American Jewish Year Book 2019: The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899 [1st ed.] 9783030403706, 9783030403713

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Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xx
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th Anniversary (Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, Chaim I. Waxman)....Pages 3-37
The Presidential Voting of American Jews (Herbert F. Weisberg)....Pages 39-90
American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections (J. J. Goldberg)....Pages 91-96
American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July 2019): The US, Israel, and the Middle East (Mitchell Bard)....Pages 97-134
United States Jewish Population, 2019 (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky)....Pages 135-231
Canadian Jewish Population, 2019 (Charles Shahar)....Pages 233-245
2018 Survey of Jews in Canada: Executive Summary (Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, Rhonda Lenton)....Pages 247-261
World Jewish Population, 2019 (Sergio DellaPergola)....Pages 263-353
Front Matter ....Pages 355-355
Local Jewish Organizations (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Sarah Markowitz)....Pages 357-418
Jewish Museums and Holocaust Museums, Memorials, and Monuments (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Sarah Markowitz)....Pages 419-452
Jewish Overnight Camps (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Sarah Markowitz)....Pages 453-466
National Jewish Organizations (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Sarah Markowitz)....Pages 467-640
Jewish Press (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Sarah Markowitz)....Pages 641-663
Academic Resources (Arnold Dashefsky, Ira M. Sheskin, Amy Lawton, Sarah Markowitz, Maria Reger)....Pages 665-743
Transitions: Major Events, Honorees, and Obituaries (Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Ben Harris, Roberta Pakowitz, Matthew Parent)....Pages 745-830
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American Jewish Year Book 120

Arnold Dashefsky Ira M. Sheskin Editors

American Jewish Year Book 2019 The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899

American Jewish Year Book Volume 119

Series Editors Arnold Dashefsky, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA Ira M. Sheskin, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA Produced under the Academic Auspices of: The Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut and The Jewish Demography Project at The Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies, University of Miami

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11193

Arnold Dashefsky  •  Ira M. Sheskin Editors

American Jewish Year Book 2019 The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899

Editors Arnold Dashefsky Department of Sociology Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life University of Connecticut Storrs, CT, USA

Ira M. Sheskin Department of Geography University of Miami Coral Gables, FL, USA

ISSN 0065-8987     ISSN 2213-9583 (electronic) American Jewish Year Book ISBN 978-3-030-40370-6    ISBN 978-3-030-40371-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This Volume is Dedicated to the Memory of Sidney Goldstein, z”l1 Dean of demographers of American Jewry, regarded by all as a gentleman and a scholar, and above all else, a mensch to all who knew him.

 See addendum in Chap. 15, Sect. 3 for the obituary of Sidney Goldstein.

1

The Publication of This Volume Was Made Possible by the Generous Support of

The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Connecticut (Interim Dean Davita Silfen Glasberg and Dean Juli Wade) Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life at the University of Connecticut (Sebastian Wogenstein, Interim Director and Avinoam Patt, Director) The Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies (Haim Shaked, Director) and its Jewish Demography Project (Ira M. Sheskin, Director); and The George Feldenkreis Program in Judaic Studies (Haim Shaked, Director) College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Miami (Dean Leonidas Bachas and Senior Associate Dean Kenneth Voss) The Fain Family Endowed Chair at the University of Miami (William Scott Green, Senior Vice President and Dean of Undergraduate Education) Mandell “Bill” Berman (z”l) and the Mandell and Madeleine Berman Foundation We acknowledge the cooperation of: Berman Jewish DataBank, a project of The Jewish Federations of North America (Mandell Berman (z”l), Founding Chair; Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Director). The Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (Leonard Saxe, President) We acknowledge the contributions of the men and women who edited the American Jewish Year Book from 1899 to 2008 Cyrus Adler, Maurice Basseches, Herman Bernstein, Morris Fine, Herbert Friedenwald, H.  G. Friedman, Lawrence Grossman, Milton Himmelfarb, Joseph Jacobs, Martha Jelenko, Julius B. Maller, Samson D. Oppenheim, Harry Schneiderman, Ruth R. Seldin, David Singer, Jacob Sloan, Maurice Spector, Henrietta Szold

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Academic Advisory Committee

Sidney (z”l) and Alice Goldstein, Honorary Chairs Carmel U. Chiswick, Research Professor of Economics at George Washington University and Professor Emerita of Economics at the University of Illinois at Chicago Lynn Davidman, Robert M. Beren Distinguished Professor of Modern Jewish Studies and Professor of Sociology at University of Kansas Sylvia Barack Fishman, Ph.D., Editor, HBI (Hadassah Brandeis Institute) Series on Gender and Jewish Women; Emerita Professor of Contemporary Jewish Life and Culture at Brandeis University. Recipient of the 2014 Marshall Sklare Award Calvin Goldscheider, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Ungerleider Professor Emeritus of Judaic Studies, and Faculty Associate of the Population Studies and Training Center at Brown University. Recipient of the 2001 Marshall Sklare Award Alice Goldstein, Research Associate Emerita, Population Studies and Training Center, Brown University Sidney Goldstein (z”l), G.  H. Crooker University Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Brown University. Recipient of the 1992 Marshall Sklare Award Harriet Hartman, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Rowan University and Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Jewry. Past President of the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (ASSJ). Recipient of the 2019 Marshall Sklare Award Samuel Heilman, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Harold Proshansky Chair in Jewish Studies at the Graduate Center, and Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Queens College of the City University of New York. Recipient of the 2003 Marshall Sklare Award. Former Editor of Contemporary Jewry Debra R. Kaufman, Professor Emerita of Sociology and Matthews Distinguished University Professor at Northeastern University Shaul Kelner, Associate Professor of Sociology and Jewish Studies, Vanderbilt University Barry A. Kosmin, Research Professor of Public Policy & Law and Director of the Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture at Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut. Former Director of the North American Jewish DataBank ix

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Academic Advisory Committee

Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Senior Director of Research and Analysis and Director of the Berman Jewish DataBank at The Jewish Federations of North America Deborah Dash Moore, Professor of History and former Director of the Frankel Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Michigan. Recipient of the 2006 Marshall Sklare Award Pamela S. Nadell, Professor and Patrick Clendenen Chair in Women's & Gender History, American University; Chair, Critical Race, Gender, and Culture Studies Collaborative; Past President, Association for Jewish Studies; America’s Jewish Women: A History from Colonial Times to Today (W.W. Norton, 2019) Bruce A.  Phillips, Professor of Sociology and Jewish Communal Service at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion in Los Angeles. Recipient of the 2016 Marshall Sklare Award Riv-Ellen Prell, Professor Emerita of American Studies and past Director of the Center for Jewish Studies at the University of Minnesota. Past Chair of the Academic Council of the American Jewish Historical Society. Recipient of the 2011 Marshall Sklare Award Jonathan D.  Sarna, University Professor and Joseph H. & Belle R.  Braun Professor of American Jewish History at Brandeis University and Chief Historian of the National Museum of American Jewish History. Recipient of the 2002 Marshall Sklare Award. Past President of the Association for Jewish Studies (AJS) Leonard Saxe, Klutznick Professor of Contemporary Jewish Studies, Director of the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, and Director of the Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis University. Recipient of the 2012 Marshall Sklare Award. President of the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (ASSJ) Morton Weinfeld, Professor of Sociology and Chair in Canadian Ethnic Studies at McGill University. Recipient of the 2013 Marshall Sklare Award

Preface

Readers of the Year Book may find more than an occasional reference in the recent past to Charles Dickens’ famous quote about the “best of times,” and the “worst of times” (see, for example, Kosmin 2015 and Chap. 4 in this volume) to describe the current situation facing Jews both in the USA and Israel. Consider that American Jews witnessed, during 2018–2019, mass shootings in Pittsburgh, PA (Tree of Life—Or L’Simcha on October 27, 2018), and in Poway, CA, near San Diego (Chabad of Poway on April 27, 2019). Furthermore, the Anti-­ Defamation League (ADL) reported that “anti-Semitic incidents remained at near-­ historic levels in 2018 with 1879 incidents reported…The 2018 total is 48% higher than the number of incidents in 2016 and 99% higher than in 2015” (ADL 2019). Likewise, in Canada, it was reported that Jews were the “most targeted minority group in Canada for the 3rd consecutive year” (Lazarus 2019). Statistics Canada reported that “the number of incidents dropped to 345 from 360 in 2017.” There was a reported decline in hate crimes against Muslims, which fell 50% (to 173), and blacks, which declined by 15% (to 283). If these reports herald among the “worst of times,” what suggests the “best of times”? Consider that in the USA, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey between February 14 and 19, 2019, among US adults to assess how warmly the overall public views various religious groups in the USA (including atheists) on a “feeling thermometer,” which has a range of 0 (“coldest and most negative”) to 100 (“warmest and most positive”). Of all US religious groups, Jews received the warmest score with a mean thermometer rating of 63, followed by Catholics and Mainline Protestants, each with a score of 60 (Pew Research Center 2019, p. 60). In contrast, nearly a century ago, Bogardus (1928) asked about 2000 Americans to rate 40 different ethnic groups on a “social distance scale,” from “7: would exclude from my country” to “1: to close kinship by marriage.” The most favored groups were British, Americans, and Canadians, followed by northern Europeans, and then southern and eastern Europeans. Jews were in the middle; and at the bottom of the social distance scale, were people of color. The dramatic difference between 2019 and 1928 in the position of Jews helps us to understand why intermarriage for Jews has increased (see Phillips 2018). xi

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Preface

The above brief discussion is emblematic of our efforts to produce a volume that provides a contemporary portrait of North American Jewish life, which offers an enduring legacy for future generations. Indeed, the Year Book has been working at this endeavor across three different centuries: nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-­first. Perhaps, this duality, reflecting the “best of times” and the “worst of times” is best captured by a recent lecture at the University of Connecticut: “Do Americans Love or Hate the Jews? Intermarriage and Antisemitism in the 21st Century” (Phillips 2019). Clearly, the earliest editors could not have conceived of the level of interest that the latest technology affords to readers of the Year Book. As of March 2019, we can report the following: • Google found about over 310,000 references to the Year Book • Google Scholar found 6700 references to the Year Book in the scientific literature. • Google News found 95 references to the Year Book. • Wikipedia has 420 references to the Year Book. • Springer’s website reported that about 30,000 chapters were downloaded from the 2012–2017 volumes. In addition, we can also report as follows: • The “Jewish Population of the United States” and the “World Jewish Population” chapters from the Year Book have been downloaded tens of thousands of times from www.jewishdatabank.org and www.bjpa.org. • Demographic data contained in the Year Book are included in the US Statistical Abstract, the World Almanac and Book of Facts, Wikipedia, the Jewish Virtual Library, and many other places. • Older issues of the Year Book are available at www.ajcarchives.org. Part I of this volume contains two lead articles: Chap. 1, “Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel's 70th Anniversary,” by Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I.  Waxman; and Chap. 2, “The Presidential Voting of American Jews,” by Herbert F. Weisberg. The next two chapters in Part I continue our coverage, as in previous years, of domestic and international events. This year, we welcome a new contributor to these pages, J.  J. Goldberg, as author of Chap. 3, “American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections.” In addition, Mitchell Bard returns to author Chap. 4, “American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July 2019): The USA, Israel, and the Middle East.” The first edition of the Year Book in 1899 contained three pages entitled “Jewish Statistics” (Adler 1899). This volume contains four chapters. Chapters 5–8 report on the Jewish population of the USA, Canada (two chapters), and the world, by Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky; Charles Shahar; Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton; and Sergio DellaPergola, respectively. As returning readers will note, more than half the volume consists of an ever-­ expanding set of lists. In 2017, we began to subdivide these lists so as to make some of them more concise. For this year, we have organized seven chapters, including:

Preface

xiii

Chapter 9, Local Jewish Organizations; Chapter 10, Jewish Museums and Holocaust Museums, Memorials, and Monuments; Chapter 11, Jewish Overnight Camps; Chapter 12, National Jewish Organizations; Chapter 13, Jewish Press; Chapter 14, Academic Resources; and Chapter 15, Transitions. Thus, more than half of the volume consists of directories and lists, which testifies to the dense infrastructure of American Jewish life. The first edition of the Year Book (Adler 1899) contained about 300 pages and nearly 90% of the pages consisted of such directories and lists. Each year the lists in Part II are checked to make certain that all contact information is current. In addition, this year, we added many new Jewish organizations and Jewish publications to these lists that were either new or ones of which we were unaware in the past. Readers should note, however, that even our best efforts to keep the lists current fall short of perfection. We have found that Jewish organizations that disband often leave their website on the internet for several years. Each year, we discover several organizations that should have been deleted several years prior. While much of the information in Part II is available on the internet (indeed we obtain most of it from the internet), we believe that collating this information in one volume helps present a full picture of the state of North American Jewry today. Part of this picture is demographics; part is the extensive infrastructure of the Jewish community (the organizations and the publications); and part is the enormous contributions made by the less than two percent of the population that is Jewish to the culture and society of the USA and Canada. In addition, while, for example, a list of Jewish Federations will probably always appear on the internet, a list current as of 2019 will not be there forever. An historian in the year 2119, wishing to examine the history of American Jewry, will have a wealth of data preserved in one volume. Indeed, preserving that history is part of the raison d'etre of the Year Book. We hope that the initiatives we have undertaken over the past eight years (2012–2019) will both uphold the traditional quality of the Year Book and effectively reflect ever-evolving trends and concerns. We also hope that the Year Book, whose existence spans three different centuries, will continue indefinitely.

References Adler, C. (ed.). 1899. The American Jewish year book. Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America. Anti-Defamation League. 2019. Audit of anti-Semitic incidents: Year in review 2018. Resource document. www.adl.org/audit2018. Accessed 1 September 2019. Bogardus, E. S. 1928. Immigration and race attitudes. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Company. Kosmin, B. A. 2015. It’s the best of times: It’s the worst of times. In American Jewish year book 2014, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin, 61–65. Cham: Springer. Lazarus, D. 2019. Jews most targeted minority group in Canada for 3rd consecutive year. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 29.

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Preface

Pew Research Center. 2019. What Americans know about religion. www.pewresearch.org. Accessed 1 August 2019. Phillips, B.  A. 2018. Intermarriage in the twenty-first century: New perspectives. In American Jewish year book 2017, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. M. Sheskin, 31–119. Cham: Springer. Phillips, B. A. 2019. Do Americans love or hate the Jews? Intermarriage and antisemitism in the 21st Century. Invited talk at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, October 17.

Storrs, CT  Arnold Dashefsky Coral Gables, FL   Ira M. Sheskin

Acknowledgments

Throughout the past eight years of our editorship, we have viewed our work as a collaborative effort, aided by many individuals, including the authors and reviewers of articles, the staffs at the University of Connecticut and the University of Miami, and the members of the Academic Advisory Committee. We would like to take this opportunity to thank them all for their assistance in preparing the 2019 edition of the American Jewish Year Book. For Part I, we would like to thank the contributing authors of our lead articles: Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I.  Waxman for Chap. 1 on “Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th Anniversary,” and Herbert F. Weisberg for Chap. 2 on “The Presidential Voting of American Jews.” In addition, we would like to thank the authors of the articles that have become standard features of the Year Book in recent years: J. J. Goldberg for Chap. 3 on “American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections”; Mitchell Bard for Chap. 4 on “American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July 2019): The USA, Israel, and the Middle East”; Charles Shahar for Chap. 6 on “Canadian Jewish Population, 2019”; Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton for Chap. 7 on “2018 Survey of Jews in Canada: Executive Summary,” which is a summary of their previously published study of Canadian Jewry; and Sergio DellaPergola for Chap. 8 on “World Jewish Population, 2019.” All of these articles form the corpus of each volume. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to the several reviewers that we consulted in preparation of this volume: Robert Brym, Joshua Comenetz, Lawrence Grossman, Shaul Kelner, Mark Silk, Daniel Staetsky, and Ken Wald. As we noted in the Preface, Part II on Jewish Lists typically represents more than one-half of the content of recent volumes. We endeavor to review and update annually each of these sections. To do that, we depend on several individuals to whom we owe a great debt of gratitude: Ben Harris and the staff of the JTA (www.jta.org), as well as Sarah Markowitz, Roberta Pakowitz, and Karen Tina Sheskin in Florida, who spent untold hours verifying the many entries. In addition, we would like to thank Amy Lawton, Matthew Parent, and Maria Reger for their excellent editorial assistance, and Pamela Weathers, who serves formally as business manager and xv

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Acknowledgments

program assistant, assisted by Kezia Mann and Charis Nyarko, all at the University of Connecticut Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life. We owe all of them heartfelt thanks. We also want to acknowledge the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, headed by former Interim Dean Davita Silfen Glasberg and current Dean Juli Wade, as well as the Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, headed by Interim Director Sebastian Wogenstein, and Director Avinoam Patt, all at the University of Connecticut, in facilitating the editorial work involved in producing this volume. Finally, we express our appreciation to Bill Berman, z”l, the founding philanthropist of the Berman Jewish DataBank and the Berman Jewish Policy Archive and to the Mandell and Madeleine Berman Foundation for their generous financial support of the Year Book. At the University of Miami, Chris Hanson and the University of Miami Department of Geography and Regional Studies Geographic Information Systems Laboratory assisted with the production of the maps. We wish to acknowledge the generous support we have received from Deans Leonidas Bachas and Kenneth Voss of the University of Miami College of Arts and Sciences, William Scott Green, Senior Vice Provost and Dean of Undergraduate Education at the University of Miami, and from Haim Shaked, Director of the Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies at UM. Finally, we wish to express our appreciation to our editors at Springer for their support and encouragement. Christopher Coughlin, Anita van der Linden-Rachmat, Marie Josephine Chandramohan, Deepthi Vasudevan, and Joseph Quatela, and their associates at Springer have shared our enthusiasm for the publication of the Year Book. We look forward to our ongoing and mutually beneficial partnership. Storrs, CT Coral Gables, FL 

Arnold Dashefsky Ira M. Sheskin

Contents

Part I Review Articles   1 Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th Anniversary����������������������������������������������������    3 Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I. Waxman   2 The Presidential Voting of American Jews��������������������������������������������   39 Herbert F. Weisberg   3 American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections ��������������������������������������������������������������   91 J. J. Goldberg   4 American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July 2019): The US, Israel, and the Middle East ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 Mitchell Bard   5 United States Jewish Population, 2019��������������������������������������������������  135 Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky   6 Canadian Jewish Population, 2019��������������������������������������������������������  233 Charles Shahar   7 2018 Survey of Jews in Canada: Executive Summary��������������������������  247 Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton   8 World Jewish Population, 2019��������������������������������������������������������������  263 Sergio DellaPergola Part II Jewish Lists   9 Local Jewish Organizations��������������������������������������������������������������������  357 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz

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10 Jewish Museums and Holocaust Museums, Memorials, and Monuments ������������������������������������������������������������������  419 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz 11 Jewish Overnight Camps������������������������������������������������������������������������  453 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz 12 National Jewish Organizations ��������������������������������������������������������������  467 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz 13 Jewish Press����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  641 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz 14 Academic Resources��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  665 Arnold Dashefsky, Ira M. Sheskin, Amy Lawton, Sarah Markowitz, and Maria Reger 15 Transitions: Major Events, Honorees, and Obituaries������������������������  745 Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, Ben Harris, Roberta Pakowitz, and Matthew Parent

Contributors

Mitchell  Bard  American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Jewish Virtual Library, Chevy Chase, MD, USA Nadia Beider  The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Robert Brym  Department of Sociology and Centre for Jewish Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Arnold  Dashefsky  Department of Sociology and Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA Sergio DellaPergola  The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel J. J. Goldberg  Independent Researcher, New York, NY, USA Ben Harris  JTA, New York, NY, USA Amy  Lawton  Department of Sociology and Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA Rhonda Lenton  York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Sarah Markowitz  Independent Researcher, Forest Hills, NY, USA Keith Neuman  The Environics Institute, Toronto, ON, Canada Roberta Pakowitz  Independent Researcher, Cooper City, FL, USA Matthew  Parent  Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA Uzi Rebhun  The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Maria Reger  Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA xix

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Contributors

Charles Shahar  The Jewish Community Foundation of Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada Ira M. Sheskin  Department of Geography and Jewish Demography Project, Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA Chaim I. Waxman  Behavioral Sciences Department, Hadassah Academic College, Jerusalem, Israel Departments of Sociology and Jewish Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA Herbert F. Weisberg  Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Part I

Review Articles

Chapter 1

Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th Anniversary Uzi Rebhun, Nadia Beider, and Chaim I. Waxman

Jews in the US and Israel exist under two different paradigms of demographic and cultural existence. In the US, Jews are a very small group residing among a non-­ Jewish majority; In Israel, Jews constitute the overwhelming majority in a state whose raison d’etre is to fulfill the rights of Jews to self-determination. The two communities differ on at least five different levels. First, the separation between “church” and state in the US means that American Jews operate as an independent community that has to raise its own human and financial resources at both local and national levels to establish communal infrastructures and to administer its religious, cultural, educational, and social activities. In Israel, these services are largely provided by the government. These differences are likely to affect the ability to plan and implement policy geared at ensuring group cohesiveness and continuity (Elazar 1989; Liebman and Cohen 1990; Rebhun and Levy 2006). Second, the local contexts of the US and Israel suggest that Jews in each country are exposed to different general conditions at the macro level. The US has a great influence on the world, including on Israel (sometimes called “Americanization”). Both countries are strong democracies with developed economies, and are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Nevertheless, each has its own history, political system, geopolitical challenges, The authors gratefully acknowledge support for this research from the Nachum Ben-Eli Honig Fund. U. Rebhun (*) · N. Beider The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] C. I. Waxman Behavioral Sciences Department, Hadassah Academic College, Jerusalem, Israel Rutgers University (Emeritus), New Brunswick, NJ, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_1

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natural resources, and economic characteristics. Each has its own ethos and values associated with the country’s dominant religion and population composition (Abramson and Troen 2000; Sarna 2004; Shapira 2012, 5). Third, each Jewish community has a unique history and ethnic structure. The overwhelming majority of American Jews are descendants of Ashkenazi immigrants who arrived from Eastern Europe in the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries. Others are Holocaust survivors or Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) who immigrated in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, from an ethnic point of view, US Jews are a relatively homogenous population. By contrast, much immigration to Israel derived from Europe, Asia, and North Africa and arrived at very different stages of modernization. Many are Sephardic or Mizrahi Jews. Each group had its specific customs and traditions, with ethnicity being a significant component of their Jewish identity. Fourth, while US Jews identify with one of the major denominations (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or declare that they are “Just Jewish” or cultural Jews), self-­ definition in Israel distinguishes people differently (as ultra-Orthodox, religious, traditional, or secular). While in the US, special meaning is given to synagogue and other organizational memberships, no such meaning exists in Israel (Goldscheider 2015; Lazerwitz et al. 1998; Levy et al. 2000). Fifth, factors at both the country level and that of communal belonging help to shape individual patterns for dimensions such as demography, family structure, socio-economic stratification, political orientation, and religio-ethnic connectivity. Moreover, the general system and the communal environment are not static; rather, they are fluid and develop in varied and sometimes contradictory directions resulting in much confusion and uncertainty. Hence, one cannot assume determinism of behaviors, attitudes, and personal feelings (Rebhun 2011). Despite these major differences, Jews in the US and in Israel largely share a common religious identity, a sense of common peoplehood, an ancient history and language, attachment to the homeland (be it tangible or spiritual), religious rituals, etc. Strong bonds and a sense of mutual dependency exist between these two communities that are reflected in political and economic support and cultural cooperation. Many American and Israeli Jews are connected to one another through familial or social relations. A steady flow of Jews occurs between the two countries with high rates of short-term visits. More recently, advanced technology enables easy and quick consumption of knowledge, which strengthens the connection, albeit virtually, with the other (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2013; Rebhun and Levy 2006; Sheskin 2012; Sasson et al. 2010; Saxe and Chazan 2008; Dashefsky et al. 1992; Waxman 1989). The 70th anniversary of the State of Israel in 2018 is an appropriate opportunity to assess the demographic and socio-economic developments of the Jewish populations of the US and Israel, trends over time in Jewish identity, and how the two communities have shaped their mutual relations. As much as the data allow, this chapter covers the entire period from 1948 to 2018. To this end, we make use of different sources, both primary and secondary, from various years; as well as

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g­ enerational and age cohort comparisons. The discussion pays attention to the implications of the empirical evidence for communal and worldwide Jewish policy1.

1.1  Socio-Demography 1.1.1  Population Size Dynamics The documentation of demographic information on US Jews and Israel applies ­different criteria for defining who is counted as part of the Jewish population. In the US, where the Census Bureau does not ask questions facilitating the identification of Jews, surveys rely on respondents’ self-definition as to whether each person regards him/herself as Jewish, be it in terms of religion, ethnicity, culture, nationality, or something else. In Israel, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, the official statistical agency), includes in the Jewish category people who are confirmed as such in the files of the Ministry of Interior, that is persons who are halakhic Jews. It is very likely that respondents to surveys in Israel conducted by private pollsters also meet the religious criteria of group identity. The core US Jewish population in 1948 was estimated at 5.00 million (Fig. 1.1). By 1958, it increased to 5.45 million and to 5.70 million in 1978. Since then, minor fluctuations (not shown in the graph) occurred with the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 1990) finding 5.50 million Jews and NJPS 2000–2001, 7000

5000

5700

5700

5451

6000 5000

5700 4785

4000 3000

3141

2000 1000 0

6556

1763 759 1948

1978

1958 US

1998

2018

Israel

Fig. 1.1  US and Israeli Jewish population size (in thousands). (Sources: For the US: for 1948: Seligman and Swados (1948/1949); for 1958: calculated from Goldstein (1969); for 1978 (reflecting the size in 1980): Schmelz and DellaPergola (1982); for 1998: DellaPergola (1999) (reflecting the size in 1997); for 2018, DellaPergola (2018). For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract 2017 and Statistical Monthly, June 2018)

1  Throughout this article, and for the sake of simplicity, we refer to the data from both the US and Israel Pew surveys as being collected in 2013 although the later survey is from 2014.

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5.30 million. In relative terms, these statistics suggest that from 1948 to 1958, the US Jewish population increased by 9% and by another 5% between 1958 and 1978. Since 1978, the growth rate has been nil (DellaPergola 2018). (See discussion below for additional US estimates.) The dynamic of the Israeli Jewish population was very different. The first registration of the country’s inhabitants in November 1948 recorded about 716,000 Jews. By 1958, this increased to 1.76 million, then to 3.14 million in 1978, 4.79 million in 1998, and 6.6 million in 2018. In the first decade (1948–1958), the pace of growth was 132% and although it remained high, it gradually diminished: to 78% between 1958 and 1978, 52% between 1978 and 1998, and 37% between 1998 and 2018. The demographic trajectories of American and Israeli Jews gradually narrowed the difference in the size of these populations. By about 2010, the number of Jews in the two communities had converged. Since 2010, Israel’s Jewish community became the single largest Jewish community in the world (DellaPergola 2016). Note that the 2013 Pew Research Center survey (Pew Research Center 2013) found about one million people who self-identified as “part Jewish.” Sheskin and Dashefsky (Chapter 5 in this volume) and the Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) at Brandeis University (www.brandeis.edu/ssri/) who used different methodologies than Pew, also include Jews and “part Jews” in their counts and report 6.7  million or more Jews. Concurrently, at the beginning of 2018, there were in Israel approximately 350,000 people of “no religion,” who are immigrants or their descendants who were eligible to immigrate to Israel according to the Law of Return but are not recognized as Jews by the religious establishment (CBS). Strong arguments can be made to include/exclude the above mentioned two groups from the enumeration of Jews in their respective countries (DellaPergola 2014; Saxe et al. 2014). This chapter suggests that the addition of one million people over 13 years (from NJPS 2000 to 2001 to the Pew results in 2013) is not associated with changes in demographic patterns of fertility, life expectancy, or migration. It probably reflects identificational alterations, especially among the children of mixed parentage who do not feel minoritized in present-day America; on the contrary, they view Jews as a privileged sub-group.2 As such, they feel confident enough to express the Jewish identity that their parents might have chosen to hide. In any case, rather than delving into this dispute, we decided not to consider either group in our statistics to maintain, as much as possible, consistent definitions of the “Jewish population” with earlier data. Were the “part Jewish” and the “no religion” added, the Jewish population in the two countries would be almost identical. The above dynamics in the size of the Jewish population can be attributed to substantial variation in fertility rates which have been at or below replacement level (2.1 children per women) among American Jews and significantly above replacement level in Israel (DellaPergola 1980; DellaPergola et al. 2000b; CBS, Statistical Abstract n.d. various years); and a much larger net gain from Jewish migration to

2  The first author wishes to thank Sylvia Barak-Fishman for her thoughtful insights in a discussion held at the Jewish People Policy Institute, January 14, 2019.

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100% 90% 80% 70%

48.5

41.4

60% 50%

6.8

14.3

20.0

16.1

36.5

44.9

43.5

39.0

32.1

24.1

40% 30% 20%

44.7

44.3

43.8

10% 0% 1948 11.2 M

1958 1978 1998 12.3 M 13.0 M 13.1 M US Israel Rest World

2018 14.6 M

Fig. 1.2  Distribution of world Jewish population. (Sources: Adapted from DellaPergola (1992), DellaPergola (2018); American Jewish Year Book, 1949)

Israel than to the US (DellaPergola 2011). (See detailed discussion below.) Likewise, over time, American Jewry has lost hundreds of thousands of core members who adopted another religion or simply discarded a religious preference altogether (Rebhun 2016). Accordingly (Fig. 1.2), the percentage of world Jewry who live in the US somewhat diminished, from 45% in 1948 to 39% in 2018. At the same time, the percentage of world Jewry who live in Israel increased from 7% in 1948 to 24% in 1978, 37% in 1998, and 45% in 2018. The percentage of world Jewry who live in Israel in 2018 is similar to the percentage of world Jews who lived in the US 70 years ago. At no point in modern times has an absolute majority of world Jewry lived in either the US or Israel (DellaPergola 1992, DellaPergola 2018). American Jews are a small minority within a majority Christian society. Since 1948, the American Jewish population remained stable while the general population increased by 117% from about 150 million in 1948 to about 325 million in 2018. Hence, the percentage of Jews in the American population decreased from 3.4% in 1948 to 2.6% in 1978 and to only about 1.7% today (Table 1.1). This reflects a diminution of more than half in the percentage Jewish in the US over the 70 years. In Israel, upon statehood, Jews accounted for 87% of the population. This percentage decreased to 84% in 1978 and to 75% in 2018. The decreases in percentage Jewish would be moderated slightly if the “part Jewish” in the US and persons of “no religion” in Israel were included. These percentages would rise to 2% in the US and to 79% in Israel.

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Table 1.1  Jews as a percentage of the total population, 1948–2018 (percentages) US Israel

1948 3.4 86.6

1978 2.6 84.0

2018 1.7 74.5

Sources: For the US: adapted from www.census.gov; and data from Fig.  1.1; For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract, various years; and Monthly Statistics, June 2018 Table 1.2  Nativity status of Jews (percentages) Total US 1957 100.0 Israel 1957 100.0 US 1970 100.0 Israel 1970 100.0 US 2013 100.0 Israel 2016 100.0

Native-born 75.0 32.9 76.6 46.2 86.1 76.3

Foreign-born 25.0 67.1 23.4 53.8 13.9 25.6

Sources: For the US in 1957: rough estimate suggested by Goldstein and Goldscheider (1985) and also in accordance with community surveys completed between the late 1930s and mid-1950s (Chenkin 1957). For the US in 1970: American Jewish Year Book 1973, For the US in 2013: authors from Pew Research Center (2013). For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract, various years

1.1.2  Demographic Characteristics Significant differences are found between the US and Israeli Jewish communities in nativity, fertility, age, and levels of secular education. Nativity. Both American Jewry and Israel are immigrant absorbing communities. Without disputing the importance of Jewish migration to both communities over the past 140 years, migration to the US was highest between 1880 and 1914 while significant numbers of Jewish immigrants to Israel arrived shortly after ­statehood and in the 1990s (DellaPergola 2000). These differences in the timing of the largest immigration waves determine the nativity status of the population. In 1957, an estimated 75% of American Jews were native born (Table 1.2). They include descendants of Jewish immigrants from Central Europe who arrived in the early nineteenth century and the second and third generations of East European Jews from the 1880–1914 mass immigration. In contrast, only 33% of Israeli Jews in 1957 were native born. The overwhelming majority of the foreign born had arrived in Israel after 1948. The percentage of native born in the US remained about the same (77%) by 1970. By 2013 in the US, many Jewish immigrants were lost to mortality and new waves of immigration were generally small; so, the percentage of native born increased to 86%. The percentage of native born among Israeli Jews also increased to 46% by 1970 and 76% by 2013 despite significant immigration in the late 1950s and early 1960s from North Africa and Eastern Europe and the large influx of FSU Jews in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, the number of new immigrants to Israel did not match the significant rate of natural increase.

1  Jews in the United States and Israel: A Comparative Look upon Israel’s 70th… 4.00 3.50

3.56

3.36

3.00 2.50

2.69

2.66

9

3.05

2.80

2.00 1.92

1.50

1.60

1.00

1.50

1.50

0.50 0.00 1955

1965

1990 US

2000

2013

Israel

Fig. 1.3  Total fertility rates among Jews. (Sources: For the US: DellaPergola (1980); Kosmin et al. (1991); DellaPergola et al. (2000b); Pew Research Center (2013). For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract, various years)

The 76% for Israel in 2013 is similar to the share of native born among American Jews in 1957. More generally, the large differences in nativity status between US and Israeli Jews in 1957 (42% points) and 1970 (31% points) decreased substantially to only 10% points in 2013. From an identificational point of view, the meaning of this development is that more people in both the US and Israel each share memories and experiences associated with respective native homelands. Fertility. The relative stability since 1957 in the nativity status of American Jews was not only affected by a low rate of international migration but was also associated with a fertility rate below the replacement level (2.1  children per women). Indeed, in the mid-1950s, the average number of children per Jewish woman (Total Fertility Rate or TFR) was 2.8, reflecting the post-WWII “baby boom” (Fig. 1.3). This number decreased to 1.9 in the mid-1960s and from 1990 onward it leveled off at about 1.5. These statistics refer to children born to a Jewish woman who are identified by their parents as Jews (“actual Jewish fertility”). Fertility of Jewish women in Israel has always been higher than in the US (Fig. 1.3). Shortly after statehood, the TFR was 3.5. The rate gradually diminished largely due to the transition to modern demographic patterns among immigrants of Asian and North African background. The large influx of FSU Jews in the 1990s, characterized by small families, further reduced the TFR to 2.66. Since then, the TFR has been increasing – a trend that can be attributed to the increase in fertility among FSU immigrants to levels resembling those of secular Israelis (around two children) (Tolts 2015) and to an increase in the share of religious Jews, especially of ultra-Orthodox Jews (Levy et al. 1993; Pew Research Center 2015), who have on average seven children per woman (Hleihal 2017). In 1955, the differential in TFR between US and Israeli Jews was 0.76; by 1965, American Jewish fertility decreased at a much faster pace than in Israel and the differences between the two communities increased to 1.4 children. By 1990 and 2000, the differential decreased to about one child; but by 2013, the differential increased to a peak gap of about 1.5. Part of the differential is the result of Israeli Jewry’s having a

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Table 1.3  Age composition of Jews (percentage) US 1957 Israel 1957 US 1970 Israel 1970 US 2013 Israel 2013

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

20–24 6.6 12.9 12.9 16.7 8.0 10.5

25–44 39.5 46.3 33.1 38.4 29.5 40.4

45–64 39.6 32.9 37.5 32.4 39.1 30.5

65 and over 14.3 7.9 16.5 12.5 23.4 18.6

Index of dissimilarity 13.1 9.1 12.9

Sources: For the US 1957: Adapted from Goldstein (1969). For Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract, various years; For the US 1970: American Jewish Year Book 1973. For the US 2013: authors from Pew Research Center (2013) Note: The Index of Dissimilarity ranges from 0 when the percentage distribution among the age groups is identical in Israel and the US to 100 for maximum variation between the two countries

larger percentage of ultra-Orthodox and modern Orthodox than does American Jewry, but even among those Israelis who are not religious, the fertility rate is higher than that of American Jews. It should also be noted that there is some differential in fertility between ultra-Orthodox women in Israel and in the US of approximately two children in favor of the former. No less important is that US Jewish fertility is below the replacement level (2.1) while that in Israel is significantly above, ensuring population growth. Age. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the age composition of American Jews is older than that of Israeli Jews (Table 1.3). Already in 1957, the Current Population Survey (CPS) completed by the US Census Bureau found that only 6.6% of the adult Jewish population (age 20 and above) were age 20–24, half the percentage for Israel. Almost twice as many American Jews were age 65 and over than Jews in Israel (14.3% vs. 7.9%). Among American Jews, the two intermediate age groups (25–44 and 45–64) were of very similar size, whereas in Israel the younger of these two cohorts was substantially larger. By 1970, the percentage for the 20–24 age group among American Jews had increased to 13%, reflecting the maturation of immediate post WWII baby-boom generation (persons born 1946–1950). This increase came at the expense of some diminution in the percentage for the intermediate age cohorts, especially the 25–44 age group, although it did not stop the increase in the percentage for the elderly population. In Israel, the 1957–1970 period shows an increase in the percentage at both ends of the age pyramid. Hence there is now more similarity between the American and Israeli populations, from an index of dissimilarity of 13.2 in 1957 to 9.1 in 1970.3 By 2013, the percentage of American Jews in the two youngest age groups decreased in favor of an increase in the percentage for the age 45–64 and age 65 and over cohorts. Although in Israel the two end cohorts behaved similarly to the US,

3  The index of dissimilarity is the percentage of American Jews who would have to be in a different age group so that the American age distribution looks exactly like the Israeli age distribution.

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the percentage of Jews age 25–44 increased while the percentage age 45–64 decreased. This resulted in a return to a much higher index of dissimilarity (12.9). Educational Attainment. Educational attainment is an important indicator of achievement, social status, and prestige both for individuals and the community as a whole. Education is also a good proxy for economic attainment and, thus, quality of life. In the case of a minority group, such as American Jews, this is likely to influence the ability of institutions and organizations to raise money for parochial activities. Aspiration to acquire higher education is associated with several individual ­characteristics such as family background, ethnicity, and religiosity. In this regard, American Jews are at an advantage over their peers in Israel. More US Jews are the second or third generation within their families to attend college compared to many Israelis who were raised in families of Holocaust survivors or of immigrants from Muslim countries who frequently did not have educational opportunities. Also, most US Jews were raised in major urban or suburban areas with good educational systems. Many Israelis, on the other hand, especially persons of Sephardic background, received a rather inferior education in Israeli development towns and other peripheral areas of the country. In addition, Ultra-Orthodox Jews are approximately 6–7% of US Jewry whereas Haredim are about 10% of the Israeli Jewish population (Pew Research Center 2013, 2015). Furthermore, US Ultra-Orthodox find it harder to isolate themselves within the religious world and are required by law to provide their children with secular education, while many of their peers in Israel provide mostly religious training and enjoy substantial governmental support.4 Moreover, US states require school attendance from age 5, 6, or 7 until age 16, 17, or 18.5 Indeed, some significant variations are seen in the educational profile of Jews in the US and Israel classified here according to three categories: 1–8 years of education, 9–12 years, and 13 years and more (Fig. 1.4). Around 1960, 30% of American Jews had some post-secondary education (13 or more years), as opposed to 11% in Israel. By 2013, both populations showed impressive increases in post-secondary education to 81% and 45%, respectively. Another important development is the almost total disappearance, both in the US and Israel, of persons with only 1–8 years of schooling. Still, 55% of Jews in Israel in 2013 lack education beyond high school, compared to 19% in the US. It should be noted that data from the 2013 and 2015 Pew surveys, not shown here, suggest that in both countries a similar percentage (71–72%) of those with post-secondary education have, in fact, an academic degree.

4  Note that, in New York, where most ultra-Orthodox in the US reside, recent controversy has arisen as the state tries to enforce the requirement about secular education in ultra-Orthodox schools https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-ultra-orthodox-in-new-york-threaten-warafter-state-demands-more-secular-education-i-1.6744784. 5  https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp.

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11.3 30.0

45.2

39.6

60.0

81.3

39.0 40.0 20.0

52.4

49.1 31.0

0.0 US 1957

Israel 1961 1-8 Years

9-12 Years

18.3 0.4 US 2013

2.4 Israel 2013

13+ Years

Fig. 1.4  Educational attainment of Jews. (Sources: For the US: Goldstein (1969); authors from Pew Research Center (2013); For Israel: Bachi (1974); authors from Pew Research Center (2015))

Overall, while in 1957 American Jews were more evenly dispersed among the three educational categories, by 2013 the majority experienced at least some type of education beyond high school. In Israel, Jews are fairly equally divided between the two categories of high school education (9–12 years) and post-secondary studies (13 or more years). The index of dissimilarity between American Jews and Israeli Jews, increased from 18.7 in 1957 to 41.1 in 2013. Yet, given the educational achievement of American Jews, any further significant advancement is not likely. By contrast, Jews in Israel still have much room to advance and, with the expansion of opportunities for higher education in Israel, as reflected in the numbers of new colleges opened in the past two decades and the increasing tendency of the Ultra-­Orthodox to acquire secular education, the gap between the two populations is likely to narrow over time.

1.2  Jewish Connectivity Jewish connectivity is multifaceted. It is comprised of both behaviors and attitudes. Each of these modes includes both religious and ethnic/cultural expressions. Some expressions occur in the private sphere and others in public space. But perhaps what makes it difficult to compare Jewish connectivity in the US and Israel is that there are some characteristics which are unique to each of the two societies. One ­community is not merely less or more Jewish than the other but is rather Jewish in a different way (Rebhun and Levy 2006). Aspects of Jewish connectivity may be important to one community but “Judaically irrelevant to the other” (Liebman and Cohen 1990, 2). Significant demographic and social differences also exist between American and Israeli Jews which are likely to affect the level and nature of Jewish connectivity. Accordingly, and with due caution, we present here the levels of major connectivity patterns which are shared by Jews in the US and Israel at four different periods in

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which there were national studies at more or less the same time: 1970, 1990, 2000, and 2013. For the most recent year (2013), we compare Jewish connectivity in the US and Israel by three of the socio-demographic characteristics discussed above: nativity status, age, and education.

1.2.1  Ritual Practice over Time and Space We focus on five rituals (see Dashefsky et al. 2003 for a similar approach). Some are daily or weekly rituals (lighting Sabbath candles, having separate dishes for meat and dairy, and synagogue attendance) and others are yearly rituals (fasting on Yom Kippur and attending a Passover Seder). For each point in time, a score average is calculated (the sum of percentages for all five rituals divided by five). The score average of the ritual practice index (of ritual observance) among American Jews has remained fairly stable over the past four decades (Table 1.4). If anything, the score average in 2013 was higher than the score average in 1970 and much higher than in 1990. The exception to stability was between 1970 and 1990 which was characterized by a decrease in four of the five indicators, whereas fasting on Yom Kippur increased somewhat. By 2013, all five indicators were increasing, although only gradually. The rituals which gained the most significant momentum are lighting Sabbath candles, having separate dishes, and synagogue attendance. These may be associated with the increasing share of Orthodox among American Jews. However, it should be noted that in the Pew survey, the questions were phrased differently and that may be influencing these results. For example, rather than asking about maintaining separate dishes, Pew asked about keeping a kosher home. Also, in Pew, there was no High Holidays category for synagogue attendance. Levels of Jewish identification are substantially higher among Jews in Israel because its culture derives from Judaism and Jewish culture (Rosner and Fuchs 2018), and because Israeli Jewish society has a much higher percentage of religious as well as Sephardi/Mizrahi Jews, who are much more traditional than is American Jewry (Table 1.4). The ritual practice index of Israeli Jews is higher by approximately 20% points over the index score of American Jews. The differentials are especially salient for Sabbath candles and keeping kosher. Interestingly, more Jews in the US attend religious services on the High Holidays or more frequently than Jews in Israel. Detailed data, not presented here, suggest that, among the attendees, more Israelis than American Jews attend services on a daily or weekly basis. The interpretation is that many American Jews, even if not strongly committed, nevertheless feel a need to express their Jewishness on major holidays in a formal, public religious gathering. Similar to the US, the level of Jewish identification in Israel was also fairly stable over time. The slight decrease between 1990 and 2000 should be attributed to a large and mainly secular influx of FSU immigrants: Since then, most of the measurements remained unchanged or increased slightly, including the overall score average.

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Table 1.4  Changes in ritual practice (percentages) US Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average of Ritual Practice Index Israel Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average of Ritual Practice Index

1970

1990

2000

2013

29.8 15.8 46.8 77.9 67.4 47.5

16.3 13.0 52.8 63.8 60.7 41.3

23.2 17.2 55.8 74.4 57.9 45.7

22.8 21.8 57.0 69.6 77.9 49.8

– 47.0 – – 74.2 –

66.3 47.9 71.4 89.5 66.3 67.7

58.2 43.7 67.2 93.0 61.0 64.6

57.0 64.4 74.1 93.4 67.6 71.3

Sources: For the US: for 1970 (except synagogue attendance: Rebhun (2001). For synagogue attendance for the US 1970: Massarik and Chenkin (1973); For the US and Israel 1990: Rebhun and Levy (2006). For the US and Israel 2013: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015) Notes: For Sabbath candles the percentage shown is for usually/all the time. For separate dishes for meat and dairy in 2013 the percentage is for “keep kosher at home.” For synagogue attendance: the percentage is for High Holidays or once-twice a year or more

1.2.2  Ritual Practice and Demographic Characteristics Nativity. Although only slightly more than 10% of US Jews are foreign born, the foreign born strengthen the overall levels of ritual practice. For all five indicators, the percentage of foreign born who observe each specific ritual is higher than the percentage among the native-born Jewish population, particularly for Sabbath candles and separate dishes (Table 1.5). The overall score average on the ritual practice index among the foreign born and the native born are 55.9 and 48.9, respectively or a ratio of 1.14. This difference is likely due to the characteristics of two major Jewish immigrant groups (Israelis and Iranians) in the US over the past several decades namely, both of which have relatively strong Jewish identification. Israelis and Iranians compensate for the much weaker ritual practice among Jewish FSU immigrants. (For a discussion of adaptations of these Jewish immigrants to the US, see Gold 2016.) The opposite is true for Jews in Israel. Native-born Israelis exhibit stronger identification than foreign-born Israelis. This is reflected in all five ritual indicators. The differential is exceptionally large for separate dishes. The overall gap between the two groups is significant: 73.6 for the native born and 64.9 for the foreign born, a ratio of 1.13, which is almost equal to the 1.14 ratio in the US, but in favor of the native born. The weaker observance of foreign-born Jews in Israel as compared with the native born is likely affected by the significant number of FSU immigrants in Israel.

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Table 1.5  Ritual practice by nativity status, 2013 US Friday candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average Israel Friday candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average

Total

Native-born

Foreign-born

22.8 21.8 57.0 69.6 77.9 49.8

21.0 20.6 56.3 68.8 77.6 48.9

34.0 30.0 61.3 74.4 79.7 55.9

57.1 64.3 74.1 93.4 67.6 71.3

57.9 69.0 75.8 95.6 69.6 73.6

50.6 52.9 70.1 88.2 62.9 64.9

Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015). See Notes in Table 1.4

Both among the native born and the foreign born, ritual practice in the US is weaker than in Israel. However, because of the different trajectories in the two countries, the ritual practice index differential between the US and Israel is especially high among the native born (24.7 = 73.6 – 48.9) while among the foreign born the differential in the ritual practice index is much lower (9 = 64.9 – 55.9). Age. Young American Jews score higher on ritual practice than do older American Jews. The score average on the ritual practice index decreases in the next two age groups and then slightly strengthens among the eldest population. The two younger age groups are more likely to light Sabbath candles and keep separate dishes than the middle and older age groups. This is probably the result of the growing percentage of Orthodox youth in American Jewry. As for the rate of synagogue attendance among Jews age 18–29 being the highest, this is also because this age group is the most likely to have young children; and parental synagogue attendance may be part of their Jewish socialization or even required once per month while children are enrolled in supplemental Jewish education. Differences by age for fasting on Yom Kippur and attendance at a Passover Seder are very small. Although the differences between the age groups are not large, they do confirm the idea that the level of ritual observance in the US is stable, with no significant signs of erosion or strengthening. In Israel, the level of ritual observance as shown by the score average is even more uniform across the age groups. The differential between the group with the lowest score on the ritual practice index (45–64, 70.3) and that with the highest score (65 and over, 72.0) is less than 2% points. Hence, the relationship between religious practices and age is similar for American and Israeli Jews. This is also true for each of the five practices (Table 1.6).

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Table 1.6  Ritual practice by age, 2013 (percentages) US Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average Israel Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Average

18–29

30–44

45–64

65 and over

23.8 26.6 56.1 72.8 82.1 52.3

27.0 29.0 56.8 65.3 75.1 50.6

20.2 18.4 58.0 66.7 76.9 48.0

21.6 14.9 54.6 75.4 78.0 48.9

57.0 65.0 77.4 92.8 65.6 71.6

57.7 65.6 72.5 94.3 68.7 71.8

55.9 62.0 71.6 93.8 68.2 70.3

58.0 65.6 76.6 92.1 67.5 72.0

Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015). See Notes in Table 1.4

Education. Another characteristic associated with ritual practices is level of secular education. This relationship is inverse: The higher the level of education, the lower is the observance of rituals. This is true for both American and Israeli Jews. Still, the relationship is weaker in the US and only distinguishes between persons without a high school degree, high school graduates, and persons with at least some post-secondary education. No difference is found between those having some ­college, those having a bachelor’s degree, and those having a master’s degree or more. The differential between the educational group with the highest level of ritual practice and the lowest level of ritual practice is ten score points. In Israel, the significant differences are between persons without a high school degree and persons who have a high school degree or higher. A significant difference is also seen between persons with a high school degree or some college, persons with a bachelor’s degree, and persons with a master’s degree or higher. The differential between the educational groups with the highest and lowest levels of identification is about 25 score average points on the ritual practice index (79.9 ‑ 55.4) compared with the ten points for US Jews. Accordingly, the scores for ritual practice of American Jews and Israeli Jews who have a master’s degree or higher are very similar (score average of 48.8 and of 55.4, a differential of less than seven score points). Some of the results for individual ritual practices are also interesting. Among American Jews, while lighting Sabbath candles, separating dishes, and fasting on Yom Kippur decrease with increasing education, the tendency to attend a Passover Seder increases among people with some college, a bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree. For synagogue attendance, the relationship is of a U-shape with the highest level for persons with no high school degree and with a master’s degree or higher. In Israel, with very few and only slight fluctuations, the decrease in ritual observances over the educational groups is much smoother (Table 1.7).

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Table 1.7  Ritual practice by level of secular education, 2013 (percentages)

US Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score Israel Sabbath candles Separate dishes Fast on Yom Kippur Attend Passover Seder Synagogue attendance Score

High school in-complete or less

High school Some college/ BA (including MA or graduate vocational degree Kollel) Higher

35.5

31.9

22.7

20.3

19.5

54.7

39.3

22.0

16.9

15.2

66.3

60.4

59.2

56.6

55.5

59.3

59.6

69.0

71.3

74.2

79.0

80.3

74.6

77.4

79.7

59.0

54.3

49.5

48.5

48.8

69.9

59.7

64.9

43.2

39.2

79.8

70.3

66.2

53.0

39.4

82.6

78.3

78.5

66.6

55.1

94.7

95.4

94.7

92.2

86.4

73.0

68.0

74.3

61.3

56.7

79.9

74.3

75.7

63.3

55.4

Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015). See Notes in Table 1.4

1.3  Political Preferences American Jews typically exhibit liberal political and world views which results in most Jews being Democrats or independents who lean toward the Democratic Party. (See Chap. 2 in this volume for a review of American Jewish political orientations.) Jews were also actively involved in the leadership of socialist movements during the first half of the twentieth century (Dollinger 2000; Forman 2001; Levy 1995; Lipset and Raab 1995). This liberalism is at least partly attributable to their diasporic experience and situation as a minority group which is generally best advanced under liberal regimes (Cohen 1958; Kaplan 2009; Walzer 1986); Jewish religious values (Fuchs 1956; Legge 1995); their high socio-economic status (Lenski 1961; Lipset 1960); historical political socialization in Europe which persists also under the new conditions of America (Lerner et al. 1989); and social and political interests such as

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100

67 64

74

78 65

69 71

60 51 50 49 51 53 47 47 47 45 42 45 42 42 42 44 41 41 37 34 36 35 33 33 29 25 24 23 21 19 22 18 14 11 13

US

Israel

2012

2016

2008

2004

2000

1996

1992

1988

1984

1980

1976

1972

1968

3

1964

0

80 78 79

54

1960

20

81 64 64

1956

40

90

64

1952

60

75

1948

80

82

Difference

Fig. 1.5  Voting patterns of Jews in the US presidential elections (Democratic candidate) and in Knesset elections in Israel (Labor and Left-Wing parties) (percentages). (Sources: For the US: percentage of Jews voting for the Democratic candidate (Smith and Martinez (2016); Forman (2001); For Israel: percentage of Knesset seats for the Labor Party (including Mapai, Mapam, Ahdut HaAvoda) and Jewish Left parties (Meretz, Shinui). (Knesset of Israel n.d.) (Note: Years refer to US presidential elections. Dates of Knesset elections are sometimes a year earlier or later. The graph skips two Knesset elections (1961, held soon after the 1959 election) and 2006, held between the elections of 2003 and 2009). The results in 1961 and 2006 did not differ much from the 1959 and 2003 elections))

political freedom, economic considerations associated with the occupational structure, and the survival of Israel (Medding 1977). The political ideology of American Jews is significantly reflected in votes in the US presidential elections. Except for 1980 (after President Jimmy Carter’s first term), between 60% and 90% of Jews voted for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections since 1948 (Fig. 1.5). It appears that over the past few elections some decrease in Jewish support of the Democratic Party has occurred. This can be attributed to tensions between African Americans and European Americans, Jews included, over issues such as quotas, affirmative action, and meritocracy (Lipset 1972; Rosenberg and Howe 1976); the crisis in secular liberal thought, and the turn toward extreme leftism which began after World War II (Lipset 1971) but has further strengthened over the past few decades, including anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli sentiments (Chanes 2006; Greenwald 2019); the ascent of the New Right and religious right and its pro-Israel bias; and an increase in the share of Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox among the Jewish population (Rebhun 2016). Despite these tendencies, some of which are related to transient developments in the overall social and economic configuration of the US, a solid majority of American Jews remain loyal to the Democratic Party. US Jews have always exhibited stronger liberal inclinations than Jews in Israel, although for many years, the differences were rather small. Between 1948 and 1988, the percentage of American Jews who voted for the Democratic Party was about

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20–30% higher than the percentage of Knesset members from the Labor party and left-wing Jewish parties. But since the 1990s, and especially over the past decade, Israelis have largely withdrawn from a socially and economically liberal outlook and from faith in a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict, resulting in a significant decrease in the representation of leftist parties in the Knesset. This decrease was much more significant than the weakening in the liberal orientation of American Jews. Accordingly, the gap between the two communities in their support for the Democratic Party and leftist parties has widened to about 50%.

1.4  Relationship Between American Jewry and Israel The relationship between American and Israeli Jews has developed and changed over the 70 years since the founding of Israel. Generally, positive mutual ties between the two communities have prevailed; but some clashes have occurred, ­ particularly between the leaders of the two communities. Long term demographic, economic, social, religious, and political trends have been the catalysts for many of the vicissitudes in the relationship, with specific events often serving as reasons for change.

1.4.1  Historical Background The establishment of Israel in 1948 was met with ambivalence by many American Jews. Zionism, defined as the idea that a Jewish state should exist in Palestine, had become increasingly popular during the first half of the twentieth century, although a portion of the American Jewish community was opposed to the idea. The concern was that the existence of a Jewish State would prompt allegations of dual loyalty. The situation was exacerbated by Israeli expectations, voiced with customary ­bluntness by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, that Jews worldwide would settle in Israel. This tension subsided somewhat after the 1950 Ben-Gurion/ Blaustein agreement, which established the principle of Israeli non-interference in American Jewish internal affairs and left decisions regarding aliyah to individual American Jews (Liebman 1974, 1977). More crucially, Truman’s speedy recognition of Israel enabled American Jews to support both Israel and US government policy. Although the majority of American Jews supported Israel in its first two decades, Israel was somewhat of a peripheral, distant concern (Auerbach 1996). The events surrounding the 1967 Six-Day War were pivotal in making Israel central to American Jews’ personal and communal life. American Jews experienced a strong emotional reaction to both the threat facing Israel and its military victory (Sklare 1993). The following years were marked by stronger support for, and attachment to, Israel, so much so that Elazar (1976) labeled this attitude “incipient ‘Israelotry’.” An increase also occurred in the number of Americans migrating to Israel, although as a percentage of the American Jewish population the numbers were

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very small. However, the political shift in Israel from a left to right wing government, military conflicts with both Lebanon and the Palestinians, and political conflicts over the legal status of non-Orthodox Judaism in Israel were associated with increased American Jewish criticism of Israel, a pattern which began in the late 1970s and gained momentum in the 1980s (Sasson 2014; Kelner 2016; Waxman 2016). A social scientific debate concerning the relationship between American and Israeli Jews emerged during the 1990s, due in part to the availability of survey data. The discourse has become somewhat asymmetrical. The analysis of the possibility of a lessening of the commitment of American Jews toward Israel, termed the “distancing hypothesis” (Cohen 1996, 2002; Cohen and Kelman 2007; Sasson et  al. 2010; Sasson 2014) has been the focus of significant social scientific research.6 The disagreement surrounding the attachment to Israel has focused on whether it has been decreasing and perhaps more crucially, whether attachment is projected to decrease further. However, scant attention is given to the implications of this decrease, if indeed there is such a decrease, for the relationship between the two communities. Rather, attitudes toward Israel are considered to be an indicator of American Jews’ ethnic identity, and as such any decrease suggests an alteration in Jewish identity overall (Tabory 2010; Waxman 2010). An alternative approach to the relationship between Israeli and American Jews has tended to focus on the diaspora, rather than America, or perhaps has subsumed all diaspora Jews to American Jewry. Emphasis has been on the homeland–Diaspora dynamic, via analysis of institutional structures, flows of philanthropic dollars, and influence over policy, with the research focused on elite pronouncements, rather than the attitudes of the Jewish population at large (Safran 2005; Sheffer 2002).

1.4.2  Increasing Familiarity by Each Group of the Other When analyzing the relationship between the Jewish populations of America and Israel, a good starting point may be the degree to which members of each group are familiar with the other. Almost half of American Jews have visited Israel, with a slight minority having visited only once. This percentage has increased from 15% in NJPS 1971 to 22% in NJPS 1990, 41% in NJPS 2000–2001, and 47% in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013), presumably partially due to the increasing ease of international travel. Similarly, around two-fifths of Israelis have visited the US, with that number fairly evenly split between persons who have visited once and more than once (Pew Research Center 2015). Aside from visiting, significant numbers settle, with estimates of 300,000 Israelis residing in the US today (Jewish People Policy Institute 2017),7 while an estimated 1.5% of Israeli Jews are immigrants from America

 See, in particular, Contemporary Jewry 2–3, October 2010.  See Gold (2016) for a range of estimates.

6 7

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(Rebhun and Waxman 2000). Consequently, large numbers residing in each country have strong ties to family and friends in the other. Indeed, NJPS 2000–2001 found that 45% of American Jews had family or friends residing in Israel, a huge increase from the 25% in NJPS 1990. A serious barrier between the two communities may be language, as 2013 data (Pew Research Center 2013) show that 52% of American Jews know the Hebrew alphabet and only 12% can hold a conversation in Hebrew. The 12% includes Israelis residing in the US.

1.4.3  Jewish Peoplehood Strong Sense of Belonging to the Jewish People. American and Israeli Jews have a range of ties, but the question is, how strong are these ties? Feeling a “strong sense of belonging” to the Jewish people is a commonly held sentiment among both American and Israeli Jews, although it is slightly less prevalent among American Jews, with 81% of American Jews and 88% of Israeli Jews professing a strong sense of belonging. The somewhat higher levels for Israelis are perhaps due to the collective nature of Israeli religious life and the overlap between national and ethnic identities in Israel. Survey data for the past 50 years consistently demonstrate that the overwhelming majority (88–96%) of Israeli Jews feel a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people (Levy and Guttman 1976; Levy et  al. 1993, 2000; Arian and Keissar-Sugarmen 2012; Pew Research Center 2015). The evidence is that Israeli Jews have an affinity with American Jews. Sixty-­ eight percent of Israelis affirm that they have a lot or some things in common with American Jews, including 26% who feel they have “a lot” in common. In fact, while only 13% of American Jews view Israeli Jews as siblings and almost one-third do not relate to them as family members at all, Israeli Jews tend to view their American coreligionists as family members, either as siblings (31%), or relatives (47%) (AJC 2019). Consistently for the past 30  years, about 75% of Israeli Jews feel that American and Israeli Jews share a common destiny. However, Israeli Jews do feel a degree of distance from American Jews, with 57% agreeing that the Jewish people in Israel are a different people from Diaspora Jews in a 1991 survey (Levy et al. 1993), with the percentage holding this view rising to 69% in 1999 (Levy et al. 2000). Have a Special Responsibility to Take Care of Jews in Need Around the World. A sense of responsibility toward worldwide Jewry is a sentiment shared by 67% of American Jews and 56% of Israeli Jews. The higher percentage among American Jews may be a function of historical patterns of American Jewish philanthropy wherein American Jews have personally contributed time and money to campaigns directed toward the wellbeing of Jews across the world, whereas in Israel the government, rather than the people, has been at the forefront of such efforts. Age and Peoplehood. For the most part, no clear relationship exists between age and a sense of peoplehood. For American Jews, a sense of belonging to the Jewish people is positively correlated with age, although the relationship is not totally linear (Fig.  1.6). This is interesting as much of the extant research concurs that

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American Jewish ethnic attachment increases with age. Indeed, throughout the distancing hypothesis debate the relationship between age and distancing was one undisputed fact,8 although its interpretation was highly contested. These data ­indicate that the youngest age group feels a slightly stronger sense of belonging than would have been expected if attachment and age showed a monotonic inverse linear relationship. This is emphatically not a result of a growing Orthodox community as the share of Orthodox Jews among persons under age 30 in this sample is less than their share of persons age 30–39. In fact, what renders the increase in a sense of Jewish peoplehood among persons under age 30 all the more remarkable is the high percentage of persons who are “Jews, No religion” in this age group. It is possible that the great communal efforts directed at fostering a sense of Jewish peoplehood among the young, notably via Taglit-Birthright trips may be bearing fruit. (Saxe and Chazan 2008; Kelner 2010) The trajectory is significant, but at this stage the effect is slight, so it would be wise to reserve judgment until such time as further research corroborates this finding. Figure 1.6 shows that the relationship between a sense of belonging and age does not exist for Israeli Jews. No relationship is found either for American Jews or Israeli Jews for the statement about a “special responsibility” to take care of Jews in need around the world.

Fig. 1.6  Sense of Jewish peoplehood by age. (Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015))

 Sheskin (2012) has shown that the relationship at the national level is not true in some local Jewish communities. 8

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Table 1.8  Sense of Jewish peoplehood by religious identity (percentages)

Orthodox/Haredi Conservative/Dati Reform/Masorati Just Jewish/Hiloni Total

“Belonging” American Jews 99.7 93.3 80.7 65.0 81.3

Israeli Jews 94.4 96.0 93.3 81.6 88.1

“Responsibility” American Jews 91.7 82.2 66.2 47.1 67.4

Israeli Jews 75.9 73.7 61.2 44.2 56.0

Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015)

Belonging and Responsibility by Denominational Subgroups. Significant differences in feelings of peoplehood are found for denominational or religious subgroups (Table  1.8). In America, these categories are Just Jewish, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox. In Israel, the categories most commonly used are Hiloni (Secular), Masorati (Traditional), Dati (Religious), and Haredi (Ultra-­ Orthodox). For the purpose of clarity, the two sets of subgroups are aligned in the table, but no suggestion is being made that they are exact parallels. But, the patterns they exhibit are definitely similar. For both American and Israeli Jews, for both “belonging” and “responsibility,” a marked decrease is found from the most traditional religious affiliation to the least. This fits the pattern established earlier for ritual practice. The only slight deviation from this rule is for Israeli Haredi Jews on the question of belonging. This likely reflects their relative social isolation within Israeli society; but even there, the relationship is very limited.

1.4.4  Israel Attachment The degree to which American Jews “feel close” to Israel is subject to analysis along two separate planes. It has been viewed as either an indicator of the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora, or as an indicator of Jewish commitment and identity. This duality of meaning is evidenced by the placement of the question regarding closeness to Israel on the American Jewish Committee (AJC) surveys, which have been completed annually for many years. The question has been included in the Israel section, the “Jewish Identity” section, and the “Background Factors” section (AJC 1995–2011). Interpretations of the closeness of American Jews to Israel are ambiguous and often contradictory. Thus, possible decreases in closeness to Israel may be related to Israeli actions, either foreign or domestic, or to structural shifts in the American Jewish population. The corollary of this is that the implicit blame, or responsibility for ameliorating what is perceived to be a negative situation may be

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placed either at the door of the Israeli government or the American Jewish community, or both, depending on one’s interpretation. However, it is equally possible to advance an explanation which suggests that, over time, sentiments of closeness or distance between the two communities sharing a religion or ethnicity may fluctuate, without this having profound effects on anything other than that relationship. The counterfactual of Israeli Jews distancing from American Jews demonstrates this point. It would likely be interpreted as a change in the nature of Jewish peoplehood, or the development of an independent Israeli identity, rather than prompting soul searching regarding the future viability of the Jewish project in Israel. Rates and volumes of charitable donations to Israel were some of the indicators used to measure the relationship between American and Israeli Jews. In the early years of Israel’s existence, these donations were of crucial importance to Israel. The current relationship between the US and Israeli Jewish communities is much different; and although there may have been decreases in annual Jewish Federation campaign donations, this is not the indicator it once was both because many other channels for philanthropy to Israel have been created (Sasson 2014) and because Israel’s economic need is today much reduced (Cohen 1996; DellaPergola et al. 2000a). The question most often used to measure American Jews’ relationship to Israel is “How emotionally attached are you to Israel?” In 2013, 69% indicated that they were very or somewhat attached to Israel, including 30% who were very attached (Pew Research Center 2013). Surveys conducted by the American Jewish Committee from 1993 to 2011 yield similar results (AJC 1995–2011), which are consistent with an earlier estimate by Liebman and Cohen (1990). According to recent Pew Research Center (2013) data, the Orthodox (61% very attached) are the most attached and the Just Jewish (16% very attached) the least, echoing previous findings. For Israel attachment, the pattern is not linear for those under 40, but from age 40, attachment does seem to increase with age. The youngest cohort, respondents age 18–29 are significantly more attached to Israel, with 31% declaring themselves “very attached” compared to respondents age 30–39, of whom only 22% feel so close to Israel. Perhaps the heightened sense of connection to Israel among the youngest cohort can be attributed to what has been termed “the Birthright effect” (Sasson 2014, p. 143). (Table 1.9). Persons who have never visited Israel (16% very attached) exhibit the lowest levels of attachment, with persons who have visited more than once being most attached (68%). It is, however, impossible to know whether visiting Israel causes people to feel more emotionally attached to the country, or whether people who are more attached to Israel are more likely to travel there. The exception to this predicament is Taglit-Birthright trips, which have been shown to increase attachment to Israel (Saxe and Chazan 2008). Finally, persons who were raised by two Jewish parents are more likely to be more strongly attached than persons raised by one Jewish parent (36% vs. 24%).

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Table 1.9  Attachment to Israel among American Jews by age, denomination, visited Israel, and Parents’ religion, 2013 (percentages) Age 18–29 30–39 40–49 50–64 65 and over Denomination Orthodox Conservative Reform Just Jewish Visited Israel Never Once More than once Parents’ Religion One Jewish Both Jewish

Very attached

Somewhat attached

Very and somewhat attached

31.4 22.2 34.9 35.4 39.3

37.4 44.3 30.6 41.2 41.8

68.8 66.5 65.5 76.6 81.1

61.4 48.1 25.5 22.2

29.4 40.8 46.5 34.4

90.8 88.9 72.0 56.6

16.3 35.8 67.9

43.4 48.6 24.9

59.7 84.4 92.8

23.6 36.3

38.5 39.5

62.1 75.8

Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013)

1.4.5  Israeli Attitudes Toward the Diaspora For Israelis, although there is a clear sense that Israeli Jews feel a common bond with American Jews, Israeli Jews place a greater emphasis on Jewish life in Israel. The shifting balance of power between Israel and the Diaspora can be charted via the level of support for each of the following two statements: 1. The Jewish people cannot continue to exist without the existence of the State of Israel; 2. The State of Israel cannot exist without a strong connection with Jews in the Diaspora. In 1976, three quarters of Israeli Jews thought Israel could not survive without Diaspora Jewry and 68% felt that Diaspora Jews were dependent on Israel for their survival. A significant shift toward greater confidence in Israel’s prospects occurred by 1991, when the position was reversed, with 77% agreeing that Jews outside Israel were dependent upon Israel for their survival, but only 68% felt that way about Israel’s reliance on the Diaspora (Levy et  al. 1993). The American Jewish Committee (2019) data demonstrate that the vast majority of Israelis (91%) view the existence of a Jewish state as necessary for the long-term survival of the Jewish people, but only 74% have the same opinion about the necessity for a thriving Jewish Diaspora. Furthermore, for Israeli Jews, residing in Israel is an important

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Fig. 1.7  Importance of residing in Israel by gender, age, and religious identity, Israeli Jews. (Source: Authors from Pew Research Center (2015))

aspect of their Jewish identity: One-third averred that residing in Israel is an ­essential part of what being Jewish means to them, and a further 54% consider it important but not essential. In comparison, 46% or American Jews assert that caring about Israel is an essential part of what being Jewish means to them, with a further 43% categorizing caring for Israel as important but not essential (Pew 2015). The Pew Research Center (2015) data show near unanimity among Israeli Jews (98%) that it is the birthright of every Jew worldwide to make aliyah, with 87% strongly agreeing with that statement. Although Israeli Jews feel that Israel is central to Jewish life and that all Jews should have the right to live in Israel, on the question of whether this is a responsibility, they are more evenly split. Even when the question is framed fairly narrowly, asking whether: 1. “Jews in Israel should feel free to pursue the good life anywhere in the world, even if it means leaving Israel;” and 2. “Jews in Israel should remain in Israel, even if it means giving up the good life elsewhere.” Accordingly, 46% agreed with the first statement and 47% with the second. A small gender gap exists on this issue (Fig.  1.7), with men (54%) placing greater emphasis on residing in Israel and women (52%) favoring pursuit of the good life over residing in Israel. Older Israelis are more committed to residing in Israel even at the risk of missing out on material comfort than younger Israeli. Secular Jews (Hiloni) are the only religious subgroup whose members prioritize pursuit of the

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good life over residing in Israel, with the Dati group (the Religious) being the most committed to residing in Israel despite materialistic constraints. This fairly high level of acceptance of leaving Israel for material gain is a significant departure from traditional Zionist principles. The correlation of youth with support for this attitude seems to be indicative of a broader societal shift. In terms of ideology, traditional Zionist dogma has given way to a more flexible approach. Where once Jews who chose either not to immigrate to Israel, or to emigrate from it were viewed negatively and referred to derogatively in the national discourse, now, perhaps an indication of the relatively secure position in which Israel finds itself, the tone used is much less strident. Concurrently, there has been a shift from a strong collectivist approach, to a more liberal, individualistic ethos especially over the past 40 years (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2013; Rebhun and Waxman 2000).

1.4.6  The Middle East Conflict The greatest divergence between American and Israeli Jews is in the political realm. American Jews are more positive about the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Three-fifths of American Jews, compared to just over two-fifths of Israeli Jews, believe that a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully (Fig. 1.8). American Jews are much more skeptical about the sincerity of the Israeli government’s efforts at peacemaking, perhaps a consequence of their greater optimism about the possibility of peace in the Middle East. Around two-fifths of American Jews believe that the Israeli government is making a sincere effort to bring about peace, compared with a clear majority of Israeli Jews.

Fig. 1.8  Political views. (Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015))

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Although Jews in both countries tend to view the Israeli government as sincerer in its efforts than the Palestinians, American Jews are a little more likely than Israeli Jews to feel that the Palestinian leadership is also making a sincere effort to bring about peace. This is consonant with the aforementioned skepticism on the part of American Jews regarding the sincerity of the Israeli government in its peacemaking efforts. The inverse of this can be noted with regard to assessments of the American government’s role. During the second term of President Barack Obama’s administration, when the Pew surveys of Jews in America and Israel asked: “Now, thinking about the relationship between the US and Israel…. Is the US too supportive of Israel, not supportive enough, or is US support of Israel about right?” A majority of American Jews felt that America was providing about the appropriate level of support, while Israeli Jews felt America was not sufficiently supportive.9 Interestingly, similar percentages, but slightly more Israeli Jews, felt that the US government was being overly supportive of Israel. While Jews in America tend to feel an attachment to Israel, it is natural for them to view the actions of their own government more favorably than Israeli Jews do, and the same is naturally true of Israeli Jews’ perceptions of the intentions of their government. It is often the case that Diaspora communities represent a certain faction within the political debate in their countries, and therefore their political views may differ from the average citizen. This is true to a small extent regarding issues of peacemaking between Israel and the Palestinians and the role of the American government in providing support for Israel. The political differences between American and Israeli Jews may be due to the specific environment in which each community operates, or it is possible that the perceptions of American and Israeli Jews differ on political issues because American Jews are, on average, more liberal or left leaning than Israeli Jews (see Sect. 1.3 above). When examined by political ideology, on a five-point scale from very liberal to very conservative for Americans and on a six-point scale from left wing to right wing for Israelis, the political differences between American and Israeli Jews n­ arrow dramatically. For Jews in both countries, positions on the political spectrum tend to correlate with their stance regarding the Arab-Israel conflict and the American ­government’s position on that issue. Thus, American Jews who define themselves as very liberal tend to concur with very left-wing Israelis, while very conservative American Jews tend to hold similar opinions to right-wing Israeli Jews. The difference in attitudes seems to be more a function of the differing political orientation of Jews in America and Israel, rather than their residing in two separate locations (Fig. 1.8). There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule, primarily in cases where overall, American and Israeli Jews agree. For example, almost identical ­percentages, 11.9% of American Jews and 10.4% of Israeli Jews, think that the Palestinians are 9  As noted earlier, the surveys were completed while Barack Obama was President. American Jews overwhelmingly were supportive of Obama, mostly for reasons unrelated to Israel, while Israeli Jews were overwhelmingly anti-Obama.

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making sincere efforts toward peace. However, when examined by political leanings, left wing Israelis are more than twice as likely as liberal Americans to consider Palestinian efforts sincere. Similarly, 9.3% of American Jews and 11.5% of Israeli Jews say that the American government is too supportive of Israel. Nevertheless, when examined by political ideology, it can be seen that such a view is held fairly evenly across the political spectrum among American Jews, but in Israel is largely confined to those who identify as left-wing. Conversely, even when examined by political stance, American Jews are more likely to think that their government is giving Israel the appropriate measure of support than Israeli Jews. On most issues relating to the Middle East conflict, where American and Israeli Jews disagree, American Jews’ attitudes are more dovish and Israeli Jews more hawkish. The differences simply express the fact that American Jews tend to be concentrated at the liberal end of the spectrum; whereas in their political approach, Israeli Jews tend to be more right wing. In fact, American conservatives and Israeli rightists would tend to agree with each other as would moderates from each country and liberals/leftists, with each pairing holding strikingly similar views (Fig. 1.9). Although Israeli Jews overwhelmingly reject taking into account the views of the American Jewish leadership regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Cohen 2018), overall, Israeli Jews tend to view the influence of American Jews on “the way things are going in Israel” positively. A clear majority (59%) of Israelis feel that Jews in the US have a good influence on Israel; 6% feel they have a bad influence; and just under a third feel that their impact is neutral (Pew Research Center 2015). It seems respondents had in mind political influence on the American government, influence on religious matters such as the status of the Reform and Conservative movements in Israel, or financial influence via philanthropy, more than influence on Israeli policy toward the peace process, which only 31% consider appropriate (AJC 2019).

1.4.7  The Status of Jewish Denominations Denominations have been a feature of American Jewish life for over a century. In Israel, however, denominations play far less of a role in religious life. The Reform and Conservative movements exist in Israel, but they have only attracted a very small minority of Israelis. Estimates range from 2% (AJC 2018) to 13%, although the movements themselves report only 12,000 adult members (Feferman 2018), which is considerably less than one-tenth of one percent of the adult Jewish Israeli population which, in 2018, was reported by Israel’s CBS to be 4,435,800. While there is no official Orthodox movement in Israel, Orthodoxy is considered the default form of Judaism and is the form of Judaism authorized by the State to fulfill religious functions. This divergence is the cause of a high degree of friction in the relationship between American and Israeli Jews. Indeed, a recent survey carried out on behalf of the UJA Federation aimed “to help American Jewish leadership better understand the perspectives of Israeli Jews that are important to both Jewries,” with

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Israel, Palestine Can Coexist

44.8

59.2 63.0

24.8 31.4 33.4

23.7

Israeli Govt Sincere

24.0 24.0

32.2

75.0

67.8 69.8

46.3 57.0 60.7

35.1

85.9 88.0

US conservative

72.9 69.3

US moderate

0.8

12.6 8.9 11.6 21.5 12 4.5 6.7 12.5

Palestinians Sincere

US liberal US very liberal 35.6

52.0

Il very right

0.8 3.9 3.4

10.6 25.4 16.6 5.6 9.7 12.3 29.5

US Govt Too Supportive

30.5 US Govt Support About Right

Il right 48.0 38.8

25.5 27.3 31.6 33.6 34.0 21.4

9.6

US Govt Not Enough Support

16.0 0

20

US very conservative

39 36.4 35.6 40

54.7

Il center right 65.2 64.0

Il center left

48.3 54.3

Il left 68.0 Il very left

55.7 65.1 55.6 60

80

100

Fig. 1.9  Views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by political leanings (percentages). (Sources: Authors from Pew Research Center (2013) and Pew Research Center (2015))

the question of religious pluralism one of the three main areas of inquiry (Cohen 2018). In the 1990s, one-third of Israeli Jews felt that Conservative, Reform and other non-Orthodox denominations should be granted a status equal to that of the Orthodox; and another third felt they should definitely be given such a status (Levy et al. 2000). However, it seems that this support is primarily at a theoretical level, rather than a practical one, as Israeli Jews tend not to want to attend a non-Orthodox synagogue. For example, if a Conservative or Reform synagogue were in their neighborhood, a majority say they would never attend it, even though 80% of Israeli Jews attend synagogue at least on some occasions (Levy et al. 1993). More recent data (Pew Research Center 2015) suggest that a majority of Israeli Jews (56%) do

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Table 1.10  Validity of non-Orthodox conversion among Israeli Jews (percentages) Valid Invalid Don’t know

All Israeli Jews 38.0 55.5 6.5

Haredi 5.1 92.8 2.1

Dati 9.0 88.3 2.7

Masorti 28.4 63.2 8.4

Hiloni 58.0 34.7 7.3

Source: Authors from Pew Research Center (2015)

not consider persons Jewish if they were converted to Judaism by a non-Orthodox rabbi, while 38% would consider them to be Jewish. Rejection of such conversion is strongest among Haredim, but majorities of Dati and Masorti Jews agree as well (Table 1.10). Essentially, the majority of Israeli Jews do not recognize the primary American Jewish denominations (Reform and Conservative) as legitimate sources of Jewish authority, although a significant minority does. The vast majority of Israeli Jews support the current system, whereby State religious services are provided by the Orthodox stream only (Cohen 2018). Similarly, 55% of Israeli Jews reject American Jewish influence on government policy regarding religious pluralism, with 15% in favor of the government taking their views into account to a great extent and 25% to some extent.

1.5  Summary and Projections The creation of the State of Israel 70 years ago was a tectonic turning point in ­modern Jewish history. It was followed by dramatic changes in world Jewry’s patterns of geographic distribution, demography, and religio-ethnic identification. It also fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship between the Jewish communities inside and outside the Land of Israel. The new political status of Israel as a pivotal player in Jewish affairs is dynamic. This requires occasional assessment of the characteristics of various Diaspora Jewish communities, especially the large and central ones such as that of the US, in comparison to Israel. Indeed, Israel’s 70th anniversary is not more special than any other decennial jubilee; but, as we advance in time, scholars have a richer and better empirical infrastructure for exploring these two communities. Accordingly, and as much as data allow, this chapter has traced the socio-demographic, Jewish identification, and political characteristics of Jews in the US and Israel between 1948 and 2018, as well as the relationship between these two largest Jewish communities. The empirical observations have several implications and directions for policy. Demography. From a demographic perspective, the effect of international migration on the size of the Jewish population in both the US and Israel has recently become very small. In the US, to the extent that the number of Jews increases, this is mainly due to changes in people’s self-identification. In Israel, the Jewish population is steadily on the rise mainly due to positive “natural movement” (births minus deaths). Any policy aimed at increasing the size of the

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Jewish population in each of the two communities will have to direct its efforts at different trajectories. Over time, Israel has become a Jewish concentration similar in size or slightly larger than that of the US. If numbers matter, this has implications for the distribution of world Jewish resources. Concurrently, today Israel can largely rely on its own economic strength. The support of American Jews (and of the Jewish Diaspora more generally) is becoming less crucial for its development. In addition, the challenges of vitality facing American Jewry may, at some point, lead American Jews to devote more of their resources to their own material and spiritual support. We anticipate that the differences in educational attainments between American and Israeli Jews will narrow in the future. Paradoxically, however, this process is somewhat hindered by the migration of Israelis to the US among whom the percentage with academic degrees is twice as high as that of the total Jewish population in Israel (Jewish People Policy Institute 2017). Many of the Israelis in the US work in the high-tech industry and research institutions, and Israel needs to find ways to attract them back and more generally to moderate this brain drain. Jewish Connectivity. As far as Jewish connectivity is concerned, significant ­differences exist between American and Israeli Jews, with Israeli Jews demonstrating higher levels of connection across most of the indicators of Jewish identity. An interesting pattern has developed wherein the trajectories among the native born in both countries are similar, while the trajectories among the foreign born are very different. In the US, the foreign born show higher Jewish connectivity than the native born, whereas in Israel, due to the very large immigration of FSU Jews, the native born are more Jewishly connected than the foreign born. Accordingly, any attempts to strengthen Jewish identification should prioritize the population by nativity status differently in the US than in Israel. Among both American and Israeli Jews, there appears to be a “religiously-­shrinking middle” (Cohen 2018)10 and a growing polarization between the religious and nonreligious. Among American Jews, the non-Orthodox are increasingly non-­traditional; but their growth rate is limited by low fertility, while the Orthodox are increasing, among other reasons, because of their significantly higher birth rate. Since the Orthodox have higher rates of communal identification, it may be ­predicted that they will gain in involvement and influence in the American Jewish communal structure. Among Israeli Jews, on the one hand, there has been a steady decrease in the percentage defining themselves as Traditional and an increase, on the other hand, in the percentage of those defining themselves as Haredi and Non-Observant. Whether this will lead to a real rift and polarization, accompanied by increasing strife along religious-secular lines, remains to be seen. In broad terms, American Jewry increasingly identifies being Jewish with liberal, universalistic norms and values, and Israel increasingly identifies being Jewish with more particularistic norms and values. How this will affect the trajectories of Jewish

10

 See also Cohen and Liebman (2019) and the response by Dashefsky and Sheskin et al. (2019).

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connectivity of both American and Israeli Jewry in the future also remains to be seen. American Jewry-Israel Mutual Relationships. Meanwhile, and notwithstanding the strong sense of affinity between American and Israeli Jews, they disagree on a number of issues. Although there has been much concern that American Jewish attachment to Israel will decrease over time, the Pew Research Center (2013) survey does not provide evidence that young American Jews are increasingly alienated from Israel. There is, however, potential for future clashes between the two centers of world Jewry. Both American and Israeli Jews are confident in their positions, but disagree somewhat over issues such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the status of Reform and Conservative denominations in Israel. Given that Israeli Jews welcome the support of American Jews but are opposed to taking their views into account, one can assume that conflicts over contentious issues will arise in the future as they have in recent years. The story of American Jewish-Israeli relations may best be characterized as one of stable and strong connection, punctuated by periodic flare ups over points of contention. Over the course of the 70  years of Israel’s existence, the relationship between American and Israeli Jews has undergone considerable change. Although there has been much concern in recent decades over American Jewish support for Israel, it should be noted that the overwhelming support for Israel in the post-Six-Day War era may represent something of an anomaly. In the 1940s, support for Israel was not considered central to American Jewish identity; and American Jewish support for Israel tended to be ambivalent, or at least tempered, by certain concerns. Ironically, any current decrease in American Jewish support for Israel, although perceived as problematic by community leaders, is of much less concern to Israeli Jews, given their sense of decreased reliance on the Diaspora. Indeed, the entire debate over the degree to which American Jews feel less attached to Israel seems to be a debate about other issues entirely, namely Jewish continuity in America and a frustration with the direction taken by the Israeli government, both in terms of religious and foreign affairs. These issues neatly encapsulate the three central issues framing the discourse regarding the relationship between American and Israeli Jews: The first is internal American, in which the relationship with Israel is simply an indicator of Jewish commitment; the second is religious, between two quite different Jewish communities; and the third is geopolitical, i.e., American Jewish opinion on Israeli foreign policy. On the Israeli side, there has been a decrease in reliance on and an increase in appreciation for the Diaspora, typified by the American Jewish community. The Jewish communities of the United States and Israel are each characterized by dynamics along with stability in major social, cultural and political attributes. The direction, pace and levels of each such attribute and its specific components may vary from one community to another and at times can overlap. This is largely a result of the unique political and social structure of each country, its Jewish communal organization, and the individual characteristics of the members that comprise them who at the same time are people who share a modern lifestyle and exposure to similar information and knowledge in an era of globalization and advanced technol-

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ogy. In addition, the fluidity of identities and personal behaviors makes it difficult to point to clear and unequivocal trajectories along which these two communities evolve. Perhaps, the concept of diversity can help best to describe the period discussed here and especially the course of the more recent decades. Each of the Jewish communities in the US and in Israel is heterogeneous with many sub-groups and each exhibits peculiar strategies of demographic and cultural survival. Such diversity seems to balance different internal trends within each community. At the same time, it also allows each sub-group to find its peers overseas and to differ and be critical toward different sub-groups in the other country. Intra- and inter-community diversities do not imply weakness, but they require consensus on a number of anchors of group belonging and solidarity.

References Abramson, G., and I. Troen, eds. 2000. The Americanization of Israel. Israel Studies 5 (1): 65–91. American Jewish Committee. 1995–2011. Annual surveys of American Jewish public opinion. http://www.jewishdatabank.org/Studies/details.cfm?StudyID=765. ———. 2018. Survey of American and Israeli Jewish opinion. https://www.ajc.org/survey2018. ———. 2019. AJC 2019 Survey of Israeli Jewish opinion. https://www.ajc.org/news/survey2019/ Israel. Arian, A., and A.  Keissar-Sugarmen. 2012. Beliefs, observance and values of Israeli Jews. Jerusalem: The Guttman Center for Surveys of the Israel Democracy Institute. Auerbach, J.S. 1996. Are we one? Menachem Begin and the long shadow of 1977. In Envisioning Israel: The changing ideals and images of North American Jews, ed. A.  Gal. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. Bachi, R. 1974. The population of Israel. Jerusalem: The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Demographic Center, Prime Minister’s Office. Chanes, J.A. 2006. Anti-Semitism. In American Jewish year book, 2006, ed. D.  Singer and L. Grossman, vol. 106, 64–91. New York: American Jewish Committee. Chenkin, A. 1957. Jewish population in the United States, 1956. In American Jewish year book 1957, ed. M. Fine and J. Sloan, vol. 58, 65–82. New York: American Jewish Committee and Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. Cohen, S.M. 1996. Did American Jews really grow more distant from Israel 1983–1992? A reconsideration. In Envisioning Israel: the changing ideals and images of North American Jews, ed. A. Gal. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. ———. 2002. Relationship of American Jews with Israel: what we know and what we need to know. Contemporary Jewry 23 (1): 132–155. Cohen, S. M. 2018. Together and apart: Israeli Jews’ views on their relationship to American Jews and religious pluralism. Unpublished findings from UJA-Federation of Greater New  York’s Survey of Israeli Jews 2017. Cohen, S.M., and A.Y. Kelman. 2007. Beyond distancing: Young adult American Jews and their alienation from Israel. New York: Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies. Cohen, S.M., and C.S. Liebman. 2019. The quality of American Jewish life. In American Jewish year book, 2018, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 118, 3–49. Dordrecht: Springer. Cohen, W. 1958. The politics of American Jews. In The Jews: Social patterns of an American group, ed. M. Sklare, 614–626. New York: Free Press. Dashefsky, A., J. DeAmicis, B. Lazerwitz, and E. Tabory. 1992. Americans abroad: A comparative study of emigrants from the United States. New York: Plenum Press.

