America’s Future in the Pacific: Lectures Delivered at the Second Quadrennial Institute, Mayling Soong Foundation, Wellesley College [Reprint 2022 ed.] 9781978812802

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AMERICA'S FUTURE IN THE PACIFIC

AMERICA'S

FUTURE

IN THE PACIFIC Lectures Delivered at the Second Quadrennial Institute, Mayling Soong Foundation, Wellesley College

JOHN RAYMOND

CARTER

VINCENT

KENNEDY

FELIX M. RUPERT EMERSON

KEESING

RUTGERS

BERENDSEN

• VERA M I C H E L E S

DAYID N E L S O N

New

KIM

BUNCHE

• SIR CARL

A. A. B E R L E , J R .

REMER

• YONGJEUNG

RALPH J. GRAYSON K I R K

• C . F.

DEAN

ROWE

Brunswick

UNIVERSITY

1947

PRESS

COPYRIGHT I 9 4 7 BY T H E TRUSTEES OF RUTGERS COLLEGE IN N E W JERSEY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PRINTED I N T H E U N I T E D STATES OF AMERICA A. B.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is faced with serious problems of foreign policy in many areas today—a fact conceded by those most intimately concerned with the elaboration of that policy as well as by their severest critics. In all of these areas, the decisions which are taken by this government will be of great importance; in some of them, its position will be definitive; in few of them has this nation a greater responsibility for making intelligent decisions than in the Pacific. The traditional role which this country has played in this region in the past, its tremendous power and influence, its very real interest in the peaceful and progressive development of Pacific peoples, the requirements of national defense all combine to emphasize the importance of the formulation and understanding of a policy or policies in which wisdom takes primacy over expediency. I t was for this reason that the theme "Problems of American Policy in the Pacific" was selected for the Second Quadrennial Institute of the Mayling Soong Foundation of Wellesley College. Since the sessions were held for only three days, October 1 0 , 1 1 , and 1 2 , 1 9 4 6 , it was impossible to arrange an exhaustive presentation of all the problems of the area. After consideration of the American economic and territorial stake, and our less tangible, but nonetheless important, interest in the social and political future of the peoples of the Pacific, the Institute concentrated upon a study of two problems of fundamental importance: security and the future of dependent peoples. The sessions culminated

vi

INTRODUCTION

in an analysis of American policy with respect to these two problems, and a consideration of the relationship of that policy to our overall national objectives. The papers presented at the Institute are now offered in book form so that a larger public than that which crowded classrooms and lecture rooms at Wellesley may share in the listeners' satisfaction in the enlightening treatment of such aspects of American foreign policy as could be included in the formal program. I t is also published with the hope that the sincere interest in China, Korea, Japan, and the Islands of the Pacific, generated in the college community at this Second Quadrennial Institute, may spread to an increasingly larger group. Each paper included in this volume brings out, directly or by implication, some special responsibility of the United States toward the development of the Pacific area. The existence of American interests in those regions where Americans are at present exercising direct control—the island territories, military and naval bases, near-trusteeships ; as well as occupied Japan and Korea—is widely recognized. The varied and contrasting natures of these interests and accompanying responsibilities are brought out in the papers by Keesing, Kirk, Bunche, Kim, and Vincent. The almost equally direct interest of the American trader and investor in the F a r East is emphasized by Remer. The fact that the United States is one of the "great powers" brings more subtle and far-reaching problems. This country's decisions must be made in the light of the decisions of other powers. In the papers by Berendsen, Rowe, and Dean some aspects of the positions of Great Britain, the British Dominions in the Pacific, and of Russia are considered. The point of view that the United States has a special obligation to assume world leadership in support

INTRODUCTION

vii

of democratic governments in backward areas is especially emphasized by Emerson and Kennedy and appears also in several other papers. The relations of American F a r E a s t ern policies to overall national objectives and the final formulation and implementation of these policies are described by Vincent and Berle. No one of the papers fully covers or is rigidly confined to the single subject suggested by its title. Taken together they display the inevitable weaknesses as well as the real virtues of symposiums written by experts. T h a t important aspects of the subject are omitted from consideration seems inevitable and unfortunate. Equally inevitable, but possibly more fortunate, is the f a c t t h a t other aspects are treated several times and from differing points of view. The wide variety of expertness embodied in the volume gives it a special virtue not likely to be achieved by the product of a single mind. A publication of this character cannot, of course, include an evaluation of the informal aspects of the Institute. Wellesley students, faculty members, alumnae, and their neighbors, together with representatives of other colleges, developed an interest in the Pacific area which was intelligent and vital. T h e men and women who delivered the p a p e r s and participated in the resultant discussions exerted an influence on the thinking of the assembled College which went f a r beyond the limits of the formal presentation. I t is customary in a four-year college to do a good many things quadrennially so t h a t once in a student generation some p a r t i c u l a r experience can be associated with the college. Surely t h a t is none too often to focus attention on matters relating to the F a r E a s t . Between Institutes the Mayling Soong Foundation maintains a less dramatic p r o g r a m . I t provides lectures, exhibits, books, equipment,

viii

INTRODUCTION

and personnel for courses dealing with the East in the departments of art, geography, history, philosophy, political science, and sociology. The Foundation was established in 1942 on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the graduation from Wellesley College of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. I t is the gift of many contributors, most of them alumnae. Among the latter is Madame Chiang herself. I t was founded with no political bias for the purpose of contributing to the mutual understanding of East and West. A statement of policy adopted by the faculty and trustees of Wellesley College includes this comment on the program of the Foundation: "The opportunity is offered by it for broadening mutual understanding and sympathetic interest not only through academic study but also through personal relations and the formation of continuing friendships between students of the Orient and of the West." The Program Committee which planned the 1946 Institute demonstrated how effectively a community can be roused to intelligent concern about a vital problem in international relations. That community is deeply indebted to the Committee, as well as to the speakers who came on its invitation. The writer of this introduction is particularly indebted to the Program Committee whose statements of their hopes and plans for the Institute and their evaluation of the papers presented here constitute the bulk of this foreword. MILDRED McAFEE HORTON, President of Wellesley College February 26, 19^7

CONTENTS

Introduction, M I L D R E D M C A F E E H O R T O N V Our Far Eastern Policies in Relation to Our Overall National Objectives, J O H N CARTER V I N C E N T 3 American Interest in the Social and Political Future of the Pacific Peoples. R A Y M O N D K E N N E D Y 20 The American Interest in the Economic Future of the Pacific, c. F . R E M E R 43 American Island Territories in the Pacific. 59 FELIX

M.

KEESING

American Policy toward Dependent Areas.

82

E U P E E T EMEESON

Korean Independence: A Soviet-American Problem. YONGJEUNG

KIM

Nationalist Movements in Southeast Asia.

102

119

E U P E E T EMEESON

Trusteeship and Accountability: The International Approach to the Colonial Problem. 137 RALPH J . BUNCHE

American Security Policy in the Pacific. GRAYSON

The New Security Problems in the Pacific. SIE CARL

156

KIRK

168

BEEENDSEN

The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, A . A. B E R L E , JR. 183 The Interest of Britain in Pacific Security. 205 DAVID N E L S O N R O W E

Russia As a Factor in the Security of the Pacific. VERA MICHELES DEAN

Reading List.

M A R G A R E T M. BOYCE

221

241

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MAYLING SOONG FOUNDATION M B S . F R E D E R I C K G. A T K I N S O N ,

CHAIRMAN

MRS. H A R O L D D. H Y N D S , A C T I N G C H A I R M A N MRS. T H E O D O R E C. H A F F E N R E F F E R ,

SECRETARY

MISS M . M A R G A R E T B A L L MR. J O H N P . CHASE MRS. R A L P H E .

CHURCH

MRS. J . L. R . DE MORINNI M R S . DOUGLAS H O R T O N MRS. MAURICE T. MOORE MISS E L L A K E A T S W H I T I N G

FACULTY-STUDENT PROGRAM COMMITTEE MISS M . M A R G A R E T B A L L , C H A I R M A N MRS. H U G H B. K I L L O U G H MISS L O T T C H E N

VONDERSMITH

E R N E S T R. L A C H E M A N H E N R Y F . SCHWARZ

QOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOQOQOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOOOOOO

OUR

FAR

IN OVERALL

EASTERN

RELATION

POLICIES

TO

NATIONAL

OUR

OBJECTIVES

John Carter Vincent *

I N the Department of State we are daily faced with problems that require a solution. In large measure these problems arise because we have set ourselves certain objectives in our foreign relations. We adopt policies as a guide in solving these problems and as a means of achieving our objectives. Of course, if we had no objectives we would still have problems but their solution would be on a haphazard basis which would get us nowhere—except probably out of one difficulty into another. The over-all objectives of our foreign policies, stated in broad but understandable terms, fall into two main categories. These objectives are ( 1 ) to provide for the security of the United States and the maintenance of international peace, and ( 2 ) to bring about in the relations between ourselves and other states mutually beneficial commercial and * Director of the Office of Far Eastern State.

Afairt,

Department

of

4

J O H N CARTER V I N C E N T

cultural exchanges which will promote international welfare and understanding. These are very broad objectives, but I believe they will afford a sound basis or starting point for discussing our problems and policies in the F a r East. They are not independent objectives. Rather I think of them as being interdependent. We cannot be successful in achieving the kind of security we want, or in maintaining the kind of peace we want, in isolation from the commercial and cultural currents of the world. As a matter of fact, a strong arm in our defense, and in the maintenance of peace, will be the establishment of commercial and cultural ties with peoples in all lands. This is particularly true in the F a r E a s t where a modernization of political and economic institutions is long overdue, and where the realization of democratic self-government and the raising of economic standards are goals of the utmost importance. The pursuit of our objective of bringing about a development of commercial and cultural exchange between ourselves and the areas of the F a r E a s t will go f a r toward improving conditions in the F a r E a s t and at the same time will contribute in the long run toward our defense and toward peace. On the other hand, a strong national defense—that is, the achievement of our objective of providing for the security of the United States—is essential to the pursuit of our broader objective of developing mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relations. We must be strong enough to enable us to adopt progressive policies with relation to other states and to encourage progress in those states. There may be times and occasions when, in the short view, it will seem advantageous to our security to throw

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

5

our weight or influence on the side of the status quo—i.e., on the side of those forces calculated to bring about immediate or early stability—but I find it objectionable to place any dependence for our security on such short-term expedients. History, I believe, will show that strength lies on the side of progress. We should use our strength for progress. We cannot rely on a preservation of the status quo as a measure of defense. In this connection I want to quote briefly from a pertinent statement made by Secretary Byrnes last February. He said: "The essence of our democracy is in our belief in life and growth and in the right of the people to shape and mold their destiny. . . . Our democracy must not be negative and inert. It must be capable of adjustment and development in response to constantly changing circumstances. It must be marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, and practical and forward-looking suggestions." This is what I mean when I say that we should be strong enough to be progressive. Our objectives raise problems and we therefore must adopt policies best calculated to solve these problems and to achieve our objectives. The demilitarization of Japan is a problem which General MacArthur has virtually solved but we must be consistently vigilant to keep it solved. Problems with regard to our security are inherent also in the situations now facing us in Korea, China, and the Philippines. If my estimate is correct our aim in Japan and Korea is to neutralize these areas so that they will not constitute a threat to us, or, for that matter, to any other nation. We hope that China, through a settlement of her

6

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

internal difficulties, will become a stabilizing rather than a disturbing influence in the F a r E a s t which would adversely affect peaceful international relations. In the Philippines our approach to the problem of security is different in character but not in motive. We have a mutual defense understanding with the Philippines and are negotiating a base agreement with the Republic which will provide for the stationing in the Philippines of U. S. army and naval forces. A n assurance of international peace is our joint motive. Our other objective of promoting commercial and cultural exchanges also raises problems. W e believe that selfgoverning peoples are not only likely to seek settlement of their internal difficulties by peaceful methods but that they are also best suited to fit into a scheme of international cooperation in commercial and cultural matters. Hence we have created f o r ourselves the problem of bringing self-government to K o r e a ; of democratizing J a p a n ; of trying to induce China to settle its internal difficulties by peaceful methods through the formation of a broadly based democratic government; and of encouraging agreements for the development of self-government in southeast Asia. In the Philippines our forty-five years of tutelage have only recently been brought to fruition in our recognition of the independence of the Philippine Republic. B u t we still have problems there in adjusting our relations with this new state and of helping it to assume its place in the community of nations. A n y attempt to promote democracy in the areas of the F a r E a s t must be supported by measures of economic assistance. We do not believe that poverty-stricken people are good material for democracy. W e therefore create for ourselves the problem of determining how and in what meas-

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

7

ure the economic strength of this country can be utilized to best advantage in the Far East. In this connection it is well to recall the words of the President in his address in Chicago last April. He said: "In the Far Fast, as elsewhere, we shall encourage the growth and the spread of democracy and civil liberties. . . . The roots of democracy, however, will not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern countries." It is inherent in any system of foreign relations that the existence of a problem, or problems, creates an immediate need for policies to meet these problems—general policies, and specific policies to meet special situations. We have a number of time-honored policies in the Far East to which we adhere. One of them is the Open Door, the original objective of which was to give Americans the right to trade and invest in the Far East, particularly China, on an equal footing with the nationals of other nations. A corollary to the Open Door policy is the Most Favored Nation principle, applicable in political as well as commercial situations. Although we have made some slips, notably in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, it is our policy to oppose the establishment of spheres of influence. Since 1900, after our acquisition of the Philippines, it has also been our policy to counter or prevent threats to our security in the western Pacific. The naval agreements with Japan in 1921 and thereafter were entered into with this thought in mind. It can be argued that they did not accomplish much. But the point is that we have since 1921 endeavored, with what force of persuasion we had, to prevent the establishment of military power in the western Pa-

8

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

cific and Asia which would constitute an armed threat to us. Even in 1904, while maintaining neutrality, we favored J a pan in its war with Czarist Russia, the idea being to prevent Russia from achieving a predominant position in Korea and Manchuria. After the war, when it became apparent that Japan was bent on establishing its hegemony in the Far East, we took such measures as were practicable to slow Japan down. It is of course debatable whether we might not have taken more effective measures. Certainly the measures we took were not effective in preventing war. But the point is that the aim of our policy was to restrain J a pan as a measure in our own defense. We have traditionally recognized that the preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China was important to us. But the measures or policies we have pursued in this connection have in large measure been negative rather than positive. For instance, the Open Door principle was put forward by us not so much with the idea of preserving China's integrity as with the idea of perserving our commercial position in China in the face of encroachments by other powers. Also, the Nine-Power Treaty is in large measure a negative or self-denying document. Actually, that treaty provided most inadequately for achieving its aims. In essence the powers, exclusive of China, denied themselves the right to take advantage of China's internal and external difficulties. But when the real test came at the Brussels Conference in 1937, it was clearly demonstrated that the Treaty was ineffectual in accomplishing its ends in the face of an aggressive Japan. Now this brings us squarely face to face with the present situation in China. If there is one thing that should be clear to us it is that the situation in China during the two decades

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

9

prior to the last war gave strong encouragement to, if it did not actually make possible, Japan's war upon us in 1941.1 am convinced that, if during those two decades positive measures had been taken to bring about unity in China, Japan would have found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get a secure enough foothold on the Asiatic continent to make her feel capable of going to war with us. Hence when we emerged from this war it seemed evident that more positive measures than had been taken in the past must be taken in the future to prevent China from furnishing again a foothold or stronghold for attack upon us. And the most logical and reasonable means for achieving this end seemed to be for us positively to assist China to achieve unity. General Marshall therefore undertook his mission to China last December and at the same time the President issued his policy statement of December 15 in regard to China. I t is sufficient to recall that in his statement the President stressed the fact that it was essential that civil war cease in China and unification be brought about by the peaceful democratic method of negotiation and agreement. In conclusion, the President said: " A s China moves toward peace and unity . . . the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order." In connection with the President's statement it is well also to recall that just two weeks later from Moscow, Secretaries Byrnes, Molotov, and Bevin issued a communique stating that they were "in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Govern-

10

J O H N CARTER VINCENT

ment, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife." The press, I feel, has made abundantly clear to you the ups and downs of General Marshall's mission. If I were commissioned to do a monument to personify perseverance, I am sure I would choose General Marshall for my subject. There is nothing abstruse about the issues involved in the situation in China. The joint communique issued by General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart made clear the problem. To those who infer that General Marshall has failed, my reply is that he has not yet succeeded. He hopes and we hope still that wise counsels—the wisdom of China—will prevent the disaster of all out civil war being inflicted upon the Chinese people who are already suffering acutely from the ravages of eight years of Japanese aggression and occupation. Ambassador Stuart, in his statement on October 10, made a strong appeal to reason. We are not going to wash our hands of the problem which China presents in the F a r East. We are going to keep out of involvement in civil warfare, but we are going to keep up our efforts, in spite of setbacks, to assist China in achieving unity. Our policy toward Japan is expressed in a number of documents, the principal of which are the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, the Terms of Surrender, and the White House statement of September 22 on policy toward Japan. The F a r Eastern Commission, which was organized in February of this year, now formulates "the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished." Eleven nations with interests in the F a r East are members of this Commission. There is also in Tokyo a Four-Power Allied Council which

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

11

acts in an advisory capacity to General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The U.S.S.R., China, the British Commonwealth, and the United States are represented on this Council. In conformity with the various policy papers I have mentioned and with the policy decisions reached in the F a r Eastern Commission, General MacArthur has proceeded with the work of demilitarizing and democratizing J a p a n . Demilitarization has been all but completed and presents no present problem. Democratization is a different and f a r more difficult problem. We cannot expect to make good Democrats and Republicans out of the Japanese in a year and perhaps not in a decade. They only can do that for themselves, if indeed, a wholly Western parliamentary type of democracy is the thing for J a p a n . They must decide for themselves. What we want, as the Potsdam Declaration states, is the establishment of " a peacefully inclined and responsible government." The new Japanese constitution constitutes an encouraging step in this direction. The democratization of J a p a n has not moved so fast as some critics would have liked. On the other hand, it has moved much faster than many cynics thought possible. General MacArthur is doing a stupendous job with unique ability. One of the problems that plagues us most now is the problem of reparations and, directly related to that problem, the problem of getting J a p a n back to a point where it can, to use the words of the Potsdam Declaration, "sustain her economy" and eventually "participate in world trade relations." The major question to be decided is the portion of Japanese industry which shall be retained in J a p a n to enable her to sustain her economy and the disposition of that portion of her industry which shall be removed for

12

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

reparations. Connected with these problems is the problem of the disposition of Japanese external assets. The F a r Eastern Commission is now actively engaged in considering these problems and we hope to have a solution before the end of this year. The question arises, of course, as to how long we should remain in control of Japan. It is my opinion that we should stay long enough to break down the major barriers to democracy and to assist in the creation and operation of political machinery for the development of democracy. When this has been done, we should terminate occupation of Japan while retaining those safeguards and controls necessary to insure that Japan will not again break the peace. Korea was, as you know, a part of the Japanese Empire for a matter of thirty-five years. It is now a liberated country. Our policy toward Korea has been stated in the Cairo Declaration and in the Declaration from Moscow last December. In the Cairo Declaration China, the United States, and Great Britain stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." A t Potsdam the Soviet Union, in subscribing to the Cairo Declaration, associated itself with this statement of policy regarding Korea. A t Moscow at the Foreign Ministers Conference last December a statement of policy was drawn up to which the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and the United States subscribed. Briefly, this statement provides that a Soviet-American Joint Commission shall take steps to form a provisional Korean government and that, after this provisional government has been formed, the Joint Commission, in consultation with the government shall make recommendations for a Four-Power trusteeship for Korea not to exceed a period of five years. The trusteeship governments

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

13

will be the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. The Joint Commission met last March and adjourned in May, having spent some two months without any concrete accomplishment other than to highlight the differences between us and the Russians with regard to the character of the proposed provisional Korean government. The Commission discussions finally broke down over the issue of consulting Korean leaders regarding formation of the government. The Russians contended that only those Koreans who had not opposed trusteeship were to be consulted. We maintained that this was an arbitrary and undemocratic restriction on the Koreans' freedom of opinion. Inasmuch as a large body of the Korean leaders had expressed their dislike for trusteeship, they would have been disqualified for membership in the government. On the other hand, Korean Communist leaders, although originally also opposed to trusteeship, had expressed themselves as entirely in favor of it after the Moscow Declaration. Thus accession to the Russian position would have meant that we would be largely limited to Communist leaders in choosing a provisional government. We stand ready at any time to resume discussions in the Soviet-American Joint Commission with a view to implementing the program adopted at Moscow last December. We have so informed the Russians. We are anxious to eliminate the barrier at the 38th parallel which now divides Korea into two zones of occupation—American and Russian. We want a united Korea, and we want to assist the Koreans toward self-government and independence. But while we are awaiting a resumption of discussions in the Joint Commission, we cannot sit quietly and do nothing.

14

J O H N CARTER V I N C E N T

Hence we are taking measures to improve economic and social conditions in southern Korea and to bring Koreans more and more directly into the administration of the area. In doing so, however, we do not lose sight of the fact that a united Korea is our goal. We are prepared to stick with the problem until we have achieved that goal. The Philippine Islands, after having been a dependency of the United States for over forty-five years, became an independent Republic last July 4. Our policy toward that Republic has been made clear in various Congressional acts and in statements by the President. We intend fully to respect the independence of the Philippines and at the same time we expect to co-operate with the new Republic in meeting the manifold problems facing it as an independent state. Prior to its independence the Philippines enjoyed a free trade status with this country. Because application to Philippine trade of our tariffs would have very seriously damaged Philippine economy, the Congress passed the Bell Trade Act, which provides that the Philippines shall continue to enjoy free trade with this country for a period of eight years, and that for the succeeding twenty years it shall have graduated tariff treatment. In other words, for twenty-eight years the Filipinos will have the benefit of a special trade relationship with this country. With regard to the economic rehabilitation of the Philippines, the Congress has authorized the expenditure of $ 6 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . This sum is split three ways : $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 is to pay war claims of private property-holders ; $120,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 is for the reconstruction of public property ; and $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 will be turned over to the Philippines in the form of surplus property. The sum of $ 6 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 is a grant, not a loan. The Congress has authorized, in addition

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

15

to this grant, a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet current administrative expenses. We are now negotiating with the Philippine Republic a military base agreement. These negotiations are being conducted on a basis of equality. The objective of the base agreement is to carry out a mutual defense understanding with the Philippines. Our attitude toward the Philippines is one of co-operation with the new Republic; co-operation with it as an independent state in regard to matters of mutual interest and co-operation with it within the United Nations for the promotion of world peace and security. We are collaborating with the Philippines in the restoration of their internal economy, in bringing about a revival of their foreign trade, and in providing for their security. This is not a short-term policy. I t is a long-term policy directed toward the benefit of both parties and toward the advancement of international well-being. I t is the co-operation of independent states. Our relationship—our co-operation— will not assume the character, on the one hand, of paternalism, or, on the other hand, of dependence. Furthermore, it will not be directed against the interests of third states. The peoples of Indochina and Indonesia will be particularly interested in the development of our relations with the Philippine Republic, for they are making a strong bid for self-government. We recognize the sovereignty of the French and Dutch in those areas but we have also endeavored in appropriate ways to encourage the sovereigns and the dependent peoples to get together in agreements which will permit recovery from the war and at the same time give due consideration to the self-governing aspirations of the Indonesians and Vietnamese.

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JOHN CARTER VINCENT

There have been many ups and downs in the negotiations between the representatives of the Dutch and the Indonesians and between the representatives of the French and the Vietnamese, otherwise known as Annamese. Present indications look promising with regard to both areas. The Dutch have sent a commission to Java to renew discussions with Sjahrir and other Indonesian leaders. We hope that these discussions will end in agreement. The French have only recently concluded discussions at Fontainebleau with the President of the Vietnam Republic, Ho Chih-Min. These discussions resulted not in total agreement but in a modus vivendi which seems to furnish a satisfactory basis for tiding things over until further discussions are undertaken in Indochina. It would be appropriate here to quote the words of Cordell Hull, our revered wartime Secretary of State. He said: "There rests upon the independent nations a responsibility in relation to dependent peoples who aspire to liberty. It should be the duty of nations having political ties with such peoples . . . to help the aspiring peoples to develop materially and educationally, to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of self-government, and to attain liberty. An excellent example of what can be achieved is afforded in the record of our relationship with the Philippines." I now come to the remaining country, the independent Kingdom of Siam. Since the conclusion of the war we have taken a much more active interest in Siam than we had in the past. Although Siam declared war on us, we did not declare war on Siam because we considered its declaration that of an irresponsible puppet government. The British, on the other hand, did declare war on Siam and last winter

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

17

they initiated negotiations to reestablish relations with that country. At our request we were consulted by the British and the Siamese throughout these negotiations. The agreement that grew out of the negotiations gave full respect to the independence of Siam. We have also been brought into the middle of the present Siamese-French difficulties. In 1940, when the French were engaged in war with the Germans, the Siamese seized by military force certain territories of French Indochina. Our stand has consistently been that Siam is obligated to return the territories to France. At the same time we have indicated to the French that they should, once the territories are returned, enter into negotiations with the Siamese with regard to frontier and related problems. While the Siamese have expressed the intention of bringing the whole question into the Security Council, both parties, it seems, are desirous that the matter be settled through bilateral discussions. These discussions are now going on with the prospect that this irritation in international affairs can be smoothed out to the satisfaction of both parties. We are being helpful when and as our help is solicited. Without prior intent, there is one recurrent theme running through the discussion I have given of the various areas and of our problems and policies in regard thereto. You might call it a sort of common denominator of our policies—the theme of self-government. Our economic program in the Far East is geared to the idea of promoting self-government. Likewise our political policies in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and southeast Asia have similar motivation. In pursuing this course we do not ignore the position and interests of other states. Nor are we naive enough to think that western democracy will spring forth

18

J O H N CARTER V I N C E N T

full-blown overnight in the F a r E a s t simply because we want it and are prepared to give economic support to democratic tendencies. B u t we do believe that the development of democratic self-government opens the way to the more ready achievement of our objectives; that, apart from the unilateral measures we must take for our own defense, nations of self-governing peoples are more likely to contribute toward our security and the maintenance of international peace than those that are not; that mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges can best be developed with areas where there is self-government; and that constructive cooperation and progress in furthering the aims of the United Nations can best be achieved by nations whose people operate on democratic principles. T o achieve our objectives we should be powerful, we should be patient, and we should be persevering. W e have the power to be progressive—without being provocative. B u t we must also be patient. W e Americans are by nature an impatient people. There are many problems that cannot be solved overnight. There are many problems which by their nature may be more satisfactorily solved later than sooner. Procrastination is not always simply "the thief of time." B u t we must be more than patient. W e must also be persevering. I t takes time but it also takes a consistent and determined effort to solve many of the problems with which we are faced. In an address at Harvard last June, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in speaking of our foreign relations problems, made this statement: " W e have got to understand that all our lives the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for discipline, will be upon us." Finally, in order to complete this lexicon of " P ' s , " —

Our Far Eastern Policies and National Objectives

19

power, patience, perseverance, progress—I should add one more: it might not be a bad idea for us to be prayerful. Mr. Byrnes, who has certainly been patient, persevering, progressive, and withal a power for peace, said when he left for Paris last summer: "I'm standing in the need of prayer."

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AMERICAN INTEREST

IN T H E

S O C I A L AND P O L I T I C A L OF T H E P A C I F I C

Raymond

FUTURE

PEOPLES

Kennedy *

A M E R I C A N interests in any part of the world are closely linked with the goals which Americans regard as right. There cannot be a policy, based upon interests, unless the policy has a direction, an aim or a set of aims. Americans do have a well defined set of national aims for their own country. They are expressed in the Constitution and the laws of the nation, and in the great documents of national history, such as the Declaration of Independence and the statements of leaders, like Washington and Lincoln, who are cherished as the folk heroes of our culture. We do have a kind of national charter, on which we base our corporate life. It defines our destiny, as we see it. We know what we want for our country and our people, now and in the future. The American national charter, so regarded, could be * Professor of Sociology, Yale University; author Peoples of the Indies and The Ageless Indies.

of Islands and

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expressed in various ways, with differing emphases, and in terms of general principles or in lengthy detail. But broadly considered the American charter sets as our national ideals the following: independence and freedom from outside domination; freedom, for groups and individuals, of speech and religion; freedom from discrimination based upon race, descent, creed, and class; equality of all men before the law; and democratic, representative government. In addition to these ideals, which could be summarized as freedom and democracy, both national and individual, we see as desirable goals for all Americans economic prosperity, good health, and universal, free education. I t is interesting to notice that equality in the political sense is an explicit ideal, but equality in the social, economic, and educational spheres is not even an implicit goal in our charter. In these matters, our ideal is equality of opportunity. In other words, we do not envision a classless society, but we do aim at a society with full mobility of individuals up and down the scale in accordance with ability and merit. Mobility is the key concept here, and so we may say that our American charter has as its essence the three ideals of freedom, democracy, and mobility. To the extent that we do not actually measure up to these ideals in our national life, we feel and will generally admit that "something is wrong" in America. We go further and say that "something must be done" to bring things more into line with the charter. The significance of this situation for America's role in international affairs is that we judge other nations by our own standards. For better or worse, Americans have the set conviction that their national ideals are best for all peoples. Our faith in them is so strong that we have a kind of missionary zeal about them, and feel that they should

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be adopted by all men, for their own individual and national good, and f o r the good of the world. And to the extent t h a t American standards are not realized in any p a r t of the world, we believe t h a t "something is wrong" with the world, and t h a t something should be done about it. Our national charter forms the base of our international charter, therefore; or, to use more prosaic terms, our international policy grows out of our national policy. W h a t we want for others is what we have ourselves. And we Americans can make a good case f o r the virtues of our ways. W e have advanced to political and economic supremacy among the great powers; we have welded together a stable nation out of the most diverse racial, national, and religious elements; we possess, if not the highest, among the highest standards of personal independence, physical wellbeing and comfort, and mass education in the world. W e have attained, despite obvious shortcomings, a remarkable degree of freedom, democracy, and social mobility. No wonder, then, t h a t we have faith in these ideals. Yet this f a i t h and our enthusiasm in spreading it to foreign lands have led us into difficulties with other nations and continue to do so. W e insisted upon keeping the new L a t i n American republics of a century ago free from E u r o pean imperialism. We opposed the attempts of Western powers to p a r t i t i o n and s u b j u g a t e China. W e upset the colonial system in the Orient by introducing democratic principles into the Philippines and then g r a n t i n g them independence. Our sister democracies—Britain, France, and the Netherlands—have national ideals similar to o u r s ; but they have differed from us in not feeling the necessity of extending their own democratic ways to other peoples. Their f a i t h has been mainly n a t i o n a l ; ours is international. They

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have talked of a free Britain, a free France, a free Netherlands, even a free E u r o p e ; we want a free world. W e see eye to eye with them in the Western countries, but our notions about the Eastern peoples have clashed with theirs. They have regarded their empires, and the colonial or imperialist system, as decent and proper; to us it seems close to tyranny. They have accused us of "cultural imperialism," and they are right. The guiding American principle in international affairs is that the American system, or something very similar to it, should be spread all over the world. If other peoples resisted this tendency, there would be good reason for doubting its propriety. B u t the truth is that most peoples, especially the ones who live in the dependent countries, have been and are striving for the very things which Americans feel that all men should have. I t may be cultural imperialism, but, unlike the political and economic imperialism which the dependent nations have been used to, they would gladly accept this new kind of foreign imposition. I have started with this rather lengthy general statement because, while the American goals in international affairs are important in every part of the world, they are especially influential in the Pacific area. America is, of course, the strongest nation of the Pacific region, but aside from that, most of the other countries there are seeking a new destiny. Some are awaking from a long period of quiescence; others are emerging from wartime devastation and civil w a r ; all are stirring with forces which will determine their national futures for generations to come. They are nations in the process of either formation or complete reorganization. America, as the leading power in the Pa-

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cific area, is being looked to for guidance and help. We have the responsibility of leadership whether we desire it or not. Moreover, America is a nation which faces both ways in the world. The only other great power whose home territory fronts on both Europe and the Pacific is Russia; but it is Russia's back door which opens on the Pacific, while it is the rapidly developing West Coast of the United States, our "other front door," which borders the Pacific. Developments in transportation, communication, trade, and defense are changing the world view of Americans from an outlook which has focussed almost completely upon Europe to a new and broader perspective which is bringing the Orient into the forefront of our attention. And American foreign policy, which was formerly based almost entirely on European considerations, is becoming increasingly concerned with the Far East. The European nations have long and relatively unbroken traditions. They follow their own lines of development, and are deep set in their established ways. America may influence, and has influenced, the social and political patterns of these old countries; but mostly they decide their own affairs. They know, or think they know, what they want and how to get it. They even resent gratuitous advice and the assumption of guidance on the part of the United States. Sometimes one feels that they actually mistrust us and our motives. But the Pacific nations, or most of them, are seeking a new philosophy and new ways of life which may help them in their efforts to attain international status and internal peace and prosperity. These countries look to America for leadership; not only because we are their most powerful neighbor, but also because, for various reasons, they ad-

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mire, respect, and trust America. They like what America stands for, or what they think it stands for. Because of this store of goodwill which we possess in the Orient, we stand in a very favorable position to advance our interests, as we see them, in the Pacific area. Looking at the situation in a purely practical way, we can, by wise policy, make of the Pacific countries a firm bastion of loyalty to America for generations to come. And by unwise policy we could lose our incalculable advantage in the Orient. We are the secret envy of European powers, which are quite generally disliked and distrusted in the Orient. If we were to allow ourselves, through an inept policy, to drop to the level of the imperialist powers in the East, we would be even more naive and impractical than these same nations have often accused us of being in the past in our attitudes on the Orient in general and imperialism in particular. We are, then, a kind of hero nation of the West to the peoples of the East, and no other Western power can rival us in this enviable, if perhaps not entirely deserved, esteem of the Pacific millions. We have a lot of capital stored up in the Orient—human capital—vast numbers of people of diverse race, nationality, and creed, who have come to regard America as representing the hope of the future. This asset should be guarded carefully, for it can bear rich benefits for us. I have heard and read a great deal about the economic and military interests of America in the Pacific area, and I appreciate the importance of these factors. In our international affairs, surely, we should plan our economic and defensive strategy prudently. But we must not allow ourselves to be hypnotized by concentration upon economic and military matters to the extent that we lose sight of other

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considerations. We must plan our human strategy wisely, for if we do not we may stand to lose the very economic and defensive gains which a shortsighted and exclusive emphasis upon these goals might bring us temporarily. Military defenses and alliances are at best transitory and shifting in value, and a devastating war can in a few months wipe out the hard-won economic profits of years. But human sentiments and loyalties have more permanence. The American interests in the Pacific countries and peoples should not, therefore, be regarded as solely or even mainly economic and defensive, but social and political as well. The Pacific area includes a remarkable variety of peoples and nations, with a wide range of racial and cultural diversity, and in different stages of social, economic, and political development. All the races of man are represented here. The levels of culture extend from the simplest primitive types to complex, modern civilizations. Education, health, and other social conditions run the gamut from almost complete illiteracy and virtual absence of organized medical care and other public services to the highest standards in the world. Some of the countries are exceedingly prosperous, others touch depths of general poverty unmatched elsewhere on earth. And the political pattern is an amazing jumble of about every form of government that could be devised. Indeed, the varieties of political organization in the Pacific area, the governments men live under there, almost defy classification. Moreover, they are shifting very rapidly in many of the countries, so that tomorrow or next month or next year may bring a radical change in the entire pattern. But taking the situation as it is right now, perhaps as good a classification as possible would be a fourfold one into: m a j o r independent nations; minor independent nations ; new nations, recently independent or soon to become

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27

so; and dependent or colonial territories. In the first category of major independent nations we have the United States, Canada, the Latin American republics, Australia, New Zealand, China, J a p a n , and Russia. There is only one long-established minor independent nation within the Pacific basin, Siam. Two new nations, both minor, are the Philippines and Korea. But most of the Pacific countries are in the fourth class, dependencies. On the mainland of Southeast Asia are Indochina and Malaya. J u s t to the south lies the great island area of Indonesia. And spread out across the vast ocean are the scattered island groups of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. All are under the rule of foreign powers. America's interest in the social and political future of these diverse lands and peoples is rooted in our ideas as to the kind of neighbors we would like to have on our Western sea frontier. I t is my opinion that we desire the Pacific peoples to be friendly toward America, internally peaceful and externally unaggressive, and, to the greatest degree possible, self-governed under democratic systems similar to our own. And, because these main considerations are dependent upon basic social conditions, we would like the Pacific peoples to be as prosperous, healthy, and well educated as possible. Such desires are perhaps Utopian, but men and nations are guided by ideals. The ideals may never be attained, but if they are abandoned the result is disorganization and loss of morale and general decadence. The truth is that men are both realistic and idealistic. They may infringe their ideals in their actions, but their lives are given direction and purpose by the ideals they cherish. The same thing is true of nations. These general interests of America in the social and political development of the Pacific peoples will be easier to

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realize, or at least to approach, in some countries than in others. W e have no uneasiness about Australia and New Zealand, nor Canada and the Latin American states. W h a t ever our doubts concerning Russia, we can do nothing about her domestic affairs. W h a t we do seem to be worried over is her policy toward other countries in the Orient. In Japan, America seems to be in a good position to carry out measures which will foster our interests as we see them. T h e military occupation of Japan, a former enemy count r y , is thoroughly justifiable, which is much less true of our postwar activities in China. B u t military administration is intrinsically a poor preparation for democratic government, and the United States, in my opinion, should remove American troops and high military officials from Japan as soon as possible. T h e danger of Japanese aggression has been completely removed by the great defeat, and extended military occupation cannot be justified on any other grounds than the necessity of destroying the war potential of a former enemy. China is the one m a j o r independent F a r Eastern nation where we appear to be having trouble in furthering what we regard to be our interests. Perhaps this is because we have not clearly defined our interests there, or because American opinion is divided on the best course f o r us to pursue in China. Personally, I feel that the heart of the difficulty is that in China our social and political interests are being impeded by economic and military considerations. W e , or rather our statesmen, seem to fear that the greatest dangers to American interests there are the possible establishment of a communistic regime and the possible military aggressiveness of Russia. These fears, perhaps exaggerated, keep us from following what would normally be our political interests, namely, refraining from interference in the do-

