Amílcar Cabral: The Life of a Reluctant Nationalist 0197525571, 9780197525579

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ANTONIO TOMAS

Am ilcar Cabral The Life o f a Reluctant Nationalist

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON

First published in the United Kingdom in 2021 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 8 3 Torbay Road, London N W 6 7D T © A ntonio Tomas, 2021 All rights reserved.

Printed in Great Britain by Bell and Bain Ltd, Glasgow The right of Antonio Tomas to be identified as the author of this publication is asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. A Cataloguing-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 9781787381445 This book is p rin ted using paper from registered sustainable and managed sources.

www.hurstpublishers.com Photographs reproduced with the kind permission of DAC— Documentos Am Hear Cabral / Arquivo da Funda^ao Mario Soares.

To my beloved uncle, A ldem iro

CONTENTS

List ojAcronyms and Abbreviations

In troductio n

xi 1

1. Betw een G uinea and Cape Verde

17

2. The Years in Lisbon

33

3. E ngineer and C landestine M ilitant

S3

4. S hattering th e Walls o f Silence

77

5. A U n ited F ro n t

87

6. M odes o f M aking W ar

109

7. T he Cape V erdean Q u estio n

127

8. A State Inside th e Colony

135

9. W inning in Politics W ith o u t Losing th e W ar

149

10. Towards Independence

169

1 1. The Killing o f Cabral

187

Epilogue

203

Notes

215

Bibliography

233

Index

243

Guinea and Cape Verde

Guinea Bissau

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CBC CEI CEL CIM ADE CNCV CONCP CSL CUF FARP FLG FLGC FLING FNLA FRELIM O FUL GNR GPRA GRAE ILO ITU MAC MFA MLG M LGCV

C ongressional Black Caucus Casa dos E studantes do Im perio C onselho Executivo da Luta (PAIGC) C o m ite in ter-m o u v em en ts aupres des evacues C onselho N acional de C ape Verde C o n feren cia das O rg an izaco es N acionalistas das C olonias Portuguesas C onselho S uperior da Luta C om panhia U niao Fabril Formas A rm adas Revolucionarias do Povo (PAIGC) F rente de L ibertacao da G uine F ren te de Liber ta^ao da G uine e de Cabo Verde F ren te de L ibertacao N acional da G uine F rente N acional de L ibertacao de Angola F ren te de L ibertacao de M ozam bique F ren te U nida de Libertacao G uarda N acional Republicana G o u v e rn e m e n t p ro v iso ire d e la R e p u b liq u e a lg erien n e G overno da R epublica de Angola no Exilio In tern atio n al Labour O rganization In ternational T elecom m unication U nion M ovim ento A nti-C olonialista M ovim ento das Formas A rm adas M ovim ento de L ibertacao da G uine M ovim ento de L ibertacao da G uine e Cabo Verde

LIST O F A CR O N Y M S A N D ABBREVIATIONS M PD MPLA NAACP

M ovim ento para a D em ocracia M ovim ento Popular de L ibertacao de Angola N atio n al A ssociation fo r th e A d v an cem en t o f C o lo red People

NATO

N o rth A tlantic T reaty O rganization

OSPAAAL

O rganiza^ao de Solidariedade dos Povos de Africa, Asia e A m erica Latina

OAU PAI (G uinea and Cape Verde) PAI (Senegal)

O rganization o f A frican U nity P artid o A fricano da Independencia

PAICV

P a rtid o A fricano p a ra a In d e p en d e n cia de C abo

PAIGC

Verde P artid o A fricano p ara a Independencia da G uine e

PC P

Cabo Verde P artid o C om unista P ortugues

PD G

P arti D em o cratiq u e de la G uinee

P ID E /D G S

Policia In te rn a c io n al da D efesa do D ireccao G eral de Seguranca

PSP

Policia de Seguranca Publica R assem blem ent D em o cratiq ue de la G uinee

RDG UDC

P arti A fricain de l ’ln d ependance

E sta d o /

UDENAM O UN UPA

U niao D em o cratica de Cabo Verde U niao D em o cratica N acional de M o 9 am bique U n ited N ations U niao dos Povos de Angola

U PG

U niao dos Povos da G uine

UPIC V

U niao dos Povos p ara a In d e p en d en cia d e C abo Verde

IN TRO D U CTIO N

By the end o f 1964, P ortugal, the m ost econom ically dep riv ed , b ack ­ w ard nation at th at tim e in E urope, was facing th ree m ilitary insurgen­ cies in A frica. In A ngola, th e a rm e d conflict had s ta rte d in January 1961, w hen h u n d red s o f the FN LA ’s m en attacked farm s in the n o rth o f th e co u n try , killing th o u san d s o f P o rtu g u e se s e ttle rs as w ell as A ngolan in d e n tu re d w o rk e rs m o stly fro m th e so u th . In n o r th e r n M ozam bique in 1964, FR E L IM O ’s tro o p s had attacked the Portuguese m ilitary p o sitio n s, and soon m ad e im p o rta n t inroads in co n tro llin g areas o f th e te rrito ry . But in G uinea in January 1963, the PAIGC sol­ diers had occupied isolated positions o f th e P ortuguese arm y in T ite and launched w hat w ould b eco m e the m o st successful m ilitary cam ­ paign against P ortuguese colonialism .T he brain behind G uinea’s u p ris­ ings and operations was the G uinean -b o rn agronom ist A m ilcar Cabral. T h e re v o lu tio n in G u in ea has b e e n h ailed as o n e o f th e defining m o m e n ts along L u so p h o n e A frica’s ro a d to political sovereignty. C o n trary to th e expectatio n s o f the nationalists from the P ortuguese colonies, the m o m e n tu m o f th e m ilitary uprisings stalled the first year a fte r th e initial c o n fro n ta tio n . A ngola is a p e rp le x in g case in this regard. Follow ing th e uprising o f 1960, P ortugal im p lem en ted a n u m ­ b e r o f sw eeping refo rm s th a t paved th e way for an era o f ro b u st eco ­ nom ic g ro w th , w hich n o t only co n trib u ted to quelling the pop u latio n ’s th irst for in d ep en d en ce, b u t also drove h u n d red s o f thousands o f se t­ tlers to the colony. M ozam bique, excluding the zones controlled by the guerrillas, was n o t m uch different. G uinea was an exception. Guineans w e re n o t only challenging th e m o re p o w erfu l and b e tte r-e q u ip p e d 1

A M ILCA R CABRAL P ortuguese arm y, they w ere also laying th e g ro u n d w o rk for the e m e r­ gence o f a postcolonial state. U ltim ately, th e m ilitary insurgency began a process o f re-th in k in g th e m eaning o f rev o lu tio n itself. This b o o k is a b o u t th e m an b e h in d this stru g g le, A m ilcar C abral. It n a rra te s his re v o lu tio n a ry tra je c to ry , from his early life in G uinea to his d e a th at th e hands o f his ow n m e n in th e n eig h b o rin g co u n try o f G u in ea-C o n ak ry o n 20 January 1973. This b o o k is, for the m o st p a r t, th e E nglish v e rsio n o f th e b io g ra p h y o f C ab ral, 0 Fazedor de Utopias, w h o se first e d itio n , in P o rtu g u e s e , cam e o u t in 2 0 0 7 . H ow ever, th is v ersio n is n o t sim ply a tra n sla tio n , even if th e overall s tru c tu r e is largely u n c h a n g e d . It tak es adv an tage o f th e tro v e s o f archiv al in fo rm a tio n w h ic h have re c e n tly b e e n m a d e p u b lic and

in sig h ts fro m th e d e lu g e o f stu d ie s o n C a b ra l, th e la st years o f P o rtu g u e se co lo n ialism , and th e an tico lo n ial m o v e m e n t in th e fo r ­ m e r P o rtu g u e s e co lo n ie s. F u r th e r m o r e , sin ce I have n o t s to p p e d w o rk in g o n C ab ral (p u b lish in g p a p e rs , p re s e n tin g a t c o n fe re n ce s, ex ch an g in g em ails w ith re a d e rs ), this e d itio n has also given m e an o p p o r tu n ity to e la b o ra te , c o r r e c t, an d ev en re fle c t o n issues th a t w ere n o t fully reso lv ed in th e P o rtu g u e se ed itio n . Accordingly, re sto rin g C ab ral’s political dim ension is n o t w hat ani­ m ate s th e w ritin g o f this study. To p u t it a n o th e r way, th e relative obscu rity in to w hich C ab ral’s travails m ay have fallen is n o t my m ain c o n c e rn . T his bio g rap h y is c o n c e rn e d w ith th e difficulty o f ho w to w rite a b o u t A frican h isto rical figures and th e tim es and co n te x ts in w hich they developed th e ir political activities. I have reflected on this qu estio n elsew h ere, building on th e w o rk o f th e an th ro p o lo g ist and cultural critic David Scott. In Conscripts o f Modernity, Scott discusses the ways in w hich postcolonial scholarship uncritically assumes that we still inhab it th e sam e histo rical tim es w h ich p ro d u c e d th e p re se n t day. I appro ach this co n cep tu al p ro b le m by relying o n w h a t I call answ er question dialectics. A ction, and m o re specifically political action, is for th e m o st p a rt a response to a very p a rtic u la r question. T he insurgency led by C abral, for exam ple, can be seen as th e answ er to the pro b lem o f colonial ex p lo itatio n . This, according to Scott, poses a serious co n ­ ceptual and epistem ological p ro b lem . For if anticolonial critiq u e w ere the answ er to th e p ro b lem o f colonialism , postcolonial critique should be c o n c e rn e d w ith th e questio n in itself, and n o t w h e th er w e arrived 2

IN T R O D U C T IO N at the answer, as if w e still live in those historical tim es. H eeding S cott’s advice, I have in te rro g a te d in my ow n w ork C ab ral’s diagnosis o f the colonial question. Was he right? D id he p o rtray colonialism in the m ost accurate way? The question h ere is how to w rite ab o u t C ab ral’s tim es and stru g ­ gles. As such, I am co u n terin g the ways in w hich a n u m b e r o f topics and m otifs have b een re p re se n te d in th e lite ra tu re on C abral. M ore specifically, this b io g rap h y o f C abral in te n d s to address th e g u lf b etw een the reality o f the a rm ed struggle in G uinea and the ways in w hich it has co m e to be discussed. F iroze M anji and Bill F letc h e r to u ch ed on this questio n w hen they recen tly acknow ledged that there w e re significant differences b e tw e e n w h a t C abral said and w h at he perhaps w ould have said if he could speak freely: Cabral was n o t only speaking of his own thoughts but was representing and leading a consensus w ithin, for lack o f a b e tte r te rm , a revolution­ ary m ovem ent. He was not, in other w ords, an individual public intel­ lectual w ho said o r w rote w hat was on his m ind, but instead, and in any case, he had to think o f the dynamics that w ere unfolding w ithin the m ovem ent.

T he p ro b lem h e re d o e sn ’t ju st flow from C a b ra l’s ow n re p re se n ta ­ tio n o f the lib eratio n m o v em en t in G uinea, b u t also from the assum p­ tio n th at C abral was speaking for “a consensus w ith in the rev o lu tio n ­ ary m o v em en t.”This passage hints at a m ajo r co n trad ictio n w hich will be exam ined in d e p th in this biography. O n th e one hand, it is tru e th at C abral was n o t able to speak freely. But on th e o ther, now here will one be able to find a process th ro u g h w hich a consensus was a ctu ­ ally re a c h e d in th e c o n te x t o f th e n a tio n a l lib e ra tio n m o v e m e n t. P aram o u n t h ere is n o t only th e issue o f in te rn a l d em o cracy (o r the lack th ereo f) in the o p eratio n s o f th e national liberation m o v em en t, b u t also its consequences. Many w rite rs con sid er C ab ral’s w ar lea d er­ ship to be exem plary, and it has inspired m any studies on re v o lu tio n ­ ary theory, on th e c o n tro l and ad m in istratio n o f lib erated zones, and on postcolonial state fo rm atio n . B ut the enthusiasm th a t characterized a c co u n ts o f G u in e a ’s p a th to in d e p e n d e n c e is n o t re fle c te d in th e c o u n try ’s p resen t-d ay situation. In fact, G u in ea’s d escen t into one o f the m o st u n d erd ev elo p ed c o u n trie s in th e w o rld sta rte d rig h t after independence. Some c o m m en tato rs have suggested that C abral’s m u r­ 3

A M ILCAR CABRAL d e r in 1973 d ep riv e d th e so o n -to -b e n atio n o f his prob lem -so lv in g ingenuity. A t th e h e a rt o f this disjunction is p erhaps n o t th e way in w hich w e talk ab o u t G u in e a ’s rev o lu tio n today, b u t th e ways in w hich it w as re p re se n te d in its ow n tim e. To b e m o re em p h atic, I am n o t co n ce rn e d w ith co n trastin g G u in ea’s p re se n t w ith the prom ises o f the past. This w ould be cheap criticism , as hindsight allows us a far g reater u n d e rsta n d in g than th o se th a t cam e b efo re us o f the co m p lex choices th a t had to be m ade. Instead, I w ill address this qu estio n w ith re fe r­ ence to w h at C abral w as able to know at d ifferen t points in tim e , and w h a t m aterials he could use in o rd e r to m ake sense o f th e w o rld in w hich he lived. This q uestion is im p o rta n t, and I will set o u t to answ er it in this b o o k , thus acting as a c o rre c tiv e to a large a m o u n t o f w h at has b een w ritte n on C abral. E arlier biographies o f C abral, by Russian O leg Ignatiev and Angolan M ario P into de A ndrade, fo r instance, te n d to d ep ict him as an over­ conscious nationalist, able to anticipate the course and configuration of historical events well in advance. For th em , the fact th at Cabral becam e the leader o f th e PAIGC, fo r exam ple, was sim ply the fulfillm ent of his calling. They w rite th e life history o f Cabral retrospectively. T he poem s th at Cabral w ro te in his early days are seen to contain th e seeds o f the revolt w hich b ro u g h t him to nationalism . This is n o t the approach I will take in this bo o k . Let m e give an exam ple. By the m id -1 9 5 0 s, Cabral was back in Lisbon, after a spell in G uinea as an agronom ist. Life was going w ell for him , his w ife, and th e ir sm all child— despite the ra m ­ p a n t racism in th e city at th a t tim e . W h ile he w as also involved in nationalist activities, u n d er th e alias Abel Djassi, he trie d his best to live a double life. Yet in 1960, he had to c o m m it fully to nationalist activ­ ism. Those biographers also ten d to describe political sovereignty as the u ltim ate goal o f his activism in th e late 1940s and early 1950s, w hen C abral was still a stu d e n t in Lisbon. H ow ever, I d e m o n stra te in this book th at such a conception o f independence was n o t available to them at that tim e. O nly later, particularly after the 1960s, w hen m ost African c o u n trie s had achieved in d e p e n d e n c e, co u ld C abral a ssert in d e p e n ­ dence as th e p rim ary goal o f his struggle. A ccounting for th ese discrepancies is th e fact th at a g rea t deal of w h at w e know ab o u t nationalism in L usophone A frica m ay have b een fabricated. A ttem p ts have b een m ade to expose such historical fabrica­ tio n s in b o o k s w h ic h a re fo r th e m o s t p a r t only available in 4

IN T R O D U C T IO N P o rtugu ese. T hese studies have trie d to b rid g e th e g u lf b etw een the acc o u n ts o f th e re v o lu tio n a ry p ro cess and w h a t really h ap p en ed . C uriously, th e nationalist M ario P into de A ndrade n o t only strongly c o n trib u te d to th e co n co ctio n o f these m isrep resen tatio n s, b u t also, even if invo lu n tarily , tr ie d to d e b u n k th e m la te r in his life. In th e fam ous in te rv ie w w ith M ichel Laban, M ario de A ndrade adm its that p ro p ag an d a was an im p o rta n t asp ect o f th e anticolonial strategy in Lusophone A lrica. P art o f this may perhaps be explained by the schism that existed in these m ovem ents b etw een those w ho m ade the w ar and th o se w h o p u b licized it. C ab ral w as in th e seco n d g ro u p , and, as Reiland Rabaka has p u t it, he was a “re lu c ta n t so ld ier”: he spent m uch o f the w ar p ro m o tin g , b u t n o t actually p articip atin g in, the fighting. C abral was n o t a m ilitary m an , n o r did he have any m ilitary training, and even th o u g h he was th e co m m a n d e r o f th e reb el forces, he was convinced th a t th e in d ep en d en ce o f G uinea could only be attained by d ip lo m atic actio n . As such, C abral sp e n t a co n sid erable p a rt o f the colonial w ar (from 1964 to 1973) travelling. It was th ro u g h these trips th at his p a rty g o t alm ost every th in g it n eed ed to subsist. But it also m ea n t th a t C abral had to d e p ic t events in a c e rta in way. Cabral was an o p tim ist, and m uch o f the m aterials and inform ation he circulated ab o u t the revolution in G uinea painted a rosy picture o f events. For him , the revolution was ab o u t how G uineans w ere being exposed to m o d e rn ity th ro u g h th e national liberation m ovem ent, how an A frican state was being fo rm ed th ro u g h political action in the lib er­ ated zones, and how a few hundred peasants w ere confronting the m ili­ tary m ight o f th e colonial army. A g re a t n u m b e r o f W estern w rite rs, jo u rn a lists and activists w h o visited and w ro te a b o u t th e lib era ted zones sim ply re p e a te d th e sam e m a n tra , e ith e r o u t o f idealism , o r because o f sh o rtsig h te d n e ss, in p a r t becau se C a b ra l’s p a rty only allow ed th em to see certain aspects o f the liberated zones. U ltim ately, im p o rta n t elem en ts o f th e m o v em en t w ere sw ept u n d e r the carp et. For instance, C ab ral’s co n stan t absence b red re se n tm e n t against him and o th e r C ape Verdeans, and alienated him from the everyday e x p e ri­ ences o f th e freedom fighters. As such, th e way we recall the revolu­ tionary process today is largely based on the “facts” w hich w ere p ro ­ duced as propaganda. C o m m en tin g on Cabral and his rev o lu tio n ary m ovem ent, the Sao Tomean nationalist Tomas M edeiros d rew a stro n g er link betw een p ro ­ 5

AMILCAR CABRAL paganda and p o litical lead ersh ip . H e arg u es th a t m o st o f th e w arrelated events w ere taking place elsew here and th a t Cabral could only know w hat was going on th ro u g h re p o rts, w hich p roduced a g reat deal of noise. T he q u estion is w h e th e r this noise has p ersisted. Key here is to u n d e rsta n d w hat really happ en ed and how these events have been describ ed and conceived. As such, th e gulf, as discussed earlier, lies b etw een reality and th e d escrip tio n o f this reality for the sake o f p ro ­ paganda. W h at im poverishes co n tem p o rary analysis o f G uinea’s road to political em ancipation is th at m o st o f th e sam e tro p e s are still evoked. But as it is no lo n g er necessary to p o rtra y th e anticolonial struggle in a specific way, o u r analysis o f these historical processes should change in its tu rn . C o n seq u en tly , in th is b o o k I focus o n archival m ate rials, o n th e in terv iew s I co n d u c te d in 2 0 0 0 — w h en a n u m b e r o f p articip an ts in the events w ere still alive— and p a rtic u la rly o n th e evolving debates over th e p re se n ta tio n o f these questions in G uinea and C ape Verde. As su ch , th is b o o k a tte m p ts to c a p tu re h o w th e an tico lo n ia l w a r w as p erceiv ed in th e a fte rm a th o f in d e p e n d e n c e, w h en th e o p tim ism o f this process had largely died do w n . T he aim is to reflect th e ways in w hich th e life and w o rk o f C abral is p erceiv ed today, outside th e aca­ d e m ic w o rld . In d o in g so, I re lie d o n a c o u p le o f so u rce s w h ich re q u ire a b rie f discussion. CaboVerde: Os Bastidores da Independencia is a good source to sta rt w ith . W ritte n by the Cape Verdean jo u rn alist Jose V icente L opes, th e b o o k does n o t only ch ro n icle th e involvem ent o f Cape V erdeans in th e natio n alist m o v e m e n t, b u t does so th ro u g h the voices o f those w ho had taken p a rt in th e action. Lopes had the o p p o r­ tu n ity to in te rv ie w a m any o f th e natio n alists, som e o f w h o m have since d ied. In th e sam e vein, a n o th e r so u rce to be taken in to account is a b o o k by th e P o rtu g u ese jo u rn a list Jose Pedro C astanheira, Quem mandou m atai Am ilcar Cabral? A ccused o f having b ee n w ritte n fo r the p u rpo se o f absolving G eneral A ntonio Spinola o f any responsibility for the events th at led to th e death o f C abral, C astanheira’s book n o n e th e ­ less contains m any details w hich have b eco m e standard in w ritin g on this h isto ric a l p e rio d . H e w as p e rh a p s n o t only th e first a u th o r to discuss in d etail th e th re e scenarios fo r th e m u rd e r o f C abral, w hich I develop in th e last ch ap ter o f this boo k , b u t he was also one o f the first jo urnalists to g e t access to th e PIDE archives w hen they becam e avail­ able to th e public. A considerable a m o u n t o f th e in fo rm a tio n is p ro b ­ 6

IN T R O D U C T IO N lem atic and un reliab le, b u t C astanheira was able to identify the m o st relevant p a rts by exam ining th e system th e PIDE used to ascertain the accuracy o f the in fo rm atio n provided by its co llab o rators. As such, his b o o k is an a n tid o te to th e h istorical fabrications. Last b u t n o t least, the biography o f Cabral p roduced by Juliao Soares Sousa is also w o rth y o f n o te. A lthough n o t m u ch is added to w hat was already know n about Cabral, Sousa has done rem arkable w ork in term s o f giving d o cu m en tary substance to a n u m b e r o f events th at research ­ ers on C abral only h in t at. H e has b een able to clarify a n u m b e r o f ou tstan d in g q u estio n s a b o u t C a b ra l’s life, such as th e ex act date on w hich he re tu rn e d to C ape Verde, the place w h ere he atten d ed school, an d , m o re im p o rta n tly , C a b ra l’s e x a c t lo catio n at th e tim e o f th e “founding” o f th e PAIGC. H e also provides a w ealth o f new detail on the rese n tm e n t b etw een Cape Verdeans and G uineans, w hich c o n trib ­ u ted to th e clim ate o f conspiracy and helps to explain the killing o f C abral. F or th e m o st p a rt, this in fo rm a tio n can only be fo u n d in archives in Portugal and in the private com m unication betw een partici­ pants in th e natio n alist stru g g le. R ead it carefully, and one starts to und erstan d th e unresolved issues w ithin th e m o v em ent that led to the assassination o f Cabral. *

* *

A m ilcar Cabral was b o rn in G uinea on 24 S ep tem ber 1924 to Cape Verdean p aren ts, Juvenal Cabral and Iva Pinhel Evora. W h en he was eight years old, his family re tu rn e d to th e island o f Santiago, w h ere he atten d e d p rim a ry school. A fter co m p letin g p rim a ry school in Praia, Cabral m oved w ith his m o th e r and siblings (the couple had split up) to the island o f Sao V icente to receive his secondary education at Liceu (high school) Gil Eanes, w here he finished to p o f his class. It was during th ese years, fro m 1936 to 1944, th a t he sta rte d w ritin g p o e try and essays. Critically, it was also d u rin g these years th at he was con fro n ted w ith p o v erty for th e first tim e. To feed h er child ren , C abral’s m o th e r had tw o jobs, and Cabral and his siblings w ere fo rced to p e rfo rm odd jobs in o rd e r to help at hom e. T he Sao V icente years also im pacted him on a m o re dram atic level. Because the Cape Verdean islands w ere cycli­ cally hit by drou g h ts w hich killed thousands o f p eople, from an early age C abral saw p e o p le starv in g to d eath o n th e stre e ts. T his im age rem ained w ith him for th e re st o f his life. 7

A M ILCAR CABRAL A fter a sh o rt stint w orking for the Imprensa National (N ational Press) in P raia, C ab ral w as aw ard ed a scholarship to a tte n d college in P ortugal. In Lisbon, he en ro lled at th e Instituto Superior deAgronomia in 1945, w h ere he o b tained a d eg ree in agronom y and m e t his colleague M aria H elen a R o d rig u es, w ho w ould b eco m e his first w ife. But the m o st im p o rta n t aspect o f C ab ral’s life in Lisbon was the political activ­ ism he began to be involved w ith . In Lisbon, alongside o th e r students fro m P o rtu g u e se co lo n ies in A frica, C abral w as ex p o sed to th re e th e m e s th a t w o u ld m a rk h im p ro fo u n d ly : N egritude, M arx ism , and n ation alism . H e w ro te and p u b lish ed p o e m s, led th e C ape V erdean section o f the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio, and to o k p a rt in the first cultural actions against P ortuguese colonialism . A fter finishing his stu d ­ ies in 1952, he m oved to G uinea-Bissau, his hom eland, to take the job o f ag ro n o m ist at the Pessube Farm . His m o st im p o rta n t achievem ent in G uinea was planning and ru n n in g th e first agronom ic census in this fo rm e r P ortuguese te rrito ry , w hich gave him plen ty o f in form ation on how th e e c o n o m y and p a rtic u la rly a g ric u ltu re w as s tru c tu re d in G uinea. D u rin g this p e rio d he becam e cautiously involved in subver­ sive political activities, b u t none that w ere a con cern at the tim e for the P ortug u ese se c re t police, th e P1DE. H e relocated back to Lisbon in 1955 and, still on the payroll o f colo­ nial agricultural firm s, visited Angola m any tim es, using these o p p o rtu ­ nities to g et involved in th e em erging nationalist m ovem ent th ere and to co n n e c t nationalists in A ngola to th o se in E u rope. As previously m en tio n ed , Cabral has long b een looked u p o n as being co m m itted to the liberation struggle from the very beginning. But his decision to leave everything behind and em brace a clandestine life was n o t taken lightly. It was m ade after pressure from his A ngolan com rades, nam ely Viriato da C ruz and A zancot de M enezes, w ho w ere crucial in the founding o f w hat w ould later becom e th e MPLA (see C hap ter 4). N o r was he the first nationalist to attem p t to rally G uineans in Cape Verde in su p p o rt of the liberation m ovem ent. In fact, w hen Cabral arrived in neighboring G uinea-C onakry, th ere w ere already a n u m b e r o f nationalists, p a rticu ­ larly fro m G uinea-B issau, cam paigning in su p p o rt o f th e nationalist presid en t, A hm ed SekouT oure (see C hap ter 5). Having developed his ideas in th e diaspora, particularly in P ortugal, w here he was a founding m e m b e r o f th e Movimento A nti-C olonial, C abral trie d to unify all the

IN T R O D U C T IO N disparate m ovem ents into a single front. As such, Cabral was forced to co n fro n t a co n ten tio u s aspect o f P ortuguese colonialism on the W est Coast: the anim osity b etw een Cape Verdeans and G uineans. I will com e back to this p o in t, for it is central to the book. C abral only b ecam e fully c o m m itte d to th e n atio n alist cause in 1960, w hen he left P ortugal and m oved to G uinea-C onakry, just after this French colony had b ecom e in d e p e n d e n t u n d e r the leadership o f SekouToure. H e th en laid the foundations for the establishm ent o f the PAIGC. In the en d , Cabral m anaged to fo rm his u nited front, using the PAIGC as an u m b re lla o rg an izatio n fo r th e m any o th e r p arties and groups fighting for the sam e goal. H e achieved this in tw o ways: eith er by silencing th e nationalists w ho did n o t agree w ith him , o r by in te ­ grating them in to th e ranks o f th e PAIGC. O n e o f the consequences o f such a strategy was th at Cabral end ed up b ringing the grow ing a n ti­ C ape Verdean se n tim e n t in to th e p a rty ’s daily operations. In January 1963, Cabral o rd e re d th e first m ilitary actions against P ortuguese units in the in te rio r o f th e country, an assault on a head­ q u a rte rs in T ite , w hich m arked the beginning o f the anticolonial w ar in G uinea. W h a t h ap p en ed n e x t, at th e Cassaca C on gress o f F eb ruary 1964, is a cautionary tale against th e ro se -tin te d d epictions o f the w ar in G uinea. M ost m ilitan ts w ere com ing fro m a m ajo r co n fro n tatio n w ith the P ortuguese army, in C om o. Cabral had given the o rd e r for his units to abandon th e island and to jo in him in Cassaca for the m eeting. It was the first o p p o rtu n ity th e g u errilla leaders had to exam ine th eir progress so far and p rep are for th e n e x t steps. A n u m b e r o f changes in the stru c tu re o f the m ovem ent w ere im plem en ted at the Congress. But these are n o t the reasons Cassaca becam e a tu rn in g point in the history of the party. It was the first tim e Cabral was co n fro nted w ith w hat he later called negative cultural practices. T h ere w ere a n u m b er o f w a r­ lords w ho only w anted to fight to liberate th e ir land, and w ho, once they acquired pow er, m irro re d all the behaviors associated w ith it. They to o k village girls as w ives, rep laced th e tribal chiefs, and killed people accused o f w itchcraft. A n u m b e r o f these chiefs co m m itted w ar crim es in the process, and C abral was left w ith little choice b u t to condem n th em to death. I w ou ld n o t go so far as D aniel dos Santos in suggesting th a t the m u rd e r o f C abral, n ine years later, w as th e re su lt o f th e death se n ­ 9

AM ILCAR CABRAL te n c e s he a u th o riz e d in Cassaca. R ather, I w o u ld say th a t Cassaca b ro u g h t to c e n te r stage th e q u estio n o f c u ltu re , by separating those w ho w ere defined by th eir cu ltu re, th e G uineans, from those w ho w ere n o t, th e Cape Verdeans. These problem s becam e even m o re acute as the n u m b e r o f Cape Verdeans in th e ranks o f th e p a rty increased, p a rtic u ­ larly after 1966. M ost C ape Verdeans w ho jo in ed the m ov em en t w ere cadres, w hich m eans that they w ere n o t directly involved in fighting or, exposed to th e suffering and deaths o f loved ones. C o n tra ry to a n u m b e r o f g u errilla leaders, C abral w as never c o n ­ vinced th at arm ed struggle w ould b rin g independence to G uinea and Cape Verde. H e used the arm ed struggle m ostly to draw the attention of th e in tern atio n al co m m u n ity to th e p lig h t o f th e G uineans u n d e r Portuguese dom ination and to create the structure o f the future indepen­ d e n t country. Instead, he view ed diplom acy as the m o st viable path to liberate his countries. From 1963 to 1973, Cabral u n d erto o k intensive political and diplom atic activity, and by the tim e he was killed by his own m en, he was in th e process o f securing th e su p p o rt o f a handful o f coun­ tries for G uinean and Cape Verdean proclam ation o f independence. This book tries to b ring together, on the one hand, C abral’s personal trajecto ry and, on the other, his revolutionary ideals and philosophy as he p u t th e m in to p ractice. Id e n tity is th e q u e stio n th a t u n ites b o th points. M ore than any o th e r nationalist o f his tim e, Cabral was obsessed w ith a collective exam ination o f identity, an in te re st w hich u n d erpins all o f his w ritin g o n subjects such as cu ltu re, ethnicity, and class. M ore im p o rtan tly , his w h o le c o n c e p t o f th e reasons b eh in d th e em erg in g national liberation m ovem ent derives from his q uest for identity. W hile G uineans u p until th e s ta rt o f th e anticolonial struggle did n o t have a c le a r-c u t id en tity , C ape V erdeans, w h o se collective ev o lu tio n is th e p ro d u c t o f th e e n c o u n te r b etw een th e P o rtu g u ese and A fricans, had b een obsessed w ith th e q u estio n o f identity. T he literary and cultural m o vem en t, Claridosos, in th e early 1930s, is a case in p o int. C abral was in a p riv ileg ed p o sitio n to u n d e rsta n d th e c o n trib u tio n o f th e p e o p le o f G uin ea, o r o f th o se fro m th e coast o f A frica, to the fo rm a tio n o f C ap e V erde— even th o u g h h e d o w nplayed th e p o w er dynam ics. In his view, th e p e n e tra tio n o f G uin ean ele m en ts in to the C ape V erdean p erso n a lity to o k place in a so m ew h at h o riz o n tal way. In fact, d u rin g th e colonial p e rio d , C ape V erdeans saw them selves, 10

IN T R O D U C T IO N and w ere seen by th e P o rtu g u e se , as su p e rio r to th e G uineans. This explains th e pivotal ro le C ape V erdeans played in th e colonisation o f G u inea. T h e islands w e re u sed as a base fo r th e o c c u p a tio n o f th e W est A frican coast, and, since this p a rt o f A frica is one o f th e m o st inhospitable on th e c o n tin e n t— m ark ed as it is by sw am py soil and high te m p e ra tu re s th ro u g h o u t th e year— th e P o rtu g u ese relied heav­ ily on C ape V erdeans to c o n tro l G uinea. T hey to o k an active ro le in th e slave tra d e , and som e w ere involved in th e w ar against the local ru le rs w hich w as in stru m e n ta l fo r P o rtu g al to a sse rt its sovereignty over th a t re g io n ahead o f th e Berlin C o n feren ce o f 1884—5. Things did n o t change m u ch w h en th e a g re e m e n t signed at th e C o nference gave th e P o rtu g u e se license to lay th e g ro u n d w o rk for th e m o d e rn colonial state. T he ro le played by C ape Verdeans in the colonization o f G uinea is central to u n d erstan d in g C ab ral’s rev o lu tio n , b u t is often overlooked in m ost w ritings on C abral. A t the h e a rt o f this question is the relation­ ship betw een n atio n -state and em p ire. M ost o f th e w ritin g on Cabral tends to p ro ject o u r c o n tem p o rary u n d erstan d in g o f th e nation-state o n to C abral’s tim e. I p refer to follow the tho u g h t o f F rederick C ooper and Jane B urbank, for w hom th e fram ew ork o f em pire may be m ore appropriate for understanding the processes through w hich nationalism developed. C ape Verdeans m oved th ro u g h th e P o rtuguese em p ire as quasi-citizens and played th e ro le o f su b altern colonizers in G uinea. Even after the effective occupation o f G uinea, Cape Verdeans still filled m ost o f th e available positions in th e colonial ad m inistration. As I dis­ cuss in C h a p te r 1, thousands o f C ape V erdeans m ig rated to G uinea, co n stitu tin g a s o rt o f m iddle strata b etw een th e P o rtuguese and the natives. H ow ever, C ape Verdeans w ere n o t seen as colonized, and had a political status th a t differed dram atically fro m th a t o f th e natives. C a b ra l’s n atio n alism , th e n , w as cau g h t up in th e zone b e tw e e n th e em pire and th e nation-state. W h ile Cabral strived to fo rm tw o n atio n ­ states, the m aterials he used to do so w ere salvaged from the w reckage o f e m p ire , in th a t th e relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n C ape V erdeans and G uineans was a b y -p ro d u ct o f P ortuguese colonialism . U ltim ately, M arxism may have provided Cabral w ith a way o u t o f th e abyss. Firstly, C abral saw colonialism as an ideology, one th a t m asked social reality itself. People w ere n o t conscious o f th e ir ow n 11

AM ILCA R CABRAL pred icam en t, b u t they could be m ade to u n d erstan d it, hence the role o f the national liberation m ovem ent. Secondly, Cabral u n d e rsto o d cul­ tu re , ethnicity, and class as th e p ro d u c ts o f o b jectiv e rea lity — th e su p e rstru c tu re , in M arxian te rm s — and if one changed objective re a l­ ity, cu ltu re, ethnicity, and class w ould change in line w ith it. To accom ­ plish this, C abral th o u g h t th a t if C ape Verdeans w ere m ade to e x p e ri­ ence the sam e kind o f ord eal to w hich G uineans had been subjected, they w ould be able to u n d erstan d th e real n atu re o f colonialism . But the w ar was never ex ten d ed to the Island o f C ape Verde, w hich created a m ajo r p ro b lem w ithin th e liberation m ovem ent. The lack o f ideological clarity was com pensated for by the care given to m atters o f war. Cabral did rem arkable w o rk in te rm s o f adapting a c o u n te rin su rg e n t m eth o d o lo g y to th e physical conditions o f G uinea itself, as I discuss in detail in C hap ter 5. G uinea did n o t have m ountains (traditionally th e sanctuary o f guerrilla fighters), b u t it had dense fo r­ ests, w h e re fre e d o m fighters fo cused m u c h o f th e ir w a r effo rt. B ut Cabral him self was n o t a com batant, and never en tertain ed the prospect o f solving th e colonial question by a m ilitary victory over the colonial army. Instead, he overestim ated the im p o rtan ce o f the role of the in te r­ national co m m u n ity in c o n trib u tin g to th e in d ep en d en ce o f G uinea. W hile Cabral was m aking the case for G uinea’s sovereignty, the p arty w as engaged in creatin g state-like s tru c tu re s in th e lib erated zones. H ow ever, th e lo n g years th a t th e w a r to o k to reach its final phase becam e a p ro b lem , affecting the m orale o f the com batants and creating enough justification for a conspiracy against C abral’s leadership. This in tu rn led to th e events o f th e nig h t o f 20 January 1973, in C onakry, th e capital city o f G uinea, d u rin g w hich A m ilcar C abral, the fighter for th e national lib eratio n o f G uinea and C ape Verde, was b r u ­ tally assassinated. The d irect p e rp e tra to rs o f this act w ere his ow n m en, m ilitants o f the African P arty for the Independence o f G uinea and Cape Verde (PA IG C ), th e p a rty he him self had fo unded. U nconfirm ed sus­ picions reg ard in g th e assassination o f C abral have p o in ted to a m o re ela b o ra te and c o m p le x p lo t, involving d ifferen t b ran ch es o f th e P ortu g u ese arm y and se c re t police w hich, since the beginning o f the arm ed struggle in 1963, had show n a p articu lar in terest in decapitating the leadership o f the PAIGC as a way to solve th e conflict in this thenP ortu g u ese te rrito ry . 12

IN T R O D U C T IO N By th e tim e o f his physical elim in atio n , C abral was hailed as the m o st serio u s A frican revolutionary. This was n o t only because o f his m ilitary successes, b u t d u e to th e a d m in istra tio n o f th e te rrito rie s recently liberated from the yoke o f P ortuguese colonialism . P articular a tte n tio n was given to social areas such as h ealth and ed u cation, and the establishm ent o f state stru c tu re s such as justice, co m m erce and so on, intern atio n ally raising hopes fo r th e fu tu re o f G uinea once fully lib erated from P o rtu g u ese colonialism . C a b ra l’s travails, it has to be n o te d , w ere taking place against th e b ack d ro p o f th e em erg en ce o f w hat is now retro sp ectiv ely called A fro-pessim ism , w h en the dream o f an in d e p e n d e n t A frica had v eered off co u rse in to m ism anagem ent, coup d ’etats, and eth n ic cleansing. T he in terp lay o f th re e fa c to rs— an u n reso lv ed assassination, the everyday aspects o f an A frican re v o lu tio n , and th e unfulfilled re v o lu ­ tio n ary ho p es— acco u n t for th e vivid in te re st th a t C abral has elicited since his assassination. This explains th e d elu g e o f w orks on Cabral and th e re v o lu tio n in G uinea. I have w ritte n this b o ok n o t so m uch as a scholar, b u t as so m e o n e w h o w as b o r n an d cam e o f age in a w o rld in w hich th e e m e rg e n c e o f C a b ra l’s th e o ry o n d eco lonization was in stru m e n ta l. * * *

I was b o rn in L uanda in th e sam e y ear in w h ich C abral was k illed, 1973. T h e re v o lu tio n a ry ideals he c h a m p io n e d w e re sh ared by his A ngolan compagnons de route, such as V iriato da C ru z , M ario P in to de A ndrade, Lucio Lara, and A gostinho N eto. T he in d ep en d en ce o f th eir c o u n trie s, G uinea in 1973 and C ape Verde and A ngola in 1975, could th e n be seen as th e realizatio n o f th e em a n c ip a tio n ist dream s they had been shaping in th e late 1940s and early 1950s in Lisbon, w h e re C a b ra l’s g e n e ra tio n had politically co m e o f age. Socialism was c h o ­ sen as th e p ath fo r p ro g re ss and m o d e rn ity and th e sam e m in d set th a t had b e e n a p p lie d d u rin g th e s tru g g le fo r in d e p e n d e n c e w as tran sp o se d to th e n atio n -b u ild in g . F re e d o m was lim ite d , th e ru lin g p a rty was th e p u rv e y o r o f th e p e o p le ’s asp iratio n s and political d is­ sid en ts, if n o t k ille d , w e re ex iled . T h e p a rty had in a way rep la ce d the ch u rch , and those w ho dared to challenge its m ystifications could e x p e c t harsh p u n ish m e n t. D u rin g m y u p b rin g in g , fo r ex am p le, the 13

A M ILCAR CABRAL h isto ry o f th e p arty , p a rtic u la rly th e d ate its fo u n d in g , could n o t be q u e s tio n e d . T h o se w h o d id , su ch as th e A n g o lan h is to ria n C arlos P acheco, co u ld only d o so fro m th e p o sitio n o f relative se cu rity th a t th e ir exile p ro v id e d . W h en I cam e o f age, particularly w h en I travelled to Lisbon (Lisbon, again, w h e re every th in g s ta rte d ), I cam e to realize th a t th e re w as a huge discrepancy b etw een th e ro se -tin te d descriptions o f th e road to indep en d en ce and w hat had actually h ap p en ed . In P ortugal, archival d ocu m en ts w ere being declassified, and th e P o rtuguese, after decades o f silence, w ere finally com ing to te rm s w ith the trau m a o f decoloniza­ tio n . T he n ew in te rp re ta tio n s o f decolonization m ade m e consider the disju n ctu re b e tw e e n how lib eratio n was c eleb rated in o u r co u n tries and th e actual events. In o th e r w o rd s, m y u p b rin g in g in A ngola, and the fact th at I have com e to consider the legacy o f and literatu re on Cabral from this p o int o f view, m akes it all th e m o re difficult fo r m e to reconcile events and th e ir p resen tatio n . This se n tim e n t was shared by m any C ape Verdeans and Guineans of my generation w hom I befriended in Lisbon. Portuguese colonialism was evil, b u t th e p rom ise o f ind ep endence had n o t been fulfilled. For th e G uineans, th e eth n ic strife th at Cabral unsuccessfully trie d to reso lv e had b e c o m e th e g lue o f th e n atio n -state. A nd m o st Cape Verdeans, w ho had n o t w ished to secede from P ortugal, w ere left w ith an in d ep en d en ce fo r w hich they did n o t fight. M y in te n tio n is n e ith e r to blindly c e leb rate th e political achieve­ m en ts o f these historical figures n o r to m ake th em solely to blam e for th e m ishaps th at o c c u rre d in th e ir c o u n try after they w ere gone. Instead, this is an a tte m p t to retrospectively re c o n stru ct w hat w ould have o c c u rre d if th e actions shaping th e anticolonial struggle w ere n o t based on propaganda, b u t o n som ething closer to the tru th . W h at kind o f descrip tio n o f the past can be pro d u ced if one disregards propaganda in favor o f th e real events? O n e final p o in t on the notes. I have decided to w rite this book w ith ­ o u t inundating it w ith fo o tn o tes, w hich te m p t the re ad e r to in te rru p t the flow o f th e narrative to look up p articu lar references. To m e e t the rigo ro u s standards re q u ire d by such a b o o k , how ever, I have pushed all th e referen ces to th e en d in a section called “N o tes.” This section is in ten d ed to provide the exact location th e citations are taken from as 14

IN TR O D U C T IO N well as com m ents on the bibliography used and contextual inform ation for u n d erstan d in g p articu lar historical aspects discussed in the book. Finally, I could n o t co n clu d e this in tro d u c tio n w ith o u t ack n o w l­ edg em en t o f the su p p o rt I was given in o rd e r to carry o u t this project. I am grateful to M ahm ood M am dani, w ho to o k a special in terest in this p ro ject, and w ho, th ro u g h the M akerere In stitute o f Social R esearch in U ganda, offered m e a stipend that allow ed m e to sta rt w orking on this book. Being based in South A frica, far from th e libraries w ith the n e c ­ essary reso u rces for this p ro je c t, I was forced to rely on a n u m b er of people w ho helped m e acquire a vast am o u n t o f inform ation, including Luciana D ias, E u rid ice M o n te iro , F ern an d o P ereira, T chiloia Lara, through the F unda^aoT chiw eka, and Pedro C erejo. I am equally grateful to a n u m b e r o f friends, colleagues, and in stitu ­ tions w ho have invited m e to speak on C abral in th e years since the publication o f the Portuguese version of this b o o k ( 0 Fazedor de Utopias: Uma biografia de Amilcar Cabral). A m ong these p eople and institutions, I am p a rtic u la rly g ra te fu l to M anuela R ib eiro Sanches, Jose N eves, M arta Lan^a, Paolo Israel, Ciraj R assool, th e C e n te r for Flum anities R esearch at the U niversity o f W estern C ape, and Joao Rapazote and M anthia D iaw ara, w ith th e p ro g ra m m e A F R IC A .C O N T ( Camara M unicipal de Lisboa). I am also particu larly grateful to the Stellenbosch

Institute for A dvanced Studies w hose fellow ship allow ed m e to w ork on the final prep aratio n s o f the m an u scrip t. STIAS’s staff, particularly C risto ff Pauw, N el M ari L oock and th e d irecto r, E dw ard K irum ira, have help ed im m ensely in creating th e p e rfe c t e n v iro n m en t to fully co m m it to this p ro je c t, helping m e in every possible way. Last b u t n o t least, I am also deeply grateful to my family, particularly my in-law s, w ho have taken on som e o f th e b u rd en s o f childcare over the years. This m an u sc rip t has also b enefited from th e careful a tte n tio n o f my lovely w ife, Sylvia C ro ese, w ho alongside h e r ow n w o rk , and o th e r co m m itm en ts, found tim e to revise sections o f this b ook and to check a n u m b e r o f facts. W ith o u t h er co n stan t love and su p p o rt, I w ould n o t have been able to w rite this book.

15

1

BETWEEN GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE

Ever since th e “discovery” by th e P ortuguese o f th e A frican te rrito ry th at w ould later be called G uinea, and th ro u g h o u t the follow ing c e n ­ tu ries, this c o u n try on the w estern coast o f Africa w as, in the im agina­ tion o f th e C ape V erdeans, th e land o f o p p o rtu n itie s and daring deeds. H em m e d in by th e n a rro w h o rizo n s o f th e p o o r islands, m o st Cape Verdeans sought to trad e w ith th e natives. In G uinea, at least, they did n o t have to co m p ete w ith th e P ortuguese w ho, because o f the clim ate, rarely stayed th ere for long p erio d s o f tim e. M ost, p articularly in the early days o f co lo n izatio n , w e re langados, o r s e ttle rs, m ad e up o f Jew s— N e w C h ristian s— and o th e rs o f A frican o rig in such as Senegam bians (m ostly from p re se n t day Senegal) and Sierra Leoneans. By the late n in e te e n th century, C ape Verdeans had largely becom e the de facto colonizers o f G uinea. C ape V erdeans, o r G uineans o f C ape Verdean o rig in , such as H o n o rio B arreto, g u aran teed the sovereignty o f the P ortuguese crow n by signing treaties w ith the local po ten tates, according to ag reem en ts reach ed by th e colonial pow ers at the 188S Berlin C o nference. C ape Verdeans played an active p a rt in the occupa­ tio n cam paigns. W h e n they w e re n o t leading th e A frican battalions them selves, they fought side by side w ith th e P ortu g u ese heroes o f the occupations such as Teixeira Pinto. Since these w ars w ere fought w ith com m endable bravery on the p a rt o f the Africans, G uinea only becam e a subjugated te r r ito r y in th e m id -1 9 5 0 s, w h e n th e last pacification cam paign in C anhabaque was co m p leted . 17

A M ILCAR CABRAL T h e in v o lv e m e n t o f C ape V erdeans in th e business o f G uinea ste m m e d fro m th e ju rid ic a l status o f this te r r ito r y itself. Since th e arrival o f th e P o rtug u ese, th e G o v ern o r o f C ape Verde also oversaw G u in e a ’s affairs fro m his h e a d q u a rte rs in th e Island o f Santiago. As such, G uinea was form ally a colony o f a colony. In practice, however, G uinea was adm in istered by th e “luzitanized blacks and m estizo tra f­ fickers, from C ape Verde.” But this state o f affairs was soon to change. In D ecem b er 1878, after a m assacre o f C ape Verdean soldiers in Bolor, in the afterm ath o f skirm ishes w ith th efelu p es, th e P ortuguese political authorities decided to separate G uinea from Cape Verde. O n 18 M arch 1879, in a le tte r signed by Fontes P ereira de M elo, p resid e n t o f the co u n cil, P o rtu g u e se G u in ea w as fo rm ally established, an d , as a P ortu g u ese overseas te rrito ry , w ould go o n to have th e rig h t, in the language o f th e epoch, to its ow n re sid e n t g o v ern o r and a locally p u b ­ lished g o v ern m en t gazette. H ow ever, in spite o f this legal a rra n g e m e n t, C ape V erdeans k e p t “colonizing” G uinea. M uch o f this was due to th e fact that the lingua fra n ca in G uinea had b een created by th e C ape V erdeans, te sta m e n t to

the m ajo r ro le o f the these islanders in the everyday life o f G uinea— unique in th e colonial system . For instance, in te rrito ry c o n tro lled by the P o rtu g u ese, colonization hinged fo r th e m o st p a rt on the e m e r­ gence o f a culturally assim ilated g ro u p operating betw een the insignifi­ cant n u m b er o f w hites and the large masses o f the colonized. In Angola, o r M ozam bique, they w ere called assimilados— assim ilated. In G uinea, however, this was n o t th e case. Cape Verdeans had in serte d and estab­ lished them selves as this in te rm e d ia ry group. By diffusing th e ir ow n C reole, they becam e an indispensable link b etw een the P ortuguese and the natives. In this way, Cape Verdeans took hold o f the entire life o f the province. They m ade up a large p a rt o f th e m ilitary units and occupied the m ajo r­ ity o f the posts in public adm inistration. This arrangem ent, w hich p re ­ v ented th e em ergence o f a native elite, suited th e P ortuguese and the Cape Verdeans alike. Portugal could rely o n subaltern colonizers, whose physical characteristics respo n d ed b e tte r to the dem ands o f the clim ate, w ith o u t having th e n eed to send w hite colonizers to the region. Cape Verde had in G uinea a way to deal w ith the p o pulation surplus or, at least, a way to find a balance b etw een th e size o f th e population and the 18

B E T W E E N G U IN E A A N D CAPE VERDE available food resources. As a school system had developed very early on in the archipelago, m any Cape Verdeans w ere w ell educated and, w ith very few o p p o rtu n itie s in th e ir o w n h o m elan d , m o st o f th em w ere forced to m igrate. T he destinations w ere eith e r in th e N ew W orld, in places such as th e U n ited States o f A m erica and A rgentina, o r in the Portuguese colonies, such as Angola and M ozam bique. However, until th e 1950s, G uinea was th e m o st im p o rta n t receiv ing co u n try for m ig ran ts from C ape V erde, b e fo re d estin atio n s such as France and M etropolitan P ortugal becam e m o re com m on. * * * Like thousands o f o th e r Cape V erdeans, C ab ral’s p arents m igrated to G uinea in th e first q u a rte r o f th e century. His m o th e r was b o rn in Santiago o n 31 D e c e m b e r 1893. She w as th e d a u g h te r o f A n tonio Pinhel Evora and M axim iana M o n teiro da R ocha, b o th from Santiago. In 1922, at th e age o f 29, she m ig rated to G uinea alongside her p a r t­ ner, Joao C arvalho Silva, and th e ir n in e-m o n th -o ld baby, Ivo C arvalho Silva. C ab ral’s father, Juvenal, w o rk ed for th e colonial state and w ro te a couple o f books full o f personal inform ation, w hich m akes the task of tracing his life sto ry far easier. Juvenal C ab ral w as b o rn o n 2 Jan u ary 1889, o n th e Island o f Santiago, in Praia, shortly after th e death o f his father, A ntonio Lopes da C osta, at th e tim e a stu d en t at th e C atholic sem inary on the island o f Sao N icolau. Before da C o sta’s death, he gave Juvenal C ab ral’s g o d ­ m o th er, Sim oa dos Reis B orges, a m o n e ta ry sum o f 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 reis to cover the costs ol his s o n ’s education from p rim ary school to p rie st­ ho o d , based on a m onthly fee at th e sem inary o f no m o re than 10,000 reis. However, Juvenal C abral’s talents did n o t blossom in the first years o f his life, and few m em b ers o f his family believed th at he was cut o u t for the priesthood. W ith Juvenal still unable to speak Portuguese by the age of nine, he w e n t to a village in Beira Alta called C assuraes, w here he sta rte d his p rim a ry ed u catio n . Eventually, he was en ro lled at the sem inary at V iseu, alongside a n u m b e r o f o th e r stu d ents w ho w ould late r beco m e very im p o rta n t in P o rtu g u e se politics— am ong th e m , A ntonio de O liveira Salazar. Juvenal did n o t spend enough tim e in the sem inary o f Viseu to be o rdained as a p riest. W hen d ro u g h t hit th e archipelago, Simoa dos Reis 19

AM ILCAR CABRAL Borges found h erself w ith o u t the funds to su p p o rt the education o f h er godson. Juvenal C abral was th erefo re su m m o n ed back to Cape Verde in 1907, a t th e age o f 18. H e th e n e n ro lle d a t th e sem inary o f Sao N icolau, at th a t tim e the only education establishm ent in Cape Verde th a t g ran ted high-school diplom as. In this way, he becam e p a rt o f the in te lle c tu a l e lite o f C ape V erde, w h o , w h ile having stu d ie d a t th e sem inary, did n o t aspire to th e priestly life.T his institu tio n train ed the vast m ajo rity o f th e clerks w ho filled positions in the colonial adm inis­ tratio n o f th e archipelago, o r those w ho later w ould go on to w ork in G uinea o r fu rth e r afield in co u n tries such as Angola and M ozam bique. In th e sem inary o f Sao N icolau, Juvenal C abral jeopardized his final chance to b eco m e a p rie st after being involved in a braw l w ith a col­ leagu e fro m G u in ea. T h e p u n ish m e n t fo r this act w as n o t o u trig h t expulsion: if he accepted a caning, he could m ake am ends fo r his bad behavior. H ow ever, even w h en offered th e o p tio n o f taking the beating in private, he refused th e p u n ish m en t. E xpelled from the sem inary, he lost his one o p p o rtu n ity to obtain a high-school d iplom a, w hich w ould have given him th e qualifications n eed ed to apply fo r a highly soughtafter g o v ern m en t job in C ape Verde. D ep riv ed o f th e possibility o f a jo b in C ape Verde at the level o f his p e rso n a l an d social e x p e c ta tio n s , Ju v en al C a b ral w as le ft w ith no o th e r c h o ic e b u t to go to G u in e a . In 1 9 1 1 , at th e age o f 2 2 , he a rriv e d at th e m o s t u n d e r-d e v e lo p e d c o lo n y o f th e P o rtu g u e se em p ire . O n ly in th e 1920s had th e P o rtu g u e se sta rte d to set up pub lie in fra s tru c tu re , such as p ro p e r roads. T h e reaso n fo r this w as th a t even th e m o st re fo rm is t o f g o v e rn o rs such as Jo rg e F re d e ric o Velez C a ro 9 o did n o t deem this s o rt o f thing a p rio rity . A t the tim e , G uinea was a colony in a p e rm a n e n t state o f w ar, w h ich fo rced Velez C aro^o to sp en d a g re a t deal o f his tim e and re so u rc e s on organizing cam ­ paigns to “pacify th e natives.” It has n o t b e e n possible to establish exactly w h en th e p are n ts o f C abral first m e t. W h a t is k n o w n is th a t Iva E vora w as ro m antically involved w ith C ab ral’s father, Juvenal, sh o rtly after arriving in G uinea in 1922. AmOcar Cabral was b o rn on 24 Septem ber 1924, in the parish o f N ossa S en h o ra da G ra 9 a, and only later, p ro b ab ly in 1926, did Juvenal leave his w ife E rnestina Soares de A ndrade, and join his new family. A lthough th e b irth o f his first son w ith Iva was celebrated w ith 20

B E T W E E N G U IN E A A N D CAPE VERDE som e p o m p — he gave him the nam e Am ilcar, in hom age to H am ilcar Barca, the Carthaginian hero w ho fought against the R om ans— it is not rec o rd ed in his m em oir, w ritte n a couple o f years later. However, his account ol his jo u rn e y th ro u g h Bafata, w h ere A m ilcar was b o rn , p ro ­ vides an in terestin g p o in t o f co n trast b etw een his life and th at o f his son. O n the banks o f the riv ers G eba and Colufi, he w rites, the n o b le ­ w om an o f Fa— a black w om an from Biafada, hungry for civilization and m adly in love— had “given” h erself to the C ape Verdean Jose Valerio. T hrough the sym bolism o f this sexual act, the P ortuguese en tered into p ossession o f th ese te r r ito r ie s th ro u g h th e m e d ia tio n o f the C ape V erdeans. A stau n ch d e fe n d e r o f th e colo n izatio n o f G uinea by th e P o rtu g u e se , Juvenal w as far fro m d re a m in g th a t tw o o f his sons, A m ilcar and Luis C ab ral, w o u ld la te r lead th e m o v e m e n t to free Guinea and Cape Verde from colonial dom ination. But here, as in m any o th e r m o v e m e n ts, th e m y th w o u ld be k e p t alive: to th e m , G uinea w ould co n tin u e to be the land o f daring deeds. In G uinea, Juvenal Cabral had to w ait a n u m b e r o f years u n til he could stabilize his professional situation. Finding jobs was never particu ­ larly difficult fo r him ; th e p ro b le m , d u e to his te m p e r, was keeping them . H e w orked in a num ber o f public offices, until he was finally hired at cu sto m s, u n d e r th e d ire c to rsh ip o f C esar C o rre ia P into, w ho is d e sc rib e d , in Ju v en al’s m em o ir, as a fearso m e m an , a d ictato r w ho expected blind obedience from his subordinates. Juvenal could n o t last long th ere, even if it w ere a g reat loss for him . In colonies such G uinea, w hich depended heavily on the e x p o rt of prim ary goods such as gro u n d ­ nuts, and im p o rted a great deal o f finished goods, the custom s office was the nerve cen ter o f econom ic life, providing clerks m any o p portunities to supplem en t th eir salaries. A ccording to w hat Juvenal Cabral w ro te later in his m em oir, he left custom s because o f d isag reem en ts w ith C o rre ia Pinto. His ex p lan a­ tio n s delve in to p sychology: n o t having h ad a fa th e r and raised by w o m en w ho had spoiled him had p erhaps c o n trib u te d to his aversion to any form o f authority. But Juvenal C abral’s d e p a rtu re from custom s may have been m otivated by o th e r events. Cabral had never hidden his ad m iratio n fo r Teixeira P in to , th e “pacifier” o f G uinea, w ho had n o t hesitated to c o m m it atro cities in o rd e r to achieve his goals. If he had k ep t his praise for P into to his close frien d s, this may n o t have had any 21

A M ILCAR CABRAL consequences. B ut Juvenal C abral m ade his ap p reciation public in a n e w sp ap er article published in th e Voz de Cabo Verde. W h en copies o f th e n e w sp a p e r s ta rte d circu latin g in Bissau, Juvenal C abral becam e the ta rg e t o f insults and th reats. H e w as even asked to w rite a piece denying th e c o n te n t o f his despicable e d ito ria l, as m any peo p le had d ee m e d it. P ressu re w as m o u n tin g fro m g ro u p o f G uineans w hose econom ic p o sitions w ere im proving and w ho w ere com p etin g socially w ith th e C ape V erdeans in th e colonial ad m in istration. T hese events m ade Juvenal C ab ral’s p o sitio n in th e custo m s office untenable. W ith his resignation from custom s, Juvenal was forced to accept a m odest position as a p rim ary school teacher, w hich he started in 1913. His first ap p o in tm e n t was in th e village o f C acine, teaching a class o f only six pupils, w hich, n o t giving him enough to do, allow ed him spare tim e to re a d , w rite , and d o so m e g ard en in g , p ro v id in g him w ith a “precious su p p lem en t to his m eagre salary.” In th e follow ing years, he was tran sferred to m any schools, in various districts o f the colony, such as Bafata, w h ere A m ilcar C abral was b o rn . His last stop was in Bissau, the capital o f th e colony, w h ere he and A delina C o rreia (an o th er g o d ­ d a u g h te r o f Sim oa dos Reis B orges), alth o u g h unable to a tte n d th e w edding in p e rso n , w ere finally m a rrie d by proxy. This arran g em en t allow ed him to b rin g fo rw ard his re tire m e n t in 1932, and to re tu rn to C ape V erde as o n e o f th e h e irs o f Sim oa dos Reis B orges, w h o had recen tly passed away. It is o ften said th at child ren in h e rit ch aracter traits from th e ir p a r­ ents. If this is tru e , Juvenal had passed som e o f his to Amilcar. T he m ost in terestin g o f th em is perhaps a naive b elief in the p ow er o f w riting. For b o th o f th e m , the act o f w ritin g was p a rt o f th e solution to every p ro b lem . T hose w ho k n ew A m ilcar C abral in C onakry re m e m b e r th at he sp en t p a r t o f th e w a r th e re w ritin g : co m m u n iq u es, m em o ran d a, le tte rs to various m em b ers o f th e party, essays, and re p o rts on the w ar situation. In th e days b efo re his assassination, he w ro te a long d o c u ­ m e n t describing in m eticu lo u s detail th e supposed plan o rch estrated by the PIDE (Policia International e de Defesa do Estado) for his physical elim in atio n and th e ex p u lsio n o f C ape V erdeans fro m th e liberation m ovem en t. For C abral, it was as if th e m e re act o f w ritin g about this p lo t, m aking his m e n conscious o f such danger, w o u ld w ard off the possibility o f his ow n death. 22

B E T W E E N G U IN E A A N D CAPE VERDE For different reasons, Juvenal Cabral had the same relationship w ith w riting. He w ro te a n u m b e r o f articles for n ew sp ap ers and le tte rs to g o v ern o rs, for ex am p le, in w hich he called a tte n tio n to the p roblem s o f d ro u g h t and th e re c u rre n t food crises in C ape Verde and the ways to definitively solve th e m . H ow ever, Juv en al’s epistolary activism was based on a different u n d e rsta n d in g o f colonialism to th a t o f his son. W h en A m ilcar C abral w ro te to Salazar in 1960 to p ropose n eg o tia­ tions for the in d ependence o f G uinea and Cape Verde, for exam ple, he was u n d er the firm conviction th at the days o f P ortguese rule in Africa w ere n u m b e re d . Juvenal C abral, for his p a rt, believed th ro u g h o u t his life th a t the biggest p ro b lem s in G uinea and C ape Verde w ere caused by the insufficient action o f P o rtu g u ese colonialism , especially in the dom ain o f education. As such, th e a p p o in tm e n t o f his h ero , Salazar, as p resid en t o f th e council was a s o rt o f co n firm atio n th at G od had lis­ te n ed to his prayers. * * *

Juvenal Cabral was n o t the only p e rso n in co n tin en tal Portugal o r its overseas d e p e n d e n c ies w h o saw th e a p p o in tm e n t o f A n to n io de O liveira Salazar as an act o f divine in terv en tio n . In th e 1920s, Portugal was going th ro u g h one o f its d ark est h o u rs since the proclam ation o f th e R epublic in 1910. T he c o u n try could find no way to balance its public finances and was spending far m o re than it could produce. These days w ere m arked by political instability, w hich m ade it im possible to im p le m e n t m a jo r re fo rm s w ith lo n g -te rm effects. For m any p o liti­ cians, and fo r a large sectio n o f th e p o p u la tio n , only a d icta to ria l re g im e co u ld re sc u e th e c o u n try fro m th is state o f affairs. C o n se ­ quently, (or at least according to Salazar’s successor M arcello Caetano), the m ilitary coup o f 28 May 1926 was enthusiastically celeb rated by m u c h o f th e p o p u la tio n , w ith th e o u stin g o f th e liberals generally received w ith re lie f ra th e r than shock. T h e g e n e ra l to w h o m th e m ilita ry gave th e P re sid e n c y o f th e R epublic, O scar C arm o n a, invited the p ro m in e n t C oim bra p ro fessor A n tonio de O liv eira Salazar to be p a r t o f th e g o v e rn m e n t. H ow ever, he only form ally accep ted th e in v itation on 27 A pril 1928— a m o n th a fte r th e p re s id e n tia l e le c tio n s — a fte r m u c h h e sita tio n and go in g back and fo rth . Salazar had b een invited as a consensus figure: he was 23

AM ILCA R CABRAL re sp e c te d by th e m ilitary, and he was p a r t o f C atholic and m o n a rc h i­ cal circles. M o re im p o rta n tly , he was a p ro fe sso r at th e m o st highly reg ard ed university in th e country, C o im b ra, and a ren o w n ed special­ ist in th e academ ic field o f pub lic finance. H e w ould apply a sim ple fo rm u la fo r governance: a close c o n tro l over foreign d e b t and a b al­ an ce d b u d g e t sh o u ld b e th e c o n d itio n s fo r re p a irin g th e p u b lic accounts. H e w ould only accep t a p o sitio n in th e g o v e rn m e n t if given “veto p o w er fo r every e x p e n d itu re o f all m in istries and vast pow ers to u n d e rta k e b u d g e t cuts and th e fiscal re fo rm s necessary to balance th e b u d g e t.” A lthough he was officially th e m in ister o f finances, Salazar, in p ra c ­ tice, c o n tro lle d th e e n tire g o v e rn m e n t. H e had n o t b ee n ap p o in ted p rim e m in ister yet, since som e high-ranking m em b ers o f the m ilitary firm ly believed th a t a civilian could n o t lead a m ilitary reg im e. This h u rd le was easily o v erco m e w h e n a g ro u p o f officials, am o n g th em H u m b e rto D elgado, convinced the p re sid e n t o f the republic to distin ­ guish Salazar w ith a Gra-Cruz da Ordem M ilitai da Torre e Espada— never b efore given to a civilian— w hich was th e equivalent o f being m ade a general. H e was given this m edal on 28 May 1932 w hen ru m o rs w ere circulating th at a constitu tio n al re fo rm to end th e m ilitary regim e was underw ay. In July o f th a t year, Salazar was ap p o inted p re sid en t o f the council, a p o sitio n he w ould hold until 1968. In his plan to stabilize public finances, Salazar had pro p o sed a revo­ lutio n ary step: th e in teg ratio n o f th e econom ies o f the colonies in the survival strateg ies o f th e re g im e itself. In th o se tim es, in fact, m o st p eop le in P ortugal did n o t know exactly w hat to do w ith the colonies. For c en tu ries, since the arrival o f th e P o rtu g u ese in A frica, these te r ­ rito rie s had p ro d u ced an econom ic surplus thanks to the slave trade. H ow ever, w ith th e en d o f th e slave tra d e in th e first q u a rte r o f the n in ete e n th century, th e P o rtu g u ese colonies becam e m o re a source o f e x p e n d itu re th an incom e. A t th e en d o f th e n in e te e n th century, fo r instance, various w rite rs and th in k ers, such as th e fam ous w rite r Eca de Q u eiro z, argued th at the te rrito rie s P ortugal held in Africa should be sold. T h ere w ere p len ty o f reasons fo r such calls. In the first q u a rte r o f the tw e n tie th century, th e econom ic crisis th a t ravaged the colonies seem ed alm ost unsolvable. Inflation was very high, and even the Banco N acional Ultram arino (N atio n al O v erseas B ank), c re a te d in 1864 in

24

BE T W E E N G U IN EA A N D CAPE VERDE o rd e r to solve th e crises arising from econom ic stagnation in the co lo ­ nies, began offering cred it and moeda jid u cia ria (p ap er m oney) w hich w o rsened the situation. T he bank was forced n u m ero u s tim es to sus­ pend the tran sfer o f funds from th e colonies to the m e tro p o le, m aking the currencies th at circulated in Africa n o t convertible into Portuguese escudos. This in tu rn m ean t that settlers in Africa could n o t redeem their rem ittan ces in P ortuguese currency. Salazar cam e to p o w er p ro fo u n d ly m o tiv a te d to change th e e c o ­ n om ic arena in th e colonies. H e applied th e sam e recip e he had used to solve th e b u d g e ta ry p ro b le m s o f c o n tin e n ta l P o rtu g al: financial balance and cu ttin g excess spending. In te rm s o f colonial policy, as the h isto ria n A lan K. S m ith has s ta te d , Salazar w o u ld p re fe r “stability ra th e r than g ro w th ,” even to the e x te n t o f dam aging P ortuguese in te r­ ests in the colonies. T he best way to achieve stability was to p u t an end to the e x p e rim e n t of d ecen tralizatio n , te ste d o u t in the last years o f the R epublic, and to in te g ra te th e colonies in to th e P o rtu g u ese e c o n ­ omy. H e o ccupied h im self w ith this p ro je c t d u rin g his te n u re as m in ­ ister o f th e colonies from January 1930 to July 1931. To realize this vision, he w o rk ed o n th e d raftin g and approval o f th e Acto Colonial (C olonial A ct), th e piece o f legislation w hich w ould th ere after govern the in teg ra tio n o f P ortu g al and its colonies. T he d o c u m e n t stipulates th a t “possessin g c o lo n ie s” is a h isto ric a l fu n c tio n and p a r t o f th e “organic essence” o f th e P o rtu g u ese. T he C olonial A ct w ould in tro ­ duce tig h te r c o n tro l over th e colonies by th e m e tro p o le , w ith Lisbon taking on a n u m b e r o f p rerogatives th a t in th e past w ere u n d e r the ju risd ic tio n o f th e local a d m in istratio n — nam ely foreign investm ent, im m ig ratio n , and em p lo y m en t. W ith the prom ulgation o f the C olonial A ct, Portugal n o t only fu r­ th ere d its isolation from the rest o f the w orld, b u t began to sail against the w inds o f history. W W I had been a victory against im perialism , and from th e ashes o f a d ecim ated E u ro p e e m e rg e d a n e w in tern atio n al order, cham pioned by the A m ericans, particularly the W ilson adm inis­ tration. Having never had traditional colonies, A m erica was striving to secure a w orld w ith o u t the fetters o f the em pire. Politicians from coun­ tries such as India, C hina and Egypt to o k p a rt in the Peace C onference in 1919 to p ro te c t p e o p le ’s rig h t to self-determ ination. Bowing to their pressu re, colonial p o w ers such as England and F rance sta rte d tra n s­ 25

A M ILCA R CABRAL form ing th eir presence in Africa in to regim es o f tutelage, and, by the end o f 1945, prep arin g m o st o f the te rrito rie s they co n trolled for self­ determ ination. W ith the Colonial Act, Portugal was attem pting to make the case th at th e te rrito rie s in Africa u n d e r its adm inistration w ere n o t colonies, b u t ra th e r “overseas dom ains.” T h e th in k in g o f Salazar and his c o lla b o ra to rs, in d raw ing u p th e Colonial A ct, was based on social D arw inism . For th e m , hum anity was divided in to hierarchical categories, w ith th e w h ite /W e s te rn m an at the top. A rm in d o M onteiro, one o f the m o st p ro m in e n t ideologues o f P ortu g u ese colonialism , w ho replaced Salazar as m in ister o f the co lo ­ nies (in this p o st from 1931—35), th o u g h t th at “a g rea t p a rt o f black societies, across th e A frican co n tin en t, w ere im m obile w ithin [the] old stru c tu re s o f organization,” and th at th e w hite m an had to act fast in o rd e r to save these societies from death. For M onteiro, civilization was a long slope, at th e to p o f w hich only th e m o st skillful society could arriv e. As th e m a rc h o f p ro g ress w as u n sto p p ab le, n atu ral selection w ould ru n its course. In a dozen o r so years, he triu m p h an tly added, the black races w hich could n o t scale th e slopes o f civilization w ould be w ip ed from th e e a rth . Salvation w as, th en , re se rv e d for the races th at w ere able to “u n d erstan d b eauty and discipline and to be subject to th em ; th e races th at in the em p ire w ill learn how to be P ortuguese and w ho already consider them selves as su c h .” This m in d se t had seep ed in to th e infam ous Estatuto do Indigenato (th e S tatu te o f Indigenous P o p u latio n s). T he in d ig en o u s, as A driano M o re ira arg u ed , w ere a categ o ry o f natives w ho w e re n o t citizens, fo r they lacked th e “e ru d itio n and cu sto m s” to distinguish th em from th e m asses o f th e black race. This “deficiency” m e a n t th a t th ey could be p u t to any use w hich th e colonial state th o u g h t to be fitting. T he view was th a t ju s t b ein g b o rn was a d e b t to th e state w hich re q u ire d paying a ta x , also k n o w n as an impost de palhota (h u t tax ). Since m o st indig en o u s p e o p le did n o t have access to cu rren cy , th e pay m en t o f this ta x w as m ad e th ro u g h labor. A lth o u g h acco rding to th e law only th e state co u ld re c ru it lab o rers u n d e r this a rra n g e m en t, in actual fact a hig h n u m b e r o f co lo n ial a d m in is tra to rs w e re d e liv e rin g fo rced la b o re rs to p riv a te e n te rp ris e s . F o r e x a m p le , th e th o u sa n d s o f M ozam bicans w ho w ere se n t to m ines in South A frica each year w ere only paid p a rt o f th e ir salaries. T he o th e r p a rt was paid in gold by the 26

B E T W E E N G U IN E A A N D CAPE VERDE South A fricans d irectly to th e Banco de Portugal (Bank o f P o rtu g al). These practices w ere d en o u n ced by in tern atio n al in stitu tio n s, in clu d ­ ing th e League o f N ations and th e In te rn a tio n a l L abour O rganization (IL O ). W h at the P o rtu g u ese, in the w ords o f Salazar, d eem ed a leg iti­ m a te way o f “civilizing” A fricans, was to re s t o f th e w e ste rn w o rld o u trig h t slavery. Salazar m ad e ch eap la b o r th e c o rn e rs to n e o f his econom y. T he rationale behind such an a rra n g e m en t was th at p ro d u c tio n costs for p rim a ry goods w ould be significantly lo w er if th e co st o f labor was red u c ed to a b are m in im u m . In d u stry in co n tin e n ta l P ortugal could b e n e fit fro m c h e a p e r access to co lo n ial p ro d u c ts , such as c o tto n . T hese pro d u cts w ere eith er co n v erted into m anufactured goods in the in d u stries o f co n tin en tal P o rtu g al, o r they w ere sim ply re -e x p o rte d . A nd because o f m ercan tilist laws w hich increased tariffs on p ro d u cts n o t m ade in P o rtu g al, such as clothing, shoes and w ine, P ortuguese in d u stry had a g u a ra n te e d m a rk e t. B ut th e se m easu res w e re n o t enough for Salazar. To close the cycle o f exchange b etw een continental P ortugal and its colonies, he had to u n d e rm in e the d ev elo p m en t o f the latter: as late as the 1960s, for ex am p le, th e re w ere still laws in place w hich p ro h ib ite d th e setu p o f certain in d u stries in A frica “w hile [ ... ] P o rtu g u e se [co u n terp arts] did n o t reach th e ir full capacity.” In this way, the Estado Novo and th e colonization o f A frica w ere so in te r­ tw ined that the d e stru c tio n o f one, as Cabral w ould n o te, w ould m ean the d e stru c tio n o f th e other. * * * N o tw ithstan d in g his rebelliousness, Juvenal Cabral was a m an o f p r in ­ ciple and politically co n serv ativ e ideals. O n e o f his lifelong habits, w hich he claim ed to have d one b o th in G uinea and in Cape Verde, was to a tte n d th e inaugural sp eech es o f colonial g o v e rn o rs. Even if he w ould criticize colonial governors in his letters and new spaper articles for th eir unfufilled p rom ises, his way o f thinking did n o t diverge from th e g en eral lines o f th e colonial p o licy o f P o rtu g al. H e spoke P ortuguese w ith g reat care, a language, in his opinion, th at should be taught to all natives o f Portuguese colonies in Africa. A lthough he h im ­ self ended up w ritin g a book o f poem s in C reole, Confissoes de Ze Badiu, he d id n ’t encourage his child ren to speak in C reo le, w hich he consid­ 27

A M ILCA R CABRAL e re d to b e “frag m en ts o f an archaic P o rtu g u e se , p e rv e rte d , having m ixed w ith m any barb aric w ords.” T h e re is n o d o u b t th a t Juvenal C abral d eeply influenced his son Amilcar, som ething th at is em phasized by alm ost every perso n w ho has w ritte n on C abral, including M ario de A ndrade, O leg Ignatiev and his ow n b ro th e r Luis Cabral. Luis Cabral w rites th a t Juvenal was in stru ­ m ental in A m ilcar’s decision to study agronomy. At one point, according to Luis, w h en A m ilcar was vacillating b etw een studying law and study­ ing agronom y, his father convinced him th at, given the natural condi­ tions o f th e archipelago, an agronom ist had far m o re social im portance than a lawyer. However, n one o f those w ho w ro te on Cabral— w ith the exception o f M ario de A ndrade— have re fe rred to the even m ore deci­ sive influence o f Iva Pinhel Evora in C abral’s form ative years. She was the one w h o , in th e w o rd s o f M ario de A ndrade, b o re the w eight o f p ro tectin g “h e r sons against the adversity o f fo rtu n e.” In 1932, w h en Juvenal Cabral re tu rn e d to Cape Verde w ith his wife and th e ir n e w b o rn son Luis, he also b ro u g h t w ith him his first th re e ch ild ren fro m his relatio n sh ip w ith Iva: A m ilcar, and th e tw in sisters A rm in d a an d A rm a n d a . Iva h ad stayed b e h in d in G u in ea w ith h e r youngest son, A ntonio. But this was n o t due to any desire to stay: only days b efo re she had b een d u e to d e p a rt for C ape V erde, she had b een ro b b e d , losing every p e n n y o f th e savings she had acc ru e d th ro u g h years o f m anaging a g uesthouse. It was only after tw o years o f buying and fa tte n in g u p pigs to sell th e ir m e a t th a t she w as able to save enou g h m o n ey fo r th e b o a t tic k e t to C ape Verde. O n h er re tu rn to Cape Verde, she was shocked to realize that Juvenal C abral had n o t taken good care o f the education o f th e ir sons. Amilcar, for instance, was te n years old and had n o t yet sta rted p rim ary school. As th e relationship b etw een A m ilcar’s p aren ts d e te rio ra ted , Iva faced m o re and m o re difficulties in visiting h e r child ren. Pedro M onteiro, a co n tem p o rary o f Amilcar, rem em b ers th at his grandparents often m ade th e ir h o u se available fo r Iva to m e e t h e r c h ild ren , in te rc e d in g w ith Juvenal Cabral to allow h e r to visit th em . Eventually, on one visit to h e r ch ild ren , Iva Evora to o k th e decision to b rin g th em back w ith her, after discovering th a t A m ilcar had serio u sly in ju re d o n e o f his eyes w hile playing, an accident w hich alm ost cost him his vision. W ith this decision, she to o k full responsibility for providing for the children. Besides feeding and clothing th e m , she also had to provide 28

B E T W E E N G U IN EA A N D CAPE VERDE school m aterials, w hich, in A m ilcar’s case, was particularly challenging. In 1936, at th e age o f tw elve, Cabral finally sta rte d his studies and fin­ ished prim ary school in one academ ic year. In O c to b e r 1936, he was e n ro lle d in first g ra d e , tra n s fe rre d to second g ra d e in January, and finished th ird and fo u rth grade b efore the en d o f th e academ ic year. In the follow ing academ ic year o f 1 9 3 7 /3 8 , he was already a stu d en t at the Liceu Gil Eanes. Financial responsibilities becam e even m o re o n erous for Iva Evora after A m ilcar C abral sta rte d high school, even though he was already co n trib u tin g to expenses at hom e by ru n n in g erra n d s, peddling and, later on, tu to rin g students of the Liceu, including som e o f his ow n class­ m ates. However, since Iva had few resources, it is probable that Amilcar Cabral w ould n ever have atten d ed the Liceu had the educational situa­ tion in C ape Verde n o t changed substantially since th e tim e o f Juvenal Cabral. In th e d ecree th at abolished the Sem inary o f Sao N icolau, in 1917, the Liceu C ape Verde was created (later becom ing the Liceu Gil Eanes). W hile keeping sons in the sem inary at Sao N icolau had required the regular sending o f m oney, as w e have seen in the case o f C abral’s father, the creation o f the Liceu in Sao V icente m ade access to education m o re dem ocratic. From th en on, families w ith less m oney could n o t only send th e ir sons, as was the case for th e sem inary, b u t also th e ir daughters to school, w ith o u t being dep riv ed o f dom estic help. The dem o cratizatio n o f education was n o t the m ain goal o f creating the school in Sao V icente. T he initial idea was to abolish the sem inary and to use the sam e facilities for th e Liceu. H ow ever, the decision was later taken to tran sfer the Liceu to Sao V icente. This tu rn e d o u t to be a g o o d decision w h ich u ltim a te ly b e n e fitte d ev ery o n e involved. Sao V icente had a p o r t, w h ich , although falling in to progressive decline because o f the end o f steam ers, was the m ost cosm opolitan place o f the w hole archipelago. Sao V icente was visited by sailors from all over the w o rld , and it w as th e m ain p o in t o f e n try fo r foreign n e w sp a p ers, m agazines and b ooks. U nlike th e sem inary, acco rd in g to H e n riq u e Teixeira de Sousa, th e Liceu b enefitted from its in se rtio n in the city as it offered students access to an intense academ ic life. To be a stu d en t in the Liceu was also to be a m e m b e r o f stu d e n t associations and to have the o p p o rtu n ity to take p a rt in various sp o rts and cultural activities. Liceu Gil Eanes was a colonial landm ark in te rm s o f education. This was n o t necessarily because it was the first o f sim ilar institutions to be 29

AMILCAR CABRAL founded in th e colonies. T he Liceu o f Luanda, for instance, was founded only a year later in 1918. T he m ajor difference was th at, w hereas in the Liceus o f G oa, M acau, M ozam bique, and A ngola th e in stru c to rs and stu den ts w ere fo r th e m o st p a rt civilians and m ilitary staff from c o n ti­ nental Portugal and th eir sons, alm ost all o f them w hite, in the Liceu Gil Eanes, in stru c to rs and stu d en ts w ere black and m ixed-race (i.e. they w ere natives o f C ape V erde). In o rd e r fo r h e r children to study at th e Liceu— above all Amilcar, w hose results in the first years o f school show ed th at he had academ ic p o ten tia l— Iva Evora m oved h e r family to Sao V icente at the en d o f 1937. To provide for h e r family, she w orked in a fish-canning factory, w here she m ade the m iserable am ount o f five tostoes p er ho u r (one tostao was a hundredth o f the escudo). But h er w o rk th ere was tem p o rary and she often had to w o rk th ro u g h o u t the night on h e r sewing m achine to b rin g in e x tra in co m e to stave off h e r fam ily’s hunger, according to M ario Pinto de A ndrade. D u rin g these years, Juvenal C abral, even if he w an ted to , could do very little to su p p o rt his family. W h e n he becam e th e o w n e r o f the p ro p e rty left by his go d m o th er, Simoa dos Reis Borges, on his re tu rn to th e n ative lan d , he b u ilt a b eau tifu l m an sio n in A chada Santa C atarina, w ith tiles im p o rte d from co n tin en tal P ortugal— som ething th at back th e n very few C ape Verdeans could afford. But this o p u len t lifestyle could n o t last, and it was n o t long before Juvenal Cabral found him self on the verge o f bankruptcy. C ontrib u tin g to this w ere the reg u ­ lar droughts in Cape Verde, along w ith his habit o f lending m oney w ith n o guarantees o f it being paid back, and his w om anizing tendencies. A fter taking o u t a n u m b e r o f loans, for w hich he had to use his p ro p ­ e rty as collateral, he lost his house in Achada. H e spent the last years of his life in Praia, in a house to o sm all for th e size o f his household. To m ake his financial situation even w o rse, Juvenal C abral was also cau g h t u p in a legal case d atin g b ack to his tim e in G uinea. In th e school o f Bissau, besides teaching, he had also b een responsible for the school fund and m anaging th e books. Several tim es he helped a co l­ league, a w om an from M adeira called M aria Baptista da C am ara, w hen she, fo r p erso n al reasons, n e e d e d to use these funds. O n ce, w h en he n e ed e d to send his sick w ife A delina and son Luis to P o rtu g al, w h ere they w ould receive b e tte r tre a tm e n t, he him self was forced to use the 30

B E T W E E N G U IN E A AN D CAPE VERDE school funds. L ater on , according to his ow n acco u n t, he replaced the d e d u c te d su m , paying th e last in sta llm e n t o f 8 ,5 0 0 escudos o n his re tu r n to C ape V erde. H ow ever, M aria B aptista da C am ara did n o t re tu r n th e d o c u m e n ts he had signed w h en th e tak ing o u t th e sum . Tw elve years a fte r leaving G u in ea, in 19 4 4 , his frien d successfully su ed h im . F ro m th e n o n , Juven al C ab ral had fifty -th re e escudos d educted from his m onthly salary o f 160 escudos, corresponding to one th ird o f his re tire m e n t fund. * * * D espite having to work, to pay for his ow n studies and help the family, these financial difficulties did n o t affect C a b ra l’s school p erfo rm an ce. D u rin g his tim e at th e Liceu , he was always am ong the b est students. A fter finishing fifth grad e, he chose to study th e sciences, finishing the co u rse in 1944 w ith an average m a rk o f sev en teen — ex ceptional at th at tim e in th e Liceu. D espite his busy schedule, A m ilcar Cabral still found tim e for in te l­ lectual stim ulation and g ro w th . It was d u rin g these years that he w ro te his first poem s. H e p u t to g e th e r tw o n o teb o o k s o f verses called Nos Intervalos da Arte da Minerva [In th e Intervals o f the A rt o f M inerva] and Quando o Cupido Acerta o Alvo [W hen C upid H its the Target], only p o st­ hum ously e d ite d , w h ich , as C abral w ro te in th e preface o f the first

n o teb o o k , w ere the “p ro d u c t o f a fleeting inspiration, the echo o f the voice o f a lyre w hich, played in th e intervals o f studies, tries to u tte r a parcel o f the feelings o f a young h e a rt from a younger g en eration.” In the first o f the n o teb o o k s, th ere is also a preface in the fo rm o f a le tte r to a friend w hich reads: “if today I dare in an alm ost unconscious act to p u t my u n p re te n tio u s poem s u n d e r the te n e b ro u s w ings o f the critic, I can ’t fail to reg ister at th e to p o f the first sheet o f my book, as e p it­ o m e, the follow ing w ords: for you friend o f good and bad tim es, only to you I have to explain, for the courage you gave m e, for the effective su p p o rt you gave m e c o n c e rn in g m y lite ra ry c a re e r (vanity?).’’T he id entity o f th e p erso n to w h o m these w ords are addressed has never been established. A lthough a n u m b e r o f co m m en tato rs claim to have d etec ted p o liti­ cal inten tio n s in th e p o e try o f A m ilcar C abral— long before they w ere to take solid form in nationalistic p ro te st— Cabral never engaged in 31

AM ILCAR CABRAL p o etry -w ritin g w ith any m o re devotion than o th e r young people o f his age. This is th e conclusion reached by scholars such as Patrick Chabal, w ho w rites th a t C ab ral’s p oetry, in its subject m a tte r and fo rm , cannot be to ld a p a rt fro m th a t o f o th e r Cape Verdeans o f his g e n e ra tio n . This is one reason w hy analyses o f th e h isto ry o f C ape V erdean p o e try do n o t include C abral as a m e m b e r o f any one gro u p : he was to o young to be a m em b er o f the Claridosos, and he did n o t join the poetic m ovem ent o f his c o n tem p o raries at Gil Eanes— such as N uno M iranda, A rnaldo Santos, G uilh erm e R o ch eteau , andTom as M iranda— w ho founded the p u b licatio n Certeza. T his m ay b e ex p la in e d by his a ttitu d e to w a rd s poetry, w hich he saw as a vehicle, an in stru m e n t th ro u g h w hich p o liti­ cal and social ideas could flow. L ater on , in Lisbon, he w ould criticize the Cape V erdean p oets for th e ir escapist tendencies and for n o t taking up co n te m p o ra ry social and political issues. A nd, perhaps inspired by his frien d s in L isbon— p o e ts such as A gostinho N e to and A lda do E sp irito Santo, w h o w e re try in g to fuse p o e try and p o litics— he yearned for a C ape Verde w h ere p o ets w ould adhere to N eo-realism , so th at they could w alk “hand in hand w ith th e p eo p le, w ith th e ir feet nailed to th e land.” A fte r c o m p le tin g his se c o n d a ry stu d ie s , A m ilca r C a b ral, his m o th e r and siblings, re tu r n e d to Praia. In P raia, A m ilcar was h ired by Imprensa Nacional, as an assistant ty p o g rap h er. H e h ated th e e x p e ­ rien c e for tw o reasons. Firstly, th e w o rk was ex trem e ly bu reau cratic; and secondly, o n a c co u n t o f his vanity, he did n o t re sp o n d w ell to his w ritin g b ein g c o rre c te d by sen io r officials. His passage through the Imprensa Nacional was only tem porary, w hile he w aited fo r an o p p o rtu n ity to p u rsu e college education in Lisbon. In 1945, he o b tained a scholarship and th e sam e year he said goodbye to everyone and m oved to Lisbon to study agronom y. At the age o f 21, he was already an ex p erien ced m an and m arked by life: a rocky childhood in G uinea and an adolescence full o f sacrifices and challenges in Cape Verde. H e had already seen p eo p le dying o f h u n g er in the stre ets of Praia. In L isbon, ex ch an g in g e x p e rie n c es w ith o th e r young p e o p le from the P o rtu g u ese colonies, A m ilcar was to discover the causes to w hich he w ould dedicate th e re st o f his life.