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Dashefsky, A., B. Lazerwitz, and E. Tabory. 2003. A journey of the “straight way” or the “roundabout path:” Jewish identity in the United States and Israel. In Handbook of the sociology of religion, ed. M. Dillon, 240–260. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. DellaPergola, S. 1980. Patterns of American Jewish fertility. Demography 17 (3): 261–273. ———. 1992. Major trends of world Jewry: the last hundred years. In Genetic diversity among Jews: diseases and markers at the DNA level, ed. B. Bonne-Tamir and A. Adam pp. 3–30. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1999. World Jewish population, 1997. In American Jewish year book, 1999, ed. D. Singer and R.R. Seldin, vol. 99, 543–580. New York: American Jewish Committee. ———. 2000. The global context of migration to Israel. In Still moving: Recent Jewish migration in comparative perspective, ed. D. Elazar and M. Weinfeld, 13–59. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 2011. Jewish demographic policies: population trends and options in Israel and in the diaspora. Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute. ———. 2014. End of Jewish/non-Jewish dichotomy? Evidence from the 2013 Pew Survey. In American Jewish year book, 2014, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin, vol. 114, 32–39. Dordrecht: Springer. ———. 2016. World Jewish Population, 2016. In American Jewish year book, 2016, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin, vol. 116, 253–332. Dordrecht: Springer. ———. 2018. World Jewish Population, 2018. In American Jewish year book, 2018, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin, vol. 118. Dordrecht: Springer (forthcoming). DellaPergola, S., U.  Rebhun, and P.R.  Raicher. 2000a. The Six-Day War and Israel-Diaspora relations: an analysis of quantitative Indicators. In The Six-Day War and World Jewry, ed. E. Lederhendler, 11–50. Bethesda, MD: University of Maryland Press. DellaPergola, S., U. Rebhun, and M. Tolts. 2000b. Prospecting the Jewish future: population projections, 2000–2080. In American Jewish year book, 2000, ed. D. Singer and L. Grossman, vol. 100, 103–146. New York: American Jewish Committee. Dollinger, M. 2000. Quest for inclusion: Jews and liberalism in modern America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Elazar, D.J. 1976. Community and polity: the organizational dynamics of American Jewry. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. ———. 1989. People and polity: the organizational dynamics of world Jewry. Detroit: Wayne University Press. Feferman, D. 2018. Rising streams: Reform and Conservative Judaism in Israel. Jerusalem: Jewish People Policy Institute. Forman, I.N. 2001. The historical voting behavior of American Jews. In Jews in American politics, ed. L.S. Maisel, I.N. Forman, D. Altschiller, and C.W. Bassett, 141–160. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Fuchs, L. 1956. The political behavior of American Jews. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Gold, S. 2016. Patterns of adaptation among contemporary Jewish immigrants to the US.  In American Jewish year book, 2015, ed. A.  Dashefsky and I.M.  Sheskin, vol. 115, 3–43. Dordrecht: Springer. Goldscheider, C. 2015. Israeli society in the 21st century: immigration, inequality, and religious conflict. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press. Goldstein, S. 1969. Socioeconomic differentials among religious groups in the United States. American Journal of Sociology 74 (5): 612–631. Goldstein, S., and C.  Goldscheider. 1985. Jewish-Americans: Three generations in a Jewish Community. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Greenwald, A. 2019. The Democrats’ growing Anti-Semitism problem, Commentary, February. Hleihal, A. 2017. Fertility among Jewish Women in Israel, by Level of Religiosity, 1979–2014. (Working Paper Series, No. 101) Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Senior Department of Geography and Census. April. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). (n.d., Various years). Statistical abstract. Jerusalem.

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Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI). 2017. Annual Assessment: The Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish people. Jerusalem. Kaplan, D.E. 2009. Contemporary American Judaism: transformation and renewal. New York: Columbia University Press. Kelner, S. 2010. Tours that bind: Diaspora, pilgrimage, and Israeli Birthright tourism. New York: New York University Press. Kelner, S. 2016. Veneration and critique: Israel, the sociology of American Judaism and the problematics of sovereignty. Jewish Studies Quarterly 23(3): 194–221. Knesset of Israel (n.d.). Knesset of Israel. https://main.knesset.gov.il/About/History/Pages/Lobby. aspx. Kosmin, B., S. Goldstein, J. Waksberg, N. Lerer, A. Keysar, and J. Scheckner. 1991. Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey. New York: Council of Jewish Federations. Lazerwitz, B., A. Winter, A. Dashefsky, and E. Tabory. 1998. Jewish choices: American Jewish denominationalism. Albany: SUNY Press. Legge, J. 1995. Explaining Jewish liberalism in the United States: an exploration of socioeconomic, religious, and communal living variables. Social Science Quarterly 76 (1): 124–141. Lerner, R., A.K. Nagai, and S. Rothman. 1989. Marginality and liberalism among Jewish elite. Public Opinion Quarterly 53 (3): 330–352. Levy, G.B. 1995. Toward a theory of disproportionate American Jewish liberalism. New  York: Oxford University Press. Levy, S., and L.  Guttman. 1976. Zionism and the Jewishness of Israelis. Forum on the Jewish People, Zionism and Israel 24: 39–50. Levy, S., H.  Levinsohn, and E.  Katz. 1993. Beliefs, observances and social interaction among Israeli Jews. Jerusalem: The Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. ———. 2000. A portrait of Israeli Jews: beliefs, observance and values of Israeli Jews. Jerusalem: The Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Liebman, C.S. 1974. Diaspora Influence on Israel: The Ben-Gurion: Blaustein ‘Exchange’ and Its Aftermath. Jewish Social Studies 36 (3/4): 271–280. ———. 1977. Pressure without sanctions: The influence of world Jewry on Israeli policy. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. Liebman, C.S., and S.M. Cohen. 1990. Two worlds of Judaism: The Israeli and American experiences. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Lipset, S.M. 1960. Political man: the social basis of politics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. ———. 1971. The socialism of fools: the left, the Jews, and Israel. In The new left and the Jews, ed. M.S. Chertoff, 103–131. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation. ———. 1972. Group life in America: a task force report. New York: American Jewish Committee. Lipset, S.M., and E. Raab. 1995. Jews and the new American scene. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Massarik, F., and A.  Chenkin. 1973. United States National Jewish Population Survey: A First Report. In American Jewish year book, 1973, ed. M. Fine and M. Himmelfarb, vol. 73, 264– 315. New York: American Jewish Committee and Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. Medding, P.Y. 1977. Towards a general theory of Jewish political interests and behavior. Jewish Journal of Sociology 19 (2): 115–144. Pew Research Center. 2013. A portrait of Jewish Americans. http://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/ jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey/. ———. 2015. Israel’s religiously divided society. http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/ israels-religiously-divided-society/. Rebhun, U. 2011. Jews and the ethnic scene: A Multidimensional Theory. In Ethnicity and beyond: Theories and dilemmas of Jewish group demarcation. Studies in contemporary Jewry, ed. E. Lederhendler, vol. XXV, 91–101. ———. 2016. Jews and the American religious landscape. New York: Columbia University Press. Rebhun, U., and L. Lev Ari. 2013. American Israelis: Migration, transnationalism, and diasporic identity. Leiden, Netherlands and Boston: Brill.

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Rebhun, U., and S. Levy. 2006. Unity and diversity: Jewish identification in America and Israel 1990–2000. Sociology of Religion: A Quarterly Review 67 (4): 391–414. Rebhun, U., and C.I. Waxman. 2000. The Americanization of Israel: A demographic, cultural and political evaluation. Israel Studies 5 (1): 65–91. Rosenberg, B., Howe., I. 1976. Are the Jews turning Toward the right? In The new conservatives: a critique from the left, ed. I. Howe and L. A. Coser, 64-89. New York: New American Library. Rosner, S., and C. Fuchs. 2018. Israel Judaism: A cultural Revolution (in Hebrew). Hevel Modiin and Jerusalem: Dvir and Jewish People Policy Institute. Safran, W. 2005. The Jewish Diaspora in a comparative and theoretical perspective. Israel Studies 10 (1): 36–60. Sarna, J. 2004. American Judaism: a history. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Sasson, T., C. Kadushin, and L. Saxe. 2010. Trends in American Jewish attachment to Israel: an assessment of the distancing hypothesis. Contemporary Jewry 30 (2-3): 297–319. Sasson, T. 2014. The new American Zionism. New York: New York University Press. Saxe, L., and B. Chazan. 2008. Ten days of Birthright Israel: a journey in young adult identity. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press. Saxe, L., J. Krasner Aronson, and T. Sasson. 2014. Pew’s portrait of American Jewry: A reassessment of the assimilation narrative. In American Jewish year book, 2014, ed. A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin, vol. 114, 71–81. Dordrecht: Springer. Schmelz, U.O., and S.  DellaPergola. 1982. World Jewish population. In American Jewish year book, 1982, ed. M. Himmelfarb and D. Singer, vol. 82, 82–96. New York: American Jewish Committee and Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. Seligman, B.B., and H.  Swados. 1948/1949. Jewish population studies in the United States. In American Jewish year book, 1948–1949, ed. H. Schneiderman and M. Fine, vol. 50, 651–782. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. Shapira, A. 2012. Israel: A history. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press. Sheffer, G. 2002. A nation and its Diaspora: A re-examination of Israeli-Jewish Diaspora relations. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 11 (3): 331–338. Sheskin, I.M. 2012. Attachment of American Jews to Israel: Perspectives from local Jewish community studies. Contemporary Jewry 32 (1): 27–65. Sklare, M. 1993. Observing America’s Jews. Hanover, MA: Brandeis University Press. Smith, G.  A. and J.  Martinez. 2016 (9/11). How the faithful voted: A preliminary 2016 analysis. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/ how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/. Tabory, E. 2010. Attachment to Israeli and Jewish identity: An assessment of an assessment. Contemporary Jewry 30 (2–3): 191–197. Tolts, M. 2015. Demographic transformations among ex-Soviet migrants in Israel. In Research in Jewish demography and identity, ed. E.  Lederhendler and U.  Rebhun, 151–156. Boston: Academic Studies Press. Walzer, M. 1986. Is Liberalism (still) good for the Jews? Moment (March): 13–19. Waxman, C.I. 1989. American aliya: Portrait of an innovative migration movement. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. ———. 2010. Beyond distancing: Jewish identity, identification, and American’s young Jews. Contemporary Jewry 30 (2–3): 227–232. Waxman, D. 2016. Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 2

The Presidential Voting of American Jews Herbert F. Weisberg

Most American Jews have been voting Democratic since the late-1920s. In every election since 1948, there has been speculation as to whether Jews’ affinity to the Democratic Party is about to end; but it has displayed remarkable persistence. Yet, more careful examination reveals that there has been variation in Jews’ voting patterns. Partisanship is not static or immutable. Attention to Jewish voting received renewed attention in early 2019 when the Republicans launched a new organization intended to create a Jewish “exodus” from the Democratic Party. This chapter summarizes the recent surge of research on Jews’ politics and supplies great detail on their voting history and voting patterns. Section 2.1 provides a review of the literature. Section 2.2 considers the various factors that have been advanced to explain Jews’ voting. Section 2.3 offers a brief analysis of their voting turnout and their political participation more generally. Section 2.4 presents a lengthy history of their presidential voting, including analysis of voting trends. Section 2.5 focuses on three factors that affect Jews’ voting: ideology, partisanship, and Israel. Section 2.6 turns to the contemporary period, including their voting in the 2016 election, the impact of the Trump administration, and the 2018 election. Section 2.7 provides a brief conclusion.

2.1  Literature Attention has been paid to the Jewish vote at least as far back as the Lincoln elections (Sarna and Shapell 2015, pp. 178–182). However, there was little literature on the topic until the advent of public opinion polling in the 1930s and the subsequent development of social science surveys. H. F. Weisberg (*) Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_2

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2.1.1  Early Literature The Jewish vote was noticed in the 1936 Washington Post (11 Oct., p. B1) on the first Gallup pre-election poll, entitled “Roosevelt Is Strongest With Catholics, Jews.” A decade later, a journal article analyzing several religious groups (Allinsmith and Allinsmith 1948) found the Jewish vote was anomalous since they were a relatively prosperous group but voted on the liberal side. The Jewish vote was mentioned in books by early pollster Sam Lubell (1951). The first major national study of American voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 302) showed that their voting was distinctively Democratic in the 1950s. By the mid-1950s, Jewish voting attracted the attention of three dissertation students. Lawrence Fuchs’ 1955 dissertation, The Political Behavior of American Jews, explained Jewish liberalism in terms of their Judaic values. By contrast, Werner Cohn’s 1956 dissertation, Sources of Jewish Liberalism, focused on the European origins of Jews’ liberalism. Maurice Guysenir’s 1957 dissertation, Jewish Voting Behavior in Chicago’s 50th Ward, concentrated on the class basis of their voting. Cohn’s work appeared as a chapter in an edited volume (Cohn 1958) and Guysenir’s (1958) in a journal article, while Fuchs (1956) published his as a book. Fuchs’ study was the first full-length book on Jewish voting. It treats Jews as an ethno-religious group, justifying “ethno-religious politics [as] basically a product of ethno-religious pluralism in American life” (p. 19). Four chapters examine Jewish American political history, starting from Jews being Jeffersonian Democrats, then transitioning in the Civil War period in which Northern Jews abandoned the Democratic Party, followed by a lengthy treatment of “the Republican years” with a transition in the 1920s, leading up to “the Democratic return” since the 1930s. Then, Fuchs turned to the 1952 election, analyzing a survey he conducted in a Boston ward. The next four chapters discuss Jews relationship to the Democratic Party, their Socialist tradition, split-ticket voting, and minor party voting. The final chapter focuses on “sources of Jewish internationalism and liberalism,” with an emphasis on the role of Jewish values (discussed further below). Fuchs placed his study in the nascent field of voting studies, but the reviews of the book were generally lukewarm because its evidence base was not as systematic as the early sociological analysis of voting. On the twentieth anniversary of the publication of his pioneering book, Fuchs revisited the topic in an introductory essay for a special bicentennial issue of American Jewish Historical Quarterly. Fuchs (1976, p.  182) duly noted that Liebman (1973) had pointed out that the most religious Jews were not the most liberal and had consequently concluded that Fuchs’ focus on Judaic values was “tenuous.” While Fuchs admitted that American politics had entered a new era, he maintained that Torah-based values still had “something to do with the persistence of Jewish liberalism.” Fuchs insisted (p. 189), “What they [Jews] are not going to lose is an overwhelming commitment to the basic structure of constitutional liberalism and to social justice—not as long as they remain Americans and Jews.”

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John Kennedy’s successful 1960 campaign to become the nation’s first president who was Catholic increased the focus on the nexus between religion and politics. That brought attention to the Jewish vote in 1960 (Brenner 1964), including what may be the first discussion in the American Jewish Year Book of the direction of the Jewish vote (Dawidowicz 1961).

2.1.2  The 1970s–1990s The first accessible compilation of the Jewish vote in presidential elections was in a book by Washington Post correspondent Stephen Isaacs (1974, pp. 151–153). Jews and American Politics is an anecdotal work based on interviews that he conducted with Jewish political personalities. He recounted several stories involving Jewish politicians, presidential campaign aides, bureaucrats, and fellow reporters. Three additional books related to Jewish voting were published during this period. They described the history of Jews’ politics, but each also had political objectives. Nathaniel Weyl’s (1968) The Jew in American Politics argued that Jewish support for liberals was misplaced. William Heitzmann’s (1975) American Jewish Voting Behavior concluded that Jews would return to the Republican Party. El Azhary (1980) performed a state-by-state analysis of several elections to claim that the importance of Jews’ votes was exaggerated; he based his estimates of Jews’ votes in each state on Jews’ national vote, although too few were interviewed (just 30–53 nationally, depending on the year) for his estimates to be reliable at the state level. Additionally, Alan Fisher, Arthur Hertzberg, Milton Himmelfarb, and Seymour Martin Lipset, among others, published popular journal articles on the Jewish vote in the 1970s and 1980s. As to be discussed in Sect. 2.2, the factors contributing to Jews’ liberalism were considered at a theoretical level by Peter Medding (1977) and Geoffrey Levey (1996), while Steven M. Cohen and Charles Liebman (1997) provided important empirical analysis of that liberalism. Cohen (1983) presented particularly insightful survey-based analysis of modernity effects on their politics. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) began its Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion in the 1980s, which led to several useful reports (see www. JewishDataBank.org).

2.1.3  The Early 2000s The 2000s began with the publication of Sandy Maisel and Ira Forman’s (2001) Jews in American Politics, an edited collection of broad-ranging essays that cover a wide set of topics on contemporary Jewish politics. Most notably for current purposes, Ira Forman (2001) contributed a historical review of American Jewish voting

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behavior, and Anna Greenberg and Kenneth Wald (2001) wrote a survey-based analysis of Jewish liberalism. Rafael Medoff’s (2002) Jewish Americans and Political Participation included a historical chapter on the Jewish vote along with examination of Jewish participation in politics more generally. Ira Sheskin (2013, 2016) has used modern probability-based surveys to examine Jews’ politics in several American cities, contributing important analyses of the geography and demography of the Jewish vote. The most recent studies of Jews’ politics are the book-length analyses of Jewish liberalism by Wald (2019) and of Jewish voting by Weisberg (2019), both of which will be described in more detail throughout this chapter.

2.1.4  Problems in Studying Jews’ Voting Studying Jews’ presidential voting has been challenging because Jews are such a small proportion of the total population. As to be discussed below, the first studies of Jewish voting were based primarily on predominantly Jewish voting precincts in a few major cities. Thus, the standard estimates of the Jewish vote through 1932, as published in Isaacs (1974) and repeated in Forman (2001), have been traced by Weisberg (2012) back to historian David Burner’s (1968) data for predominantly Jewish “sanitary districts” in Manhattan. However, there also would have been non-­ Jews living in those precincts, and the voting of Jews in those precincts might have been different from that of Jews living in religiously heterogeneous areas across the rest of the nation. National political surveys have been conducted since the mid-1930s, but they contain too few Jews to permit reliable generalizations. To compensate for that fact, the standard estimates of the Jewish vote for the 1936–1968 elections, as published in Isaacs and Forman, apparently were based on combining several poll results (e.g., Levy and Kramer 1972, p. 103). That strategy has also been used for measuring the distinctiveness of Jews’ politics, which requires comparing Jews to comparable non-Jews. While the average numbers of Jews per survey in the 1948–2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys and the 1972–2016 General Social Survey (GSS) are only in the low to middle 40s, their surveys over the years can be combined to analyze Jews’ political distinctiveness on repeated questions.1 Using that approach, Smith (2005), Djupe (2007), Abrams and Cohen (2016), and Weisberg (2019) have shown that the relative liberalism of non-Orthodox Jews is continuing, though it is restrained. National media exit polls that have been conducted since 1972 are now used to estimate the Jewish vote. Their accuracy depends on whether the precincts they happen to sample include ones where Orthodox Jews live within walking distance of their synagogues as well as a proper representation of Jews living in more

1  Both conducted 31 surveys over these time periods, with the ANES interviewing 1388 Jews (an average of 45 each year) and the GSS 1246 (an average of 40 each year).

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religiously heterogeneous areas. The “standard” estimates of Jewish voting since then are based on the main media exit poll. Weisberg (2012) revised estimates of the Jewish vote historically by including a wider variety of national exit polls, while the Solomon Report (Mellman et al. 2012) provided more complete estimates of Jews’ voting that incorporated state exit polls and gave considerable detail on the demographics of the Jewish vote. Advocacy organizations have sponsored occasional national surveys as well as recent Election-Day “exit” polls of Jews. Those surveys are generally either phone or internet based, but their samples of Orthodox and young Jews may not be representative because those groups are difficult to contact and interview without persistent multi-day attempts. Eric Uslaner and Mark Lichbach (2009) and Uslaner (2015) have made good use of advocacy group polls to examine the impact of attitudes regarding Israel on Jews’ voting. The most important development, though, has been the advent of large-scale national surveys of Jews, starting with the National Jewish Population Surveys, which included party identification and political ideology in both the 1990 and 2000–2001 surveys (see esp. Kotler-Berkowitz 2005). Most notably, the 2013 Pew Research Center Survey of US Jews conducted lengthy phone interviews with 3475 Jews chosen through random-digit-dialing (RDD) after stratifying counties based on their Jewish population size. The methodology of these surveys has improved considerably over recent years, with the best surveys using probability-based sampling. Even the most complex sampling of Jews has been challenged because of low response rates (Klausner 2013), though studies find that probabilistic surveys are quite accurate regardless (MacInnis et al. 2018). Another important problem in surveying Jews is whom to include as Jewish. Most surveys (especially exit polls) only interview “Jews by religion” (JBR), those who answer they are Jewish when asked if they are Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. That misses the 22% of “Jews of no religion” (JNR), those who say they have no religion (otherwise called “nones”), but, when asked, would say there are other reasons that they consider themselves Jewish. In particular, when asked if their parents were Jewish and/or if they were raised Jewish, most of the JNR respond affirmatively. Surveys show they are more Democratic than Jews by religion, partly because the JBR include Orthodox Jews, who are mostly Republican. JNR are about 10 percentage points more Democratic and nearly 25 points more liberal than JBR (Weisberg 2019, p.  113). The party split for JBR in the Pew survey was 68% Democratic, 7% Independent, and 25% Republican, versus 78%, 10%, and 12% for JNR.2 The difference was even larger on ideology: JBR split 43% liberal, 35% moderate, and 22% conservative, versus 67%, 22%, and 11% for JNR (Weisberg 2019, fn 6, p. 245). As a result, Jews should be considered to be more Democratic and more liberal than media surveys and exit polls typically show.

 The 2013 Pew survey results in this chapter are based on reanalysis looking only at US citizens. As in the Pew Report (Pew Research Center 2013), the JNR are included along with the JBR in this chapter. 2

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The 2013 Pew Research Center Survey of US Jews and the 2012 Public Religion Research Institute’s (PRRI) Jewish Values Survey also asked about political issues and measured presidential approval, which is a plausible substitute for a vote question, since it was asked in close proximity to a presidential election. Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz (2017) gives an important analysis of politics in the Pew data, and Weisberg (2019) contributes a parallel analysis of the Pew and PRRI data.

2.2  Factors Affecting American Jews’ Politics Countless explanations have been offered over the years for Jews’ predominantly liberal politics and Democratic voting, often focusing on the apparent paradox of a relatively affluent social group being politically liberal.

2.2.1  Early Explanations Social psychological explanations of their liberalism that were offered in the mid-­ twentieth century emphasized how Jews fit into society at that time. For example, as a minority group that was trying to assimilate, Kurt Lewin (1941) described Jews as “marginal men,” estranged from their traditional roots while being alienated from the general society. Liebman (1973) saw political emancipation as allowing Jews to rid themselves of Jewish traditions, leading to estrangement from their roots while still being alienated from society. He considered their liberalism to be a consequence of their “faith that the application of human intellect can create a constantly progressing universal cosmopolitan society” (p.  150). Edward Shapiro (2000, p. 167) emphasized Jews’ alienation from power and from authority as leading to their interest in both anarchism and liberalism. Another explanation was a status inconsistency argument. Seymour Martin Lipset (1963, p. 256) saw Jews’ leftist voting as due to their “inferior status position (social discrimination).” As Gerhard Lenski (1967) detailed, Jews had higher “achieved status” in terms of education, occupation, and income than the status ascribed to them because of how non-Jews perceived their religion. His theory claimed that Jews react to that inconsistency by opposing the social order that is responsible for the injustice; so, they support the party that advocates social change. However, Levey (1996) countered that the ties of marginality and of status inconsistency to Jews’ liberal politics are unclear, particularly because most Jews retained some of their Jewish identity. At most, he argued, such inconsistency would lead to radical responses, rather than liberal politics. In any case, even if marginality, alienation, estrangement, status inconsistency, and/or status inferiority were useful ways of thinking about Jews’ position in society in the 1940–1970s, they have less relevance in the early 2000s when there is greater acceptance of American Jews.

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A related explanation is that Jews became liberal in the US because of social discrimination. Benjamin Ginsberg (1993, p.  140) pointed out that the expanded public sector gave them employment opportunities as well as outlawing discrimination that affected them. He stated (p. 143) “Jews are, as a group, more dependent upon the domestic state than are other whites and, hence, are more likely to support domestic state spending,” though he argued this makes them likely to support the Democratic party but not necessarily likely to adopt liberalism as an ideology. Additionally, some historical explanations of Jewish liberalism have been proposed. For example, Werner Cohn’s (1958) explanation went back to the aftermath of the political emancipation of Jews during the French Revolution, when Christian forces on the political right wanted to revoke equality for Jews. Similarly, antisemitism has usually been associated with the political right, so Jews were pushed toward the left. The immigrant experience is also often cited, with Jews favoring socialism because of the harsh working and living conditions many faced when they arrived in the US.  More recently, Henry Feingold (1992, 2014) emphasized Jews being urban, urbane, and cosmopolitan as explanations of their politics. In his work on Jewish political behavior, Fuchs (1955, 1956) focused on a different set of explanations: Jewish insecurity (due to their history as a repressed minority) and a Jewish value system (love of learning, charity, and non-asceticism), combined with Jews’ high level of group solidarity. Those explanations, however, have not been treated well over the years. Fuchs did not make clear why their minority status would make Jews vote Democratic. Furthermore, if Judaic factors were responsible for American Jews voting liberal and Democratic, then the most religiously observant Jews should be the most liberal and Democratic. Instead, by the latter part of the twentieth century, Orthodox Jews were generally more conservative and Republican than non-Orthodox Jews. Critics argued that it was illogical to accept Judaic explanations that fit better for the most secular Jews than for the most observant. Two additional explanations of Jews’  liberalism reflect the changed status of Jews in America. Cohen and Liebman (1997) emphasized religious modernism as a factor pushing Jews in the liberal direction. Among other explanations, Greenberg and Wald (2001) pointed to self-interest in the sense that Jews have advanced politically and economically because of the liberal US system.

2.2.2  Recent Explanations The most recent full-blown explanatory systems are those of political scientists Wald (2019) and Weisberg (2019). Wald describes American Jews’ worldview as classical liberalism, which focuses on individual rights but not economic egalitarianism. He applies three general theories of political behavior: contextual analysis, political opportunity structure, and threat perception. The aspect of context that Wald emphasizes is the Americanness of American Jews, particularly their being granted full citizenship rights and their being part of a secular state. The political

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opportunity structure in the US gave Jews full legal protection. Wald particularly emphasizes the ban on religious tests for office in Article VI of the Constitution. Jews saw the Democrats and liberals as protectors of the separation of church and state under which Jews were prospering. Even if Jews faced some discrimination and antisemitism in the US, the levels were far below those experienced in Europe. Threat perception theory (Medding 1977) argues that Jews react to the greatest perceived threat to their interests. Thus, some Jews moved away from liberal politics and Democratic voting in the 1970s and 1980s out of reaction to threats they perceived from the black power movement and from attacks on Israeli policies from the left. However, some Jews moved back to the Democratic Party in the 1990s when they perceived a larger threat from the Christian Right. Wald’s book, The Foundations of American Jewish Liberalism, masterfully expands on these three macro-level explanations with detailed historical examination of different periods of American Jewish history. Weisberg’s (2019) book, The Politics of American Jews, instead focuses on the micro-level in applying three social-psychological factors to understand Jews’ politics: their self-interest, their values, and their social identity, with Jews’ minority consciousness affecting all three. Self-interest has usually been interpreted as pocketbook economics, as when Himmelfarb amusingly pointed to the paradox that Jews earn like Episcopalians while they vote like Puerto Ricans. Weisberg interprets economic self-interest more broadly, in terms of appreciating the economic system in which Jews have prospered. Additionally, Jews’ self-interest includes protecting fellow Jews (including Jews abroad and especially in Israel), being accepted, and having religious liberty. As to values, Weisberg applies the theory of universal values that Shalom Schwartz (1994) based on his studies of motivational values in several nations. One dimension of values is self-transcendence (emphasizing universalism and benevolence) versus self-enhancement (seeking power, achievement, and hedonism). The other dimension is conservation (valuing tradition, conformity, and security) versus openness to change (desiring stimulation and self-direction). Schwartz found people tend to emphasize values that are near one another on the values circle (Fig. 2.1). Another values theory is Inglehart’s (1977) focus on materialist versus post-­ materialist values, based on experiences in people’s pre-adult years: economic deprivation leads to materialist values while affluence leads to focus on support for freedom of speech and having a say in government decisions. Weisberg also sees a role for Fuchs’ Judaic values, but he recognizes that the Orthodox may emphasize different Judaic values (such as the value of concern for the people of Israel) than the social justice values (tikkun olam) that motivate many Conservative and Reform Jews. He argues that self-interest was important in immigrant Jews becoming Democrats during the Great Depression, and that their values kept them in the Democratic fold when the Republican Party was captured by the Christian Right. Social psychologists today emphasize social identity in understanding group behavior, with people being biased in favor of their in-groups as opposed to their out-groups. Religion is a potent social identity, and it increases in importance when Jews have high levels of interaction with other Jews. Out-groups have historically

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Openness to Change

Self−Direction

Stimulation

Self−Transcendence Universalism

Benevolence

Hedonism

Conformity

Tradition

Achievement Power Self−Enhancement

Security Conservation

Fig. 2.1  Schwartz universal values circle. (Source: Based on Schwartz and Huismans 1995)

threatened Jews, which also increases Jews’ social identity as Jews. Furthermore, social identity can become politicized when a group sees its partisan ties as part of the group’s social identity. Thus, after the Jewish vote became predominantly Democratic in the New Deal period, many of the next generation of Jews were raised learning that “we Jews are Democrats,” which became part of their social identity as Jews (see also Wald 2019, Chap. 9). Of course, many other Jews were raised in Republican families and learned that “we Jews are Republicans;” but they have been a minority in the American Jewish community. Being Democratic has become the “dominant politicized social identity” of American Jews. Weisberg’s argument is in several parts. Jews’ minority consciousness has directly affected their self-interest and their values, with that being intensified when they are subject to prejudice and discrimination. Their self-interest led most initially to be Democrats; their values kept them Democrats; their politicized social identity makes their Democratic identification resistant to change. As Dawidowicz and Goldstein (1974, p. 300) describe being Democratic, it has become a “family group tradition—a habit and custom difficult to shed.” Jews are a people of tradition, and Weisberg terms their politics “the Politics of Tradition.” Neither Wald’s nor Weisberg’s explanations are as simple as early explanations of Jews’ politics as just reflecting their “marginality” or their “alienation.” Instead, both are intended to be broad explanatory systems that can be applied universally,

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can account for exceptions, and can deal with changes. For example, changes in threat perception can lead to partisan change under the Wald system, while conflict between a group’s self-interest and its values can cause partisan change in Weisberg’s system. Additionally, the factors that affect American Jews’ ideology and political party choice can vary over time. The reasons that most Jews were liberal in the 1930s are likely different from the reasons that most were liberal in the 1960s and why most are liberal in the early 2000s. Wald would say this reflects changes in the political context, in the political opportunity structure, and in perceived threats, while Weisberg would point to changes in Jews’ self-interest and in their values between different eras. For example, the needs and issues that enthused many Jews to vote for Socialist Party candidates in the early 1900s were very different from their liberal positions on moral issues such as abortion and gay rights that motivate many Jews today to back the Democratic Party. Thus, explanations of Jews’ politics can be time-specific. That the explanations that Fuchs offered in the 1950s do not hold today does not mean that they were incorrect when originally advanced. The difficulty, however, is that reliable evidence as to Jews’ politics in earlier periods is not available. For example, the lack of large-scale surveys prevents testing whether Fuchs’ focus on Judaic values as an explanation of Jewish liberalism held for the most observant Jews in the 1950s, which was before the Haredim (fervently Orthodox) became a large part of American Orthodoxy. Still, there are not sufficient tests of Wald’s explanations or Weisberg’s. In particular, surveys of American Jews’ Shalom Schwartz values would be useful, as would be direct measures of their subjective self-interest.

2.3  Voting Turnout Jews are known for their very high level of voter registration, voting turnout, and for their high level of political participation more generally. A high turnout is useful for magnifying the effect of their votes, since Jews constitute only about 2% of the US population. Surveys often report that more than 90% of Jews have voted. However, this is likely an exaggeration, since voters are more likely to cooperate with a survey interviewer than non-voters. After all, surveys often find more than 70% of their respondents claiming to have voted, whereas the highest proportion of eligible voters turning out to vote in national elections was in the 50% range from 1972 through 2000 and barely above 60% since then (US Election Project 2019). Furthermore, studies show that the proportion of Jews who vote is not much higher than the voting proportion for non-Jews with similar socio-demographic characteristics and similar socio-economic status. The cumulative American National Election Studies (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS) data permit such comparisons with non-Jews. While those surveys show about a 20% point difference between the turnout rates of Jews and non-Jews in 1992–2012, that

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difference falls to only about four points when compared to non-Jews with similar characteristics and income (Weisberg 2019, Chap. 6). Jews’ apparent turnout advantage is largely due to their being an older group with high levels of education and income. Looking at political participation more generally, Wald (2016) finds that Jews were not politically hyperactive when compared to a matched sample of non-Jews in Roper Organization polls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Similarly, Weisberg’s (2019, Chap. 6) analysis of ANES data found only slight differences in political participation and campaign donations between Jews and comparable non-Jews. Wald (2019, Chap. 10) states that Jews contribute to campaigns disproportionately, as they do to charities. He emphasized the Democratic skew of Jews’ campaign donations, albeit the largest Jewish megadonors in the 2010s elections, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson, gave to the Republican side. Overall, whether in voting, campaign participation, or political contributions, the high activity level of Jews is basically what should be expected given their demographics and socio-economic status. Politicians would benefit from Jews’ high level of political involvement, just as candidates would benefit from the involvement of similarly situated non-Jews.

2.4  The History of Jews’ Presidential Voting 2.4.1  The First Century of US Elections: Becoming Politicized There is little solid evidence as to how Jews voted in early presidential elections, though there is information about their likely self-interest. 2.4.1.1  From 1788 to 1824 The party competition in the 1796–1816 elections was between John Adams’s Federalist Party and Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party. Jews’ self-­ interest was split between economic interests and desire to have full civil rights. Those who were creditors and those involved in manufacturing goods that competed with European goods had economic reasons to support the Federalists as the party of a strong central government (Forman 2001, p.  145). However, the Federalists were anti-immigrant, as illustrated by their enacting the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, whereas the Jeffersonians strongly supported religious freedom. There were some incidents in this period in which Jews and Jewish interests were poorly treated. In part, this was because few early presidents knew many Jews (there were only about 3000–5000 Jews in the US during this period—see Fig. 5.1 in this volume), so their images of Jews were often based on the Old Testament Hebrews. For example, John Adams characterized those who held loans as “as avaricious as

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any Jews in Jews’ Quarter,” and Thomas Jefferson called Judaism a “depraved religion.” Few Jews received presidential appointments. Early presidents gave Uriah Phillips Levy several high Navy appointments, but he was court-marshaled six times. Mordecai Manuel Noah was recalled as consul to Tunis, when it became known that he was Jewish. Given these incidents, the primary non-economic political motivation of Jews during this period was likely a desire to obtain greater acceptance. Marcus (1989, p.  527) claims that “a substantial number” of Jews were Federalists, though mentioning (p. 579) that Federalists attacked their opposition as the party of Jews. By contrast, Fuchs (1956, Chap. 2) entitles his chapter on this period “Jeffersonians All;” and Forman (2001, p.  145) emphasizes that a dozen Jewish officeholders during that period were Jeffersonians. Lipset and Raab (1995, p. 153) describe Jews being Democratic-Republicans as “an early example of Jews’ political behavior running counter to their economic interests. But it was less a matter of Jews voting against their own self-interest than of their defining self-interest beyond the pocketbook. The qualities inherent in a free and achievement-oriented America were most important for the well-being of Jews.” While there were restrictions on Jews’ civil liberties in several of the original 13 American colonies, the states all allowed Jews to vote by the time the US Constitution came into effect (Chyet 1958; Marcus 1989, p. 512). Still, Jews had limited impact in the early elections because many states did not use popular vote to choose their presidential electors. For example, Virginia was the only state with a popular vote for electors in 1800 that had a Jewish community; and Jefferson would have easily carried his home state even without Jews’ votes. 2.4.1.2  From 1828 to 1856 The party competition in the 1828–1856 elections was between the Democratic and Whig parties. Presidents generally had greater familiarity with Jews than earlier presidents. Several had Jewish friends, and presidents also had more contact with the Jewish community. For example, Zachary Taylor (Whig) met with Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise in the White House; and Franklin Pierce (Dem.) signed an act of Congress that enabled the incorporation of the District of Columbia’s first synagogue. Presidents also began to appoint Jews to public office on a more regular basis. Andrew Jackson (Dem.) appointed Mordecai Noah as Overseer to the Port of New York, John Tyler (Whig) nominated Warder Cresson as US consul to Palestine, and Franklin Pierce (Dem.) appointed August Belmont as American Ambassador to The Hague. Most notably, Millard Fillmore (Whig) offered Louisiana Senator Judah Benjamin an appointment to the US Supreme Court, though he turned down the offer because he preferred to remain in the Senate. As in earlier years, Jews’ self-interest would have been divided between economic interests and immigration concerns. The Whig Party supported a strong federal government with a national bank, which was attractive to Jews engaged in finance. That could explain Jewish support for the Whigs among the Sephardim in

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New  York City (Sarna 1981, pp.  100–101). The dominant view, however, is that most Jews, especially in New York, were Democrats (e.g., Fuchs 1956, pp. 33–35), partly out of opposition to the anti-immigrant element in the Whig Party. Jewish support for the Democratic Party is said to have increased when President Martin Van Buren (Dem.) ordered the American consul in Damascus to protect its Jews when many were attacked in 1840 (the “Damascus Affair”). The Jewish vote was still small, with perhaps 5000 Jews in the US at the beginning of this period and about 200,000 by the end (Fig. 5.1 in this volume). The increase in Jewish immigration after the 1848 European revolutions would have had minimal impact in pre-Civil War elections since there is a 5-year waiting period to obtain American citizenship and vote. The antebellum era ended with two high-profile foreign policy decisions that underlined the limited acceptance of Jewish interests. President James Buchanan (Dem.) instructed the American ambassador to work to get the Swiss cantons to remove restrictions on Jews, but he rejected requests from Jewish leaders to renegotiate the commercial treaty with Switzerland that allowed expulsion of American Jews (Adams 2014, pp. 19–20). Additionally, Buchanan refused Jews’ requests to protest to the Vatican over their taking a 6-year old Jewish boy, Edgardo Mortara, from his parents in 1858 on the claim that a maid had baptized him, possibly because challenging the Pope would have upset the larger number of Catholic voters (Adams 2014, p. 22). 2.4.1.3  From 1860 to 1880 With slavery as the dominant issue, the anti-slavery Republican Party became the Democratic Party’s main competition. Some German Jews would have been attracted to the Republican Party’s abolitionist position (Mazur 1990, p.  80). However, abolitionists were not popular among Jews because many were evangelical Protestants, who tried to convert Jews and because several used anti-Jewish rhetoric (Sarna 2004, p. 113). Some writers claim that Jews would have been drawn to the Democratic Party because it favored equal rights for white men regardless of their religion (Forman 2001, p. 146). Forman (2001, p.  147) asserts that “at the eve of the Civil War most Jews remained in the Democratic constituency.” Yet Fuchs (1956, p. 35) argues that “by 1860, Democrats were the exception among Jews in the North,” and Weyl (1968, p. 56) states that most Jews lived in the north by 1860 and “a decided majority of them sympathized with the Republican Party.” By the time of the Civil War, it is likely that Jews were split like the nation as a whole, with most northerners supporting the Republicans and most southerners the Democrats. The Republican presidents from 1860 through 1884 gave Jews more recognition than previous presidents. Abraham Lincoln’s several associations with Jews have been documented by Sarna and Shapell (2015). Most important, Lincoln cancelled General Ulysses S. Grant’s General Orders No. 11 that expelled Jews “as a class” from the Department of Tennessee. When Grant ran for president, he wrote a letter explaining and disavowing the Order (Sarna 2012, pp.  75–76). As president, he

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appointed more Jews to office than any president before him, from which Sarna (2012, p. 148) concluded that Grant learned from his mistakes and “significantly empowered” Jews during his presidency. Republican Presidents Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, and Chester Arthur all spoke against Russia in its treatment of Jews. The German Jews who immigrated to the US in the mid-1800s were assimilating during this period, with many becoming prosperous business people. They wanted to be accepted as Americans, to have their religious liberty respected, and to have their coreligionists abroad protected. They could reasonably see these Republican presidents as supportive of those interests, which led the best-known Jews in the north to be Republicans. The standard view is that most northern Jews were Republican (Fuchs 1956, p. 44), especially German Jews (Forman 2001, pp. 148–149), while most southern Jews were Democrats. That would not have been very distinctive, since the north voted Republican and the south Democratic. Diner (1992) describes Republicans as having a slight edge among Jews, which accords with the middle-class status that many central European Jewish immigrants had achieved. There was, however, considerable local variation. Chicago Jews from Bohemia (Czechoslovakia) were Democrats, as were Jews in Los Angeles, and Jews in New York City followed the Tammany Hall machine until the 1870s (Diner 1992). Jews were dispersed across the country, which minimized their electoral impact since their numbers in any single state would have been too small to affect most elections. In any case, they were still a small percentage of the population: only about 280,000 Jews resided in the country in 1880 (Fig. 5.1 in this volume).

2.4.2  T  he 1884–1932 Elections: Adjusting to Massive Immigration The immigration between 1881 and 1924 of more than two million Jews from Eastern Europe (especially Russia and Romania) had the potential of considerably changing the politics of American Jews. By 1924, more than 3.6 million Jews lived in the US (Fig. 5.1 in this volume). Progressive economic reforms to improve working conditions would have been in the self-interest of these new immigrants, but neither major party initially nominated progressive presidential candidates on a consistent basis. Indeed, in some elections both major parties nominated establishment candidates who would not have appealed to these new immigrants. These immigrants sometimes joined the German Jews in supporting a progressive Republican candidate, while voting Democratic in other elections. The immigrants also contributed considerable energy to Socialist politics.

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2.4.2.1  From 1884 to 1892 The Republican Party was still the party of the Union in the 1880s, while the Democratic Party regained strength in the South after Reconstruction ended. German Jews would have predominated in the Jewish electorate through the early 1890s because few Russian Jews were in the US long enough to attain citizenship. Grover Cleveland was the Democratic presidential candidate in the 1884–1892 elections, winning the popular vote all three times but losing the Electoral College to Republican Benjamin Harrison in 1888. Rischin (1962, p. 272) published voting data for an assembly district in New York City’s Lower East Side, an area in which new immigrants would have predominated. That district had narrow Republican presidential leads in 1884 and 1888. The 1892 election featured a rematch between Cleveland and Harrison, both of whom in their presidencies had criticized Russia’s treatment of Jews and had appointed Jews to important positions. The election focused on economic issues including tariffs (which Cleveland wanted to lower) and the gold standard (which he wanted to maintain). Both Rischin’s data and Allswang’s (1971, p. 42) for Chicago show Cleveland winning about 60% of the 1892 vote of predominantly Jewish districts, though that might have been countered by the vote of German Jews in other districts. 2.4.2.2  From 1896 to 1912 Political historians consider the 1896 election to be a realigning election, establishing an era of Republican dominance. Populist leader William Jennings Bryan became the Democratic presidential nominee that year, promising to end the gold standard. Monetizing silver was popular in the western states, but not in the eastern states which became solidly Republican. By this time, the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe was large enough to impact the character of American Jewry, though many were not yet citizens. Prominent Jewish leaders were arguing against having a “Jewish vote.” They contended it would look bad if such a small minority voted as a bloc, and they claimed that could rebound against Jewish interests. This argument, though, had partisan implications. The leaders advocating neutrality were German Jews (N. Cohen 1984), many of whom supported the Republican Party. They were motivated, in part, by fear that bloc voting would result in Democratic voting by non-Jews (Dalin 1992, p.  58). It is telling also that Louis Marshall, one of the most influential leaders who encouraged Jewish political neutrality (Dalin 1992), himself started a Yiddish newspaper to support the Republican Party (Dawidowicz 1963, p.  188). That suggests that the opposition by German Jews to a “Jewish vote” was partly an attempt to dissuade eastern European Jews from voting Democratic en masse since their large numbers would have overwhelmed the Republican votes of German Jews. Additionally, many Jews voted for Socialist presidential candidates during this period. Manor (2009) gave a provocative interpretation of this Socialist vote, stating

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that “most if not all votes given to the SP [Socialist Party] in fact benefited the Republicans” in that they took away votes that otherwise would have gone to the Democrats. A cynical reading is that establishment German Jews who supported the Republican Party were acceptant of Socialist voting by other Jews if that kept the Democrats from winning power. With most new immigrants living in New York City and a few other large cities, it is possible to study the vote in predominantly Jewish voting districts. However, Russian Jewish immigrants who were tightly packed in tenement housing in those districts were more progressive in their politics than assimilated German Jews who were dispersed across those cities. Thus, these estimates probably underrepresent the Republican voting by German Jews. The vote in predominantly Jewish precincts oscillates over this period, as illustrated by Rischin’s and Allswang’s data in Table 2.1. Estimates based on averaging the vote in multiple studies in New York, Chicago, and Boston3 (see right section of Table  2.1) show Jews supporting Republican presidential candidates William McKinley in 1896 and Theodore Roosevelt  in 1904, favoring Democrat William Jennings Bryan in 1900 and 1908, and then giving large votes to both Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Notably, those 1896–1908 candidates won barely over 50% of the vote, with the Socialist candidates taking about 10%. Rischin (1962, p.  224) attributed the alternation of the presidential vote in New  York’s Eighth Assembly District to immigration-related issues as well as a reaction to American policy toward Russia’s treatment of Jews. By contrast, the received wisdom is that Jews voted Republican during these years, with a possible exception of 1900 (Howe 1976, p. 362) and the four-way split in 1912 (Fuchs 1956, p. 58). Fuchs (pp. 50–51) advanced three reasons for their Republican voting, each of which can be challenged. First, he claimed that the immigrants followed the “older and wiser Jewish heads already here” who were mainly Republican; but the Socialist support of many immigrants violates that claim. Second, Fuchs credited their gratitude for being given refuge in the States extended to the administrations in power at the time, though it is sometimes asserted that Jews appreciated the help that Democrats gave new immigrants in New York City. Fuchs’ third point was that the Jews disliked the Irish who controlled the eastern Democratic Party; Jews were local Republican Party leaders in Boston (Gamm 1989) and New Haven (Dahl 1961); however, that was not necessarily the case in other cities. A more likely explanation is that established German Jews and the new Russian Jewish immigrants voted differently from one another because they differed in their self-interest. The Russians favored whichever party nominated the more progressive candidate. While Bryan’s “Cross of Gold” metaphor in 1896 was regarded as antisemitic, he was considered more progressive than the 1900 and 1908 Republican nominees, when he opposed “trusts” (monopolies, in today’s terms). Republican

 Because of the large proportion of American Jews who lived in New York City, this averaging gives extra weight for New York by counting its vote equally with the average of multiple studies for the other cities.

3

New York estimatea Democrat (%) 37 Bryan 49 Bryan 39 Parker 51 Bryan 37 Wilson

Republican (%) Other (%) 50 McKinley 13 Palmer 43 McKinley 8 Debs 45 TRoosevelt 16 Debs 34 Taft 15 Debs 12 Taft 39 TRoosevelt 12 Debs

Chicago estimateb Dem. (%) Rep. (%) Other (%) 41 54 36 52 34 29 19 18

Composite estimatec Dem. (%) Rep. (%) 37 54 56 38 39 48 51 38 35 21

Note: Winners are bolded. Other column lists candidate with more than 1% of the vote who was most popular with Jews a Source: Rischin (1962, p. 272) for NY 8th Assembly District b Source: Allswang (1971, pp. 42 and 218–220) c The composite averages multiple data sources for each city

Year 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912

Table 2.1  Estimates of the presidential vote of Jews, 1896–1912 Other (%) 9 6 13 11 32 12

Basis 2 cities 3 cities 3 cities 3 cities 3 cities

2  The Presidential Voting of American Jews 55

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Roosevelt was the more progressive candidate in 1904, and both Roosevelt and Wilson were considered progressive candidates in 1912. That variation corresponds to the oscillation of the vote in predominantly Jewish districts, even if the winning margins were small. By contrast, the self-interest of the establishment German Jews led them to give a strong Republican vote throughout, which might have made the combined Jewish presidential vote Republican through 1908 as Fuchs claimed. 2.4.2.3  From 1916 to 1932 Table 2.2 shows Jewish voting estimates for the 1916–1932 elections, again based on predominantly Jewish voting districts in major cities. The 1916 election was the first for which there is a standard estimate of the Jewish vote. While, as mentioned earlier, it is based on Burner’s (1968) estimates for predominantly Jewish districts in Manhattan, it ignores his Chicago data, as well as other data for Chicago and other cities. The composite column on the right updates Weisberg’s (2012) multi-­ city averages. Importantly, as more Russian Jews immigrated to the country, they outnumbered the German Jews, though many delayed becoming citizens.4 By 1930, 4.2 million Jews lived in the US (Fig. 5.1). Before Wilson ran for reelection in 1916, he vetoed an immigration bill that would have made Jewish immigration more difficult by imposing a literacy requirement, and he appointed Louis Brandeis as the first Jewish justice on the Supreme Court. With these two actions, he easily secured the Jewish vote. However, the early 1920s elections offered Jews little ideological choice. Neither major-party candidate in 1920 was a progressive. Republican Warren Harding, when he was a newspaper editor during antisemite Herman Ahlwardt’s trip to America, had attacked Ahlwardt in his newspaper as a “Jew-baiter” while praising Jews as being among America’s “most patriotic and devoted” citizens. Democrat James Cox may have been the more progressive of the major party candidates, but the data for each city show that the Jewish vote went in Harding’s direction, with a higher vote for Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate, than for Cox.5 By contrast with Harding’s clear win of the Jewish vote in 1920, there is complete disagreement as to how Jews voted in the 1924 election. Neither Republican Calvin Coolidge nor Democrat John W. Davis was progressive. Fuchs (1956, p. 64 and p. 141) describes Jews as apathetic toward the campaign, but they should instead be considered to be dissatisfied with all the candidates. There were three major issues that were of considerable interest to the Jewish population: the recently imposed immigration quotas, the increased power of the Ku Klux Klan, and

4  Less than a fifth of foreign-born adult males in a largely Jewish New York district in 1910 were naturalized and so could vote (Goren 1961), and similarly only a fifth of Kessner’s (1981, p. 232) random sample of 1500 New York City Jewish families in 1925 were on the voting rolls. 5  Marks and Burbank’s (1990) multivariate regression analysis confirms a significant Socialist vote in 1920 and 1912 among the Russian-born, who would have been largely Jewish.

Standard estimate (based on New York)a Democrat (%) Republican (%) 55 Wilson 45 Hughes 19 Cox 43 Harding 51 Davis 27 Coolidge 72 Smith 28 Hoover 82 FDRoosevelt 18 Hoover Other (%) 0 Benson 38 Debs 22 LaFollette 0 Thomas 0 Thomas

Chicago estimateb Dem. (%) Rep. (%) 57 43 28 61 37 43 78 22 85 15 11 20

Other (%)

Composite estimatec Dem. (%) Rep. (%) 53 36 19 53 34 44 64 34 68 24

a

Note: Winners are bolded. Other column lists candidate with more than 1% of the vote who was most popular with Jews Source: Forman (2001), based on Burner (1968) b Source: Burner (1968, pp. 239–242) c Source: Updated from Weisberg (2012)

Year 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932

Table 2.2  Estimates of the presidential vote of Jews, 1916–1932 Other (%) 11 28 22 2 8

Basis 3 cities 3 cities 4 cities 4 cities 4 cities

2  The Presidential Voting of American Jews 57

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prohibition, which Jews opposed. The major party platforms were almost identical and did not address those three issues. Coolidge would have been unpopular with Jews, since he had signed the controversial Johnson-Reed Act that was designed to curb Jewish immigration by imposing limits on the basis of national origins in the 1890 census. Yet, the Russian Jewish immigrants would have little reason to favor Davis, who had defeated popular New  York governor Al Smith for the party’s nomination. Fuchs (1956, p.  141) stresses that Davis’ Wall Street background would have been considered a negative, given the Socialist tradition among Jews. Senator Robert LaFollette, the Progressive candidate could have attracted Jewish votes after he was endorsed by the Socialist Party, but he had voted for the Johnson-Reed Act. Burner’s Manhattan data, which are the basis for the standard statistics on Jewish voting, show a Democratic vote by Jews. However, Fuchs (1956, p. 64) asserts that Coolidge obtained more votes than Davis in most Jewish wards in New  York.6 Indeed, Burner’s (1968) Chicago data show that more Jews voted Republican than Democratic in 1924, as does other data for Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia. Thus, the usual claim that Jews started voting Democratic in 1924 is open to dispute. Neither major party attracted Jews to move en masse in its direction. Jews’ dissatisfaction with the major party candidates is also evident in the increasing Socialist and Progressive vote in 1920 and 1924. Gamm’s (1989, p. 60) analysis of the Jewish vote in Boston shows that different groups of Jews were responding differently in these early 1920s elections. Republicans won more of the Jewish vote than Democrats in middle and working class districts, but the Socialist vote (24%) was higher than the Democratic vote in working class (likely Russian Jewish) districts in 1920. By 1924, the LaFollette vote (43%) was essentially tied with the Republican vote in working class districts, and at 27% it was nearly double the 15% Democratic vote in lower-middle districts. Furthermore, voting turnout was low: just over 40% in upper-middle (likely German Jewish) districts, and only about 25% in working class precincts. This low turnout and growing Socialist vote emphasize how Jews were not entrenched in either major party. Thus, the data, while only approximations, suggest that Jews were very divided in their voting through 1924. The Jewish vote apparently swung back and forth between the parties, likely due to differences between establishment Jews who were voting Republican and newer immigrants whose voting enthusiasm depended on the candidates. The Jewish vote shifted decidedly to the Democratic side starting in 1928 with increasing proportions in the following elections, as the Democrats increasingly addressed issues that were important to the new immigrants. Republican 1928 nominee Herbert Hoover had several prominent German Jewish supporters (Wentling and Medoff 2012), but most New York Jews were already supportive of their governor Al Smith, who was the Democratic nominee. The attack on Smith as the candidate of “Rum and Romanism” would have bolstered his support among Jews,

6  Another reason to doubt the Manhattan-based standard figures is that they overstate the Socialist voting of Jews in 1920 while missing their Socialist voting in 1916, 1928, and 1932.

2  The Presidential Voting of American Jews

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reminding them of his anti-Prohibition stance (with which most agreed) and that he was the candidate of big-city immigrants. The Republican vote nationally rose by 4% points in 1928, but the Jewish vote swung distinctively in the Democratic direction. With the exception of Philadelphia data, Jewish voting estimates based on predominantly Jewish precincts show Smith easily carried the Jewish vote. The shift of Jews away from the Republicans in the 1928 election accelerated in 1932 after the Great Depression started under Hoover. Intriguingly, Norpoth’s (2019) analysis of a Houser Poll finds that ending prohibition, rather than economics, was the major issue that differentiated 1928 Hoover voters who stayed with Hoover in 1932 from those who switched to Franklin Roosevelt. Prohibition repeal would have resonated with Jewish voters. The Jewish vote went solidly for Roosevelt, though the Philadelphia vote appears to have been close. With the country in a serious depression, the Socialist vote by Jews also increased. The composite estimates in Table  2.2 show the Republicans won more of the Jewish vote in 1920–1932 than the standard figures show, but they agree that Jews were voting predominantly Democratic by 1928. With the Democrats calling for the end of Prohibition and then with Roosevelt’s vigorous moves to stem the Depression, the self-interest of the Russian Jews was soon to put them firmly on the Democratic side.

2.4.3  The 1936–1968 Elections: Mobilized Democrats The Great Depression caused a major shift in the focus of national politics, with the federal government for the first time being considered accountable for the state of the economy. 2.4.3.1  From 1936 to 1948 Jewish voting estimates for this period are based on national face-to-face polling that began by the 1936 election, though religion was not a standard question in the early polls and few polls were taken around presidential elections. The “standard figures” columns in Table 2.3 give Isaacs’ (1974, p. 281, n. 1) estimates, which he indicated are “those commonly accepted by Jewish organizations,” and presumably are based on Gallup (AIPO) Polls. Gallup averages from other sources are also shown in the table. The right-most columns give Weisberg’s (2012) values, averaging surveys taken within a few months of the election.7 Note that the pre-1950s Gallup Polls used quota sampling, in which interviewers could select whom to interview so long as their respondents included the right proportion of men, women, older people, etc.; that sampling technique was largely abandoned as it was one

7  Weisberg’s 1936–1944 estimates use weights derived by Berinsky and Schickler (2011) to correct for Gallup’s quota sampling.

Republican (%) 15 Landon 10 Willkie 10 Dewey 10 Dewey 36 Eisenhower 40 Eisenhower 18 Nixon 10 Goldwater 17 Nixon 2

Geo.Wallace 88

15 H.Wallace

Other (%)

10

Gallup averageb Dem. (%) Rep. (%) 85 15 84 16 91 9 54 28 72 28 71 29 85 15 2

18

Other (%)

Composite estimatec Dem. (%) Rep. (%) Other (%) 87 13 91 9 91 9 54 24 22 75 23 2 71 29 86 14 94 6 88 10 2

Note: Winners are bolded. Other column lists candidate with more than 1% of the vote who was most popular with Jews a Source: Isaacs (1974) b Source: Ladd and Hadley (1975) for 1936–1960, Ladd and Lipset (1973, p. 72) for 1968 c Source: Updated from Weisberg (2012)

Year 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968

Standard estimatea Democrat (%) 85 FDRoosevelt 90 FDRoosevelt 90 FDRoosevelt 75 Truman 64 Stevenson 60 Stevenson 82 Kennedy 90 Johnson 81 Humphrey

Table 2.3  Estimates of the presidential vote of Jews, 1936–1968 Basis 2 polls 2 polls 5 polls 3 polls 6 polls 7 polls 4 polls 4 polls 4 polls

60 H. F. Weisberg

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reason why the polls erroneously predicted that Thomas Dewey would win the 1948 election. Polls show that Jews were voting strongly Democratic when Roosevelt ran for reelection in the 1936–1944 elections, though this conclusion is based on limited data since few polls asking about voting were conducted near those elections. Gamm’s (1989, p. 60) analysis of Jewish voting districts in Boston provides important perspective on how the Jewish vote had changed. He found upper-middle class (German) Jewish districts still voting slightly on the Republican side in 1928, but not in 1932 or 1936; the lower-middle class districts were narrowly Democratic in 1928 and more solidly Democratic thereafter. Working class (Russian) districts voted strongly Democratic in each of these years, with more than 90% of the vote in working class districts in 1936 being Democratic. Gamm’s other important finding involves Jews’ election turnout. Lower-middle class turnout increased from the low 40% range in 1928 and 1932 to just over 50% in 1936 and 60% in 1940, and working class precincts turnout went from 30% in 1928 and 1932 to 44% in 1936 and then 53% in 1940. Thus, not only was Jews’ Democratic vote increasing, but their impact was accelerating due to higher turnout levels. The realignment of the Jewish vote was fueled by mobilization of previous nonvoters into the electorate as the Depression, Prohibition repeal, and Roosevelt’s alignment with anti-German forces in the prelude to World War II gave immigrants important reasons to naturalize and to vote. This mobilization was an important part of Jews’ realignment into the Democratic Party. Analyses of urban voting by Andersen (1979) and by Petrocik (1981) demonstrate how the New Deal Realignment can largely be accounted for by mobilization of previous non-voters, rather than conversion of long-time Republican supporters into Democratic voters. While neither researcher focused on Jews, their insights apply equally for Jews. German Jewish merchants who had been voting Republican likely kept doing so because of concern that New Deal reforms would threaten their economic status. Meanwhile, many Russian Jews who had not been voting consistently for either party, if indeed they had voted at all, became loyal Democrats when they benefited from the New Deal. When Harry Truman ran against Republican Thomas Dewey in 1948, former vice-president Henry Wallace ran as a Progressive Party candidate. Wallace claimed that Truman’s support for Israel was insufficient, even though Truman had given immediate recognition to Israel’s proclamation of statehood. In particular, Wallace criticized Truman for preventing US citizens of military age from going to Israel and for imposing an arms embargo that mainly hurt Israel since the Palestinians could get arms elsewhere (Medoff 2012). Wallace’s candidacy pulled nearly a quarter of Jewish votes away from the Democrats in 1948, though that could have been due to his leftist stands as much as to his stance on Israel. Surveys also show a higher Republican vote by Jews, which fits with pollster Sam Lubell’s (1951, pp. 207–213) interviews indicating realignment in their vote after the decade when Jews had an “emotional attachment” to Franklin Roosevelt due to his opposition to Nazi Germany. Still, the estimates suggest that a slight majority of American Jews voted for Truman.

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2.4.3.2  From 1952 to 1968 As Jews moved to the suburbs and had more contact with non-Jews in the 1950s, the Jewish vote was widely expected to become more like the national vote. Both 1952 candidates had the potential to attract Jewish votes. Dwight Eisenhower’s role as commander of the Allied Forces in Europe that defeated the Nazis and liberated the concentration camps would have appealed to Jews, but many were drawn to Adlai Stevenson’s liberal intellectual image. Fuchs’ Boston survey (1955, pp. 93–94, 98) confirmed that Eisenhower did best among Jews living in suburban areas and who had the most contact with non-Jewish primary groups. However, revised figures for 1952 show that just a quarter of Jews nationally voted for Eisenhower.8 The only change from 1948 was a greater Democratic vote due to Wallace’s Progressives returning to the Democratic fold.9 The 1956 election was a repeat Eisenhower-­ Stevenson contest. Republican voting by Jews increased slightly, but surveys show that most still considered themselves Democrats. In contrast to 1950s elections, both 1960 candidates raised concerns among Jews. There was resentment against Richard Nixon for his 1950 Senate campaign in which he accused his opponent, Helen Gahagan Douglas, of communist sympathies and questioned her Jewish husband’s loyalty. At the same time, there was lingering antipathy against John Kennedy’s father, Joseph Kennedy, who was considered antisemitic and pro-Nazi Germany when he was American ambassador to Great Britain in 1938–1940. Jewish support for Kennedy was also expected to be lukewarm due to his Catholicism, though his strong statement in favor of separation of church and state eased those concerns. National surveys found a solid increase in Democratic vote among Jews in 1960. The Democratic vote by Jews returned to the 90% level of the Roosevelt 1940s elections when Lyndon Johnson defeated Barry Goldwater in 1964. However, the Jewish vote was seen as potentially up for grabs in the turbulent 1968 campaign. Democrat Hubert Humphrey had helped overcome Minneapolis’ rampant antisemitism when he was that city’s mayor, but many young Jews blamed Lyndon Johnson’s Democrats for the Vietnam War. Jews’ relations with blacks had become more distant after the urban riots of the 1960s (Himmelfarb 1969), causing some Jews to prefer the Republican Party’s stronger stand on law and order. Still, Jewish relations with Nixon had always been frosty. Bringing in a full set of polls shows that Nixon’s showing among Jews was weak in 1968, with Humphrey receiving the great bulk of their vote. The 1936–1968 period was when the Jewish vote became distinctively Democratic. Jews remained loyal Democrats through the 1950s and 1960s as other groups abandoned the New Deal coalition. Jews’ Republican vote increased in the 1948–1956 elections, but it fell in the 1960s. The composite survey estimates in Table 2.3 show a lower Republican vote by Jews for the 1952–1968 elections than 8  Medoff’s examination of precinct-based analysis for the 1950s also estimates the Eisenhower vote at only about 25% (Wentling and Medoff 2012, p. 163 and n. 410). 9  The margins of error for the Jewish vote after pollsters switched to probability-based sampling are probably in the range of 5%–7%.

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usually claimed. Expectations in the 1950s that the Jewish vote might realign proved to be illusory. Instead, being Democratic was becoming part of the Jewish social identity of most Jews.

2.4.4  The 1972–2016 Elections: Stability Amidst Disruption The American political party system experienced several changes starting in the early 1970s. The power of party bosses drastically diminished, the party system “dealigned” with an increase in the number of political Independents, and “candidate-­centered” politics replaced “party-centered politics.” By the end of the century, the political parties became increasingly polarized ideologically, with the Republican Party becoming more conservative and the Democrats more consistently liberal. Meanwhile, the generations of Jews who came of voting age during the 1960s and 1970s were less concerned with their economic status and security than earlier generations had been. Growing up under post-war economic prosperity, these new generations adopted post-materialist values and were more concerned about their individual rights. Those values kept most of them in the Democratic Party, albeit for different reasons than the economic reasons that brought their parents and grandparents into that party. Meanwhile, “neoconservative” Jews left the Democratic Party in the 1970s because they rejected the politics of the New Left, opposed affirmative action and the welfare state, and were adamantly anti-Communist as well as strong supporters of Israel. However, other Jews found they could not join the Republican Party when it adopted the Christian Right’s conservative positions on morality issues like abortion and homosexuality. 2.4.4.1  From 1972 to 1988 Starting in 1972, several media organizations began conducting exit polls on Election Day. When asking people their religion, exit polls likely miss people of Jewish heritage who consider themselves culturally or ethnically Jewish but who do not practice the Jewish religion. The standard voting figures for these elections in Table 2.4 are based on the exit polls published by the New York Times. The Solomon Report (Mellman et al. 2012) also included state exit polls along with national ones, while Weisberg (2012) averaged several national exit polls. The 1972–1988 period became one of somewhat diminished Democratic voting by Jews. That began with Richard Nixon’s reelection against liberal Senator George McGovern. Most Jews still voted Democratic, but they more were more supportive of Nixon in 1972 than in 1960 or 1968. Fisher’s (1976) analysis of survey data through 1972 found that there was no diminution of Jews’ liberalism, nor did he find any lessening of Jewish support civil rights even though there were disputes between the Jewish and black communities in New York City. However, Himmelfarb (1970,

71

Year 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

2016

24

Trump

Republican (%) 34 Nixon 34 Ford 39 Reagan 31 Reagan 35 GHWBush 11 GHWBush 16 Dole 19 GWBush 25 GWBush 21 McCain 30 Romney 5

Johnson

Solomon reportb Other (%) Dem. (%) Rep. (%) Other (%) 66 32 64 33 15 Anderson 44 37 19 68 31 67 32 9 Perot 77 15 8 3 Perot 79 15 6 1 Nader 79 17 4 77 21 Nader 74 23 2 Johnson 70

25

Composite estimatec Dem. (%) Rep. (%) 66 33 68 31 44 36 66 32 69 30 74 16 78 16 78 21 76 24 78 21 68 32 Other (%) Basis 1 exit 1 exit 19 2 exits 1 4 exits 1 5 exits 10 2 exits 6 2 exits 1 2 exits 2 exits 1 1 exit 1 exit/1 poll 5 1 exit/1 poll

a

Note: Electoral College winners are bolded. Other column lists candidate with more than 1% of the vote who was most popular with Jews Source: Forman (2001) through 2000; later are from the New York Times b Source: Mellman et al. (2012) c Source: Updated from Weisberg (2012)

HClinton

Standard estimatea Democrat (%) 64 McGovern 64 Carter 45 Carter 67 Mondale 64 Dukakis 80 WmClinton 78 WmClinton 79 Gore 74 Kerry 78 Obama 69 Obama

Table 2.4  Estimates of the presidential vote of Jews, 1972–2016

64 H. F. Weisberg

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1973) spotted an unusual class divide forming, with upper class Jews voting more Democratic than working class Jews. Gerald Ford, as president after Nixon’s resignation, allowed planned fighter jet sales to Israel to go ahead only after securing an agreement for withdrawing of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal. The Democratic vote nationally increased by more than 10% points from 1972 to 1976 when Jimmy Carter defeated Ford, but the Jewish vote was essentially unchanged. Carter appointed more Jews to his cabinet than any previous president. He successfully negotiated a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, but the American Jewish community viewed him as hostile to Israel when he did not allow the US ambassador to veto a UN Security Council resolution that deplored Israel’s West Bank settlements (Lazarowitz 2010). Carter’s reelection campaign was weakened by economic hyperinflation and by the Iranian hostage crisis. More Jews voted for Carter in the 1980 election than for Ronald Reagan, but the Democratic vote percentage among Jews fell below 50%. Independent candidate John Anderson won nearly a fifth of the Jewish vote, reflecting considerable dissatisfaction with Carter’s presidency as well as unease with Reagan’s conservative politics. Reagan’s portion of the Jewish vote in 1980 was the highest Republican vote in decades, giving Republicans thoughts of moving the Jewish vote to their side. Instead, that became the high point for the Republican vote among Jews. Several voting divisions were apparent among Jews in 1980. Himmelfarb (1981) found that higher-income Jews were voting more Republican. He also reported Jewish women were more likely to vote for Carter than Jewish men, an early indication of what became known as the gender gap. Himmelfarb cited the Borough Park area of Brooklyn as an Orthodox area that voted for Reagan in 1980. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Orthodox were largely eastern European Jews who practiced traditional Judaism. There is no reason to believe their voting had differed from that of other Jews. However, the growth of several Hasidic sects that moved to the US in the 1940s changed the composition of American Orthodoxy. Over the next few elections, the traditional values of Orthodox Jews led many to shift to the Republican side as the Democratic Party adopted liberal positions on morality issues. Reagan’s policies as president were more pro-Israel than Carter’s, though AIPAC vigorously fought against his plans to sell AWACS surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia. Jews were also uncomfortable with how close Reagan was to the Christian Right. While 1984 Democratic candidate Walter Mondale had a strong pro-Israel voting record in the Senate, the Jewish rift with the Democratic Party widened when Jesse Jackson made derogatory references to Jews as “Hymies” and New York City as “Hymietown” when he was running for the party’s nomination. Jews reverted to their traditional support of Democratic presidential candidates in 1984 with Reagan’s vote share falling a few percentage points. The National Jewish Coalition for Reagan-Bush commissioned its own exit poll in seven Jewish precincts, and it found Reagan winning 41% of the Jewish vote. However, Reagan’s pollsters sharply criticized that poll because it was not a probability sample (Weisberg 2012), explaining that the politics of Jews who live in areas of Jewish concentration may differ from that of other Jews. The higher Republican vote that poll obtained suggests that

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it achieved a good sample of ultra-Orthodox areas that were turning Republican without sufficiently sampling Jews living in less Orthodox areas. In 1988, the Jewish vote moved a few more percentage points back in the Democratic direction, as did the overall national vote. Two important demographic groups were changing their party loyalties during this period in ways that affected Jews. Blacks had become solidly Democratic, but their demands made some Jews reconsider their loyalty to the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, evangelical Protestants became estranged from the Democratic Party on moral issues; and most moved to the Republican Party, which made many Jews uncomfortable with that party. Polls in 1988 showed that the proportion of Jews who would not vote Democratic if African American activist Rev. Jesse Jackson were on that party’s ticket was more than equaled by the proportion who would not vote Republican if fundamentalist Rev. Pat Robertson were on that party’s ticket (Cohen 1989, pp. 9–12; Wald and Sigelman 1997, p. 153). Most Jews still voted Democratic during the 1972–1988 period, but the Republican vote by Jews in those presidential elections was higher than in any election since the Depression. That could have been a turning point toward political realignment of Jews, but instead was a prelude to returning to higher Democratic voting. 2.4.4.2  From 1992 to 2016 Jews increased their Democratic presidential voting again starting in 1992. President George H.W. Bush sent Patriot anti-missile batteries to Israel when Iraq fired Scud missiles at them during the multi-national military attack on Iraq after it seized Kuwait. However, Bush refused to authorize requested loan guarantees for Israel unless it stopped expanding its West Bank settlements, and he made a public statement against AIPAC’s lobbying on the issue. Secretary of State James Baker’s foreign policy was perceived as tough on Israel, though he denied the many claims that he used an obscenity in stating it was unnecessary to pay attention to Jews because they had not voted for Bush. Bush ran for reelection in 1992 against Bill Clinton, with billionaire H.  Ross Perot mounting a strong independent candidacy. The Republican Convention that year became known for Pat Buchanan’s “culture war speech,” in which he denounced Bill and Hillary Clinton for promoting radical feminism, abortion on demand, homosexual rights, and discrimination against religious schools. The Democratic vote nationally fell, but the Jewish vote for the Democrats increased to 74%. Only 16% of Jews voted for Bush, with 10% voting for Perot. As Lipset and Raab (1995, p. 166) maintained, “Jewish support for the GOP was undermined by severely critical anti-Israeli remarks made by President Bush and Secretary of State Baker and by the visible presence of the religious right at the Republican convention.” Clinton appointed three Jews to his first-term cabinet and nominated two for the Supreme Court. He won reelection in 1996 with 78% of the Jewish vote, their highest Democratic vote since the 1960s, with the Republican vote by Jews staying at just 16%.

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George W. Bush ran against Vice President Al Gore in 2000. Gore’s choice of Senator Joe Lieberman as his vice-presidential running mate led to a strong Democratic vote by Jews, with Orthodox Jews reportedly joining in (see Table 2.4 and the more detailed presentation of post-2000 exit polls in Table 2.5). Gore won Table 2.5  National polls of the Jewish vote, 2000–2018

Year Election pollsa 2000 Voter News Service exit poll Los Angeles Times exit poll American Jewish Committee (Sept.) 2004 National Election Pool exit poll Los Angeles Times exit poll National Jewish Democratic Council (July) American Jewish Committee (Aug.) 2008 National Election Pool exit poll American Jewish Committee (Sept.) 2012 National Election Pool exit poll Cooperative Congressional Election Study J Street Workmen’s Circle Republican Jewish Coalition Workmen’s Circle (May) American Jewish Committee (Sept.) 2016 Edison Research exit poll Cooperative Congressional Election Study J Street American Jewish Committee (Oct.)

79–19– 1Nader 77–22– 1Nader 75–11– 3Nader 74–25

Number of Jews 306

Solomon Report (including state polls) 79–17

Average of Nov.-Dec. national polls by non-advocacy groups 78D–21R–1Nader

77–21

76R–24R

74–23

78D–21R

1010 267

78–22 75–22– 3Other

817

69–24

1000

78–21

102

57–30

914

69–30

68D–32R

66–33

868

70–30 68–32 68–32b

800 2067 1000

59–21

1000

65–24

1040

71–24– 5Other 68–28– 4Other 70–25– 5Other 61–19– 9Other

70D–25R–5Other 1179

731 1002 (continued)

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Table 2.5 (continued)

Year Election pollsa 2018 Edison Research exit poll (CNN) Cooperative Congressional Election Study AP: VoteCast J Street Mellman Group (JEI) pre-election (Oct.)

Number of Jews 79–17 71–22

1068

71–28 76–19 74–26

983 800

Solomon Report (including state polls)

Average of Nov.-Dec. national polls by non-advocacy groups 74D–22R

Note: Values show the percentage Democrat (D), the percentage Republican (R), and, if stated, the percentage for “other” candidates a Some exit polls are reported slightly differently by different sources, perhaps due to recalculation after early publication using incomplete polls b The major-party split among actual voters in the RJC poll was 65–34

the popular vote, but Bush became president when he won the Electoral College vote. The Jewish vote may have been decisive, albeit unintentionally. Florida’s Palm Beach County used a confusing “butterfly ballot” in that election. Statistical analysis found that the vote for third-party candidate Pat Buchanan was higher in Palm Beach County precincts with a high Gore vote than in those with a high Bush vote, which was the opposite pattern of other counties, supporting the claim that many Buchanan votes in Palm Beach were unintended (Brady et al. 2001). There is a sizable elderly Jewish population in that county (see Appendix in Chap. 5), and it would appear that many accidentally voted for Buchanan, who has made several remarks that are considered antisemitic. The Florida vote was so close that there was a recount; hence, those unintended votes may have given Bush the presidency (Hasen 2012), though the same would hold for other groups whose members were confused by the poor ballot design. Bush’s policies were strongly pro-Israel, though he spoke in June 2002 in favor of an independent Palestinian state. Surveys show that the Jewish vote remained solidly Democratic in 2004, though a few percentage points lower than in 2000. The Jewish vote stayed strongly Democratic at 78% in 2008 when Barack Obama defeated John McCain. While there might have been questions about Jews’ willingness to support an African-American candidate, the Republican administration’s responsibility for and handling of the nation’s fiscal crisis dominated over such considerations. Thus, in the 1992–2008 period, Democratic presidential candidates averaged just over three-quarters of the Jewish vote. Whereas the Republicans had captured about 30% from 1972 through 1988, they pulled in only 16–24% from 1992 to 2008. This drop in the Republican vote among Jews coincided with the increased identification of the Republican Party with the Christian Right, as highlighted by Buchanan’s 1992 culture war speech. That is consistent with the finding that Jews who are

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negative toward the Christian Right are significantly less Republican in partisanship than other Jews, even with other variables controlled (Uslaner and Lichbach 2009; Weisberg 2019, pp. 88–89). In his first term, Obama took a strong stand against expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, though he also pushed Congress to approve American funding an Iron Dome defense system for Israel that could shoot down incoming missiles. Obama signed enhanced restrictions against Iran for its nuclear program into law in 2010, but he resisted Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s call to set a “clear red line” on that nuclear program with military action to be taken if Iran crossed that line. In campaigning against Obama’s reelection in 2012, Mitt Romney attacked Obama for the slow economic recovery and also for being insufficiently supportive of Israel. Obama won reelection, though with a lower vote percentage than at the height of the 2008 fiscal crisis (Weisberg 2015). The Democratic presidential vote among Jews fell to 68%. Uslaner (2015) and Weisberg (2014) describe the context of the fight for the 2012 Jewish vote in further detail. The 2016 election and its aftermath will be discussed later in this chapter. Hillary Clinton received about the same vote among Jews in 2016 as Obama won in 2012; Donald Trump’s vote dropped a few percentage points from Romney’s, with about a 5% vote for third-party candidates. The Democratic vote among Jews was back down in 2012 and 2016 to its level in the 1970s and 1980s, while the 2016 Republican vote fell back to its 1992–2008 level.

2.4.5  Trends Over Time More American Jews voted for Democratic than Republican presidential candidates from 1928 through 2016, but there has been more variation in the Jewish vote than is usually recognized. Figure 2.2 charts the Democratic vote for president by Jews in these elections along with the overall vote result. The Jewish vote during this period was more Democratic than the national presidential vote, with a gap usually between 15% and 35% points depending on the year. Jews’ voting shifted in the Democratic direction in the 1928 and 1932 elections, but it did not become solidly Democratic until 1936. After staying in the 90% range in 1940 and 1944, Jews’ support for the Democrats waned slightly from 1948 through 1956. Then, the Jewish vote became distinctively Democratic in the 1960s. The Republican voting of Jews increased in the 1970s and 1980s. It looked in 1980 like Jews were tempted to realign politically, but instead their vote became more Democratic again in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Republican presidential vote by Jews tracks the national Republican vote over the years fairly closely, with a 0.70 correlation, whereas a 1.0 correlation would mean they move totally together. (The two trend lines in Fig. 2.2 are correlated at just 0.55, because of the large deviations involving third-party voting by Democratic Jews in 1948 and 1980.)

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Democratic Vote

90%

70%

50%

30%

10% 1928 1936 1944 1952 1960 1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 2016 Jewish Vote

National Vote

Source: Updated from Weisberg (2012) Fig. 2.2  Democratic vote by Jews and nationally, 1928–2016

2.5  Factors Affecting Jews’ Voting This section examines three important factors relating to Jews’ voting:  ideology, party identification, and relations with Israel.

2.5.1  Ideology Surveys confirm the liberal self-identification of most Jews. The 2013 Pew Research Center Survey of US Jews found that 49% of Jews said they were politically liberal versus 19% politically conservative. That is in sharp contrast to the 21% liberal and 38% conservative for the public at large in Pew’s 2013 polls. However, surveys consistently find that Jewish liberalism is less complete than it is usually portrayed. Cohen and Liebman’s (1997) analysis of General Social Survey (GSS) data found that Jews’ liberalism was substantially reduced when comparing them with non-Jews who had similar socio-demographic characteristics. Tom Smith’s (2005, p. 56) analysis of GSS data likewise concluded that seeing liberalism “as the defining difference [between Jews and non-Jews] is wrong.” Researchers have instead found that Jews’ liberalism is “selective” (Liebman and Cohen 1999, p. 200). Thus, Abrams and Cohen (2016, p. 122) described Jews being more liberal on social issues than on regulation of business, and even less so as

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regards economic regulation. Weisberg (2019) showed Jews’ attitudes to be distinctively liberal on school prayer, morality issues, and science issues, but not on economic matters, welfare, affirmative action, or immigration. More specifically, Jews are not much more liberal than comparable non-Jews with similar ideological positions on such issues as whether the government should reduce income inequality and whether the government should help solve more problems. No differences exist on affirmative action for women, while differences are small on affirmative action for blacks. By contrast, there are double-digit percentage differences between comparable Jews and non-Jews on gay issues, marijuana legalization, and abortion as well as on accepting the theory of evolution. The implication of these studies is that many Jews are not particularly liberal on economic issues even though they are liberal on moral issues. Based on that finding, Weisberg (2019, Chap. 11) applied a four-category classification of Jews’ political ideology that differentiates between attitudes on economic and social issues: 1. Progressives, who are liberal on both social and economic issues, favoring governmental regulation of the economy but opposing laws limiting individual rights on such matters as abortion and gay marriage, 2. Libertarians, who oppose government regulations in both economic and moral realms, 3. Communitarians, who favor government regulation in both economic and moral arenas, and 4. Traditionalists, who are conservative on both moral and economic issues, favoring government enforcement of moral norms but favoring laissez-faire economics with minimal government economic regulations. Table 2.6 presents analysis of the General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1972 through 2016. The economic question is whether the government should do more or less to reduce income differences with those choosing the middle option being classified as “ambiguous.” The morality issue question is whether the person approves Table 2.6  Comparison of the ideological profile of Jews and non-Jews, GSS 1972–2016 Jews % in this category Progressive 34 Libertarian 32 Communitarian 6 Traditionalist 5 Ambiguousc 22 Total 100 Sample size 316

% of partisans who are Democratsa 87 62 72b 50b 57

Non-Jews % in this category 27 20 20 13 20 100

% of partisans who are Democratsa 71 37 67 37 46

Source: Analysis of 1972–2016 General Social Survey Democrats include leaners to the Democratic Party b Based on 20 or fewer people c This category consists of those who were neutral on the economic question a

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of suicide if a person has an incurable disease. Since most Jews are liberal on morality issues, most are Progressives or Libertarians rather than Traditionalists or Communitarians. As to be expected, Table 2.6 finds that Progressives who are partisans are predominantly Democrats. However, Libertarians are divided politically, with Jewish Libertarians favoring Democrats over Republicans by a 5-to-3 ratio and non-Jewish Libertarians splitting 5-to-3 in the Republican direction.

2.5.2  Partisanship Most political scientists regard people’s party identification as an important long-­ term factor affecting their votes. Yet, party identification is not identical to voting since partisans sometimes defect to the other party’s nominee, as when many Democrats voted against George McGovern in 1972. The polarization of American politics has decreased such defections, though many Republicans cast Democratic votes in the 2008 election held during the fiscal crisis, and there were defections in both directions in the 2016 Clinton-Trump contest. When asked their party identification, many Americans say they are Independents rather than Democrats or Republicans. However, when asked a follow-up question as to whether they are closer to the Democratic or Republican party, most Independents answer that they lean to one party or the other. Studies show that these leaners vote for that party’s presidential candidate at least as much as people who consider themselves weak Democrats or weak Republicans. As a result, it is common to combine these leaners with partisans into a measure of “leaned partisanship.” 2.5.2.1  Jews’ Party Identification Since the measurement of party identification began in the 1950s, surveys have consistently found that Jews predominantly identify as Democratic. The 2013 Pew Jewish study found that 70% of Jews who were US citizens were Democrats (or Democratic-leaning Independents) while only 22% were Republicans (or Republican-leaning Independents). These figures fluctuate in surveys, due as much to sampling issues as to real changes. For example, 68% of registered Jewish voters in Pew’s 2017 polling (Pew Research Center 2018) identified as Democrats versus 22% Republicans, which is within sampling error of the 2013 Pew results. Furthermore, studies consistently find that Jews are significantly more Democratic than non-Jews with similar socio-demographic characteristics (Campbell et  al. 1960; Manza and Brooks 1997; Stanley and Niemi 2006; Wald 2015; Weisberg

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2019). Indeed, Wald’s (2019, Chap. 2) calculations show they are more Democratic than the non-Jew who is their closest match on demographics and economic status. While this discussion has focused on national trends, it is important to recognize that there is also subnational variation. The Jewish communities in different cities differ from one another in their socio-economic, age, and denominational compositions, which leads to differences in their partisanship and voting. As shown in tables in Chap. 5, the percentage of Jews registered to vote is upwards of 90% in many cities, with New York being an important exception. The percentage of Republican identification is below 20% in most of the surveyed cities; Houston at 31% and St. Petersburg at 25% are exceptions, with those two being the only cities in which large proportions of non-Orthodox are Republican. Sheskin (2013, 2016) has summarized community surveys that illustrate these differences; see also the most recent studies under the “US Local” tab at www.JewishDataBank.org. 2.5.2.2  Changes over Time Table 2.7 shows the party identification of Jews since 2000 according to a wide variety of polls of Jews. The first three columns display the answers to the basic question of whether people consider themselves Democrats, Republicans, or Independents. The two columns on the right show “leaned partisanship,” which combines Independents who lean toward a party with that party’s partisans. The results of these different polls are remarkably similar, especially since these polls did not use identical party identification question wording, differed in who they classified as Jews, and were administered through different survey modes. Jews were predominantly Democratic across this period, with about two-thirds of Jews being Democratic or leaning in that direction versus only about one-quarter of Jews being on the Republican side.10 Additionally, there is remarkably little trend in these data. When new poll results are published, it is tempting to interpret each slight change from previous polls, but this analysis emphasizes their considerable constancy. Pew’s leaned partisan data shows that the Democratic lead among Jews increased near the end of Clinton’s presidency (1993–2000) and stayed high through the George W.  Bush presidency (2001–2008) but fell during the Obama presidency (2009–2016). The Democratic lead over the Republicans among Jews dropped from an average of 48% during the Bush years to 40% over the Obama years (see Table 2.8). Leaned partisanship has also varied over the years among the public as a whole, with the Democrats having opened up a small lead over the Republicans since 1994. As a result, the Democratic lead among Jews, while still substantial, was actually a few points less distinctive by 2016 than in 1994.

 Averaging Pew Research Center poll results on yearly leaned partisanship totals from 1994 through 2017 obtains virtually the same result.

10

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Table 2.7  Polls of Jews’ party identification, in percentages

Year 2000 2000–2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 2019

Poll AJC NJPS AJIS AJC AJC AJC NJDC AJC AJC AJC NSAJ RLS AJC AJC AJC AJC AJC-spring AJC-fall PRRI J Street RJC WC AJC Pew J Street Iran-Cohen Iran-J Street AJC AJC J Street PRRI CCES CCAP AJC AJC J Street JEI AJC CCES JEI

Methoda M P P M M M M M M P P

IP IP I-1 P-1 IP P I-1

IP P I-1 P I

P

P I

Party identification Dem. Indep/Other 59 32 59 27 42 39 48 34 51 33 54 30 60 26 54 30 54 31 58 27 62 24

Rep. 9 14 19 18 16 16 14 16 15 15 14

56 53 50 45 52 55 49 56 56 59 52 55 59 55 53 49 51 59 47 54 53 57 51 58

27 31 35 39 29 29 38 26 25 21 33 32 26 33 29 32 31 22 33 26 27 28 33 27

17 16 15 16 19 16 13 18 19 20 15 13 15 12 18 19 18 19 20 20 20 15 16 15

51 53

33 26

16 21

Leaned party ID Dem. Rep.

74

19

66

24

67

26

70 68

22 21

64

25

68

25

63 62

26 28

71 68

21 25

62 65

28 25 (continued)

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Table 2.7 (continued)

Year 2019

Poll AJC

Methoda

Party identification Dem. Indep/Other 49 32

Rep. 18

Leaned party ID Dem. Rep.

AJC American Jewish Committee, AJIS American Jewish Identity Study, CCAP Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, CCES Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, JEI Jewish Electoral Institute, NJDC National Jewish Democratic Coalition, NJPS National Jewish Population Survey, NSAJ National Survey of American Jews, PRRI Public Religion Research Institute, RJC Republican Jewish Coalition, RLS Religious Landscape Study (Pew Research Center), WC Workmen’s Circle, P phone, I internet, M mail, IP internet panel, 1 one−day poll

2.5.2.3  Partisanship and Ideology Table 2.9 provides useful evidence as to the nature of the relationship between Jews’ party identification and their political ideology. The left-hand side of the table shows that very few Jewish Democrats are politically conservative and equally few Jewish Republicans are liberals. Thus, in the current period of partisan polarization, Jews who are partisans have not been adopting the ideological positions associated with the opposite party. In contrast, the right-hand side of the table demonstrates that nearly 40% of Jewish political conservatives are not Republicans. A much lower proportion of Jewish political conservatives are Republicans than the proportion of Jewish liberals who are Democrats, a result that holds for a wide variety of surveys (Weisberg 2011). Thus, ideology does not lead to partisanship for Jews today as much as partisanship seems to rule out having the ideology associated with the opposite party. This suggests that partisanship leads to ideology for Jews today. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the ideology predominated over partisanship in earlier periods; so, the leftward views of many Jews in the early 1930s Depression days may have led them to the Democratic Party. 2.5.2.4  Exceptions There are some important exceptions to the Democratic predominance among Jews. Jews from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and other ex-Communist nations have been less liberal and Democratic (Wald 2019; Weisberg 2019). Similarly, three-­ fifths of the respondents in FSU households in the large 2018 Detroit Jewish Population Study (Sheskin 2018)  who identified with a major party were Republicans, compared to just 22% of other Jews. Similarly, American Jews from Israel in the 2013 Pew survey were also less liberal and Democratic (Weisberg 2019, Chap. 3). Another exception involves income: while upper-income Jews are famously less Republican than upper-income non-Jews, survey analysis finds Jews with higher incomes are somewhat more Republican than Jews with lower incomes (Weisberg 2019, pp. 185, 187, 220, 224).

