, this extreme-right party won 30–34  percent of the votes in e­ lections

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1943, this division had collaborated with the Nazis and participated in ­battles all over Europe. The posters were removed on April 23, 2009, following ­condemnations in the Russian and European media, but on April 28, a memorial service marking the sixty-sixth anniversary of the formation of the division took place in Lvov Square. In early May 2009, the Ternopol Regional Council decided to erect a memorial plaque in honor of Ukrainians who served in the Halychyna Division. The decision was condemned by Ilya Rogachev, Russia’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, who said, “It is known that Ukrainian SS [soldiers] annihilated Soviet soldiers, partisans in France and Yugoslavia, [and] peaceful inhabitants in Poland, suppressed anti-fascist revolts in Slovakia, [and] shot Jews and Communists in Ukraine.”30 On March 5, 2011, a parade took place in Ivano-Frankovsk, marking the sixty-first anniversary of the death of Roman Shukhevich. The torch-bearing participants shouted “Shukhevich—hero of Ukraine,” “Ukraine before every thing,” and “Death to the enemies,” among other slogans. Svoboda and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists initiated the parade.31 About six weeks later, on April 28, a rally was held in Lvov to commemorate the sixty-eighth anniversary of the establishment of the Halychyna Division. According to Iurii Mikhalchishin (Svoboda party), a member of the municipality and organizer of the event, the participants were “patriotic youths from Lvov who support the ideas of social and national justice . . . [and] oppose stigmatization of the fighters for Ukraine’s independence as Nazi collaborators and enemies of the Ukrainian state.” Participants shouted ­slogans in Ukrainian, such as “Shukhevich, Bandera—heroes of Ukraine” and

three important cities in western Ukraine: Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankovsk. Their campaign emphasized Ukrainian patriotism and resistance to Russia. See “Ukrainian Appeals to Anti-Semitism in Election Win,” Kiev Ukraine News Blog, November 5, 2010, http://news. kievukraine.info/2010/11/ukrainian-appeals-to-anti-semitism-in.html, accessed in 2010; Andreas Umland, “Ukraine’s Party System in Transition? The Rise of the Radically RightWing All-Ukrainian Association ‘Svoboda,’” Geo-Politika, January 5, 2011, http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4429, accessed in February 2011. 30 “A Memorial Board to SS Warriors to Be Opened in Termopol” [in Russian], Jewish.ru, May 4, 2009, http://www.jewish.ru/news/cis/2009/05/prn_news994273823.php, accessed in June 2009; “Russia Condemns the Opening of Memorial Board to SS Division,” Jewish. ru, May 6, 2009, http://www.jewish.ru/news/cis/2009/05/prn_news994273880.php, accessed in June 2009. 31 Historical Memory Foundation, “Nationalists Hold Torchlight Procession in Honor of Shukhevich” [in Russian], March 9, 2011, http://historyfoundation.ru/news_item. php?id=1878, accessed in September 2017.

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“Halychyna—a ­division of heroes.”32 It should be noted that Mikhalchishin is known for his antisemitic and anti-Israel views.33 In October, the administrative authorities of Railov (a village in the Lvov region) decided to change the name of Mir (peace/world) Street to Nachtigall Street. The initiator was Maryan Berezdetskii (Svoboda party), a member of the administration, and his proposal was supported by the majority.34 During the unveiling of a memorial to Stepan Bandera in Veliki Mosty (Lvov region) in early January 2012, Andrei Libych, representative of the Free Nationalists (one of Ukraine’s small nationalist groups), declared that Ukraine was now in a period of “Yidocratia” and that “our leader [Bandera] did not fight for such a Ukraine, where the soil and industry are being robbed by all kinds of Feldmans, Kolomoyskis, Akhmetovs and other Yids. We don’t need a Yidocratia.”35 Two months later, on March 16, 2012, the Lvov District Council instituted a new award named after Bandera, to be granted for exceptional ­contribution to the development of Ukrainian statehood. It is granted each year on January 1, Bandera’s birthday, except in 2012, when it was given on June 30, the day in 1941 when Ukrainian nationalists declared the Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood. A Bandera award in journalism was founded in 2007.36

32 World without Nazism Association, “March Held in Lvov to Mark 68th Anniversary of 14th Grenadier SS Division Halychyna” [in Russian], April 29, 2011, http://worldwithoutnazism.wordpress.com/2011/04/29/во-львове-состоялся-марш-по-случаю-68-ой, accessed in 2011. 33 See, for example, Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, “Hamas Apologetics by Lvov Deputy” [in Russian], June 6, 2011, http://eajc.org/page18/news24232.html, accessed in September 2017. 34 “Ukraine—Street Named after Nazi Appears in Village Near Lvov Instead of Mir Street” [in Russian], IzRus, October 12, 2011, http://izrus.co.il/print_news.php?news=44933, accessed in 2011; Voice of Russia, “Nazis from the Nachtigall Battalion Will Not Become Heroes of Ukraine” [in Russian], October 12, 2011, http://rus.ruvr.ru/_print/58626344. html, accessed in 2011. 35 “Bandera Fought for Ukraine without Jewish Akhmetovs” [in Russian], Polemika, January 10, 2012, http://polemika.com.ua/index/print/news_id/80082, accessed in 2012; “Ukrainian Nationalist Urges to Fight ‘Yidocratia’ in Ukraine with Arms” [in Russian], Kiev Evreyskii, January 11, 2012, http://evreiskiy.kiev.ua/ukrainskijj-nationalist-prizyvaet-10797.html, accessed in 2012. 36 “Award Named after Bandera Founded in Lvov” [in Russian], Focus, March 16, 2012, http:// focus.ua/society/223468, accessed in September 2017.

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RESPONSES In November 2007, during President Yushchenko’s visit to Israel, Yosef (Tommy) Lapid, late chairman of Yad Vashem, accused Yushchenko of glorifying Shukhevich and claimed that Yad Vashem had documents in its archive that prove Shukhevich’s participation in the murder of Jews in Lvov in July 1941. Lapid invited Ukrainian historians to come and research the documentation. In early 2008 a group of Ukrainian historians visited Israel, where they received some documents. However, when they returned to Ukraine, they claimed that the documents had been falsified by the Soviets to incriminate the abovementioned Oberländer. This episode caused some tension in Israeli-Ukrainian relations. Although Shukhevich’s participation in the massacre in Lvov has not yet been proven, there is a wealth of documentation and testimonies establishing OUN’s hostile attitude toward the Jews and the participation of its members in their murder during the war.37 In June 2008 the International Union of Former Juvenile Prisoners of Fascism asked President Yushchenko not to recognize UPA members as heroes because they fought alongside the Germans during World War II and because some of them took part in the killing of Jews. Boris Zabarko, chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association of Former Jewish Prisoners of Ghetto and Nazi Concentration Camps, said it was “immoral to reward those who were connected to pogroms and murdered Jews and others during and after WWII.”38 Yushchenko’s decision to honor Bandera in 2010 (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) was praised by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko but condemned by Ukraine’s chief rabbi Moshe Reuven Asman, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the AntiDefamation League, and Itzhak Arad, a former partisan and prominent historian of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union, among others.39 37 John-Paul Himka, “Debates in Ukraine over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004–2008,” Nationalities Papers 39, no. 3 (May 2011): 362–65. 38 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Ex-Prisoners Decry Insurgents’ Recognition,” June 24, 2008, http:// archive.jta.org/2008/06/24/news-opinion/ex-prisoners-decry-insurgents-recognition. 39 “Tymoshenko: Historic Truth Should be Guideline in Bandera Issue,” Kyiv Post, January 30, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/58317/print/, accessed in 2010; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Ukrainian Honor for Wartime Nationalist Angers Jews,” January 26, 2010, http://www.jta.org/news/article-print/2010/01/26/1010326/ukrainian-honor-to-wartime-nationalist-angers-jews?TB_iframe=true&width=750&height=500, accessed in 2010; Simon Wiesenthal Center, “Wiesenthal Center Blasts Ukrainian Honor for Nazi Collaborator,” January 28, 2010, http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4441467&ct=7922775, accessed in September 2017; “Former Head of Yad Vashem Speaks Out against Yushchenko’s Decision” [in Russian], IzRus, January 27, 2010, http://izrus.

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On January 25, 2010, lawyer Vladimir Olentsevich, from Donetsk, filed a suit to cancel Yushchenko’s decree of five days earlier, claiming that under Ukrainian law such an award could be granted only to a Ukrainian citizen, which Bandera never was.40 On January 30, 2010, anti-fascists held a demonstration in Odessa, during which they burned a copy of the edict and a puppet symbolizing Bandera.41 On February 25, the European Parliament issued a resolution expressing the hope that President-elect Viktor Yanukovych would cancel the decree. During his visit to Moscow in early March, Yanukovych promised to postpone it till Victory Day (May 9).42 Following the opening of a photo exhibition on April 8, 2010, at Ukrainian House in Kiev, titled “The Volyn Massacre: Polish and Jewish Victims of the OUN-UPA,” initiated by Polish Catholic priest Tadeusz Zaleski, who has been fighting to commemorate Polish victims in western Ukraine during World War II, members of Svoboda broke into the premises and damaged photographs of Polish and Jewish victims of World War II. Police arrested thirteen to fifteen of them. They claimed the exhibit was Ukrainophobic and was aimed at “stirring interethnic and religious hostility and humiliation of the national honor and dignity of Ukrainians.”43

40 41 42

43

co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2010-01-27/8307.html, accessed in 2010; Religious Information Service of Ukraine, “Ukraine Chief Rabbi Protests Bandera’s Honor,” February 2, 2010, http:// risu.org.ua/article_print.php?id=34158&name=church_state_relations&_lang=en&, accessed in 2010; Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Calls On New Ukrainian President to Withdraw ‘Hero’ Title Bestowed by Predecessor on Nazi Collaborators,” March 11, 2010, http://www.adl.org/ NR/exeres/E750CFA2-2117-4143-BAD3-494CC2390A94,0B1623CA-D5A4-465D-A369DF6E8679CD9E,frameless.htm, accessed in 2010. RIA Novosti, “Ukrainian Files Lawsuit against Honoring of Nationalist Leader,” January 26, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100126/157681165.html, accessed in 2010. “ITAR-TASS: Bandera’s Effigy, His Order, Decree Making Him Hero Burned in Odesa,” Kyiv Post, January 30, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/ukraine/detail/58334/ print/, accessed in 2010. European Parliament Resolution of 25 February 2010 on the Situation in Ukraine, http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20100035+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed in September 2017; UNIAN, “Yanukovych Promises Medvedev to Withdraw Rank of Hero of Ukraine from Bandera and Shuhevych” [in Russian], March 5, 2010, http://www.unian.net/eng/print/366099, accessed in 2010. World Congress of Russian Jewry, “Ukraine Nationalists Attack Polish-Jewish Memorial Photo Exhibit,” April 8, 2010, http://www.wcrj.org/en/news/detail.php?ID=804, accessed in 2010; Religious Information Service of Ukraine, “Svoboda Association Insists Volyn Massacre Exhibit Stirs Religious Hostility,” April 8, 2010, http://risu.org.ua/article_ print.php?id=35152&name=protests&_lang=en&, accessed in September 2017; “Kiev, Ukraine—13 Arrested for Breaking into Polish-Jewish Memorial Exhibit,” VosIzNeias (blog), April 8, 2010, http://www.vosizneias.com/52742/2010/04/08/kiev-ukraine-13-­arrestedfor-breaking-into-polish-jewish-memorial-exhibit/print/, accessed in September 2017.

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On April 2, 2010, the Donetsk Regional Court annulled the Yushchenko decree regarding Bandera, and in January 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine ratified this ruling.44 On April 21, 2010, the Donetsk Appeals Court also invalidated Yushchenko’s 2007 decree regarding Shukhevich, since, as in the case of Bandera, under Ukrainian law the title Hero of Ukraine can be given only to a citizen of independent Ukraine (as of 1991). Since Shukhevich was killed in 1950, he is not entitled to such an honor.45 These legal decisions give the government a convenient way out of a ­complex situation of opposing pressures and contradictory historical narratives. The Bandera and Shukhevich affairs can be considered manifest examples of such narratives toward the past in the post-Soviet region. The cooperation of those two men and the organizations they headed with Nazi Germany is not viewed as a problem in the eyes of their supporters. They became heroes because they fought against the Soviets for the independence of the Ukrainian people. The means they used are irrelevant, even if some members of their groups took part in atrocities against Jews. Even after the change of presidents in February 2010, the issue remained on the public agenda. Moreover, it became a bone of contention between pro-Russian and Ukrainian nationalist elements. Bandera and Shukhevich became symbols of the Ukrainian nationalists’ struggle against anyone who they believed did not fit the perceived national character of the country.46 44 “Kiev, Ukraine—Court Annuls Award to Nazi Collaborator,” VosIzNeias (blog), April 3, 2010, http://www.vosizneias.com/52489/2010/04/02/kiev-ukraine-court-annuls-awardto-nazi-collaborator/print/, accessed in September 2017; “Bandera Permanently Deprived of Hero of Ukraine Title” [in Russian], IzRus, January 10, 2011, http://izrus.co.il/print_ news.php?news=32943, accessed in 2011; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Ukraine Strips Nationalist Leader Bandera of Honor,” January 12, 2011, http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/01/12/2742522/ukraine-strips-nationalist-leader-bandera-of-honor, accessed in September 2017. 45 Voice of Russia, “Another Nazi Collaborator Deprived from Hero Title in Ukraine,” April 23, 2010, http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/04/23/6810665.html, accessed in September 2017. 46 In the wake of the worrisome changes in Ukrainian society that followed the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, and the deteriorating relations between Russia and Ukraine, the topic of “honoring the collaborators” has developed much further. See, for instance, John-Paul Himka, “The History Behind the Regional Conflict in Ukraine,”  Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History  16, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 129–36; Ivan Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine,”  Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48, nos. 2–3 ( June–September 2015): 217–28; Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe,  Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist; Fascism, Genocide, and Cult (Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2014); and Per Anders Rudling, “The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications,” Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 5 (2016): 26–65.

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The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Jews Michael Whine

I

t may strike many as bizarre that Israel’s UN ambassador Ron Prosor was pictured in November 2011 with Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen at a reception at the French Mission in New York, in view of the multiple convictions of her father, previous FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, for inciting antisemitism.1 This episode demonstrates a new approach of the French radical Right—an attempt to seek Jewish support—which has been observed by experts in the field, such as Jean-Yves Camus.2 How and why are members of the European radical Right reaching out to the Jewish population, and what is the response?3 Shortly after that meeting, the French news channel France 24 reported that six months prior to the presidential and legislative elections, a canvasser on the outskirts of Paris was astonished to hear from a young woman wearing a Star of David necklace that she was voting for Marine Le Pen.4 In reaching 1 Marc Tracey, “Israel Amb. ‘Accidentally Meets With Le Pen,’” Tablet, November 8, 2011, http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/82744/israel-amb-‘accidentally’-meets-with-le-pen. 2 See, for example, Robert Zaretzky, “France’s Far-Right Front National Party Is Courting Jewish Voters,” Tablet, December 12, 2011, http://www.tabletmag.com/­jewish-news-andpolitics/85828/send-the-marine. 3 The radical Right should be differentiated from other trends on the far right. It includes the emerging anti-immigrant populist and social movements, which are racist, are sometimes antisemitic, and may have neo-Nazi origins, but which may also have rejected them. The extreme Right includes neo-Nazis, neo-Nazi skinheads, autonomous nationalists, and Third Positionists, the majority of whom have adopted antidemocratic and sometimes violent means to pursue their ideologies. See, for example, Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, eds., Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2–5. 4 Charlotte Boitiaux, “The National Front and the Quest for the Jewish Vote,” France 24, December 14, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20111214-national-front-goes-all-outjewish-vote.

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out to the Jewish community, the FN appears to be discarding, at least outwardly, the antisemitism of its founder and former leader, and to be seeking a veneer of respectability that was glaringly absent in its past. Marine Le Pen herself reinforced this change of attitude when, in contrast to her father’s pronouncements, she denounced the Nazi concentration camps as “the pinnacle of barbarism.”5 But it is not just the French radical Right that has been courting the Jews. Leaders of the British National Party (BNP) also tried something similar. Britain’s main far-right group previously promoted Jewish conspiracy theories and even, on occasion, Nazi ideology. However, in a complete turnabout, the then BNP leader Nick Griffin stated to Israel’s Ma’ariv newspaper that he no longer has time for “crazy antisemites.”6 It should be noted that in 1998, Griffin and another activist were convicted for inciting racial hatred in connection with material denying the Holocaust. Griffin was given a nine-month suspended sentence and fined a substantial amount.7 The English Defence League (EDL), founded only in 2009, and which originally drew on football gangs for its initiatives and now includes some BNP followers, has tried to secure Jewish support for its anti-Muslim campaigns. For a short time, in addition to some Sikhs, it actually had a few Jewish members organized into a Jewish division.8 In Belgium, leaders of the Vlaams Belang (VB) have sought to make common cause with Israel in its perceived war against radical Islam. Established in the wake of the 2004 court decision to disband the Vlaams Blok on account of its racist programs, the VB has since toned down its antisemitic rhetoric and tried to attract Antwerp’s Jewish community.9 What, then, has prompted the shift of some radical right-wing groups toward seeking support from Europe’s Jews, along with a more pro-Israel stance?  5 Ibid.   6 Nadav Eyal, “I Don’t Have Time for Crazy Antisemites,” Ma’ariv, January 2, 2009.   7 Sentencing at Harrow Crown Court, May 1, 1998, for stirring up racial hatred in The Rune magazine, contrary to Section 19(1) of the Public Order Act 1986.   8 Statement from the English Defence League Jewish Division, February 17, 2011, http:// edl-englishdefenceleague.blogspot.com/2011/02/statement-from-the-edl-englishdefence-league, accessed February 18, 2011.   9 Author’s correspondence with editor of Joods Actueel (Antwerp), February 21, 2012. See also, for example, an interview with the secretary of the Antwerp Forum of Jewish Organisations, in Phillip Carmel, “Jews in Belgium Concerned That Party’s Banning May Backfire,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 14, 2004, http://www.jta.org/2004/11/15/archive/jewsin-belgium-concerned-that-partys-banning-may-backfire.

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THE RISING RADICAL RIGHT The two overriding political concerns of many in Europe now are immigration, particularly Muslim immigration, and the economic collapse.10 In the minds of far-right activists, the two are closely linked, and the rise of radical-right and populist parties over the past ten years has been a consequence. While the Far Right once lingered on the political fringes, it now commands political weight in the parliaments of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and other countries. Opposition to immigration constitutes a principal plank in the platforms of the Sweden Democrats, the VB, the FN, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, the Danish People’s Party, and the EDL.11 In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (Af D) right-wing populist party had gained representation in thirteen of the sixteen German state parliaments by early 2017, although its political support, according to polls, now appears to be dropping. To varying degrees, these parties, political organizations, and groups oppose ethnic and cultural diversity, and some incite public disorder with their marches and rallies aimed at harassing and intimidating Muslims and other immigrants. Their street violence provokes reactions from Muslims, especially Islamists, and an increasing spiral of action and counteraction has been evidenced in some cities.12 Some radical-right views may appear inconsistent when compared with those of the historic and traditional Far Right. What is particularly inconsistent, as well as novel, is the positive stand that some of these groups have demonstrated toward Israel and the Jews. According to Matthew Goodwin and Vidhya Ramalingam, what differentiates the radical Right from the traditional Far Right 10 Five recently published reports shed some light on the issues motivating supporters of these organizations and groups. They can be summarized as an overriding grievance over continued immigration into (primarily western) Europe, and in particular, fears over Muslim immigration; racial hatred toward minorities such as the Roma; growing dissatisfaction with governments and their inability to improve economic life; and pessimism about their countries’ long-term economic prospects. See Matthew Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe (London: Chatham House, 2011); Paul Jackson, The EDL: Britain’s “New Far Right” Social Movement (Northampton: University of Northampton, 2011); Jamie Bartlett and Mark Littler, Inside the EDL: Populist Politics in the Digital Age (London: Demos, 2011); Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Mark Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism (London: Demos, 2011); Matthew Goodwin and Vidhya Ramalingam, The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012). 11 Goodwin and Ramalingam, New Radical Right. 12 Ibid., x–xiii.

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of the late twentieth century is the “capacity to opportunistically shift its politics and themes, increasingly spanning left-wing, and centre spectrums, and in some cases espousing the language of liberal democracy.”13 The contemporary European radical Right is international in outlook, again in contrast with its twentieth-century predecessors. Its members mobilize across borders, they exchange ideas and best practices, they engage with local communities, and they sometimes represent those communities’ real fears in a more effective manner than traditional mainstream parties do.14 Moreover, their members are adept at using social media to amplify their message, to recruit, and to organize. Some, like the EDL, are social networks rather than formal political parties, and their use of information and communications technologies facilitates growing liaison and cooperation among supporters. A recent study noted that online social media interaction often dwarfs their formal membership.15 They present a more youthful profile than neoNazis, and their management and leadership structures are flatter and netted, rather than hierarchical, like the old Far Right. The new radical Right molds its politics in an adaptable manner, and while it may rely on the far-right tradition of street marches and demonstrations to advertise its message and attract support, it is dependent on, and greatly empowered by, its use of information and communication technologies. According to Goodwin and Ramalingam, with an “increasingly young, charismatic, well-educated and politically-minded leadership, as well as a populist style and discourse which resonate with the wider public, the new radical right is shifting the style of successful political behavior and political leadership in Europe, even shaping its strategies and methods of communication of mainstream parties.”16 In this sense, therefore, the new populist radical Right is different from the neo-Nazi and fascist extreme Right. But it should not be viewed as a uniform movement. Some groups have their origins in nationalist parties founded by Nazi-era collaborators, such as the Belgian Vlaams Blok, which preceded the Vlaams Belang, and which was a fusion of the collaborationist Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union) and the Vlaamse Volkspartij (Flemish People’s Party), while others, such as the EDL, the Alleanza Nazionale, and the Swiss Schweizer Demokraten have no Nazi or neo-Nazi foundations. 13 Ibid., 4. 14 Michael Whine, “Trans-European Trends in Right Wing Extremism,” in Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, Mapping the Extreme Right, 323–24. 15 Goodwin and Ramalingam, New Radical Right, 4. 16 Ibid.

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Some genuinely represent a growing constituency and operate within the rules of democracy. Whereas radical-right parties in Western Europe make overtures to the local Jewish communities, their counterparts in Central and Eastern European countries are not inclined to do so. They do not seek Jewish support partly because they often are antisemitic and partly because there is little Muslim migration to their countries. Of increasing concern to the Jewish communities, however, has been the electoral success of far-right and antisemitic parties, particularly in Greece and Hungary. In Central and Eastern Europe, the adoption of Nazi-era motifs and even uniforms suggests that those supporters born in the post-Communist era of collapsing political and social values have seized on ready-made images of ethnic identity in an extreme form in order to promote their concerns over migration, economics, and culture. There is little room for any pluralism in their national space, particularly for those migrants who openly preserve their religion and culture. Such activists are characterized by a rudimentary grasp of extreme and radical right-wing ideology. Tore Bjorgo has noted that defining them in terms of one single issue, value, or philosophical idea is a frustrating exercise. He suggested instead that they should be perceived as embodying an anger against perceived outsiders or the state.17 For some on the radical Right, the Jewish presence in Europe over two millennia just about allows them a place, whereas recent migrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia present a growing threat. Their attention is now focused not on Jews but against migrants, and Muslim migrants in particular. A recent Norwegian study examined antisemitic violence, and those who perpetrate it, in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Russia and established that right-wing extremists constituted a clear minority of perpetrators of attacks against Jews over a ten-year period in most countries, with the exception of Russia.18 However, Jewish concerns about extreme-right militancy are rising again in Scandinavia, as neo-Nazis in Norway and Sweden plan demonstrations close to local Jewish communities. A planned march near the synagogue in Gothenburg prior to Yom Kippur in 17 Tore Bjorgo, Terror from the Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 2. 18 Johannes Due Enstad, Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005–2015: Exposure and Perpetrators in France, UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Russia (Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, University of Oslo, and the Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017), https://www.hlsenteret.no/publikasjoner/digitale-hefter/antisemittisk-vold-i-europa_engelsk_endelig-versjon.pdf, accessed September 19, 2017.

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September 2017 was viewed as a real threat and came uncomfortably close after recent antisemitic messages were sent to another Swedish Jewish community in Umeå. “The threat against us is always large, and it becomes even larger when they are marching,” stated the chairman of the Gothenburg c­ ommunity.19 And the chairman of the Norwegian Jewish community recently accused the government of not taking extreme-right violence seriously and of failing to have an action plan against racism and right-wing extremism.20

JEWISH REJECTION Approaches by the EDL and BNP to British Jews were answered firmly by both secular and religious representative groups with statements rejecting their attempts to undermine social cohesion. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Rabbinical Council of the United Synagogue, the Spanish and Portuguese Jews’ Congregation, the Movement for Reform Judaism, Liberal Judaism, and the Assembly of Masorti Synagogues also criticized the EDL’s use of Israeli flags in their demonstrations against mosques in October 2011.21 The EDL’s overtures to British Jews appear to have been short-lived. The American Orthodox rabbi Nachum Shifren visited the EDL in England in 2010 and participated in several of its anti-Muslim rallies, as well as a proIsrael demonstration outside the Israeli embassy in London, but members of the EDL’s tiny Jewish Division now appear to have given up. Indeed, a posting to the Jewish Division website notes that they have broken with the EDL and allied themselves with the American Jewish Defense League to form the Jewish Defence League UK.22 19 Josefin Dolsten, “Neo-Nazis Plan to March near Swedish Synagogue on Yom Kippur,” Jewish Telegraph Agency, September 12, 2017, http://www.jta.org/2017/09/12/news-opinion/ world/neo-nazis-plan-to-march-near-synagogue-on-yom-kippur, accessed September 19, 2017. 20 The Nordic Page, “Neo-Nazis in Norway Increase Their Activities: Training with Weapons,” September 8, 2017, https://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/neo-nazis-norway-increaseactivities-training-weapons, accessed September 19, 2017. 21 Statements made by the Board of Deputies and the synagogal bodies were made between September 21 and October 4, and were sent to the home secretary on October 31 by the Joseph Interfaith Organisation, London. See also Matthew Taylor, “BNP Seeks to Bury Antisemitism and Gain Jewish Votes in Islamophobic Campaign,” The Guardian, April 10, 2008; Simon Rocker, “Jews Welcome Ban on EDL Marches,” Jewish Chronicle, September 1, 2012, https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/jews-welcome-ban-on-edl-marches-1.27072. 22 “Rabbi Shifren Visits England and the EDL,” English Defence League website, October 1, 2010, http://www.englishdefenceleague.org, accessed October 11, 2010; English Defence

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A concerted attempt to engage with British Jews as well as with Israel was made in 2010 by Paul Weston, the then leader of the short-lived British Freedom Party, a political group with which the EDL sought a liaison at the time. In December 2010, Weston spoke at a Jerusalem conference of the Alliance of European Freedom and National Parties in Europe and visited Yad Vashem.23 Weston wrote in the visitors’ book at Yad Vashem, “We will work to make sure that ‘Never Again’ really means never again. Signed the European Counter Jihad. 7th December 2010.”24 Later, in February 2012, he spoke at a Toronto Zionist Centre meeting of the Jewish Defence League of Canada.25 Weston and his group had no contact with official or representative Jewish or Israeli bodies. Over the course of several months, Community Security Trust senior staff outlined the basis for the community’s opposition to populist anti-Muslim campaigning.26 The BNP reacted strongly to the statement that its approach to Britain’s Jewish community was motivated by a cynical desire to garner votes wherever it could, even among its traditional “enemies”: The BNP has made its position clear many times. We are not “Zionists,” our overall concern is to look after the interests of our own country, and not to bother ourselves with or interfere in the affairs of other nations. But we have repeatedly denounced the neo-Nazi cranks who infest the fringes of British politics, and we reject anti-Semitism as part of a dangerous and outdated cycle of last century hostility between Jews and Gentiles—a hostility that can only benefit our mutual enemy, Islamic imperialism. Loyal British Jews are our natural allies in the fight against Islamic fundamentalists who want to destroy Western civilisation so many of whose core values we hold in common.27

23

24 25 26 27

League Event at the Embassy of Israel, October 24, 2010, http://www.facebook.com/ event.php?eid=145642605479131&index=1, accessed October 4, 2010; English Defence League Jewish Division announcement, Facebook, https://facebook.com/pages/JewishDefence-League-uk923:833770208343. Paul Weston, “JDL and the Victory Cake,” Blogwrath.com, February 21, 2012, http://www. blogwrath.com/europe/paul-weston-jdl-and-the-victory-cake/2575/, accessed September 19, 2017; “Paul Weston in Israel: The West Needs to Wake Up,” Tundra Tabloids (blog), December 7, 2010, http://tundratabloids.com/2010/12/paul-weston-in-israel-the-westneeds-to-wake-up.html, accessed September 19, 2017. “The European Counter-Jihad at the Yad Vashem,” Tundra Tabloids (blog), December 8, 2010, http://tundratabloids.com/2010/12/the-european-counter-jihad. Weston, “JDL and the Victory Cake.” See, for example, Mark Gardner, “Tower Hamlets, EDL, Jews and Israel,” CST blog, September 6, 2011, https://cst.org.uk/news/blog/2011/09/06/tower-hamlets-edl-jews-and-israel. British National Party, “The BNP and Anti-Semitism: A Response to the Board of Deputies,”

Michael Whine

In Belgium, despite rejection by Jewish community bodies, the VB has ­consistently adopted pro-Israel positions, has hosted the visit of an Israeli ­government minister, and even sent a delegation to Israel, with its former leader Filip Dewinter being received in the Knesset, although it was a private, not an official, visit. According to various reports, the Flemish population is generally more supportive of Israel’s political positions than is the Frenchspeaking Walloon community.28 It is ironic, and perhaps a real measure of their traditional concerns and ambivalence toward Jews, that it was the VB that initiated legislation, which the Belgian Senate voted to adopt in 2011, that would have amnestied wartime Nazi collaborators. Protests against the decision were made by the Jewish community, and the initiative has not so far been enacted.29 As in the United Kingdom, French Jewish communal opposition to the Front National, which has a small number of prominent Jewish activists, has come from both the French religious leadership and representative bodies. In January 2012, Chief Rabbi Gilles Bernheim stated in a press interview that Jewish values were incompatible with those of the Front National, and the leadership of the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions has spoken out against the radical right on numerous occasions, particularly after the Prosor/Le Pen meeting in 2011.30 A diversity of responses is now becoming apparent, and local Jewish bodies have complained vigorously and publicly about the willingness of right-wing Israelis to respond to friendly gestures by European groups. The hosting of Father Tedeusz Ryzyk, the director of the antisemitic Radio Maryja, by the Israeli ambassador at her embassy in Warsaw in September 2016 elicited complaints by the local community as well as Poland’s Never Again Association, a prominent and respected nongovernment organization that monitors antisemitism and extremism in Poland.31 The Freedom Party Land & People, April 23, 2008, http://www.bnp.org.uk/2008/04/23/the-bnp-and-antisemitism-a-response-to-the-board, accessed April 24, 2008. 28 Charles Johnson, “Vlaams Belang: Friends of Israel?,” Little Green Footballs (blog), November 10, 2008, http://littlegreenfootballs.com/article/31871_vlaams_Belang_ friends-of_Israel. 29 The Board of Deputies of British Jews also protested to the Belgian ambassador on May 24, 2010. 30 Gilles Bernheim, “Les valeurs du judaisme sont incompatibles avec celles du Front national,” SudOuest, January 15, 2012, http://www.sudouest.fr/2012/15/le-grand-rabbin-de=­france-lesvaleurs-du-judaisme, accessed July 4, 2012. 31 Josh Jackman, “Israeli Envoy Discusses Polish-Jewish Relations with Priest Who Runs Radio Station Accused of Antisemitism,” Jewish Chronicle (London), September 12, 2016, https// www.thejc.com/news/word/Israeli-nvoy-discusses-polish-jewish-relations-with-priest-whoruns-radio-station-accused-of-antisemitism, accessed September 19, 2017; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Israeli Ambassador Hosts Polish Priest Accused of Anti-Semitism,” September 10,

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of Austria (FPÖ) has sought to find common cause with Israel, and following a visit to Israel in 2010, it published the Jerusalem Declaration, in which it upheld Israel’s right to defend itself against jihadist terror. At the invitation of the FPÖ, an Israeli deputy minister, Ayoob Kara, subsequently visited Vienna, causing concern among members of the Austrian Jewish community.

CONCLUSION The evolving ideology of the radical right is now coming to light, but attitudes toward Jews are still indistinct. In Western Europe, the former narrow ultranationalism is moving toward a wider European cultural identity, which at the same time is fearful of economic collapse and the consequences of globalization, but especially of immigration, and Muslim immigration in particular. Free borders within the European Union and cyberspace have allowed it to absorb new ideas and operate transnationally. The radical Right has not, however, developed any empathy for Jews, nor in many cases abandoned antisemitism. Rather it sees the Jews, and Israel in particular, as natural allies in the struggle against Islam. This allows some leaders to speak out against their local Jewish communities while praising Israel. Whether this is a permanent or temporary approach remains unclear. Jewish communities, however, have understood that undermining pluralistic and open societies may also undermine the equality and freedoms that they have achieved, and they have not been afraid to say so in public. Far-right parties and groups in Central and Eastern Europe reflect economic concerns and loss of national powers. They focus more on historic antisemitic themes, such as the quest for world domination, and less on Muslim immigration. As a consequence, Jews are not seen as potential allies, but as “the Other,” and although they are not victimized in the way that Roma and Sinti communities are, they nevertheless understand that their well-being rests on strengthening democracy, not undermining it.

2016, https//www.timesofisrael.com/Israeli-ambassador-hosts-polish-priest-accused-ofantisemitism, accessed September 19, 2017; Don Snyder, “European Jews Alarmed by Israeli Outreach to Anti-Semitic Far Right,” Forward, January 18, 2017, http://forward.com/news/ world/360436/european-jews-alarmed-by-israeli-outreach, accessed September 19,2017

The Worrisome Defiance of the Golden Dawn Michal Navoth

O

n June 17, 2012, eighteen members of the Golden Dawn (Chryssi Avghi in Greek) were sworn into the Greek Parliament after their party had received 6.92 percent of the vote in the general elections. In so doing, it has arguably become not only the most extreme right-wing political party to have won parliamentary seats in Europe in the last years but also among the most extreme to have entered a European national legislature since Nazi-era Germany. The Golden Dawn not only openly spreads racism and antidemocratic propaganda but also incites violence against non-Greeks. The Golden Dawn’s popularity has grown ever since, and it has established itself as Greece’s third-largest party. No other party has managed to capitalize on the growing levels of despair of the population of the debt-stricken country as effectively as the Golden Dawn.1 The question, then, is why only the arrest in September 2013 of a party supporter who confessed to the fatal stabbing of an anti-fascist musician spurred an in-depth investigation of the Golden Dawn’s leadership, and why the high-profile investigation has had no long-term effect on the popularity of the Golden Dawn.2

NORMALIZING RACISM AND REHABILITATING NAZISM Even if the party is not a member of the governing coalition, it has an impact on society by normalizing racist and antisemitic speech and pushing its views into mainstream policies. Lawmakers from the Golden Dawn have frequently used undisguised antisemitic rhetoric in the Greek Parliament. For instance, on  1 Helena Smith, “Greeks Protest against Golden Dawn Attack on Communists,” The Guardian, September 13, 2013.   2 “Greek Neo-Nazis See Rise in Voter Support: Poll,” Hurriet Daily News, November 24, 2013.

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February 7, 2013, the Golden Dawn MP Ioannis Lagos submitted an interpellation questioning the country’s marking of International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and the teaching of the Holocaust in Greek schools.3 On June 6, 2013, the Golden Dawn MP and spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris went further and even intimated that he is a Holocaust denier.4 Kasidiaris was not the only one. The Golden Dawn leader Nikos Michaloliakos publicly and repeatedly denied the Holocaust in the spring of 2012, a few weeks before the elections.5 Senior party members also repeatedly express admiration for Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. In mid-May 2013, the Golden Dawn lawmaker Christos Pappas reaffirmed his admiration for Hitler and National Socialism during a session of the Greek Parliament. Later the same week, the Parliament ejected a Golden Dawn lawmaker and shouts of “Heil Hitler” were heard in the chamber.6 In July 2013, the Golden Dawn played a Greek version of the “Horst Wessel Lied,” the anthem of the German Nazi Party. It was done during a charity food handout attended by more than two thousand, where Golden Dawn functionaries checked recipients’ identity cards to ensure that nonGreeks were excluded, in accordance with the Golden Dawn’s racist agenda and propaganda.7 Despite the fact that the German occupation of Greece in 1941–44 is still a painful memory for many Greeks, the same ritual of singing   3 David Saltiel, Report on Antisemitism in Greece, 2010–2013 (Athens: Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, 2013), Annex 1, 4.  4 World Jewish Congress, “Greek Lawmaker Suggests in Parliament He is a Holocaust Denier,” June 7, 2013.   5 Michal Navoth, “The Greek Elections of 2012: The Worrisome Rise of the Golden Dawn,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, no. 1 (2013): 87–94.   6 World Jewish Congress, “Greek Neo-Nazi Party Lawmaker Urges Killing of ‘Bankers,’” May 22, 2013; “Greek Parliament Ejects Neo-Nazi MP as ‘H[e]il Hitler’ Shouts Heard,” Hindustan Times, May 17, 2013.  7 Umberto Bacchi, “Greece’s Golden Dawn Plays Hitler’s Nazi Anthem at Athens Food Handout,” International Business Times, July 25, 2013. The Golden Dawn used its Nazi rhetoric to enhance its anti-immigrant platform. In July 2013, on the basis of Law No. 927/1979, a public prosecutor pressed charges against Alexandros Plomaritis, a former Golden Dawn parliamentary candidate, for introducing the use of Nazi-era tactics against immigrants in Greece. In a program aired in March 2013 on Britain’s Channel 4 News and filmed in Athens, Plomaritis threatened to turn immigrants “into soap,” put them in “ovens,” and “make lamps from their skin.” See US Department of State, Greece 2013 Human Rights Report: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2014), 11; World Jewish Congress “Greek Neo-Nazis Threaten to Make ‘Soap’ of Immigrants,” March 7, 2013. On September 16, 2014, the Misdemeanor Court of Athens found Plomaritis guilty of inciting racist violence and issued a three-year suspended sentence. See “Former Golden Dawn MP Candidate Plomaritis Sentenced by Courts,” To Vima, September 16, 2014.

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the Nazi anthem repeated itself at the beginning of June 2014 at a rally in front of the Greek Parliament. This caused the then minister of public order and citizen protection Nikos Dendias to condemn the Golden Dawn as a “pathetic copy of Nazi totalitarianism.”8 Swastikas and other fascist symbols have become increasingly popular as the Golden Dawn’s political strength has grown. On August 4, 2013, photos of party spokesman Kasidiaris’s swastika tattoo were published in the Sunday issue of Greece’s highest-selling newspaper, Poto Thema.9 Another Golden Dawn MP, Panayiotis Iliopoulos, said he “didn’t know anything about Hitler” and that he chose to have the words “Sieg Heil” tattooed on his right arm because he liked the fonts.10

THE AUTHORITIES’ LONG-AWAITED REACTION In an annual report on human rights practices, released on February 27, 2014, the US State Department slammed Greece’s response to the activities of the Golden Dawn: “Although the far-right Golden Dawn . . . party had a swastika-like emblem, employed Nazi salutes, and its leaders made antiSemitic, anti-immigrant, and xenophobic statements, authorities charged no [Golden Dawn] party MPs with hate speech.”11 But the Greek authorities could no longer ignore the Golden Dawn when it became clear that members of the party engaged in criminal activity. On September 17, 2013, the murder near Athens of an anti-fascist musician, Pavlos Fyssas, by a man who admitted to being an active supporter of the Golden Dawn served as a wake-up call for the Greek authorities. Unlike in the past, when members of the party had been behind numerous attacks against immigrants and their crimes had remained unpunished, the murder in September 2013 triggered massive reactions from the government and all other political ­parties, as well as a probe into the alleged criminal activities of the Golden Dawn.12  8 Bacchi, “Nazi Anthem.” Nikos Dendias was minister of public order and citizen protection from June 2012 to June 2014, when he was appointed minister of development and competitiveness.   9 Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo on Golden Dawn (Athens: Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, December 2013), 8. 10 Aris Chatzistefanou, “Neo-Nazi Tattoos Fall Out of Fashion in Greece after Golden Dawn Crackdown,” The Guardian, October 21, 2013. The headline should not, however, mislead us. In the article, Michalis Spourdalakis, professor of political science at the University of Athens, points out that it would be much harder to confront neo-Nazism in Greece than simply to erase a few tattoos. 11 US Department of State, Greece 2013, 11. 12 “Greek Neo-Nazis’ Popularity Defies Containment, Experts Warn,” Global Post, September 21, 2013.

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Prime Minister Samaras was determined to eradicate what he characterized as the evil of neo-Nazism, arguing there was no place for it in any state.13 Although the party denies any involvement in the incident, Minister Dendias claimed that the investigation of the murder of Fyssas established for the first time that a clear chain of command could be drawn to top levels of the party.14 On September 28–29, 2013, the Golden Dawn leader Michaloliakos, five leading lawmakers of his party, and twenty-six party activists were arrested by the counterterrorist police unit, following orders by the Supreme Court deputy prosecutor. The arrests and the criminal investigation resulted in a detailed report documenting that the Golden Dawn is a criminal organization ­operating in line with the “Fuehrer principle.” According to the police, in the homes of MPs arrested, they uncovered swastika flags and photos of Adolf Hitler.15 A former party member, whose identity is being kept secret by the police, testified that “the Golden Dawn recruits were put through ideological training and brainwashing by being forced to buy copies of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Josef Goebbels’ diary and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, to learn who the enemy is: Jews, Zionists.”16 The two magistrates appointed to investigate the case also characterized the party as “a vertically structured organization that operates along military lines and which is inspired by the ideals of National Socialism with clear references to [Adolf] Hitler and Nazism.”17 13 Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Leader Jailed ahead of Greek Criminal Trial,” The Guardian, October 3, 2013. 14 The Golden Dawn denies any connection with the alleged murderer, although Jorgos Rupakias has both confessed to the murder and confirmed he belonged to the party. Moreover, numerous photographs show Rupakias participating in party activities. See “Greek Police Arrest Eight Right-Wing Extremists in Connection With Murder of Singer,” Romea, September 21, 2013; Mark Lowen, “Greece’s Golden Dawn: ‘Don’t Say a Word or I’ll Burn You Alive,’” BBC, October 10, 2013. 15 Smith, “Leader Jailed”; Lowen, “‘Don’t Say a Word.’” 16 “Former Golden Dawn Member: ‘We’ll Enter Parliament with Tanks,’” Enetenglish, October 8, 2013. 17 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Greek Prosecutors Seek to Lift Immunity from Remaining Golden Dawn Lawmakers,” February 21, 2014. In the second half of October 2013, the court of appeal appointed Ioanna Klapa as the chief investigative magistrate in order to examine the Golden Dawn case. Another magistrate, Maria Dimitrakopoulou, was also appointed to assist. See “Chief Magistrate Appointed for Golden Dawn Case,” Greek Reporter, October 18, 2013. The two magistrates were guarded by armed police around the clock because of death threats they had received, as was the prosecutor who ordered the inquiry. See Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Leader Hits Out at Greek Parliament’s ‘Plot’ to Prosecute Him,” The Guardian, June 4, 2014. The two magistrates were described as going “about the business of dissecting Golden Dawn with the precision of a surgeon.” After a thorough six-month investigation, they compiled a fifteen-thousand-page dossier outlining why they believe the Golden Dawn is a criminal organization. According to Greek law, judicial authorities have a deadline

Michal Navoth

In a move not seen since the collapse of military rule in Greece in 1974, party leader Michaloliakos, who was taken into custody in handcuffs, was ordered by a judge to be held in prison until his trial. Thus, he became the first elected political leader to be incarcerated in almost forty years. He was charged with several felonies, including the forming of a criminal organization, for having used his party to operate a criminal gang that sowed terror in Greece. Michaloliakos, as well as the other arrested lawmakers, denounced the crackdown, arguing that they were victims of political persecution.18 However, while three lawmakers, spokesman Kasidiaris among them, were released on bail, Michaloliakos and MPs Ioannis Lagos and Giorgos Patelis were ordered to be kept in detention. Michaloliakos and Lagos were directly connected to the murder, whereas Patelis was the head of the Golden Dawn’s local office in the area west of Athens, where Fyssas was stabbed. Even though the crackdown has been welcomed by many, there are still those who have voiced concerns regarding the legality of the procedures that led to the jailing of Michaloliakos and other MPs. According to constitutional law professor Kostas Chrysogonos, “Authorities are acting within the law, but I also think it would have been constitutionally more correct if they had asked parliament to lift their [MPs’] political immunity first.”19 George Katrougalos, a professor of public law and constitutional law, concurred and said that “it would be much better for political and legal reasons if the normal procedure for l­ifting their p­ arliamentary immunity had been followed.” However, he also further elaborated on why he didn’t think there had been any violation of the c­ onstitution: The Greek constitution provides (i.e. Article 62) that the members of the Parliament cannot be prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned or otherwise ­confined without prior permission granted by the Parliament. However, there is an exception, when members of the Parliament are caught in the act of committing a felony. The crime of establishing a criminal organization (i.e. Article 187 of the Penal Code), under which the Golden Dawn’s MPs have been arrested, is considered a perpetual flagrant felony. So, technically, their arrest was not contrary to the Constitution.20 of eighteen months to put the MPs on trial. See Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn: Courage of Two Women Stems the Rise of Greece’s Neo-Nazis,” The Guardian, March 23, 2014. 18 Smith, “Leader Jailed,”; Lowen, “‘Don’t Say a Word.’” 19 Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Leader Charged with Heading a Criminal Gang,” The Guardian, September 28, 2013. 20 Dimitris Rapidis, “Interview with Mr. George Katrougalos, Professor of Public Law & Constitutional Law Expert,” December 2, 2013, http://rapidis.blogactiv.eu/2013/12/02/

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In that context it should also be noted that Minister Dendias suggested enacting existing criminal legislation and dealing with Golden Dawn as a criminal gang.21 Only Parliament can lift the immunity of Greek legislators and thus pave the way for their prosecution on criminal charges. From the end of October 2013 till the beginning of June 2014, Parliament voted several times to strip different Golden Dawn MPs of their immunity. On June 4, 2014, an ­overwhelming 223 of the 224 MPs present voted in favor of lifting the immunity of party leader Michaloliakos; the party’s second-in-command, MP Pappas; and a leading Golden Dawn MP, Lagos. Stripping their immunity would allow another round of criminal charges to be pressed against the three. These charges include illegal arms possession and the supply of weapons. The vote was the first public appearance by Michaloliakos since he had been jailed, and it was the first time a democratically elected leader had been escorted into Parliament in handcuffs and under heavy guard.22 Another parliamentary countermeasure taken to challenge the Golden Dawn was a new law that was voted for by an overwhelming majority on October 22, 2013. The law allows an indefinite freezing of funds belonging to parties whose leadership is accused of involvement in a criminal group or terrorism.23 Then, on December 18, Parliament in a roll call voted to suspend state funding to the Golden Dawn. Again, there was an overwhelming m ­ ajority: 241 of 272 MPs voted in favor, while 26 voted against and 5 MPs abstained. The vote was important; the Golden Dawn was due to receive an annual sum of 873,000 euros in state funding.24 Meanwhile, the Golden Dawn is unrepentant. Instead of admitting guilt, the party points the finger of blame at the Jews. The theme of Jewish responsibility for the legal actions taken by the Greek authorities against the Golden Dawn is a permanent feature of the party propaganda and a further indication of how deeply antisemitism runs in the party.25 Similarly, in December 2013, on the occasion of

21 22 23 24 25

interview-with-mr-george-katrougalos-professor-of-public-law-constitutional-law-expert/; Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Arrests Take Greece into Uncharted Waters,” The Guardian, September 28, 2013. Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo, 10. “Michaloliakos, Lagos and Pappas Taken to Parliament,” To Vima, June 4, 2014; Renee Maltezou, “Jailed Greek Far-Right Leader Appears in Parliament, Hurls Abuse,” Reuters, June 4, 2014; Smith, “Hits Out.” World Jewish Congress, “Greece Cuts State Funding for Extremist Parties,” October 23, 2013. “MPs Vote to Suspend State Funding to Golden Dawn,” Ekathimerini, December 18, 2013. World Jewish Congress, Neo-Nazism in Modern Europe Update—April 2014: A Report to the President, March 30, 2014, 6.