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2

THE YEARS IN LISBON

T he fam ine crises w hich periodically ravaged Cape Verde, killing th o u ­ sands o f peo p le, w ere o f a political, ra th e r than purely geographical, character. This, at least, w as an idea on w hich th e m ajo rity o f Cape V erdean in te lle c tu a ls at th e tu r n o f th e c e n tu ry a g reed . To p u t it an o th e r way, for th em it was a lack o f political w ill, ra th e r than the scarcity o f rain o r th e uneven geographical terrain in som e parts o f the archipelago— w hich caused ra in w a te r to r u n in to the sea instead o f accum ulating in th e subsoil— th a t d irectly explained th e crises. T he c o rre c t policy was th erefo re to focus on taking ap p ro p riate p rev en ta­ tive m easures, such as con stru ctin g granaries for the storage o f agricul­ tu ral surpluses and dam s and tanks for a m o re efficient use o f rain w a­ ter. C o rre c t policies should also c o o rd in a te th e delivery o f aid if dro u g h t is ultim ately unavoidable. Cape Verdeans, perhaps m o re than o th e r people, had a good u n d e r­ stan d in g o f th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n p o litics and life, or, to p u t it o th erw ise, th e lifesaving effect th at good policies could have. But this relationship was n o t u n co n n ected to the political status o f the arc h i­ p elago. A lth o u g h m any nativ es w e re involved in d ifferen t areas o f ad m in istratio n , C ape Verde was a colony th a t d ep en d ed on the c o lo ­ nial central p o w er in Lisbon to im p le m e n t any substantive policies. In this c o n te x t, fo r so m e, in d e p e n d e n c e w as seen as th e m o st viable solution to these pro b lem s. H ow ever, for m any o th e rs, the solution 33

A M ILCAR CABRAL lay at th e o th e r e n d o f th e sp e c tru m : C ape Verde should be an “adja­ cency” o f P o rtu g al, sim ilar to M adeira and th e A zores— w hose status was effectively th a t o f a pro v in ce o f th e E u ro p ean c o u n try — giving P ortug al g re a te r resp onsibility for th e fate o f th e Islands. It was to th e back d ro p o f these debates over th e viability o f C ape Verde that A m ilcar Cabral politically cam e o f age. In this regard, he was only partially influenced by his father. For Juvenal Cabral, as w e have seen, contrary to w hat his son Am ilcar later defended, the Cape Verdean question did n o t stem from colonialism p e r se, b u t from the narrow ness o f colonial policies. Cabral may n o t have b een entirely in disagreem ent w ith this p o in t o f view, o r he likely w ould n o t have studied agronom y, w hich, for Cabral as an African, could only be applied in a colonial se t­ ting. W h e th e r he was against o r in favor o f in d ep endence should n o t co n cern us at this stage o f the biography. T he im p o rta n t p o in t to make here is that A m ilcar C abral’s anticolonial views evolved in the co n tex t o f these debates about the viability o f Cape Verde. U nity betw een Cape V erde and G uinea, w h ich w o u ld la te r b e c o m e th e b a ttle cry o f th e political p a rty founded by C abral, m u st be seen fro m this perspective. * * * Significantly, A m ilcar C abral a rriv e d in Lisbon in 1945, th e year in w hich th e C h a rte r o f th e U n ited N ations was signed in San Francisco. A rticle 73 o f th e C h a rte r inscribed in in tern atio n al law the inalienable rig h t o f p eo p le to self-d eterm in atio n . In this c o n te x t, the question o f w h e th e r th e P ortuguese w ere im p lem en tin g th e rig h t policies in Cape V erde beg an to b e o v ersh ad o w ed by a n o th e r: w h e th e r th e C ape Verdeans had th e rig h t to be m asters o f th e ir ow n destiny. This im plied a shift from a m odel based on tru steesh ip , w hich authorized a m o re developed “civilization” to lift up a lesser on e, to one based on id en ­ tity— th a t is, th e relationship b e tw e e n collective id en tity and sover­ eignty. A d istin c t c u ltu re should aspire to th e fo rm a tio n o f its ow n political en tity: the nation-state. In o th e r w o rd s, a cultu re o r civiliza­ tio n should n o t be d e te rm in e d by another, and should instead aim for political sovereignty. It is no coincidence th e n th a t for Cabral and his com p an io n s fro m o th e r P o rtu g u e se co lo n ies in A frica, th e ro a d to in d epen d en ce had to pass forcefully th ro u g h cu ltu re. It was necessary to sever colonial A frica fro m P o rtu g a l itself. If colonialism had 34

T H E YEARS IN LISBON u p ro o ted Africans from th e ir ow n history, as Cabral w ould later w rite, th ere was only way way it could be o v e rtu rn e d : by invoking a history in w hich colonialism was described as no m o re than an in te rru p tio n in the colonized p e o p le ’s story. In O c to b e r 1945, A m ilcar C abral was o n e o f th e m any A frican youths— w h ite, black and m ixed race— w ho began p u rsuing fu rth e r education in P ortugal. T he arrival o f these young m en was the resu lt of tw o im p o rta n t factors: th e end o fW W II had seen a rise in the p rice o f colonial p ro d u c ts, giving th e colonial elite th e ability to send th e ir offspring to stu d y in th e m e tro p o lis. B ut equally, th e colonial state could no longer dodge the necessity o f educating the native elites to serve as local agents o f colonialism . P o rtu g a l’s tutelage over the co lo ­ nies forced it to culturally elevate sections o f the subjugated p o pula­ tions. But a n u m b e r o f these stu d en ts w ere able to com e to Lisbon thanks to financial su p p o rt given by p ro te sta n t m issions in Angola and M ozam bique. T he vast m ajo rity w ere th erefo re still descendants o f the P o rtu g u e se . W h a te v e r th e reaso n s, th e n u m b e r o f A frican stu d e n ts g rew rapidly. M ario de A n d rad e ex p lain ed this d e v e lo p m en t w ith a soccer m etap h o r: at the sta rt o f th e decade, A frican students could be co u n ted on one hand, b u t by th e end o f th e 1950s, it was possible to organize football m atches w ith tw o team s each o f eleven players. T he m ajo rity o f stu d en ts w ho cam e to Lisbon w ere from families w ho could afford to pay for th eir education. C abral, on the o th e r hand, relied on funding from tw o scholarships: the first had been given by the Liceu o f Cape Verde fo r his academ ic m e rit, w ith th e o th e r g ran ted by th e M ission o f O v erseas S tu d en ts. H e w as o n e o f 22 0 stu d e n ts— including only 20 fem ales, am ong th em M aria H elena R odrigues, w ho was P ortuguese and w ould later becom e his w ife— w ho w ere accepted th a t year at th e ISA (Institute/ Superior de Agronomia — School o f A gronom y ). For his living ex p en ses, he w as given a stip en d o f 500 escudos— alm ost w hat he paid for a b e d ro o m — w hich w ould later be increased to 7 5 0 escudos. To pay fo r o th e r expenses, he w o rk ed as a tu to r d u rin g th e academ ic year, and found occasional w ork in the sum ­ m er. D e sp ite his financial situ a tio n , he n e v e r n e g le c te d his fam ily responsibilities. Occasionally, he w ould send m oney to the family he had left behind in Cape Verde, and later on, he helped one o f his sisters, A rm inda, to com e to Lisbon to study n u rsin g and sewing. 35

A M ILCAR CABRAL A lthough he was com ing from a less-developed educational system and had stu d ie d u n d e r h arsh circ u m sta n c es, A m ilcar C abral easily becam e one o f th e b est stu d en ts at the Institu te. This was partly due to his high grades in m athem atics, w hich was one o f the subjects w ith the highest failure rates. H e w as o n e o f only th irty -th re e stu d e n ts w ho passed from th e first to th e second year; w hen he m oved into the third year, only fo u r colleagues rem ain ed w ho had b een w ith him from the sta rt. In th e academ ic y ear o f 1948—9 , h e w o n th e M ello G eraldes Prize fo r th e b est stu d en t o f colonial tehnology. A m ilcar C abral was an o p e n -m in d e d and cordial m an, w ho found it easy to in te g ra te in to th e in stitu te . F or C habal, this w as because culturally and in tellectu ally he was n o d ifferen t fro m the re st o f his (w h ite) c o h o rt. C habal m ay be rig h t in th a t C abral studied th e sam e books and shared th e sam e cu ltu ral referen ces as his P ortuguese co u n ­ te rp a rts . H ow ever, w e should b e careful n o t to overem phasize this in teg ra tio n . A t th e end o f th e day, A m ilcar C abral was black, and in the 1940s, and indeed th ro u g h o u t th e w hole colonial p erio d , the open defense o f racism , and o f th e m o ral in fe rio rity o f th e black m an (p a r­ ticularly w h en n o t an in te lle c tu a l), was one o f th e ideological u n d e r­ pinnings o f th e P ortuguese colonial endeavor. Cabral arrived in Lisbon only elev en y ears a fte r th e a n a c h ro n istic U n iv ersal E x h ib itio n o f P o rto , held in 1934, w h ere black p eople had b een held as “specim ens” re p re se n tin g th e various p a rts o f th e P o rtu g u e se em p ire , exh ib ited like anim als in a zoo. In 1945, th e U n iv ersity o f P o rto had n o t yet d ism a n tle d th e equally a n a c h ro n istic d e p a r tm e n t o f Physical A nthropology, w h e re M endes C o rre ia ta u g h t th e su p erio rity o f the w h ite m an by m easu rin g th e brains o f black p eo p le. N o less im p o r­ tantly, m any o f C a b ra l’s p e e rs h ad g ro w n u p d ev o u rin g books and films th a t e x p o u n d ed th e p u re st and m o st abject fo rm s o f racism . T he bestselling M ariazinha em Africa, w ritte n by F ernanda de C astro— the publicatio n o f w hich was in te n d e d to teach P o rtu g u ese children the values o f e m p ire — d e sc rib e d G u in ean s as “little n ig g e rs” and “sav­ ages”, m e m b e rs o f an in te rm e d ia ry state b e tw e e n m en and m onkeys. All in all, although A m ilcar Cabral p articip ated in m any activities w ith his w h ite colleagues from th e In stitu te, to w hich a n u m b e r o f pictures atte st, it was to be e x p e c te d th a t he felt m o re co m fo rtab le aro u n d his A frican p e e rs, w ith w h o m he m o re p ro fo u n d ly identified. 36

T H E YEARS IN LISBON H is first in te ra c tio n s w ith A frican s tu d e n ts, o r stu d e n ts com ing from A frica, m ay have taken place at the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio (C E I). T h e CEI had b e e n fo u n d e d th ro u g h th e a c tio n o f A lb e rto M arques M esquita, n ep h ew o f th e g o v e rn o r o f A ngola, w ho in 1944 raised funds from various official in stitu tio n s, such as th e M inistry of C olonies and th e Mocidade Portuguesa (P o rtu g u ese Y outh), in o rd e r to found w hat w ould be called th e Casa dos Estudantes de Angola (CEA ). T h e re w e re already o th e r Casas, nam ely o n e created in C oim bra in 1941 by a g ro u p o f M ozam bican stu d en ts. T h e exam ple o f the CEA was im m ediately follow ed and in th e follow ing years, o th e r “houses” sp ro u te d up, such as those in C ape V erde, M acau, and India. Fearing the consequences o f th e free association o f stu d en ts, the M inistry o f C olonies en co u rag ed these houses to co m b in e stu d e n ts to g e th e r into an organization called the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio. T he CEI began its activities u n d e r th e p re sid e n c y o f A lb e rto M esquita in O c to b e r 1944. It was first located at n u m b e r one Rua da Praia da V ictoria, in A rco do C ego, Lisbon, b efo re m oving one m o n th la te r to n u m b e r 23 A venida D u q u e de Avila, w h e re it stayed u n til its clo su re 20 years later. A lth o u g h th e re w e re re p re se n ta tiv e s fro m every p a r t o f th e P ortuguese em p ire in th e Casa, sections w ere created g rouping stu ­ d en ts by th e ir te rrito ria l origins. In its first year o f existence, the CEI facilitated interaction betw een students com ing from Africa. D ebates w ere organized in w hich m e m ­ bers w ere invited to talk about th e ir hom eland, to read poetry, and to sing Portuguese colonial songs. In the same year, a series o f conferences on Angola, Cape Verde, M ozam bique, and T im o r was organized at the Palace o f Independence, followed by film showings on several aspects of these regions. A library was set up and a n u m b er of radio shows w ere broadcast th ro u g h th e Club Radiojonico de Portugal, u n d e r th e title o f Portugal Ultramarino, (O verseas Portugal).

E ntering the CEI was alm ost com pulsory for stu d ents com ing from A frica. T he in stitu tio n had taken on resp onsibility for providing stu ­ d e n ts w ith w h a t th e y n e e d e d to c o m p le te th e ir stu d ies: it help ed stu d en ts find housing, it ran a can teen th at offered affordable m eals, and it pro v id ed h ealth care. T he CEI also c o n trib u te d to the in te lle c ­ tu al d e v e lo p m e n t o f its m e m b e rs . In th e early 1950s, an e d ito ria l section was created , led by Carlos Ervedosa, C osta A ndrade, Fernando 37

AM ILCAR CABRAL M ourao and A lfredo M argarido. H e re p o ets such as A gostinho N eto , M ario A ntonio, V iriato da C ru z, N oem ia de Sousa and Luandino Vieira w ould publish th e ir first p o em s and sh o rt stories. C abral, u n d e r the nom de plum e Larbac (an anagram o f his su rn a m e ), published an essay, Hoje eA m anha (Today and T o m o rro w ).

The bulk o f th e C EI’s m em bership, however, w ere w hite Portuguese people, brin g in g th e ir ow n iden tity issues to the w orkings o f the o rg a­ nization. W h ite an x iety w as at th e very co re o f th e in stitu tio n . T he colonial state discrim inated against th e w hite P ortuguese com ing from Africa. In th e 1930s, th e re w ere pieces o f legislation w hich pro h ib ited w h ite p e o p le fro m A frica fro m achieving th e h ig h est po sitio n s in a n u m b e r o f professional areas— in politics, ad m in istratio n , and in the m ilitary. By th e tim e th e CEI cam e in to being in the 1940s, these laws had b een re p e a le d , b u t th e ir effects lived on . To a c e rta in e x te n t it is fair to say th a t th e CEI w as c o n c e rn e d w ith th e in te re sts o f a su b ­ g ro u p o f w h ite P o rtu g u ese. T he sm all n u m b e r o f black stu d en ts from Africa in th e Casa com plained o n several occasions th a t th e ir in terests w e re n o t re p re s e n te d in th e o rganization. T hey ex p ressed co n cern s th at th e Casa assisted only th e m o st v u lnerable stu d en ts, giving them “official r e p re s e n ta tio n ”, b u t w ith o u t m ak in g effo rts to in te g ra te th em .T h is did n o t m ean, however, th at they severed th eir ties w ith the Casa, even th o u g h som e black stu d e n ts show ed an in te re st in creating

an organization w hich w o u ld defen d th e ir in te re sts, o r at least w hich w ould o p en up a space w h e re they could d ebate issues affecting them . Q u ite th e o p p o site . Som e y ears late, fo r e x a m p le , A m ilcar C abral w ould be ap p o in ted v ice-p resid en t o f th e C ape Verde section. But it w as in th e m a rg in s o f th e Casa th a t C a b ra l’s g ro u p w o u ld s ta rt to develop a d issident political consciousness. In th e 1940s, black A frican stu d en ts c o n stitu ted a so rt o f island in Lisbon. N o t only because they w ere re p re se n te d in the universities in such sm all n u m b e rs , b u t also becau se th ey le d th e ir lives in d e p e n ­ dently, outside th e privileged places th at the m ajority o f w hite students ten d e d to com e from . O n account o f th e m eager ness o f th eir stipends o r o f the funds they received from th e ir fam ilies, the housing options available to th em w ere eith er to live in guesthouses o r re n te d ro o m s in th e p o o re st n eighborhoods o f Lisbon, at a tim e w hen p o v erty was a serio u s social p ro b le m . F or w h ile Salazar h ad shielded th e c o u n try 38

T H E YEARS IN LISBON from the d estru c tio n that W W II had b ro u g h t to m u ch o f the re st o f E urope, it had n o t been spared th e desolation o f th e p o st-w ar p erio d . In general, the w ar had n o t b een bad for P ortugal. Thanks to its n e u ­ trality, it received an influx o f foreign currency, and th e m ineral tu n g ­ sten also flo u rish ed o n th e black m a rk e t d u rin g th ese years. M ore im portantly, Lisbon was one o f th e m ain p oints o f passage for affluent Jews fleeing E urope for the U nited States, spending som e o f the m oney they bro u g h t w ith th em th ere. To explain the d estitu tio n in P ortugal, British diplom ats living in Lisbon used the im age o f a “m an w ith full pockets and an em p ty stom ach .’’This discrepancy was evident in how p eople lived in Lisbon. A ccording to Fernando Rosas, in A lcantara, or Santo A m aro , in th e w e s te rn p a r t o f th e city — p a rtic u la rly in th e neighborhoods o f Alfama, p a rts o f Graga, M arvila, Beato, Chelas and X abregas— m any p eople lived in co u rty ard s and shacks. A P ortuguese au th o r o f th e tim e , Julio M artin s, w ro te th at in Lisbon in 1944, th o u ­ sands o f “individuals o f b o th sexes share in large n u m b e rs th e sam e ro o m , som etim es the sam e b ed , in such incredible prom iscuity.” It was in th ese n eig h b o rh o o d s— such as A lcantara, w ith its co u rty a rd s and o vercrow ded “islands” (pockets o f the city), w ith o u t electricity, r u n ­ ning w a te r o r sew age— th a t m any A frican stu d e n ts such as A mil car C abral o r M ario de A n d rad e fo u n d a h o m e . H ow ever, c o n tra ry to M arxist axiom s, these students w ould n o t find any solidarity am ong the p o o r w hite P ortuguese. The relationship betw een African youths and lower-class Portuguese was n o t m uch b etter, leading the fo rm er to develop strong social bonds producing a p ro n o u n ced g ro u p m entality. In the beginning, this group was m ade up o f A ngolans, b u t Cabral was also let in once he arrived in Lisbon. He was in tro d u ced to th e g ro u p by M ario de A ndrade, after they had m e t in one o f the streets o f Lisbon, R ua Luis de C am oes, an ev en t a b o u t w h ich he w o u ld la te r re m in isc e in co n v ersatio n w ith M ichel Laban. It was in this en v iro n m en t o f p artial isolation from P ortuguese soci­ ety th at A m ilcar C ab ral’s g ro u p — w hich la te r o n M ario de A ndrade w ould call th e “C abral G e n e ra tio n ”— sta rte d n u rtu rin g a p a rtic u la r ethos. L ooking b ack o n th e se days, C abral w o u ld la te r reh e a rse an explanation for this search for identity. Influenced by the “curren ts that shocked the w o rld ,” as he p u t it, they engaged in a process o f “re-A fri­ 39

AM ILCAR CABRAL canization o f spirits.” This m e a n t for th em an a tte m p t to com p reh en d the Africa th a t was n o t tau g h t in th e school system for assimilados. This g estu re, th e “re-A fricanization o f sp irits,” im plied cuttin g the cultural link w ith P ortu g al, so th a t they could reclaim a cultu re that p red ated the arrival o f E uropeans in Africa: a black heritage. H ence, th e re-A fricanization o f spirits m e a n t detaching them selves from th e history o f P ortugal— a history in w hich Africans w ere simply a ch ap ter in the g reat sto ry o f P ortuguese expansion th ro u g h o u t the w orld . This detaching d re w o n co nnections, ex p erien ces, and readings o f th e b lack co nsciousness m o v e m e n t. T h e m o v e m e n t w as largely d eriv e d fro m th e H aitian re v o lu tio n o f 1804, w h en this c o u n try becam e th e first black in d e p e n d e n t natio n in th e w orld. This m o m e n ­ tous historical event sen t shock-w aves aro u n d the w o rld , felt b o th in slave societies such as Brazil and the USA, and in colonial societies such as those in m any A frican co u n tries. In th e te rrito rie s dom inated by the P o rtu g u e se , things w e re n o d ifferen t. In A ngola, M ozam bique, and Cape Verde, C reole elites founded associations and new spapers to give voice to native p ro te st. T he ep ic e n te r o f this A frican Lusophone “pro tonationalism ,” h o w ­ ever, was Lisbon itself. Before the proclam atio n o f the Estado Novo, the liberal political en v iro n m en t o f th e P ortuguese republic saw the c re ­ atio n in L isbon o f so m e o f th e m o st active s tu d e n t o rganizations, including th e Associafao de Estudantes Negros (Black S tu d en ts’ Associa­ tio n ) and th e Liga Academica International dos Negros (In tern atio n a l A cadem ic L eague fo r N e g ro s), w h ic h fro m 1911 o n w a rd s e d ite d a publication called 0 Negro. T he publication relied to a g reat e x te n t on the m aterials p ro d u ced on th e subject by the m em b ers o f the so-called African diaspora in th e U n ited States and th e C aribbean, w hich w ere accessible in English, for those w ho could read in th at language, or, for m o st, th ro u g h translations in to F rench. P ro o f o f the connectedness o f the global black m o v em en t and its c o u n te rp a rt in P ortugal is th a t the SaoTom ean Jose Magalhaes, one of the m o st illustrious m em bers o f the C reole societies in Lisbon, h osted W.E.B. D u Bois, w hom he called the am bassador o f “Pan-A frica”, fo r th e second session o f the th ird PanAfrican C ongress, held in Lisbon in 1923. But th e protonationalism o f the Lusophone creoles had its particu larities. T he contradictions o f the black m o v em en t in P ortugal in those years w ere described by D u Bois 40

T H E YEARS IN LISBON him self. The sessions o f the congress, w ro te D u Bois, w ere attended by the m o st p ro m in e n t m em b ers o f black society in Lisbon, com prised of African students and som e professionals, “well dressed, and w ith c o u r­ teous m an n ers”. But am ong those w ho also to o k p a rt w ere, for ex am ­ ple, th e M in ister o f C o lo n ies V icente F e rre ira , w h o even serv ed as translator, as w ell as th e fo rm e r M inister o f C olonies Vieira da Rocha. Du Bois says in co rrectly th at th e p resence o f blacks in the P ortuguese p arlia m e n t w as d u e to th e a u to n o m y o f co co a p ro d u c e rs fro m Sao Tom e, w h o , by selling th e ir p ro d u c ts d ire c tly to th e B ritish, m ade im p o rta n t profits, since they could dodge the fixed price established by P ortugal. For the African A m erican thinker, this explained how those elites could afford to send th e ir offspring to th e schools in Lisbon. D u Bois, perhaps for n o t being able to co m m unicate directly w ith the black P ortuguese, could n o t be fu rth e r from the tru th . The c o n tra­ dictions he p o in ted o u t lie elsew here. In o rd e r to dom inate the vast m ajority o f blacks in Africa, Portugal had relied on the collaboration of A frican elites. H o n o rio B arreto , w ho w e discussed earlier, is one o f such elites. H ow ever, P ortugal sta rte d to cu rtail th e d evelopm ent o f these local elites, as th e ir grow ing auth o rity began to becom e a danger to the em p ire— o r at least so it seem ed based on ex p eriences in o th e r p arts of the c o n tin en t, w here m em b ers o f these groups sta rte d leading nationalist m ovem ents. T he relevance o f this layer then began to d w in ­ dle in the 1920s, w hen P ortugal ren ew ed its app etite for colonization and encouraged th e m igration o f w hites to th e tropics, directly chal­ lenging th e social prestige o f these blacks in th e colonies. Even though such a d e v e lo p m e n t did fuel re s e n tm e n t, it d id n o t re su lt in o p en revolts against colonialism . This was n o t only because o f the repressive apparatus o f th e colonial em p ire, b u t also due to th e fact th at the in d i­ viduals o f this generation had failed to com e to term s w ith th eir biggest co n trad ictio n (one th at eludes D u Bois): being sim ultaneously black and P ortuguese. It is no coincidence that som e o f the “protonationalists” w ho engaged w ith D u Bois in Lisbon w o u ld la te r b e c o m e th e fathers o f th e first g en eratio n of African nationalists. A ndrade uses this co n cep t to nam e those Africans in th e P ortuguese colonies w ho to o k advantage o f the freedom g ran ted by liberalism to m ake citizenship claims. Besides h im ­ self, this included A m ilcar C abral and H ugo A zancot de M enezes, to 41

AM ILCAR CABRAL nam e a b u t a few. This n ew g en eratio n was developing intellectually in a very different political en v iro n m en t to th a t o f the protonationalists. A lthough Salazar’s colonial policy w o u ld n o t co n tem p late autonom y fo r th e P ortuguese te rrito rie s in A frica, C ab ral’s generation had o th e r platform s to voice th eir claims. T here was the U N C h arter condem ning colonialism in every fo rm , and th e em erging black consciousness, p a r­ ticularly in th e N ew W orld. For C abral’s g eneration, black consciousness n o t only provided the philosophical principles for th e “re-A fricanization o f spirits,” b ut, m ore im portantly, it offered a sense o f belonging. In the interactions w ith a num b er of African organizations based in Paris, as we will see, they could finally overcom e the contradictions th at had blocked a nationalist awak­ ening in the previous generation. They no longer had to struggle w ith th eir dual consciousness as b o th black and Portuguese; they could be black and fight for the em ergence o f th eir ow n nationalities. Nationalism in th e co n tex t o f Lusophone Africa, and particularly for the m em bers o f this generation, was a m a tte r overcom ing this contradiction. T he political and cu ltu ral m o v em en t Negritude was fo rm ed in Paris by A frican stu d en ts, such as L eopold Sedar Senghor, and W est Indians such as A im e C esaire, w h o lived in Paris in th e 1920s. Negritude em erged from the com plex and intense discussion betw een black in tel­ lectuals fro m different p a rts o f th e w o rld , F rench surrealists such as A ndre B reton, and leftist F rench intellectuals from M arxist tendencies and m e m b e rs o f th e F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party. It is only from 1949 onw ards th a t th e m o v em en t crossed th e b o rd e rs o f France. Senghor bro u g h t to g e th e r poem s w ritte n by his friends in to into an ed ited vol­ u m e called Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poesie Negre et Malgache, insisting th at his e d ito r secure a preface from th e m o st fam ous French in tellec ­ tual o f th e tim e: Jean-Paul S artre. S atre’s in tro d u c tio n goes far beyond w hat is usual for a preface. H e theo rizes the m o v em en t itself. In the essay “Black O rp h e u s,” Sartre developed an idea th a t w ould becom e a co rn e rsto n e o f Negritude: th e idea o f anti-racist racism . Using H egelian co n c e p ts, S a rtre sug g ested th a t racism w as th e thesis as m u c h as Negritude w as th e an ti-th esis. A ccordingly, racial consciousness was in stru m e n ta l to abolishing th e idea o f race. T he Anthologie m ade a stro n g im pression on Cabral and his friends. A fte r re a d in g it, C abral conveyed his a p p re c ia tio n in a le tte r to a 42

T H E YEARS IN LISBON frien d : “w o n d e rfu l p o e m s w r itte n by blacks fro m all p a rts o f the F rench w o rld , p o em s th a t speak a b o u t A frica, slaves, m e n , life and m e n ’s aspirations.” As an indication o f the im p o rta n c e o f this book for th e black stu d e n ts and in tellectu als w h o re sid e d in Lisbon in th ese years, one n eed only n o te th at four years after its publication, M ario Pinto de A ndrade com piled the poem s of his ow n friends and published the first collection o f the w o rk o f P ortuguese-speaking A frican poets, the Antologia da Poesia Negra de Expressao Portuguesa (A nthology o f the Black P oetry o f P o rtu g u ese E xpression). * * * The year o f th e publication o f S enghor’s Anthologie, 1949, is significant for m any reasons. P ortugal was holding p residential elections, sched­ uled for 1 3 February, and it was fast becom ing th e fiercest electoral cam paign ever. For th e first tim e, the o pposition, led by a fo rm e r gov­ e rn o r o f A ngola, N o rto n de M atos, had b een allow ed to take p a rt in the process. A lthough N o rto n de M atos en d ed up w ithdraw ing from the ballot— on account o f a lack o f conditions for free and fair elec­ tio n s— th e possibility o f change th a t de M atos (w h o was aligned to republican ideals) re p re se n te d , created a c e rta in political opening in P o rtu g al and th e colonies. T h e p o liticizatio n o f C a b ra l’s g e n era tio n traces its ro o ts to these events. T he political tra je c to ry o f A gostinho N e to illu strates this. N eto , w h o w o u ld la te r b e c o m e th e m o st p o litically active m e m b e r o f C a b ra l’s g ro u p , arriv ed in Lisbon in 1949, having tra n sfe rre d fro m C oim bra U niversity. A card -h o ld in g m e m b e r o f th e Partido Comunista Portugues (P o rtu g u e se C o m m u n ist P a rty ), he w as involved in m any risk y activ ities. H e fo u n d a c c o m m o d a tio n in th e n e ig h b o rh o o d o f A lcan tara, alo n g sid e o th e r A frican stu d e n ts such as H u m b e rto M achado— a stu d en t o f agronom y— w ho, to g e th e r w ith his wife, Julia M achado, m anaged a g u esth o u se th a t p ro v id ed a cco m m o d atio n fo r A ngolans w o rk in g on th e ships th a t m ade th e re g u la r L obito-L uandaBissau-Lisbon trip s. N e to sta rte d to build political aw areness am ongst these c rew m e m b e rs w ith the aim o f finding a m o re efficient way to send and receive clandestine m aterials from Lisbon to Luanda and vice versa. T h ro u g h c re w m e m b e rs such as Jose Van D u n e m , stu d e n ts in L isbon c o u ld eng ag e w ith su bversive lite ra tu re , such as novels by 43

AMILCAR CABRAL Jo rge A m ado and o th e r Brazilian n eo -realists, as w ell as P o rtuguese tra n sla tio n s o f b o o k s w ith M arx ist leanings, w h ich , because o f th e censo rsh ip , could n o t be fo u n d in P o rtu g a l’s bookshops. It was also th ro u g h th e se c re w m e m b e rs th a t c o n ta c t b e tw e e n n atio n alists in P ortugal and o th e rs in A frica, such as V iriato da C ru z , was m ade. To cam ouflage th e se activ ities, A g o stin h o N e to and o th e r A ngolans fo rm ed th e Clube M aritim o, w hich organized cultu ral activities. Besides the fam ous Saturday p arties, w hich a ttracted a large n u m b er o f African stu d e n ts, th e Clube also offered these c re w m e m b e rs literacy classes. Later, in 1954, M ario de A ndrade tran slated and staged w ith th em the play M aitre Ecole, by th e G uinean K eita Fodeba. T h e im p o rta n c e o f th e Clube M aritim o is less a b o u t the p a rticu la r clandestine activities they c arried o u t, as m any au th o rs have w ritte n on, and m o re about th e kind o f tem p late it provided for future political activities. T he Estado Novo re stric te d individual lib erties, prohibiting the fo rm atio n o f labor unions and associations, b u t to le rate d the existence of groups o f a sp o rtin g and cultu ral nature. T he nationalists could co n ­ d u c t th e ir p o litical activities e ith e r th ro u g h organizations already approved by th e Estado Novo, such as th e CEI, or, and this op tio n was m o re difficult, u n d e r th e cover o f organ izatio ns fo u n d ed by th e m w hich w ere officially c o n c e rn e d w ith cu ltu re and sp o rts ra th e r than po litics.T h e Centro do Estudos Africanos, fo rm ed by C abral and his co m ­ rades, fell in to th e second category. But this was n o t enough. P art o f th e reason this c e n te r was to le ra te d by th e Estado Novo was due to its being o pen to p eople w ho w ere n o t necessarily subversive. T here w ere th o se w h o w e re n o t n atio n alist, o r ev en stu d e n ts, such as th e Sao T om ean g e o g ra p h e r Francisco Jose T enreiro. A t this tim e , he w as a clerk at th e M in istry o f C olonies, and au th o r o f studies on colonial geography, as w ell as o f a little book o f poem s called Ilha de Santo Nome. Tenreiro m oved in o th e r literary circles such as that o f the neo-realists, w h ic h c o u n te d w ell-estab lish ed P o rtu g u e se w rite rs like Jo aquim N am orado and C arlos O liveira am ong th e ir m em b ers. Later his traje c­ to ry w ould diverge from th a t o f th e m ajo rity o f the o th e r m e m b ers o f the C enter, such as C abral. W hereas Cabral and his com panions becam e involved in natio n alist activities and fo u g h t fo r th e in d ep en d en ce o f th e ir co u n trie s, T enreiro becam e th e rep resen tative o f Sao Tome in the N ational Assembly. 44

T H E YEARS IN LISBON W ith th e CEA in n e e d o f a legal cover, C a b ra l’s g ro u p la te r a tte m p te d to in te g ra te itself in to the Casa de Africa, an o ld er organiza­ tio n created in th e a fte rm a th o f th e p ro clam atio n o f th e P o rtu g u ese R e p u b lic in 1 9 1 0 , w h ic h b ro u g h t to g e th e r A frican p e rso n a litie s resid in g in Lisbon. T h e Casa de Africa was by this p o in t th e only s u r­ vivor o f th e racialist org an izatio n s w hich had sp ro u ted up in Lisbon at th e tu r n o f th e cen tu ry , w h ich , as w e have already discussed, D u Bois had co n tacted on th e occasion o f the second session o f the T h ird Pan-A frican C on g ress. Leading th ese o rganizations w as the old m an and v eteran A rtu r de C astro , seen in gov ern in g circles as th e spokes­ p e rso n o f th e A frican c o m m u n ity in P o rtu g a l. C a b ra l’s g ro u p m e t w ith him to ask fo r th e use o f th e Casa’s facilities fo r a m eetin g o f the CEA. But de C astro refu sed . In the heat o f this m eetin g , according to his b io g ra p h e rs, C abral sto o d u p and in v ited all “h o n est A fricans” to a b an d o n th e ro o m , in an e p iso d e th a t has b e e n re m e m b e re d as C ab ral’s first political gestu re. “A rtu r de C astro was left totally alone. We broke w ith th e rep resen tativ e o f th e old g en eratio n o f the 1920s,” M ario de A ndrade co n clu d ed . Even if p a rt o f this episode has b een em bellished by C abral’s hagiogra p h ers, these events have a very stro n g sym bolism . By inviting his friends to abandon the m eeting, C abral’s g eneration was breaking free o f everything A rtu r de C astro rep resen ted : a com prom ise betw een the representatives o f th e African elites and the Estado Novo. From this it is possible to see tw o consequences. It was on th e one hand, the m o m en t in w hich C abral’s g ro u p started to undo the aforem entioned contradic­ tion o f being b o th Portuguese and black. O n th e other, after breaking w ith de C astro, they felt com pelled to sta rt developing political activi­ ties to eradicate the colonial system outside o f the colonial system itself. This double ru p tu re explains the illegality in to w hich the national lib­ eration m ovem ents in Lusophone Africa w ould be pushed. D e p riv e d o f th e in stitu tio n a l cover o ffered by th e Casa de Africa, C a b ra l’s g ro u p beg an h o ld in g m eetin g s in th e h o m e o f Januario da Graga do E spirito Santo, w h ere his daughter, Alda do E spirito Santo, one o f the m em b ers o f the g ro u p , lived. The residence at no. 37 A ctor Vale S treet was m anaged by one o f Ja n u a rio ’s sisters, know n as A untie Andreza, and was also the m eeting poin t o f the Sao Tomean com m unity in Lisbon. 45

A M ILCA R CABRAL The g roup w ould m e e t to discuss various topics related to Africa, in the co n te x t o f th e objective interests o f th e Centro de Estudos Ajricanos. Because o f the close surveillance o f the PIDE, they had to be careful. In o rd e r n o t to arose the PID E ’s suspicion, th e discussions to o k place w ith loud music in the background.T he w orking plan, elaborated by Francisco Tenreiro and M ario de A ndrade, covered them es such as the relationship b etw e e n m an and land in A frica, A frican philosophies, A frican social economy, and the problem s that blocked “the progress o f the black m an.” T he first o f these m eetings to o k place in O cto b er 1951, w hen Francisco T enreiro gave a talk on th e geographical s tru c tu re o f the c o n tin en t. C abral’s talk to o k place som e weeks later, at the end of O ctober, and was about system s o f farm ing and the benefits o f the itinerant system. T he C e n te r also provided th e o p p o rtu n ity to co n n ect w ith sim ilar in stitu tio n s, p a rtic u la rly th o se in Paris. It w as as m e m b e rs o f th e C en te r, fo r e x a m p le , th a t A m ilcar C ab ral, A lda do E sp irito Santo, A gostinho N e to , and M ario de A n d rad e se n t th e ir w ritin g s to th e recently created review Presence Ajricaine, founded in 1947 and directed by A lioune D iop. T h ese w ritin g s w e re in c lu d e d in th e sectio n Les Etudiants Africains Parlent, to w h ich m any A frican stu d en ts sc attered across various E uropean cities c o n trib u te d , giving th em the o p p o rtu ­ nity to speak about th e ir pro b lem s and th e ir aspirations. T h e C e n te r did n o t re c o rd m u c h activity d u rin g this tim e, w ith political actions taking place irregularly. This was p a rtly fo r reasons beyond the nationalists’ control. In the early 1950s, SaoTome was ex p e­ riencing labor shortages, largely caused by th e difficulties the colonial authorities in Angola w ere facing in sending contratados to the archipela­ gos. As such, C arlos G orgulho, the colonel o f artillery w ho had been appointed g o v ern o r in 1945, devised a way to force the native p o pula­ tion to w o rk .T h e Forros, w ho had always b een a privileged group on the islands and had rem ained free even d uring the slave p erio d , had a strong aversion to m anual labor. In need o f co n stru ctio n w orkers, G orgulho cam e up w ith a n u m b e r o f schem es to force the Forros to w ork for free, one o f w hich was to sum m on th em to w orkplaces, w ith the prom ise th at they w ould be com pensated for th eir tim e. D u rin g colonial tim e s, th e re w e re tw o c a teg o ries o f colo n ized Africans, assimilados and indigenas. Assimilados w ere paid for the w o rk they pro v id ed ; indigenas, how ever, co u ld b e fo rced to w o rk w ith o u t pay. The g o v e rn o r’s schem e likely saw these assimilados arriving at w ork 46

T H E YEARS IN LISBON w ith the expectation o f com pensation. O nce th ere, however, they w ere trea ted as m ere indigenas, and d enied paym ent for th e ir labor. Tensions b e tw e e n th e P o rtu g u e se and th e n ative p o p u la tio n m o u n te d , and, on th e n ig h t o f 31 January, a g ro u p o f w hite people w ere denied en tra n c e to a th e a te r p e rfo rm a n c e, and a fight ensued. C o n fro n ta tio n s c o n tin u e d an d G o rg u lh o se n t a g ro u p o f A ngolan policem en to arrest the rio ters. O n e o f the policem en shot a Forro m an, triggering an uprising. G orgulho th en called on w hite colonists to take up arm s, convincing th em th a t the rebellion was p a rt o f a com m unist plot. H elped by Angolans and C ape Verdeans, G orgulho and his w hite allies killed, rap ed , to rtu re d , and b u rn ed P o t t o s alive.T he exact num ber of casualties has n ever been d e te rm in e d , b u t h u n d red s are th o ught to have p e rish e d . Salustino da G ra^a do E sp irito Santo, b ro th e r o f Januario da G ra^a do E spirito Santo, accused o f being the m asterm ind o f the upheaval, was arrested and d e p o rte d to Principe. However, these events w ere co n sid ered crim in al even in th e c o n te x t o f P o rtu g u ese colonialism . Palma C arlos, a Portuguese lawyer, interv iew ed a n um ber o f survivors, and G orgulho was sum m oned back to Lisbon on 17 A pril, after the m in ister o f th e colonies discovered that th e re had never been any com m unist p lo t. As a consequence o f these events, the PIDE rein fo rced its surveil­ lance over all the nationals o f SaoTom e e Principe, especially those at 37 A ctor Vale S treet. T he surveillance and p ersecu tio n that followed the massacre in Batepa forced C abral’s group to find m ore covert form s o f political organization in o rd e r n o t to a ttra c t a tten tio n . Plans to sim ­ ply leave Lisbon and search fo r o th e r places to co n tin u e th eir w o rk against colonialism w ere co nsidered. H ow ever, in those years, Cabral and his fellow nationalists w ere d edicated to political learning. They developed a m o d el for u n d e rc o v e r political activities, including, for exam ple, creating sm all gro u p s to discuss cu ltu re, u n d er the cover o f cu ltural organizations reco g n ized by th e Estado Novo. Politics w ould com e only later, w hen the m o st indecisive m em b ers w ere cut off from the g ro u p and a clim ate o f confidentiality was created . This technique w ould later be used by A m ilcar Cabral in th e fo rm atio n o f the PAIGC, as w ell as by A gostinho N e to in the fo rm atio n o f th e m any nationalist g roups th at w ould later co n trib u te to th e foundation o f the MPLA. * * * 47

A M ILCA R CABRAL T he year o f 1949 was also im p o rta n t in th e life o f C abral fo r another, m o re p erso n al, reason. T h at year, he r e tu rn e d to C ape Verde on vaca­ tio n for th e first tim e since he had left to begin his studies in Lisbon. For him , this trip was a special m o m en t in his life and career. The m ain p u rp o s e o f his tr ip w as to c a rry o u t so m e w o rk fo r his a g ro n o m y studies. D u rin g his stay, he was invited to w rite a series o f articles on agrarian issues in C ape V erde, in w hich he laid o u t ideas u p o n w hich h e w o u ld la te r ela b o ra te in his h o n o rs thesis o n soil ero sio n in th e A lentejo— probably th e P ortuguese reg io n w hose geological and even m eteo ro lo g ical m ake-up was m o st like th a t o f C ape Verde. C abral was also r e tu r n in g to th e island w ith th e in te n tio n o f te stin g o u t, in a ru d im e n ta ry fashion, th e m e th o d he had h elp ed develop in his g ro u p in Lisbon. Cabral re tu rn e d to his hom eland at a tim e w hich was also special for th e inhabitants o f the Islands. In 1949, ab undant rainfall finally p u t an end to the four years o f dro u g h t, w hich had resu lted in the critical food crisis of 1947—8, w ith predictable consequences: a section of the p o p u ­ lation had b een red u ced to p e n u ry and another, n o less significant sec­ tio n , had b een fo rced to m igrate. T he archipelago had a new governor, th e D o c to r-C a p ta in C arlos A lb e rto G arcia Alves Rocpadas, w hose arrival had b een anticipated by th e fall o f the first rains only a few days earlier. A n u m b e r o f Cape Verdeans in te rp re te d th e arrival o f the e n e r­ getic and resourceful Carlos Ro^adas as a sign that, finally, Portugal was co m m itte d to eradicating th e food crises in Cape Verde. S h o rtly a fte r his a rriv a l, o n e o f his first acts w as to fo u n d th e Boletim de Informagao e Propaganda de Cabo Verde. T he g o v e rn o r had tw o objectiv es fo r this p u b licatio n . Firstly, he w a n te d to c reate a re f e r ­ ence m agazine, to w hich th e p rin cip al in tellectu als o f the archipelago w o u ld c o n trib u te . Secondly, he w ish ed to p ro v id e th e g o v e rn m e n t w ith th e m ean s to c o m m u n ic a te its actio n s to th e p o p u la tio n . T he ce n tra l pages w ere always o ccu p ied by official activities, such as the inau g u ratio n s o f various venues th a t th e g o v e rn o r c a rrie d o u t across th e archipelago. Juvenal Cabral and A m ilcar Cabral w ere som e o f the co n trib u to rs to this publication, w ritin g on various topics to d o w ith ag riculture. By this tim e, Juvenal had already gone b a n k ru p t, although he was still in possession o f som e land. His w ritings on granting agrarian credits w ere 48

T H E YEARS IN LISBON th erefo re sim ply a way to advance his ow n cause. A m ilcar C abral, for his p a r t, sta rte d w ritin g a series o f artic le s o n agronom y, w ith the g e n e ric title In Defense o f Land. T h e first essay, p ub lish ed o n 27 S eptem ber 1949, was w ritte n w h en he was still in Praia. T he articles by A m ilcar Cabral can be read as m essages to the gov­ ernor. C abral, repackaging an old arg u m en t, stated th at even if p ro b ­ lem s o f d ro u g h t w ere o f an enviro n m en tal n atu re, th e m eans to solve them w ere em inently p o litical. This was a poin t o f view shared by many C ape Verdeans and P o rtu g u ese w h o visited th e archipelago. Juvenal Cabral had been am ong the first, follow ed by o th ers such as the do cto r W olfgango da Silva, to defend this line o f reasoning in various ways. But A m ilcar Cabral w ould add som ething else to this debate. He was bringing th e au th o rity o f a scientist and o f a native son, and proposed co n crete m easures to quell the sp ecter o f dro u g h t. H e re co m m en d ed draw ing up an in-depth public policy plan for the construction o f dikes, re se rv o irs, an d w a te r tan k s, as w ell as th e affo restation o f c e rta in regions o f Cape Verde w ith species b e tte r adapted to a dry clim ate. T he Boletim was n o t th e only m eans by w hich A m ilcar Cabral was given the o p p o rtu n ity to spread his ideas. H e also co n trib u ted to the Radio ol Cape Verde, for w hich he w ro te som e tex ts concerning agri­ cu ltu re , such as o n e e n title d “Som e co n sid eratio n s a b o u t th e rain ,” which w ould be published in the first issue o f th e Boletim. A nother o f his te x ts w as b ro ad cast in w h ich he discussed th e relationship b etw e e n hum ans and land, an essay he w ould later p re se n t at conferences o f the Centro de Estudos Africanos. A n o th e r was o n th e cu ltu ral sim ilarities

b e tw ee n Cape V erdeans, A fro-Brasilians, and A fro-A m ericans. In this article , he follow ed th e p rin cip les o f N egritude, show ing th at C ape Verdeans, as blacks, had m o re in com m o n w ith o th e r com m unities in th e black diaspora— p a rtic u la rly th o se th a t w e re th e re su lt o f the A tlantic Slave Trade— than w ith the Portuguese population in general. C a b ra l’s h ag io g rap h ers have c o n te n d e d th a t his view s on cu ltu re w ere so subversive that his radio shows w ere suspended by the colonial authorities, particularly w hen they realized that m o re and m ore people w ere draw n to it. A t that tim e, as very few p eo p le on the Islands had transistor radios, it was com m on for m any p eople to gather, by sunset, on A lexandre A lbuquerque Square (also know n as Pelourinho ) to follow th e show s via a so u n d system p ro v id ed by th e m unicipality. C abral 49

A M ILCA R CABRAL w ro te th a t m any o f those w ho used to go to Pelourinho to listen to his show s in u n d ated th e g o v e rn o r’s office w ith le tte rs w h en they discov­ e red that th e show had b een called off. R egarding this trip , it has also b een re p o rte d th at C abral’s re q u est to give literacy courses to adults was d eclined. I have found no indica­ tio n th at this req u est did n o t take place, b u t th e re w ere o th e r reasons th at could have im p ed ed C ab ral’s plans, such as the sudden illness he c o n tra c te d . H e lo st w eig h t so frig h ten in g ly th a t, acco rd in g to his m oth er, “this tim e, w e th o u g h t he w o u ld die.”This was all because he follow ed th e advice o f a frien d to use eau de cologne to shave, instead o f th e usual alcohol. T he re su lt was a te rrib le “skin allergy,” as Cabral inform ed M ario de A ndrade in a le tte r w ritte n on 28 S eptem ber 1949. * * * As previously discussed, C abral was very popu lar at ISA. H e stood o u t fro m th e cro w d , in p a r t d u e to being a very g o o d stu d e n t, b u t also as one o f th e few black stu d e n ts in th e e n tire in stitu te . For this reason, he evoked a m ix tu re o f feelings, so m ew h ere b e tw e e n repulsion and adm iratio n . D u rin g th e years he sp en t th e re , he b u ilt solid friendships w ith colleagues and professors. O n e o f th e p eo p le he was close to was M aria H elena R odrigues, w ho later becam e his first w ife. T hey m e t in th e ir first year, even th o u g h they w ere n o t in th e sam e class. O nly in th e th ird y ear did they b e co m e classm ates and inseparable. A ccording to M aria H elen a, she and C abral sp e n t tim e to g e th e r partly because she w as th e o n ly p e rs o n at th e Instituto w h o h ad n o p ro b le m w ith having a close relatio n sh ip w ith a p e rs o n o f color. But she w o u ld pay dearly fo r this. R odrigues’ relationship w ith Cabral was a source o f num erous p ro b ­ lem s fo r her. She w as b o r n in C haves, in th e n o r th e r n re g io n o f P ortugal, T ras-os-M ontes, and was the d au g h ter o f a physician-captain w ho had lo st b o th legs in A frica. W h en th e tim e cam e fo r h e r to go to high school, she obtained tw o scholarships, w hich w ere later ex tended to study at university. H ow ever, w hen it becam e know n th at she was close to A m ilcar Cabral and atten d ed th e CEI, ru m o rs started circulat­ ing th a t she was a co m m u n ist. W h e n she an n o unced h e r in te n tio n to m arry C abral, friends a tte m p te d to dissuade her. A fter h e r m arriage, h er funding was w ith d raw n w ith only a few courses left before g ra d u ­ 50

T H E YEARS IN LISBON ating. To re m e d y th e situ atio n , th e co u p le in creased th e n u m b e r o f h ours they sp en t tu to rin g high school and university students. A lthough m ulticulturalism was th e c o rn e rsto n e o f the Estado Novo in th e years o f late colonialism , th e m a rria g e rates b e tw e e n black and w hite people w ere low er than in Alabama. T he n u m b er o f m arriages betw een black m en and w hite w om en w ere even m o re lim ited. In this c o n te x t, th e relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n A m ilcar and M aria H elena r e p r e ­ sen ted a genuine challenge to th e p rejudices o f those tim es and was fraught w ith difficulty from th e o u tset. They had to e n d u re shows o f racism on a daily basis, as w hites and blacks lived in different social w orlds. Azancot de M enezes w rites that at that tim e it was com m on for the w hite Portuguese to sneeze at the sight o f a black person. In certain p arts o f A lcantara, close to w h ere Cabral lived, they w ere frequently verbally abused by w orkers. In co n trast to M aria H elena, w ho som e­ tim es reacted , A m ilcar Cabral rarely lost his te m p e r; w orkers had dif­ ficult lives, he w ould say, and th e ir behavior was certainly influenced by the envy o f seeing som eone w ho, being black and from distant lands, was dating a w hite, P ortuguese w om an. As soon as th e financial situ atio n o f A m ilcar and M aria H elen a im proved, they decided to g et m arried . They chose 20 D ecem ber 195 1 as the date. As b est m an, A m ilcar choseT elm o C rato M o n teiro , a Cape V erdean d o c to r an d co lleague in th e Casa, w h o had w elco m e d him w hen he arriv ed in Lisbon. A t th e end o f th e cerem ony, w hen the best m an left, th e couple celeb rated by eating codfish at th e Cafe C olonial, on A lm irante Reis A venue. They then th rew a small p arty after lunch. Alda do E spirito Santo, Julieta do E spirito Santo, M ario de A ndrade and A gostinho N eto cam e to the ap a rtm e n t o f Elisa H o rta, secretary of the CEI, w ho h osted th e small celeb ratio n . Later, they w ould re n t a ro o m th ere to spend th e first years o f th e ir m a rrie d life. Juvenal C abral did n o t live to see his son m arry. H e died on 20 M arch 1951, w hen Cabral was finishing his studies. The cause o f death was a h e a rt attack th at he had suffered w h en , according to w itnesses, ru m o rs began circulating in Praia that A m ilcar had been detained by th e PIDE fo r talk in g a b o u t p olitics in a ta v e rn . C uriously, this date coincides w ith th e first im p riso n m e n t o f A gostinho N e to , w h o had b een detained w hen, collecting signatures for the Peace C onference, he had knocked on th e d o o r o f a policem an. W h en A m ilcar’s m o th er 51

AMILCAR CABRAL Iva and h e r tw in d aughters heard th e ru m o rs , they w ere desperate to know w h at had h a p p en ed . T hey se n t h im a te le g ra m from Praia, to w hich he quickly resp o n d ed . N everth eless, very few people believed th at Cabral was n o t in p riso n . Because o f this, g rie f over the death o f Juvenal Cabral was stifled by anxiety about the w hereabouts o f Amilcar, for w hom p eople w ep t as if he w ere also dead, as Iva Evora rem inisces: “M yself, A rm inda and A rm an d a, w e n t u p to the attic in the house and we w ep t from daw n to dusk. W e could n o t even eat.” A m ilcar C abral found o u t ab o u t his fa th e r’s d eath from a telgram sent by his bro th er. His sh o rt telegram in response sim ply read: “Aware painful fatality u n ite d w e fight A m ilcar.” O n ly years later, w h en A m ilcar’s b ro th e r m e t M aria H elena, did she m en tion how A m ilcar had rea cte d to the death o f his father: “H e locked h im self in his b e d ro o m for m any days w ith o u t talking to anyone.” C ab ral’s years in Lisbon w ere fo rm ativ e fo r a n u m b er o f reasons. F irst o f all, he had m oved to a d ifferen t reality, to th e capital o f the em pire, and, w hile a n u m b e r o f things may have seem ed different to him , o th e rs, such as th e p o v erty he found in Lisbon, rem in d ed him o f conditions in C ape Verde. In Lisbon, he also m e t th e com rades w ith w hom he w ould take up th e challenging struggle for the independence o f Lusophone Africa. A t a p ersonal level, Cabral w ould m a rry his first w ife, M aria H elena. B ut m o re im p o rtan tly , in Lisbon, Cabral w ould learn th e tech n iq u es for subversive w ork.

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3

ENGINEER AND CLANDESTINE MILITANT

In o rd e r to e a rn his a g ric u ltu ra l en g in e e rin g d e g re e , C abral had to co m p lete an in tern sh ip and su b m it a m in o r dissertatio n. To com plete this assignm ent, he p icked th e Estagao Agronomica Nacional (N ational A g ro n o m ic Statio n ) in th e reg io n s o f C u b a and V idigueira in th e A lentejo, so u th ern Portugal. He sp en t a g reat deal o f his tim e from the end o f 1951 to th e beginning o f th e follow ing year doing research on pedology, the science o f soil. In 1952, he su b m itted his dissertation— dedicated to his m o th e r and th e day laborers o f A lentejo— w hich was given eighteen o u t o f tw enty. This o utstanding m ark is even m o re sig­ nificant if o n e c o n sid ers th a t it was given by P ro fesso r B otelho da C osta, know n in the Instituto as one o f th e m o st rig o ro u s and d em a n d ­ ing in stru cto rs. A lthough C abral used a convincing set o f em pirical data, the m ain arg u m en t o f th e thesis was far from being radical. It was som ething his father, o r any o th e r Cape Verdean c o n cern ed about the tragic conse­ quences o f the food crises on th e archipelago, could agree w ith. A t its core, it was n o t substantially different from w hat Cabral had w ritte n before, such as in his earlier series o f pieces called Em Defesa da Terra (In D efense o f th e Soil). A dapting his m ain c o n c e rn s to th e c o n te x t o f A lentejo, th e you n g e n g in e e r co u ld co n clu d e in his final w o rk th a t although th e rain and w inds had a substantial effect on soil erosion, hum an action was th e m ain cu lp rit. 53

A M ILCAR CABRAL T he new elem en t in C abral’s reflections, perhaps, is the relationship he established b etw een capitalism and th e d estru ctio n o f soils, w hich u n q u estio n ab ly cam e fro m his M arx ist readings. T h e m ain c u lp rit b eh in d soil dam age, h e w ro te , w as th e p r o p e rty re g im e — or, in M arx ist p arlan ce, th e m ean s o f p ro d u c tio n . To s u p p o rt his p o in t, Cabral criticized the a tte m p t to tran sfo rm A lentejo into the granary of the c o u n try th ro u g h th e Campanha do Trigo, even though it was evident th at th e reg io n did n o t offer th e b est conditions for the p ro d u c tio n o f cereal. Since A lentejo has a d ry clim ate, irreg u lar rains, and generally d ry soils, w h eat harvests relied o n using all available land, including plains, hillsides and even steep slopes. A lthough the results o f the cam ­ paign w ere positive, for C abral, and c o n trary to the Estado Novo’s p ro ­ paganda, this success was only tem p o rary , for it involved a harm ful use o f the soil, w hich in th e long te rm w ould b rin g about the d estru ctio n o f the m o o rlan d itself. In te rm s o f the m eans o f pro d u ctio n , Cabral also criticized A lentejo’s econom ic-agrarian m odel, as being a d irect consequence o f the unequal d istrib u tio n o f land. In Salazarist P o rtu g al, ag ricu ltu re occupied the vast m ajo rity o f th e p o p u latio n , b u t in A lentejo, only 1.39 p e r cen t o f the popu latio n held p ro p e rty titles, despite w orking 80 p e r cen t o f the cultivated land. By draw ing a tte n tio n to this co n trast, A m ilcar Cabral aim ed to highlight tw o facts: first, th at this kind o f extensive agricu l­ tu re — based o n th e c o n c e n tra tio n o f a significant p a r t o f th e arable land in th e hands o f v ery few o w n e rs— stra n g led th e ru ra l m id d le class, fo rm ed o f seareiros, o r jo u rn ey m en . Second, as a large p a rt o f this land was subdivided in to various lots th a t w ere re n te d o u t or, at b est, w o rk e d in p a rtn e rs h ip sch em es, C abral ex p lain e d th a t p easants, indebted and in search o f rapid profits, had very few options o th er than to intensively ex p lo it th e soils, in an a tte m p t to m axim ize profit, w ith ­ o u t any co n c e rn for th e exhaustion o f th e land. * * * A fter g rad u atin g in a g ric u ltu ra l en g in e e rin g , th e tim e had com e to search fo r a job. C abral co n sid ered loo k in g fo r w o rk in C ape V erde, and m u st have m ad e co n tacts o n his p rev io u s visit to Santiago, b u t su c h an o p p o r tu n ity failed to m a te ria liz e . M o ving th e re to w o rk w ou ld m ake th e m o st sense, since all his fam ily w ere in Santiago, and 54

E N G IN E E R A N D C L A N D E ST IN E MILITANT som e o f th em w ere stru g g lin g financially. H aving a w ell-paid relative in a state-p aid job w ould re p re s e n t an e n o rm o u s help. F u rth e rm o re , C abral had b e co m e an e x p e rt in an area o f studies w ith significant p o ten tia l for applicatio n in C ape V erde. As in A len tejo, Santiago also d e a lt w ith high levels o f soil ero sio n . A lthough n o t having stu d ied Santiago in th e sam e d e p th , it was ev id en t th e re w e re a n u m b e r o f eco n o m ic -a g ra ria n issues linking b o th places. B oth w ere d o m in ated by the sam e m eans ol p ro d u c tio n : land was c o n c e n tra ted in the hands o f a sm all n u m b e r ol o w n e rs, w ho th e n re n te d it o u t o r e x p lo ite d it in p a rtn e rs h ip schem es. A len tejo and Santiago c o m p le m e n te d each o th er, and re tu rn in g to th e la tte r as an a g ric u ltu ra l en g in e e r w ould allow C abral to c o n tin u e his re se a rc h in his area o f e x p e rtise . Having failed to g et a jo b in Lisbon o r C ape Verde, the only option le ft to C abral w as to tak e a p o sitio n in his native land, G uinea. So Cabral m oved to G uinea to s ta rt a n ew life, as so m any Cape Verdeans from the previous g en eratio n had d o n e, including his father Juvenal C abral. B ut G uinea was th e least appealing place fo r an agricultural engineer train ed in Lisbon. Job posts in G uinea w ere am ong the least sought-after co m p ared to o th ers in the P ortuguese colonies, p a rtic u ­ larly Angola. W h atev er th e reason C abral m oved to G uinea, it becam e the place w h ere he w ould actively c o m m it to th e nationalist cause. It was d u r ­ ing this p e rio d th a t he c re a te d w h a t w o u ld la te r b e c o m e the PAIGC. But c o n tra ry to m uch o f w hat has b een w ritte n on C abral, his tra n sitio n from e n g in e e r to re v o lu tio n a ry w as n o t stra ig h tfo rw a rd . N eith e r was it a m ove that C abral had clearly defined: he exp erien ced m any m o m en ts o f anguish and indecision p rio r to taking the leap. And unlike m any m e m b e rs o f his g ro u p , as w e w ill discuss later, C abral was n o t stru g g lin g financially, m aking it even h a rd e r to leave behind his secure position. U ntil th e last m in u te, he m ain tain ed a double life, on the one hand w orking fo r th e colonial reg im e, w hile on the other, taking p a r t in illegal activities fo r its erad icatio n . C onsequently, these seven years, from 1952 to 1959, are the am ong the h ardest o f C abral’s ad u lt life to re c o n stru c t. D u rin g th ese years, fo r in stan ce, it is k n o w n th a t C abral was involved w ith a n u m b e r o f n atio n alist g ro u p s, b u t he ra re ly talk ed ab out it to oth ers. H e was th e link b etw een nationalists in Luanda and 55

A M ILCAR CABRAL those in Lisbon, b u t his com panions in Bissau w ere unaw are o f it. N o t even M aria H elena, his w ife, seem ed to know w hat h e r husband was doing. She rea c te d w ith su rp rise, for instance, w h en Cabral decided to p u t an en d to his dou b le life in 1960 and c o n c en trate his efforts on achieving in d ep en d en ce for G uinea and C ape Verde. In the n e x t sec­ tio n , I w ill ex p an d o n this p rocess o f tra n sfo rm a tio n from a p ro fes­ sional in th e colonial adm in istratio n in to a revolutionary. A m ilcar C abral arriv ed in Bissau o n b o ard th e m erc h an t vessel Ana M afalda o n 21 S e p te m b e r 1952. H e w as alone, since M aria H elena, w ho was preg n an t w ith the co u p le’s first child, was due to stop in Cape Verde to m e e t h e r h u sb an d ’s family. She w o u ld n ’t arrive in Bissau until 5 N o v em b er o f the sam e year. U n d e r c o n tra c t w ith th e O verseas M inistry, A m ilcar Cabral was the d e p u ty -d ire c to r o f th e A g ricu ltu re and F o restry Services, a position p u ttin g in h im in ch arg e o f th e G ianja E xperim ental de Pessube (E x p e rim e n ta l F arm o f Pessube)— “o n e o f th e m o st exten siv e and beautiful farm s w e saw in th e colony,” as a colonial traveler w ro te — occupying an area o f 4 0 0 h ectares, fo re ste d w ith bissiloes and a vast array o f fru it tre e s. A p p o in te d o n 22 S ep tem b er, th e day a fte r his arrival, A m ilcar Cabral to o k his responsibilities seriously. Before th en , the fa rm ’s only ro le had been to supply a handful o f Bissau’s inhabitants w ith fru it and vegetables, as he him self had w ritte n in the Boletim. But C abral envisioned tran sfo rm in g the farm in to a site fo r plant e x p e ri­ m en tatio n and acclim ation. A m ilcar C abral and M aria H elena R odrigues settled into the house rese rv e d for th e d ire c to r o f th e farm , located on th e prem ises o f the farm itself: it w as “a m ag n ificen t h o u se,” as C abral w ro te to M aria H elena b efo re h e r arrival in Bissau. R ecently b u ilt, it had fo u r b e d ­ ro o m s , tw o b a th ro o m s, a c o rrid o r, tw o k itch en s and tw o storage ro o m s. A ccording to th e Boletim, in a n o te fro m January 1953, “th e c o n stru c tio n o f th e fu rn itu re fo r th e d ire c to r’s resid en ce” was u n d e r­ way, p a rt o f w hich had already b een delivered. T he farm was located on th e o u tsk irts o f Bissau, close to the popu lar inform al neighborhoods typical o f m any African cities, w ith th eir unpaved roads and often w ith ­ o u t basic sanitation o r electricity. T hese areas w ere less p o pular w ith w hites, allow ing C abral to be closer to th e p eo p le he w anted to p o liti­ cally awaken. 56

E N G IN E E R A N D C L A N D ESTIN E MILITANT At C abral’s instigation, som e o f his family m oved from Cape Verde to G uinea. The first to arrive was his b ro th e r Luis Cabral— w ho he would live close to lo r the rest o f his life— and for w hom he had found a job at Casa Gouveia, a com pany specializing in the purchase o f tropical p ro d ­

ucts. Later, A ntonio, his y oungest b ro th er, jo in ed th e m , follow ed by C abral’s m other, Iva, to g e th e r w ith the tw ins A rm inda and A rm anda. It was am ong th e Cape V erdean clerks w orking in the various se r­ vices o f the colony th at Cabral found his first g ro u p o f close friends. A ristides Pereira was one o f the first p eople he m e t. A lthough they had know n each o th e r since th e ir tim e at the Liceu de Cabo Verde, and had w o rk e d to g e th e r in P raia as clerks b e fo re C a b ra l’s d e p a rtu re fo r Lisbon, they had n ever been close. They w ere re-in tro d u c ed by Sofia P om ba G u e rra , a p h a rm a c ist and P C P m e m b e r, se n t in to exile in Bissau. It was a t h e r h o m e th a t th e se tw o and m any o th e r C ape Verdeans— such as F ernando F o rtes, A bilio D u a rte , and the recently arrived Luis C abral - m e t to listen to P o rtu g u ese broadcasts on Radio Moscow, o r to read forbidden novels and n ew spapers, such as Avantel, the official publication o f th e PCP. Cabral quickly becam e the indisputable leader of this group. In p a rt, this w as o w ing to th e fact th a t he o ccu p ied th e highest ran k in th e colonial a d m in istra tio n . B ut he also cam e w ith a c e rta in nationalist aura, on account o f th e m any years he had sp en t in Lisbon and o f the type o f political activities w ith w hich he had been involved there. He w as th e re fo re th e m o s t e x p e rie n c e d p e rs o n to lead th e g ro u p . H e began by in tro d u c in g his o w n clan d estin e organ izational m e th o d s, form ing small g ro u p s to discuss diverse cultu ral topics such as lite ra ­ tu re and p oetry, w hile, at th e sam e tim e, coordinating the m o st p o liti­ cally m atu re m em b ers to eventually develop m o re political and risky w ork. A n u m b er of these m eetings took place at the farm , C abral’s own residence, w ith the g ram o p h o n e tu rn e d up to full volum e. H elena Iva, C abral’s niece, was som etim es tasked w ith w atching at the do o r for the possible arrival o f th e police. If H elena e n te re d the ro o m w here the adults w ere m eetin g , it was a sign th at som ething unusual was taking place o r th a t so m eb o d y had u n ex p ected ly arriv ed . A t this m o m e n t, conversations w ould be stopped and everyone w ould g et up and dance. T he situation, how ever, was far from am using, and was becom ing increasingly m o re d angerous, especially after a n u m b e r o f G uineans 57

A M ILCAR CABRAL joined the group. The lives o f Cape Verdeans and Guineans w ere w orlds a p a rt: th e fo rm e r w e re c o n sid e re d “civilized”, w h ile th e latter, th e m a jo rity o f th e p o p u la tio n , w e re fo r th e m o st p a r t “natives”— w ith every th in g th a t en tailed in th e colonial state. A ristides Pereira, w ho a rriv e d in G u in ea in 19 4 8 , su ccinctly ex p lain ed w h a t it m e a n t to belon g to one o r the o th e r group. “In Bissau, by 6 pm th e re was the w histle to rem in d the native w o rk ers em ployed in the city th at they had to abandon th e p re c in c t [ ...] W ith this in m ind, w h e th e r w e liked it o r n o t, any G u in ean w o u ld see m e as a se ll-o u t to th e colonists because I was in a w hites-only zone.” This social eng in eerin g , in the case o f G uinea, was in ten d ed to isolate the various social groups. P e re ira ’s reflectio n s n eatly c a p tu re th e in tricacies o f P o rtu g u e se colonialism , and the ways in w hich m em b ers o f the subjugated p o pula­ tio n w ere assigned to different g ro u p s, occupying distinct positions in th e colonial s tru c tu re . I have already show n th e p a rtic u la r place o f Cape Verdeans in G uinea, w ho som etim es even replaced the colonizers them selves. F u rth e rm o re , C ape Verdeans w ere n o t subject to the indigenato, th e N ative Law, w hereas G uineans w ere— te sta m e n t to th eir

separate social w orlds. H ence, w hile th e activities o f a g ro u p o f Cape Verdeans m eetin g at Sofia Pom ba G u e rra ’s house (such as listening to R adio M oscow ) co u ld b e eno u g h reaso n fo r th e po lice to intensify surveillan ce, a m e e tin g o f this ty p e o f g ro u p in and o f itse lf w ould a ttra c t little suspicion. O n th e o th e r h an d , th e p re sen c e o f a native G uinean w ith in a g ro u p o f C ape Verdeans w o u ld im m ediately p ro m p t the police to questio n th e ex act n atu re o f an e n c o u n ter w hich assem ­ bled p eople from such diverse social backgrounds. So although it was easy for C abral to m ix w ith C ape Verdeans, he was very aw are o f th e risks p osed by his efforts to co n tact G uineans of in ferio r social standing. This forced him to find new ways to approach th em , such as by offering to coach G uinean soccer team s. It was only th ro u g h th is k in d o f c o n ta c t th a t p o litical w o rk co u ld develop and evolve. It w as by c arry in g o u t p o litical w o rk am o n g G uineans th at Cabral p rep ared one o f his first m o re daring subversive actions: a p lo t to kill Carlos G orgulho, gov ern o r o f Sao Tome. W h en the new s g o t out that G orgulho was to be tran sferred from Sao Tome to G uinea after the B atepa m assacre o f 1953, C abral allegedly gave Bacar C assam a th e o rd e r to assassinate him as soon he disem barked at the P o rt o f Bissau. 58

E N G IN E E R A N D CLA N D E ST IN E MILITANT C abral’s ex periences in Lisbon provided th e tem p late for carrying out political w ork in Bissau. M uch like his attem p t to take over the Casa de Africa in Lisbon— as a way to develop illegal activities u n der the cover

o f an organization recognized by the regim e— Cabral and his com pan­ ions subm itted an application to the colonial adm inistration in Guinea to set up a sp o rts and cu ltu ral club. T he p re p a ra to ry m eetin g s, as explained above, w ere full o f risks, since they gathered to g eth e r Cape Verdeans and G uineans, and w ere easily infiltrated by the police. W hen it cam e to signing the application fo rm that was to be sent to the co lo ­ nial services, Cabral initially refused to add his nam e. H e alleged that because o f his past in Lisbon, adding his nam e to the d o cum ents along­ side that o f the o th e r signatories w ould only w eaken the project. Very few people agreed w ith this position, however, considering it a m ere gesture o f cow ardice. In the end, Cabral signed the docum ent. The p ro j­ ect, however, was tu rn e d dow n by the authorities. As far as I see, th e re is n o ev id en ce to s u p p o rt th e th e o ry th a t A m ilcar C abral had d e lib e ra te ly ch o sen G u in ea to c o m p le te his nationalist p ro je c t. But th e re is a p ro fo u n d link b e tw e e n his m e tie r and the kind o f nationalism he becam e involved in from th en on. The m o re o f a nationalist he b ecam e, th e less he was involved in colonial agricultural engineering. In o th e r w ords, the less tim e Cabral c o m m it­ te d to being an engineer, the m o re he was able to im m erse him self in the nationalist stru g g le. T hese tw o aspects o f his life, at least at this stage, w ere in terlin k ed . It was largely because he was an ag ricu ltu ral en g in eer th at Cabral becam e a unique type o f nationalist. By th e tim e the anticolonial stru g g le s ta rte d , he had acq u ired a k now ledge o f the geography, econom y, and sociology o f the p eople o f his co u n try which wras far g re a te r than th at o f m any o th e r nationalists at sim ilar stages o f th eir m ovem ents. C o n trib u tin g to this was th e fact th at Cabral was the main arch itect o f the first agricu ltu ral census in the province, his m ost a m b itio u s p ro fessio n al p ro je c t y et. T his w o rk w o u ld give him th e o p p o rtu n ity to g e t to k n o w th e a g ra ria n s tru c tu r e o f G u in ea and w ould p u t him in d ire c t co n tact w ith the m o st pow erful leaders o f the various eth n ic g ro u p s. Above all, it w ould m ake him conscious o f the im p o rta n c e o f n a tu ra l c o n d itio n s in o rganizing everyday activities: w ith o u t this e x p e rie n c e, as we w ill see later, it w ould have been very difficult to lead an a rm e d rev o lu tio n ary m o v em en t in G uinea.