Years 1994–2000 2001–2008 2009–2016

Jews Democratic (%) 69 70 67 Republican (%) 25 23 27

Differencea (%) 45 48 40

Independent (%) 23 52 25 100 Republican (%) 7 36 57 100

Source: Analysis of 2013 Pew Research Center Survey of US Jews

Liberal Moderate Conservative Total

Democrat (%) 66 26 9 101 Democrat Independent Republican Total

Table 2.9  Jews’ partisanship and self-declared ideology compared, 2013 Pew Survey

Source: Calculated from Pew Research Center (2018) a Differences may not add up because of rounding

Presidency Wm. Clinton G.W. Bush Obama

Table 2.8  Polling averages for partisanship by presidential administration, Pew data

Liberal (%) 93 4 2 99

Difference (%) 3 6 5

Conservative (%) 30 9 61 100

Republican (%) 44 42 43

Moderate (%) 60 14 27 101

Total public Democratic (%) 47 48 48

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The largest exception to Democratic dominance among Jews involves the Orthodox. Survey evidence on this is mixed, likely because the separation of the Haredi from secular society leads them to eschew participation in surveys. The 2013 Pew survey, which phoned designated respondents back repeatedly so they would be interviewed, found that most Orthodox are Republican: both the ultra-Orthodox (58% Republican to 35% Democratic) and the Modern Orthodox (56–38%). The Republican preference of the Orthodox is also evident in the 2018 Detroit study, with 77% of Orthodox partisans being Republican versus a fifth of the non-­ Orthodox. Precinct analysis (e.g., Fingerhut 2008; Rocklin 2017) confirms that ultra-Orthodox areas strongly vote Republican. (Election Day phone and internet polls often find the Orthodox voting Democratic, probably because of low response rates among very observant Jews.) Overall, the religious difference between the Orthodox and the non-Orthodox yields larger political divisions among Jews than socio-demographic differences such as age, gender, or income (Kotler-­ Berkowitz 2017). 2.5.2.5  Predictors of Partisanship Some studies have used regression analysis to disentangle the separate effects of possible predictors of Jews’ party identification. Kotler-Berkowitz (2017) finds that denomination is a strong predictor, with the Orthodox and Conservative being less Democratic than the Reform. Those born in the Former Soviet Union are less Democratic, while higher income Jews are more Democratic. As to age, Kotler-­ Berkowitz shows that Jews under age 30 and age 65 or over are significantly more Democratic than those age 50–64. Men are significantly more Republican, the intermarried and never married significantly more Democratic. Jews in the South are significantly more Republican as compared to those in the Northeast. Analyzing both a 2004 survey conducted for the National Jewish Democratic Coalition (see also Uslaner and Lichbach 2009) and the 2012 PRRI survey, Weisberg (2019, Chap. 5) found that ideology is a significant predictor of Jews’ party identification. Attitudes toward the Christian Right and evangelicals are also significant predictors: The more negative Jews feel toward those groups, the more Democratic they are. Higher income Jews are more Republican. In the 2004 survey, those who were favorable toward civil unions for gays were more Democratic, though in 2012 attitudes toward gay marriage did not have a significant effect when attitudes toward the Christian Right were controlled. This result leaves ambiguous whether morality issues have a significant effect on Jews’ partisanship beyond attitudes toward the Christian Right. As Wald (2019, Chap. 9) emphasizes, Jews’ views on the Christian Right are related to views on church-state separation. Unfortunately, surveys have not asked questions that distinguish whether attitudes toward church-state separation, rather than attitudes toward the Christian Right, might underlie Jews’ partisanship. Denomination is not significant in Weisberg’s (2019, Table  12.4) analysis of party identification in the 2012 PRRI and 2013 Pew surveys when issue questions

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are included. The significant predictors in both surveys are instead economic questions, moral issues, and attitudes on the Middle East, along with gender. Denomination still has indirect effects on Jews’ partisanship since the Orthodox have distinctive attitudes on moral issues. There is a gender gap in partisanship in the Jewish community. The gender gap in voting in the American general public began in 1980, with women less likely to vote for Ronald Reagan than men. By the mid-1900s, many non-Orthodox Jewish women were pushing for recognizing a greater role for women in Jewish religious services, including having bat mitzvah ceremonies and reading from the Torah. This activism extended into politics as well, with Jewish women playing an important role in the push for an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and with prominent Jewish feminists advocating gender equality more generally. Jewish women are significantly more Democratic in their partisanship than Jewish men, even with attitudes on issues controlled (Weisberg 2019, p. 189). 2.5.2.6  Party Realignment There is discussion every few decades of whether American Jews might realign to the Republican Party; but, in the end, they have reverted back to strong Democratic voting. Voting behavior studies find that party identification, once established, is fairly resistant to change. Young people are typically less attached to a party, with many starting off as Independents; but strength of partisanship tends to increase with age as one votes for the same party repeatedly. Yet, groups sometimes change their partisanship in response to changes by the parties on issues basic to the group’s self-interest. The Republican Party has tried to use support for Israel as a wedge issue to convince Jews to vote Republican. Support for Israel has traditionally been bipartisan, but there has been a recent increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among the Democratic left while the Republican Party has become unconditionally supportive of Israel’s stands. Democrats are still committed to Israel’s security, but weakening of that commitment could cause some Jewish Democrats to switch parties. Similarly, support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement by prominent Democratic politicians would likely cause some Jews to switch to the Republican side. Still, the current large number of Jewish Democrats in Congress (all 9 Jewish Senators and 27 of 29 Jewish Representatives in 2019) helps signal Jewish voters to stay on the Democratic side. In looking for possible change in the Jewish vote, it is important to recognize which types of Jews are and are not Republicans. First, while the 2013 Pew Jewish survey found that most Orthodox Jews are Republican, it also shows that most Republican Jews are not Orthodox. To the contrary, Republican Jews are split fairly evenly across Jewish denominations. Second, while Jews who take consistent hardline positions on Middle East issues are more Republican than Jews who take consistent positions in the opposite direction, the hardliners are not a majority of Jewish

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Republicans. Further, the hardliners are split quite evenly between being Republicans and Democrats (Weisberg 2019, Chap. 12). Traditionalist Jews who want minimal government economic regulations but favor government restrictions on morality issues are predominantly Republican; they constitute, however, less than 10% of American Jews. And they are considerably outnumbered by Progressive Jews who want minimal government restrictions on moral issues but favor more government intervention in economic matters; predictably, they are predominantly Democratic. Another large group are Libertarian Jews who want minimal government regulation on both economic and morality matters; they give the Democrats only a slight advantage. They could support either party, depending on the candidates and/or the issues. Libertarians who are hardline on Middle East issues are mainly Republican, and Libertarians who take the opposite positions on Middle East issues are mainly Democrats; however, many Jewish Libertarians are not consistently on either side regarding Middle East issues, and they are not firmly in either partisan camp. They are likely to drift to the Democratic side when a Republican candidate campaigns on Christian Right moral issues and/or is associated with right-wing antisemitism. However, they could move toward the Republican side when a Democratic candidate campaigns on economic justice issues and/or is seen as acceptant of left-wing antisemitism. These Libertarians are not fully committed to either party, so they could change their party depending on how American politics evolves in the future. While Israel and antisemitism are relevant issues for many Jews, most of non-­ Orthodox are more concerned with issues that directly affect themselves or their children. Depending on their life circumstances, those issues are typically jobs, climate change, childcare, the safety of their children in a gun culture, health insurance provisions regarding preexisting conditions, and/or keeping their Medicare benefits, all issues on which the Democrats have an advantage. Israel is probably a more salient issue for the older generation than for young Jews, but older Jews already considered that issue in choosing their party identification. Many in that generation are uncomfortable when some progressive politicians use antisemitic tropes, but many were also upset with President Trump’s rhetoric after the Charlottesville, Virginia “Unite the Right” march. Typically, older people have developed stronger party identification as they have voted for the same party for several decades, making it less likely for them to change parties, though they still could change if left-wing antisemitism threatens their security.

2.5.3  Israel as a Voting Issue Analyses of voting by the general public rarely considers foreign policy matters, but it is important to examine the role of Israel in Jews’ voting decisions. The topic is controversial, partly because it raises questions of whether American Jews would be considered disloyal if they voted on the basis of what is best for Israel.

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Also, there is disagreement as to whether changes in Jews’ voting for incumbent presidents seeking reelection have been due to their handling of relations with Israel. For example, decreases in Democratic voting by Jews in 1948, 1980, and 2012 from their votes in the preceding presidential elections have sometimes been interpreted as due to Jews dissatisfaction with the incumbent president’s support for Israel. However, some observers contend that views on Israel are already incorporated into Jews’ partisanship, so that views on relations with Israel do not have an added effect. Furthermore, in each election mentioned above, the drop in Democratic support among Jews simply mirrors vote change among the population at large. The vote for Roosevelt’s reelection in 1944 was partly a vote against changing leaders in wartime, so a decrease in Democratic voting was natural after the war ended. Carter’s vote fell in 1980 among the general public because of the high inflation rate and the Iranian hostage crisis. The Obama vote in 2008 was partly because people were blaming the incumbent Republican Party for the fiscal crisis; so, it was natural for it to drop in 2012, when people were less upset with the previous Republican administration. Articles by Wald and collaborators (Wald and Martinez 2001; Wald and Williams 2006) have been important in showing how attitudes on Israel affect American Jews’ political behavior. However, survey findings always depend on how a question is asked. For example, most Jews answer affirmatively when surveys ask whether Israel is important in their voting decision; but few choose Israel as one of the most important factors in their voting decisions when they are offered a list of a dozen different issues. Rather than rely on people’s explanations of their voting, statistical analysis can be used to examine the correlates of voting with other variables controlled. Attitudes on Israel or on Israeli policies were significantly related to Jews’ presidential voting and presidential approval in 2004, 2012, and 2016, even when party identification was statistically controlled (Uslaner and Lichbach 2009; Cohen and Abrams 2012; Uslaner 2015; Weisberg 2019, Table 12.1). The most important article on this topic is Uslaner and Lichbach (2009). It found that attitudes on Israel and attitudes toward evangelicals were both strong factors affecting Jews’ voting intentions in 2004. In that election, George W. Bush emphasized his strong support for Israel. Meanwhile, conservative forces, with strong backing from evangelical groups and from the Republican Party, sponsored ballot issues in several states that would prohibit gay marriage. Uslaner and Lichbach termed the battle for Jewish votes that year a “two-front war,” with attitudes on Israel and attitudes toward evangelicals being countervailing factors. The Israel issue worked in the Republican direction. However, more Jewish voters were concerned about the political power of evangelicals, which pushed the Jewish vote toward the Democrats.11 Weisberg’s (2019, Chap. 12) survey analysis similarly finds

 Evangelical support for same-gender marriage could be seen an instance of their wanting to have their religious views enacted into law, regardless of the traditional separation between church and state. However, questions on moral issues, on church-state separation, and on attitudes toward the

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attitudes on Israeli policies and morality issues are countervailing forces in affecting Jews’ party identification, ideology, and approval of the incumbent president.

2.6  The 2016 and 2018 Elections While Jews have largely voted Democratic since the late 1920s, the split in 2015 in the American Jewish community over the Iran nuclear accords provided a potential opportunity for Republican gains in the 2016 election.

2.6.1  The 2016 Campaign Hillary Clinton was well-known with Jewish voters from her role as First Lady in Bill Clinton’s presidency, followed by her election as US senator from New York, and then her service as Obama’s secretary of state. Bill Clinton’s popularity with Jewish voters was an asset for her candidacy. As secretary of state, she was strongly supportive of Israel, though the Iran nuclear accords were a potential liability even if negotiations were concluded by her successor. Donald Trump sought votes in 2016 among Jews and among evangelical Christians by promising to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to withdraw from the Iran nuclear accords (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). In February 2016, Trump said he would be neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but by March he declared himself “very pro-Israel.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu avoided favoring either candidate. Sheldon and Miriam Adelson contributed considerable financial backing for the Trump campaign, but his backing from other leading Jewish Republicans was tepid (Sales 2016). Trump pointed to his Jewish son-in-law, daughter, and grandson in claiming he would be a good president for Jews; but he was criticized throughout the campaign for connections and flirtations with antisemitism. Steve Bannon, a prominent campaign aide, was former editor of the alt-right Breitbart News service that was known for antisemitic comments. During the campaign, Trump tweeted a graphic of Hillary Clinton, with a background of dollar signs and a statement calling her corrupt, that was on a star that resembled the Star of David. His final campaign ad attacked global special interests for bleeding the country dry financially, with video clips of three prominent Jews. In July 2016, his son-in-law Jared Kushner wrote an article defending Trump against charges of antisemitism; and Kushner repeated that defense in a post-election November 2016 interview after Bannon was appointed as the chief presidential strategist. Christian right have not been asked in the same surveys of Jews, making it difficult to assess their relative importance in affecting Jews’ political positions.

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2.6.2  The Jewish Vote in 2016 The American Jewish Committee’s (AJC) pre-election poll found a substantial Clinton lead over Trump. Assuming the usual drop-off to about 5% in early intentions to vote for minor party candidates, the poll results among those planning to vote were equivalent to Clinton winning 72% of the Jewish vote versus 23% for Trump. As displayed in Table  2.5, exit polls found Jews voting about 70% for Clinton and 25% for Trump, with about 5% for minor party candidates.12 Thus, the Democratic vote by Jews in 2016 was in line with that in the 2012 election, but with a decline in the Republican vote because of the increased minor party vote. J Street released cross-tabulations for Jewish voting in 2016 that can be compared with its 2012 polling (Table  2.10). Nearly all Jewish Democrats voted for Clinton versus only three-quarters of Republican Jews voting for Trump, though little of that Republican drop-off went to Clinton. The highest Clinton vote was among Reform (76%) and Conservative (71%) Jews. The Orthodox were shown as splitting 56% Clinton and 39% Trump, though this probably understates their Trump vote because ultra-Orthodox Jews are likely to avoid participating in 1-day polls; by contrast, the 2012 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) surveys show the Orthodox voting more Table 2.10  Jewish vote: 2012, 2016, and 2018 J Street election-day polls, in percentages

Overall Democratic Republican Reform Conservative Orthodox Other Liberal Moderate conservative Men Women Age 18–39 Age 40–64 Age 65 and over Not college graduate College graduate Post graduate

2012 Obama 70 93 13 78 63 59 70 89 70 37 66 73 68 71 69 70 70 69

Romney 30 7 87 21 37 41 29 10 30 62 34 26 31 29 30 29 29 31

2016 Clinton 70 94 15 76 71 56 67 87 60 44 63 77 73 65 73 62 72 76

Trump 25 5 76 21 25 39 26 7 35 53 31 20 20 30 25 31 24 19

Other 5 2 9 3 4 4 7 6 5 3 7 3 6 6 2 6 4 5

2018 Congress Dem Rep 76 19 97 1 18 77 79 16 77 20 62 30 77 17 93 4 71 22 24 67 73 20 79 17 75 21 72 21 83 13 69 24 79 16 81 16

 Edison Research was the main media exit poll. The Comparative Congressional Election Study is a large academic survey, while J Street is the progressive group that lobbies for a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinians dispute.

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Republican (Weisberg 2019, Chap. 14). Whereas only 3–4% of those who affiliate with one of the major branches of Judaism voted for a third-party, 7% of “other” Jews did so. There were three notable demographic changes among Jews’ voting between 2012 and 2016. First, the gender gap doubled in size with a 14% point greater Democratic vote among Jewish women than men in 2016, up from 7 points in 2012. The gender gap nationally also increased considerably in 2016, moving up to 12% points due to the controversial nature of Trump’s candidacy as well as having a woman on the ballot. Second, an educational divide opened up: Clinton did best among Jews with a post-graduate degree (76%) and college graduates (72%), whereas Trump did best among Jews without a college degree (31%). There were no educational differences among Jews in their 2012 presidential voting, but the 2016 difference fits with Trump’s general appeal to those without college education. Third, there were age differences: Clinton’s vote was highest (73%) among Jews under age 40 and those age 65 and over, whereas Trump did best (30%) among persons age 40–64. (National exit polls likewise found Trump’s best showing was winning 63% of the vote of whites age 45–64.)

2.6.3  Jews and the Early Trump Administration The first 2  years of the Trump administration included several actions that were favorable to Jews and to Israel, while antisemitic incidents increased sharply. Trump was the first Republican president to appoint Jews to his initial cabinet, continuing Dr. David Shulkin as Veterans Affairs secretary and naming Steven Mnuchin to the treasury post. Several other Jews were given prominent positions in the administration, including Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Antisemitic incidents spiked after the 2016 election, including over 150 bomb threats phoned to Jewish Community Centers and other Jewish organizations around the nation in early 2017. Those bomb threats unsettled Jewish communities around the nation. After not having spoken out against those threats during the previous months, Trump vigorously denounced them in his February 28, 2017 speech to Congress. The August 12, 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia “Unite the Right” march, which included Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members and neo-Nazis, turned violent. Trump’s initial statement condemned “the egregious display of hatred, bigotry, and violence on many sides;” and he said there were “some very fine people on both sides.” Both the Republican Jewish Coalition and AIPAC publicly asked for greater moral clarity and rejected attempts to suggest moral equivalence between the white supremacists and the counter-protestors. A few days later, Trump read a statement condemning the “hatred, bigotry, and violence,” including that by “the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups;” but he subsequently emphasized that “there are two sides to a story” and repeated that “there is blame on both sides.”

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According to American Jewish Committee’s (AJC) annual polling of Jews, the proportion who viewed antisemitism as a “very serious problem” in the US increased from 19% in autumn 2016 to 41% 1 year later, with 84% in 2017 viewing it as at least a “serious problem.” Weisberg (2019, Table 14.2) found that perceptions of the severity of antisemitism were significant and behind only party identification and ideology in explanatory power for approval of Trump’s presidency in the 2017 survey. Furthermore, antisemitism’s perceived severity was tied with ideology for second place behind party identification in a multivariate analysis of presidential vote recall in the 2017 AJC survey, after not being significant in a comparable analysis of presidential vote intention in the 2016 AJC poll (Weisberg 2019, Table 14.2). These results suggest that the level of polarization of American politics has become so high that Jews’ perceptions of antisemitism have become politicized. In May 2018, Trump ordered the American embassy moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and he pulled the US out of the multination Iran nuclear accord. Interviewing for the April–May 2018 AJC survey ended as the embassy was moved. Approval of Trump’s handling US-Israel relations was at 34% in that sample, while 57% disapproved. Also, 55% felt that the status of US Jews was less secure than a year earlier, 18% more secure, and 24% about the same.

2.6.4  The 2018 Election and Its Aftermath As the 2018 congressional election approached, polls showed considerable Jewish opposition to President Trump. The Gallup Poll found only 26% of Jews in 2018 approving of the manner in which Trump was handling his job as president versus 71% disapproving. An early October 2018 online poll of Jews conducted for the Jewish Electorate Institute (JEI) found that approval of his handling of relations with Israel was at 51% among Jews, in contrast to the AJC 34% reading earlier in the year. Of those who stated their voting plans for the 2018 election, 74% indicated they would vote Democratic versus 26% Republican. The Shabbat morning killing of 11 people at the Tree of Life Synagogue in the Squirrel Hill area of Pittsburgh occurred on October 27, 2018, just 10 days before the congressional election. President Trump called the act “pure evil” and again condemned antisemitism, while musing about whether the outcome would have been different if the congregation had armed guards. Election Day polls show a strong Democratic vote by Jews in the 2018 election. Each of the polls in Table 2.5 found at least a 70% Democratic vote. The average poll result was a 74% Democratic vote and 22% Republican. The most striking result in these polls involved a question in J Street’s poll asking Jews “How much do you think Donald Trump’s comments and policies are responsible for the recent shootings that took place at the synagogue in Pittsburgh?” 39% answered “very responsible,” 33% “somewhat responsible,” 12% “not really responsible,” and only 16% “not at all responsible.”

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Table 2.10 above includes the congressional vote results from the 2018 J Street poll. Democratic Jews were more unified than in the two previous elections, whereas there was some defection on the Republican side. Politically liberal Jews voted more Democratic and politically conservative Jews voted more Republican than in recent presidential elections. The largest shifts in the Democratic direction were among men and among persons age 65 and over. The Democratic vote increased across all education categories. The 2018 election further increased the number of Jews in Congress. With Jacky Rosen’s election from Nevada, there are once again nine Jewish Senators and all are Democrats. The “blue wave” House election brought in several new Jewish Democrats. The 116th Congress (2019–2020) contains 29 Jewish Representatives, all but two (Lee Zeldin from New York and David Kutsoff from Tennessee) being Democrats. The aftermath of the 2018 election saw an increase in concern with antisemitism from the left. In particular, Rep. Ilhan Omar, a newly elected Democratic representative from Minnesota (of Somali origin), who favors the Palestinian side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, made a series of tweets and comments that suggested that Jewish financiers were buying off US politicians, raised questions about “allegiance to a foreign country,” and expressed concern about a powerful lobby, referring obviously to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). These comments, questioning the loyalty of American Jews and raising traditional antisemitic tropes, lit a firestorm of reactions. While she offered apologies, the House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning all types of hatred, including both antisemitism and anti-Muslim. Furthermore, there has been increased concern with antisemitism on American campuses against Jewish students who take public pro-­ Israel positions. Additionally, some Democratic progressives support the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement against the Israeli presence in the West Bank, a movement which is seen by critics as an attempt to delegitimize Israel. An early May 2019 internet survey by the Jewish Electorate Institute provided the first measure of the relative concern about antisemitism from the political left versus the right. Jews were asked which of four matters were most concerning to them: 38% chose President Trump encouraging ultra-right extremists committing violent acts, 28% chose Republicans tolerating  antisemitism and alliances with white nationalists within their ranks, and 7% chose Republicans encouraging Islamophobia that leads to more violence. By contrast, only 27% chose Democrats tolerating antisemitism in their own ranks. The 27% figure is very close to the proportion of Republicans in the sample, which emphasizes how politicized the topic has become. As part of a new campaign to promote a Jewish exodus from the Democratic Party, the Trump 2020 reelection effort is attempting to label the Democratic Party as “anti-Jewish.” Comparing the 2018 CCES survey with the 2016 CCES shows a very small increase in Republican identification among Jews in the Orthodox and Conservative movements. The same pattern occurs in comparing the 2019 AJC survey with its 2018 and 2017 surveys. These changes could just reflect sampling error, but they hint at shifts associated with President Trump’s Middle East moves. Still,

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with politics so polarized, it is likely to be more difficult to shift the Democratic leanings of the much larger number of Jews who are neither Orthodox nor Conservative. The spring 2019 American Jewish Committee Survey of American Jewish Opinion found 71% viewed Trump’s job performance unfavorably, only 36% approved of his handling relations with Israel, and the party split was 49% Democratic versus 18% Republican. As to how secure Jews were in the US, 65% considered Jews to be less secure than a year earlier, versus 15% considering them more secure. How secure they saw Jews was significantly related to their party identification and their approval of Trump’s presidency, whereas how hostile they considered the climate on college campuses toward pro-Israel students was not significant in multivariate analysis.

2.7  Conclusions Jews realigned their voting behavior in the late 1920s and 1930s to support for the Democratic Party. At several times since then, analysts considered Jews’ voting to be at a crossroads. While there have been some shifts in the Republican direction, their voting has always reverted back to strong Democratic support. There was once again talk of Jewish realignment in the 2010s. Not only was there Republican voting among the 10% of Jews who are Orthodox, but there was enough Republican presidential voting among the non-Orthodox to reduce the Jewish Democratic vote down to the 70% level. The controversy over the Iran nuclear accords could have sparked further movement in the Republican direction in 2016. Instead, Donald Trump’s election has, at least temporarily, slowed down such movement. His withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accords and his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital may have brought some Jews to the Republican side, though polls showed that many Jewish Americans supported the accords and many opposed immediately moving the embassy. In any case, Trump’s initial responses to the increased antisemitic threats, the Charlottesville march, and the Pittsburgh shooting instead led to increases in Jewish support for the Democrats in the 2018 election. Surveys suggest that Jews’ disapproval of the Trump administration was causing a hardening of opposition to the Republican Party, though the specter of antisemitism from the left may counterbalance that.

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Chapter 3

American Jews and the Domestic Arena: Focus on the 2018 Midterm Elections J. J. Goldberg

While midterm elections—those not coinciding with a presidential contest—are rarely of great long-term significance, those held on November 6, 2018 were an exception. They constituted what is called a “wave election,” in which a large shift in voting patterns significantly weakens the incumbent party and strengthens the opposition. In this case, the American electorate repudiated a sitting president by decisively shifting control of the US House of Representatives from the Republicans to the Democrats. Republicans maintained control of the US Senate. In the 115th Congress, before the 2018 elections, Republicans held a 235 to 196 advantage over the Democrats in the House, with four seats vacant. However, in the new 116th Congress, the balance of power was almost exactly reversed: 235 Democrats, 198 Republicans, and 1 independent, with 1 vacancy remaining. Also, Democrats enjoyed a net gain of eight state governorships and seven state legislative chambers.

3.1  The Midterms and the Jewish Vote Since most politically active Jews are Democrats, the 2018 outcome had dramatic implications for the Jewish community. For one thing, Democratic advances in the House increased the number of Jews in that body from 22 to 28, a 27% increase. This was the most significant shift in Jewish congressional representation in either direction since 1994, when eight Jewish representatives lost their seats—seven Democrats and one Republican—during that year’s Republican sweep. Of the 22 Jewish incumbents in 2018, three did not seek reelection: Sander Levin of Michigan, who retired at age 87 after 36  years in the House; Jacky Rosen of Nevada, who ran successfully for the US Senate; and Jared Polis of Colorado, who

J. J. Goldberg (*) Independent Researcher, New York, NY, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_3

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was elected governor. Thus, while the number of Jewish freshmen entering the House in January 2019 was eight, the net gain was five. Jewish House Members in the 116th Congress (January 3, 2019) (∗ indicates freshman): Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR) David Cicilline (D-RI) Steve Cohen (D-TN) Susan Davis (D-CA) Ted Deutch (D-FL) Eliot Engel (D-NY) Lois Frankel (D-FL) Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ) David Kustoff (R-TN) ∗Andy Levin (D-MI) ∗Mike Levin (D-CA) Alan Lowenthal (D-CA) Nita Lowey (D-NY) ∗Elaine Luria (D-VA) Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) ∗Dean Phillips (D-MN) Jamie Raskin (D-MD) ∗Max Rose (D-NY) Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) Adam Schiff (D-CA) Brad Schneider (D-IL) ∗Kim Schrier (D-WA) Brad Sherman (D-CA) ∗Elissa Slotkin (D-VA) Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL) ∗Susan Wild (D-PA) John Yarmuth (D-KY) Lee Zeldin (R-NY) Jewish Senate Members in the 116th Congress (January 3, 2019) (∗ indicates freshman): Michael Bennet (D-CO) Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) Ben Cardin (D-MD) Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) Jacky Rosen (D-NV)∗ Bernie Sanders (D-VT) Brian Schatz (D-HI) Charles Schumer (D-NY) Ron Wyden (D-OR)

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Some ambiguity exists about the Jewish identity of Suzanne Bonamici and Mike Levin, the former a non-Jew married to a Jew (but attending synagogue with her family) and the latter the offspring of an intermarriage, raised in both his mother’s Catholic faith and his father’s Jewish faith and describing himself as “culturally Jewish” (http://sdjewishjournal.com/sdjj/january-2019/no-gambler-an-interviewwith-congressman-mike-levin/). A similar issue surrounds Michael Bennet (D-CO), whose mother is Jewish and whose father is Christian, who said he was “proud” of both heritages, but is not known to describe himself as Jewish; in May 2019, Bennet announced his candidacy for president. The Democrats’ House victory made the ranking members of the chamber’s 24 committees in the old Congress—the leaders of the minority Democrats—into committee chairs in the new Congress. That meant that six of the committees, one-­ fourth of the total, would now be chaired by Jewish members. Two of them, now among Congress’s most visible figures, would lead the congressional investigations of the Trump-Russia affair: Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) chairing the Judiciary Committee and Adam Schiff (D-CA) chairing the Intelligence Committee. As a result, Adam Schiff played a major role in the impeachment investigations faced by Trump in 2019. Two other new Jewish chairs would head committees that oversaw US-Israel relations: Eliot Engel at Foreign Affairs and Nita Lowey at Appropriations—which, among other things, handles aid to Israel. The two remaining Jewish committee chairs were Budget Chairman John Yarmuth (D-KY) and Ethics Chairman Ted Deutch (D-FL). New Yorkers Engel and Lowey, representing the southern and northern halves of Westchester County respectively, were among seven pairs of Jewish representatives and one trio—17 members in all, three-fifths of the Jewish total—serving districts that adjoined one another. The others were Jerry Nadler and newcomer Max Rose along the Brooklyn waterfront; Bradley Schneider and Jan Schakowsky in Chicago and its northern suburbs; Adam Schiff and Brad Sherman in Los Angeles’ San Fernando Valley; Steve Cohen and David Kustoff in Memphis and its western suburbs; Josh Gottheimer of New Jersey and Susan Wild of Pennsylvania, whose districts meet along a 35-mile stretch of the Delaware River; newcomers Andy Levin and Elissa Slotkin, whose suburban Detroit districts met at a single traffic intersection; and the veteran trio of Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, Ted Deutch, and Lois Frankel lined up from south to north in South Florida. Ironically, the district represented by Kustoff, the only Republican on this list, was next door to that of Cohen, the most combatively liberal Jewish member. The significance of this phenomenon of clustered Jewish representatives is not clear, but given the high proportion of such cases it seems to deserve further study. At the outset it should be noted that more than half of all Jewish House members appear to represent districts with significant Jewish populations, including at least 12 of the 17 in clustered districts. The relationship between Jewish House members and Jewish voters deserves in-depth examination. On the Senate side, Jacky Rosen (D-NV), a Democrat and a former synagogue president, ousted Republican incumbent Dean Heller, becoming the ninth Jewish

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senator, all Democrats. Also of note in the 2018 midterms, two Jews, both Democrats, were elected state governors. Jared Polis became the first Jewish governor of Colorado and the first openly gay governor of any state. And in Illinois, billionaire J.B. Pritzker, a major donor to the Democratic Party and to Jewish causes whose family founded and controls the Hyatt Hotel chain, became that state’s third Jewish governor. Maintaining their familiar voting profile, Jews in 2018 were considerably more likely to support Democrats than Republicans. While final vote tallies (https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/house-charts/2018-house-popular-vote-tracker) showed Americans overall preferring Democrats to Republicans by 53% to 45%, exit polls showed Jewish voters favored Democrats by 79% to 17% (https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/07/how-religious-groups-voted-in-the-midterm-elections/) or: (https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls). But there was another way to look at these numbers. The election was held just ten days after the mass murder of Jews in a Pittsburgh synagogue, allegedly by a right-wing white nationalist, widely blamed on President Trump’s divisive rhetoric, and just a year after Trump described a Klan/neo-Nazi/white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, as including “some very fine people.” In that context, the 17% of Jews voting Republican in 2018 presumably represent a “rock-bottom, never-Democratic” hard core of Republican Jews willing to dismiss Trump’s seeming flirtation with the far right. While admittedly a small share of the Jewish vote, it exceeded the approximately 10% that Republican presidential candidates had achieved among Jews in 1940, 1944, 1948, 1964, and 1992 (https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-voting-record-in-u-s-presidential-elections). And there were signs that demographic shifts in the American Jewish community could bring future gains to the Republican column. First, there were about a half-­ million Russian-born Jews and their children in the country whose historical memory of state socialism made most of them politically conservative. Second, and even more significant, might be the future growth of the Orthodox population, who tend to be more socially conservative and hawkish than other Jews. Politically, Orthodox Jews tend to self-identify as Republican or leaning Republican far more than the non-Orthodox. According to a study by the Pew Research Center, while only 18% of non-Orthodox Jews identified with or leaned Republican, 57% of the Orthodox did. In the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, 7% of US Jewish adults were Orthodox. In the 2013 Pew Survey (A Portrait of Jewish Americans), 10% of Jewish adults were Orthodox. While this increase is not statistically significant (particularly given the different methodologies of the two surveys), the change is in the expected direction. And Orthodox Jews are much younger than was the case 25 years ago and are much less likely to be Orthodox in Name Only (OINO), meaning that they do not just call themselves Orthodox, but also behave in a truly Orthodox manner. This future increase in Orthodox will largely be due to a considerably higher birthrate—an average of 4.1 children per family as compared to 1.7 children for non-Orthodox families. So, in Detroit, for example, while 9% of Jewish households are Orthodox, such is the case for 15% of Jewish adults, and 37% of Jewish children.

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3.2  The Israel Factor For both the Russians and the Orthodox—and other Jews as well—the steadily widening gulf between the parties over support for Israel has increased the attractiveness of the Republicans. A much-publicized survey by the Pew Research Center in January 2018 asked whether respondents sympathized more with Israel or the Palestinians in their conflict. It found that 79% of self-identified Republicans chose Israel while 6% favored the Palestinians. Among Democrats, 27% sided with Israel and 25% with the Palestinians. (The remainder in both cases either chose both or neither.) A similar survey by the Gallup organization two months later found Republicans siding with Israel at a rate of 87% and Democrats at 49%. An analysis by the Jewish Virtual Library (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org) of Gallup polls from 1975 to 2019 indicates that preference for Israel among persons over age 45 averaged 64% among Republicans and 45% among Democrats; preference for Palestinians averaged 10% among Republicans and 18% among Democrats. In polls by both Gallup and Pew, up until about 2001, the two parties’ sympathies with Israel and the Palestinians rose and fell in close tandem, separated by a gap of about 8–10 points, well below the 44-year average gap of nearly 20 points. After 2001, though, the parties began to diverge dramatically, with Republicans’ sympathy for Israel rising and Democrats’ plummeting until the two parties show, in 2019, a 40-point (Gallup) or 50-point (Pew) gap. A further study by Pew in January 2018 subdivided the two parties into their moderate and more extreme wings, the latter being conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats. In this new four-way breakdown, three of the four subgroups sympathized more with Israel, albeit by varying margins; only the fourth group, liberal Democrats, sided more with Palestinians. Among Conservative Republicans, 81% preferred Israel versus 5% preferring Palestinians; moderate Republicans preferred Israel by 70% to 8%; 35% of moderate Democrats chose Israel and 17% the Palestinians; and liberal Democrats preferred the Palestinians by 35% to 19%. Notably, the gap between the two parties widened significantly between 2016 and 2018. For conservative Republicans, the percentage supporting Israel remained about the same (79% and 81%). For moderates, the percentage increased from 65% to 70%. Among Democrats, in contrast, a sharp decrease is seen in pro-Israel feeling. Among moderate Democrats, pro-Israel sympathies decreased from 53% to 35%. Among liberal Democrats, pro-Israel sentiment decreased from 33% to 19%; and pro-Palestinian feeling increased from 22% to 35%. The release of these polls showing declining levels of grass-roots Democratic sympathy for Israel put party leaders on the defensive in facing Jewish voters, donors, and wavering centrists in swing states. (The significant decrease in support among Democrats in just two years is somewhat suspect—eds.) These findings also reinforced the widespread assumption that Israel’s standing among Democrats and liberals suffered from Israel’s close identification with Donald Trump. Trump fared particularly well among Israelis— and their strongest American supporters—simply by contrast with Barack Obama, who was widely

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disliked by Israelis and hawkish American Jews. Asked in a Ma’agar Mohot poll in February 2016 which US president over the past 30 years was “the worst for Israel,” 63% of Israelis chose Obama. Not only had Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu enthusiastically embraced Trump following the November 2016 US election, but Israel’s right and center were reportedly cheering for Trump even before his election, when it emerged that his top Middle East advisors would be three Orthodox Jews with hawkish views on the conflict: his bankruptcy lawyer David Friedman; his company’s executive vice-president and chief legal counsel Jason Greenblatt; and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner. Friedman was a particularly active supporter of the Israeli right, serving as president of American Friends of Bet El Yeshiva Center, effectively the chief fundraiser for a key bastion of the settler movement, from 2011 until he was named US ambassador to Israel in February 2017. Kushner and his family were donors to Friedman’s Bet El charity and similar causes, and Netanyahu had been an occasional visitor in their home. Greenblatt, named presidential special representative for international negotiations in January 2017, was named to head the president’s Middle East peace team, which also included Kushner and Friedman. In a rare interview with PBS NewsHour in July 2019, Greenblatt said that he “can’t think of single instances” in which Israel had made mistakes, that he regarded Israel as the victim in the conflict, and that he preferred to refer to Israeli settlements in the West Bank as “communities” rather than settlements. Netanyahu himself told Trump directly that “Israel has never had a better friend than you,” during the March 2019 signing ceremony where Trump formally recognized Israel’s 1981 de facto annexation of the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in 1967. A 37-nation survey conducted by Pew in June 2017, six  months into Trump’s presidency, found that Israel was one of just two countries where a majority expressed confidence in Trump: Israelis’ approval of Trump stood at 69%, topped only by the Philippines at 78%. Yet, some observers questioned whether Trump’s embrace of Israel and its prime minister or the Democrats’ growing grass-roots disenchantment with the Jewish state were necessarily decisive in explaining American Jewish political behavior. Surveys of Jewish opinion had shown for decades that Israel does not figure highly in American Jews’ voting choices. When asked to name the most important issue when deciding for whom to vote, only 6–8% chose US-Israel relations, far behind the strong double-digit figures for such concerns as healthcare, economy/jobs, and national security. And yet, a 2015 American Jewish Committee survey that for the first time asked respondents to name their first, second, and third most important voting issues indicated that Israel was considered one of the top three by 22%, suggesting that American support for Israel may be playing a more significant role in Jewish voters’ decision-making than previously known.

Chapter 4

American Jews and the International Arena (August 2018–July 2019): The US, Israel, and the Middle East Mitchell Bard

Any time Israel can avoid a major armed conflict, it is a good year; nevertheless, 2018–2019 had a Dickensian quality as it was the best of times for the alliance between the governments of the US and Israel, but the worst (or at least very bad) times for relations between Israelis and American Jews. Paradoxically, the former was partially responsible for the latter. Times are always complicated when it comes to American and Israeli Jews and their governments, but this year had a series of challenges, many of which were atypical. The political upheaval in Israel was unusual even for that tumultuous system. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was under siege from multiple allegations of criminal activity, his government unexpectedly fell due to disagreements over drafting yeshiva students, a variety of legislative initiatives were introduced that critics labeled undemocratic, and the inability of Netanyahu to form a new _ government triggered a new election. The political turmoil occurred while Palestinians continued protesting in Gaza, Iran and Hezbollah were attempting to establish beachheads in Syria from which to attack Israel, Israeli relations were improving with Egypt and the Gulf States and troubling new discoveries were made about Iran’s effort to build a nuclear bomb. Netanyahu was helped by his friendship with President Trump, who announced US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and ratcheted up pressure on both Iran and the Palestinians. Netanyahu’s closeness to Trump, meanwhile, exacerbated existing tensions with American Jews, most of whom loathe Trump. Liberal American Jews, already upset about what they view as the lack of religious pluralism in Israel, were angered further when Netanyahu reneged on an agreement to provide egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall, his government’s adoption of the Nation State Law many

M. Bard (*) American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Jewish Virtual Library, Chevy Chase, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_4

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viewed as discriminatory, and his pre-election campaign pledge to annex Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Adding to the toxic mix was the start of the US presidential campaign in which more than 20 Democrats were vying for the nomination to face Trump in 2020. Given the overwhelming number of Jews in the party, it is no great leap of imagination to expect the Democratic nominee to get most of the Jewish vote (see Chap. 2 in this volume). The positions of many of the candidates are troubling for some Jewish voters, however, as some want to reverse some of the policies Trump adopted that they favored, such as withdrawing from the Iran deal. For the most part, the candidates’ views appear similar to those of traditional Democrats who have been reliably pro-Israel, but not uncritical. The cozy relationship between Jews and Democrats was also shaken in 2019 by the outspokenness of two freshman members of Congress who support the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement and made several antisemitic remarks.

4.1  New House Members Generate Controversy While Congress has always had critics of Israel, none have received more attention than newcomers Reps. Ilan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), both supporters of the BDS movement, whose antisemitic comments roiled the Democratic Party and prompted discussion about whether the party was turning on Israel. The two women had been in office only a few weeks before they ignited controversy. Omar came to Congress having made antisemitic statements in the past, notably this 2012 tweet: “Israel has hypnotized the world, may Allah awaken the people and help them see the evil doings of Israel.”1 After taking office, she retweeted a post describing how she and Rep. Tlaib were facing punishment from House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) for criticizing Israel. “It’s all about the Benjamins, baby,” Omar wrote in response, adding that the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) could be paying politicians to take pro-Israel positions.2 She later further impugned the motives of Israel’s supporters and intimated Jews were guilty of dual loyalty when she said, “I want to talk about the political influence in this country that says it is okay to push for allegiance to a foreign country.”3 This remark was condemned in a joint statement by Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Majority Whip James E. Clyburn, Assistant Speaker Ben Ray Luján, Caucus Chairman Hakeem Jeffries and Caucus Vice Chair Katherine Clark:

1  Mike Brest, “Rep. Omar Defends Tweet Claiming, ‘Israel Has Hypnotized The World,’ Says It’s Not About Religion,” Daily Caller, (January 16, 2019). 2  Victoria Albert, Rep. Ilhan Omar Criticized for ‘Anti-Semitic’ Tweet, Daily Beast, (February 11, 2019). 3  Zack Beauchamp, “The Ilhan Omar anti-Semitism controversy, explained, Vox,” (March 6, 2019).

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We are and will always be strong supporters of Israel in Congress because we understand that our support is based on shared values and strategic interests. Legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies is protected by the values of free speech and democratic debate that the United States and Israel share. But Congresswoman Omar’s use of anti-Semitic tropes and prejudicial accusations about Israel’s supporters is deeply offensive. We condemn these remarks and we call upon Congresswoman Omar to immediately apologize for these hurtful comments.4

Several individual Democrats also reproached Omar, including Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) who said, “Anti-Semitism in any form is unacceptable, and it’s shocking to hear a member of Congress invoke the anti-Semitic trope of ‘Jewish money’” and Rep. Nita Lowey (D-NY) who commented, “There is no defense for invoking anti-­ Semitic tropes.”5 Omar’s response to her colleagues was another tweet: “I should not be expected to have allegiance/pledge support to a foreign country in order to serve my country in Congress or serve on committee.” Former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel wrote in The Atlantic: “No one is questioning the right of members of Congress and others to criticize Israeli policies. But Omar is crossing a line that should not be crossed in political discourse. Her remarks are not anti-Israel; they are anti-Semitic.”6 Speaker Pelosi yielded to her progressive colleagues, such as Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), who insisted that there must be “equity in our outrage,” that all forms of hate needed to be denounced, and that “there is no hierarchy of hurt.”7 The House subsequently adopted a watered-down resolution that did not condemn Omar and, rather than simply express its opposition to antisemitism, condemned nearly every form of bigotry. Trump and other Republicans criticized the Democrats’ timidity. Trump tweeted, “It is shameful that House Democrats won’t take a stronger stand against Antisemitism in their conference. Antisemitism has fueled atrocities throughout history and it’s inconceivable they will not act to condemn it!”8 Republicans, and some Jews, argued that the failure to act more forcefully against Omar, for example, removing her from the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, was normalizing antisemitism at the highest level of American politics and would seep into other parts of society as it already has on college campuses.9

4  “Democratic Leadership Statement on Anti-Semitic Comments of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar,” Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, (February 11, 2019), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/21119/. Accessed July 25, 2019. 5  Lindsey McPherson, “House Democratic leaders, chairmen criticize Omar for ‘anti-Semitic trope,’” Roll Call, (February 11, 2019). 6  Rahm Emanuel, “I’ve Faced the Charge of Dual Loyalty,” The Atlantic, (March 7, 2019). 7  “Rep. Pressley Issues Statement in Support of Rep. Omar,” Press Release, US Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley, (March 6, 2019). 8  Natalie Andrews and Kristina Peterson, “House Democrats Split Over Measure Tied to Ilhan Omar’s Comments,” Wall Street Journal, (March 6, 2019). 9  See, for example, Mort Klein, “Morton Klein: Democratic Party Fails to Condemn Antisemitic Democrats,” Breitbart, (March 21, 2019) and Victoria Albert, “Trump: Ilhan Omar Should Resign

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Democrats responded by talking about the broader problems of racism and violence in America and attributing some of the blame to the president. Omar continued to enrage friends and foes alike. In January 2019, for example, Omar compared Israel to Iran and said, “We still uphold it as a democracy in the Middle East. I almost chuckle because I know that if we see that any other society we would criticize it, call it out.” She also said she was upset that the US did not have “an equal approach” when dealing with Israel and the Palestinians and was aggravated by America’s pro-Israel bias. She also made demonstrably false statements, such as “Israel institute[s] laws that recognize it as a Jewish state and does not recognize the other religions that are living in it.”10 Meanwhile, Tlaib also proved to be a lightning rod for critics of the Democrats. On her first day in office, Tlaib displayed a map with a note posted over Israel that read “Palestine.”11 She also expressed the popular antisemitic canard that Jews have dual loyalty and care more about Israel than the US. “They forgot what country they represent,” Tlaib tweeted in reference to supporters of anti-boycott legislation. “This is the US where boycotting is a right & part of our historical fight for freedom & equality.”12 Later, she claimed the comments were not directed at Jewish members. Tlaib also provoked Jewish ire with this comment in May: There’s always kind of a calming feeling when I think of the tragedy of the Holocaust, that it was my ancestors—Palestinians—who lost their land and some lost their lives, their livelihood, their human dignity, their existence, in many ways, has been wiped out … in the name of trying to create a safe haven for Jews, post-Holocaust, post-tragedy and the horrific persecution of Jews across the world at that time. And I love the fact that it was my ancestors that provided that in many ways.13

While much of the uproar over her comment focused on whether she was minimizing the Holocaust by saying she had a “calming feeling” when she thought about it, her falsification of history was undeniable. In the same interview where she mentioned the Holocaust, Tlaib expressed her support for a one-state solution. This, of course, means Israel must disappear and be replaced by a state based on “equality” where no one is oppressed and everyone “can feel free and safe.” Omar later retweeted a New York Times op-ed that suggested Jesus was a Palestinian, which Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate and director of the Global

from House or Foreign Affairs Committee Over Controversial Israel Tweets,” Daily Beast, (February 12, 2019). 10  Lukas Mikelionis, “Rep. Ilhan Omar slammed for saying she ‘chuckles’ when Israel is called a democracy, compares it to Iran,” Fox News, (January 31, 2019). 11  Aaron Bandler, “Rep. Tlaib’s D.C. Office Map Has ‘Palestine’ Sticky Note Over Israel,” Jewish Journal, (January 3, 2019). 12   @Rashida Tlaib, Twitter, January 6, 2019, https://twitter.com/rashidatlaib/statu s/1082095303325609984?lang=en Accessed July 29, 2019. 13  Allison Kaplan Sommer, “Tlaib Says She Is Humbled Her Ancestors Provided ‘Safe Haven’ for Jews After Holocaust,” Haaretz, (May 11, 2019).

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Social Action Agenda at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, called “grotesque.”14 The Times subsequently issued a correction: “Because of an editing error, an article last Saturday referred incorrectly to Jesus’s background. While he lived in an area that later came to be known as Palestine, Jesus was a Jew who was born in Bethlehem.”15 Defenders of Omar and Tlaib adopted a new strategy—accusing their critics of inciting violence and putting the congresswomen’s lives in danger. One of the first examples followed the uproar over antisemitic remarks by Rep. Omar. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) admitted that Omar may have used antisemitic tropes but said her detractors “should not be using Islamophobic language and imagery that incites violence.” A few weeks later, after Omar’s comment that “some people did something” on 9/11 set off another firestorm, she accused her critics of engaging in “dangerous incitement.” Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) defended her and accused Trump of “inciting violence against a sitting congresswoman” when he denounced her. When Rabbi Shmuley Boteach took out a full-page ad in New York Times pointing out the speciousness of Tlaib’s comment that Palestinians lost their land, dignity, and lives “in the name of trying to create a safe haven for Jews, post the Holocaust,” one of the most vitriolic critics of Israel, James Zogby, supported Tlaib’s position and tweeted, “It’s not an ad, it’s incitement.”16

4.1.1  Bipartisanship Continues While the new members of the House provoked controversy, they had no impact on legislation proposed to strengthen the US-Israel relationship. Support for Israel remains bipartisan, with both parties believing in strategic cooperation, maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge and generally backing its position regarding its Arab neighbors. In 2018, for example, Congress approved the terms of the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding which promised Israel a record $38 billion in military aid over 10 years. While Omar and Tlaib became the first House members to openly support BDS, 398 members voted for a resolution opposing the global boycott movement against Israel in July 2019. No one spoke in opposition to the resolution during the floor debate. Though far weaker than legislation adopted in the Senate, which would make it illegal under federal statute to boycott Israel and grant federal protection to

 Aaron Bandler, “Wiesenthal Center: ‘Grotesque’ for Omar, NYT to Say Jesus Was Palestinian,” Jewish Journal, (April 22, 2019). 15  Eric V Copage, “As a Black Child in Los Angeles, I Couldn’t Understand Why Jesus Had Blue Eyes,” New York Times, (April 19, 2019). 16  Shaked Karabelnicoff, “Boteach’s NYT Ad Skewered On Twitter For Attacking Rashida Tlaib,” Jerusalem Post, (June 5, 2019). 14

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state and local governments that refuse to invest in or contract with companies which boycott Israel, the vote put the House on record as condemning the boycott.17 The House also passed the US-Israel Cooperation Enhancement and Regional Security Act, which authorized increasing military aid to Israel to $38 billion over 10  years and added another $55 million for other cooperative programs. It also expands existing cooperation in several areas, including cyber security, industrial research, space, desalination, post-traumatic stress and food security.18 The Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act was also adopted with bipartisan support. This legislation imposes sanctions on those who support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The bill also calls on the administration to cut off and sanction international networks of support for terrorist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.19 Senate action and the president’s signature were still needed for these bills to become law; nevertheless, they sent a strong signal that the US Congress, and specifically the Democratic-controlled House, have not wavered in support of Israel. One other piece of legislation provoked controversy from both Israelis and Palestinians. The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act was passed unanimously in the House and Senate in 2018. This law was designed to allow American victims of terrorism to sue countries receiving US foreign aid in American courts over alleged complicity in “acts of war.”20 The legislation was prompted by the decision of a circuit court to throw out a judgement against the PLO due to a lack of jurisdiction. The Palestinians subsequently said they would not accept any US aid and Israelis worried this would threaten security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. Congress subsequently was considering amending the law to allow security and humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians.

4.2  Iran For the Israeli government, the threat from Iran is the top priority. The Netanyahu government was elated when Trump pulled the US out of the nuclear deal negotiated by his predecessor (the JCPOA) and has cheered on the administration’s imposition of sanctions aimed at exerting “maximum pressure” to bring Iran back to the negotiating table.  “House Passes Resolution Opposing Boycott Against Israel,” Jewish Virtual Library, https:// www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/house-passes-resolution-opposing-boycott-against-israel. Accessed July 28, 2019. 18  “US-Israel Cooperation Enhancement and Regional Security Act (H.R. 1837),” AIPAC Bill Summary, (March 2019). 19  Omri Nahmias, “House Passes Bill That Calls To Sanction Palestinian Terror Groups,” Jerusalem Post, (July 25, 2019). 20  Yolande Knell, “US stops all aid to Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza, BBC News, (February 1, 2019). 17

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Over the past year, a variety of new sanctions were imposed on Iranian officials, government entities, and individuals, in addition to companies and individuals outside Iran doing business with the Islamic Republic or aiding its military efforts. The administration targeted the iron, steel, aluminum, copper and petroleum industries. Despite warnings it would provoke violence against American assets, the administration also designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Proponents of the deal had argued the US could not successfully impose unilateral sanctions; however, they were proven wrong as governments and businesses were given the choice of trading with Iran or doing business with the US. Not surprisingly, Iran was the loser. To give an example of some of the impact of the sanctions: • Volkswagen AG agreed to end almost all its business in Iran. Other German companies, Adidas AG, and Daimler AG, have also said they will scale back or abandon their activities in Iran.21 • Despite Berlin’s pledge to keep the Iranian nuclear deal alive, German banks began refusing to process payments from Iran. Only 40–50 of Germany’s 900 cooperative banks and scores of Austrian banks are still processing payments linked to Iranian deals.22 • South Korea’s Hyundai Engineering & Construction company scrapped a $521 million deal to build a petrochemical complex in Iran.23 • Germany’s largest telecom company, Deutsche Telekom, reportedly cut off phone and internet service to Iran’s Bank Melli, which is accused of funneling money to terrorist groups.24 • The Chinese Bank of Kunlun Co. told its clients in April 2019 it was ceasing transfers with Iran. Huawei, the world’s second-largest smartphone maker, laid off most of its Iranian staff and Lenovo, the world’s largest computer manufacturer, “banned its Dubai-based distributors from selling to Iran after a warning from the US Treasury Department.”25 • On March 25, 2019, France announced that it would halt flights to and from French airports by Iran’s Mahan Air. The move followed Germany’s January ban on flights by the Iranian airline.26  Nick Wadhams, “US Says VW to Leave Iran in Symbolic Win for Trump, Bloomberg, (September 19, 2018). 22  Mathias Brüggmann, Elisabeth Atzler and Frank Wiebe, “German banks pull plug on trade with Iran,” Handelsblatt, (October 2, 2018). 23  “South Korea’s Hyundai E&C cancels $521 million petrochemicals deal, cites Iran financing failure,” Reuters, (October 29, 2018). 24  Benjamin Weinthal, “Germany’s largest telecom company stops service for Iranian ‘terror bank,’” Jerusalem Post, (November 26, 2018). 25  Benoit Faucon and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Asian Companies Pull Back from Iran Amid US Pressure,” Wall Street Journal, (April 24, 2019). 26  Farzin Nadimi, “How Sanctions Are Affecting Iran’s Airline Industry,” Washington Institute, (April 17, 2019). 21

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The Trump administration announced April 22, 2019, it would not renew waivers that allowed Italy, Greece, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, China, Turkey, and India to buy Iranian oil without facing US sanctions. “This decision is intended to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero, denying the regime its principal source of revenue,” according to a statement issued by the White House.27 Despite fears by critics that oil prices would spike because of America’s effort to block Iranian exports, the price declined below the level they were at prior to signing the nuclear accord. During the first 2  years of oil sanctions under President Barack Obama, prices spiked to more than $100 per barrel. By contrast, following the imposition of sanctions by President Trump, the price declined. Brent crude prices fell more than 20% from their 4-year peak of $86.74. After ending the waivers, the administration reassured the markets, “The US, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, three of the world’s great energy producers, along with our friends and allies, are committed to ensuring that global oil markets remain adequately supplied.”28 The prediction appeared to be accurate as the price of oil in July was around $55, and this was despite rising tensions in the Persian Gulf. Still, the Europeans, hungry for business opportunities, and petrified of the possibility that Iran might pull out of the deal, have tried to create a mechanism to circumvent American sanctions and placate the Iranians. That mechanism, the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchange (Instex) was designed to evade US sanctions by allowing goods to be bartered between Iranian companies and foreign ones without direct financial transactions or using the dollar. The US vigorously opposed its creation and reiterated the administration’s position that “entities that continue to engage in sanctionable activity involving Iran risk severe consequences that could include losing access to the US financial system and the ability to do business with the United States or US companies.”29 The Iranians were not mollified either, as Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dismissed the trade mechanism as a “bitter joke.”30 The Europeans continued to defend the nuclear deal despite the failure of Iran to moderate its behavior. The EU agreed to impose its own sanctions at the beginning of January 2019 after proof was discovered of Iran’s role in plots to assassinate dissidents on European soil.31 As the US ratcheted up pressure on Iran, the regime became increasingly belligerent and began to play a game of brinksmanship. According to Dennis Ross, the  Nick Wadhams, Glen Carey, and Margaret Talev, “Trump to Escalate Iran Feud by Ending Waivers; Oil Prices Climb,” Bloomberg, (April 21, 2019). 28  Nick Wadhams, Glen Carey, and Margaret Talev, “Trump to Escalate Iran Feud by Ending Waivers; Oil Prices Climb,” Bloomberg, (April 21, 2019). 29  Steven Erlanger, “3 European Nations Create Firm to Trade With Iran, but Will Anyone Use It?” New York Times, (January 31, 2019). 30  “Iran leader dismisses Europe trade mechanism as ‘bitter joke,’” Daily Mail, (March 21, 2019). 31  Taylor Heyman, “EU agrees on sanctions against Iranian intelligence services,” The National, (January 8, 2019); Raf Sanchez, “Iran hired criminals to assassinate dissidents in the Netherlands, Dutch government claims,” The Telegraph, (January 9, 2019). 27

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Iranians decided they could not simply wait for Trump to be defeated because of the impact sanctions were having on their economy. Their currency had already lost 60% of its value, inflation was soaring, and consumer goods were becoming scarcer and provoking civil unrest. The situation was expected to get worse because the administration withdrew waivers granted to eight countries to buy Iranian oil, which was expected to reduce exports from approximately one million barrels a day to as little as 300,000 a day.32 Months before the announcement on the waivers, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani admitted, “Today the country is facing the biggest pressure and economic sanctions in the past 40 years.”33 In an effort to impose costs on the US and its allies, and blackmail the Europeans to work harder to meet their demands to circumvent American sanctions, Iran sabotaged oil tankers, its Houthi allies in Yemen attacked Saudi targets, Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq fired missiles at bases where US forces are located and, on June 20, 2019, shot down an American drone. After the downing of the drone, the administration prepared a retaliatory air strike that Trump called off 10 min before it was scheduled after a general told him that 150 people would probably die in the attack.34 As tensions mounted, talk of the possibility of war increased. As it did, the antisemitic trope of blaming the Jews for pushing America into a conflict with Iran once again rose to the fore. Former Obama adviser Ben Rhodes claimed Netanyahu was pushing the US to confront Iran as did Democratic presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard.35 Another supporter of the nuclear agreement, the Brookings Institution’s Bruce Riedel, wrote a piece headlined, “Don’t let Israel and Saudi Arabia drag the US into another war.”36 The antisemitic Mondoweiss website ran a headline that claimed, “Israel wants the Trump administration to attack Iran, but US mainstream media ignores Netanyahu’s instigating.”37 Mondoweiss apparently missed this NBC headline: “From Bolton To Bibi To Riyadh, Trump Faces Calls For Confronting Iran.”38 And, in the grand tradition of antisemitic conspiracy theories, Philip Giraldi, Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, wrote:

 Dennis Ross, “Will Iran ‘break out’ for a nuclear weapon, and what can Trump do?” The Hill, (July 14, 2019). 33  Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Faces Worst Economic Challenge in 40  Years, President Says,” New York Times, (January 30, 2019). 34  Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Says He Was ‘Cocked and Loaded’ to Strike Iran, but Pulled Back,” New York Times, (June 21, 2019). 35  Seth J.  Frantzman, “US Far Left And Far Right Blame Netanyahu For Trump’s Iran Policy,” Jerusalem Post, (May 19, 2019). 36  Bruce Riedel, “Don’t let Israel and Saudi Arabia drag the US into another war,” Daily Beast, (May 14, 2019). 37  James North, “Israel wants the Trump administration to attack Iran, but US mainstream media ignores Netanyahu’s instigating,” Mondoweiss, (May 6, 2019). 38  “From Bolton To Bibi To Riyadh, Trump Faces Calls For Confronting Iran,” NBCnews, (May 15, 2019). 32

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The United States is moving dangerously forward in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to provoke a war with Iran, apparently based on threat intelligence provided by Israel. The claims made by National Security Advisor John Bolton and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that there is solid evidence of Iran’s intention to attack US forces in the Persian Gulf region is almost certainly a fabrication, possibly deliberately contrived by Bolton and company in collaboration with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.39

Netanyahu did not call on the US to attack Iran; rather he continued to lobby for tougher measures to bring Iran back to the negotiating table to strengthen the nuclear deal by closing the loopholes and including the areas Obama omitted, such as Iran’s production of ballistic missiles and sponsorship of terror. Israelis also had reason to be concerned if the US attacked Iran because of the possibility Hamas and Hezbollah might respond by launching missiles at Israel. Trump, however, appeared averse to a military confrontation, in part because he had campaigned on the promise to avoid foreign entanglements and to withdraw troops from the Middle East. In addition to Iran’s hostile acts, the regime ended all doubt about compliance with the nuclear deal by publicly announcing it planned to exceed the limit on the amount of enriched uranium it would stockpile and then declaring it would ignore the restrictions on uranium enrichment and increase the purity level from 3.67% to 5% with threats to go to 20%—the level it was at prior to the agreement—if the Europeans did not satisfy their demands to counter American sanctions. Despite the violation of the accord, the EU announced it would not “snapback” sanctions as Obama had promised would occur in the event of Iranian transgressions. In an apparent bid to play for time to avoid further inflaming the situation, European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini asserted that none of the signatories to the deal considered the breaches to be significant enough to act. “Technically all the steps that have been taken, and that we regret have been taken, are reversible,” she said following a meeting of EU foreign ministers. “We invite Iran to reverse the steps and go back to full compliance.”40 Before Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement, Iran was already cheating (e.g., by refusing to allow inspections of its military sites—the places most likely to have nuclear research going on) and taking advantage of various loopholes (e.g., work on naval propulsion reactors). German intelligence services also revealed ongoing Iranian efforts to obtain materials for weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Israel disclosed Iran’s secret trove of documents, proving that Iran lied about its past work on developing nuclear weapons and creating the suspicion that the materials were hidden so that the project could resume when the JCPOA expired, if not before. In a speech to the UN in September 2018, Netanyahu said Israel had discovered a warehouse used to store nuclear equipment and material and that Iran had removed 15  kg of undeclared enriched uranium from the facility in August 2018. In July 2019, sources indicated the IAEA found evidence of radioactive materials in the  Philip Giraldi, “Pandering to Israel Means War With Iran,” Strategic Culture Foundation, (May 9, 2019). 40  “Iran nuclear deal breaches not yet significant, EU says,” BBC, (July 15, 2019). 39

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warehouse, which would be a serious breach of the nuclear agreement, but the agency was not making the information public.41 For critics of the agreement, this was more proof of its flaws and the wisdom of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal. Proponents, however, seemed unbothered by the disclosures. Former Secretary of State John Kerry, the architect of the deal, had reportedly advised the Iranians earlier to wait for Trump to leave office.42 Given that several of the Democratic candidates announced they would rejoin the agreement, Iran has reason to hope for a return to the Obama policies. The Netanyahu government would see this as a disaster unless the agreement was modified.

4.3  No More Pretension of Evenhandedness One of the marked changes in US-Israel relations from Obama to Trump has been the tone. While Obama and his top advisors were routinely critical of Israeli actions, particularly regarding settlements. Trump and his advisers have not publicly criticized Israel’s behavior and have mostly applauded it. The shift has been dramatic at the United Nations where Obama ended his term by abstaining on Security Council Resolution 2334 condemning Israeli settlements. Trump’s ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, by contrast, was a vigorous and outspoken champion of Israel before resigning her post at the end of 2018. She is credited with devising a diplomatic strategy of “pairing initiatives hostile to Israel with US-led counter-initiatives that demand UN members hold the other side accountable for its part in the conflict,” according to Michael Wilner. “Resolutions calling on the UN to condemn Hamas and Hezbollah, Haley charged, put members in an uncomfortable dilemma—forcing them either to change course or reveal their biases.”43 Haley’s performance at the UN has made her quite popular in the Jewish community, where she is now a sought-after speaker and viewed by some as a potential future presidential nominee they could support.44 Haley’s interim successor Jonathan Cohen has adopted a lower profile, but the administration has not retreated from its vigorous support for Israel. In February 2019, for example, the US blocked a UN resolution denouncing Israel for expelling international monitors from Hebron.45 In July, the US blocked an attempt by Kuwait, Indonesia, and South Africa to get the  Barak Ravid, “UN finds evidence of radioactive material in Iranian warehouse, Israeli officials say,” Israel’s Channel 13 News, (July 11, 2019). 42  See, for example, editorial “Colluding with Iran,” Washington Times, (September 17, 2018). 43  Michael Wilner, “Top 10 Headlines of 2018: American Politics,” Jerusalem Post, (December 30, 2018). 44  “Jewish Groups Can’t Get Enough Of Nikki Haley, ‘Nikki For President!’” Jerusalem Post, (April 10, 2019). 45  “US Blocks UN Resolution Denouncing Israeli Expulsion of Hebron Monitoring Group,” Reuters, (February 7, 2019). 41

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Security Council to condemn Israel’s demolition of Palestinian homes built illegally on the outskirts of Jerusalem.46 Following his decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the US embassy there from Tel Aviv, the president announced via tweet on March 21, 2019, that the US would recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights upending another longstanding US position. “After 52 years it is time for the United States to fully recognize Israel’s Sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is of critical strategic and security importance to the State of Israel and Regional Stability,” Trump tweeted.47 The Golan decision was welcomed by Netanyahu and most supporters of Israel but, like the Jerusalem decision, sent the foreign policy establishment into apoplexy. The US had resisted taking this step since Israel captured the area in 1973 because of the expectation that a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement would involve a compromise on the Golan Heights. “You don’t change 52 years of US policy in a tweet, 4 days before you’re about to see the Israeli prime minister at the White House and 21 days before he’s running for reelection,” said former State Department official Aaron David Miller. He added that past administrations never considered such a move. “The issue was not recognizing Israeli sovereignty of Golan but trying to facilitate any number of Israeli prime ministers’ efforts to broker an agreement between Israel and Syria,” Miller said.48 Trump, however, recognized the practical reality that while Israel once considered withdrawing from part of the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria, the civil war in Syria had at least for the foreseeable future erased that possibility. The threats of an unstable Syria, Iranian efforts to establish a base there and the presence of Hezbollah and Islamist forces near the border made it clear that any compromise on the Golan would constitute an unreasonable risk to Israel’s security (something opponents of prior negotiations had long maintained). As Miller noted, the decision was also controversial because the announcement came just 3  weeks before Israel’s April election. Although Trump denied it, the announcement was viewed as an effort to help Netanyahu.49 Much like his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, President Trump has used a stick rather than carrots in his approach to the Palestinians, continuing to punish the Palestinians for their unwillingness to change their policies or enter negotiations. The passage of the Taylor Force Act in March 2018 required the administration to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority if it continued to pay convicted terrorists and their families (the Knesset passed a similar law to deduct terrorists’  “US Blocks UN Rebuke of Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Home in East Jerusalem,” Reuters, (July 25, 2019). 47  Jeremy Diamond and Jennifer Hansler, “Trump says it’s time for US to recognize ‘Israel’s Sovereignty over the Golan Heights,’” CNN, (March 22, 2019). 48  Adam Taylor, “No president has recognized Israel’s control of the Golan Heights. Trump changed that with a tweet,” Washington Post, (March 22, 2019). 49  Loveday Morris, “Trump’s statement on Golan Heights sparks accusations of election meddling in Israel,” Washington Post, (March 22, 2019). 46

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salaries from Palestinian taxes collected by Israel)50 and the Palestinians responded by increasing the payments.51 The administration subsequently cut $200  million in aid to the Palestinian Authority52 and later announced it would no longer contribute to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).53 The administration also announced it was ordering the closure of the mission of the Palestinian Liberation Organization because “the PLO has not taken steps to advance the start of direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel,” condemned the US peace plan, and was seeking an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court.54 In a conference call with Jewish leaders soon after the aid cuts, the President said, “I stopped massive amounts of money that we were paying to the Palestinians and the Palestinian leaders. We were—the United States was paying them tremendous amounts of money. And I’d say, you’ll get money, but we’re not paying you until we make a deal. If we don’t make a deal, we’re not paying.”55 In February 2019, the administration announced the US would cut all aid to the Palestinians. That decision was made after the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act came into effect. The US had been providing $60 million for Palestinian security forces. Israel supported the funding because cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security agencies was viewed as one of the few positive relationships and one that helped both sides keep order and prevent the establishment of Hamas terror cells in the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority said it would not accept any American aid, however, because of a fear of lawsuits.56 Netanyahu also upset many officials on both sides of the aisle when he appealed to right-wing voters during his election campaign by declaring his intention to annex the settlements if reelected. Asked if he would annex only the settlement blocs, which most Israelis—and Palestinian negotiators—have agreed would be part of Israel in any two-state solution, Netanyahu said “yes” and added, “I’m going to apply sovereignty, but I don’t distinguish between settlement blocs and the isolated settlement points, because from my perspective every such point of settlement is Israeli,” he said. “We have a responsibility as the Israeli government. I won’t

 “Knesset passes law to deduct terrorists’ salaries from tax funds,” Israel Hayom, (July 3, 2018).  Abbas Keeps on Defying US, Says PA Will Fund “Pay to Slay” Program Until Last Penny,” The Tower, (July 25, 2018). 52  David Brunnstrom, “Trump cuts more than $200 million in US aid to Palestinians,” Reuters, (August 24, 2019). 53  Karen DeYoung, Ruth Eglash and Hazem Balousha, “US ends aid to United Nations agency supporting Palestinian refugees,” Washington Post, (August 31, 2018). 54  “US officially announces closure of PLO mission in Washington,” Times of Israel, (September 10, 2018). 55  “Trump: Iran lost its mojo since I quit nuke deal; I did a great thing for Israel,” Times of Israel, (September 6, 2018). 56  Stephen Farrell and Maayan Lubell, “Trump administration cuts all aid to Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza,” Reuters, (February 1, 2019). 50 51

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uproot anyone and I won’t place them under Palestinian sovereignty. I’ll look out for everyone.”57 This prompted members of Congress to introduce resolutions opposing annexation of the West Bank and calling for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.58 Even some of Israel’s staunchest supporters spoke out. For example, a statement by Reps. Eliot Engel (D-NY), Nita Lowey (D-NY), Ted Deutch, (D-FL) and Brad Schneider (D-IL) said: “As strong, life-long supporters of Israel, a US-Israel relationship rooted in our shared values, and the two-state solution, we are greatly concerned by the possibility of Israel taking unilateral steps to annex the West Bank.”59 South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham, another staunch friend of Israel, cosponsored a resolution with Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) calling for a two-state solution. “I can’t envision a one-state solution,” Graham said. “It won’t work. I mean, you’d have to disenfranchise the Palestinians, (and) that won’t work. If you let them vote, as one state, they’ll overwhelm the Israelis. That won’t work. So if you want to have a democratic, secure Jewish state, I think you have to have two states…”.60 The administration reaction was more muted in part because officials did not want to comment just days before the Israeli election. Hence Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refused to answer questions on the subject.61 When asked what the US would do if Israel unilaterally annexed the West Bank, US ambassador to Israel David Friedman said, “We really don’t have a view until we understand how much, on what terms, why does it make sense, why is it good for Israel, why is it good for the region, why does it not create more problems than it solves.” Friedman added, “These are all things that we’d want to understand, and I don’t want to prejudge.”62 Friedman also said, however, “Under certain circumstances, I think Israel has the right to retain some, but unlikely all, of the West Bank,” which supporters of settlements and their opponents interpreted as an endorsement of Netanyahu’s position when, in fact, the substance of the remark was

 David M. Halbfinger, “Netanyahu Vows to Start Annexing West Bank, in Bid to Rally the Right,” New York Times, (April 6, 2019). 58  Barak Ravid, “Senate draft resolution challenges Netanyahu on West Bank annexation,” Axios, (June 6, 2019). 59  Ron Kampeas, “Some of Israel’s best American friends worried by Netanyahu’s annexation talk,” JTA, (April 13, 2019). 60  Eric H.  Yoffie, “Trump Ally Lindsey Graham: America’s Most Unlikely Campaigner Against Israeli Annexation,” Haaretz, (June 19, 2019). 61  Amir Tibon, “Trump Admin Refuses to Discuss Netanyahu’s Remarks on Annexing West Bank,” Haaretz, (April 8, 2019). 62  Ron Kampeas, “David Friedman gave Netanyahu half a nod for West Bank annexation. What happens next?” JTA, (June 11, 2019). 57

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consistent with longstanding US policy as well as UN Security Council Resolution 242.63

4.4  The “Ultimate Deal” The Palestinians dismissed the Trump administration early on and decided it would have nothing to do with it. This was a case of cutting off their nose to spite their face as it gained them no sympathy. In fact, the world, especially their fellow Arabs, were showing increasing signs of weariness with the Palestinian issue. No one was rushing to their defense or to replace American funding. The administration’s three top officials working on the much-anticipated peace plan—Jared Kushner, David Friedman, and Jason Greenblatt—are seen by the Palestinians (and others) as unabashed supporters of Israel. Friedman, America’s ambassador to Israel, had been a supporter of the settlements before entering the government and his statements and behavior, such as using a sledgehammer at the unveiling of a new archaeological site in Jerusalem’s City of David, which lies underneath the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan, reinforced the view among Palestinians that he is not an honest broker.64 The unveiling of the peace initiative was repeatedly delayed as Kushner claimed to be refining it. The plan to release it after Israel’s April election had to be shelved when Netanyahu failed to form a government and new elections had to be scheduled for September. The administration does not want to present the plan until a new government is in place, which would probably be at least several weeks after the election, which would mean delaying it until near the end of 2019. At that point, the administration may be reluctant to forward a plan that will surely be contentious just prior to the 2020 US election. Meanwhile, the administration did release what it figured would be the less-­ controversial economic component of its plan at a conference in Bahrain in July 2019. Kushner explained the rationale: “One who is more hopeful and sees an opportunity for his or her family will put energy into pursuing opportunity, instead of blaming others for their current misfortune.” He said, “That is why agreeing on an economic pathway forward is a necessary precondition to what has previously been an unsolvable political situation.”65 Preparations for the conference got off to an inauspicious start, however, when the Palestinians announced they were boycotting the meeting, arguing that the US was essentially trying to “buy off Palestinian political aspirations by financial  Ron Kampeas, “Friedman Gave Netanyahu Half A Nod For West Bank Annexation,” JTA, (June 13, 2019). 64  Raphael Ahren, “US envoy Friedman defends sledgehammering open controversial archaeological site,” Times of Israel, (July 1, 2019). 65  Herb Keinon, “Kushner In Bahrain: Economic Prosperity Is Pathway To Mideast Peace,” Jerusalem Post, (June 26, 2019). 63

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means.”66 Without Palestinian participation, it became politically impossible to invite the Israelis (though some business people attended) so the conference was held without the parties involved. The Arab states ignored the Palestinians’ call to boycott the conference, though some did send lower-level officials. Palestinian businesspeople were also warned not to attend by the Palestinian Authority. The 15 who did were arrested, threatened and harassed when they returned.67 Despite being impoverished and almost completely dependent on foreign aid, the Palestinians thumbed their noses at the offer of investments worth billions of dollars in part because they would be “administered by a multilateral development bank” rather than the corruption-laced Palestinian Authority to ensure that “all the Palestinians—not just the wealthy and connected—share in the benefits of peace.” The 38-page “Peace to Prosperity” plan calls on Arab states to supply $50 billion in development aid to the Palestinians.68 Two of the goals are to double the GDP of the Palestinians and create one million jobs over the next 10  years. The funding includes money to create economic opportunities for women and grants for a variety of projects, from building hospitals to promoting tourism to upgrading the Gaza power plant. It also seeks to encourage regional integration and cooperation. While the Palestinians rejected the initiative out of hand, the Israelis had one major objection, the $5 billion proposal for a highway and railway between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They fear this indicates the administration sees the two areas as a single territorial unit, possibly a Palestinian state (though the administration has never said this was part of their vision) and would pose a security threat. This is similar, however, to the proposal Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to in 2000 and other two-state plans have included a link of some kind between Gaza and the West Bank. Greenblatt tried to reassure the Israelis during the conference when he said, “We are not suggesting any corridor whatsoever that doesn’t completely make Israel comfortable that it will not be a danger to Israel.”69 None of the Arab states jumped at the opportunity to put up the money, especially given that the US did not offer any monetary contribution. Nevertheless, Ahmed Charai argued that “Kushner’s great insight is that economic development should come first and shape the discussion for a political solution. His second insight is that a single ‘grand bargain’ is not realistic; that an evolutionary and gradual approach that builds trust along with economic milestones is more likely to

66  David Makovsky, “Jared Kushner’s all-or-nothing mistake in the Middle East,” Washington Post, (July 1, 2019). 67  Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hebron Businessman Who Attended Bahrain: I’m Afraid For My Life,” Jerusalem Post, (July 1, 2019). 68  “Peace to Prosperity,” The White House, Undated, released in July 2019. 69  Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu wary of West Bank-Gaza corridor in Trump peace plan,” Axios, (July 16, 2019).

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succeed.”70 Others argued, however, that it was pointless to focus on economics without fulfilling Palestinians’ political demands.71

4.5  Syria Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel has been actively engaged in proactive measures to prevent Iran from establishing bases in Syria, to prevent Hezbollah and other hostile forces from being ensconced near Israel’s northern border, and to prevent the transfer of weapons to Lebanon for Hezbollah. The US has tacitly supported Israel’s bombing campaign targeting Iranian bases, arms depots, and convoys smuggling weapons. Trump shocked and alarmed Israel, however, when he announced in December 2018 he was planning to withdraw all US forces from Syria because, he said, ISIS had been defeated. Israelis feared this would clear the way for Iran to strengthen its position in the country and allow its proxies to pose a greater threat to Israel. Trump was convinced to reverse the decision after pressure from a bipartisan group of lawmakers.72 He subsequently announced he was sending 1500 additional troops to the region—not to Syria—to reinforce security for existing American and allied forces, and to deter attacks from Iran.73 The US was also working with Israel to remove all Iranian forces from Syria. In June 2019, an unprecedented trilateral conference of Israeli, Russian, and American national security advisers met in Jerusalem to discuss countering Iran. Russia held the key because of its dominant role in protecting the Assad regime in Syria and its good relations with both Israel and Iran. Though Russian adviser Nikolai Patrushev said Israeli airstrikes in Syria were “undesirable,” Russia has not interfered and reportedly has an unwritten agreement that it will not do so if none of its interests are threatened. Still, he rejected the American and Israeli view that Iran represents “the main threat to regional security.” He made no promises about encouraging or forcing Iranian forces to leave Syria. He said that he was aware of Israel’s security concerns and was discussing the issue with the Iranians but emphasized that Iran “was and remains our ally and partner.”74

 Ahmed Charai, “Kushner’s Middle East Plan Wins Its First Round,” The National Interest, (June 29, 2019). 71  Loveday Morris, “Kushner presents vision of a Middle East at peace but no details how to get there,” Washington Post, (June 25, 2019). 72  Anne Gearan and Karoun Demirjian, “Trump vowed to leave Syria in a tweet. Now, with a Sharpie, he agreed to stay,” Washington Post, (March 5, 2019). 73  Lucas Tomlinson and Alex Pappas, “Trump approves Pentagon plan to send more US troops to Middle East,” Fox News, (May 24, 2019). 74  Judah Ari Gross, “In trilateral Jerusalem summit, Russia sides with Iran, against Israel and US,” Times of Israel, (June 25, 2019). 70

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4.6  One Source of Tension Under Trump, unlike past administrations, the US has found little to complain about Israel’s policies. One exception is a deal Israel signed with China. In 2015, Shanghai International Ports Group won a tender to operate the newly constructed container terminal at Haifa for 25 years. As Dale Aluf, observed, “all seemed kosher” until US-China relations grew tense in 2018 and the “Americans started to ask questions about the Haifa terminals and the potential implications it has for both theirs, and Israel’s national security.” Since Haifa port is used by the US Sixth Fleet, the US expressed concern about the possibility of Chinese espionage.75 In recent years, Israel has increasingly turned to Asia for new markets and China has become Israel’s second leading trade partner. This is not the first time, however, that Israel’s efforts to develop closer relations has run afoul of American security interests. In 2000, Israel agreed to sell China Phalcon radar planes, a deal worth about $250 million, but objections by members of Congress and the Clinton administration prompted Israel to cancel the deal.76 According to Assaf Orion, Israel finds itself trying to balance “between tapping China’s considerable potential for the advancement of its economy against management of the entailed risks: both direct, to Israel’s own security, and indirect, to its strategic relations with the US, a central pillar of Israel’s national security.”77 This is likely to be an ongoing issue for years to come as America and China compete for influence.

4.7  Public Opinion New polls released in 2018–2019 regarding American public opinion toward Israel provoked a mixture of hysteria and misinformation typified by these headlines in Haaretz and the Times of Israel, respectively: “New Poll Shows Support for Israel Plummeting Among US Liberals, Millennials and Women”78 and “New poll: Americans’ support for Israel falls to lowest point in a decade.”79

 Dale Aluf, “Israel’s China challenge,” Times of Israel, (July 12, 2019).  Jane Perlezjuly, “Israel Drops Plan To Sell Air Radar To China Military,” New York Times, (July 13, 2000). 77  Assaf Orion, “Tectonics, Techno-economics, and National Security: The Strategic Clash between the United States and China, and Implications for Israel,” INSS Insight No. 1192, (July 15, 2019). 78  Chemi Shalev, “New Poll Shows Support for Israel Plummeting Among US Liberals, Millennials and Women,” Haaretz, (October 26, 2018). 79  Eric Cortellessa, “New poll: Americans’ support for Israel falls to lowest point in a decade,” Times of Israel, (March 6, 2019). 75 76

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Overall support for Israel fell from its all-time high of 64 to 59%—its lowest point since 2009—but remained well above the historical average of 48% since the Six-Day War. Support since 2000, has also been higher than previous decades.80 In addition, 69% of Americans said that they had a favorable opinion of Israel, ranking it eighth behind Canada, the UK, Japan, Germany, France, India, and South Korea. By contrast, just 21% of Americans had a favorable opinion of the Palestinian Authority, placing it near the bottom of the rankings with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Most concern has focused on an alleged decline in Democratic support for Israel. Yes, 76% of Republicans compared to 43% of Democrats were more sympathetic toward Israel than the Palestinians; however, since 1993, Democratic support for Israel has averaged only 46%. In the mid-70s, the figure was even lower. Democratic support for the Palestinians, however, has increased to an average of 20% since 1993 (30% this year), and that is more than double the percentage of Republicans. Support for Israel among liberal Democrats has remained consistent for a decade. When asked their attitude toward Israel, for example, 58% of liberal Democrats and 66% of moderate/conservative Democrats had a favorable view, and only 9% viewed Israel very unfavorably. The real story is the growth of Republican support for Israel. Back in the mid-­1970s, Republicans were more supportive than Democrats, but their numbers were in the 40s and the partisan gap was virtually zero. Since 1993, however, Republicans have averaged 67% with a partisan gap of 22% points (it was 33% points this year). There has also been a lot of discussion about declining support for Israel among younger Americans. That notion is bolstered by the data on sympathy for Israel and the Palestinians across age groups: 18–34 (47–29%), 35–54 (57–21%), and 55+ (70–15%). This should not be surprising, however, if put into historical context. Older Americans are typically more sympathetic to Israel. The disparity across age groups may appear alarming; however, if past trends persist, today’s young people will become more supportive of Israel over time. Of course, Jews being Jews, that “if” is magnified when we read exaggerated accounts of the atmosphere toward Israel and Jews on college campuses. Gallup analyst Lydia Saad concluded: Americans’ overall views toward Israel and the Palestinian Authority have changed little in the past year, with roughly seven in 10 viewing Israel very or mostly favorably and two in 10 viewing the Palestinian Authority in the same terms.… While liberal Democrats are no less favorable toward Israel today than they have been over the past two decades, they have grown more favorable toward the Palestinians.

80  “American Public Opinion Polls,” Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ american-public-opinion-polls. Accessed July 29, 2019.

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4.8  Israeli-American Jewish Ties Fray Relations between Israeli and American Jews remained a major topic of conversation. The Reform and Conservative movements stayed angry over how their Israeli branches were treated and the non-recognition of their rabbis, weddings, and conversions. Liberal Jews more broadly were upset by Netanyahu’s decision to renege on an agreement to open an egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall, his close relationship with President Trump, and his seeming disinterest in peace with the Palestinians. The differences have grown to the point where the New York Times headlined a story, “American Jews and Israeli Jews Are Headed for a Messy Breakup.” The paper quoted from a letter to the Israeli government from Rabbi Steven Wernick, chief executive of the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the umbrella organization of the Conservative movement in North America, which said: “I do not believe we can talk about a ‘gap’ between Israel and the Diaspora. It is now a ‘canyon.’”81 The disdain on the part of some Israelis for non-Orthodox Jews particularly rankles American Jews. Following the massacre at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh in October 2018, Israel’s Ashkenazi chief rabbi would not describe the site as a synagogue, calling the Conservative shul “a place with a profound Jewish flavor.”82 Conservative rabbis were outraged a few months earlier when a Conservative rabbi in Israel, Dov Haiyun, was arrested for conducting a non-sanctioned wedding in Haifa. He was released, but the incident raised the possibility other rabbis could be prosecuted for performing marriages without government authority, which means the sanction of the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate.83 More American Jewish anger followed comments in July 2019 by Israeli Education Minister Rafi Peretz, a rabbi from the ultranationalist Jewish Home Party, who said that intermarriage among American Jews is “like a second Holocaust.” In a comment not directed specifically at American Jews, which still angered many, he later said, conversion therapy could change the sexual orientation of gay men and lesbians.84

 Jonathan Weisman, “American Jews and Israeli Jews Are Headed for a Messy Breakup,” New York Times, (January 4, 2019). 82  Judy Maltz, “9 low points in Israel-Jewish Diaspora relations in 2018,” Haaretz, (December 20, 2018). 83  Ben Sales, “Why Israel nabbed a rabbi for performing a wedding, and why people are incensed,” Times of Israel, (July 21, 2018). 84  Ruth Eglash, “Israel’s education minister sparks outrage after advocating gay conversion therapy,” Washington Post, (July 14, 2019). 81

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Though Israeli officials are well-aware of the conflicts with American Jews, much of the Israeli public is oblivious. For example, less than 30% of Israelis are familiar with the Western Wall compromise.85 Since relatively few Israelis identify with Reform or Conservative Judaism, they are not particularly moved by protests from the leaders of the movements in America. They also have little patience for American Jews—unless they have similar opinions—who pontificate about matters of peace and security from the comfort of their homes 6000 miles away where they pay no Israeli taxes, face no threat from terrorists, and do not have to send their children to the military. For many years, Israeli officials adhered to the unwritten rule to refrain from criticizing their government while abroad. That convention broke down in the 1980s when, first, Labor Party officials and, later, Likudniks began to come to the US when they were in the opposition and encourage American Jews to speak out against the governing party. This emboldened American Jewry, which had typically observed the convention of avoiding public criticism of the Israeli government. This remains the policy of most establishment organizations but is ignored by others. American Jewry was generally supportive of Israel’s actions in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, but liberals, especially, were unhappy with the lack of engagement with the Palestinians. Netanyahu’s campaign promise to annex the settlements was welcomed by right-wing Jews, but widely condemned by others. While this was expected from left-wing organizations such as J Street, it was more unusual to hear criticism from “establishment” organizations, eight of which wrote to President Trump warning that annexation would “create intense divisions” in the US and “greater conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.”86 Prior to the April 2019 election, Netanyahu pressured the right-wing Bayit Yehudi party to unite with the even more extreme Otzma Yehudit party, which is composed of followers of Meir Kahane who support annexation of the disputed territories and call for removing “the enemies of Israel from our country,” a reference to Israeli Arabs. Establishment American Jewish organizations are typically reticent to publicly criticize any Israeli prime minister, or comment on Israeli elections, but Netanyahu’s action crossed an invisible line. The Anti-Defamation League ADL, for example, said, “There should be no room for racism & no accommodation for intolerance in Israel or any democracy. ADL previously has spoken out on hate-filled rhetoric of leaders of the Otzma Yehudit Party. It is troubling that they are being legitimized by this union.”87 The American Jewish Committee (AJC) said, “The views of Otzma Yehudit are reprehensible. They do not reflect the core values that are the very foundation of the State of Israel.”88 AIPAC said it agreed with AJC and that it “has a  Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman, “Israelis Are ‘Ignorant’ Of World Jewry And Its Concerns—New Survey,” Jerusalem Post, (July 22, 2019). 86  Ron Kampeas, “Some of Israel’s best American friends worried by Netanyahu’s annexation talk,” JTA, (April 13, 2019). 87  Jonathan Greenblatt, @JGreenblattADL, (February 25, 2019). 88  “AJC Statement on Otzma Yehudit Party,” AJC, (February 21, 2019). 85

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longstanding policy not to meet with members of this racist and reprehensible party” while Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Vice Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, called the development “very disturbing.”89 As Batya Ungar-Sargon observed, “Partnering with avowed racists, it turns out, was a step too far, even for American Jewish organizations devoted to hawkish Israel policy. It’s not just American Jews, either. After years of an increasing divide, American Jews were joined by our Israeli counterparts, many of whom spoke up vociferously against Netanyahu.”90 While the close relationship between Trump and Netanyahu was cheered by more conservative members of the pro-Israel community and Israelis, it upset liberal American Jews who are rabidly anti-Trump. For many, the president’s positive steps to strengthen the US-Israel relationship were offset by his other policies, his behavior, his demeaning of the office, and the allegations about collusion with the Russians and obstruction of justice. One variable affecting the relationship is the growing confidence of Israelis as their society has evolved from perhaps a Third World country to a First World country. It is not just the oft-mentioned “Start-up Nation” that has produced this change. “Not that long ago,” Anshel Pfeffer observed, there was a clear material difference between life in Israel and the west. Most Israelis didn’t own a car or fly on vacations abroad. There was one black-and-white channel on television and the variety of cheeses in most stories was limited to white and yellow. The transformation of the Israeli economy in the last quarter of a century, not only changed all that, but removed one of the chief distinctions between Israeli and western Diaspora life.”91 Furthermore, while American Jews were talking about the increase in antisemitism in the US, BDS and two horrific shootings at synagogues that shook the community, Israelis were having a very good year. According to Pfeffer: For Israelis, 2018 was a bumper year with a blooming economy, now growing for a straight decade, attaining for the first time ever an AA credit rating and with its all-time lowest unemployment figures. On the security front, despite a few scares, no major war or intifada broke out. Gaza nearly boiled over but was pacified with Qatari money. There were a few murders in the West Bank but the corrupt Palestinian Authority kept a lid on any major unrest. And across the northern border, Iran and Hezbollah were kept in check. Nothing was solved, but then no one expected that to happen.

