Anatomy of the ANC in Power: Insights from Port Elizabeth, 1990-2019 9780796926111

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Anatomy of the ANC in power

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Anatomy of the ANC in power INSIGHTS FROM PORT ELIZABETH, 1990–2019

MCEBISI NDLETYANA

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Published by HSRC Press Private Bag X9182, Cape Town 8000, South Africa www.hsrcpress.ac.za First published 2020 ISBN (soft cover) 978-0-7969-2587-9 ISBN (pdf) 978-0-7969-2588-6 © 2020 Human Sciences Research Council This book has undergone a double-blind independent peer-review process overseen by the HSRC Press Editorial Board. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Human Sciences Research Council (the Council) or indicate that the Council endorses the views of the author. In quoting from this publication, readers are advised to attribute the source of the information to the author and not to the Council. The publishers have no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet websites referred to in this book and do not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Copy-edited by Inga Norenius Proofread by Judy Tobler Typesetting and cover design by Karen Lilje Printed by [Name of printer, city, country] Distributed in Africa by Blue Weaver Tel: +27 (0) 21 701 4477 | Fax Local: +27 (0) 21 701 7302 | Fax International: 0927865242139 www.blueweaver.co.za Distributed in Europe and the United Kingdom by Eurospan Distribution Services (EDS) Tel: +44 (0) 17 6760 4972 | Fax: +44 (0) 17 6760 1640 www.eurospanbookstore.com Distributed in United States, Canada and Asia except China, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Tel: +1 303 444-6684 | Fax: +001 303 444-0824 | Email: [email protected] www.rienner.com No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission from the copyright owner. To copy any part of this publication, you may contact DALRO for information and copyright clearance. Tel: 086 12 DALRO (or 086 12 3256 from within South Africa); +27 (0)11 712 8000 Fax: +27 (0)11 403 9094 Postal Address: P O Box 31627, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa www.dalro.co.za Any unauthorised copying could lead to civil liability and/or criminal sanctions. Suggested citation: Mcebisi Ndletyana (2020) Anatomy of the ANC in Power: Insights from Port Elizabeth, 1990–2019. Cape Town: HSRC Press

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To my children – Sabatha, Naledi and Ntsiki – and the memory of a dear friend, Nyanisile ‘Spection’ Peter

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Latshon’ ilang’ emini (sunset at midday)

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Contents Tablesx Acronyms and abbreviations xi Acknowledgements  xiii

1. Introduction

1

2. Rebuilding and path to power

15

3. Adapting to political office

67

4. ‘You keep your Standard House; I’ll keep my City Hall’ 

103

5. The decline begins, 2006–2012 

129

6. Pseudo reforms: Concealment of malfeasance and interference at City Hall, 2013–2014165

7. Ukufa kusembhizeni – The enemy lies within! 

200

8. Latshon’ ilang’ emini – Sunset at midday

231

9. From incumbency to opposition and back: A return to infamy

271

10. Conclusion

315

About the author 322 Selected bibliography 323 Index333

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Tables Table 3.1 Breakdown of 2000 local elections, Nelson Mandela Metro, seats and % support Table 4.1 Breakdown of 2000 and 2006 local elections, Nelson Mandela Metro, seats and % support Table 5.1 Comparison of election results, March 2009 by-election and 2006 local election, Nelson Mandela Metro (%)

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99

126

139

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Acronyms and abbreviations

Acronyms and abbreviations ANC ANCYL AWB Azapo BBC BEC CEO CM Cope Cosas Cosatu CP CPA DA DP EDTA EFF EM Exco FF ID IDP IEC IFP IPTS IRC LP Mayco MBDA MDM MEC MFMA MK MKVA MMC MP MPL NEC

African National Congress African National Congress Youth League Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging Azanian People’s Organisation black business caucus Branch Executive Committee Chief Executive Officer city manager Congress of the People Congress of South African Students Congress of South African Trade Unions Conservative Party Cape Provincial Administration Democratic Alliance Democratic Party Economic Development, Tourism and Agriculture Economic Freedom Fighters executive mayor executive committee Freedom Front Independent Democrats Integrated Development Plan Independent Electoral Commission Inkatha Freedom Party Integrated Public Transport System Interim Regional Committee Labour Party mayoral committee Mandela Bay Development Agency Mass Democratic Movement member of Executive Council Municipal Financial Management Act Umkhonto we Sizwe Umkhonto we Sizwe Veterans Association member of mayoral committee member of Parliament member of provincial legislature National Executive Committee xi

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NMB NNP NP Numsa PA PAC PE PEC PEM Pebco Pepco Peyco PR RDP REC RLC RTT SACP Samwu Sanco Sangoco Sasco SMME TLC UDF UDM

Nelson Mandela Bay New National Party National Party National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa Patriotic Alliance Pan Africanist Congress Port Elizabeth Provincial Executive Committee Port Elizabeth Municipality Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation Port Elizabeth People’s Civic Organisation Port Elizabeth Youth Congress proportional representation Reconstruction and Development Programme Regional Executive Committee Regional List Committee Regional Task Team South African Communist Party South African Municipal Workers’ Union South African National Civic Organisation South African Non-governmental Organisation Coalition South African Students Congress Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises Transitional Local Council United Democratic Front United Democratic Movement

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Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements Writing this book involved a number of activities and support from a number of people. The initial idea to write this book came out of a discussion with a friend and colleague, Bongani Ngqulunga. Once the research got underway, another friend and colleague, Herbert Maserumule, together with Ngqulunga, provided constant encouragement and served as a sounding board for various ideas as the book took shape. Lunga General Jazz Club, a melodic place of companionship and discussions, provided a convenient spot to make the initial contact with some of the respondents. I’m grateful to those who made themselves available for interviews, especially the individuals I interviewed repeatedly over the past years. For the collection of archival material at The Herald newspaper office, the public library in Port Elizabeth and the municipal office – my gratitude goes to Zamuxolo Nduna, Siphokazi Tau, Viwe Bisset, Anda Matebese, Ntsika Mcekana and Mbulelo Melane. Matebese deserves special commendation for carrying out the laborious and demanding task of collecting archival records at the municipality. These research assistants were welcomed to The Herald archive and the public library and assisted enthusiastically by librarians, Ludumo Magwaca and Carol Victor. At the municipality, Thembeka Mbangi and Justice Sigonyela were immensely helpful. The editor of The Herald, Nwabisa Makunga, and Rochelle de Kock, the political editor, made sure that I had unhindered access to the archives, shared critical reports about the municipality and were always eager to answer my constant queries. They deserve my special gratitude. I am even more thankful to the newspaper house for appreciating the importance of archiving, and keeping back copies of the newspaper in an impeccable condition. Collecting official documents is not always easy. Insistence that the information is public is hardly persuasive to bureaucrats who are fearful of suffering reprisals for releasing information that might embarrass politicians. Thankfully the city manager, Johann Mettler, did not share such anxiety and firmly reminded his colleagues that I had the right to access public information. Without financial support, doing fieldwork would not have been possible. For this I have to thank the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences and the University of Johannesburg, especially the vice-chancellor, Prof. Tshilidzi Marwala. Tolerance for my constant absence, on the part of my colleagues in the Department of Politics and International Relations, has not gone unnoticed. I am thankful to the Head of Department, Prof. Suzy Graham, for her understanding. xiii

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Draft chapters benefited from comments by Bongani Gxilishe, Mongameli Peter and Monde Ngonyama. Their experience and insightful knowledge of the politics of Port Elizabeth ensured accuracy regarding events and names. Once the manuscript was completed, anonymous academic reviewers provided insightful and constructive comments. I thank them for their helpful feedback. For taking the manuscript through to publication, I’m thankful to the editorial team at the HSRC Press. Inga Norenius was particularly meticulous in her editorial work to ensure clarity and precision. My sincerest gratitude goes to my beloved wife Dots, and my children, Sabatha and Naledi who tolerated my frequent absence from home and neglect of parental duties. Without their support, writing this book would have been unbearable. I share the credit for this book, to varying degrees, with everyone I have mentioned above. If there are any faults in the book, I bear the sole responsibility.

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Introduction

1 Introduction ‘What is happening in PE?’ asked Thami Mazwai from the other end of the phone. His interest was triggered by a column I had just written in the 6 September 2015 issue of the Sunday Independent about the African National Congress (ANC) losing a by-election in a ward in Veeplaas/KwaMagxaki.1 A respected former journalist and an activist, Mazwai is familiar with the political history of Port Elizabeth (PE). He could not reconcile the ANC with losing a township-based ward to an upstart party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), which had never won more than 2.5 per cent in the local polls. Mazwai’s puzzlement about the state of the ANC in PE was not uncommon in discussions at the time, whether social or academic. The bewilderment became complete shock the following year when the ANC lost control of the entire municipality to a historically white party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Most observers and locals found the loss not only incomprehensible, but also an anomaly. Seeing the ANC’s loss of the Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB) municipality as an anomaly stems from the fact that PE, which is part of the NMB municipality, had always been a stronghold of the ANC. PE distinguished itself in the anti-apartheid struggle as early as the 1920s in a number of arenas. It was the first to organise black workers and embark on industrial strikes, which saw the city become the first site of a police massacre of striking workers in October 1920.2 When the ANC turned towards mass mobilisation in the 1950s, it registered most success in PE;3 in 1960, local activists were among the first recruits into the ANC’s military wing4 and would go on to constitute the largest proportion of inmates in the

1 2 3 4

M. Ndletyana, ‘Loss of Ward 30 not the Last Surprise’, Sunday Independent, 6 September 2015. G. Baines, ‘The Port Elizabeth Disturbances of October 1920’ (MA thesis, Rhodes University, 1988). T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1983). T. Simpson, Umkhonto WeSizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016).

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notorious Robben Island prison from the 1960s through to the end of the 1980s.5 Following the lull of the 1960s into the early 1970s, PE pioneered the revival of popular uprisings in the late 1970s, becoming the first city to form the civic movement and youth organisations.6 Port Elizabeth, according to Govan Mbeki, an ANC leader and intellectual, was the ‘nerve-centre of the liberation struggle’.7 The first non-racial elections in 1994 confirmed the ANC’s popularity in PE, with percentage support hovering around the upper sixties.8 That started changing in the 2009 national elections, when the results pointed to a strong possibility of the party losing control over the metro in the 2011 local elections. Although it held on by a slim majority of 51.91%, that was a far cry from the commanding 66.53% the party had received in the 2006 local elections. Conversely, support for its main rival, the DA, was rising dramatically, growing from 24.39% in the 2006 local elections to an impressive 40.13% in the 2011 local elections. The results of the 2014 national elections confirmed this electoral shift, with the ANC dipping below 50%, to 49.17%, whilst the DA maintained its momentum at 40.16%. The gap between the two parties, which stood at 48% just ten years previously, had narrowed to 9%.9 In the lead towards the 2016 local elections, the possibility of the ANC losing power in the NMB municipality was real. And, it happened. The DA emerged as the largest party in the NMB with 46%, followed by the ANC at 41%. Once 40% smaller than the ANC, the DA secured about 20 000 more votes than the ANC, inaugurating what has become a tumultuous period of coalition government. What made the DA’s victory phenomenal was that it defied expectations based on previous voting patterns, derived from the country’s racial polarisation. For a metro that is predominantly African, the general consensus had been that the ANC would always be the largest party because of its historical popularity within this constituency. The 2016 electoral outcome, therefore, not only raised the question of how the ANC lost, but also how it happened that a historically white party became the largest in a predominantly African metro? 5 6

7 8 9

F. Bam, ‘Life as a Political Prisoner’, Monitor: The Journal of the Human Rights Trust (1988), pp. 49–53. R. Lambert and D. Webster, ‘The Re-emergence of Political Unionism in Contemporary South Africa’ in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London, James Currey,1988); M. Swilling, ‘The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt’ in Cobbett and Cohen Popular Struggles. Interview with Bongani Gxilishe, regional deputy secretary from 1990 to 1994, 11 May 2018. Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za. M. Ndletyana, B. Tchereni, D. Maimela and S. Lerakong, Voting Trends Twenty Years into Democracy: Research Report (Johannesburg, MISTRA, 2014).

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Introduction

To be sure, electoral trends in the NBM municipality reflected a national picture. The overall tally for the ANC in the 2016 local elections stood at 54%. This was a similarly stark dip from 61% in the 2011 local election. A number of publications have consequently attempted to explain the decline of the ANC. This interest in the decline of once dominant parties is not peculiar to South Africa. From the start of the 2000s, it was a global phenomenon that sparked a proliferation of literature on the subject. These include seminal texts such as those by Kenneth Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose (2009), and Francoise Boucek’s Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilise (2012). In South Africa, the subject has attracted scholarly attention from, among others, Roger Southall (Liberation Movements in Power, 2013) and Susan Booysen (The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power, 2011). Both Southall and Booysen give a broad picture of the decline of the ANC. Whilst informative, the accounts do not fully help us understand the entirety of the problems – from their inception, to their ultimate impact. Nationally focused studies of the ANC, as Butler and Southall put it, lack ‘the careful analysis of causal processes’.10 What manifests at a national level is the result of what has been happening at a subnational level and, in some cases, over a considerable period of time. Therefore, studying the ANC at a subnational level gives us a comprehensive understanding of the end results that are reflected at a national level. We gain insight into the origin of problems that afflict the organisation; what attempts, if any, have been made to remedy them; and why they have persisted, if they have. This book examines the ANC in PE and the broader area that falls within the NMB metropolitan municipality. In addition to PE, the municipality includes the towns of Despatch and Uitenhage and their surrounds. Each was under its own municipal authority until 2000, when all three were fused under one metropolitan municipality. The metro covers a land surface of 1 959 km2 along the south-eastern coastline, with a population of just more than 1.1 million. It is the most economically developed region in the Eastern Cape, located in the western part of the province.11 The boundaries of the regional structure of the ANC correspond to those of the metro and share the same name, Nelson Mandela. Sometimes the region is called by the name of its office, Florence Matomela – a name it adopted in 2012. Previously, the regional office was known as Standard House. 10 A. Butler and R. Southall, ‘Introduction: Understanding the ANC at Sub-National Level’, Transformation 87 Special Issue: The African National Congress at Sub-National Level, (2015), p. 7. 11 See www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za.

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Five interrelated questions are the subject of this book: what triggered the decline of the ANC in the NMB region; what the remedial measures introduced were; what their impact was; how the party has adapted to the loss of power and what the prospects are of the party reforming itself. There is hardly any literature on the ANC in the region that focuses on these questions. Of the slim literature that exists, nothing answers these questions sufficiently. Among the few scholars that have focused on the region and its politics post-1994 are Janet Cherry, Pat Gibbs and, more recently, Chippy Olver. In a number of journal articles and book chapters, Cherry and Gibbs provide a rich record of the political transition in PE. Cherry’s work is particularly instructive on the role of the civic movement, popular participation and electoral politics,12 whilst Gibbs’s work13 provides a rare insight into political activities in the coloured communities in the early 1990s. Olver’s recent book, How to Steal a City, is most illuminating on some aspects of the current state of politics in the NMB municipality.14 It is an insider’s account of the corruption that plagued the NMB, especially in the period leading towards the 2016 elections. Olver sheds light on ‘state capture’ at the local level, showing how the party influenced the issuing of tenders, or solicited donations with promises of business contracts. Whilst this shows how much the issue of money has become an intractable problem in the running of the ANC, Olver adds, politicians have also exploited it. They claim to raise funds for the party, when in fact they pocket the donations for themselves. Equally informative in Olver’s book is the account of how corruption breeds violent deaths, with a number of individuals killed, probably because they opposed or reported corruption. This reveals an emerging alliance between politicians and the underworld. The focus of Olver’s book, therefore, is largely on corruption within the municipality and how it impacted on the party’s electoral performance in 2016. Whilst immensely instructive, the book is limited both in its subject and scope. The ANC’s problems predate 2014 and are systemic within the party. Its electoral 12 J. Cherry, ‘The Politics of Hegemony and the Politics of Development: The 1994 Elections in South Africa’s Eastern Cape’, Democratization 1:3 (1994), pp. 406–422; J. Cherry, ‘The Changing Role of Civic Organisations in South Africa: An Overview and Case Study of KwaZakhele Township, Port Elizabeth, seminar paper, Development Studies Programme, University of Port Elizabeth, November 1999; J. Cherry, ‘Strategy, Sacrifice or Sour Grapes? Cope Versus the ANC in the Eastern Cape’ in R. Southall and J. Daniel (eds), Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections (Auckland Park, Jacana Media, 2009). 13 P. Gibbs, ‘Political Identity and Democracy Formation in the Eastern Cape, 1990–1994’ in SADET Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 6, Part 1 (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 2006). 14 C. Olver, How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay (Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017).

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Introduction

decline first showed in 2009, but the causes are to be found much earlier, in the reconfiguration of the ANC when it took up local office in 1995. The causes are partly a reflection of a failure to adapt to incumbency – taking cognizance of the demands of being in government and the vulnerability of party leaders to the spoils of office, and instituting appropriate pre-emptive measures. In sum, the existing literature is focused on specific aspects relating to the ANC, at different moments. This lacks the comprehensiveness of a dedicated and thorough study of what has become of the ANC over the last 29 years, from its unbanning to incumbency and loss of power. This is the first book-length study that traces the decline of the ANC in the NMB from the beginning; examines the causes in detail; tracks how the party, at different levels of the leadership, has dealt with its problems over the years; explains elaborately why the party’s remedial measures did not work, resulting in the loss of power; and explores how it has adapted to loss of power. The book draws from a number of theoretical perspectives on parties, social structure and voter behaviour. To make sense of the decline of the ANC, it is critical that one first understands the organisation as a dominant party. Dominance has been defined differently in the literature, both in terms of influence and longevity in power. Maurice Duverger, for instance, is one of the few scholars that defines a dominant party not only in relation to the length of stay in power, but also in terms of hegemony of ideas and ways of doing things over a considerable period of time.15 The dominant party becomes associated with a particular epoch. Most scholars, however, take a post facto view of a dominant party by defining it based on the length of stay in power, about 20 years of interrupted tenure.16 Dominant parties attain such status through some heroic or epoch-defining achievements such as revolution or national liberation.17 Ironically, whilst making a party seem indomitable, dominance actually makes it highly vulnerable to decline. ‘Every domination,’ writes Duverger, ‘bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction’.18 Because it achieves dominance by being a ‘catch-all party’, the party attracts all manner of supporters across ideology and

15 M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London, Methuen, 1964). 16 F. Boucek, Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 17 O. Kirchheimer, ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’ in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966). 18 Duverger, Political Parties, p. 312.

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class lines with different interests and personal ambitions, becoming a mixture of careerist politicians, ideologues, activists and even opportunists. This makes dominant parties highly heterogeneous and thus prone to incoherence. This heterogeneity then becomes the basis for the formation of different factions within the party. Their size and affiliation is not fixed, but changes depending on circumstances in the party, and relations amongst factions vary from competition to co-operation.19 Competitive factionalism threatens the unity of a party. Whether or not it leads to a split depends on a number of factors. Dominant parties, according to Greene, enjoy the advantage of controlling resources, which they use for the benefit of both the party and its members.20 This increases the cost of splitting to form a rival party. Because the party is dominant electorally, it also creates a high degree of uncertainty that a splinter party would become a serious challenger. This loss of patronage offered by incumbency, combined with the uncertainty that a splinter party would find resonance amongst the electorate, discourages a split. Existing opposition parties tend to be niche parties that form around marginal issues that lack popular resonance. In some instances, they are hampered from growing by social cleavages along religious, wealth or even racial lines. Dominance engenders the complacent belief that the party will never lose elections regardless of the alienating impact of intra-party conflicts and involvement in impropriety. Intra-party conflict and corruption repels supporters, however, leading to a steady decline of electoral support.21 Leaders are resistant to change due to vested interest in the status quo. Some factions, because they are motivated by self-aggrandisement, are threatened by corrective change. They prioritise their own factional interests over the collective good of the party. Only when the threat of losing elections is imminent, Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1992) contend, do dominant parties become prone to changing.22 At times it takes actual electoral loss of power, which has a shock effect, to trigger reforms.23 19 Boucek, Factional Politics. 20 K. Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007). 21 F. Boucek, ‘The Maintenance and Decline of Dominant Party Systems in the Developed World: Inter- and Intra-party Interpretations’, paper presented at a Dominant Party Systems Conference, University of Michigan, 9–10 May 2014. 22 R.S. Katz and P. Mair, ‘Changing Models of Organization: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, paper presented at the Democracies and the Organization of Political Parties Workshop, European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Limerick, 30 March–4 April 1992. 23 R. Harmel and K. Janda, ‘The Integrated Theory of Party Change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 6:3 (1994) pp. 259–287.

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Introduction

Whilst acknowledging the impact of an electoral shock in triggering change, Kris Deschouwer (1992) argues that it still requires that leaders agree to effect change.24 They can choose to leave the party unchanged, even in the face of dire consequences, or loss of power. Thus Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994) argue that party changes are a result of a combination of factors, both internal and external.25 A change in the (electoral) environment can stimulate party reforms, but on its own may be insufficient. Favourable internal factors may be needed to effect changes within the party, such as new leadership.26 Ordinarily, new leadership is more likely to effect change. This is particularly so when there is a wholesale displacement of one faction by another. Factions tend to have decidedly different visions and programmes from one another. Their victory over others, resistant to change, is often propelled by the articulation of difference, new direction and new ways of doing things. In sum, dominant parties attain dominance in two ways. They are associated with epoch-defining events and, following a democratic transition, occupy the centre of the ideological spectrum. This makes them appeal to a wide spectrum of the electorate across ideology, race, religion and class status. The founding source of the party’s legitimacy, however, changes over time. Because some join the dominant party to satisfy personal ambitions, party members engage in impropriety and inter-factional fights that detract from their moral authority. They may be able to sustain their electoral majority, even despite the internal decay and corruption, so long as they meet the material needs of the electorate. Once they are no longer able to satisfy the needs of voters, their loss become imminent. A split arising from internal fights may induce electoral loss. But splits from a dominant party are not always easy due to uncertainty over whether or not the splinter party can dislodge the dominant party, and the concomitant fear of loss of patronage. Whether or not a dominant party loses, therefore, depends on the availability of an alternative party to voters. The electorate can redirect their support from a hitherto dominant party to a competitor. Loss of power, however,

24 K. Deschouwer, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Measuring and Explaining Adaptation and Change of Political Parties’, paper presented at the Democracies and the Organization of Political Parties Workshop, European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Limerick, 30 March–4 April 1992. 25 Harmel and Janda, ‘The Integrated Theory of Party Change’. 26 See K. Janda, ‘Towards a Performance Theory of Party Change’, paper presented at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Madrid, Spain, 1990.

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is not necessarily permanent. Dominant parties can reform to regain power – indeed, at times, its loss triggers genuine and determined attempts at reforms. My argument in this book, therefore, is that the decline of the ANC in the NMB is more than the result of sporadic, or passing afflictions. Rather, it is a manifestation of systemic weaknesses occasioned by the party’s inability to adapt to being a party-in-government. Instead of continuing as a transformative tool, both to change socio-economic conditions and public culture, it became an instrument for access to and disbursement of patronage, both to its leaders and party activists. This reached a point where reforming the party posed a threat to the security and comfort of these unscrupulous individuals. The result was that they sabotaged their party’s electoral prospects in order to guarantee their continued well-being and access to municipal resources. I make this argument in several points. First, the party’s rise to office had an ironic impact. Its inaugural victory in the municipal elections precipitated demobilisation of the massive organisational infrastructure that had not only rebuilt it, but also buoyed it to office. The consequence was alienation of the party from its grassroots base. Second, instead of making up for the weakening of the organisational infrastructure that had previously been provided by civic organisations, ANC branches compounded the problem as they became government focused. They became sites of intra-party rivalry between councillors and members of the Branch Executive Committee (BEC) over allocation of patronage in wards. This even saw ward committees, which were meant to serve as a public deliberation forum for the community and a watchdog over the councillor, turn into partisan bodies that simply provided an income to party activists. Activists, in turn, fought amongst themselves for placement in the ward committees, further diminishing their role as a conduit between residents and the municipality. Third, the scramble for patronage was not confined to the branches, but also permeated into the upper layers of the leadership. Councillors approved the sale of municipal assets to some of their own. The party was slow to introduce a code of conduct that would prohibit councillors profiting from work that was ostensibly intended for public service. When the party did eventually produce policies barring such behaviour, they were not strictly applied. Instead, provincial leaders, to whom regional leaders were answerable, turned a blind eye. This marked the acceptance and consequent entrenchment of corruption within the party. Fourth, the prominent use of political office for personal benefit led to the rise of factions. Their purpose was to exclude others in order to maximise benefits for themselves. In this scramble, patronage-based factions enlisted branches. This meant devising ways to limit membership to only those that supported them. 8

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Introduction

Regional leaders meddled in the election of branch leaders and in the membership generally, excluding contrarian voices. This worsened feuds in branches to the point where they became public, pitting members against one another in physical violence. Fifth, the consequence of intra-party feuds was the erosion of the integrity of the party. Rules were no longer observed. This made conflict constant within the party. Some of the party members became uninterested and potential members were repelled, which further limited the size of the party’s membership. Traditional party supporters were similarly repulsed by the unbecoming conduct and behaviour that contradicted the party’s promise of ethical leadership that prioritised the public good. Sixth, the deteriorating state of the party inevitably manifested itself in municipal performance and administration. Mayoral and municipal leadership became unstable, and the provision of services became irregular. Politicians appointed managers who were pliant to their improper approaches, and did so only on a temporary basis in order to force their compliance out of fear that they would not be reappointed. Administrative instability was, therefore, not accidental, but was intentionally fostered in order to enable malfeasance on the part of politicians. An equally important point to note in this particular instance is that the ANC did all this with the support of the opposition, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), which was also a beneficiary of malfeasance. Seventh, the eventual loss in 2016 was occasioned by the zeal to cover up corruption and secure continuous access to patronage. Some local politicians were opposed to the election of a reform-minded mayor who was chosen by national leaders in order to improve the party’s electoral fortunes in the NMB. The threat of losing power in the metro, which had initially appeared in the 2009 elections, did nothing to change their conduct. Their corruption and reliance on municipal resources as the source of personal aggrandisement had made them impervious to the broader interests of the party. They had become self-absorbed, concerned only with their own security and interests. This led to them deliberately sabotaging their party’s campaign in the 2016 elections. Lastly, loss of power has not prompted a change in organisational behaviour. The reliance on patronage has been so entrenched in the character and operation of the party that it is difficult for the party to reform. Party leaders are reluctant to lead a reform process as doing so involves eliminating receipt of patronage. The local party elite are content with a degenerated ANC so long as they continue to benefit materially. What has happened, even despite the loss of power, is that the ANC has returned to its pre-2015 infamous self.

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This book covers a 29-year period, beginning with the re-establishment of the ANC in 1990 and ends with an analysis of the 2019 national elections. It is a product of fieldwork and archival research done over a period of four years. Fieldwork entailed numerous activities in PE: attending rallies, commemorative events, memorials and funerals of activists; observing campaigns for general and by-elections and election debates, and conducting interviews. Interviews numbered more than fifty, with key individuals that occupied various positions in the ANC (from branch, to regional, provincial and national) at different times. Archival research involved going through bound copies of the local newspapers, the Evening Post and The Herald, covering the period between 1989 and 2019, and the voluminous records of the municipality generated between 1989 and 2019. Municipal records include the minutes of One-City Forum and Council meetings, reports of Council committees, forensic reports by private audit firms, mayoral speeches, budget reports, annual reports, and municipal policies and regulations. The book also drew from other primary sources: legislation, municipal audit reports, surveys on service delivery protests and court judgments. The book is structured into ten chapters. The chapter following immediately after this introductory chapter, focuses on the re-establishment of the ANC in 1990, its subsequent role in local negotiations that led to the integration of the Port Elizabeth municipality, and the inaugural local elections in 1995. Here we establish the character of the party immediately upon unbanning. The book pays special attention to the role played by Govan Mbeki, an ANC stalwart based in the Eastern Cape ANC office, in rebuilding the organisation. The initial years of revival formed the identity of the party that became cemented in the minds of its members and the general public. This, in turn, formed a yardstick against which they measured it in the subsequent years. Examining the negotiations on municipal integration illuminates the richness of political activism in PE. It explains why PE was the first city to inaugurate a Transitional Local Council (TLC) in May 1994. Participation in the TLC, between May 1994 and November 1995, marks the ANC’s debut into officialdom. Here we see how individual leaders maneouvre and lobby for positions, to the exclusion of others. The jostling over positions became even more evident towards the initial 1995 local elections. A number of popular leaders were nudged aside by factional leaders, which led to their standing as independents. This was the initial sign that if contestation for office were not managed properly, it would weaken the coherence of the party and eat into its traditional support. Chapter 3 looks at the initial term of local government, from 1995 to 2000. My main interest in this chapter is to discern how incumbency begins to reshape the ANC as a party. This involves examining what becomes of the character 10

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Introduction

of branches, relations between councillors and their branches, and party–state relations. One of the key issues that emerges is how branches were reoriented to become government focused and, in the process, become alienated from their grassroots base. Another interesting issue is the weakening of internal democracy, as the positions of party chairperson and mayor were concentrated in one person – Nceba Faku – and how this fusion of offices created a strongman figure that overrode collective leadership. An equally important point to note in this instance is how the rest of the party machinery seemed impotent in the face of a rising authoritarian figure. Whilst this phenomenon suggested a weakening of internal democracy, the chapter probes whether this was not a necessary development occasioned by the failure of the party to adapt to being a party-in-government. The traditional modus operandi of the party was unsuitable for incumbency, which demanded a different set of skills and urgency in its work. Part of the problem, I argue, was that the party failed to provide immediate guidance for its government leaders and was slow to introduce legislation on municipalities. This left municipal leaders to their own devices, often guided by their own personal traits and interests. The problems that set in as the ANC ascended to office, I argue, were not only a function of personal imperfections. Rather, they were also enabled by institutional weaknesses, at both the party and government levels. Having witnessed the weakening of internal democracy and the rise of a strongman, I move on in chapter 4 to examine attempts to reimpose collective leadership in the early to mid-2000s. This sees the return of some senior leaders from the provincial legislature to the municipality and regional office. The result was a standoff between the all-powerful mayor and the regional party leaders, which led to instability within the municipality. The idea of co-ordination between party office-bearers and government leaders was never translated into a working institutional relationship. How the party and the city government related to each other became a function of the personalities of office-holders. Nceba Faku’s domineering personality, whilst serving as mayor, warded off any attempts by the regional office to subject him to their collective will and curb his misconduct. Whilst Faku’s visionary and decisive leadership benefited the metro, the party’s inability to sanction him in instances of misbehaviour destabilised management of the municipality and harmed the image of the party. Chapter 5 shows how previous disagreements over leadership styles and exclusion from office between 2006 and 2009 consolidated factions. Key in the hardening of these factions was the leadership contest between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, beginning in 2005 and culminating in Zuma’s election as ANC president in 2007, and the split to form the Congress of the People (Cope) in 11

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2008. This period dealt a severe blow to the integrity of the party through the erosion of rules, an exodus and a purge of some of the credible local leaders. It would prove difficult in subsequent years to rebuild the integrity of the organisation. Equally important, this chapter shows that the ideological reasons factions advanced as the basis of their existence were false. Factions had less to do with ideology, than with personal, material interests that saw corruption thriving. Both the party leadership and municipal management became severely unstable as leaders fought over the spoils of office. Chapter 6 shows how party leaders, faced with the deleterious evidence of the impact of maladministration, concealed the perpetuation of corruption under the guise of leadership reforms. The focus falls specifically on two appointments in the municipality: the mayor, and the city manager. Ben Fihla was appointed mayor in 2013, ostensibly to stabilise the metro. At the advanced age of 81 years and without any executive experience, Fihla was hopelessly ineffective and controlled by party leaders determined not only to cover up their impropriety, but also to maintain their access to patronage. Clearly, politicians determined to persist in their unscrupulous ways sacrificed competent management of the municipality. When Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, a competent and experienced municipal manager, was headhunted to fill the position of city manager, they frustrated her efforts at clean management in order to force her resignation. During her three-month tenure, she fought off political meddling in the administration, which made her unpopular with party leaders, leading them to make her continuing employment untenable. Of equal importance in this chapter, is how the opposition, especially the UDM’s Mongameli Bobani, colluded with the governing ANC to hound Msengana-Ndlela out of her job. This raised suspicion that Bobani might have also been a beneficiary of corruption, especially because he was able to secure the services of an exorbitant law firm to nullify Msengana-Ndlela’s employment on spurious claims that she was unqualified. The suspicion of Bobani’s corruption would later, in 2015, prove to be credible. With the results of the 2014 national election showing that the ANC was supported by less than 50 per cent of the electorate in the metro, chapter 7 shows that the party was now forced to introduce real reforms in the municipality. Fihla was removed as mayor and replaced with Danny Jordaan. Unlike his predecessors, Jordaan was given carte blanche to stabilise and clean up the municipality, which he managed to do, to a notable degree. For a party steeped in corruption, Jordaan’s mayoralty threatened malfeasant political leaders. This saw Jordaan being sabotaged by his comrades, both at the regional and the provincial levels, in the hope that poor electoral results would force his resignation. 12

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Chapter 8 underlines that remedial measures were largely focused on the municipality, not the party. The party remained mired in intra-party feuds right up to two weeks before the 2016 elections. This mayhem continued in the face of a real electoral threat from the Democratic Alliance (DA), which had reduced the gap between their party and the incumbent to a slim 9% in 2014. The chapter also traces the state of opposition parties from 1990 to 2015, with a view to showing how the DA, a predominantly white party, came to pose a threat to the incumbent in its historical stronghold. What the chapter stresses is that the DA’s electoral rise owes less to its encroachment into the ANC’s support base, than it owes to disillusionment with the incumbent. It does so by analysing the distribution of support for the two major parties, especially focusing on turnout in their strongholds. A comparison of turnout to that of previous elections, and examined within the context of the ANC’s maladministration, shows that DA supporters were enthused and became more engaged in the electoral process, whilst ANC supporters experienced the opposite: disillusionment and disengagement from the electoral process. Equally important in this chapter is the reaction of the ANC, at regional and national levels, to the electoral loss. It was disbelief, as if something they believed impossible had come to pass. Whereas their disbelief was understandable, their efforts to annul election results on spurious grounds thereafter were worrisome. Although the local ANC later withdrew the formal complaint, how its national leaders, Gwede Mantashe and Jessie Duarte, dealt with the commissioner who handled their complaint, Terry Tselane, showed that the organisation expected the IEC to treat them favourably at the same time as showing hostility towards commissioners who executed their duties impartially. Chapter 9 examines how the ANC adapted to losing power. The key question this chapter answers is whether the party admitted to its own faults and, as a result, reformed itself. What one finds, however, is that the party remained in denial and thus failed to address challenges within. In-fighting continued and, instead of addressing internal problems, the party directed its efforts to destabilising the DA-led coalition, and became preoccupied with returning to power. The preoccupation with returning to power showed a party that could not function as an opposition. It had relied wholly on state resources and the general benefits of incumbency. The ANC caucus lacked resources and skills to undertake the preparatory work required to be an effective opposition in Council. Without state resources, neither could the regional party office function nor was the organisation able to sustain routine political activities. Regaining access to state resources for organisational survival consequently took precedence over reforms, leading to the party returning to power through a coalition. The municipality 13

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has been thrown back to instability and attempts to conceal irregular tender and contract processes have led to multiple, public assassinations. Chapter 10 concludes the book. It pulls together different threads of the argument to show how the party has deteriorated over the years since coming to office. The main points this chapter addresses is why the party has failed to reform itself even in the face of losing power, how it has adapted as opposition, and whether it has any prospects of making genuine reforms. The chapter also draws implications of the findings from this analysis of the ANC in the NMB for the rest of the organisation.

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2 Rebuilding and path to power Just before 6:30 pm, on 10 October 1989, a plane landed at Port Elizabeth’s HF Verwoerd Airport (now Port Elizabeth International Airport). Amongst its passengers was Raymond Mhlaba, one of the eight men who had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964.1 The plane had brought Mhlaba home, after 26 years of incarceration. But warders would not take him to his New Brighton home. Prison regulations prohibited them from releasing prisoners in the evening. Mhlaba had to spend the night in a local prison on what was supposed to be his first night of freedom. Only the next morning, at 5:00 am, did the prison authorities finally take Mhlaba home where, his wife of 25 years, Dideka, had patiently waited for him.2 He was finally free. Mhlaba’s sigh of relief, however, was short-lived. That very afternoon, together with his old comrade and homeboy, Govan Mbeki,3 Mhlaba was summoned to the offices of the National Reception Committee (NRC) in Johannesburg.4 The NRC had just been formed to receive activists who had been released from prison and to prepare them for reintegration into family life and political activism. The meeting was to prepare for a planned trip to meet the exiled African National

1 2 3

4

The other seven were: Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoaledi, Ahmed Kathrada and Denis Goldberg. R. Mhlaba (narrated to Thembeka Mufamadi), Raymond Mhlaba’s Personal Memoirs: Reminiscing from Rwanda and Uganda (Pretoria, HSRC Press, 2001). ‘Oom Gov’, as Govan Mbeki was popularly known, had been released in 1987. Mandela, who had been negotiating with the apartheid government since 1985, had pleaded for his release as a sign of government’s commitment to the negotiations. Being the eldest of the Rivonia trialists, Oom Gov had also become sickly in prison. Upon his release, he stayed briefly at Reverend Mcebisi Xundu’s home in the coloured area of PE, where the reverend had his ministry at the time. But he soon moved to New Brighton as the locals there started demanding that he move back to the township. Interview with Bongani Gxilishe, East London, 11 May 2018. The NRC also had regional counterparts, Regional Reception Committee, of which Dennis Neer was a member. Neer was one of the leaders of Cosatu in the region.

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Congress (ANC) in Lusaka. Mhlaba tried to wiggle his way out of the meeting: ‘I told Dennis Neer, who was one of the reception committee members, that I did not have decent clothes to fly in an aeroplane. I also told him to consult my wife.’ Neither Neer nor his wife would help him avoid the meeting. ‘Dennis brought me a brand new suit, a shirt and a pair of shoes in less than an hour … My wife disappointed me by telling Dennis that she understood and accepted that I had to leave,’ Mhlaba lamented.5 On his very first day of freedom, Mhlaba was thrust back into political activism. At the Lusaka meeting, later in October, Walter Sisulu, Mac Maharaj, Nelson Mandela, Mbeki and Mhlaba were elected to form an Interim Leadership Core (ILC) with Sisulu as the chairperson. Their role was to prepare for the eventual return of the ANC. Albeit still in prison, Mandela was similarly busy with preparatory activities. He summoned leaders from across the country to Victor Verster Prison in January 1990 for a briefing on negotiations and to discuss preparations to relaunch the ANC. Amongst those leaders were Eastern Cape’s regional leaders, drawn from the youth, civic and sport organisations, churches and trade unions. These were, among others, Henry Fazzie, Benson Fihla, Reverend DeVilliers Soga, Ernest Malgas, Dennis Neer, Sicelo Apleni, Mike Xego, Mkhuseli Jack and Mzimasi Mangcotywa.6 Apart from the usefulness of the talks, Mangcotywa also recalled how awed they were by their host: Madiba had a bar somewhere in the house. He served us himself, but we all refused to drink alcohol. It was just instinctive. We were intimidated by the old man. We later laughed about how cowardly we were, because some of us did drink.7

Whilst preoccupied with preparations, no-one was certain when exactly the ANC would be unbanned or when those in prison would be freed. Thus FW de Klerk’s announcement on 2 February 1990 stunned everyone. Even Thabo Mbeki, who had been engaged in clandestine negotiations with various groups and individuals linked to officialdom, was startled by the announcement. ‘I remember sitting with Thabo [Mbeki] the day after de Klerk’s speech,’ Van Zyl Slabbert recalled, ‘and so far as Thabo can go white, he was white.’8 With that historic announcement, the ANC, which had been banished from the country for

5 Mhlaba, Personal Memoirs, p. 153. 6 Evening Post, ‘Two Groups off to Visit Mandela’, 11 January 1990; Evening Post, ‘Mandela Impresses Youth Delegation’, 23 January 1990. 7 Interview with Mzi Mangcotywa, 19 April 2018. 8 P. Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1997, p. 151).

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almost 30 years, was instantly unbanned. This paved the way for the organisation to re-establish itself in the country and for the return of its cadres from exile and prison. This chapter focuses on the first five years of the ANC’s re-establishment, from its unbanning in 1990 to its ascension to political office, especially at the municipal level, in 1995. Its primary objective is to clarify the nature of the organisation that was re-established from 1990, and how it was impacted by its rise into political office. The chapter begins with a focus on organisational rebuilding, paying particular attention to the organisations and personalities that led the party’s re-establishment, the nature of the leadership that re-emerged in terms of both generational composition and political culture, and the character of the membership at branch level. Besides gaining insight into who rebuilt the ANC and how, these (re-)formative years serve as a yardstick against which one can track and, consequently, explain organisational changes during the subsequent 29 years. The focus of the chapter then moves to the formation of the party’s provincial structure (out of the three regions that had hitherto existed) and the selection of public representatives for the provincial legislature and the municipal council. Understanding the merger process from segregated local authorities into a unified municipal authority and how the selection process for public office happened is a prerequisite for understanding the manner in which relations between the region and the new provincial leadership would subsequently unfold. Ascension to office marked a transformation of the ANC from a mere liberation movement into a governing party. The impact of this transformation on the organisation was significant. Government employment offered prestige and financial rewards that sparked rivalry among individual leaders. The party was thus faced with the challenge of managing contestation for positions, which had the potential to destabilise the newly revived organisation. Apart from the historical importance, the period in question sees the introduction of issues, personalities and practices that would define the municipality in subsequent years.

ORGANISATIONAL REBUILDING About a month after the unbanning on 2 February 1990, regional leadership committees, dubbed Interim Regional Committees (IRCs), were appointed. They were instituted on a temporary basis until a conference was convened later that year to elect inaugural regional leaders. Drawn from across the region, the Eastern Cape IRC was intergenerational, multisectoral and endowed with collective experience that spanned approximately 50 years. Specifically, it was made up of veterans of the ANC who had joined the organisation in the 1940s and had served lengthy jail terms in Robben Island Prison; these were 17

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accomplished activists who had revived anti-apartheid resistance in the 1970s and built the Mass Democratic Movement in the 1980s, individuals of different races and gender who came from different sectors of society. ANC stalwarts Benson Fihla and Edgar Ngoyi were made chairperson and deputy respectively; Gugile Nkwinti, a United Democratic Front (UDF) leader active in the civic movement, was made secretary with Silas Mtongana, a veteran South African Communist Party (SACP) member, as his deputy; Ronald Niegaart, a civic leader in the northern areas, and Marion Lacey, a lecturer at Rhodes University, were also appointed into the IRC.9 The Eastern Cape IRC was one of 14 such structures formed throughout the country in each of the ANC’s 14 regions.10 It is worth probing why Fihla was chosen over others to become chairperson as it sheds light on the criteria used for selecting leaders. The primary consideration was that Fihla was undoubtedly ANC. He had joined the organisation before its banning in 1960, was part of the ANC’s military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), and had served a long jail term on Robben Island. On his release in 1978, he became part of the ANC underground network and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). However, Fihla was not the only cadre with a distinguished profile. Other similarly distinguished leaders were, among others, Henry Fazzie,11 Edgar Ngoyi and Ernest Malgas. In addition to sharing a similar profile to Fihla, they played an even more prominent role in the UDF, which spearheaded the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s. Conversely, Fihla was less known amongst the activists of the 1980s. Some met him for the first time in prison in the mid to late 1980s as security forces swooped on all political activists during the state of emergency. Fihla’s appointment, therefore, took some of the local leaders by surprise. They had expected prominent UDF leaders like Fazzie, Ngoyi or Malgas, who were not only similar in stature but were also more prominent than Fihla in the MDM, to be appointed instead. 9

Additional members were: Mike Xego, Vuyisile Thole, N Mabizela, John Gomomo, Jack Sikundla, Mbulelo Goniwe, Neela Hoosain, Reverend Mcebisi Xundu and Ernest Malgas. See Evening Post, ‘ANC Opens Offices in PE’, 3 April 1990. 10 The regions were: Border, Eastern Cape, Eastern Transvaal, Natal Midlands, Northern Cape, Northern Natal, Northern Orange Free State, Northern Transvaal, Pretoria-WitwatersrandVereeniging, Southern Natal, Southern Orange Free State, Transkei, Western Transvaal and Western Cape. 11 Bongani Gxilishe ascribes Fazzie’s being overlooked to the influence of the ANC underground, in which he was largely inactive. After his release from a lengthy jail sentence on Robben Island, Fazzie became more active in the civic movement in the late 1970s. Interview with Bongani Gxilishe, 11 May 2018.

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What gave Fihla the edge, says Linda Mti – Fihla’s successor – was his closeness to Raymond Mhlaba and Govan Mbeki, both of whom were members of the ANC’s ILC charged with making such appointments in the Eastern Cape. Resident in the same neighbourhood of New Brighton as Fihla, the two stalwarts had recruited Fihla into the ANC in the 1950s, became his ‘mentors’ and later served with him in the same MK unit in the early 1960s.12 Their relationship with Fihla was a lot closer than with others, which made them trust him more. What this tells us is that, in addition to personal trust, the length of service and seniority in the ANC counted in the consideration for leadership. Leaders operated in a hierarchical manner. Fihla was not only part of the next generation, but had also been Mbeki’s and Mhlaba’s mentee. Fihla was of similar mindset and most likely to be responsive to their influence. Equally important to stress is that MDM leaders constituted a key part of the inaugural layer of the re-established ANC. The ANC was not re-established anew, but was simply reconstituted upon the organisational infrastructure of the MDM. This affirmed the MDM’s affinity to the liberation movement, dating back to the early 1980s. Whilst the rest of ANC leaders were still preparing to return from exile and awaiting release from prison, the task of rebuilding the liberation movement fell on MDM activists. Their experience in building a network of mass-based organisations put them in good stead to fulfil this role. The July/ August 1990 edition of the ANC journal, Mayibuye, the first to be published since the unbanning, acknowledged as much: When building the ANC we should draw from the experience of mass organisations over the years … The recruitment campaign should also utilize the available infrastructure of the mass democratic movement. The youth, women’s, civic, workers’ and student organisations should take part in the recruitment campaign.13

The first and most important task was setting up the party’s national headquarters, which would provide a base from which to rebuild the rest of the organisation throughout the country. Accomplished in March 1990, this was followed by setting up the various departments responsible for operationalising organisational work. Amongst the first to be formed were the Organising, Publicity, and Political Education departments. These were critical for re-establishing

12 B. Fihla, My Road to Freedom: An ANC Veteran’s Reflections on the Journey to Liberation (East London, Harry’s Printers, 2018). 13 Mayibuye, ‘Some Practical Questions’, July/August 1990, pp.13–14.

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the organisation at the local level. By this time, the composition of the ILC had also been expanded beyond the initial five members to include many others, following the party’s unbanning.14 The Eastern Cape’s IRC opened its office on 1 April 1990. It was located at Main Street (now renamed Govan Mbeki Avenue) in Port Elizabeth, where it still is, in a building formerly owned by Standard Bank. Oom Gov, as Govan Mbeki was affectionately known, raised the money that was used to purchase the building. Linda Mti, who later became regional chairperson, was full of praise for Oom Gov’s talent for fundraising. ‘He knew people and was just not shy to ask for money,’15 said Mti. The primary task of the IRC was to open branches and recruit members. A joining fee, which became the annual subscription, was set at R12, but pensioners were exempted from paying the fee although they could make donations. Anyone, from 18 years and above, was allowed to join and branch membership was set at a minimum number of 100.16 Recruitment of members was done in two ways: door-to-door visits and through rallies. Door-to-door visits were an ongoing activity, whilst rallies happened occasionally. The organisational infrastructure of the MDM, especially community-based organisations (civic organisations or ‘civics’), was instrumental in the door-to-door recruitment. Street committees, which were established in almost every township street in PE, were responsible for recruitment. Because the recruitment campaign was located in communities and driven by local leaders, it was widespread and elicited positive responses from potential recruits. If not within their homes, people were signed up at rallies. Turnout at these public gatherings was massive. People were curious to see ANC leaders, some of whom, incarcerated for years, they had never seen in the flesh. Mandela’s first rally in PE on 31 March 1990 held at an open field in Motherwell, for instance, attracted a record-breaking crowd estimated at hundreds of thousands.17 Besides Mandela’s heroic status, Port Elizabeth was especially advantaged in terms of hosting massive events. The city’s political stature and the calibre of its ANC leaders made it easy to host significant political events and invite prominent national figures from other parts of the country. For instance, the commemoration of the 1976 Student Uprising in 1990 at Wolfson Stadium, addressed by the veterans Mhlaba and Mbeki, among others, attracted a crowd of more than

14 J. Rantente, The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South Africa (Pretoria, J.L. Van Schaik Publishers, 1998). 15 Interview with Linda Mti, 17 April 2018. 16 Mayibuye, ‘Some Practical Questions’. 17 Evening Post, ‘PE Goes Wild over Mandela’, 02 April 1990.

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80 000 people.18 The relaunch of the SACP in the Eastern Cape was addressed by its much loved general secretary, Joe Slovo, at Dan Qeqe Stadium on 12 November 1990 and was witnessed by a crowd estimated at 100 000.19 The popular MK commander and charismatic leader of the SACP, Chris Hani, was a regular visitor to the region before his brutal assassination on 10 April 1993, and Oliver Tambo opened the party’s regional conference on 2 November 1991. Harry Gwala’s presence at the 1992 commemoration of the Student Uprising was partly a means of recognising the distinction of Port Elizabeth in the liberation struggle. He told his audience that, of the 1 600 prisoners on Robben Island at some point, 1 300 came from Port Elizabeth.20 Apart from the prominence of its own leaders, the region’s own programme of mass action also sparked general enthusiasm. The programme drew from its own organisational networks and their tradition of political activism. The purpose was twofold: to keep the party’s mass base engaged and to apply pressure on the apartheid government in instances of a stalemate during the negotiations. On 2 July 1990, for instance, the ANC called a nationwide stayaway to protest against violence. The organisation accused the apartheid government of fanning violence in order to frustrate its efforts at organisational rebuilding and mobilisation. The stayaway was meant to pressurise the government to bring an end to the violence. In PE the stayaway was heeded by more than 90 per cent of the township-based workforce. The general manager of PE Tramways, a Mr P Cronje, reported that there was only a measly 5 per cent demand for their buses from the townships.21 Demonstrations did not register protests only. Some were a symbolic takeover of the city. This was done through renaming significant public places. Reverend De Villiers Soga, for instance, led a ceremony on 24 July 1992 that renamed the prominent Market Square as Vuyisile Mini Square. ‘By virtue of the honour

18 Evening Post, ‘Mbeki Pleads for a Unified Effort’, 18 June 1990. 19 Evening Post, ‘Huge Crowd at Launch of SA Communist Party in East Cape’, 12 November 1990. 20 Evening Post, ‘No Democracy for Those Killing Us’, 17 June 1992. Fikile Bam, who became a judge at the Land Court after 1994, had made a similar point earlier, in December 1988, in PE. The occasion was a conference, titled ‘The Festival of Human Rights’, organised by the Human Rights Trust. Bam had been asked to speak ‘about life as a political prisoner’, owing to his imprisonment in the Robben Island Prison for a ten-year period from 1964 to 1974. As he described the social and political backgrounds of prisoners during his incarceration, Bam also mentioned that ‘By far the largest group was from the Eastern Cape with the result that everyone learnt to speak Xhosa. In fact the largest single group of people came from Port Elizabeth to the extent that when this group went to work, people would say “Ah there goes the PE train”’. F. Bam, ‘Life as a Political Prisoner’, Monitor: The Journal of Human Rights Trust (1988). 21 Evening Post, ‘Most PE Blacks Heed Stay-away’, 2 July 1990.

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bestowed upon me,’ said Reverend Soga, ‘I rename this Market Square as Vuyisile Mini, who died in pursuit of peace and justice in the cause of liberation.’ The priest further explained that the ceremony went beyond just simply honouring Mini22 and his generation: ‘It is a name that is going to tell the rulers that their time is up and to show the current rulers that we are fed up with their delaying tactics. It is a living testimony to the enduring spirit of our people.’23 Mass mobilisation, therefore, was crucial for membership recruitment. The response was enthusiastic. Based on reports by one local newspaper that covered ‘native affairs’,24 the Evening Post, between 1990 and 1993 alone, attendance at public rallies numbered in the tens of thousands, with some events even registering crowds of hundreds of thousands. People attended on their own, without any assistance towards transportation. The success of the events was also owed to the actions of sports associations and local shebeen owners. It was not uncommon for sports games to be cancelled on the day of such public rallies, and for shebeens to close their doors for the duration of rallies. This was meant to encourage maximum turnout at the events. The success of mass mobilisation showed in the size of membership. Ben Fihla puts the membership of the New Brighton branch alone at 20 000, making it ‘the biggest in South Africa, with KwaZakhele second at 17 000 members’.25 The dominant view amongst regional leaders at the time was that membership approximated 100 000. ‘Recruiting people was the easiest thing to do,’ said Mike Xego, a prominent UDF leader and member of the IRC. ‘Everyone wanted to be ANC,’ stressed Xego. On 12 May 1990, the first branch of the rebuilt ANC opened in the township of New Brighton, encompassing Red and White Locations, Elundini, Thembalethu, McNamee Village and Fordville. That it all began in New Brighton was not fortuitous. The oldest township in PE, New Brighton had been the hub of anti-apartheid activism from the 1950s and remained so throughout the 1980s. Residents were not only inspired by that memory, but were also encouraged 22 Mini was hanged in Pretoria Central Prison, together with Zinakele Mkaba and Wilson Mkayingo. His daughter, Nomkhosi, followed in her father’s footsteps by joining MK, and was killed by apartheid’s security forces in the 1985 bombings by South African soldiers in Maseru. 23 Evening Post, ‘Market Square Gets ANC Name’, 27 July 1992. 24 In addition to The Evening Post, PE had another local newspaper, The Herald. Although owned by the same company, they focused on different racial communities in the same way that apartheid departments were segregated between whites or Europeans, on the one hand, and non-Europeans or natives, on the other. 25 Fihla, My Road to Freedom, p.71. A number of other leaders I interviewed, who were involved in the re-establishment of the ANC in the region – such as Linda Mti, Mike Xego, Mzimasi Mangcotywa and Zola Mtatsi – affirm Fihla’s account.

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by the example of the stalwarts of the ANC – Mbeki, Mhlaba and Fihla – who resided in the area and were actively involved in reviving the ANC. It also happened, as noted above, that Fihla was the convener of the IRC. From New Brighton the relaunch of other branches, guided by a manual that Mbeki had written in Xhosa, Skhokelo,26 spread throughout the city. The number and size of branches corresponded to the existing townships and African suburbs. New Brighton, Soweto, Motherwell, KwaMagxaki, KwaDwesi and Swartkops each constituted a branch, whilst KwaZakhele and Zwide were each divided into two branches: KwaZakhele 1 and KwaZakhele 2; and Zwide 1 and Zwide 2. They remained so throughout the 1990s. Rebuilding the ANC was not confined to the townships. Port Elizabeth’s suburban areas, which were predominantly white, were also recruitment targets. White activists that had been part of the anti-apartheid movement – such as Glen Goosen, Janet Cherry and Kobus Pienaar – featured prominently in that recruitment campaign. Their joining the ANC made local headlines, serving as testimony to the non-racial character of the ANC. Cherry, who was a member of the UDF and active in the End Conscription Campaign, urged other white residents of Port Elizabeth to join the organisation: Having worked with so many comrades, who are now members of the ANC, I feel entirely at home with them, free to participate with them and free to offer criticism. There is little sense of hierarchy and authoritarian practice in the ANC.27

The organisation was emphatic about political education and representivity. Because members were themselves recruiters, they were given lessons on the history of the ANC and its programmes. These were contained in the booklets that were issued by the national office, Joining the ANC: An Introductory Handbook of the ANC, and The Road to Peace. Part of the objective in providing such education was to ensure that members were ‘committed to the practice of democracy, political tolerance and exemplary conduct’.28 The national office further emphasised that membership of branches must be reflective of the entirety of its community in terms of class, generation, race and gender. The party’s journal, Mayibuye, noted: Branches need to make regular assessment of their membership. The question to be constantly reviewed is: are we representing the entire community or is

26 Interview with Mthwabo Ndube, 22 October 2018. 27 Evening Post, ‘PE Whites Sign Up with ANC’, 11 July 1990. 28 Mayibuye, ‘Moulding Organs of Struggle’, September 1990, p. 21.

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our branch simply representing the professionals, or the unemployed, or the youth or males? … People will have confidence in an organisation only if it takes an active interest in their problems … All citizens wherever there is an ANC branch, must feel that the movement is concerned about their plight and prepared to take up their grievances.29

With the rebuilding process now fully underway, the regional leadership was able to hold its first regional elective conference in December 1990. Out of a total of 14 regions nationally, the Eastern Cape was one of the eight regions that managed to hold the historic gathering within the first year of the party’s unbanning. Included in the business of the inaugural conference was the election of regional leaders. The interim leadership was returned unchanged, but now with the added legitimacy of having been elected democratically.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MASS-BASED MOBILISATION AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION The rise of MDM leaders into the leadership of the newly revived ANC had implications for its mass-based formations. It raised a question over their continued relevance, especially because the ANC was to take up the same issues that had previously been their sole preoccupation. The ensuing debate reflected two competing viewpoints. The one viewpoint, articulated by the ANC’s official journal, Mayibuye, regarded the activities of UDF affiliates as complementing, not competing with, the ANC. This was informed by the understanding that they were social organisations, without a political ambition. The ANC, in contrast, was a political organisation whose rise to power would be enabled by the support that UDF affiliates would have generated. Their support for the ANC would be based on the recognition that the ANC not only shared their interests, but would also use its political power to fulfil them. Mayibuye put it as follows: It is crucial that these organisations concentrate on building their sectors into formidable formations that win victories and defend, at all times, the interests of their members. It is important that they remain autonomous and independent. The above is of critical importance because mass formations allow active participation even to those people who fear or, for other reasons, do not want direct political involvement. In this way, they do not only broaden the unity of our people against apartheid but also give substance to the people’s power. Though these formations are independent of the ANC, they share with it a common goal – a better life in a free and democratic South Africa.30 29 Mayibuye, ‘Some Practical Questions’, p. 20–22. 30 Mayibuye, ‘Some Practical Questions’, pp. 14–15.

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Whilst the dominant ANC view saw complementarity in retaining the UDF, others feared duplication and possible rivalry with the ANC. Amongst those that held this view was Gugile Nkwinti, the Eastern Cape’s own UDF activist and secretary of the ANC in the region. Writing in the February 1991 edition of Mayibuye, Nkwinti argued: At the time of its formation, it had been expressed that the UDF was not a political organisation that sought to replace the African National Congress. On the contrary, it had to work towards unbanning of the ANC so that the latter could take its rightful place in engaging the regime in mechanisms aimed at transferring power to the majority … Now the ANC has been unbanned; and the UDF has not been disbanded. Fears have been expressed, perhaps correctly, about the UDF being used by some activists as a base from which they could undermine the ANC.31

At the UDF’s General Council on 2 March 1991 in Pretoria, the debate was eventually settled in favour of dissolution. That decision was not a surprise. The organisation’s Fourth National Working Committee had conceded, just in the previous year, that its role was increasingly shrinking. Some of its affiliates, especially youth and women’s orgnisations, were rapidly being absorbed into the ANC – a process it resolved neither to reverse nor discourage. Moreover, the meeting resolved to assist the ANC rebuild in order to assume a leading political role. The UDF would continue to exist to the extent that it was able to co-ordinate organisations that could not be easily absorbed into the ANC, such as sports and religious organisations. Now, meeting a year later, most delegates reported that ‘there had not been any “UDF work” in the past year. Most of the issues previously taken up by the UDF were now being dealt with by ANC structures’. Thus the dissolution of the UDF, noted Mayibuye, ‘appeared like a mighty Zithabiseni irony: when a death and burial could become a moment for jubilation and victorious celebration, all in one’.32 Not all UDF affiliates dissolved, however. The civic movement was in fact consolidating itself whilst others were disappearing. In May 1990 the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (Pebco) renamed itself Port Elizabeth People’s Civic Organisation (Pepco). The name change underlined the organisation’s reorientation to become a multiracial body. This paved the way for closer co-operation with the predominantly coloured and Indian organisations,

31 Mayibuye, ‘The Future of the UDF’, February 1991, p. 30. 32 Mayibuye, ‘The Wages of Success’, April 1991, pp. 7–9.

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the Port Elizabeth Action Committee and the Malabar Residents Association respectively. Thereafter, the various chapters spread throughout the country and formed a national body, the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco), on 15 March 1992. Port Elizabeth was at the centre of this consolidation. Henry Fazzie, Dan Sandi, Max Mamase – all prominent locals – were elected national chairperson, secretary-general and publicity secretary respectively. Thozamile Botha, the founding president of Pebco, lost to Moses Mayekiso for the position of president.33 Thus the region not only hosted the inaugural conference (in Uitenhage), but its civic leaders featured prominently in the leadership of the newly formed Sanco. That said, Sanco, too, was not spared the debate over the relevance of its continued existence. Views were similarly divided. Arguing in favour of dissolving the civics, Blade Nzimande and Mpumi Sikhosana reiterated the same argument raised in the instance of the UDF – that is, civics were akin to proxies of the ANC, whose unbanning made their continued role irrelevant. Rather, they argued, civics should be absorbed into the ANC, which, because it represented the same constituency as the civics and was a political party, was better placed to attend to the plight of township residents. Conversely, Mzwandile Mayekiso, who was formerly a leading member of the Alexandra Civic Organisation, argued in favour of retaining the civics. He was not convinced that the ANC would necessarily prioritise the interests of poor residents. His doubts were informed by the nature of the ANC as a coalition of class interests, which made it vulnerable to being swayed to prioritising other class interests, over the poor and working class. For this reason, Mayekiso believed that civics should remain autonomous, to serve as a watchdog over the ANC in order to ensure that it was responsive to the interests of poor, working-class residents.34 Apart from the UDF, however, the argument that the unbanning of the ANC made civics irrelevant was not borne out by reality. In her study of civics at KwaZakhele township in PE, for instance, Janet Cherry found that civics had effectively become de facto structures of governance through a network of street and area committees. Nothing happened in PE townships without the consent of

33 The rest of the executive positions were filled as follows: deputy president, Lechisa Tsenoli; assistant-secretary, Penrose Ntlonti; and treasurer, Thobile Sigidigidi. See Evening Post, ‘National Civic Body Launched after 13-Year Battle’, 16 March 1992. 34 M. Ndletyana, ‘Changing Role of Civic Organisations from Apartheid to the Post-Apartheid Era: A Case of the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO)’, MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1998.

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the civics.35 As just one example: the Ibhayi Town Council never enjoyed credibility and was perennially bankrupt. Pepco leaders went on to play a key role in the subsequent local negotiations towards a unified local government in PE. Sanco was allowed to continue and would often be referred to as part of the broader alliance (i.e. tripartite plus one). The debate over the relevance of civics, however, resurfaced after the ANC was elected into political office. It was sparked by a dispute over which of the two organisations had more authority to speak on behalf of township residents. Balancing competing traditions and leadership contests The ANC benefited immensely from absorbing and working closely with UDF affiliates. It inherited vast experience and expertise in organisational building and mobilisation. But, this also meant that there were fewer organisations left to accommodate the leadership ambitions of others. Competition became especially intense as more ANC leaders returned from exile and prison from mid-1990 onwards. For the months of September and October alone, for instance, of the 50 000 exiles due back to the country, 20 000 were destined for the Eastern Cape and Port Elizabeth alone would receive about 15 000 families.36 Amongst the returnees and freed activists were individuals that had achieved just as much prominence as the UDF activists. They included Thozamile Botha, Linda Mti, Saki Macozoma, Thobile Mhlahlo, Ilva McKay and Nceba Faku. Predictably, competition ensued at the party’s second annual general meeting, held on 2 November 1991. Fihla’s executive was challenged, after serving just one term. Attended by 500 delegates, the significance of the 1991 regional conference was heightened by its invited guest, Oliver Tambo – the longest serving president of the ANC and a much loved figure – to open it. This was Tambo’s first visit to PE after more than 30 years. Unlike the inaugural election, an Independent Electoral Commission, chaired by Fikile Bam – an advocate and a political activist, who had served time on Robben Island – oversaw the 1991 election for regional leaders.37 The election yielded new leaders. Comprising the new regional leadership was a mixture of the newly returned exiles and local activists. Linda Mti and Thobile

35 J. Cherry, ‘The Changing Role of Civic Organisations in South Africa: An Overview and Case Study of KwaZakhele Township, Port Elizabeth’, seminar paper, Development Studies Programme, University of Port Elizabeth, November 1999. 36 Evening Post, ‘15 000 Exiles Due Back in PE’, 20 August 1990. 37 Evening Post, ‘Tambo’s First PE Visit for Years’, 1 November 1991.

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Mhlahlo were elected chairperson and deputy chairperson; Gugile Nkwinti38 and Bongani Gxilishe, secretary and deputy secretary; and Glen Goosen, treasurer. Mti was a co-founder of the South African Student Movement and had gone into exile for military training in 1978 and later became head of MK operations in the Northern Transvaal. Mhlahlo had left the country in 1985, escaping police harassment for his trade union activities in the Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union of South Africa. In exile, Mhlahlo became part of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, an ANC ally that had also been banned. Nkwinti and Gxilishe were part of the UDF, active in the civic and youth organisations. Goosen was an activist lawyer whose election also made the executive racially diverse, but still all-male.39 Gxilishe, the new deputy secretary, ascribed the ousting of Fihla’s leadership to unhappiness with the performance of the regional leadership at the ANC’s national conference in July 1991: ‘We felt that on critical, important issues, they were nowhere to be found. We started discussing their removal in the bus, on our way back from the conference.’ A few months later at the regional conference, the mood was decidedly against the incumbents. ‘It was a rough conference, very rough conference,’ Gxilishe recalls. ‘Oom Ben made his political remarks on the first day of conference. Hey … people were critical of his report. They just ripped it apart.’40 The composition of the new executive was instructive on other criteria for leadership and how contestation was unfolding. This time around, the choice of leaders revealed the contentious, if not subjective, manner in which a true ANC leader was defined. Now that most ANC exiled leaders had returned home, emphasis was placed on experience in exile. The returnees were adamant about having individuals with a demonstrable record in the ANC as assurance of commitment to, and knowledge of the organisation, which they considered critical in rebuilding the ANC. This consideration did not apply only at regional level, but also obtained at the branch level. ‘In the election of branch leaders,’ said Zola Mtatsi, a former youth leader and regional political education officer in the early 1990s, ‘priority was given to guys from exile. If there was no-one

38 Nkwinti is the only one in the previous top five who was returned. Gxilishe says Nkwinti was saved by his self-critical stance when he presented his report on the second day of the conference. He read the mood of the conference on the first day and adjusted accordingly. Gxilishe, interview, East London, 11 May 2018. 39 Evening Post, ‘Tambo: ANC Close to its Final Goal’, 4 November 1991. 40 Gxilishe, interview, 11 May 2018.

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from exile in your area, then you look around for someone who was in prison.’41 Mtatsi elaborates: We decided that, rightly or wrongly, the people who knew the ANC best were those from exile. So they had to take leadership positions … We loaded ANC with exile people because we didn’t think there was anyone who knew the ANC better than them.42

That is how Mti came to be elected chairperson. Yet, he was relatively unknown locally due to a long absence in exile. ‘People didn’t know who this Richman Bhomane was, which was my MK name,’ Mti admits. What swung the leadership contest in Mti’s favour was mobilisation by MK combatants, who were prominent in ANC branches and, as a result, in the regional conference as well. Gxilishe estimates that he did not know or was seeing for the first time possibly more than half of the delegates at the conference. Mti was head of MK in the then Transvaal province in the 1980s and, upon the ANC’s return, was placed in charge of intelligence in the Eastern Cape-Border-Transkei regions (later fused and named Eastern Cape province). It is worth stating though that, whilst exile experience was the primary consideration in the election of leaders, which generation one belonged to also mattered. Mti’s candidature was boosted by his fit into a generational hierarchy. Mti belonged to the 1970s generation that was considered next in line for leadership after Fihla’s generation of the 1960s. Satisfying both these criteria – exile/MK and generational – made Mti a popular choice, beyond his traditional constituency of former MK combatants. Even the locally based activists supported his candidature. Nationally, the choice of leaders was considered paramount in shaping the character of the newly rebuilt ANC. Prioritising seniority offered reassurance that those elected were loyal, trustworthy and knowledgeable about the ANC. With the rebuilding and many new people joining the ANC, there was considerable concern to entrench the values of the organisation. In the case of the Eastern Cape ANC, their adherence to ANC values and diligence was reinforced by the presence of the two stalwarts, Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba, in the regional office, named Standard House. The two stalwarts were members of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) and the Politburo of the South African Communist Party (which locals simply refer to as the ‘Party’). They were part of neither the Regional Executive

41 Interview with Zola Mtatsi, 28 April 2018. 42 Mtatsi, interview, 28 April 2018.

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Committee (REC) nor staff. Their presence at Standard House was on account of their need for office space. But they did more than just occupy office space. Mbeki was a regular presence in the office, whilst Mhlaba also attended to rebuilding the Party in the Eastern Cape. Mbeki effectively became the head of the office, overshadowing the official head, Boy Mkaliphi. Everyone, including elected officials, accounted to him for their work. They submitted monthly reports, which were followed by one-on-one meetings. Both the submissions and meetings happened on time. Delays or late submissions attracted severe reprimands from Mbeki. Even foreign visitors who arrived late for appointments met with disapproval. ‘Even if they were late by just ten minutes, coming all the way from Sweden or America, Oom Gov would not wait for them,’ Mtatsi narrates, and adds: Even if he passed them as he was walking out, he would not return. His driver, Surgeant, would drive him to the beach where he liked working whilst staring at the ocean and feeling the breeze. The visitors would have to re-schedule. Uyadlala wena ngo-Oom Gov [You have no idea about Oom Gov].43

As for one-on-one-meetings between Mbeki and staff, they were a gruelling experience. He was meticulous and wanted accountability from staff. Mtatsi describes a typical meeting: After going through your latest report, he would then remind you that in a meeting of two months ago, you raised certain things about Noupoort, for instance, and promised to follow up on those things. Now your latest report doesn’t have any of those things. Then he would ask you: ‘How far are you with those follow-ups? What’s happening because you said that it was work in progress?’44

The results of Mbeki’s guidance were efficiency and a heightened work ethic in the office. Everyone was wary of disappointing Oom Gov and feared the reprimand that followed failure. This reinforced a sense of responsibility in the regional office. Officials also took advantage of Mbeki’s presence to settle contentious issues within the organisation. One such issue, Mtatsi recalls, was the suspension of armed struggle in 1990. The youth did not accept that decision, especially because it happened at a time when the apartheid government withdrew indemnity from

43 Mtatsi, interview, 28 April 2018. 44 Mtatsi, interview, 28 April 2018.

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the popular MK leader, Chris Hani, and threatened him with arrest. The youth felt that the ANC was capitulating to the apartheid government. Mtatsi explained: We couldn’t explain the decision convincingly. So we decided to call our members to the office to have Oom Gov brief them. We brought people in combis, especially the youth who didn’t like the decision. Oom Gov would sit there and explain why the decision was taken. He would answer every question that came. No-one would leave that boardroom without his question being answered. And, at the end of the meeting, as people were walking out, Oom Gov would remain seated just in case there was someone who still wanted to ask one more question. After those sessions, that issue was never raised again and we also learnt from his detailed explanations. On difficult things he would be useful to provide answers and also teach us in the process.45

It is without doubt that Mbeki’s explanation for suspending the armed struggle was more elaborate than that of the regional leaders. As a senior leader of the ANC, he would have had the benefit of intense discussions both informally and formally at the NEC, where the initial decision was taken. An intellectual in his own right, Mbeki would have also drawn from other historical experiences to illustrate his argument. His intellectual acumen and slow and deliberate manner of speaking made him a persuasive interlocutor. That said, Mbeki’s moral authority must have been equally persuasive. His exemplary leadership earned him popular trust and admiration. People believed that Mbeki would not mislead them. His moral authority and intellectual standing reinforced each other. Both Mbeki and Mhlaba were teachers and moral figures at Standard House. However, their relationship with the elected leaders was not always seamless. Mti recalled that ‘sometimes they would even override us if they felt strongly about something. We had to remind them that we’re the elected leaders of the organisation.’46 But those reminders hardly stopped them. ‘It was even worse when they disagreed between themselves,’ Mike Xego remembered: The meeting wouldn’t proceed. We would sit there waiting for them to finish and it would be like a clash of titans, like Hitler and Stalin, or something like that. At some point, they would find each other, or simply agree just to leave the issue. We would say thank God, and move on with the meeting.47

45 Mtatsi, interview, 28 April 2018. 46 Mti, interview, 17 April 2018. 47 Interview with Mike Xego, 26 April 2018.

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The stalwarts’ moral authority, therefore, came with some inconveniences. It overrode a democratically elected leadership. Whilst not always approving, the regional leaders acceded nonetheless, knowing that the stalwarts had good intentions. Not everyone left them unchallenged, however. Phila Nkayi, for one, did not just take everything they said at face value. In one conversation, Mtatsi recalled, Oom Gov seemed to be dismissing Phila saying ‘I don’t care about this or that’ – he didn’t even finish his point. Phila interjected: ‘You don’t care? Then you are in a wrong place. The ANC doesn’t need leaders who don’t care.’ That was Phila for you. He didn’t like feeling that he was being bullied.48

Overall, however, the presence of the two iconic figures enriched Standard House. The office ran efficiently and the officials were diligent. Decisions issued by Standard House to branches were readily accepted, owing to their reverence for the two elderly figures at Standard House. In this way, Mbeki and Mhlaba passed on ANC values and history to younger generations, not only verbally, but also through personal example.

PREPARATIONS FOR INAUGURAL ELECTIONS AND ASCENSION TO POLITICAL OFFICE Negotiations over a democratic South Africa made elections a certainty. Yet, the date of the elections was unknown. Negotiations happened intermittently due to violence in other parts of the country (which was soon uncovered to have been state-sponsored49). The ANC believed that the National Party (NP) government intended the uncertainty over a date to catch them ill-prepared with a sudden suggestion about it. To counter idleness from setting in, the organisation set itself on a (semi-) permanent state of mobilisation. It dubbed 1992, for instance, the year of mass mobilisation, to keep its support-base ready for elections anytime. A number of campaigns followed that year, focused on highlighting apartheid injustices it would rectify upon coming to power. In Port Elizabeth, these included sit-ins at municipal offices to highlight poor municipal services and demand their disbandment, and marches to the office of the local newspaper, The Herald, to demand fair coverage and racial representation in the profile of their management. The

48 Mtatsi, interview, 28 April 2018. 49 P. Harris, Birth: The Conspiracy to Stop the ’94 Election (Cape Town, Umuzi, 2010).

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Workers’ Day commemoration was billed, ‘The last apartheid May Day’, even though the date of the inaugural election had still not been set.50 Uncertainty over the election date did not deter the Eastern Cape from preparing for one. Electoral preparations gained even more momentum in 1993. The customary 8 January celebration of the party’s anniversary focused on election preparations. A series of rallies were held at branches on the day of the anniversary, followed by a regional one on 10 January, which was addressed by the head of local government, Thozamile Botha. The rallies were followed by a two-day workshop the next weekend, 18–19 January.51 The prevalence of violence in other parts of the country heightened the importance of the Eastern Cape, and PE especially, in the overall performance of the ANC. It was feared that violence would deflate turnout in the affected regions, such as Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging and Natal, which were the two most populous regions. Regional leaders took it upon themselves to ensure that the Eastern Cape would compensate for the likely low turnout in the violence-ridden parts of the country. Estimates put the population in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropole, for instance, at 1.7 million. Regional leaders doubted the accuracy of the estimate, but, in the absence of any other data, decided to work with it nonetheless. Mti, the regional chairperson, explained their resolve: ‘The numerical strength and the historically strong ANC support in this region qualifies our statement that the Eastern Cape is the key to an ANC election victory in the forthcoming elections.’52 To realise its goal, the region identified two potential problems to be overcome. These were a lack of voting experience, and illiteracy. Estimates put illiteracy in the Eastern Cape-Transkei-Border region at 34 per cent. This raised the risk of a substantial number of spoilt ballots. In light of these challenges, the regional office was reorganised to pay dedicated attention to preparing for elections. The following permanent appointments were made: Nkwinti, who served as regional secretary, was appointed co-ordinator of elections; Mti (chairperson) was appointed head of research and intelligence; and Bob Matji, as a political analyst. Concerns over elections were tested through a mock election held over the weekend of 28–29 August 1993, in which the party expected ‘about 200 000 voters’. The ballot papers had 17 parties with their names and logos, with 23 polling stations spread out in the townships and coloured areas, over two days,

50 Evening Post, ‘Demos March on Newspaper Office’, 29 July 1992; Evening Post, ‘The Last “Apartheid” May Day’, 4 May 1992. 51 Evening Post, ‘ANC Holds Rallies’, 7 January 1993. 52 Evening Post, ‘ANC Target Election Problem’, 20 January 1993.

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from 7:00 am to 5:00 pm. ANC branches were deployed to spread the word. By this time the election date had been set for 27 April 1994, following the assassination of Chris Hani, which had created alarm that the transition would be derailed. The ANC forced government into agreeing to a date within a year of Hani’s death in order to restore public confidence that the negotiation process was irreversible.53 The mock election was to be the first in the country, with a view to verifying the ANC’s concerns and figuring out remedies where necessary. As Nkwinti put it: We are here to learn. We want to be sure that when the time comes for real voting we know what we are doing and how to go about the process … This means we will have to ensure voters know where to put the cross.54

The electoral returns validated the ANC’s concerns. Turnout was 75% less than expected. In New Brighton, which had a membership of over 15 000, for instance, only 8 336 people cast their votes. Another worry was the substantial number of spoilt ballots, at 7%. Of the 1 445 total votes cast in the ANC Zwide branch alone, more than half (757) were spoilt. ‘Some people,’ explained Nkwinti, ‘tried to thumb print, others made their crosses too big or used incorrect symbols.’55 Most worrisome about the low turnout was that the mock election focused largely on ANC members. It was taken for granted that ANC members were most likely to turn out in large numbers. The low turnout proved the assumption wrong. Reflecting back to the mock election, Mti remembers regretting holding one. ‘The low turnout shocked us quite a lot,’ he said. They ascribed the problem to a number of factors including blaming the potential voters: ‘I think our people wanted the real thing, they didn’t care about this mock thing.’ Ultimately, however, they admitted: ‘We didn’t focus much on the technicalities and the machinery of running an election … our organisation was poor, we didn’t put a lot of effort there.’ The failure of the mock election proved to be a valuable lesson, as Mti explained: After that, we were more prepared. We had a date to work towards. And, we worked hard to reach people. There were places I didn’t know here in PE –

53 M. Ndletyana (ed.), Institutionalising Democracy: The Story of the Independent Electoral Commission, 1993–2014 (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2015). 54 Evening Post, ‘Mock Election’, 26 August 1993. 55 Evening Post, ‘ANC Mock Election Shows Voter Education Need’, 2 September 1993.

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like the place behind Green Bushes, driving towards Walmer. There are people who lived in those bushes. I started going there. During the mock election we focused on the township. Now during mobilisation I started going there and addressed people. During the elections I focused mostly there, to ensure that there was transport to take people to the voting stations.56

The election campaign received a similar level of meticulous planning and groundwork. National leadership did not presume that the ANC would necessarily win the election. Surveys were conducted to establish the precise nature of the people’s major concerns, which emerged as unemployment, housing and political violence. This informed the manifesto of the party, titled ‘A better life for all’. Whilst billing the inaugural election as the moment of the liberation through the slogan, ‘Now is the time’, the party also went out to convince potential voters, through door-to-door campaigns. For this, the organisation relied on its extensive organisational network and used Mandela as the dominant campaigner.57 Given that the election was national, the campaign was largely uniform throughout the country. In PE, however, local leaders also capitalised on the local history and notables. One example of this was the activity the party hosted as part of its Vote Awareness Day on 3 June 1993. It renamed the New Brighton-based historic public hall, Great Centenary Hall, Nangoza Jebe Hall. The main speaker at the symbolic renaming, Govan Mbeki, told the audience that Jebe was a young ANC volunteer during the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and spent most of his time ‘selling progressive literature’. Following that campaign, the government banned meetings in African townships. But the volunteers defied the ban, marching and singing, especially at night. The apartheid police killed Jebe during one of those defiant protests. Mbeki described the events of that fatal evening: On one of the evenings the police followed the long procession which broke up at Emlotheni after singing Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica. The police followed a small group up Mendi Road and at Embizweni a group of African police jumped out of the trucks and attacked the people as they were going back home after the march. A white policeman then opened fire with a machine gun. A number of people fell there wounded. Nangoza ran from there and fell dead under a lamppost at the corner of Nikiwe and Jolobe streets.

56 Mti, interview, 17 April 2018. 57 T. Lodge, ‘The African National Congress and Its Allies’ in A. Reynolds (ed.), Elections ’94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects (Cape Town, David Phillip Publishers, 1994).

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The funeral service, held three weeks after the fatal shooting, was held right on the spot where the hall stands today. It was attended by 33 000 people, who then marched to the New Brighton Cemetery waving ANC flags.58 Recalling such tragic events was also a critique of the predominantly white parties. It reminded locals that the NP was the cause of their horror, whilst the Democratic Party (DP) was an armchair critic largely concerned with white voters. This was shown by their absence in the townships before 1994. An example of this absence, for instance, was the DP’s attempted march in April 1993 in order to deliver a congratulatory message to the police for the speedy arrest of Hani’s assassin and condolences to township residents. Their march was to start at the Livingstone Hospital, located in a predominantly coloured community of Cleary Park, which is closest to New Brighton, where it was to end. The march was disallowed because they had not applied for a permit, forcing them to drive into the township instead.59 That the drive started outside of the township affirmed their absence inside the townships. Whilst white parties may have surrendered townships to the ANC, not so the coloured communities. Both the DP and the NP were optimistic about picking up reasonable support in the northern areas of PE. But, the ANC’s Hermanus Loots, who was also known by his pseudonym, James Stuart, dismissed the prospects of their competitors. Based at the party’s national office, Loots was a local hero who had distinguished himself in the anti-apartheid struggle. He was amongst the first MK guerillas to engage in combat with the enemy in what was dubbed the Wankie Campaign in the late 1960s; he headed investigations into allegations of abuse in MK camps, and served in the party’s NEC from the 1980s. Loots’s assignment to carry out a door-to-door campaign in PE’s coloured communities was strategic. He was part of a contingent of prominent locals that campaigned in the northern areas, including Danny Jordaan and Gregory Rockman. Jordaan was a prominent sports administrator who served in both national and international bodies; Rockman was a former policeman who shot into national prominence by leading a rebellion within the police service against the use of draconian measures on blacks, and eventually formed a police union that aligned itself with the anti-apartheid struggle. In a racially conscious South Africa, the deployment of such local luminaries was meant to underscore the party’s racial diversity and commitment to a non-racial future.

58 Evening Post, ‘ANC Renames PE hall’, 4 June 1993. 59 Evening Post, ‘March Turns to Drive’, 15 April 1993.

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Rather than vote for the predominantly white parties, Loots insisted that coloureds would vote alongside Africans for the ANC. He explained his reasoning as follows: Naturally, it must be understood the coloured people have suffered under the apartheid NP. They have lost property and some assets because of the system ... Our people cannot forget all that. For the NP to claim it can win their votes is a forlorn dream.60

For this reason, Loots claimed that up to 95% of the coloured vote would go to the ANC. The DP’s Bobby Stevenson disputed the estimates, citing a poll by the Human Rights Trust that put the ANC and NP almost neck-on-neck at 31%, followed by the DP at roughly 29%.61 The ANC’s election strategy in the coloured community was not dissimilar to that employed in the townships. The party sought to exploit their experience of discrimination at the hands of the NP government. Whilst treated relatively better than their African counterparts, their living conditions were testimony to their neglect. The City Housing Directorate, for instance, reported in June 1990 that there was a backlog of 45 000 houses in the northern areas. As a result, destitute families had taken to building shacks, to which the Northern Areas Management Committee responded by demolishing them.62 The August 1990 violent protests were partly the result of such deprivation. With barely two weeks before the inaugural elections on 27 April 1994, however, two rallies showed that the ANC faced much stiffer competition from the NP than it anticipated. Turnout at rallies organised by the ANC, on the one hand, and the NP, on the other, sent worrisome signals to the organisation. ‘Thousands of people pitched to listen to De Klerk’, whilst there was a ‘poor turn-out’ to Ramaphosa’s visit. Jordaan admitted that the ANC was ‘shaken’ by the contrasting support, and elaborated: ‘His (Mr De Klerk’s) visit added momentum, brought focus and brought reality home that we cannot assume that ANC would automatically get support.’63 Jordaan was nonetheless confident that the ANC would get about 50 to 60 per cent of the coloured support. The confidence was inspired, as he asserted, by the fact that the ANC had 30 000 signed-up members in an area with 70 000 eligible voters. 60 Evening Post, ‘PE Coloureds “To Vote ANC”’, 15 March 1993. 61 Evening Post, ‘DP Slams ANC Voter Claims’, 17 March 1993. 62 CC Abrahams, The 1990 Northern Areas ‘Uprising’ in Port Elizabeth: A South African Story of Communities Resisting Oppresssion (NMMU, Arts and Culture Dept, 2015).  63 Evening Post, ‘ANC Targets PE’s Coloured Voters’, 14 April 1994.

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Whilst coloured communities held out some hope for the ANC, its initial foray into white communities did not promise much. The launch of the first ever branch of the South African Students Congress (Sasco), a predominantly black student organisation aligned to the liberation movement, at the University of Port Elizabeth (UPE), had gone seamlessly two years earlier. The incursion into the conservative neighbourhood of Algoa Park in August 1993, however, elicited a different response. Algoa Park residents were not as accommodating as the academically inclined UPE students. Their disapproval of the ANC and what it stood for showed in their choice of representatives on the Port Elizabeth City Council: a Conservative Party (CP) councillor, Chris Meyer, and Danie Dorfling, a representative of an equally conservative ratepayers association. However, the ANC did not consider Algoa Park a no-go area. It applied to the municipality for permission to have a rally at the Pieter Rademeyer Hall. The event was meant to recruit white supporters and serve as an official launch of the ANC Bethelsdorp branch. At the tabling of the application in Council on 17 August 1993, Dorfling and Meyer led the discussion to reject it. They advanced two reasons for their objection: firstly, the hall could only accommodate 450, not the mass meeting that the ANC had in mind; secondly, the rally was likely to disrupt worship, as the ANC wanted to host the event on a Sunday and the Hall is situated just in front of a Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (or Dutch Reformed Church, whose congregation was predominantly white and Afrikaans-speaking). Council did not take a definitive decision on the day. Instead, it was resolved to schedule a meeting with the ANC for later in the month, to explore a compromise.64 Facilitated by the town clerk, Paul Botha, the reconvened meeting reached a compromise. Noting the CP’s objection, the ANC changed the planned day of the event from a Sunday to mid-week and agreed to keep attendance at less than 450. The compromise day was a Tuesday and prospective attendees were to phone in advance to confirm attendance. No-one would be admitted without prior confirmation. Expected speakers were Carl Niehaus, who was a highly respected clergyman and activist; Willem Verwoerd, grandson of HF Verwoerd; and Allan Boesak, a UDF founder and prominent leader. The CP reluctantly agreed to the application. Chris Meyer explained: ‘I believe in free speech, but am also convinced the ANC has ulterior motives and wants to have a show of force in Algoa Park.’65 It is noteworthy that the ANC was not going to be the first black party to host an event at the hall. Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Zulu-nationalist 64 Evening Post, ‘Blunt “No” to ANC meeting’, 18 August 1993. 65 Evening Post, ‘ANC Likely to Get Hall’, 20 August 1993.

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party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), had hosted one just the previous month without any difficulty. The CP clearly found the IFP agreeable.66 The ANC eventually held its historic meeting at Algoa Park on 21 September 1993. This augured well for the future, as it affirmed the principles of free speech and freedom of assembly, upon which the new South Africa would be founded. But, the proceedings of the day indicated that tolerance was still in the distant future. The initial sign that intolerance still reigned was the prominence of the police at the event. According to a report in the Evening Post: Security at the building was unprecedented, with coil upon coil of razor-wire turning the car park and hall into a fortress … Most, if not all, entrances to Algoa Park, except the road leading directly to the hall, were cordoned off and cars were searched by police as they entered.67

Amongst those the police managed to keep away were members of the right-wing organisation, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), who had gathered nearby, threatening to stop the event. Inside the hall the gathering was far from the swamp the CP had feared. Fewer than 200 people showed up and were predominantly black, even though the event was billed as an opportunity to introduce the ANC to whites and possibly recruit them. Of the three speakers promised, it was only Willem Verwoerd who turned up. In his speech, Verwoerd underlined the point that race relations were partly determined by fear arising from ignorance of one another. He urged interracial interactions, through joining the ANC, as a way to shatter myths about one another.68 The audience was attentive, but the proceedings outside showed the resistance towards non-racialism that was still prevalent. Unable to storm the event itself, AWB supporters terrorised journalists who had gathered outside the hall to cover the event. A newspaper report noted that the right-wingers shouted abuse at the journalists filming them, interspersed with epithets describing their feelings about the meeting and security cordon. A man in a black windbreaker walked up and down the pavement separating the journalists from the protestors, shouting moer hulle (‘hit them’). Suddenly he lunged at SABC cameraman Khaya Mpunzima and tried to stop him from filming. SABC-TV reporter Mike Procter-Simms attempted to

66 Evening Post, ‘ANC Reapplies to Use PE Hall’, 24 August 1993. 67 Evening Post, ‘PE Gets Foretaste of Campaign’, 22 September 1993. 68 Evening Post, ‘Verwoerd Praised by ANC’, 22 September 1993.