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AM ILCAR CABRAL G u in e a ’s first a g ric u ltu ra l census w as c a rrie d o u t in 1947 by P o rtu g a l in c o n ju n c tio n w ith th e U N ’s F o od and A g ric u ltu re O rgan izatio n (FA O ). T he follow ing year, a fo u r-m e m b e r co m m itte e was established in Bissau to study and plan the task. However, the w ork o f this co m m ittee was lim ited to p resen tin g a re p o r t on the n u m b er o f p eople and the am o u n t o f resources req u ired to un d ertak e the project. The delay in actually startin g this p ro je c t was probably due to the fact th at th e re w ere n o ag ricu ltu ral eng in eers in G uinea at th at tim e w ho could carry o u t such an assignm ent. But C abral was the rig h t m an for the task: he was young and strong, im p o rta n t attributes for a job w hich con sisted o f five m o n th s o f trav ellin g , fro m A ugust to D e cem b er, a ro u n d th e 3 6 ,0 0 0 sq u are k ilo m e te rs o f th e co u n try , visiting over 2,24 8 farm ers. The first step fo r C abral was to p u t to g e th e r his ow n tea m , w ho w ould follow and su p p o rt him th ro u g h o u t th e process. U pon co m p le ­ tion o f the fieldw ork, h elped by M aria H elena, he analyzed the data and pro d u ced a final re p o rt. T he idea o f th e census was to show, using a quantitative m e th o d , as th e FAO re q u ire d , w hat C abral already knew in a m o re o r less intuitive form : w hich sections o f the population ded i­ cated them selves to a g ric u ltu re , th e te ch n iq u es th ey u sed, how th e p ro d u ctio n o f certain crops was d istrib u ted across ethnicities, and how land te n u re and the d istrib u tio n o f p ro fit w ere organized. It was thanks to this w o rk that Cabral found the language n eed ed to in stru c t his m en on h ow to m obilize th e population. Peasants m u st be in fo rm e d th a t th e agricu ltu ral pro b lem s in G uinea w ere the resu lt o f th e in tro d u c tio n o f th e colonial m ean s o f p ro d u c tio n . T he G uinean eco n o m y w as m o stly based o n th e p ro d u c tio n o f th re e crops: ric e , g ro u n d n u ts, and different types o f m aize. A lthough all ethnic groups p ro d u c e d ric e , th e Balanta— a g ro u p fro m th e so u th e rn p a rt o f th e country, w ho w ould go on to be som e o f the m ost unreserved su p p o rt­ ers o f th e w a r effo rt w aged by th e PAIGC— w e re th e g ro u p w hose econom y was m ost based on m onoculture. W hile som e groups used the m e th o d o f co n so ciatio n , th ro u g h w h ich d ifferen t cro p s co u ld be p lan ted in the sam e soil, th e Balanta d ep en d ed alm ost exclusively on the p ro d u ctio n o f rice. As rice was n o t an e x p o rt crop, m ostly supply­ ing th e in te rn a l m ark et, th e ir profits w ere dism al. In c o n tra s t w ith th e B alanta th e Fulani w e re a lm o st exclusively involved in th e p ro d u c tio n o f g ro u n d n u ts. Because o f w eak d o m estic 60

E N G IN E E R A N D C LA N D E ST IN E MILITANT dem an d , alm o st all th e ir p ro d u c e was e x p o rte d , m aking th em se e m ­ ingly m o re p ro sp e ro u s. H ow ever, u n lik e th e B alanta, w h o d e sp ite th e ir m e a g e r p ro fits co u ld tra d e th e ir ric e fo r o th e r p ro d u c ts, the Fulani w ere fo rc e d to sell th e ir cro p s at p rices fixed by th e co n ces­ sionaire Casa Gouveia. F u rth e rm o re , since g ro u n d n u ts w ere an e x p o rt p ro d u c t, they w ere less p ro te c te d from p ric e fluctuations in in te rn a ­ tio n al m ark ets. In th e co n clu sio n o f his r e p o r t, A m ilcar C abral m ade various sug­ gestions to c o rre c t th e w eaknesses his in q u iry in to G u in e a ’s a g ric u l­ tu re had fo u n d . It was necessary, he w ro te , th a t th e various eth n ic g ro u p s sp ecializin g in m o n o c u ltu re d iv ersify th e ir c ro p s, m ak in g th e m less d e p e n d e n t on th e b a rte r system for th e Balanta, and less at the m e rc y o f p ric e fluctuations o n th e in te rn a tio n a l m a rk e t fo r the Fulani. H e also n o te d th at m o re d iverse p ro d u c tio n , adding v eg eta­ bles and fru its, w o u ld pro v id e peasants w ith access to a ric h e r and m o re varied d ie t. These conclusions w ere n o t w ithout political m otivation and could be read as veiled attacks on the colonial policies in Guinea. Unlike in Angola and M ozam bique, w here the concessionaires had expropriated the land of the natives and forced them into salaried labor, in G uinea the exploita­ tion took place u n d e r different principles, nam ely through engineering fixed prices. The natives produced their ow n crops, b u t they w ere forced to sell them at a price set by the concessionaires. The g reater value placed on som e crops, to the d e trim e n t o f oth ers, skewed the agricultural sys­ tem . Since g roundnuts w ere the m ost in-dem and crop, for exam ple, a large p a rt o f the province was dedicated to producing them . T herefore, only a change in the agrarian stru ctu re w ould alter the system . This was m ore in the dom ain o f politics than agriculture. Cabral learn ed tw o o th e r lessons from the census, equally as im p o r­ ta n t as th e k now ledge gained ab o u t th e eco n o m ic reality in G uinea. First, activity in G uinea should be organized according to the m e te o ­ rological calendar. As w o rk on the census began in A ugust, du rin g the rainy season, it w as necessary th a t th e less h u m id n o rth e r n regions w ere the first to be surveyed. O nly after this could C abral’s units move into the Bissau reg io n , w h ere they w ould catch th e end o f the rainy season. At the en d o f the year, they m oved to the so u th e rn p a rt o f the country, to the Balanta region, w here outside the dry season, travelling 61

A M ILCA R CABRAL was virtually im possible. D u rin g the rains, roads in the south becam e im passable, w ith floods and m u d p reventing cars from m oving about. Being in th e sou th d u rin g those tim es was also dangerous fo r healthrelated reasons, as w ith o u t p ro p e r m edication th e likelihood o f co n ­ tracting m alaria was very high. The second lesson w o rth noting was the im portance o f constant innovation. W h at was discouraging at tim es was n o t so m u ch w orking u n d e r difficult co nditions, b u t constantly being forced to look fo r alternative solutions. This was the case, for exam ple, w hen an unforeseen rise in riv er levels prevented them from tra n sp o rt­ ing m aterial, o r w h en a b o at assigned to the team was suddenly sent elsew here to p e rfo rm an o th er activity. Cabral did n o t stay m uch longer in G uinea after subm itting the final re p o rt. His h ag io g rap h ers, nam ely th e Russian O leg Ignatiev and his ow n b ro th e r Luis, have w ritte n th a t C abral left th e province on the o rd ers o f th e g o v ern o r M elo e A lvim , on account o f suspicions th at he was involved in clandestine activities. In his b o o k , Ignatiev goes even fu rth e r, d e sc rib in g an ep iso d e in w h ic h th e g o v e rn o r su m m o n e d C abral to his office and gave him a choice to e ith e r to “totally stop his [clandestine] a ctiv ities, o r to ab a n d o n th e p ro v in ce. O th e rw is e he w ould le t him be p u t in jail”. A ccording to these n arrativ es, Cabral was th u s ex p elled from G uinea, although he was g ra n te d perm issio n to r e tu r n to th e co u n try once a year to visit his family. It is p ossible, how ever, th a t a n o th e r series o f events p ro m p te d Cabral to leave G uinea. W ork on the census had left A m ilcar and M aria H elena physically w eak, due to th em having carried o u t m uch o f the w ork d u rin g th e rainy season and on acco u n t o f th e p o o r sanitary c o n ­ ditions in m any o f the places they had visited. A fter presenting the final r e p o r t, C ab ral c o n tra c te d m alaria, and his h ealth did n o t im prove d e sp ite m ed ical tre a tm e n t. C o n seq u en tly , o n 18 M arch 1955, th e couple to o k an Air France flight to Lisbon. This narrative is confirm ed by the PIDE, w hich states th a t Cabral and his wife left the province in com pliance w ith a re p o r t by th e M edical B oard. M aria H elena was so ill th at she was to ld never to re tu rn to G uinea. This does n o t m ean th at Cabral did n o t develop activities th at m ight arouse suspicions. Q u ite th e o pposite. A PIDE r e p o rt p ro d u ced years after C abral’s stay in Bissau is definitive: according to the police, Cabral had trie d to “rouse th e natives against th e presen ce o f P ortugal in the 62

E N G IN E E R A N D CLA N D E ST IN E MILITANT region, soliciting, for this reason, the com pany o f o th e r natives lo r the fo u n d atio n o f a S p o rts and R ecreatio n al A ssociation o f Bissau.” But C ab ral’s choices w ere n o t all political, and it is im p o rta n t to also c o n ­ sider the p ersonal m otivations that may have guided his actions. O n ce back in Lisbon, in M arch 1955, A m ilcar and M aria H elena m oved in to a spacious a p a rtm e n t o n Infante Santo A venue. U nlike Bissau, a very small city w h ere it was difficult to m aintain discretion, Lisbon afforded Cabral m ore freedom to develop his clandestine activi­ ties. Just as in G uinea, his w o rk served as a cover. For w ork-related reasons, he could travel th ro u g h o u t E urope and to o th e r p arts o f the P ortuguese colonial em p ire, such as A ngola, linking up the em erging hubs o f Lusophone nationalism . In this way, as we will see, during these years C abral becam e th e lynchpin o f th e incip ien t nationalist m ove­ m e n t in the P ortuguese colonies. * * * O n his re tu rn to Lisbon, Cabral trie d to find a new job. H e applied for p o sitions in various p ublic o rganizations b u t was n o t called for any interview s. T h ro u g h his fo rm e r colleagues and professors at ISA, he found som e consultancy w ork, all in the private sector. W orking for the com pany M ercantil Lda, Cabral developed a study on the possibility of sugarcane p ro d u c tio n in G uinea. T he sam e firm solicited his services again betw een 1958 and 1959, this tim e to study the viability o f sugar b e e t p ro d u c tio n in co n tin en tal P ortu g al. H e eventually found m o re stable w ork in the Brigada de Estudos e Defesa Fitossanitdria dos Produtos Ultramarinos (Brigade o f Phytosanitary Studies and D efense o f O verseas P roducts), a section o f the Junta de Investigates do Ultramar (O verseas R esearch B oard), w hose directo r, Baeta N eves, was one o f his fo rm e r teachers. B etw een 1956 and 1960, he provided in te rm itte n t services to this organization, m anaging the storage section, w hich gave him the o p p o rtu n ity to w rite a handful o f studies on th e question o f the c o n ­ se rv a tio n o f colonial p ro d u c ts, e ith e r in co n tin e n ta l P o rtu g al o r in overseas provinces. As p art of a g ro u p chaired by Botelho da Costa— and o ther fo rm er teachers and colleagues, such as Ario de Azevedo— Amilcar Cabral also took p a rt in various projects in his capacity as a pedologist. M ost o f his commissions involved travel to Angola and the clients w ere colonial com ­ 63

A M ILCAR CABRAL panies w hich prod u ced crops w ith high prices on the international m a r­ kets o f th o se tim es, such as sugarcane, coffee, and co tto n . As such, betw een 1955 and 1956, Cabral was able to travel to Angola for the first tim e in o rd e r to collect data fo r th e d ev elo p m en t o f a soil m ap for Cassequel P rop erties, paid for by the A gricultural Society o f Cassequel. H e w orked for Fazenda Tentativa and for Fazenda Sao Francisco on similar projects, in assignm ents that to o k place in 1956 and 1957, respectively. B etw een 1957 and 1958, he re tu rn e d to Angola for the agrological cen­ sus o f Fazenda Nhia. A t the end o f the follow ing year, he was once again in Angola, this tim e to take p a rt in a study o f soils and coffee-grow ing in the farm s o f A m boim and Seles, w hich had been com m issioned by the Angolan C om pany o f A griculture. This was to be his last assignm ent for institutions, even if private, linked to th e colonial regim e. In late 1959, A m ilcar C abral m e t w ith A rio de A zevedo, his fo rm e r professo r at ISA, w ho had b eco m e a close frien d and colleague in the various p ro jects he had b een involved w ith since his re tu rn to Lisbon, especially th o se th a t re q u ire d trav el to A ngola. T h e rea so n fo r th e m eetin g , w hich to o k place in a restau ran t in Setubal, was to discuss the details o f his n e x t m ission to A ngola. But Cabral to ld Azevedo th at he w as n o lo n g e r in te re ste d in such w o rk . H e w a n ted to ab andon th e com m issions in o rd e r to “give a different d irectio n to his life.” M ore than fo rty years after these events, A rio de Azevedo was still convinced th at C ab ral’s plans w ere m otivated by th e various injustices he had suf­ fered since his p lacem ents in A lentejo and in Bissau, and later, Lisbon. T hese pro b lem s w ere related to th e prevalence o f racism at th at tim e. Being a black engineer m ean t that m o st o f the tim e Cabral had to carry a docu m en t w ith clear instructions on how he should be treated (w here to sleep and w hat to eat, for instance) on his travels to Africa. In a piece w ritte n by Azevedo on th e agronom ic c a re e r o f C abral, he concludes by asking “w hat w ould have h appened if th e d o o rs o f investigation had n o t b e e n closed b u t o p e n e d m o re early to C abral?” suggesting th a t C ab ral’s desire for a change o f life d irectio n was sim ply m otivated by professional d isillu sio n m en t. W h a t he ig n o res how ever, as do m any o th ers, is C ab ral’s involvem ent in th e fo rm atio n o f the m o vem ent for the lib eratio n o f Lusophone Africa. W hich ev er perspective is used to analyze this tran sfo rm atio n , th ere is one clear fact: C abral tra d e d in a stable life, w ith a profession that 64

E N G IN E E R A N D CLA N D ESTIN E MILITANT allow ed him w ell-paid w o rk — in spite o f highs and low s and m o m en ts o f m isunderstanding— for the trials and tribulations o f nationalism and revolution in Africa— w ith no few er u n certain ties and m isu n d erstan d ­ ings. H ow ever, to re d u c e th e cause o f this tra n s fo rm a tio n to m e re professional fru stra tio n s is b o th to u n d e rp la y th e serio u sn ess w ith w hich he devoted him self to th e nationalist p ro je c t, and also to over­ look the ways in w hich he had p re p a re d and anticipated this change. His developm ent into a nationalist did n o t take place overnight b u t was a process w hich had involved m u ch d o u b t and hesitation. * * *

The independence o f G uinea-C onakry in Septem ber 1958 was an event th at changed C ab ral’s life, for he saw it as a clear indication o f a radical change in history and a sign that Portuguese colonialism in Africa could also becom e a thin g o f th e past. Luis C abral provides a vivid d e sc rip ­ tio n o f th e e u p h o ric re a c tio n o f his b r o th e r to th e ev ent. Luis had recently m arried L ucette A ndrade and was in Lisbon to enjoy his leave o f absence, licenfa graciosa, w hich allow ed h im to a tte n d academ ic exam inations for the fifth grade o f the Liceu. A ccording to Luis, this was one o f the happiest tim es o f A m ilcar’s life: he enjoyed a stable lamily en v iro n m en t and had overcom e th e financial difficulties o f his tim e as a student. Testam ent to this was the spacious ap artm en t he lived in w ith his family, w hich boasted an am ple terrace w ith a view o f theTejo river. This w ell-being was also reflected in his appearance: [H]e was groom ing a fine m oustache, dressing in the latest fashion and, w hen he w en t o u t, he dressed in a beautiful brow n raincoat w ith a matching cap. W hen he smoked one of his exquisite pipes w ith his usual self-confidence, he had all the appearance of an elegant young in tel­ lectual for w hom life was going well.

The ind ep en d en ce o f G hana, in 1957, and particu larly the political events in the French colonies began to have an effect in the cen ters o f the colonial p ow ers them selves. A lgerians had taken up arm s to fight for th e ir ow n liberation in N ovem ber 1 9 5 4 .T he colonial p o w e r’s in d e ­ cisiveness in the face o f an A lgerian revolution had p ro m p te d a handful o f pied-noirs to seize g o v ern m en t buildings in A lgiers, w hich pushed France to the b rin k o f a civil war. G eneral C harles de G aulle, the hero o f the French liberation from the Nazis in 1945, seized the op p o rtu n ity 65

AM ILCAR CABRAL and th reaten ed to stage a coup, e ru p tin g back o n to the political stage. O v e rc o m in g resistan ce fro m a n u m b e r o f m e m b e rs o f p a rliam en t, particu larly th e socialists, de G aulle was ap p o in ted head o f the state u n d e r tw o in te rre la te d cond itio n s th at he h im self had im posed. The first was that he w ould govern for seven years w ith ex traordinary p o w ­ ers for th e first six m onths. T he F rench c o n stitu tio n had to be revised to allow such sw eeping changes, and France e n te re d into a new p o liti­ cal era, th e Fifth Republic. Since Algiers was th e ep ic en te r o f the c o n ­ stitutional crisis, de G aulle, even before his ap p o in tm en t as the p re si­ d e n t o f th e council o f m in isters (p rim e m in ister) on 1 June 1958, had already an n o unced his in te n tio n to visit the te rrito ry . O nly th ree days after his inauguration on 4 June, de Gaulle travelled to A lgiers to announce w hat had already b een established in the new constitu tio n : all A frican subjects o f France w ould be called to choose betw een independence o r in teg ratio n in to a “co m m unity” in w hich the A frican states w o u ld have a u to n o m o u s g o v e rn m e n ts, b u t leaving France in c o n tro l o f p o rtfo lio s such as foreign affairs, defense, e c o ­ nom ic policies, education, justice, tran sp o rtatio n , and com m unication. France w ould also reserv e fo r itself th e rig h t to keep tro o p s in these te r rito r ie s , allegedly fo r th e p ro te c tio n o f F ren ch e x p atriate s, w h o could also be given o rd e rs to use force in case it was necessary to su p ­ press any fo rm o f in te rn a l resistance. D e G aulle, using his p ersonal influence and try in g to give fo rm to th e e le m e n ts o f th e loi-cadre (R eform Act) integ rated into the co n stitution, was attem pting to revive the old p rin cip le o f th e F rench U nion. H ow ever, th e F rench p ro je c t o f co n stitu tio n al neo-colonialism did n o t g e t off th e g ro u n d . O n 20 A ugust, de G aulle began an A frican trip , to A bidjan, Brazzaville, A ntananarivo, C onakry and Dakar, and th e n back to A lgiers, to p re s e n t th e tw o o p tio n s to th e colonies— e ith e r to jo in th e F rench fed eratio n , o r to push fo r in d ep en d en ce in th e re fe re n d u m th e F ren ch w ere to vote in on 28 Septem ber. C e re ­ m onies and en g ag em en t w ith th e co m m u n ities in these places w en t according to p lan , u n til de G aulle a rriv ed in C o nakry on th e a fte r­ n o o n o f 25 A ugust. H e w as receiv ed by Sekou T oure, fo rm e r tra d e u n io n ist and lead er o f th e Parti Democratique Africain, and at th a t tim e rep re se n ta tiv e for his co u n try in th e F ren ch p arliam en t. In fro n t o f crow ds w ho elbow ed th e ir way fo rw ard to see th e F rench p re sid e n t,

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E N G IN E E R A N D C LA N D ESTIN E MILITANT Toure stated th at G uineans w o u ld ra th e r choose p o v erty in in d e p e n ­ dence than o p u len ce in slavery. Visibly shocked, de G aulle was forced to im p ro v ise a sp eech in w h ic h he sta te d th a t G u in ea w as free to choose in d ep en d en ce by voting n o in th e re fe re n d u m . In fact, G uinea was the only co u n try th a t v o ted no to th e n ew c o n stitu tio n , and, on 29 S eptem ber, it becam e in d e p e n d e n t. The aftern o o n o f 27 A ugust in w hich Toure secured the destiny o f G uinea was broadcast w orld w id e, cap tu rin g th e im aginations o f many Africans across th e contin en t. And beyond the co n tin ent to o , il we take into acco u n t th e d escrip tio n s provided by Luis Cabral on how these events w ere celeb rated in the a p a rtm e n t at Infante Santo. This was the occasion at w hich Cabral u tte re d one o f th e sentences cherished m ost o f all by his hagiographers: “Now, I have a hom elan d. I can pack my things and re tu r n to A frica fo r go o d .” Even if this descrip tio n is n o t accurate, and even if Cabral did n o t say th ese w o rds at th a t precise m o m e n t, th e se n te n c e c a p tu re s a feeling shared by m any A frican nationalists living in Europe w ho felt that the tim e had com e to go back to Africa. * * * A rio de Azevedo and Luis C abral both provide explanations for events in C a b ra l’s life at this tim e. F or th e fo rm er, th e n e e d fo r change in C ab ral’s life was m otivated by professional fru stratio n s, w hereas for th e latter, it was a re sp o n se to th e o p p o rtu n itie s o p e n e d up by the independ en ce o f G uinea. Both suggest that these changes w ere for the m o st p a rt spontaneous. T hese differing in te rp re ta tio n s may be caused by the fact that Cabral was careful to conceal certain aspects o f his life. A rio de A zevedo, and o th e r colleagues, for instance, w ere n o t aware th at du rin g his travels to the cen ters o f sugar b eet p ro d u ctio n Cabral co ntacted friends th at had already left Lisbon. Early debates and d eliberations ab o u t fo rm in g a single fro n t against P ortu g u ese colonialism probably to o k place d u rin g C ab ral’s trip s to visit M ario de A ndrade and M arcelino dos Santos in Paris. This group w ould initially be called Movimento Anti-Colonial (M A C). T he set-up o f this organization, far m o re m o d est in its objectives and activities than described by th e Angolan nationalist Lucio Lara, only to o k place later w hen a “d elegation o f the D em o cratic M ovem ent for the P ortuguese 67

A M ILCAR CABRAL Colonies in Paris, in the p erso n o f M arcelino dos Santos, visited Lisbon in th e first se m e ste r o f 1957 by invitation o f th e A frican nationalists resid in g in P o rtu g a l. F ro m th e conclu sio n s o f this m e e tin g th e A ntico lo n ial M o v e m e n t is fo u n d e d .” A gostinho N e to , N o em ia de Sousa, H u m b e rto M achado, as w ell as E duardo dos Santos (n o t to be confused w ith th e later A ngolan p resid en t) and Lucio Lara, alm ost all o f th e m residing in Lisbon, also to o k p a rt in these m eetings. C abral w as th e m o s t financially stab le o f th e g ro u p . O n various occasio n s, h e h ad to sen d his frie n d s “sm all” a m o u n ts o f m oney. C ab ral’s help was m o re than w elcom e, as his com panions in E urope at th at tim es w ere facing p ro b lem s o f p o litical o r financial p re c a rio u s­ ness, if n o t b o th . A gostinho N e to , fo r exam ple, sp en t as m uch tim e in jail as he did o n th e o u tsid e . M arcelin o d os Santos and M ario de A ndrade lived in Paris, th e fo rm e r s u p p o rte d by his fam ily and the la tte r barely able to cover his expenses w ith th e m eag er salary o f his jo b as secretary o f A lioune D io p ’s m agazine Presence Africaine. It was only C abral w h o could freely travel u n d e r th e cover o f being an a g ri­ cu ltu ral e n g in e e r on assignm ents fo r colonial com panies. T hanks to h im , A ngolans— especially th e nationalists in L uanda and Lisbon— w ere able to keep in to u ch . U p to this p o in t A m ilcar C abral had b een very discreet. D espite the m eetings at his house o r in his car, albeit in co n stant m o tio n to dodge the police, and even though he was close to p eople w ith police records and visited o th e rs in p riso n — such as A gostinho N eto — he had never been sum m oned by the PIDE. Every year his re c o rd w ith the PIDE was u p d a te d w ith th e sam e b r ie f c o m m e n ta ry : “m o rally and politically n o thing was found against him .” H ow ever, this p e rio d o f grace w ould only last until 30 D ecem b er 1958, th re e m o n th s after he had decided to re tu rn to Africa. T he ap p aren t bubble o f security th a t C abral lived in began to bu rst w h en th e A ngolan natio n alist V iriato da C ru z a rriv e d in Lisbon. Da C ru z was com ing from Luanda, w h ere he had b een living until th en and had tak en p a rt in th e creation o f w h at was very probably the first political p a rty to be foun d ed in A ngola, th e Partido Comunista Angolano (A ngolan C o m m u n ist P a rty ). A fte r his arriv al in L isbon, w ith th e police on his tail, V iriato da C ru z, fo r w hatever reason sought shelter at th e h o m e o f A m ilcar C abral, w h o m he m u st have m e t du rin g the

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E N G IN E E R A N D C L A N D E ST IN E MILITANT various trip s the latter had m ade to Angola. This created a double p ro b ­ lem for C abral, for it was n o t only th e PIDE th at was after da C ruz. The A ngolan nationalists residing in Lisbon found it unacceptable th at a “cadre o f th e in te r io r ” had co m e to P o rtu g al w ith o u t looking fo r them .T o resolve m a tte rs, Lucio Lara approached C abral, w ho, accord­ ing to the form er, som ew hat hesitantly confirm ed th a t“V iriato da C ruz was really h iding at his place b u t th a t fo r c o n sp ira to rial reasons he asked for secrecy.” Lara was n o t convinced and, according to him self, succeeded in d em o n stratin g to Cabral the “dubious situation” he lound him self in “as m em b er o f the d irecto rate” they had created. Cabral then agreed to take da C ru z to a m eetin g to resolve th e “aw kw ardness” of th e situ atio n , w h ich to o k place at th e h o m e o f Lucio Lara. Besides those already m e n tio n e d , o th e rs w ho to o k p a rt in this m eetin g w ere A gostinho N eto , E duardo dos Santos and R uth Lara, Lucio L ara’s wife. In one o f the m eetings w ith this g ro u p , Cabral was assigned a very d an g erous m ission. D u rin g a trip to A ngola, b e tw e e n A ugust and S eptem ber 1959, he was given the task o f re c ru itin g eleven youths to b e se n t to Tunisia, w h e re th ey w e re to receiv e tra in in g in g u e rrilla tactics. T h e idea was th a t o n ce th ey w e re b ack in th e co u n try , they w ould form the “core operational g ro u p to ju m p sta rt the arm ed struggle.”T he offer had b een m ade by Frantz Fanon, at that tim e adviser to th e G PR A , w h o , d u rin g th e second C on g ress o f Black W rite rs and A rtists in R o m e b e tw e e n 26 M arch and 1 A pril 1959 m e t w ith the Angolan representatives, nam ely V iriato da C ruz, Lucio Lara and M ario de A ndrade, in th e b asem en t o f a sm all coffee bar. Fanon, w ho was yet to w rite his fam ous The Wretched o jth e Earth, explained to them th at he m eant to e x p o rt the “A lgerian m o d el” o f anti-im p erialist struggle to A ngola, as a way to sc a tte r th e forces o f N A TO , w h ich s u p p o rte d France in th e w ar against the A lgerian nationalists. Amilcar Cabral had n o t been the g ro u p ’s first choice.T he directorate had already asked N oem ia de Sousa to u n d ertak e the m ission. But, for family reasons, she was n o t available. As Cabral was to go to Frankfurt shortly after the C ongress (u n d er the cover o f one o f his trip s to study the viability o f b e e tro o t planting in continental P o rtugal), he was asked in de Sousa’s place. In Luanda, however, Cabral could n o t find any o f the individuals he was m ean t to contact. The PIDE had co nducted a raid, im prisoning and to rtu rin g hundreds o f nationalists. They w ere later p u t on trial in the fam ous Processo dos 5 0 (Trial o f th e 50). 69

AMILCAR CABRAL It is likely th a t this e x p e rie n c e in L uanda m ay have trig g e re d in C abral th e certa in ty th at the tim e had com e to re tu rn to Africa. In the re p o r t he sen t in S ep tem b er 1959 to his friends at the MAC, w ritte n fro m “so m ew h ere in A frica,” he discussed th e details o f th e m assive op eratio n u n d e rta k e n by the police to im p riso n , th re ate n , and b ribe m e m b e rs o f natio n alist cells. As such, he c o n clu d ed , th e re w e re no reasons for the m em b ers o f the MAC to stay in E urope. Tim e had com e to m ove to A frica, w h ere they should create th e conditions to develop m o re serious w o rk for th e indep en d en ce o f th e ir countries. O n his re tu rn from his last trip to Luanda, he visited the R epublic o f C ongo, “to see th e possibility o f w o rk for o u r tru ste d p eo p le ”. He visited also A ccra, the capital o f Ghana, instead o f G uinea as scheduled, having n o t b e e n given g u a ra n te e s th a t his p a ssp o rt w o u ld n o t be stam ped at the a irp o rt. To his com panions in the MAC, echoes o f these trip s cam e fro m o th e r so u rces, such as th e c o rre sp o n d e n c e w ith AK B ard en , an official in th e c a b in e t o f G h an a’s p rim e m inister. A ccording to B arden, C abral had tak en advantage o f his sh o rt stay in Ghana to “p repare a d o cu m en t on the inhum an atrocities that the indig­ enou s citizens (sic) o f A ngola w e re su b m itte d to by th e P o rtu g u ese reg im e,” adding th at this d o c u m e n t w as being analyzed w ith careful atten tio n . The p ro o f o f G hana’s in terest in the Angolan question arrived a co u p le o f days later, w h e n , acco rd in g to V iriato da C ru z, K w am e N k ru m a h gave a sp eech in w h ich h e m ad e re fe re n c e to th e case o f A ngola, b ased o n th e in fo rm a tio n p ro v id e d by A m ilcar C abral. D a C ru z was convinced th at th e info rm atio n used was based on C abral’s re p o r t since, “as p resid en t, he w ould n o t m en tio n the case w ith o u t the basis o f an A ngolan source (sic)”. C ab ral’s courage was recognized by th e m e m b ers o f the MAC. For Lucio L ara, A m ilcar C abral d e se rv e d praise fo r th e “in tellig en t and p a trio tic m a n n e r in w hich he had u n d ertak en his m ission”. However, Cabral was also the ta rg e t o f som e criticism . Lara, fo r exam ple, c riti­ cized him for having m ade reference to the MAC, in a le tte r sent to the Parti de la Federation de 1’Afrique o f M ali, as being a stru ctu re that instead o f peo p le, co m p rised all th e nationalist m ovem ents.

This d o u b t co n cern in g w h e th e r th e MAC should re p re se n t people o r organizations provides in te re stin g clues to u n d e rsta n d th e e m e r ­ gence o f anti-P ortuguese nationalism . W h at was the im p o rtan ce o f this 70

E N G IN EE R A N D CLA N D E ST IN E MILITANT ^ro u p o f fo rm e r stu d en ts in Lisbon in th e overall stru c tu re o f African nationalism in th e P ortuguese colonies? Was it th e case that the MAC, in practice, had anticipated the form ation o f the MPLA and the PAIGC? T he action plan thatV iriato da C ruz w ro te for the MAC may shed light on som e o f these questions. T he MAC was to contact the organizations o f the P ortuguese colonies; discuss w ith those organizations the condi­ tions for th e ir rep resen tatio n in th e MAC; for th e MAC to be tra n s­ fo rm ed in to a council; and to include in this council representatives of all organizations. However, the MAC ended up being dissolved, and the w ork o f bringing to g e th e r the nationalist forces w ould be continued by the PAIGC and MPLA. His w o rk colleagues w ere n o t th e only ones A m ilcar C abral k ep t ig n o ra n t o f his in v o lv em en t in clan d estin e n atio n alist g ro u p s. Even though his colleagues at the MAC could c o u n t on him to u n d e rta k e tasks as th e “m essenger,” linking up the g roups in Angola and E urope, they w ere probably unaw are o f th e efforts o f A m ilcar C abral to create a n ationalist m o v e m e n t in his native land. A cco rd in g to th e official PA IG C n a rra tiv e , A m ilcar C abral had b e e n d riv en fro m G uinea by governor M elo e Alvim and he was only autho rized to visit the country to see his family. It was thus u n d er this p re te x t that Cabral tw ice visited Bissau. D u rin g his first stay, he fo u n d e d th e Partido Africano para Independencia — w hich w ould later on b ecom e the PAIGC— and, on his second visit in 1959, in th e a fterm ath o f th e events o f Pidjiguiti, he convened the fam ous m eetin g o f cadres in w hich the p a rty decided to change its strategy. H e gave the o rd e r to end d ire c t confrontations in the big cities, w h ich w o u ld certain ly lead to civilian casualties, and advised his m en to leave Bissau and seek refuge in n eighboring co u n ­ tries such as Senegal and G uinea-C onakry, w h ere they should organize them selves to sta rt the anticolonial war. H ow ever, one can also draw atten tio n to a n u m b e r o f o th e r events w h ich help explain th e circu m stan ces u n d e r w h ich th e PAIGC was created. T he falsification o f the founding dates o f th e nationalist m ove­ m ents has been a com m o n feature in Lusophone African countries. In Angola, M ozam bique, and G uinea, for exam ple, political organizations w ould choose a date of origin w hich cam e before their actual founding. This was perhaps because o f th e fact th at colonial pow ers w ould only recognize and deal w ith “legitim ate representatives o f the people.” In 71

AM ILCAR CABRAL m o st cases, this sim ply m e a n t th e o ld est organization in the struggle for the lib eratio n o f a given te rrito ry . Leaders o f national liberation m ovem ents cam e u n d e r pressure to presen t th eir organizations as the first to be established, so as to devalue the em erg en ce o f oth ers. The fact th a t Cabral re fe rred to these m ove­ m en ts as g roups instead o f as p eo p le in his re p o r t— for w hich V iriato da C ruz had adm onished him — speaks to the fact that th e re w ere no n atio n alist and p o litical o rg an izatio n s, such as th e M PLA and th e PAIGC, at th at tim e. H ow ever, in vying for in tern atio n al su p p o rt, they had to label them selves as th e first, w h ich in m o st cases also m e a n t being the “legitim ate force o f th e p e o p le ’s aspirations.” F u rth e rm o re , it is n o t conceivable th a t th e PAIGC was fo u n d ed u n d er th e circum stances often described if one takes into account the conditions u n d er w hich these young nationalists op erated at the tim e. Political activism in the c o n te x t o f th e Estado Novo regim e was labeled a crim e, so those w ishing to subvert the colonial o rd e r w ere im m ersed in a clim ate o f fear, m istru st, and even paranoia. In the clandestine m e e t­ ings in w hich political and subversive issues w ere discussed, it was often im possible to distinguish tru e nationalists from those w ho w ere th ere as PIDE inform ants. Luis C abral is perhaps th e G uinean nationalist w ho m o st painstak­ ingly a tte m p te d to prov id e th e p a rty w ith th e fo rm ality o f a date o f b irth . In his book, he describes in g reat detail the founding o f the p arty as having taken place o n th e aftern o o n o f 19 S eptem ber 1956, in an a p a rtm e n t shared by A ristides Pereira and F ernando Fortes. H owever, th e re are n o referen ces to th e p a rty in th e co rresp o n d en ce betw een m e m b e rs o f th e MAC in th e p e rio d from 1956 to 1960. In the le tte rs th at survived, Cabral never refers to the existence o f nationalist groups in Bissau. This is all th e m o re su rp risin g as th e re w ere a n u m b e r o f op p o rtu n ities to do so. W h en he re tu rn e d from Bissau, for exam ple, he refers to th e m assacres in G uinea and m en tio n s “the d e term in atio n o f the p eo p le”, b u t he m akes n o referen ce to any anti-colonial activism taking place. The reason for this om ission may sim ply be th a t the PAIGC did n o t exist at th at tim e. Abilio D u a rte , considered one o f th e founders o f the p a rty — alth o u g h he w as n o t in Bissau o n th e d ate a ttrib u te d to its establishm ent— denied various tim es th at th e events to o k place in the 72

E N G IN E E R A N D CLA N D ESTIN E MILITANT way in w h ich th ey w e re la te r d e sc rib e d . A ristid es P ereira, m o re recently, has shed som e light on this confu sio n .T h e date for the fo u n d ­ ing o f the p arty was chosen retrospectively, w hen he and Cabral w ere asking fo r th e s u p p o rt o f th e Senegalese p re s id e n t, L eopold Sedar Senghor, in Dakar. Senghor believed that a G uinean p a rty w ith PAI as its acronym had to be a b ra n c h o f a Senegalese p o litical fo rm a tio n w hich he had declared illegal. This led to the need to find a founding date w hich p receded the form ation o f the Senegalese p arty— only later w ould the le tte rs “G C ” be added to th e acronym . It is th erefo re plau ­ sible that the PAIGC was only actually form ed in 1959, on the occasion o f C ab ral’s last trip to Bissau. In sum , in the co n tex t of the MAC, Am ilcar Cabral did n o t represent any political force o f G uinea. O r at least n o t to th e know ledge o f his friends. It w as in fact H u g o de M enezes w h o to o k th e initiative o f creating a p a rty in G uinea. M enezes, w ho inexplicably appeared at the end o f the 1950s rep re se n tin g th e MAC in th e P D G o f SekouT oure, d ecided o f his ow n volition to include G uineans in his organization, w ith the sim ple reasoning th at, as he argued, o u t o f all the P ortuguese colonies, G uinea was th e one w hose struggle for independence m ost in terested his host. His g estu re was sim ply one o f anticipation, since SekouToure him self had already considered form ing a nationalist orga­ nization to w o rk for th e in d ep en d en ce o f G uinea. T estam ent to this in te re st w ere th e privileges th a t M en ezes’ g ro u p w ere g ran ted : the right to create n ew spapers and broadcast radio shows and a loan to be “repaid after the ind ep en d en ce o f G uinea”. A n a tio n a list g ro u p had e x iste d in G u in ea since 1956, w h ich , although n o t form ally organized, was striving to be so. This is an in d i­ cation o f one o f th e m any co n trad ictio n s th a t th e PAIGC w ould face rig h t from its in cep tio n . It w as, at its founding, essentially a p a rty of C ape V erdeans (o r d escen d an ts o f C ape V erdeans) w ith scant local m em b ersh ip , foun d ed in G uinea, fo r th e p u rp o se o f liberating b o th co u n tries. A n o th e r c o n tra d ic tio n was th at C ape Verdeans w ere also a cog in the m achine o f colonial d o m in atio n , in th at they co n stitu te d an in term ed ia ry g ro u p b etw een th e natives and th e cen tral pow er. As w e have already discussed, th e different social statuses o f C ape Verdeans and G uineans— wrho lived u n d e r d ifferen t legal system s, w ith Cape V erdeans c o n sid e re d citizen s an d G u in ean s larg ely co n sid e red “natives”— they could only in te ra c t w ith each o th e r fleetingly. 73

A M ILCAR CABRAL N o tw ith stan d in g these stru c tu ra l lim itatio n s, the leadership o f this g ro u p o f nationalists trie d to w o rk am ong g ro u p s living in u rban c e n ­ te rs. A lthough it rem ain s unclear, it is p ro b ab le th at th e PAIGC was involved in th e rad icalizatio n o f p ro te s ts by d o c k ers a t th e P o rt o f Bissau o n 3 A ugust 1959, w h en these w o rk e rs decided to stop th e ir activities and d em an d an increase in th e ir salaries. A ccording to the p rie s t H e n riq u e P in to R e m a , th e re h ad already b e e n sk irm ish es b e tw e e n th e police and th e sailors o f Casa Nosoco on 8 M arch 1956— b efore th e alleged foudning o f th e PAIGC— w h en th e sailors “refused to receive th e ir salaries and did n o t allow th e e x it o f Casa Gouveia’s boats.” This w as th e in c id e n t, acco rd in g to R em a, w hich fo rced the p olice— w h o had b e e n w a rn e d a b o u t th e situ atio n at th e P idjiguiti docks— to go to the place a rm e d . A fter a s h o rt struggle in w hich tw o officers and seven agents w ere in ju re d , th e police shot at th e p ro te s t­ e rs, w h o co u ld only fen d off th e b u llets w ith sticks, oars, and iro n bars. As a re su lt, fifteen G uineans died and a n o th er fifty w ere in ju red , n o t co u n tin g th e co rp ses th a t w ere c a rrie d away by th e w aters o f the G eba river. T hese events convinced Cabral o f th e im possibility o f developing peaceful m eans o f p ro te st such as those th at w ere being em ployed in the British and French colonies. The police had already show n how they w ould quell any acts o f this n atu re. A ccording to the historiography o f the party, this is the m o m en t, during his last stay in Bissau in Septem ber 1959, th at C abral called for the “h isto ric” m eetin g o f cadres, in w hich every available m e m b e r should be p resen t. In this m eeting, a decision w as tak en to change th e stra te g y o f th e party. U rb a n actions w ith strikes and p ro tests w ould only cost hum an lives, as had been d e m o n ­ strated . A rm ed force was th e only way to adequately resp o n d to the violence o f th e P o rtu g u ese. For this, it was necessary to organize the p a rty o u tsid e o f the u rb an cen ters. A ccordingly, C abral o rd e re d the m ilitants to abandon Bissau, w h ere only a sm all stru c tu re should stay, in o rd e r to w o rk o n re c ru itin g young p eo p le to b e sen t to guerrilla p rep aratio n cam ps. A ccording to A quino de Braganca, this m arks the m o m e n t in th e h isto ry o f th e p a rty w h ere it passed fro m m ere p ro te st nationalism to revo lu tio n ary nationalism . H ow ever, at this stage, A m ilcar C abral and o th e r elem en ts o f the PAIGC leadership did n o t have th e capacity to m obilize G uineans. As 74

E N G IN E E R A N D C L A N D E ST IN E MILITANT we have already seen, the colonial state n o t only cu rtailed the right o f association, b u t was also deeply suspicious o f any in teractio n betw een people o f different social g ro u p s, such as C ape Verdeans and Guineans. To overcom e this p ro b lem , before leaving th e country, A m ilcar Cabral m e t w ith Rafael Barbosa, a G uinean, and at th at tim e one o f the m ost active m em b ers o f the u n d e rg ro u n d n etw o rk s o f Bissau. Cabral p e r­ suaded him to use his connections and his ability to m obilize oth ers in o rd e r to help th e p a rty sm uggle those young p eople in te re ste d in tak ­ ing p a rt in the g u errilla cam paign o u t o f th e city. From this encounter, according to Luis C abral, a stru c tu re em erged w hich b ro u g h t to g eth er the g roups re p re se n te d by A m ilcar C abral and Rafael Barbosa— the Front for the L iberation o f G uinea and Cape Verde. T here w ere already m any y o un g p e o p le w an tin g to leave Bissau, such as V ic to r Saude M aria, w ho w ould later b ecom e one o f th e m o st distinguished p a rty cadres. A ccording to Saude M aria, C abral convinced th em th at it was still to o early to leave Bissau— a position w hich seem ed to co n trad ict the decisions o f th e historic m eetin g o f 1959— since th e conditions to receive th em had n o t yet b een p u t in place in Conakry. Cabral bought M ussa Fati, o n e o f th ese p ro sp e c tiv e fre e d o m fig h ters, a sew ing m achine to help him m ake som e m oney w hile he was w aiting for the tim e to leave. A fter consultation w ith Rafael Barbosa, Cabral left Bissau for Lisbon, stopping off in Dakar, Senegal, on th e way, to m ee t w ith Guineans and C ape Verdeans w ho w ere organizing a nationalist m ove­ m en t there.

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4

SHATTERING THE WALLS OF SILENCE

In the late 1950s, C ab ral’s perso n al security and physical integ rity had b e c o m e a m a jo r c o n c e rn a fte r th e risk s he h ad tak en in o rd e r to accom plish his clandestine m issions to Africa. In form ation on C ab ral’s illicit activities had reached th e h ead q u arters o f th e PIDE. It was only a m a tte r o f tim e b e fo re he w o u ld receive an a rre s t w a rra n t, as th e police began to piece to g e th e r the puzzle o f his suspicious activities. O n his re tu rn to Lisbon, after visiting Bissau for th e “m eetin g o f cad­ re s”, as well as going to D akar to m e e t the nationalists residing th ere, Cabral probably realised th at his freedom to m ove around like this was com ing to an end. But he had to take this risk and re tu rn to Lisbon one final tim e b efore em bracing a clandestine life. C abral had a n u m b e r o f adm inistrative tasks to atten d to before he could leave Lisbon fo r g o o d , such as secu rin g all th e cash he could from th e banks— as C abral w as, acco rd in g to his frie n d s, the “only one in a p o sitio n to h elp o th e rs.”T h e re w ere also o th e r m o re u rg e n t and painful m a tte rs re la te d to his fam ily and m arria g e. C ab ral’s w ife M aria H e le n a in all lik elih o o d k n ew v ery little a b o u t his p o litica l activities. C abral left Lisbon w ith o u t te llin g h e r a thing. It was only a n u m b e r o f w eeks la te r on 20 D ec e m b e r 1959 th at he sen t h e r a le tte r explainin g his situ atio n and asking h e r to hold o u t w ith “the girl and life.” M aria H elen a im m ed iately w ro te to Lucio Lara, w ho trie d to “calm h e r d o w n .” But he co u ld n o t keep h e r from packing h e r things 77

A M ILCA R CABRAL and trav ellin g to jo in C ab ral in Paris. T h e c o u p le sp e n t fo u r days, 2 1—25 Jan u ary , a t H o te l de la Paix, o n B lainville S tre e t. C a b ra l, “d e p re sse d an d q u ite w o r r ie d ,” m a n a g e d to c o n v in c e his w ife to r e tu r n w ith th e ir d a u g h te r to L isbon, “w h e re th ey w ould be b e tte r off th a n a n y w h e re else.” M aria H e le n a h ad d e p a rte d L isbon fo r a leave o f absence o f a m o n th , C abral w rite s , alleging th a t h er husband w as sick, b u t she w o u ld r e tu r n to p u t th e ir accounts in o rd e r and “se ttle th e m a tte r fo r g o o d .” Perhaps on account o f this dom estic crisis, Cabral was the last o f the MAC m em b ers to arrive in Tunis, the capital ofTunisia, w here from 25 to 29 January 1960 th e Second A ll-A frican P eo p le’s C onference was taking place. This was a m ajo r event in th e history o f Africa, for it is also re fe rre d to as th e second p re p a ra to ry m eetin g (the first had taken place in A ccra) fo r the founding o f th e O rganization o f A frican U nity (O AU ) th re e years later on 25 May 1963. For Cabral and his group, Tunis was th e first o p p o rtu n ity to raise aw areness o f the colonial situ ­ ation in Lusophone Africa. R ep resen ted in this fo ru m w ere n o t only the recen tly lib erated A frican co u n tries— o r those th at w ould achieve indepen d en ce over the course o f 1960— b u t also a n u m b er o f o th ers, such as th e P e o p le ’s R ep u b lic o f C hina, th e Federal R epublic o f G erm any, India, Sw eden, th e Soviet U nion, Yugoslavia, and even the U nited States o f A m erica, through the A m erican C om m ittee on Africa. As Cabral w ould soon find o u t, d enouncing P ortuguese colonialism was no easy task in these early days. P ortuguese colonialism was for the m o st p a r t sim ply ig n o red , o r co n sid ered benign, since m any people had th e idea— than k s to w o rk s o f colonial p ro p ag an d a— th a t th e P o rtu g u e se w e re effectively b u ild in g m u ltiracial societies in A frica. Cabral illustrated this through a conversation w ith one o f the delegates at the m eeting, in w hich he trie d to explain to him the real situation in the Portuguese colonies. His in terlo cu to r simply responded: “you d o n ’t have any p ro b lem s; you g e t along w ith th e P o rtu g uese.” N ev erth eless, the m eetin g in Tunis was a m ilesto n e fo r th e lib e ra­ tio n o f L u sophone A frica fo r at least tw o reasons. Firstly, n o tw ith ­ standing th e indifference to th e situ atio n in th e P o rtu g u ese colonies, it was in Tunis th at the first victory against P ortuguese colonialism was achieved: th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s a d o p te d a re s o lu tio n c o n d e m n in g P o rtu g u e se co lo n ialism , th e first d o c u m e n t o n th e to p ic signed by 78

SH A TTERIN G TH E WALLS O F SILENCE A frican c o u n trie s, m any o f th em only re c e n tly lib e ra ted . Secondly, w ith the ex cep tio n o f A gostinho N e to w ho was im p riso n ed in Lisbon, Tunis provided an o p p o rtu n ity for this g ro u p o f A frican nationalists to reu n ite for the first tim e on African soil. Even m o re im portantly,T unis m arked the first tim e that they em erg ed as representatives o f a n atio n ­ alist organization, in this case th e MAC. P ro p e rly speaking, Tunis m ark ed th e b eg in n in g o f nationalism in th e P o rtu g u ese A frican colonies. T h e re , th e g ro u p d ecid ed to break up the MAC, resolving a c o n tra d ic tio n th a t had provoked a great deal o f d e b ate am o n g th e m , as th e M AC wras a n a tio n a list o rg an izatio n b rin g in g to g e th e r individuals. A t the Tunis co n feren ce, the individual m e m b e rs o f th e M AC w e re p u sh e d by a n u m b e r o f deleg ates and organizations to re p re s e n t th e ir ow n c o u n trie s. R eceiving assistance w ould be d e p e n d e n t o n this m ove. C o nsequently, it was in Tunis th at C abral and his colleagues signed th e first d o c u m e n ts w ith the nam es o f th e ir n atio n alist organ izatio n s, such as th e M PLA and th e PAIGC. A t th e e n d o f th e c o n fe re n c e , th e M A C w as d isso lv ed an d , in its place, as a so rt o f coord in atin g organization, they founded the African R evolutionary F ro n t for the N ational In dependence o f the P ortuguese C olonies (FR A IN ). As Tunis was the n ex t level in the struggle against P ortuguese co lo ­ nialism , C ab ral’s friends soon found African states in w hich to settle and from th ere to sta rt the fight for the liberation o f th e ir ow n c o u n ­ tries. V iriato da C ru z, M ario de A ndrade, and H ugo de M enezes w ent to Conakry, w hile Lucio Lara and his family headed to M orocco, after being gran ted political asylum th e re . C abral, how ever, w ould first go to L ondon, w h ere, in a sym bolic fashion, he was initiated into life as a freedom fighter. C abral’s stay in London in February 1960 continued the w ork he had started in Tunis: shattering the wall o f silence regarding the Portuguese colonial q uestion. L ondon was a particularly in terestin g place for such an undertaking. Like France, G reat Britain was conceding, o r about to c o n c ed e , in d e p e n d e n c e to its co lo n ies in A frica. C abral th e re fo re w a n te d to m ak e th e B ritish au d ien ce aw are o f th e p ath ch o sen by Portugal: instead o f leaving Africa, Portugal was reinforcing its m ilitary p rese n c e, p a rtic u la rly in A ngola and M o zam b iq u e, and violently repressing any in d ep en d en tist claims. Angola was a case in p o in t, as in 79

AM ILCAR CABRAL the previous year o f 1959, h u n d red s o f p eo p le had been accused and senten ced o n charges o f te rro rism . The trip to L ondon was th e last tim e th at Cabral w ould travel using a passp o rt w hich b o re his real n am e— from th en on, he w ould travel w ith m any o th e r passports displaying different nationalities and nam es. H e had so far b een ad e p t at hiding his identity, using various aliases including A bel Djassi and Abel Silva. This was probably one o f the re a ­ sons th at th e PIDE to o k so long to im plicate him in activities consid­ ered crim inal. For som e o f his close associates, how ever, the reason Cabral refused to use his ow n nam e was sim ply cow ardice. In a le tte r in w h ich he w as asked a b o u t his use o f an alias, C abral a rg u ed th a t th e re was no reason n o t to use one, explaining th a t the “organizations” they w ere form ing, w hile still w eak, w ere n o t “private m atte rs”. Cabral added th a t n o significant gain w ould co m e from using his ow n nam e, since “o u r com rades k n o w th at I am abroad and know w ho I am , and all the prestig e th a t w e can g e t has to com e from o u r w o rk and from o u r organizations, n o t from us as individuals.” H e also suggested that using his nam e at th at tim e w ould be p u ttin g his com panions and his fam ily m e m b e rs at risk , since “th e d em ands o f th e stru g g le and the n eed to act freely forced m e to be away, in th e certa in ty th at it w ould be an unnecessary sacrifice fo r th e m .” * * * In those years, Cabral was still totally unknow n in the British capital and in African and diplom atic circles th ere. T he few contacts he had w ere probably given to him by H ugo de M enezes, w ith w hom he had spent tim e w eeks before in Tunis. Mainza C hona from Zam bia and Kanyama C hium e from M alawi, m em b ers o f th e pow erful C o m m ittee o f African O rganizations— a body th at b ro u g h t to g e th e r nationalist organizations fro m various B ritish colonies re p re se n te d in L o ndon— w ere am ong these contacts. Along w ith m any o th e r A frican nationalists, they w ee staying in an eighteenth-century m ansion situated at n um ber 200 G ow er S treet, w hich served as a s o rt o f passing house for nationalist activists from Africa. This was w here Cabral spent his first nights in London. It is possible th a t this a rra n g e m e n t had also b e e n facilitated by H ugo de M enezes, w h o had lived o n G o w er S tre e t, o r at least had used this address to receive his m ail, d u rin g his tim e in th e British capital. 80

SH A TTERIN G T H E WALLS O F SILENCE In L ondon, Cabral m e t a n u m b e r o f people related in various ways to nationalist organizations in A frica, such as Joao C aracciolo Cabral from the G oa League, w ho w ould later re p re se n t the FRAIN in the British capital. M o re im p o rtan tly , C abral w o u ld m ake acquaintance w ith Basil D avidson, one o f th e m o st genuine and generous su p p o rters o f nationalism in L u so p h o n e A frica. D avidson was a jo u rn a list and w rite r w ho had w o rk ed for th e British secret services in the Balkans du rin g W W II, helping organize resistance to th e Nazis. He then m oved into w ritin g and jo u rn alism , and in 1955, published African Awakening, an essay-cum -travelogue on Angola and th e Congo. This book cam e to p ro vide first-hand insight in to tw o o f th e m o st inaccessible A frican c o u n tries at a tim e in w hich aro u n d half th e c o n tin e n t was about to becom e in d ep en d en t, and tw o w hich had b een largely ignored by the w o rld press. By travelling to these co u n tries, w hich w ere u n d e r the dom ination o f Belgium and Portugal, docum enting the appalling w o rk ­ ing conditions, and, above all, describing th e h ope at the pro sp ect o f im p en d in g in d e p e n d e n c e , p a rtic u la rly in C o n g o , Basil D avidson becam e, as Cabral p u t it, th e first W estern m an to try to break dow n the wall o f silence aro u n d the P ortuguese colonies. F or D avidson, o n e im agines it was riv e tin g to have a native o f G uinea m ake th e case fo r th e in d e p e n d e n c e o f L u sophone A frica. Davidson translated and prefaced C ab ral’s pam p h let en titled The Facts About Portugal’s African Colonies, e d ite d by th e U n io n o f D e m o cratic

C o n tro l. This d o c u m e n t was th e first m ajor in d ictm en t o f P o rtu g al’s colonialism w ritte n by a native o f th e P ortuguese colonies in Africa. Its o pening is rem in iscen t o f how Jean-Paul S artre starts the preface for Fanon’s TheWretched o f the Earth, sharing w ith the read er the n u m b er o f people w orldw ide living u n d er colonialism . Likewise, for Cabral, n u m ­ b e rs c o u n te d , and according to him , th e re w ere 11 m illion Africans w ho lived u n d e r th e d om ination o f P ortugal, th e m ost backw ard and agrarian co u n try in w estern E urope, w ith th e low est education rates. F or C ab ral, P o rtu g u e se colonialism was b ased o n w h a t h e called “E uropean m ig ratio n ”, w hich consisted o f th e im p lem en tatio n o f legal m easures to facilitate th e occupation o f A frican te rrito rie s by m e tro ­ p o lita n w h ites. T h ese se ttle rs w e re given th e b e st p lo ts o f land in A ngola an d M o zam b iq u e, w h ich co n se q u e n tly dro v e th o u san d s o f Africans o u t o f th e ir ow n hom es. Those A fricans, left w ith few' o th e r 81

A M ILCAR CABRAL alternatives, eith er settled for p o o re r plots o f land to dedicate th e m ­ selves to th e p ro d u c tio n o f colonial crops to sell at fixed prices to the concessionaires, o r su rre n d e re d them selves to the colonial state ’s labor schem es— akin to slavery. The P ortuguese lab o r reg im e, w hose origins p receded the arrival of Salazar in p o w er, h ad b e e n th e o riz e d by a n u m b e r o f th e so-called ilustres colonials, distinguished colonial thinkers. For A ntonio Ennes, for

instance, th e “natural laziness o f A fricans” should be fought through the tran sfo rm atio n o f lab o r in to a legal obligation. This philosophy is the basis o f the abject indigenato system , w hich divided the colonial society in to tw o g ro u p s, th e “civilized” and th e “natives”. In th e P o rtu g u ese colonies, th e civilized only acco u n ted for one p e rc e n t o f the p o p u la­ tio n . They w ere considered to have com parable levels o f cultu re and k n o w led g e to th e P o rtu g u e se an d w e re accordingly g ra n te d by th e state rights only citizens could enjoy. T he rem aining population did n o t benefit from any rig h ts, for th e sim ple reason th at, according to racist laws, they did n o t have “th e know ledge, th e habits and social p re su p ­ positions necessary for the full application o f the private and public law o f P o rtu g u ese citizens.” In the thinking o f C abral, shatterin g th e wall o f silence m e an t sepa­ rating th e m yths o f P o rtu g u ese colonialism in A frica from the reality. For as C abral suggests, P o rtu g u ese colonialism d e p en d ed to a great ex ten t on m aintaining th e m ythology around it. In the 1930s, p atern al­ ism, w ith its D arw inian u n d erto n es, was the co rn ersto n e o f Portuguese colon ialism , claim ing th a t w ith o u t E u ro p e ’s in te rv e n tio n , A fricans w e re c o n d e m n e d to stag n atio n , if n o t to b a rb a rity and e x tin c tio n . Later, however, this fram ew ork could n o longer be justified, as in m any p a rts o f th e c o n tin e n t A fricans w e re engaged in adm in isterin g th e ir ow n co u n tries. It was in this c o n te x t th at th e th eo ries o f the Brazilian sociologist G ilb e rto Freyre gave n e w life to P o rtu g u ese colonialism th ro u g h th e creatio n o f a n ew m yth— that o flu so -tro p icalism . For Freyre, Brazil was a unique society in th e w o rld and its fo rm a ­ tio n was a re su lt o f the sm o o th blending o f different elem en ts, nam ely the African, the native Indian, and particularly the Portuguese, w ho had co n trib u te d th e ir affectionate and m alleable character. T he outcom e o f this, Freyre argued, was n o t only the establishm ent o f a racially diverse society, b u t also th e creatio n o f a m ild er colonial process, if com pared 82

SH A TTERIN G T H E WALLS O F SILENCE to o th e r te rrito rie s in the A m ericas colonized by th e Spanish, French, British, and D u tc h .T h e Portuguese Estado Novo saw in F reyre’s w ork an o p p o rtu n ity to repackage th e P o rtu g u ese presen ce in A frica. Freyre him self was invited to travel th ro u g h P o rtu g u ese colonies and w rite a b o u t th e colonial e x p e rie n c e in A frica, w h ich he diligently did in books such as Aventura e Kotina (A dventure and R o u tin e). H e argues th at even if th e P o rtu g u ese w ere n o t “m ixing racially” as they did in Brazil, they w ere still blending culturally. W ith th e Estado Novo’s ap p ro ­ p riatio n o f the co n cep t o f luso-tropicalism , colonial propaganda w ent even fu rth e r than Freyre him self to m ake th e case for the existence of a m ultiracial society in the colonies. C o u n te rin g lu so -tro p icalism th eo retically w as p robably th e m o st serio u s c o n c e rn am o n g th e se n atio n alists, fo r living in Lisbon they could sense th e e x te n t to w hich p ractice diverged from propaganda. M ario de A ndrade, u n d e r the pseudonym o f Buanga Fele, had already addressed this issue for Presence Ajricaine. A ndrade did n o t only d em o l­ ish F rey re’s arg u m en t in Casa Grande and Sanzala, b u t he also accused the Brazilian sociologist o f selling his w o rk to the P ortuguese regim e. In the p am p h let, C abral also takes up th e critiq u e o flu so -tro p icalism , w riting that w hile the presence o f the Portuguese in Africa had resulted in som e racial diversity, it was m o re talked ab o u t than real. For racial m iscegenation had sto p p ed in th e early 1920s w ith th e m igration to Africa o f large con tin g en ts o f m e tro p o lita n w hites. H ence, the n u m ­ bers w ere m anifestly in ferio r to w hat was claim ed in propaganda: out o f 10 m illio n in h ab itan ts in A ngola and M o zam b iq ue, only 6 0 ,0 0 0 appeared in the census as m ixed race, w hich co rresp o n d ed to less than 1 p e r c e n t o f th e p o p u la tio n . In his a tte m p t to exp lain P o rtu g u ese colonialism , P erry A nderson w ro te th at in th e year 1958 in Angola, only one m arriage b etw een a w hite m an and a black w om an had taken place, a situation th a t co u ld n o t be co m p ared even to th at o f South Africa during aparth eid , but m o re closely resem bled that o f the racially segregated states o f Mississippi and Alabama. Separating m yth from reality equally m e a n t d enouncing the false­ hoods o flu so -tro p ic a lism . For as Cabral a tte m p te d to d em o n strate, in all o f P o rtu g al’s colonies, racism was hypocritically p racticed, w ith the P o rtu g u e se ju stifying th e ir p e rm a n e n t p re se n c e in A frica by th e ir “capacity” to m ix w ith black p eople and fo rm a m ultiracial com m unity. 83

A M ILCA R CABRAL This w as, o f course, a fallacy, b u t n o netheless it was a significant factor in P ortuguese colonial policy. In th e colonies w ith a significant w hite p o p u la tio n , such as A ngola and M o zam b iq u e, th e re w e re cinem as, cafes, and re sta u ra n ts exclusively fre q u e n te d by w hites. M ixed-race couples w e re laughed a t and few w o u ld show them selves in public. P erry A nderson added th at in hospitals, w h ite and black people stayed in separate w ards, and hotels only gave jobs to w hites. T he P ortuguese politician A lm eida Santos tells in his m em o irs o f an episode in w hich, during a trip to M ozam bique as a m e m b e r o f the academ ic choir Orfeao Academico de Coimbra, he refused to go to a ball h o sted by the generalgovern o r because tw o m ixed-race sisters o f his colleagues w ere refused entry. H ow ever, as C abral also h in ted , th e m o re pervasive and subtle fo rm o f discrim ination was econom ic. W ages for m o st black people did n o t g ra n t th em sufficient incom e to use public tra n sp o rt regularly o r to re n t a house in cen tral u rb an areas. If colonialism in all its form s and m anifestations was condem nable— an undisputed n o tio n in m o st o f the civilized w orld— Portuguese co lo ­ nialism , according to C abral, wras even m o re so, as P ortugal was n o t even equipped to colonize. T he survival o f colonialism was anchored in the artificial differentiation b etw een th e colonizers and the colonized. Privileges w ere d istrib u ted on that basis.T he colonized population was deprived o f political and civic rights unless they could transition to the in term e d ia ry level o f assimilado. H ow ever, in o rd e r for this to happen, the applicant had to prove econom ic stability, conditions o f habitability, the capacity to pay taxes, and p ro o f o f m ilitary service. W ith a n o te o f irony, Cabral asserts th at had these regulations applied in continental Portu g al, half th e P o rtu g u ese w ould n o t qualify as assimilado. For he concludes, “if P ortugal could have a civilizing influence over any p e o ­ ple, it w o u ld be a kind o f m iracle. C olonialism , a dying p h e n o m en o n , has never d ep en d ed o n m iracles to survive.” In th is d o c u m e n t, C ab ral c o u ld u se th e in fo rm a tio n h e h im se lf g a th e re d d u rin g th e tim e he sp e n t in A frica, as w ell as m any o th e r sources o f in fo rm a tio n con d em n in g P o rtu g a l’s p ractice w ith the same v eh em en ce. For d ata o n th e la b o r q u e stio n in A ngola, C abral used H en riq u e G alvao’s explosive re p o r t, w hose in fo rm ation was collected d u rin g his tim e as colonial in sp e c to r and re p re se n ta tiv e fo r Angola in th e N ational Assembly, in 1947. Galvao was n o t the first to d en ounce 84

SH A TTERIN G T H E WALLS O F SILENCE such p ractices, and his d o c u m e n t cam e in a long tra d itio n o f fo reig n ­ e rs d en o u n c in g p o o r, if n o t c rim in a l, la b o r co n d itio n s in th e P o rtu g u ese colonies. G alvao’s re p o r t is still in a way q u ite c o n stru c ­ tive, for he argues th a t labor cond itio n s in A ngola w ere the m ain re a ­ son for A ngolans to m ig rate to C ongo o r Z am bia, w h ere they could receive b e tte r salaries. Those w ho stayed in A ngola w ere sim ply c o n ­ d em n e d to m a ln u tritio n and physical decay, w hich was the cause o f the high ra te o f child m ortality. W hile clearly stating the p ro b lem o f colonial ex p lo itatio n , C ab ral’s d o c u m en t was to o vague in te rm s o f w hat was being d one in o rd e r to im prove th e situation th at he was denouncing. His p am p h let The Facts About Portugal’s African Colonies, for exam ple, states that it is presenting

the positio n o f organizations fighting against P o rtu g u ese colonialism , b u t these organizations are n ev er n am ed. H e also m en tio n s his desire for a peaceful reso lu tio n to the colonial situation: force was only to be used if P ortugal refu sed to n eg o tiate the rig h t o f se lf-d e term in atio n , in o rd e r to “assist th e p e o p le s r e p re s e n te d ” by th e nationalists. H ow ever, he did n o t give any explan atio n fo r w h at w as m e a n t by the “use o f fo rc e ”. Bv th e n , C abral was aw are th a t his tim e o f ano n y m ity was over. Before the publication o f Facts, he gave a press co n ference in L ondon, the c o n te n t o f w h ich was b ro ad cast by som e in te rn a tio n a l agencies and p ick e d u p by so m e jo u rn a ls o f re fe re n c e , such as th e F ren ch n e w sp ap er Le M onde. T h e re su lts w ere im m ed iate, asV iriato da C ru z en th u siastic a lly c o m m e n ts in a le tte r: “th e p re ss c o n fe re n c e A bel (A m ilcar C ab ral) gave w as b ro a d c a st by n e w s ag encies across th e w o rld . It m ade th e new s in the Congos and N igeria. In sh o rt, the case has a larm ed th e P o rtu g u e se .” C abral was rig h t to p o in t o u t that w hile th e echo o f the press c o n ­ ference did n o t have any im p act in th e P ortuguese press— its c o n ten t w as obviously n o t cited in any o f th e P o rtu g u e se n ew sp ap ers— the secret police was paying a tten tio n . W hile the PIDE had n o t been able to prove th a t C abral was involved in subversive activities du rin g his tim e as a stu d en t in Lisbon, things changed after London. A few m onths after his in te rv e n tio n in L ondon, on 30 July 1960, the PIDE p roduced an extensive re p o rt u n d er the title “Subversive Activities in Africa .’’The p olice had fo u n d o u t th a t C ab ral, a g ro n o m ist and m e m b e r o f the 85

AM ILCA R CABRAL FRAIN, had b een involved in the b ru ta l events o f Bissau, the massacres o f Pidgiguiti in 1959. T h e r e p o r t ad d ed th a t C ab ral, on his way to Lisbon, had visited n u m e ro u s A frican c o u n trie s, such as th e Belgian C ongo, G hana, th e R epublic o f C ongo, Senegal, and the R epublic o f G uinea. T hese trip s, according to the re p o rt, w ere p a rt o f a strategy to convince A frican and A sian c o u n trie s to tak e a p o sitio n against P ortuguese colonialism , since all these co u n tries had, o r w ere about to have, seats in th e G eneral Assem bly o f th e U n ited N ations. In L ondon A m ilcar C abral had accom plished a n u m b e r o f things, personally and in te rm s o f his nationalist activism . H e had clarified his position, since he was no longer w orking for th e colonial state, and had fully taken on his revolutionary status. In this way, at least tem porarily, he had also freed him self from the w eight o f family responsibilities that could lim it his m ov em en ts. M o re im p o rtan tly , he had tap p e d in to a diplom atic possibility, by conceiving o f h im self and the organizations he re p re se n te d as an in te rlo c u to r in th e process o f negotiations w ith P ortugal for in d ep en d en ce. For th e re st o f his life he w ould favor this so lu tio n , even if th e P o rtu g u e se colonial e m p ire only cam e d o w n throu g h a p ro tra c te d colonial w ar and revolution.

5

A UNITED FRONT

A fter a s h o rt stay in L o n d o n , b e tw e e n F e b ru a ry and M arch 1960, C abral finally r e tu rn e d to A frica. H e se ttle d in C onakry, the capital city ol the recen tly lib erated G uinea-C onakry, w hich was u n d er the leadership o f A hm ed Sekou Toure. H e cam e w ith the m ission o f setting up a base for his party, th e PAIGC, and was largely o p eratin g u n d e r th e auspices o f th e FR A IN , alon g sid e A ngolan n atio n alists such as M ario P in to de A n d rad e and V iriato da C ru z , w ho re p re se n te d the MPLA. In these first years o f nationalist activities, C ab ral’s operations to o k place in th e tw o c o u n trie s b o rd e rin g G uinea-B issau: G uineaC onakry and Senegal, especially in the cities o f C onakry and Dakar. T hese places d e m a n d e d d ifferen t strateg ies fo r m obilization. In the Guinea o f Sekou Toure— w hich w ould later becom e one o f the bloodi­ est dictato rsh ip s on th e en tire c o n tin e n t, w h ere only the laws o f force and naked po w er prevailed— Cabral installed the m o v em en t’s m ilitary u n its and civilian serv ices. T h e Senegal o f S en g h o r— w h ic h had a p o litic al sy stem w ith so m e sem b lan ce o f d em o cracy , d esp ite its flaws— w ould be used by Cabral as a p la tfo rm for actions o f a m o re h u m anitarian and civic n atu re. Cabral had settled in C onakry w ith th e ex p ectatio n o f a jo b at the M inistry o f R ural Economy. G uinea by th e n had been d ep leted o f its skilled labor force. Since G uinea had been th e only F rench colony to o p t o u t o f the Francophone federation, France, as Irving M arkovitz has 87

A M ILCAR CABRAL w ritte n , “tru e to h e r pro m ise, eradicated h er p resence to the e x te n t o f pulling te lep h o n es off th e walls and m edicines o u t o f th e hospitals.” Suddenly, G uinea was dep riv ed o f teach ers in m o st secondary schools, as w ell as qualified clerks and d o cto rs. To alleviate the pressure, Toure op en ed th e c o u n try up to massive foreign aid. Leftist intellectuals and techn o crats from E urope, and to a lesser e x te n t from Africa, m oved to G uinea to fill th e available p ositions. M aria H elena, w h o had finally jo in e d h e r h u sb an d , alongside th e ir d au g h ter, fo u n d a jo b as a high school teacher. Although the couple had reconciled after Paris, C abral’s m arriage to M aria H elen a w o u ld n o t last m u c h longer. C abral p ersu a d ed M aria H elena to settle in R abat, M oro cco after she becam e p re g n an t w ith th e ir second daughter. T he idea was th at she w ould benefit from b e tte r health care in Rabat. H ow ever, w hen Ana Luisa was b o rn , on 14 August 1962, Cabral m ade no effo rt to re u n ite his family. A ccording to Luis C abral, having M aria H elen a in R ab at w as n o t only c o n v en ie n t fo r Cabral him self, b u t for the p a rty as w ell, as this allow ed its leader to spend tim e outside o f C onakry and develop w ork th at dem anded co n ­ c e n tra tio n , w h ile enjoying th e co m p an y o f his family. Even th o u g h C a b ra l’s m a rria g e had b e e n in crisis since he had d ec id ed to leave Lisbon, Luis, very generously, assum ed responsibility for th e separa­ tion: “[W Jhen taking such a decision [im plying th at th e decision was in a way collectively taken], w e did n o t take in to account the pro fo u n d links o f Lena [M aria H elena] w ith th e struggle w hich she had shared from th e beginning.” Living in d ifferen t c o u n trie s, C abral and M aria H elen a began to gradually g ro w a p a rt personally, as w ell as politically. M aria H elena found h e r o w n way, w orking alongside o th e r P o rtuguese refugees in R abat against the dictato rsh ip o f Salazar. T he couple form ally divorced in 1966, although in C ab ral’s intim ate circle o f friends th e re w ere still those w ho trie d to salvage th e m arriag e by proposing, for instance, a ro m an tic trip to th e Soviet U nion. But it was to o late and, at the end o f th a t year, C abral m a rrie d A na M aria Voss e Sa, originally fro m G uinea, w ho had studied in Czechoslovakia w ith financial su p p o rt from the PAIGC. * * *

88

A U N IT E D F R O N T In tr u th , C abral w as n o t th e first n a tio n a list fro m th e M AC w h o sought to organize G uineans aro u n d a n atio n alist p ro je c t. H ugo de M enezes had p re c e d e d C abral, as C abral w rite s a couple o f decades late r w hen rem in iscin g about his re c e p tio n in C onakry. D e M enezes, a d o c to r from SaoT om e w ho had g ro w n up in A ngola, studied m e d i­ cine in Lisbon and b ecam e a n atio n alist b e fo re m oving to L ondon. D isparagingly, C abral adds th a t he th en m oved to C onakry, w h ere he o rg an iz ed th e first n a tio n a list cells in th a t A frican co u n try . W h e n C abral arriv ed , he was re fe rre d to in radio an n o u n cem en ts as the first to launch th e “c o rn e rs to n e for lib eratio n .” H e was invited to various events in celeb ratio n o f his arrival, w ith long speeches and beer, o rg a­ n ized by th e so called M ovim ento de Liberta^ao dos Territorios sob Domininagao Portuguesel (M ovem ent for the L iberation o f the T erritories

U n d e r P o rtu g u ese D o m in an ce), a subsidiary o f the MAC in Conakry. C abral in tro d u c e d h im self as th e g e n e ra l-se cre ta ry o f th e PAIGC, a p a rty fo rm e d in th e in te r io r o f G u in ea, an d o p e n to every fellow c o u n try m a n in te re s te d in w o rk in g fo r th e in d e p e n d e n c e o f this P o rtu g u ese colony. W hile th e PAICG was n o t th e first political fo rm atio n to appear in G uinea-C onakry, in less than th re e years, Cabral m anaged n o t only to n eutralize all existing political fo rm atio n s in th e neig h boring country, b u t also to tra n sfo rm his m o v em en t in to th e only nationalist fo rm a ­ tio n th at was in tern atio n ally recog n ized . H ow did this happen? W h at stra te g ie s did C ab ral use? T h e u n ity b e tw e e n C ap e V erdeans and G uineans, w hich w ould later b ecom e th e p a rty ’s A chilles’ heel, was at th at tim e one o f its biggest advantages in co m p ariso n to o th e r n a tio n ­ alist m ovem ents. C ab ral’s position was that th e PAIGC should n o t only fight for the lib eratio n o f th e tw o c o u n trie s , G uinea and C ape V erde— as som e o ther form ations w ould also p u t forw ard— but that once independence had been achieved, they should co n stitu te a single country. For Cabral, this unity was anchored in tw o sets o f argum ents, one m ore fundam en­ tal, represen tin g the em b o d im en t o f a historical process, and the o ther m o re co n tin g en t and provisional. Cape Verdeans w ere the p ro d u c t o f th e slave tra d e insofar as its p o p u la tio n w as fo rm e d by slaves taken from W est A frica, particu larly G uinea. In this way, unity as a political ta c tic seem ed so self-ev id en t to h im th a t he did n o t m ake any real

AM ILCA R CABRAL effort to justify o r th eo rize it. This lack o f explanation is interesting, p articu larly in th e c o n te x t o f his a tte m p ts to explain so m any o th e r questions, such as th e p ro b lem o f class and the relationship betw een cultu re and th e struggle for national liberation, am ong others. But unity for C abral also had a m o re circu m stantial and co n tin g en t m eaning. W h e n C abral was m aking th e case for the in d ep en d en ce ol G uinea and Cape Verde, unity was an A frican catchw ord. In the 1960s, as Luis C abral n o te d , th e slogan “A frica m u st u n ite” was very popular. F irst used by K w am e N k ru m a h , it was th e n ad o p ted as the slogan o f th e O rg an izatio n o f A frican U nity (O A U ). F u rth e rm o re , in 1960, in the afterm ath o f in d ep en d en ce, various African co u n tries w ere e x p e r­ im en tin g w ith th e m o re o r less e p h e m e ra l fo rm a tio n o f c o n fe d era­ tio n s, such as Senegal and M ali, o r G hana and G uinea-C onakry. As such, envisioning th e u n ity o f th e tw o fu tu re A frican states, G uineaBissau and C ape V erde, was a way to m ake an “im p o rta n t and original c o n trib u tio n to A frican unity,” as Luis C abral w ro te . H ence, in these years, it was n o t hard for C abral to m ake th e political and diplom atic case for unity. W ith this in m in d , Cabral envisioned th e creatio n o f a m o v em en t w h ic h w o u ld b rin g to g e th e r G u in e a n and C ape V erdean m ilita n ts alike. Since th e re w ere a n u m b e r o f in cip ien t nationalist organizations o p eratin g in these c o u n trie s, he a tte m p te d to e ith e r create u m b rella organizations to include all these fo rm atio n s, o r to im pose his PAIGC as such an organization. H e had te ste d this tech n iq u e before in 1959 w hen he fou n d ed th e Frente de Libertagao da Guine (G uinean L iberation F ro n t— FL G ), w hich in p ractice had b e e n an effo rt to en list Rafael B arb o sa’s p e o p le in to th e ran k s o f th e PA IG C. To this e n d , o n 1 N o v e m b e r 196 0 , C ab ral o rg an ized a m e e tin g o f th e e p h e m e ra l M ovim ento de Libertagao da Guine e de Cabo Verde (M o v e m e n t fo r th e

L ib e ra tio n o f G u in ea an d C ap e V erde— M L G C V ). F o u n d ed in Conakry, this organization was n o t an affiliate o f the PAIGC, b u t o f the FLG. M em b ers o f th e ex ecutive c o m m itte e in clu d ed , in addition to Cabral him self, A rm ando Ram os, A driano A raujo, R ichard Turpin, and Inacio da Silva. In Senegal, the strategy o f unity was n o t m uch different. From 12 to 14 July 1961, th e PAIGC (this tim e as the M LG CV ) called a m eeting w ith various o th er nationalist groups, such as the FLGC o f H enri Labery 90

A U N IT E D F R O N T and o th er less im p o rta n t ones, such as the U D C and the UPG, w hich w ere satellites of the PAIGC. The Movimento de Libertagao da Guine (MLG) refused to take p a rt in this m eeting. At the end o f the m eeting, the Frente Unida de Libertagao (U n ited Liberation F ro n t, FUL) was fo rm ed as an

organization defining itself as a political structure open to all trade unions and mass organizations o f Guinea and Cape Verde. W hereas in G uinea, Cabral had only n eed ed the favor o f President Toure to illegalize organizations w hich w e re n o t sym pathetic to the PAIGC, things w ere different in Senegal. T h ere, p eople had the free­ dom to engage in political activities, and uniting all nationalists behind the sam e p ro je c t was m o re difficult. Senghor him self did n o t su p p o rt the PAIGC openly, p re fe rrin g nationalist organizations th at p rio ritized the search for peaceful solutions instead o f the use o f violence. By this tim e, th e PIDE had already infiltrated these g roups, and the activities o f C abral w e re carefully m o n ito re d . A ccording to th e Portuguese consulate in Dakar, C ab ral’s in te n tio n was to im pose the PAIGC on o th e r forces, an easy task given th e ir em bryonic state o f being. A n u m b e r o f th em existed in nam e only and did n o t have any form of organized stru ctu re. The MLGCV, for exam ple, was in practice fo rm ed by only th ree m em b ers, nam ely H enri Labery, V icente Co, and Lopes da Silva. T h e M LG had split and alm o st all th e m em b e rs had been dism issed.T he U D C had essentially ceased to exist. And the RDG virtually disap p eared w h en its lead er D o u d o u Seydi was p u t in jail. C abral’s strategy in m eetings w ith these nationalists, according to the consulate, was to fo ster open discussions in w hich these organizations w ere criticized, so that the m em b ers them selves p roposed “the enlight­ ening idea o f organizing a new party.” W hile C abral was seeking to politically u n ite the nationalist forces to fight co lo n ialism , P o rtu g a l w as n atu rally w o rk in g to w ard s th e rev erse, using alm o st th e sam e strateg y w ith a different o u tc o m e in m ind. For the P ortuguese, unity b etw een G uineans and Cape Verdeans was a w eak link to be ex p lo ited . In th e years 1960—3, the P ortuguese consulate in D akar sp en t a g reat deal o f tim e re p o rtin g on this issue, using in fo rm a tio n g leaned by th e P ID E ’s in fo rm an ts. In a re p o rt to Lisbon, for exam ple, an agent, seem ingly p reo ccu p ied , dem o n strated that the Cape V erdeans w ere opposed to “th e plans o f Cabral,” and that th ey in fact p re fe rre d to m ain tain th e ir links w ith P o rtu g al. A nd if 91

A M ILCAR CABRAL C abral adam an tly tr ie d to p u sh fo rw a rd his p ro je c t, th e d o c u m e n t adds, th e re w o u ld certain ly be a “w ar o f e x te rm in a tio n .” T h e re w as also v e h e m e n t o p p o sitio n to C a b ra l’s case b ey o n d P ortugal. In fact, th e m ajo rity o f C ape V erdeans in these A frican cities w e re o p p o se d to unity. T h e C ap e V erdean n a tio n al Jose L eitao da G ra^a was o n e o f th e m o st v eh em en t and o u tsp o k en enem ies o f the unification o f G uinea and C ape Verde. H e had w o rk ed as a p re se n te r an d tra n s la to r fo r R ad io G hana since 1957 an d , a cco rd in g to th e P o rtu g u ese, was involved in a cam paign against P ortu g u ese co lo n ial­ ism . In 1962, he and C abral m e t in his house to discuss th e pro s and cons o f unity. C abral trie d to convince h im o f the econom ic advan­ tages o f th e p ro je c t, w h ich , fo r L eitao da G ra 9 a, did n o t m ake any sense. C ape V erdeans, he re sp o n d e d , had b een agents o f colonialism since th e very b eginning, and to p ro p o se a unification o f the tw o t e r ­ rito rie s was ra th e r far-fetched. Cabral c o u n te re d th at the arg u m en t of rivalry b e tw e e n th e tw o peop les was a thing o f th e past and th a t the p a rty had b e e n w o rk in g to build aw areness o f this in th e po p u latio n . H ow ever, n o th in g d e te r r e d L eitao da G ra^a. As tim e p assed , h e becam e m o re and m o re o p p o sed to th e plans o f C abral and did every­ th in g he c o u ld to sto p th e m . W h e n h e w as d ism issed fro m R adio G hana, allegedly after th e in te rv e n tio n o f C abral, he m oved to D akar and fro m th e r e he tr ie d to an im a te his U P IC V — a p o litica l p a rty fo u n d e d by C ap e V erdeans in R h o d e Island, U SA— to b e c o m e th e p rin c ip a l face o f a n o th e r cam p aig n against th e PA IG C , accusing C a b ra l’s p a rty o f b rib in g p e o p le in to jo in in g th e m . * * * T he year o f 1960 has com e to be k n o w n as th e year o f A frica. A t least six teen c o u n trie s in A frica w ould b eco m e sovereign nations. In tern al dynam ics w ere certain ly d ictating th e tra n sfe r o f p o w er fro m colonial em pires to local elites, b u t influencing this process w ere also im p o r­ ta n t d e v elo p m en ts in d ip lo m acy and in te rn a tio n a l law. Even befo re the end o f W orld W ar II, th e A m erican P resid en t Franklin D. Roosevelt and th e B ritish P rim e M in iste r W in s to n C h u rc h ill had signed th e A tlan tic C h a rte r w h ic h , in o n e o f its p o in ts, d e c la re d th e rig h t o f p eo p les to choose th e ir ow n fo rm o f g o v e rn m e n t. This p rin cip le was later re ite ra ted in San Francisco, in the U n ited States, du rin g a co n fer­ 92

A U N IT E D F R O N T ence hostin g all rep resen tativ es o f the free w o rld fo r the creation o f th e U N in M ay 1945. R atified by at least fifty sta te s, th e C h a rte r e n sh rin ed in its A rticle 73 th e system o f in te rn a tio n a l tu telag e, advis­ ing the in te rn a tio n a l p o w ers o r colonizing c o u n trie s to facilitate p ro ­ g ressive m oves to w a rd s au to n o m y , o r even in d e p e n d e n c e , fo r th e te rrito rie s u n d e r th e ir co n tro l. This w atersh ed m o m e n t was n o t a g ift from the colonial pow ers to the so o n -to -b e in d e p e n d e n t nations. Far from it. M any organizations and rep resen tativ es, som e o f th em from co u n tries th at w ould later be called the “T h ird W o rld ,” had b een lobbying for th e ad o p tio n o f such a p rin cip le. Leading th e delegation o f the N ational A ssociation for the A dvancem ent o f C olored People (N A A CP), W illiam D u Bois attended the San Francisco co n feren ce, as p a rt th e fo rty -six n on -g o v ern m en tal o rg an izatio n s th a t m ad e u p th e U n ite d States d ele g atio n . B etw een press conferences, d in n ers, and the d istrib u tin g p am phlets, these indi­ viduals cam paigned am ong th e delegates o f pow erfu l nations for “the right o f d e p e n d e n t p eople to govern them selves” to be included in the fo unding U N C h a rte r. Vijaya P an d it, Jaw aharlal N e h r u ’s sister, was also in stru m e n ta l in this p ro je c t. In h e r suite at th e F airm o n t H o tel, d elegates from c o u n trie s such as E thiopia, V ietnam , Egypt, Liberia, and Indonesia, o ften m e t to discuss strategies. For D u Bois, it was particularly im p o rta n t to have contributed to the inclusion o f the principle o f sovereignty in the U N C harter. As his biog­ rap h er David Lewis w rites, he had achieved the inclusion o f “black co n ­ sciousness in the international law.” Since th e early 1900s, D u Bois had been arguing that the participation o f African Am ericans in the American civil w ar was a betrayal o f them selves, in th e sense th at they had n o t been com pensated w ith any political rights afterw ards. It was n o t coin­ cidental that D u Bois had joined the Senegalese-born u n d ersecretary o f state for the French colonies, Blaise Diagne, in organizing the First PanAfrican C ongress in 1919. As High C om m issioner for the African troops d u rin g W W I, D iagne had re c ru ite d m o re than 8 0 ,0 0 0 soldiers from Africa to th e F rench army. T h e C ongress to o k place o n 19 February 1919 and b ro u g h t to g e th e r fifty-seven delegates, o f w hom tw elve w ere rep resen tativ es o f nine A frican covin trie s, six teen re p re se n te d th e U nited States, and tw en ty -o n e the C aribbean. All these delegates w ere soldiers and m e t in Paris for the Peace C onference, w hich was used as 93

AM ILCA R CABRAL an op p o rtu n ity for delegates from so on-to-be in d ependent countries to argue for self-determ ination. D u Bois and D iagne saw this m eeting as a way to claim m o re rights for th e people these veterans rep resen ted for th eir p articipation in the w ar o f E uropean nations. How ever, th e union b etw een A frican A m ericans, such as D u Bois, and Africans from the F rench colonies, such as D iagne, was sh o rt lived. In the Second C ongress, in 1921, w hich to o k place over th ree sessions (in London, Brussels, and Paris), D iagne sought to dissociate him self from D u Bois. By th en , he had political responsibilities in the French go v ern m en t and D u Bois’ positions w ere seen as to o radical and c o m ­ m unist. As th e C ongress chair, Diagne p roclaim ed th at F rench blacks did n o t w a n t in d ep en d en ce, b u t ra th e r w an te d to th e ir co u n tries to develop a system o f association w ith F rance. This was to be acco m ­ plished th ro u g h political refo rm s o f th e colonial system . In fact, after the F irst W o rld W ar, France had abolished fo rced labor, p u t in place tribunals, and co nsecrated th e rig h t o f association and free union in its colonies. In th e F ren ch p a rlia m e n t, d ozens o f re p re sen tativ es w ere originally fro m th e A frican colonies. As discussed earlier, the th ird edition o f th e C ongress to o k place in London, w ith one o f the sessions held in Lisbon, and no longer counted on the p articip atio n o f th e F rancophone Africans. By the tim e o f the F o u rth C ongress, w hich to o k place in 1927 in N ew York, the claims u n d erp in n in g political com pensation for African veterans w ere already fading. It was only eig h teen years later, w ith th e organization o f the Fifth C ongress in 1945 in M anchester, th at pan-A fricanism re tu rn e d to the fore o f th e discussions. A ccounting fo r this was th a t a new g e n era­ tio n o f A fricans— w ho w ould later be called the fathers o f in d e p e n ­ dence— was politically com ing o f age. T hese included leaders such as Jom o K enyatta from Kenya, Abafem i Aw olow o from N igeria, W allace Jo h n so n fro m S ierra L eone, H astings Banda fro m N yasaland (late r M alaw i), an d , m o st p ro m in e n t o f th e m all, K w am e N k ru m a h from Ghana, w ho dedicated a substantial p a rt o f his tim e as p re sid e n t to the p ro jec t o f African unity and th e establishm ent o f th e O rganization o f A frican U n ity (O A U ). T h e fact th a t th e M a n c h e ste r C o ngress to o k place m onths after the U N C onference in San Francisco allow ed the A frican d eleg ates to use th e C h a rte r to s u p p o rt th e ir dem an d s fo r national sovereignty. 94

A U N IT E D F R O N T T he ad o p tio n o f A rticle 73 o f th e U N C h a rte r w as a m ove w ith unpredictab le and unforeseen consequences. It is tru e th at it cam e in response to th e aspirations o f a n u m b e r o f p eople w ho w ere striving for self-d eterm in atio n , b u t it also provided a rationale and a justifica­ tio n fo r th e fo rm a tio n o f n atio n -states. A fricans, and p a rticu la rly L usophone A fricans, co u ld n o w rely o n in te rn a tio n al law to b o lster th e ir aspirations for freed o m . As P ortugal was p rep arin g to join the organization, it could n o t avoid recognizing such principles. For d ip lo ­ m atic Portugal, it seem ed easy to dem o n strate that the country was not a colonial pow er. P o rtu g a l re p e a le d th e C olonial A ct in 1951, and th ro u g h a sem an tic legal a rra n g e m e n t, “co lo n ies” b ecam e “overseas provinces,” and th e “P ortuguese Colonial E m pire” was tu rn e d into the “P ortu g u ese O verseas E m p ire”. All th e colonial legislation was su b ­ sum ed into the Portuguese C onstitution u n d er T itle VII “O f Portuguese O verseas .’’T he rationale for such changes was to persuade the in te rn a ­ tional com m unity that Portugal was n o t a colonial em pire, b u t a nation divided across different continents. Portugal was only ad m itted into the UN in 1955, after alm ost ten years o f unsuccessful attem p ts. T he Soviet U nion had used its pow er ol veto in the Security C ouncil at least ten tim es to p revent the admission o f Portugal. As a m e m b e r o f th e organization, the Salazar regim e ini­ tially enjoyed a p eaceful co u p le o f years, b u t in 1960, th e fifteenth G eneral Assembly o f th e U N approved reso lu tio n 1 514 on the conces­ sion o f in d e p e n d e n c e to co lonized c o u n trie s and p eo p les, and p r o ­ claim ed the “the necessity o f b ringing to a speedy and unconditional en d colonialism in all its fo rm s and m an ifestatio n s.” D esp ite all o f P o rtu g a l’s diplom atic efforts and constitu tio n al changes, for the UN, the co u n try possessed and d o m inated au tonom ous te rrito rie s and n o t overseas provinces. By going against th e o rd e rs o f th e U N , P o rtu g al was positioning itself against the free w orld. Things w ere changing rapidly on this front. By th e late 1940s and in to th e early 1950s, m any events o c c u rre d w h ich sug g ested to even th e m o st skeptical th a t colonialism was b e co m in g an anom aly. Take 1947 fo r ex am p le, w h en India becam e in d ep en d en t u n d e r th e leadership o f Jaw aharlal N e h ru . M ore signifi­ cantly, in 1954, France was forced o u t of Indochina after being defeated m ilitarily by th e guerrillas. These events show ed for the first tim e that 95

AMILCAR CABRAL m ighty colonial arm ies could be defeated on m ilitary grounds. Still n o t convinced, and to avoid a re p e a t o f Indochina, France deployed a sig­ nificant m ilitary presen ce to A lgeria to suppress th e m ilitary in su rre c ­ tion o f a few thousand insurgents w hich had begun in N ovem ber 1954. By m id -1955, fo rm e r colonies w ere leading th e international cam ­ paign for th e end o f colonialism . In A pril 1954, various Asian countries, such as B u rm a, C eylon, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, m e t at the C o lo m b o C o n feren ce, p re p a rin g th e w ay fo r th e fam ous B andung C o n feren ce (18—24 A pril 1956). Besides th e delegations fro m Asian co u n trie s, a n u m b e r o f A frican c o u n trie s also p a rticip ated . T hese included Egypt, o n e o f th e m ain organizers, Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, and Sudan (the only in d ep en d en t nations in Africa at th at tim e), as well as the G old C oast (later Ghana)— w hose independence was scheduled for the follow ing year— and Algeria, Tunisia and M orocco, as observers. Taken together, m o re than 1.35 billion p eople w ere re p re se n ted by the countries p re se n t at Bandung. M ore significantly, these countries chose n o t to take sides in the polarized w orld that came about in the afterm ath ofW W II. As such, they fo rm ed a non-aligned m ovem ent w hich becam e a third force in th e C old War, d epicted as being based upon resp ect for the sovereignty o f its m em b ers and u p o n m utual assistance. In an a tte m p t to keep up w ith these tran sfo rm ative events, France accelerated th e fo rm atio n o f a union b etw een th e m e tro p o le and its colonies th ro u g h w hat was know n as ‘association’. But n o thing could p rev en t th e o u tb reak o f w ar in A lgeria, plunging France in to a serious political crisis. T he g o v e rn m e n t was dissolved, and France called on fo rm e r h ero G eneral C harles de G aulle to lead th e c o u n try o u t o f the tu rm o il. In this co n te x t, parliam ent p ro d u ced the “Loi D efferre”— also k n o w n as th e R e fo rm A ct— w h ich o ffered F ren ch colonies p artial autonom y, as lo n g as th e y ag re e d th a t France w o u ld still m anage a n u m b e r o f im p o rta n t d o ssiers, such as d efen se, d o m e stic security, m o n etary policy, justice, and diplom acy. As previously discussed, shortly after being inaugurated, de Gaulle decided to personally share th e g o o d new s and em barked on a to u r o f A frica fro m 19 A ugust to 1 S e p te m b e r 1958. In G u in ea, how ever, Sekou Toure refused th e p roposal p re se n te d by th e French presid en t, opening u p th e p ro sp e c t o f decolonization n o t only for his ow n co u n ­ try, b u t also for o th e r F rench colonies in Africa. For this reason G uinea 96

A U N IT E D F R O N T becam e a kind o f “revolutionary M ecca,” offering refuge to a n u m b er o f African nationalists and organizations, including n o t only the PAIGC and the M PLA, b u t also the PAI o f the Senegalese M ajhem out D iop, w h o o p p o sed th e a p p easem en t policy o f Senghor in rela tio n to the French, as well as the U nion o f the Peoples o f C am eroon o f R uben Um N yobe and Felix M oum ie. T he general feeling ab o u t events in Africa in those years was aptly cap tu red by the British P rim e M inister H arold M acm illan, in a speech delivered on 3 February 1960 in the South African parliam ent. W ith his famous declaration that “th e w inds o f change” w ere blow ing across the co n tin en t and his ack n o w led g em en t that the “g ro w th o f national co n ­ sciousness” was a political fact, he m ade clear th at his regim e had no in ten tio n o f standing in th e way o f A frican c o u n tries seeking in d ep e n ­ dence. In the spirit o f these tim es, on 21 January 1961, the Portuguese captain H en riq u e Galvao, a fo rm e r colonial in sp ecto r and re p re se n ta ­ tive for Angola in the N ational Assembly, led a g ro u p o f tw en ty -fo u r reb els to hijack th e P o rtu g u e se ship Santa M aria — on its way fro m C urasao in the C aribbean to P o rt Everglades, Florida. A fter renam ing the ship Santa Liberdade (H oly L ib erty ), Galvao in fo rm ed the w orld, three days later, th at the operation he was leading was p a rt o f the DRIL (Directorio Revolucionario Iberico de Libertagao), com prising P ortuguese

and Spanish d issid en ts, and th a t th e h ijack w as a re v o lu tio n a ry act against the Iberian dictatorships. The group also m entioned that its final destination was A ngola, w h ere they in ten d ed to proclaim an in d ep en ­ d e n t republic. G alvao’s actio n had an e n o rm o u s im p act on in te rn a tio n a l public o p in io n . T h e F re n c h m agazine Paris M atch p a ra c h u te d a jo u rn a list do w n to th e ship to in te rv ie w th e h ijackers. A nd although th e ship later changed c o u rse to Brazil, since Brazilian au th o rities w ere keen to g ra n t political asylum to th e h ijackers, this act was certainly the trig g e r fo r th e b e g in n in g o f n a tio n a list activ ities in A ngola. O n 4 F e b ru a ry 1961, a g ro u p o f y o u th s a rm e d w ith m a c h e te s atta ck e d L uanda’s p risons w ith the aim o f lib erating political p riso n ers. In this a c tio n , c o o rd in a te d by th e p rie s t M an u el das N eves, a n u m b e r o f w h ite p o lic e m e n w e re k illed . In re ta lia tio n , a rm e d se ttle rs to o k revenge by raiding th e slum s o f Luanda and in d iscrim inately shooting black peo p le. Seeking to c o n tro l and take advantage o f these develop­ 97

A M ILCAR CABRAL m en ts, M PLA lead er M ario P in to de A ndrade organized a press c o n ­ ference in C onakry and claim ed responsibility in the nam e o f his p arty fo r b e g in n in g th e an tic o lo n ia l w ar. In th e fo llo w in g m o n th , on 15 M arch , th e UPA o f H o ld e n R o b e rto attack ed p lan tatio n s in th e n o rth e rn p a rt o f th e co u n try and m assacred m o re than 2 ,0 0 0 peo p le, w h ic h again w as fo llo w ed by in d isc rim in a te killings by g ro u p s o f arm e d w hites. C o n fro n te d by these events, P ortu g al was fo rced to act swiftly to save its e m p ire . A d ria n o M o re ira , p ro fe sso r at th e Escola Superior C olonial, C o lo n ial C o lleg e, w as a p p o in te d m in iste r o f colonies. M oreira was th e m o st ren o w n ed specialist in colonial law, and in 1954 he had p re s e n te d as p a r t o f his te n u re e x a m in a tio n a d isse rta tio n called “T h e P riso n P ro b le m O v e rse a s”, having as e x a m in e rs o th e r e x p e rts in colonial law such as M arcelo C aetano and Joaquim Silva e C unha. In th is w o rk , M o re ira a rg u ed th a t P o rtu g u e se colonial law should codify various aspects o f in d ig en o u s c u ltu res and in tro d u c e m oral p recep ts adapted to th e local sensibilities. As such, M oreira was m akin g th e case fo r P o rtu g u e se co lo n ialism to m ove in a d ifferen t d ire c tio n : fro m a co lo n iz a tio n th a t at le a st fo rm a lly a tte m p te d to assim ilate A fricans, to o n e w h ic h w as c o n c e rn e d w ith d ifferences b e tw e e n A fricans and E uropeans. As m in iste r o f th e colo n ies, A driano M o reira was given th e task o f e la b o ra tin g an d c o o rd in a tin g th e n e c e ssa ry p o licies and effo rts to resp o n d to th e u n re st in A ngola. H e was b ehind the idea o f settin g up a body o f a rm e d v o lu n te e rs and advised th e se ttle rs n o t to abandon th e places w h e re th ey lived. O n th e political fro n t, he ch am p io n ed sw eep in g re fo rm s o f th e c o lo n ial law, su ch as th e re p e a l o f th e E statuto do Indigenato, w h ic h b e c a m e law o n 6 S e p te m b e r 1961,

th ro u g h w h ich every p e rso n b o rn in th e P o rtu g a l-d o m in ate d te r r ito ­ ries in A frica w as given P o rtu g u e se citizenship. H e also arg u ed th a t th e colonial crisis co u ld n o t have b e e n a v e rte d and th a t th e so lu tio n should c o n te m p la te au to n o m y o f th e overseas p rovinces for a fu tu re co m m u n ity o f P ortuguese-speaking co u n tries. For him , only the c o n ­ stitu tio n o f a P o rtu g u ese-sp eak in g c o m m u n ity could survive th e end o f th e em p ire.