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mestic governmental and military affairs of China, insisting also that other foreign nations do the same, and favoring in every possible way short of physical intrusion the rapid realization of peaceful and democratic social and political conditions. Seeing the United States, with thinly disguised military force, actively participating in international competition for "spheres of influence" in Asia is a new and disturbing experience for Americans. It is undoubtedly a disillusioning spectacle for many, if not most, Chinese too. Other Asiatic peoples also must be looking at us in a new light because of our actions in China. Among the Asiatics, and in the rest of the world, the thought must be growing that now, at last, America is beginning to behave like the European powers. Our great strength has lain in our difference from most other major nations. Power politics and military intrusion in nonenemy foreign areas, except in the Western Hemisphere, are radical departures from the American way, and may in the long run lose us more than we hope to gain from them. But China is an independent country, and, despite the present peculiar involvement of America in Chinese affairs, there is good hope that the course of events there will be in the direction of the true and enduring American interests. In the case of Siam, a minor independent state, our problems are relatively simple. There have been misgivings in some quarters about our yielding to Britain on certain points of the postwar settlement which seem to infringe on Siamese sovereignty. The United States, unlike Britain, never declared war on Siam, and indeed engaged the cooperation of influential Siamese government officials during the war in espionage operations. Also, America, unlike Britain, has no colonial territory bordering on Siam; and our financial and other interests there are much smaller than

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the British. But we have held our line quite well in this country, retain most of its goodwill, and can anticipate with considerable confidence that Siam will continue as a free and increasingly democratic state. Korea, half occupied by American forces, presents problems similar to those of China, but on a much smaller scale. Also, our military presence there has better justification than in China, for Korea was technically enemy territory. All of the nations are agreed on Korean independence, which, although it may be delayed for a while, seems sure to materialize. The division of the country between Russian and American military zones is extremely undesirable, and causes the same sort of difficulties as have arisen in Germany. Here, as in China, it appears that the fear of Russian influence is leading the United States to act in an unexpected and unaccustomed manner. The cause of democracy cannot be permanently advanced merely by opposing, with military force, a rival system like communism. Democracy, to win, must demonstrate its virtues in operation, and military government by its very nature is bound to be undemocratic. In the Philippines the United States has had its greatest investment in Oriental goodwill. A remarkable paradox appears in this case, however, for so long as the Philippines were under American rule the United States had the almost universal admiration and gratitude of the Filipinos. They were the only dependent people of the F a r E a s t who demonstrated firm loyalty to a ruling power during the war. But now that the war is over and the Philippines independent, their goodwill toward America has decreased. The full evidence has yet to be revealed, but there are indications that the American authorities in the Philippines favored the political dominance of a Filipino group which, aside from

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unproven suspicions of collaboration with the Japanese and some alleged links with the Franco clerical fascism in Spain, seems to favor the interests of the large landowners and other reactionary financial elements to the degree that badly needed reforms in the economic sphere are being neglected. A strong peasant movement in Luzon, whose members performed heroically in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and now demand a break away from the traditional system of peonage under which the mass of rural Filipinos have suffered for centuries, is being suppressed with military force by troops of the Republic who carry American weapons. The peasants are fighting back with captured Japanese weapons—a situation which appears to carry a most disturbing symbolic significance. The peasant party elected several delegates to the Philippine legislature, and when the American-supported majority party moved to unseat these representatives the United States made no protest. Moreover, the treaty establishing the Philippine Republic gives the same rights in the.islands to American citizens and capital as to Filipinos; but reciprocal rights are not granted to Filipinos in the United States. Our final launching of the Philippine Republic has thus been marred by certain evidences of interference and partiality which have seemed out of character for America. If the apprehension one feels about the new Philippine Republic has any justification, there may be a danger that what will emerge from the great American experiment in colonial independence will be a semidictatorial pseudodemocracy on the pattern of some of the Latin-American republics. There could be no better object lesson for Americans in the necessity of actively favoring really democratic governments. And, since the Philippine Republic in its present form was created during a period of military rule, in

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which army officers were in control, it may be that we have here also a demonstration of the unwisdom of allowing military authorities to assume the responsibilities of political administration. But, for all of its disappointing features, the new Philippine Republic has excellent possibilities of developing in the direction of true social and political democracy. The present majority party won the presidency by a margin of only 150,000 votes, and for the first time in Philippine history an opposition party, the so-called Democratic Alliance, has shown real power. The one-party rule which characterized the prewar Philippine Commonwealth is evidently ended, and only if the dictatorial tendencies of the present ruling group are allowed to increase will there be danger of totalitarian government. The dependent areas of the Pacific present much the most vexing problems for America. If we define as Pacific countries those whose shores are washed by the great ocean, these include Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, and the island groups of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. The ruling powers involved are Britain, France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Chile, and the United States. The forms of government under which the colonial system operates in this wide and varied area are extremely diversified. There are mandated territories, protectorates, protected states, and different kinds of colonies; but the pattern in all of them runs to a type. They are all colonial, that is to say, the native population is subordinated politically, economically, and socially to the ruling whites, and the administration is directed by foreign powers. In certain of these dependencies the natives have been showing increasing opposition to the traditional system; and movements for social, economic, and political reform, centering mainly upon demands for either self-government

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or complete independence, have been gaining strength steadily. T h e sporadic revolts of prewar years have now culminated in mass revolutions in two of the most important Pacific dependencies, Indochina and Indonesia. In the other colonial regions there has so f a r been little unrest. The small and scattered island populations of Polynesia and Micronesia are, if not in all instances primitive, quite isolated from the rest of the world and have not been influenced much by the currents of international affairs and ideas which might bring them desires for change. T h e Melanesian region is almost entirely primitive and even more isolated than Polynesia and Micronesia. British Malaya, in Southeast Asia, although adjacent to the revolutionary countries of Indochina and Indonesia, has also been little troubled by political protest movements. The native Malays live mostly in small villages away from the centers of trade and communication. They are outnumbered by the immigrant Chinese, who until recently were largely transient residents. During the p a s t ten or twenty years more and more of them have been settling permanently in Malaya, and these new citizens, who are much more enterprising and politically conscious than the Malays, have virtually taken over the larger towns and cities of the country. There are clear signs of political restiveness among them, and if they and the Malays were to unite in a movement opposed to the colonial British regime the long tranquillity of Malaya would be broken. B u t , of all the Pacific dependencies, Indochina and Indonesia are the only ones where the colonial system is being challenged by outright revolution. These revolutions, which so f a r have been amazingly successful, may well mark the beginning of the end of the entire colonial system. The greatest dependency in the world, India, is now on the verge

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of dominion status, which could mean complete independence. Burma is assured of self-government, and may become a British dominion also. These developments in Southeast Asia will have repercussions in all of the other dependent areas sooner or later. Africa, almost totally occupied by dependencies of the imperial powers, is stirring with incipient upheaval; and eventually the trend will probably reach the Oceanian and American colonies. Because the Indonesian and Indochinese revolutions are the first major events in what may become a worldwide movement for emancipation—social, economic, and political —of the dependent peoples, the policy of America in these cases may set a precedent of great future importance. I t would be expected that America, with her firm allegiance to the ideals of her national charter and her conviction that these ideals should be extended all over the world for the good of all, would immediately and without the slightest reservation support any attempt by a dependent people to win freedom. If Americans judge other countries by their own standards, then the parts of the world where things are most wrong, and where something should be done about them, are the colonies of the imperial powers. These are the places where the extreme opposite of what Americans consider to be right and proper in the social and political sense prevails. There is no freedom; there is a minimum of social and political democracy; a caste line keeps the native people from upward mobility in the social, economic, and political spheres, in which they are subordinated en masse to the foreign ruling g r o u p ; the masses of the people are extremely poor; and the levels of education, health, and other social conditions are exceedingly low. What has America actually done in the test cases of Indochina and Indonesia? In the case of Indochina the

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United States has refrained from any action or official statement, merely standing by while British and French troops, using a considerable amount of "lend-lease" American military equipment, entered the country and engaged in open warfare against the native nationalist forces who were trying to establish a republic. Siding with the "imperialist bloc" of Britain, France, and the Netherlands, American statesman stood firm against any international investigation of the Indochinese revolution. At present the French have reached an agreement, perhaps temporary, with the nationalist government. The concessions which France has made, and they are considerable, have been won by the Indochinese through force of arms. America stood by, or, as I am sure the Indochinese and other Asiatics interpreted our position, tacitly favored the British-French operations against the nationalists. The case of Indonesia is more significant. This, next to India, is the largest and richest dependency in the world, with an enormous wealth of natural resources and a population close to 75,000,000. The Dutch rulers of this area had been countering native demands for a greater share in the economic and political administration of the Indies by gradual concessions during the period from 1900 to 1940, so that when the recent war started the Indonesians had made considerable gains. But they were still a dependent people, subordinated in all respects to the ruling Dutch. They derived little except mere subsistence from the very efficient Dutch economic development of their homeland. Most of them were small-scale subsistence farmers, with almost no cash income, the average per capita per year in Java being about fifteen dollars. Those few millions of them who worked for wages were almost all engaged in poorly paying jobs as coolies and servants..The good positions and

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the large incomes were monopolized by the resident whites, and the small middle class of traders and shopkeepers was mainly Chinese. The Indonesians had very little capital and very small incomes, and the chances of their rising in the economic scale were also limited by their extremely low educational qualifications. Over 90 per cent of them were illiterate. They had a very minor voice in the government of their country. Native political activity was closely controlled by the Dutch, and the laws were so strict that almost any Indonesian politician who expressed criticism of the prevailing system was subject to legal prosecution. It was a criminal offense to advocate in public the cause of independence. Adverse comments in print on the existing government were punishable by fine or imprisonment. Most of the leaders in the present republican government spent some time before the war either in prison or in exile because of political activities. The Japanese invasion broke up this system of control, and, although it was replaced by a military administration which was even more repressive, there were certain important changes which brought far-reaching results. It suited the purposes of the Japanese to indoctrinate the Indonesians with anti-imperialist propaganda; and there was enough of truth in what they said to make a profound impression on the natives. Although most of the Indonesians never accepted the idea of permanent Japanese domination, they did respond enthusiastically to the Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asiatics," which they interpreted to mean "Indonesia for the Indonesians." The Japanese overturned European control of the governmental and commercial life of the Indies by removing all Europeans from positions of authority and replacing them with Indonesians who had previously been employed in subordinate capacities as as-

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sistants to the white officials. The Japanese recruited, trained, and armed thousands of Indonesians as a native militia. The plan apparently was to set up a complete governmental, military, and economic hierarchy of Indonesians to run the islands after victory as a Japanese-dominated puppet state. But then, suddenly, J a p a n was forced to surrender. As a last gesture, since there was nothing more to lose, they declared Indonesia independent. A f t e r some delay, during which an Indonesian republic was organized and nationalist troops, with Japanese arms, were formed into an army, the British entered the Indies. The native leaders of the new republic expressed willingness to co-operate with the British in their mission of releasing Allied internees and prisoners of war and disarming the Japanese, provided that no Dutch troops or officials were brought in. In the latter event, the Indonesians warned that they would fight. The British did bring Dutch contingents with them, and the warfare which has not yet ended began. During the course of this year-old war the British violated the terms of their mission in the Indies by using Japanese troops, not only as military police but in active combat against the natives, and by declaring that they intended to keep their forces in the islands until the Dutch were strong enough to take over administration. The year of warfare has left the nationalist government and its military forces in a very favorable position. The Dutch have only small footholds in the two main islands of J a v a and Sumatra, although they control most of the other, relatively unimportant, sections of the archipelago. The Indonesian republican leaders, despite some internal dissension, having a working government, a large and wellequipped army, and the loyal support of the great majority of the people. A partial truce in the fighting is

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now in effect, and the Dutch are trying to reach an agreement with the Indonesians. The Dutch offer a watereddown plan of self-government, including a provision whereby, after an indefinite period of semidominion status, the issue of independence may be settled by mutual agreement. So far the Indonesians have rejected this scheme, and, although they say that they will be satisfied with nothing short of independence, they would probably agree to a more liberal plan of self-government within the Netherlands empire than the Dutch have proposed.* The United States has stood by during this entire course of events, and only one equivocal statement concerning Indonesia has been issued by our government. It proclaimed that we favored a settlement "recognizing alike the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the legitimate rights and interests of the Netherlands." Our almost complete silence has been widely interpreted as tacit approval of the British-Dutch operations in the Indies. We have been accused of "moral cowardice" by the Indian press, and one of the newspapers in India expressed the judgment that "American sympathy for freedom is merely platonic." But we have been even further involved in the Indonesian revolution, because American "lend-lease" weapons and equipment have been used by the Dutch against the natives. Moreover, several thousand Dutch marines were just completing their training in the United States when the war ended. They were provided with American uniforms, weapons, and other equipment and engaged in combat in J a v a . When, at one point, Dutch troops were riding through the streets of Batavia in trucks marked with the symbol " U . S . A . " and shooting at Indonesians, Secretary Byrnes' only response to a * Author's note: This prediction, made in October, 1946, was realized in March, 1947, with the signing of an agreement whose details are still being disputed.

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protest from the nationalists was a statement that he was ordering the American insignia removed from the trucks. And when the Ukrainian delegate in the United Nations proposed an investigation of the seemingly interminable warfare in Indonesia, America voted against the motion. A second motion of the same kind was again opposed by the United States. The result of this policy has been a great loss of American prestige among the dependent peoples of the world. They are beginning to look upon us as hypocrites, who brag loudly about freedom and democracy for all nations, but do nothing when put to actual test. We happen to be in a most difficult position, because our policy has gone against our ideals. We have felt a need to support our allies — Britain and Holland in this case—despite the fact that these allies have opposed the cause of national independence in Indonesia. We are "out of character," so to speak, and we and the rest of the world know it. But there is an even greater significance in the American position on Indonesia. It is my opinion that the United States holds the balance of power on the issue. If we were to side with Russia and a few other nations in demanding at least an international investigation of the Indonesian situation, the "imperialist bloc" headed by Britain would have to yield. But so far we have voted with the imperial powers every time, and as a consequence have lost our reputation of being the foremost champion of freedom and democracy. We even opposed the principle of international trusteeship for all colonial territories at the Conference in San Francisco which established the United Nations. We did this partly because of our reluctance to offend our imperialist Allies. But our supposed military interests were involved too. The insistence of the Navy upon unrestricted

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American control of island bases in the Pacific made it impossible for us to advocate international trusteeship of other dependencies. The bases will probably prove to be quite worthless under new conditions of warfare, but our position on the colonial issue was affected by Navy pressure at the very inception of the United Nations. While on the subject of the American Navy, we should note that two of our own dependencies, Guam and Samoa, have been ruled for several decades by the Navy under a system which is anything but democratic. And now the Navy is attempting to take over the administration of several other islands in the Pacific. This is still another instance of our military interests going contrary to what would normally be our social and political interests. We see, then, that the American policy on dependent peoples is strongly affected by the recognized sovereignty of our allies in their colonial possessions, and by military considerations. I t is my opinion also that American business interests, whose opinions have great weight in the governing circles of this country, generally distrust colonial independence movements. They prefer to carry on in the old ways, fearing the possibly adverse effects of colonial nationalism on their properties and profits. Also, we Americans, once a nation of radical revolutionists ourselves, are showing tendencies, in our age of wealth and power, toward increasing conservatism on social, economic, and political issues. We are coming to fear any revolutionary changes, and are apt to regard them as dangerously radical. Another element enters too, and that is our peculiar national obsessions about race. Even in our attitudes toward our own national charter, we draw a line, a color line, on Negroes and other nonwhite citizens. We even, under wartime emergency, violated the constitutional rights of all the

American Interest in Social and Political Future

41

Japanese-Americans on the Pacific coast and moved them en masse into concentration camps. We did not do the same with German-Americans or Italian-Americans. White people and white nations, we tend to think, are superior, and this leads us to look with doubt upon the efforts of darkskinned colonial peoples to rule themselves. Indeed, we probably have stronger prejudices on race than the imperialist nations themselves. These manifold factors are responsible for the inconsistencies between our ideals and our actions in the case of the dependent peoples. But another very strong influence on our policy comes from the growing fear—which the press, powerful religious groups, and many of our national leaders are continuously inflaming—of war with Russia. We are coming to view the nations of the world as either pro- or anti-Russian, potential enemies or allies in the possible conflict. Since colonial revolutionary movements are by very nature radical, we tend to put them on the danger list, and our suspicions have been further aroused by Russia's open support of the cause of colonial freedom. New nations, born of revolution, are in a sense social and political vacuums, and we are fearful that radical systems of government may gain entrance into them. On the other hand, they are "safe" under imperial rule, which shuns any form of radicalism; and furthermore the loss of their colonies might weaken our Western European allies who may some day fight with us against Russia. This line of reasoning leads us into a remarkably paradoxical position, for while the whole case is constructed on the premise that the democracies must stand united against the danger of totalitarian communism, it involves a denial of freedom and democracy in the colonial countries of the world. It seems to me that there is no way of ensuring the growth

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RAYMOND KENNEDY

of democracy in the dependent areas except by allowing the people there to practice it. The only way to transform the masses of colonial subjects into nations pledged to the cause of democracy and willing to defend it at all costs is to let them know what it means, by allowing them to govern themselves, become educated, and receive the full fruits of their own lands and their own labor. If they are going to be "on our side" they must be made like us, and not kept in the inferior status of subjection to foreign rulers. The essence of what I have had to say is merely this: that we must not allow ourselves to be blinded by economic and military considerations so that we lose sight of the most important factor in our international relations, human beings. W e give much attention to such matters as markets and sources of raw materials and fields of profitable investment in the F a r East. W e also hear a lot of talk about strategic outposts of military security in the Pacific and the Orient, about airfields and naval bases and fortifications ; and we are properly impressed. But we must not neglect the main element in our future prosperity and security, the peoples of these countries. We need not only outposts of military defense ; even more we need outposts of human loyalty. This is what I call "human strategy," and it is, in my opinion, much more important and effective than military strategy. If our human strategy is skillful enough, some bright day we may find that military strategy, with all that it implies of suffering and devastation and death, will be no longer necessary in the world.

OOOOOQOQOOOOOOOQOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOOOOOOOOQOQ

THE AMERICAN

INTEREST

IN T H E E C O N O M I C OF T H E

FUTURE

PACIFIC

C. F. Remer *

A M E R I C A N S entered into trade with the F a r E a s t as soon as this country had been launched upon separate national existence. The new United States was dependent upon foreign trade and ocean shipping. It undertook to make a place for itself in a world which was dominated by the exclusive and restrictive policies of the great powers of the Eighteenth Century. If liberal policies had not, at that time, been recently proclaimed by a great English economist, the leaders of the new republic might well have thought them up to meet the needs of their country. Trade with China and the F a r E a s t was inaugurated in the hope that the Pacific would offer greater freedom than the Atlantic to establish the required trade. W e may by now have come a full circle to our economic position. A f t e r more than a century of internal develop* Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; former Chief, Far Eastern Division, O. 8. S.; author of A m e r i c a n I n v e s t m e n t s in China.

44

C. F. REMER

ment, of international debtor status, of protectivism and isolation, we now stand in a position of some similarity to that of the early days of the republic. We feel the need from the point of view of our own economy of playing our part in the international trade and investments of the world. This need has been expressed by practically every economist who has given serious study to the problem of maintaining satisfactory postwar economic conditions in the United States. "Our basic national interest," we were recently told by a group of business men, labor leaders, and economists, "now lies in the direction of a larger volume of trade with the world." Increased exports will assist the achievement of full employment and increased exports will call for foreign investment. The brief report of this committee, whose membership included no one directly interested in the Far East, gave an important place to Pacific countries and estimated that China may "in ten or twenty years" borrow at the rate of "several billion dollars a year" and may ultimately become "the biggest single market for American capital." Such statements are often surprisingly deficient in attention to what may be called the borrower's capacity to receive, but they show how Americans view their own situation. And the United States has taken up once more the battle for more liberal trade and economic relations in a spirit like that of the early days of the republic. The first of the present conditions of American trade and investment in the Far East is that the United States is now a mature country with highly developed and war-extended industry, with strong reason to press for greater trade and with the capacity and willingness to invest abroad. A second and clearly related condition of American eco-

American Interest in Economic Future of Pacific

45

nomic activity in the F a r E a s t is the increase in the power and prestige of the United States in that area which has been brought about by the war. The war was so fought that the armed forces in the Pacific were chiefly American and their advance was impressive. I t is understood in the F a r E a s t that American military power rested upon the economic and industrial effectiveness of the country. The United States is looked upon as the chief potential source of the capital and the capital goods which the F a r E a s t needs. The occupying forces in Japan are preponderantly American, and the occupation of Japan has been more successful than that of Germany. American prestige is as likely to prove embarrassing as it is to prove truly useful, but there is little doubt that it exists and is a factor of some importance. A third condition of American economic relations is the fact of international organization and the existence of important international economic institutions. International organization is more consistent with past American policy in the F a r East than might be supposed. The United States has long sought to generalize the responsibility in the F a r East which this country has on more than one occasion shown itself willing to accept. The Open Door was an early effort to do so. The Washington Conference was a major effort, and it is probable that the failure of the Washington Conference arrangements to check Japan or bring international action against her was among the reasons for American support for the organization of the United Nations. But the Security Council is not the only institution which alters the F a r Eastern scene. The Economic and Social Council, the Fund and the Bank have come into existence and they start with an American willingness not merely to accept them but to work with them. This makes a great

46

C. F. REMER

difference from the past when economic development was constantly blocked by political jealousy among the powers. It creates the assurance that the United States will not attempt to play a lone hand, as her power and prestige might tempt her to do, and establishes a hope that economic development in the F a r E a s t will not become once more the football of international politics. A final condition is the political confusion which is common to much of the F a r E a s t today. From Korea to Burma and Malaya, there is no country in which major political changes have not recently taken place or are not possible in the near future. This is in part due to the end of the war and the end of Japanese control. The elimination of J a p a n made political problems immediate. But these problems go much deeper than adjustment to the fall of Japan. They involve colonial policies in the south, the postwar policies of the Allied Powers in J a p a n and Korea, and the fundamental problems of politico-economic organization in China and elsewhere in the F a r East. There is truth in the proposition that international economic activity must wait upon domestic political stability. It requires an accepted political equilibrium to enable economic matters to be taken in hand. But from a longer run pqint of view the political equilibrium itself represents a solution not only of political problems but of economic problems as well. The Korean case, where a new political organization is to be set up, provides a clear illustration. Will this new political organization carry with it a determination of the position of the peasant and his relation to the landlord? If it does, will it not be unstable because a powerful group in the community feels the solution to be unfair? If it does not.

American Interest in Economic Future of Pacific

47

will not the continued struggle mean continued confusion and instability? Economic development will not be served by looking at the Far Eastern countries from a distance and taking the position that houses must be set in order and political turmoil brought to an end. But it is plain also that American economic relations must be checked by the political uncertainties that are fairly general in the Far East. In such a situation progress must depend upon the establishment of a political organization, upon the setting up of a government, which makes possible significant change in the economic situation within the framework of the established political organization. Put into other words, the solution lies in a nationalism which is sufficiently democratic, that is, sufficiently concerned with the welfare of the whole community, to make adjustments and sufficiently wise to see that economic development will make adjustments necessary. Japan may prove to be the country of critical importance. If Allied policy toward Japan is successful in establishing a government which incorporates effective measures toward land reform, the example may be powerful elsewhere in the Far East. The new political arrangements in colonial areas face the same or a similar problem. In short, the political confusion in the Far East today is, in part, evidence that economic problems exist which will not be quickly solved and in whose solution foreign trade and foreign investment will play a part. The first point to be made is the importance of freedom to trade, and by this I mean the reestablishment of the right to trade. This is a different concept from free trade, though it is not entirely unrelated to tariff barriers and

48

C. F . REMER

exchange controls. Freedom to trade may seem so obvious and so well assured as not to require attention. But certainly the Greater E a s t Asia Coprosperity Sphere of the Japanese involved plans to control the trade of the area with the United States, Great Britain, and the West generally, plans which rested upon a denial of freedom to trade. And the Coprosperity Sphere is not so distant in time that it may be entirely forgotten. So it may be useful to make sure that the importance of access to the raw materials and the markets of the F a r E a s t is understood. The economic good sense of so humble a transaction as the exchange of a yard of cotton goods or a gallon of kerosene for a handful of tea or a bit of rubber should not be lost sight of in the discussion of the higher politics of international relations or of the ideological difference between ourselves and others. I t is a plain fact that it is advantageous for trade to take place, that the advantage is shared by both sides, that trade is essential to the maintenance of employment in our own country and in the F a r E a s t , that improvement in living conditions comes about when, by means of trade, peoples get what they need and could not otherwise get, or could not get in such abundance, or on such good terms. The war has given point to this and brought home to us our need of the goods of the F a r East. The American Army and Navy Munitions Board drew up in 1939 a list of seventeen "strategic" materials for which the United States was dependent upon other areas. These materials were called "strategic" not only because they were necessary in time of war but also because they were held to be essential to our economy in time of peace. Ten of the seventeen strategic materials could be supplied in the quantity required by the F a r E a s t and the

American Interest in Economic Future of Pacific

49

western Pacific. Six of the materials were actually supplied from this area to more than 90 per cent of the total American import. These six were: rubber, silk, tin, abaca or manila fiber, quinine, and tungsten. Only two of the seventeen materials were not procurable in the Far East. An American geographer, after a study of the report of the Munitions Board, stated in 1940 his conclusion that "only in the lands west of the Pacific, and especially in Southeast Asia, is our dependence so vital and complete that our very existence as a great industrial power, and perhaps even as an independent state, is threatened if the sources should be cut off." We now have the history of our efforts to provide substitutes for these materials when we were actually cut off from these sources during the war. If there is any one area in the world that lends itself to an impressive statement on the importance of foreign trade to this country, it is the Far East. Freedom to trade, however, is a practical matter. Its existence is revealed in the facts and not in some legal right. Trade may actually be cut off or cut down by national policy which does not bring the right to trade into question. Far Eastern countries may reasonably bring the charge against the United States that our tariff rates ought to be adjusted in the interest of greater trade with them. The United States, in turn, has real cause to fear that high tariffs in Far Eastern countries under the influence of postwar nationalism may cut down our trade or that exchange control, fiscal monopolies and direct government interest in trade may bring equally undesirable results. The destruction of Japanese barriers to trade in the general interest ought to inaugurate an actual expansion of trade. No one who knows the Far East can fail to believe that

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prosperity calls for greater trade among the countries within the area. Policies which have hindered the growth of such trade in the past are open to question. Practically thg whole of Korean and Formosan trade before the war was with Japan. Postwar arrangements will change this. But it is true also that an unreasonable proportion of the trade of the Philippines was with the United States and an unreasonable proportion of the trade of Indochina was with France. Far Eastern economic development calls for greater trade among Far Eastern countries and Far Eastern economic development is more important, even to the colonial powers, than is the maintenance of a narrow colonialism. But the importance of greater intra-area trade should not be exaggerated. Far Eastern countries produce commodities that enter into the industrial processes of the most highly industrialized countries of the West. And Far Eastern countries need machinery, electrical equipment, and capital goods which must come from the highly industrialized countries. The Coprosperity Sphere of the Japanese meant, for the rest of the Far East, that degree of poverty which was necessary if the political ambitions of the Japanese were to be fulfilled. Japanese regionalism was not based upon a sound appraisal of the economics of the Far East; nor is any new regional economic solution likely to be effective. The troubles of the Far East may, in the near future, become so baffling as to tempt the Americans to accept some new regionalism. The true principle would seem to be greater trade within the area and greater trade with the world. The interest of the United States in multilateral or triangular trade has been so frequently asserted as to require little comment here. American trade with the Netherlands

American Interest in Economic Future of Pacific

51

Indies provides a convenient illustration and links trade with investment as well. We have usually bought more from the Netherlands Indies than we have sold; the Dutch in Europe have usually bought more from us than they have sold; and the third leg of the triangle was built upon payments from the Indies to the Dutch in Europe of returns upon Dutch investments. Such three-cornered trade gives a flexibility which cannot be maintained under bilateralism. Multilateral trade is in the interest of undeveloped countries who wish to borrow and in the interest of developed countries with capital to export. A final observation on trade also leads to the subject of investment. The history of American trade with the Far East began, as did the English trade, with consumer's goods. Tea and silk and spices moved to the West. Later, cotton goods, flour, and kerosene moved to the East. In recent decades, however, raw materials have been the chief exports from the East and capital goods an important export from the West. Machinery and metals or manufactures of metals were the chief export from the United States during the years 1936—38 to Japan, China, British Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. The rise of capital equipment to an important place in the trade brings us to American interest in investment in the Far East, for it is certain that Far Eastern countries cannot provide themselves with the capital equipment they need and pay for it at once. Far Eastern countries, it has been said, are too poor to provide themselves with the capital equipment they need and to pay for this equipment from their own savings. The remedy seems simple. Let those who have funds to invest—and they are likely to be the countries with capital equipment to sell—provide the means by which the capital

52

C. F. REMER

equipment may be procured, the repayment to be made in the future when the greater production brought about by the capital equipment has come into existence. The advantage to the borrowing countries seems clear enough. The advantage to the lending countries lies in greater returns on investment than they would get at home and in markets for their producer's goods which would assure them fuller employment than they would otherwise have. And both sets of countries would, as a result of the whole process of development, enjoy a greater abundance of goods and so a higher standard of living. This is the plain and simple doctrine, and in essentials it is the right doctrine. But behind this statement lie real difficulties which must be overcome if the Far East is to be developed and if we are to reach the goal of better living conditions all around. In the first place it takes more than capital and more than capital equipment to bring about increased production. A significant requirement is technical knowledge; and the conditions must exist which make technical knowledge effective. How is the technical knowledge to be provided and how are the conditions of its effective use to be established? Answers to these questions are not easy to find. The search leads, in one direction, to the field of education. And education must include more than is usually included in the term. The broad problem is that of making peasant farm workers into skilled industrial laborers. It is true that Japan and Russia have faced this problem and have solved it. In Russia the change has had behind it a powerful, popular movement; in Japan a powerful, popular loyalty. It is too early to say whether Japanese invasion has created a potent impulse toward economic development among the

American Interest in Economic Future of Pacific

53

ordinary peoples of China or the Netherlands Indies. If it has not, the required education may take a long time. Nor is the difficulty of providing technical skills at the higher levels to be minimized. The long-run interest of the United States in China, for example, may lie in the promotion of such technical education as some of our industrial leaders and business men have. A well-known Chinese in discussing this matter made the suggestion that China and the United States establish a great institute of technology in his country as a fitting memorial to their joint participation in the war. The search, in another direction, is for the type or form of international investment which is appropriate. How can foreign investment in F a r Eastern countries be made most effective as a means toward economic development ? Loans to governments, the usual sort of portfolio investment in the F a r East, are not easily adapted to requirements that technical efficiency be maintained. I t has not proved simple to bind a government to arrangements for the successful operation of a railway, an air line, or an industrial plant. Investment may, however, be direct, and this form of investment does carry with it provision for technical effectiveness. Such investment, I have said elsewhere, "brings capital, managerial skill, and technical experience into an undeveloped country in one bundle." No American corporation could hope to succeed in the F a r E a s t if it did not itself provide these essentials for success. Direct investment offers other advantages as well. The return upon such investment is not fixed as it is upon government loans. The profitableness of such investment and the dividends to be paid fluctuate with the prosperity of the country in which the investment is made. The inter-

54

C. F .

REMER

national payments which are called for are likely to be adjusted to international trade. The ultimate repayment is usually a private matter, not one touching the public finances. If the business venture is not successful—the investor takes this risk—the problem of an ultimate repayment does not arise at all. Much of the foreign investment in the F a r East in the past has been direct investment by foreign business men and corporations. American investment in the whole area was small, but it was very largely direct. Even in the Philippines, whose government bonds were largely held in the United States, American direct investment was estimated to be nearly four times as great as American portfolio investment. The ratio of direct to portfolio investment in China was greater, as it was in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya. If direct investment does assure technical effectiveness, if an American pattern of great direct investment has already been set, and if the United States is to be a great investor in the future, may we not take it for granted that the investment of the postwar period in the F a r E a s t will take this form? This question cannot be answered without an examination of the objections to direct investment. A general objection on the part of undeveloped countries is that direct investment has not in the past produced important results in the training of local workers, technicians, and business managers. The foreign business man, it is said, is not interested in the training of the people or the development of the country. What is desired of the American business man in Mexico, said a Mexican leader recently, is that he should teach and retire. A similar opinion is widely held in the F a r E a s t also.

American

Interest in Economic

Future

of Pacific

55

A more sweeping objection to direct investment in the F a r E a s t is that such investment leaves the power with the foreigner and puts the people and the government of the investment receiving country into an inferior or weaker position. Direct investment is felt to be "colonial" or "imperialistic." This objection takes many forms. I t may be voiced by political leaders who see in foreign business a threat to their position. If they favor government operation and control of industry, they see a further threat in the private business which the foreign business man represents and which his operations may promote within the undeveloped country. I t may be voiced by laborers who feel that the management under which they work is remote and inaccessible. It may be voiced by the business men themselves who fear "foreign" competition within their own countries. This is not the place for a complete and balanced examination of the place of direct investment in the F a r East. I have given the matter some study and I wish to state my conviction that investment in the F a r E a s t which involves the introduction of new technical processes and of industrial changes must for the near future have some of the features of direct investment. This is certainly true for countries other than J a p a n and may be true for J a p a n when the problem of investment in that country arises again. I t is, therefore, to the interest of the United States and to the general interest that a modified or adjusted form of direct investment be worked out which will fit the complex and difficult situation in the F a r East. It is, of course, possible that the approach should be from the opposite direction and that an attempt should be made to set up a form of portfolio investment, of international loan, modified to incorporate some of the advantages which direct investment

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C. F . REMER

offers. There is still another possibility since the international institutions to which reference has been made are now in existence. I t may be that international regulation can be established over the activities of business corporations in other countries which will have the effect of making direct investment a more acceptable and more effective instrument of economic development than it has been in the past. The Chinese government has brought before the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations a document which is of the greatest interest in this connection. The newspapers report that it contains resolutions dealing, among other things, with the abolition of abuses surrounding investments of foreign capital in backward areas and proposing "an international code" relating to international investment. I f this resolution is adopted, the Economic and Social Council should be urged to give attention to the adaptation of direct investment to postwar conditions in the F a r East. In conclusion the general aspects of economic relations with the F a r East present two ideas that ought to influence American policy and American public opinion. The first of these ideas concerns the relation to each other of the following factors: F a r Eastern political aspirations, the economic development of the F a r East, and international investment. Here I am carrying into still another direction the search for the conditions of successful American investment. Foreign investment has been presented as a part of the process of F a r Eastern economic development and the whole process as a means toward the end, the ultimate goal of better living conditions. This seems to me the right long run view. However, it is probably true that F a r Eastern peoples

American

Interest

in Economic

Future

of Pacific

57

give first place to political and social aspirations. Certainly their national leaders do. It follows that no F a r Eastern people should be expected to accept a place of less significance in world affairs than it is obliged by unalterable circumstances to accept. You may suppose on observing some Chinese farm village whose people live in grinding poverty or some drab industrial suburb of Osaka or Manila that the people would be completely satisfied if they had decent housing, adequate clothing, and sufficient nourishing food. But you would probably be mistaken. The poorest Chinese laborer feels himself to be a Son of Han, the inheritor of a great tradition. He feels that he and his family have an importance which deserves respect. Feelings of a similar sort are general in Japan, in Indochina, and throughout the F a r East. It is such feelings that give power to nationalist movements and bring violent reactions when the feelings are felt to be outraged or thwarted. But the recognition of the importance of the political and psychological only starts us around a circle that leads back to the economic. Political and social aspirations cannot and will not, in the modern world, be satisfied unless there is a solid basis of economic development. A people that is ill-fed, poorly housed, uneducated, and diseased cannot achieve a place in the world which will satisfy the aspirations it cherishes. B y this path we return to international investment, for the necessary economic progress will not be brought about without foreign capital and foreign technical knowledge. And the circle is completed by the further observation that the introduction of foreign capital and technical skills and steady economic development will hardly be achieved by ex-

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C. F. REMER

treme and intolerant nationalism, whether it be of the left or of the right. The need for foreign capital and the international cooperation required for its successful use may be counted upon to restrain and educate Far Eastern nationalism. Orderly political development in the F a r East requires that F a r Eastern countries be offered the economic means of satisfying their political and psychological aspirations. It is, therefore, in the general interest of the United States that American investment in the F a r East be facilitated. A final point is the outstanding importance to this country of the economic development of China. This is no more than the application to one country of the preceding statements, but this country is the heart and center of the F a r East. I might have devoted my whole time to China, for I am convinced that it is to the interest of the United States to work for, and to play its full part in the economic development of that country. The United States has the economic power to do so. The need to do so can be shown to exist within the American economy. International organization makes it possible to move forward in co-operation with others. The need on China's part for economic development may be obscured by the turmoil and confusion of the moment, but it will appear clearly once more. The United States cannot be indifferent to this development. The poverty of the great body of the Chinese people is a great potential political danger to us for reasons that have to do with China's domestic affairs and her international relations. And the economic development of China will become one of the great facts of human history, to be compared with development of Russia and that of the United States.

OOOOOQOOOOOOOOOOQOQQQOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

AMERICAN

ISLAND

IN

THE

TERRITORIES

PACIFIC

Felix M. Keesing *

I H A D the privilege of being on the island of Ponape, in the central Pacific, for the first celebration of "Liberation D a y , " marking one year of American occupation of that formerly Japanese island. Precisely at eight o'clock the Stars and Stripes were run up at government headquarters by a smart detachment of Ponapean police; the handful of American officials drank with the brown-skinned Ponapean leaders and elders a toast to the United S t a t e s ; shots were fired by a navy squad over flower-decked graves of American fliers who lost their lives there; and then followed a gala parade, dances, and a gigantic track meet between the island's five once warlike political districts, with the massed teams first singing the " S t a r Spangled Banner." These peoples "native" to Ponape and other formerly Japanese-held islands, having now come within the sphere of the United States through the grim arbitrament of war, * Professor of Anthropology, Associate Director, School of Naval Administration, Stanford University; author of Modern Samoa, The South Seas in the Modern World, Native Peoples of the Pacific World, etc.