Some of the divisions among Jews can be seen in poll data collected by the AJC. In their 2019 surveys of American and Israeli Jews AJC found that both (68% of Israelis and 71% of Americans) were confident relations between the two would be the same or stronger in 5 years; however, they don’t have the same sense that Jews are one family. More than one-fourth (28%) of American Jews do not consider Israelis to be part of their family (23% of Israelis felt the same toward Americans).  Batya Ungar-Sargon, “Netanyahu Just Saved Liberal Zionism,” Forward, (February 25, 2019).  Batya Ungar-Sargon, “Netanyahu Just Saved Liberal Zionism,” Forward, (February 25, 2019). 91  Anshel Pfeffer, “This Year, Israelis Lived It Up While Diaspora Jews Were on a Downer,” Haaretz, (December 28, 2018). 89 90

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Roughly one-third of Israelis considered American Jews siblings (31%) or extended family (36%). Only 13% of Americans felt that Israelis were siblings; 43% see them more as extended family.92 Surprisingly more Israelis (74%) than Americans (65%) say a thriving diaspora is vital for the future of the Jewish people. Nearly all Israelis (91%) believe in the importance of a thriving Israel compared to 72% of Americans. Less surprising is the large difference in Israelis’ approval of Trump’s handling of US-Israeli relations. A whopping 79% of Israelis approve somewhat or strongly while 59% of American Jews disapproved. American Jews were even more disapproving (71%) of Trump’s overall job performance. On specific policies, 69% of Israelis approved of the US pulling out of the Iran deal. The AJC did not ask American Jews their opinion in 2019, but 68% disapproved of Trump’s handling of the Iran issue in 2017.93 More than two-thirds (71%) of American Jews feel caring about Israel is an important part of being a Jew. So perhaps it is not surprising that 57% believe it is appropriate to try to influence Israeli policy on issues such as security and peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Israelis, feel differently, however, with 63% saying it is inappropriate. This represents one of the most serious divisions between the two. It would be interesting to see the results of a question as to whether American Jews should have a say in issues related to pluralism and religion, such as the Nation-State Law, conversion, and funding for the Reform and Conservative movements in Israel. From Israelis’ perspective, it is probably a good thing that American Jews do not have a say on matters of peace and security. Israelis’ souring on the two-state solution is reflected by the 51% who oppose it even with a demilitarized Palestinian state (a popular formula that would likely be impossible to enforce). Nearly two-­ thirds (64%) of Americans, however, continue to favor this solution. This difference of opinion is also reflected in attitudes toward the settlements. One-fourth of American Jews favor dismantling all the settlements compared to only 6% of Israelis; 66% of Americans would dismantle some or all the settlements compared to 43% of Israelis. The gap is similar between the 50% of Israelis and 28% of Americans who oppose removing any settlements. Israeli and American Jews cannot even agree on US recognition of the Golan (asked before Trump did so) with Israelis favoring the move by a margin of 88%–50%. This result helps explain why it is unlikely Trump will gain Jewish votes in 2020 as many do not support what others view as his pro-Israel policies. Many Jews, especially liberal Democrats, are also turned off by the close relationship between Trump and Netanyahu as they have a strong dislike for both, which intensified as the prime minister seemed to share the president’s affinity for authoritarian leaders (such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin for Trump and Hungary’s Viktor

 “AJC 2019 Survey of Israeli Jewish Opinion,” and “AJC 2019 Survey of American Jewish Opinion,” American Jewish Committee, (June 2, 2019). 93  AJC 2017 Survey of American Jewish Opinion,” AJC, (August 10-28, 2017). 92

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Oban for Netanyahu) and adopt Trump’s approach to his critics. Facing the possibility of multiple indictments, for example, Netanyahu has dismissed the accusations as inventions by his enemies and repeatedly attacked the media for “fake news.”94 As Yossi Klein Halevi explained: Israeli Jews believe deeply that President Trump recognizes their existential threats. In scuttling the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal, which many Israelis saw as imperiling their security, in moving the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in basically doing whatever the government of Benjamin Netanyahu asks, they see a president of the United States acting to save their lives. American Jews, in contrast, see President Trump as their existential threat, a leader who they believe has stoked nationalist bigotry, stirred anti-Semitism and, time and time again, failed to renounce the violent hatred swirling around his political movement.95

The Reut Institute warned in 2017 that the growing gap between Israel and World Jewry “has widened to the point of endangering the role of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people” and that this “presents a major threat to Israel’s national security.” Reut noted that Israel “relies heavily on the [American] Jewish community’s commitment to and support of Israel.” The group’s report argued that the issue regarding the Western Wall “is not just a struggle for progressive Judaism in Israel but a matter of national security.” The conclusion was that “Israel must formulate a strategic framework towards World Jewry.”96 Many people worry about the future because the schism between Israelis and Americans is not just between Orthodox and non-Orthodox or Liberals and Conservatives, it is also generational. If you think about American Jews who are in college today, born around 2000 or later, they were toddlers during the second intifada and teens during the last Israeli “wars” fought in Gaza. They have never known a time when Israel has faced an existential threat so is it any wonder they might believe Israel should just make whatever concessions are necessary to end the conflict with the Palestinians.97 Jonathan Weissman put it this way: Older American Jews, more viscerally aware of the Holocaust and connected to the living history of the Jewish state, are generally willing to look past Israeli government actions that challenge their values. Or they embrace those actions. Younger American Jews do not typically remember Israel as the David against regional Goliaths. They see a bully, armed and indifferent, 45  years past the Yom Kippur War, the last conflict that threatened Israel’s existence.98

 Ruth Eglash, “Under investigation and up for reelection, Netanyahu’s kinship with Trump has never been clearer,” Washington Post, (March 19, 2019). 95  Jonathan Weisman, “American Jews and Israeli Jews Are Headed for a Messy Breakup,” New York Times, (January 4, 2019). 96  “Mapping the Relationship between Israeli State Agencies & World Jewry,” Reut Group, (October 2017). 97  Mitchell Bard, “Young Jews Need Their Spinach,” New York Jewish Week, (May 30, 2003). 98  Jonathan Weisman, “American Jews and Israeli Jews Are Headed for a Messy Breakup,” New York Times, (January 4, 2019). 94

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To close the growing chasm, the Jewish Federation of North America (JFNA) held its annual General Assembly (GA) in Tel Aviv with the theme, “We need to Talk.” More than 2500 people from Israel and the Diaspora attended, but Judy Maltz noted there was one notable no-show—Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs, Naftali Bennett.99

4.9  The New York Times Many Jews take it as an article of faith that the media is biased. As the “paper of record,” the New York Times, naturally gets the most attention and has long been criticized for one-sided and misleading coverage related to Israel. Media watchdogs can produce a laundry list of examples of articles and editorials that have appeared in the paper over the decades to illustrate the problem. The op-ed page has long been far more open to opinions, especially written by Jews, that are critical of Israel. In April 2019, the Times reached a new low when the paper’s international edition published a cartoon of Donald Trump wearing a yarmulke, being walked by a dog with the face of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a Star of David collar. “The offensive image published in the New York Times international edition was anti-Semitic propaganda of the most vile sort,” said Jonathan A. Greenblatt, ADL’s CEO and National Director. “This type of content normalizes anti-Semitism by reinforcing tropes of Jewish control and does so at a time when anti-Semitism is surging. And to come on the same day a man attacked a synagogue because he believed such myths—this was not simply a management misstep but a moral failing of major proportions. The New York Times owes the Jewish community more than an apology. We need accountability and action.”100 The international backlash prompted the Times to apologize in an editorial note: “A political cartoon in the international print edition of The New  York Times … included anti-Semitic tropes…. The image was offensive, and it was an error of judgement to publish it.”101 A statement on April 28, 2019, said, “Such imagery is always dangerous, and at a time when anti-Semitism is on the rise worldwide, it’s all the more unacceptable.”102 After making excuses and blaming “a single editor without adequate oversight,” the paper published another offensive cartoon a few

 Judy Maltz, “9 low points in Israel-Jewish Diaspora relations in 2018,” Haaretz, (December 20, 2018). 100  “ADL Reacts to Offensive New York Times Cartoon,” ADL, (April 28, 2019). 101  Marcy Oster, “New York Times acknowledges publishing cartoon with ‘anti-Semitic tropes,’” JTA, (April 28, 2019). 102  Zachary Halaschak, “NYT apologizes for anti-Semitic cartoon a day after acknowledging ‘error in judgment,’” Washington Examiner, (April 28, 2019). 99

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days later featuring Netanyahu with blacked-out eyes, holding a stone tablet emblazoned with a Star of David while appearing to take a selfie with a smartphone.103 The paper subsequently announced it would no longer print political cartoons in the international edition. The problems at the Times extend beyond cartoons. The paper added a new op-ed columnist, Michele Goldberg, who immediately made an impression by writing a column arguing that anti-Zionism is not anti-Semitism104 and followed that up with another defending Omar Barghouti and the BDS movement after the Trump administration refused to grant Barghouti a visa. “The B.D.S. movement doesn’t engage in or promote violence. Its leaders try to separate anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism,” she claimed. Goldberg further misstated the goals of the movement as “agnostic on a final dispensation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Finally, in protesting Barghouti’s ban from the US, she asserted: “Barghouti threatens America’s defenders not because he’s hateful, but because he isn’t.”105 The truth was that Barghouti was not barred for his views. Reasons for denying visas are not disclosed. Still, his views are well-known and quite different from Goldberg’s description: • “[Palestinians have a right to] resistance by any means, including armed resistance. [Jews] aren’t indigenous just because you say you are…. [Jews] are not a people….”106 • “Good riddance! The two-state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is finally dead. But someone has to issue an official death certificate before the rotting corpse is given a proper burial and we can all move on and explore the more just, moral and therefore enduring alternative for peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Mandate Palestine: the one-state solution.”107 • “You cannot reconcile the right of return for refugees with a two-state solution…. a return for refugees would end Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.”108 The Times doubled down on Goldberg’s defense of the BDS movement by printing a letter from Barghouti in which he quoted Jewish philosopher Joseph Levine, saying, “The very idea of a Jewish state [in Palestine] is undemocratic, a violation of the self-determination rights of its non-Jewish citizens, and therefore morally problematic.” Barghouti added the reference to Palestine. He omitted however, that  “‘The New York Times’ to scrap daily political cartoons over anti-Semitism controversy,” Jewish News Syndicate, (June 11, 2019). 104  Michelle Goldberg, “Anti-Zionism Isn’t the Same as Anti-Semitism,” New York Times, (December 7, 2018). 105  Michelle Goldberg, “Anti-Zionists Deserve Free Speech,” New York Times, (April 15, 2019). 106  Roberta P.  Seid, “Omar Barghouti at UCLA: A speaker who brings hate,” Jewish Journal, (January 16, 2014). 107  Omar Barghouti, “The Essential Obstacle to a Just Peace in Palestine,” Counterpunch, (December 13-14, 2003). 108  Ali Mustafa, “Boycotts work”: An interview with Omar Barghouti,” Electronic Intifada, (May 31, 2009). 103

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Levin’s article, also published by the Times, argued that Israel has no right to exist and that saying so is not antisemitic. The New York Times Magazine published a lengthier defense of BDS, essentially a hit piece on Israel and the pro-Israel community written by Nathan Thrall. Later it was disclosed, though not by the Times, that the author works for an organization whose major donor is Qatar, the principal funder of Hamas.109 To its credit, the Times did hire two strong supporters of Israel—Bari Weiss and Bret Stephens—but they hardly offset the plethora of news stories and columns by regular critics of Israeli government policies such as Thomas Friedman, Nicholas Kristof, and Roger Cohen. Addressing the cartoon controversy Stephens explained why the paper has a credibility problem: The reason is the almost torrential criticism of Israel and the mainstreaming of anti-­Zionism, including by this paper, which has become so common that people have been desensitized to its inherent bigotry. So long as anti-Semitic arguments or images are framed, however speciously, as commentary about Israel, there will be a tendency to view them as a form of political opinion, not ethnic prejudice. … the publication of the cartoon isn’t just an “error of judgment,” either. The paper owes the Israeli prime minister an apology. It owes itself some serious reflection as to how it came to publish that cartoon—and how its publication came, to many longtime readers, as a shock but not a surprise.

In his analysis of the paper’s coverage of Zionism and Israel from 1896–2016, Jerold Auerbach explained why readers would not be surprised given the inversion of the paper’s motto: All the news “fit to print” became news that fit the New York Times’ discomfort with the idea, and since 1948 the reality, of a thriving Jewish democratic state in the historic homeland of the Jewish people.110

4.10  Relentless Campus Battles The campus has been a battleground for decades, only the names and tactics have changed. Today, the Jewish community is investing a great deal of time, money and energy into fighting the antisemitic BDS campaign. Most of the focus remains on college campuses where the drumbeat of publicity of incidents has created the widespread perception that the campuses are on fire with anti-Israel activity. There are indeed serious issues related to BDS; however, some context is necessary. While several thousand faculty, for example, support boycotting Israel, the total number of faculty in the US at 4-year institutions totals

 Nathan Thrall, “How the Battle Over Israel and Anti-Semitism Is Fracturing American Politics,” New York Times Magazine, (March 28, 2019). 110  Jerold S. Auerbach, Print to Fit: The New York Times, Zionism and Israel, 1896-2016, (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), p. xx. 109

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approximately 625,000.111 Similarly, from 2005 to 2019, only 68 universities, less than 2% of the 4298 degree-granting postsecondary institutions,112 have had BDS-­ related student council votes.113 In 2012–2013, student governments proposed 10 BDS resolutions; the following year, the number jumped to 19; and in 2014–2015, there were 27. That trend set off alarm bells; however, 2014–2015 turned out to be the peak. During the 2018–2019 academic year, the number dwindled again to 10, and eight of the resolutions were rejected. In addition, the University of Oregon ruled the previous year’s resolution was unconstitutional. No university has endorsed BDS, and dozens of presidents, deans, and chancellors have repudiated the antisemitic campaign.114 Due to the lack of success of the divestment campaigns, Israel’s detractors have often adopted more confrontational approaches such as trying to shout down speakers. One activist saw developments differently. Jonathan Elkhoury, an Arab-Christian member of Reservists on Duty (RoD), an organization that sends IDF veterans to campuses to counter BDS, said that in the past “we were often pushed, spat on, verbally and even physically assaulted when visiting campuses.” He said this still happened occasionally, “but for the most part what we saw was a more calm and cohesive language among all SJP groups across the US, whether in their demonstrations or with regards to their lectures.”115 New York University, which has one of the largest Jewish student populations in the country, became the scene of several anti-Israel activities. The university awarded Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)—a promoter of antisemitism that is responsible for creating a climate of intolerance toward Jews—the university’s highest honor for a student organization. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Social and Cultural Analysis (SCA) voted to boycott NYU’s own satellite campus in Tel Aviv. This was followed by a commencement speech by a graduate of that department, Steven Thrasher, who said he was “so proud” of NYU’s chapters of Students for Justice in Palestine, Jewish Voice for Peace, the Graduate Student Organizing Committee labor union, and SCA for supporting BDS “against the apartheid state government in Israel.” Thrasher was hired to teach courses on social justice at Northwestern. The president of NYU and the president and provost of Northwestern condemned Thrasher’s remarks, but there was no punishment.

  National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/TrendGenerator/app/ answer/5/12. Accessed July 17, 2019. 112  Josh Moody, “A Guide to the Changing Number of US Universities,” US News and World Report, (February 15, 2019). 113  “Campus Divestment Resolutions in the USA,” Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/campus-divestment-resolutions. Accessed July 17, 2019. 114  “University Statements Rejecting Divestment and the Academic Boycott of Israel,” Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/university-statements-rejecting-bds. Accessed July 29, 2019. 115  Lidar Gravé-Lazi, “Campus activists call-in ‘reserves’ to counter new anti-Israel tactics,” JNS, (June 5, 2019). 111

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There was a different outcome after another issue came to light, namely the possibility that professors are refusing to write letters of recommendation for students who want to study in Israel. We know of at least one case because University of Michigan professor John Cheney-Lippold admitted that is what he did because he supports the boycott of Israel. Journalist Mitch Albom criticized Cheney Lippold for weaponizing a letter of recommendation. He noted that no one is required to write a letter of recommendation, but the decision is supposed to be based on merit not politics. “Forget the puzzlement of discouraging study in perhaps the only nation in the Middle East that has laws protecting free speech,” Albom wrote. “What about the academic notion that if you want to understand something, you should go and examine it?” Albom also noted the professor’s hypocrisy. Cheney Lippold said that he would be happy to write the student a recommendation to study somewhere else. “What place, I wonder would meet his approval?” Albom asked. “China? Russia?” Albom added that “if being accused of a human rights violation by the United Nations is his criterion, he couldn’t write a recommendation to study in America.”116 Usually faculty malpractice goes unpunished because they are shielded by a misapplication of “academic freedom.” In this case, however, the university disciplined the professor, denying him a merit raise and his planned sabbatical.117 That was the good news, the bad news is that more than 1000 professors have signed a petition supporting Cheney-Lippold, with many saying they would do the same thing.118

4.11  Fighting the Boycotters The BDS movement has had even less success beyond the campus. In fact, it produced a backlash. To date, 27 US states have adopted measures aimed at combating the boycott. In January 2019, the Senate’s first legislative action was to pass a bill that included the Anti-Boycott Act. The House, however, refused to take up the Senate bill due to objections from members who said it violated the First Amendment. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) also feared a vote would expose fissures between the insurgent progressive wing of the party, which includes two avid proponents of the boycott—Reps. Ilan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)—and Jews and other pro-Israel Democrats. Instead, as noted above, the House adopted a non-binding resolution in July 2019 that condemned the boycott movement and expressed support for a two-state solution. Lead sponsor Brad Schneider (D-IL) said, “I am deeply proud that more than three-quarters of my House colleagues,  Mitch Albom, “Michigan professor let politics dictate student’s education,” Detroit Free Press, (September 23, 2018). 117  Kim Kozlowski, “UM disciplines prof over Israel letter controversy,” Detroit News, (October 9, 2018). 118  “Stand with John Cheney-Lippold,” Change.org, https://www.change.org/p/stand-with-johncheney-lippold. Accessed July 22, 2019. 116

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with overwhelming majorities of both parties, have co-sponsored my resolution making clear that Congress supports a strong US-Israel relationship, is committed to achieving a negotiated two-state solution, and forcefully condemns the Global BDS Movement.”119 Not surprisingly Omar and Tlaib were two of the Democrats who voted against the resolution. Omar went further and introduced her own bill supporting the boycott, though not explicitly mentioning Israel. “In twisting the knife,” Rep. Lee Zeldin responded, “the text of Omar’s pro-BDS resolution goes so far as attempting to draw a moral equivalency with boycotting Nazi Germany.”120 This comparison between boycotts of Israel, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union drew fire from pro-­ Israel groups as well. “Millions of Holocaust survivors and their descendants, as well refugees from Soviet oppression living in Israel, will find such comparisons unfathomable,” said Democratic Majority for Israel president and CEO Mark Mellman. “I find them odious. In an effort led by parties of the left, the German Parliament officially labeled BDS as ‘anti-Semitism’—and they were right.”121 Meanwhile, one new tactic adopted by the boycotters, led by Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), is to protest training programs and other information exchanges between American police departments and other first responders and their counterparts in Israel. Referring to the campaign as “Deadly Exchange,” JVP argues that these programs “solidify partnerships between the US and Israeli governments to exchange methods of state violence and control, including mass surveillance, racial profiling, and suppression of protest and dissent.” According to JVP, “When US law enforcement trade tactics with the Israeli police and military, Israel deepens its military occupation and the US heightens its violence of policing.”122 In April 2018, Durham, North Carolina became the first and, so far, only US city to ban its police department from participating in international exchanges with the Israeli military or police. The BDS proponents hope to replicate this success elsewhere.123 They targeted Georgia, for example, where law enforcement professionals from that state and others such as North Carolina and Tennessee have traveled to Israel to study the counterterrorism techniques and emergency management methods of their Israeli colleagues since 1993 as part of the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE) program. The Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police endorsed the GILEE program and denounced the “Deadly Exchange”

 Ron Kampeas, “Congress tackles the anti-Israel boycott, but bipartisanship is fleeting,” JTA, (July 19, 2019). 120  Rep. Lee Zeldin, “Ilhan Omar is wrong—anti-Israel and anti-Semitic BDS movement must be condemned,” Fox News, (July 23, 2019). 121  Jackson Richman,” Pro-Israel groups slam Omar comparing BDS to boycotts of Nazi Germany, Soviet Union,” JNS, (July 18, 2019). 122  Jewish Voice for Peace website, https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/. Accessed July 22, 2019. 123  Miriam Elman, “Georgia police groups slam Jewish Voice for Peace’s antisemitic “Deadly Exchange” campaign,” Legal Insurrection, (January 1, 2019), https://legalinsurrection. com/2019/01/georgia-police-groups-slam-jewish-voice-for-peaces-antisemitic-deadly-exchangecampaign/. Accessed July 26, 2019. 119

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c­ampaign, saying that any claims that the professional programs were training Americans to oppress minorities lacked “any foundation in the facts or history of such exchanges” and the claim that “such training leads to deadly encounters in the US is utterly fallacious and slanderous.” The Chiefs’ statement added that “participants receive a better understanding of how to network with their citizenry and enhance the service delivery to these underserved communities.”124 A similar statement was issued by the Georgia Sheriffs’ Association.125 In 2019, defenders of antisemites adopted a new strategy. No longer content to cry “free speech” and accuse their enemies of McCarthyism, they now accuse critics of inciting violence and putting lives in danger. After Omar came under withering criticism from many of her colleagues, Republicans, and the Jewish community, others came to her defense using the new tactic to try to silence them.

4.12  Intersectionality “Intersectionality” has become a popular buzzword, particularly on college campuses. The word refers to the idea that race, class, gender, and other individual characteristics “intersect” with one another and overlap, and that all injustices are interconnected. Women and minorities (theoretically including Jews, but in certain instances excluding them) are seen as victims of white oppression. Jewish Voice for Peace summarizes how intersectionality is applied to Israel by linking the Palestinians’ plight to “the struggles of students of color, student survivors of sexual assault, and all others who on campus fight against oppression, whether imperialism, racism, patriarchy, police violence, or other systemic inequities.”126 RoD’s Elkhoury noted, for example, how many campuses replaced “Apartheid Week” with “Oppression Week,” in an effort to “frame the narrative that Israel equals white supremacy.” He said “it was clear that this was a well-thought-out strategy directed to coincide with the debate currently going on in the US regarding oppressed minorities.”127 Ziva Dahl noted that “in the ‘jabberwocky’ of multicultural victimhood, Western, white, wealthy, cis-male,128 and Israel (the collective Jew) are inherently evil, while  “Statement of GACP Support of International Law Enforcement Exchange Training Programs,” Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, (December 14, 2018). 125  “Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE),” Georgia Sheriffs’ Association, (December 19, 2018). 126  Ziva Dahl, “‘Intersectionality’ and the Bizarre World of Hating Israel,” Observer, (March 15, 2016). 127  Lidar Gravé-Lazi, “Campus activists call-in ‘reserves’ to counter new anti-Israel tactics,” JNS, (June 5, 2019). 128  A “cis” person is a person who was assigned a gender and sex at birth with which they feel comfortable. 124

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third-world people of color, women, LGBTQ and Palestinians are automatically good…. Today, to the sanctimonious social justice warrior, Jews are part of the oppressor class.”129 The persecuted feel solidarity with other victimized groups, but often ignore the inconsistencies of their positions. Thus, for example, some LBGQT and women’s organizations support the Palestinian cause and simply ignore the treatment of gays and women by Palestinians. “With the advent of ‘intersectionality,’” Dahl adds, “Jewish students must pass an Israel litmus test to prove their commitment to social justice. Jewish students are being marginalized on campuses, many feeling the need to hide their pro-Israel and Jewish identities to ‘get along’ in this hostile environment.”130 The pressure extends beyond the classroom, for example, to Black Lives Matter and the Women’s movement. The platform of the former compares Israel to racist South Africa and accuses it of engaging in genocide against the Palestinians.131 Similarly, the leaders of the Women’s March have sparked controversy with their comments about Jews and Israel. Two of them, Tamika Mallory and Linda Sarsour, were criticized for their ties to Louis Farrakhan and asked to step down for allowing antisemitism to seep into the movement.132 Sarsour was also criticized for, among other things, accusing Jews of dual loyalty, condemning the creation of a Congressional Black-Jewish caucus, and co-signing an article that accused Jews of waging “profound war on black people and people of color.”133 She said, “on an issue like Palestine, you gotta choose the side of the oppressed … if you’re on the side of the oppressor, or you’re defending the oppressor, and you’re actually trying to humanize the oppressor, then that’s a problem.”134 In 2017, organizers of Chicago’s Dyke March asked three participants carrying LGBT pride flags with a Star of David over the traditional rainbow to leave. Dyke March organizers said they acted because the flags “made people feel unsafe” and the march was “anti-Zionist.”135 This treatment of Jews has continued. The 2019 DC  Ziva Dahl, “‘Intersectionality’ and the Bizarre World of Hating Israel,” Observer, (March 15, 2016). 130  Ziva Dahl, “‘Intersectionality’ and the Bizarre World of Hating Israel,” Observer, (March 15, 2016). 131  “INVEST-DIVEST,” The Movement for Black Lives, https://policy.m4bl.org/invest-divest/. Accessed July 23, 2019. 132  Just prior to going to press, it was announced that co-chairs of the Women’s March, Linda Sarsour, Tamika Mallory, and Bob Bland, left the board, as reported by The Washington Post and JTA (“Sarsour, Other Leaders Accused of Anti-Semitism Leave Women’s March,” JTA, September 16, 2019). 133  “Women’s March founder calls on leaders to resign for ‘allowing anti-Semitism,’” JTA, (November 20, 2018); Ben Sales, “Linda Sarsour apologizes to Jewish members of Women’s March over anti-Semitism,” Times of Israel, (November 21, 2018); Ariel Sobel, “OMG, Just Shut Up: An Open Letter to Linda Sarsour,” Jewish Journal, (July 10, 2019). 134  Alex Joffe and Asaf Romirowsky, “Americans’ Two Conceptions of Israel,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,” (February 19, 2019). 135  James Kirchick, “Dykes Vs. Kikes,” Tablet, (June 26, 2017). 129

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Dyke March organizers, self-proclaimed anti-Zionists from the radical Jewish organization IfNotNow, said they were banning “Israeli flags, as well as flags that resemble Israeli flags, such as a pride flag with a Star of David in the middle.”136 Protestors from the Zionist progressive organization Zioness showed up to the march with Jewish Pride flags—a rainbow-striped flag with a Star of David in the middle. They were initially blocked at the entrance to the march by Jewish marshals from IfNotNow but would not back down and were ultimately allowed to march.137

4.13  The Attack on Birthright One of the most successful programs for educating young Jews has been Birthright Israel, which brings young adults to Israel for 10 days. Primarily targeted at Jews who have never been to Israel, the program seeks to introduce them to the history, culture, and geography of the country in the hope it will give them a better appreciation of life in Israel, help them feel closer to the Jewish homeland, and inspire them to return. Except for some specialized trips specifically geared to political activists, the itineraries are mostly apolitical. This has upset some Jews on the left and extreme left, who complain the trips ignore the Israeli-Palestinian issue and fail to present the Palestinian narrative. In the summer of 2018, a handful of activists from IfNotNow, a newly formed group of young Jews who are critical of Israeli policies, went on Birthright trips with the intention of staging a protest by leaving the trip. They also harassed students at Kennedy Airport on their way to Israel, distributing flyers full of misinformation about Israel.138 The walkouts and protests attracted press attention—Jews criticizing Israel is a classic man bites dog story that journalists find compelling— even landing the group on the front page of the New York Times.139 Just a few days before the article appeared, the group sent a private email to its members saying it was suspending the protests because of internal divisions over how they were handled and how the organization would proceed in the future. One of the authors of the email said the group was in a “reevaluation phase.”140 The student arm of another organization highly critical of the Israeli government and Birthright, J Street, offered its own tour of Israel for the first time in the summer of 2019. “We need to stop the erasure of Palestinians on organized trips to Israel,” J  Aiden Pink, “DC Dyke March Bans Jewish Pride Flag,” Forward, (June 6, 2019).  Samantha Cooper, “Pride and prejudice at LGBTQ weekend,” Washington Jewish Week, (June 12, 2019). 138  Mitchell Bard, “When Will IfNotNow Get Its Facts Right?” Algemeiner, (July 12, 2018). 139  Farah Stockman, “Birthright Trips, a Rite of Passage for Many Jews, Are Now a Target of Protests,” New York Times, (June 11, 2019). 140  Aiden Pink, “IfNotNow Made An Impact With Its Birthright Protests. Now It’s Stopping Them,” Forward, (June 13, 2019). 136 137

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Street says on its website advertising their “Let Our People Know Trip.” The agenda is clear by the fifth day when the theme is “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Occupation 101.”141 Participants on the first trip got the message J Street hoped to convey. Six participants wrote in the Forward, “we feel more connected to Israel, Palestine, and the people who live there than we ever did before.” They said they were reminded of “collectively trying to eliminate the oppression of people” and “inspired to take action.” They had nothing to say about doing anything for Israelis but vowed to “catalyze a just end to the Occupation.”142 Another student who went on the trip was more explicit about the impact it had on him, “I went to Israel with J Street a Zionist. But I was no longer a Zionist when I returned.”143

4.14  The 2020 Election When AIPAC held its annual Policy Conference in March 2019, 15 Democrats had announced plans to run for president. A controversy arose when the left-wing advocacy group MoveOn called on the candidates to boycott the conference.144 Vice President Mike Pence subsequently told attendees that eight Democratic candidates heeded the call and that “anyone who aspires to the highest office in the land should not be afraid to stand with the strongest supporters of Israel.”145 This was one of many instances during the year where a Republican tried to suggest the Democratic Party no longer supports Israel, implying Jews should switch their allegiance. The media was filled with headlines about the candidates skipping the conference, that this was “another sign of their turn to extremism,”146 and Trump accused Democrats of being “anti-Israel” and “anti-Jewish.”147 The truth was more nuanced. AIPAC typically does not invite candidates to speak in non-election years, so no one declined the opportunity to address the group. Of

  J Street website, https://jstreet.org/let-our-people-know/let-our-people-know-trip/#.XTt5uhKhaR. Accessed July 26, 2019. 142  AJ Nadel, Channah Powell, Elam Klein, Ethan Wellerstein, Gabriella Kamran, and Simone Pass Tucker, “We Went To See The Occupation. We Came Back More Connected To Israel,” Forward, (July 24, 2019). 143  Jesse Steshenko, “J Street’s Birthright Replacement Trip To Israel Killed My Zionism,” Forward, (July 17, 2019). 144  Iram Ali, “MoveOn: 2020 Presidential Candidates Should Not Attend AIPAC Conference,” MoveOn, (July 23, 2019). 145  Glenn Kessler, “Did eight Democratic candidates ‘boycott’ the AIPAC conference?” Washington Post, (March 27, 2019). 146  Editorial Board, “Dems’ AIPAC boycott is another sign of their turn to extremism,” New York Post, (March 22, 2019). 147  John Verhovek, “Trump slams 2020 Democrats for skipping AIPAC: ‘They’re totally antiIsrael,’” ABCnews, (March 21, 2019). 141

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the candidates, seven were serving in Congress and four met with AIPAC delegations on the day of the conference dedicated to lobbying. Sen. Bernie Sanders was the only candidate who said he was not attending because, his spokesman said, he was “concerned about the platform AIPAC is providing for leaders who have expressed bigotry and oppose a two-state solution.” Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) did not attend or meet with constituents in person, but Warren sent her foreign policy advisor to meet with the Massachusetts delegation. This is not unusual as members sometimes are unavailable and set up meetings with their staff. Pete Buttigieg said he was not invited to the conference and Beto O’Rourke and John Delaney said they had scheduling conflicts. O’Rourke said his decision was not a slap at AIPAC, he just thought campaigning was a better way to spend his time. Three candidates—Kamala Harris, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Amy Klobuchar— did not attend the conference but met with their constituents on Capitol Hill. Cory Booker met an AIPAC delegation at the convention center but did not attend the meeting. Israel’s detractors still declared victory. James Zogby tweeted, for example, “A few years ago, only @BernieSanders had the courage to skip #AIPAC. Now more Democrats are saying No! Thank you @MoveOn. & thank you Bernie for leading the way. It’s so important to say No to occupation & Netanyahu’s anti-Arab bigotry”.148 The first debates for the more than two dozen Democratic candidates were held in the summer of 2019 and the campaign will be all-consuming as the election approaches. For Jewish voters, the choice is likely to be Trump or Obama 2.0. Most Jews do not vote solely on a candidate’s position on Israel. In fact, one poll indicated Israel ranks at the bottom of a list of 16 policy priorities of Jewish voters.149 This assumes, however, that none of the candidates are viewed as hostile to Israel. Obama, for example, unquestionably lost some Jewish votes in 2012 because of his positions related to Israel and the perception of Jimmy Carter as anti-Israel, and his general failure in his first term on many issues, contributed to his share of the Jewish vote dropping from 71% in 1976 to 45% in 1980.150 Based solely on his policy toward Israel—his tone, military assistance, political backing, recognition of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, tough line on the Palestinians—Trump can make a strong pitch for Jewish support. On the other hand, several of these policies caused consternation for liberal Jews because they are seen as harming the prospects for peace. Apart from Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders, the Democratic candidates do not have significant records on Israel. Biden has long been viewed as a friend of Israel,  “Several Democratic Presidential Candidates to Boycott AIPAC,” The Palestine Chronicle, (March 22, 2019). 149  “Domestic Issues Dominate The Priorities Of The Jewish Electorate,” Jewish Electorate Institute, (May 22, 2019). 150  “US Presidential Elections: Jewish Voting Record,” Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-voting-record-in-u-s-presidential-elections. Accessed July 29, 2019. 148

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though some voters may associate him with less friendly Obama policies during his time as Vice President, while Sanders is a fierce critic of Israeli government policies despite his time spent on a kibbutz in the 1960s. In general, if a Democrat is elected, they are likely to return to the approach of Obama and other Democratic presidents, more critical of Israel and solicitous of the Palestinians. Though there are differences among the candidates, if one were elected, they will probably pursue policies along these lines (some candidates said early on they would do one or more): • Rejoin the nuclear deal. • Keep the US embassy in Jerusalem but freeze the process of constructing a new building and reopen the consulate as the diplomatic liaison with the Palestinian Authority. • Reiterate support for a two-state solution in which Jerusalem will be the shared capital. • Restore aid to the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA and reopen the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington.151 With the possible exception of Sanders who, in addition to being extremely critical of Israeli government policies, is too far to the left even for most liberal Jews, whomever the Democrats nominate will likely do better than the average of 75% of the Jewish vote. Trump managed to nearly equal the Republican average of 25% of the Jewish vote in 2016 (he got 24%), but general dissatisfaction with his behavior and domestic policies are likely to lose him votes in 2020 despite his pro-Israel record, although Gallup found that 26% of Jews still approve of Trump’s conduct as president.152 Republicans, including the president, attempted to paint Democrats as moving to the extreme left and tolerating antisemitism within their party because of the timid response to Tlaib and Omar. Republicans subsequently began to talk of a “Jexodus:” Jews leaving the Democratic Party for the Republicans. Despite years of trying to entice Jews to switch parties, however, there is no evidence they are having any success. Gallup’s poll found that only 16% of Jews identified as Republican, which is consistent with the 18% figure in the 2019 American Jewish Committee survey.153 The best chance for Republicans to pick up Jewish votes is if the Democrats nominate one of the candidates from the far left for the presidency. Even then, unless it is someone considered hostile to Israel, it is unlikely that Trump will significantly increase his share of the Jewish vote. Absent proof of wrongdoing beyond what was presented in the Mueller Report, Jews who do base their votes on policy toward Israel, particularly Orthodox Republicans who supported Trump in 2016, are likely to stick with him.

 Alayna Treene and Barak Ravid, “Top 2020 Dems wouldn’t reverse Trump’s Jerusalem embassy decision,” Axios, (July 14, 2019). 152  RJ Reinhart, “One in Six US Jews Identify as Republican,” Gallup, (March 14, 2019). 153  AJC 2019 Survey of American Jewish Opinion, American Jewish Committee, (June 2, 2019). 151

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Still, Trump spent part of the summer of 2019 trying to paint Omar, Tlaib, and two other congresswomen, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New  York and Ayanna Pressley of Massachusetts, who refer to themselves as the “squad,” as the face of the party. When he said they should “go back and help fix the totally broken and crime-­ infested places from which they came” and made repeated comments along similar lines, his remarks were widely condemned, including by many Jews, as racist. Trump subsequently provoked anger in the Jewish community when he began to cite criticism of Israel and antisemitic remarks as justification for his attacks on the squad. In one tweet, for example, he said, “I don’t believe the four Congresswomen are capable of loving our Country. They should apologize to America (and Israel) for the horrible (hateful) things they have said.” In another he said the women should “apologize to our Country, the people of Israel and even to the Office of the President, for the foul language they have used, and the terrible things they have said.”154 Nathan Guttman asserted Trump was “using Israel as a shield for racist attacks and justifying the targeting of non-white members of Congress by pointing to harsh words they’ve used to criticize Israel” as part of a campaign strategy. “This leaves Israel and its supporters in the US with two bad options,” Guttman said, “Either ignore Trump’s use of Israel in a racist context and face the accusation of being acquiescent to bigotry, or take a forceful stance against Trump’s comment and be exposed to claims of not standing up to attacks, at times vicious, launched against Israel by progressive politicians.”155 Many Jews have been hesitant to criticize Trump because of his pro-Israel positions. Given the importance the president places on loyalty, some fear he could turn on Israel if Jews turn on him, especially after hearing him praise evangelical Christians while complaining that Jews were not showing enough appreciation for his support for Israel.156 The racist remarks crossed a line, however, for even some of his staunchest Jewish supporters—Orthodox Jews—as evidenced by a statement by the Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America that condemned “the most recent outburst of racist rhetoric in the highest levels of government.” Although it did not mention Trump, the object of their dissatisfaction was clear. The statement went on to say: “Whether statements that question the loyalty of American Jews when the safety and security of Israel is at stake or rallies that call upon descendants of immigrants to return to countries they never knew, we see these pronouncements as dangerous to the core values of our faith and the foundations of American society.”157

 Marcy Oster, “Trump involves Israel again in criticizing 4 Democratic congresswomen,” JTA, (July 21, 2019). 155  Nathan Guttman, “The Political Battle Over BDS and Free Speech,” Moment, (July 23, 2019). 156  Anshel Pfeffer, “Donald Trump Thinks the Jews Aren’t Grateful Enough,” Haaretz, (September 22, 2018). 157  Ron Kampeas, “Rabbinical Council of America condemns racism at ‘highest levels of government,’” JTA, (July 19, 2019). 154

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Democrats and many Jewish organizations rallied around the congresswomen. For many Jews, the chants at a Trump rally to “Send her [Omar] back” were reminiscent of the reaction to Jews throughout history, the Nazi rally at Nuremberg and the neo-Nazi march in Charlottesville where white supremacists chanted, “Jews will not replace us.” Even while they attracted sympathy, however, Tlaib and Omar did the party no favor by opposing the bipartisan bill criticizing the BDS movement and then introducing their own bill to support boycotting Israel. It was clear that the Democratic Party’s effort to marginalize the squad—Pelosi said, “They’re four people, and that’s how many votes they got”158—was being undermined by both the congresswomen and the President. Still, the Republican dream of a realignment of the Jewish vote remains just that. Responding to Trump’s tweet that “Jewish people are leaving the Democratic Party,” Frank Newport, a Gallup senior scientist, said that “the stability of Jewish support for the Democratic Party over the past decade suggests that such a shift in allegiance is unlikely.”159

 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Tensions Between Pelosi and Progressive Democrats of ‘the Squad’ Burst Into Flame,” New York Times, (July 9, 2019). 159  Frank Newport, “Americans’ Views of Israel Remain Tied to Religious Beliefs,” Gallup, (March 19, 2019). 158

Chapter 5

United States Jewish Population, 2019 Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky

The 2019 American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) cumulative estimate for the US Jewish population is 6.97 million and is based, as in previous years, on the aggregation of more than 900 local estimates. More than three-quarters of the 6.97 million is based on scientific sample surveys of US Jewish communities. The above number compares to the estimate of 5.92 million in 1980.1 For an explanation of the difference between our estimate and the estimate provided by Sergio DellaPergola in Chap. 8 of this volume, see Sect. 5.3 below. One difficulty facing researchers seeking to provide an accurate assessment of the nature of the American Jewish population is estimating the number and percent of Jews of Color.2,3 Kelman et al. (2019) highlighted this issue in a recent report  “The best guidance to this complicated field [Jewish demography] is to be found in the annual volumes of the American Jewish Year Book, which publishes analytical articles, summaries of surveys of Jewish population, and estimates of Jewish population by state and community” (Glazer 1989/1972/1957, p. 189). 2  The term “Jews of Color” refers to individual Jews who may possess African, Asian, Hispanic or Latinx, or Native American heritage and derive their Jewish identity by having been raised as Jews or by conversion. Ironically, in the early part of the twentieth century, American Jews were regarded as less than “white” (Brodkin 1998) because their “Yiddishkeit” made them different. 3  We would like to thank Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Senior Director, Research and Analysis and Director, Berman Jewish DataBank at The Jewish Federations of North America and Bruce A. Phillips, Professor of Sociology and Jewish Communal Service at Hebrew Union College for reviewing this section on Jews of Color. We also thank Joshua Comenetz, Population Mapping Consultant, for his review of the entire chapter. 1

I. M. Sheskin (*) Department of Geography and Jewish Demography Project, Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Dashefsky Department of Sociology and Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_5

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focusing on Jews of Color. The authors undertook a meta-analysis of various Jewish national and local Jewish community studies to determine the size of the population of Jews of Color. They summarized their “educated guess” as follows: “We can approximate that Jews of Color represent at least 12%–15% of American Jews” (2019, p. 2). They also reported that “more younger people identify as nonwhite than older people do.” Consequently, they stated that “with cohort replacement, this means that the future of American Jewry is diverse” (2019, p. 2). The “at least 12%–15%” estimate by Kelman et al. (2019) is substantially higher than the Pew estimate of 6% (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 46).4 The 6% Pew figure is just about equal to the 7% found in the 1990 National Survey of Religious Identification (NSRI) (Kosmin and Lachman 1991, p.  7) and the 5% from the 2000–2001 National Jewish Population Survey (Kotler-Berkowitz et  al. 2003), which indicate that the percentage nationally (with the possibility of undercounts as in the US Census) does not appear to have increased between 1990 and 2013.5,6 This is particularly surprising given that the percentage of all Americans who are non-­ Hispanic white has decreased from 75.6% in 1990 to 63.7% in 2000 and 60.6% in 2017. Note that the 6% in the Pew 2013 study is comprised of 2% black (non-­Hispanic), 3% Hispanic, and 2% other/mixed races. (This adds to 7% due to rounding.) These data are consistent with Pew surveys of religion among both blacks and Hispanics (www.pewforum.org). But, as intermarriage (Phillips 2018) continues among American Jews at high levels, the share of Jews of Color in the Jewish population may increase. Such an increase may also occur as Jews adopt children who may be “of Color” and as non-­ Jewish persons of color decide to identify as Jewish.7 4  The 12%–15% mostly relies on the estimate made by the American Jewish Population Project (Kelman et al. 2019). 5  The NSRI was part of the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey. Note that the data from all three national surveys are for the respondent only so as to make the results comparable among the three studies. Also, all three studies used a random digit dialing procedure and did not employ mailing lists. (Mailing lists might tend to underestimate Jews of Color.) Note as well that only asking population group questions of respondents does not significantly underestimate a population group. In the Miami (2015a) local Jewish community study (which asked Hispanic and Sephardic status of all adults in the household, but not race), 13% of Jewish respondents were Hispanic, compared to 15% of all Jewish adults. For Sephardic Jews, the percentages were 16% and 17%, respectively. 6  Not only did the percentage of Jews who are Jews of Color not change significantly since 1990, neither has the number. In part, because of the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union and the increase of young ultra-Orthodox, who are both quite unlikely to be Jews of Color, the number of US Jews has increased from 5,981,000 in 1990 to the current 6,968,000 in 2019. Thus, in both years (because the estimate of the percentage of Jews of Color decreased from 7% to 6% from 1990 to 2013 and the number of Jews increased by about one million), the number of Jews of Color has been relatively stable at about 420,000. Note that, in all years, we are assuming that the percentage of Jews of Color among children age 0–17 is about the same as among Jewish adults. 7  The possibility of conversion of Persons of Color to Judaism in large numbers seems unlikely, as the US becomes increasingly secular (Pew Research Center 2013) and because Judaism is not a

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The Jews of Color report brings attention to two of the larger local Jewish c­ommunity studies to support the “at least 12%–15%” finding. The 2017 San Francisco Bay Area Jewish community study (Cohen et al. 2017) shows that 13% of Jews in the 10-county Bay Area are Jews of Color. The 2011 New York Jewish population study (Cohen et al. 2011) shows that 12% of Jewish households are multiracial. This does NOT mean that 12% of Jews are Jews of Color. Also, in some multiracial households, it could be that it is a non-Jew who is the person of color. It should also be noted that many Jews who might identify as Hispanic are, in fact, Ashkenazi and are much less likely to be “of Color.” For example, in Miami, about 60% of Hispanic Jews consider themselves Ashkenazi (Sheskin 2015a). In many cases, these are Jews whose parents or grandparents fled the Holocaust to places like Cuba and Argentina and then settled in the US. A similar argument can be made against assuming that all Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews are Jews of Color (Levin 2019). It is for this reason that Be’chol Lashon uses the term “diverse Jews” and not “Jews of Color.” While some researchers may disagree with the estimate of Jews of Color that Kelman et al. (2019) produced, Kelman and his colleagues are correct in asserting that this sub-population is relatively “invisible” to many members of the Jewish community as well as to researchers. Part of the reason for this “invisibility” may be due to Jews of Color being less likely to participate in the formal Jewish community.8 The recommendations of Kelman et al. (2019, p. 16) are worth considering for future studies of American Jewry: 1 . Utilize more sensitive sampling frames to discern Jews of Color. 2. Employ consistency in wording across multiple surveys (a long-standing recommendation of the Berman Jewish DataBank and American Jewish Year Book). 3. Devise questions that address “self-identified race, perceived race, and known ancestry geographic origins.” 4. Adopt consistent weighting schemes for future national and local Jewish community surveys. 5. Utilize federal guidelines in regard to race and ethnicity to create consistency with Decennial Census data and the American Community Survey. Our conclusions are that the percentage of Jews of Color is probably closer to 6% nationally than to “at least 12%–15%” and that this percentage has not increased significantly since 1990 but is likely to do so in the future. The many methodological issues in trying to estimate this population are covered well in Kelman et  al. (2019). Regardless of the true percentage, we think readers would likely agree that, whether the true percentage is around 6%, 9%, or 12–15%, the Jewish community needs to make certain that all Jews are made to feel welcome. proselytizing faith. On the other hand, as the diversity of the country increases, the number of Jews of Color could increase. 8  See The Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011, Special Study of Nonwhite, Hispanic, and Multiracial Jewish Households at www.jewishdatabank.org.

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Advocates for Jews of Color also make a case for equitable representation in Jewish organizations, communal policy making, and in the distribution of resources. Some signs of recognition of this diversity and the need to be inclusive are evident in the American Jewish community. This subject is also highlighted by the existence of at least four national Jewish organizations devoted to advancing Jewish diversity: the Jewish Multiracial Network (https://www.jewishmultiracialnetwork.org), the Jews of Color Field Building Initiative (Geller and Hemlock 2019) (https://jewsofcolorfieldbuilding.org), Jews in ALL Hues (www.jewsinallhues.org), and Be’chol Lashon (www.globaljews.org) (see Chap. 12). The Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism has also examined the subject (www.rac.org) and, among others, The New York Jewish Week, The Times of Israel (Ain 2019), and Moment Magazine (Pogrebin 2019) have featured recent articles on it. The Miami Jewish community study (Sheskin 2015a) showed significant diversity: 33% of adults in Jewish households are foreign born and 3% of adults in Jewish households are from the former Soviet Union. Fifteen percent of Jewish adults are Hispanic, 9% are Israelis, and 17% are Sephardic Jews. (These groups are not mutually exclusive.) Recognizing the ethnic and racial diversity of the Miami Jewish population, the Federation has hired an inclusion specialist. In addition, the Federation’s Board of Directors recently approved a Diversity and Inclusion Statement9 to make an affirmative expression of its commitment to an inclusive and diverse community, one in which all are welcome. Even among Hispanic Jews, significant diversity exists: 24% of Hispanic Jewish adults come from Cuba, 18% from Argentina, 16% from Venezuela, 14% from Colombia, 6% from Peru, and 40% from other places. In sum, despite our disagreement over estimates of Jews of Color, we are indebted to Kelman et al. (2019) for their research and for highlighting the significance of this diverse population for scholars and practitioners. Indeed, the 6% which Jews of Color represent within American Jewry is three times greater than the 2% that American Jews constitute of the total US population. Given this introduction, this chapter, as in previous years, examines the size, geographic distribution, and selected characteristics of the US Jewish population. Section 5.1 addresses the procedures employed to estimate the Jewish population of more than 900 local Jewish communities and parts thereof. Section 5.2 presents the major changes in  local Jewish population estimates since last year’s Year Book. Section 5.3 examines population estimates for the country as a whole, the 4 US Census Regions, each state, the 9 US Census Divisions, the 21 largest US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), the 21 largest Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs), and the 52 Jewish Federation Service Areas (JFSAs) with 20,000 or more Jews. Section 5.4 examines changes in the size and geographic distribution of the Jewish population at national, state, and regional scales from 1980 to 2019. 9  The Statement reads: “The Greater Miami Jewish Federation strives to create a caring, inclusive and united community rooted in Jewish values and traditions. We embrace and value differences, such as ethnicity and national origin, religious denomination and spiritual practice, race, age, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, socio-economic levels and mental and physical ability.”

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Section 5.5 presents a description of local Jewish community studies and a vignette on a recently completed community study: Detroit (MI). Section 5.6 ­presents five tables that compare local Jewish communities on political affiliation and voting registration and relate to Chap. 2 in this volume. Section 5.7 presents an atlas of US Jewish communities, including a national map of Jews by county and 14 regional and state maps of Jewish communities.

5.1  Population Estimation Methodology The authors have endeavored to compile accurate estimates of the size of the Jewish population in each local Jewish community, working within the constraints involved in estimating the size of a rare population.10 This effort is ongoing, as every year new local Jewish community studies are completed and population estimates are updated. The current Jewish population estimates are shown in the Appendix for about 900 Jewish communities and geographic subareas of those communities. A by-product of this effort is that the aggregation of these local estimates yields an estimate of the total US Jewish population, an estimate that actually may be a bit too high, as explained briefly in Sect. 5.3 below and in more detail by Sheskin and Dashefsky (2006). The national estimate presented below, however, is in general agreement with the 2013 estimates of the Pew Research Center (2013) and the Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis University (see Sect. 5.3 below). These estimates are derived from four sources: (1) Scientific Estimates; (2) US Census Bureau Estimates; (3) Informant Estimates; and (4) Internet Estimates.

5.1.1  Source One: Scientific Estimates Scientific Estimates are most often based on the results of surveys using random digit dial (RDD) telephone procedures (Sheskin 2001, p.  6) or Address Based Sampling (ABS) procedures (Link et al. 2008). In other cases, Scientific Estimates are based on Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) studies.11  For a description of some earlier efforts at estimating Jewish population in the US, see Kosmin, Ritterband, and Scheckner (1988), Marcus (1990), and Rabin (2017). See also Dashefsky and Sheskin (2012). 11  See Sheskin (1998), Abrahamson (1986), Kaganoff (1996), Kosmin and Waterman (1989), and Lazerwitz (1986). The fact that about 8%–12% of US Jews, despite rising intermarriage rates, continue to have one of 36 Distinctive Jewish Names (Berman, Caplan, Cohen, Epstein, Feldman, Freedman, Friedman, Goldberg, Goldman, Goldstein, Goodman, Greenberg, Gross, Grossman, Jacobs, Jaffe, Kahn, Kaplan, Katz, Kohn, Levin, Levine, Levinson, Levy, Lieberman, Rosen, Rosenberg, Rosenthal, Rubin, Schwartz, Shapiro, Siegel, Silverman, Stern, Weinstein, and Weiss) facilitates making reasonable estimates of the Jewish population. See also Mateos (2014) on the uses of ethnic names in general. 10

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DJN studies are sometimes used to estimate the Jewish population of an area by itself, or of areas contiguous to other areas in which an RDD telephone survey was completed,12 or to update a population estimate from an earlier RDD study. In a few cases, a Scientific Estimate is based on a scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN).13

5.1.2  Source Two: US Census Bureau Estimates Three New  York Jewish communities inhabited by Hasidic sects are well above 90% Jewish: 1 . Kiryas Joel in Orange County (Satmar Hasidim); 2. Kaser Village in Rockland County (Viznitz Hasidim); and 3. New Square in Rockland County (Skverer Hasidim). Thus, US Census data were used to determine the Jewish population in those communities. Although Monsey, another community in Rockland County with a Hasidic population, is not 90% or more Jewish, US Census Data on race and language spoken at home were used to derive a conservative estimate of the Jewish population in this community. In addition, Hasidic Jews constitute such a large portion of the population of Lakewood, NJ, that growth in that population can be estimated from the American Community Survey (completed annually by the US Census Bureau). Note that the decennial census has never asked religion. Two Census Bureau surveys did ask religion: An 1890 Census Bureau survey interviewed 10,000 Jewish households (Billings 1890) and the March 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) asked religion (Bureau of the Census, no date, ca 1958).14 Our thanks go to Joshua Comenetz, a geographer at the US Census, for his assistance with these estimates.

5.1.3  Source Three: Informant Estimates Informants at the more than 140 Jewish Federations and the more than 300 Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) “network communities” were contacted via email. Responses were emailed to the authors. These informants generally have

 For an example, see footnote 4 in Sheskin and Dashefsky (2008).  Note that while we have classified DJN and “different methodology” methods as Scientific, the level of accuracy of such methods is well below that of the RDD or ABS methodology. Most studies using a “different methodology” have made concerted efforts to enumerate the known Jewish population via merging membership lists and surveying known Jewish households. An estimate of the unaffiliated Jewish population is then added to the affiliated population. 14  For methods for estimating the ultra-Orthodox population from US Census data, see Comenetz (2006). 12 13

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access to information about the number of households on the local Jewish Federation’s mailing list and/or the number who are members of local synagogues and Jewish organizations. For communities that did not reply and for which other information was not available, estimates were retained from previous years.

5.1.4  Source Four: Internet Estimates For some communities, we were able to update Jewish population estimates from Internet sources, such as newspaper, Jewish Federation, and synagogue websites. For example, the Goldring/Woldenberg Institute of Southern Jewish Life (www.isjl. org/history/archive/index.html) has been publishing vignettes on existing and defunct Jewish communities in 13 Southern States (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas). These provide useful information for updating the estimates for Jewish communities in these states. We also consulted the websites of the Reform (www.urj.org) and Conservative (www.uscj.org) movements. Both have listings of affiliated synagogues. If a city is listed on one of these websites as having a synagogue that had not previously been listed in the Year Book, an entry is added to the Year Book as appropriate.

5.1.5  Other Considerations in Population Estimation The estimates for more than 85% of the total number of Jews reported in the Appendix are based on Scientific Estimates or US Census Bureau estimates. Thus, less than 15% of the total estimated number of US Jews is based on the less-reliable Informant or Internet Estimates. An analysis by Sheskin and Dashefsky (2007, pp. 136–138) strongly suggests a greater reliability of Informant Estimates than was previously assumed. It should also be noted that only 12 estimates, accounting for 0.16% of the total estimated number of US Jews, are derived from Informant Estimates that are more than 20 years old. All estimates are of Jews living in households (and in institutions, where data are available) and do not include non-Jews living in households with Jews. The estimates include Jews who are affiliated with the Jewish community, as well as Jews who are not. Different studies and different informants use different definitions of “who is a Jew.” The problem of defining who is, and who is not, a Jew is discussed in numerous books and articles. Unlike most religious groups, “being Jewish” can be both a religious and an ethnic identity. The 2000–2001 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000–2001) (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) suggests that about one-­ fifth of US Jews are “Jews of no religion.” This is consistent with the Pew Research Center result (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 7). Kosmin and Keysar (2013, p. 16) suggest that 30–40% of US Jews identify as “secular.” One does not cease to be a Jew even if one is an atheist or an agnostic or does not participate in synagogue

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services or rituals. The exception to this rule, according to most Jewish identity authorities, is when a person born Jewish formally converts or practices another monotheistic religion or professes any form of Messianic Judaism. During biblical times, Jewish identity was determined by patrilineal descent. During the rabbinic period, this was changed to matrilineal descent. In the contemporary period, Orthodox and Conservative rabbis officially recognize only matrilineal descent, while Reform (as of 1983) and Reconstructionist rabbis recognize, under certain circumstances, both matrilineal and patrilineal descent. Furthermore, Orthodox rabbis only recognize as Jewish those Jews-by-Choice who were ­ converted by Orthodox rabbis. In general, social scientists conducting survey research with US Jews do not wish to choose from the competing definitions of who is a Jew and have adopted the convention that all survey respondents who “consider themselves to be Jewish” (with the exceptions noted above) are counted as such. But, clearly the estimate of the size of the Jewish population of an area can differ depending on whom one counts as Jewish—and also, to some extent, on who is doing the counting. Note that, for the most part, we have chosen to accept the definition of “who is a Jew” that was applied in each community by the researcher conducting a scientific demographic study in the community, even in cases where we disagree with that definition. In particular, this impacts the 2011 New York study (Cohen et al. 2011), which included in its total number of Jews about 100,000 persons who responded that they considered themselves Jewish in some way, although they identified their religion as Christian. Note that the world Jewish population chapter by Sergio DellaPergola (Chap. 8 in this volume) does not include these 100,000 persons in the total for the New York metropolitan area. This issue also arises, although to a lesser extent, in some California Jewish communities. Population estimation is not an exact science. If the estimate of Jews in a community reported herein differs from the estimate reported last year, readers should not assume that the change occurred during the past year. Rather, the updated estimate in almost all cases reflects changes that have been occurring over a longer period of time that only recently have been documented.

5.2  Changes and Confirmations of Population Estimates This year, 314 estimates in the Appendix were either changed or confirmed. A complete accounting of the changes made between the estimates in the 2018 and 2019 Year Books can be found in the Excel version of the Appendix which will be available at www.jewishdatabank.org in fall of 2020. New scientific studies were completed in Palm Beach County, FL. The more significant changes include: Alabama. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Birmingham increased from 5500 to 6300. California. In the San Francisco Bay Area, the Jewish Federation of the East Bay (Oakland) merged with the Jewish Community Federation & Endowment Fund of

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San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma Counties. Thus, while the number of Jews in these areas did not change, the presentation of these numbers is ­different in this volume compared to 2018. The total for San Francisco is now 310,600 and it is now the third largest Federation service area in the US. Connecticut. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Greenwich increased from 7000 to 7500. Florida. Based on new scientific studies, the estimate of the Jewish population of South Palm Beach County was changed from 131,300 to 136,100. The estimate for West Palm Beach was changed from 124,250 from 127,200. The estimate for Martin County was changed from 3100 to 8200. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Fort Walton Beach increased from 200 to 400. Georgia. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Augusta increased from 1400 to 1600. Louisiana. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of New Orleans increased from 11,000 to 12,000. North Carolina. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Durham-Chapel Hill increased from 6000 to 7500. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Raleigh-Cary increased from 6000 to 15,000. This significant increase was reviewed and approved by Ira Sheskin and by Laurence Kotler Berkowitz of the Jewish Federations of North America. New York. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Buffalo was decreased from 12,050 to 11,000. Pennsylvania. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Hazleton-Tamaqua decreased from 300 to 100. Tennessee. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Nashville increased from 8000 to 9000. Texas. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Austin increased from 20,000 to 30,000. Vermont. Based on new informant estimates, the Jewish population of Stowe increased from 150 to 1000. The estimate for Burlington increased from 3300 to 3500. Washington. Based on a new informant estimate, the Jewish population of Seattle increased from 63,400 to 64,650.

5.3  National, Regional, State, and Urban Area Totals This Section examines population estimates for (1) the US as a whole, (2) the four US Census Regions, (3) the nine US Census Divisions, (4) each state, (5) the 21 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), (6) the 21 largest Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs), and (7) the 52 largest Jewish Federation Service Areas (JFSAs).

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5.3.1  National Jewish Population Estimates More than a century ago, in the second volume of the American Jewish Year Book, the editor observed the following in regard to the US Jewish population: As the census of the United States has, in accordance with the spirit of American institutions, taken no heed of the religious convictions of American citizens, whether native-born or naturalized, all statements concerning the number of Jews living in this country are based on estimates, though several of the estimates have been most conscientiously made (Adler 1900, p. 623).

Figure 5.1 shows changes in the US Jewish population based on a variety of historic estimates from 1780 to the current year. Not shown on the graph is that the Jewish population of the US as of 1654 was 23, a number derived from court records when a boat load of Jewish refugees arrived in New Amsterdam (renamed New York in 1664). They came to the Dutch colony from Recife, Brazil, when it was ceded by the Dutch to the Portuguese. The 1960 entry of 5,531,500 Jews is derived from the only time (1957) in the twentieth century that the US Census Bureau queried religion on a sample survey. All estimates for the time line from 1970 to the present are based on sample surveys, or, as in the current estimate reported in this chapter, an aggregate of local Jewish community estimates. Figure 5.1 shows that the growth of the US Jewish population was fueled by four periods of Jewish migration (Sachar 1992; Dimont 1978).

8,000

Sephardic Period

7,000

German Immigration

Eastern European Immigration

6,000 5,000 2,350

4,000

2,000

1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2019

0

3 3 5

1,000

5 6 15 100 200 200 280 875 1,058

3,000

3,605 4,228 4,975 5,000 5,532 Holocaust Survivors 6,000 5,921 5,941 FSU Immigrants 6,136 6,544 6,969

Thousands

Sephardic Migration (1654–1810) The Spanish Inquisition, which started in 1492, gave Jews the choice of conversion to Christianity or expulsion from Spain. Many migrated to parts of the Ottoman Empire, as the Ottoman Sultan welcomed Jews

Fig. 5.1  Growth of the US Jewish population (Source: American Jewish Historical Society until 1980; American Jewish Year Book, 1990 to current date)

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expelled from Spain. Others found their way to North America. These Jews were mostly shopkeepers and merchants. Not having been allowed to own land in most European countries, Jews did not develop farming skills. Thus, during colonial times, while 80% of Americans in general were farmers, the vast majority of Jews were urbanites. The earliest Jewish congregations were to be found in New Amsterdam (NY), Newport (RI), Savannah (GA), Philadelphia (PA), and Charleston (SC). During this period, the Jewish population increased to about 5000. German Migration (1810–1880) While Napoleon’s message of liberty, equality, and fraternity had improved conditions for Jews in Europe and had freed them from the confines of the ghetto in many areas (resulting in the Haskala, or Enlightenment movement, in Jewish history), with the end of the Napoleonic era, restrictions and difficulties were again faced by Jews in many areas, particularly in Germany (Hertzberg 1989). This led to a new wave of migration to the US. Many of these German immigrants were involved in retail trade, particularly in the garment industry. Some, who began peddling goods from push carts, gradually developed retail outlets, which evolved into major department stores, including Abraham and Strauss, Gimbel’s, Bloomingdale’s, Macy’s, and others. When the Gold Rush of 1849 began, Jewish merchants left the East and became storekeepers in the West. By 1880, two hundred new synagogues were established, which provided immigrant Jews with a place to pray as well as a familiar milieu and a center for networking and socialization. B’nai B’rith began as a (non-religious) group designed to maintain some aspects of Jewishness and to provide self-help. The German Jews also brought with them a new innovation in Jewish worship, Reform Judaism, which emerged in Hamburg at the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Economically, many German Jews prospered and, as they moved into the better neighborhoods and the non-Jews moved out, created “gilded” ghettos. Other German Jews remained poor. This German migration changed the American Jewish community from one in which most Jews were American born, to one in which most were foreign born. During this period, the Jewish population rose to about 280,000. Eastern European Migration (1880–1930) The third period of Jewish migration began with the fall of czar Alexander II in Russia in 1881. Following this change in leadership, pogroms (anti-Jewish riots) occurred in Russia in 1881 and in Kishinev in 1903 and 1905 (Pasachoff and Littman 1995, pp. 218–221 and 236–239). Jews began to arrive in significant numbers in New  York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, all prominent ports of entry, as well as Chicago (Sanders 1988, p. 167). This migration was to change the culture of American Jewry from one dominated by German Jews, who by 1880 were, because of very high levels of assimilation, well on their way to becoming another Protestant denomination, to one dominated by more religious Eastern European Jewish migrants. More than 90% of Jewish migrants during this period were from Russia. In total, 3,715,000 Jews entered the US between 1880 and 1929. During this period, 8% of migrants to the US were Jewish (Barnavi 1992: pp.194–195). Fifteen percent of all European Jewry moved to the US during this period.

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The Jewish immigrants came to the US to stay. The rate of reverse migration was only 5% for the Jewish population, compared to 35% for the general immigrant population (Sherman 1965, p. 61). This difference is probably related to the fact that while “economic opportunity” was a “pull” factor to the US for all immigrant groups, the “push” factor (antisemitism) for Jews to leave Europe was clearly more significant than for most, if not all, other ethnic groups. At first, the German Jews wanted to spread the new Jewish immigrants throughout the country. The concept was that if the Jewish population became too ­geographically clustered, a reaction would occur among non-Jews, resulting in ­antisemitism. This led to the Galveston plan in the early 1900s, which attempted to divert some of the immigrants headed for northeastern cities, particularly New York, to Galveston, Texas (Sanders 1988, pp. 235–240). This plan failed, as Jews wanted to move to the large northeastern cities that already had large Jewish populations, where they could find landsmannschaftan or landsleite, cultural societies with membership from their former country, or even their former city (Shamir and Shavit 1986). This large-scale migration increased the US Jewish population to about five million by 1940. Modern Migration (1930 to the present) The First (1921) and Second (1924) Johnson Acts (Sanders 1988, pp. 386–387) were passed by Congress, practically halting Jewish (and other Eastern and Southern European) immigration (Friesel 1990, p. 132). Unfortunately, this closing of the door to immigration occurred at the worst time for European Jews, as the next two decades saw the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust. Those Jews who came to the US during World War II clearly came as refugees, not merely as immigrants. Between 1933 and 1937, fewer than 40,000 Jews were permitted to enter the US. In total, about 110,000 Jews were permitted entry from 1938 to 1941. Wyman’s (1984) The Abandonment of the Jews provides significant detail on this period. After the birth of Israel in 1948, most of the world’s Jewish migrants, especially displaced survivors of the Holocaust, migrated to Israel. However, Jewish migrants continued to enter the US, including 160,000 Holocaust survivors (Shapiro 1992, p. 126). Since the mid-1960s, more than 600,000 Jews have immigrated to the US from the former Soviet Union (Gold 2015). During the past few decades, significant numbers of Israelis have moved to the US, resulting in between 120,000 and 350,000 American Israelis (Sheskin 2010; Gold 2015). Most live in New York, Los Angeles, and South Florida. Smaller numbers of Jews have come to the US from a variety of other locations. Jewish migrants also came from the Arab world starting in 1948. Over ten thousand Hungarian Jews arrived just after the 1956 Hungarian revolution. A few thousand Cuban Jewish migrants came to Miami in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Starting in the 1970s and continuing to the present day, Jews from a number of Middle American and South American countries have moved to Miami (Sheskin 2015a). After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Jews came from Iran (particularly to Los Angeles).

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5.3.2  Recent US Jewish Population Estimates As stated above, estimating the number of US Jews is dependent upon one’s definition of who is Jewish. Nevertheless, it is interesting that three different methodologies have recently produced estimates of the number of US Jews; and all three are in general agreement: 1. AJYB 2019: Based on a simple summation of local Jewish community estimates in the Appendix, the estimated size of the US Jewish community in 2019 is 6.968 million Jews, a significant increase of about 43,000 from the 2018 estimate of 6.925 million. This estimate is based on the aggregation of local estimates of more than 900 US Jewish communities and parts thereof. The bulk of the estimate is based on studies conducted over the past decade. For reasons discussed in Sheskin and Dashefsky (2006), it is unlikely that the number of US Jews really is as high as 6.968 million. Some percentage of part-­ year households (households who spend part of the year in one community and part in another), college students (who may be counted in both their home and school communities), and households who moved from one community to another between local Jewish community studies are likely to be double-counted in the Appendix. Thus, allowing for some double counting (see below), the American Jewish Year Book estimate is about 6.8–6.9 million. 2. SSRI 2019: The Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) Brandeis Meta-­ Analysis estimate of 7.49 million (Tighe et al. 2019) is based on an “averaging” of the percentage of Jews found in tens of national studies conducted over the past decade that happened to ask a question about religion (https://ajpp.brandeis. edu). Note that DellaPergola (2013) takes serious issue, among other matters, with: a) the fact that the SSRI estimates are based on adults only; b) SSRI’s methodology for estimating the number of children; and c) SSRI’s method for extrapolating the number of Jews “not by religion” from surveys that only estimate adult Jews by religion. See Chap. 8 in this volume for further elucidation of this issue. 3. Pew 2013: The Pew Research Center estimate (www.pewresearch.com) is 6.7 million. This includes 5.7 million persons who are Jewish and one million who are partly Jewish. This estimate is based on a national RDD study conducted in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013). However, with the advent of a high percentage of households who rely solely on cell phones, the lower response rates on cell phones, and the increasing tendency of households with landlines to only answer calls from known phone numbers, conducting RDD surveys has become increasingly challenging and response rates on this and other surveys reflect this. Thus, we have three recent estimates of the number of US Jews, all using different methodologies, each with their own significant shortcomings. Yet, all three methods yield relatively comparable estimates. A different estimate of the US Jewish population (5.7 million) is employed in Chap. 8 of this volume on World Jewish Population. In that chapter, Sergio

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DellaPergola relies on the Pew Research Center estimate, but, to be comparable with definitions accepted and used in other countries, and to keep to a consistent concept of “core Jewish” population worldwide, he does not include the one million persons who identify as “part Jewish” (who are included in the American Jewish Year Book, Pew, and SSRI totals). Thus, given our inclusion of about one million “part Jewish” persons (plus the 200,000 persons by which our 2019 estimate is higher than the Pew 2013 estimate) we would estimate 15.9  million Jews in the world. Therefore, according to our calculations, 43% (6.9 million) of Jews live in the US and 42% (6.7 million) in Israel.

5.3.3  Regional Jewish Population Estimates Table 5.1 shows that, on a regional basis, the Jewish population is distributed very differently from the US population as a whole. Map 5.1 shows the definitions of the Census Regions and Census Divisions. While only 17% of all Americans live in the Northeast, 44% of Jews live there. While 21% of all Americans live in the Midwest, only 11% of Jews do. While 38% of all Americans live in the South, only 22% of Jews do. Approximately equal percentages of all Americans and Jews live in the West (23–24%). Table 5.1  Jewish population by census region and census division, 2019

Census region/division Northeast Middle Atlantic New England Midwest East North Central West North Central South East South Central South Atlantic West South Central West Mountain Pacific Total

Jewish population Percentage Number distribution 3,074,620 44.1 2,614,635 37.5 459,985 6.6 734,330 10.5 591,755 8.5 142,575 2.0 1,541,155 22.1 45,850 0.7 1,297,275 18.6 198,030 2.8 1,618,495 23.2 308,570 4.4 1,309,925 18.8 6,968,600 100.0

Total population Number 56,111,079 41,257,789 14,853,290 68,308,744 46,931,883 21,376,861 124,753,948 19,112,813 65,322,408 40,318,727 77,993,663 24,552,385 53,441,278 327,167,434

Percentage distribution 17.2 12.6 4.5 20.9 14.3 6.5 38.1 5.8 20.0 12.3 23.8 7.5 16.3 100.0

Notes: (1) The total number of US Jews is probably about 6.8–6.9 million due to some double-­ counting between states (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2006); (2) While this table presents our best estimates of Jews for 2019, the more than 900 estimates that have been aggregated to derive this table are most frequently from previous years but remain the best estimates for the current date. For the dates of all 900 estimates, see the Appendix; (3) the total population data are from www.census. gov (July 1, 2018 estimates)

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Map 5.1  US Census regions and divisions

5.3.4  State Jewish Population Estimates The first data column of Table 5.2 shows the number of Jews in each state. Eight states have a Jewish population of 200,000 or more: New  York (1,771,000); California (1,183,000); Florida (644,000); New Jersey (545,000); Illinois (298,000); Pennsylvania (298,000); Massachusetts (293,000); and Maryland (237,000). Seven states have between 100,000 and 200,000 Jews: Texas (176,000); Virginia (151,000); Ohio (148,000); Georgia (129,000); Connecticut (118,000); Arizona (107,000); and Colorado (103,000). The third column of Table 5.2 shows the percentage of the population in each state that is Jewish. Overall, about 2.1% of Americans are Jewish, but the ­percentage is about 4% or higher in New York (9.1%), the District of Columbia (8.2%), New Jersey (6.1%), Massachusetts (4.2%), and Maryland (3.9%). The final column of Table 5.2 shows the percentage of the total US Jewish population that each state represents. The four states with the largest shares of the Jewish population—New York (25%), California (17%), Florida (9%), and New Jersey (8%)—account for 60% of the 6.968 million US Jews reported in Table 5.2. These four states account for only 27% of the total US population. The Jewish population, then, is very geographically concentrated, particularly compared to the total population. In fact, using a measure known as the index of dissimilarity or the segregation index (Burt, Barber, and Rigby 2009, pp. 127–129), 38% of Jews would have to change their state of residence for Jews to be geographically distributed among the states in the same proportions as the total population. The same measure for 1980

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Table 5.2  Jewish population by state, 2019 State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Floridaa Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island

Number of Jews 10,325 5750 106,725 2225 1,182,990 102,600 118,350 15,100 57,300

Total population 4,887,871 737,438 7,171,646 3,013,825 39,557,045 5,695,564 3,572,665 967,171 702,455

Percentage Jewish 0.2 0.8 1.5 0.1 3.0 1.8 3.3 1.6 8.2

% of total US Jewish population 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.0 17.0 1.5 1.7 0.2 0.8

643,895 128,720 7100 2125 297,735 25,245 5275 17,425 11,200 14,900 12,550 236,600 293,080 87,905 45,600 1525 64,275 1395 9350 76,300 10,120 545,450 12,625 1,771,320 45,935 400 147,815 4425 40,650 297,865 18,750

21,299,325 10,519,475 1,420,491 1,754,208 12,741,080 6,691,878 3,156,145 2,911,505 4,468,402 4,659,978 1,338,404 6,042,718 6,902,149 9,995,915 5,611,179 2,986,530 6,126,452 1,062,305 1,929,268 3,034,392 1,356,458 8,908,520 2,095,428 19,542,209 10,383,620 760,077 11,689,442 3,943,079 4,190,713 12,807,060 1,057,315

3.0 1.2 0.5 0.1 2.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.9 3.9 4.2 0.9 0.8 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.5 2.5 0.7 6.1 0.6 9.1 0.4 0.1 1.3 0.1 1.0 2.3 1.8

9.2 1.8 0.1 0.0 4.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 3.4 4.2 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.1 7.8 0.2 25.4 0.7 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.6 4.3 0.3 (continued)

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Table 5.2 (continued) State South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Total

Number of Jews 16,820 250 22,800 176,480 5650 7135 150,595 73,435 2310 33,055 1150 6,968,600

Total population 5,084,127 882,235 6,770,010 28,701,845 3,161,105 626,299 8,517,685 7,535,591 1,805,832 5,813,568 577,737 327,167,434

Percentage Jewish 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.1 1.8 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.2 2.1

% of total US Jewish population 0.2 0.0 0.3 2.5 0.1 0.1 2.2 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 100.0

See the Notes on Table 5.1 Excludes 65,000 Jews who live in Florida for 3–7 months of the year and are counted in their primary state of residence

a

was 44%, indicating that Jews are less geographically concentrated in 2019 than they were in 1980, when the four states with the largest Jewish populations—New York (36%), California (13%), Florida (8%), and New Jersey (8%)—accounted for 64% of the 5.921 million US Jews.

5.3.5  Urban Area Jewish Population Estimates Estimates of the Jewish population are provided for three different definitions of urban areas: Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (Table 5.3), Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) (Table 5.4), and Jewish Federation Service Areas (JFSAs) (Table 5.5). Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are geographic entities delineated by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for use by Federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing Federal statistics. Each MSA has a core urban area with a population of at least 50,000. Each MSA consists of one or more counties and includes the counties containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban core. Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs), also defined by OMB, consist of two or more adjacent MSAs or micropolitan areas (essentially MSAs where the major city is between 10,000 and 50,000 population), that have substantial employment interchange. Thus, CSAs are always geographically larger than MSAs.

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Table 5.3  Jewish population in the top 21 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 2019 MSA rank 1 2 3 4 5 6

MSA name New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 7 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 8 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 9 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, GA 10 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 11 Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ 12 San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA 13 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 14 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 15 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 16 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 17 San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA 18 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 19 Denver Aurora-Lakewood, CO 20 St. Louis, MO-IL 21 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD Total Population in Top 21 MSAs Total US Population Percentage of Population in Top 21 MSAs

Population Total 19,979,477 13,291,486 9,498,716 7,539,211 6,997,384 6,249,950

Jewish 2,107,800 617,480 294,280 75,005 51,640 297,290

6,198,782 6,096,372

535,500 283,450

8.6 4.6

5,949,951 4,875,390 4,857,962 4,729,484 4,622,361 4,326,442 3,939,363 3,629,190 3,343,364 3,142,663 2,932,415 2,805,465 2,802,789 127,808,217 327,167,434 39.1%

119,800 257,460 82,900 244,000 23,625 71,750 62,350 44,500 100,000 51,350 95,000 61,300 115,800 5,527,280 6,968,600 79.3%

2.0 5.3 1.7 5.2 0.5 1.7 1.6 1.2 3.0 1.6 3.2 2.2 1.9 4.3 2.1

% Jewish 10.6 4.6 3.1 1.0 0.7 4.8

Notes: (1) See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineation-files.html for a list of the counties included in each MSA; (2) Total population data are for July 1, 2018; (3) Jewish population of 5,527,280 excludes 65,000 part-year residents who are included in MSAs 7, 13, and 18. See also the Notes on Table 5.1. (3) CSA 7 above includes Palm Beach County

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Table 5.4  Jewish population in the top 21 combined statistical areas (CSAs), 2019 CSA rank 1 2 3 4

CSA name New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA Chicago-Naperville, Elgin IL-IN-WI Washington-Baltimore-Arlington, DC-MD-VA-WV-PA 5 San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, CA 6 Boston-Worcester-Providence, MA-RI-NH-CT 7 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX-OK 8 Philadelphia-Reading-Camden, PA-NJ-DE-MD 9 Houston-The Woodlands, TX 10 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Port-St. Lucie, FL 11 Atlanta-Athens-Clarke County-Sandy Springs, GA 12 Detroit-Warren-Ann Arbor, MI 13 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 14 Seattle-Tacoma, WA 15 Orlando-Deltona-Daytona Beach, FL 16 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 17 Cleveland-Akron-Canton, OH 18 Denver-Aurora, CO 19 Portland-Vancouver, Salem, OR-WA 20 St. Louis-St. Charles-Farmington, MO-IL 21 Charlotte-Concord, NC-SC Total Population in Top 21 CSAs Total US Population Percentage of Population in Top 21 CSAs

Population Total Jewish 22,679,948 2225,700 18,764,814 685,575 9,866,910 294,685 9,778,360 414,220

% Jewish 9.8 3.7 3.0 4.2

9,666,055 362,500 3.8 8,285,407 297,863 3.6 7,957,493 75,065 0.9 7,204,035 300,090 4.2 7,197,883 51,767 0.7 6,913,262 550,760 8.0 6,775,511 120,675 1.8 5,353,002 81,250 1.5 4,911,851 82,900 1.7 4,853,364 67,710 1.4 4,096,575 39,100 1.0 4,014,593 44,500 1.1 3,599,264 85,828 2.4 3,572,798 95,495 2.7 3,239,335 37,900 1.2 2,909,777 61,300 2.1 2,753,810 12,665 0.5 154,394,046 5,931,148 3.8 327,167,434 6,968,600 2.1 47.2% 85.1%

Notes: (1) See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineation-files.html for a list of the counties included in each CSA; (2) Total population data are for 2018; (3) Jewish population of 5,931,148 excludes 56,400 part-year residents who are included in CSA 10 and 15 See also the Notes on Table 5.1

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I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky Table 5.5  Jewish population of Jewish federation service areas with 20,000 or more Jews, 2019 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Community New York Los Angeles San Francisco Washington Chicago Boston Philadelphia Broward County South Palm Beach West Palm Beach Miami Atlanta Middlesex-Monmouth (NJ) Northern NJ MetroWest NJ Rockland County (NY) San Diego Denver Baltimore Ocean County (NJ) Phoenix Cleveland Orange County (CA) Las Vegas Detroit Dallas Seattle St. Louis Southern NJ Houston Pittsburgh San Jose Portland (OR) Orange County (NY) Hartford Orlando Austin San Gabriel (CA) Minneapolis St. Petersburg Cincinnati Milwaukee

Number of Jews 1,538,000 519,200 310,600 295,500 291,800 248,000 214,700 149,000 136,100 127,200 123,200 119,800 122,000 119,400 115,000 102,600 100,000 95,000 93,400 83,000 82,900 80,800 80,000 72,300 71,750 70,000 64,650 61,100 56,700 51,000 49,200 39,400 36,400 37,300 32,800 31,100 30,000 30,000 29,300 28,000 27,000 25,800 (continued)

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Table 5.5 (continued) 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Community Columbus Upper Fairfield County (CT) Long Beach (CA) New Haven Tampa Tucson Sacramento Albany (NY) Palm Springs (CA) Somerset (NJ)

Number of Jews 25,500 24,450 23,750 23,000 23,000 22,400 21,000 20,500 20,000 20,000

Jewish Federation Service Areas (JFSAs) are areas served by local Jewish Federations15 and are the result of historical forces and the geographic distribution of the Jewish population. History has produced service areas that vary significantly in size and population. UJA-Federation of New York serves an 8-county area with 1,538,000 Jews, while three Jewish Federations serve parts of Fairfield County (CT), which has about 50,000 Jews. The JFSAs rarely align themselves geographically with MSAs or CSAs. Thus, the JFSA estimates in Table  5.5 are often quite different from the estimates for MSAs and CSAs found in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The JFSAs are generally smaller than the geographic areas of the MSAs and much smaller than CSAs. The Appendix definitions generally reflect JFSAs. For example, the Appendix and Table 5.5 show the Jewish population of the Baltimore JFSA to be 93,400, while Table  5.3 shows a Jewish population of 115,800, because the Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD MSA covers a larger geographic area than the Baltimore JFSA. Table 5.4 shows that the Jewish population of the Washington-Baltimore-Arlington CSA is 414,220. Table 5.3 provides data for the 21 largest MSAs in 2019. Thirty-nine percent of all Americans live in the 21 largest MSAs, as do 79% of US Jews, and while Jews

 Among US Jewish communities, more than 140 are served by organizations known as Jewish Federations. The Jewish Federations of North America is the central coordinating body for the local Jewish Federations.A Jewish Federation is a central fundraising and coordinating body for the area it serves. It provides funds for various Jewish social service agencies, volunteer programs, educational institutions and programs, and related organizations, with allocations being made to the various beneficiary agencies by a planning or allocation committee. A local Jewish Federation’s broad purposes are to provide “human services (generally, but not exclusively, to the local Jewish community) and to fund programs designed to build commitment to the Jewish people locally, in Israel, and throughout the world.” In recent years, funding programs to assure Jewish continuity have become a major focus of Jewish Federation efforts.Most planning in the US Jewish community is done either nationally (by The Jewish Federations of North America and other national organizations) or locally by Jewish Federations. Data for local Jewish Federation service areas is essential to the US Jewish community and to planning both locally and nationally (Sheskin 2009, 2013).

15

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are only 2.1% of all Americans, they constitute 4.3% of the population of the top 21 MSAs. The New  York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA MSA and Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL MSAs are 10.6% and 8.6% Jewish, respectively, while the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA, Washington-Arlington-­ Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH, and San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA MSAs are all 4.6–5.3% Jewish. Table 5.4 provides data for the 21 largest CSAs in 2019. Forty-seven percent of all Americans live in the 21 largest CSAs, as do 85% of US Jews, and while Jews are only 2.1% of all Americans, they constitute 3.8% of the population of the top 21 CSAs. The New  York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA CSA is 9.8% Jewish, while the Miami-­Fort Lauderdale-Port St. Lucie, FL CSA is 8.0% Jewish. The BostonWorcester-Providence, MA-RI-NH-CT, Washington-Baltimore-Arlington, DC-MD-VA-WV-PA, Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, Philadelphia-Reading-­ Camden, PA-NJ-DE-MD, and San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, CA CSAs are all 3.6–4.2% Jewish. Table 5.5 provides data for the JFSAs with 20,000 or more Jews in 2019. The Jewish Federation service areas with 200,000 or more Jews are New  York (1,538,000), Los Angeles (519,200), San Francisco (310,600), Washington (295,500), Chicago (291,800), Boston (248,000), and Philadelphia (214,600). Note that the Florida community numbers in this table include part-year residents.

5.4  Changes in the Size of the Jewish Population, 1980–2019 This section examines changes in the geographic distribution of the Jewish population from 1980 to 2019. In examining the maps, note that the dot symbols are randomly placed within each state (Maps 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4). For additional information about the geographic distribution of American Jews over time, see the previous editions of the American Jewish Year Book and de Lange (1984), Gilbert (1985), Friesel (1990), Marcus (1990), Barnavi (1992), Gilbert (1995), Sheskin (1997), Ahituv (2003), and Rebhun (2011). For perspectives on Jewish population change in the future, see Goldscheider (2004) and DellaPergola (2011).

5.4.1  National Level Changes Overall, the data reveal an increase of just over one million (18%) Jews from 1980–2019 from 5.921 million in 1980 to 6.968 million in 2019. Most of the increase is clearly due to migration, including the influx of over 600,000 Jews from the Former Soviet Union (Gold 2015), the existence of as many as 350,000 Israelis

Map 5.2  Jewish population, 1980 (Each dot represents 1,500 Jews)

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 157

Map 5.3  Jewish population, 2019 (Each dot represents 1,500 Jews)

158 I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Map 5.4  Changes in Jewish population, 1980-2019 (Each dot represents 1,500 Jews)

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 159

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(Sheskin 2010 and Gold 2015) in the US, and migration from Central and South America (Gold 2015) from places like Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. But this increase in the estimate is not entirely actual growth in the Jewish population. Rather, at least some of this increase is due to improved estimates produced by local Jewish community studies. In addition, the internet was not available to researchers in 1980. Today we list many places in Appendix A that were not listed in the 1980 Year Book, having found evidence on the internet as to their existence and size. (The 1980 Year Book listed about 650 places compared to the current over 900.)