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soothe the situation, but was immediately set upon by two other burly AWB supporters. ‘Asseblief Meneer’ (‘Please Sir’) was all Mr Procter-Simms could utter before he collected a fist in the mouth from the man in the windbreaker. As other members of the Press stepped forward to support Mr Procter-Simms, police moved in quickly to break up the scuffle and the AWB men slipped away.69

Algoa Park showed how difficult it would be for the ANC to recruit conservative whites. It was unlikely to be any easier even amongst liberal white communities. Speaking in 1990, Flip Potgieter, a liberal Afrikaner academic who later switched from the DP to the ANC, explained the dominant feeling within Walmer’s liberal white community: It’s quite a liberal suburb and a lot of people were actually, I think, more antigovernment than they were non-racial and although they were protesting vehemently at the government’s racial policies they were very comfortable with it. Now that there’s a definite chance of a black government they’re decidedly uncomfortable and a lot of them are emigrating.70

Whilst unable to enlist whites en masse, the ANC was nonetheless able to sign up more notable names from within the DA circles. In addition to Potgieter, they included Rory Riordan, a DA regional leader, and Graham Richards, a DA councillor, in 1993 and early 1994 respectively. Their recruitment was a result of close work relations with the ANC in local negotiations over the new municipality (which is discussed in detail below). Richards explained his switch to the ANC as follows: It is my belief that the ANC as the party representative of the majority of the people in PE, will be the uniting factor and will afford me the best opportunity to make such experience and abilities as I have available to the whole community. It is also my belief that the constituency I represent will be best served by my association with the party which will be in power in local and national government … I hope other people who still see the ANC as a bogeyman or fear the organisation, will be encouraged by my joining.71

69 Evening Post, ‘PE Gets Foretaste of Campaign’, 22 September 1993. 70 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Richard Sizani, 17 April 1996. See The O’Malley Archives, O’Malley’s Political Interviews, https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php. 71 Evening Post, ‘I Wasn’t Promised a Post’, 6 January 1994.

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Whether recruiting notable names within the white community would convince ordinary white folk to vote for the ANC remained to be seen. And, whilst it augured well for the party to have a multiracial outlook, placing its white members on the election list proved to be a challenge. Inclusion and position on the lists, for the provincial legislature and for Parliament, were highly contested. It tested the party’s commitment to non-racialism. By then it had been agreed that the (old) Eastern Cape would be combined with Border and Transkei to form one province, Eastern Cape. In terms of the organisational structure, however, the regions would remain separate, with their amalgamation deferred for a later date. For the purpose of elections lists, it was decided to have an equal number of nominees from each region. This translated to 27 names from each region to be consolidated into one list for the provincial legislature, estimated to be 90 seats, and 9 names each that would be combined into a provincial list of 27 for Parliament. The candidate lists were fairly representative. They reflected the diversity of the anti-apartheid movement in terms of sectors, generation, race and gender. The 27 names from the Eastern Cape region, for instance, included the ANC stalwart Raymond Mhlaba; UDF’s Mike Xego; SACP’s Mbulelo Goniwe; Reverend De Villiers Soga; the youth leader, Mzimasi Mangcotywa; sports activist Danny Jordaan; and the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ (Cosatu’s) Litho Suka. Of the total number, 10 names were drawn from the minorities, such as Glen Goosen, Ronnie Pillay and Gloria Barry, and amongst the five women that made the list were Neela Hoosain, Zanele Nogaya and Mamisa Elizabeth Nxiweni (Chabula). Inclusion in the list, however, did not guarantee electability. It was the position on the list that determined whether or not one was eventually elected to the legislature or Parliament. This proved a point of controversy. The placement of some of the minorities made them unlikely to be elected. Goosen and Jordaan were placed in such unenviable positions, at 82 and 84 respectively, on the overall provincial list. Most local luminaries preferred to be placed at the provincial legislature, as they considered Parliament, according to Bongani Gxilishe, ‘a dumping place’. Goosen pulled out, saying he or any other minority was unlikely to be elected given their placing on the list: ‘The ANC would need to win about 70 per cent of the vote before the first white representative would come in.’72 Jordaan was shifted over onto the list for Parliament. Electoral returns affirmed the popularity of the ANC both in the region and the rest of the province. Of the votes cast in Port Elizabeth, the party got

72 Evening Post, ‘Goosen: Why I Withdrew’, 12 January 1994.

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61%73 (and 84% province-wide74), followed by the NP at 28% and the DP at 3.3%. Subsequent analysis of the results revealed that the NP picked up significantly more support than the ANC among coloured voters.75 This would be confirmed later in the 1995 local elections, whose results were more indicative of how different (racial) communities voted. Of the total 56 seats in the legislature (instead of the 90 initially estimated) the ANC won a sizeable 48, which was distributed largely equally amongst the three (party) regions.76 Appointment into the provincial Cabinet was similarly guided by equal representation of the regions. Raymond Mhlaba was appointed provincial premier77 and, in turn, appointed three people from each of the three regions and the NP’s Deltius Delport, in line with the national agreement to have a government of national unity. The three appointees from the Eastern Cape region were representative of the alliance: Thobile Mhlahlo, Cosatu; Neela Hoosain, the SACP; Max Mamase, Sanco. Three of the 10 members of Executive Council (MECs) were women78 and a similar number was drawn from the minority groups.79 For three regions in the process of fusing, equal representation was considered paramount. It aided their ongoing efforts towards a unified province. This was underscored in the election of the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) later, at the founding provincial conference on 22–23 October 1994 in Bisho. Each region had an equal number of delegates in attendance and nominated five of their own for inclusion as additional members into the PEC.80 The election of the top five office-bearers, however, was not canvassed along regional lines, although each 73 Evening Post, ‘ANC Romps Home in PE’, 3 May 1994. 74 Independent Election Commission, www.elections.org.za. 75 A. Reynolds (ed.), Elections ’94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects (London, David Phillip Publishers, 1994). 76 Sonwabile Mancotywa, who was one of the debutant MPLs from Transkei, recalls that most of them did not have the formal clothing required at the legislature. On the first day of arrival, they were transported in three minibuses to buy suits at a local clothing shop, called Bryan. They were allowed to get two suits and two pairs of shoes each, on credit, to be repaid later with their first salary. Interview with Sonwabile Mancotywa, 25 May 2018. 77 Whilst amongst the most senior of the active leaders, Mhlaba’s candidature for the premiership was not unchallenged. Steve Tshwete – a former Robben Island prisoner and president of the UDF in the Border region – contested the position, but failed to garner sufficient support. Interview with Phila Nkayi, 10 May 2018. 78 The women were: Neela Hoosain, Trudie Thomas and Mandisa Marasha. 79 These were: Neela Hoosain, Trudie Thomas and Tertius Delport. 80 The founding provincial conference did not elect additional members. Instead, it resolved that the three regions hold general councils to elect five individuals each, who would then be included in the PEC in late November 1994. Evening Post, ‘Last Separate ANC Meetings’, 11 November 1994.

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region was represented in the top five: the chairperson, Dumisani Mafu, and deputy secretary, Mahlubandile Qwase, were from the Transkei region; the deputy chairperson and treasurer, Mzwandile Masala and Khulile Mpahlazana were from the Border; and the secretary, Bongani Gxilishe, from the (old) Eastern Cape. It is worth stressing that personal credentials counted more than one’s birthplace in the election of the inaugural provincial office-bearers. Mafu was elected provincial chairperson for the same reasons Mti had been elected regional chairperson years earlier in Port Elizabeth. A former MK operative and commander of the entire province, Mafu was touted by former MK combatants. His candidature found province-wide support, and does not seem to have been preplanned. It emerged at the conference, following a resolution that members of Parliament (MPs) and members of the provincial legislature (MPLs) should not serve in the PEC. The resolution was unpopular amongst elected representatives, but the conference carried it nonetheless. The purpose was to ensure that the organisation received undivided attention from its officials. And, party officials were remunerated much better than before. From being paid R4 000 before 1994, ‘across the board from Mandela to a cleaner’, Gxilishe recalled, his salary was now R13 000. ‘Yho! ndothuka. Yayinintsi lo mali’ [I was shocked. That was a lot of money].81 By the close of 1994 the three regions had amalgamated to form one province. The fusion was at both a government and a party level. Some prominent regional leaders left to serve in the provincial government or in Parliament and regional party leaders were to be accountable to provincial party leaders. This had implications for the regional ANC, to which some attention is given below. Suffice to note here that how provincial leaders were elected and who they were would subsequently have a notable impact on both the dynamism of the ANC in the region and governance in the municipality. This would be determined by factors such as whether the region had any influence on provincial politics and whether local leaders considered provincial leaders credible arbiters in local party disputes. With the inaugural national and provincial elections out of the way, attention turned towards local elections. They were scheduled for 18 months later, in November 1995. For our purpose here, their results are much more insightful than those of the national elections. Local elections were preceded by local negotiations that transformed local government from segregated local authorities into a unified municipality. This was not only a historical process, but also

81 Gxilishe, interview, 11 May 2018.

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shed further light on the nature of local politics, especially trans-racial alliances, the distribution of power among local actors, the lack of understanding of the importance of local government, the socio-economic challenges that lay ahead and the lobbying and jostling for political positions in the emerging integrated municipality. What happened during this process, in other words, partly prefigured what was to follow in subsequent years. It is to this negotiation process, dubbed the one-city talks, that we now turn our attention.

PORT ELIZABETH MUNICIPALITY: AN ACCIDENTAL PIONEER TOWARDS INTEGRATION Port Elizabeth’s local government reflected apartheid logic. It was segregated into multiple authorities that served the various racial groupings. The PE City Council served white residents; Ibhayi Town Council attended to Africans in the townships, and the Northern Areas Management Committee and the Malabar Management Committee to coloureds and Indians respectively. Ibhayi Town Council served the old townships of New Brighton, KwaZakhele and Zwide, whilst the new black residential areas that had emerged in the 1980s, such as KwaMagxaki, KwaDwesi and Motherwell, were put under their own management committees that reported directly to the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA). The result was not only a local government that was racially segregated, but also one that was highly fragmented. The initial effort at integration began in 1989 under the auspices of the PE City Council, earning PE the distinction of being the first city to embark on this process. Whilst the timing coincided with an emerging shift towards democratisation within officialdom, that was neither the motivation nor the objective for initiating integration. Initially a half-hearted measure, it was the anti-apartheid organisations (or the non-statutory bodies) that forced the PE City Council to embark on a genuine process of integration. Although PE was at the forefront of the transition within local government, the pace was ultimately determined by negotiations on the legislative framework at national level. An unintended start: Limiting fragmentation The Evening Post created shockwaves on 17 May 1989 with the headlines, ‘Non-racial council for PE to be probed’. A former mayor and NP councillor, Ben Olivier, explained the reason for the momentous decision: ‘There is a great deal of duplication with the existence of separate management committees and the Ibhayi Town Council and this is a costly affair.’82 The decision promised to herald a historic change towards a unified city with a single tax base. That was what

82 Evening Post, ‘Non-Racial Council for PE to be Probed’, 17 May 1989.

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Pebco had been demanding since its inception in 1979. As a result, Ibhayi Town Council was rendered illegitimate. Residents hardly participated in its elections and refused to pay rent, registering their rejection of the council with gripes about inadequate social services.83 Led by the town clerk, Paul Botha, the investigation on how the integration would unfold was to take a period of two months and the results presented to Council for adoption and subsequent implementation. Upon conclusion of the investigation in August 1989, however, it emerged that what the PE City Council had in mind was not any different from the status quo. Botha proposed absorbing the coloured and Indian management committees into the Port Elizabeth Municipality (PEM), whilst Africans would remain under the various segregated authorities. The management committees were elated at the proposal, which Council adopted in May 1990 and began preparations towards ‘segregated integration’.84 By now, the preparations were of course unfolding against the background of De Klerk’s historic announcement unbanning political parties and committing to the end of apartheid. This became, in addition to achieving resource efficiency, part of the rationale for the segregated integration, ostensibly in pursuit of De Klerk’s reform programme. Whilst the management committees did not find the exclusion of Africans objectionable, the ANC protested bitterly. Thozamile Botha, the founding president of Pebco and then head of the ANC’s local government department, denounced the proposed measure as a ‘tricameral mini-parliament’ seeking to re-create itself through the same structures that ‘have been discredited by the people’.85 The organisation found support within Council from the DP, which did not vote for the proposal. The DP’s Bobby Stevenson berated the proposed merger as ‘laughable’ especially because it claimed to be ‘a step in the right direction’. This common opposition between the two parties marked the beginning of what they would later call a ‘tactical alliance’. The tactical alliance between the ANC and the DP saw the inauguration of a parallel process. The DP continued to articulate its opposition within Council, but also held talks with Pebco and the Northern Areas Action Committee. Altough informal, these talks were significant in two major ways: they marked the beginning of serious discussions between statutory and non-statutory bodies over the future of local government in PE, whilst also mounting a multiracial opposition to the NP’s attempts to reincarnate institutional segregation under

83 Cherry, ‘Changing Role of Civic Organisations’. 84 Evening Post, ‘Mixed Council Decision Hailed’, 30 May 1990. 85 Evening Post, ‘ANC Rejects Plan for One PE Council’, 18 October 1990.

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different guises. This amplified opposition to segregated integration and heightened the pressure on the NP-dominated Council to rethink their proposal. Discussions on the segregated integration continued nonetheless into the second half of 1991. Among the proposals made was that the PE City Council and management committees should hold joint sessions of Council and that members of management committees be included in the standing committees of Council. In what seemed geared to ensure that they were fully integrated, the Malabar Management Committee went further, proposing that they ‘be robed in similar attire to that of city councillors when attending City Council meetings’.86 Similar clothing, however, could not conceal the fundamental problem that the initiative faced a crisis of legitimacy. Members of both the Malabar and Northern Areas management committees lacked credibility. Their supposed constituencies had hardly participated in their election. If included in Council, they would neither vote nor sit on the standing committees, as the existing law restricted this to city councillors (which they were not). Given those challenges, Council realised that the joint sittings would appear ‘as no more than window dressing or tokenism’. Apart from the legal impediments, the process itself had become a public relations disaster. It flew against De Klerk’s promise to end segregation. Accordingly, the council resolved to identify legitimate interest groups across the political spectrum and initiate and pursue discussions with such groups with a view to identifying possible steps that may be taken as interim measures within its existing legal constraints to advance the cause of a single non-racial council.87

With the sham process aborted, an inclusive process got underway on 2 April 1991. The inaugural meeting of the one-city talks was convened at the municipal premises and Paul Botha was elected to chair it. Attracting about 31 organisations, the meeting was well attended. Inclusivity augured well for the integrity of the talks, but the credentials of some were considered suspect. This became a point of contention, alongside the objectives of the process and the issue of voting powers. Non-statutory bodies protested against the inclusion of management committees and black local authorities. They considered them surrogates of the PE City Council and the CPA, and thus did not represent genuine constituencies. To the non-statutory bodies, these surrogate bodies were simply geared towards

86 One-City Talks, Decision on Integration of Statutory Bodies, Policy and Resources Committee: Report by Director of Administration, meeting, 6 November 1990. 87 One-City Talks, Decision on Integration of Statutory Bodies.

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increasing the representation of the statutory bodies in the one-city talks, thereby tilting the balance of power in their favour. Equally contentious were the voting powers assigned to each representative. The DP and the ANC proposed that representatives be divided into three categories: ‘representative organisations’;88 government institutions;89 and interest groups.90 Only the first category of representatives would have voting powers, whilst the other two would be limited to participation without voting powers. Each organisation would be allowed three representatives in the formalised One-City Forum and decisions were to be taken by consensus. This was to ensure that decisions enjoyed optimal support, instead of a simple majority that would marginalise divergent views.91 This proposal met with opposition from other interested parties. The management committees and black local authorities rejected the suggestion that they be denied direct representation. They insisted on their legitimacy with the Malabar Management Committee, pointing out that participation in its recent election was over 60% of the electorate. Ratepayers protested against the dominant role given to political parties, whilst they were given observer status. According to their representative, Ronald Pearson, the association brought more value to the talks than political parties, as they knew more about their residents’ issues.92 The PE City Council tabled a counter-proposal to that of the ANC/DP over the distribution of voting powers. It was deliberately vague and legalistic, with a view to extending voting powers to a much broader category of organisations than proposed by the ANC/DP. The controversy over the composition of the Forum betrayed a concern with the balance of power, which would, in turn, influence the content of decisions. The NP-dominated Council was just as keen to stamp its influence on the tenor of the talks as the ANC/DP. Yet, whilst the ANC sought to dominate the one-city talks, its own decision to participate was not unanimous within the ranks. The disagreement was both within the regional leadership and across the various

88 This encompassed political parties or organisations that had membership and intended contesting elections in future. These were the ANC, NP, DP, SACP and Labour Party. 89 These were the Port Elizabeth Municipality and the CPA. The latter was in charge of the KwaDwesi, KwaMagxaki and the Motherwell City councils. 90 Civics, labour, business and rate-payers associations were in this category of organisation. 91 Letter from Rory Riordan, DP Regional Chair, to Mr CF Fischer, Director of Administration, 2 April 1991. 92 Evening Post, ‘Political Parties’ Role Challenged’, 18 May 1991.

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levels of the leadership. The main reason, explained Linda Mti, who was then regional chairperson of the ANC, was that the ANC did not have policies on local government … Ours was to ensure that there was housing, water and tarred roads, not how local government actually operated … So our position in those talks was not informed by any policy on local government.93

Without thoroughly thought-out policy positions of their own, Mti feared that the ANC would be duped into agreeing to policies that protected entrenched interests. Mti was particularly worried about Mike Xego’s closeness to the DP’s Rory Riordan. Xego was one of the ANC’s representatives and Riordan part of the DP’s at the one-city talks. Mti elaborates: I was quite vigilant about the DP influencing us. Mike would come to the REC meetings with proposals. I would ask him: zivelaph’ ezi zinto [where do these things come from] Mike. I could see that these things are not the things he would have thought up himself because we did not really have a detailed understanding of local government. The DP and NP put a lot of energy into these things. My fear was that the DP wanted to use us to push their own agenda. I was very worried that we were selling out …94

The ANC’s national office shared Mti’s anxiety. Thozamile Botha, ANC head of local government, did not want negotiations to happen at a local level. ‘Our main worry,’ Botha explained, was that we knew that the statutory bodies wanted to protect their privileges by devolving power right to the schools, clinics and hospitals. They wanted to keep black people out of their own communities so that they could have exclusive use of these services. We knew this because we were also negotiating at the national level. So this gave us a macro-view of what was proposed by the NP and ratepayers’ associations in the various municipalities. They had maps and well-crafted documents. Now not all our people had capacity to negotiate these things. We did not want them to negotiate because they could enter into things that would not work for

93 Mti, interview, 17 April 2018. 94 Mti, interview, 17 April 2018.

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us. Instead we wanted a framework to be concluded at the national level, then everything else would be influenced by that national framework.95

National office’s anxiety over local negotiations, however, did not derail the one-city talks in PE. Their continuation was unavoidable, since the demand for the disbandment of the apartheid local government persisted unabated and was long-standing, having been first articulated in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s. The one-city talks were therefore necessary in order to start probing what would replace the apartheid proxies. Whatever agreements they could achieve, however, remained subject to the impending national legislation. In fact, the NP government tried to influence local-based talks through the introduction of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act on 27 June 1991. This validated the ANC’s fears. The Act sought to give recognition to the agreements reached at local negotiations, whilst also giving veto powers to the provincial administrations to, among other things, appoint participants in the talks and decide what powers to grant the proposed new local government structures.96 The ANC berated the legislation as the NP’s cynical attempt to unilaterally influence the structure of the new local government. As a result, the regional ANC withdrew its participation in the one-city talks. This inevitably threw the legitimacy of the one-city talks into doubt. The initial talks had been aborted precisely because the ANC was excluded. It went without saying, therefore, that its absence in that second round of one-city talks would similarly plunge them into a crisis of credibility. Having realised this, the participants that remained behind resolved to suspend the talks until the ANC was persuaded to return.97 The suspension of the one-city talks confirmed the ANC’s moral authority. Whilst the party did not have legal authority, the one-city talks could not arrive at a binding decision without its participation. Conversely, the apartheid state, although legal, had limitations. For any agreements on the future of local government to enjoy legitimacy, it had to be a product of a collective process with the non-statutory bodies. The necessity of such jointly agreed decisions was made even more urgent by problems that beset the Ibhayi Town Council especially. In early 1992 it was declared bankrupt, with a debt of R15 million. This eliminated

95 Interview with Thozamile Botha, 18 April 2018. 96 G. Reid and W. Cobbett, (1992) ‘Negotiating in Bad Faith: Local-Level Negotiations and the Interim Measures for Local Government Act’ in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds) South African Review 6 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press 1992). 97 Evening Post, ‘“One-City Talks” Postponed Indefinitely’, 18 June 1991.

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any doubt of the town council’s ability to provide services to its African residents. It had no revenue and residents refused to pay for services.98 Provision of municipal services now fell entirely on the PEM, which had previously served the white community exclusively. However, the municipality did not want its white ratepayers to carry the burden of the costs of providing municipal services to the townships. An agreement had to be reached to facilitate the resumption of payment for services in order to spread the responsibility evenly among all the residents. Only the ANC, which was considered the leader of the non-statutory bodies, could get township areas to break the boycott. Accordingly, the statutory bodies made concessions in order to entice the ANC back to the talks in late February 1992. They made an undertaking that decisions taken in the one-city talks would not be subject to the recently promulgated Act and that workers of the now disbanded Ibhayi Town Council would be considered for incorporation into the PEM, instead of them being retrenched.99 The talks were now geared to resume on a much more serious note. The ANC was placed in a much stronger position upon its return to the one-city talks. Glen Goosen, the party’s regional treasurer and a lawyer by profession, was elected chairperson of the management committee that was to manage the talks,100 with the DP’s Graham Richards as his deputy. Below the management committee were two other working committees, the Institutional Committee and the Constitutional Committee, created to work out the organisational design of an integrated municipality and to ensure that it was shaped along the constitutional framework that was likely to emerge out of national-level negotiations. A few months later, in July 1992, the talks were officially inaugurated into a One-City Forum,101 cementing their formal status. This was in compliance with the Interim Measures for Local Government Act, which gave municipalities an ultimatum to set up such forums by 1 January 1993, or face

98 Evening Post, ‘Two EC Black Councils Broke’, 6 February 1992. 99 The Herald, ‘PE One-City Forum Reaches Consensus’, 26 February 1992. 100 Letter from ANC, Eastern Cape Region, to Town Clerk, PE Municipality, Convening of Management Committee of One-City Talks Forum, 6 March 1992. 101 Members of the Forum fell into four main categories: political parties – DP, ANC, NP, SACP, Labour Party, Solidarity Party; government institutions – PEM, CPA; Civic organisations – Central Executive of Ratepayers’ Association, Pepco, PE North Civic Associations; and business and labour associations: Afrikaanse Sakekamer, Chamber of Commerce, Midland Chamber of Industries, East Cape African Chamber of Commerce, Cosatu and National Council of Trade Unions.

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financial sanctions.102 That the city was able to comply far ahead of the deadline was testimony to the earnestness of the talks that had begun in April 1991. With negotiation structures in place, and the urgency to resolve the service delivery crisis now fully realised, the One-City Forum discussions proceeded fairly seamlessly till mid-1993. As earlier proposed by the ANC/DP alliance, the apartheid-created local authorities were left out; only political parties with proven support were accorded voting powers. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had attended the inaugural meeting, never returned to the talks. Other organisations were allowed to participate in the deliberations both in the Forum and its committees, but would not have voting powers. To ensure transparency and public dissemination of the deliberations, the media was allowed unfettered access to the Forum sessions. The one-city talks, in other words, were now transparent to the public, with a view to building legitimacy for the talks so that their outcome would be met with popular acceptance. The renewed commitment to the one-city talks, however, could not conceal the divergence of interests among the representatives. Whilst agreeing that the PEM should take over service delivery in the townships, statutory bodies were similarly keen to see an end to the boycott of payment for municipal services. The PEM was even adamant that it would not commence with service delivery until there was demonstrable commitment to resume payment. Conversely, non-statutory bodies were insistent that African residents were likely to be convinced to resume payments only when their arrears had been cancelled and there was tangible improvement in service provision.103 For non-statutory bodies, payment for services was not solely linked to inadequate services; it was also a statement of rejection of the Bantu authorities and could only resume once a new democratic dispensation had been inaugurated, as they noted: The calls for the payment of rentals/etc. must be accompanied by an event that is a political victory/advance – like the introduction of a TLC [transitional local council]. This could even be accompanied by pamphlets, posters and public rallies, at which the appointed councillors could be introduced to the community.104

102 Evening Post, ‘CPA Sets a Deadline for Municipalities to Set Up Forums by January 1, 1993’, 8 April 1992. 103 One-City Negotiation Forum, Comments on the Constitutional Arrangements for the Port Elizabeth City, 3 July 1993. 104 One-City Negotiation Forum, Institutional Working Group, Progress to Date and Issues Outstanding – A Report to the Management Committee, November 1993.

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None of the parties, therefore, were willing to budge from their contrasting positions. It was a stalemate. The negotiation parties, however, soon recognised that, because of its widespread financial implications, the impasse could be resolved only at the national level, where it was also a subject of negotiation. Thus the CPA undertook to freeze arrears until a decision had been reached at the national level. This was yet another reminder that whatever agreement was reached in Port Elizabeth was subject to the national framework, which had still not been concluded by November 1993. Notwithstanding that limitation, negotiators in Port Elizabeth were determined to have the new local government structures set up as soon as there was enabling legislation in place. That said, the negotiators were also prepared for delays in this regard. As noted earlier, local government had proven to be a contentious issue at the national negotiations. Statutory bodies feared losing control over their municipalities, which led them to resist the re-demarcation of municipal wards into trans-racial units. ‘Agreement on local government,’ said Thozamile Botha, ‘almost derailed the finalisation of the Interim Constitution. It was amongst the last subjects agreed upon at the negotiations.’105 A compromise was nonetheless reached, as outlined in the Local Government Transition Act (No. 209 of 1993), to have the envisaged transitional local councils (TLCs) made up of an equal number of representatives from the statutory bodies, on the one hand, and non-statutory bodies, on the other. Before the compromise was reached, however, the One-City Forum in PE faced the dilemma of reaching an agreement without the enabling legislation in place. To overcome this dilemma, they decided to have a pre-interim measure, which they would fittingly call a Bridging Authority, made up of members of the statutory and non-statutory bodies. This would be adapted into an appointed TLC once the Local Government Transition Act was promulgated. By mid-1993, therefore, the One-City Forum had made tremendous progress. In the second half of 1993, however, the talks once again ran into a stalemate, this time over the size of the envisaged TLC and definition of non-statutory bodies. This betrayed a concern over the balance of power in the TLC and intent on the part of (statutory) councillors to retain their jobs. All parties agreed on a 50/50 representation of statutory bodies, on the one hand, and non-statutory bodies, on the other. The incumbent statutory councillors had added demands that all 50 of them be given automatic inclusion in the TLC and that who constituted the non-statutory bodies be redefined.

105 Botha, interview, 18 April 2018.

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The demand that non-statutory bodies be re-defined was curious. All along it had been accepted that this category encompassed organisations that were historically active in the anti-apartheid struggle. The Midland Chamber of Industries and a recently formed NP-aligned Northern Areas Civic for Tenants and Ratepayers Association (Nactra) now insisted on being seen as part of the non-statutory bodies, demanding that they each be given eight representatives in the half that was allotted for non-statutory bodies. The result would be a significant reduction in the representation of the ANC and other extra-parliamentary bodies, whilst the statutory bodies would make up the majority in the chamber. The ANC and its allies not only rejected the proposal, but also countered with a demand of their own. They insisted on an 80-member TLC, as opposed to the 102 that was proposed by statutory bodies. This entailed job loss for some of the incumbent councillors. This stalemate preoccupied the best part of the second half of 1993.106 The dispute was eventually settled at the beginning of 1994. The settlement was partly prompted by the promulgation of the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, just as the year closed. The Act reaffirmed the old definition of non-statutory bodies, which excluded the Chamber and Nactra.107 Non-statutory bodies relented and agreed on a 100-member TLC comprising 50 non-statutory body members and 50 statutory body members, including all 26 councillors from the existing PE City Council, 18 from the Northern Areas Management Committee and 6 from the Malabar Management Committee. It is worth noting that all of them were male.108 As for the representatives from the non-statutory bodies, the ANC was to lead their selection. The historic agreement was formally adopted on 3 March 1994 and signed off ‘in an air of exhilaration and

106 One-City Negotiation Forum, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Constitutional Working Group, Council Chambers, City Hall, 30 September 1993; The Herald, ‘Stevenson Pleads for 100 Deal’, 16 December 1993. 107 Nactra was formed in the midst of the one-city talks, in 1992, by individuals aligned to the NP and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). It was a rival of the ANC-aligned Northern Areas Action Committee (NAAC). Letter from NACTRA to the Town Clerk, Paul Botha, Re: One-City Forum, 29 January 1994. 108 Graham Richards, a DP councillor before 1994, who switched over to the ANC and became the party’s councillor in the Transitional Local Council, does not recall there being any women in the PE Council. Correspondence with Richards, 17 February 2018. DP’s Bobby Stevenson thought there might have been, but was not sure. Correspondence with Stevenson, 6 December 2018. It is difficult to ascertain the gender of PE councillors pre-1994 from council documents. Their names were not preceded by title – i.e. Ms. Mrs. Mr. etc. I have decided to go with Richards’s recollection on account of his confidence on the matter.

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expectancy’. This not only made Port Elizabeth the first major city to conclude such an agreement, but also had the rare ‘responsibility towards other towns in the country to assist them in the transformation of local government’.109 PE was a trendsetter in local government transformation. A list of councillors from the non-statutory bodies was concluded on 22 March 1994. It comprised 24 members nominated by ANC branches and 26 by party leaders.110 Overall, the party ensured racial and gender diversity, the inclusion of members of alliance partners and other liberation movements, individuals with necessary expertise and multisectoral representation. Of the alliance partners on the party list, the SACP had seven representatives, Cosatu four and civic organisations one. Among the professionals selected were, for instance, a lawyer, Sureshni Moodliar and a medical practitioner, Dr MSM Gantsho. Although it boycotted the talks, the PAC was given three representatives, including Moki Cekisane, an old colleague of the late Steve Biko, formerly with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). From the religious and sport sectors were Reverend Mcebisi Xundu and Dan Qeqe, a stalwart in non-racial sport. The overall list was similarly representative on race and gender. Seventeen candidates were drawn from minority groups – white, coloured and Indian – nine of whom came from the branches and eight from the party list. Whilst a notable improvement on the previous apartheid local authorities, which included no women, all four women included in the non-statutory list came from the party list, with none nominated by the branches. If the party had not taken a 109 One-City Negotiation Forum, Port Elizabeth, Agreement, 3 March 1994. 110 From the branches, the following individuals were elected: Bethelsdorp, Ronald Niegaart; Chatty, Cliffie Bruiners; Chatty Extension, Ebrahim Mohammed; Gelvendale, Tennyson Mackay; Helenvale, Jeremy Saffier; Kleinskool, Churhman Adams; KwaDwesi, Mbulelo Cagwe; KwaMagxaki, Mava Ngqungwana; KwaZakhele 1, Mashwabada Msizi; KwaZakhele 2, Mbuyi Madaka; Malabar, Balu Naran; Missionvale, Johnny Jackson; Motherwell 1, Lizo Vakala; Motherwell 2, Fikile Desi; Motherwell 3, Gerald Yona; New Brighton, Phil Goduka; SchaunderKorsten, Jenny Calvert; Soweto, Boki Mabizela; Swartkops Valley, Elsia Gegesi; Veeplaas, Moses Boyce; Walmer and surburbs, Xola Manona; Windvogel-Saltlake, Stag Mitchell; Zwide 1, Henry Fazzie and Zwide 2, Sipho Khohlakala. The party nominated the following individuals: Jennifer Bowler (ANC), Moki Cekisane (PAC), Nceba Faku (SACP), Boy Fani (SACP), Dr MSM Gantso (ANC), Mrs Benedicta Godolozi (ANC), Advocate Glen Goosen (ANC), Errol Haynes (SACP), Eldridge Jerry (SACP), Mandla Madwara (SACP), Melvin Manentsa (Cosatu), Julius Maxambela (Cosatu), Mike Mayo (Cosatu), Dr CM Mini (ANC), Khaya Mkefa (SACP), Sureshni Moodliar (ANC), Dr Koogen Moodley (ANC), Orapeleng Mosia (PAC), Virginia Ngalo (SACP), Mike Nzotoyi (Civics), Dan Qeqe (ANC), Rory Riordan (ANC), E Taaibosch (Cosatu), Andile Tsikile (PAC), Dr Ronnie van Wyk (SACP), Reverend Mcebisi Xundu (non-aligned). Evening Post, ‘Local Govt List Releases’, 23 March 1994.

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conscious decision to include women in their own list, women would not have been included in the TLC. The principle of gender representation had not yet found broad acceptance. Established in 1861 as a whites-only body, the PE Council had its last sitting on 7 May 1994.111 The TLC was inaugurated on 16 May 1994. The position of mayor was replaced with that of chairperson of the TLC, but was similarly ceremonial. A new innovation was the Executive Committee (Exco) headed by a chairperson. This is where executive authority rested. It would receive and approve policies before submission to Council for further discussion and voting. Previously, standing committees had formulated and presented their proposals to Council, an arrangement that diffused power to the various committees. The innovation meant that the chairperson of the Exco would effectively become the executive leader, whilst the TLC chairperson would be a ceremonial figure that presided over sessions of Council and represented it at public functions. This would become, as shown later, a source of tension between the chairperson of the TLC, on the one hand, and the chairperson of the Exco, on the other. Whilst the composition of the TLC was meant to be evenly balanced, the ANC had an edge. The DP generally voted with the ANC and two councillors – Flip Potgieter and Graham Richards – had joined the party. As a result, Nceba Faku and Mandla Madwara were elected chairpersons of the TLC and Exco respectively. Interestingly, whilst they had dual membership, both were SACP nominees to the TLC. Faku’s election was a surprise. He had never been part of the one-city talks and his name had appeared on the nomination list for the provincial legislature, placed at position 46. Expectations were that Henry Fazzie or Phil Goduka would be elected TLC chairperson. Fazzie was senior within the ranks and led the civic movement, which had spearheaded local government issues from its formation in the late 1970s. Whilst junior to Fazzie, Goduka had a stronger claim to the leadership of the TLC. A member of Pepco, Goduka had been involved in the one-city talks from their inception in 1991, had steered the Constitutional Committee as a deputy chairperson and was head of local government in the regional office.112 Conversely, throughout the one-city talks, Faku was involved in the rebuilding of the ANC as a full-time organiser based at the regional office, Standard House. This is partly the reason why he came into the TLC as an SACP nominee, instead

111 The Herald, ‘The End of an Era’, 8 May 1994. 112 The media, especially, touted Goduka as a possible chairperson in a number of newspaper articles leading up to the inauguration of the TLC, whilst ANC leaders interviewed touted both Goduka and Fazzie.

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of the ANC’s nominee. Organisers in the ANC were generally discouraged from vying for positions, as their day-to-day activities with branches and ANC members gave them an advantage over others. The SACP did not have that prohibition, which explains why Faku opted for their endorsement, but still benefited from his position as ANC organiser (a position that involves setting up branches, recruiting members and co-ordinating the ANC’s public activities).113 Mthwabo Ndube, a local SACP leader, recalls Mandla Madwara, who was chairperson of the local SACP district, being particularly supportive of Faku’s candidature. The decision was taken at Madwara’s house in Motherwell, where this clique of SACP leaders often met. Faku was not a regular member of the clique, but came specifically on that day to canvass the party for its endorsement. Besides Faku’s credentials, Ndube ascribed Madwara’s lobbying for Faku to their personal relations. They were childhood friends, having grown up together in the same neighbourhood of Boost Village, in New Brighton.114 This marked the beginning of serious contestations for leadership positions in government. Faku wanted to be mayor. To maximize his prospects of success, he stood as an SACP nominee and lobbied his colleagues to appoint him. The ANC majority in the TLC afforded it an opportunity to augment its popular admiration, derived from a heroic past, by improving the living conditions of its traditional base. For the first time, townships and northern areas would receive dedicated attention and a meaningful budgetary allocation towards their development. Black local authorities had a severely limited tax-base from which to develop their communities. Their sources of revenue, such as sales of alcohol and trading licences, were inadequate, a problem that was exacerbated by township residents’ refusal to pay rent. Conversely, white residential areas benefited from a tax-base created by a combination of, amongst others, taxes from the commercial and industrial sectors and property-owners. Consequently, as the first budget of the TLC noted, municipal expenditure in white, coloured, and Indian areas of Port Elizabeth was, on average, probably more than 10 times as high per head as it was in Port Elizabeth’s black areas, and this was a long-term circumstance.115

113 Faku himself described his activities as organiser to the historian, Pat Gibbs. See P. Gibbs, ‘Political Identity and Democracy Formation in the Eastern Cape, 1990–1994’, in SADET Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 6, Part 1 (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 2006). 114 Ndube, interview, 22 October 2018. 115 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Capital and Operating Budgets 1994/5, 28 June 1994.

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Thus the TLC’s inaugural budget, as would subsequent ones, prioritised the developmental needs of underdeveloped areas. An initial indication of the budget’s bias towards townships was its dedication to the memory of George Pemba, a local artist who rose to legendary status for his paintings of township life in all its variety from the 1930s right up to the 1990s. Capital expenditure in the townships was directed towards infrastructure and basic amenities. These included both the building and improvement of parks, clinics, roads and swimming pools, and the provision of water, sewerage and sanitation, libraries and electricity. Prioritising underdeveloped areas did not mean neglect of the developed areas, or the so-called ‘old Port Elizabeth’. The level of development in the ‘old city’ was already far advanced and now the intention was to equalise provision of services. This entailed sharing services that had previously been enjoyed exclusively by white residents. The implication was that services such as the collection of refuse, street sweeping and road maintenance would not be as frequent as they had previously been in the suburbs, in order to enable their provision in underdeveloped areas. Whilst there was general acceptance that the bulk of the revenue would come from suburban homeowners and the commercial sector, legislation did, nonetheless, build in a mechanism to force compromises. The budget had to be approved by a two-thirds majority. Where the majority party did not meet this threshold, it had to bargain with other parties. That is what happened with the first budget. The first attempt to pass it failed. This was partly because it proposed water and electricity tariffs that were above the rate of inflation. As chairperson of the TLC Faku responded by committing his party to increases no higher than the inflation rate. This concession helped to get the 67 per cent to pass the budget. Ultimately, although boding well for historically neglected communities, the budget was unsustainable in the long term. More expenditure over a period of several years would be required to uplift the townships, but there was no guarantee that the sources of revenue would continue to grow. Almost 50 per cent of households could either not afford to pay at all or could only make ‘limited contributions to the costs of their municipal services’. Of the township residents that could pay, there were doubts about their keenness to resume payment. The TLC set monthly payment at varied rates, ranging from R41.35 to R12.08 and R5.00, based on the type of housing. The rates were considerate of income status, but township residents still wanted to see substantial improvement in the provision of services before resuming payments. Clearly, the resumption of payment would not be immediate and when it would eventually happen was unclear. In the meantime, the sources of revenue would remain commercial and residential

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payers in the old city, supplemented by state subsidies. There was also the possibility of borrowing money. While budgetary allocations favoured the ANC, the budget also had its limitations and imposed strict demands on the party. The fundamental limitation was its inadequacy in relation to the scope of needs. This meant that the budget had to be utilised prudently. In instances of a shortfall that could not be met by a state grant, securing a loan would hinge on demonstrating appropriate fiscal conduct. The limited revenue placed massive responsibility on municipal leaders to prioritise improving the city’s management of its coffers by spending prudently. Overall, the process and the outcomes of the one-city talks were telling of the political history and culture of Port Elizabeth. Its initial start, ahead of other cities, was a result of the dynamism of local activism, which had precipitated the collapse of black authorities and replaced them with governance structures (also known as ‘organs of people’s power’) that were set up by civics. By the beginning of the 1990s the momentum to change local government had become difficult to halt. Statutory bodies were under the same pressure to initiate the process to form a legitimate municipality. Whilst there was general distrust among parties, trans-racial relations that had formed among individuals across the official divide over the years enabled collaboration. This collaboration, in turn, enhanced trans-racial ties, leading to some white politicians crossing over to join a traditionally black party. Equally noteworthy was the inclusiveness of the TLC. Contrary to their comrades at the national level, local PAC leaders accepted the ANC’s invitation to form part of the TLC, even though they had spurned the one-city talks, in line with their party’s national stance against negotiations. This was yet another indication of close relations among individuals, despite their parties being generally polarised by contrasting stances on negotiations.

INAUGURAL LOCAL ELECTIONS Local elections were scheduled for 1 November 1995 throughout the country. Although voters would elect their own councillors, the balance of power in Council was pre-determined. Wards were allocated equally on racial grounds. African townships, on the one hand, and the white-coloured-Indian areas, on the other, were each allotted seventeen wards.116 This led to an awkward combination of sparsely populated residential areas, varying in population size from

116 Local Government Elections Task Group, Local Government Elections in South Africa 1995/6, Pretoria, 1996.

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4 000 to 11 000 inhabitants, in order to constitute a racially defined ward.117 Ward demarcation was designed to limit the likely dominance of the anti-apartheid parties in Council. This objective of diluting the numerical majority of former non-statutory bodies was pushed further through a formula for allocation of seats. Ward candidates were to make up 60% of council representatives, and party representatives (elected through proportional representation) the remaining 40%. The formula translated to 34 wards seats and 21 proportional representation (PR) seats (making the envisaged council a 55-seat size). The advantage of the numerical superiority that the anti-apartheid forces were likely to enjoy in elections was thus curtailed by the lower seat allocation for PR representatives. Pre-arrangements notwithstanding, the spatial geography of the apartheid city made racially based wards inevitable. Residential places were designed to be racially exclusive. Wards 1, 2, 4 to 8, 11 and 17 were overwhelmingly white;118 Ward 9 was largely Indian;119 Wards 10 and 12 to 16 were predominantly coloured;120 and Wards 18 to 34 were exclusively African.121 There was one exception: Walmer. The largely white suburban area co-existed alongside an old, predominantly poor African township. Its inhabitants had resisted forceful removal to Zwide township in the late 1970s. Walmer’s mixed population meant that one of its wards, Ward 3, would have a substantially mixed voters’ roll. The ANC began nominating candidates in the latter part of 1995. Nominations started at the branch level, but worked differently for the two ballots. For ward candidates, the process was concluded at branches, whilst for PR candi-

117 Evening Post, ‘PE Council to be Slashed in Half’, 6 June 1995. 118 Ward 1, Summerstrand and Humewood; Ward 2, Central; Ward 4, Walmer, Charlo and Walmer Downs; Ward 5, Lorraine and Sunridge Park; Ward 6, Kabega Park and Sherwood; Ward 7, Linton Grange, Westering, Rowallan Park and Bramhope; Ward 8, Newtown Park, Cotswold and Parsons Hill; Ward 11, Algoa Park and Sidwell; and Ward 17, Swartkops, North End, Kensington and Blue Water Bay. The Herald, ‘All the PE Results’, 4 November 1995. 119 Ward 9, Malabar and Schauder. 120 Ward 10, Gelvandale; Ward 12, Missionvale, Kleinskool and Govan Mbeki; Ward 13, Hillside, Windvogel, Salsoneville and Sanctor; Ward 14, Bethelsdorp, West End and Arcadia; Ward 15, Chatty; Ward 16, Booysen Park, Chatty and Kleinskool. 121 Ward 18, New Brighton Walmer Township; Ward 19, New Brighton; Ward 20, New Brighton; Ward 21, KwaZakhele and New Brighton; Ward 22, KwaZakhele; Ward 23, KwaZakhele; Ward 24, KwaZakhele; Ward 25, Zwide and KwaZakhele; Ward 26, Zwide; Ward 27, KwaZakhele; Ward 28, Soweto; Ward 29, Zwide; Ward 30, KwaDwesi and KwaMagxaki; Ward 31, Motherwell; Ward 32, Motherwell; Ward 33, New Brighton; and Ward 34, New Brighton and KwaZakhele.

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dates it was concluded at a meeting of all branches in the region – a general council attended by branch delegates. Delegates voted on the nominations made at the branch level. The number of votes each nominee received determined not only his or her inclusion into the final list, but the position on the list. One’s position on the list determined whether or not one was eventually elected. Based on the electoral support the party got in the 1994 elections, PR candidates that fell below position 15 (out of a total of 21 PR seats) faced doubtful prospects of being elected. The nomination process – for both PR and ward candidates – was contentious. The list of names of PR candidates did not reflect the voting at the conference.122 Some names were removed, their order was re-adjusted and all this happened without branches or affected persons being informed. On the names, for instance, as Mike Ndzotoyi pointed out, Flip Potgieter and Andile Yawa were removed and new names were added, such as Balu Naran, Errol Heynes and Dan Sandi. Ndzotoyi lambasted the arbitrary changes as a violation of democratic process: I’m not at all happy with the way democracy is now being raped and aborted by a few people making up a clique with the local ANC leadership. The new list is also a bad product of boardroom elitist politicians bent on destroying the ANC and the process of democracy whether consciously or unconsciously …123

Ndzotoyi found the manipulation so egregious that he threatened to report the incident to the president of the organisation, Nelson Mandela. Mzimasi Mangcotywa, head of the election committee, admitted that the list had been changed, but also insisted that the intention was not malicious. Rather, the changes were meant to ensure that the list complied with the criteria of racial and gender diversity as well as competence. Whilst feeling justified in making the changes arbitrarily, Mangcotywa admitted that the final list should have been presented to delegates for final approval, instead of simply announcing it to the public as they did during the commemorative Women’s March on 9 August 1995. The chairperson of the region, Linda Mti, promised to rectify the arbitrary changes: ‘We are still going to look at it and perhaps withdraw some of our

122 The list included the following names: Nceba Faku, Nancy Sihlwayi, Balu Naran, Benedicta Godolozi, Mandla Madwara, Sureshini Moodliar, Melvin Manensha, Jennifer Bouler, Errol Heynes, Jerry Elridge, Dan Sandi, Rory Riordan, Susan Stanley, Graham Richards, Josephine Siwisa, Phil Goduka, Mamise Nxiweni, Mthetheleli Ngcete, Nomzi Balfour, Mike Nzotoyi, Jennifer Calvert, Vember Cagwe, Lammie Niegaart, Nohle Tabata and Betty Mlandu. 123 Evening Post, ‘ANC Row to Mandela?’, 10 August 1995.

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people on the list we consider to be popular to stand for the wards. Reading it was, therefore, premature.’124 The list was subsequently changed, but marginally. Sureshini Moodliar and Graham Richards were not in the amended PR list. Richards was reassigned as a ward candidate, as well as Yawa and Potgieter, who had also been removed from the original list. Nomination of ward candidates was no less controversial. Party leaders sought to choose candidates themselves, instead of endorsing the choice made by branch members at branch general meetings. Where branch members were unyielding, they simply imposed a candidate. The result was that viable candidates, who were rejected by the party leadership, stood as independent candidates. Of the 17 wards in the township, 15 were contested by independents. Motherwell’s Ward 33 was even contested by independents only – SL Magoqwana and Mthuthuzeli Boyce Tokota.125 Notwithstanding the controversy, the ANC’s final PR list was fairly repre­ sentative both in terms of gender and race (nine women and eight minorities). Regional leaders rectified their initial faux pas by announcing the final list to the public at Centenary Hall on 23 August 1995, before submission to the electoral authority.126 The party’s historically white competitors also made some attempts at representivity. Of the 21 candidates that the NP put up, 12 were black (5 Africans and 7 coloured/Indian).127 The DP had 8 black candidates (2 Africans and 6 coloured/Indian) out of the 16 PR candidates it registered.128 But, the black candidates were placed in precarious positions, where they were unlikely to be elected.129 A total of eight parties registered to contest the election. Even the Zulu ethno-nationalist party, the IFP, contested the election in Port Elizabeth, fielding mostly white and coloured candidates in their wards.130 Not all the parties

124 Evening Post, ‘Mti Hits Out at ANC List’, 14 August 1995. 125 Evening Post, ‘PE, Uitenhage, Despatch Ward Results’, 3 November 1995. 126 Evening Post, ‘ANC to Formally Launch Poll List’, 23 August 1995. 127 Jan Maja, Tobeka Cedar Siwa, Jimmy Goodman, Mboneli Nako, Mzwandile David Yantolo, Luyanda Sompani, Shirley Frolick, Donald Cairncross, Benjamin Draai, Shirley Elizabeth Jordaan, Basil Leverment, Neville Ambraal and Patricia Julius. 128 The DP’s black candidates were: Madoda Edward Mhlaba, Zolile Wilberforce-Mamfenguza, Henry Paul Assam, Rosemary Jacobs, Isaac Adams, Henry Cairncross, Aboobaker Kapery and Marshal Roberto Von Buchenroder. 129 Evening Post, ‘Notice of PR Candidates by Party. Issued by the Municipality of the City of Port Elizabeth’, 29 September 1995. 130 The IFP contested five wards: 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 predominantly with white candidates and one black candidate.

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contested each ward. The DP and NP did not field any candidates in township wards, whilst the ANC contested only three of the nine predominantly white wards. Three ANC ward candidates, all in the township, were uncontested: Bandile Ngoqo in KwaZakhele/New Brighton’s Ward 20; Fikile Desi in Motherwell’s Ward 32; and Tony Duba in Motherwell’s Ward 34.131 And, the election authority rejected the registration of 21 candidates for a variety of reasons. Six names were rejected, for instance, because they had not registered as voters on time, and five for owing the municipality for a period longer than three months. Because all the local elections were scheduled to take place on the same day – 1 November 1995 – they assumed a national hue. The ANC pitched them as an extension of the democratisation process, which had started a year earlier, down to the communities. In electing their own councillors, the manifesto further noted, residents would finally realise people’s power, which they could use to meet their basic needs, including tap-water, tarred roads, electricity, housing and refuse collection. Accordingly, campaigning involved national leaders, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, then secretary-general and chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, in roadshows.132 Voting happened on 1 November 1995 as planned.133 Three thousand polling stations were set up throughout the city for 395 569 registered voters.134 Voting did not happen without problems. Some stations opened late, but made up by closing in the wee hours of the next day.135 Some stations were better resourced than others. The ANC’s Rory Riordan cited (Ward 3) Walmer’s polling stations – a tent at Heugh Road, Walmer Scout Hall and Water Town Hall – as examples of unevenly resourced stations determined by race. The tent served 4 500 registered voters, most of whom were African, whilst the two halls respectively served 1 300 and 2 500 predominantly white voters. Riordan explained the likely impact of the unevenness of the quality of voting stations as follows: The voting process for people waiting to vote in Heugh Road was absolute torture. They spent many hours in the sun and later in the rain because of the administrative arrangements … If white folks had to vote under those

131 Evening Post, ‘21 Candidates for PE Council Rejected’, 26 September 1995. 132 Evening Post, ‘Ramaphosa “Roadshow” Rolls to PE’, 23 October 1995. 133 KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape did not vote as scheduled. Disputes over demarcation and a model for rural local government forced a postponement to 1996. See Local Government Elections Task Group, 1995/1996. 134 This number of registered voters represented 72 per cent of the people eligible to vote – i.e. voting age population (VAP). See Local Government Elections Task Group, 1995/96. 135 Evening Post, ‘ANC to Assess Voting Problems’, 2 November 1995.

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conditions there would have been about five votes cast … The ANC candidate for the that ward, Phillip ‘Flip’ Potgieter, must have lost about 1 500 votes because of this.136

After the polling stations had closed, 59.73% of the registered voters had voted. This was far more than the national average turnout of 48.79%.137 As in the previous national election, the ANC emerged with the largest number of votes at roughly 136 683,138 followed at a distance by the NP with 30 580, and the DP came third with 19 189 votes. Accordingly, out of the total of 55 seats, the ANC secured a whopping 34 seats (19 wards and 15 PR), followed by the NP with 15 seats (11 wards and 4 PR), the DP with 4 seats (2 wards and 2 PR), and finally the independents with 2 seats. The distribution of electoral support was particularly revealing in terms of voting behaviour. Voting was essentially along racial lines. The predominantly African ANC and African independents won all 17 wards in the exclusively African townships. White voters shared their votes largely between the NP and the DP, with the former winning 6 and the latter 2 wards. The ANC received a negligible 815 votes out of the total of 45 924 cast in the 9 predominantly white wards. Even the prominent figure of Mkhuseli Jack could not sway the predominantly white Ward 4, where he was a candidate. Understandably, Walmer’s Ward 4 was not Jack’s traditional constituency and he stood against a former mayor, John Viera. The latter got 3 674 votes, against Jack’s 215 votes. The ANC’s white candidate, Flip Potgieter, however, was able to win the mixed-race Ward 3 in Walmer, despite the discomfort experienced by African voters at the under-resourced voting station on Heugh Road. Unlike Potgieter, Graham Richards did not fare as well. A former DP coun­ cillor, Richards stood at Ward 1 against a novice, but a nonetheless established name in DP circles, Elizabeth Trent – wife of Eddie Trent, a DP MP. In her first ever contest, Trent garnered 3 173 votes, against Richards’ 335. But, the ANC

136 Evening Post, ‘ANC ‘Prejudiced’ by Poll Chaos’, 2 November 1995. 137 Local Government Elections Task Group, 1995/1996. 138 This tally is an estimate. My source, the Evening Post, did not publish results in the three township wards where the ANC won uncontested. What we know is that the ANC got 114 744 votes from the 31 wards whose results were published in the newspaper. In order to determine what the party possibly got in the three other wards, I then extrapolated from what it got in each of the 14 other wards it won in the township. This gave me a figure of 7 313 voters per ward for the ANC, totalling 21 939 for all three. Combined, the known figure of 114 744 and the extrapolated sum of 21 939 added up to a possible total of 136 683 votes received by the ANC in the 1995 elections.

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did better in predominantly coloured wards. Coloured voters did not vote en bloc for any party. The ANC won 2 predominantly coloured wards, against the NP’s 4 wards. Similarly, the predominantly Indian Ward 9 went to the NP. Whilst largely dominant in the townships, the ANC was challenged somewhat by the independents. Two independents, Nyanisile Boyce and Mthuthuzeli Tokota, won wards 30 and 33 respectively. Two others, MD Lushaba and JGM Nako, had a strong showing in wards 24 and 27 respectively. Lushaba got 1 813, compared to the ANC’s MJ Sulelo at 3 368; and JGM Nako got 2 238, compared to the 6 679 received by the ANC’s Andile Yawa. Thus Port Elizabeth’s first non-racial local elections yielded a notably uneven spread of electoral support and affirmed moderate political parties. The ANC began on a highly dominant footing, whilst its fellow liberation movement, the PAC – a radical and Africanist party – was marginal139 (and the Azanian People’s Organisation [Azapo] boycotted the polls). A similar reconfiguration played out in historically white politics. The right-wing Conservative Party failed to secure official representation, whilst the NP and DP strengthened their hold over the white electorate. The NP did even better by establishing itself as the largest party amongst coloured voters. Neither historically white party had any presence in the townships. This poised the ANC to dominate local elections for a considerable period in future, so long as it retained its popularity among the majority, township-based voters.140 For any party that wished to dislodge the dominance of the ANC, it meant becoming competitive within the ANC’s own traditional stronghold. Whilst the results generally showed a racial pattern, analyses were divided over race as the primary determinant of voting. Most analyses explained the majority coloured support for the NP, for instance, as an attempt to protect their material interests, not an expression of racial prejudice against the predominantly African ANC. Coloured voters feared that an ANC government would prioritise Africans over them. The NP not only capitalised, but also fanned this anxiety through its campaign.141 This meant that the regional ANC had

139 The PAC contested two wards: New Brighton/Walmer’s Ward 18 contested by Moki Cekisane, and KwaZakhele’s Ward 22 by N Siwisa. Moki got 536 votes compared to the ANC’s H Meke at 1 409, and Siwisa got 262, compared to the ANC’s WM Khayingo’s 7 499. 140 Of the 468 819 estimated number of voters in PE, Africans constituted 253 626; whites, 108 857; coloureds, 100 466; and Indians, 5 870. Independent Electoral Commission Report, 27 April 1994, IEC Library, Pretoria. 141 H. Gilliomee, ‘The National Party’s Campaign for a Liberation Election’, in Reynolds, Elections ’94 South Africa.

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to behave and govern in a manner that invalidated such anxiety. The coloured vote would have to be earned. Although most Africans voted for the ANC, this was not guaranteed in future elections. As a party in government, it was to be evaluated differently in future. It rose to office on the strength of its moral authority and the promise of a ‘better life’. Its traditional supporters would expect the party to improve their living conditions and its leaders to continue conducting themselves in a manner consistent with their exalted moral standing. Any deviation from these expectations was likely to meet with popular disapproval. Yet, the results of the inaugural local elections already revealed existing weaknesses within the party. Squabbles over nominations ate somewhat into the party’s traditional support. If not handled properly, contestation over nomination was likely to have a deleterious impact on the organisation. And, it was unlikely that contestation for leadership would cease in future. Faku’s successful lobbying for the mayoral position showed that one’s appointment into leadership was not automatic. It took ambition and active lobbying to secure a leadership position, a lesson that would not have been lost on others. In other words, much of what would happen to the ANC hinged on how it adapted to being a party-in-government. Ascension to office exposed the party to new situations that demanded that it learnt new behaviours and practices. Among the new situations were contestation for government positions, managing personal ambitions and handling relations between Standard House and City Hall. These situations were all new and their handling was likely to impact on the overall performance of the party. Moreover, the exodus of skilled and experienced people from the organisation to public office affected the calibre of the leadership at Standard House. It no longer had the beneficial influence of the older generation at the regional office. From May 1994 onwards, regional leaders had to cope on their own and develop new ways of doing things.

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3 Adapting to political office ‘Amandla, ANC, ANC!’ the chants reverberated throughout the municipal chamber. It was just after 3:00 pm on 6 November 1995.1 The commotion was unusual for the customarily restrained Council proceedings. It marked a similarly rare occasion. For the first time in its 134-year history, the city of Port Elizabeth had elected an African, Nceba Faku, as its 53rd mayor. Faku’s election followed a string of white males who had occupied the mayoralty since the establishment of the municipality in 1861.2 Unlike his predecessors, Faku had served two stints in prison and was once denounced as a terrorist. His election was truly a signal that the democratic change that started in 1994 had not only permeated throughout the structures of governance, but was also irreversible. The ANC was now in control of the PE city government. This presented both opportunities and challenges for the party and the city government. The party was now in a position to pursue its transformative agenda, but, as noted in the previous chapter, revenue was limited. Locally generated income did not match the scale of the backlog in social services and the rent boycott in the townships exacerbated the situation, challenging the new leaders to transform public culture away from non-payment to payment of rent and for services. With the revenue the PEM was able to generate, including grants from the national government, it had to make choices over what to prioritise and what to defer to a later date. Political freedom required visible change to validate the ANC’s promise of a ‘better life’. Notwithstanding the party’s own programme, the legislative and institutional infrastructure within which the PEM worked was not entirely ideal. Legislation on local government was ill-developed and the party did not have an adequate

1 2

Evening Post, ‘The Men Who Will Run PE’, 7 November 1995. M. Harradine, Port Elizabeth: A Social Chronicle to the End of 1945 (Port Elizabeth, EH Walton Packaging, 1996).

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policy regime to guide its deployees3 in the city government. This was essentially a lacuna that was susceptible to abuse by unscrupulous councillors. Access to material gain would test both the politicians’ moral compass and the party’s ability to deal with malfeasant councillors. The major challenge for the ANC assuming city government, therefore, was adapting to being a party-in-government. The party and city government each had their roles and responsibilities, but also had to work in tandem. This required co-ordination. Whilst separate, how each performed impacted on the fortunes of the other. This chapter focuses on the transitional period between 1995 and 2000. It chronicles and probes the ANC both as a political party and as a city government in relation to five key points: firstly, the emergent character of the ANC; secondly, the impact of the ascension to power on branches and the general state of the MDM; thirdly, the performance of the municipality in relation to the service delivery backlog and its stated objectives; fourthly, the general conduct of councillors in relation to their ethical commitments; and, lastly, the party’s handling of contestation for nomination into Council and its electoral performance in the 2000 elections. Whilst largely focused on how the party adapts to being in government, the idea is also to provide both the context and logic for the institutional and legislative transformation. This provides important background to some of the infrastructural challenges that confront the city today. Currently these seem inexplicable, but the decisions that led to their neglect at the time made political sense for a newly liberated country facing popular pressure to deliver material changes. The account in this chapter, therefore, is not solely about the ANC, but also about the transition itself, in order to give a broader context and explanation for why certain decisions were made.

FROM A LIBERATION MOVEMENT TO AN ELECTORAL MACHINE Ascension to office impacted on the ANC in mixed ways. The party’s performance during the 1994 elections made it especially sensitive to the importance of affirming its non-racialism claims and reflecting various layers of society, whilst also retaining the same criteria in the election of leaders. Besides the latter considerations, the choice of regional leaders was also driven by inter-generational rivalry.

3

Members of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, except for the top six office-bearers, are assigned to specific provinces as areas of their responsibility. They communicate decisions from the national leadership, ensure compliance and provide general assistance to the province.

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The region elected new leaders in February 1995. This brought an end to Linda Mti’s tenure. Lasting over a period of almost four years, having been re-elected annually since 1991, Mti’s term not only continued with the rebuilding of the ANC, but also prepared the party for its electoral debut in 1994. The first regional leadership elected in the new South Africa was racially mixed, made up of experienced ANC cadres, civil society activists and former youth leaders. Nceba Faku was elected chairperson; Ronald Niegaart, deputy chairperson; Andile Yawa, secretary; Maria Mbengashe, deputy secretary; and Clifford Mtsulwana, Treasurer.4 The background of the new leaders affirmed the old criteria for choosing leaders, whilst also signalling greater awareness of what the party needed to do in order to attain its non-racial objective. Faku met the ANC’s criteria for leadership. Experience in exile and jail-time, as noted in the previous chapter, were considered key characteristics of a true ANC leader. Faku was jailed twice on Robben Island for a combined period of 13 years during the 1970s and into the 1980s. His time in jail brought him into contact with the jailed veterans of the ANC, including Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Ben Fihla, who were later to spearhead the revival of the ANC in the region and remained influential within the alliance throughout the 1990s. Besides sharing jail-time, Fihla was also close to Faku’s family and regarded him as one of his best recruits into the organisation.5 Thus Faku’s credentials made him a natural successor to Mti. He not only met the leadership criteria of jail-time, but also had influential power brokers on his side. Monwabisi Gomomo, who was a Branch Executive Committee (BEC) member in KwaZakhele 1 Branch in the 1990s and later a ward councillor from 2000 to 2011, explained Faku’s relationship with the two stalwarts: Faku’s election was like an anointment. Veterans like Oom Ben, Oom Gov and Oom Ray could never see anything wrong with Faku. He was their prodigy. They were together in prison. They trusted him more than they did any other comrade.6

In addition to the personal backing of venerated figures, Faku also enjoyed the support of the Party, of which he was also a member. The Party had successfully supported him for election as chairperson of the TLC in 1994, beating Phil Goduka and Henry Fazzie, whom most people considered more deserving than Faku. Mandla Madwara, who was then chairperson of the Party and 4 5 6

Evening Post, ‘ANC Pledge on Jobless’, 14 February 1995. B. Fihla, My Road to Freedom: ANC Veteran’s Reflections on the Journey to Liberation (East London, Harry’s Printers, 2018). Interview with Monwabisi Gomomo, 15 July 2018.

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instrumental in canvassing for Faku’s rise in the TLC, was again influential in his ascent to the position of regional chairperson of the ANC. This was indicative of the sway the Party wielded in the tripartite alliance. The Party’s influence stemmed from its stature as an organisation of intellectuals, with integrity and exemplary commitment to the cause. Mbeki and Mhlaba were the exemplars. And, the veneration they personally enjoyed also rubbed off onto the Party.7 An ANC organiser since his release from prison in 1990, Faku’s candidature also resonated with the ANC’s rank and file. He set up branches, provided logistical support and assisted with political education. This put him in regular contact with branch leaders and the general membership. They not only knew him well, but also related to him easily. Faku had an easy manner about him and was fond of dressing up casually, which made him accessible. ‘To us in the northern areas,’ asserted Errol Heynes, who was an ANC leader in Gelvandale and later deputy mayor, Nceba was our first choice for chairperson. There was talk of Stone, but we preferred Nceba. We knew him well. As organiser, he came here to the northern areas quite often. The guy lived at Boost Village, in New Brighton. He would take two taxis to Clairy Park to do ANC work. We would move around in taxis from one area to another, mobilising. He was very dedicated to his job. He would come over even on weekends. He was just available whenever we needed him. So when it came to the elections for ANC chairperson, Nceba was our man.8

Faku, in other words, deserved the chairperson position in the regional ANC. He had the requisite credentials, was approved by the elders (who wielded moral authority), favoured by the highly respected Party, and was popular with the ANC rank and file. Once elected chairperson in 1995, Faku’s position became entrenched. He did not face any serious challengers in the subsequent elective conferences that were held every second year (instead of yearly as was the case earlier). Not that Faku was never contested. Thobile Mhlahlo challenged him in 1997 and 1999, and lost on both occasions.9 A former trade unionist, who had fled into exile in 1985, Mhlahlo lacked a significant support base. Though he had returned in 1990 to become part of the trade union federation, Cosatu, Mhlahlo

7

8 9

Interview with Mthwabo Ndube, 22 October 2018. Thabo Mbeki’s biographer, Mark Gevisser, makes a similar point in his biography of Mbeki: M. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Cape Town, Jonathan Ball, 2007). See also: S. Ellis and T. Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid (Bloomington, Indiana Press, 1992). Interview with Errol Heynes, 20 July 2018. Interview with Mzoli Nkewu, 13 July 2018.

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was never able to swing the workers behind his candidature. His difficulty was compounded by his absence from PE, owing to his duties as a member of Executive Council (MEC) located in Bhisho. Unlike Faku, the election of the former youth leader, Andile Yawa, had a double implication. Whilst it seemed like a continuation of electing youth leaders to the position of secretary, Yawa’s election was actually the outcome of calculated decisions and active lobbying. Admittedly, Bongani Gxilishe, a former youth leader, was the first youth leader to become regional secretary. But his ascension was accidental. Gxilishe was initially elected deputy secretary in 1991, but mostly acted as secretary due to the regular absence of Gugile Nkwinti. From 1995, however, the election of youth leaders as regional secretaries was by design. It was prompted specifically by intergenerational rivalry among leaders of the youth movement: the founders of the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (Peyco) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, on the one hand; and the post-1985 leaders of Cosas and, later, the ANC Youth League, on the other hand. Of these two generations, the post1985 youth leaders became regional secretaries throughout the second half of the 1990s. Following Yawa was Sheya Kulati, then ‘Killer’ Gxavu. Post-1985 youth leaders actively kept their predecessors out of the top five positions of the REC. It was their way of securing leadership positions and influence for their own generation. The position of chairperson was already reserved for the most senior leaders, whilst the secretary position had not been claimed by any generation. They feared that if they were beaten to this position by the Peyco generation, they would be shunted out of leadership opportunities for a considerable period to come. Peyco leaders would have ensured that the position rotated amongst themselves. ‘Bebeno bango’ [they were proprietary about leadership], said Mzoli Nkewu, a branch leader in the 1990s and later councillor, and ‘were fond of asserting their seniority over the post-1985 generation’.10 It was a matter of whichever generation got the position first would dominate it for the subsequent years. In their bid for the secretariat, the post-1985 youth leaders had the support of Faku. He was similarly disenchanted with the Peyco generation. They did not approve of his election as chairperson. According to Gxilishe, the Peyco generation saw Faku’s election as a continuation of their marginalisation, which had started back in 1990 with the revival of the ANC. It was common for the Peyco generation, Gxilishe adds, to express disapproving remarks about Faku,

10 Nkewu, interview, 13 July 2018.

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especially that he was surrounding himself with young people whom he could manipulate easily. In reality though, Gxilishe insists, the relationship was mutually beneficial.11 Faku and the post-1985 youth leaders had a common interest in keeping the Peyco generation out of leadership positions. One example of this, Gomomo recalls, was Mzimasi Mangcotywa’s loss to ‘Killer’ Gxavu at the 1999 regional conference. Mangcotywa had solicited the support of the KwaZakhele 1 Branch, where his family home was located, but the branch went with Gxavu. The BEC then included youthful leaders, who shared Faku’s disapproval of the Peyco generation. They elected Gxavu even though he was absent on the day of elections. Gxavu was fun-loving and did not always allow organisational activities, including an elective conference, to get in the way.12 Equally noteworthy about Faku’s executive was the election of Ronald ‘Lammie’ Niegaart as deputy chairperson. This was an elevated position, especially for someone of Niegaart’s background and political standing. Based in the predominantly coloured community in the northern areas, Niegaart did not have a considerable mass of supporters. ANC members were concentrated in the predominantly African townships. His election was more the result of a calculated decision than an indication of a considerable power-base within the organisation. The idea was not simply to have a multiracial leadership, but also to have a coloured person in a prominent position, which would affirm the multiracial credentials of the ANC and, it was hoped, improve the party’s support amongst coloured voters.13 Writing about three months after the 1994 elections, in a discussion paper leading up to the December 1994 national conference, Thabo Mbeki had noted that the results challenged the ANC to intensify efforts to address the ‘national question’. A substantial number of coloured voters had voted for the NP and the DP, which suggested that these parties were successful in ‘exploiting racist sentiments among these sectors, many of whom see themselves as being superior to the “kaffirs” and are fearful and perhaps contemptuous of “black majority rule”’.14 Mbeki highlighted elimination of racial prejudice as one of the most

11 Interview with Bongani Gxilishe, 12 July 2018. 12 Gxilishe, interview, 12 July 2018. 13 It is worth noting that, in the following year, Jonnie Makgatho, who was chairperson of the biggest branch in PE, New Brighton, replaced Niegaart. But the principle of a multiracial leadership was sustained through the election of Errol Heynes as deputy mayor. 14 T. Mbeki, ‘From Resistance to Reconstruction and Nation-Building’, 17 December 1994. www.anc.org.za.

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urgent tasks that the ANC needed to undertake in the next five years. Niegaart’s prominence in the regional leadership was most likely, among other things, informed by Mbeki’s call. As the regional party entered competitive politics, therefore, it remained hierarchical, but was also responsive to the demands of the time. It was conscientious about accentuating its multiracial character in order to broaden its mass base across racial boundaries. Voting behaviour in the coloured communities did not change in the 1995 elections, however. The NP, as noted in the previous chapter, re-emerged as the dominant party amongst coloured voters. Nonetheless, disappointment with election results did not turn the party away from coloured leaders and the coloured electorate. Errol Heynes was elected deputy mayor to Faku in the council elections of 1995. But, it is worth noting that Heynes was not the first choice. Balu Naran, a man of Indian descent, was the initial preference. Naran declined the appointment, citing a daunting schedule owing to his involvement in running a family business. With Naran unavailable, Heynes became the next best choice, evidence of the organisation’s determination to have a minority-group person elected to the second most senior position of deputy mayor in Council. So, the ANC began its inaugural full local government term determined to maintain its core identity, but also conscious of its transformative objective to change society both structurally and normatively.

RE-ORIENTATION AFTER 1994: FROM ORGANS OF POPULAR MOBILISATION TO STATE AUXILIARIES Being in government for the first time posed challenges for the ANC. For decades, it had been a resistance movement whose goal was to defeat the apartheid government. The responsibility of governance was evidently different from mounting an insurgency. This change of responsibility inevitably called for a concomitant transformation of the party and its leaders to enable them to fulfil their new responsibilities. Whilst some of its cadres assumed positions in government, a large part of the organisation remained outside of government. This, according to Raymond Suttner writing in a paper produced whilst he was a member of the ANC’s Political Education Department, raised the risk of creating two ANCs, with those in government becoming unaccountable to the party.15

15 Gxilishe, interview, 12 July 2018. This was later confirmed by Raymond Suttner, but he could not find the paper. ‘That was before the emails became popular. People circulated hard copies,’ Suttner said as he explained why he no longer had the paper.

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However, Thabo Mbeki dismissed Suttner’s suggestions as mischievous and warned against the dangerous concept that the movement has split into various factions … The ANC outside government (the grassroots structures at all levels), which will be projected as the true representative of the soul of the movement, with a historic task to be ‘the revolutionary watchdogs’ over the ANC members in the legislature, who, it will be said, have been co-opted by ‘the new system’ represented by the GNU [Government of National Unity], which itself epitomises the height of the betrayal of the masses.16

All that was required, according to Mbeki, was a close working relationship among structures at the various levels of authority. Office bearers had to be cognizant of the fact that government remained an independent entity with its own regulations and processes. This meant that whilst directing the work of government the ANC had to be observant of the independence of the government. But the party was adamant that respecting government processes and regulations ‘should never excuse failing to implement ANC policy where applicable’.17 It was uncompromising on the primacy of ANC policies. In the case of councillors, for instance, it was noted they will ‘need to sign a sworn statement that they subscribe to the policies of the ANC and that, if they do not remain accountable, they will have to resign their seats and be replaced by another selected comrade’.18 Notwithstanding expressed intentions, the demands of building a new administration militated against a seamless co-ordination between the party and government. Attention was focused more on government, where most activities were concentrated.19 The ANC’s national headquarters, for instance, did not have its entire staff complement based there. Most were deployed to government. Whilst this was to become a common practice in subsequent years, with office-bearers dividing their time between the party and government work, the task of setting up a new government in the months following the 1994 elections proved more demanding. What complicated the functioning of the headquarters even more was that those responsible for running the organisation, the secretary-general and his deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa and Jacob Zuma respectively, were in Parliament and in provincial government. There was some reinforcement in 16 17 18 19

Gxilishe, interview, 12 July 2018. T. Mbeki, ‘From Resistance to Reconstruction and Nation-Building’. ANC, Conference Commission’s Report, 1994, p. 18. Interview with Saki Macozoma, 5 November 2018.

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December 1994 when Cheryl Carolus took over from Jacob Zuma and was based at Shell House, ANC national headquarters. But Ramaphosa, who was re-elected secretary-general, remained in Parliament as chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly that was writing up the new constitution. The heavy schedule of other office-bearers and members of the party’s National Working Committee, most of whom served in Cabinet and government, did not lighten up in the subsequent two to three years. Inevitably, insufficient capacity at national headquarters impacted negatively on the provincial offices. There was poor co-ordination and few directives on how the two components of the ANC should relate to each other. Provincial headquarters were not immune either to the staff challenges that faced the national office. Eastern Cape provincial leaders were similarly consumed by government work. That was a particularly demanding moment as the provincial administration was being formed from three separate administrations – Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape – into one. Bongani Gxilishe, who was the provincial secretary on a full-time basis, remembers it being particularly overwhelming in the provincial office due to lack of sufficient staff. The regional office at Standard House in Port Elizabeth was no different from the preceding structures. The two venerated figures, Mbeki and Mhlaba, who were effectively part of the office staff, left for Parliament and provincial government respectively. The chairperson and provincial secretary, Linda Mti and Gugile Nkwinti, were also in Parliament and the provincial legislature respectively. The staff complement was whittled down due to financial challenges. The amount of donations that the party had received from foreign donors after the 1994 elections, according to the regional spokesperson, Phila Nkayi, dropped significantly once the ANC ascended into government.20 Mabhuti Dano cites his own experience in the 1990s to illustrate the impact of inadequate staff at Standard House: he was appointed regional organiser in 1994, but ended up also assuming the role of spokesperson.21 In other words, ANC leaders were relatively absent at a formative moment in the organisation’s post-1994 life. In his political report at the first National Conference after the party came to power, Nelson Mandela described the problem in alarming terms: Seldom before, have we experienced such dislocation as in the few months after the elections. In this regard, we should be self-critical about the manner

20 Evening Post, ‘ANC EC Personnel Lay-Offs Undecided’, 26 July 1994 21 Interview with Mabhuti Dano, 10 August 2018.

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in which we conducted ourselves in this period. Ours was not a planned entry into government. Except for the highest echelons, we did not have a plan for the deployment of cadres. We were disorganized, and behaved in a manner that could have endangered the revolution.22

The result at the local level was the absence of orientation sessions on the new role of branches, and how they should relate to their councillors. Both councillors and branches were left to their own devices to figure out their organisational programmes and how to relate to each other. Without firm directives and close supervision from regional leaders, branches and councillors were likely to perform differently depending on the dynamics in each branch and personal traits. Councillors were generally in an advantageous position vis-à-vis BECs. Their advantage, according to Mzoli Nkewu, BEC member in Zwide 1 in the 1990s, accrued from their elevated income status and general role as facilitators of developmental projects in their community. They also controlled, Nkewu added, institutional resources such as photocopying, phone, faxing facilities and things like loud-hailers. These are all facilities the branch needs to facilitate its own organisational activities. Branch members also rely on them for assistance like a bus fare.23

Both BEC members and the organisation depended on councillors. This encouraged a dependent, lop-sided relationship favouring councillors. Moreover, councillors not only led the initiation of developmental projects in their communities, but also facilitated the contracting and recruitment processes. Developmental projects, such as the construction of a road, school or a community hall, made use of local labour. Councillors played a key role in identifying individuals that contractors employed. Councillors also influenced the expenditure of constituency allowances. Given that some of the things councillors were delivering were new – such as community halls, tarred roads, parks, libraries, and so on – they attracted a lot of acclaim from residents. This meant they could either claim personal credit or ascribe it to collective leadership (with the BEC). The responsibilities and role of councillors, therefore, generally skewed power relations within the ANC in their favour. The dual positions Nceba Faku held, as regional chairperson and mayor, further buttressed this advantage. His character

22 ANC, Political Report of the National Executive Committee, 49th National Conference, 17 December 1994. 23 Nkewu, interview, 13 July 2018.

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pulled him towards Council duties, at the cost of his duties as regional chairperson. He was impatient with long consultative processes, which is what his colleagues at Standard House expected of him. And, once he decided on doing something, Faku was hardly open to being persuaded otherwise. Because Council made official decisions and implemented them, his presence there enabled him to short-circuit the long consultative processes that characterised the party. For instance, Faku would present some decisions to the caucus as ANC collective decisions, taken at Standard House, when in fact they were his alone. At times, if a decision for adoption at Council was taken in his absence and he disapproved of it, Faku would use his role as chairperson of Council to stop the discussion. He would then instruct the ANC caucus to convene and reconsider the decision. In doing so, Errol Heynes points out, Faku would be seeking to ‘overturn decisions taken by official structures of Council such as the Exco or the caucus. Just because he disagreed, then we should change the entire decision’.24 It was up to individual councillors and leaders to insist on the correctness of their decision. Faku’s penchant for unilateral decisions would eventually sour relations between him and his youthful allies. Faku’s leadership style set the tone for most fellow councillors. They generally thought of themselves ‘as leaders, not deployees of the ANC’.25 They would not account to branches because they considered themselves above the branches. Whether or not that actually happened and the extent to which it became a problem in a branch, depended on the character of office-bearers in the BECs and the ambitions of the individuals involved. Being an office-bearer in the BEC was key to being nominated as a candidate for local election. Once elected, a councillor, especially one that was keen on re-election, would want to retain his/her position in the BEC and claim personal credit for initiating developmental projects, in the process sidelining the BEC. Similarly, an ambitious officer-bearer who wanted to be councillor, would be tempted to oust the incumbent councillor from the BEC in order to minimise his/her influence in the branch. These dynamics played out differently in the various branches. In some branches relations between the BEC and the councillor were generally collaborative. This was the case, for instance, at the Soweto Branch where the inaugural councillor, Bokkie Mabizela, did not have ambitions to be re-elected. According to Buli Festile,26 who was part of the BEC then, Mabizela had been nominated as a compromise candidate to avoid a debilitating feud amongst 24 Heynes, interview, 20 July 2018 25 Gomomo, interview, 15 July 2018. 26 Interview with Buli Festile, 13 August 2018.

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competing young leaders. Mabizela was a respected businessman and former teacher. The circumstances under which he had lost his teaching post earned him popular sympathy. He was related to a prominent exiled ANC leader, Stanley Mabizela, and the authorities had fired him, together with his sister – a nurse – for their brother’s illegal political activities. Mabizela, therefore, did not seek out political office, and once elected, was not ambitious for re-election. This made for collaborative relations with his BEC. Collaboration in the case of Zwide 1 was fostered by like-mindedness. BEC members, including Mzoli Nkewu and their councillor, Oscar Mgwanza, were of the same generation. Mgwanza came from a trade union background, whilst Nkewu hailed from the student movement. Both organisations fostered a strong democratic culture, marked by consultation and accountability. This made for a healthy relationship both within the branch and with community structures such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Committee, the predecessor of Ward Committees. The RDP committee assessed the needs of the community, recommended developmental projects and had an influence on who got employed.27 Co-operation, however, did not mean that interactions were entirely seamless. For example, in KwaZakhele 1, according to Monwabisi Gomomo, who was a member of the BEC, councillors were not always forthcoming with information that could assist the community to meet its developmental needs. The BEC had to be proactive by directly approaching the municipality itself to find out what else it offered. Gomomo recalls going to ‘Giraffe himself’ (Faku’s nickname because of his tall figure) to find out. It was during one of these enquiries with the municipality that Gomomo’s BEC found out about the constituency allowance. Their councillors never mentioned it, assuming they knew about it. On finding out about the constituency allowance, the BEC devised a plan for spending it. Their major consideration was to spend it, explained Gomomo, ‘on something that made a difference, to show that the ANC was delivering. People wanted to see change’.28 They decided to build a boxing training club, which they named Bholo Punch (later renamed Duma Nokwe). They achieved this by combining the funds of the three councillors within their branch. Gomomo is convinced that if the BEC had not taken the initiative the training facility would never have been built, nor would the constituency allowance ever have been spent on anything significant. Their choice of a training facility was quite telling of what they considered change or delivery: it had to be a visible structure. 27 Interview with Oscar Mgwanza, 14 July 2010; Nkewu, interview, 13 July 2018. 28 Gomomo, interview, 15 July 2018.

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Councillors, therefore, were not always conscientious about their respon­ sibilities. Some were even downright dismissive, if not insensitive, of the pleas of residents. Gomomo provides two such instances involving one of the councillors in his branch, Sicelo Kani. In one instance, Gomomo remembers residents coming to complain to Kani about mosquito bites. Their houses were built close to a dam. They came to Kani hoping for assistance, but Kani was unsympathetic. ‘Oh … mna ndithumel ingcongconi ngoku. Zithunyelwe ndim?’ [Oh … I’m the one who sent the mosquitoes. Did I send them?], Kani replied dismissively. Word of his indifference soon spread around the community. Some community members could not hide their dislike of the man. In one public meeting, as Kani was walking past the crowd up to the podium, one resident murmured, but intentionally loud enough for Kani to hear: ‘Eyi ndi yayicaphukela le-councillor inempundu ezinkulu.’ [I hate this councillor with big buttocks]. Kani pretended not to have heard the disparaging remark and proceeded to the podium. Then when his turn to speak came, he replied, but directed his attack at everyone in the meeting: ‘Ndiyanaz’ uba anindithandi. Nam andinithandi. Ndi ninikwe yile ANC. Andinifuni. Ndiya nitshica nangoku, yi’ [I know you don’t like me. I don’t like you either. The ANC just handed you to me. I don’t want you. Look I’m even spitting you out]. Kani’s notoriety worried the ANC. His indifference reflected badly on the party. He was nominated by, and represented, the ANC. Though fearing a backlash, Kani’s seniority, both in stature and age, made his removal unthinkable, unless he resigned voluntarily. The BEC decided to work around him, with the community. This was the party’s way of differentiating itself from its councillor, as if to say Kani’s conduct did not reflect what the party was about. One memorable incident, where the party purposely sided with residents, involved residents of the newly built residential area of Qaqawuli (named after one of the local leaders, Qaqawuli Godolozi, killed by apartheid assassins). Their constant complaints about the lack of water-taps and the size of their new RDP houses had gone unheeded by Kani. Residents organised a protest march to the ANC office to present their complaints. This meant that, rather than blaming Kani alone, residents were unhappy with the entire ANC for the behaviour of its councillor. The party not only accepted the complaint, but also promised to bring Kani to a public meeting to hear the residents’ grievances. Whilst BEC members were shaken by the march, Kani was his usual nonchalant self. They told him, Gomomo narrates: ‘Bawo abahlali bayakhala. Banengxaki and bathi awufumaneki e-ofisini ukuzo sombulul’ iingxaki zabo’ [Residents are complaining. They say you’re not available in the office for them to report their problems]. Kani responded: ‘Bathi andifumaneki xa benengxaki. Ngamany’ 79

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amazwi bathi mandihlal’ e-ofisini ndibalinde bade babe nee-ngxaki?’[They say I’m not available in the office when they want to report problems. Do they want me to sit in the office waiting for them until they have problems to report?].29 After some persuasion, however, Kani agreed to go to the public meeting. The BEC touted their success in bringing Kani to the public meeting as an achievement. They went around the area with a loud-hailer, calling people to the meeting: ‘Bahlali yizani entlanganisweni. U-Councillor Kani lo nikade nimfuna uzawuba ekhona. Simfumene’ [Residents come to the meeting. Councillor Kani, the one you’ve long been looking for, we found him]. Residents showed up at the meeting in large numbers. Before it started, one lady was asked to offer a prayer, to which she obliged: Awu Thixo wamazulu, undibone ngantoni namhlanje. Kunini simfuna u-Councillor wethu. Sihambe sade saphel’ izihlangu. Namhlanje umzise kuthi bawo osezulwini. [Oh Lord … we’ve been looking for our Councillor for so long. We walked until our shoes got worn out. Today you’ve delivered him to us]. Kani would not stand being accused of unresponsiveness, even through a prayer. As the lady was praying, Kani turned to his colleague, Ben Fihla, and said: ‘Ben uyaxoka lo mfazi. Ayikho yonke lento ayithethayo’ [This woman is lying. There’s no truth at all in what she’s saying].30 Kani’s conduct pointed to the possibility of an unresponsive ANC emerging. It took a conscious effort on the part of the BEC in KwaZakhele 1 to compensate for their councillor’s indifference and to hold him accountable. Emerging signs, however, made it doubtful that BECs would sustain a stance that placed them on the side of residents against the Council. Mabhuti Dano, the party’s spokesperson at the time, remembers there being a debate already about the appropriateness of ANC members participating in marches against their own government deployees. The debate was sparked by two protest marches: one against the prevalence of crime and another to highlight slow delivery of houses. ANC politicians, namely Dennis Neer and Max Mamase, controlled both portfolios in the provincial government. ‘The comrades that objected to the marches,’ explained Dano, were saying that we were embarrassing our own government. Those in favour of the marches responded that they first reported these comrades at the regional office, but nothing happened. Now they had the right to march because the regional office did not call Mamase and Neer to come address the people.31

29 Gomomo, interview, 15 July 2018. 30 Gomomo, interview, 15 July 2018. 31 Dano, interview, 10 August 2018.

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In the immediate aftermath of ascending to power, therefore, ANC branches were unclear about their role. That uncertainty, however, quickly made way for a drift towards a close relationship with ANC councillors and the municipality. They participated in communicating government programmes, promoted public participation and facilitated their implementation. Whilst doing so could be easily explained away as assisting in bringing the much-needed social relief into their constituency, it is inescapable that such activities were an affirmation of their belief that this was ‘their own government’. Such a sense of ownership was not entirely misplaced, especially in light of the fact that they had voted that government into office. There remained differences, nonetheless, over how residents or members of the ANC should relate towards the ANC, especially when they were unhappy with its government. Because the ANC was theirs, some felt it was improper of members to express their unhappiness with their government publicly through protests. There was a temptation to suppress public displays of disquiet at the ANC-controlled Council. However, this raised the possibility that, should the need arise, ANC branches would be actively dissuaded from confronting their municipalities on behalf of unhappy residents. Given their emerging reliance on branches as the dispenser of patronage, it was not unimaginable that, when that time came, members would comply. If that happened, it meant that other organisations, independent of the ANC, would have to take up the role of a critical voice in communities. Sanco had previously fulfilled this role, but the new political order would generate new dynamics creating doubts over whether or not the civic movement could still assume the role of championing the needs of residents.