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the European Jewish Congress’s visit to Athens, which concluded with the presentation of a symbolic award to Prime Minister Samaras for his firm stance in combating neo-Nazism, the Golden Dawn posted an article on the party’s website titled “In the Aftermath of the Illegal Political Prosecution, the Reward Came: The European Jewish Congress Awarded Samaras.”26

IS IT POSSIBLE TO BAN THE GOLDEN DAWN? Some political figures in Greece as well as abroad have called for a ban on the Golden Dawn. This step would not, however, be legal under the current Greek constitution. In the response of the Greek government in spring 2013 to a report released on April 16, 2013, by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe commissioner for human rights, the government, referring to the 1975 Greek Constitution, pointed out that “the intention of the constitutional legislator, going back in time to the fall of the dictatorship and the collapse of the military junta in Greece, was to avoid any legislative or judicial intervention to the free functioning of political parties.”27 Legal experts in Greece agree that in a democracy, parties and ideologies, no matter how extreme, cannot be banned. Outlawing the Golden Dawn “would be technically very difficult and politically dangerous,” experts noted, and Dimitris Christopoulos, an associate professor of law at Panteion University in Athens, added that “the constitution makes no provision for the dissolution of a parliamentary group, even if there is proof that it is a criminal organization.”28 Even though there is no legal provision for a ban, the Central Board of Jewish Communities (KIS) is of the opinion that it is appropriate to keep asking for the banning of the Golden Dawn. This, it hopes, will spur the authorities to react and to reinforce legislation, or at least to amend the Greek anti-racist legislation.29 Such a reinforcement of the general anti-racism legislation in Greece is under way, even though the process is fraught with difficulties. By the end of May 2013, a rift in the coalition on the voting on the new anti-racism draft law 26 Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo, 13–14. 27 “Comments of the Government of Greece on the Report of the Commissioner of Human Rights, 2013”; Nils Muižnieks, Report following His Visit to Greece, from 28 January to 1 February 2013, Council of Europe, April 16, 2013; “Comments of the Government,” 4. The discussion in this paragraph is based on the author’s presentation “On Antisemitism in Greece in 2012–2013” to the Working Group on Antisemitism in the EU and Western Europe at the Fourth International Conference on the Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, Jerusalem, May 28–30, 2013. 28 “Popularity Defies.” 29 Saltiel, Report, Annex 1, 5.

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was widened as most parties tabled their own versions of a draft law. All drafts endorse the main European guidelines, including punishment of Holocaust denial. The Golden Dawn submitted a bill of its own “to combat racism against Greeks” that would provide severe punishment for immigrants who attack Greeks. In connection to the presentation of the bill, the party stated that “the only racism that exists at this moment in the country is racism against Greeks.”30 From June 2013, after Greece’s political convulsions, to October 2013, the new justice minister Athanasiou, from the conservative party New Democracy, froze the issue, and the procedure required for Parliament to vote on the bill was suspended. On November 20, 2013, after the arrest of the Golden Dawn leadership, a new draft was indeed submitted to Parliament. It merges the previous legislative proposals of the coalition government parties, New Democracy, and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, known by its acronym PASOK, and amends the Greek Anti-Racism Law. The draft law provides for increased penalties for those who publicly encourage or cause hate or violence against individuals or a group of individuals on the basis of, inter alia, their race, skin color, religion, or ethnic or national origins. Likewise, it would also punish public denial or endorsement of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, the Holocaust, and Nazi crimes when this behavior is against a group of people defined on the basis of their race, skin color, religion, ethnic or national origins, or disability.31 Once again, the Golden Dawn responded to the anti-racism bill by attacking the Jews. On November 21, 2013, on its website, and on November 27, 2013, in an article in its paper, the Golden Dawn called the draft “antiGreek and not anti-racism” as well as an “abomination.” The Golden Dawn accused the government of having presented a draft “ordered by the Jews” that punishes the denial of the “so-called Holocaust of the Jews” and makes no mention of the genocide of the Armenians and the genocide of the Greeks by the Turks in Asia Minor.32

THE GOLDEN DAWN HOLDING ITS GROUND Despite the crackdown and the unprecedented parliamentary actions taken against the party, the voters do not seem to have abandoned the Golden 30 John Kolesidis, “Far-Right Greeks Push for Law Jailing Illegal Immigrants,” Reuters, June 4, 2013. 31 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Racism, Discrimination, Intolerance and Extremism: Learning from Experiences in Greece and Hungary (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2013), 15. 32 Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo, 15.

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Dawn. The party remains steadily the third-largest party in the polls. A poll published on October 4, 2013, found the party had lost almost half its support since its leader and lawmakers had been arrested. Even though the poll, conducted in two rounds, on September 25, 2013, and from September 30 to October 3, 2013, found that support for the Golden Dawn stood at 8.5 percent, down from 14.5 percent in July 2013, another poll from the end of November 2013 indicated that the party had rebounded quickly and would receive 10 percent of the vote.33 This trend was confirmed in a series of polls conducted in the first months of 2014, giving the party between 8.9 and 10.5 percent.34 Strengthened by the continuously strong support in the polls, and in a show of defiance, party spokesman Kasidiaris announced at the end of January 2014 that he would run for the office of Athens mayor in the May municipal elections. The first round of elections took place on May 18, 2014, and the second round of voting on May 25, coinciding with the elections to the European Parliament. The vote was considered a litmus test of the mood at large. Although Kasidiaris did not make it into the May 25 runoff, he did receive 16.1 percent of the vote, more than double the party's showing in the general elections in June 2012. His support was even greater in some Athens suburbs, where the Golden Dawn received over 20 percent of the vote—an indication that the party is far from a spent force.35 The Golden Dawn received even further proof of its strong standing among Greek voters in the elections to the European Parliament. On May 11, 2014, the Greek Supreme Court ruled to allow candidates from the Golden Dawn to participate in the elections to the European Parliament, despite the ongoing criminal investigation of several of the party’s leading members. 33 “Most Greeks Say Far-Right Golden Dawn a Criminal Group: Poll,” Reuters, October 4, 2013; “Rise in Voter Support.” 34 Lefteris Papadimas and George Georgiopolous, “Greek Far-Right Lawmaker to Run for Athens Mayor,” Reuters, January 25, 2014; Kerin Hope, “Greek Fascists Protest in Athens,” Financial Times, February 2, 2014. It should be noted that in mid-March 2014, the number of Golden Dawn MPs was reduced. MP Chrysovalantis Alexopoulos resigned after saying he was unaware of the party’s “criminal activities,” and MP Stathis Boukaras was ousted after suggesting that he too was considering quitting. This left the Golden Dawn with sixteen legislators in the three-hundred-seat Parliament. After his resignation, Alexopoulos was called a “liar and defamer” by remaining Golden Dawn MPs. See Andi Dabilis, “Arrests, Loss of MPs Unravel Greece’s Golden Dawn,” SEtimes, March 31, 2014; Andi Dabilis, “Golden Dawn Ditches MP,” Greek Reporter, March 16, 2014. 35 Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Ditches Boots for Suit in European Election Makeover,” The Guardian, May 23, 2014.

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There was no legal way of stopping the Golden Dawn from running, since according to Greek law, candidates are prevented from participating in elections only if they are convicted of a crime, not if they are under investigation.36 On May 25, 2014, the Golden Dawn was voted into the European Parliament for the first time, winning three of the twenty-one Greek seats by receiving 14 percent of the Greek votes.37 The result confirmed the Golden Dawn’s position as Greece’s third-largest party.38 This outcome, albeit not surprising, was nonetheless unwelcome news for many who hoped the crackdown of 2013 would break the party.39 36 Nikoleta Kalmouki, “Greek Supreme Court Allows Golden Dawn to Participate in EU Elections,” Greek Reporter, May 12, 2014; “Greek Supreme Court Allows Golden Dawn to Run in European Elections,” Ekathimerini, May 12, 2014. It should be noted that the Golden Dawn European election list included none of its Greek Parliament deputies. In the local elections, the situation was different. Kasidiaris, who stood for mayor of Athens, was released pending trial, and Golden Dawn MP Panayiotis Iliopoulos, who intended to run for the governor’s office in Thessaly, accepted his candidacy while being detained. See “Jailed Far-Right Golden Dawn MP to Run for Governor,” Ekathimerini, March 9, 2014. No Golden Dawn candidate made it through to the second round that took place on May 25, 2014. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Golden Dawn’s Showing in Elections Worries Greek Government,” May 19, 2014. 37 One seat more than the Swedish far-right party the Sweden Democrats and two seats more than Germany’s neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD). Both of these parties also entered the European Parliament for the first time. See Asaf Ronel, “Far-Right Parties Sweeping EU Vote Should Serve as Warning Sign” [in Hebrew], Haaretz, May 27, 2014. 38 The far-left Greek party SYRIZA won six out of twenty-one seats, Samaras’s New Democracy five, and the Golden Dawn three. Theodora Matsaidoni, “Final List: The 21 MEPs to Represent Greece in the European Parliament,” Greek Reporter, May 31, 2014. 39 The extreme rightists are still a small presence in the 751-seat EU Parliament, with only 38 seats as compared, for example, to the 213 seats of the Center Right and 190 seats of the Socialists. To set up a political group, twenty-five MPs from seven member states are needed. Marine Le Pen, the leader of National Front in France, a party that has twenty-­four members in the EU Parliament, said that she wanted nothing to do with radical extremists such as the Golden Dawn or Jobbik in Hungary. See Helena Smith, “SS Songs and Antisemitism: The Week Golden Dawn Turned Openly Nazi,” The Guardian, June 7, 2014. Nevertheless, the far-right parties’ sweeping electoral gains should serve as a w ­ arning. Most worrying of all is the presence in parliament of the Golden Dawn, a far-right party with a neo-Nazi ideology. It’s arguably Europe’s strongest neo-Nazi party, known as a violent political force. In that context, it should be mentioned that the World Jewish Congress in a recent report referred to three parties as case studies: NPD in Germany, Jobbik in Hungary, and the Golden Dawn in Greece. In the comparison between Jobbik and the Golden Dawn the report finds, inter alia, that Jobbik “is less obviously neo-Nazi than Golden Dawn (though it is not difficult to be less obviously neo-Nazi than Golden Dawn).” See World Jewish Congress, Update—April 2014, 5. The Golden Dawn took less than 0.5 percent in the 2009 European Parliament elections and merely

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Thus, the Golden Dawn, once a fringe group, stands as strong as ever. Despite the government crackdown and criminal investigations of the party leadership, the Golden Dawn, like several other extreme right-wing parties around Europe, seems to be here to stay.40

THE DARK PROSPECT OF A GOLDEN DAWN The Golden Dawn stands firm and even continues to grow stronger. As it grows, the party also becomes increasingly brazen in its embrace of neo-Nazi rhetoric and symbols. This begs the question, does the popularity of the Golden Dawn indicate an alarming upward trend of neo-Nazism and antisemitism in Greece, as Greek voters flock to the banner of the Golden Dawn? The answer would seem to be that these are not the major attractions of the party, and at least for the time being, there are no indications that Greek voters are embracing the virulent antisemitic and neo-Nazi worldview of the party they vote for. Instead, a large part of the Golden Dawn’s appeal to the Greek voters emanates from its vehement opposition to the austerity measures. The near collapse of Greece’s socioeconomic credibility has enabled the Golden Dawn to exploit the void and to present itself as an alternative social support network for Greeks at a time when the national institutions have failed. The Golden Dawn has established an extensive social outreach program that provides services to the elderly in crime-ridden areas and distributes food and clothing to the needy. But that assistance comes at a price—allegiance to the Golden Dawn—even if those aided do not wholeheartedly support the party’s ideology.41 Nonetheless, the approximately five hundred thousand Greeks who gave the party their vote in the European elections were at least willing to overlook the party’s anti-immigrant, anti-EU, and antisemitic rhetoric of hate. This, of course, increases the danger of such views making inroads into mainstream Greek political discourse.42 In the light of this threat, KIS repeatedly called on “the democratic ­political parties to join forces and combat the morphemes of Nazism in our 0.23 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections held the same year. That means its support is up thirty to forty times since then. This is striking evidence that extremist parties can make substantial progress from the smallest of beginnings. See Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo, 1; Navoth, “Worrisome Rise,” 87; and World Jewish Congress, Update—April 2014, 7. 40 Smith, “SS Songs”; Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Memo, 1. 41 Navoth, “Worrisome Rise,” 87. 42 Pierre Hazzan, “Competing for Victimhood: Europe’s Dangerous Elections,” Haaretz, May 19, 2014; Maltezou, “Jailed Greek.”

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country within the framework of the Constitution and the rule of law.” KIS ­further noted that “Greece and Europe had a ‘duty to isolate those who seek the return of Nazism, and those who disseminate racist, xenophobic and anti-­ Semitic ideas, in order to safeguard democracy.’”43 The crackdown on the Golden Dawn also gave the Greek government a decisive push to finally pass a bill that will strengthen the existing anti-racist criminal legislation.44 On September 9, 2014, the Parliament adopted a long awaited anti-racism law, which amended the previous legislation. The new law criminalizes endorsement, trivialization, or malicious denial of the existence or seriousness of genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, the Holocaust, and crimes of Nazism that have been recognized by decisions of international courts or the Greek Parliament if such behavior leads to incitement of violence or hatred, or if it is threatening or abusive toward groups of individuals based on race, color, religion, ethnic origin, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. The law is effective as of September 10, 2014.45 Even though it touches on several of the points brought up in the crackdown on the Golden Dawn, the new law cannot be applied retroactively. Consequently, members of the Golden Dawn could not be tried under this new legislation in the trial that started in April 2015. On October 16, 2014, the prosecutor Dogiakos submitted a 698-page report to the judicial council of the Athens Appeals Court. Dogiakos asked the judicial council to indict all current and former Golden Dawn MPs to be tried by a three-member criminal appeals court. While emphasizing that the courts have the right to judge a political party as a criminal organization, Dogiakos wrote in his report, “A party that seeks to achieve its goals through the use of physical or armed force is not legal.”46 43 World Jewish Congress, “Greek Government Accused of Influencing Judges in Neo-Nazi Party Probe,” April 7, 2014. 44 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Greece Bans Holocaust Denial, Cracks Down on Hate Speech,” September 10, 2014. International Jewish organizations and KIS have long pressed the Greek government to take a tougher legislative stance on hate speech. See also Michal Navoth, “Greece,” in Antisemitism Worldwide 2013: General Analysis (Tel Aviv: Kantor Center for the Study of Cotemporary European Jewry, 2014), 43. 45 Law 4285, Amendment of Law 927/1979 (Gov. Gazette Α 139) and adaptation thereof, in the Council Framework Decision No 2008/913/JHA of November 28, 2008, on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (L 328) and other provisions, Government Gazette Sheet 191, September 10, 2014. An informal translation was submitted to the author by KIS. 46 Dimitris Psarras, Golden Dawn on Trial (Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2015), 8. See also “All Golden Dawn MPs Should Face Criminal Trial, Prosecutor Recommends,” A Gael in Greece, October 17, 2014.

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Despite the actions taken against the party, the Golden Dawn remained steadily the third-largest party in the polls. In the national election on January 25, 2015, the Golden Dawn also came in third with 6.3 percent of the vote, which translated into seventeen parliamentary seats. Thirteen of the lawmakers were reelected, including Michaloliakos and other seniors, his deputy Pappas, and the party’s swastika-tattooed spokesman Kasidiaris. Michaloliakos and Kasidiaris were even in pretrial detention and ran the election campaign while imprisoned.47 In February 2015 the judicial council issued an indictment according to which sixty-nine individuals, among them Golden Dawn’s leader and all its MPs, would be tried.48 The trial commenced in the Korydallos maximum-security prison in Athens on April 20, 2015.49 Golden Dawn rejected the charges, claiming they were politically motivated. The political prosecution was attributed to the Jewish lobby, among others.50 Although more than forty defendants were present, neither the party leadership nor the majority of its MPs were, choosing instead to be represented by their lawyers in what appeared to be an effort to undermine the significance of the proceedings. This, however, does not change the fact that for the first time in modern democratic Greece an entire party leadership has faced trial.51 The trial, which was 47 As Michaloliakos wrote after the elections, “We achieved this great victory despite the fact that we could not be guaranteed an equal and so-called democratic election . . . having to campaign through a payphone.” See Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, AntiSemitism in Greece (Athens: Central Board of the Jewish Communities in Greece, December 2015), 1; Laurence Peter, “Greek Elections: Jail Fails to Deter Far-Right Golden Dawn,” BBC, January 26, 2015; “Golden Dawn Leader and MPs to Stand Trial, Greek Court Officials Say,” The Guardian, February 4, 2015; and “Judges’ Report on Golden Dawn Case Expected Next Week,” Ekathimerini, January 30, 2015. When the Golden Dawn first entered the Greek Parliament in the elections of June 2012, it obtained eighteen parliamentary seats. In March 2014 the number of the party’s members was reduced to sixteen. 48 Psarras, Trial, 8; Niki Kitsantonis, “Trial Postponed for Greek Neo-Fascist Golden Dawn Party Members,” New York Times, April 20, 2015. 49 By that time, Michaloliakos and other MPs who had been in custody had been released, as the eighteen-month detention limit had expired. See Psarras, Trial, 8; and “What Is the Golden Dawn Trial About,” The Telegraph, April 20, 2015. 50 Such attribution is an exception to the new rhetoric the party has adopted since its prosecution and the preparation of the trial. Unlike in the past, when its leadership openly espoused antisemitism, the Golden Dawn has transformed its rhetoric by referring to “Zionism” and “Zionist interests.” The reason for that camouflage emanates from the fact that antisemitism is a form of racism and as such can be prosecuted under the anti-racism law, Law 4285/2014. Anti-Zionism is not covered by the law and cannot be considered a criminal offence. See Michal Navoth, “Greece,” in Antisemitism Worldwide 2015: General Analysis (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry), notes 32–35 and accompanying text.“ 51 “Trial of Far-Right Golden Dawn Leaders Starts in Greece,” The Guardian, April 20, 2015.

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r­ epeatedly adjourned because of legal arguments and technicalities, ­continued in the second half of 2015. It was expected to go on for over a year, given the nature of the charges, the number of the accused, and the number of witnesses.52 As of the end of summer 2017, the trial is still going on. Again, on September 20, 2015, nearly nine months after the last election of January 25, approximately five hundred thousand Greeks once again voted for the Golden Dawn, thus confirming its place as the country’s third-biggest political force. Not only did the Golden Dawn maintain the third position, but in comparison with January’s election, it slightly increased its electoral power, from 6.3 percent to 7 percent. Consequently, its seats in Parliament grew from seventeen to eighteen, which made the Golden Dawn the only party to increase its parliamentary representation.53 The Golden Dawn was especially successful in areas most directly affected by the ongoing refugee crisis, most notably in the Aegean islands, such as Kos and Lesbos, off the Turkish coast.54 Prior to the September election, the Golden Dawn released a video in which three children called on voters to support the party and to keep Greece for the Greeks. Similarly, they urged voters not to become a minority in their own country.55 In the September election, the Golden Dawn spiked in Lesbos and Kos. In Lesbos the Golden Dawn nearly doubled its share of the vote, obtaining 7.8 percent, in comparison with the 4.7 percent it received in January. In Kos the party received more than 10 percent of the vote.56 The Golden Dawn’s surge in Kos and Lesbos is directly related to the factors that explain the rise of the party in 2012, when it first entered the Greek Parliament. The near collapse of the Greek state’s socioeconomic ­credibility enabled the then marginal Golden Dawn to move to the center of 52 “Golden Dawn Trial Set to Resume Next Week,” Ekathimerini, September 3, 2015. See also Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece, Anti-Semitism, 1. 53 Helena Smith, “Neo-Fascist Greek Party Takes Third Place in Wave of Voter Fury,” The Guardian, September 21, 2015. 54 With extensive coastlines and easily crossable borders, Greece has become a gateway to the European Union. On December 21, 2015, the International Organization for Migration confirmed that in 2015 the total number of migrants and refugees arriving in Greece was 821,008 (out of which 816,752 arrived by sea and 4,256 by land). Such numbers of refugees, especially seen against the size of the Greek population of roughly 10.8 million, have increased the appeal of the Golden Dawn and its racist views on foreigners and immigration. 55 Matthaios Tsimitakis, “Greece’s Fascists Are Gaining,” New York Times, October 4, 2015. 56 Frances Martel, “Golden Dawn Surges in Greek Islands amid Migrant Crisis,” Breitbart, September 21, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/09/21/­goldendawn-surges-in-greek-islands-amid-migrant-crisis/.

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the political scene.57 In the fall of 2015, as the local authorities were waiting for the central government to react, and while the Greek government waited for the European Union to determine its policy regarding the growing waves of immigration reaching the islands, the Golden Dawn exploited the situation to spread its propaganda and to gain ground.58 By tapping into public anger over the growing population of immigrants and austerity measures in the ­debt-stricken country, the Golden Dawn managed to portray itself as truly patriotic and as the only defender of Greek interests. This populist approach is what secured half a million votes in the September 2015 election, despite the unprecedented ongoing legal ­proceedings against the party and its leadership. As long as the economic and refugee crises remain unsolved, the Golden Dawn will most likely continue to be a forceful presence in Greek political life—despite the legal process conducted against it.59

57 Navoth, “Worrisome Rise,” 87. 58 Tsimitakis, “Greece’s Fascists.” 59 Smith, “Third Place”; Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn Leaders’ Trial Adjourned until Next Week,” The Guardian, May 7, 2015; “What Is the Golden Dawn Trial About.”

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The Struggle over the International Working Definition of Antisemitism Dina Porat

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n January 28, 2005, the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), then based in Vienna, reached a definition of antisemitism that was later prominently referred to at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Cordoba Conference in June that year. Since then, many other bodies have advocated its use. The one-page “Working Definition of Antisemitism” (WDA; reproduced below) evolved as a result of the concerted efforts of a large number of institutions and individual experts. Those efforts lasted for two years (2003–2004), during which time many questions were elaborated regarding both the principles and parameters of the definition.1 In early September 2010, the tenth biennial seminar of the Tel Aviv University Stephen Roth Institute was convened in the Memoriale de la Shoah in Paris. The title of the three-day gathering was “The Working Definition of Antisemitism—Six Years After.” Though acknowledging a number of ­shortcomings of the EUMC document (to be discussed later), the participants issued a statement urging all concerned to make use of the definition because “it sets antisemitism in the context of the contemporary world, encourages consistent analysis of the phenomenon, . . . offers venues for reactions against

 1 See Dina Porat, “Defining Antisemitism,” and Kenneth S. Stern, “Proposal for a Redefinition of Antisemitism,” in Antisemitism Worldwide 2003/4, ed. Dina Porat and Roni Stauber (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute, Tel Aviv University, 2005), 5–17 and 18–28, respectively.

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it, . . . and might serve as a model for future definitions of other evils, and as a basis for rapprochement and coalitions among minorities and ethnic groups.”2 On May 30, 2011, the congress of Britain’s University and College Union (UCU) passed a motion that vehemently attacked the WDA. That motion called on the UCU and all other academic bodies to distance themselves from the definition, since it includes paragraphs about antisemitism being camouflaged as anti-Zionism. The UCU motion precipitated a controversy in late May and throughout June that engulfed the local and international Jewish leadership, members of academia worldwide, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in the United Kingdom, and others. Open letters of protest were sent to the UCU secretariat, and Jewish members of that body announced their resignation in the media.3 On July 1, Anthony Julius—a celebrated Anglo-Jewish lawyer and an expert on antisemitism in Britain—acting for one of the resigning members, Ronnie Fraser, sent an open letter of complaint to the UCU for breach of the 2010 Equality Act, demanding a response no later than August 5.4 Before deconstructing what was behind the UCU motion and why it aroused the controversy it did, we have to examine the evolution of the WDA prior to its adoption by the EUMC, as well as some of the deliberations at the Paris seminar. We need to direct our attention to the difference between the 2005 WDA and previous definitions of antisemitism. Over the generations, the term antisemitism—originally coined in Germany in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr, “the patriarch of antisemitism”—was successively redefined in various ways. Those definitions reflected the time, place, and local political and social culture in which they emerged. To be sure, antisemitism has always been difficult to define, since antipathy to Jews involves a deep-seated emotional dimension as well as a conglomerate of historical, religious, political, and economic elements. There are, of course, inherent complications in the very fact that Jews are not the only people considered to be Semites, and in the rebirth of a Jewish political entity in the Land of Israel—a development   2 See Dina Porat and Esther Webman, eds., The Working Definition of Antisemitism—Six Years After: The Tenth Biennial TAU Stephen Roth Institute’s Seminar on Antisemitism (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute, 2011).  3 See https://engageonline.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/live-blogging-from-ucu-congressthe-eumc-working-definition/.  4 See Julius’s full letter at the weblog of Norman Geras: “UCU Facing Possible Legal Action,” July 1, 2011, http://normblog.typepad.com/normblog/2011/07/ucu-facing-possible-legalaction.html.

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that has raised new considerations and attitudes toward Jews. Yet the host of definitions reached between 1879 and 2005 was, above all, the work of independent and individual scholars and thinkers, many of whom created these definitions at the request of editors of various encyclopedias and other reference works. For the most part, these intellectuals produced definitions of an academic and theoretical nature. The 2005 definition was the product of teams of both scholars and representatives of governments and institutions. In other words, it was a joint effort aimed at formulating a wording acceptable to all participants, at a watershed moment in the millennium-long history of antisemitism. This was the time not long after the emergence of the so-called new antisemitism, which necessitated a practical basis for international activity and legislation.5 International bodies had previously shied away from any attempt to define antisemitism—even after the Shoah, when the murderous potential of anti-Jewish hostility was revealed. During the years 1945–1993, with but one exception, they refrained from even mentioning it in treaties and agreements. Even the term racism received only meager mention in the United Nations or at European conventions and in European declarations. Instead, rather vague and nonbinding expressions such as tolerance, equality, and the rights of minorities were used.6 After the war, nearly all nations shied away from pointing to specific perpetrators or victims. Yet subsequent developments beginning in the 1990s made the assessment and definition of antisemitism a European and international necessity. The First Gulf War of 1991 led to a sharp rise in a whole range of antisemitic and anti-Israeli expressions. Privatization, unemployment, and the globalization of the world economy were blamed on Jewish capitalists; ­millions of immigrants and foreign workers from the poor Southern Hemisphere flooded the rich northern one, and when they could not be integrated into   5 The term new antisemitism refers to changes that took place at the beginning of the 2000s regarding the initiators of antisemitism (more Muslims with Middle Eastern agendas); the modus operandi (more violence against individuals); tone (more verbal and visual insults); and an increasingly taboo-breaking atmosphere (especially anti-Zionism using antisemitic motifs comparing Jews and Israelis to Nazis). Those who oppose the use of the term claim that despite political and cultural developments, the generations-old negative image of the Jew has not changed. For an analysis of the term new antisemitism and its characteristics, see Dina Porat, “Does Esau Hate Jacob, and If So—Why?” [in Hebrew], Gesher145 (2002): 7–16, on antisemitism.org.il in English, French, and Spanish.   6 See Dina Porat, The Evolution of Legislation against Racism and Antisemitism ( Jerusalem: World Jewish Congress and Stephen Roth Institute, 2006), 5–10.

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surrounding host societies, they poured out their frustration on the wellestablished local Jewish communities. In the meantime, right-wing e­ xtremists exploited the tensions between the newcomers and the local societies to further their own agenda and air their own anti-Jewish sentiments. Jews and Israel were blamed for Washington’s policies in the Middle East. The United States became the strongest yet most despised power in the world, especially in the eyes of many Muslims and European leftists. At its 1992 Copenhagen conference, the CSCE (replaced by the OSCE in 1994) was the first EU (or other) body to report on and denounce the alarming rise in antisemitism—even without actually defining it when using the term. In 1993, in the wake of events in Rostock in the former East Germany, where racist violence was combined with antisemitic outbursts, the EU Parliament passed a forceful resolution mentioning antisemitism by name. Moreover, for the first time since the Second World War, Holocaust denial was defined as instigation to racism, and the EU countries were called on to enact effective ­legislation to combat it.7 Indeed, the large-scale UN conference on human rights convened in Vienna in June 1993 paved the way for a resolution by the UN Commission on Human Rights, in which antisemitism was officially classified as a form of racism.8 At the same time, a new body, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, was created and began its work.9 As problems related to the presence of immigrants steadily increased, and the 1993 conference proved of little help, the European Union declared that 1997 would be “a year of struggle against racism.” This endeavor, too, bore little fruit, but the UN announced that a conference on racism would be held in September 2001 in Durban, South Africa. As the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) drew near, it became increasingly evident that no definition of racism acceptable to all could be reached. Antisemitism was declared a form of racism in 1994, so it too remained undefined. With or without a definition, the conference turned into an anti-Israeli and antisemitic demonstration, which bore no resemblance at all to the goals of its organizers. In fact, it became a part

  7 Stephen J. Roth, “The Legal Fight against Antisemitism: A Survey of Developments in 1993,” supplement to the Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 25 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law, 1995).   8 I was privileged to be a member of the Israeli Foreign Ministry delegation to the Vienna conference, charged with persuading the delegations to enter such a statement in their final speeches.   9 See the 1994 UN Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1995), 324–36.

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of the problem, not the solution, and one of the worst mass manifestations of anti-Jewish sentiment since the Second World War.10 The year 2002 was an especially difficult one in terms of antisemitic violence and expressions of anti-Zionism. It was the year following the Durban conference, which served as a trigger and bridgehead for harsher and more intensive antisemitic activities of all kinds, and it was the year of Operation Defensive Shield, which brought the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a new climax, triggering anti-Israeli expressions around the world. Real concern arose that the widespread outbreaks of violence in Western Europe might get out of hand and be directed against state institutions (this eventually happened in France in November 2005). In June 2003, the OSCE convened a conference in Vienna, in which—for the first time—the participants called for the preparation of practical tools to tackle the rapidly deteriorating situation. The lack of an appropriate definition of antisemitism was felt most acutely, and the conference called for this situation to be rectified. The EUMC tried to meet that challenge, but its 2002–2003 report ­presented an astonishing and disturbing return to some of the earlier definitions dating back to 1880. These were based on Christian, racist, and Nazi notions of the image of the Jew. Its definition referred, among other characteristics, to the “deceitful, crooked, foreign, corrupt nature of the Jew, his power and influence, relation to money,” and so forth, and—not to be forgotten—to responsibility for the death of Jesus. Of course, this was the image of the Jew that the EUMC believed was at the root of the antisemitic imagination. But such a definition might actually suggest the idea that Jews themselves were to be blamed for the hostility directed against them and that in terms of defining the phenomenon, nothing had changed since the collapse of Nazism. As Kenneth Stern, a scholar associated with the American Jewish Committee, described it, “Cause and effect are reversed [by this definition]. Stereotypes are derived from what antisemitism is; they are not its defining characteristic.”11 Moreover, the EUMC attempt to explain the relationship between anti-­Zionism and ­antisemitism was so evasive and so convoluted that even the clear and original—even 10 See Dina Porat, “Durban—Another Attack on the Jewish People” [in Hebrew], Kivunim Hadashim 9, September 7, 2002, 51–60. See also Tom Lantos, “The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference against Racism,” Institute of the World Jewish Congress Policy Forum, no. 24 (2002): 10–18. Lantos wrote, “For me, having experienced the horrors of the Holocaust first hand, this was the most sickening and unabashed display of hate for Jews I had seen since the Nazi period,” 19. 11 See Stern, “Proposal.”

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if debatable—analysis of Brian Klug, the Oxford scholar cited in the report (“the essence of antisemitism is turning the Jew into a ‘Jew’”), was to no avail.12 The next conference, held in Berlin in April 2004, proved to be a ­milestone. The Berlin Declaration forcefully condemned all manifestations of ­antisemitism. It clearly stated that political issues (meaning the Middle East conflict) never justify antisemitism and urged the fifty-five member states of the OSCE to find an all-encompassing, useful definition of the phenomenon. Following the issuance of the Berlin Declaration, the EUMC—to its credit— put aside the former failure. This time it began cooperating with the American Jewish Committee and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, founded in 1995 and located in Warsaw, in a coordinated effort to reach a better definition. Quite a number of scholars and institutions took part in this attempt to meet the challenge,13 and on January 28, 2005, the ­following “Working Definition of Antisemitism” came into being:

WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM The purpose of this document is to provide a practical guide for identifying incidents, collecting data, and supporting the implementation and enforcement of legislation dealing with antisemitism. Working definition: Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, 12 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU, 2002–2003 (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), 12–14. 13 The participants in the deliberations listed on the EUMC Antisemitism: Summary Overview of the Situation in the EU, 2002–2003 (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), 19, are the European Jewish Congress, the Community Security Trust (UK), the Consistoire of France, the TAU Stephen Roth Institute, the Berlin Antisemitism Task Force, the American Jewish Committee, the Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, the Anti-Defamation League, B’nai Brith International, the Tolerance Unit of the ODHIR/OSCE, and Prof. Yehuda Bauer.

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The Struggle over the International Working Definition of Antisemitism ­ riting, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and w ­negative character traits. Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to: ••

 alling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the C name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.

••

 aking mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical M allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective— such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

••

 ccusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined A wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

••

 enying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intenD tionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

••

 ccusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exagA gerating the Holocaust.

••

 ccusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the A alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the state of Israel taking into account the overall context could include: ••

 enying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., D by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

••

 pplying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected A or demanded of any other democratic nation.

••

 sing the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism U (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.

Dina Porat ••

 rawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the D Nazis.

••

Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for e­ xample, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic m ­ aterials in some countries). Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property—such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries—are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.14

A number of issues about and criticism of this original text of the WDA have been raised over the years, but the text has not been altered—too much effort was put into its wording. Still, let me spell out a few of my own reservations: certain negative perceptions of Jews may indeed be expressed in hatred toward them, but a basic tenet that helps understand antisemitism is that a person does not have to be an antisemite or harbor hatred in order to be able to perpetrate antisemitic actions: one can manipulate the negative feelings of others toward Jews in order to further one’s political, religious, and social goals, acting in a manner devoid of emotion vis-à-vis the Jewish victims of one’s machinations. Also, whether denouncing Jewish citizens as more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in is antisemitism is, I believe, debatable. And finally, one may add that the underlying basis for antisemitism is the perception of Jews, or of Israel, as a cosmic, universal evil, even the embodiment of evil. Because the WDA is short and is presented as a practical tool, not merely a theoretical one, this document really does constitute a working definition; it does not deal with the image of the Jew or the motivations of antisemites, but rather with antisemitic activities. It does not even mention Judaism—a concept hard to define. What it does do is facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of manifestations of antisemitism and enable observers to gauge and compare 14 http://www.antisem.eu/projects/eumc-working-definition-of-antisemitism/.

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the level of antisemitism among countries. Regarding the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, the wording is forthright and unambiguous. Barely half a year later, reference to the working definition was made by the participants of the next OSCE conference (in Cordoba) as a matter of fact. Since then, numerous national and international bodies have used the definition, cited it, or recommended using it. These include the UK National Union of Students (2007), the US State Department (2008), and the ­Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism, which cited it in its London Declaration (2009). Courts of justice (e.g., in Lithuania and Germany) have also found it useful, as have law enforcement agencies in a number of countries ­preparing police officers to investigate general hate crimes, not necessarily directed against Jews. To facilitate its use, the WDA has been translated into thirty-three languages used by the fifty-six OSCE member states.15 In consideration of all this, it is clear that what lay behind the UCU attack was not only the desire to delegitimize an internationally accepted document but also to place itself apart from other academic institutions. Therefore, it adopted a resolution disassociating itself and all other academic institutions related to it from the WDA. The deliberations of the September 2010 Paris seminar came after members of the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign were sued in April of that year. The lawsuit itself was based on the WDA, but the court dismissed the action—ostensibly upholding the right of freedom of speech. In other words, the WDA could be construed as an attempt to stifle debate by labeling people antisemites, if one ignores the fact that the WDA deliberately does not deal with motives or personal opinions and concentrates only on deeds. Also, since the WDA specifies the cases in which some of these deeds are considered criminal, critics were afraid that it had been designed to protect Israel and the Jews who support it from criticism and lead those who oppose them to jail.16 The essence of the UCU attack of the WDA, launched on May 30, 2011, was that it included articles that define when anti-Zionism actually becomes antisemitism, and thus, it was an obstacle to the UCU’s wish to boycott Israel with impunity. Reacting to the UCU resolution, the Jewish Leadership Council sent a complaint to the EHRC in the United Kingdom. The EHRC’s chair rebuked the UCU for not having consulted the commission before deciding on its motion. 15 See Michael Whine, “Short History of the Definition,” in Working Definition of Antisemitism—Six Years After, 25–30, note 2. 16 See Dave Rich, “Reactions, Uses and Abuses of the EUMC Definition,” in Working Definition of Antisemitism—Six Years After, 52–59.

Dina Porat

Other Jewish bodies, such as the World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS), the Community Security Trust (CST), and the Board of Deputies declared that they would “not sit back and allow further red lines to be crossed.”17 During the debate on the UCU resolution, Ronnie Fraser, director of the Academic Friends of Israel, addressed the UCU in a style reminiscent of Émile Zola, using words that will undoubtedly resonate for a long time: I, a Jewish member of this union, am telling you, that I feel an ­antisemitic mood in this union and even in this room. I would feel your refusal to engage with the EUMC definition of antisemitism, if you pass this motion, as a racist act. Many Jews have resigned from this union citing their ­experience of antisemitism. . . . You, a group of mainly white, nonJewish trade unionists, do not have the right to tell me, a Jew, what feels like antisemitism and what does not.18

On July 1, 2011, Ronnie Fraser, represented by Anthony Julius, sued the UCU for breaches of the UK Equality Act of 2010. In his letter to Sally Hunt, UCU’s secretary-general, Julius wrote that his client had been harassed because he is Jewish; that the environment created in the union was intimidating, hostile, and humiliating; and that the whole affair is a long-standing scandal. He described the history of the UCU and demonstrated that since its inception it has been increasingly inhospitable to Jews. “Unable to defend itself against the charge of institutional antisemitism, the UCU sought instead to legislate antisemitism itself out of existence,” concluded Julius, and he spelled out Fraser’s demands: abrogation of the resolution, an admission by the UCU of its being guilty of institutional antisemitism, the issuance of a public apology to its Jewish ­members with a commitment to respect them, and at least a ten-year educational program teaching the dangers of antisemitism and its relationship to antiZionism. A response was requested no later than August 5.19 On the same day, the blog Engage published “The Tipping Point for UCU” by its founder and director David Hirsh, in which he labeled the “antisemitic political culture” of the UCU and wondered who would have the upper hand: the union’s “core

17 An open letter in the Jewish Chronicle, May 25, 2011. 18 See EngageOnline.org.UK, May 31, 2011, https://engageonline.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/ live-blogging-from-ucu-congress-the-eumc-working-definition/. 19 Julius, “UCU Facing Possible Legal Action.”

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anti-Zionists” or the “grownups.” He also mused about how heavy the price paid by the union would be once brought to court and found guilty.20 Finally, the matter ended up in court. The UCU members did not resolve to delete the WDA passage that defines when anti-Zionism is in fact antisemitic, nor did they suggest any kind of revision or rewriting. They just rejected the WDA en bloc, not heeding recommendations of other UK bodies. Ostensibly, the UCU stands for equality, liberalism, and the inclusion of all narratives of all individuals and groups. However, Fraser argued, when it concerned Jews and Israelis, those values were abandoned. At the same time, the UCU members clearly did not see themselves as antisemitic and were insulted when they were accused of antisemitism. Instead, their attack on the WDA was based on their view of that document not as a tool to be used against genuine antisemitism but rather as a weapon in order to stifle criticism of Israel. The lengthy trial ended in the spring of 2013, with a verdict that shook the Jewish public in the United Kingdom and abroad.21 Judge Snelson handed down a long verdict, in which he accused Fraser and Julius of “an ­impermissible attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means.” He not only dismissed the claim that the UCU was tainted with antisemitism but also depicted Fraser as a pro-Israeli activist, shifting the focus of Fraser’s claim from antisemitism to Jewish/Zionist politics.22 The WDA was not, however, universally rejected. While the trial was still in process, and in view of the rise of harassment of Jewish students at US and Canadian universities, an attempt was made in the summer of 2012 to persuade the Board of Trustees of the University of California to define a distinction between freedom of speech and hate speech, and to denounce anti-Zionism as one more form of antisemitism. Though the trustees were not requested to refer directly to the WDA, the attempt sparked a furious debate between academics who defended freedom of speech, pro-Palestinian activists who claimed this was just one more attempt to stifle criticism of Israel, and proIsraeli activists who wanted an effectively worded definition. One of the vociferous participants in the debate was a blog maintained by Palestine Solidarity Legal Support, which published a FAQ document entitled 20 Hirsh on EngageOnline.org.UK, July 1, 2011, https://engageonline.wordpress.com/. 21 See, for instance, David Hirsh, “Tribunal Had Same Attitude as UCU,” Jewish Chronicle, April 4, 2013; Simon Rocker, “Anti-Israel Union Case Was ‘Act of Epic Folly,’” Jewish Chronicle, April 4, 2013. 22 Judgment of the Employment Tribunal London Central, Case no. 2203290/2011, March 25, 2013, 44, paragraph 178.

Dina Porat

“What to Know about Efforts to Re-define Antisemitism to Silence Criticism of Israel.” The document discussed the definition of antisemitism adopted by the US State Department already in June 2010, and tried to undermine its legitimacy by exposing its origins in the EUMC definition and the efforts of a certain Israeli academic: “The effort to redefine antisemitism to include common ­criticism of Israel originated over a decade ago when the idea for a r­ e-definition by a Tel Aviv University professor, Dina Porat, was championed by the American Jewish Committee and other US-based Israel advocacy groups.”23 Though it is truly flattering to be mentioned as the initiator of ideas that were eventually adopted by the State Department, it should be reemphasized that the WDA, whatever the body that adopts it may be, is a result of efforts coordinated among many bodies and individual scholars. The document outlines what Palestine Solidarity Legal Support finds objectionable about the State Department definition and about the three Ds (a term coined by Natan Sharansky, the chairperson of the Jewish Agency for Israel) that it includes—Demonizing and Delegitimizing Israel, and treating it with Double standards. At the same time, the document also attacks a ­comparable definition that was adopted by the California State Assembly (in August 2012), on the grounds that it is one more attempt to stifle criticism of Israel and that it provides false evidence of antisemitism on campuses.24 In late 2013, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which replaced the EUMC in Vienna, issued a comprehensive survey on the responses of Jews to antisemitism in eight EU member countries. The report, written by a group of experts, analyzed the answers of some six thousand Jews. The analysis showed a gloomy picture of anxieties and even fears, and a reevaluation by Jews of the future chances for their existence as individuals and as communities in Europe. The survey was conducted with no definition of antisemitism or any mention of the WDA, which had been available on the agency’s official website since its adoption in Cordoba in early 2005. As a consequence, the survey’s six thousand participants answered according to their own assessments of what antisemitism is. In fact, a few weeks after the survey was made public, the WDA was even removed from FRA’s website, without notice or explanation. 23 Palestine Solidarity Legal Support, Legal Advocacy for Human Rights Activists, “FAQ: What to Know about Efforts to Re-define Anti-Semitism to Silence Criticism of Israel,” Electronic Intifada (blog), September 25, 2012, 3. 24 Ibid., 4–5.

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The removal of the WDA prompted many demands for the FRA to explain the move. Among those asking for an explanation was Simon Samuels, director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Europe. His letter to Catherine Ashton, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, went unanswered, but Viviane Reding, the European commissioner for justice, answered—after a lengthy delay—but without referring to the WDA. Other protests received a host of varying answers: the WDA has never been a binding document, nor was it actually ever formally adopted by an EU general decision; while the entire FRA site was remodeled, the WDA was removed along with other papers that were considered merely basis for discussion, not officially adopted documents; the FRA is an autonomous body, to which the EU does not dictate what to include on its site; the FRA collects material on antisemitism from various bodies and hence does not need a definition of its own; and so on.25 In other words, the two EU officials, as well as the FRA, ignored the many efforts that were put into formulating the definition, by individuals and institutions, and the good use it had been put to since 2005. In view of such answers, Samuels speculated on whether pressure from pro-Palestinian lobby groups could be behind the decision to remove the WDA from the website. Furthermore, he raised the possibility that the comprehensive FRA survey on antisemitism published in 2013 was in fact an attempt to mollify Jewish organization after having removed the WDA.26 The removal of the WDA from the FRA’s site also worried representatives of several Jewish organizations, and a renewed intensive effort was started to have the definition if not reinstated on the FRA’s website, then adopted by other international bodies. These efforts bore fruit in 2016. In March, the University of California board unanimously adopted a document that deals with the content of the WDA, although it is not identical to it. The adopted document states that antisemitism, forms of anti-Zionism, and other forms of discrimination have no place at the university. It should be noted that this text is milder than the originally proposed one, which caused a fierce controversy, similar to the one that was provoked by the Fraser-UCU trial. Still, the board went on to say that opposition to Zionism is often expressed “in ways that 25 Dr. Samuels kindly sent me a copy of his first letter, dated November 6, 2013. 26 Samuels lectured at a conference called “Antisemitic Terrorism and Identity Theft: From Assault to Deletion,” organized by the late Professor Robert Wistrich at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in May 2014. See the proceedings in Robert S. Wistrich, AntiJudaism, Antisemitism and Delegitimizing Israel (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016).

Dina Porat

are not simply statements of disagreement over politics and policy, but also ­assertions of prejudice and intolerance toward Jewish people and culture.”27 In May, the WDA was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), during its session in Bucharest. At that time, Romania was chair of the organization—now numbering thirty-one member countries—and the chairperson, Ambassador Constantinescu, led the move. A conference initiated by UNESCO in cooperation with the IHRA took place in December, and the deliberations exemplified the importance of the WDA. Both the general director, Irina Bukova, and the IHRA chairperson recommended the adoption of the definition and expressed opposition, even if indirectly, to the decision approved in the organization’s plenum (and later by the UN General Assembly) to the effect that Jerusalem’s history and present are exclusively Muslim.28 Indeed, a clause in the WDA that discusses denying the right of the Jewish people to self-determination made it possible for me to claim at the conference that self-determination means identity, history, and roots, whose denial—in reference to the ancient Jewish people of all groups— is at least discrimination, if not outright antisemitism.29 In the same week of December, a major meeting of the OSCE took place in Hamburg. Out of fifty-seven member states, only one—Russia—voted against the adoption of the WDA. All others agreed to adopt it, yet due to the rule of consensus, the adoption failed, and months of work and efforts on the struggle against antisemitism, led by German minister of foreign affairs FrankWalter Steinmeier and Rabbi Andrew Baker, personal representative to the OSCE presidency, were lost.30 But sometimes, the efforts to advance the WDA bear fruit. In March 2017, the WDA was adopted by the governments of Austria, Israel, and Romania and by the European Parliament. An upcoming ministerial meeting of the OSCE in Vienna toward the end of 2017 is supposed to rediscuss the adoption of the WDA. In other words, the recognition of the importance of the WDA is ­gaining ground. 27 University of California, Final Report of the Regents Working Group on Principles against Intolerance, January 22, 2016, 2. On the recommendation of the Committee on Educational Policy, the report was adopted on March 24, 2016. 28 Summary of the UNESCO conference, sent to the participants by Karel Frakapane, who initiated the conference, December 11, 2016. 29 Dina Porat, “Towards a Definition of Anti-Semitism,” Haaretz, December 20, 2016. 30 Rabbi Baker kindly shared with me a letter he sent to the OSCE conference participants, on December 19, 2016.

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A major part of the reason why the adoption of the WDA meets with such difficulty is that the WDA has become the focus of heated debates among academics, activists, and politicians. It raises questions about the limits of hate speech and the freedom of speech and about the notoriously blurry line between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. Its detractors fear that it will stifle ­criticism of Israeli policies, whereas its supporters see it as a useful tool in shedding light on bigoted attacks on the Jewish state. For instance, when, in mid-December 2016, British prime minister Theresa May announced that she would adopt the WDA because of an increase in the number of antisemitic incidents in the UK,31 a controversy regarding the line between freedom of speech and incitement, the criticism of Israel, and the Palestinian cause broke out.32 But despite this kind of debate, the WDA has been put to practical use over the years since its inception. It has proven essential in the training of police and other law enforcement officials, helping them to better understand and identify antisemitism. The WDA has also been put to good use in courts of law, helping define when speech is antisemitic hate speech, and has served as a basis for better legislation against antisemitism and other forms of ­discrimination. In other words, despite the attempts to stop its adoption and its use, the WDA has proven its usefulness time and again, and—in the words of the British sociologist David Hirsh—it would seem that the WDA does not pose a threat to anyone except antisemites.33

31 Daniella Peled, “‘Claiming Israel Is a Racist Endeavor’: Britain Adopts New Definition of Anti-Semitism,” Haaretz, December 12, 2016. 32 See, for instance, Ben White, “By Limiting Criticism of Israel, Theresa May’s New Definition of Anti-Semitism Will Do More Harm Than Good,” The Independent, December 12, 2016; Tony Greenstein et al., “Fears New Definition of Antisemitism Will Stifle Criticism of Israel,” The Guardian, December 16, 2016; and Ann Levin, “New Antisemitism Definition Is Justified,” The Guardian, December 19, 2016. 33 David Hirsh, “This New Definition of Antisemitism Is Only a Threat to Antisemites,” Jewish Chronicle, January 8, 2017.

Discrimination against Muslims and Antisemitic Views among Young Muslims in Europe Günther Jikeli

EUROPEAN MUSLIMS: BETWEEN INTEGRATION, EXCLUSION, AND DISCRIMINATION

T

he vast majority of Muslims in Europe are immigrants, or descendants of immigrants, who settled in Europe after World War II, coming mainly from North African countries, Turkey, and South Asia. Together with other immigrants, they came to work in the growing Western European economies during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s; they were joined by their families, and later, others arrived as refugees. The recent wave of refugees since 2014 has brought many Muslims from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq to European countries.1 Out of the European Union’s present population of 510 million, about 22 million, including the recent wave of refugees, are Muslim. Two-thirds live in France (5 million), Germany (6 million), and the   * I would like to thank Roni Stauber and Beryl Belsky for their careful reading of different versions of the manuscript and their thoughtful and constructive suggestions and comments. Some of the findings on discrimination against Muslims were published in Günther Jikeli, “Discrimination of European Muslims: Self-Perceptions, Experiences and Discourses of Victimhood,” in Minority Groups: Coercion, Discrimination, Exclusion, Deviance and the Quest for Equality, ed. Dan Soen, Mally Shechory, and Sarah Ben-David (New York: Nova Science, 2012), 77–96.   1 For detailed statistics on refugees in European countries, see Eurostat, “Asylum Statistics,” http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.