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FELIX M . KEESING

are beginning to enter upon an American heritage. Once under Spain, then ruled in turn by Germany and by Japan, they are rapidly shifting from humble bowing to a friendly " H e l l o " and wave of the hand. For so long subject to arbitrary colonial rule, they are also stepping on to the first rungs of the ladder of self-government and of social progress which certain other Pacific peoples have already been climbing under the American stimulus: the Hawaiians, Filipinos, Guamanians, and Samoans. Compared with European powers, the United States has been a latecomer in extending its political control into the Pacific zone. Portuguese and Spaniards had carved out colonies during the sixteenth century, and the Dutch, British, and French had followed into the area. Y e t it was not until the Spanish-American war of 1898 that the United States flag was raised over Pacific territories: the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, Wake, and shortly afterward, Eastern Samoa. Considerably later, when in the mid-thirties the dawn of transoceanic aviation suddenly made hitherto neglected specks of land in the vast Pacific of the greatest importance as potential air-way stations, the government quietly reached out to annex additional islands such as Howland and Baker. Two, Canton and Enderbury, came by agreement under joint American-British control. The latest move in this territorial alignment took place on July 4th, 1946, when the United States fulfilled its earlier pledge to give political independence to the Philippine Commonwealth. Nevertheless our country continues to accept major economic and military responsibilities which will enable the Filipinos to recover from the devastation of war and to develop a secure national life. American interest in the Pacific island area, however, long predates the development of a political stake. From

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61

the late Eighteenth Century on, American ships had ranged these seas and dropped anchors in the island harbors: fast sailing ships of the China trade, whalers, missionary vessels, and warships. American merchants and planters had scattered widely over the area. (Mixed blood descendants of some of these pioneers were to be of great aid to American forces occupying the islands.) Workers of the Boston Congregational mission had helped to lay the foundations of Christianity which is now almost universally accepted by the islanders of the central Pacific. Around 1880, rights were secured by treaty from native rulers in Hawaii and Samoa to establish coaling stations: the genesis of the Pearl Harbor and Tutuila Naval Stations of today. The United States also became deeply enmeshed in a complex game of balance of power politics in places such as Hawaii, Samoa, and Fiji, mainly with Great Britain and an increasingly aggressive Germany. As part of the colorful events of the time, our nation was involved for years with these other two powers in a three-sided regime supposedly keeping order in a Samoa wracked by intrigue and native war. Japan, we know, had its brief day too in this island picture. In World War I it occupied German possessions north of the equator, and these islands were subsequently placed under its control as a League of Nations mandate. World War II saw the agreed conditions of trusteeship, which included nonfortification of the islands, perverted, and the island harbors and airfields used as a springboard for Japan's ill-fated ventures into the east and south Pacific. Then, after tense months, came the American counterthrusts. Today with Japan crushed, and all Japanese out of these islands except small prisoner of war groups, American authority covers the whole vast semicircle of the

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KEESING

north-central Pacific. In speaking therefore of Americanheld Pacific territories we are justified in including such former Japanese islands now under our military control as well as our older territories. W h a t is the political status of these various holdings today? Hawaii is an organized territory integral to the United States, and its government is almost equivalent to that of a state of the Union, though its Governor is appointed by the President. A strong movement has been afoot for years to make Hawaii a full state, but meantime it receives federal supervision along with Alaska and several other offshore territories through the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior. Formerly the Philippines were also under this Division, acting through a High Commissioner resident in Manila. Guam and American Samoa, by contrast, have been from the first under Naval Government, with the Commandant of the local naval station in each case acting as Governor. The constitutional status of both these territories has yet to be fully clarified, as even after nearly a half century no organic acts have been passed by Congress to give such definition. B u t meantime they are administered under direct authority of the President by the Secretary of the Navy. The former Japanese islands are also at present under control of the N a v y , using Guam as the main administrative center. A s they were captured or surrendered, naval and marine personnel specially trained in "Military Government" moved in to conduct their administration under the rules of belligerent occupation as defined by the Hague Convention and other international agreements relating to the laws of war. The legal problem of whether the former

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in the Pacific

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Japanese mandate is really enemy territory and its indigenous peoples enemy nationals has been rather obscure, so that formal military government law has been interpreted benevolently as befitting "liberation" of the islanders rather than their capture. Such supervision by the Navy will presumably continue until the future of the islands is further defined by the U. S. Congress, and by peace treaties or other forms of international agreement relating to Japan's erstwhile empire. What are these islands and their peoples like? First, and most obvious from even a cursory glance at the map, they cover a vast amount of water and comprise very little land. Those of us who have sailed or flown across the vast lonely stretches of the north-central Pacific within which the islands lie never cease to marvel at the hugeness of this great oceanic zone of the earth's surface, capable of holding the United States a half dozen or more times over. There are those, perhaps not visionaries, who are claiming that such a body of sea water in itself represents an important national asset as a rich potential source of minerals as well as of fish products. Accentuating to the traveler this impression of size is the fact that the islands in the area are with rare exceptions tiny, and scattered many miles apart. It is often loosely stated that the United States holds thousands of islands here—some have referred to them as "countless." This notion comes from adding up all the little islets and sandbanks which may be dotted within one circling reef, or along the edge of a coral atoll ring. It is more realistic to say that, beyond Hawaii, our flag flies over about one hundred and fifteen separate island units. A handful of these units are complex clusters of islands such as Truk and Yap, but the rest are either single islands or

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atolls. Of the total number about seventy-five units are permanently inhabited by native islanders, and so form a special responsibility of administration. Hawaii, with seven main islands and several small outliers, forms easily the largest and most important territory. Its land area of about 6,400 square miles is about the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. Guam is a single island of two hundred and twenty-five square miles, but Samoa with four main islands and several islets totals only seventy-six square miles. The far flung exJapanese islands comprising the northern Marianas, Palaus, Carolines, Marshalls, and Bonins, with about one hundred and ten island units, total together only about eight hundred and fifty square miles. A large proportion of these islands are so small, and so limited in resources, that the visitor may well wonder how the few dozen or few hundred islanders occupying each of them could have lived and thrived there generation after generation. In such an oceanic setting, one of the most basic and formidable tasks facing those responsible for administration is to provide transport and communication services. Today the sea and air facilities of the Navy are utilized, though demobilization of naval personnel seriously impaired their operations in recent months. To meet this problem the Japanese had to subsidize heavily their shipping lines, in spite of the fact that their vessels cost far less to run than American ships. Fortunately the Navy has developed types of craft suited to island conditions. The main problem is one of crews, and since the island peoples are adept seamen, and some are already trained pilots and engineers, it should be possible before long to have all the minor sea traffic carried on by the islanders themselves. An urgent need is to have radios installed in

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all the outer islands and districts and this too can be handled by trained native technicians. One thing unanimously agreed on by whites working with these islanders is t h a t they readily pick up such technical skills; the visitor sees them already handling trucks, bulldozers, generators, and many other kinds of mechanical operations. Even so, these elementary services are going to be costly in such an island setting. Close to half a million people live in Hawaii, or more than in several of the mainland states. This colorful population traces back p a r t l y to the old native Hawaiian stock, tall brown skinned Polynesians, but also to many zones of the Occident and Orient, the l a t t e r groups including Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Filipino immigrants. By now, these discrete ethnic elements have been woven together considerably by intermarriage, and even more by a common American citizenship which covers the vast maj o r i t y of the population, and by education and Americanization generally. Guam is another area of intermixture, f o r its twenty-four thousand so-called "Chamorros" represent in their racial heritage and customs a complex fusion of the original native "Micronesian" elements with Spanish, Filipino, American, and other later elements. The Samoans are Polynesians like the native Hawaiians. Since we took over eastern Samoa nearly a half century ago their numbers have increased from about five thousand five hundred to sixteen thousand, thanks largely to good medical services which have pushed down the high death r a t e t y p ical of former island conditions. A similar increase took place in the Philippines: f r o m about seven millions to seventeen millions. Most complex from the administrative point of view are the peoples taken over from the Japanese, close to fifty

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thousand in number. Those in Saipan and the other northern Marianas are mainly Chamorros, as are the Guamanians. B u t the rest vary in custom and in language from region to region, and even show a considerable diversity in physical types. The only approach to a common language is Japanese, spoken by the younger generation who attended Japanese schools. In T r u k I heard a government officer who wanted to talk to a native leader having to speak in English to an interpreter knowing English-Japanese, who talked in turn to another interpreter knowing Japanese-Trukese, so that the latter could speak in T r u k ese to the native; the reply came in reverse through the same dubious channel. Fortunately when we moved into the islands a few individuals, mainly trained by American missionaries, knew some English. I t is also being picked up rapidly by many of the younger people working around the military establishments, and more slowly in the schools. T h e great need is to equip teachers with a knowledge of English, and the military government authorities already have such training started. These island peoples, it is well to say, are no longer "primitives" in the way we might offhand be inclined to picture them. They have been in contact with western civilization for decades, and in the case of the Chamorros for centuries. Almost all are Christians—about half and half Catholic and Protestant—a factor which incidentally stood in the way of any rapid Japanization. They are used to buying a wide range of trade goods, paying taxes, sending their children to school. Many families use western furniture rather than living on floor mats, and probably most men, though not women to any extent outside Guam, now wear shoes. A t the same time many elements of the old native cultures are still valued: for example, the use of tra-

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ditional foods such as breadfruit, taro, yams, and fish, wearing flowers in the hair, and working co-operatively in family and community groups. Notably persistent are the highly aristocratic social systems, usually with hereditary socalled "kings," and marked distinctions between those of noble and common birth. Most conservative are several of the small isolated islands of the western Carolines, one at least of which is reported by our visiting naval parties to have kept out missionaries entirely, and Y a p where most men still wear loincloths and the women grass skirts. By contrast, the people most westernized are those who have lived around the former cities and ports, now nearly all bombed to rubble. W h a t is the United States stake in these territories? W h a t benefits do we get from them, and what responsibilities are involved? A balance sheet of this kind must s t a r t with the tremendous value of these islands in terms of strategy and of communications. As amply demonstrated in the grim war years, their harbors and air landings are vital to the security of our western frontiers, and to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Both Congressional committees and the armed services have recommended t h a t we hold a chain of m a j o r and minor bases in the area, with Guam, already a m a j o r bastion, and Pearl H a r b o r as principal links. I t remains, of course, f o r the atomic age to unfold what military significance such outlying bases may continue to have. As way stations, however, on trans-Pacific shipping and air routes the importance of the island harbors and air landings seems unquestionably on the increase. A giant Mars plane can swoop down on a calm mid-Pacific lagoon, and great land planes drop from the sky on to tiny islets a f t e r patient droning across hundreds of miles of open

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ocean. Any calls which the island administrations may make upon our national purse do not, in my opinion, begin to match the worth of such holdings in terms of military security and civilian mobility. Speaking of money, Americans are likely to want to ask next the practical question as to what commercial value the islands may have in relation to our national economy. Regarding Hawaii there is no doubt: its sugar, pineapples, hides, and other produce surpass in value the wealth output of a number of the states, and its import figures gladden the hearts of mainland manufacturers. Put specifically, its prewar trade totaled annually about 200 million dollars. For the other islands the picture is very different. Guam and Samoa exported before the war minor amounts of copra (dried coconut flesh, which yields oil) and handicraft work. Their peoples won a leisurely living mainly from gardening and fishing, and their modest needs for money and commercial goods were rounded out through wages earned in employment related to the island governments and the local naval establishments. In the war and postwar periods there has been a greatly increased demand for workers in military projects, especially on Guam, and even the copra and handicraft industries have barely survived. Official navy policies, however, now stress the rehabilitation of farming for welfare reasons, in spite of serious labor shortages in the case of Guam. The position of the former Japanese islands is less clear. The area has important marine resources, some fairly large tracts of agricultural land, and some deposits of rock phosphate, bauxite, and other minerals. Under Japan, quite extensive commercial and industrial development took place, notably sugar growing and phosphate mining. But this

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was almost exclusively an enterprise of Japanese capital and colonists, and Japan's special needs for developing such products within her empire made the government willing to provide heavy subsidies and other aids. The native islanders not only took a minor role, other than in copra production, but also were deprived of much of their better class land. The disposal of Japanese properties is part of the larger picture of war reparations. The Japanese are now out, and their enterprises are almost totally destroyed, through long neglect if not by the devastation of the war. The only exception to this is the renewed mining of phosphate at Angaur island, at the request of American authorities in occupied Japan, so as to provide much needed agricultural fertilizer for that country. Furthermore, present policies exclude any movement of private American business into the islands. This is partly because of the exigencies of defense—a sudden crisis in the Pacific might jeopardize any such investments—and partly to protect the native peoples from possible exploitation and give them scope to develop their own resources. In any case, most of the former Japanese enterprises, such as growing sugar cane and mining bauxite, would not find profitable outlets either in the United States or in open world markets. Under these circumstances, the economic future of the islands depends upon how far their resources are likely to be developed by the native populations. Today these peoples are anything but idle. With assistance from our military government staffs they have returned to their homes from refuge places in the hills or in the remoter atolls, and from the Japanese forced labor camps. Hammers and saws can be heard as they are rebuilding homes, churches, schools, and community houses, often using to advantage

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the debris of war. Almost everywhere their gardens and fishing grounds are once more supplying plentifully their traditional staple foods. Considerable numbers are in government employ, including young men recruited for voluntary labor at the military centers. But there are still desperate shortages—far more than among us at home—of commercial consumer goods counted by them in times of peace as necessities, yet virtually unobtainable for years: cloth for garments, soap, lamps, and many others. To give positive help and guidance to the islanders in economic spheres, as well as to develop local food resources for the military garrisons, the Navy called in expert civilian aid. At first this was done through the now defunct F E A (Foreign Economic Administration), then later through its successor in the Pacific war zones, the United States Commercial Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Field staffs of the USCC are now scattered through the former Japanese islands, handling (and rationing) the yet scanty imports of trade goods, buying the copra and handicraft work of the islanders, organizing small native industries such as diving for shell, blacksmithing, and soapmaking, developing experimental farms, combating pests such as the giant African snail, and generally investigating and attempting to solve the economic problems of the area. A cardinal principle has been to encourage native self help and initiative. Dozens of co-operative stores have been established with reasonable success throughout the islands, each typically with a large group of native stockholders, so that USCC now acts mainly as the wholesaler and adviser in trade operations. Such joint enterprises fit the traditional habits of group economic and social activity, and more go-getting individ-

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uals still have the chance to take a leading role in their affairs. Looking to the future, the picture is not too clear. The main commercial resource of these peoples has been copra. This is now in great demand, yet it may not remain so: in the prewar depression it was a glut in world markets clogged with coconut and other oils. Native handicrafts hold out some commercial promise, especially when Congress gets around to modifying the tariff laws which impose almost prohibitive duties on such products from this legally still foreign zone. Some of the island products such as soap and sea-slugs ( b ê c h e - d e - m e r ) may find markets in the Far East. Since the people have to buy—they certainly do not want to go back to the Stone Age any more than we do—it is well for us to plan and stimulate their productive effort. The unpleasant alternative, of course, is some island brand of boondoggling or dole, not good either for the islanders or for ourselves. A bright spot in this picture is the establishment, now under way, of a center at Guam to train picked young men from all the island areas in modern agricultural and livestock management. One thing is quite clear in this uncertain economic picture, namely that, except for Hawaii, none of these territories can be financially self-sustaining. At best, when the islanders have paid their head taxes, dog licenses, court fines, and other obligations to government, and when levies have been made through customs and otherwise, the accrued funds can meet only a fraction of the administrative costs. In the past, it is true, some of the colonies of other nations in the Pacific have been financially self-supporting, but only by opening the doors wide to commercial development by outsiders, by paying native employees the merest

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pittance, and by neglecting medical, educational, and other welfare services or leaving most of what was done to mission bodies. The American way, however, has been to initiate vigorous programs of public works, health, schooling, and other beneficial activities. The unusual expense of providing basic transport and other facilities in such scattered islands has already been noted. Even so, the annual costs to the American taxpayer, totaling several million dollars, do not begin to compare with the benefits received by the nation in terms of security and service. Speaking of welfare activities, it seems fair to say that the most important yardsticks of enlightened administration for so-called backward peoples as accepted internationally today are the effectiveness of health and educational programs. Our record here, both before the war and from the beach head stages of occupation, is one of which we can be reasonably proud. It might be put this way—by the colonial standards of other nations it is excellent ; in terms of what needs ideally to be done it is only a little way along. The Navy has had the advantage in its administration of being able to utilize its existing medical personnel and facilities to tackle the local problems of public health. Good hospitals have been established at the main centers, supplemented increasingly by dispensaries in outer communities, and by field activities of traveling medical and sanitation officers. At places such as Truk and Ponape, I saw dozens of natives lining up voluntarily each day for "sick call," many from districts at a considerable distance. Aiding the white doctors were native medical assistants and nurses. I also visited in Guam the newly established schools for training island medical practitioners, nurses, and dentists, and saw at work there picked young men and women not only from Guam and Samoa, but also from the Mar-

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shalls, Palaus, and other former Japanese islands. The medical course is a four-year one, with the work slanted to island conditions; that of the nurses' school three years. In Guam, too, is a major research center converted from war use to the scientific study of tropical medicine and related problems. Most noteworthy is the fact that the vital statistics everywhere are already showing a consistent trend for births to exceed deaths, a shift from the earlier stationary condition of population in most of the islands under Japan's control. Education would deserve a whole paper in itself, for an evaluation of any program of schooling and training among such "backward" peoples involves complex and controversial questions of aims, organization, and methods. For better or worse—and I believe for better—the children of all racial groups in Hawaii have been given a sound American schooling in the English language. Numbered among the graduates of the University of Hawaii and the many students who come from the territory to mainland universities are persons of all these racial backgrounds. Without American-style education, Philippine independence could not have been consummated. Guam has its junior and senior high school and a sprinkling of Guamanians have come to "States-side" universities. Samoa takes pupils to the high school level. In these territories a sprinkling of white American teachers have bulwarked the work of local island teachers who have had less opportunity for training, but who are rising in their level of competence. F o r those who have feared that an American type education would be unduly demoralizing to the traditional ways, it is worth noting that all the ancestral languages of the Hawaii population, including the native Hawaiian, are taught at the local university. On Guam,

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too, the Chamorro language is being given a place in the school activities along with English, and a vigorous program of vocational education is being worked out to take account of local economic and social realities. The educational problem in the former Japanese islands is at present a very difficult one. Military government directives place schooling among the top priorities. Effective work, however, has depended on teaching of teachers, especially in the use of the English language. Most advanced is the Marshalls area, the earliest to be occupied, where a teachers institute has already provided a year of instruction to about sixty native teachers. Trained educational officers have just been attached to each administrative unit through the whole island area, and plans are afoot to enlist aid from the Hawaii educational system in training teachers, conducting summer institutes, and otherwise advancing school work. Children already have the habit of going to school from Japanese days—I saw schoolrooms crowded everywhere—so that the outlook is most promising for future educational work. The basic Navy directive for military government in these islands sets as a cardinal goal the "early establishment of self-governing communities." This is in line with the American faith in the ability of so-called backward peoples to assume responsibility for their own affairs, given opportunity and the necessary political training. In the Philippines, immediately following the occupation in 1898, American administrators began to organize local governments on a democratic basis. Within one decade it was possible to assemble an elected Filipino national legislature, and within one generation the Philippines had become virtually self-governing, with a mere handful of Americans left in special posts. In Hawaii, the multiracial

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citizenry elects the territorial legislature, with its House and Senate, and the territorial delegate to Congress. A colorful variation is that candidates traditionally campaign with music, flower leis, and usually a hula dancing troupe to entertain constituents. The territories under Navy control, Guam and Samoa, have a very full degree of community and district selfgovernment, based on the local island customs. So far, however, their elected central legislatures, the Guam Congress and the Samoan " F o n o " or Council of Chiefs, have only powers of advising the Naval Governors. Their effectiveness has depended in the past upon the varying willingness of successive Governors to consult them and implement their recommendations. The Guam Congress, it may be noted, has been revived after being in eclipse during the war period, and an island-wide election was recently held. Much controversy has surrounded the question of giving greater authority to these native bodies—especially as to how far their members are yet competent in modern techniques of government, and how far purely native decisions should control affairs in such strategic islands. In many respects the problem is comparable to that on our Indian reservations back home, namely how far Indian communities can run their own affairs or should be subject to federal and state supervision. In the islands, as among various Indian groups, serious tensions are generated as local hopes for greater self-government meet head on to such wider controls. The ideal to be worked for in such small island areas, obviously unable to aspire in themselves to separate nationhood, is to develop among the local peoples the fullest degree of internal political antonomy consistent with the larger national interests. The same objective can apply in the former Japanese

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areas. Here, however, the islanders have a long background experience of colonial domination, latterly with the ubiquitous Japanese policeman as the local panjandrum. Our official representatives, in the first meetings with the people after liberation, explained the American concept of self-government. According to the local wishes they either appointed existing leaders or held elections to fill the official posts: headman, chief of police, secretary, and so on. The people have already seized the opportunity to oust a number of former leaders who were personally unpopular or had been Japanese "stooges." In the larger island units such as Truk and Ponape, representatives of the various traditional native districts have been brought together for the first time in island-wide councils to handle their common affairs, a most interesting series of experiments in political consolidation. My personal observation is that in the first months of American control the islanders have been given self-government to a degree which would make professional colonial administrators of the European countries shiver. In part this was a deliberate policy, but mainly it resulted from the great demobilization of military government officer personnel from the war's end up to September of this year when trained replacements went into the field. Communities away from the few administrative centers have been largely out on their own, apart from trips made by their officials to the central councils, and the occasional visit of a traveling government representative. In some areas the results have been most promising, especially where the chosen leaders have been able to grasp intelligently the modern responsibilities of administration. But sometimes affairs have gone less smoothly: traditional "kings" and chiefs more or less suppressed by the Japanese have in places

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tried to reassert their old domination; native officials have at times used the arbitrary Japanese methods, or have feathered their own nests; the exalted ceremonial status of some leaders stands in the way of their being concerned with mundane affairs such as village sanitation and sewage; and strains have occurred between conservatives set in the old class and clan customs and progressive younger people who sense the freedom of democratic ways. All this ferment is to the good, however, as starting to bring to the surface really capable leadership and to exercise flabby muscles of political responsibility. As the people shift from emergency war conditions to a stable system of government they should make rapid progress. What then does the future appear to hold for these islands? Hawaii wants to be, and should be as soon as possible, a full state of the Union. Congress will have to define constitutional statuses for Guam and Samoa; a series of bills are currently on legislators' desks suggesting various alternative plans for this long-delayed action. In the post war period, however, the destiny of these territories with their naval establishments seems inevitably bound up with the future disposal of the former Japanese holdings. All indications to date are that none of the interested powers will oppose American supervision of these strategic islands. But the question is wide open whether, when the time comes to fix the status of Japan's former empire through international agreements, the United States will ask to annex them in outright sovereignty or will accept a United Nations trusteeship arrangement. (Author's note: Subsequent to this discussion, the United States Government presented to the United Nations Security Council a proposal for a strategic trusteeship over these islands, and this has been approved.) All of us have heard the main

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arguments pro and con: on the one hand, the need for full control in the interests of security; on the other, the desirability of demonstrating to other nations the sincerity of our much-publicized support for the trusteeship principle regarding backward territories and peoples. It is noteworthy that all powers holding mandated territories under the old League of Nations have declared their intention of accepting United Nations trusteeships for such territories except one, South Africa. Yet the position of the Japanese mandate, captured in war, is somewhat different, and indeed international jurists are having difficulty settling just who has ultimate title to these islands anyway — the Allied and Associated powers which won the last war (including our recent enemies J a p a n and Italy), or the defunct League. My own hope is that the United States will see its way open to accept the trust principle. Since each trusteeship agreement is drawn up separately as between the United Nations and the power concerned, it should be possible to write into its terms all necessary safeguards to United States interests. The United Nations Charter provides two types of trusteeship. One covers "non-strategic areas," which then fall under the supervision of the U. N. General Assembly and its appropriate expert organ, the Trusteeship Council. The other covers "strategic areas," which become supervised instead by the U. N. Security Council. Accepting the trust principle would call for decision by the United States whether to put all of the islands under one or other category, or part of them under each. Among the complex factors to be balanced here are military considerations, the intricacies of United Nations politics, and we would hope not least of all the welfare of the island peoples. Corollary to this problem, and a subject of hot contro-

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versy, is whether the administrative control of Guam, Samoa, and the ex-Japanese islands should be in military or civilian hands, or some combination of the two. Naval authorities now responsible f o r their government have evidently felt that that handling of the small local populations in such strategic areas should be under the military chain of command. Opponents of naval control claim that it is un-American to have civilized groups under a military rule, no matter how benevolent. Bills have therefore been dropped into the Congressional hopper proposing that the nonmilitary phases of island government be transferred either to the Department of the Interior or to a new civilian agency directly under the President. This question has no black-and-white answer, and its ramifications could fill a volume. A visitor in this vast sea area could hardly conceive of Congress approving wholesale duplication, through a civilian agency, of the costly technical services which the Navy already has in the area, and which it devotes collaterally to administration of civilian affairs: transport, communications, supply, engineering, medical, and so on. On the other hand, using naval personnel has in the past meant a passing parade of short-term administrators with lack of continuity in policy, relatively superficial contact with the native peoples and their customs, and some tendency to hand down orders rather than develop native initiative. During the war and since, however, the N a v y has recognized and tried to meet such weaknesses by training personnel specifically for island administration and by drawing in expert civilian aid in numerous fields. Naval officers were prepared in large numbers at Columbia and Princeton for the occupation phases of military government, and now groups are being trained at Stanford in a School of Naval Administration for the continuing tasks.

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This program is an American equivalent of the training given by the British, Dutch, and French to their colonial personnel, and brings together many phases of scientific knowledge and administrative experience as they apply to such islands and peoples. In addition, increasing numbers of civilians are being taken to the islands to handle economic, educational, and other special responsibilities. Clearly the technical and administrative tasks in such areas call for a working integration of naval and civilian personnel. I t will be up to Congress to decide whether the main channels of authority relating to nonmilitary affairs can be routed most effectively through a single department of government, naval or civilian, or through some form of interdepartment organization. Some have suggested an overall integration of our territorial policies on a national scale by way of a joint State-War-Navy-Interior Department Co-ordinating Committee, while yet having Army, Navy, and Interior primarily responsible for the actual administration in particular territories as now. These islands today have their feet set upon new and progressive paths. The dislocation of war is beginning to pass, and the ugly scars of destruction cleared up or covered by verdant jungle growth. Their peoples look to us, not for doles and handouts, but to help them develop a stable life in a world that obviously cannot leave them alone. Those more educated, as in Guam, want much the same things we do, not least of all our American citizenship. Incidentally would you, if you had the shaping of policy, give citizenship to them all outright, making them both citizens and wards a t the same time as are the American Indians today, or would you naturalize them to citizenship as they become personally competent ? This, too, is a disputed point. All in all, these islands and peoples, relatively remote as they may

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be from our everyday thought, present us as a nation with a sharp and unshirkable challenge, namely to demonstrate in practice what we have stood for in ideal. My mind goes back to a somewhat bomb damaged but still used schoolroom in an out-of-the-way district of Ponape. Faced by about a hundred or so bright eyed native youngsters, I asked if they would sing a song. With a volume like some tremendous organ they hit the first lines: "My Country 'tis of thee, Sweet land of Liberty."

OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOOQOQOQOOOQOOOQOQOOOOOOOO

AMERICAN TOWARD

POLICY

DEPENDENT

Rupert

AREAS

Emerson *

T H E American people are much addicted to giving good advice to other countries on how their dependent areas should be run or a t least to telling them in loud and i n j u r e d tones how bad a j o b they are doing. Unhappily, we are f a r less addicted to p a y i n g any serious attention to our own territories and dependencies and resent with righteous indignation any hostile comments on the affairs of the United States whether they concern such internal problems as those of the Negroes and Asiatics in this country or such external problems as P u e r t o Rico and the Pacific islands we have somewhat casually tucked under our wing. T o add to the dismay of other countries, we are normally unready t o recognize t h a t our asserted right t o criticize carries with it any responsibility to assist in implementing our admirable suggestions or even so to temper our criticism as not to make it merely annoying or embarrassing in times of difficulty or crisis. * Professor of Government, Harvard University; former Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior; author of Malaysia.

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The reasons for these confusing attitudes seem not very hard to discern. Ever since the founding of the country the American people have had a deep-rooted conviction that their freedom, their prosperity, and their republican form of government established them on a moral plane superior to that of the rest of the world. This superiority was felt to entitle them or even to obligate them to make known to the world their special blessings and the enlightened principles on which they rested. The manifest destiny which led the Americans across the continent and into the Pacific had in it also the assumption that the United States should lead the world onward and upward by its example. The traditional devotion to liberty of the Americans thus gave them a claim to be the arbiter of liberty f o r others, but it also established the conviction that whatever was under the American flag must also partake of liberty. I believe it can be said with seriousness that the Declaration of Independence and the Fourth of J u l y orations based upon it so firmly fixed the tradition of freedom in the American mind that we have been unwilling or unable to take in the contradictory but stubborn fact that we have become an imperial power ourselves. The cases of Alaska and Hawaii might be covered by the historical precedent of territories in due course taking their proper place in the Union as States although their off-shore location opened up doubts which have still not been resolved; but islands such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines, inhabited by peoples of a different tongue or race, were another story. Only in the case of the Philippines have we been able to reconcile our myths and beliefs with our realities and practices since from the very outset of our assumption of power there we have proclaimed our intention of giving them independence. I t is possible, however, that our reiterated

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insistence on Philippine independence as the goal of our activities has served to divert attention from other areas — Guam and Samoa on one side, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands on the other—in which we remain in a state of national uncertainty as to whether we are bestowers of liberty or more or less permanent custodians of American interests. The war has now added substantially to our imperial domain, and we have still made no pronouncement to the world, nor even, to the best of my knowledge decided among ourselves, which of the vast network of islands now in our military grasp we intend to retain and whether or not we shall place them under the United Nations trusteeship system which we were instrumental in creating. Even with the departure of the Philippines, the American empire is by no means so insignificant an array that we can continue to treat it with the casual indifference which has on the whole marked our approach to our own colonial problems in the past. It is no doubt a matter of geographic inevitability that our attention has up to this time been largely focused inwards on our great continental expanse rather than outwards on the wide world. Even the remaining isolationists among us seem now to recognize, however regretfully, that there are new and urgent inevitabilities which render obsolete the assumption that we can continue to cultivate our garden in peace, touching the rest of the world only with our trade and our beneficent example. More than ever before the areas under our control beyond our continental limits are outposts of America. In a rapidly contracting world they impinge more sharply than before on our global neighbors, and they will be watched far more closely as signposts to American policies and intentions. Particularly in the atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and recrimination which has developed between

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the United States and the Soviet Union our determinations as to the fate of the Pacific islands taken from Japan will be a matter of deepest international importance. However firmly persuaded we may be of our peace-loving nature, it cannot be amiss for the greatest naval and air power of the world to give as much objective proof as possible to others that it does not intend to use its power for selfish and aggressive purposes. The carrying through of the program for Philippine independence despite the plausibility of pleas for delay in a period of postwar chaos, is perhaps the most encouraging action in the colonial field taken by the United States since the end of the war. If we assume that our troubles in relation to the islands, or those of the Filipinos, have come to an end through the declaration of independence we are probably in for some severe shocks and disappointments, but it is deeply reassuring that we have had the courage to make the plunge. For the next few years at least we will have the difficult problem of establishing our actual working relationships with a country which has become independent and yet inevitably remains to some degree a protege of the United States. Such military bases as we may establish in the Philippines, the special and preferential trade arrangements which we have with the islands, and a host of other specific matters in addition to the general concern which we must feel for a new nation so closely tied to us must all serve to make our relationship something markedly different from that with other sovereign states. It is eminently reasonable to assume that we will be confronted with a considerable number of hard choices, in general circling about the question as to whether we should try to keep our hands off as completely as possible or should maintain a continued benevolent guardianship. The

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not always consistent pattern of our dealings with Cuba can in some measure serve as a guide to the new situation, but there must be substantial differences between our treatment of a country immediately adjacent to our shores and one f a r across the Pacific. In case of grave internal upheavals, should the United States undertake intervention both on behalf of American interests and of the restoration of law, order, and democracy in the islands? If it may be assumed that the United States would immediately go to war to defend the Philippines against foreign aggression, what should be our attitude in case of the appearance of clear evidence that the foreign policy of the Commonwealth was leading it into what we might regard as dangerous foreign entanglements or that alien ideologies and influences were seriously penetrating the islands? I t will require great tact and discretion to work out policies satisfactory to both the American and the Filipino peoples as such issues arise. In advance of the appearance of concrete cases I do not believe that it is possible to say much more than that the United States should aim at a policy of the greatest possible forbearance, assuming that we meant what we said when we determined that the Filipino people had clearly established their capacity for self-government and should be granted their full independence. President T r u man has pledged the United States " t o do all within our power to make Philippine independence effective and meaningful"—it can be made effective and meaningful only if we are prepared to accept and live up to the basic tenet that the Filipinos must find their own salvation in their own way, even though from time to time we may seriously disagree as to what constitutes salvation. P a r t of our task in connection with the Philippines is this essentially negative one of tolerantly keeping our

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hands off their affairs, but particularly in the economic straits in which the islands now find themselves we have also a positive task first of assisting them to secure some degree of economic stability and then of helping them on the road toward economic advance. The reasons for this are manifold. The desperate economic situation of the present is primarily a result of a war which overran them at a time when they were our wards. Their economy has for nearly half a century been deliberately geared into that of the United States to an extent which caused Mr. McNutt, in testifying as High Commissioner, to say that "our businessmen and our statesmen in past years allowed the Philippines to become a complete economic dependency of the United States to a greater degree than any single State of the Union is economically dependent on the rest of the United States." The Philippine Trade Act of 1946 continues this dependence on the United States until 1954 in terms of quotas and freedom from customs duties, with duties and quotas to be tightened up progressively by easy stages from that year until 1974. In other words, for nearly thirty years the United States will have a preferential position in the Philippine economy, and for the first eight years there will be freedom from customs duties for goods flowing in both directions. In the allocation of quotas for export to the United States, the existing American interest is protected through a provision that the quotas shall be divided up between firms existing in 1940 on the basis of the business done in that year or previously. Furthermore, American citizens and business enterprises are to be granted the same rights as the citizens of the Philippines in the exploitation of natural resources and the operation of public utilities in the islands. Since the Philippine Constitution calls for 60 per cent Filipino member-

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ship and capital for corporations operating in these spheres, a constitutional amendment is necessary to bring this proviso into force. In order to make doubly sure that none of these economic ties to the United States should be overlooked, Congress laid it down that no payments in excess of five hundred dollars should be made by the United States out of the funds provided for compensation for war damage until an executive agreement between the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines should have provided for trade relations between the two countries on the terms insisted upon by the United States. In view of these and other provisions protecting the American interest in the Philippines, it cannot be said that we have been overwhelmed by a fit of generosity in our moment of departure from our Asiatic ward, despite the precarious situation existing in the islands as a result of the war. Again to quote Mr. McNutt, "the United States has never, in recent years, faced such a critical situation as the Philippines face today." The transition from economic misery and despair to political despair and upheaval is never a very difficult one, and we are all aware from the daily press of the widespread demand for economic reform which has found political expression in a form which threatens at least minor civil war. If the United States is to reap from the Philippines the economic benefits upon which it has insisted, and if the Philippines are to continue to be one of our great armed outposts, then we have a clear obligation to try to ensure that as far as lies within our power we have established conditions within which the economy of the islands can survive and prosper. The type of colonial rule which we have exercised in the Philippines and the independence with which we have now endowed them rank among the greatest experiments which we have undertaken.