DEMOBILISATION OF ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS The agreement within the MDM was that the civic movement would continue its traditional role, even after 1994. This meant that Sanco would remain the main organisational force amongst residents to listen and take up residents’ issues with their counterpart in government, the ANC. The assumption was that the ANC would defer to Sanco on social issues that had to do with residents, but intervene only at a governmental level to solve them. This meant that both organisations would not only have to accept the division of roles, but also collaborate. The agreement unravelled as soon the ANC ascended into political office. At the core of the disagreement was the payment of rates and payment for services, as well as deployment into government positions. As noted in the previous chapter, resumption of payment was one of the key issues in the one-city talks. Although the ANC undertook to encourage residents to resume payments in order to expand its revenue base so that it was able to provide adequate services, 81

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debt continued to rise. By May 1995 it stood at R37, 6 million.32 The party was proving unable to convince residents to end the rent boycott. ANC delegates at the one-city talks had warned, however, that voting alone would not be adequate to break the rent boycott. Rather, it would take visible improvements in the provision of services for residents to resume payment. Within a year at the helm of the TLC, however, the ANC was no longer as patient and understanding as it had been. It reckoned that residents should have resumed payments. The regional secretary, Andile Yawa, pleaded with residents: The alliance wants to make it categorically clear that payment of services constitutes a political responsibility (under) an ANC-led Government of National Unity … It is imperative that communities must stand up and make rich contributions in reconstructing and developing our beloved city and the country as a whole. The payments for services are about ensuring effective rendering of those services to our communities.33

A public campaign, Masakhane, was consequently launched in July 1995 to get residents to start paying. It involved 150 trained volunteers who would do door-to-door visits. Trade union shop stewards were also to be brought on board to encourage their members to place debit orders for payments.34 The TLC set monthly service charges at R49.49 for formal housing; R15.52 for serviced sites; and R6.30 for unserviced sites. Sanco opposed the charges. It claimed not to have been consulted, and proposed much lower rates at ‘R25 for formal houses, R5 for unserviced informal housing and R15 for serviced, informal areas’.35 Besides the exorbitance of the charges, Mike Tofile’s Sanco felt that the TLC had overstepped its authority. Determining rates, Tofile insisted, was Sanco’s prerogative, or they should, at least, have been consulted: ‘We are not dummies or puppets or manipulated by Mr Faku. That must be clear to the residents. We are still their watchdog even during this transitional period.’36 Sanco’s opposition to the official rates set the stage for a public confrontation with its ally in Council. To press its demands, Sanco planned a protest march to the City Hall on 20 July 1995, which the ANC opposed. ANC leaders went around the township with a loud-hailer, urging residents to ignore the call to the

32 33 34 35 36

Evening Post, ‘ANC Demands End to Boycott’, 26 June 1995. Evening Post, ‘ANC Demands End to Boycott’. Evening Post, ‘Municipal Services Campaign’ , 7 July 1995. Evening Post, ‘Sanco in TLC Row’, 18 July 1995. Evening Post, ‘Sanco in TLC Row’.

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protest march. The protest went ahead, but turnout was poor. Sanco’s president in PE, Cecil Magqabi, blamed the poor turnout on intimidation by the ANC: What we have noticed is that there is a lot of political intimidation going on. We are going to report to our national Sanco committee and also to the regional Sanco structures. But, despite the intimidation we, the people have shown preparedness to march today ... People have a democratic right to voice their grievances even against their own Government.37

Tension persisted into the subsequent two months. It even turned violent. Sanco’s Magqabi was woken up one night in August 1995 by the sound of a breaking car windscreen and house windows. ‘Despite what has been happening recently between Sanco and the ANC in Port Elizabeth,’ remarked Magqabi, ‘I do not want to make any assumptions. But, whatever the reason for this cowardly deed, which was carried under the cloak of darkness, it is clearly some form of intimidation.’38 Whilst not entirely direct, Magqabi attributed the violent attack on his property to the tension with the ANC. He saw it as an attempt to silence civics. Towards the end of September 1995, however, open hostility ceased. The two allies had continued to meet privately, despite hostile relations in public. The result was Sanco pledging its support for the ANC in the upcoming local elections. Dumisani Beja, Sanco’s regional assistant secretary, declared: ‘Sanco is thirsty for an ANC landslide victory … Sanco and ANC branches must hold joint workshops and mass rallies. The focus must be on the election campaign and propaganda.’39 Part of the agreement was affirming that Sanco, as one of the ANC allies, would have some of its leaders included as candidates in the looming election list. But the parties remained in disagreement over rates. Sanco encouraged residents to pay, but only its proposed rates. Whilst the organisations managed to reach a truce just before the 1995 elections, the feud exposed a fundamental disagreement over roles; that inter-organisational relations were weakening and that Sanco’s influence was on the decline. The ANC was now refusing to accept that Sanco had final authority to speak on behalf of residents. The party believed that it had just as much right, if not more, to decide on matters affecting residents because its councillors were their elected representatives and ANC branches were representative of residents. The feud

37 Evening Post, ‘Late Bid to Stop March’, 20 July 1995. 38 Evening Post, ‘Sanco Condemns Attack’, 24 August 1995. 39 Evening Post, ‘Sanco Support for ANC Strong’, 26 September 1995.

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most likely divided the loyalty of residents, or simply confused them. Sanco’s stance on the ANC was self-contradictory. One moment it lambasted the ANC for what it considered insensitivity to the plight of poor residents, and the next moment it urged residents to vote for the ANC. Whatever the actual impact on residents, the feud certainly showed that Sanco’s influence had waned. Its July 1995 march against the ANC was a notable flop. But the ANC did not want to risk going into an election with a divided alliance. It wanted a united front, with a coherent electoral message. That is why the party offered Sanco seats on its list of nominees for the 1995 local government, despite its disagreement with the TLC’s rates and incitement of public protest. How the ANC related to Sanco, therefore, was determined by its calculation of harm or benefit at the time. Where there was no immediate harm it was likely to defy or act against Sanco and vice-versa. After the 1995 election the ANC did not care to please Sanco. It removed Sanco president, Dan Sandi, from his position as chairperson of the Western District Council, a forum where the PEM sat with many other municipalities from the surrounding small towns. District councils enabled small towns to benefit from the revenue and skills of relatively big cities like Port Elizabeth. It was a way of facilitating cross-subsidisation among cities and towns. Sandi’s removal, explained Bongani Gxilishe, who also worked at the district council then, followed findings by the MEC for Local Government, Max Mamase, in response to complaints that Sandi was failing to manage the district council properly. Some of the findings included employing unqualified individuals, who were his colleagues at Sanco, and making erratic decisions.40 Sandi was replaced by Melvin Manentsa, a trade unionist. However, Sanco would not admit that Sandi was removed on account of mis­management. They ascribed Sandi’s removal to his attempts to expose corruption: It is ironic that we fought apartheid to rid ourselves of corruption and the oppression of the people, only to be betrayed by our comrades, whose main objective now is to enrich themselves by driving luxury cars and buying themselves upmarket houses in the suburbs, while the people they claim to represent continue to live in squalor.41

Removal from the Western District Council was not the only fate that befell Sandi. That was just the beginning. He was also removed as chairperson of one

40 Gxilishe, interview, 6 December 2018. 41 Evening Post, ‘Protest Greets Manentsa Election’, 30 October 1997.

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of the standing committees in Council, which cost him his seat on the Executive Committee, and he lost his seats on two other standing committees. Essentially, Sandi was removed from any position of authority and reduced to being an ordinary councillor. This entailed a notable loss of income and stature in Council for Sandi. If indeed he had mismanaged the district council, then his removal was not unjustifiable. His replacement with a non-Sanco leader, however, suggests that the ANC was not particularly keen to placate Sanco. Relations between the two allies reverted to being sour. Relations were also strained within Sanco itself. Not all Sanco nominees in Council supported the call to have Sandi reinstated. Amongst them was Mcebisi Msizi, whose refusal to support Sandi’s reinstatement, according to Msizi himself, made him a target for removal from Council. His Sanco colleagues claimed Msizi’s performance in Council was unsatisfactory. At a public meeting called to discuss his resignation as councillor, Msizi refused to resign and walked out of the meeting. He was followed by his supporters, which showed disagreement not only between leaders, but also amongst residents.42 The inaugural term of local government, therefore, found Sanco in a weak state. Its influence over residents had declined; it was divided within and leaders were pitted against each other. To be sure, Sanco was conscious of its decline as early as February 1996, and had committed to reversing it. ‘What the organisation needs,’ said Sanco’s then public relations official, Aubrey Mali, ‘is an injection of new blood, a dynamic new leadership that will carry out its programme of representing the community to ensure that Government programmes aimed at uplifting people’s standards of living are implemented.’43 However, Sanco was never able to revive itself. Instead, the organisation deteriorated, and so did its relations with the ANC, especially towards the December 2000 elections.44 As a result, the civics in PE resolved to contest elections independently. About two months later, in September 2000, the provincial conference of Sanco reaffirmed that decision. ANC’s provincial secretary, Humphrey Maxhegwana, was even chased out of that conference on the grounds that he had not been invited.45 Some Sanco leaders in PE, however, would later deviate from the decision that civics contest the 2000 elections independently. These included Sanco leaders like Mike Ndzotoyi, Monde Mtanga and Linda Mlomo, who became candidates and

42 43 44 45

Evening Post, ‘Councillor Walks Out’, 24 October 1997. Evening Post, ‘Fresh Campaign to Revive Sanco’, 6 February 1996. Evening Post, ‘Sanco to Go It Alone in Elections’, 18 July 2000. Evening Post, ‘Votes: Sanco Dumps the ANC’, 5 September 2000.

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were elected councillors in the 2000 election. This affirmed that divisions within Sanco persisted.46 Democratisation marked the beginning of the demobilisation of organisational networks. ANC structures were increasingly becoming ensnared into government programmes and processes, whilst Sanco was losing both relevance and vibrancy. This pointed to an ominous future for both the ANC and residents. For the ANC it meant the beginning of alienation from residents, whilst Sanco’s decline threatened to leave residents without an independent mobilisation voice to both register their disquiet and champion their concerns. The warning that activists like Mzanele Mayekiso had issued, over the importance of civics remaining independent of the ANC in order to retain their vibrancy, was now coming to fruition. Civic leaders were becoming dependent on the ANC for employment, something that was beginning to moderate their relations towards the incumbent.

MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE: MAKING TOWNSHIPS HABITABLE In the meantime, the ANC-controlled city government performed relatively well. The major challenges, especially in light of the local government mandate then, were addressing the social services backlog and insufficient self-generated revenue. The absence of adequate social services such as water services, sanitation, and educational and recreational facilities in the townships was testimony to the fact that they had not been intended to offer satisfactory habitation for African residents. Rather, they had been built with the primary purpose of enabling officialdom to regulate the populous African community that was located as far away from the white residents as possible to afford them peace of mind. That is why townships, according to Phyllis Ntantala, are commonly referred to as ‘locations’, which simply imply a geographic space, than a place of residence with all the basic amenities suitable for decent human habitation.47 For instance, whilst white residents shared 50 sports facilities amongst themselves, black residents, who formed more than 60 per cent of the population, only had six sports facilities. Eighty-two thousand black families lived in shacks. It goes without saying, therefore, that shack-dwellers lacked basic amenities such as water and sanitation. Inhabitants of formal houses were not necessarily better off either. Three out of four residents generally lacked access to electricity, and roads were predominantly gravel, not tarred. Predictably, because officialdom

46 Interview with Mongameli Peter, Sangoco leader, 15 June 2019. 47 P. Ntantala, A Life’s Mosaic: The Autobiography of Phyllis Ntantala (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993).

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regarded Africans purely as labourers, there were no more than three libraries in the townships, whilst white suburbs had about sixteen.48 The objective of the new PEM, therefore, was twofold: to make townships habitable, and provide them with basic amenities. Among the first things the elected Council did, as it pursued these objectives, was to reconfigure the municipality. Since the old PEM catered only for white residents, the Council did not have a housing portfolio. Housing was not a concern among white residents. Issues related to construction and infrastructure were handled by the Engineering and Infrastructure Committee. The new PEM introduced a division in the municipality, the Informal Development Division, which was to provide services to informal settlements, whilst residents were awaiting proper houses. A housing portfolio was introduced about two years later to focus on the construction of houses.49 As a result, a number of housing projects began in 1996 in the various townships. These included Qaqawuli (New Brighton), Tambo Village (KwaZakhele), Mhlaba Village (Zwide), Motherwell Tyoks, Walmer Area G, Mission Garden Lots and Bloemendal Block 23. Alongside the housing construction was the provision of electricity, the tarring of roads, and the provision of sanitation and tap-water, the latter especially for residents in informal settlements. In the process of reconstructing the city, the PEM also came up with innovations to enable better provision of services, and at an affordable cost. To patch up potholes in roads, for instance, it introduced a ‘prefabricated road patch eliminating the need for large and expensive vehicles and equipment’,50 and its Geographic Information System captured the city’s water pipeline network. Other improvements were intended for the safety and general convenience of residents. Major taxi ranks in the townships and the city centre were provided with shelters to protect commuters from the elements. Traffic signs and streetnames were put up. Spots that were notorious for accidents, such as the intersection of Daku Road and the M17 from Zwide towards Motherwell, were prioritised for traffic control. Libraries were established in Zwide, KwaZakhele, New Brighton and KwaMagxaki. Part of their offering was children’s books, with sessions for story-telling. As the second half of the 1990s set in, the face of the PE townships was changing.

48 NMB Municipality, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2016–2021: Golden Years. Accessed 27 November 2019, http://www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/%5CDataRepository%5CDocuments%5C nmbm-idp-ebook.pdf. 49 PEM, Mayoral Review for the Period 1 July 1995 to 1996. 50 PEM, Mayoral Review, p.14.

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The visible changes were the result of a dedicated focus on townships. This entailed, as noted in the previous chapter, redirecting expenditure on social infrastructure from the suburbs to the townships, which meant spending on new infrastructure rather than on the maintenance of existing infrastructure in the suburbs. This was both understandable and made sense at the time, both in terms of the scale of needs and for a political party that had just come into power. Whilst the PEM was able to effect visible change, its ability to sustain improvements was nonetheless thrown into question by the perennial challenge of collecting payment for rates and services. By June 1996, the amount of money consumers owed stood at R81 million, despite Council’s efforts to get residents to pay. In the previous year, the PEM had multiplied the number of pay points. In addition to municipal (rental) offices, residents could also make payments at the post office, Standard Bank branches and at the outlets of the retail store, Pick n Pay. The idea was to make it easier and more convenient for residents to pay the municipality.51 The PEM had also changed its credit policy to consider income status. Previously, the policy was largely inconsiderate of whether or not residents’ income status allowed them to pay. Those who failed to pay had default judgments issued against them, leading to their household goods being confiscated. Persistent failure to pay, however, brought the PEM to concede that some of the residents simply earned too little to pay off their debts. An Indigence Assistance Scheme was thus introduced in December 1996, which covered households with an income of less than R800 per month. These households received subsidies of 50 to 100 per cent for services. If they exceeded their basic allocation, then they would pay out of their own pockets. Legal action against those who owed were suspended and debtors were encouraged to pay between R50 and R120 per month towards their debt. The Scheme was to be funded from intergovernmental grants provided by the national government.52 Consumers in higher-income categories were directed to pay 20 per cent of their debt as down-payment and thereafter R200 monthly towards their debt. They were given 24 months to pay it off. To ensure that debtors paid, the policy ordered that the municipality obtain garnishee orders (payments would be deducted directly off the debtors’ accounts on a monthly basis). Tampering to reconnect electricity supply was fined R750 for first offenders (tampering disconnection fee); R1 500 for second offenders and R3 000 for third time offenders. All

51 PEM, Mayoral Review, p.14. 52 PEM, Credit Policy Review, Report of the Executive Committee, 8 December 1998.

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arrears, including legal costs and disconnection call fees, would have to be paid before electricity was reconnected. Two years later, however, the rate of payment had still not improved. Debt had actually risen to R293.4 million by January 1998. Later that year, Council decided to revise the credit policy, reinstating legal actions against defaulters. Nonetheless, it remained pessimistic that payments would improve. ‘The above measures,’ the Council noted, will only bring about a modest reduction in the existing arrears – they will not be sufficient to reverse the escalating debtors situation. This view is based on the fact that final demands generally only elicit a 4% response from debtors. Debtors wait till the proverbial last moment for payment, which may be summons or judgement stage, before arrangements for the repayment of arrears, interest and substantial legal costs are made. Arrangements are often not honoured and are used as a further means of delaying the collection process. After judgement has been obtained, a lengthy and costly legal process ensues, which neither the debtor nor the local authority can afford in terms of time and cash flow. This process may at any time be interpreted by a fresh arrangement, again at considerable administrative cost.53

Failure to pay, as Council was forced to admit, had to do with more than just poor income or inaccessible pay points. Some residents simply refused to pay, and councillors were reluctant to enforce punitive measures. Cutting off supply of services and electricity was unpopular, with councillors bearing the ire of disaffected residents. They faced protests for ostensible non-performance. Rather than support punitive measures, councillors tended to intervene on behalf of debtors to receive services, even though they were in arrears.54 Even Cosatu admitted that their own shop stewards were reluctant to enforce payment for services. They had spoken to their affiliates and employers to initiate stop-orders to facilitate payment. But, they had observed that, as Welile Nolingo noted at the Workers’ Day rally in 1997, ‘Our member unions are dragging their feet or are reluctant to encourage workers to start the process rolling.’55 Payment for services, therefore, became a sensitive political issue that councillors were reluctant to enforce. Councillors came to expect the national government to bail them out. Reliance on grants from national government, instead of enforcing payments, meant that internally generated revenue was unlikely to improve. By the end of 53 PEM, Credit Policy Review, p. 10. 54 PEM, Credit Policy Review, pp. 3–4. 55 Evening Post, ‘Ward Councillor Not “Performing”’, 23 May 1997.

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the 1990s debt stood at R348 million. But politicians were still reluctant to confront the problem. The mayor, Nceba Faku, dismissed the figure, saying it ‘does not reflect the true state of affairs, thus fostering the belief that we are unable to govern the city’.56 The real amount owed, Faku insisted, was about R263 million. The municipal officials that issued the figure to the public, according to Faku, were malicious and this showed the urgency of the need for transformation, beginning with Treasury. Irvin Jim, Cosatu’s provincial leader at the time, echoed Faku: ‘The time has come for the administration to be shaken up.’57 Whether or not the figure provided by the municipal treasury was incorrect, it remained indisputable that the debt owed by residents was on the rise. This was clearly a source of irritation for Faku, sparked possibly by his inability to reverse it. The result of non-payment was of course a shortfall in cash flow. Even an increase in rates and charges, warned the city treasurer, JJ Fritz, would not make up for the shortfall. Rather, savings would have to be made from the operating budget, which would impact negatively on infrastructure, as the city treasurer explained: First affected is usually the budget for maintenance expenditure. This leads to the deterioration of assets. Thereafter, expenditure on loan installments [is] kept at existing levels and no new capital expenditure on infrastructure financed by loans can be incurred.58

Fortunately for the PEM, national government provided grants towards infrastructure. However, as noted just above, because it was spent on the installation of new infrastructure in the townships, instead of on the maintenance of existing infrastructure in the suburbs, it meant old infrastructure would fall into disrepair. This would later become a source of disgruntlement that would spark protests over inadequate services. For the time being, however, the municipality seemed to be doing fairly well with delivering social services to its needy residents. The impact of neglecting infrastructural maintenance would be felt much later. The more immediate problem as the 1990s came to a close were the emerging cracks amongst ANC councillors and within the tripartite alliance. They clashed over the use of office for private gain. This led to the start of purges that would become a common feature in subsequent years, albeit for ostensibly different reasons.

56 Evening Post, ‘Faku Lashes Out at Officials’, 29 September 1999. 57 Evening Post, ‘Faku Lashes Out’. 58 PEM, Credit Policy Review, p. 4.

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LEADERSHIP COHERENCE: A CASUALTY OF THE CLASH OVER PRIVATE INTERESTS Albeit democratised, local government remained largely untransformed throughout the 1990s. Legislation was still ill-developed. The one existing piece of legislation, the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993, as the White Paper on Local Government would later note, ‘did not provide a blueprint for a new local government system, but simply sketched out a process for change’.59 Despite its broad nature, the LGTA nonetheless managed to insert some specific details, especially in relation to the conduct of councillors. It included a Code of Conduct barring councillors from misleading or influencing Council to reach a decision on a matter in which he/she had a personal interest, and from interfering with administrators in the execution of their duties. Overall, however, further pieces of legislation were still to be formulated to provide, among other things, clarity and guidance on the various categories of municipality, specific functions and responsibilities of councillors and administrators, and guidelines on financial accountability and expenditure. The absence of such levels of specificity meant that the old apartheid laws and practices would guide the new municipalities. One of those old apartheid practices was allowing councillors to sit on committees that decided on the allocation of tenders. Previous councillors, according to Graham Richards, who at the time was a DP councillor, had abused that position. Because most were businessmen, pre-1994 councillors used their influence in Council to support their business interests.60 The new democratic Council proceeded in a similar fashion. Using the opportunity offered by their presence in Council for business interests was similarly enticing for the new councillors. They only received allowances (not salaries per se), just like their predecessors. As of March 1996, for instance, monthly allowances were: R8 995 for the mayor and chairperson of the Exco; R6 750 for members of the Exco; and R2 250 for ordinary councillors.61 For those to whom the allowance was the only source of income, being a councillor was an attractive opportunity to augment one’s income. Thus councillors not only decided who got tenders, but some of them even had business interests. These were spread out in a variety of sectors, including construction, property development, tree-planting, hospitality, security services, technology and cleaning services.62 59 COGTA (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs), White Paper on Local Government, 1998. Accessed 7 December 2019, http://www.cogta.gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/whitepaper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf. 60 Interview with Graham Richards, 12 June 2018. 61 PEM, Budget and Administration Committee, Report, 12 March 1996. 62 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Possible Contravention by Councillors of Section 10H of the Local Government Transition Act, Report of the Executive Committee, 12 September 2000.

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Moreover, Council regulations allowed councillors to enter into business contracts with the PEM. This could be buying something from, or selling something to the municipality, or ‘supplying a service to the municipality’. Councillors were also allowed to ‘perform work for or on behalf of the Municipality’, and ‘Appearing before the Council – this would be as a consultant’. They could do all the above only on condition that they declared their interests, secured the consent of Council and exempted themselves from any decision-making process related to their interests.63 However, councillors did not always seek consent to bid for municipal work. A confidential report compiled by the Chief Executive Officer (later known as municipal manager) for the Exco, dated 12 September 2000, identified eleven irregular transactions where councillors had not sought prior consent. They involved land purchases, planting trees and cutting grass, inspecting meters and fire protection.64 The Chief Financial Officer also conceded that there were possibly more such wrongful transactions, as it was not possible to exhaustively identify all such apparent contraventions as in many instances transactions are concluded at the departmental level where the officials involved do not specifically record councillor involvement or may not even be aware of it (because they may be dealing with a company).65

In another instance, a councillor with ties to a company, Amadada Resorts, was suspected of not having recused himself from a meeting to consider that company’s bid to purchase municipal land. The suspicion was strong enough for the Exco to institute an investigation. Involvement in business with the municipality pitted councillors against one another and made them susceptible to lobbying by outside business interests. It was common for councillors, says Errol Heynes – who was deputy mayor at the time – to be approached by business people with bribes to vote for their being awarded a tender. According Mthetheleli Ngcete, who was a councillor and chairperson of the Exco from late 1999, some councillors approached ANC leaders with stacks of money, showing that they had been bribed.66 Some councillors clashed over the same business deal. A prominent example of this type of clash happened in the late 1990s, over the plot of land where the Boardwalk Complex stands today. It involved two companies, Emfuleni Resorts 63 64 65 66

Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Possible Contravention by Councillors of Section 10H. Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Possible Contravention by Councillors of Section 10H. Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Possible Contravention by Councillors of Section 10H. Interview with Mthetheleli Ngcete, 13 August 2018.

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and Siyalanda Property Development. The latter was publicly associated with councillor Sicelo Kani, whilst unconfirmed names of some councillors were connected to the former. Siyalanda owned a portion of the land previously owned by the municipality. The company bought it from the municipality in 1998, privately, without its going on public auction.67 This was a deviation from normal practice. Only under special circumstances would a council conclude a private sale. There were no special circumstances for the deviation. ANC councillors simply voted in their majority to approve the sale. Emfuleni wanted to build a casino, around the plots that Siyalanda owned. Both companies made a bid for the same plots. Council could not decide, for a considerable period of time, which of the two companies should be sold the plots. The report of the Exco meeting on 18 May 2000, for instance, noted the lengthy period of indecisiveness: Essentially, the Committee has before it two applications, one from Siyalanda and one from Emfuleni, to buy all or parts of the subject land. Whilst this Committee has taken a number of resolutions in respect of these applications, all have been referred to Council, which has deferred or referred the matter back for further consideration. As such, there is no final or binding resolution in respect of these applications. It is important that this issue be disposed of finally. The parties are entitled to a decision and the danger exists that [they] either may resort to the courts for some form of relief aimed at expediting a decision or on a contention that it has suffered loss for damages which result in avoidable wasted legal costs.68

This indecisiveness hinged on disagreements within the ANC caucus over which company the municipality should sell to. This explains why Council, instead of voting on proposals from the Exco, had repeatedly sent them back for revisions. Councillors either disagreed with the Exco’s proposals, or just could not agree among themselves. Even the aforementioned meeting of the Exco itself disagreed with the proposal from Council that the municipality sells what it identified as portion ‘C’ of the land to Emfuleni and another portion, ‘B’, through a public auction. Instead, the Exco decided that the portion that Council had earmarked for sale to Emfuleni would be sold through a public

67 Evening Post, ‘Disputed Land to ANC Councillor’, 23 October 1998. 68 PEM, Sale of Erven 748 to 752 and Portion of Remainder 1256, Summerstrand: Second Avenue, Summerstrand: Siyalanda Property Development (PTY) Limited and Emfuleni Resorts (Applicant), Report of the Executive Committee, 18 May 2000.

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auction, whilst the one Council intended for public auctioning would be sold to Siyalanda. This was yet another recommendation that disagreed with the proposal from Council. It is worth stressing that, in taking the foregoing decision, the Exco was disagreeing with the dominant view from Council. The latter preferred to sell to Emfuleni, whereas the Exco opted for Siyalanda. Mabhuti Dano, who was the regional spokesperson, believes that the Exco’s decision was not entirely objective. Business interests of the Exco members influenced it.69 Whether true or not, the proliferation of politicians with business interests certainly created a general suspicion that every Council or Exco decision to award a contract or approve a sale of municipal assets to a particular company was motivated by private gain. Emfuleni eventually built the casino following a court decision in February 2000. Instead of insisting on purchasing the land, Emfuleni had switched to the easier option of leasing, which the municipality was eager to do. This entailed challenging the licensing condition by the Eastern Cape Gambling Board that the company should own the plot of land on which it planned to build the casino. The court ruled that a lease was sufficient, paving the way for Emfuleni to lease the land from the municipality.70 Before the lengthy wrangle was resolved, however, it had wrought serious damage on the organisation. In the midst of the impasse, the Exco was reshuffled. Five of its members – Mandla Madwara, Rory Riordan, Mcebisi Msizi, Khaya Mkefa and Errol Heynes – were removed. Three of the five occupied strategic positions: Madwara was chairperson of the Exco; and Riordan and Mkefa chaired the Budget and Land Use committees respectively. The dismissal was unceremonious. They were not directly informed of their removal, but read about it in the newspapers. Madwara, Msizi and Heynes were, at the time, away in China on Council business. Mike Xego, a prominent local ANC leader, narrates the story rather theatrically: Bagxothwa bese China. Kogqitywa bafowunelwa kwathiwa ‘buyani sanuba sayenza na lonto ben’ iyele apho. Anisena magunya’ [they were fired whilst in China and phoned to come back immediately since they had no standing anymore].71

69 Dano, interview, 10 August 2018. 70 The Herald, ‘Casino Developers Win Battle over Land’, 4 February 2000. 71 Interview with Mike Xego, 26 April 2018.

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The ANC justified the reshuffle on the grounds of supposed poor performance by the five councillors. Heynes was personally blamed for the ANC’s poor showing amongst coloured voters in the 1999 national elections that had taken place earlier that year. Madwara and his colleagues accepted the decision, but rejected the supposed reasons for their removal. They issued a public statement to that effect, which partly read: Our track record speaks for itself and the portfolios we have run, together with Finance and Administration and Town Planning and the Land Use Committee, have resulted in Port Elizabeth becoming the best-run municipality in the province and one of the foremost local authorities in the country.72

The claim that Madwara and his collleagues were fired on account of poor performance was spurious. It assumed that their performance would have been evaluated. None of them were.73 Mthetheleli Ngcete, who replaced Madwara as chairperson of the Exco, also does not recall ever being subjected to a performance evaluation when he was a councillor. Indeed, a closer scrutiny of the municipal performance disputes the assertion of poor performance. Actually, Mayor Faku, with whom they occasionally disagreed, was complimentary about their work. In his mayoral speech, made on 23 September 2000 – a year after the reshuffle – Faku singled out Madwara and Riordan as deserving of special praise for gaining PEM ‘the reputation as one of the most competent municipalities in the country’.74 Ismael Momoniat, deputy director-general at Treasury, recalls Riordan as a particularly competent city treasurer (as they were called then).75 Riordan chaired the council committee responsible for drafting the budget and monitoring its expenditure. As a result, according to Heynes, the municipality enjoyed triple-A rating, which meant that its finances were sound, had reserves and could easily borrow. Incompetence had nothing to do with the reshuffle. The real reasons, according to Mabhuti Dano, were their involvement in business and lack of accountability. They used their positions in the Exco, Dano explains, to advance their business interests. An ANC councillor from 1994 to 2016, Fikile Desi, adds that their personal interests possibly motivated even the trip to China. The Chinese

72 Evening Post, ‘Popular Names Emerge on ANC PE List’, 20 September 1999. 73 This according to Rory Riordan, Mandla Madwara and Errol Heynes in their interviews with me. Mcebisi Msizi is deceased. 74 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Statements or Communications by the Mayor, Minutes, 23 November 2000. 75 Telephonic interview with Ismael Momoniat, 05 August 2018.

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apparently wanted to build a refinery, in which they would have most likely partnered with local business people. What fuelled the suspicion that the trip was motivated by personal gain, Desi elaborates, was that they did not even inform Standard House, the ANC regional office, about it. This created the impression that they had intentionally concealed the trip in order to determine who went to China and and thus who would be in a position to start negotiating the deal in a manner that would include their business partners. There is no doubt that councillors’ involvement in business was a source of disquiet with some in the ANC. It is not clear if all five of the purged councillors were actually involved in business, but their colleagues in the ANC insist that they were. Madwara and Msizi did subsequently become prominent local business people. Legislation, as noted above, allowed for councillors to do business with the municipality. However, according to Ngcete the practice, was inconsistent with the image of the ANC as the party of the poor. It created a bad impression that councillors were using their positions to make money for themselves, instead of working to improve the lives of the people.76

What is noteworthy, however, is that not all councillors who were said to be involved in business suffered sanction. Mayor Faku, too, was involved in business. For instance, on 18 May 1999 – about four months before the reshuffle – the Exco noted that Councillor Faku has advised that he is a director of Murray and Roberts (EP) (Pty) Limited and should the opportunity arise for the Company to enter into contracts with the Council he would like it to be able to do so without him being disqualified as a Councillor.

The Exco approved Faku’s request that Murray and Roberts (EP) (Pty) Limited of which Councillor NC Faku is a director, be permitted to enter into contracts with the Council without bringing about Councillor Faku’s disqualification as a Councillor.77

Faku, however, did not suffer similar punishment to that of his colleagues on the Exco. He continued as mayor. Faku survived the reshuffle due to back-

76 Mthetheleli Ngcete, interview, 13 August 2018. 77 PEM, Application for Exemption from the Provision of Section 10H(3)(B) of the Local Government Transition Act, Second Amendment Act, 1996: Councillor N C Faku, Report of the Executive Committee, 18 May 1999.

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ing from provincial leaders. Though a strong mayor, he had lost support within the alliance, which, according to Dano, took the decision to reshuffle the Exco through a structure called a regional alliance secretariat. This was made up of the three secretaries of the alliance partners. Faku was not part of the secretariat and had become alienated from his lobby group, the SACP. They disapproved of the privatisation programme his municipality was implementing.78 The nomination process for the 2000 local election, just a year later, would also show that Faku’s popularity among branch members was declining. Provincial leaders, however, remained favourable towards Faku (for reasons cited below). They backed him, whilst Madwara and his colleagues lacked political support. None had a strong constituency in the ANC alliance to stand up for them.79 Riordan, for instance, owed his position to expertise and his closeness to Mike Xego, who was away at the Eastern Cape legislature; Mcebisi Msizi, as noted earlier, had clashed with Sanco leaders, and Madwara was no longer chairperson of the SACP. Unhappiness with Faku persisted nonetheless as the 2000 local elections approached. The local newspaper, Evening Post, reported that his name was low on the PR list emerging from the party’s nomination process. This meant Faku enjoyed little support among the branches and was unlikely to come back as mayor, if he came back at all. The regional secretary, ‘Killer’ Gxavu, did not dispute the reports that Faku’s name was languishing low down the list. Whether or not he returned as mayor, Gxavu pointed out, depended on the provincial leaders who determined the order of the final list.80 Speculation even emerged that Sakhumzi ‘Saki’ Macozoma could be mayor instead. Macozoma was a prominent locally born politician, part of the 1976 generation of activists, who had spent several years in the Robben Island prison and became the party’s leading national spokesperson in the 1990s. Actually, says Humphrey Maxhegwana, Macozoma’s mayoral candidature was more than speculation. A provincial secretary then, Maxhegwana remembers provincial office bearers seriously discussing the matter.81 As it turned out, the final list submitted to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had Faku’s name at the helm. Faku was placed atop the list solely at the discretion of the provincial leaders. This made him the favourite to return as mayor, if the ANC won the 2000 local elections. The individuals who had been removed from the Exco were not as fortunate. Riordan, Madwara, Heynes and

78 79 80 81

Dano, interview, 10 August 2018. Interview with Flip Potgieter, 11 July 2018. Evening Post, ‘Metropole: Faku Not Favoured’, 6 September 2000. Interview with Humphrey Maxhegwana, 12 July 2018.

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Mkefa were not included in the list. Riordan’s removal was particularly callous, as he narrates: When we did the PR list for the 2000 elections, I was placed at 9 or 10. I was obviously very safe. Then I got a phone call from Mabhuti Dano saying we wanted to get every vote including in Ward 1: ‘Can we put you in there to run against Mrs. Trent in order to get that couple of votes there?’ He said ‘You’re obviously safe on the PR, don’t worry.’ I said ‘Sure’ knowing that I was safe and would come back as a PR. Then we went for training. The venue had two queues for PR and ward councillors. I went to the PR queue and everything was still a secret then. There was a guy there who had a list, and looked at it under the table. He told me that I wasn’t on that list. I then went to Dano and said ‘Now’. He said, ‘Oh we couldn’t have you on both lists. You had to be on one list. And, we decided to take you off the PR list. It was the decision of the REC.’ That’s how they got rid of me.82

Provincial leaders’ insistence on retaining Faku as mayor showed that their considerations differed from those of local leaders. They were dismissive of local unhappiness with Faku. According to Maxhegwana, they ‘never picked up this thing in the branches in PE – that asimfun’ uNceba [we don’t want Nceba] and all that, no!’. Their main interest was in Faku’s leadership of the municipality, about which they thought favourably. The townships, Maxhegwana elaborated, were changing and that was due to Faku’s leadership: We still needed that arrogance, arrogance with action. Nceba is not a lame duck; he’s very active. If he wants things done, he wants things done. We wanted that kind of an individual. So we decided to let him continue.83

Moreover, retaining Faku was strategically important for what was happening in PE at the time. The PEM was being fused with two other municipalities, Uitenhage and Despatch, to form a bigger metropolitan municipality. Faku was considered a suitable figure to lead the integration process. He could be relied upon to lead the integration process successfully. To provincial leaders, therefore, Faku’s strength as a leader counted more than the local concerns about his autocratic tendencies and business interests. Another view is that Thabo Mbeki, who was elected the party’s and country’s president in 1997 and 1999 respectively, also supported Faku’s retention. This is

82 Interview with Rory Riordan, 15 July 2018 83 Maxhegwana, interview, 12 July 2018.

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not far-fetched. The SACP’s disapproval of Faku also had to do with his implementation of the government’s privatisation programme, for which Mbeki was also lambasted. Mbeki would have sympathised with Faku and thus opposed any action that gave his detractors satisfaction. Emerging leadership ructions within Council, however, did not dampen the ANC’s electoral support in the 2000 local elections (Table 3.1). Just as in the inaugural elections, the ANC won a convincing majority, close to two-thirds of the total votes cast. The Democratic Alliance (DA), which was a merger of the DP and New National Party (NNP), came second, but trailed far behind the ANC with more than 106 000 votes (on the ward ballot). Besides the numerical strength of its traditional support, the ANC’s superior tally was also boosted by a relatively superior turnout in its strongholds. It averaged 66 per cent, which was notably more than the DA’s 55 per cent. This gave the ANC 72 of the total 108 seats in Council. TABLE 3.1 Breakdown of 2000 local elections, Nelson Mandela Metro, seats and % support Party

Ward seats (number)

PR seats (number)

Total seats (number)

Total support (%)

ANC

34

38

72

66.67

DA

20

11

31

28.70

UDM

–

2

2

1.85

ACDP

–

1

1

0.93

PAC

–

1

1

0.93

ATEAM

–

1

1

0.93

IFP

–

–

–

–

Source: Independent Electoral Commission 84 Notes: UDM = United Democratic Movement; ATEAM = African Transformation Efficiency & Affirmative Movement

The impressive electoral performance was the result of both a coherent party and visible changes in the townships. Besides the occasional confrontations with Sanco, the ANC had remained largely coherent and relations with its allies were fairly co-operative. This showed in the seamless manner in which the process of nominating candidates proceeded. Moreover, social improvements in the townships were tangible. Changes were even more visible, according to Buli Festile, a BEC member, in places like Soweto-on-Sea – an informal settlement:

84 See https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/.

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There was nothing here, no roads, houses or schools … Now there were houses being built, a school – Sivuyile Primary School, a creche, taps were installed. Initially we had communal taps, and would have these big drums to fill up with water. You either put the drum on your head, or rolled it along on the road. Now the tap was just outside the door.85

The electoral strength, however, belied a party in limbo. Ascension to government raised an attendant question over how the party would hold its deployees accountable. Views were divided on this question. Some wanted ANC members, whenever they were unhappy with their own Council, to voice this publicly and visibly. Others counselled against public demonstrations, saying that such actions were counter-productive, for they embarrassed their own government. ANC members protested nonetheless, led by some leaders who wanted to dissociate the party from wayward councillors. This was likely to be a recurring question whenever ANC members contemplated a protest march against their own government. How it was likely to be resolved would depend on the party’s calculation of what harm, or benefit, such protest actions would bring on the party. That said, the emerging role of the organisation as a dispenser of patronage was likely to incline local leaders and activists towards protecting the party. Protest actions suggested that the ANC-controlled Council was not performing as per expectations. Led by ANC members, such protests would be even more credible and potentially damaging to the party. In other words, if complaints recurred frequently in future, party leaders and activists were likely to close ranks in order to contain the impression that their government was failing and in order to maximise the prospects of retaining power. What the foregoing portended for the future, particularly given the weaknesses that afflicted Sanco, was that residents were unlikely to have independent organisational voices to articulate their disquiet against ANC councillors. Some of Sanco’s leaders had been co-opted into the city government and the organisation itself was moribund. This raised the possibility that, sometime in future, the ANC would be delinked from its traditional electorate and they, in turn, would feel that the party had become indifferent to their needs. A similarly divisive issue, on which the party lacked decisiveness, was the use of office for private gain. Councillors’ voting on tenders and doing business with the municipality was not illegal. But it made councillors susceptible to bribes, which some accepted. And, the fact that councillors could vote to award contracts to one of their own businesses was incongruent with the public image

85 Festile, interview, 13 August 2018.

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of the ANC. It could easily create an impression that councillors prioritised their own business interests over those of their largely poor constituency. Even more worrying for the party was that councillors who had business interests caused conflict within the party itself. It pitted them against one another. But party leaders were uneven in issuing what they considered to be censorship. Some councillors were punished, whilst others were spared. This must have created the impression that the act itself was not frowned upon, but depended on whom the supposed culprit was associated with. If the leadership considered one favourably, then one did not invite sanction. This smacked of factionalism, which was unlikely to stamp out the use of office for personal gain. One could go on with the practice and escape censorship so long as one was associated with the dominant faction.

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4 ‘You keep your Standard House; I’ll keep my City Hall’ The new millennium found local government in a markedly different form. It was now fully democratised and regulated by an elaborate legislative framework. The number of wards was no longer based on a racial quota nor was the ratio of ward and PR seats skewed in order to increase minority representation. Authority and the division of responsibilities between politicians, on the one hand, and administrators, on the other, were specified. The role of municipalities now went beyond mere delivery of social services to initiating meaningful development. ANC branches and the regional leadership were inevitably affected. Alignment with the reconfigured local government became necessary. This entailed a reconfiguration of the region, re-demarcating the size of branches and aligning them to wards. Whilst the organisation was consolidating itself, relations within the alliance were deteriorating. The SACP began consolidating into a faction supposedly organised on ideological grounds. The idea was to swamp the ANC and Council with individuals who were decidedly leftist. In addition, provincial dynamics impacted on the election of regional leaders. Provincial leaders exerted influence on who became a regional leader so that they, in turn, swayed regional support in favour of their own election at the provincial level. This marked the beginning of trans-boundary alliances that would become pronounced in later years, with detrimental effect on both intra-party democracy and governance. Both the party and the municipality, in other words, were entering a new phase. The first and most notable manifestation of change was that different individuals occupied the office of ANC regional chairperson and the mayoral position. The separation put to test the proposition that the two offices could work together effectively, with the regional office providing overall guidance, whilst the municipal leader did the day-to-day operations. The test was complicated both by the introduction of the executive mayor model and by the strong personality of the initial occupant of that office, Nceba Faku. This raised the 103

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challenge of how the party would subject a strongman figure, prone to errant behaviour, to its collective will. Alongside changes in the party structure, officialdom introduced further reforms in municipal administration. One major aim of the reforms was to eliminate the involvement of politicians in administration, an intrusion that promoted corrupt practices. Albeit plausible that this would work, what became evident was that, without a similarly committed political leadership, reforms do not have the intended impact. Signs began to show that unscrupulous politicians can circumvent prohibitive measures – something that would become endemic in subsequent years. This chapter, therefore, focuses on four key issues within the 2001 to 2006 period: changes in the criteria for electing leadership; how the party and municipal leaders understood and implemented the requirement for collaboration; what happened in the instance of a strongman leader who defied collective decisions or took unilateral decisions; and how councillors reacted to reforms that sought to curb malfeasance in the administration. The subsequent discussion, however, does not necessarily follow in the aforementioned sequence.

EXECUTIVE MODEL: FROM CEREMONIAL TO EXECUTIVE MAYOR The 2000 local elections completed the transitional phase of local government. A new and permanent local government system was established. The new municipalities were a fusion of rural and urban areas, developed and less-developed towns. Accordingly, municipalities were designated into different categories: metropolitan, district and local. The underlying objective was to enable municipalities to assume a developmental role. Beyond providing just basic infrastructure, municipalities were to lead the socio-economic development of their own areas. They were to achieve this through, among other things, the use of land, further investment in infrastructure and tourism and through the choice and implementation of by-laws.1 In accordance with the developmental goals, the PE Municipality was fused with the municipalities of the neighbouring towns, Despatch and Uitenhage, into a metropolitan municipality (metro), named after South Africa’s iconic figure, Nelson Mandela. It became known as Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB). Accordingly, legislation prescribed that metros adopt a new model of executive authority. They could rest executive authority either in one individual (an executive mayor) or in a collective (an executive committee). If a municipality chose the executive 1

COGTA, White Paper on Local Government, 1998. Accessed 7 December 2019, http://www.cogta. gov.za/cgta_2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/whitepaper_on_Local-Gov_1998.pdf.

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mayor model, the executive mayor would appoint a mayoral committee to assist him or her. Executive authority remained with the executive mayor, who might choose to delegate certain functions to the members of the mayoral committee. Conversely, within an Exco model, the collective would share authority. Council would elect individual members of the Exco, which would then elect its own chairperson. The latter would also serve as a ceremonial mayoral figure.2 Each executive model has its advantages and disadvantages. An executive mayor model enables decisiveness and provides a face to the municipality, but concentrates authority in one person. Within an Exco model, authority is diffused and shared among the various members. Decisions are the product of deliberation and collective agreement, but could take time to make, due to disagreements or failure to be quorate. These were the two options presented to the newly formed NMB metro. The NMB Council opted for the executive mayor model.3 In 2000, at its first session, the ANC elected Nceba Faku as executive mayor. All executive authority in the NMB was now concentrated in Faku. Faku’s election as executive mayor was curious. He already enjoyed a reputation as domineering. Making him executive mayor was likely to embolden his imperious character. Ironically, whilst purporting to favour collective leadership, the provincial leaders at the time preferred Faku’s imperial leaderhip style. According to Humphrey Maxhegwana, then provincial secretary, the party was beginning to feel a sense of urgency to fast-track delivery of social services and improve local economies.4 It was this that motivated the reorientation of municipalities from mere service providers to agents of development. A further requirement was a visionary and decisive leadership. Faku met both prerequisites. That said, the party was still wary of Faku’s being an all-powerful mayor. They wanted a mechanism to dilute the concentration of power in his hands, to restrain him. This was to be achieved in two ways. Firstly, the party elected a deputy mayor, Bicks Ndoni. Ndoni was a senior figure, who had also been mayor of Uitenhage for the previous five years. The intention was to have Faku exercise executive power in collaboration with Ndoni, an arrangement they hoped would enable Ndoni to curb Faku’s excesses. The second, and most important restraint, was to be the regional leadership. This seemed likely, especially because the two positions – mayor and regional chairperson – were now occupied by different individuals.

2 3

4

White Paper on Local Government, 1998. Seventy-six voted in favour and thirty-one against the model (one councillor was absent). Most opposition parties opposed the executive mayor model and thus did not nominate a candidate for election. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Council, minutes of meeting, 14 December 2000. Interview with Humphrey Maxhegwana, 12 July 2018.

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SHIFT IN LEADERSHIP CRITERIA: FROM THE EX-ROBBEN ISLANDERS AND EXILES TO LOCAL ACTIVISTS The 2000s saw a similarly drastic change in the criteria for leadership. Previously, imprisonment on Robben Island and exile had been considered suitable credentials. It was on this basis that Ben Fihla, Linda Mti and Nceba Faku were elected to their leadership positions. This changed in the new millennium. Sicelo Gqobana’s election as regional chair in 2001 heralded the change. A teacher by training, then based in Somerset East, Gqobana had made his name in the Mass Democratic Movement. He started off in the teacher’s union and later, under the tutelage of Matthew Goniwe, became involved in the civic movement, largely in rural areas and to some extent also in urban areas such as PE.5 The boundaries of the old Eastern Cape ANC region, which encompassed the surrounding towns of PE, were still intact. Gqobana was also a member of the REC. Whilst significant, Gqobana’s election signified more than just a shift in leadership criteria. It also showed a growing rift within the alliance. His election was owed to intensive lobbying by the leftists within the alliance. Although not overtly associated with the Left, the Party considered Gqobana amenable to its influence. It was engaged in an ideological battle with the ANC, which it felt was succumbing to the neoliberal influence under Mbeki. Its successful lobbying for Gqobana was an attempt to reverse that ideological influence in the regional ANC. Gqobana won by a margin of one vote over Thobile Mhlahlo. The latter represented the old-style ANC leader who straddled the alliance, but was not resoundingly popular within the leftist circles. Gqobana’s slim victory showed that their attempts at ‘usurping the ANC’, as their detractors would later counter, were resisted and their victory was not irreversible, which would quickly prove to be true. Gqobana’s REC was quickly disbanded because it had been elected by an outdated party structure. The ANC’s 2000 National General Council had resolved to align the regions and branches to the newly demarcated municipalities and wards that were inaugurated in the 2000 elections. The region did not implement that resolution, an act of defiance that put their new REC in breach of a conference resolution of the organisation. An interim regional leadership structure, known as the Regional Task Team, was set up to oversee the restructuring. Bongani Gxilishe led the team. As noted earlier, Gxilishe was an experienced local leader who had served in both regional and provincial leadership positions.

5

Telephonic interview with Sicelo Gqobana, 14 November 2018.

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A realigned ANC now had eight newly formed regions in the province, one of which was formed by the borders of the recently created NMB metro. The new branches, instead of aligning with township/surburb borders, were realigned with the newly demarcated wards, which saw an increase in the number of branches to 34 in PE and 54 in the entire metro. Following organisational realignment, a regional conference was convened in August 2002. The leadership outcome reaffirmed the shift in the criteria for electing leaders, whilst the manner of the race revealed provincial influence in the region. Thobile Mhlahlo, who had just lost earlier, was the only known contender for the position of regional chairperson in the period leading to the conference. At the last minute on the day when nominations were submitted, Stone Sizani made his name available.6 Mhlahlo was a serial contender, whilst Sizani was a reluctant candidate. Sizani was already provincial deputy chairperson, a higher position that also secured him a seat in the provincial cabinet. If elected regional chairperson, Sizani would have to vacate his provincial leadership position. His candidature, therefore, was a surprise. Provincial dynamics prompted Sizani’s candidature. Makhenkesi Stofile, then provincial chairperson, nudged Sizani into joining the regional race. Stofile was due to confront his archrival, Mluleki George, for the position of provincial chairperson just the following month, after the regional conference, in September 2002. It was in Stofile’s interest to have the NMB under an ally who would, in turn, use his influence to sway the NMB region behind his candidature at the provincial conference. Mhlahlo was known to be aligned to George. With Sizani at the helm of the regional party, Stofile was poised to get the bulk of the votes from the NMB delegation at the provincial conference.7 Sizani was elected regional chairperson over Mhlahlo. His top five executives included Mike Xego as his deputy; Cosatu’s Vuyo Toto as secretary; Charmaine Williams, a youth leader, as deputy secretary; and Mthwabo Ndube, who had previously held leadership positions in the SACP, as treasurer.8 Sizani’s election reaffirmed the shift that had been initiated by Gqobana’s election earlier. The shift was further underscored by the election of Xego and Mthwabo, whose backgrounds were similar to Sizani’s and with whom he had worked closely in the past. Whilst Sizani’s election boosted Stofile’s prospects at the impending provincial conference, it was uncertain how he would deal with his mayoral counterpart, 6 7 8

The Herald, ‘Mhlahlo Front-Runner for Top ANC Regional Position’, 17 July 2002. Interview with Mzoli Nkewu, 29 September 2018. The Herald, ‘Major Coup as Sizani Is Elected Chairman’, 5 August 2002.

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Faku. What complicated the situation was that the election of Sizani’s REC took an oppositional stance towards Faku. He stood for election into the extended executive committee, but was not elected. This smacked of a rejection, if not a personal slight, against a sitting mayor and a former long-serving party chairperson. That was hardly an ideal start towards a cordial working relationship between the party chairperson and the mayor.

MAYOR FAKU: ‘A SHAKESPEAREAN CHARACTER’9 As it panned out, Faku’s leadership proved to be a double-edged sword: visionary and decisive, but also imperious and errant. An illustrious example of Faku’s creative leadership was the establishment of a developmental agency, Mandela Bay Development Agency (MBDA) that steered his mayoral vision for the newly formed municipality, Vision 2020. Visionary and decisive leadership Faku was among the first advocates of development-oriented municipalities, even before they were inaugurated in 2000. Their introduction was first mooted in 1998 through the White Paper on Local Government. Faku not only saw the proposed developmental mandate as an answer to the challenges that faced the city, but also considered the region sufficiently equipped to develop itself, instead of relying on the provincial government. Speaking at the opening of Council in 1999, Faku said: Affirming hawkers and small businesses can never be a solution to our problems and also the mirage of Ngqura may take a long time to overcome. The solution of our economic plight is in our hands – all outside attempts can only add to our strategy. It is tragic for any city of the calibre of Port Elizabeth to have its economic future and direction being decided outside its locality with minimal involvement even of its provincial leadership.10

Once elected executive mayor of the newly established NMB metro in 2000, Faku pursued a developmental agenda with typical single-mindedness. Though enthusiastic about its newly defined role, Faku was nonetheless unconvinced of its internal capacity and the suitability of municipal processes to achieve developmental goals. Instead, Faku pursued an idea he had initially mooted

9

I got this characterisation of Faku as a ‘Shakespearean character’ from Flip Potgieter, a former ANC councillor. Interview, 11 July 2018. 10 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council, Communications or Statements by the Mayor, 28 January 1999.

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in 1999, to which he had been exposed during an overseas visit to the French city of Marseilles: to set up a private agency.11 The French city had managed to transform itself drastically through an independent agency largely because of its manner of operation and institutional expertise. These qualities appealed to Faku not only because he felt an urgent need to transform the city, but also because he was notoriously impatient with lengthy bureaucratic processes and lacked confidence in his colleagues. ‘He even made us write an aptitude test,’ recalled Mike Xego, who was part of the mayoral committee at the time. ‘I refused, ndathi rha uphambene Nceba [told him he was mad],’ said Xego and added: ‘He used the results of tests to validate his refusal to delegate some of the powers to us. “How can I delegate anything to you when you’ve even failed a simple test?” Nceba asked mockingly.’12 For an overly self-confident person like Faku, it is possible that he exaggerated the intellectual challenges of his members of Mayoral Committee (MMCs). In the particular instance of the developmental agency, however, it is true that they did not quite appreciate its significance. Sivu Ntlabezo remembers Faku and, to some degree, Mike Koenaite, as the only ardent backers of the idea to set up the agency. Faku had approached Ntlabezo, a local lawyer who had previously provided legal services to the municipality, to draft the founding document. Koenaite was responsible for the portfolio that dealt with economic development, but Ntlabezo dealt with Faku more frequently than did Koenaite. ‘One morning, around 3:00 am,’ relates Ntlabezo, ‘he even woke me up with a phone call wanting to know the meaning of some clause in the document. He just could not wait for sunrise to ask me.’13 Council adopted the proposal to form the MBDA in 2002, and it was set up the following year. The board of the agency boasted a mixture of individuals from business and public sector development to the academy. They included Sipho Pityana, who was the inaugural chairperson, a businessman and locally born; Phil Gutsche, a prominent local businessman; Sakhumzi Macozoma, a former politician-turned-businessman, also born locally; Pepi Silinga, a chief executive officer (CEO) of the state-owned Coega Development Co-operation; and Danny Jordaan, CEO of the 2010 World Cup Organising Committee. The board, in turn, appointed Pierre Voges CEO. Voges had experience of working at a developmental agency, having worked in the first developmental agency to

11 Evening Post, ‘Faku Looks at Big Challenges’, 29 April 1999. 12 Interview with Mike Xego, 26 April 2018. 13 Interview with Sivu Ntlabezo, 28 September 2018.

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be established in the country, in Cape Town. The board had both the requisite experience and expertise.14 In keeping with its mandate of reviving economic activity through re­­new­ing the city centre and tourism, the agency set out to do a number of catalytic projects. These included refurbishing historic buildings, developing Njoli Square – a prominent taxi rank bustling with informal trading – into a fully fledged multi-purpose complex that would house commercial activities and government offices, constructing an International Convention Centre to host conferences, and the construction of a towering statue of South Africa’s founding father, Nelson Mandela. Building the International Convention Centre and the statue were part of an audacious plan that Faku had for the beachfront area. The potential of the beachfront was not fully exploited. It had, for instance, oil and manganese storage tanks that gave part of the beachfront an industrial appearance. Plans had already been mooted earlier to remove the tanks as they stood out as an eyesore in what should have been a pristine beachfront. But Faku’s plan went beyond just removing the tanks. He also wanted to demolish the highway – the N2, or Settlers Way – that ran parallel to the ocean in order to expand the beachfront. Instead of the N2 highway, Faku envisaged something along the lines of the Boston Tunnel, which went under water.15 The range of developmental projects was later consolidated into what became known as Vision 2020. This was a long-term plan that formed the anchor around which the metro’s Integrated Development Plan would be drafted and updated annually.16 The MBDA was to be the leading agency in implementing the vision, which would make the municipality a leader in local government institutional innovation. Besides its novelty, the formation of the MBDA was salutary in a number of ways. Its mere establishment not only promised to change the face and economic life of the metro, but was also indicative of visionary leadership and one that prioritised the public good. On the latter point, for instance, Macozoma points out that having a private agency implement developmental projects limited the possibility of corruption and augured well for the timeous completion of developmental projects. ‘Capital projects,’ explained Macozoma, tend to involve a lot of corruption by politicians. Municipalities approve contracts and target companies that are likely to benefit them financially. In

14 Mandela Bay Development Agency, Annual Report 2005/6. 15 Interview with Bongani Gxilishe, 13 September 2018. 16 Interview with Mike Koenaite, 30 September 2018.

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handing over the building of these capital projects, the politicians were letting go of that possible financial gain.17

A thorough evaluation of the MBDA is yet to be done, but a casual assessment of its activities over the 18 years of its existence suggests that it has done relatively well. Some of its intended projects have not materialised. These include the building of the statue and the International Convention Centre, as well as the wholesale change of the beachfront. It has managed, however, to refurbish some parts of the city centre and historical buildings. Whilst improvements on Parliament Street were not sustained, the neighbourhood just opposite, across Cape Road in what is commonly called ‘Stanley Street’ in Richmond Hill, has been developed into an even more vibrant restaurant area. The Donkin Reserve and Tramway buildings are now fully functional, with restaurants, offices and spaces that are also open to public activities. The Red Location Cultural Precinct was established, making the area one of the most distinct and spectacular heritage sites in the country.18 Equally commendable about the agency has been that, although funded by public money, Council hardly interfered in its operation. In fact, Macozoma lamented that Council kept aloof from the agency to the point where, he believed, they did not take sufficient credit for the work done by the agency. To be sure, the institutional innovation and developmental initiatives were reflective of Faku’s sterling leadership. The metro and its mayor distinguished themselves in other ways throughout Faku’s tenure, winning both national and international awards. Faku won the award as best mayor of the year, and the city and its beaches were rated either the cleanest, or second cleanest in the country. For its architectural design of the Red Location Museum, the metro received international accolades, including the 2006 Lubetkin Award from the Royal Institute of British Architects in June 2006.19

17 Interview with Saki Macozoma, 5 November 2018. 18 Mandela Bay Development Agency, Annual Report 2005/6; Macozoma, interview, 5 November 2018. 19 The Herald, ‘Metro Showered with Praise at National Indaba’, 7 December 2002; The Herald, ‘Three Days to Vote for Your Friendly City’, 18 January 2004; The Herald, ‘Bay’s Cleanliness Wins Accolade’, 18 November 2005; The Herald, ‘High Accolades As City Wins Leadership Awards’, 8 December 2005; The Herald, ‘Controversial Red Location Museum Finally Ready to Open’, 8 November 2006.

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Imperious and errant leadership Lauded for his visionary and bold leadership, Faku’s more negative traits as imperious and errant were not new; they had manifested whilst he was chairperson of the Transitional Local Council. This had earned him derision and disaffection from within the party to the point where he was not the popular choice for the mayoral candidate in the 2000 elections. Provincial leaders overlooked local disquiet and selected him nonetheless. Regional leaders could not restrain Faku nor did he change his errant ways. This manifested in unilateral decision-making, meddling in the administration and abuse of office for financial gain. Faku did not believe in collective leadership. His instinct was to act unilaterally. This was a function of excessive self-confidence. Whilst understandable for someone who was diligent, with an insatiable appetite for knowledge, Faku’s demeanour towards his colleagues revealed an egotistic personality. He just did not think that any of them could do something as well, let alone better than him. He was thus reluctant to delegate, and where he did so, the functions were marginal and he would still intrude. Deputy mayor, Bicks Ndoni, for instance, saw his responsibilities – international relations, institutional transformation and capital projects – as marginal to the functioning of the municipality.20 Moreover, as noted just earlier, Faku did not defer to his MMC for economic development to drive the formation of the MBDA, but was the dominant figure in that process. Faku did not spare his party either. Ordinarily, ANC directives were communicated through the caucus wherein agreement, on any issue likely to be tabled in Council, was canvassed among all councillors. Ideally, the mayor would not table any new item in Council without first presenting it to the caucus for discussion and agreement on a common position. But Faku did not always feel bound by such conventions. One such example is his signing a contract with a debt-collection company, Unihold, without first informing the ANC caucus, simply expecting them to endorse it by voting for it in Council. One ANC councillor could not contain his shock: It was terrible. It’s really bad for the ANC. The feeling we get is that he (Mr Faku) wants us to just rubber-stamp his decision. Just look at his arrival at the meeting – late, when we had finished discussing it … The ANC had no formal caucus meeting to debate this issue. We were surprised when we were now expected to make a decision on the matter.21

20 Interview with Bicks Ndoni, 1 October 2018. 21 The Herald, ‘Faku Faces Council Revolt’, 25 May 2001.

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Even Faku could not deny the accusation: ‘It is true that in so far as payment of Unihold is concerned in relation to the contract, not much consultation has been done.’22 Administrators did not escape Faku’s intrusion either. Usually, administration does not fall under the mayor. Even though there is an MMC responsible for corporate affairs, the day-to-day running of the administration is under the direct charge of the municipal manager. MMCs formulate policies and oversee their implementation, whilst administrators do the actual implementation. In the day-to-day operations this implies that any interaction with administrators goes through the city manager.23 Instead of liaising with administrators through the city manager, Faku did so directly. Executive managers would get phone (or text) messages in the wee hours of the morning, instructing them to provide information urgently. In one instance, where he was unhappy with the performance of a senior manager, Thandeka Mali, Faku promptly suspended her without following proper procedures. He announced her suspension whilst delivering the 2004 budget speech, describing her as ‘dead wood’. Usually, a suspension follows performance evaluation and remedial measures to improve inadequate performance, if necessary, and it is communicated by the city manager through correspondence. None of this happened in the case of Mali; not even the city manager, Mzimasi Mangcotywa, had prior knowledge of the suspension. The court eventually overturned the suspension.24 The result of Faku’s meddling with the administrators elicited an outcry on their part. They documented their disquiet in a letter titled, ‘Concerns from Management’ for the attention of the Mayoral Committee and Council. Amongst the things they noted in the letter was that they had started to switch off their cellphones at night over the weekend as the mayor has on a number of occasions sent SMS messages to them between 3 and 6am on Saturday and Sunday over the last two months, without regard to their resting periods and privacy of the individuals and their families.

Direct communication outside of working hours, the managers added, was ‘typical of the leadership of the council and that many issues are dealt with in an autocratic way, bordering on the actions of a dictator’.25 22 23 24 25

The Herald, ‘Faku Faces Council Revolt’. Interview with Graham Richards, 12 June 2018. Interview with Mzi Mangcotywa, 1 October 2018. The Herald, ‘Anger over ‘Dictator’ Faku’, 3 June 2004.

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Faku was also embroiled in acts of impropriety. One misdemeanor, publicised in October 2001, related to his abuse of the Mayor’s Discretionary Fund. The fund predated 1994 and was introduced in recognition of the fact that, in the course of their work, mayors have to spend on one item or another. Instead of using their own money in the course of official duties, Council made funds available for such expenses. This was necessary especially before 2000 when councillors received only stipends. In Faku’s instance, however, it also emerged that a substantial number of transactions were unrelated to his official duties. The initial report in the local newspaper, The Herald, showed a number of personal expenses, including paying for traffic fines incurred by family members, medication and repairs to a music device (a hi-fi). Faku defended these expenses, saying the Fund was for him to use at his own discretion and he did not have to account for it. Graham Richards, then (acting) municipal manager, bolstered Faku’s defence. Richards refused to have the issue discussed in an open session of Council and placed an advertisement worth R8 000 in the local newspaper defending the mayor. Richards’ major contention was that, whilst granted for use in a mayoral role, the actual expenditure items were discretionary.26 Although Richards’ point on discretion made sense, it still raised questions over boundaries. The discretion applied to items or activities within or during an official role. Some of the items initially reported were personal in nature, and a full report by Council over the period June 1998 to December 2001 revealed even more expenditure of the same nature – clothing, school fees for family members, cash handouts to party colleagues, braais for ANC volunteers, and so on. Their personal nature made the expenditures even more difficult for the ANC to defend in public. It could not defend Faku using municipal funds to buy himself clothes when his annual salary, after 2000, was approximately half-a-million rand. His actions amounted to abuse of office for personal gain. For this reason, the party insisted that Faku pay back the personal expenses, to which he finally acceded.27 His expenses were determined at R80 554, to be repaid in monthly installments over a period of two years beginning in June 2001 – which he completed paying in July 2003.28

26 The Herald, ‘Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality: Statement of the Metro Council on Mayoral Discretionary Fund’, 8 November 2001. 27 Gxilishe, interview, 13 September 2018. Gxilishe was then convener of the interim regional leadership, set up to oversee the reconstitution of branches and election of new regional leaders. 28 The Herald, ‘Two-Year Saga Ends as Faku Repays His Debt in Full’, 20 June 2003.

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Just as Council was looking into Faku’s abuse of municipal funds yet another saga made headlines. It had to do with a non-governmental organisation, Port Elizabeth Co-operative Development Trust, of which Faku was chairperson. The Trust had secured a loan of about R1.6 million from the Eastern Cape Development Co-operation (ECDC), which it was failing to repay. The ECDC was even threatening legal action to recoup the loan. Apart from the ECDC loan, the Trust also received R500 000, which it had promised to use towards training MK veterans in various trades so that they could establish their own businesses. Nothing tangible ever came of the loan. When asked for a report, the Trust was evasive and provided inadequate information.29 As ANC mayor, Faku’s misconduct had implications for the organisation. It cast the party in a bad light, and also constituted a breach of the party’s own disciplinary code. This imposed a responsibility on the party to rein in their wayward mayor, a responsibility that fell to Stone Sizani, who was regional chairperson at the time. One meeting intended to achieve this took place at Faku’s office, a choice of venue that hinted that Faku had an edge over his chairperson. ANC issues were often discussed at Standard House, which reaffirmed the authority of the party over its municipal deployees. In this case, Faku made Sizani come to him, as if to suggest that he was not answerable to Sizani and by implication, Standard House. If the symbolism of the place of the meeting was unclear, Faku made it known in that meeting that he was not answerable to Sizani. ‘Yho ukrwada, uNceba [Nceba is rude],’ Mike Koenaite recalled Vuyo Toto as saying when he narrated his experience of the meeting. Toto was the regional secretary and had accompanied his chairperson, Sizani, to the meeting. Koenaite elaborated: Faku told them they had no right telling him how to run the municipality. They were the last people to advise him. He and the city were winning awards, whilst the membership of the party was dropping. They should be worried about recruiting members, instead of telling him what to do. After giving them a piece of his mind, Nceba promptly told them to leave his office. He literally threw them out of his office.30

That meeting has become legendary in local conversations about Faku. Other accounts offer somewhat different details, but affirm the same outcome. Faku, for instance, is said to have told Sizani: ‘You keep your Standard House; I’ll keep

29 The Herald, ‘Writing-off of R500 000 to Faku Trust Causes Uproar’, 21 April 2004. 30 Koenaite, interview, 30 September 2018.

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my City Hall.’ This encounter revealed a conundrum: that of a party battling to impose its authority over a strongman figure.

PARTY VS STRONGMAN: AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION TO A POLITICAL PROBLEM Unable to subject Faku to its directive, the REC opted for an administrative solution within the municipality. They appointed Mzimasi Mangcotywa city manager. A lawyer by qualification, Mangcotywa was a known politician, whose activism dated back to the late 1970s in youth politics. He was one of the founders of Peyco in the early 1980s and rose to become deputy president of the South African Youth Congress – a predecessor to the ANC Youth League. After the 1994 democratic elections, Mangcotywa served as a member of the provincial legislature until his appointment as city manager in 2002.31 Whilst not a technocrat, Mangcotywa’s appointment was not unusual. It followed a precedent set by the appointment of his (acting) predecessor, Graham Richards. Like Mangcotywa, Richards was a politician, whilst also practising as a lawyer. His appointment in 1995 followed a failed bid for election as ANC ward councillor. The ANC then appointed him city manager, effectively making him a party deployee. Unlike Richards, however, Mangcotywa was relatively senior in the ANC and his appointment was intended to rein in the errant mayor. The REC, of which Mangcotywa was a member, had felt that Richards was unduly pliant to Faku’s wishes and his energetic defence of Faku in the Mayor’s Discretionary Fund debacle was seen as just one example thereof. Having spurned Sizani’s efforts to build a consultative relationship, Faku’s relationship with the new manager, Mangcotywa, was too poised for confrontation. With Mangcotywa having been an REC member, it was clear that his appointment was the REC’s way of exerting its influence over the running of the municipality. It was failing to do so politically, through the office of the regional chairperson, and was now resorting to an administrative measure. What made the Faku-Mangcotywa standoff even likelier was the manner of Mangcotywa’s appointment. Faku did not want Mangcotywa appointed city manager. He preferred Graham Richards. Richards had been acting in that post, following the creation of the metro. A new city manager had to be appointed. Faku rejected the initial shortlist of candidates that excluded Richards and resumed the recruitment process with a new panel. The new panel duly recommended Richards.32 The ANC, however, objected to Richards’ appointment. Richards went to court, where he stated that Faku told him that his appointment had been stopped by the 31 The Herald, ‘From Struggle Hero to Metro Manager’, 31 May 2002. 32 The Herald, ‘Unions Accuse Faku of Favouritism’, 25 April 2001.

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ANC. Instead of ascribing his exclusion to a political decision – what the ANC dubbed ‘cadre deployment’ – Richards alleged racism. The allegation was ironic, as one ANC leader, Tony Duba, pointed out: ‘I am disappointed by Mr Richards’ stance. He actually benefited from the process he is now fighting.’33 Richards was a political appointee in the same way that the new city manager was to be. This time around, however, Richards decried the practice as racism. Faku acceded to Mangcotywa’s appointment begrudgingly. ‘Ningadinika nelo donki’ [Fine, you can even give me a donkey], he said at the meeting of the REC where the matter was finalised.34 Mangcotywa took up his post in June 2002, whilst Richards’ court action was eventually settled out of court in 2004. The municipality reportedly gave him R3 million.35 The party had prevailed over Faku. For someone accustomed to getting his way, Faku could not hide his resentment of Mangctoywa’s employment against his own wishes. This elicited an equal measure of determination on Mangcotywa’s part to assert his authority. He was no ordinary city manager, but one with political pedigree who would not easily submit to his mayor, even though Faku was his superior. The stage was set for an explosive relationship, and it did not take long to show. Faku simply shunned Mangcotywa. Whereas he was a familiar presence in Richards’ office, Faku neither went to Mangcotywa’s office nor communicated with him, unless it was absolutely necessary, in which case he did so by email or indirectly. He often bypassed Mangcotywa and addressed his queries directly to administrators. Where Mangcotywa had to provide legal advice, Faku did not always heed it. A mayor overruling legal advice from his city manager, quipped Elizabeth Trent, the leader of the DA, was ‘an act unheard of’.36 Mangcotywa reciprocated by refusing to implement the mayor’s instructions. Mike Koenaite, an MMC at the time, remembers being in meetings where Mangcotywa would upfront refuse to comply with Faku’s instructions. ‘He would just tell him: “I’m not going to do that,”’ recalled Koenaite.37 It is possible that Faku’s requests were improper, or Mangcotywa’s legal advice was unsound. That frostiness characterised their relations, however, was undeniable. After about a year of cold relations, the situation deteriorated to a fullblown confrontation. In a letter to Mangcotywa, Faku threatened to fire him within 21 days on account of incompetence, unless he could convince him

33 34 35 36 37

The Herald, ‘Richards: Metro Fights Back’, 23 May 2002. Interview with Mthwabo Ndube, 22 October 2018. The Herald, ‘Metro Manager Dismal in First Year – Assessment’, 8 April 2004. The Herald, ‘ANC Regrets Row between Metro’s Two Leaders’, 14 April 2005. Koenaite, interview, 30 September 2018.

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otherwise. The letter was leaked to the local newspaper, The Herald. Seeing that the letter was public, which he suspected Faku to have leaked as a way of embarrassing him, Mangcotywa called a press conference and responded publicly. He reacted to what he considered an attempt to humiliate him with defiance. The accusations were not only false, Mangcotywa maintained, but were also motivated by a malicious intent to rid the municipality of people like him who stood up to corruption involving Faku and other ANC councillors. ‘I’m not going anywhere, they must forget,’38 Mangcotywa fumed. This defiance suggested that Mangcotywa did not recognise Faku’s authority to fire him, and added that he would ‘only resign if asked to by my party, of course, following the correct procedures’. Faku’s response to the press conference validated Mangcotywa’s counter-charge of malice. He did not follow up the threat to fire Mangcotywa, but summoned him to a disciplinary hearing for misconduct. The press conference, Faku charged, was unprofessional, impugned the integrity of the municipality and destroyed the ‘trust and confidence underlying the employment relationship’.39 As for his evaluation that Mangcotywa was incompetent, Faku set up a task team to undertake an independent evaluation. In other words, Mangcotywa faced two parallel processes, both aimed to remove him from his position. Mangcotywa agreed to a disciplinary hearing, but only on condition that it was held publicly. Faku refused. On this point, Faku had the support of the ANC, as the regional secretary, Vuyo Toto, stated: The ANC’s regional executive committee and its provincial executive are clear that the disciplinary hearing should not be held in public. It has never happened anywhere that an employee or official, answers to serious internal issues in public.40

The party feared that Mangcotywa would use the public hearing to turn the spotlight onto the impropriety of ANC councillors. Earlier in the press conference, he had alluded to Faku and councillors being involved in manipulating the issuing of tenders and handing out state-built houses in return for kickbacks. The Auditor-General had found evidence to this effect in 2004, but the forensic report was never tabled in Council. This was a deliberate act to conceal wrongdoing

38 The Herald, ‘“I Won’t Go”, Defiant Metro Boss Tells Faku’, 13 April 2005. 39 NMB Municipality, Report by Executive Mayor to Council Re Municipal Manager’s Alleged Misconduct, 9 September 2005. 40 The Herald, ‘ANC Turns down Mangcotywa’s Call for Open Hearing’, 25 August 2005.

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and ensure that the public never got access to the report.41 If the disciplinary hearing were held in public, Mangcotywa would reveal such acts of impropriety, effectively putting the party on trial. The ANC did not want that. The party’s stance suggests that although it had deployed Mangcotywa to restrain Faku’s excesses, it was unprepared for the subsequent confrontation. Faku resented Mangcotywa’s employment and went on the offensive looking for any conceivable reason to fire him. Mangcotywa, in turn, countered with revelations of corruption against Faku and ANC councillors. The party was cast in a bad light. It pleaded with the two to resolve their spat. When that failed, it chose to silence Mangcotywa, offering him other employment elsewhere. Mangcotywa refused to go alone. He insisted on Faku also going. The party declined to take action against Faku, saying it could only do so later, as part of a broader evaluation of councillors for local government elections coming up in 2006. Mangcotywa was unrelenting, saying he would leave only if Faku left too.42 In the meantime, Faku exercised his executive authority. Faced with Mangcotywa’s refusal to a private disciplinary hearing, Faku resorted to a suspension. It had nothing to do with the instances of incompetence that Faku had raised earlier, saying they constituted grounds for firing Mangcotywa. Instead, the suspension related to Mangcotywa’s handling of cases involving other employees, which, Faku charged, Mangcotywa had mishandled. Faku justified the suspension as an opportunity to allow for a proper investigation into the alleged misconduct. Mangcotywa responded with court action, disputing the grounds for his suspension. The legal challenge would remain unresolved right into the next term of local government in 2006. The foregoing saga is instructive on how the party dealt with delinquent leaders. Faku was not only defiant of party protocols but his impropriety also stained the image of the party. There was general consensus that his misbehaviour was deserving of punishment, if not removal from office. The explanations offered for the party’s inaction, however, vary. One explanation is that party leaders excused Faku’s misconduct because the metro was performing relatively well. They ascribed this relative success to Faku’s leadership. He was visible and stamped his authority through bold initiatives. This created dependence on him, which, in turn, stoked fear that his replacement would not replicate his results.43

41 The Office of the Auditor-General still has the report in its possession. My efforts to get a copy were unsuccessful on account of its never having been tabled in Council, and therefore not for public use. Access to the report requires one to submit a special application through a legislative provision, Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000). 42 Mangcotywa, interview, 1 October 2018. 43 Humphrey Maxhegwana and Bongani Gxilishe are amongst those that hold this view.

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The other explanation is that, even if some local leaders wanted him gone, they would not have succeeded. Faku reportedly enjoyed the political backing of the president of the ANC and the country, Thabo Mbeki. The ANC president had the final say on the appointment of metro mayors, based on recommendations made by provincial leaders. Faku’s removal would not have happened without Mbeki’s authorisation. Whilst Mbeki would not have approved of impropriety, the common view is that Faku’s style of leadership and the pressures he faced were not dissimilar to Mbeki’s. Just like Mbeki, Faku held strong ideas about what to do and was decisive. They were both unpopular with the SACP. The hostility was such that the SACP was not even given a slot to speak at the funeral of Thabo’s father, Govan Mbeki, in Port Elizabeth. Oom Gov was a long-standing leader of the SACP, and, through its general secretary, Blade Nzimande, the Party wanted to bid him farewell. Local organisers had included the Party in the programme. That changed when officials from Luthuli House (ANC national headquarters) arrived to join the local team that was making the funeral arrangements. They were adamant that the funeral was ‘an ANC affair’,44 which meant excluding the Party (and Cosatu). Thabo Mbeki’s disfavour with the Party stemmed from his introduction of austerity measures, which Faku, as mayor, implemented. These translated into the municipality enforcing payment for water and electricity, failing which, initially, people’s assets were confiscated following a default judgment, and if payments were still not made, finally, also disconnection of services. The Party decried such measures as privatisation of basic social services, which put them beyond the reach of the indigent. Besides his possible approval of Faku’s leadership style, the argument went, Mbeki would not have wanted to give his detractors the satisfaction of firing Faku for implementing government policies. This meant retaining Faku in his mayoral post.45

TOWARDS THE 2006 LOCAL ELECTIONS: THE STATE OF THE PARTY, THE ALLIANCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY Faku’s retention as mayor and the unresolved spat with Mangcotywa offered glimpses into the state of the local ANC, the alliance and the municipality as a whole. Some focused attention is necessary on each of these aspects in order to complete the picture. Notwithstanding the intention, Mangcotywa’s appointment as city manager illuminated an emerging practice that would later become a problem – the 44 Gxilishe, interview, 13 September 2018. 45 Mike Koenaite and Mzoli Nkewu share this view.

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appointment of politicians or shop stewards into managerial positions. The appointees behaved in a political fashion. A number of such appointments were made, partly as a measure to achieve racial equity. The managerial profile of the newly formed metro was highly skewed in favour of whites, with more than 70% of them dominating middle and upper management, whilst blacks were generally relegated to the level of support staff.46 This was a major source of disquiet for the municipal union, the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu).47 The subsequent decision to include shop stewards in the pool of potential recruits was partly the result of Samwu’s agitation, from which they benefited through appointments into managerial positions. They were not just shop stewards, however. Most tended to have political clout, as they were also prominent in either ANC or Party activities and leadership structures. Whilst the appointments of politically connected individuals were not necessarily underserved, they presented complications in instances of labour disputes. They were not treated as mere employees. Their political status had a bearing on how their disputes were handled. One such example involved Chris Jamda. A former member of the ANC’s 2001 interim REC, Jamda was appointed manager in 2003, only to be suspended the following year on suspicion of having falsified his qualifications. The suspension was lifted on account of improper procedure, but he was quickly suspended again and remained on suspension for more than a year. Whilst it seemed easy to disprove or confirm whether Jamda had the requisite qualifications, his case was complicated by his political status. Faku and Mangcotywa traded accusations over the handling of Jamda’s case. Faku blamed the delay in concluding the case on his city manager, whom he accused of protecting Jamda because they were political allies. Indeed both Jamda and Mangcotywa had served on the interim REC. Mangcotywa countered that there was nothing untoward in the manner in which he handled Jamda’s case and that it was following a normal course. It is not clear if any of the accusations had merit, but the extraordinarily long delay in verifying something that appeared straightforward does suggest that there were other considerations at play. What is clear, however, is that Jamda’s case marked the beginning of a trend of long suspensions involving politically connected managers. In the instance of some, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, it was quite obvious that the managers enjoyed protection owing to their alliance with politicians.

46 NMB Municipality, Employment Equity Plan for the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, no date. 47 The Herald, ‘Unions accuse Faku of favouritism’.

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What would also emerge in the subsequent cases was that the political protection of managers stemmed from possible financial gain. Managers became the proxies of politicians, enabling their financial gain through awarding tenders. Ironically this meddling followed a legislative remedy in 2004, the Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003) (MFMA) which aimed to improve the financial management and efficiency of municipalities. The functions of politicians and officials were ill-defined, which limited their ability to fulfil their intended roles. As noted earlier, councillors had previously been allowed to sit on bid or tender boards making decisions about which service providers to award a tender. Often, councillors were connected to some of the bidders, and awarded them the contracts. This presented a conflict of interest. It was not only an unfair bidding process, but also meant that councillors would not be objective in their oversight role. Officials, on the other hand, were responsible for operations and implementation, but could not choose service providers they considered competent. This limited the extent to which officials could be held responsible for the administration failing to deliver desired outputs. The new MFMA enforced a clear distinction of roles with accompanying functions to optimise success. Councillors were taken out of decision making about tenders, and their mandate to exercise oversight was emphasised. Choosing service providers and awarding contracts were the sole responsibility of officials, whom councillors were meant to monitor closely. The new legislation clamped down on a source of financial gain for some councillors. In an equally stunning case, the metro’s Internal Audit Division found that the MMC responsible for Corporate Affairs, Beza Ntshona, had meddled in the appointment of a service provider, Imbizo Events, to the point of fabricating two other quotes in order to give a false impression of a competitive bid. Procured to organise a conference on 13 September 2004, Imbizo Events, owned by Motse Fuleni, inflated their invoice, charging R64 980 for 300 bags, which they got from a supplier at R24 795, and R168 059 for 300 T-shirts, priced at R39 227 by the supplier. Apart from the inflated items, the conference itself was a flop, as only 62 people showed up out of the 300 planned and catered for. The poor turnout was ascribed to poor preparations, partly due to Ntshona’s insistence that the conference proceed on that day, against administrators’ advice that preparations were not ideal.48 Part of Ntshona’s insistence on the date had to do with his wedding. He wanted the conference to happen before his wedding. 48 NMB Municipality, Internal Audit Division, Investigation Report – Allegations: Irregularities Pertaining to the Human Resources Conference Held on 13 September 2004, Audit 487.

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Councillors, therefore, resisted reforms aiming to thwart impropriety. Their resistance pitted them against the managerial staff, who were now vested with the sole authority over tender adjudication and awards. In subsequent years, councillors would circumvent the MFMA through appointing proxy managers. The administration of the metro was set for tumultuous times ahead. As the second term of local government neared its end, the concern that some of the party leaders had expressed during the previous term (that the governing party was increasingly consumed by self-interest) was not dissipating. In addition to resistance at stamping out impropriety, there were no consequences for malfeasant politicians. Nonetheless, with respect to service delivery, independent evaluations rated the local government relatively positively. In its reports on the years between 2002 and 2009, for instance, Statistics South Africa reported tremendous improvements in the number of households with formal housing, access to piped water and electricity.49 Of the six metros then, NMB, together with eThekwini, were leading in these aspects of delivering ‘a better life for all’. This was confirmed by a 2003/4 survey conducted by one of South Africa’s leading research institutions, the Human Sciences Research Council, on residents’ degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with local management of all municipal services, including cutting crime and creating jobs. The survey found that 54% of NMB residents were satisfied with the municipality’s level of service delivery, the second highest degree of satisfaction in the country, after Cape Town (with 55%).50 Municipal improvements also showed in the levels of confidence that locals expressed in the municipality. Local government has generally been rated more poorly than other institutions such as churches, the public broadcaster, national government, the courts, Parliament and the police. In 2003, NMB registered the third highest number of residents with confidence in their metro, at 46%, following Ekurhuleni (52%) and Tshwane (47%).51 With relatively favourable ratings on service delivery, the ANC was poised for similarly positive returns in the impending local elections. Organisationally, however, the state of the ANC was uneven. It was coherent internally, but had sour relations with its leftist allies. A sign of a healthy internal state, according to Humphrey Maxhegwana, then provincial secretary, was regular and timeous hosting of regional conferences. Conferences are often postponed

49 See www.statssa.gov.za. 50 Cited in South African Cities Network, State of the Cities Report 2006. 51 South African Cities Network, State of the Cities Report 2006. Accessed 3 December 2019, http:// www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/state_of_cities_report2006.pdf.

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if 70 per cent of the branches are not functional. That they were held on time indicated a fairly functional and vibrant branch structure. Functionality, however, did not imply sizeable membership. ‘This is one area,’ said Maxhegwana, that worried me about PE. I always fought with them over lack of growth in the membership. My issue was that they had an army of workers, a lot of organised unions. This was an easy target to recruit to the movement. The membership there wouldn’t go beyond 10 000 and yet they had so many unions, Numsa [National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa] and Nehawu [National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union].52

Maxhegwana’s disquiet with relatively low membership numbers was not unjustifiable. The 2002 provincial conference, for instance, reported that compared to the six other regions in the province, membership at NMB stood at 8 121, fourth behind Amathole (24 282), OR Tambo (15 474) and Chris Hani (14 106).53 This was a notable decline from what the membership was in the 1990s, when New Brighton alone boasted roughly 20 000 members. Relations among alliance partners were unhealthy. Differences over policy had emerged in the late 1990s. As the 2000s got underway, policy differences began to harden into factions. The Party and Cosatu constituted themselves into a faction, ostensibly on ideological grounds, against the ANC’s pro-market policies. This saw them participating in the nationwide march on 29 August 2001 protesting against privatisation. The confrontational relationship was even more discernible when the metro experienced a wave of protests in 2005, supposedly over service delivery. Sanco dismissed the protests as the machinations of ambitious leaders who wanted to cast incumbents in a bad light in order to improve their prospects of being nominated for the 2006 elections. Conversely, the leftist allies welcomed the protests as a genuine expression of unhappiness over the ANC’s failure in respect of service delivery.54 By the start of preparations towards the 2006 local elections, therefore, relations between the ANC and its leftist allies were adversarial. Now the disagreement went beyond differences over policy to contesting power over the municipality. The leftists actively lobbied for nominations of their own cadres or individuals they considered generally sympathetic to their leftist policies. The ANC berated them as ‘rogue elements’55 and complained of shoddy attempts to influence branches, as 52 53 54 55

Maxhegwana, interview, 12 July 2018. The Herald, ‘Stofile Facing Tough Leadership Battle’, 10 September 2002. The Herald, ‘ANC Slams Its Critics in Wake of Protests’, 30 May 2005. The Herald, ‘ANC Lashes Out at “Rogue Elements behind SACP List”’, 19 October 2005.

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the then secretary, Vuyo Toto, lamented: ‘We know there have been incidents where aspiring candidates have even bought party membership cards for people so that they can nominate them for the party list. This is wrong.’56 The result was a backlash against prominent Party and Cosatu candidates. Relatively few of them were included in the final list. Those who made it, such as Thobile Ntola and Zanuxolo Wayile – Party and Cosatu leaders respectively – were placed at the bottom half of the list. Ntola protested bitterly: ‘There is an ideological cleansing being conducted by some few ANC regional executive members.’57 Equally significant about the ANC’s candidates list for the 2006 elections was the omission of Nceba Faku, the long-serving mayor. Bicks Ndoni, Faku’s deputy, headed the list, making him a possible pick for the position of mayor. For someone in his second term, Faku’s omission was not unexpected. How his future was handled, however, is noteworthy, as it would have a bearing on subsequent developments in the metro. Bongani Gxilishe, a close associate of Faku, recalls Faku telling him of a meeting with Thabo Mbeki, at his own request, to discuss his future. Faku told Mbeki he was unavailable for another mayoral term, a decision that Mbeki eagerly accepted. Mbeki saw it as an opportunity to advance gender parity in the mayoralty where the ANC was in control, and asked for Faku’s recommendation for NMB. Faku proposed Nondumiso Maphazi, whom he had appointed to his mayoral committee in 2000. He thought highly of Maphazi’s competence, to the point where he defied his ‘caucus’, which had mooted Nohle Mohapi in anticipation of Mbeki’s decision to have a female candidate.58 The widow of the Black Consciousness Movement leader, Mapetla Mohapi, Nohle was then speaker of Council. Faku would later turn against Maphazi (as we shall see in the next chapter). Mbeki was similarly keen to discuss Faku’s own future, and asked him for his preference. Faku expressed interest in the provincial government, especially in the local government portfolio. Mbeki expressed difficulty with that appointment, ‘since there was no vacancy, but asked him to go and think about where else he would like to go’.59 Barring any incapacity or bereavement, the next opportunity for recruitment into the provincial government would come three years later, after the 2009 elections. This meant that Faku would not find placement immediately. Thus Faku finished his term without any certainty of a political position, or employment, after the 2006 local election. Whether or not he would find a

56 57 58 59

The Herald, ‘Regional ANC Slams Self-Seeking Candidates’, 10 November 2005. The Herald, ‘Ndoni’s Name Tops List of Municipal Election Candidates’, 16 December 2005. Gxilishe, interview, 13 September 2018. Gxilishe, interview, 13 September 2018.