5.4.2  State Level Changes At the state level (Table 5.6), the number of Jews in New York decreased by 369,000 (17%), reflecting primarily the decrease in the New York City area, from 1,998,000 in 1980 to 1,538,000  in 2019. The number of Jews in Pennsylvania decreased by 122,000 (29%), reflecting primarily the decrease in Philadelphia, from 295,000 in 1980 to 214,700 in 2019. The only other notable decrease in states with significant Jewish population is Missouri (7500, 11%). The most significant percentage decreases not referenced in the preceding paragraph occurred in North Dakota (63%), South Dakota (58%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (47%), Iowa (36%), Arkansas (35%), and Oklahoma (27%), all of which have small Jewish populations. The number of Jews in California increased by 429,000 (57%), reflecting increases particularly in San Francisco, Orange County, and San Diego. The number of Jews in Florida increased by 189,000 (42%), reflecting increases particularly in Broward and Palm Beach Counties.16 Other significant increases include New Jersey (103,000, 23%), especially reflecting migration from New York City to the suburbs in northern New Jersey; Georgia (94,000, 272%), reflecting most notably the growth in Atlanta; Texas (104,000, 143%), reflecting largely the growth in Dallas and Houston; Virginia (91,000, 154%), reflecting the growth in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC; Colorado (71,000, 223%), reflecting primarily the growth in Denver; Arizona (65,000, 159%), reflecting particularly the growth in Phoenix; Nevada (59,000, 344%), reflecting especially the growth in Las Vegas; Washington State (55,000, 299%), reflecting the growth in Seattle, and Maryland (51,000, 27%), reflecting the growth in the Montgomery County suburbs of Washington, DC. The most significant percentage increases not referenced in the previous paragraph occurred in Alaska (499%), Idaho (321%), Oregon (275%), Wyoming (271%), North Carolina (247%), Vermont (190%), Utah (146%), and New Hampshire (126%), most of which have relatively small Jewish populations.

 The number of Jews in Florida in 2019 excludes Jews in part-year households (“snowbirds”). The historical record does not indicate the portion of the population that was part year in 1980.

16

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Table 5.6  Changes in Jewish population by state, 1980–2019 State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota

1980 8835 960 41,285 3395 753,945 31,765 102,035 10,000 40,000 454,880 34,610 5625 505 266,385 23,485 8215 10,755 11,585 16,340 6800 185,915 249,455 90,200 34,990 3200 71,790 645 7905 17,200 4480 442,765 7155 2,140,690 13,240 1085 144,670 6065 10,835 419,730 22,000 8660 595

2019 10,325 5750 106,725 2225 1,182,990 102,600 118,350 15,100 57,300 643,895 128,720 7100 2125 297,735 25,245 5275 17,425 11,200 14,900 12,550 236,600 293,080 87,905 45,600 1525 64,275 1395 9350 76,300 10,120 545,450 12,625 1,771,320 45,935 400 147,815 4425 40,650 297,865 18,750 16,820 250

Increase/(decrease) 1490 4790 65,440 (1170) 429,045 70,835 16,315 5100 17,300 189,015 94,110 1475 1620 31,350 1760 (2940) 6670 (385) (1440) 5750 50,685 43,625 (2295) 10,610 (1675) (7515) 750 1445 59,100 5640 102,685 5470 (369,370) 32,695 (685) 3145 (1640) 29,815 (121,865) (3250) 8160 (345)

Percentage change 16.9 499.0 158.5 −34.5 56.9 223.0 16.0 51.0 43.3 41.6 271.9 26.2 320.8 11.8 7.5 −35.8 62.0 −3.3 −8.8 84.6 27.3 17.5 −2.5 30.3 −52.3 −10.5 116.3 18.3 343.6 125.9 23.2 76.5 −17.3 246.9 −63.1 2.2 −27.0 275.2 −29.0 −14.8 94.2 −58.0 (continued)

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Table 5.6 (continued) State Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Total

1980 16,765 72,545 2300 2465 59,360 18,385 4340 29,750 310 5,920,895

2019 22,800 176,480 5650 7135 150,595 73,435 2310 33,055 1150 6,968,600

Increase/(decrease) 6035 103,935 3350 4670 91,235 55,050 (2030) 3305 840 1,047,705

Percentage change 36.0 143.3 145.7 189.5 153.7 299.4 −46.8 11.1 271.0 17.7

See Notes 1 and 2 on Table 5.1

5.4.3  Regional Level Changes Table 5.7 shows that the changes in the geographic distribution of Jews by Census Region and Census Division from 1980–2019, to some extent, reflect the changing geographic distribution of Americans in general. The percentage of Jews in the Northeast decreased from 57% in 1980 to 44% in 2019. The 12% of Jews in the Midwest decreased to 11% in 2019. The percentage of Jews in the South increased from 16% to 22%, and the percentage of Jews in the West increased from 15% to 23%. In sum, the Jewish population shifted from the Northeast to the West and the South. The final column of Table 5.7 shows that the number of Jews in the Northeast decreased by 9% (316,000) from 1980 to 2019 and the number of Jews in the Midwest increased by 6% (45,000). The number of Jews in the South increased by 62% (591,000). The number of Jews in the West increased by 82% (728,000).

5.5  Local Jewish Community Studies Most local Jewish community studies produce information about the size and geographic distribution of the Jewish population, migration patterns, basic demographics (e.g., age, marital status, secular education, employment status, income), religiosity, intermarriage, membership in the organized Jewish community, Jewish education, familiarity with and perception of Jewish agencies, social service needs, visits and emotional attachment to Israel, experience with and perception of antisemitism, usage of Jewish and general media, philanthropy, and other areas of interest. In 2018, one local scientific Jewish community study with probability sampling was completed in Detroit.

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Table 5.7  Changes in Jewish population by census region and census division, 1980–2019 Census region/ division Northeast Middle Atlantic New England Midwest East North Central West North Central South East South Central South Atlantic West South Central West Mountain Pacific Total

1980 Number of Jews 3,390,420 3,003,185

Percentage distribution 57.3 50.7

2019 Number of Jews 3,074,620 2,614,635

Percentage distribution 44.1 37.5

Percentage change 9.3 12.9

387,235 689,825 554,490

6.5 11.7 9.4

459,985 734,330 591,755

6.6 10.5 8.5

18.8 6.5 6.7

135,335

2.3

142,575

2.0

5.4

949,735 40,385

16.0 0.7

1,541,155 45,850

22.1 0.7

62.3 13.5

811,005 98,345

13.7 1.7

1,297,275 198,030

18.6 2.8

60.0 101.4

890,915 101,165 789,750 5,920,895

15.0 1.7 13.3 100.0

1,618,495 308,570 1,309,925 6,968,600

23.2 4.4 18.8 100.0

81.7 205.0 65.9 17.7

See Notes 1 and 2 on Table 5.1

5.5.1  Detroit, MI (2018) This 2018 study covers the service area of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit in Michigan. The study area includes Oakland, Wayne, and Macomb County. The consultant was Ira M. Sheskin of the University of Miami. The field work was completed by SSRS (Dr. David Dutwin) of Glen Mills, PA (Sheskin 2018). One thousand two hundred telephone interviews were completed, using a combination of RDD sampling, Distinctive Jewish Name sampling, Jewish Federation list sampling, and lists of cell phone numbers with non-local area codes but with Detroit billing addresses. Previous scientific community studies of the Detroit Jewish population were conducted in 1989 and 2005. Population Size and Geography. This study finds that 83,800 persons live in 31,500 Jewish households in Detroit, of whom 70,800 persons (85%) are Jewish. Detroit is the 26th largest US Jewish community. Including Jews living in institutions, the total Jewish population of Detroit is 71,750. From 2005 to 2018, the number of Jewish households increased by 1500 (5%); the number of persons in Jewish households increased by 5800 (7%); but the number of Jews in Jewish households decreased by 700 (1%). Of course, the decrease in Jews in Jewish households is within the margin of error but stands in contrast to

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the increase in households and persons. This is almost certainly due to the doubling of the percentage of married couples who are intermarried between 2005 and 2018. The percentage of Detroit households who are Jewish remained about the same (1.9% in 2005 and 2.1% in 2018). In 2018, 72% of Jewish households live in the Core Area and 28%, in the Non-­ Core Area. 22% of Jewish households live in West Bloomfield, 15% in Oak Park-­ Huntington Woods, 14% in Bloomfield-Birmingham-Franklin, 11% in Wayne County, and 9% in Farmington. From 2005 to 2018, the number of persons in Jewish households in the Core Area increased by about 1700 persons (3%) from 2005 to 2018. The number of persons in Jewish households in the Non-Core Area increased by 4100 persons (24%). The number of persons in Jewish households increased in Bloomfield-­ Birmingham-­Franklin (7050, 103%), West Oakland County (3550, 114%), Macomb County (2550, 300%), East Oakland County (2000, 95%), and Wayne County (1450, 18%). Significant decreases were seen in Farmington (5900, 45%) and West Bloomfield (3400, 18%). The number of Jewish households in the City of Detroit, consistent with the significant decrease in households in Detroit in general (based on data from the American Community Survey), decreased from 1900 households in 2005 to 800 households in 2018. The 62% of adults in Jewish households who were born in Detroit increased from 57% in 2005. The 62% is the highest of about 40 comparison Jewish communities. Ten percent of adults in Jewish households are foreign-born. Five percent of Jewish households contain an LGBT adult. The 4% of new Jewish households (in residence for 0–4 years in Detroit) is the third lowest of about 45 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 3% in 2005. The 87% of households in residence for 20 or more years is the highest of about 45 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 88% in 2005. Thus, Detroit is a Jewish community with local roots. Forty-nine percent of adult children from Jewish households in which the respondent is age 50 or over who have established their own homes live in Detroit, which is the fifth highest of about 30 comparison Jewish communities. Demography. Eighteen percent of persons in Jewish households in Detroit are age 0–17; 23% are age 18–34; 15% are age 35–49; 23% are age 50–64; and 21% are age 65 and over. The 23% age 18–34 is the fourth highest of about 45 comparison Jewish communities. The 18% under age 17 decreased from 25% in 2005. The 23% age 18–34 increased from 12% in 2005. The 15% age 35–49 compares to 17% in 2005. The 23% age 50–64 compares to 22% in 2005. The 21% age 65 and over decreased from 24% in 2005. The median age of persons in Jewish households declined from 47.1 years in 2005 to 45.7 years in 2018. The 2.66 average household size compares to 2.60 in 2005. Among about 35 comparison Jewish communities, the 19% of Jewish ­households with only children age 18 and over at home is the third highest. Among about 45 comparison Jewish communities, the 23% of married households with no children at home is the fourth lowest. Among 40 comparison Jewish communities,

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the 6% of married households with no children at home age 50–64 is the second lowest. The 57% of adults in Jewish households who are currently married is the fifth lowest of about 45 comparison Jewish communities. The 57% decreased from 66% in 2005. The 26% who are single, never married is the second highest of 40 comparison Jewish communities. The 26% increased from 17% in 2005. The 5% who are currently widowed is the fifth lowest of 40 comparison Jewish communities. The 5% decreased from 12% in 2005. In 1989, 61% of adults under age 35 were currently married. This decreased to 24% in 2005 and to 17% in 2018, indicating a tendency for the current generation to marry later in life. This has important implications for synagogues since most households do not join a synagogue until they marry. The 76% of adults age 25 and over in Jewish households with a 4-year college degree or higher is above average among about 40 comparison Jewish communities and has increased significantly from 63% in 2005. The 76% is well above the 34% for all American adults (both Jewish and non-Jewish) age 25 and over. Forty-four percent of adults in Jewish households are employed full time; 15% are employed part time; 2% were unemployed at the time of the survey; 19% are retired; 5% are homemakers; 12% are students; and 3% are disabled. The 33% of persons age 65 and over in Jewish households who are employed full time or part time has increased from 29% in 2005. The median Jewish household income of $107,000 (in 2017 dollars) is about average and the $135,000 median household income (in 2017 dollars) of households with children is about average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities. The $107,000 overall median household income (in 2017 dollars) compares to $110,000 (in 2017 dollars) in 2005. Eight percent of Jewish households earn an annual income under $25,000. The 2.0% of households with incomes below the Federal poverty levels is about average among about 30 comparison Jewish communities. On a subjective measure of financial status, 18% of respondents in Jewish ­households report that they are “well off”; 26% “have some extra money”; 29% “have enough money”; 24% are “just managing to make ends meet”; and 4% “cannot make ends meet.” Jewish Connections. Nine percent of Jewish respondents in Detroit identify as Orthodox; 20%, Conservative; 2%, Reconstructionist; 35%, Reform; 4%, Humanist; and 31%, Just Jewish. The 9% Orthodox is the seventh highest, the 20% Conservative is below average, the 35% Reform and the 35% Just Jewish/Humanist are about average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities. From 2005 to 2018, the percentage Orthodox changed slightly from 11% to 9%. The percentage Conservative decreased by 9% points; the percentage Reform remained about the same; and the percentage Just Jewish increased by 13% points. Sixty-two percent of Jewish respondents feel that being Jewish is very important in their lives; 31%, somewhat important; 6%, not too important; and 1%, not at all important. The 62% is about average among about 20 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 73% in 1989.

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Ninety-nine percent of Jewish respondents are proud to be Jewish. Ninety-one percent of Jewish respondents agree with the statement “I have a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people,” and 81% agree with the statement “I have a special responsibility to take care of Jews in need around the world.” Having a mezuzah on the front door is observed by 69% of households. Participating in a Passover Seder is always/usually observed by 74% of households and lighting Chanukah candles, by 71%. Lighting Sabbath candles is always/usually observed by 22% of households. Of the 41% of Jewish households who never light Sabbath candles, 5% always/usually do something else to observe the Sabbath. Keeping a kosher home is observed by 19% of households and keeping kosher in and out of the home, by 13% of respondents. While 8% of respondents refrain from using electricity on the Sabbath,18% of households always/usually have a Christmas tree in the home (and 25% always/usually/sometimes have one). Among the comparison Jewish communities, Detroit exhibits average levels of religious practice, except for keeping kosher in the home and outside the home and the use of electricity on the Sabbath, which are among the highest of the comparison communities. The percentage who have a mezuzah on the front door decreased from 77% in 2005 to 69% in 2018. The 74% who always/usually participate in a Passover Seder decreased from 82% in 2005 to 74% in 2018. The 71% who always/usually light Chanukah candles decreased from 77% in 2005 to 71% in 2018. The 22% who always/usually light Sabbath candles decreased from 29% in 2005 to 22% in 2018. The 19% who keep a kosher home changed from 22% in 2005. The 13% who keep kosher in and out of the home changed from 14% in 2005. The 8% who refrain from electrical use on the Sabbath changed from 10% in 2005. Thus, in general home religious practice has decreased from 2005 to 2018. The percentage who always/usually/sometimes have a Christmas tree in the home increased from 15% in 2005 to 25% in 2018. The 23% of Jewish respondents who attend synagogue services once per month or more and the 31% who never attend services are both about average among about 40 and 35 comparison Jewish communities, respectively. The 30% of married couples in Jewish households who are intermarried is well below average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 16% in 2005. Thirty-nine percent of children age 0–17 in intermarried households are not being raised Jewish and 17% are being raised part Jewish. Memberships. The 39% synagogue membership of Jewish households in Detroit is about average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 50% in 2005 and 52% in 1989. The lower synagogue membership rate in 2018 is likely due to the aging of the population and an increasing age at first marriage. The 52% of Jewish households with children and the 19% of intermarried ­households who are synagogue members are both about average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities. In the past year, 71% of Jewish households participated in or attended religious services or programs at, or sponsored by, a local synagogue; and 13% participated in or attended religious services or programs at, or sponsored by, Chabad.

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The 8% of Jewish households who are members of the Jewish Community Center (JCC) located in Detroit compares to 15% in 2005. The 8% is below average among about 45 comparison JCCs. The 51% who participated in a JCC program in the past year is the third highest of about 45 comparison JCCs and compares to 45% in 2005 and 76% in 1989. Thus, while membership is low, participation is high. The 19% of households who are members of or regular participants in a Jewish organization (other than a synagogue or JCC) is the sixth lowest of about 40 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 36% in 2005. The 45% of Jewish households who are associated with the Jewish community (someone in the household is a member of a synagogue, JCC, or Jewish organization) is the seventh lowest of about 40 comparison Jewish communities and ­compares to 64% in 2005. Adult Jewish Education. Of respondents in Jewish households in Detroit who were born or raised Jewish, the 81% who had some formal Jewish education as children is about average among about 35 comparison Jewish communities, as is the 13% who attended a Jewish day school as children among 35 comparison Jewish communities. The 13% compares to 15% in 2005. The 51% of respondents who were born or raised Jewish who attended or worked at a Jewish overnight camp as children is the highest of about 30 comparison Jewish communities. The 51% increased from 42% in 2005. The 47% who participated in a Jewish youth group as teenagers is the fourth highest of about 25 comparison Jewish communities. The 24% of college attendees who participated in Hillel/ Chabad (other than on the High Holidays) while in college is about average among about 25 comparison Jewish communities. In the past year, 31% of Jewish respondents attended an adult Jewish education program or class; 37% engaged in “any other type” of Jewish study or learning (on their own, online, with a friend, or with a teacher); and 57% visited a Jewish museum or attended a Jewish cultural event, such as a lecture by an author, a film, a play, or a musical performance. Children’s Jewish Education. The 63% of Detroit’s Jewish children age 0–5 in a preschool/child care program who attend a Jewish preschool/child care program (Jewish market share) is about average among about 35 comparison Jewish ­communities. Sixty-three percent of households with Jewish children have received children’s books in the mail from the PJ Library. Of children age 5–12 in private school, 86% attend a Jewish day school (Jewish market share), which is the sixth highest of about 40 comparison Jewish communities. Eighty-one percent of Jewish children age 5–12 and 49% of Jewish children age 13–17 currently attend formal Jewish education. The 82% of Jewish children age 13–17 who received some formal Jewish education at some time in their childhood is about average among about 40 comparison Jewish communities. Israel. The 63% of Jewish households in Detroit in which a member visited Israel is the second highest of about 25 comparison Jewish communities and has increased from 58% in 2005. The 33% of households with Jewish children age 6–17 who have sent a Jewish child on a trip to Israel is the fourth highest of about 35 comparison

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Jewish communities. Forty-six percent of households with Jewish children age 6–17 (whose Jewish children have not visited Israel) did not send a Jewish child on a trip to Israel because of cost. The 50% of Jewish respondents who are extremely or very emotionally attached to Israel is about average among about 30 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 56% in 2005. Thus, the connection of Detroit’s Jewish population to Israel is quite strong. Seventy percent of Jewish respondents had conversations with other Jews in Detroit about the political situation in Israel. Forty percent of Jewish respondents who have had such conversations frequently/sometimes hesitate to express their views about the political situation in Israel because those views might cause tension with other Jews in Detroit. Anti-Semitism. The 16% of respondents in Jewish households in Detroit who personally experienced anti-Semitism in the local community in the past year is about average among about 30 comparison Jewish communities. The 16% compares to 15% in 2005. The 13% of households with Jewish children age 6–17 in which a Jewish child age 6–17 experienced anti-Semitism in the local community in the past year is about average among about 25 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 18% in 2005. The 45% of respondents in Jewish households who perceive a great deal or moderate amount of anti-Semitism in the local community is the fourth highest of about 25 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 61% in 2005. Thus, both the experience with (among children) and perception of anti-­Semitism have decreased since 2005. Holocaust Survivors. Just 1% (300 households) of households contain a survivor, 5% (1670 households) contain a child of a survivor, and 12% (3650 households) contain a grandchild of a survivor. Overall, 14% (4500 households) of households contain a survivor, and/or the child of a survivor, and/or the grandchild of a survivor. Only 0.5% (300 adults) of Jewish adults consider themselves to be survivors, 3% (1800 adults) consider themselves to be children of survivors, and 7% (4000 adults) consider themselves to be grandchildren of survivors. Data from Jewish Family Service suggests the estimates of the number of survivors may be low. Media. Thirty percent of Jewish respondents in Detroit always read the Detroit Jewish News; 4%, usually; 40%, sometimes; and 27%, never. The 34% who always/ usually read the Detroit Jewish News is about average among about 25 comparison Jewish newspapers and compares to 57% in 2005. The 28% of Jewish respondents in Detroit who visited the local Jewish Federation website in the past year is the second highest of about 20 comparison Jewish communities. Philanthropy. The 42% of Jewish households in Detroit who donated to the local Jewish Federation in the past year is above average among about 45 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased significantly from 55% in 2005.

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The 58% of Jewish households who donated to other Jewish charities (Jewish charities other than Jewish Federations) in the past year is above average among about 40 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 68% in 2005. The 67% who donated to any Jewish charity in the past year is above average among about 40 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 78% in 2005. The 79% who donated to non-Jewish charities in the past year is about average among about 40 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 85% in 2005. Twenty-seven percent of respondents age 50 and over do not have wills; 58% have wills that contain no provisions for charities; 9% have wills that contain provisions for Jewish Charities (including 2% who have a provision for the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit); and 6% have wills that contain provisions for Non-Jewish Charities only. The 32% who volunteered for Jewish organizations in the past year is the fifth highest of about 25 comparison Jewish communities and has decreased from 42% in 2005. The 41% who volunteered for non-Jewish organizations in the past year is about average among about 25 comparison Jewish communities and compares to 37% in 2005. Helping Jews locally who are in financial need and providing services for the Jewish Elderly are the two major motivations that respondents in Jewish households consider to be the most important in their decision to donate to Jewish causes. Politics. Fifteen percent of respondents think of themselves as Republican; 51%, Democrat, and 34%, Independent. Ninety-seven percent of respondents are registered to vote and 94% of registered voters voted in the last presidential election.

5.6  Comparisons Among Jewish Communities Since 2000, about 45 US Jewish communities have completed one or more scientific Jewish community studies. Each year, this chapter presents tables comparing the results of these studies. This year, five tables are presented: (1) political party; (2) percentage of respondents who are Republican by age; (3) percentage of respondents who are Republican by Jewish identification; (4) registered to vote; and (5) registered to vote for respondents under age 35. These tables were selected because they complement the discussion in Chap. 2 of this volume. The comparisons among Jewish communities should be treated with caution, because the studies span a 15-year period, use different sampling methods, use different questionnaires (Bradburn et al. 2004), and differ in other ways (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, pp.  136–138; Sheskin 2005). Note that many more comparison tables may be found in Sheskin (2001) and Sheskin (2015b).

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Table 5.8  Political party community comparisons Base: respondents Community Washington Minneapolis St. Paul Bergen Seattle San Francisco St. Petersburg Broward Indianapolis Miami Detroit Omaha Houston

Year 2003 2004 2004 2001 2000 2004 2017 2016 2017 2014 2018 2017 2016

Republican (%) 11 9 13 11 8 9 25 17 16 18 15 17 31

Democrat 69 66 63 63 63 61 56 56 55 53 51 51 41

Independent 17 19 18 19 25 12 19 26 29 21 34 33 24

Something else 4 6 6 6 4 18 0 1 0 9 0 0 5

These tables contain relatively few references to the 45 local Jewish community studies completed since 2000. Many communities, because most studies are ­sponsored by the local Jewish Federation, which is a non-partisan organization, have felt a reluctance to ask a political question until recently. More communities are now recognizing that understanding political preference is important in understanding local Jewish communities.

5.6.1  Political Party Table 5.8 shows that the percentage of respondents who identify as Republican ­varies from 8 to 9% in Seattle, San Francisco, and Minneapolis to 31% in Houston, although most communities have percentages between 11% and 18%. St. Petersburg is another “outlier” at 25%. Houston’s high value could be due to its location in a Republican state, but the Houston metropolitan area generally votes Democratic. And, while Nebraska is also a Republican state, only 17% of Jews are Republican in Omaha.

5.6.2  Political Party by Age Table 5.9 shows political party by age. The thesis that younger Jews are more likely to be Republican receives only minimal support. The high value Republican for respondents under age 35 for Detroit and Bergen is more related to the large young

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Table 5.9  Percentage Republican by age community comparisons Base: Jewish respondents Community Year Houston 2016 Omaha 2017 Miami 2014 Broward 2016 St. Paul 2004 Detroit 2018 Bergen 2001 Minneapolis 2004 Washington 2003 Seattle 2000 Indianapolis 2017 St. Petersburg 2017 San Francisco 2004

Under 35 (%) 36 4 21 20 14 21 22 17 9 0 13 NA 12

35–49 (%) 25 21 21 19 15 14 14 13 13 13 10 10 8

50–64 (%) 35 11 19 22 7 16 10 6 10 28 30 30 8

65–74 (%) 28 29 15 14 7 13 6 5 13 2 14 29 7

75+ (%) 31 23 15 10 5 15 4 3 6 2 12 23 13

Orthodox population in those two communities, and, as will be seen in the next table, the Orthodox do tend to vote more Republican than other Jewish groups. Some tendency does exist, with the exception of Houston, Omaha, and St. Peterburg, for a low percentage of Republicans among the two older age groups (65–74 and 75 and over). A few communities do show a higher percentage of Republicans among younger respondents (Bergen, Broward, Miami, St. Paul, Minneapolis), but most of the differences are relatively minor.

5.6.3  Political Party by Jewish Identification Table 5.10 shows political party by Jewish identification. Note that respondents typically are asked whether they consider themselves to be Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Reform, or Just Jewish. Such Jewish identification is a self-­identification and is not necessarily based on (nor consistent with) synagogue membership, ideology, or religious practice. In fact, discrepancies between Jewish identification and practice are sometimes evident. For example, respondents may identify as Orthodox or Conservative but report that they do not keep kosher. Respondents may identify as Reform but report that they never attend synagogue services. Also, respondents may identify as Conservative and belong to a Reform synagogue, or to no synagogue at all. Thus, what is being examined here is really a philosophical position and not always a behavioral description. The thesis that Orthodox Jews are more likely to be Republican than other groups is supported by the table. Only in Bergen and Indianapolis are Orthodox Jews not

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Table 5.10  Percentage Republican by Jewish identification Base: Jewish respondents Community Year Orthodox (%) Houston 2016 52 Omaha 2017 36 Miami 2014 43 Broward 2016 40 St. Paul 2004 45 Detroit 2018 40 Bergen 2001 12 Minneapolis 2004 54 Washington 2003 28 Seattle 2000 9 Indianapolis 2017 14 St. Petersburg 2017 NA Twin Cities 2004 45

Conservative (%) 37 15 16 17 8 16 8 7 9 0 16 34 8

Reform (%) 26 12 15 15 7 12 14 7 12 1 14 12 7

Just Jewish (%) 31 20 16 18 14 14 13 11 9 20 19 30 13

Note: Due to a small sample size, a combined number for Minneapolis/St. Paul is presented for Orthodox

more likely to be Republican. For example, in Detroit, 40% of the Orthodox are Republican, compared to 16% of Conservative Jews, 12% of Reform Jews, and 14% of the Just Jewish. Yet, note that in only two communities (Houston and Minneapolis) are a majority of Orthodox Jews Republican; and in those cases, the percentages are just over half (52 and 54%).

5.6.4  Registered to Vote Table 5.11 shows that very large percentages of Jewish respondents who are citizens are registered to vote, ranging from 88% in New York to 98% in Omaha. This compares to 59% for all Americans nationwide from the US Census Bureau’s 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS). Given the upcoming presidential election in 2020, note that it appears likely that whatever the percentage that adult Jews are of all American adults in a metropolitan area, their share of the vote will likely average about 30% higher than their share of the population, thereby increasing their voting power.

5.6.5  Registered to Vote for Respondents Under Age 35 Table 5.12 shows that very large percentages of Jewish respondents under age 35 who are citizens are registered to vote, ranging from 72% in New York to 100% in Omaha. This compares to 45% for all Americans nationwide under age 35 in 2014

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Table 5.11  Registered to vote community comparisons Base: Jewish respondents Community Omaha Detroit Broward Columbus S Palm Beach W Palm Beach Washington Indianapolis St. Petersburg Miami Houston Bergen New York US (Current Population Survey)

Year 2017 2018 2016 2013 2005 2005 2003 2017 2017 2014 2016 2001 2011 2014

% 98 97 96 96 96 96 96 95 95 95 94 92 88 59

Table 5.12  Registered to vote under age 35 community comparisons Base: Jewish respondents under age 35 Community Omaha W Palm Beach Washington Indianapolis Miami Detroit St. Petersburg Broward Houston Columbus S Palm Beach Bergen New York US (Current Population Survey)

Year 2017 2005 2003 2017 2014 2018 2017 2016 2016 2013 2005 2001 2011 2014

% 100 94 94 93 93 92 92 87 86 85 83 82 72 45

from the US Census Bureau’s 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS). Note that in almost all cases, the percentage under age 35 is lower than the overall percentage shown in Table 5.11. Only Detroit asked if registered respondents actually voted in the last presidential election (2016). About 94% under age 35 claimed to have voted.

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5.7  Atlas of US Jewish Communities This Section presents regional and state maps showing the approximate sizes of each Jewish community. State maps are presented for the states with the largest Jewish populations. In a few cases, states with smaller Jewish populations are presented on the maps because of proximity. For example, Delaware is presented on the Maryland map. The Appendix should be used in conjunction with the maps, as it provides more exact population estimates and more detailed descriptions of the geographic areas included within each community. Note that in some places, county names are utilized, and in other cases, town or city names appear. In general, we have tried to use the names that reflect the manner in which the local Jewish community identifies itself. In some cases, because of spacing issues on the maps, we have deviated from this rule. The rankings of the population sizes and the population sizes of the communities within the US are from Table  5.5, which is based on the Jewish populations of Jewish Federation service areas. Map 5.5 shows the percentage of Jews by county (Comenetz 2011). As expected, the percentages are highest in the Northeast, California, and Florida. Note that in some cases, particularly in the West, where counties are generally larger, it may seem that the Jewish population is spread over larger areas of a state than is actually the case. For example, San Bernardino County (CA), the largest county in area in the US, covers 20,105 square miles and is larger than nine US states. Almost all Jews in this county live in the southwestern section of the county, but on the map a very large area is shaded. Large areas of the country have virtually no Jewish population. Rural, agrarian areas, in particular, are often devoid of any Jewish population. In Europe, from which most US Jews can trace their ancestry, Jews often did not become farmers, because (1) during many eras and in many geographic locations, Jews were not allowed to own land; and (2) as a people who often felt that they could be expelled at any time, Jews did not tend to invest in real estate, which clearly could not be taken with them if they were expelled. Thus, when Jews came to the US, they tended to settle in urban areas. This is still the trend. While these maps present our best estimates for 2019, note that the date on most estimates are most frequently from previous years. They remain, however, the best estimates available for the current year. For the dates of all estimates, see the Appendix.

5.7.1  New England (Maps 5.6 and 5.7) Connecticut (Map 5.6). The estimates for Hartford (32,800 Jews), New Haven (23,000), and Upper Fairfield County17 (24,450) are based on 2000, 2010, and 2000 RDD studies, respectively. Hartford is the largest Jewish community in Connecticut,  Only the Westport, Weston, Wilton, Norwalk areas of Upper Fairfield County were included in the survey in 2000.

17

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Map 5.5  Jewish population by county

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Map 5.6  Jewish communities of Southern New England

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Map 5.7  Jewish communities of Northern New England

accounts for 28% of the Jews in Connecticut, and is the 35th largest US Jewish community. New Haven is the 46th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Western Connecticut (8000) is based on a 2010 DJN study. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Maine (Map 5.7). Based on a 2007 RDD study, 8350 Jews live in Southern Maine (Portland). The estimates for Oxford County (South Paris) (750 Jews), Androscoggin County (Lewiston-Auburn) (600), and Sagadahoc (Bath) (400) are DJN estimates. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Massachusetts (Map 5.6). Based on a 2015 RDD study, 248,000 Jews live in Boston. Boston is the largest Jewish community in Massachusetts, accounts for 85% of the Jews in Massachusetts, and is the 6th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Worcester (9000 Jews) is based on a 2014 Informant update of a 1986 RDD study. An estimate of 7050 Jews (including part-year residents) for the Berkshires (2008) is based on a scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). Attleboro, based on a 2002 DJN estimate, has 800 Jews. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. New Hampshire (Map 5.7). Manchester (4000 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in New Hampshire. Most of the estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

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Rhode Island (Map 5.6). The estimate of 18,750 Jews in the state is based on a 2002 RDD study of the entire state. For more information on the Jews of Rhode Island, see Goodman and Smith (2004). Vermont (Map 5.7). Burlington (3500 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Vermont. All estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

5.7.2  Middle Atlantic (Maps 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10) New Jersey (Map 5.8). The most significant Jewish populations are in Bergen County, Monmouth County, Ocean County, Southern New Jersey, Middlesex County, and Essex County. Based, in part, on a 1997 RDD study in Monmouth and a 2008 RDD study in Middlesex, the now merged Jewish community, called the Jewish Federation in the Heart of New Jersey (Middlesex-Monmouth), contains 122,000 Jews, including 70,000 Jews in Monmouth (which includes 6000 part-year residents who live in the community for 3–7  months of the year) and 52,000 Jews in Middlesex County. Middlesex-Monmouth is the largest Jewish community in New Jersey, accounts for 21% of the Jews in New Jersey, and is the 13th largest US Jewish community Based, in part, on a 2001 RDD study updated by a 2016 Informant/Internet Estimate, 119,400 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Federation of Northern New Jersey, including 100,000 in Bergen County, 8000 in northern Passaic County, and 11,400 in Hudson County. Northern New Jersey is the 2nd largest Jewish community in New Jersey, accounts for 22% of the Jews in New Jersey, and is the 14th largest US Jewish community Based, in part, on a 1998 RDD study, updated with a 2012 DJN study, 115,000 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater MetroWest NJ, including 48,200  in Essex County, 30,300  in Morris County, 24,400  in Union County, 7400 in northern Somerset County, and 4700 in Sussex County. Greater MetroWest is the third largest Jewish community in New Jersey, accounts for 21% of the Jews in New Jersey, and is the 15th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Ocean County (83,000 Jews) is based on an Informant/Internet Estimate that is derived, in part, from a count of a mailing list said to be a complete listing of the ultra-Orthodox community in the Lakewood area. Ocean County is the 20th largest US Jewish community. Other communities with RDD studies in New Jersey include Southern New Jersey (2013) (56,700), and Atlantic and Cape May Counties (2004) (20,400, including 8200 part-year residents). The 1991 Southern New Jersey (Cherry Hill) study was updated with a 2013 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). Southern New Jersey is the 29th largest US Jewish community. A 2012 DJN study estimates 20,000 Jews for the service area of the Jewish Federation of Somerset, Hunterdon & Warren Counties, including 11,600 Jews in

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Map 5.8  Jewish communities of New Jersey

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Map 5.9  Jewish communities of New York

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Map 5.10  Jewish communities of Pennsylvania

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southern Somerset County, 6000 in Hunterdon County, and 2400 in Warren County. Somerset, Hunterdon & Warren Counties is the 52nd largest US Jewish community. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates, including southern Passaic County (12,000) and Trenton (6000). New York (Map 5.9). Based on a 2011 RDD study, 1,538,000 Jews live in the UJAFederation of New York service area, including 561,100 in Brooklyn, 239,700 in Manhattan, 229,900 in Nassau County, 197,800 in Queens, 136,200 in Westchester County, 85,700  in Suffolk County, 53,900  in The Bronx, and 33,900  in Staten Island. New York is the largest Jewish community in New York State, accounts for 87% of the Jews in New York State, and is the largest US Jewish community. For more information on the Jews of Brooklyn, see Abramovitch and Galvin (2002). The 101,300 estimate for Rockland County is based primarily on an Informant/ Internet Estimate. Rockland County is the 16th largest US Jewish community. The 37,000 estimate for Orange County includes an estimate of 25,300 for Kiryas Joel, based on the US Census. Orange County is the 34th largest US Jewish community. The five most significant Jewish communities in upstate New York are Albany (Northeastern NY) (20,500), Rochester (19,900 Jews), Buffalo (11,000), Dutchess County (10,000), and Syracuse (7000). Northeastern New York is the 50th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Rochester is based on a 1999 RDD study, updated using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). The estimate for Buffalo is based on a study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). Putnam County (3900) is based on a study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Pennsylvania (Map 5.10). Based on a 2009 RDD study, 214,700 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia, including 66,900 in the City of Philadelphia, 64,500 in Montgomery County, 41,400 in Bucks County, 21,000 in Delaware County, and 20,900 in Chester County. Philadelphia is the largest Jewish community in Pennsylvania, accounts for 72% of the Jews in Pennsylvania, and is the 6th largest US Jewish community. The estimate of 49,200 Jews for Pittsburgh is based on a 2017 RDD study. Pittsburgh is the 31st largest US Jewish community. Other Jewish communities with RDD studies in Pennsylvania include Lehigh Valley (Allentown, Bethlehem, and Easton) (2007) (8050 Jews), Harrisburg (2016) (5000), and York (1999) (1800). The 2007 estimates of Jews for Monroe County (2300) and Carbon County (600) are based on DJN studies. The estimate of 1800 Jews for Wilkes-Barre is based on a 2014 Informant update of a 2005 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. The estimate of 3100 Jews for Scranton is based upon a 2008 informant estimate.

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5.7.3  Midwest (Maps 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14) Illinois (Map 5.11). Based on a 2011 RDD study, Chicago (291,800 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Illinois, accounts for 98% of the Jews in Illinois, and is the 5th largest US Jewish community.

Map 5.11  Jewish communities of the Midwest—Part 1

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Map 5.12  Jewish communities of the Midwest—Part 2

The only other scientific estimate is for Quad Cities (750, of which 300 live in Illinois), which is based on a 1990 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Indiana (Map 5.11). Based on a 2017 RDD study, Indianapolis (17,900 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Indiana and accounts for 71% of the Jews in Indiana. All estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

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Map 5.13  Jewish communities of Ohio

Iowa (Map 5.12). Des Moines-Ames (2800 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Iowa, based on a 1956 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), updated by an Informant Estimate between 1997 and 2001. Des Moines-Ames accounts for 45% of the Jews in Iowa. The only other scientific estimate is for Quad Cities (450, of which 275 live in Iowa), which is based on a 1990

Map 5.14  Jewish communities of the South

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scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN) and updated with an Informant Estimate. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Kansas (Map 5.12). The Kansas portion of the Kansas City Jewish community contains 16,000 Jews, based on a 1985 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), updated in 2015. Kansas City is the largest Jewish community in Kansas, accounting for 92% of the Jews in Kansas. Adding in the 2000 Jews who live in the Missouri portion of Kansas City, yields a combined population of 18,000. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Michigan (Map 5.11). Detroit (71,750 Jews), the largest Jewish community in Michigan, accounts for 82% of the Jews in Michigan, and is the 25th largest US Jewish community. The estimate is based on a 2018 RDD study. The estimate for Ann Arbor (8000) is based on a 2010 DJN study, updated by a 2014 Informant Estimate. Flint (1300) is based on a 1956 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), updated by a 2009 Informant Estimate. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Minnesota (Map 5.12). The combined Twin Cities Jewish community of Minneapolis and St. Paul, with 39,200 Jews based on a 2004 RDD study (partially updated with a 2010 DJN study), is the largest Jewish community in Minnesota and accounts for 86% of the Jews in Minnesota. Minneapolis, with 29,300 Jews, is the 39th largest US Jewish community. In addition, St. Paul has 9900 Jews the estimate of 5300 Jews for the counties ­surrounding the Twin Cities is based on a 2004 DJN study. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Missouri (Map 5.12). St. Louis (61,100 Jews), based on a 2014 RDD study, is the largest Jewish community in Missouri, accounts for 95% of the Jews in Missouri, and is the 28th largest US Jewish community. The Missouri portion of the Kansas City Jewish community contains 2000 Jews, based on a 1985 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), updated in 2015. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Nebraska (Map 5.12). Omaha (8800 Jews), based on a 2017 RDD estimate, is the largest Jewish community in Nebraska and accounts for 94% of the Jews in Nebraska. The estimate for Lincoln is an Informant/Internet Estimate. North Dakota (Map 5.12). The estimates for both Fargo (150 Jews) and Grand Forks (150) are based on Informant/Internet Estimates. Ohio (Map 5.13). Cleveland, with 80,800 Jews, based on a 2011 RDD study, is the largest Jewish community in Ohio, accounts for 55% of the Jews in Ohio, and is the 22nd largest US Jewish community. The next two largest Jewish communities in Ohio are Cincinnati, with 27,000 Jews, and Columbus, with 25,500. These estimates are based on RDD studies in 2008 and 2013, respectively. Cincinnati is the 41st largest US Jewish community and Columbus is the 43rd largest. Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus combined account for 90% of the Jews in Ohio. The estimates for Dayton (4000 Jews), Akron-Kent (3000), Toledo-Bowling Green (2300), Youngstown-Warren (1300), and Canton-New Philadelphia (1000)

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are based on older scientific studies using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), and most were updated recently by Informant/Internet Estimates. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. South Dakota (Map 5.12). The estimates for both Sioux Falls (100 Jews) and Rapid City (100) are based on Informant/Internet Estimates. Wisconsin (Map 5.11). Milwaukee (25,800 Jews), based on a 2011 RDD study, is the largest Jewish community in Wisconsin, accounts for 78% of the Jews in Wisconsin, and is the 42nd largest US Jewish community. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

5.7.4  South (Maps 5.12 and 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17) Alabama (Map 5.14). Birmingham (6300 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Alabama and accounts for 61% of the Jews in Alabama. All estimates are Informant/ Internet Estimates. Arkansas (Map 5.17). Little Rock (1500 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Arkansas and accounts for 67% of the Jews in Arkansas. All estimates are Informant/ Internet Estimates.

Map 5.15  Jewish communities of Maryland, Delaware, DC, and Northern Virginia

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Map 5.16  Jewish communities of Florida

Delaware (Map 5.15). The estimates of Jewish population in Delaware are all based on a 1995 RDD study, updated with a 2006 DJN study. Wilmington (7600 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Delaware and accounts for 50% of the Jews in Delaware. The other Jewish communities are Newark (4300) and Kent and Sussex Counties (Dover) (3200). District of Columbia/Greater Washington (Map 5.15). Based on a 2017 RDD study, 295,500 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington, including 105,400 in Montgomery County (MD), 121,400 in Northern Virginia, 57,300 in the District of Columbia, and 11,400 in Prince George’s County (MD). Greater Washington is the 4th largest US Jewish community. Florida (Map 5.16). Based on RDD studies, 535,000 Jews, including 54,500 partyear residents, live in the three South Florida counties (Broward County, MiamiDade County, and Palm Beach County18): Broward County (2016) 149,000 Jews, including 5300 part-year residents; South Palm Beach (2018) 136,100, including 22,500 part-year residents; West Palm Beach (2018) 127,200, including 22,500 part-year residents; and Miami (2014) 123,200, including 4200 part-year residents.  Palm Beach County consists of two Jewish communities: The South Palm Beach community includes Greater Boca Raton and Greater Delray Beach. The West Palm Beach community includes all other areas of Palm Beach County from Boynton Beach north to the Martin County line. 18

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Map 5.17  Jewish communities of Texas, and Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma

Broward County (149,000) is the 8th largest US Jewish community, Miami (123,200) is the 11th largest, South Palm Beach (136,100) is the 9th largest, and West Palm Beach (127,200) is the 10th largest. Excluding part-year residents, these four communities account for 75% of the Jews in Florida. Other important Jewish communities in Florida include the service area of the Jewish Federation of Pinellas (St. Petersburg) & Pasco Counties (28,000, including 1500 part-year residents), Orlando (31,100, including 500 part-year residents), Tampa (23,000), Sarasota (15,500, including 3300 part-year residents), and Jacksonville (13,000, including 100 part-year residents). St. Petersburg-Pasco (28,000) is the 40th largest US Jewish community, Orlando (31,100) is the 36th largest, and Tampa (23,000) is the 47th largest. The estimates for Sarasota, Jacksonville, and St. Petersburg are based on RDD studies (2001, 2002, and 2017 respectively). The RDD study for Orlando (1993) is considerably older, but was updated with a 2010 DJN study. The estimate for Tampa is based on a 2010 DJN study. The estimates for Naples (7530, including 3200 part-year residents) is based on a scientific study (neither RDD nor DJN) and the estimate for Tallahassee (2800) is based on a 2010 DJN study. The estimate of 11,800 Jews (including 900 part-year residents) for Stuart-Port St. Lucie is based on a 2018 RDD study for Stuart and a 2004 RDD study for St. Lucie. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates, including Fort Myers-Arcadia-Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda (7500).

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For more information on the Jews of South Florida, see Greenbaum (2005). Georgia (Map 5.14). Atlanta (119,800 Jews), based on a 2006 RDD study, is the largest Jewish community in Georgia, accounts for 93% of the Jews in Georgia, and is the 12th largest US Jewish community. The only other significant Jewish community in Georgia is Savannah (4300), whose estimate, like all the other communities in Georgia, is based on an Informant/Internet Estimate. Kentucky (Map 5.14). Based on a 2006 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), Louisville (8300 Jews) accounts for 74% of the Jews in Kentucky. Lexington (2500), which is based on an Informant/Internet Estimate, is the only other significant Jewish community. All other estimates (except CovingtonNewport, which is based on an RDD study) are Informant/Internet Estimates. Louisiana (Map 5.17). New Orleans (12,000 Jews), based on a 1984 RDD study, updated in 2009 (post-Katrina) with a scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN) and in 2019 with an Informant/Internet estimate, accounts for 79% of the Jews in Louisiana. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Maryland (Map 5.15). Based on a 2014 RDD study, the largest Jewish community in Maryland is Montgomery County (105,400 Jews), which is part of the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington. (See District of Columbia above.) Montgomery County accounts for 45% of the Jews in Maryland. Based on a 2010 RDD study, Baltimore (93,400) is the second largest Jewish community in Maryland, accounts for 39% of the Jews in Maryland, and is the 19th largest US Jewish community. The estimate of 17,200 Jews for Howard County (Columbia) is based on a 2010 RDD study. Three communities, the Maryland portion of the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington (Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties), Baltimore, and Howard County, account for 96% of the Jews in Maryland. Based on a 2010 DJN estimate, 3500 Jews live in Annapolis. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates Mississippi (Map 5.14). The estimates for all four small Jewish communities in Mississippi are Informant/Internet Estimates. North Carolina (Map 5.14). Charlotte (12,000 Jews), based on a 1997 RDD study, is the largest Jewish community in North Carolina. Durham-Chapel Hill (7500), Raleigh-Cary (15,000), Western North Carolina (4200), and Greensboro (3000) are other significant communities. With the exception of Western North Carolina, which is based on a scientific study using another methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), the other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Winston-­Salem (1200) is based on a 2011 DJN estimate. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Oklahoma (Map 5.17). Based on a 2010 DJN study, the largest Jewish community in Oklahoma is Oklahoma City-Norman (2300 Jews). The estimate for Tulsa (2000) is an Informant/Internet Estimate. South Carolina (Map 5.14). Charleston (9000 Jews), based on an Informant Estimate, is the largest Jewish community in South Carolina and accounts for 54%

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of the Jews in South Carolina. The estimate for Greenville (2000) is based on a DJN study. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Tennessee (Map 5.14). The estimates for Memphis (10,000 Jews) and Nashville (9000), the two largest Jewish communities in Tennessee, are based on scientific studies using another methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). Memphis and Nashville combined account for 83% of the Jews in Tennessee. The estimates for Knoxville (2000), Chattanooga (1400), and Oak Ridge (150) are based on DJN studies. Bristol-Johnson City-Kingsport (125) is an Informant/Internet Estimate. Texas (Map 5.17). Dallas (70,000 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Texas, accounts for 42% of the Jews in Texas, and is the 26th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Dallas is based on a 1988 RDD study, updated by a 2013 scientific study using a different methodology (neither DJN nor RDD). Houston (51,000) is the second largest Jewish community in Texas, accounts for 31% of the Jews in Texas, and is the 30th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Houston is based on a 2016 RDD study. Dallas and Houston combined account for 73% of the Jews in Texas. The only other RDD study completed in Texas was in 2007  in San Antonio (9200). Based on a 2007 DJN study, an additional 1000 Jews live in counties surrounding San Antonio. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates, including Austin (30,000), El Paso (5000), and Fort Worth (5000). For more information on the Jews of Texas, see Weiner and Roseman (2007). Virginia (Maps 5.14 and 5.15). Based on a 2017 RDD study, Northern Virginia (121,400 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Virginia and is part of the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington. (See District of Columbia above.) Northern Virginia accounts for 81% of the Jews in Virginia. Other significant Jewish communities in Virginia are Tidewater (mainly Norfolk and Virginia Beach) (10,950), based on a 2001 RDD study, and Richmond (10,000), based on a 1994 RDD study, updated with a 2011 DJN study. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. West Virginia (Map 5.14). Charleston (975 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in West Virginia and accounts for 42% of the Jews in West Virginia. All e­ stimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

5.7.5  West (Maps 5.18 and 5.19) Alaska (Map 5.18). Anchorage (5000 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Alaska and accounts for 87% of the Jews in Alaska. All estimates are Informant/ Internet Estimates. Arizona (Map 5.18). Based on a 2002 RDD study, Phoenix (82,900 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Arizona, accounts for 78% of the Jews in Arizona, and is the 21st largest US Jewish community.

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Map 5.18  Jewish community of the West

A 2002 RDD study of Tucson estimated 22,400 Jews (including 1000 part-year residents), making it the second largest Jewish community in Arizona and accounts for 20% of the Jews in Arizona. Tucson (21,400, excluding the part-year residents) is the 48th largest US Jewish community. Phoenix and Tucson combined account for 98% of the Jews in Arizona.

194

Map 5.19  Jewish communities of California

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019

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The estimates for Cochise County (450) and Santa Cruz County (100) are based on 2002 DJN studies. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. California (Map 5.19). Based on a 1997 RDD study, 519,200 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles, which is the largest Jewish community in California, accounts for 44% of the Jews in California, and is the 2nd largest US Jewish community. Based on a 2017 study, 310,600 Jews live in the service area of the Jewish Community Federation & Foundation of San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma Counties, including 61,500  in San Francisco County, 37,300  in Marin County, 33,800  in parts of Santa Clara County, 29,700  in San Mateo County, 15,100 in Santa Cruz County, and 8200 in Sonoma County. This Federation recently absorbed (from the now defunct Jewish Federation of the East Bay) Alameda County (63,100), Contra Costa County (55,900), Napa County (2100), and Solano County (3900). San Francisco area is the 2nd largest Jewish community in California, accounts for 26% of the Jews in California, and is the 3rd largest US Jewish community. Based on a 2003 RDD study, updated by a 2014 Informant/Internet Estimate, 100,000 Jews live in San Diego, which is the 3rd largest Jewish community in California and the 17th largest US Jewish community. Based on a 2017 RDD study, 39,400 Jews live in San Jose, which is the 32nd largest US Jewish community. Based on a 1993 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), 21,000 Jews live in Sacramento, which is the 49th largest US Jewish community. Based on Informant/Internet Estimates, 80,000 Jews live in Orange County (excluding parts included in Long Beach); 30,000, in San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys; 23,750, in Long Beach; 15,000, in Ventura County (excluding the Simi-­Conejo area included in Los Angeles); and 8500, in Santa Barbara. Orange County is the 23rd ­largest US Jewish community, San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys is the 38th largest, and Long Beach is the 45th. Based on a 1998 RDD study updated by an Informant/Internet Estimate in 2015, 20,000 Jews (including 9000 part-year residents) live in Palm Springs. DJN studies were completed in 2011  in the Monterey Peninsula (4500), and Fresno (3500). All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. For more information on the Jews of California, see Kahn and Dollinger (2003). Colorado (Map 5.18). Denver (95,000 Jews), based on a 2007 RDD study, updated by a 2016 Informant/Internet Estimate, is the largest Jewish community in Colorado, accounts for 93% of the Jews in Colorado, and is the 18th largest US Jewish community. The estimates for Colorado Springs (2500) and Vail-Breckenridge-Eagle (1500) are based on DJN studies completed in 2010 and 2011, respectively. All other ­estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Hawaii (Map 5.18). Oahu (Honolulu) (5200 Jews), based on a 2010 DJN study, is the largest Jewish community in Hawaii and accounts for 73% of the Jews in Hawaii. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates.

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Idaho (Map 5.18). Boise (1500 Jews) is the largest Jewish community in Idaho and accounts for 71% of the Jews in Idaho. Estimates for all four small Jewish communities in Idaho are based on Informant/Internet Estimates. Montana (Map 5.18). Estimates for all five small Jewish communities are based on Informant/Internet Estimates. Nevada (Map 5.18). Las Vegas (72,300 Jews), based on a 2005 RDD study, updated by a 2009 Informant Estimate, is the largest Jewish community in Nevada, accounts for 95% of the Jews in Nevada, and is the 24th largest US Jewish community. Based on a 2011 DJN study, 4000 Jews live in Reno-Carson City. New Mexico (Map 5.18). Albuquerque (7500 Jews), based on a 2011 DJN study, is the largest Jewish community in New Mexico and accounts for 59% of the Jews in New Mexico. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates, including Santa Fe-Las Vegas (4000). Oregon (Map 5.18). The service area of the Jewish Federation of Greater Portland (36,400 Jews), based on a 2011 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN), includes 33,800 Jews in Portland and 2600 in Vancouver (WA) and is the 33rd largest US Jewish community. Portland is the largest Jewish community in Oregon, accounts for 83% of the Jews in Oregon, and is the 33rd largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Bend (1000) is based on a 2010 DJN study. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Utah (Map 5.18). Salt Lake City (4800 Jews), based on a 2010 DJN study, is the largest Jewish community in Utah and accounts for 85% of the Jews in Utah. All other estimates are Informant/Internet Estimates. Washington (Map 5.18). Seattle (64,650 Jews), based on a 2014 RDD study and updated with an Informant Estimates in 2019, is the largest Jewish community in Washington, accounts for 88% of the Jews in Washington, and is the 27th largest US Jewish community. The estimate for Clark County (2600) is based on a 2011 scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN). All other estimates are Informant/ Internet Estimates. Wyoming (Map 5.18). Estimates for all four small Jewish communities are Informant/Internet Estimates.

5.8  Conclusion While it might be more appropriate to provide a range of estimates for the US Jewish population, running from a low of 5,700,000 by DellaPergola (see Chap. 8) to 7,100,000 by Tighe et al. (2019), the current number reported in this chapter of 6,800,000–6,900,000 provides a reasonable estimate, one which is supported by the 2013 Pew figure of 6,700,000. The difference between the low figure of 5,700,000,

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on the one hand, and the AJYB estimate and the Pew estimate on the other hand, results from not counting the “partly Jewish” in the low figure. As one professional observer put it, “It’s not like we have a set of estimates claiming 15 million and another claiming 3 million. That they are all between 6.7 and 7.5 million, using different methods, is quite astounding.” In conclusion, the problem of assessing the composition of and changes in a rare population, like US Jews, is complicated by a shifting sense of personal identity, i.e., of how one defines oneself (see Dashefsky et al. 2003). Consequently, in addition to the standard demographic variables of fertility, mortality, and net migration, there are also accessions and secessions from the Jewish population based on identity shifts. Thus, the move to recognize patrilineal descent by some Jewish denominations and the growth of intermarried households have provided further challenges to offering an accurate estimate of the US Jewish population. Nevertheless, our effort is to provide, in one source, the best possible estimates for the national, state, regional, urban, and local areas of the US Jewish population, as a reference for today and a legacy for posterity. Acknowledgments  The authors thank the following individuals and organizations: 1. The Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) and former staff members at its predecessor organizations (United Jewish Communities and Council of Jewish Federations), including Jim Schwartz, Jeffrey Scheckner, and Barry Kosmin, who authored the AJYB US Jewish population chapters from 1986 to 2003. Some population estimates in this report are still based on their efforts; 2. Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Senior Director of Research and Analysis and Director of the Berman Jewish DataBank at The Jewish Federations of North America; 3. Amy Lawton and Maria Reger, Editorial Assistants, Pamela Weathers, Program Assistant, and Kezia Mann, Student Administrative Assistant, all at the Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life at the University of Connecticut, for their excellent assistance; 4. Chris Hanson and the University of Miami Department of Geography’s Geographic Information Systems Laboratory for assistance with the maps; and 5. Joshua Comenetz for the new estimates for Jewish population in Hasidic communities.

Appendix This Appendix presents detailed data on the US Jewish population in four columns: Date Column. This column provides the date of the latest Scientific Estimate or Informant/Internet Estimate for each geographic area. This chapter’s former authors provided only a range of years (pre-1997 or 1997–2001) for the last informant con-

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tact. For estimates after 2001, exact dates are shown. For communities for which the date is more recent than the date of the latest scientific study shown in boldface type in the Geographic Area column, the study estimate has been confirmed or updated by an Informant/Internet Estimate subsequent to the scientific study. Geographic Area Column. This column provides estimates for more than 900 Jewish communities (of 100 Jews or more) and geographic subareas thereof. The number of estimates for each state ranges from three in Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota to more than 75 in California (91), New York (87), and Florida (77). Many estimates are for Jewish Federation service areas. Where possible, these service areas are disaggregated into smaller geographic subareas. For example, separate estimates are provided for such places as West Bloomfield, Michigan (part of the service area of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit) and Boynton Beach (Florida) (part of the service area of the Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County). This column also indicates the source of each estimate:

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area Alabama 2017 Auburn 2019 Birmingham (Jefferson County) 2014 Dothan 2016 Huntsville 2014 Mobile (Baldwin & Mobile Counties) 2014 Montgomery 2008 Tuscaloosa Other Places Total Alabama Alaska 2008 Anchorage (Anchorage Borough) 2013 Fairbanks (Fairbanks North Star Borough) 2012 Juneau 2016 Kenai Peninsula 1997–2001 Other Places Total Alaska Arizona 2002 Cochise County (2002)a 2017 Flagstaff (Coconino County) 1997–2001 Lake Havasu City 2019 Northwest Valley (Glendale-Peoria-Sun City) (2002) 2019 Phoenix (2002) 2019 Northeast Valley (Scottsdale) (2002) 2019 Tri Cities Valley (Ahwatukee-Chandler-Gilbert-MesaTempe) (2002)

# of Jews Part-Year 100 6300 200 750 1350 1100 200 325 10,325 5000 275 300 100 75 5750 450 1000 200 10,900 23,600 34,500 13,900

500

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Greater Phoenix Total (2002) 2008 Prescott 2002 Santa Cruz County (2002)a 2008 Sedona 2019 West-Northwest (2002) 2019 Northeast (2002) 2019 Central (2002) 2019 Southeast (2002) 2019 Green Valley (2002) 2019 Jewish Federation of Southern Arizona-Tucson (Pima County) Total (2002) 2016 Other Places Total Arizona Arkansas 2016 Bentonville 2008 Fayetteville 2001 Hot Springs 2010 Little Rock 2007 Other Places Total Arkansas California 1997–2001 Antelope Valley (Lancaster-Palmdale in LA County) 1997–2001 Bakersfield (Kern County) 1997–2001 Chico-Oroville-Paradise (Butte County) 1997–2001 Eureka (Humboldt County) 2011 Fresno (Fresno County) (2011)a 2016 Grass Valley (Nevada County) 2018 Long Beach (Cerritos-Hawaiian Gardens-Lakewood-Signal Hill in Los Angeles County & Buena Park-Cypress-La Palma-Los Alamitos-Rossmoor-Seal Beach in Orange County) 2009 Airport Marina (1997) 2009 Beach Cities (1997) 2009 Beverly Hills (1997) 2009 Burbank-Glendale (1997) 2009 Central (1997) 2009 Central City (1997) 2009 Central Valley (1997) 2009 Cheviot-Beverlywood (1997) 2009 Culver City (1997) 2009 Eastern Belt (1997) 2009 Encino-Tarzana (1997) 2009 Fairfax (1997)

199

# of Jews Part-Year 82,900 300 100 300 50 3450 7850 7150 2500 450 21,400 1000 75 106,725 175 175 150 1500 225 2225 3000 1600 750 1000 3500 300 23,750

22,140 17,270 20,500 19,840 11,600 4710 27,740 29,310 9110 3900 50,290 54,850

1550

200

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2009 High Desert (1997) 2009 Hollywood (1997) 2009 Malibu-Palisades (1997) 2009 North Valley (1997) 2009 Palos Verdes Peninsula (1997) 2009 San Pedro (1997) 2009 Santa Monica-Venice (1997) 2009 Simi-Conejo (1997) 2009 Southeast Valley (1997) 2009 West Valley (1997) 2009 Westwood (1997) 2009 Los Angeles (Los Angeles County, excluding parts included in Long Beach, & southern Ventura County) Total (1997) 2010 Mendocino County (Redwood Valley-Ukiah) 1997–2001 Merced County 1997–2001 Modesto (Stanislaus County) 2011 Monterey Peninsula (2011)a 1997–2001 Murrieta Hot Springs 2016 Orange County (excluding parts included in Long Beach) 2015 Palm Springs (1998) 2015 Cathedral City-Rancho Mirage (1998) 2015 Palm Desert-Sun City (1998) 2015 East Valley (Bermuda-Dunes-Indian Wells-Indio-La Quinta) (1998) 2015 North Valley (Desert Hot Springs-North Palm SpringsThousand Palms) (1998) 2015 Palm Springs (Coachella Valley) Total (1998) 2010 Redlands 2016 Redding (Shasta County) 2016 Riverside-Corona-Moreno Valley 1997–2001 Sacramento (El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, & Yolo Counties) (1993) (except Lake Tahoe area)d 2015 Salinas 2010 San Bernardino-Fontana 2016 North County Coastal (2003) 2016 North County Inland (2003) 2016 Greater East San Diego (2003) 2016 La Jolla-Mid-Coastal (2003) 2016 Central San Diego (2003) 2016 South County (2003) 2016 San Diego (San Diego County) Total (2003) 2018 Alameda County (2018) 2018 Contra Costa County (2018) 2018 Marin County (2018)

# of Jews Part-Year 10,920 10,390 27,190 36,760 6780 5310 23,140 38,470 28,150 40,160 20,670 519,200

600 190 500 4500 550 80,000 2500 3300 3700 1200

900 5900 1900 250

300

50

11,000 1000 150 2000 21,000

9000

300 1000 27,000 20,300 21,200 16,200 13,700 1600 100,000 63,100 55,900 37,300

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2018 Napa County (2018) 2018 San Francisco County (2018) 2018 San Mateo County Total (2018) 2018 Santa Clara County (part) (2018) 2018 Santa Cruz County (2018) 2018 Solano County (Vallejo) (2018) 2018 Sonoma County (Petaluma-Santa Rosa) (2018) 2018 Jewish Community Federation & Endowment Fund of San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin & Sonoma Counties (2018) 2019 Jewish Federation of Silicon Valley Total (Parts of Santa Clara County) (San Jose) 2018 San Francisco Bay Area Total 2018 Santa Clara County (2018) Total 1997–2001 San Gabriel & Pomona Valleys (Alta Loma-ChinoClaremont-Cucamonga-La Verne-MontclairOntario-Pomona-San Dimas-Upland) 2016 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero (San Luis Obispo County) 2019 Santa Barbara (Santa Barbara County) 1997–2001 Santa Maria 2016 South Lake Tahoe (El Dorado County) 2016 Stockton 2016 Tahoe Vista 2016 Tulare & Kings Counties (Visalia) 1997–2001 Ventura County (excluding Simi-Conejo of Los Angeles) 2016 Victorville 1997–2001 Other Places Total California Colorado 2014 Aspen 2010 Colorado Springs (2010)a 2008 Crested Butte 2016 Durango 2018 Denver (2007) 2018 South Metro (2007) 2018 Boulder (2007) 2018 North & West Metro (2007) 2018 Aurora (2007) 2018 North & East Metro (2007) 2018 Greater Denver (Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Broomfield, Denver, Douglas, & Jefferson Counties) Total (2007) 2013 Fort Collins-Greeley-Loveland 2016 Grand Junction (Mesa County) 2015 Pueblo

201

# of Jews Part-Year 2100 61,500 29,700 33,800 15,100 3900 8200 310,600

39,400 350,000 73,200

30,000 1000 8500 500 100 900 200 350 15,000 100 450 1,182,990 9000 750 2500 175 200 32,500 22,400 14,600 12,900 7500 5100 95,000 1500 300 150

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Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2016 Steamboat Springs Pre-1997 Telluride 2011 Vail-Breckenridge-Eagle (Eagle & Summit Counties) (2011)a 1997–2001 Other Places Total Colorado Connecticut Pre-1997 Colchester-Lebanon 2014 Danbury (Bethel-Brookfield-New Fairfield-New Milford-Newtown-Redding-Ridgefield-Sherman) 2019 Greenwich 2009 Core Area (Bloomfield-Hartford-West Hartford) (2000) 2009 FarmingtonValley (Avon-Burlington-Canton-East GranbyFarmington-Granby-New Hartford-Simsbury) (2000) 2009 East of the River (East Hartford-East Windsor-EnfieldGlastonbury-Manchester-South Windsor in Hartford County & Andover-Bolton-CoventryEllington-Hebron-Somers-Tolland-Vernon in Tolland County) (2000) 2009 South of Hartford (Berlin-Bristol-New BritainNewington-Plainville-Rocky Hill-SouthingtonWethersfield in Hartford County, Plymouth in Litchfield County, Cromwell-Durham-HaddamMiddlefield-Middletown in Middlesex County, & Meriden in New Haven County) (2000) 2009 Suffield-Windsor-Windsor Locks (2000) 2009 Jewish Federation of Greater Hartford Total (2000) 2016 The East (Centerbrook-Chester-Clinton-Deep River-Ivoryton-Killingworth-Old SaybrookWestbrookinMiddlesexCounty&Branford-EastHaven-EssexGuilford-Madison- North Branford-Northford in New Haven County) (2010) 2016 The West (Ansonia-Derby-Milford-Seymour-West Haven in New Haven County & Shelton in Fairfield County) (2010) 2016 The Central Area (Bethany-New Haven-OrangeWoodbridge) (2010) 2016 Hamden (2010) 2016 The North (Cheshire-North Haven-Wallingford) (2010) 2016 Jewish Federation of Greater New Haven Total (2010) 1997–2001 New London-Norwich (central & southern New London County) 2010 Southbury (Beacon Falls-Middlebury-NaugatuckOxford-Prospect-Waterbury-Wolcott in New Haven County & Washington-Watertown in Litchfield County) (2010)a

# of Jews Part-Year 300 125 1500 100 102,600 300 5000 7500 15,800 6400 4800

5000

800 32,800 4900

3200

8800 3200 2900 23,000 3800 4500

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2010 Southern Litchfield County (Bethlehem-LitchfieldMorris-Roxbury-Thomaston-Woodbury) (2010)a 2010 Jewish Federation of Western Connecticut Total (2010)a 2009 Stamford (Darien-New Canaan) 2006 1997–2001 2000 2000 2000 2000 2014 2000 2006

2018 2018 2018

2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017

Storrs-Columbia & parts of Tolland County Torrington Westport (2000) Weston (2000) Wilton (2000) Norwalk (2000) Bridgeport (Easton-Fairfield-Monroe-Stratford-Trumbull) Federation for Jewish Philanthropy in Upper Fairfield County Total (2000) Windham-Willimantic & parts of Windham County Total Connecticut Delaware Kent & Sussex Counties (Dover) (1995, 2006)b Newark (1995, 2006)b Wilmington (1995, 2006)b Total Delaware (1995, 2006)b Washington, DC Total District of Columbia (2003) Lower Montgomery County (Maryland) (2017) Upper Montgomery County (Maryland) (2017) Prince George's County (Maryland) (2017) North-Central Northern Virginia (2017) Central Northern Virginia (2017) East Northern Virginia (2017) West-Northern Virginia (2017) Jewish Federation of Greater Washington Total (2017)

203

# of Jews Part-Year 3500 8000 12,000 500 600 5000 1850 1550 3050 13,000 24,450 400 118,350 3200 4300 7600 15,100 57,300 87,000 18,400 11,400 24,500 23,100 54,400 19,400 295,500

Florida 2016

Beverly Hills-Crystal River (Citrus County)

350

2016

Brevard County (Melbourne)

4000

2016 2019

Clermont (Lake County) Fort Myers-Arcadia-Port Charlotte-Punta Gorda (Charlotte, De Soto, & Northern Lee Counties) 2017 Bonita Springs-Southern Lee Countyd 2017 Jewish Federation of Lee & Charlotte Counties (Total) 1997–2001 Fort Pierce (northern St. Lucie County) 2019 Fort Walton Beach 2017 Gainesville 2017 Jacksonville Core Area (2002, 2015)e

200 7000 500 7500 1060 400 2500 8800

500 500

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Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2017 The Beaches (Atlantic Beach-Jacksonville BeachNeptune Beach-Ponte Vedra Beach) (2002, 2015)e 2017 Other Places in Clay, Duval, Nassau, & St. Johns Counties (including St. Augustine) (2002, 2015)e 2017 Jacksonville Total (2002, 2015)e 2016 Key Largo 2014 Key West Total Monroe County Pre-1997 Lakeland (Polk County) 2019 Marco Islandd 2019 Other Collier County (Naples)d 2019 Jewish Federation of Collier County (Naples) (2017)d 1997–2001 Ocala (Marion County) 2016 Oxford (Sumter County) 2017 North Orlando (Seminole County & southern Volusia County) (1993, 2010)b 2017 Central Orlando (Maitland-parts of Orlando-Winter Park) (1993, 2010)b 2017 South Orlando (parts of Orlando & northern Osceola County) (1993, 2010) b 2017 Orlando Total (1993, 2010)b 2016 Panama City (Bay County) 2015 Pensacola (Escambia & Santa Rosa Counties) 2017 North Pinellas (Clearwater) (2017) 2017 Central Pinellas (Largo) (2017) 2017 South Pinellas (St. Petersburg) (2017) 2017 Pinellas County (St. Petersburg) Subtotal (2017) 2017 Pasco County (New Port Richey) (2017) 2012 Hernando County (Spring Hill) 2017 Jewish Federation of Florida's Gulf Coast Total (2017) 2015 Sarasota (2001) 2015 Longboat Key (2001) 2015 Bradenton (Manatee County) (2001) 2015 Venice (2001) 2015 Sarasota-Manatee Total (2001) 2018 East Boca (2018) 2018 Central Boca (2018) 2018 West Boca (2018) 2018 Boca Raton Subtotal (2018) 2018 Delray Beach (2005) 2018 South Palm Beach Subtotal (2018) 2018 Boynton Beach (2018) 2018 Lake Worth (2018)

# of Jews Part-Year 1900 2200 12,900 100 1000 1100 1000 400 3930 4330 500 2000 11,900

100

10,600

100

8100

100

30,600 100 800 8800 2300 10,950 22,050 4450 350 26,850 8600 1000 1750 850 12,200 24,400 32,200 18,600 75,200 38,400 113,600 30,400 25,600

500

600 2600 3200

300

800 500 200 1500

1500 1500 1500 200 100 3300 3700 9900 400 14,000 8500 22,500 5500 2500

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2018 Town of Palm Beach (2018) 2018 West Palm Beach (2018) 2018 Wellington-Royal Palm Beach (2018) 2018 North Palm Beach-Palm Beach Gardens-Jupiter (2018) 2018 West Palm Beach Subtotal (2018) 2018 Palm Beach County Total (2018) 2018 North Dade Core East (Aventura-Golden Beach-parts of North Miami Beach) (2014) 2018 North Dade Core West (parts of North Miami BeachOjus) (2014) 2018 Other North Dade (parts of City of Miami) (north of Flagler Street) (2014) 2018 North Dade Subtotal (2014) 2018 West Kendall (2014) 2018 East Kendall (parts of Coral Gables-Pinecrest-South Miami) (2014) 2018 Northeast South Dade (Key Biscayne-parts of City of Miami) (2014) 2018 South Dade Subtotal (2014) 2018 North Beach (Bal Harbour-Bay Harbor Islands-Indian Creek Village-Surfside) (2014) 2018 Middle Beach (parts of City of Miami Beach) (2014) 2018 South Beach (parts of City of Miami Beach) (2014) 2018 The Beaches Subtotal (2014) 2018 Miami-Dade County Total (2014) 2019 East (Fort Lauderdale) (2016) 2019 North Central (Century Village-Coconut CreekMargate-Palm Aire-Wynmoor) (2016) 2019 Northwest (Coral Springs-Parkland) (2016) 2019 Southeast (Hallandale-Hollywood) (2016) 2019 Southwest (Cooper City-Davie-Pembroke Pines-Weston) (2016) 2019 West Central (Lauderdale Lakes-North LauderdalePlantation-Sunrise-Tamarac) (2016) 2019 Broward County Total (2016) Southeast Florida (Broward, Miami-Dade, & Palm Beach Counties) Total 2016 Sebring (Highlands County) 2019 Stuart (Martin County) (2018) 2004 Southern St. Lucie County (Port St. Lucie) (1999, 2004)b 2019 Stuart-Port St. Lucie (Martin-St. Lucie) Total (1999, 2004, 2018)b 2015 Tallahassee (2010)a 2017 Tampa (Hillsborough County) (2010)a

205

# of Jews 1700 11,000 9600 26,400 104,700 218,300 36,000

Part-Year 1400 1300 1100 10,700 22,500 45,000 2200

18,500

200

9500

100

64,000 17,500 6800

2500 200 100

11,900

400

36,200 4300

700 400

9800 4800 18,900 119,000 9400 8000

500 100 1000 4200 400 1800

27,200 24,000 39,400

1200 1000 300

35,700

600

143,700 481,000

5300 54,500

150 8000 2900 10,900 2800 23,000

200 900

206

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2016 Vero Beach (Indian River County) 2017 Volusia (Daytona Beach) (excluding southern parts included in North Orlando) & Flagler Counties Jewish Federation of Volusia and Flagler Counties Pre-1997 Winter Haven 2019 Other Places Total Florida Georgia 2009 Albany 2012 Athens 2012 Intown (2006) 2012 North Metro Atlanta (2006) 2012 East Cobb Expanded (2006) 2012 Sandy Springs-Dunwoody (2006) 2012 Gwinnett-East Perimeter (2006) 2012 North & West Perimeter (2006) 2012 South (2006) 2012 Atlanta Total (2006) 2019 Augusta (Burke, Columbia, & Richmond Counties) 2009 Brunswick 2015 Columbus 2009 Dahlonega 2015 Macon 2010 Rome 2016 Savannah (Chatham County) 2009 Valdosta 2009 Other Places Total Georgia Hawaii 2012 Hawaii (Hilo) 2011 Kauai 2008 Maui 2010 Oahu (Honolulu) (2010)a Total Hawaii Idaho 2015 Boise (Ada, Caldwell, Weiser, Nampa, & Boise Counties) 2014 Ketchum-Sun Valley-Hailey-Bellevue 2014 Moscow (Palouse) 2009 Pocatello Other Places Total Idaho Illinois 2015 Bloomington-Normal

# of Jews Part-Year 1000

4500 300 25 643,895

68,200

200 750 28,900 28,300 18,400 15,700 14,000 9000 5500 119,800 1600 120 600 150 750 100 4300 100 250 128,720 100 300 1500 5200 7100 1500 350 100 150 25 2125 500

1000 1000

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2015 Champaign-Urbana (Champaign County) 2019 Decatur 2019 City North (The Loop to Rogers Park, including North Lakefront) (2010) 2019 Rest of Chicago (parts of City of Chicago not included in City North) (2010) 2019 Near North Suburbs (Suburbs contiguous to City of Chicago from Evanston to Park Ridge) (2010) 2019 North/Far North (Wilmette to Wisconsin, west to include Northbrook, Glenview, Deerfield, etc.) (2010) 2019 Northwest Suburbs (includes northwest Cook County, parts of Lake County, & McHenry County) (2010) 2019 Western Suburbs (DuPage & Kane Counties & Oak Park-River Forest in Cook County) (2010) 2019 Southern Suburbs (south & southwest Cook County beyond the City to Indiana & Will County) (2010) 2019 Chicago (Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, & Will Counties) Total (2010) 1997–2001 DeKalb 2016 Lindenhurst (Lake County) 2019 Peoria 2019 Quad Cities-Illinois portion (Moline-Rock Island) (1990)d 2019 Quad Cities-Iowa portion (Davenport & surrounding Scott County) (1990)d 2005 Quad Cities Total (1990)d 2015 Quincy 2019 Rockford-Freeport (Boone, Stephenson, & Winnebago Counties) 2015 Southern Illinois (Alton-Belleville-Benton-CarbondaleCentralia-Collinsville-East St. Louis-Herrin-Marion) 2019 Springfield-Decatur (Morgan, & Sangamon Counties) Other Places 2015 Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky (Alton-Belleville-Benton-CarbondaleCentralia-Collinsville-East St. Louis-Herrin-Marion in Southern Illinois, Cape Girardeau-Farmington-Sikeston in Southeast Missouri, & Paducah in Western Kentucky) Total Total Illinois Indiana 2017 Bloomington 2017 Evansville 1997–2001 Fort Wayne 2012 Gary-Northwest Indiana (Lake & Porter Counties) 2017 North of Core (2017) 2017 Core Area (2017)

207

# of Jews Part-Year 1400 100 70,150 19,100 64,600 56,300 51,950 23,300 6400 291,800 180 100 800 175 275 450 100 650 500 830 325 650

297,735 1000 500 900 2000 9200 6100

208

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2017 South of Core (2017) 2017 Jewish Federation of Greater Indianapolis Total (2017) 2014 Lafayette 2015 Michigan City (La Porte County) 1997–2001 Muncie 2017 Richmond 2019 South Bend-Mishawaka-Elkhart (Elkhart & St. Joseph Counties) 2019 Benton Harbor (Michigan) 2019 Jewish Federation of St. Joseph Valley Total 2017 Terre Haute (Vigo County) Other Places Total Indiana Iowa 2017 Cedar Rapids 1997–2001 Des Moines-Ames (1956)d 2014 Fairfield 2017 Iowa City/Coralville (Johnson County) 2017 Postville 2019 Quad Cities-Illinois portion (Moline-Rock Island) (1990)d 2019 Quad Cities-Iowa portion (Davenport & surrounding Scott County) (1990)d 2005 Quad Cities Total (1990)d 2014 Sioux City (Plymouth & Woodbury Counties) 2014 Waterloo (Black Hawk County) Other Places Total Iowa Kansas 2016 Kansas City-Kansas portion (Johnson & Wyandotte Counties) (1985)d 2016 Kansas City-Missouri portion (1985)d 2016 Kansas City Total (1985)d 2017 Lawrence 2014 Manhattan 2014 Topeka (Shawnee County) 2019 Wichita 2019 Other Places 2019 Mid-Kansas Jewish Federation (Total) Total Kansas Kentucky 2008 Covington-Newport (2008) 2018 Lexington (Bourbon, Clark, Fayette, Jessamine, Madison, Pulaski, Scott, & Woodford Counties) Jewish Federation of the Bluegrass

# of Jews Part-Year 2600 17,900 400 300 120 100 1650 150 1800 100 275 25,245 400 2800 200 750 150 175 275 450 300 100 300 5275 16,000 2000 18,000 300 175 300 625 25 650 17,425 300

2500

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2015 Louisville (Jefferson County) (2006)d 2013 Other Places 2015 Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky (Alton-Belleville-Benton-CarbondaleCentralia-Collinsville-East St. Louis-Herrin-Marion in Southern Illinois, Cape Girardeau-Farmington-Sikeston in Southeast Missouri, & Paducah in Western Kentucky) Total Total Kentucky Louisiana 2017 Alexandria (Allen, Grant, Rapides, Vernon, & Winn Parishes) 2016 Baton Rouge (Ascension, East Baton Rouge, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. Landry, &West Baton Rouge Parishes) 2008 Lafayette 2008 Lake Charles 2019 New Orleans (Jefferson & Orleans Parishes) (1984, 2009)e 2007 Monroe-Ruston 2007 Shreveport-Bossier 2007 North Louisiana (Bossier & Caddo Parishes) Total 2007 Other Places Total Louisiana Maine 2007 Androscoggin County (Lewiston-Auburn) (2007)a 2017 Augusta 2017 Bangor 2007 Oxford County (South Paris) (2007)a 2017 Rockland 2007 Sagadahoc County (Bath) (2007)a 2018 Portland (2007) 2018 Other Cumberland County (2007) 2018 York County (2007) 2018 Southern Maine Total (2007) 2014 Waterville Other Places Total Maine Maryland 2010 Annapolis (2010)a 2018 Pikesville (2010) 2018 Park Heights-Cheswolde (2010) 2018 Owings Mills (2010) 2018 Reisterstown (2010) 2018 Mount Washington (2010)

209

# of Jews Part-Year 8300 100 650

11,200 300 1500

200 200 12,000 150 450 600 100 14,900 600 300 1500 750 300 400 4425 2350 1575 8350 225 125 12,550 3500 31,100 13,000 12,100 7000 6600

210

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2018 Towson-Lutherville-Timonium-Interstate 83 (2010) 2018 Downtown (2010) 2018 Guilford-Roland Park (2010) 2018 Randallstown-Liberty Road (2010) 2018 Other Baltimore County (2010) 2018 Carroll County (2010) 2018 Baltimore Total (2010) 2017 Cumberland 2017 Easton (Talbot County) 2017 Frederick (Frederick County) 2017 Hagerstown (Washington County) 2017 Harford County 2010 Howard County (Columbia) (2010) 2016 Lower Montgomery County (2003) 2016 Upper Montgomery County (2003) 2016 Prince George's County (2003) 2016 Jewish Federation of Greater Washington Total in Maryland (2003) 2017 Ocean City 2012 Prince Frederick (Calvert County) 2017 Salisbury 2017 Waldorf 2012 South Gate Total Maryland Massachusetts 2016 Attleboro (2002)a 2016 State of Rhode Island (2002) 2016 Jewish Alliance of Greater Rhode Island Total 2019 Northern Berkshires (North Adams) (2008)d 2019 Central Berkshires (Pittsfield) (2008)d 2019 Southern Berkshires (Lenox) (2008)d 2019 Berkshires Total (2008)d 2019 Brighton-Brookline-Newton & Contiguous Areas (2015) 2019 Cambridge-Somerville-Central Boston (2015) 2019 Greater Framingham (2015) 2019 Northwestern Suburbs (2015) 2019 Greater Sharon (2015) 2019 North Shore (2015) 2019 Southwestern Suburbs (2015) 2019 Northern Suburbs (2015) 2019 South Area (2015) 2019 Boston Total 1997–2001 Cape Cod (Barnstable County)

# of Jews Part-Year 5600 4500 4100 2900 3700 2800 93,400 275 500 1200 325 1600 17,200 87,000 18,400 11,400 116,800 1000 100 400 200 100 236,600 800 18,750 19,550 600 1600 2100 4300 70,700 66,800 21,100 11,200 10,400 30,000 5300 14,400 18,100 248,000 3250

80 415 2255 2750

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2017 Fall River 2013 Martha's Vineyard (Dukes County) 2005 Andover-Boxford-Dracut-Lawrence-Methuen-North Andover-Tewksbury 2005 Haverhill 2005 Lowell 2005 Merrimack Valley Jewish Federation Total 2014 Nantucket 2019 New Bedford (Dartmouth-Fairhaven-Mattapoisett) 1997–2001 Newburyport 2014 Plymouth 2012 Springfield (Hampden County) (1967)d 2012 Franklin County (Greenfield) 2012 Hampshire County (Amherst-Northampton) 2012 Jewish Federation of Western Massachusetts Total 2014 Taunton 2018 Worcester (central Worcester County) (1986) 2018 South Worcester County (Southbridge-Webster) 2018 North Worcester County (Fitchburg-Gardner-Leominster) 2018 Jewish Federation of Central Massachusetts (Worcester County) Total Other Places Total Massachusetts Michigan 2017 Ann Arbor (Washtenaw County) (2010)a 2012 Bay City-Saginaw 2016 South Bend-Mishawaka-Elkhart (Elkhart & St. Joseph Counties) (Indiana) 2016 Benton Harbor-St. Joseph 2016 Jewish Federation of St. Joseph Valley Total 2019 West Bloomfield (2017) 2019 Bloomfield Hills-Birmingham-Franklin (2017) 2019 Farmington (2017) 2019 Oak Park-Huntington Woods (2017) 2019 Southfield (2017) 2019 East Oakland County (2017) 2019 North Oakland County (2017) 2019 West Oakland County (2017) 2019 Wayne County (2017) 2019 Macomb County (2017) 2019 Detroit (Macomb, Oakland, & Wayne Counties) Total (2017) 2009 Flint (1956)d 2018 Grand Rapids (Kent County)

211

# of Jews Part-Year 600 375 200 3000 900 2100 6000 100 3000 280 1200 6600 1100 6500 14,200 400 9000 500 1000 10,500 75 293,080 8000 250 1650 150 1800 15,200 12,400 6300 12,800 5600 3600 3700 4450 5000 2700 71,750 1300 2000

400

3,350

212

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2017 Jackson 2012 Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo County) 2016 Lansing 2015 Lenawee & Monroe Counties 2007 Midland 2007 Muskegon (Muskegon County) 2017 Traverse City 2007 Other Places 2015 Jewish Federation of Greater Toledo (Fulton, Lucas, & Wood Counties in Ohio & Lenawee & Monroe Counties in Michigan) Total Total Michigan Minnesota 2015 Duluth (Carlton & St. Louis Counties) 2017 Rochester 2015 City of Minneapolis (2004) 2015 Inner Ring (2004) 2015 Outer Ring (2004) 2015 Minneapolis (Hennepin County) Subtotal (2004) 2019 City of St. Paul (2004, 2010)b 2019 Southern Suburbs (2004, 2010)b 2019 Northern Suburbs (2004, 2010)b 2019 St. Paul (Dakota & Ramsey Counties) Subtotal (2004, 2010)b Twin Cities Total 2004 Twin Cities Surrounding Counties (Anoka, Carver, Goodhue, Rice, Scott, Sherburne, Washington, & Wright Counties) (2004)a Other Places Total Minnesota Mississippi 2015 Biloxi-Gulfport 2008 Greenville 2008 Hattiesburg (Forrest & Lamar Counties) 2008 Jackson (Hinds, Madison, & Rankin Counties) Other Places Total Mississippi Missouri 2014 Columbia 2009 Jefferson City 2017 Joplin 2016 Kansas City-Kansas portion (Johnson & Wyandotte Counties) (1985)d

# of Jews Part-Year 200 1500 1800 200 120 210 150 275 2300

87,905 600 400 5200 16,100 8000 29,300 4000 5300 600 9900 39,200

5300 100 45,600 200 120 130 650 425 1525 400 100 100 16,000

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2016 Kansas City-Missouri portion (1985)d 2016 Kansas City Total (1985)d 2009 St. Joseph (Buchanan County) 2019 Creve Coeur Area (2014) 2019 Chesterfield (2014) 2019 University City/Clayton (2014) 2019 Olivette/Ladue (2014) 2019 St. Charles County (2014) 2019 St. Louis City (2014) 2019 Des Peres/Kirkwood/Webster (2014) 2019 Other North County (2014) 2019 Other South County (2014) 2019 St. Louis Total (2014) 2009 Springfield Other Places 2015 Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky (Alton-Belleville-Benton-CarbondaleCentralia-Collinsville-East St. Louis-Herrin-Marion in Southern Illinois, Cape Girardeau-Farmington-Sikeston in Southeast Missouri, & Paducah in Western Kentucky) Total Total Missouri Montana 2017 Billings (Yellowstone County) 2009 Bozeman 2017 Helena 2015 Kalispell-Whitefish (Flathead County) 2017 Missoula 1997–2001 Other Places Total Montana Nebraska 2014 Lincoln 2019 East Omaha (2017) 2019 West Omaha (2017) 2019 Other Areas (2017) 2019 Omaha Total (2017) 2012 Other Places Total Nebraska Nevada 2019 Northwest (2005) 2019 Southwest (2005) 2019 Central (2005) 2019 Southeast (2005) 2019 Northeast (2005) 2019 Las Vegas Total (2005)

213

# of Jews Part-Year 2000 18,000 200 13,550 12,150 9100 6200 5900 5150 2750 4400 1900 61,100 300 75 650

64,275 250 500 120 250 200 75 1395 400 1900 5700 1200 8800 150 9350 24,500 16,000 6000 18,000 7800 72,300

214

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2011 Reno-Carson City (Carson City & Washoe Counties) (2011)a Total Nevada New Hampshire 1997–2001 Concord 1997–2001 Franklin-Laconia-Meredith-Plymouth Pre-1997 Hanover-Lebanon 2001 Keene 1997–2001 Littleton-Bethlehem 1997–2001 Manchester (1983)d 1997–2001 Nashua 2008 North Conway-Mount Washington Valley 2014 Portsmouth-Exeter (Rockingham County) 1997–2001 Salem 2014 Strafford (Dover-Rochester) (2007)a 1997–2001 Other Places Total New Hampshire New Jersey 2004 The Island (Atlantic City) (2004) 2004 The Mainland (2004) 2004 Atlantic County Subtotal (2004) 2004 Cape May County-Wildwood (2004) 2004 Jewish Federation of Atlantic & Cape May Counties Total (2004) 2018 Pascack-Northern Valley (2001) 2018 North Palisades (2001) 2018 Central Bergen (2001) 2018 West Bergen (2001) 2018 South Bergen (2001) 2018 Other Bergen 2018 Bergen County Subtotal 2018 Northern Hudson County (2001) 2018 Bayonne 2018 Hoboken 2018 Jersey City 2018 Hudson County Subtotal 2018 Northern Passaic County 2018 Jewish Federation of Northern New Jersey (Bergen, Hudson, & northern Passaic Counties) Total 2019 Camden County (1991, 2013)e 2019 Burlington County (1991, 2013)e 2019 Northern Gloucester County (1991, 2013)e