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United Kingdom (3 million).2 They form only between 5 and 8 percent of the respective countries’ population, but the proportion is higher in some urban agglomerations and among young people. The history of migration to Europe has resulted in a landscape of Muslim communities in each European country that is diverse in terms of ethnic origin and religious beliefs. The majority of Muslims in Germany are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from Turkey; about a quarter are ethnic Kurds. The second-­ largest group comes from the former Yugoslavia.3 Some 80 percent of Muslims in France have a Maghreb background and are mostly Arab but also Berber, from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Other ethnicities include groups from Turkey, sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle Eastern countries.4 Most Muslims in the United Kingdom are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from former colonies in South Asia—today’s Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India.5 Today, the majority of European Muslims are an integral part of the fabric of their cities, regions, and countries. There has been no general alienation of Muslims from mainstream society, despite a number of challenges, from those that concern mostly a minority of Muslims—such as support from Muslim fringe groups for Islamist terrorism and violent intolerance of criticism of Islam (such as the reactions to drawings of Muhammad)—to approval of sharia law by many Muslims, forced marriages that are sanctioned by some Muslim clerics, genital mutilation, and “honor killings,” which are often committed in the name of religion. Most Muslims strongly identify with Islam and with their country of residence.6 It is important to bear in mind that   2 These figures are estimations. As of 2010, the Pew Research Center estimated that there were 4.7 million Muslims in France, 4.8 million in Germany, 3 million in the United Kingdom, 2.2 million in Italy, and about 1 million in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Spain. Since 2010, more than 1 million Muslim refugees have come to Germany.   3 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland (Nuremburg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009), 13, 57–93; Martin Sökefeld, Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008).   4 Patrick Simon and Vincent Tiberj, Sécularisation ou regain religieux : La religiosité des immigrés et de leurs descendants, Documents de travail 196 (Paris: Institut national d’études démographique, 2013), https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/19585/document_.travail_ 2013_196_religion.fr.pdf; Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).   5 Office for National Statistics, Full Story: What Does the Census Tell Us about Religion in 2011? London: Office for National Statistics, 2013. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_310454.pdf.  6 Gallup, The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations; With an In-Depth Analysis of Muslim Integration in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Günther Jikeli

Islam, far from being a homogeneous religion, varies according to doctrine, ideological stream, and individual preference and that most Muslims do not rigidly apply their religious beliefs in everyday life. Muslim communities face a number of socioeconomic challenges, including high unemployment rates, relatively poor housing conditions, and lower levels of formal work qualifications. Discrimination is also a factor. Muslims face racist and xenophobic attitudes in relation to their ethnic backgrounds, and stereotypes about their religion add to this. However, discrimination seems to be lower against Muslims than against some other minorities. According to a survey from 2009, 47 percent of Roma, 41 percent of people of sub-Saharan African origin, 36 percent of people of North African origin, and 23 percent of those of Turkish origin had suffered discrimination in the previous twelve months. One in three Muslims reported that they had faced discrimination.7 Negative views of Muslims and Islam are prevalent, but contrary to common belief, such views have not increased since 2004, despite the wave of terror attacks in the name of Islam. In spring 2016, 29 percent of the ­population in Germany (46 percent in 2004), 28 percent of the population in the United Kingdom (31 percent in 2004) and 29 percent (also 29 percent in 2004) expressed an unfavorable view of Muslims in their country; see Table 1. Recent debates about a rise of “Islamophobia,” pushed by Islamist organizations that try to prohibit critical debates about some interpretations of Table 1.  Unfavorable Views of Muslims in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom Unfavorable Views of Muslims 2004

2005

2006

2008

2016

France

29%

34%

35%

38%

29%

Germany

46%

47%

54%

50%

29%

United Kingdom

31%

22%

24%

23%

28%

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe (Washington, DC, 2008); Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and around the World,” 2017.

(Washington, DC: Gallup, 2009), http://www.euro-islam.info/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ gallup_coexist_2009_interfaith_relations_uk_france_germany.pdf.  7 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009), 36, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/663-FRA-2011_EU_MIDIS_ EN.pdf, accessed May 29, 2017; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data in Focus Report: Muslims (Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009), 5.

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Islam, blur the lines between such criticism and hatred of Muslims.8 AntiMuslim acts do exist and might be on the rise, but they have not supplemented racist ­manifestations in Europe in recent years, and they stay below the number of antisemitic acts. Comparative figures regarding acts of physical violence exist for France. In 2016, there were 608 racist or xenophobic registered acts, 182 anti-Muslim acts, and 355 antisemitic acts, and the number of anti-Muslim acts has stayed well below the number of racist and antisemitic acts since they began to be registered by the government in 2010.9 However, there is a growing sense of ­victimhood on the basis of Islamic belief. Debates on Islamic fundamentalism and increased anti-terror measures are often viewed by Muslims as anti-Muslim bias.

COMPARATIVE STUDY RESULTS: PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION How do young European Muslims perceive discrimination, and how and to what extent do they identify with their respective European countries and nationality? A qualitative study of 117 young males who consider themselves Muslim provides some insights into perceptions of discrimination against Muslims and differences between Muslims in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.10 The young men, aged between fourteen and twenty-seven, were asked on the streets of Berlin, Paris, and London about their experiences of d­ iscrimination. The interviews were conducted between 2005 and 2007, as part of an international study on discrimination and antisemitism. Interviewees were asked whether they had experienced racism and discrimination, and in what forms, and they were asked about their views of Jews.  Although not all kinds of discrimination are necessarily perceived by their victims as such, and other incidents might be misinterpreted as discrimination, the responses capture instances of perceived discrimination. Many interviewees did not feel that they were discriminated against at all, but the majority of interviewees reported suffering discrimination or being   8 Pascal Bruckner, Un Racisme Imaginaire (Paris: Grasset, 2017).   9 Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie: Année 2016. (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2017), 190, http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_rapport_2016_bat.pdf. 10 Günther Jikeli, “Discrimination of European Muslims: Self-Perceptions, Experiences and Discourses of Victimhood,” in Minority Groups: Coercion, Discrimination, Exclusion, Deviance and the Quest for Equality, ed. D. Soen, M. Shechory, and S. B. David (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2012), 77–96.

Günther Jikeli

s­ ubjected to negative stereotyping and prejudices directed against their ethnic or religious community. The distinction between discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion is often unclear, confirming results of a larger study of European Muslims conducted in 2008.11 Farouk, from Paris, who believes that he is more affected by racist discrimination than by religious discrimination, said, “No, I don’t think it’s because of religion. But, I dunno, honestly, I’m not in their heads, so I can’t know why.”12 Discrimination or perceived discrimination varies from place to place. Neighborhoods with large migrant communities are often seen as free of discrimination, with the exception of situations involving the police. Discrimination is ­usually felt in other districts of the city or in other cities altogether. Interviewees reported hostile looks, as well as threats and physical attacks, particularly in Germany. Many participants from France reported that they had experienced discrimination in the job market because of their skin color and Arab-sounding names. Discrimination on the basis of social background or district of residence is felt especially in Paris. A number of interviewees in Paris and London perceived the police in their district as racist and complained about the stop-and-search policies. The perception of otherness reveals differences among the three c­ ountries. Generally, interviewees in Germany believed that there was discrimination against “foreigners” on the basis of skin (and hair) color. They often felt foreign, despite having German nationality. In France, discrimination appeared to be focused primarily on Arabs and blacks, on the basis of skin color, Arab names, and stigmatized areas of residence. In Britain, while many thought that discrimination was based on skin color, too, others felt that anti-Muslim prejudices prevailed. Further differentiation can be made between perceptions of discrimination against Muslims and perceptions of hostility against Islam. Some interviewees, mostly from Britain, complained about prejudice against Islam and Muslims or felt themselves affected indirectly by alleged attacks targeting “the Muslims” in other countries—for example, the war in Iraq or Afghanistan is seen by some as an example of a global war against Muslims. This is also a core element of Islamist ideology. Notably, perceptions of anti-Islam or anti-Muslim hostility on a global scale, rather than experiences of personal discrimination, are often linked to conspiracy theories against “the Muslims” or an alleged war against Islam in which Jews are viewed as the main enemy. The remarks of Sabir, a British Muslim from London, are telling: “I haven’t been discriminated in any ways. Let it be 11 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data in Focus Report, 5. 12 Jikeli, “Discrimination of European Muslims,” 81. All names of interviewees are pseudonyms.

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job, going to a church, even though I’m a Muslim, it wasn’t really a problem. It’s alright.” However, he believes there is a global conspiracy against Muslims in which America and a “Jewish plan” are the driving forces. He alludes to “two white men” found with explosives near London, who might have been part of a plot to blame Muslims for terrorism; he then links this to the Iraq war and September 11 attacks, eventually framing these events as part of a predestined religious war prescribed in the Koran. He ends with the wildest of conspiracy theories: I remember once reading on one of the articles. They found more than enough explosives in two white men’s house somewhere down Essex. That did not come on the news. What were they playin’ with that? They could have actually put the bombs here and puttin’ the blames on the Muslims. It’s all conspiracy. I don’t know how to put it down to be honest. It’s, they are just targeting the Muslims for some reason I don’t know why. And mainly I think it’s because of the super power country which is America. The whole reason the people went to war with Iraq was for the oil .  .  . and Tony Blair, the dog, sucking his arse.  .  .  . This 9/11 thing, I don’t believe it was actually Muslim who’ve done that. This is just bullshit because . . . these two planes would not have taken this building down. . . . And it’s not only that. When the bomb went off . . . there’s so many Jews working in that block. None of the Jews were working that day, so what happens here? . . . It’s all planned out. . . . Muslims are supposed to be the Jewish’s worst enemies. . . . The way I’d say the planning is: ’cause in the Qur’an it says there will be a holy war. One solid war that will end the world and for the first couple of hundred years, Muslims will suffer but then the Muslims will overcome and they will take the pride. They will win the war. And the way it’s goin’ on, as far as Islam and Jew . . . the time is actually comin’ it’s not very far. It’s comin’ there. So the reason I think, this is part of the Jewish plan. They are planning it all out, “so let’s take out all the Muslims, make their side weaker,” ’cause that’s what they are trying to do. Because Saddam was a super power man for us because he was a Muslim, strong, he had lot of armies, he was a good support to us. If the war came along we would definitely have his support.13

Sabir’s interview is an example of how the perception of discrimination can be tied to perceptions of a general war against Muslims that are intertwined with antisemitic conspiracy theories. His is an antisemitic interpretation of reality. 13 Ibid., 87–88.

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IDENTIFICATION AS GERMAN, FRENCH, OR BRITISH The study exposes major differences between the three countries in respondents’ sense of national identity. This can be largely explained as a result of disparate concepts of national identity and immigration policies.14 Rogers Brubaker c­ ontrasted the model of French citizenry as a “territorial community” based on place of birth and residence, with that of German citizenry as a “community of descent” based on ancestry.15 These opposing representations are also referred to as “civic” (inclusive) and “ethnic” (exclusive) conceptions, or in legal terms, as ius soli and ius sanguinis. In most countries, including in today’s France and Germany, both concepts are applied to some extent. In Britain, both place of birth and ancestry have been employed in determining citizenship and national belonging.16 In Germany, interviewees felt that they were not regarded as German, despite having German citizenship; they accept and internalize their nonacceptance as Germans, demanding acknowledgment by German society as “foreigners,” “Turks,” or “Arabs,” and as permanent residents of Germany. The generally strong identification with ethnic background among all interviewees is viewed by many of them as opposition to German national identity. This can be regarded as internalization of an ethnic-exclusive concept of nationality in Germany. The statement of Murat from Berlin is telling: “I was born here, have a German passport, but I still am and remain a foreigner.” By contrast, the French civic model of a “territorial community” allows immigrants to identify as French. Most respondents consider themselves French, although many also have the feeling that they are not regarded as French. This was expressed by Omar from Paris: “We’re at home without being at home.” This leads to a sense of injustice and the insistence on being French. However, national self-identification depends on the situation and context. Most interviewees identify as French when asked about their nationality, including in the context of rivalry with other nations, for example, when talking about sports or even military strength. On the other hand, when speaking of topics such as discrimination, their neighborhoods, schools, or rivalries with youths from other ethnic backgrounds, they might 14 Jikeli, “Discrimination of European Muslims.” 15 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 16 Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Stephen Small and John Solomos, “Race, Immigration and Politics in Britain: Changing Policy Agendas and Conceptual Paradigms, 1940s–2000s,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 47, no. 3–4 (August 2006): 235–57.

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describe ­themselves as Arab, black, Algerian, Moroccan, or Tunisian, often in direct contrast to “white people” and “people with French parents,” who are then considered French. National identification among young Muslims in France is therefore situational. The multicultural concept in Britain seems to facilitate dual self-identification, which only a few respondents in France and Germany use. In Britain, not being accepted as British seems to be less of an issue than in France or Germany, although some voiced concerns about nonacceptance and discrimination against them either directly or institutionally, as members of ethnic or religious minorities. Most respondents identified Britishness as an important dimension of their identity, often in combination with ethnic background, and in self-descriptions such as “British Asian,” or according to Rahoul from London, “British-Bengali, because we are proud to be who we are!”17 Muslim identity and identification as German, French, or British are usually not perceived as contradictory among young Muslims in Europe, except for those who have a Manichaean perception of Islam that establishes a clear divide between Muslims and non-Muslims, a trend observed particularly in the United Kingdom. This explains responses in surveys to the effect that Islam and democracy are incompatible. In 2006, 36 percent of Muslims in Germany, 28 percent of Muslims in France, and 47 percent of Muslims in Great Britain thought that there was a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.18 Conflicting perceptions of Muslim identity consist of an emphasis on the community of Muslims combined with dichotomic views of Muslims and others. The latter are often related to a conspiratorial view of a “war against Muslims,” frequently phrased in religious terms, such as a war between Islam and Christianity and Judaism. These perceptions can be found in all three ­countries, but in Britain they are connected more directly to alienation from national identity, to a certain extent because of the involvement of British troops in the Iraq war, which is seen as part of the “war against Muslims.” Such views often imply conspiracy theories in which “the Jews” or “the West” are deemed responsible for the alleged global war against Muslims. The study shows that hatred of the West and the Jews stems not from the discrimination Muslims experience but rather from conspiratorial perceptions of being the victim of an alleged global attack on Muslims. A sense of discrimination and exclusion, 17 Jikeli, “Discrimination of European Muslims,” 91. 18 Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2006).

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but also certain perceptions of ethnic or religious identity, and the concept of national identity in the respective country are important factors for those not identifying as German, French, or British, and they result in different levels and forms of identification in each of the three countries.

MUSLIM ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE Since the early twenty-first century, Muslims have emerged as a new group of antisemitic perpetrators in Western Europe. Perpetrators of the most extreme cases of violence against European Jews in recent years were Muslims who partly justified their acts with their interpretation of Islam. The most terrible incidents include the terror attacks in January and February 2015 in Paris and Copenhagen, in which nineteen people were murdered, among them at least five because they were Jewish; shootings at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, killing four people; the murder of three children and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse in 2012; and the torture and murder of Ilan Halimi in Paris in 2006. However, antisemitic acts by Muslims cannot be reduced to ­terrorists and organized gangs, as in the Halimi case. Muslims are also responsible for less violent antisemitic acts that happen every day. Statistics from France and Great Britain of the last decade show that antisemitic perpetrators have been disproportionally Muslim. Exact numbers are difficult to establish, however, because most perpetrators have not been identified. Cautious e­ stimations put the percentage of Muslim perpetrators of antisemitic incidents in Great Britain at between 20 and 30 percent, while the percentage of Muslims in the general population stands at 5 percent. More than half of the identified perpetrators of all antisemitic incidents in France since the year 2000 have been Muslim or Arab. While antisemitic acts peaked during tensions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iraq war, the annual levels of antisemitic acts have risen significantly compared with the 1990s and cannot be attributed solely to fallout from these conflicts.19 However, it should be noted that the general rise of antisemitism since the beginning of the twenty-first century cannot be attributed exclusively to Muslims and that other groups of perpetrators from the extreme Right and the Far Left and hostility from mainstream society are also a growing threat to Jews in Europe. Muslim perpetrators of antisemitic acts are a tiny minority among Muslims. They are not representative of Muslims in Europe. But what 19 Günther Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism: Why Young Urban Males Say They Don’t Like Jews, Studies in Antisemitism (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015).

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are attitudes toward Jews among Muslims? And where do negative views of Jews among Muslims come from? Discussing Muslim antisemitism is politically challenging. This became apparent when a study commissioned by a European agency in 2002 revealing that “physical attacks on Jews and the desecration and destruction of synagogues were acts mainly committed by young Muslim perpetrators mostly of an Arab descent in the monitoring period” was not published by the agency.20 It was feared that naming the problem would contribute to further stigmatization of Muslim minorities. I argue that scholarly discussions about antisemitism among Muslims in Europe are necessary for a detailed understanding of the ­phenomenon and its sources in order to inform the development of effective tools for fighting antisemitism in Europe. It is only if Muslims are essentialized— that is, if it is wrongly assumed that people of Muslim background necessarily or “naturally” adhere to certain attitudes—that they become further stigmatized. Neglecting specific forms of antisemitism and groups of antisemitic perpetrators, on the other hand, is detrimental to the struggle against antisemitism. Surveys demonstrate that antisemitic attitudes are stronger and more widespread among Muslims in Europe than among non-Muslims. In 2006 the Pew Global Attitudes Project published the only internationally ­comparative survey that distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims and nonMuslims in a number of countries were asked whether they had a ­“favorable or unfavorable opinion of Jews.” In the United Kingdom, 47 ­percent of Muslims and 7 percent of the general population stated that they had an unfavorable opinion of Jews. In France, the figures were 13 percent of the ­general population and 28 percent of Muslims, and in Germany, 22 percent of the general population and 44 percent of Muslims. The contrast is even greater when “very unfavorable” opinions are compared.21 Most surveys on antisemitic attitudes that distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims are not done in international comparison, and they focus on selective samples such as certain ­ethnicities or student groups. However, since 2003, different ­surveys in ten European countries with about fifty thousand participants, ­fifteen thousand thereof Muslims, have all found a significant difference in the level of ­antisemitism among Muslims and non-Muslims (factor 1.5 to 5) that cannot be explained by s­ ocioeconomic factors or a background of 20 Werner Bergmann and Juliane Wetzel, Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in the European Union: First Semester, 2002, synthesis report on behalf of the EUMC, 25, https://www. jugendpolitikineuropa.de/downloads/4-20-1949/eustudieantisem.pdf. 21 Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Great Divide. The survey was conducted before the Lebanon War in summer 2006.

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migration.22 The largest ­international comparative survey of antisemitic attitudes to date that includes attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe and attitudes in Middle Eastern and North African countries confirms these results; see Table 2. Antisemitic attitudes among European Muslims are higher than among non-Muslims but lower than in countries with Muslim majorities. Table 2.  Comparison of Antisemitic Attitudes among European Muslims and the General Population in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa Middle Statements in the ADL survey of Belgium, East and France, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, General Muslims March–April 2015 and in countries of the Society North Africa (EU) (surveyed in Middle East and North Africa, July–December (EU) 2013 2013) Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country. 47% 58% 74% Jews have too much power in the business world. 35 67 73 Jews still talk too much about what happened 39 57 30 to them in the Holocaust. Jews have too much power in international 35 70 72 financial markets. Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone 24 44 69 but their own kind. People hate Jews because of the way Jews 24 37 76 behave. Jews have too much control over global affairs. 25 59 68 Jews have too much control over the United 27 61 72 States government. Jews think they are better than other people. 20 40 66 Jews have too much control over the global 21 59 68 media. Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars. 8 31 65 Agreement with 6 or More Statements 21 55 74 Holocaust denial (number of Jews who died has been greatly exaggerated/the Holocaust is 8 31 64 a myth and did not happen) Source: Anti-Defamation League, 2015, http://global100.adl.org/.

22 Günther Jikeli, “Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review,” in ISGAP Occasional Paper Series, ed. Charles A. Small (New York: Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2015).

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SOURCES OF ANTISEMITIC ATTITUDES IN COUNTRIES WITH MUSLIM MAJORITIES Another survey from 2009 confirms that most people in countries with Muslim majorities have negative views of Jews. In countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, as well as in the West Bank and Gaza, more than 95 percent of the population had “unfavorable views of Jews”; 73 percent in Turkey, 74 percent in Indonesia, and 78 percent in Pakistan held such views. Interestingly, “only” 35 percent of Muslim Arabs in Israel had negative views of Jews.23 The late Robert Wistrich, one of the most renowned scholars of contemporary antisemitism, found a number of tropes that are prominent today in Muslim countries: conspiracy theories along the lines of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, images of ritual murder of children, the idea of Jews as poisoners, a literal diabolization of Israel, Holocaust denial, and the use of Nazi symbols.24 He showed that antisemitism today is more ingrained in Muslim and particularly in Arab societies than other eminent scholars such as Bernard Lewis had previously admitted; it now goes well beyond anti-Zionism and propaganda that has been instrumentalized by political elites. Scholars have attributed the widespread antisemitic attitudes in c­ ountries with Muslim majorities to a number of different factors. Some have h­ ighlighted the discrimination against Jews in premodern Islamic societies and negative views of Jews in Islamic scripture.25 Parts of the Koran and the Hadith convey derogatory views of Jews or suggest an enmity between Muslims and Jews and are used to justify anti-Jewish hostility.26 However, this does not explain why today’s antisemitism in Muslim countries includes modern and global-genocidal forms of antisemitism that were not present in traditional Muslim ­societies. It has been shown that Nazis successfully exported racist and genocidal antisemitism to the Muslim world and found partners in some Muslim leaders, such as Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem who helped ­disseminate modern antisemitic attitudes in the Muslim world.27 A much 23 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Little Enthusiasm for Many Muslim Leaders,” 2010. 24 Robert S. Wistrich, Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger (American Jewish Committee, 2002). 25 Georges Vajda, “Jews and Muslims according to the Hadith,” in The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, ed. Andrew Bostom (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008). 26 Neil J. Kressel, The Sons of Pigs and Apes: Muslim Antisemitism and the Conspiracy of Silence (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012). 27 Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010); Matthias Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11

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e­ arlier export of a­ ntisemitic tropes took place in the nineteenth century, when Christian missionaries spread the blood libel in the Arab world. One of the best-known cases is the Damascus affair of 1840. Others have highlighted the role of Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and their ideologues, such as Said Qutb.28 Pan-Arabist movements propagated radical anti-Zionism (rallying against Israel was seen as a unifying force) and blunt antisemitism, which can be seen in pan-Arabist leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat (who wrote an explicit homage to Adolf Hitler in 1953), Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gadhafi.29 Antisemitic attitudes in countries with Muslim majorities seem to have a number of historical sources.

WHAT RATIONALES ARE USED BY Y OUNG EUROPEAN MUSLIMS? What are sources of antisemitism among Muslims in Europe? Are they ­influenced by the same factors as people in Muslim countries from which they came some generations earlier, or are there different or additional factors now? One way to find out is to observe views of Jews closely and to attempt to trace the tropes of Jews that are used by European Muslims.

Results from an Empirical Study How do young European Muslims express antisemitic views, and what reasons do they give for their aversion to Jews? As mentioned above, my colleagues and I conducted face-to-face interviews with more than 100 young male Muslims in Berlin, Paris, and London over a period of three years (2005–2007) until (New York: Telos Press, 2007); Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine, trans. Krista Smith (New York: Enigma Books, 2010). 28 Bassam Tibi, “From Sayyid Qutb to Hamas: The Middle East Conflict and the Islamization of Antisemitism,” in Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity, vol. 4, ed. Charles Asher Small (New York: Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2013). 29 Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York: Random House, 2010); Meir Litvak and Esther Webman, From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Gudrun Krämer Küntzel, Minderheit, Millet, Nation? Die Juden in Ägypten, 1914–1952 (Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Verlag O. Harrassowitz, 1982). For a summary, see Günther Jikeli, “L’antisémitisme en milieux et pays musulmans: Débats et travaux autour d’un processus complexe,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, no. 62-2/3 (2015): 89–114.

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the arguments repeated themselves and no additional stereotypes or views were expressed.30 The sample was thus “saturated” across the three cities.31 The interviewees had various ethnic and educational backgrounds (from early school leavers to university graduates). The majority of interviewees in Germany were of Turkish origin; most interviewees in France had a Maghreb background; and in the United Kingdom the majority originated in South Asia. Thus, the ethnic backgrounds represented largely those of Muslims in the respective countries. This, along with the fact that the arguments were repeated in all three cities despite the different contexts and interviewees’ backgrounds, is a strong indication that they can also be found among other young (male) European Muslims.32 Although the focus here is on negative views of Jews, it should be kept in mind that many European Muslims do not exhibit any antisemitic attitudes, and some interviewees in the sample spoke out explicitly against antisemitic views among their friends and family. However, the analysis of the arguments shows four distinct patterns of antisemitic argumentation used by young Muslims in all three cities: • “Classic” antisemitism (conspiracy theories, “Jews are rich,” etc.) • Negative views of Jews with reference to Israel (allegations such as “Jews/Israelis kill children”) • Negative views of Jews with reference to Muslim or ethnic identity or to Islam (“Muslims dislike Jews”) • Negative views of Jews without rationalization (perception that it is “natural” to loathe Jews, or the use of the word “Jew” as an insult) 30 We also interviewed a small number of female Muslims, but the analysis is restricted to male interviewees for methodological reasons. The role of gender in attitudes toward Jews is unclear. Different surveys show contradictory results. The study by Frindte et al. on young Muslims in Germany found no gender differences, whereas the study by the Living History Forum found significant gender differences among young Muslims in Sweden. Wolfgang Frindte, Klaus Boehnke, Henry Kreikenbom, and Wolfgang Wagner, Lebenswelten junger Muslime in Deutschland (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2012), 226; and Living History Forum, Intolerance: Anti-Semitic, Homophobic, Islamophobic and Xenophobic Tendencies among the Young (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2005), 59, 152–53. 31 This approach is used in grounded theory (“saturation” of arguments). However, the analytical strategy might be considered too focused for an orthodox method of grounded theory. See Jane C. Hood, “Orthodoxy vs. Power: The Defining Traits of Grounded Theory,” in The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory, ed. Antony Bryant and Kathy Charmaz (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010), 151–64. 32 For more information on the sample and methods, see Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism.

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“Classic” Antisemitism This category comprises antisemitic conspiracy theories and well-known ­stereotypes of Jews. The trope of rich Jews, as well as related stereotypes, such as the belief that Jews are stingy or greedy, was very popular among interviewees from all countries and backgrounds. Jews have also been portrayed as clannish, treacherous, and crafty. More rarely, certain physical characteristics have been attributed to them. Common themes of antisemitic conspiracy theories include “Jewish power” in the world; “Jewish influence” in the United States; the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; “big business”; the Holocaust; the media; suicide attacks; the Middle East conflict; the alleged war against Muslims; and, occasionally, even topics such as AIDS and tsunamis. There are many reasons why people want to believe in conspiracy ­theories. A central rationale among interviewees seems to be the wish to explain and personalize complicated processes. “For everything that must happen, there is a reason,” declared Neoy from London, after stating that “it’s obvious now, that there is someone, and not just someone, but a group of people . . . like a ruling class we hardly see.” This is a textbook illustration of the tendency to seek out simplistic, worldly explanations. Neoy holds conspiracy theory beliefs about the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Holocaust, and Israeli power and assumes that “all these other big ­channels they are owned by Jews and they do control the majority of the media.” Such “classic” antisemitism is also widespread in mainstream society: in 2008–2009, 21 percent in Germany, 33 percent in France, and 15 percent in the United Kingdom believed that it is “probably true” that Jews have too much power in the business world.33 Classic antisemitic stereotypes and c­ onspiracy theories connect to well-known negative tropes of Jews within mainstream ­society. They are also expressions of psychological mechanisms in modern ­societies and serve as simplistic explanations of the world’s problems.34

Negative Views of Jews with Reference to Israel Antisemitic attitudes with reference to Israel involve (a) conflation of Jews with Israelis and (b) Manichaean views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Negative 33 Anti-Defamation League, Attitudes toward Jews in Seven European Countries (New York: AntiDefamation League, 2009), http://www.adl.org/Public%20ADL%20Anti-Semitism%20 Presentation%20February%202009%20_3_.pdf. 34 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1972).

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views of Israel thus serve as justification for general hatred toward Jews, ­including against German, French, and British Jews. Almost all interviewees who showed hostile attitudes toward Israel or Israelis conflated Jews and Israelis at one point or another and also exhibited negative attitudes toward Jews. This confirms the results of surveys in Germany and other European countries.35 One of the most common antisemitic tropes relating to Israel is “Jews/ Israelis kill children,” including the allegation that “the Israelis” or “the Jews” (usually the latter) kill children on purpose, out of cruelty and evil. It is part of a Manichaean view of the Middle East conflict and vilifies Israel. It also relates to the old antisemitic trope of the blood libel. According to Kassim from Berlin, “The Israelis, they are warriors, they kill children, and the Palestinians are such poor people .  .  . and they [the Israelis] come and just attack them.”36 Such ­dualistic perspectives on the Middle East conflict, however, can also be found in European media and are generally widespread in Europe.37 Fundamental delegitimization of Israel is another issue. Various rationales are used to deny Israel’s legitimacy, which, according to the widely accepted “Working Definition of Antisemitism,” is an antisemitic trope in itself.38 The main argument used is that since Jews built Israel on what is regarded as Muslim (or Palestinian or Arab) land, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine wronged Muslims from the outset. The existence of the Jewish State of Israel is seen as an injustice, and some even deny the reality of its existence. Hostility against Israel is rarely a question of borders or specific policies by the Israeli government or “settlements.” The topos “Jews have taken over Muslim/Palestinian/Arab land” is used to deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel entirely. 35 Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper noted that 90 percent of Germans who criticized Israel in 2004 also endorsed antisemitic statements. Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper, “Traditioneller Und Moderner Antisemitismus,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, November 28, 2006, http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/antisemitismus/37967/traditionellerund-moderner- antisemitismus?p=all. The fact that antisemitism often appears in the guise of criticism of Israel is also reflected in comparative surveys in a number of European countries. Andreas Zick, Andreas Hövermann, and Beate Küpper, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011), 162, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07908-20110311.pdf. See also Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 548–61. 36 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 111. 37 Zick, Hövermann, and Küpper, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination. 38 http://holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/working-definition-antisemitism.

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The intensity of hostility against Jews as justified by the Middle East conflict is related to identification with “the Palestinians,” either via an Arab or Muslim identity or both. Not all interviewees identify with Palestinians, but most respondents of Arab background do. Arab identity is an important additional factor that can enhance hostility toward European Jews, on the basis of claims related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is often understood as a conflict between “the Arabs” and Israel, or “the Muslims” and “the Jews,” which leads us to the next category of justifications.

Negative Views of Jews with Reference to Religious or Ethnic Identity The interviews demonstrate that some Muslims relate their negative views of Jews to their ethnic or religious identity or to their perception of Islam. The assumption of a general enmity between Muslims and Jews is widespread.39 Somewhat less frequently interviewees believe that there was an eternal enmity between their own ethnic community and Jews. Such views are voiced approvingly in statements such as “Muslims and Jews are enemies” or “The Arabs dislike Jews.”40 As such, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict merely serves as an example. The enmity is understood in much wider terms. “As a Muslim you have problems, not with Israelis, [but] with Jews,” explained Ümit, an interviewee of Turkish origin from Berlin.41 However, justifications are often vague. Such generalizing and essentializing assumptions of enmity deny different views among individuals within the community and different interpretations of Islam, and wrongly portray Muslims as a unitary category regarding their attitudes toward Jews.42 Moreover, such assumptions that are bound to the collective religious identity make it difficult for individuals to distance themselves from them.43 The same goes for rationales related to ethnic identity. It has been argued that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are part and parcel of Arab 39 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 133. 40 Religious and ethnic identities often get blurred in this context. The enmity is seen as one between “us” and “the Jews.” 41 Ibid. 42 Tarek Fatah and Bassam Tibi are probably the most prominent contemporary scholars who write from an explicitly Muslim perspective against the assumption that Muslims and Jews are enemies. See Tarek Fatah, The Jew Is Not My Enemy: Unveiling the Myths That Fuel Muslim Anti-Semitism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2010); and Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). 43 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 152.

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nationalism.44 Many participants of Arab background believe that their Arab identity encompasses negative views of Jews. This underlying assumption is often uttered in passing: “In any case, we, the Arabs, we never get along with them [the Jews],” said Hafid, from Paris, who is of Algerian origin.45 Two main rationales are used for this justification. It is argued that either such hostility is a reaction to Jews’ alleged hatred of Arabs, or the Middle East conflict is used to explain why (all) Arabs allegedly dislike Jews. Religious justifications, on the other hand, are intertwined with arguments based on both religious sources and Muslim identity. In young Muslims’ discussions about an “interdiction” against befriending or marrying Jews, for example, alleged religious reasons and pressure from other Muslims are intertwined. Interviewees’ references to a long history of animosity between Muslims and Jews can be related to historical perspectives of confrontations between the two groups or to interpretation of Islamic scriptures that highlight conflicts between Muhammad and Jewish tribes. Direct references to the Koran or to the belief that suicide bombers go to paradise for killing Jews, on the other hand, are rooted in certain views of Islam.46 References to the Koran have a particularly strong authority, as it is regarded as the word of Allah, dictated to the Prophet Muhammad. It is thus seen as reflecting divine truth, often in a literal understanding of fragmented scriptures. The level of animosity toward Jews related to Islam or Muslim identity can vary. This also holds true for those who see similarities between Judaism and Islam or who regard Muslims and Jews as “cousins.” “Muslims are supposed to be the Jewish’s worst enemies,” said Sabir from London, who saw Muslims and Jews (and Christians) as being in a global war.47 Some root their notions of Jewish enmity in apocalyptic visions and conspiracy theories. Others assume the existence of a mutual antipathy but reject notions of war. Patterns of a­ rgumentation related to Islam include direct references to how Jews are perceived by God, who allegedly condemns them for their materialistic and life-affirming existence. However, it is important to note that it is particular perceptions of Islam and Muslim (and ethnic) identity that are relevant for such forms of ­antisemitism. 44 Jochen Müller, “Von Antizionismus Und Antisemitismus. Stereotypenbildung in Der Arabischen Öffentlichkeit,” in Antisemitismus in Europa Und in Der Arabischen Welt: Ursachen Und Wechselbeziehungen Eines Komplexen Phänomens, ed. Wolfgang Ansorge (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 2006), 163–82. 45 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 152. 46 Ibid., 242. 47 Ibid.

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As in all purported rationales for hatred of Jews, these notions are chimerical;48 they are not the actual reason for antisemitic attitudes.

No Rationalization All antisemitic attitudes are, by definition, irrational. There is no “reason” to hate “the Jews.” As demonstrated in the description of the three previous categories of argumentation, participants often try to justify their hostile attitudes toward Jews by making negative claims about them, which they assert to be true, or by extrapolating particular traits or behaviors of some Jews to “the Jews.” But some participants do not even attempt to offer justifications for their hostility. In their minds, negative views of Jews are self-evident. “Jewish people are Jewish, that’s why we don’t like them,” said Ganesh from London. And Bashir from Berlin confirmed his outspoken hatred of all Jews: “Because they are Jews nevertheless. Jews are, a Jew is a Jew anyway.”49 The “argument” of hating Jews because they are Jews points to the essence of antisemitism: its irrationality. Endorsing such irrationality is radical but ­consistent. The antisemite longs for the extermination of the Jews. Bashir, who does not see a reason to justify his hatred of Jews, wished “that the damned Jews should be burnt.”50 Antisemitic resentments stem not only from acquired stereotypes but also from unconscious projections onto Jews, whose actual behavior or lives may shape only the nature of antisemitic expressions. The argument of hating Jews because they are Jews is rarely bluntly voiced, but this irrational “cause” often shines through when hatred against “all Jews” is justified by accusations for which only some Jews can possibly be responsible. Others consider their ­negative feelings toward Jews to be “common sense” and normal. This finds expression in a peculiar use of language. The very term “Jew” is understood among many interviewees, but also in general among many young people in Germany and France, as bearing negative connotations.51 The words for 48 I borrowed this term from Gavin I. Langmuir, “Towards a Definition of Antisemitism,” in The Persisting Question: Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern Antisemitism, ed. Helen Fein (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), 86–127. 49 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 163. 50 Ibid., 178. 51 Günther Jikeli, “Anti-Semitism in Youth Language: The Pejorative Use of the Terms for ‘Jew’ in German and French Today,” Conflict & Communication Online 9, no. 1 (2010):

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“Jew” (Jude in German and Juif and Feuj in French) are used as insults or in an otherwise pejorative way by interviewees in France and Germany. Such usage appears to be less frequent in Britain today.52

THE RELATION BETWEEN ANTISEMITISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION Some scholars have linked prejudice against Muslims and Muslim ­antisemitism, alleging that a key cause of antisemitism among European Muslims lies in their marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion.53 The theoretical assumptions of such suppositions remain unclear. One could also argue c­ onversely: that suffering discrimination and exclusion would lead to ­criticism of ­prejudices against other minorities, including Jews. Moreover, it does not explain why other minorities that experience similar or even stronger discrimination display antisemitic attitudes to a lesser degree. In our sample we could not find a correlation between discrimination and antisemitism. The same is true for a relation between antisemitism and the sense of belonging to the national ­society. Self-identification with the nation is very different in Germany, France, and Britain, as shown above, but the level of antisemitism is similar, and, ­according to surveys, even stronger in Britain, where most interviewees ­identify ­themselves as British. Focusing only on statistical correlations, however, may be misleading, for two reasons: (a) possible relations between discrimination and antisemitism 1–13; Günther Jikeli, “‘Jew’ as a Slur in German and French Today,” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 1, no. 2 (2009): 209–32. 52 The interviews in London indicate that this usage of the word Jew in Britain is not as common as in Germany and France. Anna-Brita Stenström et al. did research on common insults among youths in London and did not report usage of the term Jew as an insult. Anna-Brita Stenström, Gisle Andersen, and Ingrid Kristine Hasund, Trends in Teenage Talk (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 2002). However, there were reports of such usage in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s. David Margolis, “Anti-Semitism in the Playground,” The Independent, February 1, 1999. 53 See Matti Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007), 26–27. Paul A. Silverstein wrote a “Comment on Bunzl” in the same volume. See also Esther Benbassa, “Jewish-Moslem Relations in Contemporary France,” Contemporary French and Francophone Studies 11, no. 2 (2007): 189–94. Klaus Holz adopted a similar argument and mentioned the social, racist, and religious exclusion of Muslims as indirect reasons for the manifestation of antisemitism. Klaus Holz, Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus: Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 9.

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are complex and do not have a straightforward cause-and-effect relationship, and (b) some perceptions of global discrimination against Muslims include antisemitic conspiracy theories. This was shown above in the example of the interviewee who believes there is a global war against Muslims in which Jews (and Christians) are seen as the enemies. Similarly, the rhetoric of victimhood competition can contain antisemitic arguments.54 Correlations between such attitudes would only confirm that antisemitic perceptions of discrimination and victimhood are linked to an antisemitic worldview. However, as ­demonstrated, the formation of complex attitudes such as antisemitism are unlikely to be rooted in a single factor.

SOURCES AND FACTORS OF INFLUENCE The formation of any attitude is a multidimensional process.55 This is also true in the case of antisemitism. The genesis of antisemitic attitudes among European Muslims cannot be reduced to religious beliefs or affiliation. Nor are they a result of disadvantaged living conditions. Exposure to antisemitic remarks or propaganda or to antisemitism in the media enhances antisemitic beliefs but does not necessarily lead to antisemitic attitudes, as proved by some interviewees who, despite these factors, ultimately reject antisemitic views.56 The eventual adoption of antisemitic stereotypes and ways of thinking is a choice made by individuals.57 Antisemitic attitudes are related to worldviews and individual ­psychological processes and mechanisms, along with a number of other factors.58 The 54 Bernard-Henri Lévy, Ce grand cadavre à la renverse (Paris: Grasset, 2007). See also Jochen Müller, “Auf Den Spuren Von Nasser: Nationalismus Und Antisemitismus Im Radikalen Islamismus,” in Antisemitismus und radikaler Islamismus, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (Essen: Klartext, 2007), 85–101. 55 William D. Crano and Radmila Prislin, Attitudes and Attitude Change (New York: Psychology Press, 2008). 56 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 256–70. 57 Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive (Paris: Gallimard, 1954). However, the notion of free choice is disputed. For a critical debate on free choice and antisemitism, see Thomas Maul, “Dialektik und Determinismus: Zum Verhältnis von Adorno, Sartre und Améry,” Bahamas 64 (2012): 46–52. 58 Scholars have discussed a number of reasons for the development of antisemitic attitudes, such as transmission of stereotypes and beliefs, and psychological mechanisms of group dynamics or unreflected projections. For a discussion of different theories, see Samuel Salzborn, Antisemitismus als Negative Leitidee der Moderne: Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich (Frankfurt: Campus, 2010). Projection is a psychological defense

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i­nterviews provide some insights into projections onto Jews. In some cases, participants directly linked their fantasies, which they know are immoral and thus have to be suppressed, to antisemitic assumptions. Hussein from London, for instance, explained the events of September 11, 2001, with his own wish to have more money and to do whatever it takes to obtain some. He suspects similar wishes and motives for the alleged Jewish conspirators of September 11. Other examples in which Jews were blamed for terrorist attacks can also be interpreted as expressions of pathological projection. Many interviewees had difficulty in accepting that Muslims were the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and used their religious convictions to justify their deeds. The terrorist attacks are still seen as evil, but some projected the responsibility of Muslim perpetrators onto the Jews and thus blamed them. However, Ümit from Berlin, who is convinced that people who believe in Islam cannot undertake suicide attacks, took this a step further. He feels that Muslims are unjustly accused of terrorism and stated that Jews or Americans disguised as Muslims might have blown themselves up in Israel. Another area of projection is the wish for solidarity or social stability. This can take on a positive tone: “The Jews are really smart. . . . They can get work really easily, not like us, they can do a lot of things that we can’t do,” said Omar from Paris.59 Some envy Jews for their alleged commonality and accuse them of being clannish. Interviewees explicitly mentioned a number of sources for their antisemitic beliefs: anti-Jewish views by friends and family, as well as perceptions of religious and ethnic identities; conversations in mosques; the influence of media such as television, the Internet, music, books, and newspapers; and, in some cases, schools.60 The level of education influences the form of expression of ­antisemitic attitudes: those with a higher level of formal education tended to voice negative views of Jews in more socially acceptable ways, such as i­nsinuations and allegations about Jewish influence in the finance sector and media, mechanism whereby one “projects” one’s own undesirable thoughts, motivations, desires, and feelings onto someone else. Psychoanalytical theories on antisemitism have identified projection as the main mechanism of antisemitism. Hermann Beland, “Psychoanalytische Antisemitismustheorien Im Vergleich,” in Antisemitismusforschung in den Wissenschaften, ed. Werner Bergmann and Monika Körte (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), 187–218. 59 Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism, 243. 60 For similar findings from a survey of social workers in Berlin, see Gabriele Fréville, Susanna Harms, and Serhat Karakayali, “‘Antisemitismus—ein Problem unter vielen’: Ergebnisse einer Befragung in Jugendclubs und Migrant/innen-Organisationen,” in Konstellationen des Antisemitismus Antisemitismusforschung und sozialpädagogische Praxis, ed. Wolfram Stender, Guido Follert, and Mihri Özdogan (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 185–98.

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conspiracy theories, or demonization of Israel, instead of open approval of hatred or violence against Jews.

CONCLUSIONS The ways in which discrimination and exclusion are perceived vary significantly in Germany, France, and Great Britain. Generally, interviewees in Berlin feel there is discrimination against “foreigners,” on the basis of skin and hair color. In Paris, the impression is that discrimination is focused foremost on Arabs and blacks, on the basis of skin color, Arab names, and stigmatized n­ eighborhoods. In London, many also think that discrimination is based on skin color, but others believe that, currently, anti-Muslim prejudices prevail. Still greater differences of perceptions among the three countries can be observed regarding identification with the nationality of the state of residence. Only exceptionally do interviewees in Germany identify as German, despite having German citizenship. In France, by contrast, most interviewees consider themselves French, although many feel that they are not accepted as such. In Britain, Muslim ­nonacceptance of being British seems to be less of an issue than in France, although some voiced concerns about direct or institutional nonacceptance and discrimination against them as members of ethnic or religious minorities. However, most respondents in Britain identified Britishness as an important dimension of their identity, often in combination with their ethnic background, as well as in self-descriptions such as “British Asian.” These differences can be explained largely as a result of disparate concepts of national identity and ­immigration policies in Germany, France, and Britain. Many young Muslims in Europe exhibit antisemitic attitudes; some resort to violence. Polls reveal that levels of antisemitism are significantly higher among Muslims than among non-Muslims in Europe, but they are lower than in Middle Eastern and North African countries. Our survey of young male Muslims from Berlin, Paris, and London provides some insights into sources and reasoning about negative views of Jews among young Muslims. The g­ enesis of antisemitic views cannot be reduced to a single factor. Ethnic or religious identity and interpretations of Islam are significant for some. In this sense, use of the term Muslim antisemitism is apt and meaningful. Others relate their hostility toward Jews to their hatred of the State of Israel and do not distinguish consistently between Jews and Israelis. Many use classic antisemitic attitudes that are also widespread in mainstream European society. However, negative views of Jews have become the norm in some young Muslim social

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­circles, so many do not feel the need to justify them. This facilitates radical forms of antisemitism and antisemitic violence. Sources of antisemitic attitudes include the stereotypes and beliefs held by friends, family members, religious circles in and around mosques, foreign and domestic TV, and the Internet. Projections onto Jews of fears and wishes also play an important role. While discrimination and exclusion of Muslims in Europe is still a reality, this is not a relevant factor influencing antisemitic ­attitudes.

Debates on Islamized Antisemitism in Austria in the Wake of the Israel-Gaza Conflict, 2014 Julia Edthofer

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n July 24, 2014, a group of pro-Palestinian protesters attacked a scrimmage between the Israeli soccer team Maccabi Haifa and the French team OSC Lille in the Austrian city of Bischofshofen as a reaction to the IsraelGaza conflict. Toward the end of the game, about twenty persons stormed on the field and assaulted the Israeli team while waving Palestinian flags and shouting anti-Israeli slogans such as “Free Falestin” and “Fuck Israel.” The assailants were of Turkish background, and their appearance clearly defined them as a group of ethnicized “underdogs”—most of them wore hoodies of the German rapper Kurdo with crossed sabers on the back and lyrics of his song “Ich bleib Ghetto” (I remain ghetto) on the front.1 Kurdo has a Kurdish-Iraqi background, and the song talks about life as an outlaw and implicitly addresses racist discrimination of (Muslim) immigrants and the ongoing exclusion of the second and third generation. Immediately after the attack, the rapper published a Facebook statement cheering the assault, which got about twenty-nine thousand likes and two thousand positive comments within a few hours. After being criticized by the Vienna-based online music magazine The Message for feeding into the blurring of anti-Zionism and antisemitism, Kurdo removed the thread from his Facebook page but still showed support for the pro-­Palestinian   1 “Angriff auf dem Fußballplatz: Mit Palästina-Fahne gegen Israel-Fußballer,” Spiegel, July 24, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/maccabi-haifa-spieler-in-bischofshofenangegriffen-fotostrecke-117313.html.

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assailants on Twitter.2 Still, the content of the removed Facebook postings was telling: the majority of the comments used the hashtag “#FreePalestine” and regarded the attack as an appropriate response to the events in the Middle East—not very surprisingly taking an anti-Israeli stance and strongly identifying with the Palestinian side. In addition, many postings referred to experiences of racist exclusion, in particular of anti-Muslim resentment.3 However, these comments were partially reactions to the coverage in mainstream media and to right-wing users’ comments that indeed displayed an outburst of anti-Muslim hate speech, often culminating in calls for deportation. The attack on the Maccabi Haifa team and the reactions in social media are paradigmatic for many anti-Israeli incidents and articulations in the wake of the Israel-Gaza conflict in summer 2014. Both point to the high level of identification with the Middle East conflict for parts of immigrant communities, above all for the second and third generations who were born and raised in Europe but still feel excluded and indeed experience exclusion. Furthermore, they reflect the (post)colonial framing of the conflict as a war of “suppressed and colonized Palestinian underdogs” against powerful “Israeli oppressors.” But for what reason, one might ask, can the attack on a soccer game in the middle of the Alps not only be perceived as a response to events on another continent but simultaneously function as a symbolic revolt against racist exclusion in the Austrian and German migration societies? And to what extent did the anti-Muslim comments in social media posted by people identifying as part of the Austrian majority society indeed reflect an anti-antisemitic stance? This chapter seeks to provide some answers to these questions. For this purpose, the interrelation of anti-Zionism and antisemitism is introductorily illustrated and linked to theoretical approaches explaining antisemitism.

THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AS POSTCOLONIAL SIGNIFIER AND TRIGGER FOR NEW ANTISEMITISM The Israel-Gaza conflict of 2014 brought about a massive outburst of anti-Israeli protest followed by a rise in antisemitic incidents all over Europe. According to   2 Daniel Shaked and Thomas Kiebl, “Mentales Ghetto: Nahostkonflikt in Bischofshofen,” The Message, July 26, 2014; Kurdo (@Kurdo), tweet on Bischofshofen, Twitter, July 30, 2014, 02:30 a.m., https://twitter.com/kurdo_11/status/494414799938547713/.   3 The term resentment with regard to antisemitism or anti-Muslim discrimination is adopted from the German term Ressentiment, which is used to denominate the social-psychological dimension of racism as a strong aversion fueled by the ascription of negative stereotypes to certain groups.

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the yearly report on antisemitism and racism published by the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University, reported incidents in Austria doubled in the year 2014 from 137 cases to 255; direct physical violence, such as the attack on the Israeli soccer team, increased from 4 to 9 reported cases. This disturbing trend could be observed all over Europe: in particular, the number of physical assaults increased in an alarming manner— the Kantor Center’s report for the year 2014 registered 766 acts of antisemitic physical violence worldwide, an increase of 38 percent compared with 2013. Attacks on Jews or Jewish property with weapons even doubled in this period, arson attacks tripled, and assaults on persons in public also rose by 66 percent.4 Most of the incidents were reported from Western Europe and North America; the highest rate of violence was registered in France, followed by the United Kingdom—a trend that has been consistent throughout the last decade. But also in Germany and Austria the increase of incidents was more than twofold. Aside from the rise of physical violence, however, the number of incidents of verbal and visual harassment and hate speech are troubling: reported cases in France rose from 423 to 851, and it is noteworthy in this respect that it was predominantly the number of threats that increased. With regard to verbal and visual harassment, the United Kingdom shows the highest rate of incidents, with a total of 1,168 cases reported during the year 2014. The German statistics also arouse concern: in the year 2014, a total of 1,076 cases were reported, compared with 788 in the year before.5 Many of the anti-Israeli rallies in Western Europe during summer 2014 were organized by political actors belonging to various Muslim communities, and many of them were accompanied by an alarming outburst of antisemitic hate speech and violence. In France numerous Jewish shops and businesses and eight synagogues were firebombed within the month of July. After an antiIsrael rally in Toulouse, the Jewish community center got attacked with Molotov cocktails, and the peak of violence was reached on July 20 in the wake of major, transnationally organized demonstrations taking place in many European countries. In France a number of these demonstrations ended in the looting and burning of Jewish shops. Less direct attacks and lootings were reported from Germany, but hate speech peaked with slogans like “Hamas, Hamas, Jews in the gas” or “Death to the Jews” being chanted at every bigger ­demonstration.   4 Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, Antisemitism Worldwide 2014: General Analysis (Tel Aviv: Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2015), 5–6.   5 Ibid., 6.

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In Hamburg, an elderly Jewish man was attacked by protesters, and on July 29 three Molotov cocktails were thrown at the synagogue of the German city Wuppertal, located in the southern Ruhr area. In Italy, numerous Jewish stores and businesses were defaced with swastikas and death threats during the first week of August. In England, antisemitic incidents exploded too: in the month of July alone, more than a hundred hate crimes against Jews and Jewish institutions or property were registered, and chants in British rallies frequently included slogans such as “Hitler was right” or “Oh Jew, you will die.” Perhaps the most peculiar anti-Jewish alliance was reported from the Netherlands, where two rallies in support of the Islamic State and against Israel were organized and quickly turned into antisemitic manifestations. The common denominator of these antisemitic articulations all over Europe was the discursive merging of the events in the Middle East with a general sentiment of social injustice and racist exclusion in postcolonial European migration societies. This anti-colonial framing constitutes a core meeting point with “traditional” leftist anti-Zionism, where postcolonial criticism and anti-American or more generally anti-Western stances merge with antiIsrael protest. In both perspectives, the Israeli state, Zionism, and—serving as a proxy—Jewish communities outside Israel represent a “catchy symbol” of colonialist evil.6 Such a framing was most obvious in France and England, the two countries with the most extensive colonial past, but in Germany as well, antisemitic hate speech at several protests directly related to the conspiratorial belief of complicity between an oppressive and neocolonialist “West” and Israel framed as “nation-state Jew.” This mind-set culminated most obviously in the slogan “Jew, Jew, coward pig, come forward and fight on your own,” which was chanted during a pro-Palestinian rally in Berlin-Charlottenburg on July 17 and caused debate about the interdiction of hate speech at demonstrations. Summer 2014 thus saw one of the sharpest increases of antisemitic violence within the last decade; it was exceeded only in the year 2009, when—in the wake of so-called Operation Cast Lead—the number of reported violent incidents rose even by more than 40 percent compared with the previous year. In this case, again the most significant increases were reported from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe.7 In the Kantor Center’s analysis, this geographic concentration can be explained by two influencing factors,   6 Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, Antisemitism Worldwide 2009: General Analysis (Tel Aviv: Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2010), 3.   7 Ibid., 1.

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among others: on the one hand, by the Islamization of antisemitic resentment,8 which is also reflected in the large migrant communities with Muslim or Arab backgrounds, and on the other hand, by reference to strong anti-Zionist ­traditions mainly articulated by parts of the radical Left but also merging with mainstream media and political discourse.9 Both waves of antisemitic violence indicate an ongoing process of ­radicalizing anti-Zionism, which has to be viewed against the backdrop of theoretical approaches explaining antisemitism. Predecessors of the blurring between political criticism and Israel-related antisemitism are to be found in Soviet anti-Zionism. In Western Europe it was articulated sharply following the Six-Day War in 1967, but its new formation peaked for the first time in the wake of the Second Intifada. One key event with regard to the internationalization of anti-Israeli discourse was the UN World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. Regarding political actors, Durban can be seen as a starting point of the merging of leftist and Islamic/Islamized anti-Zionism; with regard to anti-Israeli discourse, the event was marked by a fierce campaign to rebrand Zionism as one major dimension of contemporary (colonial and anti-Muslim) racism. Such claims point to one core element of “new” Israel-related antisemitism; namely, to the fact that anti-Zionist discourse frames Israeli nationalism from an exclusively colonial perspective that differs fundamentally from the framings of other nationalisms. Zionism is constructed as a colonial-racist ideology, whereas any other nationalism, albeit criticized, is still seen as “historically grown” or is positively framed as “national liberation,” such as in the Palestinian case. Such bias is to be analyzed as “discursive antisemitism,” following David Hirsh’s approach: rather than being openly expressed, the resentment is a product of “shared beliefs and meanings,” or—in other words—of a shared framing of the Middle East conflict as (post)colonial battleground with the Israeli state being the artificially installed colonial oppressor.10   8 I adopt the term Islamization of antisemitism from German Islamic scholar Michael Kiefer, who coined it in order to describe the adoption of European antisemitic stereotypes in various Muslim and Arab societies as well as the traveling of the resentment to European migration communities with a Muslim background. See Michael Kiefer, “Islamistischer oder islamisierter Antisemitismus?,” in Antisemitismus und radikaler Islamismus, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (Essen: Klartext, 2007), 71–85.   9 Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, Antisemitism Worldwide 2009, 4. 10 David Hirsh, “Hostility to Israel and Antisemitism,” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 5, no. 1 (2013): 24.

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The anti-Zionist “colonial framing” with its focus on Israel as a symbol for racism and colonialism can be explained with recourse to Moishe Postone’s theoretical work on the intrinsic relation of antisemitism and capitalism. In his analysis of such “structural anti-Semitism,” the resentment serves as an ideological tool and a pseudo-“explanation” for capitalist exploitation and inequalities.11 The framing of the Israeli state as the last oppressive—and genocidal—settler colony of the twenty-first century, which has to be defeated in order to overcome colonialism, functions in a similar way, only the false (pseudo)criticism tackles not capitalism as a whole but rather its colonialist and imperialist dimension. In addition to this structurally antisemitic “colonial frame,” anti-Zionism can also converge with openly antisemitic tropes and narratives. Main elements of such blurring would be the evocation of a “Jewish blood libel” with regard to the Palestinians, the equation of Israeli politics with National Socialism, or, most often, the recourse to conspiracy-theory narratives regarding the power of the “international Zionist lobby,” a trope that corresponds to images regarding a malicious, threatening “international Jewry.” Both dimensions of antisemitism—the structurally antisemitic colonial framing of the Middle East conflict and Israel, and open antisemitic hate speech—could be observed at numerous anti-Israeli rallies in summer 2014. Besides, the fact that they were attended mainly by people identifying as Muslims sparked a considerable media discussion about the Islamization of the resentment and social tensions within Europe’s multicultural migration societies. In Austria the attack on the soccer team Maccabi Haifa and the transnationally organized anti-Israel rally on July 20 triggered the biggest debates. With reference to these two events and their media coverage, current articulations of Islamized antisemitism and the ambivalent intersection of its criticism with anti-Muslim resentment are illustrated.

DEBATING ISLAMIZED ANTISEMITISM IN THE POST-NAZIAUSTRIAN MIGRATION SOCIETY Anti-Israel protest peaked in Austria during the month of July 2014, when ­several demonstrations and flash mobs were taking place throughout the country. The leading organizer of the biggest rally in Austria’s capital, Vienna, on July 20 was the Union of European-Turkish Democrats (UETD), the 11 Moishe Postone, “Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to ‘Holocaust,’” New German Critique, no. 19 (1980): 106–8.

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European branch of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey’s p­ resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Two rallies, organized in Bregenz (Vorarlberg) and Innsbruck (Tyrol), were accompanied by violent incidents: in Bregenz a pro-Israeli counterprotest was attacked with stones, and in Innsbruck two elderly women carrying an Austrian and an Israeli flag were assaulted, their flags were stolen, and one of them was even struck on the head. Although these two rallies were officially organized by private persons with no political affiliation, there is considerable indication that the organizers were linked to the UETD and even to the Turkish nationalist-Islamist movement Millî Görüş.12 The biggest demonstration by far took place in Vienna, where approximately eleven thousand people gathered. In this case, the UETD was the official organizer of the demonstration, but protesters came from differing national and ethnic/ethnicized backgrounds and were mainly unified by the fact that most of them identified as Muslim. Because of the massive police presence and a lack of counterprotest, no incidents occurred during the demonstration itself, but the web-based mobilization prior to the event revealed the troubling extent of Islamized antisemitism. Mobilization for the demonstration in Vienna on July 20 was organized mainly via UETD’s Facebook page.13 After the call went online, thousands of anti-Israeli comments, slogans, and pictures were posted within a few days, a good number of them containing antisemitic statements and imagery. The bottom line of the comments was the structurally antisemitic criticism of heavily biased media coverage seen as negating the ongoing “genocide” against the Palestinians and backing up the “Zionist colonial oppressors.” Openly antisemitic imagery was displayed in several respects—for instance, when the framing of Israel as “genocidal settler colony” led to equations with National Socialism, which happened either via direct comparisons or via the portrayal of Israeli soldiers as SS men. The most extreme case within the scope of Nazi references was antisemitic hate speech positively referring to the Holocaust, as displayed in a picture of Adolf Hitler containing the statement “I could have killed all the Jews, but I left some alive in order to show you why I killed them.” Another antisemitic dimension regarded ancient anti-Judaist imagery of “blood libel,” which was evoked when Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu 12 Nikolaus Hagen, “The Gaza Demonstrations and the Islamization of Austrian Antisemitism,” paper presented at the International Scholars’ Seminar “The New Anti-Semitism in European Discourse,” Haifa University, May 5–7, 2015. 13 See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014,” July 16, 2014, 4:10 p.m., https://www.Facebook.com/uetd.austria/?ref=br_rs.

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was portrayed as a vampire sucking the blood of Palestinian children. Most of the imagery, however, referred implicitly or explicitly to the topos of Jewish world dominance or world conspiracy, by suggesting an infinite expansion of the Israeli state, by the use of the trope of the “Illuminati” transferred into “US-Israeli Killuminati,” or by suggesting that the Israeli government is the “puppet master” behind US foreign policy while silencing the international community in view of the “Palestinian genocide.” Especially in combination with the latter imagery, a homogeneous Muslim community (Ummah) was evoked, which would resist the Israeli and Western oppressive and colonialist forces.14 Albeit contested by other commentators and soon deleted from UETD’s Facebook page, antisemitic contents thus formed an integral part of the mobilization. Media reports focused on this new wave of antisemitism throughout the whole spectrum of formats, ranging from quality media to the tabloids. Liberal and conservative quality newspapers discussed it in a quite balanced way, either in focusing on a political critique of Islamist right-wing actors such as the UETD and its relation to Hamas or in pointing out the interrelation of Islamized antisemitism and the persistence of the resentment within European majority societies.15 The coverage and comments in boulevard and rightwing media, however, revealed the intertwinement of a (pseudo)critique of Islamized antisemitism with anti-Muslim resentment. Instead of discussing the extent and functionality of the resentment, Muslim immigrants, and especially “the Turks” as the biggest ethnic group of Muslim background, were framed as a violent threat to Austrian society. Besides, criticism of Islamized antisemitism clearly served to deflect antisemitism within the Austrian majority society: blanking out the country’s antisemitic past and present, mainstream Austrian society was presented as having come to terms with its Nazi past while now confronting in dismay the rise of a “new (Muslim) Nazism,” which would have to be defeated.16 Consequently, what differentiates the context of Islamized antisemitic articulations from anti-Jewish stereotypes within mainstream Austrian society is their intersection with debates about “failed integration” and racist e­ xclusion. 14 See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014.” 15 E.g., Gerfried Sperl, “Der Nahe Osten und die Einäugigkeit,” Der Standard, July 20, 2014; Vladimir Vertlieb, “Der Tritt,” Die Presse, August 19, 2014. 16 E.g., “Kampf gegen Hass ist von staatlichem Interesse!,” Heute, August 5, 2014; “20 Anzeigen und Hetzer auf Facebook im Visier,” Heute, July 25, 2014; “Gaza-Protest: Randale bei Maccabi-Test in Salzburg,” Kronen Zeitung, July 24, 2014.

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A discourse-analytical look at media coverage and related web-based discussions indeed reveals that what was actually at stake was not so much the a­ ntisemitism itself but the demarcation of the Austrian majority society, framed as nonantisemitic in comparison with “the problematic Turks/Muslims.” This was reflected most clearly in discussions on UETD’s Facebook page, as the organization was the main organizer of the big rally on July 20. Many users who identified as part of Austrian dominant society (“Austrians”) intervened online and criticized the mobilization. Rather than articulating a substantive criticism of Islamized antisemitism, however, the majority of these postings actually reflected “dislocated” integration debates with the bottom line of a “failed integration.” The arguments can be summed up as follows: The anti-Israeli protest shows that “the Turks/Muslims” do not belong to “us,” as “they” are “premodern, misogynist, antisemitic, violent, etc.,” and as such “the ‘real’ new Nazis.” Consequently, they are “nonintegrable” and “should get stripped of their citizenships and/ or deported.” One main focus of criticism was basically the fact that “Muslim immigrants” would organize violent protests on “Austrian soil,” which would cost “Austrian money.” Such behavior would ultimately prove that Muslims; after “flooding Europe en masse” because of “patriarchal suppression and constant warmongering in their home countries,” over time would reveal their non-assimilable/integrable “real nature” within their “host societies” as well and would “ultimately turn aggressive.”17 On both sides, the discussions were intertwined with the issue of (failed) integration. Muslim commentators argued that for the majority society, immigrants are “good enough to work,” while their “culture and language” are not respected at all, and that even Turkish or Arab names are not pronounced correctly. “The Turks” especially are marked as constant “trouble-makers.” Reactions to the discussion of “Muslim antisemitism” in Austrian media and mainstream society were related to these general feelings of exclusion, which were ultimately—and rightly—perceived as deriving from of anti-Muslim resentment. The dominant framing of the debates about Islamized antisemitism was that “Muslims” would be “denounced for being antisemitic” while “actually protesting for human rights”—and in this way, the critique was ­perceived as a major tool of exclusion. As a consequence, Austrian minister of

17 See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014,” July 12, 2014, 3:18 p.m., https://www.Facebook.com/events/1438306863115339/?ref=3&ref_ newsfeed_story_type=regular.

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integration Sebastian Kurz was invited to join the protest on July 20 instead of problematizing it.18 In summary, the debates show clearly that both sides, the majority as well as the minority, turned the political position toward the Middle East conflict into an indicator of domestic integration. In this way, the conflict ultimately served as a proxy for problems within the Austrian migration society. This identity-political appropriation of a conflict far from the actual Austrian ­reality was also reflected in the use of profile pictures on Facebook, where the “Austrian” side identified via Austrian flags and the “Muslim” side via a visual depiction of “Silenced Gaza” that went viral in early July.19 Regarding Islamized antisemitism, this perception of being depicted as the “new antisemites” as one dimension of feeling excluded by Austrian m ­ ajority society is the crux of the matter, as it relates to antisemitic interpretations of ethnicized inequality and injustice in the Austrian migration society. When concerns about the public perception of the rally on July 20 were expressed in the discussions among UETD followers, they immediately triggered complaints about biased media coverage portraying the just protest as antisemitic and labeling all Muslim protesters as “Islamists, Salafists and Hatemongers.” “The media” was thus accused of “manipulating” public opinion in order to “hide the truth” and back up the Zionist oppressors. Therefore, it is also no wonder that only the “Muslim side” would be demonized as “radical Islamists attacking Israel,” while nobody would point to the “radical Jewish Israeli army.” Both were seen to be connected to the fact that Israel would have enough “money and power” and would therefore “always be protected and excused”— and the ultimate explanation for this bias would be that “all media depend on Zionism.”20 In conclusion, one can say that the quite real anti-Muslim bias in Austrian media coverage and the stereotyping of Muslims in web discussions were ­interpreted in an antisemitic way as an outcome of “Zionist influence” that 18 Sebastian Kurz has been Austria’s minister for foreign affairs and integration since December 2013; after showing support for the Israeli military operation in July 2014 on Facebook, so many antisemitic comments were posted that Kurz initiated a public prosecution. See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014,” July 11, 2014, 11:16 p.m., https://www.Facebook.com/uetd.austria/?ref=br_rs›. 19 See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014,” July 12, 2014, 3:18 p.m., https://www.Facebook.com/events/1438306863115339/?ref=3&ref_ newsfeed_story_type=regular. 20 See UETD Austria, “User discussions on the mobilization for July 20, 2014,” July 16 2014, 4:10 p.m., https://www.Facebook.com/events/1438306863115339/.

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would “hide the truth” and “manipulate” media and public discourse. Such perceptions, however, also must be viewed in context of the use of anti-­Muslim discourse for the deflection of autochthonous antisemitism. To what extent the narrative of having overcome the antisemitic past served as a demarcation line against “the Turks/Muslims” became most obvious in media debates and comments following the attack on the soccer team Maccabi Haifa in Bischofshofen, where the rightly problematized antisemitic attack sparked numerous comments in social media demanding the arrest or deportation of the “Turkish Nazis.” Such claims were expressed most openly in the web forum of the right-wing newspaper Kronen Zeitung, where users wanted to see the assailants being “convicted for re-engagement in National Socialist activities” and consequently getting “stripped of the Austrian citizenship.” The most explicit examples of such hypocritical use of the criticism of antisemitism for anti-Muslim arguments clearly referred to historical anti-Nazi slogans: one such comment warned to “resist the beginnings,” because it would “rumble again in Austria and—like in the 1930ies—politicians would back down in face of the rise of a new Nazism, albeit today under the guise of tolerance.”21 A short consideration of the fact that the very same newspaper has been one major source and medium for the diffusion of antisemitism ever since its foundation reveals the hypocritical double standard of such claims and hints at their problematic use for deflection.22 Indeed, secondary antisemitic framing of the escalation in summer 2014 formed part of the newspaper’s coverage when Kronen Zeitung columnist Kurt Seinitz complained that “Jewish colonial settlers” in the West Bank would be “poisonous offspring of vipers” and that the escalation of violence would recall the “Allies’ bomb war against Germany.”23 Despite such double standards, however, populist right-wing positions and media discourse have changed during the last decade, and they reflect anti-Muslim discourse by increasingly framing the Israeli state as being at the 21 “Gaza-Protest: Randale bei Maccabi-Test in Salzburg,” Kronen Zeitung, July 24, 2014. 22 For analyses of antisemitism in Austria after 1945 with special focus on the role of Kronen Zeitung, see chronologically Bernd Marin and John Bunzl, Antisemitismus in Österreich: Sozialhistorische und soziologische Studien (Vienna: Inn-Verlag, 1983), 69–169; Ruth Wodak, Peter Nowak, Johanna Pelikan, Helmut Gruber, Rudolf de Zilia, and Richard Mitten, Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter: Diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1990), 121–23; Maximilian Gottschlich, Die große Abneigung: Wie antisemitisch ist Österreich? Kritische Befunde zu einer sozialen Krankheit (Vienna: Czernin, 2012), 10. 23 Florian Markl and Alexander Gruber, “Wochenbericht, 21.7. bis 27.7.2014,” MENA-Watch, July 28, 2014, http://www.mena-watch.com/showentry/1196-Wochenbericht-21-7-bis27-7-2014#WB-28Jul14-4.

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forefront of a historic clash of civilizations between an “enlightened Occident,” built on “Christian-Jewish” heritage, and the “Islamic world.” In the concluding section of this chapter, the problematic relation of Islamized antisemitism and its use by right-wing actors is discussed in light of ambivalent liberal and leftist reactions to this new area of conflict.

RIGHT-WING “ISRAEL SOLIDARITY” AND LIBERAL BELITTLEMENT OF ISLAMIZED ANTISEMITISM? At the height of the escalation of the Israel-Gaza conflict in summer 2014, a solidarity delegation of the Austrian Freedom Party traveled to Israel and visited the cities of Ashkelon, Sderot, and Ashdod to speak with political representatives and the civilian population about Hamas attacks.24 After returning, the members urged other Austrian parties to support “Israel’s right to selfdefense facing Islamist terror.”25 Such right-wing “Israel solidarity” is not a completely new phenomenon: throughout the last decade, the political discourse of Europe’s right-wing populists shifted with regard to the Israeli state, increasingly framing it as a “‘bulwark’ against Islamist terrorism and the Islamization of Europe.” As early as 2010, Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and chairman of the Belgian Vlaams Belang party Filip Dewinter accepted an invitation of the former head of Yisrael Beiteinu, Eliezer Cohen, to attend a meeting about Islamist threats to Israel and Europe.26 Such peculiar alliances between parts of the European and Israeli Right certainly do not put an end to right-wing antisemitism. A clear indication of this was the fact that Strache’s 2010 visit to Israel brought about a c­ onsiderable scandal as he entered the memorial site Yad Vashem wearing a cap of the extreme-right German Nationalist fraternity Vandalia, of which he has been a member since his youth. Although a (pseudo-)“critique” of antisemitic articulations coming 24 The Austrian Freedom Party is the most right-wing party in the Austrian political landscape. It is the direct successor of the Verband der Unabhängigen, which was founded in 1949 as a reservoir for former NSDAP members. Since the late 1990s, the Freedom Party has changed its political image from extreme Right to right-wing populist, but it is still deeply connected with the Austrian neo-Nazi political spectrum. 25 FPÖ Wien, Pressestelle, “Lasar: Freiheitlicher Solidaritätsbesuch in Israel!,” press release, August 2, 2014, http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20140802_OTS0014/ lasar-freiheitlicher-solidaritaetsbesuch-in-israel. 26 Adar Primor, “The Unholy Alliance between Israel’s Right and Europe’s Anti-Semites,” Haaretz, December 12, 2010.

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from Muslim communities or from the European Left has indeed been observed in recent years, antisemitism is still an integral part of right-wing political discourse and practice. Current research on the intertwinement of antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate speech, for instance, reveals that although the official main goal is to fight the “Islamization of Europe,” significant parts of the extreme Right believe in a Jewish conspiracy secretly promoting the “Islamic infiltration” of the European Union.27 Equally telling is a statement by Andreas Mölzer, long-time member of the Austrian Freedom Party, with regard to the party’s pro-Israel stances: for Mölzer, the Israel tour of chairman Strache was nothing more than a “submission” to the “Jewish-Israeli” influence worldwide.28 A recent statement of a Freedom Party member revealing the unabated continuity of crude antisemitic conspiracy-theory beliefs came from Parliament member Susanne Winter, who was convicted of antiMuslim incitement a few years ago. Winter recently cheered a comment on her Facebook page that lamented that “Zionist money-Jews,” especially “the ones located in the United States,” would be “the main problem worldwide” as they would make “use of the Holocaust in order to eliminate Europe’s and Germany’s potential challenge to the US hegemony.” In complete agreement with the statement, Winter praised the commentator as a “brave and independent person” who had expressed what she, in her position as member of the Austrian Parliament, would not be allowed to bring up.29 The fact that Winter was forced to resign again sparked discussion about the “power of the Jewish/ Zionist lobby” in various (not only rightist) media forums. These selected statements illustrate that the conspiracy-theory belief in being “controlled” or “colonized” by “Jewish/Zionist forces” actually constitutes one major point of contact between Islamized and “­autochthonous” right-wing antisemitism. The trope of a powerful “Zionist lobby,” however, is also deeply ingrained in mainstream Austrian society; recent empirical studies point out the unswerving belief in a malicious “Jewish influence” on politics and ­international 27 Carina Klammer, Imaginationen des Untergangs: Zur Konstruktion antimuslimischer Fremdbilder im Rahmen der Identitätspolitik der FPÖ (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2013), 83–84. 28 Heribert Schiedel, Extreme Rechte in Europa (Vienna: Steinbauer, 2011), 69. 29 Grüner Klub im Parlament, press release, October 31, 2015, http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20151031_OTS0032/schreuder-fordert-sofortigen-ruecktritt-der-fpoenationalratsabgeordneten; “FPÖ-Abgeordnete Winter stellt Rückzug in den Raum,” Der Standard, November 2, 2015, http://derstandard.at/2000024868713/FPOe-prueftantisemitisches-Winter-Posting.

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economics.30 Yet there are two major differences between Islamized and autochthonous antisemitism: as the Facebook mobilization shows, in Muslim communities the resentment is currently articulated in a disturbingly blunt way when compared with “Austrian” antisemitic articulations. This fact can partly be explained by the social pressure within the post-Nazi majority society to avoid openly antisemitic hate speech, while it contemporaneously acts out the resentment in a more hidden way—a phenomenon that has been described as “communicative latency” (Kommunikationslatenz) in the German context, and as “antisemitism without anti-Semites” regarding Austrian deflection ­discourses.31 The second difference is the role of anti-Zionism, which serves as the most important common frame for people identifying as Muslims. As shown above, this is related to the fact that racist discrimination and exclusion are interpreted in a structurally antisemitic way.32 However, it should also be seen in the context of the hegemonic anti-Muslim discourse, in which rightwing populism and even parts of the extreme Right gradually abandon anti-­ Zionist stances and rather frame the Israeli state as a bulwark against Muslim threats outside Europe and as a good example with regard to the handling of the internal threat of Europe’s “ongoing Islamization” and Islamist terrorism. That such discursive changes, however, are mainly a surface phenomenon and absolutely do not mean that autochthonous antisemitism has come to an end is discussed in the concluding paragraph.

CONCLUDING REMARKS It would seem, then, that few actors both take Islamized antisemitism seriously and simultaneously distance themselves from anti-Muslim rhetoric. As a case in point, the right-wing focus on it rather leads to a peculiar nonhandling of 30 Maximilian Gottschlich and Oliver Gruber, Waldheims Erbe: Antisemitische Einstellungen der österreichischen Bevölkerung Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativbefragung 2010/2011 (Vienna: University of Vienna, 2011), 6–7. 31 Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung: Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (1986): 223–46; Bernd Marin, Antisemitismus ohne Antisemiten: Autoritäre Vorurteile und Feindbilder (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000). 32 For a comprehensive discussion of the identificatory potential of anti-Zionism and its intertwinement with debates on the dominance of the Holocaust in “Western” remembrance culture, see Helga Embacher, “Muslimischer Antisemitismus in Europa,” Jüdisches Echo, January 23, 2015.

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antisemitism. Such ambivalent silencing could already be observed at the turn of the century, when in the wake of the Second Intifada the Islamization of antisemitic resentment first became visible in Europe. Back then, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) chose not to publish a study conducted by the Berlin-based Center for the Study of Antisemitism in which the authors pointed to this fact. Following harsh criticism, the EUMC vindicated the decision and explained that the main reason for holding back the study was its anti-Muslim bias resulting from a lack of “reliable data” and the “insufficient” definition of (anti-Zionist) antisemitism.33 This argument points to the crux of the matter regarding new, Israel-related antisemitism, as the reluctance to differentiate between the factual conflict, and its projective dimension has to be explained partly by the “colonial framing” of the Israeli state, which is quite hegemonic not only within Muslim communities but also within European majority societies. This framing underlies ongoing scholarly debates within the research of antisemitism, where it is still questioned whether anti-Zionism could indeed be articulated as a new form of antisemitism or whether it would mainly be a “justified criticism of Israeli policies,” which somehow got out of hand.34 Similar dynamics could be observed following the antisemitic outbursts in summer 2014, when leading member of the Austrian Green Party Peter Pilz called for a boycott of Israel while completely ignoring the fact that the conflict also served as a projection screen for people identifying as Muslims. Likewise, elements of the liberal and leftist media tended to downplay the phenomenon of Islamized antisemitism in either not addressing it at all or in framing the resentment solely as a (somehow understandable) reaction to racist exclusion.35 Positions referring to postcolonial criticism even regarded the numerous anti-Israeli rallies, ­including the yearly Al-Quds demonstration, as “de-colonial articulations” in which the “traumatic historical experience of colonialist displacement” would merge with current experiences of racism.36 The last comment especially illustrates the liberal and leftist failure to tackle new antisemitism: First, the 33 “Bericht blieb geheim,” Der Standard, November 25, 2003; “EUMC wehrt sich gegen Vorwürfe,” Der Standard, November 28, 2003. 34 Dina Porat, “The International Working Definition of Antisemitism and Its Detractors,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 5, no. 3 (2001): 1–11. 35 E.g., Stefan Brändle, “Krawalle bei Demo gegen Gaza-Offensive in Paris,” Der Standard, July 20, 2014; Gianluca Wallisch, “Österreich: Hass-Mails an Muslime,” Der Standard, July 23, 2014; Sybille Biermann, “Vom Straßenlärm übertönt,” Tageszeitung (TAZ), September 13, 2014. 36 E.g., Vassilis Tsianos, “Nicht mehr nur die ‘Anderen,’” TAZ, August 19, 2014.

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anti-racist desire not to feed into anti-Muslim discourse ultimately feeds into the structurally antisemitic colonial framing of Israel, rather than providing an analytical explanation for Islamized antisemitism and its interrelation with antisemitic traditions of the majority society. Related to that, but even more disturbing, is the unquestioned adoption of antisemitic pseudo-anti-colonialist narratives such as Ayatollah Khomeini’s invention of a special day dedicated to “liberating” Jerusalem (Al-Quds in Arabic) from the “Zionist invaders.” Finally, the statement reveals a good deal of Eurocentric paternalism and lack of political knowledge, as Al-Quds Day is an invention of the Iranian religious regime and is neither connected to any factual colonial history nor unanimously embraced in the Muslim world.37 Such views are exemplary of many liberal and leftist voices, and they illustrate that the framing of Israel as a colonial entity and the unquestioned interlinking of events in the Middle East with racist exclusion in Europe are not restricted to political actors identifying as Muslims or to extreme ideologies on the right or on the left but are part of mainstream discourse. Moreover, the liberal belittlement of Islamized antisemitism is a sort of paternalistic, misunderstood “anti-racism” that does not take seriously the extreme political articulations coming from Muslim communities. Acknowledging the fact that European migration societies are shaped by racist postcolonial divisions, however, should not prevent an analysis and critique of the resentment in communities facing discrimination. Postone illustrated that injustice and exploitation in capitalism have been interpreted in a structurally antisemitic way ever since the bourgeois-capitalist system turned hegemonic in nineteenth-century Europe, as modern antisemitism turned Jewish communities into scapegoats (or proxies) for the unjust system. It would thus be at least paternalistic to behave as though people identifying as Muslims were an exception to the rule in this respect. Regrettably, though, current discussions often stop at the level of competitions of victimization—so instead of debating who would be the “new antisemites” or who would have learned from the past, adequate analyses and pedagogical responses to current antisemitic articulations are needed. Or, as Günther Jikeli points out in his pioneering qualitative study on Islamized antisemitism, the fact that the antisemitic resentment is often interconnected

37 Udo Wolter, Beispiel Al-Quds-Tag: Islamistische Netzwerke und Ideologien unter Migrantinnen und Migranten in Deutschland und Möglichkeiten zivilgesellschaftlicher Intervention (Berlin: Ufuq, 2004).

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with quite real feelings of racist exclusion and deprivation does not render it less virulent.38 What is thus needed is a comprehensive perspective that brings together a historical look at the resentment’s evolvement and its current transformations. Approaches tackling the history of Islamized antisemitism illustrate how it “traveled” from Europe to the Middle East during the 1930s and soon became entangled with an anti-Zionist colonial framing of social and political tensions in the wake of the emerging Middle East conflict.39 Theoretical analyses point out how it is currently rearticulating in Europe’s migration societies via a postcolonial framing of “failed integration” of Muslim communities, unifying not only Muslim (and Islamist) but also leftist or even Christian and other conservative standpoints in an abridged pseudocriticism of postcolonial inequalities.40 Alarming in this respect is the violent dimension of the resentment, which was clearly revealed during the rallies in summer 2014. As this chapter was written in the wake of the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015, it should thus not be concluded without pointing to the deadly potential of the structurally antisemitic colonial framing of the Israeli state: the attack on the Parisian music venue Bataclan, where a great number of people lost their lives, was by no means a coincidence, as the venue has been publicly taking pro-Israeli stances. Prior to the attacks it had been targeted by activists of the transnational anti-Israeli “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” movement and had even received threats of getting firebombed in the year 2011. Such events point to the importance of acknowledging the intersection of structurally antisemitic (pseudo-)anti-colonialism acted out on Israel and current extremist ideologies in order to tackle it. Taking the interrelation of anti-Zionism and antisemitism as well as the eliminatory potential of the resentment ­seriously, however, does not mean ignoring postcolonial realities. On the contrary—it calls for the need to relate differing societal cleavages and resentments to each other, rather than for sticking to competitions of victimization.

38 Günther Jikeli, Antisemitismus und Diskriminierungswahrnehmungen junger Muslime in Europa (Essen: Klartext, 2012). 39 Michael Kiefer, Antisemitismus in islamischen Gesellschaften: Der Palästina-Konflikt und der Transfer eines Feindbildes (Düsseldorf: Verein zur Förderung Gleichberechtigter Kommunikation, 2002); Matthias Küntzel, Jihad und Judenhaß (Freiburg: Ça Ira, 2003). 40 Robert Wistrich, “Der alte Antisemitismus in neuem Gewand,” in Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte, ed. Dorin Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2004), 250–71.

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Antisemitism and the Struggle for the “Good” Society: Ambivalent Responses to Antisemitic Attitudes and Ideas in the 2014 Swedish Electoral Race Kristin Wagrell

I

n the wake of Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, the number of antisemitic incidents rose all over Europe, and Sweden was no exception. In the campaign for the Swedish general elections that took place on September 14, several candidates from various parties were caught making antisemitic statements or comments on social media and in the news media. Even though these candidates were eventually forced to resign and drop out of the electoral race, the complacency and apologetic attitude that met most of them spoke to a deeper problem in Swedish political discourse. There was then, and still seems to be, a widespread inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to recognize antisemitism when it does not present itself in the form of neoNazism. In this position paper I argue that as long as self-avowed anti-racists allow themselves and others to employ antisemitic language, especially in the name of defending the downtrodden, it will not be possible to combat the problem of antisemitism in any meaningful way.

Kristin Wagrell

“ANTISEMITISM IS ON THE RISE IN OUR COUNTRY— AND WE REMAIN SILENT” This is the pertinent title of an article published in the evening newspaper Expressen, by the well-known Swedish actor, writer, and circus director Henry Bronett. In his 2014 article, Bronett directs a scathing critique toward Swedish decision makers, journalists, and anti-racist activists for their astounding silence at a time when antisemitic sentiments were flourishing in social media and on the streets of Sweden.1 Until mid-August 2014, the issue of Swedish antisemitism was a marginal question at best, both in the electoral campaigns and in mainstream media. It was not until five political candidates had to resign their candidacies for having made antisemitic comments or posts on Facebook that public discourse began to broach the subject of antisemitism in Sweden. However, this discussion centered on the treatment of Swedish Jews and anonymous antisemitic comments made on different social media platforms. Very little of the political conversation actually dealt with issues surrounding antisemitism as a specific problem of ideas and attitudes in contemporary Swedish society. Reports of antisemitic expressions increased throughout the final stages of the electoral race, and voices from several parties were heard after Bronett’s article in defense of tolerance and against antisemitism. Yet there was a ­lingering ambivalence within Swedish party politics regarding antisemitism— especially that which was expressed in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. In 2006 the Swedish government agency Forum för Levande Historia (Living History Forum) and BRÅ (the Council for Crime Prevention) published a report on antisemitism in Sweden, which showed that 5 percent of the Swedish population between the ages of sixteen and seventy-five expressed antisemitic ideas in a forceful and consistent manner. Furthermore, the study demonstrated that 36 percent of all Swedes in the same age group had an ambivalent attitude toward Jews.2 This meant that more than a third of the Swedish population agreed with certain antisemitic ideas while rejecting others.

  1 Henry Bronett, “Antisemitismen ökar i Sverige—och vi tiger,” Expressen, July 27, 2014, http://www.expressen.se/debatt/antisemitismen-okar-i-sverige---och-vi-tiger/.   2 Henrik Bachner and Jonas Ring, Antisemitiska attityder och föreställningar i Sverige, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Forum för Levande Historia, 2007), 8.

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Furthermore, these results were consistent with the global study c­ onducted by the Anti-Defamation League, which showed that 4 percent of the Swedish population harbored antisemitic attitudes.3 However, as the Swedish Committee against Antisemitism notes in a review of the study, over 10 percent agree with statements such as “Jews have too much power over financial markets,” “Jews only care about what happens to individuals within their own group,” and “Jews have too much influence over the American administration.”4 In the September 2014 general elections, the racist and immigrationhostile Sweden Democrats party doubled its support and received over 12 percent of the Swedish national vote.5 Many of its political candidates had been forced to resign after Expressen uncovered racist and homophobic comments on various Internet forums.6 This is hardly surprising, given the Sweden Democrats’ political program, which proposes assimilation and radical changes to Sweden’s immigration policies.7 However, it was not the only party having to suspend members and representatives on the basis of such expressions. In fact, suspensions from parties, as well as resignations of candidacies because of antisemitic statements, in the 2014 electoral race also occurred within parties with clear anti-racist, protolerance platforms, such as the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna), the Environmental Party (Miljöpartiet), and the Center Party (Centerpartiet). A majority of the candidates who had to resign because of antisemitic statements maintained that they were tolerant, compassionate human beings who do not consider themselves racists or antisemites. To speak of tolerance as an intraparty solution to this problem is, therefore, not sufficient, as antisemitism clearly follows a specific logic. The 2014 electoral race demonstrates how antisemitism continues to exist in Sweden as a latent structure,   3 Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Global 100,” July 2013–February 2014, http://global100. adl.org/#country/sweden, accessed September 12, 2014.  4 Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, “Antisemitismen i ett globalt perspektiv: SKMA sammanfattar och kommenterar ny studie,” http://skma.se/blogg/2014/05/ antisemitismen-i-ett-globalt-perspektiv-skma-sammanfattar-och-kommenterar-ny-studie, May 17, 2014.   5 The Swedish election was held on September 14, 2014. For comprehensive statistics on the election results, see Valmyndigheten, “Röster—Val 2014,” September 19, 2014, http:// www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html.   6 Emma Löfgren, “Många avhopp i valrörelsens slutskede,”Dagens Nyheter, September 9, 2014, http://www.dn.se/valet-2014/manga-avhopp-i-valrorelsens-slutskede.  7 Sverigedemokraterna, Sverigedemokraternas Principprogram 2011, http://sverigedemokraterna. se/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/principprogrammet2014_webb.pdf.

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making itself known throughout the political spectrum, particularly in times of conflict. Therefore, it is vital that party responses to expressions of antisemitism within the party itself also acknowledge that it is antisemitism specifically that needs to be combated in this case and not intolerance in general.

CONTEXTUALIZING ANTISEMITISM WITHIN THE ANTI-RACIST MOVEMENT A seemingly contradictory development within the Swedish anti-racism ­movement is that while its members aim to stand up for the values of human rights and tolerance, they have, at times, found it difficult to see, acknowledge, and act against expressions of antisemitism.8 Members of this movement, who aim to speak and act on behalf of the disenfranchised, are overrepresented in the leftist and green camps in Swedish politics but span the political spectrum. One of the main figures of the Swedish anti-racism movement is Mona Sahlin, the former head of the Social Democrats, who, in 2014, held the title of national ­coordinator against violent extremism. In a 2010 debate with the then Christian Democratic leader, Göran Hägglund, Sahlin demanded that her opponent apologize for suggesting that antisemitic attitudes were more prevalent among Swedish Muslims than among other Swedish groups.9 Sahlin’s indignant response to Hägglund’s statement demonstrates the precariousness of accusing a socioeconomically weak group of intolerance. One of the leading scholars on contemporary Swedish antisemitism, Henrik Bachner, describes this phenomenon as an expression of ignorance by individuals who find it difficult to reconcile the idea of socioeconomic weakness and perpetration.10 Conversely, this is also what causes the same individuals to trivialize antisemitism, making it a non-issue in the t­olerance debate.11 Because Jews are perceived as a strong socioeconomic group, itself an antisemitic idea, they are rarely perceived as victims of intolerance in anti-racist ­discourse.  8 Elin Melin, “Konflikten i mellanöstern kan utnyttjas för att legitimera judehat,” August 8, 2014, http://www.forskning.se/hurmarsverige/nationalism/nationalism/ konfliktenimellanosternkanutnyttjasforattlegitimerajudehat.5.3b19111a146b5b338a69fc. html, accessed September 10, 2014.   9 Peter Rubinstein, “Varför blev Mona Sahlin så upprörd?,” Judisk Krönika, no. 2 (2010): 42. 10 Melin, “Konflikten.” 11 Ibid.

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This notion is reinforced and consequently facilitated by the I­srael-Palestine conflict, in which the Israeli government’s actions in the Gaza Strip become an excuse for the expression of antisemitic sentiment. As Bachner argues in his doctoral dissertation on Swedish antisemitism after 1945, this form of antisemitism and extreme forms of anti-Zionism, framed by the Israel-Palestine conflict, have existed within the left wing of the political spectrum in Sweden and western Europe since 1967.12 Although “the anti-Zionist opinion that grew within the revolutionary left . . . was, without a doubt, also based on a genuine sympathy for the Palestinians as the weaker party in the conflict,” it came to develop significant antisemitic elements as a result of the “western anti-Jewish intellectual heritage” and antisemitic ideas embedded in socialist theory.13 The manner in which antisemitism is expressed in discourses on t­ olerance and solidarity with the Palestinian population is, therefore, nothing new, but constitutes a phenomenon that has spread and developed in Europe since the late 1960s.

ANTISEMITIC EXPRESSIONS AND AMBIVALENT RESPONSES IN THE 2014 ELECTORAL RACE On August 5 Birgitta Hansen, a city council member representing the Environmental Party in Skarpnäck (a Stockholm borough), published a statement on her Facebook page in which she compared the State of Israel with the Nazis and stated that the world stands by and does nothing because “the Jews” have such influence over big business and the US administration.14 After being criticized for her antisemitic outburst, Hansen commented that she never intended her statement to be interpreted as antisemitic or to offend anyone. She went on to explain her comments by being more diffuse but still alluded to the fact that the Jews as a group affect world events by influencing the US government.15 On August 12, the daily newspaper Metro reported that Hansen had renounced all her political responsibilities after being asked to step down by the head of the Environmental Party in Stockholm, Per Olsson.16 Before Hansen 12 Henrik Bachner, Återkomsten: Antisemitism i Sverige efter 1945 (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1999), 330–31. 13 Ibid., 155. 14 Peter Lindholm, “Miljöpartist kritiseras för antisemitism,” Metro, August 12, 2014, http://www. metro.se/stockholm/miljopartist-kritiseras-for-antisemitism/EVHnhk!FbbuDCAruL02. 15 Ibid. 16 Patrick Ekstrand, “MP-politiker slutar efter att ha jämfört Israeler med nazister,” Metro, August

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resigned from her post, Olsson commented to Metro that “as a representative of the Environmental Party, one has to manage a critique of Israeli military operations without expressing antisemitic ideas.”17 This response seems reasonable, as it condemns antisemitic expressions while leaving a critical stance against the Israeli state’s use of force in Gaza open to opinion and debate. However, in an interview in the major daily newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, Åsa Romson, one of the two national leaders of the Environmental Party in 2014, explained Hansen’s, as well as the recently suspended political candidate Jerker Nordlund’s, statements as having been interpreted as if there was antisemitism behind them.18 Thus, Romson claimed that the antisemitic character of Hansen’s statements was open to interpretation and implicitly denied that there was any antisemitism evident in the statements themselves. Furthermore, Romson concluded that “it is important, when we have a problem with antisemitism in Sweden, that we are clear with how our representatives frame their arguments.”19 Hence, rather than condemning Hansen’s and Nordlund’s antisemitic ideas, Romson critiqued the candidates’ choice of words. Moreover, in reply to the question “Why do Environmental Party ­members behave in this manner?” Romson referred to the “desperation” felt in many debates. She specifically pointed to Operation Protective Edge as a conflict that made many within her party feel “a great sense of desperation with the children who were murdered needlessly.” She continued by saying that “the fight for the ‘good society’ is sometimes desperate but that does not excuse acts of stupidity by political representatives.”20 Romson thereby characterized these antisemitic statements as unfortunate slips of the tongue made in the struggle for a better society. She mentioned that Sweden has a problem with antisemitism but did not acknowledge that it also exists in, and is often framed by, the Israeli-Palestine conflict. 13, 2014, http://www.metro.se/nyheter/mp-politiker-slutar-efter-att-ha-jamfort-­ israelermed-nazister/EVHnhl!6Qmb4vIcMsko. 17 Lindholm, “Miljöpartist.” 18 The Environmental Party, Miljöpartiet-de gröna, became a political party in 1981 and chose to have two so-called spokespeople (språkrör) instead of one party leader. At the end of July 2014, the political candidate for the Environmental Party, Jerker Nordlund, posted several antisemitic texts on Facebook encouraging a “global war on Israel” and stating that the Israeli state is a “mental illness.” See A. Lindberg, “MP-politiker: ‘Israel är en sjuk stat,’”Aftonbladet, July 27, 2014, http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article19267753.ab; and T. Brandel, J. Stiernstedt, and F. Svensson, “Live: Svds utfrågning av Åsa Romson,”Svenska Dagbladet, August 28, 2014, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/valet2014/svd-fragar-ut-asa-romson-live_3856352.svd. 19 Brandel, Stiernstedt, and Svensson, “Svds utfrågning.” 20 Ibid.

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Similarly, the antisemitic statements made by Petronella Petersson, the third name on the ballot for Parliament of the Center Party,21 were summed up by both the offender and her district head as statements that had been misinterpreted.22 In a thread on Facebook on July 20, 2014, Petersson made antisemitic statements in which she referred to “the Jews” as being reclusive and against gay marriage and alluded to the idea that antisemitism, and ultimately the Holocaust, depended on how “the Jews” behaved. For example, Petersson commented, “You who think that the Jews’ actions are good through and through, do you also mean that the German population disliked the Jews because of pure and random evil?”23 This comment reflects the antisemitic notion that hatred of Jews emanates from Jewish behavior and ways of life. According to this view, it is the fault of the Jews themselves that they are shunned and persecuted.24 In the Facebook feed, many of Petersson’s party colleagues pointed out that her statements about “the Jews” as one homogeneous group were antisemitic and offensive. Petersson’s defense also consisted of the theory that a tolerant and open society, which she claimed to promote, is dependent on the intermingling of cultures and religions, something which “the Jews” oppose. This last statement made by Petersson echoes Romson’s idea about a desperate struggle for “the good society.” In the quest for a more open and tolerant society, “the Jews” are identified as an obstacle; either in the incarnation of the State of Israel, supported by powerful Jews in the United States, or as a reclusive group that refuses to mix with the rest of the world. As in Hansen’s case, Petersson’s comments were excused by the Center Party district leader for Blekinge County as “an unfortunate choice of words which has led to people drawing the wrong conclusions” about Petersson.25 In addition, Petersson’s rather meek public apology showed that she did not regret the content of her comments but rather the fact that they might have been “perceived” as antisemitic, when that was never her intention. In contrast, the Social Democratic candidate, Omar Omeirat, whose statement on Facebook that “the Palestinians [were] being slaughtered by the 21 The Center Party has a liberal, green profile with an emphasis on local politics and the importance of rural areas and their survival in an urbanized economy. 22 Sylvia Asklöf Fortell, “När fördomar blir sanningar,”Blekinge Läns Tidning, July 24, 2014, http://www.bltsydostran.se/ledare_blt/nar-fordomar-blir-sanningar(4379587).gm, accessed September 6, 2014). 23 Ibid. 24 Bachner and Ring, Antisemitiska attityder och föreställningar i Sverige, 9. 25 “Petersson hoppar av politiken efter beskyllningar om antisemitism,”Sveriges Radio P4 Blekinge, August 6, 2014, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=105&artikel=5930985.