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placement depended on him making Mbeki a realistic proposal, and on the latter still being able, or keen, to honour his undertaking to Faku.

ELECTION RESULTS: CONSOLIDATION OF ELECTORAL DOMINANCE Local elections for the third term of local government were held on 1 March 2006. The number of wards had increased from 54 to 60. Contesting parties remained largely the same, with the exception of one significant debutant, the Independent Democrats (ID), led by the experienced politician, Patricia de Lille. The results did not change the electoral map. The ANC not only retained its dominance, but also increased its electoral support. Conversely, the DA dropped its tally of wards, especially in the coloured communities (Table 4.1). Most noteworthy about the 2006 results was the level of turnout. NMB registered the highest turnout of all the metros and major cities at 56%, notably more than the national average of 48%. Turnout was highest, averaging 58%, in the wards that the ANC won. By contrast, average turnout in the wards that the DA won stood at 49%. This showed an enthusiastic ANC support base that was both approving of the ANC’s performance in the municipality and wanted it to return to City Hall. TABLE 4.1 Breakdown of 2000 and 2006 local elections, Nelson Mandela Metro, seats and % support Party

Ward seats (number)

PR seats (number)

Total seats (number)

Total support (%)

2000

2006

2000

2006

2000

2006

2000

2006

ANC

34

43

38

38

72

81

66.67

66.53

DA

20

17

11

13

31

30

28.70

24.39

UDM

–

–

2

1

2

1

1.85

0.88

ACDP

–

–

1

–

1

–

0.93

–

PAC

–

–

1

–

1

–

0.93

–

ATEAM

–

–

1

–

1

–

0.93

–

IFP

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

ID

–

–

–

3

–

–

–

2.51

Source: Independent Electoral Commission Notes: UDM = United Democratic Movement; ATEAM = African Transformation Efficiency & Affirmative Movement 60

60 See https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/

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The scale of the ANC victory and the enthusiasm of its support base, however, concealed many flaws and divisions within the organisation and the alliance. Rules and discipline were enforced unevenly. Indiscretions were left unpunished if the individuals involved were considered valuable, or had a strong lobby within the organisation. Rules did not apply indiscriminately, but depended on the person involved. This meant that if one made oneself indispensable to the party, one was likely to get away with infractions. Moreover, disagreements over policy had evolved into factionalism. Leftists had constituted themselves into a faction within the alliance with a clear aim to wrest the leadership of the ANC from those whom they considered inimical to their ideological orientation. Their opponents were equally determined to resist what they considered an attempt to usurp the ANC in order to turn it into a leftist movement. Whilst divided over policies, the feuding factions were nonetheless still united by their interest in the victory of the ANC, and did not feel entirely unwelcome within the ANC alliance.

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5 The decline begins, 2006–2012 The ANC began its third term in local government at the height of its electoral strength. This was a sign of both approval for its previous performance and confidence that it would deliver on its electoral promises. Expectations of improvement also extended to gender relations. The NMB was one of the four ANC-controlled metros that had a woman in the mayoralty, Nondumiso Maphazi. Her historic appointment, as the first female mayor ever in the region, was part of the party’s transformative agenda to disprove the stereotype that women were unfit for leadership positions. A promising start to the third term, however, soon turned into despair. Instead of living up to its promise, the ANC’s third term marked the start of a decline for the party and mayhem in the administration of the municipality. Maphazi never finished her term; management of the municipality became unstable and the ANC plunged to the verge of losing power. At the core of this dramatic change of fortunes was the consolidation of factionalism throughout the various layers of leadership in the organisation. Factions were built around a mixture of contrasting interests: ideological on the one hand and personal on the other. Once in power, the individual members of the victorious faction pursued conflicting interests, pitting one against the other, with disastrous results for governance. Both the municipality and the ANC became casualties of the factional fights. Unscrupulous leaders not only abused public office for financial gain, but also concealed their malfeasance. This increased the stakes for political office. Competing factions resorted to improper measures in order to get into, and remain in, office. The integrity of the organisation – built on observance of and compliance with organisational rules and processes – suffered. My focus in this chapter is on this period of deterioration, between 2006 and 2012.

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MADAM MAYOR: SETTLING IN AHEAD OF THE TSUNAMI1 Maphazi’s mayoralty had a lopsided impact. It heralded progression, whilst also affirming negative practices that were beginning to characterise the organisation. On the negative side, Maphazi reappointed Bheza Ntshona onto her mayoral committee (Mayco), making him responsible for the influential portfolio of budget and treasury. The appointment happened despite Ntshona having been found guilty of wasteful expenditure, influencing the allocation of tenders and forging invoices. This showed indifference to the mandate – both within the party and within local government – to hold leaders accountable for their indiscretions. The ill-considered appointment, however, was counter-balanced by gender representivity on the Mayco and a return to managerial stability. Of the twelve members that form the leadership of the municipality – the speaker and Mayco – six were women. Maphazi reached a settlement with the suspended city manager, Mzimasi Mangcotywa, in June 2006, releasing him from his position. A new city manager, Graham Richards, was appointed. Richards, as noted earlier, was not new in the position. He was the first city manager of the democratically elected PE Council in 1995 and again acted briefly in that position for the newly formed metro in the early 2000s. In other words, Richards had a proven record, and had since acquired further experience in local government, having joined the South African Local Government Association in 2002. Besides showing preference for experience and expertise, Richards’ appointment was telling in other ways. A deployee of the ANC in the municipality from 1995, Richards had refused to accept the decision of the organisation not to reappoint him in 2001. He successfully sued the ANC-controlled municipality, alleging racism. His (re-)appointment in 2006 showed that the ANC did not hold his defiance of organisational discipline against him. They not only pleaded with Richards to apply for the post, but also appointed him even though he had sued the municipality and charged them with racism. Maphazi’s administration clearly could not envisage anyone better suited for the city manager position than Richards.

EMERGENCE AND ALIGNMENT OF FACTIONAL INTERESTS As Maphazi was strengthening municipal administration in order to implement her party’s manifesto, the party began descending into internal fights and fractured into factions. The emerging fights were different to those that had 1

This term was first used in the political lexicon by the then Cosatu leader, Zwelinzima Vavi, to describe Jacob Zuma’s prospects of victory at the Polokwane Conference. A reference to the devastating storm, Vavi used the term to imply that Zuma’s victory was inevitable.

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previously characterised the liberation movement. They were not purely ideological, but also incorporated personal interests. Whilst in the past they could be managed, if not contained, this time around they were emboldened by a similar fight building up at the national level during 2006 as the organisation began to prepare for its national elective conference in 2007. The result was a full-blown factional fight that would sweep Maphazi’s administration out of power and throw the municipality into disarray. The leadership contest that played out at the national level found resonance in the NMB. Pitted against each other for the presidency of the ANC were Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The contest ostensibly revolved around ideology and character. Zuma found vocal support among the ANC’s leftist allies. They charged Mbeki with turning the ANC, which had defined itself as a ‘disciplined force of the left’, into a pro-free-market party that benefited business. Mbeki’s presidential bid for a third term was berated as validation of a despotic trait, which they had been decrying over the past four years. Whilst barred from a third term as president of the country, Mbeki’s detractors charged that he would exercise presidential influence from Luthuli House.2 Conversely, Mbeki’s support was located largely within the ANC. His backers denounced Zuma as a moral and intellectual misfit for the presidency. At the time, Zuma had just been acquitted of raping a woman who was the daughter of a family friend, and faced corruption charges. For an organisation that had largely been led by distinguished figures, Zuma was seen as a marked deviation – or iqaba (an illiterate) – that would neither master the intricacies of governance nor be a universally endearing face of the republic and the party. Moreover, Mbeki’s supporters dismissed the leftist support for Zuma as a disguised attempt to grab what is a nationalist movement for socialist ends. Zuma was simply a Trojan horse, they charged, to displace the nationalist grip over the liberation movement. In the region that was a historical base of both the ANC and the Party, the contest was highly acute. Leftists had considerable support organised under a robust trade union, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa). Together with the Party, Numsa mobilised its members, some of whom

2

See S. Fikeni, ‘The Polokwane Moment and South Africa’s Democracy at the Crossroads’, in P. Kagwanja and K. Kondlo (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2008 (Cape Town, HRSC Press, 2009); M. Ndletyana, ‘Congress of the People: A Promise Betrayed’, Journal of African Elections 9:2 Special Issue – South Africa: Elections 2009 (2010), pp. 32–55; J. Cherry, ‘Strategy, Sacrifice or Sour Grapes? Cope versus the ANC in the Eastern Cape’ in R. Southall and J. Daniel (eds), Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections (Auckland Park, Jacana Media, 2009).

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were active members of the ANC, to support Zuma’s candidature. Including ANC councillors, they organised themselves into a faction (or ‘caucus’, or ihlathi3 as they’re commonly referred to within the ANC rank-and-file) that came to be known as Stalini, named after the Stalini Hall were they convened their regular meetings. Their spokesperson was Zandisile Qupe, an ANC councillor based in Zwide’s Ward 28, where the Stalini Hall is located. Mbeki’s campaign, by contrast, was led by the party’s REC, under Mike Xego. Elected deputy chairperson to Stone Sizani in 2002, Xego began 2007 as acting chairperson, following Sizani’s election to provincial chairperson in the previous year. A household name, with a long history of activism dating back to the 1970s, Xego was a mainstream ANC leader. His REC included individuals – Vuyo Toto, Charmaine Williams, Mthwabo Ndube – with a similar profile. Their caucus was dubbed Stepping Stone, after a venue they used at a military base in Forest Hill. It is important to point out that the composition of the Stalini faction cast doubts on its claims that they were impelled by ideological differences. It was made up not only of leftists, but also included individuals with business interests, whom they had previously denounced as their nemesis. Nceba Faku was one such figure. Faku’s business interests were public knowledge and, whilst mayor, he had led the municipality’s programme to enforce payment for water and electricity. Yet Faku did not even attempt to conceal his differences from the leftists in the faction. He did not support Zuma for the presidency. Instead he was a vocal supporter of Tokyo Sexwale, a businessman who had also entered the presidential race as the alternative to the two main candidates. What Faku had in common with the rest of the Stalini faction was his opposition to Mbeki serving a third term as ANC president. Given Faku’s earlier discussion with Mbeki over his future employment, it is not unthinkable that his opposition to him was partly influenced by what he felt was Mbeki’s lack of urgency to attend to his plight. Faku’s involvement with the Stalini would turn out to be his way of getting back to political influence, which he would then use towards ameliorating personal circumstances. Others had similar intentions. Unlike the inaugural term, when councillors were given an insignificant stipend, from 2000 onwards they earned relatively substantial salaries. The total annual package for a mayor in 2000 stood at around R500 000; MMCs earned approximately R400 000 and councillors just below R200 000.4

3 4

Ihlathi is a Xhosa word that literally means a bush, but generally denotes a secret place. The Herald, ‘Phone Allowances Raise Heated Debate’, 7 December 2002.

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Leading towards Polokwane, therefore, the NMB had varying preferences for president of the ANC. Which of the two caucuses would eventually send the largest number of delegates was to be determined largely by incumbency. The REC is central in determining the credibility of a branch and oversees branch general meetings that elect delegates to an elective conference. For instance, if the REC failed to process membership applications and/or issue a membership card on time, or not at all, a branch could easily fall below the 100-membership threshold required to be considered ‘in good standing’. This would disqualify the said branch from sending delegates to the conference. Because they oversee branch general meetings, REC deployees can also steer proceedings towards nominating their preferred delegates to the elective conference. This involves a number of tricks. For example, the REC could send a targeted group of members to a wrong venue in order to ensure that a meeting would be composed of members that supported their preferred delegates. Where a meeting was not quorate, but guaranteed a favourable outcome, an REC deployee could simply fill in names on the register inflating the number of attendants in order to legitimise the meeting. So prevalent are these shenanigans that ANC members have even coined terms to describe them: uyasetyenzwa or uyabethwa, which roughly translates as: ‘they are working you’.5 Regional leadership, as a result, became highly contested in the NMB. Incumbency gave Xego’s Stepping Stone the edge over the Stalini. The contest was particularly heightened by the fact that a regional elective conference was scheduled for March 2007. Stepping Stone were just as determined to retain office as the Stalini were to wrest it away from them. The challenge for the Stalini was who amongst them could offer a stiff challenge to Xego for the position of chairperson. Nceba Faku answered that challenge, albeit tentatively at first. He hinted at his possible candidature in January 2007. A former chairperson of the region and erstwhile mayor, who had served two terms from 1995 to 2006, Faku would be a formidable contender to Xego. Faced with stiff competition, Xego’s REC looked to incumbency to sway the contest in his favour. They tampered with the rules. Ten branches were invited to send delegates to the conference, even though they had not held a branch general meeting to select candidates for the conference. Failure to convene a branch general meeting meant that a branch was not ‘in good standing’. Faku’s supporters justifiably decried this measure, berating it as improper and an attempt to increase Xego’s support at the elective conference. Only about 36 branches, out 5

These practices have come up a number of times in numerous conversations with local activists and ANC members over the past years.

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of 60, had held branch general meetings.6 The Stalini appealed to both provincial and national headquarters for intervention. Neither headquarters responded to the appeal. Both were sympathetic to Xego’s REC, because it supported Mbeki’s re-election at the 2007 Polokwane Conference. This made them allies. The PEC had a vested interest in Xego’s retaining the position of chairperson, which he could use to mobilise support for Mbeki’s candidature. As for Luthuli House, which was then dominated by Mbeki’s supporters, it was less keen to disband an REC that backed Mbeki for a third term. It was expedient to overlook the transgression of rules. When the regional conference was eventually convened on 14 April 2007, after two postponements, Xego won by 99 votes, against Faku’s 80. Faku’s supporters questioned the legitimacy of the results, and Faku himself declined nomination as additional member on the REC.7 The earlier gripe had hardened attitudes. From then onwards, the Stalini would never recognise the legitimacy of Xego’s REC.8 They worked towards its dissolution, and the Stepping Stone were equally determined to clamp down on the Stalini. The scene was set for a bull-blown rivalry in the lead-up to the Polokwane Conference later, in December 2007. The REC threatened the Stalini with disciplinary action ‘for actively partici­ pating in unconstitutional meetings outside of the appropriate organisational structures’.9 To escape punishment, the REC instructed the Stalini to dissolve. They refused, and countered that the REC was guilty of a similar ‘offence’, as it, too, had organised itself into a separate grouping (i.e. the Stepping Stone). The Stalini went further, petitioning Luthuli House to dissolve the REC on account of improper procedure in its election at the previous conference. The impending Polokwane Conference added even more urgency to the Stalini’s petition. They feared that the REC would, as they had done in the regional conference, manoeuvre the composition of the NMB delegation to Polokwane in favour of Mbeki. If Luthuli House failed to act, the Stalini threatened legal action. Neither the threat of legal action by the Stalini, nor the possibility of disbandment by Luthuli House, restrained Xego’s REC. They suspended Zandisile Qupe, the Stalini spokesperson that had issued the statement threat-

6 7 8 9

The Herald, ‘ANC Regional Conference in Jeopardy as Legitimacy Crisis Looms’, 12 April 2007. The Herald, ‘Xego Pips Faku to Take ANC to Regional Post’, 16 April 2007. The new executive included Vuyo Toto, deputy chairperson; Mthwabo Ndube, secretary; Charmaine Williams, deputy secretary; and Mike Nzotoyi, treasurer. The Herald, ‘Rebel Councillors Ordered before ANC Regional Committee to Explain Conduct’, 3 August 2007.

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ening legal action. The reason for the suspension was that Qupe brought ‘the organisation into disrepute’.10 It is worth noting that the REC did not follow up on its threats to impose disciplinary measures on all members of the Stalini for setting themselves up as a separate grouping. They targeted only the spokesperson, and on different charges. Their retraction could be explained by the fact that the Stalini’s counter-charge (that the REC too had constituted themselves into a faction) took the sting out of their manoeuvre. The REC recognised that it lacked moral authority to mete out punishment over an infraction of which it was also guilty. Insisting on punishing the Stalini would have made them even more vulnerable to accusations of applying double standards, a transgression that might well exert more pressure on the upper structures to intervene. Whilst reasonably secure in their protection from the upper structures, the REC was also careful not to add to its infractions for fear that these structures might no longer be able to turn a blind eye. The Polokwane conference thus found the NMB unmistakably factionalised. The divisions predated the national contest, but were subsequently energised by it. This threw the region into a stalemate. Approximately half of the 60 branches that made up the regional ANC did not recognise the legitimacy of the REC. Remedial action did not come from the province or national leadership due to shared loyalties and/or partisanship. This froze the stalemate. It could only be broken by intervention from above. This meant the leadership outcome at Polokwane in December 2007 would have a bearing on the resolution of the stalemate in favour of one faction or the other.

POST-POLOKWANE TSUNAMI As it turned out, Jacob Zuma emerged victorious over Thabo Mbeki. The effect of that victory cascaded down to the NMB. Unlike its predecessor, Zuma’s Luthuli House intervened in the NMB. Hardly two months into office, national leadership decided to cut short the term of Xego’s REC, bringing the regional conference closer to April 2008, instead of leaving it to serve out its full term to April 2010. Disbandment was considered, but ruled out as it would have implied that the REC was illegitimate. This, in turn, would have created another potential problem, as it would have thrown the legitimacy of all the decisions taken by Xego’s REC into doubt, opening up the possibility of a legal challenge. Bringing an elective conference closer, instead of disbanding Xego’s REC, as Luthuli House further reasoned, limited prospects of acrimony, which would have perpetuated disunity.

10 The Herald, ‘ANC Leadership in Region Clamping Down on Rebels’, 27 November 2007.

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As for the decision to intervene itself, Luthuli House ascribed it to the findings of an audit investigation that showed that Xego’s REC disqualified eligible branches from going to the Polokwane conference on account of their support for Zuma.11 In other words, Zuma’s Luthuli House had acted, where Mbeki’s had proven reluctant, even though presented with a similar charge. This reaffirmed the point made earlier that the nature of the remedial action from upper structures, if any at all, hinged on the relationship between the two layers of leadership. Upper structures tended to act in favour of their allied group at the lower level, regardless of the merit of the case. And, whilst purporting to be impartial and prioritising unity, Zuma’s Luthuli House, it would soon show, proved to be no different to Mbeki’s. Hardly a month later, the Luthuli House stance towards Xego’s REC hardened. Instead of leaving Xego’s REC in place, it was disbanded and replaced with an interim leadership (or a Regional Task Team [RTT]), headed by his rival, Nceba Faku. Whilst initially supporting Sexwale for the ANC presidency, Faku had switched over to Zuma’s campaign. This followed Sexwale joining Zuma’s ticket after his candidature failed to gain traction. Faku was now at the helm of the RTT, tasked to prepare for a regional conference in which he could be a candidate for the position of chairperson. In appointing Faku chairperson of the RTT, Zuma’s Luthuli House showed its bias towards his becoming regional chairperson. It must have dawned on them that Faku would use his appointment to aid his candidature. Besides the bias of national leaders, what had also crystallised was that attitudes between the rival factions had hardened. The ANC caucus in Council was at loggerheads with itself. One example of the stand-off was a near failure to agree over the 2008/09 budget. About 31 councillors claimed they had not been consulted, and thus threatened to vote against the budget.12 Council had 21 days, between 30 May and 30 June 2008, to adopt the budget. Failure to pass it would lead to Council being dissolved and fresh elections. Having fresh elections favoured the opposition. Disbandment of Council would have disrupted municipal functioning, which could be blamed on the ANC, and would worsen the image of a party that was already embroiled in internal fights. The in-fighting also meant that the party was not in an ideal state to contest elections, which would have required a cohesive party machinery with all leaders working in unison. The rivals were, however, indifferent to the dire implications of their feud. It took a visit by the party’s secretary-general and the minister responsible for local government, Gwede Mantashe and Sicelo Shiceka respectively, to convince the 11 The Herald, ‘Fresh Poll Called for Bay ANC in Bid for Improved Party Unity’, 7 February 2008. 12 The Herald, ‘ANC Row Hits Metro Budget’, 28 May 2008.

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ANC caucus to vote unanimously. The caucus eventually voted for the budget at the last available opportunity, on 26 June – the very last Thursday, with only two working days left in the month. Unanimous voting did not mean the rival factions had reached a cease-fire. Confrontation resurfaced hardly a week later. The Stalini rejected a provincial-led intervention to disband both factions.13 They considered the province biased in favour of the Stepping Stone, and preferred Luthuli House to take the lead instead. One meeting in June 2008 became so rowdy that Siphato Handi, the provincial secretary, had to call the police to arrest protestors that were refusing to vacate the regional office building. They were released on a warning, and told to return to court on 25 June 2008.14 The case eventually faded away. Another meeting at the City Hall, still in the month of June 2008, ended in similarly chaotic manner with guards using tear gas to dismiss the meeting.15 Conflicting loyalties on the part of the higher structures did not help to resolve the stalemate. Luthuli House favoured the Stalini, and Calata House (ANC provincial headquarters) the REC (or Stepping Stone). Eventually, the key leaders of the Stepping Stone left the ANC to form a new party, Congress of the People (Cope). These included Xego, Mthwabo Ndube, Vuyo Toto, Charmaine Williams and Gege Mbikanye. Other local luminaries that joined Cope included Thozamile Botha, Khusta Jack and Saki Macozoma. Cope attracted those who had supported Mbeki at the 2007 Polokwane conference, who considered themselves part of the old, value-driven ANC, against what had become a new, careerist ANC under Zuma.16 Even those that remained in the organisation post-Polokwane admitted that theirs was no longer the ANC of old, and many who were of this opinion became inactive. Years later, there would be attempts to entice both Cope leaders and inactive members back to the ANC to rescue the organisation from careerists. In the meantime, the exodus to form Cope left the Stalini faction not only hegemonic, but also determined to rid the ANC of any leaders with links either to the Stepping Stone or Thabo Mbeki. They labelled such individuals Cope sympathisers and/or moles within the ANC. Removing suspected Cope sympathisers raised the spectre of instability in the municipality. The mayor, Nondumiso Maphazi, became an obvious target. She had been appointed mayor by Xego’s REC, with Mbeki’s approval. Calls for her resignation soon followed. Supported by the Party, Cosatu

13 14 15 16

The Herald, ‘Provincial ANC Leaders Unable to Resolve Factional Dispute in Bay’, 11 June 2008. The Herald, ‘107 Demonstrators Held for Trespassing Out on Warning’, 11 June 2008. The Herald, ‘Guards Use Teargas as ANC Zuma Bloc Storms City Hall’, 18 June 2008. Ndletyana, ‘Congress of the People’.

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even marched to City Hall to present that demand.17 The intent to remove Maphazi was soon overtaken by preparations for the national elections, scheduled for 22 April 2009. Focusing on the removal of suspected Cope sympathisers distracted the party machinery away from focusing on national elections.

POST-POLOKWANE SPLIT: INITIAL TEST OF ELECTORAL STRENGTH The 2009 election promised to reconfigure the electoral landscape in the NMB. An indication of this eventuality came about a month before the scheduled national elections. The metro held by-elections on 4 March 2009, as a result of the resignation of eight ANC ward councillors, who later joined Cope and stood as the party’s candidates in the same wards.18 The ANC had won seven of those wards in 2006 by landslide margins averaging 90% of the votes cast; and the other – Ward 38 – by a respectable 65%.19 The results of the by-election held contrasting fortunes for the ANC and its newest challenger. They were reassuring to the former, whilst somewhat disappointing to the latter. As shown in Table 5.1 below, all eight wards returned to the ANC. The margin of victory was lower than it had been in the 2006 local election, but still substantial. Cope’s entry had clearly cost the ANC some support. Albeit a by-election, the results were also a reliable indicator of what was likely to unfold in future, especially because the turnout averaged 45%. This was far better than the usual roughly 25% turnout for by-elections, and just below the 48% national turnout in the 2006 local elections. About a month later, however, the relief that the ANC had derived from the results of the by-election proved short-lived. The results of the national election, held on 22 April 2009, showed a far less popular ANC. The party fell dramatically to 50.14%, from 69.3% in the 2004 national election. Cope took a commendable 17.02% share of the vote cast in the metro and the DA experienced a notable surge to 28.17%, from 21% in 2004. ANC losses were all-round, both in the townships and coloured communities. Africans largely went to Cope, and coloureds to the DA.20

17 The Herald, ‘ANCYL Factions Push for New Premier’, 11 July 2008. 18 Andile Gqalane, Ward 29; Likhaya Matebese, Ward 54; Linda Mlomo, Ward 53; Violet Carelese, Ward 38 (65%); Bulelwa Mhambi, Ward 36; Zolile Skosana, Ward 25 (93%); Peter Hermans, Ward 13; Churchman Adams, Ward 33; Mwandile Hote, Ward 42 (95%). See The Herald, ‘Acid Test for ANC as By-Elections Loom’, 12 January 2009. 19 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za. 20 M. Ndletyana et al., ‘Voting Trends Twenty Years into Democracy: Research Report’ (MISTRA, 2014).

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TABLE 5.1 Comparison of election results, March 2009 by-election and 2006 local election, Nelson Mandela Metro (%) Ward

ANC

Cope

DA

By-election 2009

Local election 2006

By-election 2009

Local election 2006

By-election 2009

Local election 2006

54

85.47

91.96

11.92

–

0.28

0.75

53

47.83

51.82

15.03

–

33.04

35.73

42

82.95

95.50

16.01

–

0.56

0.36

38

51.13

65.00

13.46

–

25.34

27.31

36

67.84

95.12

29.49

–

1.06

0.73

33

81.83

89.04

15.94

–

1.42

3.01

29

72.51

95.19

26.30

–

–

0.51

25

68.06

93.19

28.28

–

–

0.62

Source: Independent Electoral Commission

21

The fourth national election revealed a strong likelihood that the ANC could lose control over City Hall. Local elections were scheduled for 2011. To fend off a possible loss, the ANC would have to govern in a manner that avoided controversies attracting public disapproval, and would have to maintain, if not accelerate, its record of service delivery. Whilst amongst the metros with the highest rates of unemployment (approximately 36%), the NMB compared relatively well on service delivery, as noted earlier, and on governance, with a clean audit for that financial year, 2009/10 – the third such audit in a row. As a result, the metro experienced comparatively fewer community protests than other metros. Between 2004 and 2011, for instance, it was placed fourth on the frequency of protests, at 17 per year (along with Tshwane), and behind Ekurhuleni with 24, Cape Town at 35 and Johannesburg at 46.22

SCRAMBLING FOR SPOILS OF VICTORY The responsibility to steer the ANC out of the doldrums fell on Nceba Faku. He was elected chairperson, unopposed, on 23 May 23 2009. The rest of the

21 See https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/. 22 Municipal IQ, ‘Delivery Protests: 2010 in Perspective’, Briefing No. 268, 1 February 2011.

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REC included Zanoxolo Wayile as deputy chairperson; Zandisile Qupe23 as secretary; Nancy Sihlwayi as deputy secretary; and Helen August-Sauls was elected treasurer. All were part of the Stalini faction that had supported Zuma at the 2007 Polokwane conference. The 2009 REC, in other words, represented a victory for the Stalini. The Stalini victory had been prepared by Faku’s RTT. It was biased in its preparatory work for the elective conference. In his report to the PEC, for instance, the secretary of the RTT, Themba Mangqase, wrote: The regional task team has since its founding not been able to rise above the factions that existed prior to its establishment … where those who do not follow a particular line determined by a faction are marginalised in all the processes of the re-launch of branches.24

The regional conference even had to be postponed twice. The second postponement happened just a day before the conference on 14 May 2009. Provincial leaders wanted to avoid having the legitimacy of the REC elected at that conference questioned. There was controversy over whether the attendance of some branches was legitimate or if others had been disqualified unfairly. For this reason, as Pemmy Majodina, a provincial leader, pointed out, ‘We want the

23 Qupe went on to become a prominent and dominant regional secretary for the next five years. His subsequent prominence in the region surprised many local activists. His political background is a bit foggy. Some of the local activists I interviewed say he comes from the Pan Africanist Congress, but I could not verify this point. His rise in the local ANC appears to stem from his involvement with the teachers’ union, the South African Democratic Teachers Union (Sadtu), which is amongst the largest in the workers’ federation, Cosatu, aligned to the ANC. Teachers swelled ANC ranks due to both Sadtu’s influence in alliance politics and teachers generally having more time on their hands than other individuals employed elsewhere. Many work a half-day and many have been known to bunk work to attend political meetings. This gave them an edge over other activists. This is how Qupe got elected councillor. His subsequent rise to the REC owes to Faku taking a liking to him. Bongani Gxilishe recalls asking Faku how Qupe came to be part of his ticket. Faku responded: ‘Ndabona nje umntu othand’ ubhala. Ehleli nje wayethath’ i-notes ze-meetings pha e-Stalini. Ndathi yaa ngunobhala wam lo [I just saw someone who was constantly taking notes at meetings. I then decided this is my secretary]’. Gxilishe, interview, 13 September 2018. Zola Mtatsi adds, ‘Qupe’s choice was not popular within his faction. Some of his comrades objected that they didn’t know him; he was still new in the organisation, was weak and didn’t have capacity.’ Faku responded, ‘Sanukhathazeka ngaye. Ndinayo i-capacity mna’ [Don’t worry about him. I have capacity]. Mtatsi, interview, 12 June 2018. 24 The Herald, ‘ANC Top Brass Head for Bay to End Power Struggle’, 18 May 2009.

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audit of the branches, to determine whether they are in good standing, to be completed first before holding the conference.’25 Ultimately, though, Faku inherited a fractured ANC. A month into his tenure, Faku’s REC instructed Maphazi to resign, or face dismissal. She refused to go and their threat to dismiss her proved hollow. Change of leadership (or deployment) could only be done with the approval of Calata House, which, at the time, was behind Maphazi. That saved her, at least for the moment.26 With Maphazi enjoying some protection, they went for whom they considered a soft target, Graham Richards, the city manager. Unlike the mayoral position, the party did not have a policy authorising the provincial leadership to decide the fate of a city manager. They could object as a superior structure, but lacked official authority to enforce their objection. The REC exploited this gap, ignoring the PEC’s instruction not to table Richards’ suspension for discussion at the Council meeting of 23 July 23 2009. They charged Richards with ‘irregular conduct and poor performance’ which, they claimed, they would prove through an investigation later. The motion was passed, leading to Richards’ suspension and an investigation supposedly to prove the charges. It is worth noting that, of the 81 ANC councillors, 13 voted against the motion. These included the mayor, her deputy, Bicks Ndoni, and the speaker, Charmaine Williams. They dismissed the charges against Richards’ as spurious, as Maphazi would later explain: They will not get anything on Graham – he’s clean to me, and some of the things that are alleged against him were before his time. They must call municipal managers who were here before his time to deal with those matters. The way the investigation is handled it seems like it is a way to get something out of Graham or maybe to push him out completely.27

Maphazi’s group also believed that the chief whip was in the wrong procedurally. The objection by the PEC, they argued, was enough to rescind the tabling of the matter in Council, but the chief whip defied it. Thus Maphazi’s group argued that their objection to Richards’ suspension was in line with organisational protocol.28 Moreover, to prove that Richards had not done anything wrong, in August 2009 Maphazi requested the member of Executive Council (MEC), Sicelo Ggobana, to institute a forensic investigation into 25 26 27 28

The Herald, ‘ANC Top Brass Head for Bay’. Interview with Nondumiso Maphazi, 23 October 2018. The Herald, ‘I Was Betrayed, Sobs Mayor’, 25 November 2009. The Herald, ‘Hearing against Mayor Put Off for Executive Decision’, 26 October 2009.

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the allegations of impropriety, going back to 2000. Ggobana acceded and the Kabuso auditing firm was appointed. Kabuso’s audit findings, almost two years later, would have a tumultuous effect on the party, implicating the same people who were accusing Richards of impropriety. Standard House was not persuaded by Maphazi’s actions. The REC considered the stance taken by the group-of-thirteen as a breach of organisational discipline. They were consequently slapped with a charge of ‘conniving’ with the opposition and hauled before a disciplinary hearing. The national leadership saved them. Just as the hearing was about to sit on 24 October 2009, the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) instructed the REC to halt the proceedings until it had itself considered the matter. Maphazi and her group had some support within the NEC. Opposition to the REC within the party caucus also found support from the general membership of the ANC. Xolani Tengo, an activist-priest and member of the ANC, was quite vocal against the attempts to remove the leadership at City Hall. In his letter to the local paper, The Herald, and writing in his capacity as a member of an ANC branch, Shakes Mkalipi in Ward 20, Tengo said: The constant threats of ousting and redeployment are about personal gain, hunger for power and control of the procurement of goods and services in the municipality, not about investments and service delivery. For instance, this group called together certain senior municipal managers and told them not to advertise certain tenders. Such tenders were then to be secretly awarded to their ‘preferred’ suppliers. This faction’s aims are to replace the individuals who want to stall them in their pursuit of self-enrichment.29

Seeing the removal as a malicious intent, Tengo foresaw dire consequences if the REC was not challenged, as the letter noted further: I urge the ANC provincial executive to intervene urgently before this municipality collapses … The councillors should be concerned and very careful in voting for the ousting of the municipal manager because it will have very serious implications in terms of our stability and will entail fruitless expenditure.30

29 The Herald, ‘Mayor Appointed by ANC, Must Be Defended against Bid to Oust Her’, letter by Rev Xolani Tengo, ANC Member, Shakes Mkalipi Branch, Ward 20, 26 October 2009. 30 The Herald, ‘Mayor Appointed by ANC, Must Be Defended’.

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Tengo ascribed Richards’ removal to mischief. The idea was to appoint a city manager that would be pliable to their improper solicitation over who should get contracts. Tengo’s prognosis was not off the mark. Richards, recalled Maphazi, was a stumbling block to the REC: ‘They wanted him to appoint their own people and to give them certain contracts. But, Richards refused.’31 With Richards gone, the resistance to REC interference in the municipality crumbled. Richards’ replacement, Elias Ntoba, who was appointed in an acting capacity, was their lackey, as Maphazi relayed her experience: Ntoba co-operated with their demands. They changed the tender and bid committees, to put their own people there who would do these things. The MFMA did not matter. Ayisebenzi lanto [That thing doesn’t work]. All they needed to do was to get their own people. And, the prohibition on the length of time a person can act was also overlooked. So long as you had a co-operative MEC and minister they could overlook the repeated reappointments in an acting capacity beyond the required 90 days. Things just got worse from that moment onwards. I was not in charge of the administration. The city manager took instructions from Matomela [Standard] House.32

The REC clearly considered its municipal deployees completely subservient to its authority. Their idea of relations with City Hall was not the co-ordination that Thabo Mbeki had envisaged at the dawn of democracy. There was no separation of responsibilities, with Standard House monitoring implementation of party policies, whilst City Hall was left to run the administration in accordance with ANC policies. City Hall was expected to simply defer to any directive issued by Standard House. Interestingly, whilst mayor, Faku had resisted what he thought was Stone Sizani’s meddling with the administration. Now that he was party chairperson, Faku had turned around to behave, towards his mayor, in exactly the same manner he had previously rejected. Faku’s conduct towards Maphazi was impelled by self-interest, in breach of organisational regulations. The 2007 Polokwane conference had reiterated Mbeki’s earlier emphasis on a separation of roles and co-ordination between the party and government deployees. On relations between the party and the state, for instance, the conference resolved that the party provide ‘strategic leadership’ – a role that required it to strengthen ‘its monitoring and evaluation capacity’ in order to fulfil it optimally. This would ‘ensure that cadres deployed

31 Maphazi, interview, 23 October 2018. 32 Maphazi, interview, 23 October 2018.

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in various capacities are able to improve their work in meeting set objectives’. That said, the resolution was equally emphatic that these cadres should have sufficient space to exercise initiative within the strategic mandate rather than being subjected to micro-management … Lastly, in its conduct in relation to the state, the ANC should be guided by its own principles, and act within the framework of the National Constitution and relevant legislation. In this regard, it should manage the state as an organ of the people as a whole rather than a party political instrument.33

Richards’ suspension was also revealing of the contrasting relations Faku’s REC had with provincial leaders at Calata House, on the one hand, and national leaders at Luthuli House, on the other. The REC was not entirely submissive to Calata House, whose authority it was subject to. They defied Calata House on Richards’ suspension, and the latter’s threat to discipline the ANC chief whip never materialised. What emboldened the REC was the backing from Luthuli House, which was now controlled by Zuma, whom they had backed for presidency at the 2007 conference. Sizani’s PEC, conversely, had supported Mbeki, which made for uneasy relations in the aftermath of Zuma’s victory. Nosimo Balindlela, for instance, who was appointed by Mbeki as premier of the Eastern Cape, was removed from her position in July 2008. Forced to choose between Faku’s REC and Sizani’s PEC, Zuma’s Luthuli House fell behind the former. That said, Sizani’s PEC still managed to protect Maphazi from being removed as mayor. A change of provincial leadership in September 2009, however, made her vulnerable. The new provincial chairperson, led by Phumulo Masualle, was aligned to the REC. Both had been Zuma’s backers for the ANC presidency in 2007. This meant that the PEC was likely to accede to REC’s quest to remove Maphazi. Predictably, Maphazi was soon instructed to resign – on 19 November 2009 – in a manner she considered callous, as she explained: I was never officially informed by the national office of the ANC. I was called to a meeting at Standard House by the regional secretary, deputy secretary and spokesman of the ANC provincially. That’s when they told me about plans to redeploy me and they wanted a letter of resignation, and I said I need time to do it.

33 ANC, Adopted Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, 52nd National Conference, 20 December 2007.

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I sent (the letter) to the ANC (on Monday). I was just told I’m being redeployed and, by that time, I was asked to go and address the REC with the decision from that meeting last week.34

Maphazi resigned officially on 23 November 23 2009 – the day before her birthday. The reasons given for her removal, Bicks Ndoni contended, were entirely groundless: There was no clarity given on why … We’ve heard in the media that part of the decision was the poor performance in the past elections and that wherever the mayor goes, people are howling … those are pure lies … We have done what we were supposed to, although we could have done better. I’m proud to say, we don’t leave behind a cupboard of skeletons and we’ve served the people of the metro with dignity.35

Maphazi was the victim of a factionalist purge that followed the 2007 Polokwane conference. A number of public officials throughout the country, who were associated with Thabo Mbeki, suffered similar fates. Whilst it was initially galvanised by ideological differences, the victorious Stalini faction had begun to show that their interest in office went beyond its supposed ideological pursuits. The removal of Graham Richards as city manager, on false grounds, was the first validation of their intent to abuse power for their financial interests. Maphazi’s removal was simply the last act to pave way for the inauguration of a self-indulgent faction at City Hall. Her successor, Zanuxolo Wayile, was sworn in on 25 November 2009. Wayile was deputy chairperson of the REC and a provincial leader of Numsa. Part of Cosatu, Numsa had participated in many of the marches that called for Maphazi’s resignation. Wayile became the beneficiary of Maphazi’s removal. His appointment was the ultimate triumph of the Stalini faction. Having removed Maphazi supposedly on account of inefficiency in order to avert an electoral loss in the next local elections in 2011, Wayile’s tenure promised probity that would improve the party’s electoral fortunes.

ORGANISATIONAL LIFE AFTER THE SPLIT: TURBULENCE PERSISTS The aftermath of the split did not yield a coherent party. Some of those who were aligned to the erstwhile REC and opposed political meddling in the administration remained within the ANC. This led to the re-drawing of the fault lines, away

34 The Herald, ‘I Was Betrayed, Sobs Mayor’. 35 The Herald, ‘I Was Betrayed, Sobs Mayor’.

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from a head-on confrontation between Stalini and the Stepping Stone. Now the fault lines existed in two forms: firstly between the old adversaries, but under the guise of marginalising ‘Cope moles’, and secondly within the victorious faction, as a manifestation of contrasting interests and over the spoils of victory. It eventually turned into a full-blown internecine battle to the detriment of the municipal administration and organisational integrity, pushing the party further onto the precipice of electoral defeat. Wayile’s initial measures as mayor confounded what had promised to be a purge of affiliates of the rival faction. Whilst affirming the dominance of his faction, Wayile’s Mayco was nonetheless inclusive of members of the rival faction. Of the councillors that served in Maphazi’s Mayco, three were retained.36 Replacements in the Mayco came from the new power bloc. Bicks Ndoni was demoted from deputy mayor, but still kept in the Mayco. The other two influential positions, deputy mayor and speaker, went to members of Wayile’s faction.37 Whilst Wayile adopted what looked like reconciliatory measures within Council, the rest of the party remained divided. Among the early signs of persistent divisions was the controversy that swirled over the nomination of candidates for the 2011 elections scheduled for 18 May 2011. The REC came under severe attack by branch leaders for meddling in the nomination process to ensure that their preferred candidates won. A branch member at New Brighton’s Ward 14, for instance, put it as follows: The REC forced us to vote for people we did not want to vote for. They have their own agenda and want to impose candidates who are not the popular choice in the community, the process is handled in a very sneaky way. Faku is calling the shots in the metro, even though he’s no longer the mayor. The REC wants councillors who can be manipulated, not assertive people.38

Another branch member at KwaZakhele’s Ward 20 added: When we put up our hands in favour of someone we nominated, we were told by the regional executive committee (REC) members to put down our hands.39

36 Those removed were: Marsla Odayar, Mahlubi Biyana, Mike Kwenaite, Mnyamezeli Tokota; those who were retained were: Bicks Ndoni, Anne-Marie van Jaarsveld and Nohle Mohapi. 37 Nancy Sihlwayi was appointed the new deputy mayor, and Helen Sauls-August, the new speaker. See The Herald, ‘New Bay Mayor Outlines Areas to Tackle in First 100 Days’, 9 December 2009. 38 The Herald, ‘Oh But Out, Faku’, 25 January 2011. 39 The Herald, ‘Oh But Out, Faku’.

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The disgruntlement over nominations even saw a march to the party’s headquarters, Standard House. Hoisting placards reading, for example, ‘Vote of no confidence to da REC’; ‘Let us choose our candidates’; and ‘Asifuni kuthathelwa sigqibo’ [We don’t want decisions taken for us], protesters staged a sit-in at the regional office.40 Determined to resist what they considered a suppression of popular will, the disgruntled members went so far as to form themselves into a separate group dubbed the Concerned Group, reportedly representing 37 wards. Zolani Dondashe was their chairperson. They launched into a series of protests, demanding the resignation of Faku and some of the executive members, and threatened not to vote for the ANC in the local elections.41 A subsequent investigation led by a senior national leader of the ANC, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, would later bear out the complaints of manipulation in the nomination process. The number of branches that the Dlamini-Zuma Task Team eventually probed, however, was fewer than the 37 that alleged irregularities. Only 13 were probed and no less than five of those – Wards 4, 14, 22, 28 and 43 – had serious infringements. Ward 4’s Nomajava Bhenya, for instance, was selected candidate even though she had scored fourth on the evaluation by the screening committee. The first and second rated nominees, Xolani Thabatha and Thenjiwe Jakavula-Nonimba, were disqualified on account of not residing in the ward. The third rated candidate, Monwabisi Thiso, met all the requirements, but was still overlooked. The Regional List Committee (RLC) ascribed Thiso’s disqualification to her ‘partial blindness’, which was strictly arbitrary and which the Task Team found prejudicial, for it amounted ‘to discriminating against a person living with disability in contravention of the ANC policy’.42 Whilst others were disqualified on account of non-residence, Thembisile Gana was selected candidate for Ward 43 even though he did not reside there. Only after he had been selected as a candidate did the Task Team uncover that ‘some comrades found accommodation for Gana’. The Task Team ‘expressed concerns about efforts to find accommodation for Thembisile Gana as that amounted to evading ANC rules that prevent a person who does not reside within the ward from being a ward candidate’.43 The policy (that one can only be a candidate in a ward that one resides in) was applied unevenly. If those in charge of the process wanted a particular person to be selected, they disregarded policy guidelines.

40 The Herald, ‘Fur Flies over ANC Poll Nominees’ 23 March 2011. 41 The Herald, ‘Protest at ANC Officers Crushed’, 16 June 2011. 42 ANC, Dlamini-Zuma Task Team, Report of the Investigating Task Team on List and other Disputes, September 2012, p. 59. 43 ANC, Dlamini-Zuma Task Team Report, p. 72.

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In the case of Wards 14 and 43, leading nominees, Dollie Bhuti and Itumeleng Ranyele, were ignored on the suspicion that they were Cope sympathisers. Ranyele was further suspected of having refused to wear an ANC T-shirt bearing Jacob Zuma’s face. Because of the suspicion, the Task Team was told, Bhuti and Ranyele were distrusted, leading to the RLC choosing Vuyisile Dyantyi and Nomhle Vilakazi instead. The latter had been scored fifth in the screening committee’s evaluation. Whilst Bhuti and Ranyele were informed of the reason for their exclusion, Ward 28’s Zola Mtatsi and Nomfuneko Phakadi were never told. The screening committee had scored them second and third respectively, behind XS Sifali, who was subsequently placed on the proportional representation list. Instead of Mtatsi or Phakade being considered a candidate, the RLC chose Buyelwa Mafaya who had come fourth in the committee’s evaluation. The RLC, the Task Team found, had never explained its decision. Notwithstanding the relatively low number of branches probed by the Task Team, it is indisputable that the cohesion of the party machinery was affected by the vocal protests. Disgruntlement within the ranks saps enthusiasm for campaign duties. The ANC relies on members volunteering to do door-to-door campaigns over a considerable period of time, often after hours when eligible voters are likely to be home. Volunteers are spurred by commitment to the party. That commitment is seriously tested by the relatively cold evening weather that sets in from April and lasts up to the end of July, which is the period over which South Africa commonly holds its elections. It goes without saying that when members are unhappy with the party they are unlikely to forsake the warmth of their homes for campaign activities in unpleasant weather at night. In sum, the May 2011 local elections found the ANC in a worse state than it had been in the pre-2009 national elections. Factionalism had not only persisted within the party structures, but had also begun to exert a destabilising impact on the municipality, as manifested by the removal of both the mayor and the city manager. Furthermore, the reasoning for their removal was unsound, disguising the real intent to abuse power for financial gain. The 2011 elections reconfirmed the ANC’s dismal results of the 2009 national elections. The party garnered 52%, which translated to a slim majority of three seats (63, down from 81 in 2006) in the 120-seat Council. This was despite the fact that Cope, which was its major rival for township votes in 2009, was in dire

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straits.44 As a result, the party got a measly 4.88% in the region – a massive drop from 17% in the 2009 elections. Township-based voters that had deserted the ANC for Cope in 2009 did not return to the ANC in 2011, but appear to have stayed away from the polls. Conversely, the northern-areas-based voters that had left the ANC for the DA in 2009 remained with the party in the 2011 elections. Consequently, the DA received 40% of the votes cast – a phenomenal surge from the 24% it had garnered five years earlier in the 2006 local elections.45 The DA had not only won over some ANC supporters in the predominantly coloured northern areas, but turnout in the party’s strongholds had also improved notably. For the first time since the 2000 election, the average turnout in the wards the DA won was higher, at 66%, in comparison to the ANC’s 63%. DA supporters were becoming more mobilised and engaged in the electoral process than the ANC supporters. The ANC’s maladministration had stirred DA supporters to remove the malfeasant incumbent. Conversely, the ANC’s traditional supporters were beginning to show less interest in supporting their party, the party’s malfeasance having dampened their enthusiasm.

INTERNECINE BATTLES WORSEN Whilst the 2009 elections had merely signalled, the 2011 local elections affirmed, the possibility of the ANC losing the NMB. This possibility rested, not only on the ANC’s drop in support, but also on the impressive rise of the DA. That these contrasting fortunes were happening for the second time in a row, suggested an emerging pattern that was likely to persist into the future. Despite the presence of an electoral threat, the state of the ANC and its municipality deteriorated in subsequent years. Wayile’s election as mayor did not change relations between City Hall and Standard House. Standard House insisted on meddling with the administration in the same way as they had done under Maphazi. Though he had supported political interference before his entry at City Hall, Wayile resisted it now that he was mayor. This created yet another stand-off between the party and municipal leaders. Two issues are illustrative of the power struggle. They involved damning findings contained in the so-called Kabuso Report and appointment of administrative staff.

44 Soon after 2009 elections, Cope had become entangled in a dreadful leadership battle, which saw leaders taking one another to court over fraudulent conferences, precipitating an exodus of some of its respected leaders. See H. Maserumule and R. Mathekga, ‘A Glimpse into the Future of the Congress of the People’, Journal of Public Administration 46:31 Special Issue: 2011 Local Government Elections (2011), pp. 1182–1198. 45 Ndletyana et al, ‘Voting Trends’.

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Forensic investigation: Kabuso Report The audit firm, Kabuso, concluded its forensic investigation in February 2010. Its findings were an irony. Maphazi had instituted the probe to disprove allegations against Graham Richards by Faku’s REC.46 Believing that the allegations were a smear aimed at hounding Richards out of the administration, Maphazi insisted that they be investigated, but in the process, uncovered corruption that implicated, among others, Nceba Faku himself – the very person who had led the charges of corruption against Richards. On seeing its damaging findings, the MEC for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Mlibo Qoboshiyane, sought to suppress the release of the Kabuso report. It took court action by the local newspaper, The Herald, to force the provincial government to release the report. Qoboshiyane reasoned that the report contained privileged and sensitive information that had to be acted upon. Its public release would jeopardise prospects of remedial actions succeeding. Conversely, The Herald contended that the release of the report was in the public interest. The refusal to release the report, The Herald maintained, simply betrayed an aversion to public scrutiny on the part of the MEC. This was further evidenced, added The Herald, by the municipality’s lack of urgency to formulate a plan of action on the recommendations of the report. The municipality had repeatedly failed to meet the MEC’s deadlines to outline a remedial plan of action on the report’s findings. In The Herald’s view, this showed lack of sincerity on the part of the municipality to act on the report, which nullified their objection to its release. The court found in favour of The Herald. Ruling on 20 October 2011, Judge AJ Dukada partly noted: ‘To withhold the Kabuso report any further will be against public interest that will be served by revealing the Kabuso report which evidences a substantial contravention of the law and such public interest clearly outweighs the harm.’47 The Judge ordered the MEC to deliver the report to The Herald within five days of issuing the verdict. When the Kabuso report was finally released, it became evident why the ANC did not want the public to see its content. Kabuso’s forensic auditors had investigated a number of allegations. They included irregular and unauthorised expenditure, the municipality’s failure to enforce regulations, improper handling of disciplinary matters involving staff and political meddling in administrative matters. The most damaging findings, however, related to the lease of public property, a rental lease and inappropriate

46 Kabuso, ‘Forensic Investigation Final Report: Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’, Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, February 2010, p. 2. 47 HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 829/2011, p. 24.

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expenditure on members of a political party. Both the lease and the rental implicated Nceba Faku, the regional secretary and former mayor. Without the approval of Council or his mayoral committee, Faku had handed a public resort, Willows Resort, over to a private company to run. Furthermore, he gave it a grant of R2 million to upgrade the place. Concluded in 2003, the agreement was never documented and the municipality came to hear of it only during the Kabuso investigation. Over the six-year period that the Madiba Bay Resort ran the place, it generated a turnover of R41.5 million, from which the municipality never benefited. In another instance, the municipality was found to be renting exorbitant office space, Kwantu Towers, when they had relatively cheaper office space available to them. Moreover, they repeatedly renewed the rental in the presence of cheaper options. Besides the unauthorised rentals, Faku awarded ANC veterans an amount of R500 000 in 2001/2 to purchase a bottle store, Matomela Bottle Store, located in KwaZakhele. The expenditure was not connected to any of the municipal functions. In this case, however, it is not clear what became of the initiative. The investigator could not find documents and the individuals interviewed, in the course of the investigation, were not helpful. What was clear, however, was that the expenditure was irregular, making a strong case for recovery of the funds. The findings of the Kabuso probe, therefore, were damning about the governing party and the former mayor, Faku. Although the report did not specifically find corruption, how the lease and rental were carried out implied that politicians and/or public officials possibly received improper financial gains. Only a criminal investigation could uncover further details and identify the exact culprits. This possibility is what caused the tension between City Hall and Standard House. Faku’s executive wanted to suppress the report, whereas Wayile sought to hand it over to the law enforcement authorities for criminal investigation and possible prosecution. In his public statement on 26 October 2011, for instance, the mayor stated: As you will see, the Report makes specific recommendations, which includes legal action to be taken against certain individuals mentioned therein. As the Executive Mayor, I plan to table the Kabuso Report, together with the recommendations that were noted at the last Council meeting, at tomorrow’s Metropolitan Council, for consideration and adoption. In addition, in accordance with the resolution taken at the last Council meeting, I am appointing a Task Team of three persons, namely Cllrs M Bungane, B Naran and N Tontsi to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations and resolutions which will be adopted tomorrow. The Task Team will be assisted by

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ECSECC [Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council], whose duties will include the unlocking of bureaucracy, legal obstacles and resources to fasttrack the process, so that projects can be identified to generate revenue and give effect to job-creation and development. I wish to state further that the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is committed to good and clean governance.48

As promised, the mayor appointed a task team to look into the report. Its terms of reference included, among other things, providing ‘guidance on the implementation of the recommendations including institution of legal and disciplinary proceedings against the implicated officials and political office bearers, both current and former’.49 In the course of its work, the task team was instructed to seek ‘the assistance of external parties from the various state entities e.g. Office of the Auditor General … law enforcement agencies e.g. SAPS, Hawks and Department of Justice as well as Chapter 9 Institutions i.e. Public Protector’.50 Faku’s REC disapproved of the mayor’s stated plan of action on the Kabuso report. Rather than have Council adopt a motion to investigate further and possibly prosecute the alleged culprits, the REC wanted the MEC’s office to handle the report. To fellow councillors who disagreed, the REC threatened reprisals. The intention was to bury the report. In a letter titled, ‘Decision to be Communicated to Caucus’, dated 7 December 2011 and addressed to the ANC chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko, the party’s regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, wrote: On the Kabuso Report, the REC resolved: 1. That the Task Team be disbanded tomorrow as its work has been concluded; 2. That the ANC decision on the process of Kabuso still stands; i.e. present, discuss and close the matter through a motion that indicates that the matter will be presented to the MEC as concluded by the Metro; 3. That the Task-Team process plan should not be presented to Council nor be adopted in any Council structure; 4. That the REC should address the caucus as such in the meeting of 8 December 2011 at 07h30 as a collective; 5. That any ANC deployee that decides to vote against ANC decisions in Council will bear the consequences of their actions.

48 NMB Municipality, Statement of the Executive Mayor, 26 October 2011. 49 NMB Municipality, Executive Mayor Special Task Team, Process Plan on Kabuso Report, November 2011, p. 2. 50 NMB Municipality, Process Plan on Kabuso Report, p. 2.

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Seeing that the report exposed impropriety by ANC leaders, the REC feared a backlash from the electorate. Writing to the PEC again on 13 December 2011, Qupe, as REC secretary, noted that the Kabuso report has dealt with the image of the ANC even during the local government elections (the DA and Cope were using it as a campaign tool against the ANC and in most instances they succeeded to convince voters that the ANC is led by corrupt people, hence the performance of the Metro). What is shocking about the process is that it seeks to extend the period of this matter being in the agenda of the Council processes well into 2012, as the Task Team is expected to report its final processes to the Council in April 2012, meaning the ANC will continue to have this dark cloud hanging over it even next year, with the potential of continuing until we get to the next general elections in 2014.51

The majority in the ANC caucus ignored the REC’s instructions. They supported the mayor in his bid to have law-enforcement agencies act on the report. After forwarding the report to the authorities, the mayor reiterated his resolve to act against corruption: ‘No amount of political intimidation and blackmail can stop us from moving forward. The time to act is now; we don’t want our children to inherit anarchy.’52 On the grounds of defying instructions from Standard House, the REC requested the PEC to grant it permission ‘to reshuffle the mayoral committee with immediate effect’,53 and to start instituting disciplinary process against all those that had defied its decisions. Appointment of municipal staff Appointment of staff presented another point of conflict between Standard House and City Hall. Party leaders thought it proper to instruct the mayor on whom to appoint, and to which position. Wayile resisted, insisting that such decisions are its prerogative. The REC countered by instructing some of its allied councillors to thwart such appointments by voting against them. One example of this conflict was over the appointment of a city manager. By September 2011, the NMB had operated without a permanent city manager for a period of two years. Graham Richards, the last incumbent, had been pushed out in June 2009 and was succeeded by Elias Ntoba who had remained in the 51 Letter from NMB regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, to Eastern Cape PEC, Re: Contravention of ANC Mandates by ANC Deployees in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 13 December 2011. 52 The Herald, Kabuso Report Move Welcomed’, 12 December 2011. 53 Letter from NMB regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, to Eastern Cape PEC, 13 December 2011.

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position, in an acting capacity, ever since. His repeated appointment was a violation of regulations that interim appointments could last for no longer than 90 days. There was no urgency to appoint a permanent city manager, as noted ealier by Nondumiso Maphazi, for Ntoba was compliant to the dictates of Standard House. Only in June 2011 did the Council make a concerted effort to appoint a permanent city manager. Disagreements over the choice of a suitable candidate, however, foiled the appointment process. Faku’s regional committee reportedly preferred Sithembele Vatala, a senior manager in the metro. But Wayile favoured Thabo Ndlovu for the job and was determined to make the appointment, setting the announcement date as 2 September 2011. When it did not happen on that day, it was rescheduled for 8 September 2011.54 That announcement too never happened. This time around it was blocked by a court interdict. Vatala had secured the interdict. He had been informed by some of the interview panelists – Nomamerika Magopeni, Balu Naran and Chippa Ngcolomba – that he was the favourite candidate, instead of Thabo Ndlovu, whom the mayor intended to appoint. The court was sympathetic to Vatala. In addition to blocking the announcement of a new permanent city manager, the court ordered Wayile to give Vatala the report of the selection panel, and allow him to address the Council before they made the final decision.55 It is not clear whether Vatala was ever able to address the Council. What is certain though is that a permanent appointment for the city manager position did not take place in 2011. Council decided to start the selection process all over again. The three panelists’ breaking ranks with Mayco over Vatala was curious. It is possible that they were prompted by a desire to avert an infraction. After all, Vatala seemed to have scored highest in the interview. Their interest in Vatala, however, seemed to have gone beyond a concern for fairness. For instance, once Vatala’s appointment to the city manager position proved unsuccessful, the REC insisted that he be retained on the committee that oversaw the issuing of tenders. In his letter dated 17 November 2011 to the ANC chief whip, Sibeko, regional secretary Qupe ordered ‘that the matter of relieving Cdes Williams and Vatala from the supply chain management committees must be reversed and they be reinstated with immediate effect’.56 The extraordinary interest that the REC took in Vatala suggested that they considered him an ally; Wayile, too, thought

54 The Herald, ‘Mayor Still Mum on New Bay Manager’, 5 September 2011. 55 The Herald, ‘Mayor Has to Explain His Choice’, 25 October 2011. 56 Letter from NMB regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe to ANC chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko, Re: Communication of ANC REC Decisions for Immediate Implementation, 17 November 2011.

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as much, which explained his reluctance to appoint Vatala and his subsequent removal from the tender commmitte. It is not apparent how Vatala reciprocated the party leaders’ interest in him, but it is not unthinkable that they expected him to sway tender decisions in their favour. Wayile’s objection to appointing Vatala was possibly motivated by the realisation that he was in cahoots with the REC. It was the same reason that got him to terminate Elias Ntoba’s tenure as acting city manager in October 2011. Backed by the REC, Ntoba refused to vacate his position. The deputy mayor, Nancy Sihlwayi, even had to resort to drastic measures, barring Ntoba entry into the office. In her letter to Ntoba, she wrote: In light of your conduct, you are hereby informed that the executive mayor has decided to restrict your access to all municipal premises, including city hall, as well as the municipal manager’s office.57

Sihlwayi also instructed Ntoba to return municipal assets, including the hired car he had been using, and to vacate the premises the municipality had been renting for him. All this had to happen ‘no later than 12pm [on] Friday 21 October 2011’. Accordingly, the bank was ordered to stop Ntoba’s salary payments with immediate effect. Themba Hani replaced Ntoba as acting city manager. The former was also seconded from the MEC’s office and appointed on an interim basis. With Ntoba’s experience in mind, the MEC, Mlibo Qoboshiyane, warned Hani against meddling in politics: This is a municipal manager for administration – he is not here as a deployed politician. Municipal managers are supposed to do their work diligently and all those who undertake such a post must remove themselves from political structures. This is an opportunity to avoid roles being blurred. The municipal manager will assist the political structures, but they must remember his role is an administrative one.58

Within days of being appointed, Hani moved swiftly against Vatala. He suspended him for being in possession of confidential interview reports, after which he was to be subjected to a disciplinary hearing. However, Hani was not able to hold the hearing as quickly as he had wished. The exact cause of the delay is not clear. It is possible that Vatala was protected by the REC. For suspending

57 The Herald, ‘Ntoba Barred from City Hall by Mayor’, 24 October 2011. 58 The Herald, ‘We Are Going to Clean Up the Rot’, 28 October 2011.

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Vatala, which the REC decried as a purge of officials aligned to it, Hani made himself unpopular with Standard House. They demanded that Vatala’s suspension be reversed,59 but Hani was unrelenting. Vatala remained on suspension for seventeen months until his resignation in April 2013. After a year acting as city manager, Hani left in November 2012. He was replaced by yet another temporary appointment, Israel Tsatsire. Tsatsire’s appointment, proved controversial from the outset. Some 14 ANC councillors, aligned to the regional leadership, did not support the appointment. This denied the ANC of a majority in Council, as its total tally of seats was 63. Wayile had to solicit the support of the opposition to pass Tsatsire’s appointment. Tsatsire had been an acting chief operating officer, and was appointed to act in yet another capacity. It is worth stressing that the REC’s meddling in the administration went beyond the appointment of the city manager. Regional leaders also meddled in the design of the organogram of the municipality’s managerial structure, in the wording of job advertisements and dates of issue for such advertisements, and in the recruitment of individuals into various positions.60 The REC’s preferred candidates were appointed with the expectation that they would do them favours in return. This meant that some of the political appointees lacked the requisite competence for the job (as shown in the case of Mod Ndoyana, discussed in the next chapter). Political bickering over the appointment of a permanent city manager, furthermore, denied the administration of the stable leadership required for efficient long-term planning and implementation. Interim appointments were simply stop-gap measures whose job security was precarious and who were constantly subject to political controversy between the bickering parties. This limited the range of decisions they could make, and made them generally hesitant as they feared castigation from politicians who considered them partisan. It is worth noting also that this uncertainty did not affect only the highest administrative post: eight municipal departments had acting executive directors. By the end of 2011 relations between Standard House and City Hall were at their lowest, and both the party caucus and the rest of the ANC were divided. The faction that had ascended to power was now fractured. So deep was the schism that the mayor, Wayile, even had to enlist the support of the opposition to get decisions passed in Council. Once united in removing the previous mayor, now Faku was mobilising for the removal of his one-time ally and deputy chair-

59 Letter from NMB regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, to ANC chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko, 17 November 2011. 60 Letter from NMB regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, to ANC chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko, 17 November 2011.

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person, Wayile, as mayor of the metro. Wayile’s stand-off with the rest of the REC was testimony to the conflicting interests that characterised their Stalini faction. Whilst some had done so for ideological reasons, others were simply motivated by greed. Wayile’s stance reflected a new realisation within Cosatu, especially Numsa. At its fifth meeting of the Central Committee on 18–31 March 2011, for instance, Cosatu’s Secretariat Report admitted that some of their allies at Polokwane had now turned out to be ‘parasites’ and ‘predators’ who ‘largely depend on demagogue zig zag political rhetoric in the most spectacular and unprincipled fashion and [are] hell bent on material gain, corruption and looting’.61

REALIGNMENT OF FACTIONS Factions had now been redefined. Factional affiliation did not necessarily follow a clear-cut pattern. On the surface, the leftist allies of the tripartite alliance – Cosatu and the SACP – sided with Wayile, whilst the ANC and its Leagues – Veterans, Women and Youth – supported Faku. In a letter to the REC in October 2011, for instance, Wayile complained that the Youth League has taken it upon themselves to stop at nothing … spearheading a smear campaign aimed at assassinating my political character and that of the ANC chief Feziwe Sibeko … I have been reliably informed that comrade Sicelo Mleve, Xolani Mgxotheni and some others within the structures of the [youth] league are at the helm of this campaign, having recently convened [a] series of formal and informal meetings in Motherwell wherein young people were agitated against the executive mayor and the chief whip.62

For their part, the MK Veterans Association (MKVA) felt that Wayile had ignored their plight. They even threatened to enforce a campaign Siyaziqesha [we’re employing ourselves] as we noticed that mayor Zanoxolo Wayile is micro-managing us through unfulfilled promises and is employing only those who support him. If someone can’t employ us he must leave the office. In fact we will go to the municipality, look at their organogram and appoint our own [parallel] staff.63

61 Cosatu, ‘Building Cosatu Engines to Heighten Class Consciousness for an Alternative Development Path’, Secretariat Report, 5th Cosatu Central Committee meeting, 28–31 March 2011. 62 The Herald, ‘Wayile Lashes Out at Bid to Oust Him’, 11 October 2011. 63 The Herald, ‘MK Vets Threaten Mayor’, 28 March 2012.

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In response, Cosatu launched ‘a hands-off Wayile campaign’.64 Their support for Wayile was not unexpected. Before his appointment as mayor, as noted earlier, Wayile had been the provincial leader of Numsa. Cosatu also had differences with the REC over its handling of governance issues, especially in relation to corruption. Numsa’s regional chairperson, Phumzile Nodongwe, speaking on behalf of Numsa, Sanco and Samwu in a press conference on 19 August 2012, lamented: Certain ANC leaders want to lay their dirty hands on the till, as opposed to serving people and communities … These actions against the executive mayor have nothing to do with meeting the electoral commitments of the alliance, but more to do with opening the door to the looting of public funds for the private enrichment … The ANC in the metro should not be used as a vehicle or cartel to dispense political patronage or buy loyalties.65

The confrontation came to a head in the lead-up towards the regional conference on 27 April 2012. Predictably, Cosatu supported Wayile, whilst the SACP proposed its own provincial secretary, Mzoleli Mrara, to challenge the incumbent, Faku, for the regional chairpersonship. ANC Leagues backed Faku, but the mother-body was divided. This showed in the period leading up to the regional conference. Thobile Mhlahlo, former deputy chairperson whose repeated bids to become chairperson had never succeeded, was approached by some branches to challenge Faku for the chairpersonship and agreed. As had become characteristic of the pre-conference period, accusations of manipulation by the REC resurfaced. The chairperson of the ANC branch in Ward 41, Mbongeni Bungane, for instance, charged that his branch had been blocked four times from holding a branch general meeting to nominate candidates for the conference. Bungane explained his frustrations: Our case is known that we won’t vote for [the regional chairman] Faku … People have to choose between politics and business. People want to cling to power to accumulate wealth for themselves. People are making the ANC their private property in this region and it shouldn’t be like that because the ANC belongs to its members. Party processes are being manipulated in the region by the same people who want to be re-elected. Branches [supporting Wayile] are being suppressed deliberately.66

64 The Herald, ‘Hands off Wayile’, 23 November 2011. 65 The Herald, ‘We Will Get Wayile – Faku’, 20 August 2012. 66 The Herald, ‘ANC Branch in Court Threat’, 25 April 2012.

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When the conference was eventually convened, the split in the organisation was laid bare. Wayile even battled to enter the conference on its opening day. He described what happened: I joined the conference around 4pm on Friday, but I was told my membership form could not be found and therefore I was not an ANC member. I was sent from pillar to post until, thankfully [ANC national chairperson] Baleka intervened and said the issue must be sorted out … I have been to provincial conferences; I was at the regional general council last year; I entered these meetings with no qualms. I serve as executive mayor. How is it possible I am not a member of the ANC?67

After the ploy to bar him entry, Wayile and his supporters walked out of the conference. They protested that attendance was manipulated to favour Faku. A supporter of Wayile, Ward 46’s Themba Xathula elaborated: According to the ANC constitution, 90% of voting delegates are supposed to come from branches. That 90% was not reached, so the conference should not have continued. This is a flagrant flouting of rules guiding ANC policies. The election is therefore illegitimate. There must be a re-run of the elections.68

Faku disputed the claims of manipulation. Re-elected regional chairperson,69 Faku explained that 43 of the 60 branches had held branch general meetings, which was one more than the requirement to convene an elective conference. One hundred and eighty-five delegates, Faku added, had pre-registered to attend, but 40 did not show up: ‘Nevertheless, the conference had a total of 145 voting delegates which constitutes a quorum of 78%. Of the delegates present, 90% were from ANC branches in accordance with the constitution.’70 One is neither able to verify the accuracy of these claims, nor discard them. Manipulation of organisational processes and membership, as noted earlier, had become commonplace by now. What is certain though is that the proceedings and outcomes of the conference simply hardened divisions and stoked further battles. Defeated at conference, Wayile faced renewed calls to step down. ‘The current situation of our deployment,’ said Faku, ‘is a huge liability to the ANC in this region. It would be extremely suicidal for the ANC in this region to go into the 67 The Herald, ‘Faku Guns for Wayile’, 30 April 2012. 68 The Herald, ‘Faku Election Slammed’, 30 April 2012. 69 The rest of the regional office-bearers were: Chippa Ngcolomba, deputy chairperson; Zandisile Qupe, secretary (again); Joy Seale, deputy secretary; and Wandisile Jikeka, Treasurer. 70 The Herald, ‘Faku Election Slammed’, 30 April 2012.

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2014 with the current crop of our deployees untampered with.’71 The PEC was not averse to Wayile’s removal. They had contemplated the move even before the regional conference. Speaking about a month before the conference, Oscar Mabuyane, the provincial secretary, insisted: The reshuffle is on hold for now, but when that time arrives, it will happen. The task team led by Derek Hanekom advised us to keep the status quo for now. But it is important to understand that deployment is the responsibility of the ANC … It [the reshuffle] is going to take place if people do not behave according to the resolutions of the organisations.72

Faku believed that Wayile’s removal was inevitable. According to Faku, Wayile’s fault was lack of co-operation with the REC. That alone, reasoned Faku, was sufficiently grave to necessitate Wayile’s removal. He was indifferent to how the public was likely to interpret the entire saga. Consider, for instance, that Wayile had taken a public stance against corruption and was keen to have the culprits face prosecution. Faku was implicated in that wrongdoing. His attempts to remove Wayile, therefore, lent themselves to being seen as a cynical ploy to stymie the probe into corruption and, consequently, to escape liability. Already the electorate had showed their disapproval of the ANC’s impropriety, which saw party support drop in the 2011 local elections. Instead of taking responsibility, however, Faku ascribed the party’s electoral woes to the media: Confidence has gone down, thanks to the media. The media – unfortunately the SABC is equally not helping just like you lot – consistently pumps [out] an impression that ANC leaders should not be trusted, there are elite and fat-cats, some of them are corrupt, the ANC municipalities and government are inefficient and whatever else. These things corrode the confidence of the ordinary people in government, but again, it’s about the earlier point I made, that this is the agenda of the media, to make people cross to the opposition parties.73

Faku expressed confidence nonetheless that the media would not mislead the public for long. ‘What I also like,’ he reasoned, ‘is that somehow our people are able to make a difference between [media] distortions and what is fact.’74 Other ANC members, however, disagreed. Gift Ngqondi, then a researcher in the Office 71 72 73 74

The Herald, ‘Faku Guns for Wayile’. The Herald, ‘Wayile Breaks Silence’, 5 March 2012. The Herald, Interview with Nwabisa Makunga – deputy editor, 6 May 2012. The Herald, Interview with Nwabisa Makunga.

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of the chief whip and a branch leader, ascribed his party’s electoral problems to bad leadership and corruption. In a letter published in the local newspaper, The Herald, Ngqondi argued: Today, our democratic society demands ethical leadership in all our institutions and communities. More often we experience confusion about the meaning of leadership, and disappointment in the quality of our leaders. In the past five years, research shows public confidence in the government has steadily declined, reflecting a widespread perception of leaders as distant, corrupt, or unable to deal effectively with complex social problems. And that confidence is eroding because of our behaviour, inconsistency and indecisiveness of leadership in society and the media is not a contributing factor.75

Faku’s regional committee evidently did not share Ngqondi’s view. They were determined to remove Wayile. Derek Hanekom, a member of the ANC’s NEC deployed to the province, sought to avert that eventuality. He had started mediating in 2011. During one of his multiple visits to the metro, Hanekom explained: It is their political responsibility to continuously work towards strengthening good working relations … We recommended what we thought best for the Nelson Mandela region. That is, we tried to bring the [warring] parties together in order to bring functionality in the metro because clearly there was a strange relationship between the City Hall and Standard House.76

By August 2012 it was becoming clearer that Hanekom was failing in his mission. The REC had become even more determined to force Wayile out of office. At one regular fortnightly meeting, which Hanekom had initiated in an attempt to resolve the stalemate, Wayile was detained and told he would be let free only if he resigned. The main doors to Matomela House, where they held the meeting, were locked to prevent people coming in and out. Only Faku’s supporters were allowed inside the building. Wayile’s supporter, based at Ward 55, Mbulelo Taaibos, told the The Herald that they had to break the padlock to let Wayile out.77 The failed attempt at firing Wayile did not deter the REC. Two months later, the regional secretary, Qupe, wrote to the chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko, telling her 75 The Herald, ‘Democracy Needs Ethical Leadership’, 10 May 2012. 76 The Herald, ‘Hanekom Gets Tough on Metro Row’, 8 May 2012. 77 The Herald, ‘Mayor, Officials Locked In’, 14 August 2012.

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that she had been fired. ‘You’re requested to vacate your office by the end of business today’, part of the letter read. Hanekom disputed that decision: There are NEC members that have been dealing with the political situation in Nelson Mandela Bay, so we have not made any such decisions. The authority does not reside with the region. We know there were resolutions taken at the conference to recall some deployees and they took it to the PEC and the NEC, but nobody supports the implementation of that decision. I told the chief whip that there has been no decision to recall her.78

The manoeuvres to force municipal leaders out of office increased the tension within the ANC and the alliance as a whole. Wayile’s supporters were equally determined to defend him. On 23 August 2012 a crowd estimated at 3 000 marched for ten kilometres from New Brighton’s Nongoza Jebe Hall to City Hall. The march stopped at Standard House, where marchers called for ANC leaders to come down and receive their petition. No-one emerged and the marchers then proceeded to the City Hall. Wayile and the trio of leaders79 came down to receive the petition. The protestors demanded, among other things, that the REC be disbanded, that Wayile and the ‘troika’ (i.e. deputy mayor, speaker and chief whip) be allowed to do their job, and that the relationship between the municipal and party leadership be defined clearly. Moreover, they insisted that the municipality should prioritise service delivery, instead of being entangled in power struggles.80 The protest march reflected the deteriorated state of relations within the alliance. Earlier, in May 2012, Cosatu had come out declaring the alliance non-existent.81 Differences amongst ANC members themselves turned violent. In August 2012, four houses were torched and some people were hacked with an axe in Motherwell’s NU 29 for allegedly being Faku’s supporters.82 Besides the violence, the strain on the organisation also showed in meagre membership numbers. As the party audited its branches in preparation for the December 2012 national elective conference at Mangaung, it came out that only 16 of the 60 branches in the metro were fully functional. The regional secretary did not

78 The Herald, ‘Bid to Fire chief whip Fails’, 23 October 2012. 79 These were deputy mayor, Nancy Sihlwayi; speaker, Maria Hermans; and chief whip, Feziwe Sibeko. The trio was also referred to as the ‘three-sisters’. 80 The Herald, ‘Hands Off Our Mayor’, 24 August 24 2012. 81 The Herald, ‘Cosatu Cut Ties with the ANC in the Bay’, 17 May 2012. 82 The Herald, ‘Torment of “Political Roadkill”’, 10 December 2012.

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dispute the figures, but said the report was preliminary and that the final report would show a higher number.83 For more than two years – a period that straddled the 2011 local elections in which the ANC had performed badly – the party was torn by strife. Intervention from both the provincial and national offices failed to curb it. The conflict simply intensified and even turned violent. This played out in full view of the public, and had an adverse effect on municipal operations. Council meetings were disrupted and administrative appointments could not be made. The possibility of the ANC losing power, as shown by the dismal performance in the 2011 elections, did not spark a change of conduct. The Xego–Faku contest signified a sacrifice of party unity for a factional victory. Both senior politicians in the NMB, their contest was always likely to divide the ANC. Faku had already served several terms as regional chairperson of the ANC, whilst it was Xego’s initial term. The rest of the local leadership, especially the stalwarts of the liberation movement in the region, did not seem to have prevailed on Faku to withdraw his candidature in order to avoid fracturing the organisation. The entire organisation was caught up in the grip of factionalism. The 2007 Polokwane conference had fractured the NMB ANC into two parts. This is what initiated their loss of support, from the 2009 elections onwards. Further feuds, administrative instability and revelations of malfeasance continued the electoral haemorrhage. As this chapter has revealed, the factional fights were not ideological, but spurred by a quest to access patronage and hide impropriety. City Hall insisted on proper governance, whilst Standard House sought patronage regardless of ethical implications. In the process, the division of roles became blurred. Standard House did not recognise the prerogative of its elected officials on administrative matters. Factionalism in the region was a reflection of what was happening nationally, throughout the organisation. Both Calata House and Luthuli House stood firmly alongside the Stalini faction, supporting their meddling in the administration. They were just as enthusiastic as their regional counterpart to hound out mayors keen to exercise ethical leadership and create an efficient administration. It is not clear if the leaders in these two upper structures shared in the patronage, but they definitely aided and abetted the malfeasance that mushroomed in the NMB from 2008 onwards. The consequence of the REC’s manoeuvres was the deterioration of the administration. As we have seen, permanent appointments in executive management were not made due to disagreements between City Hall and Standard 83 The Herald, ‘Only 16 ANC Branches Functional’, 13 September 2012.

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House and those made were temporary. Having started in 2008, this administrative instability not only continued into the subsequent years, but also deteriorated even further, with an ever more adverse impact on the efficiency of the municipality. The status quo seemed poised to continue into 2013, as Standard House and City Hall were locked in a stalemate, neither willing to yield to the other. However, the balance of power favoured Standard House. The mayor was no longer part of the REC and the PEC supported the latter in its bid to remove the mayor. With hardly two years into a five-year term, it was only a matter of time before Wayile was removed. He would become the second mayor that the ANC pushed out of office within a period of just three years.

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6 Pseudo reforms: Concealment of malfeasance and interference at City Hall, 2013–2014 The onset of the new-year – 2013 – saw the ANC introducing new measures. By the close of the previous, centenary year of the liberation movement, it had become patently clear that the problems that beset the metro required drastic remedial measures. Problems had been raging on for roughly four years, and the various interventions from the national and provincial headquarters, coupled with mediations by the provincial government, had not yielded any results. The corrective measures targeted both the municipal administration and political leadership at City Hall and in the regional office, Florence Matomela1 House (renamed from Standard House in November 2012). This chapter focuses on a period of about two years, beginning in 2013 to late 2014. The focal point of the chapter is twofold: the mayoral change from Zanuxolo Wayile to Benson Fihla and the accompanying change of regional leadership with Thando Ngcolomba at the helm, and the politico-administrative instability with its attendant detrimental effect on the municipality and the party. My argument here is that the measures that the party introduced, ostensibly to reform itself and the municipality, were actually both superficial and insincere. In the case of the mayoral change, the modification was cosmetic, leaving the de facto mayoral authority in the hands of the old political leadership who were the source of the malady in both the party and the municipality.

1

Born in1910 and a teacher by training, Florence Matomela lived in PE. She was an activist and led defiance campaigns against influx control measures in the 1950s. She became a Cape provincial organiser of the ANC Women’s League and was vice-president of the Federation of South African Women. Her illegal activism earned her detention spells, a banning order and eventually five years’ imprisonment. She died in 1969 whilst still under a banning order.

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Equally important to note in this instance is that the malfeasant elements within the REC enlisted the help of the opposition, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), to thwart the remedial measures aimed at stabilising the administration. It was not apparent then what the UDM gained from its collusion in destabilising the municipal administration. But the party’s actions certainly cast doubts over claims that it sought a clean and efficient administration.

COSMETIC MAYORAL CHANGE After more than two years of mediation to resolve the stand-off between the mayor and the party’s chairperson, Zanuxolo Wayile and Nceba Faku respectively, the senior leadership of the ANC resolved to remove the protagonists in March 2013. Wayile was reassigned to Parliament and Faku stepped down from the REC. Ben Fihla was appointed the new mayor, and Thando ‘Chippa’ Ngcolomba, who had been Faku’s deputy, became the chairperson of the REC. An 82-year-old veteran of the ANC, Fihla was touted as a reconciliatory candidate that would mend the schism in the region.2 He had been in Parliament since 1994, which supposedly meant he was removed from the local feuds. Apart from his perceived neutrality, Fihla had formidable credentials as a freedom fighter and local leader. As noted earlier, Fihla was amongst the first recruits into the ANC’s military wing, MK, in the 1960s; he served a lengthy sentence in Robben Island prison and was the first regional chairperson after the revival of the ANC in 1990. Fihla’s biography and venerated status within political circles, therefore, were touted as requisite qualities for a reconciliatory figure in the region. Whilst Fihla was supposedly neutral, the REC not only remained largely unchanged, but also tightened its grip over the municipal leadership. Two of Wayile’s allies in Council, Nancy Sihlwayi and Feziwe Sibeko, were replaced with REC leaders, Ngcolomba and Joy Seale, as deputy mayor and chief whip respectively. Only Maria Hermans, the speaker, survived Fihla’s reshuffling of the leadership in Council. This meant that almost all leaders – both in the REC and

2

The manner in which Fihla was appointed, though, was curious. Derek Hanekom, who was the deployee of the ANC’s national office to the province and was central in trying to resolve the political impasse in PE, did not know of the appointment beforehand. Hanekom knew only after the decision had been taken, and found out from a municipal official. This was telling of the ill intention behind Fihla’s appointment. Hanekom disapproved of Fihla as mayor and Jacob Zuma and Gwede Mantashe, who led the process, probably knew that, and decided to exclude him from the process that took that decision. Interview with a senior official in the municipality, 4 October 2018.

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the municipal leadership – were predisposed toward retaining the status quo. The balance of power had effectively tilted in favour of the REC, an indication that Fihla’s appointment was unlikely to thwart political meddling in the administration. It did not take long for Fihla’s tenure to reveal itself as a façade – not the change agent it was touted to be. The first and notable indication that Fihla was a proxy of the anti-change faction led by Ngcolomba showed in their dealings with the new city manager (CM), Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, and how they related with her.

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATION Msengana-Ndlela was appointed permanent city manager on 21 February 2013. Her appointment was a major relief for the municipality. It had gone for almost four years without a permanent CM. Msengana-Ndlela not only filled a glaring and long-standing void, but was also suitable for the post. Local government was an area of her expertise. Before her appointment, she had been a research fellow at the Human Sciences Research Council, doing research on local government and developmental issues, and had previously worked in the public service at senior managerial level. Her academic qualifications included postgraduate degrees in Commerce and Education and a PhD in Leadership, Urban Governance and Local Economic Development. She had previously been a deputy director general in the Department of Trade and Industry and a director general of provincial and local government with unqualified audit opinions for seven years. In that portfolio she had made immense contributions to the implementation and monitoring of legislation that governs municipalities, including the Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000). Msengana-Ndlela’s appointment as CM, therefore, was hailed as significant across the political spectrum. However, she stayed no longer than three months in the municipality in spite of the desperate need to stabilise the administration and her suitability for the job. She started officially on 1 March 2013 and resigned on 31 May 2013. Her resignation plunged the metro back into administrative instability. Fihla purposely pushed Msengana-Ndlela out. The fallout stemmed from her resistance to their undue interference in her administrative responsibilities as accounting officer and according to legislation. Having failed to badger her into a pliable CM doing the bidding of the political leadership, Fihla then made Msengana-Ndlela’s continuing stay intolerable. UDM’s Mongameli Bobani joined the mayor in this harassment, which Msengana-Ndlela would later successfully sue as constructive dismissal.

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Specifically, the fallout between the mayor and his CM was over tender procurement processes and staff appointments. Before getting to the details of the disputes, it is worth noting that Msengana-Ndlela insisted that her employment contract affirmed her sole responsibility over the administration and guaranteed non-interference by politicians. Accordingly, the contract stipulated, among other things, that ‘the City Manager will be responsible for constituting part of the Management Team of the Municipal Administration as a whole’. Moreover, the municipality committed to ensuring that there shall be no undue political interference of whatsoever nature in the Employee’s execution, delivery and performance of her duties and that the Employer undertakes at all times to provide the Employee with a working environment and necessary resources to enable her to fulfil her obligations in terms of this Agreement.3

The dispute over tender procurement processes involved an IT firm, Lumen Technologies. The firm had been contracted as part of the metro’s Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS). Introduced in circa 2010, the IPTS was meant to improve public transportation, which involved purchasing a new fleet of modern buses and extending bus routes. The buses were to be installed with an automated fare collection system, which Lumen was contracted to do. MsenganaNdlela objected to both the contracting process and the scope of work. The tender had not been advertised and the new buses came with an already installed automated fare collection system; Lumen therefore did not need to install one.4 The mayor justified the decision not to advertise the contract on the grounds that they needed to expedite the contracting process in order to avoid returning the funds to Treasury, as they would have to be if they were unspent by the end of the financial year. At any rate, the mayor further argued, the law allowed the municipality to hire Lumen without inviting tenders because the firm was already contracted to another state entity, the City of Cape Town. Msengana-Ndlela disputed the mayor’s understanding of the law. Whilst accepting the general rule, she insisted that the contract should have been signed with the City of Cape Town, not directly with the company itself, as the municipality had done. Signing the contract with Lumen was irregular, she asserted. However, her protestations, she noted, were ‘ignored in the name of

3 4

Judge J Chetty, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 3282/2013, p. 5. Memorandum from Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela to the Executive Mayor, Re: Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality/Lumen Technologies CC & Another, 23 April 2013.

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the “majority rule”, even though this could have dire consequences for the ruling party’.5 Interestingly, Msengana-Ndlela was not the only person who disputed the validity of the Lumen contract. Just before she was appointed, the municipality had been presented with forensic findings dismissing the validity of the Lumen contract. The respected lawyer and former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, had carried out that forensic investigation on the instruction of the municipality.6 Besides proving the invalidity of the Lumen contract, Pikoli had gone further, citing even more irregularities. The deviation, he pointed out, went far beyond the normal procurement process, which had not been handled by the Supply Chain Management, but was driven by the IPTS project manager at the time, Mhleli Tshamase, who then involved politicians in the selection of a local partner, Heerkos. To this effect, Pikoli found correspondence from the owner of Heerkos, thanking the then regional chairperson of the party, Nceba Faku, for choosing his company and promising to keep him abreast of developments. That selection process, according to Pikoli, did ‘not appear to be transparent and competitive’.7 Consequently, Pikoli found that ‘there was political influence in the procurement process’ and therefore no justification for deviation from a normal competitive bidding process and therefore conclude that it was a breach of the supply chain management policy and regulations as well as a breach of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.8

With regard to the appointment of staff, the mayor rescinded a previous Council decision that had approved a widely consulted organogram as well as the appointment of staff in the CM’s office and external administrative capacity that would support the selection processes for full-time executive directors. ‘I strongly believe,’ the mayor explained his decision, ‘that there is no doubt [that we have] the necessary internal capacity to handle the recruitment and selection.’9 The mayor’s claim that the municipality had internal capacity to handle

5

6 7 8 9

NMB Municipality, Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Status Quo on Administration and the Problem of Political Interference in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (metro) 1 March to 14 May 2013, p. 9. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation: IPTS Project – Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 20 February 2013. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 30. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 34. NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Special Metropolitan Council Meeting, 25 April 2013.

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staff recruitment was disingenuous. The municipality had gone on for close to four years without permanent executive directors, repeatedly appointing executive directors in acting positions. Effectively, the mayor sought to undermine the CM’s efforts to establish a functional office, as well as a transparent and credible technical process that would support Council in appointing competent senior managers. As the city manager would later report, detailing her experience from March 1 to mid-May 2013: To make matters worse, the CM has since been informed by the EM [Executive Mayor] that it was incorrect for her to advertise some of these senior positions and that all decisions that she makes in the future will have to be approved by the EM, ‘for there can be no two centres of power’. This, the EM ascribed to views expressed in a meeting he attended with some members of the Provincial Executive of the ruling party on 08 May 2013.10

Fihla not only preferred renewing temporary appointments, but also insisted on telling Msengana-Ndlela whom to appoint in such positions. In a letter to the CM dated 13 May 2013, the deputy mayor, Ngcolomba, expressed unhappiness that she had not agreed with a list of their preferred candidates, whose contracts were due for extension for another six months, and instructed her to comply. Their list included a political advisor in the mayor’s office, Mod Ndoyana, who was to be the acting executive director of Corporate Services. The portfolio included management of human resources (which would have placed Ndoyana in charge of recruitment). Part of the letter from the deputy mayor read: You are aware that a number of Acting Executive Directors have been acting for longer than 6 months. Their appointments are in contravention of the Act. Also, all decision[s] taken by them are null and void. We provide you with a list of suitable appointments to take over the acting duties precisely to recover from contravening the Act. You chose to ignore our list.11

Elsewhere in the letter, Ngcolomba added: You are once again hereby instructed to consider the Executive Mayor’s proposal which was meant to be considered in the special council meeting dated 25 April 2013, a copy dated 26 April 2013 [of] which was forwarded 10 NMB Municipality, Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Status Quo on Administration and the Problem of Political Interference, p. 8. 11 Letter from the Deputy Mayor, Cllr Thando Chippa Ngcolomba to the City Manager, Re: Acting Executive Directors, 13 May 2013.