A U N IT E D F R O N T The first signs o f the disintegration o f the Portuguese em pire w ere seen in Asia, on 18 D ecem b er 1961, w hen a force o f 4 5 ,0 0 0 soldiers o f the Indian U nion occupied th e P ortuguese te rrito rie s o f G oa, D am an and D iu. N e h ru ’s forces m e t little resistance from th e 3 ,5 0 0 ill-equipped P ortuguese soldiers w ho d efen d ed th e reg io n . In his dram atic style, Salazar sent a te le g ra m to th e g o v ern o r-g en eral o f these te rrito rie s , Vassalo e Silva, urging him to fight to the end, sacrificing his troops and killing him self if necessary. For Salazar, th e re w ere tw o ways o f losing a w ar: diplom atically o r politically, w hich was irreversible, o r m ilita r­ ily, w hich was n o t the end o f the story, as it allowed for negotiation and settlem en ts according to in tern atio n al law. For C abral’s gro u p , all o f these events had proved that w ar was not only a leg itim ate m eans to en d colonialism , b u t also, in th e case o f Portugal, the only path to national liberation. A fter the first nationalist uprisings in Angola, a delegation o f the M PLA, com posed o f Lucio Lara andV iriato da C ru z, m e t w ith Cabral and o th e r PAIGC leaders to dis­ cuss the start o f a m ilitary offensive against colonialism in Angola. In the m eeting, V iriato da C ruz, after updating PAIGC m em bers on the devel­ opm ents in A ngola, asked the PAIGC to attack Portuguese positions in Guinea so as to force the dispersal o f the Portuguese arm y into different areas. However, Cabral refused this proposal on the grounds that condi­ tions for a d irect confrontation w ith the P ortuguese w ere n o t yet ripe. A ngola was p roviding an exam ple o f how things could go w ro n g w hen a m ilitary insurrection was n o t properly p rep ared .T h e attacks on the prisons had caught th e M PLA by su rp rise, forcing the m ovem ent to strategically claim responsibility for these acts at a tim e w hen it was still largely unk n o w n and n o t y et w ell established in the country. This was a lesson that Cabral to o k to h e a rt. A lthough he w ould later also be surprised by unfolding events, forcing him to sta rt the w ar as an act of despair, Cabral had far m o re tim e to p rep are his m en and to get them to take up positions on th e g ro u n d . B efore he co u ld launch th e offensive against th e P o rtu g u ese arm y, C abral still had a h e rc u le a n task ahead o f him : tu rn in g th e PAIGC fro m a m e re political organizatio n in to a w ar m achine. By this tim e, v ery few o f th e p a r ty ’s fo u n d e rs w e re still p a r t o f th e m o v em en t. M any o f those wrh o had jo in e d th e p a rty in D akar and C onakry had also left, p u ttin g C abral u n d e r e n o rm o u s p ressu re to re c ru it m o re 99

AMILCAR CABRAL m ilita n ts. T h o se w h o jo in e d and to o k th e p a r ty to th e n e x t level largely cam e fro m th re e g ro u p s. The first g ro u p was fo rm ed by m ilitants w ho lived in Guinea and had to an e x te n t settled dow n th ere. They w ere heads o f households, and w ere ultim ately trading in th e ir relatively com fortable positions in the colonial adm inistration for active m ilitancy in the PAIGC. O ne o f those was Luis C abral, b ro th e r o f Amilcar, w ho was an em ployee in the p o w ­ erful concessionaire Casa Gouveia. Luis had ab an d o n ed Bissau after A ristides P ereira to ld him th a t he had in te rc e p te d a phone call from Lisbon w ith o rd ers for his d eten tio n . P ereira him self did n o t stay long in Bissau. H e applied for a licenga graciosa, a leave o f absence, to visit Cape Verde. From there, he travelled to Portugal, from w here he unsuc­ cessfully trie d to reach C onakry through Dakar. H e was first forced to go to Paris in o rd e r to apply for a visa to G uinea-Conakry. O verall, it to o k him about a year to reach C onakry from Bissau. T he second g ro u p did n o t com e to th e p a rty from A frica, and was m ostly m ade up o f stud en ts in E urope, particu larly in Lisbon. In the party, they had th e skills to m ake things w o rk , especially at an ad m in ­ istrative level. T h e ir adm ission in to th e p a rty w as som ew hat convo­ luted. It began w h en Jacques B eaum ont, the leader o f the French N G O CIM A D E, co n tacted som e A frican stu d en ts, m ostly from A ngola, to offer th em logistical su p p o rt for a mass escape from Lisbon. This orga­ nizatio n , w h ic h s u p p o rte d refu g ees, in te n d e d to give th ese young people the o p p o rtu n ity eith er to continue th eir education in the d em o ­ cratic c o u n trie s o f E u ro p e o r to jo in th e n atio n al lib e ra tio n m o v e ­ m en ts, especially th e FNLA. M ore than fifty young m en and w om en residing in Lisbon w ere given passports, left Lisbon, and crossed Spain by tra in , b e fo re b ein g sto p p e d in San Sebastian by F ra n c o ’s b o rd e r police. Salazar was personally a le rte d and— ad m iring the diligence o f the g ro u p , w hose escape had n o t even b een foreseen by the PIDE— dem and ed th e ir im m ediate rep atriatio n . CIM ADE staged an in te rn a ­ tional cam paign and appealed for th e in te rv e n tio n o f various g o v ern ­ m e n ts, particu larly the A m erican, w ith th e alleged su p p o rt o f John F. K ennedy being in stru m en tal in the su b seq u en t release o f the group. T h e g ro u p w as th e n a u th o riz e d to c o n tin u e th e ir jo u rn e y o n to Paris w h e re th e young p e o p le p a rte d ways. T he M ozam bicans to o k up E du ard o M o n d la n e ’s p ro p o sal and trav elled to the U n ite d States

100

A U N IT E D F R O N T to p u rsu e th e ir studies. M ost Angolans and C ape V erdeans w ere given the choice to travel to th e Soviet U n io n to fu rth e r th e ir ed u catio n , o r join th e lib e ra tio n m o v e m e n t— w hich m any o f th e m knew very little o r n o th in g ab o u t. As th e second o p tio n was n o t w hat the s tu ­ den ts had had in m in d , they staged an o th e r escape. O n e o f the g ro u p le ad e rs, G en til V iana, c o n ta c te d th e fam ous F ren ch law yer Jacques V erges, a frie n d o f A lg erian s in th e FLN , w h o a p p ro a c h e d th e G hanaian am bassador to France— th e n th e only A frican co u n try w ith d ip lo m a tic re p re s e n ta tio n in Paris— in o rd e r to send th e g ro u p to Africa. N ew p assp o rts and visas w ere issued and, w ith th e su p p o rt o f th e FLN, th e g ro u p trav elled to th e G e rm a n city o f B onn by bus and fro m th e re to A ccra, G hana. In A ccra, th e g ro u p split up again. Many o f the Angolans w ere lo o k ­ ing for the MPLA representatives in th at city, w hile the Cape Verdeans, such as Pedro Pires and O svaldo Lopes da Silva, w aited fo r Cabral. O n the verge o f despair after th e ir long w ait, Pires and Silva w ere finally to ld th at Cabral had arriv ed in th e G hanaian capital and had asked to m e e t th em at the Black Star H o tel. C abral, w rap p ed in a bath tow el, receiv ed P ires and Silva in his h o te l ro o m , p ro m isin g to give th em tickets to Dakar, w here they w ere to sta rt w ork for the political bureau o f the party. The th ird g ro u p o f p eople w ho join ed th e p arty was com posed o f natives o f G uinea-B issau, and m o stly fo rm e d th e b ack b o n e o f th e m ovem ent. They sta rte d to arrive in the early days o f C ab ral’s stay in C onakry asking for Senhor Engenheiio (M ister E ngin eer), w hom many had heard about b u t very few had had the o p p o rtu n ity to m ee t p e rso n ­ ally. They had m ig rated to G uinea-C onakry w ith the h ope o f pursuing th e ir studies o r even finding a job, even th o u g h m o st o f th e m could hardly speak a w o rd o f French— the official language in the co untry— and w ere barely literate. T he first thing o f w hich C abral a ttem p te d to convince th em was th at th eir dream s m ust w ait, as the liberation o f the co u n try was th e to p priority. A m ong these youths was C hico Te, w ho w ould later becom e one of the m o st im p o rta n t m ilitants o f th e PAIGC, and w ho was one o f the few w h o had b e e n p erso n ally in v ited by C ab ral h im self to jo in th e m ovem en t w hen they m e t in Bissau in S ep tem b er 1959. Bobo Keita, a n o th e r one o f th e first soldiers o f the PAIGC, had also m e t C abral 101

A M ILCA R CABRAL earlier in th e 1950s, w hen the latter was coaching a local football team . A t th at tim e, C abral had b een careful n o t to discuss political issues, so it was a su rp rise for Keita to discover th at the agronom ist he had m et in Bissau was leading the p a rty in Conakry. L ater he confessed his hap­ piness at being u n d e r th e com m and o f his fo rm e r coach. T he im p o rta n t thing to b ear in m in d ab o u t these youths w ho w ere fleeing from Bissau is th e social g ro u p they b elo n g ed to. It was a huge co ncern for C abral, w ho addressed this p ro b lem as he integrated them in to th e m o v em en t. Even those w ho cam e from Bissau had a peasant b a c k g ro u n d an d c o u ld cling to th e ir tra d itio n s w h e n n e e d e d . H ow ever, they le a rn e d very quickly how to o p erate the PAIGC m ili­ ta ry m ach in e and so o n b ecam e m ilita ry c o m m a n d e rs. In th e party, th ey cam e to be th e link b e tw e e n th e national liberatio n m ov em en t and th e p o p u latio n in general. These m ilitants began to arrive m ainly from Bissau, eith er o f th e ir ow n volition o r sen t by Rafael Barbosa— as p a rt o f th e re c ru itm e n t cam paign he had agreed w ith C abral. To accom m odate th em , they set up th e Lar do Combatente, initially lo c a te d in th e n e ig h b o rh o o d o f M iniere in Conakry. In th e beginning, th e Lar was sim ply a so rt o f re s t­ ing house, w h ere th e youths from Bissau w ould n o t have to w ork o r be hassled, and w h ere they w ere given free m eals and beds. It was only after a w hile th a t Cabral sta rte d to spend m o re and m o re tim e w ith th e m , engaging th e m in in fo rm al discussions on various topics. A ccording to C hicoTe, w ho later rem inisced about these tim es, Cabral used these in teractio n s to try to d e te c t in everyone the skills req u ired to fight th e P ortuguese. As the n u m b e r o f re c ru its increased— w hich consequently b ro u g h t ab o u t health issues, especially allergies and skin problem s— the Lar do Combatente was relo cated to th e o u tsk irts o f th e city, in the n e ig h b o r­ hood o f Bonfi. T here, it occupied a tw o -sto rey house, w ith a garden big

en o u g h to p ra c tic e sp o rts. In th ese early days, C abral m anaged th e house singlehandedly, p rep arin g and giving th e first lessons on subjects ranging fro m gym nastics to th e use o f w eapons. But since Cabral did n o t have any m ilitary ex p erien ce, th e co n te n t o f his teaching largely d re w o n his e x p e rie n c e train in g team s fo r th e ag rarian census. T he young m en at the Lar do Combatente learn ed th e basics o f G uinea’s soci­ ology. C abral gave lectu res o n th e ethnic com position o f the te rrito ry , 102

A U N IT E D F R O N T o n th e kind o f re la tio n sh ip tra d itio n a l chiefs had w ith th e colonial adm inistratio n , and on the agrarian practices o f the different groups. H e also sp en t a g reat deal o f tim e speaking ab o u t the p articu lar needs and concerns o f the local populations and how to tu rn them into effec­ tive su p p o rt for th e lib eration m ovem ent. D espite A m ilcar C ab ral’s M arxist leanings, he advised his m en that the key to m obilization was n o t to appeal to big th eo ries, b u t to speak to th e everyday, m a te ria l p ro b le m s o f th e p e o p le . Peasants, C abral w o u ld say, w e re h u m b le p e o p le ; they w e re m o stly c o n c e rn e d w ith concrete solutions to th eir practical problem s. They w anted schools for th e ir ch ild re n , ro ad s o n w h ich th ey could tra n s p o rt th e ir p ro d u ce , lighter and b e tte r-c o m p en sate d w ork, and, above all, they w anted to pay low er taxes. C abral tau g h t his m o bilizers to d e m o n strate to the peasants that the p a rty w ould fulfill all these prom ises as soon as the P ortuguese left th e country. C abral’s classes also had a practical co m p o n e n t, w ith the students rehearsing techniques for m obilization. A ntonio Bana to ld journalists m any years later th at Cabral used to sum m on th em one by one to ru n th ro u g h d ifferen t scenarios th a t co u ld u n fo ld d u rin g a m obilization cam paign. To set th e scene: th e m obilizers w ould arrive inT abanka, a village in G uinea, w here they w ould sta rt by greeting the older people. They should n o t reveal th eir id en tity until sitting dow n to share a m eal w here, due to the poverty that affected m ost people in the countryside, they could e x p e c t to sim ply be served ric e cooked in palm oil. This should be the cue to ask w hy it was that an elder, w ho had spent his en tire life w orking, did n o t have enough m oney to buy chicken to offer a visitor? This provided th e p re te x t to broach th e to pic o f a national m o v em en t w hich in te n d e d to fight th e P o rtu g u ese off th e te rrito ry , they w ould explain, in o rd e r to im prove the p e o p le ’s living conditions, particularly those o f th e w o rk ers. But in o rd e r for in d ependence to be achieved, the peasants m ust send th e ir child ren to C onakry, either to e n te r the m ilitary w ing o f the p a rty o r to be sent abroad to train to be th e fu ture o f the country. As is often the case, training conditions are seldom rep ro d u c ed in p ractice. In reality, th e m obilization o f the peasants was far m o re co m ­ p licated, raising m any issues w hich Cabral could n o t have anticipated. Cabral was o p eratin g u n d er th e assum ption th at peasants w ould e n te r 103

AM ILCAR CABRAL the p a rty in th e ir droves. But this did n o t tu rn o u t to be the case, fo rc­ ing the m obilizers to im provise. As p a rt o f the first wave o f m obilizers, N ino Vieira, w ho belonged to the g ro u p o f trainees sent to the M ilitary Academ y o f N anjing in China, u n d e rw e n t a painful experience. H e was denou n ced to the P ortuguese by the very p eo p le he was a ttem p tin g to m obilize, forcing him to take flight and ru n a g re a t distance to save his life. U pon his re tu r n to Conakry, as he later re c o u n te d , he felt tired and d espondent. But he was then in terro g ated by Cabral, w ho n o t only m anaged to convince him to re tu rn to th e in terio r, b u t also to re tu rn and m obilize th e sam e p eo p le w ho had ju st a tte m p ted to kill him . N evertheless, this early co n tact w ith th e co m batant m asses o f the m ovem ent forced Cabral to com e to te rm s w ith his n o tio n o f national­ ism . By th e tim e the anticolonial w ar sta rte d , Guinea-Bissau was even m o re divided in te rm s o f its ethnic stru c tu re . C reole, th e m ain lan­ guage used durin g the tim e o f the m ilitary uprising, only later acquired im p o rtan ce. As such, C abral cam e to th e conclusion th at it w ould be im possible to send his m obilizers to any reg io n , as in a co u n try w here over tw en ty languages w ere spoken, it was likely th at they w ould n o t b e able to co m m u n icate w ith th e local p o p u lations. As a re su lt, the m obilization efforts gained a strong ethnic character, w ith cam paigners en din g u p going to th e ir reg io n s o f o rig in . This p ro d u c e d tw o o u t­ com es th at th e p a rty w o u ld later have to deal w ith: eith er m obilizers succum bed to th e pressure o f the seniority system — whereby, in ethnic g ro u p s such as th e Balanta, age d e te rm in e s o n e ’s place in th e social hierarchy— and th e re fo re n ev er acquired th e necessary a u th o rity to execu te th e ir w o rk , o r they becam e so successful in th e ir ow n regions th at they im posed them selves as th e n ew chiefs, side-lining the p revi­ ous au th o rities and refusing to fight in o th e r p a rts o f the country. * * * W hile Cabral was p reparing the arm ed forces o f the PAIGC, he did n o t aband o n th e d ip lo m atic w o rk th a t was necessary to secure in te rn a ­ tional su p p o rt for the m ovem ent. O n the diplom atic front, w inning the su p p o rt o f A frican leaders was the m o st pressing issue in these years. B etw een 1960 and 1963, he travelled th ro u g h o u t th e c o n tin e n t and m et w ith a n u m b e r o f African political leaders. As he w ould recall later, the first atte m p ts w ere frustrating. W h en he first m e t Malian P resident 104

A U N IT E D F R O N T M odibo K eita, C abral asked him to g ra n t p erm ission for his m en to m ove w eap o n s th ro u g h his te rrito ry . K eita p o litely declin ed and advised him to talk to SekouToure, as G uinea-C onakry n o t only shared a b o rd e r w ith G uinea-B issau, b u t was also eq u ip p ed w ith a m o d e rn p o rt. In C ote d ’Ivoire, the c o u n try ’s president Felix H o uphouet Boigny agreed to provide assistance to th e PAIGC, although he to o m en tio n ed th at Sekou Toure w ould be in a b e tte r p o sitio n to do so. Cabral had arranged to re tu rn to C o te d ’Ivoire at the sam e tim e as a scheduled visit fro m Sekou T oure, w h en th e th re e m e n w o u ld m e e t to g eth er. However, w hen the tim e cam e, Cabral and SekouToure w ere no longer on good te rm s. T h e m o s t effectiv e s u p p o r t, ho w ev er, cam e fro m c o u n trie s in n o rth e rn A frica. A lgeria, fo r ex am p le, tra in e d som e o f the PA IG C ’s first guerrillas. M orocco, in tu rn , h osted various nationalist organiza­ tio n s fro m th e P o rtu g u e s e c o lo n ie s su ch as th e FR A IN and th e PAIGC. And it was in the M oroccan capital ol R abat th at the C O N C P was found ed to rep lace th e FRAIN, d u rin g a m eetin g w hich was held fro m 18 to 21 A pril 1961. T he m e e tin g was a tte n d e d by re p re s e n ta ­ tives o f th e M PLA , th e U D E N A M O , led by M arcelino dos Santos, as w ell as by a n u m b e r o f delegates fro m G oan organ izations, including Joao C aracciolo C ab ral, A quino de B ragan^a and G eorge Vaz, re p r e ­ sen tin g th e G oan League, th e G oan P e o p le ’s Party, and the N ational C am p aig n C o m m itte e fo r G o a, resp ectiv ely . R e p re se n ta tiv e s o f C h in a, th e Soviet U n io n , an d th e P ro v isio n al G o v e rn m e n t o f th e A lgerian R epublic (G PR A ) w ere also p re s e n t as o b se rv ers. The c o n ­ feren ce d e lib e ra te d on th e c re a tio n o f a p e rm a n e n t sec re ta ria t, w ith h e a d q u a rte rs in C asablanca. M orocco was also the first co u n try to offer w eapons to the PAIGC. King M oham ed him self m ade the gift u nder the condition that his co u n ­ try w ould n o t take any responsibility for the tra n sp o rt o f the m aterials. Accordingly, th e PA IG C’s m en had to go to the m ilitary h eadquarters them selves to pick up the w eapons and send th em to G uinea-Conakry. R etrieving th e m aterials from th e M oroccan base was accom plished w ithout any difficulty, b u t problem s soon arose w hen th e w eaponry had to be sent to T o u re’s te rrito ry . T he G uinean p resid en t su p p o rted the PA IG C’s effort to liberate Guinea-Bissau, b u t in these early stages he frow ned upon the idea o f m ilitary m aterials flowing th rough his co u n ­ 105

A M ILCA R CABRAL try. He was afraid that such an event could be used to disguise one o f the m any conspiracies th a t w e re freq u en tly org an ized against him . For C ab ra l’s p a r t, he had n o t fo rg o tte n th e lessons o f 1961, w hen Czechoslovakia had given his p a rty w eaponry, im posing as a condition that these w ar m aterials had to be sent w ith the acknow ledgm ent o f the G uinean authorities and delivered directly to the M inistry o f D efense. T he PAIGC, however, never received the shipm ent. It was to avoid such a situation that this tim e Am ilcar Cabral and his m en decided to smuggle the m aterial from M orocco straight into the p a rty ’s bases in the in terio r o f G uinea, w ith o u t inform ing the local authorities. C ab ral’s m en could n o t w ait m uch longer. Fighters trained in China and o th e r p laces had b e e n s c a tte re d th ro u g h o u t G u in ea and w ere read y to b e g in c o n fro n ta tio n s against th e P o rtu g u e se . T he colonial arm y, in tu r n , had le a rn t from th e b eginning o f th e m ilitary in su rre c ­ tio n in A ngola— w h ere a rm e d rebels had attack ed fro m the n o rth e rn fro n tie rs— and this tim e rein fo rced th e ir positions on G uinea-B issau’s b o rd e rs w ith Senegal and p a rtic u la rly w ith G uinea-C onakry. A t the sam e tim e, th e PID E lau n ch ed m ajo r raids in Bissau, w hich resu lte d in th e c a p tu re o f key m e m b e rs o f th e PAIGC, including th e m uchh u n te d Rafael Barbosa. As a re su lt, the m ilitary w ing o f th e PAIGC asked C abral to give the o rd e r to attack , th re a te n in g d e se rtio n if the lead er refu sed to do so. U p u n til th at p o in t, all th at C abral had been able to do was advise his m e n to stay p u t, hide in the bush, co n d u ct m in o r m ilitary o p eratio n s, and p ro te c t them selves as b est they could, assuring th em th at any act o f violence against th em w ould be m e t w ith retaliatio n by th e p a rty against P o rtu g u ese se ttle rs and th e ir p roperty. Follow ing th e ABCs o f g u e rrilla w arfare, C abral en couraged his m en to c o n d u ct fast actions against isolated P o rtu g u ese m ilitary bases, and to lu re A frican so ld iers in th e P o rtu g u e se arm y w ith w eapons and am m u n itio n to d e se rt. In this en v iro n m e n t, th e ability to equip th e units in th e in te rio r w ith w eapons was o f the u tm o st im portance. As such, the p arty devised a schem e to sm uggle th e m o u t o f th e te r r ito r y o f G uinea-C onakry. F irst o f all, th e w eap o n s had to b e tak en fro m th e h e a d q u a rte rs in R abat and le ft at th e office o f th e C O N C P , o r even, going up fo u r floors, sto red in the a p a rtm e n t o f C ab ral’s w ife, M aria H elena, on Paul H ole S treet. T he second step req u ired a g reat deal o f im agination in 106

A U N IT E D F R O N T o rd e r to m ove th e m th ro u g h T o u re ’s te rrito ry . To h id e th e biggest w eapons, such as rifles, guns, and m achine-guns, couches, cabinets and desks w ere used, w hile am m u n itio n was p u t inside cigarette packs and boxes fo r ty p e w rite r ink. F u rth e rm o re , re c o rd e rs w ere tak en fro m C onakry to R abat u n d e r the p re te n c e o f needing rep airs, so th at th eir co n ten ts could be replaced w ith am m unition and d eto n ato rs. A cco rd ­ ing to Luis C abral, Cabral him self m ade a n u m b er o f these trip s, trying to w alk steadily as he crossed th ro u g h custom s at the a irp o rt, w ith his body b e n t u n d e r th e w eight o f his briefcases. In Conakry, th e w ar m aterials w ere th en taken o u t o f th e ir casing and p u t inside boxes o f canned food and m edicines, b efore being sent to the p o rt to be shipped to the in te rio r o f G uinea. O ften the boxes w ere tra n sp o rte d by road to C oloboi, a location close to Boke on the b o rd e r betw een th e tw o te rrito rie s. T h ere, th e boxes w ere unloaded and taken to th e in te rio r, this tim e tra n sp o rte d by th e w o m en w ho operated as the rear-g u ard o f the m o v em en t, carrying the w eapons on th eir ow n heads in o rd e r for th em to finally arrive at th e places w here the fighters w ere co n cen trated . The sm uggling w en t w ell until the p arty had to increase the ship­ m ents in o rd e r to respond to dem and. A decision was taken to use iron boxes labelled as containing m edicines. As these operations began to be d a n g ero u s, C abral re a c h e d an a g re e m e n t w ith his colleagues th a t w henever a shipm ent was com ing in, he should n o t be in C onakry.T he rationale behind this cautious attitu d e was th at being absent from the capital in such an event w ould allow him to m obilize his diplom atic contacts for help. In fact, th e PAIGC did n o t have to w ait long to see th e w isd o m o f such an a rra n g e m e n t. T h e sam e day th a t o n e o f th e boxes o f am m u n itio n fell from a crane in th e p o rt, breaking open and leaving its co n ten t exposed, Sekou Toure o rd e re d the im m ediate arrest o f every single p a rty leader in C onakry, nam ely A ristides Pereira, Luis C abral, Vasco C abral, P edro R am os, and Fidelis A lm ada Cabral. O tto Schacht, one o f the party leaders, m anaged to pass as a m ilitant w ho was only in C o nakry for a sh o rt stay, sparing him from arrest. Schacht, alongside Luis C a b ra l’s w ife L u c e tte , so u g h t help in th e em bassies in C onakry, w hich in terced ed w ith th e G uinean authorities and allowed th em to keep in to u ch w ith the detainees. A m elia A raujo, an o th er o f the PA IG C ’s m ilitants, w ho was also spared from the purge

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A M ILCAR CABRAL for being A ngolan, was allow ed to leave th e c o u n try and travelled to Dakar, Senegal. T ogether w ith h er husband, Jose A raujo, they m anaged to co n ta c t C abral, w h o was in R abat and initiated negotiations w ith Sekou Toure via telephone. T he negotiations, however, did n o t produce the desired resu lt. Toure had in stru cted his m in ister o f defense, Fodeba Kei'ta, to in fo rm th e d etainees th at th e ir release was d e p en d e n t on the arrival o f C abral in Conakry. But C abral m ade it clear th at he w ould only travel to C onakry after th e release o f his m en. It was only after C abral c o n ta c te d a n u m b e r o f heads o f states, including th e C uban Fidel C astro and the A lgerian Ben Bella, w ho in te rv e n e d w ith Toure, th a t th e PA IG C ’s m ilitants w ere released. In re tro sp e c t, according to A ristides Pereira, this event w orked in favor o f th e p arty , d e m o n stra tin g to T oure th a t th e PAIGC had th e stru c tu re and organization req u ired to ru n such a clandestine operation inside his ow n te rrito ry . A t th e diplom atic level, th e in te rv e n tio n o f heads o f states w hom Toure held in high esteem show ed C abral’s g ro w ­ ing diplom atic w eight. H ow ever, to save his m en , C abral used his m ost pow erful arg u m en t: he was ab o u t to prove that th e w eapons sm uggled into G uinea-C onakry w ere n o t d estined for any coup d ’etat, b u t rath er fo r th e o n set o f th e anticolonial w ar in th e neighboring country. This is the co n te x t in w hich C abral gave th e o rd e r to attack the P ortuguese g a rriso n o f T ite , in th e c e n te r o f G u in ea. T h e an ticolonial w a r had begun. P ersuaded by this d em o n stratio n , Toure freed the m e m b ers o f the PAIGC.

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6

MODES OF MAKING WAR

D uring the A ll-A frican P eoples’ C onference in A ccra in 1958, Frantz Fanon, rep resen tin g the G PRA , m e t w ith the group o f Angolan n atio n ­ alists p re se n t at th e event, nam ely M ario de A ndrade, Lucio Lara and V iriato da C ruz. Fanon asked the Angolans to re c ru it eleven youths to b e tra in e d in th e cam ps o f th e A lgerian N atio n al L iberation F ro n t (FLN ), so that they could o pen the first g u errilla cell (foco ) upon th eir r e tu r n to th e co u n try . As w e have already seen , C abral had b een assigned th e m ission o f traveling to Angola to tra n sm it this m essage to the nationalist cells o p eratin g th e re at that tim e. H ow ever, w hen he arriv ed in Luanda, he failed to find any o f the nationalists he was su p ­ po sed to m e e t. A le rte d to th e n atio n alist activities, th e PID E had detained dozens o f activists w ho w ere later taken to c o u rt u n d e r the accusation o f te rro ris t activities. Two years later, th e same g ro u p m et w ith Fanon, w ho criticized th e A ngolan nationalists for th e ir p re d o m i­ nantly urban-based arm ed in su rrectio n . Based on th e experiences ot th e FLN, Fanon insisted th a t any a rm e d vanguard d ep e n d e d on the su p p o rt o f the p o p u lar masses. Fanon w ould n o t have n eed ed to d irect th e sam e criticism at Cabral had he know n the strategy th e la tte r had devised in G uinea. A fter the m assacre o f 19 5 9 , C abral w as co n vinced th a t n o th in g w o u ld be achieved th ro u g h urb an p ro tests and, according to th e PAIGC h isto ri­ ography, invited cadres to abandon th e cities and find sh elter in th e 109

AMILCAR CABRAL n e ig h b o rin g c o u n trie s. W h a t tu r n e d C abral in to o n e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t g u e rrilla leaders o f the tw e n tie th c e n tu ry was th e way in w h ic h he u sed th e lessons o f o th e r re v o lu tio n a ry e x p e rie n c e s and applied them to the c o n te x t o f G uinea. T he m ilitary techniques used in G uinea w ere n o t ju st ab o u t th e hum an factors o r the p articu larity o f G uinea’s geography, b u t ab o u t th e sym biosis b etw een m an and land. U ntil th en , w hile C ab ral’s m ilitary strategy had been close to w hat M ao Z ed o n g had p ro p o sed in C hina, he had n o t yet read any tex ts by C hairm an Mao. However, his strategy, o r at least how he cam e to speak o f it, re p ro d u c e d th e teachings o f th e C hinese th eo re tic ia n . B efore m oving to m ilitary action, the groups led by M ao had staged various p ro te s ts and strik es in big cities. As th e se actio ns re su lte d in m any casualties, M ao in stru c te d his m en to leave the cities in w hat has com e to be kn o w n as the Long M arch. Settling in the n o rth e rn p a rt o f the country, th e Chinese g u errillas n o t only m oved o u t o f the legal envi­ ro n m e n t w hich was ham pering th eir action, b u t created th e ir ow n base fo r political engagem ent. T he areas c o n tro lled by the guerrilla m ove­ m e n t becam e th e cradle o f th e n ew o rd e r w hich w ould later sweep th ro u g h the en tire country. So, m o re than Cabral w anted to adm it, China served as the tem plate for the m ilitary uprising in G uinea, even if only by osmosis. Cabral was certainly lectu red on the Chinese experience w hen he visited the co u n ­ try fo r th e first tim e in 1960, and, m o re im portantly, som e o f the first gro u p s o f G uinean soldiers w ere tra in e d at the M ilitary Academ y o f Beijing. As such, C abral’s m ilitary strategy was saturated w ith M aoism . Cabral may also have absorbed th e C hinese ex p erience w hich had seeped in to m any o th e r g u e rrilla in su rrectio n s. In 1970, in answ er to a qu estio n o n th e strateg y o f his m o v e m e n t in an in te rv ie w fo r th e q u a rte rly m agazine Tricontinental, he said th at th e re was n o t m uch to invent w ith m ilitary uprisings and th at it was enough to learn from the exam ples o f all th e peoples w ho had previously risen up against th eir o ppresso rs, such as the C hinese, th e C ubans, th e V ietnam ese, and the A lgerians. All th e se m o v e m e n ts, to a g re a te r o r lesser d e g re e , had re p ro d u c e d the principles laid o u t by Mao. O u t o f th e exam ples m e n tio n e d by C abral, it was th e C uban e x p e ­ rie n c e o f Fidel C astro and C he G uevara w h ich had d e p a rte d m o re fro m th e C hinese “style” to th e p o in t th a t it had cre ated a genre o f its

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M O D E S O F M A K IN G WAR ow n. M ao’s g u e rrilla w arfare was essentially ru ra l, and the strategy of th e m o v e m e n t rev o lv ed a ro u n d th e g riev an ces o f th e peasants. O f p a ram o u n t im p o rtan ce was the q uestion o f land d istrib u tio n . Peasants w ere th ere fo re able to jo in th e g u e rrilla m o v em en t to fu rth e r th e ir ow n in te re sts. M o re im p o rta n tly , M a o ’s em phasis w as on w o rk in g w ith and m obilizing th e m asses, to the e x te n t th at he did n o t e n c o u r­ age startin g any uprisin g w ith o u t th e fulfillm ent o f this pre-co n d itio n . T h e C u b an re v o lu tio n slightly d iv erg ed fro m this m o d e l. In its essence, it w as n o t a n c h o re d o n p e a sa n t re v o lt, b u t w as largely a m o v e m e n t o f cad res and in te lle c tu a ls, m any o f th e m com ing fro m exile, w hose im m ediate goal was to seize political pow er. G uevara has em phatically w ritte n th at “it is n o t necessary to w ait u n til all co n d i­ tions for m aking rev o lu tio n exist; th e in su rre c tio n can create th e m .” T his m o d e l o f su b v e rsio n re c e iv e d so m e p raise in th e 1960s on acco u n t o f its innovative c h a ra c te r c o m p a re d to M a o ’s theory. C he G uevara c o n trib u te d to the diffusion o f this m eth o d o lo g y th ro u g h the b o o k he a u th o re d , La Guerra de Guerrillas (G u e rrilla W arfare), p u b ­ lished after th e triu m p h o f the C uban R evolution in 1960, and tra n s­ lated into English and F rench th e n e x t year. In this m anual, G uevara arg u ed th a t a w ell-o rg an ized g ro u p o f highly m o tiv ate d in su rg en ts could defeat a con v en tio n al arm y even if th e “objective c o n d itio n s” (w hich M aoism p u t so m u ch em phasis on) to launch a p o p u la r m ove­ m e n t w ere n o t y et in place. Key to this is th at th e m ilitary uprising itself becom es a catalyst w h ich forces th e p o p u latio n to adhere to the m o v em en t. T he F ren ch philosopher, Regis D ebray, w ho to o k p a rt in th e o p e ra tio n in w h ich G uevara was a rre ste d (and late r e x e cu te d ), called this set o f p rin cip les the “foco th e o ry ”. As such, th e in su rrectio n in G uinea derived its strategy from a m ix ­ tu re o f th e C hinese and C u ban th e o rie s. F ro m th e fo rm e r, C abral le arn t the need for the em erging m ovem ent to re st on legitim ate peas­ ant concern s (even if the ad herence o f peasants to the p a rty was n o t th at stra ig h tfo rw a rd ). Im p o rta n t h ere was th at G uinea was n o t a co lo ­ nial settlem en t and the land question had never been an issue. From the latter, Cabral used th e ex p erien ce o f a g ro u p o f cadres (m ost o f them co m in g fro m ex ile, like th e C ap e V erdeans) o p e ra tin g a n ationalist m ovem ent. But this was the e x te n t o f the b o rro w in g , and in all o th er aspects Cabral added specific substance to th e existing theories. Ill

A M ILCAR CABRAL U nlike th e reg io n s o f n o rth e rn C hina, C uba, o r V ietnam , G uinea d id n o t p ro v id e o p tim a l co n d itio n s fo r g u e rrilla w arfare. T h e first h and icap o f G u in ea co m e s fro m th e g e o g ra p h ic c o n d itio n s o f th e country. It com prises only 36,125 square k ilo m eters, w hich facilitates th e a c tio n o f a c o n v e n tio n a l arm y, as th e ir c o m b a t u n its are m o re easily su p p o rte d by th e air force and tro o p s on the g ro u n d . Secondly, G uin ea does n o t have m o u n ta in s, w ith its ta lle st p o in t, M adina do Boe, no h igher than 200 m e te rs. M ountains w ere im p o rta n t factors in any g u errilla cam paign, providing sanctuaries for the fighters, as in the fam ous case o f Sierra M aestra in C uba. H ow ever, G uinea has d istin c­ tive n a tu ra l fe a tu re s o f its o w n , w h ic h w e re w ell e x p lo ite d by th e gu errillas and becam e significant factors in th e ir success. A significant p a rt o f G uinea is m ade up o f a co m plex hydrographic n etw o rk . R ivers flood d u rin g the rainy season and the w et zone may occupy alm ost a th ird o f th e w hole te rrito ry . T he lush vegetation that g ro w s in th e se places is a cru cial fa c to r w h ich m u st b e tak en in to a c c o u n t in co n d u c tin g w arfare. T h e P o rtu g u e se m ilita ry w as fully aw are o f this fact. In a b o o k o n th e colonial war, the P ortuguese m ili­ tary e x p e rts A niceto Afonso and C arlos de M atos explained the im pact o f the environm ent on the p reparation and execution o f m ilitary o p e ra­ tions. A ccording to Afonso and de M atos, th e m eandering o f the rivers and th e d en se v e g etatio n fo rc e d m ilita ry convoys to pay p a rtic u la r attentio n to th eir security, prolonging journeys and p u tting pressure on e sc o rt units. In th e areas w ith dense u n d e rb ru sh vegetation, the situa­ tio n w as n o t m u c h b e tte r fo r th e P o rtu g u e se tro o p s , leaving th e m w ith o u t any p ro te c tio n and at the m ercy o f light artillery fire w hich could com e fro m anyw here. T he success o f th e PA IG C ’s g u errillas d ep en d ed on skillfully taking advantage o f th ese n atu ral conditions. As such, it was n o t by chance th at the guerrillas invested a g reat deal o f th e ir m ilitary efforts into the so uth o f the country, as it was th ere th at th e n atural obstacles w hich h in d ered the P ortuguese arm y w ere m o st p resen t. M ore im portantly, the south was a region dom inated by th e Balanta ethnic group, w ho had a keen k n o w led g e o f th e area w h e re th e a rm e d conflict w as taking place. As a d eleg ate to th e C ongress o f th e P eople o f G uinea p u t it m any years later, although th e P ortuguese had m aps on w hich the riv ­ ers o f the co u n try w ere rep resen ted , only the Balanta knew th eir depth and the b e st places to cross th em by h e a rt. 112

M O D E S O F M A K IN G WAR T his tu r n e d th e B alanta in to th e m o to r o f th e re v o lu tio n , and C abral’s party, w h e th e r freely o r due to the circum stances, had to re c ­ oncile th e n a tu re o f a m o d e rn lib eratio n m o v e m e n t— g o v ern ed by sophisticated principles o f sovereignty and national in dep en d en ce— w ith elem en ts o f th e traditional fabric o f G uinea. In th e tex tb o o k s on the history o f G uinea, the Balanta cam e to be d escribed as the ethnic g ro u p w hich m o st vigorously resisted th e P ortu g u ese dom ination. To Am ilcar Cabral, the p articipation o f the Balanta in the colonial w ar was a continuatio n o f the m o re traditional form s o f resistance, w hich w ere sporadic o r spontaneous, as Fanon w ould describe th em , as opposed to the m ore m o d e rn form em bodied in the liberation m ovem ent. The w ar o f lib eratio n w as itse lf a re n e w e d ex p re ssio n o f th e trib a l p ro te sts w hich had b een re p re sse d since th e su rre n d e r to th e P o rtu g u ese in 1936. It is only by evoking this logic that we can u n d erstan d the su p ­ p o rt o f the Balanta for the national liberation m ovem ent. Since th e Balanta w ere o n e o f th e eth n ic g ro u p s w hich had m o re fiercely resisted colonialism , it was th em w ho had suffered m o st from the P o rtu g u e se p re se n c e . U nlike A ngola and M ozam bique, G uinea was n ev er a s e ttle m e n t colony, m eaning P o rtu g al had barely invested in public w o rk s o r in fra stru c tu re . H en ce, th e colonial state had n o t had m uch n e e d to r e s o rt to fo rc e d labor. M o st o f G uinea was d o m i­ n ated by concessio n aires, such as th e Casa Gouveia, a b ran c h o f the M anufacturing U nion C om pany (C U F), w hich purchased a significant p a r t o f th e a g ric u ltu ra l p ro d u c e o f th e te r r ito r y . As d iscussed in C h ap ter 3, th e e x p lo ita tio n o f th e natives w as based u p o n this c o n ­ cessions sy stem , w h ereb y they w ere fo rced to sell th e ir p ro d u c e at a fixed p ric e . T h e Balanta w e re m o st affected by this system as they p ro d u c e d ric e , w h ic h w as n o t an e x p o r t cro p . U n like g ro u n d n u ts (m ainly p ro d u c e d by th e Fulani), w hich a c c o u n ted fo r 95 p e r ce n t of e x p o rts in 1948, ric e was essentially co n su m ed in te rn a lly and, since it was ab u n d an t, ra re ly yielded m u ch p rofit. T he B alanta w ere th e r e ­ fo re le ft to ex ch an g e p a r t o f th e ir p ro d u c e fo r o th e r foodstuffs o r item s such as fabric. In this reg ard , the w ar for indep en d en ce may also be seen as a c o n ­ vergence o f th e old grievances o f the Balanta and the em ergence o f the natio n al m o v e m e n t. As such, in m any re sp e c ts, th e PA IG C sim ply becam e hostage to th a t w h ich it was try in g to elim inate: the tra d i­ 113

AM ILCAR CABRAL tio n a l.T h e Balanta, according to various d escriptions by travelers and colonial clerks, are an acephalous society. This m eans that, at least his­ torically, com m unities, o r tabanka — a village com posed o f an extended family— are autonom ous and do n o t recognize the au thority o f a chief, o f fam ilies, o r even o f clans. T his is e x te n d e d to w h ic h ev e r p o w e r attem p ts to ru le over th e m . T his p a rtly e x p lain ed th e difficulties faced by th e P o rtu g u e se in a ttem p tin g to subdue th e Balanta. W hile in relation to the Fulani, for exam p le— w h o w ere organized acco rd in g to ex tre m ely hierarchical political stru c tu re s— it may have b een enough to dom inate the chiefs for the w hole g ro u p to follow, this did n o t apply to the Balanta. For th em to pay taxes, for exam ple, they had to be convinced from moranga to moran$a (co m p o u n d to co m p o u n d ). In this society, th e re stric tiv e fam ily g ro u p fo rm s a “political and econom ic u n it.” H ere, age becom es o f the u tm o st im p o rtan ce, dividing the g ro u p in to p arts. O n e p a rt consists o f the o ld er m e m b ers, and the other, the younger, th e fo rm e r naturally d om inating the la tte r as they co n tro l th e sources o f w ealth and rep ro d u c tio n , such as anim als and land. M en are only resp ected w hen they m arry, b u t for a m an to be eligible for m arriag e, he needs access to cattle fro m the previous g e n ­ eratio n to pay th e dow ry. T he youngest th erefo re have no o th e r option than to be at the service o f th e elders. T h e P o rtu g u e se b eg an to d ism a n tle th is s tru c tu r e w h e n th ey a rriv e d in th e co u n try . D u rin g th e la te co lo n ial p e rio d , th e state offered th e young Balanta n ew paths to accum ulate w ealth. Instead o f staying in th e ir field cultivating rice and p ro te c tin g the tabanka until th ey w ere b esto w ed w ith cattle by an elder, fo r exam ple, they could sim ply m ig rate to th e city to learn a tra d e w hich w ould give th em a salary, o r even to enlist in th e colonial arm y. As the PAIGC was fight­ ing in th e so u th , in lands o c c u p ie d by th e B alanta, it a b so rb ed th e trib a l logic o f th e age system . But th e PAIGC involuntarily ex a c e r­ b ated th e dism antling o f w hat an th ro p o lo g ists call kinship stru c tu re s. Like th e P o rtu g u ese, they also offered an alternative way for the young to acquire fame and pow er, w ith o u t having to w ait for an elder to give th em access to land and livestock. But this absorption o f Balanta cu ltu re w en t fu rther. T he Balanta also b ro u g h t th e ir g u e rrilla tactics to th e national liberation m ovem ents, 114

M O D E S O F M A K IN G WAR honed by cen tu ries o f w ar against stro n g er neighbors. W ith the ex p an ­ sion from the fo u rte e n th cen tu ry onw ards o f the M ande E m pire, an au th o rity w hich they refused to recognize, the Balanta w ere forced to seek refuge in th e w a teriest zones o f dense vegetation, locally know n as the tarrafo. T h ere, their o p p o n en t was unable to m aneuver its horses, w hich in any case could n o t be effectively used as they w ere vulnerable to the parasite trypanosoma rhodesiense, which is tran sm itted by the tsetse fly. In o rd er to capture slaves, steal cattle, o r simply to w ard off the m ore nu m ero u s and b e tte r-e q u ip p e d enem y, the Balanta developed w arfare m eth o d s, o r raids, w hich w ere n o t dissim ilar to w h at la te r m ilitary d o c trin e w ould define as g u e rrilla techniques. M ost im p o rta n t was to take advantage o f th e sw am ps and th ick riv erin e fo rests o f th e ir n a tu ­ ral e n v iro n m e n t, p e rfe c t h id e -o u ts fro m w h ic h attack s co u ld be la u n c h e d . A lb e rto G o m es P im e n te l, a P o rtu g u e se ad m in istra to r, d escrib ed som e o f these w arfare tech n iq u es at th e b eginning o f the century. T hey co nsisted, above all in not resisting the attacks, pretending they were fleeing, hiding in the tarrafo, in the margins of the rivers and lagoons, or spread­ ing through the rice paddies, carefully separating themselves from the others so that they could not be hit by bullets. They only counter­ attacked when the attackers, thinking they had won, started to retire with their spoils of war. N o tw ith sta n d in g th e sim ilarities b e tw e e n th e re v o lu tio n ary p r o ­ cesses in China and G uinea, it was the exam ple o f Cuba w hich, at least organizationally, m o st influenced th e PAIGC. M aoism n ee d ed a peas­ a n t o rg a n iz a tio n , b u t this w o u ld p e rh a p s re q u ire g iving to o m u c h pow er to the trib al in stitu tio n s. So ra th e r than avoiding engaging w ith the peasan try alto g eth er, C abral instead devised ways to p rev en t e th ­ nic predom in an ce w ithin the party. Reflecting on this q uestion, o r the e x te n t to w h ich th e re b e llio n in G u in ea w as a p easan t m o v e m e n t, C abral later rem in isced ab o u t th e difficulties in w inning the peasants over. “W e know by e x p e rie n c e all th e p ro b lem s we faced in b ringing th e m to light. In G uinea, ap art from in c e rta in zones and g roups w ho received us favorably from th e beginning, unlike th e C hinese, w e had to w o rk ferociously to c o n q u er th e m .” So w hile these different schools c o n trib u te d to th e m o v em e n t in G uinea, traditional ethnic stru c tu re s had to be taken in to account. 115

A M ILCA R CABRAL G uinea was n o t China, w h ere d u rin g th e reg im e o f Chiang Kai-Shek m illions o f peasants had languished, dispossessed o f th eir land, therefore form ing a m obilizable mass due to th eir disconnect from the traditional structures. And contrary to Angola and M ozam bique, w here the installa­ tion of the agricultural concessionaires to o k place through the disposses­ sion o f the natives from th eir lands, in G uinea, as w e have already estab­ lished, colonial dom ination was essentially based on fixed prices. As a result, in G uinea no real g ro u p em erged w hich could be called detribalized— individuals detached from th eir tribal stru ctures and the alleged land o f th eir ancestors. N o t b ein g able to c o u n t o n this d e trib a liz e d p o p u la tio n , C abral conced ed th at trib al s tru c tu re s w ere a m ajo r factor in the p a rtic ip a ­ tio n o f th e v ario u s e th n ic g ro u p s in th e an tic o lo n ia l stru g g le . T he Balanta y ouths, unlike those from o th e r g ro u p s, had m o re freed o m to join th e lib eratio n m o v em en t, o r to p u t it differently, to use the tribal logic itself to su b v ert relatio n s o f p o w er w ith in th e ir ow n g ro u p s, as they already b elo n g ed to a d ecen tralized society. It was different for th e y o u n g p e o p le o f o th e r g ro u p s , su ch as th e Fulani and th e M and in k a. B oth e th n ic itie s fo rm e d h ie ra rc h ica l so cieties in w h ic h p a rtic ip a tio n in th e w ar generally d e p e n d e d o n th e approval o f th e “g re a t m e n ”, w h ic h w as c o n d itio n a l o n th e g e n e ra l in te re s t o f th e g ro u p . T h e F ulani h ad alw ays b e e n allies o f th e P o rtu g u e se in th e occup atio n o f G uinea and in th e su bjugation o f o th e r eth n icities, and w ere generally m o re receptive to th e colonial system , even though the low er groups w ere no less ex p lo ited by th e higher ones than they w ere by th e P o rtu g u ese. This was w hy this g ro u p m ade up a large p a rt o f th e A frican tro o p s , w h ich , alongside th e co lo n ial arm y, fo u g h t th e g u errillas. T he case o f th e M andinka was precisely the o pposite. They w ere th e biggest losers in th e occu p atio n and n u rtu re d a deep re s e n t­ m e n t against th e Fulani, accusing th e m o f having co llu d ed w ith the P o rtu g u ese o ccu p iers to d estro y w h at was left o f th e ir em p ire in the n in e te e n th century. W ith th e b eg in n in g o f th e w ar in G uinea, a n u m ­ b er o f Fulani gro u p s to o k th e o p p o rtu n ity to p ersecu te the M andinka, accusing th e m th is tim e o f b ein g b e h in d th e lib e ra tio n m o v em en t. Because o f this, th e M andinka w ere one o f th e g ro u p s w ho w ere m o st co m p elled to seek refuge elsew h ere, fleeing p articu larly in to neigh­ b o rin g co u n tries. As a re su lt, they w ere easily convinced to jo in the co m b atan t m asses o f th e PAIGC. 116

Teachers and students of the Liceu Gil Eanes posing for the year’s picture, September 1939.

Amilcar Cabral on Lisboa Street, Sao Vicente, Cape Verde, 1949.

Amilcar Cabral, top right, with colleagues from the Instituto Superior de Agronomia.

Amilcar Cabral with friends in Estrela Park, Lisbon, during his time as a student in Lisbon, March 1948.

Amilcar Cabral with colleagues, in Angola, during the time when he worked for the colonial state and private companies with interests in Angola.

Amilcar Cabral with Nha Lucinda Andrade (mother of Lucette Cabral, Luis Cabral’s wife).

Outside Amilcar Cabral’s residency in Conakry, from right to left: Joao Cruz Pinto, Aristides Pereira, Ana Maria Cabral, Amilcar Cabral, Lilica Boal and Paula Fortes.

Cabral on his way to the Congress of Cassaca, February 1964.

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Meeting of PAIGC’s leadership, from left to right: Louren^o Gomes, Honorio Chantre, Victor Saude Maria, Abilio Duarte, Pedro Pires, Luis Cabral and Aristides Pereira.

Amilcar Cabral talking to journalists in Algiers, Algeria, alongside Marcelino dos Santos (to his right) and Joseph Turpin (to his left).

Ceremony of the pledge of allegiance of PAIGC’s military at an academy in the Soviet Union. Cabral is in the middle with a Soviet official and to the right is Inocencio Cani, one of Cabral’s assassins.

Visit of Cabral to Romania, arrival at the airport, 1972.

Nino Vieira making a speech during the first National Assembly, in Madina do Boe, 23—4 December 1973.

M O D E S O F M A K IN G WAR The PAIGC, at least d u rin g the war, n o t only trie d to curb ethnic divisions, b u t en erg etically fo u g h t eth n icity -b ased ten d en cies. M em bers of th e p a rty leadership had little in te re st in the tribal qu es­ tion; the PAIGC was largely a p arty o f cadres o r m ilitants, both civilian and m ilitary. Since the p a rty ’s in cep tio n , its core leadership had been m e m b e rs o f th e clerical b u reau cracy , p re d o m in a n tly th e C ape Verdeans, w ho assum ed in G uinea “the subaltern roles o f su p p o rters of colonialism ,” as Jean Z ie g le r p u t it. A m ilcar C ab ral, Luis C abral, A ristides Pereira, and Abilio D u a rte had all b een clerks in institutions o f the colonial state o r in private entities such as th e Casa Gouveia or Banco Nacional Ultramarino, b efo re leaving th e ir jobs and heading to D akar o r C onakry to join th e party. H ow ever, w ith th e o nset o f th e war, the C ape Verdeans w ere g rad u ­ ally ceding th e ir place to an o th er gro u p , w hich Cabral called the “occa­ sional p ro le ta ria t p e tit bourgeoisie.” M em bers o f this class had in c o m ­ m o n the fact th a t they w e re “sons o f th e land”, having b een b o rn in G uinea. Cabral m e t a n u m b e r o f these youths d u rin g his tim e w orking in Bissau as an agronom ic engin eer.T h ey had little education, although they could speak P ortuguese. They did n o t have any profession o r p e r­ m an en t jobs. In m o st cases, they w ere learning trad es, such as tailoring o r m echanics. T hey w ere som etim es involved in p e tty crim e, such as theft. Some o f these youths w e n t on to jo in th e p a rty in Conakry. The success o f C abral’s nationalism hinged on articulating the in te r­ ests o f these different social layers. This is w hat Cabral m ean t by the notion o f w ar as a factor o f cu ltu re. For C abral, th e anticolonial w ar forced people from different groups to fight to g e th e r and be subjected to the same deprivations, as he w ould famously go on to w rite. This was also the co n tex t for u nderstanding C abral’s controversial statem ent— m ade in a sp eech to th e T rico n tin en tal C o n feren ce in Havana in F ebruary 1967— on the n eed for the “suicide o f the p e tty bourgeoisie,” the m eaning o f w hich becom es clearer w hen com pared w ith the con­ cept o f violence in th e w ritings o f Frantz Fanon. A lthough The Wretched o f the Earth has been in te rp re te d as an apology fo r th e violence o f th e colonized against th e colonizer, this was n o t necessarily th e idea behind its w riting. Fanon was a psychiatrist, and m o st o f his findings cam e from observing A lgerian patients w ho suf­ fered from m en tal illnesses. H e found that colonialism was a fo rm o f 117

A M ILCAR CABRAL violence w hich pro d u ced com plexes and repressions that could only be overcom e w ith th e use o f a g re a te r violence, destroying the effects o f the previous one. But this was n o t necessarily a physical kind o f vio­ lence. Above all, it was a p rocess th ro u g h w hich colonizers and the colonized w ould free them selves from th e stru c tu res co n trib u tin g to th e fo rm atio n o f th e ir iden tities. W h ile Fanon has fo r the m o st p a rt b e e n read literally, th e re is a n o th e r d im en sio n o f this th e o ry w hich should also be taken into account: violence was conceived of as a means to achieve a h igher dim ension o f th e hum an. This is the c o n te x t in w hich we can read A m ilcar C ab ral’s th e o ry o f suicide, as a way o f re n o u n c in g th e stru c tu re s th at fo rm ed the p e tty b o u rg e o isie as a class. In th e n am e o f th e n atio n al in te re s t, w h ic h transcen d ed th e ir com fo rt-b ased class in terests, they should relinquish p o w e r th ro u g h th e dynam ic o f th e rev o lu tio n itse lf and subm it th e m ­ selves to th e “c o n tro l o f w o rk ers and peasants”. This c o n cep t can be e x ten d e d n o t ju s t to th e th e o ry b u t also th e p ractice o f C abral. W hile th e suicide o f th e p e tty bourgeoisie d e p e n d e d on its ow n g enerosity and consciousness, according to C abral, the subm ission o f the peasants to the ideal o f th e p a rty d ep en d ed o n th e dynam ic o f th e struggle. In o th e r w o rd s, peasants w e re fo rc e d to ab an d o n th e ir tra d itio n s and beliefs and su b m it them selves to the ru les o f the party. This difference, as w e w ill see later, w as th e basis fo r m any o f th e pro b lem s arising b e tw e e n th e lib eratio n m o v em en t and th e eth n ic stru ctu res. * * * T he w ar in G uinea sta rte d as an act “o f rage and despair” on 23 January 1963, w hen th e rebels attacked P ortuguese positions in T ite . For the P ortuguese, it was a m ajor surprise, as they did n o t ex p ect the revolu­ tionary forces to strike in th e interio r, in the h e a rt o f the country. As such, th e guerrillas w ere able to hold the initiative in the operations, forcing the P ortuguese to w ithdraw to a defensive position. O n 19 July 1963 , six m onths after the beginning o f the war, the M inister of Defense G om es A raujo ad m itted publicly that th e guerrillas o f the PAIGC had spread to an area that covered 15 p e r cen t o f the national territo ry . D e sp ite th e e x p a n sio n o f C a b ra l’s fo rc e s, e n c o u n te rs w ith th e P o rtu g u e se arm y w e re fo r th e m o st p a r t sp o radic. T he first m a jo r skirm ish w ith th e colonial arm y only to o k place a year la te r in 1964. 118

M O D E S O F MAKING W A R T h e P o rtu g u e se co m m an d in G uinea d ecid ed to u n d e rta k e a m ajo r m ilita ry o p e ra tio n b e tw e e n January and M arch o f th a t year, w hich w ould b ec o m e th e larg est o f all th re e stages o f th e w ar. Its objective was to reg ain ab so lu te c o n tro l o f th e riv e rs in th e so u th , an area th at had b een tak en by th e g u e rrilla s. T h e island o f C o m o was th e n erv e c e n te r o f this fluvial zone; th e force th a t c o n tro lle d it had g u a ra n ­ te e d access to all th e riv e rs and canals w h ich s ta rte d th e re . T h e re, th e PAIGC had set u p its fo rces and in stalled som e m akeshift in fra­ s tru c tu re , such as schools and h o sp itals, c o n v e rtin g th e area in to a lib e ra te d zone. T he guerrilla m ilitants w ere n o t the only enem y o f the P ortuguese army. For the first tim e, the P ortuguese w ould be co n fro n ted w ith the reality o f fighting u n d e r difficult geographic and clim atic conditions. The archipelago occupied an area o f 210 square k ilo m eters, o f w hich only a sm all p a rt w as fo rm e d o f solid g ro u n d . T h e rem ain in g area, about 170 square k ilo m eters, o r m o re than tw o th ird s, was fo rm ed of tarrafo, land w hich w ould fill w ith w a te r w h en th e riv er flooded, and w hen the w a te r subsided, w ould leave k ilo m eters and kilo m eters o f sludge and m u d . Besides high te m p e ra tu re s , re c e n tly deployed P o rtu g u ese so ld iers also had to deal w ith th e u n b earab le hum idity, w hich averaged at around 67 p e r cen t th ro u g h o u t the year. The P ortuguese m ilitary operatio n s sta rte d w ith the d istrib u tio n o f pam p h lets appealing for th e co llab o ratio n o f th e p o p u latio n . It was only after this th a t th e m ilitary co m m an d gave th e o rd e r for the dis­ patch o f m o re than 1,200 m en , com p o sed o f units o f p a ra tro o p e rs, m arin es, and sappers— a m ilitary apparatus to fight a g u e rrilla force o f no m o re than 300 m en , according to th e m o st g en ero u s estim ate by the P ortu g u ese co m m an d . T h ro u g h o u t th e seventy-five days o f the o p eratio n , th e P o rtu g u ese had th e su p p o rt o f th e air force and to r ­ ped o b o at d estro y ers w hich b o m b ed th e island day after day. U n d er such fire, very little could be d one by C ab ral’s m en. D u rin g the heavybom bing, the g u errillas hid them selves u n d e r th e tarrafo, o r in tunnels dug in the scant firm g ro u n d . Such m ilitary tech n iq u es could p ro te c t th em against th e napalm b o m b s, w hich ta rg e tte d th e tall trees. But they w ere n o t enough to p ro te c t against d e p th bo m b s, w hich, w hile w ith less p o w e r o f d e s tru c tio n , had a forceful psychological effect: a fte r th e ex p lo sio n , th e noise was so deafen in g th a t m o st g u e rrilla m en felt m o m en tarily d iso rien ted . 119

AM ILCAR CABRAL O n th e fo rtie th day o f th e assault, and at the height o f despair, N ino V ieira, c o m m an d er o f th e tro o p s in C o m o , sen t C abral an agonizing lette r w hich read as follows: “C om rades, be patient, b u t I have to ask for y our help. I am in a very serious situation, and th e n u m b er o f tro o p s is increasing every day [ ... ] all I can tell you is that w e w ill lose o u r troops and p o p u latio n .” Vieira w ould n o t receive th e su p p o rt he requested as his le tte r never arrived at its d estin atio n .T h e soldier w ho was given the mission to hand the le tte r to Cabral was cap tu red by the PIDE. O n th e P ortuguese side, things w ere n o t m uch better. The colonial arm y was re d u c e d to less than half o f th e forces deployed fo r the m is­ sion. But this was n o t because o f casualties, as th e PAIGC w ould later claim . A significant n u m b e r o f so ld iers w e re p u t o u t o f c o m b a t on acco u n t o f th e d eficient sanitary co n d itio n s, th e p o o r quality o f th e food, and, above all, th e low -quality d rinking w ater. T he P ortuguese m ilitary com m and w ould only ad m it to th e com bat deaths o f a dozen soldiers, against th e 6 50 claim ed by th e g uerrillas. T he PAIGC, on the o th e r side, w o u ld la m e n t th e d eath o f fo rty -e ig h t c o m rad e s in th e seventy-five-day cam paign. O n 20 M arch, the P ortuguese tro o p s, c o n ­ vinced th at they had attain ed th e ir goal o f clearing the island o f te r r o r ­ ists, finally received th e o rd e r to w ithdraw . How ever, by this tim e C abral had already o rd e re d his m en to aban­ don th e C o m o reg io n . Behind the w ithdraw al was the fact th a t C om o Island, n o tw ith sta n d in g its p riv ileg ed g eo g rap h ic location, had very little th a t ju stified th e sacrifices b ein g m ad e fo r its o ccu p atio n . T he PA IG C ’s forces w ould re tu r n th ere m any tim es in the future, forcing the P ortuguese tro o p s to organize o th e r clearing operations, b u t never again w ould they a tte m p t to establish them selves th ere perm anently. By occupying C om o Island, th e forces o f A m ilcar Cabral had p ro b ­ ably o v erestim ated th e ir ow n pow er. O r at least they had n o t co unted on the d e te rm in a tio n o f the P o rtu g u ese to keep th em at bay. But the guerrillas had le a rn t an im p o rta n t lesson: to avoid d ire ct c o n fro n ta­ tions o f th e conventional ty p e, as th e P o rtu g u ese tro o p s w ere m uch b e tte r p rep ared and equipped for this. But the occupation o f the island also show ed a lack o f in te re st in, o r resolve to finish the w ar through m ilitary action. F rom th e n o n , th e g u e rrilla tro o p s w ould above all ex p lo it reg io n s less accessible to th e P o rtu g u ese, such as C antanhez and Q u itafin e. L o cated a t th e b o rd e r w ith G u in ea-C o n ak ry , th ese

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M O D E S O F M A K IN G W A R regions becam e sanctuaries for the guerrillas, since P ortuguese tro o p s could n o t disem bark th e re as they w ere to o far from any p o in t o f su p ­ p o rt. In this way, th e a rm e d conflict in G u in ea e n te re d th e second phase o f the guerrilla war, know n as “stabilized resistance”. In an in te r­ view given to th e Tricontinental, Cabral stated th at in th e c o n tex t of the w ar in G uinea, this phase m ainly consisted o f allow ing th e enem y to do m inate certain reg io n s, dispersing its forces and w eakening o th e r p o sitio n s. This th e n allow ed th e g u e rrilla s to o ccupy th e p o sitions w here the enem y had b ecom e w eak, so as to politically w ork w ith the populations in these areas and p rev en t th em from allow ing the re tu rn o f colonial forces. A lth ou g h this in te rp re ta tio n is w eak precisely in w hat is usually C ab ral’s stren g th , m athem atics— as G uinea was n o t a closed circu it and it was im possible to fill th e gaps, sim ply bringing in m o re tro o p s o r re c ru itin g Africans w ith o u t necessarily opening new spaces— it condenses th e essence o f G uevara’s “b ite and escape,” since the im p o rta n t thing in this phase was to constantly p e ster the enemy. H ow ever, o n e w o n d e rs w h e th e r this was an accurate d esc rip tio n o f w h a t w as going on in G u in ea, o r if C abral was ju st saying w h at his audience was ex p ectin g to hear. * * * W h ile the fighting in C o m o was taking place, C abral su m m o n ed all available m ilitants for a first ex ten d ed m eeting, in m id-F ebruary 1964, w h ich , given its im p o rta n c e , tu r n e d in to th e first C o n g ress of the PAIGC. T h e place ch o sen fo r th e m e e tin g w as C assaca— b e tw e e n C om o and th e b o rd e r o f G uinea-C onakry. The m ilitary in su rrectio n had started only th ree m onths before, and cracks w ere beginning to appear in the organization and leadership of th e m o v em en t. T h e challenges th e PAIGC had to address, as Vasco Cabral rem inisced tw en ty years later, p u t th e p a rty “betw een victory and defeat .’’They w ere the p ro d u c t o f the disconnect b etw een the goals o f the liberation m ovem ent, on the one hand, and certain cultural m ani­ festations o r tribal resiliencies, on the other. T hese p roblem s began to endanger the relationship b e tw e e n th e p a rty and th e p o pulation and even threaten ed th e survival o f the p arty itself. As if Cabral w ere ad m itting to an e rro r that he him self had co m m it­ te d aroun d th e tim e o f his “re-A fricanization o f sp irits,” he later dis­ 121

A M ILCAR CABRAL avow ed th e so-called “R e tu rn to S ources.” H e a rg u ed th a t only the petty -b o u rg eo isie, o r th e assimilados at a certain stage in th e ir develop­ m en t, n e ed ed to re tu r n to th e source in o rd e r to discover the cultu re colonialism had separated th em from : th e m o re distant the “so urce”, the m ore desperate the search. U nsurprisingly, he added, these calls for a re tu rn to th e source began am ong th e A frican diaspora in the N ew W o rld and E u ro p e. A cco rd in g to C ab ral, A fricans did n o t have the ap p etite fo r such a search. O n th e co n trary : A fricans w ere th e source o f th e ir o w n c u ltu re an d th is c u ltu re w as a w ay to resist colonial repression. A t a later stage, w ith th e em erg en ce o f the national lib era­ tio n m o v em en t, th e process th ro u g h w hich its action w ould take place w ould b eco m e a factor o f cu ltu re itself. Cabral defined cu ltu re as being “at any m o m e n t in the life o f a soci­ ety (w h e th e r an o pen o r closed one), the m o re o r less conscious result o f econom ic and political activities, th e m o re o r less dynam ic ex p re s­ sion o f the relationships prevailing in th a t society.” In this way, cultu re changes as soon as the historical m aterial and spiritual conditions o f a p eo p le change. This is th e p o in t w h ich th e a c tio n o f th e lib eratio n m ovem ent had to take in to account: it had to inscribe on the individual and collective consciousness th e n ecessary p ro c e d u re fo r cu ltu ral change. This process fo r C abral im p lied “th e p ractice o f dem ocracy, criticism and self-criticism , th e grow ing p articip atio n o f m asses in the adm inistration o f th e ir ow n lives, literacy, th e setting up o f schools and health c e n te rs, th e fo rm a tio n o f cadres e x tra c te d from peasants and w o rk e rs’ environm ents,” am ong m any o th e r m easures to bring about a “g re a t acceleratio n o f so c ie ty ’s c u ltu ra l pro cess.” In sum , w ar influ­ en ced th e p ro cess o f cu ltu ra l change in m any ways, even if only to suddenly force the “prim itive population” in to a confrontation w ith the use o f “advanced w ar m aterials p ro d u ced by the m o st m o d e rn science and technology.” Accordingly, Cabral strongly believed th at w ar constitu ted a p o w er­ ful m eans to com bat “trib al m entality,” since fighters, soo n er o r later, w ould have to co n fro n t b e lie f and reason. Before the beginning o f the war, th ere w ere very few fighters w ho did n o t fear the ira— supranatural beings th at w ere believed to inhabit the forests. Few w ould e n te r into a forest at night; even few er w ould n o t kill a relative if they knew from a w itch d o cto r th at the la tte r w ere the cause for th eir m isfortunes.

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M O D E S O F M A K IN G WAR Initially, Cabral accepted these practices. Q u ite often he gave m oney to his m en in o rd e r to buy mezinhos — am ulets to hang on the w aist, the inside o f w hich w ere lined w ith pieces o f cloth w ith Q uranic surahs on th e m , to brin g luck, or, as m any believed, to m ake th em invulnerable to the en em y ’s fire. C abral e x p ected these beliefs to b ecom e obsolete after the beginning o f the w ar: th e fighters w ould learn from th eir ow n e x p e rie n c e s, seeing o th e r p e o p le dying, and co m e to k n o w th a t a tre n ch was m o re valuable than a mezinho in a firefight; o r they could be persu ad ed o f the nonexisten ce o f iras il they need ed to find shelter in the forest. H ow ever, th ese p ractices did n o t vanish w ith th e b eg in n in g o f the w'ar. Som e o f th e m flo u rish ed o r w ere ad ap ted to th e new c irc u m ­ stances. T he PAIGC n eed ed to m ove away fro m being an organization fo rm e d by a rm e d maquisards — w ith lo st and isolated u n its in the f o r­ est and m a ln o u rish e d so ld iers— to b eco m e an o rg an ization w ith the m o d e rn stru c tu re o f a b u rg eo n in g state. T he p a rty n e ed ed to becom e an en tity w ith a logic th at was no lo n g er trib al b u t strategic. It w ould g e t th e r e th ro u g h th e c re a tio n o f a p o litic a l sp h e re w ith its o w n legitim acy, above th a t o f th e m ilitary, th e civilians and trib al chiefs, and th e p o p u latio n s. For C abral, it was u rg e n t to set u p th e in stru m e n ts th ro u g h w hich the m ilitary could be c o n tro lle d by th e political. T he p rio rity was to b rin g the m ilita ry w in g o f th e p a rty u n d e r th e scru tin y o f civilians once m o re. For this to be achieved, th e first m easure was the creation o f strateg ic zones (th e N o rth , South and East F ronts being the m o st im p o rta n t) as w ell as o f the W ar C ouncil, an en tity th at was fo rm ed bv a dual leadership from each fro n t (a political com m issar and a m ili­ tary ch ief for each o f th e m ). Cassaca was also th e beginning o f C ab ral’s m o st ch erished p ro ject, and the raison d ’e tre for the w ar itself.T h e rationale for th eir creation was the need to fill th e void left by the ab an d o n m en t o f P ortuguese colonial adm inistratio n . In the beginning, th e p a rty a ttem p ted to p ro ­ vide populations w ith the basic resources for th e ir subsistence. As tim e w e n t on these zones b ecam e c e n tra l to th e life o f th e p a rty to th e e x te n t that a considerable p a rt o f th e p a rty ’s action was the p ro te ctio n o f such zones. Behind this logic, p articularly in regards to justice, was the idea that civilians should n o t only have co n tro l over the m ilitary, 123

A M ILCAR CABRAL b u t also tra d itio n a l a u th o ritie s. A ccordingly, th e logic o f th e p a rty should be above b o th th e forces o f w eapons and trad itio n . Cassaca was about breaking w ith the past and paving the way for a new future: as such, this Congress is less rem em bered for the reform s it in tro ­ duced in the p arty organization than for th e lucid ways in w hich ques­ tions regarding the m orality o f the p arty w ere discussed. Since the start o f the confrontations Cabral began receiving re p o rts that m ilitants sent to fight in certain zones had becom e w arlords. They refused to accept o rd ers o r com ply w ith instructions from the party, instead to rtu rin g or m u rd erin g anyone w ho challenged them . G iven th e circum stances, it was u n d erstan d ab le th a t a n u m b e r o f m ilitary m en had c o m m itted such grave erro rs. However, w hat Cabral and o th e r p a rty leaders did n o t ex p ect was that the m ilitary w ould n o t show any re m o rse over th e ir ow n failures. In fact, n o t only w ere they pro u d o f th e m , b u t they w ere even trying to a ttra ct th e ir co m p atrio ts’ esteem and adm iration. M any o f th em cam e to th e Congress accom pa­ nied by th e ir griots, th e ir harem s o f adolescents and th e ir bodyguards. Instead o f represen tin g p a rty au th o rity in th eir zones, these rogue m ili­ tary m en had instead b ecom e tribal chiefs. Cabral began by discussing th e q u estio n carefully. O nly tow ards the end o f th e C ongress, w hen he raised m o re m undane topics, such as the d e te rio ra tio n o f th e p o p u la tio n ’s living conditions due to the w ar and the actions th e p a rty w ere to take, did he address the issue at hand. He in tro d u ced th e to p ic o f criticism and self-criticism . O n the table was the p o o r behavior o f som e m ilitants. A n u m b e r o f people w ere su m ­ m oned to testify, nam ely those adolescents w ho, after som e initial hesi­ tancy, confessed w hat they had b een through w ith these m ilitants. A fter the self-criticism , th e p a rty sta rte d th e trials, w hich lasted th ro u g h the n ig h t o f th e 1Sth and only finished a t d aw n n e x t day. By this tim e , Cabral had already given th e o rd e r fo r everyone to be strip p ed o f th eir w eaponry, w ith th e ex cep tio n o f those w ho w ere p a rt o f the N o rth e rn F ro n t, th e g u errilla u n it C abral tru s te d m ore. O v er th e th irty h o u rs th at follow ed, Cabral p u rsu ed the in te rro g a ­ tions, calling the accused one by one. As tim e w ent on, Cabral had little d o u b t as to how to deal w ith these issues. As a guerrilla leader, he knew w h at he had to do: im pose a severe p u n ish m en t on these m ilitants in o rd e r to p rev en t the d eterio ratio n o f the relationship betw een the m ili­

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M O D E S O F M A K IN G W AR tary and die population. As such, on 17 February, Cabral sum m oned all m ilitants for the C o n g ress’ final rem arks. H e read o u t his conclusions and only th en m oved o n to th e verdict o f the accused. D em ocratically, he chose to ask th e p eople w hat the sentence should be. T hey chose to have the accused detained and later rehabilitated by the party. Those w ho had b een accused b u t w ere n o t at th e C ongress w ere also sen­ ten ced ; com m issions w ere fo rm e d to p u t those m ilitants on trial in th e ir resp ectiv e regions. A m ong th o se accused, som e w ere rehabili­ tated by the party, b u t at least tw o w ere shot dead in fro n t o f the p o p u ­ lations they had ab u sed . The PAIGC n ev er had any qualm s ab o u t the death sentences, and C abral re fe rre d to these killings as an exam ple o f w hat could happen to those w ho deviated from th e p a rty n o rm s. H ow ever, the C ongress alone was n o t enough to b rin g to g e th e r the tw o m ethods o f w arfare: th e m o d e rn o n e , ch am p io n ed by C abral and his fo llow ers, and the traditional one, w hich was ultim ately how m ost G uineans had in c o rp o ­ ra te d anticolonial w ar and its co n sequences— pain and death — into th e ir ow n w orldview . A lthough Cassaca m arks the m o m e n t w hen th e PAIGC m anaged to absorb th e m ilitary and traditional in to th e political, this C ongress did n o t end all th e pro b lem s p ro d u ced by the convergence o f these tw o ways o f being: th e m o d e rn and th e tra d itio n a l. Vasco C abral w ro te m any years later th at th e trials in Cassaca never sto p ped being p a rt of the daily life o f th e p a rty and th at they certainly d eserved m any o th er Cassaca C ongresses.