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Jewish swine” was both reproached and rejected in full by Åsa Hååkman Feldt,26 the head of the Social Democrats in Filipstad, where Omeirat was r­unning for city council. Omeirat changed the wording of his statement to “Zionist swine,” thinking that this might be considered more acceptable to his party. This assumption proved erroneous, and although the local ballots had already been printed, Hååkman Feldt declared that Omeirat would not be “electable” come election day. Hååkman Feldt did not offer any excuses or explanations for Omeirat’s statements.27 Rather, she clearly stated that these views were not acceptable and that they had no place within the Social Democratic Party. Even the paraphrased version of the statement was denounced, and no issues of “interpretation” were raised with regard to the context of the statement. The fact that the ballots were already printed was, in Omeirat’s case, not an issue for the city council in Filipstad, as he was declared not “electable.” However, two weeks before Omeirat’s statement, a political candidate for the Center Party, Dayana Jadarian, had posted a video on her Facebook page with the notorious racist, antisemite, and former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke.28 When criticized for spreading antisemitic and racist propaganda, Jadarian responded that she did not know of Duke’s past but that what he discusses in the video are mere “facts.”29 The daily newspaper Metro contacted the head of the Center Party in Jadarian’s district, Bo Rundquist, and asked him whether Jadarian was going to be excluded from the ballot. Rather surprisingly, Rundquist replied that since the ballots were already printed, the party could not make her resign her candidacy. He added that if the ballots had not been printed and a line had been crossed, Jadarian would be excluded from the election, but he could not say whether this was the case.30 This response astounded many as Jadarian’s antisemitic post goes far beyond Omeirat’s statement, containing a multitude of hateful statements about Jews, including notions that Jews have influence and power over Hollywood and that Jews demoralize society, which encourages crime and the spread of disease. Thus, Jadarian’s post and her claims that it contained only “facts” is not a comment on 26 Bengt Hedin, “Palestinier blir slaktade av judesvinen,” Sveriges Television, August 5, 2014, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/regionalt/varmlandsnytt/palestiner-blir-slaktade-avjudesvinen, accessed September 9, 2014. 27 Ibid. 28 Åsa Larsson, “Centerpartist sprider antisemitisk propaganda—får vara kvar på valbar plats,”Metro, September 5, 2014, https://www.metro.se/nyheter/riksdagskandidat-spriderantisemitisk-propaganda/EVHnid!ujpQth7jyvYVw. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

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the ­Israel-Palestine conflict but goes far beyond this context. Yet the head of the Center Party in the district of Södermanland could not say whether Jadarian had “crossed the line.”31 Finally, three weeks after Jadarian’s post, she renounced all her candidacies for the city council, the county board, and Parliament, on the basis that she had not known Duke’s background. The Center Party simultaneously declared that although Jadarian’s name would be on the ballot, she would not be “electable.”32

WHERE IS ALL THE OUTRAGE? Antisemitic statements made by political candidates throughout the electoral campaigns in 2014 were perceived by their parties, with the exception of the Social Democrats, as proverbial “slips of the tongue,” and party responses were mild at best. Why was no one taking these antisemitic outbursts seriously? In the media coverage of the election, political voices were heard against antisemitism, although not within the context of the antisemitic statements made by individual politicians. On August 27, representatives from all parties represented in Parliament, except the Sweden Democrats, published an appeal on the public television network SVT’s news website, as a united protest against the “new” wave of antisemitism that had been sweeping over Sweden.33 This cross partisan effort was significant in that it was not merely a call for ­tolerance at large but clearly defined antisemitism as a specific problem of intolerance. More importantly, in the appeal, the representatives acknowledged the 2006 study conducted by the Living History Forum and Brottsförebyggande Rådet, which showed that antisemitism was not only a problem of the extreme right but existed among the population at large.34 In addition, on August 18 the small feminist party Feministiskt initiativ posted on its website a call for action against antisemitism in Sweden as well as in Europe at large. The call for action stated that “the growing antisemitism has to be taken seriously and be addressed with concrete politics.”35 This is ­perhaps 31 Daniel Vergara, “Riksdagskandidat för centerpartiet spred judehat,” Expo, September 5, 2014, http://expo.se/2014/riksdagskandidat-for-centern-spred-judehat_6621.html. 32 DanielVergara, “C-kandidat lämnar efter att hon spridit judehat,” Expo, September 10, 2014, http://expo.se/2014/c-kandidat-lamnar-efter-att-hon-spridit-judehat_6632.html. 33 Hanif Bali, Victoria Kawesa, Lars Ohly, and Caroline Szyber, “Vi kan inte blunda för antisemitismen,”Sveriges Television, August 27, 2014, http://www.svt.se/opinion/article2267926.svt. 34 Ibid. 35 Feministiskt initiativ, “Feministiskt initiativ uppmanar till aktion mot antisemitism i Sverige och i Europa,” August 18, 2014, http://feministisktinitiativ.se/feministiskt-initiativuppmanar-till-aktion-mot-antisemitism-i-sverige-och-i-europa/.

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the strongest statement against antisemitism made by any of the political parties during the 2014 electoral campaign. Feministiskt initiativ received 3.1 percent of the national vote in the 2014 election, which meant that it did not reach the 4 percent threshold required for entry into the Swedish Parliament. Thus, the only party that reacted forcefully against antisemitism in the 2014 electoral race did not even make it into Parliament. The cross partisan protest is significant, but it does not make as big an impact on the political agenda as when a party itself recognizes the problem and calls for action against it. In contrast, the parties that have had internal crises with regard to antisemitic statements made by political candidates have not incorporated agendas to deal with antisemitism specifically into their party programs. Rather, the Environmental Party stated, after the antisemitic expressions of Hansen and Nordlund, that it would work even harder against “intolerance” and toward the equality of all individuals, within the party ranks.36 However, in this promise of engaging with problems of intolerance within the party, antisemitism was never identified as a particular problem with a specific set of causes. This is problematic, as expressions of antisemitism are often concealed within arguments of tolerance and solidarity with groups in society that are identified as weaker and “more victimized” than the Swedish Jewish minority. Even more problematic is the fact that the Center Party failed to make any effort whatsoever to deal with the antisemitic ideas expressed by its former representatives.

I AM NOT AN ANTISEMITE, BUT . . . The failure to identify antisemitism as a specific phenomenon also enables individuals to express antisemitic ideas while simultaneously adhering to a narrative of the “self,” which proclaims, “I am not an antisemite.” Taken to its extreme, this argument was used to defend the famous cartoonist and ­caricaturist Lars Hillersberg, who expressed antisemitic ideas about Jews in his c­aricatures pertaining to the Israel-Palestine conflict, from the late 1960s onward. When Hillersberg’s antisemitic caricatures were debated in the early 2000s, his defenders claimed that he was not an antisemite, although his caricatures could be perceived as such, and used arguments such as “at least he wasn’t a Nazi.”37 In this case, what Hillersberg was became more important than what he did. 36 Christoffer Röstlund, “MP satsar mot intolerans efter antisemitiska sociala medieutspel,” Svenska Dagbladet, August 15, 2014, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/valet2014/ mp-satsar-mot-intolerans-efter-antisemitiska-uttalanden_3817326.svd. 37 Mathan Ravid, “Antisemitiska teckningar i fokus,” Expo, no. 2 (2013): 11.

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This phenomenon is also prevalent in discussions regarding antisemitic expressions by political candidates in the 2014 electoral race. In the Facebook thread where the Center Party candidate Petronella Petersson expressed her antisemitic views, she repeats that there is no room to criticize “the Jews” within her own party without being labeled an antisemite. Her main c­ oncern is therefore not that others will criticize her ideas but that they will label her with an attribute that negates her own self-perception of being a good, moral, tolerant individual. Being an antisemite means something to Petersson. It means that you are a bad person, someone who is intolerant of other groups and individuals in society. Therefore, she does not want to acknowledge that her prejudiced ideas fit into a system of ideas that constitute a certain form of antisemitism. However, nowhere in the Facebook thread is Petersson ever called an antisemite by her critics.38 Rather, all of them point out that her ­statements are antisemitic and attempt to make her see the antisemitic nature of her arguments regarding “the Jews” as a single homogeneous group. In her reply to the newspaper Metro, Hansen also emphasizes that she is “not an antisemite.”39 She makes this comment just after an elaboration of her Facebook argument that the United States gives billions of dollars to Israel and “that there must be a reason for that,” alluding to Jewish influence over US p­ olitics.40 Again, being an antisemite does not cohere with Hansen’s perception of herself as an anti-racist, tolerant human being. In her mind, just as in Petersson’s mind, she is merely “telling it like it is.” What they are both communicating in their defenses of their earlier comments is that antisemites constitute the “other.” In other words, antisemites are genocidal, extremist, right-wing, intolerant people who oppose the struggle for the “good” society. Similarly, although Jadarian commented on her Facebook page that the “facts” presented in David Duke’s video are “common knowledge, its [sic] just that people want to suppress them,”41 she maintained, when resigning her candidacy, that she is not a racist or an antisemite. Like Hansen and Petersson, Jadarian expressed a belief that there are characteristics of “the Jews” as a homogeneous group that have negative effects on the rest of the world and that these negative effects are somehow being hidden from view or subject to a collective form of self-denial. Yet it seemed very important to Jadarian that she 38 Frederick Federley, Facebook post, July 20, 2014, http://www.facebook.com/fredrick. federley/posts/10152168259325976?comment_id=10152168866095976¬if_t=like. 39 Ekstrand, “MP-politiker.” 40 Ibid. 41 Vergara, “Riksdagskandidat.”

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was not perceived as an antisemite. In February 2010 Jadarian posted a text on her blog in which she heavily reproached local politicians in Malmö for asking Swedish Jews to refrain from commenting on the Israel-Palestine conflict. She pointed to the violence and harassment that Swedish Jews have to endure and argued that this is unacceptable.42 So what has changed in the last four years? Perhaps we can find the answer by exploring the type of antisemitism that Jadarian as well as Hansen and Petersson are expressing on their Facebook pages. Rather than calling for legal repression or the physical persecution and extermination of Jews, the political candidates are reproducing “culturally contingent attitudes and ideas towards Jews.”43 As Bachner notes, “These expressions do not necessarily involve a will to act [against Jews], a discriminatory purpose, exclusion or violence. Neither are they always conscious, but can be reproduced without further reflection.”44 Hansen's, Petersson's and Jadarian's indignant defences against their critics demonstrate that antisemitic ideas are so ingrained in certain parts of Swedish discourse that to some, such ideas seem nothing if not self-evident.45

CONCLUDING REMARKS Looking at the political responses to expressions of antisemitism within the Center Party, the Environmental Party, and the Social Democrats, one is struck by the lack of force and urgency with which this problem was approached. This lax attitude is particularly striking when contrasted with the strong reactions elicited by the Sweden Democrats’ electoral result. In the weeks following the elections, almost the entire political discourse revolved around the staggering results of the Sweden Democrats, who received 12.86 percent of the national vote and thus became the third-largest party in the Swedish 42 Dayana Jadarian, “Vad händer i Malmö?,” Dayana Jadarian: Politik, juridik och lite teknik (blog), February 25, 2010, https://dayanajadarian.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/vad-hander-i-malmo. 43 Bachner, Återkomsten, 27–28. 44 Ibid. 45 The definition used herein is Helen Fein’s, which identifies antisemitism “as a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in actions—social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence—which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy, Jews as Jews.” Helen Fein, “Dimensions of Antisemitism: Attitudes, Collective Accusations, and Actions,” in The Persisting Question: Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern Antisemitism, Current Research on Antisemitism, vol. 1, ed. Helen Fein (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 67.

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Parliament. Debates in major newspapers addressed the question, Who are these people voting for the Sweden Democrats? This is indeed a pertinent question. However, since almost the same percentage as those who voted for Sweden Democrats in the 2014 election believed that “the Jews” have too much power over the media, I would like to pose the question, Who are these people harboring antisemitic attitudes and ideas? Are they Sweden Democrat voters? Are they left-wing, liberal, or rightwing extremists? Do they consider themselves tolerant or intolerant? And more important, what are we going to do about it? It seems the perfect time, while Sweden is approaching its next election to answer more than one question about who we are as political citizens and how we express antisemitic ideas as well as racist, h­ omophobic, and anti-Roma sentiments. It is not important whether someone is or isn’t an antisemite, but rather that the action itself, the communicative reproduction of antisemitic ideas and attitudes, matters. What one is is never determined but is contingent on contextual changes. Therefore, our focus needs to shift to what individuals and groups do and say within the realm of politics. Only then will the argument “I am not an antisemite, but . . .” become obsolete, and individuals will no longer be able to hide their prejudiced ideas behind a facade of “goodness.” Furthermore, the silence that Bronett speaks of in his article will persist if antisemitism is not taken seriously as its own set of prejudices with its own problems. The pervasive antisemitism that exists and is expressed throughout Swedish political life requires powerful responses from the parties themselves. Also, it is crucial to understand that antisemitism, especially that which is expressed by individuals aiming for political influence, is not merely a question of semantics. Antisemitism is a real problem with real consequences, and the 2014 electoral race demonstrated that real responses were definitely lacking.

Mohamed Omar and the Selective Detection of Non-Nazi Antisemitism Mathan Ravid

M

ohamed Omar is a Swedish writer with a Swedish mother and an Iranian  father. From his debut as a poet in 2005, he was a sought-after lecturer and a frequent guest on Swedish public television and radio. As a signatory to the so-called Amman Message condemning extremism and radicalism, Omar was long seen as a “moderate Muslim” and a builder of bridges between ­cultures and religions, preaching a message of coexistence and tolerance.1 This changed, however, when he temporarily embraced radical Islamist ­ideology. Almost immediately, Omar began spreading antisemitic propaganda, but for some parts of the media, it took quite a while to wake up to the noxious content in his new worldview. Because of Omar’s reputation as a tolerant Muslim, many were surprised when he published an article in Sweden’s second-largest evening paper, the liberal Expressen, on January 9, 2009, declaring that he had joined what he called “the worldwide Islamist movement” and attributing his turnabout to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, or “the plot against the inhabitants of Gaza,” in late 2008–early 2009.2 Despite his unambiguous declaration, however, it is doubtful that it was the Israeli military operation that led to Omar’s embrace of Islamism. A more plausible interpretation is that Omar used the dramatic event to reveal his extreme ideas, trying—as he did numerous times t­ hereafter—to pose as a champion of the Palestinian cause, in which he   1 For more on the Amman Message, see its official website, http://ammanmessage.com.   2 Mohamed Omar, “Gaza har gjort mig radikal,” Expressen, January 9, 2009, http://www. expressen.se/kultur/1.1426333/gaza-har-gjort-mig-radikal. All translations in the chapter are the author’s own. All the websites cited below are in Swedish, unless otherwise stated.

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seldom, if ever, had demonstrated any real interest previously. Signs of radicalism could in fact be discerned prior to Omar’s official “outing” as an Islamist, and he later declared that he had always, or at least for a long time, harbored many of the opinions he expresses today.3 Already in early 2009, Omar, for example, claimed that school education about the theory of evolution proves how religious people are being “persecuted” in Sweden.4 He had strongly condemned homosexuality and feminism as “diseases,” to which “Islam is the cure,”5 and advocated criminalization of the former.6 Furthermore, he had claimed that the Church of Sweden is full of “corrupt civil servants,” “the ­servants of Satan.”7 After coming out as an Islamist and turning into an outspoken supporter of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iranian regime, and Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, among others, Omar frequently spoke out in the name of all Swedish Muslims, taking for granted that they shared his radical views. When confronted with the fact that many Muslims criticize him, Omar tended to slander them as “Uncle Tom Muslims.”8

JEWISH CONSPIRACIES, MEDIA CONTROL, AND HOLOCAUST DENIAL Railing against anything Jewish, Omar deemed it “difficult” to be both Jewish and “a good human being” at the same time,9 and he referred to “Jewish   3 For example, in the first three parts of Omar’s “biography,” on his blog: Mohamed Omar, “Min berättelse,” Alazerius, November 29, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/11/29/ min-berattelse/, last viewed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Min berättelse del två – teatralisk mångkultur,” Alazerius, December 2, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress. com/2009/12/02/min-berattelse-del-tva-teatralisk-mangkultur/, last viewed November 30, 2011; and Mohamed Omar, “Min berättelse del 3 – arbetare, invandrare, upsaliensare,” Alazerius, December 7, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/min-berattelse-del-3-arbetare-invandrare-upsaliensare/, last viewed November 30, 2011.  4 Mohamed Omar, “Intervju med SVD,” Alazerius, March 30, 2010, http://alazerius. wordpress.com/2010/03/30/intervju-med-svd/, accessed November 30, 2011.   5 See, for example, Rasmus Landström, “Islam är botemedlet,” Aftonbladet, April 21, 2009, http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article4955198.ab.   6 Mohamed Omar, “‘Jag är en bråkstake’ – intervju med Alf Hardelin,” Alazerius, March 12, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/jag-ar-en-brakstake-intervju-medalf-hardelin/, accessed November 30, 2011.  7 http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912, accessed November 30, 2011.   8 Omar, “Min berättelse.”   9 See, for example, Magnus Sandelin and Ola Sandstig, “Den oheliga alliansen – antisemitism på frammarsch,” Sveriges Radio, November 1, 2009, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel. aspx?programid=1316&artikel=3204734.

Mathan Ravid

­misanthropy.”10 According to Omar, Muslims would never kill or hurt anyone simply because that individual belonged to a certain religion or ethnic group. By contrast, he reiterated the age-old allegation that the Talmud teaches Jews about the virtue of killing non-Jews.11 In a similar vein, Omar stated that there is “no evidence whatsoever” that the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks in the United States, the July 7 London bombings, or the failed suicide-bomb attack in Sweden in December 2010 were “traditional” Muslims. Rather, he claimed, Israel, “Zionists,” or CIA- and Mossad-trained “Wahhabi bandits” carried them out in order to incriminate Muslims, among other reasons.12 Also, following the July 22, 2011, bombing in Oslo and massacre on the island of Utøya by the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik, whose worldview incorporates both Islamophobic as well as antisemitic notions,13 Omar found common ground with right-wing extremists worldwide who branded Breivik a “Zionist” and “pro-Israel.” Omar declared that Utøya was “Norway’s Gaza” and that “Zionist terror” had been perpetrated by a person formed in a “pro-Israeli” environment of non-Jews “more Jewish than the Jews themselves.”14 Frequently citing well-known anti-Jewish forgeries such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and clearly influenced by the anti-Zionist discourse, Omar depicted Jewish nationalism—Zionism—as a gigantic fraud. He claimed that Sweden is ruled by “Socialist Zionism,”15 and he accused members of the Swedish Parliament,16 the anti-racist Swedish magazine Expo,17 the Swedish 10 Mohamed Omar, “Skeppsmassakern,” Alazerius, June 6, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress. com/2010/06/06/skeppsmassakern/, accessed November 30, 2011. 11 Ibid. 12 Mohamed Omar, “Intervju med SVD”; Mohamed Omar, “Hatet mot muslimer och hatet mot islam,” Alazerius, June 9, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/06/09/ hatet-mot-muslimer-och-hatet-mot-islam/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Kalla dem vid deras rätta namn,” Alazerius, December 21, 2010, http://alazerius. wordpress.com/2010/12/21/kalla-dem-vid-deras-ratta-namn/, accessed November 30, 2011. 13 Henrik Bachner and Willy Silberstein, “Terrordåden I Norge används för att sprida antisemitism,” Newsmill, September 6, 2011, http://newsmill.se/artikel/2011/09/06/terrordden-i-norge-anv-nds-f-r-att-sprida-antisemitism, accessed November 30, 2011. 14 Mohamed Omar, “Sionistisk terror drabbar Norge,” Alazerius, July 23, 2011, http://­alazerius. wordpress.com/2011/07/23/sionistisk-terror-drabbar-norge/, accessed November 30, 2011. 15 http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912, accessed November 30, 2011. 16 Mohamed Omar, “Makten och motståndet,” Alazerius, February 4, 2009, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/makten-och-motstandet/, accessed November 30, 2011; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9jEfuCTu5Q, accessed November 30, 2011. 17 Mohamed Omar, “Expo exponerar eller mörklägger?,” Alazerius, July 25, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/07/25/expo-exponerar-eller-morklagger/, accessed

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Committee against Antisemitism,18 and even Amnesty in Sweden of being Zionists.19 He has also charged that “mass immigration” (a term frequently used by groups within the extreme Right) to Sweden and “the concept of ­multiculturalism” were part of a Jewish plot aimed at dividing European societies, destroying their “ethnic identity,” and opening them up to cheap foreign labor that can benefit the Jews financially.20 Omar also embraced the antisemitic trope that the Jews control the media, claiming that “only Zionists get the opportunity to speak their minds.”21 In addition, Omar frequently denied the Holocaust.22 The “official version” of the “so-called Holocaust” was, according to Omar, merely a tool that “the Zionists” use to legitimize “the world hegemony of USrael [US and Israel]” and “the real Holocaust” in Palestine.23

ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES In November 2009, Omar announced on Swedish public radio the impending foundation of an “anti-Zionist” party. Clearly influenced by the French Parti Anti Sioniste, Omar underlined that it would not be an Islamist party but would focus solely on “anti-Zionism,” “in order to reach out to as many as possible.”24 November 30, 2011; http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Liberalismen är det största hotet’ – intervju med Oskorei,” Alazerius, March 9, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/03/09/liberalismen-ar-det-storsta-hotet-intervju-med-oskorei/, accessed November 30, 2011. 18 Mohamed Omar, “Från Albertus Pictor till Ahmed Rami,” Alazerius, September 24, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/09/24/fran-albertus-pictor-till-ahmed-rami/, accessed September 27, 2010. 19 http://www.mohamedomar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=199:amnesty&catid=35:artiklar&Itemid=49, accessed November 30, 2011 [in English]; http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912, accessed November 30, 2011. 20 http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912, accessed November 30, 2011. 21 Omar, “Intervju med SVD.” 22 Mohamed Omar, “Förintelseseminarium,” Alazerius, November 9, 2009, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/11/09/forintelseseminarium/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Fullsatt när Adelskogh föreläste i Uppsala,” Alazerius, May 31, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/fullsatt-nar-adelskogh-forelaste-i-uppsala/, accessed November 30, 2011. 23 Mohamed Omar, “Förintelselögnen och den nya världsordningen,” Alazerius, May 5, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/05/05/forintelselognen-och-den-nyavarldsordningen/, accessed November 30, 2011. 24 Sandelin and Sandstig, “Den oheliga alliansen.”

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This party never materialized, but the network connected to the idea worked at disseminating anti-Jewish propaganda. On a number of occasions, Omar stated that until his “anti-Zionist” party was formed, his endeavor should be seen as “the new anti-Zionist movement in Uppsala.”25 Accordingly, his home city, Uppsala, located some seventy kilometers north of the Swedish capital, Stockholm, is the main center of his activities, which include the establishment in 2009 of a study circle named after the Swedish painter and convert to Islam Ivan Aguéli (1869–1917). Officially a “nondenominational association,”26 Omar described the Aguéli study circle (Studiegruppen Aguéli) as “a group of dedicated Islamists” and the project as “an alternative form of integration” of young Muslims into what he called “the Swedish dissident culture.”27 However, from the outset, the focus was mainly on Jews rather than on Islamism, and many of the invited lecturers were known antisemites and Holocaust deniers. Lectures included titles such as “The Holocaust: A False Religion,” “Do We Have to Believe in the Gas Chambers?,” and “The Jewish Freemasons and the New World Order.”28 The Aguéli study circle is also the organization behind the Aguéli Islamic Publishing House (Islamiska förlaget Aguéli), which Omar described as a counterbalance to “Zionist-dominated” mainstream publishing houses and as a weapon in what he called “the daring Muslim fight” against “the heresies of the modern era”: atheism, liberalism, hedonism, Darwinism, feminism, gender science, and “faggot lobbyism.”29 Omar is an accomplished author, and during his years as an Islamist, he used his writing skills to get his message out. Starting in early 2009, Omar spread his message via groups created on Internet social forums such as Facebook. He was also one of the founders of the short-lived anti-Jewish web tabloid Fria Ordet (Free Word; friaordet.nu). Omar was a frequent contributor to the Iranian anti-Zionist e-newspaper Islam Times (islamtimes.org) and the Swedish 25 Mohamed Omar, “Jüri Lina i Uppsala,” Alazerius, November 3, 2009, http://alazerius. wordpress.com/2009/11/03/juri-lina-i-uppsala, accessed November 30, 2011. 26 Mohamed Omar, “Studiegruppen Agueli har reformerats,” Alazerius, November 3, 2011, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/studiegruppen-agueli-har-reformerats/, accessed November 30, 2011. 27 http://www.nationell.nu/2009/08/14/mohamed-omar-planerar-antisionistisk-kongress/, accessed November 30, 2011. 28 Information on lectures at Omar’s study circle was found at http://alazerius.wordpress. com/forelasningar/, accessed November 30, 2011. 29 Mohamed Omar, “Nu startar vi ett islamiskt bokförlag,” Alazerius, March 31, 2010, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/nu-startar-vi-ett-islamiskt-bokforlag/,  accessed November 30, 2011.

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Arabic news site Arab Nyheter (Arab News; arabnyheter.com/ar/), edited by the Swedish Palestinian antisemite and Holocaust denier Mousa Almallahi.30 However, Omar’s now defunct website (http://www.mohamedomar.org) and blog (http://alazerius.wordpress.com) probably offered the best insight into the opinions of the groups and individuals he has been trying to promote.31 These two sites were the main platforms for Omar’s propaganda, and the origin of most of the information disseminated to members of the various groups he was trying to build. He published movie clips, book reviews, and articles by and interviews with a variety of Swedish and international extremists. Well-known figures published, promoted, or interviewed by Omar include the American September 11 conspiracy theorist David Ray Griffin, the Israeli-born British antisemite Gilad Atzmon, and French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson.32 The various individuals attracted by and linked to him could be divided into two groups: a small inner circle of close associates and a larger, outer circle of contacts. One of Omar’s closest associates during this time was Lars Adelskogh (born 1950), formerly tied to the journal Folkets Nyheter (News of the People), which advocated the fascist-inspired “Third Position.” Adelskogh portrays the European Union as a Jewish plot and claims that the Holocaust 30 See, for example, Mohamed Omar, “How Free Is Western Media” [in English], Islam Times, November 8, 2011, http://islamtimes.org/vdcgnx9qwak9qn4.5jra.html; Mohamed Omar, “Till Syriens försvar av Mohammed Omar,” Arab Nyheter, November 15, 2011, http://arabnyheter.info/sv/2011/11/15/till-syriens-forsvar-av-mohammed-omar/, ; and Mohamed Omar, “‘Islam kommer att rädda Palestina’ – intervju med Mousa Almallahi,” Alazerius, September 4, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/09/04/islamkommer-att-radda-palestina-intervju-med-mousa-almalllahi/, accessed November 30, 2011. 31 In an interview with the conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet in March 2010, Omar claimed that his blog had about one thousand visitors a day. Omar, “Intervju med SVD.” 32 Mohamed Omar, “9/11 – en ohållbar konspirationsteori,” Alazerius, May 1, 2009, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/911-en-ohallbar-konspirationsteori/,  accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Min pappa var en frihetskämpe,” Mohamed Omar,  http://www.mohamedomar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=183:min-pappa-var-en-frihetskaempe&catid=45:gilad-atzmon&Itemid=60, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “En mordisk midnattsserenad – hur Israels ledare mördar för att vinna sitt folks röster,” Mohamed Omar, http://www. mohamedomar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=128:en-mordiskmidnattsserenad-hur-israels-ledare-moerdar-foer-att-vinna-sitt-folks-roester&catid=45:gilad-atzmon&Itemid=60, accessed November 30, 2011; http://www.mohamedomar.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=225:robert-faurisson&catid=34: intervju&Itemid=48, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Förintelsen är en lögn’ – intervju med Robert Faurisson,” Alazerius, May 17, 2010, http://alazerius. wordpress.com/2010/05/17/forintelsen-ar-en-logn-%E2%80%93-intervju-med-robertfaurisson/, accessed November 30, 2011.

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is merely propaganda spread by “Zionist-Jewish lobby groups.”33 A polyglot, Adelskogh translated various antisemitic texts into Swedish for Omar’s websites, and he contributed his own writings. Adelskogh was also a frequent lecturer at the Aguéli study circle. He had a clear influence on Omar, who described him as his mentor, “probably one of Sweden’s most intelligent people”34 and “Sweden’s leading expert” on “the mythic notion of the Holocaust.”35 Lars Wilhelmson, who according to Omar is “one of Sweden’s leading experts on Zionism,”36 was perhaps the most important member of Omar’s inner circle. Born a Jew in 1941, he claims to have been a leading figure within the 1968 Swedish left-wing and anti–Vietnam War movements.37 He has worked for the Swedish branch of European Jews for a Just Peace and the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden (Palestinagrupperna), as well as the socialist, former Maoist journal Folket i Bild/Kulturfront and the Alhambra publishing house. Alhambra has published books questioning the “mainstream” conception of the forces behind the September 11 attacks. Wilhelmson’s Jewish heritage might have been of minor interest had Omar not used it as “proof ” that he himself is not an antisemite but merely a “critic of Zionism.”38 In fact, Wilhelmson, one of the most frequent guests on Omar’s websites and at his study circle, assured Omar that racially based antisemitism is “practically nonexistent.”39 Judging by Wilhelmson’s articles in support of and interviews with Omar, “Zionism,” on the other hand, appears to be omnipresent. Wilhelmson portrays Zionism as the greatest current threat to all humanity,40 something that transcends the Jewish political movement, and a worldwide imperialist power occupying the Western world, not unlike the notion of the “Jewish world conspiracy” in Nazi propaganda.41 33 Mohamed Omar, “Lars Adelskogh – förintelser före förintelsen,” Alazierus, May 9, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/lars-adelskogh-forintelser-fore%E2%80%9D forintelsen%E2%80%9D/, accessed November 30, 2011. 34 “Mohamed Omar släpper boken Islamisten,” Realisten, June 17, 2010, http://www. realisten.se/2010/06/17/mohamed-omar-slapper-boken-islamisten/, accessed November 30, 2011. 35 Omar, “Förintelseseminarium.” 36 Mohamed Omar, “Värstingen – intervju med sionistkritikern Lasse Wilhelmsson,” Alazerius, March 31, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/03/31/varstingenintervju-med-sionistkritikern-lasse-wilhelmsson/, accessed November 30, 2011. 37 See, for example, http://lassewilhelmson.wordpress.com/the_author/. 38 Omar, “Intervju med SVD.” 39 Omar, “Värstingen – intervju med sionistkritikern Lasse Wilhelmsson.” 40 http://lassewilhelmson.wordpress.com/the_author/. 41 Mohamed Omar, “Ny bok om sionism” [in English], Mohamed Omar, http://www.

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A third person vital to Omar’s network was Ahmed Rami (born 1946 in Morocco). In 1987, in the wake of the First Palestinian Intifada, Rami founded Radio Islam, a local radio station ostensibly aimed at “deepening the friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims living in Sweden” and urging “unequivocal solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people.” However, the content focused almost entirely on Jews, and the station was accused of being a vehicle for Nazi propaganda. Books like Mein Kampf were regularly cited, and broadcasts welcomed “a new Hitler.” The abovementioned Protocols of the Elders of Zion was used as “proof ” of an international Jewish conspiracy controlling the economies, media, and political parties in the Western world. In 1989 Rami was charged by the Swedish Chancellor of Justice with hate speech and eventually sentenced to six months in jail. Seven years later, in 1996, he established the Radio Islam website (radioislam.org), which continues today to spread the same anti-Jewish propaganda. Omar explained Rami’s jail sentence as the result of political pressure from a “Jewish lobby” that could not accept Rami’s outspoken “criticism of Israel.”42 Omar characterized Rami not as a bigot but as a “martyr” and former “political prisoner” who uncovered the “destructive influence of the Jews in Sweden.”43 Rami was one of the first speakers at Omar’s study circle in August 2009; he called his lecture “Israel’s Power in Sweden,”44 which was also the title of a book he published in 1989. Describing Rami as one of the few “Muslim intellectuals” in Sweden and a “pioneer,” Omar saw himself as the keeper of Rami’s legacy and his heir.45 Rami on his part welcomed this new platform to spread his propaganda in Sweden, after some twenty years of

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mohamedomar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=169:ny-bok-om-­ sionismen&catid=34:intervju&Itemid=48, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Värstingen – intervju med sionistkritikern Lasse Wilhelmsson”; Mohamed Omar, “‘Sionistkritiken gör framsteg’ – intervju med Lasse Wilhelmson,” Alazerius, May 21, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/05/21/ sionistkritiken-gor-framstegintervju-med-lasse-wilhelmson-ii/, accessed November 30, 2011. Mohamed Omar, “Ny hemsida,” Alazerius, August 16, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress. com/2009/08/16/ny-hemsida/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Koranen stöder motståndet’ – intervju med Ahmed Rami,” Alazerius, July 11, 2009, http://alazerius. wordpress.com/2009/07/11/koranen-stoder-motstandet-intervju-med-ahmed-rami/, accessed November 30, 2011. http://www.varldenidag.se/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5002&I temid=98, accessed November 30, 2011; Sandelin and Sandstig, “Den oheliga alliansen.” For more on Ahmed Rami, Radio Islam, and the 1989 trial, see Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, Det eviga hatet: Om nynazism, antisemitism och Radio Islam (Borås: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 1993). Omar, “Ny hemsida.” “Mohamed Omar släpper boken islamisten.”

Mathan Ravid

spreading hate on the Internet and as a lecturer, debater and writer mostly in Muslim and Arab countries.46 Omar also associated with a number of other known extremists in Sweden. These included Mahmoud Aldebe, chairman of the Muslim Association of Sweden (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund), the largest organization within the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd), and one of the key groups seen as representing the Swedish Muslim community. Aldebe defended Omar’s Islamist turn in public47 and agreed to be interviewed on his blog.48 On Omar’s websites one could also find texts by other Swedish Islamists criticizing, among other things, “vulgar feminism”49 and equating homosexuality to incest.50 Such positions, which ran through Omar’s own texts, also won him friends outside Islamist circles, including a number of Christian conservatives.51 Omar also drew close to individuals on the far left of the Swedish political spectrum. One example is Jan Myrdal, a leading Swedish Maoist who demonized Israel in interviews with Omar by equating its actions to that of the Nazis.52 Other 46 Mohamed Omar, “Ahmed Rami rapporterar från Tehran,” Alazerius, September 6, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/09/06/ahmed-rami-rapporterar-fran-tehran/, accessed November 30, 2011; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFAgnTpXcGE [in French]. 47 “Varför hatar de oss?,” Muslim.nu, http://muslim.nu/joomla/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=80%3Avarfoer-hatar-de-oss&Itemid=54, accessed November 30, 2011. 48 Mohamed Omar, “‘En anda av broderskap’ – intervju med Mahmoud Aldebe,” Alazerius, June 3, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/06/03/en-anda-av-broderskap-­ intervju-med-mahmoud-aldebe/, accessed November 30, 2011. 49 Mohamed Omar, “Den opolitiska muslimen en kastrat,” Alazerius, January 5, 2010, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/01/05/den-opolitiske-muslimen-en-kastrat/,  accessed November 30, 2011. 50 Mohamed Omar, “‘Jag ser mig som en stolt homofob’ – intervju med Porang Zahedi,” October 8, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/jag-ser-mig-som-en-stolthomofob-intervju-med-porang-zahedi/, accessed November 30, 2011. 51 Mohamed Omar, “‘Sanningen inför rätta’ – intervju med Åke Green,” Alazerius, May 12, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/05/12/sanningen-infor-ratta-intervju-med-ake-green/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Jag är en bråkstake’ – intervju med Alf Hardelin,” Alazerius, March 12, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/03/12/jagar-en-brakstake-intervju-med-alf-hardelin/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Upplysningen var ett steg bakåt’ – intervju med Mikael Rosén,” Alazerius, January 7, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/01/07/upplysningen-var-ett-steg-bakat-intervjumed-mikael-rosen/, accessed November 30, 2011. 52 http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/4/, accessed November 30, 2011. According to the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” used by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (formerly, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia), drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and Nazi policy is an example of the way in which antisemitism can be manifested in regard to the State

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figures within Omar’s network were the internationally infamous antisemite Israel Shamir and his Swedish publisher, Hesham Bahari,53 founder of the abovementioned Alhambra publishing house. Omar described Shamir and the abovementioned Gilad Atzmon as “former Jews” “brave” enough to criticize Zionism.54 Shamir has claimed, inter alia, that believing in the Holocaust is like stating that the Jews are “special” and that it is the duty of every Muslim and Christian to deny “the Zionist version of the Holocaust.”55 Omar also made contacts with members of the Truth Movement, a ­collective name for loosely affiliated groups and individuals who question the mainstream account of the September 11, 2001, attacks. A leading Swedish “truther,” whom Omar interviewed in May 2009,56 is Mikael Cromsjö, founder of the website Vaken (Awake; vaken.se), which hosts numerous a­ ntisemitic texts. On his website, Cromsjö promoted the antisemitic, Estonian-born ­conspiracy theorist Jüri Lina,57 also a frequent lecturer at Omar’s study ­circle.58 At that time Omar called Lina “probably Sweden’s leading expert on Freemasonry.” Lina assured him that both the American Republican Party and the Democratic Party have connections to “Freemason Jews,” whose ultimate aim is an omnipotent world government.59

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of Israel. See http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinitiondraft.pdf, accessed November 30, 2011 [in English]. Mohamed Omar, “Hesham Bahari – ‘därför talar jag ut,’” Alazerius, June 3, 2009, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/06/03/hesham-bahari-darfor-talar-jag-ut/,  accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “‘Svinhugg går igen’ – intervju med Hesham Bahari,” Alazerius, May 15, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/svinhugg-garigen-intervju-med-hesham-bahari/, accessed November 30, 2011. Omar, “Ny hemsida.” Mohamed Omar, “‘Förintelsen är en avgud’ – intervju med Israel Shamir,” Alazerius, August 11, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/08/11/forintelsen-ar-en-avgud-intervjumed-israel-shamir/, accessed November 30, 2011; Israel Shamir, “Kroppstjuvar på hugget,” Alazerius, August 26, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/­kroppstjuvarpa-hugget/, accessed November 30, 2011. Mohamed Omar, “‘Det vaknar folk hela tiden’ – intervju med Mikael Cromsjö,” Alazerius, May 25, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/05/25/det-vaknar-folk-hela-tidenintervju-med-mikael-cromsjo/, accessed November 30, 2011. See, for example, “Världsbyggarnas bedrägeri,” Vaken.se, June 17, 2008, http://www.vaken. se/varldsbyggarnas-bedrageri/. Omar, “Jüri Lina i Uppsala.” Mohamed Omar, “En tystad kritiker talar ut – intervju med Jüri Lina,” Alazerius, April 9, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/04/09/en-tystad-regimkritiker-talar-ut-%E2% 80%93-intervju-med-juri-lina/, accessed November 30, 2011.

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Already in the fall of 2009, when publicly announcing the impending foundation of his “anti-Zionist” party, Omar stressed that even Nazis would be welcomed.60 According to him, they held common “insights” concerning, among other things, freedom of expression, democracy, “liberal culture,” and, of course, Israel. Hence, Omar also cultivated quite good relations with certain groups and individuals within the organized Swedish extreme Right, including many Islamophobes. This illustrates how Omar considered the “anti-Zionist” struggle even more important than the well-being of his fellow coreligionists. On his websites, Omar interviewed, for instance, Vávrinec “Vávra” Suk,61 party secretary and one of the founders of the National Democrats (Nationaldemokraterna), an extreme nationalist party closely linked to wholly National Socialist Swedish parties and groups. At the time of the interview ( July 2009), Suk was also editor-in-chief of the National Democrat newspaper Nationell Idag (National Today), and he reciprocated by publishing articles about and equally fawning interviews with Omar and his closest associates in Nationell Idag.62 Similarly, the web tabloid Nationell.nu, which has ties to the Nazi organization Nordic Youth (Nordisk Ungdom), posted articles about Omar’s activities,63 as well as interviews and promotions of his biography Islamisten (The Islamist).64 Until its dismantlement in 2015, Sweden’s largest Nazi organization was the Swedes’ Party (Svenskarnas parti), founded in 1994 as the National Socialist Front (Nationalsocialistisk front). It represented classic National Socialism, including antisemitism and racial b­ iology. Its party organ Realisten (The Realist) frequently featured and defended Omar and his closest associates. For example, on May 23, 2009, an article claimed that Omar, 60 Sandelin and Sandstig, “Den oheliga alliansen.” 61 Mohamed Omar, “‘Yttrandefriheten finns bara i teorin’ – intervju med Vavra Suk,” Alazerius, July  9,  2009,  http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/07/09/yttrandefriheten-finnsbara-i-teorin-intervju-med-vavra-suk/, accessed November 30, 2011. 62 http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=988&q=mohamed+omar &x=0, accessed November 30, 2011; http://www.nationellidag.se/visa/default.asp?dokID=912&q=mohamed+omar&x=0, accessed November 30, 2011. 63 “Mohamed Omar försvarar attacken mot Vilks,” Nationell.nu, May 12, 2010, http:// www.nationell.nu/2010/05/12/mohamed-omar-forsvarar-attacken-mot-vilks/,  accessed November 30, 2011. 64 “Mohamed Omar planerar antisionistisk congress,” Nationell.nu, August 14, 2009, http:// www.nationell.nu/2009/08/14/mohamed-omar-planerar-antisionistisk-kongress/, accessed November 30, 2011; “Svenka Dagbladet censurerar Omar,” Nationell.nu, March 24, 2010, http://www.nationell.nu/2010/03/24/svenska-dagbladet-censurerar-mohamed-omar/, accessed November 30, 2011.

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Rami, and Shamir were “victims” who had made the big mistake of “breaking the liberal norm, which requires obedience to questions of importance to the Jews,” who, it alleged, control the Swedish media.65 The above are just a few examples of the many radicals supporting, promoted by, or linked to Omar. In addition, a number of more or less establishment figures or politicians, some of whom belong to mainstream organizations, have supported or given legitimacy to Omar or his agenda in one way or another. These include the author Carl-Göran Ekerwald,66 poet and journalist Marcus Birro,67 Social Democratic Church Congress politician Leif Svensson,68 former Center Party parliamentary candidate Ove Svidén,69 and former Norwegian Labor Party Sami Council politician Anders Mathiesen.70 The fact that the last two were contacted by Omar after having publicly denied the Holocaust and claiming that Jews were behind September 11—consequently earning them public pariah status—are two examples of a conscious network-building strategy on his part.

A BLIND SPOT FOR NON-NAZI ANTISEMITISM Several mainstream media outlets initially had problems understanding the code of Omar’s antisemitically colored language. Their reaction was weak or 65 “Yttrandefrihet chockar etablissemanget,” Realisten, May 23, 2009, http://www.realisten. se/2009/05/23/yttrandefrihetsdebatt-chockar-etablissemanget/, accessed November 30, 2011. 66 Mohamed Omar, “‘Hamas har rätt’ – intervju med Carl Göran Ekerwald,” Alazerius, February 4, 2009, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/hamas-har-ratt-intervjumed-carl-goran-ekerwald/, accessed November 30, 2011. 67 Mohamed Omar, “‘Jag ber och någon lyssnar’ – intervju med Marcus Birro,” Alazerius, May 16, 2011, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2011/05/16/%E2%80%9Djag-ber-och-nagonlyssnar%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-intervju-med-marcus-birro/, accessed November 30, 2011. 68 Mohamed Omar, “‘Myglet bakom kulisserna’ – intervju med Leif Svensson,” Alazerius, October 6, 2011, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2011/10/06/myglet-bakom-kulisserna%E2%80%93-intervju-med-leif-svensson/, accessed November 30, 2011; Mohamed Omar, “Röven ren och blicken klar,” Alazerius, November 11, 2011, http://alazerius.wordpress. com/2011/10/11/roven-ren-och-blicken-klar/, accessed November 30, 2011. 69 Mohamed Omar, “‘Fri filosofi i ett totalitärt samhälle’ – intervju med Ove Svidén,” Alazerius, November 12, 2010, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2010/11/12/fri-filosof-i-etttotalitart-samhalle-%E2%80%93-intervju-med-ove-sviden/, accessed November 30, 2011. 70 Mohamed Omar, “‘Man måste få säga sanningen’ – intervju med Anders Mathiesen,” Alazerius, March 18, 2011, http://alazerius.wordpress.com/2011/03/18/man-­mastefa-saga-sanningen-intervju-med-anders-mathiesen/, accessed November 30, 2011.

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apologetic up until the point when he openly established links with various extreme-right elements in late spring/early summer 2009. One example was Sweden’s then leading Internet debate forum Newsmill.se, which during 2009 published a couple of Omar’s articles.71 Another, more remarkable exception was Swedish public television, which in January, March, and July 2009 saw fit to invite Omar to the leading prime-time news broadcast Aktuellt, as well as the popular shows Existens and Gomorron Sverige, to debate topics such as Muslim radicalization in densely immigrant-populated Swedish suburbs and the Iranian presidential election,72 appearances that were heavily criticized, at least within the liberal and conservative Swedish press.73 Furthermore, as late as the end of March 2011, the Foreign Policy Association of Örebro University (Utrikespolitiska Föreningen i Örebro) invited Omar to speak on campus. During the lecture, titled “The Unknown Islamism,” Omar criticized, among other things, what he called “the notion of the so-called ‘Holocaust’,” ­promoted “revisionist” literature, and distributed the manifest of his study c­ircle.74 The anti-racist magazine Expo was one of the few bodies that highlighted and ­criticized the event,75 but the organizers declared that Omar’s “successful” lecture was part of their “interest in discussing the boundaries of freedom of expression.”76 Nevertheless, most mainstream Swedish media outlets and organizations soon stopped giving Omar a platform, and leading liberal and conservative Swedish newspapers such as Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, Svenska Dagbladet, and Sydsvenskan, as well as the leading Uppsala-based newspaper Upsala Nya 71 Mohamed Omar, “Här är bevisen att valet i Iran gick rätt till,” Newsmill, July 5, 2009, http://www.newsmill.se/artikel/2009/07/05/har-ar-bevisen-att-valet-i-iran-gick-ratt-till, accessed November 30, 2011. 72 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9jEfuCTu5Q, accessed November 30, 2011; http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIoGIykq0SQ, accessed November 30, 2011. 73 See, for example, Dilsa Demirbag-Sten, “Den rumsrena fanatikern,” Expressen, July 17, 2009, http://www.expressen.se/kultur/1.1642701/den-rumsrena-fanatikern; “Ska SVT och Newsmill gå extremisters ärenden?,” Svenska Dagbladet, July 15, 2009, http://www.svd.se/ opinion/ledarsidan/ska-svt-och-newsmill-ga-extremisters-arenden_3211715.svd. 74 Mohamed Omar, “Föreläsning vid Örebro universitet,” Alazerius, March 29, 2011, http:// alazerius.wordpress.com/2011/03/29/forelasning-vid-orebro-universitet/, accessed November 30, 2011. 75 See Johannes Jakobsson, “Studentförening bjöd in antisemit som talare,” Expo, March 30, 2011, http://expo.se/2011/studentforening-bjod-in-antisemit-som-talare_3884.html. 76 “Lyckad föreläsning med Omar,” http://www.uforebro.se/archives/1372/­commentpage-1#comment-429; http://www.oru.se/Nyheter/Nyhet/Demokratipristagare-meduppmarksammade-gaster-/, accessed November 30, 2011.