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to you in ensuring that the suggested acting appointments are implemented to rescue the institution from the current situation.12

Moreover, the mayor instructed the CM to employ individuals that were neither in the municipality’s staff organogram nor budgeted for. This involved the employment of 16 members of ANC’s MK veterans as protectors for the mayor and his deputy. The cost of the positions would be approximately R4.3 million per annum. ‘To make matters worse,’ Msengana-Ndlela explained, it would seem that these MKVA members have already been informed that they will be appointed. As a result, they have been given the impression that their appointment is being delayed by the CM. For example, some of the members approached the CM in her car in the evening, knocking on her window and questioned her about the delays in their appointment. The harassment of the CM in this manner places her life in danger. … The CM has been frequently reminded by the EM of the violence and the ultimate price that is paid by those who do not submit to majority rule. How then, would any reasonable person construe these reminders of violence against those who express a different point of view, if not as threats against the CM? Seemingly there is so much at stake that issues of the administration in the Metro, such as these matters have been turned [into] issues of life and death!13

Msengana-Ndlela evidently resisted political meddling in her job. Judge Chetty would later describe her situation thus: Fastidiousness, independence, integrity and a commitment to perform her duties strictly within the parameters of the law, were, astonishingly, not traits which endeared themselves to the political hierarchy of the defendant.14

Msengana-Ndlela was not the kind of CM that the mayor cared to have. For this reason, Fihla and the regional party leaders were keen to force her out. This was clear in the initial response to the UDM’s subsequent attempt to get MsenganaNdlela fired. After making a preliminary assessment of the administrative situation, she had submitted a report to Council with proactive steps that would be undertaken to build a better foundation for good governance. All political 12 Letter from the Deputy Mayor, Cllr Thando Chippa Ngcolomba to the City Manager, 13 May 2013. 13 NMB Municipality, Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Status Quo on Administration and the Problem of Political Interference, pp. 9–10. 14 Judge J Chetty, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No, 3282/2013, p. 8.

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parties in Council welcomed the report and approved its recommendations. Strangely though, soon thereafter, on 10 April 2013, Bobani made a submission to the speaker requesting that a motion about Msengana-Ndlela be included on the agenda for debate at the next meeting of Council. His contention was that her contract with the municipality was invalid and she was unqualified for the position of city manager. Specifically, Bobani sought answers to the following questions: 1. Does the municipality have a contract with the City Manager? 2. If yes, was such contract approved by Council? 3. If not, why and what would be the legal consequences to the Council wherein City Manager has been allowed to operate and take decisions on behalf of the City, without her contract being approved? Does the City Manager possess the prescribed minimum competencies as per government gazette no 34433 dated 5 July 2011 and the amended MSA (Municipal Systems Act)? 4. If not why and what are the legal consequences for the Institution in terms of compliance with the Act?15

The motion then concluded as follows: If answers in relation to (1), (2) and (4) above are in the negative, I move that the City Manager be relieved from her duties with immediate effect and the council appoints the Acting City Manager until the position is filled.

If the Council did not deal with the allegations in a manner Bobani deemed appropriate by 20 May 2013, he threatened legal action. Bobani’s motion against Msengana-Ndlela failed in Council. In response, he secured the services of one of Port Elizabeth’s top and most expensive law firms,16 Kaplan Blumberg, which conveyed the legal threat in its correspondence to the mayor on 15 May 2013. In the same letter, the law firm added yet another charge implying further infringement: Prior to appointing the MM [Municipal Manager] the Council did not advertise the post nationally to attract a pool of candidates nationwide, but rather used the services of an employment agent for this purpose, which process is contrary to the peremptory provisions of section 54A(4)(a) and (b) of the [MSA] Act.17

15 Letter from the Office of Councillor ME Bobani to Office of the Speaker, Re: City Manager’s Position, 10 April 2013. 16 This is one of the oldest and one of the top five firms in Port Elizabeth and charges between R60 000 and R100 000 per day depending on the stage of the case. 17 Letter from Kaplan Blumberg, Attorneys, Notaries & Conveyancers to Executive Mayor, Ben Fihla, Re: Purported Appointment Of Municipal Manager, 15 May 2013.

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Almost immediately after receiving the letter from Bobani’s lawyers, the mayor launched an investigation and instructed Msengana-Ndlela to co-operate by responding to each allegation in detail, attach relevant supporting documents and advise us of your stance in respect of the continuation of your contract in the event of these allegations being true and correct.18

Fihla was obviously unsympathetic to the city manager. If Fihla wanted to retain Msengana-Ndlela, he could have instructed a manager responsible for human resources to answer the allegations. Even before getting a response from her, the mayor had gone ahead to entertain the possibility of terminating her contract.19 Bobani took a step further and applied to the High Court for an urgent interdict preventing Msengana-Ndlela from continuing as city manager until a conclusive determination about her suitability for the post was undertaken. The application for the interdict was scheduled for a hearing on 28 May 2013. The mayor’s reaction was starkly different to that of the MEC for Local Government and Traditional Affairs in the Eastern Cape Province, Mlibo Qoboshiyane, who considered the allegations malicious and defended Msengana-Ndlela. The intention of the allegations, Qoboshiyane stated in a letter to the speaker, was ‘to bring back the chaos and instability, and justifies the long held perception that there are others who thrive and benefit out of the instability that is engulfing the NMBMM’.20 The MEC based his dismissal of the allegations on MsenganaNdlela’s experience and qualifications, with which the mayor was familiar. For this reason, the MEC urged the mayor to file a notice to oppose the interdict. Bobani’s questioning of the city manager’s qualifications was hollow. The Court was unlikely to interdict Msengana-Ndlela nor would a subsequent investigation have found her unqualified for the post. She had the requisite qualifications, except for the minimum competency certificate in local government. For someone of her qualifications and experience, it was logical that Msengana-Ndlela already had the knowledge which that certification programme imparted. Moreover, Treasury had already issued a special dispensation allowing

18 Letter from Councillor NB Fihla, Executive Mayor to Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Re: Purported Appointment of Municipal Manager, 17 May 2013. 19 Even more revealing of the mayor’s indifference to Msengana-Ndlela’s fabricated legal travail, was that he had to be prodded by her lawyers to pay her legal fees as well, to which he agreed. Letter from Minnar Neihaus Attorneys to the Executive Mayor, 24 May 2013, and letter from Executive Mayor to Minnar Neihaus, 27 May 2013. 20 Letter from Mlibo Goboshiyane, MEC: Local Government and Traditional Affairs to Councillor Hermans, Speaker: Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 24 May 2013.

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Msengana-Ndlela’s appointment without the certificate. Most importantly, Bobani was part of the panel that had interviewed Msengana-Ndlela for the job of CM. Together with the DA’s Nico du Plessis, Bobani was given observer status to verify that the selection process was procedural and a qualified candidate was appointed. Bobani did not raise any objections about the headhunting process that was followed nor about Msengana-Ndlela’s qualifications. He supported her appointment.21 The only objection that Bobani raised was related to MsenganaNdlela’s recommended salary of R2.3 million, and he queried her proposal on staffing of the CM’s office.22 In other words, Bobani’s legal challenge was not only unwarranted, but also mischievous. Had Bobani been genuine, he would have raised such objections during the selection process of which he was a part. Msengana-Ndlela was clearly competent and the municipality was in dire need of a competent, permanent city manager. The appointment augured well for the effectiveness and stability of the municipality, something that an opposition leader should surely have welcomed. At any rate, the court subsequently dismissed Bobani’s application for an urgent interdict to prevent Msengana-Ndlela from continuing as city manager, with costs. Ruling on 28 June 2013, Judge J Plasket found that there was no basis to argue that Msengana-Ndlela’s decisions, if she were later to be removed owing to improper qualifications, would necessarily be rescinded. It did not follow that, as the judge explained, decisions taken by an improper authority, assuming she were later proven as such, are necessarily invalid. Such decisions would be assessed on their own merit. An improper authority, the ruling affirmed, is quite capable of taking legitimate decisions.23 The insincerity of Bobani’s challenge thus revealed, a number of questions inevitably arose: Why did Bobani want Msengana-Ndlela gone? Where did he get the money to settle what must have been an exorbitant legal bill? A possible answer to these questions was that Bobani was working with those who stood to benefit from malfeasance in City Hall. Indeed, allegations of Bobani’s complicity in the IPTS fraud would later become public in 2018. Bobani’s legal action was clearly intended to intimidate Msengana-Ndlela and make her continued stay intolerable, driving her out of her post as city manager. Msengana-Ndlela was a threat to the malfeasant elements within the municipality. Her resignation would enable the Lumen contract to continue, benefit-

21 NMB Municipality, Report of Executive Mayor to Council meeting, 21 February 2013. 22 NMB Municipality, Metropolitan Council In-Committee, minutes of meetings, 21 and 28 February 2013. 23 Judge J. Plasket, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 1459/13.

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ing a number of individuals improperly. Some of the potential beneficiaries were ANC officials who, as the February 2013 Pikoli Report showed, had got directly involved in identifying and securing a local partner to Lumen Technologies. In other dealings, also linked to IPTS, Pikoli found officials to have acted fraudulently. One official especially, Nadia Gerwel, made, among others, two payments: one to a Mrs Wessels for a total amount of R758 000 for services she never delivered, and another to a company named Esp Afrika (Pty) Ltd for an amount of approximately R5 million, also for services that were never rendered. Wessels was associated with the taxi consortium, Laphum’ Ilanga, as a consultant ‘to carry out marketing and fundraising activities on behalf of Laphum’ Ilanga’. Not only did Wessels fail to deliver on her undertaking, but it also turned out the contract itself was fraudulent. Laphum’ Ilanga’s board did not know of the contract, as it was concluded unilaterally by a Mr Mkaza, who was a member of the board. All the payments were authorised by a ‘Mrs. Nadia Gerwel, a senior treasury official with a wealth of experience who should have known better’.24 Upon enquiry on why she authorised the payments, Gerwel responded ‘that she just paid on the basis of the consulting agreement and that it was not her job to check whether services were rendered or not’. Pikoli recommended that Mkaza and Wessels be referred to the police for further investigation and possible prosecution for a ‘prima facie case of fraud’.25 As for Esp Afrika (Pty) Ltd, it was supposedly contracted to stage a musical event. The contract was worth just more than R17.5 million. As was the case with the foregoing instance, the contract was never approved by the board of Laphum’ Ilanga. It was unilaterally signed by Mkaza in Gerwel’s office, with Wessels present. Furthermore, at the time when Mkaza signed the contract, it was blank and details were filled in later. Gerwel paid Esp Afrika roughly R4.8 million even though ‘she knew that the event had not yet taken place’,26 and she did so with ‘amazing and unprecedented efficiency that is unheard of. The invoices were paid out “within a day or two of being submitted”’.27 The foregoing shows commission of fraud. It happened with alarming ease on the part of the said official, and seemed to have been allowed to happen. Expenditure was not audited nor did the councillors seem to have asked questions. Had audits been carried out or questions asked, it is possible that the fraud would have been picked up. And, it is also possible that the fraud involved more

24 25 26 27

Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 20. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 21. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 23. Vusi Pikoli and Ndyebo ‘Jimmy’ Snowball, Forensic Investigation, p. 26.

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funds than Pikoli was able to investigate. Laphum’ Ilanga alone, for instance, was awarded R20 million before and during the World Cup, on which a proper audit was never done. And the Lumen contract alone was worth more than R150 million. Pikoli notes that close to R100 million of that total contract was invoiced, even before the work had started. The report does not say, though, whether or not that invoice was paid. Given what Pikoli found on the small sample he investigated, it is possible that the fraud was widespread. Indeed, Pikoli proposed that the initial R20 million given to Laphum’ Ilanga be audited. Msengana-Ndlela’s managerial style not only threatened to put a stop to such abuse of municipal finances, but also to identify potential culprits. In the final analysis, the harassment proved unbearable for Msengana-Ndlela. She resigned on 31 May 2013, and spent the next two months serving notice. Fearing the damaging impact the resignation would have on the administration of the metro, MEC Qoboshiyane pleaded with Fihla to dissuade her. Qoboshiyane found Msengana-Ndlela’s complaints of improper, political interference credible and appealed to the mayor to change his (improper) conduct towards the city manager. The MEC’s letter28 to the mayor partly read: The Department wishes to propose that the Municipal (City) Manager, in order to be able to execute her responsibilities effectively and deal with all the challenges that NMBMM is currently faced with in terms of governance and service delivery, needs to be afforded sufficient opportunity to discharge her duties as a legally appointed head of the institution and be provided appropriate support rather than undue political interference and political pressure that must cease to occur with immediate effect. … The M(C)M has approached the MEC and other offices of authority and not just authority but relevant to her employment reporting what she regarded as undue interference that aims at rendering her incompetent to execute her functions as the municipal manager. She has submitted evidence in some cases thus making her case more strong. Now that she is resigning she may take the route of a legal process to have suffered ‘constructive dismissal’ and this may have serious financial implications for the municipality. On the strength of the above, it is of paramount importance to begin to negotiate with her that she reconsiders her decision to resign. Negotiations

28 The letter is not dated, but was written on or soon after Msengana-Ndlela had submitted her resignation on 31 May 2013.

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can only be entertained if the municipality, in particular the offices of both the Executive Mayor and his Deputy are prepared to afford her a chance to work and provide conducive environment within which to operate without any undue pressures.29

Upon expiry of the two-month notice period on 31 July 2013, MsenganaNdlela wrote to the mayor, confirming her resignation. Despite the MEC’s appeal about two months earlier, nothing had happened to dissuade her from resigning. Her letter noted: My resignation is against the background of sustained inappropriate and undue political interference that has hindered and undermined my administrative position as City Manager in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality. This is unlawful and constitutes both a serious and material breach of contract, which makes it impossible for me to perform by duties. I have no reason to believe that this problem has been (and will be) adequately addressed, hence this confirmation of my resignation.30

Msengana-Ndlela sued for constructive dismissal, arguing that she was forced to quit by intolerable conditions deliberately created by the mayor and his deputy. Their conduct was in violation of her contract and the law, which bars politicians from unduly interfering with, or inhibiting managers from undertaking their legally prescribed duties. Notwithstanding their claim of innocence, as the judge wrote: ‘Neither Fihla, Ngcolomba or anyone else testified and refuted the plaintiff’s evidence. Counsel for the defendant furthermore elected not to cross-examine the plaintiff or to make any submissions during argument.’31 They could neither defend their mistreatment of the city manager, nor refute her testimony – a clear admission of guilt. Accordingly, the judge ruled in favour of Msengana-Ndlela. In addition to the financial sanction, the judge remarked that ‘the defendant’s entire approach to the litigation merits opprobrium’ and proceeded to scold the municipal leaders: Notwithstanding the denials encapsulated in the plea, the defendant had no intention of refuting the plaintiff’s version by the adduction of viva voce

29 Letter from Mlibo Qoboshiyane, MEC Local Government and Traditional Affairs to Councillor Ben Fihla, Re: Proposal to Resolve the Current Impasse at Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’, circa 2013, p. 6. 30 Letter from Lindiwe G Msengana-Ndlela, Office of the City Manager to Councillor NB Fihla, Executive Mayor, Re: Confirmation of Resignation, 31 July 2013. 31 Judge Chetty, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 3282/2013, pp. 8–9.

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evidence. And yet, they persisted with their opposition with the concomitant incurring of legal costs, which the tax payers of the city will ultimately have to bear.32

Fihla was not the change-agent he was touted to be. He reversed the administrative changes his predecessor had made, especially Msengana-Ndlela’s appointment, and continued with the municipality in its troubled state. The metro not only returned to administrative instability, but the mayor also insisted on making inappropriate appointments. One such appointment involved Mod Ndoyana, whom Fihla wanted appointed as acting executive director of Corporate Services, whilst he also served as the mayor’s political advisor, as indicated earlier. This constituted direct political interference in the administration. In a 19 September 2013 letter, titled ‘Administrative Stabilisation of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’ the director general of National Treasury, Lungisa Fuzile, alerted the municipality to the aforementioned infringement. A month later, the deputy director-general at Treasury, Malijeng Nqgaleni, reiterated the warning against the mayor employing a political advisor into executive management: With regard to the matter of the advisor to the Executive Mayor acting as the Head of Corporate Services, we wish to state for the record purposes that the National Treasury does not support this practice as it constitutes a direct conflict of interest and cannot be supported under any circumstances. Not only will this be considered as political interference, but [it] is a direct violation of the principles of good governance.33

Ndoyana conveniently quit the political advisor post, paving the way for his appointment as executive director of Corporate Services on October 31, 2013. Based on his relationship with Fihla and Ngcolomba, Ndoyana was the favoured candidate and the selection panel34 was skewed in Ndoyana’s favour. Of the 12 voting panelists, for instance, six were already predisposed toward the mayor’s and deputy mayor’s choice.35 It would have taken one more vote to

32 Judge Chetty, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 3282/2013, p. 10. 33 Letter from Malijeng Nqgaleni, Deputy Director-General, Treasury to Mpilo Mbambisa, City Manager, 10 October 2013. 34 Deputy executive mayor; five acting appointments; one representative each from National Treasury and the NMB Business Chamber; two opposition party members; two trade union representatives and a member of the secretariat. 35 It is unlikely that the acting staff would have gone against the mayor’s choice. Their acting appointments are precarious and renewal (in those positions) depends on pleasing the mayor’s office.

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sway the decision towards Ndoyana and the opposition had shown itself to be open to persuasion by the majority party, even towards ignoble ends. Actually, the mayoral duo pressured the acting city manager to recommend Ndoyana for appointment. However, the acting city manager’s recommendation was somewhat lukewarm. He stated that Ndoyana still required ‘to be developed as per the psychometric results’ and his appointment would be reviewed after six months.36 In other words, Ndoyana did not have all the requisite competence. Appointed to stabilise the municipality, Fihla did quite the opposite. He connived with Ngcolomba and adopted the same meddling demeanour (in the administration) as was favoured by the REC and elicited similarly disastrous results. Substituting Wayile with Fihla, therefore, was a superficial change. The structure, practices and culture of the REC and the way it interacted with City Hall remained unchanged. This was because, albeit Faku had been removed as party chairperson, his regional executive, which had supported his meddling ways, remained intact. Moreover, Fihla’s advanced age (at 82) and lack of experience in municipal affairs caused him to rely on Ngcolomba, the deputy mayor and chairperson of the party and previously Faku’s deputy. Fihla was simply ill-equipped for the position of mayor. An astute political reporter for the local newspaper, The Herald, and a regular observer at Council meetings, Rochelle de Kock, described Fihla as prone to misunderstanding rules, seeking to do things that he had no powers to do, and often did not participate in Council discussions. When he did participate, Fihla veered off topic. This bolstered the view that he was a ceremonial figure, whilst Ngcolomba was the person in charge. In an article titled ‘Fihla dashes off a speech that leaves councillors in stitches’, De Kock described what must have been the most embarrassing moment for the mayor, revealing that he was out of his depth. ‘During a full council meeting on Tuesday,’ De Kock starts, and goes on to add: Fihla was reading from his speech supposedly announcing an interim replacement for sacked councillor Thembinkosi Mafana. But, instead of the name of the would-be acting incumbent, his speech writers had typed ‘---’. The council erupted in laughter when the mayor, seemingly oblivious, read: ‘I’m now appointing dash dash as a caretaker portfolio chairperson.’37

36 NMB Municipality, Supplementary Report by the Acting City Manager, Mpilo Mbambisa, 31 October 2013, pp. 138–140. 37 The Herald, ‘Fihla Dashes Off a Speech That Leaves Councillors in Stitches’, 2 April 2015.

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It was not surprising, therefore, that Fihla’s tenure saw a spike in the number of service delivery protests. They had started in 2012 and increased in the subsequent years.38 The protests were triggered by lack of housing, sanitation, electricity and poor refuse collection.39 The backlog on housing stood around 87 000, which explained the existence of 99 informal settlements; roughly 30 000 households used a bucket system; and a third of the households in the NMB municipality had their refuse collected only once in two weeks, instead of weekly as was previously common practice. This led to a rise in illegal dumping sites, making both African and coloured neighbourhoods particularly unseemly, smelly and unhealthy.40 Compared to other metros, however, the NMB performed relatively well on the housing front. The metro simply suffered from administrative and political problems that disrupted the pace and quality of service delivery. The auditor-general’s audit reports for the periods 2011/12 and 2013/14, for instance, explained that vacancies and acting appointments led to poor decision-making. New appointees took a while to familiarise themselves with their new portfolios and, when they had done so, were tentative to act due to the uncertainty over their length of stay in that acting position. The reports suggest that the uncertainty was partly fuelled by the general instability in the administration. Furthermore, performance evaluation criteria were neither clear nor objective as politicians meddled in administration. As a result managers avoided doing anything that might attract attention, fearing that they might be evaluated unfairly. Those who committed improprieties did not face any consequences due to political protection, as they had aligned themselves with one political faction against another, in the internecine battle that ravaged the NMB.41

PROMISE OF RECONCILIATION PROVES HOLLOW As we have seen, Fihla was not neutral, and he was not reconciliatory either. He did not register any success in mending relations between feuding factions within Council and the ANC, or amongst alliance partners. He appealed to household names and veterans of the ANC not only to mediate, but also to get involved in ANC activities. These included Mike Xego, Themba Manqgase and

38 Municipal IQ, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. See www.municipaliq.co.za. 39 Municipal IQ, 2016. See www.municipaliq.co.za. 40 Auditor-General of South Africa, Municipal Audit Reports, 2012/13 and 2014/15. See https:// www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports.aspx. 41 Auditor-General of South Africa, Municipal Audit Reports, 2011/12 and 2013/14. See https:// www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports.aspx.

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Mthwabo Ndube. Other former activists of the 1980s, based outside the metro, were also approached to provide support. The response was positive. Xego, for instance, said: We cannot live as if everything is normal because the opposition is working hard to win over this metro … Our primary responsibility is to bring unity and stability to council so that the ANC can be strong again. We will meet with the chairman and secretary to see how we can all work together.42

The initiative did not bear any fruit, however. Divisions that had previously built around Faku and Wayile persisted. Mbongen Bungane, an ally of the former mayor, Zanoxolo Wayile, and councillor at Ward 41, believed that the REC targeted him for ill-treatment because of his disapproval of their leadership. His constituency office was shut down on 23 September 2013, following instructions issued by the regional chairperson, Ngcolomba, citing violence in the ward. Bungane disputed Ngcolomba’s explanation, charging that the move was intended to incite disgruntlement against him. Bungane’s charge was not without merit. For instance, Princes Felix, a resident in the ward, complained: ‘We want proof of addresses to be done to receive our grants and we haven’t been able to do so for two weeks now.’43 The constituency office was re-opened on 18 October 2013, following a protest march to the City Hall earlier in September 2013. Bungane remained furious, however: What I know [is that] Chippa Ngcolomba is not above ordinary citizens and the masses of our people. He thinks just because he is the deputy mayor he can do whatever he wants. The mistake people in the mayoral committee make is to think they are above everyone. I’m not scared of anything. If you do not succumb to individuals’ agendas, then you will be a target. The ANC taught us to be politically independent, but be [bound] by decisions of the majority.44

As had happened earlier, schisms within the party reproduced themselves in the ANC caucus in Council. Councillors that supported ex-Mayor Wayile, against the REC’s intrusion, persisted in their stance. Four of them – Mike Tofile, Thembekile Jacobs, Lawrence Troon and Zukile Jodwana – were even summoned to Calata House, the ANC provincial headquarters in King William’s

42 The Herald, ‘Fihla Turns to Old Guard to Help Build ANC Unity’, 22 July 2013. 43 The Herald, ‘ANC Rift Leads to Angry Stand-Off’, 15 October 2013. 44 The Herald, ‘Ward 41 Office Re-opened after Party Infighting’, 21 October 2013.

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Town. ‘The purpose of the meeting,’ explained the ANC’s provincial secretary, Oscar Mabuyane, was to give the councillors an ultimatum. We are not going to allow anarchy and the way these councillors have been conducting themselves. What they have been consistently doing is pure ill-discipline because they have been defying ANC caucus decisions. We should not even open the debate: they should be disciplined because we cannot allow ill-discipline to prevail.45

The councillors had not voted with the ANC in the previous two Council meetings. This denied the party the requisite majority to pass motions in Council. Possibly more worrisome for the provincial leadership, was realising that the ‘dissidents’ could orchestrate a change of power in Council. They could vote with the opposition, passing a motion of no confidence in the mayor, replacing him with an opposition councillor. That is what ‘dissident’ ANC councillors did in mid-2013 in the Tlokwe Municipality, North West Province.46 In the case of the ‘dissidents’ in the NMB, they were reprimanded and threatened with disciplinary action, if they repeated their defiance.47 Relations within the alliance were similarly sour. The SACP in the region suspended relations with the ANC. The SACP did not consider it worthwhile to engage with the ANC, believing that they were neither open to persuasion nor willing to change course. Under Fihla and Ngcolomba’s leadership, the municipality was just as unstable and unscrupulous as had been the case in the previous period. The district secretary of the SACP, Nokuthula Tetyana, put it as follows: The comrades leading the governance agenda in our region have squandered, corrupted and deformed the political gains and democracy of our movement and by not caring about serving our people, but being more concerned about themselves. We will not be part of betraying the nation because the ANC in the region has moved away from the ANC principles and values … We are against our will compelled to suspend relations with the ANC leadership, particularly in this region. Of course, not that we love the ANC less but that we have a duty to defend the working class against the consequential results emanating from the leadership crisis.48

45 46 47 48

The Herald, ‘Rebel ANC Councillors under Fire’, 3 June 2014. Mail&Guardian, ‘ANC Appoints Six New Councillors in Tlokwe’, 11 July 2013. The Herald, ‘Rebel ANC Councillors’, 3 June 2014. The Herald, ‘SACP Turns Back on ANC’, 12 July 2013.

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All the aforementioned feuds, it is worth recalling, were happening against the backdrop of a party in electoral decline. In a lecture titled ‘The Continuing Relevance of the Tripartite Alliance’ delivered in November 2013 at the New Brighton’s Red Location Museum, the ANC’s leading intellectual, Pallo Jordan, had warned local leaders of the possibility of losing power, which had almost happened in the 2011 elections. If that were to happen, Jordan told his audience: Given the glorious chapters that Port Elizabeth has transcribed in the liberation struggle, that would be a scandal ... It cannot happen, and it must not be allowed to happen. I insist comrades, that cannot happen.49

About five months later, in the 2014 national elections, the cause of Jordan’s anxiety was reaffirmed. Of the votes cast in the metro, the ANC got below 50% (precisely 49.17%). The party’s electoral support had not only dipped from its dismal showing in the 2011 local elections, but also reaffirmed a strong likelihood of losing the metro. The drop was pronounced in the northern areas, where the DA continued to make massive gains by as much as 20 percentage points in areas like Schaunderville, Gelvandale, Helenvale, Bethelsdorp, Chatty, Missionvale, Saltville and Arcadia. In the African townships, the ANC regained some of the support it had lost to Cope in 2009. It picked up by an average of 5 percentage points in the various wards, which was about half of the average support Cope got in the various township wards. This meant that not all the support that left for Cope in 2009 returned to the ANC. Some simply stayed out of the elections.50

SIGNS OF A WORRYING FUTURE: THE HISTORIC TRIUMPH OF AN INDEPENDENT OVER THE PARTY As 2014 came to a close, the ANC’s loss of power became an increasing possibility. The results of the by-elections held in August and November 2014, however, had sent mixed signals, suggesting that the party’s prospects may not entirely be hopeless. It regained PE’s Ward 40, which it had lost in 2011 to the DA; and lost Ward 42 in Uitenhage’s KwaNobuhle to an independent candidate, Andile Gqabi. The party’s mixed fortunes possibly offered some relief. However, a closer analysis of the defeat to Gqabi reveals a party in disarray. Gqabi had been forced to resign as ANC ward councillor a few months earlier. This followed recommendations by an ANC task team, led by Nkosazana 49 The Herald, ‘Bay Could Fall to Opposition, ANC Warned’, 20 November 2013. 50 M. Ndletyana et al. 2014. Voting Trends Twenty Years into Democracy: Research Report (MISTRA, 2014).

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Dlamini-Zuma, which had been set up immediately after the 2011 local elections. The task team was formed to probe the veracity of allegations, which were attested by widespread protests, that nominations of candidates for the 2011 elections were fraught with irregularities. Gqabi’s Ward 42 was one of the 13 that Dlamini-Zuma’s task team investigated, for which it recommended that ‘ANC processes should be redone’. Gqabi’s was the only ward where that recommendation was made.51 Complainants had charged that Gqabi was never even nominated in the branch general meeting, as he failed to secure the requisite 10 per cent support of those present at the meeting in order to qualify for nomination. The screening committee’s subsequent recommendation that he be chosen as the ward’s candidate, they argued, was flawed. ‘Upon an enquiry,’ the Dlamini-Zuma task team’s report states, ‘members of the Screening Committee stated that they were forced by Sinah Baartman to recommend the way they did.’ The REC, however, ‘could not comment on the alleged influence, but stated that the RLC endorsed the recommendation of the Screening Committee on Andile Gqabi’.52 This meant that Gqabi, who had been elected councillor, had to resign, followed by a new nomination process culminating in a by-election. The Task Team’s recommendation was inexplicable. Gqabi’s nomination was not the only one fraught with infringements. Of the 13 branches probed by the Task Team, as discussed earlier, at least five other branches, located in Wards 4, 14, 22, 28 and 43, were found to have infringed regulations in one way or another, all of which were of similar gravity to that of Ward 43. Yet the Task Team recommended that the status quo in those branches be retained, whilst Gqabi was singled out for removal. The point is that, assuming the complaints against him were true, Gqabi was not the only candidate whose nomination was flawed. There were many others with similar infringements, warranting similar nullification. That these similarly flawed nominations were endorsed suggested that Gqabi was singled out for unfair punishment. KwaNobuhle’s sub-district organiser for the SACP, Xolisile Peter, put it as follows: We view the expulsion of coucillor Gqabi as a witchhunt against those who dare to challenge wrong-doing and corruption in the metro and who happen to

51 ANC, Dlamini-Zuma Task Team, Report of the Investigating Task Team on List and other Disputes, September 2012. 52 ANC, Dlamini-Zuma Task Team Report, September 2012; ANC, NMB Region, Eastern Cape Provincial Report, September 2012, p70.

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be members of the Communist Party. It is a dedicated plan to deal or do away with them. We urge the people of that area not to accept any other leader than the one they democratically elected in 2011.53

A closer analysis of the dispute confirms Peter’s observations. For starters, Gqabi disputed the claim that he had not met the threshold for nomination.54 He was nominated alongside Mazwi Mini, among others, who was then chairperson of the ANC’s BEC and a ward councillor. In his appearance before the public meeting that the ANC had convened earlier as part of its nomination processes, Gqabi said he scored the highest of all the nominees. He was a clear choice of the public, Gqabi insists. Community reaction to Dlamini-Zuma’s recommendation validated Gqabi’s view that he was the popular choice. Residents objected to the recommendation from the moment Zandisile Qupe, the ANC regional secretary, delivered the decision to a general meeting of the branch in Ward 42. Qupe delivered the decision as a fait accompli, decided upon by the regional leadership, with which Gqabi was expected to comply. Residents disagreed, challenging the authority of the party to have the final say on the matter. Instead, residents insisted that any decision to remove Gqabi was as much theirs to make as it was the ANC’s. Just as they were consulted to choose a candidate, they argued, they should be similarly consulted on the decision to remove him. Gqabi was their candidate and, as such, they could not see any justification for removing him. They called Qupe out of the ANC branch meeting to explain his decision to them, which he declined to do. According to Gqabi, the regional secretary responded: This was a meeting of the BGM [branch general meeting]. But, outside residents had gathered asking him to come out and explain why they were removing me. Qupe refused saying he’s the secretary of the ANC, not of the public and thus has no obligation to explain himself to them.55

Supported by residents, Gqabi refused to step down. As noted earlier, he disputed the grounds for his removal and felt that he was singled out for unfair punishment. ‘Why should I be punished,’ he said, ‘for something that Sinah Baartman was said to have done? I had nothing to do with that, and that the REC had

53 The Herald, ‘Threat of Chaos over Councillor’, 5 September 2014. 54 Interview with Andile Gqabi, 8 January 2015. 55 Gqabi, interview, 8 January 2015.

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selected me the candidate for the ward.’56 The real reason behind the decision to remove him, Gqabi stated, was factionalism. A former Numsa shop steward at the Volkswagen plant in Uitenhage, Gqabi was part of the group of councillors that supported Wayile, whilst Mini, the chief complainant, supported the REC. Mini had an interest in Gqabi’s removal. He had hoped to continue as councillor, but his plans were spoilt by Gqabi’s candidature. As it turned out, Gqabi proved to be the people’s choice. This showed in several events, including one public meeting in May 2014, called to initiate the party’s election campaign for the 2014 national elections. The ANC’s national spokesperson and the party’s deployee to the Eastern Cape, Zizi Kodwa, as Gqabi relates the event, was present at that meeting, where the chair of the branch [Mini] was tasked to open the meeting. He took the podium and shouted the slogan ‘Amandla!’; there was silence in the hall. The people didn’t respond back to him. He shouted again, ‘Amandla!’ – silence. Then Zizi called me to come up and open the meeting myself. I shouted, ‘Amandla’; the crowed roared back, ‘Ngawethu’. And the meeting was declared open, and I was also asked at the end to close that meeting.57

Kodwa could not recall the aforementioned meeting. But he remembered that Gqabi was more popular than Mini, the party’s branch secretary. Kodwa experienced that first-hand, as he narrated: I’d go with both of them to public meetings. Upon introducing them to the public, Gqabi got more enthusiastic reception, especially from the women. That was quite telling. If a candidate is popular amongst women, then that’s a winning candidate. Women are influential in communities.58

Realising Gqabi’s popularity, Kodwa warned against removing him. If Gqabi left the ANC, he believed, the ANC would lose the ward. People in the ward would vote for him, taking support from the ANC. In other words, Kodwa believed that what general residents thought of Gqabi should have taken precedence over Mini’s zeal to have the councillor removed. He explained: The views of the community, about a councillor, must take priority over that of an ANC branch. The ANC membership is a very small minority in any ward. They could be 105, for instance, in a community of about say 10 000

56 Gqabi, interview, 8 January 2015. 57 Gqabi, interview, 8 January 2015. 58 Interview with Zizi Kodwa, 27 January 2017.

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residents. To win the ward, the ANC needs all those thousands of people to vote for it. ANC members alone do not guarantee victory for the ANC. We should never conflate membership with popularity. Membership does not count in elections, it is public popularity that counts. The people’s views must have the final say, that’s why we introduced the public participation aspect in our nomination process – to ensure that the people agree and approve our choice of ward candidate.59

Both the branch and the REC, however, insisted that Gqabi had go to. Gqabi’s removal was not compulsory. ‘The ANCs National Executive Committee,’ explained Kodwa, had cautioned that the task team’s recommendations shouldn’t be implemented blindly. It had to depend on what we found on the ground, especially what residents thought of the candidate. We needed to find out from the people first, what they thought of the task team’s recommendations, then take a decision whether or not to follow it. If the people felt the councillor was performing well, even though he might have been nominated irregularly, we should ignore the recommendation.60

Kodwa’s recollection validates Gqabi’s assertion that his removal was factionalist. The REC did not have to remove him, but insisted because they wanted Mini instead. Their decision was not based on merit, but sought to advance both factional and personal interest at the risk of losing the ward. Gqabi eventually resigned following a disciplinary process by the ANC, during which he was charged with ‘colluding with Cope’ – a different charge from the initial one. The party had found it impossible to insist on his resignation in light of the community outcry. Determined to oust him, they then fabricated a charge that effectively cast Gqabi as a ‘traitor’ in the hope that residents would find that infraction an acceptable reason to force his resignation. It had become commonplace to get rid of rivals in the organisation by ‘slandering’ them as Cope ‘moles’, thus exploiting the animosity existing between the two parties. Needless to say, the disciplinary committee expelled Gqabi from the organisation. He appealed the decision, but a reply was not forthcoming from the ANC’s appeal committee, which eventually forced him to give up the fight. His resignation opened a vacancy, necessitating a by-election in the ward. The by-election was scheduled for 5 November 2014 and Gqabi declared his candidature as an independent.

59 Kodwa, interview, 27 January 2017. 60 Kodwa, interview, 27 January 2017.

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Gqabi’s campaign latched onto the ANC’s dismissal of popular opinion. His campaign message was: ‘Stop bullyism, promote democracy’, and he adopted green and gold colours. Gqabi explained his message as follows: There was this arrogance that showed in what the party used to say: ‘The ANC will rule until Jesus comes back.’ For Christians and especially because of how the ANC was behaving, this meant they believed that, like Jesus, ‘it is the ANC that gives and takes’. There’s nothing that people can do. They just need to accept the candidate that the ANC gives them. There’s also this thing that residents don’t vote for the people, but for the party. So the ANC can give you anyone, including a donkey, and you must take it. But, the Freedom Charter says something different. It says that the people shall govern. The ANC must accept that those who vote, are not all ANC members. You also have non-ANC members voting for ANC candidates. These people are part of the public, which you must respect and not ignore just because they’re not ANC members.61

The by-election effectively pitted the party against the community. Mini was the party candidate, and Gqabi the community candidate. Leaders of the party, including the ANC’s deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, campaigned for Mini. According to one former councillor in Uitenhage, local leaders of the ANC, however, were not enthusiastic about Mini’s campaign. They hardly campaigned for him.62 The reasons for them shunning Mini were twofold: character and regionalism. Firstly, residents did not think that Mini was the best candidate. They considered him rude and arrogant. A local leader of the SACP in Ward 46 described him as a ‘Kenny Kunene character. “Wake wambon’ umntu onxiba le-way yam”, he would say, bragging about being the best-dressed man in KwaNobuhle’.63 Secondly, Mini was the REC’s favourite, which made him even more unpopular. Local leaders in Uitenhage felt that the REC was dominated by people in Port Elizabeth, and that the latter were generally favoured over the former. To some degree, Mini was seen as colluding with the ‘enemy’. On election day, 5 November 2014, public sentiments prevailed over the party’s preference. Gqabi won by 51.53 per cent, defeating Mini, the ANC candi-

61 Gqabi, interview, 8 January 2015. 62 Interview with a former NMB councillor based in Uitenhage, who chose to remain anonymous, 8 January 2014. 63 Former NMB councillor, interview, 8 January 2014.

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date.64 Residents asserted their will. They refused to be dictated to by the party and were determined to have their own choice as councillor of the ward. The REC had been complicit in the attempt to erode the will of the people. The rift between the party, on the one hand, and Numsa and the SACP, on the other, aided Gqabi. He was supported by the latter against the former. In an area where the motor industry is the dominant employer, Numsa’s support for Gqabi was decisive. In addition to the loss of Ward 42, membership of the party had dipped below 5 000. This prompted a special visit to PE of the ANC’s National Working Committee, to meet with the REC. Led by Ramaphosa, the national leaders effectively gave the REC an ultimatum. They were given two weeks within which to devise a plan on how they were going to turn the party around, or face being dissolved. The regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, understood exactly what the ultimatum implied: ‘To us, the two weeks is not about dissolving the council or the REC. It is a matter of ANC shape up or shut up.’65

AN UNLIKELY AGENT FOR CHANGE: NELSON MANDELA BAY CIVIL SOCIETY COALITION Electoral misfortune was only one part of the consequences of politico-administrative impropriety. Malpractices also took a toll on the governing party’s relations with its traditional allies in civil society, especially affiliates of the South African Non-governmental Organisation Coalition (Sangoco), the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Interdenominational African Ministers Association in South Africa and Cosatu. They were not only alienated, but were also pushed towards a separate, broader coalition encompassing the various sectors of society, some of which they would not have worked with ordinarily: the Ratepayers Association and the NMB Business Chamber. Dubbed the Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition, the coalition was formed on 20 May 2013 and would subsequently include the Nelson Mandela Metro University and the South African Property Owners Association. It was an unlikely coalition, yet representative of the major sectors in the metro. The formation of the coalition was partly the reason why the ANC continued to suffer electoral losses (as would happen in 2014 and 2016). Its traditional allies, who commanded enormous networks and moral authority, and whom they had previously deployed to bolster support, were now lost to the party. Besides the loss of mobilisational resources, the coalition also threatened an additional loss of revenue to the metro: both the Chamber and the Ratepayers Association threatened to withdraw payment of rates if their concerns were not addressed. The emergence of 64 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za. 65 The Herald, ‘Pressure on ANC in Bay to Shape Up’, 28 October 2014.

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the coalition, therefore, signalled both the gravity of the problem and a potential solution. The importance of each of its partners – both to the party and the municipality – warranted them an audience with officialdom. The Coalition quickly grew into a prominent actor commanding the attention of the president of the republic, Jacob Zuma, in attempts to solve the problem in the metro. An unintended beginning The coalition had an accidental beginning. It had its origin in an outreach meeting called by the Office of the Premier in the autumn of 2011. The idea was to seek out feedback on how government was performing and solicit input on what people wanted to see done. The gatherings were organised according to regions. On 11 August 2011 it was the turn of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro – one of nine regions in the province. Whilst the premier, Phumulo Masualle, was absent, he was nonetheless represented by senior staff in the Office of the Premier, alongside the metro’s prominent officials, including the speaker, Maria Hermans, and the chief of staff in the mayor’s office, Beza Ntshona.66 Among the attendants was Sangoco, represented by its regional secretary, Mongameli Peter. Many concerns were raised. Some attendants needed financial assistance, whilst others sought intervention to deal with indifferent public officials. The Vimalani Development Solution, a co-operative set up by military veterans, for instance, asked for financial assistance; Ekuphumleni Old Age Home complained that cuts in funding had affected their services and wanted that funding restored; and a representative of the Zwide Health Clinic Committee complained about the behaviour of the ‘Sister in charge of the Zwide Clinic’, saying that she showed ‘some degree of insubordination and disregard’. Among the various organisations were also ordinary residents with concerns of their own. Someone from KwaZakhele complained about staff at the Max Madlingozi Clinic, saying that they only ‘attended in the morning, whereas after 13h00 they are not keen and available to attend’.67 Once all the inputs had been made, officials recommended they be submitted to the mayor’s office. In doing so, and for ease of reference, a further suggestion was made that they be consolidated into different categories. Among the categories were social issues such as youth, health and the aged. Sangoco was assigned to organise this category, with Peter as its convener. The purpose was to collate

66 Letter from Sangoco to the attendants of the Outreach meeting, Office of the Premier, 15 September 2011. 67 Letter from Sangoco to the attendants of the Outreach meeting, Office of the Premier, 15 September 2011.

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all the relevant inputs into a report, then submit it to officialdom. Sangoco was further tasked with liaising with municipal officials to ensure that the submission was given satisfactory attention. Besides hearing the public, the foregoing gathering inadvertently enabled wider co-ordination among numerous NGOs, whilst also initiating a new way of relating to the municipality. It brought Sangoco into close contact with municipal officials, initiating an ongoing relationship that was officially sanctioned by the higher authority, the Office of the Premier. But this official approval from the provincial office did not necessarily lead to people’s problems being resolved. Some individuals were given advice on how to secure municipal assistance and forms to fill in. The actual problems, however, remained unattended even months after the outreach. Out of this intermittent interaction with the municipality arose useful lessons that would later prove informative in the rise of the coalition. Some of the lessons were that constant pressure was necessary to get officials to respond, and they were more likely to succeed if interactions were formalised to enable regularity and binding decisions. The mayor’s office, however, was lacklustre about the proposal to formalise the relationship with civil society. In the meantime, Sangoco was challenged to put these lessons into use as the quality of municipal services deteriorated. Besides the problem of neglected elderly people, refuse was not collected; street lights were not working; the youth complained about the absence of employment programmes; heritages sites – which are tourist attractions that generate economic activity – were neglected; ward committees were dysfunctional and mandatory public consultations to solicit input towards the formulation of the Integrated Development Plan were poorly organised.68 All these problems affected Sangoco’s affiliates. Mere interactions with officialdom clearly did not elicit the desired outcome. This called for a new strategy. It was not difficult to fathom where the source of the problem lay, and what the new strategy had to entail. The local newspaper, The Herald, was awash with reports of infighting between City Hall and Matomela House. This impacted on the administration, which, in turn, interrupted service delivery. Politics, realised Sangoco, was the source of the problem.

68 While she was city manager, Msengana-Ndlela admitted as much in her ‘100 day consultation’ initiative with civil society. She highlighted, for instance, that a ‘growing gap between the NMBM and the community groupings have [sic] led to a growing degree of mistrust, a lack of credibility and an implementation programme that is not always responsive to the specific needs of the unique community and electorate’. NMB Municipality, Office of the City Manager, City Manager ‘100 Day Consultative Initiative’, PowerPoint presentation, 8 April 2013.

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Accordingly, the new strategy encompassed more than just correspondence and meetings appealing to officialdom. Sangoco’s demands had to go beyond service delivery to deal with the political problem, especially the problem of regional political leaders interfering in the administration. But, this could not be achieved through direct interactions with regional leaders, who spurned approaches for meetings with Sangoco. Unlike its counterparts at Matomela House, however, municipal leaders were responsive to Sangoco’s approaches. This was unsurprising, as Sangoco’s demands sought to strengthen their hand to govern unrestrained by meddling from Matomela House. Nonetheless, Matomela House remained a stumbling block. This made it clear to Sangoco that if any corrective measures were to be achieved, they would have to go above municipal leaders at the metro, to their superiors at the provincial and national levels. In other words, the new strategy aimed to intensify pressure – from the upper echelons of the ANC – on the regional leaders to stop meddling in the administration. It entailed an increased public scrutiny and transparency, mass mobilisation, media publicity and calls to the provincial and national leaders to intervene. Public scrutiny meant Sangoco affiliates attended council meetings to deepen their understanding of the issues as well as to identify who in the council were responsible for constraining effective delivery. To maximise attendance by members of the public, Sangoco demanded that Council meetings be held at the township-based Nangoza Jebe Hall in New Brighton. The hope was that, in the presence of a significant gathering of the public, truant councillors would be discouraged from their delinquent behaviour. Moreover, on 28 June 2012, for instance, Sangoco led a march to deliver a memo to Mayor Wayile at the Vuyisile Mini Square, opposite the City Hall. The memo contained a list of demands related to service delivery and economic development.69 Appeals outside the metro were directed to both provincial and national leaders. These were leaders who were both directly involved and had the authority to intervene. They included Derek Hanekom in his capacity as both ANC chairperson of the national disciplinary committee and an NEC deployee to the Eastern Cape;70 the secretariat; and political heads responsible for local government and extended to the president of the ANC and the country. Of these officials, only the MEC and the minister of local government, Mlibo Qoboshiyane

69 Sangoco, Newsletter, 20 June 2012. 70 Sangoco wrote Hanekom a letter on 20 August 2012, expressing an urgent need to meet him in order to apprise themselves of his efforts and propose ways to assist his endeavours.

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and Lechesa Tsenoli respectively, were responsive to requests for meetings.71 This was partly because the problems at the metro fell within their line function. Nothing came of the foregoing approaches. Instead, the situation deteriorated. Most of the municipal leaders that were responsive to Sangoco’s pleas – mayor, deputy mayor and chief whip – were removed from their positions. They were replaced, as noted above, with a proxy and loyalists of the regional leaders, enabling the REC total control over City Hall. Sangoco was outraged by the changes at City Hall. In its memo to the provincial and national leaders, dated 12 March 2013, it denounced the move as a ‘reckless decision especially that it is effected at the time wherein we [are] just in the welcoming mood of a newly appointed City Manager, that together with the EXECUTIVE MAYORSHIP were to preside over the challenges that were long facing the metro’. The decision, the memo further stated, would destabilise the simmering stability that we were beginning to experience. Similarly, we will continue [to] organize and mobilise communities of this Metro not to allow selfish political decisions of a party to be experimented using the local state machinery that is actually meant to deliver on their eagerly awaited services.

Accordingly, Sangoco demanded: 1. Immediate withdrawal or rescinding of the decision to recall and redeploy the two incumbents as well as the Executive Mayor and his Deputy, 2. Immediate disbandment of the REC which has immensely contributed to the political anarchy that characterizes this municipality and immediate stoppage to political interference in appointments and running of the administration.72

By the first quarter of 2013, therefore, Sangoco was in full confrontation with the REC. It was now its intention to remove regional leaders. This required that Sangoco intensify its campaign. In pursuit of this objective, it resolved to expand its allies. It is in this context that the Nelson Mandela Bay Coalition of Civil Society was conceived. To be sure, the idea itself had been conceived in the latter half of 2012. Sangoco wrote a letter to the Business Chamber, on 25 November 2012, proposing the idea. That letter partly read:

71 The meeting took place on 3 October 2012. 72 Memorandum from Sangoco to national and regional ANC leaders, 12 March 2013.

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Sangoco feels that a lasting solution to the affairs of the local state proves to be requiring an active Non-State Formation that includes all social organs of CSO, Labour and Organised Business. In this regard having noted and appreciated your open condemnation of the indicated instability and having been impressed by your forward looking attitude on matters of socio-economic stability of the Metro. Therefore felt it necessary as we have done with other social partners, to call upon yourselves toward a collaboration effort that will assist in bringing about the lasting order and stability in our Metro. Hence following the initial attempts made in July 2012, a meeting is proposed with yourselves with a view to craft[ing] collaborated intervention strategies that will bring about stable governance for sustainable service delivery to our constituencies and the entire people of the Metro. It is clear that we can no longer abdicate our civil duties to the Politicians who have clearly lost sight of their obligation of creating an enabling environment for social and economic development of our sectors.73

Sangoco suggested that the inception meeting take place either on 30 November or 3 December 2012. However, the meeting never took place. The inaugural meeting was eventually convened on 20 May 2013. The catalyst was the attempt to remove Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela as city manager. Since her appointment on 1 March 2013, Msengana-Ndlela had initiated consultative sessions with the various stakeholders in the metro and committed to working with them in a collaborative manner. The Business Chamber had been complaining of delays in the processing of prospective investors’ applications for rezoning in order to establish new businesses, exorbitant rates for electricity, of which supply was prone to regular outages, and delays in the processing and awarding of tenders. In addition to Msengana-Ndlela’s stance on the payment of rates, whilst services were irregular, the Ratepayers Association found her stance on corruption appealing. They had taken particular interest in exposing irregularity in the awarding of the Lumen contract, which, as we have seen, Msengana-Ndlela believed to be illegal. Ratepayers vowed to support her legal action. Msengana-Ndlela, therefore, was the kind of the city manager the coalition partners had been calling for. In other words, whilst representing different constituencies, the coalition partners also shared an overarching common interest. They wanted a stable and functional municipality. The instability affected the partners similarly. It made sense to combine their efforts, especially because each brought a particular strength that aided in achieving their collective objective. Because it was an 73 Letter from Sangoco to NMM Business Chamber, 25 November 2012.

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association of businesses, the Chamber could mobilise financial resources and could not be easily ignored by government. Ratepayers had networks and contacts to dig up information on impropriety and financial resources to pursue legal action. Sangoco and church leaders had a grassroots network that could be activated for mass demonstrations and were held in high esteem by a number of ANC councillors, with whom they had a long history of collaboration. The combined strengths of the coalition were to be instrumental in their campaign. They adopted a two-pronged strategy: a legal approach, on the one hand, and a political approach, on the other. The ultimate goal was to have a change of political leadership. This was to be done in one of two ways: either through the dissolution of Council as prescribed by legislation, or through a political decision by ANC leaders. These routes prescribed use of the law and engagement with political leaders at the national level, whilst also maintaining political mobilisation and publicity. The Chamber and Ratepayers Association pursued the legal course. In addition to this, the Chamber was also assigned to seek an audience with President Zuma. The office of the secretary – both at provincial and national level – proved indifferent to resolving the impasse. As an association of businesses, the Chamber was considered to be in good stead to get the president to grant them an audience. Direct political pressure to remove the REC was left to Sangoco to pursue, especially through its affiliates who served in the structures of the ANC. Ultimately, the decision to disband the REC rested with the ANC. Consistent with their commitment, the second half of 2013 saw the coalition engaged in a number of activities. Among their first activities was securing legal advice on how to persuade the MEC to dissolve Council. To this end, the services of a Cape Town-based lawyer, Andre Breytenbach, were procured. The coalition considered him ‘the top administrative law expert in the country’, who came at R25 000 per day.74 Breytenbach’s legal advice offered two options, one from the Constitution’s Section 139 on provincial intervention in local government, and another from the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000). Each prescribed a different trigger and form of intervention. The Constitution’s Section 139 warrants an intervention in the instance that one has proved that council ‘failed to fulfil an obligation’. Slightly different to the latter, the Act requires that one ‘proves whether there is a reasonable belief that there has been a non-fulfillment of an obligation or suspicion of fraud, corruption or maladministration’ as reasonable grounds for intervention. The

74 Minutes of the NMB Civil Society Coalition Meeting, Port Elizabeth, 6 June 2013.

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latter provides broader grounds – both failure to perform municipal functions and corruption – for intervention and its test is relatively easy to prove. It is on this option that Breytenbach advised the coalition to rest its argument for an intervention. Pursuing this option required investigative reports that would have to be compiled by experienced engineers, preferably retirees without any stake in the matter. Where there was resistance, information would be sought through legislation – the Promotion of Access to Information Act (No. 2 of 2000). Two months later, in October 2013, the coalition prepared its submission to the MEC, Qoboshiyane, for intervention in the metro. Titled, ‘Application for Intervention by Yourself in Terms of Section 139 of The Constitution Act 108 of 1996’, the submission was also copied to President Zuma and Minister Tsenoli, and his deputy, Andries Nel. The letter sought to prove two things: that the municipality had ‘failed to fulfil its obligations’, and that all efforts to have them change their ways had failed. On the failure to fulfil obligations, the coalition cited, among others, vacancies at the executive management level (city manager and executive directors), unattended forensic reports on corruption, and the collapse of infrastructure. Having laid out the problem, the coalition argued that it was futile to persist in holding out hope that the situation would ever change under the same Council. On this point, they referred to an earlier meeting, on 4 September 2013, with the MEC. ‘The conclusion that we have reached from your briefing,’ the submission stated, was that you had gone above and beyond your responsibility to try and intervene in the affairs of the municipality in terms of section 154(1) and offer guidance and assistance to the municipality. It was clear to us that the leadership of our city had disregarded your efforts at each step and that the city was now in a worse state than ever before.75

The coalition assured the MEC that they too had reached a similar conclusion in their meeting with the mayor and his committee on 18 September 2013, where they had restated their concerns. Although they received detailed responses, the coalition maintained that they found them ‘wholly unsatisfactory’, and went further: The Municipality cannot fulfil its executive functions as set out by the Constitution and has not been able to do so for a very long time. We do not

75 Letter from Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition to MEC Qoboshiyane, Re: Application for Intervention by Yourself in Terms of Section 139 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996, October 2013.

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believe that the current mayor and his team has properly appreciated the predicament that the city is in and we do not believe that they can return the city to a position in which it can fulfil its executive functions.

Based on the foregoing, as the submission stated, ‘we have decided to press ahead with our requests to you, which are’: 1. Intervention by you in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution; and 2. Appointment of a task team to investigate corruption at the municipality in terms of section 106(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

Section 139(1) of the Constitution would allow the MEC ‘to appoint an administrator, and if necessary to call new elections for the Council’.76 As it turned out, the coalition never presented the official submission requesting intervention, albeit preparations were at an advanced stage. Their plans were disrupted by sudden murmurs of an impending reshuffle in the provincial cabinet. Qoboshiyane, with whom the coalition had been interacting and who was reasonably sympathetic to their plight, was likely to be moved from his position as MEC. This meant that the submission would be the least of Qoboshiyane’s concerns as his political future was now thrown into doubt. Thus the coalition decided to wait for the situation to resettle. The request for official intervention, however, was not the only activity underway. Other appeals for intervention proceeded unheeded. One of these were letters to the ANC national office-bearers requesting a meeting. That had happened earlier, on 12 August 2013. President Zuma was among the recipients. Titled, ‘Urgent plea from the Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition’, the letter partly read: On behalf of the Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition, we register our deep disappointment with the lack of response to all attempts to obtain engagement with the Office of the President, the office of the Minister for Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, the office of the Eastern Cape Local Government MEC, and the office of the Executive Mayor for Nelson Mandela Bay regarding our concerns pertaining to the state of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality and the city leadership. We have written numerous letters and emails to the above incumbents over the period of 22 May 2013 to the end of July 2013, and to date, have not

76 Letter from Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition to MEC Qoboshiyane, October 2013.

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been offered the opportunity to engage as concerned citizens of Nelson Mandela Bay … Our letters have been clear in their concerns regarding the lack of a permanent City Manager, ineffective and inefficient service delivery to business and citizens, and poor governance compounded by political interference in the administration of the Metropolitan Municipality. This has brought severe instability to our region and is resulting in an environment not conducive to business, future investment or satisfied rate payers … It is our plea to you as the President of our Nation to intervene in this impasse, and to act speedily to find solutions to our concerns, which impact heavily on the confidence of business and the citizens of this Metro.77

Two days later, and unlike in previous instances, this letter elicited ‘positive responses from the President, Minister, the Deputy Mayor and the Acting City Manager’. Moreover, as reported by the Chamber’s Kevin Hustler, ‘I have been in telephonic conversations yesterday with the Stakeholder Relationship Manager in President Zuma’s office, who has committed to assist us in co-ordinating the relevant Ministerial response.’78 The meetings that the coalition subsequently held with the deputy mayor and the MEC were possibly prompted by this correspondence. In any case, the coalition found the meetings fruitless. President Zuma eventually met the coalition at his official residence in Pretoria on 1 April 2014. NMB Business Chamber’s Mandla Madwara and Kevin Hustler represented the coalition. In his brief to the president, and in addition to reiterating the long-standing concerns, Madwara was emphatic about ‘highlighting the city’s experiences with past political instability and administrative meltdown’. Thus Madwara urged the president to pay ‘special attention to ensure leadership stability at City Hall’.79 In his response, Zuma committed to visiting the metro ‘within the course of the next three weeks’, together with a team of ministers. In less than two weeks, on 15 April 2014, Zuma was in the metro. He was accompanied by a contingent of nine ministers and met representatives of the coalition at the City Hall. Even

77 Letter from Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition to President Jacob Zuma, Re: Urgent plea from the Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition, 12 August 2013. 78 NMB Business Chamber, correspondence to coalition partners, 14 August 2013. 79 NMB Business Chamber, Public statement, Re: State President Commits to Bay Visit in One-onOne Engagement with Business Chamber leadership, 2 April 2014.

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then the REC tried to meddle with the list of attendants in order to prefigure the inputs. They attempted to exclude genuine business people who would be critical of their political interference. Before the meeting started, a considerable amount of time was spent weeding out individuals who were not part of the Chamber delegation. As for the meeting itself, it signalled a heightened sense of urgency on Zuma’s part. This was possibly inspired by the looming national elections, scheduled for 7 May 2014. Previous elections had shown a party on the decline. Meeting the coalition, therefore, was part of a campaign trail, to placate erstwhile allies who had been alienated by the governing party and had been critical in ANC campaigns. So the pressure to change local leaders was not only exerted by the electoral misfortune. That was simply the manifestation of the problem. Constant interactions with the coalition pointed national leaders to the culprit: local leaders. Albeit delayed, Zuma’s responsiveness to the coalition’s pleas was indicative of their credibility and importance to the party. Because they operated outside the liberation movement, it was hard for Zuma to dismiss their complaints, especially in a faction-ridden party, as malice against the regional leaders and mayor. It was also critical for the president to act in order to entice some of the coalition partners, especially the churches and Sangoco affiliates, back into co-operating with the ANC. Forging alliances with such organisations was mandatory for ANC branches and formed part of the index for evaluating their standing because these organisations were crucial for the ANC to spread its influence and recruit support. It is also quite telling that the president of the party led the intervention. Neither the provincial secretary, Oscar Mabuyane, nor the secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, responded positively to the pleas for intervention. Yet, this matter fell directly under their line-function. This reaffirmed bias on their part, as already shown in their dealings earlier, with Wayile. Mabuyane and Mantashe shared Qupe’s interest in retaining the REC, Fihla as mayor and Ngcolomba as deputy mayor, despite their disruptive behaviour and incompetence.

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7 Ukufa kusembhizeni – The enemy lies within! Within two weeks of being issued with an ultimatum, on 15 December 2014, ANC President Jacob Zuma announced the disbandment of the REC. It had clearly failed to come up with a convincing strategy, if any at all, to rejuvenate the party in the region. Party membership was at its lowest, whilst service delivery protests were at their peak. Civil society had lost all confidence in the REC and blamed it for maladministration in the municipality. In disbanding the regional leadership, Zuma was partly responding to constant calls for remedial action within both the ANC and the municipality. The new-year – 2015 – saw in changes within the leadership of the party and within the municipality. Reforms were not only necessary, but also urgent. Local government elections were scheduled in roughly 18 months. The party was not in an ideal state to contest elections and previous electoral outcomes had shown that it was likely to lose the metro. Thus reforms were two-pronged: to rebuild the party whilst also improving municipal performance. These were two constituent elements of a whole, which meant they were dependent on each other. For the party to improve its electoral fortunes, especially, the two components had to work in tandem. What eventually unfolded in the subsequent seventeen months ahead of the August 2016 elections, however, was a lopsided performance. The party’s commitment to rejuvenating itself failed. Factionalism persisted, plunging the party into full-blown internal warfare that burst out into the open. Conversely, the new mayor, Danny Jordaan, improved municipal performance. Instead of capitalising on Jordaan’s improvements, party leaders sought to marginalise the mayor. This indicated bleak prospects for the local elections.

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INTERIM PARTY LEADERSHIP: A VICTIM OF FACTIONALISM In the wake of the disbandment of Ngcolomba’s REC, an interim leadership, known as the Regional Task Team (RTT), was appointed on 17 January 2015. It was made up of 31 members led by the veteran SACP leader, Charles Nqakula, who was deputised by Phumelele Ndamase. The purpose of the RTT was to rebuild the branches, grow membership, forge unity among leaders and expand the party’s popular support.1 That would entail a number of consultative processes and activities to revive organisational structures and membership, culminating in a regional general council towards the end of July 2015. Practically, the RTT’s immediate task was twofold: to introduce itself and gain first-hand knowledge of the status of the ANC. To this end, the RTT spent the first two months of its life consulting with ANC councillors and visiting branches, alliance partners and affiliates of the Mass Democratic Movement. As the only recognised ANC regional structure, the interim body could not avoid involvement in customary ANC activities. These involved commemorative events such as Human Rights Day on 21 March and a reburial of Thabang Bookholane’s remains, following their repatriation from Mozambique where he was killed by apartheid forces during a military raid on the night of 30–31 January 1981.2 Not all ANC leaders were receptive to the RTT, however. As the interim body was consulting and introducing itself, Councillor Thembinkosi Mafana and Mlindi Magwana, chairperson of Ward 36, criticised the decision to form the body. Instead of a locally based structure, they proposed that the provincial leadership should administer the region, which would also involve overseeing the preparatory process towards electing new regional leaders. Given that the regional leadership would be contested, Mafana and Magwana’s preference for provincial leadership suggested that they fancied their prospects of winning regional leadership would be better with the province in charge, rather than a locally based RTT. It is true that Mafana had long showed his proximity to the provincial leadership. When Mayor Fihla made a decision to remove him from the mayoral committee, for instance, he appealed to the province, dismissing the mayor’s powers to take such a decision. He obviously believed that the provincial leadership

1 2

ANC, NMB Region, Regional Task Team, Draft Programme of Action: Securing the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro as an Instrument of Service to all its People, 25 April 2015. ANC, NMB Region, Regional Task Team, Draft Programme of Action.

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would take a lenient view of the infringement which had led to his dismissal.3 Fihla prevailed, however. As to whether or not the provincial leadership was similarly dismissive of the RTT was not readily evident at the time. It was nonetheless clear that some of the local leaders contested the legitimacy of the RTT, and that the interim body had an enormous challenge ahead. Opposition from within the beleaguered ANC did not deter the interim body’s programme of activities. On 19 April 2015, the RTT issued a call inviting members of the ANC and its allies to a broad consultative meeting to be held on 25 April 2015 at Hume Park Hall in Humerail. The purpose of the meeting was to ‘set the stage and assert the leadership of the ANC in the region, and strengthen the political relations of the Congress Alliance partners’.4 The party’s provincial leader and premier of the province, Phumulo Masualle, was amongst the scheduled speakers. The meeting was eventually held as scheduled. Guided by their findings during the consultative process, the RTT adopted a programme of action geared primarily at resuscitating inactive branches, reviving public interest in the ANC and electing new regional leaders. This was necessary not only for organisational life, but also in order to convene successful policy and elective conferences later in the year. Delegates to these conferences, the first planned for July and the other towards the close of the year, must have been nominated by their branches with a clear mandate to present. Holding the elective conference was conditional on the party reviving itself. The policy conference would determine whether or not the ‘region has done adequate work to be allowed to convene its conference’. The public meeting had a dual significance. Its very hosting showed activity on the part of the RTT. A look at the attendants, however, also revealed that the cracks among the allies and within the party persisted. Cosatu and the former regional secretary, Zandisile Qupe, together with Thembinkosi Mafana, were absent. As noted earlier, Qupe was part of the old leadership that was disbanded in December 2014 and Mafana part of the group that did not recognise the RTT. On being asked why he did not attend, Qupe responded: ‘I did not get an invitation or a notice about the conference. Had I received it, I would have attended.’ Qupe’s response was not entirely convincing. The RTT had issued a public invitation to all ANC members, allies and sympathisers, not personal invitations to each individual.

3

4

Whilst on a trip to China Mafana had acted as a mayor, signing agreements with the city of Fuzhuo, which he did not have powers to do. Mafana justified his misconduct, saying that he thought that was ‘an opportunity for the two municipalities to be introduced to each other and with a view to pursuing mutually beneficial relations between the two cities’. The Herald, ‘Fihla sacks mayoral committee member over “official” China visit’, 17 March 2015. ANC, NMB Region, Regional Convener’s Office, Media Advisory, 19 April 2015.

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As an ANC member, the public call was sufficient invitation for Qupe to attend. That he did not attend showed a lack of interest on his part, suggesting that, as with Mafana’s group, he did not recognise the legitimacy of the RTT.5 As for Cosatu, it felt that the RTT had not done enough to mend relations. Organisational relations aside, the workers’ federation itself was not stable. Numsa’s breakaway from the national body, Cosatu, threw the regional body into turmoil. Numsa is dominant in the regional Cosatu, and its expulsion must have divided members’ loyalties on the question of whether or not to stay within Cosatu. A strong indication of the paralysis within the federation showed, for instance, in its failure to convene the traditional Workers’ Day commemorative event in 2015. That was a customary activity on Cosatu’s calendar, and by association, the ANC’s as well. Nor was there a functional regional leadership of the SACP to organise the workers’ commemorative ritual. Its regional leadership had been disbanded earlier in January 2015, and a new leadership was elected only later, in November 2015.6 In other words, none of the alliance partners was stable. The feud within the ANC was reflective of the general status quo within the entire liberation movement. It was not surprising, therefore, that the RTT did not include Workers’ Day as part of its commemorative activities. When the RTT eventually held its first commemorative event on 16 June 2015, however, it was unmemorable. Hosted at Norris Singapi Hall in KwaZakhele, the commemoration was addressed by the little-known Pam Tshwete, the widow of the ANC stalwart, Steve Tshwete, and a member of Parliament. The local newspaper, The Herald, estimated the crowd at around a measly one hundred. That was significantly poor and, as a result, the next scheduled commemorative days – Freedom Charter Day on 26 June and Mandela Day on 18 July – passed uncelebrated by the RTT. This failure to organise, and to excite public interest in commemorative activities, indicated a weakness in the functioning of the RTT, persistent dysfunctionality among ANC branches and general public indifference. As the month of July 2015 unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the RTT was not achieving any success in its objective to revive ANC branches. The regional general council (RGC) that was scheduled for the end of July 2015 was not held. It was postponed indefinitely. Almost two months later, on 24 September 2015, the RTT suddenly issued a statement saying the RGC would be held five days later, on 29 September 2015.7 That day came and passed without the RGC

5 6 7

The Herald, ‘Fight to Keep Workers’ Vote’, 27 April 2015. The Herald, ‘The SACP Affirms its Support for ANC’, 9 November 2015. The Herald, ‘ANC in Late Rush to Hold Meeting’, 25 September 2015.

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being held. Instead, it was rescheduled, once again, to be held on 1 October 2015.8 It never happened. Branches were simply not ready, which means they were not in ‘good standing’. For a branch to be in good standing, it needs 100 or more paid-up members and the leadership must be legitimate, that is, they should not have overstayed their term of office. Elections take place every three years at the branch’s general meeting, which itself requires the presence of 51 or more members – a quorum – to be valid. Failure to convene the RGC, therefore, was due to the inability to make it quorate. Seventy per cent of the branches (42 out of the 60) had to be in good standing for a credible RGC to be held. Less than 42 branches were in good standing. Whilst disillusionment had something to do with the inactivity of branches, factionalism was the major cause. Branch activities were intentionally disrupted to render a branch invalid. A person assigned to officiate over a meeting, for instance, would simply not show up; some members would intentionally boycott the meeting to deny it of a quorum; false information would be issued about the location of the meeting, or the intended venue would simply be locked.9

LOSS OF WARD 30: A GLIMPSE OF A BLEAK ELECTORAL FUTURE An incident telling of the persistent abysmal state of the organisation was the ANC’s loss of Ward 30 in a by-election on 19 August 2015. Covering both Veeplaas and KwaMagxaki – a poor, working-class and a middle-class neighbourhood respectively – Ward 30 was the ANC’s stronghold and held a sentimental value within the local anti-apartheid movement. The Veeplaas part of the ward had been a base for one of the fiercest amabutho10 at the height of skirmishes with apartheid security forces in the 1980s. In the last 2011 election, the party had won the ward by a massive 64.3%, followed far behind by the DA at 2.9% and the UDM at 1.2%.11 The ward also hosted a historic graveyard,

8 9

The Herald, ‘ANC Regional General Council Meeting Delay’, 29 September 2015. Interview with a BEC member in KwaZakhele, 9 December 2015. See also ANC, Dlamini-Zuma Task Team, Report of the Investigating Task Team on List and other Disputes, September 2012. The Task Team had identified similar problems in its investigation between June 2011 and September 2012. 10 Amabutho served like a militia force providing protection to leaders on the run, defending communities against attacks by state-sponsored vigilantes and also engaging in combat with the security forces. The term itself, amabutho, is Zulu and refers to military regiments. 11 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za.

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Zwide Cemetery, where most political activists who fell in the 1980s are buried, including the legendary Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba. The 2015 by-election reversed ANC fortunes dramatically. The UDM emerged victorious with 49% of the votes, whilst the ANC dropped sharply to 41%. The ANC’s loss was owed to a poor choice of candidate and a similarly dismal campaign. Sizakele Mnqamisa, the ANC’s candidate, was not the popular choice. A public meeting held to evaluate candidates nominated by branch members expressed the highest approval for Ciko Mgubasi. But the party’s screening committee, which oversaw the public evaluation meeting, returned a different name. It reasoned that Mgubasi had not been back in the party long enough. After losing the nomination in 2011, Mgubasi had stood as an independent, losing to the ANCs’ Mike Tofile, whose passing was the reason for the by-election.12 Having chosen Mgubasi as their candidate, residents of Ward 30 were not happy with the screening committee rescinding their choice and replacing him with Mnqamisa. They considered the decision not only arbitrary, but also mischievous. If Mgubasi were not eligible, why did the ANC branch nominate and allow him to proceed to the public participation process without any of them raising an objection, they asked. The reason the committee had given was simply a pretext to remove Mgubasi, thereby ignoring a popular choice in favour of someone imposed by the RTT. What drove residents even further away from Mnqamisa was that he had a reputation for being rude and was a recent arrival in Veeplaas. Not only was Mnqamisa an unpopular candidate, but his campaign also started late. Household ANC names, whom the party often ropes in, even for by-elections, showed up only on the weekend ahead of the Wednesday election. The delegation included the premier, Phumullo Masualle, and Mayor Jordaan. It was Jordaan’s first visit to the ward, and he had not been briefed in advance about the ward. Local activists had to brief him just before he spoke at a public gathering, providing the information he should have already had, had the campaign been efficiently organised. In addition, the ANC did not distribute the customary bags of groceries. What the ANC did do effectively was to deny its competitors of a venue. Both the UDM and the DA could not gain access to the Veeplaas Community Hall because the ANC had booked the place from June, throughout July, and to the end of August. ‘How can they book the hall from June to August?’ asked UDM’s Mongameli Bobani, alleging malice on the part of the ANC. Speaking on behalf of his party, Mnqamisi denied any wrongdoing: ‘The hall is booked through the municipality. I do not have the authority over it.’13 The UDM’s campaign, however, 12 Interview with the ANC branch organiser, ‘Gwangwa’, 15–19 August 2019. 13 The Herald, ‘Tensions Mount over Hall Ahead of By-election’, 11 August 2015.

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was not entirely derailed. This time around, the UDM particularly excelled in what was the ANC’s customary practice. The regional leader, Bobani, explained: On Monday we slaughtered four cows for the people and handed out 200 food parcels. We are not shy about it. The money came from the UDM members themselves. They sold their cows, dogs and cats to make sure that people eat. We will continue to feed the people and we will give them groceries when they’re hungry because we are not stealing money from anyone.14

The UDM’s superior campaign shone even more on election day, 19 August 2015. Some of the voters registered in Ward 30 had relocated to the newly built area of Chatty, but had not updated their registration. If any of the parties wanted their votes, they had to transport them over to Veeplaas, giving them groceries as an incentive. The ANC was particularly desperate to get the Chatty-based voters. Signs at the voting station located on Sakuba Street were not encouraging. ‘The station is just full of UDM people,’ explained one local party organiser. ‘You can see the party has tagged them. Most people there are wearing UDM T-shirts. After voting they pass by the UDM table. This shows you that they’re UDM supporters.’15 At around 5:30 pm Mnqamisa and his comrades were talking of arranging transport to bring the Chatty-based voters over. Hardly 20 minutes after that conversation, UDM leaders came down Ralo Road to Veeplaas in a convoy of minibus taxis, about 28 or so of them, full of supporters. The convoy was accompanied by another group that was singing struggle songs – that is, a toyi-toyi. From the looks of that convoy, it did not look as though the ANC would find anyone left in Chatty.16 Zizi Kodwa, the ANC’s national spokesperson and deployee to the Eastern Cape, admitted that their campaign was sloppy. He ascribed this to complacency: Sometimes we take support for granted. You hear our people walking around in KwaMagxaki, for example, saying ‘this ward belongs to the ANC’. No place in this country is guaranteed for the ANC, not in a highly contested environment. We’ve got to work hard for people’s votes. The ANC should not take people for granted. This was a protest vote. We needed to deliver more than just houses in Veeplaas. We needed to listen to our people.17

14 The Herald, ‘Ward 30 Klaps ANC’, 21 August 2015. 15 ‘Gwangwa’, interview, 15–19 August 2019. 16 Personal observations, field-work research, 15–19 August 2015. See also M. Ndletyana, ‘Loss of Ward 30 Not the Last Surprise’, Independent Online, 6 September 2015. 17 The Herald, ‘Ward 30 Klaps ANC’.

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In a statement on behalf of the RTT two days later, Thobile Mhlahlo, spokesperson of the RTT, echoed Zizi’s analysis: We fully acknowledge that there is a deficit of trust that the ANC will deliver on its promises, and that this has contributed to the shift of support in the Ward … It must be noted that some of the ANC branches in this region are not fully functional, but this is being addressed through the intensive branch work and door to door visits across the Metro. The Programme aims to re-establish the ANC’s presence in all 60 wards in the region.18

The results were more than just an indictment of the party. They were also a statement of disapproval of the party’s record of service delivery. Whilst on door-to-door campaigns, party leaders were exposed to the squalid conditions that residents lived under. In one shack, there was a disabled child without a wheelchair. The grandmother of the child said that she had reported her problem repeatedly, but received no assistance. In another incident, Masualle walked into a flooded house. ‘Look at the floor,’ the old lady said as she welcomed the premier. ‘I am actually feeling so embarrassed as you came in. I am so embarrassed that you had to see this.’ Masualle later explained the problem to journalists: ‘There’s a problem with the foundations of the houses, which are wet. It shows that clearly this land was not meant for houses.’19 The construction of houses had not been preceded by proper surveillance of the land, which betrayed carelessness about the well-being of the occupants. Houses with seriously threatening cracks have been a common cause of the protests that flared up in the metro since 2012. Notwithstanding the multiple possible causes of the defeat, the provincial leadership placed the blame on the RTT. The blame was not without grounds, as the interim body was not functioning optimally. More than half of its 31 members were inactive. To the party’s provincial secretary, Oscar Mabuyane, the composition of the RTT was such that it was never likely to succeed. A significant number of members were located outside the province, and thus should never have been made part of the interim body. ‘In essence,’ as Mabuyane put it, ‘them being part of the task team was a non-starter right from the beginning.’ Mabuyane added that at the time of its inception, the RTT had to convene general meetings in 12 branches in order to elect new branch leaders. This was part of the preparation for an elective conference. ‘That number,’ according to

18 ANC, NMB Region, Regional Task Team, Media Release: By-elections in Ward 30, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, 22 August 2015. 19 The Herald, ‘ANC Failed Us – Voters’, 17 August 2015.

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Mabuyane, ‘has almost doubled as about 25 branches are now due to hold their BGMs, meaning the RTT has not moved.’20 Mabuyane’s comments betrayed pessimism about, if not outright disapproval of, the RTT. He had obviously not been involved in picking the initial members, which he was subsequently able to do, following revelations of the interim body’s apparent ineffectiveness. Mabuyane instructed that Litho Suka, the party’s chief whip in the NMB, become the new co-ordinator of campaigns. This move was ostensibly geared to strengthen the RTT. Chippy Olver, who was a member of the RTT, disagreed. The provincial leadership’s motive, according to Olver, was to fill the RTT with individuals that would manipulate the preparatory process for the elective conference so as to ensure that it elected regional leaders pliant to provincial dictates. In a letter to the RTT on 26 January 2016, Olver put it as follows: There is a full-blown campaign underway to re-establish elements of the disbanded REC and to put a corrupt clique in power to continue to loot the metro. Unfortunately, a number of the PEC deployees in the metro have been party to this intervention, and are abusing their position as leaders to assert a particular faction. The premature push for a regional conference, despite the obvious lack of readiness on the part of the structures, is part of this agenda. If the corrupt clique regains control of the regional ANC, we will almost certainly be punished at the ballot box, and either lose the metro outright, or be forced into coalition with other parties.21

The composition of the RTT, therefore, was contested. Some locally based leaders in the RTT saw provincial involvement in a negative light, as resuscitating the old regional leadership that had embroiled the metro in corruption. They were determined to fend them off, as Olver further urged his colleagues: ‘The coup that was staged by the PEC deployees in the metro needs to be reversed, and we must stand up as the RTT and do [our] appointed job.’ Taking back the RTT meant appointing a full-time Convener that is a leader able to unite the different elements in the metro into a cohesive force able to fight the election. The current Deputy Convener has fatally compromised himself by aligning himself with a particular faction, and basically marginalized the RTT members.22

20 The Herald, ‘ANC to Beef Up Metro Task Team’, 20 August 2015. 21 Letter from Chippy Olver to ANC, NMB Region, Regional Task Team, Re: Divisions Could See ANC Lose Metro, 26 January 2016. 22 The Herald, ‘ANC to Beef Up Metro Task Team’.

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Olver’s views reaffirmed what the RTT had resolved earlier, in its meeting of 17 November 2015.23 Particularly noteworthy about their list of recommended names to strengthen the RTT was that they were local and household names with a considerable history of political involvement in the metro.24 That meeting had also recommended that Phil Goduka replace Charles Nqakula as convener of the RTT. Goduka was a revered personality in the metro. A former trade unionist, he had been a key player in the local transitional talks and a former councillor in the transitional local council. Nqakula was eventually replaced in February 2016, but his replacement was not Goduka. Rather, it was Vuyani Limba and his deputy was Mncedisi Nontsele. The RTT meeting of November 2015 obviously did not get their preferred candidate for the position of convener. They were possibly overruled, and Limba was the choice of provincial leaders. This augured badly for relations within the RTT, which would, in turn, hamper their campaign in the looming August 2016 local elections. Suspicion about the motives of the province was shared even outside the RTT. Mike Xego, former regional secretary and respected local leader, also believed that the province was deliberately sabotaging the interim body. Even the composition of the body, Xego thought, was such that it marginalised local leaders. ‘Of the 32 people they wanted for the RTT, are they saying they could not find a single, credible leader?’ asked Xego. ‘The only recognisable leader there really is Mhlahlo. The rest don’t really have a local standing.’25 For this reason, Xego led an initiative to form another body, called the ‘The Forum’. He was the convener of The Forum, with Temba Mangqase as co-ordinator. Among the active members of The Forum was also Gege Mbiyakanye, a former youth leader and prominent ANC activist. In other words, The Forum was led by prominent local leaders who felt marginalised by the RTT. Their role, explained Xego, was not to rival the interim body. Rather, they sought to complement it, especially to revive organisational structures and public support for the party. The Forum convened their meetings at the party’s regional headquarters, Matomela House. That they did not have official standing did not worry Xego, ‘for everyone knows that we are ANC, and this is an ANC office for all ANC leaders’. Their activities included door-to-

23 Present at that meeting were: Thobile Mhlahlo, Bicks Ndoni, Mncedisi Nontsele, Dipuo Kondile, Andiswa Mama, Nkosazana Sabantu and Rose Frolick. Minutes of the RTT meeting held on 17 November 2015. 24 Ben Fihla, Daniel Dube, Vuyo Toto, Neela Hoosein, Xola Ngcangca, Mike Kwenaite, Terrence Primo, Lorna Makwetu, Phil Goduka, Boy Mkhalipi, Eugene Johnson, Phakamile Ximiya, Richman Linda Mti and Nondumiso Maphazi. 25 Interview with Mike Xego, 14 November 2015.

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door campaigns carried out by volunteers and joint appearances at funeral and memorial activities, urging people to get involved in party activities. The Forum also cultivated relations with Danny Jordaan, whom it addressed as ‘Comrade Mayor’. In a letter inviting Jordaan to a meeting, for instance, The Forum outlined their worry at the state of politics in the metro and how they envisaged their relationship with City Hall: We have lived to experience a fast decline in the electoral quantum the movement has been amassing. This is very concerning especially as we are approaching 2016 elections ... In our quest to provide the interim leadership (RTT) with progressive proposals on what needs to be done in order for the movement to mount a very effective campaign in the Metro; we felt it prudent that we ought to engage with you to ascertain your comradely comprehension of what are the real threats to the movement that may seriously affect our objective of retaining this Metro and saving our people from the political scavengers who will bring about racial domination of black people by the white chauvinistic DA regime.26

Jordaan did not mind the formation of The Forum. He saw it as a boost to reviving organisational structures, especially because the RTT was not functioning optimally. The provincial leadership, however, had a different view. They saw The Forum as a rival structure to the RTT, over which they had some sway. The Forum, by contrast, would be independent of provincial control and thus free to support candidates of their own choice for branch and regional leadership. In other words, it threatened provincial leadership’s ability to steer the preparatory activities for the conference and/or nomination process towards their preferred outcomes. The convener of the RTT, Charles Nqakula, disagreed with the province, however. He, too, saw The Forum as a complementary resource to the interim leadership, since it provided organisational space for ANC members who had been demobilised by factionalism and the failed attempts to revive branches.27 What impact the The Forum was able to exert was not easily discernable in the absence of an elective regional conference. The identity of the regional leadership would have been a clear indication as to which of the two power-blocs, provincial proxies and locally based leaders, would emerge triumphant. In effect, the power struggles were the cause of the failure to convene an elective conference. Preparations to hold branch general meetings were deliberately disrupted when 26 Letter from The Forum to Executive Mayor, Cde Danny Jordaan, Re: Request for an Urgent Meeting, 4 September 2015. 27 Interview with Chimurenga Mdabula, former ANC Youth League regional leader and participant in The Forum, 14 February 2017.

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one faction or another realised that they would not yield their desired branch leadership. In the final analysis, after more than a year since its inception, the RTT had not achieved any of its objectives. It barely hosted any of the commemorative events it had set out to host, nor did it convene the regional general council and elective conference. This was partially due to the RTT’s own inactivity, but was also a reflection of the general state of disarray among branches.

JORDAAN: A TECHNOCRATIC PUBLIC LEADER, HOBBLED BY PARTY POLITICS A globally recognised football administrator, Jordaan’s appointment as mayor was unexpected. His assignment to the NMB was not the surprising part. He was born in PE and made his name locally before rising to national and, later, international prominence. Jordaan was a teacher and a sports administrator; the latter role saw him rise from being a founding member of the National Sports Council to leading a successful bid to host the Soccer World Cup in 2010. The surprising part about Jordaan’s appointment was that he was neither a career politician nor immersed in party politics. He had last held a political appointment eighteen years previously, as an ANC MP, for a three-year stint. His predecessors, conversely, were both career politicians and party activists. Apart from his international prominence, Jordaan held universal appeal. That was what gave him the edge over the other candidates, Mandla Madwara and Bicks Ndoni, who were also considered for selection.28 Both were prominent names in ANC circles, with Ndoni serving in Council, whilst Madwara was a former councillor and current business person. Their appeal, however, was largely limited to the African townships. That presented a problem for the party. African voters remained largely favourable towards the ANC, whilst their coloured counterparts were deserting the party. It was to the latter that the ANC’s campaign needed to pay particular attention. In light of the saliency of racial identity in South African politics, Jordaan’s candidature promised to woo back coloured voters, whilst retaining African voters. Jordaan’s distinguished role in soccer made him equally popular in both communities.29 Jordaan was more of an administrator than a politician. That did not change when he became mayor in May 2015. He had a technocratic approach to leadership, which meant his decisions were largely based on technical soundness, not political expediency. This approach was further enabled by the fact that he had carte blanche. He did not have to seek anyone’s approval nor could he be dictated to. That was his precondition for taking the job. ‘Once I was given the job,’ Jordaan 28 News24.com, ‘Nelson Mandela Metro May Have New Mayor’, 18 May 2015. 29 M. Ndletyana, ‘Time for DA’s “Black is Beautiful” Makeover’, Independent Online, 17 May 2015.

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remarked, ‘I said I must be allowed to do the job. I don’t want to get a phone call saying not this one, that one.’30 In a talk given at the SACP’s 94th anniversary, he told his audience: ‘I’m not afraid of anyone and I am no one’s puppet.’31 In other words, Jordaan determined the terms of his employment. He had not sought the job, but was approached to accept the job offer. This gave him leverage. The ANC needed him more than he needed the job. Jordaan was neither indebted to nor embedded in any of the feuding factions in the metro. This strengthened his hand not only to act autonomously, but also to take unpopular decisions against any of the factions. He was especially predisposed to going against factional interests because he believed they promoted personal interests, over those of the organisation and the prosperity of the municipality. As a result, Jordaan had a dim view of his colleagues. ‘What is missing in this city,’ he told his fellow councillors, ‘are people with backbone, people with [the] courage to stand up and say so and so, we are going to deal with you. I told them this is missing in all of you.’ The councillors were understandably not happy with Jordaan. But their feelings were the least of Jordaan’s concerns: ‘I think it’s time that we speak the truth. Unless we do that, and not play politics with a serious problem, corruption can actually collapse this city.’32 Jordaan considered the situation not only dire, but also potentially inescapable. The NMB was amongst the lowest performing metros on economic indicators; it did not generate sufficient revenue to fund its needs nor was it able to attract investment; a significant number of locally born skilled people were leaving the metro for opportunities elsewhere, and relations between the municipality and the public were at their lowest.

RED LOCATION MUSEUM: CASUALTY OF MISMANAGEMENT AND DISTRUST Perhaps more than any other, the Red Location Cultural Precinct is emblematic of the strained relations between residents and officialdom, as well as the challenges caused by incompetence and corruption. It is amongst the finest achievements in terms of public service and the building of public institutions, but currently lies derelict. After six successful inaugural years, the Precinct has been shut down and faces ruin. This is all because of a dispute around housing, which the Council and residents have not been able to resolve. Red Location Cultural Precinct is located in PE’s oldest township, New Brighton. The township was established in 1903 to settle residents who had been 30 Interview with Danny Jordaan, 22 April 2016. 31 The Herald, ‘Heads to Roll, Says Jordaan’, 3 August 2015. 32 The Herald, ‘Heads to Roll’.