# of Jews Part-Year 4000 76,300 500 270 600 300 200 4000 2000 100 1250 150 700 50 10,120 5450 6250 11,700 500 12,200 11,900 18,600 22,200 14,300 10,000 23,000 100,000 2000 1600 1800 6000 11,400 8000 119,400 34,600 15,900 6200

70

70

140 6700 600 7300 900 8200

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Jewish Federation of Southern New Jersey Total (1991, 2013)e 2019 South Essex (Newark) (1998, 2012)b 2019 Livingston (1998, 2012)b 2019 North Essex (1998, 2012)b 2019 West Orange-Orange (1998, 2012)b 2019 East Essex (1998, 2012)b 2019 Essex County Subtotal (1998, 2012)b 2019 West Morris (1998, 2012)b 2019 North Morris (1998, 2012)b 2019 South Morris (1998, 2012)b 2019 Morris County Subtotal (1998, 2012)b 2019 Northern Somerset County (2012)a 2019 Sussex County (1998, 2012)b 2019 Union County (2012)a 2019 Jewish Federation of Greater MetroWest NJ (Essex, Morris, northern Somerset, Sussex, & Union Counties) Total (2012) 2008 North Middlesex (Edison-Piscataway-Woodbridge) (2008) 2008 Highland Park-South Edison (2008) 2008 Central Middlesex (East Brunswick-New Brunswick) (2008) 2008 South Middlesex (Monroe Township) (2008) Middlesex County Subtotal (2008) 2006 Western Monmouth (Freehold-Howell-ManalapanMarlboro) (1997) 2006 Eastern Monmouth (Asbury Park-Deal-Long Branch) (1997) 2006 Northern Monmouth (Hazlet-Highlands-MiddletownUnion Beach) (1997) Monmouth County Subtotal (2008) 2006 Jewish Federation in the Heart of New Jersey Total 2018 Lakewood 2018 Other Ocean County 2018 Ocean County Total 2009 Southern Passaic County (Clifton-Passaic) 1997–2001 Princeton 2019 Hunterdon County (2012)a 2019 Southern Somerset County (2012)a 2019 Warren County (2012)a 2019 Jewish Federation of Somerset, Hunterdon & Warren Counties Total (2012)a 1997–2001 Trenton (most of Mercer County) (1975)d

215

# of Jews Part-Year 56,700 12,200 10,500 13,000 9000 3500 48,200 13,700 13,400 3200 30,300 7400 4700 24,400

115,000 3600 5700 24,800 17,900 52,000 37,800 17,300 8900 64,000 116,000 74,500 8500 83,000 12,000 3000 6000 11,600 2400 20,000 6000

6000 6000

216

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2015 Vineland area (including southern Gloucester & eastern Salem Counties) (Jewish Federation of Cumberland, Gloucester and Salem Counties) 1997–2001 Other Places Total New Jersey New Mexico 2011 Albuquerque (Bernalillo County) (2011)a 2016 El Paso (Texas) 2016 Las Cruces 2016 Jewish Federation of Greater El Paso (Total) 2009 Los Alamos 2011 Santa Fe-Las Vegas Pre-1997 Taos 1997–2001 Other Places Total New Mexico New York 2019 Albany (Albany County) 2019 Amsterdam 2019 Catskill 2019 Glens Falls-Lake George (southern Essex, northern Saratoga, Warren, & Washington Counties) 2019 Gloversville (Fulton County) 2019 Hudson (Columbia County) 2019 Saratoga Springs 2019 Schenectady 2019 Troy 2019 Jewish Federation of Northeastern New York (Total) 1997–2001 Auburn (Cayuga County) 1997–2001 Binghamton (Broome County) 2019 Buffalo (Erie County) (2013) 2019 Other Western New York (parts of Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Genesee, Niagara, & Wyoming Counties) (2013)d 2019 Jewish Federation of Greater Buffalo Total (2013) 1997–2001 Canandaigua-Geneva-Newark-Seneca Falls 1997–2001 Cortland (Cortland County) 2019 Dutchess County (Amenia-Beacon-Fishkill-Freedom Plains-Hyde Park-Poughkeepsie-Red Hook-Rhinebeck) 2009 Elmira-Corning (Chemung, Schuyler, southeastern Steuben, & Tioga Counties) 1997–2001 Fleischmanns 1997–2001 Herkimer (Herkimer County) 1997–2001 Ithaca (Tompkins County) 1997–2001 Jamestown

# of Jews Part-Year 2000

150 545,450 7500 5000 500 5500 250 4000 300 75 12,625 12,000 100 200 800 300 500 600 5200 800 20,500 115 2400 10,700 300

11,000 300 150 10,000 700 100 130 2000 100

14,200

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Northeast Bronx (2011) 2019 Riverdale-Kingsbridge (2011) 2019 Other Bronx (2011) 2019 Bronx Subtotal (2011) 2019 Bensonhurst-Gravesend-Bay Ridge (2011) 2019 Borough Park (2011) 2019 Brownstone Brooklyn (2011) 2019 Canarsie-Mill Basin (2011) 2019 Coney Island-Brighton Beach-Sheepshead Bay (2011) 2019 Crown Heights (2011) 2019 Flatbush-Midwood-Kensington (2011) 2019 Kings Bay-Madison (2011) 2019 Williamsburg (2011) 2019 Other Brooklyn (2011) 2019 Brooklyn Subtotal (2011) 2019 Lower Manhattan East (2011) 2019 Lower Manhattan West (2011) 2019 Upper East Side (2011) 2019 Upper West Side (2011) 2019 Washington Heights-Inwood (2011) 2019 Other Manhattan (2011) 2019 Manhattan Subtotal (2011) 2019 Flushing-Bay Terrace-Little Neck Area (2011) 2019 Forest Hills-Rego Park-Kew Gardens Area (2011) 2019 Kew Gardens Hills-Jamaica-Fresh Meadows Area (2011) 2019 Long Island City-Astoria-Elmhurst Area (2011) 2019 The Rockaways (2011) 2019 Other Queens (2011) 2019 Queens Subtotal (2011) 2019 Mid-Staten Island (2011) 2019 Southern Staten Island (2011) 2019 Other Staten Island (2011) 2019 Staten Island Subtotal (2011) 2019 New York City Subtotal (2011) 2019 Five Towns (2011) 2019 Great Neck (2011) 2019 Merrick-Bellmore-East Meadow-Massapequa Area (2011) 2019 Oceanside-Long Beach-West Hempstead-Valley Stream Area (2011) 2019 Plainview-Syosset-Jericho Area (2011) 2019 Roslyn-Port Washington-Glen Cove-Old WestburyOyster Bay Area (2011)

217

# of Jews Part-Year 18,300 20,100 15,500 53,900 47,000 131,100 19,700 24,500 56,200 23,800 108,500 29,400 74,500 46,400 561,100 39,500 33,200 57,400 70,500 21,400 17,700 239,700 26,800 60,900 41,600 12,100 22,500 33,900 197,800 18,800 8800 6300 33,900 1,086,400 25,000 28,700 38,500 45,900 35,800 34,800

218

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Other Nassau (2011) 2019 Nassau County Subtotal (2011) 2019 Commack-East Northport-Huntington Area (2011) 2019 Dix Hills-Huntington Station-Melville (2011) 2019 Smithtown-Port Jefferson-Stony Brook Area (2011) 2019 Other Suffolk (2011) 2019 Suffolk County Subtotal (2011) 2019 South-Central Westchester (2011) 2019 Sound Shore Communities (2011) 2019 River Towns (2011) 2019 North-Central & Northwestern Westchester (2011) 2019 Other Westchester (2011) 2019 Westchester County Subtotal (2011) 2019 New York Metro Area (New York City & Nassau, Suffolk, & Westchester Counties) Total (2011) 1997–2001 Niagara Falls 2009 Olean 1997–2001 Oneonta (Delaware & Otsego Counties) 2019 Kiryas Joel (2018)c 2019 Other Orange County (Middletown-Monroe-Newburgh-Port Jervis) 2019 Orange County Total 1997–2001 Plattsburgh 1997–2001 Potsdam 2016 Putnam County (2010)d 2019 Brighton (1999, 2010)e 2019 Pittsford (1999, 2010)e 2019 Other Places in Monroe County & Victor in Ontario County (1999, 2010)e 2019 Rochester Total (1999, 2010)e 2019 Kaser Village (2018)c 2019 Monsey (2018)c 2019 New Square (2018)c 2019 Other Rockland County Rockland County Total 1997–2001 Rome Pre-1997 Sullivan County (Liberty-Monticello) 2018 Syracuse (western Madison, Onondaga, & most of Oswego Counties) 2014 Ulster County (Kingston-New Paltz-Woodstock & eastern Ulster County) 2019 Utica (southeastern Oneida County) (Jewish Community Federation of the Mohawk Valley) 1997–2001 Watertown

# of Jews Part-Year 21,200 229,900 19,300 16,500 16,500 33,400 85,700 46,200 18,900 30,800 25,300 15,000 136,200 1,538,000 150 100 300 25,300 12,000 37,300 250 200 3900 10,100 3800 6000 19,900 5400 22,000 8600 66,600 102,600 100 7425 7000 5000 1100 100

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 1997–2001 Other Places Total New York North Carolina 2011 Buncombe County (Asheville) (2011)d 2011 Hendersonville County (Henderson) (2011)d 2011 Transylvania County (Brevard) (2011)d 2011 Macon County (2011)d 2011 Other Western North Carolina (2011)d 2011 WNC Jewish Federation (Western North Carolina) Total (2011)d 2009 Boone 2016 Charlotte (Mecklenburg County) (1997) 2019 Orange County 2019 Durham County 2019 Other (Chatham & parts of Wake County) 2019 Jewish Federation of Durham-Chapel Hilld 2012 Fayetteville (Cumberland County) 2009 Gastonia (Cleveland, Gaston, & Lincoln Counties) 2019 Greensboro 2015 Greenville 2011 Hickory 2009 High Point 2009 Mooresville (Iredell County) 2009 New Bern 2009 Pinehurst 2019 Raleigh-Cary (Wake County) 2014 Southeastern North Carolina (Elizabethtown-Whiteville-Wilmington) 2011 Statesville (Iredell County) 2015 Winston-Salem (2011)a 2010 Other Places Total North Carolina North Dakota 2008 Fargo 2011 Grand Forks 1997–2001 Other Places Total North Dakota Ohio 2016 Akron-Kent (parts of Portage & Summit Counties) (1999)d Pre-1997 Athens 2006 Canton-New Philadelphia (Stark & Tuscarawas Counties) (1955)d 2019 Downtown Cincinnati (2008)

219

# of Jews Part-Year 400 1,771,320 2530 510 80 60 220 3400

415 100 130 30 160 835

60 12,000 3900 3075 525 7500 300 250 3000 300 250 150 150 150 250 15,000 1600

225

150 1200 225 45,935 150 150 100 400 3000 100 1000 700

1060

220

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Hyde Park-Mount Lookout-Oakley (2008) 2019 Amberley Village-Golf Manor-Roselawn (2008) 2019 Blue Ash-Kenwood-Montgomery (2008) 2019 Loveland-Mason-Middletown (2008) 2019 Wyoming-Finneytown-Reading (2008) 2019 Other Places in Cincinnati (2008) 2019 Covington-Newport (Kentucky) (2008) 2019 Jewish Federation of Cincinnati Total (2008) 2019 The Heights (2011) 2019 East Side Suburbs (2011) 2019 Beachwood (2011) 2019 Solon & Southeast Suburbs (2011) 2019 Northern Heights (2011) 2019 West Side/Central Area (2011) 2019 Northeast (2011) 2019 Cleveland (Cuyahoga & parts of Geauga, Lake, Portage, & Summit Counties) Total (2011) 2019 Perimeter North (2013) 2019 Bexley area (2013) 2019 East (2013) 2019 Downtown/University (2013) 2019 Columbus Total (2013) 2019 Dayton (Greene & Montgomery Counties) (1986)d 1997–2001 Elyria-Oberlin 1997–2001 Hamilton-Middletown-Oxford 1997–2001 Lima (Allen County) Pre-1997 Lorain 1997–2001 Mansfield 1997–2001 Marion 1997–2001 Sandusky-Fremont-Norwalk (Huron & Sandusky Counties) 1997–2001 Springfield 2019 Toledo-Bowling Green (Fulton, Lucas, & Wood Counties) (1994)d 1997–2001 Wooster 2019 Youngstown-Warren (Mahoning & Trumbull Counties) (2002)d 1997–2001 Zanesville (Muskingum County) 1997–2001 Other Places 2015 Youngstown Area Jewish Federation (including Mahoning & Trumbull Counties in Ohio & Mercer County in Pennsylvania) Total 2015 Jewish Federation of Greater Toledo (Fulton, Lucas, & Wood Counties in Ohio & Lenawee & Monroe Counties in Michigan) Total

# of Jews Part-Year 3100 5100 9000 5500 2000 1300 300 27,000 22,200 5,300 10,700 15,300 10,400 11,900 5000 80,800 4700 5400 6400 9000 25,500 4000 155 900 180 600 150 125 105 200 2300 175 1300 100 425 1700

2300

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area Total Ohio Oklahoma 2019 Oklahoma City-Norman (Cleveland & Oklahoma Counties) (2010)a 2019 Tulsa 2012 Other Places Total Oklahoma Oregon 2010 Bend (2010)a 1997–2001 Corvallis 1997–2001 Eugene 1997–2001 Medford-Ashland-Grants Pass (Jackson & Josephine Counties) 2019 Portland (Clackamas, Multnomah, & Washington Counties) (2011)d 2019 Clark County (Vancouver, WA) (2011)d 2019 Greater Portland Total (2011)d 1997–2001 Salem (Marion & Polk Counties) 1997–2001 Other Places Total Oregon Pennsylvania 2014 Altoona (Blair County) 1997–2001 Beaver Falls (northern Beaver County) 1997–2001 Butler (Butler County) 2007 Carbon County (2007)a 1997–2001 Chambersburg 2018 Erie (Erie County) 2016 East Shore (1994) 2016 West Shore (1994) 1994 Harrisburg Total (1994) 2019 Hazelton-Tamaqua 2014 Johnstown (Cambria & Somerset Counties) 2014 Lancaster 2014 Lebanon (Lebanon County) 2018 Allentown (2007) 2018 Bethlehem (2007) 2018 Easton (2007) 2018 Lehigh Valley Total (2007) 2015 Mercer County (Sharon-Farrell) 2007 Monroe County (2007)a 2016 Bucks County (2009) 2016 Chester County (Oxford-Kennett Square-PhoenixvilleWest Chester) (2009)

221

# of Jews Part-Year 147,815 2300 2000 125 4425 1000 500 3250 1000 33,800 2600 36,400 1000 100 40,650 450 180 250 600 150 500 3000 2000 5000 100 150 3000 165 5950 1050 1050 8050 300 2300 41,400 20,900

222

I. M. Sheskin and A. Dashefsky

Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2016 Delaware County (Chester-Coatesville) (2009) 2016 Montgomery County (Norristown) (2009) 2016 Philadelphia (2009) 2016 Greater Philadelphia Total (2009) 2008 Pike County 2019 Squirrel Hill (2017) 2019 Rest of Pittsburgh (2017) 2019 South Hills (Mt. Lebanon-Upper St. Clair) (2017) 2019 North Hills (Hampton, Fox Chapel, O'Hara) (2017) 2019 Other Places in Greater Pittsburgh (2017) 2019 Greater Pittsburgh (Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Washington, & Westmoreland Counties) Total (2017) 1997–2001 Pottstown 1997–2001 Pottsville 1997–2001 Reading (Berks County) 2008 Scranton (Lackawanna County) (Northeastern Pennsylvania) 2009 State College-Bellefonte-Philipsburg 1997–2001 Sunbury-Lewisburg-Milton-Selinsgrove-Shamokin 1997–2001 Uniontown 2008 Wayne County (Honesdale) 2019 Wilkes-Barre (Luzerne County, excluding HazeltonTamaqua) (2005)d 2014 Williamsport-Lock Haven (Clinton & Lycoming Counties) 2009 York (1999) 1997–2001 Other Places 2015 Youngstown Area Jewish Federation (including Mahoning & Trumbull Counties in Ohio & Mercer County in Pennsylvania) Total Total Pennsylvania Rhode Island 2019 Attleboro, MA (2002)a 2019 Providence-Pawtucket (2002) 2019 West Bay (2002) 2019 East Bay (2002) 2019 South County (Washington County) (2002) 2019 Northern Rhode Island (2002) 2019 Newport County (2002) 2019 Total Rhode Island (2002) 2019 Jewish Alliance of Greater Rhode Island Total South Carolina 2009 Aiken 2009 Anderson 2009 Beaufort

# of Jews Part-Year 21,000 64,500 66,900 214,700 300 14,800 12,800 8800 5400 7400 49,200 650 120 2200 3100 900 200 150 500 1800 150 1800 900 1700

297,865 800 7500 6350 1100 1800 1000 1000 18,750 19,550 100 100 100

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2018 Charleston (Charleston, Dorchester, and Berkley Counties) 2015 Columbia (Lexington & Richland Counties) 2009 Florence 2009 Georgetown 2010 Greenville (2010)a 2012 Myrtle Beach (Horry County) 1997–2001 Spartanburg (Spartanburg County) 2009 Sumter (Clarendon & Sumter Counties) 2009 Other Places Total South Carolina South Dakota 2009 Rapid City 2014 Sioux Falls 1997–2001 Other Places Total South Dakota Tennessee 2013 Bristol-Johnson City-Kingsport 2019 Chattanooga (2011)a 2016 Knoxville (2010)a 2018 Memphis (2006)d 2019 Davidson County (2016) 2019 Williamson County (2016) 2019 Other Central Tennessee (2016) 2019 Nashville (2016) Total 2010 Oak Ridge (2010)a 2009 Other Places Total Tennessee Texas 2012 Amarillo (Carson, Childress, Deaf Smith, Gray, Hall, Hutchinson, Moore, Potter, & Randall Counties) 2019 Austin (Travis, Williamson, Hays, Bastrop, & Caldwell Counties) 2014 Beaumont 2011 Brownsville 2011 Bryan-College Station 2011 Columbus-Hallettsville-La Grange-Schulenburg (Colorado, Fayette, & Lavaca Counties) 2015 Corpus Christi (Nueces County) 2019 North Dallas (1988, 2013)e 2019 Plano-Frisco-Richardson-Allen-McKinney (1988, 2013)e 2019 Central Dallas-Downtown-Uptown (1988, 2013)e 2019 East Dallas (1988, 2013)e 2019 Denton-Flowermound-Lewisville (1988, 2013)e 2019 South Dallas-Duncanville-Cedar Hill (1988, 2013)e

223

# of Jews Part-Year 9000 3000 220 100 2000 1500 500 100 100 16,820 100 100 50 250 125 1400 2000 10,000 6450 1700 850 9000 150 125 22,800 200 30,000 300 200 400 100 1000 12,500 14,700 23,500 1300 900 200

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Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2019 Addison-Carrolton-Farmers Branch (1988, 2013)e 2019 Other Places in Dallas (1988, 2013)e 2019 Dallas (southern Collin, Dallas, & southeastern Denton Counties) Total (1988, 2013)e 2016 El Paso 2016 Las Cruces (New Mexico) 2016 Jewish Federation of Greater El Paso (Total) 2016 Fort Worth (Tarrant County) 2011 Galveston 2011 Harlingen-Mercedes 2019 Core Area (2016) 2019 Memorial (2016) 2019 Central City (2016) 2019 Suburban Southwest (2016) 2019 West (2016) 2019 North (2016) 2019 Southwest (2016) 2019 East (2016) 2019 Houston (Harris County & parts of Brazoria, Fort Bend, Galveston & Montgomery Counties) Total (2016) 2011 Kilgore-Longview 2017 Laredo 2012 Lubbock (Lubbock County) 2011 McAllen (Hidalgo & Starr Counties) 2012 Midland-Odessa 2011 Port Arthur 2007 Inside Loop 410 (2007) 2007 Between the Loops (2007) 2007 Outside Loop 1604 (2007) 2007 San Antonio Total (2007) 2007 San Antonio Surrounding Counties (Atascosa, Bandera, Comal, Guadalupe, Kendall, Medina, & Wilson Counties) (2007)a 2014 Tyler 2014 Waco (Bell, Coryell, Falls, Hamilton, Hill, & McLennan Counties) 2012 Wichita Falls 2011 Other Places Total Texas Utah 1997–2001 Ogden 2009 Park City 2010 Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County) (2010)a 1997–2001 Other Places

# of Jews Part-Year 2700 14,200 70,000 5000 500 5500 5000 600 150 19,800 5100 6000 5800 3600 7300 3000 400 51,000 100 150 230 300 200 100 2000 5600 1600 9200 1000

250 400 150 450 176,480 150 600 4800 100

400

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area Total Utah Vermont 1997–2001 Bennington 2008 Brattleboro 2019 Burlington 1997–2001 Manchester 2008 Middlebury 2008 Montpelier-Barre 2008 Rutland 1997–2001 St. Johnsbury-Newport (Caledonia & Orleans Counties) 2019 Stowe Pre-1997 Woodstock Total Vermont Virginia 2013 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Floyd-Radford 2015 Charlottesville 2012 Fauquier County (Warrenton) 2013 Fredericksburg (parts of King George, Orange, Spotsylvania, & Stafford Counties) 2013 Harrisonburg 2013 Lynchburg 2019 Newport News-Hampton 2019 Williamsburg 2019 United Jewish Community of the Virginia Peninsula Total 2008 Norfolk (2001) 2008 Virginia Beach (2001) 2008 Chesapeake-Portsmouth-Suffolk (2001) 2008 United Jewish Federation of Tidewater Total (2001) 2017 North-Central Northern Virginia (2017) 2017 Central Northern Virginia (2017) 2017 East Northern Virginia (2017) 2017 West-Northern Virginia (2017) 2016 Jewish Federation of Greater Washington Total in Northern Virginia (2017) 2013 Petersburg-Colonial Heights-Hopewell 2011 Central (1994, 2011)b 2011 West End (1994, 2011)b 2011 Far West End (1994, 2011)b 2011 Northeast (1994, 2011)b 2011 Southside (1994, 2011)b 2011 Richmond (City of Richmond & Chesterfield, Goochland, Hanover, Henrico, & Powhatan Counties) Total (1994, 2011)b

225

# of Jews Part-Year 5650 400 500 350 3500 325 200 550 300 140 1000 270 7135 250 2000 100 500 300 350 2250 750 3000 3550 6000 1400 10,950 24,500 23,100 54,400 19,400 121,400 300 1300 1200 4100 1200 2200 10,000

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Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 2013 Roanoke 2013 Staunton-Lexington 2013 Winchester (Clarke, Frederick, & Warren Counties) 2013 Other Places Total Virginia Washington 1997–2001 Bellingham 2011 Clark County (Vancouver) (2011)d 1997–2001 Kennewick-Pasco-Richland 2011 Longview-Kelso 1997–2001 Olympia (Thurston County) Pre-1997 Port Angeles 2009 Port Townsend 2014 Pullman (Whitman County, Palouse) 2019 South Seattle (Southeast Seattle-Southwest SeattleDowntown) (2014) 2019 North Seattle (Northeast & Northwest Seattle) (2014) 2019 Bellevue (2014) 2019 Mercer Island (2014) 2019 Redmond (2014) 2019 Rest of King County (2014) 2019 Island, Kitsap, Pierce, & Snohomish Counties (2014) 2019 Seattle Total (2014) 1997–2001 Spokane 2009 Tacoma (Pierce County) 1997–2001 Yakima-Ellensburg (Kittitas & Yakima Counties) 1997–2001 Other Places Total Washington West Virginia 2011 Bluefield-Princeton 2007 Charleston (Kanawha County) 1997–2001 Clarksburg 1997–2001 Huntington 1997–2001 Morgantown Pre-1997 Parkersburg 1997–2001 Wheeling 1997–2001 Other Places Total West Virginia Wisconsin 2015 Appleton & other Fox Cities (Outagamie, Calumet, & northern Winnebago Counties) 1997–2001 Beloit-Janesville 1997–2001 Green Bay 1997–2001 Kenosha (Kenosha County)

# of Jews Part-Year 1000 100 270 75 150,595 525 2600 300 100 560 100 200 100 16,500 16,400 6300 6400 3000 9400 6650 64,650 1500 2500 150 150 73,435 100 975 110 250 200 110 290 275 2310 200 120 500 300

5  United States Jewish Population, 2019 Communities with estimated Jewish population of 100 or more, 2019 Date Geographic Area 1997–2001 La Crosse 2017 Madison (Dane County) 2019 City of Milwaukee (2011) 2019 North Shore (2011) 2019 Waukesha (2011) 2019 Milwaukee County Ring (2011) 2019 Milwaukee (Milwaukee, southern Ozaukee, & eastern Waukesha Counties) Total (2011) 1997–2001 Oshkosh-Fond du Lac 1997–2001 Racine (Racine County) 1997–2001 Sheboygan 2015 Wausau-Antigo-Marshfield-Stevens Point 1997–2001 Other Places Total Wisconsin Wyoming 1997–2001 Casper 2012 Cheyenne 2008 Jackson Hole 2008 Laramie Total Wyoming

227

# of Jews Part-Year 100 5000 4900 13,400 3200 4300 25,800 170 200 140 300 225 33,055 150 500 300 200 1150

1. Scientific Estimates. Estimates in boldface type are based on scientific studies, which, unless otherwise indicated, are Random Digit Dial (RDD) studies. The boldface date in the Geographic Area column indicates the year in which the field work was conducted. Superscripts are used to indicate the type of Scientific Estimate when it is not RDD: (a) indicates a Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) study (b) indicates a DJN study used to update a previous RDD study (first date is for the RDD study, second date is for the DJN-based update) (c) indicates the use of US Census data (d) indicates a scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN) (e) indicates a scientific study using a different methodology (neither RDD nor DJN) that is used to update a previous RDD study (first date is for the RDD study, second date is for the other scientific study) 2. Informant/Internet Estimates. Estimates for communities not shown in boldface type are generally based on Informant/Internet Estimates # of Jews. This column shows estimates of the number of Jews for each area or subarea, exclusive of part-year Jews. Part-Year. For communities for which the information is available, this column presents estimates of the number of Jews in part-year households. Part-year house-

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holds are defined as households who live in a community for 3–7 months of the year. Note that part-year households are probably important components of other communities but we have no documentation of such. Jews in part-year households form an essential component of some Jewish ­communities, as many join synagogues and donate to Jewish Federations in the communities in which they live part time. This is particularly true in Florida, and, to a lesser extent, in other states with many retirees. Presenting the information in this way allows the reader to gain a better perspective on the size of Jewish communities with significant part-year populations, without double-counting the part-year Jewish population in the totals. Note that Jews in part-year households are reported as such in the community that is most likely their “second home.” Excel Spreadsheet. The Excel spreadsheet used to create this Appendix and the other tables in this chapter is available at www.jewishdatabank.org. This spreadsheet also includes information on about 250 Other Places with Jewish populations of less than 100, which are aggregated and shown as the last entry for many of the states in this Appendix. The spreadsheet also contains Excel versions of the other tables in this chapter as well as a table showing some of the major changes since last year’s Year Book and a table showing the calculations for the indices of dissimilarity referenced above.

References Abrahamson, M. 1986. The unreliability of DJN techniques. Contemporary Jewry 7 (1): 93–98. Abramovitch, I., and S. Galvin, eds. 2002. Jews of Brooklyn. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press. Adler, C. 1900. American Jewish year book 1900–1901. Vol. 2. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America. Ahituv, S. 2003. Historical atlas of the Jewish people. New York: Continuum. Ain, S. 2019, June 5 Jews of color: “We don’t feel comfortable in the synagogue.” The Times of Israel. Barnavi, E. 1992. A historical atlas of the Jewish people: From the time of the patriarchs to the present. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Billings, J.S. 1890. Vital Statistics of the Jews on the United States. Census Bulletin No. 19. Washington: Census Office. Bradburn, N.M., S.  Sudman, and B.  Wansink. 2004. Asking questions: The definitive guide to questionnaire design—for market research, political polls, and social and health. New York: Josses-Bass. Brodkin, K. 1998. How Jews became whitefolks: What that says about race in America. New Brunswick, NY: Rutgers University Press. Bureau of the Census. No Date, CA 1958. “Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups,” 1957. Washington DC (mimeo). Burt, J.E., G.M.  Barber, and D.L.  Rigby. 2009. Elementary statistics for geographers. 3rd ed. New York: Guilford Press. Cohen, S.M., J.B. Ukeles, and A. Grosse. 2017. A portrait of Bay Area Jewish life and communities. San Francisco: The Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, the Peninsular, Marin and Sonoma Counties.

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Cohen, S.M., J.B.  Ukeles, R.  Miller, P.  Beck, S.  Shmulyian, and D.  Dutwin. 2011. Jewish Community Study of New York 2011. New York: UJA-Federation of New York. Comenetz, J. 2006. Census-Based estimation of the Hasidic Jewish population. Contemporary Jewry 26: 35–74. ———. 2011. Jewish maps of the United States by counties. www.jewishdatabank.org/Studies/ details.cfm?StudyID=602. Dashefsky, A., B. Lazerwitz, and E. Tabory. 2003. A journey of the “straight way” or the “roundabout path”: Jewish identity in the United States and Israel. In Handbook of the sociology of religion, ed. M. Dillon, 240–260. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Dashefsky, A. and I. Sheskin. 2012. Estimating a rare population: The case of American Jews. Paper presented at the Southern Demographic Association, Williamsburg, VA. De Lange, N. 1984. Atlas of the Jewish world. New York: Facts on File. DellaPergola, S. 2011. Jewish demographic policies: Population trends and options in Israel and in the diaspora. Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute. ———. 2013. How many Jews in the United States? The demographic perspective. Contemporary Jewry 33: 15–42. Dimont, M.I. 1978. The Jews in America, The roots, history, and destiny of American Jews. New York: Simon and Schuster. Friesel, E. 1990. Atlas of modern Jewish history. New York: Oxford University Press. Gilbert, M. 1985. The Illustrated Atlas of Jewish Civilization. New York: MacMillan. ———. 1995. The Routledge atlas of Jewish history. 8th ed. London: Routledge. Geller, L. and L. Hemlock 2019. Jews of color belonging: We all have work to do. at www.ejewishphilanthropy.com. Glazer, N. 1989/1972/1957. American Judaism: Second edition revised with a new introduction. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Gold, S. 2015. Patterns of adaptation among contemporary Jewish immigrants to the US.  In American Jewish year book 2015, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 115, 3–44. Cham, SUI: Springer. Goldscheider, C. 2004. Studying the Jewish future. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Goodman, G.M., and Ellen Smith. 2004. The Jews of Rhode Island. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press. Greenbaum, A., ed. 2005. Jews of South Florida. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press. Hertzberg, A. 1989. The Jews in America: Four centuries of an uneasy encounter. New  York: Simon and Schuster. Kaganoff, B.C. 1996. A dictionary of Jewish names and their history. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. Kahn, A.F., and M. Dollinger, eds. 2003. California Jews. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press. Kelman, A.Y., A.H. Tapper, I. Fonseca, and A. Saperstein. 2019. Counting the inconsistencies: An analysis of American Jewish population studies with a focus on Jews of Color. San Francisco: University of San Francisco, Stanford University, and Jews of Color Field Building Initiative. Kosmin, B., and S.  Waterman. 1989. The Use and Misuse of Distinctive Jewish Names in Research on Jewish Populations. In Papers in Jewish demography 1985, ed. U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola, 1–9. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press. Kosmin, B.A., and A. Keysar. 2013. American Jewish secularism: Jewish life beyond the synagogue. In American Jewish year book 2012, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 109–112, 3–54. Cham, SUI: Springer. Kosmin, B.A., and S.P. Lachman. 1991. Research report, The National Survey of Religious identification, 1989–1990. New  York: The Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York. Kosmin, B.A., P.  Ritterband, and J.  Scheckner. 1988. Counting Jewish populations: Methods and problems. In American Jewish year book, vol. 88, 204–241. New York: American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Publication Society.

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Kotler-Berkowitz, L., S.M. Cohen, J. Ament, V. Klaff, F. Mott, and D. Peckerman-Neuman. 2003. The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01: Strength, challenge and diversity in the American Jewish population. New York: United Jewish Communities. Lazerwitz, B. 1986. Some comments on the use of Distinctive Jewish Names in surveys. Contemporary Jewry 7 (1): 83–91. Levin, S.  September 16, 2019. Jewish Diversity and Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews. ejewishphilanthropy. Link, Michael W., Michael P. Battaglia, Martin R. Frankel, Larry Osborn, and Ali H. Mokdad. 2008. A comparison of Address-Based Sampling (ABS) versus Random-Digit Dialing (RDD) for General Population Surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 72: 6–27. Marcus, J.R. 1990. To count a people. Lanham, MD: United Press of America. Mateos, P. 2014. Names, ethnicity, and populations. Dordrecht: Springer. Pasachoff, N., and R.J.  Littman. 1995. Jewish history in 100 nutshells. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. Pew Research Center. 2013. A portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center survey of U.S. Jews. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Phillips, B.A. 2018. Intermarriage in the twenty-first century: New perspectives. In American Jewish Year Book 2017, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 117, 31–119. Cham: Springer. Pogrebin, L. C. March 14, 2019 Jews of Color are us. Moment Magazine. Rabin, S. 2017. “Let us endeavor to count them up”: The nineteenth-century origins of American Jewish demography. American Jewish History 101 (4): 419–440. Rebhun, A. 2011. The Wandering Jew in America. Boston: Academic Studies Press. Sachar, H.M. 1992. A history of the Jews in America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Sanders, R. 1988. Shores of refuge, A hundred years of Jewish immigration. New  York: Henry Holt. Shamir, I., and S.  Shavit. 1986. Encyclopedia of Jewish History. New  York: Facts on File Publications. Shapiro, E.S. 1992. A time for healing: American Jewry since World War II. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Sherman, C.B. 1965. The Jew within American society. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Sheskin, I.M. 1997. The changing spatial distribution of American Jews. In Land and community: Geography in Jewish studies, ed. Harold Brodsky, 185–221. Bethesda, MD: University Press of Maryland. ———. 1998. A methodology for examining the changing size and spatial distribution of a Jewish population: A Miami case study. Shofar, Special Issue: Studies in Jewish Geography 17 (1): 97–116. ———. 2001. How Jewish communities differ: Variations in the findings of local Jewish demographic studies. New York: City University of New York, North American Jewish Data Bank at www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2005. Comparisons between local Jewish community studies and the 2000-01 National Jewish Population Survey. Contemporary Jewry 25: 185–192. ———. 2009. Local Jewish community studies as planning tools for the American Jewish community. Jewish Political Studies Review 21 (1–2): 107–135. Sheskin, I.  M. 2010. “Jewish Israelis in the United States,” International Geographic Union Regional Conference, Tel Aviv (2010) (available from author on request). Sheskin, I.M. 2013. Uses of local Jewish community study data for addressing national concerns. Contemporary Jewry 33 (1–2): 83–101. ———. 2015a. The 2014 Greater Miami Jewish Federation Population Study: A Portrait of Jewish Miami. Miami: The Greater Miami Jewish Federation. ———. 2015b. Comparisons of Jewish communities: A compendium of tables and bar charts. Storrs, CT: Berman Institute, North American. Jewish DataBank and The Jewish Federations of North America at www.jewishdatabank.org.

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———. 2018. The 2018 Detroit Jewish population study: A profile of Jewish Detroit. Detroit: The Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit. Sheskin, I.M., and A. Dashefsky. 2006. Jewish population in the United States, 2006. In American Jewish year book 2006, ed. D.  Singer and L.  Grossman, vol. 106, 133–193. New  York: American Jewish Committee. www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2007. Jewish population in the United States, 2007. In American Jewish year book 2007, ed. D. Singer and L. Grossman, vol. 107, 133–205. New York: American Jewish Committee. www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2008. Jewish population in the United States, 2008. In American Jewish year book 2008, ed. D. Singer and L. Grossman, vol. 108, 151–222. New York: American Jewish Committee. www.jewishdatabank.org. Tighe, E., R. Magidin de Kramer, D. Parmer, D. Nussbaum, D Kallista, X. Seabrum, and L. Saxe. 2019. American Jewish population project, summary and highlights 2014. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute at http://www.brandeis.edu/ssri. Weiner, H.A., and K.D. Roseman, eds. 2007. Lone stars of David: The Jews of Texas. Hanover. NH: Brandeis University Press. Wyman, D. 1984. The abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945. New York: Pantheon Books.

Chapter 6

Canadian Jewish Population, 2019 Charles Shahar

The Canadian Jewish population has seen only modest growth in the past 20 years, following a more significant increase between 1981 and 1991. The latter decade coincided with the beginning of significant immigration by Jews from the Former Soviet Union. Jews reside in every region of Canada including the Northern Territories, although they are concentrated heavily in the major urban centers. The metropolitan area of Toronto is home to 188,710 Jews and includes about half (48.2%) of Canada’s Jewish population. The Montreal community numbers 90,780 Jews. The median age of Canadian Jews is slightly older than the national average but much older than ethnic groups with large numbers of more recent immigrants. There are 36,040 Sephardim living in Canada with the majority residing in Montreal (22,225). The Sephardic population in Montreal has been on the ascendancy since a large influx arrived in the late 1960s. However, this growth has slowed recently, with a gain of only 1000 individuals between 2001 and 2011. Winnipeg has the fifth largest Jewish community in Canada, comprising 3.5% (13,960) of the country’s Jewish population. It was recently surpassed by Ottawa in terms of the size of its Jewish population. The community has faced a number of challenges in the past few decades, including a steadily declining Jewish population since its peak in 1961 of 19,376 Jews. Despite these challenges, the Winnipeg community has a long history of Jewish commitment and affiliation.

Chapter 7, following, presents a revised executive summary of the more recent 2018 Survey of Jews in Canada. It differs from the current chapter in that it is a sample survey of Jews in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver, where 82% of Canadian Jews reside. The current chapter relies on the 2011 National Household Survey, a government poll of a 20% random sample of Canadian households with a response rate of nearly 74%. Chapter 7 presents details on Jewish beliefs, behavior, and belonging. C. Shahar (*) The Jewish Community Foundation of Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_6

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For many decades, the census of the Canadian population has provided an important opportunity to obtain a demographic “snapshot” of the Canadian Jewish community. A major census is distributed at the start of every decade and contains a wealth of information related to the social, cultural, and economic characteristics of Canadian Jews. The two questions used to identify Jews, namely religion and ethnicity, are located on the census “long-form.” A census is also distributed in the middle of every decade, but it does not contain a religion question and, therefore, is much less useful for identifying Jews. However, the most recent mid-decade census (2016) has alarmed those who rely on census data for gaining important information about Jewish populations in Canada. “Jewish” was not included as a sample response choice among the 28 ethnic categories listed as examples in the 2016 Census. Examples were based mostly on the most frequent single ethnic origins reported in the 2011 National Household Survey. Unfortunately, the number of ethnic Jews fell below the threshold in 2011. The omission of the “Jewish” ethnicity sample choice, and the fact that the actual choices represented only national or aboriginal groups, rather than cultural groups, resulted in a severe response bias among Jews. The numbers of Canadians who indicated a Jewish ethnicity diminished by 54% between 2011 and 2016, from 309,650 to only 143,660 individuals. This has implications for the next major census in 2021. Although those who will say they are Jewish by religion will be identified as being Jewish in 2021, there is concern that those who say they have “no religion,” but who may identify as Jews on a cultural (ethnic) level, may not do so if they do not have a prompt upon which to base their response. The number of Jews who say they have no religion has been rising steadily. If the ethnicity variable is thus compromised, it may be difficult to maintain a definition of Jewishness that is as inclusive as possible for the 2021 Census, thus limiting the ability of community leaders and planners to make informed decisions that will ultimately impact their constituents in profound ways. As of July 2018, discussions are underway with Statistics Canada to see what options might be available to address this issue. The current report is based on the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS). Citing privacy issues, the Federal government decided to make the census long form voluntary in 2011, and a survey methodology was employed.1 The 2011 NHS was distributed to one-third of Canadian households, compared to the 20% who receive the long-form in the case of the 2001 or 2016 censuses. Whereas the response rate for the census was nearly universal, it was 73.9% for the NHS. Moreover, because the sample was voluntary, it was difficult to know whether certain populations were less inclined to respond, such as economically disadvantaged individuals, the less educated, and recent immigrants.2 1  Statistics Canada reverted to using a census methodology with a change in national governments in 2015. 2  In the case of Jewish communities, it is possible that the ultra-Orthodox were also under-represented in the final count.

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Statistics Canada applied rigorous statistical treatments to deal with possible gaps in the data and assured users that it would only release information if it had confidence in its reliability. An examination of the final data sets related to Jewish communities, along with such key variables as poverty and intermarriage, seemed to indicate that the data did “make sense” in light of statistical trends extrapolated from previous censuses. Respondents were identified as Jews according to the “Jewish Standard Definition,” formulated by Jim Torczyner of McGill University in 1971, which used a combination of religious and ethnic identification. However, because the ethnicity variable has been slowly eroding in terms of its usefulness in identifying Jews, the Jewish Standard Definition was revised in 2011 and expanded to include a further set of variables, such as having an Israeli ethnicity and having knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish.3 All in all, this “Revised Jewish Standard Definition” did not result in a substantial increase to the final count of Canadian Jews as it only added about 6300 persons. Despite the limitations of the 2011 NHS, this instrument nonetheless represents an important opportunity for academic researchers as well as community leaders and planners to understand the demographic situation of the Canadian Jewish population better. We are fortunate to have a national survey that includes questions related to ethnicity and religion (as the American census does not).4 Also, the NHS has a much larger scope than the Canadian Jewish community can undertake on its own.5

6.1  Basic Demographics According to the NHS, the Jewish population of Canada numbered 391,665 persons in 2011.6 This represented an increase from 2001, when there were 374,060 Jews. Between 2001 and 2011, the Canadian Jewish population thus increased by 17,605 persons, or 4.7% (Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1). The gain between 2001 and 2011 was slightly larger than that between 1991 and 2001. In the latter decade, the community increased by 14,950 persons, or 4.2%. In 3  For a more comprehensive description of the erosion of the utility of and the problems associated with using both the ethnicity and religion variables in identifying Canadian Jews, see Weinfeld and Schnoor (2015). 4  Specifically, the US Census asks only one ethnicity-related question identifying respondents of Hispanic or Latino descent. The American Community Survey, an annual demographic study of the US population, does ask questions on “ancestry” and language spoken at home. 5  The NHS did not ask specific questions such as denominational affiliation, levels of religious observance, attitudes toward Israel, etc. For these data, the Jewish community needs to develop its own survey tools. 6  All 2011 NHS data cited in this chapter were derived from Statistics Canada, special order tabulations for Jewish Federations of Canada—UIA, CO-1421. Most of the descriptions related to the data were adapted from Shahar (2014a, b; 2015).

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Table 6.1  Jewish population of Canada: a historical summary 2011 2001 1991 1981 1971 1961 1951 1941 1931 1921 1911 1901

Jewish population 391,665 374,060 359,110 313,865 286,550 254,368 204,836 168,585 155,766 125,445 74,760 16,493

Change from previous census 17,605 14,950 45,245 27,315 32,182 49,532 36,251 12,819 30,321 50,685 58,267 –

% Change from previous census 4.7% 4.2% 14.4% 9.5% 12.7% 24.2% 21.5% 8.2% 24.2% 67.8% 353.3% –

125

392

16

75

100

169

200

156

205

254

300

314

359

400

374

500

287

Thousands

Note: 1991 to 2011 are based on the Revised Standard Jewish Definition described in the methodological discussion above. The rest of the figures are based on the Jewish Standard Definition (1971 and 1981) or were derived from either the religion or ethnicity variables individually (1901 to 1961). For information on the Jewish population of Canada from 1851 to 1941, see Rosenberg (1946)

0 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

Fig. 6.1  Growth of the Canadian Jewish population. (Sources: Statistics Canada)

short, at least for the past 20 years, the growth rate of the Canadian Jewish population has not been remarkable, but compares well with growth rates in European countries and also with the United States. A more pronounced increase for the Canadian Jewish community was evident between 1981 and 1991 when it increased by 45,245 persons, or 14.4%. This is

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likely related to the beginning of significant immigration to Canada by Jews from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to a lesser extent from South Africa. In fact, this gain of 45,245 persons was the largest increase experienced by the national Jewish population since the large influx of immigrants in the 1950s. All in all, the number of Canadian Jews has been rising steadily since the turn of the past century. In the 1930s, restricted Jewish immigration to Canada slowed some of the growth experienced in previous decades. Significant levels of immigration then resumed immediately after World War II. Jews constituted 1.2% of the total Canadian population of 32.9 million in 2011, compared to 2.1% for the US (see Chap. 5). The total Canadian population has been increasing at a faster pace than the Jewish population. For instance, between 1991 and 2011, the Jewish population grew by 9.1%, compared to 21.7% for Canada’s total population. According to the 2011 NHS, the Jewish community, including single and multiple origin responses, ranked seventeenth among ethnic groups in Canada. The ten largest ethnic affiliations were British (6.5 million), Canadian (6.0 million), French (3.7 million), German (2.4 million), Aboriginal (1.8 million), Chinese (1.5 million), Italian (1.4 million), East Indian (1.1 million), Ukrainian (1 million), and Polish (644,700). It is noteworthy that the Jewish population ranked twelfth among ethnic groups in 2001, five rankings above its current status. In 2011, the Jewish community ranked seventh with respect to religious identity. The five largest religious groups in Canada were Catholics (12.8 million), Protestants (8.7 million), Muslims (1.0 million), Christian Orthodox (550,690), and Hindus (497,965). Almost one-quarter (23.9%) of the total Canadian population, or about 7.9 million persons, indicated that they had no religious identity. This category included persons who defined themselves as agnostics, atheists, or humanists or who did not identify with any religion at all. It is not clear to what extent highly secular Jews said they had no religious identity. It is thus possible that these individuals were under-represented in the final count of Jews (unless they indicated a Jewish ethnicity). Finally, the Canadian Jewish community was the fourth largest Jewish community in the world in 2012 (using the year closest to the Canadian census, but see Chap. 8 for current figures). Israel had the largest Jewish population followed by the US, France (480,000), and Canada (391,665). The Jewish populations of the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation numbered 291,000 and 194,000, respectively. The Canadian Jewish community constituted 2.8% of the total 13,746,100 Jews in the world in 2012 and 5.0% of the 7,845,000 Jews living in the Diaspora in 2012. The Jewish population of Canada comprised 6.8% of the Jews residing in North America.

6.2  Provincial and Metropolitan Population Distributions Table 6.2 and Map 6.1 show the distribution of Jewish populations across provinces and territories. More than half (57.9%, or 226,610 persons) of Jews in Canada reside in Ontario.

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Table 6.2  Jewish population distribution: provinces and territories Province/territory Nova Scotia New Brunswick Newfoundland/Labrador Prince Edward Island (Total Atlantic Canada) Quebec Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia Yukon Northwest Territories Nunavut Total Canada

Jewish population 2910 860 220 185 (4175) 93,625 226,610 14,345 1905 15,795 35,005 145 40 20 391,665

% of Canadian Jewish population 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% (1.1%) 23.9% 57.9% 3.7% 0.5% 4.0% 8.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%

Map 6.1  Geographic distribution of the Jewish population of Canada

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Table 6.3  Twenty largest Canadian Jewish communities Metropolitan area/province Toronto, ON Montreal, QC Vancouver, BC Ottawa, ON Winnipeg, MB Calgary, AB Edmonton, AB Hamilton, ON Victoria, BC London, ON Halifax, NS Kitchener/Waterloo, ON Oshawa, ON Windsor, ON Barrie, ON St. Catharines-Niagara, ON Kingston, ON Guelph, ON Regina, SK Kelowna, BC Total

Jewish population 188,710 90,780 26,255 14,010 13,690 8335 5550 5110 2740 2675 2120 2015 1670 1515 1445 1375 1185 925 900 900

% of Canadian Jewish population 48.2% 23.2% 6.7% 3.6% 3.5% 2.1% 1.4% 1.3% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 94.9%

Quebec has 93,625 Jewish residents and about a quarter (23.9%) of the total Jewish population of Canada. British Columbia has 35,005 Jews, or 8.9% of the total Jewish population of Canada. All other provinces have less than 5% of the national Jewish population. Alberta has 15,795 Jewish residents, or 4% of the country’s Jewish population. Manitoba has 14,345 Jews, or 3.7% of the total. The Atlantic Provinces have 4175 Jews, or 1.1% of the country’s total Jewish population. Saskatchewan has 1905 Jews, or 0.5% of the country’s total. There are 145 Jews in the Yukon, 40  in the Northwest Territories, and 20  in Nunavut. Although these last numbers are small, it is nonetheless instructive that Jews populate every region of the country, including the northern territories. Table 6.3 and Map 6.1 present the 20 largest Jewish communities in Canada, which account for 95% of Canada’s Jewish population. The Toronto metropolitan area is home to 188,710 Jews and includes about half (48.2%) of Canada’s Jewish population. The Montreal community numbers 90,780 Jews and constitutes about a quarter (23.2%) of the Jewish population of Canada. Vancouver has a Jewish population of 26,255, representing 6.7% of the national Jewish population. The rest of the Jewish communities in Canada each number less than 15,000 persons. For instance, Ottawa has 14,010 Jews, Winnipeg has 13,690, Calgary has 8335, Edmonton has 5550, and Hamilton has 5110.

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6.3  Focus on the Age of the Jewish Population The Canadian Jewish population has a somewhat larger proportion of children (age 0–14) than the total population (18.2% and 17.0% respectively). The Jewish population has a similar percentage in the age 15–24 cohort compared with the total Canadian population (13.4% and 13.2% respectively). In the economically productive age 25–44 cohort, the discrepancy between the two distributions is more marked. Less than a quarter (23.5%) of Jews fall into this age cohort, compared to 26.7% of Canada’s total population. The Jewish community also has a somewhat smaller proportion in the age 45–64 cohort than the overall Canadian population (28.0% and 29.3% respectively). Finally, a comparison of the two age distributions shows that the Jewish community has a significantly larger proportion of persons age 65 and over (16.9%) than the total Canadian population (13.9%). The median age of the national Jewish population is 40.5 years, slightly higher than that of Canada’s overall population (40.1 years) but a bit lower than the median age of 42 for US Jews, based on the 2000–2001 National Jewish Population Survey. Ethnic groups with the oldest median ages include the British (48.7  years), Americans (45.9  years), French (44.8  years), Germans (40.7  years), Jews (40.5 years), Greeks (40.4 years), and Poles (40.3 years). These ethnic groups generally involve older, more established communities whose peak periods of immigration to Canada have long passed. Since there has not been a large influx of recent immigrants among these groups, their median ages remain at fairly high levels. The youngest median ages were reported by the Pakistani (26.0 years), African (27.9 years), Aboriginal (28.4 years), Arab (29.3 years), Latin American (30.1 years), Caribbean (31.2 years), and Korean (33.7 years) communities. Most of the latter populations have a large number of more recent immigrants, many of whom settled in Canada in the past two decades. This infusion of people, often involving younger families, has revitalized these communities and has kept their median ages lower than the rest of the population.

6.4  Focus on Sephardim7 The term “Sephardim” initially referred to Jews living in Spain, who were expelled during the “Inquisition” in the 1490s. The term now refers to descendants of those Jews, who ultimately settled in areas such as North Africa, Holland, England, Turkey and the Balkans, and who originally spoke Judeo-Spanish languages. It also

7  Previous foci have appeared in the American Jewish Year Book 2018 (Shahar 2019) on “Seniors”, in the American Jewish Year Book 2017 (Shahar 2018) on “Poverty”, in the American Jewish Year Book 2016 (Shahar 2017) on “Holocaust Survivors”, and the American Jewish Year Book 2015 (Shahar 2016) on “Intermarriage.”

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refers to Jews who were connected to the Judeo-Spanish culture before the Inquisition, and lived in Arab countries and Iran, where they spoke a variety of Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Persian languages. The Sephardic community of Canada comprises 36,040 individuals. In fact, Canada has the seventh largest Sephardic community in the world, following those of Israel, France, United States, Argentina, Brazil and Spain. The rich cultural heritage of Sephardim has contributed to the intricate fabric of the Jewish community in Canada, particularly in Montreal. The Sephardic community in Montreal has a long history. In the late eighteenth century, Sephardim were among the first Jews to settle in the province of Quebec. The oldest surviving synagogue in Montreal, the Spanish and Portuguese Congregation, is of Sephardic origin. It was founded in 1768, and was the first such congregation in Canada. The most significant period of Sephardic immigration began following the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors. A large influx of Sephardim, mostly from Morocco, settled in Montreal between 1967 and 1987. More recent Sephardic immigrants have come mainly from Israel and Western Europe. Since many speak French as their mother tongue, and this is the dominant language of the province of Quebec, Sephardim have generally adjusted well to life in Montreal. Jews of Sephardic origin occupy key positions of leadership and influence in the Jewish community, have developed thriving businesses, and enjoy political representation in the general community. There are 22,225 Sephardim residing in the Montreal metropolitan area. Sephardim comprise 24.5% of the 90,780 members of the Montreal Jewish community. There are also 715 individuals of mixed (Sephardic and Ashkenazi) extraction living in Montreal. The Sephardic community has been on the ascendancy since their arrival in greater numbers to Montreal in the late 1960s. However, their increases slowed somewhat between 2001 and 2011, when there was a gain of only 1000 individuals. On the other hand, the Ashkenazi population declined by 3380 individuals in that decade, and contributed to an overall decline of 3% in the Jewish population of Montreal. An influx of Jewish immigrants from France in recent years may change the composition of Montreal Jewry somewhat if it continues. The largest Sephardic age cohort is middle-aged adults between 45 and 64 years of age (5570 individuals). Many of those between 45 and 64  years represent the children of Sephardim who immigrated to Montreal in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. There is also a significant representation of Sephardim in the 25–44-­ year age group (5315 individuals). About one in five Sephardim (20.4%) are seniors, or 4540 individuals. As large numbers of middle-aged Sephardim enter their senior years, the proportion of elderly will likely increase significantly. There are 9735 Canadian-born Sephardim living in Montreal, comprising 43.8% of the Sephardic community. The rest of the Sephardic population (56.2%) are immigrants. More than a quarter (28.3%) of Sephardim were born in Morocco, followed by France (7.6%) and Israel (6.4%).

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The percentage of adult Sephardim that have a university degree has increased significantly from 35.7% in 2001 to 45.7% in 2011. There are 4080 Sephardim living below the poverty line in the Montreal metropolitan area, or 18.4% of the total Sephardic population.8 The poverty level among Sephardim is lower than that of the rest of the Jewish community (20.5%). Those who are particularly vulnerable to poverty include Sephardic seniors living alone (47.7%); Sephardic adults between 15 and 64 years living alone (47.3%); and Sephardim living in female single parent families (32.7%).

6.5  Focus on a Community: Winnipeg9 Winnipeg has the fifth largest Jewish community in Canada, comprising 3.5% of the country’s Jewish population. It was recently surpassed by Ottawa in terms of the size of its Jewish population. The community has faced a number of challenges in the last few decades, including a steadily declining Jewish population since its peak in 1961 of 19,376 Jews. Other challenges include a burgeoning elderly cohort; and the fact that the community is more spread out than ever before, straining the reach of its service delivery. Despite these challenges, the Winnipeg community has a long history of Jewish commitment and affiliation. The variety and availability of Jewish services in Winnipeg are those usually found in considerably larger communities. Several community initiatives, particularly related to immigration, have been launched in the last two decades. The result is an increasingly diverse population as evident in the cultural makeup and orientations of community institutions. In 2011, the Jewish population of Winnipeg was 13,690. Jews comprised 1.9% of Winnipeg’s total population of 714,640. The Jewish population figure for 2011 represented a loss from 2001, when there were 14,820 Jews in this metropolitan area. Between 2001 and 2011 the Jewish population declined by 1130 people, or 7.6%. The population loss between 2001 and 2011 was somewhat greater than between 1991 and 2001. In the latter decade, the community declined by 415 people or 2.7%. The current decline is also a little more significant than the one experienced between 1981 and 1991, when the community decreased by 935 people or 5.8%.

8  The “poverty line” in this report refers to the low-income cutoff (LICO), which is defined by Statistics Canada as “an income threshold at which families are expected to spend 20 percentage points more than the average family on food, shelter and clothing.” 9  The corresponding chapter in  the  previous American Jewish Year Book 2018 (Shahar 2019) focused on Ottawa, on Greater Vancouver in the American Jewish Year Book 2017 (Shahar 2018), on Toronto in the American Jewish Year Book 2016 (Shahar 2017) and on Montreal in the American Jewish Year Book 2015 (Shahar 2016).

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All in all, the demographic trends suggest that the Jewish population is continuing to decrease. This is perhaps surprising given the level of Jewish immigration to Winnipeg in the last decade, particularly from individuals originating in the former Soviet Union, Israel and Argentina. Sources from the organized community suggest that the great majority of these newcomers have remained in Winnipeg and have planted their roots there. Regarding the age distribution of the Winnipeg Jewish community, after showing a very dramatic loss between 1991 and 2001, the 25–44-year age group continued to decrease in the last decade, from 3210 to 2915 individuals. The 45–64-year cohort remained at about the same level between 2001 and 2011, after demonstrating dramatic gains in the previous decade. This cohort represents the Baby Boomer generation. The number of seniors 65+ years continued to decline in the last decade, from 3180 to 2580 individuals. On the other hand, the local Jewish community has a much larger proportion of elderly (18.8%) than Winnipeg’s total population (13.1%). In fact, Winnipeg has the second highest percentage of seniors of any major Jewish community in Canada, behind only Montreal (20.4%). The median age of the Winnipeg Jewish community actually decreased between 2001 and 2011, from 44.4 to 43.1 years, but it is still significantly older than that of the Canadian Jewish population (40.5 years). There are 2000 Jews living below the poverty line in the Winnipeg metropolitan area. The poor comprise 14.6% of a total population of 13,690 Jews residing in the local community. The level of poverty among children 0–14 years in the Winnipeg Jewish population is 20.2%, almost double the rate found in 2001. There are 470 children in the local Jewish community who live in economically disadvantaged circumstances. Almost one of seven elderly Jews (65+ years) is poor, but senior women are significantly more likely to be disadvantaged than men (20.8% and 4.7% respectively). In terms of the intermarriage rate, 25.4% of Jewish spouses / partners are married to, or partnered with, non-Jews in the Winnipeg metropolitan area. The intermarriage rate among Winnipeg’s Jewish population (25.4%) is slightly lower than that of the Canadian Jewish population (26.3%). Although the intermarriage rates of Jewish communities across Canada generally increase as one moves westward, the Winnipeg community is an exception, likely because it has a long history of Jewish commitment and affiliation. In cases where both spouses are less than 30 years of age, the level of intermarriage is a striking 75.6%; although the small number of Jewish couples in this age group suggests that this figure should be interpreted with caution, as sampling error may account for this finding. It is 19.4% when both spouses are at least 40 years old. Regarding the youngest children of intermarried couples, about a quarter (26.7%) are identified by their parents as Jews; about half (55.3%) are assigned no religious affiliation; and the rest (17.9%) are identified as having other religions. Whether it is the husband or the wife who is of the Jewish faith has a significant bearing on the religious orientation of their children, with the latter being much more inclined to be identified as Jewish if the mother is identified as such.

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6.6  Summary The Canadian Jewish population has seen only modest growth in the past twenty years, following a more significant increase between 1981 and 1991. The latter decade coincided with the beginning of significant immigration by Jews from the FSU.  Jews reside in every region of Canada, including the Northern Territories, although they are concentrated heavily in the major urban centers. The metropolitan area of Toronto is home to 188,710 Jews and includes about half (48.2%) of Canada’s Jewish population. The Montreal community numbers 90,780 Jews. The median age (40.5 years) of Canadian Jews is slightly older than the national average but much older than ethnic groups with large numbers of more recent immigrants. There are 36,040 Sephardim living in Canada with the majority residing in Montreal (22,225). The Sephardic population in Montreal has been on the ascendancy since a large influx arrived in the late 1960s. However, this growth has slowed recently, with a gain of only 1000 individuals between 2001 and 2011. The percentage of Sephardic seniors is expected to increase significantly as the Baby Boomers turn elderly. More than half (56.2%) of Sephardim residing in Montreal are immigrants and more than a quarter (28.3%) were born in Morocco. Winnipeg has the fifth largest Jewish community in Canada, comprising 3.5% (13,960) of the country’s Jewish population. It was recently surpassed by Ottawa in terms of the size of its Jewish population. The community has faced a number of challenges in the last few decades, including a steadily declining Jewish population since its peak in 1961 of 19,376 Jews. Other challenges include a burgeoning elderly cohort; and the fact that the community is more spread out than ever before, straining the reach of its service delivery. Despite these challenges, the Winnipeg community has a long history of Jewish commitment and affiliation.

References Rosenberg, L. 1946. The Jewish population of Canada: A statistical summary from 1851 to 1941. In American Jewish year book, ed. H. Schneiderman and J. Maller, vol. 48, 19–50. New York: American Jewish Committee. Dordrecht: Springer. Shahar, C. 2014a. 2011 National Household Survey analysis: The Jewish population of Canada. In Part 1: Basic demographics and Part 2: Jewish populations in geographic areas. Toronto: Jewish Federations of Canada—UIA. See www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2014b. 2011 National Household Survey analysis: The Jewish community of Winnipeg. In Part 1: Basic demographics and Part 2: Jewish populations in geographic areas. Toronto: Jewish Federations of Canada—UIA. See www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2015. 2011 National Household Survey analysis: The Jewish community of Montreal. In The Sephardic community. Toronto: Federations of Canada—UIA.  See www.jewishdatabank.org. ———. 2016. Jewish population of Canada, 2015. In American Jewish year book 2015, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 115, 261–271. Dordrecht: Springer. ———. 2017. Canadian Jewish population, 2016. In American Jewish year book 2016, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 116, 241–251. Dordrecht: Springer.

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———. 2018. Canadian Jewish population, 2017. In American Jewish year book 2017, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 117, 285–295. Dordrecht: Springer. ———. 2019. Canadian Jewish population, 2018. In American Jewish year book 2018, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 118, 349–360. Dordrecht: Springer. Weinfeld, M., and R.F. Schnoor. 2015. The demography of Canadian Jewry, the “census” of 2011: Challenges and results. In American Jewish year book 2014, ed. A. Dashefsky and I.M. Sheskin, vol. 114, 285–300. Dordrecht: Springer.

Chapter 7

2018 Survey of Jews in Canada: Executive Summary Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton

The first Jew to settle in what is now Canada was an employee of the Hudson’s Bay Company. He arrived in 1732. Today, Canadian Jews number about 392,000 and form the world’s third or fourth largest Jewish community. As late as the first half of the twentieth century, Canadian Jews experienced a high level of discrimination in accommodation, employment, property ownership, and everyday interaction. Despite these impediments, they proved to be highly resilient. They achieved rapid upward mobility and made many important contributions to Canadian medicine, jurisprudence, science, education, government, the economy, and the arts. Upward mobility and increasing acceptance on the part of the Canadian mainstream have had what many community members regard as a downside: These social processes heightened the prospect of cultural assimilation, loss of traditional languages, and intermarriage. Many in the community are also deeply concerned about the recurrence of a stubborn malady; since the early 2000s, anti-Israel sentiment has sometimes engendered antisemitism, and over the past few years, the rise of “white nationalism” (dimly mirroring the same trend in the US) has resulted in increased anti-Jewish harassment and violence. Although the latter circumstance did not motivate this survey, it is part of the context in which the 2018 Survey of Canadian Jews was conducted. What is known about the identities, values, opinions, and experiences of Jews in Canada today? The basic demographics of the Jewish population are captured every R. Brym (*) Department of Sociology and Centre for Jewish Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] K. Neuman The Environics Institute, Toronto, ON, Canada R. Lenton York University, Toronto, ON, Canada © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_7

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5 years through national censuses conducted by Statistics Canada, which document the number who identify as Jewish ethnically and/or religiously, where they live, and their basic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and education).1 However, this research does not provide a full understanding about the Jewish experience in Canada, and such knowledge is becoming increasingly important given the dynamic changes taking place in society generally, and in the Jewish world in particular (e.g., assimilation, intermarriage, and antisemitism). It is remarkable that the Canadian Jewish community is one of the least studied in the world—in sharp contrast to that of the US and the UK.

7.1  Overview This research provides the first empirically-based portrait of the identity, practices, and experiences of Jews in Canada, based on a survey conducted in four cities containing 82% of the country’s Jewish population (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Winnipeg). For simplicity throughout this chapter, the expression “Canadian Jews who live in one of the four cities containing 82% of the country’s Jewish population” is shortened to “Canadian Jews.” Four overarching themes emerge from the survey, which we consider next.

7.1.1  Changing Basis of Identification Identifying oneself as a Jew is not what it used to be. Two or three centuries ago, being Jewish meant practicing a distinct religion. Today, only one in three Canadians who identifies as Jewish considers religion very important in his or her life, and just six in ten say they believe in God or a universal spirit (compared to seven in ten of all Canadians). For most Canadian Jews today, the basis of Jewish identity is less about religion than about culture, ethnicity, or a combination of culture, ethnicity, and religion. Consider that one of the most important expressions of Jewish identity involves families getting together over a meal to mark a Jewish holiday. What does this practice mean? For a growing number of Canadian Jews, the practice seems to be chiefly a means of achieving conviviality in the family and, beyond that, solidarity

 The previous Chap. 6 presents data on the Canadian Jewish population from the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS). Canada’s Conservative government cancelled the 2011 census, replacing it with the voluntary NHS, in which 73.9% of Canada’s population participated. The main non-participants were low-income and Indigenous Canadians. We declined to use data from the 2016 census because a problematic change in the wording of the ethnicity question resulted in a 54% drop in the count of Canadian Jews from 2011 to 2016 (Brym 2017). This chapter is slightly modified from Brym et al. (2019).

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with the larger community. The purely religious significance of the practice is less important than it was in the past.

7.1.2  Community Resilience It would be wrong to conclude that change in the basis of Jewish identification signifies that widespread assimilation is taking place among community members. To be sure, the rate of intermarriage is growing. A small minority of Jews display a Christmas tree (or, among relatively recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union, a New Year’s tree) in their homes. The quickly growing Vancouver Jewish community stands out in its degree of religious, ethnic, and cultural assimilation. However, the Canadian Jewish community as a whole remains surprisingly cohesive across generations. A range of indicators tells us that. Whether we examine the weekly ritual of lighting candles at the onset of the Sabbath, belonging to Jewish organizations, donating to Jewish causes, or regularly attending synagogue services, we find little difference between young adults and elderly Jews. Universally, discrimination increases group cohesiveness, and Canadian Jews are no exception in this regard.2 Perceptions of the level of antisemitism in Canada contribute to community cohesion. The survey examined Canadian Jews’ views on discrimination against various racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities. The results suggest that, by and large, Canadian Jews assess the extent and threat of antisemitism realistically.

7.1.3  Canadian Jewish Exceptionalism The cohesiveness of the Canadian Jewish community contrasts with that of the Jewish community in the US.  We know this from previous research—but the magnitude of the difference revealed by this survey is so large that it nonetheless strikes one as remarkable. Intermarriage is far more common in the US than in Canada, the ability to read or speak Hebrew is much less widespread, visiting Israel is a lot less common, and so on. Since World War II, the story of the Jewish diaspora has been dominated by historical events and social processes occurring in the US and the former Soviet Union. In both cases, community cohesiveness is on the decline. Lost in the dominant nar-

2  Discrimination is a form of social conflict, and as sociologist Georg Simmel (1955: 98–99) pointed out in 1908, “Conflict may not only heighten the concentration of an existing unit, radically eliminating all elements which might blur the distinctiveness of its boundaries against the enemy; it may also bring persons and groups together which have otherwise nothing to do with each other.”

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rative is the story of Canadian exceptionalism (Brym et al. 2020). The Jewish communities in Montreal and Winnipeg are shrinking in size, but those in Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver are growing, as is the Canadian Jewish population as a whole (albeit slowly). The overall result is that Canada’s Jews are on the verge of becoming the second largest Jewish community in the diaspora, next in size only to the much larger American Jewish community. (Research conducted by the Pew Research Center [2015] finds that the Jewish population of Canada already exceeds that of France, although Chap. 8 in this volume shows France as number two in the diaspora (at 45,000) and Canada as number three at 392,000.) In short, evidence of Canadian Jewish population growth and resilience suggests the need for a modification of the dominant diaspora narrative.

7.1.4  Heterogeneity Cohesiveness does not imply homogeneity. Far from it. This report documents that Canadian Jews vary widely in denominational affiliation, subethnic identification, strength of ties to the community, Jewish upbringing, and much else. Geographical differences exist too: a strong east/west pattern emerges, with the large Montreal and Toronto communities being the most cohesive, the Vancouver community in many respects looking more like a part of the US than of Canada, and Winnipeg sitting between these extremes, although closer to the eastern model. Heterogeneity extends to support for different Canadian political parties and differences of opinion concerning key issues in the Jewish world, notably attitudes toward Israel’s West Bank settlement policy. Among those with an opinion on the subject, nearly three times more Canadian Jews believe that West Bank settlements hurt Israel’s security than believe the settlements help Israel’s security. Some people think of the Canadian Jewish community as a monolith. This research should disabuse them of that impression.

7.2  Highlights Following are the main highlights from the study.

7.2.1  Canadian Jewish Population Canada’s approximately 392,000 Jews comprise about 1% of the country’s population. They are highly urbanized, with more than 87% living in just six census metropolitan areas: nearly one-half in Toronto, nearly one-quarter in Montreal, and nearly one-sixth in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Ottawa, and Calgary combined. The

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country’s Jewish population is growing slowly, but trends vary by city. Vancouver is the country’s fastest growing Jewish community, followed by Ottawa, Toronto, and Calgary. In contrast, the Jewish populations of Montreal and Winnipeg have been declining. The age and sex distribution of Canadian Jews is much like that of the entire Canadian population, but is somewhat more likely to include immigrants. More than eight in ten Canadian Jews define themselves as of Ashkenazi ancestry (from Western Europe and Eastern Europe), and one in ten as of Sephardi or Mizrahi ancestry (from Southern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East). The educational attainment of the Canadian Jewish population is extraordinarily high; eight in ten Jewish adults between the ages of 25 and 64 have completed at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to fewer than three in ten in the population at large.

7.2.2  Jewish Identity Jews in Canada identify as Jewish in a variety of ways. About one-half consider themselves to be Jewish mainly as a matter of religion, by culture, or by ancestry/ descent, while the other half emphasize two or more of these aspects. Identification by all three of these aspects is most common among Jews who are Orthodox or Conservative, and those who are actively involved in their local Jewish community. By comparison, identification as Jewish mainly through culture or ancestry/descent is most prevalent among those who affiliate as Reform, or are not attached to any denomination or movement. Two-thirds of Canadian Jews say that being Jewish is very important in their lives, with most of the rest indicating that it is at least somewhat important. By comparison, only three in ten place this level of importance on religion, although a majority say they believe in God or a universal spirit. What do Canadian Jews consider to be essential aspects of being Jewish? At the top of the list are leading a moral and ethical life, remembering the Holocaust, and celebrating Jewish holidays; a majority identify each of these as “essential” to what being Jewish means to them. In a second tier, at least four in ten identify as essential such attributes as working for justice and equality in society, caring about Israel, being intellectually curious, being part of a community, and having a good sense of humor. By comparison, no more than one in five places such importance on observing Jewish law, attending synagogue, and participating in Jewish cultural activities. What Canadian Jews consider as being essential to being Jewish varies by age cohort. In particular, members of the youngest cohort are much less likely than those in the oldest cohort to consider a sense of humor to be an essential element of Jewishness. This difference may be due partly to the depletion among young adults of Jewish humor’s richest reservoir—the Yiddish language, which was the mother tongue of nearly all Canadian Jews in 1931, but is spoken by just a few percent of Canadian Jews today. A second noteworthy difference is that younger Jews are

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considerably less likely than older Jews to consider caring for Israel an essential aspect of Jewishness, a trend that has been noted in the US for some time. Comparisons with American Jews. How Canadian and American Jews identify as Jewish is broadly similar. American Jews are somewhat more likely to pin their identity to religion, culture or ancestry/descent rather than a combination of these aspects. They are less apt to say that being Jewish and being religious is very important to them personally, although they are more likely than Canadian Jews to express belief in God or a universal spirit. And what they consider essential aspects of being Jewish is comparable to what is articulated by Canadian Jews, but with less emphasis on being part of a community.3

7.2.3  Jewish Life and Practice Most Jews in Canada consider themselves to be part of an established Jewish denomination or movement. About six in ten affiliate with one of the three mainstream denominations, the largest being Conservative, followed by Orthodox or Modern Orthodox, and Reform. One in ten report being part of one of the smaller Jewish movements, including Reconstructionism, Humanistic Judaism or Jewish Renewal, Hasidism, or something else. Three in ten are not affiliated with any particular type of Judaism, including some who say they are “just Jewish.” Six in ten report they or someone in their household belong to a synagogue, temple or prayer group, and this represents the majority across all denominations/ movements and even applies to three in ten Jews who do not identify with a particular denomination. Membership does not, however, translate into regular attendance: only one in six attend services at least once or twice a month outside of special occasions such as weddings, funerals and bar/bat mitzvahs. Apart from synagogues and temples, close to half of Canadian Jews say they belong to one or more other types of Jewish organizations, such as a Jewish community center. Three in ten do not belong to any type of Jewish organization. Even more prevalent than organization membership is providing financial support to Jewish organizations and causes. Eight in ten Jews in Canada report having made such a donation in the previous year (2017). This proportion is highest among those who belong to a denomination or movement, but such contributions have also been made by a majority of Canadian Jews who are unaffiliated and those with an annual household income under $75,000. Apart from formal memberships and affiliation, being Jewish in Canada is about social connections. More than half report that either all or most of their current friends are Jewish, with very few indicating that hardly any or none of them are 3  The data for American Jews is from a study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2013). Some of the observed difference between Canadian and American Jews may be due to the fact that the Canadian survey included only cities with a Jewish population of about 13,000 or more, while the Pew survey included Jews in communities of all sizes as well as in rural areas.

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Jewish. Having a high proportion of Jewish friends is most closely linked to denominational affiliation, being most prevalent among Orthodox/Modern Orthodox Jews, and least so among Reform Jews and those who affiliate with smaller denominations and movements. Remarkably little difference exists between age cohorts in their degree of religious involvement (e.g., attending religious services, lighting Sabbath candles) and in their degree of community participation (e.g., belonging to Jewish organizations, donating to Jewish causes, having close Jewish friends). This finding suggests that, all else being equal, the Canadian Jewish community is unlikely to become much less cohesive as younger generations age. On the other hand, inter-­city differences in religious involvement and community participation are large, with community cohesiveness at a very high level in Montreal and Toronto, but declining as one moves west (notably in Vancouver, which approaches American levels of community cohesiveness). Comparisons with American Jews. American Jews are as likely as Canadian Jews to have a Jewish affiliation, but are much less involved in their local community. Six in ten identify with one of the three mainstream denominations (predominantly Reform, and least apt to be Orthodox or Modern Orthodox), and like Canadian Jews about one-third have no affiliation. But American Jews are half as likely as Canadian Jews to belong to a synagogue, and even less likely to belong to other types of Jewish organizations. Only one-half have made a financial donation to Jewish organizations and causes (compared with 80% of Canadian Jews), and comparatively few have a preponderance of Jewish friends.

7.2.4  Jewish Upbringing A significant feature of the Jewish population in Canada is the continuity of identification and practice across generations. Nine in ten Canadian Jews report that both of their parents are Jewish, and a comparable proportion say they were raised in the Jewish religion. Being raised in the Jewish religion is most widespread among Orthodox/Modern Orthodox Jews, but it is also the experience of most Jews who are currently unaffiliated. Among the small percentage who were not raised in the Jewish religion, about half say they were raised in a secular Jewish tradition. A key component of continuity is the prevalence of Jewish education, with most Jews in Canada having participated in one or more types of Jewish education when growing up. Jewish education is most likely to include attendance at an overnight summer camp, Hebrew school or Sunday school, but close to one-half have attended a Jewish day school or yeshiva and have done so for an average of 9 years. Also important to Jewish upbringing is the coming-of-age tradition of becoming bar or bat mitzvah, typically at age 12 for girls and age 13 for boys. Nine in ten Canadian Jewish men and four in ten Canadian Jewish women have done so, in most cases as a youth but for a small proportion as an adult. The gender difference is due largely to the fact that bat mitzvahs did not become common practice until the

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1970s. Consequently, the prevalence of this experience is largely a function of generation, as it is reported by eight in ten Canadian Jews age 18–29, compared with little more than one-third among those age 75 and older. Notably, becoming bar or bat mitzvah is common even among Jews who are not currently synagogue members or affiliated with any denomination or movement. Most Canadian Jews claim some knowledge of the Hebrew language, with three-­ quarters saying they know the alphabet, six in ten indicating they can read at least some Hebrew words in a newspaper or prayer book, and four in ten claiming to be able to carry on a conversation in the language. Such knowledge is most widely indicated by Jews who are Orthodox/Modern Orthodox, people under age 30, and first-generation Canadians. The positive effect of Jewish schooling on community cohesion is evident. Comparing those who did not attend a Jewish day school or yeshiva with those who attended such schools for 9 or more years shows that the latter are much more likely to believe that being part of a Jewish community, celebrating holidays with family, and caring about Israel are essential parts of being Jewish. Those who attended a Jewish day school or yeshiva for 9 or more years are also significantly less likely to have intermarried. Comparisons with American Jews. One of the major distinctions between the two Jewish communities is the extent of Jewish education in the formative years. American Jews are as likely as Canadian Jews to say they were brought up in the Jewish religion. But they are half as likely to have attended a Jewish day school or yeshiva, and less apt to have attended a Jewish overnight summer camp, Sunday school or Hebrew school. Consequently, many fewer American Jews know the Hebrew alphabet or can carry on a conversation in Hebrew. At the same time, one-­ half of American Jews have become bar or bat mitzvah, not far behind the Canadian proportion of six in ten.

7.2.5  Intermarriage and Child Upbringing Assimilation is a widespread concern in the Canadian Jewish community, and a key indicator is intermarriage (Brym and Lenton 2020). Just over three-quarters of Jews who are married or in a common-law relationship have a spouse who is Jewish by religion. Having a Jewish spouse is almost universal among those who are Orthodox/ Modern Orthodox or Conservative, and somewhat less so among those who affiliate with Reform or another denomination or movement. Just over half of those who are unaffiliated have a Jewish spouse. Intermarriage is highest among Jews in the youngest age cohort (nearly one-third among people between the ages of 18 and 29), declining to one in five among those age 75 and over. In general, intermarriage is less common in cities with large Jewish marriage pools, but Vancouver is exceptional. With a Jewish population nearly twice as large as Winnipeg’s, it has a higher intermarriage rate.

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Most Canadian Jewish parents report raising their children in the Jewish religion. This practice is almost universal among Orthodox/Modern Orthodox and Conservative Jews, but is also reported by about half of those who are unaffiliated, those who do not belong to Jewish organizations, and those who themselves were not raised in a Jewishly religious home. Moreover, most Jewish parents with children under age 18 believe their children will grow up to have a connection to Jewish life that is as strong, if not stronger, than their own. Comparisons with American Jews. In Canada, intermarriage rates are increasing for all ethnic and religious groups; but they are increasing faster for Jews than for Christians. Still, intermarriage is far more common among American Jews than among Canadian Jews, at a rate of 50% (compared with 23% among Canadian Jews). Largely because of intermarriage, American Jewish parents are less likely to report raising their children in the Jewish religion. This difference is most striking among Jews who are not affiliated with any denomination or movement, with American Jews less than one-third as likely as their Canadian counterparts to be raising their children in the Jewish religion.

7.2.6  Discrimination and Antisemitism Antisemitism has a long history in Canada and continues to be experienced among Jews today. Close to four in ten Canadian Jews report having experienced discrimination in the past 5 years due to their religion, ethnicity/culture, sex and/or language. This is comparable to the experience of Muslims in Canada, and well above that of the population at large. Specifically, about one in ten Canadian Jews say he or she has been called offensive names or snubbed in a social setting in the past year because of being Jewish. Even more common is attracting criticism from others for taking a position for or against the policies and actions of Israel; many have refrained from expressing opinions about this topic to avoid such a reaction. Close to four in ten say they have downplayed being Jewish in one or more types of situations, such as at work or while travelling outside the country. Across the board, experiences of discrimination are closely linked to age, with Jews age 18–29 most likely to report such incidents. While Jews in Canada are mindful of the burden of antisemitism, they do not see themselves as the most significant target of persecution in the country. They are more likely to believe that Indigenous Peoples, Muslims and Blacks in Canada are frequent targets of discrimination, and are more likely to hold this view than Canadians as a whole. Respondents’ perceptions of discrimination against Jews are quite realistic if one considers official statistics on hate crime as one indicator of the actual level of anti-­ Jewish sentiment in Canada. In seven of the 12 years between 2006 and 2017, Jews ranked second in the number of hate crimes committed against Canadian minority groups. Jews ranked third in four of the 12 years and first in one of the 12 years. On

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average, about 0.6  (mainly non-violent) hate crimes per 100,000 Canadians are committed against Jews each year (Brym 2019). The same percentage of Montreal and Toronto Jews think they are often the object of discrimination, which is somewhat surprising given the historically higher level of antisemitism in Quebec than in Ontario as measured by surveys. Younger Jews are less likely than older Jews to report believing that Jews experience frequent discrimination; but they are more likely to report experiencing discrimination themselves, possibly because younger Jews are more exposed to non-Jews in their daily lives, while older Jews grew up when discrimination was more common, and their perceptions may be influenced by memory of an earlier era. Comparisons with American Jews. Most of the questions in this section were not included in the Pew Survey of American Jews, so direct comparisons cannot be made. American Jews are as likely as Canadian Jews to report having been called offensive names or been snubbed in social settings over the previous year. American Jews also share with their Canadian counterparts the view that other groups in society (e.g., Muslims, Blacks) are more likely than Jews to be the target of discrimination; and they are more likely to express this opinion than is the general public in the United States.

7.2.7  Connection to Israel Canadian Jews have a strong connection to Israel. A large majority express an emotional attachment to Israel and have spent time in the country. Eight in ten have visited Israel at least once and have done so an average of five times to date. One in six report having lived in Israel for 6 months or more. Travel to Israel is most prevalent among Jews who are Orthodox/Modern Orthodox, but it is common across the population, especially among Jews under 45 years of age and those with a post-graduate degree. While Jews may share a connection to Israel, they do not agree when it comes to Israeli politics. Canadian Jews are divided in their views about the Israeli government’s commitment to a peace settlement with the Palestinians and the building of settlements on the West Bank in terms of their legality and impact on the security of Israel. Critical opinions of Israel are most evident among younger Jews, and those who are Reform or unaffiliated. Opinions are also divided when it comes to how Jews view Canada’s relations with Israel. A plurality endorses Canada’s current level of support for Israel, but a significant minority believe it is not supportive enough. Opinions are closely linked to federal political party affiliation, with a majority of Liberal Party supporters judging the country’s support of Israel to be about right, and a majority of Conservative Party supporters maintaining Canada provides too little support.

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Substantial minorities of Jews who support the left-leaning New Democratic Party and Green Party believe Canada is too supportive of Israel.4 Comparisons with American Jews. American Jews have a much weaker connection to Israel than do Canadian Jews. They are only half as likely to feel a strong attachment to Israel and half as likely to have ever visited Israel. At the same time, Canadian and American Jews are similarly divided in their opinions about the political situation in Israel, in terms of the government’s commitment to peace, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and their own country’s support for Israel. The one notable difference is that American Jews are more apt to hold an opinion (whether positive or negative), while Canadian Jews have a greater tendency to say they are unsure or decline to offer an opinion.

7.2.8  Connection to Local Jewish Community A large majority Canadian Jews feel somewhat, if not strongly, connected to Jewish life in their city. Such connection is largely a function of denominational affiliation and active involvement; strong connection is most prevalent among Orthodox/ Modern Orthodox Jews, those with mostly Jewish friends, those who belong to multiple Jewish organizations, Israeli Jews, and those who live in Montreal. A strong connection is least evident among Jews from the former Soviet Union, those who identify mainly by ancestry/descent, and residents of Vancouver. Reasons for not wanting to become more connected to Jewish life tend to fall into one of three broad themes. Some Jews do not want to become more connected because they are simply not interested in doing so. Others indicate obstacles that make it difficult, such as lack of time, other priorities, access to the necessary connections or resources, and personal limitations (e.g., health issues). A third theme concerns not feeling Jewish enough, which in some cases is about not identifying or feeling comfortable with the local community. Many Jews express interest in becoming more connected to the local Jewish community, but they also tend to be the same people who are already feeling strongly connected. The types of activities and programs most likely to be of interest are, in order, those that are educational (lectures, courses, book clubs), cultural (the performing arts, movies, concerts), and social (activities that connect people). Some would like to see programs and activities tailored for specific groups, notably families and young children. 4  The Liberal and Conservative parties are the main political parties in Canada. The Liberal party was in power at the time of the survey, with 39.5% of seats in parliament. Except for the Conservative party (with 31.9% of seats), all parties in parliament are to the left of the Democratic party in the US. The New Democratic Party (with 19.7% of seats) is similar to the left wing of the US Democratic party. At the time of the survey, the Green Party had 3.5% of seats and the Bloc Québécois, 4.7%.

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Based on the survey results, the Canadian Jewish community includes roughly 37,000 Sephardim, 25,000 Jews born in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and 17,000 Jews born in Israel. Comparing members of these subgroups to the Canadian Jewish population as a whole, it is only among Jews born in the FSU that one finds a substantially larger proportion that feel less than very connected to their local Jewish community. However, Jews born in the FSU, as well as Sephardim and Jews born in Israel, seem to be significantly more eager to increase their connection to Jewish life in their city than are members of the Canadian Jewish population at large. Members of the three subgroups rank-order the kinds of programs and activities they would like to engage in much like the entire Jewish community does: Educational programs and activities lead the list, followed by cultural and social programs and activities. Religious programs and activities, and those intended for specific groups, such as children and families, rank lowest.

7.3  About the 2018 Survey of Jews in Canada In 2013, the Pew Research Center published the results of a comprehensive survey of American Jews that examined the identities, values, opinions, and experiences of US Jews. To address the gap in knowledge about these issues among Canadian Jews, the Environics Institute for Survey Research (Executive Director, Keith Neuman), in partnership with Professor Robert Brym (SD Clark Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto) and Professor Rhonda Lenton (President and Vice-Chancellor, York University) conducted a landmark national survey of Jews in Canada in 2018. The survey focuses on what it means to be Jewish in Canada today—specifically, patterns of Jewish practice, upbringing, and intermarriage; perceptions of antisemitism; attitudes toward Israel; and personal and organizational connections that, taken together, constitute the community. This research is modelled closely on the 2013 Pew Survey of American Jews to provide the basis for cross-national comparison and to set a high research standard. The principal investigators assembled the necessary institutional resources, funding, and research expertise required to launch a study of this scope. This included securing financial support from the UJA Federation of Greater Toronto, Federation CJA (Montreal), the Jewish Community Foundation of Montreal, the Jewish Foundation of Manitoba, and the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies, University of Toronto. The support provided by these organizations made it possible to expand the scope of the research to more effectively cover the Jewish population in particular cities and for particular groups. The principal investigators also assembled an informal advisory group of community members to provide input for the development of survey themes and questions. This group included Professor Anna Shternshis (Director of the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies, University of Toronto), Esther Enkin (journalist, and former Ombudsperson of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation),

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and Michael Miloff (a consultant in strategic planning to both Jewish and non-­ Jewish organizations). Through the participation of Federation CJA (Montreal) and the Jewish Foundation of Manitoba, city-specific questions were included in the survey that addressed issues of particular interest to these organizations.