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7

THE CAPE VERDEAN QUESTION

Although the PAIGC claim ed to be fighting for the liberation o f Guinea and Cape Verde, th e fact o f the m a tte r was the arm ed struggle was only taking place in G uinea. T he few dozen Cape Verdeans w ho had joined the m ovem en t held positions in the leadership and adm inistration. The Guineans w ere the ones w ho w ere paying, as it was said at the tim e, the imposto de sangue (blood tax). N o t only w ere they the ones contributing

to th e p a r ty ’s m ilita ry u n its, b u t as th e c o m b a t w as taking place in G uinea, the civilian population was also greatly affected. In tu rn , this im balance negatively im pacted on the national lib eration m ovem ent. Pressure was th erefo re m o u n tin g w ithin th e p a rty to change things by expanding th e w ar into Cape Verde. M ilitary th eo ry played a ro le in this argum en t: opening a new m ilitary Iro n t in C ape Verde w ould fu r­ th e r disperse the Portuguese tro o p s, w hich w ould certainly result in an increase o f the Portuguese w ar effort in te rm s of re c ru itm e n t, logistics and so on. F u rth e rm o re , th e n e e d to expand m ilitary op eratio n s to Cape Verde also had a m oral dim ension: Cape Verde should c o n trib u te to its ow n liberation. To discuss th e issue o f m ilita ry actio n in C ape V erde, the p a r ty ’s d ire c to ra te h eld a m e e tin g in D akar fro m 17—20 July 1 9 6 3 .T ia g o A leluia and L o u ren co G o m es fro m C onakry, A ristides P ereira and Vasco Cabral from A ccra, V ictor Saude M aria from A lgiers, and Abilio D u arte, Bebiano d ’A lm eida, Lilica Boal, Pedro Pires, and Jose Araujo 127

A M ILCAR CABRAL from D akar w ere am ong th e participants. O svaldo Lopes da Silva and Silvino da Luz, w ho w ere n o t rep resen tin g any p a rticu lar gro u p , w ere also at the m eeting. T he la tte r had ju st d eserted from the colonial army, in w h ich h e ’d b e e n se rv in g in A ngola. T h e m in u te s o f th e m e e tin g em phasize its in fo rm al ch aracter; only those residing in D akar w ere invited, p erhaps explaining th e absence o f G uineans, w ith the ex ce p ­ tion o f V ictor Saude M aria. T he m eetin g was d escribed as a gathering o f com rades to share ideas for the p rep aratio n o f a m ilitary m ission in Cape Verde. T he overall to n e o f th e m eetin g was optim istic. It was sim ply taken for gran ted th at it w ould be feasible to dispatch m ilitants to the islands, although th e geographic peculiarities o f C ape V erde w ere also taken into consideration. Since th e islands did n o t have physical b o rd ers, any m ilitarized u n it th at landed th ere w ould have to com pletely fend for itself, w ith o u t b ein g able to rely o n supplies fro m s u p p o rt g ro u p s. M oreo v er, since C ape V erde did n o t have th e sam e h isto rical b ack ­ ground , Cabral tho u g h t th at the term s o f m obilization should be differ­ e n t. A n appeal against co lonialism w o u ld n o t w o rk , as m o st C ape V erdeans did n o t c o n sid e r th em selv es colo n ized: th e y co n sid ered them selv es P o rtu g u e se . As a s tu d e n t in L isbon, C abral h im se lf had w ritte n that “Cape Verde is, in fact, and to such an e x te n t, a Portuguese p ro d u c t”. So logically, th e first task for those landing th ere w ould to be to convince th e C ape V erdeans th a t th e y w e re b ein g colo n ized by P ortugal, even if it was sim ply fo r th e reason th at because they w ere originally fro m A frica, they had n o th in g to d o w ith the P o rtuguese. C rudely, it was because they w ere n o t w h ite. The case for the rig h t o f C ape Verdeans to self-d eterm in atio n , according to C abral, essentially rested on th e fact th at they had created th e ir ow n d istinct personality. T he p articu lar id en tity o f C ape V erdeans, m o re than C abral could perhaps adm it, was n o t sim ply an idea conjured up by the natives o f the islands. It was derived from the political status o f C ape Verde in rela­ tio n to th e co lonizing co u n try , P o rtu g a l. F or m o st o f C ape V erd e’s existence, p articu larly since th e end o f slavery, P o rtuguese ru le rs had n o t know n w hat to do w ith these islands. W hile G uinea, A ngola, and M ozam bique w e re unequivocally colonies o f indigenato — w h e re th e law divided th e natives b e tw e e n the vast m ajo rity o f indigenas and an insignificant m in o rity o f th e so-called civilized— C ape Verdeans as a 128

T H E CAPE V ERD EA N Q U E S T IO N w hole p o p u latio n w ere co n sid ered civilized, and in legal te rm s, the archipelago was half-way b etw een a colony and an “adjacency,” like the P ortuguese “adjacent” islands o f M adeira and the A zores, w hose status was effectively th at o f an island province o f P ortugal. For m o st people, it see m e d m o re fo r logistical reaso n s than p o litical ones th a t C ape Verde had n ever been given the sam e status as a P o rtuguese island in the A tlantic. The question o f “adjacency” inspired the m o st brilliant m inds of Cape Verde, w ho p roduced a significant am ount o f literature on the subject. T he proponents o f this type o f legal status form ulated tw o argum ents: the first was hum anitarian and the second civilizational. Firstly, turning Cape Verde into a p a rt o f Portugal was considered the m ost effective way to p ro te c t th e islands from the natural tragedies that they periodically faced. In o th e r w o rd s, because th e local g o v e rn m e n t did n o t have resources, the islands could be m ore easily assisted by the central adm in­ istration if they w ere a p a rt o f Portugal. Second, and m ore im portantly, it was argued that Cape Verde should be a p a rt o f Portugal on account ol the unusual “civilizational” level that Cape Verdeans had reached. “A djacency” was a political p ro ject w hose concretization dragged on for m o re than a century. In 1822, a new law m ade every n ew -b o rn in the C ape Verdean archipelago P ortuguese. In 1836, the M arquis o f Sa da Bandeira— w ho had signed th e d ecree abolishing the slave trad e in the P ortuguese te rrito rie s— suggested that the islands should be tra n s­ fo rm ed in to adm in istrativ e d istricts. In th e tw e n tie th century, adja­ cency w ould find o th e r advocates, such as O scar C arm o n a, the p re si­ d e n t o f th e repu b lic w ho, d u rin g a visit to Cape Verde in June 1939, d escrib e d th e arch ip elag o as a n a tu ra l ex te n sio n o f th e P o rtu g u ese provinces in E urope. In th e 1950s, A driano D u a rte da Silva, the re p re ­ sentative for C ape Verde in th e N ational Assembly, becam e one o f the m o st ferv en t advocates o f adjacency. For him , it was an aberration that C ape V erde d e p e n d e d o n ad m in istrativ e p ro c e d u re s to effectively b eco m e p a rt o f P o rtu g al, w h en adjacency should be g ra n te d to the islands on acco u n t o f th e fact th a t C ape V erdeans spoke P ortuguese, practiced the C atholic relig io n , dressed like m e tro p o litan w hites and, in som e areas such as education, p erfo rm ed even b e tte r than the inhab­ itants o f som e regions o f co n tin en tal P o rtu g a l. But th e fundam ental difference b etw een Cape V erdeans and natives o f o th e r te rr ito r ie s d o m in a te d by P o rtu g al was th at the fo rm e r w ere 129

AMILCAR CABRAL n o t su b je c t to th e indigenato — n o tw ith s ta n d in g th e cases o f C ape V erdeans fro m th e island o f Santiago w h o had b e e n re c ru ite d and se n t to Sao Tom e e P rin cip e as sim ple in d e n tu re d w o rk e rs, sharing th e sam e c o n d itio n s as th e fo rc e d la b o re rs fro m A ngola. T h e in d i­ genato w as above all a to o l fo r social e n g in e e rin g , d e te rm in in g the social ex p e c ta tio n s p e o p le co u ld have in th e colonies. Being “n ative” o r “civilized” d e te rm in e d th e salaries w o rk e rs co u ld e x p e c t, the area o f th e city w h e re th ey co u ld build th e ir h o uses, and the schools th e ir ch ild ren could a tte n d . Since C ape V erdeans w ere civilized, they cam e to have h ig h e r e x p e c ta tio n s th a n m o s t o th e r n atives o f th e o th e r P o rtu g u e se te rrito rie s . For Cabral, Cape Verdeans first and forem ost had to join the ranks o f the colonized, as acquiring the status o f an “adjacency” o r being granted P o rtu g u ese citizenship w o u ld only m ask th e ir real conditions. T he arm e d stru g g le w as a to o l to achieve this level o f consciousness, as C abral had m ad e clear in a le tte r w ritte n years befo re to M ario de A ndrade, in w hich he disagreed w ith the notion that the existence of race, o r o f any g ro u p o f people, conditioned th e “behavior o f a hum an aggregate.” Instead, he argued that it is a “hum an g ro u p ” that form s a “race” o r “ethnic gro u p ,” o r any o th e r social reality, to the e x ten t that its m em b ers face sim ilar p roblem s and struggle for th e same kind o f co m ­ m o n aspirations. In o th e r w o rd s, C abral did n o t see race and ethnic affiliation as a p rio ri categories, b u t ra th e r as the o utcom e o f concrete conditions. This n o tio n also u n d erp in n ed his u nderstanding o f the role o f the national m ovem ent as a factor o f culture. W ar in G uinea was a factor o f cu ltu re in that it m o ld ed the p eople itself, bringing to g eth er m em b ers o f diverse ethnicities w ho w ere subjected to the same kind of hardships. In this m aterialistic view, th o se w h o w ere fo rced to live to g eth e r u n d e r these circum stances w ere accepting new form s o f id en ­ tity. C abral believed th a t th e a rm e d stru g g le in C ape V erde w ould accom plish the same goal. As such, G uineans and Cape Verdeans could be bro u g h t to g e th e r through th e arm ed conflict, resulting in a higher level o f m utual identification and shared interests. C a b ra l’s u n d e rsta n d in g o f h isto ry an d c u ltu re prev ailed , and his th eo ries filtered in to the p rep aratio n s for th e m ilitary o p eration. The conclusion o f th e m eetin g was th at it should be possible to send the first tro o p s to th e islands w ith in tw o years. B ut first they n eed ed to 130

T H E CAPE V ERDEA N Q U E S T IO N re c ru it. Im m ediately after th e m eeting, C ab ral’s p a rty sta rte d to enlist Cape Verdeans from the diaspora com m unities residing in A frican c it­ ies. Dakar was the city w here th e p a rty ’s efforts w ere m ost productive, as it was n o t only th e hom e o f one o f th e largest com m unities o f Cape Verdeans abroad, b u t it was also w h ere th e p a rty had its m o st w ello rganized s u p p o rt c o m m itte e . C abral h im self set th e ex am p le: he re c ru ite d Cape Verdeans such as H erculano A ndrade, the son o f Nha L aurinda (w ho was h ersell th e m o th er-in -law o f his b ro th e r Luis, and w hose house he stayed in w hen he visited th e city), w ho brought his en tire family— his w ife, H e n rie tte Vieira, w ho for m any years w ould w ork as C ab ral’s secretary, and h er sons, w ho w ould be sent to Cuba w ith scholarships. T he accountant Lilica Boal was also given the task of re c ru itin g C ape V erdeans. She rem in isced m any tim es la te r th at she w ould som etim es leave the p a rty office on Felix Faure stre et, using the car-rapid (inform al public tran sp o rtatio n ) to search for Cape Verdeans across the city. In m o st cases, how ever, she g o t a cold recep tio n . A ccording to initial estim ates, th e p a rty h o p ed to re c ru it at least 1,000 Cape Verdeans in D akar— a n u m b er d eem ed reasonable in a city o f about 4 0 ,0 0 0 Cape Verdean nationals. H ow ever, these expectations had to be adjusted as th e p a rty found few p eo p le in te re ste d in being deployed to fight on the islands. P edro P ires, w ho b ro u g h t in som e of the highest n u m b e rs o f p eo p le, only m anaged to convince about sixty m en. This n u m b e r drastically decreased w h en th e tim e cam e to send the re c ru its to A lgiers for m ilitary training. T hose w ho rem ained w ith th e m o v e m e n t and a rriv e d in th e A lg erian capital caused so m any p ro b le m s th a t th e p a r ty ’s re p re se n ta tiv e in th a t city w as fo rce d to arrange th e ir r e tu r n to Dakar. F rom this g ro u p , the few w ho stayed w ith the p a rty w ere m ilitan ts such as A nto n io Leite, N icolau Pio and Afonso G om es. R e c ru itm e n t w as in creased w h en P ed ro P ires m oved to France, after spending a sh o rt p e rio d o f tim e in M oscow, w h e re he studied politics and techniques o f clandestine w ork. A m e m b e r o f the famous g ro u p o f stu d en ts w ho escaped Portugal in Jun 1961, Pires settled in M oselle, in th e re g io n o f L o rra in e , and tr ie d to re c r u it th e C ape Verdeans w ho w orked th ere. W h en the PIDE becam e aware o f Pires activities, the P ortuguese police co n tacted th e F rench secret services, w ho sum m o n ed Pires and in fo rm ed him th at he was no longer w el­ 131

A M ILCA R CABRAL co m e in F rance. Since France was an ally o f P o rtu g al, he could n o t co n tin u e his p o litical activities w ith in F ren ch te rrito ry .T h e PAIGC th en d ecided to w ith d raw its th irty m en and send th em to Algiers. T he recru its from E urope and Africa w ere sent to Algiers in 1965, w h e re they w ere assigned th e ir responsibilities. P edro Pires was appoin ted as co m m a n d e r o f th e g ro u p , w ith H o n o rio C hantre as his deputy. Pedro da Cunha becam e the political commissar, while Silvino da Luz was given the duty o f m ilitary coordination, w hich involved oversee­ ing the collection o f all necessary inform ation for the m ission, such as m aps, as w ell as data on th e Portuguese m ilitary units in Cape Verde. T he o u tlin es o f th e m ission began to take shape w h en th e g ro u p arriv e d in H avana, w h e re fro m 1966 o n w a rd s m o re tra in in g was planned . H ere, th e p rep aratio n s consisted o f techniques such as m a ri­ tim e landings, sw im m ing, and survival techniques in high seas. Classes in g u errilla w arfare w ere th e core o f th e preparatio ns, fo r the PA IG C’s plan was to carry o u t in Cape Verde an o p eratio n sim ilar to that o f Che G uevara and Fidel C astro in Sierra M aestra.T h ey could reach the ce n ­ te r o f th e larg est island, Santiago, by sea o r w ith p arach u tes, taking over the highest m ountains and form ing th ere the first Joco o f in su rrec­ tio n . In later stages o f th e plan, and only after intensive political w ork w ith th e p o p u la tio n , th e g ro u p w ould begin re c ru itin g soldiers and taking positions on the island, b u t above all, w ould always avoid d irect co nfro n tatio n w ith th e P ortuguese m ilitary forces u n til the conditions w e re in place fo r th e lau n ch o f th e final phase— th e invasion o f the m ajor u rb an cen ters. However, for various in ter-related reasons th e training program m e had to be in terru p ted . In O cto b er 1967, Cuba was shocked to hear o f the disastrous operation that Che Guevara had been leading in Bolivia. The death o f the Argentinian revolutionary was a m ajor setback for his revo­ lutionary theory: Guevara had been convinced that it could be applied anyw here, discounting th e n o tio n that the triu m p h in Cuba could have been the exception to the rule. The disastrous escapades in Bolivia had n o t only cost the lives o f som e o f the in stru cto rs w ho had been assigned to accom pany the PAIGC to Cape Verde, b u t also th rew into disarray the th e o ry o f Jocos itself. M o re im p o rtan tly , th e v irtu al disappearance o f Guevara som e years earlier and his sudden reappearance in Bolivia p ro ­ vided the A m erican secret services w ith confirm ation that Cuba w anted 132

T H E CAPE V E R D E A N Q U E S T IO N to spread th eir revolutionary creed to o th e r p arts o f the globe. From then on, Cubans w ere placed u n d er even tig h ter surveillance. In January 1968, at an event for the C ape Verdean pledge o f alle­ giance, C abral trav elled to C u b a to m e e t w ith his m e n and discuss alternative ways o f landing on th e islands w ith o u t the su p p o rt o f the C ubans. A fter th e m eetin g , a decision was taken to transfer the entire gro u p to the Soviet U nion. T he Soviets, how ever, m o re realistic than the C ubans, refu sed fro m th e o u ts e t to su p p o rt a m ission th a t they considered suicidal. N onetheless, they received th e C ape Verdeans in th eir m ilitary institutes and helped them develop th eir skills in ballistics and artillery. W ith th e C ape V erdeans still insisting on th e ir m ission after they had finished th e ir training, the Soviets provided th em w ith a boat, w hich w ould be co m m an d ed by H ercu lan o V ieira, an ex-captain o f the m e rc h a n t navy w ho had ju st jo in ed th e group. T he g ro u p r e tu rn e d to A lgiers, b u t as th e ir m ission d rew closer, its cohesion began to falter. A n u m b e r o f m ilitants w anted to abandon the assignm en t, b u t th ey w e re fo rced to stay in o rd e r to p rev e n t any leaks o f in fo rm a tio n . In th e m ea n tim e , th e PID E seem ed to be aw are o f the ongoing p re p a ra tio n s, and various effo rts w ere m ade to p r e ­ v e n t th e p o ssib ility o f a m ilita ry landing. F o r e x a m p le , m ig ra n ts re tu rn in g to th e islands fro m o th e r places w ere m o re tightly sc ru ti­ nized. All b o ats using th e p o r ts o f th e island w ere m o re rigorously m o n ito re d . T h e local p o lice also c a rrie d o u t a n u m b e r o f ra n d o m searches w ith th e aim o f detain in g su p p o sed m ilitan ts o f th e PAIGC. D ozens o f p e o p le in Santo A ntao and o th e r areas w ere d etain e d and accused o f c o llectin g in fo rm a tio n on th e viability o f th e m ission and o f possessing p ro p ag an d a m aterials. It is n o t far-fetched to suggest that Cabral him self may have inadver­ ten tly caused these deten tio n s. In January 1968, C abral was detained at th e a irp o rt in Paris w hile a tte m p tin g to e n te r th e co u n try w ith a p a ssp o rt issued by G uinea-C o n ak ry , in th e n am e o f O u sm an Keita. A lthough he did n o t have p erm issio n to e n te r France— he had been issued w ith a travel ban by th e F rench g o v ern m en t in 1964---- he had visited th e c o u n try m any tim es u n d e r d ifferen t id en tities. H ow ever, this tim e, a le rte d by th e P ortuguese police, th e F rench n o t only p re ­ vented him from en te rin g th e country, b u t also to o k this o p p o rtu n ity to search his do cu m en ts, w hich w ere photographed and the copies sent 133

A M ILCA R CABRAL to Lisbon. As the PIDE then discovered, Cabral planned to send a n u m ­ b e r o f C ape Verdeans to th e island fro m different E uropean co u n tries w ho, u n d e r the cover o f developing com m ercial activities, w ould co n ­ spire against th e colonial regim e. In a le tte r w ritte n im m ediately after his d e te n tio n , C abral tr ie d to reassu re P ed ro P ires th a t th e F ren ch p o lice w o u ld n o t send th e p h o to g ra p h e d d o c u m e n ts to Lisbon. H ow ever, th e d eten tio n s th at follow ed, specifically o f people th at had recen tly arriv ed in Cape Verde, show ed th e e x te n t to w hich C abral’s optim ism was m isplaced. W ith all these setbacks, th e p a rty was forced to p o stpone the inva­ sion. H ow ever, in general, these events w ere a w in for the party. From this p o in t fo rw ard , th e PAIGC could c o u n t am on^ its n u m b ers m o re m ilitants tra in e d in a rtille ry and o th e r m ilitary techniques, even if a n u m b e r o f th em refused to fight in G uinea, p re fe rrin g to r e tu rn to th e ir p rev io u s lifestyles. T h ese m ilita n ts did n o t believe th e p a r ty ’s arg u m en t th at every b u llet shot in G uinea c o n trib u te d to the in d ep en ­ dence o f C ape Verde. H ow ever, in Cape Verde the new s o f the cancel­ lation o f th e o p e ra tio n w as receiv ed w ith g re a t c o n c e rn . P edro M onteiro , in his m em o irs, used harsh w ords to convey his fru stratio n . A t th at tim e, he had b een a sem i-clandestine m ilitan t on the island o f Santiago, and h e co n sid ered th a t this change o f plans b o th gave the im pression th at the p a rty had no strategy for C ape V erde, and also left the nationalists th e re totally u n a rm e d against PIDE brutality. A fter these deten tio n s, plans for a possible m ilitary landing in Cape Verde w ere largely discarded. For the m o st p a rt, Cape Verdeans w ere n o t in terested in independence. And w ith o u t the possibility o f e x te n d ing the w ar to the archipelago, the PAIGC was left to address increasing accusations over the privileged position o f Cape Verdeans in the national liberation m o v em en t. This failure th erefo re only heightened tensions w ithin the m ovem ent, th e resu lt o f w hich w ould be tragic.

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8

A STATE INSIDE THE COLONY

For m o st o f the w ar for independence, the m ilitary situation in Guinea was a so-called “low -intensity conflict”. This was p artly due to the size o f the colony itself, w ith th e to tal area o f the G uinean te rrito ry only being about 36,125 square k ilom eters. Each location w ithin the te r r i­ to ry w here m ilitary confrontations w ere taking place was close enough to the rear-g u ard th at it was m o re tem p tin g for th e guerrillas to simply re tire to o n e o f th e sanctuaries than to d efen d any given position. F u rth e rm o re , for C abral’s m en , it was also possible to e n te r the te r r i­ tory by sunset, strike a target, and leave the te rrito ry before sunrise. O n the o th e r hand, the size o f the te rrito ry was also an advantage for the defending force, th e P ortuguese. T he air force could easily deploy or w ithdraw tro o p s to strike the guerrillas, since it was possible to reach any p o int in the co u n try w ithin a m axim um ol th irty m inutes. B ut th e flexibility th a t C a b ra l’s m e n enjoyed also allow ed th e P ortuguese to deny on several occasions th at the PAIGC had m ilitary units inside th e c o u n try at all. In fact, in 1967, Cabral had o rd ered his m e n to aban d o n th e m ilitary bases w h ich th e m o v e m en t had m a in ­ tained inside the te rrito ry . The ex tra m obility afforded by closing these sites was w ell kn o w n to th e P o rtu g u ese, b u t it was also used to allege the n o n -e x iste n c e o f any p a rty stru c tu re s inside G uinea. A m essage in te rce p te d by the P ortuguese m ilitary intelligence, for exam ple, and ex hibited to foreign journ alists, m en tio n ed that Cabral had w arned his 135

AM ILCAR CABRAL m en n o t to stay in th e sam e location for m o re than tw o days, o r else they w ould risk revealing th e ir positions. W ith such tactics, th e PAIGC was dow nplaying the m ilitary co m p o ­ n e n t o f th e struggle. By attacking a position one day and abandoning it th e n e x t, C a b ra l’s m ilitan ts w ere n o t m aking any serious inroads in th eir attem p ts to liberate th e co u n try militarily. It was rare for them to occupy positions and defend th em at all costs against the attacks o f the colonial army. But these m easures w ere less a re su lt o f the w eakness o f the m ove­ m en t, as im plied in the com m entaries o f Portuguese officials, and m ore abou t th e n eed to curb th e p o w er o f th e m ilitary. For C abral, m ilitary actions should be lim ited to p ro te c tin g th e m o v e m en t’s civilian activi­ ties. T hese activities, as th e years w e n t on , w ould beco m e th e raison d ’etre o f th e PAIGC.

In his m anual on g u errilla w arfare, G uevara n o t only em phasizes the im p o rta n c e o f rear-g u ard zones as being “unattainable to the enem y”, b u t also adds th a t n o g u e rrilla m o v e m e n t co u ld d o w ith o u t th e m . T hese sanctuaries should be used to supply th e tro o p s, to politically and m ilitarily train n ew re c ru its, and, m o re im portantly, to provide a space fo r th e d ev elo p m en t o f social actions w ith in the population. But few guerrillas in Africa had taken th e m aintenance o f these sanctuaries as seriously as th e PAIGC. For C abral, retain in g these zones becam e the w a r’s raison d ’etre, as if the goal o f his m ovem ent was to build a state w ithin the colony. In F ebruary 1964, ab o u t a year a fte r th e b eginning o f the war, the PAIGC leadership m e t fo r th e first C on g ress, th e so-called C ongress o f Cassaca, as discussed in C h ap ter 6. C o n fro n tin g n u m e ro u s cases o f abuse o f pow er, Cabral had pushed forw ard the n o tio n th at the PAIGC was n o t a m ilitarist party, b u t ra th e r a p a rty fo rm e d by a rm e d m ili­ tants. As a bloody co n firm atio n o f this tr u th , th e p a rty had m ade the difficult d ecisio n to physically elim in ate th o se w h o had abused th e populatio n . From th en on, th e PAIGC w ould strive to lim it the pow er o f the m ilitary w herever possible, o r at least to m ake it m o re tra n sp a r­ e n t to civilians. These co ncerns w ere tran slated in to practical m easures through the creatio n o f dual p o w er stru c tu re s: m ilitary units w ere to be led by a political co m m issar alongside a m ilita ry co m m an d er. F u rth e rm o re , 136

A STATE INSIDE T H E C O L O N Y m ilitary units w ere reorganized in to units ol th e FARP (Formas Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo— P eo p le’s R evolutionary A rm ed Forces)— c re ­ ated at this C ongress— w h ich b ecam e th e m ilitary b ackbone o f th e party. FARP units w ere com posed o f m obile and flexible groups, called bi-groups, m ade up o f th irty -eig h t fighters including the political co m ­ m issar and the m ilitary com m ander. Bi-groups could o p erate in c o n ­ ju n c tio n w ith o th e r b i-g ro u p s o r separately. As th e FARP received express o rd e rs n o t to rem ain to o long in any one location, the p ro te c ­ tion o f the liberated zones was m ostly u n d ertak en by th e local p o p u la­ tions them selves. T he bi-gro u p s, in this way, had to be constantly on the m ove, never stopping for m o re than six w eeks in G uinea, during w hich tim e they dep en d ed on a “n etw o rk o f m ilitias in constant expan­ sion” for th e ir logistics and in fo rm atio n , according to Basil Davidson. To keep th e stru g g le alive, C abral n o t only d e p e n d e d on his o rg a ­ nizational abilities, b u t also o n his d ip lo m atic skills. Since th e p a rty largely d ep en d ed on in tern atio n al aid, C abral was constantly engaged in in ten se d ip lo m atic activity. T his is illu stra te d by a r e p o r t w ritte n by the jo u rn alist Suzanne Lipinska for the Africasia m agazine. Lipinska in terv iew ed C a rm e n Pereira, th e n one o f th e m o st p ro m in e n t fem ale m ilitan ts in th e p arty , w ho, in tro d u c in g th e jo u rn a list to th e g u e rril­ las and th e p o p u la tio n , stated th a t although she was w h ite, “h e r co lo r was n o t th e sym bol o f o p p ressio n .” A ccording to P ereira, th e re w ere tw o kinds o f w h ite p eo p le: th o se w ho h elp ed and those w ho did n o t. Even th o u g h F ra n c e , L ip in sk a’s c o u n try o f o rig in , w as an ally o f P o rtu g al, p ro v id in g it w ith th e Alouette h e lic o p te rs, to r exam ple, it was also w h ere a n u m b e r o f s u p p o rt co m m ittees w ere based, sending b lo o d , m ed icin es, and a ran g e ol h ealth m aterials to the m ilitants o f th e PAIGC. P ereira w as alluding to th e d ip lo m atic m aze th a t C abral and th e PAIGC had to navigate. W hile m o st W estern co u n tries w ere allies of the P ortug u ese u n d e r the b an n er o f NATO, m any o f them w ere also dem ocracies, m eaning the PAIGC was allow ed to w o rk th ere in o rd e r to raise hum anitarian funds for the social w o rk o f the party. But to get the su p p o rt it n eed ed , the p a rty had to invest a considerable am ount of tim e and skills in to in fo rm atio n , com m u n icatio n , and o u trig h t p ro p a­ ganda. The narrative in m ost o f the PA IG C’s o u treach w ork was that despite the p ressu re from th e P ortuguese, the p a rty was carrying o u t 137

A M ILCAR CABRAL social w o rk w ith a con sid erab le im p act o n th e p o p u latio n u n d e r its p ro te c tio n . But m o re im portantly, the PAIGC was also cam paigning in France to raise the consciousness o f its citizens. In the long ru n , this strategy w ould help secure the su p p o rt o f the international com m unity fo r the in d ep en d en ce o f G uinea. T he PAIGC did n o t have to b e a r th e en tire b u rd e n o f the p ro p a ­ ganda effo rt. Since its beginnings, C ab ral’s p a rty regularly m e t w ith o p in io n m a k e rs, p h o to g ra p h e rs, film m akers, and rep resen ta tiv es o f European parliam ents. O n e o f the first citizens o f a W estern co untry to visit a lib erated zone was th e F rench film m aker M ario M arre t, w ho directed th e d o cu m en tary Lala Quema, shot entirely in the south o f the country. At that tim e, the guerrillas did n o t even have uniform s, so they had to “buy blue jeans, shirts and sandals for the fighters o f the central base o f th e so u th .” M a rre t re tu rn e d in 1966 to shoot Nossa Terra, the sam e year th a t th e PAIGC received th e Italian film m akers P iero Nelli and Eugenio Bentivoglio to sho o t the d o cu m en tary Labanta Negro, this tim e in the n o rth e rn p a rt o f th e c o u n try in M ores. In 1967, the Cuban Jose Massip visited th e lib erated zones to film M adina do Boe. T he fol­ low ing year, th e B ritons John Sheppard, R ichard D odds, and C hristian W ra n g le r from G ranada TV visited these zones to shoot the episode A Sm all Group oj Terrorists Attacked, for th e series World in Action. The life o f the liberated zones was also cap tu red in pictures by p h o ­ to g ra p h e rs such as B runa A m ico and M ichel Flonorin and dep icted in rep o rta g e and books. All this m aterial circulating in W estern countries c o n trib u te d to in creased aw areness o f th e w a r in G uinea. Basil Davidson w ro te The Liberation ojG uine and its publication in 1969 coin­ cided w ith the that o f The Struggle o j Mozambique by Eduardo M ondlane. In Italy, the book Guinea-Bissau— una Rivoluzione Africana was published, au th o red by B runo C rim m i and U liano Lucas, th e fo rm e r a jo u rn alist and frien d o f C abral. In F rance, a n u m b e r o f re p o rts and books by G erard Chaliand w ere also available, such as LutteArm ee enA jrique, and the various articles and essays o f M ario de A ndrade for his m agazine in Paris, Presence Africaine. A n u m b e r o f politicians from E uropean parliam ents, especially from n o rth e rn E urope, also travelled to G uinea to visit som e o f the liberated zones. O n e such exam ple was the visit by a Swedish delegation led by Birgitta D ahl, a representative for the Social D em ocratic Party, and the 138

A STATE INSIDE T H E C O L O N Y coordinator of a com m ission for aid to developing countries. The invita­ tion was m ade by Cabral him self and th e travel was su p p o rted by the Tage E rlander Fund, w hich was m anaged by h er ow n p arty to finance the travel o f its youngest m em b ers w ho w ere interested in “studying the social econom ic conditions in developing co u n tries.” U pon h er re tu rn to her coun try on 6 January 1971, Dahl published a lengthy re p o rt in the Ajtonbladet (a new sp ap er published in Stockholm w ith an average circulation o f 5 0 7 ,4 0 0 copies a day) w ith the follow ing frontpage head­ line: “Representative of the Riksdag visits the m ost successful guerrilla in the w orld.”The article, referenced in o th e r Swedish new spapers, m e n ­ tio n e d th a t th e g ro u p had visited 162 schools and fifty-three health c en te rs. In a c o m m u n iq u e fro m th e M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, the clerks of the Portuguese embassy in Stockholm w ro te of their belief that this visit was linked to the Swedish g o v e rn m e n t’s increased c o n trib u ­ tions to various liberation m ovem ents, since, as they explained, Dahl also w o rk ed for SIDA, th e d e p a rtm e n t o f th e Sw edish M inistry o f Foreign Affairs in charge of aid to the p o o rest countries in the w orld. A lthough the p a rty was receiving a considerable am o u n t o f su p p o rt in its propaganda efforts, C abral’s organization still faced serious p ro b ­ lem s w ith in tern al com m unications, despite th e fact th at G uinea s size, at least in th e d ry season, facilitated th e ra p id m o v e m e n t from one fro n t to another. The C ongress o f Cassaca had upheld the b elief that a m ajor cause o f th e m ilita n ts’ m istakes was the isolation in w hich they found them selves. T hey w ere largely cu t off from co n tact w ith o th er m e m b e rs o f th e p a rty and significantly they w ere unable to receive updated p a rty guidelines. T he PAIGC consistently trie d to fill this gap th ro u g h m any initiatives, including th e publication of the new spaper A Libertagao, w hich was ty p ed and p rin te d by Cabral him self. H owever, as m ost o f the G uinean com batants w ere illiterate, radio becam e bo th the m ost im p o rtan t m eans o f com m unication and the m ost pow erful w eapon the p arty could use against the enemy. Also know n as the canhao de boca do partido, o r “m o u th cannon o f the PAIGC,” it gave everyone a sense o f connected n ess. In th e b eginning o f th e war, the PAIGC had b een given a sm all rad io tra n s m itte r th ro u g h w hich the m essages o f th e p arty and som e C ape Verdean songs w ere broadcast. M ore regular shows w ould only sta rt in the beginning o f 1965, w hen Amelia Araujo, nicknam ed M aria T urra by th e P ortuguese (Turra col­ loquially translating to te rro ris t), becam e its m ain voice. 139

A M ILCA R CABRAL As th e im p o rta n c e o f radio in th e p a rty ’s in tern al propaganda grew, a few m ilitants travelled to th e Soviet U nion in 1966 to particip ate in nine m onths o f training in this area. A t the end o f the course, they w ere given a S oviet-m ade p o rta b le tra n s m itte r w ith a ran g e w h ich only allow ed for broadcasting if it w ere in the in te rio r o f the country. As the risk o f broadcasting being d etected was very high, w ith the consequent risk o f air strikes, Cabral never authorized the use o f this transm itter. It was only in 1967, thanks to th e don atio n o f a tra n sm itte r and a studio by Sw eden, th a t Radio Libeitagao (Radio Liberation) started to be heard th ro u g h o u t G uinea and C ape Verde T he beginning o f Radio Libertagao broadcasts was re c o rd e d by the Portuguese them selves. A ccording to a com m unique from the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, th e PAIGC started broadcasting on 14 A ugust 1967 at the frequency 5000 k c /s . T he choice o f this specific frequency was in terp re te d as a provocation, since the official Bissau broadcast operated on 5040 k c /s . So, according to the co m m an d er-in-chief o f G uinea, it was likely that an individual searching for th e state broadcaster w ould end up tuning in to the g u errilla one. This was even m o re dangerous as Radio Libeitagao's signal, according to the PIDE, could be received across the w hole o f Guinea. They arrived at this conclusion through tests con­ ducted at 9am on 30 July 1967, w hich coincided w ith the broadcasting

o f an appeal ex h o rtin g listeners to g ather in th e Pidjiguiti D ock on 3 A ugust to m a rk th e anniversary o f th e “m assacre.” A ccording to this re p o rt, A m elia Araujo expressed h erself in c o rre c t P ortuguese and the listening conditions w ere perfect. R adio becam e th e m ain link b e tw e e n th e m ilitants o f the party, as w ell as a fu n d am en tal c o m p o n e n t o f its p ropaganda cam paign. It was th ro u g h these b roadcasts th a t m any fighters, o n th e ir long and risky jo u rn ey s th ro u g h th e country, receiv ed n ew s, listening in to the fre ­ q u e n t w ar co m m u n iq u es o n th e m ilitary situ atio n on o th e r fronts. In additio n to this, th e forces on th e fro n t lines, as they passed through o r re tu rn e d to Conakry, c o n stitu te d a p riv ileg ed source o f first-hand in fo rm a tio n o n the situ atio n w h e re they had b een deployed. Initially, P ortu g u ese and C reole w ere th e languages o f th e radio pro g ram s, b u t th e range o f listen ers soon ex p an d ed w h en th e radio sta rte d offering shows in o th e r languages, such as Balanta, Beafada, M acanha and, sub­ sequently, Fulani and M andinka. T h e ra d io b ro ad cast show s such as 140

A STATE INSIDE T H E C O L O N Y Vamos Conhecer a Nossa Terra (L e t’s g e t to k n o w o u r land), w hich was fifteen m in u tes long and focused on th em es relatin g to th e geography

o f the country. Years later, th e show was e x te n d e d to half an h o u r in o rd e r to include new s o n P o rtu g a l’s o th e r w ars in A frica, especially in A ngola, thanks to reg u lar com m u n icatio n s w ith staff at the M PLA ’s ra d io , Viva Angola Combatente, b ro a d c a st fro m B razzaville to th e A ngolan te rrito ry . T h e ra d io p ro g ra m s w e re also ta rg e te d at th e P o rtu g u e se : th e y c o n sta n tly in v ited P o rtu g u e se so ld iers to d e s e rt, an d , w h e n e v e r p o ssib le, d e s e rte rs w e re in te rv ie w e d b e fo re bein g re tu rn e d w ith p o m p and circu m stan ce to th e Red C ross in Dakar. To low er the m o rale o f th e colonial force, the nam es o f P o rtuguese so l­ diers killed in co m b at w ere o ften read o u t, using th e o b itu aries w r it­ ten in P ortu g u ese n ew sp ap ers them selves. Producing the c o n te n t for the shows was hard w ork, and was m ostly carrie d o u t by A m elia A raujo, as w ell as h er husband Jose Araujo, and fellow nationalist D ulce Alm ada. Cabral was one o f the m ain c o n trib u ­ to rs to Radio Libertagao: he was always in terv iew ed on his re tu rn from a trip abroad, and he also w ro te a w eekly edito rial. But m ore im p o r­ tantly, he also provided a g reat deal o f m o ral su p p o rt, often stopping by the radio facilities in the evening— eith er by him self o r accom panied by his wife Ana M aria— to ask if th ere was anything he could do to help o r sim ply to encourage the staff. W orking conditions w ere difficult, so th e se visits w e re highly a p p re c ia ted . D u rin g th e rainy season, fo r exam ple, the ra d io ’s staff had to w o rk w ith th e d o o r o f the tru c k open because o f the heat, despite the m osquitoes. W ith alm ost every m e m ­ b er o f the ra d io ’s team also carrying o u t o th e r tasks in the party adm in­ istration, the recordings w ere m ade th ro u g h o u t the night, rarely finish­ ing before the m o rn in g — ju st in tim e to “press the b u tto n to go on air.” Radio Libertafao had b e c o m e o n e o f th e m ain e le m e n ts o f th e

PAIGC’s strategy, as G eneral A ntonio Spinola quickly u nderstood w hen he arrived in G uinea as g o v ern o r and m ilitary com m ander. In his co n ­ c e p t o f to ta l w ar, in w h ich th e m ilita ry and civilian categ o ries are b lu rre d , he identified the PA IG C ’s radio as one o f his m ain targets. The official Bissau b roadcast began to resp o n d to th e PA IG C ’s attacks and to take advantages o f its A chilles’ heel: th e supposed u n ity b etw een Cape Verdeans and G uineans. The radio sta rte d a cam paign against the Cape Verdeans in all th e languages o f G uinea, appealing to nativism to 141

A M ILCAR CABRAL p it the tw o g roups against each other. Spinola p ro m ised to d e m o te all Cape Verdeans from th e ir leading positions in the adm inistration, to be replaced w ith th e “tru e sons o f G uinea.” Aware o f th e dam age th at could be d one by these m essages, Cabral trie d to respond: The colonists know that the political and moral unity, the combative unit of our people of Guinea and Cape Verde is the principal force of our people and our fight. In this way, they p retend to destroy it, attem pting to create hatred which never existed before to stir the ambition and the opportunism among those that, although they do not take part in the fight, are nationalists and want the liberation of our country. But even there they are completely lost. First, because the tru e nationalists from Guinea are not racist n o r opportunists and know, as militants of our party, who their leaders are and what the value is of the people of Guinea and Cape Verde. Secondly, they lie when they say they will expel the Cape Verdeans. They can’t do it, since they need the Cape Verdeans who serve them , in the same way that they need the Guineans who serve them . And the colonists know very well the great service they would do to our party and our fight if they would expel the Cape Verdeans. As we will see, C ab ral’s w ords, u nfortunately, w ere w ishful th in k ­ ing. Spinola had to u ch ed a raw nerv e. M any o th e r m e th o d s w o u ld be u sed in an a tte m p t to silence the radio, o r at least to m ake its transm ission m o re difficult. The m o st basic techniq u e was to p ro d u ce in terferen ce by issuing a signal in the same frequency. But o th e r m o re sophisticated techniques w ere also used. For exam ple, after a th o ro u g h study o f th e legislation o f the International U nion o f T elecom m unications (U IT ), th e secretary o f state for Foreign Affairs p re se n te d a com p lain t to this organization against the PAIGC. T he a rg u m en t was th at th e nationalist rad io was in te rferin g w ith the transm issio n o f th e official Bissau b ro ad cast w h ich had already b een given th e frequency o f 5000 k c /s by th e UIT, m eaning this frequency could n o t b e used to tra n sm it any o th e r signals. But the P ortuguese g o v e rn m e n t did n o t w a n t to in sist o n this. Even if th e claim w as accepted as justified, th e situation could only be resolved if the o th e r p a rty com plied voluntarily. Since in fo rm a tio n o n th e lib erated zones is very ra re and h ard to find, o ften b u rie d in p erso n al archives— w ith th e possible ex c ep tio n 142

A STATE INSIDE TH E C O L O N Y o f refere n ce s m ad e to th e m in C a b ra l’s sp eech es— m any questions a b o u t th e ir m a n ag em en t and location rem ain unan sw ered. M ustafah D h ad a’s Warriors at Work provides a w ealth o f detail on the everyday life o f th e lib e ra te d zones. T h e c o n clu sio n s th a t cam e o u t o f th e Cassaca C ongress p resen ted th e p a rty w ith a co n trad ictio n . W hile the cre a tio n o f fixed a d m in istrativ e s tru c tu re s had b e e n id entified as a priority, the organization o f the m ilitary in to m obile and flexible units called bi-g ro u p s had b een aban d o n ed . In this way, th e p a rty had sac­ rificed its ability to d efen d specific p o in ts in th e field. T he PAIGC could n o t have m ain tain ed p o p u latio n s o f several th o usand people in the face o f a b o m b in g cam paign, even if one co n sid ers the facts that these zones w ere d efen d ed by p o p u la r m ilitias; th a t the fighters had developed sophisticated system s o f defense, such as false paths, b r o ­ ken bridges and landm ines; and th a t m any o f the lib erated zones w ere found inside th e fo rest. But this does n o t m ean th a t th e PAIGC had n o t reta in e d the socalled liberated zones inside th e country. This, at least, was the thesis defended by a n u m b er journalists w ho covered the w ar in G uinea from the Portuguese side, such as Jim Hoagland from The Washington Post, and the South African Al Venter, au th o r o f Portugal’sWar in Guinea. The tru th , however, is that the lib erated zones did n o t always have the same stra ­ tegic w eight w ithin th e party and that th e ir m aintenance always hinged on the balance o f forces b etw een C ab ral’s m en and the colonial army. It had been easy to keep those spaces in th e early years o f the w ar due to the w ithdraw al o f the colonial adm inistration from m any districts. As m any inhabitants had d ecided to stay, the PAIGC simply occupied the em pty spaces that the local adm inistration left behind. However, as the colonial arm y began its offensive— at the end o f the consulship of G eneral A rnaldo Schultz and the beginning o f Spinola’s m andate— it is unlikely that th e FARP could still hold these positions by 1968, as the Portuguese airforce controlled the airspace and w ere bom bing, or w ill­ ing to bom b, m o re indiscrim inately. W ith this change o f in the balance o f forces, th e PAIGC gave the populations the choice of staying in the new ly liberated regions, despite airstrikes, o r finding refuge in neighboring co u n tries. D u rin g the first years o f the war, as we have seen, the PAIGC had dom inated a n u m b er o f re g io n s such as C o m o Island, w h e re th ey had p u t in place basic 143

A M ILCAR CABRAL facilities such as schools and hospitals. H ow ever, w ith th e violence increasing, as th e colonial arm y ceased to distinguish b etw een m ilitary and civilian targ ets, thousands o f peo p le, especially those in the n o rth , had no o p tio n b u t to leave th e ir land and find sh elter elsew here. W hile the Balanta, even if against th e ir w ill, could always r e s o rt to hiding in the fo rests, th e n o rth e rn po p u latio n s, w ho did n o t have this o p tio n , w ere forced to abandon th e ir villages. Som e o f th em w ere relo cated , as re se ttle m e n t was one o f th e strategies o f co u n ter-in su rg en cy w hich was broadly applied by th e P ortuguese army. How ever, w h en ev er th e lib erated zones could be held, Cabral trie d to push th e ir strategic ro le even further. It was n o t enough for th em to be places o f refuge for soldiers and th e p opulation: they m u st also be u n its o f p ro d u c tio n . B eing a sch o lar o f a g ric u ltu re , C abral trie d to m ake im p ro v em en ts to ag ricu ltu ral p ro d u c tio n in the liberated zones, m any o f w hich he had p ro m o te d d u rin g his tim e w orking for the co lo ­ nial go v ern m en t. H e encouraged th e peasants in the south o f the co u n ­ try to increase th e size o f th e ir cultivated areas, b u t th e results w ere n o t encouraging. W ith th e FARP eating up m an p ow er th at w ould u su ­ ally be focused on a g ricu ltu re, C abral in stru c te d his m en , in M aoist style, to h elp th e peasants w o rk the fields w h erev er possible. How ever, m o st refused to com ply w ith th e in stru ctio n s o f th e ir leader. As such, ra th e r than being a resu lt o f th e agricultural policies o f the PAIGC, the p ro d u ctio n surplus o f 1969, w hich allow ed th e p a rty to e x p o rt rice, coconuts and kola nu ts, was due to th e p o p u lar appropriation o f fertile land left behind by th e P o rtu g u ese ad m inistration. In o rd e r to distribute th e dividends o f agricultural production and assist th e populations in th e areas u n d e r th e ir co n tro l, the PAIGC c re ­ ated the P eo p le’s W arehouses. As w ith th e lib erated zones, the p arty published little inform ation on these w arehouses, m eaning the location o f m any o f these units cannot be d eterm in ed . O u t o f the te n new estab­ lishm ents o p en ed in 1968, according to M ustafah D hada, it is only p o s­ sible to lo cate four: o n e in th e zone o f Boke, o n e in th e so u th o f Q uinara, one in the area ofT om bali, and an o th er in the east, close to D elaba. O f th e o th ers, very little is know n. Since th e PAIGC did n o t w an t to increase dem and fo r colonial c u r­ rency, th e w arehouses o p e ra te d u n d e r a b a rte r system . Peasants w ere encouraged to exchange th e ir crops fo r item s th a t e ith e r they did n o t 144

A STATE INSIDE T H E C O L O N Y p ro d u c e , o r th a t w ere im p o rte d o r receiv ed by th e p a rty thanks to e x tern al help, such as dry fish, condensed m ilk, soap, shoes, tobacco, and sugar. P ro h ib itin g th e use o f m o n e y in th e w areh o u ses w as in ten d ed to encourage p ro d u c tio n (as one could only exchange if one p ro d u c e d ), and to p rev en t th e P ortuguese from ru in in g the system — w hich could h ap p en if they sen t dozens o f p o ten tial buyers to these places. The m ain issue w ith the w arehouses was the rep lenishm ent of stock: supplying the w arehouses was a com plicated process, involving h undreds o f c a rrie rs, am ong th em w om en and soldiers, w ho left the b o rd e r w ith G uinea-C onakry by night and headed to various locations in Guinea-Bissau. It is tru e th at the b a rte r system p ro te c te d the p a rty from ex tern al sabotage, b u t it did little to d efen d it against c o rru p tio n . Since the system did n o t involve m oney, accountability was difficult to ensure. Prices o f p ro d u cts w ere flexible and easy to m anipulate, allowing som e m ilitants to profit from these exchanges w ith the p o p u latio n .T h e p arty was aw are th at c o rru p tio n was increasing in d irect p ro p o rtio n to the in crease in w a r w earin ess and fatigue. T his to o k place at all levels. Inocencio Cani, one o f th e to p figures in the p a rty — w ho w ould later shoot the fatal b u llet th at w ould kill C abral— was judged by the p a rty and senten ced for having sto len engines from PAIGC boats in 1971 to sell on the black m arket. F rom 1968 o n w ard s, th e w arehouses largely ceased to be o p e ra ­ tional, particularly once operational changes im p lem en ted by G eneral Spinola began to take effect. His m ilitary strategy consisted o f making the lives o f the guerrillas and the population o f the liberated zones even m ore difficult. H e increased th e use o f airstrikes and o f helicopters in search and d estro y o p eratio n s— aim ed at elim inating th e guerrillas. M eanw hile, his n ew p ro g ram m e “For a B etter G uinea” a ttem p te d to w in the su p p o rt o f th e population, attracting a considerable n u m b er of p eople to fortified villages defended by the P ortuguese m ilitary and by popular militias. T he PAIGC also m ade significant investm ents in ed u cation, partly to overcom e th e inadequacy o f th e colonial system . At the beginning o f th e con flict, 9 7 .5 p e r c e n t o f th e p o p u la tio n w as illite ra te and, according to C abral him self, in th e e n tire h isto ry o f th e colony only fo u rte e n natives had earn ed a h igher education deg ree. E xcept for the 145

AM ILCAR CABRAL m edical d o c to r Francisco Batica— w ho had m ig rated at an early age to Senegal— and him self, th ey w ere all th e sons o f P o rtu g u ese co lo n iz­ ers. It should also b e ad ded th a t it was n o t u n til 1958 th at th e first Liceu in G uinea was o p e n e d , fo rty -o n e years after th e opening o f the Liceu o f C ape Verde.

T h e m ain goal o f th e schools c re a te d in th e lib era te d zones was to su p p ly ca d re s to th e d iffe re n t p a r ty s tru c tu re s . W h e n th e FARP n e e d e d a rtille ry m e n o r n u rse s, for ex am p le, th ese schools pro v id ed th e b e st stu d e n ts. This is p erh ap s th e reaso n fo r th e excessive p o liti­ cizatio n o f th e te a c h in g in th e p a r ty ’s sch o o ls. T h e s tu d e n ts w e re tra in e d to be m ilitan ts o f th e PAIGC and had to be fam iliarized, from an early age, w ith th e h isto ry o f th e p arty , th e deeds o f its lea d ers, as w ell as th e h is to ry o f o th e r lib e ra tio n m o v e m e n ts. A t th e m o s t advanced levels, they w ere in stru c te d in th e objectives o f th e national lib e ra tio n stru g g le. The p a rty to o k responsibility for providing at least elem en tary e d u ­ catio n to all c h ild re n in th e lib e ra te d zones. In th e academ ic year 1964—5, 4 ,0 0 0 children w ere enro lled and d istrib u ted across fifty very basic schools, w ith th e ir only fu rn itu re consisting o f w ooden boards attached to trees. The m ain obstacle to the ch ild ren ’s education was the lack o f te a c h e rs; th e few available had only finished p rim a ry school them selves. O b tainin g teaching m aterials was a n o th e r difficulty. T he first o n es, p ro d u c e d and d o n a te d by G erm any, quickly ra n o u t. Students th erefo re spent m uch o f th e ir tim e at th e schools copying o u t en tire m anuals, w hich w ere p ro d u ced by teach ers o f the p arty d u ring im p ro v em en t sem inars in Conakry. T rad itio n also played a ro le . A n u m b e r o f p a re n ts did n o t allow th e ir offspring to go to sch o o l, w h ich th ey ju stified in m any ways: som e p aren ts stated th a t th e ir sons w ere n e e d e d to w ork in th e fields, w h ile o th e rs w a n te d to p re p a re th e ir d a u g h te rs fo r m a rria g e . B ut th e re w e re also sec u rity reaso n s: any c o n c e n tra tio n o f p e o p le was easy for th e P o rtu g u e se A ir Force to d e te c t. Schools w ere th e re fo re an easy ta rg e t. P rim ary schools w ere p a rt o f a m o re co m p lex educational system , w hich in clu d ed b o ard in g schools, lo cated in th e in te rio r o f G uinea, w h ere in d ep en d en ce fighters sent th e ir ch ild ren. T h ere was also the highly soug h t-after Escola Piloto, P ilot School, in Conakry. A dm ission 146

A STATE INSIDE T H E C O L O N Y into this school was very com petitive and one o f the req u irem en ts was th at the candidate should have sp en t at least tw o years in the in te rio r o f the country. T he diplom a from th e Escola Piloto o p ened the d o o r to the universities in D akar and C onakry, and to th e h u ndreds o f scholar­ ships offered to th e p a rty annually by co u n tries in th e E astern Bloc. T he PAIGC also strived to provide health care to the people o f the liberated zones. To p ro m o te th e basic health services to its ow n m ili­ ta n ts and to th e p o p u la tio n u n d e r its c o n tro l, th e PAIGC cre ated a n e tw o rk o f m akeshift hospitals. H ow ever, as in m any o th e r areas, this system developed according to the m ilitary situation. W hile the PAIGC claim ed that it w en t from tw en ty -eig h t health posts in 1968 to 117 in 1971, in tru th , this does n o t take in to account th e type o f health care u nits. T he p a rty ch an g ed fro m using fixed to m o b ile u n its, p u ttin g nurses and health auxiliaries on th e m ove constantly, eith er assisting th e p o p u la tio n in th e zones u n d e r th e in fluence o f th e PAIGC o r instructing them in hygiene and preventive m ed icin e.T he m o st serious cases, such as com bat injuries, w ere sent to the b o rd e r w ith Senegal or to G u in ea-C o n ak ry , w h e re th e re w e re b e tte r-e q u ip p e d p e rm a n e n t u n its, se rv e d m ainly by C u ban d o c to rs , b u t also by th e A ngolan A ugusto Boal and th e P ortuguese national M ario Padua. A n other area in w hich the p a rty invested a considerable am ount of resource was the establishm ent o f a judicial system . T he objective o f this system was to separate m ilitary and civilian affairs, preventing any overlap betw een the tw o. This policy had already b een sketched o u t in Cassaca, b u t it w ould only be im p lem en ted once the n eed for it arose. As a priority , A m ilcar Cabral w anted to p rev en t th e m ilitary im posing th eir judicial system on civilians, instead providing civilians w ith th eir ow n in stru m e n ts o f ju stice. B ut th e p a rty w o u ld go even fu rth e r: efforts w ere m ade to subject the m ilitary to th e laws o f the provisional tribunals in the regions w here th e crim es w ere co m m itted . O nly the m o st serious cases, according to th e Law o f M ilitary Justice, w ould be solved by the W ar T rib u n al. T he system o f justice provided for the co n ­ dem nation o f th e accused to forced labor o r to be sent to the prison in C o n a k ry — k n o w n as M ontanha — a m easu re th a t th e p a rty did n o t encourage since it d ecreased th e w o rk fo rce available for p ro d u c tio n and co m b at.T h e m o st serious cases, in accordance w ith the law, had to be punished by death. 147

AM ILCAR CABRAL As was show n by th e Cassaca tria ls, th e PAIGC did n o t have any qualm s ab o u t o rd e rin g th e d eath penalty for th e ir m em b ers. Various re p o rts providing details o f these events w ere received by the PIDE. B etw een May and Ju n e 1967, in M adina do Boe, a c o u rt fo rm ed by Fidelis A lm ada C abral, Vasco C abral, and A ristides Pereira co ndem ned H o n o rio Sanches Vaz an d M iguel E m b an a to d eath by sh o o tin g fo r being involved in a conspiracy to kill A m ilcar C abral. A ccording to the P ID E ’s r e p o r t, th e p lo t had b e e n u n c o v e re d by A nsum ane M ane, “M andinka de Bafata”, and involved Joao B ern ard o V ieira. A lthough Vieira had b een su m m o n ed , he did n o t show u p in c o u rt. T he re p o rt also added th a t C abral had th o u g h t o f rem o v in g him fro m th e c o m ­ m an d o f th e south zone, b u t had n o t d o n e so since he was afraid o f retaliations from the natives o f G uinea. All o f this social in fra stru c tu re — education, health, and the judicial system — was ultim ately th e m eans by w hich th e p a rty in ten d e d to p u t G uinea on th e p ath o f pro g ress and how th e p a rty negated, o r d o w n ­ played, local tra d itio n s and fo rm s o f eth n ic k n o w led g e. In a telling d escrip tio n in his m e m o irs, Luis C abral discussed th e boundaries that the p a rty had established for itself b etw een th e old and the new, the traditio n al and th e m o d e rn , su p erstitio n and science. D u rin g a public discussion w ith the eld ers, th e homens grandes, o f M ores, as he trie d to convince th em to allow th e ir children— especially th e ir daughters— to go to school, A m ilcar C abral did th e follow ing: in the m iddle o f his arg um en t, like a law yer in a c o u rtro o m , he flicked his cigarette lighter, b ro u g h t th e flam e close to o n e o f th e old m e n and asked him if he could explain th e ph en o m en o n . Faced w ith th e inability o f the m en, w hose education was lim ited to th e “Q u ra n o f the tabanka ,” to do so, C abral a tte m p te d to d e m o n s tra te th e im p o rta n c e o f ed u catio n to explain such phen o m en a. It was against w hat he called “ancestral igno­ ran ce” th at Cabral trie d to build th e n ew G uinea.

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9

W IN N IN G IN POLITICS W ITH O U T LOSING THE WAR

The first p erso n to sim ultaneously act b o th as com m an der-in-chief and governor in G uinea was G eneral A rnaldo Schultz, w ho had previously occupied th e p o st o f m in ister for hom e affairs in the Estado Novo. The ap p ointm en t o f a single p erso n to b o th positions was in tended to facili­ tate the decision-m aking process involved in fighting the guerrillas. A veteran w ho had c u t his te e th in the w ar in A ngola, Schultz, w ho was ap p ointed in May 1964, pro m ised to clear th e te rrito ry o f the “te rr o r ­ ists” in less than six m onths. D uring his ten u re, he escalated the w ar to un precedented levels o f violence. But he failed to im prove the m ilitary situation in favor o f the Portuguese, for his strategy p u t great emphasis on the m ilitarist factor. He had estim ated that to achieve his goals he need only increase the size of the m ilitary contingent operating in Guinea. By the end o f his m an d ate in May 1968, m o re th an 3 0 ,0 0 0 P o rtu g u ese soldiers w ere p resen t in G uinea, far g reater than the n u m b er necessary eith er to defend th e small te rrito ry o r to p ro te c t a w hite population of no m o re than 3 ,0 0 0 people. Schultz’s arrival in G uinea coincided w ith an increase in the m ilitary capacity o f the P ortuguese army, w ith its resources m ainly allocated to indiscrim inate b om b attacks on the PA IG C’s positions by m ilitary heli­ copters. This new phase o f the conflict hit the p a rty hard. However, the PAIGC found ways to adapt to the new circum stances. As previously discussed, Cabral had o rd e re d th e tran sfo rm atio n o f large units into 149

A M ILCAR CABRAL b i-g ro u p s. It w as a q u e stio n o f reco g n izin g th e su p e rio rity o f th e P ortuguese arm y and the im possibility o f confronting it conventionally. D uring these years, from 1964 to 1968, the p arty increased its political and above all its diplom atic w ork, and by the tim e G eneral Schultz left G uinea he had b een defeated. In M ay 1968, th e Estado Novo a p p o in te d B rigadier A n to n io de Spinola— p ro m o te d to general soon afterw ards— to replace A rnaldo Schultz as g o v e rn o r and c o m m a n d e r o f th e tro o p s in G uinea. This ap p o in tm e n t to o k place at a tim e o f d ram atic change in Lisbon. Four m o n th s after Spinola to o k office, Salazar, th e long-serving p resid en t of the council, fell from his chair. H e was diagnosed w ith a brain h e m o r­ rhage w hich significantly im pacted his ability to w ork. A fter serving the Estado Novo for th irty -six years as th e p resid en t o f the council, Salazar

w as rep laced by law p ro fesso r M arcelo C aetano, w hose n o m ination aroused n ew hopes o f a possible reso lu tio n to th e P ortuguese colonial question. M any p eople believed th at C aetano was in favor o f a federal solution to th e colonial situation. In 1962, in a solicited opinion to the M inister o f th e C olonies A driano M oreira, he advised th at the fo rm a ­ tion o f a federal state b etw een P ortugal and h e r colonies was the m o st viable so lu tio n for th e colonial crisis. This w as, for him , the only po s­ sible cosm etic operation— im plying change, b u t keeping everything the sam e— th ro u g h w hich th e th re e p ro b lem s o f the colonial crisis could be addressed: th e in tern atio n al p ressure, th e need to p ro te c t the in te r­ ests o f P o rtu g al in th e co lo n ies, and th e p ro te c tio n o f th e lives and assets o f the P ortuguese in Africa. H ow ever, th e reg im e— p a rtic u la rly th e conservatives in Salazar’s party, w ho m ade up its stro n g est faction— was n o t yet ready to c o n ­ te m p la te this o p tio n . M arcelo C a e ta n o w ro te m any years a fte r his ap p o in tm en t to th e p o st o f p re sid e n t o f th e council that this was p r e ­ ce d ed by a c o n v ersatio n w ith P re sid e n t o f th e R ep u b lic A m erico Tomas. In this conversation, the la tte r m ade clear that he exp ected that C aetano w ould n o t “change anything in the politics o f the defense o f th e overseas te rrito rie s , and th at he should resist any te m p ta tio n to e x p e rim e n t w ith th e federative so lu tio n .” But as C aetano w ould later rem inisce, he had already discovered th e “e rro r” he had c o m m itted by his defense o f federalism , since although federalism was an “acceptable solutio n fo r in te rn a tio n a l public o p in io n , it c o n stitu te d a sm all step 150

W IN N IN G IN PO LITICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR in to in d e p e n d e n c e .” T his lesson w as le a rn e d as a re su lt o f F ra n c e ’s a tte m p t to create a federation w ith its colonies. N everth eless, C aetano w ould go on to im p lem en t changes in co lo ­ nial policies th a t o v er tim e w o u ld c o n trib u te to th e en d o f th e P o rtuguese em p ire. T he first one was sim ply a questio n o f sem antics. C aetano lacked Salazar’s political charism a, w hich to a certain ex te n t had convinced m o st P o rtu g u e se th a t th e ir c o u n try had the rig h t to colonize Africa. The new p resid en t o f the council, as Franco N ogueira would later w rite , w ould u n d erm in e the fundam ental tru th s w hich had su p p o rted the em p ire by re so rtin g to practical ra th e r than m etaphysi­ cal reasons: “th e a rm e d fo rces should stay in A frica to p ro te c t the P ortuguese”, and as for A fricans, he explained, “in d ependence should n o t be a panacea for th e pro b lem s faced by the A frican co n tin e n t.” In other w ords, the change in policy from Salazar to Caetano was that the defense o f the overseas dom inions was th en cefo rth anchored m ore in the need to m aintain the tw o largest and rich est te rrito rie s o f Angola and M ozam bique— w h e re th e P o rtu g u e se had real eco n o m ic in te r ­ ests— than in any m ystique attached to the supposed indivisibility o f the em pire. The Portuguese w ere try in g to m ove past the dom ino theory, by w hich the loss o f one of its te rrito rie s— even the poorer, m inuscule, and insanitary G uinea— w ould inexorably open the way for the in d e­ pendence o f o th e r colonies. By th e late 1960s, G uinea had ceased to have any econom ic im p o rtan ce for the colonial em pire, as the chem ical com pany CU F had been forced to suspend its activities in the country. But Africa as a w hole had to be defended at any cost. Spinola shared the same w orldview as C aetano, both o f them o p erat­ ing pragm atically w h e n it cam e to m a tte rs o f colonial policy. In an in te rv ie w w ith th e P o rtu g u e se jo u rn a lis t D u tra Faria in 1969, for exam ple, Spinola intim ated th at th e loss o f G uinea w ould only have a m inim al effect on the Portuguese economy. The com panies that bought g ro u n d n u ts and coconuts th ere could buy th e sam e p ro ducts in Angola o r M ozam bique at “perhaps even b e tte r prices, w hich in a way c o m ­ pensates for the costs o f tra n sp o rta tio n .” H e also added th at it was not a problem to tran sfer the few w hites w ho lived in G uinea to an o th er place in the em p ire. However, for him , the defense o f the colonies was ro o te d in th re e p oints. 1) It was p ro o f o f the co herence o f P ortuguese overseas policies: “E ither w e keep, at all costs, everything in Africa that 151

AM ILCAR CABRAL belongs to P ortu g al, or, if w e give a single finger, so o n er o r later, we w ill have to give, because o f in tern atio n al pressu re, the hand, the arm , and th e re s t”. 2) In the c o n te x t o f th e C old W ar, m aintaining the co lo ­ nies was P o rtu g a l’s m o d e st c o n trib u tio n to the efforts to prev en t the expansion o f th e Soviet U nion in Africa: “If Portugal leaves G uinea, the strategic archipelago o f Cape Verde (fundam ental for the defense o f the South A tlantic by th e W est) w ould be exposed to the appetites o f the Soviet U n io n ”. 3) P ortugal was p ro te c tin g th e w ell-being o f Africans: “The day th e P ortuguese leave G uinea the g u errilla w ar w ould becom e a civil w ar and for the “c rim e ” o f being loyal to the P ortuguese, en tire ethnic g roups, such as the Fulani, the Felupes and the M anjacos, w ould be ex te rm in a te d . . . ” These th ree pillars u n d erp in n ed Spm ola’s actions in G uinea. To clear the guerrillas from the te rrito ry , o r at least to b rin g m ilitary actions to a h alt, he did n o t change m u ch in relatio n to his predecessor, A rnaldo Schultz. H ow ever, his strateg y w o u ld co m b in e th e m ilitary and th e social. A t its core was th e axiom , rep e a te d m any tim es to journalists, th a t co u n terin su rg en cy , even th o u g h it co u ld b e lo st fro m a p u re ly m ilitary stan d p o in t, could only be w on politically. * * * For both C abral and th e P ortuguese, launching a g u errilla w ar was n o t difficult, as it was enough to adapt th e ex p erien ces o f o th e r people. In te rm s o f co unterinsurgency, th e re was n o t m uch to invent, w ith the P ortuguese sim ply able to draw on th e ex p erien ces o f o th e r c o u n te r­ insurgencies. But like th e guerrillas, they also had to adapt these les­ sons to th e p articu lar geographical and sociological conditions o f the re g io n . W h e n Spinola to o k th e p o st in G uinea, th e re w as already a considerable body o f accepted w orks on how to co n duct co u n te rin su r­ gency w ars. T he m ain m o d el, w ith m any variations in different co n ­ te x ts, consisted o f creating a link o f g ra titu d e b etw een the arm y and th e p o p u latio n — w hat Sergei C hakotin called th e “rap e o f the masses” o r the psychology o f to talitarian political propaganda, re fe rrin g to the techn iq u es used by the N azi arm y to lu re th e population to the o ccu ­ pied zones. A ccording to C hakotin, these tech n iques w ere ro o te d in applying to hum ans w hat his c o m p a trio t, Ivan Pavlov, discovered in the study o f anim als. Pavlov developed th e th e o ry th at certain p a ttern s o f 152

W IN N IN G IN PO LIT ICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR behavior could be induced by cond itio n ed reflexes, if these w ere p ro p ­ erly trained. For C hakotin, th e Nazi arm y prod u ced th e same results in hum ans, inducing p articular types o f behavior by m eeting certain needs of the population. W hen the anti-colonial w ar began, cou n terin su rg en cy was still only an incipien t m ilitary discipline. It was only in th e 1950s that British G eneral G erald Tem plar, facing a M arxist-inspired revolt in Malaysia, had form u lated the principle th at in this kind o f w ar th e m ilitary c o m ­ p o n e n t should n o t a c c o u n t fo r m o re th a n 25 p e r c e n t o f th e to ta l effort. The rest should be th e political, the econom ic and intelligence. T hese lessons provided th e o u tlin e o f th e co u n terin su rg en cy strategy that the French used d u rin g the A lgerian w ar and was also the kernel o f P o rtu g u e se policies. Even b e fo re th e b e g in n in g o f w a r in th e P ortuguese te rrito rie s , the P o rtu g u ese arm y had sent a g ro u p o f offi­ cials to A lgeria as o bservers. The officials assem bled by Spinola in Bissau w ere w ell versed in these doctrines o f counterinsurgency. A fter his arrival in G uinea, Spinola sent som e PIDE agents and less c o m p e te n t staff back to Lisbon— those w ho did n o t understand the im portance o f intelligence in the new m ethodol­ ogy, o r sim ply did n o t fit the new schem e. He then su rro u n d ed him self w ith people he liked, such as the PIDE in sp ecto r Fragoso Allas, and a n u m b er o f young am bitious officials w ho w ould becom e know n as the boys o f Spinola, o r the boys o f Guinea: Carlos Fabiao, O te lo Saraiva de C arvalho, M anuel M onge de Lim a, N unes Barata, Jose Blanco, Jorge M o reira da C o sta, and C arlos A zeredo, am o n g o th e rs. T hey w ere e x p e rts in c o u n te r insurgency, tra in e d in Lisbon, w ith placem ents in various European countries and the U nited States. They had in com m on the desire to change the course o f the w ar at any cost. H elped by these young officials, Spinola developed his ow n p rin c i­ ples fo r how to face th e guerrillas. H e first redefined the ro le o f the a rm e d forces, tellin g jo u rn a list U rb an o C arrasco o f th e P ortu g u ese n ew spaper Diario Popular th at the arm y should go beyond ju st m ilitary m issions, w hich essentially am o u n ted to the defense o f the population. They should also carry o u t o th e r im p o rta n t functions such as “social action, particularly in the dom ains o f sanitary assistance, basic educa­ tio n , th e c o n s tru c tio n o f n e w h a m le ts, th e p re p a ra tio n o f land for cultivation, etc.” Spinola also devoted p articu lar atte n tio n to the psy­ 153

A M ILCA R CABRAL chological aspects o f w ar: “the w ar in G uinea is im m inently psychologi­ cal in th at it can only be w on if we w in p e o p le ’s souls, and this is n o t ab o u t co ercio n , b u t ab o u t p ersuasion.” As th e guerrillas trie d to g e t the popu latio n on th eir side, the p u r ­ pose o f coun terin su rg en cy should be to p rev en t that. Cabral had found o u t w hich gro u p s w ould m o re easily su p p o rt the guerrillas, so Spinola trie d to u n d e rs ta n d w h ich eth n ic g ro u p s w o u ld b e o n th e side o f P o rtu g a l. T h e w h o le c o u n try w as th e n m a p p e d o u t based o n th ese divisions. In th e m aps for m ilitary o p eratio n s, blue zones rep rese n ted the areas w hose p opulations w ere on th e side o f the P ortuguese, for exam ple those w ho inhabited th e eastern p a rt o f the te rrito ry , such as the Fulani. R ed re p re se n te d th e zones in w hich the populations w ere on the side o f the guerrillas; in these areas, th e re was no distinction b etw een civilian and m ilitary targ ets, and th e air force had au thoriza­ tio n to strike th em w h en ev er necessary. Finally, th e re was a th ird area, yellow', w hich rep resen ted the places w h ere, depending on the m ilitary situation, it was possible to advance to a blue zone o r recede to a red one. Strategic ham lets, o r re se ttle m e n t areas, w ere built in blue zones, w h e re p eo p le fro m th e m o st scarcely p o p u la te d regions w e re se n t. Spinola elaborates: “th e p o p u latio n reacts differently to the o rd e r to leave, depen d in g on th e d eg ree o f a ttach m en t to the land w h ere they w e re b o rn and o th e r variable facto rs o f local n a tu re .” H ow ever, “as soon as they s ta rt to feel th e benefits th at com e from this order, th e ir n atu ral re a c tio n is can celed o u t, and th ey co m e, voluntarily, to th e poles o f p ro g ress”. As the strategic ham lets w ere intended to allow the population to be w ithdraw n from certain areas, the guerrillas found them selves exposed, facilitating the search-and-destroy operations o f the P ortuguese army, w hich w ere u n d ertak en by m ilitary h elicopters carrying special forces and m arines. T hese units m oved in sm all g ro u p s, carrying o u t rapid strikes to destroy th e guerrilla units. T h eir goals w ere, as highlighted in one o f the re p o rts o f th e com m anding general, “to m ake the life [of the guerrillas] im possible, until they lose the w ill to fight.” In th e general strategy to fight th e gu errillas, the P ortuguese paid p a rtic u la r a tte n tio n to th e A fricanization o f th e tro o p s. C o u n te r­ insurgency m anuals advise th e n eed to involve the natives in the w ar effort, and this principle was to a certain e x te n t practiced by the British

154

W IN N IN G IN PO L IT IC S W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR in M alaysia, th e F re n c h in A lgeria, and la te r by th e A m ericans in V ietnam . H ow ever, th e P o rtu g u e se , m o re th a n any o th e r colonial pow er, p re fe rred to re c ru it local tro o p s for th e ir ow n w ars w henever they could. As we have previously show n, the involvem ent o f Africans w as decisive fo r th e co n q u e st o f G uinea, p articu larly C ape V erdean tro o p s. T he colonial w ar p ro d u ced a n u m b e r o f A frican heroes w ho fought on the side o f the P ortuguese, such as Abdul Injai. T he m obilization o f African tro o p s is an im p o rta n t ch ap ter in the history o f colonialism in Africa. As m any P ortuguese people have w rit­ ten , Africans w ere the soldiers b est eq uipped to cope w ith the harsh conditions o f the c o n tin en t. A ccording to Francisco Aragao, in those hostile clim ates, w hich soon crippled the European, the indig­ enous soldier resists every difficulty. Happily, w ith o u t fatigue and tanned— he laughs at the sun that does n o t burn him — looking confi­ dently to the entangled and im penetrable jungle, he goes, the brave and traditional w alker w ho know s everything, treading the interm inable kilom eters of African land, w ithout despondency or dismay.

To th e P o rtu g u e s e arm y, th is a rra n g e m e n t w as c ra fte d o u t o f necessity. Tow ards th e en d o f th e w ar, th e costs o f it cam e to 40 p e r cen t o f the P o rtu g u ese b u d g et. H ence, train in g African tro o p s, b e tte r p re p a re d fo r th e specificities o f th e te rra in and w ith g re a te r re sis­ tance to m alaria and o th e r tropical diseases, considerably red u ced the costs o f m ain ten an ce. T he P o rtu g u e se w e re able to re c ru it A frican so ld iers in p a rt by e x p lo itin g eth n ic grievances. T he Fulani and the M andinka had a h isto rical d isp u te , stem m in g fro m th e co llab o ratio n o f th e f o rm e r w ith th e F re n c h and P o rtu g u e s e co lo n ialists in th e d e s tru c tio n o f th e M an d e e m p ire in th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry . T his rivalry was fu rth e r e x a c e rb ate d by th e fact th a t th e P o rtu g u ese did n o t re c o g n iz e th e M an d in k a tra d itio n a l chiefs an d , even w o rse , assigned F ulani chiefs as h ead s o f M an d in k a ta b a n k a s. B esides th e B alanta, a significant s e c tio n o f th e PA IG C tro o p s , as w ell as th e p re sid e n t o f G uinea-C onakry, S ekouT oure, w ere M andinka, m eaning the P o rtu g u ese did n o t have to p u t m uch effo rt in to re c ru itin g in d ig ­ enous sold iers: m any o f th e Fulani w h o e n listed w ere v o lu n teers. O n the socio-econom ic fro n t, Spinola’s adm in istration p ro d u ced a carefully c o n stru c te d econom ic plan, called Pot uma G uine M elhor (For a B e tte r G u in ea), w h o se p rin c ip a l goal w as to ad dress th e n e e d to 155

A M ILCA R CABRAL im p ro v e social life in th e te rrito ry . In th e th ird Plano de Fomento (D ev elo p m en t Plan, 1967—7 3 ), th e b u d g et for G uinea had increased considerably, to co v er th e c o n stru c tio n o f in fra stru c tu re , ro ad s, b ridg es, and p o rts , as w ell as stru c tu re s for th e supply o f electricity in Bissau. But th e m ajo r public in vestm ents, according to the go v ern o r him self, w ere m ade in health care and education, especially in e lem en ­ tary, secondary, and vocational education. F u rth e rm o re , Spinola’s adm in istratio n did n o t sim ply try to estab­ lish— as th e F rench had in A lgeria and th e A m ericans in V ietnam — a pow er w hich dem anded obedience from th e dom inated people, devoid o f any “cultural co n te n t.” Spinola w e n t further. Fie u n d ersto o d th at the national m o vem ent was using cu ltu re as a to o l fo r m obilization, and he inten d ed to p rev en t it. D uring his ten u re, he w ould try to reinforce the trib al iden tity o f th e G uineans. But for th at, he had to alter som e o f the m ain te n e ts o f P o rtu g u ese colonial ideology at th a t tim e. In te rm s o f th e e th n ic q u e stio n , S pinola’s actio n to u c h e d on th e m o st delicate subjects w ith w hich P o rtu g u ese colonialism had to deal. In th e first chapter, I discussed h ow P o rtu g u ese colonial th in k ers in th e 1920s an d th e 1930s w e re w o rk in g o u t h o w to in te g ra te th e A frican possessions in to th e P o rtu g u e se n atio n al te rrito ry . B ut this had coincided w ith th e p ro liferatio n o f dem ands fo r self-d e te rm in a ­ tio n , w h ic h fo rc e d co lo n ial e m p ire s such as B ritain and F ran ce to reassess th e ir am b itio n s. As such, th e se e m p ire s w e re b eg in n in g to u n d e rsta n d th a t th e b e st way to m anage th e A fricans u n d e r th e ir c o n ­ tro l was n o t to assim ilate th e m — particu larly in the F rench case— b u t to tra p th e m w ith in th e ir o w n in stitu tio n s o f trib a l p ow er. L o rd F re d e ric k L u g ard , a fo rm e r g o v e rn o r o f H o n g K ong— la te r tra n s ­ fe rre d to N ig e ria — c h a m p io n e d th e se p rin c ip le s. In his o p in io n , A fricans sh o u ld d ev elo p w ith in th e ir o w n trib a l stru c tu re s and be go v ern ed by th e ir native a u th o ritie s, w ho w o u ld d e te rm in e the laws and th e ru le s to access land w ith in w h at was co n sid ered tra d itio n . In th e lo n g r u n , th is fra g m e n ta tio n w o u ld n a tu ra lly w o rk against th e fo rm a tio n o f a national consciousness. P o rtu g u e se co lonialism w as d ifferen t in th a t th e Estado Novo had in teg rated th e colonies in to th e national arena, b u t had left o u t the vast m ajo rity o f A fricans w ho w ere n o t co nsidered citizens. It is n o t a co in ­ cidence th at A driano M oreira, the colonial th in k er w ho had so pains­ 156

W I N N I N G IN POLITICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR takingly justified th e Estatuto do Indigenato, also rep ealed it, granting, at least form ally, P ortuguese citizenship to all colonized Africans in 1961. A lthough this solved th e issue o f in te g ra tio n , it did n o t address the actual causes o f anti-colonial p ro te st and significantly differed from the actions o f the B ritish and th e F rench in Africa. W ith this in m in d , Spinola tr ie d to d o so m e th in g d iffe re n t in G uinea: he a tte m p te d to m o re dram atically reverse th e assim ilationist ap p ro ach w hich had c h aracterized P o rtu g u ese colonialism , creating consultative in stitu tio n s o f trib al p o w er called Congressos dos Povos da Guine (C o n g resses o f G u in ean P eo p le). Behind this m ove w as the

n o tio n that A fricans should never “ad o p t fo rm s o f E uropean life,” and th at efforts to assim ilate Africans n eg lected to acknow ledge th at tribal stru ctu res w ere th e o u tco m e o f p a rtic u la r econom ic system s. In fact, as M anuel Belchior w ro te , “Africans, for practicing an itin e ran t a g ri­ cu ltu re, w ere always at the m ercy o f fam ine”. As such, Belchior m ain ­ tains, only trib al cohesion— th ro u g h system s o f red istrib u tio n — p ro ­ te c te d th e m fro m h ardships. T his s tru c tu re w as d isru p te d by assim ilation, he contin u es, w hich resu lted in p eople feeling alienated from th e ir ow n trib es (the so-called “evolved” o r “evolues”). Ugandan scholar M ahm ood M am dani discusses the ways in w hich the colonial state in Africa trie d to deal w ith such an u p ro o tin g o f A fricans from th eir traditions. T he colonial state, M am dani states, redefined itself as th e g u a ra n to r o f trib a l co h esio n by, o n th e o n e h an d , p ro te c tin g A fricans against any fo rm o f alienation, and, on th e other, by seeing “n o t the evolues, b u t ra th e r th e ch ief o f th e trib alized ” as in terlo cu to rs w ith the colonial system , as representatives o f the tribal w orld w ith the p ow er to influence th e p o p u lar masses. This was th e thinking behind th e Congressos. T he first C ongress was held in 1970, w hen leaders o f the Fulani and th e M andinka convened w ith the aim o f reconciling the tw o groups. T he origins o f the anim os­ ity betw een the Fulani and th e M andinka has already been discussed: the Fulani as a g ro u p w ere som ew hat “favored” by P ortuguese colonial­ ism in com parison to o th e r ethnicities. Som e o f th e ir chiefs received subsidies for trip s to M ecca and for th e co n stru ctio n o f m osques. W ith the beginning o f the colonial war, the Fulani p e rsecu ted the M andinka, accusing th e m o f being on th e side o f th e nationalists. A n u m b e r o f th em w ere fo rced to seek refuge in the neighboring co untries. For the 157

AMILCAR CABRAL P ortuguese, th erefo re, it was im p o rta n t to b rin g the M andinka to th eir side w ith o u t alienating the Fulani. O u t o f this first C ongress cam e the suggestion th a t th e M andinka should be allow ed to e lec t th e ir ow n leaders for th e first tim e in th e ir land, th e region o f F arim -O io, instead o f having Fulani chiefs im posed on th e m . For the second C ongress, th e fo ru m was enlarged to accom m odate all eth n ic g ro u p s. T h e w o rk o f th e C o n g ress w as divided in to tw o phases. T he first consisted o f th e local trib al fo ru m s, w hich chose the delegates fo r the second phase— the in tereth n ic sum m it. A lthough the C ongress did n o t have deliberative pow er, it was an im p o rta n t in stru ­ m e n t to in g rain trib a l consciousness and c re a te g re a te r distance b etw een th e various eth n icities.T h e idea behind the C ongress was that perso n h o o d was attached to ethnicity. In the sh o rt te rm , the general strategy o f Spinola— n o t to w in the war, b u t at least n o t to lose it— p ro d u ced positive resu lts.T h e g u e rril­ las w ere being dep riv ed o f th e s u p p o rt o f th e p o p u latio n and from a m ilitary p erspective th e P ortu g u ese w ere finally m aking som e inroads. In m any areas c o n tro lled by th e PAIGC, the guerrillas w ere incapable of keeping the population in the regions u n d er th eir control. The visible outcom e o f this was an exodus o f 6 0 ,0 0 0 refugees to Senegal, a signifi­ ca n t n u m b e r o f w h o m le ft a fte r th e arriv al o f Spinola. H aving no qualm s a b o u t in d iscrim in ately killing civilians, Spinola’s m e n w ere given th e g re e n light to destro y th e facilities m anaged by th e m ove­ m e n t, such as schools and hospitals, th e p e o p le ’s w arehouses, gran a­ ries, and ric e paddies. As a re su lt, C a b ra l’s p a rty was— fo r th e first tim e since th e beginning o f the w ar— on th e defensive. C rucial to Spinola’s strategy was to redefine the areas dom inated by each side. T he P o rtu g u ese voluntarily abandoned th e ir m o st isolated positions, such as th e h e a d q u a rte rs o f M adina do Boe, w hose occupa­ tion by the guerrillas had been hailed internationally as a victory for the m o vem en t. As these isolated units raised serious concerns in te rm s o f supply, especially d u rin g th e rainy season, th e P ortuguese p re fe rred to co n cen trate th e ir forces in large p o p u latio n ce n te rs, such as in Bissau, Bafata, G ab u , o r in th e fo rtifie d villages. P o rtu g u ese forces also a tte m p te d to m im ic th e gu errillas, abandoning th e rigid stru ctu res o f the conventional arm y and breaking up its m ilitary forces in to sm aller units. If th e guerrillas, in 1971, could claim th e c o n tro l o f SO p er cent 158

W IN N IN G IN PO LITICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E W AR o f the te rrito ry , this did n o t m ean that they in fact dom inated this area. It sim ply m ean t th at, having m o re em pty spaces, they could, like the Portuguese, m ove th ro u g h this te rrito ry . As e x p e c te d , th e v io len t P o rtu g u ese m ilitary offensive, com bined w ith a vigorous p ro g ra m o f social actio n , trig g e re d a series o f divi­ sions w ithin C a b ra l’s party. W h e n Spinola arriv ed in G uinea, the w ar had already b een dragging on for five years and th e re was no end in sight. N ego tiatio n s for a peace a g re e m e n t w ere o u t o f the question. A nd by th e early 1970s, fatigue w as se ttin g in w ith in th e PA IG C ’s forces. D esertio n s had b eco m e ro u tin e , and m o re and m o re m ilitants w ere openly questioning th e w ar effort. The fu rth e r the m ilitants w ere from the h ead q u arters the harsher the criticism tow ards the party, and particularly tow ard s C abral. In th e lib erated zones, th e preoccupation w ith survival and th e various fo rm s o f co n tro l over the m ilitants lim ­ ited the space for o pen c ritiq u e o f the party. But in C onakry, in the re a r-g u a rd , th e less p u t-u p o n G u in ean fig h ters w e re m o re easily draw n into anti-C ape Verdean cam paigns, sponsored by Spinola, w hich criticized th e division o f labor in th e party. As Spinola him self p u t it: “G uineans re p re s e n te d th e g u e rrilla m ass o f th e co m b atan ts in the front, and th e C ape Verdeans th e cadres in the rear-g u ard. This friction is at th e h e a r t o f th e sp lit a m o n g th o se w h o effectively suffer th e h arsh n ess o f th e w a r and th o se , w h o , in th e re a r-g u a rd , enjoy th e benefits o f foreign m aterial s u p p o rt.” PAIGC b u rsary students abroad w ere those w ho m o st fiercely c riti­ cized the party. Having lost contact w ith the everyday life o f the lib era­ tion m o v em en t, they challenged n o t only th e decisions taken by the m ovem en t, b u t also C ab ral’s leadership. In the Soviet U nion alone the party had m o re than 4 00 students enrolled in academ ic program m es as d iv erse as m ech an ics, agronom y, accountancy, and ad m in istra tio n . These students organized them selves in groups o f agitation whose lead­ ers hatched plots and led rebellious acts. From these groups came som e o f those w ho w ould later conspire in th e m u rd e r o f A m ilcar Cabral. By th e en d o f th e w ar, ev ery th in g serv ed to fuel th e d isc o n ten t. A nd A m ilcar C ab ral, w ith his fre q u e n t absences, had b eco m e one o f the p rim a ry ta rg e ts o f th e criticism . It was tru e th at the lead er o f the PA IG C did n o t p ro v id e m an y e x p la n a tio n s fo r his c o n sta n t trip s ab ro ad — w h e re he w e n t and fo r how long he trav elled , o r any o th e r 159

AMILCAR CABRAL details reg ard in g his itin e ra ry — so m eth in g th a t had saved his life at least once. By this tim e, n obody could fail to n o tice his absences. This is c le a r fro m th e level an d in te n s ity o f th e d ip lo m a tic w o rk c o n ­ d u c te d to w a rd s th e e n d o f C a b ra l’s te n u re as th e p a r ty lead er. In 1966, he m ad e th re e trip s ab ro ad ; in 1972 he w e n t abroad 31 tim es. T h e re a re m an y fa c to rs b e h in d th e in c re a se , and n o t ju s t, as th e en em ies o f C abral w o u ld have it, th a t he p re fe rre d to spend m o re tim e ab ro ad . O n ly by m aking th ese c o n sta n t trip s co u ld he raise the funds n e e d e d to m e e t th e increasing w ar ex p e n d itu re: a g re a t deal o f w h a t th e g u e rrilla s c o n su m e d , w eap o n ry and so m etim es even fuel, cam e as th e re s u lt o f th e se c o n ta c ts. A nd n o t even a lte rn a tin g th e trip s a b ro a d w ith p e rio d s o f sto ic an d d e m a n d in g ro u tin e in C on ak ry — g e ttin g up early in th e m o rn in g to p a rtic ip a te in physical exercises w ith th e stu d e n ts a t th e Escola Piloto and spending th e re st o f th e day w o rk in g — w as en o u g h to q u ell th e in trig u e . * * * To dam age th e in te rn a tio n a l co hesion o f th e n atio n alist m o v em en t, Spinola staged th e lib eration o f political p riso n e rs in Bissau. In 1969, Spinola was given auth o rizatio n by M arcelo C aetano to g ran t am nesty to nin ety -tw o PAIGC p riso n e rs w ho had b een k ep t in th e cells o f the Policia de Seguranga Publica (P o rtu g u e se N atio n al Police— PSP). T he liberatio n to o k place sym bolically on 3 A ugust, th e day the p a rty c o m ­ m e m o ra te d the te n th anniversary o f th e m assacres o f Pidjiguiti. Rafael Barbosa was am ong the prisoners w ho w ere released. Barbosa had been hailed as a h ero by the p a rty in m any in tern atio n al cam paigns. H e had been described in an issue o f PAIGC-Actualites as having resisted all p res­ sures and th reats from th e colonial a u th o rities, and was considered an exam ple for th e youngest generations. T he co n d ition for the liberation o f the p riso n ers was an oath o f allegiance to Spinola and P ortuguese colonialism . Spinola’s stu n t d re w ab u n d an t coverage in the in te rn a ­ tional press, and was taken up by a n u m b er o f foreign new spapers, such as The Times o f L ondon, w hich q u o ted ex cerp ts o f the speech given by Rafael B arbosa in its S A ugust 1969 ed itio n : “T h an k y ou, Your Excellency, fo r th e fine attitu d e that you have taken upon yo u r shoul­ d ers, in liberating these dozens o f m en w ho, deceived by the prom ises o f those w ho, paid by foreign co u n tries, launched th em into rebellion [ ...] I p rom ise th at I w ill be as P o rtu g u ese as Your Excellency”. 160

W IN N IN G IN POLITICS W I T H O U T LO SIN G T H E WAR T he release o f Rafael Barbosa was p a rt o f Spinola’s Por uma Guine Melhor strategy, as he w ould later explain: [I]t is the concern o f the g o v ern m en t o f the province to satisfy the legitim ate desires of access to the benefits o f civilization and culture. T herefore, som e o f those w ho had been enthralled by the propaganda and intim idation o f the enemy, recognizing now the e rro r into w hich they fell, o r by verifying the inconsistency o f the prom ises they heard, have shown the will to collaborate in the construction o f a successful Guinea for the future, u nder the Portuguese flag. And the p ro o f of an undeniable P ortuguesism , once reintegrated, is som ething that makes us tru st in them , and, simultaneously, in the validity o f this policy.