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removed from town and its immediate surroundings, following the outbreak of bubonic plague in 1901. Red Location – Elalin’ Ebomvu – was the first part of New Brighton to be settled, with the initial population numbering 254 residents. Its name derived from the housing structures – red-painted wood and iron barracks that had been used as part of the Anglo-Boer War’s concentration camps. The population grew over subsequent years partly from the resettlement of residents who had been forcefully removed from Korsten in the 1950s.33 Whilst proper housing was built over the subsequent years, living conditions in Red Location were appalling and remained so over the subsequent decades. The barracks-type houses were still a common sight right up to the early 1990s. Together with apartheid’s repressive laws, poor living standards sparked disgruntlement amongst the locals, which the ANC and the SACP galvanised into political action. The nationwide 1952 Defiance Campaign, for instance, found most support in New Brighton. Of the 8 300 protesters who were arrested in that campaign, ‘2 000 were from Port Elizabeth’.34 A target of forced removals in the 1980s, Red Location remained a hub of anti-apartheid activism throughout the apartheid years. Its residents successfully resisted removal to the far-flung, newly built township of Motherwell. This made Red Location the target of constant harassment by apartheid’s security forces. Red Location is emblematic of the travails that Africans endured from the start of the 20th century onwards. They were partly forced into urban settlements by being dispossessed of their land through wars of conquest, where they became objects of the racial oppression that they resisted throughout the decades. This is the story that the Red Location Cultural Precinct was conceived to preserve, exhibit and popularise. Ernest Malgas first mooted the idea in 1992. Malgas’ interest arose from his central involvement in PE’s anti-apartheid activities from the early 1950s on. He was amongst the first recruits into Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1960; by 1963 his MK activities had earned him a 14-year sentence in the notorious Robben Island Prison. Following his release in the late 1970s, Malgas became prominent in setting up Pebco and the UDF. Throughout this period, Malgas was frequently detained and severely tortured. Malgas got the idea for the cultural precinct during an overseas study tour in 1992. The overseas trip was undertaken to study local government in preparation for the new democratised institutions that were to be inaugurated following

33 M. Ngonyama and S. Gwashu, Red Location Museum Reopening Facilitation Team, ‘The Red Location Cultural Precinct: Africa’s Largest Cultural Precinct’, 5 May 2016. Paper commissioned by the office of the NMB mayor. 34 Ngonyama and Gwashu, ‘The Red Location Cultural Precinct’, p. 6.

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the political transition in 1994. Included in the tour were ANC activists, DP councillors and municipal officials. As they were seeing the various museums in Europe and the USA, Malgas called a group of ANC activists from Port Elizabeth together, and told them that he did not believe he would live much longer, and entreated us to, when they become Councillors, commemorate two things: firstly, how the residents of the Red Location had to live, with primitive buckets sewerage and minimal facilities; and secondly, how the struggle against apartheid had been fought from New Brighton, and particularly from the Red Location.35

Preparations to set up the cultural precinct began in 1996, two years after the democratic breakthrough. Eastern Cape’s most decorated architect, John Rushmere, drew up the initial specifications, which were then used as a guide to invite applications to design the precinct. The adjudication panel included Govan Mbeki and Jeff Peires, a leading scholar on African history and a progressive intellectual, and three architects. Johannesburg’s Noero Wolff Architects won the bid. Wolff’s design envisaged that the precinct would include a museum and an art gallery, a digital library and archives, and a performing arts complex. Construction started with the museum in April 2003, which was officially opened on 10 November 2006. The art gallery and library followed in 2012. The museum proved an instant sensation. This owed to its splendour, but also to its utility. It quickly won a number of architectural awards, including the extraordinary achievement of winning the Lubetikin Prize from the Royal Institute of British Architects in London for the best building in the world outside of the European Union. Because of this distinction, it became the hub of cultural activity in the metro. It not only displayed exhibitions, but also hosted talks, seminars and book launches. In 2011 alone, the museum attracted 117 000 visitors, which was far more than the city’s Metropolitan Art Museum and South End Museum were ever able to attract.36 In other words, the cultural precinct had a catalytic effect in New Brighton. It served as a source of education both to students and the general public. Visits by prominent personalities – ‘such as presidents, ambassadors, and other global dignitaries’37 – generated a hive of activity in the area. This revived tourism in

35 Ngonyama and Gwashu, ‘The Red Location Cultural Precinct’, p. 29. 36 NMB Municipality, Arts, Culture, Heritage and Libraries Committee, Report on the Closure of Red Location Museum, (Ref19/14/6/2), no date. 37 NMB Municipality, Arts, Culture, Heritage and Libraries Committee, Report on the Closure of Red Location Museum.

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the township with attendant economic benefits to the locals, who also benefited through the sale of artifacts, employment in the precinct and running the restaurant located within the precinct. The precinct shut its doors on 18 October 2013. The closure happened just as it was preparing to host a major national event, National Book Week, in which a number of acclaimed authors, including the internationally acclaimed novelist, Zakes Mda, were going to feature. The purpose was to promote a reading culture and to encourage creative writing by hosting workshops with aspiring writers. But residents disrupted the opening of the event with a demonstration. They complained that the individuals employed throughout the activity were not locals, but were brought in from Uitenhage.38 From lack of local employment, the complaint quickly grew to encompass housing. This involved two issues: repairing cracks in low-cost, state-provided houses and the provision of new houses. Building cracks affected about 378 existing houses, while other residents, who had been promised houses, wanted to see this promise expedited. The housing programme had been interrupted by the construction of the precinct, which saw some 210 families relocated into temporary housing structures to make way for the new public amenities. In addition, the apartheid government had started building new houses for residents, and part of the delay now was caused by disagreement over the size of the new houses that were to be built by the new democratic government. Residents demanded that the size of their houses be the 48 square metres which had been provided by the previous government, not the 40 square metres that the new government had adopted in its policy. The problem was later compounded by the introduction of a new policy on housing. The new policy, adopted in 2015, was that government would no longer provide funding for repairs on existing houses. It complained that doing so was a waste of scarce financial resources on poor workmanship. Instead, municipalities were instructed to recover funds from the delinquent builders to repair their shoddy work.39 The precinct, therefore, fell hostage to a dispute over housing. Knowing the importance of the precinct to the municipality, affected residents used it as a bargaining chip. They insisted that the museum could not be given preference over their housing needs. Mxolisi Nduvane, a member of the Red Location

38 NMB Municipality, Ward 15 councillor, Red Location Steering Committee/Protestors, Unit Leadership Wilton Mkwayi Phase 2 &3, Municipal Officials And Museum Staff, minutes of the meeting re: The Closure of the Red Location Museum – Progress on Re-opening, 8 January 2014. 39 M. Ngonyama, ‘48 Square Meter Red Location Housing Project’, no date. Report commissioned by the office of the NMB mayor.

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Steering Committee, put it thus: ‘We were against burning it down, as it is one of Nelson Mandela Bay’s historical sites that put our area on the map. But, it does not make sense for us to have a beautiful facility surrounded by corrugated shacks.’40 Staff were chased away and threatened with being shot if they ever returned. The precinct, they insisted, would be opened only if the municipality agreed to their demands. In the meantime, the precinct fell into squalor. The casualty has not only been the delayed construction of the performing arts complex, but also the existing structures themselves. They have been vandalised and break-ins have damaged them. ‘Today,’ The Herald noted, ‘the once acclaimed museum looks more like an abandoned construction site … Looters have ravaged it, stealing wiring, power sockets, fencing, air-conditioners and palisade fencing.’41 Inside the precinct, ‘TVs, computers, scanners and speakers’42 have all been stolen. Exhibitions, archival material, and the collection of artifacts and paintings are exposed to ruin due to poor ventilation. A decaying Red Location Cultural Precinct was part of what Jordaan inherited upon inauguration on 28 May 2015. The series of meetings that had been held since the closure had not yielded any fruit. Parties were deadlocked. Some residents were still without the promised housing and others had to carry out repairs themselves. Failure to honour promises on the part of the municipality had not only eroded trust, but also infuriated the community. That the parties could not find each other, even at the detriment of the precinct, was indicative of the deteriorated state of relations between the municipality and residents. As noted earlier, this stemmed from the residents’ frustration about failed promises, but equally from the dysfunctionality of ward committees and the general absence of regular interaction between the councillor and residents.

INAUGURAL MAYORAL TENURE: REBUILDING INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Thus Jordaan, in his inaugural address, promised a fundamental departure from the status quo: ‘The message I would like to emphasise is that 2015/2016 cannot

40 The Herald, ‘R21 Budget for Closed Facility’, 13 July 2015. 41 The Herald, ‘R21 Budget for Closed Facility’. 42 The Herald, ‘From Ongoing Protests to Vandalism and Theft’, 13 July 2015. For further details on stolen items and the extent of the damage, refer to NMB Municipality, Recreation, Sports, Arts and Culture, Report on Red Location Museum Break-in, Director N. Gwintsa’s report to the Mayoral Committee, 2 July 2014.

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and shall not be business as usual.’43 Drastic measures were necessary. Jordaan prioritised combating corruption, creating fiscal stability and credit worthiness, and improving public relations.44 Within two months of being in office, Jordaan had suspended more than 10 officials who had allegedly been involved in corruption. These included Mod Ndoyana, Mvuleni Mapu, Lindile Petuna, Nadia Gerwel and Mhleli Ntshamase, all of whom had been either appointed improperly or associated with the massive corruption related to housing and the failed bus system. Jordaan’s predecessor, Fihla, had failed to clean up corruption. He had never acted on the Kabuso and Pikoli forensic reports. Fihla had found both reports on his desk and left them untouched. Jordaan not only suspended the officials linked to the failed bus system, but also referred the Pikoli Report for further forensic investigation by Treasury. If dealing with corruption was a demonstration of his relative autonomy, then Jordaan’s handling of the budget was demonstrative of his technocratic approach to governance. On his appointment in May 2015, the Council had already formulated a draft budget. However, Jordaan refused to refer it to Council for voting, because it had a deficit of R400 million. He insisted on a cash-backed budget, instead of including items in the budget for which there were no funds. His goal was to achieve fiscal stability in order to build investor confidence in the management of the municipality. Producing a cash-backed budget required savings. To this end, Jordaan cut off non-core expenses. International travel was cut out completely; allocations for public celebrations, conferences, car and venue hire was reduced by 50%; contract security service allocation was reduced by 40%; allocation towards the purchase of office furniture dropped by 90% and the agenda for the council meetings would not be couriered anymore, but emailed to councillors.45 The cuts gave the municipality a surplus of R2 billion. This gave relative assurance of availability of funds for every item in the budget and for emergency expenditure. It also revealed prudent financial management. Jordaan also realised, however, that pursuing financial prudence, had its own limits. His budget had cut out allowances paid to employees with scarce skills. The recipients included engineers and plumbers, and allowances were paid both as an incentive and as compensation for overtime work. The opposition berated the decision as counter-productive. The municipality still had vacancies in these areas of work, and discontinuing allowances limited prospects for recruitment, 43 Danny Jordaan, inaugural mayoral speech, Council meeting, 28 May 2015. 44 Jordaan, inaugural mayoral speech, 28 May 2015; budget speech, 18 June 2015. 45 See www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za.

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and risked skilled workers not attending to emergency problems after hours. But Jordaan countered that the payments were open to abuse, as there was no clear policy in place as to who qualified for these allowances and who did not.46 A councillor and whip of the portfolio committee on budget, Monde Vaaltyn, added that some employees, who had entered employment under the overtime allowances scheme, retained the allowances even after they had moved into areas that did not qualify for such payments.47 Jordaan did not have to wait long to realise that in politics decisions are not always based on practicality. Expediency is often a necessary consideration, especially if it enables one to attain one’s overall objective. As soon as their salaries were docked at the end of July 2015, technical staff in electricity, infrastructure and human settlement went on wildcat strikes for a week. The mayor was confronted with an unhappy citizenry as power outages went unattended. He acceded, restoring the payment of allowances. Notwithstanding the above, Jordaan was not entirely naïve. He was relatively attuned to the demands of a campaign year. Local elections were roughly a year away. His party was under pressure to show demonstrable evidence of service delivery, which required funding for a number of activities in one’s ward to meet real needs, whilst also cultivating goodwill. And so with the campaign in mind, Jordaan’s budget increased the discretionary fund for ward councillors by 100 per cent, from R100 000 to R200 000. Councillors had sole discretion over their use of these funds, which they tended to use for activities of a social and developmental nature. These varied from fixing a school fence or cleaning up a park, to hosting a sports activity.48 The idea was that councillors would spend as much of the fund as possible in their wards ahead of the elections to make an impression on potential voters.49 Jordaan was also mindful of the fact that he could not get a reliable account on the state of affairs in communities through councillors or the party. He interacted with the party, but rarely so. These interactions included joint public appearances and meetings at Matomela House. The Council’s chief whip, Litho Suka, was in charge of facilitating interactions, especially conveying the RTT’s invitations to

46 47 48 49

The Herald, ‘Overtime Slashed to Pay Allowances’, 31 August 2015. Interview with Monde Vaaltyn and Balu Naran, 3 February 2017. Vaaltyn and Naran, interview, 3 February 2017. A senior official in the municipality, however, told me that councillors, especially those from the ANC, hardly spent more than 50 per cent of their funds. Their lacklustre expenditure did not improve – even in that election year. Interview with a senior official in the municipality who chose to remain anonymous, 18 December 2018.

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the mayor. But, Jordaan hardly ever got invitations to the meetings at Matomela House, whilst Suka’s presence there was not uncommon. Jordaan concluded that the jostling within the party, as it attempted to convene regional conferences, complicated interactions with the RTT. His relations with Mabuyane, the party’s provincial secretary, who was especially close to Suka, were not entirely warm. Mabuyane was accustomed to issuing instructions to mayors, summoning them to abrupt meetings at the party’s provincial headquarters, Calata House, in King William’s Town. Jordaan was unresponsive to instructions and told the provincial secretary to arrange teleconferences, instead of expecting him to make sudden and constant trips to Calata House.50 Unable to access communities through ANC branches, Jordaan resorted to official channels of communication. He revived ward committees, which had last been active in 2012. They had been deactivated by a dispute between the governing party and the DA, over accusations that elections for ward committees had been improperly convened to benefit the ANC. The DA threatened legal action, which led to the elections being halted. A stalemate thus ensued, lasting for almost three years. Reviving ward committees was part of Jordaan’s broader strategy to rebuild relations with civil society in general. It took him hardly a month to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with civic formations, whereas his predecessor, Fihla, left without signing the MoU after more than two years of having the draft in his office.51 It is also worth noting that Jordaan was assisted by the national government. The possibility of losing power created an extraordinary level of responsiveness to the problems that had beset the metro for several years without much attention. Municipal housing was taken over by the national Department of Human Settlements in 2015, which promptly promised to inject R4.6 billion into the NMB municipality to fast-track housing delivery. Housing had been the cause of the spike in service delivery protests from 2012 onwards. Not to be outdone, the Department of Water and Sanitation launched the ‘War on Leaks Programme’ in PE on 15 July 2016. The president of the republic himself, Jacob Zuma, led the launch. The programme employed 300 new plumbers, who were assigned to all 60 wards in groups of five. Leaks had been a serious problem for the metro, which suffers from water scarcity, and were costly to the municipality. Between July 2015 and March 2016, for instance, the NMB metro lost 130 million rands’ worth of water. The programme was more than just a water-saving measure,

50 Senior municipal official, interview, 20 January 2017. 51 Interview with Mongameli Peter, 12 February 2016.

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however. It was also a job creation scheme, which was especially needed given the metro’s 36 per cent unemployment rate.52 National interventions created a sense of delivery whilst Jordaan’s initiatives were still unfolding. By the close of the first hundred days in office on 9 September, Jordaan could claim some successes. Council had adopted a cash-backed budget with a surplus, for which Moody’s credit rating agency duly granted it a positive rating. This was followed by public commitments by two of the car-manufacturing firms based in the metro, Volkswagen South Africa and FAW, to expand their local production. Refuse collection was collected once a week and officials suspected of corruption were on the verge of facing disciplinary action or dismissal. Public relations had improved dramatically between the metro and civil society.53 Moreover, before 2015 came to a close, Jordaan had also resolved educational challenges that were the responsibility of the provincial government. He was appointed in the midst of protests in the coloured communities, sparked by teachers’ and parents’ complaints over vacancies for support staff at schools. These related to security personnel, administrators and cleaners. The protests even disrupted normal schooling. Jordaan was able to secure funding from the provincial government for such appointments to be made, thereby bringing an end to a strike that had disrupted schooling in PE’s northern areas. Even the fiercely critical local newspaper, The Herald, recognised Jordaan’s efforts, giving him the ‘Hero of the Day’ award in their edition of 18 November 2015. The newspaper’s editorial read: More than any other mayor the ANC has appointed to this city, Jordaan has taken action to restore order in a municipality beset by corruption and cronyism … his valiant efforts to find funding to ensure that all Bay schools have caretakers and cleaning staff show that Jordaan is a mayor who is in tune with the needs of the communities he serves.54

Jordaan’s relative success owed to his autonomy from the feuding factions. He was neither loyal nor indebted to any grouping. This enabled him to act freely, making necessary changes to improve the fortunes of the metro. Even when the demands of the political environment imposed expediency on his decisions, Jordaan was not swayed away from taking unpopular, yet necessary remedial actions.

52 Weekend Post, 16 July 2016. 53 Peter, interview, 12 February 2016. 54 The Herald, ‘Jordaan in School Jobs Breakthrough’, 18 November 2015.

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As a result, however, Jordaan’s relations with the provincial leadership soured. Mabuyane, especially, disapproved of Jordaan’s leadership style. Jordaan was not pliant to Mabuyane’s dictates, something over which Mabuyane had removed Zanoxolo Wayile. In Jordaan’s instance Mabuyane had no sway, and Jordaan was particularly outspoken about being his own man, which irked Mabuyane and certainly did not make him particularly supportive of Jordaan.55 Mabuyane preferred a mayor of Fihla’s ilk – uninvolved and obedient.

A PARTY IN DISARRAY As the local election year dawned, the ANC was in no better shape than it had been a year earlier when the regional leadership was disbanded. The stakes were even higher in the election year. A candidate list was to be compiled, from which a candidate to occupy the coveted position of mayor would be nominated. The contestation over nominations was poised to become even more fierce. For divisions were rife both within branches, and between the RTT and the PEC. All these structures were involved in the nomination process. Branches nominate both ward and PR candidates. Four ward candidates are then vetted by a screening committee that is appointed by the REC (or RTT). Thereafter, nominees are subjected to scrutiny at a public meeting attended by residents in the ward. Residents evaluate the four nominees and state their choice in order of preference. A deployee from the interim leadership (or the REC) oversees the public meeting, with the screening committee present. The latter makes a recommendation to the Regional List Committee (RLC) made up of members of both the PEC and the REC (or the interim leadership in the case of the metro then). Unlike ward candidates, whose nomination is concluded at the ward level, the selection of PR candidates goes for a further round of selection at a regional list conference. The conference is presented with a master list made up of nominees from branches. Each branch is allowed to make four nominations. Branch delegates make up 70 per cent of the conference gathering, and the rest of the voting delegates are from the ANC Youth League and Women’s League. Representatives of MKVA and alliance partners – Cosatu, the SACP and Sanco – have observer status. Delegates vote on each name on the list and the number of votes each nominee gets determines his or her placing on the list. To correspond with the number of PR seats available in the council, the final list must contain 60 names. Those who were nominated by more than four branches at the initial

55 Senior municipal official, interview, 20 January 2017.

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round of voting – at a branch level – are automatically placed at the head of the list in order of their popularity. Whilst delegates are free to make their choice, the provincial leadership reserves the right to make changes. This is ostensibly to ensure that the list meets the criteria for the slate of candidates: 50% gender equity; 20% youth, racial and geographic representivity; and 60% continuity (retention of the councillors that had served in the previous Council). Members of the alliance partners are also considered. The applicability of the criteria, however, differs per ballot. The choice of ward candidates, ideally, cannot be overruled to comply with the criteria. If all four of branch nominees are men, for instance, a deployee that oversees the nomination process cannot force members to include a woman. Members can persuade one another to be gender-sensitive, but cannot force a change under the guise of complying with the criteria. With regard to the nomination of the PR candidates, however, the process works differently. The PEC can readjust a list to comply with the selection criteria. Whoever is added to comply with the criteria, however, as the provincial secretary Oscar Mabuyane emphasised, must have been included in the master list.56 In other words, the provincial leadership has a veto on the final order of candidates on the list. They can remove a candidate from an electable to an unelectable spot on the list, but on condition that they are complying with the nomination criteria. Nominations got underway in November 2015 and concluded in May 2016. Whilst branches went through the nomination process away from the glare of the public and the media, two events indicated that all was still not well within. These were the voter registration process on 5–6 March 2016 and the party’s rally to launch its manifesto on 16 April 2016. Albeit voter registration is primarily the IEC’s responsibility, parties also initiate their own campaigns to ensure optimal registrations in their strongholds. They put up posters and issue media statements. According to an official of the IEC’s NMB office, Croxby Bacela, ANC posters were hardly visible and ANC mobilisation efforts to get their traditional supporters to register were barely noticeable. The mayor’s office shared this observation, which caused them to worry that ANC support would be limited on election day. On the second day of registration, 6 March 2016, the office initiated its own drive to get eligible voters to register. This entailed issuing posters and media statements, couched as non-partisan and official measures.57 The party’s manifesto launch rally was not the usual success either. Held at the Nelson Mandela Stadium, the rally was a national event attended by leaders and 56 The Herald, ‘No Manipulation of Candidate Lists’, 31 May 2016. 57 Senior municipal official, interview, 20 January 2017.

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members from throughout the country. Deciding on the location for such events is a competitive process within the ANC. In the case of the 2016 manifesto launch rally, the competition was amongst Tshwane, Johannesburg and NMB. They were all billed as battlegrounds for the 2016 local elections. Hosting the rally was to be beneficial to the chosen metro.58 It is effectively a campaign activity used to revive organisational interest and showcase municipal performance. Prominent leaders of the organisation conduct a door-to-door campaign in the days leading up to the rally under the glare of the media. The rally, in other words, is both a revival and a marketing activity. In the case of the NMB, however, the usual impact of the manifesto launch rally was diluted. It exposed the challenges that confronted not only the metro, but also the organisation as a whole. Attendance at the NMB stadium, for one, was less than usual for such occasions, which always fill the stadium. This is often the result of enthusiasm amongst members and logistical preparedness such as transportation of members to and from the venue. Unlike previous manifesto launch rallies, the stadium for the 2016 NMB leg was half-empty – clearly a public relations failure. A packed stadium projects an impression of continuing popular dominance, which may convince undecided voters that the ANC is still the most popular choice. Organisers in the NMB ascribed the poor turnout to insufficient transport for members, which implies inadequate preparations. Even so, the poor turnout also revealed relative lack of enthusiasm on the part of supporters, who could have arranged their own transport, or toyi-toyi to the rally, as had been commonplace in the past. It does also appear that the organisers were not solely liable for the unsatisfactory attendance. An incident a few days earlier suggested that the same leaders who were supposedly meant to encourage supporters, possibly repelled some of them. A massive billboard, put up in the city centre by the DA’s Andrew Whitfield on the Wednesday before the Saturday rally, was quickly brought down the next day by Jordaan. The billboard was made in the ANC’s proud colours, but the inscription was the possible turn-off for the mayor. It read: ‘Danny Jordaan, Proudly brought to you by Jacob Zuma’.59 Jordaan possibly considered the inscription a stain, instead of a boost – just as the DA’s Whitfield had intended. Jordaan was weary of the association with Zuma, whose popularity was at its lowest. This was partly

58 See S. Booysen, S. ‘Edging out of the African National Congress in the City of Johannesburg: A Case of Collective Punishment’, Journal of Public Administration 51 Special Issue 1 (2016), pp. 532–548; M.H. Maserumule, ‘Pre-poll Mayhem in Tshwane and the Fate of the African National Congress’, Journal of Public Administration 51 Special Issue 1(2016), pp. 549–572. 59 The City Press, ‘DA’s Jordaan Billboard Enrages the ANC’, 17 April 2016.

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confirmed at the rally. By the time Zuma took to the podium, the crowd had dwindled and people continued to leave as he was speaking.60 If the billboard hinted at Jordaan’s complicated relationship with the party’s president, the subsequent list conference showed that local problems were even more intractable. The nomination process lifted a lid, allowing problems that had been simmering inside the party to burst into the open, making a highly unflattering impression. The list conference was held on 30 April 2016 to draw up a list of 60 PR candidates from a total of 219 names nominated at the branch level. They were placed on what is called a master list.61 All 60 nominated candidates were to be listed by order of their popularity. Based on the total of 133 voting delegates in attendance, the threshold for nomination was set at 67 votes and above. Predictably, the conference was highly contested. It started seven hours late at 5:00 pm, instead of the scheduled 10:00 am. The delay was caused by disputes over the credentials of delegates. If the branch chairperson or secretary could not come, they had to nominate someone to represent the branch and had to write a letter to that effect. In some instances the letter was not written. Where a letter was written, it had to be verified. Even when the conference finally got underway, it did not proceed unhindered. Because attendants voted by a show of hands, there were re-counts to achieve absolute certainty. The conference finished in the wee hours of the next day, at around 3:00 am.62 Only 51 individuals, instead of 60, were nominated. Seven of the candidates had automatic qualification and were placed at the head of the list in order of their popularity. These included Jordaan. They had been nominated by more than four branches in the first round of nominations conducted at the branch level. This left 53 spots open for contestation, but only 46 nominees got 67 or more of the votes required. This meant there were nine vacancies, prompting a discussion over how they should be filled. One view was that candidates who got closest to the threshold fill them. Another countered that the RLC should be given the discretion to fill the vacancies. The latter view prompted a concern that the RLC would abuse the discretion to fiddle with the order of the names on the list. This concern was heightened by the fact that delegates would know who had been picked to fill the vacancies only much later, at which time it would be impossible to rectify the list, if they saw fit.

60 TimesLIVE, ‘ANC Election Manifesto Poorly Attended’, 16 April 2016. 61 Some of the branches did not nominate the usual four names, which explains why the master list had 219 instead of 240 names on it. 62 Interview with Zandile Xate, 2 May 2016.

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The worry over possible manipulation by the RLC was somewhat allayed by the assurance that the added names, because they got less than 67 votes, would be placed at the tail end of the list. This would take them out of the top-30 safe zone,63 which meant they were unlikely to make it through anyway. That said, discretionary powers to fiddle with the list ostensibly in compliance with the nomination criteria, remained a general cause for concern. Some delegates feared that the criteria were unlikely to be applied fairly because of factional affiliations among those in the RLC as well as in the PEC. Inevitably, the nomination list (hereafter referred to as the Calata list) stirred up controversy once the province had made its input. The controversy had as much to do with the way candidates were informed as the content of the list itself. Candidates were informed haphazardly. Those whose candidature was approved by the province were sent text messages on their mobile phones to come for vetting. That started a frenzy of text messages among possible candidates, asking one another, ‘Did you get the SMS?’ If one had not, that meant one’s candidature had failed. This included people who had legitimate expectations not only to be on the list, but also to be in the ‘safe zone’.64 The Calata list had a number of discrepancies. No fewer than eight candidates, for instance, who had been placed in the safe zone on the conference list, were taken out in the Calala list.65 One glaring instance involved Feziwe Sibeko, who was the chief whip under Wayile’s tenure and later a member of the MMC under Jordaan. Sibeko was one of the six individuals who had automatic placing on the conference list by virtue of their prominence among branches. But Calata House removed her name from the top six and placed her at 35, making her potentially unelectable.66 Sibeko’s removal from the top of the list was not unsurprising. As noted in the previous chapter, she was part of Wayile’s leadership that was anti-corruption and opposed to political meddling in administrative affairs. Jordaan, who was just as strong as Wayile on ethical leadership, brought Sibeko back into the

63 The safe zone – i.e. among the top 30 – was determined by the provincial leadership based on the party’s previous support at 50 per cent or more. 64 Xate, interview, 2 May 2016. 65 They were: Simphiwe Madlavu, Nontombi Nama, Gege Mbikanye, Xolani Mgxotheni, Zandile Xate, Samuel Davids, Baqaqawule Mrwetyana and Similo Thube. 66 When the IEC eventually published the final list, Sibeko’s name had been moved again, up to position 26. This was possibly due to objections against the apparent overriding of the decision by branches. Still, number 26 was 20 spots below where the branches had initially placed her and, as a result, she had fewer prospects of being elected to council.

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municipal leadership as an MMC. Sibeko’s downgrading on the list was the result of factional politics, not compliance with selection criteria. In another instance, Calata House elevated eight names that branches had either voted below number 30, or had not nominated at all.67 Knight Mali and Nomgqibelo Tyumbu, for instance, were not even on the master list made up of branch nominees. Mali was a defector from the DA. These readjustments, as noted above, were not unexpected. Calata House could justify them on the basis of compliance with the nomination criteria. But, this still gave them considerable discretion to choose, for instance, which woman, youngster, minority person or member of the alliance to nominate, ostensibly in compliance with the criteria. There was an element of arbitrariness that enabled Calata House to select their preferred candidates, under the guise of enforcing the criteria. Moreover, and contrary to earlier announcements by the provincial secretary Oscar Mabuyane, about 10 individuals were included in the Calata list, despite their not being voted onto the original master list by the branches.68 In the case of two candidates – Thobekile Lawu and Josephine Siwisa – they were even placed in the top-30 safe zone. Aggrieved by inconsistencies on the Calata list, some ANC members launched a series of protests.69 This lasted for almost two months, stopping on July 22 – just two weeks before the August 3 local election. A common complaint was that the nomination process was done improperly, resulting in the nomination of wrong candidates. In the case of Mbongeni Bhungane’s Ward 41, for instance, the nomination was said to have happened in a meeting that was not quorate. A meeting was initially called, but only 290 members in good standing showed up, instead of the required 338. That meeting was then called off, but another was convened without Bhungane’s knowledge and without a quorum. A candidate was nominated nonetheless, infuriating Bhungane and other members of the branch. The aggrieved members decided to register Bhungane as an independent.70 Unlike Ward 41’s legitimate complaint, the protest at KwaZakhele’s Ward 22 sought to violate nomination rules for ward candidates. The protestors insisted that their preferred candidate, Xabaniso Ntuli, be nominated a fifth candidate. This went against the rule that only four candidates should be nominated. In any case,

67 They were: Mike Xego, Eugene Johnson, Fikile Desi, Maria Hermans, Andiswa Mama, Knight Mali, Mxolisi Mani and Nomgqibelo Tyumbu. 68 They were: Ester Mandlana, Nontobeko Odolo, Nono Maphehle, Lizo Vakala, Zodwa Zothani, Penny Naaido, Thandile Gladile, Brian Kivedo, Thobekile Lawu and Josephine Siwisa. 69 For example, protests erupted in KwaZakhele’s Wards 22 and 24, Ward 27 in Zwide, Clearly Park’s Ward 32, Ward 41 at Chatty/Booysen Park and Motherwell’s Ward 54. 70 The Herald, ‘Tensions Rise over ANC Choices’, 25 May 2016.

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a candidate – Nqabakazi Zuma – had already been selected for the ward. Their protest, around the famous Njoli Square, distinguished itself with violent scenes which even attracted national attention. The ANC’s regional headquarters, Florence Matomela House, at Govan Mbeki Avenue in the city centre, was also drawn into the spectacle. On 31 May 2016, outside Matomela House, one protestor was engulfed in a blaze of flames from burning tyres.71 Delegates had gathered at the regional headquarters to be transported to East London, where they would be vetted. They were meant to leave at around 5:00 am, but the protestors insisted that no-one was leaving until their grievance was resolved. Some of the protestors had a legitimate gripe, especially those whose names were removed, even though they had been placed in the top 30. The RLC was ambivalent in its response. It neither refuted their objections nor rectified the list. Rather, it allowed everyone to go for vetting in the nearby town of East London. This gave the impression that the list could still be changed before final submission to the IEC on 2 June 2016. Candidates left late in the afternoon, around 4:00 pm, although some had arrived at Matomela House as early as 6:00 am that morning. That their candidates were put through a vetting process did not placate the protestors. Protests continued unabated. In one incident, on 14 June 2016, demonstrators held members of the RLC hostage at Matomela House. One of them even vowed: ‘No one from the leadership will go home tonight. They have taken out all the popular and number one councillor candidates in the list and replaced them with unpopular candidates.’ The RLC members were locked in Matomela House from 8:30 am, until the police were called in and they were finally let out at about 6:30 pm, after 10 hours of confinement in the office.72 When the IEC’s final list of candidates was eventually published on 29 June 2016, it showed some changes. A number of names were reordered. Some candidates were moved from unsafe to safe spots73 and vice-versa.74 Others were taken from safe spots, out of the list completely.75 Those that Calata House had taken out initially, even though the conference list had placed them in the safe zone, never made it back to the final IEC list. Calata House had simply fiddled with the list without any clear logic. This did not help to quell the protests. One incident, on 7 July 2016, even made prime-time news on all national television stations that evening. Protestors in Ward 22 attacked volunteers who were doing

71 72 73 74 75

The Herald, ‘Insults Fly in Standoff over Candidates’, 1 June 2016. The Herald, ‘ANC Top Brass Held Hostage for 10 Hours’, 15 June 2016. Lindokuhle Vika, Lawrence Troon and Nomvuselelo Tontsi. Nontombi Nama and Deidre Bruintjies. Nohle Mohapi is one example, among many others.

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a door-to-door campaign. They were still insisting that Xabaniso Ntuli should be made candidate, instead of Nqabakazi Zuma, even though the list process had been closed. Volunteers were beaten up, robbed of their possessions, and had their cars pelted with stones. One of the volunteers, Sinoxolo Gongxeka, described what happened to him: They took all my stuff and now I cannot operate. I don’t understand why they attacked me because I am doing the work of the organisation. I have nothing against them; I am just there because of the organisation.76

Nonzwakazi Wewe, who was also a member of the screening committee that selected the ward candidate, had her car damaged with stones and bumped onto another car as she was speeding off to safety. She narrated her ordeal: ‘I was so scared and as a result, instead of putting [the gear lever] into gear one, I accidentally put it in reverse, which is why I bumped the car.’77 A deputy minister and former national commissioner of police, Bheki Cele, who was one of the volunteers, also had to abandon the campaign and run for cover. Nceba Faku and Litho Suka, organiser and the RTT’s head of campaigns respectively, were in charge of the ANC’s campaign. Yet the campaign was almost invisible, and Jordaan was virtually absent in the townships. ‘You wouldn’t have guessed that there was an election coming in about three weeks. There was no sense of excitement, enthusiasm about elections,’78 observed Mandla Nkomfe, a household name in Gauteng provincial politics. Then a political advisor in the Finance Ministry, Nkomfe was on a brief visit with his minister, Pravin Gordhan, over the weekend of 9 July 2016, to help with the door-to-door campaign in the metro. Paki Ximiya, a former political activist and member of the MKVA, adds that it was only that weekend that Jordaan started making regular appearances in the townships, at their suggestion. The campaign and organising unit of the ANC had completely marginalised Jordaan.79 As for the troubled Ward 22, campaigning started tentatively only in the following week, on 14 July 2016. This followed an undertaking by the provincial deputy chairperson of the party, Sakhumzi Somyo, that he would investigate the protestors’ complaint. If it was validated, then Nqabakazi Zuma assuming she won the ward, would resign and a by-election would be called. Whilst allowing for campaigning to go on uninterrupted, the protestors refused to have Zuma’s 76 77 78 79

The Herald, ‘Violent Protest Stops ANC Poll Campaign in KwaZakhele’, 8 July 2016. The Herald, ‘Violent Protest Stops ANC Poll Campaign in KwaZakhele’. Telephone conversation with Mandla Nkomfe, 23 January 2017. Conversation with Paki Ximiya, 27 December 2016.

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posters displayed on lamp posts: ‘Akuyiw’ epalini’ [no-one is going up the pole], they said.80 Instead of posters bearing her face, they suggested one with the face of the ANC president, or another advertising the party’s Siyanqoba Rally. Other members of the ward were similarly unrelenting. Not displaying posters bearing the face of their ward candidate, they countered, would ‘suggest that we don’t have leadership here’. Fikile Mbalula, a member of the party’s Committee on Election and Campaigns at national office, agreed with the latter group. Mbalula, who had travelled to NMB to resolve the impasse, dismissed the protestors argument that their objection warranted a deviation from the customary practice of putting up posters of ward candidates. He was decisive and firm. Posters showing Nqabakazi Zuma’s face were finally put up on 22 July 2016. That was hardly two weeks before the local elections, on 4 August 2016. How the ANC leadership dealt with the fracas in Ward 22 was telling of the schism amongst them. Provincial leaders and deployees to the metro had mollycoddled the protestors when in fact their complaint was invalid. In doing so, they defied the decision of the interim regional leaders, who had concluded that the selection process was legitimate. Thobile Mhlahlo, a member of the interim leadership and one who oversaw the nomination process in Ward 22, was unyielding in his decision that the process was legitimate. Conversely, Andile Lungisa, a PEC deployee,81 was indecisive to the point of accommodating the protestors’ grievance. He seemed careful not to alienate them. This was because Lungisa was not only an ANC candidate, but also had an interest in being elected chairperson of the region. He was a broker with a bias to resolve disputes in a manner that boosted his leadership ambitions. Unlike Lungisa, Mbalula had no immediate interest in the dispute. That is why he was able to resolve it objectively. Effectively, the ANC began campaigning only two weeks before the elections. For most of the seven months leading up to the 4 August local elections, the party’s image was marred by in-fighting which manifested publicly in violent protests and physical fights amongst members. The party had hardly improved its image as it headed into the 2016 local elections. Factional fights from 2008 had cost the party dearly at the polls in 2011. Beset with similar problems in 2016, the party seemed set for an equally dismal performance in the looming elections.

80 Xate, interview, 2 May 2016. 81 Lungisa was a member of the PEC, and members of this body are assigned to regions to assist a regional committee in such tasks as, for example, preparing for a regional conference. Lungisa was assigned to the NMB to assist the Regional Task Team, especially after it was reconstituted to replace a number of members that had become inactive following their appointment in January 2015. See ANC, NMB Region, Organisation Report, 5th Regional Conference, 10–12 March 2017.

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8 Latshon’ ilang’ emini – Sunset at midday1

It was only after the mayhem had died down that the ANC was able to commence a full campaign. The party had only two weeks, a disadvantage that was made worse by the preceding, unflattering scenes of a party at war with itself. This meant that the party’s campaign would not only tout its achievements under Danny Jordaan, but also needed to fight against public memory of an inwardly focused party consumed by individual interests to the point of using violence. Communication and visibility were of the essence in the two weeks that the party had to campaign. Their major asset was Jordaan and the changes he had made since his appointment. The impact of the campaign depended on his playing a central role. What followed in the next weeks, however, was an uneven campaign. Jordaan’s candidature led to new innovations in how the party branded itself. Overall, however, the campaign smacked more of self-sabotage than self-promotion. The peace that seemed to have set in, enabling a fully-fledged campaign, turned out to be a mirage. Internecine battles persisted. They were undeclared and clandestine, but purposeful in their intent. Their aim was to marginalise Jordaan from the campaign in order to deny him credit should the party win. Without Jordaan credited for the victory, a space would then open up for his

1

This is a Xhosa phrase referring to the occurrence of something once thought impossible. In this particular case, I have borrowed it from the title of a book written by Govan Mbeki. Part of this chapter also draws from a journal article I co-wrote earlier: M. Ndletyana and T. Nomarwayi, ‘ANC’s Loss of the Jewel – Nelson Mandela Bay’, Journal of Public Administration 51:36 (2016), pp. 573–595.

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detractors to propose his removal, bringing an end to his reform agenda that entailed weeding out corruption. In addition to internal party woes, the ANC was confronted with a surgent opposition. The political landscape had changed dramatically from what it was pre-2006 when the ANC seemed invincible. Going into the 2016 election, the leading opposition party, based on 2014 election results, was behind the incumbent by a slim nine percentage points. This was not only a remarkable rise, but also presented the real possibility of the opposition taking power. The demographic profile of the metro, together with the racially defined voting patterns in the previous elections, had made an opposition takeover seem unlikely. This seeming oddity is worth probing. Previous chapters contain marginal references to the opposition, which do not quite account for how it came to be a serious contender for office. What is especially important about the rise of the opposition is that a predominantly white party, whose rising support did not include a notable proportion of the numerous African voters, led it. Its surge owed to the maladministration and splits within the governing party. This led to constrasting levels of turnout by the traditional supporters of each party and loss of support for other parties, old and new. This chapter, therefore, deals with four factors. It starts by providing a background to the rise of the opposition. An examination of the ANC’s election campaign follows. Thereafter, the chapter provides a breakdown of the 2016 election results. The purpose here is not only to map out the distribution of results, but also to explain how the ANC lost its majority, leading to the DA emerging as the largest party in the metro. Attention is then drawn to the reaction of the ANC, both in the region and at national level, to the loss of their historical stronghold. Their state of denial betrayed an ingrained sense of entitlement to political control, prompting them to launch a spurious challenge to the integrity of the electoral outcome and an attack on an IEC commissioner.

THE RISE OF THE OPPOSITION: AN ELECTORAL THREAT Political liberalisation in 1990 saw the rise of a dynamic party system in the NMB. Parties that had been banned, previously known as extra-parliamentary parties, re-established themselves. Former statutory parties that had participated in the Tricameral Parliament either adapted or fused with others as they sought to become relevant in the new age of non-racial electoral politics. Parties that had never been present in PE also established themselves and new ones arose, some spurred by ructions within existing parties. They all experienced different fortunes as the post-apartheid political landscape unfolded. Whilst most dimished in significance, one rose within the space of 20 years to pose a serious challenge 232

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to the hitherto hegemonic ANC for control of the metro. Its rise owed less to electoral expansion than to the degeneration of both the municipality and the governing party itself, which, remarkably, persisted in wayward behaviour in the lead up to the 2016 election despite overwhelming evidence that misconduct cost it electorally. The varying performance of opposition parties was a combination of many factors, including their histories, identity and age. Some were historically whites-only parties that had either been part of the apartheid government or were an opposition in the Tricameral Parliament. Their histories of oppression and exclusion became an obstacle they needed to overcome in order to become competitive in a non-racial political dispensation. Though pre-dating 1990, others had to rebuild themselves internally owing to years of banishment. Their success at rebuilding depended on the availability of organisational infrastructure, the calibre of leaders and the resonance of the memory they had built over the period of banishment. New parties also emerged in the subsequent years, spurred by dynamics that gripped some of the existing parties. The specific circumstances each party faced determined how it fared as the non-racial political order unfolded. A difficult start that led to obscurity: The Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian People’s Organisation Among the extra-parliamentary parties that rebuilt themselves in PE after their unbanning in 1990 were the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo). Proponents of African nationalism, both these organisations were part of the broader liberation movement, but distinguished by their Afrocentricity and accent on black identity and personality. The PAC was formed in 1959 following a split from the ANC over differences on the definition of citizenship and who among the races had the right to ownership of land. Its founding president, namely Mangaliso Sobukwe, had risen through the ranks of the ANC Youth League, which embraced an exclusivist strand of African nationalism that was different from its mother-body.2 The PAC’s banishment in April 1960, just 11 months after formation, virtually cut it off from an internal base. The organisation was largely confined to exile, where, as one senior leader of the PAC Richard Sizani put it in 1996, ‘it

2

T. Plaatjie, ‘The PAC’s Internal Underground Activities, 1960-1980’ in SADET Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 2006), pp. 677–678.

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was always involved in internal struggles and wranglings’.3 This meant that the organisation was never able to cohere as a political party with a clear hierarchy of leadership, organisational culture and discipline. Rather, Sizani added, ‘It became militarised and became a military sect of some sort and therefore marginalised itself from the political processes because at that particular time everyone was a soldier focused on the armed struggle and fighting to recover land.’ Unstable in its leadership and unable to cohere as an organisation, it followed that the PAC would make little effort to cultivate or link up with mass-based movements either among workers or youth. The few internal organisations that the party’s underground structures were able to form, the Young African Christian Movement (YACM) and the National African Congress of Trade Unions (Nactu), never managed to become a significant factor in the labour struggles and student politics during the heyday of mass uprisings from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. One of the reasons for this relative absence of PAC affiliates during this period was that the party’s internal leaders, about 18 of them, including Zephania Mothopeng, were arrested and sentenced in 1979, in what was known as the Bethal Treason Trial, to lengthy terms in prison.4 Without an internal organisational base of note, the PAC was placed at an even greater disadvantage in its rebuilding efforts from 1990 onwards. It had neither an organisational infrastructure to build upon nor experienced leaders to recruit members and rebuild the organisation. Nor was the party predisposed to mass politics. Whereas Benny Alexander, the party’s secretary-general, was claiming to be spearheading the effort to rebuild branches,5 the party was in fact largely still stuck in a military mode. They continued with the armed struggle under their rallying cry, ‘One settler, one bullet’, as if nothing had changed. This put the party at odds with the general mood of negotiations to resolve the country’s political impasse. Its national leader, Clarence Makwetu, lacked the national stature and charisma to persuade the general public of the necessity to continue with the armed struggle.

3 4 5

Padraig O’Malley, interview with Richard Sizani, 17 April 1996. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005, https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php. Plaatjie, ‘The PAC’s Internal Underground Activities’. Padraig O’Malley, interview with Benny Alexander, 23 July 1993. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005.

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Inevitably, the efforts to rebuild the PAC in PE were severely hampered. Moki Cekisane,6 a household name in PE and a close associate of the late Steve Biko, explains that the PAC never developed a culture of mass-based politics or of building organisational structures: Sobukwe was into ideas. He used to say it’s better to die for an idea that will live forever, than for an idea that will die. So we focused more on spreading the idea of Pan Africanism. We had just one branch here in New Brighton. Even that one was not really big.

The efforts put into building a membership base were limited by the party’s radicalism and lack of iconic figures. ‘Many in the PAC,’ complained Cekisane, ‘did not like white people and would shout “one settler, one bullet”. This put off a lot of people. It made the PAC look too militant.’ This was exarcebated by the paucity of figures who would attract people and around whom the organisation could be built. ‘The only PAC elder we knew here,’ says Cekisane, ‘was Gqobose. But, he was not like Mbeki and Mhlaba. We used to go see Mbeki and Mhlaba. They were inspirational leaders, who were loved by the people. That’s why lots of people joined the ANC, because of them.’7 Election results reflected the party’s inadequate attempts at rebuilding. The inaugural national election in 1994 gave the first indication of the party’s obscurity. Out of the total of 416 814 votes cast in PE, the PAC got a paltry 4 198. The gloomy verdict was reconfirmed in the local election the following year. An early sign of a repeat poor performance was that the party contested only 3 of the 17 exclusively African wards in PE – Ward 18, which combined Walmer township and New Brighton; Ward 22, made of portions of KwaZakhele township; and Ward 25 in Zwide and KwaZakhele. The party’s candidates, Moki Cekisane, Abigail Siwisa and June Johnson lost the wards to an ANC candidate, an independent and an ANC candidate by 536 to 1 409 votes, 262 to 1 607, and 26 to

6

7

Cekisane joined the PAC in 1963 at the instigation of his English teacher and founding member of the PAC, Dennis Siwisa. This earned him, together with six other colleagues, a detention spell of nine months for being a member of a banned organisation. Although a PAC member, Cekisane went on to become a founding member of the Black People’s Convention (BPC). The Black Consciosuness Movement (BCM), of which the BPC was an affiliate for the general populace, was not a political party, but a cultural movement, whose objective was also to unite the ANC and the PAC. The BCM, according to Cekisane, saw the existence of multiple organisations as a weakness that divided the liberation struggle. It not only aimed to unite them, but expressed itself against forming yet another liberation movement. Interview with Moki Cekisane, 4 June 2019. Cekisane, interview, 4 June 2019.

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7 561 respectively. The losses were severe, denying the party a seat in the first democratically elected Port Elizabeth City Council. From a dismal start, the PAC never recovered. Its national conference in Bloemfontein in 1995 was chaotic. The only worthwhile thing that the conference was able to achieve, according to Sizani, was to have a convention to ‘discuss the issue of here is this thing we call the PAC, what should we do about it? Should we disband? Should we have it reconstituted and in what form?’8 Just as the PAC made its debut into competitive electoral politics, it was already contemplating whether or not it should still exist. It never folded, but has simply gone on limping. It became marred largely by lacklustre leadership, in-fighting and splits. All these inhibited the improvement of the party’s electoral fortunes from its measly debut performance. It did not help the PAC that it targeted the same constituency as the incumbent, which similarly prioritised addressing the plight of the black electorate, just as the Africanist party sought to. This further neutralised the attraction of black voters to the PAC. The party has since experienced a steady decline in support from the NMB electorate, who gave it 1.15% in the 2000 local election, from which it dropped to 0.76% in 2006 and 0.52% in 2011.9 Azapo suffered the same fate as the PAC for similar reasons. An offshoot of the Black Consciousness Movement, Azapo was formed in 1978 and limited its membership to black people, defined as African, coloured and Indian people. Unlike its predecessor that operated more as a cultural movement aimed at inspiring a political uprising and embraced existing liberation movements, Azapo assumed a distinct political identity as a socialist party. As had happened to other liberation movements, Azapo leaders were imprisoned and the party was soon banned. This led to some of its leaders going into exile, where the movement also formed an armed wing, the Azanian National Liberation Army (Azanla). As in the case of the PAC, Azapo was never able to reproduce itself into a mass-based movement through affiliates, in the 1980s. Azapo resurfaced upon unbanning to re-establish itself. Unlike other liberation movements, however, it did not participate in the inaugural national and local elections. Azapo disapproved of the manner in which the negotiations were carried out. Amongst the party’s demands were that the NP government should disband and be replaced by an international authority; that a representative body, named the Constituent Assembly, be established to write up the constitution, instead of having an interim constitution written by unelected party repre8 9

Padraig O’Malley, interview with Richard Sizani. Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za.

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sentatives; and that negotiations be facilitated by a neutral body. Azapo accused the NP of using its control over government to weaken rivals, especially through violence, and complained that unelected party representatives were agreeing to constitutional stipulations that would limit what an elected government would do. Chief amongst these pre-election agreements that Azapo rejected was a government of national unity, the protection of private property and job protection for white civil servants. Both the terrain and the pre-election arrangements, according to Azapo, disadvantaged other parties’ ability to campaign effectively and limited the ability of the post-apartheid government to embark on a redistributive project.10 Whilst it shunned the founding elections, Azapo nonetheless remained involved in organisational rebuilding through a programme dubbed ‘Village to Village, Township to Township’. Speaking on 7 August 1992, Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, the Azapo president, explained: Our strategy was more of organising our communities to understand what CODESA [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] is. It’s a programme geared at us having to visit every village of this country through our structures and setting up structures in every village of people who will be no less than five … What we are trying to do is that we think that very soon those who have resources are going to call for some kind of election and Azapo, because of its own standpoint, will not be given the resources … These people will know exactly what Azapo is preparing for so that those who have resources want to go to village A to do their campaigning they will find Azapo there.11

Because Azapo shunned the initial elections, the effectiveness of its rebuilding programme was never tested. The party nonetheless remained confident that it would do well, getting more than 10%, once it decided to take part in the electoral process, which it did in the 1999 national elections. Although the party still disapproved of the constitutional framework, especially the issue of protection of private property, it found the political terrain amenable to a competitive electoral process. Violence was no longer a prohibitive factor. Even more encouraging for the party was that the coming election would be less about liberation, and more

10 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, 26 August 1991. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005. 11 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, 7 August 1991. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005.

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about an evaluation of the incumbent. Azapo believed the ANC-led government would not meet the electoral promises made in the previous election. Azapo, according to Nefolovhodwe, would then take advantage of popular disappointment with the ANC: Azapo in reality we can go to parliament but we are gaining nothing by being in parliament and in fact we gain more by being outside parliament in order that we can point our people that where are these things? We told you that that is not a better system for you.12

Electoral returns of the 1999 national election defied Azapo’s expectations. The party fared dismally at 0.2% – far less than the 10% it had predicted. Speaking with a bird’s-eye view from the national office, Nefolovhodwe blamed the dismal performance on miscalculation and inexperience. The sympathy Azapo thought it enjoyed from the African electorate ‘does not necessarily translate into a vote’. Their boycott of the initial elections, which they thought would translate into an advantage, actually denied them of valuable experience in contesting elections. Nefholovodwe elaborated: We ourselves were new in a terrain that others understood best because they were in elections before us. We found that [with] the kind of knowledge we had about the nitty-gritty of how to go about getting the electorate, we had underestimated even the question that resources matter … we have come to the conclusion that elections are a different terrain of practicalities.13

Understandably, the results of the 1999 election were dispiriting. In Port Elizabeth, Azapo did not contest the 2000 local election. When it did finally make its debut in the local election of 2006, it secured a forgettable 0.35% and dropped further down to 0.25% in the 2011 elections. Nelvis Qekema, former president of the university-based Azanian Student Congress (Azasco), ascribed his party’s electoral failures to its inability to rebrand itself after 1990 and to its paucity of leaders. In the mid- to late-1980s, the party became associated with a notorious figure, Reverend Mzwandile Maqhina, who had masqueraded as an activist, but turned out to be a police informer implicated in a number of killings of freedom fighters. This created the misleading impression that Azapo was also used by the

12 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, 16 November 1994; see also interview, 30 September 1996. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005. 13 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, 22 September 1999. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005.

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police against members of the Mass Democratic Movement. The organisation battled to shake off the stigma, only managing to build a notable presence at schools and universities in the late 1980s to early 1990s. The party never really managed to spread its support-base outside educational institutions to the broader community. What compounded Azapo’s difficulty to rebuild, added Qekema, was that a number of their respected senior local leaders in PE, including Nguna Ngcobo and Mbuzeli Dukumbana, fell victim to alcohol abuse. This robbed the party of experienced and respected local leaders to lead its revival.14 Resistance swept aside by a wave of democratisation: Conservative Party, Freedom Front and Inkatha Freedom Party Not everyone was jubilant at the prospects of a new political order underpinned by equality and inclusiveness. Others preferred to retain the privileges conferred upon them by racial discrimination and the homeland system. The Conservative Party (CP) refused to be part of a united, non-racial South Africa, demanding self-determination for Afrikaners instead. They lambasted FW de Klerk’s NP for betraying the Afrikaner people, negotiating without their mandate. So determined was the CP to resist change that they even consorted with the right-wing military movement, the AWB, which was willing to employ arms. Together with a number of right-wing groupings and retired army generals, the resistant groupings formed themselves into a united front, the Afrikaner Volksfront, to campaign for a volkstaat (Afrikaner people’s state). To this end, they even formed a military wing, the Boer People’s Army, made up of retired soldiers, farmers and reservists.15 Part of the plan was to assassinate leading members of the ANC. They succeeded in one instance, gunning down Chris Hani in April 1993, for which CP members were arrested. The idea of a full-blown armed confrontation with the security forces, however, was deflated by the public killings of AWB members who had invaded Mafikeng to defend Lucas Mangope’s homeland administration. The executions convinced Constand Viljoen, a retired general who had been elected leader of the Volksfront, of the folly of armed resistance. Rather than resulting in a successful ‘Third Boer War’, the insurgency, Viljoen realised, was most likely to result in a racial bloodbath. Viljoen steered the Volksfront towards negotiations with the ANC, which promised to look into the possibility of a volkstaat, especially if election results showed a significant support for the idea. In return, Viljoen lured some segments of the rightwing into the inaugural election through a new party, the Freedom Front (FF).

14 Interviews with Nelvis Qekema, 28 May 2019 and 12 June 2019. 15 A. Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (New York, Hill and Wang, 1995).

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A menacing spectre nationally, the right-wing movement was an insignificant factor in PE. An overwhelming proportion of voters (74.5%) who had participated in the whites-only referendum of March 1992 voted in favour of a negotiated transition.16 The CP had only one lonesome councillor in the PE City Council by the time it was dissolved in May 1994, and did not participate in the 1994 national elections. As for the newly formed FF, of the total 416 814 votes cast in PE, it could secure only a measly 6 000 votes. Having boycotted the inaugural elections, the CP joined its bedfellow, the FF, to contest the 1995 local elections. Contesting only one ward each, their electoral fortunes did not improve. The CP managed 1 314 votes in its stronghold of Algoa Park (Ward 11) against the NP’s 2 326 votes, and the FF received 473 against the NP’s 3 246 in Ward 8, which combined Newton Park, Cotswold and Parsons Hill. Neither got a seat in the newly integrated PE City Council and remained outside throughout the subsequent elections. An ethno-nationalist movement, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) made a surprise entry into the local contests in PE. It did not fare any better than its conservative counterparts. The party was similarly resistant to a unitary state, insisting on a federal state in which KwaZulu would constitute itself into an independent kingdom. Together with Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and the Conservative Party, Gatsha Buthelezi’s IFP formed itself into a separate grouping, dubbed the Concerned South Africans Group. Buthelezi’s resistance crumbled following the ousting of Bophuthatswana’s Lucas Mangope and raiding of the militia force that was trained in KwaZulu. The IFP agreed to join the elections ostensibly on the promise that their demand for a federal state would still receive consideration after the elections. Leading the party into the 1995 local elections in PE were, amongst others, coloured leaders who had defected from the NP. These included Richard Swanepoel and Charles Julies who vowed to make the northern areas a base for the IFP, where it eventually fielded most candidates. The party performed miserably, with its candidates getting between 26 and 106 votes in each of the six wards it contested. Marginal actors from the onset, the right-wing parties would remain on the margins of PE’s political scene throughout the subsequent years. Re-alignment, fusion and co-operation: Labour Party, National Party, United Democratic Movement and Democratic Party Whilst for some it took election results to make them irrelevant, others were rendered immaterial simply by the onset of the political transition. Allan Hendrickse’s Labour Party (LP), for one, melted away even before the inaugural

16 Evening Post, ‘PE Yes’, 18 March 1992.

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elections. Previously part of the Tricameral Parliament, in the House of Representatives claiming to represent coloured people, the LP proved controversial within the coloured communities. Most dismissed the LP as a stooge that legitimised apartheid. Members of the management committee in the PE Council who were LP members came under violent attack in 1990, in the midst of an uprising in the predominantly coloured northern areas. The attacks against LP members of the management committee affirmed their notoriety amongst the people they supposedly represented. This threw into doubt their viability in an open, competitive electoral process. As a result LP leaders, because they had become career politicians, began to forsake their party for those they thought guaranteed their livelihoods. Some went to the NP. The LP itself formed a pact with the ANC that saw it joining a Patriotic Front. By the onset of the 1994 elections, the LP had ceased to be a feature in the coloured communities of PE, with some of its leaders now on the ANC list for Parliament, including its leader, Allan Hendrickse. Absorbing the LP, however, did not boost the ANC’s fortunes in the northern areas. As noted earlier, the NP emerged as the largest party amongst coloured voters in the 1995 elections. In a country that had been plagued by decades of racial polarisation, the NP had managed to endear itself to coloured communities on account of a common language, and exploited their fears that the ANC’s policy of racial redress would privilege Africans over them. Whilst successful in making the NP the largest opposition in the PE City Council and the most popular political party amongst coloureds in PE, the strategy limited the party’s growth prospects. It simply affirmed its identity as a defender of racial segregation and privileges, which alienated the party from the more numerous African electorate. For an ambitious party that wanted to remain a vibrant opposition, the NP resolved to re-make itself into something new. Views were divided on the strategy. Roelf Meyer, the NP’s secretary-general and its leading negotiator in the early 1990s, proposed that the party ‘get more and more black support … it should be clear from everybody that the black person can become [the] next leader of the National Party’.17 Tertius Delport, a senior NP leader who succeeded Meyer as the party’s chief negotiator, countered that mass recruitment of Africans would turn the NP into a ‘tame ANC’, which would be ‘suicide’ for the party:

17 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Roelf Meyer, 15 May 1996. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005.

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Let’s make no bones about it, even the National Party guys, black guys in our party, they are socialists. Then we will not be the Nationalist Party or Christian Democratic or whatever, we will not be a centre right or even a centrist party. We will move centre left, fairly extensively to the left if blacks should come in such numbers that they materially start to influence the policy.18

The NP decided on neither approach. It opted for a middle path and adopted a new name, the New National Party (NNP). This meant adopting a policy regime that appealed across the racial spectrum. An example of this was their appreciation of the need for racial redress, whilst also cautioning against ‘racial discrimination’. This created an air of uncertainty about the new NNP. Delport left the NNP to join the DP, whilst Meyer formed a new party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), together with Bantu Holomisa, who had been expelled by the ANC. A former leader of the Transkei homeland, Holomisa was amongst the most popular leaders of the ANC. He was expelled for defying the party’s instruction not to testify to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission about Stella Sigcau’s corruption, since she was now a cabinet minister in the ANC-dominated government.19 Under Tony Leon’s leadership, the DP was transforming into Delport’s ideal party. A liberal party confined largely to English-speaking whites, the DP had performed miserably, getting 1.3% under Zach de Beer in the inaugural elections. In order to improve its support, Leon redefined the party’s identity to appeal to a broad spectrum of the white community and everyone else threatened by the new dispensation. The DP became a strong defender of white interests as it fought the 1999 elections under the slogan, ‘Fight Back’. This effectively positioned the DP against the ANC’s policy of racial redress, slamming it as ‘reverse racism’. According to Meyer, the DP became no different to the CP, with a ‘strong white supremacist type of background’.20 Leon’s redefinition of the DP into a hardline white party paid dividends. It surpassed the NP in the 1999 election as the official opposition in Parliament. With the NP on the decline, the DP proposed a merger. It hoped to capitalise on the fears of some NP councillors that they would not be re-elected in the 18 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Tertius Delport, 9 May 1996. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005. 19 M. Ndletyana, ‘The United Democratic Movement: A Critical Assessment’, Politikon 26:2 (1999), pp.179–188; R. Southall, ‘The Struggle for a Place Called Home: The ANC versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape’, Politikon 26:2 (1999), pp. 155–166. 20 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Roelf Meyer, 23 June 1998. See The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005.

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2000 local elections. This saw the parties co-operating in the 2000 elections, under the banner of a new party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), with the view to merge completely in time for the 2004 elections.21 The result was an ascendant DA emerging after the 2000 elections with 28.5% in the newly formed Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality. Meyer’s newly formed UDM did not fare as well as the revamped DP. White and coloured voters opted for the hardline DA and African voters remained with the ANC. The DA offered white and coloured voters protection against ANC’s ‘reverse racism’, whilst UDM’s policy regime was not entirely distinct from the ANC. Its policy offering of, for example, non-racialism and a mixed economy were no different from the ANC’s. Nor was the party able to attract any of the local notables to attract mass support. The task of building the party in 1997 had fallen, among others, on the shoulders of an unknown student at Vista University and a native of Addo, Mongameli Bobani. As a result, the party could only secure a mere 2.16% in its debut local election of 2000. The subsequent two local elections, in 2006 and 2011, would see the party’s support declining to 0.88% and 0.55%. Splits, consolidation and surge: Independent Democrats, Congress of the People, Economic Freedom Fighters and Democratic Alliance If the first ten years were marked by realignment among the former statutory bodies, in the subsequent years it became the turn of the former non-statutory bodies. Both the PAC and the ANC saw splits and defections. The initial threat posed by the splinter group that formed the Congress of the People (Cope) in 2008, as indicated earlier by the 17% it got in the 2009 election, quickly evaporated in the 2011 election when it got a measly 4%. Local notables that had spearheaded Cope’s formation at the NMB, including Mike Xego, Khusta Jack, Mthwabo Ndube and Gege Mbikanye, had either returned to the ANC or became inactive in the party. Cope had floundered in the face of power struggles that plagued it even before its 2009 electoral debut. Both the PAC and Azapo also experienced their own share of splits. Theirs, however, were inconsequential for the balance of power in the politics of the NMB. Rather, it was the departure of one PAC leader, Patricia de Lille, and subsequent formation of the Independent Democrats (ID) that made a mark in the region. De Lille’s dynamism in Parliament, where she exposed government corruption, had earned her national prominence, upon which she built the ID.

21 T. Leon, On the Contrary: Leading the Opposition in a Democratic South Africa (Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008); C. van der Westhuizen, White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2007).

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The party focused largely on the coloured communities, where she received instant admiration on account of common language and race. In its electoral debut of 2006, the ID received a non-threatening 2.51%. This was an inconvenience for the DA, which sought to consolidate the opposition under its banner in order to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent. The DA managed to persuade the ID into disbanding and joining it, an arrangement that saw De Lille becoming DA’s mayor of Cape Town in 2011.22 Nor did the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), formed in 2013, pose a notable threat to the incumbent as it headed to the 2016 elections. The party got 4.3% in its electoral debut in 2014. Beyond the national elections, the EFF did not make much effort to build the party locally or to participate in by-elections. For instance, the EFF did not participate in the 2015 by-elections at Veeplaas and KwaMagxaki in Ward 30. It cited lack of funds as the major impediment to its participation.23 Of all opposition parties, the one party that posed a major threat to the incumbent was the DA. The difference between the DA and the incumbent had dwindled over the years, down to 9% by the close of 2014, that is, 40% and 49% respectively. This showed that the ANC might not get majority support in the impending local elections. Particularly noteworthy about the DA’s rise was that it was not boosted by growth into the populous African townships, but by an uneven electoral turnout, notably from 2011. The party’s racially tainted image, which Tony Leon’s tenure magnified, made it vulnerable to attacks as reactionary and thus unattractive to African voters. Leon admitted as much in his own autobiography.24 To overcome the impediment, Ryan Coetzee, a DA strategist, advised in 2007 that Leon step down in favour of a leader who would have trans-racial appeal. The choice was between Helen Zille, Athol Trollip and Joe Seremane – a Western Cape leader, an Eastern Cape leader and the federal chairperson. Each held a different appeal for the black electorate. Zille had a background in journalism as a progressive who covered police brutality and even broke the story of how Steve Biko was murdered. She was reasonably well known within political circles in the township, especially in Cape Town, and spoke a bit of Xhosa. Trollip lacked Zille’s political credentials within the anti-apartheid circles, but spoke fluent Xhosa owing to his upbringing on a farm. This made him easily relatable to Africans. Seremane just did not have a constituency. The DA chose Zille, a decision

22 H. Zille, Not Without a Fight (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016). 23 Ndletyana and Nomarwayi, ‘ANC’s Loss of the Jewel’. 24 Leon, On the Contrary.

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that was also motivated by the need to retain the party’s support base in the Western Cape.25 Zille’s mandate was to grow the DA amongst African voters. Her strategy centred on diversifying the racial composition of the DA leadership, especially those that were the face of the party. She appointed Lindiwe Mazibuko as national spokesperson, and later successfully backed her against a senior leader, Athol Trollip, for the position of parliamentary leader. Mmusi Maimane took over from Mazibuko as national spokesperson. Zille became the first DA leader who frequently campaigned in the townships, especially during the 2011 local elections, and did the toyi-toyi dance. The party’s mayoral candidate in the 2011 elections, Leon de Villiers, however, was not as comfortable as Zille campaigning in the townships. That changed with the nomination of Athol Trollip as the party’s mayoral candidate for the 2016 elections. Chosen over other candidates, such as Annet Lovemore and De Villiers, Trollip’s selection was aimed at appealing to African voters because of his biography. Trollip’s fluency in the local language gave him a sense of familiarity among locals and a ready audience. One ANC branch leader, Government Zini, even found Trollip’s language skills endearing. Chairperson of Motherwell’s Alex Matikinca Veterans League Cluster, Zini, noted in his letter to The Herald on 19 September 2015, ‘I have seen him in the newspapers and on television and his command of this IsiXhosa language is impressive and certainly admired by many, indeed. For that I like and respect him.’ In his foray into the townships Trollip was assisted by an able activist and organiser, Nqaba Bhanga. A former youth leader, Bhanga was a household name in the metro’s political circles. He had risen up the ranks of youth activism from Cosas at high school, to Sasco and to the ANC Youth League. He was part of the splinter group that left the ANC in 2008 to form Cope, and later became the party’s representative in the provincial legislature. After joining the DA in 2014, Bhanga set up the first constituency office for the party in the township, along the busy Njoli Road in KwaZakhele.26 Bhanga’s recruitment marked a change in the kind of African activists the party targeted. Trollip earmarked young activists with proven skills to mobilise, support and run organisations. The DA’s student wing, the Democratic Alliance Students Organisation (Daso) had done tremendously well at the local Nelson Mandela University, since around 2010. Nelson Mandela University had been an unchallenged stronghold of the ANC-aligned Sasco, but since 2010 the Student 25 Leon, On the Contrary. 26 Polity, ‘Nqaba Bhanga Joins the DA – Athol Trollip’. Accessed 5 February 2017, https://www. politicsweb.co.za/party/nqaba-bhanga-joins-the-da--athol-trollip.

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Representative Council office has been alternating between Sasco and Daso. Some of the student activists who grew the party at the university – Baxolile Nodada, Kabelo Mokgatosi, Sam Beynon and Ondela Kepe – were included on the party’s candidate list for the 2016 elections. Despite attempts at racial transformation, however, the DA had multiple incidents involving white leaders making disparaging racist remarks, as if to disprove the party’s official claims that it was non-racial. One of them was particularly instructive in the instance of the NMB. In June 2013, Stanford Slabbert, a councillor for Ward 1, circulated a racist article via email to 14 DA colleagues in the caucus. The racist article, Slabbert noted in the email he re-sent to his colleagues, was initially ‘rejected by the Metro server’. That did not alert Slabbert that there could be something disparaging about the email. Instead, he by-passed the metro server and ‘forwarded the article to all who have non-metro addresses’. He was determined that they read it. Written by Neville Lobb on 3 June 2013, the article read: After 19 years of ANC rule, the country has achieved the dubious distinction of being 140th on a world list of 144 countries in education, and this from the country that gave the world Dr. Barnard and various other leaders in their respective field!! All we now produce are dumb idiots who wait for handouts! 25% of all South African school girls are HIV+ that is by no means an easy target to achieve!! Yay!! For our lack of moral fortitude!! We have out-fornicated everyone in the world and spread more disease than any other country! Our school-girls had 100 000 abortions last year and those are only the legal ones!! Go school girls!! And go coat hanger ‘doctors’ – you make us so proud to be South African!! Keep voting them into power! You don’t get dumber than that!! Well done people – in this category you are unbeatable.

Knight Mali, a DA councillor, was outraged by the racist article. In his email response to Slabbert on 8 June 2013, Mali fumed, pointing out what should have been obvious to his colleague: This is the biggest load of rolled-up bigotry and stereotypical and racist rant I’ve ever read. It is distasteful, insensitive and very offensive to say the least. With divisive racial undertones of ‘US’ and ‘THEM’ mentality which should have no place in the DA nor in our country.

Mali went on to remind Slabbert that such emails complicate efforts to improve the DA’s unflattering image amongst blacks. They even make it easier for critics,

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Mali continued, to dismiss black leaders of the DA as tokens to mask the party’s racial prejudice. He wrote: I often have to defend accusations on the radio and local TV stations about the perceived racial image of the DA. Such emails do not help our cause. In fact they make my work and many of our colleagues very difficult. The insults and labels we receive regularly as black DA supporters, stick like glue when these emails find the attention of the public out there.

It is noteworthy that, of all the recipients of the email, only Mali, a black leader, seems to have objected to the racist diatribe. There were no reports of other leaders, especially white councillors, being similarly outraged. Moreover, only after the email made headlines in the local newspaper, The Herald, did provincial leadership, under Trollip, initiate an investigation to determine if it warranted disciplinary measures. On 13 August 2013, the provincial leadership concluded that Slabbert’s action was sufficiently grave to warrant serious censure. He had violated the constitution and, as such, ‘brought the name of the party into disrepute and did not reflect it as being a non-racial party for all voters who subscribe to its principles and values’.27 It terminated his membership, which also meant that he was no longer a councillor. Slabbert considered the verdict unfair and appealed to the Federal Council, the party’s national leadership. The appeal failed, as national leaders upheld the initial verdict. Slabbert did not accept the Federal Council’s verdict. He felt treated unfairly and victimised. In his public statement, issued on 26 November 2013, Slabbert complained that he was portrayed ‘in the media as a racist. This is something I have never been and will never be’. The image of him as a racist was unfounded, because he had simply ‘forwarded the email in question at the request of a constituent’ and ‘distanced myself from the email prior to The Herald article exposing the story’. What added to Slabbert’s grievance was that others in the party had made racist remarks, but escaped punishment: It is further of great concern to me that the DA turns a blind eye to others within the part[y] who have made crude comments on Facebook about our opposition party leaders, made disparaging and frankly racist comments to opposition party members in the provincial legislature and have made derogatory comments to individuals, and in doing so, have been insulting to

27 Mail & Guardian, ‘DA Councillor Expelled over Racist Email’, 14 August 2013.

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entire sections of the population. Several even had the same email posted on their Facebook pages, with no action taken against them.

Derogatory comments, according to Slabbert, were commonplace in the DA, and had never been punishable. The only reason he was singled out for punishment, Slabbert believed, was because the remarks were leaked outside of the circle. He considered the leakage a misconduct similarly deserving of punishment: What disturbs me is that the DA is fully aware of the fact that my fellow councillor Knight Mali, had taken upon himself to send the email to members outside the Caucus. Cllr Mali was never questioned as to who these people were, nor was any attempt made to find out whether they had sent the email to the media. It is therefore clear that someone had taken the email in question and sent it to the media with the express purpose of harming the DA’s image. It appears, however, that the DA is happy to have whoever this is, remain in its ranks.28

Slabbert’s comments exposed the dilemma that still faced the DA. A change of image did not necessarily make it non-racial. The party still had a substantial number of members and leaders that harboured racial prejudice, their proportion having grown substantially under Leon’s leadership. Such a racial outburst pointed to a potential limitation in the party’s endeavours to grow its support in the African townships. The party’s popularity amongst whites and coloured voters, however, remained unchallenged. Not only did the DA remain dominant in these two constituencies, their supporters also became more enthusiastic to vote than those of the ANC. The first sign of this uneven enthusiasm, as noted earlier, manifested in the 2011 elections turnout. Previously, turnout in the ANC’s strongholds was superior to that in DA strongholds. That changed in the 2011 election in which average turnout in DA strongholds jumped to the upper 60s, surpassing the ANC’s. The ANC’s maladministration, corruption and internal ructions dampened enthusiasm for electoral participation in its strongholds, whilst it made DA supporters more responsive to the party’s appeals to oust the incumbent. A repeat of similar behaviour, in the period leading towards the 2016 elections, was likely to have the same effect.

28 MyPE, ‘Stanford Slabbert on His Dismissal’, 26 November 2013.

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MAYOR JORDAAN: AN UNAPPRECIATED CATALYST Danny Jordaan was the ANC’s only electoral asset. As noted in the previous chapter, Jordaan was discernably different from his predecessors, and municipal performance improved under his leadership. He had followed through on some of the unmaterialised promises made by his predecessors and continued introducing new measures in the election year. One such measure was the formation of the metro police. The proposal was initially mooted in 2008, but none of Jordaan’s three predecessors had been able to launch the metro service over a period of almost eight years. Jordaan launched it on 13 May 2016, within his first year in office. Admittedly the service was not fully functional. It had only 12 vehicles and did not have a dedicated emergency telephone line.29 Employing Linda Mti as head of the metro police service, however, detracted somewhat from the significance of the moment. Mti was reportedly under investigation for illegally awarding a contract to a company, Bosasa, whilst serving as commissioner of correctional services some years previously. Jordaan did not deny that Mti was under investigation, but defended him, saying that he had not been convicted. The controversy that swirled around Mti was not ideal for the launch of the metro service and diluted the import of the occasion. The launch was nonetheless a notable advancement, and something to build upon.30 Jordaan also allocated more budgetary resources to social services and development, whilst maintaining financial prudence. The municipality’s credit rating, for instance, improved. It moved up the ratings by three notches on the national scale putting it on par with other credit-worthy metros. The upgrading meant the municipality could borrow to finance its infrastructure programme.31 Jordaan had suspended corrupt municipal officials and also opened tender meetings to the public. The issuing of tenders was always a subject of controversy, with a common complaint being that only companies with political connections won municipal tenders and that merit did not count. A public tendering process limited, if not completely removed, chances of manipulation. The process of evaluation and adjudication was now transparent.32 An equally noteworthy innovation in 2016 was the introduction of free wi-fi. Dubbed the ‘Innovative Broadband Project’, this telecommunication initiative offered free access to wi-fi, starting in the poor, working-class township of Walmer. Users got up to one GB, and it connected about 14 000 residents in 29 30 31 32

RNews, ‘Understanding Nelson Mandela Bay’s Metro Police Force’, 30 November 2016. News24, ‘Govt Protecting Mti – DA’, 21 June 2016. The Herald, ‘Positive Ratings Boost for Bay’, 18 May 2016. The Herald, ‘Tender Meetings Open to Public’, 20 May 2016.

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Walmer. Once they had exhausted their allocation, users were charged 24c per minute, instead of the average 85c per minute.33 The idea was to enable people who could otherwise not afford it, access to telecommunications. Besides general improvements, the 2016/2017 budget was decidedly geared towards an election campaign. From cutting down on expenditure in the previous year, the budget in the election year contained substantial allocations towards expenditure on visible and much-needed social services. Numerous sports facilities and memorial sites were earmarked for an unusually significant amount of expenditure. This involved expenditure of R200 million on predominantly coloured communities in the city’s northern areas. Fourteen thousand more households were added to the Assistance to the Poor (ATTP) programme. This increased the number of eligible households from 80 000 to 94 000. The number of recipients was set to increase even further.34 Jordaan’s performance, therefore, was notably different to his party’s. Whilst his organisation exhibited disorder and generated unflattering media headlines, Mayor Jordaan was registering progress and attracted generally positive reviews. Sangoco, as noted in the previous chapter, was pleased with Jordaan’s performance. Whilst critical of the mayor on other aspects, even the opposition’s chief whip, Retief Odendaal, had rated him positively on financial prudence, dealing with corruption, appreciation of the business community, relations with the public and general accessibility to all stakeholders.35 That said, Jordaan’s mayoralty was not invulnerable to criticism. A long-standing issue that also dogged Jordaan was housing. Shoddy work on newly constructed houses exacerbated the problem of a backlog. Prior to Jordaan’s appointment, 10 per cent of the budgetary allocation for housing had to be diverted towards repairs. In 2015, however, the policy was changed. None of the allocation from the national department could be used on housing repairs. ‘Where defects and poor workmanship are identified,’ explained the Minister of Human Settlement, Lindiwe Sisulu, ‘they remain the responsibility of the province, municipality and/or the developer to take relevant remedial action against the contractor and enforce repairs at the cost of the contractor or developer.’ The new policy meant that, instead of funds being allocated towards rectification, municipal officials had to make sure that they appointed competent contractors and monitored their work closely to make sure it was

33 The Herald, ‘Wi-Fi Rollout Starts in Metro’, 1 June 2016. 34 NMB Municipality, Danny Jordaan, State of the City Address, 9 June 2016. Accessed 15 December 2019, http://nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/NewsView.aspx?ID=2346. 35 The Herald, ‘Good, Bad and Ugly of New Term’, 14 September 2015.

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satisfactory. To this end, a new body, the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC), was set up to ensure that all contractors who undertake construction of a subsidized house are registered with the NHBRC and the requirement for registration, among others, is that they comply with all minimum norms and standards and expertise to construct a house.36

A 2016 assessment study commissioned by the national department, on a newly built settlement at Motherwell’s NU29, however, showed that the NHBRC and municipal officials were not entirely prepared for their new role. The newly constructed single- and double-storey units, the report noted, suffered from a number of defects. These included staircases without handrails; bathrooms with valves instead of taps; uneven verandah floors allowing water to collect; a basin on the side-wall built just above the toilet-seat, limited legroom, and poor wiring and tubing. Moreover, illegal inhabitants vandalised a number of other units after contractors had abandoned them before completion. The contractors were scared away by protesting residents, complaining about the delay in completing the construction. Contractors had gone beyond the original timeline because of cashflow problems that delayed construction. Officials veering off the original plan without prior approval, and the consequent need for additional funding, had caused the delay. The study blamed three municipal officials – Tony Anthony, Nokuthula Tetyana and Mvuleni Mapu – for ‘irregular and gross mismanagement’ and dereliction of duty, and blamed the NHBRC for approving sub-standard work.37 This showed that, however much Jordaan had tried, his administration was still plagued by ineptitude and willful neglect, if not downright corruption. The case of Motherwell’s NU 29 shone the spotlight on yet another housing bungle, the so-called ‘toilet-city’ at Khayamnandi. Almost seven years previously, the municipality had built toilets, preparing for a settlement of residents that were to be relocated from informal housing. They were to relocate with their shacks, whilst the municipality was building proper housing, and erecting proper toilets was a way of dealing with the bucket system. The problem, however, was that residents failed to relocate to the new settlement, leaving the toilets standing in open land. They were eventually vandalised, wasting substantive public

36 The Herald, ‘State Stops Paying for Repair of RDP Houses’, 25 May 2016. 37 Department of Human Settlement, National Intervention Programme, Project Management Unit, Motherwell NU 29 – Phase 11 Assessment Report, March 2016.

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resources. ‘Toilet-city’ was also a reminder that the city still had close to 40 000 households using buckets to relieve themselves. Whilst Jordaan could explain away corruption in housing as a bygone practice that would not happen under his mayoralty, corruption at FIFA implicated him directly. His appointment had coincided with the eruption of a bribery scandal in world football. South Africa was alleged to have paid a US$10 million bribe to Jack Warner, FIFA vice-president and president of a Caribbean-based football federation, in return for their votes to win the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Warner was arrested and charged with corruption on 27 May 2015, and Jordaan was inaugurated mayor the next day. Government interceded, saying the payment was not a bribe, but a donation to the African diaspora towards promotion of football. Government took responsibility for the payment as part of promoting relations between the continent and the diaspora.38 The DA turned the scandal into a mainstay of its attack against Jordaan. Trollip dismissed the government’s explanation as a ruse. Instead, he drew attention to Jordaan, implying that he was corrupt and could possibly face jail-time, leaving the metro without a mayor. Speculation about Jordaan being arrested grew with the resignation and dismissal of the FIFA president and general secretary, Sepp Blatter and Jerome Valcke, respectively. Jordaan reportedly steered clear of international travel to avoid arrest.39 Rather than accept the government’s explanation for the donation, the DA implicated Jordaan in the FIFA scandal in an attempt to convince the public that he was no different from Jacob Zuma, who had become synonymous with infamy. In a public letter published on 20 March 2016, Trollip wrote: When President Zuma deployed you to Nelson Mandela Bay some people thought that things would change. The people boldly said ‘give him a chance’ – only to be predictably disappointed when news broke of your involvement in the FIFA bribery scandal. Instead of change they got more of the same from the ANC: disgraceful corruption. When FIFA confirmed this week that a US$10 million bribe was paid to secure the 2010 World Cup, our Madiba Magic memories were dashed, all in the disgusting name of corruption and greed. Adding insult to injury, in a week of misery for the South African people, ANC colleagues of yours have exposed grotesque state capture at the hands of the Guptas who call the ANC friends.

38 News24, ‘Danny Jordaan hires top lawyers in FIFA corruption case’, 2 August 2016. 39 HeraldLive, ‘Danny Skips FIFA Meeting’, 26 February 2016.

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Your ANC colleagues this week stood up and told the truth. The question is: will you? … FIFA having now confirmed that this deal signed off by you was in fact a bribe, makes you responsible, by your own admission. As the Mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay, the integrity of our Metro, its government and the interests of the people, demand that you immediately lift the veil on allegations of $10 million bribe. Come clean Danny Jordaan, come out of hiding and tell us the truth! The people of Nelson Mandela have been let down by successive ANC mayors in past years, and don’t deserve to be let down again. In this year’s election, the people of Nelson Mandela Bay will make choices about what kind of Government they want, and we refuse to let corruption be an option.40

Accusing Jordaan of corruption aimed to dilute the import of his anti-corruption efforts. Apart from FIFA and the ANC scandals, the ANC’s handling of a case involving a former city manager, Mpilo Mbambisa, made Jordaan vulnerable to criticism for failing to hold an erring official accountable. After suspending Mbambisa for misconduct and promising to subject him to a disciplinary process, Jordaan eventually paid him out. Instead of facing censure, Mbambisa was given a golden handshake. This embellished what was already a contentious issue in public discourse – that the ANC had a callous approach to handling public resources. Mbambisa’s case was illustrative of the difficulty that faced Jordaan’s campaign. It was daunting to regain public confidence for the ANC city-government, whilst evidence of maladministration continued to manifest. Housing was an ubiquitous example of maladministration. However, Jordaan had decidedly changed the narrative about the municipality. Overall, the municipality had improved. Most importantly for his party, Jordaan had introduced sufficient changes for his party to flaunt, if not embellish, during their election campaign.

A CAMPAIGN OF SELF-SABOTAGE Instead of making Jordaan the mainstay of their campaign, party leaders – both regional and provincial – shunned him. They denied Jordaan visibility and

40 Polity, ‘DA: Third open letter to Danny Jordaan – Athol Trollip’, 20 March 2016. Accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.polity.org.za/article/da-third-open-letter-to-danny-jordaan-by-atholtrollip-2016-03-20.

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excluded him from campaign activities. Before elaborating on how Jordaan was shunned, it is worth pointing out first that his candidature forced a change in how the party dealt with the nomination of mayoral candidates and their role in campaigns. For the first time since 1994, the organisation announced the identity of its mayoral candidates before elections. Previously, voters in predominantly ANC municipalities would know the identity of their mayors only after the elections. This practice was premised on the belief that individual leaders do not sway voters’ behaviour. Rather, it was the brand of the party that attracted voters. By 20 March 2016, however, that belief no longer held sway and the party’s NEC changed the practice.41 Mayoral candidates were duly announced on 19 June 2016.42 The shift in the election strategy was occasioned by the recognition that individuals do matter. In fact, the change was inevitable. Jordaan’s appointment as mayor in May 2015 was an admission that the party’s brand was ineffective in some quarters. He was recruited more for his individual prominence as a soccer administrator, widely adored for bringing the soccer World Cup to South Africa in 2010, than for being an ANC member. The party sought to capitalise on Jordaan’s celebrity status. Voters knew that they were not just voting for the ANC, but for Jordaan to become mayor. This suggested that the ANC’s campaign in the metro would be built around Jordaan. At the point of deciding on the electoral strategy, however, national leaders took a different position, contrary to the expectations it had built. In a meeting with mayoral candidates, sometime in late June 2016, national leaders were opposed to having posters bearing faces of mayoral candidates. They insisted that the ANC had only one face – the face of its president. In 2016, that face was Jacob Zuma. Not having posters of mayoral candidates was inconsistent with the earlier admission that individual profiles mattered, even more so than the ANC’s in some places. The contradiction stood out even more sharply in the case of Zuma. Various surveys conducted in the period leading towards the local poll showed that Zuma suffered poor ratings among roughly 60% of eligible voters.43 This explained why Jordaan, as noted in the previous chapter, removed the billboard that associated him with Zuma. Eventually, a compromise was reached. National leaders agreed to posters bearing faces of mayoral candidates, but not on T-shirts or posters on cars. Mayoral candidates welcomed the concession, but in the NMB Jordaan still 41 ANC, Statement of the NEC Meeting, 18–20 March 2016. 42 ANC, Statement of the Special NEC Meeting, 18 June 2016. 43 See, for example, www.ipsos.co.za and https://citizensurveys.net/.

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encountered resistance. There were hardly any posters bearing Jordaan’s face on lampposts, even after the national office had given the go-ahead. The provincial office was tasked with the responsibility and had secured the services of two companies/individuals – Harry Printers and Cheslyn Mostert – to produce election material.44 The absence of posters displaying Jordaan’s face meant that they were either not made at all, or if they were made, were hidden somewhere. Either scenario was highly possible. Snubbed by some of the leaders in his own party, Jordaan resolved to make his own posters. He approached Craig Herman, the owner of a marketing and a communication company. This meant that the ANC had three production centres for posters: one employed by the mayor, and the other two by the regional and provincial leaders. Some local leaders were not happy that Jordaan had approached Herman to make posters bearing his face. They berated the move as a ‘coloured initiative’ and wanted it stopped. It was only after national office intervened, through Fikile Mbalula, saying they had approved the posters, that they were allowed to continue. In addition, Jordaan’s local supporters generally ignored the national directive that cars and T-shirts should not bear his face. They printed them in abundance and they were commonplace, especially in the last two weeks before the election.45 Whilst he won the tussle over posters, Jordaan was still kept out of campaign activities in the townships. Prominent local leaders did not want him to campaign in the townships. According to a senior staff member in the mayor’s office who attended a meeting in Matomela House where the campaign was discussed, Nceba Faku, a former regional chairperson then in charge of organising, was emphatic that they did not want any of Jordaan’s posters in the township. Instead, Jordaan’s posters must be taken to northern areas, said Faku. Chippy Olver, a member of the RTT, who had taken up the responsibility to drive Jordaan’s campaign, vehemently opposed Faku. Olver ‘insisted that Jordaan was an ANC candidate for the entire metro, not a coloured candidate for the northern areas’.46 It was left up to other leaders of the organisation, such as Paki Ximiya, as noted earlier, to take Jordaan on a walkabout in the townships.

44 Interview with Danny Jordaan, 22 July 2016. 45 Personal observations by the author during a fieldwork trip in Port Elizabeth. The T-shirts and cars featuring Jordaan’s face, especially, were in prominent display at the election debate, hosted by the eNCA at Nelson Mandela Metro University on 27 July 2016. 46 Interview with a senior official in the municipality who chose to remain anonymous, 20 January 2017.