7.3.1  Survey Methodology Because Canadian Jews constitute only about 1% of the Canadian population, the use of standard survey research methods was not a feasible option given the high costs of using probability sampling to identify and recruit participants.5 The principal investigators developed a research strategy to make the research sample as comprehensive and representative as possible within the available budget. This strategy entailed two main parts. First, the survey focused on the census metropolitan areas encompassing four cities (Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg) that include approximately 82% of the Canadian Jewish population. Second, a multi-stage sampling plan was developed to complete interviews with Jews in each of the four cities using a combination of sample sources and survey modalities. The primary sampling frame was drawn from a dictionary of several thousand common Jewish surnames that was used to select households with listed landline telephone numbers in census tracts with a minimum of 5% Jewish households. This source was supplemented by requesting referrals from respondents who completed the survey, social media promotion, and on-site recruitment at the Jewish Community Centre in Winnipeg. People were eligible to participate in the survey if they were age 18 or older and self-identified as Jewish or partially Jewish. The survey was conducted with 2335 individuals by telephone (85% of respondents) or online (15%) between February 10 and September 30, 2018. Quotas were established in each city for age cohort and gender based on the 2011 National Household Survey to ensure adequate representation by these characteristics.6 In addition to completing the survey with a representative sample in each city, additional surveys were conducted with Jews age 18–44  in Montreal and those who immigrated from the former Soviet Union, in both cases at the request of study sponsors. The distribution of completed surveys by city is presented in Table 7.1 below. The final city data were weighted by the age and gender distribution of Jews in each city as reported in the 2011 National Household Survey. The final national data were weighted by the size of the Jewish population in each city and the percentage of Jews in each age cohort who were married or living common-law with someone who is not Jewish, again according to the National Household Survey. Because the 5  The 2013 Pew Survey of American Jews used a comprehensive probability sampling strategy, which was made possible by a research budget estimated to be in the millions of dollars. 6  This extended time period was required because some quotas were considerably more difficult to fill than others (e.g., younger respondents are more difficult to identify and recruit than older ones).

260 Table 7.1  Survey sample by city

R. Brym et al. Final Census metropolitan area sample Toronto 1135 Montreal 638 Winnipeg 361 Vancouver 201 Total 2335

% of Canadian Jewish population 48% 23% 4% 7% 82%

survey is not fully based on probability sampling, sampling error cannot be calculated.7 A more complete description of the survey methodology is presented in the Appendix of the final report.8

7.3.2  About the Final Report The final report from which this summary is excerpted presents the results of the research and covers the following themes: what it means to be Jewish; types of Jewish practice; strength and type of connections to other Jews and to Jewish organizations; patterns of Jewish upbringing; intermarriage; views on Israel; perceptions of, and experiences with, discrimination and anti-Semitism; and connection to the local community. Throughout the report, the results highlight relevant similarities and differences across the Jewish population, by city, age cohort, denominational affiliation, and other characteristics. The Canadian results are compared with those of American Jews based on the 2013 Pew Survey of American Jews where available, and in several cases also compared to results from surveys of the Canadian population at large. Each chapter ends with a commentary with further analysis and interpretation of the results. Detailed tables presenting results for all survey questions by Jewish population segments are available separately on the Environics Institute website at www.environicsinstitute.org. All results are presented as percentages unless otherwise noted.

References Brym, R. 2017. More than half of Canada’s Jews are missing. Globe and Mail. November 7. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/more-than-half-of-canadas-jews-are-missing/article36813257/ . Brym, R. 2019. Antisemitic and anti-Israel actions and attitudes in Canada and internationally: a research agenda. Patterns of Prejudice, 53(4):407–420.

7  However, as a rough benchmark, we note that 19 of 20 simple random samples of 2335 respondents would result in a maximum margin of error of plus or minus 2.0 percentage points. 8  See footnote 1.

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Brym, R., K.  Neuman, and R.  Lenton. 2019. 2018 Survey of Jews in Canada. Toronto: The Environics Institute. https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/ survey-of-jews-in-canada. Brym, R., and Lenton, R. 2020. Jewish religious intermarriage in Canada. Canadian Jewish Studies 30 (in press). Brym, R., Slavina, A., and Lenton, R. 2020. Qualifying the leading theory of diaspora Jewry: an examination of Jews from the former Soviet Union in Canada and the United States. Contemporary Jewry 40 (in press). Pew Research Center. 2013. A Portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew Research Center Survey of U.S. Jews. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. ———. 2015. The future of world religions: population growth projections, 2010–2050: Jews. https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/jews/ Simmel, G. 1955. Conflict and the web of group affiliations. Trans. K.  Wolff and R.  Bendix. New York: Free Press.

Chapter 8

World Jewish Population, 2019 Sergio DellaPergola

At the beginning of 2019, the world’s Jewish population was estimated at 14,707,400—an increase of 100,900 (0.69%) over the 2018 revised estimate of 14,606,500 (DellaPergola 2019a). The world’s total population increased by 1.11% in 2018 (Population Reference Bureau 2018). The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to 62% of that of the total population.

8.1  Assessing Jewish Population1 Figure 8.1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world (the Diaspora)—as well as changes in the world’s total population between 1945 and 2019. The world’s core Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The core Jewish population concept addresses a human collective whose identification is mutually exclusive with respect to other subpopulations, while acknowledging that the number of persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities tends to increase in contemporary societies (Josselson and Harway 2012). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews from 11 to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah (Holocaust) (DellaPergola et al. 2000b), 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12 to 13 million. From the 1970s onwards, world Jewry stagnated at

1  This chapter is dedicated to  the  memory of  Professor Sidney Goldstein of  Brown University, for many years the dean of Jewish demographic research, who passed in 2019. See the obituary later in this volume.

S. DellaPergola (*) The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_8

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Fig. 8.1  World total population and core Jewish population, 1945–2019

nearly zero population growth for nearly 20 years but some demographic recovery occurred since 2000, mostly reflecting population increase in Israel. It took about 14 years to add another million from 13 to 14 million. In historical perspective and based on the same definitions, world Jewish population has not recovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it may take decades more to do so, if ever. World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel’s Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 and 630,000 in 1948 to over 6.6 million in 2019. The Jewish population of the Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable in number until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing, reaching less than 8.1 million in 2019. The world’s total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.621 billion by mid-2018. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world’s total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1000 in 1945 to 1.93 per 1000 currently—or one per 518 inhabitants in the world. Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for over 84% of the 2019 total; 23 countries, each with 10,000 Jews or more, accounted for another 15%, and another 73 countries, each with Jewish populations below 10,000, accounted for the

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Fig. 8.2  Twenty largest core Jewish populations, 2019

remaining 0.9%. Figure 8.2 shows the size of the 20 largest core Jewish populations in 2019. Map 8.1 shows the geographical distribution of the 20 larger Jewish communities worldwide. Israel’s Jewish population (not including 426,700 persons not recorded as Jews in the Ministry of Interior’s Population Register but who are members of families initially admitted under the Law of Return) reached 6,665,600 in 2019 (45.3% of world Jewry by the core definition)—out of Israel’s total legal population of 8,970,900. This represented a Jewish population increase of 111,100 (1.70%) in 2018. In the same year, the total Jewish population of the Diaspora was estimated to have decreased by 10,200 from 8,052,000 to 8,041,800 (−0.13%). Following the 2013 Pew Research Center (2013) A Portrait of Jewish Americans, the US core Jewish population was assessed at 5,700,000 and we estimate it to have remained stable, constituting 38.8% of world Jewry in 2019. Core Jews in the US were estimated to have increased slightly since the year 2000, following several years of moderate decline after probably reaching a peak around 1980 (DellaPergola 2013a). Jews in the rest of the world were assessed at 2,341,800  in 2019 (15.9% of world Jewry). Since all of the decline of 10,200 among Diaspora Jews occurred in countries other than the US, that amounted to an annual loss of −0.43% in the aggregate for those countries. For the total world

Map 8.1  Countries where 99% of world Jewish population live, 2019

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population, growth was 1.4% in less developed countries and zero in the more developed countries where most Jews live. After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel hosts the largest core Jewish community worldwide. Some dissenting opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013, Saxe 2019, Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume) are mostly based on different definitions of the target population. Since Israel’s independence in 1948, demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births and deaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish collective identification not subordinated to nor on par with other explicit religious or ethnic identifications. At the same time, Jewish majority status in Israel faces a significant demographic challenge vis-á-vis the more rapidly growing Palestinian Arab population within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel’s current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a relatively young age composition. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, the US and Germany), and possibly some growth due to local natural increase (plausibly in the UK and Mexico, and minimally in Australia) the total number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates. The fundamental equation of demography is that a population size at a given time reflects an uninterrupted chain of events that change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date. Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths) where low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly population generate higher death rates and an overall deficit; and (b) the variable balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). The third determinant consists of identification changes or passages (accessions and secessions)—in this case to and from a Jewish identity—and applies only to subpopulations defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people’s physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturallydefined group. All this holds true regarding the core Jewish population, which does not include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to

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Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. (See further discussion below.) The detailed mechanisms and supporting evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of the American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a). Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola et  al. 2005; DellaPergola 2017a). The 2019 Jewish population data were updated from 2018 and previous years in accordance with known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. The world Jewish population estimate results from the sum of national estimates. While individual country estimates can be obtained from nationwide sources as well as from the sum of local sources, in the case of the world’s total, in the lack of a global population census, there is no alternative to the summation of local figures. In each of the country update procedures, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another in a particular country, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target. Where needed, previous estimates were adjusted based upon newer, better evidence. The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent and conceptually robust interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2019 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bilocal residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage, but analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the permanently provisional nature of Jewish population estimates.

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8.1.1  Definitions Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population as well as data quality, is addressed at all. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would not be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail across countries. In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility of undertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use of quantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems: 1. Defining the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself; 2. Identifying the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population— primarily by systematic canvassing of populations and personally ascertaining personal identifications. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas of residence, or other random or nonrandom procedures; and 3. Covering the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by mail, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork. It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on operational, not prescriptive, definitional criteria. The main conceptual aspects, besides being rooted in social theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least, available research budgets. The ultimate empirical step— obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. While response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be much better than general surveys, the quality of the data is certainly impacted.

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No method exists to counter these decreases in response rates and cooperation rates. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover, namely the degree of involvement with or indifference to feeling Jewish by respondents. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated through various imperfect indirect techniques. However, there exist unsurmountable limits to what research methodologies can deliver. For example, large representative samples and small qualitative studies are not interchangeable regarding the answers they can provide to specific research questions. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, and corporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction and non-advocacy work such as this. Keeping these limits in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (Fig. 8.3): (a) the core Jewish population (CJP)—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive identification framework, including both those who do see or do not see religion as a major avenue for identification (Jewish only, religion: Circle 1 in Fig. 8.3; Jewish only, no religion: Circle 2 in the figure); (b) the population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)—including those who say they are partly Jewish because their identity is split between two or more different and relevant identification frameworks (Circle 3), and those who say they are not Jewish but have Jewish background in the form of at least one Jewish parent (Circle 4). Taken together Circles 3 and 4 may also be referred to as the “Jewish Connected” population; (c) the enlarged Jewish population (EJP)—including others who say they have Jewish background but not a Jewish parent (Circle 5), and all non-Jewish household members who live in households with Jews (Circle 6); and (d) the Law of Return population (LRP) (Circle 7). More detail on these definitions is presented in the Appendix. This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition approaches but it also delineates different analytic approaches grounded on alternative social theories as well as different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective catchment constituencies. It is important to realize that the categories in Fig. 8.3 are not static but continuous passages occur across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole configuration outside, and vice-versa. Further definitional extensions (not shown in Fig. 8.3) may address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of affinity with Judaism, sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal cultural or social connections with Jews. Moreover, some studies may have reached people whose ancestors ever were Jewish regardless of the respondents’ present identification. Several socio-demographic surveys indeed ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some population surveys, however, do ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendants of those Jews—for example, Conversos who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived

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Fig. 8.3  Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2019. 1 to 2 = Core Jewish population (CJP); 1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP); 1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP); 1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP); Areas represented are not proportional to actual populations

during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt 2002; Parfitt and Fisher 2016; Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018; Gross et al. 2019). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004, 2010; Carmi et al. 2014; Tian et al. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study. The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical core definition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities, but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here. The estimates

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presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, and major metropolitan area, are consistently anchored to the concept of core Jewish population. The core definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the population with Jewish parents, the enlarged definition, or the Law of Return definition (see detail in the Appendix Table).

8.1.2  Data Sources The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c, d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates. Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population censuses, national population registers, national and international public and private sponsored surveys, and national or Jewish community records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions. Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions. Jewish population projections undertaken by the author, in light of the latest data, also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data. Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographical distribution (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014) provide findings quite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As Jews are usually an extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by large sampling errors. A full list of the types and quality of documentation upon which Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the Appendix below.

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8.2  W  orld Jewish Population Size and Distribution by Major Areas As noted, in our current estimates, we corrected previously published Jewish population data in light of new information. In recent years, the most significant correction was an addition of about 300,000 Jews in the US following the 2013 Pew study. This revision generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series of data for the US, for the total Diaspora, and for World Jewry since 2000. Table 8.1 provides Table 8.1  World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945–2019

Year 1945, May 1 1950, Jan. 1 1960, Jan. 1 1970, Jan. 1 1980, Jan. 1 1990, Jan. 1 2000, Jan. 1 2005, Jan. 1 2010, Jan. 1 2015, Jan. 1 2016, Jan. 1 2017, Jan. 1 2018, Jan. 1 2019, Jan. 1

World Jewish population Revised Original estimateb estimatea 11,000,000 11,000,000

Annual % changec

World population Total Annual Jews per 1000 (millions)d % change total population 2315 4.75

11,303,400

11,297,000

0.59

2526

1.76

4.47

12,792,800

12,079,000

0.67

3026

1.82

3.99

13,950,900

12,585,000

0.41

3691

2.01

3.41

14,527,100

12,819,000

0.18

4449

1.81

2.88

12,810,300

12,868,000

0.04

5321

1.74

2.42

13,191,500

13,150,000

0.22

6127

1.42

2.15

13,034,100

13,460,000

0.47

6514

1.23

2.07

13,428,300

13,854,000

0.58

6916

1.20

2.00

14,310,500

14,311,600

0.65

7236

0.91

1.98

14,410,700

14,407,600

0.67

7336

1.38

1.96

14,511,100

14,507,600

0.69

7436

1.14

1.95

14,606,000

14,606,500

0.68

7536

1.13

1.94

0.69

7621

1.11

1.93

14,707,400

As published in the American Jewish Year Book, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originally published as of Dec. 31 of the previous year b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem c Based on revised estimates, except latest year d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Population Division (2018), Population Reference Bureau (2018) a

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a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2019, as first published each year in the American Jewish Year Book and retroactively corrected as now, also adjusting all revisions that had been suggested in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981, by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the AJYB in the past based on the information that was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research. The time series in Table 8.1 clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000  in the 1980s, and 282,000  in the 1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel’s increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2019, world Jewry increased by 853,400, but Israel’s Jewish population increased by 962,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 108,000. Table 8.1 also demonstrates the slower world Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population. In 2019, the share of Jews among the world population (1.93 per 1000) was 40.6% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1000). Table 8.2 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population by major geographical regions at the beginning of 2019 as compared to 2018. The originally published estimates from the 2018 American Jewish Year Book were slightly revised reflecting retroactive corrections due to improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 500 persons in the 2018 world Jewry estimate, reflecting a subtraction of 3600 from the previous estimate for Israel, and a net increase of 4100 in the Jewish Diaspora total. Looking first at global trends, the number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 6,554,500  in 2018 to 6,665,600 at the beginning of 2018, an increase of 111,100, or 1.70%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora decreased from the revised 8,052,000 to 8,041,800—a decrease of 10,200, or −0.13%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to a lesser extent from France, from the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem countries, and from other countries, and the internal decrease due to an excess of deaths over births typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In the absence of final accountancy for 2018 we know that in 2017, of a total increase of 108,400 core Jews in Israel, 96,700 reflected the balance of births and deaths, and 11,700 reflected the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration) and to a minor extent net conversion to Judaism (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics n.d.-a annual; Fisher 2015, 2019; Nissim 2018). Israel’s net migration balance includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the

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Table 8.2  Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2018 and 2019a 2018 Revisedb

2019

Estimate Percentc Estimate Region World total 14,606,500 100.0 14,707,400 Diaspora 8,052,000 55.1 8,041,800 US 5,700,000 39.0 5,700,000 Other 2,352,000 16.1 2,341,800 Israeld 6,554,500 44.9 6,665,600 America, total 6,469,800 44.3 6,469,900 Northe 6,090,600 41.7 6,092,100 Central, 57,000 0.4 57,000 Caribbean South 322,200 2.2 320,800 Europe, total 1,349,200 9.2 1,340,200 European 1,079,500 7.4 1,078,900 Unionf Other West 20,600 0.1 20,500 Balkansg 17,100 0.1 16,900 FSUg 232,000 1.6 223,900 Asia, total 6,589,400 45.1 6,699,700 Israel 6,554,500 44.9 6,665,600 FSU 16,000 0.1 15,300 Other 18,900 0.1 18,800 Africa, total 72,600 0.5 72,000 Northernh 3400 0.0 3300 Sub-Saharani 69,200 0.5 68,700 Oceaniaj 125,500 0.9 125,600

Percentc 100.0 54.7 38.8 15.9 45.3 44.0 41.4 0.4

Percentage change 2018–2019 0.69 −0.13 0.00 −0.43 1.70 0.00 0.02 0.00

Jews per 1000 total population in 2019 1.93 1.06 17.38 0.32 743.02 6.38 16.68 0.26

2.2 9.1 7.3

−0.43 −0.67 −0.06

0.75 1.62 2.11

0.1 0.1 1.5 45.6 45.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9

−0.49 −1.17 −3.49 1.67 1.70 −4.38 −0.53 −0.83 −2.94 −0.72 0.08

1.42 0.17 1.11 1.50 743.02 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.07 3.06

Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2018. Source: United Nations (2018), Population Reference Bureau (2019) b Compare with the original in DellaPergola (2019). The corrections reflecting newly available data are for Israel (−3600), Russia (−2000) South Africa (−1000), UK (+1000), Australia (+4.500), Austria (+1000), Ukraine (+500), Gibraltar (+100) c Minor discrepancies due to rounding d Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights e US and Canada f Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and the UK g FSU excluding the Baltic countries. Asian regions of Russian Federation and Turkey included in Europe h Including Ethiopia i Including South Africa and Zimbabwe j Including Australia and New Zealand a

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first time. Therefore, internal demographic change produced 89.2% of the total Jewish population growth in Israel. According to these estimates almost all of the Diaspora’s estimated decrease is explained by a negative migration balance. This quite certainly underestimates the actually negative vital balance in most countries, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Adjustments could be needed in the future. Recently, for sure, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or “return” to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs throughout Diaspora communities as well. The addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel (DellaPergola 2017c). In descending order by continents, over 45% of world Jewry lived in Asia, overwhelmingly in Israel (Table  8.2 and Appendix Table). Asia is defined herein to include the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asiatic areas of the Russian Federation and Turkey. The Jewish presence in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for more than 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia account each for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, the fast economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and especially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The numbers are still small but growing. Over 44% of the world’s Jews resided in the Americas, with 41.4% in North America. The Jewish population in the Americas, estimated at 6,469,900 in 2019, is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (392,000, 6%), South America (320,800, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,000, 1%). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in Central and South America, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). Panama and Mexico were the exceptions and absorbed Jewish migrants from other countries in the continent. In the Miami Jewish community (Miami-Dade County), the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In neighboring Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), the same measure increased from 5300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016 (Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2018, the total number of immigrants from Latin America to Israel surpassed 25,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons highly educated and highly involved in Jewish life (BokserLiwerant et al. 2015). Outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism has appeared among real or putative descendants of Conversos whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century. Some of these Converso communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to

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express their Jewish identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries (Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018). Persons with such backgrounds are also migrating to Israel (Torres 2017). Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounted for over 9% of world Jewry. The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,340,200 in 2019, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 28 countries prior to the June 2016 secession vote of the UK (still not fully implemented in late 2019), had an estimated total of 1,078,900 Jews in 2019 (80.5% of the continent’s total). The momentous political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the territorial deployment of Jewish communities in Europe. Revitalization of Jewish community life in the western countries had occurred over the past tens of years through immigration mainly from North Africa and the Middle East but also from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession and rising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et  al. 2013; European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013, 2018). Total emigration from the EU to Israel reached a peak of 8406 in 2015 but diminished to 5570 in 2016, 4268 in 2017, and 3628 in 2018. In spite of the unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovács and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013; Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019a). The EU’s initially expanding format symbolized an important historical landmark and a promising framework for the development of Jewish life. However, in recent years the EU concept and ideal finds itself under major stress, and the 2016 UK Brexit referendum is only one of its symptoms. Disagreements about migration policies facing large Muslim population increases in different European locations, reflect the unsolved dilemma of defining Europe’s own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. The four former Soviet republics in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, excluding the three Baltic republics) have a Jewish population of 223,900 (16.7% of the continental total). The FSU is the area where, in absolute numbers, Jewish population has diminished the most since 1991 (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with

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14,687 in 2015, 14,471 in 2016, 16,122 in 2017, and 18,887 in 2018 out of a total of 28,118 new immigrants (67%). Our 2019 assessment of the total core Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics in Europe and Asia was 248,100, of whom 232,800 live in Europe (including 8900 in the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 15,300 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an enlarged Jewish population nearly twice as large as the core (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2013, 2015). All other European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including Turkey, combined comprised 37,400 core Jews (3% of the European total). Little more than 1% of the world’s Jews live in Africa and Oceania combined. The Jewish population in Africa is mostly concentrated in South Africa (about 94% of the continental total). Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in Oceania where Australia accounts for 94% of the total. Overall, between 2018 and 2019 Jewish population size increased primarily in Israel and to a modest extent in North America and Oceania, and decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe, the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.

8.2.1  Implications of Alternative Jewish Population Definitions In Table 8.3 we evaluate the Jewish population’s regional distribution according to several alternative definitions, as outlined in Fig.  8.3. Updated and revised core Jewish population estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who have Jewish parents regardless of their current identity (PJP); the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of non-Jewish household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the Law of Return (LRP). Detailed country estimates are reported in the Appendix Table. The main purpose of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparability across countries. In light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from the criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in the present chapter and in other chapters (Sheskin and Dashefsky; Shahar) in this volume. In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in another country. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on a minimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing population trends in their countries. Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,707,400 (CJP) in 2019, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a broader global aggregate population estimate of 17,917,750 (PJP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, an enlarged

Population with Jewish parentsb JPP 17,917,750 8,450,200 505,100 1,336,500 430,800 46,700 6,878,950 25,700 23,400 81,700 138,700

Enlarged Jewish populationc EJP 20,876,400 10,550,300 605,900 1,633,500 632,500 53,400 7,092,300 37,100 27,700 88,900 154,800

Law of return populationd LRP 23,674,400 12,700,400 717,900 1,910,600 843,000 60,200 7,092,300 50,500 31,500 97,100 170,900 Number 8,967,000 6,608,300 340,100 831,700 619,100 22,800 426,700 35,200 12,700 25,100 45,300

Difference LRP—CJP Percent distribution 100.0 73.7 3.8 9.3 6.9 0.3 4.8 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5

Percent expansion LRP over CJP 61 108 90 77 277 61 6 230 68 35 36

a

Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.) d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification e The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Union f Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

Region World total North America Latin America European Unione FSU in Europee Rest of Europe Israelf FSU in Asia Rest of Asia Africa Oceania

Core Jewish populationa CJP 14,707,400 6,092,100 377,800 1,078,900 223,900 37,400 6,665,600 15,300 18,800 72,000 125,600

Table 8.3  Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2019

8  World Jewish Population, 2019 279

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S. DellaPergola

estimate obtains of 20,876,400 (EJP). Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel’s Law of Return, the total Jewish and nonJewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 23,674,400 (LRP). The US holds a significantly larger Jewish parents population (PJP) living in households with Jews or other persons with immediate Jewish background than Israel— roughly eight million compared to 6,878,950, respectively. The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of those who have a Jewish parent (PJP) (17,917,750), regardless of their own identification, stands 3,210,350 higher than the 14,707,400 core Jewish population. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) is estimated at an additional increment of 2,756,650. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return (LRP) is roughly estimated at 23,674,400, an additional increment of 2,798,000. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return population (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is 8,967,000. Of these roughly estimated nearly nine million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewish-connected, or otherwise included non-Jews, 73.7% live in North America, 9.3% in the EU, 7.3% in the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 4.8% in Israel, 3.8% in Latin America, and 1.1% in other countries. The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the core Jewish population (CJP) and the Law of Return population (LRP) is quite different in the three main geographical divisions considered in Fig. 8.4. Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel than elsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births in Israel from these households. In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of population aggregates around the CJP. One finally notes that with the emigration—mainly to Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does not necessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Indeed, their propensity to change country of residence may be lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or less submerged component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with the passing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, Fig. 8.4  Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 2019

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Fig. 8.5  World and 20 largest Diaspora Core, Jewish Parentage, Enlarged, and Law of Return Jewish populations, percentage distributions, 2019. (Source: Appendix Table)

and more of those directly related non-Jews pass too for the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose their linkage to the core collective. Greater detail is provided in Fig. 8.5 on the respective weight of the different population components within the broader Law of Return population in each of the 20 largest Jewish populations worldwide. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a larger share relative to the Law of Return definition include South Africa, Australia, the UK, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Mexico, and Chile. Countries where the core constitutes the lowest share of the Law of Return definition include Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Germany, the US, and the Netherlands.

8.3  P  atterns of Jewish Population Distribution in Major Countries 8.3.1  Development and the Jewish Presence Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation accompanied by an increasing concentration in a few countries, 84.1% of world Jews currently live in two countries, Israel and the US, and 96.4% are concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry’s total size and trends. In 2019, over 99% of world Jewry lived in the largest 25 Jewish communities, each evaluated at 10,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98.4% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 24 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 71% in the US (Table 8.4).

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Table 8.4  25 Countries with core Jewish populations of 10,000 and more, 1/1/2019 Jewish population rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 a

Country Israela United States France Canada United Kingdom Argentina Russia Germany Australia Brazil South Africa Ukraine Hungary Mexico Netherlands Belgium Italy Switzerland Chile Uruguay Sweden Turkey Spain Austria Panama

Core Jewish population 6,665,600 5,700,000 450,000 392,000 292,000 180,000 165,000 118,000 118,000 92,600 67,500 48,000 47,300 40,000 29,800 29,100 27,400 18,500 18,300 16,600 15,000 14,800 11,700 10,000 10,000

% of total Jewish population In the world In the diaspora % Cumulative% % Cumulative% b b 45.3 45.3 38.8 84.1 70.9 70.9 3.1 87.1 5.6 76.5 2.7 89.8 4.9 81.3 2.0 91.8 3.6 85.0 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

93.0 94.1 94.9 95.7 96.4 96.8 97.2 97.5 97.7 97.9 98.1 98.3 98.5 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.9 99.0 99.0 99.1

2.2 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1

87.2 89.3 90.7 92.2 93.4 94.2 94.8 95.4 95.9 96.2 96.6 97.0 97.2 97.4 97.6 97.8 98.0 98.1 98.3 98.4

Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights Not applicable

b

Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West’s relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances vis-ávis the Jewish presence. The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country’s total population tends to be directly related to the country’s level of development (Table 8.5).

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Table 8.5  25 largest core Jewish populations per 1000 country’s total population and Human Development Indices Jewish population rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Country Israelb United States France Canada United Kingdom Argentina Russia Germany Australia Other 100,000 and over Brazil South Africa Ukraine Hungary Mexico Netherlands Belgium Italy Switzerland Chile Uruguay Sweden Turkey Spain Austria Panama Other 10,000 & over Rest of the worldc

Jews per 1000 total 2017 HDI population ranka 743.0 22 17.4 13 6.9 24 10.5 12 4.4 14 4.0 47 1.1 49 1.4 5 4.9 3 3.7 22

2019 Core Jewish population 6,665,600 5,700,000 450,000 392,000 292,000 180,000 165,000 118,000 118,000 1,715,000

2019 Total population 8,970,900 328,000,000 65,140,000 37,200,000 66,600,000 44,500,000 147,300,000 82,800,000 24,100,000 467,640,000

92,600 67,500 48,000 47,300 40,000 29,800 29,100 27,400 18,500 18,300 16,600 15,000 14,800 11,700 10,000 10,000 496,600

209,400,000 57,700,000 42,300,000 9,800,000 130,800,000 17,200,000 11,400,000 60,600,000 8,500,000 18,600,000 3,500,000 10,200,000 81,300,000 46,700,000 8,800,000 4,200,000 721,000,000

0.4 1.2 1.1 4.8 0.3 1.7 2.6 0.5 2.2 1.0 4.7 1.5 0.2 0.3 1.1 2.4 0.7

79 113 88 45 74 10 17 28 2 44 55 7 64 26 20 66 46

130,200

6,094,886,100

0.0

> 100

HDI The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (measured as US dollar purchase power parity) among the country’s total population. See: United Nations Development Programme (2018) b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and non-Jewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank c Average HDI rank for group of countries a

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Regarding core Jewish populations in 2019, the share of Jews out of the total population was 743.0 per 1000  in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). Israel’s population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such, attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, the core Jewish population represented 17.4 per 1000 of total population; Jews comprised 3.7 per 1000 total population on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.6 per 1000 on average in the other 16 countries with 10,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority (80%) of world population. To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, Table 8.5 reports the latest available Human Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2018). The HDI—a composite measure of a society’s level of education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The latest available HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2017. Of the 25 countries listed, five are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Switzerland, Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands). Another seven countries are ranked 11th to 25th (Canada, the US, the UK, Belgium, Austria, Israel, and France), six more are between 26th and 50th (Italy, Spain, Chile, Hungary, Argentina, and Russia), six are between 51st and 100th (Uruguay, Turkey, Panama, Mexico, Brazil, and Ukraine), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (113th), pointing to lesser development in the host society. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting together to 95.7% of world Jewry, live in countries whose HDI ranks among the top 50. Figure 8.6 demonstrates the relationship that prevails between Jewish population size and the respective countries’ human development. The horizontal axis shows the average HDI ranks of world countries regrouped by Jewish population size (as in Table  8.5). The vertical axis indicates the total Jewish population of the same groups of countries. A country’s level of development stimulates conditions promoting more than proportionally the size of the local Jewish population. The statistical relationship between the Index of Human Development and the total number of Jews by type of countries is extraordinarily powerful, as indicated by an explained variance of over 85% when including Israel, and over 90% when excluding Israel. The loss of explanatory power following Israel’s inclusion means that the strong Jewish presence in Israel cannot be exclusively explained by the environmental circumstances of high development, and obviously draws on deeper historical, cultural, and religious determinants. But in the rest of the world (the Diaspora) the relationship between Human Development and Jewish presence certainly works. As a caveat, it is worth repeating that Jewish communities may display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of their respective countries. Nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of

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Fig. 8.6  Major groups of countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and total core Jewish population, 2019

each individual, Jews included, everywhere. Changes in the quality of life at the country level foreshadow changes in Jewish population distribution worldwide. Interestingly, the two countries with the largest Jewish populations, the US (ranked 13th in 2017) and Israel (22th) both lost three positions in the HDI ranking versus the previous year. Such fluctuations in development ranking should be monitored carefully as they may critically affect world Jewish population distribution.

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8.3.2  Time Comparisons The current Jewish population distribution worldwide has resulted from dramatic changes that occurred in the geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural profile of world Jewry—particularly over the years since the independence of the state of Israel. As an illustration of the intervening changes, we report the world distribution of core Jewish population by major geographical regions at three points in time: 1948, 1980, and 2019 (Fig. 8.7). Two opposing trends emerge from this temporal comparison: on the one hand, Israel’s Jewish population increased from being a small entity in 1948 to being the central component of world Jewish population by 2019; on the other hand, we see the decline, if not disappearance of the major Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe, the FSU, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Declines of a lesser scale also appear in Latin America and Southern Africa. North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, maintained relatively stable Jewish population sizes, although in the latter case through a significant turnaround of periods of immigration and periods of emigration. As already noted, the tendency over time was much greater consolidation of world Jewry in the two major centers in the US (here with Canada) and Israel, versus a much more dispersed Jewish population worldwide shortly after the end of World War II.

Fig. 8.7  Core Jewish populations by major regions, 1948, 1980, 2019, thousands

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A more detailed picture of the changes intervening between 1980 and 2019 is illustrated in Table 8.6. Here we compare the numbers and ranks for the 25 countries with a Jewish population of at least 28,000 Jews in 1980—based on revised estimates and using the list of countries extant upon the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Czechoslovakia. Striking changes occurred in the population sizes and rankings during the 39  years from 1980 to 2019. Quantitatively, the most remarkable was Israel’s Jewish population more than doubling from 3,282,700 to 6,665,600 (103.1%). The greatest percentage growth occurred in Germany (+242.0%). Absolute population increases were recorded in Australia (+68.6%), Canada (+27.3%), and Mexico (+14.3%). The US core Jewish population remained about the same (+0.2%). The other 19 countries witnessed Jewish population reduction, with six countries losing more than 90% of their 1980 population (the five former Soviet republics of Moldova, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and Ethiopia). An entirely different ranking of major Table 8.6  Largest core Jewish populations as of 1980, and in 2019 Countrya United States Israel Russia Ukraine France United Kingdom Canada Argentina Belarus Brazil South Africa Uzbekistan Moldova Australia Hungary Azerbaijan Uruguay Mexico Germany Belgium Romania Italy Iran Ethiopia Georgia

1980 5,690,000 3,282,700 713,400 634,400 535,000 390,000 308,000 242,000 135,500 110,000 108,000 100,100 80,200 70,000 65,000 44,300 40,000 35,000 34,500 33,000 33,000 32,000 32,000 32,000 28,300

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

2019 5,700,000 6,665,600 165,000 48,000 450,000 292,000 392,000 180,000 9000 92,600 67,500 3000 1900 118,000 47,300 7500 16,600 40,000 118,000 29,100 9000 27,400 8300 100 1500

Rank 2 1 7 12 3 5 4 6 25 10 11 37 44 9 13 29 17 14 8 15 26 16 28 78 51

% Change 0.2 103.1 −76.9 −92.4 −15.9 −25.1 27.3 −25.6 −93.4 −15.8 −37.5 −97.0 −97.6 68.6 −27.2 −83.1 −58.5 14.3 242.0 −11.8 −72.7 −14.4 −74.1 −99.7 −94.7

Rank diff. −1 1 −4 −8 2 1 3 2 −16 = = −26 −31 5 2 −13 = 4 11 5 −5 6 −5 −54 −26

Ranked as of 1980. In bold Jewish population that increased in absolute size. The following countries had Jewish populations among the 25 largest in 2019, but not in 1980: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden, Chile, Spain, Austria, and Panama

a

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communities consequently emerged. The top five in 1980 were the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and France; in 2019 they had become Israel, US, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The geographical realignment of the world Jewish population reflects both their past sufferance from political discrimination and persecution, as well as socioeconomic development lags and lack of democracy in the various countries that lost Jewish population. The consequent mass migration from those countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, generated large Jewish population declines. On the other hand, countries that offered a wider range of opportunities and greater freedom witnessed steady Jewish population growth or at least stability.

8.3.3  Dispersion and Concentration In 2019, 98 countries had at least 100 Jews (Table 8.7). Two countries had Jewish populations of over five million each (Israel and the US), another 7 had more than 100,000 Jews, 2 had 50,000–99,999, 6 had 25,000–49,999, 8 had 10,000–24,999, 9 had 5000–9999, 25 had 1000–4999, and 39 had less than 1000. The 73 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry. In only four Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (20.0 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), the US (17.4), Canada (10.5), and France (6.9). The case of Israel is very different, with a core Jewish population that represents 74.3% of the total legal population, and an enlarged Jewish population that represents 79.1% of the total population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing. By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Eleven more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Austria, and Panama. Five countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain. Over the past decades, the basic typology of size-and-density of Jewish communities throughout the world did not change as much as the underlying changes witnessed by individual countries. Table  8.8 shows the configuration of Jewish populations in 2019 as compared to 1984, the first year for which such tabulation is available (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1986). The 1984 data are reported here unrevised and in the original format of the countries and territories that existed then.

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Table 8.7  World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion per 1000 total population, 1/1/2019 Jews per 1000 total population Number of core Jews in Less than country Total 1.0 1.0–4.9 5.0–9.9 10.0–19.9 Number of countries Totala 98 70 23 1 3 100–999 39 35 3 – 1 1000–4999 25 24 1 – – 5000–9999 9 6 3 – – 10,000–24,999 8 2 6 – – 25,000–49,999 6 2 4 – – 50,000–99,999 2 1 1 – – 100,000–999,999 7 – 5 1 1 1000,000 or more 2 – – – 1 Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews) Totalb 14,707,400 293,800 1,204,600 450,000 6,092,700 100–999 10,500 8700 1100 – 700 1000–4999 54,900 53,000 1900 – – 5000–9999 64,100 45,600 18,500 – – 10,000–24,999 114,900 26,500 88,400 – 25,000–49,999 221,600 67,400 154,200 – – 50,000–99,999 160,100 92,600 67,500 – – 100,000–999,999 1,715,000 – 873,000 450,000 392,000 1000,000 or more 12,365,600 – – – 5,700,000 Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population) Totalb 100.0 2.0 8.2 3.1 41.4 100–999 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.0 1000–4999 0.4 0.4 0.0 – – 5000-9999 0.4 0.3 0.1 – – 10,000–24,999 0.8 0.2 0.6 – – 25,000–49,999 1.5 0.5 1.0 – – 50,000–99,999 1.1 0.6 0.5 – – 100,000–999,999 11.7 – 5.9 3.1 2.7 1000,000 or more 84.1 – – – 38.8

20.0+ 1 – – – – – – – 1 6,665,600 – – – – – – – 6,665,600 45.3 – – – – – – – 45.3

Not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights a

b

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Table 8.8  World core Jewish population distribution, by number of Jews in country, 1984 and 2019 Number of Jews in country Totala 100–999 1000–4999 5000–9999 10,000–49,999 50,000–99,999 100,000–999,999 1000,000-4999,999 5000,000 or more

N. of countries 1984 2019 74 98 23 39 17 25 7 9 16 14 2 2 6 7 2 0 1 2

Jewish population 1984 2019 12,963,300 14,707,400 11,000 10,500 41,900 54,900 43,800 55,100 362,400 345,500 136,500 160,100 1,616,000 1,715,000 5,046,700 0 5,705,000 12,365,600

% of world’s Jews 1984 2019 100.0 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.8 2.3 1.1 1.1 12.4 11.7 38.8 0.0 43.9 84.1

Number of countries not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews. Population and percent figures including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 Sources: Schmelz and DellaPergola (1986); Table 8.7 above

a

The number of countries with at least 100 Jews indeed increased from 74 to 98, following the devolution of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the addition of several countries with very small Jewish communities that reached the 100-person threshold. The greatest increase was in the number of countries with less than 1000 Jews, from 23 in 1984 to 39 in 2019. At the top of the distribution, two countries in 2019 had more than five million Jews, versus one only in 1984, when two countries had between one and five million Jews: Israel and the USSR. In the meantime, Israel grew and the USSR split into 15 states and lost most of its Jews through emigration. Countries with between 100,000 and one million Jews comprised 12.5% of total Jewish population in 1984 versus 11.7% in 2019. Of the 15 republics of the FSU, only Russia had more than 100,000 in 2019 when it was joined by two new entries: Germany and Australia. Brazil and South Africa had more than 100,000 Jews in 1984, but fewer in 2019. France, Canada, the UK, and Argentina were included in the 100,000 and over category for both dates, but the gap between Canada and Argentina had more than trebled, from 65,000 to 212,000. Communities between 10,000 and 100,000 comprised 3.9% of world Jewish population in 18 countries in 1984, versus 3.4% in 16 countries, respectively, in 2019. Among the smaller Jewish communities, those with less than 10,000 Jews comprised at both dates less than 1% of world Jewry, but in 1984 they were distributed across 47 countries and in 2019 across 73 countries. The apparent stability reflected a strong concentration of Jewish population in a few countries at the top of the distribution and a wide dispersion of very small numbers in a large number of countries at the bottom. The transition from a concentration of Jews in one dominant and two secondary centers, to a configuration based on two main centers reflected the quite revolutionary changes undertaken by world Jewry passing from the 20th to the twenty-first century.

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8.4  Jewish Population in Major Individual Countries We turn now to a concise review of the information available and the criteria followed in updating the figures for the largest Jewish populations worldwide. The countries are listed in decreasing order of magnitude of the respective Jewish communities. Given the gradual and slow motion of demographic change, besides a few exceptions, we shall not repeat here the detailed descriptions of sources and patterns that appeared in previous volumes of the American Jewish Year Book and refer the reader to those previous volumes.

8.4.1  Israel Since the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Israel is the country with the largest core Jewish population worldwide. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of population growth—1.70% in 2018. With a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 3.17 children currently born per Jewish woman in 2018, and a relatively young age composition (27% under age 15 and only 13% age 65 and over), the Jewish population in Israel is the one worldwide displaying the highest fertility— largely above generational replacement and currently generating a share of children among the total Jewish population twice that of the elderly. Israel’s current Jewish fertility rate is higher than the fertility for the total population of any other developed country and twice or more the current average of Jewish children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes called the effective Jewish fertility rate). This reflects not only the large family size of the more religious Jewish population component, but also a diffused and persistent desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009c, d, 2015b). A moderately positive international migration balance also helps to keep Israel’s Jewish population increasing. Information on religion is mandatory in official population data regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and in the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority). Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, entering the country including immigrants, exiting the country including emigrants, and conversions). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the defining concept is a combination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (Halakhah). At the beginning of 2019, Israel’s core Jewish population reached 6,665,600, as against a revised total of 6,554,500  in 2017, excluding people who had been missing from the country for 1  year or more. A downward adjustment of −3600 compared to the 2018 estimate reflects late entries and adjustments of demographic events, including conversions and other revisions of personal status. The revised core population combined with the addition of 426,700 “Others”—non-Jewish members of households who immigrated under the

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Law of Return or their Israel-born children—formed an enlarged Jewish population of 7,092,300  in 2019, of which these “Others” constituted 6.0% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who are not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate have one Jewish parent. The Jewish parent population of Israel is thus estimated at 6,878,950. For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2018, 134,470 Jewish births and 37,744 Jewish deaths produced a net natural increase of 96,726 Jews. This represented 87% of Israel Jews’ total growth in 2018. Figure 8.8 demonstrates the changes in birth rates and death rates for Jews and Muslims in Israel between 1980 and 2019. The two birth rate lines in a sense mirror each other, with increases in one population matched by decreases in the other one and vice versa. A major adjustment toward lower natality occurred among Israel’s Muslims since the end of the 1990s, accompanied by some increase among Jews. Besides different fertility levels, this largely reflected differences and changes in age compositions and age at marriage of the respective populations (Staetsky 2019). Death rates tended to be low and decreasing among both populations, but they were constantly lower among Muslims due to their much younger age composition. Furthermore, in 2018, the overall birthrate of Jews and Others was 20.1 per 1000 population, versus 23.3 per 1000 for all Arabs including Muslims, Christians, and Druze. These differences significantly affected the respective rates of natural increase with the consequence that in 2018 Muslim population growth continued to be significantly higher than that of Jews, and the share of Arabs among total Israelis continued to increase. At the time of this writing, the final data on all components of population change for 2018 were not yet released. In 2017, 18,400 Jewish new immigrants and immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time) arrived in Israel, out of a total of 30,700 immigrants including immigrant citizens (meaning 12,300 were not recorded as Jewish). The net balance of Jewish migrants, minus the balance of Jewish Israelis leaving the country and returning to the country

Fig. 8.8  Births and deaths per 1000 population among Jews and Muslims in Israel, 1980–2019

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after a prolonged stay abroad was 13,700. Therefore, an estimated 4700 Jews (18,400 − 13,700) plus another 2200 “Others” joined the pool of those who reside abroad permanently or in the long term. These data about Israel’s international migration balance point to a steady if moderate level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to quite low levels of emigration in historical perspective. In 2018, the total number of new immigrants—‘olim hadashim, not including immigrant citizens—increased slightly to 28,118 from 26,333 the previous year. The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants (Fisher 2013, 2015, 2019; Waxman 2013; Nissim 2018). In 2017, the net balance of conversions to and from Judaism was negative: –2000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), probably due to revisions in the personal status of some past converts, following stricter rules pursued by Israel’s Central Rabbinate. The conversions balance was 500 for Israeli Muslims, and 600 for Christians. Some increase in religious intermarriage existed in Israel, but the levels of ethnoreligious interaction were overall quite low (DellaPergola 2017d). Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza—WBG), Table  8.9 reports the numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households and Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, as well as foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group’s total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the Law of Return definition) in each division is also shown. At the beginning of 2019, of a total 6,665,600 core Jews, 6,001,700 lived within Israel’s pre-1967 borders; 221,800 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 23,200 on the Golan Heights; and 418,900 lived in the West Bank. Over the years, the pace of Jewish internal migration from Israel’s main portion to the West Bank was significantly correlated with levels of unemployment and emigration from Israel (DellaPergola 2019b). In 2019 core Jews represented 74.6% of Israel’s total legal population of 8,970,900, inclusive of 1,878,600 Arabs and others, but excluding 231,000 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Statistical Monthly). In 2018 (the last year with accessible records), the latter group comprised 88,171 legal foreign workers, 18,059 undocumented foreign workers, 74,000 tourists whose visas had expired, 14,778 refuge seekers, and 37,288 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration Authority 2019). Israel’s Law of Return Jewish population of 7,092,300  in 2019 represented 79.1% of the State’s total legal population. Israel’s Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, comprised 20.9% of the total legal population. As shown in Table 8.9, the Law of Return Jewish population represented 78.7% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers and refugees), 39.6% in East Jerusalem, 47.7% in the Golan Heights, and 14.1% of the West Bank’s total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.

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Table 8.9  Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2019a

Area

Arab population and others 4 6,361,000

Foreign workers and refugeesc 5 231,000

426,700 7,092,300

1,878,600

231,000

9,201,900 77.1

408,100 6,409,800

1,501,300

231,000

8,142,100 78.7

Core Jewish Population Others 1 2 6,665,600 426,700

Grand total State of 6,665,600 Israele Thereof: Pre-1967 6,001,700 borders East 221,800 Jerusalemf Golan 23,200 Heights West Bank 418,900 Palestinian Territory West Bank i Gaza 0

Core Jewish and othersb 3 7,092,300

Percent of Jews and othersd Total 6 7 13,684,300 51.8

8500

230,300

350,600



580,900 39.6

1200

24,400

26,700



51,100 47.7

8900

427,800

g



427,800 14.1h 4,482,400 –

– –

2,595,900 – 1,886,500  0.0

4,482,400 i

i

0

0

2,595,900 1,886,500

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations Population Fund; and author’s estimates a Rounded figures b Enlarged Jewish population c All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel Population and Migration Authority (2019) d Column 3 divided by column 6 e As defined by Israel’s legal system f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies (2019) g Included under Palestinian Territory h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction i Included under State of Israel

Regarding the Palestinian population in WBG, in November 2017 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated 4,705,600 persons, of whom 1,875,300 live in Gaza and 2,830,300  in the West Bank—including 281,200 in East Jerusalem. The Census results were about 250,000 lower than the estimated projection of 4,952,168 available from by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics’ web site (PCBS 2018). The PCBS Jerusalem’s population estimate clearly was an undercount because of their limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, b, 2018). This would imply an annual growth rate of 1.84% since 2007 in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and 2.84% in Gaza—as against 2.40% for Muslims in Israel (including East Jerusalem) during the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). These growth rates were much lower

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than in the past and pointed to significant differentiation within the Arab/Palestine population. Recall that the total rate of growth of Israeli Jews was 1.70% in 2018 with immigration, and 1.47% without immigration. The Palestinian population’s growth rate in WBG was decreasing as well due to net emigration. According to Israel’s IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2018), the total of Palestinians recorded in the West Bank population register approached three million, but this figure did not discount sufficiently for Palestinian residents permanently living abroad. Keeping in mind the data in Fig. 8.8, among the Arab population both birth rates and death rates probably continued to be somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel, and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. There was a minor internal migration flow from Gaza to the West Bank, estimated at 2671 persons as of mid-2019 (Hass 2019). In the process, most Christian Palestinians had left Gaza because they felt persecuted there. Our adjusted population estimates for WGB at the beginning of 2019 is 4,482,400, of whom 2,595,900 live in the West Bank and 1,886,500 in Gaza. These figures (always excluding East Jerusalem) are lower than the Palestinian census because they discount for persons, students and others, who actually resided abroad for more than 1 year. Other much lower estimates of WBG population (e.g. Zimmerman et  al. 2005a, b; Feitelson 2013) rather than ascertained demographic criteria reflect a political stance and should be dismissed (see also Miller 2015). The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel’s population count, was assessed at 350,600 at the beginning of 2019, and constituted 38.1% of Jerusalem’s total population of 920,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Choshen et al. 2010, 2012, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2016, DellaPergola 2008b). By summing the 1,878,600 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,482,400 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,361,000 Arabs/Palestinians obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus a total enlarged Jewish population of 7,092,300. Table 8.10 reports the percentage of Jews according to the core and Law of Return Table 8.10  Percent of core and Law of Return Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2019

Area Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory Minus foreign workers and refugees Minus Gaza Minus Golan Heights Minus West Bank Minus East Jerusalem

Percentage of Jewsa by definition Core Law of return 48.7 51.8 49.5 52.7 57.6 61.3 57.8 61.5 74.5 79.3 77.6 82.5

Source: Table 8.9 a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs and others of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly

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definitions, out of the total population of the combined territory of Israel and Palestine. Such percent is conditional upon two factors: the definition of who is a Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect on the existence and size of a Jewish population majority when gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab/Palestinian population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of total population, along with hypothesized diminishing territorial and total population extents. A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 13,684,300, including foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the beginning of 2019. The core Jewish population of 6,665,600 represented 48.7% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but actually does not exist any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, b, 2007a, 2011a; Soffer and Bistrow 2004; Soffer 2015). If the 426,700 Others (non-Jewish members of Jewish households) are added to the core Jewish population, the Law of Return Jewish population of 7,092,300 represented 51.8% of the total population in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a tiny majority. If we subtract from the grand total, the 231,000 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the core and enlarged Jewish populations rise to, respectively, 49.5% and 52.7% of the total population legally resident in Israel and the Palestinian Territory estimated at 13,453,300 in 2019. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the percentages of Jews out of total rise to 57.6% (core) and 61.3% (Law of Return); if subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the Jewish percentages become 57.8% and 61.5%, respectively; if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, they become 74.5% and 79.3%, respectively; and if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem the percentages rise to 77.6% and 82.5%. Interestingly, the proponents of much lower Palestinian population estimates argue that the percent Jewish (Law of Return) out of the total population of Israel and West Bank combined is 65% (Ettinger 2019), versus our estimated 61.5%. A spirited and aggressive polemics has been going on for several years about a modest 3.5% difference. The reality is that under current demographic trends, the rate of erosion of the Jewish majority is about 0.1% per year. The same data are graphically presented in Fig. 8.9.

8.4.2  The United States In the US, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must rely on alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein 1981, 1989, 1992; Sheskin 2015a). To assess the current number of Jews in the US one should consider three issues: (1) The need to

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Fig. 8.9  Percent Jewish out of total population of Israel and Palestine by different territorial and Jewish population definitions, 2019

rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded in demographic concepts and research techniques (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail, see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2011a, 2013, 2014a, c, d, e); (2) The definitional predicament already discussed above. To perform comparisons over time constant definition assumptions are needed. Given ongoing acculturation and assimilation trends in America, but also new meanings attributed to Jewish identity or the rediscovery of submerged identities from the past, group definitions today often may not be the same as past ones; (3) The broader narratives within which one seeks to place the findings and their interpretations (Kaufman 2014). Intriguingly, competing narratives and non-comparable empirical and definitional approaches stand behind diverging US Jewish population estimates, with a high-low gap of nearly two million individuals. Opposite interpretations circulate of current and expected trends: rapid growth, stability, or slow decline. Previous to and following the 2013 Pew survey of Jewish Americans, intense debate in and outside the social scientific community entails very different implications at the cognitive level and for Jewish community service planning, matched by a lively media discussion (Heilman 2005, 2013; Pew Research Center 2013; The Jewish Daily Forward 2014). The unescapable underlying condition—hardly acknowledged in professional let alone publicist debate—is the end of a clear dichotomy between Jews and non-Jews in the US (DellaPergola 2015b). The quest for US Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies (DellaPergola 2013a). The first is to bridge across numerous different national Jewish population estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births and deaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such as accessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. In the US, several major data sources allow for a detailed reconstruction of

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nationwide Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. For all purposes, the logic of working nationally to obtain a national population estimate is the same logic that explains why, since 1790, a national population census (and not a compilation of local statistics) was held in the US (US Bureau of the Census). The second strategy, pursued since the beginnings of US Jewish population studies in the early 1940s (Linfield 1942; Robison 1943), is to construct a national total from a compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). The third more recent strategy is to construct a national total through a meta-analysis of a pool of national and local surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each of which include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Of the three alternatives, only the first was designed to determine nationwide Jewish population estimates. The second and third methodologies were not, but they do provide valuable grounds for comparative analytic work and in-depth multivariate analysis (Hartman and Sheskin 2012). Serious attempts to monitor Jewish population size over time at the national level require a reliable baseline figure and updates based on solid empirical research. Each of the existing sources is imperfect, but they do amount to an impressive body of evidence: from historical assessment (Rosenwaike 1980), through the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et  al. 2002), the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969), the 1971 National Jewish Population Study—NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974; Lazerwitz 1978), the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey—NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et  al. 1991), NJPS 2000–2001 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001). These various data sets fit well one with another when performing forward-backward Jewish population projections as well as checking with all available data on international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions to and from Judaism (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983, 1988; DellaPergola et  al. 1999, 2000a, b; DellaPergola 2005, 2013a; Perlmann 2007). NJPS 2000–2001 yielded an initial estimate of 5200,000 after imputation of persons in homes for the elderly, prisons, military bases, and other institutional settings (Kotler-Berkowitz et  al. 2003). Further cohort analysis and projections unveiled under-coverage of over 250,000 individuals born between 1950 and 1970 (Saxe et  al. 2006a, 2007; Tighe et  al. 2009a, 2011). Evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accessions, and secessions provided revised estimates of 5,367,000 for 2000–2001, and 5,425,000 for 2013—not including the institutionalized (DellaPergola 2013a). A rounded core Jewish population estimate could thus be placed at 5.6–5.7 million around 2010, and this indeed was the estimate suggested by a 2007 Pew survey (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2008; Rebhun 2016). The 2015 Pew study of the US religious landscape confirmed the same orders of magnitude with a slightly higher percent of Jews among the total US adult population (1.9% vs. 1.8%), well within the margins of sampling error (Pew Research Center 2015b). The 2013 Pew A Portrait of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013) found 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a total of 5.1  million Americans with Jewish religion (Jews by religion or JBRs) without other religious identities. Another 600,000

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persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported no religion and Jewish (“Jews, no religion” or JNRs) without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million mutually exclusive Jewish population. This 5.7 million estimate more or less corresponded to a core Jewish population concept relying on self-assessment and mutual exclusiveness between religious or ethno-religious populations, and as noted, was fully consistent with the whole body of research on US Jewry since 1957. As against this quite impressive body of evidence, higher Jewish population estimates were provided by research that instead of one national comprehensive source used compilations of many different smaller databases. Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky evaluate the US Jewish population at 6,968,000 (see Chap. 5 in this volume). This would be an increase of about 1000,000 over the 1990 American Jewish Year Book estimate obtained with the same method. The claimed—though not demonstrated—determinants of this 17% increase include the migration of Jews from the FSU, Israel, Latin America, and other countries. While local Jewish community studies still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves recognize (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010, 2017; Sheskin 2008, 2009). One should acknowledge the diversity of databases and definitions, the lack of synchronization in time, and the very uneven quality of the technical procedures followed, including sometimes embarrassing skill gaps across different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which as noted local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations may risk cumulating significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groeneman and Smith 2009). The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set of general social surveys is an innovative and ambitious undertaking in the social scientific study of American Jews called the American Jewish Population Project (AJPP) (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, b). The Jewish population estimate suggested by SSRI for 2019, based on a synthesis of surveys of the general public conducted between 2012 and 2018, was 7,478,600, plus or minus a margin of error of over 300,000 (SSRI 2019a; Saxe 2019). This figure implies that, since 1990, American Jewry increased by nearly two million persons or about 36%, quite higher than the 32% increase for the US total population and much higher than the 5% increase for non-Hispanic whites. (The Hispanic population increased by 163% from 1990 to 2017. The African-Americans population increased by 38%.) Pew (2013) reports that 93% of American Jews are non-Hispanic whites. Thus, this alleged Jewish population growth of 36% does not seem to be in accordance with extant census data and raises serious questions about the SSRI methodology. Indeed, the AJPP estimated that at least 70,000 Jewish babies were born annually in the US, and that a majority of US Jews did not adhere to any of the major Jewish religious denominations (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These figures can be plausible only if one adopts, rather than a core concept of individually-identified Jews, a broadly enlarged concept of total population with Jewish background (as already anticipated by Tobin and Groeneman 2003).

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Five important caveats should be stressed concerning the SSRI Jewish population estimates (SSRI 2019b): (a) Jews are over-represented in general sample surveys because of their higher socioeconomic status and educational attainment, and their relatively lower presence among people difficult to cover like the homeless, those without a functioning telephone, or prisoners; (b) using a sample of US adults—like in the case of most general survey respondents—to obtain estimates for the total population ignores the comparatively lower percentage of children among Jews and thus inflates the Jewish estimate; (c) in turn the SSRI allocation of children explicitly uses Pew 2013 estimates which include children defined as partly Jewish or of Jewish background; (d) projecting percentages of Jews among the total population, hence population size, from the percentage of Jewish respondents out of all respondents ignores the multi-religious composition of many Jewish households and thus factors non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; and (e) the criteria used to estimate the broader aggregate also including Jews of no religion, based on survey data on Jews by religion are problematic. The latter point (using data on Jews by religion to estimate Jews of no religion) is important in view of attempts to estimate Jewish populations based in surveys which, as they do, include Jewish as one option in a question on religious identity (Magidin de Kramer et al. 2018; Hackett 2014). In the SSRI meta-analysis, Jewish population is assessed at the county level through a logistic regression model that predicts the likelihood an adult identifies as Jewish when asked their religion. Factors involved in weighting across the sample of surveys in the model include geographic distribution, sex, age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment. The model is fit using Bayesian Multilevel estimation with post-stratification (BMP) (SSRI 2019c). In other words, Jewishness of an individual is determined by a blind statistical iteration whose margin of error can be substantial, and not through a direct investigation of the personal religious or otherwise cultural identity of the interviewees. Even if the Jews by religion estimates were accurate, the further attempt to extrapolate the “real” number of Jews from sources that only deal with religion—instead of directly ascertaining the multivariate nature of Jewish identification—are at best speculative. The SSRI estimate of 4.4  million adults Jews by religion in 2019 was quite similar to the 4.2 million found by the 2013 Pew survey (Pew Research Center 2013). The SSRI estimate then, while rejecting the reliability of national surveys like Pew, built its own models of the proportion of persons of Jewish origin who declare not to have a religion. The 2013 Pew survey—besides 5.1  million Jews by religion (4.2  million adults and 900,000 children)—indeed found 600,000 persons (500,000 adults and 100,000 children) with no religion and Jewish, and one million persons (600,000 adults and 400,000 children) with no religion and partly Jewish (DellaPergola 2015b). The total of 6.7 million designated in the Pew report as the net Jewish population estimate included that million. A further 2.4 million non-Jewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a Jewish background. Of these, about one-third had at least one Jewish

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parent (Pew Research Center 2013), thus raising the total population with at least one Jewish parent (PJP) to about eight million (6.7 + 1.3). The about two-thirds with a Jewish background who did not have a Jewish parent, further expanded the collective to 10.6  million. An additional 1.2  million non-Jewish adults reported some Jewish affinity, raising the figure to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group. Some of these broader definitions better conform to our Jewish parents, Jewish enlarged, or Law of Return population definitions. The 2013 Pew study actually confirmed some well-known demographic patterns of US Jews, namely postponed marriage, non-marriage, and small family size (Barack Fishman and Cohen 2017; Hartman 2017). Intermarriage was assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts based on an extended Jewish population definition and showing an increase over previous cohorts. Identification with Judaism among children of intermarriages, though on the increase (Sasson et al. 2017), continued to fall below the 50% of all such children and younger adults nationally, which would be the precondition to maintain demographic stability or even determine quantitative gains from intermarriage (Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky and Heller 2008; Rebhun 2013; Phillips 2013, 2018). Seven percent of the children raised in in-married households were raised as non-Jews (probably children from previous marriages) versus 67% among intermarried couples. The current aging composition of US Jewry (also acknowledged by the SSRI study) and other evidence about age-specific birth and death rates based on standard demographic models, plausibly generates annually fewer Jewish births nationally (by the core definition) than the estimated number of Jewish deaths. The Jewish death rate in the US is one of the least investigated topics in the field of Jewish demographic research and it would be a fair research priority to try to assess it empirically. Jewish immigration to the US nearly stopped from the FSU but continued at moderate levels from other countries in Western Europe, Latin America, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle East and South Africa. The evidence for Israelis in the US shows a significant reduction in the influx, largely compensated by returns to Israel (Gold and Phillips 1996, Gold 2002, Cohen 2009, Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010, Rebhun 2014, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). The number of Israel residents who were allowed lawful permanent resident status in the US was 4324  in 2015, 4652  in 2016, and 4227  in 2017 (US Department of Homeland Security 2017). Accounting for other Jewish migration to the US, and discounting for the about 2500 yearly emigrants to Israel, an annual net migration into the US of 5000 Jews (or slightly more) can be estimated. In other words, net immigration balances the losses due to the likely excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births (stressing the core definition), and the balance of accessions to minus secessions from Judaism. Shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society are comparatively more frequent than in other countries. Different surveys found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose membership, while evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the “religiously undefined” (“none” and not reported) tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin et  al. 2001; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2008; Kosmin and

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Keysar 2009; Smith 2009; Pew Research Center 2015a). By the Pew 2013 survey, total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions; and by the 2015 Pew survey of the US religious landscape, the net balance of changes of religion resulted in a total lifetime loss of 600,000 persons for the Jewish side (Pew Research Center 2015b). Based on several comparable measures of Jewish identification, the partly Jewish no-religion individuals, mainly the children of intermarriages, looked in 2013 more similar to non-Jews with Jewish background than to Jews with no religion (JNRs), or to Jews by religion for that matter (DellaPergola 2015b). Following these observations, relying on the 2013 Pew survey and its subsequent updates, stressing that the true predicament of American Jewish demography concerns population definitions, and following the assumption that Jewish identity is mutually exclusive versus other competing religious and ethnic identities, our core Jewish population estimate remained stable at 5,700,000 for 2019—the world’s second largest. This might be a slight underestimate and national surveys that might be conducted in the near future will clarify he matter. Broader definitional criteria naturally generate higher estimates. Including the partly Jewish with no religion and the pertinent portion of non-Jews with declared Jewish background, about eight million Americans have at least one Jewish parent. The enlarged total population including non-Jews in Jewish households approaches ten million. The Law of Return population probably approaches 12 million. By each of these expanded criteria, the number of persons included is significantly larger than in Israel.

8.4.3  France France has the largest Jewish community in Europe. A 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen and Ifergan 2003). Several follow-ups (Cohen 2005, 2007, 2013b) indicated a decreasing Jewish population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and other countries. A survey (Ifop 2015) addressed an enlarged definition of the Jewish population in France but did not provide conclusive information about the size of the Jewish community. Instead, it offered important insights about their past and prospective migration. In retrospect, 39% reported they had relatives living in Israel compared to 31% who had relatives in another country (especially the US, Canada, and the UK). This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 56% to Israel compared to 44% to other countries. Regarding possible future migration, 13% reported they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it. The corresponding percentages for migrating to other countries were 13% and 33%, respectively. A previous survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence in 5 years found that 33% expected to be living in France, 26% in Israel, 14% in another country, and 27% were not sure (Cohen 2013a). The 2012 European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) survey on perceptions of antisemitism in

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EU countries unveiled that over 40% of French Jews had considered emigrating (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013). Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2000 annually for several years, actually increased to a historical peak of 6627 in 2015, and lowered again to 2431 in 2018, for a total of over 48,000 between 2001 and 2018. Jewish emigration was also directed toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of antisemitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Assuming Israel attracted half to two-thirds of the total who departed France, between 72,000 and 96,000 Jews and family members emigrated from France since 2001. Some of these returned to France in the meantime, thus reducing the impact of net migration. Currently more than half of Jews live in the Greater Paris metropolitan region (Cohen and Ifergan 2003; Ifop 2015). Jews of Sephardi ancestry, mostly first, second, or third generation immigrants from North Africa, clearly predominate numerically over those of Central-Eastern European origin who, until World War II, constituted the main component of the Jewish population. Considering these trends, our 2019 core estimate for French Jewry decreased to 450,000—the third largest Jewish population in the world.

8.4.4  Canada In Canada, the quinquennial Census, and more recently National Household Survey (NHS) data on Jewish ethnicity (Statistics Canada 2019)—released in years ending with the digit 1 or 6—can be compared with data on religion—released every decade in years ending with the digit 1 (Statistics Canada 2003a, b; Weinfeld and Schnoor 2015; Shahar 2014, 2016, 2017). Information on religion and ancestry was customarily collected through open-ended questions, where Jewish was one of the examples provided as a possible response. The 2016 NHS broke with this tradition and did not provide Jewish as an example. Probably as a consequence, the number reporting a Jewish ethnicity collapsed to 143,665 in 2016 from 309,650 in 2011. This makes the new data virtually unusable (see Chap. 7 in this volume). Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are not included in the core concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion who declare a Jewish ethnicity (single or part of a multiple choice) are included in the core. The Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA defined this as the Jewish Standard Definition (Torczyner et al. 1993; Shahar 2004). The newly suggested Revised Jewish Standard Definition also accounts for: (a) persons with no religious affiliation, but who are Israeli by ethnicity; (b) persons with no religious affiliation, but with knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a “non-official” language; (c) persons with no religious affiliation but who were born in Israel; and (d) persons with no religious affiliation who lived in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2015, Shahar 2014, 2016, 2017). This definition provided an estimate of 391,665 in

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2011. The latter figure is not strictly comparable with the core Jewish population as it includes the fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom would better be included among the Jewish parents Jewish population. In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion (Weinfeld et al. 2013). Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. A total of 293,175 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 309,650 in 2011. Striking changes actually affected the distribution of Canadians and of Jews among them, by single and multiple ethnicities. The ongoing growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). In 1981, 90% or 264,025 of total ethnic Jews declared Jewish as their single ethnicity, but this share decreased to 66% (245,580) in 1991, 53% (186,475) in 2001, 43% (134,045) in 2006, and 37% (115,640) in 2011. Such sharp decrease in Jewish ethnic identification can be explained by an increase in intermarriage which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews (Goldman 2009), but also indicates that the relevance of Jewish ethnic (unlike religious) identity is rapidly diminishing, at least as a mutually exclusive category. A systematic evaluation of the Jewish ethnicity variable in the 2016 census (Smith and McLeish 2019) shows the full picture of passages from Jewish and non-Jewish ethnicity declarations, and vice versa, between the 2011 and 2016 censuses. Ethnic origins that replaced Jewish mostly included Eastern European countries but also a 4.7% of Israeli. The dropping of Jewish ethnicity increased along with increasing generational seniority and acculturation in Canada. It was proportionally more frequent among those listing no religion or religion other than Jewish. On the other hand, among those adding Jewish as an ethnicity between 2011 and 2016, the plurality were Christians. While the decrease in responses for Jewish as an ethnic origin in 2016 was likely driven by the fact that Jewish was no longer among the list of ethnic origin examples, response mobility involving the Jewish ethnic origin is part of a larger pattern that predates the 2016 Census (Smith and McLeish 2019). These trends are confirmed by a 2018 large independent representative survey of Canadian Jews (Brym et al. 2019a). As a general pattern, Canadian Jews displayed significantly higher levels of Jewish identification than Jews in the US (Pew Research Center 2013). Indicators of Jewish religious identification appeared much more resilient than indicators of Jewish ethnicity and community participation (Brym et al. 2019b). Overall, between 2001 and 2011, 21,445 Jews by religion immigrated into Canada, mostly from the FSU, and were reported in Canada in the 2011 NHS. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion which was stable over the same 10 years would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This, besides minor emigration, reflects a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and passages of people from self-definition as Jews by religion to self-definition of Jews with no religion. Compounding the effects of continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition because of aging and cultural

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assimilation, we estimate the Jewish population to have slightly increased in 2018 to 392,000 in 2019—the world’s fourth largest Jewish community.

8.4.5  United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, the 2011 Census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 271,259 in 2011 (+1.69%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002, 2012; United Kingdom National Records of Scotland NRS 2011; Miller et al. 1996; Kosmin and Waterman 2002; Graham et  al. 2007; Graham and Waterman 2005, 2007; Voas 2007; Graham and Vulkan 2007; Graham 2013a, b; Boyd and Staetsky 2013; Graham and Caputo 2015; Staetsky and Boyd 2015). The 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century and apparently somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry (Graham 2011). In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas (Graham et al. 2012). Those who did not report a religion nationally rose from 23% in 2001 to 32% in 2011, but in view of the organized Jewish community’s encouragement to participate in the Census, Jewish population was probably less affected by the increase in no religion and not reported. Mainstream British Jewry is aging, but the higher participation of Haredi Jews in the Census is reflected in a rejuvenating age composition, with an absolute increase of 3% in the percentage under age 15 and a 1% decrease in the percentage age 65 and over. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns. A reversal has occurred in recent years from a long negative to a positive balance of Jewish births and deaths (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005; Vulkan 2012; Casale Mashiah 2018). Intermarriage was on the rise, too, though at moderate levels compared with most other European and Western countries, from 11% of all couples in 1965–1969 to 26% in 2010–2013 (Graham 2016, 2018). Synagogue membership in the UK significantly decreased over time (Casale Mashiah and Boyd 2017). In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households across the UK held synagogue membership, against 92,653  in 1995. While total Jewish households declined from 147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016, the number of synagogues actually increased from 328 in 1983 to 454 in 2016. The denominational balance also significantly shifted. Between 2010 and 2016, synagogue membership declined by 7.5% for the Central Orthodox, 4.1% for the Reform, 9.1% for the Liberal, and 21.4% for the Sephardi; membership increased by 15.5% for the Masorti, and by 18.4% for the Strictly Orthodox. Jewish education was growing, confirming the growing impact of the Haredi sector on the Jewish birth rate (Staetsky and Boyd 2016). Allowing also for some immigration, we upwardly revised our estimate the UK’s core Jewish population at 292,000  in 2019—the fifth largest Jewish community in the world.

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8.4.6  Argentina Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—following the bankruptcy of the country’s Central Bank, dire economic conditions, and special incentives offered by Israel. Subsequently, the economic situation stabilized and emigration diminished (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). By 2014, 4400 persons lived in Jewish households in Miami in which at least one adult was Argentinian (Sheskin 2015b). A 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005) found an enlarged Jewish population of 244,000 as part of the over 300,000 who were identified as in some way of Jewish origin or living with a person of Jewish origin. Of the former, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered self as totally or partly Jewish. Other research suggested significant aging of the core Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005) and growing interreligious couples (Erdei 2014). Argentina’s Jewish population was assessed at 180,000 in 2019—the world’s sixth largest Jewish community.

8.4.7  Russia In the Russian Federation, Jewish population continued its downward course in the context of a country whose general population had been diminishing for years and only recently started to slowly recover (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015). After the compulsory item on ethnicity (natsyonalnost) on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people who likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (Tolts 2013). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our core Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994 Russian Federation Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging, and a negative balance of births and deaths (Tolts 2018). Over 93,000 (enlarged) Jews migrated to Israel been 2001 and 2018. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered through emigration or vital events. The striking negative balance of Jewish births and deaths, and the recent surge in Jewish emigration generated an extremely elderly age composition and continuing population decrease, only partially compensated by migration from other FSU republics and a moderate amount of returns

8  World Jewish Population, 2019

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of previous migrants to Israel (Tolts 2003, 2009, 2015; Cohen 2009). We evaluated Russia’s Jewish population at 165,000 in 2019—the world’s seventh largest Jewish community.

8.4.8  Germany In Germany, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought to the country large numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish household members until 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. Immigration from the FSU diminished to a few hundred annually after the German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a struggling welfare system, reduced the benefits to Jewish immigrants (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz et al. 2002; Erlanger 2006). In 2018, 343 new immigrants from the FSU were added to Jewish community membership (besides 251 from other countries: Zentralwohlfhartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2019), versus a peak of 8929 in 1999. The total number of core Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the beginning of 2007, diminished gradually to 96,325 in 2019. Most of the growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany). Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area became dominant in Jewish population distribution. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. The community-registered Jewish population in Berlin, despite wide reports of a huge increase, diminished from 10,009 at the beginning of 2007 to 9255 in 2019. There is some evidence that Jews who are registered elsewhere might in reality be now living in Berlin (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012, 2014; Glöckner 2013; Rebhun et al. 2016). At the end of 2014, the number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 3991 (plus 2774 with dual citizenship) versus 3065 in 2011. This does not account for Israelis and others who may have acquired German citizenship but who do not reside in Germany. Between 2000 and 2015, 33,321 Israelis were granted German citizenship, of which 31,722 kept it and 1599 renounced it (Harpaz 2013; Times of Israel 2017). German Jews are very aged. In 2018, 227 Jewish births and 1572 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of 1345 Jews (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2019). Especially births may suffer of underreporting because of the lack of incentives to register. German Jewry surely enjoys new opportunities for religious, social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps et al. 1999). Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and

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the choice by some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate, we estimated Germany’s core Jewish population at 118,000 in 2019—the world’s eighth largest Jewish community.

8.4.9  Australia and New Zealand Australia’s 2016 Census quite surprisingly recorded 91,022 Jews, a decline of 6.5% versus 2011. The explanation is easily found in changes introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the Census form. The option No religion was moved from the bottom to the top in the list of printed options. The result was a dramatic increase by 45.5% in the number of all Australians reporting no religion. Several other religions lost respondents: Anglicans 15.7%, Eastern Orthodox 10.7%, Catholics, 2.7%, and Other Christians 4.7%. Judaism did not appear as a printed option in the questionnaire but only as a write-in option. The suggestion of the No religion response option as the first on the list must have affected reporting of Judaism as well. The 2011 Census had reported a Jewish population of 97,336, compared to 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2014a, b). In view of the general non-response to the 2016 question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a 10-year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2014a). The Jewish population is highly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2016 together comprised about 85% of the total. Intermarriage in Australia was less frequent than in most other Western large and medium-size communities, but it was on the rise and affecting the effective Jewish birth rate (Graham 2018). The community’s rather old age composition reflects a fairly high death rate (Eckstein 2009; Markus et  al. 2009, 2011; Forrest and Sheskin 2014). Yet, there possibly existed a small positive difference between an estimated 1200 Jewish births and about 900 Jewish funerals around 2016 (Graham and Narunski 2019). Factors of Jewish population growth were continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, and moderate though rising intermarriage rates. Based on the new GEN17 Australian Jewish Community Survey (Graham and Markus 2018), and a re-evaluation of the 2016 census (Graham and Narunski 2019), we upwardly corrected the previous core Jewish population estimate by 4500, raising it to 118,000 in 2019—the world’s ninth largest. In New Zealand, likewise Australia, the 2018 census form did not list Judaism (nor other religions) as explicit options as in past censuses and left respondents the choice to write-in their preferred denominations. As a consequence, the percent of those not reporting a religion increased by 38% versus the previous census of 2013. The Jewish population apparently decreased by 23%, to 5274. Of these, 3348 reported Judaism (no further denomination specified), 327 Conservative Judaism, 792 Orthodox Judaism, and 807 Reform Judaism (Statistics New Zealand 2018). In consideration of the evident under-reporting of religion in the 2018 census we kept our estimate of Jews in New Zealand at 7500.

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8.4.10  Brazil In Brazil, the 2010 Census reported a national total of 107,329 Jews, of whom 105,432 lived in urban localities and 1987 in rural localities (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE 2010). The census classified Brazil’s population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white, 10,429 brown, 1690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in the Southeast including the major cities, 12,963 in the South, 4266 in the Northeast, 2367 in the North, and 1394 in the Central West (Instituto BrasiIero de Geografia e Estadistica 1991, 2000; Decol 1999, 2009). The 2010 census found 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. While an upward adjustment is reasonable, a 36% increase is not unless the previous census was badly incomplete. There also was a 2.5% increase in Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a decrease of 8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern and Southern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What cannot be attributed to demography and likely reflects new emerging identifications or misclassifications is a decennial increase of over 8000 people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These growing numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also in São Paulo, point to inclusion as Jews in the Census population of many thousands of persons who in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah’s Witnesses, besides possible cases of Converso Jewish ancestry. Census data for São Paulo were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the local Jewish Federation that found 47,286 Jews (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002; Milkewitz et  al. 2014). Allowing for moderate but growing emigration, our assessment of Brazil’s core Jewish population stands at 92,600 in 2019—the world’s tenth largest Jewish community.

8.4.11  South Africa According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population of South Africa was 61,675, out of a reported total of 75,555 including nonwhites. Some of these nonwhites may identify with Jewish ancestry, but most probably pertain to messianic Christian denominations. Factoring in an evaluation of the national white nonresponse rate (14%) and additional factors led to a revised estimate of 72,000 (Saks 2003). After the major wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transferal of power from the apartheid regime to a democratic government, South African Jewry was relatively stable (Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006; Raijman 2015). However, due to the attrition of continuing emigration to Australia, Israel and other countries, and also because of diminishing birth rates versus relatively steady numbers of burials and cremations, the Jewish population surely declined. Jewish school enrollment data were quite stable, but they can mask growing enrollment of nonJewish pupils. Pending more definitive evidence, we cautiously revised the estimate

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of South Africa’s Jewish population at 67,500 in 2019—the world’s eleventh largest Jewish community.

8.4.12  Ukraine In Ukraine, the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). The 2010 census could not be implemented. Instability, internal cleavage, and war in Ukraine resulted in continuing Jewish emigration and population decline. Over 75,000 (enlarged) Jews migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2018. Between 1989 and 2001, the Jewish population—80% Russian speakers—diminished more sharply in the Western regions where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians were similar. The overwhelming concentration of Ukraine’s Jews in regions with a predominantly Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment under military dangers had obviously negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5816 Jews in Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia and where in 2014 a special census found 3374 Jews (Rosstat 2014). Considering continuing emigration, we assess the 2019 core Jewish population at 48,000—the world’s twelfth largest Jewish community.

8.4.13  Other Central and South American Countries In Mexico, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161, plus another 8315 Neo Israelitas (New Jews), for a total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica 2002). Projecting the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0–4, the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) already had unveiled a significant presence, among those defined as Jews, of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and reportedly shoeless (descalzos). The further inclusion of a category of Neo Israelitas in 2010 leaves open the question of the attribution to Judaism of a population possibly comprising followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as descendants of Conversos. For the Federal Capital’s metropolitan area, Jewish population surveys and other research found general stability of the Jewish population

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at numbers similar to the Census concerning a conventional definition (Comunidad Judía de México 2015; Bokser Liwerant 2013; Comité Central Israelita de México 2006, 2000; DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Some international migration operated both ways. Our 2019 Jewish population estimate was kept at 40,000—the world’s fourteenth largest Jewish community. In Chile—on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995)—the relatively stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,300 in 2019—the world’s nineteenth largest. Uruguay experienced continuing Jewish emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006; Shorer Kaplan 2016). The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was assessed at 16,600  in 2019—the world’s twentieth largest Jewish community. Panama over the last 20  years received several thousand Jewish immigrants, mostly from other Latin American countries. Its Jewish population in 2019 was estimated at 10,000—the world’s twenty-fifth largest Jewish community. The Jewish community of Venezuela now estimated at 7000, continued to shrink rapidly following political chaos and lack of security in the country.

8.4.14  Other European Union Countries In Hungary, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population has been diminishing for several years (Stark 1995; Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002; Kovács 2013a; Population Reference Bureau 2018). A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger enlarged Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only 10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion, compared to 13,000 in 2001, clearly an underestimate but indicative of a trend (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2003, 2013). A new survey in 2017, confirming the substantial gaps in Jewish population size according to different definitions, suggested a minimum-maximum range of 58,936–110,679 Jews for 2015 (Kovács and Barna 2018). Our core estimate for 2019, closer to the low of the range, was 47,300—the world’s thirteenth largest Jewish community. In the Netherlands, a survey in 2009 found high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly, and an increase in the number of Israelis (van Solinge and de Vries 2001; Kooyman and Almagor 1996; van Solinge and van Praag 2010; Tanenbaum and Kooyman 2014). Out of an enlarged Jewish population of 52,000, 25% had a Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. Accounting for aging and assuming incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our Jewish population estimate was 29,800 for 2018, the fifteenth largest Jewish community in the world.

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In Belgium, quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries (Cohn 2003; Ben Rafael 2013). Some emigration reflected growing concerns about Islamization, terrorism, and antisemitism. The Jewish population was estimated at 29,100 in 2019, the world’s sixteenth largest Jewish community. In Italy, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country’s Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 23,361 in 2018 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010, 2018; Lattes 2005; Campelli 2013, 2016). Our 2019 estimate of 27,400—the world’s seventeenth largest Jewish community—considers some increase of conversions to Judaism and recent emigration. In Sweden, the Jewish population was estimated at 15,000 in 2019—the world’s twenty-first largest Jewish community, based on a local survey and on a total estimate of the affiliated community of about 5600 (Dencik 2003, 2013). In Spain, the Jewish population estimate of 11,700 in 2019—the world’s twentythird largest Jewish community—reflected some continuing immigration from Latin America but also continuing emigration. The Spanish government 2015 initiative to offer Spanish citizenship to Jews able to demonstrate ancestry from the medieval expulsion, after a slow beginning, gathered momentum, reaching 132,226 requests (Jones 2019). Most requests came from Latin American countries, 5400 came from the US, and 4900 from Israel. The actual number of naturalizations was expected to be much lower given the quite stringent criteria requested, such as knowledge of Spanish, of the Spanish Constitution, and of Iberian culture. The majority of these requests from Latin American countries probably concerned persons who were not themselves part of the core Jewish population or Law of Return definition but belonged to more distant Jewish identification circles. A similar law was approved in 2015 in Portugal (with an estimated permanent Jewish population provisionally estimated at 600 in 2019) to atone for the expulsions from that part of the Iberian Peninsula (BBC 2015). Brexit fueled an increase in the number of applications for Portuguese citizenship. In Austria, updated Jewish community records and state vital statistics (Statistik Austria 2019; Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019b) suggested an upward revision to a new 2019 10,000 estimate—the world’s twenty-fourth largest Jewish community. In Poland the 2011 Census found about 2000 persons who indicated Jewish as their only ethnicity and an additional about 5000 persons who indicated Jewish as their second ethnicity after a mostly Polish first one (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012). Jewish community membership was reported at 1222. We provisionally adopted an estimate of 4500 assuming one half of those reporting multiple ethnicities would fall within the core Jewish population definition. In Ireland, according to the 2016 census, there were 2557 Jews, a 28.9% increase from 2011 (Ireland Central Statistics Office 2012, 2017).

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8.4.15  Other European Countries In Switzerland, in light of Census and emigration data, the estimate was updated to 18,700  in 2018 (Statistik Schweiz 2005, 2012)—the world’s eighteenth largest Jewish community. In Turkey, a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread aging in a community that since has experienced growing emigration and population decline (Filiba 2003; Tuval 2004; Kubovich 2016). Most of the Jews live in Istanbul’s European neighborhoods. The 2019 estimate was 14,800 Jews—the world’s twenty-second largest Jewish community. In Gibraltar we upwardly adjusted the estimate to 700 in 2019.

8.5  Major Cities and Metropolitan Areas Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to live in major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews have manifested unique propensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with their socioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions of urban areas vary by country. It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case of a recent Jewish population study of the service area of UJA/Federation of New York (Cohen et al. 2012), we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 that were included in the Jewish population count because they were neither born Jewish nor had converted to Judaism. We therefore do not consider them part of the core Jewish population. A similar bias affects the Jewish population estimate for the San Francisco Bay CSA (Phillips 2005). Note that elsewhere in this volume, Sheskin and Dashefsky rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish federations and often end up with what we define as an enlarged population with Jewish parents (PJP), although not one that includes non-Jews living in households with Jews. The urban areas reported here for the US are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), whereas in previous years we reported data for larger Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSAs). Therefore, some of this year’s estimates may look lower than in previous years. Similar changes in the definition of Metropolitan areas affected past data for Israel.

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The unequivocal outcome of the overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2019 more than half (53.4%) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New  York-NewarkJersey City, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim (Table 8.11). Two-thirds (66.6%) of world Jewry lived in the five previously mentioned largest areas plus the following six: Miami/Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, WashingtonArlington-Alexandria, Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, Philadelphia-CamdenWilmington, Paris, and Boston-Cambridge-Newton. In 2019, the 19 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population, each with 100,000 Jews or more, encompassed 75.8%—over three quarters—of all Jews worldwide. The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and surpassing 3.5 million Jews by the core definition, largely exceeded that in the New York MSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 19 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, eleven were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living, with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespread transnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of core Jewish among total population (91.1%), followed at a distance by Jerusalem (72.6%), Haifa (66.8%), and Beersheba (57.5%). In the diaspora, the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan area was in New York (10.6%), followed by Miami-Fort Lauderdale (8.6%), San Francisco (5.2%), Washington (4.8%), and Philadelphia (4.6%). Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. Especially in the US, the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in Table 8.11. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and some may even commute weekly (Pupko 2013). The case of Israelis regularly commuting abroad for work has also become more frequent.

8.6  Major Determinants of Demographic Change The changes in the size and composition of Jewish populations outlined above reflect a chain of interrelated factors each of which in turn depends on a complex array of explanatory determinants. We briefly review here two of these

Table 8.11  Metropolitan areas (CSAs) with core Jewish populations above 100,000, 1/1/2019

Rank Metropolitan areaa 1 Tel Avivb 2 New York-NewarkJersey City 3 Jerusalemc 4 Haifad 5 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim 6 Miami-Ft. LauderdalePompano Beach 7 Washington-ArlingtonAlexandria 8 Chicago-NapervilleElgin 9 Philadelphia-CamdenWilmington 10 Parise 11 Boston-CambridgeNewton 12 San Francisco-OaklandBerkeley 13 Be’er Shevaf 14 Londong 15 Torontoh 16 Buenos Airesi 17 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta 18 Baltimore-ColumbiaTowson 19 San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad

% Jews out of total population 91.1 10.6

% Of world Jewish population Cumulative % % 24.3 24.3 14.3 38.6

Country Israel U.S.

Core Jewish population 3,569,500 2,107,800

Israel Israel U.S.

932,900 625,600 617,500

72.6 66.8 4.6

6.3 4.3 4.2

44.9 49.2 53.4

U.S.

535,500

8.6

3.6

57.0

U.S.

297,300

4.8

2.0

59.1

U.S.

294,300

3.1

2.0

61.1

U.S.

283,500

4.6

1.9

63.0

France U.S.

275,000 257,500

2.3 3.6

1.9 1.8

64.9 66.6

U.S.

244,000

5.2

1.7

68.3

Israel U.K. Canada Argentina U.S.

221,300 195,000 190,000 159,000 119,800

57.5 1.0 3.1 1.2 2.0

1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.8

69.8 71.1 72.4 73.5 74.3

U.S.

115,800

1.9

0.8

75.1

U.S.

100,000

3.0

0.7

75.8

Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. The US metropolitan areas are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by the US Office of Management and Budget. See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineationfiles.html. A table of the population of the top 20 MSAs can be found in Chap. 5 of this volume. Some of the US estimates are not core Jewish populations and are closer to enlarged Jewish populations. Israel metropolitan areas are defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, Ashdod Subdistrict, and sections of Judea and Samaria area. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000 c Includes Jerusalem District and parts of the Judea and Samaria District. Includes Bet Shemesh with over 100,000 Jewish population d Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District e Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 f Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District g Greater London and contiguous postcode areas h Census Metropolitan Area i Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A a

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factors—international migration and age composition—which help understanding the mechanisms behind the demographic polarization that has emerged between Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora.

8.6.1  International Migration Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants as such by single country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and nonJews (US Department of Homeland Security 2017; Eurostat 2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS—formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS 2013) in the US or the Zentralwohlfhartsstelle in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete. Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the FSU opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated over 1.7 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2018 including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel’s share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years of 1990–1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002–2004 and increased again in subsequent years—significantly so in 2018. The US significantly lost weight as a destination for FSU migrants since the onset of the twenty-first century, as was the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany since 2005. These remarkable increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU—as a whole and throughout its different regional realities—during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities, as well as real or expected disruptions in the societal environment affecting Jewish life. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic options in the main countries of destination. Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and 2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a migration balance producing a net surplus to Israel, reduces the population of the Diaspora and increases the Jewish population of Israel. Table 8.12 shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2017 and 2018. The data reflect the Law of Return, not the core Jewish population, definition.