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Tidning, condemned Omar on a number of occasions during his first year as an outspoken Islamist.77 An analysis of the Social Democratic Aftonbladet, Sweden’s largest ­evening paper, however, presented a more ambivalent picture. On April 23, 2009, for example, Aftonbladet’s culture journalist Anders Johansson declared that he had fewer problems “reconciling” with Omar’s opinions than with what he termed the “self-celebratory” reactions to them.78 A week later, Johansson deemed reactions to Omar’s propaganda “inflated.” In fact, Johansson argued, Omar’s Islamism and “the supposed neutral liberalism he provokes” served each other’s purposes perfectly in a “symbiotic Kulturkampf.”79 On July 2, 2010, Aftonbladet’s chief culture editor, Åsa Linderborg, claimed that describing Omar as a more intelligent version of his abovementioned colleague and source of inspiration Rami would constitute “demonization,” as well as “an undeserved favor” to many mainstream conservatives, since Omar’s ­opinions, which “at first [can] seem extreme,” are in many cases nothing short of “­ traditional bourgeois government policy.”80 Linderborg went on to assure readers that she would never publish Omar’s “ideas about the Holocaust.” Nevertheless, about a year earlier she had defended, in the name of freedom of expression,81 the fact that Aftonbladet published an article by Omar as late as April 24, 2009, in which he announced his secession from the Swedish branch of PEN International, branding it a ­“liberal imperialist, pro-Zionist” organization that did not care about “persecuted” or jailed “authors and journalists” such as the German Nazi Horst 77 Carina Rydberg, “Överdos av Islamism,” Dagens Nyheter, April 16, 2009, http://www. dn.se/kultur-noje/kulturdebatt/overdos-av-islamism/, accessed November 30, 2011; Dilsa Demirbag-Sten, “Islamister är demokratins fiender,” Expressen, January 13, 2009, http://www. expressen.se/kultur/skribenter/dilsademirbagsten/1.1430355/islamister-ar-demokratinsfiender; “Diktarurens propagandadag vändes till sin motsats,” Svenska Dagbladet, http://www. svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/diktaturens-propagandadag-vandes-till-sin-motsats_3550407. svd; Rakel Chukri, “Mysteriet Mohamed Omar,” Sydsvenskan, November 3, 2009, http:// www.sydsvenskan.se/kultur-och-nojen/article563679/Mysteriet-Mohamed.html, accessed November 30, 2011; Maria Ripenberg, “Inte vilka åsikter som helst,” Upsala Nya Tidning, August 14, 2009, http://www.unt.se/ledare/inte-vilka-aringsikter-som-helst-123702.aspx. 78 Anders Johansson, “Västerländska ‘toleransen’ är bara hyckleri,” Aftonbladet, April 23, 2009, http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article11781472.ab. 79 Anders Johansson, “Islamismen och motreaktionerna tjänar varandras syften,” Aftonbladet, April 30, 2009, http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article11805642.ab. 80 Åsa Linderborg, “Från perfekt till paria,” Aftonbladet, July 2, 2010, http://www.aftonbladet. se/kultur/huvudartikel/article12376825.ab. 81 Åsa Linderborg, “Liberaler skär tungan av yttrandefriheten,” Aftonbladet, May 15, 2009, http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article5151777.ab.

Mathan Ravid

Mahler and the British Holocaust denier David Irving, who doubt “the official historiography of the Holocaust.”82 The hesitance toward Omar’s antisemitism should be seen in light of Swedish discourse, which since the Holocaust has viewed antisemitism largely as an ideology restricted to a few intellectually limited individuals of the extreme Right. This has resulted in two things: First, anti-Jewish statements and demagogues associated with the extreme Right are widely and forcefully condemned. Second, however, and largely as a result of the strong conceptual connection between right-wing extremism and antisemitism, when anti-Jewish attitudes and notions appear in other contexts or guises, many often have a hard time acknowledging, or even recognizing, them as such.83 Self-described “critics of Israel” without clear or outspoken links to the Swedish extreme Right, who present their notions of “Jewish power and manipulations” in “anti-Zionist” terminology, are thus not always condemned or even criticized. This applies not least to the Swedish Left, which both Aftonbladet and Linderborg belong to. The latter refused to publish an article by Omar denying the Holocaust in 2010, when his links to the extreme Right were widely known, but willingly gave him an opportunity to defend Holocaust deniers a year e­ arlier, when those links were less obvious. The fact that Aftonbladet offered Omar a platform when others had already strongly disassociated themselves from him and the tendency among some of the newspaper’s journalists to trivialize his radically reactionary propaganda are examples of the repeated failures on the part of Aftonbladet (and particularly its culture section) to stay on the right side of the line between criticism of the State of Israel and prejudice against Jews.84 82 Mohamed Omar, “Nu lämnar jag Svenska Pen,” Aftonbladet, April 24, 2009, http://www. aftonbladet.se/kultur/article4983667.ab. 83 For examples of widely diminished, denied, or even defended antisemitic tendencies within parts of the Swedish left-wing press, see Mathan Ravid, “Prejudice and Demonization in the Swedish Middle East Debate during the 2006 Lebanon War,” Jewish Political Studies Review 21, nos. 1–2 (Spring 2009): 79–94; and Mathan Ravid, “Antiracism for Anti-Jewish Purposes? Reflections on the Swedish Mana Affair,” Jewish Political Studies Review 22, no. 1–2 (Spring 2010): 75–84. 84 Another example is Donald Boström’s article “Våra söner plundras på sina organ” [Our sons are plundered of their organs], Aftonbladet, August 17, 2009. Based on unfounded allegations—in the form of insinuations—it claimed that the State of Israel systematically stole organs from dead or murdered Palestinians. According to Boström, rabbis living in the United States were also a part of this “macabre enterprise.” Many criticized the publication, pointing to the fact that the notions conveyed resembled old antisemitic accusations of Jewish plots and anti-Jewish blood libel. For more on Boström and Swedish reactions to the blood libel report, see, for example, Mikael Tossavainen, “Swedish Reactions to the

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EPILOGUE Omar’s time as an Islamist and open antisemite lasted about three years. In 2012, he publicly distanced himself from Islamism and apologized for spreading antisemitic ideas and Holocaust denial.85 One could, however, question the sincerity of Omar’s apology, since he continued having contact with ­radical conservative, fascist, and antisemitic individuals, groups, and parties on the extreme Right, supporting and praising them on social media. On his new blog, Omar continued defending former colleagues such as Lars Wilhelmson, trying to rationalize their antisemitic propaganda.86 From 2012 to 2014, Omar—who nowadays describes himself as a “nonbeliever”—also nurtured his ties to parts of the extreme Left, speaking at rallies organized by the Swedish Communist Party and writing in the Marxist-Leninist journal RiktpunKt and the Maoist journal Folket i Bild/Kulturfront.87 Over the last couple of years, Omar has openly voiced his support for the right-wing nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-Muslim Sweden Democrats, a party claiming to have distanced itself from its Nazi roots and antisemitism. However, there are countless examples, also in recent years, of Sweden Democratic representatives, both on a national and local level, who have spread antisemitism, denied the Holocaust, and had close ties to Nazi groups. Today, Omar is a columnist at the online newspaper Samtiden, which is owned by the Sweden Democratic Party.

Anti-Israel Blood Libel Report” [in English], Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 15, 2009, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1& TMID=111&FID=382&PID=0&IID=3102&CMD=ADDTOML; Charlotte Wiberg and Willy Silberstein, “Pyrande antisemitism,” Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, January 20, 2010, http://skma.se/blogg/2010/01/pyrande-antisemitism/, accessed September 11, 2017; Anna Veeder, “En anka flyger,” Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, January 12, 2010, http://skma.se/blogg/2010/01/en-anka-flyger/, accessed September 11, 2017; Dan Tilert, “Dissonant duet,” Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism, January 28, 2010, http:// skma.se/blogg/2010/01/dissonant-duett/, accessed September 11, 2017. 85 Mohamed Omar, En opieätares bekännelser (Uppsala: Aguéli Förlag, 2013), 21–22. 86 Mohamed Omar, “Vad hände med yttrandefrihetsfundamentalisten Åsa Linderborg?,” Nya Il Convito, December 6, 2012, https://nyailconvito.wordpress.com/2012/12/06/ vad-hande-med-yttrandefrihetsfundamentalisten-asa-linderborg/, accessed May 23, 2013. 87 See, e.g., Torbjörn Jerlerup, “Varning för Mohamed Omar!,” Ligator, April 17, 2016, https:// ligator.wordpress.com/2016/04/17/varning-for-mohamed-omar/.

After the Charlie Hebdo Attack: The Line between Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech Andre Oboler

T

he attack on the offices of the French satirical publication Charlie Hebdo on Wednesday January 7, 2015, left twelve people dead. On leaving the scene of the crime, the gunmen said, “We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad, we killed Charlie Hebdo.”1 The next day a policewoman was killed near a Jewish school and center. The day after that, the gunman who killed the policewoman, and who was linked to the Charlie Hebdo attackers, took people hostage in a kosher supermarket in Paris. Four French Jews and the attacker died in the incident.2 The terrorist attacks were condemned internationally, including by Muslim leaders.3 Around four million people marched in various parts of France in a demonstration against the attacks, the largest demonstration since the l­iberation of  1 Adam Sage, “Charlie Hebdo Attack: ‘We’ve Avenged Prophet, Charlie Is Dead,’” The Australian, January 9, 2015.   2 Lucy Williamson, “France Attacks: Police Storm Kosher Supermarket,” BBC, January 9, 2015.  3 Molly Hennesey-Fiske and Ramin Mostaghin, “Muslim Leaders Condemn French Massacre, But Some on Street Disagree,” Los Angeles Times, January 10, 2015; Carolyn Webb, “Charlie Hebdo: Islamic Leaders in Australia Condemn Paris Attacks,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 9, 2015; Matthew Coutts, “Canadian Muslim Leaders Condemn Attack on France’s Charlie Hebdo,” Yahoo News Canada, January 7, 2015; Muslim Council of Britain, “Paris Murders Are a Greater Insult to Islam: Muslim Council of Britain Statement on Charlie Hebdo Massacre,” January 8, 2015, http://www.mcb.org.uk/ paris-murders-jan-08-15/.

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Paris from the Nazis at the end of World War II.4 Forty-four world leaders attended the march,5 and the absence of US president Barack Obama and other senior US figures led to a front-page headline in the New York Daily News saying they had “let the world down.”6 The slogan “Je suis Charlie” had already gone viral online and was strongly present at the march.7 All who marched made a statement of defiance against terrorism, but beyond this there were many different values that led people to march. This was not the first terrorist attack on French soil in recent years. In 2012, a series of attacks targeted French soldiers, then a Jewish school in Toulouse, leaving a teacher and three children dead.8 Those attacks were declared a national tragedy but didn’t receive anything like the outpouring the Charlie Hebdo attack received. An esteemed historian of French “national sentiment,” Pierre Nora, noted that in response to the Charlie Hebdo attack, “suddenly the collective was awakened in the individual” and that people felt they, and the values that identify them, were being targeted.9 This strong identification didn’t occur before, as the victims, including the soldiers, were all members of minorities within France, and the public didn’t feel personally targeted in the same way.10 The primary value being attacked was laïcité, a form of official secularism, which was written into French law in 1905.11 The concept was intended to ensure a separation between the French state and the Catholic Church. More recently, this idea has morphed into a concept of separation between religion, as a strictly private matter, and public life. This French approach to “harmony” by relegating difference to the private domain is what led, for example, to the French ban on schoolgirls and government employees wearing Muslim headscarves in public.12

 4 ABC News, “Charlie Hebdo Shootings: More Than 3 Million People, Led by World Leaders, Join Historic Marches across France,” January 12, 2015.   5 Lizzie Dearden, “Paris March: Critics Say President Barack Obama ‘Let the World Down’ by Not Attending Rally,” The Independent, January 12, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/americas/paris-march-critics-say-president-barack-obama-let-the-worlddown-by-not-attending-rally-9972674.html.  6 New York Daily News (@NYDailyNews), “An early look at tomorrow’s front page,” Twitter, January 12, 2015, 12:06 p.m., https://twitter.com/NYDailyNews/ status/554444346372927488/photo/1.   7 Associated Press, “‘Je Suis Charlie’ Message Goes Viral after Paris Attack,” January 7, 2015.   8 BBC, “France Shooting: Toulouse Jewish School Attack Kills Four,” March 19, 2012.   9 Scott Sayare, “What Je Suis Charlie Has Become,” The Atlantic, January 30, 2015. 10 Ibid. 11 Scott Sayare, “The Charlie Hebdo I Know,” The Atlantic, January 11, 2015. 12 Ibid.

Andre Oboler

Charlie Hebdo was known to be a highly controversial satirical ­publication that regularly mocked sources of power in society, including religion. This mocking was often extreme. The paper’s slogan, “dumb and nasty” (in French, “bête et méchant”), came from a letter of complaint sent to the team behind Charlie Hebdo in the 1960s.13 It has since become a common phrase in everyday French. Charlie Hebdo’s often distasteful attacks on religion in general, and on Islam in particular, are seen as continuing the tradition of laïcité. The threats, and then attack, by those seeking to prevent this mockery of their religion are therefore seen by many in France as an external attack on core French values. In France, laïcité, and the right to publicly attack religion, coexists with values of anti-racism and laws against Holocaust denial. To the French there is no contradiction. The first idea relates to established power structures, which can, and should, be challenged. The second idea relates to the inalienable individual rights of human beings, which can and should be protected. Many outside France missed this distinction and saw “Je suis Charlie” as a call for a more absolutist approach to freedom of speech, one that would protect rather than condemn hate speech, as the current interpretation of the First Amendment does in the United States. For those that missed the distinction, the public response appeared two-faced.14 The response to the Charlie Hebdo attack has raised the need to better define and articulate what we mean by freedom of expression. A number of fundamental misconceptions and blind spots in the discussion on freedom of speech and its limitations have been exposed, and they require clarification or refutation. A number of excellent points and analogies have also been made and should be shared. This chapter argues for improved clarity in three areas: the intent and therefore coverage of laws against vilification related to an individual’s identity; the rationale for legal prohibitions on Holocaust denial that go well beyond merely preventing offense; and the difference between criticism of Islam as a religion, which should be protected, and hate speech targeting Muslims, which should be prohibited.

13 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Charlie Hebdo and Islam: The History of Its Satire,” Newsy, January 7, 2015. 14 Amanda Vanstone, “Charlie Hebdo: Defence of Free Speech Brings Out the Two-Faced,” The Age, January 19, 2015; Sam Adler-Bell, “Might Makes Free Speech,” US News, February 4, 2015.

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THE ROLE OF ANTI-VILIFICATION LAWS Hate speech, at least in the form of racism, is prohibited by national laws in most countries. Vilification of minorities has been said to “diminish their dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the community,” which in turn “reduces their ability to contribute to, or fully participate in, all social, ­political, ­economic and cultural aspects of society as equals.”15 Put another way, ­vilification of minorities damaged the “public good of an inclusive society.”16 At the individual level it also removes victims’ “assurance that there will be no need to face hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by others” as they go about their daily lives.17 For many, their religion is as much a part of their identity as their race. For some, race and religion are intertwined; Jews and Sikhs have been recognized in law as ethno-religious groups. Indigenous peoples in various countries may also have aspects of both race and religion in their identity. Religious vilification is often colloquially described as racism. This may in part arise from the overlap in areas such as antisemitism, where overt religious vilification, such as blood libel, is legally classified as racism. It also arises from the transposition of messages of classic racism toward religious minorities. Anti-Muslim religious vilification, for example, has been shown to use classic messages of racism such as dehumanization.18 In response to the colloquial use of the word racism against such hate, those vilifying Muslims have actively promoted messages seeking to differentiate their brand of bigotry and prejudice from the concept of racism.19 One reason for this differentiation is that by law, racial and religious vilification may be treated as entirely different p­ roblems resulting in different levels of protection. Laws against racial vilification are often based on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.20 This treaty, now supported by 177 state parties, was one of the first human 15 Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Victoria, Australia), Preamble paragraph 3. 16 Andre Oboler, “Legal Doctrines Applied to Online Hate Speech,” Computers and the Law, no. 87 ( July 2014):10. 17 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 2–3. 18 Andre Oboler, “Islamophobia on the Internet: The Growth of Online Hate Targeting Muslims,” Online Hate Prevention Institute, December 10, 2013. 19 Ibid. 20 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, December 21, 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195.

Andre Oboler

rights treaties of the United Nations.21 Article 2 calls on state parties to ­condemn and take steps to eliminate such discrimination. Article 4 condemns propaganda and racist organizations; it calls for laws against the dissemination of racist ideas, against incitement to racial discrimination, and against incitement to or carrying out of acts of racially motivated violence. The position of international law, however, extends beyond racism. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in Article 20(2) that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”22 In calling for a legal prohibition not only of calls for violence but also of the promotion of hostility toward a group or discrimination against a group, the covenant aims to create an environment where people’s identity does not define their relationship with society. Where laws against racism do not extend to religion, some groups in society may not receive the protection of the law against vilification. Muslim communities, for example, may be very well defined as communities but may not have legal protection against vilification of their community or against people on the basis of their being a member of that community. Some jurisdictions have been closing these gaps either through the courts or through additional legislation. In the United Kingdom, protection against religious vilification was first added with the introduction of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006. The creation of legal protections against religious hatred in the United Kingdom was complex and controversial.23 Changes in the House of Lords saw the offense related to religious hatred altered in a manner that made it far narrower than that of offenses related to racial hatred.24 While content that is “threatening, abusive or insulting” is prohibited when its use is intended to stir up racial hatred or is likely to stir up racial hatred,25 in the case of religious hatred, only threatening content used with the intent of stirring up religious hatred is an offense.26 21 United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, “United Nations Treaties Collection,” July 9, 2017, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-2& chapter=4&lang=en. 22 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, 178. 23 Neil Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (New York: Routledge, 2007), 139. 24 Ibid., 140. 25 Public Order Act 1986 (UK) S 18. 26 Public Order Act 1986 (UK) S 29B.

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In France, the idea of extending anti-vilification laws to cover religious groups runs into conflict with an extremist view of laïcité. This view sees the principle of laïcité not as a separation between religion and state but as stateendorsed secularism. Gérard Biard, Charlie Hebdo’s editor-in-chief, said in 2012 that Charlie Hebdo was “an atheist paper, a secularist paper.”27 Following the attack, he said, “Laïcité is not just some abstract idea. It is a moral value, and I believe today, one must recognise that laïcité is perhaps the prime moral value of our Republic. Because without it, Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité isn’t possible.”28 Gérard Biard’s 2012 statement that “you’re not supposed to use religion for your sense of identity, in any case not in a secular state” highlights the problem with this view of laïcité.29 It is an imposition on the individual identity and freedom of other members of society. As French sociologist and political scientist Vincent Geisser explained, “Charlie Hebdo is only looking to impose its secular purity by treating everyone else as fanatics.”30 Charlie Hebdo’s satirizing of Islam in the name of its view of laïcité is ­therefore a part of a very real attack not only on religion as an institution but also on people’s right to religious freedom. Understood in this way, laïcité stands in direct contradiction to the idea of freedom of religion expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 of the declaration states that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”31 Satire works when it is “punching upwards” against the powerful but becomes no more than bullying when it is targeted against minorities.32 Charlie Hebdo’s determination to caricature the Prophet Muhammad in a “dumb and nasty” manner can be seen in the abstract as “punching up” against the power of religious orthodoxy but also as “punching down” against a largely marginalized Muslim minority in France. It quite intentionally sends the message that those of Muslim faith must give up their religion in order to 27 Sayare, “The Charlie Hebdo I Know.” 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, http:// www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 32 Online Hate Prevention Institute, “Landover Baptist Church and the Limits of Satire,” June 3, 2014.

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belong to French society. Is an imposed religion of atheism any better than an imposed religion of Catholicism? Scott Sayare has summarized the situation well in the Atlantic, writing, “From a perch of privilege, the former outsiders, who still relished the fight, turned their attention to what they perceived as threats to the values they’d helped instate—attacking the weak, in the end, as they had once attacked the powerful.”33 The principle of laïcité, as expressed by Charlie Hebdo’s editor, is not compatible with a human rights approach that respects individual freedoms, including freedom of religion. The incompatibility should be more obvious; the fact that it is not points to a shortcoming in our approach to anti-vilification principles. For too long we have focused on racism to the exclusion of protections against other forms of vilification, be they religious vilification or ­vilification on the basis of other identity defining factors, such as gender or ­sexuality. We need a consistent approach, and the simplest approach is to take all the progress made against racial discrimination and simply extend it to these other aspects of a person’s self-identity.

WHY LAWS AGAINST HOLOCAUST DENIAL ARE THE WRONG COMPARISON The victims of the Charlie Hebdo attack were murdered because terrorists decided that the publication of cartoons was an action worthy of death. In response, some called for further publication of the pictures of Muhammad, and newspapers found themselves under pressure to republish Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons or to explain why they refused to do so. Others argued it was ­insulting to Muslims to print such cartoons and urged against publication. Many of the arguments against publication drew analogies between the offensiveness to Muslims of publishing cartoons of Muhammad and the offense that would be caused to Jews in publishing cartoons about the Holocaust. There is a long history to this argument, but it fundamentally misunderstands the problem with Holocaust denial and the reason why Holocaust denial material is banned in a number of countries. First, let’s look at the debate over whether to republish the cartoons. Richard Miniter argued in Forbes that “real safety lies in collective, unified action. . . . If every newspaper and news web site reprinted the cartoons, the jihadists would see that their actions are futile and only fuel the spread of the 33 Sayare, “The Charlie Hebdo I Know.”

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images they abhor.”34 In the Guardian, Nick Cohen decried the unwillingness to print the cartoons as self-censorship out of fear: “They would at least have acknowledged censorship if they had announced that they were frightened of attacks on their staff,” he argued.35 Other editors opposed the printing of the cartoons on principle. Martin Baron, executive editor of the Washington Post, said the paper would avoid printing material “that is pointedly, deliberately, or needlessly offensive to members of religious groups.”36 Santiago Lyon, a vice president of the Associated Press, said he didn’t think it was “useful” to “publish hate speech or spectacles that offend, provoke or intimidate, or anything that desecrates religious symbols or angers people along religious or ethnic lines.”37 Some who would not republish the cartoons still strongly supported the right of Charlie Hebdo to publish them. In an editorial, the Guardian explained that “defending the right of someone to say whatever they like does not oblige you to repeat their words.”38 What’s clear from the debate is that there is a principle of freedom of the press, but within that freedom, for reasons of good taste and the sensibilities of readers, some content that legally could be published would not be published by the mainstream media. Whether as an argument for laws against cartoons of Muhammad or for the exercise of editorial judgment to not publish such cartoons, the comparison with cartoons of the Holocaust was repeatedly made in online discussions. The argument is that cartoons of Muhammad should be banned or rejected from publication because they are insulting to Islam, just as cartoons about the Holocaust would be insulting to Jews. This argument, however, misunderstands the reason that countries such as France criminalize Holocaust denial and glorification of Nazism. The origins of the comparison go back to the Danish cartoon incident in 2006, the first global incident involving cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. At the time, Hamshahri, one of the top five Iranian newspapers by circulation, ran what it called the “International Holocaust Cartoon Competition.”39 34 Richard Miniter, “No, We Are Not All Charlie Hebdo,” Forbes, January 9, 2015. 35 Nick Cohen, “Paris Attacks: Unless We Overcome Fear, Self-Censorship Will Spread,” The Guardian, January 11, 2015. 36 Paul Farhi, “News Organizations Wrestle with Whether to Publish Charlie Hebdo Cartoons after Attack,” Washington Post, January 7, 2015. 37 Ibid. 38 “The Guardian View on Charlie Hebdo: Show Solidarity, but in Your Own Voice,” The Guardian, January 9, 2015. 39 Scott Benjamin, “Holocaust Cartoon Contest in Iran,” CBS, February 7, 2006.

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The paper, which is owned by the local government of Tehran, argued it wanted to test whether the West would apply the same principles of freedom of speech that were invoked in defense of the Danish cartoons of Muhammad when it came to cartoons about the Holocaust.40 Masoud Shojai-Tabatabai, one of the competition organizers, explained, “You see they allow the Prophet to be insulted. But when we talk about the Holocaust, they consider it so holy that they punish people for questioning it.”41 The flawed logic of regarding the Holocaust as religiously sacred can be seen in the response out of Israel to the Iranian International Holocaust Cartoon Competition. Amitai Sandy, an Israeli Jew, created the “Israeli antisemitic cartoons contest.”42 Sandy explained the competition by saying that “the contest for the best anti-Semitic cartoon was a demonstration of strength and self confidence.”43 Another problem with this comparison was expressed in a cartoon by J. McCullough, a Canadian cartoonist, showing an image of a cuddly, s­ miling Muhammad being drawn by a Dane, while next to him a Muslim says, “Do you have any idea how offensive that is?” as the Muslim draws an extremely antisemitic image labeled “The Jew.”44 McCullough’s cartoon highlights the lack of context in the demand for a ban on cartoons of Muhammad. When it comes to the Holocaust, for example, tasteful cartoons do exist and are celebrated, such as the Pulitzer Prize–winning graphic novel Maus by Art Spiegelman. To suggest that a certain topic may not be drawn in any way is to ask for a far broader restriction than would be necessary or meaningful. The problem with the analogy is broader than the framing of the ­restriction. While Muhammad is a figure of religious belief, the Holocaust is a well-­documented fact, and tragedy, of recent history. Not only families but entire communities were wiped out. The Holocaust is the event from which the very concepts of genocide, and of crimes against humanity, were created. To mock the Holocaust goes beyond insulting Jews, making fun of the dead, or calling survivors liars. These may be the reasons we object to Holocaust denial,

40 Ibid. 41 BBC, “Iran Displays Holocaust Cartoons,” August 15, 2006. 42 Terry Gross, “Stealing Thunder from Satirists in the Mideast,” NPR, February 16, 2006. 43 Henryk M. Broder, “Jewish Caricature Contest: Kosher Anti-Semites,” Der Spiegel, April 21, 2006. 44 Filibuster Cartoons at the Internet Archive, April 9, 2007, https://web.archive.org/ web/20070409044928/http://www.filibustercartoons.com/archive.php?id=20060204.

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but they are not the reason why France and other countries ban Holocaust denial. The reason Holocaust denial is banned is the same reason glorification of Nazism is banned. They are banned out of a desire to prevent a ­reemergence of fascism. As Professor Michael J. Bazyler explains, “The aim of these laws is to prevent the resurrection of Nazism in Europe by stamping [it] out at the earliest opportunity—or to use the phrase ‘to nip it in the bud’—any public re-emergence of Nazi views, whether through speech, symbols, or public association.”45 The Holocaust is not a “belief,” and mocking the Holocaust is not “blasphemy”; instead, it is a denial of historical fact and a form of incitement with very real and dangerous implications. The purpose of Holocaust denial is to rehabilitate the forces and ideology that led to the events of the Holocaust.

THE LINE BETWEEN CRITICISM OF ISLAM AND VILIFICATION OF MUSLIMS The purpose of laws against vilification is to protect the human dignity of individuals. Vilification laws protect human rights and freedoms, not ideas, ideologies, or power structures. On this basis, criticism of a religious belief must be permitted, but interference with an individual’s right to hold a belief, or to practice their religion, can be prohibited. The distinction can be seen by considering its application to cartoons of Muhammad in more detail. The Koran itself does not contain a prohibition on images of Muhammad being shown.46 While images of Muhammad are not present in the Arab Islamic context, they do exist in the Iranian, Turkish, and central Asian contexts.47 A prohibition on images of Muhammad is said to exist in a hadith, a record of conversations between Muhammad and his closest companions.48 Hadiths are, however, open to multiple interpretations, and the one on images of Muhammad gives “an ambiguous picture at best,” according to Christiane Gruber, an associate professor at the University of Michigan and an expert in 45 Michael J. Bazyler, “Holocaust Denial Laws and Other Legislation Criminalizing Promotion of Nazism,” Yad Vashem, http://www.yadvashem.org/holocaust/holocaust-antisemitism/ articles/holocaust-denial-laws. 46 Daniel Burke, “Why Islam Forbids Images of Mohammed,” CNN, January 9, 2015. 47 Ibid. 48 Christiane Gruber, “Koran Does Not Forbid Images of the Prophet,” Newsweek, January 9, 2015.

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paintings of the Prophet Muhammad.49 Islam itself, therefore, cannot be said to definitely prohibit all depictions of Muhammad. From an Islamic belief perspective, content insulting Muhammad or other prophets and their relatives is more clearly prohibited in the Koran; however, there is also a prohibition on violent retaliation against those who make such insults.50 Nevertheless, one can argue that there is a low threshold in Islamic belief for what would be, in Islamic terms, an offensive cartoon of Muhammad. This level of offense may be very different from what the average person might consider unacceptably offensive. It is, however, possible that some images of Muhammad are so offensive that they cross the standards of decency in society. Some of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons may well have done this, as indicated by the comments of newspaper editors discussed above. These cartoons, however, may offend us for reasons unrelated to the question of whether they insult Islam or Muslims, just as a ban on Holocaust denial can exist for a reason unrelated to the content’s offensiveness to Jews. Under principles of human rights, clearly a cartoon should not be ­considered hate speech merely because it depicts Muhammad. Such an approach would be too much of an imposition on freedom of e­ xpression. Equally concerning, however, is the idea that any cartoon that depicts Muhammad is not hate speech. We have seen the danger of such ­oversimplifications in relation to Facebook’s approach to the Holocaust, in which Facebook’s refusal to recognize Holocaust denial as a form of hate speech led it to reject any complaints involving the image of Hitler. This overly simplistic approach, focused on defending symbolism, led Facebook to reject reports of content that involved cyberbullying, substance abuse, and RIP ­trolling, simply because the image of Hitler was invoked.51 We clearly don’t want cartoons of Muhammad to be used to give other content a free pass. I suggest there are two questions to answer in deciding whether a particular cartoon of Muhammad is actually vilification of Muslims. The first question is whether the cartoon is being used symbolically to represent Muslims in general. The second question is whether the representation of Muslims in general is being used for vilification. Does the cartoon represent some negative trope or stereotype of Muslims? To give a comparison, there is 49 Burke, “Why Islam.” 50 Sarah Harvard, “That Radical Cleric in USA Today Is Absolutely Wrong about Islam and Blasphemy,” Slate, January 8, 2015. 51 Andre Oboler, “The Hitler Shield: Mocking the Dead at Facebook,” Jerusalem Post Blogs, October 24, 2012, http://ohpi.org.au/the-hitler-shield-mocking-the-dead-at-facebook/.

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a particular antisemitic meme of a Jew that is used persistently by neo-Nazis to represent Jews.52 That cartoon directly invokes negative tropes and is by its nature an antisemitic p­ ortrayal of Jews. Even if this were not the case, a cartoon would be antisemitic if it was used to promote an antisemitic narrative. A cartoon in which Jews were represented as standard stick figures would be antisemitic if the c­ ontent ­promoted the idea of the blood libel—that is, that Jews ritually murder Christian children.53 Returning to the question of a cartoon of Muhammad, if the message of the cartoon is that all Muslims are terrorists, for example, the cartoon can safely be regarded as hate speech. One such cartoon is the picture of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. The original version of this image was drawn by Kurt Westergaard and was considered the most controversial of the original Danish cartoons of Muhammad. Westergaard has rejected the common interpretation of his cartoon. He said, “There are interpretations, which are not correct. It is a common perception among Muslims that [the cartoon] goes against Islam as a whole. It does not. It refers to those with a specific fundamentalist trait, which of course is not shared by all.”54 Westergaard’s mistake was to use the image of Muhammad, seen as a representative of all Muslims, in a context in which he was speaking about a far narrower group. He explained that he has used the symbolism of the bomb in the turban in other contexts to depict terrorists and ran into ­controversy only once Muhammad was added to the context.55 Without the twin factors of being representative of Muslims in general and of promoting a negative stereotype, a cartoon of Muhammad may insult Islam without vilifying Muslims. There may be many reasons people object to certain cartoons, but the grounds of vilification, which should exist, are both narrow and specific. A failure to recognize religious vilification and to provide legal protection against it can allow segments of society to come under attack without having legal recourse. In an extreme case, this may lead some individuals down a path of self-indoctrination and ultimately to violent extremism. In other cases, it will simply lead to affected individuals engaging less in s­ ociety. 52 Andre Oboler, “The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew,” Online Hate Prevention Institute, February 6, 2014. 53 Of course, we then run into other problems, such as Facebook’s refusal to remove bloodlibel content; for example, despite blocking access to the page Jewish Ritual Murder (https://www.facebook.com/truthaboutjews/) for Australian users on October 10, 2013, Facebook has repeatedly refused to close the page, and it remains accessible to other users. See Oboler, “The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew.” 54 Jannik Brinch, “Bombens Ophavsmand,” Jyllands-Posten, February 26, 2006. 55 Ibid.

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This will still harm both the individual and the public good of an inclusive ­society. While we must allow criticism of religion, we must also draw a line against religious vilification, whether of entire communities or of individuals.

CONCLUSION The French tradition of laïcité, strictly applied, limits religion to the private sphere. It aims to ensure social harmony but can negatively affect the right to freedom of religion. A better approach is to inclusively celebrate diversity, both of cultural groups and of religious groups. We need to treat attacks on ­minorities in society as attacks on the fundamental values of our society as a whole. There are many reasons why certain content may be prohibited. The fact that content offends a particular group may not be enough of a reason to prohibit it. This is not the reason Holocaust denial is p­ rohibited in certain countries. One reason why content may be prohibited is that it vilifies a minority in society. Cartoons of Muhammad may in some circumstances do this, but only when the cartoon is used to represent Muslims in general and when that general representation is then used to promote a negative ­stereotype.

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Online Antisemitic Propaganda and Negationism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Ahmadinejad and His Enduring Legacy Liora Hendelman-Baavur

I

ran is reported to hold one of the highest Internet penetration rates per  capita in the Middle East.1 This might represent an opportunity for a p­ ositive development in Iran, and optimistic notions prevailed in studies, including this author’s earlier research, that specifically examined the rapidly ­growing Iranian blogosphere, the cyber sphere of self-published online journals.2 The use of the Internet by NGOs and social activists to coordinate their ­activities inside Iran, and civil journalists’ online communication with Internet users outside the country, contributed to further discussions of the web as an

  1 According to data retrieved from Internet World Statistics (updated in June 2017), Iran’s Internet penetration is 70 percent with 56.7 million users (total population 80.9 million). http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm.   2 Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi, “Performance in Everyday Life and the Rediscovery of the ‘Self ’ in Iranian Weblogs,” Bad Jens, September 7, 2004, http://www.badjens.com/rediscovery.html; Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone, “Wings of Freedom: Iranian Women, Identity and Cyberspace,” in On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005), 62–80; Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs (London: Portobello Books,2005); Liora Hendelman-Baavur, “Promises and Perils of Weblogistan: Online Personal Journals and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 11, no. 2 ( June 2007): 77–93.

Liora Hendelman-Baavur

alternative outlet to state-controlled media and as a creative forum of dissent.3 However, annual reports of Human Rights Watch, Reporters without Borders, and the OpenNet Initiative, as well as occasional news reports d­ ocumenting legal persecution and harassment of Iranian bloggers, journalists, and social media activists by the state convey a more complicated picture.4 Other attempts to counter or circumscribe potential challenges involve implicit and explicit efforts like clamping down on Internet use, interrupting speed c­ onnectivity, limiting access to networked computers, filtering content with software tools, and monitoring users’ online behavior. Along with suppressing the local media and freedom of speech, Iranian authorities have allocated considerable resources to preserving and disseminating the legacy of the Islamic Revolution’s founding father, Ayatollah Khomeini, by means of persuasion and remembrance. A potent component of this legacy is rooted in anti-Jewish sentiments, often epitomized as anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli propaganda.5 This legacy is widely adopted by the p­ ost-Khomeini leadership and prominent Shiite clerics.6 Anti-Israeli slogans associated with anti-US and anti-Western ideographs are not limited to the cyber sphere. They are also voiced in public demonstrations, displayed on wall murals and missiles, and even incorporated into Iranian elementary school books.7   3 Nima Mina, “Blogs, Cyber-Literature and Virtual Culture in Iran,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series, no. 15 (December 2007): 1–38; Babak Rahimi, “Internet and Politics in Post-revolutionary Iran,” in Iran: Media, Culture and Society; Living with Globalization and the Islamic State, ed. Mehdi Semati (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 37–56; Annabelle Sreberny and Gholam Khiabany, Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).  4 Ronald J. Deibert and Nart Villeneuve, “Firewalls and Power: An Overview of State’s Censorship of the Internet,” in Human Rights in the Digital Age, ed. Mathias Klang and Andrew Murray (London: Cavendish, 2004): 111–24; Robert Faris and Nart Villeneuve, “Measuring Global Internet Filtering,” in Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Filtering, ed. Ronald Deibert, John Pelfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 5–27.   5 David Menashri, “Iran, the Jews and the Holocaust,” Country Report (Tel Aviv: Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, 2005), http:// www.tau.ac.il/Antisemitism/asw2005/menashri.html. See also David Menashri,“The Jews of Iran: Between the Shah and Khomeini,” in Antisemitism in Times of Crisis, ed. Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 353–71.   6 Meir Litvak, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Antisemitism and AntiZionism,” Journal of Israeli History 25, no. 1 (March 2006): 267–84. See also William F.S. Miles, “Indigenization of the Holocaust and the Tehran Holocaust Conference: Iranian Aberration or Third World Trend?,” Human Rights Review 10 (2009): 505–19.  7 According to Naghmeh Sohrabi, these public spectacles have become by now “tedious state rituals that reveal nothing but the anti-imperialist and anti-Western past of the Islamic

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Propaganda benefits from computer-mediated activity in many ways. Computers along with other new media gadgets enable speedy and global interconnectivity between individuals and groups, covert communication and anonymity, cost effectiveness in mass distribution of information, easy replication of materials, and cleavages to bypass international conventions. The Internet also provides accessible means for recruitment and fund-raising.8 One example is the Iranian Movement of Justice-Seeking Students (Jonbesh-e edalatkhahi-ye deneshjuei), which campaigned online in 2008 for potential donors willing to sell their kidneys and donate the money to funding the assassination of prominent Israeli officials.9 The same year, this group organized a one-day international convention titled “The End of Israel” (Payan-e Israel). The banner posted on the speaker’s podium and printed in English read, “Israel must be wiped off the map.”10 Following the event, a two-part DVD of the ­convention was sold online for two dollars.11

ANTISEMITISM AND THE “MEDIA WAR”: WINNING PUBLIC OPINION In the Islamic Republic’s discourse, propaganda (tablighat) is frequently attributed to other nations and discussed in relation to an international “net war” (jang-e shabakei) or “media war” (jang-e rasanei). Net war is perceived as one of the most prominent aspects of the broader “soft war” (jang-e narm), imposed on Iran by outside powers seeking to intervene in its internal affairs and undermine the Iranian political system in particular and Islamic ones in general. Consequently, Iran’s clerical and military elites often consider a defensive net war, mediated by computers, against a Western-directed “soft war” as serious as a military confrontation. Militaristic jargon also prevails among unofficial groups like the Iranian Cyber Army, which promotes “virtual jihad” (jihad majaazi) in the form of large-scale disruption of computer networks. Republic.” See Naghmeh Sohrabi, “Conservatives, Neoconservatives and Reformists: Iran after the Election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad,” Middle East Brief, no. 4 (April 2006): 1–5.  8 Kathy Crilley, “Information Warfare: New Battlefields Terrorists, Propaganda and the Internet,” Aslib Proceedings 53, no. 7 ( July/August 2001): 250–64.   9 Mohammad Zarghami, “Iran: Hard-Line Students Announce Bounty on Israeli Leaders’ Heads,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 11, 2008. 10 As it appeared in a photo accompanying the announcement about the conference by Fars News Agency, May 21, 2008, http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8702310926, accessed April 12, 2009. 11 International Qoran News Agency, September 27, 2008, http://www.iqna.ir/fa/news_ print.php?ProdID=300165, accessed June 12, 2009.

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Engagement in information warfare may involve hacking into websites and spreading viruses.12 Aimed at competing over “public opinion” in more conventional ways, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, is in charge of creating and spreading content in the form of written text, audio and visual files, and video and live streaming by operating local TV channels, radio stations, world service channels, and satellite channels in several languages. By employing a wide variety of digital channels via IRIB and other state-run media outlets, the Islamic Republic tends to focus on three major target audiences: local, regional, and international. The local audience is composed of residents of Iran, groups of Iranian expatriates and exiles, and Persian-speaking communities in neighboring countries, mainly Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Other target groups in the region are Urdu-, Turkish-, and Arabic-speaking communities, especially in neighboring Iraq. Iran’s Arabic-language television news network al-Alam began operating online in February 2004 and in January 2009 launched its channel on YouTube. In 2006 the al-Kawthar television channel joined al-Alam in broadcasting mainly to Arabic-speaking audiences in the Middle East and North Africa.13 Other groups of foreign audiences targeted by Iran include non-Iranian Shiite populations, Arabic-speaking populations, non-Arab Muslims, and non-Muslims. Particularly with the last group in mind, Iran officially inaugurated the twenty-four-hour English-language satellite station Press TV under the motto “News from a different view,” in July 2007. Upon its launch, Iran’s president at the time, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, expressed hope that the channel would “stay beside the oppressed people of the world. . . . Broadcasting the truth immediately, providing precise analysis and exposing the plots of ­propaganda networks of the enemy is among its duties.”14 Press TV joined 12 Farvartish Rezvaniyeh, “Pulling the Strings of the Net: Iran’s Cyber Army,” Tehran Bureau, February 26, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/02/ pulling-the-strings-of-the-net-irans-cyber-army.html, accessed September 27, 2017; Alireza Jafarzadeh, “Iran’s Cyber Army – The Latest in a Series of Maleficence,” The Hill, March 5, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/278396-irans-cyber-armythe-latest-in-a-series-of-maleficence, accessed September 27, 2017. 13 Official website of al-Alam, http://www.alalam.ir. 14 President’s announcement upon the launch of Press TV on July 3, 2007, Iranian Students’ News Agency, http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-953414&Lang=E, accessed July 15, 2008. See also Amir A. Daftari, “Iran Launches ‘Alternative’ News,” CNN Online, July 30, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/07/10/press.tv/index.html, accessed September 27, 2017.

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Sahar, a universal television network that launched its English division in 1997 and nowadays operates multilingual broadcasts (in Arabic, Azeri, Bosnian, French, Kurdish, Turkish, and Urdu).15 In February 2005 the involvement of Sahar with antisemitic propaganda was interrupted when the Higher Council for Radio and Television in France banned its broadcasts after it aired the television drama Zahra’s Blue Eyes (Chashmha-ye abie Zahra, 2001). Written and directed by Ali Derakhshi, a former employee of the Iranian Education Ministry, the drama’s fictional plot depicted an alleged Zionist campaign to harvest organs of Palestinian children.16 Although banned in France, this production later found its way to file- and video-hosting websites. In 2009, in an effort to target younger audiences, Sahar announced the finalization of a 3-D computer-animated television series entitled The Child and the Invader, based on a cartoon series aired the previous year on Iranian local television. This cartoon series consisted of short episodes (two to four minutes) focused on a scheming soldier who repeatedly harasses innocent children. Throughout the episodes, the invader—with the Star of David on his army helmet—runs the kids over with his jeep while they are peacefully riding their bicycles, destroys their fields and crops after a hard day’s work, steals their sheep, shoots down their kites, and so forth. The invader’s expression in these cartoons is often perversely joyful at the mere thought of his secret triumph. Confronted with his malice and prevailing provocations, a young boy retaliates and prevails over the soldier’s aggression at the end of each episode. The child, as the series’ official website elaborated, was meant to stand for “the oppressed people of Palestine and their Intifada (uprising). The invader symbolizes the regime occupying Jerusalem, including his beastly and cruel acts.”17 Although the aforementioned televised productions were released during Ahmadinejad’s administration, they embodied the mandate of Sahar that preceded his presidency. The network proclaimed, in an official mission statement retrieved from Sahar’s website in 2007, its initial aims:(a) to introduce the Islamic Revolution of Iran to foreign viewers; (b) to strengthen solidarity and create an atmosphere of trust and understanding between Iranian Muslims and other nations; (c) to confront the influence of non-Islamic cultures; and (d) to 15 Sahar network also reports having seven international offices, in Islamabad, London, Delhi, Paris, Arbil, Sarajevo, and Baku. 16 The dramatic series is also known as For You, Palestine. For more details, see “France Bans Iran’s Sahar-TV for Airing Antisemitic Programs,” MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 868, February 23, 2005. 17 For the official website of the series, see http://www.child-invader.com. Accessed July 15, 2010.

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counter the misleading news dominated by the West and Zionism.18 Sahar’s proclamations might shed more light on the general guiding p­ rinciples of IRIB. Sahar’s stated objectives also offer clarifications as to the obscure “enemy” referred to on the occasion of Press TV’s inauguration. It points to what the Islamic Republic perceives as the main targets of its counter propaganda, namely Western and Zionist media. It is important to note in this context that as a rule Iranian media ­outlets transmit messages intended for international audiences in a softer and more moderate tone than those designed for local and regional audiences.19 Significantly, the same moderate strategy is implemented in certain revisions found in official Iranian web portals. This becomes particularly evident in the official website of the Islamic Propagation Organization (Sazeman-e tablighat-e eslami). Instead of using the noun for “propaganda” or “propagation,” which was used in the past and carries a derogatory connotation in the West, in the revised webpage in English, this administrative office is introduced under the title of “the Islamic ‘development’ organization.”20

CREATING “NEWS” THROUGH ACTION—CONFERENCES AND SPECTACLES On April 20, 2009, the eve of Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day, President Ahmadinejad took center stage of the United Nations’ anti-racism Durban Review Conference in Geneva and publicly denounced Israel as a cruel and racist state.21 He also accused the Zionists of using the Holocaust as an excuse to steal Arab lands.22 Ahmadinejad’s determination to take advantage of this 18 “About Us,” the official website of the Islamic Republic’s broadcasting network, http://setv. irib.ir; http://tehran2007abu.irib.ir, accessed July 15, 2009. 19 In his review of Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israeli statements, Joshua Teitelbaum argues the same technique applies to the Iranian president as well. Joshua Teitelbaum, What Iranian Leaders Really Say about Doing Away with Israel: A Refutation of the Campaign to Excuse Ahmadinejad’s Incitement to Genocide ( Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008), 8. 20 The domain of the Islamic Development Organization’s website, http://www.ido.ir, is also registered under the old name of the Islamic Propagation Organization. 21 The phrase “creating ‘news’ through action” was adopted from Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbles’ Principles of Propaganda,” Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no.3 (Fall 1950): 424–26. 22 The Durban Review Conference (also known as Durban 2) took place on April 20–24, 2009, in Geneva, Switzerland. It evaluated progress toward the goals set by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. For further reading, see the official website, http:// www.un.org/durbanreview2009.

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event—which was boycotted in advance by Germany, Italy, Poland, the United States, and five other countries—was disclosed on the eve of his departure. In a press conference held in Tehran, he stressed, “Zionists impose their will for looting nations on the world by controlling the world’s power centers.” Following Ahmadinejad’s speech, the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry at the time, Hassan Ghashghavi, also professed this was an orchestrated part of the president’s plan to advance Iran’s public policy, and he prided the wide free publicity it generated throughout world.23 Iranian-based news outlets lauded the president and were paramount in the coverage of his ­statements that initiated the international media spectacles that followed. Many Iranian multilingual electronic news agencies (such as the Islamic Republic News Agency, Fars News Agency, and Mehr News Agency) operate in the Islamic Republic, along with electronic versions of every active daily newspaper and leading magazine. Their extensive coverage of Ahmadinejad’s speech at the Durban convention was not an isolated episode but an apex in the public demonstrations on which he built his international notoriety. The conference “A World without Zionism” (Jahan bidun sahyonism) held in October 2005 in Tehran, by the Union of Islamic Student Associations (UISA), received mass exposure in Iranian media. According to reports released online by local news agencies, the conference was initiated by nongovernmental organizations and set to highlight a series of events to be held nationally and internationally between October 22 and November 13, 2005, on the occasion of Ruz-e Quds ( Jerusalem Day),24 and a new website was set up to endorse them. The central symposium in Tehran was held at the conference hall of the Iranian Interior Ministry. It was promoted on national radio and television and in five thousand poster ads throughout the streets of metropolitan Tehran. For the benefit of the international media, the poster ad displayed the name of the conference in English as well as Persian. Despite its meticulous promotion, the conference was attended by selected representatives of the government, state 23 “Ghashghavi Explains the West’s Unsuccessful Project to Exonerate Zionism of Racism at the Durban II Summit,” Kayhan, April 26, 2009, 14. The same content appeared in reports by Fars News Agency, April 19, 2009, and April 20, 2009; by the Islamic Republic News Agency, April 22, 2009; and in other Iranian media outlets. 24 Ruz-e Quds (also known as International Quds Day) has been held annually since 1979 on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan, commemorating the opposition to Israel’s control over Jerusalem. “Student Movement Calls for a World without Zionism,” Mehr News Agency, October 4, 2005, http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail. aspx?NewsID=237660, accessed September 6, 2009.

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officials, and members of the Student Basij Organization (SBO), a conduit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps highly loyal to the regime.25 Soon after the conference ended, IRIB’s news department posted a summary of the president’s keynote speech on its official English website under the blaring headline “Ahmadinejad: Israel Must Be Wiped Off the Map.”26 Within less than twenty-four hours, this headline prompted an international media frenzy and succeeding diplomatic denouncements. Coupled with Iran’s occasional anti-Israeli slogans, pro-Palestinian policies, and expedited nuclear development program, this news headline ignited troubling scenarios regarding the Islamic Republic’s future designs toward Israel. The international media blaze over his comments was followed by a heated dispute probing into the translation and genuine meaning of Ahmadinejad’s exact words; he himself misquoted a 1979 statement by Ayatollah Khomeini by saying, “The Imam said the regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the pages of time.”27 The dispute over the exact quotation and translation received extensive coverage online, especially by Middle Eastern and Iranian media pundits outside of Iran. Some considered it a manifestation of the Islamic Republic’s clear threat to regional security, and others emphasized that it further facilitated the ­international demonization of the Islamic Republic for a precursory attack to be led by the United States.28 This news release came at a crucial time for the Islamic Republic. Two days earlier, on October 24, the Iranian authorities had informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that the local uranium conversion campaign had started in August 2005.29 Identified as a leading player in the “axis of evil” by 25 For the official announcement of the public relations office of the Association of Islamic Students Societies from October 19, 2005, see http://www.uics.ir/newsid.php?newsid=9. 26 According to early reports in the Iranian media, the conference was scheduled to take place between 8:00 and 12:00. The mentioned announcement was released online by IRIB at 01:34:13 (Tehran time), October 26, 2005, http://www.iribnews.ir. 27 The speech was posted on the official website of the Iran Islamic Revolution Document Center, http://www.irdc.org/fa/content/4803/default.aspx, accessed June 25, 2011. 28 Ethan Bronner, “Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words against Israel?,” New York Times, June 11, 2006; Scott Macleod, “We Do Not Need Attacks,” Time, September 17, 2006; Juan Cole, “Ahmadinejad: ‘I Am Not Antisemitic’; Palestinians Should Decide on TwoState Solution,” Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion, June 26, 2007; Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “Hegemony and Appeasement: Setting Up the Next U.S.-Israeli Target (Iran) for Another ‘Supreme International Crime,’” ZMag, January 27, 2007, 4–6; Teitelbaum, What Iranian Leaders. 29 Director General of the IAEA Boards of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 18, 2005, 4.