T he case o f Rafael Barbosa is w o rth exam ining. He had escaped the first ro u n d o f d eten tio n s o f PAIGC m ilitants w hich to ok place in 1961. A fter a p e rio d in hiding, he w as finally c a p tu re d on the night o f 13 M arch 1962, in th e co m p an y o f o th e r m e m b e rs o f th e PAIGC— nam ely M am ad o u T oure and A lbino Sanca— in th e house th a t had served as the p a r ty ’s h e a d q u a rte rs in Bissau, in th e neighborhood o f A lto C rim .T h e PIDE also seized a range o f propaganda m aterial, such as em blem s, in stru ctio n s, subversive p am phlets, p rin to u ts, and c o rre ­ spondence. In one o f th e first in terro g atio n s to w hich he was su b m it­ te d , Barbosa con fessed th a t he u n d e rto o k th e ro le o f “sec reta ry o f c o n tro l” in th e p arty , as th e m ain re p re se n ta tiv e o f th e m o v e m e n t inside G uinea, and the second in the en tire m o v em ent— rig h t below A m ilcar C abral. A ccording to th e PID E ’s re p o rt, Barbosa was resp o n ­ sible for re c ru itin g poten tial m em b ers to th e party, bringing w eapons and w ar m aterial in to Bissau, and also served as th e link betw een the various elem en ts o f the p a rty across m any different c en ters, such as B issara,Teixeira P into, Farim , and Sao D om ingo. It is likely th a t it was th ro u g h Rafael Barbosa and o th e r elem e n ts o f Z one Z e ro — th e cod en am e fo r Bissau— th a t th e PIDE m anaged to infiltrate th e PAIGC. As he had co lla b o ra te d w ith th e police, he was given som e lib e rtie s, being p e rm itte d to w alk th ro u g h the city w ith ­ o u t surveillance and even to sleep at h o m e. This allow ed him , as the PIDE w o u ld later find o u t, to act as a s o rt o f d o u b le agent. Just as he co llab o ra te d w ith th e PID E, he also se n t m essages to his p arty, and, w ith the h elp o f m e m b e rs from his cell, he trie d to escape a couple o f tim es. 161

AM ILCA R CABRAL Rafael Barbosa was n o t the only high-ranking m em b er o f the PAIGC w ho had d e se rte d (o r at least passed to th e side o f th e P ortuguese). At th e end o f th e 1960s, d esertio n s, b o th individual and gro u p , w ere ta k ­ ing place so frequently that C abral, fo rced to in terv en e, pro p o sed the death penalty fo r collective d esertio n s from the m o vem ent. It was n o t o u t o f sheer cru e lty th a t Cabral m ade such a pro position: the PAIGC was ru n n in g o u t o f so lutions to deal w ith th e fact th a t a n u m b e r o f m ilitants, tire d o f th e war, had p re fe rre d to go back hom e in o rd e r to benefit from th e am nesty Spinola had pro m ised . How ever, th ere w ere also a significant n u m b e r o f p eople w ho had b een pard o n ed by Spinola and w ho, taking advantage o f th e p a rty ’s leniency, eventually sought readm ission in to the lib eratio n m o v em en t. H ence, the release o f the p riso n ers in Bissau and th e am nesty given to all m ilitants o f the p arty produ ced a certain flux b etw een Bissau and Conakry. But these shifting allegiances also left the p a rty unsure w h eth er to accept all the m ilitants w ho re tu rn e d from Bissau w ith o u t any reservations o r to condem n to death everyone suspected o f treason. The infiltration into the ranks o f the PAIGC was n o t random but was p a rt o f a consisten t and am bitious plan to p e n e tra te the head q u arters o f the m o v em en t and th e m ilitary fronts. A ccordingly, Spinola and his closest officials in m ilitary intelligence devised a plan to w in over the PAIGC figh ters in th e N o r th e r n F ro n t, in C atchungo. F ro m th e P ortu g u ese side, these contacts w ere established by m ajors Joaquim Pereira, Raul dos Passos R am os, and O so rio Magalhaes. O n the side o f the guerrillas, the m ain in terlo cu to r was A ndre G om es, a revered co m ­ b atan t w ho had led th e g ro u p o f th irte e n fighters w h o in 1968 had broken th e secu rity line o f Bissau and fired artillery at the a irp o rt. The conversations b etw een the tw o groups reached such a level o f intim acy that the m ajors often w en t to m e e t the guerrilla g roup u narm ed. O ften the P ortuguese officials offered th em tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and m oney. T he P ortu g u ese w ere try in g to n egotiate a ceasefire w ith the m em b e rs o f th e N o rth e rn F ro n t and to in c o rp o ra te the w hole group into the Portuguese army. In exchange, this rebel g roup w ould be given a generous salary o f 6 0 ,0 0 0 contos (P o rtu g u ese escudos), to w hich the O verseas M inistry had already agreed. In fo rm e d by th e se ev en ts, C abral d isp atch ed to th e fro n t Luis C o rreia, the head o f the intelligence service in the party, and a m an he 162

W I N N I N G IN POLITICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR could tru st. In association w ith the com m anders o f the region, C orreia p lan n ed an o p e ra tio n to c a p tu re G en eral Spinola him self, w h o had already m e t som e o f th e fighters on th a t fro n t and had pro m ised to re tu rn to officially in co rp o rate th em in to the P ortuguese forces. O n th e sch ed u led day, 20 A pril 1970, th e th re e m ajors from the P ortuguese army, P ereira, R am os, and M agalhaes, w en t to m e e t the fighters w ith o u t G eneral Spinola. They w ere shot dead soon after they left th e ir car. T h e a u th o rs o f th e killing hack ed u p th e bo d ies w ith m achetes. In a speech at th e fo u rte e n th anniversary o f the founding party, in Septem ber 1970, Cabral claim ed responsibility for the killings and sum m ed th em up as follows: “after a n u m b e r of contacts, rid ic u ­ lous le tte rs, offers, gifts and prom ises o f all kinds, the colonists suf­ fered ano th er sham eful defeat: o u r heroic com batants killed the m ajors and o th e r officials and soldiers w ho th o u g h t they could buy us.” W hen reading the available inform ation about the events o f that day, it is hard to co m p re h e n d w h at really w e n t w rong. D id the guerrilla fighters feign th e ir in te re st in negotiating w ith th e P ortuguese so as to lure, arre st o r even kill G eneral Spinola, as Luis Cabral suggests in his book? O r did they only realize they w ere b etraying the p a rty w hen C abral sent his intelligence officer? It has also been suggested that the Portuguese m ajors w ere killed by another group belonging to the party and n o t th e one w ith w hom they had been negotiating. The killing had a serious im pact on G eneral Spinola him self. H e was an old-fashioned m ilita ry m an , w h o th o u g h t th a t u n a rm e d soldiers should n o t be killed. H e also h arb o red genuine and fatherly concerns for the m en u n d er his com m and. In this sense, it is understandable that Spinola m ight have felt partially guilty for the tu rn o f the events: he had, after all, au th o rized the negotiations. H ow ever, he had n o t im ag­ ined th at C ab ral’s m en (w ith o r w ith o u t explicit o rd e rs from C abral), would have the courage to actually kill u n arm ed soldiers, w ho, accord­ ing to him , w ere on a peace m ission. A lthough Spinola was still in terested in a peaceful solution to the conflict, his patience was w earing thin. A fter th e killing o f the m ajors he was looking for revenge, and he w elcom ed any proposal for how to destroy C ab ral’s m o v em en t. H ere, he was also follow ing the c o u n te r­ insurgency p rin cip le w hich states that the g u errilla m ovem ent is like a cen tip ed e: it can only be killed by a fatal blow to its head. As such, 163

AM ILCAR CABRAL Spinola sta rte d to be receptive to th e idea th at th e PAIGC should be decapitated and began planning th e a rre st and even killing o f Cabral him self. This is h o w th e plan to invade th e h e a d q u arters in C onakry cam e in to being. * * * T h e o rig in al p lan fo r w h a t w as th e n called Opera$ao M ar Verde (O p eratio n G reen Sea) was th e lib eration o f eighteen P ortuguese p ris­ oners and the d estru ctio n o f the PAIGC’s boats. O n e o f these prisoners was A ntonio Lobato, cap tu red in 1963 w hile piloting aT-6 plane w hich had h it a n o th e r aircraft d u rin g an ill-calcu lated m an eu v er, “causing irreparable dam ages to b o th planes.” But the au th o r o f the plot, Captain A lpoim C alvao, convinced G en eral Spinola to add tw o m o re o b jec­ tives: the deposition o f Sekou Toure, by sending in a group o f dissidents train ed and a rm ed by P ortugal— w ho, once in pow er, w ould expel the PAIGC— and th e arre st o r physical elim ination o f A m ilcar Cabral. O u t o f th ese tw o goals, G e n e ra l Spinola w as m o re in favor o f arre stin g C abral, as he em phasized in a re p o rt o f 1989, signed n in etee n years after the events. T he a rre st and im m ediate tra n sp o rt o f the nationalist lea d er to Bissau “was key in m y h andling o f th e m an ag e m en t o f the p o litic a l-m ilita ry p ro cess in G u in ea, w h o se goal w as a ceasefire on te rm s I found h o n o rab le to P ortu g al .’’This o p tio n , according to the re p o r t, p ro m ised to provide an end to th e w ar in a “spectacular” way. A lpoim Galvao was tasked w ith overseeing th e op eratio n . H e trav ­ elled to South Africa to buy lim p et m ines, w hich w ere tra n sp o rte d in his ow n hand baggage on com m ercial flights, and relying on sm ugglers, negotiated th e im p o rt o f guns from th e Soviet U n ion, particularly the infam ous Kalashnikov. H e p e rso n ally c o n ta c te d various g ro u p s o f p o litical refu g ees fro m G u in ea-C o n ak ry , sc a tte re d across E u ro p ean cities. W ith th e h elp o f tw o o th e r officials o f th e P o rtu g u ese arm y, R ebordao de B rito and M arcelino da M ata, he provided the dissidents w ith forty-five days o f training on the island o f Soga, in the archipelago o f the Bijagos. A m ilitary fo rm atio n o f 215 P ortuguese soldiers (the m ajority w ere G uineans o f th e Compania de Comandos Ajricanos ) and 150 C o n ak ry G uineans, am ong th em political dissidents and fo rm e r soldiers o f the colonial army, left for C onakry on 21 N o v em b er 1970 at 10 p m . They 164

W I N N I N G IN PO LIT IC S W I T H O U T L O SIN G T H E WAR w o re u n ifo rm s w h ich re se m b le d th o se u sed by th e forces o f Sekou Toure, b u t w ith light g reen bands attached to th e ir shirtsleeves to dis­ tinguish them selves from th e m ilitary forces o f G uinea-C onakry. The m ilitary fo rm atio n was tra n sp o rte d in tw o LFG ships o f the Alfange type, equipped w ith 20m m canons, and esco rted by four Class Argos p a tro l tan k s, a rm e d w ith 4 0 m m canons. T h e c re w w as exclusively m ade up o f P o rtu g u ese nationals. C onakry’s pow er plant was the first targ et hit by the invading forces. The darkness th at fell upon the city was the signal to the o th e r units th a t th e invasion w as underw ay. Subsequently, th e g ro u p s led by R ebordao de Brito succeeded in th eir p art o f the m ission, sinking three PAIGC boats and setting th e o th e r four on fire. D u rin g the attacks on the docks, a PAIGC m a rin e r was killed, and one o f the co m m anders, Irenio N ascim en to , m anaged to escape and ru n to C am p Sam ori to a le rt th e forces o f Sekou Toure. T h e g ro u p tasked w ith a rre stin g o r killing A m ilcar C abral e n c o u n te re d serio u s resistan ce, as la te r d e sc rib e d by th e Yugoslav d o c to r D im ir S tre te n . H e w o rk e d in th e hospital close to th e p a rty h ead q u arters, and his daughter was killed by the bom bs launched by the P ortuguese forces. The Portuguese w ere aware that the success o f the mission depended on destroying the planes of the Republic o f G uinea’s Air Force, p artic u ­ larly th e M IG 21. H ow ever, c o n tra ry to w h a t th e P o rtu g u ese had assum ed, these m ilitary aircraft w ere n o t in a co n d ition to fight. The Soviets had b een late in supplying th e m w ith a m m u n itio n , and the co u ntry had no sufficiently train ed pilots to o p erate th em . In charge of the m ission to take d o w n th e aircrafts was Jose Jan u ario, w ho, like m any o th e r m em b ers o f th e Compania de Comandos Ajricanos, had been coerced into taking p art in the operation. O nce in the a irp o rt, Januario a b o rte d th e m ission and convinced th e m e n u n d e r his co m m and to su rrender. Calvao sent an o th er g ro u p to fulfill the sam e m ission, b u t they only found an A ir A frique C aravelle je t and fo u r F ocker 27 b i­ m o to rs. N one o f th em w ere co m b at planes. As this p a rt o f th e o p e ra tio n had failed, G alvao feared th a t th e P ortuguese boats w ere exposed to airstrikes, so on the m o rn in g o f 22 N ovem ber, he o rd e re d the re tre a t o f his groups. T he m ission had been partially fulfilled, since the Portuguese p risoners had been released and th e PAIGC fleet d estro y e d . B ut th o se had b e e n th e objectives o f 165

A M ILCAR CABRAL Calvao, w hich w ere obviously o f a m ilitary nature. T he political goals, those th a t Spinola had added— th e a rre st o r killing o f Cabral and the deposing o f Toure— had b een abandoned in favor o f a safe w ithdraw al, w ith only very few causalities for the P ortuguese contingent. Calvao later rem inisced that he only cared ab o u t “b ringing back the p riso n ers, the FLNG p eo p le had to fend for them selves.” The g ro u p o f G uinean dissidents m anaged to force th e ir way into the Villa Silly, th e p residential palace, b u t Toure was no longer there. T hey th en m oved on to o th e r positions, reinforcing units such as the one th at had taken th e m ilitary h e a d q u arters o f C am ayenne, a position th at was defended until th e aftern o o n o f 22 N ovem ber. T he tide o f the invasion was only tu rn e d in favor o f Toure early in the aftern o o n o f 22 N ovem ber, w h en th e G uinean p re sid e n t finally gave up the keys to the arm o ry o f w eapons— w hich he k ep t on his p e rso n — and asked fo r the in te rv e n tio n o f a C uban force o f 200 soldiers. T he invasion o f th e in d e p e n d e n t sovereign state o f G uinea was a d ip lo m atic deb acle fo r th e P o rtu g u e se forces. A n u m b e r o f p e o p le w ho p artic ip a te d in it and la te r spoke o r w ro te ab o u t it have p o in ted to a lack o f in fo rm a tio n as th e re a so n fo r its failure. C ab ral, fo r instance, was n o t even in C onakry th a t night. But in defense o f the PID E, this in fo rm atio n had n o t been in c o rre c t at the tim e the invasion was being p lan n ed . In fact, C abral had left A lgiers on 18 N ovem ber, and headed to T rip o li, Libya, w h ere he was to stay a couple o f days befo re heading to C onakry. N o t only did his u n e x p e c te d change o f plans c o n fo u n d th e p o lice, b u t his o w n m e n also fell in to th e trap. W h en th e press co rre sp o n d e n ts in A lgiers found o u t ab o u t the events in C onakry, they ru sh e d to th e PAIGC h e a d q u a rte rs to ask a fte r the w h e re a b o u ts o f C ab ral, and th ey w e re to ld th a t C abral w as in th e G uinean capital. O nly th re e days a fte r th e events did it em erg e th at C abral had changed his m in d at th e last m o m e n t and, instead o f going to C onakry, h ad g o n e to Sofia in B ulgaria, w h e re h e gave his first in te rv ie w since th e attacks to th e Italian co m m u n ist daily L’Unita. W h ile d ip lo m atically and politically th e invasion w as a failure, C alvao’s m ission was so successful fro m a m ilitary p o in t o f view that som e people have speculated that SekouToure him self had collaborated in the rescue o f P ortuguese soldiers in exchange fo r the handover o f opp o n en ts o f his reg im e (a position h ard to m aintain, however, as it is 166

W IN N IN G IN PO LITICS W I T H O U T L O SIN G TH E WAR unlikely that any p a rty w ould ru n so m uch risk for so little rew ard ). How ever, the highly im petu o u s actions o f the P ortuguese gave Sekou Toure— know n for inventing plots to g et rid o f p eople from his ow n go v ern m en t— a justification to launch one o f th e w o rst acts o f cru elty ever ca rrie d o u t in G uinea-C onakry. Sekou Toure set up a Suprem e R evolutionary C o u rt, arrestin g m o re than 5 ,0 0 0 people for in te rro g a ­ tio n . S ixty -tw o w e re su b seq u en tly se n te n c e d to d eath and a n o th e r sixty-eight given life sentences. D ozens o f people w ere hanged, includ­ ing in cum b en t m inisters. Toure also had no qualm s ab out o rd e rin g the killing o f th e w ives and c h ild re n o f real and im ag ined o p p o n en ts. Foreign nationals, m em b ers o f th e clergy, and th e su rren d e rin g m e m ­ bers of the African C om m andos— the group led by L ieutenant Januario Lopes— w ere am ong th e co n d em n ed . U p o n his r e tu rn to C onakry, C abral was g re e te d by the bodies o f th e deceased hanging fro m the bridge w hich gives access to th e city. T h e invasion o f C o n ak ry w as th e final b lo w to th e in te rn a tio n a l prestige o f P ortugal, even th o u g h , in the first days after the events, its involvem ent could n o t be officially ascertained. A lthough the radio of C onakry had initiated a verbal offensive against the forces o f Spinola from th e early h o u rs o f 22 N ovem ber, suspicions th a t P ortugal had been involved only began to fully take shape on 27 N ovem ber w hen Francisco G o m es N an g u e, a so ld ier in th e C o m p an y of A frican C om m andos, was found in th e sea off’the coast o f Liberia and saved by a British ship. Taken to M onrovia, he revealed th at his com pany had p articip ated in the attacks. His testim o n y convinced the Liberians to su p p o rt C onakry in an act o f rep u d iatio n against P ortugal— an ex am ­ ple follow ed by m any o th e r A frican co u n tries, despite th em n o t being on b est te rm s w ith the regim e of Sekou T oure— in the OAU assembly in January 1971. W eakened by th e failure o f th e Operagao Mar Verde, Spinola c o n tin ­ ued to loo k fo r a so lu tio n to th e conflict. In 1971, L eopold Senghor, the p resid e n t o f Senegal, suggested a m eetin g w ith Spinola to discuss th e possibility o f n eg o tiatio n s b e tw e e n C abral and th e g o v e rn o r o f G uinea. But due to th e relu ctan ce o f th e reg im e o f M arcelo C aetano to negociate w ith th e g u errillas, th e e n c o u n te r only to o k place the follow ing year, o n 1 8 May 1972, at th e Club Mediterranee to u rist c o m ­ plex in Cap S kirring, in th e s o u th e rn Senegal reg io n o f Casam ance. 167

AM ILCAR CABRAL A ccording to C arlos Fabiao, one o f th e P o rtu g u ese arm y officers w ho to o k p a rt in th e m eetin g s, Senghor p ro p o sed a ceasefire so as to allow the fo rm atio n o f a dual ad m in istratio n , com posed o f m em b ers o f b o th the g u errilla m o v em en t and th e P o rtu g u ese side, w hich w ould govern th e te r r ito r y according to a ten -y ear statu te o f autonom y. This p ro p o ­ sitio n — th e c o n s titu tio n o f a c o m m u n ity b e tw e e n P o rtu g a l and its colonies— was som eth in g th a t Spinola had previously believed in, b u t had b een fo rced to re n o u n c e due to th e circu m stances he found h im ­ self confronting. In 1972, th e p re sid e n t o f the council, C aetano, stated th at he favored a m ilitary defeat over negotiations w ith the guerrillas, since this w ould provide space fo r dip lo m atic action u n d e r in te rn a ­ tional law. As C aetano w ould explain in his b o o k Depoimento: “arm ies exist to w in. A nd they m u st w in , b u t it is n o t necessary th at they w in. If th e P o rtu g u e se arm y is v an q u ish ed in G u in ea a fte r using u p its capacities, this leaves us w ith o u r political and legal capacities in tact to defend th e re st o f the overseas te rrito rie s .” Spinola, fru strated w ith this attitu d e , confided: “I do n o t w a n t to hide m y fear th at perhaps we have lost th e last chance o f a dialogue b etw een th e g o vernor o f G uinea and A m ilcar C abral in a p o sitio n o f clear su p erio rity.” In 1973, Spinola was discharged at his ow n req uest and re tu rn e d to Lisbon, w h e re he w o u ld b e p ro m o te d to a fo u r-star general, and appointed deputy chairm an o f the A rm ed Forces. Later, he w ould play a central role in the April revolution o f 1 9 7 4 .1 will discuss die relationship b etw een the failure in G uinea and the A pril revolution later. * * * T he actions o f Spinola in G uinea are an im p o rta n t co rrectiv e to m uch o f th e w ritin g o n C abral an d th e w a r in G u in ea. Spinola n o t only a tte m p te d to c o u n te r th e g u e rrilla s in th e m ilita ry aren a, b u t he also fough t th e m on th e psychological and p o litical te rra in . H e success­ fully org an ized th e d e s e rtio n o f a n u m b e r o f g u e rrilla fighters, even if in doin g so he lo st som e o f his ow n m en . H e failed to d ecap itate th e ir lead ersh ip , b u t he did deal a serio u s b lo w to th e confidence o f th e g u e rrilla s. S pin o la’s policies and m ilita ry strateg ies m u st, th e r e ­ fo re, be taken in to acco u n t if w e are to fully u n d e rsta n d the c irc u m ­ stances and intricacies o f th e w ar in G uinea in g eneral, and the killing o f C abral in p articu lar. 168

10

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

T h ere was one thing th at b o th Cabral and Spinola could agree on: a m ilitary effo rt on its ow n w ould n o t be enough to w in the war. As we have seen, C a b ra l’s m ilitary strateg y re ste d o n this p rin cip le . W hile m ilitary action inflicted irrep arab le dam age on th e P ortuguese forces, dam aged th e ir m o rale, h elped to p ro te c t the populatio n, and allowed fo r the con tin u atio n o f social w o rk , it could n o t b rin g ab o u t a final victory. W ith o u t a political decision— im plying neg o tiation— the co n ­ flict could in th e o ry drag on for decades. G uerrilla m anuals take p articu lar care to discuss th e phase o f eq u i­ librium w hich follow s th e shock o f the first actions. Che G uevara, in his p o p u lar style, called it “bite and escape”, b u t o th e r tex ts describe this stage in m o re form ulaic te rm s , such as “stabilized resistance”. This is the p erio d in w hich conditions are p re p a re d for th e launch o f the final phase o f the m o v em en t, in w hich large sw athes o f the population are involved, and w hich co n stitu tes a dissuasive factor on the side o f the defending forces. G u in e a’s anti-colonial w ar, according to this schem a, w ould never reach its final phase, desp ite C a b ra l’s fre q u e n t statem en ts to the c o n ­ trary. O n ce, w h en asked ab o u t th e phase his c o u n try was in according to G u evara’s fram ew o rk , C abral began by saying th at he was against the “system atization o f phen o m en a,” since, in practice, “phenom ena do n o t take place acco rd in g to p re-estab lish ed sch em es.” H ow ever, he

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AM ILCAR CABRAL added , “w e say, without affirm ing, th a t this schem e is adaptable to our co n d itio n s”. H e co n c lu d e d th a t th e situ atio n in G uinea w o u ld very soon be ready, “thanks to th e advance o f th e war o f movement, to begin, given th e co nditions in w hich we find ourselves, the general offensive to finish th e P o rtu g u ese d o m in atio n in o u r land” (em phasis added). T he C ubans in p a rtic u la r favored attacking Bissau and finishing the w ar, as they had them selves d efeated th e Batista reg im e w ith th e invasion o f Havana in 1959. C abral’s response n o t only revealed his ignorance o f the theories of guerrilla w arfare and his attitude in relation to the “military,” b u t also his lack o f in terest in advancing in a direction that was exclusively military, as was ex p ected by som e international audiences, especially those that had been fo rm ed o u t o f revolutions, such as in C uba. Cabral knew the risks o f this direction. First o f all, leadership o f the m ovem ent w ould have to be handed to the m ilitary, w hich w ould p u t him in a subaltern po sitio n . Secondly, th e p a rty w o u ld also have to ob tain heavier w ar m aterials, such as helico p ters, w hich, given the geographic conditions o f G uinea, w ere considered th e m o st efficient m eans o f tra n sp o rt to distrib u te supplies, to su p p o rt isolated positions and to evacuate the in ju red and dead. T hirdly, an ti-aircraft m aterials w o u ld have to be acquired in o rd e r to challenge the P ortuguese air supremacy. Above all, it was n ecessary to intensify th e m ilitary actions, w hich m e a n t re c ru itin g m o re fighters to th e p a r ty ’s ranks and, as a re su lt, establishing sophisticated m eans o f surveillance to avoid in te rn a l su b ­ versio n . For th e South A frican activist S tephanie U rd an g , fo r e x a m ­ ple, this was o n e o f th e m ain co n cern s in th e lib e ra te d zones, since as w ell as th e h ard sh ip s, fatigue, bad fo o d , and c o n sta n t loss o f fam ily m e m b e rs and frien d s, th e g u e rrilla s also had to deal w ith in filtratio n by v o lu n te e r re c ru its. For all these reasons, C abral was convinced th a t the lib eration o f G uinea should n o t be achieved by increasing th e m ilitary effo rt, b u t th ro u g h th e inten sificatio n o f political actio n inside and d ip lo m atic action outside the country. Influencing this decision was C ab ral’s p e r ­ sonality itself. H e was th e principal strateg ist in the party. H e signed alm ost all th e d o cu m en ts it p ro d u c e d , w ro te th e com m uniques, gave the press conferences, and to o k p a rt in alm ost every diplom atic m is­ sion— he defined his agenda in line w ith his innate abilities. His p e r ­

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T O W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E sonal inclinations m ade him m o re com fortable on the diplom atic front: he was a frank and cordial p erso n , w ho always found a way to connect w ith o th ers and did n o t find it difficult to strike up conversation w ith people from different walks o f life. H e was in tellig en t and ad ro it w ith w o rd s, ex p ressin g h im self p erfectly in P o rtu g u e se and c o rre c tly in French, although n o t very w ell in English; he was an apt th in k er and resp o n d ed carefully to questions, w hich gave his speech a kind o f flex­ ibility. W ith his w ords he could please both the m o st radical o f co m ­ m unist audiences and th e m o st m o d erate o f d em o cratic countries. As such, it is natural that he was m o re personally invested in the d ip lo ­ m atic field. Pow erfully re p re se n tin g th e key te n e ts o f his in te rn a tio n a l action, C abral used his th e o ry o f th e tw o circles at a 1967 C o n fe ren ce o f N atio n alist O rg an izatio n s o f th e P o rtu g u e se C olonies (C O N C P ) in D a r-es-S ala am , T anzania. H e asked th e a u d ie n c e to im ag in e th e P o rtu g u ese en circlin g the g u e rrilla fighters in all th e p ositio n s o c c u ­ pied in th e te rrito ry . But this circle was m u tu a l, since th e g u errilla fighters also en c irc le d th e P o rtu g u ese. As th e P o rtu g u e se also relied on the e x te rio r to g e t su p p o rt for th e ir m ilitary effo rts, th e re was a n o th e r c irc le a ro u n d th e P A IG C ’s fig h ters. D ip lo m a tic a c tio n in favor o f th e PAIGC was m e a n t to b reak th e e x te rio r circle im posed over th e gu errillas. In te rn a tio n a l cam paigns in c o u n trie s w hich w ere allies o f P o rtu g a l w e re c e n te re d a ro u n d th e n e e d to m ake p e o p le aw are o f th e c o n se q u e n c e s o f s u p p o rtin g th e c o lo n ial p ow er. In C a b ra l’s te rm s , this w as a w ay to en c irc le P o rtu g a l’s p o sitio n s, by engaging w ith th e U N and o th e r influential o rganizations such as the Vatican and th e US C ongress. T he U N had b een foun d ed in 1945 as a fo ru m o f free cou n tries, integrating the p ow ers that possessed colonies and p ro te cto ra tes, and the very few in d e p e n d e n t fo rm e r colonies. By opposing colonialism , the 1955 Bandung C onference had helped create th e conditions for the ex pansion o f sovereig n ty th ro u g h o u t th e w o rld . It also gave these recently b o rn nations new ethics based on w h at was called “positive n eu trality ”— th a t is, n o n -alig n m en t in th e C old W ar struggle betw een the U nited States and th e Soviet U nion. This philosophy w ould u n d e r­ pin the p articip atio n o f these new co u n tries in th e G eneral Assembly o f the U N , w here they cam e to be know n as the Afro-Asiatic group. 171

A M ILCA R CABRAL It was due to the em ergence of the Afro-Asiatic group in the U N — at least at th e level o f th e G eneral Assembly— alongside the Soviets, that Portugal sta rte d to ex p erience its first m ajor setbacks in the organiza­ tion. D elegates representing these countries to o k an active role in draft­ ing R esolution 1514, approved in D ecem b er 1960, w hich condem ned P o rtu g u ese colonialism and u rg ed P ortu g al to decolonize. T hey also lobb ied fo r C abral to b e in v ited to speak as a p e titio n e r at th e U N Special C om m ission on 12 D ecem ber 1962, w hich had been established in o rd e r to gather oral and w ritte n inform ation o n the tru e situation in the P ortuguese colonies. In the re p o r t th at Cabral read to the m em b ers o f the C om m ission, he appeared overly confident that the U N could c o n trib u te to the in d e­ p endence o f G uinea. H e in ferred , for exam ple, th at the independence o f G uinea d epended less on the efforts o f Cape Verdeans and Guineans and m o re o n th e h elp o f th e U N in p u ttin g p ressu re on P ortugal to com ply w ith R esolution 1514. Since th e U N was the “guarantor o f and responsible for international laws,” Cabral may have believed th at the organization n eed only re c o m m e n d th a t th e P o rtu g u ese go v ern m en t negotiate w ith th e nationalist m o v em en t for this to occur. T h ro u g h o u t th e follow ing years, th e U N issued various appeals and resolutions urg in g P ortugal to decolonize. But it was n o t enough, as in reality th e organization had lim ited p o w er and could n o t in te rfere in th e in te rn a l affairs o f th e m e m b e r states. A t any rate , P ortugal was n o t violating any principle o f the UN, for the am endm ent to the Portuguese co n stitu tio n had tu rn e d colonies in to overseas provinces. Follow ing this prin cip le, P ortugal had b een able to survive in th e organization, n o tw ith stan d in g the p ressu re from th e Afro-Asiatic group. C abral also had to learn th e language o f U N diplom acy in o rd e r to m ake his case for th e in d ep en d en ce o f G uinea and C ape Verde. In his appearance b efo re th e organization in 1963, C abral had trie d to d e m ­ o n stra te — in a sim ilar a rg u m e n t to th e one he had em ployed in the pam p h let Facts— th at P ortugal was incapable o f colonizing and th at its attitu d e in the U N was in contravention to U N R esolution 1514. Seven years later, in 1970, C abral p re se n te d a different arg u m en t to the U N to m ake his case. H e asserted th at th e sovereignty o f a given people is m ade up o f te rrito ry , p o p u latio n , and adm inistration; based on these factors, G uinea should be considered a state. C abral’s nationalist m ove­ 172

TO W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E m e n t co n tro lled various p a rts o f th e p o p u lated te rrito ry , w here they had d ev elo p ed social in fra s tru c tu re such as schools and hospitals despite P ortuguese air attacks. In these p a rts o f th e country, Portugal could only claim c o n tro l th ro u g h a bom bing cam paign using napalm and herbicides. Any g o v ern m en t, he added, th at had to re s o rt to such m ethods to defend its sovereignty did n o t have th e rig h t to rep rese n t Cape Verde and G uinea. O v er the m any years Cabral had been m aking his case for in d ep en d en ce, G uinea had b ecom e a co u n try “w hose situ­ ation is th at o f an in d e p e n d e n t state, p a rt o f w hose national te rrito ry , notably th e urb an cen tres, is m ilitarily occupied by a foreign pow er.” * * * D iplom atically, Cabral had always been a pragm atist; he trie d as m uch as possible n o t to identify w ith any ideology. T he w o rld he was try in g to navigate w as c o m p le x and d e m a n d e d flex ib ility o f language. U ltim ately, the liberation m ovem ent shared the same theoretical back­ bone as com m unist revolutions, inspired by M arx, Lenin, o r Mao. This m ea n t th a t th e PAIGC received m o st o f its su p p o rt from th e Soviet U n io n , E ast G erm an y , C zecho slo v ak ia, B ulgaria, and Yugoslavia, including n o t only w ar m a te ria l, b u t also sanitation p ro d u c ts, food, and tra in in g in th e fo rm o f scho larsh ip s. W h e n trav ellin g to th ese c o u n tries, C abral had n o qualm s ab o u t using language w hich w ould identify him w ith co m m u n ism . B ut he was also aw are th a t su p p o rt from these c o u n trie s was n o t enough to gain G u in ea’s in d ep en d en ce, as they w ere isolated o n the in te rn a tio n a l arena, diplom atically w eak, and incapable o f e x e rtin g any so rt o f p ressu re over P ortugal. O n the o th e r hand, th e policy o f W estern co u n tries was less bound by ideology and m o re co n cern ed w ith hum an rights. Since the political system in these co u n trie s allow ed freed o m o f sp eech, it m ean t th at th e ir societies and citizens did n o t have to align w ith th e ir g o v e rn ­ m e n t’s policies and w ere able to voice th e ir disco n ten t. C abral’s d ip lo ­ m atic efforts in these co u n tries was m ean t to influence public opinion through the press in o rd e r to p u t pressure on th eir governm ents. In the W est, therefo re, the conflict in G uinea was largely fram ed as a hum ani­ tarian p ro b lem . As such, th e PAIGC was able to obtain logistical su p ­ p o r t fro m c o m m itte e s in c o u n trie s such as G re a t B ritain, th e N etherlands, and France, w hose governm ents assisted Portugal m ilitar­ 173

AMILCAR CABRAL ily. Food and blood for hospitals cam e from these countries. N o t only did this assistance com e from far-left organizations, as a re p o rt w ritte n by th e P o rtu g u e se M in istry o f Foreign Affairs p u t it, b u t also fro m apolitical organizations such as the W orld C ouncil o f C hurches, w hich in S ep tem b er 1970 don ated USD 2 0 ,0 0 0 to C ab ral’s party. But th e afo rem en tio n ed assistance cam e from N G O s o r groups of citizens, in co n trav en tio n o f th e ir g o v e rn m e n ts’ positions. In te rm s of n o n -co m m u n ist co u n tries, only the Swedish g o v ern m en t openly sup­ p o rte d th e PAIGC. D u rin g the war, this N o rd ic c o u n try sent hospital eq u ip m en t, a rad io tra n sm itte r, vehicles, and consum ables. A lthough the global level o f help has never b een m ade public, th e Swedish gov­ e rn m e n t was o p en ab o u t its increased su p p o rt to the guerrilla m ove­ m e n t from 1970—1. * * * To a large e x te n t, C ab ral’s m o v em en t was th erefo re to r n b etw een its n ecessary affiliation w ith th e E a ste rn Bloc and th e n ee d to a ttra c t W e ste rn c o u n trie s to its cause. As su ch , C abral p u t a g re a t deal o f effort in to changing th e p e rc e p tio n th at he was a com m unist. To m ake this case, few diplom atic actions w ere as im p o rta n t and consequential as the private audience g ra n te d by the Pope to the representatives o f Lusophone lib eratio n m ov em en ts, such as A m ilcar C abral, A gostinho N eto , and M arcelino dos Santos. T he aversion o f th e C atholic C hu rch to com m unism is w ell know n. Various encyclicals and papal in terv en tio n s, such as the Qui Pluribus o f 1846 and th e Nostis et Nobiscum o f 1849, had con d em ned new ly e m e rg ­ ing co m m u n ist ideologies. In th e tw e n tie th century, o th e r popes, such as Pius XI, ex ten d ed th e h atred o f com m unism to its surrogates like C hristian dem ocracy, w hich he considered to be full o f contradictions, m aintaining th at p eople could n o t practice politics and fear G od at the sam e tim e. A fter W W II, on account o f th e fo rm atio n o f the E astern Bloc, the C atholic position becam e m o re ex tre m e . Things sta rte d to change in th e 19 6 0 s w ith th e Concilio Vaticano II (Second Vatican C ouncil), w h en th e C atholic C hu rch was becom ing m o re conciliatory. C ontinuing the w o rk o f his p red ecesso r Pope John XXIII, Paul VI re i­ m agined the ro le o f the C hurch in th e w o rld , encouraging Catholics to leave th e quietness o f th e ir chapels to p articip ate in the debates th at w ere shaping politics. 174

TO W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E It is hard to know w hat was behind the P o p e’s decision to receive the African nationalists. T he m eetin g had b een planned by the Italian activist M arcella Glissanti, w ho had been in tro d u ced to Cabral in Paris in 1968 by A lioune D iop, the d irecto r of the m agazine Presence Ajricaine. D iop had also b een in stru m en tal in h e r decision to create the Italian A ssociation o f Friends o f Presence Ajricaine in R om e. This association proceed ed to found the In ternational L ibrary Paesi Nouvi, a publishing house, w hich focussed on m aking w orks on w hat was th en considered the African renaissance available to th e Italian public. T he bookstore, situated in th e c e n te r o f R om e, close to th e p arliam en t, soon becam e the hub o f A frican cultural and political life in Italy, hosting a n u m ber o f exhibitions and discussions on various th em es related to Africa. The Lusophone nationalist leaders w ere in R om e for the Conference o f Solidarity w ith th e People o f P ortu g u ese C olonies, held from June 27 to 29. It was organized by the th re e trad e unions behind the Italian C o m m unist Party, and included representatives from 171 national and in tern atio n al organizations. Glissanti decided to address a le tte r to the Pope, in w hich she in tro d u ced th e th ree A frican leaders as opponents o f th e “A frican p o litics o f P o rtu g al,” and m e n tio n e d th e ir desire to g re e t the C atholic leader, in resp ect o f th e C hristian upbringing they had all shared. T he Vatican, in a le tte r dated 30 June, replied favorably to G lissanti’s req u est and the m eetin g was scheduled for the n e x t day. Pope Paul VI receiv ed th e nationalists in th e canonical ro o m , w here Popes usually receiv e am bassadors. A cco m p an ied by tw o cardinals, Paul VI addressed the nationalists for ten m in u tes in F rench, offering each o f them a copy o f his m o st recen t encyclical Population Progressio, and bade th em farew ell w ith th e w ords “I pray for you.” Cabral to o k advantage o f this e n c o u n te r to sta rt a propaganda cam ­ paign aim ed at C atholics, especially P o rtu g u e se p e o p le w h o , w hile against th e v io len ce o f th e a rm e d stru g g le , co u ld n o n e th ele ss be responsive to th e h u m an itarian p ro b lem s in G uinea. R ight after the m e e tin g w ith th e Pope, G lissanti h o sted a press c o n fe re n ce at h er bo o k sto re, w ith a significant tu rn o u t o f Italian jou rn alists and foreign corresp o n d en ts. In his speech to the conference, Cabral stated that he was hopeful th a t th e g estu re o f Paul VI tow ard s the L usophone n atio n ­ alist m o v e m e n ts co u ld raise m o ra l q u estio n s am o n g P o rtu g u e se Catholics, w ho had given “co n crete su p p o rt to the P ortuguese colonial 175

AM ILCAR CABRAL w ar.” F or h im , th e P ope w as giving a “c o n c re te basis,” b ey o n d th e encyclicals, “to sto p su p p o rtin g th e colonial war.” T h e P o p e ’s g ro w in g closeness to th e n atio n al m o v e m e n ts in L uso p h o n e A frica w as a d ip lo m atic v ic to ry w ith p ro fo u n d negative consequences fo r th e P o rtu g u ese p resen ce in Africa. T his, com ing on to p o f many o th e r events, was seen by C aetano as confirm ation o f the P o p e ’s dislike o f th e Estado Novo. A lth o u g h P o rtu g al had one o f th e la rg e st C ath o lic c o m m u n itie s in E u ro p e — th ro u g h th e Concordata signed in 1940 b etw een th e Vatican and th e Estado Novo P ortugal was practically a C atholic state— Paul VI had taken a n u m b e r o f positions w hich had raised tensions b etw een P ortugal and the C atholic C hurch. In 1964, Paul VI visited India, w hich had an unresolved diplom atic issue w ith P ortugal on acco u n t o f th e annexation o f G oa, D am an and D iu. In May 1970, he visited th e Sanctuary o f Fatim a in P ortugal w ith o u t stopping in Lisbon. In M arch 1970, P ortuguese ecclesiastic authorities sen t v eh em en t p ro tests to th e Vatican after th e a p p o in tm e n t o f a black p rie st, th e A ngolan A ndre M uaca, as th e auxiliary bishop o f Luanda. For the P o rtu g u ese, by distinguishing a black p relate, the Vatican was hierarchizing th e black p rie sth o o d , and consequently “destroying the w o rk o f in teg ratio n in A frica.” B etw een re se n tm e n t and despair, th e reg im e o f M arcelo C aetano trie d to re p a ir th e d am age caused by this au d ien ce w ith th e Pope. Firstly, th e Estado Novo to o k an “en erg etic a ttitu d e ,” form ally lodging a com plaint w ith th e State Secretary o f th e Vatican to express the “great s o rro w ” cau sed by th e au d ien ce th e P ope had given to th e “m o st e x tre m is t a n ti-P o rtu g u e se te rro ris ts o f p ro v en M arx ist affiliation.” W hile w aiting for a form al response, Lisbon recalled its am bassador in the Vatican. T he Vatican official new spaper, Osservatore Romano, trie d to defuse th e diplom atic crisis by arguing th a t th e Pope could n o t tu rn dow n p eo p le w ho w ere asking fo r “th e c o m fo rt o f his blessing.” W ith P ortugal th reaten in g to cu t ties w ith th e Vatican, Osservatore R om ano w e n t even fu rth er, denying th a t any audience b etw een the Pope and a leader o f th e national m ovem ents in th e P ortuguese colonies had taken place, instead depicting th e en co u n ter as being a strictly religious affair as p a rt o f th e w eekly general audience. T he Osservatore was suggesting th at th e nationalists had m ixed w ith o th e r ch u rch g o ers, consequently forcing th e Pope to bless th e m . This version was later rep ea ted by the 176

T O W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E Cardinal Casaroli: “th e th ree leaders w ere in the general audience, and th en they w ent to talk to th e Pope and asked for his blessing; Paul VI did n o t know w ho they w ere.” This explanation was good enough for M arcelo C aetano, w ho, in his w eekly address on P o rtu g u ese TV, Conversas em Familia (Family Talk), explained: “the audience discreetly granted [ ...] did n o t have any politi­ cal m eaning.”T he Pope had n o t spoken to the nationalists as “leaders o f te rro rism ,” b u t as Catholics o r C hristians, as they had p resen ted th e m ­ selves w hen req u estin g an audience. T he Pope had used the o p p o rtu ­ nity to urge th em that even in looking for som ething they considered th eir rig h t, they should use “peaceful m eans.” As “n o w ords w ere said th at co u ld c o n stitu te an offense to P o rtu g al, m in o r a tte n tio n to its dignity, ju d g m en t to its politics, [or] in terferen ce in its internal affairs,” the Portuguese g overnm ent considered everything “clarified.’’W ith this g e stu re , th e d ip lo m atic relatio n s b e tw e e n P o rtu g a l and th e Vatican w ere norm alized. Since the A m ericans shared the sam e aversion to com m unism as the Vatican, A m erican diplom acy was equally difficult for Cabral to navi­ gate. C abral’s w o rk in the US had tw o objectives: as w ell as attem pting to c u t P o rtu g a l off fro m its lines o f s u p p o rt, he w as also try in g to change the p e rc e p tio n o f the PAIGC in th e eyes o f the A m erican p e o ­ ple, so as to shake off the exclusive d ep en d en cy on th e socialist co u n ­ tries. A lthough the PAIGC received h um anitarian aid from A m erican organizations, such as the A m erican A u to W o rk ers, w hich had m ade an im p o rtan t donation o f m edical supplies, th ere had never been any con­ tac t w ith official entities. In 1970, at the invitation o f Syracuse U niversity, Cabral travelled to the US to atten d the E duardo M ondlane M em orial, in rem em brance of the M ozam bican n atio n alist— le a d e r o f FR E L IM O — w h o had b een killed the previous year. D u rin g this trip , C abral visited the A m erican C on g ress, a tte n d in g a h earin g w ith co n g ressm en th a t to o k place in ro o m 22SS o f th e R ay b u rn H o u se O ffice Building. T he A frican A m erican congressm an C harles Diggs, a su p p o rte r o f the Lusophone nationalist cause in th e US, may have b een behind the invitation. The first A frican A m erican to be e le c te d to C o n g ress fro m M ichigan, C harles Diggs w ould be C ab ral’s m an in th e A m erican adm inistration. Later, in 1973, Diggs visited th e lib erated zones in G uinea and w ro te 177

AM ILCAR CABRAL P resid en t N ix o n a m em o ran d u m asking him to recognize the in d ep en ­ dence o f G uinea, w hich had b een p roclaim ed in S eptem ber th a t year in M adina do Boe. By inviting Cabral to an audience w ith the Congress S u b c o m m itte e o n A frica and th e S u b co m m ittee on F oreign Affairs, Diggs in te n d e d , above all, to illu strate the consequences o f A m erican m ilita ry assistance to P o rtu g a l. A p p o in te d as c h airm an o f th e S ubco m m ittee on A frica and o f th e C o m m ittee on Foreign Affairs in 1969, Diggs argued th at nationalist organizations fighting for liberation in Africa w ere n o t intrinsically com m unist. They w ere forced to seek th e su p p o rt o f co m m u n ist co u n tries as a consequence o f the U nited States closing th e d o o r to th em . To help C abral m ake this p o in t, Diggs began the hearing by reading a press co m m u n iq u e, d istrib u te d by th e P o rtu g u ese Em bassy in th e U n ite d States, th e c o n te n t o f w h ich w as a speech given by M arcelo C aetano to th e N ational Assembly. As C aetano had accused the PAIGC o f being a co m m u n ist organization, Diggs w an ted to give C abral the o p p o rtu n ity to re fu te th e accusation. Q u o tin g C aetano, Diggs asked Cabral if it was tru e th at the ind ep en d en ce o f Cape Verde and G uinea w o u ld p o se a “risk to th e free w o rld .” C abral sta rte d by saying th at from th e P o rtu g u ese p o in t o f view, Diggs was him self a com m unist, since it was th e te rm used by C aetano to describe anyone w ho helped the liberation m ovem ents. Cabral also added that the su p p o rt w hich his m ovem ent received from the Soviet U nion did n o t dictate the strategic position o f C ape Verde, since th e PAIGC was b o und by the principle th a t “a p e o p le fighting fo r in d e p e n d e n c e sh o u ld b e in d e p e n d e n t in thou g h t and action. If tom orrow , for any reason, any country, for giving su p p o rt to us, trie d to dom in ate us, w e w ould fight again against this country, as w e are fighting today against th e P ortuguese dom ination.” D u rin g the session, w hich lasted ab o u t one hour, Diggs also asked abou t th e e x te n t to w hich the P ortuguese arm y was using A m erican w ar m aterials in G uinea, w hich was p ro h ib ited . T he US supplied the P o rtu g u e se a rm e d fo rces w ith m ilita ry aid, th ro u g h th e M ilitary Assistance Program u n d e r th e Lajes ag reem en t, b u t these could n o t be u sed by P o rtu g al in any o f th e fro n ts o f th e colonial w ar, due to an em bargo d ecreed by th e K ennedy adm inistration in 1961. The violation o f this clause had caused tension in relations b etw een the tw o countries w hich involved th e cancellation o f licenses and req uests for the re tu rn o f m ilitary eq u ip m en t. 178

TO W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E Cabral showed pictu res o f G uineans w ith injuries clearly p roduced by napalm w hich, as Cabral trie d to argue (b u t could n o t prove), w ere the resu lt o f airstrikes w ith bom bs p ro d u ced in the US. Som e re p re ­ sentatives in the ro o m w ere m oved by the revelations and reacted posi­ tively. Jonathan Bingham, from the state o f N ew York, said at the end o f the m eetin g that he su p p o rted the g u e rrilla s’ cause: “I have for quite a w hile, in my w o rk in the UN [as m e m b e r o f the A m erican delegation in this institution] raised concerns in relation to o u r politics o f co n tin u ­ ing to supply P ortugal w ith m ilitary w eapons and o th e r assistance.” P ortugal follow ed the h earing attentively. A m erican representatives w ho su p p o rted P o rtu g a l’s positions w ere given questions to em barrass C ab ral. Since th e h e a rin g w as o p e n to th e p u b lic , P o rtu g a l se n t a co u p le o f officials fro m its em bassy in W ash in g to n to r e p o r t on C ab ral’s p erfo rm an ce. B ernardoT eixeira de A lbergaria was am ong the fifty people w ho a tte n d e d the h earing, th e m ajo rity o f w hom , “am ong w hites and blacks,” w ere m em b ers o f th e African R esearch G ro u p — “a research g ro u p ded icated to th e analysis o f th e p e n e tra tio n o f N o rth A m erican im perialism in A frica.” R e p o rtin g to the P ortuguese foreign m in istry at th e Palacio das Necessidades, A lb erg aria e x p la in ed th a t Cabral was accom panied by tw o o th e r p erso n s, O scar Teixeira and Gil F e rn an d es— w h o m he w ro n g ly id en tified as A m e ric a n s— and th a t C abral, although he was n o t co m fo rtab le speaking in English and had spoken very slowly, only tu rn e d once o r tw ice to th e in te rp re te r to ask him in French th e m eaning o f a w ord in English, and only sp oradi­ cally did n o t u n d e rsta n d th e q u estio n s he was asked. T he ra p p o rte u r also added th a t since th e h earin g was n o t m andatory, th e ro o m was n o t full and C abral could n o t hide his su rp rise w h en he failed to see congressm en such as R o b ert N .C . N ix, a m e m b e r o f the C ongressional Black C aucus fro m P ennsylvania, and B enjam in S. R o sen th al fro m N ew York— b o th D em o crats and from w h o m he had ex p ec te d m o re s u p p o rt. To c o n c lu d e , A lb erg aria r e p o r te d to L isbon th a t E dw ard J. D erw inski, a Republican representative from th e state o f Illinois and one o f th e s u p p o rte rs o f th e P o rtu g u e se p o sitio n in th e A m erican C ongress, failed to “grill C abral on the q u estio n o f ideology.” In his a tte m p t to c o m p ro m ise C ab ral, D erw in sk i re fe rre d to a speech Cabral had given in th e Soviet U nion in 1970, on the occasion o f the centen ary o f L enin’s b irth , in w hich Cabral criticized the “id eo ­ 179

A M ILCA R CABRAL logues o f th e im p erialist influence w ho try to m inim ize the ro le Lenin played, denying the im p o rtan ce of his ideas to the m ovem ents o f libera­ tio n in Asia, A frica and Latin A m erica.” D erw inski was trying to get a confession from Cabral on his ideological affiliation. T he congressm an had m o re luck in his q u estio n on th e involvem ent o f th e C ubans in the w ar in G uinea, forcing C abral to lie. By then, the Cubans w ere an im p o rtan t factor in G uinea’s w ar against the Portuguese. Che Guevara m et Cabral on 12 January 1965, during his trip to Africa, and they forged a lasting link. However, effective m ilitary and hum anitarian aid only cam e after C abral’s first trip to Cuba to take p a rt in the T ricontinental C onference in Havana, in January 1966. Fidel Castro was im pressed w ith C abral’s speech and to o k him on a personal trip to the Escambray M ountains. D uring this trip , C astro com m itted to assisting the national liberation m ovem ent in Africa w ith supplies, namely tobacco, co tto n , sugar, uniform s, tru ck s, and am m unition. Castro also sent drivers and mechanics to operate and m aintain the trucks. But m ore im portantly, Castro sent a group of Cuban doctors, w ho, during the war, w ere the only doctors to operate in the in te rio r o f Guinea. The PAIGC also could also co u n t a few dozen C uban com batants on th eir side. C abral, according to Piero Gleijeses, did everything he could to lim it th e ir p articip atio n and always v ehem ently denied th at th e re w ere C uban fighters in G uinea, until the Portuguese arm y detained the C uban official P edro R odriguez P eralta in N o v em ber 1968. But w hen asked ab o u t it, Cabral claim ed th at Peralta was in G uinea visiting his colleagues, also C uban d o c to rs, adding th a t he was n o t a Lafayette (a referen ce to th e French general w ho p articip ated in the A m erican W ar o f Indepen d en ce on th e side o f th e nationalists) and th at the guerrillas did n o t have C ubans fighting w ith th em . If C abral co u ld use his co n tacts to b e in v ited to a hearin g in the A m erican C o n g ress, P o rtu g u e se d ip lo m acy co u ld also m o bilize its influence. A ccording to a n o te signed by th e P o rtuguese am bassador Vasco G arin, The NewYork Times and The Washington Post did n o t publish anything e ith e r on C ab ral’s audience in C ongress o r on his conference at th e U niversity o f Syracuse. This w as, according to the am bassador, because his co n tact at The NewYork Times “asked his friends in the new s agencies to avoid c ircu latin g n e w s o n C ab ral as m u c h as possible.” G arin was so convinced o f th e success o f his efforts th at he added, in 180

T O W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E the final lines o f th e w ire, th a t soon after C a b ra l’s m eetin g w ith the congressm en, he received a phone call from G eorge Landau, d ire cto r o f Iberian Affairs in the State D e p a rtm e n t, in w hich he was told: “w e have survived.” But this was n o t entirely tru e . The New York Times, in fact, published a sh o rt piece on C ab ral’s jo u rn e y to N ew York. A n u m b e r o f jo u rn a l­ ists, including one from this new spaper, w ent to see Cabral at his hotel, T he Tudor, on 4 2 n d S tre e t, w h e re th e n atio n alist lead er elaborated extensively o n th e N o rth A m erican m ilitary e q u ip m e n t used by the Portuguese army. T he declarations o f the African nationalist w ere given to the P ortu g u ese Embassy for c o m m e n t, to n o avail. These tw o diplom atic actions, nam ely the audience w ith the Pope and the hearin g at th e A m erican C ongress, w e re crucial in C ab ral’s strategy for th e indep en d en ce o f G uinea. C ab ral’s plan was that once independen ce was p ro claim ed , his p arty w ould have su p p o rt n o t only from the usual suspects— the E astern Bloc and African countries— b u t also from W estern co u n tries, the m ost pow erful in th e w orld. W ith this in m in d , in 1972 C abral sta rte d his last diplom atic offen­ sive aim ed at se c u rin g s u p p o rt in th e ev en t o f th e p ro c lam atio n o f independence in G uinea. First, he visited a n u m b e r o f Asian countries, in clu d in g C hina, N o r th K o rea, and Japan. In O c to b e r, he visited Sweden as a guest o f the Social D em ocratic Party, to attend its Eleventh C ongress. He th en travelled to th e US again, w h ere he received a d o c­ to rate honoris causa from Lincoln University, in the presence o f Charles Diggs and o th e r im p o rta n t black figures, such as the p o e t and activist Leroy Jones. H e gave a speech on the situation in G uinea to the Fourth C om m ission o f the U N and m e t w ith Salim A hm ed Salim, presid en t of th e G eneral A ssem bly o f th e U N . In D e cem b er, he travelled to the Soviet U nion to take p a rt in th e celebrations o f the fiftieth anniversary o f the U nion. O n this occasion, he was also given an h o norary d o c to r­ ate by th e In stitu te o f A frican S tudies o f th e Soviet A cadem y o f Sciences. It w as o n this trip to th e Soviet U n io n th a t he was finally p rom ised a delivery o f Soviet-m ade Strela su rface-to-air m issiles, w ith w hich the guerrillas w ould finally challenge the su p erio rity o f the co lo ­ nial air force. A ccording to Jeune Afrique, Cabral planned to proclaim the indepen­ dence o f G uinea before M arch 1973. W ith this tim ing, he expected to 181

A M ILCA R CABRAL have th e su p p o rt o f representatives o f th e states th at w ould gather in Oslo to discuss the situation o f the Portuguese colonies in Africa. He also expected that the G eneral Assembly o f the OAU, scheduled for May, and the conference o f the N on-A ligned M ovem ent w hich w ould take place in Septem ber, w ould recognize independence. W ith the su p p o rt o f the African states, Cabral expected he could count upon the recognition of the U N G eneral Assembly w hich w ould take place in O ctober. To be credible to th e in tern atio n al com m unity, the independence of G uinea had to be p ro claim ed in th e in te rio r o f the country, as p ro o f th at th e g u e rrilla fighters had c o n tro l o f th e allegedly lib erated zones. In fact, a n u m b e r o f things had ch anged in th e m ilitary situ atio n o f G uinea. T h e failure o f Operagao M ar Verde, th e dem o ralizatio n o f the P ortuguese tro o p s in Africa, and the disintegration o f C aetano’s regim e in Lisbon co n trib u ted to the belief in the arm ed forces that the m ilitary situation in Africa could only change th ro u g h a coup d ’etat. In February 1972, Cabral atten d ed the 163rd session o f the Security C o u n cil in A ddis A baba, E thiopia. Speaking at th e e v e n t, C abral expressed h im self in a “convincing m anner,” co n trary to o th e r leaders, “w h o failed to stir any in te re st,” according to a B ritish official at the U n ited N ations. C abral used this o p p o rtu n ity to invite th e Security C ouncil to send a com m ission to th e in te rio r o f G uinea to ascertain w h e th e r th e PA IG C c o n tro lle d th e se p a rts o f th e te rrito ry . F rom 18 M arch to 9 A p ril 1972, th e U N G en eral A ssem bly d ispatched a tea m o f e x p e rts to G u in e a ’s lib e ra te d zones, c o m p rise d o f H oracio Sevilha B orja, Folke L efg ren , and B elkhiria K am el fro m Ecuador, Sw eden, and Tunisia, respectively, and accom panied by tw o o th e r offi­ cials from th e organization, nam ely th e Senegalese C heikh Gaye and the Japanese p h o to g ra p h e r Yutaka N agata. T he P ortuguese arm y trie d to block th e w o rk o f the C om m ission in the te rrito ry and prove th at C abral’s p arty did n o t co n tro l the liberated zones by launching a m ajo r m ilitary attack. As the agenda o f the m is­ sion was secret, the air force indiscrim inately b om bed the places w here the probability o f hosting th e C om m ission was higher, such as the b o r­ derin g zones o f Bolama and Q uitafine, and from 2 A pril onw ards, the regions o f C atio, in th e secto rs o f C ubacare andT om bali. Later, Cabral said that although the objective o f th e P ortuguese was to intim idate the m em b e rs o f th e Special M ission, and to dissuade the population from 182

T O W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E collaborating w ith the envoys, the bom bings ended up w orking in favor o f the guerrillas. For secu rity reasons, th e o b serv ers stayed six days longer than scheduled in the G uinean te rrito ry , w hich for C abral, n o t­ w ithstanding the num erical su p e rio rity o f the P ortuguese army, was a political and m ilitary victory. * * * To ensure independence w ould be su p p o rted by the international co m ­ m unity, Cabral w anted to d e m o n strate his p a rty ’s d em ocratic c re d e n ­ tials, throu g h the electio n o f th e first N ational Assem bly in the lib e r­ ated zones. T h e N atio n al A ssem bly should p ro claim G u in ea ’s indep en d en ce, b u t its c o n stitu tio n also in ten d ed to achieve a n u m b er o f o th er goals. By electing the N ational Assembly through secret ballots and universal suffrage, the PAIGC w an ted to d e m o n strate th at it was n o t aligned w ith th e m eth o d s o f com m unist leadership, w hich did n o t include p o p u lar co n su ltatio n . T h e p a rty was also try in g to prove its absolute and effective co n tro l over som e areas o f th e country. T h e ele c tio n p ro cess s ta rte d in 1969 a fte r w o rk to re g iste r th e population in the liberated zones had begun. In m any o f these areas, regional co m m ittees carried o u t civil reg istratio n s in o rd e r to provide an estim ate of the n u m b er o f people m arried and divorced, and to have reco rd s o f b irth s and deaths. H ow ever, th e p a rty only cond u cted the first population census in 1971, w hich proved m o re com plicated and difficult than previously e x p e c te d . F irst o f all, a n u m b e r o f regions w ere constantly u n d e r fire from th e P o rtu g u ese army. Secondly, the constant m o vem ent o f the population and th e high n u m b e r o f refugees in the neighboring c o u n tries m ade the figures re c o rd e d in the census u n tru stw o rth y . N o n e th e le ss, th e PAIGC e stim a te d th a t aro u n d 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 people lived in the liberated zones, w hich gave the in c o rrect im pression that th ere w ere m o re inhabitants of the zones controlled by the national lib eratio n m o v em en t than in th e u rb an centers. The Suprem e C ouncil o f th e Struggle (CSL) m e t from 9—16 A ugust 1971 to announce the holding o f th e electio n th e follow ing year. An inform ative cam paign on the electoral act was carried o u t from the end o f A ugust until A pril 1972, after w hich a special com m ission travelled the country to form electoral com m issions in each sector. The CSL also published an electoral law, stating that any G uinean could ru n for office 183

AMILCAR CABRAL regardless o f sex, religion o r social co n d itio n , as long as the candidate was above 18 years o f age, was a professional in any dom ain and had never collaborated w ith the P o rtu g u ese since at least the beginning o f the war. A ccording to th e E lectoral Law, th e p a rty should appoint re p ­ resentatives for Bissau, Bolama, Bafata, and the Bissagos Islands, due to th e im possibility o f conducting elections in these regions as the g u e r­ rillas had n o access to th e m . C onfirm ation th at th e PAIGC was involved in organizing an elec­ to ra l p ro cess w as p ro v id e d by th e m o st unlikely source: th e PID E. A cco rd in g to a m e m o , p ro d u c e d in Bissau an d d isp atch ed to th e P ortuguese M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, C ab ral’s p a rty was proceeding w ith the “census o f th e pop u latio n u n d e r th e c o n tro l o f the te rro rists, nam ely in th e so u th e rn and n o rth e a s te rn zones, also organizing elec­ tions for th e R egional C ouncil, th e local organs o f regional pow er.” T he Swedish scholar Lars R u d eb eck was one o f the few foreigners to follow th e electo ral process and to w rite a b o o k about it. A ccording to R u d eb eck , although by law th e cen tral electo ral com m ission was supposed to discuss th e draw ing up o f a list o f candidates alongside the com m issions in each sector, in reality, th e p a rty e n d ed up im posing certain candidates w ith o u t th e consen t o f th e people. This show s th at for the PAIGC, a w ell-organized process was n o t the ultim ate goal o f the election. T he p a rty was less in te re ste d in th e pedagogical natu re o f the elections than in the international prestige it could gain from them . The final phase o f the election process, the casting o f ballots, started in th e first days o f A ugust and co n tin u e d u n til 14 N o v em b er 1972. D u rin g this p e rio d , th e cadres o f th e electo ral com m ission travelled th ro u g h th e c o u n try to c o lle c t th e v o tes to e le c t th e 273 m ilitan ts propo sed by th e party, from the 336 th at com posed the regional co u n ­ cils— o u t o f w hich 63 w ere d irectly app o in ted by the party. To this effect, 100,000 ballots w ere p rin ted in each o f tw o different colors, w hite for yes and gray for no, to be deposited in the ballot box according to the intended choice o f the voter. According to the re p o rt on the elections, 8 3 ,0 0 0 ballots o f each type w ere distributed, co rrespond­ ing to the num b er of people registered in the census that took place from January to August 1972. According to the figures of the general elections, 75,16 3 p eo p le voted yes to th e PA IG C’s p roposed slate, w hile 2,352 voted no. This m eans that a total o f 7 7 ,515 people participated in the 184

T O W A R D S IN D E P E N D E N C E election, 9 3 .4 p er cent of those registered in the 1972 census— although party propaganda claim ed a tu rn o u t of 9 9 .9 p e r cent. W ith these elections, the Popular Assem bly was finally co n stitu ted , w hose first “h istorical m ission,” as C abral w ould p u t it, consisted of proclaim ing the national state, approving the co n stitu tio n and creating the executive b ranch. H ow ever, Cabral w ould n o t live to see his co u n ­ try becom e in d ep en d en t— the m o m e n t to w hich he had dedicated ten years o f his life. * * * In the ten years th at Cabral led th e revolution in G uinea, his approach to the colonial q u estio n changed considerably. In the very beginning, he may have th o u g h t th at arm ed struggle could lead to independence. But he was n o t a m ilitary m an and he feared th at such a course w ould give to o m u ch p o w e r to th e a rm e d w ing and be d e trim e n ta l to the c o u n tr y ’s in te re sts. O n ly to w a rd s th e en d o f th e w ar, by th e early 1970s, did Cabral find the necessary w ords to gain international su p ­ p o rt for indep en d en ce: basing his arg u m en t on the social e x p e rim e n t his p a rty was co n d u ctin g in the liberated zones, he argued th at Guinea was no lon g er a colony b u t an occupied te rrito ry . In the end, however, G uinea’s ind ep en d en ce w ould n o t be achieved w ith o u t a final push o f m ilitary m ight.

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11

THE KILLING OF CABRAL

A m o n th b efo re th e m u rd e r o f C abral, Lilica Boal, a C ape V erdean te a c h e r at th e Escola Piloto in C onakry, receiv ed th e sad new s th at a beloved uncle had died. To console her, Cabral used w ords w hich fo re­ shadow ed his ow n fate: “now, w e are so close to g ettin g th ere.” He was killed on the night o f 20 January 1973, w ithin tou ch in g distance o f his goal to w hich he had d edicated so m u ch o f his life. Cabral was an u n o rth o d o x th in k er and a revolutionary. He favored finding peaceful and diplom atic solutions to the colonial question over a com plete reliance the military. He approached the prospect o f his own death in a sim ilar fashion. H e was aware, through his fam iliarity w ith g u errilla literatu re, th at the death of the leaders w eakened these types o f m ovem en t. B ut instead o f p ro p erly p ro te c tin g him self against the plots that w'ere unfolding around him , he trie d instead to devalue his ow n life. In O c to b e r 1971, interview ed by Simon Malley, the directo r o f A friq u e /A sie , he used, perhaps for die first tim e, an expression w hich he w ould go on to rep eat m any tim es over: “if I die to m orrow , nothing will change in the ineluctable evolution o f the fight o f my people and th eir victory,” since “w e will have dozens, hundreds o f Cabrals in our people. O u r nation w ill find a m ilitant to continue the w ork.” At a personal level, however, in the last years o f his life Cabral began to w o rry a b o u t th e possibility o f b ein g b etray ed . In May 1972, for exam ple, at th e sym posium in m em o ry o f one o f th e founders o f the

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A M ILCA R CABRAL OAU and first p re s id e n t o f G hana, N k w am e N k ru m a h , C abral was enthusiastically applauded— and later on praised by one o f the bio g ra­ p hers o f N k ru m ah — w hen he said th at the A frican p re sid e n t had n o t died o f th ro a t cancer, b u t instead o f “betrayal cancer.” It was poverty, according to C abral, th a t inflam ed am b itio n and p u t A fricans in th e position to betray oth ers. Beginning in the m id 1960s, elem ents w ithin the p arty had begun to see Cabral as a p ro b le m , as evidenced by th e large n u m b e r o f plots against him . In 1967, a tria l was co n v en ed by Fidelis C abral, Vasco Cabral, and A ristides P ereira, and the m ilitants H o n o rio Sanches and Vaz and M iguel Em bana w ere accused o f p lo ttin g to kill the leader and senten ced to death. T he PID E also spon so red a n u m b e r o f poten tial killers to assassinate Cabral. In 1969, a m ilitant called Jonjon was found in the secretariat o f the p a rty w ith a gren ad e w ith w hich he in ten d ed to kill Cabral. In 1970, th e PIDE organized an o p eratio n called Amilcar Cabral w hose goal was th e m u rd e r o f C abral. A C ape Verdean called

Lachol, a re sid e n t in Dakar, had conceived th e plan and had re c ru ite d a n u m b er o f o th e r Cape Verdeans in Freetow n, Sierra Leone to execute it— nam ely Isidoro M anuel Lim a, A ugusto Divo de M acedo and Jose N ascim ento da Silva. As all o f these individuals had show n a willingness to kill C abral, th e o p e ra tio n , acco rd in g to th e P ID E ’s in fo rm a tio n , w ould be c a rrie d o u t by w hichever assassin, in w hichever location and using revolvers o r pistols, “had the best o pportunity.” A lthough the plan was n o t realistic, according to th e au th o r o f the d o c u m en t, the o p p o r­ tu n ity to kill Cabral in such a way should be co nsidered. In February 1971, th e d e leg atio n in M in d elo , Sao V icen te, p laced a b o u n ty o f 1,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 escudos on C ab ral’s head. T he plan w elcom ed v o lunteers for this o p eratio n , w ith p aym ent only to be m ade u p on c o m p letio n o f the job. But according to the PID E, th e “individuals in te rested in c o m m it­ ting the crim es” insisted on receiving the m oney in advance, as only this way did they believe th a t they w ould actually be paid. Later, offering the m o d est sum o f 10,000 escudos to each, the PIDE contacted six crew m em b e rs o f th e b o at Margeretha w ho had show n th e ir w illingness to “dynam ite th e am m u n itio n d ep o sit o f th e PAIGC, in Conakry, and liq ­ uidate A m ilcar C abral.” These plans w ere fo r th e m o st p a r t am ateu rish and did n o t w o rry C abral.T h ey w ere devised in places such as Lisbon, Dakar, and Bissau, 188

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL by people w ho did n o t have the reso u rces, o r even the o p p o rtu n ity , to get close to C abral. But he was h o u n d ed by th e p ro sp ec t o f being the targ e t o f a p lo t c a rrie d o u t by his ow n m en in Conakry. T he PIDE had in filtrated th e lib eratio n m o v em en t and added a handful o f m ilitants w ith resp onsibilities to its payroll. To deal h ead-on w ith this possibil­ ity, C abral d ra fte d a m e m o ra n d u m and d istrib u te d it to his p a r ty ’s m ilitants in M arch 1972, in w hich he revealed th at the “P ortuguese crim inals” had succeed ed in infiltrating th e organization in o rd e r to kill the m ain leaders o f the p a rty by b rib in g cadres w ith responsibility w ith in it. In the first phase o f its o p e ra tio n , th e PIDE w ould a tte m p t to in sert “African agents” in to th e party, w ho w ould arrive from Bissau u n d e r th e p re te n s e o f w an tin g to jo in th e lib e ra tio n m o v e m e n t. A n u m b e r o f these individuals w ere fo rm e r m em b ers o f the party, som e only recen tly freed from p risons and “train ed by the PIDE in the te c h ­ nique o f political su b v ersio n ” to in tern ally destabilize the organiza­ tion. O n ce inside, they w ould th en a tte m p t to re c o n n o ite r the various s tru c tu re s o f th e party, to u n co v er d isc o n te n te d m ilitants and to take advantage o f all th e o p p o rtu n itie s to sow dissent w ithin the organiza­ tio n . T hese actions w ould be b u ilt, according to C a b ral’s assessm ent, on religious, racial, and eth n ic differences, “so that an en v iro n m en t of in to leran ce should be n u rtu re d in the p a rty so as to hit it in its b a ck ­ bone: its unity.” A fter the first phase o f th e plan was co m p leted , th e p lo tte rs w ould move to the next: the creation o f a clandestine n etw o rk o f high-ranking m ilitants from various sectors o f the party, especially the arm ed forces. A parallel leadership should be created and should seek su p p o rt in the neighboring co u n tries, prim arily in the Republic o f G uinea. This “lead­ ership” w ould strive to be accepted as the legitim ate one. F u rth erm o re, this w o rk w o u ld go h and in h an d w ith acts o f sabotage against the au thority and prestige o f C abral, p rep arin g his d e p a rtu re , “or, if neces­ sary, his physical liquidation.” In the final phase, these infiltrators w ould rem ove all th e leaders faithful to the p a rty ’s guidelines or, if this goal could n o t be achieved, the p lo tte rs should kill C abral. O nly after this w as acco m p lish ed should th e g ro u p s ta rt n e g o tiatin g w ith th e Portuguese g o v ern m en t, re p re se n te d by G eneral A ntonio de Spinola, w ith the aim o f obtaining the in tern al autonom y o f G uinea— so-called “se lf-d e te rm in a tio n u n d e r th e P o rtu g u e se flag.” Finally, th ey w o u ld fo rm a g o v ern m en t for the G uinean state. 189

A M ILCAR CABRAL A fter th e slaying o f C abral, A quino de Braganca, the only jo u rn a list w h o w as a d m itte d to th e investigations o rd e re d by Sekou Toure to pro b e the cause o f the assassination, w ro te a n u m b e r o f articles for his m agazine A frique/A sie. His conclusions o n th e conspiracies against the nation alist lead er h elp ed to c e m e n t th e official tr u th and to influence a n u m b e r o f p e o p le w h o w o u ld la te r w r ite a b o u t th e se events. B rag an fa accu sed th e P ID E /D G S o f p lo ttin g th e d ea th o f C abral, re c ru itin g a n u m b e r o f “a d v e n tu re rs, p riso n e rs, o ld , tire d , resentful and d isc o n te n t m ilita n ts,” and in se rtin g th e m in to th e ranks o f th e p a r ty in C onakry. H e b ased th e se allegations o n th e confessions ex tra c te d from th e c o n sp irato rs th ro u g h to r tu r e , on the declarations o f various p a rty m e m b e rs— p articu larly th e C ape Verdeans— and, o f course, on th e p o rte n to u s d o cu m en t drafted by A m ilcar Cabral on the “co u p d ’e ta t o f th e G u in ean s.” T h e b ig g est m istak e o f th e p arty , a cc o rd in g to B raganca, w as having lo w e re d its g u a rd and having allow ed these p eo p le to occupy “essential p o sitions o f responsibility.” This n arrativ e was convenient w h en th e PAIGC was in a situation o f crisis after th e killing o f its lead er and m ilitants desperately n eeded the m o tiv atio n to m ove fo rw ard . It placed th e b u rd e n o f g u ilt on the antagonism s b etw een C ape V erdeans and G uineans, and em phasized a conspiracy p lo tte d by elem en ts th at had com e from outside, after long p erio d s o f tim e spent in th e P o rtu g u ese priso n s, w h ere they had been in stru c te d by th e agents o f th e P ID E /D G S to infiltrate th e PAIGC. It is a versio n w h ich coincides w ith th e d o c u m e n t w ritte n by C abral. This g ro u p in clu d ed , fo r exam ple, A ristides Barbosa, d etained by the PIDE on 18 July 1962 and la te r se n t to th e T a rra fa l p riso n in C ape Verde, and fre e d on 3 A ugust 1969 as p a r t o f th e g ro u p o f n inetyth ree p riso n ers p ard o n ed by Spinola. Barbosa then fled from Bissau to re in te g ra te w ith th e g u errillas. T h ere was also M om u Toure, one o f the h isto ric cadres o f th e party, d etain ed o n 3 M arch 1962, alongside Rafael B arbosa, and also freed on 3 A ugust 1969. Braganca was m o re c o n c e rn e d w ith c o n stru c tin g a n arra tiv e than explaining w hat had really h ap p en ed , and o m itte d the less convenient facts fro m his a c c o u n t. It is tr u e th a t th e m ilita n ts w h o h a d b e e n d e ta in e d in T arrafal had b een in c o n ta c t w ith th e PID E. This w as the case w ith Jo a o T om as, w h o h ad c o lla b o ra te d w ith th e P o rtu g u e se police since 1969. H ow ever, th e m a jo rity o f th o se w ho to o k p a r t in 190

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL th e p lo t to kill C abral had n o t had m any o p p o rtu n itie s to co llu d e w ith the PID E. T his w as th e case w ith Inocencio C ani, for exam ple, the d irec t a c to r in th e killing o f C ab ral, and o n e o f the brains behind th e o p eratio n s. Cani was n o t in good standing w ithin the party. From 1967—9 he was in the Soviet U nion for training on Karla boats, and it was probably d u ring this tim e that the p lo t began to take shape. W h en he re tu rn e d to C onakry in 1969, he was appointed C o m m an d er o f the Navy, and m e m b er o f the CEL. Two years later, however, accused o f selling a boat engine on the black m ark et, he was sentenced in a w ar trib u n al. He was p ardo n ed on 19 S ep tem b er 1972 and d e m o te d to co m m an d er of a single navy ship. A n o th er navy m an, Inacio Soares da G am a, was in a sim ilar position. H e had been detain ed in 1971, and w hen the assassi­ nation to o k place, he was aw aiting trial. In o th e r w ords, m ore than the PID E, w hat en d ed up linking th e p lo tte rs was th e fact th at they w ere in tro u b le w ith th e party. Cabral was c o rre c t to believe that betrayal was always m otivated by the accum ulation o f erro rs: “little e rro rs, that later on b ecom e big e rro rs.” Inocencio Cani, A ristides Barbosa, Joao Tomas, M am adou D ’jai, Koba N agonia, and m any o th ers w ere in debt to the p arty after having been involved in cases o f c o rru p tio n , or, even m ore seriously, betrayal. This was the case o f N agonia, C ab ral’s body­ g u ard , w h o had b e e n accused in a p rev io u s inv estigation o f having provided C ab ral’s agenda to his associates. B ut th e m istak es c o m m itte d by th e c o n sp ira to rs should n o t be s e p a ra te d fro m th e g e n e ra l e n v iro n m e n t o f su sp icion and h a tre d b etw een th e C ape Verdeans and the G uineans. In July 1972, for exam ­ ple, th e PID E k n ew th a t th e re w ere “serio u s d iv ergences” b e tw e en Cape Verdeans and G uineans follow ing an altercation betw een Amilcar C abral and M om u Toure. T oure, sh o rtly after arriv in g in Bissau, had received from th e gen eral secretary “a g ro u p o f te rro ris ts ” to initiate a m ilitary cam paign in the in te rio r o f G uinea. Toure disobeyed Cabral on the grounds that only the G uineans w ere sent to the bush w hile the C ape Verdeans occu p ied the highest p o sitions in the p a r ty ’s hierarchy w ith o u t exposing them selves on th e fro n t. This d o c u m e n t also adds that Toure and fo rty o th e r G uineans had b een detain ed and accused of atte m p tin g to fo rm a PAIGC w ith o u t th e C ape V erdeans. H ow ever accurate this d o c u m e n t is, th e fact rem ains th a t all th e co n sp irato rs in 191