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A n obligation still remains with us t o do our p a r t t h a t t h a t experiment m a y go down in h i s t o r y as a success. A t the same time t h a t a political solution f o r our relations with the Philippines has been found in independence, a precisely opposite solution is coming increasingly t o the f o r e f o r o u r two m a j o r territories in the Pacific. A f t e r m a n y y e a r s of a g i t a t i o n and increasing local demand f o r the p r o j e c t , there is now a widespread and p o p u l a r movement t o end the t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s of H a w a i i and Alaska and b r i n g them into the Union as full-fledged States. I t is p e r h a p s a little u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t this movement should come to flower a t a time when other imperial powers, such as the Netherlands and F r a n c e , a p p e a r t o be utilizing the device of p a r t n e r s h i p o r dominion s t a t u s t o lend color t o their claims t h a t dependent a r e a s are n o t really dependencies b u t equal members of l a r g e r political u n i o n s ; b u t the cases of H a w a i i and Alaska and the n a t u r e of the statehood into which they would enter are sufficiently distinct t o j u s t i f y their consideration solely on their own merits. I n both cases I can see little reason to doubt t h a t it would be a d v a n t a g e o u s t o all concerned to c a r r y t h r o u g h with the proposed actions, and round out the U n i t e d S t a t e s to a full half hundred members. I t has been one of the m a j o r complaints of Alaskans t h a t their affairs have been too closely controlled by W a s h i n g ton and t h a t the development of the T e r r i t o r y has been hampered by a n overintensive policy of conservation. T h e net results a t the present time cannot be r e g a r d e d as too h a p p y . T h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of the vast t e r r i t o r y is still only some eighty t h o u s a n d , of whom nearly half a r e I n dians and Eskimos, despite repeated assertions by government spokesmen and others t h a t the climatic and other conditions make possible a much g r e a t e r settlement. T h e

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resources of the territory have been only meagrely developed, although much effort has been expended at one time or another in surveying them and attempting to bring them to public attention. Mr. Ickes' attempt of a few years ago to combine Alaskan development with settlement of European refugees and others met only with complete defeat in Congress and indignation in Alaska; and the Matanuska colony has been only a qualified success. Absentee ownership and control of much of the economic development which has taken place in Alaska has worked sharply against the efforts to build up a coherent Alaskan political and economic system. Secretary of the Interior Krug, who has recently completed an inspection of the Territory, has announced not only his support for Statehood but also his intention to co-operate to the full in setting in motion an aggressive and comprehensive program for development of the vast economic potentialities of Alaska. The failure of the Federal Government adequately to stimulate settlement and development up to this time, and the constant irritation in the Territory at remote control from Washington appear to make it a wise move at this time to place a larger measure of confidence in the Alaskans themselves to see if they cannot bring into being at least some measure of the expansion and prosperity which have been often predicted but never realized. In every respect except its formal political status Hawaii presents a set of problems radically different from those of Alaska. Presumably the most significant stumbling block on the road to Statehood for Hawaii in the past has been the multiracial and "un-American" character of the population, and particularly the large proportion of J a p a nese. The war has done much to change this situation. Most important, it has demonstrated the loyalty of the Japanese

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in the islands to the United States, both through the admirable service of many persons of Japanese descent in the American armed forces and through the almost total absence of hostile actions of any kind by the Japanesedescended community in the islands themselves. Indeed, there is universal testimony to the devotion of this community to the American war effort and its readiness to serve in any way possible. There have also been marked changes in the make-up of the population: estimates indicate that more than 85 per cent of the people now in the islands were born either in Hawaii or the continental United States as against only 43 per cent in 1920; and the Caucasian element has grown through the influx of war workers from the mainland. As a result of this latter movement and a number of other forces, there are also taking place highly significant changes in the economic-political make-up of the Territory which tend to remove one of the fears connected with the Statehood proposal. The benevolent despotism of the so-called B i g Five economic interests which tended to control every important aspect of the life of the Territory has found itself increasingly challenged by a rising labor movement, and organized labor has by now become a force of real consequence. T o the racial harmony which has characterized the islands in the past there is thus being added a more balanced relationship between labor and the owners and managers of large business enterprises, a new relationship which has already found expression in the changed complexion of the Hawaiian legislature. A different type of war stimulus to the demand for statehood is the almost unanimous distaste with which the Hawaiians look back on the period of military government, which rouses fervent hopes that statehood would put them in a stronger position to combat any future effort on the

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part of the military to take over control of the civil life of the islands. The movement for the incorporation of Hawaii into the Union as a state was well advanced before the war; since the war it has received the endorsement not only of the people of the islands but also of the President and two successive Secretaries of the Interior. To grant statehood now will be to knit even more closely into the American fabric a loyal community which feels that its period of apprenticeship has already been too long protracted. Even if there should prove to be delays in putting through the statehood projects for Alaska and Hawaii, there is every reason to assume that incorporation into the Union is their ultimate destiny. No such assumption can be made for Guam and Samoa, and far greater uncertainties surround the future of the Pacific islands now under our military control. Except in terms of their military utilization, Guam and Samoa have proved to be orphan stepchildren of the United States as far as their political status and rights are concerned, and up to the present day they remain in the technical status of unorganized United States possessions. Their inhabitants are nationals of the United States but have never had American citizenship bestowed on them, and their government is controlled merely by executive orders placing them under the control of the Navy Department. In both the Naval Governor is and has been the supreme authority, unhampered in his actions by the provisions of the American Constitution. The presumption that the American flag automatically carries with it the doctrine of the separation of powers and the guarantees of the Bill of Rights is very speedily and flatly refuted by the barest glance at these islands. Judgments as to the substantive results of American rule in Guam and Samoa vary widely, ranging from occasional

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denunciations by outside critics to unstinted self-praise by the naval authorities. The most vigorous recent critic of naval administration of the islands is H a r o l d Ickes, whose d e p a r t u r e from the Department of the Interior a p p e a r s not t o have impaired his flair f o r either controversy or pungent epithet. I n a recent article entitled " T h e Navy at its W o r s t , " M r . Ickes sums up his conclusions in the following characteristically temperate terms: " I sum up the record. T h e Navy in Guam and Samoa f o r nearly half a century has prevented the fulfillment of national pledges made and accepted in good faith. I t has refused to permit on its own motion, and its effective lobby has prevented Congress f r o m g r a n t i n g any vestige of a bill of rights to its subject peoples. In its own unrestrained conduct of civilian affairs, it has violated, willfully and persistently, many of the tenets of the American Bill of Rights. I t has scorned every concept of due process of law and almost every principle of democracy. I t has ignored the economic problems of the islanders and given them inferior education in segregated schools, it has trampled upon the standards of social policy of the International L a b o r Office f o r dependent a r e a s . " I n its report to the United Nations on Guam and American Samoa, the Navy Department develops the other side of the picture, and gives a considerable quantity of valuable detail although the accuracy of some of the statements has already been publicly questioned. In this report it is stated, f o r example, t h a t in both areas the civil rights of the inhabitants as to freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and others are not infringed; there is reference to "the general high standards of sanitation and medical c a r e " ; the institutions allowing for popular participation in the processes of government are described; and the f a r -

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reaching objectives of the educational programs are laid out as a preface to a somewhat detailed statement concerning present and prewar educational systems and policy. A brief presentation of "Policy for the Future" accepts for Guam and Samoa a five point directive for the military government of occupied islands: 1. physical restoration of damaged property and facilities; 2. continued improvement of health and sanitation; 3. early establishment of selfgoverning institutions; 4. a sound economic program ensuring that the profits and benefits of trade, industry, and agriculture accrue to the native inhabitants and assisting them in achieving the highest possible level of economic independence; and 5. an educational program adapted to the local scene and designed to assist in the early achievement of the other objectives. More specifically, the Navy looks to an extension and improvement of the educational systems of Guam and Samoa to assist the natives toward achieving economic independence in a "Guam for the Guamanians" and a "Samoa for the Samoans," and to enable them to have a larger share in their own governments with the ultimate aim of fitting both races for United States citizenship. To aid in the realization of these objectives a selected group of officers is being given specialized training in preparation for assignment to duties in connection with Naval Military and Civil Government. From the available evidence it appears not an unfair judgment that the Navy, or rather its particular representatives in the islands from time to time, has been unable to resist the temptations of arbitrary power and has occasionally introduced measures for which it would be impossible to find other justification than the idiosyncrasies or convenience of the Naval Governor involved; that there has been too rapid a turnover of naval personnel, fre-

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quently with no special qualifications f o r their j o b s ; and t h a t it has not adequately sought the development of the islands and their inhabitants along lines which would fit them f o r the modern world as against preserving intact the somewhat anachronistic p a t t e r n of their traditional social life. As against these counts there must be set the countervailing benefits which have come under naval administration, such as educational systems reaching the great bulk of the children, tremendous improvement in conditions of health and sanitation, the basic establishment of law and order, and the prevention of alien encroachment on the land and livelihood of the local inhabitants. W h a t ever the final balance as to the virtues and vices of the naval administration in the p a s t , there is ample reason to think t h a t now, a f t e r half a century of possession of the islands, the time has come to regularize their status by Congressional action, to bestow citizenship upon their inhabitants, and to transfer them from military to civil control. These steps have all been taken a considerable time back in relation to the Virgin Islands on the other side of the world, and have served to move these islands ahead on the p a t h to democracy and progress even though all their problems are a long way from having been solved. There is surely no irreconcilable conflict between an overall civilian administration—presumably under the auspices of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Interior Department—and the maintenance of the necessary air, military, and naval bases under the control of the armed forces. The transition to civil administration would be in keeping both with the deeply sound American tradition of the supremacy of civil over military authorities and with the type of treatment for dependent areas which we are concerned to see established by other countries.

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I shall not attempt to go into any detail on the vast sweep of islands which we have taken over from J a p a n , including the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and Okinawa and others off the China coast, in part because the secrecy which has surrounded our present and future treatment of them gives little foundation for detailed comment and in part because of the rigorous limitations of space. Furthermore, the fundamental issues which confront us are not matters of detail, but revolve around three or four basic questions of principle. Which of these islands and island groups is it essential in the American interest that we continue to control? What type of regime do we propose for those which we hold and those which we relinquish? Are we to demonstrate our faith in the United Nations and place such islands under the trusteeship system—and, if so, what sort of trusteeship terms are we prepared to propose or to accept—or are we going to demand outright annexation under full American sovereignty? Assuming either trusteeship or annexation, will we insist upon military administration or will we seek to establish as farreaching civilian administration as is compatible with the maintenance of the necessary military bases? In attempting even the barest outline of answers to these basic questions, it is necessary to make a few broad assumptions. We seem already to have drifted far from the conception that the United Nations organization itself should possess and administer strategic bases throughout the world, and realistically we must take it as one of the starting points that the United States will seek its future security not only through the pooled machinery and resources of the United Nations, but also through its own system of military outposts. Laying no claim to insight into the strategic requirements of the atomic age, I would

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still say in general terms that the United States would be thoroughly ill-advised in its own interest and that of the world at large to assume sole responsibility, as sovereign owner or as trustee, for a more extended colonial domain than a strict view of its security needs and international commitments may dictate. In particular, I should have the gravest skepticism as to our good sense in taking over the Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands or any part of them in view of their remoteness from our own shores and their immediate proximity to the Asiatic coast, lying as they do between Formosa and the Japanese islands. It is arguable that these islands should not be returned to Japan, and if that decision should be reached I can see no objection to American participation in an international trusteeship of some type, but I am confident that we are merely asking for trouble if we should insist on sole American control. For those areas which we want to retain under our wing, I find it virtually incredible that we have not already unequivocally announced our intention of operating within the Charter of the United Nations. B y the Atlantic Charter, and many other declarations, we are pledged to seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other. President Truman in August and again in October of 1945 asserted that the United States wanted no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of the war, although in each instance he added the qualification that we would maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Such bases, however, would be acquired by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter. Speaking legalistically, by the letter of the Charter we are not obligated to place any areas within the trusteeship system, although we must secure the consent of other powers through the peace treaties to any action

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which we may take, but the moral and political obligation to submit ourselves to the international controls which we helped to create and which we press upon others appears to me so overwhelming as not to require argument. Nor is there any reason to believe that our fundamental interests cannot be adequately protected within the frame work of the Charter. The provisions for strategic trusteeships, which we were peculiarly instrumental in having inserted in the Charter, are so wide open as to allow of almost any safeguards upon which the United States might insist, unless we are to adopt the principle that anything we claim we want and need is solely our own business, and the public be damned. I should be the last to suggest that the United States should seek to set up essentially sham trusteeships, using the strategic trusteeship loophole to cover virtual annexation. On the contrary, I am sure that our best interest lies in the largest possible degree of international collaboration, but I can find no necessary incompatibility whatsoever between the trusteeship system and the maintenance of legitimate American interests, including those of strategic security. I t is my hope that in the very near future we will take our place with the other countries which have accepted the principle of trusteeship, that we will seek to give a generous rather than a grudging interpretation to our international obligations, and that we will follow the American tradition of civilian rather than military administrations. These latter comments lead to one further observation, bearing not only on the Pacific but on our position at many points. There can be no doubt that one of the major reasons why our decisions and our actions have been delayed and confused and why our colonial policies both for our own empire and those of other people have been somewhat

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haphazard and contradictory is that the organizational structure established in Washington to deal with such problems is itself haphazard, confused, and inadequate. I t may well be that the failure properly to organize ourselves to deal with our responsibilities in this sphere attaches in some p a r t to my earlier suggestion t h a t we have in fact declined to face up to our position as an imperial power, but the net result has in it a marked overdose of impotence and discord. Two principal criticisms must be made. In the first place, We have developed no central agency in Washington which has either over-all authority or even general advisory jurisdiction in the colonial sphere, and, in the second place, the several agencies which deal with different aspects of the problem are all at too low a level and are usually too undermanned, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to make themselves effectively heard. The Interior, Navy, and State Departments all have a direct concern and each has established an office or division to handle its concern. A number of other federal departments and agencies also have a finger in the pie, but short of the White House there is no co-ordinating center. T h a t even the White House can fall short of its ambitions is indicated by the fact that the effort of President Truman to secure co-ordinated top-level consideration of the type of administration to be aimed at in the Pacific Islands appears up to this time to have been an almost total failure. In brief, despite our considerable embroilment with colonial problems, we have no colonial office, and in its place we have a number of scattered bureaus, unrelated to each other and operating at too low a level in the hierarchy to enable them to secure consistent and effective consideration of the problems before them. F o r example, the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Department of the

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Interior has no connection with Guam and Samoa, has apparently been unable to get its foot in the door in relation to the other Pacific Islands, and in general serves only in the feeblest fashion as an advisory body on colonial problems. The Assistant or Under Secretary to which it reports has other similar divisions under him, and the Secretary of the Interior himself can obviously give only a fraction of his time to its affairs. Furthermore, it has normally been systematically starved and stifled by Congress. It is impossible to recommend a precise solution to this problem without knowing the fate of Alaska and Hawaii, of Guam, Samoa, and the other Pacific Islands, and of American participation in the trusteeship system, but it is very clear that the existing system just does not function as it should. T o make it work there must be both a consolidation of existing agencies, and a substantial raising of the hierarchic level of the new or revised agency, either within one of the existing departments or as an independent instrumentality. In addition to lacking a colonial office, and perhaps in some part because of the lack of it, we also come close to lacking a recognizable colonial policy. Given the new position we now occupy in the world and the tightening up of every aspect of our problems, the range of the empire we now possess and the added empire which we are likely to acquire, and the responsibilities which we have assumed as a member of the United Nations, it is most disheartening if we must continue to muddle through in the future as we have in the past. I referred at the outset to our readiness to criticize the policies and activities of others in relation to their dependent peoples: the time is overdue for us to pay at least equal attention to our own dependent peoples and the policies and machineries upon which we intend to draw

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in dealing with them. Much as we may dislike to admit it, we have much to learn from other countries both in the details of colonial administration and in the art of securing an effective and centralized colonial policy and direction in Washington. Perhaps most fundamental of all, I venture to suggest that the least we can do is ourselves to give heed in managing our own affairs to the admirable, high-spirited, and generous advice which we so liberally bestow upon others f o r the management of their affairs.

400GOMOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQOOOOOOOQOOOOQOOOQOO

KOREAN

INDEPENDENCE:

A SOVIET-AMERICAN

Yongjeung

PROBLEM

Kim *

W H E N you look at the map of East Asia, Korea is centered in the triangle of China, Siberia, and Japan. The Korean peninsula touches Siberia and Manchuria to the northwest, juts toward Japan to the southeast, and is surrounded by the Yellow and Japan Seas on three sides. The area of the country is 85,228 square miles, which is almost as large as that of Great Britain. Her climate is similar to that of the Atlantic Seaboard, including the Carolinas. The country as a whole is rugged. The name K O R E A describes it well; this means the mountains are high and streams are beautiful. Northern Korea, which is now occupied by Russia, is more mountainous, and has most of the heavy industries, mines, and power plants; Southern Korea, now under American occupation, is less rugged, and aside from light industries, is principally agricultural. The six thousand miles of coast line of the Korean peninsula are highly irregular, especially the western and southern seashores, which have many good harbors. Korea also * President, Korean Affairs

Institute.

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has rich fisheries which not only supply her domestic needs but also afford for export sizeable amounts of marine products. Under favorable conditions, Korea could produce adequate staple food for her own consumption. With the exception of petroleum, she has enough mineral resources for her own needs and to provide some for export. The country is now impoverished because of the dislocation of her economy, but when she is free and her resources are developed for the well-being of her people, she can become a prosperous nation. J a p a n could not have waged war so long without Korean resources, such as iron, tungsten, nitrates, as well as many other agricultural and mineral products. Agriculture has been the predominant occupation of that peaceful nation, but the abundant water power, varied mineral deposits, and large labor resources will enable her people to industrialize the country, insofar as it is wise to do so. Korea is almost as old as China. My country has enjoyed her freedom and independence for more than four thousand years. Like any other ancient nation, she has had brilliant and dark chapters in her history. During her long career, only twice was she subjected by foreign powers—once by the Mongols and once by the Japanese. Neither of the aggressors stayed more than forty years. The population of Korea today is 26,000,000 homogeneous people with one language and one culture. Like the Americans, they are individualistic. And unlike the J a p a nese, they did not worship their kings as divine beings. Oppressive or decadent rulers were overthrown from time to time, so that throughout history dynasties have been changed in Korea. Because of geographical proximity and racial similarity,

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KIM

Korea received much of her culture from China. The influence of Chinese literature in Korea was like Latin in Europe. Consequently, Korea had sisterly feelings for China, but regarded J a p a n as an uncivilized inferior nation. She used to call the Japanese "dwarf barbarians." Although Korea was influenced by Chinese classics and literature, she preserved her identity as a distinct nation. She has a language of her own which is based on an alphabet of twenty-five letters. T o d a y Korea is down but she has contributed her share toward human civilization. She was first to compile an encyclopaedia, to invent movable metal printing types, and to build ironclad warships and suspension bridges. In the F i f t h Century, A.D., Korea sent a cultural mission —teachers, artisans, weavers, carpenters, and technicians —to Japan for the purpose of civilizing the island tribes. The late Dr. Inazo Nitobe, a well-known Japanese statesman, in paying tribute to Korea, said, " K o r e a was once a powerful and advanced nation, from whom J a p a n learned most of her ancient arts and crafts. . . . The Korean peninsula, j u t t i n g out into the J a p a n Sea, was like a phial from which was poured milk and honey into the mouth of Japan." In olden Korea, scholars revered Confucian ethics and philosophy to such an extent that Confucianism almost became a religion. Once Buddhism flourished and was favored by the Court but the priests abused their privileges. Consequently, they lost their prestige and were despised by the people. During the last dynasty, Buddhist priests and monks were the lowest of all in social rank, and Buddhism practically vanished. In spite of the Japanese persecutions, Christianity thrived. T o d a y , in ratio to the population,

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there are more Christians in Korea than anywhere in the Far East, with the exception of the Philippines. Being a buffer state, throughout history Korea has been attacked by her neighbors on numerous occasions, but she successfully repelled the invaders until the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1592, the Japanese warlord, Hideyoshi, invaded Korea with 250,000 troops. Being a peaceful nation, Korea was unprepared to meet such an impact. It was a Korean Pearl Harbor. Korea was almost totally lost, but the genius of her brave son, Admiral Yi Sun-sin, inventor of the ironclad warship which was called "Turtle Ship" because of its shape, saved her by destroying the Japanese fleet. The barbaric hordes were finally driven out of the country with humiliating defeat. Nevertheless, the country was weakened from the savage devastation. After this invasion, Korea strengthened her policy of isolation, keeping all foreigners out of her realm. Thus, she was often- called the Hermit Kingdom by outsiders. This splendid isolation did not provide Korea her security. While her people were satisfied with their old glory of cultural accomplishments and going about their peaceful pursuits, their government became corrupt and tyrannical. Koreans believed in peace, but they forgot the fact that it was only a one-sided peace. As long as there was a warlike neighbor, there was no peace. While Korea neglected her national defense, Japan armed to the teeth, with the aid of Western military science. In order to fulfill its long-range aggressive purposes, Japan had first to occupy Korea. She has been always in the way on Japan's road to conquest. But now Korea was weak and unarmed. An opportune time finally came for Japan to achieve its purpose. In 1894, Japan waged war

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on China over Korea. At this time Korea was helpless to block Japan from invading the mainland of Asia, and old, feeble China was defeated. In 1904 victorious Japan forced upon Korea a treaty which would permit the former to move its army through Korea against Russia, with the promise that it would withdraw all its troops as soon as the war was over. Japan again became victorious but its army remained in Korea. At the Portsmouth Peace Conference, Japan was awarded Korea as a protectorate, over strenuous Korean protests. Five years later, in 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea against the will of the people. This was the end of Korea's old glory and the beginning of her bitter enslavement. From this time on, Japan ruled Korea with an iron hand. Koreans were not only deprived of every vestige of their political rights and personal liberty, but all their economic opportunities as well. It is unnecessary to mention the cruel methods which the Japanese used to oppress the Korean people. The atrocities practiced by the Nazis were not any worse than what the Japanese did in Korea. During the forty years of Japanese domination, Korea was made a granary and an arsenal of Japan. The Japanese, through confiscation, fraud, and usury soon acquired 80 per cent of the wealth in Korea. The Japanese became richer and the Koreans became bankrupt. Some foreign visitors have advanced the idea that Korea was benefited from Japanese domination because new highways were built, railroads extended, hills reforested, mines opened, factories built. It may sound reasonable, but those so-called experts were merely superficial observers or were beguiled and inspired by Japanese propaganda. They forget the cardinal fact—that the Japanese did not make those improvements for the Koreans. The Japanese exploited

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K o r e a f o r their amelioration and f o r their military purposes. T h e proponents of J a p a n must know that the Japanese subjected the unfortunate nation at the time when K o r e a was beginning to modernize herself. If K o r e a had been free, she would have done exactly the same things, and more, f o r her own benefit and f o r peaceful purposes. T h e y do not realize how many billions of dollars K o r e a lost during those years under the Japanese economic exploitation. F o r the Koreans, it was f o r t y years of hunger and misery. T h e Tokyo-made experts do not know how much heartache K o r e a suffered under the Japanese occupation. H e r brave sons and daughters were murdered, maimed, and tortured. T h e y also do not know how much intellectual progress K o r e a lost during this period. Koreans were denied higher learning. T h a t was not all. K o r e a n children were prohibited from speaking their own tongue. Koreans were barred from holding high offices. This deprived the Koreans of developing leadership and set back K o r e a n national progress f o r generations. T h e Japanese not only took hundreds of millions of dollars worth of gold from K o r e a , but during the w a r they stripped the country of metals, even lampposts, doorknobs, and spoons. When you calculate the moral and intellectual damage and material losses, J a p a n owes K o r e a many billions of dollars. Therefore, Korea has a right to the m a j o r share of reparation claims. I hope the Allied Powers will see that K o r e a will be adequately compensated in the final settlement with J a p a n . I t would be only simple justice. This must be done! J a p a n forcibly occupied K o r e a , but the people never were subjugated. T h e people who had such a long historical

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background, profound culture, and enlightenment, could not be easily conquered. They ceaselessly resisted Japan. Their patriots fought the Japanese with every possible means and wherever possible. Koreans never gave up the hope of their eventual liberation. After ten years of humiliation and torture under Japanese oppression, the entire people of Korea, on March 1, 1919, demanded their independence of Japan. I t was a peaceful declaration and demand without any violence or armed threat. Even if he wished, no Korean was permitted to possess arms. The movement was well organized and skillfully executed, but without giving the slightest consideration to their legitimate demand for freedom, the Japanese Government ruthlessly put down the Koreans. Between March 1, 1919, and March 1, 1920, the Japanese killed, injured, imprisoned, and tortured tens of thousands of Koreans; they burned Korean houses, churches, and schools. The Koreans were not deterred by this merciless Japanese suppression. They firmly determined to fight for their freedom and independence. They organized a Provisional Government in Shanghai, China, to continue the work of their liberation. From this foreign soil, the Korean exiles carried on the unfinished business of the Korean independence movement. They did the best they could under the perilous circumstances. Believing in Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination, they appealed to the Versailles Peace Conference and Washington Disarmament Conference for Korean freedom, but no one listened to them. The voice of the 26,000,000 liberty-loving people was ignored. They also tried to win the support of those powers who formerly had treaty relations with Korea. This, too, failed.

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The second period between 1922 and 1940 was the darkest hour of the Korean independence movement. It was a time of international appeasement. The Korean appeals to the foreign powers got nowhere. However, the Korean Provisional Government sustained its life with the support of Koreans abroad. Thus it became a symbol of Korean freedom. Among the chief financial supporters of this revolutionary government were the small Korean populations in America and Hawaii. In 1882, the United States made a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Korea. America was the first Western power to open Korea's door and the European nations followed in. The second paragraph of article I of this treaty reads as follows: "If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." As a result of the friendly co-operation of the two countries, American prestige grew rapidly and its people enjoyed many privileges in Korea. A number of Americans were employed as advisers to various branches of the Korean Government. The services of the Americans were preferred in modernizing the old nation, and they were trusted because they had no ulterior designs upon Korea. The American engineers built a Korean railroad, an electric tramway, an electric light plant, a water works, a modern arsenal, powder plant, and steam boats. They also operated mines and furnished equipment and machinery. Unfortunately, the tie between the two friendly powers was severed by Japan as the result of the Portsmouth Treaty. Korea was sacrificed to appease Japan. It was contrary to the late President Roosevelt's great principle that "enduring

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peace cannot be brought about at the cost of the other people's freedom." The recent Sino-Japanese War marked the beginning of the third period of the Korean independence movement and the star of Korea looked brighter. When the Japanese occupied Shanghai in 1937, the Korean Provisional Government moved along with the Chinese Government and established its headquarters in Chungking until it was dissolved in 1945, after the occupation of Korea by the Allied forces. However, this Government was not recognized by any power even during the war years. After Pearl Harbor, the Allied Powers began to pay attention to Korea. In December, 1943, the three Great Powers, the United States, China, and Great Britain, solemnly pledged at Cairo that in due course "Korea shall become free and independent." This was the first definite commitment made by the Allies to Korea. This assurance gave great encouragement to Koreans everywhere. The Koreans did not expect the Allies to hand them freedom as a charity, and they did not try to pick the fruits of the Allied victory. They did their share in defeating the common enemy. Since the annexation of their country by Japan, they fought guerilla warfare in Korea, Manchuria, Siberia, and China; they engaged in underground warfare—espionage, sabotage, and propaganda against their enemy. Their struggle was difficult because no one gave them even an antiquated gun, except China, in late years. The brave sons of Korea went through many hardships, privations, and dark hours for the common cause of freedom. When Japan surrendered in August, 1945, all Korea was overwhelmed with joy. I t was the first time in forty years that there were bright smiles on Korean faces. They gave

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great ovations to the Allied troops when they landed in Korea, as their liberators. They thought their liberation was final and their independence accomplished. They were naive but they had every right to that expectation. Unfortunately, however, one year after the enemy surrendered, Korea still is not independent. This begins the final period of the Korean independence movement. Now, the question of Korean independence becomes a Soviet-American problem. Russia occupies the Northern half of Korea and the United States the area South of the 38th parallel. I cannot tell you what is happening in Northern Korea because it is kept dark. But we know what is happening in the American zone. When the American forces landed in Korea on September 8, 1945, they found that the People's Republic headed by Lyuh Woon Hyung, a liberal and popular leader, was functioning as interim authority with its local committees organized. The American Commander, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, ordered it to be disbanded and set up an American Military Government and temporarily retained Japanese officials in position. At the same time, General Hodge invited some old Korean exiles like Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo and his group to Korea and sought their aid, but this failed because those men were not only too old but they lacked leadership; they had ambition but lacked vision and statesmanship. You have often heard that there are many political parties in Korea and you wonder why, but this is only human. During the forty years of Japanese domination, especially after the 1919 uprising, it was impossible under vigilant enemy eyes for Koreans to form a nationwide organization. Therefore, the secret societies and underground

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workers organized themselves more or less on a local basis, so that when the news of liberation broke out, every Tom, Dick, and Harry came out and said, "Me, too!" There is a humorous side in every life. A short time after the American occupation, General Hodge requested the Korean organizations to send two representatives each, for a conference. There were one hundred and eight Koreans at that meeting. The next day the press reported that there were fifty-four parties represented. But the truth of the matter was that Koreans did not abide by the rule of two from each organization, but practically every political or social leader in the capital attended the conference. To you, it is confusing to hear of so many political parties in Korea, but the fact is that there are only three main groups, conservatives, liberals, and radicals with their subordinate organizations and satellites. These three groups will compete for power until a government is formed, which is quite natural in every democratic nation. Instead of according Korea independence outright, in December, 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, and Great Britain, met at Moscow and decided to put Korea under a Four-Power Trusteeship (including China) for a period of five years. According to this agreement, a joint commission composed of the representatives of the Soviet and the American Commands in Korea was to assist in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government by consulting with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. A few days after this announcement, Secretary of State Byrnes in his address to the nation said: "The joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean provisional democratic government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to

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hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations." This statement gave some comfort to the disappointed people of Korea. However benevolent the purpose of the Allies may have been, all Koreans, including the communists, were disappointed over the Moscow decision. They knew their freedom was deferred once more. They are also human beings like the Americans and the Russians, but they have had t o swallow their pride and accept the edict of the Great Powers. T h e Koreans hoped the Moscow decision would work out their independence as soon as possible, but the j o i n t Soviet-American Commission was not a harmonious one. They had too many disagreements among themselves and they could not c a r r y out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement. They could not even agree on a definition of democracy. T h e conference of the j o i n t Commission finally broke down and adjourned indefinitely on M a y 8th of last year. According to an American report, one of the chief causes of the breakdown of the conference was t h a t Soviet members insisted t h a t those Korean political leaders who opposed the Moscow decision should be eliminated f r o m consultation in the formation of a Korean provisional government, while the American members insisted t h a t all Korean political parties should be consulted. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , no Korean liked trusteeship. Even the Communist P a r t y in Southern Korea a t first planned to stage a demonstration against trusteeship but later cancelled this plan. Whether communistic, liberal, or conservative, the Korean does not want his freedom postponed. If Korea is to have a democracy, no Korean should be deprived of his political rights because of his ideology and

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belief. By nonfulfillment of the terms of the Moscow Agreement, the trusteeship is automatically nullified. More than one year after the coming of the liberators, Korea still does not have her freedom and independence. There is no authority in Korea except Soviet and American authorities. There is no unity in Korea, it being impossible under the two rules of conflicting ideologies. No Korean leadership can be developed under existing conditions. Korea today is in a confusion of power politics, political muckraking, intrigues and connivances for power, riots, and disorders. The Korean independence movement is on the Soviet-American merry-go-round. Besides political chaos, the country is still divided in two: the 38th parallel is just as distinct as an international boundary line, which is patrolled by Soviet troops on one side and American soldiers on the other. The one indivisible nation is divided into a Russian-Korea and an AmericanKorea. Consequently, the social and economic life of the country is also sadly disrupted. What freedom do the Koreans have if they cannot move around in their own count r y to go about their pursuit of happiness? Korea has become the victim of the clash between two Allied Powers. For the purpose of giving Koreans greater responsibilities in governing South Korea, the U. S. Government and Military Government are planning to establish a Korean legislative body which will be the counterpart of the People's Committee in the Russian zone. I know America has a sincere desire to hasten the independence of Korea and that it is forced to choose this substitute measure instead of a provisional government for the whole of Korea, which is impossible because of the Soviet-American disagreements. We must recognize the fact that this emergency measure does not alter the situation, that the house

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of Korea remains divided, and the freedom of the people is far from complete. In Korea, not only is there no self-determination but there is no freedom from fear. Soviet-American determination and not self-determination is the basis of establishing Korean independence. Korea is the only spot in the world where the two greatest powers, Soviet Russia and America, face each other alone fully armed. It is the place where they could demonstrate their co-operation and their leadership. It is where they could compromise their differences for the welfare of a small nation. It is where they could save the Atlantic Charter. And it is where they could prove that they respect the rights of small nations. The underprivileged peoples of Asia are watching the Soviet-American drama being staged in the Land of Morning Calm. If the Allies fail to fulfill their expressed aims, they are not only endangering world peace, security, and justice, but they are defaulting in their debts to those who are dead and maimed in "the war of liberation." Unless the great powers respect the small nation's right to self-determination, the world will go back to the old order of "might makes right." Any power that tries to impose its will upon the weak is a reactionary that gambles with human security in this atomic age. Korea welcomes the friendly assistance of the United States and Soviet Russia in building a firm foundation for her independence, but she refuses to be under anyone's sphere of influence or to become anyone's satellite. I still firmly believe that America and Russia, regardless of their conflicting views, have a sincere desire to see a free and prosperous Korea, and I know they are working hard. Since they have friendly intentions for Korea, they must

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sacrifice their differences for their own good and the good of Korea. Settlement of the Korean problem will furnish a solution for some of the Soviet-American discord. If common-sense statesmanship is applied in the case of Korea, the solution will not be difficult, but lies in granting Korea unconditional independence and letting her choose whatever form of government she wants. Major General Archer L. Lerch, the American Military Governor, has said repeatedly that Korea is ready for self-government. I hope North Korea, too, is ready for self-government. The very position of Korea calls for a government of nonRussian, non-American, and non-Chinese influence. Russia often expresses its desire to have a friendly Korean government. That is natural, but Russia need not be afraid of an unfriendly Korea. Suppose Korea were unfriendly, what could that poor little country do to great big Russia? Friendship is made with good will and not by force. The truth is that Korea, for her own security, wants the friendship of all nations, but she will not sacrifice her self-respect and honor to please any nation. On several occasions, through The Voice of Korea, I made the following suggestions for the solution of the Korean problem. I think they still hold true. Let me repeat them: 1. In order to reestablish unified economic and political development, the unnatural boundary at the 38th parallel should be removed immediately and unconditionally. 2. A Korean provisional government should be formed by the Korean leaders who lived through the Japanese oppression in Korea without any interference from the Soviet and American commands and the

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Korean political leaders repatriated since VJ Day, 1945, thereby eliminating international power politics. 3. Korea is not an enemy nation and occupation is not necessary. Therefore, all Soviet and American armed forces should be withdrawn simultaneously from Korea immediately after the formation of a provisional government, but no unilateral evacuation should take place. 4. The provisional government should have sole right to select such foreign advisers and technicians as Korea may need in rebuilding her national life and to dismiss those who do not properly serve Korea's national interest or whose services are no longer needed. 5. The inviolability of Korean sovereignty and independence should be guaranteed jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain, and they should further pledge not to seek any special privileges in Korea, political or economic. These are the fundamentals of the solution of the Korean question. There is no other way out of that delicate spot, which holds the key to the solution of the whole Asiatic problem. By this just settlement, Korean independence is accomplished, the Soviet-American commitments fulfilled, Soviet-American prestige saved, and oft-mentioned Russian security in the East is guaranteed. Korea's neighbors need a strong, independent Korea and not a puppet. History has proved to us that as long as Korea was strong, neither China nor Russia was menaced by Japan. If the self-appointed guardians of that unhappy nation cannot agree to discharge their duty on the basis mentioned, the case should go before the international bar of

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justice, the United Nations. For the general security of the world, the case of Korea must be settled without further delay. The torch of liberty is still burning in every Korean heart. The task of the realization of Korean independence is American as well as Korean because if we want to have a lasting peace in this small world of today, the rights and freedom of any small nation cannot be denied. We cannot surrender to evil forces that which will destroy our hard-earned freedom and security. We cannot compromise with or appease anyone at the expense of justice. When there is no justice, there will be no human freedom and security. For world freedom and for world security, Korean freedom cannot be stifled. The United States is committed to Korean independence. On August 30, 1946, the United States Government once more solemnly pledged to fulfill its commitments to Korea and to stand by until her independence is achieved. I know it will not fail.

NATIONALIST

MOVEMENTS

IN S O U T H E A S T

Rupert

ASIA

Emerson *

A L T H O U G H V J Day is by now more than a year behind us, it is still impossible to undertake a detailed and objective analysis of the nature, strength, and significance of the basically revolutionary movements which have Southeast Asia in their grip. The notorious iron curtain obscures not only Eastern Europe, but much of Southeastern Asia also despite the fact that no accusation can be made that the latter area is in the grip of the Soviet Union. For whatever reason, we are still only getting trickles of news from Burma and the Indies and Indochina, and these trickles are not ample enough to give us the basic material on which analysis could rest. In the Netherlands Indies—the major political unit in Southeast Asia—there is still a confusion of British and Dutch military authorities as well as the self-proclaimed Indonesian Republic; in Indochina an obscure struggle is still being carried on between the Annamese Viet-nam regime and the French authorities; and in • Professor of Government, Harvard University; former Director, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior; author of Malaysia.

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Burma a corner of the curtain was lifted for a moment in midsummer to disclose an alleged state of virtual anarchy. Even in the Philippines, where accession to independence has been adequately marked in the press, there is much which is still obscure in the structure of the Roxas regime and in the warfare with the Hukbalahap. For a brief period after the Eastern empires of the West had first been swept into the Japanese orbit it was a commonplace that the old colonial system had gone for good, and that in this sphere, as indeed elsewhere, the coming of the brave new world was so indisputable as barely to need further comment than an elaboration of its detail. Imperialism had come to an end, the prestige of the white man was lost forever, and, under international auspices, still to be created but hardly to be doubted, the former colonies of Southeast Asia would press ahead toward vigorous independence. This mood lasted for all too brief a period. B y the time the war was ended other more absorbing concerns had caught our attention, and the flush of realization that an old order was doomed had both receded from active consciousness and had become somewhat tarnished by the widely prevailing doubts and skepticisms. It was, therefore, with only a rather minor shock that we saw VJ D a y followed more or less immediately by the effort of the British, the French, and the Dutch to reestablish themselves in the colonies which had been wrested from them. New colonial and imperial programs were indeed put forward, but they were not of a character to lend any firm assurance that they represented much more than a sugar coating, 1946 model, for the old pill. The United Nations came into being, but the Charter, despite occa-

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sional brave words, in no way seriously impinged on colonialism as it had been practised in the past and promised no more effective supervision of colonial areas than had the League. Both the Charter and the actions of the imperial powers were, in fact, in striking keeping with the reticence of the Allied statesmen during the war in squaring their general and frequent professions of love for freedom with the issues confronting them in the colonial world. The memory of the native inhabitants of the colonial areas of Southeast Asia, however, appears to have been less brief. The available evidence indicates that the Dutch who first landed in the Indies under the auspices of the British military confidently expected to be greeted with open arms by the Indonesians. Instead, they found their claim to gratitude for liberation rejected and their claim to governing authority ignored by an Indonesian government which held de facto power over Java and some other parts of the Indies. In Indochina, the north, by international agreement, was occupied by Chinese forces, and the south by the British military, but the returning French authorities found themselves forced into a double process of warfare and negotiation with the Annamese, as well as with the Cambodians and the Siamese. The re-entry of the British into Malaya met less opposition than was encountered elsewhere, but a series of strikes, local upheavals, and racial clashes seriously delayed the establishment of an orderly administration on the new model laid out in Whitehall. If the Americans encountered no Filipino opposition on their reappearance in the Philippines, there were, however, grave rumblings of future dissensions and a number of local struggles. In brief, the readiness of the Western world to forgive and forget was not matched by an equal

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complacency on the p a r t of the Southeast Asians who well remembered that a new world was supposed to be in the making. The discussion of the issues and problems involved in the upheaval in Southeast Asia is not made any simpler by the vigor and heat which they normally arouse among those who feel they have any stake in the outcome. The movements for independence, here as in other parts of the world, have the effect of upsetting the established order of the world, and therefore encounter the resistance of all those who seek to maintain the status quo. Furthermore they gravely threaten the continuance of private and public vested interests which have been profitable in the past and which look with dismay on a profitless future. These interests cannot be regarded as solely economic: they include also the considerable body of civilian and military authorities who in the past have had responsibility f o r the area. In addition the imperial powers themselves are highly sensitive to criticism—particularly so after the strain of a long war during which their homelands have either been occupied or under severe attack—and they tend to regard the mere existence of the nationalist movements as slurring their good name and faith. The situation is even further complicated by the charge that the nationalist leaders, abusing the trust of their innocent and misguided followers, are really only tools of Moscow's Bolshevism and found their most effective inspiration and encouragement in the days of Japan's rule. In its occasional extreme form the latter accusation contends that the natives of these colonial areas were with rare exceptions loyal to and content with the prewar imperial systems and that it is the Japanese who have created these Quisling nationalist movements for their own evil purposes.