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Jordaan was most visible in the campaign in the northern areas. For the first time in many years, for instance, the ANC not only organised a rally to commemorate Youth Day on 16 June, but attracted huge support: the event was packed by more than 5 000 people, according to newspaper reports. A local leader and former councillor, Lawrence Troon, put the size of the crowd at double that figure. The enthusiasm, Troon explained, was such that it even overcame attempts to disrupt the event. ‘The municipality organised 44 buses,’ Troon narrates the incident. ‘These ANC people redirected 30 buses to Uitenhage. Only 14 buses made it to the venue in Gelvendale. But, even then there were close to 10 000 people at the stadium. Everyone of us was shocked, we never expected so many people.’47 Marginalising Jordaan, according to Troon, was indicative of a much bigger motive. The anti-Jordaan faction simply did not want him to become mayor, Troon maintained. Their determination was such that they even ‘sabotaged’ the party itself. He explained: The so-called mistakes about ANC double-parking and not registering candidates, were not really mistakes. Those things were deliberate. They wanted the ANC to get below 60 councillors so that it’s not able to elect the mayor on its own. Then they would have approached the EFF for support, but also tell the EFF that they must have a condition that they don’t want Danny as mayor.48

The ‘so-called mistakes’ referred to above related to the registration of ward candidates. In Uitenhage’s Ward 43, the ANC failed to register their ward candidate, Zoleka Ncese.49 Three other ward candidates were ‘double-parked’, that is, registered in two wards.50 It may well be that these lapses were the result of honest mistakes. But, the manner in which Jordaan was treated by some influential local leaders lent credence to the allegations of sabotage.

47 48 49 50

Interview with Lawrence Troon, 9 January 2017. Troon, interview, 9 January 2017. The Herald, ‘Ward 43 Fussed over List Omission’, 25 July 2016. These were: Morgan Tshaka, registered both at the suburban Fairview/Newton Park’s Ward 6 and Motherwell township’s Ward 54; Duane Adams at the northern areas’ Ward 11 in Schaunderville and Ward 14 in New Brighton township; and Lunga Nomxebeza at Port Elizabeth’s Ward 40 in Kuyga and Ward 50 at Uitenhage’s KwaLanga.

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Holding back the sunset: ‘Asivuli press conference apha, silungis’ into!’51 By 4:00 pm the next day, 4 August 2016, the IEC was ready to announce the election results. They had started counting the previous night, just after voting stations closed at 7:00 pm. Both major parties, the DA and the ANC, were optimistic about their chances of victory. Whilst not anticipating a big victory, the ANC, for one, had expected to get either just above 50 per cent or remain the largest party.52 Earlier that day, as the results were being verified after a long night of counting, party activists were already predicting victory. Social media was alive with a prediction of victory in 37 wards. The prediction was not far-fetched, as party agents are part of the counting process and do transmit the results to the party’s headquarters even before they are officially announced. They had erred, however, assuming that winning the majority of wards necessarily gave them an overall victory of 56 per cent. Their (mis-)calculation did not factor in the proportional representation ballots, which could break differently to the ward ballots. On that Thursday afternoon, the ANC was about to find out whether their predictions were true, or what they considered impossible had come to pass – the sun had set at midday! But, the results were not announced that afternoon of 4 August 2016. That had never happened before. The delay was occasioned by the ANC’s questioning the integrity of the results. They alleged electoral fraud, and called for the outcome to be nullified. That, too, had never happened before in the metro. Xoli Mngambi, a journalist for the private television station eNCA, suspected that something was afoot, even before the allegation. ‘I first noticed that something was brewing inside the results centre,’ Mngambi remarked. ‘What got my attention,’ he narrates, was that ANC officials had huddled together in what looked like a very tense conversation … By this time, 80 per cent of the votes had been verified and it wasn’t clear if the ANC would win … then some of them left the building, and I quickly followed, suspecting that there could be something. Indeed just as I got behind the building, Nceba was there pointing at the open ballot boxes.53

Mngambi quickly took out his cellphone to record the conversation. In the visual recording, Faku says, ‘Ezi ballot papers azibalwanga. Xa zibaliwe azihlal’ apha kaloku. Xa zibaliwe funeka zihambe ziye kwi-archives zabo, ukwenzel’ ukuba, if there’s a dispute, they go back to them’ [These ballots have not 51 ‘We’re not opening a press conference here. We’re fixing something’. 52 Interview with Danny Jordaan, 22 July 2016. 53 eNCA recordings viewed by the author at their studios in Hyde Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 2016.

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been counted. If they were, then they would be archived so that ...]. Mngambi responded, throwing doubts over Faku’s ‘discovery’, saying ‘this could just be a ploy by the ANC, because you’re seemingly losing’. ‘No, no,’ Andile Lungisa interjected. ‘That thing cannot arise,’ he added. ‘Khawume Andile,’ Faku silenced Lungisa and continued, You see, if it’s a ploy by the ANC. The procedure is that all cast ballot papers … [then he’s interrupted by someone, whom he reprimands: Asivul’ i-press conference apha, silungis’ into – we are not opening a press conference here, we are fixing something.] What I’m saying to you is that all used ballot papers, the IEC has a procedure, they don’t just dump them. Because you can actually see the place. This is a dump place. That is why I’m saying masibize ezi zakwa IEC zilapha [Let us call the IEC people that are here].

A few minutes after the ‘discovery’, Faku was no longer as strident in his allegations of electoral fraud. Interviewed on live television by Mngambi at around 4:30 pm, Faku said: Earlier we thought that this was electoral fraud. But, we’ve since met the regional head of the IEC and he explained what happened.54 So we’ve retracted that statement. However, the senior leadership – we’ll see what it can do about this situation. It is agreed by everybody that the storage shouldn’t have been in that fashion. It’s now up to the ANC to see how it moves forward.

The retraction was incomplete. Faku still entertained the possibility of the ANC challenging the results. He was effectively saying it was still up to the ANC to pursue the matter, but was excusing himself out of the dispute. Consider his other response, for instance, to Mngambi’s question: ‘Will you accept the outcome as credible?’ Faku responded: ‘I wouldn’t want to commit the organisation given the context of this furore. If you had asked me a straight question before this furore, I would have given you a straight answer.’55 At just about the same time that Faku was withdrawing the allegation of impropriety at the election centre, it turned out later, his colleagues were 54 IEC’s regional manager, Croxby Bacela, explained that the ballot papers had indeed been counted. The Political Parties Liaison Committee knew that they were stored there, and no-one raised complaints. 55 eNCA television broadcast, 4 August 2016.

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preparing a formal challenge. Around 9:30 pm, regional leaders held a press conference announcing their intention to sue for the annulment of the elections in the metro. They had already laid a charge to that effect against the IEC at the nearby KwaZakhele Police Station. This was the start of a formal process towards interdicting the announcement of the results. Beza Ntshona, one of the regional leaders, explained that their suspicion of electoral fraud predated the election day. On 2 and 3 August, they wrote letters to the IEC complaining about poor logistical arrangements at polling stations. Polling stations, together with materials and staff, were relocated from one spot to another; and that exposed the process to fraud. The DA’s electoral agents, Ntshona added, also acted inappropriately. The IEC, according to Ntshona, had still not responded to those complaints. Because the letters had gone unanswered, and ‘we have visuals showing that ballots have been dumped … We’ll not accept the results because they’re not free and fair, based on all the issues we’ve identified.’ The complaint by the regional leaders had the backing of the national office. About an hour earlier, before the aforementioned press conference, Andries Nel, a member of the ANC National Election Team responsible for legal matters and monitoring, submitted a formal objection to the IEC’s Chief Electoral Officer, Mosotho Moepya.56 The submission, noted Nel, was based on ‘Section 65 of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act’, and pleaded for urgency to probe the allegations of irregularities: ‘We will comply with the formalities set out in the Act but, in view of the urgency and seriousness of the matter, we ask that it be investigated and dealt with by the Commission forthwith.’ Nel’s submission repeated the allegation that Faku had made earlier, but later retracted on account of its invalidity: An unguarded tent at the back of the main IEC centre was found to contain opened ballot boxes with thousands of marked ballot papers lying strewn around. Most of the ballot papers were marked ANC ballots. This is a clear violation of the electoral code, and means that the results of the elections cannot be verified, nor can a recount take place.57

Nel maintained that the foregoing incident was illustrative ‘of wider electoral irregularities’. These involved, among others, IEC officials wearing DA T-shirts; missing and uncounted ballot boxes, with some found dumped out in the veld;

56 Letter from Andries Nel to the IEC Chief Electoral Officer, Mosotho Moepya, 4 August 2016. 57 ANC, National Election Team, ‘Statement by the African National Congress Regarding Elections in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality’, submission to the IEC, 4 August 2016.

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the relocation of voting stations because the tents used were blown away by wind, and voters were not informed of their relocation; and some voters being turned away at 7:00 pm, even though they were already in the queue. Because of all these irregularities, Nel was emphatic that the ANC ‘considers the elections no longer free and fair, nor to reflect the will of the people of the metro’. This formal objection meant that the election results in the metro could not be announced that evening. The announcement of results had now been deferred to the following day, 5 August 2016, after the IEC had provided the ANC with satisfactory answers to their complaints. Unlike the gloomy mood of its rival, the DA was celebrating victory that evening. Earlier in the day, the respectable research institution, the CSIR, had already pronounced the elections to be in favour of the DA.58 Athol Trollip, the party’s mayoral candidate, dismissed the ANC’s objection as ukufeketha – behaving like spoilt brats. The next morning, however, the ANC woke up with a different attitude. Just as the sun rose at 6:00 am, Ntshona announced that the party had withdrawn its complaint. Terry Tselane, the IEC’s vice chairperson responsible for dealing with objections, had managed to convince Nel that morning that their objections were unfounded. If there were any missing ballot boxes, Tselane told Nel, that would have most probably been the result of mismanagement and was unlikely to affect the results. Reconciliation of ballot papers and turnout at a particular voting station is able to show if any cast ballots have been removed, which would be a genuine dispute. But, no such discrepancies were discovered. Nel’s acceptance of Tselane’s explanation meant that the results could be officially announced and the ANC would accept them as free and fair. The path seemed clear for a smooth transition of power – or was it?

ELECTION RESULTS Over the two days of voting, including special ballot voting on 2 August, a total of 387 058 votes were cast, of which 6 569 were spoilt votes. Of the 380 489 valid votes, the DA got the largest number of votes, at 177 551 (46.66%), but came second in terms of wards, at 23 out of a total of 60. This represented an increase of 30 992 from the party’s previous tally of 146 559 in 2011. Conversely, the ANC dropped by 32 308 votes (from 189 867 in 2011) to 157 559 (41.50%), but won the largest number of wards, at 36. The difference between the two parties now stood at a whopping 19 992 votes in DA’s favour. This represented

58 Personal observations, IEC’s Results Centre, Tshwane, 4 August 2016.

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the reversal of a 9% deficit to a 5% advantage. And, the results reaffirmed that the contest over the NMB was firmly between the DA and the ANC.59 The other parties got marginal support. The debutant EFF outperformed other established parties, coming at a distant third with 19 132 votes (5.03%), and won Ward 43 in KwaNobuhle, Uitenhage. To be sure, the EFF’s ward victory was gifted by the ANC, as the party had failed to register a candidate. Coming fourth was the UDM with 6 969 (1.83%), which was a notable increase from 1 965 (0.54%) in 2011. But, the party lost the Veeplaas/KwaMagxaki-based Ward 30, which it had won from the ANC in a by-election the previous year. The newly formed, Numsa-aligned United Front (of the Eastern Cape) finished fifth, with a tally of 3 048 (0.80%); and Cope followed in the sixth position with 2 658 votes (0.70%). The ethno-nationalist party, the Patriotic Alliance (PA), came eighth, with 1 110 votes (0.29%), just behind the religiously oriented party, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), with 1 313 votes. Whilst not entirely surprising, the results were striking. The DA’s traditional support-base of white and coloured voters constitutes a minority – about 38% of the metro’s population, whilst the ANC’s traditional African voter-base makes up about 60%. Based on this demographic make-up and previous voting patterns along racial lines, it appeared odd that the DA won the largest number of votes. As in previous elections, the DA did not win any of the wards that are predominantly African. In exclusively African wards,60 for instance, the DA got a total of 8  153 votes (which is more than double its votes in 2011, at 3 074). If one includes racially mixed wards, that is, African and coloured, then the DA’s tally peaked to 27 808. A predominant component of their support in those wards came from coloured residents. The party’s support actually rose among this section of the community by 13 009, from 51 227 in 2011, up to 64  236 in this election. Thus the DA’s taking of 23 wards was predominantly white and coloured, and the ANC’s haul of 36 wards was predominantly African.61 That the ANC won the largest number of wards simply affirmed its overwhelming popularity amongst African voters, who constitute the majority of the electorate in the metro. The difference that accounts for the DA’s victory was the sharply uneven levels of turnout in the two parties’ strongholds. The average turnout in the wards the DA won stood at 69%, compared to the ANC’s 56%. This was further improvement on turnout for the DA from the 2011 election

59 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za. 60 Such wards are: 4, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 36, 42, 43, 44, 47, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59. 61 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za.

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(66%), whilst it was a further decline for the ANC, from 63%. The difference in turnout is even clearer when looking at the actual number of votes cast for each party per ward. The total number of votes cast for DA victories in Wards 1, 2 and 3, for instance, was 6 840, 6 236 and 8 726 respectively. Conversely, in Wards 16, 17 and 18, the ANC won by a total of 3532, 3 208 and 3 644.62 The voter bevaviour that had started in 2011 had simply consolidated. DA supporters were more energised to vote for their party, whilst ANC supporters had got more disillusioned with their party. Considering the events leading up to the polls, hardening of the constrasting reactions was not unexepected. The ANC was embroiled in a violent, intra-party rivalry that manifested publicly and had lasted for approximately five years. As a metro-government, the party was similarly unflattering, improving only in the last sixteen or so months before the election. The late start and incoherence of the campaign, however, diluted the party’s ability to flaunt some of its recent improvements. This left voters’ dim evaluation of the ANC unchallenged, thus giving them relatively little to entice them to the polls. Whilst unhappy with the ANC, they would not shift to the DA in any significant manner either.

AN INTERRUPTED HANDOVER: WISHING FOR A MIRACLE On 18 August 2017, the inaugural session of the new council convened at 10:00 am, in the historic Feather Market Hall, just opposite the City Hall on Baakens Street. ‘The Market’, as it is popularly known by locals, is more spacious than the City Hall and is accustomed to hosting public officials. Some of the offices of councillors are housed there. Because the speaker had not been elected, the session was chaired by the acting city manager, Johan Mettler. The speaker, including the mayor, deputy mayor and chief whip, were to be elected at that inaugural session of council. After noting that there were 68 councillors present, Mettler initiated official proceedings for the election of the speaker. In a 120-seat council, 68 councillors was more than the requisite quorum, enabling the election to get underway. First on the list of official activities was the swearing-in of councillors. They, in turn, would elect the leadership of council. Their swearing-in proceeded smoothly until

62 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za.

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it became the ANC’s turn. Instead of following suit, Andile Lungisa63 and Ncedile Captain, both ANC councillors-elect, approached the city manager. That brought the proceedings to a halt. Lungisa and Captain complained to Mettler that their colleagues were locked out of the council. They asked that proceedings be stopped until their colleagues arrived. The city manager acceded to the request, and authorised security officials at the door to allow ANC councillors inside. A number of ANC councillors subsequently walked in, more than 30 minutes after the proceedings had officially started. That stoppage itself had lasted for approximately 15 minutes.64 The presence of the ANC contingent, however, did not set proceedings back on track. Lungisa continued to remonstrate that some of his colleagues had still not arrived. Mettler wanted the proceedings to resume, and instructed Lungisa to sit down. Lungisa defied Mettler, and howled: ANC councillors are still outside, they must be allowed to come before we proceed. ANC councillors must be allowed in; we can’t continue if they’re still outside. There’ll be no proceedings whilst ANC councillors are still outside. They must be allowed to come inside. They are part of this council, they must be allowed to come inside so that we can start.

The howling put yet another halt to the proceedings. Nothing happened for about 20 minutes. There was only singing from what appeared to be UDM and EFF supporters, taunting the ANC: ‘Ayesab’ amagwala. Ayesab’ amagwala! [Cowards are running scared] Bayengena, bayaphuma, bayadidizela! [They’re coming in, going out, they’re confused] Ayesab’ amagwala!65

63 Andile Lungisa is a PR councillor and a member of the ANC’s Provincial Executive Committee. His name was amongst those touted for mayoral candidate ahead of the elections. Whilst Jordaan eventually got the nomination for mayoral candidate, Lungisa came 12th on the list of nominees for the local elections, and some still favour him for the post of regional chairperson when the region does eventually convene the much-anticipated regional conference. Captain is the ward councillor. 64 eNCA recordings viewed by the author at their studios in Hyde Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 2016. 65 eNCA recordings viewed by the author at their studios in Hyde Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 2016.

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Some ANC councillors eventually trickled in to take their seats. They then proceeded to take the oath, in Xhosa. Now that all councillors had been sworn in, they could go ahead with the election of council leaders. But, that did not follow seamlessly. It seemed Lungisa’s earlier defiance of Mettler had set the tone for the rest of ANC councillors. They constantly raised objections. Instead of nominating a candidate for the position of speaker, as the city manager had proposed, Litho Suka66 stood up, purporting to be raising a point of order. Mettler instructed him to sit down, insisting that Suka could not speak on anything but the nomination. Suka defied Mettler, and asserted that he was objecting to the very proposal that a speaker be elected. Suka’s objection lacked grounds. It seemed geared to interrupting the proceedings, rather than raising a legitimate point. The interruptions did not succeed. The DA’s Jonathan Lawack was eventually elected speaker, unopposed, and promptly presided over the session. But the ANC persisted with several objections, intermittently. Makhi Feni stood up twice, and so did Lungisa. As the newly installed speaker, Lawack was similarly relentless. He would not allow them to speak, unless they quoted a rule upon which their objections were based. ‘We’re guided by rules here, Sir,’ he kept on saying. ‘Quote a rule first before speaking, or sit down.’ In one instance, Lungisa managed to cite a rule, which persuaded the speaker to let him speak. Lungisa disputed that council constituted a quorum. ‘There’s no 67 here,’ he claimed. The speaker then asked for a confirmation of the number of those present. The secretariat confirmed that there were more than 67 councillors present, but Lungisa persisted in his complaint that the speaker was biased. The speaker threatened to eject him from the house, which got Lungisa to sit down. That was how Lawack managed to establish order in Council – by issuing a threat to eject disruptive ANC councillors. Athol Trollip was eventually elected mayor. That sapped the ANC’s resolve to interrupt proceedings. Most of them walked out. A new mayor had now been installed. Even when Suka stood up to object that Danny Jordaan, the former ANC mayor, was still locked outside, it did not matter anymore. The speaker quickly reminded Suka that the proceedings started at 10:00 am, and whoever had not arrived then was duly locked out. A new order had dawned! The ANC’s constant objections were revealing of what was happening in the background, outside Council. Because their objections were frivolous, they could not have hoped to prevent the inaugural session from taking place altogether. 66 Suka was the chief whip in the previous council, and had been brought in from Parliament, together with Danny Jordaan, to take over the leadership of the municipality from Ben Fihla and his team.

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Rather, ANC councillors still hoped to annul election results. The plan was to buy time, whilst hoping to find a pliant lawyer who would convince a judge to interdict that morning’s session. Their objection was that the electoral formula by which the 120 seats were allocated was flawed. The manoeuvre had started the previous night. The city manager, Mettler, had received a letter from a Cape Town-based law firm, BXI Attorneys, representing the ANC. The law firm instructed Mettler not to convene the inauguration ceremony the next day. If the city manager went ahead with the ceremony, the ANC threatened to go to court to interdict it. They had given the city manager until 9:00 am the next day (of the inauguration) to respond to the letter. Mettler responded that the interdict was not urgent and that the ceremony would go ahead. ‘I can assure you that the council meeting is going ahead at 10:00 am. Nothing is going to stop it from taking place,’67 Mettler said in his response to an inquiring journalist. Some of the local leaders, however, appeared unaware of the threat to interdict the inaugural session. Asked to explain the lawyer’s letter to the city manager, the co-ordinator of the RTT, Beza Ntshona, denied knowledge of the letter: ‘I’m supposed to write letters. The information that there is a letter is new to me. I just heard that from you. Even the convener of the RTT and other members do not know about this letter.’ ANC national spokesperson, Zizi Kodwa, similarly denied knowledge of the letter. None was willing to own up to the letter. Even the lawyer who issued the letter, Barnabas Xulu, would not say who in the ANC instructed him to issue the letter. ‘I got a firm instruction from the ANC in the Nelson Mandela Bay, because that is the affected ANC … I’m not going to identify the individual, but I was instructed by the ANC there.’68 Denials aside, the thrust of the objection was that, instead of being combined, the ward and PR ballots should have been counted separately and the seats allocated accordingly. For instance, as Lawrence Troon would subsequently explain, the number of PR ballots each party got should have determined the allocation of the 60 PR seats. In the instance of the ANC, according to Troon, its 41.50% PR tally should have qualified the party for at least 20 seats (instead of the 14 it got). That would have given the ANC a total of at least 56 seats, which, albeit not a majority, would have made the party the largest in the NMB Council. The formula actually involves several, but simple, steps. The starting point is determing the threshold (or a quota) per seat. Working out the quota entails combining the total number of valid votes, both ward and PR ballots (A), then 67 Heraldlive, ‘Nelson Mandela Bay Council Meeting Goes Ahead Despite Threat of Court Action’, 18 August 2016. 68 Heraldlive, ‘Nelson Mandela Bay Council Meeting Goes Ahead’.

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divide A by the number of the seats in the metro (B), thereafter subtract the number of independent councillors (C) and add 1. This first step will yield the quota of votes per seat, a solid figure without fractions, for example 5 000 or so, which applies strictly to the PR seats. This makes it easy to allocate seats based on the round figure, but there may still be left-over seats. The second step then follows, which excludes the plus-1 step in the formula in order to yield a number with fractions. The focus is then on the fractions, with the highest getting first preference for a seat allocation, then the second highest until the seats are all taken.69 In any event, the disruption of the inaugural session was a delaying tactic. Whilst their comrades were disrupting the session, a spouse of one of the ANC’s leading candidates was phoning around looking for a locally based lawyer that would take up the case.70 None seem to have been convinced, which explains why they had a Cape Town-based law firm issue a letter about a dispute 800 kms away in Port Elizabeth. Barnabus Xulu was the only lawyer who was convinced of the merit of their objection. Even the ANC, albeit hiring lawyers to issue a legal challenge, were not entirely convinced about the merit of their own objection, hence none would own up to it publicly. The objection was a fishing expedition, which they, too, knew was potentially invalid and, if that were proven, would be embarrassing. They would have emerged from the incident as bad losers. It is worth pointing out, though, that the unhappiness over seat allocation predates the 2016 election and is not confined to the NMB. For instance, in its resolutions of the 53rd National Conference in 2012, the ANC noted the ‘allocation of fewer PR seats to parties that win many wards’ and ‘the allocation of residual votes to parties that have not qualified to win seats’. Then the party resolved: 14.2.1 That the principle of ‘fair representation’ in the allocation of seats in municipal councils after elections in the Constitution be retained; 14.2.2. However, the formula to give effect to this should be reviewed, including the way residual votes are allocated to parties as this tends to be unfair.71

The 53rd National Conference committed the organisation to taking the matter further. This was to include commissioning a paper on the subject, which

69 Municipal Structures (Act No. 117 of 1998). I also benefited from a conversation with Gauteng’s provincial electoral officer and his deputy, Thabo Masemola and Ledimo Nthejane, 22 October 2019. 70 A prominent lawyer, who made his name in PE legal circles, and now shuttles between PE and Johannesburg, where he spends most of his time, conveyed this to the author. 71 ANC, Resolutions of the 53rd National Conference, December 2012, p. 31.

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would then guide the party on how to take its concern forward. Lawrence Troon’s reluctance to accept the results, therefore, was not triggered entirely by the shock of the 2016 elections. This was already an existing gripe within the ranks. However, the national leadership had not pursued the matter any further since raising it four years previously. In other words, 14 days after the announcement of the election results, the ANC was still in denial. It just would not accept that it had lost the Nelson Mandela Bay metro. Former mayor, Nceba Faku, who was watching the pandemonium of the council meeting on the morning of 18 August from the gallery of the chamber, explained it as follows: I understand the ANC councillors’ state of disorganisation. It was their first council meeting in the opposition benches. Maybe they planned some of the things they did, but [they] were incorrectly executed. They should be taken for training, induction and orientation on being the opposition party. They will be empowered to psychologically accept the situation.72

Trollip’s inauguration marked the end of an era. The ANC had occupied city-government for the last 21 years. Its electoral hegemony had made defeat unimaginable. Even when ANC support dropped markedly, leaving the party with a slim majority in Council, its leaders could still not fathom losing power to the predominantly white DA. They assumed that the majority African electorate would always vote for them, instead of the DA. The results validated their assumptions, but only partially. African voters largely shunned the DA, but a significant number of them also stayed at home. This dropped the ANC’s margin of victory in its strongholds, whilst the DA increased theirs amongst its traditional wards. Their supporters were enthused; the ANC’s were demoralised. Apathy was owed to the ANC’s ongoing, brazen mismanagement and misconduct. This impropriety was fanned by factionalism that ran so deep it even thwarted Jordaan’s remedial measures. Jordaan’s detractors saw him as a threat rather than a change-agent. His anti-corruption measures and relative immunity to the influence of factions promised not only to expose the corruption that plagued the municipality, but also threatened future access to patronage. That hardened the detractors’ resolve to frustrate Jordaan’s ascent within the party and in the metro. But they never imagined their machinations would cost them political power. The ANC’s eventual loss was a complete shock. It seemed to

72 The Herald, ‘ANC Councillors Get First Taste of Opposition’, 19 August 2016.

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have upset what they thought was a natural order of things – their entitlement to victory, especially in their historic stronghold of Nelson Mandela Bay. It was that sense of entitlement that informed their initial rejection of the election as having been neither free nor fair. It is commendable that once a reasonable explanation was provided, the objection was retracted. But, the ANC’s secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, and his deputy, Jessie Duarte, were furious with the commissioner who had handled the dispute, Terry Tselane. At the IEC’s ceremony to announce official results, on 6 August 2016, they launched a vitriolic attack against Tselane, accusing him of malice against the ANC. Tselane reported the incident to the rest of the Commission as follows: Whilst seated at the main table during dinner with His Excellency President Zuma, Ms Duarte the Deputy Secretary-General of the African National Congress came to our table to greet or talk to the President. I was taken aback when she violently refused to greet me. I wanted to talk to her because in one of the occasions during a press conference at the Results Centre I mentioned that the elections are not about political parties but about the will of the people and Ms Duarte sent me an sms that read ‘Elections are not about Election Commissioners either’. So instead of responding through an sms I thought this was a platform where I can discuss this with her. She told me that as the ANC they regard me as the enemy and that I have stooped to the lowest level ever and that I am irredeemable and that the ANC has lost hope and confidence in me. When I requested her to explain how they arrived at this conclusion she at first refused to talk to me. I however insisted on finding out if there was anything wrong that I said or did that makes her or the ANC to come to this conclusion about me. She mentioned that during a Commission press conference I ‘planted’ a journalist to ask a specific question that I even had a script from which I read the response to this question. I was taken aback and tried to indicate to her that this was not true but she insisted that I did.

‘Later in the evening’, it was Mantashe’s turn. Tselane went on to narrate: The General-Secretary came to our table to greet some of the people at the table. I stood up to greet him and he also told me that the ANC does not want to talk to me. Mr Mantashe told me that I have become a mouthpiece of opposition parties and that the ANC was worried about my conduct.

Mantashe repeated Duarte’s accusation about Tselane planting a question with the journalist, but, Tselane also went on to add,

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besides this there is a trend that they as the ANC have been observing about my conduct. Mr Mantashe further told me that I have removed teachers as electoral staff in order to benefit opposition during the elections. I told him that I do not have such powers and that one individual cannot impose his view on the whole organisation. He told me that according to their information this falls under my responsibility and that I imposed this position on the organisation. Mr Mantashe further told me that they have a picture of me with Adv. Dali Mpofu and Tiego Moseneke and accused me of fraternizing with opposition.

After that vitriolic attack, Mantashe then threatened Tselane: Mr Mantashe further told me that if [he] was younger he would organise people to deal with me. He emphasized the fact that he is not saying now but if he was younger he would have organised people to deal with me.73

The ANC’s attack on Tselane betrayed an expectation that commissioners should act favourably towards them. Procedures should be bent to favour them, instead of being applied objectively. The ANC could not accept that Tselane had acted objectively, but ascribed his decision to some conspiracy that he was working with the opposition to undermine the party. That they even claimed to have a photo of him with a leader of the EFF, Dali Mpofu, suggests that Tselane was being watched. It did not seem to occur to them that both Mpofu and Moseneke were Tselane’s university friends and at the time they were involved in a widely publicised attempt to resolve a stalemate at their alma mater, the University of the Witwatersrand, during the #FeesMustFall campaign in 2015/16. As for the reference about Tselane removing teachers as electoral agents, Bantu Holomisa, leader of the UDM, had long complained of the IEC’s use of teachers alleging that, because some are members of a trade union aligned to the ANC, they were likely to be biased in their work. There has never been any proof to validate the allegation. Mantashe’s disquiet about their removal, however, suggests a possibility that there might be grounds to Holomisa’s allegation.74 In the meantime, the NMB ANC was poised to occupy opposition seats in the next term. Their behaviour at the inaugural Council meeting signalled refusal to accept defeat. This augured badly for the party, both at the organisational and

73 Letter from Terry Tselane, IEC commissioner, to the rest of the IEC commissioners, 11 August 2016. See also City Press, ‘ANC at War with IEC’, 25 September 2016. 74 M. Ndletyana, ‘Ruling Party Had to Find a Scapegoat’, Sunday Independent, 2 October 2016.

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municipal levels. At the organisational level, it suggested reluctance to admit that their defeat was largely self-inflicted, which would then predispose them towards self-correction. Within Council, it pointed to resistance in accepting that the DA would now lead the metro government and that the ANC needed to transform itself into an effective opposition. That was how the ANC began its new role in the opposition benches: as a distressed opposition in denial.

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9 From incumbency to opposition and back: A return to infamy After 21 years at the helm of the NMB municipality, the ANC had difficulty in accepting their position in the opposition benches. Nceba Faku’s explanation of their refusal to accept Athol Trollip’s inauguration as the new mayor (as due to lack of induction into how to become an opposition) implied that the party was temporarily disoriented, a problem it could easily overcome through proper induction. This chapter probes how the party adapted to the loss of power in the subsequent period of almost three years, up to the 2019 national elections. The dominant argument within the organisation, as the fifth local government term got underway, was that the party should avoid incumbency and focus on reforming itself instead in order to regain the lost support. What eventually happened in the subsequent period, I argue in this chapter, was the inverse. The party not only remained fractured and ridden with in-fighting, but it also became complicit in destabilising municipal administration and mismanagement. Within the municipality, the ANC effectively returned to its pre-2015, infamous self. At the organisational level, it gave rise to a party-baron, Andile Lungisa, who, in turn, steered the party towards his ignominious ends. Provincial and national leaders could not intervene decisively either, owing to factionalism. I ascribe all this to three interrelated factors: firstly, failure to settle on a strategy as an opposition; secondly, the zeal to regain the patronage previously afforded by political office; and, thirdly, persistent factionalism within the organisation as a whole. The chapter itself is divided into four parts. Immediately below is an examination of the party’s activities as it begins life on opposition benches, and its proposals on how to reform itself in order to regain power. Thereafter, attention turns to party activities – especially the 2017 regional conference. This was the first major event that tested the party’s recent resolve to reform itself. From the organisation, the focus of the chapter then shifts to the conduct of the ANC 271

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caucus in Council. Particular attention is paid to the party’s performance as an opposition party and its role in ousting the DA-led coalition. The chapter ends with a look at the organisation as part of the coalition government and how it performed in the 2019 national elections.

IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH: INTROSPECTION AND THE PROMISE OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES The electoral defeat in August 2016 was followed immediately by introspection. This was done at a gathering dubbed the Broad Consultative Forum, scheduled for three days the following month: 16–18 September 2016. The Consultative Forum invited affiliates of the erstwhile MDM, which included all anti-apartheid formations such as churches and civil society organisations. The line-up of speakers promised honest and robust self-criticism. It included the former deputy president of the organisation, Kgalema Motlanthe, and Mcebisi Jonas, a former provincial leader and a local-born (in Uitenhage), who was then deputy minister of finance. Both gentlemen had become prominent, public critics of the unethical leadership and violation of organisational rules and processes that had characterised the ANC. One of Motlanthe’s critiques was that ANC ‘structures are in a sense bogus structures’.1 Speaking at the memorial service of Makhenkesi Stofile just the previous month, Jonas had decried factionalism and self-aggrandisement in the party.2 The intent for thorough self-introspection was signalled even further at the gathering itself. Sipho Pityana, another vocal critic of the malaise that had gripped the ANC, was added onto the programme at the last minute. Pityana had made national headlines earlier, at Stofile’s funeral on 25 August 2016, deriding ANC leaders as ‘full-time thieves and looters’.3 Pityana’s addition onto the programme, however, did not receive unanimous support. Some of the regional leaders, including Andile Lungisa and Xolani Mgxotheni, opposed the decision on account of the fact that Pityana did not have a formal standing in the party. Their opposition was defeated, as others insisted that Pityana’s involvement in the ANC’s anti-apartheid activities was sufficient qualification for him to be given the podium. Expectedly, discussions at the Consultative Forum did not spare the organisation from severe rebuke. Cosatu’s paper, for instance, noted that the ANC was facing a ‘catastrophe and a revolutionary crisis, whose magnitude [is] of unprec-

1 2 3

News24.com,‘Motlanthe Slams ANC’s “Race to the Bottom”’, 31 July 2016. notedman.com, ‘A Comrade, Unifier and True Patriot’, 24 August 2016. YouTube.com, ‘Sipho Pityana Pays Tribute to Rev Stofile’, 25 August 2016.

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edented proportions’.4 Cosatu went on to explain the manifestation of the problem as follows: Public perceptions of fraud, corruption and incompetent cadreship in the local state compounded our challenges. [Cliques] and factionalism had ravage[d] the movement in the locality. Selection of unpopular candidates in the wards created a serious challenge for the ANC in the region.5

The speakers were unanimous in their denunciation of leaders and organisational practices. They decried unethical conduct that manifested in manipulation of organisational processes and defiance of rules. Moral depravity and lack of organisational integrity were commonly cited as the dominant problems that afflicted the organisation. A variety of solutions were proposed in the ensuing debate. These included electing credible and morally upright leaders, political education, a transparent membership system that relied on the use of technology, enforcement of credible disciplinary measures in the instance of wayward behaviour, and secret voting.6 Albeit commendable, the Consultative Forum ended prematurely. Delegates did not adopt resolutions. They ran out of time. Instead of the customary threeday duration for such organisational events that the RTT had envisaged, it had to be shortened to a day and a half. The organisation did not have enough money to hire the venue – Nelson Mandela Stadium – for three days. This was yet another sign of a changed political order. Now that the ANC was out of government, as discussed further below, it battled to raise funds for operational and organisational activities. A shortened duration meant that deliberations in the various discussion groups, known as commissions, were not reported back to the plenary. The report-back would have, in turn, been consolidated into resolutions. Notwithstanding the failure to adopt resolutions, the brief discussions that followed the various inputs signalled what seemed to be a consensus and a renewed commitment to restore the integrity of the organisation and for its leaders to exemplify the ANC’s moral values in their public conduct.7 Almost three months later the organisation was to face the first test of its resolve to reform: a regional elective conference. The region had last elected leadership

4

5 6 7

Cosatu, Vuyisile Mini Region, ‘Position Paper: Analysis of the ANC Performance on 3 August 2016 – Local Government Elections in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro’, Nelson Mandela Stadium, 16–18 September 2016, p. 2. Cosatu, Vuyisile Mini Region, ‘Analysis of the ANC Performance on 3 August 2016’, p. 3. Interview with Mongameli Peter, 2 February 2019. Peter, interview, 2 February 2019.

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almost two years previously, in 2014. But the regional elective conference, scheduled for 16 December 2016, was cancelled. The cause was the usual problem – an insufficient number of branches in good standing. About three months later, on 10 March 2017, the elective conference was eventually held. Events in the lead-up to the conference, however, suggested that some of the leaders were reluctant to heed the party’s own counsel. The conference seemed poised to break its own rules on eligibility to stand for office and to elect leaders of questionable character. Two days before the conference got underway, controversy erupted over one of the candidates, Andile Lungisa, for chairperson. In a letter addressed to provincial secretaries, the party’s secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, had reminded prospective candidates that they could not serve in two leadership structures at the same time. This meant that, if one was a member of a PEC, as Lungisa was, that person could not contest for office at a regional level. Doing so, Mantashe pointed out, would be a violation of the ANC’s own constitution. Lungisa rejected Mantashe’s instruction, dismissing his interpretation of the constitution as faulty, for one could resign the PEC position once elected onto the REC. In his response to Mantashe, Lungisa was adamant that he had not broken any rule and would, consequently, not withdraw from the race: Given the fact that I am not prohibited by any practice, policy, or rule in the ANC from contesting, I shall be contesting any position which I am nominated to. If I do get elected, it is my intention – in line with ANC policy and rules – to resign from the PEC.8

Mantashe was unmoved by Lungisa’s response. Besides reaffirming his interpretation of the constitution, Mantashe explained that Lungisa would not be the first ANC leader to decline a nomination on account of the said constitutional rule. There was already precedence, Mantashe elaborated, citing Bheki Cele and Nomvula Mokonyane as examples of NEC members who wanted to contest positions at lower levels, but were barred from doing so. Lungisa not only remained defiant, but also attacked Mantashe, accusing him of bias and factionalism: No particular clause must be used selectively. It is wrong for anyone to use the ANC constitution to serve a particular grouping and micromanage the organisation. If ANC branches want me to serve in a sub-region, I will. If [they want me to serve] in the region, I will also do so.9

8 9

Letter from Andile Lungisa to Gwede Mantashe, 10 March 2017. The Herald, ‘Mantashe Blocks Lungisa in Bay’, 10 March 2017.

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On the second day of the conference, however, Lungisa appeared to heed Mantashe’s instruction. This followed the secretary-general’s submission of ‘a charge’ to the party’s National Disciplinary Committee against Lungisa for what he deemed personal attacks through the media. Lungisa approached Mthwabo Ndube to stand in his stead. A former secretary of both the SACP and the ANC, with a long history of activism in the region, Ndube was a highly respected figure. He agreed to stand. As election neared in the late hours of Saturday evening and into the wee hours of the following day, Lungisa changed his mind. He decided to reinstate his candidature. This created a dilemma for Ndube, as he was torn between withdrawing and retaining his candidature. ‘We had to make a tactical decision,’ explained Gege Mbikanye – an equally prominent local leader who was aligned to Ndube. Mbikanye elaborates: Our main strategic objective was to prevent the return of la masela [these thieves]. We were not worried about le ntwana [this young man]. He was passing through. We knew that he wanted to be provincial secretary. He wanted to use the region as a base to launch his campaign. So, he was not going to stay for long. So we decided that Mthwabo should step down and to support this boy. We did not want to divide our forces because that would have opened up space for la masela [these thieves] to sneak in.10

The ‘thieves’ that Mbikanye was referring to were Zandisile Qupe and Tony Duba. Both had been implicated in the corruption around the troubled introduction of the public transport system (the IPTS) in an affidavit written by Eduard Le Roux, of the Le Roux legal firm, in 2015.11 In the final analysis, Lungisa’s ticket won against Duba’s by a margin of 14 votes: 71 against 57. Mbikanye’s group succeeded in thwarting the return of the compromised group of leaders who had been disbanded in 2014 for plunging both the municipality and organisation into mayhem. But, Lungisa’s election still hung in the balance. His candidature was a violation of a constitutional stipulation. Mbikanye reckoned that they would rather be complicit in a constitutional violation, than allow the return of unethical leaders. A constitutional violation would be easier to rectify, reasoned Mbikanye, than the return of disgraced leaders. Expectedly, Lungisa’s controversial election came up for discussion at the meeting of the ANC’s national office bearers just the following Monday. They agreed with Mantashe’s stance and instructed Lungisa, through the Eastern Cape

10 Interview with Gege Mbikanye, 25 March 2017. 11 David Eduard Le Roux, of Le Roux Inc, affidavit to the Hawks, Re: IPTS Investigation, no date.

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PEC, to step down. Lungisa refused, saying he would do so only if that decision was endorsed by the ANC’s NEC. In taking such a stance, Lungisa was defying both national office bearers and the Eastern Cape’s PEC. The latter, to which Lungisa was directly answerable, was the rightful authority to handle the matter. And, the PEC insisted on its prerogative, instead of awaiting an NEC decision as Lungisa insisted. Oscar Mabuyane, the provincial secretary, asserted: This is a provincial matter. The national structure has not revoked the PEC’s powers. It was merely giving guidance on constitutional interpretation. If he does not comply we will be forced to act.12

The PEC’s threat of disciplinary actions proved to be inconsequential. Lungisa remained in the position. Only after the NEC had affirmed the position of the national office bearers did Lungisa step down on 26 March 2017. His defiance of national office bearers and the PEC, whilst preferring a ruling by the NEC, was instructive of factionalism throughout the organisation. Provincial leaders presided at the regional conference that elected Lungisa, with some NEC members present. They had the authority to overrule Lungisa’s candidature, but did not do so. Moreover, Lungisa was supported by no less a figure than the president of the organisation, Jacob Zuma. In glaring contradiction to his secretary general, Zuma showed up on the last day of the conference to congratulate Lungisa: When we do things the wrong way the ancestors get angry. That requires elders to take up sticks to find the root cause. The ancestors agree now that Lungisa has been elected … Tambo introduced a culture of consensus in the ANC. Many matters are resolved that way … if the majority has spoken, it has spoken. Ours is to take that decision and make it ours. The ANC is looking at quality leadership, not just people with grey hair to lead.13

Zuma had flown into PE the previous night. Lungisa’s change of mind – to re-enter the contest – was possibly the result of a meeting with Zuma that Saturday evening, prior to voting. Lungisa’s victory was part of Zuma’s campaign to have his former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, elected party president at the ANC’s 54th National Conference later that year. Zuma was indifferent to rules, as long as his ally won. In insisting that the NEC decide on the matter of his election, over national office bearers and the PEC, Lungisa was hoping that his allies

12 The Herald, ‘Politics’, 23 March 2017. 13 The Herald, ‘ANC Bay Election Exposes Cracks’, 13 March 2017.

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there would be similarly dismissive of the constitution and affirm his election. That calculation did not succeed. To be sure, Lungisa’s candidature was ineligible on more than one count. His public image alone should have disqualified him. The ANC’s 2012 national conference had resolved that leaders who exhibit unbecoming conduct that taints the image of the organisation should either step down from office or not contest elective positions. At the time of the regional conference, Lungisa had been charged with physical assault. During a session of the NMB Council in October 2016, Lungisa hit a DA councillor, Rano Kayser, on the head, with a glass jug. Kayser collapsed immediately and lost consciousness.14 The violent attack, as the court would later rule, was unprovoked, intentional and Lungisa did not even show any remorse.15 Lungisa was on trial just as the conference got underway. Lungisa’s resignation as regional chairperson, however, did not extinguish his influence in the REC. Just as they were announcing his resignation, the REC undertook to support his candidature for provincial secretary at a provincial conference later, in July 2017. The regional secretary, Themba Xathula, was quick to add that their decision was not an imposition of a leadership choice on the general members: ‘We will allow the organisational structures to endorse the decision, but we are not dictating to them but guiding them.’16 ANC members, therefore, would be persuaded to endorse the regional choice, instead of coming up with their own preferred candidates. The REC’s stance on how it planned Lungisa’s nomination for the provincial contest was worrisome. It could be that, having elected him chairperson, and despite the election having later been reversed, the REC assumed that the majority of branches were still favourably disposed towards Lungisa. If that was so, then branches would not need much persuasion to endorse the REC decision to support him for provincial office. Be that as it may, their stance boiled down to a top-down process of nominations. It was not uncommon, as noted in the Consultative Forum held earlier, for the REC to manipulate processes in order to ensure that their choice of leaders were elected. The REC was evidently loyal towards its erstwhile chairperson. And, there was no telling what they were willing to do in their determination to have Lungisa elected a provincial office-bearer. Whilst

14 Independent Online, ‘Video: Andile Lungisa Says He “Was Very Scared” during Council Brawl’, 19 March 2018. 15 News24.com, ‘ANC Eastern Cape Heavyweight Andile Lungisa Found Guilty of Assault’, 17 April 2018. 16 Politicsweb, ‘ANC Nelson Mandela REC Statement on the Cde Andile Lungisa matter’, 27 March 2017.

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there was no reason to conclude that the REC manipulated processes within branches to nominate Lungisa, their stance in the subsequent stand-off with the newly elected PEC was conclusive with regard to how far they were willing to go in order to have Lungisa elected into the provincial executive.

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE VS PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE On 29 September 29 2018, the Eastern Cape Province of the ANC convened a conference (initially scheduled for July 2017) in East London to elect a new provincial leadership. Andile Lungisa was among the candidates. What was intended to affirm democratic principles – the renewal of leadership and members issuing a mandate – ended up in violence. The repercussions were not only divisions within the Eastern Cape provincial ANC, but also entanglement of the REC in Lungisa’s leadership ambitions, to its own detriment. On the second evening of the conference, just as delegates were about to vote, controversy erupted over the eligibility of some of the delegates to attend the conference. Lungisa and his supporters objected to the continuation of the conference, alleging that some of the delegates were not accredited, but were sneaked inside the venue to vote for their opponents. Others disputed the objection, insisting that every delegate present at the conference was properly endorsed. The disagreement degenerated into violence, with delegates throwing chairs at each other, sustaining injuries that required medical attention. Police were called to calm the altercation.17 The conference resumed once calm was restored. By this time, the number of delegates had dropped. Some had left the conference – mostly supporters of the Lungisa grouping. Elections got underway nonetheless and Oscar Mabuyane, the former secretary, was elected chairperson of the province. The opposing group, that had left the conference, refused to recognise the newly elected leaders. Since some of the delegates had left, they charged that the conference was inquorate.18 Unhappy with the proceedings of the conference, Lungisa’s grouping sought the dissolution of the newly elected PEC. Their strategy was two-pronged: a legal challenge and an appeal to the party’s national office. The legal route entailed several court challenges, first to the Eastern High Court in Grahamstown, then to Gauteng’s South High Court, and lastly to the apex court, the Constitutional Court. All decided in favour of the new PEC. The full bench of the Eastern Cape High Court found the testimony of Zizi Kodwa, a member of the party’s NEC sent to oversee the conference, more credible than the complainants’. Kodwa 17 Judge DJP van Zyl, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, Case No. EL1303/2012. 18 Judge DJP van Zyl, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, Case No. EL1303/2012.

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submitted that there were no grounds to dispute the credentials of the delegates. A steering committee, made up of regional secretaries, had gone through a painstaking process to validate them, following which the credentials report was adopted by the conference itself, affirming its authenticity. The objection, according to Kodwa, was a spurious attempt to manufacture a reason to leave the conference with the intention of denying it a quorum to proceed. Even this attempt was not successful, as the conference was left with enough delegates to constitute a quorum. The new leadership, Kodwa concluded, was legitimate – a conclusion with which the court agreed.19 Contrary to the meticulous approach of the courts, ANC national leaders prevaricated and were self-contradictory. Ordinarily, the NEC approves the outcome of a provincial conference based on the report of its deployees to the said conference. Kodwa and his colleagues endorsed the conference proceedings, but the NEC was reluctant to accept their endorsement. Instead of rejecting the appeal by Lungisa’s group, as per the report of its own deployees, the NEC set up a committee, headed by Sibusiso Ndebele, a former premier of KwaZulu-Natal, to investigate the veracity of the complaints. Ndebele’s findings created more controversy, rather than settling the matter. On receipt of the report in March 2018, the secretary-general, Ace Magashule, would not release it. But Lungisa’s grouping claimed to have received a leaked report, which found in their favour. Magashule denied their claim, dismissing the leaked report as fake. Lungisa’s group went to court, seeking relief to force the ANC to implement the findings of Ndebele’s report. It turned out that Lungisa’s group was correct, based on the recommendations of the Ndebele report. The court affirmed that Ndebele recommended the suspension of the new PEC and a re-run of the provincial conference. However, the NEC, according to the deposition by the party’s deputy secretary-general, Jessie Duarte, rejected the Ndebele report, because, among other things, ‘there was clear evidence before Ndebele that credentials were adopted … His finding that they were not adopted was flawed, unsubstantiated and factually baseless.20 The ANC went against its own rules by rejecting the report of its own NEC deployees, preferring to appoint a committee to investigate instead. The committee came back with a different set of recommendations, but the NEC would not accept that either. It was both indecisive and self-contradictory. This was the result of factionalism within the NEC, with an eye to the national conference. The Eastern Cape PEC had declared its support for Ramaphosa’s candidature for the presidency

19 Judge DJP van Zyl, HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, Case No. EL1303/2012. 20 Judge J Carelse, HCSA Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, Case No. 18798/2018.

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of the ANC. This disadvantaged the opposing group that supported DlaminiZuma. The PEC was to play a decisive role in influencing the composition of the delegation from the province and how they would vote at the national conference. The PEC approves membership of each branch and oversees regional conferences, whose office bearers, in conjunction with them, run branch general meetings that elect delegates. In executing these functions, as noted in the Consultative Forum earlier in PE, they often manipulate the process in favour of their allies. Ultimately, Mabuyane’s PEC was in charge of the provincial delegation to the national conference on 16 December 2017. However, this did not nullify the attempts by Lungisa’s group to reverse the provincial outcome. The stakes remained high, as speculation swirled that the new PEC was likely to reshuffle the provincial cabinet,21 and would later steer nomination of candidates for the impending 2019 national election. This was the reason why Lungisa’s group, as noted earlier, went back to court seeking an order that the party implement the findings of the Ndebele report. But that attempt, as noted earlier, also flopped. Thus the NEC, circa June 2018, decided to take a definitive stance by accepting the initial report of its deployees to recognise the elected provincial executive. Part of the reason for accepting the legitimacy of the PEC, stated the deputy secretary-general, was to promote ‘the spirit of revival and renewal, which has been championed by the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa’.22 Certainly, the 54th National Conference that elected Ramaphosa was emphatic about the urgency to restore organisational stability and integrity, and to lead in an exemplary manner. This entailed observing the rules of the organisation, enforcing discipline, reviving organisational activities and working collectively towards organisational goals. The conference even composed a song to affirm both the imperative and the urgency to strive towards unity immediately after the gathering: Unity, unity Unity maqabane [comrades] Ixesha lisondele, [time is upon us] Unity, unity Unity, maqabane [comrades] Ixesha lisondele [time is upon us]

21 The speculation was not unfounded. Mabuyane and three of his colleagues in the provincial leadership were appointed into the provincial cabinet, replacing some of those who had opposed them in the provincial conference. Herald Live, ‘Key Mabuyane Role in Reshuffled Cabinet’, 11 May 2018. 22 HCSA South Gauteng Division, Johannesburg, Case No. 18798/2018, p. 4.

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The song instantly became popular at ANC gatherings. It remained a rallying song throughout 2018. Whilst joining in the singing, possibly with passion and gusto, the Lungisa group was doing the opposite. In their defiance of the 2017 conference resolution, they were aided by the ANC’s own NEC, the highest decision-making structure in the organisation. This emboldened Lungisa’s group to defy the PEC, with the NMB regional leaders at the forefront. The confrontation between Lungisa’s group and the PEC had an adverse impact on the REC. Throughout the first six months of 2018, reported PEC deployees to the NMB region, regional leaders rarely responded to invitations to meetings at the provincial office. In one instance, the regional secretary, Themba Xathula, even chose to participate in a protest march at the national office demanding the dissolution of the PEC, instead of attending a PEC meeting. Xathula did so without even issuing an advance apology for non-attendance and was reportedly ‘actively going around stating that he does not recognise the authority of the PEC’.23 The REC hardly met and, when it did, PEC deployees in the region were not invited, as per practice. Organisational activities were almost absent. As a result, membership declined from 10 993 at the point of the national conference in December 2017 to 6 942 by July 2018. It was partly for this reason that the REC failed to convene a regional general council to elect a new chairperson. Fewer than 70 per cent of the branches were in good standing. In other words, the regional office was primarily preoccupied with the dispute about the PEC at the provincial level, to the detriment of the organisation in the region. As noted earlier, it had become entangled in the leadership ambitions of its former chairperson – to its own harm. This showed the level of influence that Lungisa still wielded within the REC. ‘He remained the de facto chairperson,’24 said Gege Mbikanye, a member of the REC. To illustrate the point, Mbikanye recalled Lungisa sending him a text message just after an REC meeting detailing the discussions of the meeting. Lungisa was trying to persuade Mbikanye to decide in a particular way. The insight reflected in Lungisa’s message and its timing, so soon after the REC meeting, convinced Mbikanye that he had prior knowledge of what would be discussed at the meeting. Moreover, it was Lungisa who fended off the PEC when it tried to assert its authority over the REC. Besides the fact that Lungisa had no authority to speak on behalf of the regional leadership, his defiance of the PEC happened even after

23 ANC Eastern Cape, PEC Deployees, Consolidated report on the ANC Nelson Mandela Region for the Consideration of the Provincial Working Committee, 8 October 2018, p. 7. 24 Gege Mbikanye, interview, 29 September 2018.

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the NEC’s June 2018 decision to recognise the PEC. This time around, Lungisa dismissed the PEC’s intentions towards the REC as malicious: People who were at the centre of the collapse of the ANC in the Nelson Mandela metro are the [Mabuyane] grouping. That is why the leadership brought in Ben Fihla and later Danny Jordaan as an intervention. This is the same grouping that is busy undermining the current regional executive committee in Nelson Mandela metro. They are the people who are causing instability … it’s the same old people.25

Lungisa’s attitude towards Mabuyane was telling. It illuminated Mabuyane’s lack of credibility as an honest broker in regional politics. The accusation that he was a destabilising force and partisan was not without merit. Mabuyane was an ally of Zandisile Qupe, whom Lungisa had defeated at the 2017 regional conference. Mabuyane, during his tenure as provincial secretary, supported Qupe’s corrosive interference in Zanuxolo Wayile’s administration between 2009 and 2013, whilst he was regional secretary; did not defend Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela when Qupe’s REC hounded her out as city manager for opposing corruption; undermined the work of the RTT that was set up in 2015 to revive the ANC, following the disbandment of Qupe’s REC; and was unsupportive of the ANC’s own Danny Jordaan for mayor in the 2016 elections. Mabuyane’s moral authority in the NMB, therefore, was suspect. In raising Mabuyane’s dodgy relations with the previous REC, Lungisa was exploiting the ill-feelings towards Mabuyane that prevailed amongst many, including influential local activists. Mabuyane was one of the individuals they blamed for the mayhem that had gripped the party in the region and in the municipality between 2009 and 2015. Albeit disapproving of Lungisa’s corrosive grip over the REC, some local leaders were not keen on provincial involvement either. They suspected that the PEC would attempt to sneak Qupe’s group back into office. This placed the PEC in a dilemma. It was obliged to act, but there was little enthusiasm for its involvement even from those who were keen on corrective actions. The implication of the foregoing, therefore, was that almost two years later, the regional ANC had not exhibited any of the spirit of renewal that had animated the Broad Consultative Forum in September 2016. Instead, the party was displaying the disruptive behaviour that had been characteristic of the ANC before the 2016 elections. The party’s conduct seemed to have fallen into a pattern: a party stuck in a perpetual mode of conflict with itself. The imminence

25 City Press, ‘Lungisa Versus Mabuyane: Round 2’, 30 June 2018.

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of national elections did not matter. This posed a challenge to the PEC over what to do, especially with elections looming, just six months down the line. I return to how the PEC resolved this dilemma later in this chapter.

LIFE ON OPPOSITION BENCHES: A DISORIENTING EXPERIENCE Adapting to the role of opposition proved immensely difficult for the ANC. For a party that had enjoyed incumbency for a whopping period of 21 years, the struggle to adapt was inevitable. The party’s operations and form, both inside and outside Council, was largely a function of it being in office. What made the new role even more challenging was the lack of elected leaders that enjoyed all-round legitimacy. This resulted in the absence of a clearly defined opposition role. To be sure, the delicacy of the DA-led coalition – an unstable majority of two votes26 – had also minimised any appetite to invest in becoming an effective opposition. Much of the party’s attention was consumed by maneouvres to oust the coalition through a vote of no confidence in the mayor. Financial pressure, both on the party and its cadres, added an urgency to return to power in whatever form and regardless of consequences. In the process of getting back to power, albeit indirectly, the party was effectively going back into its infamous self. Post-2016 elections, as noted earlier, found the ANC still under an RTT. Whilst legally constituted, the RTT did not enjoy unanimous support. A section of the ANC had accused it of colluding with the PEC to sabotage Jordaan’s candidature. This meant that for the first six months of life in the opposition benches, relations between Matomela House and the ANC caucus were almost absent. Even if the RTT had had a plan on how to become an effective opposition, a large number of councillors would not have heeded it. An early indication of the confusing impact of the lack of widely recognised leadership and the absence of a common approach was the contradictory statements over a motion of no confidence in the mayor, in early February 2017. The party’s regional spokesperson, Gift Nqgondi, had issued a statement of the party’s intent to table the motion. Bheza Ntshona, who was the co-ordinator of the RTT, disputed the statement, saying only he could issue such statements.27 In the absence of clear leadership from Matomela House, councillors were left to their own devices to chart their path. This did not prove to be easy, however.

26 The NMB council has 120 seats. Of these, the coalition has 62 seats made up as follows: DA 57, UDM 2, Cope 1, ACDP 1 and Patriotic Alliance (PA) 1. The latter is not part of the formal agreement that the other parties entered into prior to forming the executive. The PA is not bound by any formal agreement, but votes with the coalition based purely on its own interests. 27 The Herald, ‘Power Battle Hits ANC in Metro’, 4 February 2017.

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Danny Jordaan was the obvious leader on account of having headed the party’s ticket in the 2016 elections. He was to be the party’s chief whip, making him the leader of the ANC in Council. But, it was not immediately clear if Jordaan would assume that role. He never attended a single meeting of Council and subsequently resigned in early October 2016. In Jordaan’s absence, Bicks Ndoni, who was Jordaan’s deputy mayor and second on the 2016 election list, stood in as chief whip and was eventually elected into the position. Although generally liked, Ndoni was not a unanimous choice for leader of the ANC in Council. Caucus was reportedly divided into three groups. Some supported Andile Mfunda, others Andile Lungisa, with another group said to be supporting neither. The divisions showed in Council when, in one meeting in February 2017, Lungisa responded to the mayor’s speech, instead of Ndoni, who, as leader of the opposition, ordinarily fulfilled that role.28 A common feeling among councillors and the ANC generally was that Ndoni was ‘soft, too nice’. Usurping what was customarily the chief whip’s function was Lungisa’s way of asserting his leadership of the party over Ndoni. Albeit junior, Lungisa was more popular and influential than Ndoni among ordinary active members. Jordaan himself considered Lungisa a rival for the party’s mayoral candidacy towards the 2016 local elections. He undercut Lungisa’s threat by persuading him to join his ticket.29 Jordaan had the backing of national leaders, especially Jacob Zuma and his deputy, and thus was virtually assured of securing the party’s mayoral candidacy. Yet, in courting Lungisa, Jordaan acknowledged that he presented a possible threat, thereby validating the young leader’s popularity within the ANC. Unlike Ndoni, Lungisa’s style in Council was confrontational and aggressive. That was what had got him to break a whole glass jug full of water on another councillor’s head. This style appealed to some within the ANC and, consequently, exercised some influence in how they related to the DA-led coalition. Thus the party’s opposition stance vacillated between obstructing, to exposing and critiquing the coalition’s weaknesses and biases, to removing them through a motion of no confidence. ANC’s obstructionism took place outside and inside Council. This involved disrupting commemorative events and ward committee meetings to solicit residents’ input towards formulating the Integrated Development Programme (IDP). An unveiling of a monument called Heroes’ Acre was cancelled on Heritage Day, 24 September 2016. The ANC had initiated the monument whilst it was 28 The Herald, ‘Power Battle Hits ANC’. 29 Mbikanye, interview, 25 March 2017. See also C. Olver, How to Steal a City (Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017).

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in charge of the municipality. In the buildup towards the unveiling, however, a disagreement arose over the programme and list of speakers. Believing that the monument was a commemoration of their own history and heroes, the ANC insisted on controlling the event, to determine the programme and the line-up of speakers. The new DA mayor, Athol Trollip, disagreed, stating that the unveiling was a non-partisan municipal event. With both the ANC and the mayor unable to agree, the event was cancelled. The unveiling could not be cancelled indefinitely though. The monument had already been erected and families of the deceased were keen to honour their loved ones. The fourth of October 2016 was set as the new date for the unveiling. But some ANC leaders were still unhappy with the prominent role accorded to the DA mayor. On the day of the event, some protesters tried to prevent logistical arrangements from being set up. They were eventually persuaded to leave and the event was set to take place. None of the active ANC leaders, however, showed up. Instead, prominent activists of the 1980s, such as Mike Xego, Khusta Jack and Mzolisi Dyasi, graced the event. The ANC’s chief whip, Bicks Ndoni, blamed their snub of the event on Trollip, for not ‘respecting’ their ‘views’. He elaborated: ‘The unveiling was just for their political gain. We made a fair request to them to wait until the matter had been discussed properly by the provincial structures of the ANC.’30 The party was unwilling to accept that the municipality and the mayor, as its political head, had the prerogative to assume a prominent role in the ceremony. But the families of the honoured heroes were pleased. ‘I’m happy that the mayor acknowledged that he is not the one who initiated this process,’ said Sipho Hashe’s daughter, Mandisa, and added, ‘As families we are happy that he took it forward.’31 Disruptions of events scheduled to be addressed by the leaders of the coalition soon became a pattern. This became commonplace at IDP meetings held in ANC strongholds. Based on the public inputs, IDPs determine how much is budgeted for each ward. Disruptors included both party supporters and councillors. Their stated reasons varied and were inconsistent. Where a meeting was scheduled to be addressed by a councillor, they would object and insist on the mayor being called instantly to address them. In instances where the mayor was the one scheduled to speak, they would object to his speaking, saying that some of their grievances had still not been addressed.32

30 The Herald, ‘Most ANC Leaders Shun Heroes’ Acre Event’, 5 October 2016. 31 The Herald, ‘Most ANC Leaders Shun Heroes’ Acre Event’. 32 The Herald, ‘Opposition Slammed for Causing Disruptions’, 17 October 2016; The Herald, ‘Jugs and Glasses Fly, Shots Fired as Meeting Descends into Chaos’, 28 October 2016.

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The ANC was not keen to take any disciplinary action against councillors or party leaders who took part in the disruptions. For the intent of disruptions was clear: to prevent the DA from addressing any IDP meetings in the townships. They feared that, if allowed direct contact with residents, coalition leaders might develop credibility (or ‘profile themselves’, as the saying goes) among residents, which could possibly translate into electoral support. With coalition leaders denied direct contact with residents, ANC leaders hoped to control the narrative, and thus influence perceptions about the DA in the townships. Whilst outside Council the strategy was outright disruptive activity, inside Council it was mixed with the customary opposition role of criticising and exposing government flaws. Essentially, the strategy was guided by the underlying critique that the DA is predominantly white and prioritises the interests of affluent residents and the business sector. Whilst true in terms of the spread of support and the general ideological orientation, whether the DA’s conduct at City Hall validated the criticism was not clear-cut. Some of the DA policy actions affected poor black people, but were predicated on valid grounds and not peculiar to the DA-coalition. These included disconnection of services for defaulters on payment for services and eviction of land invaders. Disconnecting services for defaulters was a drastic departure from the previous policy. To be reconnected, defaulters had to pay a fee of R340 and enter into an agreement to settle their arrears. The old policy, introduced by the ANC government, did not involve disconnections. Instead, on purchasing electricity through a prepaid card, a deduction of a certain amount was made towards settling arrears. If the holder of an account that was in arrears bought electricity for R100, for instance, he would get R80 worth of electricity, with R20 deducted towards payment of arrears. The DA felt the policy was not entirely effective. Deductions were indiscriminate, treating all account holders similarly. For non-indigent account holders, whose household income was more than R3 000 per month, the DA felt that deductions should be higher, in accordance with their income. The municipality was owed R2 billion in arrears, which included households that used water beyond their free basic allocation. In the absence of certainty over household incomes, however, payment of arrears could not be customised to the income of each household. Disconnections forced defaulters to come forward and declare their income in order for the municipality to work out the amount owed and a payment schedule.33

33 The Herald, ‘Metro to Cut Off Power to Payment Dodgers’, 2 November 2016; The Herald, ‘Municipality Firm on R340 Charge to Open Meters’, 22 November 2016.

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In the meantime, the coalition introduced a measure to verify household incomes. This specifically targeted the indigent, as part of the municipality’s programme. Indigence was determined on the basis of property value. Households whose property was valued at R100 000 or less (or with a household income of R3 000 and less) were considered poor.34 This qualified indigent households to a certain quota of free water, electricity and refuse collection. However, once they exceeded their free allocation of, for example, water, they were billed. Verification that occupants were actually poor was never done. The DA-coalition introduced verification in the hope that it would uncover a substantial number of households that did not qualify, thereby reducing the number of recipients. Indigents took up a substantial portion of the grant that the municipality received from the national government, which, in turn, reduced funds available towards maintenance of infrastructure. The introduction of a reconnection fee was admittedly harsh on indigent families. It was susceptible to rebuke as an anti-poor measure. The ANC went beyond a denunciation to mobilising for the reconnection fee to be rescinded. It led a protest march to City Hall, on 1 December 2016, to present a petition. Marchers were carrying placards that read: ‘DA must Fall’, ‘Away with reconnection fee of R340, where will we get that money?’35 The ANC hoped to capitalise on the policy as an anti-black measure. But, public reaction to the incitement to publicly protest was relatively insignificant. The crowd was estimated at roughly 500 people, and it was a once-off event (whilst the reconnection fee persisted under the coalition government). It was not immediately clear, therefore, that the ANC could make political capital out of what it portrayed as the DA’s antipoor stance as those who were affected seemed to feel that the disconnection and reconnection fee were not entirely unjustified. Eviction of land invaders came under similar attack from the ANC. Illegal invasion of vacant land to erect shacks had been a long-standing problem. The land would be either privately or publicly owned and lacked infrastructure to provide sanitation, water and electricity. Because of the lack of amenities, invaders would then go on protest demonstrations, some of which involved burning tyres on roads, thus disrupting traffic flow. Because the municipality would not have earmarked the invaded site for installation of infrastructure, such protests would not yield a positive response from the municipality and, as a result, were recurrent. Municipal reaction was often removal of the illegal invaders. This had happened frequently under the previous ANC-controlled Council, and continued under the DA-coalition. Because evictions predated the DA-coalition, the ANC 34 The Herald, ‘Services Policy for Poor to be Changed’, 9 February 2017. 35 The Herald, ‘March against Utilities Curbs’, 2 December 2016.

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attack that their continuation under the coalition smacked of racism was not entirely persuasive. The evictions could be defended, based on precedence. Frankly, it was not easy to simply straightjacket coalition policies as antiblack. Some of their new measures affected all residents, both in the townships and the suburbs, in a similar fashion. This was true, for instance, of the new property rates the coalition introduced in 2017. It elicited widespread outcry across the racial line. Athol Trollip was particularly unyielding on suburban residents paying more, justifying the rates as necessary and fair: In parts of the city, in Walmer [for example], you have an airport on your doorstep, access to shops, the streets are good. There are very few potholes. There are great schools. You’ve got to pay for that. That’s how it works.36

One anonymous letter-writer, presumably from the suburbs, was particularly irked by Trollip’s unbending stance. He fumed that, instead of spending ‘their time targeting “soft and easy targets” to maximize income generated from fines’, the municipality should be ‘focusing on serious crimes and traffic violations. Minibus taxis are a law unto themselves’. Then the letter concluded with a promise of harsh consequences for the coalition: Mr Trollip, you have lost my support, as well as the vote and support of many others who feel the same about your unapproachable style of total disregard for hardworking, tax-paying citizens of this metro.37

If not introducing (unpopular) measures that cut across racial lines, the coalition adopted ANC programmes and introduced innovations that catered to old problems afflicting townships. Rory Riordan’s ANC, for instance, accused the DA of plagiarism in its 2017/18 budget. The budget contained significant allocations to bucket eradication, the electrification of informal settlements and the Assistance to the Poor programme. The same issues, charged Riordan, were in the ANCs previous budget.38 Whilst the accusation was possibly merited, it also disproved the ANC’s charge that the DA was insensitive to the needs of black residents, as it was copying the ANC’s own budget. The charge of racism was mitigated even further by two innovative proposals. One involved the use of abandoned schools, which had fallen victim to vandalism. The municipality promised to refurbish them, and thereafter make them available to sports clubs,

36 The Herald, ‘Trollip Stands Firm on Property Valuations’, 15 September 2017. 37 The Herald, ‘Trollip Has Cost DA Future Votes in Bay’, 20 September 2017. 38 The Herald, ‘ANC Scorns “Plagiarised” Budget Plan’, 30 March 2017.

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old-age homes and churches to use for their activities. This followed a proposal by a civil society body, some of whose old-age home affiliates were already using the abandoned schools for recreational purposes.39 Another innovation was identifying a central plot of land where all evicted illegal land invaders would be relocated. The site would be provided with infrastructure. This measure was also likely to attract those looking for land to build their informal homes, discouraging them from illegal invasions that also caused unrest. It is worth noting that this innovation was forced upon the municipality. Opposition parties had managed to garner a majority to pass a resolution that, if the municipality evicted illegal occupiers, it should find them alternative accommodation.40 But this did not prevent the coalition from claiming credit for finding a serviced site, not only for evicted illegal occupiers, but also for those looking for sites to build homes. That said, the coalition and the mayor himself were not entirely immune to valid criticism. At one point Trollip attempted to appoint associates onto the board of the MBDA. These were his personal lawyer and a campaign activist. He insisted that it was his prerogative to appoint whomever he chose and that previous mayors had done the same. The opposition objected, pointing out that his proposed appointments amounted to nepotism and the fact that it had been done previously did not make it right under this administration.41 Trollip eventually relented. In another instance, the coalition went against its own promise. The DA had previously lambasted the ANC government for issuing a lump-sum payment to suspended employees to induce their departure – ‘the golden handshake’. These were individuals who were suspected of wrongdoing and their suspension was meant to facilitate unhindered investigations in order to have successful disciplinary hearings. Suspensions would drag on for months, and even years, without any disciplinary hearings being held, whilst the suspended employee received his/her monthly salary. Then the employee would be paid out to leave. Trollip decried the practice as wastage of public resources on individuals who were possibly guilty of wrongdoing. Now elected mayor, Trollip himself did exactly the same thing, by paying out Trevor Harper, the chief financial officer, who had been placed on suspension for issuing payments to a company that did not have

39 Peter, interview, 2 February 2019. 40 The Herald, ‘Relief for Evicted Families’, 26 January 2018. 41 The Herald, ‘Trollip Backs Down over MBDA Board’, 28 February 2018.

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a contract.42 Trollip had promised that the DA would never pay out suspected delinquent employees. Neither did the DA-coalition prove to be as competent as it had promised. The administration, for instance, was unprepared for the sudden deluge of enquiries to pay arrears once the municipality disconnected services to defaulters. The call-centre could not deal with the volume of calls, as one letter-writer, Russell Crowhurst, pointed out in The Herald, which resulted in the system crashing. Yet ‘they didn’t even put in any overtime this weekend to try to resolve the backlog.’43 Whilst all this was happening, it seemed Trollip had gone into hiding. ‘You always appear on Facebook when you shine (like at the traffic department),’ wrote Crowhurst, ‘but when your customers experience 4–5 day delays in getting their prepaid meter unblocked, you are nowhere to be seen.’ Perhaps an even more startling failure by the DA-coalition was not eradicating the bucket toilet – about 15 000 of them upon their inauguration – as it had promised to do by the end of 2017. The coalition managed to reduce them to about half of that figure. This had been the DA’s major campaign issue, over which it had taunted the ANC and labelled it incompetent. It did not prove to be significantly better than the ANC. The DA-coalition was not without faults that the opposition could capitalise upon. But, they were not of a nature that lent the opposition much chance to caricature the DA-coalition as anti-black. There was just not sufficient evidence to substantiate that accusation. Instead, the ANC accused the DA-coalition of copying its own pro-poor programmes. Whilst the ultimate verdict would have been election results, one could surmise that the effectiveness of the ANC’s underlying opposition strategy – casting the DA as anti-black – was doubtful. To be sure, the ANC was ill-equipped for the demands of being an effective opposition. The role demanded background research, reading and discussion of official reports in order to identify loopholes, where they existed. But there were difficulties with respect to carrying out these functions. In their enquiry into how the ANC performed as an opposition between August 2016 and August 2018, PEC officials assigned to the NMB found that • The ANC Caucus does not have a research unit and a legal team that will ensure that members of the Caucus are efficient and effective in engaging with matters. The ANC is also under resourced in other administrative matters …

42 The Herald, ‘Suspended Bay Official Quits after Secret Deal’, 12 February 2018. 43 The Herald, ‘Prepaid Meter Blocking Fiasco’, 8 November 2016.

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• More efforts need to be employed in educating members of the Caucus with the rules and procedures of the Council. • The ANC study groups are not as effective as they are meant to be. A reason for this is that members of the groups do not sit with ward councillors before having the study group meetings.44

Ineffective as the official opposition, the ANC became more eager to return to government. Ousting the coalition through a motion of no confidence was a consideration as early as the beginning of 2017. However, the party was ambivalent on the matter. The idea itself was initially triggered by the instability of the coalition, which burst into the open in January 2017, roughly four months into government. The UDM’s Mongameli Bobani, who was deputy mayor, was at loggerheads with his DA mayor. The conflict was over the appointment and dismissal of executive managers. Bobani opposed the dismissal of Mod Ndoyana, who had been on suspension for 18 months, and whom a disciplinary hearing eventually found guilty of six charges out of the 10 levelled against him, including fraud and dishonesty.45 Bobani wanted Ndoyana reinstated, and to appoint his political adviser, Nombeko Nkomane, executive director in his portfolio of Public Health. Trollip opposed both measures, which soured relations with his deputy. Unable to get his way, Bobani joined forces with the opposition. The ANC saw the tension as an opportunity to oust the DA-coalition. The party’s regional spokesperson Gift Ngqondi explained: ‘We will start negotiating with the other parties. Politics is about power and we will take advantage of any disagreements in the marriage between the DA and those other parties.’46 A series of attempts to oust the coalition thus followed. The initial attempt, planned for the Council meeting of 31 January 2017, never materialised as the ANC did not table it due to insufficient numbers on their side. Other opposition parties – the EFF, the United Front and the Patriotic Alliance – refused to support the ANC.47 Initially, therefore, the ANC’s strategy shifted between voting along with the DA-coalition and disrupting Council meetings, if not engaging in activities to bring down the coalition. For example, the party voted for the adoption of the 2017/18 budget and for the expenditure of a special allocation from Treasury, which had not been spent by other municipalities. Whilst the ANC voted alongside other opposition parties on the budget vote, it broke ranks on the special

44 45 46 47

ANC Eastern Cape, PEC Deployees, Consolidated report, 8 October 2018, pp. 3–4. The Herald, ‘Deadlocked’, 27 January 2017. The Herald, ‘What Now, Mr Bobani’, 28 January 2017. The Herald, ‘ANC Plan to Unseat Trollip Falls Flat’, 1 February 2017.

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allocation. Its opposition allies voted against the allocation because some of the money was to be used to replace funds that were earmarked for the Nooitgedacht Dam, but were redirected elsewhere. The ANC supported the expenditure upon agreement with the DA that a certain amount would be set aside to buy vacant land for housing construction. This was not a difficult condition for the DA to meet, for it had decided that most of the money would be used towards infrastructure, and the demolition and reconstruction of houses that had irreparable cracks.48 All this was to take place in the townships, the traditional support-base of the ANC. This made it difficult for the party to vote against the expenditure, and still claim to advocate for the poor. If not voting alongside the DA-coalition, the ANC either boycotted or participated in walkouts that collapsed Council meetings. As a result, certain motions could not be passed because Council was not quorate. Some of them, if not all, related to the administration of the municipality. The impact of such disruptions, according to religious leaders in the metro, was ‘the breakdown of governance’ with deleterious results on service delivery. The disenchanted clergy included credible and widely respected priests like Howard Hans, chairperson of the metro South African Council of Churches; Bishop Andile Mbethe, Methodist Church of SA, Grahamstown District; Bishop Bethlehem Nopece, Anglican Church PE diocese; and Bishop Vincent Zungu, Catholic Diocese PE. They were scathing in their statement to the ANC and its opposition partners and threatened punitive measures: It was felt that boycotting council meetings betrayed the mandate of the voters, who elected the members of the council to attend council meetings and to exercise the vote the people of the metro had given them. It was therefore resolved that an appeal be made to all council members irrespective of political parties to attend the next scheduled council meeting … We are all aware of the challenges that can be presented to the governance of this metro, if it is placed under administration, and the religious leaders reiterated that they do not wish this to happen to the metro … As religious leaders who have authority to guide our people, in matters of morality, we reserve the right to go back to our congregants to get a mandate to deal with those leaders who do not put the interests of the people of this metro first. We don’t wish for that and thus we appeal to all political parties to work together, and treat our people with great care and respect as the responsible leaders that they were elected to be.49

48 The Herald, ‘Budget Windfall to be Spent, Thanks to Support from the ANC’, 9 May 2018. 49 The Herald, ‘Councillors Betray Voters’ Trust’, 28 September 2017.

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This disquiet and the threat to influence voting against the ANC and its opposition allies did not dissuade them. They hardened their stance. Their actions in Council showed a determination to collapse it, either through dissolution or a vote of no confidence. Co-operation was completely abandoned in 2018. The party rejected the 2018/19 budget, voting against it four times. Their reason was that the budgetary allocations did not follow the customary 80:20 ratio in favour of capital expenditure in poor communities. The ANC charged that most of the funds were allocated to support services. Riordan lambasted this as a disguise to hide money that would later be used in the suburbs. Johann Mettler50 and Jackson Ngcelwana,51 city manager and acting chief financial officer respectively, disputed Riordan’s claims. Mettler explained that funds allocated to support services were used to implement major projects that were earmarked for that year, not towards unrelated or undefined items. Failure to pass the budget meant that Council could be dissolved. The ANC’s repeated rejection of the budget seemed aimed precisely towards that end. They had started preparing the ground in late 2017 when the party appealed to the MEC of Local Government to dissolve Council, citing its instability as the reason.52 The appeal was meaningless, however, in the absence of demonstrable failure. To the ANC’s dismay, the budget was eventually passed, on 12 June 2018. The African Independent Congress (AIC) broke ranks with other opposition parties, which had coalesced into an informal structure they called the ‘Black Caucus’, and voted with the coalition, giving it the extra one vote it needed to have the 61 majority in Council.53 The ANC’s decisive shift towards dissolution or a motion of no confidence is worth probing. The obvious reason was that passing the vote of no confidence in 2018 became more possible than it had been previously. Following Bobani’s removal as deputy mayor on 24 August 2017, the UDM took its two votes to the ‘Black Caucus’, reducing the level of support for the DA-coalition down to 60. Moreover, unlike the past, when the EFF would vote with the coalition on certain motions, the party had now changed its stance towards the DA. It had resolved to vote the DA out of power. Julius Malema, EFF president, ascribed the shift to the DA’s refusal to support a proposal in Parliament to introduce a constitutional amendment to make it easier for the state to expropriate land

50 Interview with Johann Mettler, 12 March 2019. 51 Telephonic interview with Jackson Ngcelwana, 22 February 2019. 52 Rnews, ‘“Laughable” that ANC Now Wants Nelson Mandela Bay under Administration’, 17 August 2017. 53 The Herald, ‘Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Finally Passes its Budget after 4th Attempt’, 13 June 2018.

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without compensation.54 EFF’s resoluteness on ousting the DA evened out the balance of power in Council to 60 votes on each side. The ANC needed only one extra vote to pass a motion of no confidence, which seemed likely to come from the PA. Although the PA was part of the coalition government, it was not entirely happy. It felt deceived by the DA’s not having given it the deputy-mayor position, which it claimed to have been promised in return for its support in ousting the UDM’s Bobani from the post of deputy mayor. The PA was the weakest link in the DA-led coalition. The ANC’s change of mind to return to government was also prompted by the financial difficulty that followed loss of power. Political office had afforded access to patronage for both the party and its cadres. In addition to getting positions on the mayoral committee and in Council, MMCs and Council leaders could make political appointments. These were party cadres, who were not necessarily appointed on merit, but on political loyalty. They numbered 93 when the ANC was in power.55 With the change of government in August 2016 they lost their jobs. Some were fired the day after the announcement of the results, and others at the end of the month. Organisational finances were similarly impacted. The regional treasurer, Mbulelo Gidane, explained the situation rather dramatically to a journalist: Let me scare you immediately – asinamali [we do not have money]. We are currently sitting at a deficit. Financially, our situation is critically bad. You’ve got activities taking place all the time, such as the Youth Day celebrations recently held at Bayworld, which was not funded by us because we didn’t have money. We went to Missionvale Campus for the Relevance of Youth Formations event because of our relationships with them. We were given the venue for free, but people did not eat.56

Lack of money inhibited organisational activities. The 63rd Commemoration of the Freedom Charter was poorly attended. Gidane ascribed the poor turnout to lack of money to hire buses to bring supporters to the event. ‘Even memorial services for some of our stalwarts that require money for décor, food, flowers and transport,’ Gidane elaborated, ‘we can’t do those things because there are no resources.’57 Donations to the party had simply dried up soon after losing power. Business people previously made donations to the ANC on a quid pro quo basis. 54 55 56 57

EFF rally at Nangoza Jebe Hall, Port Elizabeth, 28 March 2018. The Herald, ‘Political Posts Slashed to Save Council Millions’, 2 November 2016. The Herald, ‘Bay ANC Running on Empty’, 6 July 2018. The Herald, ‘Bay ANC Running on Empty’, 6 July 2018.

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Without any influence in the awarding of tenders, or providing favours, business people were unresponsive to the party’s pleas for donations, as Gidane narrated one experience: I tried organising transport to East London. I spoke to about five business people and they promised until the very last day [to assist] and never came through, and eventually we were forced take the money out of our own pockets … Once you’re not in office of government, no business people listen to you and it’s very difficult to go to province and ask for money.58

Financial hardships threatened to make the party invisible. Even the mere operation of the party’s regional office was endangered. Electricity at the regional office was cut off, at one point, due to non-payment. Without visibility or a fully functional office, the party’s efforts to regain power were in jeopardy. Thus a return to power became necessary to create reasonable prospects for re-election. The idea gained impetus when the EFF promised to vote for an ANC mayor, provided the candidate was credible. They cited Mcebisi Jonas, who was the first to go public on state capture by the Gupta family, as an example of a worthy candidate. Jonas was uninterested in the position, which forced the party to look for alternative candidates. Others in the party cautioned against relying on the EFF for the mayoralty of the metro. They considered the party unreliable, as it had shown in the instance of its treatment of the DA not only at the NMB, but also in other metros where it backed the DA into power.59 Malema’s party had previously vowed never to vote the ANC back into power at the NMB and was in the habit of threatening the DA in Tshwane and at the City of Johannesburg with a vote of no confidence. Some ANC leaders feared the EFF would change its mind once more, making their mayoralty unstable. The ultimate decision was to return to the executive, but shun the mayoralty. This was considered favourable for the party’s ongoing efforts at rebuilding. A complete takeover of the municipality, it was feared, would reverse attempts to quell factionalism that was caused by a scramble for patronage. Rebuilding the party was viewed as a priority in order to enable it to regain power in the next local elections. Power was not to be shunned completely though. The party resolved to take seats in the mayoral committee and leadership positions in Council. This decision was disingenuous. Being an MMC offered control over patronage, which had given rise to corruption and in-fighting. It was not

58 The Herald, ‘Bay ANC Running on Empty’, 6 July 2018. 59 ANC Eastern Cape, PEC Deployees, Consolidated report, 8 October 2018.

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clear how avoiding the mayoralty, whilst taking seats in government, would not revive the vices that the party sought to eschew. This argument simply provided a disguise for desperation to return to office in order to control the allocation of patronage. In any event, the collapse of the DA-coalition came from an unexpected source. The night before the Council meeting on 26 August 2018, it looked like the scheduled motion of no confidence in the speaker and the mayor would suffer the same fate as the previous four motions. With the ANC withdrawing from the mayoral contest, the EFF had offered the position to the UDM. This infuriated the PA, who wanted the position for their own Marlon Daniels. The leaders of both parties – Malema and Gayton McKenzie – resented each other and had publicly traded insults, calling one another ‘thief’ and ‘gangster’.60 The PA then resolved to remain and vote with the DA-coalition. This meant that the coalition and its opposition counterpart would go into the Council meeting still tied at 60–60, which meant that the speaker, who was from the DA, would cast the tiebreaker in favour of his own party. Things changed dramatically on the day. The DA’s Mxolisi Manyathi61 turned against his own party. When voting was called on the motion of no confidence in the speaker, Manyathi abstained, giving the ANC and its allies the majority of 60 against the coalition’s 59 votes. The ANC’s Buyelwa Mafaya was elected the new speaker, and went on to preside over the election of a new mayor, the UDM’s Mongameli Bobani.62

BOBANI’S ADMINISTRATION: A RETURN TO INFAMY AT CITY HALL Bobani’s election ushered in a new coalition government. Tshonono Buyoyo, of the African Independent Congress, was elected deputy mayor and the remaining ten positions in the mayoral committee were shared between the ANC and the United Front, with the former taking nine of them. The ANC had shunned the

60 Mail & Guardian, ‘Nine Times McKenzie Burned Malema with His Open Letter’, 24 April 2014; Independent Online, ‘Malema Comes Out Gun Blazing at #EFFRally in Nelson Mandela Bay’, 29 March 2018. 61 A proportional representation councillor, Manyathi, ascribed the defiance of his own party to racism. He claimed that black councillors were disrespected in the party. His complicity in bringing down the DA coalition was a vengeful act. Another account from within the DA, by Nqaba Bhanga, was that Manyathi wanted to profit from his membership of the DA before expulsion. He was one of the accused in a trial on charges of fraud. There were discussions already in the party about whether or not he should be suspended, pending the verdict. If he were found guilty, Manyathi was certainly going to be expelled from the party. Rumours doing the rounds in PE and in social media were that he was paid by the ANC to defy his own party. 62 BusinessLive, ‘Athol Trollip Ousted as Nelson Mandela Mayor’, 27 August 2018.

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mayoralty on account of wanting to focus on reforming the party to clean up its tarnished image. In returning to City Hall, especially under Bobani, however, the party reacquainted itself with infamy and stymied efforts to eliminate factionalism within the ranks. Even before the new administration got underway with its work, the mere election of Bobani and Andile Lungisa’s appointment into the mayoral committee cast aspersions on its integrity. Bobani was a dubious figure, and rowdy. He had been complicit in hounding out Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, the city manager who fought corruption. Her departure enabled the continued siphoning of funds linked to IPTS. This had raised suspicion that Bobani was one of the beneficiaries of corruption. The UDM’s subsequent campaign in the by-election at Veeplaas/ KwaMagxaki’s Ward 30 in August 2015, as discussed earlier, showed a party that was flush with cash. One of the UDM’s senior leaders put the party’s expenditure on the campaign and subsequent victory celebrations at around R1 million. He believed the funds were illegal proceeds from the IPTS.63 Bobani was not only suspected of corruption. He had also proven himself to be disorderly as a councillor. From 2017 onwards, Bobani had gained notoriety for disruptive behaviour in Council. In television scenes beamed throughout the country, he sang in Council meetings, spoke without permission, swore and even assaulted a female colleague. His party’s national leaders were embarrassed by his misbehaviour to the point of issuing him with a final warning. The warning threatened him with expulsion and counselled him on proper behaviour: This is the last opportunity you will be given to change your behaviour and modus operandi, failing which, the UDM will automatically recall you and institute disciplinary measures … Henceforth, when you wish to join the debate, raise your hand and do not shout when presenting your case.64

If electing Bobani hinted at the ANC being indifferent to appropriateness of character for public office, Lungisa’s appointment as an MMC confirmed it. As a councillor, Lungisa hardly attended the meetings of his portfolio committee. Over the period between the DA-coalition assuming power in August 2016 and 30 June 2017, Lungisa never attended any of the portfolio committee meetings. He topped the list of dodgers in Council. On being presented with the attendance report, he dismissed it:

63 Interview with a senior UDM leader who chose to remain anonymous, 17 February 2018. 64 News24.com, ‘UDM Issues Bobani with Final Notice for his Behaviour in the Nelson Mandela Bay Council Chamber’, 10 April 2018.