A M ILCA R CABRAL th e assassination o f C abral had b een d etain ed in th e jail o f the party, th e M ontanha, at least fro m A pril to S ep tem b er 1971. O n c e o u t o f jail th e co n sp ira to rs d ev elo p ed a parallel life to th e party, choosing areas o f th e docks as m eetin g points, since alm ost all o f th em w ere m em b ers o f th e navy. C abral was aw are th at the navy was one o f the m ain hubs o f destabilization, b u t only later did he take action to d ism an tle it. O n 17 Jan u ary 19 7 3 , a few days b efo re his d eath , Cabral called O svaldo Lopes da Silva and asked him to take charge o f th e Navy. L opes da Silva, as he w o u ld la te r tell th e jo u rn a list Jose V icente Lopes later, refused this m ission, asserting th at the navy was “ro tte n ” and if he rem o v ed th e m en th e re (Inocencio Cani and co m ­ pany), he w ould be in tro u b le. Lopes da Silva, how ever, agreed to assess th e m oves o f the p a rty ’s m ilitants in C onakry in o rd e r to discover w ho was visiting fro m the various divisions on the fro n t. By asking th e cooks how m any people w ere fed daily, Lopes da Silva arrived at th e n u m b er o f 600— m inus the children o f the Escola Piloto and the m ilitants in transit— helping him to understand the scale o f the p lo t against th e Cape Verdeans. O f these 600 individuals, only a small p o rtio n (less than fifty, the n u m b er o f Cape Verdeans) w ere n o t aw are o f th e conspiracy. All th e G uineans, even those w ho did n o t take an active ro le in it, knew th at th ere was a p lo t against th e C ape V erdeans, and th e re w e re th o se w h o trie d to a le rt Cabral, such as Awa Cassama, a Fulani know n for h e r rare beauty and a m o th er o f tw o young adults serving in the FARP. Knowing the weakness o f Cabral fo r w om en, she was approached by th e conspirators to “lure Cabral in to a trap.” She n o t only refused to take p a rt b u t tried to alert Cabral to th e danger. But before she was able to do so, she was killed. A lthough C abral kn ew th a t a conspiracy to kill him was underw ay, it was w ith surp rise and awe th at on th e evening o f 20 January 1973 he found h im self face to face w ith th e g ro u p o f a rm e d m e n w ho w ere w aiting fo r him in fro n t o f his house. A ccom panied by his w ife, Ana M aria, Cabral was retu rn in g hom e from a recep tio n held by the am bas­ sador o f Poland. T he assailants to o k advantage o f the fact th at nobody w as in th e h e a d q u a rte rs — e x c e p t A ristid es P ereira w h o , as usual, w orked until late at night. T he re st o f th e p a rty m e m b ers had gone to th e n e ig h b o rh o o d o f R ato m a fo r a m e e tin g w ith th e le a d e r o f FRELIM O, Joaquim Chissano, w ho was visiting Conakry. 192

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL Cabral was parking the car w hen suddenly a jeep appeared before him , projecting its headlights o n to his face. Various arm ed m en, am ong th em Inocencio C ani, ju m p ed o u t o f th e jeep. They m anhandled the nationalist leader and— according to Ana M aria, the only survivor o f the ev ent— a b rie f arg u m e n t ensued w h en th e assailants trie d to tie Cabral up. As C abral resisted, he was shot at point-blank range. Laying o n th e flo o r and b leed in g profusely, he tr ie d to n eg o tiate: “le t’s go inside, le t’s call th e d ire c to ra te, I am ready to discuss no m a tte r w hat.” T he resp o n se was a blast o f a u to m atic rifle fire to his head, shot by Inocencio C ani, w hich killed Cabral instantly. A ccording to the plan, the death o f Cabral was the signal for the coup d ’etat against th e C ape V erdeans to beg in . A lm ost sim ultaneously, M am adou D ’jai, leading an o th er g ro u p , bro k e in to the p a rty ’s h ead ­ q u a rters w here A ristides Pereira had barricaded him self on hearing the shooting outside. Caught by th e rebels, he was tied up and sent off in one o f the Navy ships, supposedly bound for Bissau, w here he w ould be handed to Spinola. A th ird g ro u p , led by JoaoT om as Cabral, to o k the PAIGC prison and freed M om uT oure and A ristides Barbosa. O nce they had com p leted th e first p a rt o f the plan, th e group split into tw o: the first half, led by Toure, headed to th e presidential palace to m e e t Sekou Toure, and the second w ent to provide back-up for the mission to arrest all the brumedjos (C ape Verdeans). T h e sh o o tin g w as h e a rd in R ato m a, w h e re th e m e e tin g w ith FRELIM O was taking place, b u t nobody paid atte n tio n since shootings w ere a freq u en t o ccu rren ce, particularly in th e evening. W hen the talk finished, Jose A raujo to o k Joaquim Chissano to his h otel in a car also carrying o th e rs such as his w ife, A m elia A raujo, and Vasco Cabral. He sto p p ed by th e h e a d q u a rte rs to d ro p off A m elia A raujo and Vasco C abral an d , alth o u g h he fo u n d th e m o v e m e n ts th e re u n u sual, p r o ­ ceeded to take Chissano to th e ho tel. Vasco Cabral knew that som ething unusual was taking place and left Am elia A raujo th ere to go hom e and pick up his m achine gun. She was jo in ed soon after by Alcides Evora, also kn o w n as Batcha, w hose w ork in the party was centered around consular issues and o th er bureaucracy related to th e trip s o f m ilitants. But w h en Vasco Cabral cam e o u t to join A m elia A raujo, she and Alcides Evora had been forced to follow a gro u p o f co n sp irato rs w ho had found th em th ere. They w ere saved by Vasco Cabral w ho, after h earing B atcha’s scream s, had taken the co n ­ 193

AM ILCA R CABRAL spirators by su rp rise, shooting at th e m , injuring one and forcing the o th e r to flee. H ours later, this g ro u p o f Cape Verdeans w ere p icked up by a patrol o f the C onakry-G uinean arm y, w hich w ould had received o rd ers from the p resid en t to a rre st all m em b ers o f th e PAIGC. The Cape Verdeans w e re tak en to th e Palace o f th e P eople w h e re th ey w e re sep arated accord in g to gender. M en w e re tak en to be in te rro g a te d , w hile the w om en and child ren , te n in to tal— am ong th em A m elia A raujo, D ulce A lm ada, H e n rie tte V ieira, Lilica Boal, and o th ers w ho w orked at the Escola Piloto — w a ite d tw o days u n til th e y w e re given sh e lte r a t th e V ietnam ese Embassy. N o n e o f the Cape Verdeans involved in these tragic events had any pro b lem p o in tin g fingers at G eneral Spinola, th e g o v ern o r and c o m ­ m an d er o f the colonial tro o p s in G uinea at th e tim e. Spinola had been one o f th e principal arch itects o f Operagao Mar Verde, w hich had had as one o f its objectives th e physical elim ination o f C abral. F u rth e rm o re , as th e C ape V erdeans still re la te today, Spinola did n o t like C ape Verdeans, and he had spo n so red ferocious verbal attacks against th em , throug h Radio Bissau and s tre e t p ro tests. A fter freeing Rafael Barbosa in 1969, Spinola had n o t only h elped him to re-fo u n d the FUL, b u t he also pro m ised him the ind ep en d en ce o f G uinea, as long as it was w ith ­ o u t th e C ape V erdeans. T h a t w as a t least w h a t Spinola had said to P resid en t S enghor in th e ir m eetin g in Cap Skirring on 18 May 1972. But this is n o t w hat Spinola refers to in his version o f the assassina­ tion o f C abral. As Spinola later w ro te , Senghor had pro p o sed to him “th e im m ed iate b eginning o f a phase o f te n -y e a r in tern al autonom y, follow ed by a referen d u m , w hich probably w ould bring about in depen­ dence in the c o n te x t o f a Luso-African, o r Luso-African-Brazilian co m ­ m unity.” Spinola also added th a t S enghor had discussed this solution w ith C abral, w ho was “ex trem ely recep tiv e.” H ow ever, w hen Spinola m e t w ith M arcelo C aetano to discuss S enghor’s p ro p o sitio n , C aetano o rd e re d Spinola to sto p any n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e guerrillas. A ccordingly, he was fo rc e d to cover fo r “th e p o sitio n o f th e central g o v ern m en t, creating in th e G uinean secto r o f the PAIGC a clim ate o f u n certain ty regarding th e im p ed im en ts to the m eeting w ith C abral.” It is also possible th at Spinola had used C aetan o ’s veto to place the blam e for the failure o f negotiations on C abral, causing even m o re discontent 194

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL inside the PAIGC, as he explained: “th e G uinean faction o f the PAIGC a ttrib u te d to Cabral the responsibility for the cancellation o f the m e e t­ ing, sharpening th e in te rn a l dissidences adroitly ex p lo ited by Sekou Toure, leading to the death o f A m ilcar C abral.” As soon as new s sta rte d to spread ab o u t th e death ol C abral, the P ortuguese trie d to dispel any suspicions ab o u t Spinola’s involvem ent. T he daily n ew sp ap er A Capital was th e first new s o u tle t to seek o u t Spinola to co m m en t on th e events. Spinola, w hile refusing to provide additional in fo rm atio n , stated , how ever, th at G uinea had received the new s w ith calm , everything was q u iet in Bissau, and th at it was “p re ­ m atu re to m ake conjectures on th e repercussions that the assassination o f A m ilcar C abral could have on the struggle.” P ortugal only reacted officially th re e days later, on 25 January. T he state secretary for in fo r­ m ation read a com m u n iq u e on radio and television, denying the p o s­ sibility that the crim e could have been o f “P ortuguese o rigin,” since, in the first place, “it was n o t p a rt o f the P ortuguese m ethods.” Secondly, th ere was noth in g to be gained w ith such an action. Thirdly, it was n o t possible th at “P ortuguese agents could have p e n e tra te d in to the head­ q u a rte rs o f the p a rty in C onakry and chosen th e m o st intim ate stro n g ­ hold to execute this grave and condem nable act.”This was w ritte n as if th ere had n ev er b een any Mar Verde o p eratio n o r infiltration into the ranks o f th e lib eration m ovem ent. The P ortu g u ese tactics regarding accusations o f its involvem ent in the killing o f Cabral w ere only refined later. It was n o t enough to deny the accusations to prove th e ir innocence; they also had to find o th e r culprits. O n 22 January, an editorial in Diario de Noticias asked a qu es­ tion w hich still resonates today: “W h o killed Cabral?” M em bers o f the Fulani g ro u p , “to w a rd w h o m C abral had always b een hostile? Rival agents in th e fights b etw een th e Russian and th e C hinese, o r sim ply so m eb o d y w h o w as in te re s te d in his d isap p earan ce, in th e ho p e o f seeing one day the p a rtitio n o f th e P ortuguese province o f G uinea.” Ever since G uinea-C onakry and Senegal had b ecom e independent, th e P o rtu g u ese au th o rities had n o t h id d en th e ir fear o f losing th e ir colony o f Guinea-Bissau, n ested b etw een these tw o new African sover­ eign states. This was likely the legacy o f the U ltim atum o f 10 January 1890, w hen Portugal had given up the Casamance Basin in exchange for B ritish su p p o rt fo r th e so-called P ink M ap (M apa Cor-de-Rosa ). As a 195

AM ILCAR CABRAL re su lt o f this, Portugal claim ed the vast te rrito rie s in so u th ern Africa fro m A ngola to M ozam bique. W h e n Senegal becam e in d e p en d e n t in 1960, th e P o rtu g u ese g o v e rn m e n t w as th e first c o u n try to send an am bassador there. Senghor, still trying to establish the short-lived fed ­ eration w ith Mali, was deeply to u ch ed by such a gesture. However, it was never m ade clear w h eth er this m ove was in anticipation o f a possi­ ble Senegalese a tte m p t to annex G uinea in to its territo ry . P o rtu g u e se d ip lo m a tic a u th o ritie s so o n b ecam e convinced th at Senghor did n o t have any expansionist am bitions. How ever, this was n o t th e case w ith G uinea-C onakry. G uinean P resid en t Sekou Toure, fro m the M andinka ethnic g ro u p , claim ed d escen t on his m o th e r’s side from Almamy Sam ory— ancestry w hich has b een disputed— an African w arlo rd o f th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry and fo u n d er o f a short-lived king­ d om (1882—98) w hich had ex ten d ed in to areas o f to d ay ’s R epublic o f G uinea, M ali, and G hana. Sam ory’s army, how ever, was vanquished by F rench tro o p s. D espite n o t being th e largest ethnic g ro u p in the co u n ­ try (th e Fulani w e re th e m a jo rity ), th e M andinka held p o w e r in G uinea. Sekou Toure, at various tim es in his presidency, evoked the m em o ry o f his supposed an cesto r to build national consensus, w hich culm in ated in th e “n o n ” to th e F ren ch p ro je c t o f creating a FrancoA frican com m unity. Sekou T oure n ev er ab an d o n ed th e d re a m o f re s to rin g th e g lo ry o f Sam ory, e ith e r th ro u g h th e fo rm a tio n o f a so -called Grande Guinee (G re a te r G u in ea), o r sim ply by ex ercisin g p o w e r and influence over every c o u n try co n tain in g p e o p le o f his eth n ic g ro u p . This goal was m o re easily attainable in th e case o f G uinea-B issau if C abral w ere n o t in th e p ic tu re , w h ic h w o u ld leave ro o m to e x e r t in fluence o v er a d ire c to ra te fo rm e d by p e o p le o f his o w n ethnicity. H ow ever, Toure did n o t have th e m eans to b rin g such an em p ire to life. H e was afraid o f the m ilita ry and p re fe rre d to avoid any actions th a t could increase th e ir pow er. Perhaps convinced th at suspicions hanging over C abral’s death could im plicate him , o r perhaps ju st trying to rem ove any potentially incrim i­ nating signs, Toure decided to act swiftly b u t w ith d eterm in atio n . He was in fo rm ed o f C ab ral’s assassination by O scar O ram as, the C uban am bassador and C ab ral’s frien d , w ho had received a phone call only m inutes after th e shooting at the PAIGC h ead q u arters. H e spoke w ith 196

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL O tto Schacht, the head o f security, w ho sum m oned him to the place of C a b ra l’s death. A rm e d and e sc o rte d , O ram as head ed to th e p a rty ’s h eadquarters, w here he found the rem ains o f Cabral “bloody, lacedow n on the g ro u n d , a m e te r from th e gate o f his house.” He abandoned the crim e scene m inutes later w hen he heard o th e r shootings from a group o f rebels pursuing Cape Verdeans. O ram as had th en gone to the house o f Bakary G hibo, an official in the G uinean g overnm ent, w ho supposedly p u t him in touch w ith Sekou Toure. A lthough he found it strange th at Toure had asked him tw ice if he was sure that Cabral was dead, O ram as was c o n te n t th at the p resi­ d en t had prom ised to p u t his forces o n the g ro u n d and isolate the zone o f M iniere, so th at the co n sp irato rs could be detained. O th e r actions w ere also taken, such as closing the b o rd e rs and using aerial su p p o rt, w hich, w ith the help o f the Russians, m anaged to locate at sea the boat th at was presum ably taking A ristides Pereira to Bissau. H o u rs later at aro u n d 2 am , O scar O ram as received a phone call from Toure, the p resid en t him self, sum m oning him to the presidential palace to attend a m eeting w ith m em bers o f his governm ent, the ambas­ sador o f A lgeria, M essaoudi Z eituni, and a g ro u p o f the rebels, nam ely M om uT oure, the spokesperson, A ristides Barbosa, JoaoTom as Cabral, and Soares da G am a. A ccording to O ram as,T oure had called this m e e t­ ing to give to the rebels the o p p o rtu n ity to explain the factors w hich had driven them to com m it the assassination. A t the end o f the m eeting, to the surprise and d isagreem ent o f O ram as, Toure had given the o rd er to detain n o t only every m e m b e r o f the rebel gro u p , but also the Cape V erdeans— w h o had n o t b een involved— so th a t a th o ro u g h inquiry could be conducted. It is thanks to th e F rench citizen Jean-Paul Alatas th a t som e insight has b e e n p ro v id e d o n w h a t actu ally h a p p e n e d w h e n th e d eta in ee s w ere sent to th e d u n g eo n . Alatas had b een an adviser to Toure before falling from grace and being im p riso n ed in 1970, having b een accused o f com plicity in th e MarVerde op eratio n . In his b o o k Prison d ’Ajrique, he describes the arriv al o f th e G uineans in th e p riso n . T he p riso n ers had h e ard th e sh o o tin g s, b u t th ey w o u ld only b e co m e aw are o f w h at was g o ing on w h e n th e g ates to th e cells w e re o p e n to le t in C a b ra l’s assassins: “th re e d o z e n p e o p le , b a re fo o t an d d re sse d in fatigues, laughing and c eleb ratin g , heads u p , seem in g very happy a b o u t w hat 197

AMILCAR CABRAL they had d o n e,” for they w ere still convinced th a t Toure w ould end up backing th e coup. O n 21 January 1973, th e day after C ab ral’s d eath,T oure announced in a b roadcast th at th e lead er o f th e PAIGC had been “cow ardly assas­ sinated, in fro n t o f his ow n house, by th e p oisoned hands o f im p erial­ ism and an ach ro n istic colonialism .’’T h e cu lp rits, he w e n t o n , all o f them in p riso n , w ere “professionals o f subversion, p repared and bribed by th e special serv ices o f an ach ro n istic co lo n ialism .” A ccording to Toure, th e goal o f this crim e was “to liquidate w ith one strike the great prestige that he [Cabral] had acquired in the struggle and for the stru g ­ gle,” and to h it the R epublic o f G uinea, destroying its dem ocratic and popu lar regim e. Toure announced the establishm ent o f an International C om m ission o f Inquiry, fo rm e d o f high-ranking m em b ers o f the PD G and som e foreig n ers, such as Joaquim Chissano from FRELIM O, and th e C uban and A lgerian am bassadors 6 scar O ram as and M essaoudi Z ito u n i, respectively. Days later, this co m m issio n w as e x te n d e d to include th e p articipatio n o f am bassadors from o th e r cou n tries, in clu d ­ ing Senegal, Sierra L eone, Egypt, and Zaire. The com m ission began w ork im m ediately and called the accused for interro g atio n s that lasted over tw elve h o u rs n o n -sto p , in the presence o f A lcides E vora, th e only m e m b e r o f th e PAIGC a p p o in te d by the G u in ean se c re t services to serv e as an in te rp re te r. T h e te stim o n ies w ere re c o rd e d . A ccording to the re p o r t o f the sessions, in the b eg in ­ ning all th e suspects d en ied th e accusation th at th ey w ere acting on behalf o f the P ortuguese, w ith the ex ception ofV alentino M angana, the first to confess to th e ir involvem ent. A ccording to M angana, P ortugal was ready to concede in d ep en d en ce to the “blacks o f G uinea,” as long as th e PAIGC was e x tin c t, o r at least, as long as th e C ape Verdeans w ere excluded from this nationalist m ovem ent. This was the condition sine qua n o n fo r P ortu g al to g ra n t in d ep en d en ce to G uinea so as to k eep th e island o f C ape V erde as a stra te g ic and im p o rta n t base. M angana also to ld th e com m ission th a t blacks w an ted to rem ove the brum ed jo s from the p a rty and only those w ho p articip ated in th e coup could be p a rt o f th e g o v ern m en t. These confessions, e x tra c te d w ith to r tu r e , p ro v id ed Sekou Toure w ith w h at he n e e d e d : c u lp rits. D u rin g a m e e tin g o f th e P D G on 23 February, he co m m u n icated to his fellow p a rty m e m b e rs th a t 198

T H E KILLING O F CABRAL Inocencio Cani had confessed to being the au th o r of th e plot. O n the same day, in a broadcast m essage,Toure announced that 465 m ilitants ol the PAIGC had been interro g ated , all o f them residing in Conakry. W ith the exception o f fifty-one, they all had been released. Those w ho w ere n o t released had been found guilty o f being “entirely aware o f the plo t, o r taking p a rt in its execution.” O f these, fo rty -th ree w ere simply sus­ pects, w h e re n in e w e re co n sid ered active p articip an ts. H e also announced th at the p riso n ers w ould be handed over to the PAIGC so that they could be trie d internally and punished in line w ith the rules of the m ovem ent. The PAIGC, p rofoundly affected by the events, had to create som e o rd e r in the house. T he CEL m e t from 7 - 9 February and appointed A ristides Pereira as th e acting general secretary. Pereira was n o t p re s­ en t in the m eetin g as he was still recovering from th e injuries inflicted by his kidnappers. T he p arty fo rm ed a com m ission o f inquiry, w hose m e m b e rs w e re Fidelis A lm ada C ab ral, th e h ead ol m ilita ry ju stice Lourencpo G om es, O tto Schacht, A ntonio B uscardini, Jose Araujo, and Vasco Cabral. This com m ission received the suspects, delivered by the G uinean au th o rities at fo u r p oints along th e b o rd er, K andjafra, Boe, Fulamory, and K aurane, to be trie d in the in te rio r o f the country, in the liberated zones. The party, going th ro u g h a crucial m o m e n t in its history, failed to establish th e tr u th o f th e conspiracy. All o f th e accused w ere subse­ q u en tly killed. Som e w e re sim ply shot; o th e rs w ere only shot after being to rtu re d , such as Inocencio C ani, w ho according to Fernando Baginha, had his fingernails and toenails pulled o u t. A n u m b er o f m ili­ tan ts, taking advantage of the situation, trie d to resolve old quarrels. T he consequence was that a n u m b e r o f people w ho w ere n o t involved in th e d eath o f C abral en d ed u p being killed. It was as if th e party, th ro u g h this clim ate o f revenge and reprisals, could re sto re the sense o f u n ity th a t had b e e n lo st th ro u g h C a b ra l’s d eath . B ut ultim ately, C abral had b e e n th e only g u aran tee o f th e u n ity b e tw e e n th e Cape Verdeans and G uineans. Sekou Toure gave C abral th e funeral o f a head o f a state. C abral s body was laid to re st in th e M ausoleum o f C am ayenne, on the o u t­ sk irts o f C o n ak ry , w h e re th e re m a in s o f le g e n d a ry h e ro e s o f th e resistance to th e F ren ch o ccu p an ts, such as A lpha Yaya and Sam ory 199

AM ILCAR CABRAL T oure, lay. T h e serv ice, lasting fo r o v er tw o and a h a lf h o u rs, to o k place at th e Stade d u 28 S ep te m b re .T h e 2 0 ,0 0 0 places w ere filled n o t only by n ationals, b u t also by 6 80 rep resen tativ es o f foreign deleg a­ tions, fro m A frica and beyond. T h e c ro w d s to o d w h e n th e fu n e ra ry u r n e n te re d th e sta d iu m , e s c o rte d by th e G u in ean R ep u b lican G u a rd to th e so u n d o f th e Funeral M arch, tra n s p o rte d o n a rtille ry carriages and covered w ith flow ers offered by th e in te rn a tio n a l d elegations. W h e n th e fu n erary u rn was placed in th e c e n te r o f th e stad iu m , th e PAIGC an th em was played, follow ed by a p a ra d e o f th e various G uinean organizations, in clu d in g p upils fro m th e c e n te rs o f re v o lu tio n a ry e d u c atio n — the Escola Piloto and the Escola Politecnica (Technical School)— the p o p u lar

m ilitias and, finally, m ilitary units o f the PAIGC, in fatigues, a n u m b er o f them com ing straight from the fro n t to pay th e ir last respects to the natio n alist leader. To close th e funeral, a pro cession was fo rm e d , and th e rem ain s o f C abral w ere laid to re s t in C am ayenne. Sekou Toure received th e in te rn a tio n a l delegations to offer th e ir condolences. In Bissau and Praia, a n u m b e r o f p eople w en t o u t onto the streets to m o u rn th e loss o f Cabral. Iva Pinhel Evora, before leaving for C onakry to atte n d th e service, req u ested th a t a Mass be h eld in Bissau to pray fo r th e soul o f C abral, atten d ed by family m em b ers and friends. The p rie s t, acco rd in g to H ele n a , a n iece o f C ab ral, w as e x p e lle d fro m G uinea th e n e x t day, since he had express o rd e rs to n o t re fe r to the nam e o f th e nationalist. In Praia, a n u m b e r o f m ilitants o f the PAIGC to o k to th e streets d ressed in black, as a way to publicly show the loss o f the A frican nationalist. C a b ra l’s rem ain s w o u ld m ake a last trip , a fte r in d e p e n d e n c e, to Bissau, w ith G uinea u n d e r the presidency o f C ab ral’s b ro th e r Luis. In the cerem ony o f farew ell from G uinea-C onakry, Sekou Toure, n o t h id ­ ing his em o tio n s, said: “C abral, you are n o t leaving a foreign land. You are leaving a p a rt o f y o u r co u n try for an o th er p a rt o f yo u r country.” T he u rn o f Cabral is still at A m ura F o rtress in Bissau, in a co u rty ard shaded by m ango tre e s.T h e rem ains, ironically, re st on the same m o n u ­ m e n t inaugurated in 1948 to celeb rate th e h ero es o f th e occupation and pacification, P o rtu g u ese and, naturally, Cape Verdean. C ab ral, a re v o lu tio n a ry o f C ape V erdean o rig in , w as k illed at the hands o f his ow n m en fro m G uinea. C abral had n o t taken the re s e n t­

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T H E KILLING O F CABRAL m e n t b e tw e e n C a p e V erd ean s a n d G u in e a n s serio u sly , b u t a t a d e e p e r level, this show s th a t C abral was in c o rre c t in his ex p lanation o f th e social p ro cess in G u in ea. H e was co n v in ced th a t a pro cess o f c u ltu ra l osm osis w o u ld m ake th e C ape V erdeans and G uineans in to a c o m m u n ity ; in reality , G u ineans to o k advantage o f th e a n ti-c o lo ­ nial w a r to advance th e ir o w n agenda o f pow er. B ut it also show s th at C ape Verdeans and G uineans, pushed a p a rt by colonialism , w ere c u ltu ra lly irre c o n c ilab le .

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EPILOGUE (D IS -)C O N T IN U IN G AMILCAR CABRAL

W h e n C abral fo u n d o u t th a t his c o m rad es m ay be p lo ttin g against h im , he trie d to dow nplay th e advantages th a t co u ld com e from his physical elim in atio n . It w ould n o t be beneficial to anyone, he seem ed to reaso n , since by th e tim e o f his d eath , th e PAIGC w ould already have p ro d u c e d o th e r C abrals: p eo p le w ho w o u ld h o ld o n to p o w er and lead th e c o u n try to in d e p e n d e n c e. B ut this was n o t w h at to o k place, fo r the d eath o f C abral a m o u n te d to far m o re than his physical elim in atio n . T he a tte m p t to elim in ate th e C ape V erdean elem e n ts in the p a rty was also th e re p u d ia tio n o f its unity, w hich had b een one o f its m ain th e o re tic a l u n d erp in n in g s. Cabral founded the p arty in his im age. T he idea o f unity m ade m ore sense to him — since he was b o rn in G uinea to C ape Verdean parents and his second w ife Ana M aria was a native o f G uinea— than to m any o th e r p a rty m e m b e rs. H e c o n tro lle d every aspect o f th e life of th e party: he p ro d u ced its ideology and he train ed his ow n m en to begin the process of m obilization. H e was th e face o f diplom acy, the spokes­ p erso n , and the only one authorized to give in terview s to foreign jo u r­ nalists. H e was also th e p erso n w ho gave th e m o st significant m ilitary o rd ers. Such a co n cen tratio n o f pow er, at least in th e beginning, did n o t seem to create conflicts w ithin the party. Later, a n u m b er o f m ili­ tants, according to O nesim o Silveira, w ere q u o ted as saying: “we d o n ’t have to th in k , C ab ral thin k s fo r us.” L ooking b ack o n C a b ra l’s life, A ristides Pereira describ ed th e cult o f personality that had been built 203

AMILCAR CABRAL up around the nationalist leader: “I re m e m b e red th at C hrist was also irreplaceable, b u t c o m m itted disciples and those faithful to his d o ctrine carried on th e w o rk he had d e lin e a te d .. . ” W ith the death o f C abral, th e p a rty was lost. F rom th en on, m ili­ tants in th e p a rty e n te re d in to a s o rt o f guessing-gam e to try to estab­ lish w hat Cabral w ould have done o r said if he w ere alive. This a ttitu d e can be seen by th e fact th a t e x c e rp ts o f C ab ral’s speeches after in d e ­ pendence appeared daily in the new spaper No Pintcha. Vasco Cabral was the author. T he n eed for this was m o re u rg e n t in the days and m onths w hich follow ed C ab ral’s m u rd er. C on ju rin g up w hat the leader w ould say o r do becam e an im p o rta n t p a rt o f th e process o f m aking decisions w ithin th e party. P art o f this thinking was encapsulated in th e expression “Continuar Cabral : how to “continue Cabral” was a central question in the afterm ath

o f his death. Fortunately, th e p arty did n o t have to carry out m uch soulsearching in this regard. By creating the conditions for his m en to p ro ­ claim the independence o f Guinea— his final diplom atic mission before being killed— Cabral had, in a way, prep ared his ow n succession. Unlike Mao in China o r Che Guevara in Cuba— tw o o f C abral’s ow n guerrilla inspirations— Cabral p redicted the w ar ending w ith a political and diplom atic victory, one th a t w ould n o t re su lt in the defeat o f the P o rtu g u e se arm y. W ith th e p ro c la m a tio n o f in d e p e n d e n c e on 24 Septem ber 1973, the p arty u n d erm in ed the basis o f P o rtugal’s justifica­ tio n fo r staying in G uinea. However, this goal w ould n o t have been achieved had the PAIGC n o t p u t in place th e necessary m ilitary conditions fo r th e proclam ation o f indep en d en ce. In this aspect to o , C abral w ould once again— p o sth u ­ m ously this tim e— rescue his party. In one o f his last visits to the Soviet U nion, he had finally b e e n given th e fam ous Strela land-air missiles. W ith th e nationalists use o f this p o w erfu l w eapon, P o rtu g al w ould finally lose th e ir u n co n tested d om ination o f the skies. W ith confidence in th e n ew m ilitary e q u ip m en t, the p a rty to o k the decision in a council o f w ar to execu te m ajo r operations in the th ree b a ttle fro n ts: n o rth , so u th and east. T h e resu lts cam e fast and w ere surprisingly positive. In th e first w eek o f A pril, PAIGC a rtillery to o k dow n a fig hter-bom ber Fiat G -9 1 , a H arvard reconnaissance plane, and tw o D o n ier 27s. The dow ning o f these aircraft, according to A1 Venter, 204

E PIL O G U E was equal to everything th e P ortuguese A ir Force had lost before the arrival o f th e land -air m issiles. F rom th e n o n , w ith o u t th e effective aerial su p p o rt for th e ir te rre stria l operatio n s, the P ortuguese arm ed forces w ould be hopelessly isolated. The g u e rrilla forces, w ho w ere b e tte r eq u ip p ed , besieged tw o of the m o st im p o rta n t P o rtu g u ese m ilitary bases: G uidage, in the n o rth , and G uilege in th e south. In G uidage, d esp ite n u m erical in ferio rity (700 m en against 1 ,3 0 0 ), th e g u e rrilla fighters forced the P ortuguese to w ithdraw . T he P o rtu g u ese, how ever, succeeded in keeping G uilege, thanks to th e launching o f Operagao Ametista Real, involving p a ra tro o p ­ e rs and A frican c o m m a n d o s w h o la n d e d in th e re a r-g u a rd o f th e nationalist forces. But even if the g u errilla fighters had n o t taken posi­ tions, and had w ith d raw n , they w ould still have p u t the colonial arm y on the verge o f a m ilitary defeat, so g re a t was th e dam aged inflicted b o th on th e co m p o sitio n o f th e m ilitary and on m o rale. It was these battles th at convinced certain groups w ithin the P ortuguese arm y that if they co u ld n o t w in th e w ar, th ey w o u ld have to p u t in place the political conditions to rescue the arm y from th e quagm ire it had found itself in. It was in an atm osphere of m ilitary triu m p h th at the p arty convened the Second C ongress from 1 8 -2 2 July, in M adina do Boe, to discuss C a b ra l’s succession. T h e re w e re tw o o p tio n s o n th e table. T he first consisted o f electin g a C ape V erdean cad re to en su re th a t the p a rty co n tin u ed along lines co n sisten t w ith C ab ral’s thinking: w orking for the unity o f b o th co u n tries. T he second was to elect a G uinean. N ino V ieira, th e leg en d ary com m ander, was the nam e m o st talked about. But this idea did n o t enjoy the su p p o rt o f th e m ajority, since, naturally, it w ould re p re se n t a tacit acceptance o f th e reasons w hich had bro u g h t about the revolt o f th e G uineans against the C ape Verdeans. A ristides P ereira, th e actin g g en eral secretary, and re c e n tly a rriv ed fro m th e Soviet U nion, was eventually chosen as C ab ral’s successor. O n account o f th e clim ate o f m istru st b etw een C ape Verdeans and G uineans, the C ongress o f M adina do Boe was no less tense than that of Cassaca. A n u m b er o f delegates arrived arm ed and the N o rth e rn Front sent a battalion to guarantee the security o f the event. Ultimately, the assassination o f Cabral had confirm ed the existence o f tensions betw een Cape Verdeans and G uineans, and increased feelings of m utual suspicion. 205

A M ILCAR CABRAL The way to confront this problem was to p u t forw ard internal m echa­ nism s to institutionalize a separation b e tw e e n C ape Verdeans and Guineans w ithin the stru ctu re of the party. This was the context in which the C ongress ended up recognizing th e creation o f the CN CV ( Conselho N ational de Cabo Verde— N ational Congress for Cape Verde). T h e id ea o f th e C N C V w as first p ro p o se d by D u lce A lm ada in 1962, w h en , in R abat, she p re se n te d a dossier o n C ape Verde to the U N co m m ittee on th e te rrito rie s adm inistered by P ortugal. However, this p ro je c t had never b een p u t into practice. O nly later w ould Cabral re co n sid e r it in his last co m m u n icatio n o f 1 January 1973, w hich was la te r published in Jeune Ajrique as “Le Testement Politique de Cabral” (T he Political T estam ent o f C abral). A tte m p tin g to deal w ith the criticism s inside th e party, this p ro je c t co u n te rs som e o f C a b ra l’s previous p o si­ tions. In th e first years o f th e w ar, C abral th o u g h t th at “th e fight for the unity b e tw e e n Cape Verde and G uinea was n o t a tru e pro b lem . By n a tu re , by its histo ry , by its geography, by th e eco n o m ic ten d en cy , even by b lo o d , G uinea and C ape Verde are only one.” But later, Cabral w ould allow h im self to be convinced th a t a m o re pragm atic u n ity was m o re useful, taking in to co n sid eratio n th e fact th at C ape Verde and G u in ea w e re in d iffe re n t stages o f e m a n c ip a tio n . B ut it w as th e C ongress o f M adina do Boe th at p u t this proposal into effect, situating th e tw o c o u n trie s o n d iffe re n t tim e lin e s in th e ir jo u rn e y s to w ard s em ancipation. In o th e r w o rd s, th e tw o c o u n trie s w ould have separate processes o f in d ep en d en ce. The C ongress also d elib e ra te d over th e co m p o sition o f the CNCV, w h ich was c o o rd in a te d by P ed ro P ires, and on th e s tru c tu re s o f the n e w “s ta te ,” w h o se in d e p e n d e n c e sh o u ld b e p ro c la im e d o n 24 S e p te m b e r 1973 in th e sam e lo c a tio n . T h e p o litic a l le a d e rsh ip o f G u in ea w as also estab lish ed a t th is tim e . Luis C ab ral w as e le c te d p re sid e n t o f th e S ta te ’s C ou n cil (p re sid e n t o f th e re p u b lic), having as p rim e m in iste r Francisco M endes. N ino V ieira, th e w ar h ero , was the p re sid e n t o f th e P o p u lar N atio n al A ssem bly and C om m issar o f the A rm e d F o rces. P e d ro P ire s, w h o h ad tasks in th e C N CV , w as ap p o in te d D e p u ty C o m m issar o f th e A rm e d F orces, and Jose A raujo was ch o sen to be th e s ta te ’s g e n e ra l secretary . W h en th e PAIGC, in a d eclaration read by N ino V ieira, proclaim ed in d e p e n d e n c e , m o re th a n fo rty states (A frican, A sian, and E astern 206

E P IL O G U E European) recognized it im mediately. The G eneral Assembly o f the UN ap proved a re so lu tio n (w ith n in e ty -th re e votes in favor and seven against) in w hich th e organization w elcom ed “th e ind ependence o f the people o f G uinea, in creating a sovereign state o f G uinea-Bissau,” and c o n d e m n e d P o rtu g al fo r w aging a w a r o f aggression against th e G uinean population. G u in e a ’s p ro clam atio n o f in d ep en d en ce becam e o ne o f the m ain trig g ers o f the events leading up to the C arnation R evolution, w hich to p p led the last g o v ern m en t o f th e Estado Novo. O u t o f all the th eaters o f th e colonial w ar, it was in G uinea th a t th e P o rtu g u ese arm y was u n d e r m o st p re ssu re fro m th e g u e rrilla fig h ters, and it w as also in G uinea th at th e pro b lem s facing th e A rm ed Forces w ere m o st clearly revealed: difficulties in equipping the tro o p s; the breakdow n o f com bat m orale w hich tran slated in to high n u m b ers o f d esertio n s; and, above all, a general atm o sp h ere o f insubordination. T h e MFA (M o v im en to das Forgas A rm ad as— A rm e d Forces M o v em en t) w as th e p ro d u c t o f precisely th is d e te rio ra tio n in the P ortuguese army. A lthough few er officers w ere p redisposed to go to the com bat fronts by the end o f the war, the ann o u n cem ent that m ilitia officers w h o c o m p le te d a b rie f train in g p ro g ra m could be c o m m is­ sioned at the sam e rank as m ilitary academ y graduates was the straw that broke the c am el’s back, leading to the form atio n o f the MFA. T he organization was created in a m eetin g in the officer’s canteen in Bissau; alm ost all o f its m em b ers had fought in th e battles in G uinea. In the beginning the MFA was apolitical, b u t it was soon radicalized by the clim ate o f tiredness in the Portuguese arm y and by the disintegra­ tion o f the Estado Novo from th e end o f 1973 and beginning o f 1974, w hich largely explains the success o f the loosely conceived C arnation R evolution. Salgueiro Maia, at the head o f a u n it o f the cavalry school, m arched to dow ntow n Lisbon, occupied the areas in w hich the different m inistries of the Portuguese state w ere situated, and forced Caetano to recognize his deposition. The people quickly and enthusiastically adhered to the m ovem ent, and carnations w ere distributed on the street. For the soldiers involved in this cam paign, th e rev o lu tio n was a leap o f faith, founded on the assum ption that neither the navy, deployed on the o u t­ skirts o f Lisbon, n o r the air force w ould attack the Chaim ite arm oured vehicles w hich blocked access to the city. Salgueiro Maia, hugging, kiss­ 207

AM ILCAR CABRAL ing, and shaking p e o p le ’s hands, convinced th e units o f the Guarda N ational Republicana (N ational Republican G uard— G N R ) and PSP n o t

to resist to the coup. So great was the degradation o f the regim e that very few people w ould risk th eir lives to save it. A t the Convento do Car mo, on receiving th e young captain w ho cam e to in fo rm h im th a t a “r e v o lu tio n ” le d by th e M FA w as u nderw ay, M arcelo C aetan o still w ield ed enough p o w er to im pose a condition: he w o u ld only be d ep o sed by a h igh-ranking m e m b e r o f th e m ilitary. By te le p h o n e , he called G en eral Spinola, w ho becam e th e head o f the rev o lu tio n , and to o k o n th e p o sitio n o f th e p re sid e n t o f th e Ju n ta de Salvagao N ational (N ational Salvation Ju n ta ). This a g re em en t becam e th e brid g e b etw een th e Estado Novo and th e C arn ation R evolution. O r at least, it was th e re s ta te m e n t o f an old a g re e m e n t. For m any years, th e Estado Novo h ad su rv iv e d th an k s to a ta c it a g re e m e n t b e tw e e n m any national g ro u p in g s, nam ely th e m ilitary, th e C atholics and the fascists, c o n tro lle d by Salazar. A nd after Salazar had re sto re d civilian p o w er in 1933, th e m ilitary left th e p o litical arena w ith the guarantee th a t th e p re sid e n c y o f th e re p u b lic w o u ld always b e o ccu p ied by a g e n e ra l. T h a t w as th e case u n til 1 9 7 4 , and ev en after. A n to n io de S pinola w as also o n e o f th e m o s t d istin g u ish e d officials o f th e P o rtu g u ese arm y. In 1968, he was m e n tio n e d as a possible candidate to replace P resid en t A m ericoT om as. Fie w ould use G uinea— w ith his charism atic m e th o d s o f leading th e m ilitary and civilians and w ith his blow s p f propaganda and se lf-p ro m o tio n — to c e m e n t his “p re sid e n ­ tia l” im ag e. Portugal and the Future, a b o o k th a t h e p u b lish ed in F ebru ary 1974, tw o m o n th s b efo re th e rev o lu tio n , is th e self-p o rtrait o f a m an w h o was convinced he had th e rig h t w ords fo r the co u n try in a very difficult tim e. T he C arnation R evolution o f 25 A pril was seen w ith m uch c o n te n t­ m e n t am ong the guerrillas in G uinea. It offered the chance to negotiate w ith a n ew g o v ern m en t, w hich was fro m th e o u tse t m o re favorable to the reco g n itio n o f the ind ep en d en ce o f G uinea. But c o n te n tm e n t soon tu rn e d to appreh en sio n w h en they learn ed th at Spinola was the head o f the n ew regim e. Spinola had b een the m o st ruthless adversary o f the PAIG C: h e h ad o rg an ized an ti-C a p e V erdean cam paigns, in stig ated p lo ts in th e party, and led th e invasion o f a sovereign country, G uineaC onakry, to d etain o r kill A m ilcar C abral. And fo r th e vast m ajority o f 208

E P IL O G U E th e p a r ty ’s m e m b e rs , Spinola w as th e finger b eh in d th e trig g e r o f Inocencio Cani. So it did n o t com e as a su rp rise to th e guerrillas w hen they discov­ ered th at A ntonio de Spinola had organized a referen d u m in w hich the p o p u latio n s o f th e co lo n ized te r r ito r ie s w o u ld be called u p o n to approve th e c o n stitu tio n o f a Comunidade Lusiada (L usophone C o m m u n ity ) as th e way o u t o f th e colonial crisis. This solution was announced by Spinola on 15 May, d u rin g his inauguration as presid en t o f the republic. This position, according to A lm eida Santos, the then m inister o f te rrito ria l coordination, was Spinola’s offer to the guerrillas in exchange for a ceasefire. H ow ever, th e m ilitary situation had d e te ­ rio ra te d to a p o in t w h ere th e P ortuguese w ere no lo n g er in a position to im pose any kind o f p re-req u isite for negotiations. * * * In actual fact, 25 A pril did n o t signal nization. And it was n o t only Spinola a “com m unity” and trying to im pose o f the MFA, for exam ple, contained

a clear o rientation tow ards decolo­ w ho was recycling the proposal for it on th e colonies. The program m e no reference to decolonization.

It was w ith alm ost em pty hands that a Portuguese delegation, led by M ario Soares and A ntonio de A lm eida Santos, m e t w ith the guerrillas on 25 May 1974 to n egotiate a ceasefire. Leading the PAIGC side was Pedro Pires w ho, in the hierarchy o f the party, was n o t am ong the m ost p ro m in e n t figures. T he m eeting, w hich to o k places at the Hyde Park H otel in L ondon, rapidly reached an im passe. To the P ortuguese, the p ro b lem w ith G u in ea’s in d ep en d en ce was th a t it did away w ith any supposed p rin cip le th a t P o rtu g al co u ld invoke to justify postp o n in g in d ep e n d e n c e fo r A ngola and M ozam bique. It was th ese te rrito rie s w hich the P ortuguese n eg o tiato rs w ere c o n cern ed about, ra th e r than G uinea, w h ere th e P ortuguese arm y had lost the war. T he PAIGC was sure o f its goals. In line w ith the principles w hich had anim ated the w ar for liberation, the p a rty in ten d ed to annex Cape Verde as an act o f in d ep en d en ce, so that P ortugal n eed only transfer sovereignty o v er th e se te r r ito r ie s to th e PAIGC. N ationalists w ere ready to go back to w'ar if this possibility was n o t taken seriously. Spinola was relu ctan t to give po w er to the guerrillas, and negotia­ tions w ere b roken off w'ith no date announced for a second round. But 209

AM ILCA R CABRAL Spinola w ould try to solve things his way. H e distributed his p o rtra it in Bissau and announced his intention to visit the city in o rd e r to nam e the Congress o f the People o f G uinea as the institu tio n to w hich he w ould tra n sfe r sovereignty. T h e g u errillas, o u tra g e d by a n o th e r a tte m p t at m anipulation from Spinola, let him know that they w ere n o t responsible for his security there. Pressed by a n u m b er o f internal groups, above all the MFA, Spinola was forced to speak o u t in favor o f the decolonization o f the P ortuguese te rrito rie s. In July 1974, the Republic Gazette finally published the fam ous C onstitutional Law 7 / 7 4 , consecrating the p rin ­ ciple o f decolonization in the P ortuguese constitution. N e g o tia tio n s c o n tin u e d in A lg iers, w h e re , assisted by a reg im e w hich was itself th e p ro d u c t o f rev o lu tio n , th e guerrillas finally suc­ ceed ed in im p o sin g th e ir w ill and fo rc e d P o rtu g al to recognize th e in dep en d en ce o f G uinea. H ow ever, against th e desires o f som e, it was established th at Cape Verde and G uinea, countries w hich had been p a rt o f the same struggle, w ould obtain independence according to different processes. W ith th e signing o f th e peace a g reem en t and the beginning ol the process o f decolonization, Portugal recognized th e PAIGC as the legiti­ m ate represen tativ e o f th e p opulations o f b o th co u n tries. And the sub­ seq u en t jo u rn e y o f th e p a rty until it fo rm e d th e g o vernm ents in b o th c o u n trie s has m o re to d o w ith this re c o g n itio n th an w ith its ow n im plantation in the te rrito rie s. The way the PAIGC took pow er in Cape Verde, as in G uinea, is one o f the m ysteries associated w ith the dynamic o f th e lib eration m ovem ents. Jean Z iegler, using the exam ple o f Cuba to explain th e ascension o f th e PAIGC, c o m m e n ted th at th e re w ere eighty-one Cuban fighters w ho set off to the island on board the Granma in D e c e m b e r 1956 to o v e rth ro w F ulgencio Batista, and 7 0 0 w ho en te re d Havana on 6 January 1959. In relatio n to C ape V erde, th e re w ere exactly th irty -th re e — “n o t one m o re ”— com m anders and leaders o f th e PAIGC w ho d isem barked in Sal and w ho w ould later fo rm the re p u b lic , w h ereas in G u in ea th e n u m b e r w as n o t above 1 ,5 0 0 — w om en and m e n w ho left th e bush and th e various cities in G uineaC onakry and Senegal to triu m p h an tly e n te r Bissau. In G uinea, th e taking o f p o w e r w as alm o st au to m atic. The PAIGC had successfully n e u tra liz e d th e o p p o sitio n , fo rm e d by e lem en ts o f th e FL IN G (Frente de Libertagao N acional da G uine — F ro n t fo r th e

210

E P IL O G U E N ational L iberatio n o f G u in ea). T he fact o f p ractically w inning the w ar, fo r allegedly having lib e ra te d tw o th ird s o f th e te r r ito r y and p ro claim e d th e in d e p e n d e n c e in th e in te rio r, gave th em an au th o rity w hich was n o t easily ch allenged. In C ape V erde, how ever, the situ a ­ tio n was differen t. In C ape V erde, th e PA IG C had a leg itim acy th a t c o u ld only be claim ed indirectly; it had w on it on the African coast, in G uinea, whose stru g g le fo r in d e p e n d e n c e had m o v ed few C ape V erdeans. U nlike G uinea, C ape Verde had a very w e ll-stru c tu re d civil society, w ith an established press and a n u m b e r o f observ ers in terested in overseeing the d irectio n th e c o u n try was heading. T he PAIGC m ilita n ts w h o a rriv e d in P raia o n 11 O c to b e r 1974 w e re w ell receiv ed by m e m b e rs o f th e p arty , th e vast m a jo rity o f w hom had never had any co n ta c t w ith th e leaders. H ow ever, before th e ir arriv al in th e archip elag o , o th e r p o litical fo rces w ere already establishing them selves, am ong th em the U PIC V o f Leitao da G ra ta and the U D C o f Joao Baptista M o n teiro , a political fo rm ation w hich u n ited intellectuals o f Sao V icente and d efended the independence o f Cape Verde as p a rt o f th e fram ew ork o f a federation w ith Portugal. Before the arrival o f the PAIGC to the archipelago, som e o f its clan­ d estine op erativ es, including Jo rg e Q u e rid o — probably anticipating w h at C abral w o u ld have d o n e — had c reated th e Frente Am pla A n ti­ Colonial (Broad A nti-C o lo n ial F ro n t), w ith th e stated objective o f b eco m in g an u m b re lla organizatio n fo r all th e nationalist forces.

H ow ever, this organization had n ev er fu n ctio n ed because w ithin the party, th e idea th a t p o w e r co u ld be shared w ith o th e r organizations w hose legitim acy did n o t com e from the struggle against fascism was inconceivable. R elations b e tw e e n th e PAIGC and o th e r p o litical form atio n s w ere w o rsen in g to th e p o in t th at C a b ra l’s m en had to r e s o r t to violence to im p o se th e m se lv e s an d silen ce o th e r g ro u p s. A ristid e s P ereira explains this: [Cjonsidering the imminence of the elections for the Legislative Constituent Assembly and the various rum ors which referred to the possibility of landing members of the Cape Verdean diaspora on the islands to try to restore the political domination of the PAIGC, this ended up taking the adequate measure to reinforce the conquests which

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A M ILCA R CABRAL have been m ade, nam ely the creation o f com m ittees o f vigilance and popular militias, w hich served to silence the pretensions o f the p ropa­ ganda against the independence of the archipelago.

T he electio n s, organized by P ortu g al on 30 July 1975, w ere only contested by the PAIGC, and the results dictated the constitution o f the Legislative Assembly. T he PAIGC occupied fifty-six seats and, as Guinea was already in d e p e n d e n t by th en , trie d to fo rm a bi-national state. N o tw ith s ta n d in g th e ir u n ity , o n c e in d e p e n d e n c e w as a tta in e d , C ape Verde and G uinea follow ed d ifferen t ro u te s. U nity, although it fo rm e d A rtic le 4 o f b o th c o n s titu tio n s , h ad m o re o f an effect in G uinea, w h e re p o w e r w as shared by C ape V erdeans and G uineans, th an in C ape V erde, w h e re th e re w e re no G uineans in th e stru c tu re o f th e g o v e rn m e n t. In C ape V erde, a fte r som e in itial ag itation w hich p ro m p te d th e in tro d u c tio n o f e x tre m e an d a rb itra ry m e a su re s to p re v e n t loss o f p o w e r, C a b ra l’s p a r ty e x e rc is e d p o w e r in a m o re m o d e ra te m an n er. T he PAIGC ru le d th e c o u n try u n til 1991 w h e n , w ith an ex em p lary e le c to ra l p ro cess, th e M ovimento para a Democracia (M o v em en t fo r D em o c ra c y — M P D ) w o n th e first m u ltip a rty e le c ­ tio n s h eld in th e coun try . The m o d eratio n o f the PAIGC was m otivated by in tern al and e x te r­ nal factors. A m ong th e in tern al factors was that the island had been the th eater o f dialogue, on th e account o f its very active civil society, which forced every g overnm ent to negotiate a consensus. Externally influenc­ ing th e PAIGC was th e fact that Cape Verde depen ded to a large ex te n t on in tern atio n al aid. A nd all leaders had learn ed fro m C abral th at the b e st ideology to have was n o t to have one at a ll. C ape V erdeans to o k pragm atism to th e ex tre m e. T he g o v ern m en t h o n o red all th e ag reem en ts th at the Estado Novo had m ade w ith South A frica for th e use o f th e In tern atio n al A irp o rt o f Sal, w hich as a sto p ­ over p o in t am assed revenues th at accounted for 31 p er cent o f GDP, or 2 5 .4 m illion U SD a year. A nd even w ith th e p re ssu re from g o v e rn ­ m en ts such as Angola and M ozam bique, th e principal e x tern al victim s o f A p arth eid , th e Cape Verdeans refused to change th eir m inds. They said no to A gostinho N e to w hen he asked the Cape Verdeans in 1975 to close the a irp o rt to the South Africans and to allow Cuban forces to use it to aid th e units o f the MPLA in Angola, w hich w ere trying to prevent the advance o f th e South A fricans tow ard s Luanda. Pedro Pires m a n ­

212

E PIL O G U E aged to negotiate w ith b o th p arties and, in a rare g esture o f civility, the a irp o rt was used sim ultaneously by C ubans and South Africans. W ith no need to m ake this so rt o f concession, and w ithout counting u p o n a critical m ass inside and o u tsid e th e party, G uinea, w ith Luis C abral as th e p re sid e n t, m o v ed to c o n s tru c t socialism in A frica. S educed by th e Soviets, C a b ra l’s b r o th e r beg an an in d u strializatio n p ro g ram m e w hich dragged th e co u n try in to the dream o f m echaniza­ tio n . A m o n g his m o st a m b itio u s p ro je c ts was th e c o n stru c tio n o f assembly plants for EGA autom obiles and Pansau m attresses, initiatives that w ere set in m o tio n at the cost o f im provem ents in agriculture, the basis o f the G uinean economy. D ue to these differences in political position— b e tw ee n th e p rag ­ m atic and the revolutionary— both countries w ere drifting apart, reach­ ing the point w here unity becam e m o re o f a nuisance than an advantage. It was therefo re w ith a certain relief, at least as far as unity was co n ­ ce rn e d , th at th e new s th at Luis C ab ral’s u n ity g o v ern m en t had been overthrow n by N ino Vieira, on 14 N ovem ber 1980, reached Praia. T he coup d ’etat led by N ino Vieira was rightly d epicted by foreign observers, including by Jeune Afrique co rresp o n d en t Augusta Conchiglia, as the second death o f Cabral. Ultimately, the coup had been justified as a way to p u t unity to re st, setting aside th e C ape V erdean elem en t. However, o th er reasons m ust also be considered. First o f all, Guinea had becom e a dictatorship, w here th ere was no o th er forum through w hich certain kinds o f claims could be addressed. Secondly, w ith independence the influence o f the m ilitary had n o t ceased to grow. T he coup d ’etat allegedly only caused tw o casualties: O tto Schacht and A ntonio Buscardini. It was allegedly sparked by the discovery of 500 bodies o f G uinean com m andos that th e g o v ern m ent o f Luis Cabral had execu ted and b u ried in mass graves. T he revelation o f these mass ex ec u tio n s w as used by N in o V ieira to show th e fo reig n p ress the atrocities o f C ab ral’s regim e. N ino Vieira, how ever, was n o t in n o cen t in this process: w h en the com m andos w ere cap tu red , he him self had been the m in ister o f defense. But key h ere was the relevance o f N ino V ieira’s gesture itself. U nearthing from the mass graves the tru th of the crim es o f a g o v e rn m e n t in th e service o f unity b etw een G uinea and Cape Verde was also a way to p u t an end to C abral’s dream . For im plicit in these discoveries was th e idea that these crim es only occu rred due to the pressures o f a forced and futile unity. 213

NOTES

INTRODUCTION m ost successful m ilitary cam paign against colonialism .” See C ann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, p. 12.

“.. .hundreds of thousands of settlers to the colony.” Only after the w ar started did the Portuguese relax m igration policies from the m other country to the colony, w hich considerably increased the w hite population in A ngola and M ozambique. For a discussion on m igration policies in the last fifty years of colonial ru le (from 1920 to 1974), see Castelo, Passagens para Africa. “.. .answ er-question dialectics.” Scott owes this concept to a n um ber of other thinkers, prim arily Q uentin Skinner. For Skinner’s discussion o f the relatio n ­ ship betw een answers and questions, see the preface to The Foundation o f Modern Political Thought. For a discussion by Scott on Skinner’s concept, see Conscripts o f Modernity. “. . . within the m ovem ent .’’See Manji and Fletcher (Jr.), Claim No Easy Victories,

p. 9. “Earlier biographies o f Cabral . . . ” For early w orks on Cabral, see, for exam ­ ple, Andrade, Amilcar Cabral and Ignatiev, Amilcar Cabral. “. . . only available in P ortuguese.” Lara Paw son’s In the Name o f the People: A ngola’s Forgotten Massacre is n ot only one of the few attem pts to unm ask these fabrications, but also a rare study of this topic in English. Taking issue w ith the rom antic descriptions by w riters such as Basil Davidson o f the revolutionary process in Lusophone Africa, Pawson sheds light on the unfolding of the tragic events o f May 1977 in Angola, w hen after just tw o years o f independence the ru lin g p arty quashed a m ilitary coup by killing thousands o f its ow n m ilitants. “... strongly contributed to the concoction of these lies .. .’’M ario de Andrade claim ed that the MPLA had authored the attacks on the colonial prisons in Luanda on 4 February 1961 w hen this national m ovem ent was practically no n-ex istent. B ittencourt has w ritte n on this, calling attention to the role of

215

NOTES propaganda in the arm ed struggle, o r m o re precisely to “propaganda as a form of struggle”. See B ittencourt, EstamosJuntos'., p. 95. “ .. .he was a ‘reluctant soldier’”. Rabaka, Concepts o f Cabralism, p. 192. “.. .which produced a great deal of noise.” M edeiros, A Verdadeira Morte de Amilcar Cabral.

" . .. w ithin the m ovem ent that led to the assassination o f Cabral.” Soares, Amilcar CabraLVida e morte de urn revoluciondrio africano. “ .. .death sentences he authorized in Cassaca.” Santos, Amilcar Cabral: Um Outro Olhar. “. . . subaltern colonizers in Guinea.” Burbank and Cooper, “The Em pire Effect”.

“ ... n o t w ished to secede from Portugal . . . ” D uring the tum ultuous political tim es from the Carnation Revolution o f 24 April 1974 to the independence o f Cape Verde on 5 July 1975, the PAIGC had to share the political space w ith many other forces, som e o f w hich (such the U D C ) “defended a Cape Verde in te g rate d in to th e P o rtuguese te rrito ry , in th e sam e way as A zores and M adeira.” Furtado, “Cabo Verde e as quatro decadas de independencias,” p. 864.

1. BETW EEN GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE “. .. and Sierra Leoneans.” For a description o f these processes of conquest, see M ark and H o rta, The Forgotten Diaspora. “. . . signing treaties w ith the local p o te n ta te s .. . ” H o n o rio Pereira B arreto (1 8 1 3—1859) was the son o f Joao P ereira B arreto and Rosa de C arvalho Alvarenga, w hose family, the Alvarenga, controlled the m ilitary adm inistra­ tion in Z inguinchor for m ost o f the seventeenth century. For a discussion on the social and cultural environm ent o f G uinea at that tim e, see Havik, Silences and Soundbites.

“ . .. in Canhabaque was com pleted.” Bowman, “Abdul Njai,” p. 463. “‘... and m estizo traffickers, from Cape Verde.’” Pelissier, Historia da Guine I, p. 41. “ ... locally published governm ent gazette.” M endy and Lobban Jr, Historical Dictionary o f the Republic o f Guinea-Bissau, p. xlvii. “... they w ere called assimilados— assimilated.” D uring m ost of the Portuguese presence in Africa, particularly in Angola and M ozam bique, there w ere three groups o f people.T he w hites, the indigenous (the vast m ajority) and the assim­ ilados. Although the status o f assimilados was abolished in 1961, the cultural effects o f such a division have never disappeared. “. .. the m ajority of the posts in public adm inistration.” O liveira, A Imprensa Cabo-Verdiana, p. 140. “His m other was b o rn in S antiago.. .’’The origins of C abral’s m o th er have for m any years elu d ed rese arch e rs, including myself. Thanks to Jose M aria

216

NOTES A lmeida, w ho has found Iva Evora’s b irth certificate, it has been possible to establish a num ber o f im p o rtan t details regarding her birth. See M onteiro, h t t p : / / w w w .b u a la .o rg /p t/a -le r/q u e m -fo i-a -m a e -d e -a m ilc a r-c a b ra l (in Portuguese). ... no m ore than 10,000 reis.” Cabral, Memorias e Reflexoes, p. 18. “ . . . Jorge F rederico Velez Coro£o . . . ” C a r o l ’s first te rm in office was from June 1921 until N ovem ber 1923 and the second from A pril 1924 until D ecem ber 1926. His nam e is also associated w ith the first effort to in stitu ­ tionalize elem entary education in Guinea. ... pacify the natives . . . ”’ Mendy, Colonialismo Portugues em Africa. See the English version. “... hungry for civilization and madly in love . . . ” Cabral, Memorias e Reflexoes, p. 171. “ ... any form o f authority.” C abral, ibid., p. 155. “ ... his despicable editorial . . . ” Cabral, ibid., pp. 127—8. “Pressure was m ounting from a group o f G uineans . . . ’’T he Liga Guineense (G uinean League), founded in D ecem ber 1910, was the first voluntary asso­ ciation in Guinea-Bissau before the te rrito ry came under “Portuguese occu­ pation.” It was dissolved five years later, w hen its leaders w ere arrested and accused o f being behind the revolt o f the Papel ethnic g ro u p against the Portuguese. See M endy and Lobban Jr, Historical Dictionary o f the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, pp. 253 —4-. .. precious supplem ent to his m eagre salary.’” Cabral, Memorias e Reflexoes, p. 156. ... celebrated by m uch of the population . . . ” Caetano, Minhas memorias de Salazar, p. 125.

“ . . . reform s necessary to balance the budget.” Rosas and Brito, Dicionario de Histdria do Estado Novo, pp. 8 6 3 -4 . “. . . n o t convertible into Portuguese escudos.” Da C ruz, A Crise de Angola. stability rather than g ro w th ’”. Smith, “A ntonio Salazar and the reversal of Portuguese colonial policy,” p. 653. “ . . . rig h t to self-determ ination.” M anela, TheWilsonian Moment. “‘... old structures of organization.’” D uarte Silva, Salazar e Salazarismo, p. 140. “ ... based on social-D arw inism .” A lexandre, “Ideologia Colonial”. In F. Rosas and J. M. Brandao de Brito, Dicionario de Historia do Estado Novo. “‘ . . . w ho already consider them selves as such.’” D u arte Silva, Salazar e o Salazarismo, p. 140. . a category o f natives who w ere n ot citizens . . . ”, ‘“ erudition and custom s’”. M oreira, 0 Ocidente e o Ultramar Portugues, p. 14. For a b e tte r understanding o f how the indigenato was created, particularly in relation to the legal c o n tri­ butions o f Adriano M oreira, see M oreira, Administragao de Justiga aos lndigenas. “. .. this was outright slavery .’’These are som e o f the findings by the Am erican

217

NOTES sociologist Edw ard Ross, w ho travelled to Angola in 1924 on behalf o f the T em porary Slavery Com m ission o f the League o f N ations. See Ross, R eport on Em ploym ent o j N ative Labor in Portuguese Africa.

“ ... if the cost o f labor was reduced to a bare m inim um .” For the relationship b etw e en prices and costs o f p ro d u ctio n , see, fo r instance, A nne Pitcher, “Sowing the Seeds o f Failure.” ... did n o t reach their full capacity.’” Santos, Quase M emorias, p. 65. . w ith many barbaric w ords.’” Cabral, M emorias e Reflexoes, p. 27. “ ... than a lawyer.”A uthor interview w ith Luis Cabral, Lisbon, 17 M arch 2000. ... adversity o f fortu n e.’” A ndrade, A m ilcar Cabral, p. 20. “O n h er re tu rn to Cape Verde . . . ” No Pintcha, Lembrancas de lva Evora, Mae de A m ilcar Cabral, p. 3. “ ... in visiting h er children . . . ” M onteiro, Testemunho de um Combatente, p. 177. “ ... alm ost cost him his vision.” A uthor interview w ith A rm inda and A rm anda Cabral, Bissau, 21 June 2000. “ ... various sports and cultural activities.” Associacao dos Antigos Alunos do Ensino Secundario de Cabo Verde, Comemoragoes do 75° aniversario da Criagao do Liceu de CaboVerde, pp. 47—8. “... they were natives of Cape Verde).” Oliveira, A Imprensa Cabo- Verdiana 18 2 0 ­ 1 9 7 5 , p. 405. “ ... tostoes p er hour . . Cabral, Sem inario de Quadros. “. . . to stave off her family’s h u n g e r.. .’’The pow erful verses by Aime Cesaire that A ndrade had in m ind w hen he w rites on C abral’s childhood read: . .and my m other w hose legs, for ou r tireless hunger, pedal, pedal, b oth by day and by night, and I am even awakened by night by these tireless legs pedaling the night and by the Singer, bitterly biting into the soft flesh of the night as my m o th e r pedals, pedals for o u r h unger everyday, every night.” See Cesaire, Notebook o f a R eturn to M y N ative Land, p. 83. “. .. on the verge o f bankruptcy.” A uthor interview w ith O svaldo Lopes da Silva, M indelo, 30 June 2000. “ ... his w omanizing tendencies.” In The Fortunate Isles, Davidson m entions that Juvenal Cabral may have fathered sixty-tw o children. “ ... the size o f his household .’’A uthor interview w ith O svaldo Lopes da Silva, M indelo, 30 June 2000. “ ... the school fund ... one third of his retire m en t fund.” Cabral, Entre professores prim arios, pp. 8—13. my literary career (vanity?).”’ Cabral, Nos Intervalos da A rte da M inerva,

p. 3. “. .. Cape Verdeans o f his generation.” Chabal, A m ilcar Cabral, p. 33. “ . . . a m e m b er o f th e Claridosos . . . ” T he nam e Claridoso com es from the Portuguese claridade (light). It was a cultural and literary m ovem ent w hich em erged in Cape Verde in the 1930s and m arked the beginning o f literary m odernism in Cape Verde.

218

NOTES .. social and political issues.” Cabral, Apontamentos sobre a poesia de Cabo Verde, p-6-

... w ith their feet nailed to the land.’” Ibid. “ ... co rrected by senior officials.” A ndrade, Amilcar Cabral, p. 8.

2. THE YEARS IN LISBON “ . . . m ost viable solution to these problem s” Lopes, Cabo Verde: As causas da Independencia.

“A rticle 73 of the C h arter inscribed in international law the inalienable right o f people to self-determ ination .’’This is particularly clear in its point b, w hich states: “b. to develop self-governm ent, to take due account o f the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive developm ent o f th eir free political institutions, according to the particular circum stances o f each te rrito ry and its peoples and their varying stages o f advancem ent”; h ttp : / / legal. u n . org / rep e rto ry / ar t7 3. shtml “... tw o team s each of eleven players.” A ndrade, A Geragao de Cabral, p. 10. “ ... Mission o f O verseas Students.” Caldeira, Sou um simples ajricano, p. 78. “ ... w ho had been w ith him from the start.” Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p. 35. “... the best student o f colonial technology.” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, p. 5. “ ...th e same cultural references as his P ortuguese c o u n te rp a rts.” Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p. 34. “ ... u nder the title o f Portugal Ultramarino (Overseas Portugal).” Faria, A Linha Estreita da Liberdade, p. 32. “ ... did n ot try to integrate th em ”, “. .. issues that affected th em .” Presence Africaine, “Des etudiants d ’Afrique Portugaise,” pp. 2 3 7 -8 . ... full pockets and an em pty stom ach.’” Rosas, Historia de Portugal, p. 352. “ ... courtyards and shacks” and ... such incredible prom iscuity.’” O p. cit. Rosas, p. 99. “... in converstaion w ith Michel Laban.” Laban, Mario Pinto de Andrade, p. 58. “... re-Africanization o f sp irits .. . ” Cabral, A Unidade Politico e Moral, p. 2. For a b etter understanding of w hat C abral’s generation m eant by “re-Africaniza­ tio n o f spirits”, see A ndrade, Amilcar Cabral e a reajricanizagao dos espiritos, PR 8~ 9 . .. w ith courteous m anners’”, “ ... send their offspring to schools in Lisbon.” Du Bois, “Pan-Africa in Portugal”, p. 170. . slaves, m en, life and m e n ’s aspirations.’”A ndrade, Amilcar Cabral, p. 33. “. .. from Lisbon to Luanda and vice versa.” Rocha, Angola, p. 94. “... by the Guinean Keita Fodeba.” Lara, Documentos e comentarios para a Historia do MPLA, p. 32. “‘... o f the old generation of the 1920s’”. Laban, Mario Pinto de Andrade, p. 72.

219

NOTES . SaoTomean com m unity in Lisbon.” Seibert w rites that the tw elve-room flat did n o t belong to Januario Espirito Santo b u t it was ren te d by his sister, A ndreza, w ho in tu rn sublet the accom m odation to African students, mostly from SaoTome. Seibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins, p. 55. ‘“ the progress o f black m an.’” Laban, Mario Pinto de Andrade, p. 72. “. .. founded in 1947 and directed by A lioune Diop.” Laban, Mario Pinto de Andrade, p. 75.

“ . .. hundreds are thought to have perished.” S eibert, Comrades, Clients and Cousins, p. 87. “ ... never been any com m unist plot.” O p. cit. Seibert, p. 69. “‘... we thought he w ould d ie’”, ‘“ skin allergy’”. No Pintcha, “Lembran^as de Iva Evora, m ae de Amilcar Cabral,” p. 3. “ ... n o t in the same class.” For the correspondence betw een Amilcar Cabral

and Maria H elena, see Cabral, Souto and Elisio, Cartas de Amilcar Cabral a Maria Helena.

“. .. w ith a perso n o f color”, “ ... was dating a w hite, P ortuguese w om an.” D u arte, “Am ilcar Cabral visto pela viuva,” p. 19. “ . . . low er th an in Alabam a.” A nderson, “P ortugal and th e End o f U ltra ­ Colonialism 2.” “ ... united we fight Amilcar .

.

.

w ith o u t talking to anyone.’” Cabral,

Cronicas da Libertacao, p. 19.

3. ENGINEER AND CLANDESTINE MILITANT “ ... th e Campanha do Trigo . . . ’’This was a m ajo r agricu ltu ral cam paign in P o rtu gal aim ed at cu rtailin g w h eat im p o rts in to P o rtu g al. A n u m b e r o f authors have emphasized the fascist undertones of the campaign, since it came w ith a new discourse on the role o f peasants and the need to attach them to the land. See Pais, de Lima, Baptista, de Jesus, and G am eiro, “Elementos para a Historia dofascismo nos campos.”

“. .. 80 p er cent o f the cultivated land.” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, p. 122. .. failed to m aterialize.” In this regard, Patrick Chabal quotes Cabral as say­ ing: “it was n o t accidental that we w ent to Guinea, no r was it a resu lt o f m a te­ rial necessity. Everything was thought out and calculated step by step. We had opportunities to w ork elsew here in the colonies o r even in Portugal. It was the same for o ther com rades from other colonies w ho chose to re tu rn to their countries. It was, therefore, decided w ith the aim of contributing to the p re p ­ aration of the people for the struggle against colonialism.” However, this v er­ sion o f events is n o t accurate, and Cabral is doing w hat a n u m b er o f his biog­ raphers— including Chabal— are also guilty of: reading his life retrospectively, as if Cabral could have calculated step by step the events he was p a rt o f and

220

NOTES thus the direction his life would take. In fact, according to the correspondence betw een Cabral and Maria H elena, his first wife, Cabral tried to obtain a n um ­ ber of jobs. He tried the Junta do Cafe (Coffee Board in Cape Verde), and he was even given rep o rts from the board to prepare for the nom ination. He also tried to get a position at the Junta de Investigagoes Coloniais (Board for Colonial Investigation) through his professor Botelho Costa, w hich w ould only happen after his retu rn to Lisbon in 1955. For Chabal’s quotation o f C abral’s plans, see Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p. 47. For Cabral’s letters to Maria Helena in which he describes his job hunting, see Cabral, Souto and Elisio, Cartas de Amilcar Cabral a Maria Helena, p. 302. “ ... w ould later becom e the PAIGC.” For a critical analysis of the founding of the PAIGC, and one that challenges the official narrative o f the form ation of this national m ovem ent, see, Soares, Amilcar Cabral, pp. 189—96. “Recently built . . . ” Cabral, Souto and Elisio, Cartas de Amilcar Cabral a Maria Helena, 24 Septem ber 1952, pp. 348—9. “‘... we saw in the colony’”. Lopes, TerraArdente, p. 37. “ ... a handful of Bissau’s inhabitants . . . ” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, p. 182. “ ... had already been delivered.” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, p. 93. “.. .been d eliv ered .. . ” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, p. 93. “ ...m o r e political and risky w o rk .” Laban, Mario Pinto de Andrade, p. 100; Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 31. “ ... get up and dance.” A uthor interview w ith H elena Iva Cabral, Lisbon, 25 M arch 2000. “‘. .. whites-only zone.’” Pereira, Uma Luta, um partido, dois paises, p. 33. “ ... infiltrated by the police”, " ... w ould only weaken the project.” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 31. “ ... disem barked at the P ort of Bissau.” Cabral, Seminario de Quadros. “ ... to com plete his nationalist project.” As discussed, Cabral tried to find jobs in o th er places such as the Junta do Caje, and he was n o t convinced that Guinea was his best option. He m entioned in his correspondence to Maria H elena that “G uinea can go to hell”. Cabral, Souto and Elisio, p. 338. “ ... to perform another activity.” Cabral, Estudos Agrarios, pp. 302—3. “‘. .. let him be put in jail’”, “ ... to visit his family.” Ignatiev, Amilcar Cabral, pp. 9 3 -4 . “. .. never to re tu rn to Guinea.” D uarte, Amilcar Cabral visto pela viuva, p. 19. “‘. .. Sports and Recreational Association of Bissau.’” PID E /D G S, p. 4415, f. 34. “... m otivated by professional disillusionm ent.” Ibid. .. direction to his life’”, ... m ore early to Cabral?”’Azevedo, “A proposito da dim ensao hum ana de Amilcar Cabral,” p. 11. ... life was going w ell.’” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 56. “... any form of internal resistance.” Macey, Frantz Fanon, p. 367.

221

NOTES . on 29 Septem ber, it becam e independent.” For a historical discussion o f this p eriod, see the m asterful three-volum e biography of de Gaulle, De Gaulle, by Jean L acouture, particularly th e ch a p te r “u ne co m m u n ite en tran sit,” pp. 568—89. “‘. .. re tu rn to Africa for good.’” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 59. the Anticolonial M ovem ent is founded.’” Lara, U m A m pIo M ovim ento. “ . . . ‘sm all’ am ounts . . . ” Cabral, in Lara, Um A m plo M ovim ento, pp. 153—5. . to dodge the police,” “‘. .. nothing was found against h im ’”, “‘cadre o f the in te rio r’”, “ ... w ithout looking for them .” Lara, “L etter to MAC”, pp. 74—5. “‘... he asked for secrecy’”, “ ... ‘aw kw ardness’ o f the situation . . . ” Lara, Um A m plo M ovim ento, pp. 74—5. ‘“ . .. ju m p s ta rt the arm e d struggle.’” A ndrade, “Fanon e t 1’A frique C om battante”, pp. 253—4. “. .. to e x p o rt the ‘Algerian m o d e l’ . . . ” Macey, Fanon, pp. 370—1. “. .. in the w ar against the Algerian nationalists.” A ndrade, Fanon, p. 254. “ . .. in the famous Processo dos 5 0 (Trial o f the 50).” Cunha, “Processo dos 50.” ‘“ . .. for our tru ste d people.’” Lara, “R e p o rt by Amilcar Cabral to MAC”, in Lara, U m A m plo M ovim ento, 3rd ed ., p. 107. “ . .. stam ped at th e a irp o rt.” C abral, le tte r to Lara, in op. cit. Lara, pp. 160—1. “ .. .analyzed w ith careful attention.” Barden, le tte r to Lara, in Lara, U m A m plo M ovim ento, pp. 160—1. “‘. .. the basis of an Angolan source.’” D a C ruz, le tte r to Lara, in Lara, Um Am plo M ovim ento, p. 186. undertak en his m ission.’” Lara, le tte r to da C ruz, in Lara, Um A m plo M ovim ento, p. 159. “ . .. com prised all the nationalist m ovem ents” Lara, le tte r to da C ruz, in Lara, Um A m plo M ovim ento, p. 180. “ ... representatives o f all organizations.” Da C ruz, le tte r to Lara, in Lara, Um Am plo M ovim ento, p. 254. “... as the ‘m essenger’ .. .’’Andrade, “Fanon et l ’Afrique Com battante”, p. 254. “ ... form ality o f a date o f b irth .” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertafao, p. 29. “ ... w ould the letters ‘G C ’ be added . . . ” Soares, A m ilcar Cabral ( 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 7 3 ) : Vida e M orte de um Revolucionario Africano, pp. 190—6. ‘“ . .. after the independence o f G uinea.’” M enezes, le tte r to Lucio Lara, in Lara, U m A m plo M ovim ento, p. 248. ‘“ . .. o f Casa G ouveia’s boats.’” Rem a, H istoria das Missoes Catooicas da G uine, p. 885. “... by the w aters of the Geba river.” Mendy and Lobban Jr, Historical D ictionary o f the Republic o f Guinea-Bissau, p. 89. “ ... outside o f the urban centers.” Cabral, Seminario de Quadros, p. 9.

222

NOTES . from m ere p ro test nationalism to revolutionary nationalism .” Braganca, “La longue m arche d ’un Revolutionnaire Africain,” p. 9. “... o u t of the city”, “the Front for the Liberation o f Guinea and Cape Verde”, “... for the tim e to leave.” Cabral, Cronica da Libertagao, pp. 74—7.

4. SHATTERING THE WALLS OF SILENCE ... in a position to help others.’” Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, p. 331. “‘... the girl and life.’” D uarte, “Amilcar Cabral visto pela viuva,” p. 20. ‘“ calm her d o w n ’.” L etter from Amilcar Cabral to M ario de Andrade, in Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, p. 358. “... on Blainville street.” PID E /D G S, 7533. . quite w o rried .’” D uarte, “Amilcar Cabral visto pela viuva,” p. 20. ... than anyw here else.’” L etter from Cabral to Lara, in Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, p. 360. “‘... settle the m atter for good.’” Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, p. 360. “‘... get along w ith the Portuguese.’” Davidson, Liberation ojG uine, p. 12. “... shattering the wall of silence regarding the Portuguese colonial question.” Op. cit. Davidson, p. 9 “ ... charges o f terro rism .” Rocha, Angola, p. 28. “‘private m a tte rs’”, .. not from us as i n d i v i d u a l s .. sacrifice for them .’” Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, p. 403. “... akin to slavery.” For a discussion of labor schemes in Portugal, see Ne vinson, A Modern Slavery.

“‘natural laziness of A fricans’” Ennes, “Trabalho Indigena”. .law of Portuguese citizens.’” M oreira, 0 Ocidente e o Ultramar Portugues, p. 2 1 . “... luso-tropicalism . . . ” Castelo, “O m odo portugues de estar no M undo”. “ ... m ultiracial society in the colonies.” Freyre, Aventura e rotina. “... that o f South Africa during A partheid . . . ” A nderson, “Portugal and the End of U ltra-Colonialism 2,” p. 111. “ ... w hite and black people stayed in separate wards .. .’’A n d erso n ,“Portugal and the End o f Colonialism 2,” p. 110. “... exclusively frequented by w hites”, “ ... show themselves in public.” Cabral, “The Facts A bout Portugal’s African Colonies,” in Unity and Struggle, p. 23. “. .. w ere refused entry.” Santos, Quase Memories, p. 64. “ . .. in central urban areas.” A nderson, “Portugal and the end o f U ltra ­ Colonialism,” p. 110. “‘. .. on m iracles to survive.’” C abral, “The Facts A bout P o rtu g al’s African Colonies,” in Unity and Struggle, p. 26. the case has alarm ed the Portuguese.”” L etter from V iriato da C ruz to Lucio Lara, Conakry, 3 M arch 1960, in Lara, Um Amplo Movimento, 3rd ed ., p. 337. '

223

NOTES ‘“ use o ffo rc e ’”. C abral,“The Facts About Portugal’s African Colonies,” in Unity and Struggle, p. 27. “ . .. seats in th e G eneral Assembly o f the U nited N a tio n s ...” P ID E /D G S ,

ANTT, n° PI 60—65.

5. A U N ITED FRO N T m edicines o u t o f hospitals.’” M arkovitz, Leopold Sedar Senghor and the Politics ofN egritude, p. 22.

“ ... the com pany o f his family.” Luis Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao. w hich she had shared from the beginning.’” Cabral, Cronicas da Libcrtagao, pp. 1 3 7-8. “‘co rn erstone for liberation’”. Cabral, Semindrio de Quadros. contribution to Africa unity.’” Luis Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 45. “ ... instead of the use of violence.” For a discussion on political rivalries among nationalist groups in Senegal and G uinea, see Dhada, Warriors at Work. idea o f organizing a new party.’” F erreira, “R elato rio do C onsulado Portugues em Dakar,” AHDMNE-PAA, box 462. “‘w ar o f exterm in atio n ’”. Ibid. “ ...w a s rather far-fetched.” Lopes, CaboVerde, pp. 122—3. “Cabral countered that .. .’’The PIDE seems to agree. P ID E /D G S, 5418. “ . . . bribing people into to joining them .” Ibid. “. .. m e t to discuss strategies.” Ibid., p. 508. “ ... the U nited States delegation.” Lewis, WE.B. Du Bois, p. 505. “‘black consciousness in international law.’” Ibid., p. 507. “ . .. from there to Accra, Ghana.” For a full description o f the stu d en ts’ flight from Lisbon, see N icoll, “T he g rea t escape th a t changed A frica’s fu tu re,” h ttp s ://w w w .th e g u a r d ia n .c o m /w o r ld /2 0 1 5 /m a r /0 8 / great-escape-that-changed-africas-future “ ... w ork for the political bureau o f the party.” Lopes, CaboVerde, pp. 111—3. “ ... the skills required to fight the Portuguese.” A uthor interview w ith Bobo Keita, Praia, 13 May 2000. “. .. from gymnastics to the use o f weapons.” No Pintcha, “Um enco n tro m arcado em Setem bro 1959.” “ ... to be the future o f the country.” A uthor interview w ith Bobo Keita, Praia, 13 May 2000. “ ... the same people w ho had just attem pted to kill him .” Davidson, Liberation o f Guinea, pp. 5 2 -4 . “ ... w ith weapons and am m unition to desert.” Cabral, Semindrio de Quadros. “... u nder the w eight o f his briefcases”, “C abral’s grow ing diplom atic w eight.” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 128.

224

NOTES 6. MODES OF MAKING WAR upon th e ir r e tu rn to the country.” A ndrade, “Fanon et l ’A frique,” pp. 253—S. “ ... on the support o f the popular masses.” Fanon, TheWretched o f the Earth. “ . . . sw eep thro u g h the en tire country.” Wolff, Peasant Wars o f the Twentieth Century , pp. 152—3. “... saturated w ith Maoism.” Castanheira, Quem mandou matar Amilcar Cabral?, P; 37. “‘. .. can create them .’” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 13. “ ... w hich could com e from anyw here.” Afonso and G om es, Guerra Colonial, p. 99. “... o f exports in 1948.” Da M ota, Guine Portuguesa, p. 145. “ ... it was trying to elim inate: the traditional.” Cabral, Textos politicos, pp. 8 -9 . “ ... (com pound to com pound)”, ‘“ political and econom ic u nit.’” H aw thorne, Planting Rice and Harvesting Slaves, p. 34. “‘... ferociously to conquer them .’” Cabral, A Arma da Teoria, p. 7. “... than they w ere by the Portuguese.” Lopes, Etnia, Estado e R e la te s de Poder na Guine-Bissau, p. 34. ‘“ subaltern roles of supporters of colonialism.’” Ziegler, Contre l ’ordre du monde, p. 271. “ ... higher dim ension o f the hum an.” Fanon, Wretched o f the Earth, p. 143. “ ... control of w orkers and peasants.” Cabral, “T he W eapon o fT h eo ry ”. “ ... an act ‘o f rage and d espair’”. C astanheira, Quem mandou matar Amilcar Cabral, p. 20. “ ... 15 per cent of the national territo ry .” G uerra, Memorias das guerras coloni­ als, p. 214. “... rivers and canals w hich started there.” Cabral, Unidade e Luta, p. 41. “... captured by the PIDE.” Pontes and M arinho, O Seculo X X Portugues. “... as the PAIGC w ould later claim.” Cabral, Unidade e Luta, p. 24. “ . .. know n as ‘stabilized resistance.’” T roung Chinh, cited in A n derson, “Portugal and the End o f U ltra-Colonialism 3”, p. 97. “‘bite and escape’”. Guevara, La Guerra de Guerrillas, p. 18. “‘betw een victory and defeat.’” Cabral, Contribuifao ao estudo do pensamento, P- S“‘R etu rn to Sources’”, “... to resist colonial repression”, “‘prim itive popula­ tio n ’”, “‘tribal m entality’”. Cabral, “National Liberation and C ulture.” “... in front of the populations they had abused.” Ziegler, p. 314. “ . .. m any o th e r Cassaca C ongresses.” C abral, Contribuifao ao Estudo do Pensamento, p. 7.

225

NOTES 7. THE CAPE VERDEAN QUESTION .. from 17—20 July 1963.” PAIGC, 0 Desenvolvimento da Luta era Cabo Verde. “‘ . . . a Portuguese product.’” Cabral, Souto and Elisio, Cartas de Amilcar Cabral

a Maria Helena, p. 291.