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On the other side, the contrary tendency is to see the nationalist movements as the bearers of all t h a t is good, democratic, and progressive, whereas their imperial opponents represent the forces of evil, fascism, and exploitation. Substantially no good is to be found in the work of the imperial powers, and any plea for an extension of time to complete unfulfilled tasks in colonial areas is seen as an obvious and irrefutable demonstration of the unwillingness of the alien rulers to relax their greedy capitalist hold on peoples who would otherwise blossom forth in fresh and democratic vigor. T o the adherents of this creed, immediate independence f o r the clamorous nationalists of Southeast Asia will spell a long step in the direction of the peace of the world, of the prosperity of their inhabitants, and of the development of international trade. Insofar as American opinion makes itself heard a t all on the affairs of these distant and unfamiliar places its tendency is to side with this l a t t e r view. Although the government moves considerably more cautiously, tending here as elsewhere to side with the established forces of law, order, and propriety, the American public is inclined to stay within the orbit of the ideas of the Declaration of Independence and of the liberal doctrines and practices of the Nineteenth and earlier Twentieth Centuries with their sympathy for the underdog, their endorsement of national self-determination, and their condemnation of imperialism. F r o m these attitudes there comes a contradictory and somewhat stultifying state of affairs: the public voice of the United States, except f o r the government, is heard in frequent denunciations of the imperial powers and their efforts to reestablish something approaching the old colonial status while the official governmental voice is generally conciliatory to the powers t h a t be (or t h a t were)

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and is at best lukewarm toward the aspirations of the subject peoples. In consequence the imperial powers are habitually irritated by criticism which they regard as illfounded and irresponsible, particularly coming from a country which is itself adequately endowed with color and colonial problems, whereas the colonial nationalists, carrying on a life and death struggle in one form or another, fail to secure the support which the American public appears in words to be offering them. The inevitable end result is that the amorphous American goodwill for all concerned is interpreted as real friendship by none. America's current official conservatism does not go f a r enough to endear it to the harassed imperial powers, nor does its unofficial liberal tradition produce enough concrete results to win it the trust of the native nationalists and their supporters in such countries as India, China, and the Soviet Union. T o change this unhappy situation it is essential to secure a more balanced view of the struggles under way in Southeast Asia and to seek a closer reconciliation of the general public view and the attitudes officially adopted by the government. With a new world power and responsibility thrust upon us we have a strong tendency—historically explicable but no less confusing to the rest of the world—to head off in two directions at once. In these circumstances it is obviously necessary to recanvass the situation and in the light of the best information and analysis available to shape a single view and policy on the basis of which we can safely and intelligently act. A first necessity is to break away from any illusion that the problem which confronts us in Southeast Asia is a simple one which can be laid out in stark black and white. I t is possible to arrive at a balanced judgment con-

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cerning it, but only after there is full recognition that the problem itself is shot through with complexities, incalculables, and uncertainties. It will immediately be found that both the extreme approaches must be abandoned. It is possible neither to dismiss the nationalist movements as Japanese or Communist inspired, nor to hail them as the indisputable bearers of democracy, peace, and prosperity. The charge that basically the nationalist movements of Southeast Asia can be written off as phenomena brought to life by the Japanese and owing their vitality to a J a p anese inspiration which may soon be expected to dwindle away can be dismissed as almost wholly without substance. Leaving aside the Philippines whose vigorous pleas for independence have been well known to us over the half century since we occupied the islands, it is very clearly written on the historical record that Burma, Siam, Indochina, and the Netherlands Indies have all been moving toward a fullscale and dynamic nationalism for the last three or four decades. It is of no moment whether the Russo-Japanese W a r of 1904-05 or some other arbitrary date be taken as the formal starting point for the nationalist surge: the two decades of uneasy peace between the great world wars were filled with the clamor of rising nationalisms which governments moved both to suppress by forcible measures and to conciliate by the introduction of political and economic reforms. It is certainly not to be denied that Communist influences were at work in these decades and left some imprint on the movements, but virtually all available evidence would indicate that the Third International merely served to sharpen grievances which were already felt and to broaden and somewhat divert the channels in which established movements were already flowing. Furthermore, the

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high point of direct Communist influence appears to have been reached toward the end of the 1920's and in the succeeding decade the indigenous character of the movements was even more clearly evident than before. But it is essential to recognize that at all times the nationalists were building on local foundations and were responding to the increasingly vocal needs of their own people. Lacking responsive friends elsewhere, it can be no matter of great surprise that many of the nationalists should have accepted gratefully the aid which came to them from Communist sources. In the more recent period the relationship with the J a p anese was of somewhat the same order, although here it was complicated by the already established reputation of J a p a n as itself an imperialist power and far more seriously by the years of Japanese domination. It cannot be without significance that the much advertised coprosperity sphere turned out in fact to be a sphere of increasing poverty and of shortages of both essential goods and of the minor luxuries to which the area had grown accustomed. Unquestionably, however, the Japanese talk of autonomy or independence for the different regions under their control combined with their utilization of local personnel in important political and economic posts to give many individuals and groups a new sense of their potentialities and their right to leadership. It would be absurd to attempt to deny that there were many in Southeast Asia who collaborated in one fashion or another with the Japanese but it would be even more absurd to attempt to judge such collaboration on the same normal basis as in the case of free European nations which fell before the Nazi armies. Where the recognized indigenous leaders of a country have for decades been carrying on a bitter struggle for inde-

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pendence from alien rulers it cannot be regarded as inherently evil that they should collaborate f o r their own purposes with a new invader who holds out glittering promises to them. A n d f o r the masses of the people it is a plausible assumption t h a t they accepted with little more than a shrug of their fatalistic shoulders the exchange of one set of remote masters f o r another. T h e basic importance f o r the countries of Southeast Asia of the period of war and conquest is surely to be found rather in the general turmoil and in the overturn of all established institutions and assumptions than in any of the specific utterances or actions of the Japanese. T h e nationalism of this area, like nascent nationalisms elsewhere, is essentially a response to the impact of Western ideas and the economic and political reconstitution of the old traditional world. E x c e p t f o r the entire industrial and ideological revolution brought to Southeast Asia by the Western world, no event or series of events can compare with W o r l d W a r I I as an instrument f o r the revolutionizing of the human spirit in such countries as Burma or the Indies. Y e t it must be emphasized again that the revolution which took place, and whose effects must be regarded as permanent in character, was one which essentially served only to strengthen forces which were already in motion, to crystallize sentiments which were still somewhat inchoate, and to draw more of the masses into a conscious national existence. N o t only a few leaders but now the masses as well began to feel that dynamic sense of changing national destinies which had hitherto been confined to the relatively small groups—notably intellectuals, professional men, and industrial workers—which had more significantly felt the impact of the modern Western world. T h e measurement of the extent and strength of national

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sentiment is a difficult proceeding a t any time, and p a r ticularly so in societies which are largely illiterate and which are still in the midst of transition from the prenationalist to the nationalist era. The decisive criterion must be the leadership which the mass of the people are prepared to follow in time of crisis when the issues are placed squarely before them to be answered not by words but by action. I f , f o r example, there are in the Indies competing claims p u t f o r w a r d by, say, Dutch authorities, native nationalists, the old nobility, Moslem leaders, and Communists, the result will hinge on the effectiveness of the popular s u p p o r t which each may be able to secure. I t is obvious t h a t the movements toward independence now have a markedly greater mass backing than they had a t any time before the war, but it will be some time before we can arrive a t a well-balanced judgment as to how deep into the people they have reached. The stage of development arrived at, as well as the tempo of advance, varied f r o m country to country in the prewar era, and the v a r y ing effects of occupation and reoccupation have produced f u r t h e r differentiation. Due both to the long period of Spanish rule and to the effects of Christianity, the Filipinos had advanced f u r t h e r in national sentiment and organization t h a n any of the other peoples. Next in rank would presumably be the Burmese who had attained some measure of self-government under the British but were clamorous f o r more. Indochina had seen grave outbreaks against French rule, and the Dutch in the Indies had coupled stern repressive measures with compromise and conciliation. I n British M a l a y a nationalism had virtually no p o p u l a r hold except among some of the Chinese whose point of attachment was, however, r a t h e r China t h a n Malaya.

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T h e evidence which has passed since Japanese surrender leads in the main to the view that in Burma, Indochina, and the Indies it is the nationalist leaders who can now command a mass following. T h e contention that the people are really indifferent or are loyal to the old colonial regime is as suspect as the often repeated charge that the Filipinos really did not want independence: the repeated and overwhelming response of Filipino voters to whatever p a r t y appeared to offer the most and the quickest independence should be answer enough. Y e t it must still be the case that there are considerable segments of the peoples of Southeast Asia who are still sufficiently remote from the present political agitations to render the battle cries and symbols meaningless to them. In p a r t such people might be the scattered inhabitants of islands remote from the centers of action or forest or mountain dwellers cut off from the main streams of l i f e ; but another considerable p a r t is made up of the varied minority groups which will a t no time find easy absorption into the new national communities which are shaping themselves. T h e problem which these minorities pose must prove to be an increasingly serious one, threatening f o r Southeast A s i a the type of continuous conflict with which we are all too familiar in E a s t e r n and Southeastern Europe. A s in the case of E u r o p e , two principal categories of minorities can be distinguished: those whose affiliations reach beyond the country or the area and hence are likely to create international complications, and those who have no clear ties outside their own locality. In the first category by f a r the most important element is made up of the Chinese, whose members run to several millions, who are scattered throughout the entire area, and who are everywhere regarded with some degree of suspicion and hostility both

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because of their cultural separateness and because of their economic strength. Nationalist Siam and, to a less degree, the Philippine Commonwealth in the years preceding the war discriminated against the Chinese; racial cleavages appear to have been much intensified in Malaya during the Japanese occupation; and there have been reports of recent attacks upon the Chinese in J a v a . Since the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in the past been counted among the most loyal and wealthiest supporters of Chinese nationalism at home, it is only to be expected that if China should achieve strength and unity she would be prepared to intervene on their behalf, and it is even conceivable that a future Chinese imperialism might seek to reach out in the same southward direction as the Japanese. For present purposes it is an added threat to the tranquillity of Southeast Asia that the Chinese are divided sharply among themselves into those who have come to regard the southern regions as their true home, those who support the Communist creed, and the adherents of the Kuomintang. The local minority peoples are normally much more difficult to delimit and define with the same certainty because their degree of difference from the dominant nationality is far smaller, and it remains largely a matter of guesswork whether they will, soon or late, be more or less indistinguishably absorbed into it. In the case of the Netherlands Indies the principal official statistical report lists fortyeight separate "nationalities, races, and tribes," and the separation of islands by great stretches of water serves to perpetuate differences and to make even more difficult the creation of a single national community. From the scanty published reports on the negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians it appears that one of the breaking points has been the inability to agree on the geographical

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division between the areas which would have a greater degree of Indonesian control as against those which would remain more closely under the Dutch. In Indochina the conversations between the Annamese and the French have come up against the same stumbling block with Cochin China as the first point of contention but with the fate of the Cambodians and Laotians also a t stake. In the Philippines the key problem of this type has been t h a t of the Moros whose Mohammedanism divides them from the Catholic Filipinos. In Burma there is potential international conflict over the f a t e of the large Indian population and interests as well as a large internal minority problem caused by the presence of the Karens, Shans, and other peoples distinct from the Burmese. Of Malaya it can be said on this general score t h a t the country presents nothing but a minority problem since the Chinese and Malays are almost equally balanced in numbers, and there is an Indian community of some magnitude, not to mention the Europeans and other miscellaneous groups. This complex tangle of peoples throughout Southeast Asia immediately opens the door to a magnificent game of divide and rule, and promises to plague the life of any independent regimes which may be established. I t will require the greatest tolerance and moderation—more than has been shown in the Western world except on the rarest occasions—to safeguard the minority groups from oppression and to produce national communities which can live in peace within themselves. This single question of minority peoples will serve to indicate t h a t no easy road lies ahead of Southeast Asia. If there are any who expect Utopias to arise as empires are dissolved, they are doomed to grave disappointments. Too often there is a tendency to slide easily over the f a c t

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that freedom has different arid sometimes incompatible meanings. There is, sadly, no necessary correlation whatsoever between freedom for the nation and the sense of independence and freedom for the individual or group within the nation in the sense of democracy. It is eminently possible that independence may be achieved for the countries of Southeast Asia, but that democracy and respect for individual rights would have less substantial existence than they have had under imperial control. The nineteenth century faith in the all-conquering sweep of democracy has grown somewhat dim among us, and even though we may believe in its ultimate triumph we are very deeply aware that the true life of democratic institutions requires far more than paper constitutions. To name only a few of the elements which must go into democracy, there must be a deep respect for the individual and his inherent dignity and there must be a general sense of equality among men. There must be in the society a strong sense, not of a fatalistic yielding to nature and to power, but of the rightful and possible control of social destiny by man. In the mass of the ordinary people there must be a knowledge of their rights, as well as of their obligations, and a readiness to stand up and fight for them. For myself I can only express my gravest doubts as to whether the background and tradition and experience of the peoples of Southeast Asia have been such as to instill these beliefs and qualities into them. Instead of democracy as we know it, there is good reason to think that we may find in Southeast Asia dictatorships or quasi dictatorships which, perhaps in the name and under the symbols of democracy, will establish a ruling elite to control peoples used not only to being led but even to being pushed around. The international pressures which

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will presumably be bearing down on Southeast Asia and the need for close governmental management of the economies of each of the countries will work to generate f u r t h e r forces tending in the direction of the one-party state run by a small clique of insiders. The experience of Siam and even some aspects of the Philippine Commonwealth do not give much encouragement to the hope t h a t the p a t h of independence f o r the nation leads directly on toward democratic freedom f o r the human beings who compose the nation. There is also reason to fear a backsliding in many of the things which the West has brought to Southeast Asia and in which it can take a peculiar pride. In such fields, for example, as medicine and sanitation, engineering, and communications, it is probable t h a t the advanced standards of quality and efficiency which have been introduced by the colonial governments and by the large Western economic enterprises will undergo, at least temporarily, a serious decline. But this decline, unless there is real and permanent retrogression, may shortly come to be more than counterbalanced by the f a c t t h a t the actions and policies of the new national regimes will be rooted in the local soil rather than imposed from outside with little more than a mechanical and hiredman participation in them by the local people. I t is one of the most striking characteristics of colonial societies t h a t they are composed of distinct s t r a t a and layers with sharply differing modes of life and thought. A m a j o r task which lies ahead for the societies which are demanding the end of their colonial status is to take over into themselves and to a d a p t into their own social patterns the concepts and techniques, the tools and methods, which should be their continuing heritage from the West. Through their control of the educational systems—all too meagerly

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developed by the colonial governments—they will be able to shape their own future lives and to attempt the integration which has on the whole been so lacking up to the present time. These fears as to the future of democracy and civil rights, the handling of minorities, and the continuance of scientific advance are a few of the many problems which must be faced frankly in any consideration of independence for the countries of Southeast Asia. For us now there is the further question as to whether we as individuals and the government of the United States as our representative should take a hostile attitude toward the national claims which are now being so vigorously pressed. In the real world issues must be decided not by weighing perfection against imperfection, but by seeking to strike a just balance between imperfections. To do so in the colonial sphere requires the acceptance or rejection of certain moral values and hypotheses. First among these, is the proposition that the rule of any people over another people against the will of the latter is evil and undesirable. This is not to say that no good results can flow from such a relationship because, on the contrary, it is demonstrable that the peoples of Southeast Asia, like those of other colonies, have received many tangible benefits. But, at the least, any colonial system is to be judged by its success in creating the conditions under which it can most speedily and effectively withdraw, leaving the former colony to the management of its own affairs. Furthermore, a period of diminishing returns sets in in colonial matters at a rather earlier stage than is frequently asserted. There is a relatively sharp limit to the amount of tutelage which any community is prepared to accept and is in fact able to profit from. I should be the last to pretend

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that this limit can easily be set on a calendar basis, but it can be judged with considerable accuracy in terms of the opposition which a colonial government encounters. When the stage is reached at which the leading elements of the local community, those elements which are peculiarly the product of the contact with the imperial power, are generally in a state of open disaffection, then the time has come to bring the period of tutelage to an end. The issue is not to be posed in terms of the question as to whether the colony has reached the stage of perfection which the political scientist or economist would set out as the ideal picture of what a Western state or community should be, but on the basis of comparison with other actual states and communities whose independence is unquestioned and in terms of the likelihood that further significant progress would be made under colonial auspices. If the future under the imperial system promises from all available evidence to be dominated by increasing and increasingly bitter conflict between the newly rising leaders of a consciously national community and the representatives of the imperial power, then it is fundamentally in the interest of all concerned, as well as of the world at large, to set the wheels in motion for independence. On these counts the United States has acted wisely in carrying through its long-announced program for Philippine independence. Substantially the same conditions now exist in the Indies, Indochina, and Burma—of the countries of Southeast Asia only Malaya appears to justify the continuance of imperial authority. To those who doubt the ability of these countries to manage their affairs peaceably and progressively the answer must be that it is only by working out their own destinies and finding their own level that they can achieve salvation. The time has passed when

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they will accept with docility the overawing prestige of the white man and allow him to dictate the tenor of their lives. If there are to be backslidings, if there are to be conflicts of the type which threaten the future of India, these are matters which only the peoples of the several countries can settle for themselves: any other solution will be one which is imposed upon them from outside, and is therefore unstable, or is merely a postponement of the inevitable day of reckoning. The counterproposition that empires should be held as long as there is force enough to hold them can only be maintained by those who are prepared to contend that the power to run other people's lives and the profits to be gained therefrom are adequate justification for the denial of freedom. The United States has a very real choice to make. As the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world the way in which it swings, or fails to swing, cannot help but have a vast influence on developments in every corner of the world. If our wealth and our strength have in fact made us the most conservative of the powers then we may count upon a speedy seeping away of that reservoir of good will of which Wendell Willkie once spoke; and we may be sure too that other reservoirs, not representing our way of life, will be drawn upon to furnish the support which we deny. If, on the other hand, we stand by the honorable traditions of our past, we can utilize our wealth and our strength, working as f a r as possible through the channels of the United Nations, to aid in the building of free countries in Southeast Asia which will know the United States as a democracy which practices what it preaches.

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Ralph J. Bunche *

T H E institution of colonialism encircles the globe. The destinies of at least one-seventh of the world's peoples are directly controlled by it. B u t in no area of the world is the problem of colonies in a more acute stage than in the Pacific. The peoples of the Pacific have had a long and firsthand experience with colonialism. There is abundant evidence of strong feeling on their p a r t that Western imperialism in the F a r E a s t has played out its string and that the colonial peoples of that region are now entitled to a new era of political, economic, and social freedom. I t is, in my judgment, no rash statement that any firm foundation for peace in the Pacific must include a reassurance to the Asiatic peoples—a reassurance backed by convincing ac* Director,

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tion—that Pacific colonialism is in the process of liquidation and that the colonial and semicolonial peoples of the F a r East will henceforth have a fair opportunity to realize their aspirations in a secure and peaceful world. The colonial peoples have a great stake in the attainment of an enduring peace. There can be little doubt as to the kind of peace most of humanity longs for. It must be an enduring peace, involving good faith and mutual self-respect among nations and peoples, affording the opportunity for a mutilated universe to heal its wounds, and ensuring a world in which there will be a maximum of freedom—freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of self-determination, freedom of the press, thought, and religion, and freedom from racial bigotries. This is the sort of world, surely, that all articulate, peace-loving peoples with a free voice will demand of their governments and statesmen. It unfortunately happens, however, that in this modern world there are several hundreds of millions of peoples—a large proportion of whom are in the Pacific—who undoubtedly have aspirations in the postwar era which are similar to these, but who, because of their status as peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories—of colonies, territories, possessions, protectorates, and mandates—have no direct voice in international councils, and are likely to exert only a meager influence, or no influence at all, on the policies of the governments and statesmen which represent them in such gatherings. Yet these are peoples, millions of whom made their valiant and vital contributions and sacrifices in behalf of the common victory in the recent war, and whose homes, fields, and towns felt the reckless devastation wrought by war. They

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had much to lose if the evil forces of Berlin and Tokyo had triumphed. Their hopes were lifted high by the promises of the Atlantic Charter, the F o u r Freedoms, and the victories of Allied arms. They are mainly nonwhite peoples, but by no means exclusively so, since there are substantial white elements in many of the territories. I t is, indeed, an oversimplification to regard the colonial problem as primarily a racial problem. They inhabit territories which are diversified in nature. Some of them, as Indonesia, Indochina, and Malaya, are large and rich in resources—material and human. Others are tiny with meager resources, human and otherwise. They are in varying stages of cultural and political advancement. Some may quickly be enabled to stand alone; others may require tutelage and assistance f o r prolonged periods. These hundreds of millions of dependent peoples differ in no essential human characteristics from the peoples who enjoy independence. They are tillers of the soil, stevedores, miners, factory hands, artisans, white-collar workers, professionals, politicians, and even capitalists. In some places they may not seem overindustrious, judged by the work standards of the temperate zones, but they have had many odds against them, not the least of which are climate, poor nutrition, and meager incentive. Yet the burden of work in their territories is borne by them. They may often show an unfamiliarity with Western customs and mores—the standards by which too frequently they are egoistically judged. But by and large, their ways of life, their aspirations, their outlooks and reactions are much the same as those of peasant and laboring peoples everywhere, who constitute the mass of the world's inhab-

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itants. They chafe under political and economic disabilities. They eagerly wish to partake of the fruits of democratic institutions. Moreover, many of them, in fact most of them, are peoples with a venerable past, whose cultures and patterns of social organization have made and will continue to make many valuable contributions to world culture and history. There is ample evidence that they are essentially peaceloving peoples, although many have convincingly demonstrated their willingness and ability to fight for the right when called upon to do so. The war and postwar periods have witnessed numerous developments in the colonial world which are of more than casual significance. Shortly after the Japanese capitulation, armed conflict broke out in Indonesia between the British and Dutch troops and the Indonesian nationals—a conflict still unresolved. A violent disturbance of similar nature occurred in French Indochina, and there were rumblings of restiveness in other colonial territories. The Italians have been ejected from their African empire of Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, now being administered by the British under military occupation. The United States is in military occupation of the Pacific islands formerly administered by Japan under League of Nations Mandate. The Palestine problem is at the boiling point and its solution will require the wisdom of Solomon. The operation of the Mandates System, affecting fifteen territories, was, to all intents and purposes, suspended during the war. In any case, that system, in the eyes of many, had never fully lived up to its potentialities. The metropolitan states have become increasingly alert to the signals in the colonies, and empires are consequently in process of reorganization. The British have put into

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effect or have under consideration new and liberalized constitutions for numerous of their colonies, including Jamaica, Trinidad, Malaya, Ceylon, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Malta. The French have been undertaking a readjustment of the political structure of Indochina, have announced the integration of their Caribbean territories — Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana—with Metropolitan France, and are projecting an empire union. The Dutch are proposing to create a new empire federation in which their colonies would have equal partnership with the metropole. The future status of Indonesia continues to be the subject of negotiations. An agreement has been entered into between the United Kingdom and Trans jordan whereby that former mandate achieved its independence as an Arab state. The independent Philippine Republic was born July 4, 1946—a well-merited recognition of an heroic people. The war inevitably intensified the nationalist aspirations of most of the colonial peoples, and particularly so in Asia. Organized nationalist forces in many of the larger territories of the world today insistently demand a larger voice in the management of their own affairs. There is a new awareness on the part of the colonial peoples of their strategic and commercial importance to the world. Likewise the war graphically impressed upon the noncolonial world the vital importance of the colonies to the military successes of the United Nations, because of their strategic location, their manpower, their rubber, tin, quinine, sugar, copper, and other natural resources. No revolutionary developments affecting the future of the non-self-governing peoples have transpired in this first postwar year, but there is much that has happened that holds real promise for them. Despite the fact that the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories have no inter-

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national—and quite commonly no national—voice, their interests and aspirations have not been neglected in the planning f o r the peace. T h e f a c t is t h a t never before in history has the international community been so acutely aware of their problems and of the urgent need f o r constructive international action on their behalf. T h e subject was not discussed a t Dumbarton Oaks, but a t Y a l t a it was agreed t h a t a Trusteeship System to take the place of the Mandates System should be included on the agenda of the United Nations Conference on I n t e r n a tional Organization a t San Francisco. Accordingly, in the course of the San Francisco Conference searching attention was directed to international arrangements affecting the status and well-being of the non-self-governing peoples. I t was frankly recognized there t h a t the well-being of these peoples is a matter of p r o p e r international concern—a tendency which has become increasingly a p p a r e n t since World W a r I. This is quite understandable, in view of the f a c t t h a t so substantial a portion of the world's peoples live in colonies and other possessions, protectorates, and mandates. T h e United Nations Conference a t San Francisco has as its p r i m a r y objective the d r a f t i n g of a charter f o r a new international security organization which could maintain international peace and security by restraining wars and by working toward the eradication of their causes. There was a clear realization t h a t because of their resources, their potentiality as markets, their manpower, their s t r a tegic location, and their military weakness, the colonial territories are a f a c t o r to be reckoned with in building the peace. H i s t o r y records t h a t rivalries among nations, g r e a t and

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small, have developed over such areas in the past, and they have constituted sources of international friction which have contributed substantially to the fomenting of wars. I t was frankly recognized at San Francisco, therefore, t h a t the traditional humanitarian and exclusively national approach to the problem of colonies was not enough, t h a t it ignored the realities of today. I t was national and international self-interest as well as the moral pressure of humanitarianism which motivated the Charter provisions on Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories. I t is, then, in the broad interest of the peace and well-being of the world at large t h a t three of the nineteen chapters of the Charter are devoted to the non-self-governing peoples. Two of these three chapters—XII and X I I I — a r e devoted to the Trusteeship System, which is designed to take the place of the Mandates System of the recently dissolved League of Nations. The institution of the Mandates System following World W a r I marked a new development in the world's attitude toward colonialism. True, ever since Queen Isabella of Spain protested the exploitation of Indians in the New World at the end of the Fifteenth Century, the conscience of mankind has laboriously developed a somewhat vague awareness of a moral responsibility toward colonial peoples. In more recent times there have been romantic, Kiplingesque conceptions of the responsibility of the "civilized" world to what were known as the "backward" peoples—the concepts of the "white man's burden," and the "mission civilisatrice." Such concepts frequently meant little more than a race to save the soul of the native before death overtook him from disease or overwork. A t best these were merely moral responsibilities resting first on trading companies and later on individual nations engaged in building

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and maintaining empires. They were, however, an important stage in the maturation of the international conscience. The Mandates System, for the first time, introduced a new element of formal and direct international responsibility for the well-being of the peoples of the territories administered under mandate. A definite accountability to the organized international community was provided for, through the media of the annual reports submitted by the administering authorities to the Mandates Commission and the petitions considered by that Commission. Moreover, the Mandates System was predicated on the high moral principle—a principle well worth preserving—that weak and defenseless peoples and territories are not to be bartered and distributed among the victors in war. The Trusteeship System is a new system of international responsibility for such territories as may be placed under it—not merely a prolongation of the Mandates System. It differs from the Mandates System in many respects, not the least being its potentially greater scope and its broader functions. The principle of trusteeship involved in the new system as in the old is that of third-party or international responsibility—not the customary conception of the colonial power unilaterally recognizing a moral "trusteeship" on behalf of its colonial peoples. Whereas the application of the Mandates System was limited to the territories surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at the end of World War I, any Non-Self-Governing Territory can be placed under the Trusteeship System. The territories most immediately available for Trusteeship status are obviously the existing mandated territories and the territories to be detached from Italy and Japan as a result of World War II. But

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the Charter of the United Nations also provides t h a t colonies of other than enemy nations may be placed under Trusteeship, although only b y the voluntary action of the metropolitan states responsible f o r their administration. I t cannot be truthfully said that there is any imminent threat of a deluge of offers of this type. T h e new system, unlike the old, makes realistic allowances f o r security needs in the provision f o r the designation of strategic areas and in the discretion which the administering authority may exercise with respect to the defense needs of the territory. T h e Trusteeship System has an elasticity which was lacking in the Mandates System. I t avoids the rigid and artificial classification of territories into " A , " " B , " and " C " categories. E a c h T r u s t T e r r i t o r y is to be administered according to an agreement which presumably will be designed to fit the individual circumstances and needs of that territory. T h e international authority to be exercised under the Trusteeship System is substantial. A Trusteeship Council, acting under the authority of the General Assembly and composed of representatives of states administering T r u s t Territories and states having no such responsibilities—in equal number—is to be the directly responsible organ of the United Nations in the functioning of the Trusteeship System. I t is worthy of emphasis that in the Trusteeship Council, in contrast with the Permanent Mandates Commission, it is states which will hold membership and that those sitting in that Council will be official representatives of governments. T h e authorities administering T r u s t Territories are obligated to submit to the United Nations annual reports on conditions in the territories, the reports to be based on a

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questionnaire formulated by the Trusteeship Council. Petitions, either written or oral, concerning any Trust Territory and from any source may be received and examined by the United Nations. Moreover, the United Nations may undertake periodic visits to each Trust Territory for the purpose of checking on the spot conditions in the territory and the manner in which the trust is being discharged. Under the provisions of the Charter, the administering authority in a particular Trust Territory may be one or more states, or the United Nations itself. In this respect it will be recalled that a United States proposal for the disposition of the Italian colonies in Africa advanced in the Council of Foreign Ministers, is that they should be placed under international Trusteeship with the United Nations itself as administering authority. The Trusteeship agreement may provide for the automatic termination of Trusteeship status after a fixed term though it remains to be seen whether any agreement will do so. Unlike Article 22 of the League Covenant, which prohibited the establishment of fortifications and military or naval bases in Class " B " and "C" Mandates, and also banned the military training of the inhabitants for purposes other than police and local defense, the Charter permits such activities. Reflecting the contemporary preoccupation with security guarantees, Article 84 of the Charter charges the administering authorities in Trust Territories with the obligation to ensure that such territories shall play their part in maintaining international peace and security. To that end and for local defense and the maintenance of law and order, the administering authorities may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the Trust Territories.

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There are certain mechanical difficulties in connection with the creation of Trust Territories and the establishment of the Trusteeship Council which derive from the Charter itself. For example, the Charter (Article 79) provides that the "terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system . . . shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate. . . ." But the Charter does not provide a definition of the "states directly concerned," nor suggest any criteria or means of ascertaining them. This ambiguous provision, which had its origin at Yalta, has already been the subject of considerable debate in the London meetings of the Preparatory Commission and the General Assembly and will quite probably generate a good deal more when the first Trusteeship agreements come up for consideration. Again, the Charter (Article 86) provides that Members shall be elected to the Trusteeship Council for three-year terms whenever election is necessary to ensure that the total number of Members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between Members administering Trust Territories and Members having no such responsibilities. But the same Article also gives automatic and permanent membership on the Council to the states "mentioned by name in Article 23" (i.e., the Five Powers). It follows, therefore, that until some of the Five Powers become administering authorities over Trust Territories it is rather difficult to get the Trusteeship Council underway, since otherwise five other states would be required as administering authorities in order to create the essential balance. Fortunately for the Trusteeship Council's prospects, two of the Five Powers—the United Kingdom and France—are Mandatory

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Powers, and a third—the United States—is in military occupation of mandated islands. Thus far only two Trusteeship agreements have been transmitted to the United Nations. It is a matter of public knowledge, however, that several other such agreements — two of them involving the Pacific territories of New Guinea and Western Samoa—have been drafted and are the subject of diplomatic consultations among certain interested states. The Resolution on Non-Self-Governing Peoples adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at the First Part of its First Session in London, expressed unequivocally the desire of the General Assembly that the establishment of the Trusteeship Council should be expedited, and urged the Mandatory states to take steps, in consultation with other states concerned, to have Trusteeship agreements ready for the consideration of the General Assembly at the second part of its first session. It was recognized by the General Assembly that the mandated territories would be immediately the most available for transfer to the Trusteeship System since they already have an international status and the Mandatory Powers responsible for their administration cannot lay claim to ownership of them. In the Pacific the territories under mandate are New Guinea, administered by Australia; Nauru, administered by Australia on behalf of the United Kingdom and New Zealand; Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand; and the islands formerly mandated to Japan—the Carolines, Marianas, and Marshalls —now under military occupation by the United States. It is clearly a matter of considerable urgency that the Trusteeship agreements should be submitted to and approved by the General Assembly at the earliest possible

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date. T h e Trusteeship Council is the sole principal organ of the United Nations not j e t in operation. The organization of the United Nations cannot be completed until this Council comes into being. In view of the weaknesses of the Mandates System there has been an understandable tendency for many students of world affairs to cast a skeptical eye on the proposed new system of international supervision, particularly since it is an entirely voluntary system insofar as the territories to come under it are concerned. International public opinion may quite properly view with alarm any prolonged delay in implementing the Trusteeship chapters of the Charter. Moreover, there is a great obligation to the non-selfgoverning peoples whose interests can only be adversely served by delay in establishing the Trusteeship System. Delay in putting the Trusteeship System into operation deprives the peoples of the ultimate T r u s t Territories of the advantages which it is the intention of Chapters X I I and X I I I of the Charter t h a t they shall have. I n this regard, it is also of significance t h a t there is no longer any international machinery to deal with the mandated territories. The Permanent Mandates Commission was dissolved when the Assembly of the League of Nations held its final meeting in Geneva. The f a c t is t h a t there has been no international supervision of mandates administration a t all since 1939. I t is worthy of emphasis t h a t the effective operation of the Trusteeship System will depend in very large measure on the scope and substance of the Trusteeship agreements which the General Assembly will find it possible to approve. The Trusteeship provisions of the Charter are sufficiently flexible to afford a wide opportunity f o r imaginative and liberal action on the p a r t of those nations responsible f o r

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drafting the terms of Trusteeship. If they are drafted with vision they should be readily approved by the General Assembly and will put real teeth into the system of international supervision. It was recognized at San Francisco that in practice the Trusteeship System would not be likely to apply to very many of the great colonies of the world. Yet there was a widespread feeling that in the interest of the peace and well-being of the world at large there should be at least a limited accountability to the international community for all Non-Self-Governing Territories. As a result, Chapter X I of the Charter—the Declaration Regarding Non-SelfGoverning Peoples—was conceived. This Chapter of the Charter is unique in that it applies to all Non-Self-Governing Territories—all colonies, territories, and possessions —and incorporates a formal commitment on the part of administering states to submit to the United Nations information on the economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories under their control. The London Resolution on Non-Self-Governing Peoples requires the Secretary-General of the United Nations to summarize in his annual report all such information transmitted. The United States was the first among the nations having responsibilities for Non-Self-Governing Territories to submit to the United Nations the information required by Article 73 (e) of the Charter. The United States submitted this information in August of this year on behalf of all the territories and possessions which it administers, including Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and Samoa. Australia has transmitted similar information on Papua. The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations will present to the General Assembly at its forthcoming meeting a summary of the in-

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formation thus transmitted by the United States and Australia. Mention should be made of another important development of recent origin in the international approach to the problem of colonies—the regional advisory commission—a form of international co-operation on a regional basis. On March 9 , 1 9 4 2 , the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission came into existence with the purpose of encouraging and strengthening social and economic co-operation between the United States of America and its possessions and bases in the Caribbean area, and the United Kingdom and the British colonies in the same area. As an advisory body, this Commission was to make recommendations affecting the well-being of the non-self-governing peoples of the Caribbean to the two metropolitan governments. Quite soon after its inception, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission developed two auxiliary bodies to assist it in its work—the Caribbean Research Council and the West Indian Conference. The function of the Research Council has been to survey research needs in the area, to determine what research has been done, to arrange for the dissemination and exchange of the results of research, to provide for conferences between research workers, and to recommend what further research and co-operation should be undertaken. Of greater significance, perhaps, is the second auxiliary of the Commission—the West Indian Conference. This Conference, which meets in biennial sessions, is designed to provide a regular means by which the representatives of the Non-Self-Governing Territories may consult with each other and with representatives of the metropolitan governments on matters of common concern, and may submit to the Commission, and through it to the metropolitan gov-

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ernments, recommendations on such matters. The West Indian Conference, which has held two Sessions—one at Barbados in 1944 and one at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands of the United States in 1946—is a unique institution in the sense that it is the only officially sponsored international organization in which representative delegates of non-selfgoverning peoples have a formal opportunity to present their views and formulate their recommendations. In December 1945 the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission became a four-power Commission, now known as the Caribbean Commission, by the inclusion in its membership of France and the Netherlands on behalf of their Caribbean territories. While the Caribbean Commission has no organic connection with the United Nations, the new agreement for that Commission, recently initialled in Washington by the representatives of the four member governments, provides for full co-operation with the United Nations and the appropriate specialized agencies on matters of mutual concern, and for consultation with the United Nations with a view to defining the relationship which shall exist and ensuring effective co-operation between the two bodies. There is a present likelihood that the regional advisory commission may be employed in other areas of the world in which Non-Self-Governing Territories are an important factor, such as the Pacific and Africa. This is especially the case in the Southwest Pacific, where Australia and New Zealand are currently engaged in negotiations with other interested states looking toward the early establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission. There can be no doubt that the regional commission, despite the limitations inherent in its exclusively advisory role, constitutes a promising international means of dis-

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charging the obligation to promote the economic and social advancement of the colonial peoples. The United States is in full support of these international measures to improve the lot of the non-self-governing peoples. The role of the delegations of the United States at San Francisco and at London with respect to the formulation and implementation of Chapters X I , X I I , and X I I I of the Charter was one of initiative and constructive leadership. The United States is on record as supporting the earliest possible establishment of the Trusteeship Council, and it may be anticipated that it will advance or support such proposals as will expedite the operation of the Trusteeship System. The Government of the United States has supported a broad interpretation of the application of Chapter X I and has been the first nation to comply with the obligation to transmit information involved therein. The United States has consistently taken a role of leadership in the development of the Caribbean Commission and is favorably disposed toward the establishment of similar regional advisory commissions in other areas of the world where Non-Self-Governing Territories are numerous and important. The historic attitude of the United States on the subject of Non-Self-Governing Territories is discerned in the United States participation in the Congo Basin Conventions ; in the grant of independence to Cuba; in the Jones Act of 1916 foreshadowing the independence just attained by the Philippines; in the fifth of the Fourteen Points enunciated by President Wilson urging that colonies should be governed in the interest of their inhabitants, his advocacy of the principle of self-determination and of the Mandates System; and in the progressive development of local autonomy in Puerto Rico.

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I t is obvious, of course, that no miraculous results are to be anticipated from the operation of such mechanisms as the Trusteeship System and the regional commission, or from the application of the principles set forth in Chapter X I . I t may be recognized, quite frankly, that these are steps along the path of progress and nothing more—and the most advanced steps that could be taken at the time. If bolder steps are to be taken, they must be inspired by the pressure of enlightened international public opinion. In a very real sense, in view of the fact that subject peoples are involved, the true measurement of the effectiveness of these principles and mechanisms will be found in the extent to which they become, over the years, self-liquidating—no longer needed because their task has been so well performed. From the perspective of the non-self-governing peoples, international principles and mechanisms assume useful meaning only when they are translated into positive and beneficial action. Action, in the final analysis, must depend on the good faith expressed through the national policies of responsible governments. Constructive action must be designed primarily to help the non-self-governing peoples help themselves—to give them self-confidence and selfreliance. As the policies of governments breathe life into the provisions of Chapters X I , X I I , and X I I I of the Charter and develop the regional commissions into going concerns, there should result an unparalleled opportunity for the colonial peoples to realize their true aspirations and to exert an effective voice in the shaping of their future. Their aspirations are only those which are basic to a democratic life— an opportunity for all peoples, irrespective of race, color, creed, sex, or historical circumstance, to live up to their

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potentialities, to enjoy security, political freedom, respectable standards of living, and a full measure of t h a t universal respect for the individual and his group, of that human dignity, which is indispensable to honorable—and peaceful—relations among peoples. The non-self-governing peoples have an unchallengeable right to hope f o r a new life in the future. The United Nations is underwriting this right—in their interest and in the interest of the world at large.

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AMERICAN

SECURITY

IN T H E

POLICY

PACIFIC

Grayson Kirk *

I N order to appreciate the appallingly new and complex problems which confront the planners of future American security policy, one must have a sense of perspective. Only by remembering our past circumstances and the policies which we devised to deal with them can we understand fully the immensity of the changes which have been occurring and which threaten to continue to occur in the troubled years ahead. Throughout the greater p a r t of our national history we have enjoyed a situation relative to our national security which has been unparalleled in the history of any great state. Protected by wide oceanic barriers from dangerous proximity to the concentrations of power in Europe and Asia and untroubled by rival power centers in this hemisphere, the United States was free to "cultivate its own garden" without being obliged to give any serious thought * Professor of International Relations, Columbia University; Executive Officer, Security Commission, San Francisco Conference; author of Philippine Independence.