317

8  World Jewish Population, 2019 Table 8.12  New immigrants to Israela, by last country of residence, 2017–2018 Country 2017 2018 Country Grand Totalb 26,333 28,118 Germany America— 4225 4146 Greece Totalb North 2848 2759 Hungary America Canada 280 245 Ireland United States 2568 2514 Italy Central 135 144 Luxembourg America Bahamas 1 0 Malta Costa Rica 16 10 Netherlands Cuba 5 2 Poland Dominican 3 0 Portugal Rep. El Salvador 5 5 Romania Guadeloupe 8 1 Slovenia Guatemala 3 8 Slovakia Honduras 1 5 Spain Jamaica 1 0 Sweden Mexico 76 93 United Kingdom Panama 16 20 FSU in Europe 1242 1243 Belarus South America Argentina 247 283 Estonia Bolivia 4 5 Latvia Brazil 619 586 Lithuania Chile 26 34 Moldova Colombia

74

84 Russian Fed.

Ecuador Paraguay

9 9

13 Ukraine 8 FSU unspecified 47 Other West Eur. 54 Gibraltar

Peru

57

Uruguay

69

Venezuela Europe— Totalb European Unionc

128 129 Monaco 20,197 22,041 Norway 4356

3628 Switzerland

2017 2018 Country 154 170 Kazakhstan 9 6 Kyrgyzstan 52 2 115 1

36 Tadjikistan 1 Turkmenistan 74 Uzbekistan 4 Other Asia

2017 2018 131 203 21 23 7

6

24 208 226

16 200 227

0 50 18 4

7 62 24 7

China Hong Kong India Indonesia

9 7 56 0

19 1 111 1

10 1 1 88 28 469

22 0 6 63 20 514

Iraq Iran Japan Korea South Nepal Philippines

1 131 2 2 1 5

1 76 2 0 0 2

3

3

1

0

1 7 0 432

0 7 4 363

143

99

43 57

31 52

43

16

289

264

1 1

2 Sub-Sahara Afr. 5 Congo 3 Ghana

3 0

2 1

84

79 Mozambique

0

1

15,369 18,123 Singapore 952

943 Sri Lanka

5 49 25 196

7 48 42 173

Taiwan Thailand Vietnam Africa— Totalb 7109 10,474 Northern Africa 7027 6428 Ethiopia 6 8 Morocco 87 1

89 Tunisia

(continued)

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Table 8.12 (continued) Country Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark

2017 25 119 14 2 0 13

2018 26 108 6 1 5 18

12

9

Finland France

9 3160

8 2431

Country Balkans Albania Serbia Turkey Asia—Totalb FSU in Asia Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

2017 385 5 11 369 1001 775

2018 201 0 12 189 991 764

Country Namibia Ruanda Nigeria Tanzania South Africa Zimbabwe

2017 2018 0 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 282 256 1 1

48

9

140

121

131 205

131 176

Oceania— Total Australia New Zealand

140 0

117 4

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizens b Including country unknown c Not including the Baltic countries

In 2018, Jewish international migration slightly increased versus the previous year. In recent years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the rapidly decreasing Jewish population in the less developed countries which also were the main areas of Jewish emigration. We already noted the clearly negative relationship that prevails between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. At the same time perceptions and experiences of mounting antisemitism in some countries, particularly in France, stimulated Jewish emigration in more recent years. In the foreseeable future, a continuation of moderate levels of migration can be expected, provided that current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions are not seriously disrupted across the global system, especially in Europe. From this point of view, the UK withdrawal (Brexit) from the European Union might carry significant economic and demographic consequences in the longer term. In 2018, 28,118 new immigrants arrived in Israel from 87 countries and territories, compared to 26,333  in 2017 (a 6.8% increase and the highest of the past 10 years), 25,010 in 2016, 27,850 in 2015, 24,066 in 2014, and 16,882 in 2013. In 2018, immigration to Israel increased from the European but not the Asian republics of the FSU, Latin America, and Asia, while it diminished from all areas in Europe other than the FSU, North America, Africa, and Oceania. Migration toward other countries did not necessarily follow the same patterns of change over the years. Indeed, Israeli immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families, but the integration difficulties experienced in Israel by some immigrants may have created a deterrent. One case in point is immigration from France which, after an all-time peak in 2015 (6627), declined to 4147 in 2016, 3160 in 2017, and 2431 in 2018. Russia was the main country of origin in 2018 (10,474 immigrants vs. 7109

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immigrants in 2017), followed by Ukraine (6428 vs. 7027), the US (2514 vs. 2568), and France. No other country had more than 1000 migrants to Israel. Among countries with more than 100 immigrants, minuscule increases occurred from the UK, Argentina, Germany, Venezuela, and India. Declines were recorded from Belarus, Brazil, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Canada, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Georgia, Moldova, Australia, and Belgium. Azerbaijan was stable. Only 31 immigrants arrived from Ethiopia in 2018 compared to 43 in 2017. To these figures, one should add several thousand immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration. Figure 8.10 demonstrates the annual changes in the number of immigrants to Israel from six of the major countries of origin: Russia, Ukraine, the US, France, the Number 15,000 13,500 12,000

Russia

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Fig. 8.10  Number of immigrants to Israel from major countries of origin, and rate of immigrants per 1000 Jews 2001–2018

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aggregate of Latin American countries, and Ethiopia. Clearly the fluctuations reflected local circumstances in each country and not one common underlying determinant, possibly related to the receiving country Israel. Occasional peaks are related in Ukraine to civil war and the armed conflict with Russia; in Latin America, the collapse of the Central Bank in Argentina in 2002; in France mounting terrorism and antisemitism; and in Ethiopia the variable policies adopted by Israel’s government toward bringing more or less of the candidates for immigration who still reside in transition camps in Addis Ababa and elsewhere. The bottom panel of Fig. 8.10 demonstrates the frequency of migration to Israel per 1000 Jewish population in each country of origin and each year (using a logarithmic scale). The highest frequencies initially appeared in Ethiopia, reflecting a systematic repatriation policy which has been discontinued after 2010. The significantly high frequencies in Russia and the Ukraine reflect the security conditions of border areas, but also a quite deeper socioeconomic disease. Increases in France due to security uncertainty seem to have been counteracted by difficulties experienced with immigrants’ absorption in Israel. In Latin America the situation partially normalized after the above-mentioned economic bankruptcy. The US continued to feature the lowest propensity for emigration of any other country—though very slowly increasing. Emigration frequencies are clearly ordered according to the level of development of countries. However, France, though being more developed than Latin America featured higher migration frequencies, thus demonstrating the effects of a diminishing sense of security and growing disenchantment with society. While it cannot be disputed that the preference for Israel as a country of destination over competing countries is significantly affected by Jewish norms and values, aliyah seems nevertheless to follow the logic of global development. On the other hand, Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes upon some employment opportunities—is today probably the main single source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016). Levels of emigration from Israel are overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at Israel’s level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings illustrate the primacy of socioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about immigrant admissions. The effects of ideological, security, and fearrelated factors end up as weaker determinants of the volume and timing of Jewish immigration and emigration—namely to and from Israel.

8.6.2  Age Composition The age composition of a population is a fundamental mediator between demographic processes that precede a certain point in time and the processes that unfold after that point. Age structures are sensitive to the composition of migrants which usually include some over-representation of younger adults and their children.

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Exceptions occur when the immigrants include a large share of elderly persons as has been the case for migration from the FSU to Germany, or even to the US and Israel over the past decades. In general, populations in the sending countries tend to become older as a consequence of migration, while populations in the receiving countries tend to become younger. But, as just noted, immigration may also cause aging of the receiving population. The birth rate, however, is the main determinant of the age composition of a population. Large cohorts reflecting years of high birth rates, as was the case in the US during the baby-boom years (1946–1964), produce a younger population. A persistent high birth rate, as in Israel, produces an expanding population in which each cohort is followed by a slightly larger one, so creating a graphical image of a pyramid. Low birth rates, as typical of most Jewish populations outside of Israel, generate smaller cohorts which sometimes are smaller than those born several years before and in the extreme case may produce a graphic image of an upside down pyramid. In recent years some upward reversal in the Jewish birth rate occurred in the UK, Austria, and possibly Australia. In Fig. 8.11, we demonstrate four different age structures among contemporary Jewish populations, reflecting different stages of demographic transformation. All data refer to the core definition. Israel, here portrayed in 2016 for the sake of comparisons (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics) is the only case where each age group is larger than the one immediately older. The largest age group was 0–14. Israel actually is the only country in the world with a high child dependency ratio (greater than 45%) along with a relatively high old-age dependency ratio (greater than or equal to 15%). It is included by the UN in the double dependency category (United Nations Population Division 2017). At the opposite extreme, Germany in 2018 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in

UK 2011

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+65

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Fig. 8.11  Age structures of selected Jewish populations, 2011–2018, percentages

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Deutschland 2018) had an extremely elderly age distribution, where the largest group is 65 and over. The US in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013), and the UK in 2011 (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012), represent intermediate cases but with some important differences. Both the US and UK Jewish populations underwent significant aging and had relatively low birth rates during the past 50 years. In the US, the effects of the baby boom were visible, with the by far largest age group being those age 45–64 in 2013, born 1949–1968. There were significantly fewer children age 0–14 than young adults age 15–29. In the UK, aging was significant as well, but the effects of the post-World War II baby boom were significantly less and there were again more children than young adults in 2011. Such rejuvenation reflected the growing impact of Haredi Jews among the UK total Jewish population. As a benchmark for future demographic change, these very different age structures portend very different scenarios. Those countries with large elderly cohorts will unavoidably experience some numerical decline—assuming no major future migrations. Populations that are currently younger will have more of a chance to having children and possibly increasing or keeping their size stable, as well as holding a growing share of world Jewish population. Acknowledgments  Since inception, the American Jewish Year Book has documented the Jewish world and has given significant attention to Jewish population issues. Since 1981, responsibility for preparing annual population estimates for world Jewry was taken by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the A.  Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Division was founded by Roberto Bachi in 1959, was headed by Uziel O. Schmelz until 1986, by the present author until 2010, and by Uzi Rebhun since 2010. Jewish population estimates appeared in the AJYB, then under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee, until 2008. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates appeared in the framework of the North American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the renewed American Jewish Year Book. World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 and as of January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not issued. The interested reader may consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a). The author expresses warm appreciation to the editors of AJYB during more than 30 years of a close collaboration: Morris Fine, Milton Himmelfarb, David Singer, Ruth Seldin, Lawrence Grossman, and currently Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M.  Sheskin. The author also gratefully acknowledges the collaboration of many institutions and persons in various countries who supplied information or otherwise helped in the preparation of this study. Special thanks are due to my colleagues at The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Uzi Rebhun and Mark Tolts. I am also indebted to those who over the years provided relevant information and advice at different stages of the present study (in the alphabetical order of the respective cities): Chris Kooyman (Amsterdam), the late Ralph Weill (Basel), Jim Schwartz (Bergen County, NJ), Olaf Glöckner (Berlin), Shmuel Frankel (Bne Berak), Marcos Peckel (Bogota), Simon Cohn, and Claude Kandiyoti (Brussels), András Kovács (Budapest), Ezequiel Erdei, and Yaacov Rubel (Buenos Aires), Tally Frankental (Cape Town), Salomon Benzaquen and Tony Beker de Weinraub (Caracas), Cathleen Falsani, and Tom W. Smith (Chicago), Frank Mott (Columbus, OH), Heike von Bassewitz, and Ellen Rubinstein (Frankfurt a. M.), Frans van Poppel, and Hanna van Solinge (The Hague), Ariela Keysar and Barry Kosmin (Hartford, CT), Maritza Corrales Capestrany (Havana), Lina Filiba (Istanbul), Steven Adler, Benjamin Anderman, Margalit Bejarano, Maya Choshen, Eilat Cohen-Kastro, Susanne Cohen-Weisz, Oren Cytto, Nurit Dovrin, Judith Even, Netanel Fisher, Ahmad Hleihel, Shlomit Levy, Israel Pupko, Uzi Rebhun, Liat Rehavi,

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Dalia Sagi, Marina Sheps, Maya Shorer Kaplan, Mark Tolts, Eduardo Torres, Emma Trahtenberg, Chaim I. Waxman, and the late Norma Gurovich (Jerusalem), David Saks (Johannesburg), Roy van Keulen (Leiden), Jonathan Boyd, Richard Goldstein, Marlena Schmool. and Daniel Staetsky (London), Pini Herman, and Bruce Phillips (Los Angeles), Pinhas Punturello (Madrid), John Goldlust, Andrew Markus and Ran Porat (Melbourne), Judit Bokser Liwerant, Susana Lerner, Mauricio Lulka, and Yael Siman (Mexico City), Ira M.  Sheskin (Miami), Rafael Porzecanski (Montevideo), Evgueni Andreev and Eugeni Soroko (Moscow), David Bass (Neveh Daniel), the late Vivian Z. Klaff (Newark, DE), Steven M. Cohen, Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Lucette Lagnado and Sarah Markowitz (New York), David M.  Mizrachi (Panama City), Marcelo Dimentstein, Alberto Senderey, and the late Doris Bensimon-Donat (Paris), Allen Glicksman (Philadelphia), Zbyněk Tarant (Pilsen), Yochanan Moran (Porto), Alice Goldstein, and the late Sidney Goldstein (Providence, RI), Narciso Attía (Quito), Mustafa Khawaja (Ramallah), Orly C.  Meron, Carlos Tapiero, and the late Erik H. Cohen (Ramat Gan), Gloria Arbib, and Alberto Levy (Rome), Lars Dencik (Roskilde), David Saltiel (Saloniki), Alberto Milkewitz, Simon Schwartzman, and the late René Decol (São Paulo), Mordechai Abergel (Singapore), Arnold Dashefsky (Storrs, CT), Gary Eckstein, and David Graham (Sydney), Allie A.  Dubb (Tel Aviv), Robert Brym, and Gustave Goldman (Toronto), Jeffrey Scheckner (Union, NJ), Thomas Buettner, and Hania Zlotnik (United Nations, NY), Raimund Fastenbauer (Vienna), Sylvia Barack Fishman, Leonard Saxe, Charles Kadushin, Benjamin Phillips, and Elizabeth Tighe (Waltham, MA), Barry R. Chiswick, Carmel U. Chiswick, Alan Cooperman, Conrad Hackett, Neha Sagal, and Greg Smith (Washington, DC), Melita Svob (Zagreb). An anonymous reviewer provided useful suggestions to the text and tables. Responsibility for the contents of this article is the author’s only.

Appendix Definitions In most Diaspora countries, the core Jewish population (CJP—a concept initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a sociodemographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, or who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, and do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting subjective perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does not necessarily coincide, with Halakhah (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does not depend on any measure of that person’s Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The core Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the core Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin who in

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censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The core population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources. In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the core Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, and not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person’s Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources. A major research issue of growing impact is whether core Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000–2001 US National Jewish Population SurveyNJPS 2000–2001 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the core Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of Persons of Jewish Background (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000–2001. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013.) The 2013 Pew Research Center’s A Portrait of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), by introducing the previously not empirically tested concept of partly Jewish, helped clarify the demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the partly Jewish as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers would suggest that the partly Jewish stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of Non-Jews with Jewish background, or Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity. Recent research experience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of the core Jewish definition, and between different core and non-core statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and vice versa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is not necessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.

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Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of total population with at least one Jewish parent (PJP) includes the core Jewish population plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013). The enlarged Jewish population (EJP—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) further expands by including the sum of: (a) the core Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are partly Jewish; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by core Jewish population criteria—are not currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent; and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). NonJews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as partly Jewish or as PJBs who are not part of the US core Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of multiple ethnicities, naturally should be included under the enlarged definition. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the enlarged definition usually does not include other nonJewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households. The Law of Return population (LRP) reflects Israel’s distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the Law of Return (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel’s Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for Law of Return purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian nonJews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the Law of Return. The law itself does not affect a person’s Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel’s Ministry of Interior relying on Israel’s rabbinic authorities— but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the Law of Return. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren, as well as to their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a large population—the so-called aliyah eligible—whose scope is

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significantly wider than the core and enlarged Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998, 2018). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the Law of Return population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below. Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the enlarged and Law of Return definitions than to the core definition.

Presentation and Quality of Data Jewish population estimates in this chapter refer to January 1, 2019. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence some margin of inaccuracy. For example, a wealth of the data about Israel’s population becomes available annually when the American Jewish Year Book is already in print. Some of Israel’s data here are the product of estimates based on the most recent trends, but may need adjustment when the actual data are released. Indeed, where appropriate, we revise our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2018 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2019 estimates. Corrections of the 2019 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future. We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident core Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the Appendix an estimate of (1) mid-year 2018 total (including both Jews and non-Jews) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2018); (2) the estimated January 1, 2019 core Jewish population (CJP); (3) the number of Jews per 1000 total population; and (4) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last three columns provide rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (PJP), the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP), and the Law of Return population (LRP). These figures were derived from available information and assessments on the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, and the data should be taken as indicative only.

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Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or “snowbird” issue in estimating the US Jewish population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.) Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. In the Appendix Table the main types of sources are indicated as follows: (C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts and over counts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated. (P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep a permanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of individual demographic events. (S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public organization. (J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization. (E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization. Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country’s Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the Appendix Table, as follows: (A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country’s Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.

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(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. The year in which a country’s base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate’s date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2018 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information. One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al. 2000b; and author’s current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2019 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

Country World America Total Bermuda Canada United States Total North Americah Bahamas Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Jamaica Mexico Netherlands Antilles Panama Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Other Total Central Amer., Caribbean Argentina

Core Jewish populationb CJP 14,707,400 6,469,900 100 392,000 5,700,000 6,092,100 300 2500 500 100 100 900 200 40,000 300 10,000 1500 400 200 57,000

180,000

Total populationa 7,620,497,000 1,014,023,000 61,000 37,200,000 328,000,000 365,323,000 400,000 5,000,000 11,100,000 10,800,000 6,500,000 17,200,000 2,900,000 130,800,000 324,000 4,200,000 3,300,000 105,000 29,371,000 222,000,000

44,500,000

4.04

Jews per 1000 total population 1.93 6.38 1.64 10.54 17.38 16.68 0.75 0.50 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.31 0.93 2.38 0.45 3.81 0.01 0.26 B 2003

D 1990 C 1993 C 2013 D 2000 C 1993 B 1999 C 2010 B 2010 C 2016 C 2012 C 2000 D 2016 D 2016

C J S E E S J C,S C S J E

S

C 2016 B 2018 B 2013

C C S

Accuracy Typec ratingd

Source

Appendix Table  Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2019

260,000

Population with Jewish parente PJP 17,917,750 8,955,300 200 450,000 8000,000 8,450,200 500 2800 1000 200 200 1200 300 45,000 500 11,000 2000 600 400 65,700 310,000

Enlarged Jewish populationf EJP 20,876,400 11,156,200 300 550,000 10,000,000 10,550,300 700 3100 1500 300 300 1500 400 50,000 700 12,000 2500 700 600 74,300 360,000

Law of Return populationg LRP 23,674,400 13,418,300 400 700,000 12,000,000 12,700,400 900 3400 2000 400 400 1800 500 65,000 900 13,000 3000 800 800 92,900

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Country Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela Total South Americah EUROPE TOTAL Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland Francei Germany

Total populationa 11,300,000 209,400,000 18,600,000 49,800,000 17,000,000 6,900,000 32,200,000 600,000 3,500,000 31,800,000 426,700,000 827,974,000 8,800,000 11,400,000 7,000,000 4,100,000 1,200,000 10,600,000 5,800,000 1,300,000 5,500,000 65,140,000 82,800,000

Appendix Table  (continued)

Core Jewish populationb CJP 500 92,600 18,300 2100 600 1000 1900 200 16,600 7000 320,800 1,340,200 10,000 29,100 2000 1700 100 3900 6400 1900 1300 450,000 118,000 Jews per 1000 total population 0.04 0.44 0.98 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.33 4.74 0.22 0.75 1.62 1.14 2.55 0.29 0.41 0.08 0.37 1.10 1.46 0.24 6.91 1.43 C,J J C,J C,J E C,J S C,P P S J

B 2018 C 2018 C 2011 C 2001 D 2012 C 2011 C 2018 A 2017 B 2010 B 2018 B 2018

Accuracy Typec ratingd J C 2009 C B 2010 C B 2002 S C 2010 J B 2011 C B 2002 S C 1993 J D 2000 S B 2013 S C 2012

Source Population with Jewish parente PJP 700 120,000 21,000 2800 800 1300 2400 400 20,000 10,000 439,400 1,814,000 X 14,000 35,000 4000 2400 200 5000 7500 2700 1600 550,000 150,000

Enlarged Jewish populationf EJP 900 150,000 25,000 3500 1000 1600 3000 600 24,000 12,000 531,600 2,319,400 17,000 40,000 6000 3100 300 6500 8500 3500 1900 650,000 225,000

Law of Return populationg LRP 1100 180,000 30,000 4500 1200 1900 3500 800 28,000 14,000 625,000 2,813,800 20,000 45,000 8000 3800 400 8000 9500 4500 2200 750,000 275,000

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Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdomj Total European Union 28 Gibraltar Norway Switzerland Total other West Europeh Bosnia-Herzegovina North Macedonia 700 1300 18,500 20,500 500 100

3,500,000 2,100,000

4200 47,300 2600 27,400 4600 2400 600 100 29,800 4500 600 9000 2600 100 11,700 15,000 292,000 1,078,900

35,000 5,300,000 8,500,000 14,434,000

10,600,000 9,800,000 4,900,000 60,600,000 1,900,000 2,800,000 600,000 500,000 17,200,000 38,400,000 10,300,000 19,500,000 5,400,000 2,100,000 46,700,000 10,200,000 66,600,000 511,740,000

0.14 0.05

20.00 0.25 2.18 1.42

0.40 4.83 0.53 0.45 2.42 0.86 1.00 0.20 1.73 0.12 0.06 0.46 0.48 0.05 0.25 1.47 4.38 2.11

C C

C P C

J C C S,J C,P C,P J E S C,J C C,J C C J S C,S

C 2001 C 1996

B 2019 B 2010 B 2012

B 2000 C 2018 B 2016 B 2018 A 2017 B 2011 B 2000 D 2012 B 2018 C 2018 C 2001 B 2002 C 2011 C 2003 C 2018 C 2018 B 2018

X

800 200

800 1600 22,000 24,400

5200 75,000 3600 34,000 8000 4700 800 200 43,000 7000 800 13,000 3600 200 15,000 20,000 X 330,000 1,336,500

1100 300

900 2000 25,000 27,900

6000 100,000 5000 41,000 12,000 7500 1000 300 53,000 10,000 1000 17,000 4600 300 18,000 25,000 370,000 1,633,500

(continued)

1400 400

1000 2500 28,000 31,500

7000 130,000 6500 48,000 16,000 10,500 1200 400 63,000 13,000 1200 20,000 6000 400 21,000 30,000 410,000 1,910,600

8  World Jewish Population, 2019 331

Country Serbia Turkeyk Other Total Balkans Belarus Moldova Russiak Ukraine Total FSU Republics [Total FSU in Europe]l ASIA TOTAL 4,453,500,000 Israelm 8,543,109 West Bankn 3,023,700 Gazan 1,886,500 Total Israel and 13,453,250 Palestinian Territoryo 8,970,900 [Total State of Israel]p Armenia 3,000,000 Azerbaijan 9,900,000 Georgia 3,900,000 Kazakhstan 18,400,000 Kyrgyzstan 6,100,000 Turkmenistan 5,900,000

Total populationa 7,000,000 81,300,000 5,300,000 99,200,000 9,500,000 3,500,000 147,300,000 42,300,000 202,600,000 208,600,000

Appendix Table  (continued)

Jews per 1000 total population 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.95 0.54 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.50 731.20 138.54 0.00 495.46 743.02 0.03 0.76 0.38 0.14 0.07 0.03

Core Jewish populationb CJP 1400 14,800 100 16,900 9000 1900 165,000 48,000 223,900 232,800

6,699,700 6,246,700 418,900 0 6,665,600

6,665,600 100 7500 1500 2600 400 200 C C C C C C

C,P C,P C,P

C C C C

B 2011 B 2009 B 2014 B 2009 B 2009 D 1995

A 2019 A 2019 A 2019

B 2009 B 2014 C 2010 C 2001

Accuracy Typec ratingd C C 2001 S,J B 2016 D 2016

Source

6,878,950 300 10,500 3000 4800 700 400

6,928,050 X 6,455,611 X 423,339 0 6,878,950

Population with Jewish parente PJP 2100 19,000 200 22,300 17,000 3800 X 320,000 X 90,000 430,800 446,200

7,092,300 500 15,500 5000 6500 1000 600

7,157,100 6,664,509 427,791 0 7,092,300

Enlarged Jewish populationf EJP 2800 21,000 300 25,500 25,000 7500 460,000 140,000 632,500 655,500

7,092,300 700 20,500 7500 9500 1500 800

7,174,300 6,664,509 427,791 0 7,092,300

Law of Return populationg LRP 3500 23,000 400 28,700 33,000 10,000 600,000 200,000 843,000 874,000

332 S. DellaPergola

Uzbekistan Total former USSR in Asiah Chinaq India Indonesia Iran Japan Philippines Singapore South Korea Syriar Taiwan Thailand Other Total other Asia AFRICA TOTAL Egypt Ethiopia Morocco Tunisia Total Northern Africah Botswana Congo D.R. Kenya

3000 15,300

3000 4800 100 8300 1000 100 900 100 100 100 200 100 18,800 72,000 100 100 2100 1000 3300 100 100 300

32,900,000 89,200,000

1,401,900,000 1,371,300,000 265,200,000 81,600,000 126,500,000 107,000,000 5,800,000 51,800,000 18,300,000 23,600,000 66,200,000 831,646,750 4,350,846,750 1,284,000,000 97,000,000 107,500,000 35,200,000 11,600,000 342,800,000

2,200,000 84,300,000 51,000,000

0.05 0.00 0.01

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.01

0.09 0.17

C 1993 C 1993 C 1990

C 2015 C 2015 C 2015 C 2015

J S J J

E E J

D 2015 C 2011 D 2016 B 2012 D 2015 D 2000 C 2015 C 2015 D 2015 D 2000 D 2015 D 2016

D 1989

E C E C E E J J E E E

C

200 200 500

3200 6000 200 10,500 1200 200 1000 200 200 200 300 200 23,400 81,700 200 500 2500 1200 4400

6000 25,700

300 300 700

3400 7500 300 12,000 1400 300 1200 300 300 300 400 300 27,700 88,900 300 1000 2800 1400 5500

8000 37,100

(continued)

400 400 900

3600 9000 400 13,000 1600 400 1400 400 400 400 500 400 31,500 97,100 400 2500 3100 1600 7600

10,000 50,500

8  World Jewish Population, 2019 333

100 100 100 67,500 200 200 68,700

125,600 118,000 7500 100

26,300,000 2,500,000 195,900,000 57,700,000 14,000,000 507,300,000 941,200,000

41,000,000 24,100,000 4,900,000 12,000,000

Core Jewish populationb CJP

3.06 4.90 1.53 0.01

0.00 0.04 0.00 1.17 0.01 0.00 0.07

Jews per 1000 total population

C C

J C E C,S C

A 2016 B 2006 D 2016

D 2016 C 1993 D 2000 B 2018 B 2001 D 2016

Accuracy Typec ratingd

Source

138,700 X 130,000 8500 200

X

200 200 200 75,000 400 400 77,300

Population with Jewish parente PJP

154,800 145,000 9500 300

300 300 300 80,000 600 600 83,400

Enlarged Jewish populationf EJP

170,900 160,000 10,500 400

400 400 400 85,000 800 800 89,500

Law of Return populationg LRP

b

a

Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2019) and United Nations Population Division (2018). Mid-year 2018 estimates Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity e Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent f Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.) g Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification c (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register. (E) Estimate. d (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country’s Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic

Madagascar Namibia Nigeria South Africa Zimbabwe Other Total Sub-Saharan Africas OCEANIA TOTAL Australia New Zealand Other

Country

Total populationa

Appendix Table  (continued)

334 S. DellaPergola

trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A, B, and C, the year in which the country’s base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate’s date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2019 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information h Including countries and territories not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of those countries combined i Including Monaco j Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man k Including Asian regions l Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU m Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bank n Author’s revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2019: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,595,900; Gaza: 1,886,500; Total: 4,482,400. The West Bank also includes 418,900 Jews and 8,900 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total of 427,800 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 3,023,700 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents o Not including foreign workers and refugees p Israel’s total permanent (de jure) population as defined by Israel’s legal system, not including foreign workers and refugees q Including Hong Kong and Macao r Jewish population includes Lebanon s Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa

8  World Jewish Population, 2019 335

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Part II

Jewish Lists

Chapter 9

Local Jewish Organizations Ira M. Sheskin, Arnold Dashefsky, and Sarah Markowitz

This chapter provides lists with contact information (name, address, phone number, website) for about 180 Jewish Federations, about 200 Jewish Community Centers, about 185 Jewish Family Services, 15 Jewish Vocational Services, about 50 Jewish Free Loans, and all Israeli embassies and consulates. Note that the 180 Jewish Federations include more than 140 organizations that are associated with the Jewish Federations of North America and some organizations that function as federations for their communities but choose not to be formally associated with JFNA. For synagogues, college Hillels, and Jewish day schools, websites are provided that contain lists of these organizations, as we simply do not have the resources to update these lists annually. We also do not have the space in this volume to provide extensive lists of these organizations. The purpose of this chapter is to document the institutional infrastructure of the North American Jewish community and to preserve this information for historical purposes. We expect that historians 100 years from now will look back at the Year Book in researching the history of North American Jewry. In a sense, we are “freezing” the information in time. The information on the internet, of course, changes as frequently as the webmasters update that information, meaning that without this freezing, historians in the future will not have a record of the infrastructure of the community.

I. M. Sheskin (*) Department of Geography and Jewish Demography Project, Sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Dashefsky Department of Sociology and Center for Judaic Studies and Contemporary Jewish Life, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA S. Markowitz Independent Researcher, Forest Hills, NY, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Dashefsky, I. M. Sheskin (eds.), American Jewish Year Book 2019, American Jewish Year Book 119, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40371-3_9

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Each list is carefully updated each year, but the authors appreciate any corrections noted by our readers. We have found that the lists we can find for Jewish institutions on the internet are far from totally accurate.

9.1  Jewish Federations 9.1.1  C  entral Coordinating Body for Jewish Federations, United States The Jewish Federations of North America (formerly United Jewish Appeal, Council of Jewish Federations, and United Jewish Communities). For contact information and a description, see the Jewish Community Coordinating Organizations section of Chap. 12.

9.1.2  Jewish Federations, United States Alabama Birmingham Birmingham Jewish Federation. 3966 Montclair Road, Mountain Brook, AL 35213. (205) 879-0416. (www.bjf.org) Mobile Mobile Area Jewish Federation. 705 Regents Way, Mobile, AL 36609. (251) 490-4872. (www.mobilejewishfederation.org) Montgomery (Central Alabama) Jewish Federation of Central Alabama. PO Box 20058, Montgomery, AL 36120. (334) 277-5820. (www.jewishmontgomery.org) Arizona Phoenix Jewish Federation of Greater Phoenix. 12701 North Scottsdale Road, Suite 201, Scottsdale, AZ 85254. (480) 634-4900. (www.jewishphoenix.org) Tucson (Southern Arizona) Jewish Federation of Southern Arizona. 3718 East River Road, Tucson, AZ 85718. (520) 577-9393. (www.jfsa.org) Arkansas Little Rock Jewish Federation of Arkansas. 18 Corporate Hill Drive, Suite 204, Little Rock, AR 72205. (501) 663-3571. (www.jewisharkansas.org)

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California Fresno (Central California) Jewish Federation of Central California. 406 West Shields Avenue, Fresno, CA 93705. (559) 432-2162. (www.jewishfederationcentralcalifornia.org) Long Beach (West Orange County) Jewish Federation of Greater Long Beach & West Orange County. 3801 E Willow Street, Long Beach, CA 90815. (562) 426-7601. (www.jewishlongbeach.org) Los Angeles Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles. 6505 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90048. (323) 761-8000. (www.jewishla.org) Oakland (East Bay) Jewish Federation and The Jewish Community Foundation of the East Bay. (Ceased to exist as of July 2019) Orange County Jewish Federation & Family Services of Orange County. One Federation Way, Suite 210, Irvine, CA 92603. (949) 435-3484. (www.jewishorangecounty.org) Palm Springs Jewish Federation of the Desert. 69710 Highway 111, Rancho Mirage, CA 92270. (760) 324-4737. (www.jfedps.org) Sacramento Jewish Federation of the Sacramento Region. 2130 21st Street, Sacramento, CA 95818. (916) 486-0906. (www.jewishsac.org) San Diego Jewish Federation of San Diego County. 4950 Murphy Canyon Road, San Diego, CA 92123. (858) 571-3444. (www.jewishinsandiego.org) San Francisco (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma Counties) (As of July 2019, the East Bay Federation merged into the San Francisco Federation) Jewish Community Federation & Endowment Fund of San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma Counties. 121 Steuart Street, San Francisco, CA 94105. (415) 777-0411. (www.jewishfed.org) San Gabriel (Pomona Valleys) Jewish Federation of the Greater San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys. 114A West Lime Avenue, Monrovia, CA 91016. (626) 445-0810. (www.jewishsgpv.org) San Jose (Silicon Valley) Jewish Federation of Silicon Valley. 14855 Oka Road, Suite 200, Los Gatos, CA 95032. (408) 358-3033. (www.jvalley.org) San Luis Obispo JCC-Federation of San Luis Obispo. 875 Laureate Lane, San Luis Obispo, CA 93405. (805) 426-5465. (www.jccslo.com)

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Santa Barbara Jewish Federation of Greater Santa Barbara. 524 Chapala Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101. (805) 957-1115. (www.jewishsantabarbara.org) Ventura Jewish Federation of Ventura County. 7620 Foothill Road, Ventura, CA 93004. (805) 647-7800. (www.jewishventuracounty.org) Colorado Aspen UJA Aspen Valley c/o JEWISHcolorado. 300 South Dahlia Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80246. (303) 321-3399. (www.jewishcolorado.org/ujaaspenvalley) Denver-Boulder JEWISHcolorado. 300 South Dahlia Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80246. (303) 321-3399. (www.jewishcolorado.org) Connecticut Bridgeport-Westport (Upper Fairfield County) Federation for Jewish Philanthropy of Upper Fairfield County. 4200 Park Avenue, Suite 300, Bridgeport, CT 06604. (203) 226-8197. (www.jewishphilanthropyct.org) Greenwich UJA-JCC Greenwich. One Holly Hill Lane, Greenwich, CT 06830. (203) 552-1818. (www.ujajcc.org) Hartford Jewish Federation of Greater Hartford. 333 Bloomfield Avenue, Suite C, West Hartford, CT 06117. (860) 232-4483. (www.jewishhartford.org) New Haven Jewish Federation of Greater New Haven. 360 Amity Road, Woodbridge, CT 06525. (203) 387-2424. (www.jewishnewhaven.org) New London (Eastern Connecticut) Jewish Federation of Eastern Connecticut. 28 Channing Street, New London, CT 06320. (860) 442-8062. (www.jfec.com) Southbury (Western Connecticut) Jewish Federation of Western Connecticut. 444 Main Street North, Southbury, CT 06488. (203) 267-3177. (www.jfed.net) Stamford-New Canaan-Darien United Jewish Federation of Greater Stamford, New Canaan and Darien. 1035 Newfield Avenue, Suite 200, Stamford, CT 06905. (203) 321-1373. (www. ujf.org)

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Delaware Wilmington Jewish Federation of Delaware. 101 Garden of Eden Road, Wilmington, DE 19803. (302) 427-2100. (www.shalomdelaware.org) District of Columbia Washington, DC Jewish Federation of Greater Washington. 6101 Executive Boulevard, Suite 100, North Bethesda, MD 20852. (301) 230-7200. (www.shalomdc.org) Florida Boca Raton-Delray Beach (South Palm Beach) Jewish Federation of South Palm Beach County. 9901 Donna Klein Boulevard, Boca Raton, FL 33428. (561) 852-3100. (www.jewishboca.org) Daytona Beach (Volusia and Flagler Counties) Jewish Federation of Volusia & Flagler Counties. 470 Andalusia Avenue, Ormond Beach, FL 32174. (386) 672-0294. (www.jewishfederationdaytona.org) Fort Lauderdale (Broward County) Jewish Federation of Broward County. 5890 South Pine Island Road, Davie, FL 33328. (954) 252-6900. (www.jewishbroward.org) Fort Myers (Lee and Charlotte Counties) Jewish Federation of Lee and Charlotte Counties. 9701 Commerce Center Court, Fort Myers, FL 33908. (239) 481-4449. (www.jewishfederationlcc.org) Gainesville (North Central Florida) Jewish Council of North Central Florida. 3835 Northwest 8th Avenue, Gainesville, FL 32605. (352) 371-3846. (www.jcncf.org) Jacksonville Jewish Federation of Jacksonville. 8505 San Jose Boulevard, Jacksonville, FL 32217. (904) 448-5000. (www.jewishjacksonville.org) Melbourne (Brevard County) Jewish Federation of Brevard. 210 East Hibiscus Boulevard, Melbourne, FL 32901. (321) 951-1836. (www.jewishfederationbrevard.com) Miami Greater Miami Jewish Federation. 4200 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, FL 33137. (305) 576-4000. (www.jewishmiami.org) Naples (Collier County) Jewish Federation of Greater Naples. 2500 Vanderbilt Beach Road, Suite 2201, Naples, FL 34109. (239) 263-4205. (www.jewishnaples.org) Orlando Jewish Federation of Greater Orlando. 851 North Maitland Avenue, Maitland, FL 32751. (407) 645-5933. (www.orlandojewishfed.org)

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Sarasota and Manatee Counties Jewish Federation of Sarasota-Manatee. 580 McIntosh Road, Sarasota, FL 34232. (941) 371-4546. (www.jfedsrq.org) St. Petersburg (Pinellas, Pasco, and Hernando Counties) Jewish Federation of Florida’s Gulf Coast (formerly Jewish Federation of Pinellas and Pasco Counties). 13191 Starkey Road, Suite 8, Largo, FL 33773. (727) 530-3223. (www.jewishgulfcoast.org) Tallahassee Tallahassee Jewish Federation. PO Box 14825, Tallahassee, FL 32317. (850) 220-0015. (www.jewishtallahassee.org) Tampa Tampa Jewish Federation. 13009 Community Campus Drive, Tampa, FL 33625. (813) 264-9000. (www.jewishtampa.com) West Palm Beach Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County. 1 Harvard Circle, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, FL 33409. (561) 478-0700. (www.jewishpb.org/fed) Georgia Atlanta Jewish Federation of Greater Atlanta. 1440 Spring Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30309. (404) 873-1661. (www.jewishatlanta.org) Augusta Augusta Jewish Federation. 898 Weinberger Way, Evans, GA 30809. (706) 228-3636. (www.jewishaugusta.org) Columbus Jewish Federation of Columbus, GA.  PO Box 6313, Columbus, GA 31917. (706) 568-6668. (www.facebook.com/Jewish-Federation-ofColumbus-GA-396914817040809) Macon (Middle Georgia) Jewish Federation of Macon & Middle Georgia. PO Box 5276, Macon, GA 31208. (www.jewishmacon.org) Savannah Savannah Jewish Federation. 5111 Abercorn Street, Savannah, GA 31405. (912) 355-8111. (www.savj.org) Illinois Champaign-Urbana Champaign-Urbana Jewish Federation. 503 East John Street, Champaign, IL 61820. (217) 367-9872. (www.cujf.org) Chicago Jewish United Fund/Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago. 30 South Wells Street, Chicago, IL 60606. (312) 346-6700. (www.juf.org)

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Peoria Jewish Federation of Peoria. 2000 Pioneer Parkway, Suite 10B, Peoria, IL 61615. (309) 689-0063. (www.jewishpeoria.org) Rockford Jewish Federation of Greater Rockford. 1203 Comanche Drive, Rockford, IL 61107. (815) 399-5497. (www.jewishrockfordil.org) Rock Island (Quad Cities) Jewish Federation of the Quad Cities. 2715 30th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201. (309) 793-1300. (www.jfqc.org) Southern Illinois Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky. 3419 West Main Street, Belleville, IL 62226. (618) 235-1614. (www. simokyfed.com) Springfield Jewish Federation of Springfield, Illinois. 1045 Outer Park Drive, Suite 320, Springfield, IL 62704. (217) 787-7223. (www.shalomspringfield.org) Indiana Fort Wayne Jewish Federation of Fort Wayne. 5200 Old Mill Road, Fort Wayne, IN 46807. (260) 456-0400. (www.jewishfortwayne.org) Gary (Northwest Indiana) Jewish Federation of Northwest Indiana. 585 Progress Avenue, Munster, IN 46321. (219) 301-0960. (www.federationonline.org) Indianapolis Jewish Federation of Greater Indianapolis. 6705 Hoover Road, Indianapolis, IN 46260. (317) 726-5450. (www.jfgi.org) South Bend (St. Joseph Valley) Jewish Federation of St. Joseph Valley. 3202 Shalom Way, South Bend, IN 46615. (574) 233-1164. (www.thejewishfed.org) West Lafayette Jewish Federation of Greater Lafayette. PO Box 3802, West Lafayette, IN 47996. (317) 522-1938. (www.jfgl.org) Iowa Davenport (Quad Cities) Jewish Federation of the Quad Cities. 2715 30th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201. (309) 793-1300. (www.jfqc.org) Des Moines Jewish Federation of Greater Des Moines. 33158 Ute Avenue, Waukee, IA 50263. (515) 987-0899. (www.jewishdesmoines.org)

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Iowa City Iowa City Jewish Federation. c/o The University of Iowa, Aliber Hillel, 122 East Market Street, Iowa City, IA 52245. (319) 338-0778. (www.iowahillel.org) Sioux City Jewish Federation of Sioux City. 815 38th Street, Sioux City, IA 51104. (712) 258-0618. (No website) Kansas Kansas City Jewish Federation of Greater Kansas City. 5801 West 115th Street, Suite 201, Overland Park, KS 66211. (913) 327-8100. (www.jewishkansascity.org) Wichita (Mid-Kansas) Mid-Kansas Jewish Federation. 400 North Woodlawn, Suite 8, Wichita, KS 67208. (316) 686-4741. (www.mkjf.org) Kentucky Lexington (Central Kentucky) Jewish Federation of the Bluegrass. 1050 Chinoe Road, Suite 112, Lexington, KY 40502. (859) 268-0672. (www.jewishlexington.org) Louisville Jewish Federation of Louisville. 3600 Dutchmans Lane, Louisville, KY 40205. (502) 459-0660. (www.jewishlouisville.org) Northern Kentucky Jewish Federation of Cincinnati. 8499 Ridge Road, Cincinnati, OH 45236. (513) 985-1500. (www.jewishcincinnati.org) Western Kentucky Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky. 3419 West Main Street, Belleville, IL 62226. (618) 235-1614. (www. simokyfed.com) Louisiana Baton Rouge Jewish Federation of Greater Baton Rouge. 4845 Jamestown Avenue, Suite 210, Baton Rouge, LA 70808. (225) 379-7393. (www.jewishbr.org) New Orleans Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans. 3747 West Esplanade Avenue, Metairie, LA 70002. (504) 780-5600. (www.jewishnola.com) Shreveport (North Louisiana) North Louisiana Jewish Federation. 245 Southfield Road, Shreveport, LA 71105. (318) 868-1200. (www.jewishnla.org) Maine Portland (Southern Maine) Jewish Community Alliance of Southern Maine. 1342 Congress Street, Portland, ME 04102. (207) 772-1959. (www.mainejewish.org)

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Maryland Baltimore Associated: Jewish Federation of Baltimore. 101 West Mount Royal Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21201. (410) 727-4828. (www.associated.org) Bethesda (Montgomery County) Jewish Federation of Greater Washington. 6101 Executive Boulevard, Suite 100, North Bethesda, MD 20852. (301) 230-7200. (www.shalomdc.org) Columbia (Howard County) Jewish Federation of Howard County. 10630 Little Patuxent Parkway, Suite 400, Columbia, MD 21044. (410) 730-4976. (www.jewishhowardcounty.org) Northeast Maryland Jewish Federation of Delaware. 101 Garden of Eden Road, Wilmington, DE 19803. (302) 427-2100. (www.shalomdelaware.org) Massachusetts Andover (Merrimack Valley) Merrimack Valley Jewish Federation. PO Box 937, Andover, MA 01810. (978) 688-0466. (www.mvjf.org) Attleboro Jewish Alliance of Greater Rhode Island. 401 Elmgrove Avenue, Providence, RI 02906. (401) 421-4111. (www.jewishallianceri.org) Berkshire County Jewish Federation of the Berkshires. 196 South Street, Pittsfield, MA 01201. (413) 442-4360. (www.jewishberkshires.org) Boston Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston. 126 High Street, Boston, MA 02110. (617) 457-8500. (www.cjp.org) Cape Cod Jewish Federation of Cape Cod. PO Box 2568, 396 Main Street, Hyannis, MA 02601. (508) 778-5588. (www.facebook.com/Jewish-Federation-of-Cape-Cod167404356653822) Fall River Fall River UJA. 385 High Street, Fall River, MA 02720. (508) 673-7791. (No website) New Bedford Jewish Federation of Greater New Bedford. 467 Hawthorn Street, North Dartmouth, MA 02747. (508) 997-7471. (www.jewishnewbedford.org) Springfield (Western Massachusetts) Jewish Federation of Western Massachusetts. 1160 Dickinson Street, Springfield, MA 01108. (413) 737-4313. (www.jewishwesternmass.org)

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Worcester (Central Massachusetts) Jewish Federation of Central Massachusetts. 633 Salisbury Street, Worcester, MA 01609. (508) 756-1543. (www.jewishcentralmass.org) Michigan Ann Arbor Jewish Federation of Greater Ann Arbor. 2939 Birch Hollow Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48108. (734) 677-0100. (www.jewishannarbor.org) Detroit Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit. 6735 Telegraph Road, Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301. (888) 902-4673. (www.jewishdetroit.org) Flint Flint Jewish Federation. 5080 West Bristol Road, Suite 3, Flint, MI 48507. (810) 767-5922. (www.flintfed.com) Grand Rapids Jewish Federation of Grand Rapids. 2727 Michigan NE, Grand Rapids, MI 49506. (616) 942-5553. (www.jewishgrandrapids.org) Lansing Greater Lansing Jewish Welfare Federation. 360 Charles Street, East Lansing, MI 48823. (517) 332-1916. (www.jewishlansing.org) Southeast Michigan Jewish Federation of Greater Toledo. 6465 Sylvania Avenue, Sylvania, OH 43560. (419) 885-4461. (www.jewishtoledo.org) Southwest Michigan Jewish Federation of St. Joseph Valley. 3202 Shalom Way, South Bend, IN 46615. (574) 233-1164. (www.thejewishfed.org) Minnesota Minneapolis Minneapolis Jewish Federation. 111 Cheshire Lane, Suite 50, Minnetonka, MN 55305. (952) 593-2600. (www.jewishminneapolis.org) St. Paul Jewish Federation of Greater St. Paul. 790 South Cleveland Avenue, Suite 227, St. Paul, MN 55116. (651) 690-1707. (www.jewishstpaul.org) Mississippi Oxford Jewish Federation of Oxford, Mississippi. (www.jewishfederationoxfordms.org) Missouri Kansas City (West Central Missouri) Jewish Federation of Greater Kansas City. 5801 West 115th Street, Suite 201, Overland Park, KS 66211. (913) 327-8100. (www.jewishkansascity.org

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Southeast Missouri Jewish Federation of Southern Illinois, Southeast Missouri and Western Kentucky. 3419 West Main Street, Belleville, IL 62226. (618) 235-1614. (www. simokyfed.com) St. Louis Jewish Federation of St. Louis. 12 Millstone Campus Drive, St. Louis, MO 63146. (314) 432-0020. (www.jewishinstlouis.org) Nebraska Lincoln Jewish Federation of Lincoln. PO Box 67218, Lincoln, NE, 68506. (402) 915-3659. (www.jewishlincoln.org) Northeast Nebraska Jewish Federation of Sioux City. 815 38th Street, Sioux City, IA 51104. (712) 258-0618. (No website) Omaha Jewish Federation of Omaha. 333 South 132nd Street, Omaha, NE 68154. (402) 334-8200. (www.jewishomaha.org) Nevada Las Vegas Jewish Nevada. 2317 Renaissance Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89119. (702) 732-0556. (www.jewishnevada.org) New Hampshire Manchester Jewish Federation of New Hampshire. 66 Hanover Street, Suite 300, Manchester, NH 03101. (603) 627-7679. (www.jewishnh.org) New Jersey Atlantic City (Atlantic and Cape May Counties) Jewish Federation of Atlantic & Cape May Counties. 501 North Jerome Avenue, Margate, NJ 08402. (609) 822-4404. (www.jewishbytheshore.org) Bayonne UJA Federation of Bayonne. 1050 Kennedy Boulevard, Bayonne, NJ 07002. (201) 436-6900. (www.jccbayonne.org/board) Cherry Hill (Southern New Jersey) Jewish Federation of Southern New Jersey. 1301 Springdale Road, Suite 200, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003. (856) 751-9500. (www.jewishsouthjersey.org) Cumberland, Gloucester, and Salem Counties Jewish Federation of Cumberland, Gloucester and Salem Counties. 1015 East Park Avenue, Suite B, Vineland, NJ 08360. (856) 696-4445. (www.jewishcumberland.org)

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Greater MetroWest NJ (Essex, Morris, Sussex, Union, and parts of Somerset Counties) Jewish Federation of Greater MetroWest NJ. 901 Route 10, Whippany, NJ 07981. (973) 929-3000. (www.jfedgmw.org) Middlesex and Monmouth Counties Jewish Federation in the Heart of New Jersey. 230 Old Bridge Turnpike, South River, NJ 08882. (732) 588-1800. (www.jewishheartnj.org) Northern New Jersey Jewish Federation of Northern New Jersey. 50 Eisenhower Drive, Paramus, NJ 07652. (201) 820-3900. (www.jfnnj.org) Ocean County Jewish Federation of Ocean County. 1235A Route 70, Lakewood, NJ 08701. (732) 363-0530. (www.jewishoceancounty.org) Princeton (Mercer County) Jewish Federation of Princeton Mercer Bucks. 4 Princess Road, Suite 211, Lawrenceville, NJ 08648. (609) 219-0555. (www.jewishpmb.org) Somerset, Hunterdon, and Warren Counties Jewish Federation of Somerset, Hunterdon & Warren Counties. 775 Talamini Road, Bridgewater, NJ 08807. (908) 758-2006. (www.jfedshaw.org) New Mexico Albuquerque Jewish Federation of New Mexico. 5520 Wyoming Boulevard NE, Albuquerque, NM 87109. (505) 821-3214. (www.jewishnewmexico.org) New York (Outside New York Metropolitan Area) Albany-Schenectady-Troy (Northeastern New York) Jewish Federation of Northeastern New York. 184 Washington Avenue Extension, Albany, NY 12203. (518) 783-7800. (www.jewishfedny.org) Binghamton (Broome County) Jewish Federation of Greater Binghamton. 500 Clubhouse Road, Vestal, NY 13850. (607) 724-2332. (www.jfgb.org) Buffalo Buffalo Jewish Federation. 2640 North Forest Road, Getzville, NY 14068. (716) 204-2241. (www.jfedbflo.com) Elmira (Twin Tiers) Jewish Center and Federation of the Twin Tiers. 1008 West Water Street, Elmira, NY 14905. (607) 734-8122. (www.jewishelmira.org) Ithaca Ithaca Area United Jewish Community. PO Box 4214, Ithaca, NY 14852. (www. iaujc.org)

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Kingston (Ulster County) Jewish Federation of Ulster County. 1 Albany Avenue, Suite G-10, Kingston, NY 12401. (845) 338-8131. (www.ucjf.org) Newburgh (Orange County) Jewish Federation of Greater Orange County. 292 North Street, 2nd Floor, Newburgh, NY 12550. (845) 562-7860. (www.jewishorangeny.org) Poughkeepsie (Dutchess County) Jewish Federation of Dutchess County. 17 Collegeview Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12603. (845) 471-9811. (www.jewishdutchess.org) Rochester Jewish Federation of Greater Rochester. 441 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 14607. (585) 461-0490. (www.jewishrochester.org) Rockland County Jewish Federation of Rockland County. 450 West Nyack Road, West Nyack, NY 10994. (845) 362-4200. (www.jewishrockland.org) Syracuse (Central New York) Jewish Federation of Central New York. 5655 Thompson Road, De Witt, NY 13214. (315) 445-0161. (www.jewishfederationcny.org) Utica (Mohawk Valley) Jewish Community Federation of the Mohawk Valley. 2310 Oneida Street, Utica, NY 13501. (315) 733-2343. (www.jccutica.net) New York Metropolitan Area New York City (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, Staten Island, and Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties) UJA-Federation of New York. 130 East 59th Street, New York, NY 10022. (212) 980-1000. (www.ujafedny.org) North Carolina Asheville (Western North Carolina) WNC Jewish Federation. PO Box 7126, Asheville, NC 28802. (828) 545-4648. (www.jewishasheville.org) Charlotte Jewish Federation of Greater Charlotte. 5007 Providence Road, Suite 101, Charlotte, NC 28226. (704) 944-6757. (www.jewishcharlotte.org) Durham-Chapel Hill Jewish Federation of Durham-Chapel Hill. 1937 West Cornwallis Road, Durham, NC 27705. (919) 354-4936. (www.shalomdch.org) Greensboro Greensboro Jewish Federation. 5509-C West Friendly Avenue, Greensboro, NC 27410. (336) 852-5433. (www.shalomgreensboro.org)

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Raleigh-Cary Jewish Federation of Raleigh-Cary. 8210 Creedmoor Road, Suite 104, Raleigh, NC 27613. (919) 676-2200. (www.shalomraleigh.org) Ohio Akron Jewish Community Board of Akron. 750 White Pond Drive, Akron, OH 44320. (330) 869-2424. (www.jewishakron.org) Canton Canton Jewish Community Federation. 432 30th Street NW, Canton, OH 44709. (330) 445-2404. (www.jewishcanton.org) Cincinnati Jewish Federation of Cincinnati. 8499 Ridge Road, Cincinnati, OH 45236. (513) 985-1500. (www.jewishcincinnati.org) Cleveland Jewish Federation of Cleveland. 25701 Science Park Drive, Cleveland, OH 44122. (216) 593-2900. (www.jewishcleveland.org) Columbus Jewish Federation of Columbus. 1175 College Avenue, Columbus, OH 43209. (614) 237-7686. (www.columbusjewishfederation.org) Dayton Jewish Federation of Greater Dayton. 525 Versailles Drive, Centerville, OH 45459. (937) 610-1555. (www.jewishdayton.org) Toledo Jewish Federation of Greater Toledo. 6465 Sylvania Avenue, Sylvania, OH 43560. (419) 885-4461. (www.jewishtoledo.org) Youngstown Youngstown Area Jewish Federation. 505 Gypsy Lane, Youngstown, OH 44504. (330) 746-3251. (www.jewishyoungstown.org) Oklahoma Oklahoma City Jewish Federation of Greater Oklahoma City. 710 Wilshire Creek Boulevard, Suite 103, Oklahoma City, OK 73116. (405) 848-3132. (www.jfedokc.org) Tulsa Jewish Federation of Tulsa. 2021 East 71st Street, Tulsa, OK 74136. (918) 495-1100. (www.jewishtulsa.org) Oregon Eugene (Lane County) Jewish Federation of Lane County. PO Box 5924, Eugene, OR 97405. (541) 484-2541. (www.jewishfedlc.org)

9  Local Jewish Organizations

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Portland Jewish Federation of Greater Portland. 6680 Southwest Capitol Highway, Portland, OR 97219. (503) 245-6219. (www.jewishportland.org) Pennsylvania Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton (Lehigh Valley) Jewish Federation of the Lehigh Valley. 702 North 22nd Street, Allentown, PA 18104. (610) 821-5500. (www.jewishlehighvalley.org) Altoona Greater Altoona Jewish Federation. 1308 17th Street, Altoona, PA 16601. (814) 515-1182. (www.greateraltoonajewishfederation.org) Harrisburg Jewish Federation of Greater Harrisburg. 3301 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110. (717) 236-9555. (www.jewishharrisburg.org) Lancaster Jewish Community Alliance of Lancaster. PO Box 5148, Lancaster, PA 17606. (717) 569-7352. (www.jcalancaster.org) North Central Pennsylvania Jewish Center and Federation of the Twin Tiers. 1008 West Water Street, Elmira, NY 14905. (607) 734-8122. (www.jewishelmira.org) Philadelphia Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia. 2100 Arch Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. (215) 832-0500. (www.jewishphilly.org) Pittsburgh Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh. 2000 Technology Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. (412) 681-8000. (www.jfedpgh.org) Bucks County Jewish Federation of Princeton Mercer Bucks. 4 Princess Road, Suite 211, Lawrenceville, NJ 08648. (609) 219-0555. (www.jewishpmb.org) Reading Jewish Federation of Reading/Berks. 1100 Berkshire Boulevard, Suite 125, Wyomissing, PA 19610. (610) 921-0624. (www.readingjewishcommunity.org) Scranton (Northeastern Pennsylvania) Jewish Federation of Northeastern Pennsylvania. 601 Jefferson Avenue, Scranton, PA 18510. (570) 961-2300. (www.jewishnepa.org) West Central Pennsylvania Youngstown Area Jewish Federation. 505 Gypsy Lane, Youngstown, OH 44504. (330) 746-3251. (www.jewishyoungstown.org) Wilkes-Barre (Wyoming Valley) (Northeastern Pennsylvania) Jewish Community Alliance of Northeastern Pennsylvania. 613 S. J. Strauss Lane, Kingston, PA 18704. (570) 824-4646. (www.jewishwilkes-barre.org)

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Rhode Island Providence Jewish Alliance of Greater Rhode Island. 401 Elmgrove Avenue, Providence, RI 02906. (401) 421-4111. (www.jewishallianceri.org) South Carolina Charleston Charleston Jewish Federation. 176 Croghan Spur Road, Suite 100, Charleston, SC 29407. (843) 614-6600. (www.jewishcharleston.org) Columbia Columbia Jewish Federation. 306 Flora Drive, Columbia, SC 29223. (803) 787-2023. (www.jewishcolumbia.org) Greenville Greenville Jewish Federation. PO Box 5262, Greenville, SC 29606. (864) 606-4453. (www.jewishgreenville.org) North Central South Carolina Jewish Federation of Greater Charlotte. 5007 Providence Road, Suite 101, Charlotte, NC 28226. (704) 944-6757. (www.jewishcharlotte.org) West Central South Carolina Augusta Jewish Federation. 898 Weinberger Way, Evans, GA 30809. (706) 228-3636. (www.jewishaugusta.org) Tennessee Chattanooga Jewish Federation of Greater Chattanooga. 5461 North Terrace Road, Chattanooga, TN 37411. (423) 493-0270. (www.jewishchattanooga.com) Knoxville Knoxville Jewish Alliance. 6800 Deane Hill Drive SW, Knoxville, TN 37919. (865) 690-6343. (www.jewishknoxville.org) Memphis Memphis Jewish Federation. 6560 Poplar Avenue, Germantown, TN 38138. (901) 767-7100. (www.jcpmemphis.org/federation) Nashville (Middle Tennessee) Jewish Federation of Nashville and Middle Tennessee. 801 Percy Warner Boulevard, Suite 102, Nashville, TN 37205. (615) 356-3242. (www.jewishnashville.org) Texas Austin Jewish Federation of Greater Austin. 7300 Hart Lane, Austin, TX 78731. (512) 735-8010. (www.shalomaustin.org) Corpus Christi Combined Jewish Appeal of Corpus Christi. 750 Everhart Road, Corpus Christi, TX 78411. (361) 855-6239. (www.jcccorpuschristi.org)

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Dallas Jewish Federation of Greater Dallas. 7800 Northaven Road, Dallas, TX 75230. (214) 369-3313. (www.jewishdallas.org) El Paso Jewish Federation of Greater El Paso. 7110 North Mesa, El Paso, TX 79912. (915) 842-9554. (www.jewishelpaso.org) Fort Worth (Tarrant County) Jewish Federation of Fort Worth & Tarrant County. 4049 Kingsridge Road, Fort Worth, TX 76109. (817) 569-0892. (www.tarrantfederation.org) Houston Jewish Federation of Greater Houston. 5603 South Braeswood Boulevard, Houston, TX 77096. (713) 729-7000. (www.houstonjewish.org) San Antonio Jewish Federation of San Antonio. 12500 Northwest Military Highway, Suite 200, San Antonio, TX 78231. (210) 302-6960. (www.jfsatx.org) Waco Jewish Federation of Waco. 5601 Edmond Avenue, Waco, TX 76710. (254) 776-3740. (www.jfedwaco.org) Utah Salt Lake City United Jewish Federation of Utah. 2 North Medical Drive, Salt Lake City, UT 84113. (801) 581-0102. (www.shalomutah.org) Virginia Newport News (Virginia Peninsula) United Jewish Community of the Virginia Peninsula. 401 City Center Boulevard, Newport News, VA 23606. (757) 930-1422. (www.ujcvp.org) Norfolk-Virginia Beach (Tidewater) United Jewish Federation of Tidewater. 5000 Corporate Woods Drive, Suite 200, Virginia Beach, VA 23462. (757) 965-6100. (www.jewishva.org) Northern Virginia Jewish Federation of Greater Washington. 6101 Executive Boulevard, Suite 100, North Bethesda, MD 20852. (301) 230-7200. (www.shalomdc.org) Richmond Jewish Community Federation of Richmond. 5403 Monument Avenue, Richmond, VA 23226. (804) 285-6500. (www.jewishrichmond.org) Washington Seattle Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle. 2031 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98121. (206) 443-5400. (www.jewishinseattle.org)

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Southwest Washington Jewish Federation of Greater Portland. 6680 Southwest Capitol Highway, Portland, OR 97219. (503) 245-6219. (www.jewishportland.org) West Virginia Charleston Federated Jewish Charities of Charleston. PO Box 1613, Charleston, WV 25326. (304) 345-2320 (www.fjcofcharleston.org) Wisconsin Madison Jewish Federation of Madison. 6434 Enterprise Lane, Madison, WI 53719. (608) 278-1808. (www.jewishmadison.org) Milwaukee Milwaukee Jewish Federation. 1360 North Prospect Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53202. (414) 390-5700. (www.milwaukeejewish.org)

9.1.3  C  entral Coordinating Body for Jewish Federations, Canada Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA (formerly United Israel Appeal of Canada and UIA Federations Canada). For contact information and a description, see the National Jewish Organizations, Canada section of Chap. 12.

9.1.4  Jewish Federations, Canada Alberta Calgary Calgary Jewish Federation. 1607 90th Avenue SW, Calgary, AB T2V 4V7. (403) 444-3152. (www.jewishcalgary.org) Edmonton Jewish Federation of Edmonton. 10220 156th Street, Suite 100, Edmonton, AB T5P 2R1. (780) 487-0585. (www.jewishedmonton.org) British Columbia Vancouver Jewish Federation of Greater Vancouver. 950 West 41st Avenue, Suite 200, Vancouver, BC V5Z 2N7. (604) 257-5100. (www.jewishvancouver.com)

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Victoria-Vancouver Island Jewish Federation of Victoria & Vancouver Island. 3636 Shelbourne Street, Victoria, BC V8P 4H2. (250) 370-9488. (www.jewishvancouverisland.ca) Manitoba Winnipeg Jewish Federation of Winnipeg. 123 Doncaster Street, Suite C300, Winnipeg, MB R3N 2B2. (204) 477-7400. (www.jewishwinnipeg.org) Nova Scotia Halifax Atlantic Jewish Council. 5670 Spring Garden Road, Suite 309, Halifax, NS B3J 1H6. (902) 422-7491. (www.theajc.ns.ca) Ontario Hamilton Hamilton Jewish Federation. 1605 Main Street West, Hamilton, ON L8S 1E6. (905) 648-0605, ext 305. (www.jewishhamilton.org) London London Jewish Federation. JCC London, 536 Huron Street, London, ON N5Y 4J5. (519) 673-3310. (www.jewishlondon.ca) Ottawa Jewish Federation of Ottawa. 21 Nadolny Sachs Private, Ottawa, ON K2A 1R9. (613) 798-4696, ext. 231. (www.jewishottawa.com) Toronto UJA Federation of Greater Toronto. 4600 Bathurst Street, Toronto, ON M2R 3V2. (416) 635-2883. (www.jewishtoronto.com) Windsor Windsor Jewish Federation. 1641 Ouellette Avenue, Windsor, ON N8X 1K9. (519) 973-1772. www.jewishwindsor.org) Quebec Montreal Federation CJA. 1 Cummings Square (5151 Côte St. Catherine Road), Montreal, QC H3W 1M6. (514) 735-3541. (www.federationcja.org) Montreal Federation CJA West Island. 96 Roger-Pilon Street, Dollard-des-Ormeaux, QC H9B 2E1. (514) 624-5005. (www.federationcja.org/en/who/fcja_westisland)

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9.2  Jewish Community Centers 9.2.1  C  entral Coordinating Body for Jewish Community Centers JCC Association of North America (formerly Council of Young Men's Hebrew & Kindred Associations and Jewish Welfare Board). For contact information and a description, see the Jewish Community Coordinating Organizations section of Chap. 12.

9.2.2  Jewish Community Centers, United States Alabama Birmingham Levite JCC. 3960 Montclair Road, Birmingham, AL 35213. (205) 879-0411. (www. bhamjcc.org) Arizona Phoenix East Valley JCC. 908 North Alma School Road, Chandler, AZ 85224. (480) 897-0588. (www.evjcc.org) Phoenix Valley of the Sun JCC. 12701 North Scottsdale Road, Scottsdale, AZ 85254. (480) 483-7121. (www.vosjcc.org) Tucson (Southern Arizona) Tucson JCC. 3800 East River Road, Tucson, AZ 85718. (520) 299-3000. (www. tucsonjcc.org) California Long Beach (West Orange County) Barbara and Ray Alpert JCC. 3801 East Willow Street, Long Beach, CA 90815. (562) 426-7601. (www.alpertjcc.org) Los Angeles Silverlake Independent JCC. 1110 Bates Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90029. (323) 663-2255. (www.sijcc.net) Los Angeles Valley JCC. 20350 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 100, Woodland Hills, CA 91364. (818) 360-2211. (www.valleyjcc.org) Los Angeles Westside JCC. 5870 West Olympic Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90036. (323) 938-2531. (www.westsidejcc.org)

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Orange County Merage JCC of Orange County. One Federation Way, Suite 200, Irvine, CA 92603. (949) 435-3400. (www.jccoc.org) San Diego Lawrence Family JCC of San Diego County. 4126 Executive Drive, Jacobs Family Campus, La Jolla, CA 92037. (858) 457-3030. (www.lfjcc.org) San Francisco (Contra Costa County) Contra Costa JCC. 1550 Parkside Drive, Suite 130, Walnut Creek, CA 94596. (925) 938-7800. (www.ccjcc.org) San Francisco JCC of San Francisco. 3200 California Street, San Francisco, CA 94118. (415) 292-1200. (www.jccsf.org) San Francisco (Alameda County) JCC of the East Bay. 1414 Walnut Street, Berkeley, CA 94709. (510) 848-0237. (www.jcceastbay.org) San Francisco (Sonoma County) JCC, Sonoma County. 1301 Farmers Lane, Santa Rosa, CA 95405. (707) 528-4222. (www.jccsoco.org) San Francisco (Marin County) Osher Marin JCC. 200 North San Pedro Road, San Rafael, CA 94903. (415) 444-8000. (www.marinjcc.org) San Francisco (Santa Clara County) Oshman Family JCC. 3921 Fabian Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303. (650) 223-8700. (www.paloaltojcc.org) San Francisco (Monterrey Peninsula) (San Mateo County) Peninsula JCC. 800 Foster City Boulevard, Foster City, CA 94404. (650) 212-7522. (www.pjcc.org) San Jose (Silicon Valley) Addison-Penzak JCC of Silicon Valley. 14855 Oka Road, Suite 201, Los Gatos, CA 95032. (408) 357-7429. (www.svjcc.org) San Luis Obispo JCC-Federation of San Luis Obispo. 875 Laureate Lane, San Luis Obispo, CA 93405. (805) 426-5465. (www.jccslo.com) Santa Barbara Bronfman Family JCC/Jewish Federation of Greater Santa Barbara. 524 Chapala Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101. (805) 957-1115. (www.jewishsantabarbara.org)

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Colorado Boulder Boulder JCC. 6007 Oreg Avenue, Boulder, CO 80303. (303) 998-1900. (www.boulderjcc.org) Denver Staenberg-Loup JCC. 350 South Dahlia Street, Denver, CO 80246. (303) 399-2660. (www.jccdenver.org) Connecticut Danbury JCC in Sherman. 9 Route 39, Sherman, CT 06784. (860) 355-8050. (www.jccinsherman.org) Greenwich JCC Greenwich. One Holly Hill Lane, Greenwich, CT 06830. (203) 552-1818. (www.jccgreenwich.org) Hartford Mandell JCC of Greater Hartford. 335 Bloomfield Avenue, West Hartford, CT 06117. (860) 236-4571. (www.mandelljcc.org) New Haven JCC of Greater New Haven. 360 Amity Road, Woodbridge, CT 06525. (203) 387-2424. (www.jccnh.org) Stamford-New Canaan-Darien Stamford JCC. 1035 Newfield Avenue, Stamford, CT 06905. (203) 322-7900. (www.stamfordjcc.org) Delaware Wilmington Bernard and Ruth Siegel JCC. 101 Garden of Eden Road, Wilmington, DE 19803. (302) 478-5660. (www.siegeljcc.org) District of Columbia Washington, DC Edlavitch JCC of Washington, DC. 1529 Sixteenth Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 518-9400. (www.washingtondcjcc.org) Florida Boca Raton-Delray Beach (South Palm Beach) Adolph and Rose Levis JCC. 9801 Donna Klein Boulevard, Boca Raton, FL 33428. (561) 852-3200. (www.levisjcc.org) Fort Lauderdale (Broward County) David Posnack JCC. 5850 South Pine Island Road, Davie, FL 33328. (954) 434-0499. (www.dpjcc.org)

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Fort Lauderdale (Broward County) Samuel M. & Helene Soref JCC. 6501 West Sunrise Boulevard, Plantation, FL 33313. (954) 792-6700. (www.sorefjcc.org) Jacksonville David A. Stein Jewish Community Alliance. 8505 San Jose Boulevard, Jacksonville, FL 32217. (904) 730-2100. (www.jcajax.org) Miami Dave and Mary Alper JCC. 11155 Southwest 112th Avenue, Miami, FL 33176. (305) 271-9000. (www.alperjcc.org) Miami Galbut Family Miami Beach JCC. 4221 Pine Tree Drive, Miami Beach, FL 33140. (305) 534-3206. (www.mbjcc.org) Miami Michael-Ann Russell JCC. 18900 Northeast 25th Avenue, North Miami Beach, FL 33180. (305) 932-4200. (www.marjcc.org) Orlando Jack & Lee Rosen JCC. 11184 South Apopka-Vineland Road, Orlando, FL 32836. (407) 387-5330. (www.rosenjcc.org) Orlando Roth Family JCC of Greater Orlando. 851 North Maitland Avenue, Maitland, FL 32751. (407) 645-5933. (www.orlandojcc.org) Tampa Tampa JCCs, Bryan Glazer Family JCC. 522 North Howard Avenue, Tampa, FL 33606. (813) 575-5900. (www.jewishtampa.com) Tampa Tampa JCCs, JCC on the Cohn Campus. 13009 Community Campus Drive, Tampa, FL 33625. (813) 264-9000. (www.jewishtampa.com) West Palm Beach Mandel JCC of the Palm Beaches, Boynton Beach. 8500 Jog Road, Boynton Beach, FL 33472. (561) 740-9000. (https://bb.jcconline.com) West Palm Beach Mandel JCC of the Palm Beaches, Palm Beach Gardens. 5221 Hood Road, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33418. (561) 712-5200. (https://pbg.jcconline.com) Georgia Atlanta Marcus JCC of Atlanta. 5342 Tilly Mill Road, Dunwoody, GA 30338. (678) 812-4000. (www.atlantajcc.org) Augusta Augusta JCC. 898 Weinberger Way, Evans, GA 30809. (706) 228-3636. (www. augustajcc.org)

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Savannah Savannah Jewish Educational Alliance. 5111 Abercorn Street, Savannah, GA 31405. (912) 355-8111. (www.savannahjea.org) Illinois Chicago JCC Chicago, Bernard Horwich JCC. 3003 West Touhy Avenue, Chicago, IL 60645. (773) 761-9100. (www.jccchicago.org) Chicago JCC Chicago, Bernard Weinger JCC. 300 Revere Drive, Northbrook, IL 60062. (224) 406-9200. (www.jccchicago.org) Chicago JCC Chicago, Florence G.  Heller JCC. 524 West Melrose Avenue, Chicago, IL 60657. (773) 871-6780. (www.jccchicago.org) Chicago JCC Chicago, Hyde Park JCC. 5200 South Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, IL 60615. (773) 753-3080. (www.jccchicago.org) Chicago JCC Chicago, Lake County JCC. 23280 North Old McHenry Road, Lake Zurich, IL 60047. (847) 901-0620. (www.jccchicago.org) Chicago JCC Chicago, Mayer Kaplan JCC Children’s Center. 5050 Church Street, Skokie, IL 60077. (847) 763-3500. (www.jccchicago.org) (Ceased to exist as of 2018) Indiana Indianapolis Arthur M. Glick JCC. 6701 Hoover Road, Indianapolis, IN 46260. (317) 251-9467. (www.jccindy.org) Kansas Kansas City JCC of Greater Kansas City. 5801 West 115th Street, Overland Park, KS 66211. (913) 327-8000. (www.thejkc.org) Kentucky Louisville JCC of Louisville. 3600 Dutchmans Lane, Louisville, KY 40205. (502) 238-2791 or (502) 459-0660. (www.jewishlouisville.org/the-j) Louisiana New Orleans New Orleans JCC, Goldring-Woldenberg JCC-Metairie, Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Building, 3747 West Esplanade Avenue, Metairie, LA 70002. (504) 887-5158. (www.nojcc.org)

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New Orleans New Orleans JCC, Uptown. 5342 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70115. (504) 897-0143. (www.nojcc.org) Maine Portland (Southern Maine) Jewish Community Alliance of Southern Maine. 1342 Congress Street, Portland, ME 04102. (207) 772-1959. (www.mainejewish.org) Maryland Baltimore JCC of Greater Baltimore, Downtown Baltimore JCC. 1118 Light Street, Baltimore, MD 21230. (410) 559-3618. (www.jcc.org) Baltimore JCC of Greater Baltimore, Rosenbloom Owings Mills JCC. 3506 Gwynnbrook Avenue, Owings Mills, MD 21117. (410) 559-3500. (www.jcc.org) Baltimore JCC of Greater Baltimore, Weinberg Park Heights JCC. 5700 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215. (410) 500-5900. (www.jcc.org) Columbia (Howard County) Jewish Federation of Howard County. 10630 Little Patuxent Parkway, Suite 400, Columbia, MD 21044. (410) 730-4976. (www.jewishhowardcounty.org) Rockville (Montgomery County) Bender JCC of Greater Washington. 6125 Montrose Road, Rockville, MD 20852. (301) 881-0100. (www.jccgw.org) Massachusetts Boston JCC Greater Boston, Leventhal-Sidman JCC. 333 Nahanton Street, Newton, MA 02459. (617) 558-6522. (www.bostonjcc.org) Boston JCC Greater Boston, Metrowest. 327 Union Avenue, Framingham, MA 01702. (508) 879-3300. (www.bostonjcc.org) Boston JCC Greater Boston, North of Boston. (617) 841-8009. (www.bostonjcc.org) Boston JCC Greater Boston, South of Boston. (781) 795-0510. (www.bostonjcc.org) Boston (North Shore) JCC of the North Shore. 4 Community Road, Marblehead, MA 01945. (781) 631-8330. (www.jccns.org) Boston (North Shore) North Suburban JCC. 240 Lynnfield Street, Peabody, MA 01960. (978) 471-5520. (www.nsjcc.org)

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Springfield (Western Massachusetts) Springfield JCC. 1160 Dickinson Street, Springfield, MA 01108. (413) 739-4715. (www.springfieldjcc.org) Worcester (Central Massachusetts) Worcester JCC. 633 Salisbury Street, Worcester, MA 01609. (508) 756-7109. (www.worcesterjcc.org) Michigan Ann Arbor JCC of Greater Ann Arbor. 2935 Birch Hollow Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48108. (734) 971-0990. (www.jccannarbor.org) Detroit JCC of Metropolitan Detroit. 6600 West Maple Road, West Bloomfield, MI 48322. (248) 661-1000. (www.jccdet.org) Minnesota Minneapolis Sabes JCC. 4330 South Cedar Lake Road, Minneapolis, MN 55416. (952) 381-3400. (www.sabesjcc.org) St. Paul JCC of the Greater St. Paul Area. 1375 St. Paul Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55116. (651) 698-0751. (www.stpauljcc.org) Missouri St. Louis St. Louis JCC, Marilyn Fox Building, Chesterfield. 16801 Baxter Road, Chesterfield, MO 63005. (314) 442-3428. (www.jccstl.com) St. Louis St. Louis JCC, Staenberg Family Complex, Creve Coeur. 2 Millstone Campus Drive, St Louis, MO 63146. (314) 432-5700. (www.jccstl.com) Nebraska Omaha JCC of Omaha. 333 South 132nd Street, Omaha, NE 68154. (402) 334-8200. (www. jccomaha.org) Nevada Las Vegas JCC of Southern Nevada. 8689 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 180, Las Vegas, NV 89117. (702) 794-0090. (www.jccsn.org) New Jersey Atlantic and Cape May Counties Milton & Betty Katz JCC of Atlantic County. 501 North Jerome Avenue, Margate City, NJ 08402. (609) 822-1167. (www.jccatlantic.org)

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Bayonne JCC of Bayonne. 1050 Kennedy Boulevard, Bayonne, NJ 07002. (201) 436-6900. (www.jccbayonne.org) Cherry Hill (Southern New Jersey) Betty & Milton Katz JCC of Cherry Hill. 1301 Springdale Road, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003. (856) 424-4444. (www.katzjcc.org) Greater MetroWest NJ (Essex County) JCC MetroWest, Leon & Toby Cooperman JCC. 760 Northfield Avenue, West Orange, NJ 07052. (973) 530-3400. (www.jccmetrowest.org) Greater MetroWest NJ (Union County) JCC of Central New Jersey. 1391 Martine Avenue, Scotch Plains, NJ 07076. (908) 889-8800. (www.jccnj.org) Greater MetroWest NJ (Union County) YM-YWHA of Union County, Harry Lebau Jewish Center, 501 Green Lane, Union, NJ 07083. (908) 289-8112. (www.uniony.org) Middlesex County JCC of Middlesex County. 1775 Oak Tree Road, Edison, NJ 08820. (732) 494-3232. (www.jccmc.org) Monmouth County Charles & Brenda Saka DSN Community Center. 244 Norwood Avenue, Oakhurst, NJ 07755. (732) 686-9595. (www.dsnlive.org) Monmouth County JCC Jersey Shore. 100 Grant Avenue, Deal, NJ 07723. (732) 531-9100. (www. jccjerseyshore.org) Northern New Jersey Kaplen JCC on the Palisades. 411 East Clinton Avenue, Tenafly, NJ 07670. (201) 569-7900. (www.jccotp.org) Princeton (Mercer County) JCC Princeton Mercer Bucks and JCC Abrams Camps. 148 Cedarville Road, East Windsor, NJ 08520. (609) 606-7070. (www.jccabramscamps.org) Somerset, Hunterdon, and Warren Counties Shimon and Sara Birnbaum JCC. 775 Talamini Road, Bridgewater, NJ 08807. (908) 725-6994. (www.ssbjcc.org) New Mexico Albuquerque Ronald Gardenswartz JCC of Greater Albuquerque. 5520 Wyoming Boulevard NE, Albuquerque, NM 87109. (505) 332-0565. (www.jccabq.org)

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New York (Outside New York Metropolitan Area) Albany (Northeastern New York) Sidney Albert Albany JCC. 340 Whitehall Road, Albany, NY 12208. (518) 438-6651. (www.saajcc.org) Binghamton (Broome County) Binghamton JCC. 500 Clubhouse Road, Vestal, NY 13850. (607) 724-2417. (www. binghamtonjcc.org) Buffalo JCC of Greater Buffalo, Benderson Family Building, Amherst. 2640 North Forest Road, Amherst, NY 14068. (716) 688-4033. (www.jccbuffalo.org) Buffalo JCC of Greater Buffalo, Holland Family Building, Buffalo. 787 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, NY 14209. (716) 886-3145. (www.jccbuffalo.org) Elmira (Twin Tiers) Jewish Center and Federation of the Twin Tiers. 1008 West Water Street, Elmira, NY 14905. (607) 734-8122. (www.jewishelmira.org) Newburgh (Orange County) Newburgh JCC. 290 North Street, Newburgh, NY 12550. (845) 561-6602. (www. newburghjcc.org) Rochester JCC of Greater Rochester. 1200 Edgewood Avenue, Rochester, NY 14618. (585) 461-2000. (www.jccrochester.org) Rockland County JCC Rockland. 450 West Nyack Road, West Nyack, NY 10994. (845) 362-4400. (www.jccrockland.org) Schenectady (Northeastern New York) Robert & Dorothy Ludwig JCC of Schenectady. 2565 Balltown Road, Schenectady, NY 12309. (518) 377-8803. (www.schenectadyjcc.org) Syracuse (Central New York) JCC of Syracuse. 5655 Thompson Road, DeWitt, NY 13214. (315) 445-2360. (www.jccsyr.org) Utica (Mohawk Valley) JCC of the Mohawk Valley. 2310 Oneida Street, Utica, NY 13501. (315) 733-2343. (www.jccutica.net) New York Metropolitan Area Bronx Bronx House. 990 Pelham Parkway South, Bronx, NY 10461. (718) 792-1800. (www.bronxhouse.org)

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Bronx Mosholu Montefiore Community Center. 3450 DeKalb Avenue, Bronx, NY 10467. (718) 882-4000. (www.mmcc.org) Bronx The Riverdale Y. 5625 Arlington Avenue, Bronx, NY 10471. (718) 548-8200. (www. riverdaley.org) Brooklyn Boro Park Y. 4912 14th Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11219. (718) 438-5921. (www. boroparky.org) Brooklyn Edith & Carl Marks JCH of Bensonhurst. 7802 Bay Pkwy, Brooklyn, NY 11214. (718) 331-6800. (www.jchb.org) Brooklyn Kings Bay Y. 3495 Nostrand Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11229. (718) 648-7703. (www. kingsbayy.org) Brooklyn Morris and Paulette Bailey Sephardic Community Center. 1901 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn, NY 11223. (718) 627-4300. (www.scclive.org) Brooklyn Shorefront YM-YWHA of Brighton-Manhattan Beach. 3300 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11235. (718) 646-1444. (www.shorefronty.org) Manhattan 14th Street Y. 344 East 14th Street, New  York, NY 10003. (212) 780-0800. (www.14streety.org) Manhattan 92nd Street Y. 1395 Lexington Avenue, New  York, NY 10128. (212) 415-5500. (www.92y.org) Manhattan Educational Alliance. 197 East Broadway, New York, NY 10002. (212) 780-2300. (www.edalliance.org) Manhattan JCC Harlem. 318 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10026. (212) 865-1215. (www. jccmanhattan.org/communities/jccharlem) Manhattan Marlene Meyerson JCC Manhattan. 334 Amsterdam Ave, New York, NY 10023. (646) 505-4444. (www.jccmanhattan.org) Manhattan Moise Safra Center. 30 East 82nd Street, New York, NY 10028. (212) 359-0700. (www.moisesafracenter.org)

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Manhattan YM & YWHA of Washington Heights & Inwood. 54 Nagle Avenue, New York, NY 10040. (212) 569-6200. (www.ywashhts.org) Nassau County Barry and Florence Friedberg JCC, Long Beach. 310 National Boulevard, Long Beach, NY 11561. (516) 431-2929. (www.friedbergjcc.org) Nassau County Barry and Florence Friedberg JCC, Merrick/Bellmore. 225 Fox Boulevard, Merrick, NY 11566. (516) 379-938. (www.friedbergjcc.org) Nassau County Barry and Florence Friedberg JCC, Oceanside. 15 Neil Court, Oceanside, NY 11572. (516) 766-4341. (www.friedbergjcc.org) Nassau County Marion & Aaron Gural JCC. 207 Grove Avenue, Cedarhurst, NY 11516. (516) 569-6733. (www.guraljcc.org) Nassau County Mid-Island Y JCC. 45 Manetto Hill Road, Plainview, NY 11803. (516) 822-3535. (www.miyjcc.org) Nassau County Sid Jacobson JCC. 300 Forest Drive, East Hills, NY 11548. (516) 484-1545. (www. sjjcc.org) Queens Commonpoint Queens Bay Terrace Center. 212-00 23rd Avenue, Bayside, NY 11360. (718) 423-6111. (www.commonpointqueens.org) Queens Commonpoint Queens Central Queens. 67-09 108th Street, Forest Hills, NY 11375. (718) 268-5011. (www.commonpointqueens.org) Queens Commonpoint Queens Sam Field Center. 58-20 Little Neck Parkway, Little Neck, NY 11362. (718) 225-6750. (www.commonpointqueens.org) Staten Island JCC of Staten Island, Aberlin/North JCC. 485 Victory Boulevard, Staten Island, NY 10301. (718) 475-5290. (www.sijcc.org) Staten Island JCC of Staten Island, Avis/South Shore JCC. 1297 Arthur Kill Road, Staten Island, NY 10312. (718) 475-5270. (www.sijcc.org) Staten Island JCC of Staten Island, Bernikow/Mid-Island JCC. 1466 Manor Road, Staten Island, NY 10314. (718) 475-5200. (www.sijcc.org)

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Suffolk County Suffolk Y JCC. 74 Hauppauge Road, Commack, NY 11725. (631) 462-9800. (www. suffolkyjcc.org) Westchester County Harold & Elaine Shames JCC on the Hudson. 371 South Broadway, Tarrytown, NY 10591. (914) 366-7898. (www.shamesjcc.org) Westchester County JCC of Mid-Westchester. 999 Wilmot Road, Scarsdale, NY 10583. (914) 472-3300. (www.jccmw.org) North Carolina Asheville (Western North Carolina) Asheville JCC. 236 Charlotte Street, Asheville, NC 28801. (828) 253-0701. (www. jcc-asheville.org) Charlotte Sandra and Leon Levine JCC. 5007 Providence Road, Charlotte, NC 28226. (704) 366-5007. (www.charlottejcc.org) Durham-Chapel Hill Charlotte and Dick Levin JCC. 1937 West Cornwallis Road, Durham, NC 27705. (919) 354-4936. (www.levinjcc.org) Raleigh-Cary Raleigh-Cary JCC. 12804 Norwood Road, Raleigh, NC 27613. (919) 676-6170. (www.shalomraleigh.org/jcc) Ohio Akron Jerry Shaw JCC of Akron. 750 White Pond Drive, Akron, OH 44320. (330) 867-7850. (www.shawjcc.org) Canton Canton JCC. 432 30th Street NW, Canton, OH 44709. (330) 452-6444. (www.jewishcanton.org) Cincinnati Manuel D. and Rhoda Mayerson JCC. 8485 Ridge Road, Cincinnati, OH 45236. (513) 761-7500. (www.mayersonjcc.org) Cleveland Mandel JCC of Cleveland. 26001 South Woodland Road, Beachwood, OH 44122. (216) 831-0700. (www.mandeljcc.org) Columbus JCC of Greater Columbus. 1125 College Avenue, Columbus, OH 43209. (614) 231-2731. (www.columbusjcc.org)

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Dayton JCC of Greater Dayton. 525 Versailles Drive, Centerville, OH 45459. (937) 610-1555. (www.jewishdayton.org) Toledo YMCA and JCC of Greater Toledo. 1500 North Superior Street, 2nd Floor, Toledo, OH 43604. (419) 729-8135. (www.ymcatoledo.org) Youngstown JCC of Youngstown. 505 Gypsy Lane, Youngstown, OH 44504. (330) 746-3251. (www.jccyoungstown.org) Oklahoma Tulsa Charles Schusterman JCC. 2021 East 71st Street, Tulsa, OK 74136. (918) 495-1111. (www.csjcc.org) Oregon Portland Mittleman JCC. 6651 Southwest Capitol Highway, Portland, OR 97219. (503) 244-0111. (www.oregonjcc.org) Pennsylvania Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton (Lehigh Valley) JCC of the Lehigh Valley. 702 North 22nd Street, Allentown, PA 18104. (610) 435-3571. (www.allentownjcc.org) Bucks County JCC Princeton Mercer Bucks and JCC Abrams Camps. 148 Cedarville Road, East Windsor, NJ 08520. (609) 606-7070. (www.jccabramscamps.org Harrisburg JCC of Greater Harrisburg. 3301 North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110. (717) 236-9555. (www.jewishharrisburg.org) Lancaster Jewish Community Alliance of Lancaster. (Operates without a JCC building.) PO Box 5148, Lancaster, PA 17606. (717) 569-7352. (www.jcalancaster.org) North Central Pennsylvania Jewish Center and Federation of the Twin Tiers. 1008 West Water Street, Elmira, NY 14905. (607) 734-8122. (www.jewishelmira.org) Philadelphia Charles & Elizabeth Gershman Y. 401 South Broad S