.. the Portuguese provinces in Europe.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia de CaboVerde, p. 136.

“... extension of the Portuguese provinces in Europe.” Lopes, CaboVerde, p. 136. “‘. .. o f a hum an aggregate’”, ‘“ ethnic g ro u p ’”. Andrade, Amilcar Cabral, p. 34. “. .. got a cold reception.” A uthor interview w ith Lilica Boal, Praia, 24 July 2000 . “ ... the few w ho stayed w ith the party .. .’’A uthor interview w ith Lilica Boal, Praia, 24 July 2000. “ ... the first foco o f insurrection.” A uthor interview w ith Pedro Pires, Praia, 17 May 2000. “ . .. rigourously m o n ito red .” P ID E /D G S , ANTT, “Possiveis actividades do PAIGC em CaboV erde”, p. 283. “ . .. possessing propaganda m aterials.” AHDM NE-PAA, box 445. “... send the photographed docum ents to Lisbon ” A H I) MN E PAA, box 1310, “Politica U ltram arina— agita^ao nas provincias ultram arinas.” “ ... totally unarm ed against PIDE brutality.” M onteiro, Testemunho de um combatente, pp. 95—6. 8. A STATE INSIDE TH E CO LO N Y ‘“ low intensity conflict.’” See K itson, Low Intensity Operations. “ ... against the attacks o f the colonial army.” Venter, Portugal’s Guerrilla War, p. 24. “ . .. for their logistics and inform ation . . . ” Davidson, The Liberation o f Guine, p. 109-10. ‘“ unattainable to the enem y’”. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (1961), p. 110. was not the symbol o f oppression.’” Lipinska, “D eux semaines dans le maquis de la Guinee-Bissau”, p. 30. . .. central base of the south.’” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 220. “‘... in developing countries’”, “ ... aid to the p oorest countries in the w orld.” A H D M N E-PA A , box 4 8 5 , “Politica ultram arin a— agitacao nas provincias ultram arinas.” “ ... if they w ere in the in te rio r of the territory.” A uthor interview w ith Amelia Araujo, Praia, 16 July 2000. “ . .. tuning in to th e gu errilla o n e”, “ ...liste n in g conditions w ere p erfect.” A uthor interview w ith Amelia Araujo, Praia, 16 July 2000. “... in Portuguese newspapers themselves.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia de Cabo Verde, p. 163.

226

NOTES ‘“ tru e sons of G uinea’”,

... expel the Cape Verdeans.’” Cabral, Vamos reforgar a nossa vigilancia, para desmascarar os agentes do inimigo: Para dfendermos o Partido e aluta para continuarmos a condenar aofracasso todos os pianos dos criminosos colonialistas portugueses.

“. . . com ply w ith the instructions o f their leader.” AHDMNE-PAA, box 463,

“Politica ultram arina— agitacao nas provincias ultram arinas” (67369). “This, at least, was the thesis defended .. .’’Jim Hoagland, “Portugal’s ‘unw innable’ w ar”, TheWashington Post, 21 February 1971. “ ... instructions o f their leader”, “... left behind by the Portuguese adm inis­ tration”, “... close to Delaba”“. .. stolen engines from PAIGC boats . . . ’’Dhada, pp. 74^95. “ ... retaliations from the natives o f G uinea.” PID E /D G S, A NTT, “Informacjao n 79 S C /C I (2)”.

9. W IN N IN G IN POLITICS W IT H O U T LOSING THE WAR “ ... assets of Portuguese in Africa.” Cunha, 0 Ultramar, a Na(ao,e o “25 deAbriF’, P -9 E ... experim ent w ith the federative solution.’” Caetano, Depoimento, p. 169. a step into indep en d en ce.’” C aetano, Minhas memorias de Salazar, p. 708—9. “ ... faced by African continent.’” O liveira, “U m a m ao cheia de nada?” “ . .. to m ove past th e dom ino th eo ry . . . ” M acQ ueen, “P o rtu g al’s first dom ino”. “... minimal effect on the Portuguese econom y”, “‘. .. would be exterm inated . .. ’” Spinola, Por uma Guine Melhor. Some o f the excerpts I reproduce here did not make it into the aforem entioned source; I gathered them from D utra Faria, a jo u rn alist o f the A g en d a N acional de Inlorm acao (N ational A gency for Inform ation). “. . . m eeting certain needs o f the population.’” C hakhotin, The Rape o f the Masses, pp. 3—32. “. .. to Algeria as observers.” C ann, Counter insurgency in Africa. “The officials assembled by Spinola . . . ” M acQ ueen p. 214. “... such as the PIDE inspector Fragoso Allas .. .’’A ntunes, A Guerra de Africa, p. 510. “. .. change the course of the w ar at any cost .’’A ntunes, 0 Factor Africano , p. 73. “‘. .. p rep atio n o f land for cultivation . . . ”’, “‘. . . b u t ab o u t p ersu asio n .’” Spinola, Por uma Guine Melhor, pp. 1 36—8. “ ... o r recede to a red one.” A ntunes, A Guerra de Africa, p. 384. “‘. . . to the poles of progress.” Spinola, Por uma Guine Melhor, p. 182. “... to destory the guerrilla units.” A ntunes, O Factor Africano, pp. 782—3. .. lose the will to fight.”’A ntunes, A Guerra de Africa, p. 384.

227

NOTES . such as Abdul Injai.” For m ore inform ation on Abdul Injai, see Bowman, “Abdul Njai: Ally and Enemy o f the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau.” ... w ithout despondency o r dismay.’” Aragao, Tropas Negras, p. 23. “. .. and vocational education ” Spinola, Por uma G uine M elhor, p. 44. “any ‘cultural co n ten t .’’’Wolf, PeasantWars, p. 25. . institutions o f tribal pow er.” For an exhaustive discussion on the making o f tribal-related political identity see M amdani, C itizen and Subject. forms of European life.’” Belchior, Os Congressos do Povo da Guine, pp. 14—17. . the chief o f the tribalized.’” M amdani, C itizen and Subject. hailed internationally as a victory o f the m ovem ent.” Venter, P ortugal’s GuerrillaW ar, p. 147. .. questioning the w ar effort.” Dhada, p. 580. “‘... benefits o f foreign m aterial su p p o rt.’” Spinola, Por uma G uine M elhor, p. 248. “ ... as P ortuguese as Your Excellency.’” PID E /D G S, ANTT, 5445. “. .. w eaponry and som etim es even fuel . . . ” Dhada, p. 91. . validity of this policy.’”AHDMNE-PAA, box 463, “Politica ultram arina— agitacao nas provincias ultram arinas”. .. subversive pam phlets, printouts, and correspondence.” AHDMNE-PAA, box 463, “Politica ultram arina— agitacao nas provincias ultram arinas”. “ . .. Teixeira P into, Farim , and Sao D om ingo.” A H D M N E-PA A , box 4 63, “Politica ultram arina— agitacao nas provincias ultram arinas”. “ ... collective desertions from the m ovem ent.” Cabral, Sobre a situacao da Luta e suas perspectivas, p. 14. .. hacked up the bodies w ith m achetes.” C abrita, “Desaparecidos em combate,” Expresso. thought they could buy us.’” Cabral, Demasquons les messonges et les crimes des colonialistes portuguais.

“. .. sent his intelligence officer?” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 397. to bo th planes.’” M arinho, Operagao MarVerde, p. 15. . I found honorable to Portugal.’” Ibid., p. 66. “ ... sinking three PAIGC boats .. .’’A ntunes, A Guerra de A frica, p. 514. “. .. arm ed w ith 40m m canons.” Cabral, Tirons toutes les legons de 1’agression criminelle perpetree par les colonialistes Portuguais contre le Peuple de la R epublique de la G uine, p. 4.

launched by the Portuguese forces.” U nited Nations, “R ep o rt of the Special Mission o f the Security Council Established U nder R esolution 294 (1971),” h ttp ://c asa co m u m .o rg /cc /v isu a liz ad o r?p a sta = 0 7 0 6 6 .0 9 2 .0 1 3 # ! 1 coerced into taking p a rt in the operation.” M arinho, Operagao M ar Verde, p. 102. ... had to fend for them selves.’” A ntunes, A Guerra de A frica, p. 515. “. .. w hich he kept on his person . . . ” Kake, Sekou Toure, p. 147.

228

NOTES to the Italian com m unist daily L’f/nita.” AHDMNE-PAA, box 1311. “ ... ten-year statute o f autonomy.” M acQ ueen, p. 220. in a position o f clear superiority.’” A ntunes, Carta Particulares a Marcello Caetano, p. 156.

10. TOW ARD IND EPEN D EN CE “... the side o f the defending forces.” Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 21. “‘. .. Portuguese dom ination in our land.’” Cabral, “D ecididos a resistir”, in an in terv iew w ith Tricontinental, in Fonseca and Pires, A m ilcar Cabral, pp. 131-48. " ... infiltration by volunteer recruits.” Urdang, F ighting Two Colonialisms, p. 49. “ ... positions occupied in the territory.” Cabral, Unidade e L uta, p. 171. ‘“ positive neu trality ’”Worsley, The Third World, p. 133. “‘... militarily occupied by a foreign power.’” Cabral, U nity and Struggle, p. 221. “... tru e situation in the Portuguese colonies.” Cabral, Cronicas da Libertagao, p. 188. “... donated USD 20,000 to C abral’s party.”AHDMNE-PAA, box 25, 26 July 1971. “ ... Christian upbringing they had all shared.” Castanheira, “A Amiga Italiana de Cabral”, pp. 42—3. “‘... stop supporting the colonial war.’” Cabral, “Sur la situation de notre lutte arm ee de liberation nationale”. “‘destroying the w ork of integration in Africa.’” Castanheira, “Segredos de uma audiencia”, p. 47. “‘... proven M arxist affiliation.’” Ibid. “‘... did not know w ho they w ere.’” Ibid., p. 54. “... Portuguese governm ent considered everything ‘clarified.’” Da C ruz, 0 Estado Novo e a lgreja Catolica, p. 213. “ ... im p o rtant donation of medical supplies . . . ” Cabral, A condigao da ajuda que nos recebemos e que nao deve haver nenhum as condigoes, p. 55. “... closing the door to them .” A ntunes, N ixon e Caetano, pp. 225—6. “‘... risk to the free w orld.’” Foreign Affairs, “R e p o rt on Portuguese Guinea and the Liberation M ovem ent,” House t f Representatives, N inety-First Congress, W ashington DC, G overnm ent Printing Office, 1970, p. 95. “‘ . . . against the P ortuguese dom ination.’” C o m m ittee on Foreign Affairs, “R ep o rt on Portuguese G uinea and the Liberation M ovem ent,” p. 71. “ ... requests for the retu rn of m ilitary equipm ent.” Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in A frica, p. 171. “... bom bs produced in the US.” Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in A frica, pp. 195—7. “‘... weapons and other assistance.’” C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, “R ep o rt on Portuguese G uinea and the Liberation M ovem ent,” p. 71. “ ... understand the questions he was asked.” AHDMNE-PAA, box 1311.

229

NOTES . .. on the question of ideology.’” Ibid. “ . .. Peralta in N ovem ber 1968.” Saraiva, “Cubano prisioneiro de G u erra”, p. 16. “ . .. Cubans fighting on th eir side.” For a discussion o f the involvem ent of Cubans in wars in Africa and particularly in Guinea-Bissau, see Piero Gleijeses, C onflicting Missions, pp. 186—213, and Daniel dos Santos, A m ilcar Cabral: Um O utro O lha, pp. 214—5. ‘“ w e have survived’”. AHDM NE-PAA, box 1311. “ superiority o f the colonial air force.” D hada, p. 177. ‘“ w ho failed to stir any in te rest’”. AHDMNE-PAA, box 1311. “ ... in the sectors o f Cubacare andTom bali.” Cabral, “L’ Agression te rro riste portugaise contre la Mission Speciale des N ations U nies”. .. was a political and m ilitary victory.” Ibid. “ ... figures recorded in the census untrustw orthy.” R udebeck, Guinea-Bissau, p. 144. . local organs of regional pow er.’” AHDMNE-PAA, box 1311. “ . .. from January to August 1972.” R udebeck, G uinea-Bissau, p. 162.

11. THE KILLING OF CABRAL “‘. . . so close to getting th ere.’” A uthor interview w ith Lilica Boal, Praia, 24 July 2000. ‘“ betrayal cancer.’” Rooney, Kwame N krum ah. a m ilitant to continue the w ork.’” Malley, “Venger Cabral.” “ ... and Vaz and Miguel Embana . . . ” Soares, A m ilcar Cabral, pp. 394—5. “ . .. the m odest sum of 10,000 escudos to each . . . ” PID E /D G S, ANTT, (2), 7477. “‘had the best opportunity.’” Lopes, Os Bastidores da lndependencia de CaboVerde, p. 200. “‘... and liquidate Amilcar C abral.’” PID E /D G S, ANTT, (2), box 7477. “ . .. to in sert ‘African agents’ into the p arty ”, “... internally destabilize the organization”, “‘. .. in its backbone: its unity.’” Cabral, Vamos refor gar a nossa vigilancia, para desmascarar os agentes do inim igo: Para defendermos o Partido e aluta para continuarm os a condenar aojracasso todos os pianos dos criminosos colonialistas portugueses, pp. 1—6.

“‘coup d ’ etat of the G uineans’”, ‘“ essential positions o f responsibility.’” Ibid. “ ... reintegrate w ith the guerrillas”, “ ... Portuguese police since 1969”, “... a single navy ship.” C astanheira, Quern m andou m a ta r A m ilcar Cabral?, pp. 122-7. ... that later on becom e big erro rs.’” Cabral, L’Agression terroriste portuguaise contre la M ission Speciale des N ations Unies, p. 11.

230

N O TE S .. C abral’s agenda to his associates.” Castanheira, Quem mandou matar Amilcar Cabral?, p. 122.

“. .. form a PAIGC w ithout the Cape Verdeans.” PID E /D G S, ANTT, 3018. “ ... he w ould be in trouble.” A uthor interview w ith Osvaldo Lopes da Silva, M indelo, 30 June 2000. “ ... and the m ilitants in transit . . . ”, “ ... able to do so, she was killed.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da lndependencia de CaboVerde, pp. 206—7. ... to discuss no m atter w hat.’” Ignatiev, Amilcar Cabral, p. 239. “ ... arrest all the brumedjos (Cape Verdeans).” I have been able to reco n stru ct C abral’s final m om ents and the events that followed thanks to interview s w ith Amelia Araujo, Lilica Boal, and Alcides Evora. “ ... Radio Bissau and street protests.” A uthor interview w ith Osvaldo Lopes da Silva, M indelo, 30 June 2000. “ ... on 18 May 1972.” Blessis, “Q ui a tu e Amilcar Cabral?”, p. 56. “ ... w ho was ‘extrem ely receptive.’” Spinola, Portugal e o Futuro, p. 27. “‘... im pedim ents to the m eeting w ith Cabral.’” Spinola, Pals sem Rumo, p. 43. “‘... could have on the struggle.’” A Capital, “Q uem m atou Amilcar Cabral?”, 22 January 1973, p. 17. ‘“ . .. p artitio n o f the P ortuguese province o f G uinea.’” Diario de Notlcias, “D irigente dos Terroristas do PAIGC— Assassinado em Conacry”, p. 1. “ ... annex G uinea into its territory.” AHDMNE-PAA, box 1051. “... ancestry w hich has been disputed . . . ” Kake, p. 20. “‘... a m eter from the gate o f his house’”, “... conspirators could be detained.” O ram as, Amilcar Cabral: Para Alem do seu tem po, pp. 149—50. “ ... would end up backing the coup.” Alata, Prison d ’Ajrique, pp. 218—19. “‘... taking p a rt in its execution.’” O ram as, Amilcar Cabral: Para Alem do seu tempo, p. 156. “. .. had his fingernails and toenails pulled out.” Castanheira, Quem mandou matar Amilcar Cabral, p. 95. “ ... express orders to not refer to the nam e of the nationalist.” A uthor in te r­ view w ith H elena Iva Cabral, Lisbon, 25 M arch 2000. “‘... for another p a rt o f your country.’” No Pintcha, “President Sekou Toure”,

p. 8. EPILOGUE: (D IS-)C O N T IN U IN G AMILCAR CABRAL ... Cabral thinks for us.’” Lopes, Os Bastidores da lndependencia, p. 455. “‘ ... carried on the w ork he had d e lin ea te d ... ’’’A ristides Pereira, Uma Luta, um partido, dois palses, p. 244. “ ... before the arrival o f the land—air missiles.”Venter, pp. 2—3. . to guantee the security o f the event.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da lndependencia, p. 235.

231

NOTES . territo ries adm inistered by Portugal.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia, p. 243. “O nly later w ould Cabral reconsider it . . . ” Cabral, “L eT estem ent Politique de Cabral,” pp. 34—7. “‘... G uinea and Cape Verde are only one.’” Cabral, Unidade e Luta, p. 128. “ . .. the b reakdow n o f com bat m orale . . . ” Maia, Capitao de Abril, p. 64; Vasconcelos, “O Inferno de Guidage, p. 29. .. a w ar o f aggression against the G uinean population.” O liveira, “U m a m ao cheia de nada?” “... leading to the form ation o f the MFA.” Maia, p. 67. ‘“ n o t one m o re ’”. Ziegler, pp. 28—9. “ ... um brella organization for all the nationalist forces.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia, pp. 275—6. “‘. .. against the independence o f the archipelago.’” Pereira, Uma Luta, p. 283. “... refused to change their minds.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia, p. 478. “ ... used sim ultaneously by Cubans and South Africans.” Lopes, Os Bastidores da Independencia, p. 480.

232

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London, Lexington Books, 2014. Rem a, H enrique Pinto, Historia das Missoes Catolicas da Guine, Braga, Editorial Franciscana, 1982. Rocha, Edm undo, Angola: Contribuigao ao estudo da genese do nacionalismo moderno angolano (1 9 5 0 -1 9 6 4 ), Luanda, K ilom belom be, 2003. Rooney, D avid, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, London, I.B. Tauris, 1988. Rosas, Fernando, Historia de Portugal: 0 Estado Novo (1 9 2 6 —19 7 4 ), vol. VII, Lisbon, Editorial Estampa, 1998. Ross, Edw ard, Report on Employment o f Native Labor in Portuguese Africa, N ew York, A bbott Press, 1925. R udebeck, Lars, Guinea-Bissau: A Study i f Political M obilization, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974. Santos, A ntonio de Almeida, Quase Memorias: do Colonialismo e da descoloniza$ao, vol. I, Lisbon, Casa das Letras, 2006. Santos, Daniel dos, Amilcar Cabral: Um Outro Olha, Lisbon, Chiado E ditora, 2014. Saraiva, Jose M anuel, “Cubano P risioneiro de G uerra,” Expresso, 16 M arch 1996. Scott, D avid, Conscripts o f Modernity: The Tragedy o f Colonial Enlightenm ent, D urham N C, D uke University Press, 2004. Seibert, Karl G erhard, Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in Sao Tome and Principe, Leiden, Brill, 2006. Skinner, Q u e n tin , The Foundation o f Modern Political Thought, C am bridge, Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1998. Sm ith, Alan K ., “A ntonio Salazar and the Reversal o f P ortuguese Colonial Policy,” The Journal ofAfrican History, vol. 15, no. 4, 1974, pp. 653—67. Soares, Juliao, Amilcar CabraLVida e morte de um revolucionario africano, Lisbon, Edi^ao de A utor, 2016. Spinola, Antonio de, Por uma Guine Melhor, Lisbon, A genda Geral do Ultram ar, 1970. ------------ , Portugal e o Futuro, Lisbon, Editora Arcadia, 1974. ------------ , Pais sem Rumo: Contributo para a historia de uma revolugao, Lisbon, S C IR E ,1978. Telepneva, N atalia, “O u r Sacred D uty: The Soviet U n io n , th e L iberation M ovem ents in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961—1975,” PhD Thesis, The London School of Econom ics and Political Science (LSE), 2014.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY U nited N ations, “R e p o rt o f th e Special M ission o f the Security Council Established U n d er R esolution 294 (1 9 7 1 ),” Security C ouncil, Official Records,Tw enty-sixth year, Special Supplem ent no. 3, h ttp ://c a sa c o m u m . o rg /c c /v is u a liz a d o r? p a sta = 0 7 0 6 6 .0 9 2 .0 1 3 # !l (last accessed 14 N ovem ber 2020). Urdang, Stephanie, Fighting Two Colonialisms:Women in Guinea-Bissau, New York, M onthly Review Press, 1979. Vasconcelos, Francisco d e ,“0 Inferno de G uidag e,” Publico, 5 O cto b er 1995. Venter, Al. J., Portugal’s Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa, Cape Town, M alherbe, 1973. Wolf, Eric R ., Peasant Wars o f the Twentieth Century, N ew York, H arper and Row, 1969. Worsley, Peter, TheThirdWorld, Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 1970. Ziegler, Jean, Les rebelles: Contre l ’ordre du monde, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1983. Author interviews:

Alcides £vora, Praia, 25 July 2000. Amelia Araujo, Praia, 16 July 2000. Ana M aria Cabral, Praia, 29 July 2000. Anne Blanchard, Paris, 30 M arch 2000. Aristides Pereira, Praia, 9 May 2000. A rm inda and A rm anda Cabral, Bissau, 21 June 2000. Bobo Keita, Praia, 1 3 May 2000. H elena Iva Cabral, Lisbon, 25 M arch 2000. Lilica Boal, Praia, 24 July 2000. Luis Cabral, Lisbon, 17 M arch 2000. M ario Fonseca, Praia, 5 June 2000. OHvio Pires, Praia, 19 July 2000. Osvaldo Lopes da Silva, M indelo, 30 June 2000. Archives:

A rquivo H istorico D iplom atico do M inisterio dos N egocios E strangeiros, Politica Africa-Asia (AHDM NE-PAA), Lisbon, Portugal. Arquivo Nacional da Torre doT om bo (A N TT), Lisbon, Portugal.

241

IN D E X

Abidjan, C ote d ’Ivoire, 66 Accra, Ghana, 70, 78, 101, 127 Acto Colonial (1933), 25—6, 95 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 182 adjacencies, 33^4, 129—30 Afonso, Aniceto, 112 A FR IC A .C O N T , 15 African Awakening (Davidson), 81 African Research G roup, 179 Africasia, 1 37 Afrique/Asie, 187, 190 A fro-pessim ism , 13 Aftonbladet, 1 39 age system , 104, 114 agricultural census (1947), 60—62 A gricultural Society o f Cassequel, 64 Alabama, USA, 51, 83 Alatas, Jean-Paul, 197 de Albergaria, Bernardo T eixeira, 179 Alcantara, Lisbon, 39, 43, 51 Aleluia, Tiago, 127 A lentejo, Portugal, 47, 53—4-, 55 A lexandre A lbuquerque Square, Praia, 49 Alfama, Lisbon, 39 Algeria, 101, 105, 108, 109, 110, 131, 132, 133, 166

Cabral assassination com mission (1973), 198 Guinea-Bissau peace negotia­ tions (1974), 2 0 9 -1 0 W ar ofln d ep en d en ce (1954— 62), 65, 69, 96, 153, 155, 156 All-African People’s Conference 1958: 109 1960: 7 8 -9 Allas, Fragoso, 153 Almada, D ulce, 141, 194, 206 d ’Almeida, Bebiano, 127 Alouette helicopters, 137 A m ado, Jorge, 44 A m boim , Angola, 64 A m erican A uto W orkers, 177 Am erican W ar o fln d ep en d en ce (1 7 7 5 -8 3 ), 180 Amico, Bruna, 1 38 am ulets, 123 A mura Fortress, Bissau, 200 Ana Mafalda, 56 A nderson, P erry, 83, 84 A ndrade, Costa, 37 de A ndrade, Ernestina Soares, 20 de A ndrade, H erculano, 131 de A ndrade, Lucette, 65 de A ndrade, M ario Pinto

243

IN DEX Cabral, relationship w ith, 4, 13, 28, 30, SO, 51, 130 on Casa de Africa, 45 on C entro do Estudos Africanos, 46 C onakry, life in, 79 Fanon, relationship w ith, 69, 109 Lisbon, life in, 39, 43, 44, 45 Luanda prison raids (1961), 98 on luso-tropicalism , 83 Maitre Ecole staging (1954), 44 and M ovim ento A nti-Colonial, 67, 69 p o etry publication, 43 Presence Africaine, w riting in, 46, 68, 83, 138 on propaganda, 5 on protonationalism , 41 on student population, 35 Angola, 14, 79, 151 assimilados, 18 Cabral in, 8, 63-4-, 6 9 -7 0 , 109 Cape V erdean m igration, 19, 20, 55 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 101 Civil W ar (1 9 7 5 -2 0 0 2 ), 212 C om m unist Party, 68 C reole elite, 40 education in, 30 European m igration, 81, 113 FNLA, 1, 100 Galvao re p o rt (1947), 84—5 Independence (1975), 13 land expropriation in, 61, 116 m ixed race people in, 83, 84 M ovim ento A nti-Colonial, 67—8 PAIGC and, 99 political organizations, dating of, 71 p ro testan t missions in, 35

244

shipping rou tes, 43 South Africa, relations w ith, 212 students from , 35, 37, 39, 43—7 Tunisia recru itm en t mission (1959), 6 9 -7 0 Vatican, relations w ith, 176 W ar o f Independence (1961— 74), 1, 9 7 -8 , 99, 106 Angolan Com pany o f A griculture, 64 A ntananarivo, M adagascar, 66 Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poesie Negre et Malgache, 4 2, 43 Antologia da Poesia Negra de Expressao Portuguesa, 43 A ntonio, M ario, 38 Aragao, Francisco, 155 A raujo, A driano, 90 A raujo, Amelia, 107—8, 139, 140, 141, 193, 194 Araujo, G om es, 118 A raujo, Jose, 108, 127, 141, 193, 199, 206 A rgentina, 19 assimilados, 18, 4 0 , 46—7, 58, 84, 122

Associafao de Estudantes N egros, 40 A tlantic C harter (1941), 92 Aventura e Kotina (Freyre), 83 A w olow o, Abafemi, 94 A zeredo, Carlos, 153 de Azevedo, A rio, 63, 64, 67 A zores, 34, 129 Bafata, Guinea-Bissau, 21, 22, 158, 184 Baginha, Fernando, 199 Balanta people, 60—61, 104, 1 1 2 - 1 5 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 4 Bana, A ntonio, 103 Banco de Portugal, 27

IN DEX Banco Nacional U ltram arino, 24, 117 Banda, Hastings, 94 Bandung Conference (19S6), 96, 171 Barata, N unes, 153 Barbosa, A ristides, 190, 191, 197 Barbosa, Rafael, 75, 90, 102, 106, 1 6 0 -6 1 , 190, 194 Barden, AK, 70 Barreto, H onorio, 17, 41 b arter system , 61, 144—5 Batepa massacre (1953), 46—7 Batica, Francisco, 146 Batista, Fulgencio, 170, 210 Beafada people, 140 Beato, Lisbon, 39 B eaum ont, Jacques, 100 b ee tro o t, 69 Beijing, China, 110 Beira Alta, Portugal, 19 Belchior, M anuel, 157 Belgian Congo (1 9 0 8 -6 0 ), 81, 86 Belgium, 81 Ben Bella, A hm ed, 108 Bentivoglio, Eugenio, 1 38 Berlin Conference (1884—5), 11, 17 bi-groups, 137, 143, 150 Biafada people, 21 Bijagos, Guinea-Bissau, 164 Bingham, Jonathan, 179 Bissagos Islands, Guinea-Bissau, 184 Bissara, Guinea-Bissau, 161 Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 22, 30, 86, 100 am nesty (1969), 160, 162, 190, 194 ' Cabral assassination (1973), 200 Cabral in, 5 5 -6 2 , 7 2 -5 , 101 elections (1972), 184

m ilitant m igration from , 101—2 PIDE raids (1961), 106 Pidjiguiti massacre (1959), 71, 74, 86, 109, 140 bissiloes, 56 ‘bite and escape’, 121, 169 Black O rp h eu s’ (Sartre), 42 Blanco, Jose, 153 blood tax, 127 Boal, A ugusto, 147 Boal, Lilica, 127, 131, 187, 194 Boe, Guinea-Bissau, 199 Boke, G uinea-Conakry, 107, 144 Bolama, Guinea-Bissau, 182, 184 Boletim de Irform agao e Propaganda de Cabo Verde, 48, 56 Bolivia, 132 Bolor massacre (1878), 18 Bonn, G erm any, 101 Borja, Horacio Sevilha, 182 de Braganfa, Aquino, 74, 105, 190 Brazil, 40, 44, 82, 97 Brazzaville, Congo-Brazzaville, 66, 141 B reton, A ndre, 42 Brigada de Estudos e Defesa Fitossanitaria dos Produtos U ltram arinos, 63 de Brito, Rebordao, 164, 165 Bulgaria, 173 Burbank, Jane, 11 Burma, 96 Buscardini, A ntonio, 199, 213 Cabo Verde (Lopes), 6 Cabral, Amilcar agricultural census (1947), 6 0 -6 2 agronom y, career in, 1, 4, 8, 28, 32, 34, 4 8, 5 3 -4 , 55 aliases, 4, 80 All-African P eop le’s Conference (1960), 7 8 -9

245

IN D EX Angola, visits to , 8, 6 3 -4 , 69—70, 109 Asian to u r (1972), 181 assassination (1973), 3 - 4 , 6, 7, 9—10, 1 2 -1 3 , 22, 145, 1 9 0 -2 0 1 , 209 assassination plots, 148, 188—9 b irth (1924), 7, 20-21 Bissau, life in, 5 5 -6 2 , 72—5, 101 on betrayal, 187—8 Cassaca Congress (1964), 9—10, 1 2 1 -5 , 1 3 6 -7 , 1 3 9 ,1 4 3 , 147, 148 C entro do Estudos Africanos, 44—7, 49 C onakry, life in, 2, 8—9, 12, 22, 8 7 -9 0 , 1 0 1 -8 , 160, 189 da C ruz, relationship w ith, 68—9 Cuba visit (1968), 133 cult of personality, 2 0 3 -4 desertions, views on, 162 diplom acy, 104—5, 108, 171—83 education, 7—8, 28, 29—30, 3 1 -2 , 3 5 -5 2 elections (1972), 183—5 famines, experience of, 7, 32, 33 father, relationship w ith, 28 free speech, lack of, 3 da Graca, relationship w ith, 92 Guevara, m eeting w ith (1965), 180 G uinea-Conakry independence (1958), 65, 67 Independence Proclam ation (1973), 181-2 judicial system , views on, 147 Larbac nom de plum e, 38 Lisbon, life in, 4, 8, 13, 32, 3 3 -5 2 , 57, 59, 6 2 -5 London visit (1960), 79—86 luso-tropicalism , views on, 83

m arriage to Ana Maria, 88, 203 m arriage to M aria H elena, 35, 5 0 -5 2 , 88 M arxism, 8, 11—12, 54, 103, 173, 174 nationalism , 4 , 8—9, 11, 31—2, 55, 59, 65, 117 N egritude, 8, 42—3, 49 N krum ah’s death (1972), 187—8 N orthern F ront assassinations (1970), 162-3 O peracao M ar V erde (1970), 164—7, 183, 1 9 4 ,1 9 5 , 197 PAIGC founding, 7, 9, 4 7 , 71—3 Paris arrest (1968), 133 passports, 80, 133 on peasants, 103 PIDE p lo t docu m en t (1973), 22 Pidjiguiti massacre (1959), 71, 74, 86, 109 poem s, 4, 8, 31—2 Political T estam ent (1973), 206 Pope, audience w ith (1970), 174-7 race, views on, 130 radio broadcasts, 49—50 Salazar, le tte r to (1960), 23 Senegal operations, 87, 90—92 skin allergy, 50 Soviet U nion visits (1970, 1972), 1 7 9 -8 0 , 181, 204 supernatural, views on 123 Sweden visit (1972), 181 on ‘tribal m entality’, 122 T ricontinental C onference (1967), 117 Tunisia rec ru itm en t mission (1959), 6 9 -7 0 tw o circles theory, 171 UN activity (1972), 181, 182 USA visits (1970, 1972), 177-81

IN DEX W ar o f Independence (1963— 73), see Guinea-Bissau W ar of Independence w ar preparations, 99—108 w eapons smuggling, 105-8 w riting of, 4, 7, 22, 31, 38, 48, 49, 5 3 -4 , 81, 8 4 -5 , 172 Cabral, Ana Luisa, 88 Cabral, Ana Maria, 88, 141, 193 Cabral, A ntonio, 28, 57 Cabral, Arm anda, 28, 52, 57 Cabral, A rm inda, 28, 35, 52, 57 Cabral, Fidelis Almada, 107, 148, 1 8 8 ,1 9 9 Cabral, H elena Iva, 57 Cabral, Joao Caracciolo, 81, 105 Cabral, Juvenal, 7, 19—23, 27—31, 3 4 ,4 8 , 5 1 -2 , 55 Cabral, L ucette, 107 Cabral, Luis, 21, 28, 30, 52, 57, 62, 67, 88, 131, 148 on African unity, 90 A m ilcar’s death (1973), 200 arrest (1961), 107 arrest w arrant (1961), 100 Casa Gouveia, w ork at, 57, 100, 117 Guinea-Conakry independence (1958), 65, 67 on N o rthern Front negotiations (1970), 163 on PAIGC founding, 72 presidential election (1973), 206 Soviet U nion, relations w ith, 213 Cabral, Maria H elena, 35, 50—52, 56, 60, 62, 63, 77, 88, 106 Cabral, Vasco, 107, 121, 125, 127, 148, 188, 193, 199, 204 Cabral G eneration, 39 Cacine, Guinea-Bissau, 22 Caetano, M arcelo, 23, 98, 1 5 0 -5 1 , 167, 182

am nesty (1969), 160 C arnation Revolution (1974), 207, 208 at Colonial College, 98 on com m unism , 178 Senegal, negotiations with (1 9 7 1 -2 ), 1 6 7 -8 , 194 Vatican, relations with, 176, 177 Calvao, A lpoim , 164, 165, 166 Camara Municipal de Lisboa, 15 da Cam ara, Maria Baptista, 30-31 Campanha do Trigo (1929—38), 54 Canhabaque, Guinea-Bissau, 17 Cani, Inocencio, 145, 191, 193, 1 9 9 ,2 0 9 Cantanhez, Guinea-Bissau, 120 Cap Skirring, Senegal, 167, 194 Cape V erde, 5, 6, 7, 48 adjacency status debate, 33—4-, 1 29-30 assimilados, 18 Bolor massacre (1878), 18 C reole, 18 Dakar m eeting (1963), 127—8 droughts in, 7, 19, 23, 32, 33, 48, 53 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 101 Claridosos, 10, 32 education in, 19, 20, 23, 29, 35 elections (1975), 212 Guinea, relations w ith, see Cape V erde—G uinea relations identity, 10 Independence (1975), 14, 210, 212

langados, 17, 18 m igration from , 11, 19, 48, 55 population surplus, 18 Portugal, relations w ith, 10—11, 1 7 -1 9 , 21, 58, 1 1 7 ,1 2 8 slave trade and, 11, 89, 128

247

IN D EX soil erosion in, 33, SS South Africa, relations w ith, 2 1 2 -1 3 student associations from , 37 W ar of Independence period (1 9 6 3 -7 3 ), 12, 14, 1 2 7 -3 4 , 1 4 1 -2 , 2 0 9 ,2 1 0 -1 2 Cape V erde—G uinea relations, 9 - 1 1 ,1 4 , 1 7 -1 9 , 7 5 ,2 1 3 adjacency status and, 33—4, 1 29-30 colonization and, 11, 17—19, 21, 22, 58, 92, 117 Cabral assassination (1973), 1 9 0 -9 4 , 199, 2 0 0 -2 0 1 , 203, 205 C reole and, 18 D akar m eeting (1963), 127—8 independence and, 14, 211—12 juridical status and, 18 m igration and, 11, 19, 48, 55 PAIGC and, 9, 34, 73, 89, 9 1 -2 slavery and, 11, 89 W ar of Independence (1963— 73), 12, 14, 1 2 7 -3 4 , 1 4 1 -2 , 159 C apital, A , 195 C arm ona, 6 s c a r, 23, 129 Carnation R evolution (1974), 168, 2 0 7 -8 Caroijo, Jorge F rederico Velez, 20 Carrasco, U rbano, 153 de Carvalho, O telo Saraiva, 153 Casa de A frica, 45, 59 Casa dos Estudantes de Angola (CEA), 37, 45 Casa dos Estudantes do Im perio (CEI), 8, 3 7 - 8 ,4 4 , 50, 51 Casa Gouveia, 57, 61, 100, 113, 117 Casa Grande and Sanzala (Freyre), 83

Casa N osoco, 74 Casamance Basin, 195 Casaroli, A gostino, 177 Cassaca Congress (1964), 9—10, 1 2 1 -5 , 1 3 6 -7 , 139, 143, 147, 148 Cassama, Awa, 192 Cassama, Bacar, 58 Cassequel P roperties, 64 Cassuraes, Portugal, 19 Castanheira, Jose P edro, 6—7 de C astro, A rtur, 45 de C astro, Fernanda, 36 C astro, Fidel, 108, 110, 132 Catchungo, Guinea-Bissau, 162 Catholicism , 19, 24, 129, 171, 17 4 -7 , 208 Catio, Guinea-Bissau, 182 C entro do Estudos Africanos, 4 4 - 7 ,4 9 C erejo, P edro, 15 Certeza, 32 Cesaire, Aime, 42 Ceylon, 96 Chabal, Patrick, 32, 36 Chakotin, Sergei, 152—3 Chaliand, G erard, 138 C hantre, H onorio, 132 Chaves, Portugal, 50 Chelas, Lisbon, 39 Chiang Kai-Shek, 116 China, 25, 78, 104, 105, 106, 1 1 0 -1 1 , 112, 1 1 5 -1 6 , 173, 181, 195 Chissano, Joaquim , 192, 193, 199 Chium e, Kanyama, 80 Chona, Mainza, 80 Christian dem ocracy, 174 Churchill, W inston, 92 civilization, 26, 27, 34, 58, 82, 1 2 8 ,1 3 0 Claridosos, 10

IND EX Club Radiofonico de Portugal, 37 Clube M aritim o, 44 Co, Vicente, 91 cocoa, 41 coconuts, 144 coffee, 64 Coim bra, Portugal, 23, 24, 37, 43 Cold W ar (1 9 4 7 -9 1 ), 96, 152, 171, 177-8 Coloboi, G uinea-Conakry, 107 C olom bo C onference (1954), 96 Colonial Act (1933), 25—6, 95 Colufi river, 21 Com ite inter-m ouvem ents aupres des evacues (CIM ADE), 100 C om m ittee o f African O rganizations, 80 com m unism , 42, 43, 47, 50, 57, 68, 166, 171, 173, 174, 178, 183 C om m unist Party o f Angola, 68 C om m unist Party of France, 42 C om m unist Party of Italy, 175 C om m unist Party of Portugal, 43, 57 C om o, Guinea-Bissau, 9, 119—20, 143 Com panhia Uniao Fabril (CU F), 113, 151 Com pania de Com andos Africanos, 164, 165, 167 Com unidade Lusiada, 209 C onakry, G uinea-Conakry, 66, 79, 9 9 -1 0 8 , 146 Cabral in, 2, 8—9, 12, 22, 8 7 -9 0 , 1 0 1 -8 , 160, 189 Cabral assassination (1973), 3—4, 6, 7, 9 -1 0 , 1 2 -1 3 , 22, 1 4 5 ,1 9 0 -2 0 1 ,2 0 9 Escola Piloto, 146—7, 160, 187, 192, 194, 200 O p erafao Mar V erde (1970), 164—7, 183, 194, 195, 197

concessionaires, 61, 82, 113, 116 Conchiglia, Augusta, 213 Concilio Vaticano II (1962—5), 174 C oncordata (1940), 176 C O N C P , 105, 106, 171 C onference of Solidarity w ith the People of Portuguese Colonies (1970), 175 Conjissoes de Ze Badiu (Cabral), 27 Congo Belgian (1908—60), 81, 86 French (1882—1960), 66 Republic o f ( I 9 6 0 - ) , 70, 86 Congress o f Black W riters and A rtists (1959), 69 Congressos dos Povos da Guine, 157 Conscripts o jM o d ern ity (Scott), 2—3 Conselho Executivo da Luta (CEL), 191, 199 Conselho Nacional de Cabo Verde (C N C V ), 206 C onstitutional Law 7 /7 4 , 210 ‘C ontinuar C abral’, 204 Converses em Fam ilia, 177 C ooper, Frederick, 11 C orreia, Adelina, 22, 30 C orreia, M endes, 36 da Costa, A ntonio Lopes, 19 da Costa, Botelho, 53, 63 da Costa, Jorge M oreira, 153 C ote d ’Ivoire, 66, 105 cotton, 27, 64 counterinsurgency, 152—4 , 163 C reole, 18, 2 7 -8 , 104, 140 C rim m i, Bruno, 138 C roese, Sylvia, 15 crops, 60—61, 82, 113 da Cruz, Viriato, 8, 13, 38, 44, 68— 9, 70, 72, 79, 85, 87, 99, 109 Cuba Angolan W ar (1975—91), 212

249

IN DEX Cabral assassination com m ission (1973), 198 Cabral’s visit (1968), 1 33 doctors from , 147 education in, 131 G uevara’s death (1967), 1 32—3 O pera^ao Mar V erde (1970), 166 PAIGC, relations w ith, 103, 133, 147, 170, 180 Revolution (19S3—9), 110—11, 112, 115, 121, 210 T ricontinental Conference (1966), 117, 180 Cuba, Portugal, S3 C ubacare, Guinea-Bissau, 182 cult o f personality, 203—4 da Cunha, P edro, 1 32 C ura 9 ao, 97 Czechoslovakia, 88, 106, 173 D ’jai, M am adou, 191, 193 Dahl, Birgitta, 138—9 D akar, Senegal Cabral in, 75, 77, 87, 91, 131 education in, 147 de G aulle’s visit (1958), 66 Gra^a in, 92 PAIGC in, 99, 100, 101, 108, 117, 1 2 7 -8 , 131 Red Cross in, 141 D am an, 99, 176 Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 171 D avidson, Basil, 81, 137 death penalty, 9, 148, 162 D ebray, Regis, 111 D elaba, Guinea-Bissau, 144 D elgado, H um berto, 24 D em ocratic M ovem ent for the Portuguese Colonies, 67—8 Depoim ento (C aetano), 168 D erw inski, E dw ard, 179—80 2S0

detribalization, 116 D evelopm ent Plan (1967—73), 156 Dhada, Mustafah, 143, 144 D iagne, Blaise, 93—4Diario de Noticias, 195 Diario Popular, 153 Dias, Luciana, 15 Diawara, M anthia, 15 Diggs, Charles, 177—8, 181 D iop, Alioune, 46, 68, 175 D iop, M ajhem out, 97 D irecfao Geral de Seguran^a (DG S), 190 D irectorio Revolucionario Iberico de Libertacao (DRIL), 97 D iu, 99, 176 D odds, Richard, 1 38 droughts, 7, 19, 23, 32, 33, 48, 49, S3 D u Bois, W illiam Edw ard Burghardt, 40—41, 45, 93—4 D uarte, Abilio, 72, 117, 127 East G erm any, 173 Eastern Bloc, 173, 174 eau de cologne, 50 E cuador, 182 education colonial period, 13, 19—20, 23, 28, 29 in Cape V erde, 19, 20, 23, 28, 29, 35 literacy, 50, 122, 139, 145 PAIGC and, 103, 1 19, 122, 144, 1 4 5 -7 , 148, 173 in Portugal, 8, 32, 3 5 -4 7 , 50,

SI, 100 EGA, 213 Egypt, 25, 93, 96, 198 elections (1972), 183—5 Em Dejesa da Terra (Cabral), 4 9, S3 Embana, Miguel, 148, 188

INDEX em pire, 11 Ennes, A ntonio, 82 Ervedosa, Carlos, 37 Escola Piloto, C onakry, 1 4 6 -7 , 160, 187, 192, 194, 200 Escola Politecnica, C onakry, 200 Escola Superior Colonial, Lisbon, 98 do Espirito Santo, Alda, 32, 45, 46, 51 do Espirito Santo, Januario da G rafa, 45, 47 do Espirito Santo, Julieta, 51 do Espirito Santo, Salustino da Graija, 47 Esta 9 ao A gronom ica Nacional, 53 Estado N ovo (1933—74), 27, 40, 44, 4 5 ,4 7 ,5 1 , 149, 150, 156 Campanha do T rigo (1933—38), 54 Carnation R evolution (1974), 207, 208 Catholicism and, 176, 208 luso-tropicalism , 82—4 m ulticulturalism and, 51 political activism in, 44, 72 E statuto do Indigenato (1926), 26, 58, 82, 98, 157 Ethiopia, 93, 96, 182 Etudiants Africains Parlent, Les, 46 Evora, Alcides, 193, 198 Evora, A ntonio Pinhel, 19 Evora, Iva Pinhel, 7, 19, 28—9, 50, 5 1 -2 , 57, 200 Fabiao, Carlos, 153, 168 Facts About Portugal’s African Colonies, The (C abral), 81, 85,

172 famines, 7, 19, 23, 32, 3 3 ,4 8 , 53, 157 Fanon, Frantz, 69, 81, 109, 113, 117 -1 8

Faria, D utra, 151 Farim , Guinea-Bissau, 161 Fati, Mussa, 75 Fazenda Nhia, 64 Fazenda Sao Francisco, 64 Fazenda T entativa, 64 Felupes people, 152 Fernandes, Gil, 179 Ferreira, Vicente, 41 Fletcher, Bill, 3 Florida, USA, 97 foco theory, 109, 111, 132 Fodeba, Keita, 44 football, 58 For a B etter G uinea, 145, 155, 161 Formas Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo (FARP), 137, 143, 146, 192 forced labor, 26, 46—7, 82, 94 F orro people, 46—7 Fortes, Fernando, 72 F R A IN ,7 9 ,8 1 , 86, 87, 105 France, 18, 25—6, 65—7 Algerian W ar (1954—62), 65, 69, 96, 153, 155, 156 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100-102 com m unism in, 42 Diagne and, 94 Fifth Republic established (1958), 66 Ghana, relations w ith, 101 G uinea independence (1958), 6 5 -7 , 8 7 -8 , 9 6 -7 Indochina W ar (1946—54), 95—6 intellectuals in, 42 Loi Deflferre (1956), 66, 96 m igration to, 18 neo-colonialism , 65, 151 PAIGC, relations w ith, 131—2, 1 3 7 -8 , 173 Paris Peace C onference (1919), 25, 93

251

IND EX Pires in, 131—2 Portugal, relations w ith, 131—2, 137 Franco, Francisco, 100 Frankfurt, G erm any, 69 freedom of speech, 3, 173 Freetow n, Sierra Leone, 188 Frente Ampla A nti-Colonial, 211 Frente de Libertacao da Guine (FLG), 90 Frente de Libertacao da G uine e de Cabo V erde (FLG C), 90 Frente de Libertacao de M ozam bique (FRELIM O), 1, 177, 192, 193, 199 Frente de Libertacao Nacional da G uine (FLING), 210-11 F rente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), 1, 100 Frente U nida de Libertacao (FUL), 194 F reyre, G ilberto, 82—3 F ront de liberation nationale (FLN), 101, 109 Fulam ory, Guinea-Bissau, 199 Fulani people, 60—61, 113, 114, 1 1 6 ,1 4 0 , 1 5 2 ,1 5 4 -5 , 15 7 -8 , 1 9 5 ,1 9 6 Fundacao Tchiw eka, 15 G abu, Guinea-Bissau, 158 Galvao, H enrique, 84—5, 97 da Gama, Inacio Soares, 191, 197 G arin, Vasco, 180 de G aulle, Charles, 65—7, 96—7 Gaye, Cheikh, 182 Geba river, 21 G erm any, 65, 78, 81, 101, 152—3, 173 Ghana, 65, 70, 78, 86, 94, 96, 1 0 1 ,1 8 8 Ghibo, Bakary, 197

252

Gleijeses, Piero, 180 Glissanti, M arcella, 175 Goa League, 81 Goa, 30, 99, 105, 176 Goan League, 105 Goan P eople’s Party, 105 gold, 26 G old Coast, 96 G om es, Afonso, 131 G om es, Lourenyo, 127, 199 G orgulho, Carlos, 46—7, 58 G ouvernem ent provisoire de la Republique algerienne (GPRA), 69, 105, 109 G ra-C ruz da O rd e m M ilitar da T o rre e Espada, 24 da Gracpa, Leitao, 92, 211 Gra^a, Lisbon, 39 G ranada TV, 138 G ranja E xperim ental de Pessube, 8, 56 Granma, 210 griots, 124 groundnuts, 60—61, 113 G uarda Nacional Republicana (G N R ), 208 Guerra de Guerrillas, La (Guevara), 111, 136 G uerra, Sofia Pom ba, 57 Guevara, E rnesto ‘C h e’, 110, 111, 1 2 1 ,1 3 2 -3 , 136, 169, 204 Guidage, Guinea-Bissau, 205 Guilege, Guinea-Bissau, 205 Guinea-Bissau agricultural census (1947), 6 0 -6 2 Algiers Accords (1974), 209—10 Bolor massacre (1878), 18 Cape V erde, relations w ith, see Cape V erde—G uinea relations CIMADE escape incident (1961), 10 1 -2

IN DEX coup d ’etat (1980), 21 3 education in, 23 elections (1972), 183—5 geography of, 112, 141 identity, 10 Independence Proclam ation (1973), 178, 181—2, 2 0 6 -7 job posts in, 21, 55 N ational Assembly, 183, 185 Pidjiguiti massacre (1959), 71, 74, 86, 109, 140 Plano de F om ento (1967—73), 156 political organizations, dating of, 71 population census (1971), 183, 185 UN accession (1973), 207 W ar o f Independence (1963— 73), see Guinea-Bissau W ar of Independence Guinea-Bissau (C rim m i and Lucas), 138 Guinea-Bissau W ar of Independence (1963—73), 1—2, 5, 9 -1 0 , 12, 108, 109-201 air campaigns, 137, 143, 145, 146, 149, 154, 170, 173, 1 8 2 -3 , 2 0 4 -5 Algiers Accords (1974), 209—10 am nesty (1969), 160, 162, 190, 194 Balanta and, 60, 1 1 3 -1 5 , 144 bi-groups, 137, 143, 150 Cabral assassination (1973), 3—4, 6, 7, 9 -1 0 , 1 2 -1 3 , 22, 145, 1 9 0 -2 0 1 ,2 0 9 Cape Verde and, 12, 14, 1 2 7 -3 4 , 1 4 1 -2 , 159 Cassaca Congress (1964), 9—10, 1 2 1 -5 , 1 3 6 -7 , 1 3 9 ,1 4 3 , 147, 148

C om o campaign (1964), 119—20 Congressos dos Povos da Guine, 157-8 corruption and, 145 counterinsurgency, 152—4-, 163 desertions, 159, 162 education and, 145—7, 173 elections (1972), 183—5 FARP, 137, 143, 146 France and, 131—2, 137—8 health services and, 147, 173 Independence Proclam ation (1973), 178, 1 8 1 -2 , 2 0 6 -7 liberated zones, 3, 5, 12, 137, 138, 1 4 2 -7 , 170, 173, 17 7 -8 , 183, 185 as ‘low -intensity conflict’, 135 M adina do Boe Congress (1973), 205 M andinka and, 116, 155 N orthern Front negotiations (1970), 162-3 O pera^ao A m etista Real (1973), 205 O perafao Mar V erde (1970), 1 6 4 -7 , 183, 194, 195, 197 P eople’s W arehouses, 144—5 population census (1971), 183, 185 propaganda and, 138—42, 145 Radio Liberta£ao, 139—41 refugees, 158, 183 stabilized resistance phase, 121, 169 Tite attack (1963), 1 ,9 , 108, 118 UN Special Mission (1972), 182-3 G uinea-Conakry, 2, 8 Cabral in, 2, 8 - 9 , 12, 22, 86, 8 7 -9 0 , 189 Cabral assassination (1973),

253

IN D EX 3—4, 6, 7, 9 - 1 0 , 1 2 -1 3 , 22, 145, 1 9 0 -2 0 1 , 209 Escola Piloto, 146—7, 160, 187, 192, 194, 200 Independence (1958), 65—7, 8 7 -8 , 9 6 - 7 ,1 9 5 O peragao M ar V erde (1970), 1 6 4 -7 , 1 8 3 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 5 ,1 9 7 PAIGC in, 9 9 -1 0 8 P ereira in, 100 H aitian R evolution (1791—1804), 40 H am ilcar Barca, 21 Havana, Cuba, 117, 132, 170, 180, 210 health services, 147, 148, 173 H egel, G eorg W ilhelm Friedrich, 42 helicopters, 137, 145, 149, 154, 170 herbicides, 173 H oagland, Jim , 143 H oje e A m anha (Cabral), 38 H ong Kong 156 H onorin, M ichel, 138 H o rta, Elisa, 51 H ouphouet Boigny, Felix, 105 hum an rightsm 173 h u t tax, 26 Ignatiev, O leg, 4, 28, 62 Ilha de Santo Nome (T enreiro), 44

ilustres coloniais, 82 im post de palhota, 26 im posto de sangue, 127 Im prensa N acional, 8 ,3 2 In Defense o f Land (Cabral), 49, 53 India, 25, 37, 78, 82, 93, 95, 96, 99, 105, 176 indigenas, 46—7, 58, 128 indigenato, 58, 82, 128, 130

254

Indochina, 95—6 Indonesia, 93, 96 Injai, Abdul, 155 Instituto Superior de Agronom ia (ISA), 8, 35, 50, 53, 63, 64 International Labour O rganization (ILO ), 27 International U nion of T elecom m unications ,1 4 2 iras, 122 Islam, 123, 157 Israel, Paolo, 15 Italy, 69, 138, 175 Januario, Jose, 165 J a p a n ,181 Jeune A frique, 181, 206, 213 Jewish people, 17, 39 John XXIII, Pope, 174 Johnson, W allace, 94 Jones, Leroy, 181 Jonjon, 188 Junta de In v e s tig a te s do U ltram ar, 63 Junta de Salva^ao N acional, 208 Kalashnikovs, 164 K amel, Belkhiria, 182 Kandjafra, Guinea-Bissau, 199 Karla boats, 191 K aurane, Guinea-Bissau, 199 Keita, Bobo, 101 Keita, Fodeba, 108 K eita, M odibo, 105 K ennedy, John Fitzgerald, 100, 178 Kenya, 94 Kenyatta, Jom o, 94 K irum ira, Edw ard, 15 kola nuts, 144 Laban, Michel, 5, 39

IN DEX Labanta Negro (1966 docum entary),

138 Labery, H enri, 90, 91 Lachol, 188 Lafayette, G ilbert du M otier, Marquis, 180 Lala Quema (1964 docum entary), 138 I.anca, M arta, IS lancados, 17 Landau, G eorge, 181 Lar do C om batente, 102 Lara, Lucio, 13, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 99, 109 Lara, R uth, 69 Lara, Tchiloia, 1 5 Laurinda, N ha, 131 League of N ations, 27 Lefgren, Folke, 182 Leite, A ntonio, 131 Lenin, Vladimir, 173, 179—80 Lewis, David, 93 liberated zones, 3, 5, 12, 137, 138, 1 4 2 - 7 ,1 7 0 , 173, 1 7 7 -8 , 1 8 3 ,1 8 5 Liberation o f G uine, The (Davidson), 138 Liberia, 93, 96, 167 Libertacao, A , 139 Libya, 96, 166 Liceu Gil Eanes, Sao Vicente, 7, 2 9 -3 0 , 3 1 -2 , 35, 57, 146 Liga Academica Internacional dos N egros, 40 Lima, Isidoro M anuel, 188 de Lima, Manuel M onge, 153 lim pet m ines, 164 Lincoln University, 181 Lipinska, Suzanne, 137 Lisbon, Portugal Cabral in, 4, 8, 13, 32, 3 3 -5 2 , 57, 59, 6 2 -5

Carnation Revolution (1974), 207 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100 da Cruz in, 68—9 M ovim ento Anti-Colonial in, 6 7 -8 N eto in, 79 poverty in, 3 8 -9 , 52 students in, 8, 32, 35—47, 50, 51, 100 literacy, 50, 122, 139, 145 Loi D efferre (1956), 66, 96 London, England, 79—86, 87, 89, 94 Loock, N el-M ari, 15 Lopes, Januario, 167 Lopes, Jose Vicente, 6, 192 Lorraine, 131 Luanda, Angola, 13, 30, 55, 68, 97, 176 Lucas, Uliano, 1 38 Lugard, Frederick, 156 luso-tropicalism , 82—4 Lutte A rm ee en Afrique (Chaliand), 138 da Luz, Silvino, 128, 132 Macanha people, 140 Macau, 30, 37 de M acedo, Augusto Divo, 188 Machado, H um berto, 4 3 , 68 Machado, Julia, 43 Macmillan, H arold, 97 M adagascar, 66 M adeira, 30, 34, 129 M adina do Boe, Guinea-Bissau, 112, 148, 178 Congress (1973), 205, 206 M adina do Boe (1967 docum entary), 138 Magalhaes, Jose, 40

IN D EX Magalhaes, O sorio, 162—3 Maia, Salgueiro, 207 M attie Ecole (Fodeba), 44 maize, 60 M akerere Institute o f Social Research, IS malaria, 62 Malawi, 80, 94 Malayan Em ergency (1948—60), 153, 155 Mali, 70 Malley, Simon, 187 M amdani, M ah m ood, 15, 1S7 M anchester, England, 94 M ande Em pire, 115, 155 M andinka Em pire (1878—98), 196 Mandinka people, 116, 140, 155, 1 5 7 -8 , 196 M ane, A nsum ane, 148 Mangana, V alentino, 198 Manjaco people, 152 Manji, Firoze, 3 M anufacturing U nion Com pany, 113, 151 Mao Zedong, 110—11, 144, 173, 204 Mapa C or-de-R osa, 195 m aquisards, 123 M argarido, A lfredo, 38 M argeretha, 188 M ariazinha em Africa (de C astro), 36 M arkovitz, Irving, 87—8 M arquis of Sa da Bandeira M arret, M ario, 138 M artins, Julio, 39 Marvila, Lisbon, 39 M arxism, 8, 11—12, 3 9 ,4 2 ,4 4 , 54, 103, 153, 173 Massip, Jose, 138 da Mata, M arcelino, 164 de M atos, Carlos, 112 de M atos, N orto n , 43

256

M ausoleum of Cam ayenne, C onakry, 199 M ecca, 157 M edeiros, Tom as, S M ello Geraldes Prize, 36 de M elo e Alvim, D iogo, 62, 71 de M elo, Fontes P ereira, 18 M endes, Francisco, 206 de M enezes, H ugo Azancot, 8, 41, 51, 73, 79, 80, 89 M ercantil Lda, 63 M esquita, A lberto M arques, 37 m ezinhos, 123 Michigan, USA, 177 M indelo, Sao V icente, 188 M inistry of Colonies (Portugal), 37, 44 M inistry o f Rural Econom y (G uinea-C onakry), 87 M iranda, N uno, 32 M iranda, Tom as, 32 Mission of O verseas Students, 35 Mississippi, USA, 83 m ixed race people, 82—4 M ocidade Portuguesa, 37 M oham ed V, King o f M orocco, 105 M onde, Le, 85 M ondlane, Eduardo, 100, 138, 177 M onrovia, Liberia, 167 M ontanha prison, Conakry, 147, 192 M onteiro, A rm indo, 26 M onteiro, Euridice, IS M onteiro, Joao Baptista, 211 M onteiro, P edro, 28, 134 M onteiro, T elm o C rato, 51 M oreira, A driano, 26, 98, 150, 156 M ores, Guinea-Bissau, 138 M orocco, 79, 88, 96, 105—8, 206 M oselle, Lorraine, 131

IN DEX M oum ie, Felix, 97 M ourao, Fernando, 37—8 M ovim ento Anti-Colonial (M AC), 8, 6 7 -7 1 , 72, 78, 79, 89 M ovim ento das For 9 as Armadas (MFA), 207, 209, 210 M ovim ento de Libertafao da Guine e de Cabo V erde (M LGCV), 90, 91 M ovim ento de Libcrtacao dos T errito rios sob Dominina^ao Portuguesa, 89 M ovim ento para a D em ocracia (M PD ), 212 M ovim ento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (M PLA), 9, 13—14, 47, 71, 72, 79, 105 Cape V erde, relations w ith, 212 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 101 C O N C P a n d , 105 FRAIN and, 87 in G uinea-Conakry, 87, 97, 98 PAIGC, relations w ith, 99, 141 Viva Angola C om batente, 141 M ozam bique, 79, 151 assimilados, 18 Cape Verdean m igration, 19, 20 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100 C reole elite, 40 education in, 30 European m igration, 81, 113 forced labor in, 26 FRELIM O, 1, 177, 192, 193, 199 land expropriation in, 61, 116 m ixed race people in, 83, 84 M ondlane assassination (1970), 177 political organizations, dating of, 71

protestant missions in, 35 South Africa, relations w ith, 212 students from , 35, 37 U D EN A M O , 105 W ar of Independence (1964—74), 1 Muaca, A ndre, 176 m ulticulturalism , 51, 82 4 Nagata, Yutaka, 182 Nagonia, Koba, 191 N am orado, Joaquim , 44 N angue, Francisco G om es, 167 Nanjing, China, 104 napalm , 118, 173, 179 N ascim ento, Irenio, 165 N ational Assembly, 183, 185 National Association for the A dvancem ent of C olored People (N A A CP), 93 National Campaign C om m ittee for Goa, 105 nationalism , 4, 8—9, 1 1, 31—2, 42, 79 N ative Law, 58 Navy o f Guinea-Bissau, 191—2, 193 Nazi G erm any (1939—4 5 ), 65, 81, 152-3 N egritude, 8, 4 2 - 3 , 49 Negro, 0 , 40 N ehru, Jawaharlal, 93, 95, 99 Nelli, Piero, 138 N etherlands, 173 N eto, A gostinho, 13, 32, 38, 43—4-, 46, 47, 68, 69, 79, 174, 212

N eves, Baeta, 63 N eves, Jose, 1 5 das N eves, M anuel, 97 N ew Christians, 17 New York Times, 180, 181 N ew York, USA, 94, 179

257

IN DEX N igeria, 94, 156 N ix, R obert, 179 N ixon, Richard, 178 N krum ah, K w am e, 70, 90, 94, 1 8 7-8 No Pintcha, 204 N ogueira, Franco, 151 N on-A ligned M ovem ent, 96, 171, 182 N o rth Atlantic T reaty O rganization (N A T O ), 69, 137 N o rth K orea, 181 N o rth ern F ront, 106, 124, 162, 205 N orw ay, 182 Nos lntervalos da Arte da Minerva

(Cabral), 31 Nossa Senhora da Gra^a, GuineaBissau, 20 Nossa Terra (1966 docum entary), 138 Nostis et Nobiscum (1849), 174 Nyasaland (1907—64), 94 O liveira, Carlos, 44 O p erafao Am etista Real (1973), 205 O p era 9 ao M ar V erde (1970), 1 6 4 - 7 ,1 8 3 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 5 ,1 9 7 O ram as, O scar, 196—7, 198 O rfeao Academico de C oim bra, 84 O rganization o f African Unity (O A U ), 78, 89, 94, 167, 182, 188 O slo, N orw ay, 182 Osservatore Romano, 176 O verseas M inistry, 56 Pacheco, Carlos, 14 Padua, M ario, 147 Paesi Nouvi, 175 PAIGC-Actualites, 160

258

PAIGC, see Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guine e Cabo V erde Pakistan, 96 palm oil, 103 Pan-African Congress First (1919), 93 Second (1921), 94 T hird (1923), 40, 45 F ourth (1927), 94 Fifth (1945), 94 Pandit, Vijaya, 93 Pansau, 213 Paris Match, 97 Paris, France, 42, 78, 100 Paris Peace C onference (1919), 25, 93 Parti Africain de 1’Independance (PAI), 97 Parti de la Federation de 1’Afrique, 70 Parti D em ocratique Africain, 66 Parti D em ocratique de G uinee (PD G ), 73, 199 Partido Africano para a Independencia da Guine e Cabo V erde (PAIGC), 1, 3 ,5 5 ,7 1 - 3 , 87 Algiers Accords (1974), 209—10 All-African P eo p le’s Conference (1960), 79 Angolan W ar (1961—74), 99 arrests (1961), 107, 161 Balanta and, 60, 113—15, 144 Cabral assassination (1973), 3 -4 , 6, 7, 9 -1 0 , 1 2 -1 3 , 145, 190-201 Cabral assassination p lo t trial (1967), 148, 188 Cassaca Congress (1964), 9—10, 1 2 1 -5 , 1 3 6 -7 , 139, 143, 147, 148

IN DEX com m unism and, 173, 174, 177, 178, 183 Conselho Executivo da Luta (CEL), 191, 199 co rru p tion, 145 D akar m eeting (1963), 127—8 death penalty, use of, 9, 148, 162 desertions, 159, 162 diplom acy, 104—5, 108, 171-83 Eastern Bloc, relations w ith,

173,174 education provision, 103, 119,

122, 144, 145-7, 148,173 elections (1972), 183-5 ethnic divisions, 117 founding of, 7, 9, 47, 71—3 G uinea-Conakry operations, 89,

9 7 ,9 9 -1 0 8 health services, 147, 148, 173 judicial system, 147, 148 M adina do Boe Congress (1973),

205, 206 Mandinka and, 116, 155 Pidjiguiti massacre (1959), 71,

74, 86, 109, 140 People’s W arehouses, 14-4—5 population census (1971), 183 propaganda, 138—4-1 Radio L ibertafao, 139—4-1 satellite groups, 91 Senegal operations, 90—92, 99 UPICV, relations w ith, 92 W ar of Independence (1963— 73), see Guinea-Bissau W ar of Independence w ar preparations, 99—108 w eapons smuggling, 105—8 W estern nations, relations w ith,

1 3 1 -2 ,1 3 7 -9 , 140, 173-81 Partido Africano para lndependencia, 71

Partido C om unista Angolano, 68 Partido C om unista Portugues, 43, 57 Paul VI, Pope, 174 -7 Pauw, Cristoff, 15 Pavlov, Ivan, 152 peasants, 103, 111, 116, 14-4 P eople’s W arehouses, 144—5 Peralta, Pedro Rodriguez, 180 Pereira, Aristides, 100, 1 17 arrest (1961), 107, 108 Cabral assassination (1973), 192, 193, 197 Cabral assassination plot trial (1967), 148, 188 Cabral, relationship w ith, 57 on Cape V erde—G uinea rela­ tions, 5 8 ,2 1 1 —12 on cult o f personality, 203—4Dakar m eeting (1963), 127—8 general secretary appointm ent (1973), 199, 205 PAIGC founding, 72—3 Pereira, C arm en, 137 P ereira, Fernando, 15 Pereira, Joaquim , 162—3 Pessube Farm , Guinea-Bissau, 8, 56 PIDE, see Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado Pidjiguiti massacre (1959), 71, 74, 86, 109, 140 Pilot School, C onakry, 1 4 6 -7 , 160, 187, 192, 194 Pim entel, A lberto G om es, 115 Pink Map (1885), 195 Pinto, Cesar C orreia, 21 P into, Teixeira, 17, 21 Pio, N icolau, 131 Pires, P edro, 101, 127, 1 3 1 -2 , 1 3 4 ,2 0 6 , 209, 2 1 2 -1 3 Pius XI, Pope, 174

259

IN D EX Plano de Fom ento (1967—73), 156 p o etry , 4, 8, 27, 31—2, 37, 43, 44 Poland, 192 Pollcia de Seguran£a Publica (PSP), 160, 208 Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PID E), 6 - 7 , 109 and Angolan nationalists, 69 and Barbosa, 161 and Batepa massacre (1953), 47 Bissau raids (1961), 106 and Cabral, 8, 22, 46, 51, 62, 68, 77, 80, 8 5 -6 , 134 and Cabral assassination (1973), 1 2 -1 3 , 188, 189, 190-91 and Cape V erde, 92, 133, 1 34 and C entro de Estudos Africanos, 46 and CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100 and da C ruz, 69 and death penalty, 148 and elections (1972), 184 inform ants, 72, 92 and O pera£ao M ar V erde (1970), 166 and Pires, 131 Popular Assembly, 183, 185 population census (1971), 183, 185 Por um a G uine M elhor, 145, 155, 161 P o rt Everglades, Florida, 97 P o rto , Portugal, 36 Portugal Acto Colonial (1933), 25—6, 95 Algiers Accords (1974), 209—10 Angolan W ar (1961—74), 1, 97—8, 99, 106 Balanta, relations w ith, 60, 1 1 3 -1 4 Berlin C onference (1884—5), 11, 17

260

Cabral in, 4, 8, 13, 32, 33—52, 57, 59, 6 2 -5 Cabral assassination (1973), 1 2 -1 3 , 188, 189, 1 9 0 -9 1 , 194—6, 209 Caetano governm ent (1968— 74), see Caetano, M arcelo Campanha do T rigo (1929—38), 54 Cape V erde, relations w ith, 1 0 -1 1 , 1 7 -1 9 , 21, 58, 117, 128 C arnation R evolution (1974), 168, 2 0 7 -8 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100 C oncordata (1940), 176 Constitutional Law 7 /7 4 , 210 coup d ’etat (1926), 23 Estado N ovo (1933—74), see Estado Novo Estatuto do Indigenato (1926), 26, 58, 82, 98, 157 France, relations w ith, 131—2, 137 Fulani, relations w ith, 116, 155, 157-8 Goa annexed (1961), 100 luso-tropicalism , 8 2 -4 Mandinka, relations w ith, 155, 15 7 -8 , 196 M ovim ento das Formas Armadas (MFA), 207, 209, 210 M ozam bique W ar (1964—74), 1 O p era 9 ao A m etista Real (1973), 205 O peragao M ar V erde (1970), 164—7, 183, 194, 195, 197 presidential election (1949), 43 Salazar governm ent (1932—68), see Salazar, A ntonio de O liveira

IN DEX Santa Maria hijacking (1961), 97

Senega], negotiations w ith (1 9 7 1 -2 ), 1 6 7 -8 , 194 slavery, 11, 24, 27, 46, 82, 89, 128, 129 UN accession (1955), 95 US m ilitary aid, 178, 179 W orld W ar II period (1939— 4 5), 35, 3 8 -9 Portugal and the Future (Spinola), 208 Portugal Ultramarino, 37 Portugal’s War in Guinea (V enter), 143 P ortuguese Em pire Angola (1575—1975), see Angola Cape V erde (1 4 6 2 -1 9 7 5 ), see Cape Verde Colonial Act (1933), 2 5 -6 , 95 Constitutional Law 7 /7 4 , 210 Estatuto do Indigenato (1926), 26, 58, 82, 98 Guinea (1 588—1974), see Guinea-Bissau India (1 5 0 5 -1 9 6 1 ), 30, 37, 82, 99, 176 luso-tropicalism , 82—4 Macau (1 5 5 7 -1 9 9 9 ), 30, 37 M ozambique (1505—1975), see M ozambique Pink Map (1885), 195 U ltim atum (1890), 195 P ortuguese language, 19, 27—8, 129, 140 Praia, Cape V erde, 7, 8, 19, 32, 4 9, 51, 57, 200, 211 Presence Africaine, 46, 68, 83, 138, 175 price fixing, 4 1 ,6 1 ,8 2 Prison d ’Afrique (Alatas), 197 Prison Problem O verseas, T h e ’ (M oreira), 98

Processo dos 50 (1959), 69 propaganda, 5, 6, 14, 138—41 P rotestantism , 35 protonationalism , 40, 41 Quando o Cupido Acerta o Alvo

(Cabral), 31 de Q ueiroz, Ega, 24 Quem mandou matar Amilcar Cabral?

(Castanheira), 6 - 7 Q uerido, Jorge, 211 Qui Pluribus ( 1846), 174 Q uinara, Guinea-Bissau, 144 Q uitafine, Guinea-Bissau, 120, 182 Q uran, 123, 148 Rabaka, Reiland, 5 Rabat, M orocco, 88, 105, 106, 107, 108, 206 racism , 36, 42, 51, 82 Radio Bissau, 194 Radio Ghana, 92 Radio Libertacao, 1 39—41 Radio M oscow , 58 Radio of Cape V erde, 49 radio, 4 9 -5 0 , 1 39—42 Ramos, A rm ando, 90 Ramos, Pedro, 107 Ramos, Raul dos Passos, 162-3 Rapazote, Joao, 15 ‘rape of the m asses’, 152 Rassool, Ciraj, 15 R atom a, Conakry, 192, 193 re-A fricanization o f spirits’, 3 9 ^ -0 , 121 Red Cross, 141 refugees, 88, 100, 158, 164, 183 dos Reis Borges, Simoa, 19—20, 22, 30 Rem a, H enrique Pinto, 74 Republic G azette, 210 Republic o f C ongo, 70, 86

261

IN D EX Rhode Island, USA, 92 rice, 6 0 -6 1 , 103, 113, 144 R o b erto, H olden, 98 Ro^adas, Carlos, 48 da Rocha, M aximiana M onteiro, 19 da Rocha, Vieira, 41 Rocheteau, G uilherm e, 32 R odrigues, M aria H elena, see Cabral, Maria H elena R om e, Italy, 69, 175 Roosevelt, Franklin, 92 Rosas, Fernando, 39 Rosenthal, Benjamin, 179 Rudebeck, Lars, 184 Sa da Bandeira, Bernardo de Sa N ogueira de Figueiredo, 1st M arquis, 129 Sal, Cape V erde, 210, 212 Salazar, Antonio de O liveira, 19, 2 3 -7 , 42, 54, 82, 88, 208 brain hem orrhage (1968), 150 C abral’s le tte r (1960), 23 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 100 on ‘civilizing’ Africans, 27 Colonial Act (1933), 25—6 Goa annexed (1961), 99 labor policies, 27 M inister of Finance (1928—40), 2 3 -4 M inister of the Colonies (1 9 3 0 -3 1 ), 25 Prim e M inister appointm ent (1932), 24 W orld W ar II (1 9 3 9 -4 5 ), 3 8 -9 Salim, Salim A hm ed, 181 Samory, Almamy, 196 San Francisco Conference (1945), 9 2 -3 , 94 San Sebastian, Spain, 100 Sanca, Albino, 161

262

Sanches, M anuela Ribeiro, 15 Sanctuary of Fatim a, Portugal, 176 Santa Liberdade, 97 Santa M aria, 97 Santiago, Cape V erde, 7, 18, 19, 5 4 -5 , 130, 134 Santo A m aro, Lisbon, 39 Santo A ntao, Cape V erde, 1 33 Santos, A lmeida, 84, 209 Santos, A ntonio de Almeida, 209 Santos, A rnaldo, 32 dos Santos, Daniel, 9—10 dos Santos, Eduardo, 68, 69 dos Santos, M arcelino, 67—8, 105, 174 Sao D om ingo, Guinea-Bissau, 161 Sao N icolau, Cape V erde, 19, 20, 29 Sao T om e, 4 0 -4 1 , 4 4, 45, 46—7, 58, 89, 130 Batepa massacre (1953), 46—7, 58 Sao V icente, Cape V erde, 7, 30, 188,211 S artre, Jean-Paul, 42, 81 Saude M aria, V ictor, 75, 127, 128 Schacht, O tto , 107, 197, 199, 213 Schultz, A rnaldo, 143, 149—50, 152 Scott, David, 2—3 Seles, Angola, 64 Senegal Cabral assassination com m ission (1973), 198 Cabral in, 75, 77, 87, 9 0 -9 2 , 131 de G aulle’s visit (1958), 66 education in, 147 Graca in, 92 Guinea-Bissau, b o rd er w ith, 1 0 6 ,1 4 7 Guinea-Bissau, m igration to , 17

IN D EX Independence (1960), 90, 195, 196 Mali Federation (1959—60), 90, 196 PAIGC in, 71, 73, 75, 77, 86, 87, 90, 9 9 -1 0 1 , 108, 117, 127, 131 Parti Africain de l ’lndependance (PAI), 97 Portugal, negotiations with (1 9 7 1 -2 ), 1 6 7 -8 , 194 Red Cross in, 141 refugees in, 158 Senegambians, 17 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 42, 43, 73, 87, 91, 1 6 7 -8 , 194, 195 seniority system, 104, 114 Setubal, Portugal, 64 Seydi, D oudou, 91 Sheppard, John, 138 Sierra Leone, 17, 94, 188, 198 Sierra M aestra, Cuba, 112, 132 Silva e Cunha, Joaquim , 98 da Silva, Adriano D uarte, 129 da Silva, Inacio, 90 da Silva, Ivo Carvalho, 19 da Silva, Joao Carvalho, 19 da Silva, Jose N ascim ento, 188 da Silva, Lopes, 91 daSilva, O svaldo Lopes, 101, 128, 192 Silveira, O nesim o, 203 slavery, 11, 24, 27, 40, 46, 49, 82, 89, 128, 129 Small Group o f Terrorists Attacked, A

(1968 docum entary), 1 38 Smith, Alan, 25 Soares, M ario, 209 soccer, 58 social D arw inism , 26, 82 Social D em ocratic Party of Sweden, 138—9, 181

socialism, 13, 88, 177, 213 Sofia, Bulgaria, 166 Soga, Guinea-Bissau, 164 soil erosion, 48, 53—4, 55 de Sousa, H enrique Teixeira, 29 Sousa, Juliao Soares, 7 de Sousa, N oem ia, 38, 68, 69 South Africa, 15, 26—7, 83, 97, 143, 164, 170, 212, 213, 212 Soviet U nion, 78, 88, 165, 171,213 and Cabral assassination (1973), 195, 197 C abral’s visits (1970, 1972), 1 7 9 -8 0 , 1 8 1 ,2 0 4 Cani in, 191 CIMADE escape incident (1961), 101 Cold W ar (1 9 4 7 -9 1 ), 96, 152, 171, 177-8 C O N C P foundation (1961), 105 education in, 101, 159 Guinea-Bissau, relations w ith, 213 Guinea-Bissau W ar (1963—73), 133, 140, 152, 159, 164, 1 6 5 ,1 7 3 ,1 7 8 Pires in, 131 UN activity, 95 w eapons from , 164, 165, 204 Spain, 100 Spinola, A ntonio, 6, 141—2, 143, 1 4 5 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 2 - 6 8 Algiers Accords (1974), 209—10 am nesty (1969), 160, 162, 190, 194 Cabral assassination (1973), 1 8 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 3 , 1 9 4 -5 , 209 Carnation R evolution (1974), 208 Com unidade Lusiada plan (1974), 209 O pera^ao Mar V erde (1970), 16 4 -7 , 1 8 3 ,1 9 4 ,1 9 5

263

IN DEX Portugal and the Future (1974),

208 Senegal, negotiations w ith (1 9 7 1 -2 ), 1 6 7 -8 , 194 Sports and Recreational Association o f Bissau, 63 stabilized resistance, 121, 169 Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies, IS strategic ham lets, 1S4 Strela missiles, 181, 204 S treten, D im ir, 165 Struggle o f Mozambique, The

(M ondlane), 138 Sudan, 96 sugar beet, 63 sugarcane, 64 supernatural, 122—3 Suprem e Council o f the Struggle (CSL), 183 Surrealism , 42 Sweden, 78, 1 3 8 -9 , 140, 174, 1 8 1 ,1 8 2 tabanka, 114 Tabanka, Guinea-Bissau, 103 Tage E rlander Fund, 139 Tanzania, 171 Tarrafal prison, Cape V erde, 190 tarrafo, 115, 119 T e, Chico, 101, 102 Teixeira, O scar, 179 T eixeira Pinto, Guinea-Bissau, 161 Tejo river, 65 T em plar, G erald, 153 T en reiro, Francisco Jose, 44, 46 ‘T estem ent Politique de Cabral, L e’, 206 T hird W o rld , 93 Times, The, 160 T im or, 37 T ite, Guinea-Bissau, 1, 9, 108, 118

264

Tom as, A m erico, 150, 208 Tom as, Joao, 190, 191, 193, 197 T om bali, Guinea-Bissau, 144, 182 T o u re, A hmed Sekou, 8 , 9 , 66—7, 73, 87, 155, 196 Cabral assassination (1973), 1 9 0 ,1 9 3 , 195, 1 9 6 -9 foreign aid and, 88 Independence (1958), 65—7, 88, 9 6 -7 O perafao M ar V erde (1970), 1 6 4 -7 , 197 PAIGC, relations w ith, 91, 105, 107-8 T o u re, M am adou, 161 T o u re, M om u, 190, 193, 197 T o u re, Samory, 199—200 Tras-os-M ontes, Portugal, 50 Trial of the 5 0 (1 9 5 9 ), 69 tribalism , 116, 122, 124, 157 T ricontinental C onference, 117, 180 Tricontinental, 110, 121 T ripoli, Libya, 166 trypanosom a rhodesiense, 115 tsetse flies, 115 tungsten, 39 Tunisia, 69, 78—9, 96, 182 T urpin, Richard, 90 Uganda, 15 U ltim atum (1890), 19S Um N yobe Ruben, 97 Uniao D em ocratica de Cabo Verde (U D C ), 91, 211 U niao D em ocratica Nacional de M ofam bique (U D EN A M O ), 105 U niao dos Povos da G uine (U PG ), 91 U niao dos Povos de Angola (UPA), 98

IND EX Uniao dos Povos para a Independencia de Cabo V erde (UPICV ), 92, 211 U nion of D em ocratic C ontrol, 81 U nion of the Peoples o f C am eroon, 97 L ’U nita, 166 U nited Kingdom , 25—6, 79—86, 92, 153, 1 5 4 -5 , 173, 195 U nited N ations, 171—2, 179 Afro-Asiatic group, 171—2 Almada dossier (1962), 206 Cabral’s speech (1972), 181 C harter (1945), 34, 42, 93, 94, 95, 171 Food and A griculture O rganization, 60 G eneral Assembly, 86, 94, 1 7 1 -2 , 181, 182 Guinea-Bissau accession (1973), 207 PAIGC, relations w ith, 171 Portuguese accession (1955), 95 R esolution 1514 (1960), 95, 172 San Francisco C onference (1945), 9 2 -3 , 94 Security Council, 182 Special Com m ission on Portugal (1962), 172 Special Mission to Guinea (1972), 182-3 U nited States, 177—81 All-African P eople’s Conference (1960), 78 Atlantic C harter (1941), 92 Cabral’s visits (1970, 1972), 177-81 Cold W ar (1 9 4 7 -9 1 ), 96, 152, 171, 177-8 colonialism and, 25 G uevara’s death (1967), 132—3

m igration to, 19, 39 PAIGC, relations w ith, 177—81 Portugal, relations w ith, 178—9 San Francisco C onference (1945), 9 2 -3 , 94 segregation in, 51, 83 slavery in, 40 UPICV in, 92 Vietnam W ar (1955—75), 155, 156 W ar o f Independence (1775— 83), 180 weapons from , 178, 179 W orld W ar II period (1939— 45), 25, 39 Universal Exhibition o f Porto (1934), 36 U niversity of P orto, 36 University of Syracuse, 180 U rdang, Stephanie, 170 V alerio, Jose, 21 Vamos Conhecer a Nossa Terra, 141

Van D unem , Jose, 43 Vassalo e Silva, Manuel Antonio, 99 Vatican, 171, 17 4 -7 Vaz, G eorge, 105 Vaz, H onorio Sanches, 148, 188 V enter, A lbertus Johannes, 143, 20 4 -5 Verges, Jacques, 101 Viana, G entil, 101 Vidigueira, Portugal, 53 Vieira, H enriette, 131, 194 Vieira, H erculano, 133 Vieira, Joao B ernardo, 148 Vieira, Luandino, 38 Vieira, N ino, 104, 120, 205, 206, 213 V ietnam , 93, 110, 1 12, 155, 1 56, 194

265

IN DEX Viseu, Portugal, 19 Viva Angola C om batente, 141 Voss e Sa, Ana M aria, see Cabral, Ana Maria Voz de Cabo Verde, 22

W o rld W ar II (1 9 3 9 -4 5 ), 35, 3 8 -9 , 65, 81, 92, 96, 174 W rangler, Christian, 138 Wretched o jth e Earth, The (Fanon), 69, 8 1 ,1 1 7 -1 8

Warriors at Work (Dhada), 143 Washington Post, 143, 180

Xabregas, Lisbon, 39

w eapons trade, 105—8, 164, 178 W ilson, W oo d ro w , 25 w itchcraft, 9, 122 W o rld Council o f Churches, 174 W o rld in Action, 138 W o rld W ar I (1 9 1 4 -1 8 ), 25, 93, 94

Yaya, Alpha, 199 Yugoslavia, 78, 165, 173

266

Z aire (1 9 7 1 -9 7 ), 198 Zam bia, 80, 85 Z eituni, M essaoudi, 197, 198 Ziegler, Jean, 117, 210

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