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to problems of national security which so harassed the statesmen of less happily situated countries. I t was enough f o r us to threaten interlopers with the bravado of the Monroe Doctrine as reinforced by a puny naval establishment based upon our own A t l a n t i c and Pacific coasts and bulwarked f u r t h e r by the principles of neutrality and nonintervention in the affairs of the Old World. W h a t was essentially a situation produced by geography and circumstance, we ascribed to the inherent superiority of our political institutions and the wisdom of our forefathers. W e saw no connection between our national security and the fragmentation of power in E u r o p e , and no protection in the pax Britannica imposed by the men-of-war which flew the Union J a c k . W e were thus spared from coping with the hard f a c t s of international life at an early national age. Political maturity has come upon us slowly. In time, we pushed our security barriers out a trifle from the coast to advanced naval base positions in near-by islands. F o r the Pacific, this meant that the N a v y had begun to develop strategic planning in terms of an outer defense line drawn from the Aleutians to Pearl H a r b o r and thence to Panama. Unfortunately, the symmetry of this defensive triangle was marred a t the outset by the f a c t that a t the same time as we acquired a base position at Hawaii we also acquired responsibility f o r the Philippines, and naval chiefs were left to worry over the problem of maintaining strength over a salient reaching across the Pacific almost to the doorstep of Asia and without strong points of any great potentialities in the archipelagoes which lay in the mid-Pacific waters between Manila and Honolulu. Small wonder that naval strategists were none too h a p p y over this long and essentially indefensible salient. E x c e p t for

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the probable support of British naval power in the China Sea, our position was essentially untenable vis-à-vis an attack from any great power. B u t there were at that time no great powers with sufficient Pacific naval strength to constitute a serious threat to this attenuated line of communications. In consequence, the United States saw no security problem involved in political developments in Japan or on the mainland. A t times, it has been suggested that our Open Door policy of the turn of the century was motivated to a considerable extent by the desire to keep the F a r E a s t free from Great Power expansionist developments which might have constituted a threat to ourselves. It is my own feeling that the H a y doctrine was not conceived as a security policy in any direct or primary sense; it stemmed rather from a mixture of other motives among which the desire for protection of commerce was dominant. There was also an element of nascent distrust of Japan and a sympathy for the struggles of the Chinese to maintain their independence against the sudden onslaught which had followed the treaty of Shimonoseki. Nearly a half century was yet to elapse before the United States would see any substantial threat of a security nature in political developments upon the mainland of Asia. It is unnecessary to lay emphasis upon the bewildering changes in the conditions of security which have occurred, and which make it necessary for us to revise completely all the old strategic concepts upon which our past Pacific security policy was postulated. The primary fact is that modern science and technology have greatly enlarged the zone across which a first-rate power can conduct a formidable military effort. T o appreciate fully the enormity of this innovation, one need only recall the magnitude of the recent military effort of the United States, and to recall

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further that it was applied almost simultaneously in the Asiatic and European theatres beyond our traditional oceanic barriers. When a powerful state can carry on a military enterprise on this gigantic scale at such tremendous distances from its sources of supply, then the nature of warfare—and of strategic planning in particular—has undergone a fundamental change which can be ignored by a state only at its peril. In other words, if the United States could carry on such an enterprise in the face of traditionally insuperable logistical difficulties, then a great power located beyond those same oceanic barriers equally could mass its strength in the future to launch a dangerously powerful attack against the mainland of the United States. This implication of our own great military effort has been pointed up since the end of the war by a vast amount of discussion—some of it quite misinformed—about the potentialities of long-range selfpropelled instruments of destruction carrying atomic war heads and capable of being directed accurately at a small area target thousands of miles away. Our imagination has been stimulated further by the spectacular increases in the flying range of great military aircraft. The war that could be fought by great industrial states ten years from now would be as different from the war of 1914 as that war was from the Hundred Years War. This enormous extension of the range of striking power of the great states naturally makes each superpower conscious of the need to push out its zone of predominant influence as far as possible from the metropole. Such a policy has two advantages; it facilitates defensive measures by extending the range of detection and interception devices, and it vitiates the actual striking power of an enemy state. In other words, this enlargement of a sphere of influence is

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vitally necessary if, as every strategist desires, a conflict of this kind is t o be kept t o a great extent away f r o m the act u a l terrain of his country. This principle of the outward extension of national security zones, dictated by the revolutionary changes in milit a r y technology, has forced the United States to be more interested t h a n ever before in political developments in Western E u r o p e , and in cultivating closer relations with our Canadian and L a t i n American neighbors. I n the Pacific, it means t h a t the United States—to use the traditional diplomatic phrase—"cannot remain indifferent" to political developments in the Asiatic rimland confronting us across t h a t ocean, and it means, f u r t h e r , t h a t the United States probably will feel t h a t it must follow the general principle of retaining a militarily predominant position across the entire Pacific north of the equator. Finally, it will mean t h a t such a position will need to be reinforced on the southern flank by close and friendly association with the states of the southwest Pacific region. One need only sketch out such a policy situation in its broadest outlines to realize the extent to which it breaks with our p a s t traditions. Also, one realizes a t once how complicated its political and military implementation would be. F o r the sake of clarity of argument, the latter point perhaps should be dealt with first. A first problem, of course, is t h a t of bases to complete a s t r o n g military chain across such a g r e a t ocean expanse. The changes in the nature of w a r f a r e outlined above have forced certain revisions in traditional views concerning such bases. F o r one thing, it is no longer true t h a t there is a military advantage to the possession of a strong insular base a d j a c e n t t o a g r e a t land mass. Such a base presents too definite a t a r g e t ; it may be too easily overwhelmed by

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a concentrated attack launched simultaneously from a number of points on the mainland. For example, the reversal of the position of the British Isles vis-à-vis the continent of Europe is as well known as it is serious. It follows from these same considerations that the bases of the future must be extensive in area if adequate safety is to be assured. It follows also from the new mobility of weapons that an excessive dispersal of strength among a great system of bases is likely to be a disadvantage rather than an asset. Finally, it is important that as many base areas as possible must be kept out of the hands of states which conceivably could be hostile at some future time. Specifically, if one applies these general principles to our problem in the Pacific, certain lines of probable security policy concerning bases emerge. It is clear that great military emphasis will be placed upon Hawaii and upon the Alaska-Aleutians area. It is equally clear that the Philippines, once a great liability, now become a great asset, as they are extensive in area and far enough—but not too far —from the Asiatic mainland. You will recall that at the time of the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act for the independence of the Philippines it was provided that when final independence became effective the United States would surrender control over all Philippine territory "including all military and other reservations of the government of the United States in the Philippines" except for such naval reservations and fueling stations as the President might designate. In other words, the attitude of 1934 was that we would not retain any military positions in the islands except for these naval fueling and supply stations. Today, the changed situation brought about by the war has forced a revision of policy. The two governments now seem to have accepted the view that it is desirable for the

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United States permanently to retain a strong military position in the islands, and negotiations toward this end apparently have been in process for some time. As yet, however, no formal announcement of final agreement has been made. This prospect invites one comment of a political rather than a military character. If, eventually, agreement is reached whereby the United States will be authorized, through a mutual defense pact, to maintain powerful military installations of all categories in the Islands, such a step may have serious political repercussions. As a young nation, filled with the ebullient nationalism of newly won independence, the Filipinos may soon come to feel that the presence of these installations constitutes a serious derogation to their sovereignty, and that, in actuality, they have little more than a kind of dominion status within the orbit of American power. If, at such a time, there seems no conceivable threat to Philippine independence anywhere on the horizon, this resentment will be capable of exploitation by local politicians, and the United States may have an awkward problem on its hands. Already, the rumblings of discontent over the continued presence of American occupation forces have been heard. At least, this aspect of the problem is one which we ought not overlook when we make our final arrangements with the Filipinos. The Japanese mandated islands present a far different problem. Because the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched from these islands, our strategists are likely to give them special consideration in their security planning. One alternative, of course, would be to follow up our conquest and occupation with outright annexation. From a military point of view, this would be the simplest solution, but its political consequences cannot be disregarded. For one

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thing, it would not be viewed in Britain as an ideal solution. In the words of a recent publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (British Security, London, 1946, p. 137) "If the United States takes the view that • . . she should eventually take charge of the ex-Japanese Pacific Islands, British opinion would probably acquiesce: but, in general, the feeling in the United Kingdom is that an agreement upon this is desirable between Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States." More serious, of course, would be the difficulty of squaring such a step with the nonaggrandizement pledge of the Atlantic Charter. Also, such a policy would tend to complicate our dealings with the other great powers for it would weaken our position in opposing their own expansionist tendencies. The alternative is some form of trusteeship under the United Nations Charter. There are several possibilities which might be listed in this connection. Thus, the United States might transfer the entire territory to the trusteeship system; it might retain individual control of certain islands of key strategic importance, and transfer all the others to a trusteeship status; also, it might make a full transfer, meanwhile insisting that it retain a special military position in the "strategic areas" mentioned in Articles 82 and 83 of the Charter. It will be recalled, in this connection, that Article 82 reads that "There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory . . ." The next Article stipulates that all United Nations' functions relating to strategic areas are to be exercised by the Security Council. Thus, even if the United States were to retain a special military position in selected "strategic areas," its position would be legally subject to control by

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the Security Council. On the other hand, the political implications of a disregard of the trusteeship system are obvious. In view of the perplexing nature of the problem, it is little wonder that our government has been slow to state its position and policy. It is fair to assume, however, that the final solution will be one which will leave the United States in a position of great strategic strength in these island base areas. Other Japanese island possessions now under American control do not present the same legal complications, but the political problem is virtually the same. Our retention of base positions in the Bonins or Ryukyus would be a source of temporary military advantage, but this should be weighed in terms of its effect as a political irritant to greatpower relations. I have been discussing American security problems with respect to the acquisition of new oceanic base facilities to support our widened security zone. But many persons may ask if the basis for our future security policy ought not to be sought in regional security organization under the United Nations Charter, and not in purely unilateral action. Such a possibility needs to be examined analytically. It will be recalled that Article 52 of the Charter authorizes the existence of regional security organizations, provided their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Members of such regional organizations are urged to try to settle their own local disputes before referring them to the Security Council, and the Security Council, in its turn, is encouraged to refer appropriate disputes to these organizations for local settlement. This system is completed by Article 53 which authorizes the Security Council to use regional organizations as agencies for enforcement action. But the same Article

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lays down the general principle that these agencies may not resort to security enforcement action, except with respect to former enemy states, unless they receive special authorization from the Security Council. Finally, it should be noted that Article 51 specifies that member states shall retain full right of individual or collective self-defense until the Security Council has acted. Now, what are the prospects that such a system could be set up in the Pacific, and that it would become an important element of American security policy? Frankly, I do not believe that one is warranted in much anticipation on this score. I t is hard for me to visualize the Pacific as such a region within the meaning of the Charter. I t is a region consisting of a fringe of land around a great ocean. Perhaps this is a region, but, if so, it is a strange one for security organization purposes. Also, it is a portion of the globe wherein all the powers which have permanent seats on the Security Council have well defined interests. In consequence, there could be virtually no important matter of a security character which would not be of concern to all five of these powers. I f this is true, then the organization of a special regional agency would involve unnecessary duplication of machinery, and to no particular end. Moreover, it should be noted that there are comparatively few other states at a lower power level which would be members of such an organization, particularly since it has not been proposed that any of the Latin American states on the Pacific coast should be members of the organization. All in all, one is warranted in reaching the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by such a development. I t could only be an element of confusion and complication. As far as the United States is concerned, such a step would not in any way alter the fundamental principle that all col-

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lective security arrangements must rest squarely upon the basis of great-power agreement. The necessity for this political understanding would not be lessened—and it might be made more difficult of achievement—by the establishment of a Pacific area security organization. What the United Nations Security Council could not do, a regional Council could not do. One further dilemma of American security policy is too important to be omitted from this discussion. If the present tendencies toward great-power bi-polarity persist and become more pronounced, the United States will feel itself obliged to support both Great Britain and France in maintaining all the essential aspects of their national strength. But in the Pacific both powers face the necessity of coping with the rising tide of nationalism among their subject peoples, and American liberal opinion generally supports the aspirations of these peoples for a widening sphere of political autonomy. I t is undeniable, however, that extensive concessions in this direction would have the effect of weakening the power position of these states in the Pacific area. The United States thus faces a possible dilemma of supporting the maintenance, perhaps by repressive means, of a situation which is foreign to American tradition and political attitudes, or of supporting—or, at least, permitting—a deterioration in the power position of those states whose collaboratibn is potentially of great importance. Perhaps, a clear-cut decision along the lines of these sharply defined alternatives can be avoided, but the existence of the problem cannot be overlooked. What I have been attempting to convey, at least by implication, is that there is a grave danger that the United States may take policy decisions of a technical military character without adequately considering the long-range

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political problems involved. Such a course, in my judgment, would lead to eventual disaster. The technical military steps taken to provide insurance against f u t u r e contingencies may, through their political repercussions, produce precisely the contingencies which they were designed to g u a r d against. This does not mean t h a t a p r o p e r security policy should not be based on a strong military position : it does mean t h a t all the decisions relating to a strong military position should be taken only a f t e r all the implications of a political character have been fully explored and evaluated. In the long run, and in the kind of a world which we now have, the security of the United States in the Pacific —and everywhere else, f o r t h a t matter—will be achieved more by political means than by military might. The p r o p e r blending of the two will require statesmanship of the highest order, but the stakes are the greatest in our national hist o r y , and we must now be prepared t o secure through intelligence the same degree of security t h a t we have enjoyed in the p a s t through the largesse of fortune.

THE

NEW

SECURITY

IN T H E

PROBLEMS

PACIFIC

Sir Carl Berendsen *

T I E S of close friendship and mutual respect bind the people of my small country of New Zealand to the people of China. We have long followed, with sympathetic understanding, the trials and tests with which the Chinese people have in our time been confronted. We have seen them, by the exercise of those qualities for which the race is justly famous, struggling upwards from the oppression of political tyranny. We have seen them meet and overcome the overwhelming odds of military aggression, fighting indeed our war for international decency long before we knew we were involved in a war. And we observe them now, with hope and with confidence, in their continuing struggle to establish a new, a just, and an abiding social and political economy which will enable them to take their proper place among the nations of the world, and once again to become an inspiration to mankind. In this great task, as throughout their most grievous troubles, we in New Zealand wish them well. * New Zealand Minuter to the United

States.

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I n discussing "the New Security Problems of the P a cific," a purist might hold—and he would be right—that the title is a misnomer, t h a t there are no new security problems in the Pacific. Many of the old problems present new, often perplexing and sometimes menacing aspects, but such new problems as do exist—and they are f r a u g h t with untold potentialities f o r the good or ill of the human race— are not specifically Pacific, either in their origin or in their application. But the title serves as an introduction to an analysis of Pacific problems as they exist t o d a y ; and I invite you to join with me in a quick, and necessarily simplified, appraisal of the situation in t h a t area of the world as it has been and as it is, and in a short attempt to peer through the crystal ball a t the probabilities, the possibilities, and the potential dangers of the future, so f a r as they can be seen. When we speak of the Pacific we are, implicity or explicitly, thinking only of one portion of the Pacific—the Western Pacific—and t h a t f a c t is not without significance. I t is the result of a conviction t h a t no serious t h r e a t to world peace or world progress is to be expected from the Eastern Pacific. The necessary corollary, of course, is t h a t the world is not free from apprehension concerning the West. Looking then on the Western Pacific, and confining myself in the meantime entirely to t h a t area, I wish to draw to your attention a series of phenomena—all interesting, many perplexing, and some threatening—which are p a r ticularly characteristic of, although not always solely confined to, t h a t area. I wonder how many people realize—or if they do realize, how many appreciate—the full implications of the f a c t

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that, in the countries which form the Western littoral of the Pacific, and in the lands immediately adjacent thereto whose problems are substantially the same—that p a r t of the world running from India, through the Netherlands E a s t Indies, to China and Japan—live more than half of the whole population of the world. More than a billion human beings inhabit that area and the f a c t is strikingly significant in more than one aspect. The first thought that occurs is this. How little, how pitifully little, is the influence on the affairs of man of that large proportion of our fellow human beings. Is it an exaggeration to say that one half of the world knows little, and (perhaps because of that f a c t ) cares little how the other half lives, and that, speaking of course always generally, we in more fortunate lands are apt to turn our attention to matters in this area only in times of catastrophe or stark tragedy—when men, women and children have died by the hundreds of thousands of pestilence or starvation or of violence —or when conditions there appear likely to threaten our own economic welfare or our own national security ? Y o u will find in that portion of the globe a number of quite astounding examples of want of balance, or absence of that political symmetry, which should be the basis of human intercourse. This area is inhabited by peoples of the utmost diversity of type, of all colors, of all creeds, of widely differing philosophies and moralities, and of markedly distinct economic and social development. Socially, they vary literally from cannibalism to the most lofty and enlightened levels of human thought. Economically, they range from a stone age culture to a highly developed economy on the Western model. Of all that welter of peoples and of countries—some of

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them, of course, among the largest, both numerically and geographically, in the world—one group only, the J a p a nese, have in our time possessed or acquired a sufficiently numerous population, a sufficiently adequate access to raw materials, and a sufficiently advanced economy, to become, if they willed it so, a serious menace to their neighbors. And, unfortunately, that group also possessed an urge to dominate and a lust for power which have been beaten back only at the cost of indescribable suffering and colossal waste of human effort. These Oriental peoples are not alone in that part of the world. Living literally with them or alongside them is a small group of Occidental peoples—very few, in comparison, startingly few. Less than two million New Zealanders, seven million Australians, a handful of British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, and f a r too few Americans, this group is almost in a thousandfold minority. And now add to that f a c t these facts. This small Occidental group enjoys a high and ample standard of living. We in New Zealand and Australia do not apologize for that f a c t ; there is no need of apology. This high standard of living is due, just as it is in this great country and others, to the courage and enterprise of our forefathers, and the energy and industry of our people; but it is also due, just as is yours, to the fact that we do, speaking generally, inhabit a land that is literally flowing with milk and honey. Let us compare—as our less fortunate neighbors are, of course, comparing—our situation with that of the teeming millions so close at hand. I t is a most menacing fact that these brother men—more than half of the whole population of the world—eke out an underprivileged and undernourished existence on a handful of rice or a couple of coco-

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nuts a day. It is literally true that millions upon millions of them cannot confidently know where their next meal is coming from, or indeed if there will be a next meal. It is literally true that their lives are, and must be, of a spartan simplicity, of a tragic emptiness. I am not one of those who believe that material possessions are, beyond a certain limited minimum, essential to a happy and contented life, but the disparity here is so great, so immensely grave, that it behooves all of us to pause and to consider these facts. It is surely a poignant thought, and an ominous one, that we in the more fortunate countries, who are apt to complain when we cannot at once obtain all of everything that we desire, have access, and constant access, to means of enjoyment, of gracious living, and of luxury, that are entirely, and, so far as they know, eternally, beyond the reach of an enormous proportion of mankind. For the problem to which I am calling attention is not confined to the countries at present under examination, which merely provide an extreme example of what is, unfortunately, much too common elsewhere. What can we—surrounded as we are even in times of restriction by crowded markets, offering to all a wealth of articles of nourishment, of utility, of comfort and of luxury; what can we—whose strikingly longer expectation of life offers continual and unquestionable evidence of the advantages we possess; what can we say of a world economic system under which more than half the population in the world faces a constant risk of starvation, to whom even the tawdriest geegaw in any of our ten cent stores would be wealth beyond the dreams of avarice, completely and utterly unattainable. This situation in the Pacific area is not a stable situation. It cannot be made a stable situation. It should not be

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made a stable situation. Why? For two reasons. Firstly, because it would be morally wrong to attempt to stabilize such a state of affairs. The one certain conviction that I have achieved in a quarter of a century's professional experience in international affairs is that the moral element is supreme. Nothing can ever be politically wise unless it is morally right, and the converse is equally true. When we shut our eyes to the eternal verities, we are always wrong, and we are always stupid. To ignore this state of affairs would not only be wrong, and stupid because it is wrong, but stupid also from the lowest and most selfish aspect. In the long run we cannot hope to maintain a situation which is so manifestly unjust, so flagrantly contrary to every law of morality, to every principle of human decency. In the long run those—if such there be—who might wish to maintain such a situation, would unquestionably have to fight for it. Before we leave the Pacific proper to look upon the wider horizons of the world as a whole, and to inquire as to which Pacific problems are world problems and which world problems are Pacific problems, let us adventure for a moment or two, and with due care, on the possible implications in a troubled and perplexed world of the Pacific as it exists today. What can we expect from Russia ? If I knew the answer to that question I would know the answer to a number of grave problems which affright and perplex the whole world today. I do not know the answer to that question. What can we expect from China? This great country, like India, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines, will, one would expect, be occupied almost exclusively as far ahead as we can see with confidence, in endeavoring to build up within its own borders a viable economy, both social and

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political. In the light of their probable internal preoccupation I would not, in the immediate future, expect any of these countries to exercise a direct influence by their own policy on affairs of the Pacific. Some of them could, of course, be used by others. But perhaps the most immediate danger that arises in the Western Pacific generally is that of internal conflict and disturbance. The whole area is astir, alive, aflame, with vivid and sometimes violent political and social ferments, a resurgent nationalism, a revulsion against any degree of external control, a vibrant determination to change things, if possible, for the better, but at any rate to change. Add to all this the ominous crosscurrents of race, of color, and of creed, and you have in the Western Pacific today a melting pot which is boiling furiously and which might conceivably boil over. There is much in the present situation that commands respect and inspires hope. There is also much for apprehension. What the ultimate end may be no one can confidently say, but a lengthy period of confusion and some degree of disruption would appear to be probable, and history shows that chaos in one area of the world has a habit of spreading. I t is not only that muddy waters make traditionally good fishing for mischief, but social and economic disease expand just as rapidly, and apparently as capriciously, as does physical disease. What then can be done by men of goodwill throughout the world? Every people naturally prefers self-government, even to good government, and we can all sympathize with, and, with due and proper caution and moderation, assist such movements gradually to their inevitable success. But let no one imagine that self-government alone, where it is at present absent, offers any facile solution to Western

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Pacific problems; they go much deeper than t h a t . The world will do well to p a y constant attention to affairs in this area, to form and to implement their policies on the principle that any assistance which can be rendered to these peoples will not only be morally sound, but of practical use to the remainder of the world. In what way then can help be given? There will obviously be much need of advice, both political and technical, but I am bound to sound a note of caution, t h a t the need of advice does not necessarily import a willingness to receive or to follow advice. There will be need also of much practical help, in the provision of finance, in the encouragement of industries, and in the facilitation of trade. These are, of course, broad principles only. I t will be a test of the wisdom of the western world how fully and how wisely, how patiently and how generously we extend our aid to our less fortunate brethren. Looking on a situation which is still extremely fluid and largely incalculable it seems to me t h a t the prospects are definitely hopeful and encouraging. W h a t can be expected of Australia and New Zealand? Certainly sympathetic and friendly assistance in the solution of Pacific problems; some apprehension as to possible developments; a sombre realization that the world may not yet have seen the end of its travail, and that, within the limits of their powers, and with due regard to the rights of their neighbors, they must take what steps are possible to meet any eventualities t h a t may arise. If these two peoples can be relied upon, as I know they can, f o r a firm adherence to the right as they see it, they can equally be relied upon —their deeds have proved it—for a firm opposition to the wrong to the full extent of their limited strength. W h a t can be expected of the United States ? Nothing but good, but how much good? How long will you retain your

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present, very welcome, interest in Pacific affairs? I am making no criticism, for I appreciate the reasons underlying the fact, when I say that this nation, on which rests the hope of the world, is not distinguished by the continuity of its foreign policies. May it not be—and we who live in the Pacific would infinitely regret it—that your present interest in that area may prove to be merely a temporary hobby? I do not know and you do not know. What is to be expected of J a p a n ? The answer to that question again is shrouded in the mists of the future. At the moment, J a p a n is no longer in a position to threaten the peace of the world or the safety and happiness of her neighbors. That this is so is the result, predominantly, of the gigantic war effort of this great Republic, the full nature and extent of which, and the skill and determination of its implementation are not yet fully realized by the people of this country, but which will, I know, be recorded in history as among the finest feats of arms in the annals of man. With her present facilities J a p a n is physically unable to wage an aggressive war, even should she wish to do so. But how long that situation will continue to exist I could not venture to say. I believe that the Supreme Commander in J a p a n and the occupation authorities have made a magnificent commencement in a most difficult and lengthy task. Whether it will be possible—and in my judgment it will not be possible at all unless the time taken to achieve it is lengthy—to induce the J a p anese people to accept democracy in place of feudalism, peaceful co-operation in place of armed aggression, time alone can show. Judging the future of the occupation by the past, I have much hope and some confidence. It is a supremely difficult task, and it will require all the patience, all the goodwill, and above all, all the time and all

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the determination that the United States and the world can bring to bear. We must succeed if we are to escape the danger that the Pacific may again have to face a Japanese raid. This is not the first time the world has had to meet such a situation as exists today—a defeated aggressor lying prostrate. A quarter of a century ago an aggressor nation was beaten to its knees, and in a few short years, it might almost be said deliberately, we built that nation up again and stood supinely by while it prepared for—and made—a second raid. It could happen again, if we allow our hearts to run away with our heads. Peace is the ultimate essential; we must not only seek peace, we must be constantly and at all times vigilant to prevent and defeat any danger or threat to peace. One aspect of the present situation in J a p a n leaves me in considerable bewilderment and some apprehension. I have this year had an opportunity of seeing these people in defeat, and it is a remarkable—indeed to me an incomprehensible—state of affairs. There never has been in all history a capitulation so complete as that of Japan. At the moment the Japanese are abject; they seem entirely reconciled to defeat; they even seem to like the occupation; and certainly it is true that there has not been one single incident to mar the success of the occupation or any outward sign of opposition. But I cannot bring myself to believe that this fanatical, warlike people, whose raid on their neighbors was so wickedly unprovoked, whose conduct in war so marked by the most inhuman and wanton cruelties and atrocities, who have been trained for generations to believe that they are a superior folk, destined to rule, guided by divine inspiration through the Emperor, and therefore unconquerable, have changed overnight into a smiling and obsequious race, grateful to receive and to

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follow instructions. To me it does not seem to "add up," and I am not without apprehension that the leopard may not perhaps have changed his spots, but may be merely biding his time until the period of occupation and control is over. I have every confidence in the judgment of the occupation authorities while they are there, but I suggest that this is another ground for a lengthy period of control. To turn from the Pacific in particular to the world at large is not departing from the general subject, for the security of the Pacific cannot be separated from the security of the world. Peace is indivisible. It is one world now in very truth, and we must acknowledge and be guided by that fact. My appreciation of the fundamental principles which must form the basis of international relations in the years to come is three-fold and simple. We must maintain the peace. We must strive toward even-handed justice, both economic and political, among and between all peoples. And to achieve those two ends, which are inseparable, we can succeed only if we recognize, and are guided by, the immutable principles of right and wrong. I propose to conclude with a short examination of these principles which are nonetheless problems of the Pacific because they are at the same time problems of the world. In the first place, nothing at all can be done unless we can preserve and enforce the peace of the world. There can be no Pacific peace unless there is world peace, and the first problem of the Pacific is, quite obviously, the problem of world peace. How then are we to achieve that essential object? We in New Zealand see only one way. We believe that world peace is indeed within man's grasp if man will but g r a s p ; we be-

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lieve that if the peace-loving peoples of the world—and they are, thank God, in an enormous majority—will but determine that lawless force must always be met and defeated by lawful force, wherever, whenever, for whatever reason, with whatever justification, and in whatever circumstances an attempt is made to apply individual national force, then indeed peace can be achieved. But we believe that nothing less is adequate. Peace cannot be achieved by words alone. Any such attempt leads inevitably to the policy that has become known, and properly despised, as appeasement, and appeasement leads inevitably, not only to compromise with evil and to gross injustice to innocent and helpless people, but ultimately to bloody war. And I regret to add that, as we see it, the Charter of the United Nations, as presently operating, falls short—far short—of the essential requirements. Unless we solve the problem of preserving peace we can solve nothing. I t is in very truth a fact that upon the solution of this problem depends the solution of every other problem that perplexes the mind of man. I t may well be that if this problem is not solved and solved quickly, there will not only be no civilization as we know it, there may indeed be no human beings and no world. Twice in our time the peace-loving peoples of the world have had to face a ruthless raid of aggression. Twice the aggressor was ready —he chose his time and moved only when he was ready. Twice the democracies were not ready—and perhaps they never will be. Twice the democracies had to shelter behind a rampart of dead and agonized human flesh, to sacrifice the flower of their youth in order to buy the time to gird up their loins and seize their weapons. And twice that time was accorded to us, and only just accorded to us. If there

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be another aggression, which God forbid, atomic power may well provide overwhelming and decisive force for the first blow, and there may never be another. In the second place, one of the fundamental things which we are obviously called upon to do if the world as we know it is to survive—and with all its imperfections the world is, to many of us, good—is to endeavor to achieve a substantially greater measure of economic justice as between nation and nation, as between peoples and peoples. It is in the Pacific that the problem, as I have indicated, is present in its most dramatic form. I cannot too strongly emphasize my complete certainty that this is an essential step for man to take if civilization is to endure. We not only should not, but we cannot, indefinitely maintain this shocking disproportion, this wicked inequality, in the access of man to the good things which the world can so abundantly provide. And in the third place, I believe that the problem the world has to face is a moral problem, and that, if it is not solved as a moral problem it will not be solved at all. And the problem is urgent and insistent. It is on our very doorsteps, it is in our every home. The two great wars in our time, and the uneasy and shameful period of truce between those two wars, were, in essence, the result of a widespread failure of morals. To achieve success in this greatest of all human objectives, the nations of the world, supported by the peoples of the world, must abandon many of the policies which have too often guided international relations in the past. We must renounce, fully and forever, the false and pagan belief that expediency pays better dividends than principle, that international morality differs in some way from individual morality, that a nation's word is not necessarily its bond should it subsequently prove inconvenient, that it is both proper and possible to save one's own babies

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by throwing someone else's babies to the wolves. Such policies as these, far too common in the past, lead inevitably, inescapably, to chaos and misery. There are many who believe that a country's foreign policy, if it is to be successful, and if national interests are to be served, must vary from day to day according to the contingencies of the moment; that its success depends upon skill of maneuver; that the ship of state must trim its sails to every wind that blows. While there must, of course, be some degree of flexibility in any foreign policy, fundamentally I am in disagreement with this school of thought. As time goes on, and those of us whose years are many look back on life, we are, I think, all of us inclined to the view that the path of wisdom is that of simplification, that the only course to take in the troubled waters of our time is to seek, and to steer by, the polestar of principle. I know of no touchstone, no test, of policy—individual, national, or international—but the test of rectitude. If we must compromise—as from time to time in this imperfect world we must—we must never compromise with principle. We must search, not for individual or national advantage, but for the right. When we have found the right, we have found the wrong. We must not only do the right; we must resist and defeat the wrong. Are these principles that I am commending mere generalities, either dangerous or impracticable of application? That is a proper question, which we will do well to examine. Generalities, of course they are; so are the Ten Commandments, and most other laws, moral and physical. Are they dangerous? Does the course of insisting on and enforcing the right, and of resisting the wrong, involve a risk? Of course it does. Is it what is commonly referred to as a "calculated risk"? No, I am afraid it is not. I think it is

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almost completely incalculable. Is the risk worth taking? Unquestionably, it is. If the risk is not taken, the alternative, as I see it, is not a risk at all—it is a certainty, of dreadful and dire disaster, moral and physical. What, indeed, is the alternative? Is it not a world of naked power politics, of blocs, of intrigue, of spheres of influence and balances of power, of the constant interplay of competitive and selfish and national interests? Is it not, in short, a return to the old rule, the simple plan that he shall take who hath the power, and he shall keep who can? If that is the course the world chooses then God is mocked and Man is mocked. And finally, are these principles impossible of application? Impossible—no. Difficult—immensely, appallingly difficult. And the difficulties are as obvious as they are grave. The relations of man with man, of nation with nation, of East with West, are so infinitely complicated, the rights and wrongs of almost every situation are at times so inextricably mixed, that dismay and confusion are not incomprehensible. It is often most difficult to find the right, to isolate the wrong. There have been, and there will be, many instances of conflicts of right, of contests of wrongs. But with courage and understanding, and a disposition to make the effort and the sacrifices involved, the difficulties are not insuperable. Mankind will find itself, from time to time, lost in a dark forest of doubt, but sooner or later, in every case, the light of truth gleams through, and the one irretrievable, irremediable error is to ignore that light when it can be seen. There is only one way out of this tangled undergrowth of interests and claims, of doubts and hesitations and perplexities, and that is the path of rectitude—even if that path must be cut.

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THE FORMULATION MENTATION

OF

FOREIGN

AND

IMPLE-

AMERICAN

POLICY

A. A. Berle, Jr.*

I ON January 1, 1942, four men met at the White House. They were Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. They then signed a document which changed the basis of foreign policy in the United States and in all the peace-loving world. This was the "Declaration by the United Nations," which not only established a wartime alliance but which stated that the parties to it had subscribed to "a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter." The Atlantic Charter was and remains the one statement of war aims which got immediate popular ratification throughout the entire world. It spoke to peoples—rather than to governments; and about peoples—rather than *Former Assistant bassador to Brazil.