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former US president George W. Bush in 2002, and faced with threats of United Nations sanctions over its suspected nuclear program, the Islamic Republic was under extreme international pressure by late 2005. Occasional reports in the international media were speculating about the possibility of a foreign ­military intervention in Iran. At the same time, the country was struggling with economic instability. The international media spectacle of October 2005 transformed the newly elected Ahmadinejad overnight from an unknown head of state into a household name. The Iranian authorities might have anticipated the international reactions to the conference “A World without Zionism,” or perhaps their propaganda temporarily backfired. But from that moment, officials in Tehran must have been aware of the possible international fallout,30 while Ahmadinejad’s public statements further legitimized the Islamic Republic’s antisemitic campaign online and led to a series of additional international media spectacles. In March 2006 Iranian electronic news outlets reported that members of the SBO were coordinating a special seminar titled “The Holocaust: A Myth or Reality[?]” (Holocaust: Afsaneh ya vagheyat).31 In the two-hour seminar furnished by the Faculty of Engineering at Tehran University, students of the medical sciences division met with American representatives of the antiZionist Jewish sect of Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City), an ultra-Orthodox faction objecting to Jewish sovereignty over the Holy Land. The group’s visit received extensive coverage in Iranian media and was accompanied by photographed press conferences, interviews, and headlines such as “Jews Pray for the Immediate Dismantlement of the Zionist Regime.”32 However, members of the delegation strongly rejected reports by Iranian media of their p­ articipation in a conference on the Holocaust, and they reiterated that they had never heard of such a conference. The visit of Neturei Karta representatives, as underlined by MNA’s English news report, meant to “set the record straight,” 30 In his instructive briefing, Trita Parsi, for instance, indicates “the international backlash has taken Tehran by surprise.” Trita Parsi, “Under the Veil of Ideology: The Israeli-Iranian Strategic Rivalry,” Middle East Report, June 9, 2006. 31 The 2006 visit of Neturei Karta representatives to Iran was one of several visits paid by members of this group to the Islamic Republic. On the “Holocaust: A Myth or Reality” seminar, see the announcement on the public relations website of the Tehran University of Medical Sciences, http://publicrelations.tums.ac.ir/news/detail.asp?newsID=770, accessed June 15, 2009; and “Tehran University’s Seminar ‘Holocaust, Myth or Reality’ Will Host Jewish American Leaders,” Mehr News Agency, March 5, 2006. 32 “Jews pray for the immediate dismantlement of the Zionist regime,” Fars News Agency, March 5, 2006; Iran Daily, March 7, 2006; Mehr News Agency, March 5, 2006.

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or rather counter diplomatic allegations denouncing Iran for inducing antisemitic propaganda.33 By stressing the distinction between “antisemitism” or “anti-Judaism” and “anti-Zionism,” the Islamic Republic was exploiting this visit to substantiate its legitimacy in order to advocate anti-Zionism on humanitarian grounds in its support for the Palestinian struggle.34 However, the Islamic Republic frequently fails to uphold this distinction. Antisemitic propaganda and Holocaust denial figure prominently in forms of visual media, and supposedly “anti-Zionist” caricatures and illustrations ­appearing in leading Iranian daily newspapers are characterized by ­classic antisemitic motifs and elements based on prejudiced stereotypes of “the Jews.”35 For over a decade, this tradition has not only been translated through digital techniques on the web, but it has globally promoted new kinds of slander under Iranian sponsorship.

THE VISUAL EFFECT Graphic media has played a pivotal role in the Islamic Republic’s propaganda for the past several decades. Visual imagery was highly advantageous in staging the Islamic Revolution (1979) and in the subsequent war with Iraq (1980–88).36 This legacy is nowadays being transmitted to the Internet in many different ways. Most often Iranian state propaganda is distributed by ­complicated networks and web portals maintained by cultural and social ­institutions, organizations, and centers, which proclaim their impartiality, objectivity, ­independent operation, or nonaffiliation with the Iranian government. Tebyan.net, for instance, is the multilingual web portal of Iran’s Institute for Culture and Information. In a web statement, the institute proclaims that it is legally i­ndependent, yet it is affiliated with the Islamic Propagation Organization, which is also responsible for the Mehr News Agency and the Tehran Times.37 Such amalgamative netting enables the Islamic Republic both 33 The complete headline reads, “Anti-Zionist rabbis in Tehran to set the record straight,” Mehr News Agency, March 5, 2006. 34 Jeff Weintraub, “Antisemitic Imagery Becomes Respectable Again: A Cartoon Roundup from Engage,” Commentaries and Controversies, September 17, 2006. 35 See a collection of cartoons from Iranian media, especially from the daily Kayhan, on the German website Honestly Concerned, http://www.honestlyconcerned.org. 36 Peter Chellkowski and Hamid Dabashi, Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 37 See the official website of the Islamic Development Organization, http://www.ido.ir.

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to multiply its textual as well as visual propaganda on the Internet and to carefully communicate its messages to suit specific audiences. In October 2005, the UISA, in collaboration with the Iranian House of Cartoons (Khaneh-ye karikatur-e Iran; IHC) and a local photography museum, announced the launch of an international contest of cartoons, ­paintings, and graphic works under the main theme of “a world without Zionism.” The contest, which was part of the events marking the 2005 Ruz-e Quds, had two tracks: one for schoolchildren under eighteen and the other for professionals above eighteen. The subthemes of the contest, as presented in the website of the Iranian House of Cartoons, were as follows: the world without America, a mirage called Israel, futurism and fighting Zionism, aspirations of a Palestinian pupil, and the Intifada and Palestinian liberation.38 The artworks were posted on the now defunct website Zionot.ir and on two other mirror sites.39 In retrospect, this initiative can be seen as a preliminary attempt to launch an ­ideographic propaganda online. Several months later, in February 2006, the leading Iranian newspaper Hamshahri managed to attract world attention by announcing its plan to hold an international cartoon contest on the subject of the Holocaust.40 The ­contest, as well as the subsequent award ceremony and public exhibition, was administered by Hamshahri with the collaboration of the IHC, both of which are maintained by the Tehran municipality. On its website (Irancartoon.ir), the IHC invited artists from all over the world to send up to five satirical cartoons about the Holocaust. The Internet was a crucial forum for a­ dvancing this event, as selected cartoons were regularly displayed on the website for viewers’ comments. By the time the contest ended, early in November 2006, a total of 227 cartoons, illustrated by artists from thirty-two countries, were gathered in to an album posted in the gallery section on the site. Out of the 227 caricatures, 30 percent were illustrated by Iranians, 15 percent by Brazilians, 14 percent by Arabic-speaking Middle Easterners, and 10 percent by Europeans. 38 The announcement was also placed on the website of the Iranian House of Cartoons, http://irancartoon.ir/news/archives/2005/10/post_15.php. 39 The site Zionot.ir was found to be operating under a US Internet service provider and therefore canceled according to the “Guidance on the Provision of Internet Connectivity Services” issued by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control on June 3, 2003. For further reading, see Jeremy Raynalds, “Iranian Antisemitic Web Site Hosted in U.S.,” Global Politician, November 16, 2005. 40 “Cartoon Competition (Holocaust),” Hamshahri, February 6, 2006, http://www.­ hamshahrionline.ir/hamnews/1384/841117/news/shari.htm#s10032. Accessed June 15, 2011.

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Regarding this cartoon collection, Manfred Gerstenfeld and Hildegunn Hansen stressed that it “shows once more how antisemitism and anti-Israelism overlap. Cartoonists mingle supposed Israeli and Jewish characteristics in their pictures.” They further indicated that the cartoons from Muslim countries illustrate Jews as ultra-Orthodox, while those from other countries depict Israeli soldiers. Following Arieh Stav and Joël Kotek’s seminal works on antisemitic stereotypes in Arab cartoons, Gerstenfeld and Hansen identify in this collection most of the prevalent antisemitic stereotypes of Jews that nowadays are associated with Israelis as well. These stereotypes combine both classical and new antisemitic prejudices such as Holocaust inversion, the alleged “pernicious Jewish influence,” ostensible Jewish avarice, Holocaust exploitation and denial, deicide, conspiracy theories of world domination, blood libel, infanticide, and zoomorphism.41 Throughout the competition, various motives were presented to justify holding this propagandist exhibition. The prime motive depicted the event as a counter attack against the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in late September 2005. On February 23, the Tehran Times published the vitriolic opinion column of Ahmed Rami, a Swedish Moroccan best known for mixing antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and anti-Zionism on his website, Radio Islam. In his column, Rami argued that the publication of the anti-Islamic cartoons in the Danish press was a Jewish conspiracy meant to trigger a clash of civilizations between Muslims and Christians.42 Another set of motives addressed freedom of speech, artistic freedom, and the desire to advance peace and justice among international artists by advocating religious courtesy. The organizers of the Holocaust cartoon competition set out to prove that when it comes to freedom of speech, Western countries also impose limitations: Holocaust denial is taboo, but blasphemy of Islam is tolerated.43 Another set of motives stressed solidarity 41 Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Ahmadinejad, Iran, and the Holocaust Manipulation: Methods, Aims, and Reactions,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, no. 551, February 1, 2007, http://jcpa. org/article/ahmadinejad-iran-and-holocaust-manipulation-methods-aims-and-reactions/. 42 Ahmed Rami, “Who Was Behind the ‘Danish’ Cartoons,” Tehran Times, February 23, 2006; Mehr News Agency, February 23, 2006. On Ahmed Rami, see Mark Weitzman, “Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus,” in Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung, ed. Thomas Greven and Thomas Grumke (Wiesbaden:VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 15–29. 43 See announcements on the Holocaust caricature competition by Mehr News Agency, February 14, 2006; Etemad, no.1186, August 14, 2006, 16; Resalat, no. 5938, August 16,

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with the Palestinians in particular, and with “oppressed people” in general, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The director of the IHC and curator of the Holocaust exhibition, Masoud Shojayee-Tabatabayee, seized every opportunity to voice his opinion and promote what he defined as “the biggest cartoon competition in the world on the Holocaust.”44 While he rejected the allegations accusing him of antisemitism on the English section of the IHC website, in an interview with Hamshahri on February 19, Shojayee-Tabatabayee referred to the “artificial legend of the Holocaust” (afsaneh-ye sakhtegi-ye holocaust).45 He also expressed a s­imilar notion in a filmed interview with Danish journalist Karsten Kjaer, director of the documentary Bloody Cartoons (2007). Shojayee-Tabatabayee was asked whether he thinks there is a taboo on the Holocaust in the West. In the presence of a colleague interpreter, Shojayee-Tabatabayee steadily and quietly replied, “Yes. In reality the Zionists have made up a fairytale claiming that six million Jews were killed.”46 Beyond the international controversy, the 2006 international Holocaust cartoon contest enabled the Islamic Republic to establish one of the most comprehensive databases of antisemitic digital graphics online in less than a year. The exhibition also traveled across the country. In May 2008, for instance, it was hosted by the Culture and Islamic Guidance Department of the city of Qom.47 The international cartoon contest further motivated the Shahid Shahbazi Cultural Institute and SBO of the University of Science and Technology to jointly publish an illustration book entitled Holocaust in 2008. This collection of cartoons by the leading Iranian caricaturist Maziar Bijani, accompanied by notes on “the Holocaust myth” by Omid Mehdinejad, was marketed online and later displayed on a blog (holocaustcartoons.blogfa.com) and social media sites, including Twitter and Facebook.48

44 45 46 47 48

2006, 24; Fars News Agency, November 1, 2006; Iran, no. 3487, November 2, 2006, 24, acessed July 15, 2009. About the competition, retrieved from the official website, http://irancartoon.ir/news/ archives/2006/09/post_484.php. Hamshahri, February 19, 2006, http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/HAMNEWS/1384/841130/ news/ejtem.htm. From Shojayee-Tabatabayee’s filmed interview with Danish journalist and director Karsten Kjaer in the documentary Bloody Cartoons, 2007. On the caricature competition, see Shabestan News Agency, May 27, 2008, http://www. shabestan.ir. Another recent website associated with Iran Cartoon is Resistart.ir, accessed September 28, 2017. The number of antisemitic cartoons on Iranian blogs has also increased since

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IRANIAN NEGATIONISM Today, anti-Israeli campaigns have become a common basis for post-Holocaust antisemitism and negationism—that is, the denial of the systematic genocide of Jewish communities in Europe during World War II. Mark Weitzman underlines that post-Holocaust antisemitism, disguised under an anti-Israeli veil, is one of the dominant ideological foundations of the global right-wing extremist movement.49 Relating to Europe, Kotek indicates that “anti-Zionism has become a civil religion in Belgium. Its credo is that the Palestinians are always right and the Israelis are always wrong.”50 Dave Rich further elucidates on the financial gains involved by asserting, “The idea that Holocaust denial can be a central part of the struggle against Israel has long been the basis of a sustained marketing campaign by neo-Nazis and Holocaust deniers to potential sources of funding and support in the Arab and Muslim world.”51 While anti-Zionism provides the glue that binds negationists together, in the case of the Islamic Republic, the roles are being reversed as the rising post-Holocaust antisemitism and negationism of Ahmadinejad’s presidency have become the main ideological capital of its anti-Israeli propaganda online.52 The Islamic Republic’s negationist and antisemitic propaganda is not assembled on particular websites, but it permeates the general discourse and can be found throughout various platforms of communication, information-sharing websites, and web portals. For instance, the article “The Shoah Myth and the Holocaust Industry” by Mehdi Alikhani is hosted on the official website of the Islamic Revolution Document Center and is also to be found on the Tebyan network website of the Islamic Propagation Organization and Fars News Agency.53 Mohammad Taieb’s article “Holocaust: The Gold Hen of Zionists,” published by Jam-e-jam, the official organ of IRIB, with a reported daily circulation of more than 450,000 readers,54 is displayed on Bashgah.net, the international cartoon contest; see, for instance, http://cartoontalk.blogfa.com, http:// www.ansareemam.blogfa.com, and www.holocast313.blogfa.com. 49 Weitzman, “Antisemitismus,” 15. 50 Joël Kotek, “Major Antisemitic Motifs in Arab Cartoons: Interview with Joël Kotek,” PostHolocaust & Antisemitism, no. 21, June 1, 2004. 51 Dave Rich, “Holocaust Denial as an Anti-Zionist and Anti-Imperialist Tool for the European Far Left,” Post-Holocaust & Antisemitism, no. 65, February 1, 2008. 52 Ibid. 53 Mehdi Alikhani, “The Legend of the Shoah and the Holocaust Industry,” Fars News Agency, March 7, 2006, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8412160024. 54 “About Us,” the official website of the Islamic Republic broadcasting network, http://www. irib.ir.

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Yahood.net, and Hawzah.net, maintained by the Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences (CRCIS). The CRCIS was established in 1989 and went online in 1999. The ­center’s prime objective was the promotion of Islamic culture through the use of modern technology. The center’s headquarters are located in the city of Qom, the heartland of Shiite Islamic scholarship, and its board of directors is appointed directly by the Islamic Republic’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Apart from developing “Islamic software,” uploading Koranic exegesis, and spreading pan-Islamic ideology, CRCIS projects also accommodate anti-Western and antisemitic propaganda disseminated by affiliated websites (such as Howzah.net and Bashgah.net) and replicated further by unaffiliated forums, news groups, blogs, and individual websites (such as Shahbazi.org, Yahood.net, Military.ir, and the now disabled Auschwitz.blogsky.com). These and other examples to be further presented attest to ways in which information hosting and online communication enable Iran’s state apparatus to casually disseminate propaganda on a global scale. Operating from Qom, the Hawzah Information Network (Paygah-e etela’ resani-ye howzeh) is a modern computerized form of the traditional Shiite ­religious seminary (al-hawzah al-’ilmiyah, or “enclave of knowledge”). It provides a database of Islamic studies; a theological archive of books, journals, and articles; news and information about Islamic centers; FAQs; and direct communication between net users and prominent clerics of the religious seminaries in Qom. As of 2017 the databank of Hawzah.net hosts over 55,000 documents (compared with 22,423 in 2009) on various issues, from Islamic commentaries and Shia ­philosophy to interviews with Iranian parliament members and translated articles from the foreign press. In June 2017 the Hawzah.net databank hosted 253 documents using the keyword “Holocaust” (in comparison with 135 in 2009 and 249 in 2015). The bulk of these documents (176) appeared under the category “magazine articles.” In 51 of the 176 magazine articles, “Holocaust” was found to be associated with the keyword dorugh (“lie,” “falsehood,” “hypocrisy”), afsaneh (“myth,” “fable,” “fiction,” “charm”), or ostureh (“fable,” “myth”).55 Crossing “Holocaust” with the keyword “Israel” resulted in 125 hits; with “Zionism,”65 results; and with “Jews” and “Jewish,” 52 entries. Magazine articles on the Hawzah.net databank range from short reports to long pseudo academic historical reviews retrieved 55 In twenty magazine articles out of thirty-nine, afsaneh, ostureh and dorugh appear together in association with the keyword “Holocaust.”

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from different periodicals, published by various Iranian-based centers; most of them originate in Qom and have their own websites. For instance, the monthly Akhbar-e Shi’iyan, dedicated to issues pertaining to the Shia world, is published by the Institute of Shiite Studies. Pegah-ye hawzah, defined as a cultural, social, political, and economic fortnightly, is issued by the Islamic Propagation Office of the Islamic Seminary of Qom.56

Figure 1.  Distribution of Magazine Articles about the Holocaust on Hawzah.net (June 2017).

Figure 1 presents the dominant antisemitic categorizations associated with the keyword “Holocaust” in magazine articles posted online on Hawzah.net: Ahmadinejad’s statements (8 percent) include selected quotes from his speeches and announcements at international conventions, at local c­ onferences, 56 These publications include magazine articles such as Ibrahim Fayaz, “Baztabha-ye holocaust,” Pegah-ye Hawzah, no. 175, January 7, 2006, 4–5; and “Afsaneh-ye holocaust,” Didar-e Ashna, no. 66, February 2006, 10– 11; “Amrika, holocaust va-jangha-ye astore’i,” Pasdar-e Eslam, no. 295, June 2006, 42–45; and Alireza Mohammadi, “Holocaust bozorgtarin dorugh-e taarikh,” Porseman, no. 41, 2006, 18–20.

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and in media interviews regarding Israel and the “myth of the Holocaust,” most of which were debated at length in the international media as well. Occasionally, the articles hail Ahmadinejad’s resilience in enduring international denunciations and standing up for oppressed people, especially the Palestinians. “Zionist lobby” in the United States and Europe (26 percent): Articles in this category associate the “myth of the Holocaust” with alleged undue Zionist or Jewish influence on US and European politics, domestic and foreign policies, world media, and entertainment. Despite an emphasis on the “Zionist lobby,” the discussions predominantly identify global Jews as its members. Translated reviews that focus on the same notions plainly contain the term “Jewish lobby” in Persian. The same tendency recurs in references to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which appear in Persian under several titles, including The Protocols of the Jews. A large portion of articles in this group are preoccupied with the subject of Jewish domination in the Western film industry. While some attribute movies, such as the 2007 production 300, to a global Jewish ­conspiracy to disparage the Persian legacy and heritage, others posit ways in which Hollywood is assisting in creating the myth of the Jewish Holocaust. Another set of articles focuses on the European sense of freedom of speech and e­ mphasizes the (alleged) Jewish objection to holding conferences on the Holocaust and supposed reluctance to investigate the subject historically. Most often the articles base their premises on bogus historical research manufactured by known Holocaust deniers. Works cited in this category include, for instance, Henry Ford’s The International Jew; “Awakening: The Unspeakable Influence of Jews in America” by David Duke, former leader of the Ku Klux Klan; and materials from the website of Jeff Rense, an American conspiracy theorist who endorses, among other topics, Holocaust denial and September 11 conspiracies. Israel, Zionism, and world domination (19 percent) encompasses conspiracy-theory articles, most of which posit that Zionism, Israel, communism, Marxism, imperialism, and capitalism are instruments in the diabolical scheme of, ostensibly, global Jewry against Christianity and Islam. This category is very similar to the “Zionist lobby” one; however, in this set of articles, Israel is specifically mentioned, while in the other category it is not. This group also includes selected speeches of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Palestinian references. Among the works cited in this category are The Trial of Israeli Zionism by the French Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy, published in Iran by Kayhan in 2005/2006, and an obituary following his death in 2012.

Liora Hendelman-Baavur

Others (11 percent): This category includes translated reports from foreign newspapers and magazines regarding the Holocaust, such as ­summaries of  Pope Benedict XVI’s sermons, a preelection report of Barack Obama’s visit to Yad Vashem in July 2008, Hawzah news, and calendar events. This category also includes one anomaly of the entire collection, an interview with an Iranian MP cleric who argues against the continued preoccupation with the Holocaust in Iran. Holocaust inversion (19 percent) relates to accounts that either portray the Zionists/Israelis/Jews as Nazis or ascribe the term “Holocaust” to other people. Most often the term is associated with the Palestinians, twice with Lebanon in the context of the Second Lebanon War of July 2006, and once with the Shiite community of Pakistan. Genocide negationism (17 percent): Articles and reviews of this category clearly negate the mass and systematic killing of Jews during World War II and the existence of gas chambers. All of them refer to writings of known European Holocaust deniers and speak in their defense, while discrediting and ridiculing accounts of Holocaust survivors like Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel. The most cited source is “The Gas Chambers in the Second World War: A Myth or Reality?” by the French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson.57 One of the most conspicuous features in this online archive (which applies to the entire antisemitic campaign of the Islamic Republic online during 2005–2009), is the excessive advocacy of “historical revisionism” ­promoted by ­ pseudo-academic Holocaust deniers. In the course of Ahmadinejad’s ­presidency, the Islamic Republic embraced the world’s most renowned negationists as its main sources of reference and authoritative voices on the subject of the Holocaust. These Holocaust deniers include Faurisson and Georges Theil (also known by the pseudonym Gilbert Dubreuil), both convicted in France under the act of crimes against humanity; Gerald Fredrick Töben, twice convicted for “defamation of the dead” and for inciting hatred online both in Germany and Australia; and Garaudy, who was tried in France for endorsing negationism and conducted frequent visits to the Islamic Republic, even prior to 2005. These and other Holocaust deniers were extensively quoted and ­interviewed by Iranian online media outlets. Banned in their countries of origin, George Michael notes, Holocaust deniers find fertile ground in Middle Eastern countries, where there are few restrictions on hate speech or liability—that is, 57 “The Myth of the Nazi Gas Chambers,” according to the revisionist historian Faurisson, was republished by Fars News Agency on June 24, 2017, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext. php?nn=13960402001429.

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as long as it does not concern Islam or local regimes.58 For Holocaust deniers, cooperating with the Islamic Republic facilitated public exposure, as well as translation and distribution of their volumes and papers in book fairs by Iranian publishers and commercial websites (Ketabroom.ir, Adinebook.com, Irmc.ir). For the Islamic Republic, European and American Holocaust deniers— similar to the anti-Zionist Jewish radical sect of Neturei Karta—were highly valuable ideological assets. They were beneficial in erecting international media spectacles that the Islamic Republic was presenting. Perhaps the most ­notorious display in that respect was the international conference titled “Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision” (Barresi-ye holocaust: Cheshm-e andaz-e jahani).59 The two-day event was held by the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Political and International Studies on December 11–12, 2006, and it hosted the biggest public gathering of Holocaust deniers in the twenty-first century. This ­gathering gave impetus to the expansion of “historical revisionist” literature in Iran, a growth sustained further by the quantity and content of magazine articles uploaded on Hawzah.net at the time. Global Holocaust deniers also contributed to TV productions, like the antisemitic documentary series Merchants of Myth (Sowdagaran-e afsaneh), which aired on Channel 4, an Iranian educational s­ tation, at the outset of 2006 and was soon after uploaded on video-hosting sites.60 Under pseudo academic revisionism, global Holocaust deniers introduce to members of the Iranian public—who for the most part are hardly familiar with the subject of the Holocaust—a new repertoire of a well-known “evil.” As “enemy images” of Iran’s long-time bitter rival, Saddam Hussein, faded away along with his regime in 2003 and execution in 2006, and old imagery a­ ssociated with anti-Western and anti-American views have perhaps worn out during the past thirty-seven years, exploiting the Holocaust to further vilify “Zionists” or

58 George Michael, “Deciphering Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust Revisionism,” Middle East Quarterly 14, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 11–18. 59 See, for instance, “The First Holocaust Conference to Be Hosted in Iran,” Iran Emruz, January 23, 2006; and “An International Conference on the Holocaust to Be Held in Tehran with Representatives from Thirty Countries,” Mehr News Agency, December 5, 2006; and “The Holocaust Narrative Was a Collective Conspiracy,” Fars News Agency, December 11, 2006. 60 An interview with Faurisson denying the possibility of mass killings in gas chambers during the Second World War, Mehr News Agency, January 17, 2008, http://www. mehrnews.ir/NewsPrint.aspx?NewsID=276806; “Iranian Holocaust-Denial Documentary Series on Iranian TV: ‘Merchants of the Myth,’” MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 1, 566, May 2, 2007.

Liora Hendelman-Baavur

“Israelis” seems like a relatively easy task for the propaganda machine of the Islamic Republic.

SUMMARY During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Islamic Republic has managed to earn itself the dubious position of top promoter of antisemitism and negationism in the digital age. President Ahmadinejad’s infamous televised statements regarding Israel and the Holocaust between 2005 and 2009 ­generated a series of international spectacles that allowed the Islamic Republic to communicate its messages more overtly in the international arena. In Iran, his proclamations also legitimized and directed resources toward an exceedingly antisemitic and negationist campaign. The Internet has evolved as a major locus for this campaign, which is disseminated online in various formats by news agencies; electronic journals, magazines, and newspapers; online television channels; official websites; institutional websites; online portals; and social media. Two recent examples are a translated article (from Arabic) depicting Jews as the most bloodthirsty people in human history, published on April 18, 2015, on the Iranian news website Alef,61 and the online launch of the second international Holocaust cartoon contest, which concluded in May 2015, on the backdrop of finalizing the deal on the Iranian nuclear program.62 These join an online display of excerpts from speeches delivered by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who occasionally associates the issue of the Holocaust with myth.63 This chapter focused on official antisemitic and 61 The Iranian news website Alef is associated with Ahmad Tavakoli, a member of Iran’s parliament who formerly served as minister of labor and social affairs and as president of the parliamentary research center. The mentioned article that luridly revives Passover blood libel is a translated version of the Egyptian journalist Firnas Hafzi’s article published in the magazine al-Kebar on April 14, 2014. For the version in Persian, see “Chehquaumi ‘khonkharantarikh-e bashariat’ laqibgereftehand” [Who are human history’s most bloodthirsty people?], Alef, April 18, 2015. See also “Article in Egyptian Magazine: ‘The Jews Can Rejoice in Their Holidays Only If They Eat Matza Laced with the Blood of Non-Jews,’” MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 5,714, April 17, 2014. 62 See the announcement of IHC on the Iran Cartoon website, http://www.irancartoon. com/the-second-holocaust-international-cartoon-contest-2015/#. On the second, “2nd Intl. Holocaust Cartoon Competition Opens in Tehran,” Mehr News Agency, May 14, 2016. 63 See, for instance, the collection of declarations by Khamenei on the website http://farsi. Khamenei.ir/newspart-index?tid=5070, accessed September 28, 2017. For further reading, see also Meir Javedanfar, “Why Iran’s Khamenei Resorts to Holocaust Denial,” Middle East

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negationist Iranian propaganda on the Internet. Despite the multiplicity and diversity of state-affiliated websites, several features can be identified in relation to the ways in which they continue to disperse antisemitic and negationist propaganda. One prominent feature is the casual integration of such materials on state-run/sponsored/authorized websites. Commentaries, pseudo historical reviews, short reports, and other forms of texts and images containing hate materials are archived on the websites of Iranian-based educational, ­scientific, cultural, and social institutions. Another recurrent feature is the replication of the same antisemitic materials through different Internet platforms. Such ­repetitions assist both in presenting a consistent message and in reaching wider audiences online. Most of the official websites of the Islamic Republic are multilingual, designed to appeal to wide target audiences of net users in the ­international, regional, and local arenas. However, negationist materials are usually directed to local and regional audiences, rather than Western audiences, which are generally addressed in a more moderate tone. An additional feature is associated with online promotion and marketing of “revisionist” accounts by renowned global Holocaust deniers as sources of reference and authority on the subject of the Holocaust. Since the election of President Rouhani and the diplomatic efforts of his administration to bring Iran’s nuclear standoff to an end, the scope of Iranian antisemitic spectacles and declarative Holocaust denial seem to have decreased considerably in scope. However, the efforts of Ahmadinejad’s administration are imprinted on official, cultural, and educational websites, and together with ever-growing access to the Internet, they continue to assimilate on the World Wide Web and into Iranian society.

Eye, January 29, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-irans-Khameneiresorts-holocaust-denial-2079267545.

The Nisman Case: Its Impact on the Jewish Community and on National Politics in Argentina Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

T

he Jewish population in Argentina dates back to the Spanish colonial period, and Jews are believed to have first come to Argentina in the early sixteenth century, following their expulsion from Spain. They were mostly Spanish conversos, or crypto-Jews who settled in the country and assimilated into the general population. Massive Jewish immigration began in 1889, mainly from Eastern Europe, though there is also a significant Sephardic or oriental Jewish presence. At its peak during the 1940s, the Jewish population was estimated to number almost half a million, with two-thirds living in Buenos Aires and its suburbs. Today there are an estimated 180,000 to 220,000 Jews in Argentina.1 Though unable to work in government or in the military (and in many areas of public services such as health, education, or justice), Jews came to play an important role in Argentina and were involved in most sectors of Argentine society. Although some were involved from the beginning in the   1 For a history of Jewish colonization in Argentina, see Haim Avni, Argentina and the Jews: A History of Jewish Immigration (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002); Enrique Herszkowich, Historia de la Comunidad Judía Argentina: Su aporte y participación en el país (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Sociales, DAIA, 2006), http://www.daia.org.ar/2013/ uploads/documentos/69/cuad.historia.com.judia.pdf. For an estimate of the actual Argentinian Jewish population, see Adrian Jmelnitzky and Ezequiel Erdei, La población judia de Buenos Aires: Estudio sociodemografico (Buenos Aires: AMIA and American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 2005).

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cooperative, small farmers’, and labor movements and in left-wing parties developed by immigrants, Jews mostly took part in the center-left Socialist and Democratic Progressive parties.2 In the decade beginning in 1900, the daily anarchist ­newspaper La Protesta even published a daily page in Yiddish. There were prominent Jewish political leaders, including members of Congress, in both the Socialist Party and the Radical (liberal) Party. The Communist Party of Argentina has had a Yiddish-speaking Jewish section since the end of the 1920s, following the model of the Soviet Union. It also developed a full-fledged network of Jewish communal institutions of Communist allegiance (known as ICUF) parallel to the official ones, which is still active today. During the 1940s, Jews were present both in the Unión Democrática (an alliance between liberal, radical, socialist, and communist parties) and in the Peronist movement, which contained both antisemitic and Jewish components.

ANTISEMITISM IN ARGENTINA There was always antisemitism in the background. Classic Argentinian antisemitism originated mainly from right-wing, nationalist, and totalitarian circles, including the army, the police, and the Catholic Church; parts of the Argentinian elite maintained the classic anti-Jewish prejudices of Christian origins. But much of the liberal literature of the late nineteenth century also expressed antisemitic prejudices. Conspiracy theories arose, such as the “Andinia plan” (an alleged plan to establish a Jewish state in parts of Argentina and Chile, circulated widely since the 1970s), supposedly based on Jewish colonization movements such as Baron Hirsch’s movement, which sponsored large-scale Jewish immigration to Argentina, and on Theodor Herzl’s mention of Patagonia as a possible venue for a Jewish state in his book The Jewish State. Jews served as scapegoats for economic and political setbacks, and ­political turmoil was often accompanied by antisemitic manifestations. There were instances of politically motivated violence against Jews.3 Two serious   2 See, for instance, A. Gerchunoff, who coined the famous literary figure of the Jewish gauchos in a tale published in 1910. His tales were published on the occasion of the centennial of national independence and immediately became canonical, and they continue to be published and translated in different countries. See, for instance, the bilingual Spanish/Hebrew edition: Los Gauchos Judios/Gauchos Yehudim (Tel Aviv: Argentinian Embassy in Israel, 1997).  3 On the role of antisemitism in the philosophy of the Argentinian Right, and on the violence between 1950 and 1970, see Juan Jose Sebreli, La cuestion judia en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Tiempo Contemporaneo, 1973). For a short summary of Argentinian antisemitism, see Luciana Sabina and Ignacio Montes de Oca, “La vieja costumbre argentina del antisemitismo,” Eliminando Variables, August 24, 2015.

Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

a­ntisemitic incidents took place: in 1909, during semana roja (red week), and during semana trágica (tragic week) in January 1919, in Buenos Aires. In response to a general strike, civilian paramilitary groups (the Argentine Patriotic League) went after “agitators,” claiming hundreds of victims, i­ ncluding numerous Jews (known as Rusos—Russians—in Argentinian vernacular), who were accused of masterminding a communist conspiracy. Jewish libraries and newspapers were attacked while police looked on passively.4 During Juan Perón’s presidency (1946–55), many Nazis took refuge in Argentina, but there was also significant Jewish immigration. Antisemitic strike forces (such as the Nationalist Liberation Alliance) coexisted with Jewish elements among Perón’s followers, who even founded a parallel c­ ommunitarian Peronist organization (known as OIA).5 There was also antisemitic violence during the period that followed Perón’s defeat and exile. One of the most ­serious attacks took place on June 21, 1962, when the far-right group Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara kidnapped a nineteen-year-old Jewish girl, Graciela Sirota, tortured her, and scarred her with swastika signs, allegedly in retaliation for the abduction and execution of Adolf Eichmann. The fate of Graciela Sirota raised public outrage, and on June 28, 1962, in protest against this crime, the Delegation of Jewish Associations (DAIA) stopped all the activities of Jewish trade—a move supported by various political organizations, trade unions, and intellectuals. During the last military dictatorship (1976–83), there were no overt antisemitic armed attacks, but in the process known as “the dirty war,”6 Jews were estimated to represent 9–12 percent of the victims of the military regime, while constituting less than 1 percent of Argentina’s population. Nazi ideology permeated the military and security forces, and Jews were singled out for special treatment. Recordings of Hitler’s speeches were played during torture sessions. The most famous case was that of Jacobo Timerman,  4 See Guido Maisuls, “Pogrom en Argentina,” Identidades, January 20, 2016, http://­ identidades.com.ar/argentina/417-pogrom-en-argentina.   5 For the relationship between Peronism and antisemitism in the 1940s and 1950s, see Ismael Viñas, “Los judios y la sociedad argentina: Un analisis clasista retrospectivo,” in El antisemitismo en Argentina, ed. Leonardo Senkman (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1989), 329–91.   6 “The Dirty War, from 1976–1983, was a seven-year campaign by the Argentine government against suspected dissidents and subversives. Many people, both opponents of the government as well as innocent people, were ‘disappeared’ in the middle of the night. They were taken to secret government detention centers where they were tortured and eventually killed. These people are known as ‘los desaparecidos’ or ‘the disappeared.’” “Argentina Dirty War—1976–1983,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified May 18, 2016, http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/argentina.htm.

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a ­prominent liberal Jewish newspaper editor and self-defined Zionist socialist, who was detained in 1977 and tortured in a secret prison until he was released and expelled to Israel after an international outcry.7 The Argentinian defeat in the Falklands (or, as they are called in Argentina, Malvinas) War of 1982 brought about the collapse of the dictatorship. Jews have taken part in both Radical (liberal) and Peronist governments since then, and in the 1994 constitutional reform, all constitutional barriers that prevented equality between cults and that limited non-Catholics were removed. Jews were appointed to positions in state institutions, including some that were previously almost unthinkable: judges, ambassadors, and police chiefs. In President Cristina Kirchner’s government, the foreign minister was Héctor Timerman, son of journalist Jacobo Timerman, mentioned above, and her economy minister, Axel Kicillof, was also Jewish.8 There are also Jewish provincial governors. At the same time, there were indications of attempts by the Peronist party to control the elections in Jewish community institutions in order to favor “friendly leaders.” Furthermore, there was clear hostility toward the Netanyahu government in Israel, and in the official media there was growing criticism of the “Zionist Right” at the same time as the government initiated a policy of rapprochement with Venezuela’s sharply anti-Israeli, pro-Iranian president Hugo Chávez. This is significant because while classic right-wing and pre–Vatican II Catholic antisemitism still exists today, much of present-day Argentinian antisemitism emanates from anti-Israel movements of Islamic militants and the extreme populist Left.9

THE AMIA BOMBING On July 18, 1994, a van packed with explosives smashed into the headquarters of the AMIA (Argentine Jewish Mutual Association) center of the Jewish ­community in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and injuring hundreds. The attack followed a similar one two years earlier, when a suicide bomber 7 See for instance Uki Goñi, “Jews Targeted in Argentina’s Dirty War,” The Guardian, March 24, 1999. 8 Sometimes old habits die hard. A mainstream conservative newspaper accused Kiciloff of populism because of his “rabbinical and Marxist roots.” See Carlos Pagni, “Axel Kicillof, el marxista que desplazó a Boudou,” La Nación (Buenos Aires), March 12, 2012, http://www. lanacion.com.ar/1455874-axel-kicillof-el-marxista-que-desplazo-a-boudou. 9 For the role of antisemitism in the philosophy of the Argentinian Right, and for the violence between 1950 and 1970, see Sebreli, La cuestion. For a brief overview of Argentinian antisemitism, see Sabina and Montes de Oca, “La vieja costumbre.”

Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

smashed into the Israeli embassy on March 17, 1992, killing 29 people and wounding 242. The perpetrators were never brought to justice, although most investigators, including in the Western intelligence community, were ­convinced that both attacks were masterminded by the Iranian government and carried out by members of Hezbollah.10 From the beginning, the Argentinian investigation was marked by ­corruption and incompetence. The prosecutors focused at first on what was known as the “local connection”: twenty-two Argentinians, among them a number of police officers accused of assisting in the attack, and a member of a local stolen-car ring named Carlos Alberto Telleldin, who was accused of selling the van to the bombers. But in 2003, all twenty-two defendants in the “local connection” were found not guilty. At the same time, Judge Juan José Galeano, in charge of the initial investigation, was removed from the case and impeached two years later after being accused of irregularities and mishandling of the investigation. Carlos Menem, president of Argentina at the time of the attack, and Hugo Anzorreguy, the head of the country’s main intelligence agency (SIDE) during Menem’s presidency, were also prosecuted and accused of obstruction of justice. Their trial commenced in August 2015. In April 2016, head of the Buenos Aires provincial cassation court Federico Domínguez, former police commissioner Luis Ernesto Vicat, lawyer Marta Parascandalo, and three others were also accused of irregularities during the investigation of the attack and indicted.

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE KIRCHNER ERA Things changed after the election of Néstor Kirchner as president of Argentina. In 2004, Kirchner appointed Alberto Nisman as special prosecutor in charge of the investigation. In 2006, Nisman formally accused Iran of planning the attack and Hezbollah of carrying it out. International arrest warrants were issued through Interpol against several high-ranking Iranians, including leaders of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, among them Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural attaché in Buenos Aires, suspected of masterminding the attack; former president Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani; and others.11 In speeches before 10 For an alternative theory, which was never fully investigated, see the so-called Syrian lead, which focused on disputes between President Carlos Menem (an Argentinian of Syrian descent) and the Syrian government: “New AMIA Unit to Investigate Syrian Lead,” Buenos Aires Herald, February 23, 2015. 11 “AMIA: Canicoba ratifica orden de captura sobre 12 iraníes,” Infobae, October 13, 2004, http://www.infobae.com/2004/10/13/145628-amia-canicoba-ratifica-orden-captura-12-­

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the United Nations, Néstor Kirchner demanded greater Iranian cooperation with the bombing investigation and condemned Tehran for its refusal to hand over suspects. At first, Kirchner’s elected successor, his wife, Cristina, who took office in 2007, followed his policy in demanding justice for the bombing. Every September, when she traveled to New York for the opening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, she brought a group of AMIA survivors with her. In 2011, she told the assembly, “I am demanding, on the basis of the requirements of Argentine justice, that the Islamic Republic of Iran submit to the legal authority and in particular allow those who have been accused of some level of participation in the AMIA attack to be brought to justice.”12 But following her husband’s death in 2010 and her reelection in 2011, her position changed, and she showed willingness to negotiate with the Iranians. On January 27, 2013, Cristina Kirchner announced the establishment of a joint Argentinian-Iranian Truth Commission to investigate the AMIA bombing. Iran agreed to set up the commission in return for Argentina closing down the judicial investigation and canceling the Interpol warrants during the work of the commission. The Truth Commission would allow Argentinian judges to go to Tehran and possibly interview the suspects. The commission would review information presented by both sides, interview the suspects in Tehran, and make suggestions on how to proceed in line with the laws of both countries. Before its official formation, the commission had to be approved by the p­ arliaments of both countries. The agreement (also known as the Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU) was negotiated by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Héctor Timerman and Ali Akbar Salehi. The memorandum was approved by Argentina’s Congress on February 28, 2013. Iran, however, failed to confirm it, perhaps because the Interpol w ­ arrants had not been lifted. On February 12, the Iranian government announced that Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, who is suspected of involvement in the case, would not be subject to questioning in the coming proceedings. In 2014 an Argentinian federal court declared the memorandum unconstitutional.

iranies/; “Interpol ordena el arresto de seis presuntos implicados en los atentados de Buenos Aires en 1994,” Libertad Digital, March 15, 2007, http://www.libertaddigital.com/ mundo/interpol-ordena-el-arresto-de-seis-presuntos-implicados-en-los-atentados-debuenos-aires-en-1994-1276301203/. 12 Address by Cristina Kirchner at the UN General Assembly, September 21, 2011, http:// www.cfkargentina.com/11353/.

Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

Even though Congress approved the agreement, it was far from uncontroversial in Argentina. It was accused of providing diplomatic legitimacy for terror-financing Iran, and it created a national uproar. Leaders of the DAIA and the AMIA immediately rejected the agreement and claimed that it “paved the way for a third attack” on Argentina because the country had subjected itself to foreign, and specifically Iranian, input.13 Prosecutor Alberto Nisman declared that the agreement represented an “unconstitutional” intrusion by the president into the judiciary and, in a televised interview, insisted that the Iranian suspects be brought to trial in Argentina. Shortly afterward, Nisman began investigating Kirchner and Timerman, with help from Antonio Jaime Stiuso, the senior intelligence official. In January 2015, Nisman accused President Cristina Kirchner of engaging in a criminal conspiracy to bury the AMIA case. He accused Cristina Kirchner and Timerman of “being authors and accomplices of an aggravated cover-up and obstruction of justice regarding the Iranians accused of the AMIA terrorist attack.”14 In addition to the public agreement to set up a truth commission, there was a secret agreement, in which the Argentine government was expected to remove the Iranian names from Interpol’s wanted list. In exchange, Argentina would benefit from lucrative agreements to sell grain and buy Iranian oil, or possibly to trade them. To make the deal acceptable to the public, Nisman said, Kirchner and Timerman planned to come up with a “new theory” of who committed the AMIA bombing. A few days after lodging the complaint, and the night before he was due to present its contents to a committee of the Argentine Congress, Nisman was found dead with a bullet in his head in the bathroom of his apartment. The investigation into Nisman’s death was marked by incompetence and conflicting versions. An autopsy was performed, and the death was pronounced a suicide. At first, Kirchner endorsed the findings of suicide, but later on, following the public outcry, she declared that he had been murdered in an effort to discredit her. She announced the disbanding of SIDE and the creation of a new federal intelligence agency. Conspiracy theories abounded. In a nationwide poll commissioned the week after Nisman’s death, 70 percent of those s­ urveyed believed that he had been murdered, and half said they believed that the g­ overnment was involved. In protest, Jewish groups boycotted the 13 See Avery Kelly, “Searching for the Truth: AMIA Case and the Agreement with Iran,” Argentina Independent, March 13, 2013. 14 Hernán Cappiello, “Denuncian a Cristina Kirchner y a Héctor Timerman por encubrir a Irán en el atentado a la AMIA,” La Nación January 14, 2015.

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Argentine government’s Holocaust Day commemoration at the Foreign Ministry on January 27, 2015, holding a separate ceremony at the AMIA building. On February 18, 2015, some four hundred thousand Argentinians marched from the Argentine Congress to the Plaza de Mayo in pouring rain, in honor of Nisman and in protest against what they described as the government’s failure to protect a prosecutor.15

THE JEWISH FACTOR The Jewish factor is central to the developments described above. It all began with the bombing of the headquarters of the Jewish community. Many of the principal protagonists are Jewish. Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman is an Argentinian Jew, son of Jacobo Timerman, mentioned above. Formerly an involved member of Argentina’s Jewish community, Héctor Timerman resigned his AMIA membership in April 2015, because of its “obstructionist actions” against the deal with Iran. He frequently mentions his Jewishness but stresses that his loyalty is first and foremost to Argentina. His Jewish identity was also noted by others. For instance, Jorge Alejandro “Yusuf ” Khalil, an Argentinian citizen who served as Tehran’s main back-channel interlocutor with the government of Argentina, was caught on tape referring to Timerman as a “fucking Jew.” Alberto Nisman was also Jewish, and the many daily death threats he received included antisemitic abuse. President Cristina Kirchner appears to have ambivalent feelings about Jews. On the one hand, she seems to be in awe of Jews. In her initial reaction to Nisman’s death, she asked how anyone could believe that Timerman, who “professes the Jewish faith and is Jewish,”16 could possibly have done anything illegal during the negotiations with Iran. On the other hand, her reaction to the developments and events that followed the signing of the MOU have led to accusations of antisemitism. Cristina Kirchner perceived the whole AMIA issue as a foreign struggle being played out on Argentinian soil. In a column published on her official website, alluding to the Middle East conflict and citing Israeli prime ­minister Netanyahu’s speech in the US Congress aimed at preventing “Obama’s 15 For more on the death of Alberto Nisman, see Dexter Filkins, “Death of a Prosecutor,” New Yorker, July 20, 2015; Eamonn MacDonagh, “Iran, the Nisman Murder, and the Future of Jewish Life in Argentina,” Tower Magazine, March 2015; and Eamonn MacDonagh, “Alberto Nisman’s Secret Recordings, Revealed,” Tower Magazine, July 2015. 16 Interview with Cristina Kirchner, New Yorker, March 11, 2015, https://youtu.be/ Fd8RVd1SbPc.

Adrian Gruszniewski and Lidia Lerner

a­ greement with Iran on the nuclear plan,” she notes that “for some, Argentina and AMIA are just collateral damages in a war we never took part in nor want to.”17 According to her, there was a close connection between foreign groups and individuals who were plotting to undermine her efforts to “determine what happened.” Kirchner also believed she was the target of a conspiracy between the US “vulture funds” (alluding to a decade-long financial battle to collect $1.5 billion from Argentina on defaulted foreign bonds held by US hedge funds managed by the Jewish American financier Paul Singer), the US embassy, Argentinian Jewish groups (DAIA and AMIA), and intelligence agents led by Antonio Jaime Stiuso and Alberto Nisman. The government claimed that Nisman pressured the Jewish community to join him in challenging the MOU, thereby smearing the government. During a visit to the neighborhood of Villa Lugano in Buenos Aires, Cristina Kirchner recommended that young people read The Merchant of Venice by William Shakespeare in order to understand “the vulture funds.” According to Rabbi Sergio Bergman, then a leading conservative opposition politician, beginning in March 2015 the government began to attack the Jewish community and the State of Israel and began deploying one of the most Judeophobic and antisemitic positions we have heard from a president of the nation. He did, however, stop short of calling the president antisemitic, saying instead that she used antisemitic arguments.18 Kirchner’s followers accused Nisman and Stiuso of being on the payroll of the CIA and the Israeli Mossad. According to the former presidential candidate and senator Leopoldo Moreau, for instance, Nisman’s complaint was aimed at assisting Prime Minister Netanyahu in his attempt to prevent Obama’s agreement with Iran. When he realized he had no proof of his allegations and his foreign connections were about to be revealed, he killed himself.19 The situation was utilized by antisemitic elements in Argentina in order to rehash arguments such as the claim that the Israeli Mossad was behind Nisman’s accusations, and to voice accusations of dual loyalty against the Jewish community. Juan Gabriel Labaké, defense attorney for some of the accused in connection with the AMIA bombing, filed a criminal complaint 17 “Dates, Facts and Strategies: Argentina and AMIA as Collateral Damages of the Middle East Issue,” Cfkargentina, March 4, 2015, http://www.cfkargentina.com/argentina-and-amiaas-collateral-damages-of-the-middle-east-issue/. 18 “Dura crítica de Bergman a Cristina, por discurso ‘judío fóbico,’” El Cronista, July 17, 2015, http://www.cronista.com/economiapolitica/Dura-critica-de-Bergman-a-Cristina-pordiscurso-judio-fobico-20150717-0100.html. 19 See Leopoldo Moreau, “Cómo llegó al suicidio Nisman,” Pagina 12 (Buenos Aires), January 18, 2016; and Raúl Kollmann, “El juego de los espías,” Pagina 12 (Buenos Aires), January 18, 2016.