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The person who wrote that my attendance was 0% is crazy … I’m a political commissar of the ANC. It is not mandatory for me to attend committee meetings, especially if there is another programme that clashes with the committee.65

In addition to a lackadaisical attitude to official duties, Lungisa had a criminal conviction. Earlier in 2018, the court had sentenced him to a two-year period in prison for the ‘glass jug’ assault on a fellow councillor. According to the party’s own rules, Lungisa’s conviction should have disqualified him from appointment into the mayoral committee. To be sure, the PEC did not want Lungisa appointed MMC. The list of names it sent to the REC for inclusion into the executive committee, as per the party’s practice, excluded Lungisa. Upon receiving the list, however, the REC changed it to include Lungisa before handing it over to mayor Bobani, who appointed Lungisa onto his mayoral committee.66 On being instructed by the PEC to step down, Lungisa refused,67 and the ANC caucus was reluctant take a resolution to pressurise Bobani to comply with the request from their provincial executive to remove Lungisa.68 It was left up to the PEC to take disciplinary actions against Lungisa, but it would not do so for the reasons explained later in this chapter. With both Bobani and Lungisa in the municipal government, it seemed highly likely that the ANC-dominated coalition would be embroiled in impropriety. Besides the unscrupulous character of the two leading figures, the coalition was not based on any written agreement. There was no formal agreement on how it would be managed or what its priorities would be. This meant that Bobani, as executive mayor, would be free to do what he chose.69 And, the fact that he refused to remove Lungisa at the PEC’s request showed that the two were kindred spirits. Both were unrestrained by organisational discipline and both had a penchant for mischief. The municipality was poised for troubled times. It did not take long. Hardly a week in office, Bobani instructed executive managers to halt staff recruitment and the issuing of tenders. Instead, they were told to hand in a list showing all the vacancies and tenders. Executive managers refused on account of the fact that, as the city manager Johann Mettler explained, ‘It is illegal to interfere

65 The Herald, ‘Bunking Councillors Exposed in Report’, 9 March 2018. 66 Interview with an ANC councillor and REC member who chose to remain anonymous, 13 March 2019. 67 The Herald, ‘Lungisa Told to Step Down from Mayoral Committee’, 9 October 2018. 68 ANC councillor and REC member, interview, 13 March 2019. 69 Interview with Bicks Ndoni, 13 March 2019.

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in this manner in the procurement process of the metro.’70 Issuing tenders falls under the ambit of the city manager, and politicians get involved in recruitment only with the full support of Council in relation to the city manager position. Mettler’s opposition to political meddling made him a target for removal. Bobani was already not enamoured with him. Mettler had opposed Bobani’s earlier attempt to have his political adviser appointed executive director, to dismiss Vuyo Zitumane and to bring back Mod Ndoyana who, as mentioned earlier, had been fired due to fraud and dishonesty. Now Bobani had the power to remove what he considered a hurdle to his interests. Another cause of the cold relations, added Mettler, was that he had submitted a charge of fraud to the police involving officials who worked in Bobani’s department, whilst he was MMC of Public Health.71 A draft forensic report by the auditing firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) uncovered irregularities in the hiring of staff in the public health department, specifically in the city’s waste management depots. Upon taking over the department in August, Bobani instructed senior official Annalisa Dyakala to hire litter-pickers he had selected himself. This was a violation of regulations, which stated that litter-pickers should be recruited through the public works programme. When Dyakala refused, Bobani replaced her with Nkosinathi Dolo, who was not qualified for the post. Dolo complied with Bobani’s instruction. The head of the department, Andile Tolom, asked to be demoted in order to avoid the responsibility of approving the appointments. He claimed to have come under pressure, including death threats, to approve a number of things that were improper. Through Bobani’s instruction, 217 litter-pickers were appointed; most were recruited through the UDM offices. Some were paid without even signing the attendance register. On inspection, some of the areas they were assigned to clean, remained dirty. When those who did not show for work were reprimanded, they told the managers that they would report them to Bobani.72 The charge of fraud implicated Bobani, thereby worsening his relations with Mettler. Bobani suspended Mettler on 27 September 2016. The suspension was based on dubious grounds. The reasons included concluding an irregular contract with a media company, Mohlaleng Media, and the improper appointment of Vuyo Zitumane as executive director. Zitumane’s employment contract was entered

70 Herald Live, ‘Mongameli Bobani: Show Me the Tenders’, 4 September 2018. 71 Mettler, interview, 12 March 2019. 72 NMB Municipality, City Manager’s Report to Council meeting, Forensic Investigation in Respect of Irregular Appointment of Litter Pickers (5/20/2/2) , circa 2017; The Herald, ‘“Father” Bobani Eight Months of Mayhem, Threats’, 9 September 2017.

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into with her company, not her personally. This is what the ANC-coalition charged was improper and blamed Mettler for it. Yet, Zitumane was neither recruited nor employed by Mettler. She had been seconded, as had Mettler, by the national government soon after Danny Jordaan took over as mayor in 2015. If there was anything improper with her appointment, it was for national government and Council to account for, not Mettler. About a month later, Council’s Municipal Public Accounts Committee ruled that the appointment was procedural.73 As for Mettler’s role in approving an allegedly improper contract for a media company, an investigation instigated by Council cleared Mettler of impropriety in the Mohlaleng contract.74 Mettler’s suspension was not only vindictive, but was also meant to open a way for appointing a city manager who would be responsive to politicians’ approaches for the approval of dodgy deals. The immediate result of his suspension was the return of instability at management level. He was quickly replaced with Nolwandle Gqiba as acting city manager. Ggiba quit on 16 October 2016, without even finishing a month in the post, citing ‘family reasons’. Noxolo Nqwazi was then appointed in the same capacity. Bobani removed Nqwazi just more than a month after appointing her. The removal was unceremonious. It happened on a Sunday and Bobani informed the media before telling her. ‘I have not resigned as city manager,’75 Nqwazi told an inquiring journalist. If she had been removed, Nqwazi added: ‘I don’t know why, maybe I will get the reason tomorrow [Monday].’ Meanwhile, Bobani said Nqwazi knew of her removal and ‘did not have a problem at all’. This was obviously false, and Bobani, at a later Council meeting, would not provide the real reasons why he fired Nqwazi.76 Peter Nielson was then appointed acting city manager. Nielson’s appointment flouted regulations. He was a director, a level below executive directors, and regulations stipulated that the chief operating officer, and then executive directors, enjoy preference in such appointments.

73 NMB Municipality, Municipal Public Accounts Committee, Report by the MPAC Chairperson: Findings in Respect of Further Investigations Pertaining to Item 1.9, Pages 236 – Section 32 Report on Payment of Local Government Development and Support Institute (Logodisa) During 2015 and 2016 (5/20/2/5), 30 October 2016. 74 Chippy Olver, who worked with Mayor Jordaan, maintains that this contract benefited the ANC in the lead-up to the 2016 elections. Yet, the party was now part of the effort to punish Mettler for something they had initiated and for their own benefit. See Olver, How to Steal a City. 75 The Herald, ‘Nqwazi Removed as City Boss’, 26 November 2018. 76 NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018.

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Nielson’s appointment suggested that there was an expectation that he would return the favour. The misgiving was especially heightened by two other factors: firstly, Nielson did not have the requisite academic qualifications for the post. He had only a diploma, when the requirement was a degree. Not only was Nielson the least qualified individual to occupy that post since 1995, but he had also been rejected for an executive director post earlier. Secondly, he came from a department – Infrastructure and Engineering – that fell under Lungisa’s portfolio. Lungisa had shown himself to have disdain for rules. When Nielson’s qualifications were questioned at a Council meeting, Lungisa put up a spirited defence describing him as the ‘most competent senior manager’.77 Nielson’s immediate predecessors did not last long in the position because they resisted attempts by the mayor and his ilk to influence administrative decisions in their favour. Gqiba did not resign due to ‘family reasons’, but quit of her own accord due to pressure to make irregular decisions. Soon after her appointment, the mayoral committee presented Gqiba with a list of things to do. These ranged from firing senior managers who where not compliant with their improper directives, hiring individuals who did not qualify, returning suspended officials and signing off on certain irregular contracts. Bobani even took to going to Ggiba’s office with a contract in hand to insist on her approving it. When Gqiba refused to authorise any of the improper activities, she received anonymous threats. The threats were constant, making her job unbearable.78 In the case of Nqwazi, Bobani pushed her out. Her fault was also refusing to sign off certain things Bobani wanted done. Even the timing of her removal, on a Sunday, was not coincidental. The previous night, whilst at the local Opera House Theatre, Bobani phoned her to come out and meet his bodyguard. On meeting the bodyguard in the foyer, Nqwazi was presented with a file of documents to sign on the spot. She refused, saying she could not sign something about which she had no knowledge.79 Her removal the following day was most likely punishment for refusing to go along with the mayor’s improper meddling in the administration. Just as the metro was hobbling from one acting city manager to another, reminiscent of the heyday of instability between 2009 and 2014, it emerged in early October 2018 that the man responsible for the volatility, Bobani, was

77 NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018, p. 116. 78 Interview with a senior official in the municipality who chose to remain anonymous, 20 January 2017. 79 A colleague of Nqwazi informed me of these details, on the same Sunday that the news of her dismissals hit the media.

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under investigation for corruption. The probe followed the aforementioned affidavit by Eduard Roux regarding the payment of fraudulent invoices, for which Bobani had been under investigation since April that year. Roux mentioned that Bobani was paid a total of R1 million in 2014 to settle the legal bill for his case against the former city manager, Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela. As the investigation became public, the president of the UDM, Bantu Holomisa, promised to have the party look through Bobani’s bank accounts to determine if there were any such payments. However, Bobani never made the bank statements available to his party. Instead, and whilst they were waiting for delivery of the statements, Bobani’s lawyer, Danie Gouws, suddenly issued a statement saying he had perused the statements and there was nothing untoward.80 Bobani clearly did not want his party to have sight of his financial affairs. He preferred his lawyer instead, who was bound by lawyer-client confidentiality and would most likely defend him, if and when he was brought to court. It goes without saying that the lawyer would not have revealed anything that would have implicated his client. The suspicion of corruption over the mayor thus lingered on.

POPULISM AND THE UNDERWORLD MEET IN DEFENCE OF A PARTY-BARON Following its conclusion on 8 October 2018 that the REC had become dysfunctional, the PEC resolved, later that month, to dissolve it. The REC refused to disband, dismissing the PEC’s reasons for its disbandment as ‘nothing short of delusion and [it] is an outright delinquent assessment of the realities that confront the Nelson Mandela Bay Region’.81 The REC’s defiance found support from the ANC’s secretary-general, Ace Magashule, and locally from Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs), which had organised themselves into the Black Business Caucus (BBC). Each supported the REC for different reasons. From national headquarters in Johannesburg, Magashule issued a letter instructing provincial secretaries not to disband RECs because doing so created

80 www.udm.org.za, ‘Bobani’s Bank Account Inspected, Says Attorney’, 4 November 2018. 81 The REC countered that it had done commendable work since its election in March 2017. The results of its good work, the REC asserted, was growth in membership, regular REC meetings, victory by its student ally in their elections at the nearby Nelson Mandela University and the ANC’s presence on the mayoral committee. The REC dismissed their disbandment to a vendetta owing to their opposition to the current PEC at the previous provincial conference. See ANC, NMB Region, Themba Xathula, Regional Secretary, Statement of the African National Congress Nelson Mandela Bay Regional Executive Committee on the Outcomes of the ANC Eastern Cape PEC meeting, 24 October 2018.

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divisions, and to reinstate those that had been dissolved. Oscar Mabuyane, provincial chairperson, dismissed Magashule’s instruction as improper and insisted that the PEC was within its rights to disband the REC.82 Magashule and Lungisa were part of the same faction that came under intense suspicion, in September 2018, of plotting to undermine Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. The suspicion was aroused by Magashule’s denial of a meeting with Jacob Zuma at Durban’s Maharani Hotel. One of the Sunday newspapers, Sunday Times, subsequently proved the meeting with photographic evidence. Following this publication, Magashule refused to answer questions for two days. When he eventually did, Magashule said he met Zuma over organisational issues – a response that most dismissed as unconvincing.83 Lungisa was part of the ‘Maharani meeting’.84 Magashule’s intervention on the side of the REC was in defence of his ally, Lungisa. A subsequent meeting of the NEC overruled Magashule, and affirmed the decision by provincial leaders to disband the NMB regional executive committee. Back in Port Elizabeth, the BBC held public meetings in support of the disbanded REC. The meetings were addressed by, among others, the BBC’s co-ordinator, Lithemba Singaphi, and were attended by some of the household names in the ANC, including Mike Xego and Themba Mangqase.85 The BBC prevented the newly announced RTT from entering the regional office, Matomela House (which would remain shut for the most part of November and December 2018).86 Their defence of the REC was owed to Lungisa, whom they still saw as part of the REC, despite his resigning, styling himself as a champion of small black business. Whilst supporting SMMEs is a municipal policy, Lungisa had managed to convince SMMEs that they would not get anything without him (and his REC). In the past two years, Lungisa had built a reputation as a partybaron, largely through financial influence, handing out money to his supporters for attending ANC meetings, and to needy comrades. This partly explained

82 The Herald, ‘Ace’s Instruction Rejected’, 2 November 2018. 83 TimesLIVE, ‘Magashule Part of Secret Meeting with Zuma and Allies “to Chart Fightback against Ramaphosa”’, 9 September 2018. 84 I was told this by one of Lungisa’s closest allies and a prominent regional leader in the ANC’s Amathole region in East London. 85 One of the public meetings took place at the legendary Nangoza Jebe Hall in New Brighton on 10 October 2018. 86 The Herald, ‘Protesters Stop ANC Leaders from Meeting’, 8 November 2018.

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his support among the rank and file, as well as some of the local notables who defended him in public.87 To sustain the mobilisation in defence of ‘his REC’, Lungisa increased the rewards for BBC members. He went beyond just issuing handouts, to giving them a share of the municipal budget. His department, infrastructure and engineering introduced a scheme worth R21.9 million for SMMEs to clean drains. The scheme was unbudgeted for, unnecessary and deviated from normal procurement processes.88 The municipality had a permanent workforce whose responsibility included the cleaning of drains, and there was no crisis with the drainage system that necessitated employment of a special workforce to clean them up. Because the scheme was irregular, it elicited resistance from some officials and councillors. Officials took leave to avoid political pressure to approve the scheme.89 To overcome this resistance, Lungisa decided to have Council issue a special resolution authorising the scheme. For the resolution to pass he needed the full support of the coalition, which was not guaranteed as some councillors, including from his own party, questioned the appropriateness of the scheme. Despite the glaring irregularity, the reluctance to support the scheme on the part of some councillors also had to do with intended beneficiaries. Not all were genuine SMMEs. Amongst them were known figures in the underworld, such as Baba Ningi. Ningi had become a common feature in ANC branch meetings that involved Lungisa, and in the mobilisation against the disbandment of the REC. Ningi mobilised his ilk to close down the regional office and terrorised members of the RTT. At some point in November 2018, they even knocked down the door at the regional office and threatened the interim regional leaders with violence, if they ever returned.90 Ningi’s mob also took to harassing officials in their offices when it became known that they were resistant to approving the drain-cleaning scheme. Lungisa had told them which officials were opposing the scheme. He was effectively mobilising the mob to intimidate officials into

87 I came across this view quite often in conversations, during the course of my fieldwork in PE, with ANC activists, former leaders and even Lungisa’s own admirers and associates in the mayoral committee. For a councillor, it is not clear where Lungisa gets all the money from. Given the prominence of money in ANC national contests, which has been denounced in numerous previous national conferences, it is not far-fetched that it was a leftover from the recent 54th National Conference. Lungisa was a key figure for the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (dubbed NDZ 17) campaign for the presidency of the ANC in the Eastern Cape. 88 NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018. 89 The Herald, ‘Silent Mutiny’, 30 November 2018. 90 Algoa FM, www.algoafm.co.za, 28 October 2018.

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approving an irregular expenditure. The intimidation led to officials fleeing their offices under the guise of taking leave. On 4 December 2018, the drain-cleaning scheme was tabled at a Council meeting. The choice of the location for the meeting, at Nangoza Jebe in New Brighton, was deliberate. It was meant to enable maximum turnout of the SMMEs and the elements of the underworld. The idea was for the crowd to intimidate reluctant councillors into voting for the scheme. Already, intimidation was rife in the days leading up to the Council meeting, and word had spread that those who did not vote for the scheme would become targets of violent attacks. New Brighton itself is notorious as indawo yama-gintsa (a place of gangsters), and the meeting was due to finish in the wee hours of the next day (which it did, at 3:00 am). One of the ANC councillors, Ncediso Captain, was even confronted by Ningi on the morning of the meeting, wanting to know if he was opposed to the scheme. Captain had questioned the scheme the previous night in a meeting of councillors with the PEC. His criticism of the scheme was then communicated to Ningi on the same night, through a text message. The message was intentional, intended for Ningi to intimidate Captain.91 Turnout at the Council meeting was as Lungisa had intended. The gallery upstairs was packed, with those in attendance looking down at the councillors. ‘It was pretty intimidating,’ said Captain. ‘You could feel their stares as they looked down at us to see who was not raising his hand in support of the scheme.’ The Council meeting approved the scheme, with the majority support of the ANC-coalition, whilst the DA councillors abstained. The DA and its allies decided that abstention was a safer option than outright opposition.92 There were no substantial reasons provided for introducing the scheme. It was simply couched as support for SMMEs, which was quite startling, especially given that funding the scheme entailed diverting funds from legitimate service delivery projects. These included the purchase of sewerage collection vehicles, and the construction of a bridge and roads.93 Now that Council had issued a resolution, it was left to administrators to implement the drain-cleaning scheme. However, some were still uncomfortable with taking on the responsibility. Officials in the infrastructure and engineering department especially, who were ordinarily responsible for drains, refused to get involved. Besides the dubious nature of the scheme, it was clear that its implementation would not be concluded seamlessly. Implementation involved 91 ANC councillor and REC member, interview, 13 March 2019. 92 Interview with DA councillor, Sandile Rwexana, 13 March 2019. 93 NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018.

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registering more than 900 companies, identifying drains that needed cleaning, cleaning them up, verifying work done and processing payments.94 Payments alone normally took 31 working days to process. All this had to happen before Christmas, within 13 working days. This is what makes the decision by the Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Agriculture (EDTA) to take the responsibility for implementation curious. EDTA lacked the knowledge of which drains needed cleaning, if at all, and lacked the expertise to verify later if any work had been done.95 A possible answer is that EDTA’s executive director, Anele Qaba, agreed to the undertaking in order to court favour with the councillors as his contract was expiring in March 201996 and he wanted to be re-hired. In their intimidation of councillors, Ningi had mentioned that those who resisted the scheme would not have their contracts renewed. In the case of the executive director of the Department of Infrastructure and Engineering, Walter Shaidi, whose contract was also expiring at the same time as Qaba’s, he was perhaps indifferent to his contract being renewed. In any case, Qaba’s EDTA was ill-equipped to oversee the cleaning of drains. For this reason, the department hired two companies – JK Structures and Finecorp – to oversee the work. These two companies were already contracted by the municipality and worked in the sanitation and construction sectors.97 The scope of the work and the rush with which it was meant to be completed, however, was overwhelming, even for the two contractors. In turn, they hired two other companies, which were identified by Ningi himself, to assist them.98 This took the total number of companies hired to four in number – two main contractors and two sub-contractors. It remained to be seen if they could undertake a task that ordinarily took months to do properly, within a period of about 13 days. Whilst Lungisa had an immediate gain in issuing the scheme, he was not the only one who stood to benefit. Bobani, too, was likely to gain in popularity. He had fashioned himself as ‘a man of the people’, even promising to focus 94 NMB Municipality, Report to the Executive Mayoral Committee by the Executive Director of Economic Development, Tourism and Agriculture, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019. 95 NMB Municipality, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019. 96 NMB Municipality, Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018. 97 NMB Municipality, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019. 98 NMB Municipality. Submission to the Mayoral Committee: Klopper, C (JK Structures) and J. Carelson (Finecorp Trading), Auditing Report of SMME Drain Cleaning Report, 1 February 2019.

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expenditure exclusively on the predominantly poor and black townships, to the exclusion of the largely white suburbs.99 His populist stance, with the national elections looming, was a way of building up support for his own party, the UDM. The mayoralty gave Bobani visibility and executive authority to issue populist schemes, for which the UDM could then claim credit. This explains why the party launched its election manifesto, later in February 2019, in Port Elizabeth. The metro provided an ideal location for the party to gloat about what Bobani’s administration was doing. It was only after the drain-cleaning scheme was completed and payments issued on 24 December 2018, that calm returned in the ANC. Lungisa’s mob stopped harassing the RTT. The interim leaders were able to occupy the regional office in early January 2019. Just as the RTT was settling into its work, another storm was beginning to brew. Pictures of Baba Ningi in a car, with a young child waving stacks of cash, began to make the rounds in social media. This was accompanied by reports that some of the small business people had not been paid. A protest march was subsequently convened in mid-January 2019 at City Hall, where hundreds of SMMEs complained of not being paid. The protest march was followed by a series of killings of individuals who allegedly got the bulk of the money. Ningi was the first to suffer a fatal shooting, at daylight on 28 January 2019, with no less than 10 bullets pumped into his body.100 By the end of February 2019, nine more individuals that were allegedly linked to the drainage work had been killed. Subsequent reports101 by both the EDTA and the two main contractors validated the complaints that some of the SMMEs had not been paid. These totalled 31, whilst 44 were paid without producing any evidence of work done. Of the latter, 10 were even double-paid. The main contractors’ report also noted that the sub-contractors could not account for about R4.5 million of the total amount deposited to their accounts to pay SMMEs. Ultimately, as the EDTA report conceded, the scheme was fated to go haywire due to insufficient

99 The Citizen, ‘Bobani’s “Plan” to Ignore PE’s White Suburbs for Service Delivery Backfires on UDM’, 19 September 2018. 100 Sunday Times, ‘Stormwater Drain Tender Spark Rash of Killings in PE’, 24 February 2019. 101 NMB Municipality. Submission to the Mayoral Committee: Klopper, C (JK Structures) and J. Carelson (Finecorp Trading), Auditing Report of SMME Drain Cleaning Report, 1 February 2019; and NMB Municipality, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019.

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time within which it was to be done, lack of proper procurement processes and inadequate expertise to oversee the work.102 Lungisa enlisted the underworld in his defence against the PEC. He not only used this mob to terrorise and destabilise the organisation, but also rewarded them with financial resources secured improperly from the municipality. The effect of this underworld involvement in the fraudulent drain-cleaning scheme led, as we have seen, to multiple hit-murders that created a climate of fear within the organisation and the city at large. Clearly, Lungisa had become emboldened in his defiance of the ANC. He had initiated the bogus scheme in the midst of the PEC instructing him to resign from the mayoral committee. Nonetheless, the PEC’s endorsement of the scheme also cast doubts on their sincerity about removing Lungisa and their commitment to weeding out impropriety. The RTT’s standpoint on the matter of Lungisa’s removal, discussed next, would reveal that, contrary to their supposed disapproval of Lungisa’s serving in the mayoral committee, the PEC actually wanted him to remain in the executive.

TOWARDS THE 2019 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: NMB ANC CAMPAIGN – THUMA MINA!103 And so, the campaign for the 2019 national elections, which began in January 2019, found the NMB ANC faced with a number of challenges. In addition to a municipality mired in malfeasance that sparked killings, the challenges included a rift amongst regional leaders and disenchanted members. Leaders of the disbanded REC did not recognise the newly appointed interim leaders, and enjoyed some level of support among the 60 branches in the region. It was not clear if those branches would remain loyal to their disbanded leadership, or accept the legitimacy of the new interim leaders. An equally interesting challenge was how the disbanded leaders, in light of their disgruntlement, would relate to the RTT in the period leading up to the national elections due on 8 May 2019 – just about four months away. 102 NMB Municipality, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019. 103 Thuma mina is a Zulu phrase that means ‘send me’. ANC president and head of state, Cyril Ramaphosa, adopted the phrase to characterise his tenure. He borrowed it from the title of a popular song by the legendary singer, Hugh Masekela. The phrase appeals to ordinary people to get involved in activities towards the public good. In adopting the phrase to characterise his tenure, Ramaphosa promised that the ANC and his government would lead in an exemplary manner. See Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address, 16 February 2018. Accessed 29 December 2019, https://www.gov.za/speeches/ president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000.

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Elections are contested differently depending on what sphere of government they involve. Unlike local elections, national elections rest largely on national leaders, who make frequent visits to communities to feature in rallies and engage in door-to-door visits to potential voters. Whilst they may touch on some of the issues that affect locals, national leaders tend to speak broadly on what the ANC government has done. Their role is to ignite popular excitement locally, especially if they enjoy high approval ratings, which was the case with the ANC’s Cyril Ramaphosa.104 During periods of their absence, local leaders are supposed to carry through the momentum that would have been created. They create a ground force, made up of party members that serve as volunteers, to continue the campaign, especially through door-to-door visits. The 2019 elections were fought over a combination of issues. In a country with roughly 27 per cent of its able-bodied population unemployed, job creation remained a constant cry. What was most worrisome to the ANC, however, was corruption and maladministration. Whilst recognising the negative impact that unemployment has on its ratings, the ANC identified malfeasance and misconduct of its leaders as most detrimental to their electoral prospects. This is why the party made ‘renewal’ a major theme of its 2017 national conference and undertook to herald a ‘new dawn’ in government. Consequently, their election manifesto promised, among other things, intolerance for corruption, integrity in public institutions, ethical leadership and the rule of law. Both the campaign operation and the theme proved to be a tall order for the ANC in the region. The problems lay in the composition105 and mandate of the RTT, the conduct of the ANC-dominated municipality and the general state of the organisation. Nceba Faku headed the RTT, making him the face and spokesperson of the local campaign. A long-serving leader of the ANC, Faku’s name is not synonymous with the ethical leadership and intolerance for corruption

104 The ANC’s own internal poll put Ramaphosa’s approval ratings at 73% and the party’s at 60%. See TimesLIVE, ‘Voters Like Cyril Ramaphosa More than They Like the ANC’, 24 February 2019. 105 The Regional Task Team was made up of 31 members: Nceba Faku was the convener; Babalwa Lobishe, co-ordinator and Wandisile Jikeka, Treasurer. The rest of the members were: Vuyokazi Dapo, Gama Maqhula, Nondumiso Maphazi, Mazwi Mini, Bicks Ndoni, Buyelwa Mafaya, Veliswa Ndidi, Nomvuselelo Tontsi, JP Pretorious, Mark Beale, Betty Ncanywa, Mabhuti Dano, Gege Mbikanye, Mthwabo Ndube, Ncediso Captain, Nodoli Jodwana, Feziwe Sibeko, Itumeleng Reunyile, Vuyo Toto, Phumeza Mpushe, Yoliswa Pali, Thobile Mhlahlo, Tony Duba, Nomsa Booi, Tamara Xhanti, Eugene Johnson and Lawrence Troon.

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that were the mainstay of the ANC campaign.106 As noted in earlier chapters, and although he has not been convicted, Faku has been implicated in major misdemeanours that have tainted the metro since 2000. These involved expenditure of the mayoral fund on personal items in the early 2000s, corruption that was unearthed by the Kabuso Report in 2010, the firing of Graham Richards and Nondumiso Maphazi – the city manager and mayor respectively – in 2009, and the general municipal instability between 2009 and 2013. Faku’s notoriety was raised by one of the callers into a popular radio station, Nkqubela, on 20 November 2018, just after the RTT had been officially appointed. The host of the show, Percy Lamani, had invited Faku to explain what the RTT would do. A caller, who would not identify himself, but whom Faku recognised as Ntlane, said Faku should step back because ‘waziwa ngomosha’ [Faku is known for mischief].107 This put the image of the RTT at odds with its own campaign theme. In addition to the image problem, the RTT’s mandate did not give it authority over ANC councillors in order to address maladministration. This mandate was defined by the PEC, the body that appointed the REC. The result was that the RTT would not join the call for Lungisa’s removal from the mayoral committee on account of his criminal conviction and destabilisation of the ANC through criminal elements. Faku explained their role as follows: We don’t want to sustain i-mood yezixhiba no xhwitha-xhwithano. Lo mba mdala. Uphethwe zinkokheli ezipha phezulu. Thina sizo-unifaya and improve i-integrity ye-ANC. [… the mood of vengeance and conflict. This matter is old and is being handled by the leaders in the upper structures. Our role is to unify and improve the integrity of the ANC]. Our focal point is rebuilding the ANC. Governance will be a by-the-way issue.108

The mandate of the RTT, therefore, was limited. Strangely, it hoped to improve the image of the ANC without paying attention to the misconduct of its councillors in Council. This was effectively an endorsement for Lungisa to remain in the mayoral committee despite his criminal conviction and his subsequent role in issuing a fraudulent contract that led to multiple hit-murders. Instead of taking the lead in rebuking misbehaviour, as another member of the

106 ANC, Let’s Grow South Africa Together: 2019 Election Manifesto – A People’s Plan for a Better Life for All, January 2019. 107 Faku was not the only RTT member whose name was synonymous with mischief. Tony Duba was similarly tainted. He was implicated in the IPTS corruption. Nkqubela Community Radio Station, Percy Lamani’s Show, 20 November 2018. 108 Nkqubela Community Radio Station, Percy Lamani’s Show, 20 November 2018.

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RTT – Thobile Mhlahlo – pointed out, the RTT was characterised by a bizarre silence. The silence applied not only to the RTT, but also extended to ANC branches. Meetings hardly discussed why people were being killed for fear that they, too, could be killed, if they said something unpopular. ‘ANC members are gripped by fear, which means the organisation is not providing leadership to society,’ said Mhlahlo.109 The status quo within the NMB ANC was at odds with the party’s general election theme. Municipal activities, the choice of leaders and their conduct did not hint at the onset of a new dawn, but pointed at a regression. This made it difficult for local leaders to mount a credible campaign under the party’s election theme. They did not epitomise what they promised. As a result, the campaign was generally lucklustre. There were occasional walkabouts and door-to-door campaigns, but they lacked the general excitement typical of campaigns for national elections. Interim leaders looked up to Ramaphosa to enthuse their local campaign. After failing to come on the weekend of 15–17 March 2019 as was initially scheduled, Ramaphosa eventually visited a month later on 14 April. His visit was as the local party leaders expected. He set the metro abuzz. All three venues he visited – at Algoa Park, New Brighton and Motherwell – were packed to capacity. Excited and relieved party activists circulated boastful pictures of the packed venues throughout PE that day.110 The level of excitement was similarly high on his visit to Uitenhage on 27 April 2019. However, the excitement did not last. It dissipated just as Ramaphosa left the coastal town. The most notable sign was on 1 May, Workers’ Day – a day that is part of the political calendar commemorated by the ANC and its allies. Whilst it is largely about workers’ issues, local leaders also used the event as their own version of the Siyanqoba (we are winning) rally. This is the last public gathering the ANC holds just before an election as ‘the last push’ to excite both ANC supporters and the general public to vote for the party. The event, however, did not have the intended effect. Addressed by former treasurer of the ANC, Zweli Mkhize and Senzeni Zokwana, chairperson of the SACP, attendance was notably underwhelming. ‘Bafun’ uRamaphosa abantu’ (people want Ramaphosa), a former ANC Youth League leader and a close associate of Andile Lungisa explained.111 This was also validated during door-to-door visits. People were not

109 Interview with Thobile Mhlahlo, 14 March 2019. 110 Lawrence Troon, an ANC local leader, was amongst those that circulated pictures of 14 April 2019. 111 A conversation with a former ANCYL leader and a close associate of Andile Lungisa, who chose to remain anonymous, 3 May 2019.

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keen to listen to what volunteers were saying, but quickly told them that they will vote for Ramaphosa and promptly ushered them out of their homes. They hardly even signed the answer sheets that volunteers took along with them to fill in their answers. Their signatures, alongside a home address, served as proof of the visits. This shows that potential voters did not place any value on what the local ANC said, nor did they even care to please the volunteers, but they trusted Ramaphosa. If they voted for the ANC, it would be because of their trust in Ramaphosa, not what the party’s local leaders told them. Rifts hampered the campaign even further. The RTT were divided amongst themselves. Thobile Mhlahlo and Mthwabo Ndube, two of the few untainted local leaders, were unhappy at the inclusion of other individuals whom they felt did not epitomise the party’s election theme due to their association with corruption and the destabilisation of the ANC pre-2015. They eventually pulled out of the RTT. Those who remained carried on bickering over Lungisa’s continued inclusion in the mayoral committee. Some wanted him removed, whilst others were not keen on the idea. One of those who wanted Lungisa removed believed that his colleagues’ opposition to the idea was prompted by the financial support they sought from Lungisa to ease their own financial problems.112 Fissures also manifested between the office bearers of the erstwhile REC and the RTT. Whilst the RTT was rebuilding the organisation and leading the campaign, elements of the disbanded REC were mobilising towards a regional conference that was tentatively scheduled for June 2019. These objectives were not necessarily aligned. Members of the disbanded REC neither recognised nor worked with the RTT. Rather, they were strictly focused on preparing for the regional conference, scheduled for soon after the national elections. One of their preparatory activities was engaging in the old corrosive practice that the 54th National Conference had vowed to eliminate, namely, the buying of ‘block membership cards’. This involved purchasing R40 000 worth of membership cards.113 At R20 per membership, this translates to 2 000 members who will be signed up by the person that bought the cards. The ‘bought members’ will vote whichever way their patron instructs them, in return for a payment. They are rented members at the behest of their patron.114 Moreover, when the former REC leaders did work with the RTT, it was for self-interest, especially in instances where the RTT needed money. On one occasion, in February 2019, the RTT could not buy refreshments for volunteers and 112 Interview with a member of the RTT who chose to remain anonymous, 13 March 2019. 113 RTT member, interview, 13 March 2019. 114 RTT member, interview, 13 March 2019.

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members of branch election teams who had gathered at Opera House for a meeting. Lungisa bought the refreshments, and made it known that it was him. That must have bought him some goodwill from ANC members. It is clear that the organisation was not only divided, but also lacked funds to sustain their ground forces and create visibility. Activists complained about lack of branded T-shirts, and posters were not widely displayed. By the time the national election got underway on 8 May, the question for the NMB ANC was whether Ramaphosa’s high approval ratings would mitigate deep local disapproval for the party. The proceedings of the day began in an alarmingly similar fashion to the 3 August 2016 local elections. The Herald reported that ‘early indications suggested that voters in Wards 1 to 10, mostly suburban areas, came out in large numbers, while in many other parts of the metro the turnout was poor’.115 The regional IEC manager, Crosby Bacela, made a similar observation on the day: ‘When I got to a voting station at Lorraine at 6:15 am there was already a long queue outside, before we even opened.’116 This suggested eagerness on the part of white voters, who have traditionally been DA supporters. Bacela speculated that the pouring rain, as was the case in 2016, could have had something to do with the relatively low turnout in the townships. The rain did not seem to dampen the keenness of white voters, however. Nonetheless, the results were not as bad as the uneven queues had suggested earlier in the day. The ANC got the highest number of votes, at 177 422, followed by the DA with 153 840. The ANC had displaced the DA as the largest party in the metro. Whilst back to being largest, it did not get the majority of the votes cast in the metro. Its proportion of votes constituted 45.85%, which still fell short of the 48.81% it had registered in the past national elections. Ramaphosa’s popularity improved the party’s electoral fortunes, which was also helped by the DA’s poor performance. Some of the DA supporters appeared to have switched over to the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and the newly formed Good party. The FF+ more than doubled its support in the metro, from 2 526 (0.58%) in 2014 to 5 645 (1.46%), and Patricia de Lille’s Good party attracted 2 780 votes (0.72%).117 These were possibly conservative voters that the DA had attracted to the party in 1999 when it contested the election under the slogan, ‘Fight Back’ and those that De Lille had taken along after dissolving her party, the Independent Democrats, to join the DA. 115 The Herald, ‘Now We Wait’, 9 May 2019. 116 Telephonic conversation with Crosby Bacela, 8 May 2019. 117 Independent Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.za.

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To regain majority status in the 2021 local elections, the regional ANC still has a lot more to do, both in terms of governance and leadership choices. The marginal improvement in the 2019 elections is not an endorsement of local ANC leaders or the coalition government led by UDM’s Mongameli Bobani. Electoral support for the UDM, down to 4 142 (1.07%) from 7 276 (1.67%) in 2014, was further indication that locals are unhappy with the municipal performance. The UDM had launched its election manifesto in the metro to tout Bobani’s achievements in the hope that, whatever popularity he might have got, would rub off on the party nationally. On the contrary, Bobani’s mayoralty depressed the party’s popularity in the metro. The ANC, which is the dominant component of Bobani’s coalition, was spared a similar fate by Ramaphosa’s popularity. In the two years that followed the Broad Consultative Forum of September 2016, therefore, the ANC showed hardly any signs of reforming. It not only remained plagued by factionalism, but was also dominated by a party-baron who entangled the organisation in his own leadership ambitions. Andile Lungisa owed his elevation to financial influence. He dispensed patronage to both members and leaders alike. This showed that subsistence took precedence over organisational integrity. Individual leaders and members could not adapt to life outside of power (with its access to patronage). Patronage had become the lifeblood of the entire organisational machinery and its cadreship. This explains the decision to lessen their effort towards reforming the party in favour of returning to government, even through a morally flawed candidate – Mongameli Bobani. They were aware of Bobani’s moral shortcomings, but voted for him nonetheless. Their coalition was not based on any principles, but was merely a route back to power. This meant that Bobani could act in any manner he chose so long as they remained in office. Bobani and Lungisa’s conduct, in the process, undercut any moral claims that the organisation made to integrity. That Bobani was from the UDM did not make it any easier for the ANC to absolve itself of culpability for his impropriety. They accounted for 90 per cent of the coalition and leadership seats in the mayoral committee and Council, and voted against motions of no confidence in Bobani. They not only elevated Bobani to the mayoralty knowing his moral flaws, but also protected him so that he remained mayor.

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10 Conclusion This book set out to both chronicle and analyse the ANC’s decline and eventual loss of power in the NMB municipality. It examined the party in its various forms and at different moments as an institution since re-establishment in 1990; as an incumbent, beginning with the TLC in May 1994, and as an opposition party and part of a coalition government post-August 2016. This entailed a 29-year period, from 1990 to May 2019. Specifically, the book answered four interrelated questions: what was the cause of the decline? what remedial measures were introduced to reform the party? why did remedial measures not work, and how has the party adapted to the loss of power? In answering these questions the book began with an examination of how the organisation was rebuilt in 1990 and the major organisational actors that were involved in that process. The purpose was to establish the character of the organisation upon re-establishment in order to track and discern the changes it subsequently experienced in the following years. This involved looking at what criteria members used in identifying leaders, their leadership culture and style, how the organisation recruited members, what attracted members to the party and the size of the party’s membership. The ANC enjoyed enormous support due to its heroic role in forcing the apartheid government to democratise. Leadership preference started off with individuals who had a demonstrable, lengthy record in the ANC and had proven their dedication to the cause. These tended to be individuals who had been in exile and served time in prison. The idea was to ensure that the revived ANC was imbued with, and reflected, ANC values. Govan Mbeki, an ANC stalwart, played a central role in this process. This opening part of the book also looked at the ANC’s involvement in local negotiations with the statutory bodies to integrate the segregated and fragmented municipal authorities into one. Port Elizabeth was the first city to engage in such negotiations, which led to the city’s pioneering the formation of TLCs in the

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country. This distinction owed to a long and rich history of political activism, coupled with trans-racial ties that were forged amongst individuals across the political divide in the city. Following the establishment of the TLC in 1994, the book shifted the focus to the ANC’s debut into officialdom, leading to incumbency that would last, uninterrupted, over a period of roughly 22 years. Ascension to office raised a potential problem over how the two components of the organisation, inside and outside of government, would work together. Thabo Mbeki stressed co-ordination as the answer to ensuring that the two components worked effectively. From outside government, the party laid out policies and monitored their implementation. Inside government, party deployees would be guided by those policies in their work. In practice, however, there was little co-ordination. The causes were both structural issues and lapses in leadership. Ascension to office led to a number of credible and experienced leaders leaving party structures for government, especially since there was a sense of urgency to restructure government. The consequences were that the regional, provincial and national offices remained ill-equipped to provide guidance to their government and Council deployees. This resulted in a lack of clear guidelines spelling out what co-ordination should entail. How the relationship between party office-bearers and deployees in government and Council panned out, depended on the individuals involved. Leaders with a strong personality, such as Nceba Faku, got their way regardless of the wishes of the leadership collective. The benefits of officialdom also swayed relations between the party and its deployees, in favour of the latter. Branch Executive Committees and some of their members came to rely on councillors for organisational resources and personal sustenance. This created a lopsided relationship that advantaged councillors. It was left up to individual councillors as to whether or not they exploited their elevated status in their own interests, and whether or not BEC members enjoyed sufficient autonomy to enforce proper co-ordination between the BEC and councillors. Personal ambitions greatly influenced dynamics between councillors and BEC members. The position of councillor is a coveted one. This led to intra-party feuds that would later have a damaging impact on the coherence and reputation of the party. Just like the ANC, Council was also slow to adapt to the new political order. Apartheid regulations and practices persisted into the new, democratic Council. Councillors did business with Council. They used their positions to award themselves contracts and authorise the lease or sale of municipal assets to themselves. Even though barred from deciding over contracts where there was a conflict of 316

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interest, they ignored such prohibitions without sanction from the party. Political office quickly became an instrument of financial accumulation. They began to fight amongst one another for executive positions that would give them the most influence over the allocation of tenders and municipal business in general. The result was leadership instability, as rival leaders were purged from Council, and factions became prominent. When new legislation was eventually promulgated in 2004, eliminating loopholes that had enabled abuse of office for financial gain, councillors found ways around it. They had become accustomed, over a period of almost ten years, to the spoils of office. Now that it was only municipal officials who would decide on tender allocation, councillors began the practice of employing pliant city managers and influencing the recruitment of the rest of the executive managers. Some were even employed without the requisite technical skills. The idea was to have managers issue contracts to companies that were connected to councillors. This sparked squabbles amongst councillors, as each faction insisted on appointing an individual who would be pliant to their own solicitation. The result of disagreements over candidates for permanent or fixed-term positions resulted in a proliferation of temporary appointments. Some remained in the same position for years, which was illegal, with adverse consequences for the municipality. Because temporary appointees were keen for reappointment, they tended to be overly cautious for fear of making mistakes and were reluctant to take decisions that would have a long-term impact. To increase prospects of reappointment, others simply sided with certain politicians against others, adding to the intra-party conflict. Administrative instability showed in poor service delivery, especially from 2012 onwards. Corruption and the lure of financial gain worsened intra-party feuds. Malfeasant politicians and those who sought office for private benefit became obsessed with getting, and clinging onto power. They fanned factionalism under the guise of ideological differences. Once triumphant, their greed became evident in the subsequent purge of officials and politicians who opposed corruption. Not all – the triumphant Stalini faction, for instance – had ill intentions. Some of them, led by mayor Zanuxolo Wayile, insisted on ethical leadership and resisted influences towards ignoble ends. This resistance turned them into enemies of the malfeasant lot. Because of threats to expose corruption and institute legal charges, the patronage-obsessed faction became even more determined to purge its rivals. A full-blown feud among members who had formerly belonged to the same faction ensued in public. Council hardly functioned, to the point of threatening its dissolution.

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Faced with a debilitating intra-party feud, provincial and national leaders introduced what they claimed to be corrective leadership changes. Ben Fihla’s appointment as the new mayor, however, turned out to be a disguise to perpetuate maladministration. Fihla himself became complicit in improper appointments and hounding out competent and ethical officials. This showed that the patronage-based faction was not just confined to the NMB. It cut across the leadership hierarchy, up to the national level. Malfeasant local leaders enjoyed the protection and support of provincial and national leaders. Intra-party feuds and maladministration took their toll on the party’s ratings. It dropped notably in electoral support. By the time the 2016 local elections approached, the possibility of the ANC losing the metro had become real. This necessitated introducing a real change-agent in the metro, with accompanying powers to clean up the municipality and resume regular service delivery. Whilst beneficial for the party, Danny Jordaan’s drastic changes threatened malfeasant leaders with jail-time and jeopardised their continuing access to patronage. Rather than help Jordaan succeed, they sabotaged him in the hope that poor electoral returns would force his resignation. Malfeasant leaders risked the ANC losing its majority, but did not entertain the idea that the DA could replace them as the biggest party in the metro. Their confidence came from the fact that the DA support-base, a combination of predominantly white and some coloured supporters, constituted a minority in terms of the metro’s demographic make-up. Voter turnout shifted the balance of power towards the opposition. Traditional ANC supporters simply stayed at home on 3 August 2016, whilst DA supporters turned up in large numbers. The contrasting turnout was a reaction to the ANC’s infamy since 2009. Whilst most African voters could not bring themselves to support the DA, they could not vote for the ANC either. They were disillusioned with the party. Conversely, maladministration made DA supporters more determined than ever to rid the municipality of the ANC. Maladministration had a catalytic effect on levels of turnout. The ANC had previously enjoyed superior voter turnout, but that began to change in 2011 – a change that coincided with the onset of maladministration. The electoral loss came as a shock. It was followed by introspection and resolutions to reform the party. The decision was to focus on the new role as opposition, whilst going through reforms. But the party just could not function outside of government. Its shape and operations were wholly dependent on the benefits of incumbency. Being out of power threatened organisational operations and party activities. What followed was a decision to return to power, but indirectly, without assuming the mayoralty. The return to power effectively meant 318

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the abandonment of party reforms. It was an admission of the centrality of patronage in the existence of the party. Given the delicacy of coalition politics, this time around it was not just about exploiting the benefits of incumbency, but also about exploiting the moment, callously abusing power as quickly as possible before the coalition collapsed. This has brought instability back to the management of the municipality and led to desperate measures that even saw the ANC enlisting elements of the underworld to terrorise municipal officials into issuing irregular contracts. The consequence has been public assassinations amongst the criminals who paraded as business people. The reform project was aborted with the endorsement of provincial leaders. Andile Lungisa, who is the de facto leader of the party in Council, has not attracted any sanction from the upper structures. Not only that, but the party has also not enforced the decision to remove him from the mayoral committee on account of his conviction for assault. As a PR councillor, Lungisa is a party appointee to Council, and, as such, can be recalled by the party. Refusing to resign is a breach of organisational discipline that is punishable by suspension or expulsion. The fact that provincial leaders have not removed Lungisa from the mayoral committee shows that they are not entirely averse to his continued stay in the executive. Lungisa is a local party patron who operates perfectly in the patronage-based party that the ANC has become. His rise to leadership in the metro is owed to his disbursement of patronage to other influential leaders and his followers in the party. He knows how to secure and distribute patronage, abilities that provincial leaders may not necessarily frown upon. Lungisa’s shenanigans, however, have proven detrimental to the party’s electoral fortunes. The party performed better than the DA in the 2019 elections, but still fell short of 50 per cent. This marginal improvement owed to approval ratings of the party’s presidential candidate, Cyril Ramaphosa. Campaign activities were built around Ramaphosa and were visible when he visited the metro. Without Ramaphosa, the local campaign was lacklustre. The local ANC is far from reforming itself. The ANC’s decline in the metro is typical of dominant parties. The party’s heroic history was the source of both its initial dominance and subsequent decline. Ordinary people flocked to join the ranks of the party and voted for it due to their reverence for and admiration of its leaders, who had sacrificed their lives for the cause of freedom, prioritising the public good over personal comforts. Once in government, however, leaders of the liberation movement could not sustain their adulated status and exemplary conduct. It divided into various 319

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factions formed around ideology (centrist and left-wing) and material interest. Whilst disagreeing on policy from the late 1990s, the ideologically driven factions largely co-operated throughout the early 2000s for the good of the party. It was only when personal interests, rather than ideological differences, became the dominant factor in the formation of factions post-2006 that they became highly competitive with one another. Factional competition sharpened the intra-party feud. This eventually led to a split in 2008, which marked the beginning of the ANC’s electoral decline in 2009. The split saw some supporters following the new splinter group – Cope – whilst others were alienated from the ANC and never returned. Cope’s relatively poor performance in the 2009 elections, occasioned by internal problems, saw some of the defectors returning to the ANC. Even though they could not return to the helm of the party instantly, the ANC could still guarantee their livelihood through employment in the administration or public entities, and the issuing of contracts. The return of Cope defectors affirmed the advantages of incumbency. Besides controlling resources, the party had done notably well in changing the face of black neighbourhoods. Unemployment remained a challenge, but townships had undoubtedly changed from what they were before 1994. This is what had given the ANC relative advantage over the opposition, especially as its glorious stature began to erode. The largest opposition party, the DA, was further disadvantaged by racial cleavages. Intra-party feuds, however, eroded the capacity of the municipality to function. The threat of losing elections triggered reforms within the ANC at the leadership level. The reform-minded leadership was thwarted, however. Reforms threatened those who benefited from corruption. Factional interests preceded organisational objectives. Electoral success would have strengthened and extended the tenure of reformers in the party, enabling them to proceed with their reforms. The patronage faction sabotaged the party’s electoral prospects in the hope of saving themselves. The shock that came with losing the elections did not induce real changes. The patronage faction remains dominant in the NMB. Provincial and national leaders support it. Without decisive intervention from outside, the status quo is likely to persist. However, instituting corrective changes, even from the national office, will not be easy. The entrenchment of corruption has increased the stakes to remain in office. New and independent leaders bring up the possibility of exposing corruption and, consequently, imprisonment. This has led to some of the leaders using violent criminals to silence critical members and entrench themselves in positions of influence. Corruption threatens to make violence a common means to settle party matters. Any intervention to reform the party will have to deal not only 320

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with wayward party leaders, but also with the criminal underworld that has been recruited into a militia force in their defence. They, too, stand to lose from the ejection of their ‘handlers’ and may just be equally determined, if not more, to resist party reforms. This involvement of the underworld in politics shows that corruption has taken on a variety of guises. Those who parade as SMMEs are not entirely authentic business people. Some are criminal elements disguised as business people. Their claims to business are simply a guise to justify receiving lucrative business contracts; their true nature is revealed when they engage in violence to force officials to issue their contracts without following proper procedures. That some of the SMMEs cannot account for all funds received also indicates a strong possibility of thievery, or fraud, that may well include the politicians who championed the issuing of such irregular tenders. This suggests an emerging and disturbing alliance between politicians and criminal elements. Whilst this may not necessarily imply that the underworld has ‘captured the state’, we may well be seeing a strengthening of mutual dependence between politics and criminality towards ends that have little to do with ‘a better life for all’.

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About the author Mcebisi Ndletyana is one of South Africa’s leading  public commentators on politics. He holds a PhD from the University of the Witwatersrand, and is Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Johannesburg (UJ). Before joining UJ, Professor Ndletyana  held research positions at several  institutions,  including the Human Sciences  Research Council and the Mapungubwe  Institute for Strategic Research (MISTRA), and taught at Marrymount Manhattan College and City University of New York in the United states. He is the author of several publications on South African politics, history and public institutions. 

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Selected bibliography Ndletyana, M. ‘Changing Role of Civic Organisations from Apartheid to the Post-Apartheid Era: A Case of the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO)’ (MA Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1998) Ndletyana, M. ‘The United Democratic Movement: A Critical Assessment’, Politikon 26:2 (1999), pp. 179–188 Ndletyana, M. ‘Congress of the People: A Promise Betrayed’, Journal of African Elections 9:2 Special Issue – South Africa: Elections 2009 (2010), pp. 32–55 Ndletyana, M. (ed.) Institutionalising Democracy: The Story of the Independent Electoral Commission, 1993–2014 (Pretoria, HSRC Press, 2015) Ndletyana, M. and Nomarwayi, T. ‘ANC’s Loss of the Jewel – Nelson Mandela Bay’, Journal of Public Administration 51:36 (2016), pp. 573–595 Ndletyana, M., Tchereni, B., Maimela, D. and Lerakong, S. ‘Voting Trends Twenty Years into Democracy: Research Report’ (Johannesburg, MISTRA, 2014) Ngonyama, M. ‘48 Square Meter Red Location Housing Project’, no date. Report commissioned by the office of the NMB mayor Ngonyama, M. and Gwashu, S. Red Location Museum Reopening Facilitation Team, ‘The Red Location Cultural Precinct: Africa’s Largest Cultural Precinct’, 5 May 2016. Paper commissioned by the office of the NMB mayor Ntantala, P. A Life’s Mosaic: The Autobiography of Phyllis Ntantala (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993) Olver, C. How to Steal a City (Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017) Plaatjie, T. ‘The PAC’s Internal Underground Activities, 1960–1980’ in SADET Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2 (Pretoria, Unisa Press, 2006), pp. 677–678 Rantente, J. The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South Africa (Pretoria, J.L. Van Schaik Publishers, 1998) Reid, G. and Cobbett, W. (1992) ‘Negotiating in Bad Faith: Local-Level Negotiations and the Interim Measures for Local Government Act’ in G. Moss and I. Obrey (eds) South African Review 6 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1992) Reynolds, A. (ed.) Elections ’94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects (Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 1994) Simpson, T. Umkhonto WeSizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016) South African Cities Network. State of the Cities Report 2006. Accessed 3 December 2019, http://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/state_of_cities_report2006.pdf Southall, R. ‘The Struggle for a Place Called Home: The ANC Versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape’, Politikon 26:2 (1999), pp. 155–166 Southall, R. Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (Scottville, UKZN Press, 2013) Sparks, A. Tomorrow is Another Country (New York, Hill and Wang, 1995) Swilling, M. ‘The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt’ in W. Cobbett, and R. Cohen, (eds), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London, James Currey,1988) Van der Westhuizen, C. White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2007) 325

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER Waldmeir, P. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1997) Zille, H. Not Without a Fight (Cape Town, Penguin Books, 2016)

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Selected bibliography David Eduard Le Roux, of Le Roux Inc, affidavit to the Hawks, Re: IPTS Investigation, no date Department of Human Settlement. National Intervention Programme, Project Management Unit, ‘Motherwell NU 29 – Phase 11 Assessment Report’, March 2016 HCSA (High Court of South Africa) Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 829/2011, 20 October 2011 HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 1459/13, 28 June 2013 HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Port Elizabeth, Case No. 3282/2013, 19 May 2015 HCSA Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, Case No. EL1303/2017, 12 December 2017 HCSA South Gauteng Division, Johannesburg, Case No. 18798/2018, 25 June 2018 Independent Electoral Commission Report, 27 April 1994, IEC Library, Pretoria Kabuso. Forensic Investigation Final Report: Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape, February 2010 Letter: Rory Riordan, DP Regional Chair, to Mr CF Fischer, Director of Administration, 2 April 1991 Letter: ANC, Eastern Cape Region, to Town Clerk, PE Municipality, Re: Convening of Management Committee of One City Talks Forum, 6 March 1992 Letter: NACTRA to the Town Clerk, Paul Botha, Re: One-City Forum, 29 January 1994 Letter: Sangoco to the attendants of the Outreach meeting, Office of the Premier, 15 September 2011 Letter: NMB Regional Secretary, Zandile Qupe to ANC Chief Whip, Feziwe Sibeko, Re: Communication of ANC REC Decisions for Immediate Implementation, 17 November 2011 Letter: NMB Regional Secretary, Zandile Qupe to ANC Chief Whip, Feziwe Sibeko, Re: Decision to be Communicated to Caucus, 7 December 2011 Letter: NMB Regional Secretary, Zandile Qupe to the Eastern Cape PEC, Re: Contravention of ANC Mandates by ANC Deployees in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 13 December 2011 Letter: Mlibo Qoboshiyane, MEC, Local Government and Traditional Affairs to Councillor Ben Fihla, Re: Proposal to Resolve the Current Impasse at Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, circa 2013 Letter: Office of Councillor ME Bobani to Office of the Speaker, Re: City Manager’s Position, 10 April 2013 Letter: NMB Deputy Mayor, Cllr Thando Chippa Ngcolomba to the City Manager, Re: Acting Executive Directors, 13 May 2013 Letter: Kaplan Blumberg, Attorneys, Notaries & Conveyancers to Executive Mayor, Ben Fihla, Re: Purported Appointment Of Municipal Manager, 15 May 2013 Letter: Councillor N.B. Fihla, Executive Mayor to Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Re: Purported Appointment of Municipal Manager, 17 May 2013 Letter: Mlibo Qoboshiyane, MEC: Local Government and Traditional Affairs to Councillor Hermans, Speaker, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 24 May 2013 Letter: Minnar Neihaus Attorneys to the Executive Mayor, 24 May 2013

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Selected bibliography NMB Municipality. Minutes of the Special Metropolitan Council meeting, 25 April 2013 NMB Municipality. Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, Status Quo on Administration and the Problem of Political Interference in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (metro), 1 March to 14 May 2013 NMB Municipality. Supplementary Report by the acting City Manager, Mpilo Mbambisa, 31 October 2013 NMB Municipality. Ward 15 Councillor, Red Location Steering Committee/Protestors, Unit Leadership Wilton Mkwayi Phase 2 &3, Municipal Officials and Museum Staff, minutes of the meeting re: The Closure of the Red Location Museum – Progress on Re-opening, 8 January 2014 NMB Municipality. Arts, Culture, Heritage and Libraries Committee, Report on the Closure of Red Location Museum, (Ref19/14/6/2), no date NMB Municipality. Recreation, Sports, Arts and Culture, Report on Red Location Museum Break-in, Director N. Gwintsa’s report to the Mayoral Committee, 2 July 2014 NMB Municipality. Danny Jordaan, inaugural mayoral speech, Council meeting, 28 May 2015 NMB Municipality. Danny Jordaan, budget speech, Council meeting, 18 June 2015 NMB Municipality. Danny Jordaan, ‘State of the City Address’, 9 June 2016. Accessed 15 December 2019, http://nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/NewsView.aspx?ID=2346 NMB Municipality. Municipal Public Accounts Committee, Report by the MPAC Chairperson: Findings in Respect of Further Investigations Pertaining to Item 1.9, Pages 236 – Section 32 Report on Payment of Local Government Development and Support Institute (Logodisa) During 2015 and 2016 (5/20/2/5), 30 October 2016 NMB Municipality. City Manager’s Report to Council meeting, Forensic Investigation in Respect of Irregular Appointment of Litter Pickers (5/20/2/2), circa 2017 NMB Municipality. Minutes of the Metropolitan Council meeting, 4 December 2018 NMB Municipality. Submission to the Mayoral Committee: Klopper, C (JK Structures) and J. Carelson (Finecorp Trading), Auditing Report of SMME Drain Cleaning Report, 1 February 2019 NMB Municipality. Report to the Executive Mayoral Committee by the Executive Director of Economic Development, Tourism and Agriculture, Report on Drain Cleaning Project, tabled at meeting with Mayor on 11 February 2019 NMB Municipality. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2016–2021: Golden Years. Accessed 27 November 2019, http://www.nelsonmandelabay.gov.za/%5CDataRepository%5CDo cuments%5Cnmbm-idp-ebook.pdf One-City Talks. Decision on Integration of Statutory Bodies, Policy and Resources Committee: Report by Director of Administration, meeting, 6 November1990 One-City Negotiation Forum. Comments on the Constitutional Arrangements for the Port Elizabeth City, 3 July 1993 One-City Negotiation Forum. Minutes of the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Constitutional Working Group, Council Chambers, City Hall, 30 September 1993 One-City Negotiation Forum. Institutional Working Group: Progress to Date and Issues Outstanding – A Report to the Management Committee, November 1993 One-City Negotiation Forum, Port Elizabeth. Agreement, 3 March 1994

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER Padraig O’Malley, The O’Malley Interviews 1985–2005. Accessed 23 December 2019, https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php Interview with Benny Alexander, 23 July 1993 Interview with Richard Sizani, 17 April 1996 Interview with Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, 26 August 1991; 7 August 1992; 16 November 1994; 30 September 1996; 22 September 1999 Interview with Roelf Meyer, 15 May 1996, 23 June 1998 Interview with Tertius Delport, 9 May 1996 Pikoli, Vusi and Ndyebo, ‘Jimmy’ Snowball. Forensic Investigation: IPTS Project – Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 20 February 2013 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council. Capital and Operating Budgets 1994/5, 28 June 1994 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council. Communications or Statements by the Mayor, minutes, 28 January 1999 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council. Possible Contravention by Councillors of Section 10H of the Local Government Transition Act, Report of the Executive Committee, 12 September 2000 Port Elizabeth Transitional Local Council. Communications or Statements by the Mayor, minutes, 23 November 2000 PEM (Port Elizabeth Municipality). Budget and Administration Committee, Report, 12 March 1996 PEM. Mayoral Review for the Period 1 July 1995 to 1996 PEM. Credit Policy Review, Report of the Executive Committee, 8 December 1998 PEM. Application for Exemption from the Provision of Section 10H(3)(B) of the Local Government Transition Act, Second Amendment Act, 1996: Councillor N C Faku, Report of the Executive Committee, 18 May 1999 PEM. Sale of Erven 748 to 752 and Portion of Remainder 1256, Summerstrand: Second Avenue, Summerstrand: Siyalanda Property Development (PTY) Limited and Emfuleni Resorts (Applicant), Report of the Executive Committee, 18 May 2000 PEM. Statements or Communications by the Mayor, 23 November 2000 Sangoco, Newsletter, 20 June 2012 The Presidency. State of the Nation Address, 16 February 2018. Accessed 29 December 2019, https://www.gov.za/speeches/ president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000

INTERVIEWS ANC councillor and REC member who chose to remain anonymous, Port Elizabeth, 13 March 2019 BEC member in KwaZakhele, who chose to remain anonymous, Port Elizabeth, 9 December 2015 Former ANCYL leader who chose to remain anonymous, informal conversation, Port Elizabeth, 3 May 2019 330

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Selected bibliography Former NMB councillor based in Uitenhage, who chose to remain anonymous, Uitenhage, 8 January 2014 Member of the REC, who chose to remain anonymous, Port Elizabeth, 13 March 2019 Member of the RTT, who chose to remain anonymous, Port Elizabeth, 13 March 2019 Senior municipal officials who chose to remain anonymous, 20 January 2017, 4 October 2018, 8 December 2018 Senior UDM leader who chose to remain anonymous,17 February 2018 Andile Ggabi, Uitenhage, 8 January 2015 Balu Naran, Port Elizabeth, 3 February 2017 Bicks Ndoni, Port Elizabeth, 1 October 2018 and 13 March 2019 Bongani Gxilishe, East London, 11 May 2018; 12 July 2018; 13 September 2018; and 6 December 2018 Buli Festile, Port Elizabeth, 13 August 2018 Chimurenga Mdabula, Port Elizabeth, 14 February 2017 Crosby Bacela, telephone conversation, 8 May 2019 Danny Jordaan, Port Elizabeth, 22 July 2016 Errol Heynes, Pretoria, 20 July 2018 Flip Potgieter, Port Elizabeth, 11 July 2018 Gege Mbikanye, Port Elizabeth, 25 March 2017 and 29 September 2018 Graham Richards, Port Elizabeth, 12 June 2018 ‘Gwangwa’, Port Elizabeth, 15–19 August 2015 Humphrey Maxhegwana, East London, 12 July 2018 Ismael Momoniat, telephone conversation, 05 August 2018 Jackson Ngcelwana, telephone conversation, 22 February 2019 Johann Mettler, Port Elizabeth, 12 March 2019 Lawrence Troon, Port Elizabeth, 9 January 2017 Linda Mti, Midrand, 17 April 2018 Mabhuti Dano, Port Elizabeth, 10 August 2018 Mandla Nkomfe, telephone conversation, 23 January 2017 Mandla Madwara, Port Elizabeth, 14 November 2018 Mike Koenaite, Uitenhage, 30 September 2018 Mike Xego, Port Elizabeth,14 November 2015 and 26 April 2018 Moki Cekisane, Port Elizabeth, 4 June 2019 Monde Vaaltyn, Port Elizabeth, 3 February 2017 Mongameli Peter, Port Elizabeth,12 February 2016; 2 February 2019; and 12 and 15 June 2019 Monwabisi Gomomo, Port Elizabeth, 15 July 2018 Mthetheleli Ngcete, Port Elizabeth, 13 August 2018 Mthwabo Ndube, Port Elizabeth, 22 October 2018 Mzi Mangcotywa, Port Elizabeth, 19 April 2018 and 1 October 2018 331

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER Mzoli Nkewu, Port Elizabeth, 13 July 2018 and 29 September 2018 Nelvis Qekema, Pretoria, 28 May 2019 and 12 June 2019 Nondumiso Maphazi, Port Elizabeth, 23 October 2018 Oscar Mgwanza, Port Elizabeth, 14 July 2010 Paki Ximiya, Port Elizabeth, 27 December 2016 Phila Nkayi, East London, 10 May 2018 Rory Riordan, Port Elizabeth, 15 July 2018 Saki Macozoma, Johannesburg, 5 November 2018 Sandile Rwexana, Port Elizabeth, 13 March 2019 Sicelo Gqobana, telephone conversation, 14 November 2018 Sivu Ntlebezo, Port Elizabeth, 28 September 2018 Sonwabile Mancotywa, Pretoria, 25 May 2018 Themba Mangqase, Port Elizabeth, 11 June 2019 Thobile Mhlahlo, Port Elizabeth, 14 March 2019 Thozamile Botha, Centurion, 18 April 2018 Zandile Xate, Port Elizabeth, 2 May 2016 Zizi Kodwa, telephonic interview, 27 January 2017 Zola Mtatsi, Port Elizabeth, 28 April 2018; 12 June 2018; and 13 September 2018

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Index

Index 1994 elections (inaugural national) campaign 34–35 candidate lists 41 preparations 32–33 setting a date 34 violence leading up to 33 1995 local election 58–65 candidate lists 59–61 racially defined results 63–65 2000 local election 99 2006 local election 124–127, 126, 139 2011 local election 148–149 2014 election 2, 199 ANC losses 12, 183 DA rise 13 2016 local election ACDP results 261 ANC in denial 267 campaign 231–232 candidate nominations 225–230 DA victory 2–3, 260–261 possible election fraud 257–260 results 260–262 seat quota formula 265–266 2019 election anti-corruption theme 309–311 build-up 308–309 DA poor performance 313 lack of campaign funds 312–313 low township turnout 313 UDM 313–314 A abuse of power 319 administrative instability 9 African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 261 Algoa Park 38–39 alliance 54, 70, 90, 157 influence on appointments 120–121 instability 203 tensions 97, 103, 124, 127, 162, 182–183, 188–189 amenities 86–87 ANC (African National Congress) arrogance 188 branches not in good standing 204, 274, 281 vs civics 26–27 complacency 206–207 criteria for leadership 19, 28–29 vs DA 1–2 decline in NMB 4–5 diversity 42–43 diversity gender vs racial 28 dominance 5–6 and DP 45–46, 48 education handbooks 23 inability to govern 8 image vs reality 310 inclusivity 23–24 leaders full-time thieves and looters 272 manifesto launch rally 223–224 membership loss 138 national decline 3 party officials’ remuneration 43 in power see incumbent rebuilding 17–24 regions 107, 18n10 reluctance to negotiate locally 48–49 supporters demoralised 262, 267, 318 time for introspection 272–273 and UDF 24–25, 27 unbanning 16–17 values 315

see also party-in-government ANC in opposition 266–267, 269–270 adapting to loss of power 271, 283 electricity non-payment 295 ineffectiveness 290–291 intention to reform 271 lack of money 294–295 obstructionism 284–286, 291–293 anti-change faction 167 Apleni, Sicelo 16 aptitude tests 109 armed struggle suspension 30–31 ATTP (Assistance to the Poor) programme 250 austerity measures 120 AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) 39–40, 239 Azapo 236–239 B Bam, Fikile 27 Bethal Treason Trial 234 Bhanga, Nqaba 245 Black Business Caucus (BBC) 302–304 block membership cards 312 Boardwalk Casino 92–94 Bobani, Mongameli 12, 296 corruption investigation 301–302 corruption suspicion 297 harassment of Msengana-Ndlela 167, 172–174 intimidating staff 301 and Lungisa 296–298 Boesak, Allan 38 Botha, Paul 38, 45, 46 Botha, Thozamile 26, 27, 45, 48–49, 52, 137 and Cope 137 boxing club 78 boycotting meetings 204, 292 Breytenbach, Andre 195–196 bribery see corruption Bridging Authority 52 Broad Consultative Forum 272 bucket system 180, 214, 251–252, 288, 290 budget plagiarism 288 rejection by ANC opposition 293 special allocation 291–292 stalemate 136–137 Bungane, Mbongeni 158 victimisation 181 Business Chamber 189, 193–195 by-election 2009 138–139, 139 by-election 2014 November 188­–189 by-election 2015 August 204–205 Chatty voters 206 loss 1 UDM campaign funds 297 C cadre deployment 143–144 Calata House 137, 219, 226 Calata list 225–227 candidates see nominations lists Cekisane, Moki 54, 235 Chatty 206 Cherry, Janet 23 China 94–96 city managers see municipal managers civil society 4, 20, 25–27 vs ANC 26–27 Coalition see Coalition consultation with 191n68 disillusionment with REC 200

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER and Jordaan 219 Coalition 189–190 engaging with Zuma 197–198 formation 190–191 preparation for submission to MEC 196 coloured vote 36–38, 72 and Danny Jordaan 212 Conservative Party (CP) 38, 239–240 constituency allowances 76, 78 Cope (Congress of the People) 137–138, 149n144, 243 corruption 4–5, 84, 91–92, 150–151, 316–317 difficulty in preventing 104 and FIFA 252–253 and land development deals 92–94 and patronage 8 temptation 68 Cosas (Congress of South African Students) 71 Cosatu 120, 138, 203 alienation 189 and candidate lists 125 on corruption 272–273 disillusionment with Alliance 157 protesting against privatisation 124 and RTT 203 support for Wayile 158 Council tension with Alliance 181–182 leadership shuffle 166–167 segregated integration 44–46 vote manipulation 146–147 councillors ethics 68 indifference 79 criminals 304, 319–320 D DA (Democratic Alliance) 243, 244–245 2016 local election victory 2–3, 260–261 vs ANC 1–2 coalition tension 291 collapse 296 and EFF 293–294 gaining from ANC disillusionment 13 incompetence 290 nepotism 289 racism 246–248, 288 DA inauguration ceremony 262 disrupted by ANC 263–266 indicted 265 Dano, Mabhuti 75, 80, 94 De Klerk, FW 37 De Lille, Patricia 126, 243–244, 313 Defiance Campaign 213 Delport, Tertius 241, 242 Democratic Alliance Students Organisation (Daso) 245–246 Democratic Party (DP) 242–243 alliance with ANC 45–46, 48 whiteness 36 deputy mayor 105 Despatch 3, 98 discretionary funds 218–219 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana 147 task team 183–184 dominant parties 5–6 resistance to change 6–7 double parking 256 drain cleaning scheme 304–307 Duarte, Jessie 279 expecting special treatment from IEC 13, 268 Duba, Tony 62, 117, 275 E Eastern Cape consolidation 43, 75 Economic Freedom Front (EFF) 244 2016 results 261

determination to oust DA 293–294 unreliability as an ally 295 election/s 2 1994 see 1994 elections 1995 see 1995 local elections 2000 see 2000 local elections 2006 see 2006 local elections posters 229, 255 seat quotas 265–266 see also by-elections elective conference 202 entitlement 232, 268 ethical leadership 317 evictions 287–288, 289 Executive Committee (Exco) 55 executive council diversity 42–43 executive mayor vs executive committee 104–105 exiles/returnees 28–29 vs younger local activists 106–108 F factionalism 127, 186, 317, 319–320 and corruption 101, 129 destabilising municipality 148 national and local 130 and party splits 6–7 and Xego–Faku rivalry 163–164 Faku, Nceba 11, 55 and 2019 elections 309–310 abusing discretionary fund 114 and ANC and SACP 56 relationship with Ben Fihla 69 blaming media 160 call for resignation 147 corruption 150–152 elected chair 2009 139–140 elected mayor 67 executive mayor 105, 108–109 conflict with Mangcotywa 116–119 and Maphazi 141 management style 109, 112–116 and Mbeki 120, 132, Peyco’s disapproval 71–72 political support 96–97 popularity and accessibility 70 standing for regional chair 158–159 supporters attacked 162 unilateral decisions 77 vs Wayile 156 166 loss to Xego 134, 136 support for Zuma 136 falsifying qualifications 121 falsifying quotes 122 Fazzie, Henry 16, 26, 55 FIFA corruption 252–253 Fihla, Ben 12, 16, 18–19, 178 anti-change 167 relationship with Faku 69 ineptitude 179 appointed mayor 166n2 relationship with Mbeki; Mhlaba 19 ousting 28 financial mismanagement 150–151 Florence Matomela 3, 165n1 see also Standard House; Matomela House food parcels 205, 206 Forum, the 209–211 Freedom Front (FF) 239–240

,

G gender diversity 53, 54–55, 130 generational hierarchy 28, 68, 71 George, Mluleki 107 Goduka, Phil 55n112, 69, 209 golden handshakes 289–290

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Index Gomomo, Monwabisi 78–79 Good party 313 Goosen, Glen 23, Gordhan, Pravin 229 governance vs resistance 73–74 government of national unity 42 Gqabi, Andile 183 expulsion 184–185, 187 popularity 186–187 standing as independent 188–189 Gqiba, Nolwandle 300–301 Gqobana, Sicelo 106 Groot Drakenstein see Victor Verster Gxavu, ‘Killer’ 71, 72, 97 Gxilishe, Bongani 28, 43, 71, 106–107, 125 H Hanekom, Derek 160–162, 166n2 Hani, Chris 30–31, 34, 239 assassination 239 Hani, Themba 155–156 Harper, Trevor 289–290 Hendrickse, Allan 240–241 Hermans, Maria 166, 190 Heroes’ Acre 284–285 Heynes, Errol 73 hit-murders 308 Holomisa, Bantu 242, 269 housing 250–251 national assistance 219–220 sub-standard 251 How to Steal a City 4 I Ibhayi Town Council 27, 44 bankruptcy 49–50 illegitimacy 45 workers incorporated in PEM 50 ID (Independent Democrats) 126, 243–244 IEC (Independent Electoral Commission) 13, 223, 257, 258–259, 260, 268, 313 incumbent/incumbency 11 adapting to 5, 10–11, 68, 316, 319–320 adapting to loss of 283, 318–319 advantages of 133 benefits of 13, 318–319 independent candidates 61 Informal Development Division 87 infrastructure upgrading 86–87 grants from national government 90 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 38–39, 240 Integrated Development Programme (IDP) 284, 285–286 Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) 168–169, 275 Interdenominational African Ministers Association in SA 189 Interim Leadership Core (ILC) 16 interim managers 153–154 Interim Measures for Local Government Act 50–51 Interim Regional Committees (IRC) 17–18 Eastern Cape 18, 20 election of 24 intimidation 305 see also violence intra-party conflict 9, 316–319 intra-party democracy 103 J Jack, Khusta 137, 243 Jack, Mkhuseli 16 Jamda, Chris 121 Jebe, Nangoza 35–36 Jonas, Mcebisi 272, 295 Jordaan, Danny 12, 36, 249, 318 2016 resignation 284 and coloured voters 212, 255

financial prudence 217–218 and the Forum 210 and Lungisa 284 marginalised 200, 253–255 mayorship 211–213 personality vs party 254 suspended corrupt officials 217 unprepared for Veeplaas 205 World Cup 211 association with Zuma 224 compared to Zuma 252–253 K Kabuso Report 150–153 Kani, Sicelo 79–80 corruption 92 Kodwa, Zizi 186–187, 278–279 KwaMagxaki see Veeplaas/KwaMagxaki KwaZakhele 1 72, 78, 80 L Labour Party (LP) 240–241 Lacey, Marion 18 land invasions 287–288, 289 leaks, war on 220 libraries 87 list conference 224–225 litter pickers 299 local government 103–104 lack of transformation 91 Transition Act 91 Loots, Hermanus 36–37 Lungisa, Andile 230, 271, 319 assault charge 277 and Bobani 296–298 criminal conviction 298 de facto PEC chair 281–282 interrupting DA inauguration 263–265 and Jordaan 284 mayoral committee appointment 297 party baron 303–304 standing for two positions 274–278 underworld, association with 304, 305, 308 usurping chief whip’s function 284 Luthuli House 134, 136 M Mabuyane, Oscar 199, 278, 280n21, 282 and disbanding REC 303 and Jordaan 219, 221, and RTT 207–208 Macozoma, Saki 97, 109, 110–111 and Cope 137 Madiba Bay Resort 151 Madwara, Mandla 55–56, 198, 211 Mafana, Thembinkosi 179, 201, 202n3, Mafikeng invasion 239 Magashule, Ace 279 support for REC 302–303 and Zuma 303 Magwana, Mlindi 201 Maharani meeting 303 Maimane, Mmusi 245 Malabar Management Committee 44–46, 53 Malabar Residents Association 26 Malema, Julius 293, 296 Malgas, Ernest 16, 18, 214 Mali, Knight 246–248 Mali, Thandeka 113 Mandela Bay Development Agency (MBDA) 108, 109–110 Mandela, Nelson 16 PE rally 20 Mangaung conference 162 Mangcotywa, Mzimasi 16, 60, 113

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER appointed city manager 116 –117 disciplinary hearing 117–119 conflict with Faku 116–119 loss to ‘Killer’ Gxavu 72 suspension 119 Mangqase, Themba 209, 303 Mantashe, Gwede 199, 274–275 expecting special treatment from IEC 13, 268–269 Manyathi, Mxolisi 296n61 Maphazi, Nondumiso 125, 129 dismissal 144–145 dismissal threat 141 mayoralty 130 Maqhina, Mzwandile 238 mass action in PE 21–22 Mass Democratic Movement 18–19, 106 vs Azapo 238–239 Masualle, Phumulo 144, 190, 202, 205, 207 Matomela House 161, 191, 192, 210, 219, 227–228, 283 Mayekiso, Mzwandile 26 mayors/mayoral candidates known vs unknown 254–255 ceremonial vs executive 104–105 cosmetic change 166–167 female 129 Mazibuko, Lindiwe 245 Mbalula, Fikile 229–230, 255 Mbambisa, Mpilo 253 Mbeki, Govan 15n3, 19, 29, 315 fundraising 20 funeral 120 and Mhlaba 31–32 punctuality 30 work ethic 30–31 Mbeki, Thabo 16–17, 73–74, 316 and Faku 120, 125–126 neoliberal stance 106 call to eliminate racism 72–73 vs Zuma 131 Mbikanye, Gege 275 and Cope 137, 243 McKenzie, Gayton and Malema 296 MDM and Broad Consultative Forum 272 metro police 249 Mettler, Johan 262–265, 293, 298–300 vs Bobani 298–299 suspension 299–300 Meyer, Roelf 241–242 Mgubasi, Ciko 205 Mhlaba, Raymond 29 and Govan Mbeki 31–32 provincial premier 42 release 15–16, 19 Mhlahlo, Thobile 27–28, 106, 207, 209 challenging Faku 70–71, 158 regional chair candidate 107 Midland Chamber of Industries 53 Mini, Mazwi 185–188 Mini, Vuyisile 22n22 MK Veterans Association (MKVA) 157 staff appointments 171 Mnqamisa, Sizakele 205–206 mock election 34 Mohapi, Nohle 125 Mothopeng, Zephania 234 Motlanthe, Kgalema 272 Mrara, Mzoleli 158 Msengana-Ndlela, Lindiwe 12, 167 consulting with civil society 191n68, 194 conflict with Fihla 168–171 harassment 171–174 intimidation by MKVA 171 suing for constructive dismissal 177–178 Mti, Linda 19, 20, 27–28, 48 head of metro police 249 Mtongana, Silas 18 municipal admin structure 104–105

expenditure unequal 56 Finance Management Act (MFMA) 122–123 records 10 rent scandals 151 salaries 132 staff appointment 153–157, 169–171 wards see wards municipal managers need for improvement 200 political protection 121–122 vs politics 104–105, 120–121, 155, 167–160 racial equity 121 municipalities as development agencies 105 N Naran, Balu 73 National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) 251 Party (NP) 241–241 Reception Committee (NRC) 15–16 Union of Metalworkers of South Africa see Numsa Ndebele, Sibusiso 279–280 Ndoni, Bicks 105, 112 chief whip 284 Ndoyana, Mod 170, 178, 217, 291, 299 Ndube, Mthwabo 56, 107, 132 and Cope 137, 243 substitute for Lungisa 245 Neer, Dennis 16 Nelson Mandela Bay Civil Society Coalition see Coalition Nelson Mandela Bay Metropole 3 Metropole creation 104–105 Metropole possibility of ANC losing 149 see also Port Elizabeth Ngcolomba, Thando ‘Chippa’ 167, 181 deputy mayor 166 conflict with Msengana-Ndlela 170 Ngoyi, Edgar 18 Niegaart, Ronald 18, 69, 72, 73 Niehaus, Carl 38 Nielson, Peter 300–301 Ningi, Baba 304–306 death 307 Nkayi, Phila 32 Nkwinti, Gugile 18, 25, 28n38, 71, 75 nominations lists 221–222, 224–225 election 41 1995 election 59–61 2016 election 226–228 diversity 61 manipulation 60–61, 125, 226–228 protests 227 provincial leadership veto 222 registration rejections 62 Northern Areas Civic for Tenants and Ratepayers Association (Nactra) 53 Northern Areas Management Committee 44–46, 53 Nqakula, Charles 201, 209, 210 Nqwazi, Noxolo 300–301 Ntoba, Elias 143, 153–154, 155 Ntshona, Beza 122 Numsa 131–132, 145, 158 breakaway from Cosatu 203 Nzimande, Blade 26 O old age 190–191 Olver, Chippy 4, 300n74, 208–209 One-City Forum/talks 46–48, 50–51 ANC withdrawal 49 representative categories 47 opposition parties 232 see also ANC in opposition overtime allowances 218

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Index P Pan Africanist Congress 51, 233–234 in the TLC 58 party-in-government see incumbent Patriotic Alliance (PA) 261, 283n26, 291, 294 2016 results 261 and DA support 294 vs UDM 296 patronage 8–9, 100, 158, 163, 294, 295–296, 317–320 dominance of 319–320 see also corruption PE see Port Elizabeth Pebco/Pepco 25–26 Peter, Mongameli 190–191 Peter, Xolisile 184–185 Pienaar, Kobus 23 Pikoli Report 217 Pikoli, Vusi 169, 175–176 Pityana, Sipho 109, 272, political parties decline of dominant 3 splitting 6 politico-administrative instability 165 politics and crime 320 vs management 103–104, 120–121, 155, 167–180 polling stations inequity 62–63 Polokwane conference 133, 135, 163 Port Elizabeth City Council see Council mass action 21–22 People’s Civic Organisation see Pepco pre-eminence in struggle 20–21, 21n20, racially defined authorities 44 struggle history 1–2 Youth Congress (Peyco) 71–72 Potgieter, Flip 40 PricewaterhouseCoopers report 299 prison bonds 17–18, 29, 69, 97 Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) 42–43 attempted dissolution 278–279 failure to discipline Lungise 276 vs REC 278–283, 302–303 Q Qaba, Anele 306 Qoboshiane, Mlibo 150, 155, 192 defense of Msengana-Ndlela 173, 176–177 quorum 159, 227, 262, 264 denying 204, 279, 292 stuffing 133 Qupe, Zandisile 134–135, 140n23, 185, 202–203, 275, 282 R racial diversity 54 Ramaphosa, Cyril 62, 74–75, 188, 189, 309 support of Eastern Cape PEC 279–280 trust 312 visit to PE 311–312, 319 rates increase 288 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 78 recruitment to ANC 20 of white people 23 Red Location Cultural Precinct 111, 213–217 residents’ demands 215–216 refinery deal with China 94–96 regional conferences 123–124 April 2012 158–159 regional elective conference 273–274 Regional Executive Committee disbandment 200 disciplinary hearing 118 refusal to disband 302–303 vs PEC 278–283

ultimatum 189 Regional List Committee (RLC) held hostage 227–228 manipulation 147, 226–228 Regional Task Team (RTT) 106, 201 composition 207–208 and Cosatu 203 failure to organise activities 203–204 RTT vs the Forum 210–211 intimidation of 304, 307 legitimacy 202 and Olver 208–209 religious leaders 292 reluctance to challenge ANC government 81 rent boycotts 45, 56, 67, 82 Richards, Graham 50, 53n108, 55, 63, 150 city manager appointment 116–117, 130 defence of Faku 114, 116 settlement 117 suspension 141–142, 145, 153 Richman Bhomane see Mti Riordan, Rory 40, 48, 288–289 sidelining 97–98 Robben Island ex prisoners 28–29 Rockman, Gregory 36 Rushmere, John 214 S SA Communist Party (SACP) 56, 120, 138 and candidate lists 125 disillusionment with Alliance 157 support of Faku 69–70 protesting against privatisation 124 support of Mzoleli Mrara 158 SA Council of Churches (SACC) 189 SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) 26–27, 81–82 vs ANC 83–84, 99 decline 85–86 SA Non-governmental Organisation Coalition (Sangoco) alienation 189–191 confronts Metro 192–194 Sandi, Dan 84–85 schools repurposing 288–289 segregated integration 44–46 Seremane, Joe 244 service delivery 9 ANC’s poor record 207 backlog 68, 86 disconnections 286–287 equalising 57 improvements 123 indigent households free allocation 287 innovations 87 instilling a culture of paying for 67 payment facilitation 88–89 payment stalemate 50–52, 57–58, 81–82 protests 89, 90, 124 reconnection fee 287 Sexwale, Tokyo 132, 136 shack dwellers 86 Shaidi, Walter 306 shop stewards as municipal management 120–121 Sibeko, Feziwe 152, 154, 157, 161–162 list position 226 Sihlwayi, Nancy 140, 146, 155, 166 Sikhosana, Mpumi 26 Sizani, Stone 107 disciplining Faku 115–116 Skhokelo 23 Slabbert, Stanford 246–248 Slabbert, Van Zyl 16–17 social issues 190–191 Soga, DeVilliers 16, 21–22 South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) 121 Soweto-on-Sea 99–100

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ANATOMY OF THE ANC IN POWER sports facilities 86 staff challenges 75 hiring irregularities 298–299 appointing MK veterans 171 Stalini faction 132–135, 137, 140, 146 legal action 134 Standard House 3, 29–30 state capture 4 Stepping Stone 132–134, 137, 146 Stevenson, Bobby 37, 45 Stofile, Makhenkesi 107, 272 strongman leaders 11, 104, 116–117 Stuart, James see Loots Suttner, Raymond 73–74 T Tambo, Oliver 27 teachers as electoral agents 269 tenders 91–92, 100–101, 122 Lumen Technologies 168–169 managerial responsibility 123, 168 open to public 249 toilet-city 251–252 Toto, Vuyo 107, 132 and Cope 137 Township to Township 237 transitional local councils (TLC) 10, 315–316 budget 56–57 composition 53–54 composition dispute 51–53 inclusiveness 58 determining rates 82, 84 Transitional Local Government Act 53 tricameral parliament 241 tripartite alliance see alliance Trollip, Athol 245, 260, 285 vs Bobani 291 mayor 264 not so squeaky clean 289–290 vs Jordaan 252–253 and suburban rates 288 Xhosa-speaking 244 Troon, Lawrence 256, 265 Tselane, Terry 13, 260, intimidation by ANC 268–269 Tshwete, Pam 203 U Uitenhage 3, 98 Umkhonto we Sizwe see MK United Democratic Front (UDF) 18 and ANC 24–25, 27 dissolution 25 United Democratic Movement (UDM) 1, 242, 243 campaign funds 297 corruption 9 destabilising municipality 166 food parcels 206 populist schemes 306–307 vs PA 296 United Front 261, 291, 296–297 unity song 280–281 urban renewal 111

V Vatala, Sithembele 154–156 Veeplaas/KwaMagxaki 1, 204, 244, 261, 297 see also by-elections 2015 Verwoerd, Willem 38, 39 Victor Verster 1990 meeting 16 vigilantes 204n10 Village to Village 237 violence 162, 278, 304, 307, 308, 310–311, 319–320 AWB vs journalists 39–40 violence pre-election 33 Vision 2020 108, 109–110 voter apathy 318 registration 223 turnout 261–262 Vuyisile Mini Square 21–22 W ward/s

allocation racial 58–59 and apartheid spatial legacy 59 candidate registration issues 256 candidates vs PR 59–61 councillors discretionary fund 218–219 demarcation 52, 107 Wayile, Zanuxolo 125, 145, 153, 154, 156–157, 317 and ANC membership 158–159 vs Faku 156, 166 hands off campaign 158 and Kabuso Report 151–152 reconciliatory measures 146 removal 159–160 white vote 38–40 WiFi in poor areas 249–250 Williams, Charmaine 107, 132 and Cope 137 women as political influencers 185 X Xathula, Themba 159, 277, 281 protesting against PEC 281 Xego, Mike 16, 48, 107, 133–134 and Cope 137, 243 and Thabo Mbeki 132 Ximiya, Paki 229, 255 Xulu, Barnabus 265, 266 Y Yawa, Andlie 60, 64, 69, 71, 82 Youth Day rally 256 Z Zille, Helen 244–245 Zitumane, Vuyo 299–300 Zuma, Jacob 131, 190, 195, and the Coalition 198–199 compared to Jordaan 252–253 support for Lungise 276 and Magashula 303 victory 136 Zuma, Nqabakazi 227, 228, 229 Zwide Cemetery 204–205

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