Secretary

of State, former

United States

Am-

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about governments; and it was based on an idea revolutionary in international affairs—the rights of peoples, as distinct from the rights of sovereign governments. My own diary entries, and those of many others active in international affairs, show that President Roosevelt had been formulating the idea of the Four Freedoms in his own mind two or three years before he stated them in public. He knew, as did everyone who discussed the subject with him, that foreign relations based on the rights of people would be vastly different from foreign relations based on the assumed rights of sovereigns. U p to that time the language of foreign relations had been the language of duties, obligations, contracts and so forth, between kings and emperors; even republics continued to talk of their popular states as though their governments were still "sovereign" without the ancient insignia of a crown. But where rights of peoples are concerned, international policy and international law no longer stops at governments. The men in the palaces or government offices, the occupants of the Kremlins, the Downing Streets, the State Departments, the Wilhelmstrasses, and the Casas Rosadas, no longer can claim to be the sole and unquestioned spokesmen. In certain matters, a community of nations, in the name of the rights of people, can go behind the scenery of government, and deal directly with the grievances of peoples. The Four Freedoms contemplated t h a t such a community of nations could take up the grievances of peoples where they were not free from fear, not free from want, were prevented from receiving free flow of information, and were denied religious freedom. When the world community known as the United Nations was organized and took form, it automatically carried forward the revolutionary dogma that, thenceforth in inter-

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national affairs, the controlling basis must be the rights of peoples. A t this moment, we, and most of the other countries, are painfully struggling to establish foreign affairs and foreign policy on this new basis. The job is h a r d ; the medieval or feudal conception t h a t policy is made by and for sovereigns —crowned or elected—dies hard. I t is still harder to digest the idea t h a t much of the magic of the " g r e a t powers" went out when the rights of peoples came into being; yet this was the fact. The rights of the peoples of small and weak states like Greece or I r a n rank equal with the rights of great peoples like the United States and the Soviet Union. Action in foreign affairs today is legitimate or not, depending on whether it squares with the recognized rights of peoples. F o r t h a t reason at every conference in the State Department, at every meeting of foreign ministers, at every conference on Inter-American affairs and a t all the big and little European and Asiatic Congresses and peace assemblies, there is an unrecorded presence: the rights of peoples, which silently judges the work of the diplomats. And these peoples are not a myth but are flesh and blood. They include the peasant, the share-cropper, the farm laborer; the workman in the mill, or the factory, or the mine; the clerk at his desk, the school teacher in the classroom, the housewife standing in line for a ration of bread, the coolie carrying his burden, the peon, the cattle tender in South American valley or p a m p a ; the journalist, the playwright, the intellectual, the banker, the f a c t o r y manager—the whole complex series of masses who have organized themselves into nations and within nations propose to make a life. This is new: but not wholly new. Some centuries ago

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there was an idea that the world was a community—a universal empire. Christian doctrine proclaimed it, and the Catholic Church endeavored—and eventually failed—to give it form. So far as that early attempt gained strength, its basis lay in the equality of souls, and their right to be heard before God and men. Something of the same equality, in different form, is emerging today. II The objectives of a country are the desires of its people or those who are able to speak for them. Foreign policy, accurately defined, is the course of action maintained by government to achieve those objectives. The United States, for example, has not substantially changed its objectives for nearly a century. It became and was and is, in conventional diplomatic terms, the most "satisfied power" in history when its present geographical limits were reached. From then out, its dominant objective has been world peace. Its foreign policy, sometimes successful and sometimes not, has always at long last been molded to that end. This was soundly conceived in the national interest: in a world at peace, the United States is clearly safe. Today, with the possibility of atomic warfare hanging like a cloud over everyone's life, it is plainly in the best interests of peoples as well. This statement of American objectives flatly violates a number of ideas often talked about today. The Marxian dialectics insist that every nation, like every class within a nation, pursues the path of economic profit; that Marxian is not so happy when his arguments are taken against him, for, in a dictatorship of the proletariat, classes are created based not on strata of wealth but on strata of power; and the power motive is substituted for the profit motive. The

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Marxian logic would suggest that a dictatorial state would inevitably follow a policy which increases its power. Guglielmo Ferrero indeed insisted that every revolutionary government was bound to become imperialist through fear lest its power be challenged; in that way he explained why the revolutionary governments of Europe, since the French Revolution, had been the most violent seekers after empire. It is true, of course, that small groups of men may possess themselves of a nation, and, for a time, even of the mass mind of that nation, and may determine its international policy on the basis of their own fears or ambitions. Napoleon certainly did so; and so did the Fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, just as did the old autocrats of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. But as peoples increasingly take charge of their governments, this becomes less possible. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini (aside from the fact that they were not hereditary kings) would have been regarded as abnormal in 1745. In 1945 they were rightly considered atavistic criminals. In the Nineteenth Century, when small economic groups tended to dominate the governments, minor wars to secure resources or markets did not excite world opinion. Today, a foray like the opium war in China would be a blank impossibility in England, and as the Japanese war on China to secure the assets of that great country led in time to the downfall of the Japanese Empire. The theory that Britain went to war on Hitler for commercial reasons simply does not stand up. Wherever people can make their voices heard or their ideas effective, they want peace and they want safety; and when they do go to war it is usually because there is no other means by which they can hope to achieve either. Charles H. Beard in a recent study of the politics of American foreign policy from 1932 to 1940 endeavored to

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make the case t h a t American politicians who proclaimed t h a t their objective was to preserve peace, a t the same time t h a t they were p r e p a r i n g f o r a possible war, were hoaxing the American public. B u t to anyone who lived through t h a t period, this is a t r a g i c mistake. During the Nineteenth Century America could count on reasonable likelihood of immunity from war, on safety and peace f o r herself—although the E u r o p e a n powers were fighting. I t is arguable t h a t she might have continued to count on t h a t immunity a t the time of World W a r I. B u t in the decade from 1930 to 1940, no one who was familiar with the growing a r t of t o t a l i t a r i a n war, with its new tools of air power, had any illusions on t h a t score. T h e politician who said he would promise peace if he could get it, and t h a t he would fight a totalitarian aggressor t o get it if need be, was not saying inconsistent things. W h a t is more, a m a j o r i t y of the American public knew t h a t he was telling the t r u t h on both scores. T h e United States, and G r e a t Britain, are today probably more representative of their peoples than any other g r e a t powers. I t is not unnatural, therefore, to find t h a t they, beyond others, most vigorously seek ways and means of reaching the goal of world peace. No economic benefit can possibly compensate the cost of any w a r ; no individual, or group, or class, can fail to be worse off. They must, therefore, seek to solve each situation in such fashion t h a t the probability of world peace will be increased. And this means not merely avoiding danger out of the specific situation, but keeping affairs on a basis so t h a t f u t u r e situations will not arise. The experiment of obtaining peace by sacrificing the rights of peoples was tried a t Munich in 1938. Neville

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Chamberlain found it the road, not to "peace in our time," but to inescapable world conflict. Let us take a specific illustration in a case now at issue. At this present moment, the United States is facing a crisis very much like the kind of crisis which Neville Chamberlain and the British met—or failed to meet—at Munich. The problem of Russian-inspired aggression against Greece presents to American policy makers now an issue very like that which Hitler presented to England when he undertook to tear Czechoslovakia to pieces. The Greek people, as well as the Greek Government, decided instanter, to resist Fascist aggression. They fought, and beat the armies of Mussolini. They fought the German re-enforcements thrown in by Hitler in 1941, and were eventually defeated in part at least because a substantial section of Yugoslavia did not join that resistance. When the American and British troops entered the Mediterranean via North Africa and forced the Germans step by step out of Italy, combined Greek and British forces followed hard after the retreating Germans until at length Greece was cleared; but at the same time a Russian army had entered Bulgaria. More than two years ago, intrigues started revolving around the Soviet headquarters in Bulgaria. They were directed in part toward creation of a "Macedonian" movement in northern Greece whose capital was to be Salonika. At the same time, the defeated Axis satellite of Bulgaria was encouraged to seize the territory of Thrace. These various intrigues were gradually implemented by what General Staffs call "paramilitary" operations—that is to say, subsidized bands of irregulars and local renegades acting under local leaders, but directed from abroad. By the summer of 1946, it had become plain

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that three such intrigues now blown into full-fledged irregular military movements were going forward: one from the Russian satellite state of Albania, a second from the Russian satellite state of Yugoslavia directed by Tito, a third from the Bulgarian side. Added together, the three would tear Greece to pieces. They would, incidentally, create a huge additional leverage for later Russian demands on Turkey—demands which have already been made in the form of—substantially—an insistence that Russian armies shall be allowed to line the Dardanelles. This could have been met by a policy of straight appeasement; by the twisted version of "non-intervention" which led the European world to stand aside from the Spanish prelude to World War I I in 1938; or by the policy of "appeasement" which permitted Hitler to tear Czechoslovakia apart. A t the moment, the situation in Greece is, quite briefly, that she is being invaded from the north by Russian-inspired forces, just as she was in 1940 by Fascist forces. The American policy-makers had to consider that their objective is world peace. They could get this, temporarily, by standing aside from the whole situation, and perhaps by bringing pressure on Britain to do likewise. This might avoid the danger of war for the moment. But, had American policy taken this view, there is no doubt in my mind that Greece would be seized from without, as Spain was; and that a savage World W a r I I I would become a certainty in that very moment. The objective of world peace clearly is not to be gained by standing aside. The issue has to be met. Equally in formulating an American policy it was necessary to take into account the right of a weak people to be free from fear and to have a government of its own choos-

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ing. There was a sharp division in opinion as to the policy to be pursued. One clique advocated "getting on with Russia" at any price, and sacrificing the rights of peoples, if need be, to that end. An opposite group maintained that the plain right of a people to determine its own government and to be free from invasion must be paramount. The bitter attacks which were stimulated against the men who urged this in the State Department are matters of history: you will find them in every left-wing journal. It remained for President Truman and Secretary Byrnes to pick the policy, and they came to the right conclusion. Unless the rights of peoples were defended in the Greek case, the chance of continuing peace was gravely minimized. The United States accordingly gave clear notice that aggression in the Near East would be resisted. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal's announcement of September 30, 1946 merely made the policy explicit. A piece of international aggression had been diagnosed for what it was; the mistake made when we stood aside from Japan's invasion of China was avoided. At the same time the United Nations were called on to act. Appropriate inquiry was prevented by the use of the cruel and somewhat illogical "power of veto" exercised in the Greek case, as might be expected, by the Soviet Union. The American policy makers, deprived of the use of the United Nations to deal with the situation, nevertheless defended the right of peoples unilaterally—which is the only logical course to follow where veto paralyzes the United Nations. The end is not yet. I believe the course chosen by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes to have been sound. With all my very great love for Henry Wallace, and my yearning, which is as great as his for eventual understanding of the Soviet Union, the Wallace proposal that we pull

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out of this situation and limit ourselves to keeping the Soviet Union out of the Western Hemisphere simply did not stand analysis. W e should not sacrifice the possibility of established rights of peoples which may lead to world peace for a policy of spheres of influence based on military force, a policy which has always ended in war. The soundness of President Truman's decision as to the Greek case was demonstrated within the short space of a few weeks. While the drama of Greece was developing, the inevitable next step was in preparation; a set of Soviet demands on Turkey virtually calculated to wipe out that country as an independent nation. The Dardanelles were merely an incident or perhaps an excuse. Demands included occupation of parts of Turkey by a Soviet army; and the taking of a substantial part of Eastern Turkey for annexation to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. The fact is that there was likewise a still undisclosed move to demand further sections of Turkey, including part of Turkey's Mediterranean coast, using as a pretext the so-called "Kurdish" national movement. A Grecian Munich would be followed by the seizure of Turkey. And this would not be the end; a sacrifice of the rights of the Greek people could only prove the straight road to World W a r I I I . World peace, based on peoples' rights, means defense of those rights. Ill The objective of world peace, then, must be sought through policies based on the rights of peoples. The illustration just given turns on the right of a people to be free from fear—from fear of invasion, military or paramilitary. But this alone is not enough. Peoples have now a recognized right to work toward freedom from want:

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a starving or abjectly miserable people easily becomes a threat to general peace. The United States must follow, therefore, an economic policy calculated to assist peoples to avoid want as fully as she can do so. Such policies should be urged upon and carried out through the United Nations and in co-operation with the Soviet Union wherever this is possible; but, in any case, the United States must carry on this policy by herself or with such associates as may be appropriate. This is, indeed, nothing more than the logical extension of the "Good Neighbor" policy pursued by President Roosevelt with growing success in Latin America. This means a dynamic policy; and, like good policy generally, it conforms both to world interest and to our national interest. It happens that the United States is now the largest reservoir of accumulated capital in the world. It happens also that its current productive capacity allows for great measure of export. This seems an odd thing to say at the moment, when we are facing current national shortages. Yet informed economists and businessmen substantially agree that within the next few years we shall be worried, not about shortages, but about the ability wisely to distribute surplus production. Shortly before his death, the late Professor Maynard Keynes observed to a group of Americans that within four years the world would be faced with an apparent surplus in production beyond any previously known; and that its ability to use that apparent surplus would be the great economic test of the postwar era. Now it so happens that in great areas of the world the ability to develop a higher standard of living—to get away from the barest subsistence level—depends directly on the ability to develop and use the human and natural resources of those regions. The success of the Soviet Union in causing

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such development in certain areas is, indeed, her best argument. We have said some harsh things about Soviet policy. In fairness, it should be observed that the economic results of the Soviet Union in certain underprivileged areas—for instance, Soviet Armenia lying just north of Turkey, Soviet Azerbaijan, lying j u s t north of Iran, and the beginning of development in the Kirghiz section on the Chinese border— have been considerable. More than t h a t : it has been the most substantial contribution toward advancing standards of living in these areas in a long time. Not unnaturally these and similar areas, looking at a western world f a r more competent economically than the Soviet Union, ask why a community of nations cannot also achieve these results. The answer is that it can; only the will to do so is needed. There is in an advanced stage of development, a model for development of backward areas which is unique. This is the Tennessee Valley Authority conceived by President Roosevelt and brought to reality by the sheer genius of David Lilienthal. T h a t particular p r o j e c t used the then untapped resources of the water shed of the Tennessee River, and combined the electricity developed with the local soils, minerals, and timbers. There is little doubt that a similar system, with modifications, could be employed to use other resources: oil, coal, minerals, or irrigation. Even if the identical resource—river water—was used, an economic revolution would take place in great areas whose inhabitants now are dodging starvation from one day to the next. F o r instance, in one of the most miserable arfcas of Europe—the Balkans—just such an opportunity exists on the Danube R i v e r ; four countries could be assisted, if not revolutionized economically, by the use of the water power available at the Iron Gates where the Danube water shed funnels over the Rumanian border; and the possibilities

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are not theoretical but actual. Nor, for t h a t matter, is there any great doubt t h a t one section of the Near E a s t could be lifted from want to moderate prosperity if the waters of the Tigris and E u p h r a t e s were once more turned into the fertile but desert fields in t h a t great valley. Actually, there are as great or greater opportunities f o r economic building in these areas as those which existed when the American West was pioneered. The ancient argument in the United States that these things can only be done by "private" capitalists has long since disappeared. The reason such projects have not been undertaken already is purely and simply because private capital was unable or unwilling to tackle the j o b ; or because conditions existed in which nobody could tackle it. So f a r as the United States is concerned, indeed, international finance is already semisocialized; since American investors do not buy foreign securities and there is complete absence of pressure to conquer countries so t h a t capital may be invested there. Instead, American international finance is chiefly carried on by the E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank. Still another section is being evolved through the World Bank. The World Bank was largely developed by a committee which habitually met in my office in the State Department; and I think I can say with assurance t h a t its possibilities are as great as those of any other United Nations instrument. The United States has now a great reservoir of trained technicians in substantially all fields; it will have a still greater reserve in the future. The stage is already set f o r economic development on a world-wide scale; and t h a t development can be handled under any of several forms of political organization. A fraction of the effort devoted to World W a r I I could produce an amazing constructive result.

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Formulating economic policy as a course of action to assist in maintaining world peace must likewise be guided by the emerging principle of rights of peoples. Its wisdom must be tested by its effect on individuals: by what happens to the men, women, and children in the area in which it operates. Unless it directly assists in removing the fear of want, the policy is of no international significance. A policy-maker must begin his work with a reasonably clear picture of the condition of the people to be affected; and his policy must include insistence that the benefits of the policy shall accrue substantially to that people. He cannot have preconceived theories as to how this should be done; every people has its own methods of organization and its own way of life. This fact introduces an element new in international affairs. Suppose a government so backward, or corrupt, or ineffective, that it is unable or unwilling to permit betterment of the standard of living of its own people. Suppose, still worse, a government so oppressive that a small group of men have acquired a vested interest in the misery of its people. Perhaps for the first time in history, that very fact becomes a matter of international concern. In substance indeed, Communist propaganda the world over says substantially that. True, only the naive fail to realize that the Communist criticisms are principally directed to aid Soviet foreign policy; and the Communist objective is satisfied when a government subservient to it is finally obtained. In Brazil last year, the Communist candidate for President, waving the banner of hammer and sickle, had been a notoriously corrupt politician who made a fortune from road contracts under the Vargas dictatorship ; just as the principal pro-Russian in the Iran Cabinet has a reputation for corruptly gathered wealth. We need

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not take propaganda claims of interest in the masses at face value; even Nazi propaganda proclaimed the benefits that would accrue to workers if they surrendered their liberty to the Quislings, the Seyss-Inquarts, and the Henleins. But there is a ground on which sincere men can meet; and that is the fact that the misery of a population has effects transcending local limits; that it can become a matter of international concern. This force can operate in either of two ways: a government representing its people can come to its neighbors and say, in substance, "Our people need assistance"; and can expect consideration of that request as a right. Like all rights, this has correlative duties: the duty of a people to bend its efforts to relieve its own conditions, the duty of a government to handle internal affairs so that the improvement accrues to the masses and not to a favored few. Fulfilling these duties, a people today has a basis to ask for and to expect sympathetic assistance in securing freedom from want. Alternatively, where a government impedes or prevents or crushes the attempts of its people to raise its standard of living, so that they are in fear of want, the international community of nations can also take account of that fact. It may be added that appropriate handling of economic policy, based on this conception, is of benefit not only to the underprivileged areas, but to great and well-favored nations like our own. For no country—and this applies even to the Soviet Union though it is less visible in her case—has yet escaped the alternating periods of what is called "over supply," which merely means productive capacity outrunning organized distribution, and "shortages," which merely means that the demands of the population have temporarily outrun the available supply. Intelligent handling of foreign

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economic policy could, for instance, channel the recurring American periods of overproduction and powerfully contribute to leveling off the cycles of "boom and bust" which disfigured our prewar economy. My personal view is that the time is about ripe for a ringing, clear-cut, redefinition of American economic policy. This should not be the conventional platitudes about foreign trade—sound though many of these are. It should rather be a direct announcement of an American program, to be worked out through the United Nations so f a r as possible, but to be undertaken in any case, designed to raise the standard of living in certain areas with the simple and direct purpose of raising standards of living there. Such a program, properly conceived, would be the "moral substitute for war." Foreign policy has concerned itself far too much with negatives—the mere defense of a nation, or a group of nations. Even the Security Council of the United Nations is designed to defend against war, rather than to make a positive advance in the condition of mankind. But there is now opened a great vista. Even more, the tools are in existence. There is the plain end to be met. We have the instruments. We have the accumulated experience of the Good Neighbor Policy. We have a clear national interest. We have the technical skill. We have an international organization through which such an economic policy may be kept free of any taint of imperialism, and a Social and Economic Council headed by John Winant, a power in himself. And we have as the driving principle, the newly sanctioned right of peoples to share in the natural resources of the world. The United States, through the United Nations, if possible, can take the lead in material reconstruction of great

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areas in the world. American foreign policy can parallel Secretary Byrnes' able defense of the rights of peoples to be free from aggression with an equally able assertion of the rights of peoples to move toward freedom from want. Somewhat blunderingly and uncertainly, American foreign policy is finally meeting the challenge to defend peoples' rights. I t must, even more clearly, develop its offensive against hunger and disease and ignorance which are the elements of want. I n so doing, it can supply the necessary new element in foreign relations: the element of aggressive, positive action which assists peoples en masse. A f t e r World W a r I, and now, we were rightly told t h a t there must be a moral substitute for w a r : an objective as commanding to the imagination as the defeat of a hated foe. This objective we now have; for, by the paradox of history, the period of greatest destruction was likewise the period of greatest intensity in forging the tools by which disease and misery could be checked. Our armies in war could banish malaria from whole sections; a peacetime policy could do the same. The co-operative handling of supply could assure t h a t great areas would be adequately f e d ; a peacetime program could do this as well. Even the black miracle of atomic fission holds as great or greater possibilities f o r material welfare as it does for material destruction. This p a r t of American policy is still unstated. The time has come to insist upon it. IV This essay began by stating foreign policy in terms of rights of peoples. I t must close by asserting t h a t the formulation of foreign policy, through State Departments, is

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itself controlled by the voices of peoples. And this is a duty which rests peculiarly on the American people, for it, beyond any other, has a voice and is able to use it. There has been continuous discussion of the work of the American State Department during the past few years — and this discussion has included more criticism than praise. No doubt much of the criticism was deserved; but, having been both critic and criticized, I can bear witness to one fact. A s often as not, the critics were attacking the State Department not merely for faults within that Department, but for the failure of that Department to take action or to do things which public opinion itself was unwilling to take or support. The American Secretary of State has a position unique among Cabinet members. A n y other member of the American Cabinet may make proposals, may urge them before the Congress, may be defeated without danger to himself, and, having lost that battle, may return again to the charge. Indeed, in domestic affairs, he normally expects that it will take time f o r him to persuade the American public and the American Congress to adopt his measures. B u t the Secretary of State has no such latitude. His proposals must be substantial victories at every point. The reason is obvious. He undertakes to speak for the nation to other countries. If he is ever beaten on any m a j o r question of policy, it is made plain to the world that he does not represent the country; and whatever he says is no longer taken very seriously. From the day of his defeat, he can only express, to other countries, his personal views; they must look elsewhere f o r the voices which speak with authority. If the agreements he makes are not supported; if the treaties he negotiates are not ratified; if the policies he announces are nullified by public opinion or by the Con-

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gress, he loses all significance internationally, however worthy his ideas, his measures, his objectives. This at least, in p a r t , accounts for the extreme caution with which Secret a r y Hull handled foreign affairs during the long period of his office. And it has often occurred in the State Department t h a t men knew perfectly well what ought to be done; but knew equally well t h a t they were unable at the moment to command the support of public opinion and the resulting support in the Congress which would make their views effective. The President and his Secretary of State must therefore spend the time and effort necessary to convince the public and Congress t h a t the actions they take, the measures they propose, and the international agreements they present are necessary and wise in the interests of the United States, and of the peace of the world which is the m a j o r American need. F o r t h a t reason, the formation of American public opinion in foreign policy is a matter of m a j o r responsibility to the individuals, as well as to high officials. Groups like the Wellesley meetings under the auspices of the Mayling Soong Foundation have and exercise responsibility in foreign affairs no less solemn than t h a t of the Secretary of State or the President. They and groups like them must state the problems, suggest the lines of solution, and cause public opinion to support them or indeed to insist on them. A literate people like our own, now committed to realizing foreign policy in terms of the rights of peoples, must use its own head as well as the heads of its officials. As an illustration, it may be pointed out t h a t the doctrine here advocated calls for j u s t this result. I n analysing the harsh and difficult alternatives of the problem of policy now before the State Department and the American people in the Near E a s t , it has appeared t h a t the m a j o r question

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is that of whether we should assume the responsibility of defending the rights of peoples to which we are already pledged. I t is plain that unless we do this there is no logical alternative save that of a policy of spheres of influence divided by an armed frontier, maintaining an uneasy balance until at length one sphere of influence endeavors to devour the other. The principle of peoples' rights is therefore the only line suggesting an advance toward world peace; hence the conclusion that the general lines of the policy pursued by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes should be supported by group thinking throughout the country. Parallel with that, it has been suggested that the mere negative act of preventing aggression is not of itself enough to create a peaceful world; and that positive action is needed as well. This positive action can only be taken if it is authorized and backed by the people and the Congress of the United States. Swift moving, aggressive economic policy aimed to help peoples is essential if we are really to advance toward world peace. Private American citizens are probably better able to express the need for this even than is the American government. For the fact is that American influence and strength in foreign affairs depends largely on the estimate of Americans by other peoples, rather than on the estimate of American governmental policy by other governments. Recently a capable American journalist traveled through the Soviet Union with unusual freedom to observe and report. While he was there, the Soviet propaganda both within and without Russia was shouting abuse of America and everything for which she stands. Yet the Russian people, even behind the Iron Curtain, knew of America and of Americans through the endless contacts developed during

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the war, and they simply would not absorb the bitterness and hatred developed by diplomatic wrangles in the school of propaganda. The journalist, Strohm, quoted one of them as saying that it was time peoples educated diplomats and this Russian was talking of his own as well as of foreign diplomats. In the Near East, Americans, as a people, stand high, although much of the Near East is at odds with the American views on Zionism. Americans, to them, are people who taught the schools, organized hospitals, educated children, established personal contact. We are at this moment in a phase of bitter relations with the government of Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia; yet I am prepared to think that an American crashing from a plane in a Yugoslavia village would be as tenderly dealt with as the resources of the village permitted; for Yugoslavs know Americans; and their view of Americans is quite different from the view which the palace at Belgrade may have of the American government at Washington. Peoples, in expressing themselves on policy, deal with realities which are all too easily lost. If there were no other reason for urging the rights of peoples, this would be sufficient: peoples left to themselves invariably seek peace. It is governments that make war. For that reason, certainly in the United States, public opinion should begin to formulate foreign policy for the guidance of its diplomats. In essence, and if the peoples' right of free flow of information is attained, their fundamental reactions are likely to be as sound as those of the experts. In essence, the peoples of the world in general and the peoples of Europe in particular, have been led by men they did not particularly trust, down roads they did not wish to travel, and winding up in catastrophes they wished to avoid. This has been the result of foreign policy

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conducted by sovereign, or by modern substitutes for sovereign, nonrepresentative governments. Old school diplomacy might calculate coldly on the advantages of an arrangement or alliance with Hitler, based on calculations of advantage. A people, and particularly the American people, knew in its bones and its viscera that no alliance or cooperation could ever be possible with a group capable of massacring Jews and glorifying brutality. The instincts of peoples in the decade from 1930—1940 proved sound; the calculations of experts proved wrong. The conclusion is plain. In this revolutionary development in foreign affairs, we must recast both our tests of action and our methods of formulation. Foreign policy is tested as it moves toward the peace of the world by establishing, defending, and forwarding the rights of peoples. Foreign policy is formulated by the interaction of informed public opinion on the men charged with responsibility. This, and this alone, can give reality to the struggling institution we call the United Nations. This, and this alone, can cause the United Nations to evolve from a mechanism to an institution. This, and this alone, can bring into existence the community of nations whose common action will decide the fate of the coming generations.

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THE INTEREST IN PACIFIC

OF

BRITAIN

SECURITY

David Nelson Rowe *

F O R the purposes of this discussion Britain is defined to mean the United Kingdom. T h a t is merely to say that our approach to the broader problems of Empire and Commonwealth will be from this point of view. Actually, such an approach is possible only in theory. The overwhelming bulk of the problems involved must be studied as component parts of a unity which not only includes them but transcends them. Our approach is justified, however, if only because the specific regional and other special points of view are to be presented elsewhere in this Conference. F o r our purposes it is also necessary to define what we mean by the term "Pacific." As used in this discussion, it will designate those countries and possessions the territories of which lie in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean. We are definitely not concerned merely with what has been historically known as the F a r East, a term usually used to designate those countries lying on the western shore of * Associate Professor of International Relations, Research Associate of the Institute of International Studies, Director of Studies in Eastern Asiatic and Russian fields, Yale University; author of China Among the Powers.

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the Pacific, plus Japan and some of the islands of the Southwest Pacific. The recent war has reduced greatly the significance previously attached to this term from a security point of view. I t has, on the other hand, demonstrated the truth that the security of the countries on the eastern shores of the Pacific and in its southern reaches is effectively tied to that of countries on the eastern rim of the Eurasiatic continent. From the point of view of the great powers, no security policy can be worth the name which does not take account of the f a c t that the vast Pacific today, instead of separating the countries on its west and east, north and south, effectively ties them together. F o r what have been known as F a r Eastern policies of the past, must in the future be substituted Pacific policies, if security is to be protected. Finally, we must define security, which for this discussion will be given a broad meaning. Security must include all those factors which contribute to the maintenance of the life of the state and to its well-being. The three chief components are economic, military, and political, the word political being used in its broadest sense. T h a t security is here defined in terms of the state is merely to recognize the basic fact that states are still the persons of international society, and not to deny the obvious realities connected with that international society in the shape of interstate economic, military, and political concerns. These efforts at definition have forced us to focus our attention on some of the most elementary facts of the international world, facts which, however, cannot be considered so elementary that we can with impunity neglect them. If security for individual states is by its nature the subj e c t of concern for the general group of states individually and as a whole, this is quite as true f o r the Pacific as for

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other regions of the globe. Pacific security is a general concern, and any analysis of the specific interest in it of one power such as Britain must be from this point of view. Analysis from the specific one-power point of view, derives its importance from the fundamental stated above, namely t h a t states are the individual units involved in these general concerns, and t h a t they will be involved in the ways and to the extent dictated by their own interests. These interests, as conceived by the governments, statesmen, and others who influence decisions, form the motivations for action by states in the general group. I t must also be kept in mind t h a t the m a j o r instrument through which the general concern with security is likely to be expressed is, in the Pacific as elsewhere, the United N a tions. On the other hand, the United Nations does not seem likely to develop soon to the place where it will supercede entirely the strictly interstate methods f o r the creation and preservation of security. T h a t such methods are in f a c t sanctioned by the United Nations Charter is merely a recognition of the facts as they are. W i t h these general facts in mind, we must now pass to a consideration of the shape of British interests in the P a cific. The remoteness of the United Kingdom from the Pacific area does nothing to lessen the vital character of British interests there. Both world wars have provided convincing proof, f o r example, of the interdependence existing between the security of the United Kingdom in the Atlantic and t h a t of the Dominions in the Pacific. Military forces from the Antipodes fought in Africa and the Mediterranean in both wars, and it would be superfluous to attempt to summarize here even briefly the contributions made in this way to the elimination of the successive threats

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to British security. Equally well known are the military contributions of Canada in the Atlantic zone in the first war, and in both Atlantic and Pacific in the second world war. From the point of view of United Kingdom security, one of the greatest contrasts between the two wars lies in the fact that while during World War I the local security of the Pacific Dominions was never seriously threatened, it was under heavy and direct attack during much of World War II. What this meant to the security of the United Kingdom cannot well be accurately assessed. It is symbolized in the sinking off Malaya by the Japanese of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, in December 1941, as well as in the expenditure of British military strength attendant on the unsuccessful defense of Singapore. There was in consequence a greater concentration of Dominion strength upon defense in the Pacific in World War II. On the other hand, the development between the wars of the economic strength of the Pacific Dominions provided a counterbalance to their need for defense in their own area. This development provided a major safeguard to British security in time of war, as well as a most valued source of peacetime trade, and thus gave double support to the politics of interdependence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The perpetuation in the Dominions scattered around the globe, of the forms and spirit of British parliamentary democracy, must also be taken into account as a vital British interest. It is an embodiment and an expression of the strength of the democratic system for the preservation of which the two world wars have been fought. By their very existence as democracies the Dominions support the vital interests of the people of Britain. All the current

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emphasis upon British colonialism in the Pacific cannot alter this f a c t , nor prevent the probable further development in the British Empire of the pattern of democratic self-government. F a r from being a handicap in the field of British security, the geographical position of the regions in which B r i t a i n has vital interests in the Pacific has definitely advantageous features. T h e f a c t is that these regions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific are for the most p a r t remote from the zones of vital interest of the other g r e a t powers, the U . S . S . R . and the U . S . A . T h e destruction of the Japanese power makes it no longer necessary to consider the urgencies of front-line defense in relation to the British colonies and Dominions. T h e situation here is thus strikingly different from that in such regions as the Middle E a s t , where the vital interests of B r i t a i n are confronted directly with the dynamic assertion of the interest of the U . S . S . R . Whether this situation remains as it is today depends upon whether the historic pressures outward from the center of E u r a s i a succeed in effectively bringing the Russian power f a r southward in E a s t e r n A s i a or to the shores of the Indian Ocean. I t also depends upon whether the United States maintains in the future a position of power in the Western Pacific down to the equator, and upon the extent to which such a position would be considered by countries of the Pacific to involve confrontation by powers potentially hostile. In this connection it is doubtful whether there is yet any adequate understanding in the United States of the natural apprehension among small or weak powers which must have resulted from the creation of a massive armed striking power b y the United States during the p a s t war. T o o few Americans have seen this power in action, and even those

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few seem to have difficulty in realizing that what they think of as a defensive weapon must appear to others as potentially a means of coercion. Thus while in the field of politics the small or weak may respect the power of the strong, it is only natural that they should always fear it while at the same time trying to use it to their own advantage. The possibility of Soviet or American expansion into the southwest Pacific or southeast Asia cannot, thus, be arbitrarily disregarded. It seems, however, for a number of reasons to be comparatively remote. In this connection a further difference exists between the British position in the Pacific and elsewhere. In the Pacific the involvement of the United States is, at least for the present, so direct and immediate as to insure its primary concern in any question bearing on the security of British territories in that area. I t should be clear that in this region at least, British territories clearly lie on the outskirts as f a r as any clash of great power interests is concerned. T o the peoples of these regions this isolation must simply point up the fact that their security is likely to remain a function of the relations between the great powers, though not in the near future a focal source of great power frictions. Related most directly to all this is the obvious f a c t that the recent war has caused a m a j o r readjustment in the quantity and distribution of power elements in the Pacific. •This shift has taken place in the most extreme form in the cases of Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The modern development of Japanese power had at least three main aspects or components. These were the economic, the military, and the political aspects. Political mobilization and control made possible the use of military strength for the enhancement of economic strength. Eco-

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nomic strength was then used for the basic implementation in the fields of war and politics through which further development of power could take place. Fundamental in the process were the political elements, which not only provided the controls which guided existing power toward its own enhancement, but which embodied the basic drives which impelled the entire movement. The nature of these drives was fairly simple, involving the effort to protect the existence of the Japanese polity, and to do so by expanding the prevalence of its ideological basis as far as possible toward universality. The economic strength that resulted from over half a century of this process has been greatly diminished by the war and the resultant loss of the overseas possessions of the Japanese Empire. The resource base of Japan's power has been destroyed for the most part. There still remain, however, many of the chief elements of the productive plant in the home islands. Furthermore, whatever the reparations experts may do to this plant, they cannot well destroy the skills, training, and experience developed in the last half century and upon which Japanese industrial supremacy in the F a r East has been founded. These skills are likely to be utilized, and must be, if the Japanese people are to be fed. Since this is so, it is easy to envisage the occupation authorities as the custodians and protectors of this particular Japanese asset. Along with the resource base for the expanded Japanese economy there have also disappeared the armed forces of the Japanese military establishment. There is now proposed in the new Japanese constitution not so much the future limitation of arms, as the total abandonment of armed force as a means of insuring the security of the Empire. Despite its embodiment in the fundamental law, such

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a proposal is basically political in character, and as such is subject to future modification. Judging by available evidences, there is not too much reliance in foreign quarters upon the probable permanence of this constitutional provision. I t is only correct to view it, along with the constitution as a whole, as actually foreign in its origin and thus perhaps not too deeply rooted in the political will of even those few Japanese who have had anything to do with its acceptance as the supreme law of the land. A t this point we again approach the fundamental element in the question of Japanese power, namely the political element. Here is where the greatest uncertainties would seem to lie, but where we may also discover some of the clearest signposts to the future. A s to what may be the future forms of Japanese government and social control there may be doubt. Still greater doubts may arise as to possible shifts in the social psychology underlying such mechanical changes. There is, however, little doubt that the Japanese will still desire to preserve the existence of Japan as a nation, and to do so by any means possible. I t is therefore highly probable that, as in the past when they lacked the economic and military implementation with which to place their defense on a positive basis, they will again seek to affiliate themselves with those who can and will supply these necessities. The only possible bar to such a policy is the evolution of a general system for the preservation of security, in which Japan may achieve security through the agreement of the group of powers as a whole, backed up by positive methods of enforcement. From this point of view, the alternatives in the political sphere are clear. Unless the present attempt to provide security by agreement can succeed, Japan is bound to trade on her alliance value. From the point of view of British

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interest this could hardly be considered a good second choice, since it would be merely one of numerous evidences of a trend toward disaster in world affairs. It is thus to the interest of Britain that postwar Japan should not become the special ally of any great power. In the case of China the war has brought an only slightly broadened resource base. In this respect the reassertion of Chinese sovereignty over the provinces of the Manchurian region will probably mean little in the near future. Joint Chinese-Russian control over railway communications there, and strategic control by the U.S.S.R. over the Liaotung peninsula are both secured by the Sino-Russian Treaty and Agreements of August, 1945. In the economic field the probable net effect of these agreements will be to inhibit any rebuilding under Chinese auspices of those plant facilities for exploiting the resources of Manchuria which were removed as war booty by the Russians. For the thirtyfive-year duration of the agreements with the U.S.S.R. any such investment in Manchuria would hardly be secure from foreign domination. Such may well be the chief disadvantage resulting from the imposition of what it is hoped will be the last in the series of "unequal treaties" which China has endured for the past century or more. What is at present often termed "intervention" when practiced in China by the United States must be seen as the common practice of the two great powers, based upon the weakness of China. The political element is the critical factor in the creation of such power in China as would make it possible to reduce to a minimum the involvement of other nations in her internal affairs, and derogations by them from her national sovereignty. Even the immediate solution of her political problems would not, however, eliminate the massive material obstacles to the creation of

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a substantial national power. I t is likely to be at least twenty-five years before the development of China progresses to the point at which power in substantial amounts can be contributed to the safeguarding of the general security. In this connection it must be emphasized that no strong China can emerge unless the internal political settlement is such as to prevent the division and dismemberment of China into two or more hostile states. The splitting off from the rest of China of substantial regions in the north and west would rob the Chinese people as a whole of much of their mineral resources, and would condemn three hundred million of them to life in a permanent economic slum. Peace and stability cannot be the result of such an occurrence, which would only aggravate the present state of weakness in China and thus continue its recent status as an inviting target for aggressions. I t is likely that these aggressions would be multifarious and that through them the aggressors would develop such frictions with each other as would endanger the peace generally. From such dangers no p a r t of the Pacific could remain immune. The position of the British Dominions under such circumstances would be likely to remain such that their security would depend on continuing association not only with the United Kingdom but with the United States. The increasing trend toward industrialization in all three of the Pacific Dominions will increase their military potential, but must be seen in relation to the probable development of their populations, which is unlikely to be great in the near future. In the case of Canada the linkage of its security with that of the United States must inevitably continue, firmly based as it is on geographical, political, and economic realities. The Dominions of the Southwest Pacific

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may, however, lack some of t h a t feeling of assurance which proceeds from a set of expectations which, however they may be evaluated in substance, have at least the merit of stability. T h e y may rightly speculate as to the future relation of the United States to their security, quite beyond the question of what they would prefer that relation to be. In the latter respect they are almost bound to fluctuate between desiring the advantages of affiliation with the powerful and fearing the consequences of the choice of affiliations. F r o m this dilemma in psychology and politics they are not likely to be relieved until there develops a f a r better resolution of the conflicts between the great powers than exists a t the present time. In this regard it is necessary to say t h a t the g r e a t powers are pursuing, in their relations with each other, policies which have a t least a double aspect. T h e y are on the one hand entering tentatively into a process of divesting themselves of some of their power to a c t upon each other militarily (control and limitation of armaments), and on the other hand implementing their policies toward each other by the usual employment of military and economic power short of war. I t is a f a c t which is often lost sight of, that this dual process is proceeding in the Pacific as elsewhere, and that its net effects on peace and security in that region will be felt everywhere. I t is therefore necess a r y to evaluate the trends in the development of the power positions of the great powers in this region, particularly as they have been effected by the war. T h e position of the U . S . S . R . in Asia has been vastly improved b y the war, as it has been elsewhere. T h e acquisition of the former Japanese possessions in southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands has secured Soviet control over the northern entrance into the Sea of J a p a n . T h e renewal of

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Russian controls in Manchuria has in effect restored the position existing before 1905, thus not only destroying completely the source of any possible threat to the Soviet Union from a possibly hostile Manchurian power center, but solidifying Soviet strategic controls over this vast area. Whether as a consequence the future economic development of the region will become tributary to that of Asiatic Russia still remains to be seen. The policy of the U.S.S.R. in Manchuria contrasts strongly with that in Korea, where there exists, if only in principle, an agreement for total withdrawal and the establishment of Korean independence and self-government. Such an agreement would make natural a greater monopoly of control during the occupation period than the Russians have insisted upon in Manchuria where their partial occupation is guaranteed until 1980. They can also depend in Manchuria upon the existence of a large body of wellorganized and armed Chinese Communists, and since they realize the political cost of a total occupation of the region in terms of non-Communist Chinese public opinion, their Manchurian policy is established in terms of immediate return of all the territory except Port Arthur to the control of the Chinese government upon the establishment of peace. On the other hand, the Russian policy toward Korea seems designed to make impossible the creation of a united Korea unless on a basis guaranteeing its control by a government "friendly" to the Soviet Union. It can be doubted, however, whether in the face of present Korean disunion any such policy can succeed in a short period of time. The likelihood is that the occupation by the Russians and Americans will continue longer than previously agreed upon, and that the development of local regimes in the north and south of Korea may present the most serious obstacles to

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the achievement of eventual Korean unity and self-government. Under these circumstances, and with the possibility of termination of the occupation of J a p a n within a shorter time than previously anticipated, implementation of American occupation of South K o r e a may be seriously weakened. In this connection it must be realized t h a t the effective strategic domination of the K o r e a n peninsula b y any one g r e a t power would be the surest guarantee of a rapid resurgence of militarism in J a p a n , and would thus do much to prevent the achievement of the objectives of our policy toward that country. I t is therefore to the interest of Britain no less than of the other powers t h a t there should be created an independent K o r e a , the security of which is guaranteed b y a general agreement of the interested powers. T h e retirement of the United States forces from K o r e a and J a p a n need not be envisaged as necessarily weakening the American strategic position in the western Pacific. A f t e r the occupation of those countries ends, our position can be based upon the effective control of the region lying roughly between the Philippines, Marianas, Volcanoes, and R y u k y u s . This area may be thought of as a triangle, having a t its apex an effectively demilitarized J a p a n . I t may be further assumed that the islands of the Pacific formerly under Japanese mandate will remain under such measure of American control as will be deemed necessary to guarantee the security of communications with this western Pacific region. This whole system can be safeguarded on the north through the utilization of our position in A l a s k a and the Aleutians. A n essential element in this system is the new American relationship with the independent Philippine nation. This relationship involves collaboration in the economic and mil-

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itary fields, firmly set in a foundation of political agreement. The present difficulties of negotiating the settlement of economic and military relations are no more than are to be expected in view of the war and of the attendant dislocations. These difficulties may be expected to subside with the coming of general stability, and to be followed by a period in which the advantages to the United States of its new relationship to the Philippine people will be very clearly apparent. Such a relationship can only be established and maintained on a basis of mutuality of interest. As has already been pointed out, the general position of the British possessions and of the Dominions in the Pacific in the near future is that of the rear behind this line of strategic American control. The great destruction which was caused by the war in the British possessions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific calls for the export of capital for investment in the economic rehabilitation of these regions. The critical point in their reconstruction in the future may well be, however, the political question involved in the rise of native nationalism. This topic is being dealt with elsewhere and will not be discussed in detail here. In brief, however, it is possible to predict that the pattern of politics in the British possessions will develop along three main lines : 1. Increasing independence in local self-government and increasing assertion of cultural identity. 2. Development of local economic control and of participation in economic enterprise. 3. Maintenance of dependency in the fields of foreign relations and military security. It is a serious question whether British influence in these possessions has suffered such a blow during the war that the local populations cannot tolerate a political relation

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with Britain even along the lines sketched above. Time only can indicate the answer to this question, although a negative answer seems indicated at the present time. Questions of this sort are being asked today even regarding the Philippines, where increasing realization of their actual economic and military dependence upon the United States now and for the future is arousing antagonisms among the people. Those who impute to our Philippine settlement the character of a politically sagacious and statesmanlike policy should be reminded that the United States has not rid itself thereby of very heavy future responsibility for the security and prosperity of the Philippines. For the problem of British dependent areas it is probably unjustifiable to expect more rapid solutions than those which we have secured in the Philippines. In the course of this rapid survey of existing circumstances in the Pacific, some of the specific interests of Britain have been noted in passing. Particularly worthy of emphasis are the following points : 1. The promotion of the economic, military, and political security of the British Dominions constitutes a contribution to the security of Britain and of the Pacific area as a whole. 2. The security of Asiatic nations in the beginning of their development as modern states, such as China, Korea, the Philippines, and such other states as may come into being in the Pacific should be guaranteed by the great powers individually and in co-operation with each other. These guarantees are vital to the future well-being of these states, and from them Britain will stand to benefit as will other countries. 3. In regard to Japan, it is to the interest of Britain that in the postwar era Japan's security should not

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depend upon the development of a special relation to any one power. Such a development would be the surest means of guaranteeing the eventual recovery of Japanese power. 4. The former possessions and mandates of Japan should be brought under trusteeship, with due recognition of their strategic importance in the future of security in the Pacific. 5. There should be developed specific international agreements and functional organizations for the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of the island possessions and trusteeships of the various Pacific powers, and for the purposes of security, as under the terms of the United Nations Charter. 6. Regionalism in the Pacific should be limited to agreements of the type mentioned above. There should be no effort to promote Pacific security through a general regional organization for the whole Pacific. It is clear that no one great power can dominate the area, and that the vital interests of all the great powers are represented there. There would seem every reason to guarantee the security of the Pacific through the general organization of the United Nations. The stakes of Britain in Pacific security are high. Unless the prevailing instability and unrest in large sections of that region are decreased and finally eliminated by the adoption of sound general solutions by the powers involved, British interests are bound to suffer. The peace of the whole world may, in fact, be placed in danger again unless the great powers can agree to solve their problems and reconcile their interests in the Pacific. In this sense the interest of Britain in Pacific security is identical with that of all other peace-loving states.