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demanding the investigation of alleged financial links between the US “vulture funds” and Alberto Nisman, and he accused Nisman, Jewish leaders, members of the opposition, and journalists of committing “treason” and constituting a serious danger to the Argentine nation. The complaint was dismissed by the court in September 2015.20 Nisman’s death was a central theme in the 2015 presidential election campaign. The government denied any intention of concealment, but hundreds of thousands of people, encouraged by the opposition and the central Jewish community organizations, were nonetheless mobilized against the government. A new prosecutor, Viviana Fein, who is also Jewish, i­nvestigated the case and pointed to suicide. She was later removed from the case. In February 2015, federal judge Daniel Rafecas (a specialist in the fields of the Holocaust, discrimination, and human rights) dismissed Nisman’s allegations against Kirchner. Things changed yet again when the anti-Peronist opposition won the presidential elections in December 2015. Mauricio Macri’s new government condemned Venezuela and announced a rapprochement with the West and Israel. It canceled the agreement with Iran and reopened the investigation into the Nisman case. There is a clear change of climate in the relations between the new government and the Jewish leadership. In February 2016, Ricardo Sáenz, the prosecutor before the city’s criminal appeals court, demanded that the case be handled by federal judicial authorities, as he affirmed that the former AMIA special prosecutor Nisman was the victim of a “homicide.” On February 29, former chief intelligence official Stiuso testified that he is convinced that the death of prosecutor Alberto Nisman was murder, a death “closely linked to the work he was doing,” and said that in recent years the government of Cristina Kirchner “hindered” the investigation of the AMIA bombing.21

ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTS—THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE NISMAN CASE There is no clear-cut evidence of the impact of Nisman’s death on the results of the 2015 presidential election. Although Nisman’s death was a central theme in the election campaign and was utilized by the opposition against 20 “Archivan una denuncia por traición a la patria,” La Nación, September 17, 2015, http:// www.lanacion.com.ar/1828550-archivan-una-denuncia-por-traicion-a-la-patria. 21 “Antonio Stiuso declaró que a Alberto Nisman lo mataron por ‘el trabajo que estaba realizando,’” La Nación, March 1, 2016, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1875800-antoniostiuso-declaro-que-a-alberto-nisman-lo-mataron-por-el-trabajo-que-estaba-realizando.

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Kirchner and the governing party, its effect was probably short-lived. The ruling party’s defeat was primarily a result of the people’s weariness with political corruption and economic turmoil. However, the Nisman case marks a break in relations between politics and the official Jewish community in Argentina. Never before has a “Jewish issue” been so prominent in the electoral campaign, nor has the Jewish community ever openly and officially supported one of the sides into which Argentinian society was divided. A group of “Argentinians of Jewish origin” led by former DAIA vice president J. Kirschbaum even broke with the official Jewish ­entities (DAIA and AMIA) and held a separate meeting to air their differences, claiming those entities did not represent them. The Jewish leadership saw this as an attempt on the part of the government to exploit existing rifts in the community for their own benefit, comparing it to the semiofficial OIA during the first Peronist government in the 1950s, mentioned above. On the other hand, as noted above, the center-right conservative coalition headed by Macri utilized the Nisman case to attack the ruling party and bolster its own ­popularity with the Jewish community. One of the ministers in Macri’s government, Sergio Bergman, is a practicing rabbi, and he was sworn in on the Hebrew Bible. This was the first time Argentinian state symbols and Jewish religious symbols were combined in an official ceremony. In spite of the friction between the Jewish community and Cristina Kirchner’s government following the MOU, with Alberto Nisman’s death and Cristina Kirchner’s statements, the Jewish community’s support for the anti-Peronist coalition did not lead to a shift to official antisemitic positions or discourse by the ruling Peronist party. On the contrary, the Peronist party and its “Front for Victory” coalition stressed its pluralist character, and there were notable Jewish candidates for offices of judges, prosecutors, ministers, deputies, senators, and provincial governors.22 It still appears that the adoption of radical antisemitic speech that is racist in content, as might be the case in other Latin American countries ruled by regimes sympathetic to Iran, has clear limits in the case of Argentina. On the one hand, there is the memory of the victims of the military dictatorships of the 1960s, the ’70s, and the beginning of the ’80s, with its large proportion of Jews; on the other hand, the terrorist attacks of the 1990s are perceived as 22 At the same time, there are some elements on the periphery of the Peronist left that have not abandoned anti-Zionism as part of an anti-capitalist and especially anti-American approach. In society in general, one can find sporadic and unorganized anti-Zionist/anti-capitalist speech, such as in online comments on articles in major newspapers on the subject of Israel or the Middle East.

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Islamic attacks that cost the lives of many “innocent” non-Jewish Argentinian victims. Thus, the memory of the victims, always present in Argentina’s political discourse and in civic life, prevents the direct adoption of anti-Jewish discourse by meaningful political or social actors on the national scene, in the media, or among intellectuals. It is even possible that the ecumenical actions of Argentine-born Pope Francis have had far-reaching effects on Argentinian society. As stated in the introduction, the Catholic Church in Argentina has traditionally served as a source for antisemitism, both by action and by omission. Before Pope Francis, the doctrinal changes of the Second Vatican Council (1959–65) were not applied in practice by most Argentinian church leaders. The current pope and his reformist stance have started a process of draining this swamp. His deeds can no longer be ignored by the church hierarchy in his own country. The post–Vatican II pope Francis, seen widely as “an Argentinian and Peronist” pope, is strengthening this effect from above, preventing the use of antisemitism as a weighty political factor.23 So, much as in many other societies that have suffered through political upheavals, in postdictatorial Argentina, the use of remembrance and forgetfulness of the recent past has immediate political consequences. In his essay “Reflections on Oblivion,” Yosef Yerushalmi states that the memory of a bad practice in the past often serves as a prescription for the desirable political future and its limits. Thus, the “repression” by the military government (1976–83) and “corruption” of Menem’s government (1989–99) are integrated with anti-Jewish policies or practices in the collective imagination. Along the same lines, the memory of the victims “of the past” (including the disappearances and attacks on Jewish institutions) are a protest against impunity “in the present” and a reminder of the limits that a democratic government must not overstep “in the future.” Thus, it would seem that as in postwar Germany, the “Never Again” to anti-Jewish persecution is part of the democratic contract of the Argentinian society.24 23 “The Peronist Pope,” The Economist, July 11, 2015; Uki Goñi, “The Peronist Roots of Pope Francis’ Politics,” New York Times, August 12, 2015. 24 On the political use of remembrance in Latin America since the transition to democracy, see Pilar Calveiro, “Los usos políticos de la memoria,” in Sujetos sociales y nuevas formas de protesta, ed. Gerardo Caetano (Buenos Aires: Consejo Latino-Americano de Ciencias Sociales, 2006), 359–82. On the political use of remembrance in Jewish tradition, see, for instance, Yosef Yerushalmi, “Reflexiones sobre el olvido,” in Usos del olvido, ed. Yosef Yerushalmi, Nicole Loreaux, Hans Mommsen, Jean-Claude Milner, and Gianni Vattimo (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Vision, 1989), 13–26. On the political use of remembrance in Argentina since its return to democracy, see Emilio Crenzel, “Políticas de la memoria: La historia del informe Nunca más,” Papeles del CEIC, no. 61 (September 2010): 2–31. For the report of the National Commission on Disappearance of Persons, Never Again, see: Nunca más: Informe final de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984).

Venezuela’s 2012 Presidential Elections: Introducing Antisemitism into Venezuelan Political Discourse Lidia Lerner

S

ince the 1998 presidential elections, Venezuela has undergone a political transformation that has had a significant impact on its tradition of cultural and religious tolerance. Following the election of Hugo Chávez as president, official attitudes in the country toward Jews, which till then had been basically positive, gradually turned into suspicion and hostility.1 While not concealing their sometimes virulent anti-Zionist rhetoric, Chávez and his government have denied charges of antisemitism and have attempted to distinguish between their policy toward Israel and the Middle East, and their attitude toward Jews in general.2 However, recent years have witnessed a rise in antisemitic manifestations, including vandalism, media attacks, caricatures, and physical attacks on Venezuelan Jewish institutions.3 The roots of Chávez’s antisemitism, and that of his followers, are various: racist, political, opportunistic, and in some cases, religious. Chávez was strongly influenced by the late Norberto Ceresole, an ultranationalist Argentinian antisemite and Holocaust denier, who served as his adviser and mentor from 1994. Chávez’s strong links with Iran and the Arab   1 Many thanks to Beatriz Rittigstein and La Confederación de Asociaciones Israelitas de Venezuela (CAIV) for their help in compiling the material.   2 See, for instance, “Letter from President Hugo Chávez to the Secretary General of the United Nations,” Venezuela Analysis, September 21, 2011.  3 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, 2009, http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/venezuela2009eng/VE09CHAPIENG. htm, 206, 208.

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world also play a significant role in his attitude toward Israel and Jews, despite his protestations of differentiating between them.4 Antisemitic manifestations surfaced for the first time during the 1998 election campaigns, but following an abortive coup against President Chávez in 2002, there was an escalation in antisemitic accusations made by political groups close to official circles, as well as in the media. Some left-wing groups identified with Chávez suggested that the coup was the work of foreign ­countries, mainly the United States and Israel. They claimed that the CIA and the Israeli Mossad were acting to overthrow the Chávez regime. Conspiracy theories, especially about alleged Israeli involvement in the abortive coup, abounded in the official and semiofficial press and were expounded by figures linked to the government.5 Since then, there has been a persistent growth of antisemitic rhetoric, partly in response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and partly reflecting the reinforcement of Venezuela’s economic and strategic links with the Iranian regime and increased hostility toward the United States and Israel. Antisemitic messages feature in the speeches and publications of government circles, pro-government organizations, and the Left. The tone is set by Chávez himself, who generally blames the Jews or the Israeli government for perceived ­historical or contemporary injustices. His statement to the opposition leadership on August 25, 2004, a few days after his victory in a referendum aimed at ­ousting him from office, is an example: “Don’t let yourselves be poisoned by those wandering Jews.”6 This trend reached new heights with the election on February 12, 2012, of the wealthy politician Henrique Capriles Radonski—a Catholic of Jewish descent—as opposition candidate to Hugo Chávez in the presidential e­ lections in October 2012.7 Capriles Radonski represents the Democratic Unity ­coalition, a collection of thirty parties that compose the bulk of Venezuela’s   4 Claudio Lomnitz and Rafael Sánchez, “United by Hate,” Boston Review, July–August 2009; Claudio Lomnitz and Rafael Sánchez, “A Necessary Critique,” Boston Review, July 16, 2009.   5 Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Venezuela 2002–2003, Country Reports.   6 Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Venezuela 2004, Country Reports.   7 Capriles’s father was a Catholic of Sephardic Jewish descent (son of a converted Jew and a Catholic mother). His mother’s family were Holocaust survivors from Russia and Poland, and his great-grandparents perished at Treblinka. Capriles does not hide his Jewish roots but considers himself a devout Catholic. See “Biografía de Henrique Capriles Radonski,” De libre Opinion Politica, March 14, 2012.

Lidia Lerner

opposition. Although Capriles himself belongs to the center-right party Primero Justicia ( Justice First), he describes himself as a moderate leftist. Capriles was elected to the Venezuelan Chamber of Deputies in December 1998, representing the Christian democratic party COPEI (Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente), a center-right party also known as the Social Christian Party. He first served as vice president and then, for two years, as president of the Chamber of Deputies. In 2000, Capriles cofounded the Primero Justicia Party, and in July 2000, he was elected mayor of the municipality of Baruta. He was reelected in October 2004, obtaining 79 percent of the vote, and defeating Chávez’s candidate, telenovela actor Simón Pestana. Capriles was mayor during the 2002 attempted coup against the Chávez g­ overnment. During this period, protesters at the Cuban embassy in Baruta cut off water, gas, and electricity; smashed windows; and blocked the Cuban ambassador, German Sanchez Otero, from leaving. Otero claimed that Capriles should have used his authority as mayor to disperse the demonstrators. For his part, Capriles said he helped avert more violence by preventing protesters from storming the embassy. In 2004 Capriles spent four months in jail on charges related to the aborted coup. In 2006 he was charged with fomenting violence during the siege of the Cuban embassy. He was acquitted, but there have been several attempts to reopen the case (so far unsuccessfully). In 2008 Capriles was elected governor of the state of Miranda.8 Capriles’s political background, his links to right-wing and conservative elements, his alleged role during the attempted coup, and his family’s wealthy background are all utilized by his opponents against him, but a significant place in their campaign is dedicated to Capriles’s Jewish roots. His February 2012 victory in the primaries gave rise to a blatantly antisemitic campaign, which exploited both classic antisemitism—such as claims of deicide, usury, and Jewish control of all wealth and the media—and new antisemitism, manifested mainly as hatred toward Israel and Zionism. In Venezuela it included the accusation that Capriles was a Zionist agent planning to o­ verthrow the ­government and conquer Venezuela with the help of the Mossad. Even though their intensity was increased, antisemitic claims directed against Capriles were not new. He has been described by opponents as “fascist” and “Nazi” and is repeatedly depicted in cartoons and caricatures wearing a

  8 Greg Morsbach, “Venezuela Mayor Tried Over Siege,” BBC, June 20, 2006; “Biografía de Henrique Capriles Radonski.”

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Star of David or swastikas and making the Nazi salute.9 During his campaign for governor in 2008, he was described by the Chávez-controlled media as a member of the “Jewish-Zionist bourgeoisie” and “genetically fascist.” In 2009, at the height of antisemitic activity in Venezuela, the governor’s house was surrounded by a mob, led by a pro-Chávez mayor, who chanted “Nazi fascist” and spray-painted red swastikas on the walls.10 Claiming that the poor would not be voting in the primaries, Kikiriki, a local weekly circulated in Valencia, published a photomontage of the candidates on January 28, 2012, depicting Capriles as a Jewish millionaire wearing a Star of David.11 On February 8, 2012, the Venezuelan daily Diario Vea published an article denouncing the “­ostentatious campaign” run by Capriles, who was expecting millions of dollars from companies and bankers sympathetic to Jewish Zionism and who were interested in getting rid of Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution.12 The antisemitic campaign rose to new heights immediately ­following Capriles’s election as opposition candidate to Chávez. On February 13, Venezuelan National Radio posted on its website an article by Adal Hernandez, titled “The Enemy Is Zionism,” also duplicated on other sites such as Aporrea. Making use of both classic and new antisemitic stereotypes, Hernandez argued that in order to understand the interests that “the candidate of the Venezuelan and transnational oligarchy Capriles Radonski stands for, it is important to know what Zionism, the Israeli ideology that he deceitfully represents,” is—“without a doubt, the ideology of terror, the rottenest feelings ­representing humanity.” According to Hernandez, “Zionism is the owner of the majority of the financial institutions of the planet. It controls almost 80% of the world economy and almost the entire media industry. In addition, it maintains decision-making positions in the US State Department and in Europe.  .  .  . This is our enemy, the Zionism represented today by Capriles Radonski, which has nothing to do with a national and independent approach.” Thus, he concluded, in October there would be two clear options for Venezuela: “the Bolivarian Revolution which works for Latin American unity and the interests of the people, and international Zionism which threatens the destruction of

 9 Omar Cruz, “El Boxeador Majunche”, Martillo Rojo (blog), April 9, 2012, http:// blogmartillorojo.blogspot.co.il/2012/04/el-boxeador-majunche.html. 10 “Chavistas pintan esvásticas en fachada de la Gobernación de Miranda,” El Nacional, June 18, 2009. 11 “Adecos Ricachones vs. Judios Millonarios,” Kikiriki, no. 2, 801, February 2012. 12 “La Columna del Diablo,” Diario Via, February 8, 2012.

Lidia Lerner

the planet we ­inhabit.”13 Similar accusations were repeated in a virulent article by the commentator Basem Tajeldine, son of the Venezuelan ambassador to Libya, who is known for his antisemitic views, posted on February 15 on the websites Colarebo and Aporrea.14 President Chávez himself did not mince words either. On February 16, at a medical graduation ceremony in the province of Vargas, broadcast live by all radio and television stations, he said, “It doesn’t matter how many times you change your costume, lowlife; your pig’s tail still shows behind you as well as your pig’s ears. You snore like a pig. Well, what am I saying? You are a pig. Don’t try and hide it.”15

THE TOOLS OF ANTISEMITIC PROPAGANDA The antisemitic campaign against Capriles was opportunistic, utilizing ­existing antisemitic bias and mobilizing antisemitic rhetoric to characterize the ­opposition as anti-national. It employed tools such as defamation, including demonization, intimidation, and conspiracy theories, to warn the public of the consequences of an opposition victory. On the one hand, Capriles was accused of being Jewish, with all the racist characteristics that this entails, while on the other, his opponents claimed he once belonged to an ultrarightist Catholic sect called Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), “where perverse religious rites were practiced and selective crimes were planned to attack everything that did not represent the national Aryan race and the high Venezuelan bourgeoisie.”16 Later, after the TFP’s disbandment, Capriles was linked to the Catholic fundamentalist Opus Dei. This allegation was repeated by Venezuelan TV a day after the primaries and also on various occasions by Hugo Chávez himself.17 It should be noted that 13 Adal Hernandez, “El Enemigo es el Sionismo: Un barranco como solapada promesa,” Radio Nacional de Venezuela, February 20, 2012. 14 Basem Tajeldine, “El sionista Henrique Capriles Radonsky y la batalla que se nos viene,” Colarebo (blog), February 15, 2012, http://blogmartillorojo.blogspot.co.il/2012/04/ revolucion-bolivariana-vs-sionismo.html. 15 “Chávez insulta a Capriles,” YouTube video, 1:08, posted by “cerestv” on February 17, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKtUsW2tDK8. 16 Hernandez, “El Enemigo.” See also Enrique Policarpio, “Hay un Camino..! El opus dei y el libro de Capriles,” Aporrea, March 31, 2012, https://www.aporrea.org/oposicion/a141099.html. 17 “Hugo Chávez asegura que tildar de “Fascista o Corrupto” a Henrique Capriles no es Insulto,” Nuestras Telenoticias 24, http://www.ntn24.com/noticias/hugo-Chávez-­aseguraque-tildar-059485.

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Capriles could not have been a member of TFP, since he was a child when it was disbanded. There were several attempts to explain the apparent contradiction between Capriles’s alleged Opus Deist (“Christian”) and Zionist (“Jewish”) beliefs. Filmmaker Tamanaco de la Torre called them “two ideological extremes of ultraconservative oligarchic classes which have resorted to state ­terrorism.”18 Bolivarian University of Venezuela professor Emilio Silva conducted a historical analysis of the alleged collaboration between Nazis and Zionists before World War II against other Jews in an attempt to clarify how the “Catholic-Zionist Ratonsky [sic]” might have served a “Nazi-fascist” sect.19 The video “Capriles Radonski: Nazi-Zionist Agent,” posted by the blog Martillo Rojo (Red Hammer) on April 16, 2012, also attempted to explain the ­contradiction.20 Capriles was also accused of hypocrisy. “He disguises himself as a Christian and prays to the Virgin for votes. In reality he is a Zionist. He hates Jesus and the Virgin,” tweeted Basem Tajeldine,21 while in his column “A Grain of Sand” in the daily Diario Vea, Toby Valderrama lists those who would vote for Capriles in the election. First, he places Caiaphas, high priest of the ­tribunal that condemned Christ to death, stating, this “is a sure vote for Capriles,” since they both belong to the same “miasma.” Then he names Hitler, since they ­supposedly both belong to the same ideological movement.22 In another article, titled “How Capriles Radonski Is Trying to Disguise Himself,” Carlos Lanz Rodríguez, adviser to the Education Ministry, also mixes traditional and contemporary antisemitism. He denies being antisemitic, since Judaism is “a chosen race or consecrated elite, not only for religious motives, but for corporate interests,” and “when we denounce this racist and exclusive tendency, we are not subscribing to an antisemitic approach.” According to Lanz, Zionism “will no longer need intermediaries: they will have Capriles Radonski as a spokesperson-agent.” He accuses Capriles of wearing a disguise, usurping patriotic and religious symbols, and attempting to disconnect himself 18 Tamanaco de la Torre, “Henrique Capriles Radonski no es copia . . . !!!,” Aporrea, March 4, 2012. 19 Emilio Silva, “Capriles Ratonsky: Contraejemplo de la supuesta divergencia entre Sionismo y Nazifascismo,” Ensartaos, March 8, 2012. 20 “Capriles Radonski: Agente Nazi-Sionista ,” Martillo Rojo (blog), April 16, 2012, http:// blogmartillorojo.blogspot.co.il/2012/03/capriles-radonski-agente-nazi-sionista.html. 21 Basem Tajeldine (@BasemTajeldine), Twitter, February 18, 2012. 22 Toby Valderrama, “La Encuesta de Capriles” in “Un Grano de Maiz,” Diario Vea, May 31, 2012.

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from his link with international Zionism by using the excuse of antisemitism against his denouncers.23 The public was continuously warned that a Capriles victory would inevitably be followed by Zionist infiltration of Venezuela. Voters were also ­cautioned that Israel would have no choice but to intervene in Venezuela in order to guarantee that an “Israeli” citizen would win the presidential elections. According to Julio Escalona, Venezuelan adjunct ambassador to the United Nations, “his inevitable defeat will also not be easily accepted. The Mossad has its own plans.”24 On October 19, 2011, Aporrea published an article by Yoel Pérez Marcano, Venezuelan ambassador to St. Vincent and the Grenadines, claiming that the candidacy was part of a counterrevolutionary plot by Venezuelan Zionism, “a 5th column of the Israeli Zionist entity and international Zionism,” to deceive the Venezuelan people and defeat Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution.25 Another article posted to the site stated that “in the impossible event of a government of Capriles and the opposition, those who govern here will be the masters of the Zionist Yankee monopolies.”26 Similarly, according to sociologist Mariadela Villanueva, “The candidacy of Henrique Capriles Radonski is no more than the tip of the iceberg of the vilest Zionism capital which aims to control and plunder Venezuela’s and Latin America’s immense wealth.”27 Capriles was thus portrayed as a Zionist agent who would try to import the Zionist war in the Middle East into Venezuela.28 He was repeatedly described as a candidate imposed on the opposition by the colonial Zionist Yankee power center in order to act against the country’s interests in favor of the North American and the Jewish states.29 Several writers warned of the possibility of a Machiavellian plan by “reactionary forces” to assassinate Capriles in order to incriminate government circles and serve as a pretext for US and Israeli intervention.30 According to Raimundo Kabchi, “Capriles is 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

“Como Capriles Radonski busca enmascararse,” Alba TV, February 21, 2012. Julio Escalona, “Qué hay detrás del discurso de Capriles?,” Aporrea, June 12, 2012. Yoel Pérez Marcano, “Con Radonsky el sionismo tiene candidato,” Aporrea, October 19, 2012. Javier Del Valle Monagas Maita, “Capriles promete volver al pasado magro y empobrecedor,” Aporrea, June 10, 2012. Mariadela Villanueva, “Ahi Viene el Lobo!,” Correo del Orinoco, May 18, 2012. For a similar sentiment, see “Japan’s Tsunami and Palestinians Holocaust,” Kikiriki, March 3, 2012. Basem Tajeldine (@BasemTajeldine), Twitter, February 13, 2012. Javier Del Valle Monagas Maita, “Miedo al pueblo, miedo a la verdad, miedo a la justicia, miedo a la historia,” Aporrea, March 1, 2012. See Humberto Gómez García, “Quieren matar a Radonski y él se hace el bobo,” Aporrea, March 22, 2012; Nil Nikandrov, “Sacrificio humano para desatar la revuelta en Venezuela,”

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of Jewish origin. Tomorrow they may say that it was the Arabs who made an attempt on his life.”31

CONCLUSION Thus, Chávez and his supporters took advantage of Capriles’s Jewish origins in order to vilify him and to warn of the dire consequences to Venezuela if he were to win the presidential election in 2012. This was done by a variety of methods, such as defamation, intimidation, and conspiracy theories, many of which portray Capriles as a Zionist agent, and by mixing elements of traditional and new antisemitism. A Capriles victory, it was claimed, would inevitably lead to Zionist infiltration. According to Claudio Lomnitz, professor of anthropology at Columbia University, and Rafael Sánchez, who teaches in the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University, in its attempts at delegitimization, the Chávez government systematically targeted the internal ­opposition as “squalid” (escuálidos) and anti-national. The political exploitation of ­antisemitism is part and parcel of this strategy. All oppositional discourse was branded as foreign and treasonous.32 In this context, the Jewish roots of the opposition candidate provided a convenient pretext. On October 7, 2012, Hugo Chávez won the presidential elections by an eleven-point margin. His death on March 5, 2013, led to new elections in April that year. Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, followed in his predecessor’s footsteps, utilizing his opponent’s Jewish origins as an electoral tool. Maduro won the election against Henrique Capriles Radonski, by a very slim margin (1.49 percent). At the time of Chávez’s election in 1998, the Jewish population of Venezuela numbered twenty-two thousand. By the end of 2016, it had fallen to under ten thousand. While emigration is mostly due to the political and economic crises the country is undergoing, antisemitism also plays a significant role. No matter what the outcome of the political turmoil the country is undergoing, there is no doubt that Venezuela’s Jews will not return to the ­situation they enjoyed in the pre-Chávez era. Aporrea, April 4, 2012; and Pedro Estacio, “Para el imperio, Radonski es necesariamente sacrificable,” Radio Nacional de Venezuela, March 22, 2012. 31 Raimundo Kabchi, “Sectores dentro de la oposición son los interesados en realizarle un ­atentado a Capriles Radonski,” Noticias 24, March 20, 2012. 32 Lomnitz and Sánchez, “United.”

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Irena Cantorovich, PhD, is a researcher of antisemitism in the former Soviet Union area and bulletin coordinator at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, Tel Aviv University. She is also a freelance translator. Lars Dencik is senior professor of social psychology at Roskilde University, Denmark. His research deals with the implications of societal modernization on social relations in families and between individuals and groups in society. In recent years he has focused his research on the conditions and life patterns of Jews in modern societal conditions. Julia Edthofer is a PhD candidate at the University of Vienna. Her research focuses on Israel-related antisemitism in the Viennese radical Left and on the contentious relation of antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism. Adrian Gruszniewski, MA, was born in Buenos Aires. He is a sociologist and has worked in Jewish social research in the AMIA, the Jewish community of Buenos Aires, and in applied sociology in Israel. He currently works as a researcher at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University and as a Yiddish archivist at the National Library of Israel. Liora Hendelman-Baavur, PhD, is a senior researcher at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS) and teaches at the Department of Middle Eastern and North African History at Tel Aviv University. Günther Jikeli is visiting associate professor at the Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism at Indiana University. He is a research fellow at the Groupe Sociétés, Religions, Laïcités at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (GSRL/CNRS) in Paris, the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), and the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European-Jewish Studies at Potsdam University. Lidia Lerner, MA, was born in Argentina and immigrated to Israel in 1966. She has one degree in political science and one in international relations. Lerner works as a researcher specializing in Latin America and Spain at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University.

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Karl Marosi is a sociologist specializing in public opinion research. He has taught at the Department of Sociology at Stockholm University and subsequently worked as media researcher at the Swedish and the Danish Public Service Radio and TV networks. Michal Navoth is an Israeli attorney, focusing, inter alia, on public international law. In this capacity she publishes and lectures in various local and international forums on subjects relating to legal aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, human rights, and antisemitism. Navoth is also a frequent commentator on events in Greece. Andre Oboler, PhD, is CEO of the Online Hate Prevention Institute, an Australian charity dedicated to combating all forms of online hate and a ­lecturer in the La Trobe University Law School. He is an expert member of the Australian Government's delegation to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Professor Dina Porat is the head of the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, Tel Aviv University (TAU), and chief historian at Yad Vashem. She has been awarded numerous prizes, including the National Jewish Book Award, TAU’s Faculty of Humanities best teacher, and the Raoul Wallenberg Medal. Porat has served as an expert on Israeli Foreign Ministry delegations to UN world conferences and as the academic adviser of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (now IHRA). Mathan Ravid, a graduate student of history at Uppsala University in Sweden, has done research on antisemitism and studied in both Sweden and Israel. He works as a researcher, writer, and educator for the Swedish Committee against Antisemitism (SCAA). Mikael Shainkman, PhD, is a research fellow at the Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University and the editor of the center’s series of position papers. Shainkman’s research focuses mainly on antisemitism and historical culture. Natalia Sineaeva-Pankowska is writing her PhD dissertation on the topic of Holocaust denial and identity in Moldova and Eastern Europe. SineaevaPankowska also works as an education specialist and guide at the POLIN Museum of the History of  Polish Jews.

About the Authors

Kristin Wagrell is a PhD candidate in Culture Studies at Linköping University. In her coming dissertation Wagrell explores the twentieth-century construction of Holocaust survivors in Swedish public discourse, focusing on the ways in which survivors are understood in relation to notions of the ‘exemplary victim.’ Wagrell is also currently executive editor for the interdisciplinary open-access journal Culture Unbound—Journal of Current Cultural Research. Michael Whine is government and international affairs director at the Community Security Trust. In 2013 he was appointed the UK member of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) at the Council of Europe, and in 2015 he was elected to its Working Group on Civil Society and Specialised Bodies. He was appointed MBE in 2012 for services to the community.

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Index A

Adelskogh, Lars, 160–161 Aftonbladet, xxiii, 168–169 Aguéli, Ivan (also Aguéli study circle), 159, 161 Aguéli Islamic Publishing House, 159 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, xxiv, 187–192, 197, 199–201, 203–204 Akhbar-e Shi’iyan, 199 Aldebe, Mahmoud, 163 al-Husseini, Amin, 112 Alikhani, Mehdi, 197 Alleanza Nazionale, 64–65 Almallahi, Mousa, 160 Alternative for Germany (Af D), 64 anti-antisemitism, xvii–xix Anti-Defamation League (ADL) survey of attitudes toward Jews, 1–3, 5–9, 144 anti-Israeli public discourse, 20, 58, 88–90, 125–131, 133, 139, 141, 185, 191, 195, 197, 208 anti-Muslim public discourse, xxii, 31, 63, 67–68, 104, 105, 120, 123, 126, 129, 130, 132–135, 137–140, 170, 174 anti-Muslim hate speech, 126, 137, 173, 181–182 antisemitism autochthonous, 135, 137–138 classic, xiv, xix, xxii, 2–8, 17, 21–23, 29, 30, 32–33, 92, 114–115, 123, 193, 206, 219 Enlightenment-based, xix, 22 hate crimes, speech, and violence, xxiii, 73, 82, 94, 96, 100, 127–128, 130–131, 138, 162, 201 Israel-related or Israel-derived, xiii–xiv, xix, xxii, 17–21, 29–32, 115–117, 129, 139 in Middle East, xv–xvii Muslim or Islamized, see Muslim antisemitism in Europe

new, xii–xv, xvii, xxii, 18–19, 88, 126–130, 134, 139–140, 195, 219, 220, 224 anti-vilification laws, 173–177, 180 anti-Zionism, xiv, xviii, xxiii–xxiv, 19–20, 84n50, 87, 90, 94–96, 98, 100, 112–113, 117, 125–126, 128–130, 138–139, 141, 146, 157–159, 165, 169, 185, 192–193, 195, 197, 202, 215n22, 217 “anti-Zionist” caricatures and illustrations, 193–196 Antonescu, Ion, 37, 40n24, 41–42, 46–47 Anzorreguy, Hugo, 209 Arab–Israeli conflict, xvi, 17–21 Arad, Itzhak, 59 Argentina, xxiv, 205–216 Andinia plan, 206 Falklands War of 1982, 208 Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA), 208–215 Argentinian-Iranian Truth Commission, 210 Ashton, Catherine, 98 Asman, Moshe Reuven, 59 Atzmon, Gilad, 160, 164 Aufklärungsantisemitismus, 21–22, 29, 32–33 Auschwitz, xi, xiii, Austria, xxii, 46, 64, 70, 99, 125–141

B

Baker, Rabbi Andrew, 99 Bandera, Stepan, 50–53, 55, 57–61 Baron, Martin, 178 Benedict XVI, x, 201 Berezdetskii, Maryan, 58 Bergman, Rabbi Sergio, 213, 215 Berlin Declaration, 91 Bernheim, Rabbi Gilles, 69 Biard, Gérard, 176 Bjorgo, Tore, 66 Blonski, Jan, 43 Breivik, Anders Behring, 157

242

Index British National Party (BNP), 63, 67–68 Bronett, Henry, 143, 154 Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 150 Brubaker, Rogers, 107 Bukova, Irina, 99

C

Camus, Jean-Yves, 62 Cast Lead, Operation, 128, 155 Central Board of Jewish Communities (KIS), 77, 82 Ceresole, Norberto, xxv, 217 Charlie Hebdo attack, xxiii, 171–173, 176–178, 181 Chávez, Hugo, xxiv–xxv, 208, 217–224 The Child and the Invader, 188 Chisinau ghetto, 39 Christopoulos, Dimitris, 77 Chrysogonos, Kostas, 75 classic antisemitism, see antisemitism Cohen, Eliezer, 136 Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI), 219 Communist Party of Argentina, 206 Community Security Trust (CST), 95 Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences (CRCIS), 198 Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), 143 Cromsjö, Mikael, 164

D

Danish cartoon incident (2006), 178–179, 182 Danish People’s Party, 64 Defensive Shield, Operation, 90 Delegation of Jewish Associations (DAIA), 207, 211, 213, 215 Dendias, Nikos, 73–74, 76 Derakhshi, Ali, 188 Dewinter, Filip, 69, 136 Dirty War (1976–1983), 207n6 Dogiakos, Isidoros, 83 Duke, David, 149–150, 152, 200

E

Ekerwald, Carl-Göran, 166 English Defence League (EDL), 63–65, 67–68 Enlightenment-based antisemitism, see antisemitism Environmental Party of Sweden (Miljöpartiet-de gröna), 144, 146–147, 151, 153

Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 87, 94 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 131 Escalona, Julio, 223 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 44, 89, 227 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), formerly known as European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), xxi, 1, 86, 90–91, 95, 97–98, 139, 163n52

F

Facebook, 125–126, 132–134, 137–138, 143, 146, 148–149, 152–153, 159, 181, 182n53, 196 Faurisson, Robert, 160, 201, 202n60 Fein, Viviana, 214 First Gulf War of 1991, 88 Forum för Levande Historia (Living History Forum), 143, 150 Foxman, Abraham, xiv Francis, Pope, x, 216 Fraser, Ronnie, 87, 95–96, 98 freedom of speech vs freedom of religion, debate on, xxiii, 22, 94, 96, 100, 173, 176–179, 183, 185, 195, 200. See also hate speech and violence Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 69–70, 136–137 “#FreePalestine,” 126 French Jews (also antisemitism in France), xv, 1–2, 4–5, 11–17, 19, 23–25, 32–33, 62–63, 66, 69, 90, 111, 115–116, 119–120, 127–128, 158, 160, 171–172, 174, 177–179, 181–182, 188, 200–201 French Muslims (also anti-Muslim public discourse in France), 101–105, 107–111, 114, 120, 123, 127, 171–183 Front National (FN), 62–64 Fuehrer principle, 74 Fundamental Rights’ (FRA) survey of Jews’ perceptions and experiences, 1, 3, 6–12, 14–16, 18, 20, 23–29, 97–98 Fyssas, Pavlos, 73–75

G

Gadhafi, Muammar, 113 Garaudy, Roger, 200–201 German Jews (also contemporary antisemitism in Germany), 1, 11, 15, 22, 32–33, 66, 89, 115–116, 119–120, 123, 126–128, 135, 148, 201

Index German Muslims (also anti-Muslim public discourse in Germany), 101–105, 107–110, 114, 123, 125 Ghashghavi, Hassan, 190 Goga, Octavian, 39 Golden Dawn, xxi, 71–85 and anti-racism legislation in Greece, 77–78 arrests and criminal investigation against, 74–76 call for a ban on, 77–78 crackdown on, 82–85 European election list, 80n36 popularity of, 71, 78–85 racist agenda and propaganda, 72–73 standing among Greek voters, 78–81 surge in Kos and Lesbos, 84–85 Goldhagen, Daniel, 43 Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 43 Goodwin, Matthew, 64–65 Gordon, Murray, xv Görüş, Millî, 131 Graf, Jürgen, 37 Greek Anti-Racism Law, 77–78 Griffin, David Ray, 160 Griffin, Nick, 63 Gross, Jan Tomasz, 40–41, 43–44 Neighbors, 40–41, 43–44 Gruber, Christiane, 180

H

Haifa, Maccabi, 125–126, 130, 135 Hååkman Feldt, Åsa, 149 Hamas, xvi, 127, 132, 136, 156 Hansen, Birgitta, 146–148, 151–153 Hansen, Hildegunn, 195 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah, 209 hate speech and violence, xxiii, 78, 82, 174–175 anti-Muslim, 126, 137, 171–183, 201 antisemitic, 28, 32, 43, 66–67, 73, 96, 89–90, 100, 109, 123–124, 126–131, 135, 138, 153, 162, 206–207 Hawzah Information Network (Hawzah.net), 198–199, 201–202 Hernandez, Adal, 220 Hezbollah, xvi, 156, 200, 209 Hillersberg, Lars, 151 Hirsh, David, xviii, 95, 100, 129 Hitler, Adolf, xvi, 37, 72–74, 113, 128, 131, 162, 181, 207, 222

Holocaust (also Holocaust denial), ix–xiii, xix–xx, xxiii–xv, 2, 8–12, 34–48, 59, 63, 72, 78, 82, 89, 92–93, 99, 111–112, 115, 131, 137, 148, 156–161, 164, 166–170, 173, 177–181, 183, 189, 192–204, 212, 214, 217 Hungarian Jews (also antisemitism in Hungary), 1–2, 4–5, 12–13, 17, 19, 21–24, 26, 28, 32, 43, 66 Hussein, Saddam, 113, 122, 202

I

Iliopoulos, Panayiotis, 73, 80n36 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 174–175 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), 99 Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism, 94 Iranian House of Cartoons (Khaneh-ye karikatur-e Iran; IHC), 194, 196 Iranian Movement of Justice-Seeking Students (Jonbesh-e edalatkhahi-ye deneshjuei), 186 Iranian negationism, 197–203 Iran’s public-diplomacy exploitation of antisemitism under Ahmadinejad, xxiv, 187–190, 199–200 under Rouhani, xxiv, 204 Irving, David, 38, 169 Islamic Propagation Organization (Sazeman-e tablighat-e eslami), 189, 193 Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), 187–189, 191, 197 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, 191 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), xvi, 31, 128 Islamization of antisemitic resentment, 129–130, 139, 141. See also Muslim antisemitism in Europe Israel-Gaza сonflict (2014), 125–141, 146–147 Israeli Mossad, 157, 213, 218–219, 223 Israeli–Palestinian conflict (also Palestinians; pro-Palestinian activists), xiii, xv–xvi, 20, 90, 94, 96–98, 100, 109, 115–117, 125–126, 128–132, 143, 146–151, 153, 155, 158, 160–162, 188, 191, 193–194, 196–197, 200–201, 218 Israel-related antisemitism, see antisemitism

243

244

Index J

Jadarian, Dayana, 149–150, 152–153 Jassy-Kishinev Operation, 47 Jedwabne, 40, 43–44 Jobbik, 80–81n39 Johansson, Anders, 168 John Paul II, Pope, x “Judeo-communism,” myth of, 43 Julius, Anthony, 87, 95–96

K

Kabchi, Raimundo, 223 Kasidiaris, Ilias, 72–73, 75, 79, 80n35, 83 Katrougalos, George, 75 Khalil, Jorge Alejandro “Yusuf,” 212 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 198, 203 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 140, 185, 191 Kirchner, Cristina, 208, 210–215 Kirchner, Néstor, 209–210 Kronen Zeitung, 135 Kurz, Sebastian, 134

L

Labaké, Juan Gabriel, 213 Lagos, Ioannis, 72, 75–76 Lapid, Yosef (Tommy), 59 Latvian Jews (also Latvian antisemitism), 1, 4, 11–12, 19, 23, 32 left-wing views, xiv–xv, xviii–xix, 23–25, 27–28, 32–33, 42, 47, 65, 154, 161, 206, 218 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 62 Le Pen, Marine, 62–63, 69, 80n39 Lewis, Bernard, 112 Libych, Andrei, 58 Lina, Jüri, 164 Linderborg, Åsa, 168–169 Lipstadt, Deborah, 35 Livingstone, Ken, xviii Livingstone formulation, xviii–xix Lomnitz, Claudio, 224 London Declaration (2009), 94

M

Maccabi Haifa, 125–126, 130, 135 Mahler, Horst, 168–169 Marr, Wilhelm, 87 Mathiesen, Anders, 166 May, Theresa, 100 McCullough, J., 179 “media war” (jang-e rasanei), 186 Menem, Carlos, 209, 216

Michaloliakos, Nikos, 72, 74–76, 83 Miniter, Richard, 177 Moldova, xix–xx, 34–48 Moreau, Leopoldo, 213 Muhammad, cartoon of, 195. See also Charlie Hebdo attack Muižnieks, Nils, 77 Muslim antisemitism in Europe, xxii, 109– 120. See also Islamization of antisemitic resentment Muslim Brotherhood, xvi, 113 Myrdal, Jan, 163

N

Nachtigall (Nightingale) Battalion, 51–53 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 113 Nazi Germany (also Nazi ideology; Third Reich), ix, xi, xiv, xvi, xx, 15, 36–40, 43–44, 46–47, 49–57, 59, 61, 63, 66, 69, 71–74, 78, 82, 90, 92–93, 97, 112, 131, 132, 146, 161–162, 170, 172, 178, 180, 207, 219–220, 222 neo-Nazis, xx–xxi, xxiii, 62n3, 65, 68, 73–74, 77, 80n37, 80–81n39, 81–82, 133, 135, 142, 165, 168, 170, 180, 182, 197, 219–220 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 131, 208, 212–213 “net war” (jang-e shabakei), 186 Neturei Karta, 192, 202 Never Again Association (Poland), 69 “New Order” (Nazi ideology), 49 Nisman, Alberto, xxiv, 209–215 Nordlund, Jerker, 147, 151

O

Oberländer, Theodor, 53, 59 Olentsevich, Vladimir, 60 Olsson, Per, 146–147 Omar, Mohamed, xxiii, 155–170 activities and associates, 158–166 antisemitism and anti-Zionism, 157–159, 161, 166–169 embrace of Islamism, 155–157 ideas about the Holocaust, 168 platforms for propaganda, 160 Omeirat, Omar, 148–149 OpenNet Initiative, 185 Opus Dei, 221–222 Orange Revolution (2004–2005), 55 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), xi, 86, 89–91, 94, 99

Index Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), 50–56 attitude toward Jews, 54–55 OUN-B (Bandera’s faction), 51, 53–55 OUN-M, 51–52 Orla-Bukowska, Annamaria, 45 OSC Lille, 125 Otero, Sanchez, 219

P

Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden (Palestinagrupperna), 161 Palestine Solidarity Legal Support, 96–97 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 78 Pankowski, Rafal, 37, 45 Pappas, Christos, 72, 76, 83 Parti Anti Sioniste, Parti, 158 Patelis, Giorgos, 75 Pegah-ye hawzah, 199 Perón, Juan, 207 Peronists (also anti-Peronists), xxiv, 206–208, 214–216 Petersson, Petronella, 148, 152–153 Petrencu, Anatol, 41–42 Pilz, Peter, 139 Pinto, Diana, 22 Piłsudski, Józef, 45 Poland, x, xii, xix–xx, 34–38, 40–41, 45, 47, 48, 50–51, 54, 57, 69, 190 Postone, Moishe, 130, 140 Prosor, Ron, 62, 69 Protective Edge, Operation, xxii, 142, 147 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, xvi–xvii, 74, 112, 157, 162, 200 Pulzer, Peter, xv

Q

al-Qaeda, xvi

R

Rabbani, Mohsen, 209 Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006, 175 radical Right, see right-wing movements Rafecas, Daniel, 214 Ramalingam, Vidhya, 64–65 Rami, Ahmed, 162, 166, 168, 195 Ratajczak, Dariusz, 38 Reepalu, Ilmar, 26, 30 religious vilification, see anti-vilification laws Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 51 Righteous Among the Nations, 36

right-wing movements (also radical Right), xviiin1, xi, xii, xviii–xxiii, 23–25, 27–29, 32, 38, 42–43, 56, 62–70, 71–85, 89, 126, 132, 135–138, 150, 152, 154, 157–158, 165, 167, 169–170, 197, 206–208, 215, 219, 221 Rodríguez, Carlos Lanz, 222 Romson, Åsa, 147–148 Rouhani, Hassan, xxiv, 204 Rupakias, Jorgos, 74n14 Ryzyk, Father Tedeusz, 69

S

Sáenz, Ricardo, 214 al-Sadat, Anwar, 113 Sahar, 188–189 Sahlin, Mona, 145 Salehi, Ali Akbar, 210 Samuels, Simon, 98 Saramago, José, xiii Sayare, Scott, 177 Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign, 94 Second Vatican Council (1962–65), x, 216 Seinitz, Kurt, 135 Shafir, Michael, 34 Sharansky, Natan, 97 Shifren, Rabbi Nachum, 67 Shojai-Tabatabai, Masoud, 179 Shukhevich, Roman, 50, 53, 56–57, 59, 61 Sirota, Graciela, 207 Social Democrats of Sweden (Socialdemokraterna), 20, 30, 144–145, 148–150, 153, 166 “soft war” (jang-e narm), 186 Solonari, Vladimir, 37, 41, 45 Soviet anti-Zionism, 129 Stauber, Roni, xvi, 101n Stechko, Yaroslav, 54 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 99 Stern, Kenneth, 90 Stiuso, Antonio Jaime, 211, 213–124 Strache, Heinz-Christian, 136–137 Student Basij Organization (SBO), 191–192, 196 Suk, Vávrinec “Vávra,” 165 Svensson, Leif, 166 Sweden Democrats, xxiii, 64, 80n37, 144, 150, 153–154, 170 Swedish anti-racism movement, 145–146 antisemitic expressions by political candidates, xxiii, 150–153 call for action against antisemitism in, 150–151

245

246

Index Swedish Committee against Antisemitism, 144, 157–158 Swedish Jews (also antisemitism in Sweden), 1, 3–6, 8–9, 11–17, 19–28, 30–33, 66–67, 142–143, 144–147, 150–151, 153, 158, 160–162, 164, 166, 169, 195 Swedish Muslims (also anti-Muslim public discourse in Sweden) , 145, 155–157, 159, 162–163, 165, 170 Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd), 163 SYRIZA, 80n38

T

Tajeldine, Basem, 221–222 Tartakovsky, Dmitry, 39, 42–43, 46 Tebyan.net, 193, 197 terrorists (also fear of terrorism), xxiv, 25–26, 70, 76, 102–104, 106, 109, 115, 118, 122, 127, 136, 138, 141, 157, 164, 166, 171–172, 177, 182, 208–215 Timerman, Héctor, 208, 210–212 Timerman, Jacobo, 207–208 Töben, Gerald Fredrick, 201 Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara, xi Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), 221–222

U

UK Equality Act (2010), 95 Ukrainian auxiliary police, 52 Ukrainian SS Halychyna Division, 56–58 Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 52–53, 55–56, 59–60 Union of European-Turkish Democrats (UETD), 130–134 Union of Islamic Student Associations (UISA), 190, 194 United Kingdom Jews (also antisemitism in UK), 1–6, 8, 11, 16–17, 22, 24–25, 32–33, 66, 69, 87, 96, 115, 127 United Kingdom Muslims (also anti-Muslim public discourse in UK), 102–104, 108, 110, 114, 175

University and College Union (UCU), Britain, 87, 94–96, 98 UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR), 89

V

Vahidi, Ahmad, 210 Venezuela, xxiv–xxv, 208, 214, 217–224 “virtual jihad” (jihad majaazi), 186 Vlaams Belang (VB), 63–65, 69, 135 Vlaamse Volkspartij (Flemish People’s Party), 65 Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish National Union), 65

W

Wallström, Margot, 20 Weitzman, Mark, 197 Westergaard, Kurt, 182 Weston, Paul, 68 Wiesel, Elie (also Elie Wiesel Commission), 40–41, 201 Wilhelmson, Lars, 161, 170 Wistrich, Robert, x, xvii, 98n26, 112 Working Definition of Antisemitism (WDA), xxi, 86–100, 116 adoption of, 99–100 contemporary examples of antisemitism, 92–93 practical use, 100 purpose of, 91 removal from FRA’s site, 97–98 UCU attack of, 94–96 World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS), 95

Y

Yad Vashem, 59, 68, 136, 201 Yanukovych, Viktor, 60 Yerushalmi, Yosef, 216 Yugoslavia, xi, 57, 102 Yushchenko, Viktor, 50, 59–61

Z

Zabarko, Boris, 59 “Zionist lobby,” 130, 137, 200