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R U S S I A AS A FACTOR IN T H E

SECURITY

OF T H E

PACIFIC

Vera Mickeies

Dean

W H I L E Russia, in modern times, has had Germany as its chief antagonist on the continent of Europe, and Britain as its principal opponent in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, on the continent of Asia it has had to contend primarily with Japan, allied in the early part of this century with Britain. The United States had already persuaded Japan to open its doors to foreigners in 1853—54 and Britain had acquired Hong Kong and obtained special privileges for its traders in China by the time Russia, about 1860, began to take an active part in Asiatic affairs. During the Crimean war the Russians defeated British forces sent to occupy Kamchatka, and in 1858—1860 obtained from China the Amur region and a portion of the Chinese seacoast down to the boundary of Korea. In this coastal region Muravyov-Amursky, one of * Research

Director,

Foreign

Policy

Association.

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Russia's leading colonizers, who foresaw a great future for Siberia, founded the port of Vladivostok, icefree most of the year, which in World War I became a major point of entry for Allied war materials. During that period Russia and Japan had a controversy over the island of Sakhalin, lying across the Gulf of Tartary close to the Siberian mainland, and in 1875 Russia took possession of the island. With the inauguration, in 1891, of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which opened up the Russian Far East to largescale colonization and development, Russia became animated with a spirit of "manifest destiny" similar to that which inspired American pioneers of the Nineteenth Century to push this country's frontier further and further West until they reached the shores of the Pacific. The hardy men and women who settled Siberia matched their American contemporaries in sense of adventure, willingness to take risks by making a new life for themselves in what was then a wilderness, courage, and initiative. This drive to the Pacific received the whole-hearted backing of one of Russia's outstanding prerevolutionary political figures, Count Witte, who became Minister of Finance and Communications in 1892. Witte had far-reaching plans to transform Russia into a great industrial and naval power by funneling the rich raw material resources of Siberia into the heavy industries he hoped to see established, and by constructing naval facilities on the Pacific coast. In its efforts to strengthen its position in Asia, Russia collided with Japan, which had plans of its own for domination of the strategic coastline facing the Japanese islands. When Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, and under the Treaty of Shimonoseki obtained the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia, aided by France and Germany, forced Japan to surrender this territory.

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Russia also guaranteed a loan to China by establishing the Russo-Chinese Bank, a joint stock concern, and concluded an alliance with China against Japan by which it obtained the right to build across northern Manchuria a broadgauge railway known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, thus materially shortening its communications with Vladivostok. The Chinese Eastern, whose construction was practically completed by 1904 (as compared with the Trans-Siberian, not completed until 1917), was controlled entirely by the Russian government, which enjoyed wide rights of administration over the adjoining railway zone in Manchuria. In 1898 China granted to Russia a twenty-five year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula which Japan had been forced to surrender. Of particular importance to Russia was the port on the peninsula, Port Arthur, open to navigation all the year round, which the Russians transformed into a strong fortress and naval base. Not satisfied with this acquisition, however, Russia displayed increasing interest in nearby Korea, where it hoped to obtain an ice-free port less remote from Vladivostok than Port Arthur. Count Witte, a diplomat as well as a man of political vision, had sought to obtain special privileges for Russia in Asia by negotiations, but extremist nationalists found his policy too cautious, and urged the use of force to wrest an unchallenged position for Russia on the Pacific. The Japanese, for their part, were determined to prevent Russian domination of the mainland, where they hoped to obtain raw materials for their growing industries. When Japan saw that Russia had become entrenched in northern Manchuria and was contemplating further penetration in Korea, it concluded an alliance with Britain (1902), then the strongest naval power in Europe, and delivered a surprise night attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in

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February 1904, comparable to its attack nearly forty years later on Pearl Harbor. It was not until May 1905, fifteen months later, that Russia's Baltic fleet, which had had to travel all the way around the world, arrived in the Sea of Japan, only to be destroyed by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima —a disaster which demonstrated in a tragic manner the country's grave naval weakness and the lack of facilities on the Pacific coast for the operation of a major fleet. Meanwhile, at home, thousands of miles from the Asiatic theatre of war, mounting public anxiety and dissatisfaction over the disastrous course of the conflict with Japan boiled up in the revolution of 1904—05. President Theodore Roosevelt, who at first had welcomed the Russo-Japanese clash, in the hope that Japan would check Russia's advance into Manchuria which he regarded as a threat to the future of American trade in that area, was disturbed by the rapid pace of Japan's victories, and offered his services as a mediator. Both belligerents were by that time ready to consider terms of peace. Negotiations in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, resulted in conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth in September, 1905. Under this treaty Russia abandoned Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula as well as southern Manchuria; acknowledged Japan's control over Korea, which Tokyo annexed in 1910; ceded to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin; and accorded to Tokyo valuable fishing rights along the coast of Siberia. Russia's defeat strengthened the demand of revolutionary groups at home for fundamental reforms, and undermined its prestige and influence abroad. Yet in spite of the concessions Russia had been forced to make to Japan, it aligned itself with Japan in opposing the policy of the Open Door in China proclaimed by American Secretary of State John H a y in 1899

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and 1900. I t also came to terms with Japan in defining respective spheres of influence in China, as it had done with Britain in the Middle East and Central Asia. Under this arrangement Russia was to exercise domination in northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, and Japan over southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Following the Chinese revolution of 1911, which deposed the Manchu dynasty in Peking, Russia forced China to concede full autonomy to Outer Mongolia—a move that foreshadowed the policy of the Soviet government which, in 1921, established close relations with the Mongolian People's Republic whose internal system was closely patterned on that of the U.S.S.R. Although the first W o r l d W a r was waged primarily in Europe, it created a serious threat for Russia in Asia when Japan, one of the Allied and Associated Powers, took advantage of Allied intervention in Siberia (1918-1922), ostensibly to check Germany but actually to oppose the Soviet government, and tried to oust Russia from the Siberian mainland. I t required vigorous action by the United States to obtain the removal of the seventy thousand Japanese troops sent to Siberia, which were not finally withdrawn until 1922. Three years later, in 1925, Japan recognized the Soviet government and evacuated the northern portion of Sakhalin, obtaining in return oil concessions in that area as well as extensive fishing rights. In 19J7 the Soviet government had repudiated in the F a r East, as elsewhere, all special rights and privileges acquired by the Tsarist regime, including extraterritoriality. B y this measure Russia sought to range itself on the side of dependent peoples

against

the

imperialism

of

Western

colonial

powers. During his brief tenure of power Lenin had established

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close relations with the leader of the Chinese revolution, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who in his testament and his Three Principles of Democracy expressed ideas in some respects similar to those of Lenin. Sun Yat-sen's People's Party (Kuomintang) had looked to the Soviet government as a source of inspiration in a common struggle against Western imperialism, and had received ideological and technical assistance from Moscow which, at that time, hoped that Communism would triumph in other countries. The newly formed Chinese Communist Party was seen as a hopeful portent of the spread of international communism by Russian leaders like Trotsky, who advocated "permanent revolution." But a break within the Kuomintang in 1927, two years after the death of Sun Yat-sen, between right-wing and left-wing elements resulted in a setback for the Chinese Communists, who had been committed to thorough-going revolution. This break coincided with a rift among Soviet leaders, resulting in the victory of Stalin, who expelled and later exiled Trotsky, and then inaugurated the policy of "building socialism in one country." The Chinese Communists, although defeated both in their hopes for national domination and in their co-operation with Moscow, developed a practical program which drew its inspiration chiefly from the traditions and existing conditions of China. During China's long-drawn-out war with Japan the Chinese Communists established themselves firmly in the provinces of Yenan and Shansi, close to the Russian border, ruling over a population estimated at ninety million out of China's four hundred million. The extent of Moscow's influence and material assistance to the Chinese Communists remains a matter of dispute. The program of the Chinese Communists, whose policy is affected by the predominantly agrarian character of the

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country's still backward economy, differs in many respects from that of the Soviet government. Nor can it be assumed that the Communist leaders of China are prepared to accept unquestionably the diktat of Moscow. At the same time there is little doubt that a greater affinity of past experience, present objectives, and future expectations exists between the Chinese Communists and Russia than between the former and the Western powers. Following the invasion of China by Japan in 1931, however, Russia gave material aid to Chiang Kai-shek in the form of arms and airplanes exceeding, at that time, the aid of the United States, which was then still selling war materials to Japan. Russia also urged the Chinese Communists to join forces with the Kuomintang in a "national front" of resistance to Japan. Alarmed by Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Russia, feeling unequal to an open clash with Tokyo, retreated from that area and in 1935 sold its rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese-controlled government of Manchoukuo. In accordance with Stalin's policy of "building socialism in one country," Russia was meanwhile strengthening its own base of operations in Asia by industrialization of the country east of the Urals, the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the construction of a second rail connection north of the Amur River, out of range of Japanese attack. This improvement in communications across the vast reaches of Siberia was intended to remedy the grave defect in transportation which had been one of the principal reasons for Russia's defeat in 1904-05. By 1939 Russia, no longer willing to accept further encroachments by Japan, vigorously resisted Japanese efforts to press northward in the vicinity of Outer Mongolia with which Moscow had concluded a pact of guarantee in 1936.

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After a sharp military clash the two countries concluded an armistice in 1939 at the outbreak of war in Europe. In April, 1941, as Germany was preparing to strike at the Balkans, Russia signed a nonaggression pact with Japan. During the first two years of that war Russia and Japan remained on guard along their fifteen hundred mile border, with Russia reported as maintaining a Far Eastern army of one million men, and Japan a force in Manchuria estimated at close to that figure. In spite of Russia's unconcealed aid to China, Japan, rejecting the counsels of its army leaders, who advised war against Russia, yielded to the advice of its naval spokesmen, and struck without warning at the United States on December 7 , 1 9 4 1 . Just as Russia, by its nonaggression pact with Tokyo, had obtained a safeguard against Japanese attack in Asia while it was fighting for survival in Europe, so Japan, by that pact, had obtained a safeguard against an attack from the north while it sought to achieve domination in southern Asia and in the Pacific. Under the nonaggression pact Japan had recognized Russia's sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia, and Russia that of Japan in Manchuria. The United States, faced as late as the Potsdam Conference of July, 1945, with the prospect of a prolonged, indecisive, and bloody struggle against the Japanese islands, vigorously urged Russia's entrance into the war in Asia even before the war in Europe had come to an end. T o obtain Russia's aid, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, in a secret undertaking made at Yalta in February, 1945, promised to assist Moscow in obtaining special rights and privileges from China. As it turned out, the United States, having mastered the secret of manufacturing the atomic bomb, was able to shorten the war ma-

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terially by delivering two staggering blows at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russia which, in accordance with its undertaking, had denounced its nonaggression pact with T o k y o in A p r i l , 1945, and had declared war on Japan three months after V E D a y (the time regarded as necessary to transfer Russian forces from the West to the E a s t ) invaded Manchuria only to find Japan suing f o r unconditional surrender a week later. Meanwhile, Russia and China had opened negotiations in Moscow f o r a thirty-year pact of friendship and alliance, concluded on August 26, 1945, which embodied the main terms agreed on by the Big Three at Y a l t a . The most significant features of the treaty and its supplementary agreements are the recognition of a special position f o r Russia in Manchuria and the explicit pledge of the signatories " t o act according to the principles of mutual respect f o r their sovereignty and territorial entity and noninterference in the internal affairs of both contracting parties." This clause was assumed to mean that the U.S.S.R. would deal only with the Chinese Central government and would not extend aid or recognition to the Chinese Communists in Yenan. Shortly after, conversations looking toward establishment of national unity were opened in Chungking by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and M a o

Tse-tung,

leader of the Chinese Communists, with the active participation of General Marshall, former Chief of Staff of the United States, in the capacity of mediator. These conversations, however, proved abortive, and civil war flared up anew in the autumn of 1946. The Russo-Chinese treaty did not fully restore Russia to the position it occupied before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. The rights granted to the U.S.S.R. by China are much more limited than those possessed by Tsarist

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Russia, and no attempt was made to restore extraterritoriality. Russia and China are to have joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway (built by Japan), which are to be combined under the single name of the Chinese Changchun Railway. The joint control, however, is to apply only to those properties in which the Russians previously had an interest, and other lines will apparently come under complete Chinese control. Port Arthur, from which Russia was ousted by Japan in 1905, is to be used jointly by Russia and China as a naval base "at the disposal of the battleships and merchant ships of China and the U.S.S.R. alone," while the nearby port of Dairen is to be a "free port open to trade and shipping of all countries." In Dairen various piers and warehouses will be leased to Russia, and no import or export duties will be levied on goods passing directly to or from the Soviet Union through that port. In both Port Arthur and Dairen the civil administration is to be Chinese, but there will be a large measure of Russian authority, especially in the former. The Soviet government also declared in the 1945 treaty that it regards Manchuria as part of China and undertakes to respect China's full sovereignty over that area. According to a minute appended to the treaty, Stalin pledged that Russian troops would begin to withdraw from Manchuria three weeks after Japan's capitulation, the withdrawal to be completed within three months at the most. With regard to Outer Mongolia, which is non-Chinese in language, population, and historical background, but in theory has been under Chinese sovereignty, it was agreed that, if a plebiscite confirmed the people's desire for independence, China would recognize Outer Mongolia's independent status. Such recognition, Chiang Kai-shek stated in an ad-

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dress of August 25, 1945, was not only necessary for friendship, but would also be in harmony with the Kuomintang's principles of the equality and freedom of peoples. A f t e r a plebiscite held in October, 1945 had resulted in an overwhelming popular vote for independence, the Mongolian People's Republic, with the support of Russia, sought, but without success, to obtain admission as a member of the United Nations organization. As to Sinkiang, another disputed border area with a population 90 per cent non-Chinese in which the Russians exerted great influence from 1934 until 1942, when they withdrew in favor of China, Russian Foreign Minister Molotov stated in connection with the treaty that the Soviet Union "has no intention to interfere with China's internal affairs." Since the conclusion of this comprehensive Russo-Chinese treaty, relations between the two countries have shown little evidence of improvement. Russia's delay in evacuating Manchuria—originally, at least, at the request of Chungking, which wanted additional time to bring up its forces, and thus prevent occupation of Manchurian centers by neighboring Chinese Communist troops—provoked protests not only from China, but also from the United States and Britain; and Russia eventually promised to complete its evacuation by the end of April, 1946, by which time the United States, too, had agreed to remove its troops from Chinese territory. Russian troops did evacuate Manchuria but, before withdrawing, they stripped many factories and mines of machinery and other equipment. This action was justified by Moscow on the ground that the machinery had been used by Japan for war purposes and therefore constituted legitimate war booty—although no formal agreement has yet been concluded by the Big Three as to disposal of Japanese

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property in that area, or its possible application to a general reparations account. Moreover, it might have been assumed that China, which has suffered most from J a p a nese occupation, would have first priority on reparations from Japanese sources, as against Russia, which had waged a war of but a week's duration in Manchuria. Subsequent reports indicated that Russia's removal of industrial material from Manchuria was motivated less by a desire to claim war booty or even to use this material in its own plants, as by fear that the Chinese Central government, possibly with the aid of the United States, would utilize Japanese-built industries, left intact by war, to create a powerful base for future operations against the U.S.S.R. The United States and Britain were also alarmed by indications that Russia, taking advantage of the position it gained in Manchuria in its one week of military operations against J a p a n , was planning, in accordance with the policy of the Tsarist Empire, to oppose the Open Door in that area, and to seek special economic privileges from China, including Russian participation on a joint stock basis in Chinese industrial and mining enterprises. The controversy over Manchuria is but a symptom of the uneasiness that developed between the United States and Russia in Asia upon termination of war with Japan. The fundamental change in the balance of power effected by World War I I is that the United States has acquired a strategic position in the F a r E a s t which, taken in conjunction with our unequaled industrial and financial resources, gives this country a potentially far greater opportunity to determine the destiny of the Asiatic mainland than J a p a n commanded at the peak of its military successes. In this sense the United States has replaced J a p a n as a prospective contender with Russia for a position of influence on

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the Pacific shores of A s i a . B u t if Russia, even a f t e r a quarter of a century of industrial development, had much to fear from a militant J a p a n , the United States could be a still more formidable opponent f o r Russia during the period of that country's necessarily painful recovery from the damage wreaked on its economy by the Germans. T o the casual reader of newspaper headlines it may have seemed, since V J D a y , that Russia was encroaching further and further on its Asiatic neighbors. Y e t a dispassionate examination of the historical record shows that the Soviet government has so f a r , at least, been merely retracing the paths of Russian penetration in the F a r E a s t blazed f o r over fifty years by the T s a r i s t Empire. I t is not so much Russia's position on the Asiatic mainland which has changed, as it is that the United States, for the first time in its history, has emerged not only as an interested p a r t y but as an active p a r t i c i p a n t in F a r E a s t e r n affairs. While to us Russia's attitude toward the Chinese Communists, its relations with Outer Mongolia, its policy toward Manchuria and K o r e a , may seem to constitute a threat to our interests, the stake we have acquired in the Orient as a result of the war may seem equally menacing to the Russians. If we look a t postwar developments in Asia from the point of view of Moscow, and not of Washington, what do we see P W e see t h a t the United States exercises paramount control over the Japanese islands, even though this control is qualified, on paper, by the existence of the Allied Control Council in T o k y o and the F a r E a s t e r n Commission in Washington, on both of which Russia is represented. T h i s seems entirely proper to most Americans, who recall the sacrifices made b y this country to defeat J a p a n . A n d it is understandable that General M c A r t h u r should find Russia's attempts to question or challenge various aspects of

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his administration of J a p a n as irksome and unwarranted. It can also be argued that, while Russia undoubtedly bore the brunt of the fighting in Europe, its contribution to the winning of the war in Asia was relatively small, especially when compared to that of China or the United States, although the presence of one million Russian soldiers on the Manchurian border immobilized a comparable Japanese force. Yet the Russians, who can still remember the disastrous defeat inflicted on them by J a p a n in 1904-05, and the attempt of the Japanese to oust them from Siberia in 1918, feel that the future of J a p a n is of crucial importance for the security of their country—more crucial-, perhaps, than it is for the security of the United States. While some of the suggestions made by the Russians in the Allied Control Council in Tokyo for changes in Japan's political and economic structure can be discounted as propaganda, there is genuine concern in Moscow that the reforms undertaken by the United States may leave more or less intact the very elements among the Japanese who did not hesitate to expose their people to the risks of war. The Russians, moreover, fear that the United States, sooner or later, may use force to dislodge them from the positions they have acquired in Asia. While this assumption may appear to some Americans as the figment of a distorted imagination, the Russians, measuring our policy by the yardstick of their anxiety, believe that the United States may use J a p a n as a base for air and naval attack on the Siberian mainland, now infinitely more vulnerable because of the possible use of the atomic bomb. The results achieved by this country at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have not escaped the attention of Soviet leaders. The Russians do not think it fantastic to expect that from J a p a n , which occupies a position with respect to the conti-

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nent of A s i a strikingly similar to that of Britain with respect to the continent of Europe, the United States, if it were so minded, could in short order destroy the laborious efforts Russia has made since the middle of the Nineteenth Century to establish itself on the Pacific. T r u e , the R u s sians have sought to enhance their own security by obtaining outright the Kurile Islands off the northern coast of Siberia. B u t this acquisition is more than matched by American control of former Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific which, even though subject to the supervision of the Security Council of the United Nations, are to be administered as an integral p a r t of the territory of the United States. T h e problem of Russia's security in the Pacific will remain a cause of anxiety to any government in Moscow, whatever its political character, as long as Russia continues to l a g behind the United States in air and naval power, and in the industrial c a p a c i t y f o r mass production of airplanes, ships, and especially atomic bombs. A comparable problem of security arises also in Russia's relations with the United States in China. There General Marshall, President Truman's special envoy, with the assistance, in later stages, of the American Ambassador, D r . John Leighton S t u a r t , sought f o r a y e a r to reconcile differences between the Central government of Chiang K a i shek and the Chinese Communists. F r o m the point of view of the United States, this constituted legitimate and, indeed, urgently necessary intervention to prevent the renewal of civil war in China, suspended but f a r from settled by the Japanese invasion. M a n y Americans, however, believe that American intervention, while intended to be impartial, in effect redounded to the benefit of the Central government. F o r this country continued to extend economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek without waiting f o r the crea-

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tion of a democratic regime representing all political parties which, according to President Truman's statement of December 15, 1945, was to have been a prerequisite of further assistance. Although it can be argued that the Chinese Communists might not in any case have found it possible to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek, the economic aid the Generalissimo received from the United States served to strengthen the reactionary elements in the Kuomintang, who were determined to crush the Communists once and for all and hoped to obtain American aid for this purpose. While the United States openly intervened in China, with the effect, unsought though it may have been, of consolidating the position of the Central government, Russia carefully abstained from giving any public indication of its attitude toward the contending groups—although there can be little doubt of where its sympathies lie. By deciding on unilateral intervention in China, the United States, as in Japan, avoided the innumerable complications that might have attended an attempt to reconcile its interests with those of Russia—complications that have unquestionably hampered joint Allied action in the liberated countries of Europe. But it has also gambled on having to assume sole blame for the failure of General Marshall's mission, in the eyes of the world and, what is even more important, of the Chinese people. The result may be that this country, without conscious volition on its part, will appear to the Chinese as an associate, if not actually a supporter, of the reactionary elements in the Central government and, by that token, an opponent of the groups in China—not only Communists but also moderate reformers—who have been endeavoring to shape the country into the kind of progres-

Russia as a Factor in the Security of the Pacific

237

sive modern nation that many Americans say they want China to be. The difference in approach to Asiatic peoples by the United States and Russia, which can only be guessed at in J a p a n and China, where the two great powers do not operate jointly, emerges into sharp focus in Korea, which is under their joint administration. I t will be recalled that Korea, coveted by both Russia and Japan, was finally annexed by J a p a n in 1910, to be liberated only with the defeat of the Japanese in World W a r II. At the Cairo Conference, November 22—26, 1943, in which Russia did not participate, the United States, Britain, and China agreed that Korea should receive independence "in due course." At the Moscow Conference of December 1945 the United States, Britain, and Russia, with the approval of China, agreed on the formation of a provisional democratic government in Korea by a joint American-Russian Commission working in consultation with Korean democratic organizations, and the establishment of a Four-Power trusteeship for the country for a period up to five years, after which Korea was to achieve full independence. Under the terms of this agreement, the northern p a r t of Korea has been administered by Russia, and the southern part by the United States, pending the outcome of negotiations for establishment of a provisional democratic government, which so far have proved fruitless. The Russians, in their zone, have supported not only Communists, as might have been expected, but also non-Communist elements who played an active p a r t in resistance to the Japanese during the war. The American military government at first relied primarily on Korean political exiles who had been out of the country since 1919, notably Rhee Syngman and Kim

238

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Koo, and opposed and tried to suppress not only Communists, but also other groups critical of the United States. The Russians won popular acclaim in their zone by instituting a land reform under which land, formerly a monopoly of the Japanese, was distributed on the basis of five hectares per farming family. The American military government has undertaken no land distribution in spite of the fact that our zone includes nearly 70 per cent of the cultivated area of the country and two-thirds of its 30 million population, and has preserved the principal Japanese industrial combine, the Oriental Development Company, which owned more than one half of Korea's entire wealth, renaming it the New Korea Company. The political stalemate has had as its corollary an economic deadlock, as a result of which the American zone, which contains well over half of the country's population and a major part of its foodstuffs, notably rice, the Korean staple, is cut off from the Russian zone, which contains the principal industrial and mining resources of Korea, notably coal. Russia's uncompromising attitude on the composition of the provisional government has been regarded in the United States as an insuperable stumbling block to the development of Korea along the lines contemplated by the Allies in 1945. Agreement about the future of Korea whose strategic position is appreciated with equal keenness by Russia and the United States, depends not merely on compromises by one or the other of the two great powers, but on their ultimate success in achieving a fusion of their admittedly differing views about the political, economic, and social issues of our times. This, in essence, is the fundamental problem the United States and Russia must tackle not only in Asia, but wherever their interests come into contact. For while Russia's

Russia

as a Factor in the Security of the Pacific

239

geographic and strategic position on the Asiatic mainland has not materially altered today, in contrast to the days of the Tsars, it has at its disposal a magnetic weapon that may draw to its side peoples whose territory it may not even directly touch, and who have never seen a Russian. The weapon, of course, is propaganda—propaganda reiterated in unchanging form from the early congresses of the Communist International to the League of Nations, from San Francisco to Lake Success, skillfully stressing the grievances and rights of colonial peoples and the alleged misdeeds of Western imperialism. It is this propaganda, far more than Russia's military power or economic influence, that the United States has cause to fear, and must learn to counter. But propaganda cannot be successfully met by counterpropaganda. Deeds, not words, must be the answer. T o the extent that the United States becomes identified in the mind of Asiatic peoples with the excesses of colonial rule which they are combating, to that extent this country will be the loser, even if Russia does not win by our default. In Japan, in China, in Korea, wherever there is a confrontation in Asia between Russia and the United States, it is essential that our actions should demonstrate, first and foremost, concern for the welfare and future progress of the peoples of these countries, and not merely of the small ruling groups with which we may have been linked in the past through diplomatic and business ties. The peoples of Japan, China, and Korea know that the United States, with its vast industrial resources, can give them more prompt and effective assistance in their plans for internal reconstruction than Russia, which is itself in the throes of rebuilding its shattered and, by Western standards, still backward economy. They also know that political liberty, to which they have long aspired

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under the rule of feudal native regimes or colonial systems, is deeply embedded in the American tradition. They still look for leadership to the United States. If they do not find it here, they may turn to Russia. But even if they do not, even if they reject Communism, ours will have been a hollow victory, for unless we can offer constructive leadership we will have won the semblance of power in Asia, but without that substance of sympathetic participation in the growth of the peoples of Asia which alone could make our power workable and enduring.

READING Prepared

LIST

by a Committee

Wellesley

College

M A R G A R E T M . BOYCE,

of the

Library CHAIRMAN

I. T H E AMERICAN STAKE IN T H E BIENSTOCK, GREGORY.

PACIFIC

The Struggle for the Pacific.

N . Y.,

Mac-

millan, 1937. G . Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia. N . Y . , Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. D I E T R I C H , E T H E L B . Far Eastern Trade of the United, States. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. D U L L E S , F O S T E R R. America in the Pacific. N. Y., Houghton, 1938. F A R L E Y , M I R I A M S. America's Stake in the Far East. 2d rev. ed. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1937. H A A S , W I L L I A M H . , ed. The American Empirej A Study of the Outlying Territories of the United States. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1940. H O L L A N D , W I L L I A M L., ed. Commodity Control in the Pacific Area; A Symposium on Recent Experience. Stanford University, California; Stanford University Press, 1935. H U D S O N , G E O F F R E Y F . and M A R T H E R A J C H M A N . An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics. N. Y., Day, 1942. Institute of Pacific Relations. An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941-42. P a r t 1. Population and Land Utilization by Karl J. Pelzer. P a r t 2. Transportation by Katrine R. C. Greene. Foreign Trade by Joseph D. Phillips. P a r t 3. Industrialization of the Western Pacific by Kate L. Mitchell. Institute of Pacific Relations 7th Conference, 1939. Problems of the Pacific. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. CALLIS, H E L M U T

242

Reading

List

Institute of Pacific Relations 8th Conference, 1942. War and Peace in the Pacific. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. Institute of Pacific Relations 9th Conference, 1945. Security in the Pacific. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945. KEESING, F E L I X M. Modern Samoa. Stanford University, California; Stanford University Press, 1934. KEESING, F E L I X M . Native Peoples in the Pacific World. N . Y., Macmillan, 1945. KEESING, F E L I X M . The South Seas in the Modern World. N . Y . , Day, 1945. K E N N E D Y , RAYMOND. The Ageless Indies. N. Y., Day, 1 9 4 2 . K E N N E D Y , RAYMOND. Islands and Peoples of the Indies. Washington, D. C. ; Smithsonian Institution, 1943. LATOURETTE, K E N N E T H S . The United States Moves Across the Pacificj the A. B. C.'s of the American Problem in the Western Pacific and the Far East. N. Y., Harper, 1946. L E I T H , C H A R L E S K. and others. World Minerals and World Peace. Washington, D. C.; Brookings Institution, 1943. L E W I S , CLEONA. America's Stahe in International Investments. Washington, D. C.; Brookings Institution, 1938. R E I D , C H A R L E S F . Overseas America; Our Territorial Outposts. N. Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1942. R E M E R , C H A R L E S F. The Foreign Trade of China. Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1926. R E M E R , C H A R L E S F . Foreign Investments in China. N . Y . , Macmillan, 1933. S A M M O N S , R O B E R T L . American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries—19Jfi. Washington, D. C.; Government Printing Office, 1942. T A Y L O R , GEORGE E. America in the New Pacific. N. Y., Macmillan, 1942. II. F U N D A M E N T A L THE

FUTURE

PROBLEMS!

SECURITY

OF D E P E N D E N T

AND

AREAS

Australian Institute of International Affairs. Australia and the Pacific. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. B U N C H E , R A L P H J . "Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Ter-

Reading List

243

ritories in the Charter of the United Nations." U. S. Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945; pp. 1037-44. B U N C H E , R A L P H J . "The Trusteeship System." The Round Table, March, 1946; pp. 127-132. C R A W F O R D , R A Y M O N D M., ed. Ourselves and the Pacific. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1941. C R E S S E Y , G E O R G E B. Asia's Lands and Peoples. N. Y., McGrawHill, 1944. C R E S S E Y , G E O R G E B . The Basis of Soviet Strength. N . Y . , McGraw-Hill, 1945. D E H A A S , J A C O B A . Our Allies: The Netherlands East Indies. N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1942. D E A N , V E R A M I C H E L E S . The Four Cornerstones of Peace. N . Y . , McGraw-Hill, 1946. D E A N , V E R A M I C H E L E S . Russia—Menace or Promise? N . Y . , Foreign Policy Association, 1946 (Headline Series No. 58). E M E R S O N , R U P E R T . Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. E M E R S O N , R U P E R T . Malaysia; A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule. N. Y., Macmillan, 1937. F U R N I V A L L , J O H N S . Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia: A Comparison of Colonial Progress and Practice. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. G R A J D A N Z E V , A N D R E W J . Modern Korea. N . Y . , Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. G R A T T A N , C L I N T O N H . Lands Down Under. St. Louis, Webster, 1943. G U L L , E D W A R D M . British Economic Interests in the Far East. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. H O L C O M B E , A R T H U R N . Dependent Areas in the Post-War World. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941. J E N K I N S , D A V I D R . New Zealand's Role in the Pacific. N . Y . , Foreign Policy Association, 1943. K E E S I N G , F E L I X M . The Philippines: A Nation in the Making. Shanghai, Kelly, 1937. L A S K E R , B R U N O . Asia on the Move. N . Y . , Holt, 1 9 4 5 . L U K E , S I R H A R R Y C. The British Pacific Islands. London, Oxford University Press, 1943. M C K A Y , V E R N O N . "International Trusteeship — Role of United

244

Reading List

Nations in the Colonial World." Foreign Policy Reports, May 15, 1946. M I L N E R , I A N F . G . New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. M O O R E , H A R R I E T L . Soviet Far Eastern Policyj 1931—1945. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945. M O S S E , R O B E R T , ed. Soviet Far East and Pacific Northwest. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1944. N A S H , W A L T E R . New Zealand, a Working Democracy. N . Y . , Duell, 1943. R O W E , D A V I D N. China Among the Powers. N. Y., Harcourt, 1945. R O W E , D A V I D N. "Collective Security in the Pacific, an American View." Pacific Affairs, March, 1945. Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Patterns of Pacific Security. London, The Institute, 1946. S H E P H E R D , J A C K . Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. S N O W , E D G A R . Pattern of Soviet Power. N . Y., Random House, 1945. United Nations Charter, chapters X I , X I I , X I I I . ch. X I . Non-self-governing territories, ch. X I I . International trusteeships system, ch. X I I I . Trusteeship council. V A N D E N B O S C H , A M R Y . The Dutch East Indies, Its Government, Problems, and Politics. 3d ed. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1942. V L E K K E , B E R N A R D H . The Story of the Dutch East Indies. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1945. Y A K H O N T O F F , V I C T O R A . USSR Foreign Policy. N . Y . , CowardMcCann, 1945. III. T H E AMERICAN POLICY I N T H E

PACIFIC

A. "The American Outlook in Foreign Affairs." U. S. Department of State Bulletin, October 22, 1944. B I S S O N , T H O M A S A. America's Far Eastern Policy. N. Y., Macmillan, 1945.

B E R L E , ADOLF

Reading List CHOU, KENG-SHENG.

245 Winning the Peace in the Pacific.

N.

Y.,

Macmillan, 1914. R U P E R T . The Netherlands Indies and the United States. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1942. G R I S W O L D , A L F R E D W . The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. N. Y., Harcourt, 1938. H O W A R D , H A R R Y P. America's Role in Asia. N. Y., Howell, 1943. International Center. Postwar Problems of the Pacific and World Organization, A Report of Four Institutes Held on the Pacific Coast, March 1—9, 19^. San Francisco, International Center, 1944. J O H N S T O N E , W I L L I A M C. Future of Japan. N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1945. K I R K , G R A Y S O N . "The Future Security of the United States." Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, May, 1945. K I R K , G R A Y S O N . Philippine Independence. N. Y . , Farrar, 1936. K I R K , G R A Y S O N . Uniting Today for Tomorrow: The United Nations in War and Peace. N. Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1942. L A T A N E , J O H N H . and D A V I D W . W A I N H O U S E . A History of American Foreign Policy. 2d rev. ed. N. Y., Odyssey Press, 1940. L A T T I M O R E , O W E N . America and Asia. Claremont, California; Claremont College, 1943. L A T T I M O R E , O W E N . Solution in Asia. Boston, Little, Brown, 1945. L E N G Y E L , E M I L . America's Role in World Affairs. N . Y . , Harper, 1946. L O R W I N , L E W I S L . Postwar Plans of the United Nations. N . Y . , Twentieth Century Fund, 1943. Our Far Eastern Record. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 1942, 1946. 3 volumes. P E F F E R , N A T H A N I E L . America's Place in the World. N . Y., Viking, 1945. R E I D , C H A R L E S F. Overseas America. N. Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1942. S M I T H , R O B E R T A. Our Future in Asia. N. Y., Viking, 1940. EMERSON,

246

Reading

List

Your Foreign Policy: How, What and Why? N. Y., Viking, 1941. S P R O U T , H A R O L D and M . T . S P R O U T , eds. Foundations of National Power: Readings on World Politics and American Security. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946. S P Y K M A N , N I C H O L A S J. The Geography of the Peace, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl. N. Y., Harcourt, Brace, 1944. T H O M P S O N , W A R R E N S . Population and Peace in the Pacific. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946. V A N A L Y S T Y N E , R I C H A R D W . American Diplomacy in Action, A Series of Case Studies. Stanford University, California; Stanford University Press, 1944. V I N C E N T , J O H N C A R T E R . "Korea and the Far East." U. S. Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1946; pp. 104—110. W A L L A C E , H E N R Y A . Our Job in the Pacific. N . Y . , Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. W E L L E S , S U M N E R . Where Are We Heading? N . Y . , Harper, 1946.

SMITH, ROBERT A .

IV. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

WORKS

B . and H E R B E R T R O S I N S K I . Sea Power in the Pacific, 1986—1941: A Selected Bibliography of Boohs, Periodical Articles, and Maps from the End of the London Naval Conference to the Beginning of the War in the Pacific. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942. Far Eastern Bibliography. (In Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1—Vol. 5, No. 3; November, 1941—May, 1946. Formerly Bulletin of Far Eastern Bibliography.) Foreign Affairs Bibliography: A Selected and Annotated List of Books on International Relations; 1919-1932j 1982-194%. N. Y., Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1933, 1945. Supplemented by "Recent Books on International Relations" in current issues of Foreign Affairs. Guide to Historical Literature. N. Y., Macmillan, 1936. Section on Oceanica. H A R R I S , G E O R G E L . The Far East—A Syllabus. N . Y . , Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. ELLINGER, WERNER

Reading

List

247

Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944. L E W I N , E V A N S . Pacific Region: A Bibliography of the Pacific and East Indian Islands. London, Royal Empire Society, 1944. M A C F A D D E N , C L I F F O R D H . A Bibliography of Pacific Area Maps. N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. "Outstanding Recent Books on the F a r E a s t . " Far Eastern Quarterly: May, 1942, pp. 247-252; August, 1945, pp. 3 6 7 377. P E A K E , C Y R U S H . "War and Peace in the Pacific: A Classified and Annotated Bibliography of Selected Books." Far Eastern Quarterly, May, 1942, pp. 253-274. United States. Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography. Islands of the Pacific: A Selected List of References. Washington, D. C., Library of Congress, 1943. Supplement, 1945. United States. Library of Congress. Division of Bibliography. List of Recent Books on Foreign Relations of the United States. Supplementary to Mimeographed Lists of 1929 and 1985. Washington, D. C., Library of Congress, 1940. KENNEDY, RAYMOND.